

Persuasion

Now in its sixth edition, *Persuasion: Social Influence and Compliance Gaining* continues to boast an accessible voice and vibrant aesthetic that appeals to undergraduate students of communication, psychology, advertising, and marketing. In addition to presenting established theories and models, this text encourages students to develop and apply general conclusions about persuasion in real-world settings. Along the way, students are introduced to the practice of social influence in an array of contexts (e.g., advertising, marketing, politics, interpersonal relationships, social media, groups) and across a variety of topics (e.g., credibility, personality, deception, motivational appeals, visual persuasion). The new edition features an expanded treatment of digital and social media, up-to-date research on theory and practice, and enhanced discussions of topics such as political campaigning, emotional marketing, olfactory influence, and ethics. Instructors can also use the book's downloadable test bank, instructor's manual, and PowerPoint slides in preparing course material.

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Persuasion

Social Influence and
Compliance Gaining

Sixth Edition

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*To Banjo and Julep, my two English Setters, who
keep me company when I'm writing at home.*

Bob Gass

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knowing that self-concept is the proper starting
place.*

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*To our families—Susan, Jordan, Graham,
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without us when we were writing and for putting
up with us when we weren't.*

Robert Gass and John Seiter

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Preface for the Sixth Edition

PErsuasion continues to occupy the attention of academics and non-academics alike. Not only scholars, but practitioners such as advertisers, lawyers, lobbyists, marketing firms, motivational speakers, politicians, public relations experts, social activists, syndicated columnists, and others have a vested interest in knowing how persuasion works. Therefore, students who aspire to careers in any of the “people professions” would be wise to acquire a basic understanding of how persuasion functions.

With each edition of this text, we marvel at how much persuasion changes over time, yet still remains the same. For example, controversies over “fake news” have altered the way people perceive facts and assess source credibility. Even so, credibility remains as central to the process of persuasion as ever. It is *perceived* credibility that counts. The credibility of news sources is in the eye of the beholder.

The observation that “the more persuasion changes, the more it remains the same” applies to almost every aspect of persuasion. Compliance-gaining strategies such as the “foot in the door” now occur in online settings. Audience analysis is key to persuasion, but rather than examining demographic data, persuaders can now use *microtargeting* to tailor their messages to niche groups. For example, in the 2016 presidential election, rumors swirled that Cambridge Analytica, a company that specializes in opinion mining and data analysis, identified low-information voters in key swing states and bombarded them with highly targeted messages (Confessore & Hakim, 2017). Product placement, once only found on television and in movies, is now prevalent in novels, pop music, and virtual environments such as computer games. Fear appeals, long a staple of persuaders, have moved online. In addition to being fearful of Ebola, terrorism, and clowns, we can now be worried about cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and whatever diet and nutrition advice Gwyneth Paltrow is about to post.

In this edition, we address the increasing importance of digital and online persuasion, while emphasizing the importance of traditional forms of persuasion as well. Since the last edition, digital persuasion has come into its own. On social media, pop-up ads and banners have given way to more sophisticated forms of marketing, such as *webtracking* (Avergin, 2016). Using third-party cookies, *canvas fingerprinting* (Kirk, 2014), and other techniques, Web marketers can follow users’ activities across websites. “Like” a bluegrass video on YouTube, “follow” a fiddle player on Facebook, or post some banjo pictures on Instagram, and you’ll start getting messages about hoedowns and honky-tonks in your area.

Persuasion on the Web also relies on *sentiment tracking* or *opinion mining*. For example, using natural language processing software, millions of tweets can be analyzed to see what topics, people, or brands are trending and what emotion-laden

words or emojis are being used in connection with those topics or issues. Insights about political preferences, brand images, and economic trends can be gleaned from the results. As Bannister (2015) noted, “shifts in sentiment on social media have been shown to correlate with shifts in the stock market” (para. 3).

The widespread use of mobile technology has also been accompanied by increasing apps and techniques designed to influence. Texting, tweeting, and other apps disseminate word-of-mouth (WOM) messages. WOM is perceived by many as more genuine, authentic, and trustworthy than commercial advertising or expert opinions. Of course, marketers can sneak into these conversations via sponsored tweets and promoted posts. In many ways, social media has become a form of *mass interpersonal persuasion*. Posting a picture on Instagram may seem interpersonal in nature, but posts can be shared far beyond one’s social network. Just ask Anthony Weiner.

Despite the advent of digital and social media, most of us still live in a face-to-face world, too. Traditional forms of influence still matter, and interacting “in person” is by far the most effective way to persuade other people. A retail salesperson talking to a customer has a much greater chance of success than a pop-up ad reminding you about the last item you viewed on Amazon.com. That said, we often underestimate our effectiveness in one-on-one-settings. For example, Roghanizad and Bohns (2017) found that when people were asked to judge their influence via email versus in person, they overestimated the former and underestimated the latter. Groups, too, exert enormous influence over people. Whether within a family, a classroom, a workplace, at a coffee shop with friends, or some other group setting, the pressure to conform or risk being isolated is potent. Mass persuasion has greater reach, but less effectiveness.

As long as humans occupy planet Earth, they will be engaged in persuading one another. If apes or machines do take over one day, who can say? For now, we believe a solid understanding of persuasion, social influence, and compliance gaining will be an asset in this world. With that in mind, we hope you catch our enthusiasm for this field of study and turn the pages of this book with a better understanding of how persuasion functions, an improved knowledge of ways to maximize your own persuasion efforts, and a greater ability to resist influence attempts, especially unscrupulous influence attempts, by others.

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ONE OF THE AUTHORS was enjoying a day at the beach with his family. As he sat in a folding chair, lost in a good book, he could hear the cries of seagulls overhead and the pounding of the surf. Nothing was bothering him. He was oblivious to the world around him. Or so he thought. As he reflected more on the situation, however, he became aware that he was being bombarded by persuasive messages on all sides. A boom box was playing a few yards away. During commercial breaks, various ads tried to convince him to choose a new cellphone provider, switch auto insurance companies, and try a hot, spicy cheeseburger. A nearby sign warned that no alcohol, glass objects, or smoking were permitted on the beach. A plastic bag in which a nearby family's children had brought their beach toys advertised Walmart on its side. The family picnic cooler proudly displayed its manufacturer, Igloo, as well.

And that was only the beginning. A plane flew overhead, trailing a banner that advertised a collect calling service. The lifeguard's tower displayed a Hurley logo. Their swimsuits were sponsored by Izod. The lifeguard's truck, a specially equipped Toyota, announced that it was the "official emergency vehicle" of "Surf City USA," a moniker trademarked by the city of Huntington Beach, California. Oh, the indignity of being rescued by an unofficial vehicle.

There were oral influence attempts, too. His son tried to lure him into the water by saying, "Come on, it's not that cold." But he knew better. His son *always* said that, no matter how cold the water was. "Would you mind keeping an eye on our things?" the family next to the author's asked. I guess our family looks trustworthy, he thought. His wife asked him, "Do you want to walk down to the pier? They have frozen bananas." She knew he would be unable to resist the temptation.

And those were only the overt persuasive messages. A host of more subtle messages also competed for the author's attention. A few yards away, a woman was applying sun block to her neck and shoulders. The author decided he'd better do the same. Had she nonverbally influenced him to do likewise? Nearby, a young couple was soaking up the sun. Both were wearing hats with the Nike "swoosh" logo. Were they "advertising" that brand? A young man with a boogie board ran by, headed for the water. His head was shaved and he sported a goodly amount of body art. Did his appearance advocate a particular set of values or tastes? Was he a billboard for an "alternative" lifestyle? A half dozen male heads turned in unison as a trio of bikini-clad women walked by. Were the males "persuaded" to turn their heads or was this simply an involuntary reflex? Two tan, muscular dudes were tossing a Frisbee back and forth. Both had six-pack abs. The author made a mental note to do more sit-ups. There seemed to be as many persuasive messages, or potentially persuasive messages, as there were shells on the beach.

The preceding examples raise two important issues. First, persuasion and social influence are pervasive. We are surrounded by influence attempts, both explicit and implicit, no matter where we are. As Cascio, Scholz, and Falk emphasize (2015):

social influence is omnipresent, occurring through implicit observation of cultural norms, face-to-face and mediated interpersonal communication, as well as mass mediated communication. Even though individuals are often unaware of the power of social influence, research shows its effects on behavior in a wide variety of circumstances.

(p. 51)

Second, it is difficult to say with any certainty what is and is not “persuasion.” Where should we draw the line between persuasion and other forms of communication? We address the first of these issues in this chapter. Here we examine the pervasive nature of persuasion and offer a rationale for learning more about its workings. In the next chapter, we tackle the issue of what constitutes *persuasion* and related terms such as *social influence* and *compliance gaining*.

AIMS AND GOALS

This is a book about persuasion. Its aims are at once academic and practical. On the academic side, we examine how and why persuasion functions the way it does. In so doing, we identify some of the most recent theories and findings by persuasion researchers. On the practical side, we illustrate these theories and findings with a host of real-life examples. We also offer useful advice on how to become a more effective persuader and how to resist influence attempts, especially unethical influence attempts, by others.

If learning how to persuade seems a bit manipulative, remember, we don’t live in a society populated with unicorns and rainbows. The real world is brimming with persuaders. You can avoid learning about persuasion, perhaps, but you can’t avoid persuasion itself. Besides, we can’t tell you everything there is to know about persuasion. Nobody knows all there is to know about this subject. One of the points we stress throughout this book is that people aren’t that easy to persuade. Human beings are complex. They can be stubborn, unpredictable, and intractable, despite the best efforts of persuaders.

Persuasion is still as much an “art” as it is a “science.” Human nature is too complicated, and our understanding of persuasion too limited, to be certain which influence attempts will succeed and which will fail. Think how often you flip the channel when a commercial costing millions of dollars to produce and air appears on television. As one advertising executive put it, “half the money I spend on advertising is wasted . . . but I don’t know which half” (cited in Berger, 2011, p. 1). Think how many candidates for public office have spent fortunes campaigning, only to lose their elections. Or think how difficult it is for the federal government to convince people to stop smoking, practice safe sex, or avoid texting while driving—behaviors that are in their own self-interest.

The science of persuasion is still in its infancy. Despite P. T. Barnum’s axiom that “there’s a sucker born every minute,” people are uncannily perceptive at times. It is tempting to believe that if one only knew the right button to push, one could persuade anybody. More often than not, though, there are multiple buttons to push, in the right sequence, and the sequence is constantly changing. Even so, persuasion is not entirely a matter of luck. Much is known about persuasion. Persuasion has been scientifically studied since the 1940s.¹ Written texts on persuasion date back to ancient Greece.² A host of strategies and techniques have been identified and their effectiveness or ineffectiveness documented. Persuaders are a long way from achieving an Orwellian nightmare of thought control, but a good deal is known about how to capture people’s hearts and minds. Before proceeding further, we want to address a common negative stereotype about persuasion.

PERSUASION IS NOT A DIRTY WORD

The study of persuasion has gotten some bad publicity over the years. Everyone seems to agree that the subject is fascinating, but some are reluctant to embrace a field of study that conjures up images of manipulation, deceit, or brainwashing. There is, after all, a sinister side to persuasion. Adolf Hitler, Charles Manson, Jim Jones, David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite, and Osama bin Laden were all accomplished persuaders—much to the detriment of their followers.³ We, however, do not think of persuasion as the ugly stepsister in the family of human communication. Rather, we find the study of persuasion to be enormously intriguing. Persuasion is the backbone of many communicative endeavors. We can't resist the urge to learn more about how and why it works. Part of our fascination stems from the fact that persuasion is, on occasion, used for unsavory ends. It is therefore all the more important that researchers learn as much as they can about the strategies and tactics of unethical persuaders.

PERSUASION IS OUR FRIEND

Persuasion isn't merely a tool used by con artists, chiselers, charlatans, cheats, connivers, and cult leaders. Nobel Peace Prize recipients and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalists are also persuaders. In fact, most “professional” persuaders are engaged in socially acceptable, if not downright respectable, careers. They include advertising executives, bloggers, campaign managers, celebrity endorsers, clergy, congresspersons, diplomats, infomercial spokespersons, lawyers, lobbyists, mediators, media pundits, motivational speakers, political cartoonists, press secretaries, public relations experts, radio talk-show hosts, recruiters, salespersons, senators, social activists, syndicated columnists, and whistleblowers, to name just a few.

Let's focus on the positive side of persuasion for a moment. Persuasion helps forge peace agreements between nations. Persuasion helps expose corruption and open up closed societies. Persuasion is crucial to the fundraising efforts of charities and philanthropic organizations. Persuasion convinces motorists to buckle up when driving or refrain from driving when they've had a few too many. Persuasion is used to convince a substance-abusing family member to seek professional help. Persuasion is how the coach of an underdog team inspires the players to give it their all. Persuasion is a tool used by parents to urge children not to accept rides from strangers or to allow anyone to touch them inappropriately. In short, persuasion is the cornerstone of a number of positive, prosocial endeavors. *Very little of the good that we see in the world could be accomplished without persuasion.*

Persuasion, then, is a powerful and often prosocial force. Having highlighted the positive side of persuasion, we address the question of *why* the study of persuasion is so valuable. The next section, therefore, offers a justification for the study of social influence.

THE PERVERSIVENESS OF PERSUASION: YOU CAN RUN BUT YOU CAN'T HIDE

We've already mentioned one of the primary reasons for learning about this subject: Persuasion is a central feature of every sphere of human communication. The same is true of social influence. We can't avoid it. We can't make it go away. Like Elvis impersonators in Las Vegas, persuasion is here to stay. Various estimates suggest that the average person is exposed to anywhere from 300 to 5,000 messages per day.⁴ There are more ways to persuade than ever before. Indeed, traditional persuasion in the form of political speeches, television commercials, print ads, billboards, and product placements in movies and television is alive and well. So too are protest marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms of symbolic action. In the last two decades, social media has been added to the mix. You can submit online reviews of products and services, post a YouTube video advocating your message, engage in *hashtag activism*, advocate a cause via Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram, solicit funding via crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter or GoFundMe, or promote change through a website such as www.change.org or www.dosomething.org. Let's consider one of these pervasive strategies, known as *viral persuasion*, more closely.

Tipping Points, Buzz Marketing, and Word of Mouth

Key concepts and principles associated with viral persuasion were laid out by Malcolm Gladwell in his bestseller, *The Tipping Point* (2000). Gladwell likens word-of-mouth (WOM) to a virus through which a message is spread until the whole society is "infected." Based on what he calls "*the law of the few*," a small number of influential people can generate a groundswell of support for an idea, brand, or phenomenon. If a message gains sufficient traction, it reaches a tipping point and becomes "contagious." In order to reach the tipping point, however, a number of things have to happen.

Über Influencers

First, the right kinds of people must be involved. Gladwell identifies three types of people who are essential to the process. *Mavens* possess specialized expertise. They are in the know. They may be celebrity chefs, fashionistas, fitness gurus, tech geeks, or wine snobs. Mavens needn't be rich or famous, but they must be ahead of the curve. They are the early adopters, opinion leaders, or what some call *alpha consumers*, the ones who hear about ideas and try out gadgets first. "One American in ten," Keller and Barry (2003) maintain, "tells the other nine how to vote, where to eat, and what to buy" (p. 1).

In addition to mavens, Gladwell states that *connectors* are also essential. Based on the viral metaphor, they are carriers. They have large social networks. When connectors learn from mavens what the "next big thing" is, they spread the word. Since social circles tend to be overlapping, forwarding messages spreads them increasingly outward from their epicenter.

The last type Gladwell identifies is *salespeople*. They receive the message from a connector and then talk it up within their own circle of friends. Salespeople tell their friends, "You must see this movie," "You've got to try this restaurant," or "You gotta read this book."



FIGURE 1.1
ALS ice-bucket challenge in New York City.
Source: Saklova/
Shutterstock.com

Orchestrating the Next Big Thing

In addition to having the right kinds of people, some additional conditions must be satisfied for an idea to go viral. *Context* is critical. The idea must come along at the right time and place. Twitter, for example, wouldn't have worked before there was widespread mobile access to the Internet. An idea also must possess *stickiness*, which means that it is inherently attractive. Without some sort of natural appeal, people won't gravitate toward the idea or pass it along (Heath & Heath, 2008). For example, in 2014, the ALS water bucket challenge, which dared people to dump ice water over their own or other people's heads, went viral, raising over \$100 million in the USA alone (www.als.org). Its stickiness was based, in part, on its eye-catching appeal, its urgency (there was a 24-hour deadline to respond), and the fact that it was for a good cause.

Scalability is another requirement: It must be easy to ramp up production of the idea, product, or message to meet demand. The ice-bucket challenge met this requirement because almost everyone can find a bucket and some ice. Finally, *effortless transfer* is yet another ingredient in the recipe for an effective viral campaign. A viral campaign has to leverage free media. Ideas that can be spread by forwarding an email, including an attachment, or embedding a link are easy to disseminate. The more time, effort, or money it takes to spread the word, the less likely the idea will go viral. In the ice-bucket campaign, most challenges were issued from one friend to another via video.

Infectious or Inexplicable?

Although viral marketing holds considerable potential, it is often a hit-or-miss strategy, with far more misses than hits. What's more, evidence for the effectiveness of tipping points is largely anecdotal, and there is no guarantee that an idea will gain traction. If one does, its shelf life is often limited. The ice-bucket challenge, for example, came and went in a few months. And flash mobs, another approach to viral marketing, were a flash in the pan.

The Word of Mouth Marketing Association (WOMM) offers advice for conducting viral campaigns. The very concept of viral marketing, however, is something of an oxymoron. A viral campaign is planned to appear unplanned. It is contrived to seem genuine. As consumers grow wise to the strategy, it will become less effective. There are also ethical questions about using friends as shills. The FTC now requires any online endorsement that involves compensation to be disclosed (Sprague & Wells, 2010).

Nudges: Sometimes Less Is More


The ubiquitous nature of persuasion is also illustrated by *nudge theory*, developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008). They maintain that subtle changes in the way choices are presented to people can influence, or “nudge,” them to behave in certain ways. For example, when men use a public restroom, they aren’t always neat and tidy. They often miss the mark, to put it mildly, which increases janitorial costs significantly. To address this, folks at Amsterdam’s Schiphol international airport gave men a target of their own. Specifically, urinals were installed that included a stenciled image of a housefly near the drain. The result? Having a target made all the difference. The men’s aim improved considerably (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

As another example, school cafeterias tried offering apples at lunch. Most of them wound up in the trash can. However, when kids were given sliced apples, as opposed to whole apples, they were 73 percent more likely to eat them (Schwartz, 2016). Similarly, when vending machines listed the calories in snack foods, people were more likely to make healthier choices.

Although some critics have accused nudge theory of being paternalistic (Pasquale, 2015), others (Sunstein, 2014) argue that people are free to resist nudges if they wish. Kids can still throw apple slices in the trash. They are simply being provided with options that encourage healthy behaviors (www.nudges.org). That said, some nudges may be perceived as more like shoves. To encourage organ donors, for example, some countries have adopted a “presumed consent” policy, meaning that a person must take the initiative to opt out if she or he does not want to be an organ donor.

NEW PERSUASION: DIGITAL AND ONLINE INFLUENCE

Some people seem to spend their every waking moment texting, tweeting, blogging, or posting their views on all matter of subjects large and small. That said, social media isn’t just an entertaining diversion, it is an important tool for influence. Whenever someone likes, follows, posts, shares, tweets or retweets, forwards, or comments on a message, online influence is taking place. Let’s consider a few forms of digital influence.

**FIGURE 1.2**

Persuasion is everywhere—even in the womb.

Source: Baby Blues © 2001, Baby Blues Partnership, King Features Syndicate. Reprinted with special permission.

eWOM: Digital Buzz

Earlier, we mentioned the importance of viral persuasion and word-of-mouth (WOM). Like WOM, electronic word of mouth (eWOM) is all the rage. People actively comment on brands, companies, political issues, and public figures via all manner of social media. By way of illustration, Twitter alone accounts for 6,000 tweets per second or 500 million tweets per day (www.internetlivestats.com). Eighty percent of Twitter users have mentioned brands in their tweets and 54 percent of users report that they have acted based on tweets (Midha, 2014).

Like WOM, eWOM is most effective when it is perceived as genuine rather than manufactured and peer driven rather than commercially sponsored. eWOM enjoys several advantages over traditional advertising and marketing techniques (Erkan & Evans, 2016). It operates largely through interpersonal channels (cellphone, email, texting), lending it an air of authenticity. It is inexpensive compared to traditional media. And it is self-perpetuating. Moreover, eWOM is far more effective than traditional media at reaching younger audiences.

Sponsored Content: The Native Advertisers Are Getting Restless

The rise of social media has spawned a surge in advertising masquerading as genuine peer-to-peer influence. For example, *sponsored content* includes promoted tweets and Instagram posts, which are essentially paid advertisements. *Native advertising* involves ads posing as news stories. Native ads function as “clickbait,” luring in readers with snappy headlines or provocative photos. Both approaches are effective because many users have difficulty distinguishing such content from genuine material (Wojdynski, 2016).

Opinion Mining and Sentiment Tracking: I Feel You

The Web is an opinion-rich environment. People constantly share their attitudes, opinions, and values via social media. And marketers are listening. Many companies, for example, now specialize in *opinion mining* and *sentiment tracking* by monitoring social media to gauge the public’s mood in nearly real time (Ravi & Ravi, 2015). Sophisticated algorithms can track how a person, brand, or issue is trending based, not only on the number of tweets generated, but also on how favorable, neutral, or negative those tweets are (Kennedy & Moss, 2015; Lee, Yang, Chen, Wang, & Sun, 2016). As an example, after analyzing over 10,000 online mentions from auto-

enthusiast websites, the Ford Motor Company adopted a three-blink turn signal on all of its vehicles (Rosenbush & Totty, 2013).

As sophisticated as such methods seem, a problem with opinion mining is that the data is often “squishy”—that is, the people commenting aren’t always articulate or coherent. Furthermore, the tone of a message—that is, whether it is ironic, satirical, or hyperbolic—can be hard for artificial intelligence to decipher. Nevertheless, programmers are getting better at analyzing and interpreting words related to feelings, emotions, and opinions.

Gamification: You've Got Game

Parents have known for decades that one way to get infants to eat their vegetables is by turning mealtime into a game. “Here comes the airplane,” the parent says with each spoonful of strained peas. A modernized version of this approach, known as *gamification*, is being used to stimulate consumer interest and involvement (McGonigal, 2011). Gamification applies video-game methods to other contexts to increase consumer engagement. People like to play games. They enjoy the competition. Why else would they spend hours on end playing Angry Birds or Candy Crush? Games are entertaining, challenging, and rewarding. Transforming a mundane task into a game can make it more fun and exciting.

Games also can be used to influence. Take exercise, for example. Thanks to a shoe sensor that allows runners to post information about their running distance, time, and calories burned, Nike+ provides customers with a fun way to socialize, compete, and “play” with each other using downloadable apps (Are you game? 2011). What’s more, through points, badges, leaderboards, and other incentives, gamification keeps people coming back for more. This approach has been used to enhance education, improve workplace productivity, increase voter turnout, and promote awareness and participation in social causes.

Gamification is not without its critics, however. Ian Bogost (2011), a professor and expert in video games as cultural artifacts, cautioned that “‘exploitationware’ is a more accurate name for gamification’s true purpose” (para. 12). Critics charge that earning badges and points trivializes activities such as learning, working, exercising, or participating in social causes.

Crowdsourcing and Crowdfunding: Lending a Helping Hand

Moving a heavy object, like a piano, isn’t easy. To accomplish such a task, you might invite some friends to pitch in. Similarly, *crowdsourcing* puts out an open call for anyone online to participate in completing a task or solving a problem. Wikipedia was one of the earliest crowdsourcing platforms (Lee & Seo, 2016). The online encyclopedia is collaborative. Content can be contributed and edited by anyone. Crowdsourcing is premised on the assumption that wisdom is not the exclusive province of experts, but is distributed throughout the commons (Kitter, 2010). As an example, Doritos invited consumers to participate in a “Crash the Super Bowl” contest by generating their own ideas for a 30-second commercial (for examples, go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vVIUBU1gZs). As another example, Starbucks’s “White Cup Contest” contest solicited customers’ suggestions for a graphic design for a limited edition coffee cup. Contestants posted their creations via #WhiteCupContest.



FIGURE 1.3

Persuasive messages must struggle to cut through the background of media clutter.

Source: Reprinted with permission: www.andysinger.com

While crowdsourcing has assisted in solving problems in astronomy, legislation, language translation, and urban planning, among many areas, it is not without its critics. Detractors complain that crowdsourcing is exploitative; it relies on the unpaid labor and efforts of others. Another complaint is that the wisdom of the commons isn't always so wise. For example, when NASA asked people to submit names for a new section of the International Space Station, the crowd chose "Colbert" (after the late-night comedian) over names like "Serenity," "Earthrise," and "Tranquility." NASA went with the name "Tranquility" anyway.

A related strategy, *crowdfunding*, involves raising money through online donations. Websites such as Kickstarter, GoFundMe, and Indiegogo allow people to ask for donations or start-up funds for a cause or business venture. On the plus side, crowdfunding gives "the little guy" or a good cause the chance to be noticed. On the downside, some of the requests are scams (Fredman, 2015) and most start-ups fail. The SEC recently adopted rules regulating crowdfunding practices online.

Persuasive Technology: My Heart Says Yes, but My Watch Says No

Persuasive technology focuses on devices "aimed at changing users' attitudes or behaviors through persuasion and social influence, but not through coercion or deception" (Persuasive Technology, 2016, para. 1). Smart devices and wearable technology "are not just persuasive but specifically aimed at forging new habits" (*MIT Technology Review*, p. 64). Smartwatches, for example, exhort wearers to take action via taps, vibrations, or other haptic cues (Gilmore, 2016). Got a big date coming up? An app developed by MIT can tell you if you sound boring, nervous, happy, or sad based on your speech pattern (Lee, 2017). As an alternative, you could always check to see if your date is asleep.

Fitness trackers not only track your daily step count, they also encourage you to exercise. For example, Fitbit's display shows a flower that grows or shrinks based on your activity level. Taking that concept one step further, Nissan Leaf owners can view an LCD display of a pine tree that grows as they drive more efficiently.

As part of the Internet of Things, smart pill bottles can remind people when to take their medicine (Orji & Moffat, 2016). Skip a dose and a light will glow or a chime will sound, followed by a text or phone-call reminder. For some patients, taking their medicine at the right time each day is a matter of life and death. As many as 125,000 deaths per year and \$105 billion in medical costs are attributable to patients not taking medicine properly (Ruggerio & Wick, 2016).

Persuasion will continue to play a major role in traditional contexts, such as advertising and marketing. It is worth noting, though, that persuasion also plays a key role in a variety of not-so-obvious contexts. We examine two such contexts next: persuasion in the sciences, and persuasion in the arts.

PERSUASION IN THE SCIENCES

You may not think of them this way, but scientists are persuaders (Glassner, 2011). The ongoing debate about climate change illustrates the persuasive challenge facing climatologists. Despite widespread agreement among evolutionary biologists that evolution is a fact rather than a theory, there is a continuing social controversy over the teaching of creationism alongside evolution in public school curriculums. Even in

fields such as chemistry, mathematics, or physics—the so-called hard sciences—persuasion plays a major role.⁵ Scientists often have to convince others that their research possesses scientific merit and social value. They also have to argue for the superiority of their theories over rival theories. In this respect, Thomas Kuhn (1970) argues that all scientists employ “techniques of persuasion in their efforts to establish the superiority of their own paradigms over those of their rivals” (p. 151). Similarly, Mitroff (1974) comments that “the notion of the purely objective, uncommitted scientist [is] naïve. . . . The best scientist . . . not only has points of view but also defends them with gusto” (p. 120). Scientists must do more than conduct experiments and report their results. They also must persuade other scientists, funding agencies, and the public at large of the merits of their work.

PERSUASION IN THE ARTS

Another not-so-obvious context for persuasion is the arts. Not all art is created “for art’s sake.” Art serves more than an aesthetic or decorative function. Artists have strong opinions and they lend expression to their opinions in and through their work. Consider film as an art form, for example. Movies such as *12 Years a Slave*, *Life Is Beautiful*, and *Schindler’s List* demonstrate the power of the camera to increase awareness, change attitudes, alter beliefs, and shape opinions. Other art forms have the capability to persuade as well. Playwrights, painters, muralists, sculptors, photographers, and dancers give voice to their political and social views through their art.

Think about painting for a moment. Many of the famous works hanging in museums were created out of a sense of social conscience. Using images rather than words, artists comment on social conditions, criticize society, and attempt to transform the social order. We examine this issue in more detail in Chapter 14, but for now let’s consider one particular work of art, Pablo Picasso’s *Guernica*. Through this painting, Picasso offered a moral indictment of war and man’s inhumanity to man. The painting features people and animals, the victims of the indiscriminate bombing of a Basque town during the Spanish Civil War, in various states of agony, torment, and grief. As Von Blum (1976) notes, “the purpose of the painting is frankly propagandistic. The artist’s intent was to point out the inhuman character of Franco’s fascist rebellion” (p. 92). Picasso wasn’t trying to paint a “pretty” picture. He was making a moral statement. The painting has been dubbed by one art historian “the highest achievement in modernist political painting” (Clark, 1997, p. 39). Not only Picasso, but also many other artists express persuasive points of view in and through their art.

OTHER NOT-SO-OBVIOUS CONTEXTS FOR PERSUASION

Persuasion operates in a variety of other contexts, some of which are not so obvious. We highlight a few here as illustrations. Social scientists have studied bumper stickers as a form of political expression and as an unobtrusive means of measuring attitudes (Endersby & Towle, 1996; Sechrist & Belew, 1983). Scholars have examined the effects of intercessory prayer (offered for the benefit of another person) on recovery from illness (Frank & Frank, 1991; Hodge, 2007). Studies have examined the

military's use of social influence (Cialdini, 2011; King, 2010). Other researchers have focused on 12-step programs, such as Alcoholics Anonymous, and other support groups as forms of self-help and group influence (Kassel & Wagner, 1993). Some studies have investigated terrorism as a form of persuasion by examining how jihadists are radicalized and recruited and how effective the use of violence is on the groups who are targeted (Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013; Iyer, Hornsey, Vanman, Esposo, & Ale, 2015; Kydd & Walter, 2006). As Tuman (2010) observed, "the real goal of the communicated message in terrorism may be persuasion: to persuade audience members that chaos and fear will be their lot in life, to persuade them to pay attention to an issue they have ignored" (p. 37). One scholar has written about compliance-gaining tactics found in dramatic plays, such as Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Ibsen's *A Doll's House* (Kipnis, 2001). One of the authors investigated various styles and strategies of panhandling to see which ones proved most effective (Robinson, Seiter, & Acharya, 1992). Research on the study of robotic persuasion is just beginning to emerge. One study found, for example, that having a robot whisper instructions to people increased their motivation to perform a boring task (Nakagawa, Shiomi, Shinozawa, Matsumura, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2013). Another study focused on the effect of robot-to-human touch as a method of compliance gaining (Shiomi, Nakagawa, Shinozawa, Matsumura, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2017).

WEIRD PERSUASION

Sometimes persuasion is downright weird. A case in point involved Kensington, Canada, where the police department threatened that any motorist arrested for drunk driving would be subjected to Nickelback music while riding in the police cruiser to the station (Zenteno, 2016). When the story went viral, Colin Jost, the news co-host of *Saturday Night Live*, joked, "Just make sure the crash kills you." Ultimately, the policy was rescinded because the seriousness of the message was obscured by the frivolousness of the strategy.

Yet another example of weird persuasion occurred in Mansfield, Nottinghamshire, UK. The citizens wanted to stop rowdy teens from loitering at an underpass at night. Their solution was to install street lights with a bright pink hue. Why pink, you ask? Pink light highlights acne. Teens with blemishes didn't want to be seen with bright, glowing acne. The plan worked: The teens moved on (Spotty teens, 2009).

Scholars sometimes investigate quirky aspects of persuasion, too. Did you know that participants in a study who consumed caffeine were more easily persuaded than participants who had no caffeine (Martin, Hamilton, McKimmie, Terry, & Martin, 2007)? Now you do. As long as the participants were motivated to pay attention to the message, caffeine consumption increased agreement. Here is another strange finding: Washing one's hands not only produces cleaner hands, it also reduces a person's sense of guilt (Kaspa, 2013). The explanation for this is related to a phenomenon called *embodied cognition*, wherein physical behaviors often affect higher mental states.

Other researchers found that mixed-handed people were more persuadable and more gullible than purely left- or right-handed people (Christman, Henning, Geers, Propper, & Niebauer, 2008). And Briñol and Petty (2003) discovered that asking people to nod their heads up and down (as if in agreement) made them more

agreeable than shaking their heads back and forth (as if in disagreement). What is the point of such research, you ask? Such studies illustrate both the complexities and subtle nuances of persuasion.

Persuasion, then, can be found in obvious and not-so-obvious places. Before concluding this section, we examine one additional context in which persuasion occurs: the interpersonal arena.

PERSUASION IN INTERPERSONAL SETTINGS

The extent of influence exerted in the interpersonal arena should not be underestimated. Although we may think of Madison Avenue as all-powerful, face-to-face influence is far more effective. Yet people tend to underestimate the effectiveness of in-person influence compared to other communication contexts. One study, for example, found that people making requests underestimated how successful face-to-face requests would be, compared to email requests (Roghanizad & Bohns, 2017). Another study found that people tend to underestimate their influence on others when it comes to questionable requests. Participants were asked to estimate how successful they would be at convincing a stranger to commit a minor act of vandalism (writing the word “pickle” on a page in a library book). Overall, 87 percent of the participants underestimated how persuasive they would be. On average, they were twice as effective as they thought (Bohns, Roghanizad, & Xu, 2014).

Despite all the money spent on traditional advertising and the increasing amounts being spent on new media, most influence attempts still take place in face-to-face settings. Some 90 percent of word-of-mouth recommendations, for example, take place offline (Moore, 2011). On a daily basis we are bombarded with persuasive requests in the interpersonal arena. Your brother wants you to hurry up and get out of the bathroom. A homeless person asks if you can spare some change. Your parents try to talk you out of getting a tongue stud. Or worse yet, your significant other uses the “F” word to redefine your relationship: That’s right; she or he just wants to be “friends.” Aaahhh! Naturally, we persuade back as well, targeting others with our own entreaties, pleadings, and requests for favors.

Why is interpersonal influence so much more effective? Because it seems more genuine and less conspicuous. Consider the following scenario:

The bait: Your friend calls up and says, “Hey, what are you doing Friday night?”

The nibble: Anticipating an invitation to go somewhere, you reply, “Nothing much, why?”

You’re hooked and reeled in: “Well, I wonder if you could help me move into my new apartment then?”

At least when you watch a television commercial you *know* the sponsor is after something from the outset. In interpersonal encounters, others’ motives may be less transparent. Most communication scholars agree that if you have a choice of mediums for persuasion, you should choose the interpersonal arena. Our advice: Next time you want to turn in a paper late, talk to your professor in person.

From our discussion thus far, it should be apparent that persuasion functions as a pervasive force in virtually every facet of human communication. Kenneth Burke (1966), among others, has written that humans are, by their very nature, symbol-using beings. One vital aspect of human symbolicity involves the tendency to persuade others. We are symbol users, and one of the principal functions of symbol usage is persuasion.

The recognition that social influence is an essential, pervasive feature of human symbolic action provides the strongest possible justification for the study of persuasion. Persuasion is one of the major underlying impulses for human communication. By way of analogy, one can't understand how an automobile works without taking a look under the hood. Similarly, one can't understand how human communication functions without examining one of its primary motives—persuasion.

FIVE BENEFITS OF STUDYING PERSUASION

Given that persuasion is an inevitable fact of life, we offer five primary benefits of learning about persuasion. We refer to these as the instrumental function, the knowledge and awareness function, the defensive function, the debunking function, and the well-being function. We examine each of these in turn.

The Instrumental Function: Be All That You Can Be

One good reason for learning about persuasion is so that you can become a more effective persuader yourself. We refer to this as the *instrumental function* of persuasion, because persuasion serves as an instrument, or a means to an end. We view the ability to persuade others as an important aspect of communication competence. *Communication competence* involves acting in ways that are perceived as effective and appropriate (Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984). Competent communicators possess the skills needed to achieve their objectives in fitting ways for the particular situation.

A competent persuader needs to know how to analyze an audience in order to adapt the message to the audience's frame of reference. She or he needs to be able to identify which strategies are appropriate and which will enjoy the greatest likelihood of success. A competent persuader also must know how to organize and arrange a persuasive message for maximum benefit. These are only some of the abilities required for successful persuasion.

But achieving the desired outcome is only one facet of communication competence. How one goes about persuading also matters. A competent persuader needs to be viewed as persuading in acceptable, appropriate ways. This means a persuader must be aware of social and cultural norms governing the persuasive situation. For example, a parent who publicly berates his or her child during a soccer match may be seen by other parents as engaging in boorish behavior.

We are confident that by learning more about persuasion you will become a more effective and appropriate persuader. Of course, not every influence attempt will succeed. By applying the principles and processes presented in this text, and by adhering to the ethical guidelines we offer, you should be able to improve your competence as a persuader.

The Knowledge and Awareness Function: Inquiring Minds Want to Know

Another good reason for learning about persuasion is because it will enhance your knowledge and awareness of a variety of persuasive processes. Knowledge is power, as the saying goes. There is value in learning more about how persuasion operates. You may not plan on going into advertising for a living, but simply knowing how branding operates is worthwhile in and of itself. You may not plan on joining a cult (who does?), but learning more about what makes persons susceptible to cult conversion is worthwhile nonetheless. Simply from the standpoint of an observer, learning about these topics can be fascinating.

An additional benefit of learning about how persuasion functions concerns overcoming *habitual persuasion*. Many people rely on habitual forms of persuasion, regardless of whether they are effective. They get comfortable with a few strategies and tactics that they use over and over again. A good deal of our communication behavior is “mindless,” as opposed to mindful, meaning we don’t pay much attention to how we communicate (Langer, 1978, 1989a, 1989b). Sometimes persuasion operates this way. Just as runners, swimmers, and other athletes need to learn to adjust their breathing in response to different situations, persuaders—to maximize their effectiveness—need to learn to adapt their methods to different audiences and situations. Persuasion isn’t a “one-size-fits-all” form of communication.



"That's it, Henry—you've dialed your last mattress!"

FIGURE 1.4

A little persuasive acumen just might save you from yourself.

Source: © Lee Lorenz/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com

The Defensive Function: Duck and Cover

A third reason for learning about how persuasion operates is vital in our view: The study of persuasion serves a *defensive function*. By studying how and why influence attempts succeed or fail, you can become a more discerning consumer of persuasive messages, unlike the hapless fellow depicted in Figure 1.4. If you know how persuasion works, you are less likely to be taken in. It is worth noting that people tend to *underestimate* the influence of advertising on themselves and *overestimate* its effects on others, a phenomenon known as the *third-person effect* (Davidson, 1983; Jensen & Collins, 2008). Thus, you may be more defenseless than you realize.

Throughout this text, we expose a number of persuasive tactics used in retail sales, advertising, and marketing campaigns. For example, we have found in our classes that after students are given a behind-the-scenes look at how car salespeople are taught to sell, several students usually acknowledge, “Oh yeah, they did that to me.” Admittedly, a huckster could also take advantage of the advice we offer in this book. We think it is far more likely, however, that the typical student reader will use our advice and suggestions as weapons *against* unethical influence attempts. Box 1.1, for example, offers advice on how to recognize various propaganda ploys. In later chapters of this book, we warn you about common ploys used by all manner of persuaders, from cult leaders to panhandlers to funeral home directors.

The Debunking Function: Puh-Shaw

A fourth reason for studying persuasion is that it serves a *debunking function*. The study of human influence can aid in dispelling various “common-sense” assumptions and “homespun” notions about persuasion. Traditional wisdom isn’t always right, and it’s worth knowing when it’s wrong. Some individuals cling tenaciously to folk wisdom about persuasive practices that are known by researchers to be patently false. For example, many people believe that subliminal messages are highly effective and operate in a manner similar to that of post-hypnotic suggestion. This belief is pure poppycock, as we point out in Chapter 15.

Of considerable importance, then, are empirical findings that are *counterintuitive* in nature—that is, they go against the grain of common sense. By learning about research findings on persuasion, the reader can learn to ferret out the true from the false, the fact from the fiction.

Well-Being and Self-Worth: I Feel Good

A fifth benefit of learning about persuasion is that the ability to persuade others improves one’s subjective sense of well-being. There is a sense of satisfaction that comes from persuading others. Researchers have found that influencing others satisfies five basic needs, which are accuracy, belonging, self-worth, control, and meaning (Bourgeois, Sommer, & Bruno, 2009; Sommer & Bourgeois, 2010). The first need, accuracy, refers to the desire to be right about one’s beliefs and attitudes. One of the author’s spouses likes to joke, “I married Mr. Right. Mr. *always* Right.” Winning someone over is one way of validating one’s own views.

The need for belonging reflects the desire for social inclusion. People value social connections. Persuading others is one means of establishing and maintaining relationships. People also strive to maintain a positive self-concept or sense of self-

BOX 1.1 | Persuasion Versus Propaganda and Indoctrination

What are propaganda and indoctrination and how do they differ from persuasion? To a large extent, it is a matter of perspective. People tend to label their own messages as persuasion and the other guy's as propaganda. The same applies to indoctrination: We tend to think that our government educates its citizens, but foreign governments, especially those we dislike, indoctrinate their citizens. Understood in this way, propaganda and indoctrination are largely pejorative terms used to describe persuasive messages or positions with which people disagree. Gun control advocates claim the NRA uses propaganda to thwart legislation that would place restrictions on gun sales. Opponents of school prayer think that requiring students to recite a prayer in class constitutes a form of religious indoctrination. When accused of propagandizing, the common defense is to state that one was only engaged in an education or information campaign. Thus, whether a given attempt at influence, such as the D.A.R.E. campaign, is persuasion, propaganda, or indoctrination is largely in the eye of the beholder.

Definitions of propaganda are many and varied, but we happen to think Pratkanis and Aronson's (1991) definition does a good job of capturing the essence of the term:

Propaganda was originally defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often through the use of lies and deception. . . . The word propaganda has since evolved to mean mass "suggestion" or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. Propaganda is the communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient come to "voluntarily" accept the position as if it were his or her own.

(p. 9)

Different scholars have offered different views on the nature and characteristics of propaganda (see Ellul, 1973; Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Smith, 1989). However, there are some essential characteristics on which most scholars agree. These are as follows:

- Propaganda has a strong ideological bent. Most scholars agree that propaganda does not serve a purely informational function. Propaganda typically embodies a strong bias, such as that of a "left-wing" or "right-wing" agenda. The campaign of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) to promote animal rights would fall into this category. Propagandists aren't trying to be neutral or objective. They are working a specific agenda.
- Propaganda is institutional in nature. Most scholars agree that propaganda is practiced by organized groups, whether they happen to be government agencies, political lobbies, private corporations, religious groups, or social movements. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League is an organization founded to prevent libeling and slandering of Jewish people. Although individuals might use propaganda too (a parent might tell a child, "Santa only brings presents for good girls and boys"), the term usually is associated with institutional efforts to persuade.
- Propaganda involves mass persuasion. Most scholars agree that propaganda targets a mass audience and relies on mass media to persuade. Propaganda is aimed at large numbers of people and, as such, relies on mass communication (TV, radio, posters, billboards, email, mass mailings, etc.) to reach its audience. Thus, gossip that was shared by one office worker with another at the water cooler wouldn't constitute propaganda, but a corporate rumor that was circulated via email would.
- Propaganda tends to rely on ethically suspect methods of influence. Propagandists tend to put results first and ethics second. This characteristic is probably the one that laypersons most closely associate with propaganda and the one that gives it its negative connotation.

What are some of the questionable tactics used by propagandists? The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which was founded in 1937, identified seven basic propaganda techniques, which still exist today (Miller, 1937). These include the plain folks appeal ("I'm one of you"), testimonials ("I saw the aliens, sure as I'm standing here"), the bandwagon effect (everybody's doing it), card-stacking (presenting only one side of the story), transfer (positive or negative associations, such as guilt by association), glittering generalities (idealistic or loaded language, such as "freedom," "empowering," "family values"), and name calling ("racist," "tree hugger," "femi-Nazi").

worth. The ability to persuade others enhances a person's self-esteem. The need for control, or perceived control, stems from a desire to shape our environment and exert influence over those with whom we interact. Some people like to be in charge, take over, and have things their way. Others are content to let someone else take the helm. Yet everyone seeks some degree of self-efficacy or a sense that she or he is in control of their life. Lastly, people want to believe there is meaning and purpose in their lives. One way of demonstrating one's value or importance is by influencing others.

We hope you'll agree, based on the foregoing discussion, that there are quite a few good reasons for studying persuasion. We hope we've persuaded you that the study of persuasion can be a prosocial endeavor. That brings us back to an earlier point, however: Not all persuaders are scrupulous. At this juncture, then, it seems appropriate that we address two common criticisms related to the study of persuasion.

TWO CRITICISMS OF PERSUASION

Does Learning About Persuasion Foster Manipulation?

We've already touched on one of the common criticisms of studying persuasion: the notion that it fosters a manipulative approach to communication. We address ethical concerns surrounding the study and practice of persuasion more specifically in Chapter 16. For the time being, however, a few general arguments can be offered in response to this concern. First, our principal focus in this text is on the *means* of persuasion (e.g., how persuasion functions). We view the means of persuasion not so much as moral or immoral, but rather as amoral, or ethically neutral. In this respect, persuasion can be likened to a tool, such as a hammer. Like any other tool, persuasion can be put to good or bad use. If this sounds like a cop-out, read what Aristotle had to say on this same point in his *Rhetoric*:

If it is urged that an abuse of the rhetorical faculty can work great mischief, the same charge can be brought against all good things (save virtue itself), and especially against the most useful things such as strength, health, wealth, and military skill. Rightly employed, they work the greatest blessings; and wrongly employed, they work the greatest harm.

(1355b)

Related to this idea is the fact that tools can be used in good or bad ways, depending on their user. We believe that first and foremost, a *persuader's motives*

determine whether a given influence attempt is good or bad, right or wrong, ethical or unethical. We maintain that the moral quality of a persuasive act is derived primarily from the ends a persuader seeks, and only secondarily from the means the persuader employs. It isn't so much *what* strategies and tactics a persuader uses as *why* he or she uses them.

To illustrate, suppose you asked us whether the use of "fear appeals" is ethically justified. We would have to say, it depends. If a fear appeal were being used to warn sexually active teens of the risks of HIV infection from unprotected sex, we would tend to say the appeal was justified. If a fear appeal were being used by a terrorist who threatened to kill a hostage every hour until his demands were met, we would say the appeal was unjustified. In each case, the motives of the persuader would "color" the use of the fear appeal. Consistent with our tool analogy, fear appeals, like other persuasive strategies, can be used for good or bad ends.

A second response to this criticism was highlighted earlier. The study of persuasion performs a *defensive function* insofar as it educates people to become more discriminating consumers of persuasive messages. For instance, we believe our "Tips on Buying a New or Used Car" (see Box 1.2) are useful to any potential car buyer who wants to avoid being manipulated at a car lot. By increasing your awareness of the ploys of would-be persuaders, this text performs a watchdog function. You can use the information contained herein to arm yourself against the tactics of unscrupulous persuaders.

A third response that bears mentioning is that in denouncing the study of persuasion, antimanipulation types are also attempting to persuade. The message that persuasion is manipulative or exploitative is itself a persuasive appeal that advocates a position regarding the "proper" study of communication. When one group claims to know best how human communication should be studied, they are, in fact, standing on the persuasion soapbox themselves.

Are Persuasion Findings Too Inconsistent or Confusing?

An additional complaint is that the study of persuasion has led to findings that are overly qualified, or contradictory in nature. Empirical investigations of persuasion, it is argued, have not yielded clear and consistent generalizations. There is no " $E = mc^2$," no "second law of thermodynamics," no universal when it comes to persuasion.

First, the complaint that persuasion isn't worth studying because the findings are often inconclusive or contradictory makes little sense. Quite the opposite: We believe that persuasion warrants study precisely because it *is* so elusive. Underlying this criticism is the expectation that reality is, or should be, simple and uncomplicated. Like it or not, understanding reality is hard work. As we've already noted, human beings are complex creatures who rarely respond to messages for one and only one reason. Actually, we find this to be a redeeming feature of humanity. We rejoice in the fact that we aren't an altogether gullible, predictable, or controllable species.

A second response to this criticism is simply that persuasion research *has* revealed a number of significant, relevant generalizations. You'll find many such generalizations throughout this book. Newer techniques of statistical analysis, such

BOX 1.2 | Tips on Buying a New or Used Car

Given the current state of the economy and the economic fix in which car dealers find themselves, buying a car nowadays is easier than before. Car dealers are eager to sell cars. Nevertheless, car salespersons, especially used car salespersons, have a bad reputation. We've met some honest, upstanding sellers. We've also met some shady operators. Because a car is a major purchase, one would be well advised to err on the side of caution when negotiating with a car salesperson. *Caveat emptor*, as the saying goes: Let the buyer beware.

1. Be wary. Remember, buying a car is a ritual in which the car dealer has the upper hand. This is the prototype for high-pressure sales. They are professionals. They sell cars every day. You are an amateur. Who do you think has more experience with persuasion in this setting?
2. Do your homework before you go visit a car dealer. Read up on the makes and models in which you're interested. Find out about performance criteria, standard features, and options before setting foot on a car lot. Consumer Reports compares used cars on reliability, safety, and other criteria based on data from actual owners. Research shows that doing your homework can save you money (Seiter & Seiter, 2005).
3. Keep a poker face. If the salesperson knows you are eager or excited about the car purchase, he or she will smell blood. Once the salesperson knows you are emotionally attached to a particular car, you'll wind up paying more.
4. Take a calculator with you. Car salespersons like to pretend that the prices of things are entirely up to the calculator ("Hey, let's see how the numbers shake out"). The implication is that the numbers aren't negotiable or flexible. Everything is negotiable. Do your own figuring to see if the numbers "shake out" the same way. If not, ask why.
5. Once you are on the car lot, dealers will try to keep you there. They may put you in a cubicle, holding you "hostage" during the negotiations. Their psychological strategy is to wear you down. After hours of haggling, you'll become mentally drained and more likely to give in. They may ask for the keys to your trade-in, presumably to look it over and determine its value. Once they have your keys, you can't leave.
6. The car salesperson will want to avoid talking about the total price of the car, opting instead to discuss the monthly payment you can afford. You, however, should focus on four things: (a) the total purchase price, (b) the finance period, (c) the interest rate, and (d) the monthly payment. Don't discuss the monthly payment unless you are clear on the finance period involved (a 3-year loan, 4-year loan, 5-year loan, etc.). If you admit you can afford \$300 per month, the salesperson may simply switch to a longer finance period—say, 4 years, instead of 3, thereby adding thousands of dollars to the total purchase price.
7. During the negotiations, the salesperson may leave the room a number of times to talk with the "sales manager." This is all choreographed. The salesperson can't agree to anything without checking with this mysterious figure, so the person with whom you are negotiating really can't commit to anything. You, however, will be asked to commit to a lot of things. Don't.
8. The salesperson will act like he or she is your best friend, even though you just met. The salesperson will look for ways to identify with you or ingratiate himself or herself to you to establish camaraderie ("You like fly fishing? That makes two of us." "Whaddya-know, my granddaughter is named 'Fifi' too!"). During the negotiations, the salesperson will pretend he or she is on your side and is willing to go out on a limb for you ("Well, my sales manager may

kick my butt for even taking him this offer, but hey, I like you"). Remember, these two are working as a team, against you. Don't be confused for a moment about where the salesperson's loyalties reside.

9. The car salesperson will do all kinds of things to get you to make a commitment to buy ("What would it take to get you to buy this car? Just tell me, whudda-l-godda-do to get you in this car?"). Often, the salesperson will ask you to write down any amount you're offering on a slip of paper or an offer sheet, even though it isn't legally binding (it does increase your psychological commitment, however). The car dealer wants you to sit in the car, take it for a test spin, smell the upholstery, because then you will become psychologically committed to owning the car.
10. If you get close to a deal, or alternatively, if a deal seems to be coming apart, don't be surprised if another salesperson comes in to take over the negotiations. Often a "closer" is sent in (sort of like a relief pitcher in baseball) to complete the sale.
11. Beware of "loss leaders" (advertised specials at absurdly low prices). These are come-ons designed to get you onto the lot. Once there, however, you'll be subjected to the "old switcheroo." You'll find there is/was only one car at that price. You will probably be told, "Sorry, it's already sold . . . but I can make you a honey of a deal on . . ."
12. The sale isn't over simply because you've agreed on a price. You still have to deal with the dreaded "finance person." You'll be given the impression that you're simply seeing the finance person to sign documents and process paperwork. Don't let down your guard. The finance person will try to add on thousands of dollars in the form of extended warranties, antitheft systems, and protective coatings.
13. The interest rate is just as important as the price of the car. Shop around for a car loan from a bank or credit union before you shop for a car. The rates may be lower and you can find out exactly how much you qualify for in advance.
14. Shop around for prices on options such as stereos before you go to a car dealer. People often bargain well on the purchase price, then give up everything they've gained by failing to bargain on the price of extras. The price of everything is negotiable.
15. Don't let the salesperson know in advance that you have a trade-in. Any bargaining gains you make on the purchase price of the new car will just be deducted from the trade-in value of your used car. Sell the used car on your own, if at all possible. If that's not possible, you can always mention your trade-in after you've negotiated the price of the new car.
16. Don't get a lemon. Buying a used car can be particularly risky. One of the authors bought a used sports car on eBay. How did he know from a mere picture and description whether the car was in good shape? He ran a CARFAX history on the car, easily available online (see www.carfax.com), which revealed that the car had had only one previous owner; had never been stolen, totaled, or repossessed; had correct odometer readings; and had passed a smog check each year when the vehicle registration was renewed. Since the car was coming from another state, the author went one step further and hired an independent mechanic to perform a "prepurchase inspection" on the car, at a cost of about \$150. We strongly suggest you do the same for any used car. After all, how much can the average consumer tell about a car from looking under the hood and kicking the tires?

as *meta-analysis*,⁶ have made it possible to reconcile some of the previous inconsistencies in the literature. In this text, we identify a number of noteworthy, albeit qualified, generalizations that are based on the most recent meta-analyses available.

You'll notice in this book that we've drawn on the people in the trenches themselves to learn how persuasion works in particular contexts and settings. We've talked to used car salespersons, funeral home operators, retail clothing clerks, advertising firms, former cult members, door-to-door salespersons, and telemarketers to find out—from the horse's mouth, so to speak—how persuasion operates.

ETHICAL CONCERN ABOUT THE USE OF PERSUASION

We would be remiss if we concluded this chapter without emphasizing the importance of ethics in the persuasion process. We wish to underscore the point that the use of

BOX 1.3 | Ethical or Unethical Persuasion? You Decide

Instructions: For each of the following scenarios, indicate how ethical or unethical you perceive the persuader or the persuasive strategy to be, based on a five-point scale (with 1 being "highly ethical" and 5 being "highly unethical").

1. A student pretends to cry in a professor's office in an attempt to coax the professor into giving her a makeup exam. Is this ethical persuasion?
2. A persuader advances an argument he doesn't believe in, but that he thinks will be convincing to his listeners. The argument isn't untrue or invalid; it just happens to be one with that the persuader himself does not agree. Is this ethical persuasion?
3. A car salesperson emphasizes that the model of car a customer is considering has "more horsepower and better mileage than the competition." The salesperson fails to mention that the car has worse reliability and a worse safety record than the competition. Is this ethical persuasion?
4. A skilled attorney successfully defends a client she knows to be guilty. Is this ethical persuasion?
5. A minister tells his congregation that a vote for a particular candidate is "a vote for the Devil incarnate" and that the scriptures demand that the faithful cast their ballots for another candidate. Is this ethical persuasion?
6. A persuader sincerely believes in the arguments she is presenting, but the facts and information she cites are incorrect and outdated. Is this ethical persuasion?
7. Parents use a fear appeal to convince their child to clean her room. "Santa doesn't bring presents to children with dirty rooms," they warn. Is this ethical persuasion?
8. A children's cereal states on the box, "High in the vitamins kids need" but doesn't mention that the cereal is high in sugar, too. Is this ethical persuasion?
9. A newlywed husband is upset that his wife wants to go to a dance club with some of her single friends for drinks. "If you go," he warns, "I'm going to a strip club with some of my friends." Is this ethical persuasion?
10. A political campaign runs a series of negative attack ads against an opponent, not because the campaign manager prefers to but because voter surveys show that negative ads will work, whereas ads that take the political "high road" won't. Is this ethical persuasion?

persuasion is fraught with ethical concerns. We raise a number of such concerns in Box 1.3 for you to ponder. Our position is that in learning how to become a more effective persuader, you should strive to be an ethical persuader as well. In the final chapter, we address a number of ethical questions related to various strategies and techniques of persuasion discussed throughout the text. We wait until the final chapter to fully examine ethical concerns for two reasons: First, until you've learned more about persuasion, you may not fully appreciate all of the ethical issues that are involved. Second, after you've studied the full scope of persuasion as we present it in this text, you'll be in a much better position to place these ethical questions in perspective.

SUMMARY

We hope that we've convinced you of the ubiquity of persuasion in human interaction. The capacity to persuade is one of the defining features of humankind. This fact provides the strongest possible reason for studying persuasion. Given that learning about persuasion serves an instrumental function, a knowledge and awareness function, a defensive function, a debunking function, and a well-being and self-worth function, we believe there is ample justification for studying this topic. Finally, rejoinders to two current criticisms of the study of persuasion were offered. Hopefully, a persuasive case has been made for learning about persuasion.

One other thing: Did we mention that learning about persuasion can also be fun?

NOTES

1. The scientific study of persuasion dates back to the 1940s and 1950s, when Carl Hovland founded the Yale Attitude Research Program as part of the war effort. The government wanted to know how to counter enemy propaganda that could affect the morale of troops and how susceptible POWs were to brainwashing.
2. Aristotle's work *Rhetoric* is one such text that has survived the test of time. Written in the fourth century BCE, Aristotle's work has had a lasting influence on our understanding of persuasion. Many of his insights and observations are considered valid even today.
3. Note that with the exception of Hitler, these charismatic leaders enjoyed a limited following. The rest of us weren't taken in by their claims, suggesting that people, in general, aren't that gullible after all.
4. A *New York Times* article (Story, 2007) sets daily ad exposure at up to 5,000 ads per day. Rosseli, Skelly, and Mackie (1995) state, "even by conservative estimates, the average person is exposed to 300–400 persuasive messages a day from the mass media alone" (p. 163). Jones (2004) pegs the number of advertising messages at 300 to 1,500 every day, but indicates that some estimates are as high as 3,000 per day—a number Jones labels fanciful (p. 12). Without saying who says so, Berger (2011) reports that "some estimate that we are exposed to 15,000 commercial messages each day" (p. 101).

We are suspicious of such estimates, however, because they may simply represent "unknowable" statistics. At the very least, estimates of the number of persuasive messages to which the average person is exposed involve extrapolations, and the criteria upon which the extrapolations are based aren't always provided. What's more,

the estimates often contradict one another. By way of illustration, Berger (2011) maintains that “advertisers spend around \$800 per person in the United States on advertising” (p. 101), whereas Dupont (1999) claims, “In the U.S., close to \$400 for every man, woman, and child are invested in advertising each year” (p. 8). Which, if either, estimate is correct?

5. We don’t have sufficient space to devote to this topic here, but suffice it to say that the traditional notion of scientific realism is under siege from the antirealism camp (see Kourany, 1998). The antirealists argue that science is neither purely objective nor impartial but heavily value laden (see also Laudan, 1984; Longino, 1990).
6. *Meta-analysis* refers to a statistical technique that allows a researcher to combine the results of many separate investigations and examine them as if they were one big super study. A meta-analysis is capable of revealing trends across a number of studies and resolving apparent inconsistencies among studies.

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CHAPTER 2

What Constitutes Persuasion?

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WHAT IS PERSUASION? How broad or narrow is the concept? Is persuasion a subset of human communication in general, much like baseball is a subset of sports? Or is persuasion an element found in all human communication in the same way that coordination plays a role in every sport? Not surprisingly, different authors view the concept of persuasion in different ways and have adopted different definitions of the term. In this chapter, we explore some of the ways that persuasion has been defined. We offer our own rather broad-based, far-reaching conceptualization of persuasion based on five limiting criteria. We also present our own model of what persuasion is (Gass & Seiter, 1997, 2000, 2004) and examine three additional models (Chaiken, 1979, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b; Kruglanksi & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b) of how persuasion functions.

You may have encountered some unusual uses of the term *persuasion*. For example, we have a friend in the construction industry who refers to his

sledgehammer as his “persuader.” He tends to err on the side of cutting a 2 × 4 board too long, rather than too short, and then “persuading” it into place. As another example, you may recall seeing an old gangster movie in which a mob boss orders his henchman to take somebody out back “for a little gentle persuasion,” meaning a beating. Although we don’t normally associate persuasion with pounding lumber or pummeling people, even in ordinary usage the term does have a wide variety of meanings. Consider each of the hypothetical situations in Box 2.1, “What Constitutes Persuasion?” Which of these scenarios do *you* consider to be persuasion?

BOX 2.1 | What Constitutes Persuasion?

1. Muffin notices a grubby-looking weirdo in one of the front seats of the bus she is boarding. She opts for a seat toward the rear of the bus. Did the man “persuade” her to sit elsewhere?
2. Benny Bigot is the principal speaker at a park rally to recruit more members to the American Nazi party. Many of the people who hear Benny are so turned off by his speech that they are more anti-Nazi than they were before they attended the rally. Did Benny “persuade” them?
3. During a dramatic pause in his lecture for his three-hour night class, Professor Hohum hears a student’s stomach growling. The professor then decides it would be a good time for the class to take a break. Did the student “persuade” Professor Hohum?
4. Babbs is standing at a street corner, watching passersby. The first three people she sees are wearing sweatshirts with political and/or social slogans emblazoned across the front. The fourth person to pass by is wearing a plain white T-shirt. Are the first three people “persuading” Babbs? Is the fourth?
5. Sheldon makes a new year’s resolution to go on a diet. To remind himself not to snack, he sticks a picture of a male model with “six pack” abs on his refrigerator. Later, when he has an ice-cream craving, he sees the picture and decides to have an apple instead. Did Sheldon “persuade” himself?
6. Bubba is at the supermarket, pondering which of two brands of beer to purchase. After studying both brands attentively, he opts for an imported brand. Unbeknown to him, another shopper observed his deliberations. That shopper then walks over to the display and selects the same brand. Did “persuasion” take place?
7. Trudy is an impressionable freshperson who is in a jam. She has just realized a term paper is due in her philosophy class. Desperate, she asks Rex, who is the captain of the debate squad, if he will help her. Rex offers to give her an “A” paper he submitted when he had the same class 2 years prior if Trudy will sleep with him. Is Rex using “persuasion”?

Adding to the difficulty of defining persuasion is the fact that persuasion also goes by a variety of other names. Some of its aliases include terms such as *advising*, *brainwashing*, *coercion*, *compliance gaining*, *convincing*, *education*, *indoctrination*, *influence*, *manipulation*, and *propaganda*. Of course, whether these terms are considered synonyms for persuasion, or simply related terms, depends on one's definition of persuasion.

Defining a concept is analogous to building a fence. A fence is designed to keep some things in and other things out. In the same way, a definition encompasses some elements or aspects of a concept while excluding others. Which “species” of human communication is to be found inside the “barnyard” of persuasion depends on the size and shape of the fence a particular author builds. Fortunately, the differences in various definitions can be clarified, if not resolved, by focusing on two key considerations. We turn to these next.

PURE VERSUS BORDERLINE CASES OF PERSUASION

The first consideration is whether one is interested in pure persuasion or borderline cases of persuasion. By *pure persuasion*, we mean clear-cut cases of persuasion, on which most people would agree. Everyone would agree that a presidential debate, or a television commercial, or an attorney's closing remarks to a jury are instances of persuasion. Such examples represent “paradigm cases” (O'Keefe, 2016; Simons, 1986) because they are at the core of what we think of when we envision persuasion at work. Other instances, though, lie closer to the boundary or periphery of what we normally think of as persuasion. These instances we refer to as *borderline cases* of persuasion. Not everyone would agree that a derelict's mere appearance “persuades” passersby to keep their distance. Nor would everyone agree that involuntary reflexes such as burps, blinking, and pupil dilation constitute “persuasive” phenomena. These cases are less clear-cut, more “iffy.” Much of the disparity in definitions is rooted in the fact that some authors are concerned with pure persuasion, whereas other authors are concerned with borderline cases as well. It isn't so much a matter of being right or wrong as it is a matter of how wide a net each author wishes to cast. The preliminary model of the scope of persuasion (Figure 2.1) illustrates this distinction in approaches.¹ As the shading in the model suggests, the dividing line between pure and borderline persuasion is fuzzy, rather than distinct.

Although we don't think there is a single, correct definition of persuasion, we do think there are some things that a functional, contemporary definition of persuasion ought to do. A contemporary definition should take into account the rich complex of verbal, nonverbal, and contextual cues found in interpersonal encounters. A contemporary definition also should acknowledge the many subtle, implicit cues that accompany face-to-face influence attempts. By implicit cues, we mean communication that occurs at a very low level of awareness, or even unconsciously. As an example, cultural factors might influence a person's choice of compliance-gaining strategies, without the person even realizing it (Wiseman et al., 1995). Such implicit communication is, in fact, quite common (Langer, 1978, 1989a, 1989b; Roloff, 1980) and an important ingredient in persuasion. The definition and model of persuasion that we offer later in this chapter take these features into account.




FIGURE 2.1
Preliminary model of
persuasion.

LIMITING CRITERIA FOR DEFINING PERSUASION

A second consideration in defining persuasion involves the limiting criteria that form the basis for a given definition. Different scholars apply different litmus tests when defining persuasion. Five basic criteria can be gleaned from the various definitions offered in the literature (Gass & Seiter, 2004). We examine each of these criteria in turn.

Intentionality

Is persuasion necessarily conscious or purposeful? Is there such a thing as “accidental” persuasion? Many who write about persuasion adopt a source-centered view by focusing on the sender’s intent as a defining feature of persuasion. Perloff (2013) adopts this view, stressing that “persuasion does involve a deliberate attempt to influence another person. Persuaders must intend to change another individual’s attitude or behavior and must be aware (at least at some level) that they are trying to accomplish this goal” (p. 18). For some authors, intentionality is the litmus test that distinguishes *persuasion* from *social influence* (Gass & Seiter, 2004).

Certainly, pure persuasion would seem to be intentional. When we think of obvious cases of persuasion we tend to think of situations in which one person purposefully tries to influence another. But what about borderline cases of persuasion? We believe that many influence attempts take place without any conscious awareness on the part of the persuader.

As just one instance, parents quite commonly instill beliefs, impart values, and model behavior for their children, a phenomenon known as *social modeling* (Bandura, 1977). Yet they may not realize how much of what they say and do is absorbed by their young-uns. As any parent will attest, many of the lessons parents “teach” their children are completely unintended. Another form of unintentional influence involves

socialization processes. From the moment children are born, they are socialized into their respective gender roles, cultural customs, religious practices, and socioeconomic habits. Some socialization processes are mindful, but many are not.

A second way in which an intent criterion is problematic is that people do not always know what specific outcome they are seeking. Face-to-face encounters, in particular, are laden with spontaneity. Social influence may arise in and through our interaction with others, rather than as a result of planning and forethought. Sometimes persuasion just happens.

A third problem with relying on an intent criterion involves situations in which there are unintended receivers. Imagine a scenario in which two people are discussing which bets to place on a horse race. One tells the other about an inside tip on a horse that's a "sure thing." A third party overhears the conversation and places a wager on the horse. In such situations, persuaders don't intend for third parties to be influenced, yet they often are. Two studies (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Kirkland, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1987) clearly demonstrate the operation of the *unintended receiver effect*. In these studies, the researchers created a situation in which third parties overheard an ethnic slur directed against an African American. The results of both studies revealed that the overheard ethnic slur led to lower evaluations by the third parties of the individual at whom the slur was directed. Notice that a reliance on an intent standard for defining persuasion tends to make senders less accountable for the consequences of their unintended communication. If a message has harmful effects, the source can disavow any responsibility by claiming "that's not what I intended."

A fourth limitation lies in the difficulty of ascertaining another's intent. There can be a difference between a persuader's *stated* intent versus his or her *actual* intent. Who makes the determination in such cases? The sender? The receiver? A third party?

Finally, resolving the issue of intent is particularly difficult in interpersonal contexts, in which both parties may be engaged simultaneously in attempts at influence. When there are two interactants, whose intent counts? Intent-based definitions, we believe, are ill suited to modern conceptualizations of human interaction as a two-way venture. The linear view of persuasion that such definitions imply, from sender to receiver, ignores opportunities for mutual influence.

Effects

The effects criterion poses the question: Has persuasion taken place if no one is actually persuaded? Some authors adopt a receiver-oriented definition of persuasion by restricting its use to situations in which receivers are somehow changed, altered, or affected. Daniel O'Keefe (2016) underscores this perspective when he writes:

The notion of success is embedded in the concept of persuasion. Notice, for instance, that it doesn't make sense to say, "I persuaded him, but failed." One can say, "I *tried* to persuade him, but failed," but to say simply, "I persuaded him" is to imply a successful attempt to influence.

(pp. 2–3)

Although we recognize the attraction of this point of view, we believe there are problems with limiting the definition of persuasion in this way. We take the position

that even if a person is communicating badly, he or she is *still* communicating. Similarly, we believe that a person can be engaged in persuasion even if it is *ineffective* persuasion. The same can be said for most other activities. A salesperson might fail to close a deal but would still be engaged in selling. A dancer might dance badly, stepping on his or her partner's toes, but would still be engaged in dancing. In short, a person can be engaged in an activity whether the person is doing it well or not.

An effects criterion emphasizes persuasion as a *product*. Such an orientation, however, bears little fidelity to current conceptualizations of human communication as a *process*. If we think of persuasion only as an outcome or a thing, then an effects orientation makes perfectly good sense. We maintain that persuasion is better understood as an activity in which people engage. This is more than semantic quibbling. By approaching persuasion as a process, scholars and researchers are more likely to gain insights into how it functions, or what makes it tick, because they are focusing on *what's going on*, not simply on how things turn out.

A second weakness is the same as that already associated with an intent criterion: An effects criterion embodies a linear view of persuasion, from source to receiver. In face-to-face encounters, however, there isn't simply *a* source and *a* receiver. Both parties may be simultaneously engaged in persuasion. They shape, adapt, and adjust their strategies in response to one another (Prislin et al., 2011).


A third problem with relying on an effects criterion is that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to measure persuasive effects. Rotzoll and Haefner (1996), for example, concluded that only 20 to 40 percent of advertising is effective. The other 60 to 80 percent is also persuasion—it's just ineffective persuasion. In fact, the ability to measure persuasive outcomes may hinge entirely on the sensitivity of one's measuring instruments (scales, surveys, sales figures, etc.). Furthermore, what constitutes the threshold for a successful versus unsuccessful attempt at persuasion? How much attitude or behavior change must take place to say persuasion has occurred? And what about the occasional odd circumstance in which persuasion "boomerangs"—that is, a persuader achieves an effect that is *contrary* to his or her intended purpose? Such questions, we believe, highlight the many vagaries inherent in relying on an effects criterion.

We do agree that, as with an intent criterion, pure cases of persuasion can usually be evaluated by their overall effectiveness. Even then, persuasion is rarely an all-or-nothing venture. If one also wishes to focus on borderline cases of persuasion, one must accept the fact that partial persuasion is more the rule than the exception. Notice, too, that there is some tension between relying on intent and effects as limiting criteria: What is achieved isn't always what is intended, and what is intended isn't always what is achieved.

Free Will and Conscious Awareness

Many authors endorse the view that there is a distinction between persuasion and coercion. This view is also receiver based, but it focuses on whether a person is aware that she or he is being persuaded and how much freedom the person has to accept or reject the message. Persuasion, these authors suggest, is noncoercive. As Herbert Simons (1986) puts it, "persuasion is a form of influence that predisposes, but does not impose" (p. 22). Richard Perloff (2013) also makes this point when he states that persuasion requires "an atmosphere of free choice" (p. 27).

FIGURE 2.2
 “Persuasion” and
 “coercion” often coexist
 side by side.
 Source: © Robert Mankoff/
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It naturally follows that if a person is unaware that an influence attempt is taking place, she or he can't consciously resist it. Thus, mindfulness is a prerequisite for free choice. Nevertheless, we believe that persuasion can and does occur without the conscious awareness of receivers. For example, Ackerman, Nocera, and Bargh (2010) found that evaluations of job applicants can be shaped in important yet unconscious ways. Participants in an experiment were asked to evaluate resumes of job applicants. Some participants read resumes attached to heavier clipboards, while others read resumes attached to lighter clipboards. The results were intriguing. Applicants whose resumes were attached to heavier clipboards were rated higher overall and as being more serious than their “lightweight” counterparts. The physical weight of the clipboards translated into judgments about whether the applicants themselves were more substantial. Our advice, if you want to be seen as having more “gravitas”: print your resume on a heavier bond of paper or, better yet, chisel it in stone.

In fact, many influence attempts succeed precisely because they operate at a low level of awareness. For example, consumers generally may be aware that product planting (placing products in movies and TV shows) is common, but they may not know how prevalent the practice is, let alone recognize each and every instance of product planting that occurs. Persuasion that relies on social networking, such as word of mouth (WOM), is designed to seem spontaneous rather than planned. A person might receive a link to a funny website from a friend, not realizing that the site was developed as a marketing tool by a commercial entity.

You may think of persuasion and coercion as being separate and distinct, but in our view, they aren't so much polar opposites as close relatives. Powers (2007) agrees when she asks:

Does a coercion claim have to show that another choice was in fact available? Just how available does the other choice have to be? Is it necessary to present all possible alternatives in order to avoid a charge of coercion? How equal do the choices have to be and how aware does the receiver have to be of those choices, and who decides what *available* means?

(p. 128)

In fact, we would suggest that most influence attempts we encounter in daily life include both persuasive and coercive elements. Rarely in life is one free to make a completely unfettered choice. There are almost always strings attached. This is particularly true of face-to-face encounters. If a friend asks to borrow 20 bucks, we can say “no,” but there may be relational consequences for declining.

Rarely, too, are influence attempts completely coercive. For example, holding a gun to another person’s head would seem to be an obvious example of coercion. We readily admit that this situation is *primarily* coercive. But what if the victim doesn’t believe the gun is loaded? Or what if the victim thinks the threatener is bluffing? To be successful, a threat—even a threat of violence—must be perceived as credible. Thus, even in what might seem like a clear-cut case of coercion there are persuasive elements at work. And conversely, even in what appear to be cut-and-dried cases of persuasion, there may be coercive features operating. In our view, the issue isn’t so much *whether* a situation is persuasive or coercive as *how* persuasive or coercive the situation is.

Symbolic Action

A number of authors maintain that persuasion begins and ends with symbolic expression, which includes language as well as other meaning-laden acts, such as civil disobedience and protest marches. This approach focuses on the means, or channel, of persuasion as a limiting criterion. Timothy Borchers (2013) endorses this view, noting that “our definition of persuasion uses the phrase ‘language strategies and/or other symbols’ to indicate the content of persuasion” (p. 19). Similarly, Gerald Miller (1980) maintains that “in most instances, language is an integral aspect of the persuasive transaction” (p. 5). Richard Perloff (2013) also adheres to this point of view, noting that “Persuasion is a symbolic process” (p. 17).

Authors who limit the scope of persuasion to symbolic action fear that without such a limitation, all human behavior could be construed as persuasion. Their point is well taken. However, restricting the medium for persuasion to words or symbols leads to a rather disjointed view of persuasion. We believe that a definition that limits persuasion to words and clearly codified symbols leaves out too much. Most magazine ads emphasize pictures rather than words. In fact, one study suggests that the text of a typical ad is read by fewer than 10 percent of the readers (Starch, cited in Dupont, 1999). The same is true of television commercials. It seems arbitrary to limit persuasion to the words contained in an ad or a commercial, without considering the role of the images as well. We think that the *whole* ad or the *whole* commercial persuades.

We also believe that some of the most intriguing aspects of persuasion can be found in nonverbal behavior, which lies on the periphery of symbolic action. For example, research on the physiological correlates of deception demonstrates that

a variety of involuntary nonverbal cues (such as blinking, smiling, and pupil dilation) are positive indicators of lying (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). We focus on deception as a form of persuasion in Chapter 12. Research on source credibility reveals that physical attributes, such as height or attractiveness, influence judgments of source credibility (Chaiken, 1979). We examine such factors in Chapter 4. We also can think of situations in which pure behavior—for example, nonsymbolic actions—are nevertheless persuasive. When a basketball player makes a head fake to fool a defender, we would maintain that the player is *persuading* the defender to go the wrong way. The fake is all behavior, but the player has to *sell* the fake to get the defender to “bite” on it.

We believe that restricting the study of persuasion exclusively to symbolic expression leads to a fragmented understanding of the subject. Persuasion involves more than language usage or symbol usage. A whole host of factors are at work. Interestingly, many authors who profess an adherence to symbolic action nevertheless treat a variety of nonsymbolic aspects of behavior, such as those just mentioned, in their texts.

Interpersonal Versus Intrapersonal

How many actors are required for persuasion to take place? A last limiting criterion that deserves mention is whether persuasion can involve only one person or whether persuasion requires the participation of two or more distinct persons. Some scholars adopt the view that engaging in persuasion is like dancing the tango: it takes two (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994; Johnston, 1994). We agree in the case of the tango, but not in the case of persuasion. In fact, we maintain that attempts at self-persuasion are quite common (Aronson, 1999; Perloff, 2013). A person might search for a rationalization to do something he or she wants to do, such as blowing the rent money on front-row concert tickets. In such cases, people talk themselves into whatever they wish to do.

We are sympathetic to the “two or more” perspective but suggest that, once again, the issue comes down to whether one wishes to focus exclusively on pure cases of persuasion or borderline cases as well. We heartily agree that when we think of pure cases of persuasion, we conjure up an image of one person persuading another. When we include borderline cases, we imagine instances in which individuals sometimes try to convince themselves.

A MODEL OF THE SCOPE OF PERSUASION

In light of the five limiting criteria just discussed, we can now offer an enhanced model (see Figure 2.3) that encompasses both pure and borderline cases of persuasion (Gass & Seiter, 2004). As with the preliminary model, the inner circle represents pure persuasion—that is, what we think of as the core of persuasion. The outer circle represents borderline persuasion. Superimposed on top of these two circles are five wedges, each representing one of the five limiting criteria previously discussed. The inner portion of each wedge represents the pure case for that criterion. The outer portion represents the borderline case. Once again, the shading between the inner and outer circles reflects the fuzzy dividing line that exists between pure and borderline persuasion.




FIGURE 2.3
Enhanced model of persuasion.

Based on this enhanced model, you can appreciate the fact that different definitions feature different wedges of the inner and outer circles. Source-oriented definitions restrict persuasion to the inner circle of the “intentional–unintentional” wedge. Receiver-based definitions limit persuasion to the inner circle of the “effects–no effects” wedge. Other receiver-based definitions favor the inner circle with respect to the “free choice–coercion” criterion, and so on.

As you can also see from the enhanced model, some definitions concern themselves with several wedges at the same time, whereas other definitions are based on a single limiting criterion. It’s worth noting that all definitions of persuasion—including our own, which we present shortly—are linguistic constructs. They exist in the world of words. Whether a given situation involves persuasion is not a matter of fact but of judgment.

Our own preference is for an expanded view of persuasion that includes borderline cases as well as pure persuasion. We tend to side with the view that persuasion is sometimes unintentional; that it sometimes has no discernible effects; that people aren’t always aware of when it is occurring; that it often includes at least some coercive features; that it needn’t be conveyed exclusively via symbols; and that humans do, on occasion, engage in self-persuasion. Many of the topics discussed in later chapters reside in the outer ring of our model. As we’ve already indicated, we believe that some of the most intriguing aspects of persuasion can be found there. We firmly believe we must look at both the inner and outer rings to fully understand the phenomenon of persuasion.

THE CONTEXT FOR PERSUASION

Consistent with current conceptualizations of persuasion, we view social influence as a process. Thus far, however, our model has remained relatively static. A final feature must be incorporated into our model to reflect the nature of persuasion as a process.

That feature is the *context* for persuasion. The context in which persuasion occurs—for example, within a small group, via mass media, in an organizational setting, and so forth—is crucial because it is the context that determines the nature of the communication process. In a face-to-face setting, for example, influence is a mutual, two-way process. In an advertising setting, influence tends to be more linear, from the advertiser to the consumer (there may be feedback from consumers, but it is delayed). Each context imposes its own unique set of constraints on the options available to persuaders.

By context, we don't simply mean the number of communicators present, although that is certainly one key factor. The context for communication also includes how synchronous or asynchronous communication is. Synchronous communication refers to the simultaneous sending and receiving of messages. Such is the case in face-to-face interaction. Asynchronous communication refers to a back-and-forth process that involves some delay, such as email or texting.

Another contextual factor is the ratio of verbal to nonverbal cues that are present. A print ad consisting entirely of text would rely exclusively on verbal cues (words) to persuade. A poster featuring only an image would rely exclusively on nonverbal cues to persuade. Most persuasive messages involve both verbal and nonverbal cues. The ratio of verbal to nonverbal cues available in any persuasive situation imposes particular constraints on the persuasion process.

An additional contextual factor is the nature and type of media used in the persuasion process. Television commercials, radio ads, magazine ads, and telemarketing are traditional media for persuasion. New media include blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, among many others. Face-to-face encounters, such as door-to-door sales and panhandling, are unmediated. As with the other contextual factors, each medium imposes its own constraints on the persuasion process.

Yet another contextual factor involves the goals of the participants. Often, but not always, participants enter into communication encounters with specific objectives in mind (Dillard, 1990, 1993, 2004; Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). Canary and Cody (1994) break down these goals into three types—self-presentational goals, relational goals, and instrumental goals. *Self-presentational goals* have to do with identity management. People want to project a favorable image of themselves to others. *Relational goals* have to do with what people want out of their relationships—how to develop them, improve them, change them, and so forth. *Instrumental goals* involve attempts at compliance gaining. People's goals may be thwarted or may change during a persuasive encounter.

A final contextual variable involves sociocultural factors that affect the persuasion process. People from different cultures or subcultures may persuade and be persuaded in different ways (Ma & Chuang, 2001). For example, research suggests that some cultures prefer more indirect approaches to compliance gaining (hinting, guilt, reliance on group norms), whereas other cultures prefer more direct approaches to compliance gaining (direct requests, demanding) (Wiseman et al., 1995). Different cultural traditions can dramatically affect what is expected or accepted in the way of influence attempts.

Note that all of these contextual factors are operating at once in a given persuasive situation. Each of the contextual factors constrains the process of persuasion in one way or another. The context involves the totality of the relationships among all these

factors. The final version of our model, depicted in Figure 2.4, illustrates how persuasion is shaped by context (Gass & Seiter, 2004). Context, then, is what determines the nature of the process involved in a given persuasive situation.

A WORKING DEFINITION OF PERSUASION

At last we arrive at our own definition of persuasion. Our view is that *persuasion involves one or more persons who are engaged in the activity of creating, reinforcing, modifying, or extinguishing beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations, and/or behaviors within the constraints of a given communication context*. The advantage of our definition is that it encompasses the full scope of persuasion, both pure and borderline cases. Our definition also emphasizes persuasion as an activity or a process; it is something people do. Our definition encompasses the notion that in face-to-face encounters, persuasion is a two-way street. Each party has an opportunity to influence the other. With respect to our definition, we also wish to stress that persuasion doesn't involve simply changing one's own or another's mind, though that is the most typical connotation (Miller, 1980). Persuasion also can involve creating new beliefs or attitudes, where none existed before. It also can involve reinforcing, strengthening, or solidifying attitudes already held by receivers. And persuasion also can involve attempts to extinguish or eliminate beliefs and attitudes. The latter approach is exemplified by Alcoholics Anonymous's position that alcoholics must abandon the belief that other people are responsible, or circumstances are to blame, for their dependency.

If our definition seems expansive, it is because we believe the topic of persuasion itself is rather far ranging. We wish to examine not only the core of persuasion in this text but its periphery as well. The majority of our examples focus on pure cases of persuasion. However, from time to time we dabble on the fuzzy outer edges. We find some of the borderline cases of persuasion quite interesting, and we believe you will too.




FIGURE 2.4

Completed model of persuasion. This figure illustrates three of many possible persuasive situations.

SO WHAT ISN'T PERSUASION?

Given the breadth of our definition, you're probably wondering, "What *isn't* persuasion?" We address this concern now. Our position is that the ingredients for persuasion can be found in most, if not all, communication transactions. The degree to which these persuasive ingredients are present is what matters. We think most human communication involves at least the *potential* to influence. Of course, one may choose not to focus on the persuasive, or potentially persuasive, elements in a communication situation. One can concentrate on some other aspect of communication instead. The potential for persuasion remains nonetheless. What matters, then, is how persuasive a given communication situation is, not whether a communication situation is persuasive.

Many other features of communication besides persuasion can command one's attention. For example, one can examine the role of self-disclosure and relationship satisfaction without discussing persuasion. One can study effective listening skills, regardless of whether the message listened to is persuasive or not. One can study nonverbal cues and liking without focusing on persuasion. One can look at how people try to save face during conflicts without involving persuasion. Persuasive elements needn't comprise the focus of attention even if they are present. One can focus on other relevant features of human communication to the exclusion of persuasive processes.

Although we believe that nearly all human communication is potentially persuasive, we don't believe the same about all human behavior. The mere act of breathing, in and of itself, doesn't seem like persuasion to us—although under the right circumstances it could be (such as pretending to be out of breath). Tripping over a rock, by itself, doesn't seem like a persuasive act to us, although, again, under certain conditions it could be (such as feigning clumsiness). Biological functions, such as sneezing, coughing, or vomiting don't strike us as being persuasive, though, again, a person could fake having allergies, a cold, or a hangover to influence someone else. A good deal of human behavior, then, we don't consider to be persuasion, unless and until some additional conditions are met. We don't think everything humans do is persuasive.

There are also some forms of communication that we've excluded from consideration in this text for purely practical reasons. We don't discuss torture as a form of persuasion, although some, like Abbott (2016) call it persuasion at its most gruesome. We also don't address the possibility of human-to-animal persuasion, or vice versa, though such a case probably could be made. Furthermore, we don't consider a whole range of studies on how plants, such as willow trees or sugar maples, can warn other trees about insect infestations. There are biologists, though, who study "talking trees" (McGowan, 2013). We don't examine the power of hypnotic suggestion as a form of influence. We don't examine attempts to persuade via telepathy, paranormal, or psychic activity either. We've heard that some people with cancerous tumors try to "talk to" their cancer and "persuade" it to go away. We don't deal with that topic here, except insofar as it may constitute a form of self-persuasion. We also don't address a host of other intriguing topics, such as the role of genetics and neuropsychology in persuasion. We simply don't have the space to devote

to those topics here. Thus, as big as the fence that we've built is, there is a lot of human communication we've left out.

DUAL PROCESSES OF PERSUASION

Now that we've clarified what we think persuasion is, we want to take a look at how it functions. To this end, we present a brief explanation of two prevailing models of persuasion. Both are known as *dual process* models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) because they postulate that persuasion operates via two basic paths. The two models share many similarities and, in our opinion, both do an excellent job of explaining how persuasive messages are perceived and processed.

The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion

Richard Petty and John Cacioppo's (1986a, 1986b) *elaboration likelihood model of persuasion* (ELM), is one of the most widely cited models in the persuasion literature.² Their model proposes two basic routes to persuasion that operate in tandem. The first of these they call the *central route*. The central route, or *central processing*, as they sometimes refer to it, involves *cognitive elaboration*. That means thinking about the content of a message, reflecting on the ideas and information contained in it, and scrutinizing the evidence and reasoning presented. The second route to persuasion is known as the *peripheral route*. The peripheral route, or *peripheral processing*, as it is sometimes called, involves focusing on cues that aren't directly related to the substance of a message. For example, focusing on a source's physical attractiveness, or the sheer quantity of arguments presented, or a catchy jingle as a basis for decision making would entail peripheral processing. According to the ELM, the two routes represent the ends, or anchor points, of an elaboration continuum (Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004). At one end of the continuum, a person engages in no or low elaboration. At the other end, a person engages in high elaboration.

To illustrate the two basic routes, imagine that Rex and Trudy are on a date at a restaurant. Trudy is very health conscious, so she studies the menu carefully. She looks to see whether certain dishes are fatty or high in calories. When the food server arrives to take their order, she asks, "What kind of oil is used to prepare the pasta?" She might sound picky, but Trudy is engaging in central processing. She is actively thinking about what the menu says. Rex, however, is smitten with Trudy's good looks. He hardly looks at the menu, and when the food server asks for his order, he says, "I'll have what she's having." Rex is engaging in peripheral processing. He's basing his decision on cues that are unrelated to the items on the menu.

Petty and Cacioppo acknowledge the possibility of *parallel processing*—that is, using both routes at once (Petty, Kasmer, Haugvedt, & Cacioppo, 2004). For example, when people judge the credibility of websites, they consider the look and layout of a website (peripheral cue) and the content of the website (central processing) (SanJosé-Cabezuo, Gutiérrez-Arranze, & Gutiérrez-Cillán, 2009). However, Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, 1986b) suggest that there is usually a trade-off between central and peripheral processing, such that a person tends to favor one route over the other. Whether a person emphasizes the central or the peripheral route hinges on two basic factors. The first of these is the individual's *motivation* to engage in central processing. Because central processing requires more mental effort, a person with greater

motivation is more likely to rely on central processing. Typically, this means the person has *high involvement* with the topic or issue. That is, the topic or issue matters to him or her, or affects him or her personally. If a person has *low involvement* with a topic or issue, he or she will be less inclined to engage in central processing, and more likely to resort to peripheral processing. For example, voters with little knowledge are more likely to be swayed by politicians' looks than voters who are informed about the candidates' positions (Lenz & Lawson, 2011).

The second factor that determines whether a person will rely on central or peripheral processing is his or her *ability* to process information. A person must not only be willing but also able to engage in central processing. Some people are more adept at grasping ideas, understanding concepts, and making sense of things. Some people also have more knowledge of or expertise in certain topics or issues than others. Thus, receivers are more likely to process a persuasive message via the central route if they have the motivation and ability to do so. If they lack the motivation or the ability, they will tend to rely on peripheral processing instead.

Aside from ability and motivation, a variety of other factors can tilt the balance in favor of central or peripheral processing. These include distractions, such as background noise, time constraints, a person's mood, or a personality trait called *need for cognition*. Need for cognition has to do with how much a person enjoys thinking about things. We discuss this trait in more detail in Chapter 5.

The type of processing affects the persistence of persuasion. Researchers have found that persuasion via the central route tends to be more long lasting, whereas persuasion via the peripheral route tends to be more short-lived (Carpenter, 2015; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). This seems sensible: When we think about ideas,




FIGURE 2.5

Peripheral processing in action.

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they are more likely to be absorbed. Similarly, persuasion that takes place via central processing also tends to be more resistant to counterinfluence attempts than persuasion via peripheral processing. This also makes sense: If you've thought through your position, you're less likely to "waffle." Researchers also have found that if receivers disagree with the content of a message, using central processing causes them to generate more counterarguments. That is, they mentally rehearse their objections to the message. If receivers disagree with a message and rely on peripheral processing, however, they will generate fewer counterarguments or other unfavorable thoughts about the message. A useful generalization when persuading, then, is that to make persuasion last, you've got to make people think.

The Heuristic Systematic Model of Persuasion

Another model of persuasion that bears many similarities to the ELM is Shelley Chaiken and Alice Eagly's *heuristic systematic model*, or HSM (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As with the ELM, the HSM operates on the assumption that individuals rely on two different modes of information processing. One mode, called *systematic processing*, is more thoughtful and deliberate. Systematic processing in the HSM is roughly analogous to central processing in the ELM. The other mode, called *heuristic processing*, relies on mental shortcuts. Heuristic processing is based on the application of *decision rules* or *heuristic cues* that help simplify the thought process. An example of a decision rule would be buying a TV based on its brand name ("Sony televisions are reliable"). An example of a heuristic cue would be choosing one wine over another because the bottle is prettier. Heuristic processing in the HSM is roughly equivalent to peripheral processing in the ELM.

Chaiken and Eagly's model also maintains that *simultaneous processing* of messages is commonplace. Messages travel the heuristic and systematic routes concurrently. As with the ELM, the HSM states that *motivation* and *ability* are two primary determinants of the extent to which heuristic or systematic processing will be used. A problem for both models is that, to date, there is limited empirical evidence of simultaneous processing, at least in laboratory studies of persuasion (Booth-Butterfield et al., 1994; Chaiken et al., 1989).

Another feature of the HSM is the *sufficiency principle*, which states that people strive to know as much as they need to when making a decision, but no more or less. On one hand, people want to devote the time and attention to issues that they deserve. On the other hand, people can't afford to spend all their time and mental energy worrying about every little thing. Therefore, people balance their heuristic and systematic processing to create the best "fit" for the issue at hand.

By way of illustration, suppose Irwin is thinking of buying a digital camera. If Irwin didn't know much about such devices, he could take one of two approaches. He could rely on systematic processing by reading up on digital cameras. He would likely adopt this route if he thought he really needed a digital camera (motivation) and he lacked the necessary knowledge about them (sufficiency principle). He also would need time to gather information and be able to understand it (ability). Alternatively, he could opt for heuristic processing. He could base his decision on a friend's advice using a simple decision rule ("Lance knows his cameras") He could base his decision on a heuristic cue, such as the brand ("Canon is the best brand"). He would be more

FIGURE 2.6

Heuristic processing is more reflexive than reflective.

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"I have no idea what gluten is, either, but I'm avoiding it, just to be safe."

likely to resort to heuristic processing if he didn't really need a digital camera—it was only an electronic toy (low motivation)—or if he didn't think he could make sense of the information about cameras anyway (lack of ability).

Both the ELM and HSM are useful for explaining and predicting people's reactions to persuasive messages. Literally dozens of studies devoted to testing the explanatory and predictive power of these two models have been conducted. These studies have generally upheld the models' utility. Although both models have their critics (see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b; Mongeau & Stiff, 1993; Stiff & Boster, 1987), it is safe to say that they enjoy considerable support in the literature. We develop and amplify principles related to the ELM and HSM throughout this text. Because we refer to both models repeatedly, it would be worth your while to familiarize yourself with their basic concepts for later reference.

THE UNIMODEL OF PERSUASION

An alternative to dual process models of persuasion is the *unimodel* developed by Arie Kruglanski and Erik Thompson (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b). Kruglanski and Thompson posit that, rather than two distinct modes of information processing, there is a single route to persuasion. Central processing isn't qualitatively different from peripheral processing, according to the *unimodel*; there is simply more or less of it. Kruglanski maintains that the alleged differences in processing based on the ELM and HSM merely reflect differences in the messages themselves. Longer, more complex messages require more thought, while shorter, simpler messages require less thought (Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005).

Despite the simplicity of the *unimodel*, we believe there are cases in which persuasive messages are processed in fundamentally different ways (Petty, Wheeler, &

Bizer, 1999). For example, a consumer who responded to a fear appeal emotionally or reflexively would be quite different from a consumer who responded to a fear appeal rationally or reflectively. Even so, the *unimodel* raises important questions about whether and how dual processing occurs. Some scholars have questioned whether dual processing has ever been empirically documented (Booth-Butterfield et al., 1994).

SUMMARY

We began this chapter by presenting a preliminary model of persuasion that distinguishes pure from borderline cases of persuasion. We identified five limiting criteria for defining persuasion that are reflected in our own model of persuasion. We followed our model with our own broad-based, far-reaching definition of persuasion. Finally, we provided a brief explanation of Petty and Cacioppo's *elaboration likelihood model* (ELM) of persuasion and Chaiken and Eagly's *heuristic systematic model* (HSM) of persuasion. An alternative to dual-process models, the *unimodel*, also was presented.

NOTES

1. More than two decades ago, Simons (1986, p. 116) introduced a model of persuasion having concentric circles, representing pure persuasion, peripheral persuasion, and non-persuasion. Our preliminary model (Figure 2.1) draws on his work.
2. Not all scholars are enamored with Petty and Cacioppo's model. Among others, Mongeau and Stiff (1993) and Stiff and Boster (1987) have criticized the ELM for its theoretical and empirical limitations. Petty, Wegener, Fabrigar, Priester, and Cacioppo (1993) and Petty, Kasmer, Haugvedt, and Cacioppo (2004) have responded to many of the criticisms directed against their model.

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