

Mobile Security Threats

Adi Sharabani



About me

Adi Sharabani

CEO & co-founder, Skycure

- Over 15 years of security experience
- Built and managed Watchfire's research group
- Built and led IBM's worldwide Rational security initiative, was responsible for IBM software products, developed by thousands of developers worldwide
- Author of more than 20 patents
- Fellow at Yuval Ne'eman's workshop
- High school teacher

About Skycure



- Provides seamless security for mobile devices
- Sell to large organizations
- Backed by Pitango Venture Capital
- Team consists of elite security experts coming from IBM, Google, CheckPoint and more

Mobile Security Threats

5 Biggest Mobile Threats



The Simple Threat

Physical Access


1



The Known Threat

Malware


2



2


The Known Threat

Malware



2012: The year of Android malware

Android Threat Growth




Source: Trend Micro 2012 Mobile Threat and Security Roundup

iOS Security Model

App Characteristics

- One Store
- Heavy Screening
- App Sandboxing



iOS Security Model

App Characteristics

- One Store
- Heavy Screening
- App Sandboxing

Profile Characteristics

- No Store
- No Screening
- No Sandboxing

Profiles break the iOS security model

Mobile Security Threats


Malicious Profiles

For iOS, the incarnation of malware is malicious configuration profiles.


Profiles break the iOS security model

Recent relevant Skycure discovery

<http://blog.skycure.com/2013/03/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-of.html>



2013: The year of iOS malware



The Biggest Threat

Wi-Fi
Networks

3




Mobile Security Threats

Wi-Fi Attacks

Are you comfortable connecting to Wi-Fi networks?

Did you know that connecting to a public Wi-Fi could lead to **persistent** control over your device?



History of MiTM

Wi-Fi attacks becomes more prevalent with mobile use
These attacks have two main requirements:

Attacker has to
be in a nearby
location

User has to
actively connect
to the Wi-Fi

Mar 2013: Malicious iOS profiles
MiTM has become fully remote

?

Connecting to Wi-fi networks

“I hardly connect to wi-fi
networks, so I’m protected.
Right?”

Connecting to Wi-fi networks

"I hardly connect to
networks... I'm not
connected."

Wrong!

Wi-Fi Guessing

Auto Connect

WiFiGate


“I have never connected to
Wi-Fi networks, so I’m
protected. Right?”

WiFiGate

“I have never connected to
Wi-Fi networks I’m not sure about.
Wrong! Right?”


WiFiGate

In practice, many carrier settings configures wi-fi networks on user behalf



WiFiGate

In practice, many carrier settings configures wi-fi networks on user behalf




The screenshot shows an SSH terminal window titled "adish — ssh — 72x14". The command "ls -d [A-C]" is run from the directory "Sakin:/System/Library/Carrier Bundles/iPhone root#". The output lists numerous carrier bundle names, grouped into three columns. The first column contains: AIS_th.bundle, ATT_us.bundle, AVEA_tr.bundle, Aircel_in.bundle, Bell_ca.bundle, BhartiAirtel_in.bundle, Bouygues_fr.bundle, CMCC_cn.bundle, CSL_hk.bundle, CTM_mo.bundle, CW_bs.bundle, CW_pa.bundle. The second column contains: CW_tt.bundle, CW_wi.bundle, CarrierLab.bundle, Celcom_my.bundle, CellC_za.bundle, Cellcom_il.bundle, Chunghwa_tw.bundle, Claro_ar.bundle, Claro_br.bundle, Claro_cl.bundle, Claro_cr.bundle, Claro_do.bundle. The third column contains: Claro_gt.bundle, Claro_hn.bundle, Claro_jm.bundle, Claro_ni.bundle, Claro_pa.bundle, Claro_pe.bundle, Claro_pr.bundle, Claro_py.bundle, Claro_sv.bundle, Claro_uy.bundle, Comcel_co.bundle, Comviq_se.bundle.

```
Sakin:/System/Library/Carrier Bundles/iPhone root# ls -d [A-C]
AIS_th.bundle          CW_tt.bundle          Claro_gt.bundle
ATT_us.bundle          CW_wi.bundle          Claro_hn.bundle
AVEA_tr.bundle         CarrierLab.bundle   Claro_jm.bundle
Aircel_in.bundle       Celcom_my.bundle    Claro_ni.bundle
Bell_ca.bundle         CellC_za.bundle    Claro_pa.bundle
BhartiAirtel_in.bundle Cellcom_il.bundle   Claro_pe.bundle
Bouygues_fr.bundle    Chunghwa_tw.bundle Claro_pr.bundle
CMCC_cn.bundle         Claro_ar.bundle    Claro_py.bundle
CSL_hk.bundle          Claro_br.bundle    Claro_sv.bundle
CTM_mo.bundle          Claro_cl.bundle    Claro_uy.bundle
CW_bs.bundle           Claro_cr.bundle    Comcel_co.bundle
CW_pa.bundle           Claro_do.bundle    Comviq_se.bundle

Sakin:/System/Library/Carrier Bundles/iPhone root#
```

WiFiGate

In practice, many carrier settings configures wi-fi networks on user behalf



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "adish — less — 56x21". The content of the terminal is an XML configuration snippet:

```
<string>com.apple.wifi.managed</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>3F728C9C-AF47-4771-A21D-BE151BF6DE8A</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
<key>Proxies</key>
<dict>
    <key>HTTPEnable</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
    <key>HTTPSEnable</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
    <key>ProxyAutoConfigEnable</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
    <key>ProxyAutoDiscoveryEnable</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
</dict>
<key>SSID_STR</key>
<string>wnfia</string>
</dict>
</array>
:
```

Setting-up such a network would automatically initiate an attack on all nearby carrier customers

Putting the attack to test

Attack - During the cyber security conference

- Location: Smolarz Auditorium, TAU



Putting the attack to test

Attack - During the cyber security conference

- Location: Smolarz Auditorium, TAU
- **448** devices connected to our in **2.5** hours



Remediation

So what should you do about this?

- **Users and Organizations:**
Close the Wi-Fi connection when not in use
Use a mobile firewall protection
- **Carriers and Wi-Fi network providers:**
If you need to provide Wi-Fi access, enable client-side firewall capabilities on it



Join our beta program
contact@skycure.com

The Growing Threat

Vulnerabilities in Apps and OS

4



The Growing Threat

Vulnerabilities in Apps and OS

4



The Growing Threat

Vulnerabilities in Apps and OS

4



The Leaking Threat

Privacy

5



The Leaking Threat

Privacy

5

2012: Skycure uncovers a major privacy violation in the LinkedIn app

LinkedIn leaked out its users' calendar information

Skycure's discovery in the news

```
{ "calendar": { "calendarOptIn":true, "values": [ { "events": [ { "organizer": { "name": "Adi Sharabani", "email": "adi@skycure.com"}, "id": "635D0B49-1A84-445E-9FCD-00F975468B90:03E3338028A54FC0945BA33119C297A70000000000000000000000000000000000", "notes": "AT&T conference call:\n USA:1-800-225-5288\n Passcode: 4218000#", "endDate": "1338559200000", "startDate": "1338556000000", "attendees": [ { "name": "Yair Amit", "email": "yair@skycure.com"}], "title": "Confidential: Internal financial results"}], "timestamp": "1338498000000"}] } }
```

The New York Times
Forbes
BBC
The Verge
The Huffington Post
Washington Post
The Next Web
Gizmodo
Ars technica
Apple Insider
CSO Online
cnet


The Leaking Threat

Privacy

5



Following our work, LinkedIn changed their app to ask the user for permission to leak out the information
When it comes to organizations, the problem is still unsolved




The Leaking Threat

Privacy

5

 **Skycure**

Following our work, LinkedIn changed their app to ask the user for permission to leak out the information



אל: פורום טכנולוגיות ומחשוב

הבדודות והירדות מאפליקציית MeZeZe

1. לאutorוונה התפיסה מה במרקט
אצלכם בטלפון הנייד.

מעתיקה את הספר טלפוןים שלכם לאינטרנט למאגר מידע שלו מהיה נגיש אליו כיום ובעתיד. המאגר הזה יוצר חדרה חמורה

A Few Tips

1. Enable “Find Phone” features
2. Do not automatically click “Continue”
3. Be cautious when using public Wi-Fi networks
4. Always update your software
5. Follow me on Twitter:

My Twitter @AdiSharabani

Contact us contact@skycure.com
Website <http://www.skycure.com>
Blog <http://blog.skycure.com>
Twitter @SkycureSecurity

Backup Slides