



Threat Detection with GuardDuty



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The screenshot displays the AWS GuardDuty console interface. The left sidebar contains navigation links for GuardDuty, Findings, Malware scans, Protection plans, Accounts, Usage, Suppression rules, Settings, Lists, What's New, Partners, and Security Hub. The main content area shows a list of findings, with one finding selected. The finding details include:

- Finding ID:** d2ce25944dbac2e0a43c54c3a0381530
- Type:** UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration:InsideAWS
- Severity:** HIGH
- Region:** us-east-1
- Count:** 1
- Account ID:** 510482603806
- Resource ID:** guardduty-test-thesebucket-607xvhsvchot
- Created at:** 02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)
- Updated at:** 02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)

The finding description states: "Credentials for the EC2 instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srtor7JDxiZ were used from a remote AWS account." It also mentions that the credentials were created exclusively for an EC2 instance using instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srtor7JDxiZ and have been used from a remote AWS account 304933761247.

The right sidebar shows the "Resource affected" section with details for the resource role, type, access key ID, principal ID, user type, and user name.



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Introducing Today's Project!

Tools and concepts

The services I used were Amazon GuardDuty, IAM, EC2, and S3. Key concepts I learnt include threat detection, credential exfiltration, anomaly detection, cross-account access monitoring, and how GuardDuty identifies suspicious activity using behavioral analysis.

Project reflection

This project took me approximately 2 hours

I did this project because I have a goal of becoming a cloud engineer and I have to learn these things if I want to reach that goal



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Project Setup

To set up for this project, I deployed a CloudFormation template that launches a new VPC, subnets, security group, internet gateway, S3 bucket, GuardDuty, route tables, vpc endpoints, elastic load balancer, and launch templates. The three main components are EC2 Instance, networking resources, and a CloudFront distribution.

The web app deployed is called OWASP Juice Shop. To practice my GuardDuty skills, I will attempt to hack the OWASP Juice Shop since it is intentionally built with data vulnerabilities for security engineers to practice on.

GuardDuty is an AI tool that scans your AWS account for suspicious activity and alerts you right away if it detects anything. In this project, it will search for and hopefully find me when I hack into the resources in my EC2.



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aws CloudFormation Stacks GuardDuty-Test

Search [Option+S] United States (N. Virginia) Saqib Hossain (3104-8300-8005) saqib-IAM-Admin

Stacks (2)

Filter status: Active

View nested

Stacks

- GuardDuty-Test
2026-02-10 22:40:42 UTC-0500
CREATE_COMPLETE
- guardduty-test-web-app
2026-02-10 21:36:22 UTC-0500
DELETE_IN_PROGRESS

GuardDuty-Test

Delete Update stack Stack actions Create stack

Stack info Events Resources Outputs Parameters Template Change sets Git sync

Overview

Stack ID: [arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:510482603806:stack/GuardDuty-Test/7110cb40-06fb-11f1-a468-0e238f217595](#)

Description: This template creates an insecure web app for NextWork's project on threat detection and GuardDuty!

Status: CREATE_COMPLETE

Detailed status: -

Status reason: -

Root stack: -

Parent stack: -

Created time: 2026-02-10 22:40:42 UTC-0500

Updated time: -

Deleted time: -

Drift status: NOT_CHECKED

Last drift check time: -

Termination protection: Deactivated

IAM role: -

CloudShell Feedback Console Mobile App

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SQL Injection

The first attack I performed on the web app is SQL injection, which means inserting malicious SQL code into an application's input fields in order to manipulate the database behind it. SQL injection is a security risk because it can allow attackers to view, modify, or delete sensitive data, bypass authentication, and potentially gain unauthorized access to the system if input validation and proper query parameterization are not implemented.



My SQL injection attack involved entering ' or 1=1;-- in the email field and 1 in the password field. This means I manipulated the SQL query so that the condition 1=1 always evaluates to true, and the -- commented out the rest of the query, allowing me to bypass authentication and log in without valid credentials.






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OWASP Juice Shop

AccountEN

You successfully solved a challenge: Login Admin (Log in with the administrator's user account.) X

Login

Email *
* or 1=1;--

Password *
•

Forgot your password?

Log In

☒ Remember me

Not yet a customer?



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Command Injection

Next, I used command injection, which is an attack where malicious system commands are inserted into a vulnerable application input field and executed on the underlying server. The Juice Shop web app is vulnerable to this because it does not properly sanitize or validate user input before passing it to the system shell, allowing injected commands to run with the application's permissions.

To run command injection, I entered the javascript command into the username field. The script will download the data from the EC2 instance and enter it into a credentials.json file so anyone who accesses the web app can see the leaked data.



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User Profile



[object Object]

File Upload: No file selected.

- Maximum file size 150Kb
- All image formats are accepted

or

Image URL:

Email:

Username:



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Attack Verification

To verify the attack's success, I went to the address where the credentials would be saved based on the command I ran. The credentials page showed me the key pair, token, and expiration date of the token.

```
JSON Raw Data Headers
Save Copy Collapse All Expand All Filter JSON
AccessKeyId: "ASIANNWZCL4PFRGEEV7W"
Code: "Success"
Expiration: "2026-02-11T18:42:38Z"
LastUpdated: "2026-02-11T04:16:58Z"
SecretAccessKey: "OTtLBRjUqyqWML9GtLzDF9HlfrhB0ccz4PDPN"
Token: "I0a3h3j2Z1uX2VjE03//////////rEaCXXZLWKhC3QhMSJMEUCI0CvZPMA-KkIjX/8s4V1wIPEADJRl1hsq20e0ZqBQDLxZA1gYsDa/p6sxsID+XCfucnEYjrcC9hITLpZPLgSpKhKhqewlITf//////////
AAAAgGwJMTABODI2MDM4NDYIDF:-0nBb8RaPvgRkxSqmVnK/kuWVeaoCasTwo5Sh7dnTGLoXn5BES/85+ejedWkPcfCk(NeQ)Huc/BZkytkegvuoopyA5u6wo1zT7G1eb1E7Em621Chq+3N08FDsaIKndjrc+9YtwlBlyrHGzoq/+czgtpIrd2Llqm
ZLB+uLNQDQICDgrH+d4Rt+ECo/NZebbhFnpOMENTY2IZ1d4DLznA/
Sf9rvv448N/AuyyHPBqLPS0mmdgELSDPh1LhVJA3CmWCKY9ZS7n5G5wFC3mMTYyC30huXZ5TDF0hbyRl6pdkLUtqLJ3GvWbnt1Fsg4AN+Kb3pThk4pfT7+qWf7JbaT6vP854Ez3aPCvNHyD0K+2a2gmKddtGp/O3omGLHvbr
Z0A9+X1B9KvOvdy2+Tkg+1x1PK1D+18x0W7UPamLwom5h1fPxo3Nf37d0N0DL81KaQ3IEPHNDXNzhqscsCvkVgKLU0gv3IA3z3+H8Cvtpq3j01IeT3w08As10o5JK9eAnvj1aYgwMeyKXLh06SuICj3BPQYcyBwWw7+PHjqout587
aTY8ddht/w2M071o5YXPPN1PpxEHZrh74UJrA3yqqvqZ8Y3FDP39Hj1ndNj1Wk575brDpsWtzeJR2uCHTUJ3ZTPBAbuHggRkzbvngRTwz2P1r7Mak992r1lrk3CD+7XBL00b+1t/
MK45IS+ftZROQJF35oYAYMLFeu7L3hgASR3jbbgWfym0+ZZXa8VXXnmTE1rrngSNjx8j03gl/GzZpCWF1822bcmqD6z3yWyxcnq16t15bvxkars77e0Lypp65enDMDHfShwG0rEBhzGBF0WtW5ts/
oV7AtZaT0FAUEv+VLV7BAEugndq3Ry8Ado3Lk6M4BPcnc72y12807msedgBgKf1rDpCwudD+z10Nks1RKA9Lj
d+FB1j3E8VDU1DQxumOXahH95qV9nr2MVGjBj5z2ddka8GxCBV1tyndNk2tEaejEkoLpu0TqjP9TYyaELzLR8p19r6B2Zz1scky4md1ETqNfVbunv98OFFPEPp"
Type: "AWS-IAMC"
```



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
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Using CloudShell for Advanced Attacks

The attack continues in CloudShell, because AWS assigns each CloudShell session a different user, so I can attempt to use the stolen keys to login as if I'm a different person. GuardDuty will see that the keys im trying to use are not associated with my user and go off.

In CloudShell, I used `wget` to retrieve the file from AWS and pull it into CloudShell. Next, I ran a command using `cat` and `jq` to show me the contents of the file and interpret the json into plain text so its easy to read.

then set up a profile, called stolen to attempt to log into my AWS with the stolen credentials. I had to create a new profile because the default profile created in CloudShell has the same permissions as the user thats logged into the console, so I need a new profile that doesn't have authorization to access my aws data in order to hack into it.

[illegible]



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GuardDuty's Findings

After performing the attack, GuardDuty reported a finding within about 30 seconds. Findings are essentially reports of activity that GuardDuty finds to be problematic.

GuardDuty's finding was called

UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS, which means credentials created for an EC2 instance role were used from a different AWS account, indicating possible credential suspicious activity. Anomaly detection was used because GuardDuty monitors normal credential usage patterns and flagged this activity as suspicious when the instance role credentials were accessed from an unexpected external account.

GuardDuty's detailed finding reported that credentials created exclusively for an EC2 instance role were used from a remote AWS account, indicating potential credential exfiltration and unauthorized access.



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aws

Search

[Option+S]

United States (N. Virginia)

Saqib Hossain [5104-8200-3800]

saqib-IAM-Admin

GuardDuty

Findings

GuardDuty

Summary

Findings

Malware scans

Protection plans

S3 Protection

EKS Protection

Extended Threat Detection New

Runtime Monitoring

Malware Protection

RDS Protection

Lambda Protection

Accounts

Usage

Suppression rules New

Settings

Lists

What's New

Partners

Security Hub New

Findings (1) Info

Create suppression rule

Actions

Saved filters

Apply saved filters

Filter findings

Status: Current

Threat type: All findings

1

Title

Credentials for the EC2 instance r from a remote AWS account.

Credentials for the EC2 instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srtor7JDxiZ were used from a remote AWS account.

High First seen 8 minutes ago, last seen 8 minutes ago

Credentials created exclusively for an EC2 instance using instance role GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srtor7JDxiZ have been used from a remote AWS account 304933761247.

Investigate with Detective

This finding is Useful Not useful

Overview

Finding ID	d2ce25944dbac2e0a43c54c3a0381530	🔍
Type	UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS	🔍
Severity	HIGH	🔍
Region	us-east-1	
Count	1	
Account ID	510482603806	🔍
Resource ID	guardduty-test-thesebucket-6o7xvhsyhz	🔍
Created at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)	
Updated at	02-11-2026 00:24:38 (3 minutes ago)	

Resource affected

Resource role	TARGET	🔍
Resource type	S3Bucket	🔍
Access key ID	ASIAXNWZCL4PFRGEEV7W	🔍
Principal ID	AROAXNWZCL4PD5Q5OLQUA1-08853014fce10eeb0	🔍
User type	AssumedRole	🔍
User name	GuardDuty-Test-TheRole-srtor7JDxiZ	🔍

CloudShell

Feedback

Console Mobile App

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Extra: Malware Protection

To test Malware Protection, I uploaded a malware file to my S3 bucket. The uploaded file won't actually cause damage because it is purpose built to test anti-malware software on computers.

Start your answer with 'Once I uploaded the file, GuardDuty instantly triggered an alert showing that a piece of malware had been added to my S3 bucket. This verified that the malware protection from GuardDuty was working.'

The screenshot shows the AWS GuardDuty console interface. On the left, there's a navigation menu with options like Summary, Findings, and Malware scans. The main area displays a finding titled 'A malware scan on your S3 object EICAR-test-file.txt has detected a security risk EICAR-Test-File (not a virus)'. The finding is categorized as 'High' and is 'First seen a few seconds ago, last seen a few seconds ago'. The console provides details about the finding, including the Finding ID, Type, Severity, Region, Count, Account ID, Resource ID, Created at, and Updated at. It also lists the 'Resource affected', which is an S3 object with its ARN, Key, ETag, and MD5 hash.

Overview	
Finding ID	2ace259c24443a32dd38cbd5834e5c6e
Type	Object/S3/MaliciousFile
Severity	HIGH
Region	us-east-2
Count	1
Account ID	510482603806
Resource ID	guardduty-test-thesebucket-t55wpqagor8
Created at	02-11-2026 00:41:45 (a few seconds ago)
Updated at	02-11-2026 00:41:45 (a few seconds ago)

Resource affected	
Resource type	S3Object

S3 objects	
ARN	arn:aws:s3::guardduty-test-thesebucket-t55wpqagor8/EICAR-test-file.txt
Key	EICAR-test-file.txt
ETag	A4d89612f6a8b9f36de82e1278abb02f
MD5	275e0721b7b7c640b0c54d433820f1c7b16635c105ce7257a7e4538e9b