

Margherita Harris

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Postdoctoral Fellow	2024-2025
<i>SOCRATES Centre</i> , Leibniz University Hannover.	
Postdoctoral Fellow	2023-2024
<i>Center for Philosophy of Science</i> , University of Pittsburgh.	
Guest Teacher	2022-2023
<i>Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method</i> , London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).	
Visiting Fellow	2021-2024
<i>Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method</i> , LSE.	

EDUCATION

PhD Philosophy , LSE	2017-2021
Thesis: <i>Conceptualizing uncertainty: the IPCC, model robustness and the weight of evidence</i>	
Supervisors: Roman Frigg, Liam Kofi Bright	
MSc Philosophy of Science , LSE	2015-2016
MMath Mathematics , University of Warwick	2008-2012

RESEARCH INTERESTS

AoS: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

AoC: Philosophy of Climate Science, Philosophy of Statistics, Decision Theory

PUBLICATIONS

- Harris, M., Frigg, R. (2023). Climate Models and Robustness Analysis – Part I: Core Concepts and Premises. In: Pellegrino, G., Di Paola, M. (eds) Handbook of Philosophy of Climate Change. Handbooks in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16960-2_146-1

- Harris, M., Frigg, R. (2023). Climate Models and Robustness Analysis – Part II: The Justificatory Challenge. In: Pellegrino, G., Di Paola, M. (eds) Handbook of Philosophy of Climate Change. Handbooks in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16960-2_147-1
- Harris, M. (2021). The Epistemic Value of Independent Lies: False Analogies and Equivocations. *Synthese* 199, 14577–14597. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03434-8>

WORK IN PROGRESS

- “Robustness Reexamined: Unpacking the Limits of Model-Based Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning” (Under Review)
- “The IPCC Uncertainty Framework: What Some Decision Makers Want (and Why They Shouldn’t)” (Under Review)
- “Some Conceptual Problems in the IPCC Uncertainty Framework, How They Came About, and Where to Go from Here” (Under Review)
- “Probabilism Under Scrutiny: Grappling with the Weight of Evidence”
- “*Just Pay Attention to Me: Flourishing Relationships without Commitments*” with Henry Schiller
- “What is the purpose of an account of scientific representation?” with Arnon Levy

PRESENTATIONS

13. “*Just Pay Attention to Me: Flourishing Relationships without Commitments*”, *XXV World Congress of Philosophy*, August 2024, Rome
12. “Probabilism Under Scrutiny: Grappling with the Weight of Evidence”, *Center for Philosophy of Science*, April 2024, Pittsburgh
11. “Some Conceptual Problems in the IPCC Uncertainty Framework, and Where to Go from Here”, *Center for Philosophy of Science*, November 2023, Pittsburgh
10. “The Detrimental Impact of Quantifauxcation on Our Understanding of the Evolution of the Climate”, *European Philosophy of Science Association*, September 2023, Belgrade, Online (due to environmental concerns)

9. “The Ubiquity of Quantifauxcation and Why it Must Stop”, *17th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology*, July 2023, Buenos Aires
8. “On Severity, the Weight of Evidence, and the Relationship Between the Two”, *The Statistics Wars and Their Casualties*, December 2022, LSE, Online
7. “Model Robustness: Schupbach’s Explanatory Account of Robustness Analysis to the Rescue?”, *Sigma Club*, March 2022, LSE, Online
6. “Some Conceptual Problems in the IPCC Uncertainty Framework, and How They Came About”, *Conference on Climate Change and Studies of the Future*; October 2021, A Coruña
5. “What Does the Bayesian Have to Say about Model-Based Robustness Analysis?”, *Bayesian Epistemology: Perspectives and Challenges*, August 2020, Munich, Online (due to Covid 19)
4. “What Does the Bayesian have to Say about Model-Based Robustness Analysis?”, *Choice Group*, June 2020, LSE, Online (due to Covid 19)
3. “The Epistemic Value of Independent Lies: False Analogies and Equivocations”, *London Graduate Philosophy Conference*, June 2020, Online (due to Covid 19)
2. “On the Relationship between Confidence and Likelihood in the IPCC Uncertainty Framework”, *European Philosophy of Science Association*, September 2019, Geneva
1. “On the Relationship between Confidence and Likelihood in the IPCC Uncertainty Framework”, *British Society for the Philosophy of Science*, July 2019, Durham

TEACHING

At the LSE, GTAs are responsible for small-group classes, marking and feedback.

2022-23: Philosophy of Science. LSE. Guest Teacher. 3 classes, 45 students. A tour of the philosophical underpinnings of modern science. (LT)

2021-22: Historical and Global Perspectives on Philosophy. LSE. GTA. 3 classes, 46 students. Example topics: Zhuangzi as a Political Philosopher, Plato’s Politeia, Confucius’ and Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics, Elisabeth of Bohemia’s Philosophy of Mind. (LT)

2021-22: Genes, Brains and Society. LSE. GTA. 4 classes, 60 students. Example topics: human nature; gender and the brain; race and the genome. (MT)

2019-20: Einstein for Everyone: From Time Travel to the Edge of the Universe. LSE. GTA. 3 classes, 45 students. Introduction to relativity theory and its philosophical implications. (MT)

2017-19, 2021-23: The Big Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy. LSE. GTA. Several classes. Example topics: scepticism; the existence of God; consciousness; persistence; time, numbers; ethics; justice; meaning. (MT & LT)

2014-2017: Mathematics A-level. Cambridge Assessment, Cambridge. Part-time examiner (twice a year) for A-Levels Mathematics international examinations.

2013-14: Mathematics A-Level. CATS College, Cambridge. Main roles: teaching A-Levels Maths and advanced classes in preparation for STEP (Cambridge Maths entry requirement).

SERVICE

2022-2024: Referee for the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, the European Journal of Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, the National Science Foundation and Cambridge Elements

2022: Co-organizer of The Statistics Wars and Their Casualties workshop (LSE)

2020-2022: Co-organizer of Conjectures and Refutations seminar series (LSE)

2018-2021: Referee for the LSE–Bayreuth Student Philosophy Conference

AWARDS

Global Priorities Institute accommodation and travel fund for participating in the symposium “Scientific Evidence and Uncertainty about the Long-Run Future” at CLMPST 2023

John Watkins memorial prize: LSE award for the paper “The Epistemic Value of Independent Lies: False Analogies and Equivocations” (2022)

LSE doctoral studentship (tuition fees and full living expenses, 2017-2021)

LSE postgraduate travel fund (multiple, 2019)

AHRC Northern Bridge doctoral studentship (tuition fees and full living expenses, 2017-2020) (*declined*)

LSE 120th anniversary MSc scholarship (tuition fees and contribution to living expenses, 2015-2016)