



Threat Detection with GuardDuty



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The screenshot shows the AWS GuardDuty console. On the left, the navigation pane includes 'Summary', 'Findings' (which is selected), 'Malware scans', and sections for 'Protection plans' (S3 Protection, EKS Protection, Extended Threat Detection, Runtime Monitoring, Malware Protection, RDS Protection, Lambda Protection), 'Accounts', 'Usage', 'Suppression rules', 'Settings', 'Lists', 'What's New', 'Partners', and 'Security Hub'. The main content area displays a single finding under 'Findings (1)'. The finding details are as follows:

Findings (1) Info	
Create suppression rule	
Actions Save filters Apply saved filters	
Filter findings	
Status	Current
Threat type	All findings
Title	
Credentials for the EC2 instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxjz were used from a remote AWS account.	

Credentials for the EC2 instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxjz were used from a remote AWS account.

High First seen 8 minutes ago, last seen 8 minutes ago

Credentials created exclusively for an EC2 instance using instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxjz have been used from a remote AWS account 304953761247.

[Investigate with Detective](#)

This finding is [Useful](#) [Not useful](#)

Overview

Finding ID	d2ce25944dbac2e0a43c54c3a0381530	Q Q
Type	UnauthorizedAccess IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS	Q Q
Severity	HIGH	Q Q
Region	us-east-1	Q Q
Count	1	Q Q
Account ID	510482603806	Q Q
Resource ID	guardduty-test-thesequarebucket-6o7vhsvchzt	Q Q
Created at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)	Q Q
Updated at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)	Q Q

Resource affected

Resource role	TARGET	Q Q
Resource type	S3Bucket	Q Q
Access key ID	ASIAJXNWZCL4PFRGEV7W	Q Q
Principal ID	AROAAXNWZCL4PFRGEV7WQUAi-08853014fce10eeb0	Q Q
User type	AssumedRole	Q Q
User name	GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxjz	Q Q

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Introducing Today's Project!

Tools and concepts

The services I used were Amazon GuardDuty, IAM, EC2, and S3. Key concepts I learnt include threat detection, credential exfiltration, anomaly detection, cross-account access monitoring, and how GuardDuty identifies suspicious activity using behavioral analysis.

Project reflection

This project took me approximately 2 hours

I did this project because I have a goal of becoming a cloud engineer and I have to learn these things if I want to reach that goal

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Project Setup

To set up for this project, I deployed a CloudFormation template that launches a new VPC, subnets, security group, internet gateway, S3 bucket, GuardDuty, route tables, vpc endpoints, elastic load balancer, and launch templates. The three main components are EC2 Instance, networking resources, and a CloudFront distribution.


The web app deployed is called OWASP Juice Shop. To practice my GuardDuty skills, I will attempt to hack the OWASP Juice Shop since it is intentionally built with data vulnerabilities for security engineers to practice on.

GuardDuty is an AI tool that scans your AWS account for suspicious activity and alerts you right away if it detects anything. In this project, it will search for and hopefully find me when I hack into the resources in my EC2.

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SQL Injection

The first attack I performed on the web app is SQL injection, which means inserting malicious SQL code into an application's input fields in order to manipulate the database behind it. SQL injection is a security risk because it can allow attackers to view, modify, or delete sensitive data, bypass authentication, and potentially gain unauthorized access to the system if input validation and proper query parameterization are not implemented.


My SQL injection attack involved entering ' `or 1=1;--`' in the email field and '1' in the password field. This means I manipulated the SQL query so that the condition `1=1` always evaluates to true, and the `--` commented out the rest of the query, allowing me to bypass authentication and log in without valid credentials.



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You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.)

Login

Email *
' or 1=1;--

Password *
•

Forgot your password?

Remember me

Not yet a customer?

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Command Injection

Next, I used command injection, which is an attack where malicious system commands are inserted into a vulnerable application input field and executed on the underlying server. The Juice Shop web app is vulnerable to this because it does not properly sanitize or validate user input before passing it to the system shell, allowing injected commands to run with the application's permissions.

To run command injection, I entered teh javascript command into the username field. The script will download the data from the EC2 instance and enter it into a credentials.json file so anyone who accesses the web app can see the leaked data.

A circular profile picture of a man with glasses and a beard, wearing a blue shirt.

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User Profile



[object Object]

File Upload: No file selected.
• Maximum file size
150Kb
• All image formats are
accepted

or

Email:
 Username:



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Attack Verification

To verify the attack's success, I went to the address where the credentials would be saved based on the command I ran. The credentials page showed me the key pair, token, and expiration date of the token.

```
JSON Raw Data Headers
Save Copy Collapse All Expand All ⌂ Filter JSON
AccessKeyId: "ASIAKNNWZCL4PFRGEEV7W"
Code: "Success"
Expiration: "2026-02-11T18:42:36Z"
LastUpdated: "2026-02-11T18:41:58Z"
SecretAccessKey: "0T1L8hj1jqvApMhJzXfUyfHfIrhBqGzzd9Pw"
Token: "1e4c2021e2037744d44XX-1EcN/WZemhhm9y9M96NTY7Z1d40LnhvNRAAGp9HTAMQD32PNR4H01tBF-2mnbabuPn7r0v5-0WVh/Vu0kvcscCaslw5t9dn7GloxB5ES/85-ejowkPcfCkNm0hjuc/02RytkegyuponyA5wNo127761b1E7E6210h+q-N0WfdalhKd/c=97TwH8y:Hgzoq/+czgtplR02tLqmZLBwJLh0lMC9p9d4dXX-1EcN/WZemhhm9y9M96NTY7Z1d40Lnhv
stg+rvvk49p/4uyvnpbhq1PSdam6gELs5DPd4n1MV1k1CmNCY9Zf1s5SxFcMhpFY1C13Rbzkd5TOFxDnb0byCuk91EpMENUXNhzhjqscaCxzVglLubgvJtA3zJ+kBcvTp3j01eT3mKhAs1051ks79Anw/1faYgvX6yXKLk065uIGjzBPQYeyBwWm7+Fljgou587ca1y8ddhr7wJWf1o5YXPPM1pXEH2r174AUuA3yqvqf2XY2FDp39Hj1n01vK675brOpsVMznR2zUC-MTUzzTPB8u-Hgrprk2zvngTwzb2P17Wmk99211rkjCd+7X81E0Bb-11/MK45jS+TzR0GJFz3oYxYMLTEewTN13NgAS0jbbgNly0+42XkpqBvxXknnyEl+rnrg5NjBxjD3gt/G+ZgdWt82bcnqr06zJyWyxcnrlqI6t15bvxkars771e01yg6SenDMshG0rEBhzGBFB0Wt5S/oV7d12AHLFAUEv+7L7V78xkv-g-adoJyRaaba1Lk6W1APch27z1200hzedgpbgRC411Dez2vzid0+z18Nk1s1RkXv/dvfb1jJE8v0UT0xqUmrxahh9sqy9n/2hVGbj5Zedku8gxCBVttymdrXz2tEaejEkdp0U0tsjP5tYyaElzL8p19t68zzLscky4d1EtqNfVbunVd80FPEPb"
Type: "AWS-HMAC"
```

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Using CloudShell for Advanced Attacks

The attack continues in CloudShell, because AWS assigns each CloudShell session a different user, so I can attempt to use the stolen keys to login as if I'm a different person. GuardDuty will see that the keys im trying to use are not associated with my user and go off.

In CloudShell, I used wget to retrieve the file from AWS and pull it into CloudShell. Next, I ran a command using cat and jq to show me the contents of the file and interpret the json into plain text so its easy to read.

then set up a profile, called stolen to attempt to log into my AWS with the stolen credentials. I had to create a new profile because the default profile created in CloudShell has the same permissions as the user thats logged into the console, so I need a new profile that doesn't have authorization to access my aws data in order to hack into it.



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GuardDuty's Findings

After performing the attack, GuardDuty reported a finding within about 30 seconds. Findings are essentially reports of activity that GuardDuty finds to be problematic.

GuardDuty's finding was called

UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS, which means credentials created for an EC2 instance role were used from a different AWS account, indicating possible credential suspicious activity. Anomaly detection was used because GuardDuty monitors normal credential usage patterns and flagged this activity as suspicious when the instance role credentials were accessed from an unexpected external account.

GuardDuty's detailed finding reported that credentials created exclusively for an EC2 instance role were used from a remote AWS account, indicating potential credential exfiltration and unauthorized access.

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The screenshot shows the AWS GuardDuty findings interface. On the left, a sidebar navigation includes 'GuardDuty' (selected), 'Summary', 'Findings' (selected), 'Malware scans', 'Protection plans' (with S3, EKS, Extended Threat Detection, Runtime Monitoring, Malware Protection, RDS, and Lambda listed), 'Accounts', 'Usage', 'Suppression rules' (New), 'Settings', 'Lists', 'What's New', 'Partners', and 'Security Hub' (New). The main content area displays a single finding titled 'Findings (1)'. The finding details are as follows:

Overview	
Finding ID	d2ce25944dbac2e0a43c54c3a0381530
Type	UnauthorizedAccess:IAmUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS
Severity	HIGH
Region	us-east-1
Count	1
Account ID	510482603806
Resource ID	guardduty-test-thesecurebucket-607vhsvchzt
Created at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)
Updated at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)
Resource affected	
Resource role	TARGET
Resource type	S3Bucket
Access key ID	ASIAXXNWZCL4PFRGEEV7W
Principal ID	AROAXNWZCL4PDSQ5OLQUA:i-08853014fce10eeb0
User type	AssumedRole
User name	GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxiZ

Below the finding details, a note states: 'Credentials for the EC2 instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srto7jDxiZ were used from a remote AWS account.' A timestamp indicates it was first seen 8 minutes ago and last seen 8 minutes ago. A link to 'Investigate with Detective' is provided. The user can rate the finding as 'Useful' or 'Not useful'.

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Extra: Malware Protection

To test Malware Protection, I uploaded a malware file to my S3 bucket. The uploaded file won't actually cause damage because it is purpose built to test anti-malware software on computers.

Start your answer with 'Once I uploaded the file, GuardDuty instantly triggered an alert showing that a piece of malware had been added to my S3 bucket. This verified that the malware protection from GuardDuty was working.'

The screenshot shows the AWS GuardDuty interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with 'GuardDuty' selected under 'Findings'. The main area displays a single finding:

Findings (1) Info

A malware scan on your S3 object EICAR-test-file.txt has detected a security risk EICAR-Test-File (not a virus).

High First seen a few seconds ago, last seen a few seconds ago info

A malware scan on your S3 object armaws:s3::guardduty-test-thesecurebucket-t55wpqagoz8/EICAR-test-file.txt has detected a security risk EICAR-Test-File (not a virus).

Investigate with Detective

This finding is **Useful** **Not useful**

Overview

Finding ID	2ace259c24443a32dd38cbd5834e5c6e
Type	ObjectS3/MaliciousFile
Severity	HIGH
Region	us-east-2
Count	1
Account ID	S10482603806
Resource ID	guardduty-test-thesecurebucket-t55wpqagoz8 L
Created at	02-11-2026 00:41:45 (a few seconds ago)
Updated at	02-11-2026 00:41:45 (a few seconds ago)

Resource affected

Resource type	S3 Object
ARN	arn:aws:s3::guardduty-test-thesecurebucket-t55wpqagoz8/EICAR-test-file.txt
Key	EICAR-test-file.txt
E tag	44d8612fe8a8f36de82e1278abb02f
Hash	275a021bbfd6499e54d718997d901663fc605ec2fe2a2c539aaab

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