DAY 4

EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK

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SOMETHING ABOUT ME

Experience:

- 10+ years in Cybersecurity
- Security Analysis
- Incident Handling and response
- Security Architecture and Strategy
- SIEM Engineering
- Vulnerability management
- SOAR

Socials:

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Project Delivered in:

- India
- Australia
- Belgium

Current Company:

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
CHALLENGING QUESTIONS FOR DEFENDERS

- How effective are my defenses?
- Do I have a chance at detecting APT29 or APT28 or any other adversary group?
- Is the data I'm collecting useful?
- Do I have overlapping tool coverage?
- Will this new product/technology help my organization's defenses?
- How can I strategize my defences and strengthen the security posture?

WHAT IS MITRE ATT&CK?

- ATT&CK is a knowledge base of cyber adversary behavior and taxonomy for adversarial actions across their lifecycle.
- ATT&CK has two parts:
- ATT&CK for Enterprise: which covers behavior against enterprise IT networks and cloud.
- ATT&CK for Mobile: which focuses on behavior against mobile devices.


DAVID BIANCO'S PYRAMID OF PAIN



WHY DID MITRE DEVELOP ATT&CK?

- MITRE started ATT&CK in 2013 to document common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
- It was created out of a need to document adversary behaviors for use within a MITRE research project called FMX
- Investigate use of endpoint telemetry data and analytics to improve post-compromise detection of adversaries operating within enterprise networks
- ATT&CK was used as the basis for testing the efficacy of the sensors and analytics under FMX
- Served as the common language which both offense and defense could use to improve over time

OVERVIEW OF THE ADVERSARY LIFECYCLE



OVERVIEW OF THE ADVERSARY LIFECYCLE

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques			
Active Scanning (0/2)	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Account Manipulation (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/2)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/2)	Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)	Account Access Removal			
Gather Victim Host Information (I)/4)	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Brute Force (0/4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data (0/3)	Communication Through Removable	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction			
Gather Victim Identity Information (0/3)	Compromise	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Autostart	II Boot or Logon	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (0/5)	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture	Media	Exfiltration Over	Data Encrypted for Impact			
Gather Victim Network	Infrastructure (0/6) Develop	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Execution (0/15) Boot or Logon	Autostart Execution (0/15)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session	Automated Collection	Data Encoding (8/2) Data Obfuscation (8/3)	Alternative Protocol (0/3)	Data Manipulation (0/3)			
Gather Victim Org	Capabilities ((/4)	Phishing (0/3)	Inter-Process	Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts ms	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced	Cloud Service Dashboard	Hijacking (0/2)	Browser Session Hijacking	Dynamic	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Defacement (0/2)			
Information (0/4)	Establish Accounts (0/2)	Replication Through Removable Media	Communication (0/2)	Browser Extensions	Create or Modify	Deploy Container	Authentication	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Services (0/6)	Clipboard Data	Resolution (0/3)	Exfiltration Over	Disk Wipe (0/2)			
Phishing for Information (0/3)	Obtain Capabilities (0/6)	Supply Chain	Native API	Compromise Client Software Binary	System Process (0/4)	Direct Volume Access	Forge Web Credentials (0/2)	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Cloud	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	Other Network Medium (0/1)	Endpoint Denial of Service ()/4)			
Search Closed Sources (0/2) Search Open Technical	Stage Capabilities (0/5)	Compromise (0/3) Trusted Relationship	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6) Shared Modules	Create Account (0/3)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Domain Policy Modification	Input Capture (0/4)	Container and Resource Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Storage Object Data from	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption			
Databases (0/5)		Valid Accounts (0/4)	Software Deployment	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Modify Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Configuration Repository	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over	Inhibit System Recovery			
Search Open Websites/Domains (0/2)			Tools System Services (1)(2)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Process (0/4) Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication	Data from Information Repositories	Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application	Web Service (0/2) Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service (0/2)			
Search Victim-Owned			topa.	The second secon	Exploitation for		- Constitution of the Cons	Group Policy Discovery	Material (0/4)		Layer Protocol		Resource Hijacking			
Websites			User Execution (0/3) Windows Management	External Remote Services	Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution	File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Network Service Scanning		Data from Local System	Non-Standard Port	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Service Stop			
			Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Flow (0/11)	Hide Artifacts (0/9)	Steal Application Access Token	Network Share Discovery		Data from Network Shared Drive	Protocol Tunneling		System Shutdown/Reboot			
				Implant Internal Image	Process Injection (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Steal or Forge	Network Sniffing		Data from Removable	Proxy (0/4)	11				
				Modify Authentication	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	Impair Defenses (0/9)	Kerberos Tickets (0/4)	Password Policy Discovery		Media	Remote Access Software					
					Process (0/4)	Valid Accounts (0/4)	Indicator Removal on Host (0/6)	Steal Web Session Cookie		_	Data Staged (0/2)	Traffic Signaling mm				
				Office Application Startup (0/6)		Indirect Command Execution		Permission Groups Discovery (0/3)	H.	Email Collection (0/3)	Web Service					
								Pre-OS Boot (0/5)	ii	Masquerading (0/7)	Authentication Interception	Process Discovery		Screen Capture		-
A .				Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	11	Modify Authentication Process (1)(4)	Unsecured Credentials (0/7)	Query Registry		Video Capture						
4				Server Software Component (0.4)	II .	Modify Cloud Compute		Remote System Discovery	_							
				Traffic Signaling	н	Infrastructure (0/4)		Software Discovery (0/1)	н							
PRE-AT	T&CK			Valid Accounts (0/4)	п	Modify Registry		System Information Discovery								
						Modify System Image (0/2) Network Boundary Bridging (0/1)	,	System Location Discovery (0/1)	и.							
ATT	&CK					Obfuscated Files or Information		System Network Configuration Discovery (0/1)	n:							
						Pre-OS Boot (0/S)		System Network Connections Discovery								

WHAT ARE "TACTICS", "TECHNIQUES", "SUB-TECHNIQUES" AND "PROCEDURES"?

Tactics:

- Tactics represent the "why" of an ATT&CK technique or sub-technique
- It is the adversary's tactical goal: the reason for performing an action
- Example: An adversary may want to achieve credential access

Techniques:

- Techniques represent "how" an adversary achieves a tactical goal by performing an action
- Example: an adversary may dump credentials to achieve credential access

Sub-techniques:

- Sub-techniques are a more specific description of the adversarial behavior used to achieve a goal
- They describe behavior at a lower level than a technique
- Example: an adversary may dump credentials by accessing the Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets

Procedures:

- Procedures are the specific implementation that the adversary uses for techniques or sub-techniques
- These are categorized in ATT&CK as the observed in the wild use of techniques in the "Procedure Examples" section of technique pages

WHAT ARE "TACTICS", "TECHNIQUES", "SUB-TECHNIQUES" **AND "PROCEDURES"?**

APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits. [62]

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise		Scheduled Task		Binary Padding	Networ	k Sniffing	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfitration	Data Destructio
Exploit Public-Fading	Laur	nohoti	Access Toker	Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Communication Through	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for I
Application	Local Job	Scheduling	Bypass User /	Account Control	Bash History	Application Window	Software	Clipboard Data	Removable Media	Data Encrypted	Defacement
External Remote Services	LSASS	S Driver			Brute Force	Discovery	Distributed Component	Data from Information	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content W
Hardware Additions	Tr	rap	Process Injection		Credential Dumping	Browser Bookmark	Object Model	Repositories	Custom Command and	Exfitration Over Other	Disk Structure V
Replication Through	AppleScript		DLL Search Order Hijacking		Credentials in Files	Discovery	Exploitation of	Data from Local System	Control Protocol	Network Medium	Endpoint Denial of
Removable Media	CMSTP	1	Image File Execution Options Injecti	on	Credentials In Registry	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Network	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfitration Over Command	Firmware Corru
Spearphishing Attachment	Command Line Interace	nto-	Plist Modification		Exploitation for	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Shared Drive	Protocol	and Control Channel	Inhibit System Re
Spearphishing Link			Valid Accounts	And Andrews and Andrews	Credential Access	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	Data Encoding	Exflitration Over Alternative	Network Denial of
Spearphishing via Service	Control Panel Items	Accession	lity Egatures	BITS Jobs	Forced Authentication	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Data Obfuscation Protocol	Protocol	Resource Hija
Stoply Chain Compromise	Dynamic Data Exchange	Appci	ert DLLs	Clear Command History	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote Desittop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Fronting	Exfitration Over	Runtime Data Mar
Thisted Relationship	Execution through API	Appli	nit DLLs	CMOEP	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Domain Generation	Physical Medium	Service Sto
Valid Accounts	Execution through	Application	on Shimming	Code Signing	- Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	Stored Data Man
``	Module Load		Hijacking	Compiled HTML File	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	dion Through Screen Capture	Fallback Channels		Transmitted I
`	Exploitation for	File System Pern	missions Weakness	Component Firmware	Keychain	Query Registry	Charles and Charle	Video Capture	Multiband Communication	8	Manipulatio
` `	Client Execution	Ho	poking	Semognent Object Model	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Remote System Discovery	Shared Webrood		Multi-hop Proxy		
\	Graphical User Interface	Launch	h Daemon	Hijacking	and Relay	Security Software Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption		
\	InstallUtil	New	Service	Control Panel Items -	Password Filter DLL	System Information	Taint Shared Content		Multi-Stage Channels		
\	Mshta					Nisrovany					
\	PowerShell	D.				4	and the same of the same		-4-4:		
	↑ Regsvos/Regasm	Serv		res Si	necitic	Techni		neme	ntation		
1	Negsvr32										
1	Rundli32				A	1	30-1	142			
	▲ Scripting		าคarnn	ichina	Attacr	ment					
	Service Execution	.bash_profile a	11 . (11 11	1.31 111 111		achment					

Procedure Examples Name

APT19

Space after Fliename

Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Description

APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached. [88] [89]

Indicator Removal on Host

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Spearphishing Attachment

Spearphishing Attachment

Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Spearphishing Attachment

ID: T1193

Tactic: Initial Access

Platform: Windows, macOS, Linux

Data Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture,

Network intrusion detection system, Detonation

chamber, Email gateway, Mail server

CAPEC ID: CAPEC-163

Version: 1.0

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Spearphishing Attachment

Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Antivirus/Antimalware	Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Network Intrusion Prevention	Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity.
Restrict Web-Based Content	Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.
User Training	Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails.

Detection

Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit.

Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Spearphishing Attachment

Procedure Examples

Name	Description
APT12	APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached. [88] [89]
APT19	APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits. [62]
APT28	APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office attachments. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]

References

- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). 'Operation Oceansalt' Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018.
- Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019.

- Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, July 27). The Curious Case of Mia Ash: Fake Persona Lures Middle Eastern Targets. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
- 48. Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing

Home > Groups > APT28

APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence

Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. [1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004. [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. ^[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations. ^[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

ID: G0007

Associated Groups:
 SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group
 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy
 Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat

Group-4127, TG-4127

Contributors: Sébastien Ruel, CGI; Drew Church, Splunk; Emily Ratliff, IBM;

Richard Gold, Digital Shadows

Version: 3.2

Created: 31 May 2017

Last Modified: 18 October 2021

Associated Group Descriptions

Name	Description
SNAKEMACKEREL	[15]
Swallowtail	[12]
Group 74	[16]
Sednit	This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. [8][7][17][4]
Sofacy	This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. [6][7][5][18][4][16]
Pawn Storm	[7][18][19]
Fancy Bear	[5][17][18][4][16][12][20][2]
STRONTIUM	[17][18][21][22][19][2]
Tsar Team	[18][16][16]

Techniques Used

ATT&CK[®] Navigator Layers ▼

Domain	ID	Name		Use				
Enterprise	T1134	.001	Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft	APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation. ^[23]				
Enterprise	T1098	.002	Account Manipulation: Exchange Email Delegate Permissions	APT28 has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account. [2]				
Enterprise	T1583	.001	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	APT28 registered domains imitating NATO, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources and other organizations. ^[6] [14]				
Enterprise	T1595	.002	Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning	APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. [24]				
Enterprise	T1071	.001	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Later implants used by APT28, such as CHOPSTICK, use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration. [6][2]				
		.003	Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols	APT28 has used IMAP, POP3, and SMTP for a communication channel in various implants, including using self-registered Google Mail accounts and later compromised email servers of its victims. ^{[6][2]}				

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access 15 techniques	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Active Scanning (1/2)	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (2/8)	Account Manipulation (1/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/2)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in-the- Middle (0/2)	Application Layer Protocol (2.44)	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)	Account Access Removal
Gather Victim Host Information (0/4)	Compromise Accounts	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (1/5)	Access Token Manipulation (1/5)	Brute Force (2/4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Identity Information (1/3)	Compromise Infrastructure	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Boot or Logon Autostart	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (0/5)	Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Capture	Media Data Encoding (0/2)	Exfiltration Over Alternative	Data Encrypted for Impact
Gather Victim Network Information (0/6)	Develop	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Boot or Logon	Execution (1/15)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access	Discovery	Remote Service Session	Automated Collection	Data Obfuscation (1/3)	Protocol (1/3)	Data Manipulation (0/3)
Gather Victim Org Information (6/4)	Capabilities (0/4) Establish Accounts (0/4)	Phishing (2/3) Replication Through	Inter-Process Communication (1/2)	Initialization Scripts (1/5) Browser Extensions	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (1/5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery	Hijacking (0/2) Remote Services (1/6)	Browser Session Hijacking	Dynamic Resolution (0/3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Defacement (0/2) Disk Wipe (0/2)
Phishing for Information (0/4)	Obtain Capabilities (1/6)	Removable Media Supply Chain	Native API	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Deploy Container Direct Volume Access	Forge Web Credentials	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Clipboard Data Data from Cloud	Encrypted Channel (1/2)	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (0/1)	Endpoint Denial of Service (0/4)
Search Closed Sources (0/2)	Stage Capabilities (0/5)	Compromise (D/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	Create Account (0/3)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Domain Policy	Input Capture (1/4)	Container and Resource	Software	Storage Object	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption
Search Open Technical Databases (0/5)		Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts	Shared Modules Software Deployment	Create or Modify System Process	Escape to Host	Modification (0/2) Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Modify Modify Authentication	Discovery Domain Trust Discovery	Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content	Data from Configuration Repository	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over	Inhibit System Recovery
Search Open Websites/Domains (0/2)		1000	Tools System Services (0/2)	Event Triggered Execution	Event Triggered Execution (1/15)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Process (0/4) Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication	Data from Information Repositories	Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application	Web Service Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service
Search Victim-Owned Websites			User Execution (2/3)	External Remote Services	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	File and Directory Permissions Modification	OS Credential	Group Policy Discovery Network Service Scanning	Material (2/4)	Data from Local System	Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Resource Hijacking Service Stop
			Windows Management Instrumentation	Hijack Execution	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Hide Artifacts (2/9)	Dumping (2/8) Steal Application Access Token	Network Share Discovery		Data from Network	Protocol Tunneling	Codo Account	System
				Flow (0/11) Implant Internal Image	Process Injection (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Steal or Forge	Network Sniffing		Shared Drive Data from Removable	Proxy (2/4)	n	Shutdown/Reboot
				Modify Authentication Process (0)40	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	Impair Defenses (0/9) Indicator Removal on	Kerberos Tičkets (0/4) Steal Web Session	Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery		Media Data Staged (2/2)	Remote Access Software	-	
				Office Application	11	Host (3/6)	Cookie Two-Factor	Permission Groups	yang M	Email Collection (1/3)	Traffic Signaling (0/1)	11	
				Startup (1/6) Pre-OS Boot (1/5)		Indirect Command Execution Masquerading 11/21	Authentication Interception	Discovery (0/3) Process Discovery		Input Capture (1/4)	Web Service (1/3)		
				Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	и	Modify Authentication Process	Unsecured Credentials	Query Registry		Screen Capture Video Capture			
				Server Software Component (1/4)	н	Modify Cloud Compute	1	Remote System Discovery Software Discovery	N.				
				Traffic Signaling (0/1)	11	Modify Registry	S.	System Information	<u> </u>				
				Valid Accounts (1/4)	M	Modify System Image (0/2)	п	Discovery System Location	ı				
						Network Boundary Bridging (0/1)	H.	Discovery (0/1) System Network	1				
						Obfuscated Files or Information	ii.	Configuration Discovery (0/1)	1				
						Pre-OS Boot (1/5)	0	System Network Connections Discovery					

Software

ID	Name	References	Techniques
S0045	ADVSTORESHELL	[17][20]	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method, Archive Collected Data, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Commonly Used Port, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Scheduled Transfer, Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Information Discovery
S0351	Cannon	[27][43]	Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Process Discovery, Screen Capture, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Time Discovery
S0160	certutil	[31][2]	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Ingress Tool Transfer, Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate

Home > Software > ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. [1] [2]

ID: S0045

Associated Software: AZZY,
 EVILTOSS, NETUI, Sedreco

i Type: MALWARE

i Platforms: Windows

Version: 1.1

Created: 31 May 2017

Last Modified: 30 March 2020

ATT&CK USE CASES


Detection

```
processes = search Process:Create
reg = filter processes where (exe == "reg.exe" and parent_exe
== "cmd.exe")
cmd = filter processes where (exe == "cmd.exe" and
parent_exe != "explorer.exe"")
reg_and_cmd = join (reg, cmd) where (reg.ppid == cmd.pid and
reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)
output reg_and_cmd
```


Assessment and Engineering



Threat Intelligence



Adversary Emulation



DETECTION: FIND THE BEHAVIOR

- Different mindset from looking for indicators
- Look for what the adversary or software does
- Focus on initial compromise and post-compromise details
- Info that may not be useful for ATT&CK mapping:
 - Static malware analysis
 - Infrastructure registration information
 - Industry/victim targeting information

DETECTION: FIND THE BEHAVIOR

The most interesting PDB string is the "4113.pdb," which appears to reference CVE-2014-4113. This CVE is a local kernel vulnerability that, with successful exploitation, would give any user SYSTEM access on the machine.

The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami" to verify it is running with the elevated privileges of "System" and creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task:

schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System"

When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. The malware sends the SOCKS5 connection request "05 01 00" and verifies the server response starts with "05 00".

DETECTION: RESEARCH THE BEHAVIOR

- CTI analysts may not be familiar with adversary/software behavior
- Encourage them to do additional research:
 - of your own team or organization (defenders/red teamers)
 - of external resources
- Time-consuming, but builds better analysis
- Understanding of core behavior helps with next steps

DETECTION: RESEARCH THE BEHAVIOR





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SOCKS

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about the internet protocol. For other uses, see Socks (disambiguation).

SOCKS is an Internet protocol that exchanges network packets between a client and server through a proxy server. **SOCKS5** additionally provides authentication so only authorized users may access a server. Practically, a SOCKS server proxies TCP connections to an arbitrary IP address, and provides a means for UDP packets to be forwarded.

SOCKS performs at Layer 5 of the OSI model (the session layer, an intermediate layer between the presentation layer and the transport layer). SOCKS server accepts incoming client connection on TCP port 1080.^{[1][2]}

Port 1913 Details

threat/application/port search:

known port assignments and vulnerabilities

Port(s)	Protocol	Service	Details	Source
1913	tcp,udp	armadp a	armadp	IANA

- What is the adversary trying to accomplish?
- Often requires domain expertise
- Finished intel can give you context
- Only 12 options:
 - Initial Access Execution
 - Persistence Privilege Escalation
 - Defense Evasion Credential Access
 - Discovery Lateral Movement
 - Collection Command and Control
 - Exfiltration Impact

- "When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. ... Once the connection to the server is established, the malware expects a message containing at least three bytes from the server. These first three bytes are the command identifier. The following commands are supported by the malware ... "
- A connection in order to command the malware to do something
- Command and Control

- Often the toughest part
- Not every behavior is necessarily a technique
- Key strategies:
 - Look at the list of Techniques for the identified Tactic
 - Search attack.mitre.org
 - Try key words
 - Try "procedure"-level detail
 - Try specific command strings

MITRE ATT&CK	Matrices	Tactics ▼	Techniques ▼	Groups	Software	Resources ▼	Blog ☑*	Contact
ENTERPRISE ▼	Home > Ta	ctics > Enterpr	ise > Command and	d Control				
TACTICS	Com	mand	l and Co	ontro		Tec	hniqu	es: 21

T1094 Custom
Command and
Control
Protocol

Protocol vs. Port

→ 2 techniques?

T1043 Commonly Used Port

"the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection"

SOCKS

Techniques


Term found on page Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol (ID: T1095)

Connection Proxy (ID: T1090)

Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol

Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. ^[1] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).

BUBBLEWRAP can communicate using SOCKS.[4]



ASSESSMENT AND ENGINEERING

- Based on the type of visibility decisions should be driven on what you collect
 - What are the tools and technology you choose?
 - What is the current coverage?
 - Are the gaps identified?
 - Will they help you in building effective and efficient defenses?
- Look at the bigger picture beyond detection
- Increase awareness among the stake holders

ASSESSMENT AND ENGINEERING

- Collect one log source at a time to improve ATT&CK visibility
- Places to start:
 - rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT
 - https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT
 - Windows Event logs
 - https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets
 - Sysmon
 - https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config

EXAMPLE: DETT&CT

- DeTT&CT provides the following functionality:
 - Administrate and score the quality of your data sources.
 - Get insight on the visibility you have on for example endpoints.
 - Map your detection coverage.
 - Map threat actor behaviors.
 - Compare visibility, detection coverage and threat actor behaviors to uncover possible improvements in detection and visibility (which is based on your available data sources). This can help you to prioritize your blue teaming efforts.

HOW TO SCORE DETECTION'S FOR ASSESSMENT?

Score	Score name	Degree of detection	Timing	Coverage of the technique	Opportunities to bypass detection
-1	None	None	N/A	None	N/A
0	Forensics / context	None	Possibly not real time	None	N/A
1	Basic			Small number of aspects of the technique	Bypassing (evasion/obfuscation) could be possible
2	Fair	(Correlation) rule(s)	Possibly not real time		Bypassing (evasion/obfuscation) could be possible
3	Good	More complex analytics	Real time	Many known aspects of the technique	Bypassing (evasion/obfuscation) could be possible
4	Very good	More complex analytics	Real time	Almost all known aspects of the technique	Bypassing (evasion/obfuscation) is hard
5	Excellent	More complex analytics	Real time	All known aspects of the technique	Bypassing (evasion/obfuscation) is hard

Score	Score name	Description					
0	None	No visibility at all.					
1	Sufficient data sources with sufficient quality availate to be able to see one aspect of the technique's procedures.						
2	Sufficient data sources with sufficient quality availa to be able to see more aspects of the technique's procedures compared to "1/Minimal".						
3	Good	Sufficient data sources with sufficient quality available to be able to see almost all known aspects of the technique's procedures.					
4	Excellent	All data sources and required data quality necessary to be able to see all known aspects of the technique's procedures are available.					

ASSESSMENT OF THE GAPS

Lecal Job Scheduling Web Shall

Modify Existing Service Notice Helper DLL

Path interception.

Port Monnoes

No. continue

User Execution

HISTOCHTROL

Indianal Constitute Execution Install Root Certificate

LC MAIN Hyacking

Mesquereding

Modify Registry

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And	Exfiltration	Impact
Dave by Componise	AppleScript	bash_profile and bashro	Access Token Manipulate	Access Token Manipulate	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScrpt	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automoted Exhibition	Data Gestruction
Exploit Fiducification	CM67P	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Dinary Padding	Seek History	Discount Westow	of excursor Deployment	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Made	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for impact
External Revision Service	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BYTS Jobs	thrute Force	DOMEST HOLDING	Calculation (see Constitution or other	Clipticard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Delacement
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Supply Chain Comprone		4	Expidition for Privilege	Completed HTML Files	Hooking	Pessword Policy Discove	Remote File Copy	Email Cultection	Operage Generation	Scheduled Transfer	Network Desigl of Service
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	Misma	STREET, CROSS.	New Service	costs discussion	Network Smitting	Charles Scalinger	Third-party Software		Poli Knocking		
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	Registros/Registers	Estama e	Plast Modification	Ct.i. Side-Loading	Keys	System Network	Virializas Remote Management	1	Remote Fire Copy		
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	Third-party Software	LC LOAD DYLIB Addition	VMHE Accounts	Hidden Use		Speal	mnist	una A	mach	ment	•

Spearpinishing Attachinent:

Supply Chain Compromise?

Good Coverage Medium Coverage Low Coverage No Coverage

ASSESSMENT AND ENGINEERING CONCLUSIONS

- Plan out your tools and log monitoring strategy based on coverage
- Determine what techniques your current logs and technology detect and remediate
 - Review the documentation
 - Check with the vendor
- Identify what changes can be done to the environment
 - Configuration changes?
 - acquiring new detection tools?
 - map the gaps the tool can fill
- Plan to use the resources based on the security budget

THANK YOU!!

AND KEEP USING ATT&CK TO DETTECT;)