

Secure Bootloader with RBF

By: Mohamed Abo Khalil



Introduction

What is a Bootloader?

- **Definition:**
 - **A bootloader is a small program that initializes hardware and loads the main application firmware on a microcontroller.**

Purpose:

- **it allows for programming and updating the application code after the initial firmware installation.**
- **Ensures the Integrity of the Application**



Project Overview

The primary goal of this project is to design and implement a reliable bootloader for the STM32F103C8T6 microcontroller. The bootloader will enable:


- **Firmware Updates:** Seamlessly update the application firmware through UART communication.
- **Integrity Verification:** Ensure that the firmware being uploaded is genuine and free from corruption.
- **Robust Error Handling:** Implement mechanisms to handle failures during flash operations, ensuring system reliability.
- **Security Features:** Protect the firmware and ensure only authorized updates are applied.



Key Features

- **Firmware Update Mechanism:**
- **Support for Over-the-Air (OTA)**
 - Ability to manage firmware sizes and handle partial updates.
- **Application Verification:**
 - Implement CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) and digital signatures (using symmetric encryption)
 - to verify the integrity using SHA256 and authenticity of the firmware before installation.
- **Rollback Mechanism:**
 - Provide a fallback option to revert to the previous stable firmware version in case of update failures.
 - Safe State Restoration: The system can restore to a stable state without user intervention, ensuring minimal downtime and maintaining system functionality.

Over-the-air update process
for IoT devices



Key Features

- **Security Measures:**
 - **Ensure Confidentiality by using** of AES encryption to secure firmware during transmission to protect against eavesdropping.
 - Authentication mechanisms to verify the sender's identity before accepting a firmware update.
- **Authorization Mechanism to Read from Memory using seed**
- **Logging Mechanism and Debugging using UART**



Bootloader Working Process

1 Initialization

2 Check APP Integrity

if there's update : Update and Verify and Jump

if not:

if Valid App: Jump to It

if not: Check for rollback version

if there's no roll back version

stuck on Menu waiting for update from Authorized Entity

Note

Supports Also Reading and Writing to Memory from Authorized Entity Using Seed Mechanism



Mechanism for Updating Application Firmware

- Start Update Session: prepare for firmware update.
- Retrieve Encrypted Hash: Recieve the AES-ECB encrypted hash - SHA256 from Authenticated Entity
- Receive and Decrypt Data: Receive firmware chunks via UART, decrypt them, and store in decrypted_data buffer.
- Write to Flash Memory
- Hash Accumulation: Accumulate hash of received decrypted data.
- Final Hash Verification: Compare calculated hash with the received encrypted hash to ensure integrity.
- Update Metadata: Update application size and hash using Set_ValidUpdate().
- End Update Session: Clean up cryptographic contexts with End_Updating_Session().

```
* Welcome to AboKhalil Bootloader Script *
8 -> For Help and Instructions


6
Getting Update
Enter bin file path (e.g ./update.bin) :update.bin
Size of file 'update.bin': 6316 bytes
ack
Sending Hex File
```

```
dec_hash = e849eb2468b3370144c8fc0712e025c27db1fbc015d167dee7f00c6514a4a78b
sent_hash = e849eb2468b3370144c8fc0712e025c27db1fbc015d167dee7f00c6514a4a78b
ack
=====
Update Downloaded Successfully!
```



Reading Memory Mechanism

- Verifies the provided address
- Initializes the AES decryption context using the pre-defined read_key.
- Generates a random seed (16 bytes) to enhance security.
- Transmit Seed:
 - Sends the generated seed to the host via UART for further processing.
- Receive Encrypted Seed:
 - Waits to receive the encrypted version of the seed from the host.
- Seed Decryption:
 - Decrypts the received encrypted seed using AES in ECB mode to verify the authorization.
- Authorization Check:
 - Compares the decrypted seed with the original seed:
 - if Authorized Return Memory Bytes
 - Else Send NACK.




Roll Back Mechanism

Problem: Single Bank MCU

Solution:

- Version Tracking:
 - Each firmware version has its own metadata to keep track of the current and previous versions.
- Dual Firmware Storage:
 - Store two firmware images in separate memory regions:
 - Current Firmware: The version currently running on the device.
 - Previous or updated Firmware: The last known stable version.
- Firmware Update Process:
 - During an update, the bootloader first writes the new firmware to a designated area in memory.
 - After writing, the bootloader verifies the integrity of the new firmware using SHA-256 in mbedtls library.
- Validation Check:
 - If the new firmware passes the validation copy it to the desired app location to avoid the hassle of VTOR and Linker Script Editing Each update.
 - If validation fails, maintain the current firmware and work with normal app.
- Rollback Logic:
 - In the bootloader, implement a check to determine if the current firmware is valid:
 - If the device fails to boot or operates incorrectly after an update, switch back to the second copy of firmware version.
 - The rollback process include:
 - Change App and Updated App MetaData and Store it in Flash.



All Supported Commands

```
8  
get help cmd  
ack  
---  
1. Get Bootloader Version ID      --> 1  
2. Get Chip Identification Number   --> 2  
3. Read Memory Contents          --> 3  
4. Erase Flash Memory            --> 4  
5. Get Flash Read Protection Level --> 5  
6. Get Application Update        --> 6  
7. Jump to Application Code      --> 7  
8. Help                          --> 8  
---
```

- **Get Help CMD**

```
5  
Getting RDP Level  
ack  
RDP level is : 0
```

- **Read Protection Level**

```
7  
jumping to app  
STM32f103c8t6 MCU Medium Density has 64 page starting from page 0 to 63  
Enter App starting page: 27
```

- **Jump to Entire Page**

```
1  
get version id  
ack  
Vendor ID: 1F  
BootLoader Version: 1:0:0
```

- **Vendor iD - Version**

```
4  
Erasing Flash  
STM32f103c8t6 MCU Medium Density has 64 page starting from page 0 to 63  
Enter Starting Page: 26  
Enter Number of Pages to erase: 38  
start:b'\x1a',num:b'&'  
ack  
Erase Finished ....
```

- **Erase Flash**

```
tx_enc_seed: e5e89171064b9c16ela8a60efal335bd  
rx_enc_seed: e5e89171064b9c16ela8a60efal335bd  
ack  
AUTHORIZED !!!!  
0x00 0x50 0x00 0x20 0x31 0x0c 0x00 0x08 0xd9 0x0b
```

- **Reading Memory**

```
ack  
calc_hash = 70d45323a54849f91ec3a793ebc93cf37949d5095ad1e5b2fb3bce0ac2956  
ack  
=====  
Update Downloaded Successfully!  
=====
```


- **Update the APP**



Deliverables



Developed Python Script to
Communicate with BL



Tested Bootloader
Project Files



Doxygen
Documentation for
Bootloader & CRC
files

Chellenges and Solutions :

1-Problem: Asymmetric Encryption like ECDSA & ECDH Algorithms for Digital Signature and Key Sharing has very large footprint as stm32f10c8t6 flash size is 64kb

Solution: made Digital Signature using Preshared symmetric key AES which is shared only with authenticated entites.

2- Problem: HAL CRC32 give different result than crc lib in python script

Solution: Studed How CRC32 Works and with Help of Chatgpt i could make Needed Functions.

3- Problem: Mis-Synchronization of BL with python Script

Solution: Made Synchronization Ack

4- Problem: Shifted Recieved Hash

Solution: Flush UART Buffer before recieve the hash



Future Work

Ensure Authentication using PreShared Asymmetric Keys

Digital Signature Using ECDSA

Share Symmetric Key using ECDH

**Use AES-GCM and be familiar with it's operation,
authentication tag, etc.**

Fix any Bugs found in the bootloader



Thank You