



# PenPie Audit Report

Jun 5, 2023



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## Summary

This report has been prepared for PenPie smart contract, to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.



# Overview

## Project Summary

Project Name	PenPie
Codebase	<a href="https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie">https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie</a>
Commit	0470a8c5ad5021c870d22bb5dbb348f69120a109
Language	Solidity

## Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Jun 5, 2023
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Total Issues	7

## [WP-H1] `harvestVePendleReward()` Lack of methods to claim vePendle rewards

High

### Issue Description

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L330-L373>

```
330  function registerPool(  
331      address _market,  
332      uint256 _allocPoints,  
333      string memory name,  
334      string memory symbol  
335  ) external onlyOwner {  
336      if (pools[_market].isActive != false) {  
337          revert PoolOccupied();  
338      }  
339  
340      IERC20 newToken = IERC20(  
341          ERC20FactoryLib.createReceipt(_market, masterPenpie, name, symbol)  
342      );  
343  
344      address rewarder = IMasterPenpie(masterPenpie).createRewarder(  
345          address(newToken),  
346          address(PENDLE)  
347      );  
348  
349      IPendleMarketDepositHelper(marketDepositHelper).setPoolInfo(  
350          _market,  
351          rewarder,  
352          true  
353      );  
354  
355      IMasterPenpie(masterPenpie).add(  
356          _allocPoints,  
357          address(_market),  
358          address(newToken),  
359          address(rewarder)  
360      );
```

```

361
362     pools[_market] = Pool({
363         isActive: true,
364         market: _market,
365         receiptToken: address(newToken),
366         rewarder: address(rewarder),
367         helper: marketDepositHelper,
368         lastHarvestTime: block.timestamp
369     });
370     poolTokenList.push(_market);
371
372     emit PoolAdded(_market, address(rewarder), address(newToken));
373 }

```

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L289-L317>

```

289 function harvestVePendleReward() external {
290     if (this.totalUnclaimedETH() == 0)
291         revert NoVePendleReward();
292
293     if ((protocolFee != 0 && feeCollector == address(0)) || bribeManagerEOA ==
address(0))
294         revert InvalidFeeDestination();
295
296     uint256 length = poolTokenList.length;
297     address[] memory _pools = new address[](length);
298
299     for (uint256 i; i < length; i++) {
300         _pools[i] = poolTokenList[i];
301     }
302
303     (uint256 totalAmountOut, ) = distributorETH.claimProtocol(address(this),
_pools);
304     // for protocol
305     uint256 fee = (totalAmountOut * protocolFee) / DENOMINATOR;
306     IERC20(WETH).safeTransfer(feeCollector, fee);
307
308     // for caller
309     uint256 callerFeeAmount = (totalAmountOut * vePendleHarvestCallerFee) /
DENOMINATOR;

```

```
310     IERC20(WETH).safeTransfer(msg.sender, callerFeeAmount);
311
312     uint256 left = totalAmountOut - fee - callerFeeAmount;
313     IERC20(WETH).safeTransfer(bribeManagerEOA, left);
314
315     emit VePendleHarvested(totalAmountOut, fee, callerFeeAmount, left);
316 }
```

The `_pools` parameter in the `harvestVePendleReward()` function does not include `vePendle` . Consequently, a significant portion of the rewards accredited to the `vePendle` held by the `PendleStaking` contract can not be claimed.

Furthermore, we have been unable to locate any other location where the `vePendle` rewards can be claimed.

## Recommendation

Consider adding the `vePendle` address to the `_pools` list to claim the vePendle rewards.

## Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-H2] The current setup doesn't work on Arbitrum.

High

### Issue Description

Based on the deploy script, it appears that you intend to deploy the exact same code for `mPendleConvertor` and `PendleStaking` on Arbitrum.

However, this will not work as Pendle does not allow locking PENDLE to vePendle on Arbitrum.

The expected setup should be as follows:

1. If you plan to enable users to convert Pendle to mPendle on Arbitrum, the `mPendleConvertor` should allow the admin to withdraw the Pendle tokens and bridge them to the mainchain, then lock them to vePendle.
2. The `PendleStaking` contract on the sidechain should synchronize the vePendle balance from the mainchain and hold the LP tokens on behalf of the users for boosting and rewards.

[https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/](https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/46f24334e7c075813767a24c30512a3a1e62e292/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L243-L260)

[46f24334e7c075813767a24c30512a3a1e62e292/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L243-L260](https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/46f24334e7c075813767a24c30512a3a1e62e292/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L243-L260)

```

243  function convertPendle(
244      uint256 _amount
245  ) public whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
246      uint256 preVePendleAmount = this.accumulatedVePendle();
247      if (_amount > 0) {
248          IERC20(PENDLE).safeApprove(address(vePendle), _amount);
249          uint128 unlockTime = _getIncreaseLockTime();
250          IPVotingEscrowMainchain(vePendle).increaseLockPosition(
251              uint128(_amount),
252              unlockTime
253          );
254      }
255      uint256 mintedVePendleAmount = this.accumulatedVePendle() -
256          preVePendleAmount;
257      emit PendleLocked(_amount, lockPeriod, mintedVePendleAmount);
258
259      return mintedVePendleAmount;

```





260 }

## Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-M3] Griefing attack by calling `IPendleMarket.redeemRewards()` to claim the reward for `PendleStaking`, resulting in the `rewardAmount` cannot be correctly assigned to the pools

Medium

### Issue Description

`PendleMarket.redeemRewards()` allows any `msg.sender`, not just the user, to claim rewards on behalf of the user.

However, `PendleStaking#_harvestMarketRewards()` relies on the delta amount of `rewardTokens` balances to track the rewards.

If an attack were to call `IPendleMarket.redeemRewards()` for `PendleStaking`, it could prevent `_harvestMarketRewards()` from accurately tracking the reward amounts.

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/6019761b7055e5ea5f8df70a18fa452ca8dc1/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L565-L587>

```

565 function _harvestMarketRewards(address _market, bool _force) internal {
566     Pool storage poolInfo = pools[_market];
567     if (!_force && (block.timestamp - poolInfo.lastHarvestTime) < harvestTimeGap)
568         return;
569
570     address[] memory bonusTokens = IPendleMarket(_market).getRewardTokens();
571     uint256[] memory beforeBalances = _rewardBeforeBalances(bonusTokens);
572     IPendleMarket(_market).redeemRewards(address(this));
573
574     for (uint256 i; i < bonusTokens.length; i++) {
575         uint256 bonusBalanceDiff = IERC20(bonusTokens[i]).balanceOf(
576             address(this)
577         ) - beforeBalances[i];
578         if (bonusBalanceDiff > 0) {
579             _sendRewards(
580                 _market,
581                 bonusTokens[i],
582                 poolInfo.rewarder,

```

```
583         bonusBalanceDiff
584     );
585 }
586 }
587 }
```

## Recommendation

Consider monitoring the source of rewards claimed on behalf of **PendleMarket** off-chain and allocating the claimed rewards based on the monitoring data.

## Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-M4] `MasterPenpie._onlyWhiteListed` is improperly implemented, resulting in a malfunction of `updatePoolsAlloc()` .

Medium

### Issue Description

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/5d85c87f55f5d19ab87330255f59e5735a43919b/contracts/rewards/MasterPenpie.sol#L145-L154>

```
145 modifier _onlyWhiteListed() {
146     if (AllocationManagers[msg.sender])
147         return;
148     if (PoolManagers[msg.sender])
149         return;
150     if (msg.sender == owner())
151         return;
152     revert OnlyWhiteListedAllocaUpdator();
153     _;
154 }
```

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/rewards/MasterPenpie.sol#L739-L754>

```
739 function updatePoolsAlloc(address[] calldata _stakingTokens, uint256[] calldata
    _allocPoints) external _onlyWhiteListed() {
740     massUpdatePools();
741
742     if (_stakingTokens.length != _allocPoints.length)
743         revert LengthMismatch();
744
745     for (uint256 i = 0; i < _stakingTokens.length; i++) {
746         uint256 oldAllocPoint = tokenToPoolInfo[_stakingTokens[i]].allocPoint;
747
748         totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint - oldAllocPoint + _allocPoints[i];
749
750         tokenToPoolInfo[_stakingTokens[i]].allocPoint = _allocPoints[i];
751
752         emit UpdatePoolAlloc(_stakingTokens[i], oldAllocPoint, _allocPoints[i]);
```

```
753     }  
754 }
```

A modifier in Solidity is not a function. When it is used with the `return` keyword, it returns the consumer function of the modifier.

## Recommendation

```
145 modifier _onlyWhiteListed() {  
146     if (AllocationManagers[msg.sender] || PoolManagers[msg.sender] || msg.sender  
    == owner()) {  
147         _;  
148     } else {  
149         revert OnlyWhiteListedAllocaUpdater();  
150     }  
151 }
```

## Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-L6] `PendleStaking#_perPoolReward()` was never called

Low

### Issue Description

[https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/](https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/5ee6019761b7055e5ea5f8df70a18fa452ca8dc1/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L553-L563)

[5ee6019761b7055e5ea5f8df70a18fa452ca8dc1/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L553-L563](https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/5ee6019761b7055e5ea5f8df70a18fa452ca8dc1/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L553-L563)

```
553  function _perPoolReward(  
554      address _pool  
555  ) internal nonReentrant returns (uint256) {  
556      address[] memory poolAddress = new address[](1);  
557      poolAddress[0] = address(_pool);  
558      uint256 wethPreBalance = IWETH(WETH).balanceOf(address(this));  
559      distributorETH.claimProtocol(address(this), poolAddress);  
560      uint256 wethReward = IWETH(WETH).balanceOf(address(this)) -  
561          wethPreBalance;  
562      return wethReward;  
563  }
```

The internal function `_perPoolReward()` in `PendleStaking` is never called anywhere in the contract.

### Recommendation

Consider removing the redundant function or put it in use.

### Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-N7] Dev related codes to be removed

### Issue Description

https:

[//github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/bribeMarket/PenpieBribePool.sol#L8-L10](https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/bribeMarket/PenpieBribePool.sol#L8-L10)

```
8  
9  import "hardhat/console.sol";  
10
```

### Status

✓ Fixed

## [WP-I8] Allowing a 0 amount in `convertPendle()` is unnecessary.

### Informational

### Issue Description

If the case where `_amount` is 0 is the same as when it is greater than 0, returning early can save gas.

If it is different, specific code is needed.

<https://github.com/magpiexyz/pendleMagpie/blob/1e23ec6148f9fb3a081d3efd89f87a04cbf687cb/contracts/pendle/PendleStaking.sol#L243-L260>

```

243  function convertPendle(
244      uint256 _amount
245  ) public whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
246      uint256 preVePendleAmount = this.accumulatedVePendle();
247      if (_amount > 0) {
248          IERC20(PENDLE).safeApprove(address(vePendle), _amount);
249          uint128 unlockTime = _getIncreaseLockTime();
250          IPVotingEscrowMainchain(vePendle).increaseLockPosition(
251              uint128(_amount),
252              unlockTime
253          );
254      }
255      uint256 mintedVePendleAmount = this.accumulatedVePendle() -
256          preVePendleAmount;
257      emit PendleLocked(_amount, lockPeriod, mintedVePendleAmount);
258
259      return mintedVePendleAmount;
260  }

```

### Recommendation

Consider requiring `_amount > 0` .





## Status

✓ Fixed

# Appendix

## Timeliness of content

The content contained in the report is current as of the date appearing on the report and is subject to change without notice, unless indicated otherwise by WatchPug; however, WatchPug does not guarantee or warrant the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any report you access using the internet or other means, and assumes no obligation to update any information following publication.

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