

## HW 8

### 1a) Equilibrium factors of the population purchasing the good

Given:

$$R(x) = 1 - x$$

$$F(z) = 4z$$

$$\text{Price } p = 0.75$$

Reservation price for consumer  $x$ :  $r(x)f(z) = (1 - x)(4z)$ . At equilibrium,  $x = z$ , so:

$$(1 - z)(4z) = 0.75$$

Expand and simplify:

$$4z - 4z^2 = 0.75 \Rightarrow 4z^2 - 4z + 0.75 = 0$$

Divide by 4:

$$z^2 - z + 0.1875 = 0$$

Solve the quadratic equation:

$$z = \frac{-(-1) \pm \sqrt{(-1)^2 - 4(1)(0.1875)}}{2(1)} = \frac{1 \pm \sqrt{0.25}}{2}$$
$$z = \frac{1 \pm 0.5}{2}$$

Thus:

$$z = 0.75 \quad \text{or} \quad z = 0.25$$

**Answer:**  $z = 0.25$  and  $z = 0.75$ .

### b) stability of equilibria

To determine stability:

- $z = 0.25$ : If  $z$  increases slightly,  $f(z) = 4z > 0.75$ , leading to further adoption.  $z = 0.25$  is **unstable**.
- $z = 0.75$ : If  $z$  decreases slightly,  $f(z) < 0.75$ , leading to fewer users.  $z = 0.75$  is **stable**.

**Answer:**  $z = 0.75$  is stable;  $z = 0.25$  is unstable.

### c) trend if $z = 0.3$ initially

At  $z = 0.3$ :

$$f(z) = 4z = 4(0.3) = 1.2 \quad (\text{greater than } 0.75).$$

This means adoption will increase. The product becomes more popular, trending toward  $z = 0.75$ .

**Answer:** The product becomes more popular over time, trending toward  $z = 0.75$ .

d) trend if  $z = 0.5$  initially

at  $z = 0.5$ :

$$f(z) = 4z = 4(0.5) = 2 \quad (\text{greater than } 0.75)$$

adoption will continue rising toward  $z = 0.75$

the product becomes increasingly popular, trending toward  $z = 0.75$

2)

**a) Is  $z = \frac{1}{4}$  an equilibrium?**

At  $z = \frac{1}{4}$ ,  $f(z) = 4z = 1$ :

$$R(z)f(z) = (1-z)f(z) = (1-\frac{1}{4})(1) = \frac{3}{4}$$

Since  $\frac{3}{4} > \frac{7}{16}$ ,  $z = \frac{1}{4}$  isn't an equilibrium because more people will adopt the product.

Thus,  $z = \frac{1}{4}$  isn't an equilibrium

**b) Equilibrium fractions lesser than  $\frac{1}{4}$**

For  $z < \frac{1}{4}$ ,  $f(z) = 4z$ . At equilibrium:

$$(1-z)(4z) = \frac{7}{16}$$

$$4z - 4z^2 = \frac{7}{16} \Rightarrow 4z^2 - 4z + \frac{7}{16} = 0$$

$$z^2 - z + \frac{7}{64} = 0$$

Solve:

$$z = \frac{1 \pm \sqrt{1 - 4(1)(\frac{7}{64})}}{2} = \frac{1 \pm \sqrt{0.5625}}{2}$$
$$z = \frac{1 \pm 0.75}{2}$$

Thus:

$$z = 0.875 \quad (\text{invalid as it exceeds } 1) \quad \text{or} \quad z = 0.125$$

**Answer:**  $z = 0.125$  is the only equilibrium less than  $\frac{1}{4}$ .

**c) Equilibrium fractions greater than  $\frac{1}{4}$**

For  $z > 1/4$ ,  $f(z) = 1$ . At equilibrium:

$$(1 - z) = 7/16 \Rightarrow z = 9/16$$

Answer:  $z = 9/16$  is the equilibrium greater than  $1/4$ .

**D) trend if  $z=1/4$  initially**

Since  $z = 1/4$  isn't an equilibrium ; adoption will increase toward  $z = 9/16$

Ans: adoption increases to  $z = 9/16$

**3) given budget of \$50k split into  $x$  (reducing contacts) and  $y$  (reducing infection probability)**

1. Current spending ( $x = y = 25,000$ ):

- Contact reduction:  $20 - 25,000/5,000 = 15$
- Infection probability:  $0.1 - 25,000/2,500,000 = 0.09$

2. Reallocating budget entirely to  $x$ :

- Contacts:  $20 - 50,000/5,000 = 10$
- Probability remains 0.1.

3. Reallocating budget entirely to  $y$ :

- Probability:  $0.1 - 50,000/2,500,000 = 0.08$
- Contacts remain 20.

Compare basic reproduction number ( $R_0$ ):

$$R_0 = \text{Contacts} \times \text{Infection Probability}$$

- $x = y = 25,000$ :  $R_0 = 15 \times 0.09 = 1.35$
- All to  $x$ :  $R_0 = 10 \times 0.1 = 1.0$
- All to  $y$ :  $R_0 = 20 \times 0.08 = 1.6$

Answer: Allocating all \$50,000 to  $x$  is the optimal strategy.

4)

Question 4:

**(a) Expected outcome**

- **Network 1:** Calculate  $q$  for each node:
  - Central node:  $q = 1 - (1 - p)^4 = 1 - (1 - 0.5)^4 = 0.9375$
  - Peripheral nodes:  $q = 0.5$ .

$$\text{Average } q = (0.9375 + 4 \times 0.5)/5 = 0.5875.$$

- **Network 2:** Symmetric connections:
  - Each node:  $q = 1 - (1 - p)^2 = 1 - (1 - 0.5)^2 = 0.75$ .

$$\text{Average } q = 0.75.$$

Answer: Network 1:  $q = 0.5875$ , Network 2:  $q = 0.75$ .

**(b) Worst-case outcome**

- **Network 1:** Worst-case node is the central one,  $q = 0.9375$ .
- **Network 2:** All nodes have the same  $q = 0.75$ .

Answer: Network 1:  $q = 0.9375$ , Network 2:  $q = 0.75$ .