Chapter 1
Introduction

For the new theory of Language has unquestionably produced a new theory of Race. . . . There seems to me no doubt that modern philology has suggested a grouping of peoples quite unlike anything that had been thought of before. If you examine the bases proposed for common nationality before the new knowledge growing out of the study of Sanscrit had been popularised in Europe, you will find them extremely unlike those which are now advocated and even passionately advocated in parts of the Continent. . . . That peoples not necessarily understanding one another's tongue should be grouped together politically on the ground of linguistic affinities assumed to prove community of descent, is quite a new idea.

—Sir Henry Sumner Maine,
The effects of observation of India on modern European thought

In 1875, when Britain was at the height of its power in India, Sir Henry Maine addressed the question of the effects of India as object of study upon European thought in the Rede Lecture delivered at the University of Cambridge. He opened by observing the strong contrast in the reception of Indian matters in England and on the Continent. In England (which then ruled the whole of India, more or less) Indian topics were regarded as the epitome of dullness, while in other European countries (excluded from colonial rule of India by England's monopoly) India was regarded as providing the most exciting of new problems, holding out the promise of new discoveries. The source of

this intellectual effervescence was the new theory of language that arose from acquaintance with Sanskrit, the ancient language of India—which is to say, the theory of an Indo-European language family comprising (roughly) Sanskrit and its descendants in North India and Sri Lanka, Persian, and the languages of Europe. But what was at issue was more than language—it was ethnology. Modern philology, Maine argued, had suggested a grouping of peoples quite unlike anything that had been thought of before—before, that is, Europeans began to study Sanskrit in the eighteenth century. The bases proposed for common nationality prior to the European study of Sanskrit were very different from those which were now passionately advocated in parts of the Continent. The new ethnology was led by the classifications of languages. Sir Henry's own work in comparative jurisprudence was based upon this ethnological idea, for his researches were directed to the comparison of the laws of Indo-European-speaking peoples in ancient times. Increasingly it was race that appeared to be the object of the ethnology of Indo-Europeans: "For the new theory of language has unquestionably produced a new theory of Race" (Maine 1875:9). The people who were the first speakers of languages of the Indo-European language family had long since Come to be called, by a name taken from Sanskrit, Arya (*arya*) or Aryan.

The Indo-European or Aryan concept is the focus of this book. This concept has certain formal properties of its own that have been more or less stable from its inception in the eighteenth century to the present, as I shall shortly describe. But the premise from which this book sets out is that, notwithstanding this stability of form, the concept has a very different aspect when it is looked upon from different perspectives; specifically that it has a different meaning for the British, their gaze directed toward their empire in India, than it does for those elsewhere in Europe. This requires us to take not only a "formalist" but also a "perspectival" approach to the matter; that is, we must not only analyze the structure of the Indo-European conception as a perduring object but also consider the different readings of it, looking especially at England and the Continent as different readers of a text or having varying perspectives on the same object. Maine puts the Indo-European idea at the center of the excitement about India he perceives on the Continent, and we would be right to infer that in England, where Indian subjects were regarded as dull, it was comparatively neglected. That is true, but there is much more to be said about the British "take," which had its own twist.

The special character of the British concept of the Aryan came to me as an epiphany from a stone inscription written in Sanskrit, which I found in a most unexpected place: Oxford, where I had been reading for many weeks in the Bodleian Library. I was looking at eighteenth-and nineteenth-century British writings on the non-European world, but I began to focus more and more on writings about India, the subject in which I am most at home. Following their conquest of Bengal in the middle of the eighteenth century—the beginnings of their Indian empire—the British had urgent need to answer certain questions: Who are the Indians? What is their place among the nations of the world? What is their relation to us? These are questions that had belonged to the realm of universal history and that would come to belong to an inquiry named ethnology. Conquest provoked the questions, and it also provided the means for a more intimate knowledge of India by which they could be answered. A new Orientalism came into being that was centered on India and, for a few decades, the production of it was practically a monopoly of the scholars of British-Indian Calcutta before it was established in Europe.

Increasingly I had been thinking that India was, for the development of ethnology in Britain, not merely a source for British ethnological discourse which the accidents of history had put in its way, but the very center of its debates. In British eyes India presented the spectacle of a dark-skinned people who were evidently civilized, and as such it constituted the central problem for Victorian anthropology, whose project it was to achieve classifications of human variety consistent with the master idea of the opposition of the dark-skinned savage and the fair-skinned civilized European.[1]To this project India was an enigma, and the intensity of the enigma deepened in the course of the nineteenth century, bursting into scholarly warfare over the competing claims of language and complexion as the foundation of ethnological classifica-

[1]. This notion and the problematic place of India in it appears to have a very long genealogy, extending back to Islamic writers of an early period, for whom Indians were a source of wisdom and science as well as black descendants of Ham. For example, Sa`id ibn Ahmad Andalusi, in his eleventh-century ethnology (1068:11), *says* that the Indians were the first nation to have cultivated the sciences, and that although black, Allah ranked them above many white and brown peoples. The opposition of negritude to science doubtless has to do with the darkening face of slavery in the international slave trade, both European and Middle Eastern, as elucidated in a masterly article by William McKee Evans (1980), "From the land of Canaan to the Land of Guinea: The strange odyssey of the 'Sons of Ham.' " We will return to this problem and these authors in the concluding chapter.

tion. India, thus, was the site of a *Methodenstreit* among Victorian Britons who were in the process of creating a "science of man" that concerned the respective claims of language and physique. By century's end a deep and lasting consensus was reached respecting India, which I call the racial theory of Indian civilization: that India's civilization was produced by the clash and subsequent mixture of light-skinned civilizing invaders (the Aryans) and dark-skinned barbarian aborigines (often identified as Dravidians). The racial theory of Indian civilization has proved remarkably durable and resistant to new information, and it persists to this day. It is the crabgrass of Indian history, and I should like to uproot it.

It seemed to me that there might be more than the obvious to be found in an examination of British ethnologies of India in the period of empire and the creation of anthropology as a specialized science. It seemed possible, if one respected the tension between the cognitive and the ideological, the scientific and the political (instead of simply reducing the one to the other), to make discoveries—to find new things that were not merely answers contained in the question.

There was first, though, the question of a cup of tea. This was not to be had, I soon decided, from the machine in the gloomy readers' common room in the bowels of the nearby Clarendon Building. The History Faculty Library, in the Old Indian Institute Building, offered better tea, amiable porters, and history students for company. As it happens, there is a foundation stone with Sanskrit verses inscribed in modern Nagari script at the entryway, but it was only after passing it many times that I stopped to read it. The first and last verses struck me forcibly:

> saleyam pracyasastranam jnanottejanatatparaih. |
> paropakaribhih. sadbhih. sthapitaryopayogini || 1 ||
> [. . .]
> isanukampaya nityam aryavidya mahiyatam |
> aryavartanglabhumyos ca mitho maittri vivardhatam || 4 ||

Beneath the stone inscription is a brass plate, inscribed with the official English translation:

> This building, dedicated to Eastern sciences, was founded for the use of Aryas (Indians and Englishmen) by excellent and benevolent men desirous Of encouraging knowledge . . . By the favour of God may the learning and literature of India be ever held in honour; and may the mutual friendship of India and England constantly increase!


ज्ञानेयं प्राच्यशास्त्राणां ज्ञानोत्तेजनतत्परैः ।
परोपकारिभिः सद्भिः स्थापितार्योपयोगिनी ॥ १ ॥
आल्बर्टेडवर्डितिख्यातो युवराजो महामनाः ।
राजराजेश्वरीपुत्रस्तत्प्रतिष्ठां व्यधात्स्वयम् ॥ २ ॥

अङ्करामाङ्कचन्द्रेऽब्दे वैशाखस्यासिते दले ।
दशम्यां बुधवारे च वास्तुविधिरभूदिह ॥ ३ ॥

ईशानुकम्पया नित्यमार्यविद्या महीयताम् ।
आर्यावर्ताङ्गलभूम्योश्च मिथो मैत्री विवर्धताम् ॥

This Building, dedicated to Eastern sciences, was founded for the use of Aryas
(Indians and Englishmen) by excellent and benevolent men desirous of encouraging knowledge.
The High-minded Heir-Apparent, named Albert Edward, Son of the Empress of India, himself performed
the act of inauguration. The ceremony of laying the Memorial Stone took place on Wednesday,
the tenth lunar day of the dark half of the month of Vaisakha, in the Samvat year 1939
(= Wednesday, May 2, 1883). By the favor of God may the learning and literature of India be
ever held in honour; and may the mutual friendship of India and England constantly increase!
Figure 1.
Sanskrit inscription in the Old Indian Institute Building, Oxford.

What is so curious about this inscription is the use of the Sanskrit word *arya* in novel and contradictory ways that repay a closer look. To begin, the building is "for the use of Aryas" (*aryopayogini*), and the official translation instructs us that this is to be taken in an inclusive sense, to mean both Indians and Englishmen. In other European settings and in other times a sign saying "for the use of Aryas" would be taken to have an exclusive sense, denying entry to Jews, Gypsies, and non-whites generally. Yet both senses of *Arya* or *Aryan*, the inclusive one of the Oxford inscription and the exclusive one of the ideologists of racial hatred, come from different perspectives on the same construct, the idea of an Aryan people (whether conceived as a race or not), which is the human substrate of the family of languages called Indo-European.[2]

[2]. Joan Leopold was the first to see the significance of the Oxford inscription. Her articles speak directly to several of the issues of this book and have been helpful guides to the sources (Leopold 1970, 1974-a, 1974b).



Figure 2.
Schleicher's family tree of Indo-European languages.

Although the word *arya* is a Sanskrit one, the construct in question is unmistakably European and by no means native to Sanskrit. It comes from the European study of Sanskrit in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The discovery that Sanskrit was very similar to ancient Greek and Latin, and more distantly to the modern languages of Europe, led to the unexpected groupings of languages and peoples to which Sir Henry Maine alludes. The relationships among the Indo-European languages are understood by means of a genealogical diagram or family tree as in the one published by August Schleicher in 1861 (figure 2). Thus the Indic languages (Sanskrit and its descendants in North India and Sri Lanka) are closely related to the Iranian languages; they are more distantly related (reading up the diagram) to Greek and Albanian, the Celtic (e.g., Irish, Welsh) and Italic (Latin and the Romance languages, e.g., French, Spanish, Italian, Rumanian), the Balto-Slavic group (including Russian), and the Germanic group (including English). Relations of near and far are calibrated by the branching structure of the family tree, and the whole expresses a conception of the progressive differentiation and radiation across Eurasia of languages from

a common ancestral language. This ancestral language is called Proto-Indo-European. It is a scholarly construct of a language for which we have no direct trace and which is known wholly by inference from the shared features of the languages of this family. What makes the family relation of these languages surprising and unexpected is that they do not form a single geographical area. Languages of the Indo-Iranian branch form one region (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh), the others another (Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union), and the two regions are separated by a wedge consisting of Turkey and the Arabic-speaking countries (figure 3).

Other language groups fall outside this figure, including the Semitic languages such as Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and Amharic, and the Hamitic languages of North Africa. There are several ways the relations among distinct language families might be understood, but the dominant trend within comparative philology or historical linguistics is to say that the relationships of these (or any other family of languages in the world) to the Indo-European languages is remote, perhaps more remote than philological study at a given time can demonstrate, in that they are all branchings of a common tree at a level deeper than that of the Proto-Indo-European node, which is the starting point of the Indo-European tree. Indeed, several scholars of the nineteenth century believed what could not then be shown, and what historical linguists of today demonstrate: The Indo-European and Semitic families (to take a historically salient example) are historically related at a deeper level. The ideal end of the historical-linguistic project is to subsume all the languages of the world into a single family tree. It is easy to show that this impulse continues to run strong. One thinks immediately of the work of Joseph Greenberg. to unify the various language families of Africa (1955) and of the Americas (1987), or of the "Nostratic" super-family posited by V. M. Illich-Svitych (see Manaster Ramer 1993).

Thus the figure of the family tree or *Stammbaum* is not confined to the Indo-European idea but pervades historical linguistics as its master image. It becomes necessary at this point to temporarily take leave of the Oxford inscription in order to take up the formalist side of the inquiry. There are several important matters of the structure and history of this master image that need to be stated right at the outset, even though much of what I say here will be substantiated only in chapters to come.

The matter is so important because the tree image not only serves as the master image for historical linguistics but also has been of major

Figure 3.
Map of the Indo-European languages.

importance in ethnological discussion and in Darwinian biology. As I have argued elsewhere, British (and American) ethnological thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was guided by two master figures, the tree and the staircase. The first is the branching tree-of-nations image that ethnologists share with linguists, and the second is the stepped staircase of progressive succession of forms, the "scale of civilization" that subtends the notion of the stages of social evolution (Trautmann 1987, 1992a). The stage theory of social evolutionism that so dominated the anthropology that emerged in the 1860s and 1870s in Britain is very well known to us and constitutes our shared sense of the anthropological past. But we have little Collective recollection of the very great power of the tree image, which (as I shall be arguing in this book) dominated British ethnological thinking from Sir William Jones

to James Cowles Prichard—that is, roughly from 1780 to 1850. While the tree remains a powerful paradigm in historical linguistics and in biology (which has recently given it a new-old name, "cladistics"), it has long since faded from ethnology, and an effort of the imagination is required to recover a sense of its former dominance. Each of these ideas has a long pedigree. The scale of civilization is an elaboration of Aristotle's scale of nature, and the tree of nations is from the Biblical book of Genesis attributed to Moses, whence I speak of "Mosaic ethnology" as the kind of ethnological thinking that has this treelike structure. It is sometimes suggested that linguistic and ethnological usage of the tree idea derives from biology, specifically comparative physiology, but Charles Darwin makes it quite clear in his great chapter on classification in *On the origin of species* (1859) that the influence runs from linguistics/ethnology to biology (see chapter 2).

Coming now to the structure of the tree image, we see on examination that the family tree in question (as in figure 2, for example) is of a peculiar type, one in which there are no marriages to tie up the ends of a descent structure which, therefore, ramifies endlessly. It is a kinship structure of unilineal type, like the patrilineages of the Nuer social structure to which E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) gave the name segmentary lineage. *Segmentary* is a somewhat opaque term, but it becomes clear if one considers its source, Emile Durkheim's *Division of labor (De la division du travail sociale*, 1893). Durkheim wished to contrast two types of society (call them complex and simple) based on his conception of the two fundamental types of solidarity. Organic solidarity is the kind of social cohesion that comes about through the division of labor, by the interdependence it establishes among subgroups of specialists, whereas mechanical solidarity is the weaker form of social cohesion arising from the similarity to one another of the members of a simpler kind of society that lacks a division of labor. The ideal type of a simple society based on mechanical solidarity would be one in which there is no specialization of functions and in which the internal divisions of the society (moieties, clans, marriage classes) are homogeneous in structure and content, like the segments of a worm. Hence the term *segmentary*, which Durkheim got from the zoologists. Building on Durkheim's work, Evans-Pritchard's concept of the segmentary lineage characterizes the ideology of a society segmented into lineages, but one in which there is neither a state to create solidarity by force nor a specialization of economic functions integrating the groups through structures of exchange.

The segmentary lineage is a certain kind of genealogical figure in which (to put it briefly) relations among the living are understood and calibrated for nearness by reference to common ancestry, with the result that everyone within the structure (which could be the entire human race, as is potentially the case for linguistic trees) is related to everyone else, and everyone of the same generation is a sibling or cousin of a specifiable degree. In societies with a segmentary way of thinking the function of such calibration of nearness is to determine with whom and against whom to side in a dispute: "My brother and me against my cousin; my brother and my cousin against my distant relation," and so forth. It is not a question of self versus other, but of a universe of thought in which *everyone* is imagined to be kin, albeit sometimes warring kin, internally divided by a gradation of nearness with as many grades as may be required. The totality of the figure is built up of segments, each one of which is alike in structure to every other irrespective of scale: Larger units comprise smaller units that are of the same structure.

Thinking of this kind is important to our inquiry because it is characteristic of the story of the descent of Noah in the Bible, whence universal histories among Jews, Christians, and Muslims have had, over many centuries, a segmentary character, which they impart to the ethnological and linguistic discussions that are the object of this book. Not only is the segmentary lineage an *object of* ethnological thought, it also has been an important thought structure *for* ethnological thought through a very long period, beginning with Biblical times and continuing into the nineteenth century (although it has been overtaken by other forms and become largely forgotten within anthropology).

In our own time segmentary thinking retains a place in linguistics, but in ethnology it is largly replaced by the familiar Hegelian binary of Self versus Other (Hegel 1807), as deployed by the structuralists, particularly Claude Lévi-Strauss, who taught us how to use it. It is undoubtedly a very useful tool of analysis. Any congeries of relations (segmentary trees included), no matter how complex, can be analyzed into so many nesting oppositions of self/other at successive levels of generality. The segmentary idea is quite different. Instead of difference it assumes sameness (kinship), which it then partitions along a calculus of distance. Thus every position within the segmentary universe is both self and other at one and the same time, but the system allows for infinite modulations between oneself and the most distant point in that universe. It takes nothing away from the method of binarism (which I

use) to say that it has become overworked these days by virtue of its own success, which has grown even greater under postmodernism than it had been under structuralism. There are, however, analytic tasks for which the old segmentary way of thinking has proven and continues to prove indispensable.

Like any principle of classification, the segmentary idea derives its great power to order large amounts of information into a general scheme of things from its ability to simplify, and the information that is left aside in order to make these simplifications is itself of a characteristic kind. Every analytic has its shortcomings, and it is important to be aware of what exactly they are. To impose the radiating logic of segmentation upon language history or ethnological classifications one has to remove or ignore or deal in other ways with the phenomena produced by convergence of languages and peoples in the formation of new languages and new peoples. Specifically, the segmentary logic of the family tree of languages or of nations prevents and disallows the idea of *mixture* as a creative principle.

In segmentary systems inclusion and exclusion are not given by the structure alone, but are relative to the social location of any particular episode of conflict; that is, they are determined by the relative positions of everyone to the parties in conflict, solidarity following segmentary nearness.[3] It is in this sense, it seems to me, that the inclusiveness or exclusiveness that attaches to the word *Aryan* is not given by the structure independently of the situation. And—returning to the inscription at the Old Indian Institute—as our text so plainly shows, British rule of India imparts to the word an inescapably inclusive significance for Britons of that period.

The single passage I have quoted together with its officially sanctioned translation, "for the use of Aryas (Indians and Englishmen)," would be enough, without any further information, to establish that the word *Arya* is here used in a sense that it did not have in older Sanskrit literature, and that the inscription cannot predate the nineteenth

[3]. There is of course a large bibliography on segmentation. I have relied on Paul Dresch's *Tribes, government, and history in Yemen* (1989), an exceptionally fine treatment of segmentary principles, together with his important 1988 article, "Segmentation: Its roots in Arabia and its flowering elsewhere." Segmentation, in the end, has a forking genealogy: The lexeme (and part of the semantics, the idea of mechanical solidarity) leads back to Durkheim and thence to the segmentary structures of zoology, but the structure of segmentary *lineages* as an anthropological concept derives from certain societies of the Middle East and the Biblical concept of the tree of nations that I discuss in chapter 2.

century. The inscription was in fact composed by the Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, Monier Monier-Williams, as we know from other sources, but even if we did not know this we would guess from the construction of *Arya* in the first stanza that its author was a practitioner or at least an admirer of the comparative philology of the nineteenth century. The middle verses from the inscription would confirm this conjecture, at least as to the time horizon: The act of inauguration was performed by the high-minded heir apparent, named Albert Edward (*albart-edvard iti khyato yuvarajo mahamanah*), son of the Empress of India (the *rajarajesvari*, Victoria). The date is given as Wednesday, the tenth lunar day of the dark fortnight of the month of Vaisakha, Samvat 1939, which is to say, A.D. 2 May 1883.

But *arya* also occurs, twice, in compounds in the second of the two verses I have quoted, in quite a different sense. In those places the official translation implies that it means not Indians and Englishman (that is, the Aryan or Indo-European people), but Indians alone and in opposition to the English. Thus we are given *aryavidya*, "Aryan learning," a compound devised for the occasion to refer to the "language and literature of India," and *Aryavarta* (anciently North India), in the new meaning of India as a whole, contrasted to *Anglabhumi*, a translation of the name England. This is of course inconsistent with the inclusive sense that the author intends for *Arya* in the first stanza.

Professor Monier-Williams was perfectly aware of the prephilological referents of the word *arya* in Sanskrit literature, for they are given in his *Sanskrit-English dictionary* (Monier-Williams 1899). Looking up the entry for *Arya* we find the following significations: a respectable or honorable or faithful man; an inhabitant of Aryavarta; one who is faithful to the religion of that country; name of the race that immigrated from Central Asia into Aryavarta, opposed to *an-arya*, *Dasyu, Dasa* (although here we would have to say that the use of the word *race* and the reference to Central Asia comes from European ideas and not from Sanskrit texts); in later times the name of the first three castes, Brahmana, Ksatriya, Vaisya, as opposed to Sudra; in Buddhism, a man who has thought on the four chief truths of Buddhism (the *aryasatyas*) and lives accordingly; someone behaving like an Aryan, worthy of one, honorable, respectable, noble; of a good family; excellent; wise; suitable . . . . Monier-Williams would have known, too, that in a Sanskrit text an Englishman would be—insofar as an Englishman would figure in a work of Sanskrit—a Mleccha (outcaste, barbarian), or Yavana (Ionian, Greek, Westerner), conceivably a Huna (judging from *Huna*

pati, "Hun lord," for the French general Dupleix in the eighteenth century), or perhaps the Angla implied by the *Angla-land* of this inscription—but by no means an Arya. If the Old Indian Institute had fallen to ruin and we had only the Sanskrit inscription on the foundation stone to go by we would reach a very different reading of it than that which the official translation imposes on us. We would presume internal consistency in the use of *Arya* and come to the conclusion that a building had been built in central Oxford for the use of Indians, and that Englishmen must keep out! This is not altogether fanciful, for Monier-Williams himself said that the very name Indian Institute tended to be taken in that way (Indian Institute 1887).

The broader usage of the term *Arya* is largely due to Friedrich Max Müller, who took the word from Sanskrit and applied it to the family of languages now called Indo-European and the peoples speaking them. As we shall see in the next chapter, the concept of the Indo-European language family had been clearly articulated by Sir William Jones in 1786 as a group of related languages consisting of Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, Gothic, Celtic, and Old Persian, codescended from a lost ancestral language, although he did not give this language family a name. The "original stock" that spoke the ancestral language he simply called Indian or Hindu. In the early nineteenth century the name for the language family and its peoples varied among four main choices. From the Bible narrative of Noah and his three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet, came the name Japhetic for this family; unlike the coordinate names Semitic and Hamitic, which are still in use for language families, the name Japhetic did not last long. German philologists preferred "Indo-Germanic," devised by Heinrich Klaproth in 1823 (see Schwab 1984:184), but non-Germans resisted. The English linguist Arthur Young proposed "Indo-European" as early as 1813, and it eventually displaced the other terms (Young 1813). But "Aryan" had a long innings.

What made "Aryan" seem appropriate was that it was not only the name Sanskrit speakers gave themselves, but it was also used by the speakers of Old Persian; indeed, the name Iran is derived from a genitive plural of this word, meaning "(land) of the Aryas" (the *Ariana* of Greek sources, equivalent to Sanskrit *aryanam*). Some thought that the name Arya was not confined to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family but was also found, for example, in the name for Ireland, Eire. Thus it was argued that "Aryan" was the self-designation not only of those who spoke ancient languages of the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family but, since it was found as well in the most

distant branches of the Indo-European linguistic family tree, also of the ancestral Proto-Indo-European language. To these considerations Max Mül1er brought others. He observed that Zoroastrian sources oppose Iran, land of the Aryas, to Turan, the Central Asian land of nomads, and he proposed a Turanian language family to comprehend the latter, the core of which consisted of languages we would call Turkik. He explained the name Turan as connected with the "swiftness of the horse" (via Sanskrit *turanga*, "horse," that is, *tura* + *ga*, "swift-goer"), whence it refers to the nomadism of the Central Asian enemies of Iranians. Under this construction, "Turan" is neatly opposed to "Aryan," which he connected with plowing (cf. Latin *arare*, "to plow"); thus, for him, Aryans are people who practice agriculture and who self-consciously named themselves as farmers over against the nomadic pastoralists who were their neighbors and enemies (Max Mül1er 1861:248). These etymologies are no longer taken seriously, but they express the sense widely held by those who use 'Aryan" to mean a people in a higher state of social evolution.

For us, as children of the twentieth century, the name Aryan has different, far more sinister connotations. Associated forever with the Nazi atrocities of the recent past, it continues in the present through racial hate groups who use it to evoke the full 'force of the racist idea: mental differences among races that are original and unchangeable; the superiority of whites; the preservation of the racial purity of whites by separation from Jews, blacks, Asians, and others. Through these associations the name Aryan joins the memory of deeds that have defined for us the farthest extreme of human evil with one of the great and enduring intellectual accomplishments of modern times, the discovery of Sanskrit's relation to the languages of Europe and through it the creation of historical linguistics. It is hardly surprising therefore that the use of "Aryan," so popular up to World War II, is now poison for linguists and has given way completely to "Indo-European." "Aryan" lingers among them only where it is directly justified, namely in relation to India and Iran, specifically in the name Indo-Aryan for languages of the Indian branch of the Indo-European family and occasionally as a name for speakers of the lost common language of the Indo-Iranian subfamily.

The long shadow of the death camps casts itself backward, darkening the aspect of nineteenth-century linguistic and ethnological thought. The Aryan concept is the central idea of twentieth-century fascisms, and the fact that it was developed by scholars raises the question of the

role scholars have played in preparing the way for these appropriations. Ethnological ideas belong inescapably to the realm of moral reasoning, and their misuses are properly subject to moral evaluation. The need to combat the appropriations of science by Nazis, segregationists, and hate groups has led to the writing of a number of books exploring ways in which linguists and ethnologists have provided the materials for such appropriations and in some cases participated willingly in them.[4]

The story of this book, however, is a different Aryan story. It has a shape all its own and is by no means a simple inversion of the better-known one. It is at the outset, if I may call it that at the risk of being misunderstood, a love story. I mean to use "love" as a cover term of very large reach, as the genus of which the many species include not only erotic love but also such forms of human solidarity as familial love (including the mechanical solidarity of brothers in a segmentary lineage), friendship, the affection of master to servant, and the loyalty of servant to master. This Aryan story is a story of love in several senses. In the first place it inquires into the relation of Briton and Indian to each other and gives unexpected news: We are long-lost kin; we are Aryan brethren, to use the phrase of Max Müller. The colonial encounter of the two nations thereupon takes on the sense of one of those television programs in which orphans separated at a tender age are reunited many years after—the Aryan love story as family reunion. In the British vision of India, then, the Aryan idea always has the function of being a sign of the kinship between the two nations. Since this is so, the Aryan idea and the Orientalism that sustains it tend to be associated with discussion of the ways in which Indians may be bound to British rule by some

[4]. Léon Poliakov's The *Aryan myth* (1974) is very good treatment of the Aryan concept and anti-Semitism, written from a depth-psychology viewpoint. Martin Bernal's ambitious *Black Athena* (1987; to comprise four volumes) touches this issue, in that the author makes the case that anti-Semitism was the primary reason European scholars of the nineteenth century abandoned the idea of the Egyptian origins of Greek civilization in favor of the newly discovered Indo-European connection. However, the argument in that strong form seems quite wrong for, as we shall see, India and Egypt were not opposed but intertwined in the beginnings of the Indo-European idea, and remained so until the non-Indo-European character of the Coptic language of Egypt became clear and the hieroglyphics were deciphered. If anything, nineteenth-century European and Euroamerican discussion of Egypt, so far from driving a wedge between the ancient Egyptians and the Greeks, tended rather to make the Egyptians white, uniting them with the Greeks and driving a wedge between them and black Africans. This is especially so in the notorious *Types of mankind* of J. C. Nott and George R. Gliddon (1854) The recent book of Maurice Olender is a very good survey of European philology and ethnology from J. G. Herder to Ignaz Goldziher: The *languages of paradise: Race, religion and philology in the nineteenth century* (1992).

form of love, whether of solidarity, of "firm attachment," loyalty, or friendship. We see that function in the last verse of Monier-Williams's inscription, calling for the friendship (*maitri*) of the two nations.

Now, everything depends on what exactly "friendship" (or any other species of love under conditions of colonial rule) may mean to the British and the Indians in expressions of this kind. In the case in hand we can consult the speech that Monier-Williams gave in 1884 at the ceremony marking the opening of the completed half of the Indian Institute building that he had done so much to bring about. He makes it very clear that this is not a friendship of equals.

It was always his desire, Monier-Williams Said, "that the Indian Institute should have, so to speak, two wings, one spreading itself to foster Eastern studies among Europeans, the other extending itself to foster Western studies among Indians" (Indian Institute 1887:46). The Europeans in question were the Indian Civil Service Probationers at Oxford, who were given a yearly stipend of £150 by their London masters, the Civil Service Commissioners, and were housed in Oxford colleges while they were studying in the Indian Institute and sitting examinations in London. They would be, he hoped, "well trained physically, morally, and mentally, well formed in character, well informed in mind, well instructed in Indian languages, law, and history, carefully imbued with a respect for those they will have to govern, free from all tendency to self-conceit and arrogance of manner, capable of governing themselves that they may govern others, able to be firm, yet not overbearing, conciliatory, yet not weak, patterns of justice and morality, models of Christian truth, rectitude, and integrity" (1887:40). Thus the meanings of love, of Britons toward Indians: love as paternalism without arrogance.

Monier-Williams's hopes of having fellowships for Indians attached to the Indian Institute were not being realized, however, and he felt the disappointment acutely. His reasons for wanting to assist young Indians to attend Oxford derived from an analysis of Indian needs that is, to my mind, astonishing: Indians, he claims, have inadequate family life and lack the benefits of English public schools. "From what I have seen of the youthful natives of India in their own country," he says, "and from my knowledge of the debilitating effects of Indian home life, and the absence of all strengthening influences like those of our Public School system, I am convinced that no young Indian is fit to stand alone at an English University. . . [and] Will return to India deteriorated in character rather than improved" (1887:47). Strange as that diagnosis sounds today, it was part of the standard British Protestant critique of

the Indian family as a source of moral decay, first formulated by William Wilberforce (1813). Whatever we may make of the diagnosis, the fact is that the parties did not meet, and the intended "interchange of the literary wealth of Asia and Europe . . . repaying with interest the wisdom and knowledge received centuries ago from the East" (Indian Institute 1887:46) on common ground did not happen. Something was always coming between the British and the Indians and preventing their friendship. In the end was not that something the colonial relation it-self[5]

The whole argument with its contradictory elements of love and coercion sounds like a distant echo of the classic statement of Warren Hastings, architect of the Orientalist policy, in the preface to the first English translation of the *Bhagavad Gita* by Charles Wilkins, published in 1785:

> Every accumulation of knowledge, and especially such as is obtained by social communication with people over whom we exercise a dominion founded on the right of conquest, is useful to the state: it is the gain of humanity: in the specific instance which I have stated, it attracts and conciliates distant affections; it lessens the weight of the chain by which the natives are held in subjection; and it imprints on the hearts of our own countrymen the sense and obligation of benevolence. (*Bhagavad Gita* 1785:13)

Whereas Hastings wrote modestly and realistically of conciliating affections that were distant and recognized that the bond between Briton and Indian was a heavy chain that could, at best, be lightened, his Orientalist successors spoke of love and brotherhood as if colonial rule was a happy family reunion and coercion had nothing to do with it. A central issue for the British in their arguments over Indian policy was how the Indians might be made to love the British regime. In the paradigm wars the British fought among themselves over India, the

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[5]. Nicholas Dirks recalls the frustrated friendship of Aziz and Fielding in E. M. Forster's *A passage to India*:
The novel concludes with a kind of natural closure that reiterates the inscription of colonialism in India's landscape. For in spite of an extraordinary past of intimacy and support, Aziz and Fielding could not be friends, would not be friends, not until the Indians had driven "every blasted Englishman into the sea." In the words of the final paragraph: "The horses didn't want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn't want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House . . . : they didn't want it, they said in their hundred voices, 'No, not yet,' and the sky said, 'No, not there.' "Not until the antinomy of native nature and colonial culture was dissolved through the closure of colonialism itself would Aziz and Fielding be in a position to engage with each other as genuine friends. (Dirks 1992:2).

Orientalists embraced the Indo-European idea and were identified with the politics of love; those who rejected the politics of love rejected the Indo-European idea, and Orientalism, as well.

I hope I have said sufficient to make it clear that I do *not* mean that British Orientalism promoted affection between Britons and Indians as a matter of fact. I am speaking rather of Orientalist *representations*. I mean to say that British Orientalists devised a theory of their own activities (further discussed in the next chapter) that involved *claims* about promoting affection between ruler and ruled and a political *rhetoric* of love. The Indo-European concept was foundational for this position, and accordingly the nearness of kinship between Briton and Indian tended to be stressed by Orientalists. At a more general level, to anticipate a misunderstanding of another sort, I am *not* saying that the effect of the Indo-European or Aryan concept was to promote British affection for Indians. The Aryan idea stood as a sign of kinship and the political rhetoric of love; those who rejected the rhetoric of love, and they were many, tended also to ignore or attack the Aryan idea, to deny a close kinship of Britons and Indians, and to oppose the Orientalists. I shall give examples of this anti-Orientalist rejectionism in chapter 4.

This study lies within the territory opened up for exploration by Bernard S. Cohn, which he has called the construction of the colonial sociology of India. I think of such notable papers as "Notes on the history of the study of Indian society and culture" (1968), "The command of language and the language of command" (1985), and "The census, social structure and objectification in South Asia" (in Cohn 1990:224—254), some of which were given in seminar and became widely influential long before their publication. The achievement of this fine body of work is to have shown that the knowledge of India that is current today is the product of the colonial situation and to have elucidated the process of its production by a wide variety of types such as Orientalists, missionaries, and administrators, and by state institutions such as the census. In this book I will focus more narrowly upon the Orientalists, specifically the British Sanskritists, because (as I believe and will try to show) it was they who supplied the theoretical structures that dominated and directed the construction of ethnologies of India.

The importance of Cohn's work lies in the fact that it is very good history and, because the object of study is the built-up structure of sociological constructs about India, that it is at the same time a critique and reconstruction of existing knowledge, bringing expertise to bear in the reformulation of itself. In the same vein are some notable works

of historiography, such as David Lorenzen's "Imperialism and the historiography of ancient India" (1982) and writings of Romila Thapar, culminating in her recent book, *Interpreting early India* (1993).

In the meantime, Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) has appeared, bringing a harsher critique to bear. Coming from outside the guild and concerned with the Middle East rather than India, it is nevertheless a book that has brought about a revolution of opinion among Indianists. Like all revolutions it has been divisive and violent in its effects.

Said's argument, briefly, is an extension to the colonial world of Michel Foucault's concept of power/knowledge: that power and knowledge implicate each other (Foucault 1979). The two terms are particularized by Said to colonial power and Orientalist knowledge, or Orientalism. Put in this bare way, the Saidian thesis would be perfectly agreeable to the British Sanskritists of whom I shall be speaking, who were all of them empire loyalists and for whom the relation of their intellectual work to the governance of India was by no means concealed or shamefaced. What has generated a large and growing literature on. Orientalism is not the bare fact of that relation, which lay open to view and did not need to be unmasked, nor again the fact that the ethnological thinking of the present has its origins in a colonial past, which has always been evident. What constituted the success of Said's book was that it exploded the comforting sense of "that was then and this is now" and implanted in its place a sense that "all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact" (1978:11). Since the appearance of Said's book, we cannot discuss current knowledge of Asia without a far more acute sense of the relevance to it of the colonial conditions under which such knowledge came into being than that which we have held.

For those whose training was in the Orientalist tradition, the Saidian attack was something of a surprise. Does studying the ancient languages of Asia hold out the prospect of lucrative careers and an abundance of jobs among which to choose or influence in the formation of government policy? If anything, the public image of Orientalism before Said was that of Proust, for whom (in his great novel) the Professor of Sanskrit alternates with the Professor of Tamil as the very type of the dry old stick, the ineffectual academic, the purveyor of arcane knowledge who has few students. Scholars are used to such cruel jibes from the great writers, but the changed image of Orientalism in Said—from dreamy obscurantism to the intellectual Foreign Legion of Europe— was a shocking reversal.

What needs to be kept in mind when weighing the claims of the book is that for Said—and this is a crucial move—Orientalism is not limited to the intellectual product of Orientalists. Said's Orientalism includes as well (as we could expect from a literary critic) the Oriental-ism of poets, and painters, and more. Orientalism is "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having an authority over it" (1978:3). In the end, for Said, Orientalism is any European pronouncement about the Orient that is made with h show of authority. The Saidian expansionary redefinition of Orientalism unites the productions of Orientalists and non-Orientalists, both of the colonial past and of the postcolonial present.

Said's concept of Orientalism can be illustrated with a contemporary example. Henry Kissinger, in the chapter in his memoirs on "The India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971," has this to say about South Asia:

> Bordered on the south by the Indian Ocean, on the north by the Himalayas, and on the west by the Hindu Kush mountains that merge with the heavens as if determined to seal off the teeming masses, and petering out in the east in the marshes and rivers of Bengal, the Indian subcontinent has existed through the millennia as a world apart. Its northern plains simmer in enervating heat in summer and are assailed by incongruous frost in winter; its lush south invites a life of tranquillity and repose. Its polyglot peoples testify to the waves of conquerors who have descended upon it through the mountain passes, from neighboring deserts, and occasionally from across the sea. Huns, Mongols, Greeks, Persians, Moguls, Afghans, Portuguese, and at last Britons have established empires and then vanished, leaving multitudes oblivious of either the coming or the going. (1979:842)

The passage is remarkable for the way in which the burden is carried by the adjectives: *teeming, enervating, incongruous, lush, polyglot, oblivious*; almost by themselves they sketch a view of Indian civilization— shaped by climate and landscape, unchanged by history—that comes straight out of the eighteenth century. The writer has more in the same vein, and worse, but I will spare readers the painful details. Enough has been given, I think, to conclude that in the corridors of power where ideas may have very real consequences there do indeed circulate general views of Indian civilization that, although they strike one as parodies, have a genealogical affiliation with things that Orientalists have written over the centuries. It is this order of facts that makes Said's argument persuasive and the inflationary redefinition of Orientalism seem well

founded, linking the non-Orientalist Kissinger of the present with the knowledge production of a colonial past.

Even if one finds it persuasive, however, considerable problems arise when one wishes to translate Said's book into the terms of South Asia. In the first place he limits his argument to discussion of the French and British in their relation to the Arabs, which is constructed as but one "case" of the more general phenomenon he calls Orientalism, and inevitably the specificities of that particular triangular relation shape generalizations about Orientalism in ways that will not be applicable to the "case" of India under British rule. In the second place the work is one of polemic, meant to stir things up and set discussion going in a new direction (and in this it has been immensely successful), but of course the tools of polemic are rather blunt instruments and are not always used with the best of manners. What is needed to make the book useful for India is a double translation, out of the terms of the Middle East and into those of South Asia, and from polemic into analysis.[6]

This effort is well under way, and one of the most notable results came out of the 1988-89 South Asia Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, namely the collection of papers edited by Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer titled *Orientalism and the postcolonial predicament* (1993). One gathers from the preface that the book did not come about without personal turmoil, disagreement, complaints of Orientalist-bashing, and published opposition, so that its pro-Saidian contents are by no means the whole story of the Indianist response. Another direct response is Ronald Inden's *Imagining India* (1990), an ambitious attempt to apply a Saidian reading to the four big topics of Indology—caste, Hinduism, the village, and kingship—and it does so with learning and vigor. The root-and-branch extremity of its criticism is disarming: Inden flays practically everyone in sight, including close colleagues and even his own earlier world. Quite different is Wilhelm Halbfass's *India and Europe: An essay in understanding* (1988), a superb study of the place of India in the Western philosophical tradition and the effect of the latter upon Indian philosophy. This is a topic that could be subjected to a Saidian analysis, but in fact Said does not merit so much as a single entry in the index. The wide space between these landmarks tends to show how vague the Saidian thesis is, and how underdetermined and various its applications to India are bound to be.

The problem of translating Said into Indian terms, as I see it, goes

[6]. James Clifford's review of Said strikes me as the one that gets both the strengths and weaknesses of the book just right (1988:255-276).

something like this: One begins by observing, with David Ludden (1993), that Foucault's power/knowledge and Said's colonialism/Orientalism are badly underspecified. These formulations offer us a direction in which to pitch our attention but very little guidance about what to do with what we find. To say that colonialism and Orientalism are mutually entailed does not get us very far. What about the Orientalist study of Europeans before colonial rule, as exampled by the Orientalism of diplomacy, Christian missions, trade, and the "philosophical traveler"? How does Said's thesis help us understand the special enthusiasm of the Germans for Orientalist study? In these and other ways we are left asea.

As to the "case" of India, at first blush it exemplifies the Saidian thesis even better than does the Middle East. To show the full-blown conjuncture of Orientalist and scientific information gathering with colonialism in the Middle East, Said must start with Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, which came rather late and did not last very long. European colonialism of an extensive and durable kind is established much earlier in India (in the mid-eighteenth century) than in the Middle East. What is more, its conjuncture with Orientalism was originary and deep. The government formed by Warren Hastings after the conquest of Bengal was committed to an Orientalist policy of respecting Indian religion and law and committed thereby to developing and controlling knowledge of them through knowledge of Indian languages. The formation of the Asiatic Society in 1784- to promote the scientific study of Asia, and the issuance of the Society's famous journal, *Asiatic researches*, and the founding of the College of Fort William in 1800 for the education of civil servants in the seat of colonial government insured that an overlapping roster of persons, British and Indian, were jointly engaged in the advancement of Orientalist knowledge, the teaching of Indian languages to servants of the East India Company, the operation of the courts administering Hindu and Muslim law, and the construction and execution of government policy along the lines of Orientalist conceptions. Said would have made his case better by putting India at the center of it.

Nevertheless, it is exactly this close connectedness of Orientalists with government in British India that makes the fuzziness of the Saidian formulation troublesome in another-way, one having to do with his expansion of the concept of Orientalism. Orientalists are those whose knowledge of Asian history, religion, and so forth are grounded in mastery of Asian languages, and in the ordinary way Orientalism is

the knowledge that Orientalists produce. But, for Said, Orientalism is the whole, more or less, of Western authoritative pronouncements on Asian societies.

There is nothing inherently wrong with such inflationary redefinition of a familiar word, which happens all the time. But it creates the problem that new and older senses of this word trip up one another in discussions of India. Let us tag these two meanings so that we can distinguish them in discussion; call them Orientalism[1] (knowledge produced by Orientalists, scholars who know Asian languages) and Orientalism[2] (European representations of the Orient, whether by Orientalists or others). In India the British Orientalists were by no means a unitary group, but Orientalists constituted the core of a distinct policy group who, as I have said, had been dominant since the time of Hastings and who had devised the Orientalizing policy. This group constituted a faction promoting education in the vernacular languages; these "Orientalists" were in opposition to the 'Anglicists," Evangelicals, and others who promoted English as a medium of instruction. The Anglicists were also involved in the production of knowledge of a kind Said calls Orientalism. In this case Orientalism[1] was one party to a dispute within Orientalism[2], and the Saidian expansion of Orientalism, applied in this context, tends to sow confusion where there once was clarity.

Something like this seems to have happened in Inden's book, *Imagining India*, when the author makes the surprising claim that the writings of James Mill and G. W. F. Hegel on India constituted hegemonic texts for Indology (Inden 1990 :43-48), which is tantamount to making them the authors of Orientalism for the Indian "case." But neither Mill nor Hegel learned an Indian language or set foot in India, and although they both read deeply in the scholarly productions of Orientalists available to them in European languages, they used their secondhand knowledge to fashion arguments *against* the authority of the Orientalists and the enthusiasm for India with which it was associated. Thus Mill's essay "On the Hindoos" in his *History of British India* (1817) attacks Orientalism[1], in the person of Sir William Jones and the India hands generally, as being too partial to Indians, insufficiently theoretical, and lacking in the kind of philosophical judgment that is cultivated by long study in Europe (see chapter 4, this volume). And Hegel, reviewing all that Europeans had discovered about Indian thought, concluded that there was no philosophy, indeed no theory, outside Greece and Europe, and that India's marginality in the history-of-philosophy narrative was thereby effectively settled—and with it the marginality of Orientalism[1] in

German philosophy (see Halbfass 1988:chap. 6). Both Mill and Hegel are undoubtedly major architects of Orientalism[2], that is, Orientalism *sensu* Said, but in these matters Orientalism[2] is in *opposition* to Orientalism[1] and the Orientalists who produced it. Moreover, it is by no means the case that Mill and Hegel were hegemonic for Indology—that is, Orientalism[1]. Thus not only do we have the confusion of two senses of Orientalism, but the relation between the two is not a simple one of inclusion or of part to whole. Orientalism of the Saidian variety that we find in Mill, or Hegel, or, ultimately, Henry Kissinger is parasitic of the Orientalism produced by the Orientalists, but it is often hostile to it at the same time. Said himself is well aware of such conflicts within his Orientalism, but what he wants to draw attention to is the common ground that unites the Opposing parties. We need to redraw the distinction in order to understand the production of the Orientalists, which has a coherence and ideology of its own. Thus the relation of the two kinds of Orientalism needs to be problematized and investigated.

The application of Said's thesis to India also faces a problem of a more general kind. Said declines to examine the *value* of Orientalist scholarship, dismissing it, moreover, not as an open question, but with prejudice. He asserts that "Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient .than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient" which it claims to be, and that its durability shows it to be "more formidable than a mere collection of lies" (1978:6). The accomplishments of Orientalism[1]—the Orientalism of the Orientalists—that remain viable, of which the great decipherments of the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the cuneiform writings of old Mesopotamia are the premier examples, appear in his work only in the form of mockery, of a silly argument made by reactionaries to justify imperialism. What he parodies, to be sure, is real: The idea that Orientalism is colonialism's monument, a noble and enduring edifice that justifies the otherwise sordid and evanescent taking of profit, is an old one. We find, for example, the following sentiment in a *Monthly review* article on a work of the British Orientalists of Calcutta, written at a time when the British Indian empire seemed a temporary commercial advantage that would soon be lost.

> We always contemplate with renewed satisfaction the ingenious labours of our countrymen in the East. We consider them, in the aggregate, as constituting the monument more durable than brass, which will survive the existence and illustrate the memory of our Eastern dominion. After the

> contingent circumstances to which we owe our present preponderance in that country shall have ceased to operate, and the channels of Indian knowledge and Indian wealth shall have again become impervious to the western world, the Asiatic Researches will furnish a proof to our posterity, that the acquisition of the latter did not absorb the attention of their countrymen to the exclusion of the former; and that the English laws and English government, in those distant regions, have sometimes been administered by men of extensive capacity, erudition, and application. (*Monthly review* 1797:408)[7]

Even so, Said's simple inversion of the idea of Orientalism as monument-of-colonialism is hardly satisfactory. It seems to betray a feeling that one cannot seriously weigh the value of Orientalism's substance without running the risk of finding some of it good and, in that measure, a justification of a regime of colonial power. This strikes me as the central unresolved moral dilemma of a book that is above all a work of moral assessment, in that it passes judgment on Oriental-ism while refusing to pass judgment on its substance. But any view one holds or may construct about India is built and will continue to be built in part upon the work of Orientalists of the last two centuries, so that the continual reassessment of that body of work is something we cannot refuse. We cannot do without a critical and expert winnowing of that work.

Are these two features connected—the two features, that is, of expanding the meaning of Orientalism so that it includes anti-Orientalist productions and of passing judgment on Orientalist knowledge while refusing to assess its content? I cannot help thinking that they are. Said's expanded definition of Orientalism, in that it joins "describing" with "dominating" the Orient, is an argument in the form of a definition, a conclusion concealed in the introduction, a destination in a starting point. Its argument, as I hope I have made clear, is a serious one and deserves examination, but the examination must include, I would have thought, what actual Orientalism—that is to say, Oriental-ism[1]—actually contains. In that enterprise a knowledge of Sanskrit and of ancient Indian history will not neccssarily be a disadvantage.

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[7]. The anonymous article in the *Monthly review* is attributed to Alexander Hamilton, an important British Sanskritist, by the editor in his own set of the journal, as described in Nangle (1955); but I have to add that there are internal reasons for doubts, including several references to the author's previous articles in the *Monthly review* which the editor attributed to someone else. There is no sign of the Sanskrit and Persian learning that is so marked a feature of Hamilton's other reviews of Orientalist productions. The viewpoint here seems to be that of a stay-at-home Briton.

Accordingly I need to make it clear that the Orientalism I will be examining in this book is Orientalism[1]. Within that more limited category I will focus even more narrowly, concentrating upon the British Sanskritists to the exclusion of others whose knowledge of, say, Persian or Hindustani qualifies them for inclusion in the Orientalist category strictly construed. I believe that doing so will enable me to show things that can be discovered in no other way, in particular that it was the British Sanskritists who provided the theoretical foundation of the British ethnologies of India. I will engage with the technical content of this knowledge as well as with its relation to power.

The book which, more than any other, forms the foundation of this study is one that Said himself introduced to the Anglophone world in 1984, but that runs in rather a different direction from his own: Raymond Schwab's *The Oriental renaissance* (1984), first published in French in 1950.[8] This extraordinary book—extraordinary in its richness of detail, its passion, its beauty—takes its title from the conception, which came into being at the beginning of the nineteenth century and a bit before, that Europe would undergo a second renaissance through the study of the Orient, especially through the study of Sanskrit and the Veda, much as the study of Greek was the cause of the first Renaissance. Thus India and Sanskrit were the defining center of a new Orientalism, stimulated by the translation of the *Avesta* by Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron in 1771, the various translations of Sir William Jones and his associates in the Asiatic Society at Calcutta, and followed by the founding of Asiatic societies in Europe. The older Orientalism based on the study in Europe of Hebrew, Arabic, and Persian continued, but the ensuing Indomania gave the Oriental renaissance a new Indian center.

Schwab follows the enthusiasm for India on the Continent and (in part) the United States. But he also notes the paradox of Britain:

> The Oriental Renaissance—though not Indic studies themselves—had only an ephemeral career in the same England to which it owed its origin. Later the debt of several writers, especially the Lake Poets, to the Hindu revelation became clear, and the shadow of its impact on London was evident in Chateaubriand when he returned from exile. But the fire in England was soon damped. Great Britain could not, or would not, be the hearth for such a renaissance. Thereafter, even in Indic Studies, the Victorians procured their best workers only by appealing to the German universities. This had

[8]. See also Said's "Raymond Schwab and the romance of ideas" in The *world, the text, and the critic* (1983:248-267).

> already been the case with Rosen, who was born in Hanover and died a professor of Sanskrit at London. It was, above all, the case with Max Müller, who was born in Dessau in 1823 and died a professor of comparative linguistics at Oxford in 1900. Ultimately, England was to welcome many more Orientalists than she gave birth to. (1984:43)

The process by which, in British eyes, Sanskrit and the Orientalist study of India came to seem something foreign, an inexplicable enthusiasm of the Continent (especially a German one), to the degree that it was sometimes forgotten that it was British in origin, is evident at many points in the record we will be studying, including the passage from Sir Henry Maine with which this chapter opened. The British paradox, including the fact that Oriental studies languished in Britain and that Britain did not produce enough Orientalists to meet its own low level of need, is a phenomenon for which, again, the Saidian conception of Orientalism does not prepare us; it does not help us explain, more especially, the inverse relation between colonialism and the production of Sanskritists as between Britain on the one hand and the Continent on the other. Schwab gave only a few words to the question of its mechanism. The British paradox and its causes must be a major problem for this story of the Aryans and British India.