

Chapter 2

Application Layer


A note on the use of these ppt slides:

We're making these slides freely available to all (faculty, students, readers). They're in PowerPoint form so you see the animations; and can add, modify, and delete slides (including this one) and slide content to suit your needs. They obviously represent a *lot* of work on our part. In return for use, we only ask the following:

- ❖ If you use these slides (e.g., in a class) that you mention their source (after all, we'd like people to use our book!)
- ❖ If you post any slides on a www site, that you note that they are adapted from (or perhaps identical to) our slides, and note our copyright of this material.

Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR

© All material copyright 1996-2012
J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved



Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach

6th edition

Jim Kurose, Keith Ross
Addison-Wesley
March 2012

Chapter 2: outline

2.1 principles of network applications

- app architectures
- app requirements

2.2 Web and HTTP

2.3 FTP

2.4 electronic mail

- SMTP, POP3, IMAP

2.5 DNS

2.6 P2P applications

2.7 socket programming with UDP and TCP

DNS: domain name system

people: many identifiers:

- SSN, name, passport #

Internet hosts, routers:

- IP address (32 bit) - used for addressing datagrams
- “name”, e.g., www.yahoo.com - used by humans

Q: how to map between IP address and name, and vice versa ?

Domain Name System:

- ❖ *distributed database*
implemented in hierarchy of many *name servers*
- ❖ *application-layer protocol:* hosts, name servers communicate to *resolve* names (address/name translation)
 - note: core Internet function, implemented as application-layer protocol
 - complexity at network's “edge”

DNS: services, structure

DNS services


- ❖ hostname to IP address translation
- ❖ host aliasing
 - canonical, alias names
- ❖ mail server aliasing
- ❖ load distribution
 - replicated Web servers: many IP addresses correspond to one name

why not centralize DNS?

- ❖ single point of failure
- ❖ traffic volume
- ❖ distant centralized database
- ❖ maintenance

A: doesn't scale!

DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database




client wants IP for www.amazon.com; 1st approx:

- ❖ client queries root server to find com DNS server
- ❖ client queries .com DNS server to get amazon.com DNS server
- ❖ client queries amazon.com DNS server to get IP address for www.amazon.com

DNS: root name servers

- ❖ contacted by local name server that can not resolve name
- ❖ root name server:
 - contacts authoritative name server if name mapping not known
 - gets mapping
 - returns mapping to local name server



TLD, authoritative servers

top-level domain (TLD) servers:

- responsible for com, org, net, edu, aero, jobs, museums, and all top-level country domains, e.g.: uk, fr, ca, jp
- Network Solutions maintains servers for .com TLD
- Educause for .edu TLD

authoritative DNS servers:

- organization's own DNS server(s), providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization's named hosts
- can be maintained by organization or service provider

Local DNS name server


- ❖ does not strictly belong to hierarchy
- ❖ each ISP (residential ISP, company, university) has one
 - also called “default name server”
- ❖ when host makes DNS query, query is sent to its local DNS server
 - has local cache of recent name-to-address translation pairs (but may be out of date!)
 - acts as proxy, forwards query into hierarchy

DNS name resolution example

- ❖ host at cis.poly.edu wants IP address for gaia.cs.umass.edu

iterated query:


- ❖ contacted server replies with name of server to contact
- ❖ “I don’t know this name, but ask this server”



DNS name resolution example

recursive query:

- ❖ puts burden of name resolution on contacted name server
- ❖ heavy load at upper levels of hierarchy?



DNS: caching, updating records

- ❖ once (any) name server learns mapping, it *caches* mapping
 - cache entries timeout (disappear) after some time (TTL)
 - TLD servers typically cached in local name servers
 - thus root name servers not often visited
- ❖ cached entries may be *out-of-date* (best effort name-to-address translation!)
 - if name host changes IP address, may not be known Internet-wide until all TTLs expire
- ❖ update/notify mechanisms proposed IETF standard
 - RFC 2136

DNS records

DNS: distributed db storing resource records (RR)

RR format: (name, value, type, ttl)

type=A

- **name** is hostname
- **value** is IP address

type=NS

- **name** is domain (e.g., foo.com)
- **value** is hostname of authoritative name server for this domain

type=CNAME

- **name** is alias name for some “canonical” (the real) name
- **www.ibm.com** is really **servereast.backup2.ibm.com**
- **value** is canonical name

type=MX


- **value** is name of mailserver associated with **name**

DNS protocol, messages


- ❖ *query* and *reply* messages, both with same *message format*

msg header

- ❖ **identification**: 16 bit # for query, reply to query uses same #
- ❖ **flags**:
 - query or reply
 - recursion desired
 - recursion available
 - reply is authoritative



DNS protocol, messages



Inserting records into DNS

- ❖ example: new startup “Network Utopia”
- ❖ register name networkutopia.com at *DNS registrar* (e.g., Network Solutions)
 - provide names, IP addresses of authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
 - registrar inserts two RRs into .com TLD server:
(networkutopia.com, dns1.networkutopia.com, NS)
(dns1.networkutopia.com, 212.212.212.1, A)
- ❖ create authoritative server type A record for www.networkutopia.com; type MX record for networkutopia.com

Attacking DNS

DDoS attacks

- ❖ Bombard root servers with traffic
 - Not successful to date
 - Traffic Filtering
 - Local DNS servers cache IPs of TLD servers, allowing root server bypass
- ❖ Bombard TLD servers
 - Potentially more dangerous

Redirect attacks

- ❖ Man-in-middle
 - Intercept queries
- ❖ DNS poisoning
 - Send bogus replies to DNS server, which caches

Exploit DNS for DDoS

- ❖ Send queries with spoofed source address: target IP
- ❖ Requires amplification