

Machine Programming


Lecture 11 – Agentic Frameworks for Software Development (2)

Ziyang Li

Logistics – Week 6


- Assignment 2
 - <https://github.com/machine-programming/assignment-2>
 - Due this Sunday (Oct 5th)
 - Expected to take quite some time, so please start working on it early
- Oral presentation sign up sheet
 - Sending out today
 - Oral presentation starting on Week 8

The Course So Far




Agentic Pipelines

- Agent holds the responsibility to
 - Send requests to LLM
 - Keep a history of dialogue
 - Invoke the tools and format the feedback





← User



Environment



Bash




Python




Filesystem

Agentic Framework




Sequential Thinking Tool

- **thought** (string)
 - the current step you want to record
- **nextThoughtNeeded** (boolean)
 - whether you inter...
The user wants to write a function in OCaml. Here are the available tools: [..., {"name": "sequentialthinking"}]
- **thoughtNumber** (in int)
 - index of this step
- **totalThoughts** (int ≥ 1)
 - your *current* plan for how many steps you'll need




File System (FS) Tool

- Create, read, write, or edit files



RAG Database as Tool

- Write me a Dafny function Max : ...
3
8
function Max(a:int, b:int): int
ret
ensures result >= a && result >= b &&
(result == a || result == b) {
"
if a >= b then a else b
}
4
- Querying: embedding-based similarity search
- Assume query x , query embedding is $q(x)$
2
7
Here are the retrieved documents: [[
"Functions are pure: 'function
Max(a:int,b:int):int ensures ...' Example: function
Abs(x:int):int ensures result>=0",
"Methods: 'method M(...) returns (...) use
ensures on methods; assertions with 'assert'",
"Spec grammar for ensures/returns; using 'result'
in postconditions"
]],
5



Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
 - Terminal as a tool
 - Language servers as tools
- Other topics of agentic systems
 - Tool selection problem
 - Interactive programming
 - Context management
 - Security of agentic systems

Terminal as Tool

- Usage
 - Running **compilers**: `gcc foo.c` → syntax/type errors
 - Running **programs**: `python foo.c` → runtime errors
 - Running **tests**: `pytest` → test cases pass/fail
 - Managing **packages**: `pip` (Python), `cargo` (Rust), `npm` (JavaScript)
 - Processing **files**: `cat` (read), `grep/find` (search), `sed` (edit), `echo` (file write)
 - Managing **folders** and **directories**: `cd` (go to dir), `ls` (list items in dir)
- Interaction
 - Input: **command** (string)
 - Output: **stdout / stderr** (string), **exit code** (integer)

Now I need to update the test files to use the correct types. Let me update the test that creates generic types:

test_type_inference.rs +1 -1 •

x ✓ ⚡

Now let me try to compile again:

Auto-Ran command: cd, cargo check

```
$ cd /Users/liby99/Local/Projects/scallop-lang/scallop-v3 && cargo check --package scallop-fir
```

```
For more information about an error, try `rustc --explain E0277`.
```

```
warning: `scallop-fir` (lib) generated 1 warning
```

```
error: could not compile `scallop-fir` (lib) due to 4 previous errors; 1 warning emitted
```

I see the issue. The problem is that I'm trying to match on `Type::Named` and `Type::Generic` but the AST `Type` is actually a struct, not an enum. Let me check the actual structure of the AST Type:


Read `types.rs`

I see! The AST `Type` is actually a struct that represents both named types and generic types. If `type_args` is empty, it's a named type. If `type_args` is not empty, it's a generic type. Let me fix the type checking method:


type_inference.rs +10 -18 •

x ✓ ⚡


Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool




Terminal as Tool



Terminal as Tool



Terminal as Tool



Terminal as Tool

- Context blow-up from command output (esp. build logs)
 - Keep a separate “bash context buffer” from chat/planning memory.
 - Before sending to the LLM, budget-check size.
 - If too large: summarize head + tail (e.g., first 50 lines, last 200 lines, plus a bullet list of errors/warnings).
 - If still large: store full log in a vector DB (with run ID + command + timestamp); send only a compact summary + retrieval keys.
 - Always attach metadata: command, exit code, duration, bytes, truncation flag.

Can you execute a command for me brew install opam

@ [1 Tab]

39.2%

Can you execute this command for me: top

Agent Auto

I'll execute the `top` command for you to show system processes and resource usage.

Rejected command: top

\$ top

[Terminal output truncated: ~3675KB dropped from beginning]

lightEx	0.0	00:00.03	3	2	43	2705K	0B	2384K	68189	1	sleeping	*0[1]	0.
00000	0.00000	501	957	92	189	78		3805		384		209	
3	0	0.0	0	0	0	40	liby99			N/A	N/A	N/A	N/
A	N/A	N/A											
68188	ContactsCoreSpot	0.0	00:00.05	3	2/1	47	3089K	0B	2736K	68188	1	sleeping	
*0[1]	0.00000	0.00000	501	1445	103	249	126	4697		595			
386	44	0	0.0	0	0	40	liby99			N/A	N/		
A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A									
68074	sysmond	0.0	00:23.49	2	1	17	1809K	0B	1488K	68074	1	sleeping	
0[2]	0.00000	0.00000	0	6922	80	377259	223020	448584		345814			
92195	35	1	0.0	0	0	0	0	root			N/A	N/	
A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A									
67831	smd	0.0	00:00.21	2	1	30	2177K	0B	1888K	67831	1	sleeping	
0[23]	0.00000	0.00000	0	4197	81	864	526	9237		2086			
1873	124	2	0.0	0	0	0	0	root			N/A	N/	
A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A									
67822	countryd	0.0	00:00.28	2	1	34	3233K	0B	2832K	67822	1	sleeping	
0[4]	0.00000	0.00000	0	2949	87	316	195	7464		646			
1017	43	2	0.0	0	0	0	0	root			N/A	N/	
A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A									
67029	iCloudNotificati	0.0	00:00.76	3	1	101	6705K	0B	5072K	67029	1	sleeping	

Use Allowlist

Rejected

Terminal as Tool

- Don't rely on stdout alone, inspect exit code & stderr
 - Treat exitCode as the primary success signal.
 - Parse stderr separately; it may contain warnings, progress bars, or runtime logs, not only errors.
 - Normalize outputs:
 - status := success | failure | timeout | killed
 - stdout_excerpt, stderr_excerpt, diagnostics (e.g., grep for “error:”, “warning:”).
 - Prefer structured extraction (regex for file:line:col, error codes) to feed precise hints back to the LLM.

Terminal as Tool

- Non-terminating / long-running commands
 - Set hard timeouts per command (e.g., 30–120s default; shorter for cat, longer for pytest).
 - For allowed long runs:
 - Stream incremental chunks (e.g., every N seconds / N KB) and ask the LLM: “Continue or preempt?”
 - Support preemption (SIGINT/SIGKILL), and return a partial transcript with a “truncated” marker.
 - Maintain a deny/guard list (e.g., top, interactive shells, tail -f) unless explicitly whitelisted.



OPENHANDS: AN OPEN PLATFORM FOR AI SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS AS GENERALIST AGENTS

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Mingchen Zhuge⁶, Jiayi Pan⁴, Yueqi Song², Bowen Li, Jaskirat Singh⁷,
Hoang H. Tran⁸, Fuqiang Li, Ren Ma, Mingzhang Zheng, Bill Qian³, Yanjun Shao³,
Niklas Muennighoff⁵, Yizhe Zhang, Binyuan Hui⁹, Junyang Lin⁹,
Robert Brennan¹⁰, Hao Peng¹, Heng Ji¹, Graham Neubig^{2,10}**


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👋 OPENHANDS: AN OPEN PLATFORM FOR AI SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS AS GENERALIST AGENTS

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


Table 2: Evaluation benchmarks in OpenHands.


Category	Benchmark	Required Capability
Software	SWE-Bench (Jimenez et al., 2024) HumanEvalFix (Muennighoff et al., 2024) BIRD (Li et al., 2023b) BioCoder (Tang et al., 2024c) ML-Bench (Tang et al., 2024b) Gorilla APIBench (Patil et al., 2023) ToolQA (Zhuang et al., 2024)	Fixing Github issues Fixing Bugs Text-to-SQL Bioinformatics coding Machine learning coding Software API calling Tool use
Web	WebArena (Zhou et al., 2023a) MiniWoB++ (Liu et al., 2018)	Goal planning & realistic browsing Short trajectory on synthetic web
Misc. Assistance	GAIA (Mialon et al., 2023) GPQA (Rein et al., 2023) AgentBench (Liu et al., 2023) MINT (Wang et al., 2024b) Entity Deduction Arena (Zhang et al., 2024a) ProofWriter (Tafjord et al., 2021)	Tool-use, browsing, multi-modality Graduate-level Google-proof Q&A Operating system interaction (bash) Multi-turn math and code problems State tracking & strategic planning Deductive Logic Reasoning



OPENHANDS: AN OPEN PLATFORM FOR

AI S

Xing
Ming
Hoan
Nikla
Robe
1UIU
8HCM
xing



OpenHands: Code Less, Make More

CONTRIBUTORS

378

STARS

64K

LICENSE

NOT IDENTIFIABLE BY GITHUB



SLACK

JOIN US



PROJECT

CREDITS



DOCUMENTATION




PAPER ON ARXIV




BENCHMARK SCORE

[Deutsch](#) | [Español](#) | [français](#) | [日本語](#) | [한국어](#) | [Português](#) | [Русский](#) | [中文](#)




Terminal as Tool: Security

- LLM may leave the current working directory
 - CWE-22: Path Traversal Vulnerability



Terminal as Tool: Security

- LLM may pursue excessive permissions
 - CWE-284: Improper Access Controls



When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents

Matous Kozak

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Czech Technical University in Prague

Roshanak Zilouchian Moghaddam

Microsoft

Siva Sivaraman

Microsoft [email](#)

When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents

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Czech Techni

2.1 Data Collection

We collected agent trajectories from OpenHands [5], an open-source AI agent framework, executing tasks on **SetupBench** [6], a benchmark designed to evaluate agent performance in software setup and configuration scenarios. *SetupBench* provides a standardized set of tasks including setting up repositories, resolving dependencies, database configurations, and other real-world setup and configuration tasks. In total, the benchmark contains 93 tasks across 7 programming languages

(Python, TypeScript, JavaScript, Java, Go, Rust, C++). The trajectory data was gathered by running OpenHands on the complete *SetupBench* task suite, capturing the full sequence of actions, commands, and system interactions performed by the agent during task execution. We ran the agent in a controlled Linux environment (Ubuntu 22.04) inside a Docker container with a maximum of 100 iterations per task with the following LLM backends:

When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis

2.1 Data Collection

We collected agent trajectories from OpenHands [5], an open-source AI agent framework, executing

tasks on [GitHub](#) and config
up repositories
configurations

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Table 1: Taxonomy of insecure behaviors observed in agent trajectories.

CWE Category	Description	Example
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information ¹	Storing credentials or secrets directly in code or scripts rather than secure storage	Embedding database credentials in script files or passing passwords via command-line
CWE-284: Improper Access Control ²	File or directory permissions that are overly broad, violating least privilege	Using <code>chmod 777</code> which grants all users full control over a file
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check ³	Running scripts from external sources without verification	Piping curl commands to shell (“curl-bash”) which can execute untrusted code
CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure ⁴	Intentionally disabling security mechanisms to avoid obstacles	Skipping SSH host key checks or disabling database authentication

When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis

2.1 Data Collection

We collected tasks on Set and config up com

Table 1: Taxonomy of insecure behaviors observed in agent trajectories.

CWE Category	Description	Example
CWE-200: F	Format string vulnerability	Using printf with user input without proper validation.
CWE-201: E	Escape character injection	Using eval or similar functions with user input.
CWE-202: S	SQL injection	Using direct SQL queries with user input.
CWE-203: C	Command injection	Using system or shell commands with user input.
CWE-204: T	Type confusion	Misinterpreting data types or sizes.
CWE-205: R	Resource exhaustion	Excessive memory or CPU usage.
CWE-206: P	Path traversal	Navigating through file paths with user input.
CWE-207: I	Information disclosure	Leaking sensitive information.
CWE-208: D	Denial of service	Crashing or crashing the system.
CWE-209: B	Buffer overflow	Writing beyond the bounds of a buffer.
CWE-210: H	Heap corruption	Corrupting the heap memory.
CWE-211: M	Memory leak	Leaking memory that is no longer needed.
CWE-212: N	Network-based attack	Attacking over a network interface.
CWE-213: O	Object-oriented attack	Exploiting flaws in object-oriented programming.
CWE-214: P	Protocol-based attack	Attacking a communication protocol.
CWE-215: R	Runtime error	Crashing or crashing the system during execution.
CWE-216: S	Stack-based attack	Exploiting flaws in the stack memory.
CWE-217: T	Thread-based attack	Attacking threads or thread synchronization.
CWE-218: U	Unintended behavior	Behavior that was not intended or expected.
CWE-219: V	Vulnerability	A weakness in the system that can be exploited.
CWE-220: W	Weakness	A potential problem or risk in the system.
CWE-221: X	Exploit	A method for taking advantage of a vulnerability.
CWE-222: Y	Attack vector	A way to exploit a vulnerability.
CWE-223: Z	Attack surface	The parts of a system that are exposed to attack.

Table 2: Distribution of agent's insecure steps and trajectories from the *SetupBench* by model.

	Steps			Trajectories		
	Total	Insecure	[%]	Total	Insecure	[%]
GPT-4o	1784	34	1.91	93	15	16.13
GPT-4.1	2342	21	0.90	92	16	17.39
Claude 3.5 Sonnet	1236	38	3.07	85	17	20.00
Claude 3.7 Sonnet	3185	62	1.95	92	21	22.83
Claude 4 Sonnet	3915	73	1.86	93	25	26.88
Average			1.83			20.66

Shifting responsibility back to the users...

Can you execute this command for me: top

I'll execute the `top` command for you to show system processes and resource usage.

Run command: top


`$ top`

Use Allowlist ▾ Skip Add 'top' to Allowlist ↗ ↘ Run ↵

Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
 - ~~Terminal as a tool~~
 - Language servers as tools
- Other topics of agentic systems
 - Tool selection problem
 - Interactive programming
 - Context management
 - Security of agentic systems

Language servers as Tools



A screenshot of a code editor showing a Python file named `test.py`. The code contains:

```
1 import sys
2
3 sys.std|
```

The cursor is at the end of `sys.std`. A completion dropdown menu is open, listing:

- __stderr__
- __stdin__
- __stdout__
- stderr
- stdin
- stdout

To the right of the completion menu, a tooltip provides documentation for `stdin`:

instance: sys.
file(name[, mode[, buffering]]) -> file object Open a file. The mode

Python Language Server

Language servers as Tools



Go Language Server

Language servers as Tools

- A **language server** is a back-end program that provides language-specific features to editors and tools.
- Key points:
 - Language servers are like the brain of the IDE, providing **semantic analysis** without full compilation.
 - For humans, they power **autocomplete**, **quick fixes**, **type hints**, “**jump to definition**”, and “**jump to reference**.”
 - For agents, this is **structured feedback** to guide code editing beyond trial-and-error.

Language servers as Tools

- Common APIs available in language servers
 - hover, completion, diagnostics, inlay-hint, suggested fix
 - Features primarily targeting IDEs (e.g., VSCode, Eclipse, IntelliJ)



rust-analyzer is a language server that provides IDE functionality for writing Rust programs. You can use it with any editor that supports the [Language Server Protocol](#) (VS Code, Vim, Emacs, Zed, etc).

rust-analyzer features include go-to-definition, find-all-references, refactorings and code completion. rust-analyzer also supports integrated formatting (with rustfmt) and integrated diagnostics (with rustc and clippy).

Internally, rust-analyzer is structured as a set of libraries for analyzing Rust code. See [Architecture](#) in the manual.

```
18 impl<'a> NodeVisitor<RuleDecl> for TransformTaggedRule<'a> {
19     fn visit_mut(&mut self, rule_decl: &mut RuleDecl) {
20         // If rule is directly declared with probability
21         if let Some(tag) = rule_decl.tag().clone() {
22             // Transform the rule
23             let pred = rule_decl.rule_tag_predicate();
24
25             // We create a new variable to hold the tag
26             let tag_var_name = format!("{}#var");
27             let tag_var = Variable::new(Identifier::new(tag_var_name.clone()));
28             let tag_var_expr = Expr::variable(tag_var);
29
30             // We generate a constraint encoding that `variable == $tag`
31             let eq_constraint = Formula::constraint(Constraint::new(Expr::binary(BinaryExpr::new(
32                 BinaryOp::new_eq(),
33                 tag_var_expr.clone(),
34                 tag.to_front_expr(),
35             ))));
36
37             // Generate the foreign predicate atom with that tag variable as the only argument
38             let atom = Atom::new(Identifier::new(pred.clone()), vec![], vec![tag_var_expr]);
39             let atom_formula = Formula::atom(atom);
40
41             // Generate a formula that is the conjunction of constraint and atom
42             let to_add_formula = Formula::conjunction(C conjunction::new(vec![eq_constraint, atom_formula]));
43
44             // Update the original rule body
45             let new_body = Formula::Conjunction(C conjunction::new(vec![to_add_formula, rule_decl.rule().body().clone()]));
46             *rule_decl.rule_mut().body_mut() = new_body;
47
48             // Remove the rule tag surface syntax
49             *rule_decl.tag_mut() = None;
50
51             // Tell the analyzer to store the information
52             let rule_id = rule_decl.rule().location().clone();
53             self
54                 .tagged_rule_analysis
55                 .add_tag_predicate(rule_id, pred, tag_var_name, tag.location().clone());
```

```
18 impl<'a> NodeVisitor<RuleDecl> for TransformTaggedRule<'a> {
19     fn visit(&mut self, rule_decl: &mut RuleDecl) {
20         // I
21         if let l = rule_decl.tag().clone() {
22             // mismatched types
23             if l.expected_ty().is_err() {
24                 // expected enum `compiler::front::ast::expr::Expr`
25                 // found enum `std::option::Option<compiler::front::ast::expr::Expr>` rustc(Click for full compiler diagnostic)
26                 tagged_rule.rs(31, 76): arguments to this function are incorrect
27                 expr.rs(278, 46): associated function defined here
28                 tagged_rule.rs(34, 28): consider using `Option::expect` to unwrap the
29                 `std::option::Option<compiler::front::ast::expr::Expr>` value, panicking if the value is an `Option::None`:
30                 `.expect("REASON")`
31             }
32         }
33         le Fix in Chat (⇧⌘D)
34     }
35 }
36 op2: tag.to_front_expr(),
37 );
38
39 // Generate the foreign predicate atom with that tag variable as the only argument
40 let atom: AstNodeWrapper<_Atom> = Atom::new(predicate: Identifier::new(name: pred.clone()), type_... vec![], vec![tag_var_expr]);
41 let atom_formula: Formula = Formula::atom(atom);
42
43 // Generate a formula that is the conjunction of constraint and atom
44 let to_add_formula: Formula = Formula::conjunction(Conjunction::new(args: vec![eq_constraint, atom_formula]));
45
46 // Update the original rule body
47 let new_body: Formula = Formula::Conjunction(Conjunction::new(args: vec![to_add_formula, rule_decl.rule().body().clone()]));
```

Fix in Chat (⇧⌘D)


⌘+click to open in new tab

```
48 *rule_decl.rule_mut().body_mut() = new_body;
49
50 // Remove the rule tag surface syntax
51 *rule_decl.tag_mut() = None;
52
53 // Tell the analyzer to store the information
54 let rule_id: NodeLocation = rule_decl.rule().location().clone();
55 self &mut TransformTaggedRule<'a>
    .tagged_rule_analysis &mut TaggedRuleAnalysis
    .add_tag_predicate(rule_id, name: pred, arg_name: tag_var_name, tag_loc: tag.location().clone());
```

Language Server (LS) as Tool

1. Diagnostics (LS → LLM)


```
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 4,
  "method": "textDocument/codeAction",
  "params": {
    "textDocument": {
      "uri": "file:///workspace/main.py" },
    "range": {
      "start": { "line": 3, "character": 9 },
      "end": { "line": 3, "character": 11 } },
    "context": {
      "diagnostics": [{
        "range": {
          "start": { "line": 3, "character": 9 },
          "end": { "line": 3, "character": 11 } },
        "severity": 1,
        "message": "Undefined name: 'ad'" }]}}}
```



Language Server (LS) as Tool

1. Diagnostics (LS → LLM)
2. Asks for a fix (LLM → LS)


```
{ "tool": "pyright",
  "name": "textDocument/codeAction",
  "arguments": {
    "textDocument": { "uri": "file:///workspace/main.py" },
    "range": {
      "start": { "line": 3, "character": 9 },
      "end": { "line": 3, "character": 11 }
    }
  }
}
```



Language Server (LS) as Tool

1. Diagnostics (LS → LLM)
2. Asks for a fix (LLM → LS)
3. Performs simple fix (LS → Env)


```
{ "kind": "quickfix", "edit": {  
  "documentChanges": [ {  
    "textDocument": {  
      "uri": "file:///workspace/main.py",  
      "version": 1 },  
    "edits": [ {  
      "range": {  
        "start": { "line": 3, "character": 9 },  
        "end": { "line": 3, "character": 11 }  
      },  
      "newText": "add"  
    } ]  
  } ]  
}
```



Language Server (LS) as Tool

1. Diagnostics (LS → LLM)
2. Asks for a fix (LLM → LS)
3. Performs simple fix (LS → Env)
4. Report to LLM agent (Env → LLM)

```
{ "success": true }
```



Language Server (LS) as Tool

- Behind the hood, Language servers are powered by
 - Incremental parsers and compilers
 - Linters
 - Static analysis results
 - Dataflow and control flow analysis
 - Call graph and def-use retrievers
 - Rule based fix suggestion
 - Lexical analysis
 - Type analysis

MarsCode Agent: AI-native Automated Bug Fixing

Yizhou Liu^{1*} Pengfei Gao^{1*} Xinchen Wang^{2†} Jie Liu¹

Yexuan Shi¹ Zhao Zhang¹ Chao Peng^{1‡}

¹ByteDance ²Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen

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[https://se-research.bytedance.com/](https://se-research/bytedance.com/)

CODEAGENT: Enhancing Code Generation with Tool-Integrated Agent Systems for Real-World Repo-level Coding Challenges

Kechi Zhang*, Jia Li*, Ge Li†, Xianjie Shi, Zhi Jin†

Key Lab of High Confidence Software Technology (PKU), Ministry of Education


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
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MarsCode Agent: AI-native Automated Bug Fixing



CODEAGENT: Enhancing Code Generation Systems for Real-World Repo-level Testing


Kechi Zhang*, Jia Li*, Ge Li†, Xianjie Shi, Zhi Jin†
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Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
 - ~~Terminal as a tool~~
 - ~~Language servers as tools~~
- Other topics of agentic systems
 - Tool selection problem
 - Context management
 - Security of agentic systems

Tool Selection Problem



Tool Selection Problem

- Agents often have **too many tools** available:
 - Sequential thinking, web search, file system, vector database, terminal, language servers, CI/CD pipelines
 - Auxiliary tools: get date/time, user info, local IDE context, system info
- Wrong tool choice leads to...
 - Wasted tokens, cost, wrong fixes, security loopholes...
- How could LLM agent plan and know what tool to use?
 - Challenge 1: multiple ways to solve the same problem
 - Challenge 2: some are costly but precise, others are cheap but shallow
 - Challenge 3: error attribution – which tool call led to a failure outcome?

On the Tool Manipulation Capability of Open-source Large Language Models

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On the Tool Manipulation Capability of Open-source Large Language Models

Qiantong Xu, Feng

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Table 4: Tasks in the ToolBench. We provide demonstration examples for few-shot in-context-learning while test cases are for quantitatively evaluation. We develop API complexity, a metric to quantify the challenge level in generalizing to unseen API combinations; higher complexity indicates more challenging tasks. We package the challenges beyond API complexity as advanced reasoning. We refer to Appendix A for more details on these tasks.

Task	Single Step					Multi-Step		
	Open Weather	The Cat API	Home Search	Trip Booking	Google Sheets	VirtualHome	WebShop Long / Short	Tabletop
Data								
API functions	9	6	15	20	108	40	2	32
Demonstration examples	18	12	10	11	10	83	1533 / 200	74
Test cases	100	100	100	120	70	100	100	105
Level of challenges								
API complexity	2.2	1.4	7.3	11.1	8.4	12.3	0.0	4.6
Advanced reasoning					✓		✓	✓

On the Tool Manipulation Capability of

Table 4: Tasks in the ToolBench. We provide demonstration examples for few-shot in-context-learning while test cases are for quantitatively evaluation. We develop API complexity, a metric to quantify the challenge level in generalizing to unseen API combinations; higher complexity indicates more challenging tasks. We package the challenges beyond API complexity as advanced reasoning. We refer to Appendix A for more details on these tasks.

Task
Data
API functions
Demonstration example
Test cases
Level of challenges
API complexity
Advanced reasoning

Table 6: Capability gap in tool manipulation is substantial between closed API and open-source LLMs in the out-of-the-box zero-shot setting. Using model alignment, the in-context demonstration retriever and the system prompt, open-sourced LLMs attain significant boost in success rate. GPT-4 is enhanced with the retriever and system prompt. Tabletop is only evaluated in the few-shot fashion.

Task	Open	The Cat	Home	Trip	Google	VirtualHome	WebShop		Tabletop
	Weather	API	Search	Booking	Sheets		Long	Short	
Zero-shot Baseline									
GPT-4	81.3	97.4	76.6	91.5	5.7	40.8 / 8.0	0.0	-	
LLaMA-30b	39.0	49.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	78.0 / 0.3	0.0	-	
StarCoder	32.0	71.0	7.0	13.3	5.9	22.0 / 3.7	0.0	-	
CodeGen-16B-mono	7.0	78.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	4.0 / 1.0	0.0	-	
Enhanced w/ techniques									
GPT-4	99.0	98.0	98.0	99.2	68.6	29.0 / 21.7	0.0	0.0	83.8
LLaMA-30b	100.0	94.0	87.0	85.8	2.9	16.0 / 24.3	0.0	0.0	7.5
StarCoder	99.0	97.0	83.0	80.8	21.2	31.0 / 18.4	0.0	0.0	13.9
CodeGen-16B-mono	97.7	99.0	82.0	77.5	19.8	29.0 / 17.2	0.0	3.5	16.2

TOOLGEN: UNIFIED TOOL RETRIEVAL AND CALLING VIA GENERATION

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Lei Ji³


³Microsoft

Shu Wang⁴

TOOLGEN: UNIFIED TOOL RETRIEVAL AND CALLING VIA GENERATION


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TOOLGEN: UNIFIED TOOL RETRIEVAL AND CALLING

VIA G...



TOOLGEN: UNIFIED TOOL RETRIEVAL AND CALLING

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


Table 1: Tool retrieval evaluation across two settings: (1) **In-Domain**, where models are trained and evaluated within the same domain; and (2) **Multi-Domain**, where models are trained on all domains and evaluated with the full set of tools across all domains. BM25, EmbSim, and Re-Invoke are unsupervised baselines without training. IterFeedback is retrieval system with multiple models and feedback mechanism. ToolRetriever is trained using contrastive learning, while ToolGen is trained with next-token prediction. Results marked with * were not implemented by us and are copied from their original paper, and hence only in the In-Domain setting. For ToolGen in the In-Domain setting, we allow the generation space to include all tokens, which is a more challenging scenario compared to other models. Best results in each category are **bolded**.

Model	I1			I2			I3		
	NDCG1	NDCG3	NDCG5	NDCG1	NDCG3	NDCG5	NDCG1	NDCG3	NDCG5
In-Domain									
BM25	29.46	31.12	33.27	24.13	25.29	27.65	32.00	25.88	29.78
Long-Context LLM*	32.22	42.87	52.14	25.39	33.91	46.07	25.11	32.57	44.03
EmbSim	63.67	61.03	65.37	49.11	42.27	46.56	53.00	46.40	52.73
Re-Invoke*	69.47	—	61.10	54.56	—	53.79	59.65	—	59.55
IterFeedback*	90.70	90.95	92.47	<u>89.01</u>	<u>85.46</u>	<u>87.10</u>	91.74	87.94	90.20
ToolRetriever	80.50	79.55	84.39	71.18	64.81	70.35	70.00	60.44	64.70
ToolGen	<u>89.17</u>	<u>90.85</u>	92.67	91.45	88.79	91.13	<u>87.00</u>	<u>85.59</u>	<u>90.16</u>
Multi-Domain									
BM25	22.77	22.64	25.61	18.29	20.74	22.18	10.00	10.08	12.33
EmbSim	54.00	50.82	55.86	40.84	36.67	39.55	18.00	17.77	20.70
ToolRetriever	72.31	70.30	74.99	64.54	57.91	63.61	52.00	39.89	42.92
ToolGen	87.67	88.84	91.54	83.46	86.24	88.84	79.00	79.80	84.79

Note on NDCG Metrics


- Normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG)
- Evaluating ranking quality
- For example:
 - Ground truth ranking: [C, A, B, D]
 - Predicted ranking 1: [C, B, A, D]
 - Predicted ranking 2: [A, C, B, D]
- Discounted cumulative gain (DCG) divided by Ideal discounted cumulative gain (IDCG)

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Multi-Domain									
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ToolGen	87.67	88.84	91.54	83.46	86.24	88.84	79.00	79.80	84.79


Note on NDCG Metrics

- Normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG)
- Evaluating **ranking** quality
- For example:
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 - Predicted ranking 2: [A, C, B, D]
- Discounted cumulative gain (DCG) divided by Ideal discounted cumulative gain (IDCG)



Note on NDCG@k Metrics

- Normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG)
- Evaluating ranking quality
- For example:
 - Ground truth ranking: [C, A, B, D]
 - Predicted ranking 1: [C, B, A, D]
 - Predicted ranking 2: [A, C, B, D]
- Discounted cumulative gain (DCG) divided by Ideal discounted cumulative gain (IDCG) up to index k



Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
 - ~~Terminal as a tool~~
 - ~~Language servers as tools~~
- Other topics of agentic systems
 - ~~Tool selection problem~~
 - Context management
 - Security of agentic systems

Context Management Problem

- Phenomena related to long contexts:
 - When context is too long, LLM performance starts to degrade
 - Information buried in the middle would be more likely ignored by LLM

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LongICLBench: Long-context LLMs Struggle with Long In-context Learning

♠, ♦Tianle Li, ♠, ♦Ge Zhang, ♠Quy Duc Do, †Xiang Yue, ♠, ♦Wenhu Chen

♠University of Waterloo

†Carnegie Mellon University


♣Vector Institute, Toronto

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<https://github.com/TIGER-AI-Lab/LongICLBench>

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Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts

Nelson F. Liu^{1*}

Kevin Lin²

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Michele Bevilacqua³

Fabio Petroni³

Percy Liang¹

¹Stanford University


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Context Management Problem

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Context Rot




CHROMA TECHNICAL REPORT

July 14, 2025

Context Rot: How Increasing Input Tokens Impacts LLM Performance

Context Rot: How Tokens Impact



Context Management Problem


- Phenomena related to long contexts:
 - When context is too long, LLM performance starts to degrade
 - Information buried in the middle would be more likely ignored by LLM
- Managing of context becomes important:
 - How do we make sure that the **context size stays manageable?**
 - How do we make sure that **relevant information are recognizable** by LLM?

Context Management Problem

- Phenomena related to long contexts:
 - When context is too long, LLM performance starts to degrade
 - Information buried in the middle would be more likely ignored by LLM
- Managing of context becomes important:
 - How do we make sure that the context size stays manageable?
 - How do we make sure that relevant information are recognizable by LLM?
- Solution: **Improving token efficiency of tools**
 - For costly tool calls, optimize the tokens; prefer dense information
 - Avoid showing full terminal error message logs or entire files

Summarization & Compression

- ... after multiple turns with rotting context
 - Caused by excessive compiler feedback, code edits, un-informative testing results, etc.
- Agentic framework:
 - Summarizes the current context...
 - Saves the summarization into a file...
 - Stores the file into RAG database...
 - Clears the context...
 - Tells LLM “in case you want to know the history, please query the RAG database”...
 - Continuing the implementation...




Active Context Management

SCULPTOR: EMPOWERING LLMs WITH COGNITIVE AGENCY VIA ACTIVE CONTEXT MANAGEMENT


Mo Li¹, L.H. Xu², Qitai Tan¹, Long Ma³, Ting Cao^{1*}, Yunxin Liu¹

¹ Tsinghua University ² Independent ³ Peking University

Active Context Management



Active Context Management



Active Context Management

SCULPTOR: EMPOWERING LLMs WITH COGNITIVE AGENCEY

Mo Li¹, L...

¹ Tsinghua




Figure 1: Overview of Sculptor's process for managing active context, transforming overloaded contexts into optimized ones, enabling successful task completion.

Table 1: Performance improvements of frontier models with ACM Tools on NeedleBench-M-RS and PI-LLM benchmarks. Both benchmarks demonstrate substantial performance gains.

Method	NeedleBench-M-RS					PI-LLM (Update Count / Context Length)							
	2-N	3-N	4-N	5-N	Avg	4/1K	8/2K	16/4K	32/8K	64/16K	128/32K	256/64K	Avg
Claude-4-Sonnet													
Baseline	96.0	82.0	54.0	36.0	67.0	99.13	95.65	92.17	84.78	81.74	65.22	69.57	84.04
w/ ACM Tools	100.0	98.0	88.0	90.0	94.0	90.43	91.74	98.26	92.17	91.74	87.39	77.83	89.94
Δ	+4.0	+16.0	+34.0	+54.0	+27.0	-8.70	-3.91	+6.09	+7.39	+10.00	+22.17	+8.26	+5.90
GPT-4.1													
Baseline	90.0	64.0	30.0	8.0	48.0	96.96	91.30	79.57	67.83	63.04	63.91	50.43	73.29
w/ ACM Tools	96.0	84.0	60.0	44.0	71.0	92.17	89.13	93.04	83.91	76.09	64.35	60.43	79.87
Δ	+6.0	+20.0	+30.0	+36.0	+23.0	-4.79	-2.17	+13.47	+16.08	+13.05	+0.44	+10.00	+6.58
DeepSeek-V3													
Baseline	88.0	68.0	28.0	16.0	50.0	95.22	85.65	70.00	63.91	33.04	32.17	21.74	57.39
w/ ACM Tools	92.0	58.0	50.0	32.0	58.0	73.91	90.00	79.13	37.39	53.04	55.65	11.74	57.27
Δ	+4.0	-10.0	+22.0	+16.0	+8.0	-21.31	+4.35	+9.13	-26.52	+20.00	+23.48	-10.00	-0.12

Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
 - ~~Terminal as a tool~~
 - ~~Language servers as tools~~
- Other topics of agentic systems
 - ~~Tool selection problem~~
 - ~~Context management~~
 - Security of agentic systems

Security of Agentic Frameworks



When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents

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When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents

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Czech Techni

2.1 Data Collection

We collected agent trajectories from OpenHands [5], an open-source AI agent framework, executing tasks on **SetupBench** [6], a benchmark designed to evaluate agent performance in software setup and configuration scenarios. *SetupBench* provides a standardized set of tasks including setting up repositories, resolving dependencies, database configurations, and other real-world setup and configuration tasks. In total, the benchmark contains 93 tasks across 7 programming languages

(Python, TypeScript, JavaScript, Java, Go, Rust, C++). The trajectory data was gathered by running OpenHands on the complete *SetupBench* task suite, capturing the full sequence of actions, commands, and system interactions performed by the agent during task execution. We ran the agent in a controlled Linux environment (Ubuntu 22.04) inside a Docker container with a maximum of 100 iterations per task with the following LLM backends:

When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis

2.1 Data Collection

We collected agent trajectories from OpenHands [5], an open-source AI agent framework, executing

tasks on [GitHub](#) and config
up repositories
configurations

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Table 1: Taxonomy of insecure behaviors observed in agent trajectories.

CWE Category	Description	Example
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information ¹	Storing credentials or secrets directly in code or scripts rather than secure storage	Embedding database credentials in script files or passing passwords via command-line
CWE-284: Improper Access Control ²	File or directory permissions that are overly broad, violating least privilege	Using chmod 777 which grants all users full control over a file
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check ³	Running scripts from external sources without verification	Piping curl commands to shell (“curl-bash”) which can execute untrusted code
CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure ⁴	Intentionally disabling security mechanisms to avoid obstacles	Skipping SSH host key checks or disabling database authentication

When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis

2.1 Data Collection

We collected tasks on **Set** and configu

Table 1: Taxonomy of insecure behaviors observed in agent trajectories.

CWE Category	Description	Example
CWE-200: F	Stack-based buffer overflow	Stack-based buffer overflow

Table 2: Distribution of agent's insecure steps and trajectories from the *SetupBench* by model.

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	Steps			Trajectories		
	Total	Insecure	[%]	Total	Insecure	[%]
GPT-4o	1784	34	1.91	93	15	16.13
GPT-4.1	2342	21	0.90	92	16	17.39
Claude 3.5 Sonnet	1236	38	3.07	85	17	20.00
Claude 3.7 Sonnet	3185	62	1.95	92	21	22.83
Claude 4 Sonnet	3915	73	1.86	93	25	26.88
Average			1.83			20.66

CWE: Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
A community-developed list of SW & HW weaknesses that can become vulnerabilities

Top 25 **Top HW CWE** **New to CWE?**
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CWE Knowing the weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities means software developers, hardware designers, and security architects can eliminate them before deployment, when it is much easier and cheaper to do so

Learn About CWE

Overview – Learn what CWE is and how to use the information available on this website Basics FAQs Glossary	Root Cause Mapping – Learn about identifying the underlying cause(s) of a vulnerability Guidance Quick Tips Examples
---	---

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Podcast [Mapping CVEs to CWEs Is Main Topic of "We Speak CVE" Podcast](#)
News [Videos of Three CWE-Focused Sessions at VulnCon 2025 Now Available](#)
Podcast ["Root Cause Mapping and the CWE Top 25"](#)
News ["2024 CWE Top 10 KEV Weaknesses" List Now Available](#)
Community [View and Comment on Community Submissions in the "CWE Content Development Repository \(CDR\)"](#)

CWE: Common Weakness Enumeration

2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses

[Top 25 Home](#)[Share via:](#) [View in table format](#)[Key Insights](#)[Methodology](#)**1**

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
[CWE-79](#) | CVEs in KEV: 3 | Rank Last Year: 2 (up 1)

2

Out-of-bounds Write
[CWE-787](#) | CVEs in KEV: 18 | Rank Last Year: 1 (down 1)

3

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
[CWE-89](#) | CVEs in KEV: 4 | Rank Last Year: 3

4

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
[CWE-352](#) | CVEs in KEV: 0 | Rank Last Year: 9 (up 5)

5

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
[CWE-22](#) | CVEs in KEV: 4 | Rank Last Year: 8 (up 3)

6

Out-of-bounds Read
[CWE-125](#) | CVEs in KEV: 3 | Rank Last Year: 7 (up 1)

7

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
[CWE-78](#) | CVEs in KEV: 5 | Rank Last Year: 5 (down 2)

8


Use After Free
[CWE-416](#) | CVEs in KEV: 5 | Rank Last Year: 4 (down 4)

9


Missing Authorization
[CWE-862](#) | CVEs in KEV: 0 | Rank Last Year: 11 (up 2)

Terminal as Tool: Security

- LLM may leave the current working directory
 - CWE-22: Path Traversal Vulnerability



Sandboxing LLM Agents



Sandboxing LLM Agents



OPENHANDS: AN OPEN PLATFORM FOR AI SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS AS GENERALIST AGENTS

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Hoang H. Tran⁸, Fuqiang Li, Ren Ma, Mingzhang Zheng, Bill Qian³, Yanjun Shao³,
Niklas Muennighoff⁵, Yizhe Zhang, Binyuan Hui⁹, Junyang Lin⁹,
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Sandboxing LLM Agents



OPENHANDS: AN OPEN PLATFORM FOR AI SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS AS GENERALIST AGENTS

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In this paper, we introduce OpenHands (*f.k.a.* OpenDevin), a community-driven platform designed for the development of generalist and specialist AI agents that interact with the world through software.¹ It features:

- (1) **An interaction mechanism** which allows user interfaces, agents, and environments to interact through an *event stream* architecture that is powerful and flexible (§2.1).
- (2) **A runtime environment** that consists of a docker-sandboxed operating system with a bash shell, a web browser, and IPython server that the agents can interact with (§2.2).
- (3) **An interface** allowing the agent to interact with the environment in a manner similar to actual software engineers (§2.3). We provide the capability for agents to a) create and edit complex software, b) execute arbitrary code in the sandbox, and c) browse websites to collect information.
- (4) **Multi-agent delegation**, allowing multiple specialized agents to work together (§2.4).
- (5) **Evaluation framework**, facilitating the evaluation of agents across a wide range of tasks (§4).

Topics of Today

- More tools for agentic systems:
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 - ~~Security of agentic systems~~

Logistics – Week 6

- Assignment 2
 - <https://github.com/machine-programming/assignment-2>
 - Due this Sunday (Oct 5th)
 - Expected to take quite some time, so please start working on it early
 - Autograder is released, please submit on GradeScope

The image shows two side-by-side screenshots of a web-based autograder interface.

Autograder Results (Left):

- Header: Autograder Results
- Buttons: Results (selected), Code
- Section: Autograder Output (hidden from students)
 - Starting Assignment 2 Autograder...
 - Copying submission files...
 - Copying .json files to reports directory...
 - Copying .png files to visualizations directory...
 - [WARNING] Running as root is not recommended
 - Running autograder tests...
 - Post-processing results...
 - Results processed and saved to /autograder/results/results.json
 - Total score: 80/0
 - Autograder completed.
- Section: 1.1) OCaml: Test evaluation with syntax error. (1/1)
 - Syntax error test passed - 1 compiler errors
- Section: 1.2) OCaml: Test evaluation with type error. (1/1)
 - Type error test passed - 1 compiler errors
- Section: 1.3) OCaml: Test evaluation with runtime error. (1/1)
 - Runtime error test passed - 3 runtime errors, 0/3 tests passed
- Section: 1.4) OCaml: Test evaluation with timeout. (1/1)
 - Timeout test passed - 1 runtime errors, 0/1 tests passed
- Section: 1.5) OCaml: Test evaluation with partial test failure. (1/1)
 - Partial failure test passed - 1/3 tests passed (33.33%)

Assignment 2: Evaluating • Ungraded Coding LLMs

Student: Unknown Student (removed from roster?)

Total Points: - / 100 pts

Autograder Score: 80.0 / 80.0

Passed Tests:

- 1.1) OCaml: Test evaluation with syntax error. (1/1)
- 1.2) OCaml: Test evaluation with type error. (1/1)
- 1.3) OCaml: Test evaluation with runtime error. (1/1)
- 1.4) OCaml: Test evaluation with timeout. (1/1)
- 1.5) OCaml: Test evaluation with partial test failure. (1/1)
- 1.6) OCaml: Test evaluation with complete success. (1/1)
- 1.7) OCaml: Test evaluation with undefined variable error. (1/1)
- 1.8) OCaml: Test evaluation with pattern matching error. (1/1)
- 1.9) OCaml: Test evaluation with compilation failure. (1/1)
- 2.1) Python: Test evaluation with syntax error. (1/1)
- 2.2) Python: Test evaluation with indentation error. (1/1)
- 2.3) Python: Test evaluation with runtime error. (1/1)
- 2.4) Python: Test evaluation with timeout. (1/1)
- 2.5) Python: Test evaluation with partial test failure. (1/1)