

Market Clearing Project

220 marks

Consider the following simple system (the base power is 1 MW):




Figure 1: Case 2 - Network Constrained System

The generation offers are as follows:

Table 1: Generation Offers

Hour 1	Unit 1				Unit 2			
Block	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Energy (puMWh)	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Price (\$/puMWh)	11.8	12.6	13.5	14.0	10.1	11.2	12.3	13.0
Hour 2	Unit 1				Unit 2			
Energy (puMWh)	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Price (\$/puMWh)	11.8	12.6	13.5	14.0	10.1	11.2	12.3	13.0

The demand bids are also as follows:

Table 2: Demand Bids

Hour 1	Demand 1				Demand 2			
Block	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1
Price (\$/puMWh)	16.2	14.6	12.1	10.0	16.1	14.2	12.5	11.0
Hour 2	Demand 1				Demand 2			
Energy (puMWh)	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.1
Price (\$/puMWh)	16.2	14.6	12.1	10.0	16.1	14.2	12.5	11.0

Report Tasks:

- (a) Write a detailed, specific formulation for an optimal social welfare maximization problem for this system. Ignore the network in this part. Clearly name and specify your variables and parameters. Label all your equations and describe what each equation does. (30 marks)

- **Producers** that own generating units and produce electrical energy.
- **Consumers** that consume electrical energy.

Here, in the question, two generating units given and two power consumers are given.

<i>Consumer Surplus is a measure of the happiness of the consumers as it is equal to the difference between the amount that the consumers are willing to pay (energy times bid price) and the actual consumers' payment (energy times market clearing price).</i>	<i>Producer Surplus represents the happiness of the producers as it is equal to the difference between the actual producers' revenue (energy times market clearing price) and the revenue that producers are willing to accept (energy times offer price).</i>
<i>Considering the market as whole, the social welfare is a measure of happiness of both consumers and producers and equals consumer surplus plus producer surplus.</i>	

Formulation

In order to clear the market, the market operator seeks to maximize the social welfare, which is the sum of producer surplus and the consumer surplus.

This problem can be formulated as:

$$\max_{p_{tdc}^D, \forall t, \forall d, \forall c; p_{tgb}^G, \forall t, \forall g, \forall b}$$

$$\sum_t \left[\sum_d \sum_{c \in \Psi_d^D} \lambda_{tdc}^D p_{tdc}^D - \sum_g \sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} \lambda_{tgb}^G p_{tgb}^G \right] \quad (1a)$$

Subject to

$$0 \leq p_{tdc}^D \leq P_{tdc}^{Dmax}, \quad \forall t, \forall d, \forall c \in \Psi_d^D, \quad (1b)$$

$$0 \leq p_{tgb}^G \leq P_{tgb}^{Gmax}, \quad \forall t, \forall g, \forall b \in \Psi_g^G, \quad (1c)$$

$$\sum_g \sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} p_{tgb}^G - \sum_d \sum_{c \in \Psi_d^D} p_{tdc}^D = 0, \quad \forall t \quad (1d)$$

The objective function (1) represent the social welfare to be maximized by the market operator.

Constraints (1b) are bid bounds on the consumption energy of all demands, constraints (1c) are offer bounds on the production energy of all generating units, and constraint (1d) represents the energy balance.

where,

The indexes of the market clearing auctions are:

b production blocks,

c consumption blocks,
 d demands,
 g generating units, and
 t time periods.

Optimization variables:

p_{tdc}^D consumption block c bid by demand d at time period t (in $puMWh$)
 p_{tgb}^G production block b offered by generating unit g at time period t (in $puMWh$)
 δ_{tn} voltage angle at node n at time period t (in $purad$)

Constants:

B_{nm} susceptance of transmission line nm ,
 p_{tdc}^{Dmax} , size of consumption block c bid by demand d at time period t , (in $puMWh$)
 p_{tgb}^{Gmax} , size of production block b offered by unit g at time period t , (in $puMWh$)
 p_{nm}^{lmax} , transmission capacity of line nm , (in $puMW$)
 λ_{tdc}^D consumption bid price of block c of demand d at period t , and (in $\$/puMWh$)
 λ_{tgb}^G production offer price of block b of unit g at period t (in $\$/puMWh$).

Sets:

Λ_n set of nodes directly connected to node n
 Ω_n^D set of demands located at node n
 Ω_n^G set of generating units located at node n
 Ψ_g^G set of production blocks of generating unit g
 Ψ_d^D set of consumption blocks of demand d

We denote as λ^* the optimal value of the dual variable associated with the energy balance constraint.

This dual variable is the market clearing price, which is the price paid to power producers for providing electrical energy and the price paid by power consumers for consuming electrical energy.

The profit of each generating unit can be computed as follows:

$$\pi_g = \sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} (\lambda_t^* - C_{tgb}^G) p_{tgb}^{G*}, \quad \forall g, \forall t \quad (1e)$$

This equation includes two terms, namely:

$\sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} (\lambda_t^* p_{tgb}^{G*})$	The following term represents the revenues achieved by unit g in t period
$\sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} (C_{tgb}^G p_{tgb}^{G*})$	The above term represents the costs incurred by unit g in t period

where, π_g profit of the producer that owns generating unit g (in $\$$)

C_{gb}^G cost of production block b of generating unit g (in $\$/puMWh$)

p_{gb}^{G*} optimal value of variable p_{gb}^G obtained for the given problem (in $puMWh$)

Formulating the given problem as below.

Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Price (\$/puMWh)	11.8	12.6	13.5	14.0	10.1	11.2	12.3	13.0	11.8	12.6	13.5	14.0	10.1	11.2	12.3	13.0

Table 1: Generation offers for two-hour time period

Bid	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.1
Price (\$/puMWh)	16.2	14.6	12.1	10.0	16.1	14.2	12.5	11.0	16.2	14.6	12.1	10.0	16.1	14.2	12.5	11.0

Table 2: Consumption Bids for two-hour time period

From the equation number (1a), Our objective function to be maximized is given as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_{p_{tdc}^D, \forall t, \forall d, \forall c; p_{tgb}^G, \forall t, \forall g, \forall b} & \\
 = & 16.2 * p_{111}^D + 14.6 * p_{112}^D + 12.1 * p_{113}^D + 10 * p_{114}^D \\
 & + 16.1 * p_{121}^D + 14.2 * p_{122}^D + 12.5 * p_{123}^D + 11 * p_{124}^D \\
 & + 16.2 * p_{211}^D + 14.6 * p_{212}^D + 12.1 * p_{213}^D + 10 * p_{214}^D \\
 & + 16.1 * p_{221}^D + 14.2 * p_{222}^D + 12.5 * p_{223}^D + 11 * p_{224}^D \\
 & - (11.8 * p_{111}^G + 12.6 * p_{112}^G + 13.5 * p_{113}^G + 14 * p_{114}^G) \\
 & - (10.1 * p_{121}^G + 11.2 * p_{122}^G + 12.3 * p_{123}^G + 13 * p_{124}^G) \\
 & - (11.8 * p_{211}^G + 12.6 * p_{212}^G + 13.5 * p_{213}^G + 14 * p_{214}^G) \\
 & - (10.1 * p_{221}^G + 11.2 * p_{222}^G + 12.3 * p_{223}^G + 13 * p_{224}^G) \$
 \end{aligned}$$

From the equation number (1b), Consumption limits of consumption bids are given as (in puMWh):

For the 1st hour

$$\begin{aligned}
 0 &\leq p_{111}^D \leq 0.4, \\
 0 &\leq p_{112}^D \leq 0.2, \\
 0 &\leq p_{113}^D \leq 0.1, \\
 0 &\leq p_{114}^D \leq 0.1, \\
 0 &\leq p_{121}^D \leq 0.6, \\
 0 &\leq p_{122}^D \leq 0.3, \\
 0 &\leq p_{123}^D \leq 0.1, \\
 0 &\leq p_{124}^D \leq 0.1,
 \end{aligned}$$

For the 2nd hour

$$\begin{aligned}
 0 &\leq p_{211}^D \leq 0.7, \\
 0 &\leq p_{212}^D \leq 0.3, \\
 0 &\leq p_{213}^D \leq 0.2, \\
 0 &\leq p_{214}^D \leq 0.1, \\
 0 &\leq p_{221}^D \leq 0.8, \\
 0 &\leq p_{222}^D \leq 0.4, \\
 0 &\leq p_{223}^D \leq 0.2, \\
 0 &\leq p_{224}^D \leq 0.1,
 \end{aligned}$$

From the equation number (1c), Production limits of production offers(*in puMWh*):

For the 1st hour

$$0 \leq p_{111}^G \leq 0.8,$$

$$0 \leq p_{112}^G \leq 0.6,$$

$$0 \leq p_{113}^G \leq 0.4,$$

$$0 \leq p_{114}^G \leq 0.2,$$

$$0 \leq p_{121}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{122}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{123}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{124}^G \leq 0.5,$$

For the 2nd hour

$$0 \leq p_{211}^G \leq 0.8,$$

$$0 \leq p_{212}^G \leq 0.6,$$

$$0 \leq p_{213}^G \leq 0.4,$$

$$0 \leq p_{214}^G \leq 0.2,$$

$$0 \leq p_{221}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{222}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{223}^G \leq 0.5,$$

$$0 \leq p_{224}^G \leq 0.5,$$

From the equation number (1d), Energy Balance equations are:

For the 1st hour

$$\begin{aligned} & p_{111}^D + p_{112}^D + p_{113}^D + p_{114}^D + p_{121}^D + p_{122}^D + p_{123}^D + p_{124}^D \\ & - p_{111}^G - p_{112}^G - p_{113}^G - p_{114}^G - p_{121}^G - p_{122}^G - p_{123}^G - p_{124}^G = 0 \end{aligned}$$

For the 2nd hour

$$\begin{aligned} & p_{211}^D + p_{212}^D + p_{213}^D + p_{214}^D + p_{221}^D + p_{222}^D + p_{223}^D + p_{224}^D \\ & - p_{211}^G - p_{212}^G - p_{213}^G - p_{214}^G - p_{221}^G - p_{222}^G - p_{223}^G - p_{224}^G = 0 \end{aligned}$$

- (b) Implement the formulation in a computer simulation code and find the optimal solution. No generic code. The code must be specific to the specific equations that you developed for this network in the previous part. List the accepted bids and offers, and rejected bids and offers, and the market clearing prices for each of the intervals in separate well-organized/labelled tables. Do not forget the units. (70 marks)

```
#Pyomo objects exist within the pyomo.environ namespace
#Every Pyomo model starts with this; it tells Python to load the Pyomo Modeling Environment
from pyomo.environ import *
from pyomo.opt import SolverFactory

#Create an instance of a Concrete model
m = ConcreteModel("Question-(b)")

# In below equations, [i,j,k] indicates [time period, Generating unit number, block].

# Defining demand-1 for first hour
m.pd111 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 1
m.pd112 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 2
m.pd113 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 3
m.pd114 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-2 for first hour
m.pd121 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 1
m.pd122 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.3)) #--->Block 2
m.pd123 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 3
m.pd124 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-1 for second hour
m.pd211 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.7)) #--->Block 1
m.pd212 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.3)) #--->Block 2
m.pd213 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 3
m.pd214 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-2 for second hour
m.pd221 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pd222 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 2
m.pd223 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 3
m.pd224 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-1 generation for first hour
m.pg111 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pg112 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 2
m.pg113 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 3
m.pg114 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-2 generation for first hour
m.pg121 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 1
m.pg122 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 2
m.pg123 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 3
m.pg124 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-1 generation for second hour
m.pg211 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pg212 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 2
m.pg213 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 3
m.pg214 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-2 generation for second hour
m.pg221 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 1
m.pg222 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 2
m.pg223 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 3
m.pg224 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 4
```

```

# Defining an objective function to maximize the social welfare.
m.objective = Objective(expr = 16.2*m.pd111 + 14.6*m.pd112 + 12.1*m.pd113 + 10*m.pd114\      #--->Time period-1
                          + 16.1*m.pd121 + 14.2*m.pd122 + 12.5*m.pd123 + 11*m.pd124\      #--->Time period-1
                          + 16.2*m.pd211 + 14.6*m.pd212 + 12.1*m.pd213 + 10*m.pd214\      #--->Time period-2
                          + 16.1*m.pd221 + 14.2*m.pd222 + 12.5*m.pd223 + 11*m.pd224\      #--->Time period-2
                          - (11.8*m.pg111 + 12.6*m.pg112 + 13.5*m.pg113 + 14*m.pg114)\      #--->Time period-1
                          - (10.1*m.pg121 + 11.2*m.pg122 + 12.3*m.pg123 + 13*m.pg124)\      #--->Time period-1
                          - (11.8*m.pg211 + 12.6*m.pg212 + 13.5*m.pg213 + 14*m.pg214)\      #--->Time period-2
                          - (10.1*m.pg221 + 11.2*m.pg222 + 12.3*m.pg223 + 13*m.pg224) , sense = maximize) #--->Time period-2

# Energy balance equation for first hour.
m.constraint1 = Constraint(expr = m.pd111 + m.pd112 + m.pd113 + m.pd114 \
                                + m.pd121 + m.pd122 + m.pd123 + m.pd124\
                                - (m.pg111 + m.pg112 + m.pg113 + m.pg114)\
                                - (m.pg121 + m.pg122 + m.pg123 + m.pg124) == 0)

# Energy balance equation for second hour.
m.constraint2 = Constraint(expr = m.pd211 + m.pd212 + m.pd213 + m.pd214\
                                + m.pd221 + m.pd222 + m.pd223 + m.pd224\
                                - (m.pg211 + m.pg212 + m.pg213 + m.pg214)\
                                - (m.pg221 + m.pg222 + m.pg223 + m.pg224) == 0)

# To extract the dual variable.
m.dual = Suffix(direction=Suffix.IMPORT)

#Solving models
opt = SolverFactory('gurobi')
opt.solve(m)

#Display the result
m.display()

#Display the extracted multipliers
m.dual.pprint()

```

Model 'Question-(b)'

Variables:

```

pd111 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.4 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pd112 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.2 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pd113 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.1 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd114 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd121 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.6 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals
pd122 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.3 : 0.3 : False : False : Reals
pd123 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.1 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd124 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd211 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.7 : 0.7 : False : False : Reals
pd212 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.3 : 0.3 : False : False : Reals
pd213 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals

```

```

pd214 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pg221 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.8 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals
pd222 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.4 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pd223 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.10000000000000009 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pd224 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pg111 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.7000000000000001 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals
pg112 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals
pg113 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pg114 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pg121 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.5 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg122 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.5 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals
pg123 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals
pg124 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals
pg211 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.8 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals
pg212 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals
pg213 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pg214 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pg221 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.5 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals
pg222 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.5 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals
pg223 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.5 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg224 : Size=1, Index=None
  Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
  None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

```

Objectives:

```

objective : Size=1, Index=None, Active=True
  Key : Active : Value
  None : True : 16.159999999999997

```



```

Constraints:
constraint1 : Size=1
    Key : Lower : Body : Upper
    None : 0.0 : 0.0 : 0.0
constraint2 : Size=1
    Key : Lower : Body : Upper
    None : 0.0 : 2.220446049250313e-16 : 0.0
dual : Direction=Suffix.IMPORT, Datatype=Suffix.FLOAT
Key : Value
constraint1 : 11.8
constraint2 : 12.5

```

Accepted production offers of the generating units

Accepted Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)	0.7				0.5	0.5			0.8				0.5	0.5	0.5	

Table 3: Accepted production offers of generation units

Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Accepted bids	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.1		0.7	0.3			0.8	0.4	0.1	

Table 4: Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Rejected production offers of the generating units

Rejected Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2			0.5	0.5		0.6	0.4	0.2				0.5

Table 5: Rejected production offers of the generating units

Rejected consumption bids of the demand

Rejected Bids	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)				0.1				0.1			0.2	0.1			0.1	0.1

Table 6: Rejected consumption bids of the demand

Market Clearing Price and Social Welfare

Market Clearing Price	Hour 1	Hour 2
	11.8 \$/puMWh	12.5 \$/puMWh
	16.16 \$	
Social Welfare(\$)		

Table 7: Market Clearing Price and Social Welfare

We observe that, as expected, the accepted production offer blocks are those with the lowest offer prices, while the accepted bid blocks are those with the highest bid prices as shown in [Table 3-6](#).

This solution provides an optimal value of the objective function, i.e., the social welfare, of \$16.16.

The dual variable is known as the market clearing price and it is the price paid to producers for providing energy and the price paid by consumers for consuming energy.

The profit of each generating unit can be computed as follows:

Total profit of generating Unit-1

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_1 &= (\lambda_1^* - C_{11}^G) p_{111}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{12}^G) p_{112}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{13}^G) p_{113}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{14}^G) p_{114}^G \\
 &\quad + (\lambda_2^* - C_{21}^G) p_{211}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{22}^G) p_{212}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{23}^G) p_{213}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{24}^G) p_{214}^G \\
 &= (11.8 - 11.8) * 0.7 + (11.8 - 12.6) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 13.5) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 14.0) * 0.0 \\
 &\quad + (12.5 - 11.8) * 0.8 + (12.5 - 12.6) * 0.0 + (12.5 - 13.5) * 0.0 + (12.5 - 14.0) * 0.0 \\
 &= 0.56 \$
 \end{aligned}$$

Total profit of generating Unit-2

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_2 &= (\lambda_1^* - C_{21}^G) p_{121}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{22}^G) p_{122}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{23}^G) p_{123}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{24}^G) p_{124}^G \\
 &\quad + (\lambda_2^* - C_{21}^G) p_{221}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{22}^G) p_{222}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{23}^G) p_{223}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{24}^G) p_{224}^G \\
 &= (11.8 - 10.1) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 11.2) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 12.3) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 13.0) * 0.0 \\
 &\quad + (12.5 - 10.1) * 0.5 + (12.5 - 11.2) * 0.5 + (12.5 - 12.3) * 0.5 + (12.5 - 13.0) * 0.0 \\
 &= 0.85 + 0.3 + 1.2 + 0.65 + 0.1 \\
 &= 3.1 \$
 \end{aligned}$$

<i>Total Profit of generating Units</i>		
	Unit 1	Unit 2
<i>Total profit</i>	0.56 \$	3.1 \$

Table 8: Total Profit of generating Units

- (c) Determine and present the additional specific equations that must be added to the formulation in part 1 in order to have an optimal DC-network-constrained multi-period market clearing model. (20 marks)

Transmission-Constrained Multi-Period Market Clearing Auction

The multi-period market clearing auction formulated in the previous section is extended here to consider also the constraints of the transmission network:

Transmission Network Constraints:

$$\sum_{g \in \Omega_n^G} \sum_{b \in \Psi_g^G} p_{tgb}^G - \sum_{d \in \Omega_n^D} \sum_{c \in \Psi_d^D} p_{tdc}^D = \sum_{m \in \Lambda_n} B_{nm}(\delta_{tn} - \delta_{tm}) \quad : \lambda_{tn}, \forall t, \forall n, \quad (1f)$$

$$-P_{nm}^{Lmax} \leq B_{nm}(\delta_{tn} - \delta_{tm}) \leq P_{nm}^{Lmax}, \quad \forall t, \forall n, \forall m \in \Lambda_n, \quad (1g)$$

$$\delta_{tn} = 0, \forall t, n: ref. \quad (1h)$$

The differences between these two problems are constraints (1f) that represent the energy balance per node and time period, constraints (1g) that impose transmission capacity limits per transmission line and time period, and constraints (1h) that fix to zero the voltage angle at the reference node for all time period.

Prices can be different at different nodes: we may use a cheap generating unit to supply a demand at a given node but this cheap generating unit may not be used to supply a demand at a different node due to transmission congestion.

Therefore, these dual variables λ_{tn} are usually known as locational marginal prices (LMPs) or spot prices.

Considering the network shown in figure, generating units 1 and 2 are located at Node-1 and Node-2 respectively. While, the demand-1 and 2 are located at Node-1 and Node-3 respectively.

The data of transmission network are given in the question.

I consider a base power of 1MW so that all the data of the previous example can be easily transformed into a per-unit system.

Using the above data, we formulate the required additional transmission-constrained multi-period auction as shown below.

Energy balance per node constraints:

For node-1

$$p_{111}^G + p_{112}^G + p_{113}^G + p_{114}^G = p_{111}^D + p_{112}^D + p_{113}^D + p_{114}^D + B_{13}(\delta_{11} - \delta_{13}) \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$p_{211}^G + p_{212}^G + p_{213}^G + p_{214}^G = p_{211}^D + p_{212}^D + p_{213}^D + p_{214}^D + B_{23}(\delta_{21} - \delta_{23}) \dots 2^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

For node-2

$$p_{121}^G + p_{122}^G + p_{123}^G + p_{124}^G = B_{23}(\delta_{12} - \delta_{13}) \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$p_{221}^G + p_{222}^G + p_{223}^G + p_{224}^G = B_{23}(\delta_{22} - \delta_{23}) \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

For node-3

$$p_{121}^D + p_{122}^D + p_{123}^D + p_{124}^D = B_{23}(\delta_{12} - \delta_{13}) + B_{13}(\delta_{11} - \delta_{13}) \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$p_{221}^D + p_{222}^D + p_{223}^D + p_{224}^D = B_{23}(\delta_{22} - \delta_{23}) + B_{13}(\delta_{21} - \delta_{23}) \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

Transmission Line loading capacity:Transmission Line L_{13}

$$-P_{13}^{L_{max}} \leq B_{13}(\delta_{11} - \delta_{13}) \leq P_{13}^{L_{max}} \dots \dots \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$-P_{13}^{L_{max}} \leq B_{13}(\delta_{21} - \delta_{23}) \leq P_{13}^{L_{max}} \dots \dots \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

Therefore,

$$-1 \leq B_{13}(\delta_{11}) \leq 1 \dots \dots \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$-1 \leq B_{13}(\delta_{21}) \leq 1 \dots \dots \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

Transmission Line L_{23}

$$-P_{23}^{L_{max}} \leq B_{23}(\delta_{11} - \delta_{13}) \leq P_{23}^{L_{max}} \dots \dots \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$-P_{23}^{L_{max}} \leq B_{23}(\delta_{21} - \delta_{23}) \leq P_{23}^{L_{max}} \dots \dots \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

Therefore,

$$-1 \leq B_{23}(\delta_{11}) \leq 1 \dots \dots \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$-1 \leq B_{23}(\delta_{21}) \leq 1 \dots \dots \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

Voltage Angle at reference node-3

$$\delta_{13} = 0 \dots \dots \dots 1^{st} \text{ hour time period}$$

$$\delta_{23} = 0 \dots \dots \dots 2^{nd} \text{ hour time period}$$

- (d) Implement your complete model of part 3 in a computer simulation code and find the optimal solution. No generic code. The code must be specific to the specific equations that you developed for this network in the previous part. List the accepted bids and offers, and rejected bids and offers, and the market clearing prices for each of the intervals at each node in separate well-organized/labelled tables. Do not forget the units. (40 marks)

```
#Pyomo objects exist within the pyomo.environ namespace
#Every Pyomo model starts with this; it tells Python to load the Pyomo Modeling Environment
from pyomo.environ import *
from pyomo.opt import SolverFactory
import cmath
import math

#Create an instance of a Concrete model
m = ConcreteModel("Question-(d)")

# In below equations, [i,j,k] indicates [time period, Generating unit number, block].

# Defining demand-1 for first hour
m.pd111 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 1
m.pd112 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 2
m.pd113 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 3
m.pd114 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-2 for first hour
m.pd121 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 1
m.pd122 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.3)) #--->Block 2
m.pd123 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 3
m.pd124 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-1 for second hour
m.pd211 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.7)) #--->Block 1
m.pd212 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.3)) #--->Block 2
m.pd213 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 3
m.pd214 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining demand-2 for second hour
m.pd221 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pd222 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 2
m.pd223 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 3
m.pd224 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.1)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-1 generation for first hour
m.pg111 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pg112 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 2
m.pg113 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 3
m.pg114 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-2 generation for first hour
m.pg121 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 1
m.pg122 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 2
m.pg123 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 3
m.pg124 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-1 generation for second hour
m.pg211 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.8)) #--->Block 1
m.pg212 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.6)) #--->Block 2
m.pg213 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.4)) #--->Block 3
m.pg214 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.2)) #--->Block 4

# Defining Unit-2 generation for second hour
m.pg221 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 1
m.pg222 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 2
m.pg223 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 3
m.pg224 = Var(bounds=(0.0,0.5)) #--->Block 4
```

```

# Defining voltage angle for first hour.
m.δ11 = Var(bounds=(-math.pi,math.pi)) #--->Node 1
m.δ12 = Var(bounds=(-math.pi,math.pi)) #--->Node 2
m.δ13 = Var(bounds=(0,0)) #--->Node 3 (Given=0 as reference node)

# Defining voltage angle for second hour.
m.δ21 = Var(bounds=(-math.pi,math.pi)) #--->Node 1
m.δ22 = Var(bounds=(-math.pi,math.pi)) #--->Node 2
m.δ23 = Var(bounds=(0,0)) #--->Node 3 (Given=0 as reference node)

# Defining susceptance for transmission line-13 and line-23.
m.B13 = Var(bounds=(1,1))
m.B23 = Var(bounds=(1,1))

# Defining an objective function to minimize the total cost for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
m.objective = Objective(expr = 16.2*m.pd111 + 14.6*m.pd112 + 12.1*m.pd113 + 10*m.pd114 \
+ 16.1*m.pd121 + 14.2*m.pd122 + 12.5*m.pd123 + 11*m.pd124 \
+ 16.2*m.pd211 + 14.6*m.pd212 + 12.1*m.pd213 + 10*m.pd214 \
+ 16.1*m.pd221 + 14.2*m.pd222 + 12.5*m.pd223 + 11*m.pd224 \
- (11.8*m.pg111 + 12.6*m.pg112 + 13.5*m.pg113 + 14*m.pg114) \
- (10.1*m.pg121 + 11.2*m.pg122 + 12.3*m.pg123 + 13*m.pg124) \
- (11.8*m.pg211 + 12.6*m.pg212 + 13.5*m.pg213 + 14*m.pg214) \
- (10.1*m.pg221 + 11.2*m.pg222 + 12.3*m.pg223 + 13*m.pg224) , sense = maximize)

# Energy balance equation for first hour.
m.constraint1 = Constraint(expr = m.pd111 + m.pd112 + m.pd113 + m.pd114 \
+ m.pd121 + m.pd122 + m.pd123 + m.pd124 \
- (m.pg111 + m.pg112 + m.pg113 + m.pg114) \
- (m.pg121 + m.pg122 + m.pg123 + m.pg124) == 0)

# Energy balance equation for second hour.
m.constraint2 = Constraint(expr = m.pd211 + m.pd212 + m.pd213 + m.pd214 \
+ m.pd221 + m.pd222 + m.pd223 + m.pd224 \
- (m.pg211 + m.pg212 + m.pg213 + m.pg214) \
- (m.pg221 + m.pg222 + m.pg223 + m.pg224) == 0)

# Energy balance at Node-1 for first hour.
m.constraint3 = Constraint(expr = m.pg111 + m.pg112 + m.pg113 + m.pg114 - m.pd111 - m.pd112 \
- m.pd113 - m.pd114 - m.B13*(m.δ11-m.δ13) == 0)

# Energy balance at Node-1 for second hour.
m.constraint4 = Constraint(expr = m.pg211 + m.pg212 + m.pg213 + m.pg214 - m.pd211 - m.pd212 \
+ m.pd213 + m.pd214 + m.B13*(m.δ21-m.δ23))

# Energy balance at Node-2 for first hour.
m.constraint5 = Constraint(expr = m.pg121 + m.pg122 + m.pg123 + m.pg124 == m.B23*(m.δ12-m.δ13))

# Energy balance at Node-2 for second hour.
m.constraint6 = Constraint(expr = m.pg221 + m.pg222 + m.pg223 + m.pg224 == m.B23*(m.δ22-m.δ23))

# Energy balance at Node-3 for first hour.
m.constraint7 = Constraint(expr = m.pd121 + m.pd122 + m.pd123 + m.pd124 == m.B13*(m.δ11-m.δ13) + m.B23*(m.δ12-m.δ13))

# Energy balance at Node-3 for second hour.
m.constraint8 = Constraint(expr = m.pd221 + m.pd222 + m.pd223 + m.pd224 == m.B13*(m.δ21-m.δ23) + m.B23*(m.δ22-m.δ23))

# Line Limit Loading constraint for Line 1-3 for first hour
m.constraint9 = Constraint(expr = -1 <= m.B13*(m.δ11-m.δ13))
m.constraint10 = Constraint(expr = 1 >= m.B13*(m.δ11-m.δ13))

# Line Limit Loading constraint for Line 1-3 for second hour
m.constraint11 = Constraint(expr = -1 <= m.B13*(m.δ21-m.δ23))
m.constraint12 = Constraint(expr = 1 >= m.B13*(m.δ21-m.δ23))

# Line Limit Loading constraint for Line 2-3 for first hour
m.constraint13 = Constraint(expr = -1 <= m.B23*(m.δ12-m.δ13))
m.constraint14 = Constraint(expr = 1 >= m.B23*(m.δ12-m.δ13))

# Line Limit Loading constraint for Line 2-3 for second hour
m.constraint15 = Constraint(expr = -1 <= m.B23*(m.δ22-m.δ23))
m.constraint16 = Constraint(expr = 1 >= m.B23*(m.δ22-m.δ23))

```

```
# To extract the dual variable.
m.dual = Suffix(direction=Suffix.IMPORT)

#Solving models
opt = SolverFactory('gurobi')
opt.solve(m)

#Display the result
m.display()

#Display the extracted multipliers
m.dual.pprint()
```

Model 'Question-(d)'

Variables:

```
pd111 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.39999999999999994 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pd112 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.19999999999999999 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pd113 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.09999999999999987 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd114 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 2.6419270758218413e-15 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd121 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.59999999999999993 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals
pd122 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.29999999999999988 : 0.3 : False : False : Reals
pd123 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.0999999999999998785 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd124 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 1.3924621205762768e-14 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd211 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.69999999999999992 : 0.7 : False : False : Reals
pd212 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.29999999999999983 : 0.3 : False : False : Reals
pd213 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 4.036707576942669e-15 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pd214 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 1.1317903324177152e-15 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pd221 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.79999999999999993 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals
pd222 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.39999999999999981 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals
pd223 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 4.286232076714011e-14 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals
pd224 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 1.7137489253976136e-15 : 0.1 : False : False : Reals
pg111 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 0.700000000000000639 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals
pg112 : Size=1, Index=None
      Key : Lower : Value          : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
      None : 0.0 : 2.3310890063530397e-14 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals
```

pg113 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 2.1603816021007377e-15 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals

pg114 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 1.328644865292083e-15 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals

pg121 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.49999999999999947 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg122 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.499999999999999133 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg123 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 1.1580511764588907e-16 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg124 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 9.034842334024899e-16 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg211 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.79999999999999963 : 0.8 : False : False : Reals

pg212 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.400000000000000447 : 0.6 : False : False : Reals

pg213 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 4.133516110684886e-15 : 0.4 : False : False : Reals

pg214 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 2.3980172016874665e-15 : 0.2 : False : False : Reals

pg221 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.49999999999999976 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg222 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 0.499999999999999123 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg223 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 5.6829106406131916e-15 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

pg224 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0.0 : 2.598038762213887e-15 : 0.5 : False : False : Reals

δ11 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : -3.141592653589793 : 8.837375276016246e-14 : 3.141592653589793 : False : False : Reals

δ12 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : -3.141592653589793 : 0.9999999999999905 : 3.141592653589793 : False : False : Reals

δ13 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0 : 0.0 : 0 : False : False : Reals

δ21 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : -3.141592653589793 : 0.200000000000000437 : 3.141592653589793 : False : False : Reals

δ22 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : -3.141592653589793 : 0.99999999999999956 : 3.141592653589793 : False : False : Reals

δ23 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 0 : 0.0 : 0 : False : False : Reals

B13 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 1 : 1.0 : 1 : False : False : Reals

B23 : Size=1, Index=None
Key : Lower : Value : Upper : Fixed : Stale : Domain
None : 1 : 1.0 : 1 : False : False : Reals

Objectives:

```
objective : Size=1, Index=None, Active=True
Key   : Active : Value
None  : True  : 16.019999999999983
```

Constraints:

```
constraint1 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 0.0   : 0.0

constraint2 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 2.220446049250313e-16 : 0.0

constraint3 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 2.5206099886851367e-15 : 0.0

constraint4 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 1.3322676295501878e-15 : 0.0

constraint5 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 4.107825191113079e-15 : 0.0

constraint6 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 1.5543122344752192e-15 : 0.0

constraint7 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 6.5503158452884236e-15 : 0.0

constraint8 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : 0.0   : 2.6645352591003757e-15 : 0.0

constraint9 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : -1.0  : 8.837375276016246e-14 : None

constraint10 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : None  : 8.837375276016246e-14 : 1.0

constraint11 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : -1.0  : 0.20000000000000437 : None

constraint12 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : None  : 0.20000000000000437 : 1.0

constraint13 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : -1.0  : 0.9999999999999905 : None

constraint14 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : None  : 0.9999999999999905 : 1.0

constraint15 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : -1.0  : 0.9999999999999956 : None

constraint16 : Size=1
Key   : Lower : Body           : Upper
None  : None  : 0.9999999999999956 : 1.0

dual : Direction=Suffix.IMPORT, Datatype=Suffix.FLOAT
Key   : Value
constraint1 : 11.800000000401287
constraint10 : 0.0
constraint11 : -0.0
constraint12 : 0.0
constraint13 : -0.0
constraint14 : 0.3419329877011282
constraint15 : -0.0
constraint16 : 0.9630759067077719
constraint2 : 12.600000194066551
constraint3 : 2.0315288176716185e-10
constraint4 : 9.69893018651401e-08
constraint5 : 0.3419329875188512
constraint6 : 0.963075906684621
constraint7 : 0.0
constraint8 : 0.0
constraint9 : -0.0
```

Accepted production offers of the generating units

Accepted Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	Block				Block				Block				Block			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.7				0.5	0.5			0.8	0.4			0.5	0.5		

Table 9: Accepted production offers of the generating units

Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Accepted bids	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	Block															
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.1		0.7	0.3			0.8	0.4		

Table 10: Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Rejected production offers of the generating units

Rejected Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	Block															
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2			0.5	0.5		0.2	0.4	0.2			0.5	0.5

Table 11: Rejected production offers of the generating units

Rejected consumption bids of the demand

Rejected Bids	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
				0.1				0.1			0.2	0.1			0.2	0.1

Table 12: Rejected consumption bids of the demand

Market Clearing Price of the system and Social Welfare

Market Clearing Price λ	Hour 1	Hour 2
	11.8 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh
	Social Welfare(\$)	
	16.02 \$	

Table 13: Market Clearing Price and Social Welfare

This solution provides an optimal value of the objective function, i.e., the social welfare, of \$16.02.

Market Clearing Price at each node and each time interval

Market Clearing Price	Hour 1						Hour 2					
	Node 1		Node 2		Node 3		Node 1		Node 2		Node 3	
	Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	Block
	Energy (puMWh)	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh
	Social Welfare(\$)											
	16.02 \$											

Table 14: Market Clearing Price at each node for each time interval

The profit of each generating unit can be computed as follows:

Total profit of generating Unit-1

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_1 &= (\lambda_1^* - C_{11}^G) p_{111}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{12}^G) p_{112}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{13}^G) p_{113}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{14}^G) p_{114}^G \\
 &\quad + (\lambda_2^* - C_{21}^G) p_{211}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{22}^G) p_{212}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{23}^G) p_{213}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{24}^G) p_{214}^G \\
 &= (11.8 - 11.8) * 0.7 + (11.8 - 12.6) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 13.5) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 14.0) * 0.0 \\
 &\quad + (12.6 - 11.8) * 0.8 + (12.6 - 12.6) * 0.4 + (12.6 - 13.5) * 0.0 + (12.6 - 14.0) * 0.0 \\
 &= 0.64 \$
 \end{aligned}$$

Total profit of generating Unit-2

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_2 &= (\lambda_1^* - C_{21}^G) p_{121}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{22}^G) p_{122}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{23}^G) p_{123}^G + (\lambda_1^* - C_{24}^G) p_{124}^G \\
 &\quad + (\lambda_2^* - C_{21}^G) p_{221}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{22}^G) p_{222}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{23}^G) p_{223}^G + (\lambda_2^* - C_{24}^G) p_{224}^G \\
 &= (11.8 - 10.1) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 11.2) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 12.3) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 13.0) * 0.0 \\
 &\quad + (11.8 - 10.1) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 11.2) * 0.5 + (11.8 - 12.3) * 0.0 + (11.8 - 13.0) * 0.0 \\
 &= 0.85 + 0.3 + 0.85 + 0.3 \\
 &= 2.3 \$
 \end{aligned}$$

<i>Total Profit of generating Units</i>		
	Unit 1	Unit 2
<i>Total profit</i>	0.64 \$	2.3 \$

Table 15: Total Profit of generating Units

- (e) Compare the optimal solutions from parts 2 and 4. If they are different, explain why. If they are not, explain why and speculate on conditions that would have made the solutions different. Apply your speculations in the code and verify. (40 marks)

Accepted production offers for Part-2									Accepted production offers for Part-4							
Accepted Offer	Hour 1								Hour 1							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.7				0.5	0.5			0.7				0.5	0.5		
Accepted Offer	Hour 2								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.8				0.5	0.5	0.5		0.8	0.4			0.5	0.5		

Table 16: Comparison of Accepted production offers in Part-2 and Part-4

Accepted Consumption bids for Part-2									Accepted Consumption bids for Part-4							
Accepted Bids	Hour 1								Hour 1							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.1		0.4	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.1	
Accepted Bids	Hour 2								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
Block	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Energy (puMWh)	0.7	0.3			0.8	0.4	0.1		0.7	0.3			0.8	0.4		

Table 17: Comparison of Accepted bids in Part-2 and Part-4

After analysing the impact of transmission capacity limits on the solution of a market clearing auction with transmission constraints, we get two different solutions.

- As shown in the [Table-16](#), in the later case (especially for hour-2), not all the cheapest production blocks are used at capacity due to line limit loading constraints. i.e., Unit-2 has third block offer available to generate 0.5 puMWh at 12.3 \$/puMWh; however, Unit-1's second block accepted with 12.6 \$/puMWh over the Unit-2 due to the transmission line limit constraint.

Market Clearing Price obtained in Part-2				Market Clearing Price obtained in Part-4		
Market Clearing Price	Hour 1			Hour 1		
	Node 1	Node 2	Node 3	Node 1	Node 2	Node 3
	11.8 \$/puMWh			11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh
	Hour 2			Hour 2		
Market Clearing Price	Node 1	Node 2	Node 3	Node 1	Node 2	Node 3
	12.5 \$/puMWh			12.6 \$/puMWh	12.6 \$/puMWh	11.8 \$/puMWh
Social Welfare(\$)	16.16 \$			16.02 \$		

Table 18: Comparison of Market clearing price obtained in Part-2 and Part-4

As seen in the [Table-18](#), the market clearing price is same for all three nodes because we have ignored the transmission

line loading constraints. On the other hand, for second hour, the market clearing price is different for both generating node. Here to serve the load, at node-1, last generation offer accepted at 12.6 \$/puMWh, while, at node-2, last generation offer accepted at 11.8 \$/puMWh even though next generation offer available to dispatch at 12.3 \$/puMWh. For node-3, the market clearing price is same as the last demand bid accepted price which is the overall market clearing price = 12.6 \$/puMWh.

To reiterate, the overall market clearing price in later case is comparatively higher due to the transmission line (L_{23}) loading constraint than the first case.

Profits Achieved by each generating unit

Generating Unit	Without transmission constraints	With transmission constraints
1	0.56 \$	0.64 \$
2	3.1 \$	2.30 \$

Table 19: Comparison of profit achieved by each generating unit

Note that due to the congestion in the transmission network, the profits of generating units 2 is reduced, while the profit of generating unit 1 increases. This is due to the changes in their power schedules and also to the price differences across the network.

We analyze the impact of transmission capacity limits on the solution of a market clearing auction with transmission constraints.

To do so, I solve again the previous example, but in this case, I relax the transmission capacity limits of all the lines and consider them equal to 1.5 puMWh.

In such a case, we obtain that the solution (Table 19-23) is the same than that obtained in the multi-period market clearing auction without transmission constraints (Part-2).

Accepted production offers of the generating units

Accepted Offer	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)	0.7				0.5	0.5			0.8				0.5	0.5	0.5	

Table 19: Accepted production offers of generation units

Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Accepted bids	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
Block																
Energy (puMWh)	0.4	0.2	0.1		0.6	0.3	0.1		0.7	0.3			0.8	0.4	0.1	

Table 20: Accepted consumption bids of the demand

Rejected production offers of the generating units

<i>Rejected Offer</i>	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Unit 1				Unit 2				Unit 1				Unit 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2			0.5	0.5		0.6	0.4	0.2				0.5

Table 21: Rejected production offers of the generating units

Rejected consumption bids of the demand

<i>Rejected Bids</i>	Hour 1								Hour 2							
	Demand 1				Demand 2				Demand 1				Demand 2			
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4
				0.1				0.1			0.2	0.1			0.1	0.1

Table 22: Rejected consumption bids of the demand

Market Clearing Price and Social Welfare

Market Clearing Price	Hour 1	Hour 2
	11.8 \$/puMWh	12.5 \$/puMWh
	16.16 \$	
Social Welfare(\$)		

Table 23: Market Clearing Price and Social Welfare

Note: Above case shows the effect of transmission line loading limit on market. Here, transmission Line loading capacity is increased gradually and each time the result changes. To get the same result as question-b, I have taken 1.5 puMWh line loading limit. Similarly, by changing Line loading capacity to lower side, we get the different solution. Please find an attachment of code and result herewith the report.