Find file
2031e6a Sep 2, 2016
@vinipsmaker @maqi @frabrunelle @dirvine
385 lines (284 sloc) 22 KB

Data Chains


DataChains are a container that allows large blocks of data to be maintained. These blocks can be validated by a node on a network, close to the data name, to contain valid data that was guaranteed to have been correctly stored onto the network. Code for this RFC is available on github

Definitions used

  • Decentralised network, A peer to peer network in xor space, using Kadmelia type addressing.
  • Hash, a cryptographic one way function that produces a fixed length representation of any input.
  • Immutable data, a data type that has a name == hash of it's contents (it is immutable as changing the contents creates a new piece of immutable data).
  • Structured data, a data type that has a fixed name, but mutable contents.
  • GROUP_SIZE, the number of nodes surrounding a network address.
  • Chain consensus, the fact that majority number of signatories exist in the next link (DataBlock as described below) that also exist in the previous block.
  • Churn event, a change in the group, either by a node leaving or a node joining.


A mechanism to lock data descriptors in containers that may be held on a decentralised network. Such structures are cryptographically secured in lock step using a consensus of cryptographic signatures. These signatures are of a certain size (group size) with a majority required to be considered valid (much like N of P sharing). In a decentralised network that has secured groups, these signatures are those closest to the holder of a DataChain. The implementation linked at github provides a mechanism to hold data as well as the DataChain of descriptors.

When a DataChain begins, the first item is likely a link. This is a block that uses the identity of a close group on the network. This link has an associated proof that is the PublicKey and a corresponding signature for each node. The Signature is the signed link block. On each churn event a new link is created and again signed by all members of the close_group. This link is the nodes close group as known by all members of that close_group. The link is the xor result of that close_group. The first link in a network may be referred to as the Genesis block.

Data block entries are signed by an ever changing majority of pre-existing nodes. As the chain grows, this rolling majority of different signatories can be cryptographically confirmed (via links). This process continues to the very top of the chain which will contain entries signed by a majority of the current close group of nodes. This current group of nodes can then cryptographically validate the entire chain and every data element referred to within it.

An example of a DataChain may look like this.


The links maintain group consensus and the data elements should individually validate all data blocks though the group consensus provided by the preceding link.

As groups change and the network grows, or indeed shrinks, many chains held by various nodes will have a common element. This allows such chains to be cross referenced in order to build a complete picture of data from the start of the network. In essence, this chain of verifiable data elements provides a provable sequence of data validity and also the sequence of such data appearing on the network. It is assumed that a later project using graph analysis can provide analytics that may be subjected to deep learning algorithms that will improve network security and efficiency.

It is through this basic recognition of chained majority agreements that assures the ability for a DataChain to be validated and therefore allows data to be republished.

The design described below will show a system where node capabilities are amortised across a network, providing a balance of resources that can be mixed evenly across a network of nodes with varying capabilities, from mass persistent data storage to node with very little, transient data storage.


In a fully decentralised network there are many problems to solve, two of these issues can be thought of as:

  1. Handling the transfer of large amounts of data to replicant nodes on each churn event.

  2. Allowing data to be republished in a secure manner.

Point 2 actually encompasses two large issues in itself. The ability to start a node and make it's data available is obviously required where we have large amounts of data to maintain. Another large advantage is the ability for such a network to recover from a full system outage (full network collapse, worldwide power outage etc.).

Detailed design

Data covered by a data chain

This proposal is aimed at protecting data by confirming the nodes on the network that were the closest to the data at that point in time. This data will have a common number of leading bits corresponding to the part of the network they were close to.

DataChains can be validated by a majority of the current nodes close peers. As a chain will be transferable (with the data) it will not have an identifier of any particular address. Instead the identifiers for the groups will appear somewhat arbitrary. Acceptance of a DataChain by a node will require that the current close nodes in a group have all signed the chain.

What concerns us in this design is that at least all group members agree on something that they can sign to attest to this group having existed on the network. To achieve this we again use xor and as described below the identifier for links is merely the xor of all group members in relation to individual nodes and not any data item itself.


A BlockIdentifier is simple enumeration that represents a Data item such as (structuredData or ImmutableData).

The other type that can be represented in the enum is a Link. A Link represents a valid group of nodes that are close to a point in the Xor address space. This point changes with respect to changing nodes around any address. The representation of the link address in the chain is the Xor of all the current close group members of the current node. All close group members will recognise the group of this node and this node will also know the close group of all of it's close nodes.

The BlockIdentifier that represents a data item contains the hash of that data item. This allows the DataChain to hold identifiers to data that can validate the data itself. This allows the data to be republished whilst being certain that data was created on the network itself.

To ensure there are no extension attacks possible the data size should also be maintained along with any other identifying fields deemed required by the implementation. Additionally an HMAC can be used to further secure the data in question.


A Block is made up of a BlockIdentifier and a vector of PublicKey and Signature.This vector is known as the Proof. Each Proof tuple can be used to verify the signature is that of the BlockIdentifier and that the PublicKey is the one used to sign this.

A link Block has the same Proof vector. This Block type is the glue that holds the chain together and provides the link of proofs right up until the current group can be identified. It is this pattern that allows a series of links to be cryptographically secured. As each link is only valid if signed by all previous members minus 1 of the previous (valid) link then a detectable series is calculable.

Blocks that have data as their [BlockIdentifer] part are merely slotted into the appropriate gap between links. A block of data is validated in the same manner as the connections between links.

The last valid link can also be tested to contain the current close group (minus 1). In this case the chain is valid right to the last link. This phenomenon allows all blocks to be shown to be valid. As a new node then a new link will be created that will contain all of the current close group.


A NodeBlock consists of the BlockIdentifier and a Proof. Nodes will create these and send them as messages to group members when the network mutates. This will require that for every Put Delete or Post a new BlockIdentifier for that data item is created and sent to all group members. The Proof is this nodes PublicKey and Signature, allowing the receiving node to call the DataChain's fn add_nodeblock() to try and add this to the data chain.

In times of network churn a node will create a separate LinkDescriptor to create the BlockIdentifier for this NodeBlock. This LinkDescriptor is created by calling the create_link_descriptor() method and passing the close_group to that node as the input. Each node in the group will do the same and send the NodeBlock to that node.

This continual updating of the chain also provides a history of part of the network, both in terms of data and also groups. Each block will contain a list of the nodes that have been seen on the network as the chain evolved.


The chain itself is a very simple vector of Blocks. The [API] of the DataChain allows for splitting, merging and validating chains. This allows chains to be exchanged and validated between nodes. If a chain can be proven to be owned (by calling the chain validate_ownership function) by a receiving node then it is considered fully valid.

An interesting aspect though is the ability to "validate in history". This means that even if a chain cannot be proven to be able to be fully published to a group (as there are not enough remaining members of the group existing) it may still be queried with a few more conditions.

  1. The current receiving node, did exist in the chain and has previously signed a block. Even though others do not remain this node does believe the chain, but cannot prove it to anyone else.

  2. A chain may contain an older link that is validate-able as there is a common link in a current held chain and the published one. The published chain may hold data after this point that cannot be validated, however the data up to the point of a common link (a link that holds enough common nodes to provide a majority against a link we already know in our own chain) can be proven valid. This phenomenon allows even older data than we know to be collected and increase the length of the current chain. This allows the adding of "history" to an existing chain.

Routing requirements

  1. A node address will be a cryptographic signing key.

  2. A node will attempt to join a previous group with the last known key. It will not though, join the routing table at that stage. Routing will ask the upper layer (vaults in this case) if that node is acceptable. While this process is taking place this joining node will be added to a list of nodes attempting to join. If vaults agree the node is OK then routing will add this node to the routing table.

  3. If vaults reject a node, then it will follow the normal joining process (secure join)

  4. Routing must punish nodes ASAP on failure to transmit a Link NodeBlock on a churn event. Links will validate on majority, but routing will require to maintain security of the chain by ensuring all nodes participate effectively. These messages should be high priority.

Vault requirements

  1. A vault will allow majority - 1 nodes to join via the mechanism above.

  2. On receiving a join request for a node (from routing), vaults will request the nodes DataChain

  3. If this nodes DataChain is longer than an existing majority - 1 nodes, then nodes query the joining node for data from the chain and then it is allowed to join.

  4. All nodes that can hold a lot of data will try and build their data chain from existing nodes holding such data (Archive Nodes). This data is transferred with the lowest priority.

  5. On a churn even a node that is off line for a period may find on restart an existing node did build a chain and now this restarting node has to join another group to begin the process again of building a data chain.

  6. Nodes will choose the sender of the data on Get requests. New nodes will only be expected to have data that has appeared since they joined (each node knows this via it's own data chain"). New nodes can and will try (if they have resources) toGetdata from the group. When nodes have this data they can request full membership of the group. At that time they can be chosen to respond to anyGetrequest, thereby earning safecoin or rewards. Nodes may then continue to ask for data from archive nodes that are outwith the current group data. This may allow them to restart as an archive node, maximising their reward time as restarts are much faster since data does not need relocated.

  7. On start a new node will ask 1 member for the group for the chain and all members for the genesis block only. This allows that node to verify the chain is current and is traverses back to genesis Ok. If there is doubt over chain validity, other nodes may be asked for the BlockIdentifiers only , should any block be missing then the node that sent this (signed) will be reported to the group and this action will mean that node is expelled, immediately.

  8. A node on startup may request the genesis block from any group and store this locally.

Nodes will build their chains to become more valuable to the network and therefore earn more safecoin. This process will encourage high capability nodes to spread evenly across the network.

Lower capability nodes will not attempt to build data history and will therefore have less earning potential. This is perfectly valid and possibly a requirement of such a network, to allow nodes of varying capability (cpu/bandwidth/storage etc.) to exist.

Additional observations

Group size

Whilst it was thought that a DataChain did not require the use of a magic number, there is a requirement at this time for it to know the group size used in the network for group consensus. This is unfortunate and hopefully will be factored out. The use of group size though, is required on groups splitting and the chain progressing. As this happens a link will potentially lose majority. In this case the data chain needs to us another factor to decide quorum has been met and this size is the group size figure.

It is hoped that this can be eradicated by a more sophisticated checkpointing mechanism where both sides of a split can sign the split link. This would be identifiable as the split happens at a common leading bits agreement of a number of the group. At this time using a naive algorithm though may introduce unwanted and potentially insecure side effects.

Archive nodes

Nodes that hold the longest DataChains may be considered to be archive nodes. Such nodes will be responsible for maintaining all network data for specific areas of the network address range. There will be less than group_size/2 archive nodes per group. These more reliable nodes and will have a vote weight higher than a less capable node within a group. There will still require to be a majority of group members who agree on votes though, regardless of these high weighted nodes. This is to prevent attacks where nodes lasting for long periods in a group cannot collude via some out of band method such as publishing ID's on a website and soliciting other nodes in the group to collude and attack that group.

Archive node Datachain length

The length of the DataChain should be as long as possible. Although a node may not require to hold data outwith it's current close group. It is prudent such nodes hold as much of the Chain as possible as this all allow quicker rebuild of a network on complete outage. Nodes may keep such structures and associated data in a container that prunes older blocks to make space for new blocks as new blocks appear (FIFO or first in first out).

Additional requirements of Archive nodes

All nodes in a group will build on their DataChain, whether an Archive node or simply attempting to become an archive node. Small nodes with little resources though may find it difficult to create a DataChain of any significance. In these cases these smaller less capable nodes will receive limited rewards as they do not have the ability to respond to many data retrieval requests, if any at all. These small nodes though are still beneficial to the network to provide connectivity and lower level consensus at the routing level.

A non archive node can request old data from existing archive nodes in a group, but the rate should be limited in cases where there are already three such nodes in a group. These messages will be the lowest priority messages in the group. Thereby any attacker will require to become an archive node and this will take time, unless the group falls below (group_size / 2) - 1 archive nodes in which case the priority is increased on such relocation messages.

Chained chains

As chains grow and nodes hold longer chains across many disparate groups, there will be commonalities on DataBlocks held. Such links across chains has not as yet been fully analysed, however, it is speculated that the ability to cross reference will enable a fuller picture of network data to be built up.

Structured data first version

To strengthen validity of mutable data (StructuredData) the first version (version 0) may be maintained in the chain. This will show age of such data, which may be particularly useful in types of mutable data that do not change ownership or indeed where network created elements (such as any currency) can be further validated.

Network "difficulty"

The distance of the furthest group member to a nodes own ID is regarded as network difficulty. In small networks this will wildly fluctuate. This value must be written to the nodes configuration file, in case of SAFE this is the vault configuration file.

Network restart / mass segmentation

The process described above will mean that decentralised network, far from potentially losing data on restart should recover with a very high degree of certainty.

If a node restarts or in cases of massive churn there will be a significant reduction in network difficulty. This reduction will mean that any nodes joining again should be accepted, regardless of chain length.

If a restart has been detected, any node recognised in the last link of the chain will be allowed entry again.

Further work

The current implementation of DataChains is secure, but can be made extremely more efficient over time. Merkle tree's, checkpoints and more such as use an xored checkpoint that contains not only a signed checkpoint, but a checkpoint that can evaluate when all contained blocks are available by xoring back to all zero's. This RFC does not attempt to include any such efficient mechanism, instead this is left for further design improvements and RFC's.

Merkle tree of checkpoints

A datachain of the group locks the node and data status of that group along the timeline. But this still leave the risk that a whole forged data chain cannot be detected by the network. A merkle-tree of checkpoints, which locks checkpoints network wide (actually creates a snapshot), can expose such forged chain easily. Once DisjointGroup is deployed, such merkle-tree can be computed as:

  1. Every fixed interval, each group computes a hash of all the checkpoints generated during that period. This hash will then be exchanged with group's sibling group to compute an one level up hash (say group 000 exchanging with group 001 to compute hash for 00x).

  2. Once one level up hash computed, the group exchange it with a group it knows in that level, so the hash of that level can be computed (exchange hash of 00x with a group in 01 to compute 0x hash).

  3. Repeat this procedure till get a root hash.

  4. To verify the computed merkle-tree is correct, the root hash needs to be published to the network (or just contact the furthest group knows, which has the highest chance of mismatch, to reduce the messages transferred).

Such merkle-trees (snapshots of network) prove the validity of datachains when restoring data during network restart / mass segmentation. To prove identity to the network, a member of group 000 only needs to provide: root hash, hash of 0x and 1x, hash of 00x and 01x, checkpoints hashes. If the duty of providing this set of hashes left to the node joining the network, the existing nodes only need to holds the root hash in cache (and probably store the partial merkel-tree containing itself in disk, so the joining node can get access to via fetching request).


  • In very small networks (less than approx 3000) network difficulty is a fluctuating number, this can probably not be prevented, but may allow unwanted data or in fact prevent valid data from being refreshed.
  • This pattern is at it's earliest of stages and will require significant testing to ensure integrity of data as well as safety.
  • Chain merging and data integrity checking is not well defined in this RFC and will require further analysis during implementation.


None as of yet

Unresolved questions

Not initially required, but should be considered in near future.

  • Effective handling of removed blocks from the chain. (A holder can remove blocks but not add them)
  • Effective checkpoints of chains to reduce size.
  • Store efficiently on disk (disk based key value store of DataChain)
  • Calculate vote weights and ensure collusion is not possible in a group.