ken English, for example, is at least as good as Sewid's. Interpreting Nowell as a traditional man, nevertheless, seems fitting because his sympathies and concerns were traditional.

Sewid interprets himself as a progressive Indian who was frequently at odds with those of traditional bent who stood in the way of progress, because they, for example, let attending potlatches interfere with their jobs. But Sewid was never at odds with himself about the desirability of being like a White, Christian Canadian. Through both his interpretation and his scriptwriting in which, for example, he gives "Kwakiutl" chapter headings to chapters that are almost exclusively taken up with thoroughly modern content and concerns, Spradley emphasizes Indianness and presents Sewid and his life as an harmonious composite of about equal measures of traditional Indian and White Canadian cultures. Are either or both of them correct? Or is Sewid a successful and thoroughly Canadian man of minority origins who is still being patronized and stereotyped by fellow (White) Canadians because of his origins? And was not the Kwakiutl culture in which Sewid grew up one undergoing a headlong acculturative process of becoming Canadianized with a number of such men as Sewid in the vanguard of acculturation?

It would be a classic anthropological irony of fate that the cliché of the "vanishing Indian" had never been true during the long years it was in use, only to be replaced by the new cliché of "no longer vanishing" that is equally false if it is supposed to have any reference to the heart and guts of traditional Indian culture.

STRATIFICATION

Homo hierarchicus: Essai sur le système des castes. LOUIS DUMONT. Bibliothèque des Sciences Humaines. Paris: Gallimard, 1966, (publication date 1967). 445 pp., figures, maps, 4 appendices, bibliography, index of authors cited, index of subjects. 32 F (paper)

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Homo hierarchicus is an anthropologist's attempt, noteworthy for its intellectualism, to construct from a Western confrontation with India another pair of universally relevant opposed civilizational models—the "equalitarian" and the "hierarchical." Louis Dumont builds this attempt from the top downward, starting with an abstract conception of Indian hierarchy as a purely relative, noncompetitive ranking oriented to a single idea of higher and lower. Hierarchy relates homogeneously conceived, mutually dependent social segments to any unified, one-dimensional, above-and-below conception of the total universe. The ideology of hierarchy is held to be logically incompatible with any other ideology, such as the regnant equalitarian ideology of the modern West or the libertarian ideology of the Hindu *sannyasi,* which countenances individuality or gives value to individual achievement. Since hierarchical ideology can logically deal with only one substance, it is also held to be incompatible with any other nonholistic, pluralistic modes of thought that distinguish individuals, groups, things, or substances by their diverse natures, qualities, or partial functions.

In this book, Dumont attempts mainly to depict the ideology of hierarchy as the only sacred conception of the whole of Indian civilization, both Hindu and non-Hindu. He sees this ideology as occupying an encompassing or "englobing" (*englobant*) level above the society. It expresses itself positively in the existence of a caste system, in rules of contact and food, in a ritualized division of labor, in ranked structures of marriage, and so on, and negatively in the opposed ideas of the world-renouncing Hindu sects. Since Indian hierarchy has a monopoly on sacredness, secular government is deprived of religious authority and politics are doomed to perpetual disorder. Dumont introduces but reserves for fuller treatment later, a parallel study of the opposite ideology of equality that encompasses Western civilization.

Traditional Indian and modern Western societies are the specimens that illustrate Dumont's typological contrasts, yet he advises that in no society can either the hierarchical or the equalitarian ideology be realized to perfection. In real societies, the opposed mental models are always complemented by each other, often in dialectical fashion. Herarchical ideology has structured

the castes of ideologically casteless Lingayats, Muslims, Christians, and others in Indian society, yet through the centuries Hindu caste hierarchy has itself suffered many distortions from rebellion and intrusion. Indian society is now obviously corrupted by egalitarian features of independence, pluralism, and competition among its formerly more interdependent units. Likewise, although Western society has in recent centuries tended toward the egalitarian, individualistic type, it is not free from such submerged elements of hierarchical thought and action as class, racism, and totalitarianism.

Since actual societies are always mixed in nature, members of both extreme types—both *Homo hierarchicus* and *Homo aequalis*—are held to be likedly to gain more complete understandings of even their own respective societies by taking each other's contrasting positive ideologies into account. Dumont believes that general sociological theory should deal with pairs of logically opposite, but separately coherent, culturally relative models, rather than attempting to see all forms of social status as approximations to or deviations from one Western, egalitarian ideology alone. That this has not yet been done is attributed by Dumont to previously naive approaches to the Indian facts (resulting from artificialist, historistic, narrowly materialistic, and generally Western sociocentric theories) and also to neglect of the theories of such perceptive previous Western students of caste as Bouglé, Hocart, and Dumézil. However, Dumont's own preoccupation with Platonic metaphysics, intellectualist epistemology, dialectical analysis, and ideal-typical, East-versus-West formulations place him so firmly in the train of Hegel, Durkheim, or Max Weber that his expressed preference for taking the non-Western view must be understood more as precept than as example. He portrays himself as a Western man enjoying the advantages of contrast between his own ideology and that of the civilization he studies, like the monarchist Tocqueville when studying democratic America. Yet the similarity between the structure of Dumont's philosophical predilections and his portrayal of the structure of the Indian object before him is striking. For him, the study of Indian civilization seems useful less for the opposition that it might present to his own cultural assumptions than for the support that it gives to his preferred positions in debates on certain issues in Western social scientific methodology and social thought. India provides illustrative material for what is in effect (in the early chapters) an arresting introduction to social anthropology for the philosophically educated layman.

Along the way of arguing his approach to comparative sociology and constructing his mental model of hierarchical India, Dumont offers penetrating reviews of some previous theories about caste, thorough discussions of some relevant Sanskrit works, an unusual bibliography of four hundred titles, most of them discussed in the text, and indexes to all of these. Students will be rightly inclined by this splendid spread of information to make use of *Homo hierarchicus* as their basic guide to writing and research on caste, preferring it to the older standard works by Ghurye and Hutton. They should note, however, that the book's classical references are concentrated on certain legal, ritual, and speculative texts to the exclusion of most other kinds of Sanskrit literature; that it scarcely touches upon standard caste compendia or statistical materials; that it does not undertake seriously to consider much of what is otherwise known of ancient or medieval Indian social history; that its comparisons outside India are based mainly on samples of European philosophy and on the American commentaries of Tocqueville and Myrdal rather than on histories or community studies; that its coverage of modern research on Indian society is highly selective, falls off after 1962, and thus omits mention of such important work as that of Beals (1955, 1961), Nicholas (1965), and Retzlaff (1962) on village politics; Kolenda (1963) and Rowe (1963) on the division of labor; Singer on values and this-worldly asceticism (1956, 1961), challenging Weber's dicta on Hinduism (1966); Van Buitenen (1959) on individuality; Harper (1964), Khare (1966), and Gough (1957) on purity-impurity; Orans (1959, 1965) on the origin of non-Brahmanic values; Freed on cross-caste kinship (1963a) and caste ranking (1963b); and such relevant descriptive monographs as those of Eglar (1960) and Mathur (1964). Sociological writing on

stratification—a body of literature in which there are many predecessors to Dumont's effort—is excoriated by him as a genre and is therefore all but eliminated from specific reference. Dumont's own field researches in India, which have been focused on two separate castes rather than on any system or hierarchy of castes, supply only occasional footnotes. The book thus contains a speculative sketch of a pair of models, strongly shaped by the author's personal ideology of social science and documented mainly with theoretical, textual, and philosophic allusions. It aims toward internal truth and the raising of fundamental theoretical questions rather than toward technical precision, factual demonstration, or comprehensive survey.

The model of Indian caste offered in *Homo hierarchicus* will not be entirely unfamiliar to readers of *Contributions to Indian Sociology,* an occasional journal of theory and criticism published in English from 1957 to 1966 under the joint editorship of Louis Dumont (with David Pocock) and frequently including articles authored by him. Indeed, the present book includes as appendices four connected essays (on stratification, renunciation, kingship, and communalism) that Dumont previously published in *Contributions.*

But *Homo hierarchicus* also shows several important shifts of method and conceptualization. "Ideology," a part of what in American usage would be called "culture," is to a greater degree distinguished from the encompassing French term "society;" so is the term "social structure." While conjectures as to past change and cultural mixture were often decried according to the doctrine of strict synchronic analysis in the reviews of *Contributions,* in this book Dumont often expansively presents such conjectures, generally without apology. While differences of region and sect and differences between high and low cultural traditions were often denied or doubted by the editors of *Contributions,* who held to a postulate of the unity of Indian civilization, such differences are sometimes embraced and emphasized here. Village community studies, viewed with misgivings in previous pronouncements by Dumont and Pocock, are here tacitly granted a respectable status, at least in the analysis of economic interdependence among castes. The structure of caste hierarchy is no longer held to be fundamentally identical with any all-Indian structure of marriage, for, despite previous hopes, an all-Indian marriage structure beyond a very general notion of "alliance" apparently cannot be found. Indian hierarchy is no longer defined only in particularizing ideological terms of "purity-pollution," as previously in *Contributions,* but is here also placed within a potentially more inclusive category of hierarchical societies (of which India is still evidently the only member recognized by Dumont). While some of these shifts will be disappointing to readers in that they imply the author's retreat from certain simple, bold assertions that kept *Contributions* on the fringe of South Asianist thought, they seem also to constitute an advance into a more complicated, confusing universe of discourse that is more thickly populated by other scholars.

Most importantly, the all-encompassing, monistic intellectualism of Dumont's earlier statements on Indian civilization is now explicitly qualified: "ideology is not everything" (Sect. 22). The absolute sway previously posited for the alleged caste ideology of pure-impure is reduced here to an initial working assumption; in concrete fact, analytic "residues" of power or force and economic behavior are found to occupy much of the central space of any empirically known caste situation; as a result, the ideology must be relegated to a peripheral, encompassing position. But peripheral does not mean secondary: "the englobing is more important than that which is englobed, just as the whole is more important than the parts" (Sect. 34). That which englobes the civilization at a higher level, commanding the organization of all situations at a lower level, must consist of ideas and values, Dumont still believes. So a kind of ultimate intellectualism remains in the scheme in that one idea at the top ultimately reigns inviolable over all lower oppositions. However, Dumont protests his readiness to shift ideology to a genuinely secondary, therefore lower level (englobed, not englobing) position in the model, if the results of future analyses so require. The kind of results that might require such a shift is not stated; yet, since ideology is depicted as having been in de-

cline for centuries, the day for a shift of its level may come, he hints.

Apparently, Dumont's dialectical dualisms of englobing and englobed are matters of metaphysics not themselves to be examined factually. They are postulated constantly as the favored formulations of the book: the nonempirical englobes the empirical; ideas englobe facts; hierarchy englobes equality and separation; the *varna* scheme englobes the castes; the Brahman-untouchable polarity englobes the *Ksatriya;* the extremes englobe the middle of the caste hierarchy; marriage hierarchy englobes endogamy; occupational hierarchy englobes the division of labor; etc. (Sect. 50, etc.). In this universe of layered spheres, everything tends to be surrounded by, and in turn to surround, something opposite in nature to itself. Nothing is completely what it seems to be.

Readers of *Homo hierarchicus* may well develop the opinion that results now at hand do already make desirable several further shifts in the methods and postulations offered by Dumont. They may perceive that a prior commitment to an intellectualist position, to dualisms, complementarities, and dialectics can provoke fresh thought, but that such commitment can also distract attention from certain kinds of data, discourage complete analysis at any one level, and can thus divert effort from the announced objective of understanding an actual civilization as a whole. They may feel most acutely the awkwardness of distinguishing the concept "ideology" from its "residues" (principally "power," i.e., force, wealth), as antithetically defined by Dumont. Is it not more productive to seek the ideas implicit in all actions? How is the whole pattern of a civilization to be seen when the concepts through which it is viewed refer only to small, opposing parts of the whole and at different levels of reality? The content of the putative caste ideology of India is narrowed until it refers only to sacred, religious ideas and, finally, to only the one idea of purity-pollution. The content of marriage hierarchy is discussed without reference to such other evident Indian ideas as sexual dominance.

At first, readers may hope that ideology will provide a wide view of the whole to start with, because it is said to be directly accessible in men's minds (Sect. 1, n. 1); but later they are told that both ideology and its structural reflexes may be unconscious ways of talking and thinking, and may not be capable of study directly in the present by empirical means (Sects. 18, 22, 24, 43). The "empirical data" that are englobed by such a restricted notion of ideology are also narrowly conceived not as merely nonreligious, but also as nonideological, nonmental, noncultural, and external. They include mainly politicoeconomic, local, and individual matters. They rarely exhibit recurrent or widespread forms and typically comprise "unstable" (Sect. 96) "affairs of fact, not principle" (Sect. 74.3). A theorist is likely to find himself uncomfortable with so remote a separation of ideas from action as is indicated by these conceptions; articulations of the two will seem difficult to think about. Working literally with Dumont's terms and within his epistemological strictures, a field investigator today might lose hope of ever discovering a local political structure, or village economic system, or code of personal ethics, or a peasant ideology of any sort relevant to caste hierarchy. But of course, as the example of Dumont the distinguished ethnographer of the Kallar demonstrates (in his 1957 book), readers need not always take Dumont the methodologist literally. The narrowly circumscribed methodology proposed in the present book seems partly intended to propagate an intellectualist doctrine, and perhaps to apologize for its limited results, while also providing Dumont with a challenge to reconstruct the lost universe of uncorrupted ideology from certain ancient and classical Sanskrit texts.

Dumont's main distillations from the Sanskrit texts he examines are that Indian tradition, unlike Western tradition, "distinguished absolutely between hierarchical status and power" and that it gave precedence to considerations of Brahmanic status over considerations of secular power. Dumont links "hierarchical status" strictly with the role of "priest," treats "priest" as idential with a fixed Brahman *varna,* and depicts it as being concerned with the "pure," "spiritual," "ideological," and "absolute." (His implicit rejection of more serviceable glosses for "Brahman," such as "supreme *varna,*" or "learned elite," reflect his theoretical prefer-

ences as much as his preference for Brahmanic legal and ritual texts.) Power ranking, on the other hand, he sees as oriented to the role of the lordly (*Ksatriya*) *varna,* and therefore as impure, temporal, factual, shifting, and relative. Significantly omitted from Dumont's consideration are those vast and popular epic texts that deal with the flow of action, the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana.* In this bardic literature, readers learn of Brahman sages like Vasistha, who is by name "most wealthy." They meet kings like the Brahman Drona, who is a famous warrior lord, and many other kings with Brahman sires. They hear much about the learned *Ksatriya* sages, Vyasa and Visvamitra, who perform sacrifical acts that in Dumont's typology belong exclusively to Brahmans. Visvamitra even founds a lineage of priests. In the *Mahabharata,* individual physical prowess, military command, territorial possession, and genealogical seniority are much more evident as bases of rank and deference than is *varna* membership. Both *Ksatriya* and Brahman in the epics have frequent resort to similar sacrificial, ascetic techniques for gaining magical strength (*tapas*); and that strength is a fluid, spiritual force that is freely applicable to the winning of either temporal dominion or influence among the gods. The absoluteness of the distinction that Dumont professes to find between spiritual status and temporal power is thus difficult to sustain from events in the epic literature, as it is also from the case material available for scrutiny in other narrative, dramatic, and historical literature of India's older traditions. Indeed, the "absolute distinction" alleged to exist between the two in Chapter 2 is no more than a "relative autonomy" in the appended essay on Indian kingship.

Summarizing the fluidity and relativism implied even in his legal sources, Dumont writes that "he who rules . . . and submits himself [ritually, hierarchically] to the Brahman is a Ksatriya" (Sect. 33). Looking at the fuller range of textual and ethnographic sources, readers might equally well maintain, going beyond Dumont, that he who submits to rule and in return receives the ruler's highest ritual deference is a Brahman. Both power and hierarchical status can be seen as involved in such mutual definitions of both Brahman and Ksatriya roles. Readers therefore may wonder at Dumont's rejection of Srinivas's concept "ritual dominance" (Sect. 74.2); the concept is necessarily, if implicitly, used by Dumont throughout his discussions of both varna and caste (Sects. 33, 35, 36, 42.2, 55, 97), for ritual positions do carry with them potentialities for affecting the behavior of others and of an entire community.

However readers may assess the degree of distinction in Indian civilization between the domains of power and hierarchical status, they will not find in *H. hierarchicus* comparative evidence to show that the ideal types of Brahman and Ksatriya are more distinct in India than are comparable concepts elsewhere—than "church" and "state" in the less hierarchical civilization of Europe, for example. If the domains of priests and warriors, of status and power, are found to be no more distinguished from each other in India's caste-structured civilization than they are in less hierarchical cultures, as seems likely, then Dumont's assertion of India's peculiar separation of these domains will have to be reconsidered.

At the village level, Dumont is again led by his dualistic metaphysics to posit the existence of two disjunctive, complementary orders of local and caste rank: one ideological in inspiration, the other politicoeconomic. Behind these two orders readers may glimpse the shadows of Hegel and Marx, respectively. These two orders lack even the limited linkage through mutual deference with which Dumont qualifies the separation of status and power at the elite level of the Brahman and Ksatriya images. Careful readers of village ethnographies may, nevertheless, see many analogies to the Brahman-Ksatriya exchange of status for power at all levels of local rank.

The "primary," ideological order of the village still rests for Dumont on the conventional but unexamined idealistic assumption that castes are ranked according to their various attributes or characteristics along a presumed scale of purity-impurity. This assumption rests on one of the imperfect native models of caste ranking. A modern theoretical underpinning for assuming this kind of order is sought by Dumont in Talcott Parsons' essay on stratification. Du-

mont, following Parsons, supposes that there must be a purity-related, pan-Indian, absolute value scale of occupational functions in which priesthood is considered superior to farming, farming is considered superior to sweeping, etc. (Sect. 25.6). But Dumont cites no evidence for the existence of such a scale. When evaluations of occupations have actually been studied by others in rural India (as recently by Singh 1967 or Bopegamage and Veeraraghavan 1967), no peculiarly Indian influence of purity-impurity values has been detected. One striking difference between India's and other nations' occupational evaluation scales is, in fact, that priesthood rates unusually low, below farming, which rates unusually high. The value involved is independence, not purity. It appears then that Brahmans are top caste in spite of, rather than because of, the priestly occupations followed by some of them.

However, Dumont supposes that the occupational value-scale is employed not alone but in combination with a multitude of other specific, similarly absolute "criteria" having to do with purity in diet, purity in marriage rules, etc. All "criteria" are assumed to express the single polarity of the englobing caste ideology, so that, despite the conspicuous diversity of expressions, Dumont would still think of caste rank as one-dimensional (Sect. 25.7).

But all this is hypothesis. While the presumed multiple criteria are clearly oriented up and down, their unidimensional scaling or intercorrelation is not demonstrated and remains open to doubt, both for the native and for the anthropologist. Without referring to any actual locality, Dumont imagines that a different criterion might be applied to each adjacently ranked pair of castes whose relative standing is to be decided. Thus caste *A* (which is vegetarian and has a rule of celibacy for widows) is imagined to be placed higher than caste *B* (which is also vegetarian but allows its widows to marry), while caste *B* is placed higher than caste *C* (which is both carnivorous and widow-remarrying) (Sect. 25.6). Dumont does not tell us how he imagines the ideological placement of a fourth caste, *D*, which may be carnivorous like *C* but keeps its widows celibate like *A*; nor does he bring himself to consider the confusions of judgment that would result from combining these alleged criteria with the presumed occupational criteria, supposing that *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* were, respectively, blacksmith, barber, farmer, and warrior, to take a realistic example from western Uttar Pradesh. Whenever the attributes are distinguished discontinuously and disharmoniously among the castes (as here in the dietary order *A,B/C,D*; widow rules order *A,D/B,C*; and occupational order *D/C/A/B*), any possible single rank order is destroyed by intransitivity. The model will then not work.

It may seem odd that Dumont should propose a model for caste hierarchy that is fallible because of potentially conflicting criteria, since by his definition the ideology of hierarchy deals with only one substance —with one dimension in a domain set apart from all others. Plurality of substances and dimensions is for Dumont a mark of the egalitarian ideology that englobes an individualistic, competitive social structure. Readers might have expected him to regard the multiplication of distinctive caste attributes (projected as "criteria") as evidences for competition among castes, as attempts to depart from a single line of precedence. Competitive orientations either to the Brahman or to the Ksatriya elite types might well be regarded as such potential departures analogous to the religious renunciations on which Dumont has written so insightfully. The choice of certain occupations and the adoption of vegetarianism by some Brahmans are convincingly explained elsewhere in the book (Sects. 41, 65) by Dumont as symbolic acts intended to justify hierarchical statuses, not as criteria for placement in those statuses. Why should not other attributes be explained in the same way, as suggested by Barber (1957, 1969)? Incomprehensible in their disorder, if they are regarded as "criteria" of local rank, caste attributes may become comprehensible when they are regarded as parallel claims put forward in deliberately incommensurable terms. One lesson here might be that strong orientation of action to a common set of values and ideas need not eliminate competition, since values themselves may be competitively defined and actualized. Social structure and organization need not be re-

garded only as one-way reflexes of ideology but may also be seen as themselves giving rise to variations of ideology.

Dumont's search for a mental model that can define caste rank consistently as an expression of ideology is troubled still further by the contradictory doctrine that he calls "substantialism." Substantialism—which holds that substances (things, persons, groups) have diverse inherent properties of purity or impurity that determine their places in human affairs—is a doctrine that he formally rejects as alien to the relationalism of hierarchical thinking. He regards it as typical of the modern conceptual world of individualism and equality (Sects. 112, 116). Yet in his efforts to imagine the ideas and logic that might lie behind Hindu usages connected with touching, feeding, marriage, work, etc. (mainly in Chapters 2, 5, and 6), Dumont's own analyses are frequently substantialistic. "Purities" and "impurities" are treated by him as two kinds of substances, as things to be acquired or avoided, respectively, by contact or separation. For a brief moment (in Sect. 61), Dumont criticizes the idea of "separation" as being secondary to the idea of hierarchy; he might logically have also rejected the long assumed relevance of the idea of "contact" itself, for contact, sharing, and associating an inherently symmetrical, equalizing acts, rather than asymmetrical, ranking ones. But ultimately Dumont goes on to allow a theory of substances, rather than of ranked relationships, to structure his understandings of the outcomes of "contacts." Thus he writes that "impurity is more powerful than purity" (Sect. 32), and so on. Foods are categorized by him as "vulnerable" or "resistant"; polluting substances are divided into at least three kinds; bodily functions unpredictably yield "permanent" or "impermanent" pollutions; situations of substantial contact are classified as "ordinary" or "specialized," "auspicious" or "inauspicious," "voluntary" or "involuntary," etc. The number of analytic distinctions and qualifications in this attempt to build a substantialist theory is necessarily large, yet all of them together do not suffice to clarify such common questions as why the female rather than the male is heavily polluted in sexual contacts, why a dog does not seriously pollute the plates he licks, why the caste of agricultural laborers is regarded as polluted, etc. These and other questions, puzzles for the substantialist, are discussed inconclusively in Section 62.

A genuinely relational analysis, true to the conception of hierarchy that Dumont advocates on deductive grounds, might have solved all these puzzles by a simpler formula: "pollution" (better understood in strictly hierarchical terms as "degradation") need not be a substance or a quality of substances. Rather, it is a process that inevitably occurs, according to Indian ideology, through the ranked relationships of any transaction. Whatever is given—semen, food, pay, etc.—the act of giving is degrading to the receiver, upgrading to the giver. The idiom of "pollution" provides one major way of establishing and one major way of talking about caste rank, while rank itself is the outcome of transactions in that and certain other idioms (Marriott (1959). Dumont accepts such a "transactional" or "interactional" theory as valid in principle (Sect. 37), but he does not press his uses of it far enough to realize that it can yield a consistent cultural model of ranks in the whole hierarchy from Brahmans to untouchables (as in Marriott 1968), as well as a model of hypergamous ranking and of individual prestige. Pursuing his dualistic doctrine of ideological englobement, Dumont breaks off his analysis of some intercaste transactions in a Malwa village short of summing the whole matrix (Sect. 36). He then relegates the idiom of transactions, along with politicoeconomic relationships, to a restricted sphere in what he believes to be the dissensual middle of the hierarchy.

The middle of any local caste hierarchy, according to Dumont's model, is an area where the absolute religious values characterizing the civilization "are in retreat." Here he holds that the castes stand in a politicoeconomic disorder, their ranks determined only by forceful domination, not by attributes, criteria, substances, or any other expressions of ideology. "Nearly any group has been able, in favorable circumstances, to become a dominant caste in a determined locality," and many castes struggle indecisively with each other (Sects. 23, 43). This inner sphere is thus surrendered to Marxian analysis, but victory is denied to the Marx-

ists by depriving them of the sacred idea by which alone an agreed hierarchy can be constructed.

The chaos of opinions that should result from an actualization of either of Dumont's proposed models of ranking taken separately, and the greater chaos that should result from their actual combination, does not occur in the three local studies of caste rank cited by Dumont—in Mayer's book on Ram Kheri (1960), in Mahar's paper on Khalapur (1959), or in Marriott's work on Kishan Garhi (1960). All these studies, like Freed's (1963), report a number of clear distinctions of rank among the middle third of the castes, contrary to Dumont's model of politicoeconomic disorder. None reports that ranks are clearer near the hypothesized ideological "poles" of Brahman and untouchable than they are in the middle. The caste ranks do not correspond in any detailed way to either their quotients of power or their attributes. Finally, none of these studies reports the general disjunction of native judgments of caste rank between the postulated ideological and politicoeconomic elements that is predicted by Dumont, and all report a homogeneous concern with raising and lowering transactions running from the top to the bottom of the local hierarchy. Such studies call for a unified model that can show the articulation of all elements into varied but consensual, evenly differentiated local systems.

Readers may agree that Dumont's dualistic theories do not fit these local studies well, but they may find these theories very hard to test against facts, generally. His proposed dialectic of opposite, complementary, partial models at different levels leaves the explanation of any actual data in an indeterminate state. A failure of either explanation —ideological or politicoeconomic—may be claimed as the success of the other explanation, or as a demonstration of the theoretical conflict between the two models. Full, systematic analysis of any local data in terms of either of the two partial models seems to be rendered futile by the assumption that each model is incomplete or limited in its scope. Empiricism may itself be irrelevant, for "in real gradations of status . . . power somehow counterbalances purity at secondary [local] levels while remaining subordinate to it at the primary or unsegmented [i.e., macrotheoretical] level" (Sect. 34).

The incompleteness of *Homo hierarchicus* that will, perhaps, most excite the attention of social theorists generally is the omitted consideration—almost the denial—of secular individuality in caste society (Sect. 3). For Dumont, this omission seems triply determined by his antipsychological version of general sociological theory, by Western stereotypes of Indian society, and by his own characterization of hierarchy as "a world of strict interdependence in which the individual is ignored" (Sect. 92). Consistently with this characterization of hierarchy, Dumont declares that persons who are members of any one caste will share an equality of status that guarantees plural authority (Sect. 74.3) and prevents the rise of superior individual authority (Sect. 85). Inconsistently with this characterization, Dumont is at pains to deny for caste society those equivalences of roles in various contexts that Barth, following Nadel and Weber, has discussed as "status summations" (Sect. 104). If Dumont's latter view is correct—if individual economic and political and other situations differ widely within each caste, as they surely do—then secular individuality cannot be denied and deserves not to be ignored as incidental, but should be given a positive place in any holistic model of a hierarchical society. Readers familiar with Indian stories and biographies, or with the ethnography of village factional conflict, will demand to know how Dumont's present model of a hierarchical society can be reconciled with the actuality of fierce and culturally recognized intracaste and intercaste competition for individual achievement and prestige.

In sum, Dumont's attempt to construct a model of hierarchical society is, perhaps, most interesting as an essay in pure theory and criticism, and as an imposing specimen of intellectualistic model-building. It asks and answers questions that have been little asked, yet are immensely worth asking. If the resulting model of Indian civilization seems in part unrealistic, or unviable, or untestable, some features of that model may, nevertheless, be disassembled and reassembled for further productive study. If the many dualisms and antitheses of this model

seem arbitrary, a partial heuristic return may be made to Dumont's powerful previous assumption of the unity of any civilization's structure. Unidimensionality, internal relativism, and conceptual distinctness of any hierarchical domain are features of the provisional universal definition of hierarchy proposed by Dumont that should have enduring importance. That a hierarchy may be secular as conceivably as it may be sacred in its ideological orientation; that it may flourish as obviously in the transactions of daily life as in high mythic themes; that its essential ideas may be relational ideas rather than attributional ideas; that it may stimulate a plurality of other, conflicting ideas even while remaining unidimensional; that it may articulate both ideas and actions, both status and power throughout its structure rather than only at the extremes; that it need not have absolute, peculiar "poles" at its extremities but may extend on homogeneously, with or without Brahmans, to include gods, animals, etc.; that positions within it may be competitive rather than cooperative; that analogously structured, separate, coexistent hierarchies may be formed not only by castes and marriage categories, but also by many other kinds of teams and by individuals—these are some alternative possibilities that are yet to be explored. Exploration of these possibilities may lead to construction of a more representational model of Indian civilization, a more unified model that can generate hypotheses and possibly suffer its own negation by empirical tests. It may also lead to recognizing many further resemblances of Indian caste hierarchy, abstractly conceived, not only to the systems of class and race so far compared, but also to the non-Indian forms of games, gifting, tribute, patronage, marriage, age grading, and bureaucracy—to a wider world of other hierarchies hitherto unperceived.

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Singh, a social psychologist, studied patterns of caste tension in two villages, Senapur and Borsar, in Uttar Pradesh in 1954-1955. This study was one of the Cornell-India projects, carried out when changes in laws following Independence may have increased tension and conflict. Singh recognizes that tension exists to some degree in any community, but he assumes that changes intensified conflicts and threatened the traditional social system.

Implicit in the study is the theory that tension is created as a result of conflicts between castes when the social system is threatened, rather than that tension results from position in the caste hierarchy or that it is related to caste customs and social distance. The study has three aims: to find out the nature of tension in caste communities; to measure the amount of tension in each caste; and to determine what causes intergroup and interindividual differences in tension.

The measurement of tension is based on the sum of scores from responses to a questionnaire. The responses show differences in tension among individuals and between castes. The questionnaire is divided into three parts for all castes; low caste; and Thakurs, the high caste. The scores show high tension for all castes.

Sampling appears adequate from low castes and Thakurs. Males between twenty and fifty-nine years of age were selected. Females were not included in the sample. This raises the question of representativeness of a male sample for questions regarding the community as a whole.

Tension for Thakurs arises from conflicts about land, fear of low caste domination, threats to Thakur ascendancy, fear of damage and destruction of property, and refusal or threat of refusal of low castes to work. For the low castes, tension is generated by fear of Thakurs as a source of land conflicts, domination, forced labor and inadequate wages, oppression, property destruction, and for nonpayment or slow payment for goods and services.

Tension scores are correlated with caste, sociopsychological, and personality variables. Caste variables are economic and social status, political and internal organization, and dependence upon and participation