Quantum Assisted Secure Multiparty Computation

Manuel Batalha dos Santos

Thesis defence 18 September 2024





Motivation and outcomes



Motivation and outcomes

Quantum and classical oblivious transfer



Motivation and outcomes

• Quantum and classical oblivious transfer

Private phylogenetic trees



Motivation and outcomes

• Quantum and classical oblivious transfer


Private phylogenetic trees

• Quantum oblivious linear evaluation


























SMC









SMC

Primitive









SMC

Primitive Oblivious Transfer









SMC


Primitive Oblivious Transfer

Oblivious Linear Evaluation



























































































Outcomes





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



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



















Oblivious Transfer





















Comparable structure?
Corresponding phases with same technology?
Any practical insight?









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








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
If













Primitive (SPM.21) Classic Quantum Classic (NPOY) (SPM.22) SimpleOT (SPM.22) SimpleO


Classic

Base OT

OT Extension

Quantum [BBCS'91]





Classic

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Quantum [BBCS'91]

Issue: PK operations



Primitive Districtions Secure auctions Secure voting Secure vo


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
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
Base OT OT Extension

OT/s

[NP'01] 56 [ALSZ'13] 2.68 s
SimpleOT 1 375 < [KOS'15] 3.35 s
NTRU-OT 728
Kyber-OT 41

Quantum [BBCS'91]





Classic Quantum
Base OT OT Extension [BBCS'91]


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
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
Online phase for *m* OTs

		Computation	Communication	
	[ALSZ'13]	$O^{ALSZ} - O^{BBCS} > m \log m$	$C^{ALSZ} - C^{BBCS} = 0$	
 				BBCS
1	[KOS'15]	$O^{KOS} - O^{BBCS} > m \log m + 5ml$	CKOS - CBBCS ≥ 0	










Shows the evolutionary relationship between **DNA** sequences in a tree.





Primitive | SPM21 | Classic | Classi

Results summary

• Tailored SMC protocol for phylogenetic trees algorithms




Primitive | Classic | Clas

Results summary

- Tailored SMC protocol for phylogenetic trees algorithms
- Classical implementation
 - CBMC-GC: circuit generation
 - MPC-Benchmark: yao protocol based on Libscapi
 - PHYLIP: phylogeny analysis






Results summary

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- Integrate BBCS based protocol into Libscapi






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- Integrate BBCS based protocol into Libscapi
- Benchmark classical and quantum approaches





Distance based: trees depend on the matrix distance of genes

Character based: search for the tree that optimizes the evolution the most

Computation: simple

Algorithms:


- UPGMA
- NJ
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
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
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Distances:

- JC
- K2P
- F84
- LogDet








Part 1: Compute the distance matrix








Part 1: Compute the distance matrix



Part 2: Iteratively group the genes through some specific method








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SMC for distances



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
SMC for distances



Part 2: Iteratively group the genes through some specific method

No interaction






[BBCS'91]

Offline phase


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























Performance evaluation

Setup:

- **3 parties:** VMs running Ubuntu 16.04.3
- 30 SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences* with 32 000 length

Boolean circuit:

- ~3 minutes (CBMC-GC)
- ~2.2 million gates
- 128 000 input wires







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
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



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
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






Private phylogenetic trees





Results summary

- Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE)
- Vector OLE





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




Primitive | Classic | Clas

Results summary

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Results summary

- Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE)
- Vector OLE

Alice

OLE

$$f(x) = ax + b$$



Bob


Primitive | SPM22| Classic | Quantum | | Quantum

Results summary

- Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE)
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Alice

b



$$\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b}$$



Bob

In an Hilbert space of dimension d







In an Hilbert space of dimension d, there exists a set of MUBs $\{|e^x_r\rangle\}_{r\in\mathbb{Z}_d}$





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$$\mathcal{B}_{1} = \{ |\phi_{1}\rangle, \dots, |\phi_{d}\rangle \}$$

$$\mathcal{B}_{0} = \{ |\psi_{1}\rangle, \dots, |\psi_{d}\rangle \}$$

$$|\langle \psi_{i} | \phi_{j}\rangle | = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}}$$





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which, upon the action of the Heisenberg-Weyl operators, ${\cal V}_a^b$

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Definition:


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$$\mathcal{B}_{0} = \{ |\psi_{1}\rangle, \dots, |\psi_{d}\rangle \}$$

$$|\langle \psi_{i} | \phi_{j}\rangle | = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}}$$

$$V_a^b := V_0^b V_a^0 = \sum_{l=0}^{d-1} \omega^{(l+a)b} |l+a\rangle\langle l|$$





In an Hilbert space of dimension d, there exists a set of MUBs

$$\{|e_r^x\rangle\}_{r\in\mathbb{Z}_d}$$

which, upon the action of the Heisenberg-Weyl operators, V_a^b

$$V_a^b \left| e_r^x \right\rangle = c_{a,b,x,r} \left| e_{ax-b+r}^x \right\rangle$$

Definition:


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Alice, (a,b) Bob, x

Definition:


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Alice, (a,b)

Bob, x

 $|e_r^x\rangle$

Definition:


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Alice, (a,b) Bob, x $|e_r^x\rangle \longleftarrow |e_r^x\rangle$

Definition:


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Alice,
$$(a,b)$$
 Bob, x $|e_r^x\rangle$ $V_a^b\,|e_r^x\rangle$

Definition:


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Definition:


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




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Definition:


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




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
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Primitive (BBCS91) Oblivious (SimpleOT Transfer (NAV22) SimpleOT Trans


Alice, (a,b) Bob, x







Alice, (a,b)	Bob, x
$i\in[m]$	
	$\left e_{r_{i}}^{x_{i}^{0}} ight angle$
1 1	' '
	1
1	

































































Quantum OLE | Protocol



Alice, (a,b)	$i \in [m]$	Bob, x
$\left e_{r_{i}}^{x_{i}^{0}} ight angle$	←	$\left e_{r_{i}}^{x_{i}^{0}} ight angle$
$\left e^{x_i^0}_{a_i^0 x_i^0 - b_i^0 + r_i} \right\rangle$		
$T \subset [m]$	Commit-and-open phase	$ exttt{commit}(i, x_i^0, r_i)_{i \in [m]} \ exttt{open}(i, x_i^0, r_i)_{i \in T}$
$\left e_{a_i^0x_i^0-b_i^0+r_i}^{x_i^0}\right\rangle$		$\left e_{a_i^0x_i^0-b_i^0+r_i}^{x_i^0}\right\rangle$

Security:

$$H_{\min}(\mathbf{F}_0|B')_{\sigma_{\mathbf{F}_0B'}} \ge \frac{n\log d}{2}(1 - h_d(\zeta))$$



Quantum OLE | Protocol





Security: $H_{\min}(\mathbf{F}_0|B')_{\sigma_{\mathbf{F}_0B'}} \geq \frac{n\log d}{2}(1-h_d(\zeta))$






Quantum OLE | Protocol





Security:

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
Real Ideal






Real Ideal






Ideal


E








Ideal












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









Ideal



Real



E ≈






Ideal

A No Transcript

FOLE

B


E ≈









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









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









Ideal











Ideal Alice

Indistinguishability: Transcript Inputs & Outputs **Extractability:** Fole Inputs & Outputs








Ideal Alice

Indistinguishability: Transcript Fake commitments Inputs & Outputs **Extractability:** $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{OLE}}$ Inputs & Outputs








Ideal Alice

Ε Indistinguishability: Transcript Fake commitments Inputs & Outputs **Extractability:** $= (\mathbb{1} \otimes V_a^b) |B_{0,0}\rangle$ $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{OLE}}$ Inputs & Outputs








Ideal Bob

Indistinguishability: Transcript Inputs & Outputs **Extractability:** $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{OLE}}$ Inputs & Outputs








Ideal Bob


В

Indistinguishability:

$$H_{\min}(\mathbf{F}_{\boldsymbol{a}} \mid \mathbf{Y}E) \ge \frac{n \log d}{2} (1 - h_d(\zeta))$$

Extractability:











Ideal Bob

Ε Indistinguishability: Transcript $H_{\min}(\mathbf{F}_{\boldsymbol{a}} \mid \mathbf{Y}E) \ge \frac{n \log d}{2} (1 - h_d(\zeta))$ Inputs & Privacy
Amplification a Outputs **Extractability:** $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{OLE}}$ Inputs & Outputs










Ideal Bob


Ε Indistinguishability: Transcript $H_{\min}(\mathbf{F}_{\boldsymbol{a}} \mid \mathbf{Y}E) \ge \frac{n \log d}{2} (1 - h_d(\zeta))$ Inputs & Privacy
Amplification a Outputs **Extractability:** Com. functionality $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{OLE}}$ Inputs & Outputs














Thank you

I acknowledge Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT, Portugal) for its support through the PhD grant SFRH/BD/ 144806/2019 in the context of the Doctoral Program in the Information Security (IS).