

## CPTR\_EL2, Architectural Feature Trap Register (EL2)

The CPT<sub>R</sub>\_EL2 characteristics are:

### Purpose

Controls trapping to EL2 of accesses to [CPACR](#), [CPACR\\_EL1](#), trace, Activity Monitor, SME, Streaming SVE, SVE, and Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality.

### Configuration

AArch64 System register CPT<sub>R</sub>\_EL2 bits [31:0] are architecturally mapped to AArch32 System register [HCPTR\[31:0\]](#).

If EL2 is not implemented, this register is res0 from EL3.

This register has no effect if EL2 is not enabled in the current Security state.

### Attributes

CPT<sub>R</sub>\_EL2 is a 64-bit register.

### Field descriptions

**When FEAT\_VHE is implemented and HCR\_EL2.E2H == 1:**

63	62	61	60	59	58	57	56	55	54	53	52	51	50	49	48	47	46	45	44	43	42	41	40	39	38	37	36	35	34	33	32
RES0																															
TCPAC	TAM	EOP	EOE	TTA	RES0	SME	RES0	FPE	RES0	ZEN	RES0																				
31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

#### Bits [63:32]

Reserved, res0.

#### TCPAC, bit [31]

In AArch64 state, traps accesses to [CPACR\\_EL1](#) from EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x18.

In AArch32 state, traps accesses to [CPACR](#) from EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x03.

TCPAC	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	EL1 accesses to <a href="#">CPACR_EL1</a> and <a href="#">CPACR</a> are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

When [HCR\\_EL2.TGE](#) is 1, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

#### Note

[CPACR\\_EL1](#) and [CPACR](#) are not accessible at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### TAM, bit [30]

When FEAT\_AMUv1 is implemented:

Trap Activity Monitor access. Traps EL1 and EL0 accesses to all Activity Monitor registers to EL2, as follows:

- In AArch64 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x18:
  - [AMUSERENR\\_EL0](#), [AMCFGR\\_EL0](#), [AMCGCR\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENCLR0\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENCLR1\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENSET0\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENSET1\\_EL0](#), [AMCR\\_EL0](#), [AMEVCNTR0<n>\\_EL0](#), [AMEVCNTR1<n>\\_EL0](#), [AMEVTYPER0<n>\\_EL0](#), and [AMEVTYPER1<n>\\_EL0](#).
- In AArch32 state, MRC or MCR accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x03:
  - [AMUSERENR](#), [AMCFGR](#), [AMCGCR](#), [AMCNTENCLR0](#), [AMCNTENCLR1](#), [AMCNTENSET0](#), [AMCNTENSET1](#), [AMCR](#), [AMEVTYPER0<n>](#), and [AMEVTYPER1<n>](#).
- In AArch32 state, MRRC or MCRR accesses to [AMEVCNTR0<n>](#) and [AMEVCNTR1<n>](#), are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x04.

<b>TAM</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
0b0	Accesses from EL1 and EL0 to Activity Monitor registers are not trapped.
0b1	Accesses from EL1 and EL0 to Activity Monitor registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

**Otherwise:**

Reserved, res0.

**E0POE, bit [29]**

**When FEAT\_S1POE is implemented:**

Enable access to [POR\\_EL0](#).

Traps EL0 accesses to [POR\\_EL0](#) to EL2, from AArch64 state only. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x18.

<b>E0POE</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
0b0	This control causes EL0 access to <a href="#">POR_EL0</a> to be trapped.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

**Otherwise:**

Reserved, res0.

## TTA, bit [28]

Traps System register accesses to all implemented trace registers from both Execution states to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:

- In AArch64 state, accesses to trace registers with  $op0=2$ ,  $op1=1$ , and  $CRn < 0b1000$  are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value  $0x18$ .
- In AArch32 state, MRC or MCR accesses to trace registers with  $cpnum=14$ ,  $opc1=1$ , and  $CRn < 0b1000$  are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value  $0x05$ .

TTA	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	Any attempt at EL0, EL1 or EL2, to execute a System register access to an implemented trace register is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, unless <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 0 and it is trapped by <a href="#">CPACR.NSTRCDIS</a> or <a href="#">CPACR_EL1.TTA</a> . When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 1, any attempt at EL0 or EL2 to execute a System register access to an implemented trace register is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

### Note

The ETMv4 architecture and ETE do not permit EL0 to access the trace registers. If the trace unit implements FEAT\_ETMv4 or ETE, EL0 accesses to the trace registers are undefined, and any resulting exception is higher priority than an exception that would be generated because the value of [CPTR\\_EL2.TTA](#) is 1.

EL2 does not provide traps on trace register accesses through the optional Memory-mapped interface.

System register accesses to the trace registers can have side-effects. When a System register access is trapped, any side-effects that are

normally associated with the access do not occur before the exception is taken.

If System register access to the trace functionality is not supported, this bit is res0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Bits [27:26]

Reserved, res0.

#### SMEN, bits [25:24]

When FEAT\_SME is implemented:

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of SME instructions, SVE instructions when FEAT\_SVE is not implemented or the PE is in Streaming SVE mode, and instructions that directly access the [SVCR](#), [SMCR\\_EL1](#), or [SMCR\\_EL2](#) System registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

When instructions that directly access the [SVCR](#) System register are trapped with reference to this control, the MSR SVCRSM, MSR SVCRZA, and MSR SVCRSMZA instructions are also trapped.

The exception is reported using ESR\_EL2.EC value of 0x1D, with an ISS code of 0x0000000.

This field does not affect whether Streaming SVE or SME register values are valid.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.SMEN has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.FPEN.

SMEN	Meaning
0b00	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.
0b01	When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 0, this control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped. When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 1, this control causes execution of these instructions at EL0 to be trapped, but does not cause execution of any instructions at EL2 to be trapped.

0b10	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.
0b11	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.

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The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

#### Bits [23:22]

Reserved, res0.

#### FPEN, bits [21:20]

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of instructions that access the Advanced SIMD and floating-point registers from both Execution states to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x07.

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of SME and SVE instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x07.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.SMEN has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.FPEN.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.ZEN has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.FPEN.

FPEN	Meaning
0b00	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.

0b01	When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 0, this control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped. When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 1, this control causes execution of these instructions at EL0 to be trapped, but does not cause execution of any instructions at EL2 to be trapped.
0b10	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.
0b11	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.

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Writes to [MVFR0](#), [MVFR1](#), and [MVFR2](#) from EL1 or higher are constrained unpredictable and whether these accesses can be trapped by this control depends on implemented constrained unpredictable behavior.

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#### Note

- Attempts to write to the FPSID count as use of the registers for accesses from EL1 or higher.
  - Accesses from EL0 to [FPSID](#), [MVFR0](#), [MVFR1](#), [MVFR2](#), and [FPEXC](#) are undefined, and any resulting exception is higher priority than an exception that would be generated because the value of [CPTR\\_EL2.FPEN](#) is not 0b11.
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The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Bits [19:18]

Reserved, res0.

#### ZEN, bits [17:16]

When [FEAT\\_SVE](#) is implemented:

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of SVE instructions when the PE is not in Streaming SVE mode, and instructions that directly access the [ZCR\\_EL1](#) or [ZCR\\_EL2](#) System registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x19.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.ZEN has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.FPEN.

ZEN	Meaning
0b00	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.
0b01	When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 0, this control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped. When <a href="#">HCR_EL2.TGE</a> is 1, this control causes execution of these instructions at EL0 to be trapped, but does not cause execution of any instructions at EL2 to be trapped.
0b10	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.
0b11	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

**Otherwise:**

Reserved, res0.

**Bits [15:0]**

Reserved, res0.

**Otherwise:**

63	62	61	60	59	58	57	56	55	54	53	52	51	50	49	48	47	46	45	44	43	42	41	40	39	38	37	36	35	34	33	32
RES0																															
TCPAC	TAM	RES0										TTA	RES0					RES1	TSM	RES0	TFP	RES1	TZ	RES1							
31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

This format applies in all Armv8.0 implementations.

**Bits [63:32]**

Reserved, res0.



## TCPAC, bit [31]

In AArch64 state, traps accesses to [CPACR\\_EL1](#) from EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x18.

In AArch32 state, traps accesses to [CPACR](#) from EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x03.

TCPAC	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	EL1 accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">CPACR_EL1</a>.</li><li>• <a href="#">CPACR</a>.</li></ul>

When [HCR\\_EL2.TGE](#) is 1, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

### Note

[CPACR\\_EL1](#) and [CPACR](#) are not accessible at EL0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

## TAM, bit [30]

### When FEAT\_AMUv1 is implemented:

Trap Activity Monitor access. Traps EL1 and EL0 accesses to all Activity Monitor registers to EL2, as follows:

- In AArch64 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x18:
  - [AMUSERENR\\_EL0](#), [AMCFGR\\_EL0](#), [AMCGCR\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENCLR0\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENCLR1\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENSET0\\_EL0](#), [AMCNTENSET1\\_EL0](#), [AMCR\\_EL0](#), [AMEVCNTR0<n>\\_EL0](#), [AMEVCNTR1<n>\\_EL0](#), [AMEVTYPER0<n>\\_EL0](#), and [AMEVTYPER1<n>\\_EL0](#).

- In AArch32 state, MCR or MRC accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x03:
  - [AMUSERENR](#), [AMCFGR](#), [AMCGCR](#), [AMCNTENCLR0](#), [AMCNTENCLR1](#), [AMCNTENSET0](#), [AMCNTENSET1](#), [AMCR](#), [AMEVTYPEPER0<n>](#), and [AMEVTYPEPER1<n>](#).
- In AArch32 state, MCRR or MRRC accesses to [AMEVCNTR0<n>](#) and [AMEVCNTR1<n>](#), are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x04.

TAM	Meaning
0b0	Accesses from EL1 and EL0 to Activity Monitor registers are not trapped.
0b1	Accesses from EL1 and EL0 to Activity Monitor registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

#### Otherwise:

Reserved, res0.

#### Bits [29:21]

Reserved, res0.

#### TTA, bit [20]

Traps System register accesses to all implemented trace registers from both Execution states to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:

- In AArch64 state, accesses to trace registers with op0=2, op1=1, and CRn<0b1000 are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- In AArch32 state, MRC or MCR accesses to trace registers with cpnum=14, opc1=1, and CRn<0b1000 are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x05.

TTA	Meaning
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0b0	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	Any attempt at EL0, EL1, or EL2, to execute a System register access to an implemented trace register is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, unless it is trapped by one of the following controls: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">CPACR_EL1</a>.TTA.</li> <li>• <a href="#">CPACR</a>.TRCDIS.</li> </ul>

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## Note

- The ETMv4 architecture does not permit EL0 to access the trace registers. If the trace unit implements FEAT\_ETMv4, EL0 accesses to the trace registers are undefined, and any resulting exception is higher priority than an exception that would be generated because the value of [CPTR\\_EL2](#).TTA is 1.
  - EL2 does not provide traps on trace register accesses through the optional memory-mapped interface.
- 

System register accesses to the trace registers can have side-effects. When a System register access is trapped, any side-effects that are normally associated with the access do not occur before the exception is taken.

If System register access to the trace functionality is not supported, this bit is res0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

## Bits [19:14]

Reserved, res0.

## Bit [13]

Reserved, res1.

## **TSM, bit [12]**

### **When FEAT\_SME is implemented:**

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of SME instructions, SVE instructions when FEAT\_SVE is not implemented or the PE is in Streaming SVE mode, and instructions that directly access the [SVCR](#), [SMCR\\_EL1](#), or [SMCR\\_EL2](#) System registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

When instructions that directly access the [SVCR](#) System register are trapped with reference to this control, the MSR SVCRSM, MSR SVCRZA, and MSR SVCRSMZA instructions are also trapped.

The exception is reported using ESR\_EL2.EC value of 0x1D, with an ISS code of 0x0000000.

This field does not affect whether Streaming SVE or SME register values are valid.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TSM has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TFP.

<b>TSM</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
0b0	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### **Otherwise:**

Reserved, res1.

## **Bit [11]**

Reserved, res0.

## TFP, bit [10]

Traps execution of instructions which access the Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality, from both Execution states to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:

- In AArch64 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x07:
  - [FPCR](#), [FPSR](#), [FPEXC32\\_EL2](#), any of the SIMD and floating-point registers V0-V31, including their views as D0-D31 registers or S0-31 registers.
- In AArch32 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x07:
  - [MVFR0](#), [MVFR1](#), [MVFR2](#), [FPSCR](#), [FPEXC](#), and any of the SIMD and floating-point registers Q0-15, including their views as D0-D31 registers or S0-31 registers. For the purposes of this trap, the architecture defines a VMSR access to [FPSID](#) from EL1 or higher as an access to a SIMD and floating-point register. Otherwise, permitted VMSR accesses to [FPSID](#) are ignored.

Traps execution at the same Exception levels of SME and SVE instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x07.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TSM has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TFP.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TZ has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TFP.

TFP	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.

### Note

[FPEXC32\\_EL2](#) is not accessible from EL0 using AArch64.

[FPSID](#), [MVFR0](#), [MVFR1](#), and [FPEXC](#) are not accessible from EL0 using AArch32.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

## Bit [9]

Reserved, res1.

## TZ, bit [8]

### When FEAT\_SVE is implemented:

Traps execution at EL2, EL1, and EL0 of SVE instructions when the PE is not in Streaming SVE mode, and instructions that directly access the [ZCR\\_EL2](#) or [ZCR\\_EL1](#) System registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.

The exception is reported using ESR\_ELx.EC value 0x19.

A trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TZ has precedence over a trap taken as a result of CPTR\_EL2.TFP.

TZ	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause execution of any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	This control causes execution of these instructions at EL2, EL1, and EL0 to be trapped.

The reset behavior of this field is:

- On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally unknown value.

### Otherwise:

Reserved, res1.

## Bits [7:0]

Reserved, res1.

## Accessing CPTR\_EL2

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

MRS <Xt>, CPTR\_EL2

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b100	0b0001	0b0001	0b010

```

if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
    && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        UNDEFINED;
    elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        else
            AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
    else
        X[t, 64] = CPTR_EL2;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    X[t, 64] = CPTR_EL2;

```

## MSR CPTR\_EL2, <Xt>

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b100	0b0001	0b0001	0b010

```

if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    else
        UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
    && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        UNDEFINED;
    elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        else
            AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
    else
        CPTR_EL2 = X[t, 64];
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
    CPTR_EL2 = X[t, 64];

```

## When FEAT\_VHE is implemented

### MRS <Xt>, CPACR\_EL1

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b000	0b0001	0b0000	0b010

```
if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
    && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
    when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        UNDEFINED;
    elsif EL2Enabled() && CPTR_EL2.TCPAC == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() &&
    IsFeatureImplemented(FEAT_FGT) && (!HaveEL(EL3) ||
    SCR_EL3.FGTEn == '1') && HFGTR_EL2.CPACR_EL1 == '1'
    then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        else
            AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
        elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV1,NV> ==
        '111' then
            X[t, 64] = NVMem[0x100];
        else
            X[t, 64] = CPACR_EL1;
    elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
        && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
        when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
            if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
                UNDEFINED;
            else
                AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
        elsif HCR_EL2.E2H == '1' then
            X[t, 64] = CPTR_EL2;
        else
            X[t, 64] = CPACR_EL1;
    elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
        X[t, 64] = CPACR_EL1;
```



## When FEAT\_VHE is implemented

### MSR CPACR\_EL1, <Xt>

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b000	0b0001	0b0000	0b010

```
if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then
    UNDEFINED;
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
    && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
    when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        UNDEFINED;
    elsif EL2Enabled() && CPTR_EL2.TCPAC == '1' then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif EL2Enabled() &&
    IsFeatureImplemented(FEAT_FGT) && (!HaveEL(EL3) ||
    SCR_EL3.FGTEn == '1') && HFGWTR_EL2.CPACR_EL1 == '1'
    then
        AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18);
    elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
        if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        else
            AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
        elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV1,NV> ==
        '111' then
            NVMem[0x100] = X[t, 64];
        else
            CPACR_EL1 = X[t, 64];
    elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && EDSCR.SDD == '1'
        && boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "EL3 trap priority
        when SDD == '1'" && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
            UNDEFINED;
        elsif HaveEL(EL3) && CPTR_EL3.TCPAC == '1' then
            if Halted() && EDSCR.SDD == '1' then
                UNDEFINED;
            else
                AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18);
        elsif HCR_EL2.E2H == '1' then
            CPTR_EL2 = X[t, 64];
        else
            CPACR_EL1 = X[t, 64];
    elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
        CPACR_EL1 = X[t, 64];
```

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