



# Cloudy With a Chance of WAF

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Akamai Cloud Security





# What is a WAF?

It depends who you ask...but most vendors will agree with the following statements:

“A (WAF) is an appliance, server plugin, or filter”

“Applies a set of rules to an HTTP conversation”

“Generally, these rules cover common attacks such as XSS and SQLi” (OWASP)

“..WAFs sit (in-line) and monitor traffic to and from web applications.”

“WAFs interrogate the behavior and logic of what is requested and returned”

“WAFs also detect (and can prevent) new unknown types of attacks. By watching for unusual or unexpected patterns in the traffic”

# WAF History

1998: Sanctum's "AppShield"

1998: Gillian's "Exit Control"

2002: ModSecurity

2002: Imperva SecureSphere (2G Positive Security)

- Teros->Citrix, Kavado->Protegrity, Magnifire->F5, NetContinuum>Baraccuda,

2006: Breach Security acquires ThinkingStone (ModSecurity)

2006: OWASP ModSecurity CRS v1.0

2008: Akamai introduces world's first cloud-based distributed WAF

Today: Several cloud based WAFs such as: Incapsula, Qualys, CloudFlare...

# WAF in the Cloud: benefits

- Elastic / Scalable
- Distributed (computing)
- Easy to set-up (when offered as a service)
- Offered as pay-as-you-grow service
- Stops attacks in the cloud
- Always up-to-date
- All events are stored in centralized location

# WAF in Cloud Security Benefits

- Orchestrated attack campaigns
- Slow & low
- Zero day detection

# Orchestrated Attack Campaigns




# WordPress Remote File Inclusion Vulnerability

```
GET /wp-content/plugins/wordtube/wordtube-button.php?wpPATH=http://www.google.com/humans.txt? HTTP/1.1
Host: www.test.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
```

Trying to inject to this HTTP parameter **wpPATH**

The content of this URL <http://www.google.com/humans.txt?>


## Content of hummans.txt



## **Some Question that Crossed Our Minds:**

- Why RFI exploit from 2007?
- Why trying to exploit PHP inclusion on .NET application?
- Why including a legitimate page?

# What Else Did This Hacker Do On This Site?



Sending **2212** different RFI exploits

Any Other Akamai Customers Hit by This Hacker?

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
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
Attacking **34** different Web sites, sending **24301** attacks

Lets find similar activity across the internet...

Bot Network that include **272** machines  
Targeting **1696** Web applications  
Sending **1358980** attacks



Any Other Akamai Customers Hit by This Hacker?




Lets find similar activity across the internet...

Bot Network that include **272** machines  
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# Still Some Questions that Need to be Answered...



Why did Captain Cook

bring oil ashore?

Why including a logbook page?

Master choosing specific documents

Why trying to prove their innocence

on trial against Cook?

## Why RFI Exploit from 2007?

Hacker trying to be lucky  
using old exploits

## Why Including a Legitimate Page?


Hacker checking exploit feasibility

## **Why trying to Exploit PHP Inclusion on .NET Application?**

Hacker is just shooting all over the place

# Attack Summary

- Distributed attack campaign.
- 200 compromised web servers
- Lasting over more than a month.



# Slow & Low - Brute Force Attacks



# Analyzing 8 Hours of Traffic

**4301**  
Application were targeted

**2848**  
Malicious clients participated in the attacks

Most of the attacks originated from: US, China and France  


**289**  
Highest number of applications being scanned by one IP

**531**  
Joomla and WordPress applications brute forced with 230K attempts

**14%**  
Of the traffic originated from anonymized sources  



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
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# Bypassing Detection Mechanism

## One to One

Attacker is sending up to 15 brute force attempts in 1 hour to application

## One to Many

Attacker is sending up to 15 brute force attempts in 1 hour to 207 different applications



## Many to Many

- 11 Attackers
- each is targeting between 100 to 231 different applications
- All together targeting 478 applications
- Over time frame of 3 months




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
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## Why This Attack is Successful?

- Attacker has time
- Attacker has resources
- Attacker know how to bypass security filters

# Zero Day Detection - PHP vulnerabilities



## Objective

Find attackers that send PHP attacks

## 3 Steps Technique

Step 1 - Monitor traffic for malicious requests  
Signature pattern detection tool

Step 2 - Log Data Analysis  
Collecting clients in a document table  
on the basis of ip address used

Step 3 - Analyze the data  
Look for anomalous behavior

## Objective

Find attackers that send PHP attacks

# 3 Steps Technique

## Step 1 - Analyze Applications' Behavior

Fingerprint platform behind each app (e.g. PHP)

## Step 3 - Big Data Analysis

Calculate clients maliciousness based on the number of apps scanned

## Step 2 - Analyze Client Behavior

Look for clients that try to access PHP URLs on ASP.NET apps

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# Let's Test Drive This Approach...

[ 950 ]

Malicious clients were detected over one week

[ ~9 ]

The average amount of applications scanned by client

[ 236 ]

Highest number of scanned applications by one client in one hour

We analyzed 10% of Akamai traffic over a 1-week time period

[ 43% ]

Of the detected clients are web servers

[ 4 days ]

The average amount of time client was maliciously active

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
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
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## Further Analysis of Clients Traffic

- PHP known vulnerabilities - RFI, XSS, SQLi, Path traversal...
- Brute force attacks - looking for WordPress and Joomla login pages
- Comment spamming
- And in the future: Zero day exploits...





**Q&A**