## Assignment 2

## Durbasmriti Saha and Mainak Sarkar Introduction to game theory

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1)

- A king is deciding where to hide his treasure, while a pirate is deciding where to look for the treasure.
- The payoff to the king from successfully hiding the treasure is 5 and from having it found is 2.
- The payoff to the pirate from finding the treasure is 9 and from not finding it is 4.
- The king can hide it in location X, Y, or Z.

Suppose the pirate has two pure strategies: inspect both X and Y (they are close together), or just inspect Z (it is far away).

Find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where:

- p is the probability the treasure is hidden in X or Y,
- 1-p is the probability it is hidden in Z (treat the king as having two strategies),
- ullet q is the probability that the pirate inspects X and Y.

Choose the correct option:

1. 
$$p = \frac{1}{2}$$
,  $q = \frac{1}{2}$ 

2. 
$$p = \frac{4}{9}$$
,  $q = \frac{2}{5}$ 

3. 
$$p = \frac{5}{9}$$
,  $q = \frac{3}{5}$ 


4. 
$$p = \frac{2}{5}$$
,  $q = \frac{4}{9}$ 

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

- Two players have to share 50 coins (of equal value).
- Players' payoffs are the number of coins they each get.
- First, player 1 splits the coins into 2 piles.
- Second, player 2 chooses one pile for him/herself and gives the other pile to player 1.

What is agent 1's strategy in a backward induction solution?

- 1. Splitting coins into 25/25.
- 2. Splitting coins into 0/50.
- 3. Splitting coins into 15/35.
- 4. Splitting coins into 1/49.
- 3) Which is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game? [Here ((Not Play,Steal),(Trust)) indicates that player 1 chooses Not Play at the first decision node and Steal at the second decision node, and 2 chooses Trust at his unique decision node.]



- a) ((Not play, Steal),(Distrust))
- b) ((Not play, Share), (Distrust))
- c) ((Not play, Steal), (Trust))
- d) ((Play, Steal), (Distrust))
- e) ((Play, Share), (Trust))