

Threat and Weakness Analysis in SimplyTag ORGADATA COMPANY, LEER

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Table of Content I

- Introduction
- 2 Purpose of Analysis
- Challenges
- Application Sector
- 5 Positioning Analytics in Relevant Architectures
- 6 Knowledge Discovery in Database (KDD) Process
- Conclusion and Future Scope



Introduction

About ORGADATA:

- Orgadata is a leading software company, specializing in solutions for window and door digitalization, offering services like SimplyTag.
- SimplyTag is a tool that provides quick and convenient access to construction-related data for specific elements (e.g., windows or doors) using QR codes, enabling on-site professionals to retrieve essential information in real time.

Why?

- As a student of Industrial Informatics, we have studied how to digitalize products and processes in line with Industry 4.0 principles.
- In today's digital age, safeguarding sensitive information and system integrity is crucial.
- Threat and Weakness Analysis is an essential step in mitigating risks, preventing breaches, and ensuring operational resilience.



Purpose of Analysis

- Exploit exposed endpoints or unauthorized access.
- Detecting vulnerabilities in Orgadata's systems that could be exploited by malicious actors.
- Prevent unauthorized access attempts.
- Improve data security by safeguarding sensitive information of customer and operational data against breaches.
- Build a predictive model using the KDD process to classify threats and evaluate system requests effectively.
- Provide actionable insights to enhance system security and performance.



Challenges We Faced

- Understanding the huge data (approx. 2.2 million rows) provided in '.log' file and JSON formats.
- Distinguishing between genuine user activities and malicious attempts.
- Handling complex patterns in user behavior and request logs.





Application Sector

This project belongs to the Industry Domain, specifically for the Digital Tools and Software Solutions domain, with a focus on:

- Threat Detection
- Data Integrity Assurance
- Operational Security Optimizations
- Cybersecurity Measures



Positioning Analytics in Relevant Architecture

The analytics focus on cybersecurity and anomaly detection, aligning with ISO standards for secure data handling and reliable operations.

- **RAMI 4.0:** Positioned in the Information Layer (real-time data collection, processing and analysis for threat detection).
- IIRA: Located in the Control Domain (automated threat detection and response) and the Operations Domain (long-term system optimization and strategic planning).




Figure: 2.RAMI_IIRA



Knowledge Discovery in Database (KDD) Process

Data Selection:


Identify and Extract relevant data from log files while filtering out irrelevant information.

• Data Origin: Graylog server

Format: .logSize: 3.34 GB

• Features: Timestamps, PID, Logger, Message, Scope (e.g.,

Traceld, RequestID), Application, State, EventID.






Data Preparation:

Given the dataset, the following steps are carryout out to make the dataset clean and ready for analysis

- Merging and Conversion: Format .log to CSV
- Cleaning: Removed entries with no traceid, errors ,warnings
- Identified Key Attributes: Trace-ID, Status code, Path and User Agent



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Data Transformation

Restructure and manipulate the cleaned data for analysis.

- Grouped log entries by Traceld to rebuild complete request flows
- Parsed fields from nested JSON structures: Traceld, HTTP Status Code, Path, User-Agent.
- Transformed each log entry into a distinct row, aligning Traceld with its corresponding attributes for seamless analysis.

	A	В	C	D
1	Trace-id *	HTTP Status Co. *	Path v	User Agent
2	00000e83229182560bc00dc08d8d0895	200	/api/v1/nodes/08dd0fba-4f8b-4103-8a95-aed373124a23/el	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like G
3	0000ca9c0504724ec0352caf2d927e26	204	/api/v1/references/HTTPS:%2F%2FOWDS.ORG%2FAG.KZF4J	Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 14; SM-P620 Build/UP1A.231005.007; wv) AppleWeb
4	0000d58f79c6040f625be46853e6143f	200	/api/v1/references/d5731268-72f8-4350-8b42-d44b4fa4efe	1/codes
5	0001693fd167addef160ab0dddfb31d8	200	/api/v1/services/8054f549-6c59-4191-afb3-d31efc46f17e	Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrc
6	0001c4d4a65e06934a9e38f0f71b6496	204	/api/v2/nodes/ebf9e23b-3b78-4c30-9dab-cf963fb01f1a/pro	Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 14; SM-S911B Build/UP1A.231005.007; wv) AppleWe
7	0001d8ca5b76e77d80a9a3ec83903f7d	204	/api/v1/nodes/08dac0aa-8ed5-4ee8-866f-1c22990e0ef0/el-	Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_4 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15
8	0001fbbee4d73c2f6a9b28dde44c8e77	200	/api/healthz	curl/8.5.0
9	000273de5951b79ad885cc2de52675be	200	/api/healthz	curl/8.5.0
10	0002b1825f778a4cb8e0fc65f6e765cc	204	/api/v2/assets/650a0fb5-2e26-44c4-8055-2e7a691e1f9b/no	Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_1_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.1
11	0002f7cc5075af12e46bd55ee4636d81	200	/api/v1/references/43bdf33e-7709-4e25-bbbb-848e309714	bb/codes
12	000302bc46d6fb65289bc2355604cc8f	200	/api/v2/versions	check_http/v2.4.0 (monitoring-plugins 2.4.0)
13	00030a9aeb3eaa3e54a28873d94e81ea	200	/api/v2/versions	check_http/v2.4.0 (monitoring-plugins 2.4.0)
14	000360463cc19ebcad352f42441055b3	200	/api/v2/versions	check_http/v2.4.0 (monitoring-plugins 2.4.0)
15	000379bd694343567e14425b1985acfe	200	/api/v1/elements/d5fd8aa5-89e1-4f7e-9dbf-0f180ef64ceb/	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like G
16	000439937e3f6ec27d4ee47d56d33d57	200	/api/v1/references/HTTPS:%2F%2FOWDS.ORG%2FAG.M9FB	Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 14; moto g14 Build/UTLB34.102-54-1; wv) AppleWel
17	000472fc41c4d21ae9516f91ec850212	200	/api/v1/elements/81dbd634-7fff-4bc3-b04c-c7dccad5383d/	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:132.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/:

Figure: 5. Transformed CSV data



Data Mining

Feature Extraction

Extracted hidden patterns and anomalies from the selected data.

- Path-Based Features (Approach 1 & 2):
 - Extracted key features based on the Path attribute. Features included:
 - Path length
 - Presence of special characters
 - SQL keywords
 - Path traversal attempts
 - Suspicious file extensions
 - Applied TF-IDF vectorization on the Path attribute to convert API endpoint access into numerical features for machine learning.
- User-Agent Analysis (Approach 3):
 - Analyzed User-Agent strings to detect patterns linked to suspicious or malicious activities.



Data Mining

Clustering and Anomaly Detection

- Approach 1: Path and Frequency-Based Clustering
 - Combined extracted path features with frequency metrics and HTTP status codes.
 - Used DBSCAN for clustering and Isolation Forest for outlier detection.
- Approach 2: TF-IDF and Clustering
 - Utilized TF-IDF vectorized features and numeric attributes for clustering.
 - Integrated DBSCAN and Isolation Forest for robust anomaly detection, flagging unusual requests.
- Approach 3: User-Agent Pattern Analysis
 - Focused on identifying suspicious behaviors using User-Agent patterns.



Validation/ Verification

- DBSCAN: Verified datapoints within clusters had similar patterns and the endpoints with SwaggerUI
- **Isolation Forest:** Distribution of anomaly scores was evaluated to differentiate anomalies from regular requests.

Data Visualization



Figure: 6.Analysis based on Path



Figure: 7.Analysis based on Useragent



Conclusion and Future Scope

Conclusion:

- Used Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) process to identify potential threats.
- Applied machine learning techniques like DBSCAN and Isolation Forest for clustering and anomaly detection.
- Found exposed endpoints or unauthorized access requests.

Future Scope:

- Unified Approach Integration
- Advanced Model Optimization Algorithms
- Automated Feature Engineering
- Broader Dataset Analysis



Thank you for your attention