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**馬英九的新兩岸關係政策與其對"中華民國
"的詮釋**

**Ma Ying-jeou's New Cross-Strait Policy
and his Approach of "the Republic of China
Nation"**

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To my Parents, Teachers, and my Muse

Note on Romanization of Chine names and terms

Names of persons and places from Taiwan are transcribed according to the local usage or the Romanization chosen by the person. However, names of persons from the People's Republic of China and names of places in the Chinese Mainland are transcribed following the *pinyin* system.

Ma Ying-jeou's New Cross-Strait Policy and his Approach of "the Republic of China Nation"

Abstract

Is Taiwan a laboratory of nationalism? The absence of national consensus among the Taiwanese population regarding national identity has left Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist movements struggling for State power. The cornerstones of the Taiwanese political community are its paradoxical relation with China of economical integration and national conflict. Cross-Strait policies and national identity policies are actually intimately interdependent, one shapes the other. The election of Ma Ying-jeou, a Chinese Nationalist from Taiwan, at the Presidency of the Republic in March 2008, initiated a U-turn in both Taiwan's State identity and cross-Strait relations, after two decades of domination of Taiwanese nationalism, leading to some tension with China.

Based on a historical approach of Taiwan's national building process and of cross-Strait relations, this research aims at analyzing the implementation of Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalist policies. Furthermore, this study tries to analyze the impacts and limits of Ma Ying-jeou's policies on the Taiwanese political community. On the one hand, Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy set up a *détente* with Beijing, institutionalizing Cross-Strait dialogue and relations, and eventually leading to the reunification with China. On the other hand, Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy tried to re-transform Taiwan back into a "Republic of China nation", for whom it was considered legitimate to reunify the whole Chinese nation under the model of development implemented by the KMT on Taiwan since 1949. Surveys, however, show that a very large majority of Taiwanese think otherwise.

Keywords: Cross-Strait Relations, Historical Approach, Taiwanese Nationalism, Chinese Nationalism, Taiwanese Political Community, Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou.

馬英九的新兩岸關係政策與其對"中華民國"的詮釋

摘要

台灣是民族主義的實驗室嗎？由於台灣人民之間缺乏國家共識及認同，使得台灣意識及中國意識兩派透過民族主義運動尋求國家權力。台灣政治社會的基石是與中國的經濟整合和國家衝突兩者之間的矛盾所構成的關係，因此兩岸政策和國家認同政策是互賴且密不可分的。經過了二十幾年台灣民族主義的統治，西元 2008 年三月，國民黨的馬英九贏得總統大選，台灣的國家認同及兩岸關係上的大轉變導致了與中國之間的緊張關係。

本研究旨在於從台灣的國家建設過程的歷史途徑及兩岸關係基礎上，分析馬英九的中華民族主義政策的實施，此外，本研究也試圖分析馬英九的政策對台灣政治社會的影響及限制。一方面，馬英九的兩岸政策緩和了與北京的關係、建立兩岸對話和關係的制度化發展，並最終導致與中國的重新統一；另一方面，為了自西元 1949 年起在國民黨所發展的模型之下－合法重新統一中華民族，馬英九的國家認同政策試圖重新將台灣轉變回一個中華民國國家(Republic of China nation)，但是根據調查，多數的台灣人民有不一樣的想法。

關鍵詞：兩岸關係、歷史途徑、台灣民族主義、中華民族主義、台灣政治社會、中華民國、馬英九。

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CHAPTER 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Motivation

In March 2008, Ma Ying-jeou (Appendix 1) became the twelfth president of the Republic of China (ROC, *Chunghwua Minkuo*, 中華民國) (Appendix 2) in Taiwan (台灣) (Appendix 3). His political party, the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), won two months earlier with a majority at the Legislative Yuan (*Lifa Yuan*, 立法院)¹ – it won with its allies eighty one seats out of the one hundred and thirteen to be elected – giving thereby a quasi-monopoly of political power in Taiwan to the new elected president.

Although the question of identity in Taiwan was discussed, the economical questions were clearly the main focus of the electoral campaign; it was and it is still the priority of the Taiwanese people. Ma Ying-jeou promised a second economic miracle for Taiwan, the normalization of economical relations with China and the détente in Cross-Strait relations (*Haixia Lianggan Guanxi*, 海峽兩岸關係).

Ma Ying-jeou's election certainly marks the beginning of a new era in Sino-Taiwanese relations (*Zhongtai Guanxi*, 中台關係). During two decades, the Taiwanization of the State in Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian enabled the rise of a Taiwanese political community and a Taiwanese identity – creating a quasi Taiwanese nation-state. However China, which irredentism over Taiwan has not weakened since the 1950s, reacted violently to any attempt from Taipei to move towards a formal declaration of independence. Ma Ying-jeou, on the contrary, has promoted, since his election, the idea that Taiwan is part of China and that the

¹ The Constitution of the Republic of China is a hybrid system of Western influences and Chinese influences. The political system in Taiwan is composed of five powers, called Yuan (院). The three classical Western powers are the Executive Yuan (*Xingzheng Yuan*, 行政院), the Legislative Yuan (*Lifa Yuan*, 立法院), and the Judiciary Yuan (*Sifa Yuan*, 司法院). The two Chinese powers, inherited from the Chinese imperial system, are the Examination Yuan (*Kaoshi Yuan*, 考試院), its function is to organize State's workers recruitment, and the Control Yuan (*Jiancha Yuan*, 監察院), which has to check the good management of the administration.

Taiwanese are members of the Chinese nation. Beijing (北京) is pleased; and cooperation and dialogue are replacing confrontation and the threat of war.

Hence, the Cross-Strait dialogue, which was interrupted since 1999 despite contacts between the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF, *Haixia Jiaoliu Jijinhui*, 海峽交流基金會) for Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, *Haixia Liangan Guanxi Xiehui*, 海峽兩岸關係協會) for Chia², resumed with the election of Ma Ying-jeou biannually. Since then, fifteen agreements has been signed until now, including the ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, *Liang'an Jinjihezuo Jiagou Xeyi*, 兩岸經濟合作架構協議), which eventually will lead to the creation of a free trade area across the Strait if the World Trade Organization's rules are respected.

Regarding Taiwan's recent history, we assume that Taiwan's Cross-Strait policies and national identity policies are intimately interdependent to the extent that Taiwan's national identity policies are shaping Cross-Strait policies and the other way around; they both shape the relation that Taiwanese want with China. If Taiwanese wants closer economic ties with China, they also want to preserve their political independence from China, and their specific identity. In other words they want to preserve the *Status Quo* in the Taiwan Strait – something that Ma Ying-jeou promised.

However, we are making the hypothesis that Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait and national identity policies are promoting the reunification of the two sides of the Strait; these policies are essentially Chinese nationalist policies. But, if Taiwan was seen as peripheral to the Chinese nation within the classic ideology of the Chinese nationalism, Ma Ying-jeou is promoting a neo-Chinese nationalism which is placing Taiwan at the center of the Chinese nation. Indeed according to him, the virtue of Taiwan is to preserve traditional values of the Chinese culture and civilization and to adapt it to the Western values and modernity; Taiwan must be an example to follow

² These two semi-governmental organizations were created during the 1990's to open the dialogue between the two sides of the Strait and settle bone of contention on economical matters.

The website of the Strait Exchange Foundation can be retrieved in English at this address: <http://www.sef.org.tw/mp.asp?mp=300>

The website of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait can be retrieved in Chinese at this address: <http://www.arats.com.cn/>

for the whole Chinese nation because of the success of its social, economic and political model. Our hypothesis is that if reunification is to be occurring, Taiwan must become more Chinese (culturally) and China must become more Taiwanese (politically).

As Hans Stockton (2008) emphasizes it, a nation's image and the image that it can have from other actors of the international system is essential to its integration within the system. According to him, "such images provide cognitive structures such as schema or 'mental models' that decision makers use to interpret the behavior of international actors (p.103)." Ma Ying-jeou wants the international community to see Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation; whilst remaining separated from the People's Republic of China (PRC, *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo*, 中華人民共和國).

On the other hand, Ma Ying-jeou aims to build Cross-Strait's institutional framework in order to enable reunification. Indeed with the multiplication of interactions and the growing interdependence between the two sides, Ma Ying-jeou's objective is to reduce the political, economical, social and cultural gap between the two Chinese models of development and create the opportunity of a reunification.

These observations are raising numerous questions; we retain only three of them as following:

- **In what extent does Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait relations policy implement an institutional and relational framework between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? Will this policy implement the reunification of the so-called Chinese nation?**
- **In what extent does Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism redefine the identity of the Taiwanese political community towards a "Republic of China nation" in order to create the legitimate context for Taiwan to be reunified with China?**
- **What are the limits of Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism and Cross-Strait Policy constrained by the reality of the current political context?**

1.2 Literature Review

Corcuff (2002) describes Taiwan as “a laboratory of identities (p.xi);” it is also ‘a laboratory of nationalism’. For Gellner³ (2006), “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (p.1);” a nation-state is the consequence of the convergence at different levels of the will of a population to be part of a state with its own cultural identification (p.54). Moreover, according to him, nationalism holds the principle of ethnic unity; that is to say political leaders’ ethnicity shouldn’t differ from the rest of the population (p.1). A nation can be defined in two opposite but complementary ways: 1. “Two mans are from the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs of associations and ways of behaving and communicating. 2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize (emphasize from the author) each other as belonging to the same nation (p.7).”

Moreover, if Max Webber defines the State as a political unit that holds the monopoly of legitimate violence; Gellner (2006) proposes the definition of the State as a political unit that holds “the monopoly of legitimate education (p.33).” A state, as defined by the Montevideo Convention⁴ is a political entity structured in a government that administrates a permanent population on a defined territory, holding the capacity to enter in relations with others states.

Anderson (1991) sees nation “as an imagined political community; it is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” It is a community by the horizontal link of fraternity that exists between its members; it is imagined because even in the smallest nation every member cannot know each other; it is limited because any nation wishes to extend itself to the whole humanity – on the contrary, nations raise borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – and it is sovereign because it holds the principle of independence from any other nation (pp.6-7).

³ According to Gellner (2006), three features of nationalism should be distinguished: the nationalist *principle* which is the idea of nationalism itself; the nationalist *sentiment* which is the fulfillment or the failure of the nationalist ideal; and the nationalist *movement* which is a political movement which old the nationalist principle for the fulfillment of it (p.1).

⁴ The Montevideo Convention, *The Avalon Project*, retrieved from, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp

Gellner and Anderson are sharing a modernist point of view of the nation and of nationalism. According to them, nationalism, using modernity as a tool (mass education for Gellner, printing capitalism for Anderson), is creating the nation, inventing or rewriting from preexisting ethnic culture, the national identity and the national culture.

On the other hand, Smith (1999) proposes an alternative theory of nationalism: Nations existed prior to modernity- they were just waiting to be awakened. Nations are within the continuity of ethnicity preexisting to modernity. According to him, a nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (p.11).” Moreover, he defines ethnicity as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common element of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the *élites* (p.13).” Ethnicity for him is at the center of the national building process.

Taiwan is obviously a special case in the study of nationalism. Indeed, if the ROC in Taiwan is officially a Chinese State, Taiwan is also a nation ‘waiting to be born’. However, both are not recognized as such, especially because of Beijing’s irredentism over Taiwan, but also because of the ethnic divisions with the Island which is shaping Taiwanese politics.

Events like February 28th, 1947 (228, *Ereba Shijian*, 二二八事件) and the White Terror (*Baise Kongbu*, 白色恐怖) shaped the ethnic differentiation between the ‘Taiwanese’ or *Benshengren* (本省人) – immigrants from the Chinese provinces of Fujian (福建) and Guangdong (廣東) who had arrived in Taiwan before the Japanese colonization – and the Mainlanders or *Waishengren* (外省人) – Chinese refugees from the Chinese Civil War following Chiang Kai-shek (*Jiang Jie-shi*, 蔣介石) in his retreat in 1949. The 228 events saw the massacre of the Taiwanese *intelligencia* by the Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek, and the White Terror starting from the very end of the 1940s saw the seizure of the political power in Taiwan by Mainlanders and the silencing of every political opposition.

However, according to Corcuff (2011) the relevance of the ethnic dichotomy *Waishengren/Benshengren* is debatable in the post-democratic reforms that have occurred in Taiwan. Indeed, the demographic weight of people born on the Mainland is nowadays insignificant and their descendants, though they were raised as Mainlanders, are partially or fully already 'taiwanized'. He prefers to highlight two different kinds of consciousnesses in Taiwan: A 'Taiwanese consciousness' and a 'Chinese consciousness' or two different lectures of Taiwan's history, juridical status, identity, and future (p.20).

The democratization of the political system of Taiwan didn't create a movement of decolonization, and the KMT remained at the center of the political game within the Taiwanese democratic system. Because it initiates the democratic process, it effectively shaped the political structure of the State to stay in power preserving on the one hand the symbolic link between Taiwan and China, especially toward the Constitution, and on the other hand giving Taiwanese people the right to express their political choices. To a large extent they subscribe to this new political consensus, increasing KMT's legitimacy. The transition towards democracy is called 'peaceful revolution' (*Ningjing Geming*, 寧靜革命) or 'passive revolution' in the extent that the Chinese colonial nation-state has been replaced by a Taiwanese State without fundamentally reshaping the State's structures and institutions (Wu Rwei-Ren. 2002, p.196).

According to Breuilly (1985), nationalism (as a political ideology) is intimately linked to the goal of every nationalist movement to obtain and use the power of the State in order to differentiate itself from other nations, to see that the interests of the nation overcome any others, and to make the nation independent as much as possible (pp.2-3). Moreover, Breuilly admits the existence of a State's nationalism, especially when it is opposed to another rival nationalist movement (p.11). The heart of the question surrounding nationalism in Taiwan since the democratization of the Island is here: It is the competition between two nationalist movements that result from the ethnic divides in Taiwan, for the State power. Each side is desperate to impose its own vision of the Island, of Taiwan's future, and of Taiwan's national identity. The Democratic Progressive Party (*Minjindang*, 民進黨),

the main Taiwanese nationalist movement, is competing with the KMT for the control of the State's power in Taiwan.

Le Pesant (2006) defines Taiwan as a political community which is limited to the borders of the island; however, it exists without any national consensus on the identity of this community, neither on its future (p.10). Jiang (2006) following the same idea proposes to define Taiwan as “a political community with divided identity.” According to him, the two dominant groups of Taiwan define the Island's territory, population, and sovereignty differently (p.161).

If Benedict Anderson has obviously influenced these definitions; they, however, highlight the fact that there's no national consensus in Taiwan. Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) (1999) recognizes himself this fact indirectly by defining Taiwan as “a community of life or a community of fate” where a person without considering his or her ethnic origin is participating as well as the other members of the Taiwanese society to the prosperity and the survival of the country (p.11). The Taiwanese political community, despite the absence of national consensus, has been built on what Cabestan (2005) or Shubert (2004) are naming “a sovereignist consensus”; that is to say the adherence and the identification of the whole Taiwanese population to the State of the ROC in Taiwan and the values that it holds, each citizen being free to define his or her own' national identity.

Although the concept of national identity is unclear, Harrison (2006), taking Duara's theory (1995) that nations are contingency of History as a source of inspiration, proposes the following definition: “National identity works like a form of collective identity as the historical privileging of one narrative in relation to others, producing meaning through the difference between them (p.30).” Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism, indeed, aims to redefine Taiwan's national identity, redefining the identity of the Taiwanese political community, in order to fit with the narrative schema imagined by the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan.

1.3 Research Methodology

Breuilly (1985), as an historian, doesn't think that a general theory of nationalism is possible. He does, however, propose to study nationalism as an

historical whole, case by case for each nation (p.2). We are choosing this kind of historical approach knowing that the complexity of the reality cannot be fully transcribed.

Our study is clearly a trans-disciplinary study of nationalism in the field of the Taiwanese studies. Our objective here is to create a contrast between Ma Ying-jeou's neo-Chinese nationalism and his Cross-Strait policy, and the nation building process in Taiwan prior to his election in order to underline differences, similarities, and the limits to Ma Ying-jeou's policy.

In an attempt to simplify the understanding of the study, we have decided to build our study in two axes. In our first axis (Chapters 2-3-4) we will go back in time and detail milestones of the Taiwanese History under the focus of the construction of a Taiwanese nation. Our goal is to highlight the politico-historic context in which the national building process in Taiwan was implemented, what are the constraints to it and why it is a failure as far as Taiwan is not a fully independent nation-state. Our second axis (Chapters 5-6-7) will relate to our research questions and underline outcome of Ma Ying-jeou's policies on the identity of the Taiwanese political community. We are looking as well to highlight the institutionalization of the reunification process as a cause and a consequence of Ma Ying-jeou's policies; and also to show its limits.

This study is principally using two types of sources, primary and secondary. Primary sources are multiple and reveal the diversity of the subjects tackled in the study; internet being the main tool to collect sources. We paid attention to Ma Ying-jeou's discourses and political actions; its routine discourses like the national day's discourse or the New Year's discourse specifically attracted our attention. Moreover, the study of those discourses and political actions highlights the evolution of Ma Ying-jeou's policies; he focused on Cross-Strait at the beginning of his mandate and more on the transformation of the identity of the Taiwanese political community during the second half.

These sources are mainly retrieved from the website of the *Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)*⁵, and websites of newspapers from Taiwan and abroad. We did only use news papers edited in English: The *Taipei Times* (*Taibei Shibao*, 台北時報), *The China Post* (*Yingwen Zhongguo Youbao*, 英文中國郵報), *The Wall Street Journal*, *CNN* or encore *Associated Press* mainly. We also have to specify here the extensive utilization of a data base, created in collaboration with Stéphane Corcuff, based on mostly *Taipei Times* articles following a thematic nomenclature (Appendix 4) and starting from Ma Ying-jeou's election until today.

Moreover because we are dealing with the question of the juridical status of Taiwan, we did use the data base of the *Taiwan Document Project* which regroups all juridical acts regarding Taiwan, and the data base of *The Avalon Project* which contains a large number of treaties and juridical acts in international law.

The last type of primary sources we used is statistical sources. These contain two types, economic statistics in order to evaluate Cross-Strait trade and identity statistics which highlight the evolution of Taiwanese national identification and desire for the future of Taiwan. These statistics mainly come from the website of the Mainland Affairs Council *Daluwei Yuanhui*, 大陸委員會⁶, and of the website of the Election Study Center of the Chengchi University.⁷

The secondary sources refer to all the scientific literature we used in this study. We particularly used literature in French compared to the literature in English for its originality and pertinence on the subject of our study. Corcuff, Le Pesant, Muyard or Cabestan are the main authors that contribute to our study.

Moreover, we want to specify here that certain concepts we are using in the study differ slightly in the Chinese language; nationalism and nations are recent concepts, from the beginning of the 20th century, for the Chinese civilization area –

⁵ The Website of the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) can be retrieve in English at this address : <http://english.president.gov.tw/>

⁶ The Mainland Affairs Council or MAC is the Taiwanese government agency that is in charge of implementing Cross-Strait policies; the SEF is under its control. The Website of the Mainland Affairs Council can be found at the address in English: <http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3>

⁷ The Website of the Election Study Center (ESC) of the Chengchi University can be retrieved in English at this address: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/>

Sun Yat-sen (*Sun Zhong-shan*, 孫中山) first used the concept of nation only in 1904 (Hughes, 1997, p.3). If ‘nation’ explicitly means ‘political community’ in European languages, it is not the case for the Mandarin; it is translated in the Chinese language as ‘*Minzu* (民族)’ which means ethnic or cultural group but without political connotation. The term ‘*Guojia* (國家)’, ‘country’ or ‘state’, holds the meaning of ‘political community’. As a consequence, the term ‘national identity’ holds two interpretations in Mandarin: ‘*Minzu Rentong* (民族認同)’ as a cultural national identity and ‘*Guojia Rentong* (國家認同)’ as the state national identity (Jiang. 2006, p.146).

Finally, we want to introduce a new concept in this study: The software of nationalism. The *Encyclopedia Britannica*⁸ defines ‘software’ as “a set of instructions that directs a computer’s hardware to perform a task”. Imagined as hardware, a nationalist movement holds a set of ideologies and means, its software, to achieve its very task, that is to say the creation or survival of a nation-state of its own. As a software, the set of the set of ideologies and means held by a nationalist movement can be ‘updated or upgraded’, it can evolve regarding new circumstances; its very task or function remains the same however.

⁸ The website of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* can be retrieved at this address: <http://www.britannica.com/>

CHAPTER 2 The Complex History of Cross-Strait Relations

“Taiwan has never been a part of China since ancient times. Thanks to the far-reaching majestic divine power of my deceased father [Kangxi], Taiwan has been incorporated into our empire since his time.”

*Emperor Yongzheng, 1722*⁹

“It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”

*Cairo Declaration, 1943-12-01*¹⁰

“Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”

⁹ Ehertai, et al., comp., 1937, *Da Qing Shizong Huangdi Shilu (Veritable Records of Emperor Yongzheng of the Great Qing Dynasty)*, Xinjing., chuan 10, p.20, retrieved from Wang Yu-teh, 1982 January, *Tai-wan tzi-ku bu-shu Chung-kuo*”, in *T'ai-tu Chi-k'an*, 1, p.10, as cited in Hsiao, 2008 April, p.112.

¹⁰ Cairo Declaration, 1943-12-01, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/cairo.htm>

“Taiwan is an independent and sovereign regime *de jure* and *de facto*, not as a Republic of Taiwan, but as a Republic of China, which is the constitutional and juridical continuation of the regime founded in 1912 henceforth reduced to the island of Taiwan and its offshore islands, the Pescadores archipelago, Kinmen and Matsu, Green Island and Lanyu; however, its constitutional borders are still for political reason those of the Republic of China before the division of China in 1949 (Corcuff, 2004-2005, p.64).¹²” This definition of Taiwan that Stéphane Corcuff gives us is symbolic of the complexity of Taiwan’s history and of Cross-Strait relations. The goal of this chapter is to study the State building process in Taiwan from a historical perspective.

Through a quick overview of the political history of Taiwan starting from the Dutch colonization until the 20th century, we will try to highlight historical constraints that lead to the formation of the State in Taiwan. Although Taiwan was independent from China for a large period of time, complex relations between the two sides of the Strait are a historical constant. The influence of China is crucial to the history of Taiwan; however we can’t underestimate the historical impact of the Island and the Chinese Mainland. Taiwan has been a successful European colony, an independent Chinese kingdom, a prefecture then a province of the Qing Empire, a Japanese colony, a province of the Republic of China then the ‘Free China’, and today the independent political community of Taiwan under the Republic of China’s jurisdiction, a hybrid Sino-Taiwanese regime.

¹¹ Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea [regarding also the status of Taiwan], 1950-01-05, *Public Paper of the President Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, Truman Library and Museum*, retrieved from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=574&st=&st1=>

¹² “Taiwan est un régime indépendant et souverain en fait comme en droit, non en tant que République de Taiwan, mais en tant que République de Chine, celle-ci étant la continuation constitutionnelle et juridique du régime fondé en 1912, qui se réduit désormais à l’île de Taiwan et ses îles offshore, l’archipel des Pescadores, Kinmen et Matsu, l’île verte et Lanyu, mais dont les frontières constitutionnelles restent encore pour le moment, pour des raisons politiques, celle de la République de Chine d’avant la division de la Chine en 1949.”

2.1 History of Taiwan, a Chinese story?

Though Chinese Annals report that some trade expeditions were sent to Taiwan, the first one seems to be during the third century (Chiu, 1973, p.13), the Island was quite ignored by Chinese Lords. It is the Dutch that first found an interest in Taiwan: The East India Company wanted to access the Chinese market but the Ming Dynasty (*Daming*, 大明) denied to the Company the privilege of settling a trade post on Chinese soil. However as far as Taiwan was not considered as a part of the Imperial territory, the Ming advised the East India Company to occupy the Island; the main colony was established in 1624 in Anping (安平) near Tainan (台南) in the South of Taiwan.

The colony was a trade colony and the European settlement was limited to administrators, traders, missionaries and soldiers. However, the Company which wanted to develop the colony for its profit needed cheap and qualified workers that the Aboriginal population couldn't provide and called Chinese immigrants to settle in Taiwan. Though few villages of Chinese were already settled in Taiwan, the Dutch colonization created the first massive settlement of Chinese in the Island. The colony became prosperous and Taiwan became a trade hub of the East Asian region during the 17th century.

In the mean time, China was at war; and the Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Manchu coming from the North. The Qing Dynasty (*Daqing*, 大清) was established in 1636, and controlled the whole of China in 1662 when the last Ming Emperor was captured. The same year, Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功), a Ming loyalist, took Taiwan from the Dutch; the small garrison was not able to defend the colony facing a large Chinese army. Zheng Chenggong, son of a pirate, established an independent kingdom in Taiwan following the Chinese imperial model, but his goal was to overthrow the Qing and restore Ming's rule over China. The first independent State of Taiwan was established; it remained independent because of the superiority of its navy. A second wave of immigration from China took place during the Zheng's rule of Taiwan. Soon after establishing its power on Taiwan, Zheng Chenggong died; his son, Zheng Jing (鄭經), continued its father's plan to recover Mainland China.

However, the campaign of 1674 failed and Zheng Jing died in 1681, leaving an underage son to succeed him. Ruined and politically divided, the Zheng's State didn't survive the Manchu offensive during the summer 1684.

The primary intention of the Qing Emperor Kangxi (*Kangxidi*, 康熙帝) was to pacify then abandon Taiwan, forcing all the migrants to return to China. However, Shi Lang (施琅), one of Zheng Cheng-gong's former generals who betrayed the Zheng family to join the Qing, persuaded Kangxi to establish its rule over the island. His argument was that in the future Taiwan could become a threat again.

Kangxi, in conformity with the Chinese tradition, didn't consider Taiwan as a part of China because it never had been and there was no reason for the contrary (Lee, 2004, p.31). Indeed, the physical geography of the State, the ethnoscape¹³ (Smith, 1999, p.16), is primordial in Chinese collective memory, and Chinese conception of the State. Kangxi declared that Taiwan is *beyond the sea*; in his mind Taiwan is excluded from the Chinese ethnoscape (Wachman, 2007, pp.55-57). Even if Taiwan is controlled by the Qing Empire, it remained beyond the Chinese 'frontier' until the end of the 19th century.

In 1683, Taiwan was made prefecture of the Fujian Province; the Island would keep this status until it became a province itself in 1885. Despite restrictions and interdictions to go to Taiwan, theatrically punished by death, migrants continued to cross the Strait, braving the danger. During the domination of the Qing over Taiwan, numerous revolts occurred all over the island between Chinese migrants and the imperial Administration, migrants and the Aborigines tribes, or, even just between themselves.

During this period occurred also miscegenation between Chinese inhabitants and Aborigines. Indeed, most of the colonists were young man migrating without any families; they took Aborigines wife and settled in Taiwan, starting the differentiation process between islanders and the other Chinese population on the Mainland.

¹³ Smith defines the ethnoscape as a 'poetic' representation of the ethnical territory with the integration of natural elements such as mountain or rivers into the ethnic collective memory. Mass national education within modern societies is teaching the love for the nation's ethnoscape. Every nation has one; irredentism is the struggle between two nations for the totality or parts of the same ethnoscape.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Qing Empire was already vanishing because of numerous socio-economic problems caused by the fast increase of the Chinese population. Moreover, European imperialism started to pressure the Empire. Forbidding sea trade starting from the 17th century, China was forced to open its ports to European trade in 1841 after the Qing was defeated during the First Opium War. For its geographical position in front the Chinese coast, European nations were interested in occupying Taiwan like the Dutch during the 17th century. Indeed, British traders had already asked their government to take possession of the Island in 1833; Commodore Perry gave the same advice to the US government in 1853.

The Westerners pressure was a major geopolitical change for China; it was also the first moment that Chinese integrated Taiwan into their ethnoscape. In the Chinese cosmology, China is the center of the world, and since the beginning of its history it has been threatened by people coming from the land of the North or of the West. The maximal extension of the Qing Empire to the West and the North-West (Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia) was indeed to pacify those regions that can represent a threat to the Empire. Mongol and Manchu that conquered China are not themselves from the North and the West. Starting from the 19th, however, the threat came from the East and the sea.

In this new context, Taiwan became the new frontier to defend the threat of Western powers. It is after the Sino-French War of 1884-1885, when the French controlled the whole maritime trade of South China by occupying the North of Taiwan and the Pescadores, that the imperial court realized the strategic importance of Taiwan: who controls Taiwan, controls the strait. Starting from 1885, Taiwan was made a province of the Qing Empire, and Liu Ming-chuan (劉銘傳) appointed as governor. Liu Ming-chuan was a reformer and the development of Taiwan was privileged compared to other provinces; his goal was to turn the island into a modern province, a model for the whole of China. A modern postal service was implemented, a railway line was created, the telegraph installed; Taipei became a modern city with electric and water systems, hospitals and schools, all without Western assistance. Moreover, the Island's defenses were strengthened.

This marks the new place that Taiwan took in Chinese collective memories, but was it sufficient? Apparently not, the Sino-Japanese War regarding Korea took

place in 1894 and China was defeated; the Emperor ceded the island to Japan even without the military occupation of the Japanese Army. The Shimonoseki Treaty was ratified in 1895 and despite protests from the Court, it was implemented. These protests, however, were more motivated by the feeling of humiliation as the result of the signature of the treaty with a country that was considered as inferior, rather than for keeping Taiwan inside the empire (Wachman, 2007, p.65).

In Taiwan, the news was a shock. The Taiwanese bourgeoisie were opposed to the cession of their island to Japan; they called the help of England and France to defend Taiwan against the Japanese in exchange for trade facilities, but both refused. Determined to avoid falling into Japanese hands, political leaders of Taiwan declared the independence of the island on the May 23 1895 in order to attract sympathies from Western powers to their cause. The Japanese Army landed in Keelung (基隆), North of Taiwan, on May 28; and Tainan the capital of the young Republic was taken the 21st of October. Taiwan became a Japanese colony for fifty years.

2.2 The Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait and the Ambiguous Question of the Juridical Status of Taiwan

The *Status Quo* in the Taiwan Strait and the indetermination of the juridical status of Taiwan are contingency of the Cold War. At the end of the Second World War, MacArthur's General Order n°1¹⁴ ordered the Japanese troops in China, North Vietnam, and Taiwan to surrender to the Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek, Manchuria however was already occupied by the Soviet Union (Article 1a)¹⁵ However based on the Cairo Declaration¹⁶, Chiang Kai-shek directly annexed Taiwan in October

¹⁴ The General MacArthur was the commandant in chief of the Allied forces in the Pacific.

¹⁵ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Order n° One, 1945-09-06, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/surrender05.htm>

¹⁶ Cairo Declaration, 1943-12-01, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/cairo.htm>

25 1945¹⁷, this day was called by the regime the “Retrocession Day (*Guangfu Jie*, 光復節).” Taiwan became a part of the ROC and the last bastion of Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalist regime after their defeat during the Chinese Civil War. Nevertheless, prior to 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat in Taiwan, the juridical status of Taiwan has not been settled by a peace treaty.

The Nationalist leader in exile in Taiwan took with him the Nationalist institutions, the rest of his army and thousands of refugees. However, Taiwan remained under the direct threat of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and without the American assistance that Harry Truman withdrew in January 1950¹⁸ until June of the same year, Taiwan was defenseless. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) indeed predicted the fall of Taiwan before the end of 1950.¹⁹ Despite the official version, American political leaders were divided on supporting Taiwan. When the Korean conflict broke out in June 1950, the Communist North attacked the South supported by the United States, Truman reacted regarding Taiwan by sending the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait in order to neutralize the area and prevent a larger conflict.²⁰ Taiwan became the symbol of ‘Free China’ in the Cold War; Taiwan became the domino that didn’t have to fall. The *Status Quo* didn’t evolve since 1950: the Republic of China in Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China on the Mainland.

Hence, it is possible to wonder why there are questions surrounding Taiwan’s juridical status. The problem came from the fact that none of the two Chinese States recognized each other officially, creating the problem of the representativeness of the

¹⁷ Chen Yi’s General Order n°1 : “I, and the forces and administrative personnel named by me, have been designated to accept the surrender of Japanese ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces on Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago and to accept the territory, people, administrative power, military and civil arrangements, and assets on Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago”, Chen Yi, Japanese Instrument of Surrender on Taiwan, 1945-10-25, retrieved from Huang Shun-ching, Lin Hsiung-hsiang, Kuo Hai-ming Trad., *Taiwan sheng tung-chih kao, X, Kuang-fu chih*, 39-40-41, as cited in Chiu, 1973.

¹⁸ The President's News Conference [regarding the status of Taiwan], 1950-01-05, *Public Paper of the President Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, The Truman Library and Museum.*, retrieved from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=574&st=&st1=>

¹⁹ Policy of the United States toward Formosa (Taiwan): Concern of the United States Regarding Possible Conquest by Chinese Communists, *Foreign relations of the United States, University of Wisconsin Digital Collection* retrieved from <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1949v09&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=393>

²⁰ Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea , 1950-06-27, *Public Paper of the President Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, The Truman Library and Museum.*, retrieved from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=800&st=&st1=>

Chinese nation within the international community. We will tackle here the question of the juridical status of Taiwan; we will try to address the complex question in simple terms.

At the signature of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952, the juridical status of Taiwan was not in any case determined and it has never been tackled since. The question of which State will represent China at the San Francisco Conference was extremely controversial in 1950. Indeed, United States and a part of Europe continued to recognize the ROC as the legitimate power after 1949 when Great Britain²¹ and the Soviet state lead by the Soviet Union was recognizing the PRC. British and Americans reached a compromise and none of the two Chinese governments were invited to the Conference; the Soviet Union boycotted in protest. However, Washington promised Chiang Kai-shek that Taipei would be able to sign a peace treaty with Japan during the following years.

Legally, the San Francisco Treaty (SFT)²² – signed September 8 1951 and put in to action on April 28 1952 – did not determine Taiwan juridical status. Indeed, Article 2b of the SFT specifies that “*Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores*”, however it didn’t specify to which state Japan renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan. Moreover, SFT’s Article 26 stipulates that Japan was allowed to sign a bilateral peace treaty with any State that didn’t sign the SFT, but that State must be member of the United Nations and at war with Japan. If any clause within the new treaty which was different from the SFT these clauses would be added to the San Francisco Treaty.²³ The SFT’s 26th Articles is obviously in

²¹ London recognized Beijing in 1950 because it was afraid for its economical interests in China and in Hong Kong.

²² San Francisco Peace treaty with Japan, 1951-09-08, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm>

²³ Article 26: “Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.”, as cited in San Francisco Peace treaty with Japan, 1951-09-08, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm>

favor of Taipei signing peace with Japan, and tries to stop Mao Zedong doing the same thing, Beijing not being a member of the UN.

The Treaty of Taipei (ToT)²⁴ between Japan and the ROC was signed on April 28 1952 in respect of the Article 26 of the SFT, the day it was affected. In addition to the end of the state of war between Japan and China (Article 1), and the renunciation of Japan's sovereignty over Taiwan (Article 2), the ToT specified that every treaty prior to the state of war between Japan and China *shall be null and void* (Article 4). This treaty legitimized the ROC's claim to represent the whole China to that extent that it ends the war with Japan in the name of the Chinese nation; however regarding this treaty, the juridical status of Taiwan is not yet clarified.

Washington's shadow can be seen behind these two treaties; the juridical status of Taiwan had to remain vague and undetermined to allow American intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, if the sovereignty over Taiwan was recognized by the ROC, Washington wouldn't have been to intervene in the Taiwan Strait and defend Taiwan according to the international rules it tried to implement; the Taiwan question was to be considered as internal to China and not an international matter (Roy, 2003, p.129).

Nonetheless, Stéphane Corcuff (2008) considers that the Treaty of Taipei, by cancelling all treaties previously signed between China and Japan (and hence, the Shimonoseki Treaty)²⁵ retro-ceded Taiwan to China in 1952, and to that one China that signed the Treaty, i.e. the Republic of China (p.1251). This juridical argument is obviously valid; however several other arguments lead us to believe that the juridical status of Taiwan had never been determined in 1951, nor 1952 or later.

First of all, international right doesn't explicitly recognize any sovereignty transfer in the case of a treaty annulment. If the declaration of war cannot cancel clauses of a treaty that specify "*a permanent condition of things*", the victor can however impose it within a new treaty (Oppenheim, 1955 b., §99 a. 3, p.304). On the other hand, this is not specified if the cancelation of a treaty, still, can deal with

²⁴ Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, 1952-04-28, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm>

²⁵ Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895-04-17, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm>

sovereignty matters. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969²⁶, thought that it couldn't be applied to the case of Taiwan because it was *a posteriori*, can enlighten us on international law's practices. The Article 43 specifies that denunciation, annulment, or the end of a treaty shall not force a State to fulfill its obligations within a treaty that can be subjected to international law independently to the treaty. That is to say that if the international community through international treaties or agreements recognized the cession of Taiwan to Japan, which is the case, it had to be must be fulfilled in perpetuity even if the Shimonoseki Treaty was canceled. In other words, this prevents the retroactive transfer of sovereignty; the annulment of a treaty can create chaos within the international society. For example, France never asked Germany to cancel the Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871 to retrieve its sovereignty over the Alsace-Lorraine; both parts signed a new treat, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, to acknowledge that. What will happen if France forces the United Kingdom to cancel the Treaty of Paris of 1763 and retrieve its sovereign rights over the half of Canada and United States?

Secondly, the legitimacy of today's Republic of China as legitimate successor to the international rights of the Qing Empire is problematic. If a change of regime, from a monarchy to a republic for example, does not imply the disappearance of an international person (Oppenheim, 1955 b., §77, pp.153-154), it ceases to exist after its conquest by one or several States, or its spilt between two or more new States (Oppenheim, 1955 b. §79, pp. 155-156). If the 'first' Republic of China of 1912 did succeed the Qing Empire's international representative, it ceased to exist during the Warlord Period. The 'second' Republic of China, founded in Guangzhou in 1921 by Sun Yat-sen, created a new international representative by the conquest of the Chinese territory putting an end to the Warlord Period. If Chiang Kai-shek failed during the Northern Expedition, History will retain his name only as another warlord – history of the 'winners' prevails. Moreover, the very existence of the Republic of Formosa or Republic of Taiwan before the application of the Shimonoseki Treaty (the Japanese

²⁶Article 43: The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present Convention or of the provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfill any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the treaty. as cited in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969-05-23, *United Nation Treaty Collection*, retrieved from http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

occupation of Taiwan) gives juridical priority to the self-determination of Taiwan rather than any Chinese pretention over Taiwan (Chen & Reisman, 1972, pp.632-633).

Thirdly and finally, international laws recognize only five modes of sovereignty acquisition: cession (the cession of sovereignty over a territory from a State to another by a transaction, a treaty), occupation (acquisition of the sovereignty by an act of sovereignty over a territory which is not beforehand administrated by another State), accretion (natural extension of a territory), subjugation (takeover of a State by another one), and prescription (uncontested occupation of a territory during a long period of time) (Oppenheim, 1955 a., §211, p.546). The transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan within the Shimonoseki Treaty is clearly a case of cession; however nor the San Francisco Treaty, neither the Treaty of Taipei acknowledged the transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan to China regarding these rules.

In addition, both Chinese governments put forward political arguments to justify their sovereignty rights over Taiwan; however, based on so-called historical truth, these arguments lack juridical foundations.

On one hand, KMT' argues that Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are legal acts that transfer the sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan to the ROC. The San Francisco Treaty and as well as the Treaty of Taipei, are only the confirmation of what was already *de jure* in 1943 and *de facto* in 1945 when the Nationalist Army took possession of Taiwan. Yet, the juridical weight of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations remains hypothetical as the two documents were never ratified neither by the Allies, nor by Japan; they are only declarations of intention from the Allies on the post-war settlement. Chaigne (2000) quotes the General Guillerma, a French military attaché in China at the end of the Second World War and famous sinologist, regarding the status of Taiwan in 1949: "The world political climate has dramatically changed since 1945, and despite the usage, promises from a government are not easily transferred to its successor (p.169).²⁷" The Cairo Declaration is indeed a promise from Roosevelt to keep China fighting into the war; the other half of the Japanese Army was occupied fighting the Nationalist Army in China. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek was expecting military and financial support rather than post-war promises.

²⁷ "Le climat politique mondial a beaucoup changé depuis 1945 et malgré la coutume, les promesses ne se transfèrent point si aisément d'un gouvernement à celui qui lui succède."

On the other hand, Beijing considered the *de jure* retrocession of Taiwan to China when China declared war on Japan on the December 9 1941²⁸, and implicitly canceled the Shimonoseki Treaty. Taiwan was becoming *de facto* Chinese when the Japanese troops surrendered to Chen Yi (陳儀), Chiang Kai-shek's General sent to Taiwan, on October 25 1945. We have already proved the invalidity of the annulment of the Shimonoseki Treaty as an argument to justify the sovereignty transfer of Taiwan from Japan to China earlier in this Chapter so we won't go back to. Moreover, Beijing denies the juridical existence of the ROC, and considers itself as its successor in international law. However, the ROC does still legally exist in Taiwan, perhaps, on the Offshore Islands of Quemoy, Kinmen, and Matsu, certainly. Beijing unrightfully pretended the inheritance of all treaty and agreements signed by the ROC.

The Taiwanese independence movement for its part considered the right to self-determination as a solution to solve the question of the juridical status of Taiwan. Theoretically, the right of self-determination as specified in the United Nations Charter²⁹ had to be applied during the 1950's when Japan relinquished its sovereignty over Taiwan, but the context of the Cold War never permitted it. In this context, what is the meaning of Taiwan's democratization at the end of the 1980s? If the ROC retains sovereignty over Taiwan, then democratization is only a regime change from dictatorship to democracy; but if the ROC does not retain sovereignty over Taiwan, the military occupation of the Island becomes a civil occupation. Nonetheless, the democracy in Taiwan marked the attachment of the Taiwanese population to the institutions of the ROC. But as far as the ROC is not internationally recognized and its sovereignty over Taiwan contested by the People's Republic of China, not represented at the United Nations, can the right to self-determination for the Taiwanese be recognized in these terms in international law? Moreover, as far as the ROC claimed to represent the Chinese nation and commitment to the One China Principle, Taipei sent the wrong message to the international community and denied the right of self-determination for Taiwanese.

²⁸ China's Declaration of War Against Japan, Germany and Italy, 1941-12-09, *The Jewish Virtual Library*, retrieved from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/chinawar.html>

²⁹ Article 1, Charter of the United Nations, *United Nations*, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

To conclude, Hughes (1997), quoting Crawford, describes the ROC as “consolidated *de facto* government in a civil war situation (p.18).” Indeed, the Chinese civil war hadn’t legally ended, and Taiwan’s juridical status remained undetermined until the state of war between the KMT and the PCC had been officially declared. The ROC in Taiwan is independent *de facto* but it is *de jure*? It is actually still dependent from a politico-cultural entity called ‘China’.

2.3 The One China Principle, the Opposition of the Two Chinas and the Strategic Triangle

The intervention of the United States in the Taiwan Strait opened a new era of Sino-Taiwanese relations; the military *Status Quo* in the Strait created two Chinese States fighting for the legitimacy to represent the whole of China within the international community. China was China but Taiwan was also China. There was only one point where the two sides of the Strait reached consensus: the One China Principle (*Yige Zhongguo Zhence*, 一個中國政策). The concept of One China is quasi-universal within the Chinese cosmology: there can be only one monarch, only one son of heaven, because it represents the link between earth and heaven; throughout all Chinese historiography, there’s only one son of heaven even if China is politically divided (Dreyer, 2008, p.19). Transposed to 20th century, there can be only one legitimate Chinese State ruling the whole Chinese nation; moreover in the Cross-Strait conflict context, Taiwan can only be a part of it. The simple evocation of the One China Principle is proof in itself that China is divided in two States, otherwise the question of the unification of the Chinese nation won’t exist (Chiang & Hwang , 2008, p.63).

Recognition of a state by another state is a political and/or ideological matter that is exclusively was an internal question and was not ruled by any international agreement. The question of the representation of China within the international community followed the course of history of the second half of the 20th century: the détente during the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet Split, and especially the decolonization.

Moreover, the United States, as only protector of Taiwan and world's super-power, played a decisive role in the settlement of the Chinese representation's question.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the international community supported the legitimacy of the ROC 'by default', following the American's lead. Only Communists nations from the Eastern Bloc, North European countries as well as Great Britain recognized Mao Zedong (毛澤東)'s regime as a legitimate representation of the whole of China. However, starting from the beginning of the 1970's, the situation was reversed and increasing numbers of nations were recognizing Beijing instead of Taipei; Chiang Kai-shek was losing the diplomatic battle.

In 1968, 64 States recognized the ROC and 45 the PRC; in 1975, less than ten years after, only 26 States recognized Taipei wit 112 recognizing Beijing (Roy, 2003, p.132). France recognized Beijing in 1964³⁰, followed by Japan in 1972, and finally the United States in 1979. Nowadays, only 23 States are recognize the ROC³¹, including the Pontifical State, and only 19 have an embassy in Taipei³² – these States usually receive Taiwan's technical and financial assistance and do not recognize Beijing, preserving the myth of the ROC as the One China.

Precisely, two events caused Taipei's diplomatic defeat: the expulsion of the ROC from the United Nations in 1971 and the warming relations between Beijing and Washington starting from 1972.

The accession of the PRC to the world major international organization was the result of two factors: the increasing number of States favorable to Beijing and against so-called American imperialism within the process of decolonization, and the will to integrate the largest world population into the international Community after twenty years of isolation. Starting from the 1950s, Communist countries, diplomatically allied with Beijing, proposed an annual vote at the General Assembly

³⁰ De Gaulle wanted to find a two Chinas solution that Beijing cannot oppose but Chiang Kai-shek decided to turn down this initiative and break off diplomatic relations with France.

³¹ Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Swaziland, The Holy See, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia.

³² Foreign Embassies in the ROC (Taiwan)'s web page, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?ctnode=1867&ctunit=34&basedsd=32&mp=6>

of the United Nations for the recognition of the PRC as representative of China within the Organization's institutions instead of the ROC. In 1970, Beijing obtained the majority; however, a 2/3 majority was required for the resolution to be passed. Confident from this victory and certain that the vote of 1971 would be decisive, Beijing enunciated its conditions: the ROC and its delegate would have to be expelled from the UN if the Organization wanted the PRC to become a member of it. On the October 25 1971, the General Assembly voted 75 against 35 in Beijing's favor. The Resolution 2758 specifies that the ROC was expelled from the UN and its related agencies, and the PRC become "*the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations*."³³ It is clearly specified that one China is not expelled from the UN and being replaced by another one, but that the representative government of China within the Organization switch from being the ROC to the PRC. Here, the UN explicitly acknowledges the One China Principle.

The second event that caused Taipei's loss of legitimacy within the international community was the warming relations between Beijing and Washington and the opening of an official dialogue between them. Indeed, Cross-Strait politics were contingent of the triangular relation between Taiwan, the United States and China, where Washington played the role of an arbitrator: Taipei needed Washington to preserve its political independence, and Beijing needed Washington's tacit agreement to pressure Taiwan (Dittmer, 2008, pp.179-180). American's policy regarding Taiwan was divided in two phases: the unconditional support of Taipei facing the Communist China, and the "Strategic Ambiguity"; Washington tried to maintain the *Status Quo* and balanced its relationship with Taipei and Beijing from 1979 onwards and Beijing's recognition.

When he dispatched the 7th Fleet in 1952 and militarily and economic support to Taiwan, Harry Truman "had no plan to create two Chinas or to secure independence for Taiwan (Bernkopf Tucker, 2009, p.13)"; he however created this situation as *de facto*. As a consequence of the Chinese threat, amplified by the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of December 1954 – the PLA shelled the Offshore Island of

³³ Resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, Resolution 2758, 1971-10-25, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/un2758-XXVI.htm>

Quemoy – Taipei and Washington signed the Mutual Defense Treaty.³⁴ However despite Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on including the Offshore Island within the scope of application of the treaty, it was only a defensive alliance if and only if the PLA launched an attack on Taiwan or the Pescadores Archipelago (Article 2) – Washington didn't want to be pulled into a conflict with China because of Chiang Kai-shek's dream of retaking the Mainland. Moreover, President Eisenhower excluded any support to the Nationalist Army if it tried to launch any operation on the Mainland China. In fact, the American government doubted the Nationalist Army's capacity to launch any such operation; as a result the fall of Taiwan was eventually expected (Roy, 2003, p.114).

In addition, Lin and Lin (2009) argue that the Mutual Defense Treaty implicitly recognizes the sovereignty of the ROC over Taiwan (p.12). In our opinion, this treaty doesn't settle the Taiwan's juridical status in the extent that it recognizes that the ROC's territory is *de facto* limited to the Island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Archipelago. The territorial clause (Article 6) however emphasizes its purpose and is limited to the application of the Articles 2 and 5; the exchange of notes related to this treaty confirms this view.³⁵ The treaty was abrogated following Washington's switch of recognition.

Though Richard Nixon made assurances to Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) that the United States “*will never sell you down the river* (Roy, 2003, p.131)” during an official visit in Washington while Chiang Kai-shek's son was Prime Minister, the American's policy regarding Taiwan and China took a U-turn from 1971 onwards. Nixon, though Republican and well-known anti-Communist, having visited Taiwan several times before his election, saw in the Sino-Soviet Split and in warming relations with Beijing, the opportunity to pressure and isolate Moscow.

At the beginning of 1972, Nixon went himself to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (周恩來); at the end of this trip, Chinese and Americans declared the

³⁴ Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, 1954-12-02, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>

³⁵ Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of China Relating to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 2 December 1954, 1954-12-10, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual02.htm>

Shanghai Communiqué. If on the Chinese side, Taiwan was declared as part of the PRC, the Americans “*acknowledged the Chinese position that there was but one China and Taiwan is part of China.*”³⁶ It was the end of the so-called two Chinas policy and the beginning the American support to the One China Principle; we need to notice here that no US president after Nixon has challenged this policy.

However, if the Shanghai Communiqué was the first step to the normalization of the relations between Beijing and Washington, it took years for both sides to be ready politically. If President Nixon and President Ford needed pro-ROC Republicans for domestic matters, Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, had more breathing space to implement the diplomatic recognition of Beijing. On the Chinese side, Mao’s death threw China into political struggle and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) waited three years to be victorious and apply his own pragmatic policies. On the January 1st 1979, Beijing and Washington recognized each other, ending automatically American’s recognition of the ROC and the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The ROC’s lobby remained strong within the American Congress and it voted the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) in April 1979. This Act provided written confirmation of America’s commitment to defend “Taiwan and its people” (not the ROC anymore) and the sale of weapons to the Island for its own protection into the American Constitution. The TRA also acknowledged the establishment of unofficial relations between Taiwan’s government and Washington.

What about Taiwan in all of this? Actually, each American government didn’t pay much importance to Taipei’s opinion and even less to the Taiwanese population. Washington had absolutely no confidence in the KMT; it was viewed finally as a Chinese government in exile. After the break off of their diplomatic relations, it was expected that Taipei would negotiate with Beijing a peaceful settlement of their conflict. However, the contrary happened; to Washington’s and Beijing’s surprise, Chiang Ching-kuo engaged the liberalization and democratization process of the ROC in Taiwan placing both American and Chinese in an unwelcomed and unfamiliar situation (Waldron, 2008, p.161).

³⁶ Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 1972-02-28, *Taiwan Document Project*, retrieved from <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique01.htm>

The creation of substitutive relations between a part of the international community and Taiwan after de-recognition of the ROC allowed the continuity of commercial and cultural exchanges between them. Regarding this situation, Taiwan's isolation was relative and the loss of ROC's legitimate representation of China didn't slow down Taiwan's economical development; Taiwan, starting from the 1980s, was one of the most developed economies in the world. If the Nationalist government was not recognized as representing China; it was however recognized as legitimately being able 'to administrate' Taiwan.

2.4 Pragmatism to redefine Cross-Strait Relations

Leadership changes within the CCP at the end of the 1970s and the KMT at the end of the 1980s marked the evolution of Cross-Strait Relations toward pragmatism. During the 1980s Beijing first showed signs of openness towards Taiwan and the will to create a Cross-Strait dialogue; Taipei waited to respond until the beginning of the 1990s and Lee Teng-hui's control over the KMT to see the Cross-Strait dialogue being established. Effectively, two factors forced Taipei to be more pragmatic towards China: the democratization of Taipei's regime and its Taiwanization, and the illegal, already expanding, economical exchange between the two sides.

The new Chinese policy towards pragmatism in its relationship with Taiwan was a consequence of the rise of Deng Xiaoping as new leader of China. Taiwan's liberation rhetoric was replaced by a discourse more pacific in order to seduce the Taiwanese and implement the reunification. Though Beijing never renounced any military actions to force Taiwan to reunify, Chinese leaders were careful to pose no direct threat to Taiwan, (Roy, 2003, p.147).

Indeed, January 1st 1979, the National People's Congress made the "*Message to Taiwan's Compatriots* (*Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu*, 告台灣同胞書)³⁷"; Beijing proposed Taiwan to establish the Three Links (*San Tong*, 三通) (Commercial, aerial and maritime, and postal) as well as 'Four Exchanges' (academic, cultural, sports, and

³⁷ Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, 1979-01-01, *China.org.cn*, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/7943.htm>

technological) in order to “reconnect” people from each side of the Strait (Le Pesant, 2006, pp.83-84). The same year, China opened its economy to Taiwanese investments.

On the September 30 1981, Marshal Ye Jianying (葉劍英), as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, proposed Nine Points (*Ye Juitiao*, 葉九條) to put an end to “the division of China.”³⁸ He called the KMT to form a Third United Front with the CCP in order to reunify China. He proposed that Taiwan, after the reunification, could “enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region, and could retain its armed forces. The central government will not interfere with local affairs in Taiwan.” He added that Taiwan can keep its socioeconomic system, independent cultural relations with foreign countries, and its army. As Le Pesant (2006) mentions it, this policy, under the name “One Country, Two Systems (*Yige Guojia Liangzhong Zhidu*, 一個國家兩種制度) (See Chao, 1987)”, became Beijing’s new dogma regarding Taiwan’s policy (p.84). Moreover in 1982, under Deng Xiaoping’s impulse, China adopted a new constitution that introduced the concept of “special administrative region (*Tebie Xingzhengqu*, 特別行政區)” in order to reunify Hong Kong under the One Country, Two Systems principle, but it was obviously targeting Taiwan.

Taiwan’s answer was fast in conformity with Chiang-Kai-shek’s dogma of the ‘Three No’s: no contact, no negotiation, no compromising with the CCP. Indeed, for Chiang Ching-kuo –“*To talk peace with the Chinese Communist is to invite death*” – reunification is impossible as far as Beijing does not give up Communist ideology and does not accept the Three Principles of the People (*Sanmin Zhuyi*, 三民主義) of Sun Yat-sen (Roy, 2003, p.148).

However, though the two Chinese governments were not officially in contact from 1949, exchange, trade and population movement took place between the two sides of the Strait; fishing boats were introducing people or goods in Taiwan, vice versa occurred. During the 1980s, several events forced Taipei and Beijing to open the Cross-Strait dialogue.

³⁸ PRC Leader Ye Jianying's Nine-Point Proposal, 1981-09-30, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*,
retrieved from
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/sums/timeline_docs/CSI_19810930.htm

The first unofficial contact between the Chinese government took place in 1986 when a pilot of the ROC's national airline company, China Airlines (*Zhonghua Hangkong Gongsì*, 中華航空公司), defected for Beijing. The two governments entered into talks by the intermediary of their two civil airline administrations; the pilot was able to stay in China when the cargo-plane was sent back to Taiwan. From then, events speeded up. In 1987, a group of veterans from the Nationalist Army protested demanding to be able to visit the Mainland in order to perform their ancestor's ritual and to visit their families before their death. The lift of the restrictions around visits to the Mainland was up in the air, and people of Taiwan were finally allowed under certain restrictions to visit China starting from November of the same year. By 1989, already one million of Taiwanese people had visited China; though only state-workers and military personnel were allowed to. Moreover, postal liaisons opened in 1988 and phone liaisons in 1989. In December 1990 the second unofficial contact took place in Kinmen by intermediary of respective Red Cross Organizations to tackle the question of extradition of criminals and fugitives that found shelter 'on the other side of the Strait'.

If as we have just observed direct political discussion didn't occur during the 1980s, economical exchanges on the contrary were sky-rocketing. Taiwanese economical competitiveness was downgrading, China offered new economical development perspective. However, investing directly in China was forbidden, Hong Kong served as a back door to invest in China: in less than ten years, from 1986 to 1994, Taiwanese investments in China through Hong Kong were multiplied by ten.³⁹

Forced to recognize the evidence, the Nationalist government of Chiang Ching-kuo authorized Taiwanese people to invest directly in China, however, though restrictions were made on the total sum and sector. Progressively, these restrictions were lowered or suppressed, contributing actively to the implementation of an economical integration process. The Mainland Affairs Council values Cross-Strait

³⁹ Transit Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China via Hong Kong, 2009-07-03, *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly n°141*, Mainland Affairs Council, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E7%B6%93%E6%BF%9F%E7%B5%B1%E8%A8%88%E6%9C%88%E5%A0%B1no.1412.pdf>

commercial exchanges at four billions US Dollars in 1989, forty billion in 2002, and more than 110 billion in 2010.⁴⁰

This period of economical opening up towards China comes together with Taiwan's beginning of liberalization and democratization. They actually are both linked together; Taiwan's Chinese policy evolution was impossible without a fundamental evolution of the Nationalist regime.

Taiwan's political discourse evolution on the PRC is the result of Lee Teng-hui's rise to presidency after Chiang Ching-kuo's death and the democratization of the ROC: Taipei implicitly recognized the PRC's rule over the Mainland that opened the possibility of a dialogue. On the April 22 1991, Lee Teng-hui proclaimed the end of the "*Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion* (*Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan*, 動員戡亂時期臨時條款)"; Taipei put an end unilaterally to the Chinese Civil War and recognized PRC's *de facto* existence. On 18th of September 1992, the "*Statute Governing the Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area* (*Liang'an Renmin Guanxi Taoli*, 兩岸人民關係條例)⁴¹" was implemented in order to govern Cross-Strait relations on the Taiwanese side. Furthermore, it implicitly recognized the Cross-Strait division.

If six secret meetings took place between the two governments during the 1980s (Su, 2009, p.7), the beginning of the 1990s is the starting point of the institutionalization of Cross-Strait relations and dialogue. On the January 30 1991, Taipei created the Mainland Affairs Council in order to tackle Cross-Strait issues and implement Cross-Strait regulations. Less than six months after, the MAC authorized the creation of the Strait Exchange Foundation, a private organization but financed by the government; its function was to enter directly in contact with China for dialogue

⁴⁰ Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, 2011-03-24, *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly* n°216, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/132414433591.pdf>

Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, 2009-07-02, *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly* n°145, *Website of the Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E7%B6%93%E6%BF%9F%E7%B5%B1%E8%A8%88%E6%9C%88%E5%A0%B1no.1455.pdf>

⁴¹ Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, 1992-09-18, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=90541&ctNode=5914&mp=3>

and negotiations. As a consequence to this, Beijing responded to the SEF's creation through the creation of the ARATS; they both had the same function.

During the first semi-official meetings, the question of the sovereignty of each part came naturally arose; however both sides had different ideas. Taipei insisted on the equal status between Taiwan and China when Beijing insisted on the subordination of Taiwan to China (Su, 2009, p.15). Eventually, a so-called *modus vivendi* was found during 1992s fall: "One China, respective interpretations (*Yige Zhongguo, Gezi Biao Shu*, 一個中國，各自表述)". The SEF proposed that each side should *publically* and *verbally* enounce its point of view on the One China Principle; the ARATS agreed but specified that Cross-Strait functional negotiations shouldn't mention any political interpretation. Indeed, for Beijing the One China Principle is not a question of interpretation because it is the One China.

Between 1992 and 1995, without approving the 'One China, respective interpretations', Beijing didn't reject it at first. It rejected it after Lee Teng-hui's trip to the United States in June 1995. Nonetheless, Beijing admitted this formula after Chen Shui-bian's election. In April 2000, Su Chi⁴² (蘇起) (2009) reworded the 'One China, respective interpretations' formula in "1992 Consensus (*Juier Gongshi*, 九二共識)." He expected that by erasing the term "One China" the new DDP Administration would be encouraged to pursue Cross-Strait dialogues and find a compromise around this question with the KMT. Naturally, Chen Shui-bian didn't acknowledge it, but Beijing considered this formula as a requirement to resume Cross-Strait negotiations (pp.89-91).

Was there ever a consensus in 1992? Beijing's constant changing opinion on this matter is proof of what Chen Shui-bian called the so-called "1992 Consensus" - the fact that KMT and CCP "agreed to disagree" (Su, 2009, p.180). Beijing never

⁴² Su Chi was a scholar before joining the KMT in 1993 and entering in Lee Teng-hui's government as secretary general of the presidency; then he was Chairman of the MAC. He became legislator at the Legislative Yuan from 2005 to 2008; he was in the same time Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic adviser during the presidential campaign. He became Chairman of the National Security Council once Ma Ying-jeou elected; he quitted this function in 2010.

agreed this principle until it was politically useful; the “1992 Consensus” is nowadays an “objective truth” according to the Chinese government.⁴³

The first meeting between ARATS’s and SEF’s directors – known as the Koo-Wang meetings because of both directors’ names, Koo Chen-foo (辜振甫) for Taiwan and Wang Daohan (汪道涵) for China – took place in Singapore from April 27 to April 29 1993, historically opening the institutionalization of Cross-Strait relations. SEF’s and ARATS’s directors marked the meeting by an official signing. A second meeting was planned, but Beijing canceled it because of Lee Teng-hui’s ‘private’ visit to the United States, the first for a ROC president since 1949. Beijing denounced Lee Teng-hui’s trip as an attempt from Taiwan’s president to declare formal independence, using Washington’s recognition. The confidence crisis between Taipei and Beijing found its climax with the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 when the PLA launched missiles over Taiwan a few days before the first democratic presidential election on the Island. The institutional dialogue resumed in 1998 but eventually stopped with Lee Teng-hui’s “State to State Relations theory’s” enunciation in 1999, and never resumed with Chen Shui-bian which refused to subscribe to Beijing’s conditions.

In addition, Lee Teng-hui’s Chinese policy can be summarized within the National Unification Guidelines (NUG, *Guojia Tongyi Gangling*, 國家統一綱領)⁴⁴; they were published by the National Unification Council (NUC, *Guojia Tongyi Weiyuanhui*, 國家統一委員會) created in 1990 by Lee. The NUG proposed a reunification process in three stages: first in a short period of time, the NUG planned to increase Cross-Strait economical and cultural exchanges, the second stage planned to create a cooperation and mutual trust institutionalized platform, and the third planned to create a reunification’s institutionalized process where all the conditions converge. However, Lee Teng-hui efforts to open political negotiations between the two sides were contingent to China’s political evolution towards democracy and economical development towards a free market economy; that is to say Beijing needed to redefine its own governance model and value system.

⁴³ Beijing says ‘1992 consensus’ is an ‘objective truth’, 2011-01-13, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/01/13/2003493381>

⁴⁴ Guidelines for National Unification, 1991-03-13, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68107&ctNode=5910&mp=3&xq_xCat=1991

In fact, Lee Teng-hui obviously wanted to institutionalize the *Status Quo* in the Taiwan Strait and to protect the ROC because both ensured Taiwan political independence. He proclaimed ROC's political and juridical existence as a fact that Beijing could not ignore. Officially, Taipei did recognize only one China but China was seen as a historical, geographical, cultural, even racial entity that the PRC could not represent alone. Indeed, according to the Taiwan's government both the Island and the Mainland were part of China, and both ROC and PRC were equal political entities within China.⁴⁵

Moreover, Lee Teng-hui's international policy, its "flexible diplomacy", was implemented to break Taiwan's isolation within the international community. Its goal was to increase economical, cultural, scientific, educational relations between Taiwan and other nations within the limits of the *Status Quo*; Corcuff (2005) precisely calls this policy "*the methodical exploration of the Status Quo*"⁴⁶ (p.7)."

If we look at the History of Taiwan and its interaction with China, the Island seems as close as it is far from China. The historical fact that could not be contested is the colonization of Taiwan by Chinese settlers; however, though Taiwan was under a Chinese State during the larger part of its history, the Island was in fact politically separated from Mainland China. Indeed, Taiwan was politically dependent from China only during four years from 1945 to 1949. On the one hand, Taiwan during the Qing's rule enjoyed a particular autonomous status that precisely permitted in some extent the foundation of the Republic of Taiwan in 1895 without any political struggle on the Island. On the other hand, the Zheng's State and the KMT's State, though they pretended to represent China to some extent or other, they both only controlled and ruled the Island separately from China.

Within Sino-Taiwanese's relations History, Cross-Strait exchange never stopped. However, exchanges between the two sides of the Strait were quite exclusively from China to Taiwan. Starting from the end of the 1980's, Cross-Strait exchanges grew

⁴⁵ Relations Across The Taiwan Strait, 1994-07-11, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68126&CtNode=6619&mp=3>

⁴⁶ "Exploration méthodique du statu quo."

rapidly, but from Taiwan to China. We can wonder if Cross-Strait exchanges, which lead to economical interdependence between Taiwan and China, are an historical movement particular to the relation between the Island and the Mainland or, if we take a larger point of view, only the symptom of the world's evolution toward a worldwide economical interdependence? Taiwan's desire to open its economy to China followed an economical logic, and cultural proximity helped it to do so, but was Taiwan the only country who wanted to take advantage of China's economical development?

CHAPTER 3 Building Taiwan's Political Community

“The Central Government will not dispatch troops to Taiwan. I earnestly entreat the people of Taiwan not to irritate the Central Government, but to cooperate to maintain order. I can risk my life to guarantee that the Central Government will not take any military actions against Taiwan”.

*Statement to the Settlement Committee, Major General Chang Wu-tso,
Commander of the Fourth Gendarme Regiment, 1947-03-08⁴⁷*

The goal of this Chapter is to highlight Taiwan's ‘nation’ building process. In what context the nation and the State in Taiwan were built, and why the result is not a Taiwanese nation-state but a hybrid political community, not really Chinese but not completely Taiwanese either.

A community is refers to a group of individuals that choose to live together, and have common interests in living together. The communitarian link between Taiwan's inhabitants, despite their cultural and ethnic differences, was the common will to flee from a China which did not fit them, in order to build something else? The Taiwanese political community was built during the second half of the 20th century precisely on the very idea that recent immigrants and late immigrants had a common enemy to face: the PRC. However, the historical events, that precisely created the Taiwanese ethnical differentiation, are as well at the origin of Taiwan's lack of national consensus.

⁴⁷ Kerr, 1992, p.305

The Taiwanese political community became mature and autonomous starting from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. Nonetheless, the hybrid nature of the new democratic regime – the former republicans institutions, only centered and adapted to Taiwan – did not satisfy either the Taiwanese Nationalists, or the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan. The Taiwanese political community stayed united as far as China was seen as an enemy, for different reasons, by the whole Taiwanese population. However, a crisis within Taiwan's political community came up when a part of the population and politicians, reinforced by China's economical development, started to see Beijing as a partner rather than an enemy. The Chinese government intentions towards Taiwan nevertheless, had not changed.

3.1 February 28 1947 or Taiwan's nationalism birth

The Japanese colonization of the Island made Taiwan a prosperous and self-sufficient territory. Though civil and political rights were limited by a strong colonial State, the Japanese colonization installed a State laws, developed the agriculture, industry and infrastructures all over the country (electric system, water system, roads, railways, and telecommunication means). The Taiwanese population was also received an education – many Taiwanese got the opportunity to study in Japanese universities or in the Taihoku Imperial University (台北帝國大學) in Taiwan, today's National Taiwan University (*Guoli Taiwan Daxue*, 國立台灣大學). These developments resulted in the birth of the Taiwanese middle-class. In 1945, Taiwan, regarding its socio-economic development, was already more advanced from two decades of Japanese rule, compared to China (Corcuff, 2008, p.1256).

The Japanese's goal was to develop Taiwan as a model colony and eventually integrate the Island into Japan's national territory. In parallel of Taiwan's modernization, the colonial government implemented the 'Nipponization' of the population, the *Kominka*. Starting from 1935 the acculturation process became more authoritative. Japanese became the only language that could be used in Taiwan, and any other languages, including all Insulars' mother tongue, were banished from public spaces. Moreover, Taiwanese and Aboriginal cults were replaced by Shinto's cults and the worship of the Emperor. For the most 'japanized' of the Taiwanese, they were

able to join the Imperial Army after 1937 and especially after 1942 when the Imperial Army lacked soldiers (Chang, 2003, p. 40).

However, as Hughes (1997) highlights, the acculturation process was, in some extent, a failure because Taiwanese's political rights remained limited and the colonizer/colonized differentiation divide remained vivid (p.22). Nevertheless, starting from the 1920s, a feeling of 'Taiwanity' was to be born within the insular population; several autonomist organizations, but not nationalist, were created. Their objective was to promote a specific Taiwanese culture and identity in opposition with the Japanese culture and classic Chinese culture, but still as part of the Empire of Japan. The Taiwanese Cultural Association, the first of these organizations, was founded in 1921.

Moreover, Mengin (2006) describes the Japanese colonization period the "primary material of the Taiwanese conscience problematic."⁴⁸ According to her, if the Taiwanese conscience was built within a classic process of opposition between the colonizer and the colonized, it is "in the multiple cultural 'interstices' existing in the Chinese traditional society that the 'nipponity' spread and contributed to form a conscience more Taiwanese than Chinese (p.88)."⁴⁹ The "Taiwanity" appears to be a Japanese invention: Starting from 1910, the colonizer started to name insular populations, cultural, social, or political organization as "Taiwanese" and to conduct "Taiwanese studies" (p.90). Moreover, modern transportation and the imposition of the Japanese as *lingua franca* all over the Island permitted different populations, that didn't understand each other prior to the Japanese colonization, to communicate and realize in some extent their common destiny. The choice made by Taiwanese political elites to promote their cultural movement in Japanese was a strong symbol of the growing Taiwanese identity (pp.90-91).

In 1945, the arrival of the Nationalist Army and the departure of the Japanese were welcomed by the Taiwanese population; at this moment, only few Taiwanese wanted Taiwan's independence (Roy, 2003, p.58). However, Taiwanese opinion

⁴⁸ "Le substrat scellant toute problématisation d'une conscience taiwanaise."

⁴⁹ "C'est dans les multiples interstices culturels existant dans toute société chinoise traditionnelle que la 'nipponité' a pu se répandre et contribuer à la formation d'une conscience plus taiwanaise que chinoise."

changed rapidly confronted when with the reality of the Nationalist regime. On the October 24 1945, Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Chen Yi as Taiwan's Governor-general, and installed a military government even though Taiwan was annexed by the ROC on the day of the Japanese army surrendered. If KMT's determination to take over Taiwan was strong because they saw the Island as a part of China, mainlanders however felt superior over the Taiwanese "corrupted by Japanese ideology". According to the KMT, Islanders had to be "educated" (Roy, 2003, pp.56-57).

Taiwan's economy had been flourishing before the war but was partially destroyed by American bombing. It was expected by the population that the Nationalist administration would rejuvenate the Island's economy. However, according to the KMT, Taiwan had a debt to pay for its freedom from Japanese rule; Taiwan's population and economy were roped in to support the Nationalist Army fighting the Communists (Roy, 2003, pp.59-60). Indeed the KMT and Chen Yi's economic policies worsened the situation; the pillage of Taiwan's resources was directly organized by the Nationalist government at its own profit: The economy was nationalized, a state monopoly was created, industries and infrastructure were dismantled to be sent to the Mainland, and the agriculture was requisitioned to feed the Nationalist Army in China.

Moreover, Mandarin Chinese that only few Taiwanese were speaking at the time was imposed as compulsory language in public spaces while Japanese and Taiwan's local languages were banished. Positions in high and middle administrations, and the police, were monopolized by mainlanders. The Taiwanese were confined to minor tasks by Nationalist administration on the grounds that they lacked knowledge of the National Language (*Guoyu*, 國語). Corruption became endemic and being appointed in Taiwan was an easy way to get rich for Chinese state-workers.

Comaroff (1998, as cited in Simon, 2006, p.5) defines colonialism as "an ideological project and an institutional order, a process and an existential state-of-mind, but above all, a construction and negotiation of difference in situation of unequal power (p.5)." Indeed, the Nationalists didn't act as liberators in Taiwan but as a new colonizer. Chen Yi kept the Japanese administrative structure, and several Japanese administrators stayed in charge. KMT's administrators installed themselves

in the same houses as the Japanese; Chen Yi chose the Japanese governor's palace as his new residence (it is nowadays the Presidential Palace). Though the Governor-general allowed the election of a 'consultative' provincial Assembly, only Taiwanese that took oath to the KMT could vote for candidates appointed by the Governor (Roy, 2003, p.66). Chiang Kai-shek as well refused to fully apply the ROC's Constitution in Taiwan, depriving the Taiwanese people from their civil and political rights guaranteed in the Constitution because of their Japanese past (Edmondson, 2002, note n°2; Hughes 1997, p.25).

It is in this context of economical degradation, political deprivation, and cultural humiliation – that the events of the February 28 1947 took place. Frustrated Taiwanese declared that “Chinese pigs replaced Japanese dogs, but at least the dog can guard the house”. On the 26, two Taipei Wine & Tobacco Monopoly Bureau agents arrested and beat a street peddler; they confiscated her cigarettes and money. Local witnesses gathered at the scene and expressed their anger; the two agents had to use their guns to escape and one person in the crowd was killed. The morning after, on 28th February, a crowd protested in front of the Wine & Tobacco Monopoly Bureau; they were calling for justice and wanted to handle a petition listing all KMT's abuses. Shotguns welcomed the demonstrators killing several people; the demonstration turned into a mob. A few hours later the building of the radio station was taken and the news of the events was broadcasted throughout Taiwan; and general uprising started against KMT's misrule. Despite Chen Yi's declaration of martial law on the evening of the 28th, Chinese troops were outnumbered and unable to retain control of the whole island; the result was the death of lots mainlanders killed by angry mobs.

Rapidly a dialogue begun between Chen Yi and the Settlement Committee, composed of Taiwanese elites; the Committee was able to influence the mob and calm its anger. However educated in the Japanese system of value, Taiwanese elites elaborated their strategy as if they were dealing with their former master (Hughes, 1997, p.27). The elites trusted the KMT, but Chen Yi secretly called reinforcement from the Mainland to restore its rule. The KMT was losing the Civil War, and Taiwan's uprising and demands for autonomy were seen as an insurrection against the Central Government (Roy, 2003, p.69).

When the calm returned on the March 2nd, Chen Yi accepted the Settlement Committee's requests to amnesty the demonstrators, and to try the policemen who had shot in the crowd. On the March 7th, the Committee handed over to Chen Yi Thirty Two Demands of reforms, in particular the full application of the Constitution, including civil and political rights, plus a certain degree of political and economical autonomy. Between the 8th and the 10th of March, reinforcements requested by Chen Yi landed in Keelung, the main arbor of the North, and Kaohsiung (高雄), the biggest harbor in the South. On the direct orders of Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist soldiers suppressed systematically the entire intellectual elite, members of the Settlement Committee, and randomly executed civilians; on the March 13th, the Nationalist government authority was restored (Roy, 2003, p.71). Kerr (1992) was in Taiwan in duty at the American Embassy during the events; he reported that between ten thousand and twenty thousand Taiwanese were killed during the repression (p.310). The Nationalist government naturally investigated the cause of the uprising; the investigation concluded on May 23 1950 that Taiwan was corrupted by the Japanese colonization and the Communists used the 27th events to start a revolt against Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

According to Edmondson (2002), the 228 is one of the most memorable events of Taiwan's History. He thinks that the violence used by the Nationalists on the Taiwanese population turned Taiwan in a "specific historical object"; for him, Taiwan's History after the 228 is something that is "thinkable" (p.25). However until the democratization of Taiwan, the events of that particular day remained a "*footnote*" in the ROC's History, and the Taiwanese were forced to forget it, reinforcing the feeling that the ROC was foreign regime (p.30).

As a consequence of the 228, several Taiwanese independence movements were created in exile in Japan or in the United States; Corcuff (2008) mentions the February 28th and the following days reprisals as "the founding myth of Taiwanese nationalism (pp.1255-1256)." However these movements had limited influence on Taiwan because of the "White Terror" that limited free speech and free information on the Island until the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, starting from the 1970s the movements began to influence numbers of Taiwanese students in Japan, the United States or Europe. In January 1970, they were united in one organization, the World

United Formosans for Independence (WUFI, *Taiwan Duli Jianguo Lianmeng*, 台灣獨立建國聯盟). One of the first acts of the organization was to attempt to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo on April 24th of 1970 whilst he was on an official visit to the United States. Despite this act of violence, Taiwan independence movements worked on the fabrication and the diffusion in Taiwan of an alternative History of Taiwan from the Nationalist official discourse, based on the KMT's illegitimate rule over Taiwan and the refusal of the One China Principle.

Peng Ming-min (彭明敏) can be taken as an example of the creation of an alternative narrative to Taiwan's history; he is indeed seen as one of the founding fathers of Taiwan's independent nationalist movement. In 1964 he was one of the first in Taiwan to challenge KMT's legitimacy. As Chairman of the Political Science department of the National Taiwan University and helped by two students, they published the *Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation* (*Taiwan Renmin Ziji Xuanyan*, 台灣人民自救宣言)⁵⁰ that denounces Chiang Kai-shek's illusions of retaking the Mainland and the illegitimate occupation of Taiwan and in doing so called for the democratization of the regime. He was later imprisoned then released under Washington's pressure; and scared for his own life chose a life of exile thereafter.

In 1972, he became the first Taiwanese to publish a direct account of 28th February reprisals in *A Taste of Freedom*; George Kerr's first edition of its *Formosa Betrayed* was published in 1965. According to Peng, Taiwan should be a political community that includes the whole Island's population without discrimination of its origin. This community must be separated from China, rejecting what Hughes (1997 and 2000) calls the '*feudal prejudice*' of Chinese nationalism – the essentialist principle that wants every member of the 'Chinese race' to be ruled by "the one Chinese State" regardless of their political history or culture. On the contrary, Peng Ming-min follows Ernest Renan's concept of nationalism⁵¹ to separate cultural and ethnic identification from the political identification (pp.37-38, p.76). He was finally

⁵⁰ *The Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation* can be retrieved in English at this address: http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ad/peng_0707_z04.html

⁵¹ Renan's thesis, *What is a Nation?*, can be retrieved in English at the address: <http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/renan.htm>

able to return to Taiwan during the 1990's following the democratization of the island. He was in addition the DPP's candidate for the presidential election of 1996.

3.2 Taiwan during the KMT's Colonial Period: Building and Crisis of “the Nation Republic of China”

In December 1949 began the Formosan exile of the State/Party ROC/KMT. However, because of the events of February 28th and its defeat during the Chinese Civil War, internationally the Nationalist regime in Taiwan was discredited. The security of Taiwan was only ensured by the American commitment to defend the Island. If the beginning of the Cold War and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War offered to Chiang Kai-shek legitimacy ‘by default’ to represent China within the international community, the first goal of the KMT in Taiwan was to rebuild its legitimacy internationally and domestically on the Island.

In this context, the traditional Chinese culture was used as tool; its function was to legitimate the ROC in Taiwan as a nation equal to the others. The ROC was described as a traditional values bearer in opposition with the PRC, and as the representative of a homogenous culture in opposition to Taiwan's ethnic reality (Chun, 1996, p.133). In fact, the cultural and national identity policies of the KMT were contingent to the precarious conditions in which the Nationalist government must ensure its survival (Chun, 1996, p.135). The KMT's project included a process of colonial domination between new migrants and local people; the former monopolizing political power at the expense of the later until the moment of democratization (Simon, 2006, p.5).

From the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the Republic of China a nation was in crisis. The increasing number of nations switching their recognition from Taipei to Beijing caused the end of the myth that the ROC still represented the whole Chinese nation; the very myth which supposedly justified the dictatorship. Moreover at the same period, Taiwanese independence movements saw their influence growing in Taiwan.

In Taiwan's ethnical context at the beginning of the 1950s, building a ROC's national identity was not an easy task. Indeed, though it asserted that Taiwanese and Chinese were all belonged to the same Han ethnies, the Nationalist government faced a population culturally and ethnically diverse.

The *Waishengren* as a group during the first years of the KMT's colonial period were far from being homogenous; men, women from different social and economical conditions and from all over China followed the KMT in its retreat in Taiwan. Moreover, Mandarin was mastered only by a few of them; Chiang Kai-shek himself, himself a southerner, had problems understanding 'his own' national language (Hughes, 2000, p.66). To some extent, *Waishengren* was gathered together by province of origin in villages reserved for them but separated from the rest of the Island population, the *Juancun* (眷村); the KMT provided all their material needs. They kept alive the hope of retaking the mainland and eventually went home within these populations. The KMT and Chiang Kai-shek were quasi-religiously worshiped by these different populations. It is generally suggested that they represented 15% of the whole Taiwan's population.

On the other side, the *Benshengren* were not ethnically homogeneous either. The group is divided into two sub-ethnical groups: Hoklo from the Fujian and Hakka (*Kejia*, 客家) from the Province of Guangdong. Languages, cultures, and traditions are all different between these two groups. The Hakka were an important minority in Taiwan. They represented 15% of the whole population; while Hoklo were the majority with 75%. Even if Aborigines were important culturally speaking, they represented only 2% of the whole Taiwanese population.

Moreover, the Taiwanese population before 1945 was a mosaic of local identities. Indeed, migrants were grouped by local origins reinforced through solidarity between individuals in the same village. They had to survive despite increased competition with other groups of migrants as well as Aborigines. This system was continued by the Qing and the Japanese in order to increase their control over the Island.

When it retreated to Taiwan, the KMT also brought its political system and its dictatorship. In April 1948, the "*Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of*

Communist Rebellion” was promulgated; it not only abrogated the Constitution of 1947 but also suspended its democratic functions. Even if the ROC, in some extent, was still a legitimate representative to China (Taiwan as a part of China) – representatives from the whole China, ‘democratically’ elected in 1947, followed the KMT in its retreat to Taiwan – the dictatorship was justified constitutionally because it was impossible to organize new elections on the Mainland; democratic institutions had to wait until the unification of the whole China under the ROC to resume (Hughes, 1997, p.26).

Domestically, the KMT needed to establish itself on Taiwan and consolidate its presence on the Island. It needed local support. However, the 228 and Taiwanese societies’ structural make-up- structured in local networks of trust- made it almost impossible for the KMT to effectively infiltrate Taiwanese society (Kempf, 2000, p.251). Even if the ROC’s international situation was critical and forbid national elections, it was still however possible for the KMT to implement local elections which did not challenge KMT’s political monopoly in Taiwan (Hughes, 2000, p.69). Within the local elections system, the KMT was a “king maker” between different local factions as far as the KMT was the only authorized political party; being elected represented large economical and political resources. This allowed the KMT to co-opt Taiwanese elites and create a large network of clients (Hughes, 2000, p.70). Moreover, the land reform implemented during the 1950s destroyed ancient local loyalties in rural areas; the KMT created a landlord’s class loyal to the Party (Hughes, 2000, p. 67).

Chun (2000) sees culture as a hegemonic force linked to the mechanism of political domination per se whose goal is to perpetuate the authority of the State (p.10). The very existence and definition of Taiwan as the Nationalist China, as the ROC, was an ideological construction based on traditional Chinese culture (Chun, 1996, p.129; 2000, p.10). Starting from 1949, the KMT defined Taiwan’s national identity in terms of race, language, history, tradition and culture – a tradition and a culture that the KMT wrote and redefined itself in order to legitimize the ROC’s existence in Taiwan, but as a political community larger than Taiwan (Chun, 1996, p.128; 2000, p.11).

On a more pragmatic aspect, it was through administration, education, the army, and social functions that the KMT imposed its traditional Chinese culture. Starting from 1945, the movement of “cultural reunification” imposed Mandarin as the only language allowed in public spaces as well as in education. This objective of this movement was to expel Japanese elements of culture in Taiwan, and to suppress any local cultural expression; the language was a tool to spread Chinese traditional values (Chun, 1996, p.133). Starting from 1966 as a reaction to the Cultural Revolution in China and to celebrate Sun Yat-sen centenary of its birth, begun the Cultural Renaissance Movement (*Zhonghua Wenhua Fuxing Yundong*, 中華文化復興運動). This movement organized cultural events and rallies, especially within schools, not in order to rediscover traditional Chinese culture, but to redefine it. The traditional Chinese culture was presented as a national bond and the engine of Taiwan’s economic development (Chun, 1996, p.134).

Moreover, Time and Space were ‘nationalized’ methodically in order to socialize the Taiwanese population to the ROC nation’s narrative (Corcuff, 2000, p.138). The ROC’s calendar replaced the Gregorian calendar – the ROC continued the Chinese imperial Dynasties’ tradition of establishing the first year of the reign as the first year of the calendar (Hughes, 1997, p.29; 2000, p. 67). Moreover, most of the ROC’s national holidays commemorated the republic’s history (Corcuff, 2000, p.138). Maps edited in Taiwan represented the Island as well as ROC’s territorial claims (Appendix 2). Streets were renamed using Chinese places names, historical characters of the Republic, or Chinese traditional values (Corcuff, 2000, pp.131-132).

As Gellner (2006) defines it, the State holds the monopoly of “legitimate education”. That is to say that the process of constructing national identity was contingent to the fabrication and diffusion of a specific national identity through national education. Education was indeed another tool in KMT’s redefinition of Taiwan’s national identity. Textbooks highlighted the superiority of the Chinese culture over others because of its historical longevity, capacity to integrate other ethnic groups, and its promotion of peace and private property (Vickers, 2006, p.308). Taiwan’s place in history textbooks was exploited by KMT’s Chinese nationalism as well: the Island was presented as the ROC’s socio-economic success in comparison with the “socialist catastrophe” in Mainland China, and the ultimate goal of the whole

Taiwanese population throughout history was to remain Chinese against foreign colonization (Vickers, 2006, p.310).

According to Chun (1996), the rise of a Taiwanese conscience during the democratization process was obviously the failure of the Chinese cultural hegemony in suppressing Taiwanese local identity (p.146). On the contrary, the persistent feeling of ethnical differentiation inherited from the 228 Events is the cause of KMT's national identity policy failure in addition with KMT's lost legitimacy to represent the whole China; it created an imbalance between the real situation and the domestic discourse.

Indeed, starting from the 1970s Chiang Ching-kuo and the Nationalist Party understood that they could not stay in power without increasing their legitimacy in Taiwan. However steeped in old political schemas, they faced large dilemmas on what particular strategy to adopt: increase oppression and risk alienating definitively the whole population of Taiwan, or accept reform and eventually the liberalization and democratization of the country, and in doing so risk losing power in the process (Roy, 2003, p.153). Chiang Ching-kuo chose a middle ground and opened up the regime, in particular freedom of speech, but suppressed critics of the Party. Moreover, the regime searched in Taiwan's socio-economic development a new legitimacy, integrating new Taiwanese economical elites within the KMT.

Though political arrests continued until the end of the 1980s, the White Period was ending and it was possible in some extent to criticize the regime indirectly. During the 1970, a new literary movement 'localiste' or 'nativist' was born in Taiwan. The goal of this movement was indeed not to find a new objective Taiwanese identity but to describe nostalgically the island's traditional rural past and life (Harrison, 2009, pp.131-132) in opposition with the 1970s modernity and urban life represented by the KMT's achievement and new legitimacy (Mengin, 2006, p.92).

Despite, the implementation of local elections during the 1950s, it was however impossible for any new political party to be created and to participate in any ballot because of the martial law of the period. Nonetheless, political opposition to the KMT arose during the 1970s, in some extent inspired by the 'localiste' literary movement of the same period. The *Dangwai* (黨外), in literal terms the "outside of

the Party'', was an informal political movement, organized as an ideological network based on the defense of Taiwan's interests, the promotion of democracy, and the self-determination principle for the Taiwanese people. As Ferhat (2006) highlights it, the KMT's national identity policies was in some extent a success in Taiwan: even if the *Dangwai* were in political opposition to the KMT, it never defended Taiwan's independence and found only its legitimacy in the ROC's constitutional system; its first goal was to see the ROC's Constitution fully applied (pp.291-292).

The *Dangwai* was a political success and despite its limited economical resources it won several prestigious victories and entered in several local assemblies. In 1977 for example, the *Dangwai* won 30% of the seats at the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (Hughes, 1997, p.38; Jacobs, 2008, p.48). The movement became more structured when during the summer of 1979 the magazine *Formosa* (*Meilidao*, 美麗島) began its publication, spreading the *Dangwai*'s ideology all over Taiwan.

The year 1979 was crucial in Taiwan's political History, first because the United States switched their allegiance against Beijing but also because in December of that year the *Formosa* magazine organized a demonstration in Kaohsiung to promote democracy and Human Rights in Taiwan. Though forbidden by the regime, the demonstration eventually took place; it was suppressed by the police, and *Dangwai*'s leaders were imprisoned, the *Formosa* magazine was also forbidden and its editors arrested. The Nationalist regime was in fact under pressure after Washington's de-recognition, and the Legislative Yuan's by-election was canceled this year to avoid expressions against the regime. The news of the Kaohsiung Events (*Meilidao Shijian*, 美麗島事件) created indignation within the whole Island and the international community though the KMT tried to justify its actions by arguing it was trying to preserve public order. The media coverage of the trial that followed the events continued to spread *Dangwai*'s ideas of democracy and to delegitimize the Nationalist regime.

On the September 28 1986, a large part of the *Dangwai*'s members founded the Democratic Progressive Party. The new party was created despite martial law not being lifted yet, and was tolerated by the regime. A year after, on the 14th of July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the martial law and replaced it by the National Security Law that restored individuals civil rights and press freedom specified in the Constitution.

Did Chiang Ching-kuo have the choice not only to liberalize the regime but also to engage the democratization process when his regime was facing an increasingly organized and credible political opposition? It is certain that Washington pressured Taipei to implement a democratic transition of the regime, but the domestic political situation was in our opinion determinant in this process. The KMT had to choose between implementing its own democratic process in order to survive or to disappear.

3.3 The Democratic Transition in Taiwan during the 1990s: Imagine the Taiwanese Political Community

When Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, only 10% of the whole ‘national representation’ had been elected by the Taiwanese population (Chiang & Huang, 2008, p.60), in 2000 when Lee Teng-hui left the power, Taiwan was already a full liberal democracy electing all its representatives democratically, including the President of the Republic. In approximately twelve years, Lee Teng-hui and its political allies (within the KMT or outside of it) had transformed a vanishing Chinese dictatorship into a dynamic Taiwanese democracy.

The localization and the democratization of the regime intimately linked together (See Corcuff, 2004) did created a process of Taiwanization in the political system and throughout society. That is to say that the Chinese national identity evolved towards a national identity of Taiwan. Though this process never succeeded in establishing a full Taiwanese nation-state, it resulted in the creation of a Taiwanese political community instead. Indeed as Le Pesant (2006) highlights, “the generalization of a representativeness principle limited to the very population of Taiwan largely contributed to the emergence of an imagined political community limited to the Island territory (p.264).⁵²” The regime’s structure did evolved and succeeded in sticking to Taiwan’s insular borders. According to Mengin (2006), “democratization can be explained as a split between the metropolitan territory and the colonial territory by realignment or the indigenization of the ROC in Taiwan. If

⁵² “La généralisation du principe de représentativité limité à la seule population de Taiwan a fortement contribué à l’émergence d’une communauté politique imaginée se limitant au territoire de l’île.”

this split is as much imaginary as the Nationalist regime's claim to represent the whole China, it is determining nowadays, as well as before, the modality of the exercise of power; the democratization is *in fine* a large movement of re-appropriation of political power by the Taiwanese population (pp.83-84).⁵³”

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were three major political forces in Taiwan: the reformer's camp within the KMT headed by Lee Teng-hui, the conservator's camp within and outside of the KMT (that was still influent within the Army, the national education and the KMT itself), and the DPP that at that time choose openly to promote Taiwan's formal independence. If some thought that Lee Teng-hui would be a weak president when he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo (Roy, 2003, p.185), he proved contrary and imposed its domination and its principles over the KMT. In doing so he eliminated the most aggressive opposition within the Party. Mostly Mainlanders, these Conservators quit the KMT in 1993 to found the Chinese New Party (*Xingdang*, 新黨); however, this party remained marginal because of its limited Mainlanders electorate.

The Taiwanization of the ROC's political system as well as the national identity was the compromise between these three political forces. On the one side, the Reformers were not able to push any further Taiwan's movement towards formal independence. If that was their objective, confronted with the Conservators' opposition and Beijing's threat of war, both could not accept the end of the symbolic link between Taiwan and the Chinese nation. On the other side, Reformers had to face the DPP's opposition that increased its political credibility as an alternative to the KMT.

Conscious of Taiwan's absence of national consensus, Lee Teng-hui's political action had two goals. The first was to calm ethnical tension born with the liberalization, particularly freedom of speech, and second was to satisfy Taiwanese people's aspiration for democracy that could also increase ethnical tensions. Lee

⁵³ “Cette démocratisation se ramène à une scission entre territoire métropolitain et territoire colonial par le recentrage ou l'indigénisation (bentuhua) de la République de Chine à Taiwan. Si cette scission est aussi fictive que l'était la prétention du régime nationaliste à représenter l'ensemble de la Chine, celle-là détermine aujourd'hui, comme celle-ci hier, les modalités concrètes d'exercice du pouvoir, la démocratisation se ramenant *in fine* à un vaste mouvement de réappropriation du pouvoir par la population insulaire.”

Teng-hui re-invented Taiwan as “a community of life” where “New Taiwanese (*Xintaiwanren*, 新台灣人)” choose to live together and defend their own model of society against a common enemy (the PRC), and in doing so created a common ground. He wanted the island to be the “Taiwanese people’s thing (Lee, 1994, p.58).” According to him, the ROC was an independent and sovereign State from 1912, but was limited to the territory of Taiwan, the Pescadores Archipelago, and the Offshore Island from 1949 (Lee, 1999, p.11). Lee Teng-hui’s rule did not promote Taiwan’s independence during his presidency but the foundation of a “Taiwanized State”, keeping theoretical and symbolic links with China; his nationalism is more like a form of patriotism – Smith (1999) defines patriotism as “a sense of attachment to a country or a state [when] nationalism is an ideological movement on behalf of a nation, a cultural-historical community which may or may not have at that moment have its own homeland or state (p.102).”

Starting from 1990, Lee Teng-hui was assisted by the National Affairs Conference that worked as a think tank gathering all Taiwan’s political forces to implement democratic reforms. On May 1st 1991, the *Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion* were abrogated, and the *Additional Articles to the Constitution of the Republic of China* (*Zhonghua Minguo Xianfa Zengxiu Tiaowen*, 中華民國憲法增修條文)⁵⁴ promulgated. The Constitution of the Republic of China (*Zhonghua Minguo Xianfa*, 中華民國憲法) is one of the last bonds between the ROC in Taiwan and China; it was drafted for the whole of mainland China and any modification is seen as a crime for Conservators within the KMT. The draft of additional articles is an hybrid solution between the localization of the regime and preservation of the symbolic bond with China: though they are changing the “constitutional order⁵⁵” and the political system, these articles are, properly speaking, not “amendments” to the Constitution, and are added after the end of the text, and with a different font (Corcuff, 2005, p.3), “as if the Constitution must remain untouched from any impairment, scared that the very existence of the ROC was threatened (Ferhat, 2006, p.300).”

⁵⁴ The Additional Articles to the Constitution of the Republic of China can be retrieved on the website of the *Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)* at this address: <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=435#01>

⁵⁵ “Ordre constitutionnel.”

On July 31 1992, the *Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area* (*Taiwan Diqu yu Dalu Diqu Renmin Guanxi Tiaoli*, 台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例) was promulgated. Though this act did not redefine ROC's borders and limited it only to the territory of Taiwan, it did however constitutionalize the slip of the ROC's territory in two different areas: the "Taiwan Area (*Taiwan Diqu*, 台灣地區)" where the Constitution was implemented and the "Mainland Area (*Dalu Diqu*, 大陸地區)" where it was not (Corcuff, 2005, p.298; Ferhat, 2005, p.15). In June 1990, the Council of Grand Justice of the ROC (*Da Faguan Huiyi*, 大法官會議) decided to renew the National Assembly (*Guomin Dahui*, 國民大會) and the Legislative Yuan which members were elected in 1948; the redefinition of the constitutional frontier, though fictive and so-called temporary, was essential for the resuming of the ROC's democratic institutions only in Taiwan.

The first general elections in Taiwan were decisive for the Taiwanese political community's geometry. During the campaign for the National Assembly, the only institution able to revise the Constitution, the DPP adopted a clear stance on Taiwan's independence; its program was to draft a new Constitution fitted for Taiwan. On the other side of the political field, Lee Teng-hui's KMT erased from its campaign platform the Chinese nationalist discourse that was still very present only a few years before the 1992s election. On the contrary, it defended the independence and the sovereignty of the ROC against Beijing's irredentism, and focus on the pragmatic questions of people's daily life. The KMT started to erase its image of the party of the Mainlanders, and was eventually perceived as a normal political party by the Taiwanese people; it won the elections with 71% of the ballot (Roy, 2003, p.193). KMT's large victory can be explained because democracy and freedom of speech seemed to be established in Taiwan; socio-economical questions were more essential for Taiwanese voters (Chang, 2003, p.52). Moreover, the result of this election and the following elections showed that Taiwanese people yearned for a normalized political life. It was the desire of Taiwanese people and that every election in the future would not become a permanent referendum on independence or reunification.

Furthermore, the full localization of the political system required the disappearance of the political and institutional structure of the Province of Taiwan. The existence of the provincial structure was symbolic of the temporary character of

the ROC's central institutions present in Taiwan (Roy, 2003, p.209); on one side the New Party wanted to preserve this institution, on the other side the DPP wanted to eliminate this symbol of Taiwan's subordination to China. In fact, the provincial government was obsolete and doubled the central government's competence. Moreover, James Soong (Soong Chu-yu, 宋楚瑜), the governor of the Province, was a political rival that Lee Teng-hui wanted to eliminate; the alliance with the DPP was essential here. In 1998 the provincial administration was replaced by an Executive Yuan Agency and the resigning assembly has never been renewed.

Parallel to these political reforms, Lee Teng-hui began a process of national identity transition, especially 'taiwanizing' the State's identity and implementing a collective work on the dictatorship memory. The objective was to strengthen the Taiwanese political community in its own Taiwanese subjectivity; "that is to say free from the systematic reference with Mainland China, its members would identify themselves with Taiwan (*Rentong Taiwan*, 認同台灣) and with a Taiwan conscience (*Taiwan Yishi*, 台灣意識) based on being proud of being Taiwanese and the love of their country (Le Pesant, 2006, p.278).⁵⁶

During the years 1990s, Lee Teng-hui put an end to the ROC's 'civil religion'.⁵⁷ This religion got its writings (the Three Principles of the People), its guide (Chiang Kai-shek), its cults (Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen), its temples (Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen memorials), and its martyrs and heroes (those dead to protect the Republic of China and the Chinese nation) (Le Pesant, 2006, p.275). As Corcuff expresses it in three of its articles (Corcuff, 1997; 2000; 2002) this "civil religion" disappeared progressively without contestations from the Conservative camp.

In addition, in order to respond to people's expectations and counter DPP's monopoly on memories, Lee Teng-hui's KMT engaged a reflection on its role during the dictatorship and the specificity of Taiwan's History. As every authoritarian regime, the KMT kept archives on historical milestones of the Republic. A large part of the

⁵⁶ "C'est-à-dire affranchie d'une mise en relation systématique avec la Chine continentale et dont les membres seraient animés par une « identification à Taiwan » (*Rentong Taiwan* 認同台灣) et une « conscience taiwanaise » (*Taiwan Yishi* 台灣意識) fondées sur l'amour porté à l'île et la fierté d'être taiwanais."

⁵⁷ Le Pesant (2006, p.275) is using here Dominique Schnapper's term (1994, *La communauté des citoyens, Sur l'idée moderne de nation*, Gallimard, Paris)

regime archives were opened at the beginning of the 1990s revealing with more objectivity Taiwan's traumatizing History during the KMT's dictatorship; history was given back to historians (Le Pesant, 2006, p.274). The 228 Events got particular attention, numerous commemorations of the Events took place and memorials were built; February 28th became in 1997 the first holiday commemorating Taiwan's history in the ROC's calendar (Corcuff, 2000, p.144).

Moreover, education played an essential role in the Taiwanization of national consciences. During the KMT's dictatorship the History and Geography of China were taught to young Taiwanese on the Party's ideological basis, ignoring the political reality of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's place in the history textbooks was proportional to Taiwan's size compared to the whole China; that is to say not much. The reform of History textbooks implemented in 1997 by Lee Teng-hui raised a strong opposition from the Conservatives. Indeed, they were conscience that the three new textbooks (History, Geography, and Society) would end the Nationalist education and definitively the hegemonic domination of the Chinese culture and identity in Taiwan, breaking another symbolic bond between Taiwan and China. In fact, the reformers' goal was to depoliticize the teaching of History. The concept of 'concentric circles' was introduced, Taiwan as the center of the representation system, China as the second circle, and the rest of the world as the third. Furthermore, the History textbooks reforms introduced a new point of view on Taiwan's History, highlighting the contribution of Taiwan's different ethnic groups as well as foreigners within history (Corcuff, 2000, p.54).

In twelve years in charge of the ROC's presidency, Lee Teng-hui dramatically transformed Taiwan's political landscape, State identity and national identity. Moreover, the Chinese State nationalism – the Three Principles of the People, the retaking of the Mainland, Taiwan's a part of China, and Taiwanese people as Chinese – were replaced by a new legitimating discourse of the KMT in Taiwan, tainted by Taiwanese nationalism. As the best example of the Taiwanization of the regime an increasing number of political rallies were made in Taiwanese languages, Taiwanese (*Taiyu*, 台語) or Hakka (*Kejiahua*, 客家話) starting from the beginning of the 1990s, even by Mainlanders politicians, especially James Soong. Taiwan was ready for its first political alternation benefiting the DPP.

3.4 The Years 2000 and the Taiwanese Political Community's Crisis: The Incompletion of the National Transition Process

In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian was surprisingly elected with 39% of the ballots. Chen Shui-bian had benefited from KMT's divisions to win.⁵⁸ He pushed forward the Taiwanisation of the whole society and of the political system in order to create a Taiwanese national identity "written in large." Chen Shui-bian's final goal was to promote the emergence of a Taiwanese nation-state, proud of its own subjectivity and the marginalization of the Chinese elements of its identity (Schubert, 2004, p.551).

However, internal and external constraints prevented Chen Shui-bian in achieving this very goal. Indeed on the one hand, the KMT, that retained the majority at the Legislative Yuan, adopted a scorched earth tactic rather than conciliation to block or slowdown Chen's national identity policies. This specific institutional situation turned Taiwan's politics into a battlefield between the Taiwanese and the Chinese nationalisms; the Taiwanese political community was in crisis. On the other hand, Beijing threatened Taiwan with war if Chen's Administration pushed forward Taiwan's formal independence.

Despite limited room to breathe, Chen Shui-bian tested the Chinese government and the KMT's limits. Nonetheless, Chen's best option was to continue the building of a Taiwanese nation within the ROC's constitutional and institutional framework in order to preserve the *Status Quo* and prevent war in the Strait (Le Pesant, 2006, pp302-303). But, if the DPP was not able to suppress the ROC's national symbols and to create new national tags for Taiwan in order to establish a Taiwanese nation-state, it did however 'taiwanize' it (Le Pesant, 2006, p.305). The national anthem, for example, sang during celebrations, commemorations, or sport events, is a common experience for all its members as a 'physical' achievement of the political community (Anderson, 1991, p.145). Nevertheless, ROC's symbols were "recycled" as identification tags of the Taiwanese political community, creating a

⁵⁸ Chen Shui-bian was ahead with 39,3%, James Soong, dissident of the KMT, 36,8% and Lien Chan, the KMT's official candidate, only 23,1%.

movement of differentiation between Taiwan and China internationally (Le Pesant, 2006, p.307). If Taiwan was Taiwan and not China, then ROC's symbols were symbols of Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian's national identity policies aimed to crystallize the ROC entity and the Taiwan entity in one, and install the idea that the ROC *was* Taiwan and Taiwan *was* the ROC. The aim was for the ROC to eventually disappear in Taiwan's reality as a Taiwanese nation-state independent from China.

In order to push forward the Taiwanization of the State – to create a Taiwanese State and not only a 'taiwanized State' – Chen's Administration systematically added the word "Taiwan" on every official documents as well as every institution that could acknowledge the very existence of a Taiwanese State within the international community⁵⁹ (Le Pesant, 2006, p.305). The extensive use of the "logo-map"⁶⁰ of Taiwan in public spaces and official documents was a strategy to fit Taiwan's insular borders with the State's borders in Taiwanese people's minds as well as foreigners (Le Pesant, 2006, p.310), another strategy to promote the very creation of a Taiwanese State.

The DPP intended to change the Republican calendar and erase several ROC's celebrations that recalled Taiwan's now ancient subordination to China. However, the absence of consensus on this question forced Chen Shui-bian to act indirectly: if some celebrations could not be suppressed, they could however be forgotten. It is especially the case for October 25th, the commemoration of the "Glorious Retrocession" of Taiwan to the ROC, which ceased to be a legal holiday in 2002. On the contrary, other political commemorations inscribed in the calendar could not be forgotten nor replaced; they were taiwanized. The Double Ten, the national day, for example lost its bond with the commemoration of the Wuchang Uprising in China which started the Chinese Revolution. Sun Yat-sen, who is consensual in Taiwan amongst KMT and DPP voters, was celebrated as the "father of the nation", but without specifying which nation he was the father of. Aside from this, commemorations of the 228 Events became crucial during Chen Shui-bian's mandate; celebrated as a second national day,

⁵⁹ "Ajouter systématiquement le mot 'Taiwan' sur tous les documents officiels ainsi que dans le nom de toutes les institutions pouvant matérialiser l'existence d'un Etat taiwanais sur la scène internationale."

⁶⁰ "Carte-logo."

it was the symbol of Taiwanese struggle against the dictatorship of the KMT, and the symbol of Taiwan's subjectivity (Le Pesant, 2006, pp.310-311).

Other policies however failed and could not be fully implemented, blocked by the political opposition like the campaign of "rectification of names" of public companies – replacing the word "China" by "Taiwan". The rectification of the name of the Chunghwua Post (*Zhonghua Youzheng*, 中華郵政) in Taiwan Post (*Taiwan Youzheng*, 台灣郵政) in 2007 for example provoked a large campaign of protests from the KMT, and despite the name change the bill was blocked by legislature. Another example is the changing of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall's name (*Guoli Zhongzheng Jiniantang*, 國立中正紀念堂) in the National Taiwan Democracy Hall (*Taiwan Mingzhu Jinianquan*, 台灣民主紀念館) provoked controversy as well as protests, the name was eventually changed without the legislature's approval. When the KMT returned to power, both names were changed back to their original status.

Moreover when the Nationalists took possession of Taiwan in 1945, they conserved the Taiwanese currency, different to that of China's currency. In June 1949 the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD, *Xintaibi*, 新台幣) was introduced in order to stop hyperinflation; the Nationalist regime continued to use the Taiwanese currency even after December 1949. However, in order to preserve China's unity myth, the New Taiwanese Dollar continued to be used and its issue was granted by the Bank of Taiwan (*Taiwan Yinhang* 台灣銀行) instead of the Central Bank of China (*Zhongyang Yinhang*, 中央銀行) while the *Fabi* (法幣) remained the official currency of the ROC but was not used in Taiwan. In July 2000, one of Chen Shui-bian's first measure of taiwanization was to authorize the issue of NTD by the Central Bank and to make the New Taiwan Dollar the official currency of Taiwan (Mengin, 2006, p.85).

Regarding DPP's cultural and national identity policies, its goal was to "to reinterpret the Chinese cultural inheritance, and to highlight the Taiwanese culture not only as a frontier's form of the Chinese culture (Le Pesant, 2006, p.318).⁶¹" The KMT and the Conservative political opposition in general described these policies as a

⁶¹ "Réinterpréter l'héritage culturel chinois et de mettre en avant une culture taiwanaise qui ne soit pas uniquement une forme frontalière de la culture chinoise."

movement of ‘de-sinization’; however, the Chinese culture in Taiwan was so hegemonic that any attempt to rebalance its place and legitimately emphasize Taiwan’s other cultural inheritance can only appear as an intention to ‘de-sinize’ of Island.

As Vickers (2010) highlights it, quoting Brown (1996), when Taiwanese scholars and politician are trying to characterize differences between the Taiwanese identity and a Chinese identity, it is always within the framework of the Han culture; but it is significant that there is a clear difference between Chinese culture and Han culture (p.100). Vickers observes in addition that different studies on Taiwanese identity implicitly recognize “a correspondence between the Han ethnicity and the Chinese political identity. This explains to some extent why Taiwan’s independence promoters’ emphasize the importance of the Aborigines’ inheritance (not Han) of Taiwan [...]. This, starting from the 1990s, contributed to the increase in the interests of Japanese, Dutch, and other non-Chinese historical actors on the evolution of Taiwan’s culture and identity (p.101).⁶²”

Concepts of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity were described as Taiwan’s symbols of its difference (Le Pesant, 2006, p.293). Local cultural inheritance (Hoklo, Hakka, and Aborigines) as well as foreigners’ (European, Japanese, and American) were introduced as equal with each other and with the Chinese cultural inheritance in Taiwan’s culture building; an active cultural policy highlighted the contribution of these different cultures long ago masked by the Chinese cultural hegemony. Moreover, Aborigines found a central place in the new national identity policy; marginalized culturally and humanly by the Nationalist regime, they became the new symbol of Taiwan’s cultural difference with China.

DPP’s national education policy was a continuation of Lee Teng-hui’s reforms, but with the major difference being that the “second concentric circle” was no longer China but the whole of Asia. The goal here was indeed to separate China’s historical orbit and to include both of it within a larger Asian space. Moreover, Taiwan’s ethnic

⁶² “Une correspondance entre l’ethnicité Han et l’identité politique chinoise. Cela explique en partie l’accent qui a été mis par beaucoup de défenseurs de l’indépendance taiwanaise sur l’importance de l’héritage aborigène (non han) de l’île [...]. Cela a contribué, depuis les années 1990, à accroître l’intérêt pour l’influence des Japonais, des Hollandais et autres acteurs historiques non chinois sur l’évolution de la culture et de l’identité taiwanaise ”

languages teaching program (Hoklo generally, but also Hakka, and Aborigines languages when these population were in majority) was introduced into the High School curriculum as an initiation in order to assist students to realize Taiwan's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character.

In addition, the DPP's step up to power marked the bipolarization of Taiwan's political field – the fracture between those who saw China as a threat and those who saw China as an opportunity; those who saw China as an opportunity also saw Chen Shui-bian as a threat – and the beginning of the Taiwanese political community's crisis. Mainlanders were afraid that Chen's Administration would simply throw them into the sea, and they were shocked by DPP's cultural and national identity policies; they considered these policies as attempts to turn them into foreigners in their own country. Numerous Taiwanese were also hostile to Chen Shui-bian and his policy was either attached to a certain Chinese culture in Taiwan, or seen as a threat to economic interests. Despite this perception eventually, the majority of Taiwanese wanting independence more than the reunification with China, they favored maintenance of the *Status Quo* against China's threat of war.

During his two mandates, Chen Shui-bian and his political allies were a minority at both the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. If Chen's first mandate was characterized by inexperience – the KMT monopolized political power in Taiwan during fifty years, and the DPP lacked indeed of experienced people – the political opposition adopted a scorched earth tactic rather than conciliation to block or slowdown Chen's policies, and tried to present DPP's administration as incompetent. In this context, it gained the people's approval and the organization of referendum on crucial matters was essential tools for Chen to overcome this institutional deadlock (Corcuff, 2008, p.1259).

The KMT on its side never suffered any electoral defeat before 2000 and lived Chen Shui-bian's election as a trauma. Lee Teng-hui and its Taiwanese faction were pointed out as responsible for favoring Chen's victory. Thereof, the KMT returned to the Chinese nationalism ideology, and the Conservatives that were marginalized during the 1990s went back in charge. Lee Teng-hui for his part, as the accomplishment of his ideological course towards Taiwan's independence (Schubert, 2004, p.551), founded the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟). James

Soong, after its defeat during the 2000s presidential election, also created his own political party: the People First Party (PFP, 親民黨) as a Mainlander and in defense of the ROC political platform. If the Blue Camp gathered the KMT, the NP and the PFP, the Green Camp gathered the DPP and the TSU. Within the Blue Camp, the KMT represented the majority and promoted a Greater China ideology along with the PFP and the NP. Within the Green Camp however, the TSU was clearly a Taiwan's independence movement, the DPP on the contrary was a Taiwanese nationalist party starting from 1995 and its new adherence to the defense of the ROC; nationalism not being synonym of quest for independence if Taiwan was already independent within the ROC (Cabestan, 2005, p.11).

After his first election in 2000, Chen Shui-bian's Cross-Strait policy was cautiously expected by Beijing and the Blue Camp. Indeed, Chen Shui-bian during the 1980s and the 1990s advocated Taiwan's independence before pragmatically refocusing its discourse on ROC's sovereignty; his Vice-President, Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien, 呂秀蓮), was however closed from Taiwan's independence movements. In his inaugural speech, Chen Shui-bian declared its "Four No's, One Without" policy (*Sibu Yimeiyou*, 四不一沒有) – no independence, no change in the national title from "the Republic of China" to "the Republic of Taiwan", no inclusion of the doctrine of special State-to-State relations in the Constitution of the Republic of China, and no referendum on unification or independence; without abolishing the National Unification Council – and showed signs of searching for a consensus with Beijing and the KMT. He proposed to resume Cross-Strait dialogue under the "Spirit of 1992" – dialogue, exchange and resolution of disputes – but Chen Shui-bian never acknowledged the "1992 Consensus" and the One China Principle. He did however mention the possibility of political integration between Taiwan and the Mainland, Chinese and Taiwanese being brothers and capable of tackling the One China question through dialogue (Schubert, 2004, pp.549-550).

Moreover, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP reaffirmed their attachment to the ROC during the spring of 1999. According to them, Taiwan is already an independent and sovereign State under the name of Republic of China; it is thereof pointless to declare the country's independence. Though both sides of the Strait ethnically

Chinese, Taiwanese people shall decide if Taiwan and China must be reunified (Le Pesant, 2006, pp.299-300).

However on the one hand, Beijing and Blue camp did not trust Chen Shui-bian and continued to see him as an advocate of Taiwan's independence, and did nothing to find a consensus with the new president; they, on the contrary, contested his legitimacy. On the other hand, the TSU and the most radicals within the DPP criticized Chen for its middle way conciliation discourse with Beijing. Thereof, it is without surprise that there was no real progress in the Cross-Strait dialogues. In August 2002, Chen Shui-bian declared that there's "one country on each side of the Strait (*Yibian Yiguo*, 一邊一國)" during a videoconference with the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (*Shijie Taiwan Tongxiang Huilian Hehui*, 世界台灣同鄉會聯合會). Naturally, Beijing and the KMT were furious. Here, Chen Shui-bian was going further than Lee Teng-hui and his "special State to State relations (*Tebi De Guo Wu Guo Guanxi*, 特別的國無國關係)" theory, directly referring to Taiwan's independence as a nation-state separated from China. After this declaration, Chen Shui-bian did actively promote a strong Taiwanese nationalism in order to mobilize its supporters.

In 2004 Chen Shui-bian was reelected by a small margin. However, the 2004 presidential election increased the bipolarization of the Taiwanese political community: the KMT convinced of being victorious⁶³ contested the result of the election with demonstrations and judicial procedures to cancel the ballot. Moreover, the day before the election, Chen Shui-bian and the Vice-President, Annette Lu, were shot in the street of Tainan. Though an independent investigation declared that the assassination attack was not a set up, Chen Shui-bian was seen as guilty in this affair and not as a victim. Chen was elected with 30 000 votes more than its adversaries; it is certain that the attack influenced the outcome of the election. Moreover starting from 2006, Chen's family's members started to be suspected of corruption; Chen Shui-bian himself was suspected, discrediting his political action.

⁶³ The two defeated conservative candidates of the 2000 election, Lien Chan and James Soong, were together on the same presidential ticket; they were thinking that the addition of both votes of the 2000's election will ensure them the victory.

Furthermore, Cross-Strait relations became conflicting, especially after 2004. After his reelection, it was more credible that Chen Shui-bian planned to promote Taiwan's independence further, calling for a referendum or for a new constitution. Thereof Beijing reaffirmed its intention to attack Taiwan and the Anti-Secession Law was passed in 2005. Moreover in 2004 and 2008, Chen Shui-bian organized three referendums on Cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's international air space. The referendum on Taiwan's reintegration in the UN in 2008 especially infuriated Beijing as a so-called attempt to change the *Status Quo*. Beijing tried to prevent the organization of referendum by every peaceful means possible as far as the concept of referendum itself was at odds with Beijing view of Taiwan. The Chinese government was afraid the Chen might propose directly a referendum on Taiwan's formal independence (Rigger, 2005, p.20).

Cabestan (2005) is certainly right when he mentions Chen Shui-bian's race against time to reinforce the Taiwanese character of the Taiwanese political community facing the increasing economical interdependence with the PRC (p.12). The biggest threat to the independence of the Taiwanese political community was indeed not the perspective of a war in the Strait; it would have been against every actor's interests, but the complete integration of Taiwan's economy with the Mainland, offering to Beijing leverage on Taipei's government and the Taiwanese population.

What was future for the Taiwanese political community? Chen Shui-bian tried to transform it in a full Taiwanese nation-state; however he faced, as well as Lee Teng-hui, what Corcuff (2008) calls the "Taiwanese constitutional deadlock". That is to say the impossibility of adhering to the ROC's legal sovereignty symbols (borders, name, and constitution) with the reality of Taiwan without provoking war in the Strait (p.1255). Chen's failure was marked by a crisis between two different views of Taiwan and its future; Ma Ying-jeou's election in 2008 didn't solve this crisis but expanded upon it instead.

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CHAPTER 4 Chinese Nationalism facing the Taiwanese Political Community

“Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”

Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Preamble), Dec. 4 1982⁶⁴

“In fact, ironically the only part of China that the PRC Constitution declares to be “part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China” is Taiwan – not Beijing, or Tibet or Xinjiang, or downtown Shanghai.”

John J. Tkacik Jr.⁶⁵

This fourth Chapter, through its different approaches, deals with Chinese nationalism and its relationship with Taiwan. It was a time when Taiwan was not the Chinese nation's “sacred land” and the Chinese irredentism over Taiwan is the result of the awareness of Taiwan's primordial role in China's security and prosperity.

The goal of this chapter is to highlight Taiwan's place within the Chinese nationalism's ideological software and its reactions facing the rise of a Taiwanese nationalism as a credible political force within the island. Indeed, the building and the strengthening of the Taiwanese political community is a direct threat for the Chinese nationalism's ultimate goal – that of reunification of the Chinese nation.

⁶⁴ Constitution de la République populaire de Chine, 1982-12-04, *People's Daily Online*, retrieved from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>

⁶⁵ Tkacik, 2009, p.1

In the first part, we will tackle Taiwan's place in the Chinese nationalism issue; how Taiwan, indeed, became the very "sacred land" of China. In the second and third parts, the object of our study is China's reaction to the rise of the Taiwanese political community. Violently first then more seductively, how Beijing is trying to influence Taiwanese people's political choice toward its own nationalist agenda. In addition, in the last part, we want to tackle Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan's reactions facing the Taiwanese political community and the rise of the political Taiwanese nationalism. Though they subscribe to the Taiwanese political community's founding principle of democracy, what are their motivations to promote unification with China?

4.1 Taiwan: Chinese Nationalism's New Frontier

Chinese nationalism's main argument to justify its irredentism over Taiwan is that the Taiwanese are ethnically Chinese and that Taiwan has been part of China's history since "ancient times" – since Chinese civilization began. According to Chinese Nationalists (KMT, NP, PFP, and PCC), Taiwan's Chineseness is universal and challenging it is not conceivable for them. However, we have seen that Taiwan was not a part of Chinese people's ethnoscape⁶⁶, as Smith defines it, before the end of the 19th century; Taiwan was excluded of it again after 1895 and the Shimonoseki Treaty.

Our goal here is not to demonstrate Chinese irredentism's lack of legitimacy to claim Taiwan, but to highlight Chinese nationalism's evolution regarding Taiwan's place within its ideological software.

The first Chinese nationalist movement, The China Revival Society (*Xin Zhong Hui*, 興中會), was founded by Sun Yat-sen in Hong Kong and Hawaii the year of the Shimonoseki Treaty and in some extends in reaction of it. However, it is not the loss of Taiwan that favors the Chinese nationalist movement to be born against the Qing Dynasty, but more the other clauses of the treaty (extraterritoriality for Japanese like Westerners, and the compensation of 200 million Teals) that was seen as a humiliation from a so-called 'inferior race'.

⁶⁶ See supra, p.14

The military defeat against the Japanese indeed showed up the increasing weakness of the Qing Empire, and its difficulty to adapt and be a part the new world order. In Chinese cosmology, China was the center of the world (*Tian Xia*, 天下); the Emperor was the ‘son of heaven’ (*Tian Zi*, 天子). Relations between China and the other surrounding states were organized as a feudal system – a subordination of other peoples to the Chinese Empire depended on their degree of Chineseness.⁶⁷

During a large part of the 19th century, if the system of treaty established with Westerners could be seen as a decline of China’s sovereignty in the Westphalian system of equality between members, this system was only seen by the Qing court as a means to integrate these ‘barbarians’ from the sea into the Chinese system (Fairbank, 1968, p. 258). Westerners did take advantage of this systemic flaw to weaken the Qing Empire and divide it in influence zones, sometimes establishing colonies on Chinese soil. Moreover starting from the 19th century and the Taiping Kingdom (*Taiping Tianguo*, 太平天國) from 1851 to 1864 in South China, the Qing Empire entered a period of trouble and political division that led the Qing Dynasty to its fall and the Warlord period.⁶⁸ The foreign domination over China and the challenge of Chinese universalistic values and cosmology worked as a founding ‘trauma’ of the Chinese nationalism; besides, at its creation Chinese nationalism also held a strong racist feeling against their Manchu masters and against Foreigners in general.

Following the Xinhai Revolution (*Xinhai Geming*, 辛亥革命), started by the Wuchang Uprising (*Wuchang Qiyi*, 武昌起義) October 10th 1911, the Republic of China was established at the beginning of 1912 in Nanjing. Though the sovereignty over the whole Qing Empire was recognized the ROC by Western powers, in fact the

⁶⁷ See Fairbank (1968) in Chinese cosmology.

⁶⁸ Though the ‘first’ Republic of China was founded and installed in Nanjing on the January 1st 1912, the government was relocated in Beijing under Yuan Shikai’s command (袁世凱), the General that overthrown the Qing, within the following months. In 1913, the KMT, victorious of both elections of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly tried to overthrow Yuan Shikai that persecuted them eventually; Sun Yat-sen chose the exile. Yuan appointed military governor on each province with their own army and autonomy from the central government in orders to strengthen its power and stabilize the country. In 1915, he restored the monarchy and became Emperor; the ROC was dissolved. In 1916, Yuan’s death started the Warlord period; China was already in trouble because of the end of the Republic. In 1917, Sun Yat-sen is back in China, and in 1921 the ‘second’ Republic of China is proclaimed in Guangzhou. Chiang Kai-shek, leading the Republican Army, partially success to unify China during the Northern Expedition (*Beifa*, 北伐) between 1926 and 1928; the Warlord period was over.

new Chinese regime got to accept Qing Dynasty's debt and international obligations (Dreyer, 2008, p.30) but was not legitimate over all those territories and did only control a small part of it.

On the one hand, the Chinese nationalism's ideological software represents 'space' as 'power': The Qing Empire's ancient borders were thereof transformed into the Chinese nation's idealized borders (Watchman, 2007, p.48), including peoples living at the Empire's periphery (Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongol, and Manchu). The first flag of the ROC was made of five bands of different colors, representing the Chinese nation's five races. Sun Yat-sen, in its lectures on the Chinese nation more commonly known as the *Three Principles of the People*, rewrote Chinese History; the Manchu Dynasty of the Qing and the Mongol Dynasty of the Yuan (*Yuanchao*, 元朝) became Chinese and no longer foreigners. China became suddenly, regardless of any anachronism, a multi-millennium nation.

On the other hand, Sun Yat-sen acknowledged that China is a "heap of loose sand", a cluster of clans (Hughes, 1997, p.7). Moreover, Hughes (1997) quotes Johnson suggesting that concepts of China and Chinese nationalism did not reached Chinese countryside where the large majority of the population was living before the end of the 1930's; that is when China was invaded by Japan (p.7). Starting from these observations, Sun Yat-sen and the other thinkers of the Chinese nationalism imagined that only a strong State could turn local loyalties and identities into a Chinese nation (Hughes, 1997, p.7).

The historical argument that bonds the new Chinese nation is weak and cannot hide China's political division of the beginning of the 20th century; Sun Yat-sen used the argument of blood to justify the Chinese irredentism over territories at the Chinese frontier. According to him, only blood cannot be altered by nature or man on the contrary of states and cultures (Leibold, 2006, p.191): Mongol as well as Manchu or Tibetan have different languages, religions and custom from Chinese but they are all members of the Chinese race, the Han race because of the bond of blood.

Moreover, blood implies a common ancestor from whom the whole Han race is born; it is the role played by the Yellow Emperor (*Huangdi*, 黃帝) in Chinese Nationalists' discourse. Not only he is the common ancestor of the whole Chinese

nation, including Mongol, Manchu and Tibetan, he is the very inventor of the Chinese culture and State (Leibold, 2006, p.192). According to Sun Yat-sen, China is “a single state out of a single race (Sun, n.d. as cited in Watchman, 2007, p.72);” his Three Principles of the People, especially the principle of nationalism, became upon his death Chinese Nationalists’ dogma, within the KMT as much as the PCC.

What about Taiwan in all of this? The island is nothing before 1943 and everything after; our purpose here is indeed to highlight the Chinese nationalism ideological software’s evolution regarding Taiwan’s inclusion in Chinese ethnoscape.

The KMT until the 1930s did not care about Taiwan. Regarding Chinese nationalism’s racial principle, the Taiwanese were not seen as members of the Chinese nation but an ethnic minority. Though Taiwan was ‘influenced’ by the Chinese culture, Sun Yat-sen, shortly before his death, wished to give political autonomy to Taiwan. In the Three Principles of the People’s speeches, Taiwan was pointed out as a lost territory, but never as a Chinese “sacred land” that must be retaken from the Japanese or the Westerners (Watchman, 2007, p.73). Furthermore, Taiwan was compared to Korean regarding the island’s political autonomy, and Taiwanese seen as foreigners in China; they indeed were considered as Japanese nationals and enjoyed extraterritoriality.

In addition, Chiang Kai-shek never mentioned Taiwan in his speeches or writings before 1938. The island became a concern for the Nationalist leader after Japan’s invasion of China, but in geostrategic terms: According to him, Taiwan as well as Korea must be independent from Japan to strengthen the ROC’s security (Watchman, 2007, p.75). Until 1943, Taiwan, for the KMT, was not a part of China and only represented a possible buffer State between China and Japan.

On its side during the 1920s and the 1930s, the CCP, founded in 1921 and widely influenced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s ideology, promoted dogmatically Taiwan’s independence. In 1931, for example, the CCP declared the Taiwanese were neither from the same nationality as Chinese people, nor from the same race (Hsiao & Sullivan, 1979, p.448); thereof, Taiwan shall not be a part of China but independent from the Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, the Taiwanese

Communist Party (TCP, *Taiwan Gongchangdang*, 台灣共產黨) was not associated with the CCP but with the Japanese Communist Party.

On the one hand, Hsiao and Sullivan (1979) suggest that the CCP's (and the KMT) view of Taiwan during the 1930s was based more on cultural criteria than ideological ones. The acculturation process of a population to the Chinese culture operates through the Chinese language learning and the teaching of Chinese moral and social values. On the contrary, according to them, a process of "de-culturation" is possible if a Chinese population is separated over a long period from the Chinese cultural matrix, and influenced by foreign cultures; this might be how Taiwanese cultural subjectivity can exist (pp.459-460). Furthermore, migrants from Fujian Guangdong were not fully "sinisized" when they chose to leave China for Taiwan during the 17th century (Guillermaz, n.d. as cited in Chaigne, 2000, p.163).

On the other hand, Hughes (1997) highlights the fact that Mao Zedong's choice to support the ethnic minorities' independence movement was a means to mobilize them against the Japanese and later the KMT. Mao's goal (as well as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek) was not to divide the former Qing Empire up, but to build the Chinese nation-state within the same borders; Chinese minorities' territories were indeed included within the 1954 Constitution as inalienable parts of China (pp.13-14).

It was in October 1942, when Chiang Kai-shek met Franklin Roosevelt's envoy, that he publically declared his intention to integrate Taiwan into China. Unthinkable before 1943 regarding China's military weakness and Japan's military power, taking over Taiwan and integrating the island to the Chinese national territory became possible with the United States alliance during the war. Indeed according to Hughes (1997), the Cairo Declaration in 1943 is the international recognition of China's claim over Taiwan (p.6), a position that is contested by many historians of the pro-Green camp in Taiwan. It may have structured a new political alternative on Taiwan's post-war settlement question (Hsiao & Sullivan, 1979, p.465). Thereof, Chinese Nationalists switched their discourses redefining Taiwan's identity and history in order to legitimate their new irredentism as they did for Tibetan, Mongol or Manchu. If Taiwanese were strangers and foreigners to the Chinese prior to 1943,

they became part of the Chinese nation afterward, ‘as they have always been and will be forever’.

Moreover, the Cairo Declaration forced the CCP to align on KMT’s position on Taiwan. Already isolated internationally, the Chinese Communist Party could not challenge an agreement that recognize China as a member of the international community.

Though there is nothing in Taiwan that is part of the Chinese nationalism’s mythology – “Taipei is not China’s Jerusalem (Watchman 2007, p.39)” – the Island *is* Chinese nationalism’s ‘next frontier.’ Since 1943 and even more since 1949, Chinese nationalism is shaped by Taiwan’s question and the Cross-Strait conflict. If the United States hadn’t send the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait and freeze the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese national Revolution, started by Sun Yat-sen in 1911, would have been achieved, and China unified under only one regime, one State.

Taiwan for Chinese Nationalists is not only a question of international rights on the island’s juridical status, but also a question of legitimacy of the Chinese nation-state to exist: Taiwan is holding another Chinese State than China; it is the so-called last territory that must be reunified to the motherland in order to repair last centuries’ humiliation; and it is the key to the Chinese nation’s security.

Chinese Nationalists see reunification and the Chineseness of Taiwan as within the natural order of things; it is the very wish of both side of the Strait. Why should Taiwan be reunified with China and not be independent? It is because Taiwan is a part of China. As Corcuff (2005) underlines it, it is a “petition of principle⁶⁹”: when the justification, understood as an argument, acknowledges that the outcome is already realized (p.11). Chinese Nationalists don’t see the reunification as a concept that can be discuss or challenged but as a universal fact where only when and the how matter. Indeed, the Chinese perception “highlights to us time as a stake in the extend that time must be watched to be eventually used (Corcuff, 2009, p.11).⁷⁰”

⁶⁹ “Pétition de principe.”

⁷⁰ “La perception du temps en Chine « nous approche d’une vision du temps comme enjeu, dans la mesure où elle présente le temps comme devant être surveillé, guetté, pour être enfin utilisé.”

4.2 Beijing Facing the Building of the Taiwanese Political Community: A Strait in Crisis

After the implementation of Cross-Strait dialogue during the beginning of the 1990s and the multiplication of Cross-Strait trade, the opening of political dialogue in a short period of time was obvious for Beijing. Indeed in September 1993, the publishing of Beijing's white paper, *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China's White Paper*⁷¹, was the outcome of a double concern from the Chinese government: Starting political negotiations and preventing Taiwan's independence. As an answer to Lee Teng-hui's *National Unification Guidelines* and Taiwan's democratization, the 1993s White Paper asserted Beijing's point of view on the matter that "Self-determination' for Taiwan is out of the question."

Jiang Zemin (江泽民) summarized Beijing's conditions for reunification in its "*Eight Point Proposal*"⁷² of the Chinese new year 1995 (January 30). He proposed the implementation of a Cross-Strait political dialogue in order to end the conflict in the Taiwan Strait; the recognition of the One China Principle as prerequisite, and the Chinese culture as bedrock of official relations. In addition, he wished that political dialogue difficulties do not infringe commercial exchange between the two sides of the Strait. However, Beijing did not gave up the possibility to use military actions to reunify the Chinese nation, but force will be eventually used only against foreign powers if they try to implement Taiwan's formal independence; Beijing defended that Chinese are not fighting against each other (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, pp.39-40). Obviously the United States are targeted here.

The democratization and Taiwanization process of the Nationalist regime indeed put Beijing on a defensive stance facing this new situation. Lee Teng-hui was described as a separatist and a traitor to the Chinese nation by Chinese newspapers; his private visit to the United States in June 1995 was perceived as a new step toward Taiwan's formal independence, implicitly recognized by Washington. Thereof during

⁷¹ The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China's White Paper, 1993-09-01, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789216.htm

⁷² Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal, 1995-01-30, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/201103/t20110316_1789198.htm

the summer 1995, the PLA proceeded to two military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including missile firing tests. Beijing wanted to show its muscles and its determination against Lee Teng-hui and what it considered as a movement toward Taiwan's independence. After Lee's visit in the United States, Cross-Strait dialogue was suspended to resume briefly in 1998.

Between March 8 and March 15 1996, only a few days before the first democratic presidential election in Taiwan, Beijing organized a new missile firing exercises in order to intimidate Taiwanese people and shape the vote in its favor. Beijing was determined as much as some missiles felt within Taiwan's territorial waters, strengthened by Washington's passive reaction during the summer 1995. On the contrary, the US Army did react in March 1996 and sent several battleships, including a carrier within the Strait. In addition, this crisis marked the awareness in Washington that the Taiwan's army was lagging behind the PLA, starting a new partnership between Taipei and the US Army (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.41). Lee Teng-hui's election with 54% in three candidate ballot marked Beijing's failure to influence Taiwan's presidential election and to block the rise of the Taiwanese nationalism.

On July 9 1999, Lee Teng-hui declared his "special State to State theory" to the German media, *Deutsche Welle*, sanctioning the Nationalist regime democratization and Taiwanization. On the one hand, this formula is not challenging Cross-Strait functional agreements, but on the other hand Taipei is challenging Cross-Strait's *modus vivendi*, the One China Principle. Beijing didn't wait long to reply and the following month, the PLA organized new military exercise within the Taiwan Strait; Washington once again sent back its battleships. Beijing's tone was harder and the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*, 人民日報) said that Lee Teng-hui is a criminal toward the nation. The Chinese Minister of Defense declared PLA's determination to prevent Taiwan's independence (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, pp.44-45).

In February 2000, a few weeks before the second direct presidential election Beijing published *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue's White Paper*.⁷³ It

⁷³ The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue's White Paper, 2000-02-21, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm

was not that different to the 1993 White Paper except for two new concepts in Beijing's Taiwan policy. The first is Beijing's resort to military action if Taipei refuses *sine die* to reunify; Beijing in fact wants to pressure Taiwan declaring it can attack at any time. The second, observing and maybe anticipating KMT's leadership changing, Beijing is calling the KMT to resume Cross-Strait dialogue based on the One China Principle and open political negotiations on equal footing. Obviously, the Chinese government wanted (once again) to influence the ballot and favor the election of a pro-China candidate.

Chen Shui-bian's victory in 2000 is another failure of Beijing's Taiwan policy that must be redefined; it will be the task of the new generation of Chinese leaders that will succeed to Jiang Zemin. In two years (starting from 2002), Hu Jintao completely succeeded to the old leader. He became General Secretary of the CCP in November 2002, President of the PRC in March 2003, Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, and Chairman of the "Working Group of the Central Committee for Taiwan's Relations" in May 2003, the secret organ of the CCP working on the Taiwan's policy (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.113).

Hu Jintao's policy toward Taiwan was more 'proactive' than his predecessor's but this policy started to be implemented after Chen's election. Hu's new policy targeted Chen Shui-bian's oppositions within the Taiwan society to prevent Taiwan's independence movement to move forward and favor the reunification option, mixing support and pressure. Already in June 2000, Chen Yunlin, then Chairman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, declared in June 2000 that China was ready to work with all those in Taiwan who recognized the One China Principle; In November 2000, Jiang Zemin told Bill Clinton that everything was negotiable on equal footing as far as both sides of the Strait recognize the One China Principle (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, pp.108-109). After 2004, Beijing took advantage of the bad relations between Washington and Taipei and of the Sino-American growing economic interdependence to increase its pressure on Taiwan with the President Bush tacit agreement; PLA's military pressure on Taiwan also increased. However, if Hu Jintao called to resume Cross-Strait dialogue in 2000, it never resumed because Chen Shui-bian cannot and did not accept Beijing conditions.

Facing Chen's pro-independence policy, Beijing adopted in March 2005 the Anti-Secession Law (ASL).⁷⁴ More than establishing a new Taiwan's policy, this law 'constitutionalizes' Beijing's use of force in case of 'Taiwan's declaration of independence, of political troubles within the Island that lead to independence, or if all pacific options of reunification are exhausted. Moreover, the decision making process in case of military attack on Taiwan is simplified and only concern the State Council and the Central Military Commission (Article 8).

Directly addressing Taipei, Washington and the rest of the international community, the ASL shows Beijing's determination to reunify Taiwan. For Cabestan and Vermader (2005), the ASL highlights what Beijing is ready to concede and where the red line is drawn. "Anti-Secession Law widens Beijing's option in the way of war as much as in the way of peace (p.146).⁷⁵" Indeed, Article 7 lists what Beijing is ready to negotiate with Taipei without conditions and on equal footing: the end of the state of war and the conclusion of a peace treaty, conditions of future Cross-Strait development, a reunification schedule, and the status of 'Taiwan's authorities' and 'Taiwan's region's international space' within the reunification.

Furthermore, Tkacik (2009) sees the LAS as a counter-weight to the US Taiwan Relation Act; he thinks that Beijing needs a "Chinese law on unification" that shall have more juridical weight than an American law on de-unification (pp.1-2). The LAS author, Yu Yuanzhou, (余元洲) thought that Deng Xiaoping 'One Country, Two Systems' lacked of juridical basis and proposed to correct it. In addition, he rejected the idea of a Pacific Unification Law"; according to him it would not prevent Taiwan's formal independence (p.2-3). Originally, it was planned to call the ASL "Unification Law", however this is a direct reference to China's division that Beijing refuses to recognize. On the contrary, the term 'anti-secession' refers to China's unity that shall not be challenged (p.9).

Taiwan's answer to the ALS was bipolar as Taiwan's political field can be. Indeed within the Blue Camp, the ALS was welcomed as creating peace in the Taiwan

⁷⁴ Anti-secession Law, 2005-03-14, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790121.htm

⁷⁵ "La Loi Anti-sécession élargit les options que se donne Pékin, dans le sens de la guerre comme dans celui de la paix."

Strait. Less than two month after its promulgation, during spring 2005, leaders from the KMT and the PFP (Lien Chan in April and James Soong in May) traveled to China and met Hu Jintao in person. On the contrary, Chen Shui-bian's first reaction was to protest and organize demonstrations against the ASL. Furthermore in the following year, he suspended the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines. When he stepped up to the presidency in 2000, he wished to maintain them as a means to find a consensus with the Blue Camp on Cross-Strait relations. However, the promulgation of the ASL and the Blue Camp rapprochement with Beijing did make it useless. Moreover, NUG's suspension was justified by the self-determination principle and the will to create an alternative to the unification for Taiwan (Le Pesant, 2006, pp.303-304).

Behind the question of Beijing's intervention to prevent Taiwan's formal independence, the credibility of each actor of the Strategic Triangle was at stake, especially after 2004. Is Taiwan going to declare formal independence? What will be Chen Shui-bian's next action? Is China going to attack the island in that case? Will the United States defend Taiwan in any case and at any cost? Although Washington's commitment to defend Taiwan in any case was strong at the beginning of the years 2000, George W. Bush's condition was that Taiwan shall not change the *Status Quo*⁷⁶. To this effect, he proposed to Taiwan the biggest arms' package in US-Taiwan military history.

However, if Washington originally sided with Taiwan, it started to side with Beijing, and condemned Chen for its so called pro-independence provocations – the calls to referenda in 2004 and 2008, especially the referendum on Taiwan reintegration at the UN under the name 'Taiwan', or the suspending of the NUG. In fact, the US Army, already engaged in two fronts, in Afghanistan and Iraq, will have the biggest challenge to face the Chinese Army in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, Beijing was an important partner in the fight against terrorism and the perspective of a war in the Strait was harmful to America's economic interests. Washington became indeed a buffer between Taipei's independence expressions and Beijing's threat of war, but divided on prioritizing the moral interest of supporting democracy against

⁷⁶ Bush pledges whatever it takes to defend Taiwan, 2001-04-25, *CNN.com*, retrieved from <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/>

dictatorship or choosing to defend its short-term economic interests. Washington critics of Chen's policies are obviously a victory for ASL creators; if Beijing's credibility to use military action against Taiwan, Washington's commitment to defend Taiwan and its democracy is on the contrary downgraded (Tkacik, 2009, pp.22-23).

4.3 Beijing and Cross-Strait Interdependence: Between Intimidation and Seduction

Between the '*Message to Taiwan's Compatriots*' in 1979 and the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, Taiwan Strait geopolitics dramatically evolved: China became a world economic power and a regional military power, at the same time Taiwan became a democracy in quest for identity. These evolutions created new means to promote reunification but also new constraints for the Chinese nationalism to reach its goal.

Up until Lee Teng-hui's presidency, the CCP was facing an adversary that it knew well and was 'surpriseless'. Indeed, Chiangs' KMT—promoted a Chinese nationalism quite similar to Beijing's and the conflict only took place on the political level of which State is legitimate to represent China. With Taiwan's democratization and the Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui, the conflict is no longer a question of legitimacy but a question of nationality as much as the Taiwanese identity and State became a reality, and this is a bigger threat for Beijing. Indeed, if Taiwan, after fifty years of irredentist propaganda on Taiwan's reunification and belonging to the Chinese nation, becomes independent, it is the whole Beijing's legitimating discourse that is impaired and the very existence of the PRC threatened. If Beijing appeared confused facing Taiwan's new challenge during the 1990s, is the new strategy implemented during the 2000s by the new CCP's leadership more assertive, using not only the stick but also the carrot, to bring forward Beijing's reunification agenda?

Chevalerias (2006) thinks that Cross-Strait economic logic does not follow Cross-Strait political logic; however in this context, the economy can serve political interests (p.323). In 1979, Beijing declared that the Cross-Strait economical exchanges opening goal was to co-opt Taiwan's businessmen in order to promote a Cross-Strait economical union and start the reunification process (p.330). In 2002, an

anonymous Chinese official declared that “our economy is our best weapon. We won’t attack them. We will buy them. It’s very Chinese (Bernkopf Tucker, 2002, p.16).” However, obvious economic pressure from Beijing to obtain political concessions will be counter-productive: The international community might see the Chinese government as untruthful, and it will alienate Taiwanese investors, the *Taishangren* (台灣商人).⁷⁷ In 2004, 67.4% of Taiwan’s foreign direct investment were made in China (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.155); in 2007, more than 70% and 41% of Taiwan’s export went to China (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.22). China imports from Taiwan twice less than the island exported to the mainland in 2010.⁷⁸ However, the asymmetric economic interdependence between the two sides of the Strait reduces Taiwan’s political breathing space and increases Beijing’s leverage over the island as Taiwan is over dependent from China’s economy. At the same time, China is economically Taiwan’s main factory and its main market.

Cross-Strait exchanges are not only limited to trade and economic matters. But as a result of business or touristic trips on the mainland, Cross-Strait phone calls rapidly increased, as well as 16 million mails that were exchanged in 2004 (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.162). *Taishangren*, which have been established for a long period in China, are allowed to open Taiwanese schools and Taiwanese university diplomas are recognized in China. Cross-Strait sportive, academic and cultural exchanges increased during the 2000 decade; and if the number of Chinese people to be allowed to visit the Island was limited, they already represented 13% of the overall foreign tourists visiting Taiwan in 2001 (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.165).

Furthermore, Beijing tries to seduce Taiwanese people who choose to do business in China and to turn them into allies into Taiwanese society in order to challenge the legitimacy of Chen Shui-bian’s policies, prevent Taiwan’s formal independence, and promote reunification. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Taiwanese investors got financial advantages to invest in China compared to their

⁷⁷ These people are generally Taiwanese that are living occasionally or permanently in China. They are not only investors but also students, young choosing the Mainland for their career or people choosing to settle down in China, mostly Mainlanders.

⁷⁸ Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, 2011-07-06, *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly* n°218, Mainland Affairs Council, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/1761442537.pdf>

Western rival; starting from December 2005, Chinese banks are allowed to loan money to Taiwanese in the Mainland. In August 2005, Taiwan's agricultural products are tax-free to enter in China; in October, university fees for Taiwanese students were the same as their 'mainland compatriots'. In addition, Hu Jintao recognized the KMT's role in the War against Japan that originally the CCP won alone, for the first time in September 2005 (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.354).

Nonetheless on the one hand, Beijing pressured Taiwan's investors in China to weaken Chen Shui-bian's race to formal independence. The example of Shi Wen-long (許文龍), founder of Chimei Corporation (*Qi Mei Shiye*, 奇美實業), one of the biggest Taiwanese groups that has huge interests in China, is the best example of Beijing's shadow influencing Taiwanese businesspeople to support Beijing's political agenda: from the generation of Lee Teng-hui, Shi Wen-long was Chen Shui-bian's advisor during its first mandate and a Taiwan's independence advocate; but in 2005 at the moment when the Anti-Secession Law promulgation, he suddenly advocated the One China Principle and denied supporting Taiwan's independence (Cabestan & Vermander, 2005, p.351). We can wonder what kind of pressure Shi Wen-long received from Beijing, certainly some that threatened the very existence of its company.

On the other hand, the PLA military pressure increased dramatically during the 2000s; Cross-Strait trade is however the main reason of that. In fact, China's economic development allows for PLA's modernization, adapted to the Taiwan Strait strategic needs. If the PLA was a soldier's army for a long time, the navy and the air force benefited from the modernization; however it is not yet able to challenge directly the US Army in a conflict. Thereof, Beijing developed an asymmetric arsenal to face the US Army, but it aims to prevent the United States from interceding if the PLA decide to attack Taiwan, in addition to 'credibilize' its military threat on Taiwan.

Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, the PLA has built hundreds of missiles pointed in Taiwan's direction; there were about 1500 in 2009.⁷⁹ Strategically, their goal was to destroy Taiwan's political and military command centers and infringe Taiwan's riposte capacities in order to obtain Taiwan's surrender as fast as

⁷⁹ "China increases missiles pointed at Taiwan to 1,500", 2009-02-15, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/02/15/2003436194>

possible, especially before the US Army (or Japan) could support the Island. But, their psychological impact is more devastating than its lethal impact. Indeed, the very prospect that war can be brought in Taiwan in a few minutes is dissuasive to over-provoke Beijing.

4.4 Kuomintang's Ambiguities during the 2000s: Between Chinese Nationalism, Taiwanization, and Returning to State Power

After the KMT's defeat during the 2000 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui and his allies within the Party were marginalized and Conservative mainlanders went back in charge and restored the Chinese nationalism as KMT's dogma. As Breuilly (1985) suggests, the very interest of the nation overcomes any others (pp.2-3). Indeed, the new KMT of the years 2000 followed a nationalist logic siding with Beijing against the DPP; its national interest is to ensure the survival of its nation, the ROC nation, which the accession of a Taiwanese nationalist movement to the State power is threatening. Increasing Cross-Strait exchanges became KMT's motto to solve every Taiwan's economic problems, especially after 2000's economic crisis. In the best interest of Taiwan (the ROC nation), it is believed that increasing interactions and contacts between the two sides of the Strait will prevent the Taiwanese nationalist movement from growing up and on the contrary promote reunification.

KMT's presidential campaign of 2004 followed this framework, and late adherence to pragmatic discourse on Taiwan's sovereignty from Lien Chan and James Soong did not mask their Chinese nationalism and appeared not much as a vote-catching maneuver (Muyard, 2004, p.10). However, as Corcuff (2004) mentions, most of KMT's voters are not indeed in favor the reunification. They can be from the South of Taiwan, traditionally hostile to the KMT, speak Taiwanese at home, and see China as another country, but they are not interested in sovereignty questions - and short-term economic matters are their priority. They support the KMT because of its so-called management of economical questions, especially since it is attracting China's goodwill against Chen Shui-bian (p.13-14).

The sovereignty question remained however central in the 2004 presidential election and certainly caused the KMT's defeat. Ma Ying-Jeou's election in 2008 is exactly its confirmation. Indeed during his campaign, Ma went back in some extent to Lee Teng-hui's Taiwanese patriotism; he promoted KMT's program to increase Cross-Strait relations to improve Taiwan's economy but he did not promote the reunification. On the contrary, he defended Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy. Furthermore, Ma Ying-Jeou's KMT identified itself only with Taiwan, and rejected images from the past. ROC's symbols were replaced by symbols of Taiwan; the KMT used DPP's 'logo-map' of Taiwan for its campaign. Chiang Ching-kuo (the KMT's muse after 2000) appeared symbolically as an image of the past and the proof that the KMT had evolved. Ma Ying-jeou even declared that if he was not born in Taiwan, he will be buried there (Le Pesant, 2008, pp.296-297). He became the incarnation of the 'New Taiwanese' of Lee Teng-hui (1999) – it refers “to those who are willing to fight for the prosperity and survival of their country, regardless of when they or their forebears arrived on Taiwan and regardless of their provincial heritage or native language (p.9).” Ma's and the KMT's victory during both Legislative Yuan and presidential elections were due to its capacity to appear as much Taiwanese as the DPP; “Ma Ying-jeou neutralized the campaigns' identity issue in order to pull the election into his favorite topic: the economy and criticizing Chen Shui-bian's assessment (Le Pesant, 2008, p.298).⁸⁰”

Moreover, it seems important here to highlight KMT's ideological software evolution. On the one hand, the Nationalist Party evolved in a process of Taiwanization which saw native Taiwanese people being in majority within the Party and influencing its nationalist ideology toward a Taiwanese patriotism - even if the reunification remains the ultimate goal. On the other hand, the KMT compromised itself with Beijing expecting that it is in its best interest in order to prevent a Taiwanese nation-state to rise and see the end of the ROC as a reality but also as a myth.

The Taiwanization process is the most important evolution within the KMT since the adoption of the Leninist model in 1923. Prior to the beginning of the 1970s,

⁸⁰ “Neutraliser la composante identitaire de l'élection [afin] de maintenir l'élection sur son terrain : l'économie et la critique du bilan de Chen.”

the Party was hermetic to Taiwanese people. What we can call the ‘first Taiwanization’ started with the nomination of Taiwanese to replace mainlanders at governmental offices (Lams and Liao, 2011, p.70). From the first mutation engaged by Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT inherited from a deep division between the Taiwanese faction that supported Lee Teng-hui during the 1990s and the mainlander faction. However, this division is not ethnically based but political between a liberal wing, the Taiwanese faction and a conservative wing, the Mainlander faction. The latter is indeed not only composed of mainlanders but also of Taiwanese that subscribe to the Chinese nationalism and the Greater China ideology.

As Harding (1993) points it, the Greater China is a concept created during the Second World War to point out territories controlled and claimed by the ROC; however, this term is effectively used only since the 1970s (pp.662-663). He adds that the term “Greater” refers to a coherent territory in terms of economy, demography, and that is extended beyond States’ borders (p.661). According to him, the concept of “Greater China” has three dimensions that are linked together: a common cultural identity provides a catalyst for economic ties, and economic interdependence may lay the foundation for political unification. In theory, therefore, the three aspects of Greater China could merge into a single integrated entity (p.684).”

KMT’s Taiwanization answered at first to a strategy of political survival. Indeed, KMT’s members were getting old – Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 and Chiang Ching-kuo was already 65 years old when he took control of the Party after his father’s death – and the next generation of mainlander political leaders is not mature yet. In addition, it was during the 1970s that Taipei lost the diplomatic battle against Beijing. By integrating Taiwanese elites within the Party, the KMT found a new legitimacy, but also diffused its nationalist ideology within these populations (Leclercq, 2010, p.45). If the *Waishengren* were still in majority with 60% of the Party members in 1969, they were only 47% in 1975, 31% in 1992, and only 12% nowadays (Leclercq, 2010, p.44 and p.46).

As seen in the Third Chapter, the KMT during the 1950s had no choice but to co-opt Taiwanese elites to establish itself durably on the island; however, none were integrated within the Party’s partisan structure. The Nationalist Party did monopolize Taiwan’s politics; it allows on the other side the Taiwanese to occupy the economical

world. During the 1960s and Taiwan's fast economic development, a class of businessman and tycoon raised; in regard of their economic power, their role became essential in local and national economic policies making (Kempf, 2000, p.254). Despite opposition from the most conservative elements of the KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo let Taiwan's economic and intellectual elites to enter the Party and access to political power; Lee Teng-hui is the best example. If the KMT was not able to infiltrate the Taiwanese society, it is the Taiwanese society that infiltrates the KMT (Kempf, 2000, p.251).

The National Congress of the KMT in August 1993 was decisive in the Party's Taiwanization process. Strong of its reelection as president of the Nationalist Party, Lee Teng-hui imposed his reform of the Central Comity and Permanent Central Comity appointment mode; he marginalized mainlanders within these two institutions numerically by increasing the number of members and forbidding the military to access to these assemblies (Hughes, 1997, pp.84-85). Thereof, Lee Teng-hui was able to form the Taiwanese faction around him; they were businessmen or men of trust that believed in Lee's reform program.

The 'second Taiwanization', that is to say the KMT will no longer look for legitimacy in the Chinese nation but within the Taiwanese citizens, started during spring 1994. In May, Lee Teng-hui proclaimed the doctrine of the "people's sovereignty"; the people here refers directly to the Taiwanese population (Hughes, p.96). Furthermore, as Ferhat (2006) claims, the process had already started in 1991 when the "free zone" of the ROC (where only Taiwanese people can decide for their national institution) was institutionally separated from the "mainland zone" (p.300). Almost all political campaigns since 1991, except in some extend the presidential campaign of 2004, have been on the theme of 'Taiwan fist' and the defense of the islands' interests.

However, the Taiwanese faction, though it was in majority, could not impose its political agenda after the 2000 defeat and the resignation of its charismatic leader. However, did Lee Teng-hui the Taiwanese faction have a political agenda? Most of its members did not enter politics to defend some ideology but for economical and power interests. Hughes (1997) highlights it when he says that the KMT during the 1990s was hard to control because it was not bound by ideology. Furthermore, the

democratization and increasing number of election and elective responsibilities increased struggle within the Party creating very a lucrative situation of corruption and political networking (p.85).

The Taiwanese faction supported Lee Teng-hui because he was serving its interests, but its lack of ideology allowed the mainlanders to come back to the Party's head; on the contrary, only a few members of the faction followed Lee Teng-hui within the TSU. KMT's new political orientation after 2000 appears to be a compromise between the mainlanders' Chinese nationalism and the Taiwanese faction's economic interests, both having interests in increasing Cross-Strait relations.

The ideological evolution of the KMT and especially the ideology of its conservative wing is the result of its loss of the political power in Taiwan and of China's rise as a world power. If the mainlanders within the KMT accepted or encouraged the Taiwanization of the Party and of the regime, being themselves Taiwanized, adhering to a Taiwanese patriotism, they on the contrary did not give up the founding idea of the political sociology: The reunification and greatness of the Chinese nation.

Cabestan and Vermander (2005) suggest that the KMT's compromising and cooperation with the CCP have suffered (p.128). In our opinion it is however a conscious (or unconscious) strategy from the mainlander faction to participate in the Chinese nation's greatness building; we believe that they want to create the opportunity of the reunification and bring the last piece of it, that is to say Taiwan. Lien Chan's speech the Beijing's University (*Beida*, 北京大學) on the 29th April 2005, transcribed here by Le Pesant (2006), is full of answers:

“For Lien Chan, populations on both sides of the Strait belong to the same nation, which unity must be progressively rebuilt, is without any doubt. Thereby, he rejects every critic from those who opposed his trip to China, condemning outdate thoughts from the Cold War and the Chinese Civil War (Neizhan, 內戰), and wondering: “Why can't we adopt common perspectives and build a common future? Why can't we restart with good intentions, based on confidence, thinking to the welfare of both people across the Strait, thinking to the long-run interest of the nation

(Minzu, 民族)?”. Quoting as an example declarations from the former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, and the South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun – “we need each other (Women Xianghu Xuyao, 我們相互需要)”, and we have “a relationship of empathy and brotherhood (Tonglixin, Xiongdqing, 同理心兄弟情)” – as basis of Cross-Strait development; Lien Chan suggest that “compatriots from Taiwan (Taiwan Tongbao, 台灣同胞)” and from the Mainland (Dalu Tongbao, 大陸同胞) should be reconciled and enter in a new era of cooperation. Further, he suggest that “the modernization and power, wealth and happiness of the Chinese nation should not be only a sweet but inaccessible dream (Zhonghua minzu de xiandaihua he fuchiang kongle yijing bu zai shi yao bu keji de meimeng eryi le, 中華民族的現代化和富強康樂已經不再是遙不可及的美夢而已了)”, and together, “sons and daughters of China (Zhonghua ernu, 中華兒女)” will conquer economically the world (pp.335-336).⁸¹”

The last sentence of Lien Chan’s speech is clear that he does not want Taiwan, in his mind a part of the Chinese nation, to lag behind China’s economic development and wants to be an active part of it. We can strongly suppose that he is speaking on behalf of the KMT.

⁸¹ “Pour Lien Chan, l’appartenance des populations des deux rives du détroit à une même nation chinoise dont l’unité doit être progressivement reconstituée ne fait pas l’ombre d’un doute. Ainsi rejette-t-il les critiques de ceux qui se sont opposés à son voyage, condamnant une pensée restée au temps de la guerre froide et de la guerre civile (Neizhan, 內戰) tout en s’interrogeant : « Pourquoi ne peut-on adopter une perspective commune et construire un futur commun ? Pourquoi ne pourrait-on pas partir sur de bonnes intentions, se baser sur la confiance, penser au bien être du peuple des deux rives, penser aux intérêts à long terme de la nation (Minzu, 民族) ? ». Citant en exemple les déclarations du chancelier allemand Helmut Kohl et du président sud-coréen Roh Moo-hyun – « nous avons mutuellement besoin l’un de l’autre (Women Xianghu Xuyao, 我們相互需要) » et nous entretenons une « relation d’empathie et de fraternité » (Tonglixin, Xiongdqing, 同理心兄弟情) – comme bases du développement des relations entre les deux rives, Lien avance que les « compatriotes de Taiwan (Taiwan Tongbao, 台灣同胞) » et du continent (Dalu Tongbao, 大陸同胞) devraient se réconcilier et entrer dans une ère de coopération. Plus loin, il estime que « la modernisation et la puissance, la richesse et le bonheur de la nation chinoise ne soit plus seulement un joli rêve inaccessible (Zhonghua minzu de xiandaihua he fuchiang kongle yijing bu zai shi yao bu keji de meimeng eryi le, 中華民族的現代化和富強康樂已經不再是遙不可及的美夢而已了) » et qu’ensemble, « les fils et les filles de Chine (Zhonghua ernu, 中華兒女) » puissent partir à la conquête économique du monde.”

However, is the KMT's model of development still legitimate regarding CCP's accomplishments? Chen Hsi-fan, a former ambassador in the United States and former member of the National Security Council, a true mainlander promoting the Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, is giving us a part of the answer in 2006, interviewed by Cabestan and Le Pesant (2009):

“Taiwan’s interest is on the contrary to take its distance with its former allied in order to reconcile with China and rebuild the ‘Great China’, the only Asian power able to accede to the status of world power. [...] He’s defining himself as a Chinese considers the Taiwanese identity not as different as the Hunan or the Shanghai provincial identity. For him, Taiwan is not a nation. However, the ROC is a sovereign State that included Mainland China and Mongolia. Thereof, the KMT cannot recognize the People’s Republic of China: as well as the Chinese Communist Party, the KMT acknowledge the One China Principle, but keep its own interpretation of this principle. [...] The last part of its opinion is unexpected and potentially destabilizing: his will to democratize the Mainland. According to him, the ROC showed the way of the democratization of China [...]. The KMT’s mission is precisely to promote the democratization of the Mainland in order to haste the reunification of the Chinese nation. In other words, to the CCP’s policy of United Front, the KMT opposes its own strategy of united front (pp.190-191).⁸²”

Obviously, according to him the KMT is still legitimate and its main asset is its model of democracy that he must export to the mainland to make the reunification

⁸² “L’intérêt de Taiwan est au contraire de prendre ses distances avec ses anciens alliés pour rechercher la réconciliation avec Pékin et reconstituer la Grande Chine, la seule puissance asiatique habilitée à accéder au statut de puissance mondiale. [...] Se définissant comme Chinois, Chen estime que l’identité taiwanaise n’est pas différente de l’identité provinciale hunanaise ou shanghaienne. Pour lui Taiwan n’est pas une nation. En revanche, le République de Chine est un Etat souverain qui comprend le continent chinois et la Mongolie extérieure. En conséquence, le KMT ne peut reconnaître la République populaire de Chine à proprement parler : comme le PC chinois, le KMT adhère au principe d’une seule Chine, mais conserve sa propre interprétation de ce principe. [...] Cela étant dit, un dernier volet de cette position est plus inattendu et potentiellement déstabilisateur : la volonté de démocratiser le continent. A ses yeux, le RDC a montré la voie de la démocratisation de la Chine [...]. La mission du KMT est justement de favoriser la démocratisation du continent afin de hâter la réunification de la nation chinoise. Dit autrement, à la politique de front uni du PC chinois, le KMT oppose sa propre stratégie de front uni.”

possible; the similitude of this speech and Ma Ying-jeou's political actions since 2008 are more than troubling.

To conclude, eventually Taiwan took a central place within the Chinese nationalism legitimating rhetoric; without the reunification, China cannot be a world power and erase past humiliations. However, the rise of the Taiwanese nationalism is a direct threat to the Chinese nation legitimacy as it is built now; a threat that the KMT and the CCP sided to prevent. The crucial interest of the Chinese nation to remain symbolically undivided is at stake.

China's economic development since the 1980s gave Beijing new means to pressure Taiwan and favor unification. However, Chinese leaders understood too late that the Taiwanese political community was built because of Beijing's irredentism, creating a bond between the people of Taiwan. As war is too costly, Beijing preferred to implement a long run policy of economic interdependence that the KMT made its own, never giving up its ideal to reunify the Chinese nation under its own model of development.

CHAPTER 5 The “New Deal” in the Taiwan Strait: A Reunification Process which does not say its Name?

“In resolving Cross-Strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life. We care about the welfare of the 1.3 billion people of mainland China, and hope that mainland China will continue to move toward freedom, democracy and prosperity for all the people. This would pave the way for the long-term peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations”.

Taiwan’s Renaissance, Ma Ying-jeou’s inaugural address, 2008-05-20

“For the two sides of the Strait, to return to unity is not the recreation of sovereignty or territory, but an end to political antagonism”.

Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, Hu Jintao, 2008-12-31⁸³

“Put aside Cross-Strait political dispute in favor of a healthy competition of systems; embark on across-the-board political and economic development in order to shape up a modern nation of democracy and free economy”.

KMT Policy Guidelines, 2007-06-24⁸⁴

⁸³ Hu Jintao, *Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation*, 2008-12-31, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110322_1794707.htm

⁸⁴ KMT Policy Guidelines, 2007-07-05, *Kuomintang Official Website* retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=3161>

In this fifth Chapter, we want to highlight the implementation of the reunification process after Ma Ying-jeou's election. We hesitated in discussing Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy and attempt to redefine the Taiwanese political community's identity first, but as we observed Ma Ying-jeou's priority in 2008 was to institutionalize Cross-Strait rapprochement. Our hypothesis is after completing economical institutionalization with the signature of the ECFA, Ma Ying-jeou has more breathing room to focus on national identity policies.

In the first part, we want to focus on Ma Ying-jeou himself; his political action is shaping the recent Cross-Strait evolution. We want to highlight here the features of his identification, what his inspirations are, and his aspirations. In the second part, we want to highlight the implementation of the reunification process in institutionalizing Cross-Strait dialogue and economical interdependence. In the third and last part, we want to underline Ma Ying-jeou's attempt to influence China's political destiny and create a United Front between the KMT and the Chinese people.

5.1 Ma Ying-jeou: A Chinese President in Taiwan holding an Ideal

As Corcuff (2004) defines it, "identity is neither a state, nor a having beyond the strict genetic inheritance with which we born. Identity cannot be described, but identification can be analyzed, because it is an infinite process – an ever on-going process (p.7)." Therefore, if we cannot define Ma Ying-jeou's identity precisely, we can at least underline some elements of his identification which is essential to understanding his political choices.

Though there is a controversy on Ma Ying-jeou's birth place⁸⁵, he may have been born in Hong Kong in 1950. His parents, both from the Province of Hunan (湖

⁸⁵ One of Ma Ying-jeou's daughter birth certificate indicates that he was born in Shenzhen in China and not in Hong Kong. One possible hypothesis but denied by Ma Ying-jeou is that he wanted to benefit from the United States' positive discrimination as an over-seas Chinese, but he could not because he was born in Hong Kong. The same controversy exists about his wife (Christine Chow Mei-ching, 周美青) also born in the former British colony. The couple met in New York during their studies in the

南), were refugees in Taiwan in 1949⁸⁶ at the same time as Chiang Kai-shek, then moved to Hong Kong in 1950 to come back in Taiwan in 1951. His father, Ma Hō-ling (馬鶴凌), born in 1919 and deceased in 2005, was engaged late in the Nationalist Army to fight the Japanese invasion after studying in Nanjing at the Central Political School, today's National Chengchi University (*Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue*, 國立政治大學) situated in the South of Taipei. In Taiwan, he was secretary general of the Intellectual Youth Division of the Kuomintang Central Committee – a crucial role in Youth's propaganda decision-making – and vice chairman of Kuomintang's Chapter in Taipei⁸⁷. Ma Ying-jeou was the only boy in the middle of his four sisters; they grew up in Taipei's Dan area (大安). *Waishengren* were living in majority in this area; and he lived a few hundred meters from Chiang Ching-kuo's main residence (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex 5, p.220).

The family setting and parental education are the first place of socialization, and often where identity defines its structure; this stage was crucial in Ma Ying-jeou's identity building. As we just mentioned, Ma Ying-jeou is a *Waishengren* with all the identification stereotypes that it encapsulates: identification to the Chinese nation, the Chinese culture, and the will to reunify Taiwan with China, etc. His father was erudite on Chinese civilization and he gave him a special education on Chinese culture Classics and civilization. The name itself of Ma Ying-jeou is a direct reference to the ancient Chinese literature as Leclercq (2010) highlights it:

“His last name, Ma 馬, is a direct reference to the clan of the Ma from the Hunan and Ma Ying-jeou is the twentieth generation. Ying 英 is referring to “上尊大人, 英才繼起”, that is to say that his parents hoped he will be talented, Yingcai 英才 means “person with remarkable talent”. Lastly, the most complex character to understand in his name is Jiu 九 which means ‘nine’. [...] It refers to “君子有九思” and “體健九如”,

United States. However, if both of them were born on the Chinese Mainland in 1950, it means that they are PRC's citizens.

⁸⁶ This make Ma Ying-jeou said that he has been conceived in Taiwan.

⁸⁷ KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou's father dies at 86, 2005-11-02, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2005/11/02/71227/KMT-chairman.htm>

that is to say “the nine things that an honorable man should pay attention” and “to the wish of long life and fortune”. In fact, “君子有九思” is referring to the *Analects*, Chapter XVI, and paragraph 10. And “體健九如” is referring to the *Book of Odes*, Chapter II of the *Odes minor of the Kingdom*, decade *Lu Ming*, and paragraph 166 where the poem *天保* is (pp.84-85).⁸⁸”

Furthermore, Ma Ying-jeou is from a Christian family; he is Catholic and his Christian name is Joseph. Though he was not practicing his religions when he entered adulthood, we can think that his religious education during his childhood was bound with his democratic and human rights values. Without being ‘culturalist’, human rights and individual freedom are central in Christian religions. The Presbyterian Church of Taiwan for example was one of the most active organizations to protect human rights and promote the democracy during the dictatorship period. However since he entered politics, Ma Ying-jeou has participated in numerous religious events from all Taiwan’s main confessions. As a vote-catching strategy, spirituality is a means for Ma Ying-jeou to be closer to the Taiwanese population, smooth out ethnic differentiations.

Ma Ying-jeou’s familial context pushed him early in his life to be part of the China Youth National Salvation Corps (*Zhongguo Qingnian Jiuguotuan*, 中國青年救國團). The organization was intimately linked to the KMT; it was created by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1952. The goals of this organization were to educate mainlanders’ sons in the Nationalist ideology and prepare them to serve the nation. Because he was one of its more enthusiastic and zealous members, Ma Ying-jeou had been allowed to meet Chiang Ching-kuo when he was only 18; Chiang Kai-shek’s son was at this

⁸⁸ “Son nom de famille, Ma 馬, fait référence au clan des Ma, dans le Hunan, dont Ma Ying-jeou est le représentant de la vingtième génération. Ying 英 fait référence à «上尊大人, 英才繼起», c'est-à-dire au fait que les parents de Ma Ying-jeou espèrent qu’il obtiendra les talents remarquables de ses ancêtres, Yingcai 英才 voulant dire « personne aux talents remarquables ». Enfin, le caractère le plus complexe à déchiffrer dans son nom est Jiu 九, qui veut dire « neuf » (le chiffre). Mais en réalité, la signification qui a été donnée à ce « neuf » par les parents de Ma Ying-jeou est beaucoup plus complexe. Cela fait référence à «君子有九思» et à «體健九如», c'est-à-dire aux «neuf choses auxquelles l’homme honorable donne attention» et aux «vœux de longue vie et de fortune». En réalité, 君子有九思 est une référence directe aux *Entretiens de Confucius*, Chapitre XVI paragraphe 10. Et 體健九如 est une référence directe au Livre des Odes, Chapitre II des Odes mineures du Royaume, décade de Lu Ming, paragraphe 166 où se trouve le poème *天保*.”

moment Minister of Defense (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex 5, p.220). This organization left Ma Ying-jeou with very positive memories though he does not mention the political education. It is extensively quoted in his special article for the centenary anniversary of Chiang Ching-kuo, a double biography of their meetings.⁸⁹

During his time in senior high school and at university, Ma Ying-jeou was interested in international relations and participated in numerous conferences on the matter as a listener but also as a speaker. It is during these years – the beginning of 1970 was crucial for the ROC and its lost diplomatic battle against Beijing – which Ma Ying-jeou formed its political identification and became a “young Chinese Nationalist.” The campaign of protests organized by Chinese overseas students (from Taiwan and Honk Kong) on the Diaoyutai (*Diaoyutai Qundao*, 釣魚台群島) or Senkaku in Japanese question⁹⁰ deeply influenced Ma Ying-jeou while he was on a trip to the United States in 1971 for two months, awarding the best Asian students. When he came back to Taiwan, he actively participated in the student movement for the defense of the ROC’s sovereignty over the Archipelago. Indeed, this question became essential for Ma Ying-jeou; his PhD thesis in Harvard in international law was on the Diaoyutai issue.⁹¹ When in 1972 Japan derecognized Taipei for Beijing, he is in the front line to organize protests against the Japanese diplomatic envoy to signify the end of the official relations between the two States (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex 5, pp.224-225). In an authoritarian regime as Taiwan during the 1970s, nationalist protests are pressure valve to release people’s dissatisfaction – Beijing has been using and abusing it for a long time – but these movements are controlled and their leaders often closed from the regime.

⁸⁹ We want here to mention the excellent work of translation of Jean-Baptiste Leclercq of this article from Chinese to French, as well as his bibliographic research on Ma Ying-jeou.

⁹⁰ Being ourselves in Taiwan, we will use the term in Chinese to designate the islets archipelago without siding with Taiwan’s, Japan’s or China’s point of view on this controversy. Japan has *de facto* sovereignty over the Diaoyutai because of its agreement with the United States when the US Army ended its occupation of Okinawa; according to this agreement, Japan is also *de jure* sovereign over the archipelago. However, both Chinese governments contest this fact on historical basis. For them, the Diaoyutai must go back to China at the end of the war in 1945 because Japan ‘illegally stole’ the archipelago during the ‘Unequal Treaties’ period. In fact, the Diaoyutai is rich in submarine resources, especially oil.

⁹¹ Ma Ying-jeou’s PhD thesis has been published as a book at this reference: Ma Ying-jeou. (1984). *Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea*. Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

In 1974, Ma Ying-jeou was awarded from the Sun Yat-sen scholarship from the KMT for the best students willing to study abroad. Ma chose the United States where he studied his Master degree in the Law School of the New York University then join Harvard Law School for its PhD.

However, scholarships from the Nationalist Party have a reputation to serve political goals. In other words, those who receive the Sun Yat-sen Scholarship are accused of monitoring and spying on other Taiwanese students' activities during their studies abroad in Europe, the United States or Japan, especially students that are suspected of 'subversive' activities like promoting Taiwan's independence. Taiwanese that were abroad needed a visa to go back in Taiwan that could be refused by the Nationalist regime. Some had to remain in exile, some of their families received death threats, whilst others were simply assassinated for belonging to any Taiwanese independence movement.⁹²

Ma Ying-jeou was himself accused of being a "professional student" by Shieh Jhy-wei (謝志偉), a member of Chen Shui-bian's Administration.⁹³ Though there is no material evidence to support these accusations, Ma Ying-jeou's political activism and writings can create some doubts about his past when he was student. Indeed during his years in Harvard, he became the chief-editor of the *Boston Periodical*, a journal close to the KMT, and he himself published several articles against Taiwan's independence. Furthermore during his internship in New York after his PhD graduation, he wrote an article of 84 pages for the American Administration entitled *Terrorism and Pro-Taiwan Independence*. Our source from the *Taipei Times* here quotes Ma Ying-jeou referring to the scholarship he received to study in the United States: "*I came here for my graduate school with KMT's Chungshan Scholarship so it is natural for me to do something in return.*" This sentence however outside of its context, that we don't have, can be interpreted in different ways.

⁹² The assassination of Chen Wen-chen (陳文成), professor at the Carnegie Mellon University of Pittsburgh, is certainly the most well-known. It was the subject of a movie released in 2009, *Formosa Betrayed*, but not to confuse with George Kerr's book of the same name first published in 1965.

⁹³ Ma office files suit over 'professional student' allegation, 2007-07-04, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/07/04/2003367976>

Furthermore, it seems important here to compare Ma Ying-jeou's so-called spy life and his adolescence in the 'Nationalist Youth'. Indeed, recalling the "good time" in the Corp, Ma Ying-jeou did not only learn how drive or to swim but also "*the leadership, ways to make new friends and to make a deal* (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex 5, p.222).⁹⁴" If Ma Ying-jeou was really a spy, his training certainly started during this summer camp. However, he would not be the first spy to become a president; George Bush Senior was the director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) during a year starting from January 1976, and Vladimir Putin before entering politics was an agent of the KGB, the former secret services of the Soviet Union, specialized in the counter-intelligence of Russian dissidents. And of course, Chiang Ching-kuo himself, Ma's mentor, had for many years been the chief of his father's secret police.

The time Ma Ying-jeou spent in the United States influenced him deeply; his 'love' for the ideals of democracy and human rights certainly starting during his first trip on the American soil in 1971. He indeed recognized that the student movement of which he was member also fought for the democracy and the defense of human rights in Taiwan. However, for him, democracy didn't equal with Taiwan's independence. Two of his numerous articles published both in 1979 for the Taiwanese press, and especially for the *Central News Agency* (CNA, *Zhongyangtong XunShe*, 中央通訊社) for the overseas Chinese, can characterize furthermore his political opinion during his student life: *Welcome democracy, opposing independence* (*Huanyin Minzhu, Fandui Duli*, 歡迎民主、反對獨立) in which Ma Ying-jeou wishes Taiwan to become a democracy but he is considering that Taiwan's formal independence is meaningless, and *Promoting Mainland China's Taiwanization* (*Cujin Zhongguodalu De Taiwanhua*, 促進中國大陸的台灣化) where he wants to allow mainland China's students in the United States to understand Taiwan's experience and bring it back to the mainland (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex 5, p.226).

After his PhD graduation, Ma Ying-jeou planned to stay in the United States for an internship in a law firm, then he planned to be an associate professor at the National Chengchi University after coming back to Taiwan. Unexpectedly, he was

⁹⁴ "Le leadership, le fait de savoir se faire des amis et l'entraînement à passer des accords."

eventually called to enter at Chiang Ching-kuo's service in 1981: he became the president of the ROC's English interpreter and his personal secretary for six years, and his man of trust. In 1984 Ma Ying-jeou was appointed as deputy secretary general of the KMT's Central Committee, and direct superior of his father. In 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo assigned him to the task group in charge of the lift of the Martial Law; it was lifted in July 1987. This same year, he also worked at the lift of the restrictions to visit the mainland. In 1988, he was appointed Chairman of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan; he entered the Government for the first time. Concurrently, he was assigned to form a Mainland Affairs Task Force and subsequently became the body's executive secretary; and in 1991 he became vice chairman of the newly created Mainland Affairs Council. Two years later, he was appointed as Minister of Justice in Lee Teng-hui's Government, but he had to step down because of political disagreement with the President in 1996; he became minister without-portfolio during one year before resigning. He went back to teach. However, his political career was not over and in 1998 he was elected mayor of Taipei against Chen Shui-bian with 51.3% – it is said that the mayor of Taipei is a president of the republic to become; Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were mayor of Taipei before Ma. Reelected in 2002, he became president of the KMT in 2005, but he was forced to resign in 2007 over accusations of corruption, reinforcing his image of integrity. He became president of the Republic of China in 2008.⁹⁵

If we look at Ma Ying-jeou's life and political career, it seems that he was programmed to become president. He was always closed from the head of the power and the KMT through his family or his education, even the place he grew up was closed off from the Power; since his childhood he was influenced by the Nationalist ideology. When he entered politics, Ma Ying-jeou didn't start at the bottom of the scale – he has never been elected locally or a KMT's activist and his first election was for being mayor of Taipei – but it is within the high sphere of the power that he began directly his political career.

Chosen by Chiang Ching-kuo to be his personal interpreter and secretary, Ma Ying-jeou learned during these years with the old Nationalist leader how the 'Power

⁹⁵ Ma Ying-jeou's biography can be retrieved in English at the address on the website of the *Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)*: <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=454#02>

machinery' works and all the responsibilities of being the head of the country. His political career was in constant progress except for the year 1997. Moreover, he was appointed to sensitive tasks and all the most important political issues since the end of the 1980s: the lift of the Martial Law and the liberalization of the regime, the reform of the National Assembly and the democratization, the opening of Cross-Strait relations, the justice and the fight against corruption. He was not in charge of economical matters which are not in line with his education and defense questions were still exclusively reserved to the military until the end of the 1990s. If we have to describe his political career, he is obviously a man of the system who knows what he is doing.

Ma Ying-jeou during his political career expressed several times his views on Taiwan's independence. He declared in 2006 and in 2010 for example that the Republic of China has been an independent and sovereign State since 1912 and it doesn't need to declare its independence a second time.⁹⁶ Here, he refuses to recognize the possibility that Taiwan can be independent outside of the ROC's framework and signify his rejection of the Taiwan's independence movement; he neglects the very existence of a Taiwanese nation (which is logical because for him, Taiwan is part of the Chinese nation). Though he recognized in 2006 that Taiwan's independence is an option in Taiwan's democracy⁹⁷, it is not his choice or the one of his party.⁹⁸ For Ma Ying-jeou the *status quo* is crucial not because it is Taiwanese people's preference but it is the only possible option that secures the ROC's survival before the conditions for reunification are ripe.

Furthermore, why does Ma Ying-jeou seduce Mainlanders as much as the native Taiwanese despite his ethnic identity? For the *Waishengren*, he is the symbol

⁹⁶ Amanpour, C., CNN Interview with President Ma, 2010-04-30, *Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=21344&rmid=2355&sd=2010/04/30&ed=2010/05/01>

Cohen, J. A., A Conversation with Ma Ying-jeou [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service, Inc.], 2006-03-20, *Council on Foreign Relations*, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/china/conversation-ma-ying-jeou-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10217>

⁹⁷ Sparks fly over KMT's controversial ad, 2006-02-16, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/02/16/2003293195>

⁹⁸ Independence never a KMT option: Ma, 2006-02-20, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/20/2003293815/1>

of renewal of mainlanders' political generation. He grew up in Taiwan, took advantage of the KMT's model of development, and he is the heir of Chiang Ching-kuo – the son of Chiang Kai-shek is highly appreciated within the whole Taiwanese population for his achievements, and Ma Ying-jeou never miss the opportunity to claim his inheritance – he reassures by his commitment to the Chinese culture and his democratic values. He is appreciated by the Taiwanese because he grew up in Taiwan and reassures through his commitment to the Island's sovereignty. He is in addition the only leader of the KMT during the 2000s that had never been to China. Though his culture is Chinese and he recognizes that, he is reassuring by his commitment to the democracy, and the defense of Taiwan's interests against China. Is he not the living incarnation of the "New Taiwanese"?

To conclude, it is obvious that Ma Ying-jeou is a Chinese Nationalist and he wishes the reunification. But, his Nationalist ideal is closer to Sun Yat-sen's idealism of a democratic and united China than Chiang Kai-shek's struggle for survival. Ma Ying-jeou's ideal will be to reunify the Chinese nation but also secure Taiwan within the reunification process. He is holding a 'taiwanized' Chinese nationalism where the Taiwanese values of democracy and human rights are central in its ideological software.

As Muiyad highlights (2010) it, Ma Ying-jeou campaigned based on "his own" Taiwanese identity (p.20). His commitment to Taiwan is legitimate and is the symbol of a strong patriotism: "Taiwan is not my birthplace, but it is where I was raised and the resting place of my family. I am forever grateful to society for accepting and nurturing this post-war immigrant. I will protect Taiwan with all my heart and resolutely move forward."⁹⁹ He declared that Taiwan is his homeland and China his motherland (Lams and Liao, 2011, p.86). According to Smith (1999), "patriotism is a sense of attachment to a country or state [while] nationalism is an ideological movement on behalf of a nation (p.102)." Thus, his Taiwanese patriotism, the attachment to Taiwan's regime and democracy, does not conflict with his Chinese nationalism and the interest of the whole Chinese nation; they on the contrary complete each other as far as Taiwan is a part of the Chinese nation.

⁹⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*,
retrieved from
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

“Ladies and Gentlemen, present-day Mainland China is no longer the impoverished and totalitarian China as we knew it. Thirty or forty years ago, reconciliation with Mainland China would have been utterly inconceivable. Yet it is no longer so. [...]

What’s needed, I believe, is sustainable social and political reform. Herein lays the continuing relevance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People as exemplified by the Taiwan experience. And the Kuomintang under my leadership is willing to contribute to Mainland China’s progressive development. Indeed, it’s about time for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to end the Chinese civil war, and to formulate a new and constructive relationship based on trust and a common vision for peace and prosperity.

Needless to say, the Kuomintang now is a political party firmly based in Taiwan. Its Taiwanese identity is unmistakable, but this identity is neither inward-looking nor secessionist. I have every confidence that my party, while advancing Taiwanese people’s best interests and upholding Taiwan’s democracy, can also contribute in large measure to the unfinished task and constitutional mandate of building a free, democratic and prosperous modern China. We have no time for divide and rule, instead, my friends; we will heal the wound and bridge the divide.”

Bridging the Divide, Ma Ying-jeou’s speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006-02-13¹⁰⁰

5.2 The Cross-Strait “New Deal”: “Bridging the Divide”

Since the middle of the 1990s, Cross-Strait dialogue was interrupted, Beijing opposing the rise of the Taiwanese nationalism to the State power in Taiwan. Its resumption since 2008 underlines the change in Taiwan’s State identity and the

¹⁰⁰ The transcript of Ma Ying-jeou’s speech can be retrieved at the following address: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2006/20051215t1335z001.aspx>

negotiation framework which are more fitting with Beijing's conditions. Several political and institutional frameworks have been implemented by Ma Ying-jeou in order to resume and institutionalize Cross-Strait dialogue and exchanges: The "1992 Consensus", the "Three No's policy", the "Mutual Non-Denial" principle, the flexible diplomacy, and the transformation of the national identity toward a more Chinese Taiwan. Naturally, we won't study all these frameworks in this part but eventually tackle them all along the following Chapters.

It appears here crucial for us to start with the "1992 Consensus" because it is central to Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait and national identity policies as far as it is shaping all others frameworks. Indeed, it recognizes the One China Principle and Taiwan is no longer an independent State but is reduced to a part of China within the ROC. As far as both Chinese governments do not recognize each other, the symbolic illusion of China's unity is preserved. It is moreover Beijing's *sine qua non* condition to resume Cross-Strait dialogue.

In addition, Lin (2010), a Chinese scholar, acknowledges that the "1992 Consensus" is the recognition of the One China Principle, however according to him, this principle has two levels of interpretation: "a weak principle" that refers to the refusal of Taiwan's independence, and "a strong principle" that asserts the will of reunifying the Chinese nation as soon as possible. Furthermore, these two principles do not have any incidence on China's representation issue and permit both sides of the Strait to find a *modus vivendi* to negotiate (p.1). According to him, Ma Ying-jeou, based on its "Three No's policy", accepts the "weak principle" of the "1992 Consensus" but rejects the "strong principle" that Beijing wants him to acknowledge (p.2). Ma Ying-jeou's commitment to the "1992 consensus" and his "Three No's policy" are nevertheless the guaranty for Beijing that he won't push forward Taiwan's independence.

Moreover Ma Ying-jeou calls for Beijing to respect the principle of "Mutual Non-Denial". If both Chinese governments refute to recognize the other's sovereignty,

they cannot ignore each other. According to Ma Ying-jeou, the simple fact to not ignore the other government creates the possibility of a dialogue.¹⁰¹

Ma Ying-jeou's "Three No's policy" – no unification, no independence, and use of force in the Strait (at least not during its mandate) – is a second pillar of the 'New Deal' in the Strait. According to him, it is under the maintaining of the *Status Quo* that the first Cross-Strait dialogue took place; he indeed was an influent member of the MAC when it happened. However, he thinks that it is the non-respect of the *Status Quo* and the attempts to change it from Lee Teng-hui's and Chen Shui-bian's Administration as well as Beijing that created the Cross-Strait instability starting from 1995. The large majority of Taiwanese want to preserve the *Status Quo*, and he believes that only the respect of the *Status Quo* from both sides can bring back peace, mutual trust, and Taiwan's economical growth.¹⁰²

As described in the KMT's policy guidelines of 2007¹⁰³, Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy seems to be simply in Lee Teng-hui's *National Unification Guidelines* continuation (Muyard, 2008, p.91); he himself participated in their elaboration. However, the Guidelines, suspended by Chen Shui-bian¹⁰⁴, cannot be institutionally and politically reactivated by Ma Ying-jeou without flaunting his will to reunify the Taiwan Strait and contradict himself. The NUG planned the implementation of the reunification in three steps: implementing economical and cultural exchanges, then building cooperation and mutual trust institutionalized platform for eventually engage a political dialogue on reunification. If the NUG were more symbolic during Lee Teng-hui's period and aimed to institutionalize the *Status Quo*, Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy aims to accomplish the first phase and implement the second.

¹⁰¹ 'Mutual non-denial' remains, Ma says, 2008-04-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/06/2003408525>

¹⁰² Ma Ying-jeou, Keynote Address at The Confidence-Building Measures: Successful Cases and Implications for the Taiwan Strait, 2008-01-16, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=110&anum=3905>

¹⁰³ KMT Policy Guidelines, 2007-07-05, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=3161>

¹⁰⁴ See *supra*, p.97

Ma Ying-jeou constantly reminds us that thanks to him and the eighteen Cross-Strait agreements that had been signed since 2008 peace in the Taiwan Strait is restored. These agreements implement the progressive normalization of economic exchanges: the ECFA, the creation of food protection mechanisms, juridical protection and financial protection, Cross-Strait direct flights, Taiwan's opening to Chinese tourists, etc. However, although Chen's Administration had already agreed with Beijing to open direct Cross-Strait flights and allow more Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, the Chinese government blocked the agreement as a political gift for Ma Ying-jeou which he presented this agreement as his own achievements (Muyard, 2008, p.95). Indeed, Ma Ying-jeou cannot achieve anything without Beijing's goodwill.

Furthermore, Ma's government eased regulations on Cross-Strait exchanges from its own initiative: it authorized the exchange between the Renminbi (人民幣) and the New Taiwan Dollar, it permitted the development of the "direct mini-links" from Kinmen and Matsu to the mainland, it lifted the ban for elected representatives to visit China, it rose the maximal amount to invest in China, it allowed the high-tech sector to invest in China as well as the banking and the financial sectors, etc (Muyard, 2010, pp.6-7).

However, if these agreements were not debated by Taiwan's public opinion, the ECFA on the contrary, raised an important controversy and concern on economic interdependence with China that it will create. Here Muyard (2010) summarized well what represents the ECFA for Ma Ying-jeou:

"The ECFA is a framework agreement limited to trade and investments liberalization, but without political signification, that aim to reduce custom taxes and to protect investment and intellectual property in China. Its goal is to ease the access to the Chinese market to some Taiwanese industries and services included in the "first harvest" list [...], to protect the Taiwanese economy from the impact of the ASEAN-China and the future ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea) free trade agreements planned for 2011 and 2012, and at last to foster the signature of new free-trade

agreements between Taiwan and other countries that are today reluctant to upset China by signing economical treaty with the Island (p.12).¹⁰⁵”

As Muyard (2010) underlines it, a report from the Legislature’s Organic Laws and Statutes Bureau shares its concern regarding the ECFA and confirm the oppositions to its signature’s critics: According to the report, ECFA “is a key-element of the Chinese unification strategy with Taiwan, and Beijing wants to use it as a leverage to increase economical interdependence between Taiwan and China, and to pressure [Taipei] to favor unification negotiations (p.14).¹⁰⁶” If indeed, the ECFA is a mean to favor unification, Ma Ying-jeou recognizes this fact¹⁰⁷; it is also a tool for Ma Ying-jeou to implement his own reunification plan.

In our opinion, the ECFA completes the first step of the NUG and is within the continuation of the second phase. As specified in the ECFA’s first Article¹⁰⁸, its third goal is “to expand areas of economic cooperation and establish a cooperation mechanism”. Moreover, Article 11 specifies the implementation of the Cross-Strait s Economic Cooperation Committee; its function is to watch over the good implementation of the agreement and solve conflicts. It is composed of half representatives from Taiwan and the other half from China; its meetings will take place every 6 months or *ad hoc* if required.

In fact, the Cross-Strait s Economic Cooperation Committee completes the mechanism of consultation and dialogue that was progressively implemented since the middle of the 2000s between the KMT and the CCP. In other words, the KMT/CCP Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Forum, created in 2005, is a think-tank for Cross-

¹⁰⁵ “Ses objectifs sont de faciliter l’accès au marché chinois à une série d’industrie et de services taiwanais inclus dans une liste dite de « première récolte » [...], de protéger l’économie de l’impact de l’accord de libre échange ASEAN-Chine et du futur accord ASEAN+3 (Chine, Corée Japon) attendu pour 2011 ou 2012, et enfin d’encourager la signature d’accords additionnels de libre-échange entre Taiwan et les pays aujourd’hui réticents à indisposer la Chine en s’engageant dans des ententes économiques avec l’île.”

¹⁰⁶ “L’ECFA est un élément clé de la stratégie chinoise d’unification avec Taiwan et que Pékin entend l’utiliser comme levier pour augmenter la dépendance économique de Taiwan envers la Chine et faire pression en faveur de pourparlers sur l’unification.”

¹⁰⁷ Ma admits PRC sees ECFA as tool, 2010-07-02, *Taipei times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/02/2003476915>

¹⁰⁸ The English version of the ECFA is available online in the website of the *Strait Exchange Foundation* at this address: <http://www.sef.org.tw/public/Attachment/010418592371.pdf>

Strait, a platform where agreements are imagined¹⁰⁹, SEF/ARATS biannual meetings are the platform of negotiations and decision making – Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 indeed highlights the fact that they are completing each other regarding Cross-Strait matters¹¹⁰ – and ECFA’s Cross-Strait s Economic Cooperation Committee serves as a platform of control and conflict resolution; the ECFA’s Article 11 specifies that the committee range can be extended to any matters. Even if these platforms of dialogue only tackle economic matters, it is obvious that Beijing wants to speed up Cross-Strait reunification and implement political and military dialogue as soon as possible. Hu Jintao proposed in December 2008 and his “*Six Proposals*”¹¹¹ to initiate a military Cross-Strait dialogue, this offer is repeated in 2010.¹¹²

In addition, Vincent Siew, Ma Ying-jeou’s Vice-President, is the promoter in Taiwan of a Cross-Strait common market, proposed in the KMT Policies Guidelines for the 2008 campaigns¹¹³. In 2001, he founded the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation (*Liangan Gongtong Shichang Jijinhui*, 兩岸共同市場基金會), and he declared the same year that the implementation of a Cross-Strait common market is a solution to solve Cross-Strait economic and political conflict on the European Union model, but with certain adjustments regarding both sides of the Strait’s economy and territorial size. He added that a common market’s outcome will be the implementation of consultation and cooperation mechanism, “These interim arrangements will lead to the “sharing of sovereignty” in the agreed areas. Under this concept, therefore, the One China issue will be solved gradually as the jurisdiction of “A Greater China” is

¹⁰⁹ Fifth Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum, Joint Recommendations, 2009-07-12, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=6589>

¹¹⁰ Ma sees role for KMT-CCP in cross-strait talks, 2008-04-01, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/01/2003407900>

¹¹¹ Hu Jintao, Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, 2008-12-31, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC*, retrieved from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110322_1794707.htm

¹¹² China offers Taiwan military dialogue, 2010-10-14, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/10/14/2003485317>

¹¹³ KMT Policy Guidelines, 2007-06-24, *Kuomintang Official Website*, 2007-07-05, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=3161>

phased in.¹¹⁴ Though Taiwanese people were hostile to the idea of a Cross-Strait common market, Ma Ying-jeou gave up the idea, is the ECFA not initiating it?

Though Ma Ying-jeou ensured that he will not engage political negotiations with Beijing during his mandate – he went on to predict that he will not see unification realized during his life so long as Taiwanese people oppose it.¹¹⁵ He declared in addition to the *Wall Street Journal* in 2009 (that the *Taipei Times* quotes for us) that conditions for reunifications are not ripe and will take place within “decades”; the news paper at first quoted Ma Ying-jeou saying “within the decade”, that created controversy in Taiwan, before being corrected.¹¹⁶ However in 2010 after the signature of the ECFA, he replied to the same question in an interview with *Associated Press* that the opening of a Cross-Strait political dialogue will eventually depend on his reelection and how fast economical issues are tackle. According to him, it is the wish of the Taiwanese.¹¹⁷ If Ma Ying-jeou declared in 2006 that the KMT doesn’t not have a reunification schedule¹¹⁸; it seems to have one in 2010 and that the ECFA is part of the process.

Moreover, we must underline here the lack of democracy within institutional framework of the Cross-Strait dialogue on the Taiwanese side (it is obvious that the decision making process in Beijing is not democratic at all). As we highlighted in the third Chapter, Cross-Strait relations are ruled by the *Act Governing Relations between*

¹¹⁴ Vincent Siew, Toward the Creation of a Cross-Strait Common Market, Keynote Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 2001-01-22, *Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation*, retrieved from <http://www.crossstrait.org/version3/subpage4/sp4-1.htm>

¹¹⁵ Unification with China unlikely ‘in our lifetimes’: president-elect, 2008-05-16, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/16/156644/Unification-with.htm>

¹¹⁶ ‘Decades’ to unification, Ma’s aides say, 2009-10-16, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/12/16/2003461100>

¹¹⁷ Transcript of President Ma's Associated Press interview, 2010-10-19, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=22582&rmid=2355>

¹¹⁸ Ma Ying-jeou, Bridging the Divide, 2006-02-13, *Ma Ying-jeou's speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science*, retrieved from <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2006/20051215t1335z001.aspx>

*the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area*¹¹⁹, which was promulgated in 1992. However, certainly to give Lee Teng-hui breathing space to deal with Beijing facing the Conservatives of the KMT, Cross-Strait relations issues are exclusively under the Executive Yuan control. On the one hand, the Mainland Affairs Council is a quasi-ministry under the prime minister and the presidency control. On the other hand, the Strait Exchange Foundation is the only organization in Taiwan allowed to sign and negotiation agreements with Beijing, but it is under the direct control of the MAC and its president is appointed directly by the president of the Republic. The institutional process wants every new agreement to be signed by the SEF and this must be approved by the Executive Yuan, and be voted in by the Legislative Yuan within thirty days after the agreement is effective (Article 5). This procedure indeed limits the Legislative Yuan power on Cross-Strait matters and most of the time Cross-Strait agreements are not even debated in the Assembly, pushing Taiwanese people aside from the decision making process on relation matters with China.

On another side, this exclusion of the Legislative Yuan of the Cross-Strait decision making process is constitutionally logic. Indeed, if the *Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area* institutionalizes Taiwan's separation with China (Article 2), it is not however and in any case acknowledging constitutionally the separation of the ROC between two zones and subsequently recognizing the PRC. The mainland area being not another country; every agreement signed with the authority controlling the mainland area are not treaties and should not be submitted to the legislative Yuan as such; Cross-Strait agreements are constitutionally considered as internal.

Furthermore, the intense controversy surrounding the signature of the ECFA, besides its relevance, it is the nature of the agreement that was controversial. It is a treaty or is it not, and with which procedure should the Legislative Yuan review it?¹²⁰ Ma Ying-jeou in August 2010 highlighted the nature of the agreement: "We do not recognize China as a State, so our relationship with each other is not one of country-

¹¹⁹ Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, 1992-07-31, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=90541&ctNode=5914&mp=3>

¹²⁰ ECFA a 'quasi-treaty': government officials, 2010-06-02, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/02/2003476923>

to-country. Cross-strait agreements are not international treaties signed between two countries, but they are very similar.¹²¹”

In August 2008, Ma Ying-jeou challenged Lee Teng-hui’s “State to State Theory” in an interview with the Mexican news paper *El Sol*. According to him, Taiwan and China have “special relations”; Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦), the Presidential Office spokesman added that Cross-Strait relations are equal region to region relationships within the ROC’s Constitution framework.¹²²

5.3 Taiwan’s Soft Power: How to Influence the Other Side?

If generally “power” is admitted as the ability to obtain an outcome, it is as well admitted in politics that “power” is defined “as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes (Nye, 2004, p.3)”. Moreover, the power of a country lies in the size of its territory, its natural resources, the strength of its economy, the size of its population, its military power, and the stability of its society. Nonetheless, Nye (2004) rejects this definition because it is too simple and adds that “having power resources doesn’t does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want”; the context is crucial in the search for an outcome (p.3). According to him, there is “a second face of power (p.5)”, less direct but maybe more efficient: The soft power.

He defines the soft power as the ability to obtain an outcome by cooperation rather than coercion; the soft power of a country lies in its ability to shape preferences of another (p.5). The soft power often lies in a country’s culture, universal values like democracy and human rights defense, and in its foreign policy. Moreover, if a culture and a political system hold democratic and human rights values, its soft power can be

¹²¹ ECFA not a country-to-country agreement, Ma says, 2010-08-05, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/08/05/2003479644>

¹²² ‘State to state’ theory is dead, Ma says, 2008-09-04, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/09/04/2003422244>

Taiwan and China in ‘special relations’: Ma, 2008-09-04, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm>

only more efficient (p.11). The American cinema to take an example is a mass destruction weapon for every authoritarian regime for the universal values that movies are holding. However according to Nye, using the soft power requires certain legitimacy otherwise it will appear as hypocrisy. During a visit to Taiwan at the end of 2010, he praised Beijing's soft power effort and the mushrooming of Confucius Institutes in the world, but he added that China's soft power cannot be efficient as far as it remains an authoritarian regime.¹²³

If we tackle here the question of the soft power of Taiwan, it is because this concept is central in Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy. From April 2008, before his inauguration, Ma Ying-jeou stressed the importance of Taiwan's soft power in Cross-Strait relations. If he recognizes that it is not possible to export Taiwan's democracy in China, it is however one of its goals; he suggested the Cross-Strait exchange's multiplication will diffuse the very idea of democracy in Mainland China.¹²⁴

Herein lays one of the central elements of the ideological software of the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan: Taiwanizing China to reunify the Chinese nation. In other words, a democratic China is the *sine qua non* condition in the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan's reunification project. Taiwan's soft power must set the democratization of China in motion, assist it, and catalyze it.

Chu (2010), joining Ma Ying-jeou on Taiwan's ability to spread its values over China, adds that "Taiwan can serve as a Chinese model of social and political pluralism featuring free mass media, autonomous civic organizations, open political contestation, and unconstrained individual freedom (p.7)." Secondly, according to him, Taiwan can inspire the CCP to face socio-economic transformations within China, as well as the island helping the socio-political transition of Beijing's regime toward a state of right, and a market economy. Taiwan not only succeeded in its democratic transition and in its evolution toward modernity, but Taiwan's Chineseness is an extraordinary vehicle to diffuse universal values and democracy to the people of the Mainland, avoiding language and culture differences problems (p.7). Though he

¹²³ Soft power behind cross-strait peace: Nye, 2010-12-09, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/09/2003490480>

¹²⁴ Nation's democratic influence on PRC inevitable: Ma, 2008-04-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/07/2003408611>

recognizes that using soft power must be a long run policy (p.8), he is deeply convinced that Taiwan's soft power will shape China's political future and Cross-Strait development (p.4).

Several policies of Ma Ying-jeou are indeed relevant to its will to use Taiwan's soft power: the increasing number of Chinese tourists, Cross-Strait direct flights, or the authorization for Chinese students to stay longer in Taiwan are examples. Moreover, the medias play a crucial role in Taiwan's soft power in China. Ma Ying-jeou never misses an opportunity to remind that if Cross-Strait relations are eased, it is a bit thanks to Taiwan's soft power.¹²⁵

Despite economic matters – Chinese tourists are supposed to help Taiwan's economy to improve and Chinese students are supposed to prevent Taiwanese universities' enrolment rate to decline or for some universities simply to close their doors¹²⁶ – the welcoming of more people for the mainland goal is to promote to them Taiwan's model of free and democratic society, and prove that a "Chinese society" can hold human rights values. However, not every Chinese person can visit Taiwan and only those registered as resident of China's coastal provinces can eventually cross the Strait.¹²⁷ It is obvious that Taipei wants only the most educated and the richest Chinese people to visit the island and prevent illegal immigration; Ma Ying-jeou wants to attract this new Chinese middle-class and shapes its political choice. Moreover, Ma wants Taiwan to recognize Chinese diplomas and to allow Chinese students to freely register in Taiwanese universities. Even if this issue is very controversial, regulations are progressively relaxed and two thousand Chinese students are allowed to enter Taiwanese universities' undergraduate programs for the

¹²⁵ Soft power behind cross-strait peace: Nye, 2010-12-09, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/09/2003490480>

¹²⁶ Tsai warns of Chinese students' impact, 2008-10-13, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/13/2003425755>

¹²⁷ Chinese tourist deal nears completion, 2011-06-11, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/06/02/2003504766>

fall semester 2011.¹²⁸ This policy is essential for Ma Ying-jeou as far as he believes that Chinese students will become “Taiwan’s best friends in China.”¹²⁹

Though it is uncertain to see positive results of Taiwan’s soft power on China yet, it is too early; we can however observe some tendencies thanks to the survey published by the SEF in its magazine with the assistance of the sociology department of the Chengchi University. The report of this study is published in the *Taipei Times* of the February 13th 2011.¹³⁰

The survey¹³¹ found that 75% of Chinese students and 60% of Chinese tourists have a better impression of Taiwan’s society and culture after their stay on the island. It is in particular because of Taiwanese’s innovation ability, and its flourishing cultural life as well as its ability to preserve the Chinese traditional cultural heritage. However, Chinese students’ feeling on Taiwan’s political and economical situation did not evolve much during their stay: 50% of them say that their feeling on the situation did not evolve and 20% think that it is worse. When the survey asked Chinese tourists their motivation to visit Taiwan, some of their answers can be surprising: “A romantic feeling of history,” “an anachronistic nostalgia,” or “a desire to seek the roots of traditional Chinese culture”, but also “the relative superiority of Taiwan’s culture” are examples of their answers.

Discovering Taiwan’s democracy seems not be part of Chinese tourists and students’ priority, and their point of view on the question seems not evolving in favor of the diffusion of democratic ideal; they rather see Taiwan as a museum, a piece of their lost past, more than a part of their future. We can be careful regarding this

¹²⁸ Taiwanese schools take part in Chinese fair to woo students, 2011-04-25, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/04/25/2003501649>

¹²⁹ Nation’s democratic influence on PRC inevitable: Ma, 2008-04-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/07/2003408611>

¹³⁰ Chinese students more positive than tourist compatriots, 2011-02-13, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/02/13/2003495779/1>

This survey can be retrieved in Chinese at this address:
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=194291&ctNode=4407&mp=1>

¹³¹ The survey has been realized on forty-one groups of Chinese tourists, collecting about one thousand questionnaires in June 2010; two hundred and twenty seven Chinese students answered the same survey. Moreover, forty-one individual interviews were conducted on Chinese student, eleven on Chinese tourists, three on Chinese tour-guides, and three others on Taiwanese tour-guides.

survey's results however, and keep in mind that these answers are 'politically correct', not free from political pressure from the CCP.

Moreover, the Chinese are impressed by the Taiwanese' kindness and hospitality. It is ironic regarding Taiwanese people's apprehensions in 2008 before the massive arrival of Chinese tourists; the *Taipei Times* said: "They are eager to show off Taiwan's democracy, wealth, culture and sophistication, but some worry that the Chinese are backward, rude and may bring diseases to their homeland."¹³²

Taiwan also exports its soft power to China; however as Chu (2010) highlights, the main vector of diffusion of Taiwan's soft power is the private sector as much as the Taiwan's diplomacy has a very limited impact in China (p.4). In addition to Taiwanese businesspeople that brought their technique of management of companies (that provoke Chinese workers hostility but Chu forgets to mention it) as well as assisting local governments in their reorganization, in addition to Taiwanese jurists that help the reform of Chinese juridical system, in addition to NOGs actions on the mainland, in addition to religious organizations Cross-Strait exchanges, we want to highlight here the role of the media in Taiwan's soft power. Indeed, Taiwan's place in Chinese media and the interest for the island are growing. Ma Ying-jeou knows that and he reminds us in his inaugural address "that hundreds of millions of ethnic Chinese worldwide watched the ballot count on TV and the Internet."¹³³ The Taiwanese television is broadcasted by satellite or by internet in China, and Taiwanese programs are 'fashion' as far as they remain 'politically correct' for the regime. Indeed, Chinese television stations are broadcasting Taiwanese series or shows on prime time in Taiwan's Mandarin (*Guoyu*, 國語)¹³⁴ instead of in Chinese

¹³² Taiwanese await Chinese tourists with ambivalence, 2008-07-01, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/07/01/2003416218>

¹³³ Ma Ying-jeou's inaugural address: Taiwan's Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

¹³⁴ The Mandarin became China's *lingua franca* starting from the beginning of the 20th century; it is based on Northern China dialect, and especially Beijing dialect (*Beijing Hua*, 北京話). It was introduced in Taiwan by the KMT in 1945. After 1949 a process of differentiation occurred between the language spoken in Taiwan and the language spoken in China favored by the severance of contacts between the two sides of the Strait, the Mandarin in Taiwan being deeply influenced by the Taiwanese, the mother tongue of the large majority of the population, and by foreign languages, notably Japanese. China's Mandarin is using extensively phonetic retroflexions when it does not exist in Taiwan. Both languages can find their differences in grammatical structure, vocabulary, and pronunciation. In addition, Taiwan is still using traditional characters (*Fantizi*, 繁體字) when China is using simplified

Mandarin (*Putonghua*, 普通話)¹³⁵ Chu (2010) adds that Taiwanese television stars (comedians, talk-show hosts, political commentators, etc...) are becoming stars in China as well and they help Chinese people to understand political and social evolution in Taiwan (p.12).

Moreover, Taiwan's pavilion at the Shanghai Expo was one of the most popular, and the city of Beijing is planning to create a 'Taiwan Street' where Taiwan's life style can be reproduced with stores and restaurants like in already some cities of the Mainland.¹³⁶

Chu (2010) reports a study on how Chinese see the Taiwanese democracy. The survey was conducted in 2006 on urban Chinese population of Xiamen and Chengdu in collaboration with Duke University and the Research Center for Contemporary China of the Beijing's University. The survey proposes to measure the democratic image of Chinese, Taiwanese, and American societies within these populations on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 is the highest level of democracy. The results are surprising: 5.4 for the Chinese society, 6.2 for Taiwan, and 7.2 for the American society (pp.10-11). The Chinese perceived the Taiwanese society as only slightly more democratic than the Chinese society; that may explain their lack of interest for the Taiwanese political system. However, this survey was conducted in 2006 when Chen Shui-bian was president and the Cross-Strait relations shaking; this unfavorable context may explain Chinese people's answers. The Chinese will certainly reply differently if the survey were to be conducted nowadays.

Ma Ying-jeou's soft power policies have the obvious goal to create a united front in order to democratized China. Even if first trends seem negative, Ma Ying-jeou is convinced of the efficiency of his policies: "Maybe the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] could force Taiwanese to bend to its political will, but the Chinese people

characters (*Jiantizi*, 簡體字) starting from the 1950s. To set an example, the differentiation between the China's Mandarin and Taiwan's Mandarin could be compared to French from France and the French spoken in France's former African colonies; both cases know a similar period of differentiation.

¹³⁵ China 'mad' for Taiwanese culture, 2010-08-15, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/08/15/2003480374>

¹³⁶ China 'mad' for Taiwanese culture, 2010-08-15, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/08/15/2003480374>

could also demand that the CCP reform the country based on Taiwan's democratic achievements.¹³⁷ 1.63 million Chinese people visited Taiwan in 2010.¹³⁸

If some doubts remained on Ma's intentions before his election, he showed that he is a real Chinese Nationalist who wishes the reunification of the Chinese nation; however, the conditions in which the reunification must take place is symbolic of the Taiwanization of his identity and his ideological software. The study of his Cross-Strait policies and especially their implementation framework highlights us Ma Ying-jeou's implementation of a 'soft' reunification process: Peace in the Taiwan Strait, normalization of Cross-Strait economic exchanges, and institutionalization of Cross-Strait dialogue. However, though Ma Ying-jeou promised to defend and preserve Taiwan's sovereignty, the Cross-Strait 'New Deal' is directly threatening Taiwan's political independence as far as the economical interdependence with China is increasing too fast and Beijing's regime liberalization is too slow, if one day China has to be a democracy.

¹³⁷ Ma fetes Chiang Ching-kuo's contributions, 2009-04-12, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/12/2003440862>

¹³⁸ Chinese students more positive than tourist compatriots, 2011-02-13, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/02/13/2003495779/1>

CHAPTER 6 Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese Nationalism and the Legitimacy of the "Republic of China Nation": Transforming the Taiwanese Political Community's Identity

"Taiwan is poised to be the standard-bearer at the leading edge of Chinese culture. In the next century, the ROC will serve as a paragon of democracy for the Chinese-speaking world. The ROC is a nation with its own independent sovereignty. The existence of the ROC not only ensures the security and dignity of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, but also proves that ethnic Chinese can indeed tread a new path of freedom and democracy. [...] We hope one day that all descendents of Emperors Yen and Huang will enjoy freedom, democracy, and rule of law, as we do here in Taiwan. This is not a far-off dream, because these values have all been realized in Taiwan. They are not exclusive to the West. Taiwan's experience can serve as a reference for the future development of mainland China".

Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage, President Ma's New Year's Day Message, 2011-01-01¹³⁹

In this Sixth Chapter, we aim to tackle the question of transformation of the Taiwanese political community's identity which is directly related to Ma Ying-jeou's

¹³⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, *Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage*, 2011-01-01, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23186&rmid=2355>

Cross-Strait policies. Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy privileges the Chinese narrative feature compared to other elements of Taiwan's identity; it aims to redraw the identity of the Taiwanese political community toward the identification to the Chinese nation. In addition, we hypothesize that this narrative aims to re-legitimize the ROC after two decades of taiwanization as first a part of the Chinese nation, and second the only model of development in which the Chinese nation should be reunified.

In the first part, we want to highlight how Ma Ying-jeou tries to recreate political and juridical links between Taiwan and China, especially by the redefinition of the Taiwanese political community's identity as a Chinese political entity; how Ma Ying-jeou's policies are transforming Taiwan's international image. Our second part will focus on the cultural aspect of Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy. He implements a process of re-sinization of Taiwan's cultural space in order to legitimate Taiwan's belonging to the Chinese nation. As a final point, we will tackle how Ma Ying-jeou wants to create a legitimate historical bond between the ROC's past in the mainland, its Taiwanese present, and the future of the Chinese nation that is eventually reunified under the ROC's model.

6.1 A Politico-Juridical Legitimacy: The Republic of China in Taiwan as a Credible Actor of the Chinese Nation

Since the beginning of the 1990s and the Taiwanization of the Nationalist regime, it was generally admitted that the ROC and Taiwan are two indivisible entities; Lee Teng-hui even declared when he was president that "the ROC *is* Taiwan and Taiwan *is* the ROC". The definition indeed worked for Taiwan's separation with the mainland, though it preserved a symbolic bond with China through its Constitution.

After his election as president, Ma Ying-jeou challenged this definition of Taiwan. According to him, if Taiwan is indeed the ROC, Taiwan is however only a

part of the ROC, the other part being the Chinese mainland. This nuance, as Muyard (2010) highlights it, subordinate Taiwan to the ROC and reduces the Taiwanese identity to a Chinese provincial identity (p.8). Indeed, he declared in August 2008 that Taiwan and Mainland China are ‘two regions’ of the ROC¹⁴⁰; he refers to Taiwan in 2010 as the “province of Taiwan” while recalling friendship links between the Island and the State of Texas.¹⁴¹

In addition, Taipei’s response to the new Diaoyutai controversy that took place in October 2010 is another example of Ma Ying-jeou’s attempt to rebuild the juridical bond between the ROC in Taiwan and China: Taipei claims the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai and challenge Tokyo’s claim, however it does not challenge Beijing’s claim. The explanation, according to Taipei, is that constitutionally China is a part of the ROC¹⁴²; Wu Den-yi (吳敦義), the Prime Minister since the end of 2009, added during the controversy that “by our Constitution, the only China is the ROC.”¹⁴³ In other words, Ma’s government just makes the PRC disappear to legitimate its claim of be the only legitimate Chinese State, and the ROC’s constitution is the main bond between the ROC in Taiwan and China.

In its crossed biography with Chiang Ching-kuo, Ma Ying-jeou mentions the legitimacy of the Constitutions to be the essential bond with China; he recounts the last days of the old Nationalist leader at the very moment of the reform of the National Assembly. After the lift of the Martial Law, the renewing of the National Assembly was problematic in these terms: Should the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan include representatives from the Mainland in order to preserve the ROC’s legitimacy to represent the whole of China? Chiang Ching-kuo responded that “the Constitution of the Republic of China, it is the legitimacy of the Republic of

¹⁴⁰ Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview, 2008-10-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320>

Ma sticks to ROC Constitution’s writ, 2008-12-29, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/12/29/2003432343>

¹⁴¹ Ma hails ‘Taiwan Province’-Texas ties, 2010-06-22, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/22/2003476110>

¹⁴² Japan worried over ROC interpretation, 2010-10-04, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/10/04/2003484493>

¹⁴³ Wu explains China Diaoyutai claim, 2010-10-09, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/09/2003484941>

China. Representatives of the central authority, elected in line with the Constitution, can indeed represent the legitimacy of the Republic of China; there is no need to include representatives from the Mainland (Ma Ying-jeou, 2009, as cited in Leclercq, 2010, Annex n°5, p.236).”

Obviously, Ma Ying-jeou draws his inspiration from former mentor’s “constitutional legitimacy theory” on the ROC’s legitimacy issue. According to him, “in a young democracy, respecting the Constitution is more important than amending it.”¹⁴⁴ Referring to Chen Shui-bian’s will to build a new constitution for Taiwan and send the ROC’s Constitution to oblivion, Ma Ying-jeou devotes himself to the protection of the last juridical bond between Taiwan and China.

However, the issue of the Constitution is intimately linked to the issue of the borders of the ROC. This issue is highly politicized and open to different interpretations as a result of the Taiwan undetermined juridical status; it is conceivable to recognize that the ROC is the *de facto* ruler of Taiwan, but the definition of the borders of the Republic is problematic as far as the Constitution does not specify the inclusion of Taiwan within its territory. As Corcuff (2005) highlights, national borders of the ROC as defined within the Constitution do not specify any number of provinces, any names, any layout of a border, or any total area (p.6). Article 4 of the Constitution¹⁴⁵ defines the national borders as such: “The territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly.”

The terms “existing national boundaries” are confusing and to what boundaries are they referring? The main interpretation in Taiwan is that these boundaries are those of 1947 when the Constitution was implemented. However, it only partially recognizes historical events of the following years; it does recognize the fact that the Constitution does not apply on mainland China but it is still claiming sovereignty over it. Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou gave us his own interpretation of the Article 4 during an interview in 2006: “It says that the territory of the Republic of China covered its

¹⁴⁴ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*,
retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ The Constitution of the Republic of China, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*,
retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=1107>

traditional sort of boundary and unless it was approved by the National Assembly, which should not be changed.” He added that Taiwan is a part of the ROC since 1945 because the Taiwanese sent eighteen representatives to the National Assembly in 1947.¹⁴⁶

Corcuff (2005) and Hsiao (2008) highlight the fact that Taiwan was never included within ROC Constitution’s drafts prior to 1947. The 1936’s draft specifies a list of provinces that the ROC claims, including those not under its control; Taiwan is not in this list (Corcuff, note n°7, p.6; Hsiao, pp.116-117). The Article 4 of the 1947’s Constitution is certainly a contingency of the military situation of the end of the Second World War: The Soviet Union was still occupying Manchuria, and the Chinese Communist a part of the Chinese territory. Moreover, the Article 4 indirectly ‘constitutionalizes’ the annexing of Taiwan and avoids challenge from other countries before the signature of a peace treaty with Japan and the settlement of territorial issues.

If Chen Shui-bian taiwanized Taiwan’s State identity, systematically replacing the ‘ROC’ by ‘Taiwan’ in unofficial embassies’, State controlled companies’ and institutions’ names¹⁴⁷, Ma Ying-jeou immediately after his election restored the term “ROC”, reversing Chen’s policy. For example, the Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Ou (Ou Hung-lien, 歐鴻鍊) justified that replacing the term “Taiwan” by “ROC” in Taiwanese representation offices’ names because it is the official name of the country; according to him, it should be more efficient to safeguard the national sovereignty (ROC’s sovereignty). However, this policy has never been implemented because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received complaints from Taiwanese diplomatic personnel; this measure was going to destroy several years of work to make Taiwan recognized by the international community and avoid the confusion with the PRC.¹⁴⁸ Though this measure is still not yet implemented¹⁴⁹, this shows obviously Ma’s

¹⁴⁶ Cohen, J.A., A Conversation with Ma Ying-jeou, *Council on Foreign Relation*, 2006-03-20, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/china/conversation-ma-ying-jeou-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10217>

¹⁴⁷ See supra, p.76

¹⁴⁸ MOFA delays ‘Taiwan’ name changes, 2008-06-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/06/06/2003413996>

¹⁴⁹ See for example the website of the *Bureau de Représentation de Taipei en France* (Representative Office of Taipei in France): <http://www.taiwanembassy.org/mp.asp?mp=122>

Administration's will to make the international community identify Taiwan as a part of China.

Lams and Liao (2011) also noticed that State-controlled companies and numbers of symbols that can characterize the State identity were "re-sinized" (p.78). The best example is the re-changing of the name of the Post Company in Taiwan. Originally called *Chunghwa Post* (中華郵政); its name has been changed in *Taiwan Post* (台灣郵政) by Chen Shui-bian. After Ma Ying-jeou's election, it returned to its original name; a deputy from the KMT, certainly a Chinese Nationalist, even said the "Taiwan Post never existed" because the Legislative Yuan dominated by the KMT never pass the bill.¹⁵⁰ In addition, Lams and Liao (2011) underlines that changing in the presidency webpage head: the flag of the ROC and the name "Republic of China" have replaced the word "Taiwan" and the "logo-map" of the island. However, after a few months and several contestations, the word "Taiwan" reappeared but between brackets behind Republic of China to signify Taiwan's subordination (p.78). We nonetheless observed that the term Taiwan reappeared only when the name of the country was written in English but not when it was written in Chinese. The blue replaced the green as the font of the website and the presidential palace appeared on the page as a symbol of authority.¹⁵¹ The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) holds the same features: a large flag of the ROC flies at the head of the webpage, the blue is the dominant color, but the word "Taiwan" does not appear in the Chinese version either.¹⁵² We must notice here that the website of the Mainland Affairs Council is showing the word "Taiwan" neither in the English version, nor in the Chinese version, but the "logo-map" of Taiwan appears on both versions.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ 'Taiwan Post' sent into history, 2008-08-05, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/08/05/2003419468>

¹⁵¹ The website of the *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)* can be retrieved at this address: <http://www.president.gov.tw/>

¹⁵² See the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Chinese at this address: <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/mp?mp=1>

¹⁵³ See the website of the Mainland Affairs Council in Chinese at this address: <http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1>

Erasing “Taiwan” in governmental websites’ Chinese versions sends a clear message to the Taiwanese and the Chinese nation in general that the ROC exists and that Taiwan belongs to the ROC but that Taiwan is not the ROC. If the English version keeps the term “Taiwan”, it is indeed to avoid confusion with the PRC as mentioned earlier.

Regarding Cross-Strait relation, Ma’s Administration specifies, in respect of the One China Principle, that the other side of the Strait must be designate under the terms “Mainland China (*Zhongguo Dalu*, 中國大陸)” or only “Mainland (*Dalu*, 大陸)” rather than “China (中國)” in official and diplomatic documents.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the term “China” is a direct reference to the Cross-Strait national division; on the contrary, the ‘term’ “mainland” does not recognize this division but only a geographical separation. It seems that this measure is also difficult to implement as far as Ma Ying-jeou recalls it at the beginning of 2011.¹⁵⁵

To conclude, we want to highlight the Taiwan/ROC dichotomy in Ma Ying-jeou’s speech. As we just saw it, Taiwan is not a sovereign juridical entity for Ma, but the ROC is. Therefore, Taiwan is the geo-political entity where the ROC is established. Ma’s inaugural address¹⁵⁶ is clear on both entities’ respective position: The ROC plays an international role as a sovereign nation-state that must represent the whole of China; Taiwan on the contrary is playing only regional role as an economical actor. Even if Taiwan is cited forty-three times and the ROC only nine times, “Taiwan can better integrate itself in East Asia and contribute more to the region's peace and prosperity” contrasts with “the Republic of China must restore its reputation in the international community as a peace-maker;” Taiwan is a member of the “global village” while the Republic of China is “a world citizen that will accept its responsibilities in promoting free trade, nonproliferation, anti-global warming measures, counter-terrorism, humanitarian aid, and other global commons.” Moreover

¹⁵⁴ MOFA delays ‘Taiwan’ name changes, 2008-06-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/06/06/2003413996>

¹⁵⁵ Ma wants a return to use of ‘mainland’, 2011-02-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/02/08/2003495360>

¹⁵⁶ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

at the end of his speech, Ma Ying-jeou proclaims “Long live Taiwan’s democracy, Long live the Republic of China”, as the expression of his view on the island: the model of society developed in Taiwan is the ROC’s achievement recalling that the first is subordinated and depending from the second.

6.2 A Cultural and Ethnical Legitimacy: “Make The Taiwanese Real Chinese”

In the second step of the redefinition of the Taiwanese political community’s identity, Ma Ying-jeou emphasizes the rhetorical redefinition of the insular society as ethnically Han and culturally Chinese. Indeed, Ma Ying-jeou highlights Chinese characteristics of the Taiwanese society and ignores contributions of others. The Chinese origin of Taiwanese people is constantly underlined, the Confucian and Chinese traditional values as core values of the Taiwanese society as well in his discourse; educational and cultural policies are used as a tool to reinforce the feeling of belonging to the Chinese nation.

As Brown (1996, as cited in Vickers, 2010) highlights, the Han identity can be interpreted in two contradictory but complementary ways: “On the one hand, Confucian civilizing mission’s myths support the idea that other populations can be assimilated; on the other hand, social practices and patriarchal Confucian values spread the idea that the Han identity is bound to Han ancestry (transmit by the male’s lineage) (pp.100-101).¹⁵⁷” Though Ma Ying-jeou recognizes the existence of a Taiwanese identity, because of its Han ascendancy the Taiwanese identity can only be “a provincial identity and a ‘particularism’ within a Chinese nation at large (Muyard, 2010, p.8).¹⁵⁸”

¹⁵⁷ “D’une part, les mythes associés à la mission civilisatrice confucianiste soutiennent que l’adoption de la culture chinoise (c’est-à-dire Han) mais, d’autre part, les pratiques sociales, renforcées par une morale confucéenne fortement patriarcale, ont profondément implanté l’idée que l’identité Han serait associée de façon inextricable à l’ascendance Han (transmise par la ligne masculine).”

¹⁵⁸ “Une identité provinciale et un particularisme au sein d’une nation chinoise élargie.”

As we saw in the Third Chapter, the definition of the Taiwanese political community takes place within the framework of the Han culture¹⁵⁹, that is to say within the general framework of the Han ethnics and the Chinese civilization but separated from any political framework. That was then rhetorically easy for Ma Ying-jeou in his inaugural address¹⁶⁰ for example to describe Taiwan as “an ethnic Chinese Community”, and thereof include Taiwan within “a Chinese nation at large”; he insists four times in six lines on this term. In addition in his speech, according to him Taiwan must be an example for other Chinese communities throughout the world because it accomplished a second democratic alternation. Ma Ying-jeou uses here a rhetorical differentiation that exists in Mandarin but not in European languages: indeed the Mandarin allows us to differentiate the ethnical definition from the political definition of the Chinese people: *Zhonghuaren* (中華人) is translated as “ethnic Chinese” and *Zhongguoren* (中國人) which is also pronounced “Chinese” refers to citizens of the PRC. This term of “ethnic Chinese” usually refers to the term “Han”; it is widely used in China but only seldom in Taiwan.

Furthermore, as the Taiwanese are indeed Chinese immigrants – Ma Ying-jeou uses this fact as a rhetorical argument to bond the Taiwanese to the Chinese nation, both being the descendants of the Yellow Emperors (*Yan Huang Zisun*, 炎黃子孫). If Ma Ying-jeou barely suggests it during the first half of his mandate, the reference to the Yellow Emperors is becoming recurrent starting from the end of the year 2010 – after the signature of the ECFA. In November of 2010, he declared that “both sides would find the best solution to cross-strait disputes under the guidance of Chinese culture because both peoples are of one Chinese nation and all *Yan Huang Zisun* (descendants of emperors Yan and Huang)¹⁶¹” In his New Year speech of 2011, he declared that “as both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a common ancestry dating back to legendary emperors Yen and Huang, we should enhance mutual understanding, build mutual trust, and gradually dispel differences of opinion via in-depth exchanges.

¹⁵⁹ See *supra*, pp.77-78

¹⁶⁰ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

¹⁶¹ ‘1992 consensus’ is basis of ties: Ma, 2010-10-29, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/29/2003487182>

Guided by the wisdom of our common ethnic Chinese culture, we can surely work out a very satisfactory solution.” He, in addition, hopes that “one day all descendents of Emperors Yen and Huang will enjoy freedom, democracy, and rule of law, as we do here in Taiwan.¹⁶²” Besides, Ma Ying-jeou after the Typhoon Morakot disaster, to thank the Chinese generosity and assistance, recalled the Chinese nationalism’s motto suggesting the very bond between both sides of the Strait: “Such interaction, reflecting the feeling shared by both peoples with common ethnic roots that “blood is thicker than water,” inspires us to look forward to future cross-strait developments with confidence and hope.¹⁶³”

Moreover, Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄), KMT’s president between 2007 and 2009, told Hu Jintao during spring 2008 on a trip to China that “the people on both sides of the Strait belong to the Chinese nation.” He assumed that the Taiwanese identity does not equal the Taiwan’s independence movement before adding that “the two sides share the same blood, culture, religion, and customs.¹⁶⁴” We need to precise here that Wu Poh-hsiung is one of the most active promoters of the reunification in Taiwan. In 2000, he was KMT’s highest official (Vice-president) to visit the Mainland since 1949, but as the president of the World Hakka Association. He also declared in 2009 to the same Hakka forum that Hakka people think that people on each side of the Strait are descendants of the Yellow Emperors and belong to the Chinese nation.¹⁶⁵

The ethnical question remains central in Taiwan’s society, though the 2008 campaign lightly tackled this issue. In his inaugural speech, Ma Ying-jeou sought ethnical harmony between the different ethnical groups of Taiwan: “We will promote

¹⁶² Ma Ying-jeou, Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage, 2011-01-01, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23186&rmid=2355>

¹⁶³ Ma Ying-jeou, Growing amid Challenges, Progressing amid Reconstruction, 2009-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16345&rmid=2355&word1=national+day>

¹⁶⁴ Wu Poh-hsiung, Sympathy and Humanitarian Concern Can Cross the Strait, 2008-05-28, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=4696>

¹⁶⁵ Ma determined to develop nation's cultural diversity, 2009-08-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/06/2003450471>

harmony among sub-ethnic groups and between the old and new immigrants [...].¹⁶⁶ However, as Lams and Liao (2011) highlight it, “Ma mobilizes “harmony” as a moral incentive and as an operational framework to promote a certain sort of communitarian cohabitation. However, his Chinese-centric approach, which highlights the grandeur of the Han Chinese ethnic culture, may silence other ethnic subgroups in Taiwan by granting them fewer rights of voice (p.85).”

Indeed, the Aborigines question is here central. If with Chen Shui-bian the Aborigines’ contribution to the culture in Taiwan was over-represented, it is intentionally ignored with Ma Ying-jeou. He never refers to them and their contribution to Taiwan in his speeches. Being non-Han and out with the Chinese nation, they are seen as inferior to the other ethnical groups of Taiwan. In December 2007 as a Mayor of Taipei and in campaign for the presidential election, Ma declared referring to Aborigines that if they are moving to Taipei, he will see them as “human beings” and “he will educate them well,” but they have to “adjust their mentality” to live in the city.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou promised during the presidential campaign autonomy to the Aborigines, but during spring 2011 no autonomy was granted yet. He explained it because autonomy will isolate Aborigines from the rest of Taiwan, before adding that “the public should value the talents of Aborigines more, such as in sports or in music, and that Aborigines may need some degree of protection.”¹⁶⁸

According to Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan holds harmoniously “different Chinese cultures¹⁶⁹” that reinforce the feeling of Taiwan’s belonging to the Chinese nation. It is obvious here that he is differentiating the traditional Chinese culture (*Zhonghua Wenhua*, 中華文化) – the “high national Chinese culture” that he is the advocate and

¹⁶⁶ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

¹⁶⁷ Ma comment sparks Aboriginal fury, 2007-12-26, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/12/26/2003394156>

¹⁶⁸ Aborigines slam Ma’s remarks on total autonomy, 2011-05-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/07/2003502612>

¹⁶⁹ Ma determined to develop nation's cultural diversity, 2009-08-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/06/2003450471>

promoter¹⁷⁰ – and the other “local cultures” of Taiwan: Hakka and Hoklo; Aborigines cultures are naturally excluded.

Ma Ying-jeou does not recognize the existence of a national Taiwanese culture but acknowledges the very existence of a Taiwanese subjectivity. He names this subjectivity within the Chinese culture in Taiwan as the “the spirit of Taiwan” or a “Chinese culture with a unique Taiwanese character.” His New Year speech of 2011 expresses most clearly his view on his so-called “spirit of Taiwan”: “Taiwan also possesses the openness and innovation of a maritime culture. Traditional Chinese culture on this island early on absorbed the essence of Western contemporary civilization, which is manifested in its innovative art. Our dance, music, drama, visual arts, motion pictures, and television programming command high international acclaim and are reflective of a Chinese culture with Taiwan characteristics.¹⁷¹” He is also adding that the Taiwanese specific society and culture would never have been implemented without the democracy.¹⁷²

As we highlighted in Chapter Five; Ma Ying-jeou was educated in the knowledge of the Chinese Classics by his father¹⁷³; Confucianism is indeed a central feature features of his national identity policy. According to him, Confucian values (benevolence, righteousness, diligence, honesty, generosity and industriousness) are core values of Taiwan (Lams and Liao, 2011, p.84). Besides, Ma Ying-jeou is the first president since Chiang Kai-shek in 1968 to celebrate Confucius’ birthday in his temple in Taipei.¹⁷⁴ Regarding Cross-Strait relations, Ma quotes Mencius (*Mengzi*, 孟子) and says “the best way for two countries to get along was for the smaller country to be smart and flexible in dealing with the bigger country, and for the bigger country

¹⁷⁰ President touts Chinese culture, 2010-10-15, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/10/15/2003485413>

¹⁷¹ Ma Ying-jeou, Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage, 2011-01-01, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23186&rmid=2355>

¹⁷² President Ma attends press conference to unveil logo for ROC centennial anniversary, 2010-03-29, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=21018&rmid=2355&word1=Preparatory+Committee+for+the+Centenary+Celebrations+of+the+Republic+of+China>

¹⁷³ See supra, p.114

¹⁷⁴ Ma presides over ‘imperial’ rites, 2008-10-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/06/2003425153>

to be generous and kind and not to browbeat its smaller counterpart.¹⁷⁵ Moreover and more surprising, Ma Ying-jeou praises the ROC's contribution to the redaction of the Declaration of Human Rights, "infusing into it the spirit of Confucianism."¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, Ma's Administration restores the teaching of Confucianism in high school using education to restore the bond between Taiwan and China. Besides, the increase in time spent to study Chinese literature Classics, 65% now and 45% before, the teaching of the "Four Books" – Great Learning (*Daxue*, 大學), Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhongyong*, 中庸), Analects of Confucius (*Lunyu*, 論語) and Mencius (*Mengzi*, 孟子) – is compulsory in senior high school starting from 2011.¹⁷⁷ However, the Ministry of Education justified this measure because of the multiplication of social problems within school ("school bullying, gangs and drugs"); according to him it is the result of a poor understanding of the Chinese culture.¹⁷⁸ Ma Ying-jeou justified his educational policy against critics because according to him Mencius' wisdom is not outdated and can be applied to the modern world; his intention is moreover to turn Taiwan "into a hub of advanced education for Chinese language and literature."¹⁷⁹ Obviously, the restoration of Chinese Classics within the education hides some more nationalistic purposes that inscribe Taiwan into the Chinese nation.

Moreover when Ma Ying-jeou was mayor of Taipei, he implemented a voluntary educational program to teach the Four Books to children. This program was then extended to the mainland's children and about two millions of them participated in the program in 2011.¹⁸⁰ His goal is obviously to diffuse the same traditional

¹⁷⁵ Ma quotes Mencius, says best not to provoke China, 2010-08-04, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/08/04/2003479564>

Ma urges Taiwan to show wisdom, 2010-11-01, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/11/01/2003487435>

¹⁷⁶ Ma Ying-jeou, Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage, 2011-01-01, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23186&rmid=2355>

¹⁷⁷ Mandatory study of ancient texts ignites backlash, 2011-02-12, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/02/12/2003495700/1>

¹⁷⁸ Confucian works back on teaching curriculum, 2011-02-20, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/02/20/2003496324>

¹⁷⁹ Ma praises Confucianism, 2011-09-29, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/29/2003514478>

¹⁸⁰ Ma touts preservation of 'Chinese culture' in TV ad, 2011-09-27, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/27/2003514305>

Chinese culture on each side of the Strait and reinforce the feeling of belonging to the same nation. Did Ma Ying-jeou not declare regarding the Chinese nation that people have “the same ancestors and the same last names, come from the same towns and villages and go to the same schools?”¹⁸¹

The museum policy is another feature of Ma’s national identity policy to present Taiwan as a part of the Chinese nation. As Vickers (2010) highlights, Ma’s Administration has aimed since 2008 “to resurrect the old Chinese cultural orthodoxy as a scientific objectivity”¹⁸², as opposed to Chen Shui-bian’s museum policy described as “politicized” (p.103). The National Palace Museum (*Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan*, 國立故宮博物院) is central in Ma Ying-jeou museum’s policy since it is the most Chinese museum of Taiwan; its director, Chou Kung-shin (周功鑫), reminds us that the collection is at the heart of the museum as the reaffirmation of its Chineseness (p.110). It is moreover the only museum of Taiwan that is systematically visited by Chinese tourists (p.113).

6.3 A Historical Legitimacy: Rewriting the Past for a Common Future

The first two parts highlighted the recreating of the juridical and cultural bond between Taiwan and China. This last part aims to emphasize Ma Ying-jeou’s last narrative feature of his national identity policy: creating and legitimating a historical bond between the ROC’s past and Taiwan’s present as a ROC’s achievement in order to inspire the future reunification. The ROC’s centenary that was celebrated in October 2011 played a central role in Ma Ying-jeou’s narrative

As a clue to the importance of this event, Ma Ying-jeou appointed his Vice-president as the president of the Preparatory Committee for the Centenary Celebrations of the Republic of China; Ma Ying-jeou himself participated in the

¹⁸¹ ‘1992 consensus’ is basis of ties: Ma, 2010-10-29, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/29/2003487182>

¹⁸² “Ressusciter la vieille orthodoxie tournée vers la Chine sous la bannière de l’objectivité scientifique.”

elaboration of the celebration. As he underlined in May 2010, the celebrations' objective was to show "the ROC's power as a nation, and the soft power of its culture, as we look back on the past 100 years. The various events should enable the public and the international community to understand the value of the development of Taiwan in so many areas." Moreover, they were to take place in three parts: "having the public interpret history (looking at the past), having the world take note of Taiwan (looking at the present), and moving forward hand-in-hand (looking at the future)" ¹⁸³ In addition, the Centenary celebrations aimed to show the ROC's independence and sovereignty: A military parade was organized, and about 50 foreign delegations composed of 1500 representatives were received. ¹⁸⁴

Besides, Beijing invited Taipei to celebrate conjointly the October 10. Ma Ying-jeou rejected the invitation ¹⁸⁵ and replied that China should adopt Taiwan's development model: "Taiwan is poised to be the standard-bearer at the leading edge of Chinese culture. In the next century, the ROC will serve as a paragon of democracy for the Chinese-speaking world." ¹⁸⁶

If the Double Tenth marks the end of the monarchy in China and the creation of the republican system, Ma Ying-jeou recalls proudly that the ROC is the first 'democratic republic' in Asia. ¹⁸⁷ The Xinhai Revolution (*Xinhai Geming*, 辛亥革命)

¹⁸³ President Ma and Vice President Siew attend second general meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Centenary Celebrations of the ROC, 2010-05-15, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=21490&rmid=2355&word1=Preparatory+Committee+for+the+Centenary+Celebrations+of+the+Republic+of+China>

President Ma attends the third general meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Centenary Celebrations of the Republic of China, 2010-12-11, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23078&rmid=2355>

¹⁸⁴ National Day draws huge foreign turnout, 2011-10-09, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2011/10/09/319275/National-Day.htm>

¹⁸⁵ Taiwan will not celebrate 1911 revolution with PRC, 2010-05-16, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/05/16/2003473111>

¹⁸⁶ Ma Ying-jeou, "Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage", 2011-01-01, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23186&rmid=2355>

¹⁸⁷ A simple research on Wikipedia highlights the existence of older republican system in Asia and Ma Ying-jeou cannot ignore it; his proud certainly comes from the democratic feature of the ROC. The oldest republican system in Asia seems to be the Lanfang Republic (*Lanfang Gongheguo*, 蘭芳共和國) founded in Indonesia in 1777 by Chinese immigrants, but it was suppressed in 1884 by the Dutch. The Ezo Republic in the North of Japan survived one year (1868-1869) before its incorporation in Japan's

and the establishing of the ROC was the dream of idealists that Ma Ying-jeou glorifies as heroes of the Republic, including people from Taiwan:

“It is with deep reverence that we here salute the idealistic, courageous, self-sacrificing revolutionaries of that time. We salute Lu Hao-dong of Guangdong, Huang Xing of Hunan, Qiu Jin of Zhejiang, Lin Jue-min of Fujian, and Luo Fu-xing of Taiwan. These are just a very few of the many heroes who fought to establish the Republic. Since the inception of the Republic 100 years ago, countless numbers of our citizens have perished amid the travails of the Northern Expedition, the War of Resistance against Japan, government action to end the Communist rebellion, and the defense of Taiwan and its outlying islands against invasion by Communist forces. The vast majority of those who gave their lives are nameless heroes who sacrificed their youth and their very existence so that the Republic of China might prosper.”¹⁸⁸

If Ma Ying-jeou refers to Luo Fuxing, it is because Sun Yat-sen sent him in 1911 to Taiwan to spread the revolution over the island; he was arrested for subversion by the Japanese. He declared before his death that “I am not dying at home to be remembered by the offspring, I die in Taiwan to be remembered by the people of Taiwan.” In fact and maybe most importantly, he was an overseas Chinese man from Indonesia.¹⁸⁹ Ma Ying-jeou’s commemoration of Luo Fuxing is symbolic of the narrative that he tried to create between Taiwan and the 1911 Revolution: the Xinhai Revolution was a concern of the whole Chinese nation (Chinese from the Mainland, overseas Chinese, and Taiwanese). Even if Taiwan was part of Japan at the very moment of the Chinese Revolution, Ma Ying-jeou’s narrative aimed to include Taiwan in the revolutionary process that created the ROC and the Chinese nation.

Empire. The Republic of Taiwan (1895) and the First Republic of the Philippines from 1899 to 1901 are following.

¹⁸⁸ Ma Ying-jeou, A Century of Struggle, a Democratic Taiwan, 2011-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=25514&rmid=2355#>

¹⁸⁹ Pres. Ma unveils Luo Fuxing's statue, 2009-03-04, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/03/04/198578/Pres-Ma.htm>

Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou commemorated the centenary of the Huanghuagang Uprising (*Huanghuagang Qiyi*, 黃花崗起義) on the March 29; he took this opportunity to present the Centenary's logo. According to Ma and despite its failure, the end of March's uprising was the first step to the success of the Xinhai Revolution. If Ma Ying-jeou commemorates this event it is to highlight the contribution of three Taiwanese people in the uprising:

“President Ma said that two Taiwanese participated in the Huanghuagang Uprising. One was the martyr Lo Fuxing, who was from Dahu in Miaoli County, while the other was Mr. Xu Zan-yuan, who hailed from Tainan. In addition, Mr. Lin Wei-ge from the noted Lin family of Banqiao donated 3,000 Japanese yen, bankrolling 19 students studying in Japan so they could make their way by ship to Guangzhou and participate in the movement. Among these was Lin Jue-min, who wrote a famous farewell letter to his wife. The president said that these fascinating nuggets of history remind us that people from Taiwan also participated in the uprising.”¹⁹⁰

In addition, Ma Ying-jeou emphasizes the role of Chinese overseas in the Revolution and the foundation of the ROC. They are the “Mothers of the Revolution” according to Ma; it is thanks to their financial, personal and ideological supports that the Revolution was successful. Besides, the Taiwanese at the beginning of the 20th century were also overseas Chinese thus very much a part of the Chinese nation: “Ma said residents in Taiwan had provided generous financial assistance and personally participated in uprisings led by Dr. Sun in early 20th century, although the island was still under colonial rule by the Japanese.”¹⁹¹ Sun Yat-sen was not himself an overseas Chinese?¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ President Ma attends press conference to unveil logo for ROC centennial anniversary, 2010-03-29, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=21018&rmid=2355&word1=Preparatory+Committee+for+the+Centenary+Celebrations+of+the+Republic+of+China>

¹⁹¹ Ma honors Dr. Sun, overseas compatriots, 2011-10-10, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2011/10/10/319327/p1/Ma-honors.htm>

¹⁹² Document suggests Sun Yat-sen was born in the US, 2011-07-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/06/07/2003505154>

For the most recent history, the memorial bond is stronger and created in blood; Taiwanese people must remember and be thankful for the ROC and the Chinese who fought for them and protected them: According to Ma Ying-jeou, “it was the sacrifice of 20 million soldiers and civilians of the Republic during the War of Resistance against Japan that enabled Taiwan to end Japan’s colonial rule.” And without the retrocession of Taiwan, the ROC was lost “with no chance for a transformative rebirth or possibility of development of the two sides of the strait along different trajectories.”¹⁹³ If Taiwan is a democratic State and a modern economy, it is thanks to the Chinese people’s sacrifice to save and protect the ROC, Taiwan, and their nation.¹⁹⁴ Hence, Ma Ying-jeou commemorates the role played by the Nationalist Army in the protection of Taiwan against the PLA – he especially recalled the battle of Kuningtou (古寧頭) in Kinmen, where the Chiang Kai-shek’s army stopped the PLA’s invasion of the Offshore Island in October 1949. According to him, this battle is the first step to the ROC’s rebirth and the building of contemporary Taiwan.¹⁹⁵

Furthermore during his mandate, Ma Ying-jeou multiplied commemorations of the ROC’s role during the Second World War¹⁹⁶, and included Taiwan within the ROC’s historical bond with the Chinese nation in order to counter Beijing’s rhetoric on Chinese history which eradicated the KMT’s crucial role during the Second World

¹⁹³ Ma Ying-jeou, “A Century of Struggle, a Democratic Taiwan”, 2011-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=25514&rmid=2355#>

¹⁹⁴ Ma Ying-jeou, Reform, Innovation and the Pursuit of Justice, 2010-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=22495&rmid=2355&sd=2010/07/01&ed=2011/02/28&size=100#>

¹⁹⁵ Ma marks anniversary of historic battle on Kinmen, 2009-10-26, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/10/26/2003456908>

President Ma attends the first general meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Centenary Celebrations of the Republic of China, 2009-11-08, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=23588&rmid=2355>,

¹⁹⁶ Ma praises KMT ‘victory’ over Japan, 2010-09-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/09/10/2003482519/2>

Ma sees lessons from victory in war of resistance, 2010-10-26, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/10/26/2003486917>

President Ma attends activities focusing on war against Japan and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 2011-07-07, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24763&rmid=2355>

War and has denied the ROC's existence since 1949. Ma Ying-jeou commemorated allied prisoners of war detained on the island by the Japanese¹⁹⁷; he indeed never mentioned the fact that the Taiwanese were fighting against the Allies during the War. Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou recalled that the Nationalists Army's commitment to fight the Japanese imperial Army allowed the ROC to be recognized by the allied power as their equal and cancel 'unequal treaties' from the 19th century.¹⁹⁸

To conclude, Ma Ying-jeou ends his Centenary speech by describing that the ROC is more than a nation: "It also stands for a free and democratic way of life, and serves as a model for those living in other ethnic Chinese societies who yearn for freedom and democracy." According to him, the ROC must be a pioneer to give a 'new direction' and become "the gold standard" of the whole Chinese nation.¹⁹⁹

"He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past".

George Orwell, 1984

Ma Ying-jeou summarizes Nationalist ideology when he declares that "the Republic of China is our nation, and Taiwan is our home."²⁰⁰ If the ROC is the State that rule Taiwan, Ma wants the ROC to be a Chinese nation-state that is only temporally limited to Taiwan. This indeed links us to our Chapter Three and the building of a ROC nation during the dictatorship. However contrarily to the Chiangs,

¹⁹⁷ POWs to be honored on Nov. 15, 2009-10-30, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/10/30/2003457202>

¹⁹⁸ President Ma attends activities focusing on war against Japan and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 2011-07-07, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24763&rmid=2355>

¹⁹⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, A Century of Struggle, a Democratic Taiwan, 2011-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=25514&rmid=2355#>

²⁰⁰ Ma Ying-jeou, A Century of Struggle, a Democratic Taiwan, 2011-10-10, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=25514&rmid=2355#>

Ma Ying-jeou cannot impose his own national identity within Taiwan's democracy. He can only diffuse it through speeches and voluntary policies.

For him, though the ROC nation-state is now limited to Taiwan, it remains the guardian of the 'real' Chinese traditional culture and permits the synthesis between Chinese traditions, Western modernity, and universal values. Because Chinese culture has been altered by the Communist regime, especially the Cultural Revolution, and because Beijing rejects Sun Yat-sen's will of a democratic, free, and united China, the only model of development in which the reunification must be implemented is Taiwan's model because it is achieving Sun's dream for China. Indeed by the multiplication of Cross-Strait exchanges, Ma Ying-jeou aims "to create a situation where the two sides could see which system is better for the Chinese culture, for the Chinese people."²⁰¹

²⁰¹ 'Decades' to unification, Ma's aides say, 2009-12-16, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/12/16/2003461100/1>

CHAPTER 7 Limits and Impact of Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese Nationalism on the Taiwanese Political Community: "When Everything Changes but Nothing Changes"

"We will also enter consultations with mainland China over Taiwan's international space and a possible cross-strait peace accord. Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can cross-strait relations move forward with confidence".

Taiwan's Renaissance, Ma Ying-jeou, 2008-05-20²⁰²

- *"Here's the most naïve thing you can imagine: There are many Americans who remain genuinely convinced that if Taiwan would stop pursuing formal independence, you (China) would give up the quest for unification. These Americans think you would be willing to maintain the status quo indefinitely!"*
- *How could they possibly think that? We've said over and over again what our ultimate intentions are. It's inevitable that Taiwan and China will be reunified*
- *Will it happen in the 2020s?*
- *It could happen in the 2020s or even sooner".*

²⁰² Ma Ying-jeou, "Taiwan's Renaissance", 2008-05-20, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), retrieved from
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

*Conversation between Daniel Lynch and the head of a Chinese scholar
delegation at the University of Southern California, 2010*²⁰³

*“China cannot accept that Taiwan is a country or that the Republic of
China exists”.*

*Cable from the US embassy in Beijing reporting Li Li’s point of view, director of
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s overseas affairs office, 2008-12-05*²⁰⁴

In the seventh and last Chapter, we aim to tackle the issue regarding the impact and limitations to Ma Ying-jeou’s Chinese nationalist policy, including Cross-Strait policies. Though it is too early to tell if these policies are successful, certain trends can already be observed.

Obviously, Ma’s policies meet resistance from the Taiwanese population and from Beijing. The fast rapprochement, too fast for a part of the Taiwanese population, and the new Chinese national identity policy has raised concerns among Taiwanese and provoked an identity reaction. Our first part will aim to highlight these reactions as well as passive or active resistance to Ma Ying-jeou’s policies.

Though Beijing prefers Ma Ying-jeou compared to the DPP, it does not mean that the Chinese government agrees with Ma’s reunification plan. On the contrary, Beijing continues to pressure Taiwan in order to shape the Taiwanese population’s political choice towards Beijing’s reunification plan. One of Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign promises was to ensure Taiwan’s dignity by enlarging its international space and Taiwan’s security; the Cross-Strait dialogue and the increase of Cross-Strait exchange aimed to ease Beijing’s military and diplomatic pressure.

On the one hand, Taiwan’s international space, despite the Island’s admission to the World Health Assembly with a status of observer only, did not increase much. On the contrary, Taipei’s applications to international organizations that requires the

²⁰³ Daniel Lynch, 2010, p.73

²⁰⁴ China does not support ‘mutual non-denial’: cable, 2011-09-11, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/11/2003513008>

status of state remained blocked by Beijing, Taiwan's international image has been declining since Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism implementation. Moreover, Beijing's humiliations of Taiwanese people on international front has not stopped, but this is not new; what is more worrying is the increasing identification of Taiwan's by the international community as 'a province of China' or a part of the PRC, symbolically reducing Taiwan's international space.

On the other hand, even if the perspective of a war in the Taiwan Strait did decrease significantly, Beijing has not however loosened its military pressure on Taiwan; on the contrary Beijing reinforced its military arsenal during the last three years. Our third and last part will tackle the security and military issue, including the American factor. Indeed, even if Washington stays as Taiwan's only protector, its commitment to ensure Taiwan's political independence has been waning for several years.

7.1 To be or not to be (Taiwanese)?

Taiwan's absence of national consensus put the national identity issue at the center of Taiwan's political game; this question is moreover intimately linked to Taiwan's political future issue. In other words, the national identity issue is shaped and shapes questions about reunification, formal independence, or the maintenance of the *status quo*.

The national identity issue takes its roots in the ethnical conflict inherited from the dictatorship period and was marked by partisan division, the DPP as the party of the Taiwanese conscience and the KMT as the party of the Chinese conscience. However, this ethnical division has seemed to have vanished since Ma Ying-jeou took the head of the KMT. Indeed, maybe one of his most important political victories has been to make the Chinese Nationalist Party appear as a real Taiwanese party. In our opinion, the election of Ma Ying-jeou, a *Waishengren*, by a majority of ethnic Taiwanese is symbolic of a transformation of Taiwan's politics in relation to the ethnic issue. Le Pesant (2004) already noticed this evolution with young Taiwanese people (20-29 years old); he however conceded that ethnical tensions are persisting in older generation (p.411).

As Muyard (2010) highlights it however, more Ma Ying-jeou moves away from his Taiwanese patriot and ‘sovereignist’ discourse and promotes Taiwan’s Chinese national identity, in doing so he goes against Taiwanese’s identification to their island and their perception of China. According to him, if some in Beijing and Taipei thought that the Taiwanese identity was a political manipulation from Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian; they also thought that it would vanish after Ma Ying-jeou’s election and that the increasing of Cross-Strait interaction would create a Cross-Strait common identity favoring unification. On the contrary, people’s identification to a Taiwanese identity separated from China has increased since 2008 while the rejection of the reunification has increased as well (pp.20-21).

Indeed, if we observe statistics on the Taiwanese people’s national identification, published by The Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University²⁰⁵, conducted for the first time in 1992, the year 2008 saw 48% of the respondents identifying themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ only; their proportion has increased since and reached 54% in 2011. Prior to 2008, the Taiwanese people’s majority declared that they identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese and Chinese’, a “dual identity”; they were 44.7% in 2007 but only 39% in 2011. Moreover, only 4.1% of the respondents identify themselves as ‘Chinese only’. The Election Study Center’s methodology indicates the survey question as the following: “Do you consider yourself to be ‘Taiwanese’, ‘Chinese’, or both? (*Qingwen Nin Renwei Ziji Shi ‘Taiwanren’, ‘Zhongguoren’, Huozhe Dou Shi?*, 請問您認為自己是『台灣人』、『中國人』，或者都是?).²⁰⁶”

As Jiang (2006) underlines it, this survey has some ambiguity on the term’s definition. Indeed, he questions the pertinence of using the label ‘Chinese’ which does not differentiate the political identification from the cultural identification. For him, the “dual identity” regroups two kinds of people: those who want to highlight their Taiwanese-ness but without rejecting their Chinese cultural inheritance, and those who

²⁰⁵ Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2011-06), 2011-07-01, *Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University*, retrieved from <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm>

²⁰⁶ The Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese’s Data Collection Methodology can be retrieved in Chinese and in English at this address: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/method.pdf>

identify themselves as Chinese but conscious of the Taiwanese subjectivity of their identity. Moreover, he suggests that the label ‘Taiwanese’ is vague because it is underlining a territorial and psychological identification to Taiwan but it is not the expression of strong Taiwanese nationalism (pp.156-158).

Le Pesant (2008) joins Jiang’s observations suggesting that the two parts of the “dual identity” are “neither equivalent, nor interchangeable (p.298).²⁰⁷” In the survey that he conducted in 2005 on Taiwanese Youth’s (20-25 years old) political behavior and identities, he specifically split the “dual identity” in two categories: ‘Taiwanese and Chinese’, and ‘Chinese and Taiwanese’. According to him (2006), the Taiwanese element of the first category represents a political identification with Taiwan while the Chinese element is a cultural identification. The Chinese element of the second category is on the one hand a national identification with the Chinese nation bonded by blood but not a political identification with the PRC. On the other hand, the Taiwanese element projects their patriotism to Taiwan, the land in which they inhabit. Out of the 42.7% of the young Taiwanese that replied the label ‘dual identity’, 32.4% did not place the Taiwanese element first while 10.3% did choose the Chinese element first. It is not specified what is represented by the label ‘Taiwanese’ but we might suggest that it is a political and cultural identification to Taiwan (p.353).

If we extrapolate these results in terms of the whole Taiwanese population, it is not surprising to find only 4% of ‘Chinese’ in the Election Study Center’s survey (3.2% in Le Pesant’s survey). On the one hand, the identification as ‘Chinese only’ is the symbol of a total rejection of any identification to both Taiwanese culture and Taiwan as a political entity. On the other hand, the very large majority of the Taiwanese population indeed identifies itself with Taiwan as a political entity separated from the PRC though a part of them emphasizes their cultural Chineseness; those who identify themselves as a part of the Chinese nation are accepting their part of political taiwaneseness as well, as the founding principle of the Taiwanese political community.

Regarding the last paragraph, it is difficult to explain the increasing of the “Taiwanese identity” and the weakening of the “dual identity” in only 3 years? If Ma

²⁰⁷ “Ni équivalentes, ni interchangeables.”

Ying-jeou's national identity policy aims to reinforce a dual identity among Taiwanese people, emphasizing the cultural Chineseness of Taiwan, it is obvious that these policies meet some resistance and have a limited impact. However, the survey takes place every year in June, one month after Ma Ying-jeou's initial inauguration in May 2008, reaction to Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy cannot explain this evolution. We suggest that it is the consequence of the presidential campaign based on Taiwanese patriotic speeches and the impression of security compared to the rule lived in Chen's period. Ma Ying-jeou's election has allowed them to express their Taiwanese identity. Moreover, it is important to consider the demographic factors of the election. Indeed as Le Pesant highlights it in his survey of 2005, on the one hand young generations identify themselves in majority as 'Taiwanese only' and it is in constant progression, on the other hand older generations that more easily identify themselves as 'Chinese' or to the Chinese culture are at the end of their life.

The Election Study Center has also conducted since 1992 surveys on Taiwanese people's political attitudes regarding the future of their Island – formal independence, reunification, and the maintenance of the *Status quo*.²⁰⁸ As Jiang (2006) suggests it, it is another way to observe Taiwanese identity preferences (p.158). The question asked within the survey is the following: "Thinking about Taiwan-mainland relations, there are several differing opinions: 1. unification as soon as possible; 2. independence as soon as possible; 3. maintain the status quo and move towards unification in the future; 4. maintain the status quo and move toward independence in the future; 5. maintain the status quo and decide in the future between independence or unification; 6. maintain the status quo indefinitely. Which do you prefer? (*Lianyu Taiwan He Dalu De guanxi, You Xiamian Jizhong Bu Tong De Kanfa: 1.Jinkuai Tongyi; 2.Jinkuai Xuanbu Duli; 3.Weichi Xianzhuang, Yihou Zouxian Tongyi; 4. Weichi Xianzhuang, Yihou Zouxian Duli; 5. Weichi Xianzhuang, Kan Qingxing Zai Jueding Duli Hou Tongyi; 6.Yongyuan Weichi Xianzhuang. Qingwen Nin Bijiao Pianxiang Na yi Zhong?*, 關於台灣和大陸的關係，有下面幾種不同的看法 1.儘快統一；2.儘快宣布獨立；3.維持現狀，以後走向統一；4.維持現狀，以後走向獨

²⁰⁸ Change in Unification - Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2011-06), 2011-07-01, *Election Study Center, NCCU*, <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm>

立；5.維持現狀，看情形再決定獨立或統一；6.永遠維持現狀。請問您比較偏向那一種？).²⁰⁹，

If Taiwanese's preference was the '*Status quo* and decide later' category with 35.8% in 2008, it decreased to 33% in 2011. On the contrary, an increasing number of Taiwanese chooses to maintain the *status quo* indefinitely; 18.1% in 2007 and 26.8% in 2011. People who support the *status quo* then the formal independence of Taiwan are increasing in number but lightly, from 13.1% of the respondent in 2007 to 17% in 2011. In addition, we need to underline here that there is about 10% of the respondents that unification as soon as possible or later in 2011, but only 4% of the Taiwanese identify themselves as 'Chinese only'. This suggests the very Taiwanization of Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. The data published by the Mainland Affairs Council reveals the same trends but we prefer not to use them for methodological reasons.²¹⁰

If we observe closely the results of this annual survey, we can conclude that 90% of the Taiwanese people are in favor of independence. The difference between the *status quo* and the formal independence of Taiwan lies on the identity of the State but does not challenge the principle of political independence and sovereignty of the Island. This is far from Ma Ying-jeou's or Beijing's reunification project.

On a more political matter and Cross-Strait relations, Muiyad (2010) highlights the facts that Taiwanese have a pragmatic attitude toward Chinese. In 2009, 52.3% of them saw Chinese as "trade partners" but only 13.3% as "friends" (p.21).²¹¹ This maybe explains why 67% of Taiwanese people are satisfied of Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy in 2009.²¹² A survey published by the MAC shows that 74% of Taiwanese approved the implementation of institutional mechanisms of Cross-Strait

²⁰⁹ The Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese's Data Collection Methodology can be retrieved in Chinese and in English at this address: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/method.pdf>

²¹⁰ Mainland Affairs Council's data are the compilation of several survey, including the Election Study Center's survey, in only one graphic; no methodology is given despite that surveys are conducted on people between 20 and 69 years old.

²¹¹ Muiyad's source is not online anymore.

²¹² Public backs China policy: MAC, 2009-02-17, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/02/17/2003436293>

negotiations.²¹³ However, another survey shows that 54% of the Taiwanese think that Taiwan's sovereignty is diminished in Cross-Strait negotiations.²¹⁴ Moreover, a survey from the *CommonWeath Magazine* of September 2009 highlights Taiwanese people's concern toward China: 70% of them have a bad opinion of Chinese tourists and 74% think that Cross-Strait relations are going against Taiwan's sovereignty.²¹⁵ Contact between Chinese and Taiwanese societies since the 1980's did permit measurement of the political and the cultural gap between both sides of the Strait. Muiyad (2010) reveals indeed a *Global View Magazine's* survey from July 2010 that 66% of Taiwanese people are opposed to unification even if both sides became politically and economically compatible, expressing their desire of independence from China and their Taiwanese identity (pp.21-22).

As well as through the survey, the Taiwanese people's rejection of Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy and Cross-Strait policy can be observed on the streets and in the ballot boxes. In October 2008, more than 600 000 people protested to defend Taiwan's sovereignty after Ma Ying-jeou said that Taiwan was a part of China. Demonstrators chanted slogans such as "Oppose toxic products, defend sovereignty (in reference to melamine tainted food scandal few weeks earlier)," "Defend Taiwan," "I am Taiwanese, not Chinese" and "Taiwan is not part of China."²¹⁶ Several other protests were organized by opposition parties, the DPP and the TSU, but the mobilization was less important in 2009²¹⁷ and in 2010, especially before the signature of the ECFA.²¹⁸

²¹³ Poll shows 70 percent approval for cross-strait talks, 2009-12-31, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/12/31/2003462287>

²¹⁴ MAC survey shows support for results of cross-strait talks, 2009-05-06, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/05/06/2003442871>

²¹⁵ Three out of Four Taiwanese Have Sinophobia, 2009-09-10, *CommonWealth Magazine*, retrieved from <http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=11340>

²¹⁶ Rallies vent anger at Ma government, 2008-10-26, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/10/26/2003426956>

²¹⁷ Taiwanese vent anger at Ma policies, 2009-05-18, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/05/18/2003443912>

²¹⁸ Three-day ECFA sit-in protest starts, 2010-05-21, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/05/21/2003473518>

Protesters ready for anti-ECFA rally in Taipei, 2010-06-26, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/2003476441>

Moreover, Chen Yunlin's (陳雲林) visit in Taiwan to sign the first series of Cross-Strait agreements was an important factor of mobilization of Taiwanese people against Ma's Cross-Strait policy. He came only twice in Taiwan but his first visit in November 2008 was the most significant: His entire journey in Taipei was marked by a strong opposition to his coming. However, the police suppressed demonstration and was over zealous suppressing Taiwan's sovereignty symbols like the ROC's flag.²¹⁹ In every place Chen Yunlin was scheduled to go²²⁰. Anger arose as a consequence of this. Taipei was put under siege; protesters even forced Chen Yunlin to reschedule, barricading him in a hotel whilst he met Wu Poh-hsiung the middle of the night of the November 6²²¹. He was also forced to cancel his press conference at the end of his trip.²²² Chen Yunlin saved face declaring before leaving his hotel for the airport: "I came here five days ago bringing the deep affections of the 1.3 billion Chinese for the 23 million Taiwanese, and today I will leave Taiwan with the understanding and support of the 23 million Taiwanese for the Chinese people."²²³ In order to avoid Taipei's fiasco, Chen Yunlin's itinerary in Taichung (台中) and central Taiwan during his second visit was kept secret²²⁴ and under strong police protection.²²⁵

If Taiwanese electors did massively voted for the KMT in 2008, the local elections of 2009 and 2010 marked a weakening of KMT's support and a progression of the DPP. The economical situation remained the main criteria of political choice; the miss-management of the 2008 economical crisis by Ma's Administration can

²¹⁹ The following video retrieved from a Taiwanese TV-channel on the November 3rd 2008 shows policemen confiscating violently ROC's flags from Taiwanese protesters on the freeway that Chen Yunlin will take from the airport. It shows in parallel pro-unification groups parading in the center of Taipei with PRC's flags under police protection: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6yM91fiv0Xk>

²²⁰ Protesters say measures recall the martial law era, 2008-11-04, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/11/04/2003427719>

²²¹ Chen blockaded in hotel for hours, 2008-11-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/11/07/2003427943>

²²² Tensions mount in the capital, 2008-11-07, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/11/07/2003428014>

²²³ Chen says mission has been completed, flies home, 2008-11-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/11/08/2003428028>

²²⁴ Reporters blast secrecy of Chen travel itinerary, 2009-12-22, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/12/22/2003461568>

²²⁵ Thousands of police deployed in Taichung, 2009-12-22, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/12/22/2003461572>

explain a strong abstention within KMT's ranks. However, the rejection of Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy may explain the DPP's progression. With a new image of a party close to the people and rid of Chen Shui-bian's corruption's ghost, the main opposition party consolidated its own partisan base and progress in KMT's one. The DPP became the main political force of Taiwan in terms of votes after 2009 and 2010 elections.

Indeed, Muyard (2010) observes that for the election for counties councilor of 2009²²⁶, the KMT lost 218 000 votes while the DPP gained 236 000 compared to 2005; the abstention of 93 000 voters is more important (p.17). Though the DPP only won 4 counties and municipalities out of 17, the KMT only lead with 2%, representing 100 000 votes. Our source is Muyard's table based on data from the Central Electoral Commission (*Zhongyang Xuanju Weiyuanhui*, 中央選舉委員會).²²⁷ More importantly, the local elections for the special municipalities at the end of 2010 confirmed and amplified KMT's weakening. Though the Nationalist Party won three out of the five special municipalities, the DPP was 5% higher than the KMT, by more than 400 000.²²⁸ Moreover, the DPP won seven out of ten by-elections for the Legislative Yuan between 2009 and 2010.

To conclude on the one hand, Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy appears to have been a failure that can be observed in the survey, on the streets and in ballot boxes. He was however never elected to implement the reunification, or to promote Taiwan's Chineseness, and Taiwanese people liked to re remind him of this. Ma's Cross-Strait policies' impact on the Taiwanese political community is on the other hand ambivalent: If Taiwanese people welcome the economical opportunities that offer China; they are concerned by the consequences on Taiwan's sovereignty. This

²²⁶ The 2009's election was specific because it concerned only 40% of the whole population, the most rural populations. The other 60%, the urban counties, elected their representatives at the end of 2010 because of the administrative reform: cities of Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung merged with their county to become special municipalities, outside of the direct control of the government like Taipei. The County of Taipei also became a special municipality with the name of New Taipei City (*Xin Taipei Shi*, 新北市).

²²⁷ See the Website of the Central Election Commission in English at the address: <http://engweb.cec.gov.tw/bin/home.php>

²²⁸ Election results should sound alarm bells for president, 2010-11-29, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/11/29/2003489705>

however might explain why there is a strong mobilization when their sovereignty appears to be at stake, and when it is not.

7.2 “Taiwan, Province of China” or the Permanent (National) Humiliation

We wish to highlight here the main feature of China’s rejection of Ma Ying-jeou’s national identity policy: The constant downgrading of Taiwan’s sovereignty and international image. Indeed since Ma Ying-jeou’s election and despite a conciliating Cross-Strait policy, Beijing continues to block Taiwan’s accession to any new international organization requiring the status of sovereign State, and continues to humiliate Taiwan within the international community. At the same time though Taiwan has not lost any diplomatic allies, neither has it tried to find new ones.

Ma Ying-jeou summarizes his own foreign policy under the principle of “flexible diplomacy²²⁹”, but different from Lee Teng-hui’s diplomacy. Indeed, Taiwan does not search confrontation with Beijing; on the contrary “the cornerstone of this “flexible diplomacy” is to a certain degree of mutual trust across the Strait, which could later be extended to the international arena. Naturally, mutual trust in the international community will be likely to receive positive feedback on the health of cross-strait relations.” Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou calls Beijing to a “diplomatic truce”: “Both sides should be committed to not wasting national resources in a vicious cycle to win over diplomatic allies from the other side, or conducting diplomatic activities that will hurt the feelings or interests of the other side.” This diplomatic truce is initiated on the Taiwanese side especially by the acceptance that Taipei’s allies can develop non-official relations with Beijing²³⁰, on the model of relation that Taiwan

²²⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, The Concept and Strategy of the "Flexible Diplomacy, 2008-08-04, *Taipei Representative Office in the U.K.*, retrieved from <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/uk/ct.asp?xItem=65451&ctNode=932&mp=132>

²³⁰ Ma’s ‘diplomatic truce’ prompts allies’ questions, 2008-08-17, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/08/17/2003420627>

Ma not opposed to ally’s unofficial ties with China, 2010-01-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/01/14/2003463440>

Taiwan not opposed to Kiribati-China relations: Ma, 2010-06-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/08/2003474979>

has with a large part of the international community. Ma Ying-jeou wish to find a *modus vivendi* with Beijing based on the improvement of Cross-Strait relations in order to end the diplomatic confrontation between the two (Chinese) governments and increase Taiwan's international space. Did Ma Ying-jeou himself not say in his inaugural speech that he would consult Beijing before tackling Taiwan's international space issue?²³¹

However, the revelation from Wikileaks of cables from the US Embassy in Beijing and the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT), the unofficial US Embassy in Taipei, sent to Washington on Cross-Strait and Taiwan's internal situations, shows that if Taipei eventually accedes to certain international organizations, it is because Beijing did allow it to follow its conditions. A cable of the December 24 2008, for example, highlights Beijing's attitude toward Taiwan's will to increase its international space. This cable quotes Wang Yi (王毅), director of the Taiwan Affairs Office: according to him, "to solve the international space problem, the two sides must stick to the one-China framework [...] because the improvement in cross-Strait relations thus far has been on the basis of the one-China principle." He adds that the international community accepts the consensus on the One China and that international rules cannot be changed. For him, without the One China Principle international relations will be chaotic; if the question of Taiwan's international space should be tackled, it must be only under the One China framework. The same cable quotes Ding Kuisong, the vice chairman of the China Reform Forum saying that Taiwan's participation to the World Health Assembly (WHA) and to other international organizations will be worked out "case by case" and "year by year". Another cable of the May 1st 2009 specifies that Beijing does not want Taiwan's participation to the WHA to work like a spillover effect to other international organizations.²³²

²³¹ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

²³² Taipei's quest for international space at odds with China, 2011-09-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/08/2003512745>

Taiwan's participation to the WHA and its adhesion to the International Health Regulations (IHR)²³³ precisely was Ma Ying-jeou's priority. Taiwan has been listed as a part of China under the name "Taiwan, China" or "Taiwan, Province of China" and any information should pass by Beijing first before being addressed to Taipei; the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis in Taiwan in 2003-2004 took place because Beijing blocked the IHR information channel with Taiwan. In January 2009 Taiwan was accepted within the World Health Organization's (OMS) disease control mechanisms without transiting its information by Beijing under the name "contact point in Taipei" allows Taipei.²³⁴ Moreover, Taiwan was invited to participate in the WHA in May 2009 under the name 'Chinese Taipei'. Ma Ying-jeou presented both events as success of his diplomatic policy with Beijing; according to him it is not infringing Taiwan's sovereignty.²³⁵ The WHO confirmed at the beginning of May 2009 that it did not negotiate Taiwan's participation with anyone; it is only after Margaret Chan (陳馮富珍), the Director-General of the WHO, was notified of Cross-Strait improvement that she decided to invite Taiwan in 2009.²³⁶ Taiwan has been invited again in 2010²³⁷, and 2011.²³⁸

However, a secret memo from the WHO revealed in May 2011 Taiwan's true status within the Organization and "double-standard" policy reserved for the Island. Previously in 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between Beijing and the WHO regarding Taiwan's status. It specified that any contact between the WHO and Taipei must be approved by Beijing. The secret memo underlines the fact that the situation has not changed and that Taiwan remains named "Taiwan, Province of China" within the Organization and that the Island does not have the

²³³ The International Health Regulation was created in 1851 under the name of International Sanitary Regulations and took its today's name in 1969; it is a legally-binding treaty since 2005.

²³⁴ 'Taipei' gets direct link to WHO unit, 2009-01-23, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/01/23/2003434435>

²³⁵ WHO invites 'Chinese Taipei' to WHA, 2009-04-30, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/04/30/2003442391>

²³⁶ WHO was 'not involved' in bid, 2009-05-02, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/05/02/2003442557>

²³⁷ WHO chief sends Taipei invitation to WHA meeting, 2010-03-24, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/03/24/2003468815>

²³⁸ Taiwan to attend WHA, 2011-04-01, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/04/01/2003499642>

status of member within the IHR.²³⁹ Furthermore at the moment of controversy in Taiwan, the Taiwan Affairs Office commented that Taiwan's participation in the WHA was possible only because of Beijing's goodwill, the Taiwan Affairs Office inviting Taiwanese to calm down and recognize what the international community recognizes already.²⁴⁰ Though Ma Ying-jeou protested, he only weakly pointed out the Chinese government for this humiliation²⁴¹, but Cross-Strait relations did not become tangled.

In addition from 2008 onwards, Ma's Administration has ceased Taiwan's yearly candidacy for the General Assembly of the United Nations. It has only focused on auxiliaries agencies of the Organization, especially the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), but it is still without any success, blocked by Beijing.

If Taiwan can eventually gain access to an international forum, it will be only under Beijing's shadow. Instead of forcing the organization to expel Taiwan, the Chinese government requires that the Island's name within the organization and its status recognize Taiwan as a part of China. For example for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, though Taiwan's official name within the International Olympic Committee is "Chinese, Taipei" (*Zhonghua Taipei*, 中華台北), the Chinese government did use the term "China, Taipei" (*Zhongguo Taipei*, 中國台北) in its official publications for the Games; the Chinese Olympic Committee justified it because it is Taiwan's Olympic team's name in Chinese Medias. After protests from the Taiwanese Olympic Committee, the Chinese committee reverted back to the

²³⁹ Memo says Taiwan not a party to IHR, 2011-05-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/05/10/2003502869>

WHO memo sparks outrage in Taiwan, 2011-05-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/10/2003502850>

²⁴⁰ WHA invite due to China's goodwill, TAO spokesperson, 2011-05-12, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/12/2003503018>

²⁴¹ Ma slams WHO, China on name, 2011-05-11, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/11/2003502936>

original formula but not the Chinese Medias, whilst the Taiwan Affairs Office said that it had no control over the media's coverage of the Games.²⁴²

It has also checked Taiwan's participation in the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) annual meeting; Taiwan is the only member which is not sending its head of the executive at the reunion. Wang Yi clearly admitted, reported by a cable of the November 25 2008, that Lien Chan's appointment as Taiwanese representative at the APEC meeting – Lien Chan does not need to be presented but declared that Hu Jintao is like an 'old friend'²⁴³ – was approved by Beijing.²⁴⁴

On the bilateral diplomatic relations front, Ma's diplomatic truce has however been respected by Beijing. It provoked the anger of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' because it was forced to give up years of diplomatic work under the pressure of the Taiwan Affairs Office.²⁴⁵ Taiwan or the ROC did not lose any diplomatic allies since Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration but relations with diplomatic allies have not eased.²⁴⁶ A cable from June 2nd 2008 reveals that Beijing refused Nicaragua's demand of diplomatic recognition. Another cable from the AIT from March 20 2009, quoting Francisco Ou, shows that five Taipei's diplomatic allies wants to switch their recognition to Beijing. These countries seem to be the Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, and the Honduras, but Beijing rejected all their demands. According to Taipei's Foreign Affairs Minister, Beijing accepts "tacitly Taiwan's diplomatic truce." In addition, a cable from September 25 2008 reveals that Taiwan's six allies in the Pacific Ocean (Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Salomon Islands, and Tuvalu) are unhappy with Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic truce. Indeed, these small poor countries are afraid that Taipei's economical assistance in exchange of their recognition will cease or decrease as a consequence of the truce.

²⁴² Taiwan's Olympic title fuels controversy, 2008-07-25, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/07/25/2003418502>

²⁴³ Ma's envoy meets 'old friend' Hu Jintao, 2008-11-23, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/11/23/2003429307>

²⁴⁴ Lien's APEC appointment approved by China: cable, 2011-09-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/08/2003512727>

²⁴⁵ PRC diplomats 'unhappy' with Ma's truce, 2011-09-09, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/09/2003512816>

²⁴⁶ Cables detail rocky diplomatic relations, 2011-09-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/10/2003512928>

If for now the truce is respected and Taipei can focus on Cross-Strait relations rather than searching for new allies, all depends on Beijing's goodwill. Obviously if the truce is broken, Taiwan won't be able to keep its allies. Finding new ones will be more complicated, decreasing *de facto* Taiwan's international space.

However, a part of the international community responded positively to Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait and diplomatic policies and allowed Taiwanese to enter their territory without visa for a duration of ninety days. Sixty-six new countries including the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Schengen Space countries have accepted Taiwanese passports and visa (one hundred and twenty four in total in October 2011). If this measure does not have a real diplomatic impact on Taiwan's relations with these countries, it nonetheless indicates that Taiwan is becoming a strategic point of access to the Chinese market and is certainly what motivates the European Union. But, Taiwan remains unable to sign free trade agreements with its main economic partners despite the ECFA; one of the agreement's objectives was to allow Taiwan sign free trade agreements²⁴⁷. It remains blocked by Beijing with this kind of agreement requiring the status of sovereign State.

Regarding Taiwan's international image, Ma Ying-jeou is in the paradoxical situation of recognizing the One China Principle but at the same time presenting Taiwan as separated from the PRC. This paradox is indeed creating confusion around Taiwan's international image and thereof reduces Taiwan's international space. Taiwan's sovereignty issues being too sensitive for some countries (or international companies and organization) or too far from their concern for others, the amalgam between Taiwan, the ROC, the PRC and the Chinese nation is easy, recognizing eventually Taiwan as a part of the PRC.

The Philippines attitude in February 2011 is symbolic of this, when fourteen Taiwanese suspected of fraud were deported to China for their trial despite Taipei's protestations towards the One China Principle.²⁴⁸ Another example is the Norwegian

²⁴⁷ AIT doubts ECFA impact: cable says, 2011-09-08, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/08/2003512743/1>

²⁴⁸ Philippine deportation case proof of Beijing's pressure, 2011-02-05, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/02/05/2003495185>

Deportations based on 'one China' policy: Manila, 2011-02-10, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/02/10/2003495504>

government that indentifies Taiwanese as PRC citizens since 2010; Oslo justifies this policy because it is recognizing the One China Principle and not Taiwan as a country.²⁴⁹ It is not obvious that Beijing pressured Oslo to implement such policy. Besides, Croatia lists the Island as “Taiwan, PRC” while Slovenia lists Taiwan in the category “China” along with Hong Kong and Macao. These two countries are however part of the EU’s program that recognize Taiwanese passports, but as countries from the former Yugoslavia, they maintain historical bonds from the Cold War with the PRC.²⁵⁰ Furthermore and more surprising, a cable from the December 24 2009 reveals that Japan, though it is the country that is the most worried of Taiwan’s rapprochement with Beijing, also recognizes that Taiwan is a part of the PRC.²⁵¹

The article of the *Taipei Times* of the May 22 2011 reveals the fact that the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a simple research on *Google* found more than 80 million references of the label “Taiwan, Province of China”. Moreover, the Ministry is concerned about the ‘extensive’ usage of the term “Chinese Taipei”; it is the case for example for the Australian and Thailand’s immigration services, the International Air Transport Association, or the International Energy Agency.²⁵²

Furthermore, Beijing has not stopped bullying Taiwanese people in international forums despite the easing of Cross-Strait dialogues. The Taiwanese WHA’s delegation after the secret memo was revealed reported pressures during workshops.²⁵³ The Taiwanese delegation at the Tokyo Film Festival during the fall 2010 got to retire because of the Chinese delegation’s protests; it found offending that the delegation was labeled “Taiwan”, like every year prior to this event. The Chinese delegation threatened to boycott the ceremony if the label “China” was not added on

²⁴⁹ Norwegian visas classify Taiwanese as PRC nationals, 2010-05-23, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/05/23/2003473670>

²⁵⁰ Croatian visa rules list ‘Taiwan, PRC’, 2011-05-22, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/05/22/2003503842>

²⁵¹ Cable shows Japan official said Taiwan part of China, 2011-09-12, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/12/2003513091>

²⁵² MOFA issues warning on ‘Chinese Taipei’, 2008-08-30, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/08/30/2003421819>

²⁵³ Delegation describes pressure at WHA, 2011-05-23, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/05/23/2003503944>

the Taiwan's delegation's name. Eventually both delegations were suspended by the Japanese organizers.²⁵⁴ One of the events that shocked most Taiwanese regarding Taiwan's bullying by Beijing was the disqualification of the Taiwanese athlete Yang Shu-chun (楊淑君) at the Asian Games in 2010 in Guangzhou during the Taekwondo's competition.²⁵⁵ At 12 seconds from the end, winning the game, the Taiwanese athlete was disqualified under the pretext that her sensor spat did not fit with regulations. The referee however did check it twice before the beginning of the combat.²⁵⁶ This event called the "Sockgate" in Taiwan created a large controversy and the Deputy Minister of the Sport Affairs Council resigned after declaring that Yang Shu-chun must "swallow" the decision.²⁵⁷ The Taiwanese government protested and the athlete reported the case to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, but she eventually dropped it under Chinese pressures.²⁵⁸

To conclude, we may ask ourselves what Ma Ying-jeou is doing in regard to Beijing's diplomatic and politic 'vandalism'. In fact, he has very little breathing space and it seems he did not prepare a 'Plan B' in case that the Cross-Strait dialogue became more difficult. Forced to obtain results to validate his Cross-Strait policy, Ma Ying-jeou is condemned to observe Beijing bullying Taiwan with limited reaction in order to protect the Cross-Strait dialogue and the reunification process.

7.3 The Taiwan Strait between Feeling of Security and Perspectives of Insecurity

Since 2008 and the resuming of Cross-Strait dialogue, the perspective of a war in the Taiwan Strait seems to be decreasing, while peace, favorable to Cross-Strait

²⁵⁴ Sovereignty spat spills to film festival, 2010-10-25, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/10/25/2003486837>

²⁵⁵ Taiwanese disqualified in sensor spat, 2010-11-18, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/11/18/2003488785>

²⁵⁶ The following video shows the event: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tymr9A5hKi4>,

²⁵⁷ Deputy minister of SAC resigns after Yang comments, 2010-11-20, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/11/20/2003489014>

²⁵⁸ Chinese pressured Yang to drop lawsuit, legislator, 2011-08-03, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/03/2003509800>

exchanges, seems to have been secured. This détente is welcomed by the international community and Washington first. Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy and his will to be reconciled with Beijing based on Hu Jintao's declaration of April 2008 – “building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution²⁵⁹” – are the starting point of Cross-Strait warming. Indeed, Ma Ying-jeou reassures Beijing because he does not want to declare the independence of Taiwan and he is promoting the One China Principle.

However, the Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has not decreased. On the contrary it has increased since Ma's election; Cabestan (2010) describes the warming relations between Taipei and Beijing as a “highly militarized détente.”²⁶⁰ Indeed, more than 1500 missiles are pointed in Taiwan's direction and the PLA's capabilities to project its Navy and its Air-forces across the Strait, to blockade Taiwan, and to prepare an invasion increased dramatically (pp.27-28). The military balance in the Strait has been in favor of Beijing since the mid 2000's but at the same time Cross-Strait economical interdependence is increasing, placing Taiwan in front of “strategic paradox.”²⁶¹ Taiwan's biggest threat is also Taiwan's first economical partner (p.29).

If military issues were not central during the presidential campaign, Ma Ying-jeou was however aware of Washington's essential support for Taiwan's security and its concern about Taiwan's will to defend itself. For this purpose, Ma Ying-jeou assured the American government that he will make no surprises and commits himself to reinforcing Taiwan's defensive capabilities: Buying more weapons from Washington, increasing the military spending to 3% of the GDP, and initiating the transition towards a Taiwanese professional army.²⁶² Raymond Burghardt, the president of the AIT, in a cable of March 20 2009 did confirm Ma Ying-jeou's commitment to avoid provoking Washington after a meeting with the Taiwanese

²⁵⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, “Taiwan's Renaissance”, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

²⁶⁰ “Détente hautement militarisée.”

²⁶¹ “Un paradoxe stratégique.”

²⁶² Ma Ying-jeou, The Concept and Strategy of the "Flexible Diplomacy", 2008-08-04, *Taipei Representative Office in the U.K.*, retrieved from <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/uk/ct.asp?xItem=65451&ctNode=932&mp=132>

Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁶³ It is maybe by accident that the same day Burghardt declared that the United States are “comfortable” with Cross-Strait development. He added that Cross-Strait détente is favoring the American commercial interests.²⁶⁴ After a period of observation of the new Taiwanese Administration, Washington granted its trust again.

In addition, the American government is “agnostic (Cabestan, 2009, p.15)” on Taiwan’s future; that is to say that Washington will not oppose reunification if it is the Taiwanese people’s choice (Bernkopf Tucker, 2002, p.25). However, even if Cross-Strait détente is serving the US interests, the growing Cross-Strait interdependence is decreasing Washington’s breathing space to deal with the Taiwan issue and weakening Taiwan in the perspective of future Cross-Strait (military and political) negotiations (Cabestan, 2009, p.15). This indeed was summarized by Admiral Dennis Blair’s – he is Obama’s Director of the National Intelligence – when he declared to the American Senate that:

“China poses a great threat to Taiwan. [...] Unless Taiwan does something about it, then we’re really the only other country helping them to do it. That means that we’re going to have to help them some more in order to maintain a balance [...] Taiwan should not be so defenseless that it feels it has to do everything that China says. On the other hand, China cannot be so overwhelming that it can bully Taiwan (Cabestan, 2009, pp.14-15; Cabestan, 2010, pp.33-34).”

The military balance in the Strait is in favor of the PLA since 2005; for two decades the Taiwanese Army has lagged behind the PLA for its development and modernization. Indeed, heir of Chiang Kai-shek’s army, the Taiwanese Army’s strategy was inadequate in the Taiwan military context, privileging the Army rather than the Navy and the Air-force. Kurt Campbell declared in 2000 that “before arriving in Taiwan, we were expecting Israel, in fact we found Panama (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.215).” The Cross-Strait 1996 crisis did reveal Taiwan’s military

²⁶³ ‘No surprises’ approach outlined: Wikileaks, 2011-06-19, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/06/19/2003506136>

²⁶⁴ US comfortable with détente: AIT, 2009-03-19, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/03/19/2003438868>

backwardness, and since the Taiwanese Army is improving with the assistance of the United States. The formation of officers to the American material were emphasized, the cooperation between the different Corps as well. Washington's objective was to allow the Taiwanese Army to resist a PLA attack during one month, waiting for the US Army to mobilize, against two weeks at the beginning of the years 2000. It is not certain whether this objective has been fulfilled today regarding the PLA's modernization.

Moreover, PLA's modernization²⁶⁵ forced Taipei to adapt its strategy, and develop asymmetric weapons to increase the cost of attacking Taiwan in order to prevent it. Chen Shui-bian's strategy on the one hand was to limit the battlefield to the Strait and preserve Taiwan's soil. On the other hand Chen's strategy was to give Taiwan the capacity to strike back at the Mainland. Ma Ying-jeou however has favored a strategy exclusively defensive in order to avoid provoking Beijing, but expects in the same time that Cross-Strait dialogue will prevent war.²⁶⁶ Inspired by William Murray's "porcupine strategy", Ma Ying-jeou's national defense strategy – the "Hard ROC" strategy – aims to forbid the PLA to find or destroy its objectives using Taiwan's natural defenses and to oppose a passive defense with the Navy and the Air-forces (Cabestan, 2010, p.28). However, Ma Ying-jeou's efforts to strengthen Taiwan's defense have been limited. The defense budget was under the 3% of the GDP in 2008, 2009 and 2010 contrary to his campaign promise. The 9.6 billion spent on Taiwan's defense in 2009 are only few compared to the 78 billion supposedly spent by Beijing the same year (Cabestan, 2010, p.29). Moreover, the professionalization of the Taiwanese Army is behind schedule and depends on the government's financial problems. The Minister of defense hopes its full implementation in 2015; nothing is certain however.²⁶⁷

Nonetheless, Ma Ying-jeou and the Nationalist Party do favor the diplomatic and dialogue solutions to ensure Taiwan's security. Indeed, a "Cross-Strait peace agreement" (and not a peace treaty) was part of the KMT's policy guidelines for the

²⁶⁵ See *supra*, pp.101-102

²⁶⁶ Ma Ying-jeou, A SMART Strategy for National Security, 2008-02-26, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=110&anum=4141>

²⁶⁷ Minister vows to abolish military conscription, 2010-10-19, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/10/19/276685/Minister-vows.htm>

2008's elections²⁶⁸, Ma Ying-jeou mentioned it in his inaugural speech²⁶⁹ and presented it as an electoral argument in 2012's presidential campaign.²⁷⁰ However as Roy (2009) highlights it, the framework of the agreement is maybe more important than the agreement itself. A peace agreement is only possible with a dramatic improvement of Cross-Strait relations, but in such conditions the agreement will be useless and will never survive to the deterioration of Cross-Strait relations (p.13). Moreover according to Cabestan (2010), including Washington in the negotiations is neither wanted by Taipei because it is afraid that it will be set apart from the discussions, leaving Beijing and Washington decide for Taiwan, nor by Beijing because Washington's inclusion will weakened its position. He adds that Cross-Strait peace discussions can take place under the SEF-ARATS framework but Ma Ying-jeou won't negotiate with Beijing without Washington's support; in today's situation it is certain that the American government will be involved in the agreement (p.32).

A cable from the AIT of June 2007 reveals that Ma Ying-jeou was ready to sign a peace agreement with Beijing for a limited or unlimited time if he was elected; with the condition that Beijing removes its missiles pointed at Taiwan. However in the same conversation, Raymond Burghardt specified that Beijing will require the end of the arms sale to Taiwan; this is a condition that Taiwan cannot accept according to Ma.²⁷¹ Indeed, the neutralization of Taiwan being excluded regarding Beijing's irredentism over Taiwan and its strategic intentions for the Island, Taiwan cannot sustain its defense without Washington's material support, especially in the perspective of a Cross-Strait peace agreement. However according to the Admiral Blair, "Taiwan has to realize that its long-term security lies in some sort of arrangement with China. It doesn't lie in military defense (as cited in Cabestan, 2010, p.35)."

²⁶⁸ KMT Policy Guidelines, 2007-07-05, *Kuomintang Official Website*, retrieved from <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=3161>

²⁶⁹ Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's Renaissance, 2008-05-20, *Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)*, retrieved from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf>

²⁷⁰ Ma talks peace deal with China, 2011-10-18, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/10/18/2003516029>

²⁷¹ AIT warned Ma on peace pact: cable, 2011-10-22, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/10/22/2003516392>

The perspective of a peace agreement is a trend that is growing within Taiwan's society. As Cabestan and Le Pesant (2009) underline it, the supposed weakness of the Taiwanese Army facing the PLA and the growing interdependence are feeding a sentiment of "defeatism" or/and "pacifism" which favor the diplomatic settlement of the Cross-Strait issue (p.188). The *Taiwan Security Survey* in 2005 reveals that only 14.2% of the Taiwanese people believe that the Taiwanese Army will resist to an attack from the PLA, and 51.5% favor to find a negotiated solution with Beijing; only 18.7% want to increase military spending (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p. 113). This trend is even more relevant with younger generations (20 to 39 years old) where 60% favor the negotiated solution (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.121). Moreover since Ma Ying-jeou's election, the perception of Taiwanese people that the PRC is hostile toward them decreased from 48.8% in March 2008 to 41.5% in September 2011. The perception of the PRC's hostility toward the ROC's government decreased also from 61.8% in March 2008 to 51% in September 2011.²⁷²

However, if on the one hand Taiwanese are rejecting openly the reunification that will signify the end of their life style and their political independence, they are not on the other hand willing to defend it. The 2005 *Taiwan Security Survey* reports that only 17% of the respondent wanted to defend Taiwan in case of attack, 10.4% would follow the government decision, 13% wanted to flee to another country while 24.6% would accept their fate; a bit less than 30% hadn't decided yet (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.124). However, 77% of the respondents think that the Taiwanese Army would resist if the United States enter in the conflict (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.113). This last data shows that the American factor and the assistance of the US Army to defend the island are essential in Taiwanese will to fight against the PLA. If Taiwanese defense spirit is depending on Washington's commitment to defend the island, Taiwanese people are maybe not as pacifists, that would not resist the PLA, as Chinese experts like to think (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.214).

Besides, is the American commitment to defend Taiwan as strong as it was at the beginning of 2000? After the 2008 economical and financial crisis, the recurrent issue of the American disengagement towards Taiwan has been reappearing: Though

²⁷² Beijing's Hostility toward ROC, *Mainland Affairs Council*, retrieved from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/11111085977.gif>

the American administration's abandoning of Taiwan is not planned despite Beijing's economical pressure and remains a long term perspective; an academic debate is progressively taking place.²⁷³ The arms sales to Taiwan are in addition self-limited. The Cross-Strait economical interdependence and the increasing exchanges between the two sides of the Strait are raising Washington's concerns about spying and technology transfer to China; thereof, the American government refuses to sell to Taipei its most advanced weapons (Bernkopf Tucker, 2002, p.23; Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, pp.216-217). Washington recently refused again to sell its most advanced fighters to Taipei but it is the weapon that the Taiwanese Army needs the most.²⁷⁴

On the one hand, the rise of pacifism within Taiwan's society and the weak motivation from its political leaders to consider more seriously the military issue is raising Washington's concern and create impatience among Americans (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, pp.216-217). If this trend is confirmed, Washington might reconsider its commitment to Taiwan (Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.229). On the other hand, if Washington respects Taiwanese's political choice, the Americans are not ready to give up decades of work with the Taiwanese Army and Intelligence, and give up decades of technological exchanges. Moreover, is Washington ready to give up Taiwan's democracy, that it has itself helped create, by letting any party handing Taiwan over to the Chinese?

For Kaplan, Taiwan should have a crucial importance for Washington: "the Island is the touchstone between authoritarianism and democracy, the Chinese world order and the American world order, the *Pax Sinica* and the *Pax Americana* (Kaplan cited in Cabestan & Le Pesant, 2009, p.34). If Washington were to abandon Taiwan, the Americans would lose the trust of their allies and it would mark the end of the United States as a superpower.

²⁷³ Abandon Taiwan: US academic, 2011-03-02, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/03/02/2003497159>

US forum debates issue of 'abandoning' Taiwan, 2011-10-20, *Taipei Times*, retrieved from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/10/20/2003516214>

²⁷⁴ F-16C/Ds left out of arms deal: AIT, 2011-09-22, *The China Post*, retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2011/09/22/317458/F-16C-Ds-left.htm>

The Taiwanese people remain trapped in a vicious circle; they on the one hand want to defend their identity and their independence facing Beijing's irredentism, on the other hand they want to preserve peace and their life style. However, peace has a price and the price is to accept Beijing's rules of the game. As Cabestan (2009) highlights, the peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations under the One China Principle is "structuring" Cross-Strait relations toward Beijing's reunification plan and narrowing Taipei's and Washington's options, as well as China's (p.17).

CHAPTER 8 Conclusion

In this study, Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait policy was linked to the issue of national identity policy. They are in fact the two faces of the same coin: Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism. We included the study of Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese nationalism in a historical approach in order to analyze to what extent these policies impact or transform the relations across the Taiwan Strait and the Taiwanese political community. Secondly, we tried to highlight the limits of these policies on the Taiwanese population and regarding Beijing.

Ma Ying-jeou's nationalist policy is characterized on the one hand by a will to reunify the Chinese nation; and, on the other, by a will to give Taiwan a central place in an eventual reunification process. Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policy aims at restoring within the Taiwanese society the feeling of belonging to the Chinese nation, as well as creating a historical link between Sun Yat-sen development model imagined for the China of the beginning of the 20th century – a democratic regime and a liberal economical system that married the Chinese tradition and the Western modernity – and nowadays Taiwan. In simple terms, Ma Ying-jeou wishes to recreate a “Republic of China nation” an idea that, according to him, is still a legitimate one to reunify the whole Chinese nation under its own model of development. The institutionalization of Cross-Strait dialogue and exchanges is a political platform to initiate the reunification process. Moreover, they are eventually an instrument to bridge the societies on each side of the Strait and promote the Taiwanese model of development in China. Ma Ying-jeou apparently wants to create a United Front regrouping the KMT, the Taiwanese and the Chinese population against the CCP.

However, the impact on the Chinese society appears to be very limited. Nevertheless, the model of development initiated by the CCP for thirty years has been successful; China, in just a few decades, has out turned to be one of the world's biggest economies which makes the Chinese proud of their nation. If the Chinese

Communist Party is contested, it is first because of socio-economic problems and inner Party issues such as corruption or violation of Human Rights. Chinese people are not (yet) asking for democratic reforms and less for the return of the KMT.

Regarding the effect of Ma Ying-jeou's policies' on the Taiwanese, it appears that they have rejected or ignored his efforts. Surveys on Insular identity show a constant decline in Chinese identification in comparison to growing Taiwanese identification. On the contrary of Ma Ying-jeou's national identity policies have had an inverse effect, with Taiwanese identification sky-rocketing since his election. Moreover, a large majority of the Taiwanese population also rejects the very idea of reunifying Taiwan with China and prefers to retain its political independence, whatever the regime Republic of China or Republic of Taiwan.

Hence, however, the question of Ma Ying-jeou's political legacy is not yet to be asked, and Taiwanese elected him for a second term in January 2012. Economical issues, like in 2008, were central in the campaign reflecting Taiwanese people's main concern. In a three candidates race²⁷⁵, Ma Ying-jeou remained the most legitimate to tackle this issue despite a narrower margin with its main opponent, Tsai Ying-wen (蔡英文), from the DPP. We can expect that Ma Ying-jeou continues the policy he implements already since four years, normalizing Cross-Strait economical relations, developing inter-societies exchanges, and deepening Cross-Strait economical interdependence. The pace of Cross-Strait integration remains to be asked; it is however obvious that Sino-Taiwanese relation cannot be back to the situation '*ante*-Ma Ying-jeou'.

In the long run, will the reunification process initiated by Ma Ying-jeou eventually be successful? As Stéphane Corcuff told us in a private conversation, "implementing any form of unification would be as difficult as implementing the formal independence of Taiwan."

The German Reunification was based on political will from both sides to end the separation of the German nation even if economical systems and life styles were different between the West and the East. Indeed, political consensus is the cornerstone

²⁷⁵ Ma Ying-jeou won 51.6%, Tsai Ying-wen 45.3%, and James Soong only 2.77% of the ballots.

of Cross-Strait reunification, but, except through the use of military, economical, and/or political force, Beijing, Ma Ying-jeou and the other Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan cannot impose the reunification to the Taiwanese people as the Taiwanese society remains society against the option. Ma Ying-jeou's Nationalist policies are to force or seduce Taiwanese people to accept this option of reunification. Moreover, economical interdependence does not guaranty the outcome of a political integration. The European Union is the best example where, after sixty years of progressive economical integration and interdependence, States are always reluctant to give up pieces of their very sovereignty.

As Gellner (2006) highlights, national unification implies always the disappearance of the doubloons; that is to say it cannot be two presidents, two prime ministers, two captains of the football team, etc, in the new reunified nation-state (p.129). He adds that: "there can be little doubt that while it is better to be head of a big 'un then a little 'un, the difference is not so drastic as that between being a head, never mind how much, and not being a head at all (p.130)." With the present balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, the reunification will profit Beijing; indeed, Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT, if they can stay in charge in Taiwan, would not accept Beijing's conditions and leave the state power to the CCP. In retrospect, if the KMT was ready to leave power in 1949, it would have disappeared like the ROC.


APPENDIX

Appendix 1 Ma Ying-jeou, Vincent Siew and their wives for the Centenary of the Republic of China's celebrations (2011-10-10)



Source: *Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan).* Retrieved from <http://media.president.gov.tw/ImageTotalView.aspx?hl=en-US>

Appendix 2 Territory claimed by the Republic of China



Source: *Wikimedia*. Retrieved from

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ROC_Administrative_and_Claims.png

Appendix 3 Map of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait



Source: Taiwan Strait Area (Shaded Relief), *University of Texas at Austin*. Retrieved from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/taiwan_strait_98.jpg

Appendix 4 Thematic Nomenclature of the Data Base on the *Taipei Times*, 2008/03-2011/08 (in French)

100 – Géopolitique et géo-économie du détroit de Taiwan

- 101 - Déclarations et points de vue des autorités taiwanaises
- 102 - Déclarations et points de vue des autorités chinoises
- 103 - Déclarations et points de vue des autorités américaines
- 104 - Déclarations et points de vue des États européens et institutions européennes
- 105 - Déclarations et points de vue des autorités japonaises
- 106 - Déclarations et points de vue des États asiatiques
- 107 - Analyses des médias internationaux
- 108 - Analyses et rapports de centres de recherche internationaux
- 109 - Mouvements et activités militaires (exercices et achats d'armes)
- 110 - Le triangle stratégique Taipei-Pékin-Washington
- 111 - Le statut de Taiwan en droit international : histoire, droit et politique
- 112 - Pressions de la Chine, stratégie suivie sur la « question de Taiwan » et ses réactions (Actions non-militaires, notamment diplomatiques et déclarations de la Chine populaire contre l'indépendantisme de Taiwan)
- 113 - Ouverture à la Chine sous Ma Ying-jeou et accords signés
- 114 - Oppositions dans la société civile au rapprochement avec la Chine
- 115 - Juridicisation de la frontière entre la Chine et Taiwan depuis les années 80
- 116 - Présence de la RDC dans des organisations internationales

200 - Politique des identités à Taiwan

201 - Politiques suivies depuis 1991 par le Palais Présidentiel sur les questions de l'identité nationale à Taiwan

202 - Questions constitutionnelles depuis 1991

203 - Changements des repères d'identification nationale, des symboles nationaux et des manuels scolaires, division de la mémoire et de l'identité nationale

204 – Manifestations, commémorations politiques et histoire du mouvement de construction nationale

205 – Changements du Kuomintang sur la question des deux rives et de l'identité nationale à Taiwan

206 – Opposition des réunificateurs face au mouvement indépendantiste et à la localisation ou une « désinistation » (sous Chen)

207 – Opposition de la société civile à une « resinisation » et dénonciation d'atteintes aux libertés publiques (sous Ma)

208 – Questions ethniques, identifications ethniques, débats sur l'ethnicité

209 – Actions locales, sociétales et des historiens liées à la question de l'identité taiwanaise (expos, musées, centres d'histoire locales, construction de la localité...)

210 – Positions des médias internationaux au sujet de l'identité taiwanaise

211 – Télévision taiwanaise : débat public, séries et émission touchant à la politique des identités, à l'histoire, à la question nationale

212 – Questions touchant aux Aborigènes et à l'autochtonie

300 – Politique intérieure, médias et tendances économiques

301 – Élections nationales

302 – Élections locales

303 – Politique parlementaire

- 304 – Vie politique nationale et vie des partis nationaux
- 305 – Tendances économiques
- 306 – Tendances sociales
- 307 – Défis posés par les investissements taiwanais en Chine
- 308 – Enquêtes sur les perceptions politiques des Taiwanais
- 309 – Indépendance et fonctionnement de la justice
- 310 – Indépendance et fonctionnement des médias

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