Design_Document

Status Done

DESIGN DOCUMENT

1. Purpose & Scope

This design document explains how the AVID-FP Object Store turns the AVID-FP research protocol into a production-grade, container-native storage service. It targets (i) developers who will read/extend the code, (ii) operators who will deploy and monitor clusters, and (iii) reviewers who need a precise map from requirements to implementation. Topics covered:

- Functional & non-functional requirements
- High-level and component-level architecture
- Data and metadata layouts
- Control-flow (write/read) state machines
- · Persistence, recovery, and GC strategies
- Configuration hierarchy
- Security model
- Performance and scalability considerations
- Extensibility hooks

2. Requirements Summary

Category	Requirement	
Durability	Recover the object if $\geq m$ of n shards survive	
Integrity	Detect any tampering with probability ≤ 2 ⁻⁶⁴	
Fault tolerance	Liveness & safety under $\leq f = n - m$ Byzantine nodes	
Throughput	≥ 100 MB s ⁻¹ aggregated writes for 1 GiB objects (3-of-5)	
Latency	Retrieve overhead < 10 % vs. raw copy	

Observability	Prometheus metrics + Grafana dashboard out-of-box
Operability	One-command compose up, rolling upgrade, GC, snapshot
Portability	Run on any x86/ARM host that supports Docker ≥ 24

Non-goals: encryption at rest, dynamic membership, and WAN optimisation.

3. Architecture Overview





Fig - High-Level Design

Stateless clients compute shards and metadata; stateful nodes persist fragments and orchestrate quorums. No coordinator or external DB is needed.

4. Key Data Structures

Structure	Description	Stored In
Shard	Binary fragment (data or parity)	Filesystem
FPCC	{hashes[], fps[], seed} - per-object cross-checksum	BoltDB (fpccs)
Quorum receipts	echoSeen , readySeen keyed by `object	peer
Meta	created: time.Time for GC	BoltDB (meta)

5. Control Flows



5.1 Disperse (Write)

1. Client

- Encode object $\rightarrow n$ shards (pkg/erasure).
- Compute SHA-256 + 64-bit FP (pkg/fingerprint).
- Broadcast DisperseRequest to every node.

2. Node

- Verify hash & FP; atomic-write shard; persist FPCC if first fragment.
- Mark echoSeen[self]; batch commit; gossip Echo.
- On $\geq m + f$ Echoes \rightarrow gossip Ready; on $\geq 2f + 1$ Readies \rightarrow commit, reply ok to client.
- 3. **Client** succeeds when every shard index has an ok response.

5.2 Retrieve (Read)

- 1. Client fetches shard 0 from any node to obtain FPCC.
- 2. Downloads fragments until *m* pass hash + FP checks.
- 3. RS-decodes, trims padding, writes output.
- 4. Aborts if < *m* good shards before list exhausted.

6. Component Design

Component	Core APIs / Responsibilities
pkg/erasure	New(m,n) , Encode([]byte) , Decode(shards, size)
pkg/fingerprint	NewRandom() , Eval([]byte) uint64 , Seed()
pkg/storage	AtomicWrite(path, data) , Batcher.Put(k,v)
cmd/server	Flag parse \rightarrow config, open BoltDB, start gRPC, register Prometheus, GC, snapshot
cmd/client	CLI flag parse, codec + FP compute, shard fan-out, retry policy, retrieve orchestration
deploy/	docker-compose.yml , prometheus.yml , Grafana JSON

7. Persistence & Recovery

- Atomicity Write to <path>.tmp then os.Rename .
- **Crash safety** BoltDB is WAL-backed; commit after fsync ensures metadata durable.
- **Startup recovery** On boot, server reloads FPCC bucket to serve reads instantly; incomplete .tmp files are ignored.
- **Garbage collection** GC loop every TTL/2 deletes expired fragment dirs and BoltDB keys in one transaction.
- **Snapshot** snapshot /dst copies BoltDB + fragment tree to timestamped dir; safe because writes are immutable after commit.

8. Configuration & Deployment Details

Layer	Mechanism	Example
Node config	-config /etc/avid/config.yaml	Ports, peers, paths
Env override	AVID_ERASURE_DATA=4	CI secrets, quick tuning
CLI override	server -peers a,b,c	Dev experiments
Build	Two-stage Dockerfile (Go builder → distroless)	Static bins, 14 MB image
Orchestration	docker compose up -d	5 nodes + Prom/Graf

9. Security Considerations

- Integrity Combined SHA-256 + 64-bit FP; collision prob ≤ 2⁻⁶⁴.
- **Confidentiality** BYO encryption (client-side).
- Transport Optional mTLS (tls_cert , tls_key , client tls_ca).
- **Supply chain** Distroless image, SBOM via cosign sbom.
- **Threats out-of-scope** Physical theft post-GC, side-channel leakage, kernel exploits.

10. Performance Notes

- SIMD RS codec saturates single core at ~1.1 GB s⁻¹.
- Fingerprint Eval cost ≈ 0.13 cycles/byte (< 2 % CPU).
- Batcher reduces fsyncs to ~12 per 1 GiB object (3-of-5).
- Throughput bottleneck = SSD write bandwidth, not CPU/NIC.
- Gossip adds ~2 RTTs = 0.5 ms on LAN, 200 ms on 100 ms WAN.

11 Extensibility Hooks

Area	How to Swap	
Erasure code	Implement Codec interface; register in pkg/erasure/factory.go .	

Fingerprint	Replace Eval() with 128-bit GHASH; adjust FPCC proto.	
Metadata KV	Replace BoltDB calls with Badger or SQLite; keep same buckets.	
Transport	Inject grpc.WithTransportCredentials(creds) for mTLS/ALTS.	
Observability	Add OpenTelemetry interceptors; spans propagate via gRPC metadata.	

12 Risks & Mitigations

Risk	Mitigation
Large objects exhaust RAM	Future streaming encode/decode pipeline
Quorum traffic O(n²)	Cap clusters at ≈ 10 nodes or adopt hierarchical overlay
Disk-full mid-commit	Disperse RPC returns error; client retries after operator action
Long GC pauses	GC runs in small batches, sleeps between objects

13 Conclusion

The design keeps the **trusted computing base minimal**, separates **stateless client logic from stateful storage**, and uses **well-understood libraries** for cryptography, encoding, and persistence. Echo/Ready quorums give Byzantine safety without heavyweight consensus logs; homomorphic fingerprints cut verification cost to the bone; distroless containers and Prometheus/Grafana deliver DevOps parity with modern micro-services. The resulting architecture meets academic correctness proofs *and* real-world operability demands, providing a solid foundation for future enhancements such as streaming stripes, dynamic membership, and geo-replicated clusters.