

**Table 3: Assessments of RttT Influence by State Legislators**

	All states (%)	RttT winning states (%)	RttT applicants (%)	RttT non- applicants (%)
Massive influence	5.69	8.51	4.92	4.35
Big influence	26.24	52.13	20.08	8.70
Minor influence	49.01	37.23	53.79	45.65
No influence at all	19.06	2.13	21.21	41.30
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Number of respondents	404	94	264	46

This table reports responses from an online survey conducted in the spring of 2014 in which state legislators were asked the following question: “In an effort to encourage state governments to pass elements of his education agenda, President Obama in 2010 launched a series of competitions known as Race to the Top. In these competitions, states had a chance of winning federal monies in exchange for their commitments to enact a series of specific education policies that were supported by the federal Department of Education. We’re wondering what impact, if any, these initiatives have had on education policymaking in your state. Have they had a massive impact, a big impact, a minor impact, or no impact at all?” A two-tailed t-test finds the responses of each paired combination of winners, losers, and non-applicants to be statistically significantly different from one another at the  $p < 0.01$  level.

Table 4: RttT Policy Enactment among Winners and Losers

	(1a) RttT Policies	(1b) Control Policies	(2a) RttT Policies	(2b) Control Policies	(3a) RttT Policies	(3b) Control Policies	(4a) RttT Policies	(4b) Control Policies
Won RttT (up to time t)	0.408*** (0.032)	0.289** (0.114)	0.406*** (0.032)	0.283** (0.114)	0.519*** (0.001)	0.064 (0.039)	0.592** (0.247)	-0.287*** (0.096)
Applied and lost RttT (up to time t)	0.207*** (0.033)	0.123 (0.099)	0.205*** (0.033)	0.120 (0.099)	0.549*** (0.046)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.620** (0.235)	-0.305*** (0.096)
State education revenue per capita							0.109 (0.151)	0.003 (0.184)
Democratic governor							-0.019 (0.032)	-0.072* (0.040)
Democratic majority, both chambers							0.039 (0.027)	0.017 (0.035)
Constant	0.160*** (0.026)	0.137 (0.087)	0.052 (0.063)	0.012 (0.089)	0.076 (0.058)	0.180*** (0.041)	-0.150 (0.314)	0.178 (0.376)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.091	0.047	0.353	0.142	0.424	0.499	0.424	0.501
N	4762	689	4762	689	4762	689	4762	689

Per capita income and state revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of dollars. Elementary-secondary school enrollment and state population are in thousands. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.

**Table 5: Linking RttT Policy Enactments to Application Promises**

	(1)	(2)
Won RttT (up to time t)	-0.011 (0.078)	-0.011 (0.077)
Promise * won	0.200*** (0.063)	0.201*** (0.062)
Promise * applied and lost	0.216*** (0.036)	0.217*** (0.036)
State education revenue per capita		0.117 (0.209)
Democratic governor		-0.016 (0.035)
Democratic majority, both chambers		0.042 (0.027)
Constant	-0.002 (0.058)	0.019 (0.308)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Policy fixed effects	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.446	0.446
N	4384	4384

Per capita income and state revenue and expenditure variables are in thousands of dollars. Elementary-secondary school enrollment and state population are in thousands. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.

**Table 6: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated  
Exact Matching on Year and Policy Domain, Nearest Neighbor Matching on  
Section Score**

Comparison 1: 2010-11, treated observations include Phase 1 and 2 winners and untreated observations include all others

	(1) Full data	(2) Cal=0.1 SD	(3) Cal=0.05 SD
ATT	0.120*** (0.032)	0.115*** (0.037)	0.098** (0.038)
N	936	676	652

Comparison 2: 2012-13, treated observations include Phase 3 winners and untreated observations include applicants that never won

	(1) Full data	(2) Cal=0.1 SD	(3) Cal=0.05 SD
ATT	0.093*** (0.033)	0.156*** (0.036)	0.154*** (0.037)
N	776	628	596

Comparison 3: 2012-13, treated observations include Phase 1 and 2 winners and untreated observations include all others (including Phase 3 winners)

	(1) Full data	(2) Cal=0.1 SD	(3) Cal=0.05 SD
ATT	0.118*** (0.025)	0.094*** (0.029)	0.073** (0.030)
N	1302	914	882

Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.

**Table 7: Effect of Adoption of Same Policy in Proximate States**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Won RttT (up to time t)	0.314*** (0.041)	0.335*** (0.048)	0.291*** (0.080)	0.326*** (0.073)
Applied and lost RttT (up to time t)	0.188*** (0.039)	0.208*** (0.044)	0.157** (0.077)	0.190*** (0.070)
Same policy in similar states	0.258*** (0.013)	0.258*** (0.013)		
Same policy in neighboring states			0.145*** (0.017)	0.146*** (0.017)
State education revenue per capita		0.019 (0.019)		0.031 (0.024)
Democratic governor		0.006 (0.016)		0.004 (0.016)
Democratic majority, both chambers		-0.006 (0.019)		-0.002 (0.022)
Constant	0.199*** (0.035)	0.163*** (0.052)	0.185*** (0.048)	0.126* (0.073)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.520	0.521	0.487	0.488
N	12101	12101	12101	12101

Same policy in similar and neighboring states, state population, percent Black and Hispanic, elementary-secondary school enrollment, per capita income, and state education revenue and expenditure variables are standardized, so that the interpretation of their coefficients is the change in the outcome associated with a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.