## SCTLR\_EL1, System Control Register (EL1)

The SCTLR EL1 characteristics are:

### **Purpose**

Provides top level control of the system, including its memory system, at EL1 and EL0.

## **Configuration**

AArch64 System register SCTLR\_EL1 bits [31:0] are architecturally mapped to AArch32 System register <a href="SCTLR[31:0]">SCTLR[31:0]</a>.

### **Attributes**

SCTLR EL1 is a 64-bit register.

## Field descriptions

|   | 63    | 62        | 61     | 60     | 59          | 58    | 57          | 56           | 55    | 54           | 53   | 52    | 51  | 50   | 49                |
|---|-------|-----------|--------|--------|-------------|-------|-------------|--------------|-------|--------------|------|-------|-----|------|-------------------|
|   | TIDCP | SPINTMASK | NMI    | EnTP2  | TCSO        | TCS00 | <b>EPAN</b> | <b>EnALS</b> | EnAS0 | <b>EnASR</b> | TME  | TME0  | TMT | TMT0 | ٦                 |
|   | EnIA  | EnIB      | LSMAOE | nTLSMD | <b>EnDA</b> | UCI   | EE          | E0E          | SPAN  | EIS          | IESB | TSCXT | WXN | nTWE | RES0 <sub>r</sub> |
| • | 31    | 30        | 29     | 28     | 27          | 26    | 25          | 24           | 23    | 22           | 21   | 20    | 19  | 18   | 17                |

# TIDCP, bit [63] When FEAT TIDCP1 is implemented:

Trap implementation defined functionality. When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE}  $!=\{1,1\}$ , traps EL0 accesses to the encodings reserved for implementation defined functionality to EL1.

| TIDCP | Meaning   |  |
|-------|---|--|
| 0d0   | No instructions accessing the System register or System instruction spaces are trapped by this mechanism. |  |

- In AArch64 state, EL0 access to the encodings in the following reserved encoding spaces are trapped and reported using EC syndrome 0x18:
  - implementation defined System instructions, which are accessed using SYS and SYSL, with CRn == {11, 15}.
  - implementation defined System registers, which are accessed using MRS and MSR with the S3\_<op1>\_<Cn>\_<Cm>\_<op2> register name.
- In AArch32 state, EL0 MCR and MRC access to the following encodings are trapped and reported using EC syndrome 0x03:
  - o All coproc==p15, CRn==c9, opc1 == {0-7}, CRm == {c0-c2, c5-c8}, opc2 == {0-7}.
  - o All coproc==p15, CRn==c10, opc1 =={0-7}, CRm == {c0, c1, c4, c8}, opc2 == {0-7}.
  - o All coproc==p15, CRn==c11,
     opc1=={0-7}, CRm == {c0-c8,
     c15}, opc2 == {0-7}.

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# SPINTMASK, bit [62] When FEAT\_NMI is implemented:

SP Interrupt Mask enable. When SCTLR\_EL1.NMI is 1, controls whether PSTATE.SP acts as an interrupt mask, and controls the value of PSTATE.ALLINT on taking an exception to EL1.

| SPINTMASK | Meaning |  |
|-----------|---------|--|
|           |         |  |

| 0b0 | Does not cause             |
|-----|----------------------------|
|     | PSTATE.SP to mask          |
|     | interrupts.                |
|     | PSTATE.ALLINT is set to    |
|     | 1 on taking an exception   |
|     | to EL1.                    |
| 0b1 | When PSTATE.SP is 1        |
|     | and execution is at EL1,   |
|     | an IRQ or FIQ interrupt    |
|     | that is targeted to EL1 is |
|     | masked regardless of       |
|     | any denotion of            |
|     | Superpriority.             |
|     | PSTATE.ALLINT is set to    |
|     | 0 on taking an exception   |
|     | to EL1.                    |
|     |                            |

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

## NMI, bit [61] When FEAT\_NMI is implemented:

Non-maskable Interrupt enable.

| NMI | Meaning  |  |
|-----|--|--|
| 0d0 | This control does not affect interrupt masking behavior.   |  |
| 0b1 | This control enables all of the following:   |  |
|     | <ul> <li>The use of the PSTATE.ALLINT interrupt mask.</li> <li>IRQ and FIQ interrupts to have Superpriority as an additional attribute.</li> <li>PSTATE.SP to be used as an interrupt mask.</li> </ul> |  |

- On a Warm reset:
  - When EL2 is not implemented and EL3 is not implemented, this field resets to 0.
  - Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnTP2, bit [60] When FEAT SME is implemented:

Traps instructions executed at EL0 that access <u>TPIDR2\_EL0</u> to EL1, or to EL2 when EL2 is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.TGE is 1. The exception is reported using ESR ELx.EC value 0x18.

| EnTP2 | Meaning                          |  |
|-------|----------------------------------|--|
| 0b0   | This control causes execution of |  |
|       | these instructions at ELO to be  |  |
|       | trapped.                         |  |
| 0b1   | This control does not cause      |  |
|       | execution of any instructions to |  |
|       | be trapped.                      |  |

If FEAT\_VHE is implemented, EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state, and  $\frac{HCR\_EL2}{E2H}$ , TGE} == {1, 1}, this field has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TCSO, bit [59] When FEAT\_MTE\_STORE\_ONLY is implemented:

Tag Checking Store Only.

| TCSO | Meaning                         |
|------|---------------------------------|
| 0b0  | This field has no effect on Tag |
|      | checking.                       |

| 0b1 | Load instructions executed in |
|-----|-------------------------------|
|     | EL1 are Tag Unchecked.        |

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TCSO0, bit [58] When FEAT\_MTE\_STORE\_ONLY is implemented:

When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} != {1, 1}, Tag Checking Store Only in EL0.

| TCS00 | Meaning  |  |
|-------|--|--|
| 0d0   | This field has no effect on Tag checking.            |  |
| 0b1   | Load instructions executed in ELO are Tag Unchecked. |  |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EPAN, bit [57] When FEAT PAN3 is implemented:

Enhanced Privileged Access Never. When PSTATE.PAN is 1, determines whether an EL1 data access to a page with stage 1 EL0 instruction access permission generates a Permission fault as a result of the Privileged Access Never mechanism.

| EPAN                               | Meaning               |  |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| 0b0 No additional Permission fault |                       |  |
|                                    | are generated by this |  |
|                                    | mechanism.            |  |

| 0b1 | An EL1 data access to a page with stage 1 EL0 data access |
|-----|---|
|     | permission or stage 1 EL0                                 |
|     | instruction access permission                             |
|     | generates a Permission fault.                             |
|     | Any speculative data accesses                             |
|     | that would generate a                                     |
|     | Permission fault as a result of                           |
|     | PSTATE.PAN = 1 if the accesses                            |
|     | were not speculative, will not                            |
|     | cause an allocation into a cache.                         |

This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnALS, bit [56] When FEAT LS64 is implemented:

When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} != {1, 1}, traps execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL0 to EL1.

| EnALS | Meaning                         |  |
|-------|---------------------------------|--|
| 0b0   | Execution of an LD64B or        |  |
|       | ST64B instruction at EL0 is     |  |
|       | trapped to EL1.                 |  |
| 0b1   | This control does not cause any |  |
|       | instructions to be trapped.     |  |

A trap of an LD64B or ST64B instruction is reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of  $0 \times 0 A$ , with an ISS code of  $0 \times 00000002$ .

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnASO, bit [55] When FEAT LS64 ACCDATA is implemented:

When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} != {1, 1}, traps execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL0 to EL1.

| EnAS0 | Meaning   |  |
|-------|---|--|
| 0b0   | Execution of an ST64BV0                                     |  |
|       | instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL1.                       |  |
| 0b1   | This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |  |

A trap of an ST64BV0 instruction is reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of 0x0A, with an ISS code of 0x0000001.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnASR, bit [54] When FEAT\_LS64\_V is implemented:

When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} != {1, 1}, traps execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL0 to EL1.

| EnASR | Meaning                          |  |
|-------|----------------------------------|--|
| 0b0   | Execution of an ST64BV           |  |
|       | instruction at ELO is trapped to |  |
|       | EL1.                             |  |
| 0b1   | This control does not cause any  |  |
|       | instructions to be trapped.      |  |

A trap of an ST64BV instruction is reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of 0x0A, with an ISS code of 0x0000000.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TME, bit [53] When FEAT TME is implemented:

Enables the Transactional Memory Extension at EL1.

| TME | Meaning   |
|-----|---|
| 0b0 | Any attempt to execute a TSTART                                   |
|     | instruction at EL1 is trapped to                                  |
|     | EL1, unless <u>HCR_EL2</u> .TME or                                |
|     | SCR EL3.TME causes TSTART   |
|     | instructions to be undefined at                                   |
|     | EL1.  |
| 0b1 | This control does not cause any TSTART instruction to be trapped. |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TME0, bit [52] When FEAT\_TME is implemented:

Enables the Transactional Memory Extension at ELO.

| TME0 | Meaning                         |  |
|------|---------------------------------|--|
| 0b0  | Any attempt to execute a        |  |
|      | TSTART instruction at EL0 is    |  |
|      | trapped to EL1, unless          |  |
|      | <u>HCR_EL2</u> .TME or          |  |
|      | SCR_EL3.TME causes TSTART       |  |
|      | instructions to be undefined at |  |
|      | ELO.                            |  |
| 0b1  | This control does not cause any |  |
|      | TSTART instruction to be        |  |
|      | trapped.                        |  |

If FEAT\_VHE is implemented, EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state, and  $\underline{HCR\_EL2}$ .{E2H, TGE} == {1, 1}, this field has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TMT, bit [51] When FEAT TME is implemented:

Forces a trivial implementation of the Transactional Memory Extension at EL1.

| TMT | Meaning                             |
|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | This control does not cause any     |
|     | TSTART instruction to fail.         |
| 0b1 | When the TSTART instruction is      |
|     | executed at EL1, the transaction    |
|     | fails with a TRIVIAL failure cause. |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TMT0, bit [50] When FEAT TME is implemented:

Forces a trivial implementation of the Transactional Memory Extension at ELO.

| TMT0 | Meaning                          |
|------|----------------------------------|
| 0b0  | This control does not cause any  |
|      | TSTART instruction to fail.      |
| 0b1  | When the TSTART instruction is   |
|      | executed at EL0, the transaction |
|      | fails with a TRIVIAL failure     |
|      | cause.                           |

If FEAT\_VHE is implemented, EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state, and  $\frac{HCR\_EL2}{E2H}$ , TGE} == {1, 1}, this field has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TWEDEL, bits [49:46] When FEAT\_TWED is implemented:

TWE Delay. A 4-bit unsigned number that, when SCTLR\_EL1.TWEDEn is 1, encodes the minimum delay in taking a trap of WFE\* caused by SCTLR\_EL1.nTWE as 2<sup>(TWEDEL + 8)</sup> cycles.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TWEDEn, bit [45] When FEAT\_TWED is implemented:

TWE Delay Enable. Enables a configurable delayed trap of the WFE\* instruction caused by SCTLR EL1.nTWE.

| TWEDEn | Meaning                       |
|--------|-------------------------------|
| 0b0    | The delay for taking the trap |
|        | is implementation defined.    |
| 0b1    | The delay for taking the trap |
|        | is at least the number of     |
|        | cycles defined in             |
|        | SCTLR EL1.TWEDEL.             |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# DSSBS, bit [44] When FEAT SSBS is implemented:

Default PSTATE.SSBS value on Exception Entry.

| DSSBS | Meaning |  |
|-------|---------|--|
| DSSDS | Meaning |  |

| 0b0 | PSTATE.SSBS is set to 0 on an |  |
|-----|-------------------------------|--|
|     | exception to EL1.             |  |
| 0b1 | PSTATE.SSBS is set to 1 on an |  |
|     | exception to EL1.             |  |

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an implementation defined value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# ATA, bit [43] When FEAT MTE2 is implemented:

Allocation Tag Access in EL1.

When  $\underline{SCR\_EL3}$ .ATA == 1 and  $\underline{HCR\_EL2}$ .ATA == 1, controls access to Allocation Tags and Tag Check operations in EL1.

| ATA        | Meaning                              |  |
|------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| 0b0        | Access to Allocation Tags is         |  |
|            | prevented at EL1.                    |  |
|            | Memory accesses at EL1 are not       |  |
|            | subject to a Tag Check operation.    |  |
| 0b1        | This control does not prevent access |  |
|            | to Allocation Tags at £L1.           |  |
|            | Tag Checked memory accesses at       |  |
|            | EL1 are subject to a Tag Check       |  |
|            | operation.                           |  |
|            | The Tag Check operation depends on   |  |
|            | the type of tag at the memory being  |  |
|            | accessed:                            |  |
|            | T 411 T 1                            |  |
|            | • For Allocation Tagged memory,      |  |
|            | an Allocation Tag Check              |  |
| operation. |                                      |  |
|            | • If                                 |  |
|            | FEAT_MTE_CANONICAL_TAGS              |  |
|            | is implemented, for                  |  |
|            | Canonically Tagged memory, a         |  |
|            | Canonical Tag Check                  |  |
|            | operation.                           |  |
|            |                                      |  |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# ATA0, bit [42] When FEAT\_MTE2 is implemented:

Allocation Tag Access in EL0.

When  $\underline{SCR\_EL3}$ .ATA == 1,  $\underline{HCR\_EL2}$ .ATA == 1, and  $\underline{HCR\_EL2}$ . {E2H, TGE} != {1, 1}, controls access to Allocation Tags and Tag Check operations in EL0.

| ATA0 | Meaning   |  |
|------|---|--|
| 0b0  | Access to Allocation Tags is prevented at EL0.  Memory accesses at EL0 are not subject to a Tag Check operation.  |  |
| 0b1  | This control does not prevent access to Allocation Tags at EL0.  Tag Checked memory accesses at EL0 are subject to a Tag Check operation.  The Tag Check operation depends on the type of tag at the memory being accessed: |  |
|      | <ul> <li>For Allocation Tagged memory, an Allocation Tag Check operation.</li> <li>If     FEAT_MTE_CANONICAL_TAGS is implemented, for Canonically Tagged memory, a Canonical Tag Check operation.</li> </ul>                |  |

### **Note**

Software may change this control bit on a context switch.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TCF, bits [41:40] When FEAT MTE2 is implemented:

Tag Check Fault in EL1. Controls the effect of Tag Check Faults due to Loads and Stores in EL1.

If FEAT MTE3 is not implemented, the value 0b11 is reserved.

| TCF  | Meaning  | Applies<br>when         |
|------|--|-------------------------|
| 0b00 | Tag Check Faults have no effect on the PE.                                   |                         |
| 0b01 | Tag Check Faults<br>cause a<br>synchronous                                   |                         |
| 0b10 | exception. Tag Check Faults are  |                         |
| 0b11 | asynchronously<br>accumulated.<br>Tag Check Faults<br>cause a<br>synchronous | When<br>FEAT_MTE3<br>is |
|      | exception on reads, and are asynchronously accumulated on writes.            | implemented             |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TCF0, bits [39:38] When FEAT\_MTE2 is implemented:

Tag Check Fault in EL0. When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H,TGE} != {1,1}, controls the effect of Tag Check Faults due to Loads and Stores in EL0.

If FEAT MTE3 is not implemented, the value 0b11 is reserved.

### Note

Software may change this control bit on a context switch.

|      |                | Applies     |
|------|----------------|-------------|
| TCF0 | Meaning        | when        |
| 0b00 | Tag Check      |             |
|      | Faults have no |             |
|      | effect on the  |             |
|      | PE.            |             |
| 0b01 | Tag Check      |             |
|      | Faults cause a |             |
|      | synchronous    |             |
|      | exception.     |             |
| 0b10 | Tag Check      |             |
|      | Faults are     |             |
|      | asynchronously |             |
|      | accumulated.   |             |
| 0b11 | Tag Check      | When        |
|      | Faults cause a | FEAT MTE3   |
|      | synchronous    | is          |
|      | exception on   | implemented |
|      | reads, and are |             |
|      | asynchronously |             |
|      | accumulated on |             |
|      | writes.        |             |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# ITFSB, bit [37] When FEAT\_MTE2 is implemented:

When synchronous exceptions are not being generated by Tag Check Faults, this field controls whether on exception entry into EL1, all Tag Check Faults due to instructions executed before exception entry, that are reported asynchronously, are synchronized into <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/j.com/nc/10.1001/j.

| ITFSB | Meaning |  |
|-------|---------|--|
|       |         |  |

| 0b0 | Tag Check Faults are not      |
|-----|-------------------------------|
|     | synchronized on entry to EL1. |
| 0b1 | Tag Check Faults are          |
|     | synchronized on entry to EL1. |

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### BT1, bit [36] When FEAT\_BTI is implemented:

PAC Branch Type compatibility at EL1.

| BT1 | Meaning  |
|-----|--|
| 0b0 | When the PE is executing at EL1, PACIASP and PACIBSP are compatible with PSTATE.BTYPE == 0b11.     |
| 0b1 | When the PE is executing at EL1, PACIASP and PACIBSP are not compatible with PSTATE.BTYPE == 0b11. |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# BT0, bit [35] When FEAT\_BTI is implemented:

PAC Branch Type compatibility at EL0.

| BT0 | Meaning  |
|-----|--|
| 0b0 | When the PE is executing at ELO, PACIASP and PACIBSP are compatible with PSTATE.BTYPE == 0b11. |

When the PE is executing at ELO, PACIASP and PACIBSP are not compatible with PSTATE.BTYPE == 0b11.

When the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, the value of SCTLR EL1.BT0 has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### Bit [34]

Reserved, res0.

### MSCEn, bit [33]

When FEAT\_MOPS is implemented and (HCR\_EL2.E2H == 0 or HCR\_EL2.TGE == 0):

Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions Enable. Enables execution of the Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions at ELO.

| MSCEn | Meaning                        |
|-------|--------------------------------|
| 0b0   | Execution of the Memory Copy   |
|       | and Memory Set instructions is |
|       | undefined at EL0.              |
| 0b1   | This control does not cause    |
|       | any instructions to be         |
|       | undefined.                     |

When FEAT\_MOPS is implemented and <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, the Effective value of this bit is 0b1.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# CMOW, bit [32] When FEAT CMOW is implemented:

Controls cache maintenance instruction permission for the following instructions executed at ELO.

• IC IVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CIGDVAC and DC CIGVAC.

| CMOW | Meaning   |
|------|---|
| 0b0  | These instructions executed at                                  |
|      | EL0 with stage 1 read   |
|      | permission, but without stage 1                                 |
|      | write permission, do not  |
|      | generate a stage 1 permission                                   |
|      | fault.  |
| 0b1  | If enabled as a result of                                       |
|      | $\underline{\text{SCTLR}}\underline{\text{EL1}}$ .UCI==1, these |
|      | instructions executed at EL0                                    |
|      | with stage 1 read permission,                                   |
|      | but without stage 1 write                                       |
|      | permission, generate a stage 1                                  |
|      | permission fault.   |

When AArch64.HCR\_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

For this control, stage 1 has write permission if all of the following apply:

- AP[2] is 0 or DBM is 1 in the stage 1 descriptor.
- Where APTable is in use, APTable[1] is 0 for all levels of the translation table.

This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnIA, bit [31] When FEAT\_PAuth is implemented:

Controls enabling of pointer authentication (using the APIAKey\_EL1 key) of instruction addresses in the EL1&0 translation regime.

For more information, see 'System register control of pointer authentication'.

| EnIA | Meaning                           |
|------|-----------------------------------|
| 0d0  | Pointer authentication (using the |
|      | APIAKey_EL1 key) of instruction   |
|      | addresses is not enabled.         |
| 0b1  | Pointer authentication (using the |
|      | APIAKey_EL1 key) of instruction   |
|      | addresses is enabled.             |

#### Note

This field controls the behavior of the AddPACIA and AuthIA pseudocode functions. Specifically, when the field is 1, AddPACIA returns a copy of a pointer to which a pointer authentication code has been added, and AuthIA returns an authenticated copy of a pointer. When the field is 0, both of these functions are NOP.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# EnIB, bit [30] When FEAT\_PAuth is implemented:

Controls enabling of pointer authentication (using the APIBKey\_EL1 key) of instruction addresses in the EL1&0 translation regime.

For more information, see 'System register control of pointer authentication'.

| EnIB | Meaning   |
|------|---|
| 0b0  | Pointer authentication (using the APIBKey_EL1 key) of instruction addresses is not enabled. |
| 0b1  | Pointer authentication (using the APIBKey_EL1 key) of instruction addresses is enabled.     |

#### Note

This field controls the behavior of the AddPACIB and AuthIB pseudocode functions. Specifically, when the field is 1,

AddPACIB returns a copy of a pointer to which a pointer authentication code has been added, and AuthIB returns an authenticated copy of a pointer. When the field is 0, both of these functions are NOP.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# LSMAOE, bit [29] When FEAT LSMAOC is implemented:

Load Multiple and Store Multiple Atomicity and Ordering Enable.

| LSMAOE | Meaning                       |
|--------|-------------------------------|
| 0b0    | For all memory accesses at    |
|        | EL0, A32 and T32 Load         |
|        | Multiple and Store Multiple   |
|        | can have an interrupt taken   |
|        | during the sequence memory    |
|        | accesses, and the memory      |
|        | accesses are not required to  |
|        | be ordered.                   |
| 0b1    | The ordering and interrupt    |
|        | behavior of A32 and T32       |
|        | Load Multiple and Store       |
|        | Multiple at EL0 is as defined |
|        | for Armv8.0.                  |

This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# nTLSMD, bit [28] When FEAT LSMAOC is implemented:

No Trap Load Multiple and Store Multiple to Device-nGRE/Device-nGnRE/Device-nGnRnE memory.

| nTLSMD | Meaning                      |
|--------|------------------------------|
| 0b0    | All memory accesses by A32   |
|        | and T32 Load Multiple and    |
|        | Store Multiple at EL0 that   |
|        | are marked at stage 1 as     |
|        | Device-nGRE/Device-nGnRE/    |
|        | Device-nGnRnE memory are     |
|        | trapped and generate a stage |
|        | 1 Alignment fault.           |
| 0b1    | All memory accesses by A32   |
|        | and T32 Load Multiple and    |
|        | Store Multiple at EL0 that   |
|        | are marked at stage 1 as     |
|        | Device-nGRE/Device-nGnRE/    |
|        | Device-nGnRnE memory are     |
|        | not trapped.                 |

This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# EnDA, bit [27] When FEAT\_PAuth is implemented:

Controls enabling of pointer authentication (using the APDAKey\_EL1 key) of instruction addresses in the EL1&0 translation regime.

For more information, see 'System register control of pointer authentication'.

| EnDA | Meaning  |
|------|--|
| 0d0  | Pointer authentication (using the APDAKey_EL1 key) of data addresses is not enabled. |

| Pointer authentication (using the |
|-----------------------------------|
| APDAKey EL1 key) of data          |
| addresses is enabled.             |

#### **Note**

0b1

This field controls the behavior of the AddPACDA and AuthDA pseudocode functions. Specifically, when the field is 1, AddPACDA returns a copy of a pointer to which a pointer authentication code has been added, and AuthDA returns an authenticated copy of a pointer. When the field is 0, both of these functions are NOP.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### **UCI, bit [26]**

Traps EL0 execution of cache maintenance instructions, to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <a href="https://executive.ncb/hc2"><u>HCR\_EL2</u></a>.TGE is 1, from AArch64 state only, reported using an ESR ELx.EC value of 0x18.

This applies to <u>DC CVAU</u>, <u>DC CIVAC</u>, <u>DC CVAP</u>, and <u>IC IVAU</u>.

If FEAT DPB2 is implemented, this trap also applies to DC CVADP.

If FEAT\_MTE is implemented, this trap also applies to <u>DC CIGVAC</u>, <u>DC CIGDVAC</u>, <u>DC CGVAC</u>, <u>DC CGVAP</u>, and <u>DC CGDVAP</u>.

If FEAT\_DPB2 and FEAT\_MTE are implemented, this trap also applies to <u>DC CGVADP</u> and <u>DC CGDVADP</u>.

| UCI | Meaning                           |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 0d0 | Execution of the specified        |
|     | instructions at EL0 using AArch64 |
|     | is trapped.                       |
| 0b1 | This control does not cause any   |
|     | instructions to be trapped.       |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

If the Point of Coherency is before any level of data cache, it is implementation defined whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean, or clean and invalidate instruction that operates by VA to the point of coherency can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.

If the Point of Unification is before any level of data cache, it is implementation defined whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean by VA to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.

If the Point of Unification is before any level of instruction cache, it is implementation defined whether the execution of any instruction cache invalidate by VA to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **EE**, bit [25]

Endianness of data accesses at EL1, and stage 1 translation table walks in the EL1&0 translation regime.

| EE  | Meaning                            |
|-----|------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | Explicit data accesses at EL1, and |
|     | stage 1 translation table walks in |
|     | the EL1&0 translation regime are   |
|     | little-endian.                     |
| 0b1 | Explicit data accesses at EL1, and |
|     | stage 1 translation table walks in |
|     | the EL1&0 translation regime are   |
|     | big-endian.                        |

If an implementation does not provide Big-endian support at Exception levels higher than ELO, this bit is res0.

If an implementation does not provide Little-endian support at Exception levels higher than ELO, this bit is res1.

The EE bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an implementation defined value.

### **E0E**, bit [24]

Endianness of data accesses at ELO.

| EOE | Meaning                           |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 0d0 | Explicit data accesses at EL0 are |
|     | little-endian.                    |
| 0b1 | Explicit data accesses at EL0 are |
|     | big-endian.                       |

If an implementation only supports Little-endian accesses at ELO, then this bit is res0. This option is not permitted when SCTLR EL1.EE is res1.

If an implementation only supports Big-endian accesses at EL0, then this bit is res1. This option is not permitted when SCTLR\_EL1.EE is res0.

This bit has no effect on the endianness of LDTR, LDTRH, LDTRSH, LDTRSW, STTR, and STTRH instructions executed at EL1.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

# SPAN, bit [23] When FEAT\_PAN is implemented:

Set Privileged Access Never, on taking an exception to EL1.

| <b>SPAN</b> | Meaning                          |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| 0b0         | PSTATE.PAN is set to 1 on taking |
|             | an exception to EL1.             |
| 0b1         | The value of PSTATE.PAN is left  |
|             | unchanged on taking an           |
|             | exception to EL1.                |

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# EIS, bit [22] When FEAT ExS is implemented:

Exception Entry is Context Synchronizing.

| EIS | Meaning                           |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 0d0 | The taking of an exception to EL1 |
|     | is not a context synchronizing    |
|     | event.                            |
| 0b1 | The taking of an exception to EL1 |
|     | is a context synchronizing event. |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

If SCTLR\_EL1.EIS is set to 0b0:

- Indirect writes to <u>ESR\_EL1</u>, <u>FAR\_EL1</u>, <u>SPSR\_EL1</u>, <u>ELR\_EL1</u> are synchronized on exception entry to EL1, so that a direct read of the register after exception entry sees the indirectly written value caused by the exception entry.
- Memory transactions, including instruction fetches, from an Exception level always use the translation resources associated with that translation regime.
- Exception Catch debug events are synchronous debug events.
- DCPS\* and DRPS instructions are context synchronization events.

The following are not affected by the value of SCTLR EL1.EIS:

- Changes to the PSTATE information on entry to EL1.
- Behavior of accessing the banked copies of the stack pointer using the SP register name for loads, stores and data processing instructions.
- Exit from Debug state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# IESB, bit [21] When FEAT\_IESB is implemented:

Implicit Error Synchronization event enable. Possible values are:

| IESB | Meaning  |
|------|--|
| 0b0  | Disabled.  |
| 0b1  | An implicit error synchronization event is added:  |
|      | <ul> <li>At each exception taken to EL1.</li> <li>Before the operational pseudocode of each ERET instruction executed at EL1.</li> </ul> |

When the PE is in Debug state, the effect of this field is constrained unpredictable, and its Effective value might be 0 or 1 regardless of the value of the field. If the Effective value of the field is 1, then an implicit error synchronization event is added after each DCPSX instruction taken to EL1 and before each DRPS instruction executed at EL1, in addition to the other cases where it is added.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# TSCXT, bit [20] When FEAT\_CSV2\_2 is implemented or FEAT\_CSV2\_1p2 is implemented:

Trap EL0 Access to the <u>SCXTNUM\_EL0</u> register, when EL0 is using AArch64.

| TSCXT | Meaning                   |
|-------|---------------------------|
| 0b0   | EL0 access to SCXTNUM EL0 |
|       | is not disabled by this   |
|       | mechanism.                |

| 0b1 | EL0 access to SCXTNUM_EL0 is disabled, causing an exception to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and HCR_EL2.TGE is 1.  The value of SCXTNUM_EL0 is |
|-----|--|
|     | treated as 0.  |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

### WXN, bit [19]

Write permission implies XN (Execute-never). For the EL1&0 translation regime, this bit can force all memory regions that are writable to be treated as XN.

| WXN | Meaning                            |
|-----|------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | This control has no effect on      |
|     | memory access permissions.         |
| 0b1 | Any region that is writable in the |
|     | EL1&0 translation regime is        |
|     | forced to XN for accesses from     |
|     | software executing at EL1 or       |
|     | ELO.                               |

This bit applies only when SCTLR EL1.M bit is set.

The WXN bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **nTWE**, bit [18]

Traps EL0 execution of WFE instructions to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>.TGE is 1, from both Execution states, reported using an ESR ELx.EC value of 0x01.

When FEAT\_WFxT is implemented, this trap also applies to the WFET instruction.

| nTWE | Meaning                           |
|------|-----------------------------------|
| 0b0  | Any attempt to execute a WFE      |
|      | instruction at ELO is trapped, if |
|      | the instruction would otherwise   |
|      | have caused the PE to enter a     |
|      | low-power state.                  |
| 0b1  | This control does not cause any   |
|      | instructions to be trapped.       |

In AArch32 state, the attempted execution of a conditional WFE instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

#### **Note**

Since a WFE or WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE of WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE or WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Bit [17]

Reserved, res0.

### nTWI, bit [16]

Traps EL0 execution of WFI instructions to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and

<u>HCR\_EL2</u>.TGE is 1, from both Execution states, reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of 0x01.

When FEAT\_WFxT is implemented, this trap also applies to the WFIT instruction.

| nTWI | Meaning                           |
|------|-----------------------------------|
| 0b0  | Any attempt to execute a WFI      |
|      | instruction at EL0 is trapped, if |
|      | the instruction would otherwise   |
|      | have caused the PE to enter a     |
|      | low-power state.                  |
| 0b1  | This control does not cause any   |
|      | instructions to be trapped.       |

In AArch32 state, the attempted execution of a conditional WFI instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

#### **Note**

Since a WFE or WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE of WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE or WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **UCT, bit [15]**

Traps EL0 accesses to the <u>CTR\_EL0</u> to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.TGE is 1, from AArch64 state only, reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of 0x18.

| UCT | Meaning                        |
|-----|--------------------------------|
| 0b0 | Accesses to the CTR_ELO from   |
|     | EL0 using AArch64 are trapped. |

This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **DZE**, bit [14]

Traps EL0 execution of <u>DC ZVA</u> instructions to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.TGE is 1, from AArch64 state only, reported using an ESR ELx.EC value of 0x18.

If FEAT\_MTE is implemented, this trap also applies to <u>DC GVA</u> and <u>DC GZVA</u>.

| DZE | Meaning                            |
|-----|------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | Any attempt to execute an          |
|     | instruction that this trap applies |
|     | to at EL0 using AArch64 is         |
|     | trapped.                           |
|     | Reading <u>DCZID_EL0</u> .DZP from |
|     | EL0 returns 1, indicating that the |
|     | instructions this trap applies to  |
|     | are not supported.                 |
| 0b1 | This control does not cause any    |
|     | instructions to be trapped.        |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

# EnDB, bit [13] When FEAT PAuth is implemented:

Controls enabling of pointer authentication (using the APDBKey\_EL1 key) of instruction addresses in the EL1&0 translation regime.

For more information, see 'System register control of pointer authentication'.

| EnDB | Meaning |   |
|------|---------|---|
|      |         | · |

| Pointer authentication (using the |
|-----------------------------------|
| APDBKey EL1 key) of data          |
| addresses is not enabled.         |
| Pointer authentication (using the |
| APDBKey EL1 key) of data          |
| addresses is enabled.             |
|                                   |

### **Note**

This field controls the behavior of the AddPACDB and AuthDB pseudocode functions. Specifically, when the field is 1, AddPACDB returns a copy of a pointer to which a pointer authentication code has been added, and AuthDB returns an authenticated copy of a pointer. When the field is 0, both of these functions are NOP.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### I, bit [12]

Stage 1 instruction access Cacheability control, for accesses at EL0 and EL1:

| I   | Meaning   |
|-----|---|
| 0b0 | All instruction access to Stage 1 Normal memory from EL0 and EL1 are Stage 1 Non-cacheable. If the value of SCTLR_EL1.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL1&0 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non- |
|     | cacheable memory.   |

This control has no effect on the Stage 1 Cacheability of instruction access to Stage 1 Normal memory from EL0 and EL1.

If the value of SCTLR\_EL1.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL1&0 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Write-Through, Outer Write-Through memory.

When the value of the <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.DC bit is 1, then instruction access to Normal memory from EL0 and EL1 are Cacheable regardless of the value of the SCTLR\_EL1.I bit.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset:
  - When EL2 is not implemented and EL3 is not implemented, this field resets to 0.
  - Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

# EOS, bit [11] When FEAT\_ExS is implemented:

Exception Exit is Context Synchronizing.

| EOS | Meaning                           |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| 0b0 | An exception return from EL1 is   |
|     | not a context synchronizing event |
| 0b1 | An exception return from EL1 is a |
|     | context synchronizing event       |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

If SCTLR EL1.EOS is set to 0b0:

- Memory transactions, including instruction fetches, from an Exception level always use the translation resources associated with that translation regime.
- Exception Catch debug events are synchronous debug events.
- DCPS\* and DRPS instructions are context synchronization events.

The following are not affected by the value of SCTLR EL1.EOS:

- The indirect write of the PSTATE and PC values from <a href="SPSR\_EL1">SPSR\_EL1</a> and <a href="ELR EL1">ELR EL1</a> on exception return is synchronized.
- Behavior of accessing the banked copies of the stack pointer using the SP register name for loads, stores and data processing instructions.
- Exit from Debug state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# EnRCTX, bit [10] When FEAT\_SPECRES is implemented:

Enable EL0 access to the following System instructions:

- CFPRCTX, DVPRCTX and CPPRCTX instructions.
- If FEAT SPECRES2 is implemented, <u>COSPRCTX</u>.
- <u>CFP RCTX</u>, <u>DVP RCTX</u> and <u>CPP RCTX</u> instructions.
- If FEAT\_SPECRES2 is implemented, <u>COSP RCTX</u>.

| EnRCTX | Meaning                        |
|--------|--------------------------------|
| 0b0    | EL0 access to these            |
|        | instructions is disabled, and  |
|        | these instructions are trapped |
|        | to EL1, or to EL2 when it is   |
|        | implemented and enabled for    |
|        | the current Security state and |
|        | HCR_EL2.TGE is 1.              |
| 0b1    | EL0 access to these            |
|        | instructions is enabled.       |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### **UMA, bit [9]**

User Mask Access. Traps EL0 execution of MSR and MRS instructions that access the PSTATE.{D, A, I, F} masks to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>.TGE is 1, from AArch64 state only, reported using an ESR ELx.EC value of 0x18.

| UMA | Meaning   |
|-----|---|
| 0d0 | Any attempt at ELO using AArch64 to execute an MRS, |
|     | MSR(REGISTER), or                                   |
|     | MSR(IMMEDIATE) instruction that                     |
|     | accesses the <u>DAIF</u> is trapped.                |
| 0b1 | This control does not cause any                     |
|     | instructions to be trapped.                         |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

# SED, bit [8] When EL0 is capable of using AArch32:

SETEND instruction disable. Disables SETEND instructions at EL0 using AArch32.

| SED | Meaning                             |
|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | SETEND instruction execution is     |
|     | enabled at EL0 using AArch32.       |
| 0b1 | SETEND instructions are             |
|     | undefined at EL0 using AArch32      |
|     | and any attempt at EL0 to access    |
|     | a SETEND instruction generates      |
|     | an exception to EL1, or to EL2      |
|     | when it is implemented and          |
|     | enabled for the current Security    |
|     | state and <u>HCR_EL2</u> .TGE is 1, |
|     | reported using an ESR_ELx.EC        |
|     | value of 0x00.                      |

If the implementation does not support mixed-endian operation at any Exception level, this bit is res1.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

# ITD, bit [7] When EL0 is capable of using AArch32:

IT Disable. Disables some uses of IT instructions at EL0 using AArch32.

| ITD | Meaning                             |
|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 0b0 | All IT instruction functionality is |
|     | enabled at EL0 using AArch32.       |

- Any attempt at EL0 using AArch32 to execute any of the following is undefined and generates an exception, reported using an ESR\_ELx.EC value of 0x00, to EL1 or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and <a href="https://linearchar.com/hCR\_EL2">https://linearchar.com/hCR\_EL2</a>.TGE is 1:
  - All encodings of the IT instruction with hw1[3:0]!
    =1000.
  - All encodings of the subsequent instruction with the following values for hw1:

    - 0b0100x1xxx1111xxx:
       ADD Rdn, PC; CMP Rn,
       PC; MOV Rd, PC; BX
       PC; BLX PC.
    - 0b010001xx1xxxx111:
       ADD PC, Rm; CMP PC, Rm; MOV PC, Rm. This pattern also covers unpredictable cases with BLX Rn.

These instructions are always undefined, regardless of whether they would pass or fail the condition code check that applies to them as a result of being in an IT block.

It is implementation defined whether the IT instruction is treated as:

- A 16-bit instruction, that can only be followed by another 16-bit instruction.
- The first half of a 32-bit instruction.

If an instruction in an active IT block that would be disabled by this field sets this field to 1 then behavior is constrained unpredictable. For more information, see 'Changes to an ITD control by an instruction in an IT block'.

ITD is optional, but if it is implemented in the SCTLR\_EL1 then it must also be implemented in the SCTLR\_EL2, HSCTLR, and SCTLR.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

When an implementation does not implement ITD, access to this field is **RAZ/WI**.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

### nAA, bit [6] When FEAT\_LSE2 is implemented:

Non-aligned access. This bit controls generation of Alignment faults at EL1 and EL0 under certain conditions.

The following instructions generate an Alignment fault if all bytes being accessed are not within a single 16-byte quantity, aligned to 16 bytes for access:

- LDAPR, LDAPRH, LDAPUR, LDAPURH, LDAPURSH, LDAPURSW, LDAR, LDARH, LDLAR, LDLARH.
- STLLR, STLLRH, STLR, STLRH, STLUR, and STLURH.

If FEAT\_LRCPC3 is implemented, the following instructions generate an Alignment fault if all bytes being accessed for a single register are not within a single 16-byte quantity, aligned to 16 bytes for access:

- LDIAPP, STILP, the post index versions of LDAPR and the pre index versions of STLR.
- If Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions are implemented, LDAPUR (SIMD&FP), LDAP1 (SIMD&FP), STLUR (SIMD&FP), and STL1 (SIMD&FP).

### nAA Meaning

| 0d0 | Unaligned accesses by the          |
|-----|------------------------------------|
|     | specified instructions generate an |
|     | Alignment fault.                   |
| 0b1 | This control does not generate     |
|     | Alignment faults.                  |

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

# CP15BEN, bit [5] When EL0 is capable of using AArch32:

System instruction memory barrier enable. Enables accesses to the DMB, DSB, and ISB System instructions in the (coproc==0b1111) encoding space from ELO:

| CP15BEN | Meaning  |
|---------|--|
| 0b0     | EL0 using AArch32: EL0 execution of the CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions is undefined and generates an exception to EL1, or to EL2 when it is implemented and enabled for the current Security state and HCR_EL2.TGE is 1. The exception is reported using an ESR_ELx.EC value |
| 0b1     | of 0x00. EL0 using AArch32: EL0 execution of the <u>CP15DMB</u> , <u>CP15DSB</u> , and <u>CP15ISB</u> instructions is enabled.   |

CP15BEN is optional, but if it is implemented in the SCTLR\_EL1 then it must also be implemented in the <u>SCTLR\_EL2</u>, <u>HSCTLR</u>, and <u>SCTLR</u>.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

When an implementation does not implement CP15BEN, access to this field is **RAO/WI**.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

### **SA0, bit [4]**

SP Alignment check enable for EL0. When set to 1, if a load or store instruction executed at EL0 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a 16-byte boundary, then an SP alignment fault exception is generated. For more information, see 'SP alignment checking'.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at ELO.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **SA**, bit [3]

SP Alignment check enable. When set to 1, if a load or store instruction executed at EL1 uses the SP as the base address and the SP is not aligned to a 16-byte boundary, then an SP alignment fault exception is generated. For more information, see 'SP alignment checking'.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### C, bit [2]

Stage 1 Cacheability control, for data accesses.

| C | Meaning |  |
|---|---------|--|
|---|---------|--|

| 0b0 | All data access to Stage 1 Normal  |
|-----|------------------------------------|
|     | memory from EL0 and EL1, and all   |
|     | Normal memory accesses from        |
|     | unified cache to the EL1&0 Stage 1 |
|     | translation tables, are treated as |
|     | Stage 1 Non-cacheable.             |
| 0b1 | This control has no effect on the  |
|     | Stage 1 Cacheability of:           |
|     |                                    |

- Data access to Normal memory from EL0 and EL1.
- Normal memory accesses to the EL1&0 Stage 1 translation tables.

When the Effective value of the <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.DC bit in the current Security state is 1, the PE ignores SCTLR\_EL1.C. This means that EL0 and EL1 data accesses to Normal memory are Cacheable.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the Effective value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset:
  - $^{\circ}$  When EL2 is not implemented and EL3 is not implemented, this field resets to 0.
  - Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### A, bit [1]

Alignment check enable. This is the enable bit for Alignment fault checking at EL1 and EL0.

| A   | Meaning                              |  |  |
|-----|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 0b0 | Alignment fault checking disabled    |  |  |
|     | when executing at EL1 or EL0.        |  |  |
|     | Instructions that load or store one  |  |  |
|     | or more registers, other than load/  |  |  |
|     | store exclusive and load-acquire/    |  |  |
|     | store-release, do not check that the |  |  |
|     | address being accessed is aligned    |  |  |
|     | to the size of the data element(s)   |  |  |
|     | being accessed.                      |  |  |

Alignment fault checking enabled when executing at EL1 or EL0.
All instructions that load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element(s) being accessed. If this check fails it causes an Alignment fault, which is taken as a Data Abort exception.

Load/store exclusive and load-acquire/store-release instructions have an alignment check regardless of the value of the A bit.

If FEAT\_MOPS is implemented, SETG\* instructions have an alignment check regardless of the value of the A bit.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

• On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### M, bit [0]

MMU enable for EL1&0 stage 1 address translation.

| M   | Meaning                             |  |  |  |
|-----|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| 0b0 | EL1&0 stage 1 address translation   |  |  |  |
|     | disabled.                           |  |  |  |
|     | See the SCTLR EL1.I field for the   |  |  |  |
|     | behavior of instruction accesses to |  |  |  |
|     | Normal memory.                      |  |  |  |
| 0b1 | EL1&0 stage 1 address translation   |  |  |  |
|     | enabled.                            |  |  |  |

If the Effective value of <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.{DC, TGE} in the current Security state is not {0, 0} then the PE behaves as if the value of the SCTLR\_EL1.M field is 0 for all purposes other than returning the value of a direct read of the field.

When FEAT\_VHE is implemented, and the Effective value of <a href="https://example.com/HCR\_EL2">HCR\_EL2</a>. {E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this bit has no effect on the PE.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset:
  - When EL2 is not implemented and EL3 is not implemented, this field resets to 0.

• Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

## **Accessing SCTLR\_EL1**

When <u>HCR\_EL2</u>.E2H is 1, without explicit synchronization, access from EL3 using the mnemonic SCTLR\_EL1 or SCTLR\_EL12 are not guaranteed to be ordered with respect to accesses using the other mnemonic.

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

## MRS <Xt>, SCTLR\_EL1

| op0  | op1   | CRn    | CRm    | op2   |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 0b11 | 0b000 | 0b0001 | 0b0000 | 0b000 |

```
if PSTATE.EL == ELO then
   UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.TRVM == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() &&
IsFeatureImplemented(FEAT_FGT) && (!HaveEL(EL3) | |
SCR_EL3.FGTEn == '1') && HFGRTR_EL2.SCTLR_EL1 == '1'
then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV1,NV> ==
'111' then
        X[t, 64] = NVMem[0x110];
    else
        X[t, 64] = SCTLR\_EL1;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if HCR EL2.E2H == '1' then
        X[t, 64] = SCTLR\_EL2;
    else
        X[t, 64] = SCTLR EL1;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    X[t, 64] = SCTLR\_EL1;
```

## MSR SCTLR\_EL1, <Xt>

| op0  | op1   | CRn    | CRm    | op2   |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 0b11 | 0b000 | 0b0001 | 0b0000 | 0b000 |

```
if PSTATE.EL == ELO then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.TVM == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() &&
IsFeatureImplemented(FEAT_FGT) && (!HaveEL(EL3) | |
SCR_EL3.FGTEn == '1') && HFGWTR_EL2.SCTLR_EL1 == '1'
then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV1,NV> ==
'111' then
        NVMem[0x110] = X[t, 64];
    else
        SCTLR\_EL1 = X[t, 64];
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if HCR_EL2.E2H == '1' then
        SCTLR EL2 = X[t, 64];
    else
        SCTLR EL1 = X[t, 64];
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    SCTLR\_EL1 = X[t, 64];
```

## MRS <Xt>, SCTLR\_EL12

| op0  | op1   | CRn    | CRm    | op2   |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 0b11 | 0b101 | 0b0001 | 0b0000 | 0b000 |

```
if PSTATE.EL == ELO then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2, NV1, NV> == '101'
then
        X[t, 64] = NVMem[0x110];
    elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if HCR_EL2.E2H == '1' then
        X[t, 64] = SCTLR\_EL1;
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    if EL2Enabled() && !ELUsingAArch32(EL2) &&
HCR\_EL2.E2H == '1' then
        X[t, 64] = SCTLR\_EL1;
    else
        UNDEFINED;
```

## MSR SCTLR EL12, <Xt>

| op0  | op1   | CRn    | CRm    | op2   |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 0b11 | 0b101 | 0b0001 | 0b0000 | 0b000 |

```
if PSTATE.EL == ELO then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2, NV1, NV> == '101'
then
        NVMem[0x110] = X[t, 64];
    elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if HCR_EL2.E2H == '1' then
        SCTLR\_EL1 = X[t, 64];
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    if EL2Enabled() && !ELUsingAArch32(EL2) &&
HCR EL2.E2H == '1' then
        SCTLR\_EL1 = X[t, 64];
    else
        UNDEFINED;
```

AArch32AArch64AArch32AArch64Index byExternalRegistersRegistersInstructionsInstructionsEncodingRegisters

28/03/2023 16:01; 72747e43966d6b97dcbd230a1b3f0421d1ea3d94

Copyright © 2010-2023 Arm Limited or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is Non-Confidential.