

CLASSICAL VERIFICATION OF QUANTUM COMPUTATIONS

- QPIP_k definition :
- Prover \mathbb{P} capable of BQP computations.
 - Verifier \mathbb{V} capable of BPP computations + Quantum operations on "k" qubits
- Unitary transformation, Measurements
- \mathbb{P}, \mathbb{V} exchange poly($|x|$) classical messages, "k" qubits of quantum messages.

→ Result I : QPIP₁ = BQP

Two parts

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(i)} \quad & \text{QPIP}_1 \subseteq \text{BQP} && \rightarrow \text{Trivial Proof} \\ \text{(ii)} \quad & \text{BQP} \subseteq \text{QPIP}_1 && \rightarrow [\text{Morimae '15, '16}] \end{aligned}$$

- The proof uses [Kitaev '03] [Biamonte '08]'s results on QMA-completeness of the 5-LOCAL HAMILTONIAN and the 2-LOCAL HAMILTONIAN problems respectively.
- The idea is to convert an instance $x \in L$ of BQP to hamiltonian H_x (that is 2-local).
 \mathbb{P} determines the ground state of H_x and sends to \mathbb{V} just the qubit that is to be measured (only 2 times)
 \mathbb{V} accordingly determines the ground energy of this hamiltonian.

→ Result II : QPIP₀ = BPP (true under certain LWE assumption)

Two parts

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(i)} \quad & \text{QPIP}_0 \subseteq \text{BPP} && \rightarrow \text{Trivial proof} \\ \text{(ii)} \quad & \text{BPP} \subseteq \text{QPIP}_0 && \rightarrow [\text{Mahadev '18}] \end{aligned}$$

builds upon the proof of Result I.

- The reduction in previous proof involves a single measurement by \mathbb{V} which is now outsourced to the QPIP₀ framework.

RESULT I: [Morimae '15 '16]

(Proof of $BQP \subseteq QPIP_1$)

→ We make use of previous results

[Kitaev '03] QMA-completeness of 5-LOCAL HAMILTONIAN

[Kempe '05] QMA-completeness of 2-LOCAL HAMILTONIAN

[Biamonte '08] QMA-completeness of 2-LOCAL ZX HAMILTONIAN

→ Take any $L \in BQP$.

- For an iIP instance $x \in L$?

- $L \in BQP \subseteq QMA \Rightarrow \neg L \in BQP \subseteq QMA$.

- Let V_x, \bar{V}_x be the verification circuits of $L, \neg L$ resp.

- Since $L, \neg L \in BQP$, the verification certificate state for both of V_x, \bar{V}_x will be an all 10^{trivial state}.

→ Reduce the instances V_x, \bar{V}_x using reduction R
2-LOCAL ZX HAMILTONIAN instances H_x, \bar{H}_x respectively

→ Both V and IP know H_x, \bar{H}_x

- IP can construct the eigen state $|n\rangle$ ($\bar{n}\rangle$) of H_x (or \bar{H}_x) from the trivial certificate $|\xi\rangle = |0\rangle^{\otimes n}$.
(using reduction R)

→ - IP uses V_x, \bar{V}_x to find out if $x \in L$ or $x \in \neg L$.

- IP conveys the information to V and will subsequently try to prove his claim.

- If $x \in L$, they use $V_x, H_x, |n\rangle$
and if $x \in \neg L$, they use $\bar{V}_x, \bar{H}_x, |\bar{n}\rangle$.

→ Using 2-Local hamiltonian H_x (or \bar{H}_x) V decides which locations and bases to measure $|n\rangle$ (or $\bar{n}\rangle$)

- IP sends all the qubits of $|n\rangle$ (or $\bar{n}\rangle$) to V one-by-one

- V performs the some measurements to decide.

In more detail.

2-LOCAL ZX HAMILTONIAN PROBLEM (Language L_{2H})

$$H_{ZX} = \sum_i h_i Z_i + \sum_i \Delta_i X_i + \sum_{i < j} J_{ij} Z_i X_j + \sum_{i < j} K_{ij} X_i Z_j$$

with $h_i, \Delta_i, J_{ij}, K_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$

$$x \in L_{2H} \Rightarrow \exists |\eta\rangle$$

$$x \notin L_{2H} \Rightarrow \nexists |\eta\rangle$$

$$|b-a| \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(x)}$$

$$\langle n | H_{ZX} | n \rangle \leq a$$

$$\langle n | H_{ZX} | n \rangle \geq b$$

→ Take $L \in \text{BQP}$, ($\neg L \in \text{BQP}$)

we want to show $L \in \text{QPIP}_1$ ($\because \text{BQP} \subseteq \text{QPIP}_1$)

For any instance $x \in L$? or $x \in \neg L$?

\exists verification ccls $V_x, V_{\bar{x}}$ respectively.

with trivial verification certificates $|0\rangle^{\otimes w}$ ($\because L, \neg L \in \text{BQP}$)

→ Take a reduction $R : \text{QMA} \longrightarrow \text{2-LOCAL HAMILTONIAN}$

$$R : V_x \longmapsto H_x \\ (|0\rangle^{\otimes w} \longmapsto |\eta_x\rangle)$$

→ P, V know H_x

Only P knows $|\eta_x\rangle = R(|0\rangle^{\otimes w})$ because V has only one qubit.

$$H_x = \sum_i h_i Z_i + \sum_i \Delta_i X_i + \sum_{i < j} J_{ij} Z_i X_j + \sum_{i < j} K_{ij} X_i Z_j$$

(from defn of 2-local ZX hamiltonian)

$$\Rightarrow H_x = \sum_S d_S S \quad (\text{where } S \text{ is } Z_i, X_i, Z_i X_j \text{ or } X_i Z_j)$$

↳ is real

$$\begin{aligned}
 H'_z &:= H_z + \sum_s |d_s| I \\
 &= \sum_s |d_s| (I + \text{sign}(d_s) S) \\
 &= \sum_s 2 |d_s| P_s \quad \left[P_s = \frac{I + \text{sign}(d_s) S}{2} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

$$H_x := \frac{1}{2 \sum_s |d_s|} H'_x = \sum_s \Pi_s P_s$$

↑ probability = $\frac{|d_s|}{\sum_s |d_s|}$

P_s is a projection operator on one or two qubits

It involves projection in $\{|0\rangle\langle 0|\}, |1\rangle\langle 1|$, $|+\rangle\langle +|$ or $|-\rangle\langle -|$ on exactly two qubits.

→ \checkmark measures in one of those projectors for the required qubits (one or two)
 If the product of measurement equals $-\text{sign}(d_s)$,

$$\langle \eta | \Pi_s P_s | \eta \rangle = 0. \quad (\text{or } \langle \bar{\eta} | \bar{\Pi}_s \bar{P}_s | \bar{\eta} \rangle)$$

\checkmark returns "✓" else "✗"

This procedure is repeated k times, $k = \text{poly}(|x|)$.

If more than half of them result in "✓",
 \checkmark accepts $x \in L$
 (or equivalently $x \in L$)

Can we outsource this measurement step to the Browser? [Mahadev '18]

RESULT II: [Mahadev '18]

$\text{BQP} \subseteq \text{QPIP}_0$ (under certain assumptions)

→ KEY IDEA:

Develop a framework where IP has a quantum state S , and V is able to measure S over a Z-local projection operator in Z, X bases (denoted by h)

Importantly, the statistics of the measurement outcomes for this prover IP, $D_{P,h}$ should be close to the statistics of an actual measurement of SOME STATE S' in the bases ' h ' $D_{S',h}$ ($S=S'$ for honest provers)

$$D_{P,h} \sim D_{S',h}$$

→ For this purpose, we employ a MEASUREMENT Protocol.

ROUGH IDEA:

- V prepares a basis of measurement ' h ', according to the Pauli operator S ,
This basis is only for two qubits. $h_i = \begin{cases} 1 & X \text{ basis} \\ 0 & Z \text{ basis} \end{cases}$
($h_i=0$ for other qubits)

- For ($i=1$ to n):

- <series of steps> -

V decides to perform MEASUREMENT ROUND or TEST ROUND

MEASUREMENT

- steps for V to get measurement result.

TEST

- a check on malicious behaviour of IP.

SOME PREREQUISITES

TRAPDOOR CLAW-FREE FAMILIES: $F = \{f_{kb} : X \rightarrow Y\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$

- ① $f_{k,0}, f_{k,1}$ are INJECTIVE and have the SAME RANGE
- ② INVERTIBLE using trapdoor t_k . [For $y = f_{kb}(x)$, $\text{INV}_F(t_k, b, y) = x$] for BPP machine

(x_0, x_1) is a claw when $f_{k,0}(x_0) = f_{k,1}(x_1)$

- ③ CLAW-FREE: Hard to find $x_0, x_1 \in X$ st. (x_0, x_1) is a claw for BQP

- ④ ADAPTIVE-HARDCORE-BIT PROPERTY:

Hard for BQP machine to find $b, z_b \in \{0,1\}^n \times X$ and $d \in \{0,1\}^n$ st. $d \cdot (x_0 + z_1) = 0$ with non-negligible advantage over $\frac{1}{2}$.
 $\hookrightarrow (x_0, x_1)$ is a claw.

- ⑤ EFFICIENTLY GENERATED: Efficient (BPP) algorithm GEN_F

$$(k, t_k) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_F(1^n)$$

- ⑥ Efficient BQP procedure SAMP_F that for ip x, k, b gives

$$|x>|b> \xrightarrow{\text{SAMP}_F(k, b)} |x>|f_{kb}(x)>$$

TRAPDOOR INJECTIVE FN FAMILIES: $G = \{g_{kb} : X \rightarrow Y\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$

- ① g_{kb} is INJECTIVE and has DISJOINT range with $g_{k,b \oplus 1}$
- ② INVERTIBLE using a trapdoor t_k [For $y = g_{kb}(x)$, $\text{INV}_G(t_k, b, y) = x$] for BPP machine.

- ③ EFFICIENTLY GENERATED: Efficient (BPP) algorithm GEN_G

$$(k, t_k) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_G(1^n)$$

- ⑦ Efficient BQP procedure SAMP_G that for ip x, k, b gives

$$|x>|b> \xrightarrow{\text{SAMP}_G(k, b)} |x>|g_{kb}(x)>$$

→ INJECTIVE INVARIANCE:

Given fn key k , it is computationally hard (for BQP) to determine whether it is from a CLAW-FREE FAMILY or INJECTIVE FN FAMILY.

→ Unfortunately we do not know to construct a TRAPDOOR CLAW-FREE FN FAMILY.
We'll address this later.

→ For now, **ASSUME** a TRAPDOOR CLAW FREE FAMILY F exists which satisfies.

(i) conditions ①, ②, ③, ④, ⑤, ⑥ in prev. page

(ii) is injective invariant with a TRAPDOOR INJECTIVE FN FAMILY G.

→ Design a MEASUREMENT PROTOCOL under this assumption.

MEASUREMENT PROTOCOL

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- V decides the basis for measurement $b \in \{0,1\}^n$
 $h_i=0 \rightarrow Z \text{ basis}, h_i=1 \rightarrow X \text{ basis}$
- P has a state S

PROTOCOL:

For $i=1$ to n

V has $h_i=0$ or 1

P has $S_i = \sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle$ (not necessarily pure, but for illustration purpose)

(1) V samples k_i, t_{k_i} from G if $h_i=0$ for $i=1$ to n
from F if $h_i=1$.

(2) V sends k_i to P for $i=1$ to n

(3) P constructs the following state using S_i

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|x|}} \sum_b \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |g_{kb}(x)\rangle \quad \text{if } h_i=0$$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|x|}} \sum_b \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |f_{kb}(x)\rangle \quad \text{if } h_i=1$$

Registers $\overbrace{\textcircled{1}}^{\text{---}} \overbrace{\textcircled{2}}^{\text{---}} \overbrace{\textcircled{3}}^{\text{---}}$

(4) P measures register $\textcircled{3}$ to get result " y_i " for $i=1$ to n
(5) P commits to " y_i " by sending it to V for $i=1$ to n

→ Commitment string

The state in $\textcircled{1}, \textcircled{2}$ is now
 $|b\rangle |x_{by}\rangle$ if $h_i=0$ $\sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle |x_{by}\rangle$ if $h_i=1$

(6) V decides to perform either a MEASUREMENT ROUND
or TEST ROUND

The yellow coloured states in this page are only for illustrative purposes.
and are true only when the i^{th} qubit is a pure state.

MEASUREMENT ROUND

- (M1) IP measures registers ①, ② in X basis.
- (M2) IP sends b'_i, d'_i to V to get results b'_i, d'_i resp. for $i=1$ to n
- (M3) If ($h_i=0$)
V ignores b'_i, d'_i
V computes $b_i, x_{b_i, y} = \text{INV}_S(y_i, t_{k_i})$
V stores $m_i = b'_i$
- If ($h_i=1$)
V computes $x_{0y}, x_{1y} = \text{INV}_F(y_i, t_{k_i})$
V stores $m_i = b'_i \oplus d'_i \cdot (x_{0y} \oplus x_{1y})$
- m_i is the measurement result. for $i=1$ to n

TEST ROUND

- (T1) IP measures registers ①, ② in Z basis
to get results b'_i, z'_i resp.] for $i=1$ to n
- (T2) IP sends b'_i, z'_i to V
- (T3) If ($h_i=0$)
V computes $b_i, x_{b_i y} = \text{invert}(y_i, t_{k_i})$
V tests if $b_i, x_{b_i y} == b'_i, z'_i$?] for $i=1$ to n
- If ($h_i=1$)
V computes $x_{0y}, x_{1y} = \text{invert}(y_i, t_{k_i})$
V tests if $(z'_i == x_{0y} \text{ AND } b'_i == 0)$
 OR
 $(z'_i == x_{1y} \text{ AND } b'_i == 1)$?
- V aborts the protocol (or rejects the input string)
if the test fails.

ILLUSTRATION OF MEASUREMENT PROTOCOL

→ For illustration purpose, we take an honest prover P_0 and the state S_i in its pure form.

$$S_i = \sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle$$

CASE I : $h_i = 0$

After step (3), P_0 has state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_b \sum_x \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |g_b(x)\rangle$

After step (5), P_0 has $|b\rangle |x_{by}\rangle$ for some b w.p. $|\alpha_b|^2$, $|x_i|^2$ resp.

In MEASUREMENT ROUND:

After step (M1), P_0 's result (b'_i, d_i) is irrelevant

After step (M3), $m_i = 0$ or 1 w.p. $|\alpha_b|^2$, $|x_i|^2$ resp.

$$\therefore D_{B, h_i=0} = \{|\alpha_b|^2, |x_i|^2\}$$

$$= D_{B, h_i=0} \quad \left\{ S_i = \sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle \right\}$$

The measurement probabilities match.

In TEST round,

After step (T1), P_0 gets $b'_i, x'_i = b, x_{by}$.

(T3), The test passes

CASE II: $h_i = 1$

After step (3), P_0 's state is $\frac{1}{\sqrt{M}} \sum_b \sum_x \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |f_{kb}(x)\rangle$

Step (5), P_0 's state is $\sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle |x_{by}\rangle$

In MEASUREMENT ROUND.

After step (M1), measuring in X basis

$$\text{measuring } \sum_b \alpha_b H |b\rangle \otimes H |x_{by}\rangle \text{ in Z basis}$$

$$\sum_b \alpha_b H |b\rangle \otimes H X^{x_{by}} |0\rangle$$

$$= \sum_b X_b H |b\rangle \otimes Z^{x_{by}} H |0\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} \sum_b \alpha_b H |b\rangle \otimes Z^{x_{by}} \frac{|d\rangle}{\sqrt{|X|}}$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} \frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|}} \sum_b \alpha_b (-1)^{d \cdot x_{by}} H |b\rangle \otimes |d\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} (H \otimes I) \sum_b (-1)^{d \cdot x_{by}} X_b |b\rangle \otimes |d\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|}}$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} (H \otimes I) (-1)^{d \cdot x_{by}} \sum_b Z^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{by})} \alpha_b |b\rangle \otimes |d\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|}}$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} H \underbrace{Z^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{by})}}_{\text{red}} \underbrace{\left[\sum_b \alpha_b |b\rangle \right]}_{\text{blue}} \otimes Z^{x_{ay}} \frac{|d\rangle}{\sqrt{|X|}}$$

$$= \sum_{d \in X} X^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{by})} H |0\rangle \otimes Z^{x_{ay}} \frac{|d\rangle}{\sqrt{|X|}}$$

Results in final state

$$\sum_{d \in X} \frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|}} \times^{d \cdot (kxy + x_i y)} \left[\sum_b \alpha'_b |b\rangle \right] \otimes Z^{xay} |d\rangle$$

$$\left[\alpha'_0 \triangleq \frac{\alpha_0 + \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}}, \alpha'_1 \triangleq \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right] = \sum_{d \in X} \sum_b \frac{\alpha'_b}{\sqrt{|X|}} (|b\rangle \oplus d \cdot (kxy + x_i y) \rangle \otimes |d\rangle)$$

Measuring registers ①, ② to be b'_i, d'_i

$$b'_i = \begin{cases} 0 + d \cdot (kxy + x_i y) & \text{w.p. } |\alpha'_0|^2 = \left| \frac{\alpha_0 + \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2 \\ 1 + d \cdot (kxy + x_i y) & \text{w.p. } |\alpha'_1|^2 = \left| \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2 \end{cases}$$

After step (M3),

$$m'_i = b'_i + d \cdot (kxy + x_i y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{w.p. } |\alpha'_0|^2 = \left| \frac{\alpha_0 + \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2 \\ 1 & \text{w.p. } |\alpha'_1|^2 = \left| \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2 \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow D_{P, h_i=1} = \left\{ \left| \frac{\alpha_0 + \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2, \left| \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_i}{\sqrt{2}} \right|^2 \right\}$$

$$= D_{S, h_i=1} \quad \left\{ S_i = \sum_b \alpha'_b |b\rangle \right\}$$

The measurement probabilities match

In TEST ROUND,

After step (T1), P0 gets $b'_i, x'_i = x_{b'_i} y$

In step (T3), V's test passes

The test passes.


GENERAL PROVER BEHAVIOUR

FOR HONEST PROVER P,

→ Say performs U_{C_0} unitary operation on an ancillary state $|0\rangle$ to get state S, where he measures reg ③ in Z basis

FOR GENERAL PROVER P,


- Performs unitary U_C before U_{C_0}
- Performs unitary U_T before test round (T1)
- Performs unitary U_M before measurement round (M1)



→ U_T, U_M act only on reg ①②
So they commute with measuring "y" in reg ③

EQUIVALENT BEHAVIOUR FOR GENERAL PROVER P

- Performs $V_b = U_T U_{C_0} U_C$ on initial state $|0\rangle$
- If it's a MEASUREMENT ROUND, P performs $U = U_M U_T^\dagger$ on his state at that time.
- No unitary operation in test round.



→ General prover P is characterised by (U_0, U)
 ↓
 IP characterised by CPTP maps (S_0, S)

UNDERLYING QUANTUM STATES

How do the states evolve for general prover IP?

→ IP begins with four registers.

- Reg ① of length "n" of committed qubits
- Reg ② of length "nw" of preimage registers
- Reg ③ of length "nw" of commitment strings
- Reg ④ all auxiliary things.

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1x27

1y7

fxn keys $|k\rangle$, ancillary bits, measurement results

$$k^n = R_1 R_2 \dots R_n$$

MEASUREMENT Protocol
Corresponding steps

PROTOCOL A

(1) Initially IP has an all zero state $|0\rangle^{\otimes e} \otimes |k\rangle^{(1),(2)}$

(2) IP performs $U_0 (|0\rangle^{\otimes e} \otimes |k\rangle) = U_{0k} (|0\rangle^{\otimes e}) \otimes |k\rangle^{(3)}$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|^n}} \sum_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} \sum_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle |x_1 x_2 \dots x_n\rangle \otimes |g_{kb_1}(x_1) f_{kb_2}(x_2) f_{kb_3}(x_3) \dots g_{kb_n}(x_n)\rangle |k\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes e}$$

$\hookrightarrow g_{kb_i}(x_i)$ or $f_{kb_i}(x_i)$ depending on $h_i = 0$ or 1

(3) IP measures Reg ③ completely in Z basis to obtain (4)
 $y^n = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Y}^n$

(4) IP sends y^n to V (5)

(5) TEST ROUND : IP measures Reg ①,② and send results to V one by one for $1 \leq i \leq n$ (T1), (T2)

MEASUREMENT ROUND:

(6) IP applies unitary U to his state $\text{reg}_1 \oplus \text{reg}_2$

(7) IP measures $\text{reg}_1 \oplus \text{reg}_2$ in X basis.
and sends the results b'_i, d'_i to V
one by one for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

→ V gets $m_i = b'_i \oplus d_i \cdot (x_{k_{i,0}} + x_{k_{i,1}})$ or b'_i
Return (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n) depending on $d_i = 0$ or 1

GOAL: To show that the measurement statistic obtained by V
for prover IP following Protocol A = $D_{IP,h}$

is equivalent to the measurement stats of measuring
SOME quantum state S in basis h. : $D_{S,h}$

$$D_{IP,h} \sim D_{S,h}$$

Towards this goal we prove

Claim I

For IP characterised by (U_0, U)

where U is trivial (U commutes with measurement of
 reg_1 in Z basis)

$$\exists S \text{ s.t. } D_{IP,h} \sim D_{S,h}$$

Claim II

For all IP' characterised by (U_0, U)

\exists IP characterised by (\bar{U}_0, \bar{U}) s.t. \bar{U} is trivial.

$$\text{and } D_{IP',h} \sim D_{IP,h}$$

PROOF OF CLAIM I

→ We construct a series of protocols which all return the same measurement statistic as S , Protocol A

→ Protocol B

1. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, Sample $(R_i, t_{k_i}) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_F(1^{\lambda})$
2. Designate $\text{req}①, \text{req}②, \text{req}③, \text{req}④$ like in protocol A
- 3.

Perform unitary U_0 on $|0\rangle^{\otimes n} \otimes |R\rangle$ to get

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|^n}} \sum_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} \sum_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle |x_1 x_2 \dots x_n\rangle \otimes f_{b_1 b_2}(x_1) f_{b_2 b_3}(x_2) \dots f_{b_n b_1}(x_n)$$

4. Measure $\text{req}③$ completely to get y^n
5. Apply unitary U to $\text{reqs } ① \& ②$
6. Measure $\text{req}②$ in X basis to get $d_1 d_2 \dots d_n \in \{0, 1\}^w$
7. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, use t_{k_i} to get x_{0y_i}, x_{1y_i}
Apply $Z^{d_i} (x_{0y_i} + x_{1y_i})$ to the i th committed qubit in $\text{req}①$

→ Define the resulting state as S .

→ Measure the resulting $\text{req}①$, each qubit one by one to get m_i .
Return (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n)

→ with statistic $D_{S,h}$.

→ Observe that the state S prepared above is same irrespective of the bases states h .

→ Protocol C

1. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, sample $(k_i, t_{k_i}) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_f(i)$
2. If $t_{k_i} = 0$, forget t_{k_i}
3. Designate $\text{req}(1), \text{req}(2), \text{req}(3), \text{req}(4)$ like in protocol B
4. Perform unitary U_0 on $|0\rangle^{\otimes n} \otimes |R\rangle$ to get

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|^n}} \sum_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} \sum_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle |x_1 x_2 \dots x_n\rangle \otimes |f_{k_1 b_1}(x_1) f_{k_2 b_2}(x_2) \dots f_{k_n b_n}(x_n)\rangle$$

5 Measure $\text{req}(3)$ completely to get y^n

6 Apply unitary U to $\text{reqs } 1 \& 2$

7 Measure $\text{req}(2)$ in X basis to get $d_1 d_2 \dots d_n \in \{0, 1\}^n$

8 For $1 \leq i \leq n$,

→ If $(h_i = 1)$

 use t_{k_i} to get $x_0 y_i, x_1 y_i$
 Apply $Z^{d_i} (x_0 y_i + x_1 y_i)$ to the i th committed qubit in $\text{req}(1)$

→ If $(h_i = 0)$

 Don't do anything.

→ Define the resulting state as $S_L^{(1)}$

→ Measure the resulting $\text{req}(1)$, each qubit one by one to get m_i .
 Return (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n)

 ↗ with statistic $D_{S_L^{(1)}, h}$

→ Unlike S of protocol B, $S_L^{(1)}$ here depends on the basis states.

→ Protocol B differs from Protocol C only at step 8 (of C), step 7 (of B) when $h_i = 0$.

 where a Z operator is applied in protocol C.
 But it doesn't make any difference in the measurement result, since we measure in Z basis itself.

⇒ $D_{S_L^{(1)}, h} = D_{S_B^{(1)}, h}$

→ Protocol D

1. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, $(k_i, t_{ki}) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_F(1^{\lambda})$ if $h_i = 1$
 $(k_i, t_{ki}) \leftarrow \text{GEN}_G(1^{\lambda})$ if $h_i = 0$ and discard t_{ki}
2. Designate $\text{req}①, \text{req}②, \text{req}③, \text{req}④$ like in protocol C
3. Perform unitary U_0 on $|0\rangle^{\otimes n} \otimes |R\rangle$ to get

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X|^n}} \sum_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} \sum_{x_1 x_2 \dots x_n} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle |x_1 x_2 \dots x_n\rangle \otimes |g_{h_1}(x_1) f_{kb_1}(x_2) g_{h_2}(x_3) \dots f_{kb_n}(x_n)\rangle$$

depends on h_i

4. Measure y^n $\text{req}③$ completely to get y^n
5. Apply unitary U to $\text{reqs } ① \& ②$
6. Measure $\text{req}②$ in X basis to get $d_1 d_2 \dots d_n \in \{0, 1\}^w$
7. For $1 \leq i \leq n$,
 \rightarrow If $(h_i = 1)$

use t_{ki} to get x_{0,y_i}, x_{1,y_i}
 Apply $\sum d_i (x_{0,y_i} + x_{1,y_i})$ to the i^{th} committed qubit in $\text{req}①$
 \rightarrow If $(h_i = 0)$
 Don't do anything.

→ Define the resulting state as $S_h^{(2)}$

→ Measure the resulting $\text{req}①$, each qubit one by one to get m_i .
 Return (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n) ↪ with statistic $D_{S_h^{(2)}, h}$

→ $S_h^{(2)}$ also depends on the bases h .

→ Protocol D differs from Protocol C only at step 1, where the keys are sampled from F and G separately.
 For $h_i = 0$, since t_{ki} is unknown, from the computational indistinguishability of FG, (INJECTIVE INVARIANCE property)

$$|D_{S_h^{(1)}, h} - D_{S_h^{(2)}, h}| \leq \lambda(n) \quad \Rightarrow \quad D_{S_h^{(1)}, h} \sim D_{S_h^{(2)}, h}$$

negligible fn

→ So far, we have $D_{S,h} = D_{S_h^{(0)},h} \sim D_{S_h^{(1)},h} \stackrel{?}{=} D_{P,h}$
 ↑
 to prove

→ Compare Protocol **D** and Protocol **A**. on a case by case basis.
 The two differ in steps 6,7 (of **D**) and step 7 (of **A**)

Case I: $h_i=0$.

Analyzing **Protocol A**, the result of step(7) and the measurement by V is

(if the state before step 5 is $|s'\rangle$ after measuring y_i
 $m_i = b_i$ (which is obtained by $\text{INV}_G(t_{k_i}, y_i)$)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{The state is } & \sum_{b_i : k_i \in F} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle \otimes |x_{k_i, y_i}\rangle \\ &= |b_j\rangle \left(\sum_{i \neq j} \alpha_{b_1 b_2 \dots b_n} |b_1 b_2 \dots b_n\rangle \otimes |x\right) \end{aligned}$$

In **Protocol D**, the measurement m_i is by measuring in Z basis,

$$(Z \otimes H) U(s')$$

Since V is trivial, measurement in Z basis shouldn't affect the measurement. (in **reg A**)

So m_i is also same as measuring s' in Z basis directly, which results in outcome b_i exactly.

Case II: $h_i=1$.

Protocol **A** & **D** differ at steps 7 and the measurement basis.

In **Protocol A**,

we measure in X basis,
 and then apply $X^{d_i \cdot (x_{k_i,0} + x_{k_i,1})}$ decoding operator

$$\begin{aligned} &\equiv \text{measuring } X^{d_i \cdot (x_{k_i,0} + x_{k_i,1})} H(s) \text{ in } Z \text{ basis} \\ &\equiv H Z^{d_i \cdot (x_{k_i,0} + x_{k_i,1})}(s) \text{ in } Z \text{ basis.} \\ &\equiv Z^{d_i \cdot (x_{k_i,0} + x_{k_i,1})}(s) \text{ in } X \text{ basis} \end{aligned}$$

which is what is happening in **Protocol D**.

$$\Rightarrow D_{S_h^{(2)}, h} = D_{P_h}$$

■

→ From other previous results, $D_{S_h} = D_{S_h^{(1)}, h} \sim D_{S_h^{(2)}, h} = D_{P_h}$

$$\rightarrow D_{S_h} \sim D_{P_h}.$$

PROOF OF CLAIM II

→ Crucially we have a prover P characterised by (V_0, S) who acc to **Protocol R**, results in distribution $D_{P,h}$. We would like to show that another prover P' characterised by (V_0, S') where S' is trivial, also results in distribution $D_{P',h}$ same as $D_{P,h}$.

→ More formally,

For $S = \{B_z\}_z$ of prover P characterised by (V_0, S)
 $\exists S_j = \{B'_{j,x,z}\}_{x \in \{0,1\}, z}$ of prover P_j char. by (V_0, S_j)

$$\text{S1. } B_z = \sum_{x, z \in \{0,1\}} X^z Z^z \otimes B_{j,x,z} \quad \text{and} \quad D_{P,h} = D_{P'_j, h}$$

$$B'_{j,x,z} = \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}} Z^z \otimes B_{j,x,z}$$

$[B_z, B_{j,x,z}]$ are rearranged so that $X^z Z^z, Z^z$ act on the j^{th} qubit of reg ①.

→ Clearly S_j is trivial wrt. j^{th} qubit.

→ We can do this reduction one-by-one for every qubit, and the final CPTP map will be trivial wrt all qubits.

→ We do the proof for $j=1$.

CASE I: $h_1 = 0$

$D_{P,h}, D_{P'_j, h}$ are trivially equal because, the attack S happens after measurement of ' y ' and doesn't affect the measurement output.

CASE II: $b_j = 1$

→ The state after Step ④ should be

$$\sum_{b \in \{0,1\}^3} |b, x_{by}\rangle |\Psi_{b,y,k}\rangle |y\rangle \quad \text{s.t. } f_{kb}(x_{by}) = y.$$

↳ correspond to the $i=2, 3, \dots, n$ registers

If $P(\alpha P_j)$ has to pass the Test Round.

$$S_{yk} = \left[\sum_{\substack{b_1 \in \{0,1\} \\ b_2}} |b_1, x_{by}\rangle \langle b_2, x_{by}| \otimes |\Psi_{b_2,yk}\rangle \langle \Psi_{b_2,yk}| \right] \otimes |y\rangle \langle y|$$

→ Now, in measurement round, for prover IP, the state is Step ⑥

$$\sum_{\tau} B_{\tau} S_{yk} B_{\tau}^+$$

→ Measuring in X basis, \equiv Applying H gate and measuring in Z basis Step ⑦

$$\sum_{\tau} (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) B_{\tau} S_{yk} B_{\tau}^+ (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I)$$

→ Decoding operator XORing with $d \cdot (x_{by} + x_{iy})$

$$\sum_{\tau} (X^{d \cdot (x_{by} + x_{iy})} \otimes I) (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) B_{\tau} S_{yk} B_{\tau}^+ (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{by} + x_{iy})} \otimes I)$$

for the measurement results "d" on reg ②

→ The distribution state is (applying projection operators

$$\sigma_{IP,k} = \sum_{b,d,\tau} ((|b\rangle \langle b| \otimes |d\rangle \langle d| \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{by} + x_{iy})} \otimes I) (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) B_{\tau} S_{yk} B_{\tau}^+ (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{by} + x_{iy})} \otimes I) (|b\rangle \langle b| \otimes |d\rangle \langle d| \otimes I))$$

$$= \sum_{b,d,\tau} O_{b,d,(x_{by} + x_{iy}),d,\tau} S_{yk} O_{b,d,(x_{by} + x_{iy}),d,\tau}^+$$

where

$$O_{b,c,d,\tau} := (|b\rangle\langle b| \otimes |d\rangle\langle d| \otimes I) (X^c \otimes I) (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) B_\tau$$

→ Say prover \hat{P}_i is characterised by $(U_0, \{Z \otimes I\} S \{Z \otimes I\})$

→ Similarly the final distribution state for prover \hat{P}_i is

$$\sigma_{\hat{P}_i, k} = \sum_{bd\tau} (|b\rangle\langle b| \otimes |d\rangle\langle d| \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy})} \otimes I) (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) \\ (Z \otimes I) B_\tau (Z \otimes I) S (Z \otimes I) B_\tau^\dagger (Z \otimes I) \\ (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy})} \otimes I) (|b\rangle\langle b| \otimes |d\rangle\langle d| \otimes I)$$

$$[HZ = XH]$$

$$= \sum_{bd\tau} (|b\rangle\langle b| \otimes |d\rangle\langle d| \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy}) + c} \otimes I) B_\tau \\ (Z \otimes I) S (Z \otimes I)$$

$$B_\tau^\dagger (H^{\otimes l+1} \otimes I) (X^{d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy}) + c} \otimes I) (|b\rangle\langle b| \otimes |d\rangle\langle d| \otimes I)$$

$$= \sum_{bd\tau} O_{b,d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy}) + 1, d, \tau} (Z \otimes I) S (Z \otimes I) O_{b,d \cdot (x_{ay} + x_{iy}) + 1, d, \tau}^\dagger$$

→ We know prover P_i is characterized by $(U_0, \{B'_x\}_{x \in \{0, 1, \tau\}})$

→ We have a Z-Pauli Twirl measurement result. (proven later)

When followed by Hadamard measurement, the CPTP attacks

$$\left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (Z^n \otimes I) B_\tau (Z^n \otimes I) \right\}_{n \in \{0, 1, \tau\}} \equiv \left\{ B'_{x, \tau} \right\}_{x \in \{0, 1\}, \tau}$$

\rightarrow So power P_i is characterised by $(V_0, \left\{ \frac{1}{2^n} (Z^n \otimes I) B_z (Z^n \otimes I) \right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}})$

It looks like the CPTP of P_i is an average of P and of \hat{P}_i .

$$\rightarrow P_{i,h} = \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d(x+y+xy), d, \tau} e_{yk} O_{b,d(x+y+xy), d, \tau}^+ + \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d((xy+x)y)+1, d, \tau} (Z \otimes I) e_{yk} (Z \otimes I) O_{b,d((xy+x)y)+1, d, \tau}^+ \right) \right) \\ = \frac{1}{2} (P_{i,h} + \sigma_{P_i, h})$$

\rightarrow It suffices to show now that $\sigma_{P_i, h}$ is computationally indistinguishable from $\sigma_{\hat{P}_i, h}$.

$$\sigma_{0,k} := \sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d(x+y+xy), d, \tau} e_{yk} O_{b,d(x+y+xy), d, \tau}^+$$

$$\sigma_{1,k} := \sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d((xy+x)y)+1, d, \tau} (Z \otimes I) e_{yk} (Z \otimes I) O_{b,d((xy+x)y)+1, d, \tau}^+$$

$$\sigma_{g_i/k} = \sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d(x+y+xy)+k, d, \tau} (Z^n \otimes I) e_{yk} (Z \otimes I) O_{b,d(x+y+xy)+k, d, \tau}^+$$

$$\sigma_{g_i} := \sum_k D_{V,h}(k) \sigma_{g_i/k}$$

$$\rightarrow S_{yk} = \sum_{b_1, b_2} |b_1, x_{by}\rangle \langle b_2, x_{by}| \otimes |\psi_{byk}\rangle \langle \psi_{byk}| \otimes |y\rangle \langle y| \\ = \sum_b |b\rangle \langle b| \otimes |x_{by}\rangle \langle x_{by}| \otimes |\psi_{byk}\rangle \langle \psi_{byk}| \otimes |y\rangle \langle y| \quad \begin{matrix} \text{Diagonal terms} \\ \xrightarrow{\text{S}^D_{yk}} \end{matrix} \\ + \sum_b |b\rangle \langle b+1| \otimes |x_{by}\rangle \langle x_{b+1,y}| \otimes |\psi_{byk}\rangle \langle \psi_{b+1,yk}| \otimes |y\rangle \langle y| \quad \begin{matrix} \downarrow \text{Cross-terms} \\ \xrightarrow{\text{S}^C_{yk}} \end{matrix} \\ = S^D_{yk} + S^C_{yk}$$

$$\rightarrow \sigma_{g_i k} = \sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} (Z^n \otimes I) (S^D_{yk} + S^C_{yk}) (Z^n \otimes I) O_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}}^+ \\ = \sum_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}} (S^D_{yk} + (-1)^n S^C_{yk}) O_{b,d \in \mathbb{C}}^+ \\ = \sigma_{g_i k}^D + \sigma_{g_i k}^C$$

$$\begin{cases} Z|b\rangle \langle b|Z = |b\rangle \langle b| \\ Z|b\rangle \langle b+1|Z = -|b\rangle \langle b+1| \end{cases}$$

$$\rightarrow \sigma_{0k}^D = \sum_{b \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b \in \mathbb{C}} S_{0k}^D O_{b \in \mathbb{C}}^\dagger$$

$$\sigma_{0k}^C = \sum_{b \in \mathbb{C}} O_{b \in \mathbb{C}} (-1)^b S_{0k}^C O_{b \in \mathbb{C}}^\dagger$$

$\rightarrow \sigma_{0k}, \sigma_{1k}$'s first qubit denotes the measurement statistics with operators P, \hat{P} , respectively.

$$\text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_1} [\sigma_{0k}] = \sum_m D_{P, h_1}(m) |m\rangle\langle m|$$

$$\text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_1} [\sigma_{1k}] = \sum_m D_{P, h_2}(m) |m\rangle\langle m|$$

$D_{P, h_1} \sim D_{P, h_2} \iff \sigma_{0k}, \sigma_{1k}$ are computationally indistinguishable

\rightarrow To prove: σ_{0k}, σ_{1k} are computationally indistinguishable

\Rightarrow (1) $\sigma_{0k}^D, \sigma_{1k}^D$ are computationally indistinguishable
 (2) $\sigma_{0k}^C, \sigma_{1k}^C$ are computationally indistinguishable.

\rightarrow (1) $\sigma_{0k}^D, \sigma_{1k}^D$ are computationally indistinguishable

Proof: Assume not.

i.e., \exists procedure \mathcal{S} that distinguishes them
 i.e., \exists a CPTP map S which when passed through a state σ and then measuring (the first qubit) is able to find out if $\sigma = \sigma_{0k}^D$ or σ_{1k}^D .

$$|\text{Tr}(|0\rangle\langle 0| \otimes I) S (\sigma_{0k}^D - \sigma_{1k}^D)| \geq \lambda(n)$$

\hookrightarrow not a negligible-fn.

(Idea: Use \mathcal{S} to violate the hardcore bit property of \mathcal{F}).