

# Improving Open Source Security for a Sustainable Open Source Ecosystem





Open Source Software won!





OSPPOs need to facilitate open source sustainability!




Securing the supply chain is an immediate contribution to sustainability

# Open-Source Security and Sustainability



## Recent incidents and increasing threat level

FIGURE 1.6. NEXT GENERATION SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS, 2019–2022



“[8<sup>th</sup> annual State of the Software Supply Chain](#)”, Sonatype

## Requirements of Regulators and Customers

Executive Order on  
Improving the Nation's  
Cybersecurity

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

**Section 1. Policy.** The United States faces a growing and increasingly sophisticated threat to its national security and economic prosperity from cyberattacks that threaten the public sector.

**EU Cyber Resilience Act**

For safer & more secure digital products

#DigitalEU #CyberSecEU

117<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

**S. 4913**

To establish the duties of the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency regarding open source software security, and for other purposes.


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 21, 2022


Mr. PETERS (for himself and Mr. PORTMAN) introduced the following bill, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

**A BILL**

# Software Supply Chain



# Software Supply Chain – Security Challenges






# Software Supply Chain Security Challenges\*



- How do we know what's in the software and how to trace vulnerabilities?
- How do we ensure the integrity of software artifacts?
- How can developers learn about security best practices?
- How can we measure and improve the security posture?



# OpenSSF

OPEN SOURCE SECURITY FOUNDATION

1Password

aws



Capital One

cisco

citi



intel.

IBM



JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.

Meta

coinbase

DELL Technologies



Fidelity

GitHub

Google



Morgan Stanley

ORACLE



sonatype

# About the OpenSSF



- Aims to securing the open source ecosystem by
  - securing investment, resources, and expertise,
  - educating developers in secure software design,
  - establishing best practices in supply chain security,
  - developing and improving tooling for securing software,
  - addressing the security posture of open source projects.



# Disclaimer





- The supply chain security challenge is broad, wide and deep...  
... and so are the activities of the OpenSSF.
- I will only be able to dive into a small subset of all activities

# OpenSSF Landscape



- How do we know what's in the software?
- How do we ensure the integrity of software artifacts?
- How can developers learn about security best practices?
- How can we measure and improve the security posture?



# Best Practices Working Group



- Provide open source developers with best practices and tools
  - Concise Guides + Training
  - Scorecards analysis tool
  - Education SIG
  - OpenSSF Best Practices badge
  - ... and more ...

# Scorecards



- Automatically scores OSS projects based on checks
  - Each related to security, scored 0-10, weighted average computed
- Value for our OSPO
  - Scorecard provides a list of addressable gaps
  - Framework for guiding contributions and improvements
  - List of tasks to get a development team going

# Scorecards Tests



Name	Description
<a href="#">Binary-Artifacts</a>	Is the project free of checked-in binaries?
<a href="#">Branch-Protection</a>	Does the project use <a href="#">Branch Protection</a> ?
<a href="#">CI-Tests</a>	Does the project run tests in CI, e.g. <a href="#">GitHub Actions</a> , <a href="#">Prow</a> ?
<a href="#">CII-Best-Practices</a>	Does the project have an <a href="#">OpenSSF (formerly CII) Best Practices Badge</a> ?
<a href="#">Code-Review</a>	Does the project practice code review before code is merged?
<a href="#">Contributors</a>	Does the project have contributors from at least two different organizations?
<a href="#">Dangerous-Workflow</a>	Does the project avoid dangerous coding patterns in GitHub Action workflows?
<a href="#">Dependency-Update-Tool</a>	Does the project use tools to help update its dependencies?
<a href="#">Fuzzing</a>	Does the project use fuzzing tools, e.g. <a href="#">OSS-Fuzz</a> ?
<a href="#">License</a>	Does the project declare a license?
<a href="#">Maintained</a>	Is the project at least 90 days old, and maintained?
<a href="#">Pinned-Dependencies</a>	Does the project declare and pin <a href="#">dependencies</a> ?
<a href="#">Packaging</a>	Does the project build and publish official packages from CI/CD, e.g. <a href="#">GitHub Publishing</a> ?
<a href="#">SAST</a>	Does the project use static code analysis tools, e.g. <a href="#">CodeQL</a> , <a href="#">LGTM (deprecated)</a> , <a href="#">SonarCloud</a> ?
<a href="#">Security-Policy</a>	Does the project contain a <a href="#">security policy</a> ?
<a href="#">Signed-Releases</a>	Does the project cryptographically <a href="#">sign releases</a> ?
<a href="#">Token-Permissions</a>	Does the project declare GitHub workflow tokens as <a href="#">read only</a> ?
<a href="#">Vulnerabilities</a>	Does the project have unfixed vulnerabilities? Uses the <a href="#">OSV service</a> .
<a href="#">Webhooks</a>	Does the webhook defined in the repository have a token configured to authenticate the origins of requests?



# Use Case: Scorecards for metal3



## Metal3-io

Metal3 project's own organization.

### baremetal-operator

<https://github.com/metal3-io/baremetal-operator>

Generic score: 5.6

Check	Score	Finding
Branch-Protection	3/10	CodeOwner review not required in "main", Required reviewers is 0 in "main"
CII-Best-Practices	0/10	Missing self-assessment + badge in README.md
Dependency-Update-Tool	0/10	Configuration not found
Fuzzing	0/10	No fuzzing
Pinned-Dependencies	5/10	Not all deps (Github actions, Dockerfiles) are pinned by hash
SAST	0/10	No SAST checks
Token-Permissions	0/10	Github workflows using token with too many permissions

# Best Practices Working Group



- Upcoming activities
  - Guide on recommended compiler flags for C/C++
  - Guide on Software Configuration Management best practices

# Tooling Working Group / SBOM Everywhere SIG



- SBOM Everywhere SIG Mission Statement
  - Work within the “evolving” SBOM community to connect and empower that community to create and consume SBOMs. Use the resources available to the OpenSSF to encourage others to cooperate and build the tooling needed for widespread SBOM usage and adoption.

# Tooling Working Group / SBOM Everywhere SIG



- Approach
  1. Create a landscape of SBOM tooling, standards, and organizations in the SBOM community
  2. Use OpenSSF resources to encourage SBOM adoption with a focus on creating and consumption
  3. Focus on the near-term wins initially but with end goals in mind
  4. Incentivize and educate producers, consumers, and maintainers to aid adoption of SBOM tooling
  5. Celebrate wins. Make progress and use very visible

# End Users Working Group



- Purpose
  - Represent the end user's perspective and voice
- Current Work Items
  - [Taxonomy](#) of software supply chain threats
  - [Holistic architecture](#) to address identified threats and map to OpenSSF solutions
- Values
  - Structure complexity of supply chain security
  - Demonstrate the applicability of OpenSSF efforts
  - Facilitate and ease adoption of recommended target solution by end users

# Open Source Security Dashboard



- Purpose
  - Provide metrics to help make decisions about using open source software
- Approach
  - Based on existing data OpenSSF Scorecards, OpenSSF Best Practices Badge, LFX, CHAOSS, etc.
- Values
  - Extremely valuable for open source consumption in R&D

# Open Source Security Dashboard



Overview | Vulnerabilities | Dependencies | Licenses

Security Confidence Index  
Less ———+———— High

Vulnerability Exposure Index  
Few ———+———— Many

Published  
12.1.2022

Description

OpenSSF Scorecard  
Score  
6.6 / 10

Project Criticality

44.49%  
Score

18K  
Watchers

4K  
Contributors

79  
Releases

36  
Direct Dep

80  
Indirect Dep

Vulnerabilities Detected

3  
Critical

5  
High

2  
Medium

10  
Low

# TODO Supply Chain Security Working Group



- Proposed Mission
  - Facilitate the support of Supply Chain Security by OSPOs
  - Boosting the sustainability of Open Source Software
- Approach
  - Leverage and compile material for use by OSPOs
  - Bridge between OSPOs and technical communities
- Example artifact
  - [Blog post](#): “How OSPOs Can Be a Key Lever for Open Source Sustainability and Security”
- Discuss and comment on TODO group strategic goals for 2023
  - <https://github.com/todogroup/governance/issues/262>





# Q & A



