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Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for “Indian” Pasts?

Push thought to extremes.
—Louis Althusser

I

IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN SAID in praise of the postcolonial project of *Subaltern Studies* that it demonstrates, “perhaps for the first time since colonization,” that “Indians are showing sustained signs of reappropriating the capacity to represent themselves [within the discipline of history].”¹ As a historian who is a member of the *Subaltern Studies* collective, I find the congratulation contained in this remark gratifying but premature. The purpose of this article is to problematize the idea of “Indians” “representing themselves in history.” Let us put aside for the moment the messy problems of identity inherent in a transnational enterprise such as *Subaltern Studies*, where passports and commitments blur the distinctions of ethnicity in a manner that some would regard as characteristically postmodern. I have a more perverse proposition to argue. It is that insofar as the academic discourse of history—that is, “history” as a discourse produced at the institutional site of the university—is concerned, “Europe” remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call “Indian,” “Chinese,” “Kenyan,” and so on. There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called “the history of Europe.” In this sense, “Indian” history itself is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject positions in the name of this history.

While the rest of this article will elaborate on this proposition, let me enter a few qualifications. “Europe” and “India” are treated here as hyperreal terms in that they refer to certain figures of imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat indeterminate.² As figures of the imaginary they are, of course, subject to contestation, but for the moment I shall treat them as though they were given, reified categories, opposites paired in a structure of domination and subordination. I realize that in treating them thus I leave myself open to the charge of nativism, nationalism, or worse, the sin of sins, nostalgia. Liberal-minded scholars would immediately protest that any idea of a homogeneous, uncontested

“Europe” dissolves under analysis. True, but just as the phenomenon of orientalism does not disappear simply because some of us have now attained a critical awareness of it, similarly a certain version of “Europe,” reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern, continues to dominate the discourse of history. Analysis does not make it go away.

That Europe works as a silent referent in historical knowledge itself becomes obvious in a highly ordinary way. There are at least two everyday symptoms of the subalternity of non-Western, third-world histories. Third-world historians feel a need to refer to works in European history; historians of Europe do not feel any need to reciprocate. Whether it is an Edward Thompson, a Le Roy Ladurie, a George Duby, a Carlo Ginzberg, a Lawrence Stone, a Robert Darnton, or a Natalie Davis—to take but a few names at random from our contemporary world—the “greats” and the models of the historian’s enterprise are always at least culturally “European.” “They” produce their work in relative ignorance of non-Western histories, and this does not seem to affect the quality of their work. This is a gesture, however, that “we” cannot return. We cannot even afford an equality or symmetry of ignorance at this level without taking the risk of appearing “old-fashioned” or “outdated.”

The problem, I may add in parenthesis, is not particular to historians. An unselfconscious but nevertheless blatant example of this “inequality of ignorance” in literary studies, for example, is the following sentence on Salman Rushdie from a recent text on postmodernism: “Though Saleem Sinai [of *Midnight’s Children*] narrates in English . . . his intertexts for both writing history and writing fiction are doubled: they are, on the one hand, from Indian legends, films, and literature and, on the other, from the West—*The Tin Drum*, *Tristram Shandy*, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, and so on.”³ It is interesting to note how this sentence teases out only those references that are from “the West.” The author is under no obligation here to be able to name with any authority and specificity the “Indian” allusions that make Rushdie’s intertextuality “doubled.” This ignorance, shared and unstated, is part of the assumed compact that makes it “easy” to include Rushdie in English department offerings on postcolonialism.

This problem of asymmetric ignorance is not simply a matter of “cultural cringe” (to let my Australian self speak) on our part or of cultural arrogance on the part of the European historian. These problems exist but can be relatively easily addressed. Nor do I mean to take anything away from the achievements of the historians I mentioned. Our footnotes bear rich testimony to the insights we have derived from their knowledge and creativity. The dominance of “Europe” as the subject of all histories is a part of a much more profound theoretical condition under which historical knowledge is produced in the third world. This

condition ordinarily expresses itself in a paradoxical manner. It is this paradox that I shall describe as the second everyday symptom of our subalternity, and it refers to the very nature of social science pronouncements themselves.

For generations now, philosophers and thinkers shaping the nature of social science have produced theories embracing the entirety of humanity. As we well know, these statements have been produced in relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the majority of humankind—i.e., those living in non-Western cultures. This in itself is not paradoxical, for the more self-conscious of European philosophers have always sought theoretically to justify this stance. The everyday paradox of third-world social science is that *we* find these theories, in spite of their inherent ignorance of “us,” eminently useful in understanding our societies. What allowed the modern European sages to develop such clairvoyance with regard to societies of which they were empirically ignorant? Why cannot we, once again, return the gaze?

There is an answer to this question in the writings of philosophers who have read into European history an entelechy of universal reason, if we regard such philosophy as the self-consciousness of social science. Only “Europe,” the argument would appear to be, is *theoretically* (i.e., at the level of the fundamental categories that shape historical thinking) knowable; all other histories are matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton which is substantially “Europe.” There is one version of this argument in Edmund Husserl’s Vienna lecture of 1935, where he proposed that the fundamental difference between “oriental philosophies” (more specifically, Indian and Chinese) and “Greek-European science” (or as he added, “universally speaking: philosophy”) was the capacity of the latter to produce “absolute theoretical insights,” that is “*theoria*” (universal science), while the former retained a “practical-universal,” and hence “mythical-religious,” character. This “practical-universal” philosophy was directed to the world in a “naive” and “straightforward” manner, while the world presented itself as a “thematic” to *theoria*, making possible a praxis “whose aim is to elevate mankind through universal scientific reason.”⁴

A rather similar epistemological proposition underlies Marx’s use of categories like “bourgeois” and “prebourgeois” or “capital” and “precapital.” The prefix *pre* here signifies a relationship that is both chronological and theoretical. The coming of the bourgeois or capitalist society, Marx argues in the *Grundrisse* and elsewhere, gives rise for the first time to a history that can be apprehended through a philosophical and universal category, “capital.” History becomes, for the first time, *theoretically* knowable. All past histories are now to be known (theoretically, that is) from the vantage point of this category, that is in terms of their differences from it. Things reveal their categorical essence only when they reach their fullest development, or as Marx put it in that famous aphorism of the *Grundrisse*: “Human anatomy contains the key to the anatomy of the ape.”⁵ The category “capital,” as I have discussed elsewhere, contains within itself the legal subject of

Enlightenment thought.⁶ Not surprisingly, Marx said in that very Hegelian first chapter of *Capital*, vol. 1, that the secret of “capital,” the category, “cannot be deciphered until the notion of human equality has acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice.”⁷ To continue with Marx’s words:

Even the most abstract categories, despite their validity—precisely because of their abstractness—for all epochs, are nevertheless . . . themselves . . . a product of historical relations. Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allow insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. . . . The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species . . . can be understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient.⁸

For “capital” or “bourgeois,” I submit, read “Europe.”

II

Neither Marx nor Husserl spoke—not at least in the words quoted above—in a historicist spirit. In parenthesis, we should also recall here that Marx’s vision of emancipation entailed a journey beyond the rule of capital, in fact beyond the notion of juridical equality that liberalism holds so sacred. The maxim “From each according to his ability to each according to his need” runs quite contrary to the principle of “Equal pay for equal work,” and this is why Marx remains—the Berlin Wall notwithstanding (or not standing!)—a relevant and fundamental critic of both capitalism and liberalism and thus central to any post-colonial, postmodern project of writing history. Yet Marx’s methodological/epistemological statements have not always successfully resisted historicist readings. There has always remained enough ambiguity in these statements to make possible the emergence of “Marxist” historical narratives. These narratives turn around the theme of “historical transition.” Most modern third-world histories are written within problematics posed by this transition narrative, of which the overriding (if often implicit) themes are those of development, modernization, capitalism.

This tendency can be located in our own work in the *Subaltern Studies* project. My book on working-class history struggles with the problem.⁹ Sumit Sarkar’s (another colleague in the *Subaltern Studies* project) *Modern India*, justifiably regarded as one of the best textbooks on Indian history written primarily for Indian universities, opens with the following sentences:

The sixty years or so that lie between the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 and the achievement of independence in August 1947 witnessed perhaps the greatest transition in our country’s long history. A transition, however, which in many ways remains

grievously incomplete, and it is with this central ambiguity that it seems most convenient to begin our survey.¹⁰

What kind of a transition was it that remained “grievously incomplete”? Sarkar hints at the possibility of there having been several by naming three:

So many of the aspirations aroused in the course of the national struggle remained unfulfilled—the Gandhian dream of the peasant coming into his own in *Ram-rajya* [the rule of the legendary and the ideal god-king Ram], as much as the left ideals of social revolution. And as the history of independent India and Pakistan (and Bangladesh) was repeatedly to reveal, even the problems of a complete bourgeois transformation and successful capitalist development were not fully solved by the transfer of power of 1947. (4)

Neither the peasant’s dream of a mythical and just kingdom, nor the Left’s ideal of a social[ist] revolution, nor a “complete bourgeois transformation”—it is within these three absences, these “grievously incomplete” scenarios that Sarkar locates the story of modern India.

It is also with a similar reference to “absences”—the “failure” of a history to keep an appointment with its destiny (once again an instance of the “lazy native,” shall we say?)—that we announced our project of *Subaltern Studies*:

It is the study of this *historic failure of the nation to come to its own*, a failure due to the *inadequacy* [emphasis added] of the bourgeoisie as well as of the working class to lead it into a decisive victory over colonialism and a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the classic nineteenth-century type . . . or [of the] “new democracy” [type]—*it is the study of this failure which constitutes the central problematic of the historiography of colonial India*.¹¹

The tendency to read Indian history in terms of a lack, an absence, or an incompleteness that translates into “inadequacy” is obvious in these excerpts. As a trope, however, it is an ancient one, going back to the hoary beginnings of colonial rule in India. The British conquered and represented the diversity of “Indian” pasts through a homogenizing narrative of transition from a “medieval” period to “modernity.” The terms have changed with time. The “medieval” was once called “despotic” and the “modern,” “the rule of law.” “Feudal/capitalist” has been a later variant.

When it was first formulated in colonial histories of India, this transition narrative was an unashamed celebration of the imperialist’s capacity for violence and conquest. To give only one example among the many available, Alexander Dow’s *History of Hindostan*, first published in three volumes between 1770 and 1772, was dedicated to the king with a candor characteristic of the eighteenth century when one did not need a Michel Foucault to uncover the connection between violence and knowledge: “The success of Your Majesty’s arms,” said Dow, “has laid open the East to the researches of the curious.”¹² Underscoring this connection between violence and modernity, Dow added:

The British nation have become the conquerors of Bengal and they ought to extend some part of their fundamental jurisprudence to secure their conquest. . . . The sword is our tenure. It is an absolute conquest, and it is so considered by the world. (1:cxxxviii)

This “fundamental jurisprudence” was the “rule of law” that contrasted, in Dow’s narrative, with a past rule that was “arbitrary” and “despotic.” In a further gloss Dow explained that “despotism” did not refer to a “government of mere caprice and whim,” for he knew enough history to know that that was not true of India. Despotism was the opposite of English constitutional government; it was a system where “the legislative, the judicial and the executive power [were] vested in the prince.” This was the past of unfreedom. With the establishment of British power, the Indian was to be made a legal subject, ruled by a government open to the pressures of private property (“the foundation of public prosperity,” said Dow) and public opinion, and supervised by a judiciary where “the distributors of justice ought to be independent of everything but law [as] otherwise the officer [the judge] becomes a tool of oppression in the hands of despotism” (1:xcv, cl, cxl–cxli).

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, generations of elite Indian nationalists found their subject positions, as nationalists, within this transition narrative that, at various times and depending on one’s ideology, hung the tapestry of “Indian history” between the two poles of the homologous sets of oppositions, despotic/constitutional, medieval/modern, feudal/capitalist. Within this narrative shared between imperialist and nationalist imaginations, the “Indian” was always a figure of lack. There was always, in other words, room in this story for characters who embodied, on behalf of the native, the theme of “inadequacy” or “failure.” Dow’s recommendation of a “rule of law” for Bengal/India came with the paradoxical assurance (to the British) that there was no danger of such a rule “infusing” in the natives “a spirit of freedom”:

To make the natives of the fertile soil of Bengal free, is beyond the power of political arrangement. . . . Their religion, their institutions, their manners, the very disposition of their minds, form them for passive obedience. To give them property would only bind them with stronger ties to our interests, and make them our subjects; or if the British nation prefers the name—more our slaves. (1:cxl–cxli)

We do not need to be reminded that this would remain the cornerstone of imperial ideology for many years to come—subjecthood but not citizenship, as the native was never adequate to the latter—and would eventually become a strand of liberal theory itself.¹³ This was of course where nationalists differed. For Rammohun Roy as for Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, two of India’s most prominent nationalist intellectuals of the nineteenth century, British rule was a necessary period of tutelage that Indians had to undergo in order to prepare precisely for what the British denied but extolled as the end of all history: citizen-

ship and the nation state. Years later, in 1951, an “unknown” Indian who successfully sold his “obscurity” dedicated the story of his life thus:

To the memory of the
British Empire in India
Which conferred subjecthood on us
But withheld citizenship;
To which yet
Everyone of us threw out the challenge
“Civis Britannicus Sum”
Because
All that was good and living
Within us
Was made, shaped, and quickened
By the same British Rule.¹⁴

In nationalist versions of this narrative, as Partha Chatterjee has shown, it was the peasants and the workers, the subaltern classes, who were given to bear the cross of “inadequacy,” for, according to this version, it was they who needed to be educated out of their ignorance, parochialism, or, depending on your preference, false consciousness.¹⁵ Even today the Anglo-Indian word *communalism* refers to those who allegedly fail to measure up to the “secular” ideals of citizenship.

That British rule put in place the practices, institutions, and discourse of bourgeois individualism in the Indian soil is undeniable. Early expressions—that is, before the beginnings of nationalism—of this desire to be a “legal subject” make it clear that to Indians in the 1830s and 1840s to be a “modern individual” was to become a “European.” *The Literary Gleaner*, a magazine in colonial Calcutta, ran the following poem in 1842, written in English by a Bengali schoolboy eighteen years of age. The poem apparently was inspired by the sight of ships leaving the coast of Bengal “for the glorious shores of England”:

Oft like a sad bird I sigh
To leave this land, though mine own land it be;
Its green robed meads,—gay flowers and cloudless sky
Though passing fair, have but few charms for me.
For I have dreamed of climes more bright and free
Where virtue dwells and heaven-born liberty
Makes even the lowest happy;—where the eye
Doth sicken not to see man bend the knee
To sordid interest:—climes where science thrives,
And genius doth receive her guerdon meet;
Where man in his all his truest glory lives,
And nature’s face is exquisitely sweet:
For those fair climes I heave the impatient sigh,
There let me live and there let me die.¹⁶

In its echoes of Milton and seventeenth-century English radicalism, this is obviously a piece of colonial pastiche.¹⁷ Michael Madhusudan Dutt, the young Bengali author of this poem, eventually realized the impossibility of being “European” and returned to Bengali literature to become one of our finest poets. Later Indian nationalists, however, abandoned such abject desire to be “Europeans” themselves. Nationalist thought was premised precisely on the assumed universality of the project of becoming individuals, on the assumption that “individual rights” and abstract “equality” were universals that could find home anywhere in the world, that one could be both an “Indian” and a “citizen” at the same time. We shall soon explore some of the contradictions of this project.

Many of the public and private rituals of modern individualism became visible in India in the nineteenth century. One sees this, for instance, in the sudden flourishing in this period of the four basic genres that help express the modern self: the novel, the biography, the autobiography, and history.¹⁸ Along with these came modern industry, technology, medicine, a quasibourgeois (though colonial) legal system supported by a state that nationalism was to take over and make its own. The transition narrative that I have been discussing underwrote, and was in turn underpinned by, these institutions. To think this narrative was to think these institutions at the apex of which sat the modern state,¹⁹ and to think the modern or the nation state was to think a history whose theoretical subject was Europe. Gandhi realized this as early as 1909. Referring to the Indian nationalists’ demands for more railways, modern medicine, and bourgeois law, he cannily remarked in his book *Hind Swaraj* that this was to “make India English” or, as he put it, to have “English rule without the Englishman.”²⁰ This “Europe,” as Michael Madhusudan Dutt’s youthful and naive poetry shows, was of course nothing but a piece of fiction told to the colonized by the colonizer in the very process of fabricating colonial domination.²¹ Gandhi’s critique of this “Europe” is compromised on many points by his nationalism, and I do not intend to fetishize his text. But I find his gesture useful in developing the problematic of nonmetropolitan histories.

III

I shall now return to the themes of “failure,” “lack,” and “inadequacy” that so ubiquitously characterize the speaking subject of “Indian” history. As in the practice of the insurgent peasants of colonial India, the first step in a critical effort must arise from a gesture of inversion.²² Let us begin from where the transition narrative ends and read “plenitude” and “creativity” where this narrative has made us read “lack” and “inadequacy.”

According to the fable of their constitution, Indians today are all “citizens.”

The constitution embraces almost a classically liberal definition of citizenship. If the modern state and the modern individual, the citizen, are but the two inseparable sides of the same phenomenon, as William Connolly argues in *Political Theory and Modernity*, it would appear that the end of history is in sight for us in India.²³ This modern individual, however, whose political/public life is lived in citizenship, is also supposed to have an interiorized “private” self that pours out incessantly in diaries, letters, autobiographies, novels, and, of course, in what we say to our analysts. The bourgeois individual is not born until one discovers the pleasures of privacy. But this is a very special kind of “private”—it is, in fact, a deferred “public,” for this bourgeois private, as Jürgen Habermas has reminded us, is “always already oriented to an audience [*Publikum*].”²⁴

Indian public life may mimic on paper the bourgeois legal fiction of citizenship—the fiction is usually performed as a farce in India—but what about the bourgeois private and its history? Anyone who has tried to write “French” social history with Indian material would know how impossibly difficult the task is.²⁵ It is not that the form of the bourgeois private did not come with European rule. There have been, since the middle of the nineteenth century, Indian novels, diaries, letters, and autobiographies, but they seldom yield pictures of an endlessly interiorized subject. Our autobiographies are remarkably “public” (with constructions of public life that are not necessarily modern) when written by men, and they tell the story of the extended family when written by women.²⁶ In any case, autobiographies in the confessional mode are notable for their absence. The single paragraph (out of 963 pages) that Nirad Chaudhuri spends on describing the experience of his wedding night in the second volume of his celebrated and prize-winning autobiography is as good an example as any other and is worth quoting at some length. I should explain that this was an arranged marriage (Bengal, 1932), and Chaudhuri was anxious lest his wife should not appreciate his newly acquired but unaffordably expensive hobby of buying records of Western classical music. Our reading of Chaudhuri is handicapped in part by our lack of knowledge of the intertextuality of his prose—there may have been at work, for instance, an imbibed puritanical revulsion against revealing “too much.” Yet the passage remains a telling exercise in the construction of memory, for it is about what Chaudhuri “remembers” and “forgets” of his “first night’s experience.” He screens off intimacy with expressions like “I do not remember” or “I do not know how” (not to mention the very Freudian “making a clean breast of”), and this self-constructed veil is no doubt a part of the self that speaks:

I was terribly uneasy at the prospect of meeting as wife a girl who was a complete stranger to me, and when she was brought in . . . and left standing before me I had nothing to say. I saw only a very shy smile on her face, and timidly she came and sat by my side on the edge of the bed. I do not know how after that both of us drifted to the pillows, to lie down side by side. [Chaudhuri adds in a footnote: “Of course, fully dressed. We Hindus . . .

consider both extremes—fully clad and fully nude—to be modest, and everything in-between as grossly immodest. No decent man wants his wife to be an *allumeuse*.”] Then the first words were exchanged. She took up one of my arms, felt it and said: “You are so thin. I shall take good care of you.” I did not thank her, and I do not remember that beyond noting the words I even felt touched. The horrible suspense about European music had reawakened in my mind, and I decided to make a clean breast of it at once and look the sacrifice, if it was called for, straight in the face and begin romance on such terms as were offered to me. I asked her timidly after a while: “Have you listened to any European music?” She shook her head to say “No.” Nonetheless, I took another chance and this time asked: “Have you heard the name of a man called Beethoven?” She nodded and signified “Yes.” I was reassured, but not wholly satisfied. So I asked yet again: “Can you spell the name?” She said slowly: “B, E, E, T, H, O, V, E, N.” I felt very encouraged . . . and [we] dozed off.²⁷

The desire to be “modern” screams out of every sentence in the two volumes of Chaudhuri’s autobiography. His legendary name now stands for the cultural history of Indo-British encounter. Yet in the 1500-odd pages that he has written in English about his life, this is the only passage where the narrative of Chaudhuri’s participation in public life and literary circles is interrupted to make room for something approaching the intimate. How do we read this text, this self-making of an Indian male who was second to no one in his ardor for the public life of the citizen, yet who seldom, if ever, reproduced in writing the other side of the modern citizen, the interiorized private self unceasingly reaching out for an audience? Public without private? Yet another instance of the “incompleteness” of bourgeois transformation in India?

These questions are themselves prompted by the transition narrative that in turn situates the modern individual at the very end of history. I do not wish to confer on Chaudhuri’s autobiography a representativeness it may not have. Women’s writings, as I have already said, are different, and scholars have just begun to explore the world of autobiographies in Indian history. But if one result of European imperialism in India was to introduce the modern state and the idea of the nation with their attendant discourse of “citizenship,” which, by the very idea of “the citizen’s rights” (i.e., “the rule of law”), splits the figure of the modern individual into “public” and “private” parts of the self (as the young Marx once pointed out in his *On the Jewish Question*), these themes have existed—in contestation, alliance, and miscegenation—with other narratives of the self and community that do not look to the state/citizen bind as the ultimate construction of sociality.²⁸ This as such will not be disputed, but my point goes further. It is that these other constructions of self and community, while documentable in themselves, will never enjoy the privilege of providing the metanarratives or teleologies (assuming that there cannot be a narrative without at least an implicit teleology) of our histories. This is so partly because these narratives often themselves bespeak an antihistorical consciousness; that is, they entail subject positions

and configurations of memory that challenge and undermine the subject that speaks in the name of history. “History” is precisely the site where the struggle goes on to appropriate, on behalf of the modern (my hyperreal Europe), these other collocations of memory.

To illustrate these propositions, I will now discuss a fragment of this contested history in which the modern private and the modern individual were embroiled in colonial India.²⁹

IV

What I present here are the outlines, so to speak, of a chapter in the history of bourgeois domesticity in colonial Bengal. The material—in the main texts produced in Bengali between 1850 and 1920 for teaching women that very Victorian subject, “domestic science”—relates to the Bengali Hindu middle class, the *bhadralok* or “respectable people.” British rule instituted into Indian life the trichotomous ideational division on which modern political structures rest, e.g., the state, civil society, and the (bourgeois) family. It was therefore not surprising that ideas relating to bourgeois domesticity, privacy, and individuality should come to India via British rule. What I want to highlight here, however, through the example of the *bhadralok*, are certain cultural operations by which the “Indians” challenged and modified these received ideas in such a way as to put in question two fundamental tenets underlying the idea of “modernity”—the nuclear family based on companionate marriage and the secular, historical construction of time.

As Meredith Borthwick, Ghulam Murshid, and other scholars have shown, the eighteenth-century European idea of “civilization” culminated, in early nineteenth-century India, in a full-blown imperialist critique of Indian/Hindu domestic life, which was now held to be inferior to what became mid-Victorian ideals of bourgeois domesticity.³⁰ The “condition of women” question in nineteenth-century India was part of that critique, as were the ideas of the “modern” individual, “freedom,” “equality,” and “rights.” In passages remarkable for their combination of egalitarianism and orientalism, James Mill’s *The History of British India* (1817) joined together the thematic of the family/nation and a teleology of “freedom”:

The condition of women is one of the most remarkable circumstances in the manners of nations. . . . The history of uncultivated nations uniformly represents the women as in a state of abject slavery, from which they slowly emerge as civilisation advances. . . . As society refines upon its enjoyments . . . the condition of the weaker sex is gradually improved, till they associate on equal terms with the men, and occupy the place of voluntary and useful coadjutors. A state of dependence more strict and humiliating than that which is ordained for the weaker sex among the Hindus cannot be easily conceived.³¹

As is well known, the Indian middle classes generally felt answerable to this charge. From the early nineteenth-century onward a movement developed in Bengal (and other regions) to reform “women’s conditions” and to give them formal education. Much of this discourse on women’s education was emancipationist in that it spoke the language of “freedom,” “equality,” and “awakening,” and was strongly influenced by Ruskinian ideals and idealization of bourgeois domesticity.³² If one looks on this history as part of the history of the modern individual in India, an interesting feature emerges. It is that in this literature on women’s education certain terms, after all, were much more vigorously debated than others. There was, for example, a degree of consensus over the desirability of domestic “discipline” and “hygiene” as practices reflective of a state of modernity, but the word *freedom*, yet another important term in the rhetoric of the modern, hardly ever acted as the register of such a social consensus. It was a passionately disputed word, and we would be wrong to assume that the passions reflected a simple and straightforward battle of the sexes. The word was assimilated to the nationalist need to construct cultural boundaries that supposedly separated the “European” from the “Indian.” The dispute over this word was thus central to the discursive strategies through which a subject position was created enabling the “Indian” to speak. It is this subject position that I want to discuss here in some detail.

What the Bengali literature on women’s education played out was a battle between a nationalist construction of a cultural norm of the patriarchal, patrilocal, patrilineal, extended family and the ideal of the patriarchal, bourgeois nuclear family that was implicit in the European/imperialist/universalist discourse on the “freedoms” of individualism, citizenship, and civil society.³³ The themes of “discipline” and “order” were critical in shaping nationalist imaginings of aesthetics and power. “Discipline” was seen as the key to the power of the colonial (i.e., modern) state, but it required certain procedures for redefining the self. The British were powerful, it was argued, because they were disciplined, orderly, and punctual in every detail of their lives, and this was made possible by the education of “their” women who brought the virtues of discipline into the home. The “Indian” home, a colonial construct, now fared badly in nationalist writings on modern domesticity. To quote a Bengali text on women’s education from 1877:

The house of any civilised European is like the abode of gods. Every household object is clean, set in its proper place and decorated; nothing seems unclean or smells foul. . . . It is as if [the goddess of] order [*srinkhala*, “order, discipline”; *srinkhal*, “chains”] had become manifest to please the [human] eye. In the middle of the room would be a covered table with a bouquet of flowers on it, while around it would be [a few] chairs nicely arranged [with] everything sparkling clean. But enter a house in our country and you would feel as if you had been transported there by your destiny to make you atone for all the sins of your life. [A mass of] coudung torturing the senses . . . dust in the air, a growing heap of ashes, flies buzzing around . . . a little boy urinating into the ground and putting the mess back into his mouth. . . . The whole place is dominated by a stench that seems to be run-

ning free. . . . There is no order anywhere, the household objects are so unclean that they only evoke disgust.³⁴

This self-division of the colonial subject, the double movement of recognition by which it both knows its “present” as the site of disorder and yet moves away from this space in desiring a discipline that can only exist in an imagined but “historical” future, is a rehearsal, in the context of the discussion of the bourgeois domestic in colonial India, of the transition narrative we have encountered before. A historical construction of temporality (medieval/modern, separated by historical time), in other words, is precisely the axis along which the colonial subject splits itself. Or to put it differently, this split *is* what is history; writing history is performing this split over and over again.

The desire for order and discipline in the domestic sphere thus may be seen as having been a correlate of the nationalist, modernizing desire for a similar discipline in the public sphere, that is for a rule of law enforced by the state. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue this point further, but the connection between personal discipline and discipline in public life was to reveal itself in what the nationalists wrote about domestic hygiene and public health. The connection is recognizably modernist, and it is what the Indian modern shared with the European modern.³⁵ What I want to attend to, however, are the differences between the two. And this is where I turn to the other important aspect of the European modern, the rhetoric of “freedom” and “equality.”

The argument about “freedom”—in the texts under discussion—was waged around the question of the Victorian ideals of the companionate marriage, that is, over the question as to whether or not the wife should also be a friend to the husband. Nothing threatened the ideal of the Bengali/Indian extended family (or the exalted position of the mother-in-law within that structure) more than this idea, wrapped up in notions of bourgeois privacy, that the wife was also to be a friend or, to put it differently, that the woman was now to be a modern individual. I must mention here that the modern individual, who asserts his/her individuality over the claims of the joint or extended family, almost always appears in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Bengali literature as an embattled figure, often the subject of ridicule and scorn in the same Bengali fiction and essays that otherwise extolled the virtues of discipline and scientific rationality in personal and public lives. This irony had many expressions. The most well-known Bengali fictional character who represents this moral censure of modern individuality is Nimchand Datta in Dinabandhu Mitra’s play *Sadhabar ekadashi* (1866). Nimchand, who is English-educated, quotes Shakespeare, Milton, or Locke at the slightest opportunity and uses this education arrogantly to ignore his duties toward his extended family, finds his nemeses in alcohol and debauchery. This metonymic relationship between the love of “modern”/English education (which stood for the romantic individual in nineteenth-century Bengal) and the slippery path of

alcohol is suggested in the play by a conversation between Nimchand and a Bengali official of the colonial bureaucracy, a Deputy Magistrate. Nimchand's supercilious braggadocio about his command of the English language quickly and inevitably runs to the subject of drinks (synonymous, in middle-class Bengali culture of the period, with absolute decadence):

I read English, write English, speechify in English, think in English, dream in English—mind you, it's no child's play—now tell me, my good fellow, what would you like to drink?—Claret for ladies, sherry for men and brandy for heroes.³⁶

A similar connection between the modern, “free” individual and selfishness was made in the literature on women's education. The construction was undisguisedly nationalist (and patriarchal). *Freedom* was used to mark a difference between what was “Indian” and what was “European/English.” The ultra-free woman acted like a *memsahib* (European woman), selfish and shameless. As Kundamala Devi, a woman writing for a women's magazine *Bamabodhini patrika*, said in 1870: “Oh dear ones! If you have acquired real knowledge, then give no place in your heart to *memsahib*-like behaviour. This is not becoming in a Bengali housewife.”³⁷ The idea of “true modesty” was mobilized to build up this picture of the “really” Bengali woman.³⁸ Writing in 1920, Indira Devi dedicated her *Narir ukti* [A Woman Speaks]—interestingly enough, a defense of modern Bengali womanhood against criticisms by (predominantly) male writers—to generations of ideal Bengali women whom she thus described: “Unaffected by nature, of pleasant speech, untiring in their service [to others], oblivious of their own pleasures, [while] moved easily by the suffering of others, and capable of being content with very little.”³⁹

This model of the “modern” Bengali/Indian woman—educated enough to appreciate the modern regulations of the body and the state but yet “modest” enough to be unselfassertive and unselfish—was tied to the debates on “freedom.” “Freedom” in the West, several authors argued, meant *jathechhachar*, to do as one pleased, the right to self-indulgence. In India, it was said, *freedom* meant freedom from the ego, the capacity to serve and obey voluntarily. Notice how the terms *freedom* and *slavery* have changed positions in the following quote:

To be able to subordinate oneself to others and to *dharma* [duty/moral order/proper action] . . . to free the soul from the slavery of the senses, are the first tasks of human freedom. . . . That is why in Indian families boys and girls are subordinate to the parents, wife to the husband and to the parents-in-law, the disciple to the guru, the student to the teacher . . . the king to *dharma* . . . the people to the king, [and one's] dignity and prestige to [that of] the community [*samaj*].⁴⁰

There was an ironical twist to this theorizing that needs to be noted. Quite clearly, this theory of “freedom-in-obedience” did not apply to the domestic servants who were sometimes mentioned in this literature as examples of the “truly” unfree, the nationalist point being that (European) observers commenting on the unfree

status of Indian women often missed (so some nationalists argued) this crucial distinction between the housewife and the domestic. Obviously, the servants were not yet included in the India of the nationalist imagination.

Thus went the Bengali discourse on modern domesticity in a colonial period when the rise of a civil society and a quasimodern state had already inserted the modern questions of “public” and “private” into middle-class Bengali lives. The received bourgeois ideas about domesticity and connections between the domestic and the national were modified here in two significant ways. One strategy, as I have sought to demonstrate, was to contrapose the cultural norm of the patriarchal extended family to the bourgeois patriarchal ideals of the companionate marriage, to oppose the new patriarchy with a redefined version of the old one(s). Thus was fought the idea of the modern private. The other strategy, equally significant, was to mobilize, on behalf of the extended family, forms and figurations of collective memory that challenged, albeit ambiguously, the seemingly absolute separation of “sacred” and “secular” time on which the very modern (“European”) idea of history was/is based.⁴¹ The figure of the “truly educated,” “truly modest,” and “truly Indian” woman is invested, in this discussion of women’s education, with a sacred authority by subordinating the question of domestic life to religious ideas of female auspiciousness that joined the heavenly with the mundane in a conceptualization of time that could be only antihistorical. The truly modern housewife, it was said, would be so auspicious as to mark the eternal return of the cosmic principle embodied in the goddess Lakshmi, the goddess of domestic well-being by whose grace the extended family (and clan, and hence, by extending the sentiment, the nation, *Bharatlakshmi*) lived and prospered. Thus we read in a contemporary pamphlet: “Women are the Lakshmis of the community. If they undertake to improve themselves in the sphere of *dharma* and knowledge . . . there will be an automatic improvement in [the quality of] social life.”⁴² Lakshmi, regarded as the Hindu god Vishnu’s wife by about A.D. 400, has for long been held up in popular Hinduism, and in the everyday pantheism of Hindu families, as the model of the Hindu wife, united in complete harmony with her husband (and his family) through willful submission, loyalty, devotion, and chastity.⁴³ When women did not follow her ideals, it was said, the (extended) family and the family line were destroyed by the spirit of Alakshmi (not-Lakshmi), the dark and malevolent reverse of the Lakshmi principle. While women’s education and the idea of discipline as such were seldom opposed in this discourse regarding the modern individual in colonial Bengal, the line was drawn at the point where modernity and the demand for bourgeois privacy threatened the power and the pleasures of the extended family.

There is no question that the speaking subject here is nationalist and patriarchal, employing the clichéd orientalist categories, “the East” and “the West.”⁴⁴ However, of importance to us are the two denials on which this particular moment of subjectivity rests: the denial, or at least contestation, of the bourgeois

private and, equally important, the denial of historical time by making the family a site where the sacred and the secular blended in a perpetual reenactment of a principle that was heavenly and divine.

The cultural space the antihistorical invoked was by no means harmonious or nonconflictual, though nationalist thought of necessity tried to portray it to be so. The antihistorical norms of the patriarchal extended family, for example, could only have had a contested existence, contested both by women's struggles and by those of the subaltern classes. But these struggles did not necessarily follow any lines that would allow us to construct emancipatory narratives by putting the "patriarchals" clearly on one side and the "liberals" on the other. The history of modern "Indian" individuality is caught up in too many contradictions to lend itself to such a treatment.

I do not have the space here to develop the point, so I will make do with one example. It comes from the autobiography of Ramabai Ranade, the wife of the famous nineteenth-century social reformer from the Bombay Presidency, M. G. Ranade. Ramabai Ranade's struggle for self-respect was in part against the "old" patriarchal order of the extended family and for the "new" patriarchy of companionate marriage, which her reform-minded husband saw as the most civilized form of the conjugal bond. In pursuit of this ideal, Ramabai began to share her husband's commitment to public life and would often take part (in the 1880s) in public gatherings and deliberations of male and female social reformers. As she herself says: "It was at these meetings that I learnt what a meeting was and how one should conduct oneself at one."⁴⁵ Interestingly, however, one of the chief sources of opposition to Ramabai's efforts were (apart from men) the other women in the family. There is of course no doubt that they, her mother-in-law and her husband's sisters, spoke for the old patriarchal extended family. But it is quite instructive to listen to their voices (as they come across through Ramabai's text), for they also spoke for their own sense of self-respect and their own forms of struggle against men:

You should not really go to these meetings [they said to Ramabai]. . . . Even if the men want you to do these things, you should ignore them. You need not say no; but after all, you need not do it. They will then give up, out of sheer boredom. . . . You are outdoing even the European women.

Or this:

It is she [Ramabai] herself who loves this frivolousness of going to meetings. Dada [Mr. Ranade] is not at all so keen about it. But should she not have some sense of proportion of how much the women should actually do? If men tell you to do a hundred things, women should take up ten at the most. After all men do not understand these practical things! . . . The good woman [in the past] never turned frivolous like this. . . . That is why this large family . . . could live together in a respectable way. . . . But now it is all so different! If Dada suggests one thing, this woman is prepared to do three. How can we live with any sense of self-respect then and how can we endure all this? (84–85)

These voices, combining the contradictory themes of nationalism, of patriarchal clan-based ideology, of women's struggles against men, and opposed at the same time to friendship between husbands and wives, remind us of the deep ambivalences that marked the trajectory of the modern private and bourgeois individuality in colonial India. Yet historians manage, by maneuvers reminiscent of the old "dialectical" card trick called "negation of negation," to deny a subject position to this voice of ambivalence. The evidence of what I have called "the denial of the bourgeois private and of the historical subject" is acknowledged but subordinated in their accounts to the supposedly higher purpose of making Indian history look like yet another episode in the universal and (in their view, the ultimately victorious) march of citizenship, of the nation state, of themes of human emancipation spelled out in the course of the European Enlightenment and after. It is the figure of the citizen that speaks through these histories. And so long as that happens, my hyperreal Europe will continually return to dominate the stories we tell. "The modern" will then continue to be understood, as Meaghan Morris has so aptly put it in discussing her own Australian context, "as a *known history*, something which has *already happened elsewhere*, and which is to be reproduced, mechanically or otherwise, with a local content." This can only leave us with a task of reproducing what Morris calls "the project of positive unoriginality."⁴⁶

V

Yet the "originality"—I concede that this is a bad term—of the idioms through which struggles have been conducted in the Indian subcontinent has often been in the sphere of the nonmodern. One does not have to subscribe to the ideology of clannish patriarchy, for instance, to acknowledge that the metaphor of the sanctified and patriarchal extended family was one of the most important elements in the cultural politics of Indian nationalism. In the struggle against British rule, it was frequently the use of this idiom—in songs, poetry, and other forms of nationalist mobilization—that allowed "Indians" to fabricate a sense of community and to retrieve for themselves a subject position from which to address the British. I will illustrate this with an example from the life of Gandhi, "the father of the nation," to highlight the political importance of this cultural move on the part of the "Indian."

My example refers to the year 1946. There had been ghastly riots between the Hindus and the Muslims in Calcutta over the impending partition of the country into India and Pakistan. Gandhi was in the city, fasting in protest over the behavior of his own people. And here is how an Indian intellectual recalls the experience:

Who Speaks for "Indian" Pasts?

17

Men would come back from their offices in the evening and find food prepared by the family [meaning the womenfolk] ready for them; but soon it would be revealed that the women of the home had not eaten the whole day. They [apparently] had not felt hungry. Pressed further, the wife or the mother would admit that they could not understand how they could go on [eating] when Gandhiji was dying for their own crimes. Restaurants and amusement centres did little business; some of them were voluntarily closed by the proprietors. . . . The nerve of feeling had been restored; the pain began to be felt. . . . Gandhiji knew when to start the redemptive process.⁴⁷

We do not have to take this description literally, but the nature of the community imagined in these lines is clear. It blends, in Gayatri Spivak's words, "the feeling of community that belongs to national links and political organizations" with "that other feeling of community whose structural model is the [clan or the extended] family."⁴⁸ Colonial Indian history is replete with instances where Indians arrogated subjecthood to themselves precisely by mobilizing, within the context of "modern" institutions and sometimes on behalf of the modernizing project of nationalism, devices of collective memory that were both antihistorical and antimodern.⁴⁹ This is not to deny the capacity of "Indians" to act as subjects endowed with what we in the universities would recognize as "a sense of history" (what Peter Burke calls "the renaissance of the past") but to insist at the same time that there were also contrary trends, that in the multifarious struggles that took place in colonial India, antihistorical constructions of the past often provided very powerful forms of collective memory.⁵⁰

There is then this double bind through which the subject of "Indian" history articulates itself. On the one hand, it is both the subject and the object of modernity, because it stands for an assumed unity called the "Indian people" that is always split into two—a modernizing elite and a yet-to-be-modernized peasantry. As such a split subject, however, it speaks from within a metanarrative that celebrates the nation state; and of this metanarrative the theoretical subject can only be a hyperreal "Europe," a "Europe" constructed by the tales that both imperialism and nationalism have told the colonized. The mode of self-representation that the "Indian" can adopt here is what Homi Bhabha has justly called "mimetic."⁵¹ Indian history, even in the most dedicated socialist or nationalist hands, remains a mimicry of a certain "modern" subject of "European" history and is bound to represent a sad figure of lack and failure. The transition narrative will always remain "grievously incomplete."

On the other hand, maneuvers are made within the space of the mimetic—and therefore within the project called "Indian" history—to represent the "difference" and the "originality" of the "Indian," and it is in this cause that the antihistorical devices of memory and the antihistorical "histories" of the subaltern classes are appropriated. Thus peasant/worker constructions of "mythical" kingdoms and "mythical" pasts/futures find a place in texts designated "Indian" history precisely through a procedure that subordinates these narratives to the rules

of evidence and to the secular, linear calendar that the writing of “history” must follow. The antihistorical, antimodern subject, therefore, cannot speak itself as “theory” within the knowledge procedures of the university even when these knowledge procedures acknowledge and “document” its existence. Much like Spivak’s “subaltern” (or the anthropologist’s peasant who can only have a quoted existence in a larger statement that belongs to the anthropologist alone), this subject can only be spoken for and spoken of by the transition narrative that will always ultimately privilege the modern (i.e., “Europe”).⁵²

So long as one operates within the discourse of “history” produced at the institutional site of the university, it is not possible simply to walk out of the deep collusion between “history” and the modernizing narrative(s) of citizenship, bourgeois public and private, and the nation state. “History” as a knowledge system is firmly embedded in institutional practices that invoke the nation state at every step—witness the organization and politics of teaching, recruitment, promotions, and publication in history departments, politics that survive the occasional brave and heroic attempts by individual historians to liberate “history” from the meta-narrative of the nation state. One only has to ask, for instance: Why is history a compulsory part of education of the modern person in all countries today including those that did quite comfortably without it until as late as the eighteenth century? Why should children all over the world today have to come to terms with a subject called “history” when we know that this compulsion is neither natural nor ancient?⁵³ It does not take much imagination to see that the reason for this lies in what European imperialism and third-world nationalisms have achieved together: the universalization of the nation state as the most desirable form of political community. Nation states have the capacity to enforce their truth games, and universities, their critical distance notwithstanding, are part of the battery of institutions complicit in this process. “Economics” and “history” are the knowledge forms that correspond to the two major institutions that the rise (and later universalization) of the bourgeois order has given to the world—the capitalist mode of production and the nation state (“history” speaking to the figure of the citizen).⁵⁴ A critical historian has no choice but to negotiate this knowledge. She or he therefore needs to understand the state on its own terms, i.e., in terms of its self-justificatory narratives of citizenship and modernity. Since these themes will always take us back to the universalist propositions of “modern” (European) political philosophy—even the “practical” science of economics that now seems “natural” to our constructions of world systems is (theoretically) rooted in the ideas of ethics in eighteenth-century Europe⁵⁵—a third-world historian is condemned to knowing “Europe” as the original home of the “modern,” whereas the “European” historian does not share a comparable predicament with regard to the pasts of the majority of humankind. Thus follows the everyday subalternity of non-Western histories with which I began this paper.

Yet the understanding that “we” all do “European” history with our different

and often non-European archives opens up the possibility of a politics and project of alliance between the dominant metropolitan histories and the subaltern peripheral pasts. Let us call this the project of provincializing “Europe,” the “Europe” that modern imperialism and (third-world) nationalism have, by their collaborative venture and violence, made universal. Philosophically, this project must ground itself in a radical critique and transcendence of liberalism (i.e., of the bureaucratic constructions of citizenship, modern state, and bourgeois privacy that classical political philosophy has produced), a ground that late Marx shares with certain moments in both poststructuralist thought and feminist philosophy. In particular, I am emboldened by Carole Pateman’s courageous declaration—in her remarkable book *The Sexual Contract*—that the very conception of the modern individual belongs to patriarchal categories of thought.⁵⁶

VI

The project of provincializing “Europe” refers to a history that does not yet exist; I can therefore only speak of it in a programmatic manner. To forestall misunderstanding, however, I must spell out what it is *not* while outlining what it could be.

To begin with, it does not call for a simplistic, out-of-hand rejection of modernity, liberal values, universals, science, reason, grand narratives, totalizing explanations, and so on. Fredric Jameson has recently reminded us that the easy equation often made between “a philosophical conception of totality” and “a political practice of totalitarianism” is “baleful.”⁵⁷ What intervenes between the two is history—contradictory, plural, and heterogeneous struggles whose outcomes are never predictable, even retrospectively, in accordance with schemas that seek to naturalize and domesticate this heterogeneity. These struggles include coercion (both on behalf of and against modernity)—physical, institutional, and symbolic violence, often dispensed with dreamy-eyed idealism—and it is this violence that plays a decisive role in the establishment of meaning, in the creation of truth regimes, in deciding, as it were, whose and which “universal” wins. As intellectuals operating in academia, we are not neutral to these struggles and cannot pretend to situate ourselves outside of the knowledge procedures of our institutions.

The project of provincializing “Europe” therefore cannot be a project of “cultural relativism.” It cannot originate from the stance that the reason/science/universals which help define Europe as the modern are simply “culture-specific” and therefore only belong to the European cultures. For the point is not that Enlightenment rationalism is always unreasonable in itself but rather a matter of documenting how—through what historical process—its “reason,” which was not always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look “obvious” far beyond the ground where it originated. If a language, as has been said, is but a dialect backed

up by an army, the same could be said of the narratives of “modernity” that, almost universally today, point to a certain “Europe” as the primary habitus of the modern.

This Europe, like “the West,” is demonstrably an imaginary entity, but the demonstration as such does not lessen its appeal or power. The project of provincializing “Europe” has to include certain other additional moves: 1) the recognition that Europe’s acquisition of the adjective *modern* for itself is a piece of global history of which an integral part is the story of European imperialism; and 2) the understanding that this equating of a certain version of Europe with “modernity” is not the work of Europeans alone; third-world nationalisms, as modernizing ideologies *par excellence*, have been equal partners in the process. I do not mean to overlook the anti-imperial moments in the careers of these nationalisms; I only underscore the point that the project of provincializing “Europe” cannot be a nationalist, nativist, or atavistic project. In unraveling the necessary entanglement of history—a disciplined and institutionally regulated form of collective memory—with the grand narratives of “rights,” “citizenship,” the nation state, “public” and “private” spheres, one cannot but problematize “India” at the same time as one dismantles “Europe.”

The idea is to write into the history of modernity the ambivalences, contradictions, the use of force, and the tragedies and the ironies that attend it. That the rhetoric and the claims of (bourgeois) equality, of citizens’ rights, of self-determination through a sovereign nation state have in many circumstances empowered marginal social groups in their struggles is undeniable—this recognition is indispensable to the project of *Subaltern Studies*. What effectively is played down, however, in histories that either implicitly or explicitly celebrate the advent of the modern state and the idea of citizenship is the repression and violence that are as instrumental in the victory of the modern as is the persuasive power of its rhetorical strategies. Nowhere is this irony—the undemocratic foundations of “democracy”—more visible than in the history of modern medicine, public health, and personal hygiene, the discourses of which have been central in locating the body of the modern at the intersection of the public and the private (as defined by, and subject to negotiations with, the state). The triumph of this discourse, however, has always been dependent on the mobilization, on its behalf, of effective means of physical coercion. I say “always” because this coercion is both originary/foundational (i.e., historic) as well as pandemic and quotidian. Of foundational violence, David Arnold gives a good example in a recent essay on the history of the prison in India. The coercion of the colonial prison, Arnold shows, was integral to some of the earliest and pioneering research on the medical, dietary, and demographic statistics of India, for the prison was where Indian bodies were accessible to modernizing investigators.⁵⁸ Of the coercion that continues in the names of the nation and modernity, a recent example comes from the Indian campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s. Two American doctors

(one of them presumably of “Indian” origin) who participated in the process thus describe their operations in a village of the Ho tribe in the Indian state of Bihar:

In the middle of gentle Indian night, an intruder burst through the bamboo door of the simple adobe hut. He was a government vaccinator, under orders to break resistance against smallpox vaccination. Lakshmi Singh awoke screaming and scrambled to hide herself. Her husband leaped out of bed, grabbed an axe, and chased the intruder into the courtyard. Outside a squad of doctors and policemen quickly overpowered Mohan Singh. The instant he was pinned to the ground, a second vaccinator jabbed smallpox vaccine into his arm. Mohan Singh, a wiry 40-year-old leader of the Ho tribe, squirmed away from the needle, causing the vaccination site to bleed. The government team held him until they had injected enough vaccine. . . . While the two policemen rebuffed him, the rest of the team overpowered the entire family and vaccinated each in turn. Lakshmi Singh bit deep into one doctor’s hand, but to no avail.⁵⁹

There is no escaping the idealism that accompanies this violence. The subtitle of the article in question unselfconsciously reproduces both the military and the do-gooding instincts of the enterprise. It reads: “How an army of samaritans drove smallpox from the earth.”

Histories that aim to displace a hyperreal Europe from the center toward which all historical imagination currently gravitates will have to seek out relentlessly this connection between violence and idealism that lies at the heart of the process by which the narratives of citizenship and modernity come to find a natural home in “history.” I register a fundamental disagreement here with a position taken by Richard Rorty in an exchange with Jürgen Habermas. Rorty criticizes Habermas for the latter’s conviction “that the story of modern philosophy is an important part of the story of the democratic societies’ attempts at self-reassurance.”⁶⁰ Rorty’s statement follows the practice of many Europeanists who speak of the histories of these “democratic societies” as if these were self-contained histories complete in themselves, as if the self-fashioning of the West were something that occurred only within its self-assigned geographical boundaries. At the very least Rorty ignores the role that the “colonial theater” (both external and internal)—where the theme of “freedom” as defined by modern political philosophy was constantly invoked in aid of the ideas of “civilization,” “progress,” and latterly “development”—played in the process of engendering this “reassurance.” The task, as I see it, will be to wrestle ideas that legitimize the modern state and its attendant institutions, in order to return to political philosophy—in the same way as suspect coins returned to their owners in an Indian bazaar—its categories whose global currency can no longer be taken for granted.⁶¹

And, finally—since “Europe” cannot after all be provincialized within the institutional site of the university whose knowledge protocols will always take us back to the terrain where all contours follow that of my hyperreal Europe—the project of provincializing Europe must realize within itself its own impossibility.

It therefore looks to a history that embodies this politics of despair. It will have been clear by now that this is not a call for cultural relativism or for atavistic, nativist histories. Nor is this a program for a simple rejection of modernity, which would be, in many situations, politically suicidal. I ask for a history that deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of citizenships in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of human solidarity. The politics of despair will require of such history that it lays bare to its readers the reasons why such a predicament is necessarily inescapable. This is a history that will attempt the impossible: to look toward its own death by tracing that which resists and escapes the best human effort at translation across cultural and other semiotic systems, so that the world may once again be imagined as radically heterogeneous. This, as I have said, is impossible within the knowledge protocols of academic history, for the globality of academia is not independent of the globality that the European modern has created. To attempt to provincialize this “Europe” is to see the modern as inevitably contested, to write over the given and privileged narratives of citizenship other narratives of human connections that draw sustenance from dreamed-up pasts and futures where collectivities are defined neither by the rituals of citizenship nor by the nightmare of “tradition” that “modernity” creates. There are of course no (infra)structural sites where such dreams could lodge themselves. Yet they will recur so long as the themes of citizenship and the nation state dominate our narratives of historical transition, for these dreams are what the modern represses in order to be.

Notes

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1. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988); Ronald Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India,” *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 445.
2. I am indebted to Jean Baudrillard for the term *hyperreal* (see his *Simulations* [New York, 1983]), but my use differs from his.
3. Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (London, 1989), 65.

4. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill., 1970), 281–85. See also Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (New York, 1988), 167–68.
5. See the discussion in Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicholas (Harmondsworth, Eng., 1973), 469–512; and in Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1971), 3:593–613.
6. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal, 1890–1940* (Princeton, N.J., 1989), chap. 7.
7. Marx, *Capital*, 1:60.
8. Marx, *Grundrisse*, 105.
9. See Chakrabarty, *Rethinking Working-Class History*, chap. 7, in particular.
10. Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947* (Delhi, 1985), 1.
11. Guha and Spivak, *Selected Subaltern Studies*, 43. The words quoted here are Guha's. But I think they represent a sense of historiographical responsibility that is shared by all the members of the Subaltern Studies collective.
12. Alexander Dow, *History of Hindostan*, 3 vols. (London, 1812–16), dedication, vol. 1.
13. See L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, 1964), 26–27.
14. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (New York, 1989), dedication page.
15. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, 1986).
16. *Mudhusudan rachanabali* [Bengali] (Calcutta, 1965), 449. See also Jogindranath Basu, *Michael Madhusudan Datter jibancharit* [Bengali] (Calcutta, 1978), 86.
17. My understanding of this poem has been enriched by discussions with Marjorie Levinson and David Bennett.
18. I am not making the claim that all of these genres necessarily emerge with bourgeois individualism. See Natalie Zemon Davis, "Fame and Secrecy: Leon Modena's *Life* as an Early Modern Autobiography," *History and Theory* 27 (1988): 103–18; and Davis, "Boundaries and Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France," in Thomas C. Heller et al., eds., *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford, Calif., 1986), 53–63. See also Philippe Lejeune, *On Autobiography*, trans. Katherine Leary (Minneapolis, 1989), 163–84.
19. See the chapter on Nehru in Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*.
20. M. K. Gandhi, *Hind swaraj* (1909), in *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 10 (Ahmedabad, 1963), 15.
21. See the discussion in Gauri Visvanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Studies and British Rule in India* (London, 1989), 128–41, *passim*.
22. Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (New Delhi, 1983), chap. 2.
23. William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Oxford, 1989). See also David Bennett, "Postmodernism and Vision: Ways of Seeing (at) the End of History" (forthcoming).
24. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 49.
25. See Sumit Sarkar, "Social History: Predicament and Possibilities," in Iqbal Khan, ed., *Fresh Perspective on India and Pakistan: Essays on Economics, Politics, and Culture* (Oxford, 1985), 256–74.
26. For reasons of space, I shall leave this claim here unsubstantiated, though I hope to have an opportunity to discuss it in detail elsewhere. I should qualify the statement by

mentioning that in the main it refers to autobiographies published between 1850 and 1910. Once women join the public sphere in the twentieth century, their self-fashioning takes on different dimensions.

27. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *Thy Hand, Great Anarch!: India, 1921–1952* (London, 1987), 350–51.
28. See Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, in *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth, Eng., 1975), 215–22.
29. For a more detailed treatment of what follows, see my paper “Colonial Rule and the Domestic Order,” to be published in David Arnold and David Hardiman, eds., *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 8.
30. Meredith Borthwick, *The Changing Role of Women in Bengal, 1849–1905* (Princeton, N.J., 1984); Ghulam Murshid, *Reluctant Debutante: Response of Bengali Women to Modernisation, 1849–1905* (Rajshahi, 1983). On the history of the word *civilization*, see Lucien Febvre, “*Civilisation: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas*,” in Peter Burke, ed., *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, trans. K. Folca (London, 1973), 219–57. I owe this reference to Peter Sahlins.
31. James Mill, *The History of British India*, vol. 1, ed. H. H. Wilson (London, 1840), 309–10.
32. Borthwick, *Changing Role*.
33. The classic text where this assumption has been worked up into philosophy is of course Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1967), 110–22. See also Joanna Hodge, “Women and the Hegelian State,” in Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus, eds., *Women in Western Philosophy* (Brighton, Eng., 1987), 127–58; Simon During, “Rousseau’s Heirs: Primitivism, Romance, and Other Relations Between the Modern and the Nonmodern” (forthcoming); Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988); Mary Ryan, *Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880* (Baltimore, 1990).
34. Anon., *Streetsiksha*, vol. 1 (Calcutta, 1877), 28–29.
35. I develop this argument further in Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Open Space/Public Place: Garbage, Modernity, and India,” *South Asia* (forthcoming).
36. *Dinabandhu racanabali*, ed. Kshetra Gupta (Calcutta, 1981), 138.
37. Borthwick, *Changing Role*, 105.
38. I discuss this in more detail in Chakrabarty, “Colonial Rule.”
39. Indira Devi, *Narir ukti* (Calcutta, 1920), dedication page.
40. Deenanath Bandyopadhyaya, *Nanabishayak prabandha* (Calcutta, 1887), 30–31. For a genealogy of the terms *slavery* and *freedom* as used in the colonial discourse of British India, see Gyan Prakash, *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India* (Cambridge, 1990).
41. Peter Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (London, 1970).
42. Bikshuk [Chandrasekhar Sen], *Ki holo!* (Calcutta, 1876), 77.
43. David Kinsley, *Hindu Goddesses: Visions of the Divine Feminine in the Hindu Religious Tradition* (Berkeley, 1988), 19–31; Manomohan Basu, *Hindu acar byabahar* (Calcutta, 1873), 60; H. D. Bhattacharya, “Minor Religious Sects,” in R. C. Majumdar, ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People: The Age of Imperial Unity*, vol. 2 (Bombay, 1951), 469–71; Upendranath Dhal, *Goddess Lakshmi: Origin and Development* (Delhi, 1978). The expression *everyday pantheism* was suggested to me by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (personal communication).
44. See the chapter on Bankim in Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*.
45. *Ranade: His Wife’s Reminiscences*, trans. Kusumavati Deshpande (Delhi, 1963), 77.

46. Meaghan Morris, "Metamorphoses at Sydney Tower," *New Formations* 11 (Summer 1990): 10.
47. Amiya Chakravarty, quoted in Bhikhu Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Discourse* (London, 1989), 163.
48. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana, Ill., 1988), 277.
49. See *Subaltern Studies*, vols. 1–7 (Delhi, 1982–91); and Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi, 1983).
50. *Subaltern Studies*, vols. 1–7, and Guha, *Elementary Aspects*.
51. Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," in Annette Michelson et al., eds., *October: The First Decade, 1976–1986* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 317–26; also Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990).
52. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Also see Spivak's interview published in *Socialist Review* 20, no. 3 (July–September 1990): 81–98.
53. On the close connection between imperialist ideologies and the teaching of history in colonial India, see Ranajit Guha, *An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth-Century Agenda and Its Implications* (Calcutta, 1988).
54. Without in any way implicating them in the entirety of this argument, I may mention that there are parallels here between my statement and what Gyan Prakash and Nicholas Dirks have argued elsewhere. See Gyan Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 2 (April 1990): 383–408; Nicholas B. Dirks, "History as a Sign of the Modern," *Public Culture* 2, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 25–33.
55. See Amartya Kumar Sen, *Of Ethics and Economics* (Oxford, 1987). Tessa Morris-Suzuki's *A History of Japanese Economic Thought* (London, 1989) makes interesting reading in this regard. I am grateful to Gavan McCormack for bringing this book to my attention.
56. Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, Calif., 1988), 184.
57. Fredric Jameson, "Cognitive Mapping," in Nelson and Grossberg, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, 354.
58. David Arnold, "The Colonial Prison: Power, Knowledge, and Penology in Nineteenth-Century India," in Arnold and Hardiman, *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 8. I have discussed some of these issues in a Bengali article: Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Sarir, samaj, o rashtra: Oupanibeshik bharate mahamari o janasangskriti," *Anustup*, 1988.
59. Lawrence Brilliant with Girija Brilliant, "Death for a Killer Disease," *Quest*, May/June 1978, 3. I owe this reference to Paul Greenough.
60. Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," in Richard J. Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 169.
61. For an interesting and revisionist reading of Hegel in this regard, see the exchange between Charles Taylor and Partha Chatterjee in *Public Culture* 3, no. 1 (1990). My book *Rethinking Working-Class History* attempts a small beginning in this direction.