

# LATTICES GIVE US KEMS AND FHE, BUT WHERE ARE THE EFFICIENT LATTICE PETS?

BY EXAMPLE OF (VERIFIABLE) OBLIVIOUS PRFs

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24 June 2025

# OUTLINE

LWE and DH

Follow the Blueprint

Trapdoor Friendly

Noise Leakage

Noise Growth

Wrapping Up

## LWE AND DH

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## ON THE ONE HAND, ON THE OTHER HAND

### Bottom of the Stack:

- Kyber (KEM)
- Dilithium (Signature)
- Falcon (Signature)

### Top of the Stack:

- FHE [Gen09; BGV12; CGGI20; GSW13]
- iO [GGHRSW13; BDGM20]
- FE [SW05; BSW11]

# SOMEWHAT EFFICIENT

## RSA 2048

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|                |                              |
|----------------|------------------------------|
| Key generation | $\approx 130,000,000$ cycles |
| Encapsulation  | $\approx 20,000$ cycles      |
| Decapsulation  | $\approx 2,700,000$ cycles   |
| Ciphertext     | 256 bytes                    |
| Public key     | 256 bytes                    |

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<https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-kem.html>

## Curve25519

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|                |                          |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| Key generation | $\approx 60,000$ cycles  |
| Key agreement  | $\approx 160,000$ cycles |
| Public key     | 32 bytes                 |
| Key Share      | 32 bytes                 |

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<https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/943>

## Kyber-768

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|                |                         |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| Key generation | $\approx 38,000$ cycles |
| Encapsulation  | $\approx 49,000$ cycles |
| Decapsulation  | $\approx 39,000$ cycles |
| Ciphertext     | 1,088 bytes             |
| Public key     | 1,184 bytes             |

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<https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-kem.html>

# THE LEARNING WITH ERRORS PROBLEM (LWE)

Given  $(A, c)$  with  $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ ,  $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ ,  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  and **small**  $e \in \mathbb{Z}^m$  is

$$\begin{pmatrix} c \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \leftarrow n \rightarrow \\ A \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} s \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} e \end{pmatrix}$$

or  $c \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^m)$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \\ c_4 \\ c_5 \\ c_6 \\ c_7 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{0,0} & a_{0,1} & a_{0,2} & a_{0,3} & a_{0,4} & a_{0,5} & a_{0,6} & a_{0,7} \\ a_{1,0} & a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & a_{1,3} & a_{1,4} & a_{1,5} & a_{1,6} & a_{1,7} \\ a_{2,0} & a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & a_{2,3} & a_{2,4} & a_{2,5} & a_{2,6} & a_{2,7} \\ a_{3,0} & a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & a_{3,3} & a_{3,4} & a_{3,5} & a_{3,6} & a_{3,7} \\ a_{4,0} & a_{4,1} & a_{4,2} & a_{4,3} & a_{4,4} & a_{4,5} & a_{4,6} & a_{4,7} \\ a_{5,0} & a_{5,1} & a_{5,2} & a_{5,3} & a_{5,4} & a_{5,5} & a_{5,6} & a_{5,7} \\ a_{6,0} & a_{6,1} & a_{6,2} & a_{6,3} & a_{6,4} & a_{6,5} & a_{6,6} & a_{6,7} \\ a_{7,0} & a_{7,1} & a_{7,2} & a_{7,3} & a_{7,4} & a_{7,5} & a_{7,6} & a_{7,7} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ s_2 \\ s_3 \\ s_4 \\ s_5 \\ s_6 \\ s_7 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} e_0 \\ e_1 \\ e_2 \\ e_3 \\ e_4 \\ e_5 \\ e_6 \\ e_7 \end{pmatrix}$$

## Performance

Storage:  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ ; Computation  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$

# RING-LWE/POLYNOMIAL-LWE

$$\begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \\ c_4 \\ c_5 \\ c_6 \\ c_7 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 & -a_5 & -a_4 & -a_3 & -a_2 & -a_1 \\ a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 & -a_5 & -a_4 & -a_3 & -a_2 \\ a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 & -a_5 & -a_4 & -a_3 \\ a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 & -a_5 & -a_4 \\ a_4 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 & -a_5 \\ a_5 & a_4 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 & -a_6 \\ a_6 & a_5 & a_4 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & -a_7 \\ a_7 & a_6 & a_5 & a_4 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ s_2 \\ s_3 \\ s_4 \\ s_5 \\ s_6 \\ s_7 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} e_0 \\ e_1 \\ e_2 \\ e_3 \\ e_4 \\ e_5 \\ e_6 \\ e_7 \end{pmatrix}$$

Performance ( $n$  is a power of two)

Storage:  $\mathcal{O}(n)$ ; Computation  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$



$$\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} c_i \cdot X^i = \left( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \cdot X^i \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} s_i \cdot X^i \right) + \sum_{i=0}^8 e_i \cdot X^i \bmod X^n + 1$$
$$c(X) = a(X) \cdot s(X) + e(X) \bmod \phi(X)$$

We write  $\mathcal{R} := \mathbb{Z}[X]/\phi(X)$  and  $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\phi(X)$ .

Damien Stehlé, Ron Steinfeld, Keisuke Tanaka, and Keita Xagawa. **Efficient Public Key Encryption Based on Ideal Lattices**. In: *ASIACRYPT 2009*. Ed. by Mitsuru Matsui. Vol. 5912. LNCS. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, Dec. 2009, pp. 617–635. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7\\_36](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_36)

Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Oded Regev. **On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings**. In: *EUROCRYPT 2010*. Ed. by Henri Gilbert. Vol. 6110. LNCS. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 1–23. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_1)

## CONVENTION

- I am going to use the Ring-LWE formulation

$$c_i(X) = a_i(X) \cdot s(X) + e_i(X)$$

Thus, each sample corresponds to “ $n$  LWE samples”

- I will suppress the “ $(X)$ ” in “ $a(X)$ ” etc.
- I will assume  $s$  is “small” and that the product of two “small” things is “small”.
- I will write  $e_i$  to emphasise that  $e_i$  is small.

TL;DR: I will write

$$c_i = a_i \cdot s + e_i$$

# DH TO RING-LWE DICTIONARY

| DH Land                      | Ring-LWE Land  |
|------------------------------|--|
| $g$                          | $a$  |
| $g^x$                        | $a \cdot s + e$  |
| $g^x \cdot g^y = g^{x+y}$    | $(a \cdot s + e_0) + (a \cdot t + e_1) = a \cdot (s + t) + e'$   |
| $(g^a)^b = (g^b)^a$          | $(a \cdot s + e) \cdot t = (a \cdot s \cdot t + e \cdot t)$<br>$\approx a \cdot s \cdot t \approx (a \cdot t + e) \cdot s$ |
| $(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$      | $(a, a \cdot s + e, a \cdot t + d, a \cdot s \cdot t + e')$  |
| $\approx_c (g, g^a, g^b, u)$ | $\approx_c (a, a \cdot s + e, a \cdot t + d, u)$   |

## ElGamal

**KeyGen**  $h = g^s$

**Encrypt**  $d_0, d_1 = (g^v, m \cdot h^v)$  for some random  $v$

**Decrypt**  $d_1/d_0^s = m \cdot (g^s)^v / (g^v)^s = m$

## [LPR10]

**KeyGen**  $c = a \cdot s + e$

**Encrypt**  $d_0, d_1 = v \cdot a + e', v \cdot c + e'' + \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor \cdot m$


**Decrypt**

$$\begin{aligned} \left\lfloor \frac{2}{q} \cdot (d_1 - d_0 \cdot s) \right\rfloor &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{q} \cdot \left( v \cdot (a \cdot s + e) + e'' + \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \cdot m - (v \cdot a + e') \cdot s \right) \right\rfloor \\ &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{q} \cdot \left( v \cdot e + e'' + \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \cdot m - e' \cdot s \right) \right\rfloor = m \end{aligned}$$

## FOLLOW THE BLUEPRINT

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# VERIFIABLE OBLIVIOUS PRFs



## EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS: PRIVACY PASS

### Problem:

- Tor users are having a hard time on Cloudflare protected sites
- They're constantly asked to solve CAPTCHAs to prove that they're not bots
- Want a privacy-preserving way of running reverse Turing test once and re-use later

### Idea:

- Solve CAPTCHA
- Evaluate a VOPRF on a bunch of random points to produce tokens  $F_k(x_i)$
- Redeem token by sending  $(x_i, F_k(x_i))$

Alex Davidson, Ian Goldberg, Nick Sullivan, George Tankersley, and Filippo Valsorda. **Privacy Pass: Bypassing Internet Challenges Anonymously**. In: *PoPETs 2018.3* (July 2018), pp. 164–180. DOI: 10.1515/popets-2018-0026

# DH-BASED OPRF

Client

Server

$$c_x := H(x) \cdot g^r$$



$$d_x := c_x^k, c = g^k$$



$$d_x/c^r = H(x)^k$$

$$d_x/c^r = c_x^k/c^r = (H(x) \cdot g^r)^k / (g^k)^r = H(x)^k$$



# "JUST TAKE LOGS"

Client

Server

$$c_x := H(x) + a \cdot r + e$$

$$d_x := c_x \cdot k + e', c := a \cdot k + e''$$

$$\left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot d_x - c \cdot r \right\rfloor$$

$$\begin{aligned} d_x - c \cdot r &= (H(x) + a \cdot r + e) \cdot k + e' - (a \cdot k + e'') \cdot r \\ &= H(x) \cdot k + a \cdot r \cdot k + e \cdot k + e' - a \cdot k \cdot r - e'' \cdot r \\ &= H(x) \cdot k + e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r \\ &\approx H(x) \cdot k \end{aligned}$$

**Trapdoor Friendly** It is not safe to output  $c_x \cdot k + e$  for some arbitrary  $c_x$

**Noise Leakage** “ $\approx$ ” glosses over  $e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r$  which depends on  $k$

**Noise Growth** “ $\approx$ ” is not  $=$ , how do we arrive at the same value?

TRAPDOOR FRIENDLY

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## THE PROBLEM

The server has to output  $c_x \cdot k + e'$  for some  $c_x \stackrel{?}{=} H(x) + a \cdot r + e$ . This may not be safe.

## Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys

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**Abstract.** We present practical and realistic attacks on some standardized elliptic curve key establishment and public-key encryption protocols that are effective if the receiver of an elliptic curve point does not check that the point lies on the appropriate elliptic curve. The attacks combine ideas from the small subgroup attack of Lim and Lee, and the differential fault attack of Biehl, Meyer and Müller. Although the ideas behind the attacks are quite elementary, and there are simple countermeasures known, the attacks can have drastic consequences if these countermeasures are not taken by implementors of the protocols. We illustrate the effectiveness of such attacks on a key agreement protocol recently proposed for the IEEE 802.15 Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) standard.

## Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys

### Prime and Prejudice: Primality Testing Under Adversarial Conditions

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`juraj.somorovsky@rub.de`

**Abstract.** This work provides a systematic analysis of primality testing under adversarial conditions, where the numbers being tested for primality are not generated randomly, but instead provided by a possibly malicious party. Such a situation can arise in secure messaging protocols where a server supplies Diffie-Hellman parameters to the peers, or in a secure communications protocol like TLS where a developer can insert such a number to be able to later passively spy on client-server data. We study a broad range of cryptographic libraries and assess their performance in this adversarial setting. As examples of our findings, we are able to construct 2048-bit composites that are declared prime with probability  $1/16$  by OpenSSL's primality testing in its default configuration; the advertised performance is  $2^{-80}$ . We can also construct 1024-bit composites that *always* pass the primality testing routine in GNU GMP when configured with the recommended minimum number of rounds. And, for a number of libraries (Cryptlib, LibTomCrypt, JavaScript Big Number, WolfSSL), we can construct composites that *always* pass the supplied primality tests. We explore the implications of these security failures in applications, focusing on the construction of malicious Diffie-Hellman parameters. We show that, unless careful primality testing is performed, an adversary can supply parameters  $(p, q, g)$  which on the surface look secure, but where the discrete logarithm problem in the subgroup of order  $q$  generated by  $g$  is easy. We close by making recommendations for users and developers. In particular, we promote the Baillie-PSW primality test which is both efficient and conjectured to be robust even in the adversarial setting for numbers up to a few thousand bits.

## Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys

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- However, (likely) no “point validation” for LWE by the NTRU assumption [HPS96]:

$$f, g \leftarrow \mathcal{R}^2 : h := f/g \approx_c \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_q)$$

- Attack<sup>a</sup>:
  1. Sample  $f, g \leftarrow \mathcal{R}^2$  and set  $\Delta := \lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil$
  2. Submit  $a := \Delta \cdot f/g$
  3. Receive  $c := a \cdot k + e$  and compute

$$g \cdot c = g \cdot (\Delta \cdot f/g \cdot k + e)$$

$$g \cdot c = \Delta \cdot f \cdot k + g \cdot e$$

$$\equiv g \cdot e \bmod \Delta$$

<sup>a</sup>assuming  $f, g, k, e$  are sufficiently small

## WORKAROUND

- The client proves in zero-knowledge that  $c_x$  is well-formed:  $c_x := H(x) + a \cdot r + e$
- This means the client needs to prove the evaluation of  $H(x)$
- This is sound, we do not need to treat  $H(x)$  as a Random Oracle
- This is expensive in terms of bandwidth and computation cost
  - [ADD21]:  $\approx 128\text{GB}$  per evaluation using [YAZYW19]
  - [AG24]:  $\approx 63\text{kB}$  per evaluation using [BS23]

### An Aside

This NTRU “attack” can be used constructively to make proof systems online extractable (e.g. [ADDG24])



## NOISE LEAKAGE

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# THE PROBLEM

The client learns

$$e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r$$

where it chooses  $e$  and  $r$ .

## The Attack

Write  $\mathbf{a} := (e, -r)$  and  $\mathbf{s} := (k, e'')$ , then we can rewrite

$$e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r$$

as  $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} + e'$  which is essentially an instance of “LWE without modular reduction” [BDEFT18] which is easy.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The word “essentially” does a lot of work here. That is, this is a simplification because  $e''$  changes in each invocation and the attacks from [BDEFT18] do not apply as is.

**Statistical Noise Drowning**  $\|e'\| \geq \lambda^{\omega(1)} \cdot \|e \cdot k - e'' \cdot r\|$  [ADDS21]

**Rényi Noise Drowning**  $\|e'\| \geq \text{poly}(\lambda) \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot \|e \cdot k - e'' \cdot r\|$  [AG24]

- $Q$  is the number of queries
- must play a search game instead of a distinguishing game (use ROM)

**Computational Assumption**  $\|e'\| \geq \text{poly}(\lambda) \cdot \sqrt{Q} \cdot \|e \cdot k - e'' \cdot r\|$  [ESTX24]

- similar to Hint-(M)LWE, but w/o reduction from (M)LWE

## Cost

Since we require  $q > \|e'\|$  we have that  $q/\|e\|$  – the “signal to noise ratio” of the underlying RLWE samples – is quite big. A big signal to noise ratio makes decoding – i.e. solving LWE – easier. This requires us to use larger secret dimensions  $n$  to compensate. Bandwidth cost is essentially  $n \log q$ .


## NOISE GROWTH

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## THE PROBLEM


$$H(x) \cdot k + e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r \approx H(x) \cdot k$$
$$\left\lceil \frac{2}{q} \cdot \left( H(x) \cdot k + e \cdot k + e' - e'' \cdot r \right) \right\rceil \stackrel{?}{=} \left\lceil \frac{2}{q} \cdot \left( H(x) \cdot k \right) \right\rceil$$

# ROUNDING



## SOLUTION ATTEMPT

Make  $q > \text{poly}(\lambda)$  such that the red area is negligibly small.




## SOLUTION ATTEMPT

Make  $q > \text{poly}(\lambda)$  such that the red area is negligibly small.

### Malicious Servers

This argument works on average but does not work against adversaries that somehow pick  $k$  s.t.  $H(x) \cdot k$  lands in the red area with high probability for some  $x$ .





## SOLUTION

- Plant a hard SIS instance in each coefficient: 1D-SIS [ADDS21]

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# SOLUTION

- Plant a hard SIS instance in each coefficient: 1D-SIS [ADDS21]
  - Yes, seriously!
  - This requires  $q \gg 2^\lambda$
- Change the PRF output to  $H(x) \cdot k + H_2(x, c_0)$  [AG24]
  - $H_2()$  is some Random Oracle that randomly shifts  $H(x) \cdot k$
  - $c_0 := a_0 \cdot k + e'_0$  is a commitment to  $k$
  - The trick is from [GKQMS24]
  - $q \gg \text{poly}(\lambda)$  is sufficient

Stuck with a super-polynomial  $q$

Big “signal-to-noise” ratio, forcing us to increase  $n$ , as above.

NIKE enables Alice and Bob, who know each others' public keys, to agree on shared key without requiring any interaction [DH76]

- Deployed in WireGuard [HNSWZ20] and static DH is also used in e.g. Google's QUIC.
- For lattices there are significant barriers [GKRS20].
- Stark contrast to **interactive** key-exchanges or plain public-key encryption
  1. We send along some “hints” that allow to handle the noise
  2. secrets are not re-used, allowing us to avoid expensive “well-formedness” proofs
- [GKQMS24] is an instantiation that essentially accepts the super-polynomial modulus

## WRAPPING UP

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## REALISATIONS OF THIS BLUEPRINT

| Work     | Model | 1-time | Offline | Online | $Q$      |
|----------|-------|--------|---------|--------|----------|
| [ADDS21] | H-H   |        | –       | 2MB    |          |
| [ADDS21] | M-M   |        | –       | 128GB  |          |
| [AG24]   | M-M   |        | 114kB   | 198kB  | $2^{32}$ |
| [ESTX24] | M-M   |        | 20kB    | 159kB  | $2^{32}$ |

H: semi-honest, M: malicious

We do have efficient FHE, indeed FHE ciphertexts are typically **smaller** than the messages exchanged in the schemes discussed above.

- Simple idea:
  1. Client FHE encrypts  $x$  as  $[x]$
  2. Server homomorphically computes PRF using plaintext  $k$  and  $[x]$  to obtain  $[F_k(x)]$
  3. Client FHE decrypts  $F_k(x)$
- Problem: PRFs need deep circuits, deep circuits are expensive
- Proposal: Use Dark Matter (weak-)PRF candidate [BIPSW18]  $\sum (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} \bmod 2) \bmod 3$  where  $\mathbf{A}$  is the secret key
- This can be computed with one level of FHE bootstrapping

## OTHER ROUND-OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVES W/O TRUSTED SETUP

| Work    | Assumption                         | Model   | 1-time Offline | Online  |
|---------|------------------------------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| ADDS21  | (R)LWE+SIS                         | H-H     | -              | 2MB     |
| ADDS21  | (R)LWE+SIS                         | M-M     | -              | 128GB   |
| AG24    | (R)LWE+SIS                         | M-M     | 114kB          | 198kB   |
| ADDG23  | mod(2,3)+lattices                  | M-H     | 2.5MB          | 10KB    |
| ADDG23  | mod(2,3)+lattices                  | M-M     | 2.5MB          | 160KB   |
| ESTX24  | iMLWER-RU+MLE+SIS                  | M-M     | 20kB           | 159KB   |
| APRR24  | mod(2,3)                           | M-H, pp | 4.75B          | 114.5B  |
| FOO23   | AES+Garbled Circuits               | H-H     | -              | 6.79MB  |
| Basso24 | Higher-Dimensional isogenies       | M-M     | -              | 28.9kB  |
| HHM+23  | Isogenies $F_p$ + lattices + HE OT | H-H     | -              | 640kB   |
| dSP23   | Isogenies $F_p$                    | M-H, pp | 68.4 kB        | 384B    |
| dSP23   | Isogenies $F_p$                    | M-H, pp | -              | 16.38kB |

adapted from <https://heimberger.xyz/oprfs.html>



FIN

THANK YOU

<https://ia.cr/2019/1271>

<https://ia.cr/2023/232>

<https://ia.cr/2024/1459>

# REFERENCES I

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