The Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing

Advanced Topics in ~~Cybersecurity~~Cryptography (7CCSMATC)

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Outline

Introduction

Recap

- We have defined what it means for an encryption scheme to be secure (IND-CPA + INT-CTXT = IND-CCA).
- We have shown that the OTP achieves IND-CPA security, even **unconditionally**.

The One-Time Pad is impractical, we want something more manageable $\Rightarrow$ Pseudorandomness!

Main Reference

Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/331. 2004. URL: `https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331`



Mihir Bellare is a professor at UCSD

- **2003** RSA Conference's Sixth Annual Award
- **2013** Fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery.
- **2019** Levchin Prize for Real-World Cryptography

CTR Mode

CTR Mode



Picture credit: `https://www.iacr.org/authors/tikz/`

CTR Mode Stream



$r_i \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$

Want: $n+1$ Pseudorandom Strings of length λ

Definition (PRF)

A PRF is a keyed function $F_k : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^N$ where N depends on λ and for $k \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{K}$. We say F_k is (t, ε)-secure **PRF** if for Game_0 and Game_1 defined below we have:

$$\forall \mathcal{D} \in t \text{ steps: } \text{Adv}_F^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left|\Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\text{Game}_1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\text{Game}_0} = 1]\right| < \varepsilon$$

Game_0

1 : $f \leftarrow \emptyset$

2 : **return** $\mathcal{D}^{\text{F}}$

Game_1

1 : $f \leftarrow \emptyset; k \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{K}$

2 : **return** $\mathcal{D}^{\text{F}}$

$\text{F}(x)$

1 : **if** $x \notin f.\text{keys}$ **then** $f[x] \leftarrow\$ \{0,1\}^N$

2 : $y \leftarrow f[x]$

3 : $y \leftarrow F_k(x)$ $//\text{Game}_1$

4 : **return** y

Have: $n+1$ calls to Pseudorandom Permutation of length λ

Definition (PRP)

A PRP is a keyed permutation $E_k : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\lambda$ for $k \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{K}$. We say E is (t, ε)-secure **PRP** if for Game_0 and Game_1 defined below we have:

$$\forall \mathcal{D} \in t \text{ steps: } \mathsf{Adv}_E^{\mathrm{prp}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left|\Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{Game}_1} = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{Game}_0} = 1]\right| < \varepsilon$$

Game_0	$\mathsf{P}(x)$
$f \leftarrow \emptyset$	**if** $x \notin f.\mathsf{keys}$ **then** $f[x] \leftarrow\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda \setminus f.\mathsf{values}$
return $\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{P}}$	$y \leftarrow f[x]$
Game_1	$y \leftarrow E_k(x)$ //Game_1
$f \leftarrow \emptyset;\ k \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{K}$	**return** y
return $\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{P}}$	

The Gap

Game$_0$

$f \leftarrow \emptyset$

return $\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{F}}$

Game$_1$

$f \leftarrow \emptyset;$

return $\mathcal{D}^{\mathsf{F}}$

$\mathsf{F}(x)$

if $x \in f.\mathrm{keys}$ **then**

$\quad y \leftarrow f[x]$

else

$\quad y \leftarrow\!\$\ \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \setminus f.\mathrm{values}$

$\quad y \leftarrow\!\$\ \{0,1\}^{\lambda}$ //Game$_1$

$f[x] \leftarrow y$

return y

PRP-PRF Switching Lemma

Lemma

Let π *be a random* ***permutation*** *from* $\{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\lambda$*; let* ρ *be a random* ***function*** *from* $\{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\lambda$*. Let* $\mathcal{A}$ *be an adversary making at most* q *queries to its oracle, then:*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^\pi] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^\rho]| \le \frac{q \cdot (q-1)}{2^{\lambda+1}}.$$

Consider the following games:

Game$_0$

$\pi \leftarrow \emptyset$

return $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{P}}$

Game$_1$

$\pi \leftarrow \emptyset$

return $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{P}}$

P(x)

if $x \in \pi.\mathsf{keys}$ **then return** $\pi[x]$

$y \leftarrow\!\!\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda$

if $y \in \pi.\mathsf{values}$ **then**

  $\mathsf{bad} \leftarrow$ **true**

  $y \leftarrow\!\!\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda \setminus \pi.\mathsf{values}$ // Game$_1$

$\pi[x] \leftarrow y$

return y

PRP-PRF Switching Lemma II

$$\begin{aligned}
\left|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\pi}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\rho}]\right| &= \left|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_0}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_1}]\right| && (1)\\
&\leq \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_0}] \text{ sets bad} && (2)\\
&\leq q \cdot (q+1)/2^{\lambda+1} && (3)
\end{aligned}$$

On Eq. (1): Game_0 perfectly simulates a random function ρ and Game_1 perfectly simulates a random permutation π, by the principle of lazy sampling. Thus, we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\rho}] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_0}] \text{ and } \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_1}] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\pi}].$$

On Eq. (2): we will appeal to the fundamental lemma of game playing.

On Eq. (3): by the union bound the probability that $y \in \pi$.values, is at most

$$\frac{(1+2+\cdots+(q-1))}{2^{\lambda}} = \frac{q \cdot (q-1)}{2^{\lambda+1}}.$$

Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing

We say Game_0 and Game_1 are "identical-until-bad" if they are … identical until some flag bad is set.

Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing

Lemma (Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing)

Let Game_0, Game_1, Game_2 *be identical-until-bad games and* $\mathcal{A}$ *be an adversary. Then*

$$\left|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_0}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_1}]\right| \leq \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Game}_2} \textit{ sets bad}] \textit{ and}$$
$$\left|\Pr[\mathrm{Game}_0{}^{\mathcal{A}}] - \Pr[\mathrm{Game}_1{}^{\mathcal{A}}]\right| \leq \Pr[\mathrm{Game}_2{}^{\mathcal{A}} \textit{ sets bad}].$$

- The first statement follows immediately from the second.
- For the second statement we first prove it with $\mathrm{Game}_2 = \mathrm{Game}_0$ and then generalise.

(Optional) Proof I

We require that both the adversary and the game always terminate in finite time.

- For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there must exist an integer T such that $\mathcal{A}$ always halts within T steps (regardless of the random choices $\mathcal{A}$ makes and the answers it receives to its oracle queries).
- For any game Game there must exist an integer T such that Game always halts within T steps (regardless of the random choices made).

(Optional) Proof II

Since $\mathcal{A}$ and Game terminate in finite time,

- there must be an integer T such that they each execute at most T random-assignment statements, and
- there must be an integer B such that the size of the set $\mathcal{S}$ in any random-assignment statement $s \leftarrow\$ \mathcal{S}$ executed by the adversary or the game is at most B.

$\Rightarrow$ The execution of Game with $\mathcal{A}$ uses finite randomness, meaning Game and $\mathcal{A}$ are underlain by a finite sample space Ω.

Punchline

Probabilities are well-defined and we can talk about the probabilities of various events in the execution.

(Optional) Proof III

- This means that there exists an integer z such that the execution of Game_0 with $\mathcal{A}$ and the execution of Game_1 with $\mathcal{A}$ perform no more than z random-assignment statements, each of these sampling from a set of size at most z.

(Optional) Proof IV

- Let $\mathcal{C} := \text{Coins}(\mathcal{A}, \text{Game}_0, \text{Game}_1) = [1 \ldots z!]^z$ be the set of z-tuples of numbers, each number between 1 and $z!$.

```
z = 2
R = IntegerModRing(factorial(z)); offset = vector(R, z, [1]*z).lift()
Coins = [coin.lift() + offset for coin in FreeModule(R, z)]
print(Coins)
```

```
[(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)]
```

- For $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, \ldots, c_{z-1}) \in \mathcal{C}$, the execution of Game with $\mathcal{A}$ on coins c is defined as follows:
  - On the i-th random-assignment statement, call it $x \leftarrow\!\$\, \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{S})$, where $\mathcal{S} := \{s_i\}_{0 \leq i < m}$, if $\mathcal{S} \neq \emptyset$, return $s_{c_i \bmod |\mathcal{S}|}$, otherwise return $\perp$.
- This way to perform random-assignment statements is done regardless of whether it is $\mathcal{A}$ or one of the procedures from Game that is is performing the random-assignment statement.

(Optional) Proof v

- Note that $m = |\mathcal{S}|$ satisfies $m|z!$ so if $\mathbf{c}$ is chosen at random from $\mathcal{C}$ then the mechanism above will return a point x drawn uniformly from $\mathcal{S}$, and also the values for each random-assignment statement are independent.

(Optional) Proof vi

- For $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ we let $\mathrm{Game_0}^{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{c})$ denote the output of $\mathrm{Game_0}$ when $\mathrm{Game_0}$ is executed with $\mathcal{A}$ on coins $\mathbf{c}$. Same for $\mathrm{Game_1}$.
- Write $\mathcal{C}_{i,\text{one}} := \{\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C} : \mathrm{Game_i}^{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{c}) \Rightarrow 1\}$
- Write $\mathcal{C}_i^{bad} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ for the coins that result in *bad* being set to **true** when running $\mathrm{Game_i}^{\mathcal{A}}$.
- Partition $\mathcal{C}_{i,\text{one}}$ into $\mathcal{C}_{i,\text{one}}^{bad}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{i,\text{one}}^{good}$ depending on whether bad was set or not in game $\mathrm{Game_i}$.
- Because games $\mathrm{Game_0}$ and $\mathrm{Game_1}$ are identical-until-bad, an element $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ is in $\mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}^{good}$ if and only if it is in $\mathcal{C}_{1,\text{one}}^{good}$.
    - Bad is never set so the sets are same and in particular have the same size.

We then get:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathsf{Game}_0{}^{\mathcal{A}}] - \Pr[\mathsf{Game}_1{}^{\mathcal{A}}] &= \frac{\mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}}{\mathcal{C}} - \frac{\mathcal{C}_{1,\text{one}}}{\mathcal{C}} \\
&= \frac{\mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}^{good} + \mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} - \frac{\mathcal{C}_{1,\text{one}}^{good} + \mathcal{C}_{1,\text{one}}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} \\
&= \frac{\mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} - \frac{\mathcal{C}_{1,\text{one}}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} \\
&\leq \frac{\mathcal{C}_{0,\text{one}}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} \\
&\leq \frac{\mathcal{C}_{0}^{bad}}{\mathcal{C}} \\
&= \Pr[\mathsf{Game}_0{}^{\mathcal{A}} \text{ sets bad}].
\end{aligned}
$$

To prove the second statement we rely on the following lemma.

Lemma

Let Game$_0$ *and* Game$_1$ *be identical-until-bad games. Let* $\mathcal{A}$ *be an adversary. Then*

$$\Pr[\mathrm{Game}_0{}^{\mathcal{A}} \textit{ sets bad}] = \Pr[\mathrm{Game}_1{}^{\mathcal{A}} \textit{ sets bad}].$$

(Optional) Proof ix

- Since Game_0 and Game_1 are identical-until-bad, each $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ causes bad to be set in ${\text{Game}_0}^{\mathcal{A}}$ if and only if it is set in ${\text{Game}_1}^{\mathcal{A}}$.
- Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_1^{bad} &= \mathcal{C}_2^{bad} \\ |\mathcal{C}_1^{bad}| &= |\mathcal{C}_2^{bad}| \\ |\mathcal{C}_1^{bad}|/|\mathcal{C}| &= |\mathcal{C}_2^{bad}|/|\mathcal{C}| \\ \Pr[{\text{Game}_1}^{\mathcal{A}} \text{ sets bad}] &= \Pr[{\text{Game}_2}^{\mathcal{A}} \text{ sets bad}]. \end{aligned}$$

Matching Attack

- Call $\sqrt{2^\lambda} = 2^{\lambda/2}$ times and check if any answer repeats.
- By the birthday bound this happens with constant probability

Memory-less Attack

Read about the Pollard-rho attack to learn how to make this attack use poly(λ) memory instead of $2^{\lambda/2}$.

Fin

We want to approximate the one-time pad

If we have a PRF, this is straight-forward

If we "only" have a PRP, an ideal primitive, this breaks down after $q = \sqrt{2^\lambda}$ queries, e.g. 2^{64} for $\lambda = 128$ (AES-128).

Next: How do we get a PRP?

References I

[BR04] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/331. 2004. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331.