




Malicious Code Detection

BRIC Breaking Through Static Analysis

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Why?






Guidance for Addressing Malicious Code Risk

SECURITY-ENFORCING SOFTWARE			
	Custom-developed	Pre-existing with Source	Pre-existing with Executable
Acquisition	Trustworthy developers (contractor reputation)	NIAP or FIPS evaluation Acquisition Policy, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Background checks on developer/supplierTrusted distribution (checksums, signatures, authenticated out of band distribution channel)Blind buys	NIAP or FIPS evaluation Acquisition Policy, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Background checks on developer/supplierTrusted distribution (checksums, signatures, authenticated out of band distribution channel)Blind buys
Design	Separation of duties: Designers modify only parts for which they're responsible Reputable, well-understood high-level design languages and tools. Least Privilege/Fail Secure Design	n/a 	n/a
Construction	Separation of duties: Coders modify only code for which they're responsible Software evaluation tools Code review	n/a 	n/a
Testing	Software evaluation tools Security testing to ensure security requirements are fulfilled. Inter-team Testing	Software evaluation tools Security testing to ensure security requirements are fulfilled. Inter-team Testing	Software evaluation tools Security testing to ensure security requirements are fulfilled.




Malware Analysis vs. MCD






“Maliciousness”






Introducing MCD through SCR





The Threat





Development

- Source code
- 3rd Party library manipulation

Promotion / CFG Mgmt


- Dependency manipulation / injection
- Unauthorized code promotion


Production

- Code injection vectors
- Dynamic update




Architecture



- Patterns
- 
- Elements of malicious design




Evolution of a Methodology







Time Bomb

- Trigger
- Functionality





Trojan





Resource Exhaustion

Intent?





Case Study

Methodology:


1. Normal functionality
2. Automated analysis:
 - a. *Semantic rules*
 - b. *Static strings*
3. Manual analysis





Bowling Time

It is Bowling Time! Now on android with 3D graphics and realistic ball spin. Simply a good classic arcade style bowling game.





Semantic Rules


1. **com/android/root/Setting.java:**
 - *process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(s);*
2. **com/android/root/udevRoot.java:**
 - *Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("/system/bin/mount");*
 - *process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("/system/bin/mount");*
 - *Process process1 = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(s10);*
 - *Process process2 = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(s12);*
3. **jackpal/androidterm/Exec.java:**
 - *System.loadLibrary("androidterm");*



Static Strings

- a) "chmod 04755 /system/bin/profile"
- b) "chmod 6755 /system/bin/profile\n"
- c) "chmod 770 "
- d) "chmod 777 "
- e) "chown 0.0 /system/bin/profile\n"
- f) "chown root.root /system/bin/profile\n"
- g) "kill -9 "
- h) "mount -o remount rw /system\n"
- i) "mount -o remount rw system|next|n"
- j) "mount -o remount,"
- k) "mount -o remount,ro -t "
- l) "mount -o remount,rw -t "
- m) "6^)(9-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-=1"

High Entropy





Manual Analysis I

- udevRoot.java: *private boolean runExploid()*

```
{
```

```
...
```

Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("/system/bin/mount");

```
...
```

if(s == null)

```
    s = "/dev/block/mtdblock5";
```

```
if(s3 == null)
```

```
    s3 = "/dev/block/mtdblock3";
```

```
String s5 = (new StringBuilder("mount -o remount,rw -t ")).append(s4).append("").append(s3).append(" /system").toString();
```

```
...
```

```
File file1;
```

```
File file = ctx.getFilesDir();
```

```
file1 = new File(file, "exploid");
```

```
if(!file1.exists())
```

```
    break MISSING_BLOCK_LABEL_434;
```

```
StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder("chmod 770 ");
```

```
...
```

```
}
```






Manual Analysis II

- Hard coded key:

```
KEYVALUE = "6^)(9-p35a%3#4S!4S0)$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(*0)$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-=1".getBytes();
...
public static void crypt(byte abyte0[])
{
    int i = 0;
    int j = 0;
    do
    {
        ...
        byte byte1 = KEYVALUE[i];
        byte byte2 = (byte)(byte0 ^ byte1);
        abyte0[j] = byte2;
        i++;
        i...
    } while(true);
}
```





Manual Analysis III

- “IMEI” & “IMSI”:

"?><Request><Protocol>1.0</Protocol><Command>0</Command><ClientInfo><Partner>%s</Partner><ProductId>%s</ProductId><IMEI>%s</IMEI><IMSI>%s</IMSI><Modle>%s</Modle><ClientInfo></Request>"





Lessons Learned

- Broad searches
- Static strings yield good results
 - *Hex*
 - *IP/Host encodings*
- Imports are important



Future work

- Application archetypes
- Anomaly detection





The OWASP Foundation
<http://www.owasp.org>

Q&A

