Thesis

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1. Introduction

As online communication gained more popularity, using instant messaging applications has become a standard in our quotidian lives. Therefore, the need for assurance that there is no third party spying on our conversations, either the government, the service provider or a person with malicious intent, grew even more, especially in states where free speech is threatened.

End-to-end encryption is used to protect the privacy of the messages sent between two or more participants, as they are in transit or at rest, with the intended recipients being the only ones that can decrypt and read the messages. Thus, the third parties interested in intercepting the information sent are unable to see the actual plaintext.

Messaging apps using end-to-end encryption have been around since 2012, with iPhone's native messaging app iMessage[1] and then Signal[4], previously known as TextSecure and RedPhone, developed in 2013. But this practice was popularized by WhatsApp in 2016[2], after they announced that the users' messages will have end-to-end encryption enabled by default for all of their chats from now on, and Facebook's testing of secret chats in the application, in the same year[3].

Both are using the Signal protocol in the background, which came with a few novelties in the field, such as the Double Ratchet Algorithm[5]. Various other apps became more popular in the past years after they received endorsement from different public figures or are used in a more restricted area.

Some of these are implementing their own encryption schemes and protocols, but they are mostly relying on Elliptic Curve cryptography, especially the Curve25519 variant of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and SHA 256 for hashing ++

A more in depth analysis of the protocols used by some popular applications will be discussed in Section 3, as well as their security issues or proposed improvements.

The main cryptographic concepts on which these are based will be briefly presented in Section 2, details added accordingly for each protocol extending them.

The application

The app created is a web messaging application which provides end-to-end encryption for both private and group chats. In order to illustrate the risks of using chat applications without end-to-end encryption, the user can switch

between the encrypted and non-encrypted versions.

The implementation and the used frameworks and libraries are discussed at large in Section 4 and Section 5.

2. Basic concepts

- definitions and small descriptions of various base concepts that will be used throughout the thesis, more will be added later

Symmetric key encryption

- HOAC 33

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric-key_algorithm

- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/padding-oracle-attack-2/

- aes

- Symmetric-key encryption is an encryption scheme which uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. In this case, the key must be a shared secret between the communicating parties, which might result in security issues if the key is intercepted, if it is sent through an insecure channel. An advantage of this type of ciphers is that they are more efficient in terms of software and hardware.

- image/ formula?

- One such cryptographic algorithm used by some end-to-end encryption protocols is AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) aes

Attacks - https://www.ics.uci.edu/~stasio/ics8-w12/Week9%20-%20part%202%20-%20Symmetric%20Key%20Encryption.pdf - ciphertext only attack - known plaintext attack - chosen plaintext - chosen ciphetext - brute force - try all keys and determine if the decrypted text is a likely plaintext

AES

- contemporary crypto/ 282

- NIST paper

- diagrams for the algo https://proprivacy.com/guides/aes-encryption

- It is a symmetric block cipher, based on a substitution-permutation network, which uses keys of length 128, 192 or 256 bits to process data in blocks of 128 bits, introduced by NIST in 2001.

- the operations are performed on a State array, which is a two-dimensional array of bytes, having the block length div by 32, Nb (Nb = 128 / 32 = 4) rows and columns and the cells contain 1 byte of the block

- in the beginning, the input bytes are copied into the State and after the encryption/ decryption, the output bytes are copied again in the State, row by row (figure at pg 285)

- the key length is computed in the same way, so it would have length Nk 4, 6, 8, depending on number of columns in the cipher key (from 128, 192, 256 bits)

- the state array can be interpreted as a state array of 32 bit words

- operations over a finite field

- addition - xor

- multiplication - multiplication of the polynomials mod irreducible polynomial $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$

- round keys are values derived from the cipher key and are applied to the state

- these values are fixed: Nr = 10, Nk = 4; Nr = 12, Nk = 6; Nr = 14, Nk = 8

- the round function is composed of:

- byte subst using a subst table (S-box)

- shift the rows of the state by different offsets

- mix data in each column

- add round key to state

- after an initial round key addition, the round function is implemented Nr - 1 times

- the inverse cipher (decryption) is following the previous steps but in reverse order

- algo + sbox/ 287 and so on with the rest of the operations

Modus operandi

- 296
- electronic code book mode (ebc)
- plaintext m is split into t n-bit blocks and a pdding is added if there are not enough bits and encrypted
- prb: same ciphertext blocks everytime, same key, same message; no protection
- cipherblock chaining mode (cbc)
- encr depends on the key, all prev message blocks and an initialization vector that is public => identical plaintext blocks are mapped to different ciphetext blocks
- prb: w/ the init vector, the ciphertext is 1 block longer; if an error occurs in one block, the error is propagated (ex transmission errors)
- cipher feedback mode (cfb)
- turns block cipher into stream cipher by generating a seq of pseudorandom bits from the block cipher that are added mod 2 to the plaintext to produce the ciphertext bits
- good when you don't need large data transfers
- prb: performance; error propagation; can't precompute key stream because you need the ciphertext block
- output feedback mode (ofb)
- similar to cfb
- no error propagation
- it is important to change the init vector regularly if you have the same

key

- counter mode (ctr)
- taken from serious crypto/ 111
- turns a block cipher into a stream cipher
- enc blocks composed of a counter and a nonce
  - counter - integer that is incremented for each block - unique for each block
  - nonce - number used only once, each message has a unique nonce
- enc: xor the plaintext and stream (obtained by "enc"? the nonce and the counter)

Attacks

- brute force + crytanalysis
- side channel attacks - gain info about the implementation of the algo

aes: NIST, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)

Public key encryption

- HOAC 43, 301

- Public-key encryption, or asymmetric encryption, is an encryption scheme which uses a public and a private key pair for each user. The public key is known and can be publicly distributed, so sending it through an insecure channel is not an issue anymore, but the private key must be kept secret by the user.

- To encrypt a message, the sender uses the public key of the receiver, which can be decrypted only using the recipient's private key.

- The security of this encryption scheme resides on the property of the key pair that while knowing the encryption key, it must be computationally infeasible to obtain the plaintext message from a random ciphertext, thus obtaining the decryption key. ?

- Public key encryption is less efficient than symmetric key encryption, so it can be used as a secure channel for key exchange or for encrypting smaller data sets.

- Examples of asymmmetric key algorithms, commonly used in popular end-to-end protocols, are the Diffie-Hellman key echange protocol and Elliptic curve based cryptography.

Attacks

Impersonation - There still remains room for an impersonation attack. This means that an adversary can place themselves in the communication between two parties, A and B, and send their public key such that A thinks it was B's public key. - In this way, the adversary can decrypt the message, read and/ or alter it before encrypting it with B's key and sending it forward. - This kind of attack can be mitigated using authentication, so guaranteeing that the recipient is the intended one.

Chosen plaintext - wiki - wiki, semantic security - The adversary chooses arbitrary plaintext and then is given the corresponding ciphertext and the intention is to reduce the security of the encryption scheme. - There are two forms, of this attack: - batch attack - when the adversary knows the plaintext before seeing the ciphertext - adatptive - when the attacker can request other ciphertexts after seeing some ciphertexts of corresponding plaintext - This vulnerability can be fixed by providing semantic security, meaning that the adversary should not be able to derive anything but negligible information about a plaintext message, given the ciphertext and the public key. This property is also called indistiguishability under chosen plaintext attack.

Chosen ciphertext - wiki - This type of attack consists of an adversay that has access to decryptions of chosen ciphertexts and the intention is to obtain the private key. - This type of attacks can be split in two categories: - indifferent or lunchtime attacks - the attacker receives the decryptions of any chosen ciphertext. These must be chosen before receiving the target ciphertext ??? - adaptive attacks - the attacker has access to the victim's **decryption machine**, and may request decryptions of related ciphertext,

but not the target ciphertext, based on the previously received plaintext -
To avoid such attacks, the cryptosystem should not provide any decryption
oracles, for example.

Authentication

- intro - hoac 42

- identification and entity auth - hoac 401

- Authentication is the process of proving the identity of an entity, called
  claimant, to a verifier, and preventing impersonations. It might be done
  using certain credentials (a password) or with a digital certificate (in
  case of websites).

- Data origin authentication or message authentication techniques assures
  one party of the identity of the sender.

- Usually, the message has additional information attached so the receiver
  can determine it. The following objectives are included for the three
  different parties A, B, C

1. A successfully authenticates to B, then B will complete the protocol by
   accepting A's identity.
2. After an identity exchange of B with A, B cannot impersonate A to the
   third party C.
3. The probability of C to impersonate A is negligible.
4. The previous points remain true even if there where a polynomially large
   number of authentications between A and B or that C have participated
   in previous protocol executions with A or B.

- A difference between entity authentication and message authentication
  is that the latter does not provide timeliness guarantees regarding
  when the message was created, while entity authentication does the
  verification in real-time, during the execution of the verification protocol.
  ?

- Also, the message authentication provides a meaningful message,
  whereas the other type only assures that the claimant is right?

Message authentication codes

- some other info from Serious crypto pg 179

- contemporary crypto/ 318

- MLS

- hash function - function that transforms data of an arbitrary size to a fixed size hash value, and it can be used for data verification, signatures etc.

- it should not produce collisions, that is having the same hash for two different sets of data

- keyed hashing functions (hashing func with secret keys) => message auth codes (MAC) and pseudorandom func (PRF)

- macs protect the identity and auth by creating a value (authentication tag) from the message and the key

- authentication tags, computed and verified with a secret key. They depend on the authenticated message and the secret key, which is known to the communicating parties

- if you know the macs key, you can confirm that a message was not modified in transit => integrity and auth

- often combined with a cipher => preserving message's confidentiality, integrity, auth

- ex: ssh, tls, ip security generate a mac for each packet sent

- forgery - create a tag when you don't know the key

- attack vectors:

- known-message attack - tags and data collected by an eavesdropper

- chosen message attack - the attacker chooses the messages to be auth and if the attacker is able to adaptively choose other messages and their corresponding MACs, it is an adaptive chosen-message attack

- replay attacks - capture a message and resent it to the receiver, pretending to be the sender - mitigation by numbering the messages?

- There are two types of technologies used for messsage authentication:

- digital signatures + public key crypto => the private key being the one generating the digital signature and the public one is the used for verification

- message authentication codes (MACs) + secret key crypto?

- A further comparison can be made with digital signatures:

- digital signatures may be used to provide nonrepudiation

- MACs can be verified only by those who know or obtain the secret key, whereas the digital signatures can be verified by anyone

- It can be concluded that if the adversary can determine the secret key, the system is totally broken. If the MAC of a meaningful message was determined, then the MAC is selectively forged, and if the message is not meaningful, the MAC is existentially forged. ? rephrase

- A way to lower the possibility of guessing a MAC (which is always possible?) is to increase the tag length and a message authentication system is secure if the attacker can only guess the MAC in order to forge it.

- Another issue is whether the attacker can verify the guessed MAC and this gives us two new categories: verifiable and non-verifiable MACs.

- Non-verifiable MACs are more secure, since it's not possible to find the correct one using brute-force.

PRFs

- pseudorandom functions sc/ 181

- contemporary crypto/ 327

- "should be indistiguishable from a random function"

- takes in a message and e key and the output should seem random =>
  unpredictable values

- called xor macs

- not meant to be used on their own

- key derivation schemes use this to generate crypto keys from a master
  key or password

- ident keys use this to generate a response from a random challenge? -
  ex a server sends a random challenge message and the recv should prove
  with this that it knows the key

- tls - prf to generate key material from a master secret and session
  specific random values

- stronger than macs and any secure prf is also a secure mac

- f:X -> Y pseudorandom if it is randomly chosen from the set of all
  mappings from X to Y

- message authentication using families of finite prfs proposed in 1995

- I don't think I really need these things

HMAC

- sc pg 184

- hash based mac

- build a mac from a hash function

- produces a secure prf if the underlying hash is collision resistant or if
  the hash's compression function is a prf

- SOME OTHER INFO ABOUT ATTACKS AND HOW TO BREAK
  CBC-MACS AND HOW TO FIX THEM/ 186

- contemporary crypto/ 323

- authenticity and integrity

- more efficient when you want to auth the messages

- three types? or at least that many are proposed in the book

Auth encryption

- sc 200

- wiki

- AE or AEAD (auth enc with assoc data) - assure confidentiality and auth

- produce the tag and encrypt the data => combination of cipher and mac

- about AES GCM also

- combinations:

- encrypt and mac - ciphertext and tag are generated from the plaintext

- mac then encrypt

- encrypt then mac

- auth ciphers - alternative to the cipher and mac combinations => like normal ciphers but return an auth tag with the ciphertext

- contemporary crypto/ 451 - entity encryption

Auth enc with assoc data

- sc 204
- data processed by an auth cipher, but not encrypted => data is auth but in plaintext

- ex: if you want to send a header and a payload, you enc the payload, but keep the header (assoc data) unencrypted so it can be processed, but you still want to auth it
- takes in the key, plaintext and the assoc data and returns the ciphertext, unenc assoc data, the auth tag
- if assoc data is empty => normal auth cipher
- if plaintext is empty => mac
- you should avoid predictability of enc schemes using a nonce
- more on security and AES GCM from 206

Digital signatures

- intro - hoac 40
- digital signatures (ch 11) - hoac 441
- contemporary crypto/ 396

Digital signatures are equivalent to handwritten signatures and are a means of verifying the authenticity of messages or documents, by providing the entity a way to bind its identity to a piece of information, making it dependent on a secret known by the sender and the content of the message. A valid digital signature is supposed to assure the recipient that the sender is authenticated and that the data was not altered in transit, becoming a way to detect forgery or tampering. They must be verifiable and they can also provide non-repudiation, which means that the signer cannot successfully claim that they did not sign the message.

- So, the digital signature must be correct (the valid signatures must be accepted) and secure (it is computationally infeasible to forge a signature without knowing the key).

Attacks

- cc/397
- Regarding the security bit, there are two major attack vectors that are taken into account:

- key-only attack - when the attacker knows the signatory's verification key but has no information about the signed messages
- message attack - the attacker knows both the signatory's verification key and some information about the messages or is able to obtain it; this category can be further split into:
  - knwon message - a certain number of messages and their corresponding signatures are known, but not chosen
  - generic chosen message - the signatory's key knowledge is independent of the attacker's choice of messages (along with their corresponding digital signatures)
  - directed chosen message - similar to the previous attack vector but this one is directed against a signatory's key
  - adaptive chosen message - the attacker can obtain the digital signatures of a chosen list of messages and it depends on the signing key; the list of messages can be adaptively chosen during the attack (the attacker has access to the signature generation oracle => for every message, the attacker returns a valid signature)
- maybe about the security breaks?
- total break - determine the key
- universal forgery - find similar signature algo
- selective forgery - forge digital signature for a particular message, chosen before
- existential forgery - forge digital signature for at least one random and not necessarily meaningful message

The general algorithm The digital signature scheme is similar to public key encryption, and consists of the following algorithms: Key generation: A public and a private key are generated. The private one is kept secret, while the other one is publicly available. Signing procedure: The signature is produced using the private key of the signer and the message. Signature verification procedure: From the public key of the sender, the message and the signature, the authenticity of the message can be either accepted or rejected. Also, the following properties must be satisfied by the signing and verification transformations: 1. A signature of a party on a message is valid if and only if the verification function returns true. 2. It is computationally infeasible for any entity other than A to find a signature for any message from A such that

the verification function returns true.

End to end encryption

- End-to-end encryption is a communication system in which the messages can be read only by those participating in the conversation and allowing them to securely communicate through an unsecured channel.
- The data is encrypted by the sender, at the endpoint, using the public key of the receiver and the only way to decrypt it is by using the recipient's private key.
- This ensures that the data cannot be read or modified by the service provider or any third party involved because they don't have access to the private keys.
- The need for this method arises from the fact that many email and messaging applications use third parties to store the data and it is protected only "in transit" (ex: TLS), but when it reaches the server, it can be decrypted and read and/ or tampered with before redirecting it to the recipient
- Thus, the privacy of data and the user is put at risk, since the contents can be used and interpreted by anyone with access to the server

Limitations

- details are usually present in the general sources

Metadata about the users

- an important drawback of end-to-end encryption is the fact that matadata is available to the server and it can be read and collected to be used for advertising etc.
- so the server knows to whom did you talk to, at what hour, for how long, from where etc.

- an example would be the update of terms and services of WhatsApp, now owned by Facebook, at the end of 2020, which resulted in a massive shift of the users to Signal or Telegram (some blog post here)
- information that is collected includes, besides hardware and model information, browser information, mobile network, connection info, location information (for location related features)
- proposed ways of handling this and collecting as little metadata as possible about the users are going to be later addressed in the next sections

Man-in-the-middle attacks

This type of attacks require that the attacker injects themselves between the two endpoints and impersonates one or more of the participating parties. The sender will unknowingly use the public key of the attacker and they are able to decrypt and read or tamper with the messages before sending them forward. This can be avoided if the participants' identities are verified and some applications provide authentication via QR code scanning or using safety numbers.

Endpoint security

The messages are only protected from possible eavesdroppers on the communication channel or while the data is at rest, but the endpoints are still vulnerable. After decryption, the messages in plaintext are available to anyone who has access to the endpoint device, so they can be accessed using other methods (ex. device theft, social engineering, hacking the device).

Backdoors and general backlash

- The application providers might include, intentionally or not, ways to access the data by bypassing the encryption, called backdoors. - surveillance etc.

Classical Diffie Hellamn

- serious crypto/ 268
- Diffie Hellamn (1976) is a protocol that allows the participants to share a secret between them, with the exchanged information being public
- the secret could be turned into a secure channel for transmitting symmetric keys, for ex

The algorithm

- the mathematical function involves a big prime number p and a base number/ generator g (public part) and a number a from the Zp* set, chosen by each participant (private part)
- for example, for two participants, we have the numbers a and b
- then each of the participants computes A = gˆa mod p, B = gˆb mod p and makes these computations publicly available
- the other participant takes this result and raises it to their private number and this will be the shared secret, so: (gˆa mod p)ˆb = (gˆb mod p)ˆa = gˆab mod p

Security

- the security of the Diffie Hellman protocol resides on the discrete logarithmic problem, which means that you need to recover a from gˆa mod p; this is possible, but takes a long time if the values are chosen correctly

- this algorithm is designed for secure key agreement protocols => a shared secret between two or more parties, which is turned into session key(s)

- the session keys are symmetric keys used to encrypt and authenticate data during the duration of the session

- attack models, as named and defined in the book at / 275

- the eavesdropper - attacker observers the message exchange and can record, modify, drop, inject messages; to protect against, the protocol should not leak info

- the data leak - the attacker has access to some of the session keys and temp secrets (from one or more exec of the protocol), but not the long term secrets

- the breach - the attacker knows the long term key of one or more parties

- some security goals

- authentication - auth key agreement - both parties auth

- key control -

- *forward secrecy* - if the session is compromised, the keys used in the past cannot be compromised

- resistance to key-compromise impersonation - happens when the long-term key is compromised

- *backward secrecy* - if a session is compromised, the following communication is not compromised if at least one uncompromised message is sent between the parties

Elliptic curve cryptography

- serious crypto/ pg 288 and the presentation saved somewhere
- the intro might be useful https://scholar.rose-hulman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&
- this definetly needs images
- they are curves which are also groups, so they keep the group axioms
- they can also be defined over finite fields and the law is constructed geometrically, the points on the curve with equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ (Weierstrass curve) - but can have different forms
- they are horizontally symmetric
- the operations are addition and multiplication ++
- general idea of addition (geometrically): ++ pictures
  - fix the two points on the curve and draw a line through them until it intersects the curve again
  - the sum of the two points is the reflection of the second/ third point

- if the points are the same, draw the tangent through that point until it intersects the curve again and the result is still the reflected point
- multiplication: add a point to itself multiple times - this can be optimized using the double and add method

The algorithm - to exchange a shared secret over an insecure channel using this protocol, the algorithm is similar to the one of the classical Diffie Hellman protocol - the public variables are the base point P and the elliptic curve over a finite field $E(P\_q)$ - the participants need to choose a random integer k_a and k_b, which are their private keys and compute $A = k\_a * P$ and $B = k\_b * P$ respectively - they then exchange the results, A and B, and the shared secret is $k\_a * k\_b * P = k\_a (k\_b * P) = k\_b (k\_a * P)$

Security

- details here + DH + ECC

- security relies on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem

- this is defined in a similar way, but instead of obtaining a power a from $g\hat{\ }a$, one needs to find a k, if exists, such that $kP = Q$, where P, Q are points on the elliptic curve over a finite field F_q, $q = p\hat{\ }n$, p prime

- usually methods for solving this problem are slow, but there are certain types of curves that are vulnerable

- types:

- baby step, giant step method - general

- MOV method - for elliptic curves over finite fields described as $F\hat{\ }x\_q\hat{\ }m$, when m is small

- index calculus method

- combined with DH => DH key agreement over elliptic curves

- digital signatures (ECDSA)

- encryption

- NIST curves: standardized curves and one that is throughoughly used is Curve25519 and has the equation yˆ2 = xˆ3 + 486662xˆ2 + x, which works with numbers mod 2ˆ{255} - 19 (256 bit prime number)

3. Existing Technologies

- about the technologies used in some of the popular end-to-end encrypted apps and a brief description of how they work

Signal protocol

- x3dh

- double ratchet

- ecdsa

- Signal protocol - wiki

- Signal docs

- The X3DH Key Agreement Protocol

- A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protoco

- Hecar Lexicon: What Is the Signal Encryption Protocol?

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montgomery_curve

- A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol - notes on how the protocol works

- apps: Signal, Whatsapp, Facebook Messenger, Wire

- combines

- double ratchet algo

- prekey bundle

- x3dh handshake

- uses

- Curve25519

- AES-256

- HMAC-SHA256

- 20. Cohn-Gordon2020_Article_AFormalSecurityAnalysisOfTheSi - for security analysis too

- 20. Signal Protocol - Makalah-Kripto-2020-06.pdf*

- ratcheting, forward secrecy

- X3DH

- **EXTRA** - OTR was the first security protocol for instant messaging and after each message round trip?, the users established a new ephemeral Diffie-Hellman shared secret => ratcheting because you couldn't decrypt past messages

- **EXTRA** - widespread adoption of secure instant messaging protocols started with iMessage

- 3 stages:
  - initial key exchange with X3DH - long term, mid term and ephemeral DH keys to produce a shared secret root value
  - async ratchet - users alternate in sending the new ephemeral keys with prev generated root keys to generate forward secret chaining keys
  - sym ratchet - use key derivation functions to ratchet forward chaining keys to create sym enc keys

- => each message is encrypted with a new message key

- the ping pong pattern of new epehemaral keys inject auto entropy

- TextSecure - used Double ratche, called Axolotl ratchet at that time => RedPhone => Signal

- over 10 diff types of keys and a chain of updated keys

- async transmission protocol which requires pre-send batches of ephemeral public keys

- when a sender wants to send the messages, they get the keys and performs an AKE like protocol using the long term and ephemeral keys tp compute the message encryption key

- the message keys depend on previous computations of the keys

- registration - users register their identity w/ a key distribution server and upload the long, mid term and eph keys

- session setup - get the public keys of the recv and establish initial enc keys (x3dh)

- sync messaging (asym ratchet updates) - sender exchanges their public keys with the recv and generate a shared secret => start chains of message keys, fresh ephemeral keys

- async messaging (sym ratchet) - a new sym message key is derived from the previous state, if no new message was sent by the recv, keys derived from the previous ephemeral dh public key of the sender

- the following are present there *

- uses X25519 or X448 ECDH

- key derivation functions: HMAC SHA256, HKDF SHA256

- AEAD - encrypt then MAC scheme: AES256 in CBC, PKCS#5 padding, MAC is HMAC sha 256

- xeddsa signature scheme - x25519 or x448

- the rest is highlighted in the other version of the paper

Extended Triple Diffie Hellamn

- x3dh

- Extended Triple Diffie Hellamn is the key exchange protocol used by Signal and provides forward secrecy and cryptographic deniability

- It was designed for asynchronous communication, so the users need to provide some information to the server such that the others can establish the secret key without both being online; also, the public keys are used to authenticate the users

- To prepare the setting, the communication will have 3 parties: the users, A (sender) and B (receiver), and the server

- the algorithm used by the application needs the following parameters: a curve (X25519 or X448), a hash function (SHA 256 or 512) and information that identifies the application; it also needs an encoding function to encode the public key into a byte sequence

- the keys are based on the elliptic curve previously chosen as parameter and they are as follows:

- long-term identity key - each party has one and they are public

- ephemeral key pair - generated at each run with the public key

- signed prekeys and a set of one-time prekeys - these are sent to the server so that the other party can establish the key exchange

- the shared secret is a 32 byte secret key

- the protocol has 3 phases:

Key publishing - B publishes his id key and prekeys to the server as follows: - the id key is uploaded once - the signed prekey and prekey signature are replaced after a time interval - a set of one-time prekeys, which are changed after each run - the private keys of the previous signed prekeys should be deleted as fast as possible after they have decrypted the message, so forward secrecy can be kept

Initial message - A gets the prekey bundle from the server, used to send the first message to B - the prekey bundle should contain the keys stated previously but the one-time prekeys are optional; if the server sends one, it should be then deleted - after the prekey signature verification is successful, A

generates an ephemeral key pair and uses it, along with the signed prekey and identity key of B, to generate 3 key pairs that will compose the secret key; if the prekey bundle contains a one-time prekey, another key pair is generated using it and the ephemeral key - after the shared secret is computed, the ephemeral private key is deleted - from the identity keys of the parties, an associated data sequence is generated, which may be have other additional information appended, such as identifying information, certificates, usernames etc. - the initial message contains: - the identity and ephemeral keys of A - information about B's used keys - a ciphertext encrypted with an AEAD scheme which uses the associated data sequence and the encryption key is either the shared secret or a the output of a pseudo random function (PRF) keyed by the shared secret

Receiving the initial message - to receive the initial message, B needs to obtain A's identity and ephemeral keys from the message - B then follows the same steps to compute the secret key and creates the AD sequence using the identity keys so he can decrypt the message using it and the shared secret - to keep th e forward secrecy, he deletes the one-time prekeys used for this message

- in both cases, the parties may continue to use the same secret key or derivations of it after the exchange

Security considerations - authentication - the parties can compare their id public keys using an authenticated channel (ex QR code scanning, compare pk fingerprints) - if they don't do this, there is no guarantee that the parties are who they claim to be

- replay and key reuse
- if no one-time prekey is provided, the message can be replayed and accepted by the receiver
- this could raise problems because the same secret key can be derived in different runs
    - to avoid
        * after the key exchange, a new encryption key for the sender can be negociated from a fresh input from the receiver
        * blacklist observed messages

* replace old signed prekeys earlier
- deniability
- provides no proof that that of the contents or that the communication took place
  - if one of the participants is collaborating with a third party, then proof of their communication can be provided
- signatures
  - if there is no signature verification - the server could provide forged prekeys => key compromise
- key compromise
  - compromise of private keys => could lead to impersonation or affect the security of secret key values
  - mitigation (a kind of) - use of ephemeral keys and prekeys
  - some compromise scenarios (pg 9)
- server trust
  - malicious server could cause communication failure, can refuse to deliver messages
  - if the parties are auth, the server might refuse to send the one time prekeys and then the forward secrecy of the secret key depends on the signed prekey's lifetime
  - if one party attempts to drain the one-time prekeys of the other party, the server should prevent this (ex: rate limits on fetching the prekey bundles) - affects the forward secrecy
- identity binding
  - auth doesn't prevent identity misbinding/ unknown key share attacks
  - an attacker could impersonate a party by presenting their prekey bundle as someone else's
  - mitigation: add more identifying info in the associated data, hash more identifying info etc.

Double Ratchet

- double ratchet
- after the key exchange, the parties are using the Double ratchet algo-

rithm to exchange messages

- new keys are derived, combined with results from previous DH computations so that the keys cannot be recalculated later
- this algorithm uses a cryptographic function, denoted KDF, which provides a seemingly random output from a random secret key and the input data
- this is further expanded into KDF chains, which use as input and output key parts of the output of another KDF
- this type of function then has the following properties, as stated in the paper:
- resilience - the output keys appear random if the keys are not known
- forward security - past keys appear random if the current ones are known
- break-in recovery - future keys appear random if the current ones are known
- each party has 3 chains for each session: root, sending, receiving
- a new concept, called DH ratchet, is described as follows: the newly exchanged DH secrets, during message exchange, become the input to the root chain and the outputs of the KDF are the keys for the sending and receiving chains

Symmetric key ratchet - the chains advance with each message sent and received and their unique output keys are used for the encryption and decryption; this is called a symmetric key ratchet and the unique keys are message keys - they don't provide break-in recovery because the input ot the KDF is constant and they can be stored unordered or lost messages can be easily handled

Double Ratchet - to prevent previous and future messages compromise, the protocol combines the symmetric key ratchet and the DH ratchet, resulting in the double ratchet algorithm - a new DH key pair is generated, being the current ratchet key pair; when a new ratchet key pair is received from another party (from the message header), the current one is replaced - when a new message is sent or received, the symmetric key ratchet step is applied on the corresponding chain (sending or receiving) - in this way, if one of the private keys is compromised, it will soon be replaced with another one, providing

both forward and backward secrecy

- in case the messages are sent out of order or some are lost, the messages header contains the number in the sending chian and the length in the previous sending chain /x, so the receiver will store the message keys for those messsages

- pg 20

EdDSA signature

- xeddsa

- create and verify EdDSA signatures using the key pair defined for X25519 or X448

- this scheme is defined as xeddsa with the extension vxeddsa, which provides a verifiable random function(VRF)

- signatures are defined on twisted Edwards curves and use the SHA 512 hash function

- the input parameters for the signature algorithm are the (Montgomery) private key mod integer q, the message and 64 bytes of secure random data and for the verification algorithm: the (Montgomery) public key, the message and the signature

- the signatures are randommized

- signing time is constant

- it is considered safe to use the same key pair to produce the signatures

Sealed sender

- sealed sender

- available for the Signal app

- the users have a certificate that attests their identity; they are periodically changed and contain the phone numner, public identity key and the expiration date; it can be included in the messages too

- the users derive delivery token from the profile key, which is 96 bits long, and register it to the services; in order to send the sealed sender message, the user needs to prove that they know the delivery token for that user

- the profile keys are also encrypted and the profiles are shared between the contacts

- but the Signal app allows the users to receive sealed sender messages from outside their contacts list, but they won't be able to authenticate the senders first

- the messages are encrypted in a normal fashion, but then the sender certificate and the ciphertext are also encrypted

Security analyses

- 16 analysis

- double ratchet started with TextSecure, which was the app developed before Signal and it combined the ideas from OTR's asymmetric ratchet with a symmetric ratchet; this one didn't include parts from the DH exchange, it only derived a new symmetric key; this was reffered to as Axolotl ratchet

- unknown key share attack (UKS) - hones user tries to communicate with another honest user

MTProto

General description

- the protocol was created in 2013 for the Telegram messaging app, which was founded by Nikolai and Pavel Durov

- this part is mostly from the docs, this section from here

- from version 4.6 (dec 2017), the protocol was upgraded from MTProto 1.0 to MTProto 2.0 but the first version is still supported for backward compatibility

- the MTProto 2.0 uses

  - SHA 256 instead of SHA 1
  - padding
  - the message key depends on the message and a portion of the secret chat key
  - 12 - 1024 padding bytes used instead of 1 - 15

- the default provided are the unencrypted chats, or cloud chats, where the messages are encrypted only in transit

- the end-to-end encrypted chats are called "secret chats", option which should be explicitly stated by the user, and the group messages are not encrypted at all

- has 3 components:

- high lvl component (API query language)

- cyrptographic layer

- transport component

- High lvl component/ API query language

- the session in which the client and the server communicate, which is attached to the application on the client device and a user ID, for authorization purposes

- Authorization and encryption

- before the message is sent, it is encrypted and an external header is added on top of it, with a 64 bit key identifier and a 128 bit key => user key and the message key return a 256 bit key and initialization vector which will be used to encrypt the message with AES 256 in infinite garble extension (IGE) mod /x

- the initial part of the message contains data about the session, message ID, sequence number, server salt

- the message key is the 128 middle bits of SHA 256 of the message body prepended by 32 bytes from the authorization key

- the authorization key is 2048 bit key and is generated at first app run and is not changed (almost never) => no backward secrecy if the device is compromised

- the creation takes place by exchanging Diffie Hellman keys with the server /x??

- how they overcome this:

- session keys with Diffie Hellman key exchange

- protect the key on the device with a password

- encrypt cached data

- if the time is not sync for both the client and the server, the server sends a message with the correct time and a 128 bit salt and some identifiers, which will be checked by the client; if a time correction was not performed, a new session will be generated

- Transport

- the payload/ message is wrapped in a secondary header, defined by the appropriate MTProto transport protocol /x

- a list with them here /4-5

- some terminology and key details, from here

- the message is encrypted and an external header is added on top of it; it contains a 64bit auth key id and a 128 bit message key, defined as the 128 middle bits from the SHA 256 of the message body prepended by 32 bytes taken from the authorization key /x

- the authorization key with the message form a 256 bit key and initialization vector that will be used to encrypt the message using AES 256 in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode /x

- the initial part of the message contains information about the session, message ID, message length, sequence numbers and server salt

- the authorization key is 2048 bit long and is created on user registration; it is exchanged between the client and the server using the Diffie Hellman protocol; these rarely change

- the server key is also 2048 bit long and is a RSA key used to digitally sign the messages on registration and when the authorization key is created

- the key identifier is used to show which key was used to encrypt a message; it is made up of the first lower-order of the 64 bits of the SHA1 hash of the authorization key; they are unique and if a collision happens, the authorization key is regenerated; this version of the hash algorithm is still used because the authorization key should be identified independently of the protocol /x

- the session is identified by using a randomly generated (by the user) 64 bit number

- server salt is required to protect against replay attacks and time desync with the server /x; it is a random 64 number that is changed periodically; the change is requested by the server and all new messages should contain the new salt

- message identifiers are also 64 bit numbers that uniquely identify the message in a session and must be approx equal to unixtime*2^32 so that the time it was created can be determined

- the message key is the middle 128 bits of the sha 256 hash of the

plaintext message and the message details, prepended by the 32 byte fragment from the authorization key; compared to MTProto 1.0, the last 128 buts of SHA 1 hash were taken into account and no padding and authorization key fragments were involved

- internal cryptographic header - server salt and the session => 16 bytes header added before the message is encrypted

- external cryptogarphic header - 24 bytes header added before the message encryption and it has the authentication key identifier and the message key

- the AES 256 key and the 256 bit initialization vector are computed from the authorization key and the message key

Secret chats - section from the docs

- the key generation and exchange are done using the Diffie Hellman protocol

- the initiator of the request needs to obtain the prime p and generator from the server and check if p is 2048 bit number and is it a safe prime

- private keys used are also 2048 bit long

- the shared secret key's fingerprint, which is used for detecting bugs, is equal to the last 64 bits of the SHA 1 hash of the key

- forward secrecy is kept by re-initiating the keys after it was used to encrypt or decrypt 100 messages or after a week, the old keys being discarded

- files are encrypted using one-time keys that are not related to the shared key

- the AES key and the initialization vector are two random 256 numbers

- it is assumed that the address of the file is attached to the outside of the encrypted message using a file parameter and the key is send in th ebody of the parameter /x

Security analyses

- symbolic verification
- code for the client and the protocol itself is open source, but not the servers
- there are not enough security analyses on this protocol and was criticised for the choice of cryptographic primitives and the encryption mode

Previous issues found - these issues were found for version 1.0 - the padding was added after the encryption, so this could lead to chosen ciphertext attcks - no forward secrecy was provided - the message sequence numbers were managed by the server, so there was place for reply attacks - the server could perform a MITM attack on two parties because the Diffie Hellman exchange protocol was used before the participants were authenticated; the first 128 bits of the hash, using SHA 1, were used for the fingerprint and the server could perform a birthday attack to find the keys corresponding to this fingerprint; this was changed in 2.0 and the fingerprint is 288 bits long, containing parts from the SHA 256 key /x

- the current version is considered to guarantee integrity of ciphertext, indistiguishability of chosen ciphertext and forward secrecy, as no attacks of these types are known

Study findings - the study conducted finds that there are no logical flaws in the protocol, and possible vulnerabilities can arise from the cryptographic primiteves used, implementation flaws (not enough checks), side-channel exfiltration (time and traffic analysis) /x or incorrect user behaviour /x - also, the messages are kept secret after the re-keying process is completed, even if the authorization keys are compromised for both participants before the process - forward secrecy is also kept but if the attacker recovers the session key, the last 100 messages or the messages in the past week are compromised - if the parties have correctly validated the initial session keys, then the messages they exchange are authentic; otherwise, MITM attacks are possible, so the participants need to be aware of the correct way in which they perform the procedure - the server can send out weakened Diffie Hellman parameters such that the discrete logarithms become easier to compute, so the end user need to verify these parameters

- security analysis on mtproto 1.0

- SOME OF THESE THINGS ARE DEPRECATED

- the whole study shows that you could use the metadata to "guess" when the communication between two parties takes place

- is considered to provide the best user experience because of its speed and functionality

- the reason they gave for the fact that end-to-end encryption is not enabled by default is that the secret chats are bound to the device and that it is not possible to continue a conversation on devices where this feature is not enabled

- the official clients are open source but have binaries without public codes

- Telegram also provided a CLI lol

- cloud storage, so the server has access to all unencrypted messages and metadata

- the paper classifies the issues as follows:

- non-technical concerns

  - end-to-end encryption is not by default
  - the protocol is "home grown"
  - access to the contact list needs to be provided beforehand and the information is stored on the server

- technical

  - MITM attacks (2015), by generating Diffie Hellman secrets that provide the same authorization fingerprints with the same 128 bits as the ones of the users, so they can't detect the attack
  - used a modified version of the Diffie Hellman protocol until 2014, where the key was XORed with a nonce, so the attacker could use different nonces and the users would have the same key which would be also known to the server /x

- – SHA 1 instead of SHA 256, which is not collision resistant
- – third parties could observe metadata aboud the users - an example of this is the avialability leak, meaning that the observer (someone who has their phone number) could see when the communication between two users might take place

- cca

- study on the fact that MTProto is not IND CCA secure and doesn't satisfy the authenticated encryption definitions, but this was fixed in version 2.0

- the attack is only theoretical

- the protocol uses a block cipher structure, so it has padding, but it is not checked for integrity, so one can create two different ciphertexts that decrypt to the same plaintext

- the two attacks presented are

- padding length extension, which means adding a random block at the end of the ciphertext; the padding is not checked by the authentication function; to mitigate this type of attacks, you need to check the length of the padding during dercyption

- last block substitution, or, in other words, replacing the last block with a random block; mitigation by adding the padding when computing the authentication tag, but this breaks backward compatibility

- authentication problem

- this is referenced https://www.cryptofails.com/post/70546720222/telegrams-cryptanalysis-contest

- the possibility of a MITM attack is presented here aswell, with the fingerprints, but the atacker needs to make the victims install a malicious client or modify the installed one

- also the use of IGE was criticised

Signcryption

- Official

- E2ee official

- Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage

- more on signcryption (definitions) - 2002?

- this protocol is used by iMessage

Apple iMessage - official docs (this section) say that iMessage and FaceTime use end to end encryption, attachements are also encrypted (are uploaded and deleted after 30 days if the message was not sent) - you can choose automatic deletion of the messages - info stored: - use of services - messages that can't be delivered - held for 30 days - metadata about FaceTime calls, 30 days - contacts, 30 days - encryption is enabled by default

Apple security and encryption - Encryption and data protection, official (this section) - Security overview - APN - Apple Push Notification service - IDS - Apple Identity service - encryption - RSA 1280 bit key, EC 256 bit key on NIST P 256 curve - signatures - ECSDA - private keys are saved in the device's keychain (API for passwords, keys and other sensitive credentials) - public keys are sent to IDS

- How iMessage sends and receives messages securely

- methodology - Data Protection

- sender retrieves the public keys and APNs addresses for all associated devices of the receiver

- the message is individually encrypted for each device

- the sender generates a random 88 bit value that is used as a HMAC SHA 256 key to create a 40 bit value, from the sender and receiver's pubic keys and the plaintext; this value will be used to verify the integrity of the message, after decryption

- $88 + 40 = 128$ bit key, which encrypts the message using AES in CTR

mode

- AES key is encrypted using RSA-OAEP public keys of the recv device, but iOS 13 or later might use ECIES encryption

- the messages then contain the encrypted message, encrypted message key and the sender's digital signature; metadata (timestamp, APN routing info) is not encrypted

- the combination of the encrypted message and the encrypted key are hashed using SHA 1abd sugned with ECDSA

- if message too long or has an attachement, it is encrypted using AES in CTR mode with a randomly generated 256 bit key and uploaded to the cloud; the receiver gets the AES key, the URI and a SHA 1 hash of the encrypted form?, encrypted

- this process repeated for each participant in case of group communications

Signcryption

- Wiki

- introduced in 1997, along with an elliptic curve signcryption (saves 58% computational and 40% communication costs, compared to the classical signature-then-encryption schemes)

- public key

- functions of both digital signature and encryption, so you don't digitally sign the message and then encrypt it and in this way you decrease the cost and optimize the procedure

- key generation, signcryption, unsigncryption

- properties:

- correctness

- efficiency

- security, and some signcryption schemes provide public verifiability and foward secrecy, so:

  - confidentiality
  - unforgeability
  - non-repudiation
  - integrity
  - public verifiability
  - forward secrecy and message confidentiality

- zheng

- this primitive was first introduced to reduce the cost of the signature and encryption operations, by combining them

- the total cost can be considered the sum of costs of each operation and using this combined approach would reduce it with, as specified in the paper, 50% in computational cost and 85% in communication overhead, keeping the security definitions offered by the two operations, namely sending an authenticated and secure message

- the primitive would contain a pair of signryption and unsigncryption aglorithms that are satisfying the conditions:

- unique unsigncryptability - the ciphertext run through the unsigncryption algorithm would return the message unambiguously /x

- security - the algorithms fullfil the properties of a secure encryption scheme and secure digital signature: confidentiality, unforgeability, non-repudiation, integrity

- efficiency - smaller cost on applying the scheme

- this paper explores a version based on shortened ElGamal signatures and encryption

- security of signcryption

- two definitions, depending on the adversary: outsider or insider

- signcryption is defined for the public key setting, being the equivalent

of authenticated encryption is in the symmetric encryption

- the paper explores the applicability of this scheme in a setting with two users, but this can be generalized to multiple users

- the scheme needs to fulfill the folowing conditions?:

- each user should publish their public key

- the signcryption needs to contain the identities of the sender and the receiver

- each user should be protected from the other users /x

- the scheme has three algorithms:

- generation, which returns the pair of keys: the private sign and decrypt key and the public verification key

- (randomized) signcryption, which takes as parameters the sender's secret key, the receiver's public key and the message /x

- (deterministic) designcryption or unsigncryption, takes as parameters the ciphertext, the receiver's secret key and the sender's public key

Security - pg 8 - outsider security - the adv knows the public keys and has access to the signcryption and unsigncryption oracles of the sender and the receiver, so it can do CPAs and CCAs; the scheme is outsider secure (indistiguishable against generalized CCA2) if it is outsider secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks; OR it protects the privacy of the receiver when talking to the sender from outsider intruders who don'r knwo the secret key of the sender - insider security - the adversary is a user of the system so the sender has access to the secret key of the receiver and for encryption, the receiver has access to the decryption key because it contains the secret key of the sender; the scheme is insider secure against gcca2 or cma attacks on the privacy or authenticity property if the corresponding induced enc/ sign scheme is secure against the attack (IND gCCA2 - enc, UF-CMA - sign); OR one of the parties is the attacker, so the scheme protects the sender's authenticity against the receiver and the receiver's privacy against the sender

- non-repudiation - singcryption only assures the receiver that the mesage was sent by the actual sender
- comparison btw insider and outsider security:
- is for authentcity implies non-repudiation when the receiver reveals its secret decryption key or by zero-knowledge proof
- os - th ereceiver can generate valid signcryptions of messages that are not actually send by the sender, so non-repudiation can't be acheived
- os might be enough for privacy and authenticity, but the is can be useful in case the secret key of the sender is stolen and we don't want the attacker to be able to understand previously or future recorder signcryption (some kind of forward and backward secrecy)

Security analyses

- Security under Message-Derived Keys Signcryption in iMessage

- iMessage uses signcryption to encrypt the messages

- iMessage uses a scheme that involves symmetric encryption with the key derived from the message

- EMDK (encryption under message derived keys) is the scheme (as named in the article) that is the primitive used by this protocol

- the protocol was vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks, CVE 2016 1788, and it was revised later

- EXTRA - as is pointed out in the article, Msg1 is the version before the revision and Msg2 is the one after

- the aim of signcryption is to provide privacy and authenticity of the message, so it can be percieved as the "asymmetric analogue of the symmetric authenticated encryption" /x

- EXTRA

- a formal definition was given by ADR (will be addressed) and they distinguish between outsider security - the adversary is not one of the users - and insider security - adversary is one of the users

- the Msg1 scheme can be considered a simple (ADR) encrypt then sign method and they provide an attack vector, showing that it is not IND CCA (not insider secure); the Msg2 version protects against this type of attacks

- the algorithm is multi-recipient, meaning that one can send messages to a receiver and they can access them on every device

- as defined, the EMDK scheme takes in the message and returns a key and the ciphertext and to decrypt, the algorithm uses the key and the ciphertext; the key is sent using asymmetric encryption

- two security requirements are defined: an adapted authenticated encryption requirement for the symmetric encryption and a form of robustness, wrong key detection method /x

- cca

- the analysis shows that practical adaptive chosen ciphertext vulnerabilities are present and that the attacker can retrospectively decrypt ciphertext (payloads and attachments) in a relatively short time (2^18 queries)

- this type of attack operates on gzip compressed data and they call it "gzip format oracle attack"

- about the conducted attacks: they provide attacks that are retrospective, meaning that the attacker needs one of the target devices to be online and has access to the ciphertexts

- some limitations of the protocol

- key server and registration: the server (IDS) is operated by Apple, so if it is compromised, it can become the platform for MITM attacks /x; they don't provide a way for the uses to verify the authenticity of the keys

- no forward secrecy: the encryption keys are rarely changed and the protocol doesn't provide any forward secrecy mechanism

- replay and reflection attacks: no mechanism that prevents replay or

reflection attacks, so the attacker can falsify conversations or, if they have access to the device, replay previously captured traffic and obtain the plaintext /x

- no certificate pinning on older versions: devices running older versions of iOS are still vulnerable to MITM attacks because of the lack of certificate pinning

- seemingly ad-hoc cryptographic scheme: combines RSA, AES and ECDSA

- and attacks on the encryption mechanism, in two stages:

- the encryption mechanism has weaknesses because, instead of using a MAC or AEAD modus operandi, it uses ECDSA to guarantee the authenticity /x of the ciphertext (symmetrically encrypted portion of the message payload /x), which is not sufficient because the attacker can change the signature from an account controlled by the them /x

- the attacker has the ability to modify the AES ciphertext and then can recover the plaintext from the decryption provided by the target device (CCA2)

- these made the attack possible

- gzip, version of DEFLATE compression, combines LZ77 and Huffman coding to compress common data types

- the attacker intercepts the gzip compressed message encrypted with an unauth stream cipher and has access to the decryption oracle,

- EXTRA: some references to the fact that the some states (USA mostly) wanted to have backdoors into the end-to-end encryption schemes of the app

- 2020 paper

Letter Sealing

- https://linecorp.com/en/security/encryption/2020h1

- https://help.line.me/line/?contentId=50001520

- the app that implements this protocol is LINE

- introduced in 2015, default from 2016 on new versions

- whitepaper

- https://d.line-scdn.net/stf/linecorp/en/csr/line-encryption-whitepaper-ver2.0.pdf

- transport protocol: based on SPDY

- handshake protocol based on 0-RTT

- the transport protocol uses secp256k1 curve for key exchange and server identity verification

- symmetric encryption - AES + HKDF for key derivation

- static ECC key pairs and the private part is stored on the server and the public one on the device? (for TLS)

- the key exchange is done using ECDH and the server identity verification with ECDSA

- handshake protocol, you need to exchange some data first:

- client:

    - generate ephemeral ECDH key + 16 byte client nonce
    - derive temp transport key and initialization vector (16 bytes long) using the server's static key and the ephemeral key generated before
    - epehmeral ECDH client handshake generated
    - gen ephemeral ECDH client handshake key
    - encrypt the application data with the epehemral key and initialization vector and send the static key, the public key, the nonce and the encrypted data to the server

- server:

- temp transport key and initialization vector using server's static ECDH key and client's initial eph key
- decrypt recv app data and get public key
- generate eph key pair and nonce - 16 bytes
- derive forward sec transport key and init vect
- gen sign and handshake state using server's static key
- encrypt app data
- send to client: server public key, server nonce, server's static signing key, enc data

- client finish:

  - handshake signature verif
  - if verified, get the forward secrecy key and initialization vector
  - enc using the key and the initialization vector

- application data is encrypted with 128 bit key using AES GCM AEAD cipher

- the server and the client generate a nonce, computed from a 64bit long sequence number and the initialization vector from the handshake

- the encryption function takes as parameters the key, nonce and application data?

Message encryption - only messages and metadata are encrypted - the protocol was updated to version 2 (after vulnerabilities were reported in 2018, discussed later) and it also adds integrity of the message metadata - version 2 is enabled by default unless one of the participants doesn't support it; in that case, the message is sent again using version 1 - the primitives used (comparison between versions with /) are: (this is a table) - for key exchange: ECDH over curve25519 - message encryption, data authentication: AES 256 in CBC/ GCM - data authentication: AES-ECB withSHA256 MAC/ AES 256 in GCM - SHA 256/ no message hash function? - message data: encryption and integrity? - it refers to the fact that the mode is AEAD - message metadata: not protected/ integrity?

- message encryption protocols are different for each type of the provided environments (presented below)

- private messaging

- the key pair is generated at app launch or after the app is reinstalled and it is saved locally

- the public key is registered on the server and it binds the user (using a key ID) to that public key

- the shared secret is established using ECDH and the key can be verified

- message encryption depends on the version supported by the user:

- version 1: using the key and the initialization vector, which are derived from the shared secret and a random 8 byte salt, withe message as parameters for the AES in CBC mode; a MAC is computed and the following data is sent to the receiver: version, content type, salt, ciphertext, MAC, sender ID, recipient ID; if the key pair is obsolete, the messages are requested to be resent; to decrypt, the receiver needs the init vector, key, the MAC of the ciphertext is compared with the value included and then it is decrypted

- version 2: key and random nonce derived from the shared secret and a 16 byte salt; the nonce is a 8byte per-chat counter with a 4 byte randomly generated value /x; the key and the nonce are used to encrypt the message using AES GCM; message data is encrypted and authenticated and the metadata (sender ID, receiver ID, version, content type) is added associated data; the authentication tag is 16 bytes long and is concatenated to the ciphertext; the receiver gets the decryption key and from the shared secret and the salt, decrypts the message and cehcks if the tag of the message matches the one computed

- group messaging

- the application generates a shared group key and the private keys for each participant, using their public keys

- then calculates the symmetric keys from the current user's private key (the one who created the group?) and the public keys of the participants

- the key derivation process is similar to the one for private chats

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- the shared key is encrypted and sent to the participants and the encrypted data is sent to the server, where it associates the group keys with the group and returns the shared key ID ????

- when something changes between the group participants, a new shared key is generated

- message encryption:

- version 1: the members need to otain the shared group key and decrypt it; the encryption key and initialization vector are derived from the shared key and the public key of the sender; the rest is similar with the version 1 private chats, but the key ID of the receiver is changed with the shared key of the group

- version 2: after the shared group key is obtained, the encryption key is composed of the shared group key and the public key; the rest is similar with the version 2 private chats

- for VOIP, the key exchange is done with ECDH over secp256r1

- the caller and callee exchange pairs of ephemeral keys that will be used to generate a master secret /x and derive a VOIP session key and salt, along with a randomly generated unique call ID

- the streams are encrypted with AES CM 128 HMAC SHA1 80 suite

- LINE enc

- provides end-to-end encryption when all of the participants have the Letter Sealing enabled in the following environments

- private chats

- 1-to-n chats

- group chats

- this mode is enabled by default since 2016

- the protocol ensures privacy for the following

- text messages and location in the previously specified environments

- private video and audio calls

- there are a few cases when end-to-end encryption is broken:

- on website preview - when a user sends an URL, the page can be previewed in the chat room

- on spam reports - the messages are sent to the server

- stickers

- open chat?

- group calls

- LINE meetings, social plugin?

- these are encrypted only using TLS - with LEGY*1 (Line Event-delivery Gateway, a custom built API) or HTTPS

- forward secrecy is not by default and few channels support it, such as:

- client-server communication

- in case of key compromise

Security analyses - change from version 1 to version 2 - the papers shows the following vulnerabilities: - impersonation and forgery on group message encryption - a group member could derive the encryption key of another member without knowing the secret key of said member, so this could lead to impersonation; also, this attacker (which could be the server itself) can forge the messages if they bypass the client-to-server encryption - malicious key exchange - a malicious user A can establish a malicious session with a user B in which the shared secret between them is the same as the one used between B and another user C, so A can impersonate both B and C in one of the following ways - message from A to B is sent to C as if it was from B - message from B to C is sent to B as it was sent from A - forgery on authenticated encryption scheme - the attacker can forge a message and that will be considered valid (AES 256 and SHA 256 are combined in a non-standard way)

- some definitions of the attacker are given:

- e2e adversary - bypasses the client-server encryption, so it has access to the messaging server, can intercept, read, modify the messages etc.

- malicious user - a legitimate user of the end-to-end encryption protocol that wants to manipulate the protocol maliciously

- malicious group member - legitimate member of a group with a shared key that want too to manipulate the protocol

- if a malicious member has the shared group key, they can decrypt the messages

Impersonation and forgery attacks - these attacks target a vulnerability in the key derivation phase, because the decryption key and initialization vector are derived from the group key and the sender's public information, so a malicious user can compute any other member's group key and the IV for the message

- impersonation attack

- take the public key of the victim, derive the key and the iv, generate the ciphertext and the message tag and choose the associated data such that it contains the victim's ID and then broadcast it to the group (the attacker can omit the victim) => the message encryption algorithm doesn't provide the authenticity of the message

- forgery attack

- intercept a packet from the victim, obtain the keys and salt from it and the server, decrypt and modify the message, generate a new ciphertext and tag and broadcast the new packet to all members except the victim, to which the original one is sent

- this type of attack can be placed by an e2e adversary, since they can bypass the client-to-server transport encryption

- mitigation: Sender keys used by the Signal protocol, pairwise key exchange

Malicious key exchange on private message encryption - the problem is that there is no key confirmation during the exchange phase and the

integrity of the associated data in a packet is not guaranteed (sender ID, recipient ID) - the authentication tag only takes in the ciphertext and the associated data is concatenated with the ciphertext and the tag

- the presented attack is an unknown key share attack - the shared secret key is the same as one used in another session

- if there already is a session between two users, A and B, and one of them trusts a malicious user, C, then C can attack the session between A and B, by establishing a fake session using the same key and IV as the one in that session

- this can be done by registering the victim's public key as C's own public key on the server and to request a new session with the other party; C can now impersonate both participants

- attack 1: impersonate B - send a message to A, which was initially sent from B to C, by impersonating B - can be done by a normal user

- attack 2: implersonate A - send a message (modified) to B, originally from A, as a message from C ? - can be done if the attacker is an e2e adversary

- mitigation: add a key confirmation phase, guarantee the integrity of the associated data by adding them to the hashing function SHA 256, when computing the authentication tag

Security of the Message encryption scheme - it is not a standard one - the adversary doesn't need to know the be trusted by the victims - encrypts a message with AES 256 CBC mode and then tag, computer using SHA 256 on the ciphertext, is encrypted with AES 256 EBC, making the tag computable without any secret info /x - also, in the CBC encryption, the same encryption key is used for the encryption and MAC - forgery attacks, this one consisting of an online and an offline phase; the idea is to compute the tag during the offline phase and get the data in the online phase (left around page 15)

- replay attacks
- replay attack and lack of forwards secrecy, this assumes that the adversary has access to the server

- for the replay attack, the adversary is the server and for the forward secrecy, they require that the private keys of the user are compromised
- replay attack - the adversary can record messages and resend them later to one of the parties and seem to be sent legitimately - the adv can just replace the body of the message
- to protect against replay attacks, one can use MACs which authenticate associated data
- LINE only authenticates the message itself, not the associated data, so the replay attack is possible
- another problems are that the same key is used for both the MAC and the message encryption and that sections, such as the encrypted message, MAC and salt could be obtained through reverse engineering
- forward secrecy - it is only provided from client to server and for this attack the private keys of one of the parties is enough

Threema

- open source
- links
- 2020 audit
- the thing used for encryption
- 2021 whitepaper
- the applications are open source
- uses 2 diff encryption layers
- end-to-end
- transport layer, between the client and server
- as cryptographic algorithms, the protocol uses:
- ECDH over curve 25519 for key exchange - asymm keys are 256 bits long

- XSalsa 20 for symmetric encryption - symm keys are derived from the private key of the sender and public key of the receiver + 192 bit nonce -> 256 bits long, as well as the random sym keys used for attachment encryption

- Poly1305 AES for authentication and integrity - MACs are 128 bits long

- forward secrecy is provided on the transport layer

- random padding (PKCS#7) is added before the messages are encrypted

- the protocol offers repudiability

- to avoid replay attacks, the nonces are saved

- local data (caches, contact lists) is encrypted and stored

- the app allows users to sync their contacts list, and it is sent to the server after each email address or phone number was hashed with HMAC SHA 256; because the hashes of the phone numbers can be cracked using brute force attacks, they are discarded after the ID was obtained

End to end encryption

- the messages and attachments are end-to-end encrypted

- key generation:

- the keys are generated using Curve25519 (the private key includes entropy from the user) and the public key is sent to the server, where the new key is assigned with a Threema ID

- to retrieve the public key, a user needs to query for the Threema ID, or hash of an email or phone number linked to the ID

- this system allows more verification levels, the lowest one being the public key only, while the highest is with the phone number

- additionally, the users can scan a QR code to personally verify the contacts

- key fingerprints can be created to compare public keys; this is done by hashing the public key with SHA 256 and taking the first 16 bytes

- message encryption

- the encryption and authentication algorithm uses NaCL library

- the shared secret is exchanged using ECDH over Curve25519 and hashed with HSalsa20, then the sender uses the XSalsa20 stream cipher with the shared secret and a random nonce to encrypt the message

- the MAC is computed using Poly1305, where the MAC key is a part of the XSalsa20 key, and it is prepended to the ciphertext

- groups

- in case of groups, the server doesn't keep track of the group structures and the messages are individually encrypted and sent to each member

- the app also provides key backup (pg 9)

Client-server protocol - 3 servers are used

- chat protocol

- used to transfer the messages

- uses a custom protocol with the NaCl library and provides:

- forward secrecy

- optimization for minimal overhead /x

- user authentication with th epublic key on connection setup /x

- directory access

- used for user signup (creating the Threema ID, linking the email or the phone numbers), getting the public keys

- it uses TLS

- media access

- used to temporarily store attachments

- this data is encrypted with 256 bit symmetric key using Xsalsa20 and has an additional Poly1305 authenticator and uploaded to the server, where an ID is assigned

- the id is returned to the user who then sends the id and the symmetric key to the recipient

- the receiver uses these to download and decrypt the attachment and when this is done, the server is signaled to delete the file

- in case of groups, the data is kept on the server and is deleted after 14 days

Web clients - in case of web clients, the apps communicate between platforms using WebRTC, the packets are end-to-end encrypted using NaCl the signaling with SaltyRTC protocol

VOIP - audio and video calls are also encrypted

Threema Safe - this is for backup

- From the official faq page

- app remote protocol for app and web client data exchange https://threema-ch.github.io/app-remote-protocol/

- Swiss, 2012

- Elliptic curve based (255 bits)

- ECDH with curve25519

- hash function + random nonce = 256 symmetric key for each message

- to encrypt: XSalsa20

- 128 bit MAC added to detect forgeries

- forward secrecy on the network connection

- doesn't require phone number/ email and it provides a Threema ID and contacts access is not mandatory

- personal info is hashed

- contacts or group chats are stored in a decentralized way on the users' devices, not on a server

- messages and media are e2ee

- data stored on servers:

  - messages and group chats until they are sent
  - email addresses and contacts are hashed until the comparizon is done (I guess it's the fact that the other one accepts your request/ you are in their contacts list?)
  - key pairs are locally generated
  - no logs on who talks to whom

- for android - AES 256 based encryption for stored messages, media and the ID's private key

- for ios - ios data protection for local encryption

- ID verification to avoid MITM attacks

- Whitepaper

- 3 verif lvls

  - typed id and contact not found in the address book by phone nr or email
  - id matched with one of the contacts
  - persoanlly verified id (scanned the QR code)

- NaCl encryption box model used to encrypt and auth the messages

- SHA256 of the raw public key => first 16 bits are the fingerprint

- to encrypt and decrypt a message

  - ECDH over Curve25519 hased with the result of HSalsa20 => shared secret
  - random nonce generated
  - XSalsa20 stream cipher with the shared secret and the random nonce to encrypt the plaintext

- sender uses Poly1305 to compute a MAC and adds it to the ciphertext (prepend) a portion from XSalsa20 is used ot form the MAC key
- sends MAC, cipertext and nonce to recv
- decrypt and verify authenticity by reversing the steps

Security analyses

- security autdit 2019

- the security audit found mostly minor vulnerabilities or informational and two medium risk ones:

- these are for the Android app, files containing sensitive info (such as key.dat, which contains the private keys of the user) could be sent to another user

- logs with parts of the password for the backup feature, Threema Safe, were saved and could be accessed by an adversary

- some of the low risk vulnerabilities found are:

- the screenshot saver feature could let you see, for example, the messages in the last open chat, if it was open on application exit, even if the app is protected with a PIN

- messages could be sent using google assistant, even if the app is locked with a pin

- for the iOS, there was missing public key pinning in the HTTPS request, which could allow MITM attacks

- also, an overview of the permissions asked by the app is given and it is stated that these are either necessary or optional; hence, permissions such as access to the voice recording, phone state (for incoming calls) are requested on demand

- Security audit 2020

- the security audit on the mobile applications for Android and iOS, conducted by cure53 in 2020, shows no high security vulnerabilities,

only minor or general flaws which are more related to the devices than to the application itself

- such issues include the risks of using rooted/ jailbroken devices, since the user can escalate privileges and access files storing private keys and other data or, for Android, that the key used for encrypting and decrypting local data was stored in a file that can be accessed by an attacker with higher privileges if no passphrase is set

- there is also a screenshot saving feature when the user exists the app which was labeled as a vulnerability with medium security, since sensitive data (such as the messages from the last viewed chat, if it was still open when the user exit the app) can be exposed when a screenshot of the app is taken (this is still present from the last audit)

Group messaging

- 2020 - Anonymous Asynchronous Ratchet Tree Protocol for Group Messaging
- info is available in this blog post too
- some of the previously mentioned apps are implementing the same ee2e protocol for one-to-one ahts, but, when talking about the group conversations, the approapches are different, or they don't support this feature at all
- Telegram, for example, doesn't have ee2e for group chats, for security reasons (here we will have some stories about this. I saw this in the whitepaper or another paper)
- so it relies only on the transport layer security, as well as Facebook messenger, the content of the messages being available to the server
- if you want to have e2ee in group conversations, you may want to keep forward secrecy, post-compromise security, deniability (if possible)
- bigger groups => gets harder to manage the keys (it is hard in the first place, since you need to do certain things for each participant)
- there are 3 ways in which you can handle this:
- pair-wise - the sender takes the secret key of each of the receiver, encrypts the message and sends it forward to the intended recipient

(behaves like normal one to one chats); all the properties of the simple chats are preserved and the groups could be practically invisible for the server

- encrypted message keys - the sender should choose a new random key for each message with which they would encrypt the message and send only a copy to the recipients. The encrypted message keys are then send out to each of the recipients, in order to decrypt the message; the properties are still kept, but the server is aware of the fact that there is a group
- shared group-keys - a group key-exchange should be made (both static and ephemeral public keys from each member); while this would significantly lower the complexity of sending messages, the key exchange complexity could grow, especially when you want to keep forward secrecy and post-compromise security, as the keys must be changed regularly; the server, again, is aware of the group structure
- metadata could be collected, again
- one way to obstruct metadada collection by third parties is to use TLS to secure the comm between the user and client
- the server still needs to know where to send a message
- inside the app:
- if you can use only email or an username, yo could gain anonomity, but the app would still be aware of your social graph (you will need to find and communicate with the other users anyway)
- if you have contacts list - use a hash, but this is still not enough, because someone can obtain the tuples of username and hash
- **SGX**
    - wiki
    - some more on this
    - intel
    - set of security related instruction codes that are built into some intel cpus
    - have private regions (enclaves) whose contents are protected and unable to be read or saved by any process (including those with higher priv) outside the enclave
    - encryption of some parts of the memory, actually

App comparison - signal - double ratchet procedure for authenticated key-exchange: long term + short term keys from each participant => shared key - key used in a key deriv ratchet protocol => ephemeral session keys - forward secrecy and post-compromise security achieved - ake takes long term enc keys => deniability - initiator sends, in a pair-wise fashion, a fresh keys to each participant - group session key is derived from the shared group key, using double ratchet and the group keys are updated on each newly added participant - online-offline key exchange - static keys are given by the server, but the ephemeral key exchanges are dealt with by having all users frequently upload one-time prekeys to the server, so the inline party can perform the key exchange - safety numbers or qr code for auth - SGX - metadata is stored encrypted on the server

- wapp

- similar, using pair-wise channels

- but the server has access to the medatada

- imessage

- public/ private key pair for encryption and signature, and the public keys are saved on the server

- only static public keys are used => no forward sececry, post-compromise security

- pair-wise and ineffiecient, but groups are not used that much, since it was initially created to replace sms

- no way to auth the users

- wire

- double ratchet for session keys for pair-wise comm and channels for group conversations

- auth with safety numbers

- threema

- public keys published to the server and these are used for encr and sign => no forward sececry, post-compromise security

- shared secret keys ofer deniability

- group communication with pair-wise channes, but multimedia is encrypted using the message key method

- may offer anonimity - username, phone number or email to create an account

- auth with safety numbers

- 2020 - Challenges in E2E Encrypted Group Messaging

- gives definitions about group anonimity features, such as internal group anonimity and external group anonimity and propose the Anonymous Async Ratchet Tree protocol

- the properties of forward secrecy and post-compromise security should be kept

About MLS?

- CONCLUSIONS SECTION - 2020 - Anonymous Asynchronous Ratchet Tree Protocol for Group Messaging

- messaging layer security - initiative from The Internet Engineering Task Force - protocol for group messaging with the best security properties and and more efficient key exchanges (log communication cost, using bin trees)

- MLS

- draft?

- all drafts

Async ratcheting trees - allow async communication where none of the parties need to be online at the same time - keeps backward secrecy - the idea is to generate a group key, encrypt the message once and send it to the group

participants (maybe in a server-side fan-out fashion) - a binary tree is created, where the member device is a leaf node => $O(\log(N))$, N nr of participants - the parent nodes are generated using Diffie Hellman operations between the teo children and the intermediate nodes are subgroups => each device might be a member of $\log(N)$ subgroups - the ones in the subgroups can use the key pair to encrypt and decrypt the messages - when a user changes their key or a new user is added, then a new leaf is added to the tree and the updates go up the tree => the root key is changed on each update - this means that all the nodes know the private key of the parent, but not of the other nodes - a node is removed => the path from the root to the removed leaf is blanked and a new shared group secret is computed

TreeKEM - developed based on ART ideas - users arranged in left-balanced trees - the parent key is computed by hashing the key of the last modified node - the nodes know the private key of the parent node, then the updater needs to encrypt $O(\log(N))$ messages and each node receives a mesage with a secret ++ add and remove operations

MLS

- WIP but would support 2 - 50.000 users
- initially based on ART, but the current versions (as of 2020) are based on TreeKEM
- a few initial implementations available (pg 11)
- hash function for parent nodes replaced with a key deriv function
- the messages are encrypted once and broadcasted as the group operations
- it is assumed that participant has the public keys of all the nodes in the tree, and the private keys for those in the subgroup/ copath (siblings to each node in the path)
- tree verification by recursive hashing
- hash value of each node is based on the info about the current node (leaves) or the hashes of the children (non-leaves)
- running transcript hash value - created using the group ops leading to the current state - each step is a combination of the prev transcript hash function and the current op

- keys and nonces are updated every time the state changes, using a number of key schedules
- the server should provide
- authentication service - connect identity to one or more keys (long term identifier, key that can be used to auth protocol messages)
- delivery service - delivers messages in an async fashion and they are stored until the recipient becomes available; the clients publish a set of initial keys/ keying material, which is used only once; the users can be auth using the auth service

Group operations - 4 types of operations can be performed: welcome, add, remove, update (these are functions)

- group addition

- users publish the initialization keys to the delivery server and other clients can request these keys to create a group

- the requestee gets the initialization keys of the chosen participants and create a new group state

- then they will send the a welcome and then an add message to all of these participants consecutively, updating the group state after each addition

- if the a new participant is added, the process is repeated and the add message is broadcast to the rest of the group and the new member will perform an update after they were invited (recommended)

- updating

- changes the participant's leaf secret and the direct path from the leaf => bacward secrecy on the participant's leaf secret

- updates depend on the application

- deleting

- a member sends the removal request with the index in the tree and the direct path from the leaf to the root is blanked and the tree is truncated at the rightmost blank leaf

Initial implementations - MLS++ Cisco - https://github.com/cisco/mlspp
- Molasses, Trail of bits - https://github.com/trailofbits/molasses - Melissa,
Wire - https://github.com/wireapp/melissa

4. Technologies used

- React
- node.js
- Redux toolkit
- Virgil security
    - browser code
    - docs
- socket.io
- Firebase
- Docker

5. The application

The application is a full stack web application, created with React, Node.js
and the database and authentication logic are hosted by Firebase. For
the real-time property of the messaging app, the front and the back are
communicating using Socket.io, which is a package created over websockets.
The key management and encryption/ decryption are managed using the
VirgilSecurity framework.

The functionalities provided by the application are as follows: - Login/ Signup
- the user can login to an existing account or create a new account with the
email and a password, upon opening the application, and is redirected to
the main application window. - Logout - the user is send back to the login
page. - Display chats - the conversations of the logged user are displayed
automatically, if any. - Select chat and send messages and attachments - once
a chat is selected, the user can send messages to the recipient(s) and also see
the previous messages sent and received - Add chat - a private or a group

chat can be added. Here, the user can select whether they want it encrypted or not - Delete chat - each chat will have a delete button, which erases it from the database and it won't appear in the user's list anymore, but will still be visible for the recipient. In case of a group, a message will be displayed that the user left the chat - Delete message - each message will have a delete button and will be removed from the user's message list. It will be still visible for the recipient.

General flow

The user is greeted with a login page. From this, they can create a new account or login, using an email and a password.

On the left side, the list of conversations for that account (it is empty if a new account was created) will appear, as well as buttons to add a new private or group chat. Clicking one of the buttons will open a form over the chat list and, for the private chat, will ask for the email of the recipient and to choose if you want the chat unencrypted (encryption is selected by default) and for the group, there will be an additional input for the chat name and an button saying "Add another participant". When this succeeds, the initiator and the recipients will be prompted with the newly created chat. The chats can be deleted by clicking the "x" button next to them and after confirming the decision in the dialog box. In case of groups, the participants will be notified if one of them leaves and will be deleted from the list of participants.

After choosing one of the listed chats (or after adding one), the user is prompted with a chat box and can send messages to the selected recipient. If the user wants to add an attachment, the file explorer will open and the client will be able to choose the desired file. Each message can be deleted by clicking "x" and confirming in the dialog box. These messages are only deleted for the current user, so they will remain visible for the rest of the participants.

The right side contains information about the user (the email), the participants in the selected group and the logout button. The logout button will redirect the user to the login page and all the locally saved data will be deleted.

Figure 1: Use case diagram

Implementation and code layout

- diagrams for the frontend and backend are present in the "back.pdf" and "front.pdf" files

The frontend is created using React with functional components, the axios package to communicate with the server and Redux Toolkit for state management. The backend uses Node.js and express, to handle the requests. To obtain the real-time communication between the users, the socket.io library is used. When a message is sent or a chat is created, the server notifies the parties involved using sockets and only after the data is saved to the database.

The cryptographic infrastructure is mostly managed by the Virgil Security platform. When the user first registers, a profile is created in the database and, based on the email and password, a new "user card" is saved on the platform. This will be then requested on login and will provide the private key of the user, based on email and password, the public keys of the rest of the users, on demand, and the encryption and decryption operations. Before each registration and login, the server needs to generate a token that will be used for authentication. These modified JSON web tokens are based on the user identity (email used for account creation) and they are composed of header, payload and signature. The header contains information about how the signature needs to be computed and the payload is the user data. The signature provides authenticity of the token and is made up of the header and the payload from before. They are encoded in base 64, joined with a dot and the HS256 signature algorithm is applied. /x

After the authentication token is obtained, the user token ? is requested by using the "initialize" method from the EThree class. It is then saved to the local context and the client can now use the application. The username and other user details are saved in the redux store.

A request is sent to the server to retrieve the chats from the database. When one of them is selected, the message list is populated and the user can send and delete messages. This data is also saved in the redux store, as well as the selected chat. The list of participants is shown on the right.

When a message is sent, it is first encrypted using the participants' public

keys and is signed with the private key of the sender, verifying that they are who they claim to be. Decryption happens in a similar fashion, by using the public keys and the message to be decrypted. Both of these operations make use of the `authEncrypt` and `authDecrypt` functions provided by the framework. The message is sent to the server and is saved to the database. The user gets a response with the id, so it can be handled easier on delete. ? The fact that the message was added is then broadcast to the user or group.

The decryption process takes place only when the messages are displayed to the user, so they are still encrypted in the store.

To add a new chat or group, the user needs to enter the email(s) in the corresponding form. The names are sent to the server and they are added to the database, if the emails are found, and the specified participants will have a new chat added and can communicate with each other. They are notified using sockets and the server is aware if this is a private or a group chat. When one of the users deletes the chat on their side, only the group is notified using sockets and that participant is removed. Message encryption for groups uses the same functions and they are threated in a similar way to the one-to-one messages.

On logout, all the locally saved data and the store are cleared and the user is sent to the login page.

6. Conclusions

7. References

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