
SIGNAL FROM OUTER SPACE



MATERIAL:

info.pdf
flag.enc
challenge.py

FLAG:

HTB{37_c0m3_h0m3_d1nn3r_15_r34dy}

SOLVER:

M1gnus

FOOTHOLD

The challenge provide a script named challenge.py:

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES from Crypto.Util.number import inverse from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad from collections import namedtuple from random import randint import hashlib import os
# Create a simple Point class to represent the affine points.

Point = namedtuple("Point", "x y")
# The point at infinity (origin for the group law).
O = 'Origin'
def encrypt(secret):
    sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
    sha1.update(str(secret).encode('ascii'))
key = sha1.digest()[:16]
    dt = open('flag.mp3','rb').read()
    # Encrypt flag
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
    ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(pad(dt, 16))
    open('flag.enc','wb').write(ciphertext)
def check_point(P: tuple):
   if P == O:
    return True
        return (P.y^{**2} - (P.x^{**3} + a^*P.x + b)) \% p == 0 and 0 \le P.x \le p and 0 \le P.y \le p
def point_inverse(P: tuple):
  if P == O:
       return P
    return Point(P.x, -P.y \% p)
def point_addition(P: tuple, Q: tuple):
    if P == O:
    return Q
elif Q == O:
return P
    elif Q == point_inverse(P):
return O
            lam = (3*P.x**2 + a)*inverse(2*P.y, p)
lam %= p
    else:

lam = (Q.y - P.y) * inverse((Q.x - P.x), p)

lam %= p


Rx = (lam**2 - P.x - Q.x) % p

Ry = (lam*(P.x - Rx) - P.y) % p

R = Point(Rx, Ry)

assert check_point(R)

return R
def double_and_add(P: tuple, n: int):
    Q = P
R = O
     while n > 0:
       if n % 2 == 1:
R = point_addition(R, Q)
    Q = point_addition(Q, Q)
n = n // 2
assert check_point(R)
    return R
\label{eq:continuous_def} \begin{aligned} & def \ \mbox{gen\_shared\_secret}(Q; \ tuple, \ n; \ int); \\ & S = double\_and\_add(Q, \ n) \end{aligned}
    return S.x
g_y = ...
G = Point(g_x, g_y)
n = randint(1, p)
public = double_and_add(G, n)
key = gen_shared_secret(public,n)
 encrypt(key)
decrypt(key)
```



Space Complex f: $y^2 = x^3 + 16964108867870875431022511847406074513505438269132199629926447105117327702973321429130078673611996313382775579316996202239740533714013559789369433905598853 x$

255726990390468297009923653803173521846278084481717531769738565937700718678505 0969676938059088155922328011075081606354569621958862612850816694647002380820

Space Field:

19308852038255401085139163234646196078905206138821102689993154025024839927136 24056070847778485065788387695567162120805830837964237496163664777233360835853

ISS Coordinates as Reference Point:

 $(11612316038801479962400723698427883310130163176291338759911281034170556609743457773032375965620429931675410389220512342834663089126659445523701533922313238,\\ 14492470559976609909614920150302533890662281539874542639808213982956316710837667114681496336361906718748053884513468343236055545337522055713141076615967243)$

Miscalculated Source Point:

(716447455218443211337138354910360820310039222467099750548875601978669948877653 369670984450493776038314939273990792875030477209738905138162016103972822887, 257763683540484460608659351365624287240962911508468079700967729803003501905607 4660428408865132307063442440986937998752115629728860272800311376841076830297)

and the encrypted flag.

The provided script uses \underline{ECC} to encrypt a symmetric key and \underline{AES} with \underline{ECB} mode to encrypt the flag (which is a mp3 file). The PDF file gives us the info needed to afford the problem: the curve:

$y^2 = x^3 +$

 $\frac{1696410886787087543102251184740607451350543826913219962992644710511732770}{2973321429130078673611996313382775579316996202239740533714013559789369433}{905598853x} +$

2557269903904682970099236538031735218462780844817175317697385659377007186 7850509696769380590881559223280110750816063545696219588626128508166946470 02380820

Char of the field:

1993088520382554010851391632346461960789052061388211026899931540250248399 2713624056070847778485065788387695567162120805830837964237496163664777233 360835853

G:

(116123160388014799624007236984278833101301631762913387599112810341705566 0974345777303237596562042993167541038922051234283466308912665944552370153 3922313238,

1449247055997660990961492015030253389066228153987454263980821398295631671 0837667114681496336361906718748053884513468343236055545337522055713141076 615967243)

P:

(716447455218443211337138354910360820310039222467099750548875601978669948877653369670984450493776038314939273990792875030477209738905138162016103972822887,

2577636835404844606086593513656242872409629115084680797009677298030035019 0560746604284088651323070634424409869379987521156297288602728003113768410 76830297)

THE ATTACK

By analyzing the curve is possible to see that is an <u>anomalous curve</u>: the cardinality of the curve is equal to the char of the field. This means that is possible to perform the $\underline{Smart\ Attack}$ against the curve to compute efficiently discrete_log(P, base=G), then recover the symmetric key and decrypt the flag.

THE IMPLEMENTATION

```
import hashlib
import sys
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
def HenselLift(P, p, prec):
 E = P.curve()
 f(a,1,a2,a3,a4,a6,x,y) = y^{2} + a1^{*}x^{*}y + a3^{*}y - x^{3} - a2^{*}x^{2} - a4^{*}x - a6 g(y) = f(ZZ(Eq.a1()),ZZ(Eq.a2()),ZZ(Eq.a3()),ZZ(Eq.a4()),ZZ(Eq.a6()),ZZ(x_P),y)
  gDiff = g.diff()
  for i in range(1,prec):

uInv = ZZ(gDiff(y=y_lift))

u = uInv.inverse_mod(p^i)
 y_lift= y_lift -u*g(y_lift)
y_lift = ZZ(Mod(y_lift,p^(i+1)))
y_lift = y_lift+O(p^prec)
  return Ep([x_lift,y_lift])
def SmartAttack(P,Q,p,prec):
 E = P.curve()
  Eqq = E.change_ring(QQ)
 Eqp = Eqq.change_ring(Qp(p,prec))
 P_Qp = HenselLift(P,p,prec)
 Q_{p} = HenselLift(Q,p,prec)
 p\_times\_P = p*P\_Qp
 p_times_Q=p*Q_Qp

x_P,y_P = p_times_P.xy()

x_Q,y_Q = p_times_Q.xy()
 phi_P = -(x_P/y_P)
 phi_Q = -(x_Q/y_Q)

k = phi_Q/phi_P

k = Mod(k,p)
  return k
853
853
b =
E = EllipticCurve(GF(p), [a, b])
print(f"checking if the curve is anomalous...")
if E.cardinality() == p:
 print(f"OK\n")
else:
 print(f"The curve is not anomalous exiting with 1...")
 sys.exit(1)
print(f"Calculating dlog...")
243)
887, 25776368354048446060865935136562428724096291150846807970096772980300350190560746604284088651323070634424409869379987521156297288602728003113768410768302
dlog = int(SmartAttack(G,P,p,4096))
print(f"SUCCESS, dlog = {dlog}\n")
Q = dlog*P
secret = str(Q[0])
print(f"Secret: {secret}")
hasher = hashlib.sha1()
hasher.update(secret.encode("ascii"))
key = hasher.digest()[:16]
print(f"Key: {key}")
decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
with open("flag.enc", "rb") as f:
encflag = f.read()
flag = decryptor.decrypt(encflag)
with open("flag.mp3", "wb") as f:
 f.write(flag)
print(f"Flag written to 'flag.mp3"")
```

Recover the flag

By running the script and listen the decrypted mp3 file we can easily obtain the flag. $\,$

CHEESE!

```
sage: load("decrypt_flag.sage")
checking if the curve is anomalous...
OK

Calculating dlog...
SUCCESS, dlog = 1156822894803375631688043930935093967346672875180024761629079332
79837260972044409417775428918116766829809367879731454381102192544504799021478976
54728360094

Secret: 947736182759059489371411526594399049564618970818793181020342582725748643
72913483050270890204757206477136592280862669709952979116649808546938150718327672
29
Key: b'\xae\x9e_D\x1aw\xd3Hzb\xe9U\xb4\xd8\xb3\x0f'
Flag written to 'flag.mp3'
```