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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3.5(c)

SUMMARY

	USSR	
1.	USSR munitions production increased (page 3).	•
		3.3(h)(2)
Delegan	FAR EAST	
3.	Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector (page 4).	
		3.3(h)(2)
5,	Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed (page 5).
6.	Petroleum being shipped to Communist China from Indonesia (page 5).
	NEAR EAST	
		3.3(h)(2)
8.	UN Secretary-General Lie cautions Israel on its international policies (page 7).	
¢	EASTERN EUROPE	
9.	Anti-Communist resistance in Poland (page 7).	
	WESTERN EUROPE	
		3.3(h)(2)
ļ 1.	Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement (page 9).	

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02733122

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

USSR

USSR munitions production increased:	<i>∨5</i> 5 K
<u>Comment:</u> This wood-working trust in Irkutsk supplies packing for the major armaments plants between Lake Baikal	3.3(h)(
and the Urals. The increase in production of special packing for munitions in the first quarter of 1951 is approximately 50 percent over pro-	
duction for the first quarter of 1950. Further increases are evidently planned, for an additional mill of this trust was preparing in late	•
March to manufacture special packing for munitions.	
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	KORE
	CHINA
	3.3(h)(2
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TOP SECRET

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3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector:

HOREA

CINCFE Telecon
1 May 51

SECRET

A CINCFE telecon of 1 May reported that five enemy tanks attacked six miles northeast of Seoul and that UN aircraft observed seventeen more in enemy rear areas.

Comment: Although there have been almost continuous air sightings of enemy armor since January, scarcely any ground contacts have been reported during this period. This tank contact is reported in the sector occupied by the Chinese Communist 3rd Army Group, previously reported as having received armored support in Manchuria. Two major North Korean armored units are also known to be located in western North Korea.

An 11 April Far East Command analysis of enemy tank sightings revealed 82 sightings in western Korea south of Pyongyang for the period from 16 March to 10 April. In the light of previous experience indicating that air sightings fail to account for more than 50 percent of actual armored strength, this same analysis estimated that the enemy may have at least 150 to 175 tanks for future employment along the more favorable west coast road net.

4.	Manchurian arsenals produce aerial bombs:	CHINA	
	in	3.3(h)(2)	
	late March Manchurian arsenals were ordered		
	to increase the production of aerial bombs of	3.3(h)(2)	

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Comment: The Mukden Arsenal, and probably a few others in Manchuria, are believed to be capable of producing bombs up to 1,000 pounds. This evidence of increased bomb production ties in with recent reports of increased numbers and training activity of Chinese Communist Air Force light bombers.

5. Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed:

CHINA INDOPHIDA

3.3(h)(2)

30 Apr 51 CONFIDENTIAL

US Cons Gen Hong Kong An untested source has informed the US Consul General in Hong Kong that the railroad from Laipin (in Kwangsi province) to the Indochina border at Chennankuan has been completed by

using rails taken from a section of another line in Kweichow province. The source alleges that the line from Nanning to the Indochina border is the same narrow gauge that is used in Indochina railroads.

Comment: This line was previously reported

the Communists

scheduled for completion by the end of April.

had to tear up another line to complete this new one to the Indochina border. This is the only report, however, which indicates that a section of the line is narrow gauge. If true, this would necessitate transshipping at Nanning.

6. Petroleum being shipped to Communist China from Indonesia:

INDONESIA

5 Apr 51 CONFIDENTIAL

US Cons Gen Hong Kong The US Consul General in Hong Kong reports that the tightening of Singapore's export regulations have led to an organized movement of goods from Singapore to Indonesia for trans-

shipment to Hong Kong, Macao, or directly to Communist China. Consul General states that, although the trade is not large as yet, operations may become larger in scale. He mentions in particular the movement of petroleum products via this route, and says that mounting evidence indicates that considerable finance is available to make possible a steady flow of petroleum to Macao from Indonesia.

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NEAR EAST	3.3(h)(
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UN Secretary-General Lie cautions Israel on its international policies: 15891

US Emb Tel Aviv 30 Apr 51 SECRET

According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, UN Secretary-General Lie has discussed with Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett the present unsatisfactory situation in the Middle East.

Referring to the dangers arising from Israel's hatred of the Arab States and to the lack of progress in improving that situation, Lie advised the Israeli Foreign Minister (1) to follow a milder policy in international relations, (2) to abide by the UN decisions, and (3) while retaining a necessary independence, to avoid any course that would lessen Israel's friendship with the US. Lie stressed the importance to Israel of American goodwill, citing the Hule controversy -- particularly the retaliatory bombing -- as an example of unwise policies which might jeopardize US goodwill.

Comment: Domestic considerations within Israel -- such as the strong Israeli nationalism, the influence upon Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of General Yadin, Army Chief of Staff, and the problems involved in a general election this summer -- have made it difficult for the government to pursue a moderate foreign policy, particularly in regard to Israel's relations with the Arab States. Lie's advice, however, may have some effect in improving Israel's attitude toward the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the various Mixed Armistice Commissions.

EASTERN EUROPE

9.	Anti-Communist re	esistance	in	Poland
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3.3(h)(2)

The Polish resistance groups are small, numbering from four to 200 members. They engage in dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda, acts of local sabotage, aid to farmers fighting collectivization, liquidation of Communist activitists and Security Police agents, harassment of Polish and Soviet transportation, raids on political prisons, and attacks on small outlying Security Police offices.

3.3(h)(2)

WIN (Freedom and

Independence), was founded in the first half of 1945, is composed of rem- 3.3(h)(2) nants of World War II undergrounds, and is open to all loyal Poles whatever their political complexion. It is presently estimated to number approximately 10,000 members on an active or semi-active basis.

WIN's current activities are limited, since it holds that attempts at active resistance or an armed uprising would be futile under present circumstances. However, some WIN personnel are believed to be engaged in active resistance despite the organization's policy of passivity.

Presently WIN is the only known nationwide resistance organization capable of supporting an armed internal insurrection in the event of war, provided outside aid were supplied. Moreover, WIN is probably in the best position to organize and give cohesion to the spontaneous resistance groups now scattered throughout Poland.

On the other hand, seven groups of top WIN leaders have been eliminated by the Security Police since 1946. The Security Police have, in addition, prepared elaborate lists of individuals who are deemed politically unreliable, and who would form the bulk of a wartime underground. These lists would provide the information for mass deportations to the USSR or for imprisonment in work camps, thus seriously weakening the formation of an effective wartime resistance organization.

TOP SECRET


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3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

10.	West German	leaders	concerned	over	prospects	of	neo-Nazi	party	in i
	Lower Saxony	election	•		*				



cent of the vote. The party, led by Dr. Fritz Dorls and ex-General Otto Remer, is "essentially a revival of the Nazi Party and proud of that fact." The SRP has been suspected of camouflaged dealings with the East. The Communists have ceased their attacks on the SRP, and in at least one case have given it indirect assistance. Although the Federal Government has considered repressive measures against the party, no definite action banning the SRP has yet been taken. The Social Democratic government of Lower Saxony reportedly is unwilling to take action against the SRP until after the election, hoping that the party will help split and weaken rightist political opponents.

Comment: Numerous reports have been received on the extremely active electioneering of the SRP, which has held large and frequent meetings in Lower Saxony, where it has its largest following. The SRP does not yet represent a nation-wide threat, although it receives much publicity from the demogogic utterances in the West German Bundestag of its leader Dr. Dorls. The party could, however, by securing a large Landtag representation in Lower Saxony, attract considerable publicity and possible strength in Western Germany.

11. Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement:

US Emb Madrid 29 Apr 51 SECRET

The US Embassy in Madrid reports that, despite previous denials, the secretary of the non-Communist opposition Comite Interior de Coordinacion (CIC) now admits that his organization was

- 9 -

behind the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. The CIC is planning a further series of non-violent strikes culminating in a general sit-down strike in Madrid during the month of May synchronized with the issuance of a Monarchist manifesto calling on Franco to turn over the government to the Pretender Don Juan.

Comment: In the light of available evidence, the CIC, a coalition of clandestine Monarchist, Socialist and Anarchist organizations within Spain, does not appear justified in claiming credit for instigating or directing the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. Monarchists within the CIC, who sense the latent possibilities of the strike movement, apparently are anxious to use it as a lever for the immediate ouster of Franco and the restoration of the monarchy under Don Juan. On the other hand, the non-Monarchist elements of the CIC, who have a more intimate grasp of the aspirations of Spanish workers, counsel caution, since they feel that any undue haste might well jeopardize their cause by affording Franco a pretext for a new series of repressive measures that could break the back of the non-violent strike movement before it gains momentum.

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