Return Oriented Programming

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Abstract. In this paper we introduce the concept of Return Oriented Programming, how to apply it, how to protect against it and show a concrete attack.

Keywords: ROP · Return Oriented Programming · Buffer Overflow · Binary Exploitation

1 Introduction

BIBLIOGRAFIE NICHT VERGESSEN Return Oriented Programming is a type of buffer overflow attack that has been published in 2007 and ever since has become a widely known buffer overflow technique. It has been developed to circumvent the NX-BIT protection that protects the stack from being executed. At the time of writing this paper modern techniques like Stack Carnaries and ASLR prevent these attacks from being practical but there are millions of running systems using old hard-, firm- and software that is possibly vulnerable to these kinds of buffer overflow attacks. Return Oriented Programming is based on chaining return addresses to code just before a return and therefor allowing almost arbitrary code segments to be chained.

2 Gadgets

Introduction On the x86 architecture the `ret` instruction is defined to pop the return instruction pointer from the stack into the `eip` register and redirect code execution to that memory address. By chaining addresses of instructions that end on a return and injecting them Gadgets are code segments that sit before a `ret` instruction, these assembly instructions can be chained arbitrarily

How to find Gadgets A gadget can be found by searching for `0xC3` Bytes in the program. The instructions before then represent the code we can use, for that we need the address of the gadget. It is possible this manually using tools like `objdump`, `hexdump` or use one of the many tools available, to name a few there is `ropper`, `ROPgadget` and `pwntools`. For this paper i will be using `ROPgadget` since i found it easy to use and fast. `ROPgadget` can be found in most package managers or can be downloaded directly from https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget. The gadgets can be extracted from the file using the following command Lst. 1. We can then use regular expressions to search for the gadgets that we need.

Listing 1: Exporting gadgets with ROPgadget

```
ROPgadget --binary ./vuln --nojop > gadgets
```

This command produces an output with results similar to this.

Listing 2: Output of ROPgadget

```
34      0x08059ee3 : mov word ptr [edx], ax ; mov eax, edx ;
35        ret
36      0x08071e4e : mov esp, 0xc70cec83 ; ret 0xffe0
37      0x0807faa3 : sti ; xor eax, eax ; ret
38      0x0808b285 : pop edx ; xor eax, eax ; pop edi ; ret
39      0x080539e7 : mov esp, 0x39fffffd ; ret
40      0x0804b8d4 : xchg eax, esp ; ret
41      0x08095aef : mov esi, eax ; pop ebx ; mov eax, esi ;
42        pop esi ; pop edi ; pop ebp ; ret
43      0x0806ceec : pop es ; add byte ptr [ebx - 0x39], dl ;
44        ret 0xffd4
45      0x0804a444 : or eax, 0xffffffff ; ret
46      0x08051bce : dec eax ; ret
```

These are only 10 Lines out of the 8244 lines found by the tool though and i purposefully filtered out some good and bad ones for demonstration. It is clearly visible that many candidates for ROP can be found, even in a file with a relatively small size of 72 kB. Though most of these gadgets are not all that useful because they often modify a lot of registers, possibly messing up the desired state or they use a fixed return address. In most cases we can find suitable candidates using regular expressions though, this will be demonstrated later in this section.

Overview of powerful gadgets

pop   pop allows us to write arbitrary values into registers. For that we search for a pop <reg> instruction inside our gadgets, in the payload we can then place the value that we want to insert after the address of the pop instruction. If we can not find a suitable gadget we can try to get creative and achieve the desired state another way. For example if we want to modify ecx but do not have a pop ecx instruction available we could achieve it with something like this: xor ecx, ecx ; pop eax ; xor ecx, eax. Provided that we have these gadgets available.

mov   mov allows us to write arbitrary values into memory. For that we search for a mov dword ptr [<reg1>], <reg2> instruction inside our gadgets, we can then, in combination with two pops write arbitrary values at arbitary memory locations. The following example writes the value in ecx to where eax points to: pop ecx ; pop eax ; mov dword ptr [eax], ecx

arithmetics, boolean algebra   Arithmetic operations like add, sub, inc, xor, or, and can be useful to bring registers into our desired state. For that we search for the corresponding gadget with the required operands. For example xor can be used to clear a register or copy its contents. It often occurs in the following forms: xor eax, eax or xor eax, edx. The first case clears the register since xor computes a non-equivalence, formally $a \oplus a = 0$ and the second one copies the value of the 2nd operand into the 1st operand when the target register is 0x00 since 0x00 is the neutral element of the xor operation, formally $a \oplus 0 = a$.

int 0x80   int stand for an interrupt, the interrupt 0x80 causes a system call to be executed. System calls are kernelspace programs/operations that require higher privileges than what is available in a userspace program. Examples for system calls include io and execve which allows to execute arbitary programs. In combination with pop, mov and other instructions we can specify the concrete system call. One of the most powerful system calls for blackhats is bash since it allows permanently implementing malware or gain insight into files, it can be called with the argument /bin/sh. This will be demonstrated in Sec. 4

2.1 Filtering the gadgets

Introduction In order to find the gadgets we want we can use the tools directly or we can use regular expressions. In order to make this paper more general and easy to replicate i will be using regular expressions to find the desired gadgets.

Gadgets and their corresponding Regular Expression The following table describes what regex we can use to find the gadgets needed for the attack.

- pop edx → `^.{0,20}pop edx.{0,20}ret\n`

- int 0x80 → `^.{0,20}int 0x80\n`

- xor eax, eax → `^.{0,20}xor eax, eax.{0,20}ret\n`

for all of these regular expressions i was able to find at least a few suitable candidates. If there are no results the amount of possible characters before or after the gadget can be increased until results show up. It is however desirable to have gadgets with as few and noninterfering instructions as possible, if this is accomplished we can almost use the instructions we found like in assembly. Gadgets which do multiple things at once however can mess up the desired state and break the payload so it is important to thoroughly analyze the gadgets before using them.

3 Theory

3.1 Stack

Figure 1: The stack when injecting the payload

3.2 ROP Chain

4 Attack

4.1 Target Program

Target Program The following program is the target of our attack, it uses a command line argument to provide the payload and `strcpy` for the buffer overflow, overwriting the return address after the 8 Byte buffer. Using vulnerable input functions also works though.

Listing 3: The Target Program

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include <string.h>
3
4 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
5   char buffer[8] = {0};
6   if (argc != 2) {
7     printf("A single argument is required.\n");
8     return 1;
9   }
10  strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
11  return 0;
12 }
```

Compilation   We compile the target program with the following command. There are several important options given in this command. Most importantly the `-fno-stack-protector` option disables stack canaries which would otherwise directly terminate the program when the canary is overwritten. The `-m32` option compiles the binary as a 32 Bit executable, this makes the attack easier. The `-static` option makes the binary statically linked. Without this option there are only 50 gadgets available, considering most of them are not useful for our attack it is practically impossible to perform the attack with just these gadgets. The `-static` option includes the `libc` library in the executable, increasing the gadget count to over 8000. However, it is possible to determine the address of the dynamically linked library at runtime and adding an offset for each gadget to this address. This has been described by Saif El-Sherei but will not be further discussed in this paper.

Listing 4: The compliation command

```
clang -o vuln vuln.c -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -static
```

4.2   Phases of developing the attack

Phases   The attack consists of several phases

1. Specify concrete goal with required program state and instructions

2. Generate desired list of instructions and arguments (abstract payload)

3. Extract gadgets using tools

4. Search gadgets for instructions

5. Generate payload using the gadgets according to the the abstract payload while making sure gadgets dont interfere with our desired program state. This step can be done using Python which we will show in a later section Lst. 5

6. Insert payload into target

Goal and abstract payload   After specifying the goal and possibly simplifying it we have to write a list of instructions and arguments that achieve the goal, for this its favorable to directly use the format of the final payload except for using instructions instead of addresses as this will then allow to simply insert the found gadgets into this abstract payload.

Extract and search gadgets   After extracting the gadgets using one of the above mentioned methods we can search for gadgets

struct.pack   struct.pack is a Python function that allows to easily generate our desired payload from the raw bytes. Bash then allows to directly pipe the generated payload into our target. In order to generate the payload we first have to fill the buffer and override the EBP with arbitary values as seen in line 2 Lst. 5. This is usually done using easily recognizable characters, using the letter A for this is common. It has the hex value 0x41, doing this allows then to spot the buffer in a debugger like gdb. So in this example we fill the buffer with 8 A's and 4 B's. After that it is time to insert the addresses of the gadgets and the arguments. This is done by calling pack with the double word (64 Bit) while specifying the endianness, converting that to a string and adding it to the string as seen in line 3 Lst. 5. After the whole payload has been generated we can print it and use the output directly for running the buffer overflow attack as mentioned above.

Listing 5: How to use struct.pack

```
from struct import pack
p = bytes('AAAAAAAABBBB', 'ascii')
p += pack('<I', 0x0802840)
print(str(p)[2:-1])
```

5   Results

Attack   After injecting the generated payload from Sec. 4 as a command line argument the program opened a shell from which we can use privilege escalation techniques in order to completely compromise the system. The only compiler options that had to be activated were PIE and stack canaries. It is likely that there are systems still in use today which are vulnerable to this kind of attack. Since it allows almost arbitrary code execution it is very important to identify these devices and patch or replace them.

ASLR   The information about wether or not ROP can be applied to systems with ASLR enabled is inconsistent. In the run with PIE and stack canaries disabled the attack still worked even with /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space set to 2, meaning full randomization of the different segments like header, libraries and stack. This is probably due to PIE

6   Protection

Luckily we had to disable several security mechanisms to make this attack possible, especially

7   Discussion

Sources: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/28479-return-oriented-programming-(rop-ftw) .pdf https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/5.1-mitigation_aslr_pie/index.html