

## Lecture 8.1

### Selfish Load Balancing Game

- Players :  $[n]$  the set of jobs.
- Strategy set of each player :  $[m]$   
the set of machines.
- Strategy profile : an assignment  
 $A : [n] \longrightarrow [m]$
- Cost function : suppose  $i$ -th job is assigned to

$j$ -th machine. Each job  $i \in [n]$  has a length  $w_i$  and each  
 machine  $j$  has a speed of  $s_j$ . Time taken to  
 run job  $i$  in machine  $j$  is  $\frac{w_i}{s_j}$ . The load  $l_j$   
 of machine  $j$  in an assignment  $A: [n] \rightarrow [m]$   
 is  $\sum_{i \in [n]: A(i)=j} \frac{w_i}{s_j}$ . The cost of job  $i$  in a  
 strategy profile  $A: [n] \rightarrow [m]$  is  $l_j$  where  $A(i)=j$ .

Theorem: Every selfish load balancing game has a PSNE.

Proof: Associate every assignment  $A:[n] \rightarrow [m]$  with its sorted "load vector"  $(\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_m)$   $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \dots \geq \lambda_m$ . We say  $(\overset{\rightarrow}{\lambda}_1, \dots, \lambda_m) > (\overset{\rightarrow}{\lambda}'_1, \dots, \lambda'_m)$  if there exists  $j \in [m]$  such that  $\lambda_k = \lambda'_k \quad \forall k \in [j-1],$   $\lambda_j > \lambda'_j.$

Let  $(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_m)$  be the smallest sorted load vector, let  
 the assignment  $A$  corresponds to  $(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_m)$ . We claim  
 that  $A$  is a PSNE. Suppose not. Then, there exists  
 a job  $i \in [n]$  which benefits by moving from machine  
 $s$  to machine  $t$ .

$$\begin{aligned} & (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_a, \underset{s}{\uparrow}, \dots, \underset{t}{\uparrow}, \gamma_b, \dots, \gamma_m) \\ & > (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{a-1}, \dots, \dots, \dots, \underset{t}{\uparrow}, \dots, \gamma_m) \quad \text{new sorted load vector} \end{aligned}$$

This contradicts our assumption that  $(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_m)$  is the  
smallest sorted load vector.  $\square$

Theorem: The PoA of any selfish load balancing game with  
 $n$  jobs and  $m$  identical (same speed) machines is  
at most  $2 - \frac{2}{m+1}$ .

Proof: Since the machines are identical, wlog  
that  $s_j = 1 \quad \forall j \in [m]$ ,

Let  $A$  be a PSNE assignment. Social welfare function  
is the makespan i.e.  $\max_{j \in [m]} l_j$ . Let  $OPT$  be the minimum  
makespan possible.

Let  $c(A) = l_{j^*}$

There must be at least 2 jobs assigned to  $j^*$ .

Otherwise,  $c(A) = l_{j^*} = OPT$  since  $OPT \geq \max_{i \in [n]} w_i$

and  $P_{\text{opt}} = 1$

Let  $i^* \in [n]$  be a job assigned to  $j^*$  in  $A$ .

wlog

$$j \in [m] \setminus \{j^*\},$$

$$w_{i^*} \leq \frac{1}{2} c(A)$$

$$l_j + w_{i^*} \geq l_{j^*}$$

$$\Rightarrow l_j \geq c(A) - w_{i^*}$$

$$> c(A) - \frac{1}{2} c(A)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} c(A)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 OPT &\geq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i}{m} \\
 &= \frac{\sum_{j=1}^m l_j}{m} \\
 &= \frac{l_{j^*} + \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq j^*}}^m l_j}{m} \\
 &\geq \frac{c(A) + \frac{1}{2}(m-1)c(A)}{m} \\
 &= \frac{m+1}{2m} c(A)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$P_{\sigma A} = \frac{c(A)}{\#T} \leq \frac{2^m}{m+1} = 2 - \frac{2}{m+1}$$

□