



# **The STATE the NATION & the JEWS**

Liberalism and the Antisemitism  
Dispute in Bismarck's Germany

Marcel Stoetzler

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The product is for Hae-Yung, although we can write a much better book.





## The State, the Nation, and the Jews



In the November 1879 edition of the prestigious Berlin-based journal *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Prussian Annals), one could read the following words by its editor, Heinrich von Treitschke: “What we have to demand from our Jewish fellow-citizens is simple: that they become Germans, feel themselves simply and justly as Germans, regardless of their faith and their old sacred memories, which all of us hold in reverence; for we do not want thousands of years of Germanic civilization to be followed by an era of German-Jewish mixed culture.”<sup>1</sup>

The most momentous of the many responses provoked by the article that contained this passage began with the following statement: “Fierce struggles have unified our fatherland to a powerfully advancing Empire. Unity has been achieved because the feeling that necessity has welded us together carried the victory over the tribal and religious divisions that had fragmented our nation like no other. Making individual members [of the nation] pay for these divisions is unfair and vulgar and mostly punishes those who honestly and seriously strive to overcome [their] particularity and to achieve true amalgamation with the nation.”<sup>2</sup> The string of themes voiced in this much-quoted declaration—national unity, power, progress, “the feeling that necessity has welded us together,” individual fairness, true amalgamation—outlines quite accurately the typical position held by German National Liberals in the second half of the nineteenth century, including Treitschke himself.

The event under examination here, the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute, began in November 1879 when Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96), a leading German liberal, in a review of current affairs, reflected on the anti-Jewish activities of some groups and individuals, particularly in Berlin, in a way that was generally understood to support their cause. The best known among the respondents to his remarks included the social scientist Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903), the historian Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903), the philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), and the banker and politician Ludwig Bamberger (1823–93). Treitschke, born in Saxony, was a leading ideologist of a Prussian-led unification of Germany. He was a member of parliament and a professor at Berlin University. Lazarus had been the president of the Israelitic Synods of 1869 and 1871 and was coeditor of the prestigious *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (Journal for Psycho-Ethnography and Linguistics).<sup>3</sup> Mommsen, also a professor at Berlin University, was the author of *Römische Geschichte* (Roman History), whose celebration of Julius Caesar had profoundly influenced the political thinking of middle-class Germans in the 1860s. Bamberger, born in the Francophile environment of Mainz, was a republican, a (former) democrat, and a banker. He had been an adviser to Bismarck and had played a leading role in the restructuring of the German currency system. The historical background to the Dispute was the foundation of the German Reich in 1871 after a particularly brutal war between Prussia and France. The year 1879 saw the formation of some fringe groups of radical antisemites, complete with some antisemitic street violence, and indeed the word *antisemite* itself was coined in the same year.

What later came to be known as the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute was a twofold intellectual scandal. The first scandal was that Treitschke expressed sympathy for antisemitic attempts to curb Jewish emancipation. This kept parts of the educated liberal elite in Germany on their toes for the best part of two years, and also gained prominence abroad. It continues to be of central interest for those studying German history, especially that of German state-formation, nationalism and antisemitism, and German-Jewish history: an established representative of National Liberalism—the form of liberalism that primarily bore the German national movement in the period

after 1848—took a stand against what by that time had come to be seen as an important plank in the liberal program. The second, complementary scandal, however, was a matter for comment merely for some in the Jewish community: what liberal (Gentile as well as Jewish) critics of Treitschke's move put forward was limited by their commitment to a nationalism that was to a large extent held in common with the offender. Viewed a century and a quarter later, this second scandal emerges as at least equally challenging for our understanding of the historical process. In the Dispute, overlapping theoretical premises were used for the defense of, as well as for the attack on, Jewish emancipation, and this created ambiguities and confusions that make the analysis of the Dispute significant far beyond its specific historical context.

This book offers a presentation and interpretation of the Dispute, an exchange of journal articles and pamphlets between scholars and other members of the educated elite in Germany between 1879 and 1881. Although it is not an attempt at developing a general theory of antisemitism, liberalism, or nationalism, it has been guided by a set of general (and painfully contemporary) theoretical questions: How do liberals conceive of that Janus-faced creature, the nation-state? What is the role of culture for liberal nationalism? What place do liberal nationalists give to cultural difference? What does antisemitism have to do with all of this, and with the Jews?

The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute was a dispute on the relevance, meaning, and origins of the antisemitic movement that was, like the word itself, emerging at the time. More specifically, the Dispute was about why Treitschke, a leading National Liberal historian, political theorist, and politician, appeared to lend his support to antisemites, and how this should be responded to in a period of intensified consolidation of the “small-German” nation-state. On closer inspection—and only close inspection can reveal what is most interesting here—one might be surprised to find how much the Dispute exceeded the issues of antisemitism, the Jews, and Judaism. The Dispute was as much about Germans and how they could best form and consolidate their national state as it was about Jews and those who hated them. Those involved took the scandal of antisemitism as an occasion for

an extended and sophisticated argument about the concept of the nation, its relation to culture, the relevance of religion for culture, and likewise, that of “race” for culture and nation. The exploration of how Treitschke arrived at supporting antisemitism from within the national-liberal framework of his thinking, and how his (mostly) national-liberal opponents struggled to come to terms with this fact, is of burning contemporary relevance, because several fundamental aspects of this framework—the ones I will focus on in the discussion—are still with us today.

Antisemitism responded to the twin processes of Jewish emancipation and assimilation. The contributors to the Dispute argued about whether antisemitic agitation would push the Jews to accelerate assimilation (Treitschke’s view) or would obstruct and slow down their assimilation (most others’ view). Antisemitism has, of course, a variety of origins, and the form expressed by Treitschke—due to his elitist, anti-democratic self-understanding—is in itself probably not even one of the most historically significant ones. In this sense the analysis of this particular dispute can make only a partial contribution to the general analysis of antisemitism’s origins, but it can make a major contribution to explaining a historically decisive aspect of the history of antisemitism’s success.

The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute cannot on its own be taken to be representative of nineteenth-century discourses on antisemitism or, more generally, hostile attitudes toward Jews. However, the polemical as well as scholarly literature has consistently recognized that the remarks Treitschke made in this context were a crucial instance in the development of Jew-hatred in Germany in the period between legal emancipation—culminating in 1869–71—and the Nazi extermination of European Jews.<sup>4</sup> The combination of the two observations that the Dispute has been central to the development of antisemitism and that the concept of the nation has been central to the Dispute makes the latter an obvious starting point for exploring the place of antisemitism within late-nineteenth-century thinking on the relations among liberal state, nation, culture, race, and religion. The general point I will be making is that the existence of the nation-state puts pressure on its representatives to enforce some extent of cultural homogeneity, especially

in times of crisis, and that this tendency is one of the forces that helped (in the German case, successfully in the twentieth century) antisemitism gain hegemony.<sup>5</sup> A more generic theory of antisemitism would have to look at a much broader range of issues (especially the factors that gained mass support for populist antisemitism); the analysis proposed in this book—of why and how a liberal turned to endorsing and helping propagate blatantly anti-liberal ideas such as antisemitism, and of how those who tried to defend the liberal program and its specifically liberal articulation of nationalism had such difficulties in doing so—is understood here as a contribution to the wider analysis of the tendency of liberalism to be complicit in its own undoing.

The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute followed the emergence of an “antise-mitic movement,” although it predated the development of that movement into differentiated and programmatically articulated political organizations. The Dispute was in the first place a debate *about* the nascent antisemitic movement and did not involve the protagonists of this movement as participants.<sup>6</sup> This reflects the specific social location of the Dispute: mainly professors, liberal politicians, priests, and rabbis exchanged extended and elaborate statements. The social exclusiveness of most of the contributors and their style obviously limited the debate’s immediate impact, but they also contributed to its long-term relevance: the Dispute features members of the educated elite trying to make sense of a new key word that had been coined in a lower-middle-class milieu and had populist connotations. In a society that held scholars and (state-approved) intellectuals in as high prestige as the Bismarck Reich, such an exchange was bound to have a lasting impact.

### Treitschke’s Ambivalence

Treitschke’s texts are notorious for catchy antisemitic formulations such as “The Jews are our misfortune” or “Our country is invaded year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths from the inexhaustible cradle of Poland.”<sup>7</sup> However, his position is full of ambivalence and cannot easily be dismissed as that of a racist and anti-liberal demagogue. Treitschke is interesting particularly because he was a figure of the center, not the margins, of



German society. His opponents, some of whom were or had been his friends, colleagues, or political allies, acknowledged this either implicitly or explicitly and demonstrated difficulties in coping with Treitschke's ambivalence as well as the fact that they belonged to the same social and political milieu. In the Dispute, national liberals responded to a fellow national liberal's anti-Jewish remarks; both sides were equally committed to defending and helping consolidate the newly founded German nation-state. Both sides shared assumptions about the national state, emancipation, and the status of cultural or ethnic minorities.

Why did the "Jewish question" seem so important that a nationalist like Treitschke chose to undermine national-liberal unity in order to challenge what he saw as the "Jewification" of society? In the period of the consolidation of the German nation-state, most National Liberals tended to subordinate a general and rather diffuse feeling of antipathy toward Jews to the larger objective, national unity. Treitschke stopped doing this, and was attacked for it. The question is, what prompted him to transform his latent, as it were acceptable, dislike of Jews—the "normal" antisemitism that has been described as a "cultural code"—into a virulent and "political" endorsement of antisemitism?<sup>8</sup>

The text that triggered the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute is a difficult and ambiguous document. The illiberal or even racist elements in a text that seems predominantly to constitute a call to accelerated assimilation—a staple of the liberal tradition—beg explanation. A look through the literature clearly shows that the Dispute has consistently puzzled commentators.<sup>9</sup> It is widely seen as an event of decisive significance for the development of "modern antisemitism" (i.e., the transformation of "traditional Jew-hatred" into whatever different authors suggest is its late-nineteenth-century variant or successor), the development of liberalism (German liberalism in particular), and its relation to nationalism. Furthermore, almost all commentators note that there is some form of ambivalence in Treitschke's position (and many state the same for Mommsen, Treitschke's most prominent critic). The most widely noticed ambivalence in Treitschke's argument was that between the demand for the Jews to accelerate their assimilation and—at the same

time—the (less explicitly stated) demand for their social exclusion. However, not much has been written that would try to explain that ambivalence, nor is there much systematic discussion of how nationalism, antisemitism, and liberalism relate to each other.<sup>10</sup> The scandal that the Dispute constitutes for liberal nationalism has as often been named as avoided.<sup>11</sup>

My contention is that the close interpretation of the historical sources can be put to work for the current debates on antisemitism, race, and ethnic-cultural difference in the context of modern state and liberal society. Treitschke is a prime example of the type of antisemites described by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as “liberals who wanted to assert their antiliberal opinion.”<sup>12</sup> Horkheimer and Adorno proposed this notion in contrast to that of late-modern, post-bourgeois, fascist antisemites. As liberal society has historically defeated fascism, study of the forms of antisemitism that occur in *liberal* societies is (again, and perhaps against the expectations of the Frankfurt theorists) of highest urgency: if “liberal” antisemitism ever disappeared at all, it should be expected to have reappeared after the defeat of fascism. This means for the current situation, at least in the West, that the type of antisemitism represented by Treitschke demands analysis more, rather than less, urgently than that of Hitler or Goebbels. Horkheimer and Adorno pointed in the same context to the dialectic between liberalism and antisemitism: “The beer hall politics of the antisemites revealed the lie of German liberalism, on which it fed and whose demise it finally brought about.”<sup>13</sup> What exactly “the lie of German liberalism” (arguably, not just of *German* liberalism) was, or is, is among the problems that are pivotal to this book.

Trying to explain the paradoxical phenomenon of a liberal asserting antiliberal opinions is one of the two perspectives under which I explore the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute. The other is to look at the validity and effectiveness of the liberal counterattack. Treitschke’s critics rejected antisemitism primarily as the signature of “exaggerated nationalism”: antisemitism seemed to them a case of “too much” of what was basically a good thing, benign and well-proportioned nationalism. I will be testing here another thesis by Adorno, namely, that “the philistines [Spiessbürger]” (short for treacherous

bourgeois who have abandoned the classic ideals of the era of bourgeois revolution) were never able to define “the line between nationalism [which they professed to reject] and that which they cultivate as natural national feelings [gesittete Bürgerlichkeit].”<sup>14</sup>

The moniker “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit” seems to have been coined by the publicist Walter Boehlich, who used it as the title of his 1965 edited volume of most of the more important texts.<sup>15</sup> Boehlich, who was born in 1921 in Breslau but lived then in Frankfurt/Main—something like an archetypical Frankfurt intellectual—was (until 1968) a chief editor of the highly influential left-liberal Suhrkamp publishing house, and to the present day he has remained a leading essayist, publicist, and critic. Before Boehlich’s term became universally accepted, the object of the present exploration was usually referred to as the “Treitschke-Streit”; I use both terms as synonyms.<sup>16</sup> I selected texts that explicitly refer to Treitschke’s rather sophisticated and elaborate argument or any of the responses to it, not the more populist debates that took place at the same time (and had their epicenter also in Berlin).<sup>17</sup> My intention and—to the extent that there is any—the originality of my work lie in presenting, charting comprehensively, and opening up for examination the actual content of the Dispute, by doing so, taking it seriously as a historically crucial debate on how to make sense of modern society, and exploring what place antisemitism occupies in it.<sup>18</sup> After all, as Reinhard Rürup wrote, antisemitism is but “the travesty of a theory of society.”<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, my presentation and discussion will try to draw out why a debate about the demand for a revocation of Jewish emancipation (at the time in Germany a hopelessly remote possibility) could take on the enormous weight that it did. The hint may suffice here that one of those attending seminars at Berlin University while the repercussions of the Dispute could still be felt was the “father of sociology,” Max Weber, whose father in turn was one of the signatories of the declaration against Treitschke.<sup>20</sup>

As the dispute about and with Treitschke attracted some of the brightest, most articulate, and most politically committed minds of the time, it can scarcely be rivaled as a document of social and political thought in Bismarck’s Germany. It was predominantly about how national culture was understood to

mediate among state, society, and individual in the modern context. As it was also a crucial instance in the development of modern antisemitism, it allows, or rather, demands from us a reflection on how the former are connected to the latter, that is, the relations among antisemitism and state, nation, and national culture. The gist of my thesis is that—Treitschke's embarrassment and temporary silence on the issue after 1881 notwithstanding—the Dispute highlights a conceptual weakness of liberalism in its relation to antisemitism and Jewish emancipation. Treitschke's support for antisemitism is rooted in the contradiction between inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies inherent in the "nation-form."<sup>21</sup> National states refer to and presuppose the existence of a national culture. To the extent that liberal society constitutes itself in the form of a nation-state, it has to guarantee, or produce, some degree of cultural homogeneity or conformity, that is, the assimilation of not-yet-conforming elements.<sup>22</sup> If a considerable minority seems not to be assimilating, the nation-state's representatives will inevitably ask whether this minority is prevented from assimilating, refusing to assimilate, or unable to assimilate. Exactly these questions are pivotal to the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute. I suggest that Treitschke's support for antisemitism is a symptom of contradictions intrinsic to liberal society, by which is understood a modern form of society characterized by the duality and interplay of a "civil society" and a "liberal state." Antisemitism develops from within; it is not a challenge coming from somewhere outside that society and its values. To the extent that antisemitism is anti-liberal, it is an element of the self-negation of liberal society. In antisemitism, liberal society revokes its promise to gradually expand emancipation to all groups of the population. Liberalism is understood here to be a tradition of modern thinking that is as much concerned with individuals (rights-bearing subjects who are owners and sellers of commodities) as with how best to construct the state they form in line with their specific needs and interests.<sup>23</sup> Liberal theory often asserts, and always implies, that in order to meet the needs of an association of individuals of selfish interests, the state must be provided with an ethos of belonging and a sense of "us," which is typically referred to as "the nation." Liberalism without some form of nationalism is therefore an impossibility.<sup>24</sup>

The notion put forward by Treitschke's critics—namely, that his antisemitism is based on “exaggerated nationalism”—contrasts in an illuminating way with the currently predominant liberal notion that there are two distinct “kinds” of nationalism, one benign (“Western,” French, political), the other malign (“Eastern,” German, ethnic-cultural).<sup>25</sup> Treitschke's case illustrates that this distinction does not hold, as his support for antisemitism follows from a form of nationalism that would fall into the political (“Western”) just as much as the ethnic (allegedly German-romantic) category.

### Treitschke's Initial Remarks on the Jews

The concluding section of the review of current political affairs in *Preussische Jahrbücher* of November 1879 that was the starting point of the Dispute, contained nearly all the topics that would be unfolded in its course.<sup>26</sup> Treitschke argued as follows:

There is a frightening anti-liberal mood among the public that needs to be explained in terms of what goes on “in the depths” of “the nation's life.” The current mood is in its essence an adverse reaction to “humanitarianism and Enlightenment,” implying a return from skepticism to “moral groundedness” and “religious earnestness.” On one hand Treitschke welcomes this trend, but on the other he stresses that religion ought not to interfere with “the positive right of the secular state.” The awakening of the national consciousness is directed against “effeminate philanthropy” and aims at restoring the “majesty of the law.”<sup>27</sup>

The new anti-Jewish movement is one of the symptoms of this overall, anti-liberal current. It represents an ugly but welcome liberation from the liberal anti-anti-Judaism of the preceding decade; it comes from “the people” and is directed against the “authoritative” discourse of the liberal-intellectual-Jewish establishment. The Jews, the press, and more generally liberalism are to be blamed for having caused the popular irritation, which Treitschke implies could get out of hand. While different from earlier forms of “Jew-baiting,” which had been “hollow and unfounded,” the current “noisy activity” expresses a “long-suppressed anger” that is genuine and legitimate. It reflects the emergence of “a German Jewish question [eine deutsche Judenfrage].”<sup>28</sup>

Because of the mass immigration of Polish Jews, Treitschke argues, the “Jewish question” in Germany differs from that in “Western” countries such as England and France. While the “Spanish Jews” who immigrated into the western countries tended to assimilate easier, the “Polish Jews” who are immigrating into Germany are unable to assimilate.<sup>29</sup>

Treitschke’s main emphasis is his demand for assimilation: the Jews shall “become Germans,” which means in the first instance to “regard themselves” as Germans, irrespective of their religion. However, he makes this demand on the grounds that “Germanic civilization” must remain unmixed. The conflict between the concern for an “unspoiled” Germanic civilization and the demand for political assimilation irrespective of religion remains unresolved: the Jews are expected to adopt the “German spirit.” Treitschke expresses doubts about whether many Jews actually want to become Germans. In a reversal of the Enlightenment expectation that legal emancipation will lead to assimilation, Treitschke suggests that “Jewish arrogance” is a post-emancipation phenomenon. He argues that Jewish academic and business involvement is changing the traditional character of German economy and “German spirit.” He develops at length the theme of “Jewish domination of the press.” He accuses Ludwig Börne in particular of mocking Germany “as if” he *were not* a member of the nation—implying that he actually *was* and ought to have acted more loyally. Nevertheless, he argues the German nation is a “Christian nation,” leaving open how or to what extent Jewish citizens (short of conversion, which he does not demand) ought to identify themselves with the Christian German nation.<sup>30</sup>

Treitschke urges the reader to take seriously the anti-Jewish movement, and he warns against underestimating it as a transitory mood of the mob and a few fanatics. The current anti-Jewish movement is grounded neither in mere “Christian fanaticism” nor in “national arrogance”: some of the “best educated” men share the anti-Jewish feeling. Treitschke suggests only indirectly that this may include himself.<sup>31</sup>

Treitschke rejects the idea of revoking legal emancipation, arguing that to do so would mean a betrayal of the “fine traditions” of the (liberal, secular) state. However, he argues that the weakness of the German nation (as compared to

France and England) necessitates a specifically German unequivocal stance toward the Jews. Once German national consciousness will have become as strong as it already is in France and England, it will constitute an environment in which Jews will be “harmless” or “even beneficial.” He concludes with two demands: the Germans shall become more conscious and proud of their nationality, and the Jews shall become more German. To the extent that assimilation can never be complete, Treitschke argues, the minority should accept the dominant role of the majority without criticism of, or intervention in, “their” business and show “tact” and “tolerance.”<sup>32</sup>

### On Mistrusting Bourgeois Political Culture

In the most recent contribution to the growing scholarly literature on the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute, the German historian Uffa Jensen writes that it ought to teach us how to mistrust what he calls the “bürgerliche Bildungskultur,” the culture of educated bourgeois, which was the common intellectual home of Treitschke as well as his critics.<sup>33</sup> This “culture” is still today expected by the liberal public to provide the cultural framework for the rejection of the barbarism of which antisemitism has become a signature, and when Jensen invites us to cast doubts on this expectation, he echoes the point famously made by Adorno: that after Auschwitz all culture is garbage, and that this included even the critique of culture itself.<sup>34</sup> The focus of the present discussion is more specifically on the traditions in which educated members of modern bourgeois society have thought about this society and its political forms, that is, on modern social and political theory. Adorno’s fundamental suspicion against any effort to resurrect “the culture” or the social and political thought of an apparently more salubrious and benign pre-Nazi world remains the same. The salient—and deliberately paradoxical—point I am trying to make is that Treitschke’s illiberalism is liberal, and his opponents’ liberalism is also illiberal.

One methodological point needs to be added: in the presentation of my argument I aim to tease the relevant theoretical questions out of the source material, rather than confronting the latter with a preformulated set of questions or problems (as if research ever started with exactly the

questions for which it finally suggests answers). The key concepts of my analysis are liberalism, nationalism, and antisemitism. I will not strain the reader's patience with detailed discussion of what exactly I hold these concepts to mean before going into the thick of the primary source material of "the case": I trust that the material itself will throw into relief the meaning and interrelationships of these terms. I will do the conceptual and contextual work after, as I hope the exploration of the source material will have urged unto the reader the questions with which the concepts will have to be approached, as it has done to me. Contextualizing the material too much and too early would mean bringing to the fore prêt-à-porter narratives into which the source material only needs to be slotted and fitted, and would, I believe, strangle it rather than make it speak. The reader will have to bring to the book a childlike, leisurely pleasure in wading through a labyrinth of original text that was written by people who were scholarly trained but found themselves in political combat, and who threw into battle all and sundry they could muster.<sup>35</sup> The messiness of the material is witness to the seriousness of the case; too much streamlining of its presentation would mean a betrayal of the struggle. In the second part of the book I will develop theoretically and historically the problems and contradictions that I suggest can be found in the material, concerning the state, the nation and the Jews. There I will also address the historians' *Gretchenfrage* whether or not all this is perhaps merely a German peculiarity (perchance obliterated in 1945, as the most optimistic commentators suggest), that is, a regionally limited problem that should not cause too many sleepless nights to those not directly involved.<sup>36</sup>

### Dramatis Personae

Heinrich von Treitschke, born in Dresden, Saxony, was at the time of the Dispute the editor of the prestigious journal *Preussische Jahrbücher* (a position he had held since 1866), a member of the Reichstag (since 1871), and, since 1873, a professor of history and what we would now call political science at Berlin University. He had been a member of the National Liberal Party until he left this party in July 1879 because of its less-than-unanimous support



for the introduction of a number of tariffs.<sup>37</sup> Treitschke was a liberal and a nationalist, as the name of the party he represented in parliament indicates; however, his statements on Jews and on antisemitism will necessitate a more detailed look at his development, which I will provide later on.<sup>38</sup> For the purposes of this introduction, it may suffice to embrace Guido de Ruggiero's judgment: "Treitschke's political conception . . . represents a form of Liberalism doubtless in many respects at variance with Western Liberalism, but at bottom inspired by the same motives, and equally tending to find in the autonomous personality the source of a rich and varied political life."<sup>39</sup>

### First Set of Responses

Treitschke's notorious text "Unsere Aussichten" (Our Prospects) from November 1879 was immediately answered by an open letter from Manuel Joël, a moderately conservative rabbi in Breslau<sup>40</sup> and the author of a "pioneering work" on the Jewish sources of Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise*.<sup>41</sup> It was published first in a newspaper and then as a brochure that was reprinted three times already before the end of the year. A rapid response was also provided by a man who came closest to what in today's parlance would be called a "community leader" of Berlin's Jewry, Moritz Lazarus, like Treitschke a professor at Berlin University.<sup>42</sup> Lazarus, born in the Prussian province of Poznan, was (in 1869 and 1871) president of the Israelitic Synods, two international gatherings of rabbis, scholars, and lay leaders, predominantly liberal but including conservatives.<sup>43</sup> On December 2, 1879, he gave a lecture before the general meeting of the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums (College for Jewish Studies), an opportunity he used for promoting self-clarification among the Jewish community on the issues addressed by Treitschke. The lecture was titled "What Does National Mean?" and was widely circulated in a printed version published in January 1880.<sup>44</sup> Politically, Lazarus was "a devoted German patriot": his first-ever published text, *Über die sittliche Berechtigung Preussens in Deutschland* (On the Ethical Legitimacy of Prussia in Germany) (1850), had been a "hymnic defense of Prussia."<sup>45</sup> Lazarus had then argued that Prussia's cultural superiority warranted its political hegemony.<sup>46</sup> His academic fame was based on his

having cofounded with the specialist in Humboldtian linguistics, Heymann Steinthal, in 1859 the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (Journal for Psycho-Ethnography and Linguistics).<sup>47</sup> When they developed *Völkerpsychologie* in the early 1850s, Lazarus and Steinthal first considered calling the new discipline *psychische Ethnologie* (mental ethnology). They refrained from using the concept of “anthropology,” as this was at the time too much concerned with physiology. Most of the topics covered by the *Zeitschrift* “clearly fell within the scope of socio-cultural anthropology as we know it today.”<sup>48</sup> *Volksgeist* meant for Lazarus and Steinthal “the social heritage of an ethnic group,” that is, roughly what anthropology today calls “a culture.”<sup>49</sup> Lazarus defined as the central category of this new discipline, *Völkerpsychologie*, the *objektiver Geist* (objective spirit) or *Gesamtgeist* (all-spirit). According to *Völkerpsychologie*, *objektiver Geist*, *Volksgeist*, or *Gesamtgeist* precedes the individuals, who are primarily carriers, not creators, of “objective spirit.”<sup>50</sup> From December 1880, Lazarus would be at the forefront of efforts to organize Jewish self-defense against antisemitism.

Four other Jewish intellectuals were quick to respond: Seligmann Meyer (1853–1925), a rabbi in Berlin, wrote several articles as the editor of the journal *Jüdische Presse*.<sup>51</sup> Moses Aron Nadyr (1848–1909), a rabbi from Löbau, Western Prussia, wrote a “letter from a Polish Jew” to Treitschke. Ludwig Philippson (1811–89), a rabbi in Bonn, was the editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums: Ein unparteiisches Organ für alles jüdische Interesse* (General Journal of Jewry: A Nonpartisan Organ for All Jewish Interests). This liberal journal (“clearly the most important Jewish weekly of the nineteenth century,” writes Shulamit Volkov) published numerous articles and comments, and also reviews of pamphlets and brochures concerning the anti-Jewish agitation.<sup>52</sup>

The only contemporary Jew whom Treitschke attacked directly was the historian Heinrich Graetz (1817–91), a professor in Breslau. Treitschke had read the eleventh volume of Graetz’s famous *Geschichte der Juden* (History of the Jews) (1870), dealing with the period from 1750 to 1848, just weeks before he wrote the remarks that triggered the Dispute. In his book, Graetz makes frequent use of the (mildly derogatory) term *Deutscher Michel* (denoting

an easy-going, well-meaning simpleton) and implies that the failure of the Germans to achieve political liberties was due to their national characteristics.<sup>53</sup> Graetz's book seems to have been the catalyst that triggered Treitschke's piece. Less than three weeks later, Graetz published (in a newspaper) the first in a series of responses and replies to Treitschke, to which Treitschke responded in turn, and so forth several times over. Despite their particularly bitter dispute, as Michael Meyer writes, "Graetz and Treitschke were remarkably alike in the manner of their historiography."<sup>54</sup> For example, reference to "Jewish blood" is "a racial element which is as prominent in Graetz . . . as in Treitschke."<sup>55</sup> They also shared a background in the German school of historicism. It was a crucial element of nineteenth-century thinking that religious forms evolve and progress like other historical forms. Graetz, who taught (like Joël) at the Jüdisch-Theologisches Seminar (Jewish Theological Seminary) in Breslau, helped establish historicism within the Jewish context. For Graetz the historicization of Judaism seemed to be the key to finding a way of being Jewish in the modern world without "submitting" to liberal reform Judaism. He thought that the reform idea of Judaism as a "modern religion of reason" would help to dissolve rather than emancipate the Jewish community. While accepting the idea of slow and gradual development of religious forms, Graetz defended the unity of the religious and the national.<sup>56</sup> He aimed to defend Judaism as it had developed historically against what he saw as the imposition of religious forms taken from other contexts (Protestantism), much as Ranke had defended German political forms against the imposition of French republican conceptions. Although he hesitated using the word, Graetz's historiography presupposed the notion of a Jewish *Volksgeist* evolving through history that needed to be defended against sudden and "non-organic" challenges.<sup>57</sup> "His interest in theological problems was limited," though.<sup>58</sup> His concern was with the continuation of a "Jewish existence" that maintained Jewish particular characteristics—including but not primarily religion—that was secular, that is (at least implicitly), national in character. Hans Liebeschütz writes that Graetz's "view of the future of the messianic people had . . . taken on the bourgeois forms of his century and his environment." Graetz was also decidedly *German-Jewish* and had

no high opinion of Polish-Russian Jewry (nor of their language, Yiddish, nor of Hasidism): for Graetz, Judaism owed its reemergence—from Mendelssohn's time onward—to the German Enlightenment.<sup>59</sup>

### Second Set of Responses, January 1880

Another newspaper contribution was published in January as a brochure that went through six editions in 1880 alone, being one of the most highly circulated contributions. The text, "Against Heinrich von Treitschke," was by Paulus Cassel, priest at the Christuskirche in Berlin.<sup>60</sup> Cassel (1821–92), born in Silesia as Selig Cassel, had converted from Judaism in 1855 and was a Protestant theologian working for the Judenmission. He had briefly (1866–67) been a Conservative member of the Prussian Diet. His statement bore all the ambivalence of his office, and it is interesting that it sold in huge numbers, although no well-known commentator on either side seemed particularly impressed by it.

Apart from the publication of Treitschke's first three statements in the *Dispute* as a brochure called "Ein Wort über unser Judentum" (A Word about Our Jews), which became the (until that time) biggest-selling antisemitic pamphlet ever,<sup>61</sup> January 1880 saw the publication of six of the most substantial contributions, namely, those by Breßlau, Bamberger, Oppenheim, Cohen, Endner, and Naudh, the last two of whom were radical antisemites and so far the only non-Jews to respond publicly to Treitschke. Also, the pamphlet "Börne and Treitschke: Open Letter on the Jews," by an author who masquerades—or rather, ironically pretends to masquerade—as Löb Baruch/Dr. Ludwig Börne, elegantly adopting Börne's radical-liberal language, was published in the same month.<sup>62</sup>

The historian Harry Breßlau (1848–1928), another Berlin professor, a student of Johann Gustav Droysen, was involved in a number of Jewish cultural institutions but believed in the possibility of assimilation. As Liebeschütz writes, "the continued existence of Jewry was not a concern of his."<sup>63</sup> Being like Treitschke a National Liberal, Breßlau had as late as in 1878 closely cooperated with Treitschke in an election committee that aimed to defeat a Progress (i.e., left-liberal) candidate in Berlin.<sup>64</sup> Breßlau's letter to Treitschke

from January 1880 that was published as a brochure is “sober like the positivistic scholarship of which Breßlau became a master.”<sup>65</sup>

Of a quite different temperament, and commanding a writing style that reflected his somewhat more exciting biography, but also a member of the same National Liberal Party, was the politician Ludwig Bamberger, whose spirited response to Treitschke was published first as an article in the journal *Unsere Zeit*, then as a brochure; it was the only article he ever published on the subject.<sup>66</sup> Bamberger was a man with a history: he was born in Mainz, a place whose Jacobin and Francophile political traditions could still be felt at the time. The young Bamberger had been a republican and supported a centralized German state modeled on France to be established by revolutionary means, while (then) rejecting Prussian hegemony.<sup>67</sup> During the revolution he played a decisive role in the process in which republican democrats split away from the liberals (April 1848), which won him the nickname *der rote Bamberger* (the red Bamberger) and an invitation to join the local communist *Arbeiterbildungsverein*, one of the “workers’ educational associations” that were at the time of revolution not so strictly about education.<sup>68</sup> Holding observer status as a journalist, he came to the conclusion in June 1848 that the Frankfurt Parliament would not bring about any political change, and he suggested mobilizing the wider population. He also advocated careful social reform and propagated a Proudhonist Volksbank (People’s Bank) project.<sup>69</sup> Bamberger took part in the Reichsverfassungskampagne (Campaign for the Imperial Constitution, May 1849) but dissolved his corps and fled to Switzerland on arrival of the Prussian troops in the Palatinate, partly to escape reprisals by the remaining insurgents for his premature capitulation, partly because he was sought for high treason by the state.<sup>70</sup> (The Reichsverfassungskampagne was the effort by democrats and a minority of liberals to force the German princes militarily to accept the compromise that liberals and democrats had found in between themselves in the Paulskirche parliament.) In this period, Bamberger strongly rejected the stirring of cultural-nationalist emotion (such as promoted by Mazzini in Italy or Kossuth in Hungary) and praised “the healthy and simple logic of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.”<sup>71</sup> Subsequently, he lived in London, Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Paris, where

he became a multimillionaire and was able to retire from business in 1866. In this period he developed from democrat to (“Manchester”) “left-liberal” with no sympathies for state-led social reform.<sup>72</sup> However, he also came to the conviction that only Prussia could effect the creation of a unified nation state and the ending of *Kleinstaaterei*, the parallel existence of a multitude of (often semifeudal) small German states. Instrumental for this seems to have been the influence of Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim, with whom Bamberger edited the official journal of the Deutscher Nationalverein (German National Association), the institutional face of the national movement, the *Deutsche Jahrbücher für Politik and Literatur* (German Annals for Politics and Literature).<sup>73</sup> In 1859 Bamberger advocated in a widely read pamphlet (“Juchhe nach Italia” [Three Cheers to Italy], first published anonymously) that German unification should be modeled on the example given in Italy by Cavour: Prussia ought to push Austria out of the German League and annex the smaller German states. His position became—and remained thereafter—that there was no social basis for any alternative process of unification. Bamberger joined the Progress Party, returned from exile to Mainz in 1868, and became a member of the Zollparlament (the parliament of the Customs Union).<sup>74</sup> He was convinced that the “thousand-year-old culture of the German people will absorb Prussia” once a unitary (i.e., not a federal) state allowed Prussia to dissolve all the smaller dynasties.<sup>75</sup> Rather optimistically, and in this sense he was a typical nineteenth-century progressivist, he held that this state would then inevitably evolve into a republic. He understood (and therefore supported) Bismarck as the “executor of the economic and national desires of the bourgeoisie.”<sup>76</sup> As an expert on France, Bamberger worked as an adviser and publicist for Bismarck during the German-French war when he was instrumental in securing liberal support for the Prussian cause (while Treitschke rejected an invitation to work directly for the government, preferring the institutional independence of the academic). Bamberger was among the supporters of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and characterized the Paris Commune as “a horde of clowns and cannibals [eine Horde kannibalischer Possenreisser].”<sup>77</sup> At the time of the Dispute he belonged to the left wing of the National Liberal Party.<sup>78</sup>

Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim (1819–80) was a National Liberal journalist who published widely on law, politics, and economics. From January 1880 he wrote a series of articles on the Dispute in the journal *Die Gegenwart* (The Present). In 1844, while a lecturer at Heidelberg University (where Bamberger was one of his students), Oppenheim published a celebrated volume on international law, and in 1850 he published *Philosophie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft* (Philosophy of Law and Society). In 1848 he belonged to the democratic left around Arnold Ruge and took part in the civil war in Baden. He then spent eleven years in exile in Switzerland, Belgium, and England. Subsequently, he became a member of the Progress Party and from 1866 was a leading National Liberal supporter of Bismarck.<sup>79</sup> He was one of the main contributors to *Die Gegenwart*, which had been founded in 1871 as a liberal discussion journal trying to bridge the divisions between the competing liberal parties. In 1872 Oppenheim published a controversial essay “On the History of Stock-Market Fraud” at a time when the *Gründerzeit* (a contemporary term literally meaning “the time of the founders and promoters”) was still generally seen as a time of economic boom. In his influential text on *Kathedersozialismus* (socialism of the lectern) (1873)<sup>80</sup> he argued that trade unions were a corrupting influence on workers and that academic theorists of (state-sponsored) socialism were a threat to academic freedom.<sup>81</sup> His polemic against “Stöcker and Treitschke” was his final longer publication—he died on March 29, 1880. Significantly, a large part of the *Gegenwart*’s obituary for Oppenheim dealt with Treitschke and the antisemitic “Berlin movement.” Reflecting views formulated by Oppenheim in the last weeks of his life, the obituary argued that religious and racial hatred are “signs of barbarism, lack of culture or a regress in culture.”<sup>82</sup> Its author found it “incomprehensible” that racial hatred could be formulated with reference to the national state, since it had seemed that only some “backward” countries in southeastern Europe would host such “stupidity and passions.”<sup>83</sup> The author of the obituary relates that Oppenheim had observed in the last conversation they had shared that every war “destroys an amount of economical, moral [sittlichen] and intellectual [geistigen] cultural capital and leaves behind a certain degree of brutalization [Verwilderung]” among

the victorious no less than the defeated. This is where Oppenheim saw the deeper cause of the Jew-baiting—an observation that was as true for the situation after 1870–71 as it was for that after 1914–18.

One of the more famous but little loved and somewhat scandalized responses to Treitschke was by the philosopher Hermann Cohen, also published in January 1880. Born in Coswig (Anhalt), Cohen studied at the Jewish Theological Seminary in Breslau with Zacharia Fränkel (“the founder of Conservative Judaism”) and Heinrich Graetz.<sup>84</sup> After two years of studies he turned toward liberal Judaism in the vein of Abraham Geiger and studied philosophy in Breslau and Berlin. His publication *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (Kant’s Theory of Experience) (1871) gained him a post in 1873 at Marburg University, where he became professor in 1876. He was the first Jewish ordinary professor in Germany, and he held this professorship until 1912.<sup>85</sup> Although Cohen was affiliated with various Jewish organizations, particularly those concerned with education, his interest in Judaism arose only after 1880; his statement against Treitschke seems to have been the first reflection he published on the relationship of Judaism and German nationality. Before Cohen published his response to Treitschke he had already sent him two letters, seeking some kind of shared understanding, that remained unanswered.<sup>86</sup> Treitschke merely made some dismissive and polemical remarks that seemed to allude to Cohen’s letters in his second contribution to the Dispute. Cohen adhered to the notion of a close affinity between Protestantism and Judaism that he seems to have adopted from left-wing Hegelianism.<sup>87</sup> He supported “the idea that the political unity of the nation needs to be firmly based on the spiritual, on the humanitarian content of religion.”<sup>88</sup> He saw his position as the continuation of the earlier liberal tradition that had “understood [the formation of] the nation state and the ethics of German classicism as one undivisible task.”<sup>89</sup>

Nothing seems to be known about the antisemite Wilhelm Endner, whose pamphlet “Zur Judenfrage” (On the Jewish Question), a response to Breßlau’s letter to Treitschke, also came out in January 1880. His fellow pamphletist Naudh (apparently a pseudonym for Heinrich Nordmann) was a well-known antisemite, though. Naudh was the author of one of the most emblematic



texts of racial, anti-Christian antisemitism, *Die Juden und der Deutsche Staat* (The Jews and the German State) (first published in 1862 or earlier).<sup>90</sup> He succeeded Wilhelm Marr in April 1880 (according to comments in the publication) as editor of the extremist and short-lived but highly influential journal *Die Deutsche Wacht: Monatsschrift für nationale Kulturinteressen—Organ der antijüdischen Vereinigung* (The German Guard: A Monthly for National Cultural Interest—Organ of the Anti-Jewish Association).<sup>91</sup>

### The Dispute Simmers on Low Heat

In studying the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute there are some unexpected rewards in the form of great humor. There is of course the unintentional comedy constantly produced by the radical antisemites, such as the following sentence from the *Deutsche Wacht*: “We are of the opinion that the system of uncontrolled advertising is a thousand times more pernicious than all of Hegel’s philosophy and Darwinism together.”<sup>92</sup> On the other side there is the very intentional humor of those who perceive and challenge the pomposity of Treitschke’s discourse. The example of the (anonymous) mock-Börne has already been mentioned; another gem is the letter by the rabbi of Memel, a town on the German-Polish border, Isaac Rülff, published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums* in February 1880: he engages critically with Treitschke’s use of the *epitheton ornans* “trouser-selling” for the emigrating Jewish youths from “the East” and points out, *inter alia*, that they tend not even to own a decent pair of trousers for themselves to wear.

The general tone of the Dispute, however, remained serious. An important gesture of the highest symbolic value available to Imperial high society was made by the historian Theodor Mommsen in March 1880, when he attacked Treitschke’s support for antisemitism (without naming Treitschke directly) in a keynote speech at the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Prussian Academy of Sciences) on the occasion of the emperor’s birthday. Mommsen, who held equal if not higher prestige in German academia at the time, referred to antisemitism as a “process of moral-civilizational disintegration [sittliche Zersetzungsprozess].”<sup>93</sup> This remark mirrored a similar one famously made by the crown prince Friedrich Wilhelm (the future Emperor Friedrich III)

on the occasion of attending a fund-raising concert at the New Synagogue of Berlin at the end of December 1879.<sup>94</sup>

The most important publication in the summer of 1880 was that by the renowned statistician and medical doctor Salomon Neumann (1819–1908, born in Pomerania), *Die Fabel von der jüdischen Masseneinwanderung* (The Fairy-Tale of Jewish Mass Immigration).<sup>95</sup> Neumann was one of the democratically inclined members of the medical reform movement and a pioneer of social and health statistics.<sup>96</sup> He was close to the reformist workers association *Arbeiterverbrüderung* and later also to Social Democracy. He was a left-liberal city councillor of Berlin and also one of the founders of the *Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*.<sup>97</sup> The initial publication of Neumann's refutation of Treitschke's claims about Jewish immigration (in August) had little impact. Its second edition (in November), however, received a positive review in the liberal *Vossische Zeitung*. It was referred to by the liberal Rudolf Virchow (also a famous medical doctor and a founder of the Progress Party) in the debate in the Prussian Diet on the *Antisemitenpetition* (on November 20) and then by Theodor Mommsen in his own highly publicized response to Treitschke that was published later in the same month. (The *Antisemitenpetition* was an antisemitic petition circulated in the fall of 1880 that fetched a quarter of a million signatures all over the Reich. It was debated in the Prussian Diet in November 1880 after the left-liberal *Freisinnige* Party demanded that the government make a public statement on the petition, which it refused to do. On New Year's Eve night 1880–81, "organized gangs of hooligans provoked antisemitic incidents outside coffee-houses in Berlin Friedrichstadt" after a rally organized by the group behind the *Antisemitenpetition*.)<sup>98</sup> The public recognition of Neumann's scholarly argument forced Treitschke subsequently to write a review of Neumann's brochure and publicly acknowledge that significant Jewish immigration from Poland and Russia did not exist at the time.<sup>99</sup>

### The Declaration and Mommsen's Letters

A short, but perhaps the most momentous, reaction to Treitschke's anti-Jewish comments was the text that became famous as the "Declaration of the Notables," first published on November 14, 1880, in the liberal press.<sup>100</sup>

Its seventy-five signatories (seventy-three in the first publications) included the mayor of Berlin, Max von Forckenbeck (who seems to have initiated it); the historians Johann Gustav Droysen, Rudolf Gneist, and Theodor Mommsen; the engineer Werner von Siemens; Rudolf Virchow; Max Weber Sr., father of the sociologist Max Weber; and also a comprehensive list of leading Berlin businesspeople.<sup>101</sup>

Theodor Mommsen published on November 20 a letter which confirmed that one particular passage in the Declaration was targeted at Treitschke (without naming him directly), and slightly later he published a detailed response to Treitschke, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum” (Another Word on Our Jewry). Apart from the Declaration, whose initiators had deliberately asked only non-Jews for their signature, Mommsen’s was the only high-profile public statement against Treitschke that came from someone without Jewish background. This fact gave Mommsen’s statement, although it had been written grudgingly and hesitantly, a prominence and long-lasting reputation as *the* liberal counterpoint to Treitschke’s illiberalism, and makes necessary a somewhat closer look at Mommsen’s background.

Both politically and as a historian, Mommsen was quite close to Treitschke. Mommsen had been a student of Droysen and was influenced by the latter’s conception of history.<sup>102</sup> The building of the German nation was a central concern for Mommsen. He commented in 1865 on the controversial Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein (where he was born): “If the great dream of 1848 should come true, then every means, including force, will be justified. Necessity and the nation both speak in the categorical imperative, and as the nation-state can heal every wound, it is also entitled to inflict every wound”<sup>103</sup> (a use of the term “categorical imperative” that Kant would hardly have approved of). In August 1870 Mommsen published an open letter in Italian newspapers asking readers to support the German war effort of “defending the freedom of the continent against the common tyrant,” France.<sup>104</sup> In a letter from December 1877 he wrote: “Whoever lives within another nation has to assimilate to it, and the resistance to do so is as wrong as the hesitation of those who let them get away with it.”<sup>105</sup>

According to a letter written by Hermann Grimm (a colleague at Berlin University and common friend of Treitschke and Mommsen) to Treitschke

in February 1880, Mommsen had remarked to Grimm that Treitschke's comments in "Our Prospects" "would have been good and legitimate" as a chapter in Treitschke's academic work on German history "but not as a journal article."<sup>106</sup> In a related letter, Mommsen confirmed to Grimm that he agreed with his suggestion that "we all share the basic attitudes" but insisted that "the sun is reflected differently in a chamber pot and in a silver shield . . . in issues like this one, everything depends on how one says something, not what one says."<sup>107</sup>

Mommsen exerted political influence on the German educated classes most importantly through his widely read major work, *Römische Geschichte* (Roman History) (1854–85).<sup>108</sup> Especially Mommsen's positive depiction of Julius Caesar was often seen as an endorsement of the kind of politics that Bismarck came to stand for. Indeed, Treitschke used a quote from Mommsen's work to support one of his antisemitic arguments, and the fact that Mommsen did not want to let that happen without a response seems to have been what drove him to get involved in the Dispute in the first place. To the extent that Treitschke's use of Mommsen's formulation was not as disingenuous as Mommsen furiously claimed it was, his strong commitment as the leading non-Jewish critic of Treitschke can be seen as a form of denial and displacement of his own subliminal antisemitism.

Mommsen depicted the formation of the Roman Empire as a process of "national decomposition" in the course of which "the Greek and the Latin nationality find a peace with each other" that is based on "the rubble of second-rate peoples [Völkerschaften]."<sup>109</sup> Greek and Latin elements are the "positive" elements of the new citizenry, while the Jews and others form the "parasitical" Hellenistic-Oriental population of Rome. Julius Caesar faced the task of amalgamating the two principal "nations"—Greeks and Italians—that were destined to rule the Empire. The "Barbarian" nations had to be destroyed, while the Jews—that "peculiar, flexible but enduring people [merkwürdige nachgiebig zähe Volk]"—acted "as it were" as a third party.<sup>110</sup> Mommsen wrote: "Already then we find the distinct antipathy of the Occidentals against this so thoroughly Oriental race and its foreign opinions and mores. Nevertheless, this Jewry [Judenthum]—although

it was not the most pleasant trait of the nowhere pleasant picture of the miscegenation of peoples [Völkermengung] of the day—was a historical element that developed in the natural course of things.” Caesar (like Alexander before him) protected the Jews’ “peculiar cult” from the hostility of local Greek and Roman clerics. He “of course” did not intend to establish Jewry as a third nationality of equal weight, but rather wanted to take advantage of two characteristics of the Jews: first, their indifferent behavior against any state (the Jew—unlike the Occidental—had not been given the “Pandora’s gift of political organization”);<sup>111</sup> and second, their tendency to adopt any nationality to a certain extent in order to “wrap up [umhüllen]” their “national particularity [Eigenthümlichkeit].” “Therefore the Jews were as if made for a state that was built on the debris of one hundred destroyed polities and that needed to be fitted with an—as it were—abstract and integral [abstracten und von vornherein verschliffenen] nationality. Already in the old world, Jewry/Judaism [Judenthum] was a powerful ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition and for this reason a particularly legitimate member of the Caesarian state whose polity was nothing but cosmopolitanism, whose nationality [Volksthümlichkeit] was nothing but humanity.”<sup>112</sup> Mommsen’s interpretations of Jewish history in the Roman context tell a lot about his general political-historical conception. The chapter “Judea and the Jews” (in volume 5) discusses the Jewish defeat by Rome in 70 CE as a result of the failure of the Jews to be integrated into the Empire.<sup>113</sup> Mommsen writes that while under Caesar relations were good, the subsequent combination of clerical restoration and a sentiment of Jewish-national exclusivity prevented Jewish state-political development. Tendencies for secular statehood that could have controlled clerical rule were defeated by anti-secular popular movements (the Pharisees).<sup>114</sup> As a result, the only opposition to the combination of rule by Rome and by the clerical hierarchy was clerical-fanatical messianism. Mommsen argues that the diasporic Jews in the Hellenistic world, by contrast, remained central to Hellenic civilization, enjoying privileges while also being victims of popular riots, and thus developed differently.<sup>115</sup> Only the existence of the clerical state in Palestine and its “cult of the temple” maintained the Jews’ national

identity as a religious identity and prevented their complete assimilation. Mommsen compares the role of the Temple to the role of the Vatican in the present: the Roman state had to defend itself by crushing clerical-theocratic fanaticism just as the German Reich had to defeat ultramontaniam in the *Kulturkampf*.<sup>116</sup> As Hoffmann points out, though, the Roman Empire was not the secular quasi-modern state that Mommsen's comparison suggests, and the role of the Jewish community of Palestine surely had little in common with that of Catholics in nineteenth-century Germany.<sup>117</sup>

Treitschke used Mommsen's formulation of the "ferment" of "national decomposition" and thus associated Mommsen's view of the Jews with his own and that of the antisemites (something that antisemites had done before, however).<sup>118</sup> Mommsen's response is dominated by the effort to dissociate the notion of the Jews as pictured in his *Römische Geschichte* from antisemitism.<sup>119</sup>

Like several others of the group who published the Declaration, Mommsen was also among those who founded in 1890 the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (Defense League against Antisemitism), whose advocacy of "complete amalgamation"<sup>120</sup> was not necessarily welcomed by most Jews.<sup>121</sup> Having been an enthusiastic Bismarck supporter, Mommsen turned into a skeptic in his later days; in 1885 he wrote in a letter, "I wish to be forgotten by this spineless nation as quickly as possible."<sup>122</sup> The "spineless nation" had, however, good reasons not to forget him. Hans Kohn commented scornfully that "even in his last years . . . [Mommsen] continued to live in the illusion, typical of a German National Liberal, that Germany's unification through Bismarck's Prussia could have established a free society. So he turned in the 1880s against the German nation which had followed his own precepts. He sat in judgement over the nation. He never sat in judgement over his own nationalism."<sup>123</sup> At the time when it would have mattered, in 1848–49, Mommsen failed to support the liberal-democratic draft for a constitution for the German Reich, as he found "that the Frankfurt Constitution was too democratic and not sufficiently centralized."<sup>124</sup> In 1865, in addition to suggesting that both necessity and the nation speak in the "categorical imperative," he also, rather illogically, said that "as the nation-state can heal

every wound, it is also entitled to inflict every wound.” Most importantly, however, Mommsen’s glorification of Julius Caesar contributed to the consolidation of an authoritarian spirit in German middle-class society, and this was hardly an unintended side effect of innocent historical scholarship: after having met Napoléon III in 1863, Mommsen wrote in a letter that he envied the French for having “such a *grand criminel*” and wished fate might “throw one” to the Germans. As Kohn comments drily, “fate was soon to be so unkind as to fulfill Mommsen’s wish” several times over.<sup>125</sup>

This is the colorful cast of German Imperial intellectuals that we will now observe on the stage of a suitably dramatic battle of minds. In the following chapters the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute will be presented and discussed thematically. Each chapter is devoted to looking at what all discussants wrote on a particular aspect of the Dispute, usually beginning with Treitschke.

The examination begins in chapter 1 with Treitschke’s initial comments on the meaning and origin of the antisemitic movement, its social base, its relation to liberalism and the concept of education, and how these themes have been taken up and developed in the course of the Dispute. Chapter 2 looks at the different ways in which Jew-hatred has been linked to questions of nationality, and chapter 3 examines the concept of culture. Chapter 4, which is also the longest and most substantial, examines how the concepts of state, nation, race, and religion have been interrelated and delimited from each other by various contributors, some of whom engaged here in a detailed, scholarly, and highly theoretical discourse. Chapter 5 looks at how the discussants related to the concepts of emancipation, assimilation, and right. Finally, chapter 6 will examine the (hardly resolvable) question asked by many, still today: What did Treitschke actually think he was doing? Chapter 7 will draw some first conclusions. In the second section of the book, the findings of these chapters, at least some of which will challenge customary notions of how liberalism and nationalism relate to antisemitism and its rejection, will be put into historical context and related to some more theoretical questions.

## **I. The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute**





## One. Liberals, Antisemites, and “Educated Men”

Treitschke's comments on the “Jewish question” were made in the context of a longer argument on foreign affairs that culminated in his thoughts on the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary. This provided a framework and opportunity for Treitschke to speak his mind on “the German Jewish question.” Treitschke strongly rejects the *grossdeutsche* (pan-German) perspective, which would aim to destabilize Austria-Hungary and to annex its German-speaking parts to the German Reich. His is the *kleindeutsche* (small-German) position, which finds the continued existence of the “Dual Monarchy” to be in the interest of the German Reich.<sup>1</sup> Treitschke argues that the prospect of a possible disintegration of Austria-Hungary creates a general “feeling of insecurity.”<sup>2</sup> This diagnosis of the international situation leads him to his comments on domestic affairs, starting with an analysis of recent elections to the Prussian Diet in which Conservatives won, and Liberals lost seats:

In such a situation we need most of all strong government, loyal harmony between crown and people. The Prussian electorate has understood this necessity. We want peace with the government—this was the message of the recent polls. . . . The nation is disgusted and fed up with the quarreling of her parliaments; even the majority of the opponents of the new economic policy seem determined to wait for the effects of the reforms and to judge the facts. The Progress Party finds itself limited to some big cities and a few dispersed boroughs. The voters

have mercilessly cleared out the National Liberal faction. . . . The people does not want anymore to be spoon-fed by coteries.<sup>3</sup>

Treitschke concludes that the Prussian elections have “strengthened the central power” over against the particular states. His argument is that because of the looming insecurities of the international context, the German state needs unity and a powerful, centralized government, and for this purpose it is necessary to end the “quarreling” in the parliaments caused by the dated doctrines of “old school” liberals and progressives. Because “the people” seem to understand this necessity, the formula for the future lies in a “loyal harmony” between “crown and people.”

Next follow the notorious nine pages of comments on the “Jewish question.” Treitschke draws a general picture of the mood prevalent in Germany as he encountered it when he returned from a holiday in Italy. (In a letter to his wife he reported that in Italy he had found support for his view of the “deep necessity of Christianity” and had also been able to make some anthropological observations, such as that Romance and Slavonic people do not have proper hip bones, “which remain the privilege of the Germanic peoples”; some of the leitmotifs of the Dispute are in place even in Treitschke’s holiday mail.)<sup>4</sup> Having spent “the last couple of months abroad,” Treitschke hints that he is in a particularly good position to observe “the stormy German world” more objectively.

“Meanwhile a miraculous and powerful excitement labors in the depths of our nation’s life. It is as if the nation reflected on itself, as if it judged itself harshly.”<sup>5</sup> The returning Treitschke “is almost frightened” by the “awakening of the national conscience” manifested in a thousand voices “that defend or indict each other.” He attributes to this process additional importance and authenticity by claiming that this happens “almost in total independence from the press.” He suggests that “the press is still” (as in the 1860s) dominated by “liberal wish lists” and the “naive belief in the unfailing moral force of ‘education’ [Bildung; note the quotation marks].” Different from “the majority of the German press,” “public opinion” manifests an anti-liberal popular mood coming from “the depths of our folk-life.” “Economic

hardship, the memories of so many disappointed hopes and of the sins of the Gründerzeiten,<sup>6</sup> the sight of the increasing degeneration of the masses, which keeps pace with, or even overtakes, the spreading of the secret arts of reading and writing, and last but not least, the recollection of those days of horror in spring 1878<sup>7</sup>—all this forced thousands to reflect on the value of our humanitarianism and Enlightenment. Thousands feel that due to educational conceit we risk forgetting completely the moral groundedness of human life.”<sup>8</sup>

After describing the attacks on liberalism and “the press,” Treitschke evokes a popular sentiment against education (slandered as *Bildungsdünkel*, educational conceit) that is bound to give up on Enlightenment and “humanitarianism” and returns to questions of “moral groundedness [sittlichen Halt]”—implying that Enlightenment and talk about *Humanität* have eroded “moral groundedness.” He argues not against *Bildung* per se but against its generalization, which he links to social “degeneration.”<sup>9</sup>

Treitschke paints a picture of a society divided into two groups: one, which is made up of those who “fall for arid skepticism [wüsten Unglauben],” is opposed to another, in whom “religious earnestness” and “the ecclesiastical sense [der kirchliche Sinn]” have “gained strength again.” This generic suggestion leads Treitschke to comment on a specific event, the Protestant General Synod. He introduces here thoughts that will remain central to his argument: the interrelation of religion and the state. Treitschke gives an ambivalent assessment of the synod. He applauds the way it has shown “even to the opponents” that “this church still lives, it is still an effective force, firmly rooted in the people, full of moral gravity [sittliche Ernst] and not at all lacking in spiritual powers.” On the other hand, he criticizes “some disagreeable decisions,” including the “hopefully unfeasible attempt to subject the theological faculties [of the universities] to ecclesiastical rule [kirchliche Parteiherrschaft].” These resolutions were accompanied by “some ugly zealous words” and betrayed “the old theologians’ sin, the disrespect for the positive right of the secular state.” Two of Treitschke’s key concepts—the “positive right of the secular state” and the “moral gravity” of (Protestant) religiosity—are introduced as standing in a relation of tension. It is significant

that in the introduction of the section of the text that is mainly about the position of *Jewry* in the national state and society, Treitschke reflects on the relationship between the secular state and the (Protestant) *church*. The state depends on the church to provide vital ethical underpinnings that complement the secular state, while the state also finds its authority challenged in the field of education—a field that is crucial to the process of nation building. Treitschke applauds the “religious gravity” of the Protestant Synod, but he rejects its challenge to the authority of the state.

Treitschke then returns to his observations on the popular mood that were the starting point of the argument, phrased here as “the awakened conscience of the people” that is directed “mainly against the effeminate philanthropy of our age,” a remark that takes up again his attacks on liberalism and humanitarianism. This is followed by the discussion of the recent publication of a pamphlet by Otto Mittelstädt, a judge in Hamburg, titled “Gegen die Freiheitsstrafen” (Against Prison Sentences), which Treitschke describes as “a powerful protest against that pampering and mollicoddling of criminals which has overcrowded our prisons and has become a cruel insult to decent people.”<sup>10</sup> Treitschke asserts that “this strictly objective publication” has been answered by “incensed meetings and harsh resolutions of contempt from the radical parties” because “the heroes of the philanthropic phrase silently feel that the brave author—although his statements on their own often deserve criticism—essentially merely propounds what hundreds of thousands are thinking. The whole spirit of the age urges that the most severe majesty of the law be fully restored in our laws and their execution.”<sup>11</sup> Treitschke does not give any evidence for his claim that Mittelstädt’s anti-liberalism reflects a popular, anti-liberal mood.

Treitschke’s concerns with the resurgence of religious sentiment and with law and its enforcement provide the context for the discussion of antisemitism, which is referred to for the first time in the following paragraph: “Among the symptoms of the deep change in mood that goes through our people none appears as disconcerting as the passionate movement against Jewry.”<sup>12</sup> The statement that the antisemitic movement is the most “disconcerting” of a number of “symptoms” sounds cautiously critical. The subsequent sentence,

however, contrasts antisemitic agitation positively with how much worse Treitschke alleges the situation had been before: "Until a few months ago, the authoritative 'reverse *Hep-Hep*-call' was still dominant in Germany." "Hep-Hep" is the notorious rallying cry against Jews especially associated with the anti-Jewish events of 1819.<sup>13</sup> In the 1870s and 1880s anti-Jewish tendencies were often likened to revivals of the "Hep-Hep" riots. Treitschke reverses this common (liberal) topos and uses the tabooed term to stigmatize the (liberal) critique of antisemitism. By qualifying the liberal discourse as "authoritative [berufene]" he reinforces his point that the change of mood among the people represents an anti-authoritative, authentically popular movement. His attack on the liberal discourse delegitimizes in advance liberal reproaches and allows him to express sympathies for the current "movement" without appearing to be continuing the "medieval barbarism" of Jew-baiting.

In the established liberal discourse, according to Treitschke, "everybody could freely say the worst things" about "the national wrongs of the Germans, the French and all other nations"; "but if somebody dared to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and a religious persecutor by nearly all newspapers." Treitschke invokes here an anonymous (German) collective of independent minds who wish to debate the weaknesses of all peoples, including their own and that of the Jews, but are kept in check by "the press," which allegedly suppressed any criticism of the Jews.<sup>14</sup>

In the rest of this paragraph Treitschke enumerates recent events that outline the current antisemitic movement: "Today we have already come to the point where the majority of Breslau voters—apparently not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation—conspired not to elect a Jew to the [Prussian] Diet under any circumstances. Antisemitic societies are formed, the 'Jewish Question' is discussed in noisy meetings, a flood of anti-Jewish pamphlets inundates the book market."<sup>15</sup> Treitschke reverts to the tone he adopted earlier. "We have come to the point" seems to suggest that a basically legitimate reactive development is tending to go too far: voters "conspire," meetings are "noisy," "floods" of pamphlets "inundate" the market. Treitschke

uses negative terminology to express his distance from the events. At the same time, though, he stresses that the Breslau electorate at least (in contrast to the “passionate” popular movement) acted “not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation.” Taking into account that Treitschke’s main concern is with the “positivity” of state and law (as expressed earlier), his ambivalence about these processes seems to be more than just tactical: he perceives and articulates the risks for the “positivity” of the authoritative state that lie in popular movements and the “noise” and the “floods” they cause. However, liberalism and the Jews are to blame for the fact that “we have come to this point.” The social process is at least partly rational and legitimate.

Treitschke further elaborates on the twofold character of antisemitism: “There is only too much of dirt and brutality in these activities [Treiben], and it is impossible to suppress one’s disgust when one notices that some of these incendiary pamphlets [Brandschriften] seem to come from Jewish pens; it is well known that since Pfefferkorn and Eisenmenger, there were always many who had been born as Jews among the fanatical Jew-eaters [Judenfressern].”<sup>16</sup> “Dirt and brutality,” “activities,” and “incendiary pamphlets” add to the dissociating tone of the previous statement. However, the (unsupported) claim that “geborene Juden” (Jews who converted to Christianity) are among the “Jew-eaters” suggests not only that the Jews contributed indirectly to Jew-hatred by giving it a cause but that some are even directly involved.<sup>17</sup> The Jews are the force behind liberalism as well as behind the (self-)destruction of liberalism; in other words, the self-destructive element of liberalism is identical to its Jewish element. This construction allows Treitschke to separate and exempt the non-Jewish and non-destructive elements of liberalism from criticism. The same pattern works with reference to the anti-Jewish movement: the Jews are responsible for the movement’s dangerous and destructive features, which allows Treitschke to salvage also this movement’s true and respectable side. Furthermore, the notion of Jews hating (literally: eating) Jews (inducing “disgust” in the observer) implies that being destructive of the group they belong to is an essential characteristic of the Jews. Under this perspective, the “disgust” with this (as it were) “carnivorous” behavior seems to point—in reverse—to the fundamental belief that decent human

beings are always loyal to "their group." If a group consists of people whose main characteristic is to be disloyal to their own as to any other group, this group is thus different from and inferior to all other groups of human beings. Treitschke concludes: "But is there really nothing but mob brutality and business envy at the bottom of this noisy activity? Are these outbreaks of a deep, long-suppressed anger really only a momentary outburst, as hollow and unfounded as the Teutonic Jew-baiting of 1819? No—the instinct of the masses has in fact correctly recognized a grave danger, a very considerable fault of the new German life; it is not an empty phrase when one talks today of a German Jewish question [eine deutsche Judenfrage]." Treitschke refers again to the Hep-Hep riots of 1819, which he dismisses as "hollow and unfounded" and contrasts with the recent antisemitic movement, which he argues has "correctly recognized a grave danger." He asserts the different character of the recent antisemitic movement (although it is also rooted in a "deep, long-suppressed anger"). While most liberal critics tended to ignore the historical specificity of the antisemitism that emerged in the late 1870s and dismissed it as an anachronistic reincarnation of the Hep-Hep riots, Treitschke grounds his sympathies for the antisemitic movement on the fact that it is not like the earlier "hollow and unfounded" riots—or at least this is what he wants the reader to believe. The argument implies that the recent antisemitism is rational and well founded. It is noteworthy that Treitschke has already pointed out that the antisemitic voters in Breslau acted "not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation." His argument anticipates both the scholarly distinction between "modern antisemitism" and "pre-modern anti-Judaism" and Hitler's notion of "antisemitism of reason."<sup>18</sup>

Treitschke's formulations in this paragraph imply further that the specific (modern) character of the antisemitic movement in Germany is related to the specificities of German historical development. The "grave danger" that has been recognized by the antisemites is, according to Treitschke, "a very considerable fault of the new German life"; the problem is thus as much "new" as it is specifically German.

In the concluding section of this article, Treitschke states that "the noisy agitation of the moment appears only as a brutal and spiteful but natural



reaction of the Germanic national feeling against an alien element which has usurped too much space in our life.”<sup>19</sup> He suggests that the removal of the taboo on discussing “this evil” is in itself an achievement: “Let us not deceive ourselves: the movement is very deep and strong. A few jokes about the cheap words of wisdom from the mouths of Christian-Socialist soap-box orators will not suffice to suppress it. Even in the best-educated circles, among men who would reject with horror any thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance, we hear today the cry, as from one mouth: the Jews are our misfortune!” Treitschke formulates here a powerful antisemitic slogan, but he puts it into the mouths of an anonymous multitude that is said to include “educated men.”<sup>20</sup> Apart from constituting a precaution against criticism, the image of the “cry, as from one mouth” is a very strong rhetorical means. Treitschke invokes a unified voice that—even metaphorically—did not exist at the time. His claim that even “educated men” held the antisemitic persuasion qualifies his earlier description of the antisemitic movement as an anti-establishment movement: it is further evidence of the rational elements of the movement that it is being joined by “educated men,” too; antisemitism transcends class.<sup>21</sup>

The key to the formulation’s ambivalence—starting from a perspective apparently critical of antisemitism and gradually turning to supporting it—is the “us” at its exhortative beginning. *We*, the imaginary community of reasonable people of all walks of life who do not like noisy people (Stöcker and other populist demagogues), should not “deceive ourselves” and underestimate the current movement. However, the line between reevaluation and appreciation is thin. In pointing out the modern character of the antisemitic movement lies part of the strength of Treitschke’s text. His understanding is here superior to that of those of his contemporaries who merely turned up their noses to the vulgar noises of the antisemites. Treitschke asserts that antisemitism grew “even in the best-educated circles.” He locates the paranoid projection that identifies “misfortune” straight and simple with “the Jews” in the imagined common mouth of men (silently including himself) “who would reject with horror any thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance.” With this statement Treitschke points to the existence

of a modern type of anti-Jewish attitude that is based neither on religious fanaticism nor simply on "national arrogance": he consciously inaugurates liberal antisemitism.

In the course of the Dispute, Treitschke did not move away from most aspects of his position, although he did concretize and qualify a lot. In his very detailed third contribution, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage" (Some Further Remarks on the Jewish Question), he claims to express "the opinion of hundreds of thousands."<sup>22</sup> He rejects the claim that anti-Jewish agitation has been initiated by ultraconservatives and ultramontanists. He claims that "respectable circles [die gute Gesellschaft]" "irrespective of party allegiance" discussed for more than a decade "how to protect our old German ways against the growing power and arrogance [Übermuth] of the Jews."<sup>23</sup> It was only a fear of being identified with the particularist interests of ultramontanism, clericalism, and deep conservatism that made "many decent men" still hesitate to join the "movement." Therefore Treitschke "found it more desirable that for a change a man who cannot be silenced with the popular slogans 'intolerant priest' or 'the Jew is being burnt' speaks out openly about the current movement."<sup>24</sup> In other words, if antisemitism has so far been articulated mostly by reactionaries, this merely shows that non-reactionary antisemites are still waiting for a mouthpiece from a nonclerical background—such as Treitschke himself. Treitschke offers here an account of the social meaning and function of his own intervention: he helped to shift (one is tempted to say, to emancipate) antisemitism from being a domain of clerical conservatism to being a national (and, by implication, liberal) ideology. In other words, Treitschke made antisemitism respectable not so much for "respectable society" as such (as opposed to "the street") but for the liberal, nonclerical mainstream of "respectable society" as it had become predominant at the time. In that sense, Treitschke understands himself correctly as a modernizer of anti-Jewish sentiment—as someone who not so much makes it "respectable" but rather helps it to remain respectable with a new kind of "respectable society."

In the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute, two principal views of the social foundation of the anti-Jewish campaign can be found: Treitschke claims to see a

massive change of mood in the deep structure of “the people” and its “soul” that is also embraced and articulated by “educated men.” He also appears to believe that some “educated men” had anticipated it all in the preceding years. Either way, the “educated men” are secondary to “the people”: they are the latter’s mouthpieces.

The alternative model, variations of which are adopted by most others, supposes that the masses of ordinary people are in principle unimpressed and that the antisemitism formulated by (some) intellectuals is dangerous but—in the eyes of most—futile demagoguery motivated by enmity toward the Imperial state, toward liberalism, or toward both. Heinrich Graetz, for example, argues that the antisemitic campaign is “isolated and little relevant”; Seligman Meyer writes that the anti-Jewish agitation in Berlin does not have much effect on most people.<sup>25</sup> Harry Breßlau rejects the claim that the antisemitic agitation “arose” from the “instincts of the masses.”<sup>26</sup> He traces its beginnings back to the series of five articles that appeared in the *Kreuzzeitung* in 1875 in which he claims the more general anti-liberal theme was first combined with anti-Jewish rhetoric and subsequently developed into a campaign against the *Judenwirtschaft* (Jew-economy) in Prussia and the German Reich.<sup>27</sup> These articles were mainly directed against the financial and economic politics of the Prussian and Imperial governments, which were claimed to be under the influence of Jews. Soon, the “agrarian party,” the “ultramontanist” tendency within Catholicism, and also particularist (i.e., “anti-Imperial”) newspapers in the German provinces took up the theme.<sup>28</sup> By locating the origins of antisemitism in the conservative camp, that is, in a background hostile to National Liberalism, he seems to be trying to “win back” Treitschke. Breßlau claims that apart from the foundation of the “League of Antisemites” (which he dismisses as irrelevant), the only news in recent months is that the agitation has been extended “from the press into parliament” and, addressing Treitschke, “the unfortunate phenomenon that you also joined the anti-Jewish movement.”<sup>29</sup> He suggests that until the end of 1875, only “certain political parties”—identical to those who used to be called *Reichsfeinde*, enemies of the Empire (and in particular of Bismarck’s politics)—have driven the public toward antisemitism “for certain

political purposes" and "making use of old prejudices." Breßlau concludes sarcastically that the political and social background of the initiators of the Jew-baiting is actually "powerful evidence to prove the Jews' patriotism and national-mindedness [nationale Gesinnung]—in the meaning you and I understand this concept."<sup>30</sup>

In a subsequent comment, Breßlau singles out the character and origin of "today's movement" as the main point of disagreement between himself and Treitschke.<sup>31</sup> He argues that the context of the current anti-Jewish agitation makes Treitschke's aphorism, "The Jews are our misfortune," particularly harmful, but he disputes the notion that the discussions Treitschke claims to have observed among "respectable circles" are a general phenomenon.<sup>32</sup>

Manuel Joël points out a contradiction fundamental to Treitschke's argument: the claim that the anti-Jewish agitation is "deeply rooted" in the "spirit" of the German people is populist, while his denunciation of "noisy antisemitic rabble" is elitist. Joël finds that Treitschke's distancing of himself from the antisemitic demagoguery is merely tactical. He asserts against Treitschke that the common people are innocent in the first place and are deliberately "seduced" for political reasons. "The people working with loyal industriousness [das in treuem Fleisse arbeitende Volk] . . . are innocent of the anti-Jewish campaign," he writes. "Hatred of Jews has always been a poison that has been injected purposefully by fanatics either of religion or of a doctrine or by those who served those for opportunistic reasons. . . . Unless the masses are being seduced, they have the instinct that the Jews do not differ in humanity from their Christian fellow citizens."<sup>33</sup> In a similar vein, Seligmann Meyer argues (in his response to Treitschke's third article) that—judging from the responses to Treitschke—the "attempt at resuscitating embalmed medieval cadavers has failed." The "Jew-baiters" have not managed "to rob the German people of its culture and enlightenment."<sup>34</sup>

While Meyer, Breßlau, and Joël tried to reclaim the soul, instinct, and culture of the German people from Treitschke, Naudh emphasized like Treitschke the popular roots of antisemitism but attacked what he understood is the liberal conceptual framework of Treitschke's position. Naudh claims that antisemitism started not in 1875 but as early as the escape of Moses and

“his bunch of lazy and dirty thieves” from Egypt.<sup>35</sup> Anti-Jewish attitudes have never been absent during the last three thousand years, although they changed forms of appearance among persecution, “passive hate,” and “disgust,” “depending on whether the behavior of the Jews provoked the one or the other.” In Germany it existed “as disgust” until 1848 and “turned into hate only since liberalism allowed itself to be hijacked by the Jews in order to afford them domination of economy and state.”<sup>36</sup> Naudh scorns Treitschke for his support for Bismarck’s alliance with liberalism and connects this with the criticism that Treitschke’s historiography is unscientific and ideologically informed by his (liberal) understanding of the present.<sup>37</sup> Naudh defends Stöcker against Treitschke’s condescension and claims for Stöcker, too, what Treitschke claimed for the anti-Jewish movement in general: Stöcker only expressed “what was seething among the people.” However—reversing, as it were, Joël’s and Breßlau’s indictment—Naudh reproaches Stöcker for “soothing the passions of the masses”: his obligation to Christian love makes him undermine patriotic love.<sup>38</sup>

Naudh supports his version of a populist, antisemitic nationalism with a long discussion of the concept of education, reflecting on Treitschke’s use of the term. He points out that Treitschke noted with surprise, and Breßlau rejected, the claim that the “Jewish question” has even penetrated “into the circles of the highest education.” Naudh argues that “these circles” are unlikely to take up the issue, because they entertain a concept of *Bildung* that abstracts from the character of the nation.<sup>39</sup> He claims that “every ‘*Bildung*’ is essentially something false” because educating [*bilden*] “does not mean to bring forth the thing itself but an image, a semblance of it [*ein Bild*].” Naudh believes that the liberal concept of *Bildung* means development through external influence, while he argues that people should develop “from inside” only. His argument opposes the notion of an individual in harmony with his or her authentic, inalienable essence to attempts to form or shape (*bilden*) this individual according to external—that is, inauthentic—educational standards. In Naudh’s critique of the concept of *Bildung* two elements of late-eighteenth-century German thought seem to reverberate: resentment of the elitism of official culture and the anti-French, anti-aristocratic discourse

of German proto-nationalism. Naudh mocks the lack of nationalism on the side of the "educated" elites: they "attempt to suppress nationality, which is—in Hegel's words—the ground of all living life, and want to be men in general who live in a nowhere land [Menschen schlechthin, die nirgends leben] instead of being Germans, which only they can become and be."<sup>40</sup> In Naudh's demotic discourse, the educated—even when they are nationalists like Treitschke—are suspect because they are simultaneously also a cosmopolitan, universal class.

The question of what motivates the anti-Jewish demagoguery is central in particular to the contributions by Ludwig Bamberger and Heinrich Bernhardt Oppenheim.<sup>41</sup> Bamberger argues that "the attack on the Jews is only a smoke screen diverting attention from today's great campaign against liberalism" and that "without doubt" it was the attack on liberalism that led Treitschke toward antisemitism.<sup>42</sup> He points out that "the essay in whose concluding section the Jewish question is being addressed is directed against liberalism" as well as against philanthropy and education. For example, Treitschke expressed approval of Mittelstädt's agitation for corporal punishment.<sup>43</sup> Bamberger states that a "good portion of the anger against the Jews comes from the fact of their liberal conviction," quoting Eduard Lasker as an example.<sup>44</sup> Since the Jews have predominantly been seated "on the benches of the left wing," he continues, they "have to put up with" the anti-Jewish campaign. He adds that only two Jewish deputies of previous Reichstage sat on the right, the "financial aristocrats [Fürstlichkeiten der Finanz]" Strousberg and von Rothschild. It could be held against Bamberger's argument that these two are regularly cited by antisemites as particularly despicable Jews. Bamberger's reduction of the anti-Jewish campaign to nothing but an element of a campaign against liberalism fails to explain why it also directs itself against Jews who are not liberals. Bamberger suggests that "educated men" do not in their entirety hold anti-Jewish opinions and, pointing to election results, that "the people by and large think in a much more unprejudiced way than some scholars do."<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, while anti-Jewish sentiment is least widespread in the countryside, where Christian and Jewish poor share the

same fate, and rare among the uneducated, it is all in all more widespread than the Jews, “especially the educated Jews,” are ready to admit.<sup>46</sup>

Oppenheim also argues that whatever is new in the current anti-Jewish movement is of “agrarian-socialist origin.”<sup>47</sup> He suggests—like Breßlau—that it had been initiated five years earlier as a campaign against Bismarck in which the Jews were merely a pretext. The campaigners had then “fantasized about a conspiracy between Bismarck, Lasker and Bleichröder.”<sup>48</sup> Oppenheim sees the current campaign as an expression of “a systematic promoting of political, clerical and in particular, economic reaction” for which Treitschke “seems to be working . . .—probably unknowingly.” Oppenheim adds that he had taken part in the struggle for emancipation already in the 1830s and 1840s when identical “complaints” were held against the Jews, “only sharper and more honest.” This had then been “an honest struggle” about “actual prejudices” and “real convictions.” The opponents were “more grim, more convinced and more clever,” but some of them also could be “converted” after an “objective debate” fought with “real arguments.”<sup>49</sup> For Oppenheim, “the Jewish question is but a pretext,” as “totally different things are at stake”: “To challenge Jewish emancipation would mean challenging the constitutional and the economic foundations of the constitutional state. Whoever would try this, would have against himself not only the Jews.” Therefore, “not the Jewish question, but the question of Jew-hatred” needs to be discussed. Oppenheim ridicules the pompous and pretentious rhetoric of Treitschke’s article (“You believe you hear the *Zeitgeist*’s pulse beating, but it is merely the noise made by the scene-shifter [Kulissenschieber]”) and refutes Treitschke’s claims about what the current manifestations of the *Zeitgeist* or the *Volksgeist* are, in particular Treitschke’s “phantasmagoric presentation” that there has been a sudden change of mood in society.<sup>50</sup> There has neither been any particularly pro-Jewish mood before, nor is there a deep anti-Jewish movement now among the people. Oppenheim rejects Treitschke’s claims as fictional and points out that Treitschke fails to give any reasons for the sudden change he claims to have observed.<sup>51</sup> Oppenheim points out that the only firm evidence of a change in mood is in some parts of the (party-political) press, contrary to Treitschke’s claim that this change occurred

outside the press. He concludes that Treitschke's intention is to demonstrate "the existence of a 'Jewish question'" and to lend an "ideal foundation" to crude Jew-hatred, mob brutality ("Pöbelroheit"), and economic envy ("Geschäftsneid").<sup>52</sup> "If the people was as lowly as Herr von Treitschke writes, then today's Jew-baiting would inevitably lead to atrocities no less than in 1819."<sup>53</sup> However, then as now it was merely a small part of the "mob" that was "incited by half-educated men enraptured by phraseology [phrasenberauschten Halbgelehrten]."<sup>54</sup> Oppenheim's observations are interspersed with reflections of a more philosophical character. At the beginning of his contribution Oppenheim quotes a reflection on the concepts of "progress" and "civilization" by the French romantic writer and critic Charles-Augustin Saint-Beuve. The quotation implies that the continued existence of "civilization" cannot be taken for granted or as if it was natural, but has to be (re-)invented and confirmed ever again. It can also be lost: centuries of progress can be reversed "in just a matter of weeks": "Savagery is always but two steps away, and it recommences as soon as one falls back."<sup>55</sup> It is implied that for Oppenheim the anti-Jewish campaign represents such a "fall-back" into "savagery" and signifies the precariousness and reversibility of "progress and civilization." Oppenheim's principal target is the decline of idealism and the triumph of *realpolitik*:<sup>56</sup> "Those who used to believe in the victory of the idea now—with a mocking smile—merely believe in the victory of the cannon, the right of the mightier."<sup>57</sup> Together with the worship of Bismarck, this has created a general climate beneficial for reaction. As a further example of this he refers to the argument (also quoted by Treitschke in his first article) that the reintroduction of corporal punishment would mean the "salvation of society." Oppenheim opposes the talk about the "degeneration of the masses [Verwilderung]."<sup>58</sup> He argues that the call for cruel methods of punishment (as advocated by Mittelstädt and Treitschke) rather suggests there is "a certain degeneration of the so-called educated classes." He compares the calls for reintroduction of corporal punishment, as well as the current anti-Jewish movement, to clerical reactionaries' continued opposition to the heliocentric model of the universe long after it was clearly established.

This comparison points to an important tension in Oppenheim's argument:



the reference to the debate about the heliocentric model works as ridicule of anti-liberalism, because attacks on heliocentrism were then obviously futile. Oppenheim, like many others, could not imagine that attacks on liberalism and Jewish emancipation could be successful. The centrality of liberal values in society seemed as certain as the place of the sun in the solar system. Nevertheless, his choice of the aphorism by Saint-Beuve shows that Oppenheim also felt ambivalent about his trust in the irreversibility of progress. While the quote stands for skepticism about progress, the likening of anti-liberalism to anti-heliocentrism stands for optimism. However, Oppenheim does not take up the theme of the quote in the body of the text at all: the text is ruled by liberal optimism, while the darker, skeptical tone is exiled into its antechamber, couched between inverted commas and at a secure distance from the argument.

A different perspective can be found in some remarks by the priest Paulus Cassel, who comments on the weaknesses of liberalism from the perspective of a Christian missionary. He writes that one of the roots of the anti-Jewish movement is the fact that the emancipation of the Jews in 1848 happened not for reasons of “love of the Jews or actual liberal-mindedness [Freisinnigkeit]” but “for the sake of being in opposition: emancipation was part of the liberal platform.” Correspondingly, the Jews are now attacked with the intention of hurting the Progress Party.<sup>59</sup> People “begrudged them the liberty” because “they were not liberated themselves.”<sup>60</sup> In this situation of failed or incomplete liberation, “self-righteous envy exploits the old prejudice.”<sup>61</sup>

Concluding from this initial sample of passages from the Dispute, it is striking how little the questions have changed by which debates on anti-semitism are shaped: Does it come from the people or from the elites? Is it all political manipulation, or is it genuine popular, national sentiment? Is it plainly reactionary, or is it also rooted in the movement of progress? Does it have to do with progress’s failure to deliver? The following chapters will confirm this initial sense of almost uncanny familiarity.

## Two. Jew-hatred and Nationality

More than the questions of the social background of the anti-Jewish agitation and how it relates to liberalism, the question of the link between the anti-Jewish or antisemitic tendencies and nationalism was a main theme in the Dispute. Paulus Cassel might have been the first contributor who emphasized this connection when he called the anti-Jewish movement the “exuberance of national stimulation over the true cosmopolitanism of the Gospel.”<sup>1</sup> Treitschke reversed this argument when he stated that “the newly reemerging Jew-debate” is merely “the sad inheritance of a long epoch of weakened national pride and insecure religious sentiment.” He held that “it is our fault that the Jews in Germany show off their tribal consciousness [Stammesbewusstsein] as provocatively as in no other large state.”<sup>2</sup> While for Cassel and others antisemitism seems to signify an overdose of nationalism, for Treitschke it points to a lack of nationalism.

The extent to which the Dispute is part of, and shaped by, a wider discourse on the nation is illustrated by Ludwig Philippson’s suggestion that Treitschke’s article might have been triggered by an article in the French *Journal des débats* by J. Bourdeau (November 5, 1879) on the anti-Jewish campaign in Germany.<sup>3</sup> In his own earlier review of this article, Philippson had expressed his “truly patriotic pain”: he showed himself hurt that the French author ridiculed the German anxiety about Jewish domination as unreal and “gloatingly” interpreted the fact that the Germans perceive themselves as captives, “the booty of a conquering race,” as showing their

own national weakness.<sup>4</sup> One can imagine that if Philippson felt “patriotic pain” about this kind of comment from a French journalist, Treitschke must have been furious.

The most important evidence for the view that the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute was essentially a debate about differing concepts of the nation is the much-quoted and much-celebrated “Erklärung” (Declaration of the Notables), published in November 1880.<sup>5</sup> Significantly, its text is foremost an appeal to patriotic unity and the defense of central liberal tenets in the name of the German idealist tradition. The Declaration begins with a statement on German national unification:

Fierce struggles have unified our fatherland to a powerfully rising Empire. Unity has been achieved because the feeling that necessity has welded us together<sup>6</sup> carried the victory over the tribal and religious divisions that had fragmented our nation like no other. Making individual members [of the nation] pay for these divisions is unfair and vulgar and mostly punishes those who honestly and seriously strive to overcome [their] particularity and to achieve true amalgamation with the nation.<sup>7</sup> They experience it [this discrimination] as a breach of loyalty from those with whom they feel they are striving for the same goals. It prevents what is and remains the common goal: the eradication of all past divisions that still continue to exist within the German nation.<sup>8</sup>

The Declaration takes the standpoint of those who are committed to eliminating all religious and “tribal” divisions within the German nation. It claims that this is the group most affected by the current anti-Jewish campaign. Those not committed to complete assimilation (let alone social divisions along lines other than religion and “tribe”) are not mentioned. It is implied that such groups are not included in the patriotic defense effort.<sup>9</sup> National unification and the elimination of particularity are presented as historical necessities, counter-tendencies are stigmatized as anachronistic: “In various places, in particular the larger towns of the Reich, the racial hatred and fanaticism of the Middle Ages are currently revived and directed against our Jewish fellow citizens in an unexpected and deeply embarrassing fashion.”<sup>10</sup> The current campaign is referred to as “racial” as well as “medieval,”<sup>11</sup> adding

up to an effective stigmatization: the characterization as “racial” removes the anti-Jewish discourse from the realm of idealism and liberalism, and the characterization as “medieval” puts it into contrast with the historical teleology of progress that leads from pre-modern dividedness to national unity. “It is being forgotten how many of them [the Jewish fellow citizens] have brought benefit and honor to the fatherland in the areas of business and trade, art and science.” Those who anachronistically hate the Jews have to be reminded that a national policy of integration is beneficial to the nation. The formulation “it is being forgotten” implies that the authors of the Declaration presuppose that the antisemites also acknowledge that the nation is an overriding value and that they are merely forgetful of the benefits the Jews bring. Their motives can only be of a lesser order: the “reanimation of an old delusion” in the name of “envy” threatens to poison social relations based on toleration. However, the “resistance of level-headed men” can still oppose the “confusion” and the “artificially fanned passion of the multitude.” The Declaration appeals to “the Christians of all parties” and “all Germans who cherish the ideal heritage of their great princes, thinkers and poets” to defend “the ground of our common life”: “Respect for every denomination, equal right, equal sun in competition, equal recognition of merit and achievement for Christians and Jews.” While the first half of the Declaration focuses on national history and the necessity of unification, the second half shifts the argument toward central liberal tenets and also refers to their wider socioeconomic framework. The demands with which the Declaration culminates include two cultural-political liberal demands—religious freedom and legal equality—and one socioeconomic demand (in two complementary formulations): only merit won in unrestricted competition should determine an individual’s positioning in society.<sup>12</sup> The Declaration thus links Jewish emancipation to a wider conception of a liberal-bourgeois socioeconomic order, and on the other hand it links the anti-Jewish “confusion” to “the passions of the multitude” driven by “envy.” “Racial hatred” and also its rejection are linked to economic interest and class positioning. At the same time, the Declaration emphasizes the struggle for German national unification and the elimination of all particularities as the political and historical

framework of the conflict and comes to the defense of Jewish citizens who are assimilated or in the process of becoming such. In addition, the explicit reference to the merits of Jews “in the areas of business and trade, art and science” leaves lower-class Jews (such as most of the immigrants from the East) in the cold. Although this is not openly articulated, the intertwining of a political-cultural argument and a socioeconomic argument also implies that the process of nation building is supposed to eliminate particular class interests, namely, the “envy” and the “confusions” of “the multitude,” along with the elimination of ethnic-cultural particularities.<sup>13</sup>

Theodor Mommsen’s answer to Treitschke follows similar lines. Mommsen explicitly states that he has in mind only a group of friends and political allies as the intended addressees of his statement, a group that is defined by a particular historical experience—national unification: “To our generation it was granted . . . that our nation has reached the great goals that we found ahead of us when we were growing up to be thinking people.”<sup>14</sup> We, “our nation,” have reached the goals that we, “our generation,” “found ahead of us.” Whoever grew up in those days—that is, between 1848 and 1871—“will consider no price too high for our Reichstag and the Imperial flag come what may—and many a thing may still come.” This nationalist confession is followed by a qualification:

But one has to be very steadfast and farsighted in order actually to enjoy this fortunate fate. The immediate consequences recall the saying that fate punishes men by fulfilling their wishes. While Germany was still in the making, nobody—as befits those who are fighting for a common goal—asked about confessional or tribal differences, about conflicting interests of rural and urban population, of merchants and industrialists. In the realized Germany war is being waged by all against all, and we will soon reach a stage when only he is considered a full citizen who can trace back his descent to one of the three sons of Mannus,<sup>15</sup> who confesses the gospel the way the *pastor collocutus*<sup>16</sup> does and who gives evidence of his skills in ploughing and sowing. The confessional war, the so-called Kulturkampf, and the recently waged civil war of the wallet is being joined now by the deformed child [Missgeburt] of national feeling, the antisemitic campaign.<sup>17</sup>

Mommsen reasons that “[we] older men, all of whose willing and hoping had been invested in the national idea,” feel ambivalent about this state of affairs. On the one hand, the antisemitic campaign recalls “Saturn once more eating his offspring”;<sup>18</sup> on the other hand, this “backlash” appears futile and merely a “retarding moment” that will not actually change the course of things. Nevertheless, this “suicidal acting of the national feeling” does “grave damage to persons and interests.”

Mommsen links antisemitism to the process of nation building, describing it as its “Missgeburt” in one instance, in the next one as “Saturn eating his offspring,” then as “that suicidal acting of the national feeling.”<sup>19</sup> Antisemitism appears here as a product of nationalism that is at the same time destroying nation building. The overall historical process cannot be halted by some antisemitic noisy rabble; nevertheless, it does “grave damage.” Mommsen states that the social coherence that was generated in the process of struggling for national unification was lost in the moment that this struggle was successful; once the nation-state is established it develops a dynamic of social conflicts, the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf*, economic struggles, and antisemitism. The national movement aims at a form of social coherence—the national community—but actually seems to be able to guarantee this cohesion only as long as it is not (yet) successful. This awareness gives Mommsen’s nationalism an unhappy, melancholy touch.

### Treitschke’s German “Jewish Question”

One strand of the Dispute involved Treitschke’s claim that there is a German “Jewish question,” or else that the “Jewish question” had a specifically German character in Germany: “If the English and the French talk with some disdain of the prejudice of the Germans against the Jews we must reply to them: you do not know us; you live in happier circumstances which make the rise of such ‘prejudices’ impossible.”<sup>20</sup> Treitschke defends here the anti-Jewish “prejudice” against criticism from English and French observers. He claims that Jewish immigration from “the East” reinforces what he claims to be the non-Western character—arrogance, unassimilability—of the German Jews. The crux of this argument is that Jewish immigration is harmful

because of a continuity of “Easternness” between immigrating (Polish) and resident (citizen) German Jews. Both are “Orientals” in the last instance. Furthermore, Treitschke argues that the harmful effect of Jewish influence is aggravated by a lack of national-mindedness on the side of the Germans. He opposes “our country” to “Western Europe”: “The number of Jews in Western Europe is so small that they cannot have any noticeable influence upon the morality of the nation; but the eastern border of our country is invaded year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths from the inexhaustible cradle of Poland, whose children and grandchildren are to be the future rulers of Germany’s stock exchanges and Germany’s press.”<sup>21</sup> Treitschke invokes an “invasion” of foreigners from the East who first engage in petty trade and will then rise into powerful positions in civil society. He presents this as a quasi-automatic process. He implies that petty trade, trading on the stock market, and journalism are essentially similar activities that not only attract the same sort of people but allow individuals to rise easily from trouser seller to editor or stock jobber.<sup>22</sup> Treitschke claims that massive Jewish immigration throws up the question of how “this alien nation” can be assimilated.<sup>23</sup> Significantly, he emphasizes as the most threatening aspect of the immigration the fact that the immigrants have successful careers. The crucial problem is therefore not whether they can assimilate but what exactly the immigrants assimilate to. Treitschke asserts that they assimilate not to the “German people” but to the “German Jews,” whereas “the Jews of the Western and Southern European countries” in their great majority “have become good Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, as far as can be reasonably expected from a people of such pure blood and such distinct peculiarity.” Treitschke gives two different reasons for the alleged difference: their number and their alleged descent. Those in “the West” and “the South” “belong mostly to the Spanish branch [Stamm],<sup>24</sup> which looks back on a comparatively proud history and which always adjusted comparatively easily to the Western way of life.” He contrasts these Jews favorably to the alleged mass of Jewish immigrants into Germany: “We Germans, however, have to deal with Jews of the Polish branch, which bears the deep scars of many centuries of Christian tyranny.” The use of the term “Christian tyranny”

reinforces Treitschke's dissociation from pre-modern anti-Judaism, as we have seen. "According to experience, they are incomparably more alien to the European and especially to the Germanic character [dem germanischen Wesen]." Treitschke refers to those Jews who do not belong to the "Spanish branch" with the concept of the "Polish branch" instead of calling them "Germanic." As he must have been aware, the Jewish population of Poland was a product of immigration by German Jews to Eastern Europe. Logically speaking, the equivalent of the concept "Spanish" (more precisely, Iberian) Jews would have been "Germanic" or "Eastern European" Jews. Given the low esteem in which Poles were generally held in the German capital at the time, the concept of a "Polish branch" seems to be tarring the immigrants with additional stigma. Treitschke also avoids the implication that the Jewish immigrants could historically claim some form of Germanness. Under the headings of "East" and "West," "Polish," and "Spanish," his argument invokes a notion of bad and good Jews. As Holz states, "The Western Jews are 'good Jews' because they appear as 'good Frenchmen' (etc.) whereas 'bad Jews' bring to bear their 'alien Volksthüm.'" <sup>25</sup> This implies that the best that can be expected from any Jew is not to make the Jewish *Wesen* (character) to appear. Treitschke writes: "I think, however, some of my Jewish friends will agree, with deep regret, when I say that recently a dangerous spirit of arrogance has arisen in Jewish circles and that the influence of Jewry upon our national life, which in former times was often beneficial, is now often harmful." <sup>26</sup> Whether or not Treitschke actually expected that "Jewish friends" would come forward and defend him in a dispute that he seems to anticipate, one cannot know. Criticism of old-fashioned, idiosyncratic Jewish particularity and the effort to get rid of a large part of traditional Jewish habits and attitudes (or what was held to be such) was indeed pivotal to the Enlightenment discourse on Jewish emancipation among Jews no less than Gentiles. The novelty in Treitschke's variation on this theme is, though, that he suggests a development from "former times," when Jews apparently have been modest and "often beneficial," to modern times ("recently," i.e., since legal emancipation), when (a significant portion of) the Jews became arrogant and harmful. This inverts the older liberal argument



that emancipation would turn unproductive, conservative, and parochial Jews into good and productive citizens of modern society.

In Treitschke's discourse, the peculiarity of the German (i.e., not "Western") Jews is mirrored and aggravated in its harmful effects by the peculiarity of the German historical situation. The Jews of England or France are "harmless or even beneficial" because of the higher "energy of the national pride and the firmly rooted national way of life [nationale Sitte] of these two old and civilized nations."<sup>27</sup> This implies that a strong national culture does not allow a problematic "Jewish question" to emerge in the first place. In Germany, the situation is different: "Our civilization is young; in our whole existence we are still lacking national style, instinctive pride, a firmly developed individuality, which is why we were defenseless against alien manners for so long. But we are in the process of acquiring these qualities, and we can only wish that our Jews recognize in time the change which is now occurring in Germany as a necessary consequence of the foundation of the German state." Treitschke's formulation implies here the notion of Germany as a backward country that has to catch up with its delayed nation building—the original nineteenth-century version of what later came to be known as the "verspätete Nation" (belated nation) and "Deutscher Sonderweg" (special path) arguments.<sup>28</sup>

### **"Immigration from the East"**

Treitschke's invocation of a floodlike immigration of "trouser-selling youths" was perhaps the passage of his text that was most commented on. Both the immigration issue and the debate on how to conceptualize the "two Jewish branches" received plenty of attention. Only one of numerous responses reacted to the ridiculousness of the claim by ridiculing Treitschke's imagery: Dr. Rülff from Memel writes drily that Treitschke might have been inspired by his visit to the town of Memel—on the German-Polish border—the previous year.<sup>29</sup> There he must have noticed the substantial number of Jewish-owned secondhand clothes shops. However, the shopkeepers there are not "youths." Rülff relates that the German state had just awarded one of these Jewish trouser sellers a Hebrew bible adorned with the picture of the kaiser (plus

an amount of money) on the occasion of his diamond wedding, as this old Jew had given over half a dozen brave soldiers to the German fatherland. Rülff makes two points: first, the Eastern Jews are officially recognized to be German patriots; second, the migrant youths leave the province simply because they cannot find a living, not in order to subvert the German *Volksgeist*. He points out that the young men who migrate west to find themselves a living are often themselves short of decent trousers. Local people in Memel therefore donate trousers to Dr. Rülff in order to hand them on to the emigrating young men. Rülff offers to send some of the young men to Treitschke for him to have a look at their trousers and perhaps if appropriate to donate a pair of his own. Rülff presents the fact of migration from the province to the capital as an unremarkable, legitimate social process. Perhaps surprisingly, only one other contributor to the Dispute made the same point, the priest Paulus Cassel: "It is natural and a right for any human being to press toward the light."<sup>30</sup>

Ludwig Bamberger points to the lack of conclusive statistical evidence and rejects Treitschke's invocation of an "incoming flood like that of the Chinese in California."<sup>31</sup> Further, the people referred to by Treitschke as "Poles" might actually come from the Prussian part of what used to be Poland.<sup>32</sup> "In the latter case, with what right does the bitter opponent of Polish national resistance treat the inhabitants of the province of Poznan as foreigners?"<sup>33</sup> Bamberger points to the contradiction that Treitschke on the one hand demands loyalty to the state from ethnic minority groups, but on the other hand excludes such groups—even when they are loyal—on grounds of their ethnicity. However, as Bamberger suggests, the Jews of Poznan have traditionally been understood to be not only a German-speaking but also a Germanizing element of the population.

Moritz Lazarus writes that a proper examination of the question of Jewish immigration had not been done recently and pointed to a debate on the same issue in the 1850s.<sup>34</sup> He holds that over the period from 1834 to 1855, Jewish emigration from Prussia regularly exceeded immigration by a large margin. For the time after 1855 Lazarus holds that most probably any increase in the number of Jews in Germany would stem from the Jews'

relatively higher rate of births rather than from an excess of immigration over emigration. Lazarus suggests that the rate of emigration still in 1880 was most likely to exceed that of immigration.<sup>35</sup> This argument is followed by a more general consideration:

But even if . . . a handful more Jews were actually coming to Germany every year, what danger would it be? And I am not invoking here the notion of humanitarianism toward strangers, which certain circles seem not to appreciate anymore at all. What I mean is that an Englishman would laugh into our faces if we suggested that he control the immigration of some group of foreigners into the British Isles. He might consider it an insult to his nation to suggest that a handful of foreigners could corrupt the ideals, morality and character of his people.<sup>36</sup>

Similarly, Graetz remarks sarcastically that Treitschke's suggestion that "a handful of Jews" present a "misfortune" for forty million Germans is less than flattering for the "genius of the German people" and its "heroism."<sup>37</sup> Lazarus quotes Treitschke's claim that it is "impossible to make the hard German heads Jewish" and asks: "What's the noise about then? Why the fear?"<sup>38</sup> Lazarus implies here that the problem was not whether Treitschke's readings of immigration statistics (or else his understanding of the ethnic divisions within European Jewry) were factually correct. A large part of the Dispute subsequently branched out, though, into discussions of just these particulars, thereby tending to obscure the meaning and also the actual dangerousness of Treitschke's argument.

Treitschke himself also writes (in his answer to Graetz) that there are no statistical data available that break down immigration numbers according to religious affiliation, which means that such data had to be reconstructed indirectly from other statistics. Treitschke defends his reading of these data.<sup>39</sup> However—echoing Lazarus, although obviously with inverse intention—Treitschke also points to the merely secondary importance of the statistical issue: for him, the Jews' numerical share in the population does not allow conclusions on their "social power [sociale Machtstellung]."<sup>40</sup>

In his authoritative statement on the issue from August 1880, *Die Fabel*

*von der jüdischen Masseneinwanderung* (The Fairy Tale of Jewish Mass Immigration), Salomon Neumann refutes the repeated claim that Prussian statistics that would break down immigration according to religious affiliation are lacking. Neumann argues that the Prussian statistics give detailed information on religious affiliation, in particular Jewish.<sup>41</sup> In his review of Neumann's brochure in *Preussische Jahrbücher* (from January 1881), Treitschke acknowledges the validity of Neumann's observation that Jewish emigration exceeded Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe to the effect that the overall growth of the Jewish population in Prussia was lower than its birth rate.<sup>42</sup> However, he argues that this did not affect the validity of his own claims, "for the social impact of strong foreign immigration is not neutralized by the subsequent emigration of the immigrants. Rather, it is obvious that those elements of Jewry that will leave Germany after a few years will be least inclined to assimilate [sich zu germanisieren]."<sup>43</sup> On the one hand, Treitschke certainly has a point here: the possible existence of an immigrant population that is merely "stopping over" on its way to "the West" (in particular America) constitutes a social fact in its own right that may be obscured by the statistics. On the other hand, he glosses over that this constellation is fundamentally different from the one that he had presupposed in his previous and also his subsequent arguments. Such a group of "temporary immigrants"—if they existed—cannot at all be argued to pose the kind of problem for the nation-building process that Treitschke claims the Jews, and in particular Jewish immigrants from the East, pose to Germany. However, instead of conceding that he was wrong in this question, Treitschke concludes that "further substantial statistical evidence has to be produced before the issue can be evaluated conclusively."<sup>44</sup>

The thrust of Neumann's argument is that Treitschke has mistaken migration from the Eastern Prussian provinces into (first of all) Berlin (in the context of a general migration from the countryside to the urban centers) for immigration. The people Treitschke calls "Polish Jews" are actually "Prussian Jews." The fact that this issue gained (relatively) much attention within the debate is further evidence for how much it was bound up in a discourse on nationality: from the point of view of a straightforwardly racist or

ethnic-culturalist antisemitism, it is irrelevant which state's territory the undesirable Jews come from. The fact that Treitschke too did not care much about the precise place of origin of the unwelcome strangers indicates that he already had one foot in the racist discourse that became "mainstream" only in the 1890s. Another irony of the debate is that migration from the East increased significantly only in the course of the 1880s. To the extent that the defense against Treitschke focused on proving that there was no Jewish immigration, it was eclipsed by later developments. While Treitschke "lost" the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute on the terrain of migration statistics, in the long run it proved fatal that the defenders of the Jews won their battle on this ground and not on the grounds of principle. The debate's focus on some of the facts and figures used in the anti-Jewish discourse contributed to avoiding the more fundamental issues at stake.

The other ground on which Treitschke based his claim of a specifically German "Jewish question" was his notion of the "two branches" of Jewry. Three issues were under discussion: Treitschke's use of the term "Polish branch" (instead of "Germanic branch"); his notion that the Jews of the "Western" countries consisted predominantly of "Spanish Jews" and that these tended to be more assimilated than the "Polish" (German) Jews; and his understanding of how the "character" and degree of assimilation of either branch was formed by their differing experience of persecution.

Manuel Joël rejects the concept of a "Polish branch" and argues that the Jews of Poland are actually the descendants of German Jews who never stopped sticking to their "Germanness [Deutschthum]."<sup>45</sup> "The *Polish Jew* is the *German Jew* who once had been driven to Poland."<sup>46</sup> Graetz argued that the majority of French Jews were "of German descent."<sup>47</sup> Philippson also writes that during the two centuries that Alsace-Lorraine was a part of France more than 120,000 mostly German Jews lived in France; furthermore, most Parisian Jews were of German background.<sup>48</sup> Oppenheim argues, referring to his own experience, that in France, England, and Holland nine out of ten Jews involved in public affairs are "German Jews," while the much smaller number of Iberian Jews live more secluded than the former.<sup>49</sup> Breßlau holds

that only Italian Jewry consisted in its majority of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants, while in France and England (similar to Germany), relatively few Jews were from the “Spanish branch.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, he points out that there was no evident correspondence at all between ethnic (*Stammes-*) background and the measure of assimilation or emancipation.<sup>51</sup> Differences in the extent of anti-Jewish prejudice in different countries must have other reasons. In England, Breßlau adds, anti-Jewish prejudice “exists to almost the same degree, only it never took as disgusting forms as currently in Germany.”<sup>52</sup> In France and Italy it is less strong, first because in the Romance countries there is no big difference in physical appearance between Jews and non-Jews, and second because “one does not have to indicate one’s confession at any conceivable [official] occasion.” Due to the confessional divide stemming from the sixteenth century, religious divisions in general are also experienced more strongly in Germany than elsewhere.

Graetz writes that while Jews in Spain and Portugal suffered much more brutal persecution from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Jews who come to Germany from Poland bring with them “no scars” since they have been persecuted there only since the seventeenth century.<sup>53</sup> He concludes that the “Spanish Jews” integrated themselves despite their scars from centuries of persecution, while the “German Jews” assimilated even more (in the absence of such scars) and actually are “incomparably more patriotic than for example the Poles [Wasserpölen] in Upper Silesia and other Slavonic tribes in Germany.”<sup>54</sup>

Treitschke responds to Graetz’s objections by restating his argument in a rather idiosyncratic way.<sup>55</sup> He writes that the Spanish Jews’ downfall under the Christian monarchs (after their enjoyment of cultural and economic high status under the Omayyad dynasty) brought them not only misery but also “the sublime and enthusiastic power of martyrdom,” while the Jews in Poland had suffered a “formally more moderate but essentially more pernicious tyranny.”<sup>56</sup> Treitschke explains that “an enslavement over hundreds of years accompanied by modest economic well-being necessarily does greater damage to the character of a people than a history full of great sufferings and struggles. Since our occidental history is essentially a

history of freedom, aberrations and setbacks notwithstanding, the Marranos of the West must be closer to us in character than the Polish branch of the Jews.”<sup>57</sup> He plays here on a Hegelian theme in his distinction between the proud and freedom-loving Spanish Jews and the “Polish Jews” whose history is not a “history of freedom” (i.e., of the unfolding of freedom) and whose less-brutal fate has corrupted their *Volksggeist*. Different from the survivors of the Spanish Catholic reaction, the Jews in Germany carry deep “scars” not so much from persecution but from the unheroic character of their own history.<sup>58</sup> As a result of this, contemporary German Jews are less patriotic and assimilated than the descendants of the “Marranos” of France or England and are also rather arrogant and unpleasant fellow citizens.<sup>59</sup> Treitschke’s notion of the unheroic character of the German Jews is perhaps a projection of German nationalism’s shame about the lack of a continuous German “national history.” Treitschke concludes: “However, our public opinion finally is beginning to be watchful. In only a few years to come, it will be strengthened enough so that derogatory speeches about the ‘ancient Germanic rabble’ [germanischen Ur-mob] as can be found now in the Jewish press will be as inconceivable in Germany as they already are in England.”<sup>60</sup> Again, Treitschke points to the Jews of “the West”—in this case, of England—as showing the way the Jews of Germany ought to go.<sup>61</sup> Except for Graetz, Treitschke does not give any evidence for his claim that the German Jews are less loyal to the German state than British Jews are to their state. Breßlau’s reaction prompted a particularly backhanded interpretation by Treitschke: he states that Breßlau’s response was the only one that he “read with a sincere feeling of regret” as he claims that he had hoped his text would be welcomed by “those Jews who unconditionally feel themselves to be Germans.”<sup>62</sup> Treitschke turns the fact that “a man as totally German-minded [deutsch gesinnt] as Breßlau” feels offended by remarks that “he cannot possibly understand as referring to himself” into another “proof of that exaggerated sensitivity that distinguishes the German Jews from the French or English Jews.”<sup>63</sup>

Treitschke further supports his position with a reference to the history of the French Revolution. While the “Jews of the South”—that is, those

descending from Jews from Portugal, Spain, and Avignon—gained legal equality in 1790, the Alsatian—that is, “German” Jews—did not do so for another year and a half. Treitschke draws the conclusion that this must be because the “Spanish Jews” fit better into occidental civilization.<sup>64</sup> Breßlau replies that the differences in the pace of the emancipation of the Jews in France do not warrant conclusions about their “tribal” character but can be explained much more easily. He relates that “the Spanish and Portuguese Jews” of southern France had immigrated as (outwardly) converted Jews (*Scheinchristen*) and therefore had gained civil rights in France as early as 1550. Because they followed all Catholic customs, they were not persecuted (as, e.g., the Huguenots were) but managed in some cases even to attain nobility. Only from the eighteenth century on did their descendants begin to reemphasize their Jewishness. Breßlau concludes on this issue:

That a difference was made between those who had been French for two hundred years on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Jews from Alsace, who had been excluded until 1790 from purchasing land and from almost every decent trade and were generally hated for this reason; that there was hesitation to lead the latter abruptly from complete absence of rights into complete equality—this is easily understandable and does not need to be explained through the assumption of a difference in the ability for assimilation between the two groups of European Jewry.<sup>65</sup>

Breßlau, in his refutation of Treitschke’s attempt to “racialize” or essentialize the different fates of the two groups, develops a historical explanation of the discrimination of the Alsatian Jews by the French National Assembly in 1790 that comes close to a justification.

Bamberger points out that there would have been much less outrage about “trouser-selling youths” if their descendants had also become trouser sellers. Anti-Jewish animosities are a reaction to “an unusual drive toward learning” and to social advance in the areas of “honorable commerce, industry, art and . . . scholarship [Wissenschaft].”<sup>66</sup> Finally, Theodor Mommsen shares Treitschke’s principal worries about the youthful vulnerability of the German nation but draws a different conclusion: “With the war of the Jews,



we—the nation that has just been unified—enter upon a dangerous path. Our tribes [Stämme] are very unequal among themselves. None of them lacks their specific defects, and our mutual love is not so old that it would not possibly die.”<sup>67</sup> Mommsen adds that German unity is particularly precarious because it has been granted more “by hatred of our enemies than by our own merit.” He warns that what has been granted by war can be taken away by disunity in peace.<sup>68</sup>

The centrality of nationality and ethnicity of both the Germans and the Jews, whether long resident or recently immigrated, for the discussion of their relationship and the formulation of a “Jewish question” is clear, and so is the awareness of several National Liberals, perhaps especially Mommsen, of a tricky dialectic between nationalism and antisemitism. Central to all of these is the concept of “mixed culture,” which the next chapter explores.

### Three. German-Jewish “Mixed Culture”

Along with “the Jews are our misfortune” and the remark about the “trouser-selling youths,” the sequence that contains what Treitschke has to demand from the German Jews is one of his best-known formulations: “What we have to demand from our Jewish fellow-citizens is simple: that they become Germans, feel themselves simply and justly as Germans, regardless of their faith and their old sacred memories, which all of us hold in reverence; for we do not want thousands of years of Germanic civilization [Gesittung] to be followed by an era of German-Jewish mixed culture [Mischcultur].”<sup>1</sup> The logical structure of this statement is contradictory: the demand that the Jews become Germans regardless of faith and memories seems to imply that religion is irrelevant for Germanness. This “demand” appears to be a statement about state citizenship and loyalty only. The process at the end of which one “feels” oneself to be German is one in which a choice that is political as well as cultural is internalized. This is confirmed by the subsequent phrase—the one introduced by “for”—in which Treitschke explains why he demands the Jews become Germans: “we” do not want “Germanic civilization” to be replaced by a “mixed culture.” The wish—a statement about “civilization” and “culture”—provides Treitschke with the reason for demanding that the Jews become Germans. If the concern about the purity of German culture provides the grounds for the demand for “Germanness,” the latter cannot be primarily a state-political issue. If “Germanness” is, though, a cultural issue, it is unclear how “faith and . . . old sacred memories” could be bracketed out of the equation.

Treitschke names the composer Felix Mendelssohn and two liberal politicians, Veit and Riesser,<sup>2</sup> as positive exceptions: "It would be a sin to forget that a great number of Jews, baptized and unbaptized . . . were German men in the best sense of the word, men in whom we revere the noble and fine traits of the German spirit."<sup>3</sup> Treitschke identifies the indifference of religion ("baptized and unbaptized") and presents the display of "German spirit" as the decisive quality expected from a full member of German society, a notion that expands on the idea that being German means "feeling" oneself German. "At the same time it cannot be denied, however, that there are numerous and powerful circles among our Jewry who clearly do not intend simply to become Germans." While there were Jewish individuals who became Germans—that is, developed and displayed "German spirit"—there are "numerous and powerful circles" who "clearly" do not have the will to do so.<sup>4</sup> As evidence he points to the Jewish "arrogance" displayed by Heinrich Graetz, a discussion of the Jewish economic spirit, and the role of Jews in the cultural realm. "Among the leading men of arts and scholarship there are not many Jews; the greater is the busy horde of Semitic third-rank talents."<sup>5</sup> Treitschke refers to two groups of Jewish intellectuals in particular, writers and journalists, which together form a "swarm of literati" bonded together by a mutual "insurance company for immortality [Unsterblichkeits-Versicherungsanstalt]" that hands out "one-day fame" instantly and "in cash."<sup>6</sup> He describes cultural life here in language borrowed from the sphere of money circulation, linking together both spheres: while dealings in money express "Jewish spirit," Jewish cultural production reflects the patterns of a monetarized economy. "The most dangerous consequences, however, has the inappropriate Jewish domination of the press—a fateful consequence of our old narrow-minded [engherzigen] laws, which denied the Israelites access to most learned professions. For ten years public opinion in many German cities was 'made' mostly by Jewish pens; it was a misfortune for the liberal party, and one of the reasons of its decline, that its papers gave far too much scope to Jewry." While the complaint about alleged Jewish domination of the press was then a staple of anti-Jewish agitation, Treitschke gives this an unusual twist with his claim that Jewish involvement was one

of the reasons for the decline of "the liberal party." Given that liberalism in Germany owed a lot to a number of Jewish intellectuals and politicians, this is a distortion and slander. But according to Treitschke, the Jews did a disservice not only to liberalism and its press but also to the press in general. He claims that "the little man cannot be dissuaded from believing now that the Jews write the newspapers and therefore he will not believe anything they say any longer."<sup>7</sup> Treitschke assumes here the air of one who would like to talk "the little man" out of his antisemitic misbeliefs, but unfortunately the Jews have driven things too far already. He continues with a nod to Jewish talent: "Our newspapers owe much to Jewish talents; the acuteness and nimble quickness of the Jewish mind always found the arena of the press a rewarding field."<sup>8</sup> However, this compliment also turns into an indictment in the same breath: "But here too the effect was two-edged. Börne was the first to introduce into our journalism the peculiarly shameless tone of talking about the fatherland as if from an external position [so von aussen her] and without any reverence, as if one did not belong to it [als gehöre man selber gar nicht mit dazu], as if mockery of Germany did not cut most deeply into the heart of every individual German."<sup>9</sup> While Treitschke had in the preceding formulation accused Jewish journalism of general trivialization and commercialization of intellectual life, the attack on Börne is more specific: Börne talks "as if from an external position" and as if he does not belong. Significantly, the charge is not that Börne is an outsider and *actually* does not belong; rather, the charge is that despite belonging, he still "mocks." This formulation brings the argument back to Treitschke's earlier "demand": the Jews, just like everyone else, should "become Germans" unconditionally and stop being "other" at the same time. While Treitschke on the one hand asserts the freedom of religion, on the other hand he demands unequivocal identification and identity, not identity and difference interlocked.

Treitschke claims that the Jews are mediocre in the arts and sciences and harmful in literature and journalism. That they do not make any valuable contribution shows that they do not want to "become Germans." Treitschke leaves open whether they are unwilling or actually unable to contribute, that is, whether the problem lies in a Jewish lack of patriotism or in a racial

defect. Numerous contributions to the Dispute discuss the value of the Jewish contribution to German culture, and some take up the question whether there is such a thing as “cultural purity,” and if so, whether it is something worth aspiring to. Another widely discussed notion is that of a specific affinity between German and Jewish “spirit.” It is argued on the one hand that Jewish difference is not a bad thing at all, and on the other hand that the difference is much smaller than Treitschke claims.

### The Concept of a “Mixed Culture”

For Bamberger, Treitschke’s concept of the “purity” of culture is mistaken and meaningless:

If purity was a particularly distinguishing quality in connection with the concept of culture, then indeed one would have to be suspicious about German culture. . . . If culture was something to be grown from the primeval soil, then the concept of a pure German culture that is thousands of years old would be an [enormously exaggerated] fiction. . . . Fortunately, though, culture is just the opposite of the linear propagation of a single national spirit [Volksgeist], and German culture stands so high because it managed to assimilate and digest so much.<sup>10</sup>

“Not even the Chinese” have pure culture; Bamberger points out that Goethe had named Shakespeare and Spinoza as his main influences, and quotes Herder’s statement: “We Germans would still live in the forests peacefully like Americans, or rather brutally fighting and being heroes, had not the chain of foreign culture urged itself closely upon us and forced us, with the might of centuries, to get involved.”<sup>11</sup> Since German culture is anything but “pure” in the first place, “it is a mystery” how it should “become a mixed culture” through the influence of the Jews, “who have settled in Germany almost from the very beginnings.”<sup>12</sup> Bamberger points to the particular paradox that they are considered a threat to the purity of German culture because they “push into the German universities and the German army,” “the two breasts of contemporary Germany’s communal life”: the Jews “sit in the lectures of Treitschke, Dühring and Adolf Wagner, they even break their necks for the

music of Richard Wagner, and in return—O ingratitude—they are accused of shoving German culture into their bags as if they could run away with it like with a silver spoon.”<sup>13</sup> Bamberger gives here a striking metaphor for the reification of culture into a set of static artifacts (resembling silver spoons) that underlies Treitschke’s thinking.

Breßlau rejects the concept of the unitary character of German culture in similar terms: “Our culture is not at all, not even predominantly, a Germanic one, and in fact we have a mixed culture resting on three factors: Germanity, Christianity and classical antiquity. . . . Nothing had a stronger impact on the culture of the German people than both the Old and the New Testament, both of which are undeniably products of Judaism [Judenthum].”<sup>14</sup> Breßlau stresses, however, that he “subscribe[s] totally and completely” to Treitschke’s demand for the “Israelites” to “become Germans.”<sup>15</sup> He writes that had Treitschke not joined into the common, “merely negative critique of Jewry,” he could have “earned” for himself “considerable merits about the development of the Jewish question.” For that purpose he should have made an effort to “deepen the question positively,” namely, to point out what exactly distinguishes a Jew “born and brought up in Germany” from a “Germanic” person of similar background and by which means “the transmutation of a Jewish into a Germanic person could be accelerated.” Treitschke then would have “obliged every impartial and unprejudiced Jew to be grateful.” Breßlau merely rejects Treitschke’s claim that “numerous and powerful circles” within Jewry do not intend “to give up that quality that distinguishes the Jew from the Germanic person.” Breßlau argues that this is true of only “a small bunch of ultra-orthodox rabbis” who still consider “Palestine the promised land” and the Jewish residence in Germany “merely temporary.”<sup>16</sup> “Holding the large majority of German Jews responsible for this bunch’s attitude would be as unfair and inappropriate as condemning the large majority of German Catholics because a few fanatical ultramontanists are prepared at any moment to subordinate their German national feeling to Rome’s claim to power. Anyway, the former’s small and declining number is incomparably less dangerous to the German being [Wesen] than the activities of those minions of Rome [Römlinge] who dare to want to teach the Jews patriotism.”<sup>17</sup>

While “ultramontanists” represent a much greater potential for disloyalty than orthodox Jews, the existence of a small number of unassimilated Jews, in particular in the countryside, is not surprising: “Just a century ago everything prevented the Jews from becoming German. The religious divide, the intolerance of Christian as well as Jewish clerics [Pfaffen], and most of all a legislation that made them pariahs, kept away every beam of German education from the dirty and despised quarters where princely favor had granted them a meager existence.”<sup>18</sup> Given that emancipation had been under way for only a short time, it is rather surprising that the “process of amalgamation” has already succeeded so far.<sup>19</sup> The urging of so many Jews into education is, to Breßlau, a sign of their determination to assimilate to German culture. Jewish scholars like Breßlau himself are making an effort to accelerate the process by leading the way with a good example—but, directly addressing Treitschke again: “You join the men who make the divide that we chose as our lives’ aim to make disappear as far as we can more grave and thus you make our effort more difficult. I do not doubt, my most respected colleague, that you intend the good, but allow me to say that you are achieving the evil!”<sup>20</sup>

The central argument of Moritz Lazarus’s contribution is that “true culture . . . consists in diversity” and that “the permanent vocation of the Jews” is to be promoters of difference.<sup>21</sup> Lazarus sees at the root of the problem a conception of history that is teleological and linear. He rejects the notion that the earlier “stage” of a development has a right to exist only insofar as it “gives birth” to the subsequent “stage” or form of existence.<sup>22</sup> He argues that “the generic” or “humanity” is not the result of an evolutionary process but the totality of all the forms or individuals that evolve in the process. Rather than believing that history is evolving toward an “end”—such as “the individual” or “the nation”—it ought to be understood that “the whole great diversity of spiritual life and creation” is “precious in itself.” “Here [in the linear and teleological conception of history] lies the deepest root of all intolerance. This is why for the Catholic, Protestantism is *nothing but* secession and heresy, while for the Protestant, Catholicism is but a preparatory stage. . . .

It has been held as an ideal that the whole world should adopt the culture of one people: all should become Roman or French. True culture, though, consists in *diversity*.”<sup>23</sup> Both Catholicism and Protestantism are mistaken. In a Herderian tone, Lazarus condemns the cultural imperialism of Roman as well as French culture and adds: “Mores, customs, strivings, lifestyles can, may and should be diverse; they will have to be objectively different because they are meant to be the ultimate, the most pure, the most certain for everyone [subjectively]. . . . How will truth grow if not through spiritual struggle, . . . through the competition of forces?”<sup>24</sup>

Lazarus does not reject the notions of development and progress in general. The “ultimate,” though, consists for him not in “unity [Einheit]” but in “totality [Gesamtheit]” and “diversity [Mannigfaltigkeit],” “which cannot nor should be destroyed.” At this point Lazarus attributes a particular role to the Jews: the “permanent vocation of the Jews” is to be universal promoters of difference: “By participating in various national spirits” they become themselves more and more diverse. The Jews differ from all other peoples because they gain “heightening and deepening of their own”<sup>25</sup> by way of “totally immersing themselves” into the particular (national) cultures of the societies they live in, whereas all other peoples “learn from each other” while remaining separate. The Jews relate in every people or culture to those elements that correspond to their own identity. The Jews thus represent a generic element, which they find and reinforce in every particular people. Doing this feeds and enhances within themselves “the generic” as their own particular characteristic. In this sense, Lazarus’s argument implies that the Jews constitute a common denominator of all other peoples and cultures that they immerse themselves in. Lazarus defines this generic element as “an ethical-religious content that towers in power and dignity over any individual deed.” This specific content has come to replace what previously had been the Jews’ nationality. Lazarus suggests that “the Jews do not have a nationality of their own anymore.”<sup>26</sup> Instead, they are “individualized also according to the nations within which they live.” This allows Lazarus—in an attempt to square the circle of (German) identity and (Jewish) difference—to define the Jews as “not an alien but an individually shaped distinct element



inherent to each nation, reciprocally and specifically appropriated.”<sup>27</sup> This constitutes their “specific capability.”

In a key passage of his lecture, Lazarus discusses Treitschke’s “demand” that the Jews become Germans, developing his concept of the specific role of the Jews within the German nation. Lazarus asserts that the “concept” and the “ideal” of nationality are capable of being permanently deepened and elevated in a permanent struggle for national unity: “All of us who care for the ideal and its fulfillment ought to unite; we should struggle together against all those who fail to participate truly and energetically in the national idea, against all those who hinder and damage the ideality through their base attitudes and their mean ways of living and acting.”<sup>28</sup> Any separation through confession and descent will damage the struggle for national “ideality.” Lazarus’s understanding of the “national ideality” includes a cosmopolitan dimension: “Let the highest development of the idea of German nationality be the standard around which we flock. But we aim at a Germany that must be free of any felony against received traditions as well as against universal human principles. True Germany . . . must be high minded and generous.”<sup>29</sup> Lazarus argues that “the idea of humanity stands higher than any nationality.” However, granting humanity priority over nationality is a typically German attitude: “Never, though, had the particular spirit [Gemüthsart] of any one people a more direct relationship to this idea of humanity than the particular spirit of the Germans has.”<sup>30</sup> Other nations might have served humanity unintentionally, but the “particular course of our history” has led the Germans to choose consciously the idea of humanity as their (national) trademark. Lazarus develops the notion of the particularly unselfish character of German nationalism emphatically: “We have often been reprimanded for not esteeming our own but instead admiring the alien; it has never been possible to vaccinate us with a decent dosage of national pride. . . . With all the will in the world we do not manage to despise the alien, to answer the hate of the enemy with equal hate; we cannot help searching for and acknowledging the good wherever it may be.”<sup>31</sup> As a witness to his argument, Lazarus quotes Schiller:

Germans, you hope in vain ever to form a nation. Strive instead, as you can,  
To a state of greater freedom than that: strive to be humans.<sup>32</sup>

At this point in the argument, Lazarus introduces the concept of "mixed culture." He argues that "it has been long established" that the most diversely mixed peoples turn out to be the culturally and historically strongest ones. Therefore the German Jews "have the duty . . . to remain Jews" and to put their Judaism "to the service of German national spirit as a part of its strength." This is not, however, an issue of the "mixing of blood" but of "intellectual abilities, moral drives," and the "longing to shape the world." These "spiritual abilities" are incorporated individually in the tribes that come together to form the nation: only in the nation are they harmonized and transcend the individual and the tribal toward the generically human.

As if, in a peculiar way, echoing Lazarus, the prominent antisemite Naudh also attacks the (liberal) trajectory of "progress" and pleads for the particular and for diversity against the generic and the unified, but with diametrically opposed conclusions for the status of the Jews. The comparison between Lazarus and Naudh provides, *mutatis mutandis*, some insight into the strange dialectic between multicultural and ethno-nationalist "celebration" of difference in the contemporary discourse.<sup>33</sup> Naudh accuses liberalism of "ignorance of the particularity of men [Menschen] by declaring all men to be equal." Naudh finds it "strange" that both Treitschke and Breßlau "more or less subscribe to liberalism, although all history only originated from the diversity of people."<sup>34</sup> Naudh defines history as the study of the particularity of people and claims that it is not compatible with the egalitarian ideas intrinsic to liberalism ("the scholasticism of politics"). The "science of politics" will only be able to progress "when it liberates itself from scholastic dogmatism [Formelwesen] and transforms itself into an empirical science [Beobachtungs-und Erfahrungs-Wissenschaft]." Liberals try to deflect from the "Jewish question" with "unscientific" formulas: "According to the liberal textbook, all men are equal and thus it is a mere matter of tactlessness [Unhöflichkeit] of the Jews that they are Jews."<sup>35</sup> The

sarcastic use of the word *tactlessness* seems to imply that the liberal conception falsely suggested the ways one acts in society could be arbitrarily chosen as well as changed. For Naudh, there is more to the issue than tactful or not-so-tactful visible behavior, for behind the visible stands the invisible, the racial essence. Naudh understands and exploits the fact that for liberalism—as for himself—“Jewishness” is not a positive value: he does not reproach (Gentile) liberalism for being pro-Jewish but for being naive about the Jews. According to him, liberalism underestimates the danger when it mistakes Jewishness for a mere surface phenomenon—for just an accidental matter of bad manners that are easily reformable.

Naudh argues that Treitschke and Breßlau share the “liberal formula.” When Treitschke demands that the Jews become Germans, Breßlau responds that they already are Germans (and also that the Germans were “half Jews” due to the Jewish origin of Christianity). Naudh rejects Breßlau’s account of the concept of “mixed culture.” The influence of classical antiquity on the formation of German culture has not produced a “mixed culture”: “Greeks and Romans were people of our race [Stammes], their spirit was closely related to ours and just as alien to the Semitic spirit. Mommsen has already pointed out that it was for this reason that the Punic wars became wars of extinction, and the proverbial ‘Punic loyalty’ refers to a feature of the Semitic character in a way similar to how we use the term ‘Jewish’ when referring to a moral character type.”<sup>36</sup> Naudh suggests a three-thousand-year-long Semitic-Gentile conflict (with the Phoenicians temporarily standing in for the Jews).<sup>37</sup> Although Naudh does not use the word on this occasion, his notion of a conflict between two sets of peoples over a period of three thousand years logically presupposes the concept of “race.” While, however, “the old Jews” failed “to impose a Jewish mixed culture” on “us,” “the living Jews” constitute an actual danger.<sup>38</sup> This threat is not so much that of a mixed culture but rather one of *Entsittlichung*, that is, a loss of culture, morality, and civilization because the Jews are not bearers of a civilization in the first place.<sup>39</sup>

The emphasis on the cultural-moral threat constituted by the Jews underpins the radicality of Naudh’s position. He is critical of the legalistic

character of the *Antisemitenpetition*, which he finds too "moderate."<sup>40</sup> The danger will not be averted "even when we exclude the Jews again from the sphere of the state." Naudh grounds his argument on the anthropological notion that "in every individual all good and all bad characteristics can be found together."<sup>41</sup> Actual individual behavior is determined by predominance of the one or the other element. This predominance, however, is determined in turn by social "consensus," that is, the interdependence with fellow members of society. This is why it is less Jewish positioning in the state than the number of Jews living in society that is at the root of the "Jewish question." Naudh mentions in particular the "cunning" of the Jews. The necessity for Germans to compete with Jews will inevitably force the former to adopt essentially "Jewish" strategies. The anthropological model presented by Naudh helps him to explain why it is due to Jewish influence and responsibility if non-Jewish Germans display behavior that is stigmatized as Jewish. However, this line of argument still needs to take account of the obvious fact that the Jews—even after extraordinary levels of immigration—would still constitute a tiny minority in Germany: why would not a morally superior German majority of more than 98 percent simply annihilate Jewish misbehavior (which had been the expectation underpinning the Enlightenment pro-emancipation position)? This is where Naudh brings in the concept of the Jews as an unproductive, parasitic race. He suggests that "we" should not wait and see when "the Jews will have the kindness to become Germans which actually they do not want at all and, even if they wanted, could not do."<sup>42</sup> "If historiography would be done in a more strictly scientific way [mehr in naturwissenschaftlicher Richtung]" and if ethnography "would be given the weight it deserves," Naudh argues, then historians would not come up with the "adventurous idea" of turning Jews into Germans. "[The Jew's] bones are crooked and askew and his muscles are weak, which is why he has a low fitness for work coupled with an even lower enthusiasm for work." Naudh suggests that "a whole people cannot do without working," which is why the Jews are forced to live as "parasites" on the backs of other peoples' work. "Their physical disposition" also determines "their concept of God" and "their spiritual disposition" in general. While for the German,

religion means “communion with God through moral betterment [sittliche Läuterung],” the Jews “*dispute* with their God.”<sup>43</sup> They posit themselves “as would-be competitors [als Contrahenten] against God and as negotiating partners “enter into an immoral contract [unsittlichen Vertrag].”<sup>44</sup> The subject of this contract, or covenant, is the exchange of worship in return for the supply of peoples “to eat”: “That is the promise that the people of parasites needed,” Naudh concludes.<sup>45</sup> “The difference in the understanding of one’s relation to God and world” in the German/Aryan and the Jewish conception is “that the Aryan considers perfection his task, while the Jew considers enrichment his task.” Feelings of honor and idealism spring from the Aryan conception, while they would contradict the nature of the Jewish covenant and be inconvenient for anyone living as a parasite. On the other hand, a lack of feeling of honor might result in ruthlessness and thus economic success. The effects of the covenant cannot be avoided by conversion: “Those who deny their Torah still cannot deny their descent,” as the particular type of contract that the Jews made a centerpiece of their religion was merely the expression of their particular “mind-set [Denkungsart].” The latter in turn was “a function of what was then the Jewish brain. There is no reason to assume that today’s Jewish brain would not function in the same way.”<sup>46</sup> The notion of the identity of “the Jewish brain” then and now is supported by the assumed fact of “three thousand years of Jewish in-breeding” and also by the observation that, for example, “Negroes in Northern America did not become white.” This proves that people’s physical “organization does not change because of a change of climate.”<sup>47</sup> Naudh formulates a racist version of the demand for respect for cultural difference: “We do not want to hold the Jews’ lack of honor against them, while we would hold it against a German, whose physique is designed for honor. It is denied to the physique of the Jew like the drive and the fitness for work.” Naudh suggests that, in particular, the Jew “does not know work honor [Arbeitsehre].”<sup>48</sup> He concludes that because of the Jews’ “parasitical way of life, to which their physical characteristics drive them,” their character will not be affected by “so-called emancipation.”<sup>49</sup>

Treitschke responded to Breßlau’s claim that German culture was a “mixed culture” by restating his earlier argument:

The intellectual work of past millennia is given to all modern peoples to lean on. Although our German culture flows—as Breßlau is right to point out—from three great sources, classical antiquity, Christianity and Germanity, it is not at all a mixed culture: we have amalgamated the Christian and the classical ideals with our own essence so totally that it has become part of our flesh and blood. But we do not want the neo-Jewish being [*das neujüdische Wesen*] to join these three cultural powers as a fourth one because whatever elements of Judaism fit in with the German genius have long been included into our culture through the mediation of Christianity. We do not want this because we have experienced bitterly enough once before<sup>50</sup> that the neo-Jewish spirit leads our people astray when it faces ours independently.<sup>51</sup>

Treitschke again transforms criticism into support for his position. The strategy of his argument is to contest the meaning of the term “mixed culture.” Treitschke opposes “mixed culture” to “amalgamations” that have happened slowly over a long period of time. “Mixed culture” in his definition presupposes the recognizable existence of the constituting elements as distinct. This definition serves to invalidate Breßlau’s critique. In the way Treitschke suggests using the word, German culture is not a “mixed” but an “amalgamated” culture: the “mixing” has proceeded so far that its elements are no longer distinguishable. A significant inconsistency manifests itself when he argues that “we have amalgamated the Christian and the classical ideals with our own essence”—namely, “Germanity”—and have thereby produced “German culture.” “Germanity,” “our own essence” appears here as one of the three ingredients that make up the “amalgam” of “German culture.” The extra-historical *Wesen* of “German culture” is in this conception joined by classical culture and Christianity—which are less essential but rather accidental additions—to form “German culture.” This reflects a contradiction in Treitschke’s concept of the nation as both historically constituted and transhistorical: while in the majority of his formulations (German) culture, as the essence of the nation, is itself understood as the result of historical developments, in this case “Germanity” is presented as the essence and antecedent of (German) culture (namely, being one of its three constituents).

Treitschke argues that because the “German genius” is already an “amalgam,” it should not become a “mixed culture,” too. He concedes to Breßlau that there are already Jewish elements in the “German genius,” but he turns this into an argument against any further “mixing” of culture. The Jewish elements of “German genius” are legitimate and beneficial only to the extent that they are not recognizable as such but mediated and completely amalgamated. While those Jewish elements that have already been added to the German amalgam are the best ones, those that have been rejected by Christianity are detrimental if they are allowed to constitute themselves independently as “neo-Judaism,” that is, outside the seamless amalgam. They must therefore not be accepted.

### The Affinity between the German Spirit and the Jewish Spirit

Bamberger and Lazarus, both strongly patriotic writers, hold against Treitschke the notion of a specific affinity between the German spirit and the Jewish spirit. For Bamberger, the apparently “German-Jewish” conflict is actually a “German-German” conflict, because it is characterized on both sides by the same “bad habits” that are “probably German”: high emotionality in religious and cultural affairs and a tendency for indulging in prejudices and for voicing them aloud.<sup>52</sup> “The thinking ones among the German Jews” tended not to get angry about the anti-Jewish campaigning, because they “know and appreciate their fellow Germans [ihre deutschen Landsleute]” to such an extent that they understand that the anti-Jewish sentiment is merely an unavoidable symptom of the Germans’ character—a frame of mind that they share and, by and large, appreciate. Furthermore, they know—or feel, anyway—that in sharing those bad German habits they also share in the responsibility for the antisemitic movement. Disputing Treitschke’s claim, Bamberger argues that the Jews have lived with no other people in such close communion: “They are Germanized not only on German soil but far beyond Germany’s borders.”<sup>53</sup> The Jews’ language anywhere in Europe is blended with German vocabulary, “and he who talks about language talks about spirit.” Bamberger points out that the Jews had maintained themselves in Germany throughout the ages although their lives have always

been made particularly difficult there. This "drives one to the assumption" that the Jews must have been attracted by the Germans by "commonalties in the fundamental character structure." "A mixture of heterogeneous and common spiritual characteristics" are at the basis of both mutual attraction and "intimate animosity." Bamberger explains: "The common trait is the fundamentally spiritual character: Jews and Germans are without doubt the two most spiritual nations of all times and places. . . . The inclination towards abstract thinking, one of the foundations of the spiritual outlook on life, is most developed in Jews and Germans."<sup>54</sup> As evidence he points out that nowhere except in Germany have "the spiritual views of Judaism, denationalized in the form of Christianity," or "Spinoza's speculative philosophy," or "the philosophizing socialists Marx and Lassalle," been received and embraced so thoroughly and won such a large following. Jews and Germans also share a "cosmopolitan aptitude" and the ability to "depart from the given state of things [sich vom Gegebenen loszureissen]." Bamberger concludes: "Both possess in common the mystery of speculation, in the philosophical as well as the economic sense of the word, a profound term that covers not coincidentally both these operations of the mind, the philosophical and the mercantile."<sup>55</sup> Bamberger argues here in an idealistic way, as if the history of Jewish settlement and migration were a function of the mutual attraction or repulsion of "national spirits."

Bamberger further claims that the Germans are "the most outstanding merchants of the world," held down only by "territorial-political fragmentation [Kleinstaaterei]" and "the arrogance of Junkers, civil servants or academics."<sup>56</sup> The reference to territorial fragmentation serves as a reminder that the prospect of economic expansion was one of the main driving forces behind national unification, whereas "the attack on the 'merchants' in general was the logical opening of the campaign against the Jews." Bamberger implies that the attack on the Jews and their speculative-spiritual-commercial spirit is *ipso facto* an attack on those Germans who—driven by the same spiritual gifts as are the Jews—were the force behind German nation building. Anti-business antisemitic sentiment is anti-national also.

Despite the far-reaching identity of the German spirit and the Jewish spirit



in the “mystery of speculation,” Bamberger also recognizes differences. “Depth of thinking and wealth of feeling [Gedankentiefe und Empfindungsfülle]” are more German, while “hot-blooded, witty humor merging into frivolity” is more Jewish.<sup>57</sup> He illustrates his conception of difference and affinity with two examples of Jewish-German-ness: Heinrich Heine represents a “peculiar blend” of the deep and the frivolous path to speculative transcendence. Those who rejected Heine for being witty as well as deep actually acted against “the German spirit”: they “granted German citizenship to the totally un-German sentiment of chauvinism and ostracized the liberal, humane and truthful spirit of our classic literature.”<sup>58</sup> A contrasting model case of German-Jewish spiritual blending is the liberal parliamentarian Lasker, whom Bamberger portrays as a grave, ascetic idealist. Lasker’s character is linked to the political framework defined by Bismarck: “When the great realist Bismarck managed to move German politics from the world of German abstraction onto the concrete grounds of power, he enrolled into his vast project the nation’s idealistic drive for great creation and high legislative aims. This was Lasker’s great time of fighting for German idealism with the brightest weapons of Jewish dialectics while following the lead of realism.” Bamberger remarks in a bitter tone that only after Bismarck turned against his “idealistic ally” did the latter’s “slightly abstract moral indignation” that until then had served the national project turn against its leader.<sup>59</sup> Lasker was henceforth reproached for the same things for which he had previously been praised. Bamberger presents two very different German-Jewish individuals, Heine and Lasker, in order to show that both were able to contribute significantly to German culture and politics by combining the different strengths of the two cultures: they managed in different ways to put their Jewish particularity into the service of their German affinity.

Lazarus, too, argues that there is a “particularly profound and momentous affinity between the Germanic and the Jewish spirit.” This found particular expression in scholarly research on the Old Testament, which blossomed in the context of German culture more than any other.<sup>60</sup> Owing to this affinity, Jews are so devoted to both reception and production of German culture that “an inner separation from it appears to them totally

unthinkable and incomprehensible." Lazarus argues that "in all religions, religiosity itself is the ultimate and the deepest and what is common to all of them. It is what strives toward the highest in humanity."<sup>61</sup> He separates *Religiosität*—being religious and feeling in a religious way—from the actual content of any specific religion and argues that every human being can revere the *Religiosität* of others irrespective of the specific content of their religion. He concludes from this that although Jews might not directly take sides and interfere in confessional debates and struggles within the church, they might hope for and support the victory of "what will be the best of every church," namely, "whatever represents the higher, more dignified, more beneficial stage of the religious development of humanity," trusting in "reason and the future."<sup>62</sup> The Jews "drink daily from the wellsprings of the German spirit, one of whose deepest sources is Christianity" and would not therefore slander Christianity. Lazarus argues that the animosity between Christians and Jews is a residue of a conflict that goes back to the origins of Christianity: "When, in the beginning, the new religious community split from the old one, of course there were animosity and bitterness." Lazarus suggests that the animosity between Rome and the Reformation had the same psychological origins as the earlier conflict between Jews and Christians, but asserts optimistically that "this is over!"<sup>63</sup> Likewise, Jews also have for a long time now demonstrated that they consider Christian moral theory identical to their own and have no hard feelings toward Christianity: "Would a mother despise her own child?"<sup>64</sup>

### The Jewish Economic Spirit and the German Spirit of Work

References to the economic role of the Jews tended to dominate many anti-Jewish publications of the time and seem to have been one of the more populist aspects of anti-Judaism and antisemitism. This includes both specific claims about the Jewish role in the financial economic sphere or the alleged role of the Jews in crises like the *Gründerkrach* as well as speculations about the Jewish economic spirit in the widest sense.<sup>65</sup> The topic figures remarkably little, however, in Treitschke's contributions to the Dispute: apart from one mention of Jewish "cosmopolitan financial powers," he dedicates to this issue

only one sequence in the first contribution, in the context of the discussion of the harmful Jewish influence on German culture.<sup>66</sup>

Treitschke's comment on the Jews' influence on the economy shows the cautious ambivalence typical of much of his discourse:

There is no German merchant city that does not count many honest, respectable Jewish firms among its number. But it cannot be denied that the Semites have contributed a large part to the dishonesty and deception and the bold greediness of the boom-time mischief [*Gründer-Unwesen*], and that they share heavily in the guilt for the contemptible materialism of our age which regards every kind of work only as business [*Geschäft*] and threatens to suffocate our people's ancient good-natured willingness to work [*die alte gemüthliche Arbeitsfreudigkeit unseres Volkes*]; in thousands of German villages there sits the Jewish usurer who appropriates the possessions of his ruined neighbors.<sup>67</sup>

In this paragraph, Treitschke distinguishes three categories of Jewish economic activity: first, honest and respectable Jewish firms in merchant cities, that is, representatives of traditional merchant capital; second, dishonest, deceitful, and greedy Jews involved in the largely unsuccessful *Gründer*-boom, that is, representatives of portions of such capital that is being invested in new economic enterprises at high risk—"speculation"; third, the classic figure of the Jewish small-town usurer. Treitschke discusses all three types of Jewish economic engagement in terms of "spirit": the merchant capitalist is characterized by honesty and respectability, the *Gründer* is characterized by greed, and the usurer "threatens to suffocate our people's ancient good-natured willingness to work." *Arbeitsfreudigkeit*—literally, "willingness to work" or "eagerness to work"—has a resonance with *Arbeitsfreude*, which means experiencing joy (*Freude*) in the working process.<sup>68</sup> *Gemüthlich* (here translated as "good-natured") reinforces the "spiritual" connotation.<sup>69</sup> Those whose attitude has become "Judaized" see work only under the perspective of *Geschäft*, that is, commodity exchange. Treitschke's terminology points to an idealized notion of work in an imaginary age when people would have been working for the sheer joy of it. It is safe to assume that the necessity to work has throughout human history been experienced as suffering (which

is the primary meaning of the Latin word *laborare*, "to work") rather than joy. Ironically, against itself, and only on condition of its own negation, it is capitalist modernity itself that has first opened the possibility of a human world that would reduce the pains of *laborare* to the unavoidable minimum and make the old dream of doing things for the sheer joy of them a real perspective for the many (rather than for those few elites who always found ways to organize for themselves leisurely anticipations of a humane existence).<sup>70</sup> Treitschke's liberalism does not allow such a positive perspective on what might one day emerge out of capitalist society, nor is he able to distinguish capitalist from pre-capitalist forms of commodity economy: he ignores the fact that medieval artisans also produced things in order to sell them. The grain of truth in his statement is, though, that working is in many ways even less a source of joy in modern times than it might have been before. Treitschke blames this on the domination of production by *Geschäft* and describes this as a problem of false, namely Jewish, "spirit." He seems to understand capitalism as a dictatorship of "business" over "production." Again, there is a grain of truth in this folly: it was one of the stages of the emergence of the capitalist mode of production that production was subsumed under a type of relations (the commodity form) that historically has emerged from trade—however, this does not describe its essence at all.

An article in *Deutsche Wacht* from May 1880 is much more explicit than Treitschke's remarks, thanks to its use of the terminology of political economy.<sup>71</sup> It argues that "legal equality of Jews and Christians is unethical [ethisch unfassbar] and anti-national [antivolksrechtsthümllich]" because "the Jews never aim at the production of 'useful values' but only for profit. . . . Jews as socialists . . . have invented 'capitalism' as a historical-economical point of attack in order to deflect attention from distribution and try to blame all hate on industry."<sup>72</sup> While "capitalism"—a conceptual fabrication by Jewish socialists—is a "smoke screen [Popanz]," the real "enemy of the nation" is "egotistic commercialism [das selbstsüchtige Krämerthum]," namely, the Jews.<sup>73</sup> "In earlier times" (the author seems to be thinking of the period of mercantilism), inviting Jews into the country was thought to be economically advantageous because of the money the Jews would bring with them. This was

mistaken, however, because “they do not use money productively but only for haggling [Schacher].”<sup>74</sup> The tyranny of intermediate trade reduces general wealth and therewith “increases the proletariat which is the greatest enemy of any state order.”<sup>75</sup> The author proposes that intermediate trade should be content with “calculating the . . . costs for transportation, storage and loss of commodities as well as the average interest to be charged on the stored commodity capital,” implying that such trade enriches itself by taking out more than these, as it were, legitimate rewards and thus “destroys the balance of production and consumption.”<sup>76</sup> The import of foreign goods “tyrannizes” the domestic market, destroys national consciousness, and “promotes the international.” The article concludes that trade “is thus an enemy of state, nation and society. . . . Not capitalism . . . but commercial capitalism . . . has to be fought.” The author argues that only if the state regulated trade accordingly could the Jews begin to “develop,” “overcome their faults,” and begin to participate in “patriotic culture and greatness.” Only then could they “earn” the emancipation that has been granted to them undeservedly.<sup>77</sup>

Treitschke’s liberal respondents comment widely on both his comments on the Jewish part in the *Gründer-Unwesen* and on the wider issue of “the contemptible materialism of the modern age.” Manuel Joël states that among the *Gründer* there have been many Jews “simply because among the Jews there are many merchants.” He adds that some of them “would be even more inclined to become presidents, senior civil servant, staff officer, senior postal civil servant etc.” if they only had a chance to. Joël argues that the claim of a particular Jewish materialism is disproved by the fact of Jewish refusal to convert when conversion would improve career chances: simultaneously reproaching the Jews both for not giving up Judaism and for materialist greed is therefore inconsistent.<sup>78</sup> Oppenheim also writes that the Jews have been involved in *Gründungen* merely to the extent of their share in the economy in general.<sup>79</sup> He argues, however, that due to their relatively higher economic skills they did not typically belong to those who “came closest to overstepping the mark.” He thus turns the stereotype of the Jewish superiority in business into a virtue and argues that the most adventurous and speculative enterprises were led by—less skilled and less solid—non-Jews.

The tone of Harry Breßlau's answer differs somewhat from the former in expressing support for Treitschke's attack on "the Jewish promoters [Gründer] and usurers."<sup>80</sup> However, he adds that there are also many Christian *Gründer* and argues that the higher proportion of Jews in the financial sphere in general has its cause in medieval laws that excluded them from a number of other occupations. "What I miss in your elaborations, though, is any positive suggestion."<sup>81</sup> Breßlau accuses Treitschke of discouraging "those decent men who—as you emphasize yourself—work against usury to the best of their ability in their circles." Breßlau seems here to accept silently Treitschke's notion of Jewish group responsibility, but he leaves open what its practical relevance should be. (Why, for example, would a professor of medieval history like Breßlau have a particularly good chance to convert a "speculator" to "decent" banking practices just because both happen to be Jewish?) Breßlau adds that "not a single Jewish or Christian usurer or promoter would mend his ways because of an article like yours."<sup>82</sup> He suggests that straightforward legislation would be most effective.

The *Allgemeine Zeitung* carried the translation of an article by "Valbert" (i.e., the popular French novelist Cherbuliez).<sup>83</sup> "Valbert" mocks: "When a truly German cobbler makes a pair of shoes he does not only put his consciousness into them but his soul, too, and even some poetry. Alas! Since the German cobblers allowed the deplorable propaganda of the sons of Abraham to corrupt them, they see in a pair of shoes only a business, because for the Jews the world only consists of business and calculation." Philippson adds that Treitschke's emotional rhetoric sits oddly with the fact that "since 1870, Treitschke kept preaching realism in politics" and demanding that "idealist dreaming" end.<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Oppenheim claims that the economic idealism of Treitschke's recent position brings him "into the realm of the Kathedersozialisten"<sup>85</sup> as well as that of the "apologists of the guild system [Zünftler]" against both of whom Treitschke had been renowned for fighting aggressively.<sup>86</sup> Oppenheim asserts that work should be a "business" rather than a "feudal or state service." He rejects what "Treitschke and the Kathedersozialisten" seemed to demand, that it should be "an ethical achievement [Leistung]." Oppenheim admits that "everything has an ethical dimension"

but suggests that boots made by a cobbler “who goes about his work as a business” are probably better than boots made from “ethical consciousness.” Oppenheim states that even if it was true that trade and business have lost their *Gemüthlichkeit* (“if there ever was any”) then it would be quite another thing to prove that the Jews are responsible for this loss. He writes that even the most conservative peasant has no problem seeing his produce as commodities “and his calculation of their prices is affected by neither the songs of the lark nor those of a whole forest of German poets, whom he otherwise might highly appreciate.” The mere fact that the product of work is a commodity does not make it more or less ethical. Oppenheim sees the “moral” critique of capitalist production as a cheap excuse for lazy people who fail to adapt to the standards and expectations of modern society: “The whining about the lack of pleasantness [*Ungemüthlichkeit*] of modern production comes from the bunglers who fail to produce up-to-date products and who would be saved if they could hide behind the privileges of a guild or a system of protective customs.”<sup>87</sup> Oppenheim points out that already in the 1770s when guilds in France were abolished under Turgot the guild masters understood *Gemüthlichkeit* of work “to mean police protection for the right to use force and exclusion [*Zwangs-und Bannrechte*].” He suggests that “the fertile field of the joy of labor” lies in meeting the increasingly sophisticated and diverse demands of the consumers rather than in backward-oriented “reminiscences.” “Even now the apprentices’ question and some related issues pose numerous serious problems because the crafts have lost their ability to help themselves, having been spoiled and incapacitated through centuries of privileges and police protection. I bet ten against one that all those apologists of the guild system who seek their salvation in reactionary fraternities and run to join Stöcker and sing the tune of ‘the evil Jews’ are incompetent and unreliable workers in their trade. . . . Does Herr von Treitschke want to enlist these people for his Christian-Germanic brigade, too?” Against Treitschke’s revisionism, Oppenheim defends the liberal modernizing thrust of creating dynamic economic relations by removing *ancien régime* structures and regulations.

Like Oppenheim, Bamberger warns Treitschke against deviating not only

from religious and cultural tolerance but also from freedom of property as another tenet of liberalism: "Hopefully Herr von Treitschke, who used to profess sound economic principles, will not intend making concessions to the simplistic delusion—currently coming back into fashion—that those who make money through their labor exploit society and do not through their services make society so much richer."<sup>88</sup> Bamberger refers to the first section of "Our Prospects," in which Treitschke criticized—among other things—the anti-German current in the political debate in Russia. Bamberger suggests that "the Russian Treitschkes" declared the Germans to be "Russia's misfortune," just as Treitschke declared the Jews to be Germany's.<sup>89</sup> Like the anti-Jewish agitation in Germany, the anti-German agitation in Russia "merely decorates ancient prejudices and passions with the tinsel of patriotic phraseology." Their historical point of reference is the immigration of poor Germans at the time of the Reformation, who succeeded in Russia "through skill, industriousness and moderation." The Russian people "had to acknowledge these advantages of the 'intruders' but despised them even more for that reason. Since those times it remained an established truth in the thinking of the common man that the Germans 'destroy national religion and appropriate the riches of the country.' The more or less learned Moscow pan-Slavists have only recently begun to repeat this notion with enormously pompous and cheap moral outrage and scholarly flimflam." Bamberger draws the analogy between Germans in Russia and Jews in Germany: "The well-being of the Jewish Germans no more prevents that of Christian Germans than industrious, clever and economical Russians are prevented in Russia by Germans from enjoying the fruits of their work and from becoming cultured and wealthy."<sup>90</sup> Bamberger presents the conflict in both instances as based on the different economic attitudes of a traditional population and an immigrant group that has a modernizing impact on economic life characterized by industriousness, moderation and rationality. He states that the origin of national-religious prejudice is economic and strongly affirms the modern economic spirit. He asserts that the "activity and wealth of the German settlers in Russia benefit Russian culture as a whole," just as "the intellectual and economic activity of German Jews benefits the German state and German society."<sup>91</sup>



Bamberger's emphasis on economic attitudes indicates clearly that liberal opposition to antisemitic agitation took the latter's "anti-capitalist" and populist aspects very seriously.<sup>92</sup> Treitschke, by contrast, clearly did not expect (let alone hope for) any socialist side effects of antisemitism.

Treitschke chose not to articulate further the "anti-capitalist" side of antisemitism that he had displayed in a passage of his first contribution, silently accepting the fierce criticism of fellow liberals such as Oppenheim and Bamberger. It occupies much more space, however, and is further developed in the contributions by Naudh and Endner.

For Naudh, it is a fact of history that the Jews invented "Manchesterism" two thousand years ago and that already back then an anti-Jewish, anti-capitalist movement led by a man called Jesus struggled against it: "Christianity with its imperative of love was the revolution *against* the Jewish principle of arrogance and exploitation and indeed, like every revolution, it started its struggle from within. Jesus confronted a Judaism that was oriented toward worldly benefits—the religion of Manchesterism—with transcendental communism and thus was welcomed first by the poor—least, however, by the Jewish poor. A gospel of worldly uselessness did not really appeal to their tastes."<sup>93</sup> For Naudh, the anti-Jewish movement of the present is similarly motivated: "Although eighty Germans might be able to feed one unproductive Jew, the burden is distributed too unevenly over the country. In Berlin, for example—and Berlin shows not yet the most unfortunate ratio—only eighteen locals have to sustain one Jew, who on average might perhaps appropriate more than is left to his breadwinners [Ernährern]."<sup>94</sup> Naudh continues that out of these eighteen local Berliners only five "at most" are fit for work, so that, according to his calculation, "the Jew consumes at least a fifth of the productive power of the Berlin population." Because of the "infinite of Jewish immigration," which "accelerates progressively," the Germans will be "helots of the Jews" in another twenty years. They will be "run down morally as much as economically." Naudh concludes that "it follows from the preceding that we can neither allow the Jews active participation in the affairs of the state, nor—due to their inherited hostile morality—can we tolerate them next to us in such

[large] numbers."<sup>95</sup> In other words, exclusion of Jews from the state-political sphere needs to be complemented by their exclusion from civil society. Another economic aspect is emphasized by Wilhelm Endner—making the Jews productive: "We would not mind, if Berlin's Jewry (from Victoriastrasse just as from Königstrasse) would head off and settle for example in the Tucheler or Lüneburger heath, if Cohn became a ploughman, Abrahamson a thresher, if Philipponson would establish himself as a blacksmith, Jacobson as a locksmith, Levyson as a roofer, if Bresslauer became a tar-cooker, Danziger a peat-cutter, Veilchenfeld a carpenter, Rosenbaum a bricklayer, if Lilienthal would be working on the street, Löwe, Wolf, Bär and Hirsch at the ram and so on."<sup>96</sup> Endner adds a whole list of suggestions how the Jews should accelerate their assimilation.<sup>97</sup> He is most adamant about the issue of taking up productive occupations: "Most of all, make sure that the *Jews become members of the working classes in the same ratio as the Germans are*; that they produce instead of merely enrich themselves through trade. Then the—until now justified—judgment that the Jews bleed the country white will possibly change."<sup>98</sup> Endner, who writes that he finds both Treitschke's and Stöcker's politics "too moderate," is one of the less established, more populist, and in that sense more "radical" antisemites. Two aspects are particularly interesting from that perspective. First, he rejects Breßlau's claim that the anti-Jewish attitude is "basically" about race. Endner stresses that it is about cultural, economic, and social questions no less than about race, and he puts particular emphasis on the economic argument that the Jews are "unproductive." For Endner, the "Jewish element" is to be "eliminated" not so much because the Jews constitute another race (the Wends are also of a different "race," but Endner has no problem with them) but because their racial difference manifests itself in specific cultural-social practices, most prominently their being "unproductive." Endner also seems to hold that persons of non-Jewish (or non-"semitic") "stock" also fall under the category "Jews" (while "Semites" is for him the properly racial category) as soon as they display cultural-economic "Jewish characteristics": in a comment on Breßlau's and Treitschke's argument about "mixed culture," Endner formulates explicitly: "Among the promoters and usurers, pawnbrokers and

repurchase traders, among all the bloodsuckers who understand just how to avoid prison, there are also many of German descent. Those are called 'Jews' by the people—not by me—, they are representatives and the first offspring of German-Jewish mixed culture."<sup>99</sup> For Endner, the problem is not "race" but cultural—in particular economic—behavior, which is only secondarily articulated or explained in the language of "race." Although Treitschke did not come back to the economic issue in the course of the Dispute, it is revealing to see how he restated the issue a few years later: a "wildly passionate drive for commerce" is "the most eminent trait of the Jewish character," and it is "plain obvious" that "a section of Europe's large-scale capital stands in an international alliance" whose aim it is to push its interests against small-scale capital and landed property.<sup>100</sup>

### The Jewish Contribution to German Culture

Many responses to Treitschke argue against his claim that the Jews failed to contribute to German culture. Most comments on these issues emphasize that the Jewish contribution to German culture and science is very high given that the Jews had been institutionally excluded until only one generation before.<sup>101</sup> Breßlau states that the seventy or so Jewish professors at German universities (more than three times what could be expected from their share in the population) "honestly work for the greater honor of the German name and to the advancement of the greatest fame of our nation, German scholarship."<sup>102</sup> He accuses Treitschke of uncritically replicating the strategy of the ultramontane press to denounce the liberal press as Jewish by hugely exaggerating the role Jews play in it.<sup>103</sup> He reports that although there might indeed be a great number of Jewish correspondents and reporters, their representation on editorial boards and thus their influence on editorial policy was actually minute. He adds that the existence of incompetent and characterless "Catilinarian existences" among journalists is not a specifically Jewish problem and adds that not Jewry but the Catholic reaction is unpatriotic.<sup>104</sup> Breßlau underlines his own patriotism through the repeated attack on ultramontanism's orientation toward Rome. Furthermore, he rejects Treitschke's comments on Börne and states that "acerbic self-criticism"

has "always been a trait of the German character—and not one of its worst traits."<sup>105</sup> He points as an example to Samuel von Pufendorf and argues that "superior scorn" was not evidence of alienation but a mark of great writers.<sup>106</sup> Breßlau also stresses that Börne was very serious in his "burning ardor of patriotism."<sup>107</sup> Treitschke replies to Breßlau that Christian editors are dependent on "their Jewish correspondents in Paris and London" as well as the money coming from Jewish advertisers.<sup>108</sup> In other words, not only are Jewish reporters able to dominate even their employers, but the fact that there are non-Jewish editors who are not particularly anti-Jewish is in itself proof of the dictatorial influence of Jewish money.<sup>109</sup>

To illustrate the evil influence of "neo-Judaism," Treitschke adds a discussion of Börne and Heine and "the days of Young Germany." With hindsight, as Treitschke claims, these days can now be recognized as "an era of moral and intellectual decline": "Alien, radical, abstract ideas invaded our life at that time, and a slavish adoration of foreign ideas was preached in the name of liberty. Up to the present day, our best minds have been laboring to liberate the nation from the un-German ideals of that infertile epoch and to lead it back to itself."<sup>110</sup> While Breßlau had likened Börne to Pufendorf, Treitschke argues that Börne lacked what constituted Pufendorf's greatness, namely, "superiority" and "thorough industriousness"; Börne's patriotism lacked seriousness. Treitschke compares Heine favorably to Börne because of Heine's "richer nature" and "most of all, because Heine was far more German than Börne." Treitschke distinguishes two dimensions of Heine's work: the "international jokes" for which he earned a reputation as being *vraiment parisien*, and those poems—like "Loreley"—that display "straightforwardly German" sentiment or even the "smell of the soil" from the Rhineland. Dismissing the former but applauding the latter, Treitschke puts Heine in a line with Jews who "recognized that they can achieve great works of art only on the tracks of the German spirit." By way of making a halfhearted compliment, Treitschke turns Heine into a witness to his own argument. Börne, however, unlike Heine, used the "abstract journalistic language of education [abstrakte journalistische Bildungssprache]," which is "never truly German." Treitschke concludes: "Only arrogant mediocrity opposes itself

with an air of imagined superiority to the knightly Germanic Esau. . . . When we oppose such bad habits of the evil elements of our Jewry, men like Breßlau should support us. I cannot find a serious and deep disagreement between him and myself.”<sup>111</sup>

It is Bamberger who detects another one of Treitschke’s contradictions and turns Treitschke’s claim that only a few Jewish talents are prominent in the arts and sciences against Treitschke: if that were true, Bamberger writes sarcastically, it should be a relief to him because it would lessen the Jews’ chances of polluting German culture. Bamberger misses, though, the pessimistic point of Treitschke’s argument: in contemporary culture, the mediocre may dominate the truly great.

Within the discourse of the nation, the concept of culture assumes an encompassing and mediating role; culture is the specific, separate sphere, a part of the whole, that tends to present itself as the totality, the whole itself: this can be read from the relevant passages in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute. There cannot of course be any such thing as a “cultural antisemitism” distinguished from “economic antisemitism,” “racial antisemitism,” and so forth. The following chapter will expand the discussion further, focusing on the concepts of state, nation, race, and religion.

## Four. State, Nation, Race, Religion

Conflicting constellations of the concepts state, nation, race and religion are at the heart of the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute and attracted a large number of more elaborate treatments, including some by leading scholars of the time: the political analyses by Treitschke, Breßlau, Bamberger, Oppenheim, and Naudh were joined by the more scholarly contributions in particular by Lazarus, Cohen, and Mommsen. These more theoretical statements differ in style from most of the journalistic pamphlet material discussed so far and deserve a more detailed presentation.

### **Patriotism as *Staatsgesinnung***

Two-thirds of Treitschke's "Our Prospects" from November 1879 are not about the "Jewish question" or any domestic, social affairs at all but about international, or rather inter-Imperial, relations. Although this part of the text is generally not given much attention, it contains important clues about Treitschke's overall political conception and allows an immediate contextualization of his comments on the "Jewish question." Treitschke makes explicit that for him the two fields of discussion are closely related; he even seems to indicate that the "domestic" problems (the "Jewish question"; the relation of state, nation, and culture) receive their importance from the "global" context.<sup>1</sup>

Treitschke writes about the final stage of the Balkan crisis and the outcomes of the Berlin Congress of June and July 1878. On this occasion Bismarck

managed to establish himself as an arbiter between English, Austrian, and Russian interests in the Balkans after a successful Russian military intervention in a Serbian-Turkish conflict.<sup>2</sup> Treitschke comments on the ill-feeling between Germany and Russia that originated after the Berlin conference when Russia had to sacrifice some of its military spoils from the Balkan war to the “balance of powers” as brokered by Bismarck. He points out that the two states are allies by tradition as well as by mutual benefit, and he blames the temporary ill-feeling on the “blind spitefulness” rooted in the “mighty national passions of the Russian people” or, rather, of influential parties among them.<sup>3</sup> Treitschke suggests that the “passionate desire of the nation,” “youthful” and “immature,” and the “propaganda of pan-Slavism” had driven the czar into conflict with the Ottoman Empire.<sup>4</sup> Treitschke draws an enthusiastic portrayal of Bismarck’s presidency of the Berlin Congress: Bismarck saved the Russians the largest part of their spoils while Britain and Austria initially aimed at annulling the results of the Balkan war completely so as to save the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The driving force behind the German position was, according to Treitschke, the wish to see “the liberation of the Balkan Christians from unbearable [Turkish] pressure.”<sup>5</sup> The driving force behind Russian popular mood was, by contrast, not sympathy for the Christians of the Balkans but pan-Slavism. Russian public opinion opposed the czar’s diplomacy after the war and even called for war against Germany because the war aims of pan-Slavism were not fulfilled. Additionally, as Treitschke notes, popular anger was fueled by the fact that the newly created nation-states in the Balkans had “constitutional forms of state” which Russia still lacked.<sup>6</sup> The twofold disappointment after the military triumph operated as a catalyst: “And just like the innermost secrets of man always are betrayed in anger, so the pan-Slavists’ deep-rooted hate of Germans came to the fore in measureless force.”<sup>7</sup> While Treitschke shows himself less than sympathetic to populist pan-Slavism, he applauds the majority of public opinion in Germany for being sympathetic to the politics of the Russian state. He adds that only some “isolated adherents of the old liberal school” and some “dogged” progressives did not support Russia in the Balkan war.<sup>8</sup> He argues for a renewed alliance of the “three imperial powers,” Germany,

Austria, and Russia, as long as pan-Slavism does not become official Russian policy.<sup>9</sup> Treitschke sees as the main result of the Berlin Congress that Britain gave up its traditional position of defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He takes it as a fact that the latter will be divided among the European powers in due course: "In the age of the railway the ideas and projects of the epoch of the crusades are resurgent."<sup>10</sup> Treitschke argues that England and Russia as the main players should be able to come to a peaceful agreement, because both had "to fear a common enemy in the fanaticism of Islam." "Unfortunately," though, "reason alone does not decide about the fates of peoples."<sup>11</sup> Conflict is unavoidable because of, on the one side, the "enormous expansive power of Slavdom" and, on the other side, the "far more insatiable greed for territory of English commercial policy" looking for markets. Treitschke anticipates a European coalition to prevent British hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean.

In this context he moves to a second element of the results of the Berlin Congress, the incorporation of Bosnia into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Treitschke's assessment of this is ambivalent; he appreciates as an immediate benefit that the conquest has boosted national self-consciousness: "One has started again to believe in the state and its good fortunes; one can hear from Vienna articulations of a healthy patriotic pride, a vital Austrian state-mindedness [*Staatsgesinnung*] more often now than since many years ago."<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, he points out the administrative problems of governing this remote province, and the subsequent necessity for the Dual Monarchy to be engaged in Balkan politics to make Bosnia economically viable.

Taken together, Treitschke's comments on the political situation at large allow for some first conclusions about his conception of state and nation. In keeping with his background as a key proponent of *kleindeutsche* policy—as opposed to pan-Germanism—he rejects pan-Slavism, too. The "liberation" of Christianity from Ottoman rule has his sympathy, although this seems not a priority. As in the case of Austria, he appreciates military success as a contributor to "healthy patriotism," which he defines as *Staatsgesinnung*, that is, loyalty to and identification with a state, which in itself does not necessarily imply an ethnic sense of nationality. He seems to support the



existence of empires as long as they are economically and administratively viable and supported by “public opinion.” Since this is not the case for the Ottoman Empire, the latter’s days are numbered. He discerns potential difficulties in the case of Austria-Hungary, while critical difficulties are already apparent in the case of Russia. While Russia is characterized as a potential troublemaker because of the popularity of the “dreamings” and “fairy tales” of pan-Slavism, Treitschke speaks of England with hostility because of the uniquely commercial character of its politics. All in all, Treitschke appears here as a supporter of nationalism as state patriotism, that is, nationalism as the basis of *Staatsgesinnung*. Economic viability is mentioned repeatedly as a key category, although he refers also to Christianity and the culture of the “Occident.” Only when a state does not manage to mobilize the necessary patriotic support of its citizens, as in the Turkish case, does it appear as a legitimate prey to destabilizing forces such as other nations’ nationalisms.

### The Christian Nation

Although for Treitschke, patriotism translates as *Staatsgesinnung*, in his discussion of the “Jewish question” he refers to Germany as a “Christian nation”: “The moment emancipation was gained one insisted boldly on one’s ‘certificate,’<sup>13</sup> literal parity was demanded in all and sundry, forgetful of the fact that we Germans are, after all, a Christian nation [ein christliches Volk] and the Jews are only a minority in our midst; we have witnessed that the removal of Christian pictures in mixed schools was demanded, and even the celebration of the Sabbath.”<sup>14</sup> The concept of *christliches Volk* blurs the boundaries between, on the one hand, state, citizenship, and emancipation and, on the other hand, morality and religion.<sup>15</sup> Treitschke rejects any challenge to the Christian character of the nation. While he suggests that the Jews make wholly unreasonable demands.<sup>16</sup> But Treitschke also insists that emancipation is crucial for the character of the German state: “Among those who understand, there can be no talk of an abolition or even of a limitation of the emancipation; that would be an obvious injustice, a betrayal of the fine traditions of our state, and would accentuate rather than mitigate the national divide which torments us.”<sup>17</sup> Treitschke connects his argument

here to the liberal tradition that sees in the state a means to “harmonize” civil society, “mitigating” its “divides.” He characterizes the German nation as Christian, the German state as liberal.

In his third contribution, Treitschke claims that the relatively higher increase in the size of the Jewish population warrants a “momentous change in our social life.”<sup>18</sup> He states that “this tribe” includes “apart from many honorable, fully patriotic people also a bunch of unreconstructed Orientals” as well as “a swarm of rootless international journalists,” “large cosmopolitan financial powers,” “some simply anti-social elements,” and criminals.<sup>19</sup> Although legal emancipation has been “beneficial insofar as it took from the Jews all reason for legitimate complaint,” it also “made the mixing of blood more difficult, which has always been the most effective means of leveling tribal differences”: “The numbers of conversions to Christianity have sharply decreased, and mixed marriage between Christians and Jews will remain a rare exception as long as our people holds its Christian beliefs sacred.”<sup>20</sup> Treitschke reaffirms his support for legal emancipation and for the “mixing of blood” as a means of (national) amalgamation against tribal particularisms. At the same time, however, he reasserts strongly the incompatibility of the two religions.<sup>21</sup> From among the four categories blood/tribe/race, religion, nation, and state, nation and state appear as historical ends, the others as either means to these ends or obstacles to be overcome: for the sake of nation building, blood/tribes/races should be “mixed” and “amalgamated.” The problem with the Jews is that their sticking to their old religion makes this amalgamation undesirable for the Christians who in turn have to stick to their (more modern) religion for the sake of nation-state formation. The continued existence of the Jews as an ethno-religious group is therefore an obstacle for the constitution of the nation-state. Treitschke continues: “The Jews owe gratitude to the new Germany for the work of liberation because the participation in governing the state is not at all a natural right of all inhabitants but is decided freely by every state.”<sup>22</sup> He complains that the Jews not only show a lack of gratitude but even criticize Christian dogma. In some cases, he claims, they try to limit the Christian’s freedom of belief “in the name of tolerance”—for example, when Jews complain about Christian schoolteachers teaching that the Jews

crucified Jesus.<sup>23</sup> Treitschke concludes that the beginnings of the “terrorism of a busy minority” must not be encouraged through “cowardly patience” on the side of “us Christians.”<sup>24</sup> He seems here less concerned, however, with the truth about issues such as who was responsible for the death of Jesus than with the effects that questioning such truths may have on nation building and state formation.

### “Exaggerated Nationalism”

The rejection of Treitschke’s nationalism as “exaggerated” was a common denominator of most critical responses. The notion of “exaggerated nationalism” presupposes—sometimes implicitly, often explicitly—a contrasting notion of not-exaggerated, “healthy” nationalism or patriotism. A comment in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* by Ludwig Philippson, who sees the “nationality principle” as central to the problem, touches on many of the issues at stake in the wider discussion.<sup>25</sup> He presents himself as a supporter of the nationality principle who has argued for decades that the Jews should assimilate to the German nation, or whatever nation they happen to live among, and that this would not at all affect their Jewishness. He warns, however, that the nationality principle, when it is exaggerated, creates hate and division, as the case of Treitschke shows. According to Philippson, Treitschke argues for the extinction of all Jewish particularity because he interprets all Jewish particularity as national. Philippson rejects this interpretation and holds that a degree of particularity in one’s way of life is necessary for the reproduction of religious particularity: no religion can exist without its specific institutional forms, because “religion that existed only in three or four abstract sentences would not persist.”<sup>26</sup> He writes that “pseudo-liberals” like Treitschke share with the ultramontanists the goal of bringing down the liberal principle that legal and political equality override religion or confession, which is a “bulwark of the constitutional state [Rechtsstaat].”<sup>27</sup> He argues that the anti-liberal strategy is to deliberately repeat the rhetorical attack on the *Rechtsstaat* again and again until the general public has absorbed it “like a sponge absorbs dirty water.” However, the fact that “in all religions and confessions countless individuals have transcended clerical dogmas and forms” and “the state in almost all

civilized countries [Culturländern] fights the armies of the churches” makes this an anachronistic enterprise. Philippson warns that any violation of a “great legal principle” will inevitably spread over the whole legal realm: “partial violation”—such as abolition of civil rights only for the Jews—“abolishes the principle as such.” Furthermore, he argues that “exaggerated nationalism” becomes “despotism” as soon as it suppresses the development of individuality within the legal framework. Out of “enraged delusion,” nationalism turns against itself and mimics its opposite, which is socialism.<sup>28</sup> Philippson rejects the conservative attack on “modern civilization”:

We think it is a mistake to ascribe to modern civilization the drive toward leveling out all differences between human beings [Nivellirungssucht]. From antiquity and medieval barbarism large entities had developed that contained a vast diversity of unrefined forms as well as delusions, superstitions and tyranny. Civilization challenges these forms and their contents in order to destroy them. In doing so, it calls the true essence and the intellectual wealth of those entities to new life, which naturally also take on purer and more subtle forms. Everywhere this process is governed by the same rules of reason, taste, the incorporation [of the particular] into the general, and into the demands of the time. Civilization does not thus challenge the phenomena in themselves but merely what they came to be under the conditions of barbarism: only the latter brought them into contradiction with generality. Civilization rejuvenates and refreshes the life and the vitality of these historical phenomena. This is what also happened and continues to happen to Judaism.<sup>29</sup>

He warns that attempts to undermine the rule of law and freedom might in the future unite into the foundation of a “Christian-Nationalist” party, which would damage both Christianity and the nation. Treitschke’s argument already contained this possibility in nuclear form. Philippson ends on an optimistic note implying that such “anachronistic” endeavors would be but temporary.<sup>30</sup>

“The Jewish question the way it occurs today is not a religious question but one of nationality [or], if you wish, one of race,” argues Harry Breßlau.<sup>31</sup>

As evidence he refers to Treitschke's use of the phrase "baptized and non-baptized Jews" and his demand for the Jews to "become Germans" while "wanting to allow us [the Jews] to stick to our religion."<sup>32</sup> In his reply, the antisemite Wilhelm Endner rejects Breßlau's claim: he writes that race, "which manifests itself in physical appearance," was only one of a number of aspects, which also included customs, opinions, and religion.<sup>33</sup> Endner claims that in everyday parlance "Jew" refers to any person—irrespective of "race"—acting in a "Jewish" way. It is interesting that Endner, who (like Naudh) professes an overtly racist antisemitism, at the same time insists that "race" is only one aspect subordinate to a broader, cultural issue.

Ludwig Bamberger goes further than Breßlau in attempting to explain the meaning of the category "race": he argues that "exaggerated nationalism" adopts the category of "race" in order to justify inequality when that inequality can no longer be justified by religion. As a "historian and patriot," writes Bamberger, Treitschke should have studied the "peculiar phenomena" that resulted from the "mixing of the Jewish element with modern nationality [Volkswesen]."<sup>34</sup> "This surviving artifact from time immemorial in the present"<sup>35</sup> should have given the "historian and patriot" the opportunity to study the "marvellous vitality based on such a strong individuality" as well as "the manifold ways in which the liberated element<sup>36</sup> has integrated itself into the various nations." Such examination would have thrown light on "the characteristics of the German being [Wesen]" and how it deals with social and political tasks. It would have shown that "the immortality of the unfortunate divide" between Jews and Gentiles "is but a particular form of that large German hereditary evil: self-destruction [Selbstzerfleischung]." Bamberger suggests that the current anti-Jewish agitation is but a new instance of what he calls "the old discord" that makes life difficult for the German nation.<sup>37</sup> Treitschke the historian failed to analyze any of these issues. However, Bamberger's argument has its ambivalence, too: "Jewry" is on the one hand a "surviving artefact from time immemorial . . . peeping into the present," that is, an anachronistic element that stands in opposition to "modern nationality," and on the other hand it is a party in a conflict within the modern German nation. Bamberger sees Treitschke motivated by three factors: tactical party-

political opportunism, Treitschke's individual psychological makeup, and the inherent propensity of "exaggerated nationalism" as a political doctrine to "degenerate" into hatred of anything alien both within and without the boundaries of the nation: "The cult of nationality more than anything else carries within itself this temptation and it easily degenerates into making hate of other nations a sign of authentic conviction. From this hate of the alien beyond the border, it is only a [small] step to the hate of what can be found to be alien within one's own country."<sup>38</sup> Bamberger argues that "from time immemorial" people created social divisions with reference to "the privileges of birth."<sup>39</sup> He quotes as an example the party of the "nativists" or "know-nothings" in the United States, who aimed to restrict the civil rights of newly arriving immigrants. Unlike the American immigrants, however, the German Jews have settled in Germany since Germany "entered history." Therefore, they cannot be attacked as immigrants. Bamberger either does not distinguish between Jews who are in fact recent immigrants and the established community or he has only the latter in mind.<sup>40</sup> Anyway, it would not make sense to demand "that today's large national states should be purified according to the principle of absolute racial purity. As a matter of fact, all civilized nations have been created from diverse tribes and have found and expressed their power precisely in such assimilation."<sup>41</sup> The concept of the "Semitic race" stems from the "garbage of physiology and linguistics." "The racial distinction" has been adopted in spite of its meaninglessness: "It was adopted only when inequality of right could no longer be justified with reference to religious denomination. But the weak surrogate cannot replace this concrete and honest means of distinction. Being baptized or not, that makes sense and has power; Semitic or Germanic cannot be used without hitting the baptized with the unbaptized."<sup>42</sup> The category of race serves to perpetuate inequality after the latter's initial justification has stopped working. Bamberger points out that the 1878 Berlin Congress proclaimed the equality of confessions as a fundamental principle of modern constitutional law, a principle that Treitschke would not want to challenge.<sup>43</sup> Bamberger suggests, though, that the discontinuation of formal religious discrimination has not led to equality but merely to a change in the way inequality is

legitimized: “The impossibility of a denial of rights on the basis of religion pushes the struggle in our country time and again onto the physiological terrain of the inequality of races.” If the racial principle were to be taken seriously and put into practice, then Jews—baptized or not—would have to be expelled together with second- or third-generation descendants of Jews as well as children of mixed marriage. For Bamberger it goes without saying that such a monstrous endeavor would be a practical impossibility: his pointing to the enormous implications of invoking the category of “race” at all is for Bamberger a *reductio ad absurdum* of the racial discourse itself. It was then not conceivable that anyone might possibly find these practical implications quite reasonable (as was the case only a few decades later). Bamberger brushes “race” from the table and concludes: “Why should one torture oneself with all these threadbare pretexts! Let us admit honestly: we are dealing with an ancient antipathy that has been handed down from generation to generation for centuries and has become a fact of nature so much that in many people even the strongest logic cannot challenge the power of habit.” This antipathy “originated essentially from the conflicts of religious confessions.” Once people have learned that “there are many homes in the house of God,” religious antipathy is “destined to disappear,” and so “the racial divide” will finally be overcome by “humanity and education.” “Until then one has to take into account the undeniable fact of a sentiment which is unable to take account of itself.”<sup>44</sup>

Bamberger’s position is based on the conceptual distinction between “modern nationality” and “the cult of nationality,” the latter of which easily “degenerates” into racism. Modern, well-measured nationalism and the exaggerated “cult of nationality” (by implication something unmodern) appear as distinct entities, as the latter’s inherent racism is merely a “threadbare pretext” for religious discrimination in a time when religion has ceased to appear as a legitimate discourse in itself: racism is merely the misleading packaging of an anachronistic and outdated phenomenon, religious hatred. Bamberger not only underrates the modernity of the discourse of race but also fails to explain why religious discrimination should now need the racial pretext. In his account, religious belief and its specific forms seem

to change and disappear spontaneously: people “learned” to tolerate each other’s beliefs, and the divide “is destined” to disappear. The slow but finally victorious march of “humanity and education” remains unaccounted for. Despite his suggestive and often brilliant formulations, his general conception does not allow Bamberger to address the crucial questions of why “religious antipathy” took on the disguise of “racial divide,” and why one should expect both to disappear.

### The Nation as Product of the National Spirit

It is of obvious significance that the title of one of the first public responses to Treitschke’s first article was “What Does National Mean?”<sup>45</sup> Moritz Lazarus argues that the German Jews are Germans, and he engages for this purpose in a detailed discussion of the concept of the nation.<sup>46</sup> He compiles a comprehensive list of categories that he argues are not in themselves elements of a sufficient definition of the nation: forms of settlement, morals, and customs are not crucial parameters that define a nation because they are not generic within any single nation, and the same forms of settlement, morals, and customs can be found in the contexts of different and unrelated nations. Territorial separation and community are “the basis of political unity,” but members of different nationalities can share the same territory, while members of the same nationality can be found inhabiting different territories. One territorial unit can contain several state structures, and one nation-state can consist of different noncontinuous territories. Most importantly, though, territorial borders change and “depend on subjective perspective.” Lazarus argues that “the separation of peoples is for themselves beyond doubt, but the borders of the country are object of nearly interminable struggles.” He claims that while the state (in its territorial and political borders) is contingent, national-ethnic (*Volks*-) boundaries are fixed and self-evident. Citizenship does not define a nation, because only “in earliest times” did the borders of states coincide with the boundaries of nations.<sup>47</sup> The same is true of religion. Descent is “not at all the true mark” of nationality, since no nationality in Europe is “of pure descent.” Nations emerge either through mixing of lines of descent or through their splitting up.<sup>48</sup>



While all of the above are elements of nation formation, Lazarus singles out language as the most important “objective element of the formation of national unity.”<sup>49</sup> Language “connects all members of a nation to a *spiritual community*.”<sup>50</sup> Its importance is underlined by the fact that language was created “in the first human community through the need for mutual understanding and continued [in turn] to create the conditions for this understanding.” The child “develops the ability to think in the language of the family” first. Communication and exchange lead to the development of “manifold forms of what in its innermost core is the same.”<sup>51</sup> Lazarus does not stop, though, at a definition of the nation as a community of language. The main thrust of his argument is based on his refusal to acknowledge that what he calls “objective” categories (including language) are in the last instance at all decisive. The question “what is a nation [Volk]”<sup>52</sup> ought not to be answered with “a classification of the human species in the style of natural history<sup>53</sup> according to its varieties<sup>54</sup> and its less and less numerous differences and forms.”<sup>55</sup> Such an approach might be appropriate for the classification of plants by a botanist who has to ask what degree of similarity is necessary to group two plants into the same family, but the concept of the nation cannot be conceived in such a way, because it “is not formed from the corporeal, zoological aspect, but from a spiritual [geistigen] one.” Although language is the most important objective element, the objective elements in themselves do not make a nation.

An important element of Lazarus’s conception is his differentiation between the “content” and “form” of consciousness.<sup>56</sup> “Content” is constituted by sentiments, notions, concepts, and the feelings attached to them, “form” by “the moving of these contents through [the faculty of] consciousness or [in other words] the combination of their elements.” All elements of “national consciousness [Volksbewusstsein]”—religion, customs, constitution—are “thought content.” Form as well as content of language are subject to “national specificity [Volkseigenthümlichkeit]”; form, though, is affected by national specificity “in a finer, more tender and more intense way” than content is. Words are the unity of “idea [Vorstellungsinhalt]” and “thought form [Gedankenform],” while “movement of thought” is represented in

inflection as well as syntax. "Language not only contains the worldview of a people but also represents the perceptive activity itself."<sup>57</sup> Lazarus employs here a conceptual mind/body dialectic that separates "material" or "objective" from "spiritual" or "subjective" aspects, the latter of which transform and transcend the former:

The true nature and the essence of nationality can only be understood as residing in the spirit. . . . Spirit, freedom and history intervene in the natural distribution of the human species according to races, tribal groups, tribes, clans, families. They separate what by nature would belong together and mix and assimilate what by nature would be different. Spiritual community and difference are therefore independent from genealogical community and difference. The concept of the nation is grounded on spiritual, historical constellations intervening into naturally given differences; and what makes a nation a nation are not objective conditions such as descent or language as such but the subjective ideas of the members of the nation who are joined together in considering themselves a nation.<sup>58</sup>

Lazarus concludes that the researcher can determine human beings' belonging to race and tribe with the same objectivity with which a natural historian classifies plants. Talking about the nation, however, is different: "We ask human beings which nation they see themselves belonging to."<sup>59</sup> Although the nation is not independent from material conditions, it "does not have anything that could be called—except by analogy—its body." It is a "spiritual creation of the individuals who constitute it; they are not a people, they *constantly create* one."<sup>60</sup> "The nation is the first product of the national spirit. The individuals do not create it as individuals but only by overcoming [aufheben] their isolation. The awareness of this self-transcendence [Selbst-aufhebung] and of the [individuals'] dissolution into a general national spirit [Volksgeist] expresses itself in the notion of the people. The national spirit creates the notion and with it also the actuality of the nation."<sup>61</sup> Lazarus rejects a "scientific"—in other words, a positivist—approach and advocates what could be called a "hermeneutical" or "interpretative" approach: "Our task is therefore not to develop out of an examination of objective givens

our own definition of the nation as a discrete, objective concept as if corresponding to a concrete object, but we have to interpret the existing subjective definitions that nations implicitly give of themselves.”<sup>62</sup> Every nation has an individual conception of itself that “will always base itself on objective conditions such as descent, language, political life and so on,” and which in turn is an aspect of its particular actuality as a nation.<sup>63</sup> However, “the crucial issue, namely the light in which the self-consciousness illuminates itself, is the subjective, free act of self-awareness [Selbsterfassung] as a whole and as a people.” Lazarus concludes that “the subjective connection in the spirit of a nation” is “based on, developed and experienced” through the nation’s “history in the widest sense”—its “common destiny”:

Insofar as an individual—or an individual with his family—over generations participates in history passively and actively, the subjective bond of belonging grows. When illness and famine hit a country they do not ask after religion, descent or language but as common destiny they unite the minds. The blessings of peace and the burdens, sorrows and sacrifices of war are shared by all, and all share as well the virtues that war has demanded and strengthened. Fighting shoulder to shoulder, the men grow hearts fit for the unity of the historical deed. Even separate and hostile tribes proceed toward national unity. Will—that most personal, most character-forming element of the human mind—alone the will of the tribes decides. In the German Reich, will alone, proven in deed, has made those who less than a decade ago had fought each other as mortal enemies, a unity. Not least, as we Germans know best, the common history of intellectual life joins individuals and tribes together to form the unity of the nation.<sup>64</sup>

Shared subjects and levels of education, mutual support in exploring the same things, and exchange in exploring different things, “in short: the flow of spirit and intellect that forms the inner life creates in everybody, according to the degree of their participation, the consciousness of their national-spiritual unity.”<sup>65</sup> Similarly, while it is an objective anthropological fact that “nature” has “planted into our hearts the inclination to join a defined group of fellow creatures,”<sup>66</sup> it has left open for the individual humans to decide what kind of group to join or to build: “The motives for acting thus [die

Gruppierungsmotive] have been left open to us and we see them change through all ages.”<sup>67</sup>

The “natural underpinnings of human sociability”—spatial community, language, exchange of means of subsistence, geographical and hereditary influences—constitute an “intertwining of interests and customs to which higher relationships can easily attach themselves.” They do not, however, constitute “the bond of minds [Band der Gemüther]” that is the basis of the nation:

Not every birthplace is a homeland [Heimat], not every land of the fathers is a fatherland. I can be chained through the community of state and law to people whose language I do not understand, whose customs, culture and belief are alien to me. *Human freedom again stands above all these individual powers of attraction.* I can break away from it all, join strangers and talk to King David’s ancestress: Your people be my people and your God be my God.<sup>68</sup> *The concept of the nation is not objectively defined but also depends on subjective sentiment. My nation are those whom I consider to be my nation, whom I call my people, to whom I know myself joined by unbreakable bonds [unlösare Bande].*<sup>69</sup>

Lazarus makes a distinction between a more emphatic concept of the nation and a more casual one. He presents the emphatic concept in a formulation by Rümelin:

Our mind . . . will always feel a silent longing for a full, unitary community of life. It will aim at the ideal of a central group that encompasses all matters of life, the pivot of all particular motives for getting together, in which we have a complete sense that these are our people, the kin by whom we stand, with whom we endure, whose fate we share, from whom to part would be an intolerable thought.

Our German word *Volk* in its deeper meaning refers to this ideal aim of the universal group of the full community of life, without, though, excluding those less perfect forms that are constituted by the individual main characteristics.<sup>70</sup>

On the other hand, Lazarus argues, “we have to accept” that there is also a more casual use of the term: this usage refers to every group that wants to

distinguish itself from its neighbors with reference to descent or language, or, on the other hand, “every multitude that is governed by a state” as a people or a nation. Paradoxical statements such as that “the Belgian people consists of two peoples” follow from confusing the two ways of using the term *Volk*.<sup>71</sup> Lazarus proceeds to integrate “objective” and “subjective” elements into a comprehensive definition of the ideal concept of the nation:

A country large and fertile enough to feed a dense, numerous population, fit to defend itself against all its neighbors, varied enough to warrant a multiple development of economic and intellectual life; on this soil, a linguistically unified population that works it and has struggled for it and knows itself united in common deeds and sufferings; this multitude protected and ordered through a unified state sprung from its womb and intertwined with its interests and memories; based on secure statehood, the flowering and cultivation of all those ideal goods of humanity and of intellectual, moral and religious life [growing] in free and manifold forms, including contradictions and struggles that strengthen a sense of community spreading in sovereignty and reconciliation—this is what it means to be a nation.<sup>72</sup>

For Lazarus, the prevalence of nation over race is part of the prevalence of spirit over matter, and the victory of a “subjective” concept of the nation over an “objective” one is part of the struggle of “idealism” over “materialism.” He opposes his idealist concept of the nation—which has the “national spirit” transcend its material conditions and actually make the nation—to racial conceptions of the nation: “This blood-and-race theory is in its entirety a product of a general coarsely sensualist-materialist worldview.”<sup>73</sup> Those who—on the one hand—argue for a revival of ideality are critically wrong if they do not—on the other hand—recognize that materialism has to be fought lock, stock and barrel and replaced by a higher and purer worldview.”<sup>74</sup> Lazarus writes that the idea of culture being determined by blood is inconsistent with subscribing to “the victorious power of the idea.”<sup>75</sup> He sees “the arousal of racial or tribal hatred” as a necessary accompaniment of materialism. Racial hatred is “the lowest [form of] antagonism.”<sup>76</sup> Although the actuality of race and tribe are not denied, they are but aspects of matter

and have no role to play in the realm of spirit and sociability. Bringing race and tribe as points of reference into the realm of spirit and society means undermining the human effort to spiritualize existence.

Although for Lazarus commonality of religion is one of the “objective elements” that constitute the material substratum of a particular nation, he rejects the idea that any one religion as such could have a national character: there is no such thing as a “German religion.” Therefore he rejects Treitschke’s claim that Judaism “was not German.”<sup>77</sup> Judaism is just as much (or as little) German as Christianity is: “Today, every nationality comprises several religions, every religion several nationalities. . . . Individual-civil [individuell bürgerliche], political and national activity of any human being, including the Jew, is independent from religion.”<sup>78</sup> Lazarus adds that Judaism in particular is a religion that “neither grants to nor demands anything from any power or dominion,” and concludes from this that it “can never come into conflict with the state.” He supports this claim with reference to the dictum by the Talmudic sage Mar Samuel, which he argues is crucial to Jewish religious and state theory, stating that “the law of the country’s government, of the state power, is the law for the Jew.”<sup>79</sup> Lazarus argues that this formulation is based on a notion that has been pivotal to Judaism from its very beginnings: the belief that God commands the fate of the world, and so every legitimate government is *ipso facto* legitimized by God. Lazarus claims that his own understanding of nationality is in keeping with a line of traditional Jewish thought that “has never been challenged”: since German Jews have become German citizens, they share the fate of the German nation, are therefore Germans, and accept the German state as legitimate.

Lazarus adds that the Germans have only recently become “a nation in the genuine, true sense of the word,” a process in which the Jews have fully taken part, and he underscores the participation of Jews in the German-French war of 1870–71. “Whatever we do we do as Germans,” he writes. “When we earn fortunes on the world market—something people like to point out so much—then we increase the wealth of the [German] nation.” Lazarus concludes that “the heightening of the national feeling [Nationalgefühl] is a serious issue . . . for the German as well as for any other people.” One cannot

contribute to this aim by arousing antagonism (*Widerwillen*) in one part of the population against another one, and particularly not by “alarming the imagination with a strong fear of facts that are—not facts at all.”<sup>80</sup>

Central to Lazarus’s conception is the categorical distinction between “material”—as it were, corporeal—aspects of the nation, as the worldly “intertwining of interests,” and the nation’s “spiritual” aspects. Language is the mediator between them, standing with one leg in the material world (warranted by its practical, functional aspects) and with one leg in the realm of self-consciousness, freedom, human will, and the making of history. While the material world constitutes races, tribes, clans, and so forth, only the spiritual world—the “bonding of minds”—constitutes nations.<sup>81</sup>

“Unfortunately,” responds Treitschke to Lazarus, he has to disagree. Treitschke concedes that “the essence of nationality is to be found not merely in descent or language, but in the unquestioned and lively consciousness of unity,” but he reproaches Lazarus for not dealing with the problem how such “consciousness of unity” would be possible among people who hold differing religious sentiments: “That living consciousness of unity that constitutes nationality cannot usually be formed among people who think in fundamentally different ways about the highest and most sacred questions of emotional life.”<sup>82</sup> While different *denominations* are a lesser problem, different *religions* can coexist in one nationality “only as a transitional state,” and only as long as one religion “clearly predominates” while believers of other religions are “a minute minority.”<sup>83</sup> Treitschke also rejects Lazarus’s claim that “today, every nationality includes several religions”: “I am not a follower of the doctrine of the Christian state, because the state is a secular order and has to exert its power with impartial justice also against non-Christians. But without doubt we Germans are a Christian nation.”<sup>84</sup> Treitschke argues that Christianity is intertwined “with every fiber of the German people,” while Judaism is “the national religion of a tribe that initially was alien to us.”<sup>85</sup> Art, science, “even disbelief,” and “all healthy institutions of state and society” of the German people have been “fertilized” by Christianity, whereas “the Germans never had any part” in the development of Judaism, and vice versa. Judaism remained restricted to the “Jewish tribe” because it was “more suitable for

defense than for proselytizing.” Treitschke also rejects Lazarus’s disconnecting religion and nationality with reference to other nations: “The most civilized [bestgesitteten] nations of the present, the Western European nations, are all Christian nations [Völker].” He concludes: “Just imagine that one half of our nation would renounce Christianity: no doubt, the German nation would have to fall apart. Everything we call German would fall to pieces.” He reproaches Lazarus for not distinguishing between “religion” and “denomination” and argues that while different denominations can coexist within one nation, different religions cannot. Crucial to this step in Treitschke’s argument is the ambivalent use of the concepts *Staat*, *Nation*, and *Volk* and their relation to each other. He argues first that the state should be beyond religion as a “secular order,” although this is followed by the assertion that in the case of Germany “all institutions of the state” are essentially Christian in their spirit. Also, all Western nations are “Christian nations.” *Nation* and *Volk* seem to be used as synonyms (as in Lazarus). The argument that all German state institutions are Christian seems to presuppose that national culture informs (and to some extent precedes) state institutions. It follows from this that the initial (normative) statement—the state *should be* secular—is contradicted by the subsequent (positive) statement that the state *is* always informed by religion as one crucial constituent of nationality. The normative claim for the nation-state’s secular character necessarily stands in contradiction with its actual constitution, which involves a particular religion. This contradiction affects the guarantee given by Treitschke that the (secular but Christian) state “has to exert its power with impartial justice also against non-Christians”: “Just because a tiny minority of Jews lives among them, the Christian peoples of the West have not become mixed Christian-Jewish peoples. They might grant that minority all civil rights and complete freedom of religion; but despite having granted emancipation to the Jews they remain entitled and obliged to remain in the upright stance of their Christian culture<sup>86</sup> and to preserve the Christian character of their institutions.”<sup>87</sup> The Jews’ claim to cultural equality beyond legal emancipation appears so “monstrous” to Treitschke because of their tiny number: Lazarus’s “principal mistake” is that he ignores “the modest status of exception that befits the Jews in the Christian cultural world.”<sup>88</sup>



Treitschke writes that the nation is Christian but not the state. The question is, then, if the nation is Christian and the state is not, how can the state be a national state, that is, a state based on the nation? In other words, is the secular nation-state—a central project of liberalism—not a contradiction in terms? This is the question that Naudh in particular will ask.

Hermann Cohen, who regrets “to admit” that his statement was caused and motivated by Lazarus’s claim that “there is no German religion” and that Judaism is just as German as Christianity is, comprehensively rejects Lazarus’s position.<sup>89</sup> He attacks four crucial claims by Lazarus: that the link between nationalism and religion is rather loose; that race is of little relevance to the nation; that nationalism should be linked with and, as it were, balanced out by universalist ideals; and that diversity is an intrinsic good. Cohen asserts that “a nation that wants to found and to reinforce its existence as a state needs to take care of its religious foundation.”<sup>90</sup> All (potential) members of the nation have to participate in its religious foundation, “confessional differences related to history and tradition” notwithstanding.<sup>91</sup> He rejects the idea “that religious form was a matter of no political relevance and should not be the concern of the state” as “a flawed liberal slogan, which unfortunately has been taken onboard by many Jews.”<sup>92</sup> Against Lazarus, Cohen holds that “the German people, and that includes us Jews, breathe out of the culture of Christianity.” Cohen agrees with Treitschke’s claim that “the coexistence of several different religions can only be a transitory state” and can last only “if one religion predominates and the followers of the other religions are the exception and by far a minority.”<sup>93</sup> However, he holds that this argument cannot be used in support of antisemitism: Christianity, which is in the “world-historical” process of “struggling for that purer form” of religion, can easily accommodate a minority that holds “a belief so pure and free of all paganism” as the Jews’.

The concept of the “coexistence of several different religions” does not sit comfortably with Cohen’s Kantian definition of the term, which recognizes only one (universal) religion but many different *Glaubensarten* (confessions, or ways of believing). In this context, a multiplicity of *Glaubensarten* is held never to be a problem for the state as long as all of them can be interpreted in

the sense of the generic concept of *Religion*. In the present passage, however, Cohen's stressing the "purity" of Judaism implies that a less "pure" religion (more precisely: *Glaubensart*) would indeed constitute a problem. Furthermore, the formulation by Treitschke that Cohen approves of clearly implies that the "minority" believers do not enjoy equal cultural currency, while Cohen argues for the equality in value of Judaism and Protestant Christianity in the "struggle for that purer form of religion." Admission to the national community appears here as a reward for "purity" from "paganism"—in other words, compatibility with Protestantism.

Cohen underpins his discussion of the concept of "race" with a methodological critique: he accuses Lazarus of both empiricism and one-sided idealism. Cohen is not interested in asking (as Lazarus does) whether race is empirically a constitutive element of nations as they actually exist: he acknowledges that Lazarus's discussion is valid in the context of an empirical account of the actuality of existing nations. However, Cohen subscribes to a normative concept of nationality that differs from that formulated by Lazarus: "without hesitation" Cohen affirms that racial unity of a nation is desirable and "to a certain minimal extent necessary."<sup>94</sup> Similarly, "the ideal politician . . . will say: I aim toward a more intimate and higher unity for my nation than what the statistician is able to abstract from the given empirical material. I aim toward a representation of my people that respects its physical characteristics and develops its racial type most magnificently. This wish and this ideal measure for the evaluation of national processes and misfortunes are natural and legitimate."<sup>95</sup> Cohen refuses to limit the theoretical argument merely to approximate to a given reality but argues that it should project a potential state of things that could become real under ideal conditions. This ideality consists for Cohen in a state that would allow the inherent racial characteristics of any nation to develop fully. A racial ideal should serve as the natural and legitimate touchstone for national politics. Cohen adds: "Treitschke did not say: the Jews are Semites and are therefore not allowed to retain German citizenship, but he said the opposite," namely, he urged them to become more German rather than less.

Cohen rejects Lazarus's rejection of racialism as "vulgar materialism"

and argues that the concept of race is compatible with an overall idealist conception: “Whoever appreciates and loves the bodily substance [leibliche Substanz] of a national soul [Volksseele] in and for its particularity, is not therefore a materialist.” With this remark, Cohen implies that Lazarus’s conception is one-sidedly idealist, while for Cohen (arguing dialectically) a soul appears to be necessarily linked to a material substratum. The bodily equivalent of the “national soul” is the “racial substance.” Cohen adds that “whoever loves his nation with natural spontaneous love does not have to fear shriveling [verschrumpfen] into a narrow-hearted cosmopolitan [engerherzigen Weltbürger].” He also takes issue with Lazarus’s formulation that “we aim at a Germany that is free of any felony against received traditions as well as against universal human principles [allgemeine menschheitliche Prinzipien].”<sup>96</sup> Cohen rejects both sides of this statement: developing and extending traditions is more important than keeping “received” ones, and the admonition to respect “universal human principles” is out of place: “It is not necessary to recommend this advice too dearly to the hearts of us Jews; if this was only possible to say without ridiculous embarrassment and clumsy indiscreet intrusiveness, I should suggest that spontaneous cultivation of pure Germany [naturwüchsige Pflege des puren Deutschthums] would be to the benefit of all of us.” “As we are human beings,” we “feel and think differently from what Lazarus suggests.” Cohen asserts that “we have to love our nation” not because it is “worth loving” but “*because it is our nation*.”<sup>97</sup> “What would the English or French Jews say,” he asks sarcastically, if the German Jews loved Germany (in Lazarus’s words) “because we think that it struggles most fervently for the fulfillment of a universally human ideal”? Cohen rejects universalistic and liberal rationalizations of patriotic love—such as those advocated by Lazarus—and asserts straightforwardly: “We all love our nation because it is our maternal soil [Mutterboden], because we love our home [Heimath], because we consider Palestine worth at best a journey; because in the fatherland our German mother tongue is spoken: that first sound I ever made, my sweet first mother-word!”<sup>98</sup> Because we are just humans, and every human being wants to have a fatherland.”<sup>99</sup> Cohen rejects Lazarus’s search for good, rational, and universalistic reasons

to love one's particular nation and puts forward the notion that patriotic attachment is in itself reason enough, as it is an anthropological universal.<sup>100</sup> In an almost ironic sense, there is a rationalist edge in Cohen's rejection of rationalizing one's patriotism: unlike Lazarus, Cohen looks for a categorically universal concept of patriotic love. If all members of all nations in the world tried to find equally good and convincing reasons for loving their respective nations, trouble would be looming. The members of a nation that can reasonably claim, for example, "that it struggles most fervently for the fulfillment of a universally human ideal" (as Lazarus suggests is the case with the Germans) may easily feel superior to the members of a nation that can only claim that it is good at cooking or, let's say, football. Except within a strictly relativistic framework (which neither Cohen nor Lazarus embraces) there would inevitably be a hierarchy of good or not-so-good reasons for loving one's country. Some nations must be more worth loving than others, an inevitable source of conflict. Cohen's argument implies that being proud of striving for particularly universalist ideals actually brings in particularism through the back door. Patriotism without specific reasons is in this sense less dangerous than an "enlightened" patriotism that has learned how to enroll the concept of "humanity" in its services. This element of Cohen's rejection of Lazarus's idealism is almost a "critique of ideology."<sup>101</sup>

Cohen demands that German Jewry's "evil, slippery ambivalence" about patriotism "be rooted out completely."<sup>102</sup> Together with the religious Jewish question (the converging of Protestant Christianity and Judaism to the "purer form of religion"), the racial question ("insofar as it is a question at all that poses itself to human consideration") will solve itself automatically.<sup>103</sup> Cohen admonishes the Jews not to be deceived by the "malicious or obscure" character of the antisemitic attack into a general rejection of the category of "race": "We have to acknowledge that the racial instinct is not at all straightforward barbarism, but it is a natural, nationally legitimate desire. It only becomes barbarism when it degenerates into the political or national exclusion of those fellow citizens who do not have, nor want to have, another fatherland. In itself, it is a spontaneous and good psychological motive, and indeed it can be developed into a useful corrective and

regulative that is worth considering; never, though, must it be given validity as a moral norm.”<sup>104</sup> The “racial instinct” is for Cohen an aspect of the general human longing to belong to a nation. The thrust of his argument is that the German Jews should channel this longing unequivocally into the desire to become Germans by any means. He claims that “all of us wish we simply had the German, the Germanic appearance.” Therefore it is just a matter of time until physical assimilation will have happened. The important point, however, is that “it has to become the most holy of desires to tune into the natural tone of the people with whom we want to amalgamate.”<sup>105</sup> The Jews are therefore obliged to strive to rid themselves of any peculiarities: “If we take pride in our tribe as a constant feature of our living religion, this must under no sentimental excuse—*except for defense*—be mistaken for an innocent private obsession [Privatliebhaberei]. National ambivalence [Doppelgefühl] is not only an immoral, but an impossible thing.”<sup>106</sup> Cohen asserts that the reprehensible “miscreation”<sup>107</sup> of national “ambivalence” is the exclusive product of a “transitional period in which even the best of the Jews still count just for a Jew.”<sup>108</sup> In other words, it is nothing but an indication that surrounding society has not yet completely conceded emancipation. Cohen admits that the necessity of defense justifies temporary expressions of “tribal” attachment, but the temptation has to be resisted “to turn the excitement of the time of defense into a permanent attitude for the time of peace.” The point is not to let this temporary necessity seriously interrupt the process of assimilation, but to keep in mind that “complete and unconditional Germanization [rückhaltlose, unbedingte deutsche Naturalisierung] in no way inhibits Israelitic religion.” Cohen accepts Lazarus’s claim that “true culture” lies in “diversity” (adding that universal human unity is equally important) but claims that this is only so “from a bird’s-eye view.” For “human beings from blood and flesh, who want to found a state down here” seeking “to unite themselves into a unity of state and people [zu einer Staats-und Volkseinheit],” diversity might be an “illicit burden [unerlaubte . . . Zumuthung].” Cohen contrasts “humanity” and its “ends,” which are mere “concepts of philosophy of history,” with “national unity [Volkseinheit],” which is “a moral task [sittliche Aufgabe].”<sup>109</sup> Aiming toward ever more

intense “unity of being and consciousness” is a “duty.” On these grounds, he rejects Lazarus’s notion that it is a “permanent task of the Jews” to take part in all particular national cultures as a distinct element promoting universalism. The only task of the Jews is, according to Cohen, “the preservation of monotheism” until the “purer form of Christianity” has been attained. “For diversities other than this one, I have no time and I cannot grant asylum. A people’s civilization is national, or at least aims at being national. Within a national community there can be individual morality, but no particular morality is desirable that is embodied in any religious groups or sects.”<sup>110</sup> Cohen insists that the Jews should react to the antisemitic attack without deviating from the path of assimilation.<sup>111</sup> Once legal emancipation has been fully translated into respective administrative policy, “odd behavior [Anstössigkeiten des Benehmens]” will gradually disappear and render the question of “race” irrelevant. Whether or not one “sticks to a certain particularity of mores,” what matters first of all are emancipation and, more generally, the political and state sphere:<sup>112</sup>

For belonging to a state is not something external or mundane; it demands the whole innermost man. One has to love its institutions as one loves those of religion; . . . service to one’s state must count as holy, like service to God.<sup>113</sup> But let the natural traits of the nation—love of which lives in you no less [than in gentile Germans] as soon as your cultural consciousness has reached maturity—grow and develop without self-censure or restraint<sup>114</sup> in all aspects of your way of life—in the nation’s pleasures as well as its warfare. Even when you maintain your belief in positive difference, you must not lose sight of the fact that the foundations of your religiosity oblige you to hope and struggle for amalgamation into national unity [Volksgemeinschaft] with the Christians.<sup>115</sup>

Differences of positive religion are to be tolerated, but they are irrelevant in social and political matters. Religiosity in a more fundamental and general sense, which is—or should be—shared by Jews and Christians alike, is the spiritual foundation of the “ethical” order of the state. As his drawing a parallel between state service and service to God suggests, Cohen’s (neo-Kantian) ethical-religious approach gives to the state a spiritual halo no

less than Treitschke's approach does. Although Cohen is explicit about the disgust he feels for Treitschke's ideas, the demand for the Jews "to become Germans" has a strong supporter in Cohen.

### The Defense of German Nationality against Jewification

In his response to Lazarus, Naudh reminds Lazarus that he "could have learned" from Hegel's *Philosophy of History* that "religion stands in the closest connection with the principle of the state: *the concept of God is the general foundation of a people*." He could also have learned this from the disintegration of European Turkey, where a population using the same language cannot live within the same state because some are Muslims and the others are Christians."<sup>116</sup>

Naudh reflects on the relation of church and state in the specific context of modern—national—society: "Since nationality has come back to life within the peoples, the talk about the separation of state and church has lost its meaning."<sup>117</sup> He seems to imply that the separation of church and state had a meaning as long as "nationality" was not the hegemonic principle of social cohesion. Having Germany in mind, he might refer here to the time from the Reformation until 1871. Naudh adds that "for us, anyway" (i.e., today), all Christian denominations have "the essence of Christianity" in common, implying that this has not necessarily always been so.

Religion is the supreme expression of the civilization [Sittlichkeit] of a people and God is the embodiment of its consciousness of right. . . . Right, mores and religion originate from the same source. . . . Church and state are not hostile to each other but exert the same task in different spheres. In the sphere of the state lie the deeds: these, though, have first been thoughts and had to negotiate with mind and conscience, which lie in the sphere of the church. It is better and safer that the church educates conscience than that the state punishes deeds. The church does work in advance of the state in the world of thoughts, while the state merely needs to catch up with what might have escaped the church.<sup>118</sup>

Naudh makes here a statement on the relation of state and (national and religious) culture that is crucial to the debate. For him, church and state

differ in the functions they exert in society, but together with *Sitte* (morality) and *Rechtsbewusstsein* (consciousness of right) they emanate from the same source. Naudh seems to suggest that *Sitte* and *Recht* (right) are not cosmopolitan categories (as in Kant) but emanate from the *Volkgeist* (the general national character), a notion that reflects influences from Burke, Savigny, romanticism, and the historicism of the Historische Rechtsschule (Historical School of Law). Although arguing for the common origin of church and state, Naudh is not at all a religious thinker. For individuals with a “will to freedom,” he writes, the church is neither a good nor a bad thing but simply irrelevant. For society as a whole, however, it is relevant as a complement to the state that integrates “thoughts” and “deeds.” Naudh argues that “the church rules only those who need it” and that “the mere will to freedom” as well as “the consciousness of not needing it anymore” are sufficient for liberating oneself from it.<sup>119</sup> One does not have to fight the church: one either needs it or one ignores it (on the individual level). Naudh concludes that those who choose to fight the church must be motivated either by the intention “to replace one church with another church” or by “profane secret agendas.” This is an attack on the liberals who fought the influence of the church on the state: what they wanted, according to Naudh, was to replace the synagogue with the church. “For these reasons we have to agree completely when Herr von Treitschke says, ‘the Jews are our misfortune,’ but we can only regret that he has not much earlier been engaged with us in the attempt to prevent this misfortune.”<sup>120</sup> Naudh suggests that “nationality and liberalism are strict opposites” and considers the name of the National Liberal Party “paradoxical.” He suggests that this party was too dependent on the approval of the Jewish press and so “it had to end as a sacrificial animal on the altar of Judaism.” National Liberalism did not understand that the equal participation of “two elements of such different culture [Sittlichkeit] as the Germans and the Jews” would necessarily prevent the “healthy development of a state”: “Political freedom can only be national. It can only mean the freedom of a people to live and to develop according to its natural characteristics.”<sup>121</sup> Naudh suggests that “the Jews” dragged the National Liberal Party into the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf*



because the doctrine of the separation of state and church was instrumental in removing the most important obstacle for their achieving hegemony. “Church influence on the state,” he argues, is “the best protection for the Germans,” while the separation of state and church actually meant making the state Jewish.<sup>122</sup>

When Naudh mentions “natural characteristics” he understands these, differing from Treitschke and the other interlocutors, in an unequivocally racial sense. Naudh argues, for example, that the lack of a sense of “honor” that gives the Jews an advantage in competition with Aryans in civil society is grounded in their physical “organization,” which has been kept identical through millennia of “in-breeding.” He also rejects Treitschke’s notion that intermarriage was one possible strategy to achieve “amalgamation”: “Products of racial mixing would not share the characteristics of both parents to equal degree, but would be predominantly Jewish by far. Experience from animal breeding shows without doubt that constancy and hereditary predominance are directly relational to the duration of how long a race has propagated through pure in-breeding.”<sup>123</sup> In any case, Naudh finds that intermarriage on a larger scale is unlikely. Only a very poor “German girl” would be able to overcome the moral repulsion at the “unnatural obscenity” of marrying a Jew. Because the Jews regard marriage—like everything else—as a mere matter of money, no (male) Jew would be interested in a poor German girl.<sup>124</sup> The likelihood of the reverse case—an impoverished German man marrying a rich Jewish woman—is negligible, and apart from that there are only some “rare cases of pathological deviation.” Naudh adopts the discourse of “race” to explain and “naturalize” phenomena that he holds can be observed in society (specifically Jewish economic practices and a generic “disgust” of Christian Germans for Jews), while Treitschke claims to have observed the same phenomena without explicitly adopting the terminology of “race.”

On the other main topic discussed by Naudh, his dissent seems also to be one of degree rather than of principle: while both Treitschke and his liberal critics stick to the quintessential liberal principle of the separation of church and state, they all—including Naudh—agree on the necessity for some kind of cultural-moral cohesion that underpins the state while not

being part of the state: national culture. Further, everyone—including the Jewish authors—seems to agree that this culture is—in the German case—more or less Christian. While Naudh differs in emphasizing the common origin of state and religion in national character and its *Sittlichkeit* (civil culture providing moral norms), his notion of a division of labor between state and church is not incompatible with the conceptions held by Treitschke as well as his critics. The partly critical and partly affirmative way Naudh relates to Treitschke also mirrors that of some of the other contributors. Like Breßlau,<sup>125</sup> Naudh expresses the hope that Treitschke will recognize where the “true nature” of his overall political framework is rooted. However, while Breßlau and others oppose liberal patriotism to illiberal nationalism, Naudh claims that nationalism is incompatible with liberalism and denies any consistency to the patriotic, National Liberal argument. For Naudh, religion is constitutive (although not exclusively) of national culture to such an extent that religious difference by necessity undermines national unity and the viability of the national state. Although all the liberal contributors to the Dispute see the national state as rooted in some form of national culture, they tend to accord less relevance to religion in this context. Naudh challenges this assumption and claims that the national community cannot tolerate contradictions within national culture. He implies that the mistaken liberal belief that minor contradictions would not undermine the nation is motivated by the particularist interests of a small, selfish section of society: the “ethno-class” of the capitalists/Jews who stand behind the liberal creed.<sup>126</sup>

### The Costs and the Pains of Becoming a Nation

For Theodor Mommsen the nation has been created by “the sentiment of the larger community,”<sup>127</sup> although there might still remain a feeling of “closer sympathy” (based on memories and feelings) toward the “so-called closer compatriots” on the level of “the various German tribes [Stämme].” The nation is based on solidarity between and “in a certain sense, amalgamation” of those tribes. The “diversity” of their skills and characteristics should be a cause of enjoyment and is also functional for the necessities of a large state.

Mommsen implies that “the status of the Jews within our people” is not essentially different “from that of the Saxons or Pomeranians.”

Mommsen quotes the French anthropologist Jean Louis Armand Quatrefages, who had argued that only some central German states were of mainly Germanic descent, while the Prussians, for example, were mainly Slavonic.<sup>128</sup> This difference has become irrelevant, says Mommsen, once they have marched together on the battlefield: “Anybody who is really familiar with history will know that transformation of the nationality—a gradual development with numerous and manifold transitions—is not a rarity. Historically as well as practically only the living is everywhere in the right. Just as the descendants of the French colony in Berlin are by no means Frenchmen born in Germany, so their Jewish compatriots are nothing less than Germans.”<sup>129</sup> In this paragraph Mommsen formulates a general historical observation (nationality is not a stable phenomenon but changes in the course of historical development), backs it up with a more general aphorism (“Historisch wie praktisch hat eben überall nur der Lebende Recht”),<sup>130</sup> and gives two historical examples: the French colony in Berlin and the German Jews. He argues that the present is not determined, nor can it be validated, by the past. The particularisms of the past have to disappear and give way to the new social form, the patriotic order that is “in the right” against the residues of the past because it is constituted by “the living” and sails with the winds of progress and historical dynamic. Mommsen’s point is that the origins of a group of persons do not and cannot—or rather, ought not—determine the present status of its members. As this is true—by definition—of the *legal* status of citizens, he formulates here a fundamental element of liberal thought. However, the formulation omits that the actual social status of the empirical individual in society is—to a greater or lesser extent—indeed determined by the past: society is as much the present as it is the past in crystallized form. In the structures as well as the specific dynamics that together constitute society, the past does exert some degree of power over the present; even the particular achievements, talents, or productivity of a (present) individual owe more to the totality of achievements and sufferings that have happened in the past than the individual might be able

to realize. On closer inspection, Mommsen's throwaway remark reveals a crucial paradox of his (i.e., the liberal) concept of history and the nation. The new order—the present social order as well as the present form of state—preserves the memory that it has been born out of the struggle against the particularisms and injustices of the old order, pointing to the latter's historicity. At the same time, however, the order that rules in the present claims to be “in the right” not only against the past (“historically”) but also against competing claims in the present (“practically”). This sentence is highly ideological in the strong sense of the word: not only is the meaning of the word *praktisch* obscure, but it would be difficult to say who exactly “*der Lebende*” is. In reality, there are many different *Lebende*, and they all claim to be “in the right.” A singular and non-antagonistic subject who is “in the right” is a phantasmagoria: it can only be understood within the context of the bourgeois imagination that finds bourgeois society exists as a perfect (natural, as it were) “equilibrium.” (In a bourgeois society undistorted by troublemakers, including socialists, Jews, monks, particularists, suffragettes, etc., the only remaining form of conflict would be “competition,” which in the classless society of burghers is a peaceful mechanism that merely helps distribute the wealth that has been produced collectively by all productive members of society in harmonious unity. This is the liberal utopia.) This implication of Mommsen's conception of history is crucial to his view of Jewishness as particularism: it ought to disappear just as much as “Saxonianism” is disappearing. The question needed to be raised whether the anachronistic element, the remainder marginalized by progress, may not to some extent be in the right against the victorious present, if only as a reminder of the historicity of the present and its finite, contingent character. An alternative concept of history that allows the defeated of the past to be “in the right” and that throws light on the cynicism of Mommsen's “positivist” (or “presentist”) remark is the driving force of the famous poem by Ferdinand Freiligrath from July 1848, “Die Todten an die Lebenden” (The Dead to the Living), in which the revolutionaries who had been shot on the Berlin barricades in March 1848 speak to those who survived them.<sup>131</sup> Freiligrath makes very clear that the dead are “in the right” against those who (between April and July

1848) squandered the historical chance, opened up by the revolutionaries, to topple the Prussian monarchy.<sup>132</sup>

After this programmatic statement, Mommsen discusses the situation of Jewry in modern as opposed to ancient times. The “essential difference” is that “the old world did not know what we call today the national state”: “In antiquity one did not conceive of the citizenry as homogeneous and roughly coextensive with linguistic area, the concept that is now fundamental to any politics.”<sup>133</sup> Because of the non-national character of the state in antiquity, the Jews managed to maintain “a certain national identity [nationale Geschlossenheit]” “even beyond the demise of their state.”<sup>134</sup> Although they tended to use the prevailing world languages and were immersed in the respectively valid standard of education and culture, their best writers were “totally Jewish, conscious representatives of Jewry.”<sup>135</sup> Mommsen argues that such a phenomenon does not exist anymore: “All eminent works created by Jews in modern times are of the culture of the nation, of which this particular Jew is a member. . . . [T]he German Israelite stands in the middle of German literary life just as the English Israelite in the middle of the English one.” He concedes that Graetz’s “Talmudic history scribblings [talmudistische Geschichtsschreiberei]” are an exception, but they are marginal to Jewish literary life.

The failure to grasp the difference between modern and ancient conceptions of state, nationality, and culture is “the real location of that delusion which recently has gripped the masses” and of which Treitschke is the “prophet.” “What does it mean that he [Treitschke] demands that our Jewish compatriots become Germans? They are Germans already, just as I am, and just as he is. He may be more virtuous than they are; but do virtues make a German?” Mommsen argues that even if certain defects were actual characteristics of fellow citizens “of this or that category,” this would not warrant “removing them from the ranks of the Germans.”<sup>136</sup> He stresses that “it must not at all be denied” that the peculiarities of “the persons of Jewish descent living among us” are stronger than “those of other tribes and even nations.”<sup>137</sup> This is a result of “the millennial suppression of German Semites by German Christians,” which has been “equally pernicious for either side”—although Jew-hatred

may have at the same time also provoked and developed the talents of German Jews. Mommsen rejects both the cult and the fear of the Jews, which he sees as reciprocal.<sup>138</sup> Both are “most simple-minded confusions.” In the case of the Jews, as elsewhere, “light and shadow are mixed.”

Central to Mommsen’s argument is his reappropriation of a formulation famously coined by him in his *Römische Geschichte* which Treitschke had quoted in his most recent statement: “Without doubt the Jews are an element of tribal decomposition in Germany just as they once were an element of national decomposition in the Roman state. This is why in the German capital, where the tribes actually mingle more thoroughly than anywhere else, the Jews hold a position for which they are envied in other places.”<sup>139</sup> Mommsen likens “national decomposition”—to which the Jews contributed in the Roman Empire—to “tribal decomposition”—to which the Jews now contribute in the German Empire. The building of Rome, which was not a nation-state, was based on the decomposition of nations; the building of Germany, which is a nation-state, is based on the decomposition of tribes. “Processes of decomposition are often necessary, but they are never pleasant.” Mommsen proceeds here to the key statement of his argument:

I am not so estranged from my homeland, however, that I would not painfully feel [the loss of] something I used to have and that my children will miss. But the happiness of children and the pride of men [Kinderglück und Männerstolz] do not go together. A certain amount of mutual grinding down [Abschleifen] [of their peculiarities] on the part of the tribes is demanded unconditionally by the current situation, i.e., the formation of a German nationality that is not identical with any particular tribe [Landsmannschaft]. The big cities, and first of all Berlin, are its natural protagonists. I do not consider it at all a misfortune that the Jews have been active in this direction for generations. It is my opinion that Providence, much more than Herr Stöcker, has understood very well why a few percent of Israel had to be added to form the Germanic metal.<sup>140</sup>

Mommsen formulates here a programmatic view of the process of nation building, and in this framework he defines the role of the Jews. He invokes the transition from tribal particularism to national statehood as a necessary

and welcome historical process involving both gain and loss. On the side of loss is the “happiness of children”; on the side of gain is the “pride of men.” This characterizes the nation-building process as one of maturing and growing up. *Männerstolz*, the “pride of men,” underlines that this is imagined as a male affair. The trope of “growing up” presents the process as natural and led by objective, not arbitrary, forces and legitimizes the loss of the “happiness of children.” A second element of the imagery is taken from the productive processes of handicraft or industry. Like fine wooden furniture, the tribes have to “grind down” their edges and the rough surfaces of their particularity; like a solid metal, they have to be smelted and amalgamated in a determinate ratio. Only as an ironic aside against the clerical Jew-baiter Stöcker does Mommsen refer to “Providence” as the subject of this process: the one who does the smelting and who knows the correct formula. In seriousness, the liberal historian would not need “divine Providence” to refer to—the objectivity of the historical process itself is authority enough.<sup>141</sup>

The notion of the loss of the “happiness of children” connects the artisanal metaphor of the “grinding down” to the notion of “growing up.” It is implied that growing up is a process of adaptation and subordination to an adult world. The grown-up man is allowed—perhaps even expected—to have melancholy and nostalgic feelings about the lost happiness of childhood, but these feelings must be mastered for the greater benefit of adult manhood. The building of the nation is imagined as the growing up of a boy: the grinding down of the childish particularities of the tribes “is demanded unconditionally by the current situation.” The pre-national (tribal) memory has to be mastered and sublimated to regional folklore. The man (and likewise, the nation) who is not able to control and sublimate his (and likewise, its) tribal memory and master his (its) melancholia reveals his (its) immaturity. He will not be able to hold his own in the modern world. As for the Jewish question, the conclusion is: it might be “painful,” but a few percent of Jews have to be in that national melting pot to help make that German metal nice and strong.

In his response to Mommsen, Treitschke holds that the Jews promoted “homeless cosmopolitanism [heimathloses Weltbürgerthum]” and rejects

Mommsen's claim that the Jewish contribution to the "decomposition of the German tribes" was beneficial to the process of German nation building. Those "elements of Jewry" who "do what they can to destroy the Germans' national pride and pleasure in the fatherland" are "hostile to all German being."<sup>142</sup> Treitschke also reaffirms his view that religion mattered in the political debate. While Mommsen—according to Treitschke—disregards the relevance of religious difference, Treitschke states that "maturing civilization will lead our deeply religious people back to purer and stronger ecclesiastical life." Treitschke sees therefore polemics by Jews against Christian theology as "attacks on the foundations of our culture [Gesittung]."<sup>143</sup>

The main point in Treitschke's response is that Mommsen confirmed Treitschke's central contention: "I have acknowledged that many of our Jewish fellow citizens long ago became good Germans, and I have merely regretted that others still keep themselves principally in a distance from our national life. Mommsen responded: 'the Jews are Germans as much as he and me,' but then proceeds emphasizing that some of these 'Germans' fancy themselves in a national-Jewish segregation [Sonderleben]. Alas, he says in other words exactly the same as what I say. I believe, though, that my expression was more accurate."<sup>144</sup> Since Mommsen—according to Treitschke—does not disagree in substance, Treitschke asserts that Mommsen merely "finds my intervention in the Jewish question inopportune." However, articulating freely "a social problem that all the world feels to exist" is more appropriate than politely keeping silent about it.

Treitschke's strategy of defense against Mommsen consists of three elements. First, he shows that Mommsen's argument is inconsistent in itself. He exploits Mommsen's failure to distinguish clearly enough a normative claim to legal equality from an account of actual (sociocultural) equality or difference, while both Treitschke and Mommsen presuppose that legal equality would or should reflect (or rather, be a reward for) actual (sociocultural) equality. Second, Treitschke points out disagreement on the relevance of religion for nation building and on the actual distribution of power between Jewish and Christian Germans. Here he merely repeats unwarranted claims about the power of the Jews. Third, Treitschke claims



that he and Mommsen agree in substance while his own position differs merely in being more straightforward and honest than Mommsen's. Playing down the disagreements, he reduces the thrust of Mommsen's criticism to the tactical question of whether or not Treitschke's intervention has been "opportune." The overall effect of Treitschke's response is the implication that Mommsen lacks the courage of his opinions.

In this reply, the two faces of Treitschke's attitude are as clearly pronounced as in his original contribution: a nationalism that demands complete social and cultural assimilation is intertwined with a phantasmagoric vision of a deeply hostile and immensely powerful Judenthum. The way the latter is pictured makes assimilation appear neither possible nor really desirable; these two basic elements of Treitschke's position constitute an unresolvable contradiction.

### The Eternal Hatred of the Jews

One important element of Treitschke's construction of an unchanging (i.e., quasi-racial) Jewish identity is the longevity of the Jews' persecution. The defenders of Jewish emancipation have conversely tended to deny that there is such a thing as an "eternal" Jew-hatred. Treitschke states that "since Tacitus once complained about the *odium generis humani*" there has always been and there will always be "an abyss between occidental and Semitic being [Wesen]," and some Jews will always be merely "German-speaking Orientals."<sup>145</sup> Assimilation will never be complete. Any claim about the "eternal" character of an "abyss" between Jews and non-Jews obviously stands and falls with the validity of references to authorities from past times. Therefore, several respondents found the Tacitus quote worth discussing in some detail. Graetz and Cassel point out that Tacitus wrote that the Christians, not the Jews, had been "convicted of hate of the human species" under Nero.<sup>146</sup> Cassel suggests that Treitschke might have mixed up *Annales* 15.44 with book 5 of *Historiae*, which has a much more clearly anti-Jewish tendency.<sup>147</sup> Naudh, who claims an uninterrupted continuity of "Jew-baiting"<sup>148</sup> from Exodus through classical and medieval to modern times, also quotes a passage from *Historiae* (5,8) as evidence of Tacitus's anti-Jewish attitude.<sup>149</sup> In his response

to Graetz, Treitschke reasserts his view that the very long history of anti-Jewish attitudes rules out the possibility of a “complete amalgamation of Jewry and the occidental peoples.”<sup>150</sup> He asserts that the Romans at Tacitus’s time saw the Christians as just another Jewish sect: the Christians were accused of “hate of the human species” as Jews. Roman anti-Christianism represented nothing but a specific case of anti-Judaism.<sup>151</sup> Treitschke claims that “almost all writers of late antiquity” agreed in their “hatred of Jews”<sup>152</sup> and concludes:

Whoever has at least an elementary grasp of our discipline must concede straightaway: it is totally inconceivable that a struggle of two thousand years should know only cruelty, tyranny, greed on one side, on the other side only suffering innocence. The question cannot be denied: why did so many noble and highly gifted nations vent the base and—I do not avoid the word—diabolical drives slumbering in the depths of their souls exclusively on the Jewish people? The answer is simple. Since its dispersion over the whole of the world, Jewry existed in an unresolvable inner contradiction; it suffered the tragic fate of a nation without state. The Jews always wanted to live under the protection of Occidental laws, take advantage of the busyness of the Occident and yet claim to be a strictly separate nation. Such an attitude always had to provoke new struggles because it stands in such fierce contradiction to the hard necessity of the unity of the state [zu der harten Notwendigkeit der Staatseinheit].<sup>153</sup>

Treitschke states that “cruelty, tyranny, greed” cannot be the sole motivations of an (allegedly) two-thousand-year-long struggle: the “other side” involved in this history cannot be innocent. He takes for granted that there has been a continuous “struggle” between two “sides” whose identity through history has been uninterrupted. Treitschke presupposes “occidental history” as one continuing historical process<sup>154</sup> whose main protagonist—“the occidental peoples”—faces an eternally unchanging enemy, “the Jews.”<sup>155</sup> He does not merely state that hatred of the Jews has “always been there” but also gives what he thinks is the reason: Jewry suffered for two thousand years “the tragic fate of a nation without state,” an account that seems taken from Treitschke’s own historical experience.<sup>156</sup> Being a “nation without state,” the Jews had to

preserve their distinctiveness in terms of religion and culture, which had to bring them into “fierce contradiction to the hard necessity of the unity of the state.” It is telling that Treitschke, who puts great emphasis on the Christian character of the German nation, sides with Tacitus—a representative of Roman imperial *raison d’état*—against the persecuted Christians and excuses the imperial point of view with the assumption that the Romans might have seen just another Jewish sect in the Christians. Treitschke could not declare more explicitly whose side he is on and why: the decisive category is “the hard necessity of the unity of the state.”

In his second reply, Graetz insists that Tacitus had referred exclusively to Christians, not to Jews. He argues that in Nero’s time, the Christians in Rome were “almost exclusively Gentile Christians,” that is, converted Greeks and Romans rather than from ethnic Jewish background.<sup>157</sup> Jews at the time were not generally “unruly,” while actually many loyal Romans practiced Judaism, which therefore was not an “ethnic” but a religious category. Graetz concludes that Treitschke’s “drawing ethnographic conclusions from [single] ill-disposed sentences by Roman writers is rather unhistorical.”<sup>158</sup> Graetz’s rebuke does, however, not quite get to Treitschke’s point. Treitschke had quoted Tacitus as evidence that writers in classical antiquity generally despised the Jews, which is part of his “no smoke without fire” type of argument: because the Jews have been persecuted for such a long time, there must be a reason for it and therefore they should continue to be viewed with suspicion. However, while Graetz’s response refers to how things actually were, Treitschke’s argument was on how Tacitus saw them. In the light of the further sources Graetz is quoting, Josephus and Dio Cassius, it looks like Graetz is probably right on the historical facts, but Treitschke seems to be right on reading an anti-Jewish sentiment in Tacitus (although wrong on exactly what kind of anti-Jewish sentiment that was).

Cassel follows a completely different strategy in his reply. Brushing aside the historiographical subtleties, he argues that everything Tacitus held against the Jews was just as true of the Christians, no matter what Tacitus actually intended to say. He argues that Jews and Christians found themselves on the same side opposed to imperial arrogance then and they should acknowledge

that now. He argues that “thanks to God” the “Semitism” of the apostle Paul has brought “all the sins of the Orient to Rome”<sup>159</sup> so that “the Jordan now flows into the Tiber.” While Treitschke identifies with Tacitus’s invocation of imperial *raison d’état*, Cassel suggests an alliance of Mosaic Law and apostolic teachings against a “pagan-modern frenzy of licentiousness [heidnisch-modernen Unzuchtstaumel].”<sup>160</sup>

### The Relationship between Christian and Jewish Religion

Treitschke discusses religion almost exclusively under the aspect of its relevance for the state. Only when Lazarus and Cohen use what they see as the close affinity between Judaism and Christianity as evidence for the cultural affinity between German Christians and Jews does Treitschke respond with some remarks on the issue. However, even these remarks are more of historical than of theological character.

Lazarus, however, argues in a long and detailed scholarly discussion that Christianity is both historically and theologically closely related to Judaism and that there is a close affinity between Judaism and the concept of the modern state. The starting point for both strands of his argument is the destruction of the Temple, the “enormous defeat” of the Jewish people.<sup>161</sup> The Jews were lifted “out of the ashes of the Temple on Zion” by a “Phoenix” which was the “ideal concept of humanity” of Christian religion as first formulated by its Jewish founders.<sup>162</sup> What distinguished the Christians among other groups of Jewry was that they “deliberately withdrew from the [Jewish] national struggle” and thus arrived at a position where they were able to reformulate the original Jewish concepts of monotheism and of the unity of a single humanity (expressed in the image of one universal flock led by one shepherd). These two central motives that are common to Judaism and Christianity are also pivotal to the Jews’ relation to the state (especially the modern state). Lazarus gives a long quote from declarations agreed on by the first and second Israelitic synods.<sup>163</sup> These stress that Judaism respects and embraces the “principles of the new society and the constitutional state” and emphasizes that they go back to the same universalist principles of humanity and equality.<sup>164</sup> The second synod emphasized

that “the consciousness of humanity as a whole” is increasingly filled by “true knowledge of God” and “pure morality.” It interpreted these as an approximation to the aims that always have led Judaism on its path through history.<sup>165</sup> Lazarus rejects Christian polemics against the Talmud—he mentions Eisenmenger, Pfefferkorn, and Rohling—as misleading because they one-sidedly overemphasize the formalistic characteristics of the Talmudic literature and ignore that there is now a “new Rabbinism” that has overcome many defects of the old one.<sup>166</sup> Lazarus points out that a mother does not have to die “after she has given birth to a child,” a metaphor for his rejection of a mechanistic concept of historical progress according to which an older historical form was not legitimized to continue to exist alongside a newer historical form.<sup>167</sup> In the same mold, Judaism ought to continue to exist, and without even being reduced to its motherly function to remind Christianity that it is not yet what it might or should become, to “advance the education of Christianity through its criticism.”<sup>168</sup> Lazarus argues that it is a “genuinely Christian conviction” that Jews are not inferior.<sup>169</sup> To support this claim, he quotes several long passages from Luther’s writings. Luther’s later anti-Jewish statements can be explained, he writes, by his disappointment about the Jews not converting to the “purified” religion of the Reformation.<sup>170</sup>

Against the concept of a close affinity between Judaism and Christianity, Treitschke holds that after “the Jews crucified Jesus,” Christianity “overcame” Judaism: “Every young spiritual power that is victorious against an older one is itself the offspring of its adversary. The greatness of the Christian doctrine that originated from a Semitic people lies in its having overcome Semitism and having become the universal church [Weltkirche].”<sup>171</sup> “Semitism” is here almost a synonym for ethnic particularism. Treitschke concedes that Christianity originated from Judaism but insists that Christianity’s specific identity lies in its difference from the defeated precursor—whom it must continue to fight in case it should recover. Treitschke argues in not a theological but a secular historical-philosophical way. His interest is less with the actual content of the two religions than with Judaism and Christianity as “spiritual powers,” that is, as historical agents in a vaguely Hegelian sense.

He does not see continuity between Judaism and Christianity but rather a life-and-death struggle and the overcoming of the former by the latter. While his view has the merit of taking the actuality of the Christian-Jewish conflict more into account than, for example, Cassel's integrative theology seems to do, Treitschke simply takes the positivity of historical victory as evidence of truth, reason, and legitimacy.<sup>172</sup>

Treitschke's view of antagonism and rupture between Judaism and Christianity is shared by Naudh, who reformulates it in a language that includes the rhetoric of "race" as well as a socioeconomic dimension. Naudh argues that it was a "mistake" of Christianity to refer to "the Jewish legend," as if a historically independent actor "Christianity" had existed then and had arbitrarily chosen to "refer to" some aspects of Judaism. Naudh seems to see the actual content of religion as consisting of "legends" that are chosen by movements which in turn are essentially socioeconomic in nature.<sup>173</sup> He denies the originality of central aspects of Judaism: according to him, not even monotheism was specifically Jewish but was generally Mediterranean. While Moses "brought his God from Egypt," monotheistic elements could even be found in the concept of "fate," as, for example, in the *Iliad*.<sup>174</sup> The essential difference between Judaism and Christianity became apparent in the course of the latter's evolution: Christianity mostly "developed within the peoples of the Aryan family," among whom he includes Greeks, Romans, Celts, and Germanic and Slavonic peoples. He adds that within these peoples, Christianity actually is more pervasive than the Christian church, because the church carries too much "Jewish ballast": he names fanaticism and intolerance as the aftereffects of the Jewish influence on the church. Nevertheless, despite the church, Christianity is the "expression of Aryan conscience and idealism" while it never really managed to "win over" the Jews.

Among all contributors, Cohen pays the most attention to the actual content of the two religions.<sup>175</sup> He writes that Treitschke's position most significantly differs from other anti-Jewish texts in having thrown up (again) the issue of religion.<sup>176</sup> The thrust of Cohen's argument is the assertion of commonality between "Israelites" and Christians, while rejecting at the same time the pressure on the former to convert. He relates that the (anti-

Catholic) *Kulturkampf* had been criticized for lacking in “positive religious thought” and asserts the necessity to discuss religion—in its own terms—in the context of national history.<sup>177</sup> He stresses that “the German people” has been and will remain “a religious one” and that “national history” since the sixteenth century had been driven by the “religious spirit of the German people.” The pivot of Cohen’s argument is his opposition of two alternative pairs of concepts: “religions” versus “denominations [Konfessionen]” (as used by Treitschke), and “religion” versus “forms of religion [Glaubensarten]” (as used by Cohen drawing on Kant). Cohen asserts that “the distinction between religion and denomination” helps Treitschke to construct a close affinity between the two Christian denominations as mere denominations within the same religion (downplaying the brutality of their actual mutual history) while at the same time excluding Judaism as “the religion of an alien tribe.”<sup>178</sup> This construction rules out the possibility that Judaism could amalgamate together with the Christian confessions into what in the “messianic-humanistic” conception had been envisaged as “a purer form of Christianity.”<sup>179</sup> This possibility, however, is just what Cohen argues for.

Cohen introduces Kant’s distinction between *Religion* as a universally valid and unitary concept and “forms of religion [Glaubensarten]” as the historically specific, diverse, and contingent “vehicles” of *Religion*.<sup>180</sup> Cohen asserts that “Israelitic monotheism” and “Protestant Christianity” are different as “vehicles” but identical as *Religion*. Therefore it is possible that they eventually will converge into “a purer form of religion.”

Cohen’s argument interconnects Israelitic and (Protestant) Christian theology with the concepts of modern ethics and the modern state. In the center of this web of connections sits Kant’s critical philosophy, which mediates these elements with each other and—being in turn crucial to German national consciousness as Cohen understands it—with German national history. Cohen names “the spiritual character of God [Geistigkeit Gottes]” and “the messianic promise” as the two defining features of Israelitic monotheism. These two notions concern the nature of God as well as the “ethical ideal of the human species being.”<sup>181</sup> Cohen emphasizes that the Prophets already had a universalistic concept of the Israelitic God as a fatherlike shepherd of

all of humanity, not merely of the people of Israel. "One issue though failed to come to full expression in this deepening of the concept of God," asserts Cohen: this "one issue" has been contributed by Christianity, drawing on "the Greek spirit": "The idea that God has become Man has rendered the notion of the relationship between Man and God internal. As the dogmatic form of the humanization of God, it realizes the cultural-historical mission of humanizing religion."<sup>182</sup> Without this "mission" having been fulfilled, the "autonomy of the moral law, the freedom to submit under its unconditional imperative," would be inconceivable. "The idealistic concept of morality, . . . the holy of holies of Kantian teaching . . . which we Germans appreciate as the ultimate treasure of national wisdom against all modern peoples," is rooted in the enthusiasm and rigorism of the ethics of the Prophets. Even the Kantian concept of the free will is anticipated in the Talmud when it is stated that "everything is in God's hand except the fear of God."<sup>183</sup> However, "the derivation of the moral law [Sittengesetz] from the concept of legislating reason [gesetzgebende Vernunft]," which is fundamental to Kant's concept of autonomy, cannot historically be understood "without the Christological form of humanizing the divine." "This kind of Christianity is shared by all modern Israelites, whether we [Israelites] are aware of it or not." However, there is no need for the Israelites to convert, since "we know that—the necessity to humanize the moral notwithstanding—a core of the old God of the Prophets has to remain exempt from humanization." In this aspect, which is "not only cosmological," "all Christians are Israelites." Matters are even, as it were: the Christians will always remain Israelites just as much as "modern Israelites" are Christians. In Cohen's theological-philosophical-historical argument, there is neither a need to convert nor any fundamental obstacle for both *Glaubensarten* to converge in the future.

After these more general considerations, Cohen turns more specifically to the German situation. He argues that the religious development of the Jews, and in particular that of the German Jews, "proceeds in the historical tendency of German *Protestantism*": "For the first time since the apogee of Jewish spirit in the Arab-Spanish period, the Jewish tribe has developed again a *universal cultural life within the German people*."<sup>184</sup> Cohen mentions



that Jews were among the first to embrace Kantian philosophy and that they “realized their religious development through participation in German culture, so manifesting their being Germans.”<sup>185</sup> The “deep commotion of the mind” when listening to Bach is not a mere matter of aesthetics. Commonality in being touched by Bach’s music and poetry “is commonality in religious feeling—as far as such commonality is necessary . . . in a *modern civilized people*.”<sup>186</sup> With Kant’s philosophy and Bach’s music, Cohen refers to two crucial instances of German (Protestant) culture that exemplify his concept of *Religion* as transcending the differences of *Glaubensarten*. Jewish Germans have been crucially involved in the development of both.

In Cohen’s conception, religion and nationality are closely intertwined. Although the nation remains central to his argument, he asserts that the “Jewish question” is essentially a religious one. He argues that “the *backwards trend in religion* is the real determining cause of the attack that we are suffering in the new Reich.”<sup>187</sup> He pleads that dealing with the Israelitic religion “as a religion” seems the best and most honest way of contributing to “the solution of the Jewish question in a national sense.” Cohen admits a decline of religiosity among Jews but holds that it is less pronounced than such a decline among Christians. “If we are to amalgamate into the German people,” which presupposes a “community of religious foundation,” religiosity as (each group’s) “specific contribution to the national community” has to be “preserved and cultivated”: nation needs religion.<sup>188</sup> In whichever vehicle it may come, religion needs to be cherished and furthered in the interest of nation building. Cohen rejects Lazarus’s suggestion that religion is not one of the objective factors whose common subjective appropriation constitutes nationality. For Cohen, religion (in the sense of religiosity) is as much an objective factor as the others in Lazarus’s list (descent, language, statehood). Furthermore, every single one of Lazarus’s objective factors is neither necessary nor sufficient, while all are overruled by “objective conviction of commonly existing religious foundation” as it defines “a modern civilized nation.”<sup>189</sup> This “conviction” is for Cohen not a mere subjective feeling or opinion but a “sensual object [fühlbar Ding].”<sup>190</sup> The common experience of (objective) religiosity can easily make up for the lack of any of

the other criteria from Lazarus's list, including "common descent." Cohen asserts that this common religiosity exists between Christian and Jewish Germans, denials by "spiteful or bigoted people" notwithstanding, and it "will grow and blossom to the greater honor of the German name and to the best of German morality [Sittlichkeit]." <sup>191</sup> The "backwards trend in religion" that underlies the anti-Jewish campaign is for these reasons anti-national. In the same vein, Cohen admonishes the Reform Jews <sup>192</sup> against mistaking a denigration of (Jewish) religion as a proof of "being German" and demands: "Respect and learn to understand your Israelitic monotheism, preserve it in your mind and make it the religious touchstone of your existence that all human beings need: then you will feel as one with what modern culture calls the spirit of Christianity, and the differences in the form of catechism will not disturb that commonality of religious foundation that is necessary for a unified and spiritually harmonious national community [eine einheitliche, im Gemüthe harmonisirte Volksgemeinschaft]." <sup>193</sup> Since the identity of Protestant spirit and that of modern Judaism is "the most effective 'glue' for an intimate national amalgamation," he also urges his Jewish readers to show "respect and piety" toward Christian religious dogma. <sup>194</sup>

Among those who refute Treitschke's claim that the Jews corrupted the Germans' religiosity are Bamberger and Joël. Bamberger holds that "surprisingly few" Jews had a part in the critique of religion of the Enlightenment, while Fichte (whom Treitschke quotes as "one of the most pure and powerful representatives of Germanic essence") predicted the imminent replacement of Christian religion by reason. He concludes that although the Germans were without doubt a Christian people, as Treitschke claimed, they were less Christian than others. Bamberger quotes Treitschke himself pointing to growing disbelief among large sections of the German people. <sup>195</sup> In a similar vein, Joël, "being a teacher of religion" himself, states that he shares with Treitschke the "pain" about the fact that "large sections of the people fell prey to disbelief." However, the sources of disbelief in Germany are not Jewish: Joël points to Hegel's "so-called pantheism," which is a "disguised atheism." Hegel's students, including the "young Germany," are "men idolizing themselves." <sup>196</sup> Schopenhauer, "a fanatic of atheism," not only was not

a Jew but hated the Jews as “the Swiss Guard of theism.”<sup>197</sup> Joël argues that Strauss, Hartmann, and “Häckel-Darwin” have been more influential than the “occasional tactlessness” of any Jewish writers. This leads him to point out a contradiction in Treitschke’s argument: “You present yourself as a pious and ecclesiastically minded man. I am indeed the last person who would not find that worth applauding. But why then do you accept the arguments of atheism against the Jews?” He argues that being Christian necessarily means allowing that the “Semitic spirit” and the “Germanic spirit” are mutually compatible; after all, the “Germanic spirit” is no longer the spirit of Arminius but has “organically assimilated” (Semitic) Christianity. Joël denies that there is a general tendency in modern Jewish literature to dismiss Christianity, whereas “in the most noble books by Christian scholars . . . one will find the most dismissive comments whenever Jews and Judaism are the issues.” He argues that it is only natural that sometimes anger is also expressed on the side of the Jews: “What function does Jewry have other than serving as a foil? . . . You are preaching us tolerance? Is this not mockery?”<sup>198</sup>

### The Nationality of the German Jews

Joël states sarcastically that he found himself “sympathetically touched” by Treitschke’s observation that “the nation underwent a deep soul-searching” and “without mercy pronounced judgment on itself.” However, “the nation,” according to Treitschke, located the evil only in the Jews, “making them a scapegoat.” Instead of judging itself harshly, “the nation” only judges “a small fraction of the nation and at that one whose belonging to the German nation you [Treitschke] even want to deny.”<sup>199</sup> This process, writes Joël, can hardly be described as *self*-criticism of the nation, because the “self-criticism” constitutes the criticized part of the “self” as not-self. Joël adds that the Jews are “a nationality that was defeated almost two thousand years ago . . . whose descendants nationally belong to the most diverse peoples and show the most diverse languages and customs, who do not have anything in common but the same religion and who are meant to be marked and preserved by force as a separate body [Sonderkörper], abscesses in the national organism through such [i.e., such as Treitschke’s] ‘just and moderate’ assessments

of their ‘undeniable weaknesses.’”<sup>200</sup> Joël’s comment pinpoints Treitschke’s ambivalence about the nationality of the German Jews: they are accused of fancying themselves wrongly as non-Germans when they actually ought to feel German like their fellow compatriots, while at the same time they are also accused of dressing up as Germans when they are actually aliens.

Treitschke’s second contribution, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” was almost exclusively concerned with the issue of the German Jews’ nationality. Treitschke targets especially Graetz “because reflecting on the thoughts of this writer will give me the welcome opportunity of showing to the readers with utmost determinacy what this debate is essentially about”: nationality.<sup>201</sup> The long section on Graetz begins with a confession of methodological relativism (or rather “cultural insiderism”):<sup>202</sup> one has to belong to a “great people” in order to understand it, only Jews can understand Jews, and only Germans can understand Germans.<sup>203</sup> Treitschke writes that he does not want to challenge what Graetz has to say about *Jewish* history—German history, however, falls outside Graetz’s proper domain. Graetz’s misjudgments of German issues cannot surprise Treitschke, who concedes that some of Graetz’s bitterness and sense of injustice is “understandable” since he has to deal with “so much sadness” in his *Geschichte der Juden*.<sup>204</sup> But “we are allowed to demand two things from him: his polemics against the religion of the overwhelming majority of his German compatriots should not completely overstep the limits of moderation, and he should speak with some respect and reserve of the people whose mild legislation protects him.” This formulation betrays the ambivalence that is fundamental to Treitschke’s argument. On the one hand, he demands that Graetz show “moderation” when talking about the religion of his “German compatriots,” implying that the demand for moderation follows from Graetz’s being a fellow citizen; on the other hand, he demands that he show “respect” for those same “compatriots” who “protect” him with “mild legislation.” The formulation “mild legislation” can only refer to specific legislation that protects the Jews from being discriminated against; Treitschke is not talking about national solidarity between equal compatriots. If the Jews were full citizens or “compatriots,” they would not need to be “protected” with “mild legislation.”

Graetz does not meet Treitschke's "modest demands." Treitschke quotes Graetz dismissing Christian influences on Jewish religious life (such as the impact of Schleiermacher's writings)<sup>205</sup> as well as, for example, the liberal politician Gabriel Riesser: "Herr Graetz freely admits that he does not regard Germany as his fatherland; he portrays the excellent Gabriel Riesser as the peculiar example of a Jew who 'completely merged into his fortuitous place of birth.'" <sup>206</sup> Treitschke claims he did not object to Graetz's "admonishing his tribal fellows to 'take pride in their ancestry'" but accuses him of not granting the Germans the same right.<sup>207</sup> He expresses his disagreement with Graetz's claim that the greatest German poet was Lessing, and disagrees even more when Graetz continues that "Börne was more than Lessing."<sup>208</sup> Treitschke complains: "So we have the pleasure of admiring in Börne the very greatest son of German soil, but we are immediately interrupted in this pleasure when the author expressly declares that Börne was not at all a German but a Jew."<sup>209</sup> Treitschke takes issue in particular with the following formulation by Graetz: "The recognition of the Jews as full members [of society] is already widely accomplished; the recognition of Judaism, however, is still heavily disputed."<sup>210</sup> Graetz's formulation "the recognition of Judaism" could be understood in different ways. Treitschke claims that "Judaism as religious community has long been recognized" and that Graetz can therefore only be understood to refer to the recognition of Jewry "as a nation within and next to the German nation." Since Treitschke's claim is factually untrue, his conclusion is also untenable.<sup>211</sup> He (mis)reads Graetz's demand for recognition as a religious community as a demand for national emancipation, which he strongly rejects: "To such a claim every German who holds his Christianity and his nationality [*Volksthum*] holy cannot but respond instantly: never! Our state has never seen in the Jews anything but a religious community and cannot under any circumstances give up this legal concept—the only one tenable."<sup>212</sup> Treitschke makes here three points: first, the Jews are not a nationality but merely a religious group; second, Germans who hold their Christianity and *Volksthum* "holy" (which is by implication what they ought to do) cannot accept the claim of a group of fellow citizens for recognition as a distinct nationality; and third, neither can "our state." Since the Germans

and the “we” that constitute “our state” are the same people, the German people simultaneously hold their Christianity and *Volksthum* “holy” and form a state that recognizes religious minorities but not national minorities. By the look of this argument, the only problem with the Jews seems to be that some of them (such as Graetz) allegedly claim that Jewry constitutes a separate nationality: “Our old culture is rich and tolerant enough to bear many strong contradictions: the followers of that church that thinks of itself as the only one that guarantees salvation live together peacefully with heretics, and so we can accept with equanimity that some of our fellow citizens silently consider themselves the chosen people. If however this racial arrogance [Rassendünkel] steps out onto the marketplace, if Jewry even claims recognition for its nationality, then the legal ground on which emancipation is founded collapses.”<sup>213</sup> Although Treitschke previously argued that German national culture is young and not yet self-conscious enough to afford the luxuries of the liberal mind, in this sequence he seems confident enough to grant a free rein to the marginal peculiarities of Catholicism, assorted heretics, and Jews—as long as these oddities take place “silently.” However, should the “racial arrogance” of the Jewish minority come out of the closet, Treitschke recommends “emigration and foundation of a Jewish state” somewhere else, which could then search for national recognition: “On German soil there is no space for a double nationality.” He adds that “until the most recent past the Jews did not participate in the millennial effort of German state formation.” Nor did they contribute to the formation of German culture in any significant way: “At the time they started to have significance in state and literature” of Germany, they found “the foundations of Germanic culture” ready-made and had to assimilate individually in order to achieve something. While many did so, “Herr Graetz and his kind move into other directions.”<sup>214</sup> Treitschke adds here a third motive, that of historical merit: the Jews did not contribute significantly enough, so they do not deserve to be recognized as a second nationality on the same “soil.” He turns the formulation that Graetz made with reference to Gabriel Riesser against Graetz himself to the effect of his virtual disenfranchisement: “I ask now: can a man who thinks and writes like that be considered a German himself? No, Herr

Graetz is a stranger on the soil of his 'fortuitous place of birth,' an Oriental who does not understand nor wishes to understand our people."<sup>215</sup> Taking advantage of an ambivalence in Graetz's argument between the democratic demand for emancipation without enforced assimilation and intimations of a "proto-Zionist" nationalism, Treitschke portrays Graetz one-sidedly as a Jewish nationalist and anti-German, anti-Christian separatist who would claim "Germanness" for himself only for tactical advantage. He suggests that Graetz has attempted to "prove with continuous mocking invective that the nation of Kant was really educated to humanity by the Jews only, that the language of Lessing and Goethe became sensitive to beauty, spirit and wit only through Börne and Heine."<sup>216</sup>

Graetz replies that Treitschke has quoted him out of context and selectively. He points out that he spoke more favorably of the beginnings of Christianity than Reimarus, Goethe, Strauss, or Renan ever did.<sup>217</sup> He argues that when he said that many converted Jews "joined the enemy camp," he was referring not to Christianity but to the camp of Jew-haters.<sup>218</sup> As for his view of the German nation, Graetz points out that the eleventh volume of his work had been written before 1868: "The glorious victories, the unity that was accomplished through ingenious leadership and Germany's ascendancy took place after that date."<sup>219</sup> Having made this compliment in Bismarck's direction, Graetz asserts that for the English translation that was currently in the process of being published he cut his earlier condescending remarks on the German nation "which had been true before 1870, but became untrue after that date."<sup>220</sup> He stresses that his presentation of the relation between Christianity and Jewry in his *Geschichte der Juden* represents a balanced account and is sympathetic to early Christianity, if less so to its later development.<sup>221</sup> Rather than expressing hatred for eminent Germans, he merely argued that one could have expected "a powerful assertion of humanity" with respect to the Jews from "two men of the first rank" like Goethe and Fichte. Both, however, made anti-Jewish remarks.

Philippon, who had been on the editorial board of the publishing house that published the first ten volumes of Graetz's *Geschichte der Juden*, points out that the eleventh volume had been rejected by the (liberal) publisher,

which did not want to take responsibility for Graetz's style and was particularly critical of Graetz's rejection of religious reform.<sup>222</sup> He stresses that the decision was made because the book should not be published in a place that could be seen as representative of German Jewry; anyway, large sale numbers do not necessarily mean that buyers agree with everything an author writes.<sup>223</sup> He concludes that "both Treitschke and Graetz are partisan and romantic historians,<sup>224</sup> keen on having particular views and tending toward speculation." Philippson sees their dispute as a personal affair that is of no relevance to the Jews in general.<sup>225</sup>

Nadyr quotes the literal wording of Graetz's remark on Börne and Heine, with which he finds nothing wrong: "Börne and Heine gave wit and spirit a home within German literature, qualities of which then—apart from Lessing—only a few in Germany had a proper understanding."<sup>226</sup> Joël cautiously defends Graetz; he remains, apart from Nadyr, the only contributor to the debate to do so: "Graetz has the wrongs of his virtues"; it is only passion for his subject, Joël writes, that leads Graetz to the occasional overstatement.<sup>227</sup>

Treitschke's claim that his portrayal of Graetz was representative of the spirit of the German Jews (when it was hardly even representative of Graetz himself) was thus rejected unequivocally by those German Jews who replied to his intervention. A formulation by Lazarus makes the essential point: "Gentlemen, we are Germans, nothing but Germans. When talking about the concept of nationality, we belong to only one nation, the German one."<sup>228</sup> Similarly, Seligmann Meyer holds that the Jews cannot become Germans because they are Germans already. He mentions the Jews' achievements and contributions to German national history and adds that the Germanic tribes migrated from "the East" just like the Jews did.<sup>229</sup> Oppenheim judges Graetz much more harshly, calling him an "indiscreet and zealously one-sided man, the benefit of whose great scholarship is spoiled by the absurdity of his conclusions." However, this is not a problem of the Jews: "The Jews are as little responsible for Herrn Graetz as the kingdom of Saxony for the confusions of Herrn von Treitschke."<sup>230</sup> Bamberger also remarks that Treitschke's implicit claim that the German Jews are not "good German patriots" is supported merely by "some formulations by Graetz."<sup>231</sup>



Lazarus recommends that “we [German Jews] should keep silent” and just wait until “what is called once more the Jewish question” has run out of steam.<sup>232</sup> “For us as Jews” there is no such thing as a “Jewish question” but merely a “German question,” namely, the problem of the Germans achieving the humanity that consists in granting humanity to others. For “the Jews as Jews” there is nothing to do in this affair. However, “we are Germans, [and] as Germans we have to talk.” “On our cheek burns not the red of anger of the Jew but the red of shame of the German.”<sup>233</sup> Lazarus asserts that the Jews of Germany are German in all the ways that he described in his discussion of the concept of the nation—language, country, state, culture, fate—except one: descent.<sup>234</sup> But the Germans do not share common descent anyway, since many non-Jewish Germans are also of only partly Germanic descent. All groups that constitute today’s Germans, including the Jews, have immigrated at some point earlier or later in history. The Jews came “searching for a homeland and a homeland is what they found.”<sup>235</sup> They have been united with the other groups of the German population through “seven generations of . . . common fate.”

Lazarus ends his speech on a particularly patriotic tone and with a reference to the two attempts on the life of the kaiser in 1878:

Today we are not lacking the art of the prophetic word but its bloodcurdling power. If as monstrous a deed of moral degradation as the attempts on the most honorable head of the nation would have happened in the times of the Prophets, sounds of enormous power would have arisen, whose ringing we would still be hearing today like we still today hear the penetrating call of Jeremiah and Isaiah. Perhaps somewhere in a German mind a spark of that ardor might still be glowing under the ashes of the centuries; it might light up—even if less bright—and illuminate for us the path of justice and clemency and be to the benefit of the whole German people: may God bring that to pass!<sup>236</sup>

Lazarus’s speech shows a strong sense of Jewish identity—after all, it is dedicated to “self-clarification” among Jews and was first given to a Jewish audience. Nevertheless, it also strongly emphasizes the German nationality of the German Jews. Cohen articulates—more strongly than Lazarus—his

reluctance to accept the fact of being addressed and being obliged to reply as a Jew: those replying to Treitschke tend to feel strongly and painfully the fact that responding as a Jew means giving recognition to the appellation as a Jew. Cohen writes as the first sentence of his response to Treitschke and Lazarus: "So after all, we arrived again at the point of having to confess [to being Jewish]"; Cohen would have preferred not "having to confess."<sup>237</sup> Echoing Treitschke, Cohen refers to the historical experience of a specific generation. As Treitschke invokes the generation that had fought for national unification, Cohen invokes those who had fought for emancipation and assimilation: "We, the younger generation [Wir Jüngeren]," had been allowed to hope to be able to assimilate into "the nation of Kant." There had been hope that "moral politics" and "historical understanding" would level out differences and would allow German Jews to express their "patriotic love" and their pride to contribute to the nation's tasks without second thoughts.<sup>238</sup> This hope has now been shattered, because "one of the leaders of the national party" has chosen "to raise the race issue against us." Cohen underlines that this attack did not come from "forces inimical to [liberal] civilization" but from a man "to whom we, the younger generation, owe so much in understanding and inspiration."<sup>239</sup> Cohen's argument underlines how closely national unification and Jewish emancipation/assimilation had been felt to be the same process, which is reflected in reverse in the particular weight carried by a nationalist attack on emancipation. Without using the word, Cohen implies that Treitschke is guilty of treason.

Cohen adds several very polemical remarks on Graetz, whose student he had been<sup>240</sup> and whom he associates with "the Palestine faction [die Partei der Palästinenser]."<sup>241</sup> He reproaches Graetz for a "perversity of moral judgment" and asserts that "there is nothing sound" in the direction Graetz was going. Cohen warns about "being only excited and touched by Jewish tribal issues" and ignoring the "pride and dignity of the German spirit." Significantly, he asserts that "the same fallacy" also underlies Lazarus's position, although the latter is formulated more abstractly.

Philippson agrees with Cohen that the Jews "should become more German" but reproaches Cohen for directing this demand only at the Jews.

The Christian Germans had to become more German, too; alluding to ultramontanist, he asks rhetorically: “Does not a large part of the Germans adhere to religious convictions that put the church higher than the nation, in particular a church that has its gravitational point beyond the mountains?”<sup>242</sup> Further, many Germans still swear by their being Saxonian, Bavarian, or Austrian. In their professions, though, Christians and Jews follow the same ends and tendencies irrespective of their different religions.<sup>243</sup> He also reproaches Cohen for failing to say what the Jews should do in order to become more German.

Apart from Joël, only Oppenheim refuses to discuss whether or not the German Jews are German enough in the first place. Oppenheim points to two contradictions in Treitschke’s position. First, Treitschke accuses the Jews of threatening to destroy German culture, while on the other hand he writes that the “hard German heads” cannot become accustomed to alleged Jewish values.<sup>244</sup> Second, Treitschke accuses the Jews of not wanting enough to become German, while on the other hand he accuses them of “insisting on their certificate,” that is, on emancipation. Oppenheim writes that “either of these would be bad” but both accusations are “fortunately wrong”: the struggle for (or defense of) emancipation, assimilation to German culture, and German national consciousness are three sides of the same process. He points out that since emancipation the German Jews have become involved in all areas of the public sphere beyond their share in the population, and he suggests that Treitschke resents precisely their involvement and, by implication, their assimilation rather than their alleged separatism, “because Jews who swear on Treitschke’s colors are rare indeed.” Oppenheim thus suggests that Treitschke’s concern is with the specific political convictions of the Jews, not any lack of Germanness at all.

“What does national mean,” then? The elements of consensus and dissensus on this central question will be assessed in chapter 7; at this point it is only stated that first of all, the question is posed only in the context of the state: if not for the state, nobody would even ask what “national” means, not even those who emphasize its cultural aspects. Culture is addressed as national only when its relation to the state comes to appear problematic. Patriotism

is first of all *Staatsgesinnung*, a healthy measure of loyalty to a particular state; the fact that this is emphasized by Treitschke, whose thinking is at the same time ethnic, racial, and culturalist enough to repudiate the evidently very *staatsgesinnnten* German Jews, makes this more than clear.

The question of the state, though, must lead invariably to the question of right, especially in a context heavily shaped by post-Hegelian and post-Kantian liberalism. This is the subject matter of the next chapter.

## Five. Emancipation, Assimilation, and the Concept of Rights

On several occasions, Treitschke rejects the idea of challenging the legal emancipation of the Jews in the German state. The principal formulation is the following:

Today the unfortunate struggle is settled, civil equality [bürgerliche Gleichberechtigung] of the Jews has long been achieved in all civilized states, and in all of Germany I do not know one sensible politician who would want to overthrow this accomplished deed. The German Jews enjoy unrestricted freedom of worship; no one interferes with their old customs and traditions or with their distinct cosmopolitan scholarship [eigenthümlichen kosmopolitischen Wissenschaft]; civic life [der bürgerliche Verkehr] even widely respects their Sabbath, although this is undeniably for us Christians a very inconvenient institution. With emancipation achieved, however, the old Jewish claim to separate nationhood has also become totally obsolete. In the present century of national state formations, the European Jews can have a role that is peaceful and conducive to civilization only if they decide to dissolve into the civilized peoples, whose languages they speak—as far as religion, tradition and tribal characteristics [Stammesart] allow this to happen.<sup>1</sup>

In this crucial paragraph, Treitschke makes four distinct statements. First, all “civilized peoples” have granted “civil equality.” Since by implication this is part of what makes them “civilized,” one ought not attempt to challenge this. Second, although the fact that the Jews enjoy the same civil equality as

other groups seems to be grounded in universalist liberal values, Treitschke mentions some of what seem to him particular characteristics of the Jews: the Jews continue to stick to their “peculiar cosmopolitan scholarship” and to the Sabbath. The fact that he finds it necessary to mention these things in the context of his adherence to universal liberal rights underlines that these rights do not go without saying: the universality of civic rights includes Jews despite their “peculiar” and “inconvenient” characteristics. Third, “with emancipation achieved,” Jews have traded in and forsaken the right to make claims to separate nationhood. Treitschke demands they dissolve in the “civilized peoples” now that they have accepted the terms of trade of emancipation. By implication, everything short of an active policy of dissolving Jewish separate identity counts as Jewish nationalism.<sup>2</sup> Fourth, there is still a limit to the extent to which the Jews can have a positive role in modern European history (which is characterized as a history of nation-state building): that limit is their ability to assimilate. Their culture and “tribal characteristics” do not allow for complete assimilation, and thus by implication neither for a completely positive role in modern history. A residue of ethnic characteristics will remain unassimilable and alien to the world of modern European nation-states.

Treitschke’s position on this issue is deeply ambivalent. First, he claims that “the unfortunate struggle”—namely, the conflict between “the hard necessity of the state’s unity” and the Jews’ claim to both equality and difference—“has been settled” with the achievement of legal emancipation. However, the remainder of the paragraph implies that struggle and conflict continue. The exhortative (and discreetly threatening) tone of his discourse in these sentences clearly has a “pragmatic” dimension: urging the Jews to make “a decision.” His own words make more than clear that the case that he claims has been “settled” is actually not so settled. Treitschke’s ostensible defense of (legal) emancipation is contradicted by his pointing to the insurmountable limits of assimilation due to “religion, tradition and tribal characteristics.” If assimilation cannot be complete, neither can equality. Treitschke’s claim that the struggle is over is part of the ongoing struggle. In his view, emancipation has been granted to the Jews as an advance installment—thanks to

the self-forgetful tolerance of the *Culturvölker* (nations of culture)—but the Jews still have to deliver their part. They still have to decide to “dissolve into” the latter, as far as it is possible for the alien “tribe” that they are. Treitschke admits that “a part of the German Jews has long taken this necessary decision” to assimilate, but he claims that another “very influential part of our Jewry” does not even intend to.

It was left to Treitschke’s interlocutors, however, to spell out in more theoretical language what underpinned the controversy about the meaning and implications of Jewish emancipation. Manuel Joël comments on Treitschke’s formulation that “the moment emancipation was gained the Jews insisted boldly on their ‘certificate.’”<sup>3</sup> Playing on the double meaning of the German word *Schein* (certificate, document, voucher; appearance, illusion), Joël rebukes: “So the certificate [of legal emancipation] was meant to remain an illusion?” Treitschke’s formulation throws light on his understanding of legal emancipation: emancipation is received in the form of a certificate, the use of which one can “insist” on more or less “boldly.” Exchange etiquette as Treitschke seems to understand it demands the Jews not to make too much use of their right, which leads Joël to pun on the double meaning of *Schein*: a certificate that one is expected to use only discreetly or partially is not worth its nominal value—this form of emancipation is illusory (*Schein*).<sup>4</sup>

Joël remarks sarcastically that human rights cannot be “granted” to the Jew, because “the Jew is as it were also a human being.”<sup>5</sup> This implies that having rights is a property of the human being as such (*jus naturalis*); natural rights (as opposed to privileges, *libertates*) cannot be subject to any form of trading or dealing. Philippson, Cohen, and “Börne” elaborate on this issue further.

Philippson writes that “all those who currently act as enemies of the Jews intend to reverse emancipation.”<sup>6</sup> If some of them (such as Treitschke) claim not to have such an intention they argue in bad faith, hiding behind the notion that the state had the liberty to grant, or not to grant, civil and political rights, gifts given as so many acts of tolerance. Philippson states that Treitschke was the first to use this tactic, and he quotes a recent pamphlet by one Brake that makes explicit what had been merely implicit

in Treitschke's argument: "The granting of civil rights and religious freedom to the Jews has certainly not been the self-evident acknowledgment of their natural and human rights but merely a declaration of the positive will of the state in a specific case. Therefore the state has not renounced its inalienable sovereign right in every single case to decide anew and on its own about the admission of any new religious community and its compatibility with the state's general purposes and the overall culture of its subjects as they exist."<sup>7</sup> Brake (and likewise Treitschke) does not seem to deny the existence of universal rights *tout court*, but he claims that the state has granted emancipation to the Jews only because their religion is not too different from the Christian religion and because their number is (then) small enough so as not to endanger "the unity of the moral and religious foundations of our population." Emancipation is based on these conditions. Brake concludes that the state has the duty both to consider itself to be Christian as long as the majority of its population is such, and to guarantee toleration to the Jewish minority.

Philippon holds against Brake that conditional emancipation means failure to acknowledge the concept of individual rights and is as such dangerous and in opposition to the *Rechtsstaat*. He admits that a state has a right to allow (or deny) religious freedom, and he further grants that it is debatable whether and when the state has the right to grant or not grant naturalization to a person who was not born within the territory of that state. However, he holds that under no circumstances can a state deny civil and political rights to anyone born within the country to parents who were also born there. Further, the state has a duty not to allow religion to have any impact on a person's possession of rights: "Humanity has progressed. Human society has developed. Legal concepts have become clarified, and right has assumed a large and far-reaching power. However much the sophists tease their brains, whatever the crooked lawyers ruminate: what has generally been acknowledged as right has to persist and will persist."<sup>8</sup> Cohen also asserts that the anti-Jewish campaign at least implicitly intends to reverse legal emancipation: "If one 'deliberately' decides to grant emancipation, one is naive to complain about the falling number of conversions. However, if one



is already working toward the logical conclusion that emancipation should be reversed, one must not continue to complain that the Jews are not willing to become Germans.”<sup>9</sup> He takes issue with the political voluntarism implicit in Treitschke’s formulation that every state decides deliberately about who has “the right to participate in its leadership.” However, unlike Philippson, Cohen does not refer to “natural and human right” in a strict sense. He argues that legislation is the “emanation of general national culture.” While the nation can expect the emancipated to show gratitude for emancipation, it does not have the right to *demand* gratitude: the state’s “freedom of deliberation has its limits not in so-called natural law (which is a rather vague concept) but in the respective nation’s concept of the moral law [Sittengesetz].”<sup>10</sup> Cohen here equates “general national culture [Gesittung]” with the “nation’s concept of the moral law,” reconciling the Kantian positing of a universal *Sittengesetz* with a nationalist perspective, in which the particular view of the *Sittengesetz* taken by a nation is decisive.

Cohen suggests that making participation conditional on a particular positive confession will provoke “lies and pretense.” Therefore, *sittliche* administration of the state has to be based on “a religious ground that is independent from contested dogmas,” that is, on *Religion* rather than any particular *Glaubensarten*. In a typical Kantian move, Cohen asserts that “it is through such ethical insight that the state’s deliberation gains its freedom.”<sup>11</sup>

A quite different perspective is taken by the anonymous author of a pamphlet who masqueraded (or rather, ironically pretended to masquerade) as Ludwig Börne and borrowed the latter’s radical-liberal language.<sup>12</sup> “Börne” repeatedly points out that he has said it all fifty years ago, so that the continuity of the adopted identity is meant to indicate an identity of the debate across the different contexts: for “Börne,” the earlier Hep-Hep movement and the current anti-Jewish movement are cut from the same cloth. “Börne” bases his polemic—perhaps most straightforwardly among all respondents to Treitschke—on Enlightenment liberal thought. First, he ridicules the failure of Treitschke and his ilk to differentiate between feelings and rational considerations about state and society: “You do not love the Jews. It is bad for the Jews that even educated Germans are subject to the relentless government

of their hearts. Even to be just, the German needs to love.”<sup>13</sup> Treitschke has failed to emancipate himself from the “relentless government” of his heart. “Börne’s” sarcastic remark that “even to be just, the German needs to love” implies that issues of justice are (or should be) of a different categorical order from issues of love—a crucial distinction that allowed liberals not to like (let alone love) the Jews but still to argue (or even fight) for them to receive “justice.”<sup>14</sup> By implication, Treitschke’s emphatic and irrational rhetoric is unpolitical and as such not part of a modern, bourgeois liberal discourse. “Börne” continues his line of argument with a simile: “The storm and the sun had an argument about who was more powerful. The storm tried to snatch away a coat from a wanderer—in vain; the more it blew the more the wanderer wrapped himself into the coat. The sun came out in its light and mildness—the wanderer took off the coat. The Jews are such wanderers, Rabbinism is their coat, you are the storm—but the sun has started to shine!”<sup>15</sup> The sun, an obvious symbol of the Enlightenment, “has started to shine” and thus makes the old coat of Rabbinism (which might have been useful in the past but is no longer so in modern times) anachronistic and superfluous. Significantly, the storm and the sun compete over reaching the same goal—snatching away the coat. The storm against which the coat is a defense does not reach this goal, while the sun does because it removes the actual reason for wearing a coat. The simile used by “Börne” on the one hand makes the realistic and farsighted point that not authoritarian hostility but actual social and political improvement will almost casually and effortlessly overcome antiquated forms of consciousness; on the other hand, though, it displays some wishful thinking: “the sun has started to shine!” (note the exclamation mark) is—in hindsight—perhaps a strange watchword for the year 1880. Taking up his previous argument that justice does not need to be based on love for the Jews, “Börne” adds an attack on the “world of commerce” and its lack of morality: “I do not have to defend the world of commerce. I profoundly hate its Jewishness [Judenthümlichkeit]—that manifestation of the demon of money, this rising fury of greed, this bodily devil of gold—whether it comes in Hebrew, Muslim or Christian shape.”<sup>16</sup> He adds that even if the Jews are more successful in commerce than the

Christians this does not mean they are responsible for the phenomenon as such.<sup>17</sup> “Börne” seems to be taking up a current manner of speech in an ironic way in order to undermine its implicit claims: if the devilish “fury of greed” comes in “Hebrew, Muslim or Christian shape” and has not been initiated by Jews, it is of course not really “Jewish” at all.

In the body of his pamphlet, “Börne” discusses the concept of “civil rights.” He rejects the notion that “human rights and civil rights, as well as religious and political toleration” are so different from each other that “one could have claims to the one while not to the other.” He argues that Treitschke uses this conceptual distinction as a secondary legitimization or a smoke screen for a dislike of Jews that is ultimately motivated by economic factors: “Basically you have always been a hater of the Jews, but intellectually you have made progress: now you try to justify your hostility. You do not hate the Jews because they deserve it [weil sie es verdienen]; you hate them and then you try to prove as well as you can that they deserve it. And you hate them—because they earn [weil sie—*verdienen*].”<sup>18</sup> “Börne” argues that what Treitschke wants to offer as “human rights”—that is, human rights without civil rights—are merely “animal rights,” namely, the right to physically reproduce: “Only civil rights are human rights: for Man becomes Man only in civil society. This is where he is born, and he is born a citizen. This is the principle of England, France and any free state.”<sup>19</sup> “Börne” argues that a meaningful conception of “human rights” must be embodied in “civil rights.” Ultimately, the two concepts are identical because Man becomes Man only in bourgeois society, that is, as a citizen: “denn der Mensch wird erst in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zum Menschen.” “Man” outside society would be an animal, and the “rights” that such a creature could lay claim to would be not more than the “rights” that animals have, that is, strictly speaking no rights at all.

The equation of Man with citizen is a two-edged sword, however: on the one hand it is inclusivist, as it claims that no one who is born within the boundaries of society can be denied full membership of that society, that is, no one can be given human rights without civil rights being included in the package; on the other hand it is exclusivist, as it implicitly denies the

humanity of all human beings who—for whatever reason—are not actually members of “society.” The equation of Man and citizen implies the equation of bourgeois society and human society; those inhabiting other-than-bourgeois/civil societies, who appear to the latter as “savages,” cannot be considered humans if Man becomes Man only in bourgeois/civil society. On the domestic level it implies that categories of people who are for varying reasons not considered full citizens (strangers, women, children, the propertyless, paupers, handicapped) lose also the safety valve of the “human rights.” Bourgeois society created the distinction between human and civil rights not without reason; the concept of “human rights”—as a promise, reminiscent of Catholic universalism—makes sense only in its specific difference from the rights of a citizen; it is something to fall back on for those who are not full members. (Hannah Arendt argued, of course, that the history of the refugee problem in the twentieth century teaches that one tends to lose the human rights in the very instance that one would actually need them, namely, after losing the rights of the citizen.)<sup>20</sup>

In the next sentence, “Börne” shifts his argument by stating that one becomes a citizen only when one comes of age, not when being born.<sup>21</sup> This seems to imply that, for example, minors—who are not citizens—are ipso facto also not humans: one comes of age when the intellectual powers are “fully developed,” which is presumed to coincide with the bodily powers “appearing mature.” “Börne” mocks the fact that the Jews are being denied citizenship “because nature had condemned them body and soul to eternal childhood” and suggests sarcastically that immature Christians should also be treated as children and be denied citizenship.<sup>22</sup> While for him, citizenship is the same as human rights, he accuses Treitschke of reducing citizenship to membership in a civil corporation. He points out that in Treitschke’s understanding, only in death do all members of society become equal in their human and civil rights: “the shroud is your toga [i.e., the sign of being a citizen], and you turn into social beings only in your graves!”<sup>23</sup> “Börne” argues that the enemies of the Jews only adopted the language of religious toleration after they ceased caring about religion; what they do care about is that “Jewish haggling does not outperform Christian haggling”: for “Börne,”

economic competition is at the heart of anti-Jewish attitudes. The language of religious toleration, however, is compatible with and ineffective against the more modern form of Jew-hatred, which is no longer bound up with religious forms of consciousness.<sup>24</sup>

Matters of rights, citizenship, and emancipation are closely bound up with that of the nature of the state. The issue at stake here is basically how the notion of individual, natural, and universal rights survived the shift of Enlightenment liberal thought to liberalism as a political practice in the context of the national state? Not too well. Cohen's position most clearly expresses the dialectic at the bottom of this problem: *jus naturalis* may even be admitted to exist, but the nation and the state cannot do other than act on their specific, historical version of what is right, which in turn is shaped by this nation-state's "national culture." After the general turn to a historical view of political, social, and intellectual forms, itself already part of the legacy of Enlightenment liberalism, unmediated natural right seems too metaphysical. In this context it can hardly surprise that emancipation is also subject to "the hard necessity of the unity of the state," or what different proponents of it believe to be such.

## Six. The Riddle of Treitschke's Intentions

One asks oneself: What does Herr von Treitschke want?—MANUEL JOËL,  
“Open Letter to Herrn Professor Heinrich von Treitschke”

The preceding chapters have been concerned with how Treitschke and his respondents used a number of crucial political, social, and historical concepts in differing (or not so differing) ways. This final chapter of textual analysis looks at what Treitschke explicitly wrote about how he wanted to see the “Jewish question” resolved, and what some of his respondents thought his intentions were.

In the final section of his first contribution, “Our Prospects,” Treitschke makes specific suggestions as to how the Jews should behave in the face of Germany’s developing into a proper nation-state. He points toward examples such as “Jewish societies against usury which silently do much good” and the “work of intelligent Israelites who have recognized that their tribal fellows [ihre Stammgenossen] must adjust to the customs and ideas of their Christian fellow-citizens” (to whom, by implication, such things as “usury” are completely alien); he concludes: “Much remains to be done in this direction. It is not of course possible to change the hard German heads into Jewish heads; the only way out therefore is for our Jewish fellow citizens to make up their minds without reservations to be Germans, as many of them have done already long ago, to their advantage and ours.”<sup>1</sup> Treitschke considers it self-evident that “German heads” and “Jewish heads” cannot

coexist next to each other without the latter adapting to the former. He sounds confident here that this process is under way and merely needs to be continued consistently. His tone changes slightly when he discusses the remaining obstacles: the Jews “who talk so much about tolerance” should “become truly tolerant themselves and show some respect for the faith, the customs and the feelings of the German people which has long ago atoned for old injustice and given them the gift of human and civil rights.” The lack of this “respect” on the side of “a section of our commercial and literary Jewry” is the “ultimate reason” for the present anger. This anger, Treitschke concludes, might not be “a pleasant sight” but is merely the accompaniment of “boiling-up unfinished ideas” and thus not a bad thing: “May God grant that we come out of the ferment and unrest of these restless years with a stricter concept of the state and its obligations and with a more vigorous national consciousness.” The antisemitic movement is a phenomenon of the more general process of bringing about the maturing of Germany into a modern nation-state, to which it is necessary but merely instrumental. This implies that antisemitism will disappear once this process is successfully completed.

In the concluding section of his third contribution (his response to Breßlau, Lazarus, and Cassel), Treitschke develops the one point in his original contribution that he claims has been “strangely ignored” by all commentators, although he had intended it to be the main issue: his (self-)criticism of the “complicity of the Germans in the power of Jewry”: “We have allowed ourselves to be misguided by the great words of tolerance and Enlightenment toward some mistaken decisions on schooling that now threaten to damage the Christian education of our youth. . . . Tolerance is a wonderful thing but it presupposes that one already has a firm religious conviction oneself. . . . It is the duty of the state to take utmost care that our school pupils are not taught indifference toward religion under the cover of tolerance.”<sup>2</sup> Since Treitschke sees toleration and legal emancipation as benevolence that the victorious party can afford to show only after a decisive and final victory, any doubts about the finality of the victory would be reason enough to call toleration and emancipation into question. For Treitschke, such doubts

seem to be raised by the lack of religious enthusiasm on the part of “our youth.” It seems that Treitschke would be happy to “grant” all liberal rights to the Jews (“a wonderful thing”) were it not for a lack of “firm religious conviction” on the Christian side. According to Treitschke, society can afford tolerance only on the condition of general “firm religious conviction.” It is difficult to imagine, though, how religious conviction, if it is “firm” as well as in power (which is the only place from where toleration can be “granted”), could be anything other than patronizing. This comment by Treitschke touches the heart of the paradoxical problem of the status of religion in liberal society. Treitschke adds: “The state could also give more protection against the tyranny of usury, which is committed by the unclean strata of Jews and Christians in a sad competition.”<sup>3</sup> This is the only legal-practical step Treitschke suggests. Having criticized the lack of determination on the side of the state, he turns to society:

However, the attitude of the nation itself is always more important than all the measures taken by the state. Our carefreeness and slowness could learn a lot from the economic virtues of the Jewish tribe. Instead, though, we have been only too receptive to the weaknesses and illnesses of the Jewish character. Our cosmopolitanism was beneficial to theirs, our thirst for dispute wallowed in the scandal-loving outpourings of the Jewish press. . . . Most of all, though, Jewish arrogance has been nurtured by the unfortunate disunity of our clerical life, by the compulsive mocking and materialism of so many Christians. In the frivolous, infidel circles of Jewry it is a strongly held belief that the huge majority of educated Germans have long broken with Christianity. The time will come, though, and perhaps it is close, when urgency will teach us again to pray, when modest piety will regain its proper place next to the pride of education. In the last instance, every grave social question leads the serious observer back to religion. The German Jewish question will not come to a rest completely . . . before our Israelite fellow citizens will be convinced through our attitude that we are a Christian people and want to remain so.<sup>4</sup>

This paragraph shows that Treitschke’s attack on the Jews is also an effort at disciplining potentially unruly or disloyal Germans of any religious



background. The “Jewish question” appears here as a mere symptom of what counts for Treitschke as a crisis of German society in general. Jewish “pride” is presented as an indicator for the lack of Christian identity on the side of the Germans—with all its implications for civil obedience and *Staatsgesinnung*. In this section of the text, the underlying logic seems to be that disciplining the Jews helps in disciplining the Germans.

In a subsequent text Treitschke reasserts that no one currently considers taking back emancipation, but he also says that no options exist for the state and the political sphere to address the “Jewish question” and to challenge the particularism of Jewish “tribal consciousness” and its “provocative” manifestations. The “Jewish question,” though, still undeniably exists and its discussion is legitimate, although preferably it should be discussed without rousing too much passion. From this Treitschke concludes that it is “solely up to civil society, and in particular to the Jews themselves, to overcome gradually the existing discord that cannot be denied anymore.”<sup>5</sup> Rather than indicating how “civil society” (as opposed to the state) should respond to the issue, he puts the responsibility on the Jews. He follows this with the claim that there are no signs that the Jews are ready to undertake any steps toward solving the “Jewish question”: they respond even to moderate critique with “angry diatribes”; they mobilize Jews in the foreign press “against their fellow Germans”; they exert “open terrorism” against supporters of the antisemitic petition; they “conspire to damage Christian fellow citizens whom they dislike”; and they continue to publish pamphlets that scorn Christian theology.<sup>6</sup> Treitschke follows this catalog of offenses—unreasonableness, treason, terrorism, conspiracy—which owes a lot to traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes, with a conclusion that contradicts his earlier affirmation of emancipation: “Is it not obvious that this slippery slope will necessarily lead one to call emancipation into question once more? For the strongest argument of the enemies of emancipation used to be that ‘the Jews are and remain a nation of their own; if we grant them full civil rights they will form a state within the state.’ If Jewry continues to go down the road that they entered recently we will witness the emergence of this state within the state, and then we should inevitably hear the Christians shout: away with emancipation!”<sup>7</sup>

Unless those Jews who feel themselves to be “good Germans” manage to prevent “their coreligionists” from “dangerous arrogance and separation,” Treitschke warns, “our soil might perhaps come to witness savage eruptions of uncanny hatred that would not do any credit to the Germans, Christian or Jewish alike.”

Thirteen months after his remarks in the same publication had triggered the Dispute, Treitschke relates that (anonymous) enemies of the emancipation have said that the existence of a separate Jewish nationality inevitably would make *emancipated* Jews a “state within the state”—the antisemitic reversal of the Enlightenment pro-emancipation argument that had seen the *unemancipated* Jews as a *status in statu* that needed to be abolished. Treitschke uses in this passage rhetorical techniques very similar to those adopted in his first contribution: the reference to anonymous skeptics and their collective shouting make the author appear as a detached observer. He suggests that the “Jewish question” consists in the particularistic consciousness and arrogance of the Jews. While German Christian society has granted them emancipation against the warnings of the skeptics, the Jews have frustrated the optimistic expectations of their benefactors. While at the moment the state is still well advised to remain patient, it is the assimilated Jews’ responsibility to speed up the process of assimilation and to overcome the anomaly that there are emancipated but not wholly assimilated Jews. Unless the Jews manage to disprove the growing and—as Treitschke implies—legitimate discontent on the side of the Christian Germans, they might provoke not only the loss of legal emancipation but also the possibility of new pogroms, quasi-automatic or natural reactions to Jewish misbehavior. He concludes: “My pronounced intention has been to remind the fully German-minded Jews that the attitude of some of their coreligionists does not meet what any great nation has to demand from its citizens.”<sup>8</sup>

Bamberger concedes that Treitschke had indeed intended to make a constructive patriotic intervention and acted with “the best intentions”; Treitschke’s pamphlet is not “an antisemitic harangue.”<sup>9</sup> Its effects, though, proved “deplorable” because the antisemites were able to appropriate it. Bamberger acknowledges that Treitschke ruled out both reversal of emancipation and

expulsion of the Jews and argued for a politics of “reconciliation.” Moreover, Treitschke’s “demands” would have been received favorably had he opposed the agitation of those who “search for new legitimation for old unreflected ill-feeling.”<sup>10</sup> In fact, however, Treitschke’s “conciliatory” conclusions follow from “a chain of unreasoned assertions each of which actually works against the intended effect.”<sup>11</sup> His inconclusively argued accusations “cannot but make the accused believe that Treitschke is one of those persecutors who choose plausible pretexts according to time and circumstances in order to justify their own feeling of dislike which has become second nature to them. Should there still be many Jews in Germany who do not think of themselves as Germans, then Treitschke’s indictment would only alienate them further.”<sup>12</sup> If the tone and manner of persecution are more “spiteful and cynical” in Germany than in France or England, Bamberger suggests, it cannot lie “in the nature of the persecuted” but only “in the nature of the persecutors.”<sup>13</sup> He asserts that Treitschke provided the antisemites with “a whole torrent of most detrimental slogans”: “This proceeding that contradicts its professed intention [of reconciliation] can obviously be explained by the fact that in the author himself the inner drives of a certain intellectual tendency have been stronger than those undoubtedly good intentions. He himself stands most of all under the domination of the hereditary antipathy, and where he wants to be doctor he is patient.”<sup>14</sup> Bamberger points out that Treitschke’s position is contradictory, and he understands the contradiction as that between an adequate and legitimate side (liberalism, as shared by Bamberger) and an anachronistic side (illiberalism; hereditary antipathy).

Bamberger argues that polemical criticism is characteristic of German culture itself. He enumerates a long list of German writers who attacked Luther, Goethe, Hegel, or Fichte and includes in the same breath Richard Wagner, “who cannot admit that Felix Mendelssohn was a German composer,” and Eugen Dühring for his attack on Helmholtz.<sup>15</sup> For Bamberger the antisemitic persecution is part and parcel of a longer tradition of German-German discord. Treitschke “attributes the severe criticism of German character and of German personalities to some Jews in particular,” whom he sees “only as tolerated guests violating the rules of hospitality.” Treitschke misrepresents

criticizing German characteristics, which is part of the German character itself, as Jewish lack of gratitude.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Bamberger's contribution is his comment on Treitschke's concern with religion:

Herr von Treitschke, who fights socialism, takes the position of those who hope to be able to fight the evil at its root by restoring religion. If the restoration of religion is feasible,<sup>16</sup> this approach would be legitimate<sup>17</sup> insofar as socialist ideas are undeniably linked to irreligious ones. The instinct of the ruling classes of England, France and America has established a form of existence of the church as necessary for respectability and essentially based on the awareness of that link between religion and order. This is not the place to discuss whether something similar or better can successfully be developed in Germany. However, should it be attempted, the Jews certainly will not stand in the way. They have no particular interest in the realization of the big socialist redistribution of wealth.<sup>18</sup> Only, they find one could use other means of reinforcing Christianity than arousing hate and contempt of the Jews.<sup>19</sup>

No other commentator related Treitschke's support for antisemitism so directly to the most prominent aspect of Treitschke's publishing at the time, the polemic against "socialism."<sup>20</sup> Bamberger sees here the principal concern of Treitschke's politics, and this is also the only passage of the text where Bamberger signals some agreement with Treitschke. Bamberger claims that "the Jews" stand—with Treitschke as well as Bamberger—on the side of the defense of order and property and are opposed to socialist redistribution. He concedes that the restoration of religion is a possible means toward that shared goal, although he does not clearly argue for or against the use of this weapon.<sup>21</sup> He seems indifferent to any aspect of religion other than its socially stabilizing function. His main point is, however, that neither the principal political goal—fighting off socialism—nor one of the possible weapons—restoring religion—necessitates anti-Jewish agitation: quite to the contrary, it puts off a potential ally.

"The point is," writes Theodor Mommsen, to get "from confusion and disunity toward secure principles of practical agency." It is the duty of every

individual German to “prove whether we are a free people able to govern itself as well as its moods and to improve on mistakes that have been made.”<sup>22</sup> Mommsen links here the concepts of “freedom” and “self-control” to an ethical argument. He makes the German “people” appear as a moral personality that has to give evidence of its maturity for freedom. Such evidence would, for example, consist in being able to discuss “the idiosyncrasies of the particular nations and tribes with moderation and forbearance,” as it is demanded by the necessity of national peace. “All potential truth and goodwill [of strong critique of tribal idiosyncrasies] notwithstanding,” its unavoidable generalizations cause bitterness and would not lead to improvement anyway. “Above all, this is what the grave wrong and the immeasurable damage done by Herr v. Treitschke consist in.”<sup>23</sup> Mommsen repeats that Treitschke’s articles “certainly have been meant benevolently” and “are certainly based on much truth”, but

the sentiment of difference between the [Jewish] part of the German citizenry and its large majority has been held down so far by the strong feeling of duty on the side of the better part of the nation that understood that equal duty asks for equal rights and drew the consequences. Now, however, Herr v. Treitschke has proclaimed that this sentiment is the “natural reaction of the Germanic popular feeling against a foreign element,” “the eruption of a deep and long-suppressed anger.” These have been the words of Herr v. Treitschke, the one among all her writers to whom the German nation owes most gratefulness during her recent grave crises, whose pen was, and still is, one of the best swords in the struggle against the old hereditary enemy of the nation—particularism—a struggle that has been turned around but not yet completed.<sup>24</sup>

Mommsen stresses that he does not hold Treitschke responsible for the unintended effects of his interventions.<sup>25</sup> Leaving the question of intentions unanswered, Mommsen sticks to discussing the (unintended) effects of Treitschke’s intervention. He reproaches Treitschke for “preach[ing] civil war” because “every Jew of German nationality could not but understand the article as saying that he [Treitschke] views them as second-class citizens, at best as a reformable punishment battalion [besserungsfähige Strafcompagnie].”

Treitschke “might have intended a merely Platonic civil war; but unsurprisingly, it took the same turn that Platonic love tends to take.” Treitschke’s intervention deepened the gap and made “rabble of all classes fall eagerly on the defenseless prey” while even “the better ones” ended up “confused and wavering in their attitude.” Mommsen strongly conveys his anger about Treitschke’s intervention: it has been detrimental to what had been both men’s common political concern in the past, German nation building. Mommsen rules out, however, that Treitschke might simply have intended what he effectively did, to promote antisemitism. The behavior of the old comrade and colleague remains a mysterious and inexplicable disappointment for Mommsen. He expresses the hope that antisemitic agitation will soon give place to a return of tolerance. He argues that “tolerance of the synagogue . . . goes without saying” and demands “the more essential tolerance of the peculiarity of the Jews which is not their responsibility but given to them by fate.”<sup>26</sup> Mommsen seems to find “tolerance against religion” not threatened even by the antisemitic agitation. Tolerance against (by implication: ethnic or racial) “peculiarity,” however, does not go without saying but seems to be a property of the educated classes: “the strong sense of duty of the better part of the nation” has to “hold down” the “sentiment of difference” held by the not-so-good parts of the nation.<sup>27</sup>

Mommsen admits that there is a “particularity of German Jewry in good things as in bad” but insists that these things have to be discussed “in a way that is acceptable to the sensible Jew.” The nation has the duty to protect the Jews’ equality both legally and administratively: “And this duty, which we first of all owe to ourselves, is by no means dependent on good conduct of the Jews.”<sup>28</sup> Mommsen defends here the abstract universality of legal and political equality as irrespective of the particular actuality of individual subjects or groups of subjects. In the next sentence, however, he shifts from a statement about the state and citizenship (where the Jews are to be defended as equals) to one about civil society:

But we cannot defend them from the sentiment of strangeness and difference held still today by the Christian German against the Jewish German which—as is shown by the current situation once more—carries a danger for them just as

for us: the civil war of a majority against a minority, even as a mere possibility, is a national calamity. This is though, in part, the fault of the Jews. Today the word "Christianity" [Christenheit] might no longer mean fully what it used to mean; nevertheless it is the only word which still defines the entire international civilization of our day and in which millions and millions of people recognize themselves as intrinsically united on our highly populated globe. It is possible to remain outside these boundaries and yet live within the nation, but it is difficult and dangerous. He whose conscience—be it positive or negative—does not permit him to renounce his Judaism and accept Christianity will act accordingly and will accept the consequences; deliberations of this kind belong in the private chamber, not in public debate.<sup>29</sup>

Mommsen adds the "notorious fact" that many Jews are kept from conversion not by conscience "but by quite different emotions, which I can understand but not approve of." He cites the existence of numerous "specifically Jewish societies" that are not concerned with strictly religious issues: "I would never join a philanthropic institution obliged by statute to support no one but people from Holstein."<sup>30</sup> Mommsen takes up here again his view of the Jews as one of many German "tribes." However, he admits a small difference: "And while I respect the endeavors and achievements of these societies, I view their separate existence only as an aftereffect of the times before emancipation when Jews had the status of a group protected by the princes." Respect notwithstanding, the existence of these societies is anachronistic:

If those aftereffects are to disappear on the one side, they will have to disappear on the other side as well; and on both sides there is still much to be done. The admission into a large nation has its price. The people from Hanover, Hesse and we from Schleswig-Holstein are in the process of paying it, and we do feel that we are giving up a part of ourselves. But we make this sacrifice to our common fatherland. The Jews, too, will not be led by another Moses into the Promised Land; whether they sell trousers or write books, it is their duty to do away with their particularity as far as they can do so without offending their conscience, and with a firm hand to tear down all barriers between themselves and their German compatriots.

Mommsen mirrors the bifurcated structure of Treitschke's argument, which defends legal emancipation and does not explicitly demand the state to "solve" the "Jewish question," but envisages the need *for civil society* to find a solution. Mommsen does not refute Treitschke's argument about civil society, but he rearticulates it, including the demand for the Jews to "become Germans." His argument in these paragraphs distinguishes three groups of persons—or else three positions of agency—in German society. The first group or position is "we," which refers back to "the nation." "We," "the nation," have "the duty" to defend the legal equality of "the German Jews" (or "the Jewish Germans"; the second group), but "we" cannot defend "them" against the "Christian Germans," who appear to form a third group. Although it is also implied that all three groups together form the nation and will suffer together a "national calamity" if antisemitic agitation prevails, the development of the argument implies that the entity referred to as "we" is the nation in a more substantial sense than the totality of the three groups is. It is evident from the context that "we" refers to the liberal members of the educated classes who show a strong patriotic commitment. The statement that an antisemitic "civil war of a majority against a minority" would be a "national calamity" that would affect the Jews just as much as "us" seems to have the secondary meaning that it brings into danger the liberals and their parties in particular—which was at the time already clearly visible: the antisemitic campaign coincided with the end of the cohabitation of liberalism and Bismarck's state. If "we" have to defend the Jews but the Jews are themselves "partly" to blame for "the Christian Germans" forming a noisy rabble, then "we," "the nation," have to act as a worried, fatherly authority, looking after self-harming minors.<sup>31</sup> As far as the defense of the Jews coincides with liberal self-definition—namely, in the realm of the state and citizenship—the nation "owes" this engagement to itself and its principles; the defense of the Jews as abstractly equal citizens goes without saying. Beyond this, however, "the nation" is regrettably not in a position to offer much help: there is nothing that "we" could possibly do to change or alleviate "the sentiment of strangeness and difference held still today by the Christian German against the Jewish German." The



subsequent statement on the concept of “Christianity” gives indirectly a reason for this. Although its religious content seems less than relevant in the modern world, the concept of “Christianity” “still defines the entire international civilization of our day.” While Treitschke defines the German nation as intrinsically Christian—that is, non-Jewish—Mommsen defines “the entire international civilization” as such. The fact that “the nation” is unable to defend “the Jewish Germans” against the “sentiment” of “the Christian Germans” seems to imply that “the nation” is intrinsically part of that global Christian “civilization”; in other words, it *is* Christian, although “merely” in a cultural, not (anymore) in a strictly religious sense. While behind Treitschke’s claim that the nation-state needs to “have” a religion sits the horror of particularism and social atomization, Mommsen seems to imply that a world order of (nation-)states needs a unified global “civilization” to avoid general carnage—both of which are fully justified fears.<sup>32</sup> Nonconverted Jews, although formally equal citizens, place themselves outside global civilization. Mommsen argues that it is “possible” but “difficult and dangerous” to do so. He implies that Jews obviously know that; if some of them make such a risky choice they can be assumed to have urgent enough reasons. Mommsen names two possible reasons, only one of which he finds legitimate: one is religion, a private affair that ought to take place exclusively in the “private chamber”; the illegitimate reason is Jewish particularism and proto-nationalism.<sup>33</sup> Mommsen’s position is clear: difference and particularism are acceptable and do not put into question equal rights even if one places oneself outside the allegedly global civilization of Christianity. Nothing of that sort, however, should ooze out of the private chamber into the public realm. Particularism *in public* is an anachronistic leftover of the pre-bourgeois past. The precarious process of nation building rests on the readiness of *all* citizens to sacrifice public particularisms and restrict their idiosyncrasies to the private chamber.

Manuel Joël points to the contradiction between the massiveness of Treitschke’s argument and its rather thin conclusions. He suggests that the only consistent conclusion from Treitschke’s argument would have been the revocation of legal emancipation, a conclusion that “an elegant author”

leaves for others to formulate.<sup>34</sup> Philippson puts a positive spin on the same observation, writing that the German Jews can be optimistic because the Jew-haters do not have any practical suggestions to offer.<sup>35</sup> Naudh was one of those others whom Joël had on his mind: he made indeed practical suggestions, which he supported with a gloating reference to two speeches made by Napoleon in 1806.<sup>36</sup> Naudh points out triumphantly that his suggestions for how to revoke emancipation come from no lesser authority than the “birthplace of the ‘Rights of Man’” and the “glorious principles of 1789.” According to the translation used by Naudh, Napoleon called the Jews a “contemptible nation” that needed to be treated as “a distinct people, not a religious sect,” since they formed “a nation within the nation.”<sup>37</sup> The Jews, the “robber barons of modern times, veritable swarms of ravens,” appropriated whole villages.<sup>38</sup> Since they are “no real citizens” they must be treated according to state law, not civil law. Collective measures would be legitimate, because “whatever evil Jews do, does not stem from the faults of individuals but from the basic character of this people,” according to Napoleon, according to Naudh.<sup>39</sup> Naudh also quotes from the Napoleonic law of March 17, 1808, which contained mostly business regulations intended to cancel as well as prevent particular types of financial claims of Jewish creditors.<sup>40</sup> Naudh is gloating about being able to quote Napoleonic law that he uses as the model for his own list of anti-Jewish measures. In addition, he suggests a halt to immigration, a ban on Jewish entry to all state or communal office and the Jews’ removal from such posts (in exchange for compensation), the abolition of active and passive vote, expropriation of real estate (also with compensation), ban from the stock exchange and from running public bars, homogeneous distribution of all Jews over the country, and a *numerus clausus* to the effect that surplus numbers of Jews have to emigrate. All discriminations are meant to apply also to “baptized Jews” and to descendants from mixed marriage into the third generation “at least.” Two of his suggestions are only indirectly targeting the Jews: all newspaper articles ought to be signed by the actual author, and the advertising business has to become a state monopoly.<sup>41</sup>

Not unlike Mommsen, Harry Breßlau writes that when he first read about

the recent antisemitic agitation he felt no urge to intervene. The statement by Treitschke, however, with whom he used to stand in “friendly collegial relations,” sharing “essentially a common standpoint in political affairs,” he could not leave unanswered.<sup>42</sup> He expresses the wish to convince Treitschke of the inaccuracy, unfairness, and harmfulness of his intervention, while stressing that he is not “an unconditional apologist of our Jewry [Judenthums].”<sup>43</sup> Breßlau states that it has always been “popular to look for a scapegoat” and that in Germany the Jews tend to form a “convenient whipping boy.”<sup>44</sup> Treitschke, however, given his academic and political position, could be expected not to repeat “accusations heard a hundred times before”: instead he should “say what should happen in order to solve” the “Jewish question.” Breßlau writes: “I miss such positive suggestions. . . . You reject abolition or restriction of our emancipation as impossible and unworthy, but finally you restrict yourself to moral exhortations and for the lack of any other suggestion you put the solution of the problem into the hands of the Jews themselves, whom you call out to be Germans.” He points out that Treitschke’s intervention contributed “to make the barriers that still exist between Germans and Jews higher and stronger” and then formulates his own “positive suggestions” that focus on changing the public image of the Jews. Breßlau suggests that representations of the Jew are most often modeled on their “lowest elements” and that these representations are responsible for the generally held prejudice about the Jews: “The Jews that are presented in literature or onstage are either noble and good characters, who, though, are presented as exceptions, or they are junk dealers, peddlers and usurers whose language triggers the laughter, and whose mean behavior triggers the moral outrage of the multitude.”<sup>45</sup> Against this cliché, “every single Jew . . . has to conquer his civil and social position anew ever and ever again” only to be seen as a mere exception anyway.<sup>46</sup> “Christians are rather unfamiliar with the great mass of the urban Jewish population who live in quiet civil industriousness [in stiller bürgerlicher Arbeitsamkeit] without either the pompous luxury of the financial aristocracy or the rotten dirt of the existence of usurers and peddlers. . . . If one could succeed in assembling the concept of the Jew from the characteristics of that middle class without being

influenced by those higher or lower exceptions, I reckon the so-called Jewish question would be significantly closer to its solution." A man like Treitschke, "so extraordinarily gifted with the talent of the word," could have made an essential contribution to such a project.<sup>47</sup>

Breßlau deals with the problem of anti-Jewish sentiment as a case of prejudice. He seems to suggest that the search for scapegoats is a universal, quasi-natural reaction to social crisis, while the matter of who will be the scapegoat is a result of false or selective representations of social reality. He suggests that misleading representations of the Jew should be changed. Breßlau suggests a counter-strategy of media representation that would deemphasize the Jewish poor as well as the very rich and make the public image of Jewry more middle class. However, he does not indicate how he thinks his "positive suggestion" to change the public image could be implemented. One might wonder, how could writers, journalists, and scholars be persuaded to make the image of Jewry more middle class? Which social dynamic would be the basis of such a shift? Apart from that, a uniformly middle-class image of German Jewry would still have to stand comparison with a not-so-uniform social reality. Furthermore, it is probably not true that the German media of the time excluded representations of the Jewish middle classes; the widely read liberal *Gartenlaube*, for example, seems to have done so quite effectively.<sup>48</sup> It is also notable that Breßlau's "quiet civil industriousness" is not very far from Treitschke's ideal of "ancient good-natured willingness to work."

Breßlau concedes to Treitschke that despite disagreements on a number of issues, "there can be no disagreement between us about what is evil and mean and therewith worth fighting" within Jewry.<sup>49</sup> Breßlau assures Treitschke of his cooperation in this fight, adding, however, that "*this* fight cannot be fought in public" and that the offer of cooperation is conditional on Treitschke's supporting the Jewish "defense of our honor that is being slandered" and "the defense of our fatherland that some want to take away from us."<sup>50</sup> Breßlau demands that Treitschke declare himself clearly in support of emancipation of those Jews who are, or want to be, proper Germans: "I may hope that we in turn can also count on the support of my colleague

in this just struggle of defense . . . and I am sure that when the leaders of this movement delude the German people into thinking that Heinrich von Treitschke was their ally, it does not happen with his consent.”<sup>51</sup> Judging from the context, Breßlau does not seem to be sarcastic.

A satisfying answer to the question “What does Herr von Treitschke want?” has not been found yet.

## Seven. Dissent and Consensus in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute

Treitschke formulated the positions that triggered the Dispute in the context of his analysis of the growing precariousness of international relations. The continued existence of the *kleindeutsche* nation-state is the supreme value underlying his analysis. The international situation makes enforcing national cohesion, including religiosity and moral culture (*Sittlichkeit*), more urgent, and this is the framework for his discussion of antisemitism. Treitschke claims antisemitism is a “symptom” of a general anti-liberal trend. While he expresses ambivalence about the demotic elements of the antisemitic movement, he strongly welcomes the “deeper” reality to which the symptom is said to refer. His position on the concept of the nation is complicated by a tension between on the one hand his reference to *Volksgeist* as a central analytical category, and on the other hand his elitist and hierarchical conception of society: he celebrates *ethnos* but demonizes *demos*. While earlier forms of Jew-baiting (especially the events of 1819) are dismissed as “medieval,” liberal anti-antisemitism is denounced as merely reversed Jew-baiting, equally anachronistic and illegitimate. The current anti-Jewish campaign is characterized as a legitimate and considered reaction against the negative (side) effects of Jewish emancipation. Treitschke emphasizes that the “Jewish question” is more acute and of a different character in Germany than in neighboring countries and that it cannot be suppressed easily: antisemitism is an authentic expression of a general anti-liberal tendency of the *Volksgeist* (although articulated in different ways by members of different social

groups). While he rejects some specific articulations of antisemitism, he welcomes the general tendency.

### **Antisemitism: Demagoguery, Pretext, Upper- or Lower-Class Phenomenon, or Resulting from a Lack of Liberty?**

Graetz, Meyer, Breßlau, and Joël reject Treitschke's interpretation of antisemitism as a "symptom" of a change in the *Volksgeist*. They assert that the antisemitic movement is a marginal phenomenon and merely a product of demagoguery and manipulation, in particular by enemies of Bismarck, of the Reich, and of National Liberalism. Naudh supports Treitschke except for two significant aspects: he identifies current antisemitism with all previous forms of Jew-hatred and argues that there has been an uninterrupted continuity of "eternal" antisemitism since the time of Moses. Further, he defends the more populist forms of antisemitism against Treitschke's bourgeois elitism and—elaborating on a remark made by Treitschke himself—develops a nationalist-populist criticism of the bourgeois concept of *Bildung*.

Bamberger and Oppenheim, like other liberal commentators, agree with Treitschke's view that antisemitism is a partial aspect of a wider anti-liberal agenda. Bamberger suggests that it originates within the educated class and is less significant in the lower classes, but despite being a minority view he believes it should not be underestimated. Oppenheim goes as far as calling antisemitism a "pretext." He holds responsible the triumph of realpolitik and the brutalization of political culture, partly as an effect of the experience of warfare. Although he warns that civilizational progress can be reversed, he remains all in all optimistic. Cassel adds a different perspective with his remark that the Jews are "begrudged" the benefits of emancipation because society as a whole does not enjoy liberty.

### **Antisemitism: Nationalist or Anti-Nationalist?**

While Cassel denounces antisemitism as an "exuberance" of nationalism, in the "Declaration of the Notables" it is argued that antisemitism is parochial and particularist and that it threatens national unity. All those who can make beneficial contributions should be integrated and assimilated into the

nation. Out of all the documents, the Declaration asserts most unequivocally the link between the defense of Jewish emancipation and that of the liberal socioeconomic order. It is significant that Treitschke fails at first to understand that the Declaration is directed against himself, among others. Mommsen asserts that the success of national unification has created antisemitism as its “deformed child” which is now threatening its “parent,” national unity. Although he shows himself confident that national unity will survive this (self-incurred) backlash, he writes that it does grave damage to the nation.

### **The German Jewish Question, the Belated Nation, and the Immigration of Unassimilable Polish Jews**

A peculiar characteristic of Treitschke’s argument (as far as I can see, shared by no other anti-Jewish writer of the time) is the claim that there is not just a “Jewish question” but a specifically *German* “Jewish question.” Treitschke argues that on the one hand the weakness and belatedness of German nation building, on the other hand the numbers and specific characteristics of the Jews that live in, and are migrating to, Germany constitute the *German* “Jewish question.” The Jews immigrating to Germany are “Jews of the Polish branch.” They are numerous, rise easily into positions of power, and are less assimilable than the “Spanish Jews” of Western Europe. Instead of assimilating, they turned more arrogant and stubbornly idiosyncratic the more influential they became thanks to legal emancipation. Treitschke’s argument culminates in the notion that the history of the “Spanish” Jews is a “history of freedom” like that of the “occidental” nations, while that of the “Polish” branch of Jewry is not. This lack of a “heroic” history makes the latter unassimilable to German culture.

Few respondents (Cassel, Rülff) defend the legitimacy of migration. Most (Bamberger, Lazarus, Graetz, Neumann) deny that there is clear statistical evidence that would support Treitschke’s claim and assert the loyalty and German-mindedness of the majority of German Jews, and even that of the “Germanic” Jews in Poland (Rülff, Bamberger). Lazarus and Graetz ridicule the notion that a numerically small minority like the Jews could “corrupt”



the moral fiber of the German nation. Treitschke's claim of a correlation between Jewish willingness to assimilate and the differing ethnicity of Jews of the "Spanish" and "Polish" branches is rejected unanimously and with detailed historical argument.

### **The Precariousness of the German Nation and the Dangers of Mixed Culture**

One aspect of Treitschke's argument that was not challenged was his claim that German national unity is singularly precarious and needs to be actively defended. Treitschke suggests that unless the Jews "become Germans," Germanic civilization is in danger of being replaced by "German-Jewish mixed culture." Although he does not demand formal religious conversion, he demands the Jews should completely assimilate culturally. He names as evidence for a Jewish lack of commitment to assimilation the failure of Jews to make first-rank contributions to German culture; they are prominent only in inferior practices such as journalism.

Treitschke's argument here is based on two presuppositions. First, becoming German is a cultural issue. One crucial aspect of culture is economic behavior, while religious denomination—as opposed to "religiosity"—is secondary; literature and journalism are exemplary because they are cultural and economic at the same time. Lazarus, Breßlau, and Oppenheim hold, in contrast, that the Jews contribute significantly, and they see this contribution as evidence of a commitment to German culture and nation. Treitschke replies with a discussion of Heine; he acknowledges Heine's merits but attributes them to his Germanness: they have, as it were, been achieved only *despite* Heine's Jewishness. Treitschke's second presupposition is that the Jewish failure to assimilate threatens the unity and purity of German culture. No contributor challenges the validity and necessity of assimilation as such except Nadyr, who counters that the German Jews are already too "Germanized."

### **Purity and Diversity of Culture, Race, and Amalgamation**

Bamberger and Lazarus challenge the concept of "pure culture" as such and argue that the potential of any culture depends on its ability to assimilate.

Breßlau also asserts that German culture is a “mixed culture” resting on Germanity, Christianity, and classical antiquity. He supports Treitschke’s demand for the Jews to “become Germans” but asserts that they are more clearly in the process of becoming Germans than, for example, Catholic ultramontanists. Lazarus suggests that the concept of historical progress that underpins Treitschke’s position needs to be rearticulated and argues that progress consists in growing diversity. The earlier stage within a development ought not to have to disappear but could coexist with subsequent stages, as in the case of Judaism and Christianity. The “permanent vocation of the Jews” is the furthering of difference while at the same time being a particular embodiment of the generically human.

Naudh also defends diversity against universality, but the thrust of his contribution is to accuse liberalism of ignoring the value of diversity. Liberal egalitarianism tries to distract from the danger that unassimilable Jews constitute for German particularity. He rejects the notion that German culture is a “mixed culture,” because Greeks, Romans, and Germans are “of the same race.” Up to the present moment, Semitic influences have been irrelevant to Germanic culture. Jews have to be excluded from both state and society, because their parasitical and unethical character is a racial trait and cannot be overcome by assimilation. Treitschke also rejects the notion that German culture is a “mixed culture.” Differing from Naudh, he claims that German culture has “amalgamated” Germanic, Christian, and classical elements to the effect that they no longer constitute a “mixture” of distinct elements. Treitschke admits that German culture is an “amalgam” but does not want that amalgam to be *further* mixed with “neo-Jewish” elements.

### German Spirit and Jewish Spirit

While most respondents engage in a defense of (some remaining) Jewish difference against Treitschke’s demand for complete assimilation, Bamberger and Lazarus also make a point about the affinity of the German and Jewish “spirits”: the Germans are the people Jews have been most strongly attracted to out of all peoples, and the high level of emotion in the Dispute itself is evidence of this. Both Jews and Germans are inclined toward spirituality,

cosmopolitanism, abstract thinking, and speculation (both in the intellectual and commercial senses). Lazarus emphasizes that—differences in dogma notwithstanding—there are strong affinities in morality (*Sittenlehre*) and all essential aspects of religiosity. Bamberger stresses that given the fundamental affinity, the remaining differences of character and temperament are beneficial for German culture and politics.

### Manchesterism and Unproductive Jews

Treitschke holds (in his first contribution) that the Jews, in their appearance as speculators and usurers, characterized by dishonesty, deception, and greed, are about to destroy what he thinks are the traditional, pre-capitalist ethics of the German people, its “good-natured willingness to work,” that is, to work not for utility and financial profit only. Treitschke cites the allegedly disproportionate Jewish involvement in the *Gründer*-boom as evidence. The “anti-capitalist” undertones of Treitschke’s remarks spark a strong reaction from Philippson, Oppenheim, and Bamberger and in the “Declaration of the Notables,” to the effect that Treitschke does not come back to this line of reasoning. Treitschke’s adoption of what Oppenheim denounces as a quasi-socialist argument is the only aspect of his argument that Treitschke abandons. Oppenheim defends the notion of work as business against any alternative notion of work as an “ethical” or state service. The Declaration asserts the link between the demand for religious equality and that for “equal sun in competition.” Bamberger asserts that successful businesses do not exploit society but make it richer, and he likens Treitschke’s anti-Jewish stance to the pan-Slavonic campaign against the (economically successful) German minority in Russia (a campaign that Treitschke himself had criticized). Joël and Oppenheim stress that Jews were not involved in the *Gründungen* beyond the extent of their share among businesspeople. Breßlau supports Treitschke’s attack on Jewish speculators but points out that the Jews’ higher share in the financial sectors has specific historical reasons not of the Jews’ own choosing.

The “straightforward” antisemites Naudh and Endner, however, take up the economic argument and develop it in more detail. As with Treitschke,

the racial, ethnic-cultural, and economic arguments are closely intertwined in their comments. For Naudh, Christianity was a revolution against “Manchesterism” and utilitarianism as invented by the Jews two thousand years ago. Contemporary Germans are the “breadwinners” for unproductive Jews, who have become so numerous—especially in Berlin—as to overburden the Germans. Naudh demands a halt to Jewish immigration, while Endner suggests (in addition) resettling the Jews in remote and uncultivated parts of the countryside and making them embrace productive occupations.

### **Healthy Patriotism and Exaggerated Nationalism**

The question of how state, nation, race, and religion should relate to each other is—quantitatively and conceptually—at the center of the Dispute. No participant in the Dispute questions the validity of nationalism and the notion that the nation-state is the form of state adequate to and characteristic of modern society. Lazarus and Cohen are most explicit in arguing that the building of nations and nation-states is a crucial civilizational and ethical endeavor for humanity; Cohen goes as far as declaring the nation as significant as religion.

All contributors emphasize that the nation ought to create unity as well as the consciousness of unity, that is, national consciousness. However, Philippson and Bamberger in particular emphasize that “exaggerated” nationalism can “degenerate” and become exclusionary. For them, “exaggerated nationalism” overlaps with socialism and threatens the liberal-capitalist social order. In the case of pan-Slavism, Treitschke, too, rejects a variation of (quasi-racial) nationalism because it undermines rather than strengthens “healthy patriotism.” Cohen warns that nationalism must not become a “moral norm” and must not exclude from the nation those who do not have, or do not want to have, another nation (such as, it is implied, the German Jews).

### **National Spirit and Racial Matter; Intermarriage and the Amalgamation of Tribes**

Treitschke, Bamberger, and Mommsen hold that nations are constituted by the amalgamation of tribes. In the process—a crucial aspect of historical

progress—the nation's tribal constituents have to lose to a large extent their particular characteristics. However, Mommsen also emphasizes that it is important that their differing particular characteristics go into the national amalgam. Only Naudh seems to disagree with the basic theory that the nation is constituted through an amalgamation of different elements. While Treitschke deplores the decrease of conversions and intermarriage as a negative side effect of emancipation, Naudh argues that intermarriage is not a means of assimilation at all but helps further Jewish domination. Cohen holds that a degree of racial unity of the nation is necessary and that the nation ought to develop “its racial type.” Only Cohen and Naudh (neither of whom subscribes to a strict mind-body dualism) reject the conception formulated by Lazarus (and silently shared by all the others) that national spirit ought to overcome and transcend racial-corporeal matter. Unlike Naudh, however, Cohen argues for assimilation, implying that “racial type” is in itself already the result of historical development: national “spirit” and racial/tribal “body” overcome each other in a dialectical way, resulting in a new national spirit and body. He also holds that although “racial instinct” is “natural,” it must not be allowed to degenerate into a principle of exclusion of those “who do not have, nor want to have, another nation.”

### Objective versus Subjective Elements of the Nation

Lazarus also entertains some kind of a dialectical tension between what he calls the “objective” and “subjective” elements of the nation. While language (not race) is the most important objective element in the formation of a nation, the nation is constituted by a subjective, spiritual as well as historical constellation that intervenes in objectively given conditions. Although not independent from material conditions, the nation is “a spiritual creation of the individuals who constitute it.” The national spirit is in turn, however, a product of common history and destiny (which are at least partly objective elements). Despite his insistence on the relevance of “objective” factors, Lazarus rejects the reference to “race” because it means undermining the human effort to spiritualize existence.

Naudh embraces a static concept of “race” that the “national spirit” cannot

overcome. Bamberger argues that the category of “race” has been adopted only to further legitimize an injustice that used to be justified on grounds of religion. The discussion of “race” is but a pretext for the continued and anachronistic existence of an ancient antipathy.

### Christian Nation, Secular State, Religious Form

Another bone of contention is the relationship between religion and nation. Treitschke writes that the Germans are a “Christian nation,” while the German state—as a modern state—is secular. However, the Germans ought to “preserve the Christian character of their institutions.” Treitschke and Cohen agree that different religions can only temporarily coexist in one nationality and with one religion ruling over the other(s). Philippson and Lazarus argue that politics is beyond religion and that the Jews ought to maintain their religious particularity. Cohen rejects this as a “flawed liberal slogan” and argues that all members of a nation ought to participate in that nation’s religious foundation. However, he also rejects Treitschke’s notion that Judaism is the religion of “an alien tribe”: for Cohen common religiosity is what matters, while the difference between Jewish and Christian religious *form* is unproblematic: also, the German Jews “breathe out of the culture of Christianity.” Naudh argues that religion is the supreme expression of morality (*Sittlichkeit*) and as such pivotal to the national character of a people. Like Cohen and Treitschke, he rejects the idea that politics is unaffected by religion. Unlike Cohen, however, he does not distinguish between religiosity and religious form, and this brings him to a different conclusion: under the condition of modernity—where the state is based on nationality, to which religion is crucial—the separation of state and church has become meaningless.

### Assimilation and the Unity of the State

Jewish assimilation is advocated by all contributors except Naudh, who does not believe that assimilation is possible. Treitschke’s position is ambivalent: he advocates assimilation, but his portrayal of the Jews and their culture seems to suggest implicitly the conclusion (drawn by Naudh explicitly on

the grounds of “race”) that the Jews cannot assimilate to the German nation. Treitschke supports his claim that complete Jewish amalgamation is impossible with the further claim that the “abyss” between Jews and Gentiles is “thousands” of years old and especially made permanent by the fact that the Jews are a “nation without a state.” This brings them inevitably into conflict with any existing state’s endeavors to protect its cultural-political unity. The conclusion has to be for the Jews to act with discretion and modesty in order not to provoke any escalation of this unbridgeable contradiction. In this context Treitschke refers affirmatively to the Roman state’s persecution of the Christians as these were then seen as just another Jewish sect. Cassel points out that this contradicts Treitschke’s repeated invocations of Christianity. It clearly shows that for Treitschke religion is subordinate to *raison d’état*. Graetz responds on the level of historical facts, trying to disprove the existence of official Roman anti-Judaism. The crux of Treitschke’s argument that Jewish (or rather, any) cultural particularism has by necessity to be overruled by “the hard necessity of the unity of the state” is in this context not challenged by any respondent.

### Religion, Religiosity, Denomination, and *Glaubensart*

Treitschke as well as Lazarus and Cohen discuss the question of the relationship between Christian and Jewish religion under the perspective of what it means for national unification, although Cohen includes more strictly theological arguments in his discourse than do Treitschke and Lazarus. Cohen and Treitschke insist—against Lazarus—that religion is central to nation building, but Cohen disagrees from Treitschke on the definition of religion, employing a (Kantian) distinction between specific “religions” and “religiosity.” While Treitschke emphasizes that Protestant and Catholic denominations can come together in the nation because they share the same religion—excluding the Jews from this possibility—Cohen asserts that adherents of all forms of religion (*Glaubensarten*) can come together as long as they share *Religion* in the sense of (ethical) religiosity.

While Treitschke and Naudh see Christianity as a departure and a progressive development away from Judaism, Lazarus and Cohen maintain that

Christianity has added a new element to the evolution of religion without making Judaism redundant or anachronistic. Lazarus argues for maintaining religious difference despite national amalgamation, and Cohen argues for only temporary religious difference until a higher synthesis of Judaism and Protestantism is achieved. All authors rely on a concept of progress: while Treitschke argues that Judaism has already been sublated and overcome—that is, rendered anachronistic—by Protestantism, Cohen expects this to happen in the future. Lazarus sees growing diversity itself as a sign of progress. For Naudh, even those elements of Judaism that were absorbed into Christianity are evil and need to be eliminated: Christianity came into its own only in its successful history within the “Aryan peoples,” not in its futile attempts to win over the Jews.

### **Possibility and Impossibility of Assimilation**

There is general agreement in the Dispute that the Jews were and are obliged to “become Germans” as part of the “barter,” as it were, of emancipation for assimilation. Treitschke claims they have not yet done so sufficiently (with which some of the interlocutors also agree) and casts doubt on whether they are actually capable of complete assimilation. Here lies a fundamental fault line that runs not only between Treitschke and his liberal critics but also through Treitschke’s argument itself when he demands, on the one hand, assimilation, but on the other hand denounces it as impossible. With the second face of his discourse Treitschke comes close to Naudh’s unambiguous position. Treitschke explicitly chooses a polemic against Graetz as his vehicle for demonstrating that the antisemitism dispute is essentially about the question of nationality. Instrumental to this choice is the argument about the differing evaluation of the heritage of German-Jewish culture. Graetz’s writing vacillates between a (“proto-Zionist”) Jewish nationalist sentiment and a critical perspective on German culture that emphasizes the failure of German Enlightenment writers to support unequivocally the cause of Jewish emancipation. Treitschke rejects paradigmatic figures of German-Jewish culture (with the exception of Gabriel Riesser) as well as German non-Jews who were supportive of the Jewish cause (Lessing). Through



selective quotation he constructs an exaggerated portrayal of Graetz as a Jewish nationalist and implies that Graetz's attitude is representative of that of the German Jews of the time. Joël points out the contradictory character of Treitschke's accusing the Jews of fancying themselves as non-Germans when they ought to embrace their Germanness, and at the same time of being aliens who only masquerade as Germans for tactical reasons. Joël is also the only author who defends Graetz against Treitschke's, Cohen's, and Philippson's verdicts. Lazarus, Cohen, and Meyer unequivocally assert that the German Jews are Germans. Lazarus, Bamberger, and most strongly Cohen regret having to respond "as Jews" at all. Philippson reproaches Cohen for directing the demand to become (more) German at the Jews when it should be directed at all Germans. While rejecting the notion of a Jewish nationality, all respondents nevertheless assert and defend some sense of Jewishness that would be compatible with assimilation. Apart from Joël, only Oppenheim rejects the notion that the Jews lack Germanness. For him, the Jews' defending their emancipation does not contradict but is rather evidence of their determination to assimilate to German nationality and culture.

### **Emancipation for Assimilation; Universal versus Positive Law**

Treitschke's remarks on legal emancipation are highly ambivalent. On the one hand, he endorses "civil equality" as a general mark of "civilization," which has to be paid for, however, with complete assimilation. On the other hand, he implies that the Jews' "tribal characteristics" do not allow complete assimilation to happen, which in turn means that their emancipation can never be "complete." Joël and Philippson endorse a natural law conception of civil rights, while "Börne" claims that civil and human rights are inseparable because they emerge together within the context of (bourgeois) society. Philippson interprets Treitschke's position in the light of a formulation by another anti-Jewish pamphletist who argued that civil rights for the Jews are rooted in the "positive will of the state" and the "overall culture of its subjects," not in the individualistic concept of universal natural law. Philippson qualifies the natural law position by stating that the state cannot deny civil rights to anyone "born within the country to parents who were

also born there.” “Börne” asserts that rights are formulated irrespective of individual merit. He strongly endorses the necessity of assimilation but argues that only general social and political progress can deliver it. Cohen rejects the unmediated concept of natural law and argues that the action of the state is, or ought to be, rooted in how the particular nation conceives of the universal “moral law.” By insisting on how the universal is articulated in a specific national culture, Cohen attempts to mediate the two concepts of “right”—the universal one and the positive, historically relative one.

### **German Disunity and the Power of Jewry**

Treitschke’s “demand” is simply that the Jews give up their remaining reservations about “becoming Germans.” The antisemitic movement (which is the German people’s response to the lack of respect on the side of the Jews) should help the Germans reaching “a stricter concept of the state and its obligations” and “a more vigorous national consciousness.” Only civil society—not the state—can solve the “Jewish question” caused by the arrogance of the Jews. Inasmuch as the Germans have been indulging in tolerance, Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, and relativism (endangering their own “firm religious conviction”), they are complicit in the “power of Jewry.” Only a strong reassertion of Christian conviction and the overcoming of clerical disunity can create a situation in which the Germans will be able to “afford” being tolerant. The German nation demands from the Jews nothing it would not demand from all its citizens. If the Jews, however, continue acting as if building a “state within the state” and frustrating German expectations of their assimilation, they may provoke not only the reversal of legal emancipation but also anti-Jewish pogroms.

Direct responses to these aspects of Treitschke’s discourse are few. Naudh argues straightforwardly that the Jews are “a distinct people, not a religious sect” and form “a nation within the nation.” They need to be treated as a foreign, conquering nation; not individual Jews but the Jews as a people are evil, and specific legislation is needed to deal with them. In the first place it ought to restrict economic freedoms and freedom of movement. Similarly, Endner demands resettlement and “productivization” of the Jews.

Breßlau reproaches Treitschke for having failed to make any specific suggestions for how to solve the “Jewish question”: Treitschke merely repeats old accusations that help to make the existing barriers higher and stronger. Breßlau agrees about what is “evil and mean” within Jewry and what needs to be fought. However, this fight can only be fought together if Treitschke lends his support to defend Jewish honor. Breßlau’s practical suggestion is that representations of Jews in literature or onstage be modeled on the middle-class normality of German Jewry. Mommsen reproaches Treitschke for having violated a specific duty that the “better part of the nation” has toward nation building: the duty to hold down “sentiments of difference” felt by other members of the nation. Mommsen holds that it is crucial to the process of the nation’s maturing toward self-government that its representatives are able to discuss the “idiosyncracies” of particular groups within the nation with “moderation and forbearance.” The nation owes to itself the protection of the Jews’ religion and peculiarity, irrespective of their conduct. However, Mommsen warns that the state cannot do more than warrant legal equality: “we”—that is, the national-liberal elite—cannot defend the Jews from popular hostility based on a sense of difference. Since Christianity still defines international civilization, the Jews’ refusal to convert remains a dangerous and difficult personal choice. Mommsen’s only practical suggestion is that in order not to provoke a civil war that would endanger the Jews as well as national unity, Jews need to understand their obligation to practice their religion in private, not in public. They ought to give up all not strictly religious communal Jewish institutions that could be interpreted by others as expressions of an anachronistic national particularism.

Bamberger’s position is in this respect not very different from Mommsen’s. Bamberger argues that Treitschke acted with the best patriotic intentions but that these were frustrated by Treitschke’s assertions about the detrimental influence of the German Jews and his failure to reject the antisemitic agitation. Treitschke’s, and more generally the antisemites’, indictments can be expected to reinforce separatist sentiments on the side of the German Jews wherever such sentiments still exist. They damage the process of nation building. Bamberger’s argument rests on a distinction between Treitschke’s

good (liberal) intentions and an anachronistic, anti-Jewish “intellectual tendency.” Bamberger appreciates Treitschke’s concern with restoring Christian religion as a bulwark against the threat of Social Democracy, but he has reservations as to whether it is feasible to defend bourgeois order with the help of religion. However, Bamberger insists it should be done without attacking the Jews, since they are allies of order and respectability, not of disorder and socialism.

### **Some Extent of Consensus**

The discussion and analysis of the multiple and complex differences among the positions held in the Dispute has also shown that all involved agree on what needs or deserves to be discussed and what goes unquestioned. The foremost and most general consensus is that the nation-state is the form of state most adequate to modern society, and that this form of state and society needs to warrant its cohesion through some form of national culture, including a sense of morality. Furthermore, there is a general agreement that morality is in some way intertwined with religion. However, opinions vary as to whether national culture implies a shared (positive) religion or merely general religiosity: the shared, national-liberal discourse is based on state, nation, culture, and morality as a chain of closely related concepts, while the link from culture and morality to religion or religiosity is less clear and thus fiercely contended. It is in this last element that the divide between the liberalism of the defenders of emancipation and the illiberalism of Treitschke and the antisemites seems to be located. This observation must throw the concept of liberalism into relief, however: Treitschke presents his own orientation as a turning away from liberalism, and while some see it the same way, others continue to address him as a fellow liberal whose illiberal aberrations may be merely local and temporary, whereas the straightforward antisemites remain skeptical of him for exactly the same reason. Arguably, it was because he remained basically a liberal that Treitschke found little fault with the “Declaration of the Notables” and initially missed the point of it.

Conceptions of “culture” in the Dispute are as if on a sliding scale, with one extreme being a monolithic, racial concept of culture, a majority opinion

that culture is based on an “amalgam,” and the opposite pole holding that culture is, and ought to be, “mixed” and open-ended. Those who think culture is an “amalgam” think, or at least seem not to reject, that there is a point when enough “mixing” has taken place, that is, when the amalgam is a quasi-“pure” culture. There is little opposition to the notion that immigration by “Eastern Jews” challenges the sense of who the members of the nation are: the dissent is about whether or not the immigrants are numerous enough to cause a problem.

All National Liberals except Treitschke view the movement that refers to itself with the neologism “antisemitic” as a threat to national unity: the nationalism of the antisemites is dangerous because it is “exaggerated,” a notion that resonates with Treitschke’s own rejection of pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism. The closest thing to a definition of what exactly constitutes “exaggerated nationalism” is that it turns on the nationalist endeavor itself. It is in this sense that antisemites appear as “enemies of the Reich” and of National Liberalism.

There is a consensus that some groups are “too different” to be included in the nation. It is unclear, however, where the threshold of difference lies that one ought not to cross in order to be recognized as a member of the nation. The defenders of the Jews argue either that the Jews are less different than the antisemites claim or that in spite of being different they are not numerous enough to do much damage. It is also pointed out that they constitute not the only, and not even the most pressing, problem: other groups (Catholics, socialists) are more different as well as more numerous, that is, much more dangerous.

There is a clearly articulated clash of opinions between, on the one hand, Treitschke’s concern about the “Jewish” (i.e., modern capitalist) threat to the Germans’ “good-natured willingness to work” and, on the other hand, the support for market capitalism and utilitarian ethics. It is significant that Treitschke, not normally one to easily change his mind following criticism, abandoned this issue straight after it was signaled to him that his endorsing the “anti-capitalist” aspect of the antisemitic program contradicted his well-known polemics against *Katheders* socialism. In the context of the Dispute,

not even Treitschke's rhetorical abilities sufficed to formulate the attack on "Manchesterism" (in political terms, on left liberalism) without sounding like a "socialist."

Furthermore, on the more philosophical level there is a general consensus (excluding only Naudh and Endner) that "spirit" ought to prevail over "matter." The adoption or condemnation of the demand for "racial unity" is dependent on whether reference to "race" is deemed compatible with a general framework of idealism (Cohen, Treitschke) or whether it means succumbing to "materialism" (Lazarus). There is a consensus that there is progress in the evolution of religion—a fundamental liberal concept—but there is dissent about whether each step invalidates all previous ones, or whether the remnants of earlier stages in the development remain valid and legitimate, or will remain valid only until a perfect synthesis will have been reached.

There is a consensus that "the particular" needs to feed into, and be overcome by, the quasi-universal (the nation), and that the universal and the historically relative need to be mediated. Civic rights as well as political forms and institutions need to be mediated with historically specific national-cultural traditions. The dissent is over which side in this process ought to prevail.

All in all it seems that the contradiction between Treitschke's "undoubtedly good intentions" and their adverse effects are connected in ways that the liberal critics of antisemitism were not able to pin down. Not one of the liberal politicians and academics but—out of all people—the priest, Paulus Cassel, gave a hint that no one considered worthy of discussion: that the public discussion on whether Jewish emancipation should be revoked was an indication that (liberal) society is lacking in liberty in a generic sense.



## **II. The State, the Nation, and the Jews**



*This section is devoted to exploring the theoretical implications of the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute. Taking its cues from the textual analysis, the discussion focuses on the interrelations among liberalism, nationalism, and antisemitism, aiming at theoretical-conceptual as well as historical-political contextualization of the Dispute. In the exploration of National Liberalism in chapter 9, special attention will be given to Treitschke's role; chapter 10 will discuss the concept of nationalism, especially in the German imperial context; chapter 8 will point to some of the continuities and the ruptures in the development of nineteenth-century antisemitism in Germany.*

## Eight. Antisemitism

The Viennese rabbi Adolf Jellinek predicted in 1866 that the antithesis “Christians against Jews” was going to be replaced by that of “Aryans against Semites,” the “new Jewish question.”<sup>1</sup> The emergence of a movement that chose to refer to itself with the neologism “antisemitic” around 1880 proved him right. The social and intellectual process that found expression in the new concept, however, reached back much farther. The rather ambiguous phenomenon that can best be described as “modern antisemitism” is the product of the specific late-nineteenth-century synthesis of pro- and anti-modern forms of antisemitism. The product of this synthesis is “modern” not because of any of its formal aspects (being formulated in racial as opposed to theological language, e.g.) but because of its specific social content: it is a form of anti-modernism, anti-capitalism, and anti-liberalism that is not one. Throughout the twentieth century and still today, this has remained the specific nature of modern antisemitism.

The word “Semitic” had been established as a collective term for the Hebrew, Phoenician, Arabic, Aramaic, and Ethiopian languages by eighteenth-century scholars.<sup>2</sup> The concept of a “Semitic race” was introduced by historians, philologists, and political commentators in the 1840s.<sup>3</sup> The exact origin of the term “antisemitic” is not known. The earliest known reference seems to be an article in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des deutschen Judentums* (September 2, 1879) reporting the announcement of an “antisemitic journal” by Wilhelm Marr.<sup>4</sup> At the end of the same month there were advertisements for the

foundation of an “Antisemitic League” which did, however, little more than propagate the word. The breakthrough of the term as a new political keyword occurred in the course of the year 1880. The new term was “conveniently inaccurate,” as it implied more than “just” hatred of the Jews but still left no doubts about the target.<sup>5</sup> It also “tended to load on the Jews . . . the whole weight of ‘Asiatic barbarism.’”<sup>6</sup> The proponents of “antisemitism” claimed that “Semites” (in particular, Jews as the most prominent and exemplary group) had “always” been hated, although the new term was chosen to signal, and in the consciousness of, its modernity. This double character—in itself a modern feature of antisemitism—resembles the like ambivalence of the concept of the modern nation. Those who coined the new word (and many contemporaries) seem to have felt that they “invented” something radically new; however, the explicit reference to the notion of a “Semitic race” was not more than a shift in emphasis within a discourse significant parts of which had presupposed that notion for a long time (see below). The words “antisemitism” and “Jew-hatred”—as far as the modern period is concerned—are, and should be used as, synonyms: an overemphasis on a rupture around 1880 (when the former term was coined) is misleading because it gives undue credit to the antisemitic claim that the movement that referred to itself with that name was something new and different from, for example, the Jew-hatred of 1819 or 1848. Furthermore, the overlap between Jew-hatred that is articulated within the rhetoric of race and those forms of Jew-hatred that do not use that same rhetoric is so strong that such a conceptual distinction obscures more than it clarifies.<sup>7</sup> This is why also Volkov, for example, writes that the role of racism “in shaping ‘modern’ antisemitism was less than crucial.”<sup>8</sup> Use of the word “race” meant, as it were, “Look at me, I am radical!” It was a specific, deliberately offensive form of saying something that could also be said, and had been said, in other ways.

The most perplexing aspect of nineteenth-century antisemitism is that hatred of Jews could express opposition to modern liberal society, nationalism, and “bourgeois revolution” as well as (nationalist, bourgeois, liberal) opposition to reaction and counterrevolution. As will become clear, modern antisemitism mirrors in this respect also the fundamental structure of the

discourse of modern liberalism. Modern, late-nineteenth-century antisemitism originated historically from two antagonistic sources at the same time, and each side left its traces in all subsequent forms and manifestations of antisemitism. How to take account of this peculiar phenomenon, appreciating the branching out of an increasing number of differential and contradictory, even antagonistic, manifestations rather than fragmenting the historiography of nineteenth-century antisemitism to so many descriptions of successive distinct phenomena, must be the touchstone of any interpretation of modern antisemitism. The short period of anti-feudal reform in Prussia between 1807 and 1815 gave birth to a form of antisemitism that expressed conservative aristocratic opposition to modernization. The Prussian conservative landlord Ludwig von der Marwitz argued in 1811 that the legal introduction of the free alienability of real estate made Prussia “a new-fangled Jew-state [ein neumodischer Judenstaat].”<sup>9</sup> The antisemitic German-nationalist radicals from the period of the anti-Napoleonic wars (Arndt, Fries) were anti-reform and anti-French.<sup>10</sup> The anti-Jewish and anti-French agitation of the “Wartburgfest” (1817) included celebrating Luther as well as burning copies of the Code Napoléon. Anti-modernist antisemites adopted in this context the idea first developed by the French Catholic reaction to the French Revolution that the Jews were “useful instruments” for Illuminati and Jacobins who were carrying out a conspiracy against religion, monarchy, civil society, and property.<sup>11</sup> Anti-modernist antisemitism evolved suddenly in Prussia and destroyed friendly relations between aristocracy and Jews where they had existed, such as in the Berlin salon scene, but it decreased when the reform period ended with the Vienna Congress: when reaction ruled securely, imagery of the Jews as dangerous modernizers was less attractive.

Conservative antisemitism (often reduced to forms of “mild discrimination”) continued to exist next to a competing and initially more marginal form: liberal, anti-aristocratic, pro-modernization antisemitism. A Prussian anti-feudal pamphlet from 1807 claimed that the Jews formed a symbiosis with the nobility.<sup>12</sup> This line of anti-feudal, pro-bourgeois (and in this sense, liberal) antisemitism exploited similarities of some aristocratic and (as seen at the time) traditional Jewish values (social conservatism, the

emphasis on the importance of family links, an a-national, inter-European orientation). Arendt argues that the view held by early liberals in Prussia and France, namely, that aristocracy and (privileged) Jews constituted an interested alliance against the rising bourgeoisie, may have been not completely counterfactual at the time.<sup>13</sup>

Populist antisemitism before 1848 was rooted in the anti-capitalist and anti-modernist moral sentiments of the petite bourgeoisie. Although they were “related in many ways to the conservative world-view,” they were articulated as a petit bourgeois form of liberalism: primarily, they were still pitted against aristocratic, old-regime domination.<sup>14</sup> From the perspective of artisans and other traditional “middle-class” groups, the ascendancy of the Jews from the very lowest to fairly comfortable positions contrasted with their own fears of decline. This produced a rhetoric that could see “the puffing locomotive” as a work of demonic Jews.<sup>15</sup> An example of this “liberal” form of antisemitism is a pamphlet distributed in Bavaria in May 1819 by a lawyer, Thomas August Scheuring, who argued that Jews considered themselves only temporarily to be living in Diaspora until “their great Messiah” would lead them to Palestine. Therefore, “the Jews [could] never fully amalgamate with the indigenous, national people and become a part of that harmonious whole that we call a bourgeois society.”<sup>16</sup> This pamphlet—perhaps the earliest example of a quasi-liberal position that anticipates the basic structure of Treitschke’s attitude—was debated in the local press and village pubs immediately before the Hep-Hep riots in Würzburg in August 1819. Local debates and Hep-Hep riots coincided with the Bavarian Diet’s discussing the emancipation of the Jews.<sup>17</sup> The riots were a political protest against emancipation and invoked—among other arguments—the notion that the Jews were unable to be part of bourgeois society.<sup>18</sup> The sociohistorical interpretation of the riots is contested. The socioeconomic background was that the ending of the Napoleonic “Continental System” resulted in cheap English commodities (especially textiles) entering the continental European market. In particular in south Germany this had severely damaging effects on local production and distribution. The imported products seem to have been sold mainly by Jewish traders.<sup>19</sup> These issues were fiercely discussed also

at the universities and within student fraternities. Nevertheless, Würzburg (like other places where anti-Jewish riots occurred) was then not a place of particularly extreme poverty.<sup>20</sup> While it is evident that the (journalistic and state-official) discourse about the riots consistently claimed that the urban and rural poor suffered from and took revenge for Jewish usury, such contemporary claims may themselves have been antisemitic.<sup>21</sup> It seems far from clear that the rioters were actually debtors and the victims their creditors.<sup>22</sup>

The period before 1848 also saw other examples of liberal opposition to Jewish emancipation: when the Baden reform government abolished the distinction between “citizen of a town” (*Ortsbürger*) and “protected citizen” (*Schutzbürger*) in 1831, the Jews were exempted due to a motion brought in by the Liberal politician Karl von Rotteck. Subsequently, only Jews could be *Schutzbürger* in Baden towns—their relative discrimination had actually increased: a social divide between full citizens and protected subjects had turned into a divide between Christian citizens and Jewish non-citizens.<sup>23</sup>

Antisemitism changed to the extent that people got used to “demons” such as locomotives, liberalism, and the capitalist mode of production. The period between 1848 and 1871 saw the majority of the landed aristocracy as well as the more wealthy petite bourgeoisie join the dynamic, capitalist sections of society and increasingly adopt the capitalist methods they had previously condemned as “Jewish.” This condemnation was transformed in the process if not given up: capitalism and liberalism were in their eyes—so to speak—“baptized” to the effect that only their destructive, radical, incompatible, or unpleasant sides continued to be referred to as “Jewish.”<sup>24</sup>

Modern antisemitism in the more narrow sense—the “antisemitism of the industrial age”<sup>25</sup>—was an even less homogeneous phenomenon than that of the reform and reaction periods following the French Revolution: next to the (now smaller) number of those who still hated the Jews for standing in the way of progress and the (still large) number of those (mainly conservatives) who hated them for ushering in progress at all, there were those antisemites “who were, in effect, a disappointed second generation of the National Liberal bourgeoisie,”<sup>26</sup> a “bourgeois movement against the

principles of bourgeois society.”<sup>27</sup> Although they also inherited some of the petit bourgeois, pre-1848 (artisanal) liberalism, their rejection of capitalist modernity was much more selective. Only rather marginal figures among the national-liberal educated bourgeois would completely reject industrial society; but still, many saw themselves disappointed when they realized that the result of the process they had supported was quite different from what they had expected it to be: a modern state based on and a promoter of capitalist economic development. They tended to blame what they would see as the “exaggerations” of its modern capitalist elements on the influence of the “Jewish spirit,” rather than on the specific historical dynamic of which their own involvement had been a part. Many other antisemites came from “the disappointed democratic camp,” such as Richard Wagner, Wilhelm Marr, and Bruno Bauer.<sup>28</sup> Their antisemitism resulted from disappointment with either the failure or the unwanted effects of the partial successes of the left-liberal, democratic movement, combined with their refusal to join the only credible inheritor of 1848 radicalism, Social Democracy. A further differentiation has to be made between those who despised liberal capitalism when it worked smoothly and those who despised it only in its periods of crisis such as the one after 1873.<sup>29</sup> Respectively, there is a sliding scale of antisemites who would (with similar rhetoric) want to go back to whatever they imagined pre-capitalist society had been like—reactionaries—and those who would intend to make the existing system work better—reformists. Perhaps the only element that constitutes a real novelty in the second half of the 1870s was the emergence of antisemitism as a “worldview.” This aspect of antisemitism was more than an anti-Jewish program but offered “the travesty of a theory of society,” more specifically of “bourgeois society in crisis.”<sup>30</sup> As a worldview, antisemitism promised that the destruction of the “evil” principle of Judentum would mean the victory of a “good” principle, while other forms of antisemitism also knew of other evils that were not supposed to be automatically resolved together with the “Jewish question.”<sup>31</sup> However, this particular form of antisemitism only gained some currency during and since the 1890s and therefore falls outside the demarcations of the present discussion.<sup>32</sup>

The Jew-hatred of peasants, for example, was probably not often intensely ideological. The peasants might have hated “their” Jewish middlemen, but they still had an awareness that they belonged to the same rural world within which they depended on each other.<sup>33</sup> Dan White writes: “Periodically anti-Semitic excesses broke out in Hessen during the Middle Ages and Reformation, outbursts of the usual sort that took the Jews as surrogates for feudal lords or urban patricians. But these abated during the absolutist era between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Jewish life, as a part of the rural existence in Hessen, remained relatively undisturbed until the French Revolution and Napoleonic order revolutionized both.”<sup>34</sup> In Hessen, as White points out, antisemitism became hegemonic only in areas in which “peasant liberation was a mocking euphemism.”<sup>35</sup> The rural population had to repay the state for the compensation it had granted the nobility, and therefore the “liberated” peasants had to take out loans, often from local Jewish merchants or traders.

The urban middle classes were differently positioned. “Insecurity and instability were the dominant notes of their existence,” or at least of their consciousness. The lower-middle-class youth of Christian and Jewish background were competing directly for social advancement; peasants and village Jews were objectively bound up together and on the decline together.<sup>36</sup> The specific form of antisemitism of the “small people” that was based in “material interest, social envy and the craving for social status” and the belief in “the identity and moral inferiority of Jewry, usury and the rule of capital” became “something much more encompassing”—namely, the worldview of modern antisemitism—only when “politicians, agitators and ideological fanatics” mirrored back to them their sentiments in systematic form seizing the opportunity given by circumstance.<sup>37</sup>

The main tendency of antisemitism after 1848 reflects the partial convergence of the main ideological positions in the political arena *tout court*, liberalism and conservatism.<sup>38</sup> Within this framework, elements of the (reactionary) discourse that finds the Jews too modern can be found in combination with elements of the (modernization and emancipation) discourse that finds the Jews too unmodern. The majority of antisemitic pamphlet literature



(which seems mostly to have been written by people from petit bourgeois background) in the nineteenth century can be located somewhere between the anti-modern tendency and that of those who were disappointed by the failure of modernization to take place thoroughly enough. Treitschke's position, although it is *bildungsbürgerlich* (from the educated bourgeois elite) rather than petit bourgeois, is characterized by the same ambiguity.

### Antisemitism and the Concept of "Race"

Volkov writes that the role of racism in shaping "modern" antisemitism was "less than crucial."<sup>39</sup> This is only true, however, if by "racism" is meant the explicit racist discourse of the late nineteenth century. An altogether different issue is the relevance of the concept of "race" (as distinct from the word "race").

The familiar typological distinction between (racial) "antisemitism" and (not racial) "Jew-hatred," "anti-Judaism," or "traditional antisemitism" tends to obscure and play down the danger of the latter.<sup>40</sup> The suspicion that even a converted Jew "always remains a Jew"—not a pervasive but neither an unusual element of "traditional anti-Judaism"—has always been implicitly racial, whether or not the word "race" is actually used.<sup>41</sup> The notion of an unchangeable Jewish character was already present in some of Luther's writings; they were racist *avant la lettre*. Caricatures of Jews that constructed "typical" physical characteristics of Jews, that is, a "racial type," became common as early as in the second half of the seventeenth century.<sup>42</sup> Sartre showed that at the basis of race-thinking, long before any reference to alleged "biology" came into play, is the notion that social groups relate to each other the same way individuals in society do. The notion that every social group has a "collective will" or agency accommodates the idealistic view that social processes are caused by "wills"—which manifest themselves in the form of intrigues, cabals, perfidy, courage, and virtue—with the contradictory experience of the relative powerlessness of one's *individual* will.<sup>43</sup> If a social group is supposed to have a will and agency, it must be thought of as a quasi-personality, modeled on the bourgeois individual. For the antisemite, the Jewishness that makes the Jews Jews is a substance "analogous to *phlogiston*,"

the “substance” that in the nineteenth century was thought to constitute the “matter” of electricity.<sup>44</sup> The developed, allegedly biological concept of “race” is only a secondary “slender scientific coating” of this much older and more fundamental—namely, societal—conviction.<sup>45</sup> The word “Jews” and the phrase “the Jewish people” referred until the end of the eighteenth century to a group constituted by its religion as well as its status outside (although not independent from) *ständische* (corporate) society.<sup>46</sup> To the extent that within the context of that society social position was static and quasi-inherited anyway, a specific notion of inherited—that is, racial—characteristics was unnecessary and hardly existed.<sup>47</sup> From the eighteenth century on, a radical and momentous change occurred: “Jews” became an anthropological category. In the context of “Protestant theology of the Enlightenment, idealism and liberalism,”<sup>48</sup> those elements of Christianity that enlightened critique aimed to challenge tended to be identified as not just false theological doctrine but the anachronistic manifestations of a “spirit of Judaism,” a spiritual force that needed to be restricted to its proper realm, the ghetto of the Jewish subculture. A template was established: the same “spirit of Judaism” that was found to have corrupted and falsified Christian religion subsequently could also be held responsible for the wrongs of Christian society. In this process, Judaism was transformed from a theological to a secular, anthropological-historical category.<sup>49</sup> While in the pre-modern context, religion could be thought of as constituting a social-cultural-ethnic group (a “nation” in the rather vague, pre-modern meaning of the term), for the historical-anthropological thinking predominant in the nineteenth century, religion could not be more than the epiphenomenon of an underlying national, cultural/historical substance. This substance is what finally came to be called “race.”<sup>50</sup> In the pre-modern context, a statement such as that the Jews are a nation constituted by their religion was a meaningful statement; in the modern context it is not.

As in Treitschke’s case, the antisemitic discourse often entertains the notion that there must be a reason why the Jews have been objects of hate in so many instances and over such a long time. Antisemites have always been keen to demonstrate the antiquity of Jew-hatred: if not only Goethe and

Napoleon but even “the Romans” hated the Jews, it cannot be completely wrong. Antisemitism tends to suggest a specific construction of a history of animosities against Jews. The wider the temporal framework for such a construction—that is, the more transhistorical Jew-hatred is claimed to be—the more transhistorical must be the supposedly self-identical object of that “eternal” hatred, the Jews. This process inevitably produces a “racial” concept. Again: whether or not the word “race” is used is of only secondary importance. Those who argue in such a mode identify, or at least ally, themselves with the long line of perpetrators of what they claim are antisemitic acts. Their racism is “the attempt of the persecutors and discriminators to explain their own practice of persecution to themselves” in a way that necessarily obscures the actual history of those practices.<sup>51</sup> The concept of “race” is also implicit in the uneven logic of the emancipation bargain: if toleration led to the Jews’ becoming assimilated and civilized, this was evidence of the validity of the idea that emancipation leads to assimilation. If it did not, this was evidence of the unassimilable nature of the Jews, or at least their (tendentially eternal) “immaturity.” The concept of an inferior “race” (whether the word is actually used or not) functions here, too, as a way of explaining the failure of the emancipation doctrine. Rather than admitting that the doctrine does not work, it is argued that the stubborn Jews are beings outside the doctrine’s range of validity: they are not human, assimilable beings, capable of being fitted into bourgeois society. It is on these grounds that the centrality of the demand for “amalgamation”—demanded by the antisemites and advocated, or perhaps rather conceded, by most of the defenders of Jewish emancipation—can be recognized as the key to understanding the discursive slippery slope from liberal to straightforwardly racist antisemitism. (The violence, and even an intimation of its industrial form, can already be felt in the metaphor of “amalgamation,” which is taken from heavy industry.) The more bourgeois society has become total in the course of the twentieth century, be that in its totalitarian or the liberal/social-democratic variants, the more it has developed its “rage against difference,”<sup>52</sup> the more critics of that society will be attracted by the quality of unassimilability of the small remaining pockets of apparently pre-bourgeois

groups: blue-collar proletarians, real women, authentic Jews, noble savages. Their very existence seems to promise (or menace with) the possibility of a reality beyond that of bourgeois society and subjectivity, but as chimerical as their existence is, as ambiguous is the promise projected unto them. It is in this sense that the fascination with difference and apparent unassimilability is the flip side of the rage against it.

### Digression on the Historical Background of the Concept of “Race”

As the concept of “race” is so central to the debate on antisemitism, it seems necessary to dwell a bit longer on its evolution. Modern “race-thinking”—gradually evolving into the “worldview” of “racism” as it can be found in the late nineteenth century—has most prominently been shaped by three different historical developments and the discourses that accompanied them, reinforcing and influencing each other in various ways: the Spanish *reconquista* and Catholic reaction, European colonialism, and the struggle between old and new nobility (feeding into that between nobility and “third estate”) in eighteenth-century France. The first discourse is part of an intra-elite struggle about the legitimacy of leadership, and in particular reflects the elitist (and for this reason unsuccessful) attempt at state and nation building in early modern Spain.<sup>53</sup> The second is about the categorical recognition of differential levels of productivity and the value of labor-power (or rather, the value of the laborers themselves if they are slaves), a discourse more directly connected to the emerging modern economic structure. The third combines elements of both and is the most relevant one for the present context.

In the context of the Spanish Inquisition, the (formerly Jewish) *conversos* were suspected of not sincerely having adopted Christian belief, because those who forced them to convert knew that the conversion had been by force.<sup>54</sup> The formulation of what probably was the earliest form of explicit racial theory (pivoted on the notion of the “*limpieza de sangre*”) began with the belief that the presence of Jews was “a problem” and that this problem ought to be solved by forced conversion of half of the Jews and expulsion of the rest.<sup>55</sup> After this happened, it was felt that “the problem” was not sufficiently solved, so persecution and discrimination continued. Furthermore,

it was generally conceded that the brutality of the Inquisition reinforced the (alleged) hostility of the Jews: the Inquisition explicitly referred to the hate that persecution must have created as the reason for continued and preventative persecution. An explanation had to be found that would legitimize the continued practice of persecution and suspicion without questioning the adequacy of persecution as a means to solve “the problem.” This explanation was the concept of the “Jewish race,” which emerged in this context for the first time.<sup>56</sup> As Reemtsma notes, “the mental traces of a centuries-long practice live longer than the considerations which led to that practice in the first place.”<sup>57</sup> The history of persecution and murder, and their multifarious reasons and motivations, is obscured and petrified not only by the notion of “race” but also by that of “racism”: “racism” is not one of the causes of racist practices, as the casual use of the concept seems to imply, but merely an aspect of the specific forms they take, and of how the perpetrators themselves account for their deeds: “The Aryan myth was their (false) rationalization of their hostility, but since we do not believe that biological differences were the cause of their hostility, ‘racism’ cannot be our explanation of the myth of their hostility.”<sup>58</sup> The examination of specific histories of persecution is relevant; not relevant, however, are “lyrical thoughts about ‘the problem of the other.’”<sup>59</sup>

In the colonial context, an older tradition of European Christian “ethnocentrism” and the Renaissance ethnographic discourse on various “exotic” peoples that European explorers met was transformed into the modern concept of “race” when the conditions of slavery of “blacks” (which became more exclusively harsh in the course of the second half of the seventeenth century) needed to be explained and legitimized.<sup>60</sup> In the colonial context, “race” referred first of all to the lower level of productivity prevalent in the subjected colonial (or imported slave) population, a socioeconomic characteristic that was hypostatized into a physical one.<sup>61</sup> The most momentous development in this context was the “invention of the white race” in the late seventeenth century.<sup>62</sup> Clear concepts of “a white race” and “a black race” need to be distinguished from the more diffuse elements of racialization and race-thinking that can be found in the colonial context from its

beginnings to the extent that “race” was a regular part of the vocabulary of the most “advanced” European elites since the sixteenth century.<sup>63</sup> The status of African American laborers was until 1660 “essentially the same as that of European-American bond-laborers, namely limited-term bond-servitude.”<sup>64</sup> In the framework of the triangular trade, however, African slaves turned out to be much cheaper than European servants,<sup>65</sup> and their servitude could (for practical-material as well as cultural-ideological reasons) more easily be extended to lifelong, and then hereditary, slavery.<sup>66</sup> This outcome set them so fundamentally apart from everyone else that “race” became a plausible denotation of this segment of the workforce. The sheer brutality of a quasi-naked form of intensive production, pure modern economy uninhibited by traditional or reinvented morality also produced in the colonies a purely economic semantic of “race.”

In the early eighteenth century, members of the high aristocracy in France developed a theory of history—most famously formulated by Boulainvilliers (1727)—that made use of the concept of “race” in an effort to explain and legitimize the existing class structure of French society: the privileges of the high aristocracy were said to be the result of the conquest of a Gaulish race by a Frankish race.<sup>67</sup> Not unlike in the Spanish case two centuries earlier, a ruling elite of old lineage defended itself against successful boundary crossers from less noble lineage with reference to the concept of “race.” (The Spanish high aristocracy held a similar myth: they considered themselves descendants of the Visigoths who conquered Spain in the fifth century.)<sup>68</sup> In the period preceding the French Revolution, this notion was invoked against the claims of the Third Estate but backfired devastatingly in the Revolution when spokesmen of the Third Estate took it up, turned it around, and used it as a nationalist argument against a treacherous, anti-national high nobility.<sup>69</sup> Abbé Sieyès, preeminent pamphletist and a popularizer of crucial elements of classical political economy, wrote: “Why should it [the Third Estate] not relegate to the forests of Franconia all those families which persist in the foolhardy pretence of being descended from the race of the conquerors and of having succeeded to the rights of conquest?”<sup>70</sup> The French, supposedly Frankish, high aristocracy continued using the idea of their superior racial

makeup with an anti-nationalist, reactionary intention and in the hope to rally aristocratic solidarity on a European level.

Although the political use of the concept had been a French aristocratic invention, the “Germanic race” was subsequently more successfully invoked in Prussia in the context of the anti-French wars of “liberation.” Here the concept functioned in two overlapping but distinct ways: as a means to unite a not (yet) national population against French domination, and to create a national society in which the aristocracy (some of whom had been suspiciously fond of French language and culture) would cease to be the exclusive ruling class. In Prussia, thus, race-thinking first developed not against but within the discourse of nationalism, independent from a nobility that was closely involved with the non-national state.<sup>71</sup> It is in the specific historical context of early-nineteenth-century Germany only that “racial” ethnic-cultural nationalism stood in opposition to more traditional, that is, aristocratic-patrimonial, forms of state-nationalism, the “patriotism” that translates as loyalty to a *Vaterland* and a *Landesvater*, the Fatherland and the Father of the Country. (The questions of nationalism, patriotism, and race/ethnicity will be discussed further in chapter 10.)

Another distinction needs to be added here. Most forms of European “race-thinking” assume the existence of a multiplicity of races that usually, but not necessarily, are ranked in a strict hierarchy. In such contexts, “the Jews” are one race among others and often rank somewhere in the middle ground between “Aryans” (top) and “the Africans” or “the Chinese” (bottom). Ernest Renan is an example of this line of thought. It is important therefore to distinguish from a more general notion of “racist antisemitism” a more specific one that Sokel suggested calling “ontological antisemitism”: the “Jewish essence” is unchangeable and transhistorical, as in the concept of “race,” but based on a Manichaean dualism of good and evil, light and darkness, with Judaism/Jewry/the Jews being the evil element.<sup>72</sup> This concept operates with moral, universal, sometimes cosmological claims and in a metaphysical rather than (or in combination with) a “biological inheritance” rhetoric and seems to be indebted to the older theological tradition of anti-semitism.<sup>73</sup> Richard Wagner, Gustav Raabe, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Eugen

Dürring espoused ontological antisemitism. Use of the rhetoric of “race” does not necessarily imply ontological dualism. The more systematically violent forms of antisemitism tend to be those that show the element of ontological dualism: the Manichaean principle seems to imply an imperative for particularly extreme action (such as extermination), while the concept of “race” as such does not.<sup>74</sup>

### Antisemitic Anti-capitalism

Clerical reaction and conservatism in the aftermath of the French Revolution opposed a cluster of historically related phenomena—including liberalism, individualism, and the capitalist mode of production—that are usually summed up with the concepts “modernity,” “modernization,” and “modern society.” They also opposed socialism as long as it appeared to be part of the general cluster of modernist movements—not, however, when socialist notions of collectivism or “community” offered themselves as allies against liberalism and individualism and were themselves articulated in backward-looking terms and imagery.<sup>75</sup> To a significant extent, clerical reaction and conservatism were antisemitic in the sense that they held “the Jews” responsible for the modern phenomena that they opposed.<sup>76</sup> In particular, Catholic economic thought as it was cultivated in the nineteenth century in the context of clerical-populist Catholic reaction<sup>77</sup> painted egotism, greed, and materialism as Jewish and established the distinction between a “good” and a “bad” economy: Jewish economy means exploitation that is not based on productive labor, its wealth stems from frivolous speculation, while Christian economy is based on honest labor and the just use of rightfully acquired or inherited property.<sup>78</sup> Non-bourgeois Catholics tended to maintain a “theological” work ethic that saw labor as just punishment for the Fall that no one should be allowed to escape.<sup>79</sup> The gist of the idea is epitomized in a formulation from a text from 1880: “The factories must become monasteries again.”<sup>80</sup> In 1891, Pope Leo XIII tried to square the circle of the Catholic concept of labor with economic reality by maintaining that capitalism meant “degeneration [Verwilderung und Entartung]” unless it was “spiritualized” by the “right spirit” and thereby reformed into a “civilizing [kulturbejahend]” economy.



Two phenomena are in this context most important and also most perplexing: first, Catholic populist reaction was extremely successful during most of the nineteenth century; second, its antisemitic anti-capitalism was not only shared but further developed by an array of non-Catholic groups and individuals, including liberals, democrats, and socialists. The notion of the Jews as harbingers or embodiment of capitalism seems to have been the most influential element that mediated between anti-modernist and pro-modernist forms of antisemitism as described above. How is it possible that a concept that stems from late-medieval Catholic social-ethical-economic thinking (based on contrasting feudal property as legitimate to bourgeois-mercantile property as illegitimate, or at least less legitimate) could be translated into a conception that became immensely effective in the very different context of industrial capitalism?<sup>81</sup>

Non-Catholics were able to appropriate Catholic anti-capitalist and anti-modernist ideology because it not only antedated capitalism and modernity but had pre-Christian historical sources in the Attic and Hellenistic Enlightenment and the classical (i.e., non-capitalist) bourgeois society that carried it.<sup>82</sup> These allowed it to bridge other, historically younger divisions (e.g., those between liberalism, conservatism, and socialism) in situations when these seemed to become temporarily less significant—first of all, of course, in situations of intensified nation building, and again in the various forms of crisis that capitalist society produces. Antisemitic anti-capitalism was channeled from its place of origin in Catholic economic thought through German romanticism and French Proudhonism into the liberal and socialist traditions.<sup>83</sup> A classic formulation is the following of 1845 by the Fourierist antisemite Alphonse Toussenel:

As do the people, I call by the despised name of Jew every dealer in money, every unproductive parasite living off the work of someone else. Jew, usurer, money-dealer—all are synonymous for me. Many people have reproached me for having given the name of a still living people to an infamous profession. I reply that it is not up to a writer to attack the value of an expression that has been consecrated by use, and that in my national language I have not been able to find a better name than Jew to designate those whom I wish to stigmatize.<sup>84</sup>

Toussenel added that also Protestant nations—the Puritan English and the Dutch, Swiss, and American Calvinists—were included. Still, in the Kaiserreich it was not uncommon that liberals who defended Jewish emancipation would maintain the notion that “mammonization” is crucial to “the Jewish spirit” and that the Jews are the clearest (although not the only) carriers of this “spirit.”<sup>85</sup> In popular liberal publications, “Jews were granted a virtual monopoly in caricatures concerned with moneymaking and commerce in its dishonest and vulgar forms.”<sup>86</sup> Blaming the nasty sides of moneymaking on “the Jewish spirit” helped liberals bridge the gap between embracing industrial capitalism while being “locked into an older, competing system of values” that stemmed from petit bourgeois, small-scale commodity production. The distinction between financial and industrial-agrarian capital “provided them [the middle classes] with a social critique that did not touch . . . private property.”<sup>87</sup> Probably the publication that was most influential in this direction was the best-selling 1855 “realist” novel *Soll und Haben* (Debit and Credit) by Gustav Freytag, National Liberal and long-term friend of both Treitschke and Mommsen. Christine Achinger calls *Soll und Haben* “a case study of bourgeois consciousness.”<sup>88</sup> As she demonstrates, the value-structure of this novel is pivoted on the notion of “German work,” namely, work that is supposedly not mediated abstractly as is “Jewish,” capitalist work. “German work” is the constitutive core of the “autonomous moral subject” who has the strength to resist pipe dreams and temptations (such as wild, dominant, non-feminine women) as well as being “lazy, dirty and rebellious like the Poles,” “wild and haughty like the nobility,” or “cunning like the Jews.” Somewhat ironically, this novel, apparently the most successful German novel of the period of National Liberal ascendancy, constructs in this way a remarkably boring bourgeois hero and, as if waiting in the wings of the narrative, also already its own vitalistic negation in the character of a cynical power-man (*Machtmensch*) who refuses to play along bourgeois rules and “creates his own norms.”<sup>89</sup> Arendt states that more generally in the period, the “leftist movement of the lower middle class and the entire propaganda against banking capital turned more or less antisemitic, a development of little importance in industrial Germany but of great significance in France

and, to a lesser extent, in Austria.”<sup>90</sup> Massing points out that Marx and Engels devoted a large part of the *Communist Manifesto* to deriding reactionary, romantic, and artisanal forms of socialism; the polemic against Proudhonism in particular runs through Marx’s whole life work. The concept of “predatory capital” was common property to all populist antisemites from the 1870s on. It allowed conservatives, reactionaries, and the last representatives of old-fashioned petit bourgeois liberalism to appropriate some of the more traditional elements of the socialist movement. The ultraconservative (and racial) antisemite Max Liebermann von Sonnenberg gave a clear definition of “useful and harmful capital” in a speech before the Reichstag in 1893:

We anti-Semites are opposed to neither Jewish capital nor to capital in general. We distinguish, however, between useful and harmful capital. We seek to promote the useful and to restrain the harmful. Useful capital, in our opinion, is that which is put to work in agriculture and in industry, where it creates livelihoods for millions of workers. Useful capital operates in honest trade, the function of which is to collect the world’s goods and offer them for sale everywhere, thus enabling the whole of mankind to participate in the progress of civilization. Useful capital, we think, is present in the form of savings, which represent the fruit of an industrious life. Useful capital increases on a modest scale only after real labor has been spent on increasing it. But harmful capital grows beyond all limits without doing real work, setting the stage for frauds and swindles that rob trusting people. Such capital may be found at the stock exchanges, and it is certainly no fault of ours that this capital is mostly in Jewish hands.<sup>91</sup>

The petit bourgeois–liberal and socialist undertones of this statement by an ultraconservative aristocrat illustrate impressively the extent to which antisemitism, especially thanks to its fetishization of “honest” and “useful” work, can help to bridge all ideological divides within modern bourgeois society. At the same time, however, antisemitism sharply distanced those who adopted it from the specific form of modern liberalism that was then predominant among the upper bourgeoisie (“Manchester” liberalism) and also from Marxist Social Democracy. Populist antisemitism appropriated socialism but fought Marxism; antisemites have no time for the paradoxical

realities of capitalism as understood by Marxist dialectics: they reduce all historical phenomena to unchanging essences and hope one day to be able to build the racial community “on timeless, indestructible qualities,” the highest expression of which is the “Aryan blood,” in order to reconstruct Germany “in the immortal spirit of honor, beauty, friendship, and the regulation of profit,” prevailing against “the Jewish forces of Mammonism and Marxism.”<sup>92</sup> The racist myth was a static ideology that “culminated in the dream of a noncompetitive society based on private enterprise.”<sup>93</sup> In analogy to their imagining capitalism without competition, the racists dreamed of history without history: they attempted to “de-historicize history” by transposing all social categories into biological ones. “Indeed it was a constant complaint among antisemites that the Marxists refused to regard stock exchanges or banks as more wicked than other capitalist institutions” since they “welcomed the dynamism of the capitalist system as irrevocably insuring its historical demise.”<sup>94</sup> The Protestant priest Adolf Stöcker emphasized that he warred only against “mobile capital,” “stock-exchange capital,” while “Marx and Lassalle . . . looked for the roots of the [social] problem not in the direction of the stock-exchange, but of industrial production; they made the industrialists responsible for all social ills and directed the workers’ wrath upon them. Our movement corrects this. We show the people that the roots of their plight are in the power of money, in the mercenary spirit of the stock-exchange.”<sup>95</sup> Here lies the immediate political background for the paradox that subsequent generations of antisemites held Jews responsible for both capitalism and the forces that aimed to overcome it (such as in the antisemitic slogan of an alleged alliance of “the Golden and the Red International”). “The industrialists” are in this vision exempted from any responsibility for the evils of “capitalism,” which is not understood as a “mode of production” (as in Marx) but as the dictatorship of money and the stock market. This notion seems much less paradoxical if one considers that at the time, liberalism and socialism could indeed be understood as reflections and aspects of the same sociohistorical process. The antisemites seem to have understood (instinctively, as it were) the dialectical dependency of socialism and communism on capitalism: emancipation of the working

class—implying that of humanity—relied on the dynamism of the capitalist mode of production.<sup>96</sup> The historian Talmon paraphrased the antisemitic logic similarly: “Modern Jewish universalism in the form of international capitalism or international Marxism, was the same thing using two differing disguises, for both aimed at weakening the organic unity of the race and national solidarity.”<sup>97</sup> Likewise, Pulzer: “To the more old-fashioned kind of Conservative antisemitism, the fundamental similarities shared by Liberals and Socialists in any case loomed large—their humanism, positivism, internationalism, and the revolutionary origins of their theories all seemed to come out of the same stable.”<sup>98</sup> In nineteenth-century Europe, industrial capitalism and social democracy could indeed appear as two newly arrived, competing but related entities, as the modernity of both was still fresh, and the belief that they are of the same “essence” must have seemed plausible to many. Whether they might then call this essence “the Jew” or something else is of course a different question.<sup>99</sup>

The ascendancy of the Social Democratic Party, marked by the unification of the two workers’ parties in Gotha in 1875, gaining momentum especially in the 1890s, forced antisemitic socialism to rearticulate itself: the growing hegemony of the Marxist rejection of Proudhonism and related ideologies (then often denounced as “anarchism”) meant that antisemitic socialism needed to confront (“Manchester”) liberalism and Marxist Social Democracy at the same time. This is an important element in Stöcker’s rhetoric and was developed after the 1880s into a more consistent ideology in which Judaism came to be seen as the “common essence” of capitalism and Marxism. This conception is not without its irony, because the socialism that the antisemites tend to endorse is indeed (in the perspective of the Marxist critique) of the same essence with capitalism: it fails to challenge the basic elements of the capitalist mode of production (the value form, commodity production, labor-power as a commodity, wage labor). The antisemitic socialists attack the Marxist challenge to the capitalist mode of production for being of the same essence with capitalism, while they themselves endorse just those elements of the socialist tradition that *fail* to challenge the capitalist mode of production. The antisemitic notion that emancipation of “unproductive

people” (like the Jews) is only welcome if it means that they become productive links antisemitism to bourgeois ideology, while Marx’s critique of political economy offers a critique of the bourgeois concept of productivity (namely, productivity of value).<sup>100</sup> However, the workers’ movement and its institutions did certainly not in their entirety manage to leave behind bourgeois conceptions of productivity and labor, which weakened in turn their members’ immunity to antisemitism.

The notion of the Jews as embodiments of Mammon could hardly have become a universally accepted cliché had there not been some traces of historical truth to it. Until the eighth century c.e., most Jews at any given place in the world were peasants and artisans, not traders or moneylenders.<sup>101</sup> However, already long before the dissolution of the Jewish state in Palestine by the Romans, a number of Jews all over the Mediterranean basin were engaged in trade. When after the disintegration of the Roman Empire commodity production shrank to a minimum in Europe, Jewish traders “continued to be the sole commercial intermediaries between the East and the West.”<sup>102</sup> It was not before the high Middle Ages, however, and only in central Europe, that the Jews were driven out of agriculture and shifted toward whatever economic niche was most open to newcomers; often this niche was trade. In Carolingian times, *judaeus* and *mercator* seem to have been used as synonyms: documents from the tenth century use the phrase “Jews and other traders.”<sup>103</sup> The shift from trade to moneylending was caused by a somewhat paradoxical twin process that was part of the general crisis at the beginning of the second millennium: following the Crusades, Christian traders were able to expand their activities hugely. This general process of expanding money economy was accompanied, however—perhaps as a moral-political reaction of a clergy concerned about the societal changes occurring under their eyes—by the proclamation, and increasing propagation, of the canonical ban on interest.<sup>104</sup> The moral-theological view of interest was based on the refusal on the side of medieval law, following Roman law and in contrast to modern political economy, to understand money as a (special) commodity: pre-modern economic thought “considered gold and silver as tokens possessing imaginary value, varying at the will of the king.”<sup>105</sup> Only

in the absence of an adequate theory of money could the “price of money” be seen as subject to ethical-political-theological considerations. The more society was monetarized, however, the less viable became an “ethical approach” to determining interest. In modern society, any interference with the law of value (“ethical” rates of interest, or “ethical” wages above the value of labor-power) comes at a price that a ruling group can only afford in exceptional circumstances.<sup>106</sup>

As also the emergence of the guilds kept the European Jews out of artisanal occupations, Jews were driven into moneylending, while in the Mediterranean and in the Arab and Muslim realms, where the huge majority of Jews lived, they continued being peasants and artisans.<sup>107</sup> For the larger part of the Middle Ages, very little had been produced in Europe that potential trading partners in the Orient would have been interested in buying. The few places where goods for exchange (such as textiles) were produced (some cities in Flanders and Italy) were also those where a Christian class of merchants led the process of pushing the Jewish merchants out of business.<sup>108</sup> The modern anti-Jewish discourse preserves the equation of “Jew” with “merchant,” although it had been meaningful only in the context of medieval economy when Jews did to a certain extent represent money economy as a foreign, external element within an “underdeveloped,” decommmodified economic order. To the extent that commodity production in Europe resumed on a wider scale, let alone when the capitalist mode of production developed, this equation became less and less meaningful but still remained in use.

In the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries the Jews were expelled from the more advanced countries (England, France, Spain) toward the more “backward” countries. The largest number ended up at the bottom of the ladder, Poland, while some survived in the “underdeveloped” pockets of Germany and Italy.<sup>109</sup> Everywhere except in Poland began the time of petty usury, ghettos, persecutions, special taxes, and dealing in secondhand goods. It is telling that the most economically “backward,” that is, the least bourgeois place—Poland—was also the only one where religious toleration was a principle of governance. In England, France, and Spain the beginning processes of consolidation of large territorial states—which would

subsequently be reinterpreted as nation-states—including the expulsion of the Jews (in 1290, 1394, and 1492, respectively). Even after readmission, their numbers were small in these countries. In Germany, however, the Jews were numerous and visible, and lived under the precarious condition that the lack of a uniform legal and political system prevented their effective expulsion as well as their integration or permanent establishment.<sup>110</sup> The famous failure of a “bourgeois revolution” to occur between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries (which is when it “should” have happened, from the standpoint of “Whiggish” historiography) was, first of all, responsible for the fact that a considerable number of Jews survived in Germany. At the same time, under the miserable conditions of Germany after the religious wars, not conducive to the formation of a nationally minded bourgeoisie and a modern state, money capital was desperately sought after by a plethora of princes, but no Christian bourgeoisie existed that would have been able and willing to provide the necessary monies. It was then that a very small number of rich Jews became court Jews, prominent and highly visible Jews who became allies of modernizing absolutist monarchs operating toward what would later turn out to be bourgeois society and the national state. However, in the 1600s also Jewish moneylending declined in Germany, and “the increasingly anachronistic image of the Jewish usurer blended with two developing forms of economic antisemitism: fantasies about the Jewish thief, leeching off the populace from below, and the Court Jew, the manipulator from above.” The rise of Jewish banditry from the late 1600s helped to create “a new stereotype,” that of “the Jews as a people of thieves and robbers extraordinaire.”<sup>111</sup> Popular literature created in the subsequent period from these elements “an antisemitic collage of the Jew as manipulator and profiteer.” Additionally, the “growing Sephardic presence in the Ottoman Empire” stimulated “a new myth of Jewish conspirational power”: Jewish merchants and manufacturers seemed to be “behind the successes of the Turkish foe.”<sup>112</sup> These are, in rough outline, the historical particulars that constitute the particles of truth around which “antisemitic anti-capitalism” developed. Its identification of “the Jews” as the people historically responsible for the emergence of modern state and economy was a gross exaggeration for any period of time at any



place, but was completely misguided in the nineteenth century, when it successfully evolved into a fully articulated ideology.

### Antisemitism in the German Reich in the Years Leading up to the Dispute

Antisemitism blossomed during the Bismarck Reich during the periods in which the Conservatives were hostile toward the government, namely, in the last phase of Bismarck's liberal era (1875–78) and during the liberal era under Chancellor Caprivi (1890–94).<sup>113</sup> This observation allows the conclusion that in this period only established Conservatism was able to mobilize antisemitism efficiently, and it did so as a means to challenge the government, while all other tendencies of antisemitism—the “radicals” of all hues—were still fellow travelers of the Conservatives, whether they liked it or not. An illustration of this is the case of the antisemitic petition that was circulated in the fall of 1880 and constituted the high-water mark of antisemitic publicity when it fetched a quarter of a million signatures all over the Reich.<sup>114</sup> Although it was initiated by an assemblage of radical antisemites, its actual text “merely demanded the legalization of what was the predominant administrative practice anyway.”<sup>115</sup>

The literature seems generally to agree that the ascendancy of antisemitism as a modern political discourse started in 1875 when antisemitism was “taken up by two politically defined newspapers,”<sup>116</sup> the so-called *Kreuzzeitung*, the voice of orthodox Prussian Protestantism, and *Germania*, the organ of the Catholic Center Party.<sup>117</sup> In January 1874 the Conservatives had suffered a massive electoral defeat by the National Liberals and the Catholic Center.<sup>118</sup> The antisemitic articles of the *Kreuzzeitung* that were answered by those in the *Germania* seem to have been a deliberate offer of cooperation to a new potential ally reflecting the new situation.<sup>119</sup> The initial tone was set by the *Kreuzzeitung*'s Franz Perrot, who called “our fellow citizens of Semitic race and Mosaic belief” the “actual leaders of the National-Liberal majority in the Reichstag.”<sup>120</sup> Articles in the *Kreuzzeitung* attacked in particular the economic aspects of Bismarck's policy, which was tarred as “a banker's policy made for and by Jews.” Articles in *Germania* denied that hatred and persecution

of Jews had ever been “caused by religious fanaticism” but argued they were rather “a protest of the Germanic race against the intrusion of an alien tribe.” They supported this claim with anti-Jewish quotes from (non-Catholic) authors such as Goethe, Herder, Kant, Fichte, and even a speech by Bismarck from 1847. *Germania* pointed out that there were few Jews in the “productive strata” and interpreted the recent liberal anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* as a Jewish war of revenge. It called for “emancipation of the Christians from the Jews” and for Christian economic solidarity: “Don’t buy from Jews!”<sup>121</sup> In the aftermath of both series of articles, a group of Conservatives and Catholics, informally dubbed the Antikanzlerliga (Anti-Chancellor League), continued publishing on the same tracks.<sup>122</sup>

Another point of reference for the formulation of antisemitism was the emergence of the Social Democratic Party, founded in 1875. Although in theory anti-liberal, it could in practice be expected to be an ally for the democratically inclined wing of liberalism—obviously an alarming scenario for the conservative and right-wing/liberal elite.<sup>123</sup> The fight against Social Democracy was particularly prominent in Treitschke’s as well as Stöcker’s positions.

The year 1877 saw the publication of *Politische Gründer und die Korruption in Deutschland* (Political Promoters and Corruption in Germany) by Rudolf Meyer, who played a central role in the Anti-Chancellor League.<sup>124</sup> Meyer was “the most extreme anti-Bismarckian, antisemitic State Socialist” and advocated the idea that the monarchy should be responsible for the welfare of the working class.<sup>125</sup> He argued that Bismarck was “owned by the Jews and the Gründer.”<sup>126</sup>

All the strictly right-wing antisemites mentioned so far were effectively enemies of the politics represented by Treitschke, who supported Bismarck as strongly as he resented socialism, whether from the lectern, the pulpit, or the Social Democratic Party. Their antisemitism was part of a larger agenda of rejuvenating church and state by way of toppling Bismarck and turning the Conservative Party into a popular party.<sup>127</sup> The same is true of another leading antisemite close to the extremely conservative part of the Lutheran Prussian establishment, the priest Adolf Stöcker. Stöcker came from a lower-middle-

class background and via a career through university and army became a court chaplain in 1874. He had close relations to the *Kreuzzeitung* and was a lifelong friend of Adolf Wagner, a Berlin University economist and the leading *Kathedern* socialist of the 1880s.<sup>128</sup> Stöcker's fundamental attitude—rooted in Christian economic doctrine—is summed up in his 1874 description of socialism as “an offspring of materialism, created in the palaces of atheist wealth.”<sup>129</sup> In 1878 Stöcker founded the Christlich-Soziale Arbeiterpartei (Christian Social Workers' Party), which attempted to promote a clerical version of Prussian state socialist reformism, timed to take advantage of the anti-Socialist laws of the same year.<sup>130</sup> After Stöcker increased the use of antisemitic rhetoric from September 1879 on, he pioneered the translation of conservative antisemitism into an urban populist movement. Still, he “made no secret of the fact that Social Democracy was his chief enemy.”<sup>131</sup>

Stöcker's “first full-dress antisemitic attack,” a speech on “What We Demand of Modern Jewry,” given on September 19, 1879, must be regarded one of the most influential antisemitic documents in this context, and seems to have made a strong impression on Treitschke.<sup>132</sup> Already the emphasis on “modern Jewry” in the title points to Stöcker's claim that he “respected” or even “loved” Jews as long as they remained religious, that is, were not “modern” Jews.<sup>133</sup> Stöcker's speech made the following argument: “Jewish papers assail our faith”; “I do indeed consider modern Jewry a great danger to German national life”; “please, be a little more modest!”; “modern Jewry is most certainly a power against religion”; “they persist in remaining Jews”; “please, be a little more tolerant!”; “the worst Berlin papers are in the hands of Jews and . . . the Jewish element completely dominates the editorial staffs”; “our sacred institutions are constantly dragged into the dust”; “unless these wells of poison are cleaned out, the situation cannot improve”; “Germany's splendor will arise with new life after this period of decline”; “the Jews are and remain a people within a people, a state within a state, a separate tribe within a foreign race. All immigrants are eventually absorbed by the people among whom they live—all save the Jews”; “they control the arteries of money, banking, and trade; they dominate the press and they are flooding the institutions of higher learning”; “and this is where we make

our third request. Modern Jewry must take part in productive work: a little more equality, please!"; "they do not enjoy work and . . . they do not believe in the German concept of dignity of labor"; "hatred of the Jews is already flaring up here and there, and this is repugnant to the Gospels. If modern Jewry continues to use the power of capital and the power of the press to bring misfortune to the nation, a final catastrophe is unavoidable. Israel must renounce its ambition to become the master of Germany"; "either we succeed in this . . . or . . . German spirit will become Judaized."<sup>134</sup>

Treitschke's first article in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute—written less than eight weeks later—took its cues from Stöcker's speech to an extent that borders on plagiarism, despite the verbal contempt that Treitschke had for Stöcker. It appears that Treitschke rejected the populism and the "socialist" moments in Stöcker's program but joined Stöcker in picking up what had by now become a powerful discursive weapon for the anti-Bismarck Conservatives and recuperating it for the pro-Bismarck camp. A telling episode that throws light on the still-liberal context of even populist antisemitism is a report from a speech Stöcker gave before master artisans in 1880: "Reacting to continuous heckling from the floor, Stöcker was forced to explain that he was not, in fact, objecting to liberalism as such, but only to the present subverted and corrupted liberalism."<sup>135</sup>

Another mainstream source of antisemitism in the period, the writings of the journalist Otto Glagau, was far removed from the reactionary establishment. Jacob Katz argues that Glagau was "the central figure in the birth of the movement."<sup>136</sup> From December 1874, Glagau published a series of articles, "The Stock Exchange and Speculation Fraud in Berlin," in the moderate liberal *Gartenlaube*, which seems to have had a readership of two million.<sup>137</sup> The *Gartenlaube* stood for a "fusion of political liberalism, *Kitsch* and mass following"; it was anti-aristocratic and generally supported "equal opportunities."<sup>138</sup> Until that time it had a track record of presenting a quaint and unthreatening, schmaltzy Judaism.<sup>139</sup> Glagau's articles provided a form of moralistic indictment of dishonest business practices that included references to anti-Jewish stereotypes as a rhetorical element of their populist journalistic style.<sup>140</sup> Glagau presented himself as a defender of

petit bourgeois economic interest against big industry and finance capital.<sup>141</sup> In 1878 his articles were published as a widely read book of the same title as the series.<sup>142</sup> Glagau claimed that before 1866, National Liberalism had campaigned abstractly for “freedom” and “unity,” while since 1866 it set out establishing “Manchester freedoms” that enabled the *Gründer* to rob common people of their money. In this context, he claims that 90 percent of the *Gründer* were Jewish.<sup>143</sup> In another text published in 1878, Glagau blamed Jewish liberals—Lasker and Bamberger—for the liberalization of trade and stock exchange and criticized liberal hypocrisy in the face of the uprooting of handicraft by industry, the disappearance of the peasantry, and the emergence of a “destitute proletariat.” Manchesterism “wants to transform everything into money,” “rejects all sense of solidarity, humanity and all ethical principles,” and “preaches crass materialism.” The freedom of trade and movement that it has brought to the worker is actually just “the freedom to choose the occupation and the place where he may starve to death”: “Jewry is applied Manchesterism in the extreme. It knows nothing any more but trade, and of that merely haggling and usury. It does not work but makes others work for it, it haggles and speculates with the manual and mental products of others. Its center is the stock exchange. . . . As an alien tribe it fastens itself on the German people and sucks their marrow. The social question is essentially the Jewish question; everything else is swindle.”<sup>144</sup> On an optimistic tone, Glagau claims that the number of “decent and honest folk” was slowly rising<sup>145</sup> and concludes: “I do not want to murder or slaughter the Jews, nor drive them out of the country; I do not want to take away any of their possessions, but I want to change them thoroughly.”<sup>146</sup> Although being “a physically as well as psychically decidedly degenerate race,” they “are ruling the whole world.”<sup>147</sup> From the Jews “we can learn” how to function as “a single chain, closely knit.”<sup>148</sup> Both the assurance that one did not want to kill or drive out the Jews and the references to an ethical economy reappeared, as we have seen, in Treitschke’s texts on the subject: a closer comparison of Glagau’s and Treitschke’s writings would certainly show that their positions, directly evolved from the right-wing strand of liberalism, are indeed very much alike. Although Glagau was more like Wilhelm Marr in the radicality

of his tone, he was, like Treitschke, a well-connected establishment figure and a defender of Bismarck against reactionary opposition.<sup>149</sup>

Of similar background to the case of the *Gartenlaube* is that of the periodical *Grenzboten*. Founded in the 1840s, this liberal publication<sup>150</sup> “swung over to supporting Bismarck . . . without qualification”—due to Bismarck’s cooperation with National Liberalism—by the end of the 1870s.<sup>151</sup> In 1880 it published articles written by Moritz Busch<sup>152</sup>—press officer in the Foreign Office and Bismarck’s “journalistic handyman”—in which the foundation of a cross-party and cross-denomination umbrella organization solely dedicated to antisemitism was suggested.<sup>153</sup>

Naudh and Endner, whose responses to Treitschke have been discussed above, were part of a very different scene, the radical fringe of antisemitism that also saw a breakthrough in 1879. The best-known document of radical antisemitism, the first explicitly racial, populist, and anti-Christian antisemitic publication that reached mass circulation, was Wilhelm Marr’s *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum, vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet* (The Victory of Judaism over Germanism, Regarded from the Nondenominational Point of View).<sup>154</sup> Marr was also involved in founding in September 1879 the short-lived Antisemiten-Liga (League of Antisemites). He suggested that the fact that the Jews are the dominant power in the West was the result of their racial qualities and that only a general pogrom could save the Germanic peoples from “Judaization.” Marr saw “passionate popular indignation” on the rise. He presented himself as a disillusioned democrat and atheist who turns his back on liberalism, which he finds has become “Judaized” and materialist.<sup>155</sup> The economic behavior that he considered characteristically Jewish was for him a manifestation of monotheistic religion.<sup>156</sup>

Marr was also the first editor of *Die Deutsche Wacht: Monatsschrift für nationale Kulturinteressen—Organ der antijüdischen Vereinigung* (The German Guard: Monthly for National Cultural Interests, Published by the Anti-Jewish Association), whose first issue appeared in November 1879.<sup>157</sup> The lead article in the first issue of the journal is a key document for understanding Marr’s brand of antisemitism. The article (written in the form of an appeal to the

two chambers of the Reich) starts with a list of all the liberties that had been fought for in 1848 and that have subsequently been revised and restricted, or have never been implemented fully in the first place. The article suggests that only one of the “achievements” (in quotation marks in the source) has not been reversed: Jewish emancipation. Marr<sup>158</sup> points out that he had himself been among the “cloud-cuckoo-landers [Wolkenwandler]” of the “people’s springtime,” a mistake of which he says he is not ashamed. He goes on to tell the “unvarnished truth” of the “democratic” (in quotation marks in the source) birth of Jewish emancipation: he claims that Jewish emancipation has actually never been supported by the majority of any assembly, but it had to be “fabricated and smuggled in” in a package together with other demands, including general suffrage and freedom of the press: “Jewish emancipation has been a contraband of the revolution of 1848.”<sup>159</sup> The “sufferings” that stem from Jewish emancipation are worse than any other endured by the German nation: “All of society sighs under the spirit of Jewification [Verjudung] that has become flesh and blood . . . and grows like cancer.”<sup>160</sup> Emancipation was the only “achievement” of 1848 that had escaped revision, and it should not remain thus.

Already in 1880, Marr was replaced as editor by H. Naudh,<sup>161</sup> the author of another emblematic text of racial, anti-Christian antisemitism, *Die Juden und der Deutsche Staat* (The Jews and the German State), which was then in its tenth edition.<sup>162</sup> Naudh discusses the “Jewish question” strictly as a problem of the state and its underlying *Sittlichkeit* (morality), which he claims is determined by race. Naudh and Marr were the two antisemites who made most unequivocally a point of not being anti-modern. They rearticulated the pro-modernization antisemitism from the first decades of the nineteenth century. The thrust of their argument is to show that Jews cannot be part of modern liberal society and that their presence endangers its successful realization. They combine anti-Jewish ideas with various references to modern bourgeois political thought. From their autobiographical remarks it is clear that the events of 1848 were pivotal to their thinking: antisemitism seems for them a way of rationalizing the experience that the “democratic” revolution they had hoped for had not been realized.<sup>163</sup>

## Nine. Liberalism and National Liberalism

The National Liberal journal *Grenzboten*, one of whose editors was Gustav Freytag, published in 1879 the following statement: “Manchester radicalism is as anti-national as ultramontanist and socialist radicalisms are. Its delusion is the cosmopolitan free trader society, the atomistic cosmic fog that has some kind of a core preventing it from total disintegration only in the power of English capital.”<sup>1</sup> This anti-liberal comment of this journal, which is also known for its antisemitic contributions, has its roots within, not outside, the liberal tradition; the following discussion of the development of liberalism in Germany will show that liberal anti-Manchesterism is not a contradiction in terms: the liberal tradition in Germany contained at any point of its history forms of opposition to what was then seen as “English conditions.” My contention is that this fact can help to explain liberalism’s ambivalent attitude toward antisemitism. Even the most extravagant examples of liberals or democrats who turned into antisemites (Richard Wagner, Bruno Bauer, Wilhelm Marr) should therefore not be treated as isolated cases explicable only on an individual level (nor, indeed, as emanations of a particular German “national character”). Their antisemitism should rather be taken seriously as part of the continuum of responses to capitalist-industrial modernization that emerged from within the liberal and democratic traditions in Germany (in distinction to but also intertwined with the antisemitism of conservatives, which never ceased to exist next to it).

As the central perspective of this book is to look at the dispute over



Treitschke's antisemitic remarks as a dispute among liberals about the central categories with which to think about state, nation, society, culture, and religion, it is crucial to be as clear as possible about the meaning of the words "liberal" and "liberalism." These are notoriously evasive concepts that are descriptive as much as normative; as there is no straightforward and generally agreed-upon definition that could simply be referred to, one can get at their meaning only through a combination of historical and theoretical discussion. In this chapter, particular attention will be paid to liberalism's relation to nationalism, especially in the German context. What must sound to the contemporary reader like an oxymoron, "liberal anti-Manchesterism," or the liberal critique of "English conditions" (a phenomenon not too dissimilar from what in contemporary usage goes under the names of "anti-capitalism" or "anti-globalization"), is the immediate context in which "liberal antisemitism"—likewise, two words most people would not easily use in combination—developed.<sup>2</sup> My principal contention, that the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute can help us understand some of the contradictions fundamental to liberalism and modern liberal society, needs to be developed against a prevailing, unhistorical notion of what constitutes liberalism.

The National Liberal Party, of which Treitschke had been a member until July 1879, was a product of the multilayered antagonisms of 1848–49 and the developments in the decades following these years. Differentiations and contradictions that had already been intrinsic to the liberal tradition before 1848 became explicit and more clearly articulated in organizational differentiation. When the optimistic belief that (quasi-automatic) extension of the middle classes and their social and political values and organizations (i.e., the process of modernization itself) would "prevent revolution" eroded, calls for the state to help grew louder. Within the liberal discourse, an antagonism developed between the belief that "social harmony" is natural (invisible hand) and that it needs to be actively created (visible hand, as it were); the mediation between these two beliefs, often implied rather than explicitly embraced, was that the creation of the "visible hand" of the national state is itself a natural process (i.e., in turn part of the higher wisdom of the invisible hand; to put it with Hegel, it is God's—the invisible hand's—will that

there be states). The question of how much and what kind of “visible hand” is necessary has not left liberalism ever since. The “early liberal” idea of a harmonious society in which citizens peacefully worked together for the common good was modified under the impression of the rapid development of industrialization and capitalism. The science that aims to explain these processes is political economy; the variant of it that seems to have been most influential in Germany was that connected with the name of Bastiat. Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim wrote in 1861 that Frédéric Bastiat in his *Harmonies économiques* (1850, translated into German in the same year) had developed “like nobody before or after him” “the organism of laboring society . . . objectively.” “This is the science of the modern state,” Oppenheim enthused.<sup>3</sup> Bastiat argued that “all legitimate interests are in harmony.”<sup>4</sup> Because nature created the individual for living in society, the laws of society cannot be in contradiction with the (natural) laws that govern the individual.<sup>5</sup> The notion of separate or even antagonistic class interests should be rejected, while the notion of “self-help and education” should be central to social reform.<sup>6</sup>

### National Liberalism

The expectation that the middle classes would successively absorb all other classes of society and thus be able “automatically” to provide mediation and synthesis for society as a whole had been central to early, pre-1848 liberalism. The emergence of the proletariat seemed—at that time—to be a merely temporary phenomenon that could either be patronized and embraced or else fought and defeated easily. Pro-emancipation liberals expected the workers to become de-proletarianized, well-behaved, and educated citizens in much the same way that they expected the Jews to become “de-Judaized” German citizens.<sup>7</sup> Liberals in the Rhineland (a province of Prussia), where industry was most developed, departed as early as the 1830s from the notion of the “classless society of citizens” and argued that “reputable merchants and manufacturers” should play the leading role in society, that industry was the “true basis of the state,” and that “where industry is strong as a force, so too are political power and freedom.”<sup>8</sup> This is the background

against which the (subsequently hegemonic) combination of free-market policy and Prussianism, the notion that Prussia was the locomotive for the establishment of “English conditions,” originated. For this new perspective within the liberal movement, the quick creation of a national economic sphere was more important and more promising for liberty than the rather old-fashioned and legalistic “yearning for a constitution.”<sup>9</sup> The more the latter seemed to be going nowhere, the more the new dynamism, based on industrial and merchant bourgeoisie, and thus on *national* liberalism, gained hegemony. This change in the character of liberalism meant the decision to trust in the dynamics of capitalist development within a unified national territory rather than in constitutional reform of existing dynastic states. E. K. Bramsted has characterized National Liberalism drily: “After 1830 in most Continental countries liberals stressed the need for national identification, for a national State rooted in the rule of law . . . [whereby] the traditional freedoms of classic liberalism were to be maintained. There arose sometimes a problem of priorities.”<sup>10</sup>

The liberal bourgeoisie was faced with the reality of bourgeois class society, most clearly brought home by the class antagonisms of 1848. The choice was now between hoping for a classless society or for a bourgeois society. In the context of struggling for bourgeois society, the turn toward pro-Prussian, *kleindeutsche*, National Liberalism cannot be portrayed as a “betrayal” (such as in some of the more traditional literature on the subject): within the liberal framework and in the historical context, realpolitik and the politics of the Fortschrittspartei (Progress Party)—the immediate context of Treitschke’s career—made sense and could appear as progressive. The further development of liberalism in Germany cannot be understood, however, without a look at the events of 1848 and 1849.<sup>11</sup>

From the perspective of the future National Liberals (Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Johann Gustav Droysen, Rudolf Haym, Heinrich von Sybel, and others), the year 1848 “was really about preventing a revolution and bringing into one their hopes for a Prussian-led and liberal unified Germany.”<sup>12</sup> For this the nation should “sacrifice some of its domestic liberty” for receiving in return “an increase in power and

prestige abroad,” as Haym wrote then.<sup>13</sup> The crucial problem lay in squaring their ambitions for a liberal, united Germany with the fact that Prussia was liberal in an economic but not a political sense.<sup>14</sup>

The Bundestag established in March 1848 a committee of seventeen notables of liberalism in order to draft a new Imperial constitution on the lines of moderate liberalism. The attempt to create a federal and right-bound nation-state was rejected, though, by the existing dynasties; they felt at that point no need to accept constitutional monarchy. Having failed to bring political change the institutional way, the liberals worked together with republicans and democrats in the national movement toward a compromise platform that warranted legal continuity and that of the individual states and their dynasties.<sup>15</sup> Liberals and moderate democrats pointed to the benefits of constitutional monarchy as enjoyed in England and Belgium. When republicans subsequently led a revolutionary insurgency in April 1848 (fatally limited to a few regions), the liberal members of the Federal Assembly supported the dynastic governments to deploy federal troops against them.<sup>16</sup>

Federal and Prussian troops were only able to defeat the popular movements in the southern states, though, because the Prussian regime survived the revolutionary situation in March 1848 when popular assemblies in Berlin mirrored the Paris February revolution. Realizing that the monarchy seemed unprepared to handle the situation, the Berlin bourgeoisie immediately organized militias and saved the Prussian regime from its temporary weakness.<sup>17</sup> A revolutionary leaflet from end of May 1848 made the point succinctly: “Denn aus der freien Bürgerwehr / Wird leicht ein Freiheits-Würger-Bär,” which means “The liberal militias / Can quickly turn malicious.”<sup>18</sup> It is important to add that a situation (March–July 1848) characterized by weakness of the bourgeoisie and temporary collapse of the aristocracy was decided in favor of the status quo through contradictions on the side of the proletariat. While some workers defended their own “moral economy” (to use Thompson’s expression),<sup>19</sup> others had already begun to internalize the standards and values of the bourgeois-liberal order—they saw disciplined, productive labor as something to be proud of and considered the existence of a class of people who “give work” to workers as a necessity—and

preached moderation to themselves. The second, new class contradiction (the capital relation) that grew next to and transformed the older one (the class contradiction between the two surplus-appropriating classes) did not take the form of a clear-cut antagonism—bourgeois versus workers: rather, it produced contradictory behavior on the side of the workers, which gave the bourgeoisie the time necessary to recover its agency and to restore the status quo. (Likewise, the revolutionary small-town artisans who subsequently carried the revolution in Baden suffered from what hindsight can recognize as wavering between progress and reaction, but for them it must have meant the refusal to choose between bounded feudal and unbounded capitalist exploitation.)<sup>20</sup> A counter-revolutionary Berlin publication from August 1848 declared that the revolution had been caused by “aliens, Jews and lousy literati.”<sup>21</sup> The authors of this publication apparently intended to build the defeated lower bourgeois and workers a bridge home into the status quo—amnesty cum amnesia: they were supposedly not to blame for their attempt at a revolution, after all. Troublemakers—the usual suspects—had misguided the good German people.

In March 1849, the Prussian king refused to accept a compromise constitution and the Imperial crown from the hands of parliament, whereupon the liberals practically withdrew from the process; the Frankfurt National Assembly capitulated before the German princes’ unwillingness to acknowledge its authority. Extra-parliamentary (mostly democratic) factions tried then to force the princes militarily (the *Reichsverfassungskampagne*) to accept the compromise that liberals and democrats had found between themselves, an effort that was not supported by the majority liberals.<sup>22</sup> This war (following the second proclamation of the republic in Baden in 1849) was a watershed in German political culture: the republic of Baden was supported by a majority of the population, who fiercely defended it against impossible odds.<sup>23</sup> When the Prussian military finally won in a series of massacres, eighty thousand democrats and left-liberals fled Baden and a similar number fled the neighboring Palatinate and Rhineland. This bloodletting is the background against which German National Liberalism emerged. Especially reading Friedrich Engels’s account of the war with its mixture

of admiration for the heroic popular effort and scorn for a halfhearted bourgeois leadership that did not dare to fight its corner gives an impressive sense of what the historical content of the innocent-looking term “post-1848” is.<sup>24</sup> From his own republican-liberal perspective, Hans Kohn suggests that the German liberals “in their haste to establish national unity” wasted the revolutionary momentum of March 1848 when they called for a National Assembly in Frankfurt/Main. Kohn suggests that an alternative strategy would have been to call for assemblies in all German states that could have formulated demands for reform reflecting actual power relations in each specific context.<sup>25</sup> Such a strategy might have prevented the united front of the princes. It appears that the German liberals decided against this option because it might have led to a democratic and republican solution—a “giant Switzerland in the heart of Europe,” as Michael Hughes puts it—which they distrusted.<sup>26</sup>

No giant Switzerland was formed. The National Liberal historian Johann Gustav Droysen declared at the end of 1848, in the midst of the popular uprisings, that he saw in the Prussian army “a great moral force.”<sup>27</sup> Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann declared in January 1849 that “our urge for liberty . . . does not primarily aspire to liberty; to a greater degree it lusts for power which has so far been denied to it.”<sup>28</sup> A good expression of the liberals’ unhappy consciousness is Gabriel Riesser’s comment that given “the sorry choice between the despotism of the princes and the so-called democrats,” “the victory of a despotic, even bloody reaction might be the lesser evil; but I dread the rule of a people which could be happy to see that victory.”<sup>29</sup>

Most German liberals concluded from the events of 1848 and 1849 that national unification had to precede the liberalization of domestic policy. Since any invocation of popular support could not but result in power sharing with democrats and republicans, an emerging central power would have to militarily defeat the cohort of the particularist German princely dynasties. The only contender for this task was Prussia, which made support for Prussian expansionism seem the only strategy to modernize and liberalize state and society in the German realm without giving in to what the liberals saw as mob rule. *After* unification, political liberalism could be

advanced in a unified effort, while the liberal forces in each individual state would remain powerless against reaction and conservatism (unless, indeed, popular radicalism would be encouraged). In order to sail with the wind of progress and *zeitgeist*, one large sail was needed that would capture this wind, rather than many small ones that are difficult to coordinate—if they can be coordinated at all. Left-wing liberals and also many south German liberals held against this view that the unified state—if founded on illiberal principles—would merely be an even greater enemy of liberty. One of the main advocates of Prussian-led unification among south German liberals was Ludwig Bamberger.

The events of 1848 and 1849 also made many of those who had been more radical liberals or democrats redefine their general strategy and aspirations. This rethinking affected all aspects of the liberal program, as is emblematically expressed in the famous remark by Richard Wagner from his essay “Das Judentum in der Musik” (Judaism in Music) (1850): “All our liberalism was a luxurious play of the mind,<sup>30</sup> and so we talked about<sup>31</sup> the liberty of the people without knowing that people, actually resenting any actual contact with the people. And so, our enthusiasm for the emancipation [Gleichberechtigung] of the Jews also came from a mere idea<sup>32</sup> rather than from real sympathy.”<sup>33</sup> This statement illustrates a more general phenomenon: the experience of “actual contact with the people” made many liberals and democrats shed doubt on the desirability of popular “liberty,” and this affected the whole liberal ticket. *Every* item on that ticket was to be reexamined, including the legal betterment of the Jews. It is important to distinguish two elements in Wagner’s statement: liberal-bourgeois disappointment about “the people,” and Wagner’s projecting this disappointment onto “the Jews.” While the liberals had good reasons to be “disappointed” by “the people,” there has not been anything in the actual contribution by Jews to 1848 that would justify the anger of Wagner and other disappointed democrats. In Wagner’s case, the projection of anti-popular anger onto “the Jews” seems to be a way of constructing a concept of “the people” as victims, not perpetrators, of insurgency that the disappointed liberal can refer to affirmatively: blaming “the Jews” exonerates “the people” and restores “the people” as a positive

point of reference. The same discursive strategy was used in the counter-revolutionary Berlin leaflet from 1848 quoted above.

The liberal view of democracy as a threat to “bourgeois society” led liberals to accept “temporary” despotism and warfare: Treitschke, whose writing career begins in this context, demanded—a characteristic formulation of the National Liberal position—“a powerful, purely German state” (i.e., a state without multinational Austria) “in which this particularist nonsense is forced to submit to a centralizing force.”<sup>34</sup> This strategic demand was underpinned by the belief that “when the genuinely national unity of our people has been achieved, any unnatural constitutional form could only be short-lived.” Compromise with Bismarck was “not a capitulation of liberalism but the attempt to create a new basis for the representation of bourgeois interests.”<sup>35</sup> After all, even Bismarck was a free trader, such as when he said in 1849: “Protective tariffs are a protection against the freedom of the people to buy where it seems most economical and convenient.” Around 1870 “all Germany was for free trade.”<sup>36</sup> (If the idea that Bismarck was a Manchester man seems strange, one should remember that Karl Marx, too, defended free trade as a force of progress against Friedrich List and his south German liberal followers, who demanded protectionism in the framework of what in the twentieth century was called “state-driven development”).<sup>37</sup> The achievements of the 1860s and 1870s were so impressive that National Liberals failed to consider the possibility that Bismarck might one day choose other partners. National Liberalism was antifeudal, anticlerical, and antisocialist but not anti-monarchist: Heinrich von Sybel in a text from 1847, Hermann Baumgarten in his famous “Self-Criticism” from 1866, and Treitschke in a text from 1869 argued that the preservation of a monarchical veto against parliamentary suggestions was necessary to defend bourgeois interests against both clerical reaction and proletarian revolution.<sup>38</sup>

The most influential analysis of the prospects for liberalism after 1848 was Ludwig August von Rochau’s “Grundsätze der Realpolitik” (Principles of Realpolitik), published in 1853 “to widespread liberal acclaim.”<sup>39</sup> The general message could not get lost on the liberals: “Only through the exercise of power is what is right appointed to rule.” Right without power was like



“castles in the air.”<sup>40</sup> Rochau suggested that rather than seeking compromises with democrats and republicans—as in 1848—the liberals should trust that the “spirit of the age” was on their side.

By that time, those liberals who thought that politically reactionary Prussia needed actively to be defeated in order to help progress to materialize had become a minority. Economic progress would more or less automatically make Prussia a liberalizing force despite itself: although Prussia subjectively followed its own egoistic interests (the extension of territory and power), it would inevitably and unintentionally turn into a blind tool of the common good of bourgeois society by creating the conditions for the objective unfolding of liberal and capitalist progress. Once the dynamic of progress was unleashed and irreversible, it would sweep away its reactionary midwife, the Prussian warrior state for which the *Weltgeist*, that is, liberal progress, would—after completed German unification—not have any further use.<sup>41</sup> This generally accepted belief of German liberals was eloquently reformulated by Hermann Baumgarten’s famous *Der deutsche Liberalismus: Eine Selbstkritik* (German Liberalism: A Self-Criticism) of 1866 (first published in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, of which Treitschke was then the editor).<sup>42</sup> It was on this platform that in 1867 the National Liberal Party was founded.<sup>43</sup> When liberals and democrats realized they needed the accommodation with the ruling powers to defuse the “social threat,” those items on the liberal ticket that could be dispensed with (such as support for the Polish cause and for Jewish emancipation) were either given up completely (as in the Polish case) or put on the back burner (as in the Jewish case).<sup>44</sup>

### The Concept of Liberalism

Liberalism as a political program is a product of the experience of the American and French revolutions. In this context and immediately after, the word referred to those who opposed the restoration of the *ancien régime* and advocated careful reform “in keeping with the times.”<sup>45</sup> Before that, however, “liberal” had meant the attitude or views that would typically, or even naturally, be held by any benevolent, generous, reasonable, unprejudiced, educated, morally and emotionally balanced person—characteristics

that would in the bourgeois age be thought of as those of an independent, sovereign bourgeois individual.<sup>46</sup> The modern political concept “liberal” preserved and exploited its pre-modern and pre-political meaning. Because liberal individuals were in reality propertied (until, in the twentieth century, the extension and redefinition of citizenship changed this semantic field), the concept has always had a class connotation that bourgeois liberals before the twentieth century usually did not deny: they asserted, though, that pursuit of the particular interests of the bourgeoisie is for the benefit of the general good.<sup>47</sup>

On first sight it seems that the modern, political meaning of the word does not have a stable meaning at all: a present-day liberal in England or the United States seems not to share very much with those moderate forces within the French Revolution who coined the concept.<sup>48</sup> This implies that defining the concept means first of all writing its history. Furthermore, as George L. Mosse has suggested, a distinction must be made between “liberal thought”—in particular, individualism and the concept of *Bildung*, the formation of individual personality by education, as an unending process—and “liberal politics.”<sup>49</sup> Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones write similarly that liberalism is not only “an organized political movement” but also “a set of cultural attitudes, social practices, and economic principles.”<sup>50</sup> Liberalism as a political program, or even a political party, came into existence only after a significant portion of what could be called “liberal society” had already been realized, such as the splitting of traditional social order into separate spheres—the economic, the political, and “the social” (the latter being that which is left from “traditional society” after “economy” and “politics” have been established as separate spheres). Liberal society must have been brought about by people who were not liberals, although their worldviews may have anticipated important elements of liberalism: before the era of the founding of the German Reich the calls for “economic liberalism”—that is, the freeing of “the economy” from “shackles of all kinds”—did not typically come from people called “liberals.”<sup>51</sup> Anthony Arblaster suggests that only such positions ought to be called liberal in the full sense of the word that pursue specifically liberal *goals and values*—such as individual rights and freedoms,

limited government, religious toleration, free-market economics—against the backdrop of the specifically liberal *worldview*, namely, methodological individualism, secularism, confidence in the use of reason, confidence in progress.<sup>52</sup> This definition has the advantage of acknowledging that goals typically pursued by liberals can also be pursued by people who have different (e.g., socialist or conservative) worldviews, and also that liberal pre-suppositions (in terms of worldview) can lead to “illiberal conclusions” (as in the case of Hobbes). An “ideal-typical” liberal writer, in Arblaster’s sense, would be Charles de Montesquieu, who suggested a set of pragmatic measures to ensure liberty (e.g., separation of powers, constitutional checks and balances) based on a discussion of human society.<sup>53</sup> Especially the fact that Montesquieu looked for ways to adopt the example of English political institutions by adapting them to the specific and different historical conditions (of France, in his case) rather than plainly emulating them illustrates well the common roots of liberalism and historicism. Immanuel Wallerstein makes a similar case with his suggestion to distinguish between lowercase and uppercase liberalism. He argues that “liberalism” is “the global ideology” or “the geoculture . . . of the modern world-system,” while “Liberalism” is a particular movement or party within this framework.<sup>54</sup>

In Germany, at least from the 1780s, the word “liberal” was used with reference to a concept of liberty conceived of in a vaguely natural-law sense as a natural human property. In this context, liberality meant as much as nonpartisanship (a notion that lives on in what liberal sociologists like Weber would a century later call “objectivity” or “value-freedom”) and all that one is assumed to arrive at through truly nonpartisan—that is, liberal—thinking. This was underpinned by the Enlightenment assumption that proper, undistorted thinking cannot but lead to the recognition of (natural-law) truth.

The political program of liberalism was formed in France during the years following 1795, that is, the governments of the Directoire and Napoléon. It referred primarily to the politics of the Gironde and the upper bourgeoisie in their struggle—against royalist reaction on the one side, egalitarian popular movements on the other side—for ending the “revolutionary passions” and securing what had been achieved up to this point.<sup>55</sup> When the new

concept was received in Germany at the time, its political dimension was closely bound to its pre-political, ethical meaning. In 1793, Friedrich Gentz advocated in an essay attached to his translation of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* "liberal, non-partisan multifaceted thinking about the nature and the fundamentals of bourgeois society."<sup>56</sup> Friedrich Schiller described in his "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen" (Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man) of the same year "liberal thinking" as thinking that is free of limitations and prejudices and able to abstract from one's own position.<sup>57</sup> Again in the same year, Schiller remarked in a private letter that current events in France showed that humanity was not yet mature enough for "the liberal regime of reason." In another letter he described a "liberal government" as one in which one (monarchical) will rules in such a way that "the individual citizen can persuade himself that he lives according to his own principles and preferences."<sup>58</sup> Schiller does not question *that* the monarchical will rules—the point is that it rules in such a way that the individual does not feel alienated from government. Friedrich Schlegel, the outstanding voice of early romanticism, asserted the Stoic conception of liberality in his famous *Athenaeumsfragment* 441 of 1798, which emphasizes spontaneous immunity against narrow-mindedness or hate: "Liberal is whoever is spontaneously free in all aspects and aspirations and acts in his undivided humanity; whoever appreciates the sacredness of all things acting, existing and becoming according to his possibilities; and whoever partakes in the totality of life without allowing partiality to seduce him toward hatred or disregard thereof."<sup>59</sup> The comments by Schiller in particular are significant beyond the German context, as he strongly influenced English liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold. Gentz contributed in 1795 the sociology of the concept "liberal": echoing the *doux commerce* topos common in the eighteenth century and formulated by Hume, for example, in his "Of Luxury" (1752), Gentz wrote that in the big trading places, "together with that of business, the intellectual horizon is extended," and more commercial interaction brings "more liberality into the appreciation of things and human relations."<sup>60</sup>

From the beginning, the concept developed along nationally differential

paths, without however ever arriving at completely different meanings. In restoration France the word “liberal” was generally used with negative connotations. In 1819, however, the first copy of the journal *Le libéral* was issued.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, the concept gained currency in England, apparently first as an import from Spain, where it had—under Napoleonic influence—developed into a political party name that implied the affirmation of the ending of the *ancien régime*, defense of individual rights and liberties, and warning of the dangers of social equality. It was explicitly understood as being progressive and conservative at the same time.<sup>62</sup>

This ambiguity in the nature of liberalism makes it difficult to grasp the place of economic ideas in it. While classical political economy is usually recognized today as a constitutive element of liberalism, the former’s authors, such as Adam Smith, did not use the word “liberalism,” nor was their overall thinking identical to that of nineteenth-century (let alone twentieth-century) liberals. Nevertheless, the movement that subsequently became known as liberalism owes a lot to classical political economy, as well as, indeed, to the Enlightenment. In the nineteenth century, “liberals were in greater agreement on economics than on politics”: they all “believed that the civic rights of man included the liberation of his productive energies.”<sup>63</sup> All liberals abhorred the vision of “lotus-eating indolence,” the enemy of “industriousness.”<sup>64</sup> Only “some reactionary politicians of half juridical, half theological complexion” could want to defend credit restrictions, one could read in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* in 1860.<sup>65</sup> The historian Augustin Thierry, “refracting the historical perspective of . . . David Hume through the experience and ideology of France after the Revolution,” decisively influenced the liberal perspective on history and society by presenting middle-class “industry” (i.e., industriousness) as the “progressive force of civilization” that had been “hampered” for a long time by “parasitic wealth and indolence; by tradition, privilege, and ignorance; by special interests and arbitrary injustice.”<sup>66</sup> Thierry suggests that in the English Revolution an army whose rallying cry was “idleness and power” was confronted by the army of “industry and liberty,” as “the idlers, those who wanted no other occupation in life than pleasure without pains, of whichever caste, enlisted with the royalist troops, to defend

interests conforming to their own; whereas those families from the caste of the former [Norman] conquerors that had been won over to industry joined the party of the commons.”<sup>67</sup> In the French context, the army of “industry and liberty” was also known as the Third Estate or *la nation* (Sieyes): here in the concept of “industry and liberty” lies the most elementary link between the discourses of liberalism and nationalism.

The concepts “free trade” and “liberalism” seem to have converged explicitly, though not before the movement around the British “Anti-Corn-Law-League” was founded in 1838 by Manchester industrialists. By the time the Corn Laws were abolished, in 1846, it had developed into a mass movement with associations all over the country. The mass pamphlet literature of this movement made generous use of the word “liberty.”<sup>68</sup> However, those who referred to themselves as liberals in Germany at the time tended to reject what they saw as “economism”: even if they embraced free-trade policy, they tended not to see it as a generic recipe for solving any conceivable social and political problem.

In Germany, where the constitution of parliamentary parties was slower than in England or France, the concept of liberalism retained for a longer period both its Napoleonic and the older, “pre-political” meanings. The differentiation into liberals and radicals, or liberals and democrats (soon to be followed by that between democrats and socialists), also hardly occurred in Germany before 1848. The journal *Allemannia* defined in 1816 a liberal government as one that provides and protects legally the freedoms of commerce, person, and opinion; promotes and furthers economic well-being and guarantees equality in jurisdiction and taxation; gains for the people independence and dignity through its foreign policy; and creates an army that is based on honor and patriotism. Such a government would be “a warranty for the development of the national character of the people.”<sup>69</sup> In the same year, the journal *Neue Allemannia* argued that the neologism was not vain fashion but a relevant addition to the vocabulary, because no other word captured exactly the same meaning. Interestingly, the author suggested that the English language was able to use “gentlemanly” instead of “liberal” but that no equivalent existed in German. This article aimed to refute allegations that the new word meant something dangerous and

rebellious, arguing that it merely expressed all that the good, patriotic, and noble-minded citizen, “the independent and active member of the big political family,” would wish. Although the author admitted that “liberal ideas” could be misused, properly understood they are “innate to every good and honest mind.”<sup>70</sup> In the restoration period, “liberalism” turned into a portmanteau concept for everything the Metternich system found dangerous. In a text from 1819 the conservative Adam Müller rejected both extreme legitimism and “so-called liberalism,” which he identified as a standpoint preoccupied with immediate economic benefit.<sup>71</sup> Another conservative writer attacked the “moneyed as well as scholarly arrogance” (*Geldhochmut* and *Gelehrtenhochmut*) of liberalism. Franz von Baader, in a text from 1825, saw liberalism as an atheistic and despotic agent of the disintegration of the European states. The similarities between the conservative critique of liberalism and conservative antisemitism are evident already at this early stage.

The partial realization of liberal bourgeois society made the pursuit of liberal politics a possibility, but it became a necessity only after the early liberal optimism that “progress,” in the sense of the spontaneous effects of the unfolding of economic modernization, will sort out things automatically fell victim to (post-Napoleonic) reaction.<sup>72</sup> The “bureaucratic liberalism” of the reform period constituted a link between enlightened absolutism and constitutional liberalism, but it also first created the social conditions for the emergence of a middle class that could subsequently formulate “constitutional liberalism.”<sup>73</sup> In the first place, “the programmatic drafts outlining the future society of citizens of the state were not produced by the middle classes of the towns” or by a capitalist bourgeoisie that “did not yet exist in Germany, but by a non-*ständisch* intelligentsia”<sup>74</sup>—the academically trained people whom Hegel thought of as the “universal class.” The Prussian bureaucratic liberals might have been staunch free traders, but they did not see much point in creating public representation for a rather traditional agricultural population. Furthermore, equal suffrage was rarely on the liberal wish list anyway, in any country. (The same goes, of course, for gender equality; authority of the paterfamilias reasons with reference to nature, as do liberalism and political economy. Within the family, there is no contract between equals.)

Liberals always held that representation should be organized in a way that prevented the “rule of those without assets.”<sup>75</sup> Bureaucratic liberals had to be “illiberal” in the liberal-democratic sense that the word has assumed since the twentieth century in order to impose on society the liberal politics that the state entrusted them to pursue.

The groups that embraced modern liberal positions in the period leading up to and around 1848 included—apart from merchants, shopkeepers, and industrialists—artisans, peasants, students, and trainees.<sup>76</sup> These groups tended to be torn between a dedication to the existing order and the hope to benefit from the emerging new order, despite the uncertainties it brought. In this period, liberals in Germany typically vacillated between the old and the new. This positioning made them prone to policies that would embrace the promises of the new but safeguard them against its risks, especially against what came to be known as “the social question”: they advocated not only cooperatives, various forms of self-help, and educational associations but also state intervention and regulation.

### **Liberal State Socialism in the German Reich**

In the aftermath of 1848, the threat of revolution was defeated and reaction ruled. In the two decades that followed, however, society changed to such an extent that the situation was reversed: anti-bourgeois reaction was to a large extent *de facto* defeated by the everyday workings of bourgeois society, while the specter of proletarian revolution reappeared. Two decades of socio-economic development (capitalist modernization in the absence of liberalization of government and form of the state) produced ever more evidently a new class of people who showed tendencies to challenge that same form of society. They had to be appeased with concessions—degrees of participation in the distribution of the ever-increasing surplus the new society was able to produce—while at the same time the necessities inherent in the expanding accumulation of capital had to be met. For the administrators of the new regime this was an increasingly difficult balancing act. Economic harmony could no longer simply be postulated; it had to be created, “never quite knowing how many concessions were too much, or how few were too little.”<sup>77</sup>



Some liberals tended to accept the principle of freedom of association also for the working class, and argued for better general education (financed through cutting other, unproductive state expenditure).<sup>78</sup> They saw the right to strike as a contribution, not a threat to the “harmony of classes.” Likewise, liberal supporters of universal (male) suffrage had a self-conscious view of the workings of bourgeois society and argued that giving suffrage to the workers was not very dangerous because, as Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch argued, for example, the “great social interests . . . will automatically prevail,” and the man “who stands at the head of an important industrial establishment, the man who by his intelligence surpasses a great part of his fellow citizens, the proprietor of a large estate . . . are powers in life which assert themselves of their own accord.”<sup>79</sup> Schulze-Delitzsch understood that the fundamental structure of bourgeois society, once established, would be impossible to abolish by electoral means. On the other hand, liberal opponents of universal male suffrage tended to argue that the masses were “not ripe yet” and that a democratically empowered mob (stupid either by nature or as a result of millennia of admittedly unnatural despotism) might derail the slow but certain train of natural progress that headed to the conflict-free utopia of bourgeois society. In this vein, the moderate liberal Johannes Miquel noted that “universal suffrage forces us to wage a difficult struggle against the stupidity of the masses.”<sup>80</sup> Liberals expected that “economic harmony” would first of all realize itself at the level of civil society, in the bargaining and contracting of legal subjects, but not exclusively: they understood as well as did conservatives and socialists that the “invisible hand” needed help from the visible hand. State intervention and social reform ought not to empower the wrong people, though. In 1874 Theodor Mommsen stated that Social Democracy was “the mean enemy of all noble human kind, the gospel of the necessary abolition of all civilization, the oligarchy of the mob.”<sup>81</sup> The Progress politician Eugen Richter wrote in his “Die Fortschrittspartei und die Sozialdemokratie” (The Progress Party and Social Democracy) (1878): “Let us always consider the Progress Party’s struggle with other parties to the right as a side issue, and remind our friends as well as other parties that our main task is to defeat our common enemy, Social Democracy.”<sup>82</sup> As early

as 1877 there were liberals who called for stricter legislation against Social Democratic “demagoguery.”<sup>83</sup> Ludwig Bamberger in his 1878 *Deutschland und der Socialismus* (Germany and Socialism) argued against an appeasement of Social Democracy in any form because in his view, the German bourgeoisie was too weak to be able to assimilate Social Democratic workers. He saw the Social Democratic Party as a mere product of universal franchise—which he disapproved of—and as an ally of reaction against bourgeois society. He applauded the massacre of the Paris Commune and praised the English working class for not making demands that would challenge the existing social order. Treitschke demanded after the attempt on the life of the kaiser in May 1878 that the nation’s parliamentary representatives ought to go about the “extermination [Ausrottung] of Social Democracy” irrespective of the legal subtleties involved.<sup>84</sup> When parliament subsequently discussed legislation that was meant to do exactly that, the liberal response was mixed. Only a small minority warned against panicking about the “red menace” and suggested prioritizing the defense of democratic and liberal rights. Anti-democratic and anti-liberal rhetoric used in the antisocialist demagoguery “bounced back on the liberals like boomerangs.”<sup>85</sup> Liberals themselves had contributed to the panic atmosphere of 1878 that led to massive electoral defeat of the liberal parties.<sup>86</sup> The liberals’ consent to the *Sozialistengesetz* (anti-socialist laws) in its toned-down second version was “not merely opportunistic”;<sup>87</sup> tactical considerations were underpinned by the more fundamental position that “the privilege of liberal freedom” should not be granted to those whom the liberals saw as the enemies of liberal freedom. When Sell (1953) famously formulated that the fate of liberalism in Germany was “tragic” he was right in a more literal sense than he seems to have had in mind. The liberals’ hubris—the delusion that leads to the tragedy’s unfolding—consisted in equating democracy and republicanism to proletarian mob rule and expecting that bourgeois society by necessity and even in the absence of parliamentary government would, sooner or later, hand over the commanding posts to representatives of the bourgeoisie. The liberals failed to comprehend the full logic of the form of society whose natural-born representatives they thought they were, so that their own actions

accelerated a process that turned themselves into instruments of their own undoing; it is in this sense that they were indeed tragic heroes.

Liberals were not unaware, though, of the precariousness of the form of society as whose natural leadership they saw themselves. If the demonization of Social Democracy was almost universal among liberals, their attitude toward state-led social reform was mixed.<sup>88</sup> As the populist antisemitism of the 1870s made one of its trademarks the call for state intervention on behalf of those who seemed to suffer under the “Judaization” of society, the ideas of the liberals on social reform are obviously of high importance also for understanding their position toward antisemitism. Key here is the observation that in the second half of the 1870s in Germany, “reformism was the fashionable creed of the day.”<sup>89</sup> Reform organizations mushroomed with various suggestions for how to solve “the social question,” shorthand for both the destitute situation of the urban and rural poor and the danger of their resulting disaffection with church and state. “All this reform activity essentially aimed at restoring the confidence of the working man in the government and at making the position of the lower middle classes more secure.”<sup>90</sup> While the industrial workers tended to be unimpressed by being patronized by priests and professors, the middle classes—despite historically being opposed to the conservative concept of “the Christian state”—were looking toward state support with respect to both their own economic distress and the threat of a revolutionary working class that seemed to be poised to abolish private property, the state, and the family. Oppenheim sarcastically coined in 1871 the nickname *Kathedersozialisten* (socialists of the lectern) for a group of proponents of state-led social reform who belonged to different political persuasions but were united by a rejection of “Manchester” liberalism.<sup>91</sup> The state-socialist reformist tradition they belonged to was immensely influential. Victor Aimé Huber, who was among its earliest representatives, was involved in the first housing cooperatives in the 1840s.<sup>92</sup> Gustav Schmoller presented the history of the Prussian monarchy as that of a benevolent, socially mediating institution; Adolf Wagner, initially a Manchester liberal, developed into a far-right-wing conservative and antisemite (he was a main cooperator of Stöcker) under the influence of the

state-socialist ideas of Karl Rodbertus. Wagner was the editor of a journal that was actually called *Staatssozialist* (State Socialist).<sup>93</sup> Lujo Brentano was a *Kathedersozialist* with a more liberal background: having lived for some time in England, he understood that workers would stop being hostile to liberal ideas if they were granted the freedom of coalition, so he saw trade unionism as the key to social reform. Despite their differences, all of the above had three tenets in common, which Sell calls the basic program of *Kathedersozialismus*: economic freedom cannot be absolute, the economy must obey ethical as well as practical demands, and the state must intervene to provide a degree of social justice.<sup>94</sup> The fact that none of these tenets would be anathema to most contemporary Western liberals points on the one hand to the historical success of this tradition and on the other hand to its roots in or compatibility with the larger tradition of liberalism. The *Kathedersozialisten* fought on two fronts. On the one hand they were opposed by Manchester liberals such as Bamberger and Oppenheim, who dismissed their teachings as “purely class hate propaganda.” “Less expectedly,” they were also fiercely attacked by Treitschke in a famous article from 1874, as we will see.<sup>95</sup> In the context of an earlier Treitschke dispute, Schmoller defended himself with a quotation from a text by Bamberger of 1868: “The state asks the individual to give his blood because the state is in danger, and it should say another time round, go and starve for I do not know you? . . . Folly, nonsense, contradiction!”<sup>96</sup> A contradiction indeed it is. Bamberger’s 1868 formulation sums up succinctly the underlying logic: if the state wants to rely on the citizenry to “give their blood” (in war, but also in the daily life of building a dynamic capitalist economy) it has to give something in return—namely, some relief from the social distress caused by the extraction of the surplus product that is the basis of the state’s existence. The fact that the leading proponent of *Kathedersozialismus* quotes a formulation from the formerly “red” Bamberger—a democrat turned Manchester liberal and as such a staunch enemy of *Kathedersozialismus*—indicates that the whole discourse, despite and through its antagonisms, constitutes one continent of ideas, not several: the continent of what Wallerstein calls “lowercase” liberalism. Once it is generally acknowledged that the loyalty of the working

class comes at a price, the different political factions within the state leadership (and candidates for becoming such) mainly argue about what that price should be.

### Treitschke's Liberalism

There is lying at my elbow a heap of anti-Jewish literature, consisting of pamphlets, periodicals, and newspaper cuttings, which I have been curious enough to collect. . . . Knights of otherwise noble fame had not thought it unworthy of their steel to descend into the lists, with vizor down, and do strenuous battle against the alien. Professor Treitschke, Progressist or Ultra-Liberal member of the Imperial Parliament, has been called the Macaulay of Germany; and there is undoubted truth in the comparison. The Professor has written stirring poems and brilliant essays and he is also the most picturesque historian of his country. But there the likeness abruptly ends. (*The Times*, November 18, 1880)<sup>97</sup>

Treitschke was one of the main proponents of National Liberalism, which is what gave the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute its historical weight, and which in turn makes the Dispute such an important document for the study of the history of liberalism. Perhaps the most striking aspect of Treitschke's brand of liberal historiography is how closely he intertwined societal-sociological concepts with political and ethnic-national ones. Whenever he celebrated bourgeois values—which he did consistently throughout his life—the celebration of a particular people and its national state (typically, but not exclusively, those of the Germans) followed instantly. A few examples should illustrate this. In a speech given at a festival of nationalist gymnasts in 1863, he praised the bourgeois sense of enterprise, the creation of wealth in the German towns, and the bourgeois notion of the “nobility of labor [Adel der Arbeit]” that made “our economy more moral and more joyful [sittlicher und freudiger].”<sup>98</sup> In the same speech he also argued that the dynamic of bourgeois economic success will finally lead to unification, and he admonished the gymnasts not to forget that the Germans were “one flesh and one blood.”<sup>99</sup> In an essay on “The Republic of the United Netherlands” (1869) Treitschke depicted the Dutch struggle of liberation from Habsburg rule with

undivided sympathy.<sup>100</sup> He saw in the revolutionary Dutch the avant-garde of the modern bourgeoisie and its primary virtues, labor and thrift: "Among this industrious little nation trade and industry seem to have been more a passion than a business. Everybody was trading, and everybody traded with every commodity."<sup>101</sup> One may wonder why he did not accuse the Dutch traders of "Jewification." The semantic trick that lets the Dutch get away with full-scale trading and money-grabbing is that they do it out of "passion" not just business like the Jews.

Strikingly, even Treitschke's notorious essay on the "Teutonic Knights" (1862), which provides a quasi-mythical prehistory to the modern Prussian state's claim to leadership, is written from a bourgeois perspective insofar as it emphasizes the role of German merchants in the colonization of the East.<sup>102</sup> Treitschke praises the Code Napoléon and the anti-feudal orientation of Napoléon I,<sup>103</sup> while he describes the ideas of the revolution of 1789 as "an obscure chaos of despotic and liberal thoughts that exclude each other."<sup>104</sup> He attacks egalitarianism and the notion of popular sovereignty together with the "all-powerfulness of the state" and the—typically French—desire for "unconditional unity and centralization."<sup>105</sup> He argues that under Louis Philippe (1830–48), when for the first time in a European country the middle classes gained "complete possession of ordered government," they missed the chance to "reconcile old and new propertied classes" and showed the same "class egotism [ständische Selbstsucht]" that the aristocracy had previously shown. They turned France into "a nation of careerists." Treitschke acknowledges that Louis Napoléon recognized and tried to address the destitution of the working class. However, "even this coldly calculating mind fell for the perennial delusion of all absolutists, as if the education to freedom was possible other than through freedom itself."<sup>106</sup> The last part of this statement seems a nod toward Humboldt. Treitschke praises the efforts made by Napoleon III to raise the educational level of the workers and for their "civil improvement [bürgerliche Verbesserung]." However, he asserts that "not even the magic tricks of monarchic socialism managed to reconcile capital and labor."<sup>107</sup> Treitschke recognized (quite correctly) that state-socialist policy cannot reconcile the conflict of capital and labor. His

conclusion was that only such carefully chosen measures are to be supported that promise to weaken the class consciousness of workers.

When in 1871 Oppenheim attacked *Kathedersozialismus*, Treitschke supported the social reform option rather than the Manchester position.<sup>108</sup> Treitschke also signed the invitation to a meeting in the summer of 1872 that resulted in the foundation of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy). (However, he did not attend the meeting, apparently because of his deafness.) Treitschke only published a fiercely polemical statement against attempts at social reform, “Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner” (Socialism and Its Benefactors), in reaction to a speech by Schmoller from March 1874.<sup>109</sup> Treitschke agrees with Schmoller that social reform was necessary to prevent revolution and that the state was “the most magnificent moral institution for the education of humanity.”<sup>110</sup> Treitschke’s disagreement is with Schmoller’s suggestion that “the origin of social classes and, more generally, of history was force [Gewalt].” For Treitschke the existence of classes is an anthropological universal: “The millions must plow, forge and plane for some thousands to be able to study, paint and govern.”<sup>111</sup> As Edward Megay comments in Treitschke’s defense, these famous words are “often condemned. But moral indignation does not alter the facts of the history of civilizations.”<sup>112</sup> Treitschke’s words were (as so often) particularly catchy, but the idea was anything but new. Jacques Turgot, for example, had already recognized that “inequality is necessary to the development of division of labor and commerce, and therefore to all the social benefits which modern Europe enjoyed through them.”<sup>113</sup> Treitschke repeated a point that earlier writers had had no hesitations to make; in the late nineteenth century, though, mass literacy made it advisable for bourgeois theorists to formulate more tactfully—advice not usually heeded by Treitschke. For Treitschke, “marriage, property and the organic subdivision of society” were the foundation of society *sans phrase*. For him, classes were not formed by struggle and violence but preexisted them. Struggles between unequal social groups are the ontological basis of human history, not a specific historical form of that history.

Cultural leveling (*Gleichmacherei*) seemed to Treitschke particularly

dangerous, since universal suffrage opened the perspective of “democracy,” which spelled the “political de-civilizing of the masses [politische Entsittlichung des Haufens].” Against what he saw as the *Kathedersozialisten*’s naïveté, Treitschke emphasizes the danger that too much reform would dissolve bourgeois society into anarchy (i.e., into not-society, a not-human state of things). Clearly aware of the difficulty of navigating liberal society between the Scylla of “too little reform” and the Charybdis of “too much reform,” he bases his hopes of achieving this tightrope act on the particular nature of the German bourgeoisie, which he contrasted favorably to its French counterpart: while the latter is egotistic and greedy by nature, the German bourgeoisie has only occasionally succumbed to the “temptations of an epoch of feverish speculation”—and even these rare cases cannot be blamed on the properly German bourgeoisie: “Many new fortunes have been made, amassed by dirty hands using immoral means, and in some parts of the press the greed of these circles shows itself in its ugly triviality as the Shylock-character of the worse elements of our Jewry.”<sup>114</sup> Because the German bourgeoisie is less capitalist-minded than the French bourgeoisie, there is hope that it will be able to maintain bourgeois society with only a modest amount of reform—under the condition, however, that the Jews, whose negative influence aggravates the social problem, are being kept in check. If the Jews are left at large, modernization might fail in its totality. It is in this sense that Treitschke’s understanding of the precarious and contradictory nature of bourgeois class society provides the framework for his take on “the Jewish question.”<sup>115</sup>

A second aspect of Treitschke’s work that is crucial for understanding his position on antisemitism is his concept of the state. Treitschke advocates “the liberty of man within the liberal state.”<sup>116</sup> “Man” can act as a man only as a citizen, that is, in the framework of the state. Decisive is not the morality of the individual (*Moralität*) but the morality as mediated by the state (*Sittlichkeit*, the synthesis of subjective and objective morality).<sup>117</sup> Full development of human personality (following Hegel) is only possible *in* the state; those who conceived of it as being *against* the state (Humboldt, Mill) proposed, according to Treitschke, a “deformed” liberalism.



The ways Treitschke conceived of the relations among state, nation, society, and individual are less than coherent. His reasoning can best be described as a de-dialecticized reading of the Hegelian conception in which each single element stands next to all the others in its own right and rather unmediated. Treitschke saw the state simultaneously as the political form of the *Volk* (people/nation) and as the unified and structured form of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (bourgeois/civil society), otherwise the sphere of particular and conflicting interests. Treitschke vaguely reflects the mutual dependence of nation, state, and society and holds that the state's interventions into nation and society needed to be limited. Relying on Hegel's account, civil society can only be formed as state (i.e., "the people united under law," or else "civil society homogeneously organized").<sup>118</sup> Civil society abstracted from the state is for Treitschke just that: an abstraction. Treitschke's reduction of civil society to an abstraction makes him fall back behind Hegel as he employs a vulgar nominalism to civil society, and fetishizes, or reifies, the state. Treitschke's conception fails thus to grasp the concepts of state and civil society dialectically. Treitschke on the one hand (in keeping with the teachings of the historical school of law and economics) "explained political and legal institutions as a reflection of the power relations existing among the more important societal forces," but on the other hand he introduced "the state (the actualization of universality and concrete morality) from the outside as an agent with inherent power to bring order and justice into the chaos of civil society." He "was never able to eliminate this dichotomy between society and state," which "also mars his view of man as an individual person and as a citizen."<sup>119</sup> Megay holds that for Hegel, "the essence of the modern state" was that "the universal is united with the full freedom of particularity . . . which must retain its right." While the strength of the dialectical conception of state, civil society, and individual would lie in its keeping open the tension—the "force field"—between its contradicting terms, Treitschke maintained "an uneasy symbiosis of the essentially antithetical concepts."<sup>120</sup> His notion of the state as an "ethical force that draws together the nation on a higher level" only superficially resembles Hegel's conception, because it lacks the essential idea that the state "in its

development as well as structure is reasonable.”<sup>121</sup> The idea that the state is an “ethical personality” is for Treitschke just another way of saying that it is not subject to universal norms and values. Georg Iggers emphasizes that this concept only appears idealist, while actually it is a form of positivism, irrationalism, and value-relativism.<sup>122</sup>

It is not, however, utilitarian. Treitschke rejects the utilitarian concept of the state as a mere means for achieving the interests of individuals. He holds that the “totality [Gesamtdasein]” of society is of higher value than the “free movement” of the individuals.<sup>123</sup> However, he also argues for the “mutuality of rights and duties” between citizens and the state, whereby both the state and the citizens carry rights and duties. The state “is its own purpose like everything living”; it “leads an actual life just like each citizen does.”<sup>124</sup> On another occasion Treitschke rejected what he saw as Hegel’s deification of the state and defended (against Hegel, he believed) the independent force of conscience of the individual (which he thought Christianity had introduced into world history).<sup>125</sup> In the context of the *Kulturkampf* Treitschke writes that the state is also “a cultural force [Culturmacht] which we expect to make constructive contributions to all spheres of national life.”<sup>126</sup> He maintains—against the U.S. model, in which churches are private associations separate from the state—that churches should be publicly supported and, by the same token, publicly controlled. He also argues that the state as the creator of order is necessary for bridging the particular interests of the groups that make up society.<sup>127</sup> Treitschke argues that “the ultimate legal basis of the state” is the “ethical consciousness of the nation”;<sup>128</sup> the state is therefore (as Treitschke holds against Mill) “not the enemy of the citizen.”<sup>129</sup> At the same time, he fears (like Mill) egalitarianism and “dictatorship of mediocrity” and applauds Mill’s demand that the individual be protected against “the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling.”<sup>130</sup> Here is where Treitschke sees the main task of the emerging German nation-state: to give expression to “the love of the German for individual freedom” and the Germans’ characteristically strong sense of toleration.<sup>131</sup> The German state is expected to fight off uniform mass civilization.

For Treitschke, liberty remains a mere phrase “as long as no nation exists,”

because the nation “is the only basis of any development of the state,” and liberty is possible only in the state.<sup>132</sup> Whichever path leads fastest to nation building and state formation is the best, “even despotism,” because “once national unity is achieved, any unnatural constitutional form will not last.”<sup>133</sup> National unity will lead to (constitutional) freedom, while (constitutional) freedom not based on national unity is mere illusion. Treitschke embraces a pro-Prussian attitude because Prussia provides (comparatively speaking) the most liberties among all German states.<sup>134</sup> He holds that all other German principalities “can be called states only in a daringly metaphorical way of speaking.”<sup>135</sup> Prussia—since the reform period—qualifies as an “ethical” state in the Hegelian sense. In a letter written in 1860, Treitschke outlines his view of what had to be done: “driving out the dynasties, annexation by Prussia. . . . Who believes this could be done peacefully? But is not German unification under Emperor Wilhelm I an idea worth a few hundred thousand lives?”<sup>136</sup> If measured by early-twenty-first-century standards of polite discourse, the political rhetoric of nineteenth-century liberals is breathtakingly casual and frank in the ways they calculate that a certain quantity of deaths is worth the equivalent of a certain quantity of political goals accomplished. This is the language of realism: “The concept of war is inherent in the concept of the state, because the essence of the state is power . . . without weapons against those who disturb the inner order and against the foreign enemy no state can exist,” a formulation that—like the Fichtean and Hegelian ideas on the necessity and the benefits of war on which it is based—has the advantage that indeed it reflects the historical facts.<sup>137</sup> Treitschke had no sympathies for the defenders of the dynastic rights of the princely rulers of semi-feudal realms such as Schleswig-Holstein. If the power that had constituted those rights in the first place had ceased to exist or stood in the way of progress, those rights were void. Treitschke rejects scruples in destroying the old principalities, because “the ball is rolling, not even a God could stop its course now.” The “train of history” necessitated the “unification of large national masses,” which Treitschke expects would also replace provincial narrow-mindedness with the “moral improvement” that characterizes the citizens of large nation-states.<sup>138</sup> After the Prussian victory over Austria in July 1866,

Treitschke commented that the smaller states were now “more than ripe for the deserved destruction.”<sup>139</sup> Now was the time to attach “the soft mass of statelets” to Prussia “in its rough greatness, its strength and brusqueness as a hard core.”<sup>140</sup> Only the nation-state can guarantee true civilization and world peace, and political liberalism needed to “have the courage” to support Prussia in ending the widely hated *Kleinstaaterei*, the political fragmentation of the German lands.<sup>141</sup> From a liberal position, seeing the evolution of nation-states as an element of liberal progress, there is indeed no good reason to shed any tears about the destruction of Saxonian or Hanoverian princely semi-feudalism; Langer calls Treitschke’s attitude in this sense “idealistic realism.”<sup>142</sup> Since unification had to be achieved at the exclusion of what liberalism had always considered its main enemy, Habsburg Austria, it had to be carried out by a lesser enemy of liberalism—the Prussian state. The National Liberal pattern of thought is strikingly contemporary: we don’t like war, and we don’t even doubt that the motives of the states that are starting it (against existing interstate law) are egotistic and narrow self-interest, but we still support it because we—due to our superior insight—understand that the *Weltgeist* merely *uses* the egotism of the warmongers for the higher purpose of advancing liberal democracy (just as it uses the egotism of the baker to provide society with the finest bread). Therefore we have to allow the superpower of the day to destroy petty, evil dictators (dynastic absolutist semi-feudal princes) in the name of long-term progress. Once sweet commerce (free market economics) is by any means necessary restored to its naturally rightful might, the political superstructure (national self-determination, democracy, human rights) will follow of its own accord.

Treitschke welcomes the fact that the liberal movement after 1848 had freed itself from what he saw as its “naive” trust on the reformability of absolutism. This is one of the ways in which the more modern and nationalist *Gotha* liberalism differed from the cautious and moderate old-fashioned *Beamtenliberalismus*, the liberalism of the bureaucrats.<sup>143</sup> At the same time, however, Treitschke still favors the gradualism and reformism of German monarchical thinking over Rousseau’s concept of popular sovereignty, as the latter in his view could not but lead to anarchy and despotism.<sup>144</sup> The ideas of

German (post-1848) National Liberals must be understood in the context of their historicism and methodical “realism” (a concept coined by Dahlmann). This school of thought (of which the German *Sonderweg* thinking is only a specific instance) claimed that the principles of politics could be deduced from an historical account of the political and social circumstances of any given country.<sup>145</sup> Treitschke admired English “aristocratic” institutions of “self-government” but thought that English parliamentarianism was viable only thanks to the existence of a strong, talented, and self-governed aristocracy that enjoyed popular trust.<sup>146</sup> It did not provide a “model” that could be transferred to other countries with different social and historical conditions. Treitschke emphasizes two aspects of German particularity: Germany is more democratic and more bureaucratic than England. “Because our society is more democratic than English society, our government needs to be truly monarchic.”<sup>147</sup> Germany’s ruling class was therefore not the aristocracy but the *Beamtentum*. Nevertheless, Treitschke holds that the English and the Germans share the concept of liberty as “the unlimited right of the personality” (Mill according to Treitschke), that differed from the French (democratic) idea of liberty. Treitschke rejected those elements of the liberal tradition that he understood to be French (representative democracy and centralized state government), and he considered natural-law liberalism (as prevalent in the south German states) an effect of the “French deformation of liberalism” and “the smug old Enlightenment” that filtered across the border into Germany, particularly in the hand luggage of “international Jewry.”<sup>148</sup> National monarchy was considered necessary to counterbalance the tendency of parliamentarians to represent the interests of the propertied classes, as well as preventing a tyranny of the majority and “*socialisme autoritaire*.”<sup>149</sup>

When Treitschke left the National Liberal Party in July 1879, he commented that the terms “liberal” and “conservative” had lost their meaning. He sensed correctly the winds of change. Supra-party organizations and pressure groups would in the 1880s and 1890s realize precisely the kind of conservative-liberal rapprochement (“on the model of the Victorian Compromise”) that Treitschke began to advocate in the arena of party politics

already around 1879.<sup>150</sup> It could be built upon “the solid foundation of parallel economic interests” of agrarians and industrialists. In any case, it was not antisemitism or cultural illiberalism that wiped the remaining forces of left-wing or Manchester liberalism out of German Imperial politics: Bismarck’s social security scheme did. Whoever opposed it, for whatever reasons, in an era when support for state-centered social reform became a national consensus, stood no chance in parliamentary politics.<sup>151</sup>

In many respects there was not a significant break in Treitschke’s intellectual development, although a radicalization of his nationalism and an increase in straightforwardly racial rhetoric can be discerned.<sup>152</sup> Langer concludes that in the 1860s Treitschke was probably a “typical German liberal,” while the Treitschke of the 1870s was neither exactly a middle-of-the-roader nor a complete outsider.<sup>153</sup> Hans Herzfeld—drawing on Friedrich Meinecke—saw Treitschke as a representative of “classic liberalism” aiming at “a synthesis of previous German idealism and historical-political experience.”<sup>154</sup> Herzfeld characterized Treitschke after his turn toward admiring Bismarck as a “liberal Tory”: the anti-democratic features of Treitschke’s individualism are rooted in his opposition to what he saw (and abhorred) as the “atomism” inherent in “natural-law liberalism.”

## Ten. Nationalism and the Reich of 1871

Next to antisemitism and liberalism, nationalism is the third major category that is needed to put the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute into perspective. The specific history of the formation of the Reich of 1871, whose consolidation provided the immediate context of the Dispute, needs to be explored.

Although one of the defining characteristics of the modern nation is that it is an ethnic-cultural and political entity at the same time, one of the dominant themes of nationalist discourse, and also of scholarly and other discussions about them, is the effort to establish a dichotomy between two types of nationalism: ethnic or cultural, sometimes dubbed German or “Eastern European,” versus civic, political, patriotic, or “Western” nationalisms. Within the liberal context, this distinction is connected to the notion that the “civic” is normatively superior (tolerant of cultural diversity, e.g., and non-racist) to the “ethnic.” This discourse, which identifies France and Germany as opposite paradigms, seems to be traceable to the border dispute following the German conquest of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.<sup>1</sup> As the discourse of the two opposed types of nationalism is also closely connected with the question of how nationalism and antisemitism, especially in the German case, relate to each other, and also because there are striking parallels between the dispute on Alsace-Lorraine and the Treitschke Dispute, it is worth looking at it more closely.

The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was advocated as a war aim of 1870–71 by most German liberals, including Treitschke and Bamberger, and increasingly

also by the general public in Germany.<sup>2</sup> Although Bismarck seems to have been rather reserved about the idea, not even the democratic press was unanimous in defending the popular sovereignty of the Alsatians. Treitschke wrote in 1870 that the Alsatians could not possibly know “what is good for them” because they had to live under despotic French cultural influence; the German state should “return to them their own self against their own will.” Their German features would soon be reanimated by “nature itself, the voice of the blood.”<sup>3</sup> (He did not fail to mention, however, the economic benefits of annexation.) In the aftermath of the war, David Friedrich Strauss and Theodor Mommsen went public, similarly invoking language, culture, race, and history for their argument that the Alsatians were German and that the Prussian military had only corrected the “historical anomaly” of French tutelage that had resulted from French seventeenth-century conquest.<sup>4</sup> The most notable respondent on the French side was Ernest Renan, a moderate republican and part of the intellectual establishment of the French Third Republic.<sup>5</sup> Renan had—until then—shared German historicism’s concept of the nation and its scorn for Enlightenment contractarianism.<sup>6</sup> He had held that it was a “dangerous sophism” to assume that the individual existed prior to the nation.<sup>7</sup> However, the experience that after French military defeat representatives of the (ethnically German) Alsatians expressed their wish to remain French seems to have converted him to a more contractarian concept of the nation: the case of the Alsatians appeared to prove that ethnicity did not determine political will. Renan avoided the dispute about what the “real” ethnicity of the Alsatians was and argued instead that ethnic-cultural-racial “abstractions carry much less weight than the right of flesh and blood Alsatians to submit only to an authority enjoying their consent.”<sup>8</sup> He claimed with this formulation the virtues of concreteness for the republican concept of the nation and discredited the ethnic concept as being based on (typically German) abstractions, a line of argument that resonated well with an intellectual context that adored the concrete and abhorred abstraction. (His German opposites would obviously claim that the ethnic is concrete and that republicanism is based on abstractions.) The circumstantial necessities of the patriotic cause converted the Renan



who had been “the real scientific inspiration behind the Aryan myth in France,” the author of the words that “the Semitic race, compared to the Indo-European race, represents a truly inferior version of human nature,”<sup>9</sup> to the progressive liberal who is now mostly remembered for having defined (in a famous speech of 1882) the nation as a “daily plebiscite.” Renan’s reaction to German triumphalism became emblematic for the subsequent canonization of a conception of the nation that implied a notion of man as able to “lift himself out of his context, escape from his national heritage,”<sup>10</sup> apparently the progressive alternative to what the apologists of German military might, Mommsen and Strauss, seemed to presuppose: man as “a captive of history.”<sup>11</sup> Finkelkraut points out that the basic constellation of the dispute over Alsace repeated itself in the Dreyfus affair, when the anti-Dreyfussards argued the “German,” ethnic way to the extent that some of the patriotic defenders of Dreyfus found that antisemitism was an un-French, typically German attitude.<sup>12</sup> The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute followed a similar pattern, but in this instance—again somewhat ironically—Mommsen played the role of Renan, while Treitschke excelled in his performance of what had been Mommsen’s part a decade earlier.<sup>13</sup>

The widespread belief that German nationalism has a consistent history of being ethnic-cultural while French nationalism is essentially political has been shaped in the German-French conflicts from Alsace to Dreyfus.<sup>14</sup> This orthodoxy was challenged and substantially modified more than a decade ago by Rogers Brubaker, who pointed out that in France, “cultural nationhood has been conceived as an ingredient, not a competitor, of political nationhood.”<sup>15</sup> In Germany, by contrast, this integration did not happen at an early stage, because nationalism appeared in two separate and for a long period hostile forms: as that of the (Prussian) “reformers,” who thought of nation building in strictly political terms, and that of the “romantics,” who tended to think in cultural, moral, and aesthetic terms.<sup>16</sup> The difference between French and German nationalism is not a distinction between political nationalism on the one side and cultural/ethnic nationalism on the other, but between a comparatively integrated political-cultural/ethnic nationalism as it emerged in France and that of a tension-ridden dualism between

political and cultural/ethnic nationalisms (in the plural) characteristic of nineteenth-century Germany. However, in both countries the “inner” nation building through state-led unified educational and communication institutions succeeded only from the 1870s onward. “In practice, in the midst of war against other states as well as against internal rebellions,” that is, in the course of the revolution itself, “the successive governments of France fused the idea of nation as the body of the citizens with the idea of the nation as the French.”<sup>17</sup> That articulations of nationalist thought in the context of the French Revolution mostly emphasized universal and political values as defining the nation does not mean that other (“objective,” cultural, “ethnic”) features were not presupposed as existing. The latter had to move more into the focus of revolutionary, nationalist discourse when *La Nation* found herself at war with other states, and especially later when the competing states were themselves nation-states, too. Only as long as the conflict was between *La Nation* on the one side and an assemblage of dynastic, non-national states on the other was the “universal,” “political,” “subjective,” “civic,” or “constitutional” side of nationalism specific enough to sustain its articulations. The more, however, a situation emerged in which different states of the same kind—namely, nation-states—confronted each other, the less the political form of the state could be a sufficient ground for mobilization.

In the cases of France and England it is generally acknowledged that “the state” preceded and created “the nation.” The same is true for Germany. In the German case this is less often acknowledged, however, because many intellectuals at the time chose to believe, and made others believe, that “the nation” created “the state,” and the latter’s functionaries often found it opportune to confirm this notion. The kernel of truth in the nationalist claim that there “is” a nation that is somehow prevented from “having” its own state is that in a specific territory and among a specific population, favorable conditions for building a nation-state would be found by someone who was about to create one. Not “the nation” but the ingredients necessary for making one, the “ethnic-cultural,” that is, not-yet-national raw material, is what is present there and could be made into a nation in the process of state formation. As the latter is usually rather violent and includes intensified

class and other antagonisms, it can effectively and yet discreetly transform ethnicity into nationality. The set of questions that needs to be asked about any alleged “common heritage” is: How and why are which cultural, social, or political traditions, institutions, or artifacts considered by whom to be constitutive of what kind of commonality?<sup>18</sup>

The only connection between the dichotomy of “ethnic” versus “civic” nationalism and the German and the French nations is that this dichotomy was first formulated in the context of the conflicts between these two nations and entered the wider discourse from there. Its ubiquity is not matched by any conceptual clarity: if ethnicity is narrowly defined as a reference to descent, hardly any modern nationalism will fit into that category, because hardly any modern nationalism actually makes descent the main issue. If ethnicity is defined as a reference to culture,<sup>19</sup> then all nationalisms are ethnic.<sup>20</sup> This point is salient: in reality all nations are characterized by a claim to a national culture, and most theories of the nation, as well as most nationalisms, acknowledge this fact, whether they might otherwise be filed under “political” or under “ethnic.”<sup>21</sup> Renan’s famous lecture which contains the formulation that the nation is a “daily plebiscite” (introduced by Renan with “pardon the metaphor”) also stresses (in many more words) “possession in common of a rich legacy of memories” and “a long past of endeavours, sacrifice and devotion.”<sup>22</sup> The point of Renan’s lecture was that “the nation is ‘given’ as well as ‘chosen’” in the sense that one is supposed “to choose” from among what is “given.”<sup>23</sup> The ethnic and the civic aspects of the nationalist discourse are just that, *aspects*, and cannot be understood even as the opposite endings of a scale of types of nationalisms defined by the proportion in which these two supposedly distinct ingredients are mixed.<sup>24</sup>

### Nation, State, Society

The concept of the nation refers to a specifically modern form of mediation between society and the state. (Against the notion that there is also a “cultural nationalism” that supposedly is not concerned with the state, I agree with Anthony Marx’s point that “if nationalism is not defined with reference to the state, then it would remain too vague a subject of analysis.”)<sup>25</sup> Their

interdependence is so powerful that in the modern context the meanings of the three concepts “nation,” “state,” and “society” have tended to converge: these days not even sociologists speak often about society without thinking of “a society,” that is, a national society, a society within the borders of a particular national state.<sup>26</sup> Anthony Marx defines nationalism as “the modern ideal of popular loyalty and obedience coinciding with the boundaries of political power, either institutionalized as states or asserted against those states.” It “implies the ideal of a ‘nation-state’ in which mass allegiance and institutional power coincide.”<sup>27</sup> The decisive characteristic is that nationalism is about “mass political sentiment or solidarity” involving “mass engagement with states.”<sup>28</sup>

Building on the turbulent historical experience of the early modern European states that were formed before nationalism emerged as a doctrine, Rousseau was among the first to systematically formulate the insight that early modern, rationalist social-contract theory could not adequately describe what was needed to unify society enough to sustain a modern state: in addition to being based on a (metaphorical) contract between egotistic individuals, the nation had to be “a moral, collective body.”<sup>29</sup> It is in this sense that the concept “nation” refers to a specific form of society that is characterized by a specifically modern kind of loyalty of “the people” to “its” state. The emergence or the “making” of this loyalty, from its first beginnings in the fifteenth century to the present day, was and is a complicated, multi-directional, and indetermined process that was never exclusively controlled by any one instance, group, or class of people. In its more developed form in the nineteenth century, national loyalty could be used by the bourgeoisie to impress “its system of values on all of the people.”<sup>30</sup> The cultural-ethnic features of the nation flesh out the “contract” between egotistic individuals to form a society based on bourgeois values in a fashion that gives the particular constellation of state and society its uniqueness. They make it worthy of loyalty (especially, worth dying for) in spite of the universality of most of its features, or else because it embodies certain universal values better than others. The nationality of the population and “its” state are a mere claim or pretense as much as a continually reproduced reality. The

ethnicity and culture of the nation invoke the particularity as well as the unity, and possibly the homogeneity, of the national society.

### The Role of Religion in the Context of the Nation-State

The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute was a debate on religion, too. All sides involved expressed views on the necessity, the role, and the form of religion in the modern state and society. Religion has not usually been at the forefront of discussions on nationalism and liberalism during the last century, perhaps due to rather premature assumptions about the progress of secularization in the modern period, but religious conflict in the nineteenth century was neither anachronistic nor parochial (and sadly this still seems to be the case in the twenty-first century, perhaps even increasingly so). The meanings of “religion” and “confession,” however, changed considerably compared to earlier periods. At least three distinct but related tendencies characterize religion in the modern period: first, the church hierarchy took over, centralized, and standardized the forms of religious life that had previously been much more local and village centered (clericalization); second, parallel to clericalization (*Verkirchlichung*) and contrary to it, there has been a growing tendency to *Entkirchlichung*, that is, the emergence of a sphere of “religiosity” different from but not indifferent to formal, institutional, and positive religion (individualization); and third, with the emergence of the modern state and of “politics” as a separate sphere of activity in the modern period, religion became one of the modern state’s most effective tools: it became politicized. Religion as a tool of politics is fundamentally different from the moral-religious view of social and economic processes that is characteristic of traditional society where “the economy” as a separate sphere in its own right, following its own amoral rules and laws, does not exist. The complex of processes usually summed up as “modernization,” including the constitution of the sphere of “the economy” next to that of “the political,” subsumes religion to these spheres and takes the revival of “moral-religious” worldviews, which it tends to provoke, into its own services. The interaction of these three tendencies—clericalization, individualization, and politicization—produced the immense multiplicity of religious phenomena characteristic of the modern period.

From the late fifteenth century on, “the evangelization of the populace coincided with the development of what can loosely be called nation states.”<sup>31</sup> Post-Reformation Christianity (in its dual form of Protestantism and Counter-Reformation Catholicism) was “the world’s first political ideology.” Early modern formulas such as “Un foi, un roi, une loi” (One creed, one king, one law) or “Cuius regio eius religio” (Whose realm it is, that ruler’s religion one has to adopt) reflect that “the political” and “the private” have never been located in separate or even independent “spheres” to the extent that liberal theory later suggested. Religious confessionalization was bound up with the emergence of territorial states.<sup>32</sup> Religion provided rulers of early modern states with a powerful legitimation to challenge traditional and corporate social and legal relations within their territory—that is, to lay the foundations for a political program that later would be canonized as liberalism—and also to consolidate its borders.<sup>33</sup> Religion played a role in many ways not unlike that played by nationalism later. “Religio vinculum societatis” (Religion is the ligament/tie/bond of society) was the axiom of not medieval but “early modern socialization [Vergesellschaftung].”<sup>34</sup> Religion in the confessional age was also instrumental in imposing social discipline as well as the first modern standards of moral and sexual behavior: it was only in the modern context that the church (in either denominational form) took over the regulation of crucial social functions such as engagement and marriage ceremonies from local family and village structures.<sup>35</sup> In the same breath it fought also the heathen elements of popular piety.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) had aimed to create territories in the German area that were confessionally homogeneous to an extent comparable to that of most other early modern European states. However, this effort was undermined by both the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities in countries of different confession and by enlargement of states by annexing areas populated by people of different confession (especially Prussia and Bavaria).<sup>36</sup> Dutch, Belgian, French, Bohemian, and Swiss Protestant refugees were welcomed by German governments because they came “from culturally advanced regions.”<sup>37</sup> Jews who were in a position of becoming instrumental to advancing modernization were also welcomed, although

their relevance was actually much less central than has often been assumed. Lucian Hölscher suggests that generally in (early) modern Europe, religious minorities that faced difficulties “to maintain their religious integrity in an alien environment” tended “to strive for economic and cultural success.”<sup>38</sup> The “map-makers at Vienna boldly joined what those at Augsburg and Westphalia had so carefully kept asunder.”<sup>39</sup> The enormous increase in spatial mobility and urbanization throughout the nineteenth century intensified this mixing process. “The demographic shifts that brought Catholics and Protestants into common space prefigured, far more than Bismarck’s policy, the recrudescence of confessional conflicts in the Kaiserreich.”<sup>40</sup> The confessional mixing process through intrastate migration or changing state borders had different effects in the cities and in the countryside: among the more mobile and urban parts of the population (first of all, from the mid-eighteenth century, the educated bourgeoisie), confessional distinctions appeared more bridgeable the more personal belief gained in importance. Less mobile and more traditional groups reacted by reaffirming local church traditions. In Prussia after 1815, for example, Catholics reacted against the Prussian reform policy as much as did Lutherans and Calvinists against the state-led unification process of Prussian Protestantism.<sup>41</sup> Not surprisingly, German nationalism in the period after Napoleon and before 1848 searched for a singular, national religion that could bridge the confessional breach. Ernst Moritz Arndt, for example, claimed that “Germany is the land of Protestantism,”<sup>42</sup> while others searched for a synthetic form of Christianity beyond the Christian confessions (such as Fichte in his later years and Jacob Fries, one of the protagonists of the Wartburg festival in 1817), or looked at pre-Christian religiosity rooted in the ethnic Germanic past (such as Jacob Grimm).<sup>43</sup> In this context, the Jews formed “a negative point of reference for an ideology of national-religious integration.”<sup>44</sup> Nineteenth-century piety created in Germany a plethora of sects and religious groupings that constituted a “vast religious spectrum” characterized by “social and regional breaches” rendering “a weltanschauliche integration of society” difficult.<sup>45</sup> Society was not simply divided into an anti-clerical and a pro-clerical camp, but pious and dissenting groups often opposed both “the established Church

and its political allies in governments and bureaucracies.”<sup>46</sup> At the same time, antisemitism could borrow from an understanding of Judaism as a “national” or “ethnic” religion.

### Religion and Religiosity

Modern society transformed traditional religions into “systems of belief” and “confessions” that one does or does not “have.” “From around 1770,” writes Hölscher, “the theology of the Protestant Enlightenment distinguishes between a ‘public’ and a ‘private,’ an ‘outer’ and an ‘inner’ religion.”<sup>47</sup> Confession and belief, or religiosity and piety, were conceived of as separate (although not independent) from each other.<sup>48</sup> The mutation of religion to religiosity meant, for example, that Protestants did not always see decline in church attendance as something negative.<sup>49</sup> Religion’s “evaporation into religiosity [Verflüchtigung der Religion ins Religiöse]”<sup>50</sup> was instrumental to the sacralization of the nation, since it blurred the distinction between a “sacred” and a “profane” sphere. This was anticipated theologically by the notion of history as the arena in which God’s will reveals itself.<sup>51</sup> Seen in this perspective, the suggestion that nationalism emerged as an *Ersatzreligion* is misleading; rather, the nation could be an *ersatz* for church and milieu as these had been discharged from “religiosity”: the nation seems to have given people back what they lost when religion became religiosity. Nationalism in itself was neither antagonistic to religion nor *ersatz* for it. In either Christian confession, the dialectic of clericalization/confessionalization and personalization/individualization worked together against both local, non-clerical traditions of piety, which were indifferent or even disloyal toward the church as an institution, and the trend toward secularization.<sup>52</sup> Catholic clerical reaction in the form of ultramontanism was accompanied by a campaign of spiritual—quasi-evangelist—popular missions. On the Protestant side there was the spiritual movement of Pietism, while clericalization (in Prussia, the main Protestant power) took the form of the Prussian Unionist Church, which was in a Lutheran way allied to the Prussian state. In either case, the clerical and the spiritual movements overlapped but were not identical. By the early nineteenth century, “Catholic popular piety and the Catholic Church



had been in ruins,” but both “neo-traditional forms of mass-religiosity” and the institution of the church itself (as the “ultramontane” church) went through “a stupendous renewal” in the course of the nineteenth century.<sup>53</sup> The “new forms of integration, demarcation, and identity” that emerged in the nineteenth century in all confessions might have been misunderstood by some contemporaries and commentators as anachronistic leftovers of a religious past, but they were “aspects of the modernization process” itself. “Severe and lasting intra-religious divisions occurred in the 1840s, especially in the cities” among Jews, Catholics, and Protestants to similar degrees and as part of the same historical process.<sup>54</sup> “Religious division, which Kant once believed would disappear with the passage of time, deepened in nineteenth-century Germany because of, not despite, social and demographic, cultural and political forces pushing for integration.”<sup>55</sup>

The renewed, ultramontane Catholic Church introduced and reinforced an effective hierarchical institutional structure, regimentation, and homogenization of piety and superstition, including that of antisemitism: the church partly opposed Jew-hatred and partly redefined and standardized it—it defined, for example, what a “proper” ritual murder was supposed to look like.<sup>56</sup> Anti-Jewish riots should not break out “spontaneously” but “in ways defined by the clerics”: as an effect, undisciplined riots in which stones were thrown at Jews as well as at the parish priest were disapproved of.<sup>57</sup>

The twin phenomena of a popular pious movement coinciding with attempts by Rome to reinforce papal authority within the church were intensified in the fall of 1848 when the Catholic bishops of Germany agreed to commit the church to a “full-fledged campaign of popular missions to restore faith, obedience and order among Catholics all across Germany.”<sup>58</sup> These missions were organized by religious orders, foremost the Jesuits.<sup>59</sup> Before the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* began in 1871 in Prussia and on the level of the Reich, it had already been fought—*avant la lettre*—in Bavaria and Baden in the wake of liberal economic reforms from 1863 on.<sup>60</sup> The “liberal Protestant educated middle classes” felt they had to defend modern culture against medieval barbarism. Treitschke, for example, wrote that Rome’s policy made him appreciate the value of Protestantism and reminded him

that “the Pope is the Anti-Christ.”<sup>61</sup> Many Lutheran conservatives, however, understood (correctly) that the *Kulturkampf* was not merely a denominational religious conflict but a struggle of secular authority against clerical authority—a fact that is still clearly reflected by Treitschke’s comments on the Protestant Synod in “Our Prospects” of 1879—and thus felt themselves under attack.<sup>62</sup> It is not without its irony that in the same way that for many liberals Catholicism seemed a dangerous anachronism, for some the same was true for Judaism, while others saw antisemitism as part of a “relapse” from modernity into “the Middle Ages.” Whether any modern (in the widest sense, liberal) individual saw Catholicism, Judaism, or antisemitism (or all of these) as distasteful and reactionary medieval anachronisms depended on what exactly that particular individual understood modernity to be, a category that is of course flexible enough to accommodate an array of different positions. However, no less than a conflict about the right kind of religion, “for liberals the *Kulturkampf* meant . . . a struggle to unlock the potential for social progress, freeing the dynamism of German society from the dead hand of archaic institutions.” Central to this was defeating “clerical control of charities, poorhouses and schools.”<sup>63</sup> The newly introduced freedoms of enterprise and movement as well as government attempts to put the riches of foundations (that had previously, e.g., provided poor relief) to productive use underpinned the popular anti-liberal movement especially among the rural population. “The fact that this anti-liberal popular movement was also a Catholic movement, increased the liberal readiness to pursue the *Kulturkampf* as a domestic preventative war against ‘ultramontane anti-modernity.’”<sup>64</sup> As if echoing Hobbes’s warning that religion other than in the service of the state was dangerous, the *Kulturkampf* was (also) the delegitimization of an ideological resource for popular resistance to (capitalist) progress.<sup>65</sup>

Protestantism, too, especially in Berlin, went after 1815 through a (neo-Pietist) movement of religious revival.<sup>66</sup> This was paralleled by the state-led effort to unite Lutherans and Calvinists in the Church of the Prussian Union, which included the standardization of rites, vestments, and buildings “down to the most minute details.”<sup>67</sup> Those who resisted the unification process (such as the “Old Lutherans”) were depicted as troublemakers and subversives. The

Prussian Union “was a church-state organism of a new type,” an exercise in both “disciplining the Church and sacralizing the state.”<sup>68</sup> While Frederick William III maintained generally an enlightened point of view, seeing religion as functional and subordinate to *raison d'état* and being only tangentially influenced by Pietist revivalism, Frederick William IV (from 1840) embraced the concept of the “Christian state” and made conversion of the Jews an issue of state policy.<sup>69</sup> Friedrich Julius Stahl, a convert from Judaism and director of a Berlin-based society for the conversion of Jews, developed the concept in his *The Christian State* (1847). Stahl argued that the state was “a revelation of the ethical spirit of a nation,” and since ethics in turn were grounded in religion, the state had to express, propagate, and realize in practice the values of the nation’s religion (i.e., Christianity). Stahl rejected in particular the traditional Lutheran view that the earthly realm ought to be kept separate from the Kingdom of God, and argued that the state was an instrument for remodeling the former on the image of the latter.<sup>70</sup> Church and state were to be separate but not “apart.”<sup>71</sup> In contrast to the rhetoric of the “Christian state” of the 1880s and 1890s, Stahl’s concept was still grounded in a notion of Christianity as a spiritual aim of humanity that needed to be served by the state (any state), not in the idea that Christianity was a particular characteristic of a particular nation (the Germans) and needed for this reason to be reflected in the character of the German state.

While the war of 1866 had met substantial Catholic opposition, Protestants and Catholics hardly differed in their attitudes toward the Franco-Prussian War.<sup>72</sup> Correspondingly, the Versailles proclamation of the Reich was strictly military and avoided a confessionally straightforward religious ceremony.<sup>73</sup> Even the concept of the Reich could be understood as an “offer of integration” to Catholics. The majority of educated Catholics welcomed the Reich of 1871, although they might have understood it as a first installment to later *grossdeutsche* unification.<sup>74</sup> Of course, members of differing faiths “constructed their national identity differently, appealing to different traditions, separate memories, another history.”<sup>75</sup> While Protestant nationalists saw Luther as a founder of the German nation, Catholics tended to see him as a traitor who had invited foreign powers to intervene in Germany and

caused its disintegration.<sup>76</sup> As Helmut Walser Smith writes, the problem of “national unity in a polity with a divided memory” is a “peculiarly modern” one.<sup>77</sup> “National unity” is, of course, a “peculiarly modern” phenomenon anyway; the salient question is, why does “divided memory” constitute a problem? Why did Protestants imagine the Catholics or the Jews as disloyal even though they actually were not? The integration of a Catholic into the nation cannot happen in exactly the same way as that of a Protestant: for the one, Bonifatius must be a national hero; for the other, Luther; for a Jewish German nationalist, perhaps Mendelssohn or Börne.<sup>78</sup> Looking back from a twenty-first-century perspective, one may wonder why promoters of nation building have not always and everywhere appreciated that different groups of the population accommodate themselves in slightly differing ways to the nation, and failed to recognize that allowing this to happen is in the best nationalist interest. Once the actual day-to-day mechanics of modern society ensure that everyone, irrespective of religion (or lack thereof), works the same shifts, pays the same taxes, and dies in the same trenches, the advantages of multicultural capitalist development could not fail to become obvious. But the builders and unifiers of the same modern nations that centuries later came to embrace multiculturalism more often than not have been blind to the blessings of “celebrating diversity.” Part of the explanation is that these “group identities” often coincided with specific class positions, but there is also an intrinsic reason: religion cannot be reduced to merely an integrating ideology instrumental to nation building. Essence must appear, religiosity must be religion. The more religion requires the believer to take serious its specific national-religious narrative, the more it reproduces difference and antagonism to the extent that it can become an obstacle to, as much as an instrument of, nation building. It is in this sense that nationalism’s reliance on and subsumption of religion is a double-edged sword. The case of religion is far from unique in this respect: other double-edged swords that nationalism is forced to make use of are socialism and feminism. On the one hand, nationalists could hardly put a more powerful force than socialism into the service of creating the imagined unity of “the people” that obscures the divisions and antagonisms characteristic of modern society. On the

other hand, bestowing patriotic approval onto socialism will inevitably also encourage challenges to the obfuscation of these antagonisms. Wherever (functionalist-sociological) theory sees “function,” historical practice shows struggle. In the same vein, nationalists could not do better than inviting women to be nationalist in a “female,” or even in a feminist, way. Whenever nation building was offered to women, workers, Jews, or other subalterns as their highway to emancipation, though, the actual leaders of “the nation” (who tended not to be women, workers, or Jews themselves) had to make good on some of the promises involved, which in turn could not but create frictions and contradictions.

Religion is a unifying as well as a divisive element. This dialectic, however, can take many forms. In the last decades of the Kaiserreich, Catholics and Protestants learned to create a common national culture based on “shared antagonisms.”<sup>79</sup> It was agreed between them to maintain confessionally exclusive schools, high grain tariffs, the protection of “public morality” against what they held to be “the evils of modernity,” and antipathy toward Jews, ethnic minorities, and Social Democracy. As it were, they marched separately but learned how to fight together.

### The Reich of 1871

The German Reich of 1871 was a nation-state, but it was neither founded by nationalists nor inspired by a broad nationalist movement. It was a bourgeois state, but it was not governed by representatives of the bourgeoisie. It realized a consistent program of liberal-capitalist economic reforms, most of them formulated by liberal experts and politicians, but the backbone of the authoritarian state apparatus that implemented them was an army and a bureaucracy predominantly staffed by the sons of the landed nobility. When looked at under a wider historical perspective, though, in the light of the general intrinsic contradictions of the histories of liberalism and of the epoch of bourgeois revolution, these contradictions are less perplexing than they perhaps first appear.<sup>80</sup>

The founding of the Reich under Bismarck was not primarily inspired by nationalism, although many nationalists claimed this.<sup>81</sup> The National

Liberal Rochau stated as late as 1869 that a strong national consciousness did not exist in Germany and that therefore a national state could only be created through strong external force, not through an internal development leading toward political agreements.<sup>82</sup> This is exactly what—surprising for all involved—happened in 1870–71. A form of nationalism tailored to fit the Reich still had to emerge and grip the masses.<sup>83</sup> The *kleindeutsche* unification of 1871 “was a radical departure from earlier trends in German history” and “was carried out to solve Prussia’s internal political difficulties not the German problem.” However, Prussia’s domestic problems were not solved but rather “transferred into the Reich.” Michael Hughes suggests that a continuation of the development of the Confederation would have resulted in “a giant Switzerland at the heart of Europe,” which would have benefited and secured Germany’s international position more than the Reich did. Unification was a “damage-limitation exercise” aimed at containing modernizing trends and safeguarding the existence of traditional structures.<sup>84</sup> The “supposed national unification” led—“ironically”—first of all to a “serious polarization of the [alleged] nation.”<sup>85</sup> Through the war of 1866, Prussia created a solid power base “down to the river Main” for the project of a greater Prussian state.<sup>86</sup> The actual foundation of the Imperial German state took place in a situation where “anti-Prussianism was growing stronger.”<sup>87</sup> Carr suggests that “National Liberal reactions to deadlock over final unification combined with serious political unrest in South Germany . . . may well have played a part in the decision to go to war in 1870.”<sup>88</sup> The governments of Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria were under serious pressure around 1869. Popular Catholic movements opposed increased military spending, military service, and the curtailment of church activities and defended a *grossdeutsche* perspective against the prospect of Prussian hegemony.<sup>89</sup>

The Prussian bourgeoisie, though, had strong economic reasons for making national unification a priority: as long as the antagonism between Prussia and Austria remained unresolved, Prussia had to carry the main financial burden for protection of the smaller German states from possible Austrian expansion. The Prussian bourgeoisie saw itself as structurally discriminated against by this situation.<sup>90</sup> Likewise, multiple state structures

meant unnecessary deductions from the revenue: a “most irrational system of taxation” (the tolls raised on the river Elbe) allowed, for example, a minor prince to build “in Schwerin a palace which surpasses Windsor and Versailles,” as the author of an article in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* complained in 1859.<sup>91</sup> In the liberal *German Quarterly* from 1862 it was pointed out that investments in modern factories fail to be made, because “in view of our national weakness a war threatens us at any moment.” Furthermore, “no fleet collects for German industrialists the unpaid claims they may happen to have in Mexico.”<sup>92</sup> German nation building needed not only regime change but territorial changes that a majority of liberals came to think could not be achieved other than by military means.<sup>93</sup> This placed at the center of the political scene an institution that is by definition unlikely to promote a liberal mind-set. Liberals were allowed to run the economy and be “arbiters of what constituted good taste,” but political-military power remained in the hands of the experts.<sup>94</sup>

The founding of the German Reich—that is, the fixing of its borders and institutions—was followed by what in German is called “innere Staatsbildung”: creating the conditions for a deeper penetration of the state into society, of center into periphery, of state and society into the relations between individuals and into the individuals themselves, destroying the relative autonomy of intermediary institutions.<sup>95</sup> For this process a new and more effective legitimization was needed that would also trigger an atmosphere of dynamism, mobilization, and enthusiasm for a cause shared by all who found themselves inside the borders of the new state—the nation.<sup>96</sup> This became more difficult when, during the industrial depression since 1873 and the agricultural crisis since 1876, the “nationalist fever” caused by the wars of 1866 and 1870–71 gave way to the more sober mood of having to deal with pressing everyday problems.<sup>97</sup> After all, *Reichsnationalismus*—nationalist enthusiasm for the Reich—was primarily based on (apart from military success) increased economic unification and dynamism after 1871, supported by fast-growing communication systems (railway and media).<sup>98</sup> The fact that nation building in Germany coincided with industrialization allowed for the claim that its benefits (e.g., a higher general standard of living and

economic dynamism) were achievements “of the nation” and of nationalism. At the same time it could be claimed that the nation-state was needed to resolve the specific problems that industrialization created; after 1878, the slogan “protection of national labor” became common currency.<sup>99</sup>

The German Imperial state “had to deal with strong particularisms in Eastern Prussia, Bavaria and elsewhere, a potential liberal-democratic opposition, religious divisions and a rising labour movement, without the benefit of a centralized state apparatus (given the entrenched federalism of the constitution) or national cultural institutions.”<sup>100</sup> The defeat in 1848–49 of democrats who could have implemented some kind of social reform meant that class conflict became so unmitigated a reality that independent labor organizations emerged that stood in opposition to liberalism and bourgeois democracy; in the second half of the 1860s Germany saw an unprecedented series of strikes.<sup>101</sup> Under such precarious conditions, the Reich was unable to initiate easily a form of “integral” or “state-sponsored” nationalism. “Official nationalism . . . may have helped temporarily to consolidate the alliance of the ‘ins’ but it had the effect of alienating other groups.”<sup>102</sup> The relevance of “official nationalism” is difficult to assess but should not be overrated. Nationalism is rarely a “strategy” arbitrarily adopted (or not) by “the state”; rather, the social and historical dynamic of society in its totality gives birth to the state and also, as an aspect and effect of specific changes in society, drives this state toward transforming itself into a “national state.” Furthermore, nation building in the Reich was hampered by the problem that “the foundation of the national state did not lead to a creative unfolding of national culture,” because this culture’s fixation on the new state meant it lost its reference to the German linguistic realm.<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, a large section of the cultural elite turned against the Imperial “nation-state”—in their eyes, a state of philistines—in the name of the values of classical, humanist German culture; Nietzsche would be an example.<sup>104</sup> The classical, philosophically saturated, normative concept of culture is not easily reconciled with the positive nationalist conception of culture as the supposed “expression” of the specific national character of the *Reichsnation*.<sup>105</sup>

The boom period of the Gründerzeit began in 1867 and intensified after the



Franco-Prussian War.<sup>106</sup> From 1867, Prussia and the North German Federation, and after 1871 the Reich, also saw an encompassing series of economic reforms, chiefly the work of Rudolf Delbrück and Otto von Camphausen (“confirmed ‘Manchester men,’” Pulzer notes).<sup>107</sup> Freedom of trade was introduced in the trading regulations (*Gewerbeordnung*) of 1869. The *Aktiennovelle* of 1870 abolished restrictions on the development of joint stock companies. The imperial law on currency (*Reichsmünzgesetz*) of 1871 and 1873 introduced the gold standard, which helped “encourage German business to go after a larger share of the world market.”<sup>108</sup> Duties on pig iron, scrap, and shipbuilding materials were abolished in 1873, and those on half-finished iron products and machinery were halved and subsequently abolished in 1877. Because of rapid industrialization, prices for grain and for cultivated land rose sharply, encouraging agrarian capitalists in the early 1870s to borrow money to invest in land and in industrial methods to increase yield.<sup>109</sup> By 1880, two-thirds of Eastern Prussian Junker estates were in bourgeois hands.<sup>110</sup> When grain prices collapsed due to the industrial depression from 1873 to 1878, worsened by the influx of cheap wheat from the United States and Russia, an agrarian crisis broke out that made Conservatives (from the mid-1870s) call for protective tariffs on wheat. Because from the 1860s the public image of liberalism had increasingly been identified with free-trade policy,<sup>111</sup> many blamed political liberalism for the crisis of 1873–75 (the *Gründerkrach*).<sup>112</sup> The crisis forced industrial and agrarian capital to come to concerted action, negotiating their contradictory interests in low food prices (that meant low value of industrial labor power) on the one side and cheap industrial products and machines on the other.<sup>113</sup> Bismarck managed to translate the changed constellation into the political sphere. Using the occasion of the two attempts on the life of the kaiser (May 11 and June 2, 1878), he intensified the fight against Social Democracy with the *Sozialistengesetz* and used the process of introducing this law to paralyze the liberals. On the same day that the Reichstag passed the *Sozialistengesetz* (October 19, 1878), an assembly of deputies from Conservatives, National Liberals, and Center Party issued a declaration cautiously calling for protective tariffs.<sup>114</sup> This was “of the highest significance for social history” because it was the first case

of political cooperation between large-scale agrarians and heavy industry, and it made possible "Bismarck's emancipation from liberalism."<sup>115</sup> (On a methodological note, it is of no concern here whether or not protective tariffs actually were economically necessary or at all beneficial to the German economy of the time.<sup>116</sup> The point is that a significant enough portion of both industrialists and agrarians *thought* they were necessary. On top of their specific understanding of political economy, or lack thereof, nationalism might have been among the factors that made them think so: just as much as one may become a nationalist because economic reasons demand it, one may become an advocate of economic protectionism because one is a nationalist.) When the National Liberal faction was unable to decide on a clear policy on tariffs, fifteen right-wing members left the party in July 1879, among them Treitschke.

In his widely read "The Secession" (1880), the manifesto of a left-wing faction that left the National Liberal Party in the following year, Ludwig Bamberger suggests that "among all the civilized nations [Kulturländern], Germany has experienced least the political power of its bourgeoisie. This means that feudal ideas have remained stronger here and that socialist ideas have . . . gained more and more power."<sup>117</sup> It is easy to recognize in this formulation a version, or perhaps the original form, of the German *Sonderweg* (special path) argument.<sup>118</sup> Bamberger uses this observation to explain the double phenomenon of Bismarck's successful outmaneuvering of the National Liberal Party and the growth of Social Democracy. The Prussian state (and likewise the Reich that was dominated by it) was old-fashioned in some respects but modern in others.<sup>119</sup> The landed aristocracy in Prussia managed to emerge from the dissolution of feudal structures as an economically successful class in its own right that did not need the cooperation of the bourgeoisie, so that aristocracy and bourgeoisie tended to maintain their separate cultural characteristics more than they did in England and France.<sup>120</sup> The characteristic feature of the modernization process in Germany is the extent of "separation and conflict between the institutions specialising in administration and warfare on the one hand, and those specialising in economic and cultural activity on the other hand." The bourgeoisie was

more self-consciously bourgeois, and the nobility equally self-consciously aristocratic, while both contributed to “modernization.”<sup>121</sup> However, in France and Britain, as in Germany, the building of “popular national identity,” industrialization, capitalization, and the creation of modern state structures—the main elements of “modernization”—took place in the nineteenth century. To quote an expert witness, Richard Cobden found “the Prussian bureaucracy with its specialized administrative functions . . . clearly more modern than the English system,”<sup>122</sup> while Bismarck as “a radical-conservative modernizer . . . had clear contemporary parallels in other European countries, such as Disraeli in Britain or Cavour in Italy.”<sup>123</sup> According to Geoff Eley:

Neither the exclusivist, executive, nor aristocratic features of the German polity before 1914—that is, the checks on popular participation, the relative weakness of parliamentary controls, and the privileges of the titular nobility—were at all unusual by the European standards of the time. Indeed, the *Kaiserreich* was more frequently regarded as an exemplary “modern” state—in the technocratic efficiency of its bureaucratic and military machines, in its more interventionist relationship to the economy and society, in the vaunted excellence of its municipal governments, in its system of social administration, and (from a different point of view) in the existence of universal suffrage and the extent of popular political mobilization.<sup>124</sup>

Eley asserts that “the German experience” of the last decades of the nineteenth century was “a *successful* but conflict-ridden (conflict-ridden *because* so successful) capitalist modernization.”<sup>125</sup> The formation of the German nation-state “did indeed represent an intensified version of structures and processes at work in Western and Central Europe as a whole.”<sup>126</sup> The most extraordinary features of the German case according to Richard J. Evans are the size and economic power of Germany and the particular timing: German nation building happened when industrialization and capitalist class formation were already in full swing.<sup>127</sup> The emerging image is that nineteenth-century German history in its social, political, and intellectual aspects roughly followed patterns that can also be discerned in the histories of neighboring countries, although not in identical form.<sup>128</sup> Its protagonists

saw their own as a “special path” to only a limited extent, and indeed looked as much to the experiences and discourses of their neighbors for help in understanding their own as the latter looked at those of the Germans. For the conclusions that need to be drawn from the analysis of the Berlin Anti-semitism Dispute this means that present-day discourses of liberalism and nationalism in any national context, to the extent that they are rooted in nineteenth-century traditions, cannot be treated as if they were located a safe and hygienic distance from the specific German context that produced Treitschke’s support for antisemitism and the ultimate failure of liberal society to prevent it from turning catastrophic.



## Conclusion. Antisemitism and the Limits of Liberal Society

### A Final Recapitulation of the Dispute

A German “liberal Tory” finds that antisemitism deserves to be taken seriously and declares it, quite happily, an authentic expression of the general mood of the nation.<sup>1</sup> It has its reason in the fact that the “Jewish question” is in Germany more acute and of a different character than in other countries. Some other liberals object: antisemitism is only a product of manipulation and demagoguery, a tool in the struggle of Catholics and Conservatives against Bismarck and National Liberalism. A radical antisemite also objects, pointing out instead that all the people have always hated the Jews everywhere, anyway, but members of the educated elite cannot be trusted when they want to join the antisemitic campaign: they and their *Bildung* are part of the problem itself. Two more left-wing liberals argue the opposite: antisemitism originates with the educated class, not with the common people. The problem is, the progress of civilization is not irreversible, and especially the brutalization experienced in modern warfare tends to throw civilization into reverse gear. An authoritative statement by a large group of liberal notables points out that antisemitism threatens national unity and the liberal socioeconomic order. One of its initiators calls antisemitism the “deformed child” of national unity itself. The liberal Tory finds, to the contrary, that antisemitism will strengthen, rather than undermine, national unity, and points out that Germany, being a belated and still weak nation, is not currently able to assimilate a large number of rather stubborn eastern

immigrants with alien attitudes and manners. Bleeding-heart liberalism may be fine for France or England, but not, at the present stage, for Germany. Several others assert the loyalty and German-mindedness of the German Jews, even including most of those from the East, and make fun of the idea that a tiny minority like the Jews could corrupt the moral fiber of the great German nation. Assimilation is well under way, and there are no signs of its failure. But, says the liberal Tory, the Jews do not make any first-rank contributions to German culture: they are only really good at journalism and pop culture, and that is because these are cultural as well as economic practices. And here is from where they corrupt German culture. "What about Heinrich Heine?" Everyone seems to like Heine's poetry, but the liberal Tory finds that Heine was only great when his Germanness overruled his Jewishness, while others find he was great because he managed to integrate his Jewishness with his Germanness, making him a truly German Jew, while one person thought Heine's Jewishness, not his Germanness, was the main source of his poetic sensibility.

A liberal economist and a liberal anthropologist challenge the nationalist concept of culture in itself: there is no pure culture; culture's greatness and progress depend on its ability to assimilate. Progress actually consists in growing diversity. In the course of societal and cultural evolution, manifestations of an earlier stage of development continue to coexist with those of later stages, as with Judaism and Christianity. And why not? It is actually the "permanent vocation of the Jews" to further difference as well as humanist universalism. A liberal historian adds that German culture is a mixed culture already, consisting of Germanity, Christianity, and classical antiquity. The radical antisemite also advocates cultural diversity, but he accuses liberalism and the Jews of destroying the cultural particularity of the German culture: they want to make everything and everyone the same. On the other hand, Germanity, Christianity, and classical antiquity are not really different cultures anyway, as they are all of the same race. Semites had no part in it, and so it should remain. The liberal Tory makes a slightly different point: German culture has successfully amalgamated its three constituent elements, but that is as far as the mixing of cultures should go. German culture is now a

really winning formula, and no further “neo-Jewish” elements should enter it. From the left-liberal side comes the objection that the German spirit and the Jewish spirit are actually quite similar: both groups are quarrelsome as well as cosmopolitan; they like speculation and are good at abstract thinking. Their morality and religiosity are also similar, and whatever differences there are between them will benefit German culture.

The liberal Tory sees a much more fundamental problem at work, though: because the Jews turn everything into a mere business, they destroy the German people’s “good-natured willingness to work,” which is central to the very fabric of society, its hierarchy and division of labor. His more left-leaning colleagues reply that work should indeed best be seen as a business and not anything else, such as an ethical or a state service, and they reproach the liberal Tory, himself famous for rabid socialist-baiting, of socialist tendencies. The radical antisemites happily take up this point. They have a raw sketch of something very much like National Socialism at the ready: Germans are overburdened with having to feed unproductive, exploitative, and speculating Jews; but the revolution against the Jewish inventions of Manchesterism and utilitarianism is well under way, as it began two thousand years ago with a man called Jesus.

The liberal Tory and other liberals agree that nations are constituted by the amalgamation of tribes, whereby national spirit overcomes and transcends racial-corporeal matter. The antisemite, however, finds that intermarriage strengthens Jewish domination, because the Jewish genes are so very powerful. One liberal, though, a neo-Kantian philosopher, agrees that the nation ought to develop its “racial type” but understands this to mean a dialectical, mutual conditioning of national spirit and racial body in the historical process. The liberal economist and the liberal anthropologist bluntly reject the category of race as a pretext and nonsense.

The liberal Tory tries to square the circle with his central contention that the German nation is Christian but the German state is secular. When some liberals claim politics is beyond religion, the neo-Kantian philosopher responds that, except temporarily, all members of the nation ought to participate in that nation’s religious foundation—in their religiosity, not



necessarily in the religious forms and institutions, though, which are mere vehicles of that religiosity. The radical antisemite, having no time for such subtle distinctions, asserts that in the modern context where the state is based on nationality, in turn including religion, the separation of church and state had become meaningless. The liberal Tory doubts whether the Jews would be able fully to become Germans, as some of them can be found indulging in being a nation apart. In the same breath he accuses them of cheekily masquerading as Germans when they were, as has just been shown, essentially strangers. Some others find this position rather contradictory. While the liberal Tory seems to treat civil and human rights, at least those of the Jews, as if they are positive rights granted, or not, by the state at will, others assert they are natural rights. Again, the neo-Kantian philosopher finds a dialectical way of asserting that the state's action was, and ought to be, rooted in its particular interpretation of universal, moral law.

### The Great Harmony of Society

One of the more mysterious and unsettling statements to be found in Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* reads: "The liberal Jews had to experience at last the harmony of society which they confessed to as the harmony of the national community."<sup>2</sup> The liberal Jews confessed to, or chose to believe in, the (liberal) idea of "the harmony of society," namely, the kind of harmony Bastiat refers to in his *Harmonies économiques*. They had to experience this harmony, which does not exist, as that of "the national community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*), which exists: the only harmony that antagonistic society can warrant is that of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Horkheimer and Adorno's formulation implies that the worst consequences of "national community" could have been fought more effectively had fewer people believed in the convenient illusion of social harmony.

But this possibility seems rather theoretical: Do not the protagonists and defenders of liberal society have to believe in its harmony, its community, its identity? Tocqueville seems to say that much: "Despotism can do without faith but freedom cannot. . . . How could society fail to perish if, while the political bond is relaxed, the moral bond were not tightened?"<sup>3</sup> If

Tocqueville is right, and all the evidence suggests he is, liberal society especially relies on tight “moral bonds,” which in the historical reality known to us inevitably point to “the culture” of those who live closely together, and to “religion”: the closeness in Greek of the twin concepts *ethos* and *ethnos*, ethics and ethnicity, points in this direction, while the etymology of *religion* gives already the notion of something that “binds” the members of a community together. The problem seems to lie with a society that cannot afford the “moral bond”—ethnic ethics, binding religion—to be relaxed together with “the political bond.” To put it the other way around, a sociality needs to be looked for that knows neither the chaos created by antagonistic egotisms nor the need for bonds that stems from it. This form of sociality is what Adorno hints at in another famous comment: “Politics that are still seriously concerned with [an emancipated] society ought not, therefore, to propound the abstract equality of men even as an idea. Instead, they should . . . conceive the better state of things [Zustand] as one in which people could be different without fear.”<sup>4</sup> Another question that needs to be asked is, if liberal society relies on some kind of bonds, why should they be religious ones? After all, at least parts of the Enlightenment tradition had seemed to look forward to religion’s disappearance, and religion did take some blows during the French Revolution. In Germany, too, it was possible in 1795 for some angry young men to write that both religion and politics teach “contempt for humanity and the incapacity of man to realize the good and to achieve something through his own efforts.”<sup>5</sup> While this text seems to condemn positive religion as such, Hegel (who might have had a hand in writing it but at least found it worth copying) exempted Christianity from such condemnation as early as in his “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” (1798–99), where he presented Judaism as the paradigmatic religion of despotism.<sup>6</sup> He gave a hint to what made him do so in a text of 1802 when he wrote that religion “expresses the innermost being of all people, so that all external and diffuse matters aside, they can find a common focus and, despite inequality and transformations in other spheres and conditions, are still able to trust and rely on each other.”<sup>7</sup> Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that many of the brightest thinkers of the modern era were prevented

from challenging religion by their horror of what might happen to liberal society without the bonds of religion. In the modern period “religion was subsumed [eingegliedert], and not overcome [aufgehoben]” as Adorno and Horkheimer write: when religion became a “cultural artefact [Kulturgut]” only its “reified forms” survived, while the “element of truth” that they had carried and preserved (the messianic promise of a better life) tended to be suppressed and made forgotten.<sup>8</sup> The German society of the Second Reich might have been “becoming increasingly secularized,” but it was “by no means secular.”<sup>9</sup> Private and public, inner and outer, state and civil society needed a link of some sort, providing firm values, and this link was generally seen in “culture.” “Values” and “culture” were, however, impossible to think of without reference to religion. Enlightenment (proto-)liberalism had developed two approaches to religion, which Smith calls a “soft,” or pluralist, and a “hard,” or rationalist tendency. The former saw theological differences as irreconcilable and suggested that creating “a competitive market in religious sects” could best neutralize their frictions—the more there were, the more peaceful it would be (the historical root of today’s notion of the “multicultural society”).<sup>10</sup> The other line of thinking was the idea that old-time theology ought to be transformed into a new, rational form of religion that was very often understood to be a continuation and extension of the Reformation. The rational religion would be universal, cosmopolitan, pure morality stripped of all institutional, historical, and popular encrustation. The “soft” and “hard” tendencies were not, however, separate items: an emblematic thinker like Locke contributed to both at the same time. When Locke argues that politics should not concern itself with religion, this does not mean it is independent from it. The tension between a secular state and a religious civil society is not abolished by decree. The resurgence of forms of religious enthusiasm that would challenge this precarious separation has never been absent from modern societies.

Toleration was extended first of all, in England, to the dissenting Protestant sects, not necessarily to Catholics or Jews and especially not to atheists. “The point [of toleration] was to validate not every way of life and set of moral beliefs but only enough of them to avoid the dangers of civil war.”<sup>11</sup>

Within this logic, minorities that were too insignificant to engage in a civil war did not need to be tolerated. Moses Mendelssohn argued, in the German context, for the extension of toleration to Judaism and Islam on the grounds that church, mosque, and synagogue (no mention, however, of the atheist reading club) could “assist the government in inculcating moral reasons for obeying the law.”<sup>12</sup> Also in Mendelssohn’s argument, toleration of diversity will best ensure that moderate, not-too-unreasonable religion will complement and support the purposes of the modern liberal state. The state should therefore grant the space for this to happen while it critically observes that toleration is actually being put to good use.<sup>13</sup> Hegel’s position is not totally dissimilar: he argues for religious toleration because the recognition of religious freedom asserts a crucial Protestant principle, the centrality of individual subjectivity that thereby interpenetrates the secular sphere. “Hegel argues that to exclude Jews from civil rights would only confirm the separatism for which they have been reproached.”<sup>14</sup> The modern state and society, united in the spirit of Protestantism, assert their world-historical triumph by tolerating the remnants of outdated religions. The case for toleration is here an expression of optimistic belief in the actuality of liberal progress.

The social content of this belief is spelled out in Christian Wilhelm von Dohm’s *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* (On the Civic Improvement of the Jews, 1781), which links the question of Jewish emancipation to the larger framework of redefining the tasks of (modern) government with respect to society:

It is the great and noble business of government so to attenuate the exclusive principles [ausschliessenden Grundsätze] of all those various societies that they do not damage the large common bond that embraces all of them; that each of these divisions shall stimulate only competitiveness and activity rather than dislike and distance; and that all of them are resolved in the great harmony of the state. The government ought to allow each of those particular groupings to indulge in their pride, even in their not damaging prejudices; but it also ought to strive to instill yet more love in every single one of their members, and it will

have achieved its great task when the nobleman, the peasant, the scholar, the artisan, the Christian and the Jew are, beyond and above all that, *citizens*.<sup>15</sup>

Dohm describes the transformation of the *Gesellschaften* and *Verbindungen*—corporations and estates—of traditional bourgeois society into the layers, classes, and groupings of modern bourgeois society. He points to a characteristic dialectic of continuity and change: social groupings continue to exist, and they still “indulge” in prejudices and “exclusive principles,” but rather than existing statically next to each other, they engage in dynamic competition and form a harmonious whole, the modern “state” (in today’s usage, “society”). The task of government is to help harmony to emerge by attenuating social separations: the “great harmony of the state” is based not on the abolition of separation and prejudices but rather on their transformation. Dohm’s notion of harmony is a dynamic rather than a static harmony: the state’s members “love” and recognize each other individually as citizens but are in competition with each other as members of social strata, groups, and classes. Dohm suggests that Jewish emancipation would help to increase competition, dynamism, and productivity.<sup>16</sup>

### From the Enlightenment to the Nation

It is crucial to the discussion that the fate of Enlightenment, liberalism, and emancipation is bound up with that of the modern state, the nation, and the necessities they represent. Altogether, these are moments of the larger sociohistorical framework of modern bourgeois society. (“The modern era” is understood here as the period in which “modernization” of society took place, i.e., when a specific set of structural changes occurred that resulted in the creation of “bourgeois society.” The difficulty and complexity of the concept lies in the fact that beyond its historical-structural meaning, “modernity” also carries normative connotations, a set of promises—emancipation, humanity, human reconciliation in universal liberation—that “modernization” has only begun to fulfil. The unfulfilled promises of “the modern”—the difference between “modernity” and “modernization”—need to be salvaged against the reality of modern society as it currently exists. For

this reason, “modern bourgeois society” is not the pleonasm that it seems to be: although the notion of *another modernity* is currently driven underground, it is as relevant now as it has been at any previous point in time.)<sup>17</sup> Spinoza, Locke, Kant, and others called for a civil and reasonable religion that would provide the necessary bridging of the gaps between private and public, between civil society and the state, and left the door open for various religions to join into a general neo-reformation movement. Hegel and then Treitschke, together with cohorts of others, claimed straightforwardly what had previously been implied between the lines: this modern and reasonable religion already exists—more or less—in the form of Protestant Christianity. In this situation, the Jews and others have to double their effort to join the Protestant train of reasonable religion, or they might find themselves being left behind.

Liberals in the age of nation building tended to postulate “a certain uniformity of thought and action for the new society” in a way that had not been customary in the Enlightenment period.<sup>18</sup> Most Jews, hoping to assimilate into the emerging bourgeois society, or rather into the class that saw itself as the core of that society, were ready to take part in the bourgeoisie’s struggle for emancipation from aristocratic domination. However, the non-Jewish bourgeoisie did not unconditionally welcome the support by an even less privileged group, let alone fight for their specific interests.<sup>19</sup> An example is the statement by Friedrich Dahlmann of 1831: the “fault lines of our civil society [die Gebrechen unserer bürgerlichen Gesellschaft]” would not allow an act as “politically daring” as the emancipation of the Jews: he feared emancipation would trigger riots that could get out of hand.<sup>20</sup>

Jewish liberals tended to endorse the emancipation-for-assimilation deal. But while in the context of the Enlightenment, “de-Judaization” had meant religious reform, participation in the general trend of making society “industrious,” and commitment to “universal reason,” under the new conditions of advanced nation-state formation these concerns were complemented, and partly replaced, with a much more encompassing concern for “culture.” The urge toward cultural-national assimilation was an element of nationalism rather than of Enlightenment universalism.<sup>21</sup> The concept of assimilation

was rearticulated in terms of state-culture during the first half of the nineteenth century. The liberal Karl von Rotteck wrote in 1828 that “the Jew had to be de-Jewified.”<sup>22</sup> He rejected Jewish emancipation with the argument their religion was *völkerfeindlich*, by which he seemed to mean antisocial as well as anti-national.<sup>23</sup> The Jews lacked “the freedom and true *Sittlichkeit*” to “subject themselves voluntarily to the majority principle.”<sup>24</sup> He argued in 1833 that the “temporary restriction of the rights of the Israelites” was necessary “because the state as an intimate association [inniger Verein] necessitates a certain homogeneity or amalgamation [Gleichförmigkeit oder Verschmelzung] of attitudes and preferences, and the Jews can not have this actually social attitude towards us [unless they] stop being Jews in the strong sense of the word.” Rotteck held that “hostility against or at least separation from all other peoples” was intrinsic to Judaism.<sup>25</sup>

While Enlightenment liberalism was concerned primarily with civic-political assimilation (and also with reform toward universal “reasonable religion”), nationalist liberalism shifted the emphasis on assimilation toward national culture. The “insistence that the emancipated Jew should cease to be a Jew in any but a purely private capacity remained the liberal orthodoxy” throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>26</sup> Concerning the time scale of how to get there, however, two positions continued to compete with each other. Rotteck—like most pre-1848 liberals—argued for a postponement of emancipation until sufficient reform of Judaism and of the Jews was completed, but also the more radical Humboldtian position—then the minority position—was present, as formulated, for example, by another Baden deputy (also in 1833): the Israelites should “be thrown into the masses of the Christian population so that they would be carried away by the torrent and, like a pebble wandering along a riverbed, be rounded and made to fit into the existing order [dem Bestehenden sich einfügen].”<sup>27</sup> The second position, which twenty-first-century readers will tend to find “more liberal,” is also rather brutal and inhumane in its imagery; it can hardly surprise that more traditional or conservative Jews at the time would have found it rather more objectionable.

Only from around 1846, majority liberal thought generally shifted toward

support for emancipation without conditions.<sup>28</sup> From the 1860s, finally, there was a liberal consensus that state legislation should not be concerned with the actual process of the social integration of the Jews but should merely abolish any obstacles that restricted the individual, allowing society to take care of the rest. Such shifts were the results of struggles, though: Dagmar Herzog warned from the traditional notion of a “logical unfolding of liberal principles, expanding to include ever more social groups in the circle of those who deserved equality” and argued that the liberals’ turn toward supporting emancipation was a reaction to “a complex conjunction of intra-Christian conflicts,” namely, the increased effectiveness of Catholic reaction and “neoorthodoxy.”<sup>29</sup> She shows in the case of Baden that liberals were particularly antagonized by “Rome’s new authoritarianism in marital matters,” which prompted Baden liberals to speak out against “religious tyranny” and for religious freedom (i.e., the right of the “German Catholic [deutschkatholischen]” dissenters to organize themselves as recognized Christian communities) so emphatically that they had to give up in the end their reservations against Jewish emancipation.<sup>30</sup> A parliamentary speech by Friedrich Hecker in the August 1846 session in which the Lower Chamber of Baden for the first time voted for Jewish emancipation illustrates the process beautifully:

I must admit that this religious persecution, this repression for the sake of faith, makes quite clear to me what sort of oppression has weighed on the Jews, and from that moment on that I saw the oppression of our *Deutschkatholiken*, I vowed to vote for the emancipation of the Jews. (Many voices cry bravo.) . . . I was caught in the prejudice of youth, of custom, and now I have returned to freedom. . . . I would not be able to justify it before God and the people to put someone in a worse or lower position, because he cannot worship God as I do, but rather wants to serve Him in his own way.<sup>31</sup>

Hecker added, though: “I know well, that it makes a peculiar impression upon one with Christian Germanic sensibilities, when he sees the sharply etched Oriental face suddenly invading.”<sup>32</sup> As Herzog points out, into the very argument that relativizes the religious difference the same difference has already returned as the racial difference.



### Inclusion and Exclusion

The analysis of the Dispute has pointed to the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion as inherent in the “nation” form of the modern state. Whenever a state and society are constituted in the form of “the nation,” some degree of cultural homogeneity will have to be enforced, and there will inevitably be some form of (more subtle or more overt) pressure toward sociocultural assimilation. If a relevant minority appears not to be assimilating as much as it is expected to, representatives of the established national culture tend to draw one of three conclusions. First, they may think that the members of the minority are *prevented* from assimilating by circumstance; this is the classic position taken by Enlightenment figures such as Dohm and Humboldt and echoed by Mommsen, Breßlau, and other liberal critics of Treitschke to the extent that they admit that the Jews are still lacking Germanness. Second, they are seen as being *unwilling* to assimilate, which is the dominant theme of Treitschke’s contributions. Or third, they are seen as *unable* to assimilate, which is the “racist” position held by Naudh and Endner, and sometimes by Treitschke. These three interpretations have different and potentially opposite practical implications but work toward the same political end, the consolidation of nation building. Because Treitschke expects antisemitism to accelerate the assimilation of the German Jews (his first objective) and strengthen national consciousness of all Germans (his second objective), he endorses it. The tension in his argument between whether or not he believes Jewish assimilation to be possible implies that the second objective can still be achieved independently from the first: if inclusion does not work, exclusion will. Mommsen, Cohen, and others do not want the second objective (strengthening of the Germans’ national consciousness) to be realized without the first (inclusion and assimilation of the Jews). Treitschke’s liberal critics oppose antisemitism primarily because they think it weakens national unity. Statements that reject antisemitism for reasons other than its adverse implications for nation building are few and far between.

A discussion of liberalism needs to differentiate between the presuppositions of the liberal “worldview” and the more practical propositions of liberal

politics; they do not necessarily—and perhaps not even typically—come in a package. Invocations of progress, civilization, “industry and liberty,” and social harmony can mean very different things in practice. A look at the beginnings of the political concept of liberalism in the context of the French Revolution shows that it is best characterized—in the modern context—as the predominant centrist position in simultaneously opposing reaction and (revolutionary, democratic, or socialist) radicalism. The advent of modern class society as shaped by industrial capitalism led to a redefinition of the liberal notion of social harmony and how it was to be secured.

German National Liberalism—to which Treitschke, Bamberger, Mommsen, and Oppenheim adhered—was shaped by the experience in 1848 and 1849 when unexpectedly strong popular democratic forces emerged that only the Prussian “warrior state” was able to defeat. Because democratic populism was at the ready to take advantage of any power vacuum caused by a defeat of the aristocracy, National Liberals had to learn the hard way that their vision of transforming the old regime into modern society without any extreme and sudden political change was impossible to realize unless in a coalition with the traditional ruling classes. This coalition was no “betrayal” but followed from the concept of liberalism. The National Liberal outlook’s vacillations reflected the Janus character of the Prussian state and society. It was able to accommodate a range of positions, from Treitschke’s emphasis on the importance of the state as an ethical (*sittliche*) force to the “Manchester” liberalism of Bamberger and Oppenheim. Although Prussia was not bourgeois in political form and appearance, it would be able to destroy traditional power structures in the smaller German states without allowing a power vacuum to emerge—so they thought—because Prussian society and bureaucracy were more modern than those of most German states.

National Liberals assumed that the modernizing dynamic of national unification would quasi-automatically transform and modernize non-bourgeois political forms. Therefore, a *realpolitische* alliance with the representatives of such forms (Bismarck in particular) could seem to be legitimate and of long-term benefit to the liberal cause. In the context of liberal *realpolitik* the principle of the *Rechtsstaat* was repeatedly violated, as in the cases of

the *Kulturkampf*, the regulations concerning national minorities (such as in Alsace-Lorraine), and the *Sozialistengesetze*. At the same time, enmity toward state-led social policy was equivocal among National Liberals, some of whom advocated moderate state-socialist reform (as also pre-1848 petit bourgeois liberalism had entertained the notion of state-supported social harmonization). The continued existence of opposition within liberalism to so-called English conditions or Manchester capitalism on the grounds that they undermined the harmony of national unity constituted an important ideological bridge between liberal and antisemitic nationalism.

Mark Levene sums it up nicely: “The tolerant nation-state is a contradiction in terms.”<sup>33</sup> The claim that a particular state is “a nation-state” or that the society whose political form this state is, is “a nation” is a claim about the congruence of a political and an “ethnic” entity whereby “ethnicity” means “culture” in the static (as opposed to dynamic and relational) sense of the word. The claim of nationality must be made sufficiently plausible through the existence or the creation of some ethnic-national “culture,” that is, the (attempted or successful) reification and fetishization of society’s *actual* culture—the ensemble of lived relationships between people—which is always fluid and contradictory, never fully and consistently “national.” “National culture” helps stabilize in turn the citizens’ loyalty to the state and the unity and coherence of society. Even the denial that ethnicity is at all relevant for the nation-state’s cohesion can at times be a defining feature of the particular national culture. This tends to occur in cases when a competing nationalism (from within or without the national context) is articulated in strongly ethnic-cultural or racial terms, such as in the cases of Renan’s statement on nationalism in the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine, or Lazarus’s statement in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute, or indeed, a century later, the social-liberal version of “political” nationalism represented in West Germany by Habermas, among others.

The German state of 1871 was founded before a strong national consciousness became common currency among most of the population. The founding of the state was therefore followed by a strong effort of “internal nation building.” Its bearer was less the Reich—given its federal structure—than

the dynamic of economic unification and modernization of society. When industrial and agrarian crisis set in (in the 1870s), the relevance of the state inevitably increased as a force that could—in the national framework—lessen some of the phenomena of crisis. To the same extent, however, that the crisis increased the importance of the state it also undermined some of its credibility and strength (which relied in the first place on prosperity and economic security); the more precarious the latter became, the more national coherence had to be increased through emphasis not on material but on national-cultural values.

Despite the extent of secularization that is characteristic of the process of modernization, cultural and moral values were in the nineteenth century (and arguably still are for most people) impossible to conceive of without reference to religion. In the context of Enlightenment liberalism, the toleration of religious difference was connected to the expectation that a reformed, rational, and universal form of religiosity would emerge that would underpin modern civilization, morality, and legality. The toleration of traditional, positive (especially revealed) religion was understood to serve, or at least not to obstruct, the pursuit of modern, rational religiosity.

This tension was exacerbated by the fact that in the age of confessionalization of (Christian) religion in Europe, positive religion functioned more than ever before as a form of political ideology and was implicated in the process of early modern—that is, pre-(or proto-)nationalist—state formation. The emergence of the modern concept of religiosity (which tends to reduce positive religion to mere “vehicles of religiosity”) is paralleled by the clericalization of religion and the increased importance of the socially ordering function of clerical control and hierarchy. However, religious belonging—like that from descent or ethnicity—has never been coextensive with state territory, and the more religion served as a unifying force in the service of national state and society, the more it also became a divisive force.

The modernizing Prussian state that was not (yet) a national state was not (yet) committed to enforcing assimilation and cultural homogeneity either: most Prussian governments before 1848 found the continued existence of a separate Jewish community more beneficial than its abolition. Only the

modern sovereign nation-state (as it constituted itself unequivocally first in the American and French revolutions) made the abolition of “(e)states within the state” a matter of explicit policy. Emancipation of the Jews *as individuals* was in this context the flip side of overcoming the existence of “the Jews” as a separate corporate group or “nation” (in the pre-modern sense). Humboldt (1809) already used the concept of “amalgamation” that still was a keyword for Treitschke, Mommsen, and their contemporaries.<sup>34</sup> Liberals in the period between the anti-Napoleonic wars and 1848 tended not to profess much sympathy for the Jews, whom they considered anachronistic, unenlightened, and alien to the emerging “culture” of the German nation that they were working toward. It was only in the mid-1840s that Jewish emancipation became an unconditional part of the liberal program.

Taking their cue from the Catholic reaction to the French Revolution, opponents of the new order depicted the Jews as the latter’s instruments or even its (hidden) conductors. At the same time, in terms of the Enlightenment discourse on emancipation, Jews were attacked as anachronistic and backward elements that hindered modernization and the formation of the liberal national state and society. Insofar as the new order meant the capitalist transformation of economic relations, Jews were construed either as its embodiments or as stumbling blocks to it. Insofar as the new order meant the nationalist transformation of political relations, Jews were construed as either modernizing destroyers of traditional loyalty or as invariably alien to the modernity and community of the nation. The synthesis of these antithetical accusations in the last decades of the nineteenth century must be seen in the context of the general liberal-conservative rapprochement: the survival of the new order relied on the alliance of its protagonists with the more enlightened representatives of the old regime and involved enlisting traditional values and loyalties to the cause of capitalist modernity; unsurprisingly, some of the enemies of the old regime also became enemies of the new.

For the “antisemitism of the industrial age” the nation and the capitalist mode of production had become familiar and quasi-natural aspects of current social relations. The Jews could be accused for any unwelcome aspect

of their normal workings as well as their malfunctioning. They were said to be obstructing their harmonious functioning as well as to have ushered them in in the first place. Anyone's notion of what constituted a healthy and desirable extent of capitalist modernity implied a complementary notion of what was *excessive* capitalist modernity—greed, materialism, usury, speculation, mammonization, predatory capital. The strategy of blaming that excess on “the Jews” fit into socialist or liberal frameworks just as well as into a conservative or reactionary framework.

### Multiculturalism and Societal Cohesion

How does the liberal state act when some or even most members of civil society find—for good or bad reasons, or both—particular cultural practices of some of its members obnoxious, hypocritical, anachronistic, superstitious, anti-liberal, aesthetically displeasing, clannish and cliquish, or, horror of horrors, a threat to “community cohesion”? Common sense might assume that reasonable and well-meaning people can strike a balance between warranting the “multicultural” right to difference and asserting liberal values, but closer scrutiny points to a fundamental contradiction: the modern liberal state appears to be an institution dedicated to easing societal antagonisms by conducting gentle social and cultural reform, led by the reasonableness of justice and equality; but in order to be able to do so, that state claims to be expressive of a particular national culture. The social harmony, cohesion, and inclusion it promises are in reality those of the national community, and thus inevitably exclusionary at the same time.

David Goodhart, a former journalist for the *Financial Times* and editor of the British right-wing liberal journal *Prospect*, managed early in 2004 to capture a crucial bit of zeitgeist and considerable attention with a persuasively written opinion piece entitled “Too Diverse.”<sup>35</sup> He wrote about the “progressive dilemma,” quoting a conservative politician, David Willetts: progressives “want diversity, but they thereby undermine part of the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests.”<sup>36</sup> Goodhart's primary concern here was with the dangers of “tax resistance”: a lack of moral consensus—in particular the sense that morally “undeserving” people receive handouts from

the state—can endanger the fiscal basis of the welfare state. This argument is, however, only a particular instance of the more general problem (as old as the modern age) that the state itself, not only the apparent beneficiaries of the welfare it may provide, must appear to “deserve” society’s entrusting to it a large portion of its surplus product. Refusing to squander even minute amounts of money on welfare scroungers, work-refuseniks, and those who choose lifestyles, beliefs, and attitudes upon which the majority frowns is only one of the ways in which the state can score points in legitimacy.

Painfully aware of the fundamental precariousness of the liberal state, Goodhart argued that “the left . . . is ready to stress the erosion of community from ‘bad’ forms of diversity, such as market individualism, but not from ‘good’ forms of diversity, such as sexual freedom and immigration.” Contrary to what “the left” proposes, Goodhart’s argument implies that we should not rock the boat with too many sexual, immigration, and other funny freedoms, because “community” (namely, in its current form of appearance as “society,” to use Tönnies’s concepts) is already suffering badly from the effects of “market individualism.”<sup>37</sup> We are warned that exaggerated liberalism (i.e., more individualism than what a market economy *inevitably* brings with itself) endangers the continued existence of the liberal state.<sup>38</sup>

In an earlier episode of the same ongoing discourse, the then British home secretary, David Blunkett, pointed in September 2002 to “a continuing tension between modernity and the cultural practices of some of those entering highly advanced countries” who “because of education or geography, find themselves catapulted into effectively different centuries.”<sup>39</sup> The “clash of modernity with long held cultural traditions” must be recognized by the liberal state as a “challenge,” something about which Pim Fortuyn (the populist Dutch politician who had been murdered shortly before that date) “had a point to make,” as Blunkett recognized. As if responding to Blunkett (and Treitschke and Fortuyn, etc.), Terry Eagleton commented more recently on the relationship between culture and state power, arguing that culture “beds power down, makes it appear natural and inevitable, turns it into spontaneous reflex and response.” If power is to secure people’s allegiance, it “must become the invisible colour of everyday life itself. And this is what we know

as culture. . . . If culture is about plurality, power is about unity. How can it sell itself simultaneously to a whole range of life forms without being fatally diluted?" As long as the things that constitute culture "are fairly uniform, political power can afford to leave them alone. It is when they become too diverse" that culture "becomes part of the problem rather than the solution" from the point of view of the state.<sup>40</sup> Eagleton plays here on a crucial ambivalence of the concept of culture: on the one hand, "culture is about plurality" (literally Lazarus's argument); on the other hand, state power (and, by implication, the societal structures, forces, and dynamics that the state is based on) is forced to take possession and control of culture (the point quite rightly made by aforementioned "liberal Tories," or rather Tory-ish liberals). The more culture comes into its own, as it were, by becoming truly plural, the less the state can afford to let it do. Eagleton emphasizes the universality of certain moral values, which are beyond and independent of culture ("As far as morality goes, it is hard to slide a cigarette paper between Allah and Jehovah," he writes, again recalling what many in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute said about the Christian and the Jewish concepts of God), but he also asserts that "those in power are right to see multiculturalism as a threat." Against the defiant and almost optimistic tone of Eagleton's endorsement of multiculturalism (which is perhaps typical of the British Cultural Studies tradition), it needs to be equally emphasized that the state and "those in power" are a very big threat to culture, as they are compelled to reduce the plurality and dynamism of culture (always already "multi-") to the self-identical, reified entity known as "national culture."

In this book I have suggested it would be worthwhile to step back from these contemporary musings of different types of liberals who want "to assert their antiliberal opinions" and explore historical sources from a century and a quarter earlier.<sup>41</sup> In making this move I was led by the hope that a shift of scenery and historical context may open a different, and perchance enlightening, perspective on what I argue was then as fundamental a problem for liberal society as it is today. In the question of the nation-state's relation to cultural difference I argue it is possible to discuss one of the conditions of modernity that have provided antisemitism with a platform from which it



was able (and in some way or other still is) to unfold its destructive potential.<sup>42</sup> As the idea of the nation, and more generally liberalism's dependence on invoking social harmony and "moral cohesion," has a plethora of other, perhaps more obvious, implications, the perspective suggested here also allows reconnecting the discussion of antisemitism to that of inclusion and exclusion in antagonistic society, from *Volksgemeinschaft* and "national community" to "social cohesion." I would like to see my suggestion to link the discussion of nineteenth-century German antisemitism to that of contemporary multicultural society as part of a larger, ongoing trend to restore the analysis of antisemitism to its place as paradigmatic for more general discussions of race, emancipation, assimilation, cultural difference, liberal society, and national state in Europe. This implies shifting the focus on those pre-Hitlerite manifestations of antisemitism that are still more clearly rooted within bourgeois society, rather than in gestures of rebellion to it (although Hitler's was of course a rebellion of the "authoritarian character," i.e., a rebellion that was not one). The issue here is, why did the "Jewish question" seem so important that a nationalist like Treitschke rather took the risk of threatening social peace than accepting what was to him the fact of the increasing "Jewishness" of society? Treitschke stopped subordinating a general and rather diffuse feeling of antipathy toward Jews to the larger objective, national unity, therewith adopting "political" antisemitism, and this is what fellow liberals like Mommsen attacked him for.

How little the basic problem has changed in the last century and a quarter can be read off the recent argument by John Gray—an influential voice of centrist liberalism—that "a stable liberal civil society cannot be radically multicultural but depends for its successful renewal across the generations on an undergirding culture that is held in common. This common culture need not encompass a shared religion and it certainly need not presuppose ethnic homogeneity, but it does demand widespread acceptance of certain norms and conventions of behaviour and, in our times, it typically expresses a shared sense of nationality."<sup>43</sup> Now as then, the liberal critique of the exclusionary tendencies of nationalism finds its limits at what Treitschke called "the hard necessity of the unity of the state," which is a necessity produced

by liberal society itself. The liberal discourse collapses and gives way to an anti-liberal one at the point where a whole series of conceptual dichotomies that are foundational to it prove unstable: “mixed culture” is difficult to distinguish from “amalgamation,” “culture” from “race,” “politics” from “religion,” the “national state” from “national society,” “*Sittlichkeit*” from “religion,” “religion” from “religiosity.” All these distinctions and differentiations, in spite of their intellectual appeal and importance, melt away when brought into the discursive force field of “the hard necessity of the unity of the state,” especially in a historical context characterized by economic and political crisis and the “red danger” lurking in the background.

In the concept of the nation, society is articulated simultaneously as a cultural community and as a political one inasmuch as it forms a state. It is in this context that state and culture in their interplay came to be understood, in the words of David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, as furnishing “sites of reconciliation for a civil and political society that is seen to be riven by conflict and contradiction.” From Friedrich Schiller via Humboldt to Matthew Arnold, “cultural (or aesthetic) formation comes gradually to play the role of forming citizens for the modern state.”<sup>44</sup> The decisive shift in the modern context is that an arbitrary relation between state and population is now seen as illegitimate: the state is now seen as the historically developed “unifying representation” of a “popular will.”<sup>45</sup> The state “expresses at a higher level the still developing essence” of “its” people. Culture, though, is supposed to sublimate competing partial interests by developing everyone to his or her “full human capacity”—actually, the capacity to be bourgeois—which promises the ending of all conflict. Culture “educates” the “citizen” from the mere “human being.”<sup>46</sup> Lloyd and Thomas’s words describe well the processes of “emancipation” of various groups of the population (women, Jews, workers, “ethnic groups”) into the “maturity” or adulthood of being bourgeois subjects and citizens. It is “the function of culture to interpellate individuals into the disposition to disinterested reflection” that alone allows the state to mediate conflicts between social groups:<sup>47</sup> “As culture comes to represent the fundamental common identity of human beings, so the state is conceived, ideally, as the disinterested ethical representative of this same common humanity. The idea of culture produces the consensual

grounds for representative democracy and the liberal settlement by annulling individual differences and drawing or eliciting the formal or ‘representative’ disposition in every person out of the real, particular conditions of that person’s life.”<sup>48</sup> It is significant that Matthew Arnold, on whose interpretation Lloyd and Thomas base these thoughts on culture and the state, relied on Schiller and Humboldt, as did John Stuart Mill: these cross-references seem to illustrate the unity of European liberalism at least in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. The German *Sonderweg* was not yet discovered back then. Likewise, Stanley Aronowitz writes that Talcott Parsons “never tired of reminding us” that “preserving the cultural system is the very presupposition of social stability, without which reason cannot flourish,” and that current debates on multiculturalism “are, in part, a replay, in different cadences, of this much older dispute.”<sup>49</sup> If culture is understood as national culture—the basis of a collective national identity underpinning a state that is almost by definition something static (therefore it is called “state”)—then also the concept of culture must be static: it must to some extent reify and negate the dynamism that constitutes actual culture. A consistently dynamic concept of culture, as Lazarus attempted to formulate, is therefore not possible within the national-liberal framework.

### *Volksgemeinschaft*

In the liberal context, and in its following also in the socialist one, nation formation has often been construed as the overcoming of ethnic-racial divisions, as it was in the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute; nationalism tends to appear in these contexts indeed as the opposite of racism. This notion lives on in the contemporary discourse that opposes republican “patriotism” to nationalism, or good, moderate nationalism to bad, ethnic nationalism. When, however, “the liberal Jews had to experience at last the harmony of society, which they confessed to, as the harmony of the *Volksgemeinschaft*,” it became clear that the antagonistic society defended by liberalism has no better community to offer than the national community, and the harmony of liberal, national society turned against even their most committed adherents for no other reason than their Jewishness.<sup>50</sup>

Talk about the “will of the nation” (initially a discourse that challenged the legitimist, traditional, historical rights of princes and nobility) needed to be based on a determination of who the nation is. This implies a definition not only in socioeconomic terms (the nation is the Third Estate, as in Sieyès’s famous formula)<sup>51</sup> but also in cultural-geographical ones. To the extent that the lower nobility and the (traditional, not yet industrial) bourgeoisie needed to challenge and destroy the legitimacy of the higher aristocracy (the transnational, aristocratic “race” in the older sense of the word), they could not be happy with state borders whose legitimacy was based merely (i.e., honestly) on the fact that they had been established by way of feudal, marital, and military means. One of the implications of the fact that the new society emerged as a national one was that it reinterpreted state borders by subjecting them to culture, ethnicity, and race (and also redrew them wherever this was possible and advantageous). The citizens of the new regime learned to expect borders to be meaningful and expressive of deep history rather than to be contingent and arbitrary. Since the nineteenth century the full-blooded, warm-as-life discourse of ethnic statehood increasingly flushed out traditional political legitimacy, and it continues to do so. Contemporary liberals and socialists who believe it is enough simply to “cool down” and de-ethnicize the discourses of the state (i.e., redress liberal nationalism as “constitutional patriotism” or “postnational nationalism”) borrow eighteenth-century ideas to deal with twenty-first-century realities: the nation may be a phantasm, the nation-state is not.<sup>52</sup>

As John Gray writes, the notion “that a common allegiance can be sustained by subscription to abstract principles, without the support of a common culture,” is a “rationalist illusion.”<sup>53</sup> Likewise, though from a different ideological background, Stuart Hall writes that the modern liberal state is of necessity “enmeshed” and “embedded” in the social practices and imaginaries of national culture.<sup>54</sup> Bhikhu Parekh confirms that “a morally neutral state, making no moral demands on its citizens and equally hospitable to all cultures, is logically impossible.”<sup>55</sup> The basic point, however, was made in its classic form already in 1835 by Alexis de Tocqueville: “Despotism can do without faith but freedom cannot. . . . How could society fail to perish if,

while the political bond is relaxed, the moral bond were not tightened?"<sup>56</sup> Indeed, nineteenth-century liberals were acutely aware of the fact that one of the tasks of the liberal nation-state was to *create* social coherence. Sadly, the nation-state in the twentieth century was astonishingly successful with creating homogeneity, using more brutal (fascist) as well as more subtle (democratic) means. As a result, today's society is simultaneously as differentiated and as homogeneous as no other preceding form of society. In this context, "ethnic diversity," especially the thin trickle of cultural alterity that results from immigration, has grabbed public attention out of all proportion. An increasingly homogeneous society holds on to the debate about ethnic difference as if to a fetish that helps it suppress its well-founded fear of a cultural death by self-imposed monotony. It also compensates for the silence on differences other than cultural and helps forget also that many vibrant cultural differences fell victim to destruction by the "culture industry" (such as the working-class culture that once formed the milieu of the labor movement). The actual differences that have survived elimination tend now to be reduced to differences between "ethnicities" or "cultures"—indeed, a telling aspect of society's increasing homogenization. Failure to recognize and criticize this reality is one of the conceptual weaknesses of the discourse of "multiculturalism" that is based on a rather thin concept of culture. As Russell Jacoby writes: "No divergent political or economic vision animates cultural diversity. From the most militant Afrocentrists to the most ardent feminists, all quarters subscribe to very similar beliefs about work, equality and success. The secret of cultural diversity is its political and economic uniformity."<sup>57</sup> Jacoby writes that Horace Meyer Kallen, who seems to have coined the term "cultural pluralism" during and in the aftermath of World War I, did so in the context of his rejection of the worldview of his father, an orthodox rabbi. Kallen's clearly stated intention was to replace the culture represented by his father with a lifestyle based on the *acceptance* of U.S. mainstream society's secularism, humanism, science, and industrial economy.<sup>58</sup> The concept of "cultural pluralism" was coined not as a rejection of but as a gentler articulation of "assimilation."<sup>59</sup>

The related paradox that liberal society is simultaneously increasingly

homogeneous *and* antagonistic is indirectly reflected in another remark by John Gray: "Pressure for the integration of ethnic minorities into the mainstream culture may indeed be unhealthy when, as perhaps in Britain today, the cultural traditions of some ethnic groups embody virtues of community better than the larger society does."<sup>60</sup> Gray admits here between the lines that the culture shared by "larger society" does not "embody virtues of community" very well. Its sociability is "unsociable."<sup>61</sup> This adds further irony to the problematic of multiculturalism: the members of liberal society are aware and perhaps envious of the fact that there is more community in those stubbornly particularistic minority cultures than in the national community that aims to integrate all and sundry but that never really "is." The need to defend the cohesion of national culture alone cannot explain the venom with which in the current period the battles against head scarves are fought and with which some of today's liberals' forebears fought trouser-selling youths from the East: in real terms, either matter is negligible. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that some of the conservative practices of minority cultures mirror back to the liberals the implications of their own melancholy longing for community: minority communitarianism spills the truth about what liberals themselves needed to impose (or alternatively, needed to allow others to impose) in order to glue together the liberal society of owners and sellers of commodities, of whose dark sides the self-hating liberals are only too aware. The look-how-cliquish-and-clannish-they-are side of liberal anti-liberalism mirrors and complements the equally self-hating look-how-modern/capitalist/liberal/socialist-they-are side of liberal anti-liberalism. The nods that the Home Secretary Blunkett Labour made toward Pim Fortuyn testify to this, as did Tocqueville's enthusiasm about the religiosity of civil society in the United States. My suggestion is that Treitschke's support for antisemitism has the same roots. Cultural conservatism as well as liberalism's open flank to reaction appear thus as hidden necessities of liberal society. Awareness of the fact that even demands for "merely cultural" national homogenization have far more than merely cultural implications can help defending multicultural liberalism against the champions of unitary national culture as well as keeping in mind its intrinsic

limitations. Liberalism has to mimic what it fights against. Having touched this painful scar on the liberal consciousness is perhaps the gravest offense those Muslim girls are committing, and perhaps this echoes some of the ways in which the trouser-selling youths from the East offended the sensibilities of German liberals (Gentile or Jewish) a century and a quarter ago. This is an aspect that antisemitism shares with the liberal anti-Catholicism of the same period. The “envy” (and projection) of strong community cohesion (from “cliquishness” to “conspiracy”) is a powerful although only partial aspect of either. Value judgments, or “taking sides,” are difficult in this area if one’s principal allegiance is to the vision of a state of things in which one can be different without fear—in other words, in which the free development of each individual is the condition of that of all. This—the notion of an actually humane culture—is something neither the liberal state and society nor the “communities” or “cultures” are on their own able to provide.<sup>62</sup>

### Ordinary Liberals

The “clearly stated polemical purpose” of the discourse which holds that Germany failed to take what Dahrendorf called the “long hard road to modernity” was “to explain fascism not by its capitalist present but by the baleful influence of the feudal past.”<sup>63</sup> Remnants of the feudal past are no sufficient explanation, though, as they existed in the nineteenth century not only, and perhaps not even especially, in Germany.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, when Habermas wrote (in 1986) that “the only patriotism that will not alienate us from the West is constitutional patriotism,” his thinking might have been led by the notion that only intensified, capitalist-liberal modernization (formerly known as “Manchesterism”) would be able to smother any remaining nostalgia for *deutsch-national* state-socialism of the varieties favored by antisemites from the *Katheder* socialists up to and including Hitler. (If this was indeed his drift, it would be in line with the thinking of nineteenth-century left-liberals such as Bamberger and Oppenheim but oblivious of the fact that the modernity of Nazism combined the racial “social state” with intensive “Fordist” development.)<sup>65</sup> Habermas’s reasoning, however, seems not to have paid attention to its own lineage: when he added that “unfortunately,

a commitment to universal constitutional principles based in conviction,” which is “the only reliable basis of our tie to the West,” has “only been possible in German national culture since—and because of—Auschwitz,” Habermas is factually wrong: “constitutional patriotism” was possible in German history before Auschwitz and had indeed been advocated by German liberals in the nineteenth century.<sup>66</sup> For that very reason, though, it cannot be categorically separated from the overall history that made Auschwitz possible. (Besides, there is something unpleasant about any argument that tries to derive some kind of secondary utility from the “final solution”: it carries the subtext, “at least there is one good thing about it, it healed the Germans of German peculiarities.”)<sup>67</sup>

To common sense it must appear obvious that strengthening liberalism helps prevent fascism. Historical reality is more complex. In the words of Geoff Eley, “It was not the *weakness* of liberalism in Germany, or the failure of Enlightenment properly to take hold, that explains the possibility of anti-semitism, that is, but a flaw at the center of liberalism’s own positive creed, its own best version, which was so strongly centered around a set of dominant cultural norms.”<sup>68</sup> As Dagmar Herzog wrote, “liberalism itself was part of the problem”: “anti-Jewish sentiment in Germany was not so much due to the failure of a ‘western-style’ Enlightenment to take proper hold there, but rather to a contradiction at the heart of the western ideal itself. It was not, then, the impotence of liberalism in Germany that caused difficulties for those who were disenfranchised, but rather liberalism’s own fundamental duality: its simultaneous tolerance and intolerance—the elastic, always potentially inclusive aspects, and the continually contested and renegotiated exclusions which characterized it as well.”<sup>69</sup> Twenty years earlier, Dan White had already observed that “all of us who write on modern German history trace out our investigations under the shadow of the colossal failure of civilized, let alone liberal values in that country during this [the twentieth] century,” which is “inducing us to attribute more weight to strictly national causes than they should perhaps bear. . . . Liberalism in Europe nowhere survived the transition to mass politics with the same strength it possessed in the age of limited electorates.”<sup>70</sup> “When the comparison is extended to



1914, a good part of the German experience seems to prefigure the common dilemmas of European liberalism.”<sup>71</sup> The allegedly “belated nation” was in this view ahead of its time in many ways, including the extent of its democracy and the corresponding decline of (party-political) liberalism. Under conditions of a democratic franchise, liberals “could not make good on their claims of general representation”: German “National Liberals were unlucky in that political developments in Germany forced the problem of representativeness upon them long before their counterparts elsewhere in Europe had to deal with it.”<sup>72</sup> Almost another two decades before White wrote these comments on German National Liberalism, the failure of the notion of “German peculiarities” to help explain the Holocaust was already stated by Horkheimer and Adorno in their foreword to the German edition of Massing’s *Rehearsal for Destruction* (1959):

Totalitarian antisemitism is not at all a specifically German phenomenon. Efforts to derive it from such a dubious entity as the national character, the impoverished reflection of what once used to be called *Volksgeist*, trivialize the incomprehensible that is to be comprehended. . . . The riddle demands to be resolved on the level of society. . . . Totalitarian antisemitism indeed owes its German triumphs to a social and economic constellation, not to the characteristics or the attitude of a nation that spontaneously perhaps harbored less racial hatred than those civilized countries that had expelled or slaughtered their Jews already centuries earlier.<sup>73</sup>

Horkheimer and Adorno point in this short text both to political manipulation and the “receptivity of the masses” for it and conclude, bringing together the societal, the individual, and the political levels of analysis: “Antisemitism has its basis in objective social relations as much as in consciousness and unconsciousness of the masses. But it is actualized as a means of politics: as a means of integrating divergent group interests; as the shortest and least dangerous way of diverting attention from a misery for whose resolution other means would be available.”<sup>74</sup>

As Volkov recently restated, “the ongoing debate on break and continuity” is “only about the correct proportions.”<sup>75</sup> In order to adequately grasp the

transition to what subsequently became the Hitlerite form of antisemitism and its specific character, though, especially with a view to Auschwitz, “it is important to stress the relative marginality of antisemitic ideas in German public life, taking the *Kaiserreich* as a whole. For instance, antisemitism as such was not part of the radical-nationalist ideological repertoire for most of the Imperial period.”<sup>76</sup> The decisive development was the merging of intellectual and populist forms of antisemitism, but this happened on a large scale not before the run-up to World War I, for example, in the “Cartel of the Productive Estates.”<sup>77</sup> As for the role of antisemitism in the context of the nineteenth century in general, “massive scholarship on antisemitism in France and Britain has made it abundantly clear that Imperial Germany was entirely typical in this respect.”<sup>78</sup>

### State, Society, Culture, Individual

The problem of difference and separation as well as the interdependence of state, society, its culture, and the individuals who constitute them needs to be discussed in order to get to the problem of why Treitschke, a National Liberal, welcomed and endorsed antisemitism, and why the liberals who criticized him nevertheless had to concede a significant extent of consensus between themselves and him.

For Treitschke, the Jews are a “misfortune” because they threaten the precarious unity of national state and national society as mediated by national culture. It is important to recognize that even those who explicitly invoke the concept of “race” present racial difference as dangerous not in itself but because it refers as shorthand to differences of cultural, religious, moral, and economic behavior. Whether such differences are considered to be “immutable” (i.e., “racial”) or merely to be changing very slowly (over periods of many years, i.e., “cultural”) is in practice of little relevance. Even the most radical racists sometimes credit sociocultural practices (even in the absence of carnal miscegenation) with the power to corrupt the (not-so-immutable) racial essence of the master race: not even they are totally convinced that “race” is eternal. Likewise, the fists that beat up “third-world-looking” persons in the street have probably been set into motion not so much

by the (abstract) idea of race but by the (concrete) reality of the nation (i.e., nation-state and national society). The shouts of “out with, too many of” are claims to mastery over a specific territory combined with the belief that entitlement to this claim is grounded in a set of determinate sociocultural characteristics historically and politically linked to the territory in question.<sup>79</sup> The person behind the fists may or may not imagine these characteristics to be inscribed into the DNA.

Treitschke’s opponents fail to reject his position conclusively, because their thinking and their politics are rooted in the same dialectic of nation-state and civil society. A state or society that demands loyalty and “identification” from its members (i.e., not merely the payment of tributes or taxes) tends to demand that ethnic or religious minorities assimilate or convert. Although this is not an exclusive characteristic of national state and society, the relevance of such processes immensely increased in the course of the nineteenth century and after. The increased relevance of cultural identification in the modern context gave the issue of Jew-hatred an equally increased and qualitatively new significance.

Most theories of the relationship of modern state and society assert in one form or other the separation of state, nation, and culture as a given fact, or at least as a fair possibility that is worth working toward: the notion of “constitutional patriotism” (such as in Habermas) proposes, for example, that nationalism (patriotism) be contained within the constitutional-political realm so that its “cultural” and societal base remain non-national.<sup>80</sup> The notion of “cultural nationalism” (such as in Otto Bauer) rests on the complementary suggestion that nationalism be allowed to spread in the realm of culture but ought to, and indeed could, be prevented from influencing the non-national (or rather “multinational”) state.<sup>81</sup> Both conceptions assume—from opposite angles—that the state superstructure could reside in majestic independence above society and its culture. Each fatally overestimates the possibilities of the practical separation of state and society, respectively, state citizenship and membership in society and “the cultural community.”

The merit of the *Dispute*, and indeed of Treitschke’s and the antisemites’ pamphlets, is that they throw into sharp relief antinomies inherent in the

modern constellation of state, culture, and society. Any form of liberalism has to be concerned about the state's ability to function as a guarantor of the rule of law and—if necessary—of liberal reform. It has therefore to provide for all that is necessary for the state to persist and function. The state has to demand loyalty, but loyalty cannot be based on merely abstract citizenship. It is difficult to see either how membership in the state on the one hand and in the “cultural community” on the other hand could be strictly separate, or how the state could be fully separate from religion as long as religion remains an integral part of civil society, both as something handed down and as a constantly reproduced response to the social need for some form of (transcendent) resolution of suffering that society fails (immanently) to resolve: “you can sooner build a city in the skies than see a state endure without religion,” as the antisemitic *The German Guard: Monthly for National Cultural Interests* asserted (quoting a formulation by the Greek writer and philosopher Plutarch).<sup>82</sup>

Religious difference that is firmly locked away in the “chamber” of the private is easy to tolerate. When, however, as is the case with Treitschke, a strict public-private divide is rejected because the public realm is understood to refer to inner values (morality linked to religiosity), toleration becomes precarious. Treitschke articulates a contradiction that might appear as a departure from liberal theory but is intrinsic to liberal society. If this is the case, the real scandal is not Treitschke's position but the reality of liberal society itself, and it turns out to be a decisive weakness of liberal political thought that it presupposes conceptually the existence of separations that at the same time it presupposes not to exist.

The modern state assumes direct, unmediated authority over the individual, thus challenging and transforming traditional community. The legitimacy of this authority is supported by the claim that the state is the political embodiment of a new form of community that (logically, not necessarily temporally) preexists the state. This new form of community, the nation, is supposed to “speak” through “its” state as it also speaks through “its” culture. The open-ended and dynamic character of actual culture is contained and partially denied by the claim that it is the expression of an

imaginary entity—the national community—that is an abstraction from culture in its actual diversity: the claim that culture is “national culture” is based on a fetishistic reversal.

State politics of toleration were and are always framed by discriminatory measures that warrant the superiority of the hegemonic creed. As Ghassan Hage writes, the Christian variety (such as expressed in the English Toleration Act of 1689), the variety practiced in the Muslim empires (as derived from the Shari’a prescriptions about the treatment of Christians and Jews as *dhumma*, “those to be protected”), the liberal policies of the nineteenth century, and the “multicultural” policies of the late twentieth century all have this in common.<sup>83</sup> “Where we empower an agent to be tolerant, we empower him equally to be intolerant,” because “when those who are intolerant are asked to be tolerant, their power to be intolerant is not taken away from them.”<sup>84</sup>

In *Antisemite and Jew*, Sartre writes that “there may be detected in the most liberal democrat a tinge of antisemitism; he is hostile to the Jew to the extent that the latter thinks of himself as a Jew.”<sup>85</sup> Sartre sees “the antisemite” and “the democrat” as complementary forces: “the former wishes to destroy him [the Jew] as a man and leave nothing in him but the Jew,” while the latter “wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing in him but the man.” “The antisemite reproaches the Jew with *being Jewish*; the democrat reproaches him with willfully *considering himself* a Jew.”<sup>86</sup> Sartre argues that “the democrat” aims “to persuade individuals that they exist in an isolated state . . . in order to plunge [them] into the democratic crucible whence [the individual] will emerge naked and alone, an individual and solitary particle like all the other particles.”<sup>87</sup> Sartre’s image of “the democrat” is intended as a polemic, but his notion of the “democratic crucible” is still too optimistic: it fails to show that the “crucible”—where the often-mentioned “amalgamation” takes place—does not produce “abstract individuals” but nationals.

Modern society as we know it constitutes the individual twofold, as an “abstract” and a “concrete” individual.<sup>88</sup> To the same extent to which *Gesellschaft* (society) is always underpinned by some form of *Gemeinschaft* (community), the “abstract individual” is always underpinned by a more specific identity

whose “characteristic role is to structure and limit the choices the individual makes.”<sup>89</sup> This becomes most visible in situations in which the individual is called upon to sacrifice a degree of his or her liberty (ultimately, life) for the “common good” that could not be motivated or rationalized by recourse to a purely “abstract” identity only. So far, no liberal society (and no liberal set of ideas about such a society) dared rely on the purely “abstract identity” of its citizen-individuals only. One of the crucial points in this context is which characteristics of an individual ought to be relevant for how this individual will participate in state and society, and which (cultural) characteristics are irrelevant (i.e., purely “private”), and whether the line between the two is solid, precarious, or perhaps nonexistent.

The separation but mutual dependence of state and civil society (the state’s re-creating society and society’s determining the shape of the state) produces a characteristic no-win situation: if you declare you are not different from your fellow citizens, someone will show you are different (which is—fortunately—always true); if you declare yourself different, someone will tell you that you ought to grow up and become an equal member of society. A society where one can be “different without fear” would be one where (“concrete”) difference would not be overdetermined by being the carrier of social structure, by not being the “border guards” of social divisions.<sup>90</sup> Difference needs to be emancipated from being carrier and signifier of social domination; “concrete difference” freed from having to be “abstract difference” would be a different kind of difference.<sup>91</sup> Only the assimilation of the human world as it currently exists to the humane world that does not yet exist would create a situation where giving up the hard shell of given identity would lose the odor of treason that is founded in the hunch that assimilation today inevitably means assimilation to the false state of things.

It can be concluded from the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute that liberalism—as it implies acceptance of the nation-state—has been unable to consistently refute and indeed immunize itself against antisemitism. (The same is, of course, equally true of all forms of socialism that are based on acceptance of the nation-state.) Modern political thought relied almost universally on the state as the guarantor of liberal progress and modernization, and a

modern state that would not invoke some form of national culture to warrant its cohesion has never convincingly been conceived let alone practically realized. If it can be agreed

that the persistence, as well as more specifically the reform, of liberal society depends on the existence of a state;

that a state in the modern context can only be a nation-state in which the construction of a national culture mediates among state, society, and individual;

that national culture consists of inseparably interwoven assumptions about morality, social behavior (including “the economy”), and religion;

and that religious and other cultural difference is being tolerated only on the condition that it is hidden away in the private realm, but that at the same time the public realm cannot do without invocations of religiously informed culture;

then “the better state of things . . . in which people could be different without fear” must within this framework perpetually remain a utopian dream.<sup>92</sup>

From this perspective, Treitschke’s liberal antisemitism, in combination with the ambivalence of his liberal-patriotic critics and the brutal frankness of the confessing racists who translated Treitschke’s ambiguity into support for their cause, can—against the intentions of all of the above—be put to work for the critical understanding of the limits of liberal society.

## Appendix 1. Heinrich von Treitschke's "Our Prospects" (1879)

*This is the closing section of Treitschke's article in Preussische Jahrbücher from November 1879, which provoked the Dispute. The translation is based on the one by Helen Lederer, which was published (without date) as part of the series Readings in Modern Jewish History (which contains all of Treitschke's major contributions to the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute as they were republished as a brochure in 1880 and 1881), edited by Ellis Rivkin and published by the Hebrew Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion in Cincinnati, Ohio. The translation is used here with the kind permission of the Hebrew Union College.*

In such a situation we need most of all strong government, loyal harmony between crown and people. The Prussian electorate has understood this necessity. We want peace with the government—this was the message of the recent polls. The ranks of the conservative parties in the [Prussian] diet have been reinforced not by artificial pressure from above but through the voters' free will. The conservative current in the people is even stronger than the election results make it appear to be: some liberal deputies had their mandate confirmed only due to personal respect or old habit or as well because of the difficulties that a new party or grouping faces in the borough. The nation is disgusted and fed up with the quarreling of her parliaments; even the majority of the opponents of the new economic policy seem determined to wait for the effects of the reforms and to judge the facts. The Progress



Party finds itself limited to some big cities and a few dispersed boroughs. The voters have mercilessly cleared out the National-Liberal faction. . . . The people does not want anymore to be spoon-fed by coteries. . . .

Meanwhile<sup>1</sup> a miraculous and powerful excitement labors in the depths of our nation's life. It is as if the nation reflected on itself, as if it judged itself harshly. Who has spent, like this author, the last couple of months abroad and now suddenly re-enters the stormy German world, is almost frightened by this awakening of national conscience, by these thousand voices that defend or indict each other. This process is the more remarkable as it takes place in almost total independence from the press; for never have our newspapers less truthfully reflected public opinion. When one browses through the majority of German papers one is led to believe that the liberal wish lists and the naïve belief in the unfailing moral force of "education" still dominate our people. In truth the situation is different. Economic hardship, the memories of so many disappointed hopes and the sins of the *Gründerzeiten*, the sight of the increasing degeneration of the masses, which keeps pace with, or even overtakes, the spreading of the secret arts of reading and writing, and last but not least, the recollection of those days of horror in spring 1878—all this forced thousands to reflect on the value of our humanitarianism and Enlightenment. Thousands feel that due to educational conceit we risk forgetting completely the moral groundedness of human life. While large sections of our people fall for arid scepticism, in others religious earnestness, the ecclesiastical sense unmistakably have regained strength. On the Protestant *General Synod* some ugly zealous words have been said, the old theologians' sin, disrespect for the positive right of the secular state, betrayed itself in a few disagreeable decisions; the hopelessly unfeasible attempt to subject theological faculties [of the universities] to ecclesiastical rule was quite rightly frowned upon; but its debates have proven one thing even to its opponents: this church still lives, it is still an effective force, firmly rooted in the people, full of moral gravity and not at all lacking in spiritual powers.

The awakened conscience of the people is directed mainly against the effeminate philanthropy of our age. Quite a sign of the times, O. Mittelstädt's

text "Against Prison Sentences" was published recently, a powerful protest against that pampering and mollycoddling of criminals which has overcrowded our prisons and has become a cruel insult to decent people. Why has this strictly objective publication been answered by incensed meetings and harsh resolutions of contempt from the radical parties? Because the heroes of the philanthropic phrase silently feel that the brave author—although his statements on their own often deserve criticism—essentially merely propounds what hundreds of thousands are thinking. The whole spirit of the age urges that the most severe majesty of the law be fully restored in our laws and their execution.

Among<sup>2</sup> the symptoms of the deep change in mood that goes through our people none appears as disconcerting as the passionate movement against Jewry. Until a few months ago, the authoritative "reverse *Hep-Hep* call" was still dominant in Germany. About the national wrongs of the Germans, the French, and all other nations everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody dared to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and a religious persecutor by nearly all newspapers. Today we have already come to the point where the majority of Breslau voters—apparently not in wild excitement but with quiet deliberation—conspired not to elect a Jew to the [Prussian] diet under any circumstances. Antisemitic societies are formed, the "Jewish Question" is discussed in noisy meetings, a flood of anti-Jewish pamphlets inundates the book market. There is only too much of dirt and brutality in these activities, and it is impossible to suppress one's disgust when one notices that some of these incendiary pamphlets seem to come from Jewish pens; it is well known that since Pfefferkorn and Eisenmenger, there were always many who had been born as Jews among the fanatical Jew-eaters. But is there really nothing but mob brutality and business envy at the bottom of this noisy activity? Are these outbreaks of a deep, long-suppressed anger really only a momentary outburst, as hollow and unfounded as the Teutonic Jew-baiting of 1819? No—the instinct of the masses has in fact correctly recognized a grave danger, a very considerable fault of the new German life; it is not an empty phrase when one talks today of a German Jewish question.

If the English and the French talk with some disdain of the prejudice of the Germans against the Jews we must reply to them: you don't know us; you live in happier circumstances which make the rise of such "prejudices" impossible. The number of Jews in Western Europe is so small that they cannot have any noticeable influence upon the morality of the nation; but the Eastern border of our country is invaded year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths from the inexhaustible cradle of Poland, whose children and grand-children are to be the future rulers of Germany's stock exchanges and Germany's press; this immigration is rapidly increasing and the question becomes more and more serious how this alien nationality can be amalgamated with ours. The Jews of the Western and Southern European countries belong mostly to the Spanish branch which looks back on a comparatively proud history and which always adjusted comparatively easily to the Western way of life; in fact, the great majority of them have become good Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians—as far as can be reasonably expected from a people of such pure blood and such distinct peculiarity. We Germans, however, have to deal with Jews of the Polish branch, which bears the deep scars of centuries of Christian tyranny; according to experience they are incomparably more alien to the European, and especially to the Germanic character.

What we have to demand from our Jewish fellow-citizens is simple: that they become Germans, feel themselves simply and justly as Germans—regardless of their faith and their old sacred memories which all of us hold in reverence; for we do not want thousands of years of Germanic civilization to be followed by an era of German-Jewish mixed culture. It would be a sin to forget that a great number of Jews, baptized and unbaptized, Felix Mendelssohn, Veit, Riesser and others—not to mention the ones now living—were German men in the best sense of the word, men in whom we revere the noble and fine traits of the German spirit. At the same time it cannot be denied, however, that there are numerous and powerful circles among our Jewry who clearly do not intend simply to become Germans. It is painful enough to talk about these things; even conciliatory words are easily misunderstood here. I think, however, some of my Jewish friends will agree, with deep regret, when I say

that recently a dangerous spirit of arrogance has arisen in Jewish circles and that the influence of Jewry upon our national life, which in former times was often beneficial, is now often harmful. I refer the reader to *The History of the Jews* by Graetz; what a fanatical fury against the "arch enemy" Christianity, what deadly hatred just of the purest and most powerful exponents of Germanic character, from Luther down to Goethe and Fichte! And what hollow, offensive self-overestimation! Here it is proved with continuous mocking invective that the nation of Kant was really educated to humanity by the Jews only, that the language of Lessing and Goethe became sensitive to beauty, spirit, and wit only through Börne and Heine! Is there any English Jew who would dare to slander in such manner the land which guards and protects him? And this stubborn contempt for the German *goyim* is not at all merely the attitude of an isolated fanatic. There is no German merchant city that does not count many honest, respectable Jewish firms among its number. But it cannot be denied that the Semites have contributed a large part to the dishonesty and deception and the bold greediness of the boom-time mischief, and that they share heavily in the guilt for the contemptible materialism of our age which regards every kind of work only as business and threatens to suffocate our people's ancient good-natured willingness to work; in thousands of German villages there sits the Jewish usurer who appropriates the possessions of his ruined neighbors. Among the leading men of art and science there are not many Jews; the greater is the busy horde of Semitic third-rank talents. And how firmly this swarm of literati hangs together! How safely this insurance company for immortality works, based on the tested business principle of mutuality, so that every Jewish poetaster receives his one-day fame, dealt out by the newspapers instantly and in cash, without fee nor delay.

The most dangerous consequences, however, has the inappropriate Jewish domination of the press—a fateful consequence of our old narrow-minded laws, which had denied the Israelites access to most learned professions. For ten years public opinion in many German cities was "made" mostly by Jewish pens; it was a misfortune for the liberal party, and one of the reasons of its decline, that its papers gave far too much scope to Jewry. The present

powerlessness of the press is the inevitable reaction against this unnatural state of things. The little man cannot be dissuaded from believing now that the Jews write the newspapers and therefore he will not believe anything they say any longer. Our newspapers owe much to Jewish talents; the acuteness and nimble quickness of the Jewish mind always found the arena of the press a rewarding field. But here too the effect was two-edged. Börne was the first to introduce into our journalism the peculiarly shameless way of talking about the fatherland as if from an external position and without any reverence, as if one did not belong to it, as if mockery of Germany did not cut most deeply into the heart of every individual German. To this add the unfortunate busybody impertinence, which has to have a hand in everything and does not even refrain from passing judgment on the inner affairs of the Christian churches. What Jewish journalists write in mockery and satirical remarks against Christianity is downright revolting, and such blasphemies are offered to our people in its own language as the newest acquisitions of “German” Enlightenment! The moment emancipation was gained one insisted boldly on one’s “certificate”; literal parity was demanded in all and sundry, forgetful of the fact that we Germans are, after all, a Christian nation, and the Jews are only a minority in our midst; we have witnessed that the removal of Christian pictures in mixed schools was demanded, and even the celebration of the Sabbath.

All this considered—and how much more could be added!—the noisy agitation of the moment appears only as a brutal and spiteful but natural reaction of the Germanic national feeling against an alien element which has usurped too much space in our life. It has at least the one involuntary merit of having taken of us the ban of a tacit falsehood; it is already a gain that an evil which everybody sensed but which nobody wanted to touch is now discussed openly. Let us not deceive ourselves: the movement is very deep and strong. A few jokes about the words of wisdom from the mouths of Christian-Socialist soap box orators will not suffice to suppress it. Even in the best-educated circles, among men who would reject with horror any thought of Christian fanaticism or national arrogance, we hear today the cry, as from one mouth: the Jews are our misfortune!

Among those who understand, there can be no talk of an abolition or even of a limitation of the emancipation; that would be an obvious injustice, a betrayal of the fine traditions of our state, and would accentuate rather than mitigate the national divide which torments us. What made the Jews of France and England harmless and often beneficent members of bourgeois society was at bottom nothing but the energy of the national pride and the firmly rooted national way of life of these two old and civilized nations. Our civilization is young; in our whole existence we are still lacking national style, instinctive pride, a firmly developed individuality, which is why we were defenceless against alien manners for so long. But we are in the process of acquiring these qualities, and we can only wish that our Jews recognize in time the change which is now occurring in Germany as a necessary consequence of the foundation of the German state. In some places there are Jewish societies against usury which silently do much good; they are the work of intelligent Israelites who have recognized that their tribal fellows must adjust to the customs and ideas of their Christian fellow-citizens. Much remains to be done in this direction. It is of course not possible to change the hard German heads into Jewish heads; the only way out therefore is for our Jewish fellow-citizens to make up their minds without reservations to be Germans, as many of them have done already long ago, to their advantage and ours. The task can never be solved completely. There has always been an abyss between occidental and Semitic being, since Tacitus once complained about the *odium generis humani*; there will always be Jews who are nothing but German-speaking Orientals; also a specifically Jewish education will always blossom and, as a cosmopolitan power, it has a historical right to existence. But the antagonism can be mitigated if the Jews, who talk so much about tolerance, become truly tolerant themselves and show some respect for the faith, the customs, and the feelings of the German people which has long ago atoned for old injustice and given them the gift of human and civil rights. The complete absence of such respect in a section of our commercial and literary Jewry is the ultimate reason for today's passionate bitterness.

It is not a pleasant sight, this raging and quarrelling, this boiling up of unfinished ideas in the new Germany. But we cannot help our being the most

passionate of all nations, although we accused ourselves of being phlegmatic so often; new ideas never broke through amongst us other than under spasmodic convulsions. May God grant that we come out of the ferment and unrest of these restless years with a stricter concept of the state and its obligations, with a more vigorous national consciousness.

## Appendix 2. Moritz Lazarus's "What Does National Mean? A Lecture" (1880)

*The bracketed subheadings have been introduced by the translator.*

### [1. Introduction: The Occasion and the Purpose of the Lecture]

Esteemed audience!

A lecture that is by invitation only is unusual; the circumstances under which it is given, and its occasion, are no less unusual.<sup>1</sup> We have invited Jews only; not because the lecture is to be kept secret; "may the whole world hear us," I may say with [Lessing's character] Nathan. But the primary purpose of the lecture is to provide clarification and instruction for ourselves, for our coreligionists. And, do not expect that I will enter the arena to do battle, as I would have to in a public meeting. For all that has been said and written lately against us I only can express here my gratitude. Yes, gratitude. The doctors know it: it is best that the internal illness comes to the fore; then there is more hope that the damage can heal. Could we, too, contribute to healing this damage?

Strictly speaking, we should be silent; we should be allowed silently to wait for the curing to happen. For us as Jews, there is no question that would be a legitimate matter of dispute. What once again has been called the Jewish Question is merely a *German* question. The question of humanity is in this case not our question but that of the whole German nation, as we are the object of humanity, as we are the ones who have to expect and to demand humanity. The question of humanity and justice is always and everywhere



more important for the one who has to grant it than for the one who has to receive it. But we are Germans, and as Germans we must speak.

[6] On having to read an article from an otherwise highly esteemed pen that argues on the level of the League of Antisemites, our cheeks blush; but whoever stands on the standpoint of humanity, will know that on our cheek burns not the red of anger of the Jew but the red of shame of the German. But for that very reason I exhort you most of all, not only in this hour but as for our overall reaction to this affair: let this not embitter us! Let's keep the solid calm of those on whose side are truth and justice. But let us seek clarity, clarity for ourselves and about ourselves, in order to maintain this solid calm.

This is all that matters, that on the basis of scholarly contemplation and with the calmness it brings with it we understand what our situation really is, that we ourselves gain most of all the clearest understanding which of the attacks directed against us are legitimate and which are not.

The first step we should take tonight is I reckon to answer the question that I have announced.

For the whole excitement that has recently been created again against the Jewish community of faith is based on the presupposition that it is something particular, autonomous, something standing apart from and facing all other people who inhabit the country. The answer to the question What is the peculiarity and particularity of the Jews? boils down to the statement that the Jew has a separate nationality distinct from the German one. This is what one gets to hear from the meanest hacks to those who belong to the highest academic circles.

It is therefore very much in our interest to illustrate and define the concept of nationality, as [7] the concept of "the nation" or "the people" is not only in this particular case but in all kinds of respects among those most often wrongly or superficially understood.

This concept "resists definition," as also Rümelin rightly observed, "although we encounter it on a daily basis in everyday life as in scholarship." I am in the lucky position to share with you my altogether nonpartisan view of this matter, as it developed not in the context of the current occasion

but a while ago and far from any particular application, and also to show you that my view is being shared in its currently most relevant aspects by eminent scholars.

### [2.1 The Concept of the Nation according to Boeckh]

When in 1859 the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* [Journal for Psycho-Ethnology and Linguistics] was founded, *Steinthal* and myself, as its editors, had to outline the program of that new discipline that was about to join the ranks of the academic disciplines in the first introductory essay. Of course it was our task, as *Völkerpsychologie*, i.e., the psychological exploration of nations, was the subject, to define the concept of the nation in the first place. Subsequently, in the fourth volume of the journal, our colleague *R. Boeckh* further discussed "The Statistical Significance of National Languages as Marks of Nationality."

As time is limited, I point only to the most important aspects of this multilayered examination. In his extraordinarily acute and poignant piece, *Boeckh* aims to critique misconceptions and to show what are *not* the foundations of nationality, in order to come to the positive conclusion that only language is its defining characteristic. Neither forms of settlement, *morals or customs* define the nation, as has sometimes been suggested; within the same nation different groups with differing morals and customs can be found, [8] and the same morals and customs, and the same forms of settlement, can be found among different nations. Descriptions of the morals and customs of a multitude of people cannot therefore result in a definition of the characteristics of a nation.

The same goes for the *territory* they inhabit—although people's living together is tremendously important for the founding of nationalities: to the extent that their settlement coheres, also their inner life becomes more similar, they become an internal unity, too. Territorial separation and connectedness are the basis of political unity as they determine the maintenance of coherent units, the defense, and liberty of countries from each other.

Only when talking about providence, about fate as it is given to man, we enter its *solid ground*. The first determination of fate is *where* one is born.

However, not even political, much less so national unity can be grounded on territorial unity. I am not talking about the exceptions, such as when already strong nations and states expand beyond their coherent territory into enclaves and colonies, or split into several states within the same territory. The point is that we find people of differing nationality on the same territory, and not only temporarily as strangers, but also permanently, and vice versa people of the same nationality are distributed throughout different territories.

Most importantly, though, territorial borders change and depend on subjective perspective. The groupings of nations cannot be defined in terms of which country they inhabit, as, even though the separation of peoples is for themselves beyond doubt, the borders of the country are object of nearly interminable struggles.

The same is true about *state citizenship*. [9] Surely in earliest times, the borders of the state mostly coincided with those of the nation. In modern times, though, there is hardly a state that consists of only one nationality, and hardly a nation that inhabits only one state.

*Religion*, too, is not different. In the oldest times nationality and religion followed the same borders; today not one of the somehow higher developed religions has followers in only one nation; and vice versa there is hardly a nation all of whose members adhere to only one religion.

But even what is so often and facilely taken as synonymous with nationality, *descent*, is not its true determination. Not all those of common descent belong to the same nation, and vice versa we find in every nation individuals of differing descent. As for the latter, every European nationality testifies this: no nationality of pure unmixed descent exists. Here on this soil we consistently find a mixture of Slavs and Germans. In Italy one can find twice, yes thrice the mixing of descents which have eventually found entry into the unity of Italian nationality. Vice versa, the Dutch, the Flemish are of German descent but do not at all see themselves as belonging to the German nation. "The classification of nations according to descent of individuals is theoretically wrong and practically unfeasible because it would presuppose that the individuals who belong to different nations propagated only

among their own, or else, that every mixing resulted in a new nationality. Neither is the case. . . . To which nation would one, [10] applying such criteria, count the already quite numerous descendants of Jewish and German descent, even if they have the physical characteristics of the one or the other group? To which nation the descendants of two Indo-European or even two Germanic nations? The bookkeeping about humanity will not deliver the material to determine the descent of individuals. How many people know over ten generations the thousands of fathers and mothers to whom they owe their existence; and is there anyone who could track down his or her descent twenty generations, i.e. to the million of names who are his or her ancestors *etc.* . . ."

What remains as the most essential category after all others have been refuted in detailed argument is therefore *language*.

"Language is the unmistakable bond that connects all members of a nation to a *spiritual community*. Created in the first human community through the need for mutual understanding, it continues to create the conditions for this understanding. The child . . . receives with the language spoken in the family home the first particularity of human life; in it the child enjoys human expression and thus consciousness; it first develops the ability to think in the language of the family. . . . Likewise, the contact among speakers of *the same* language means, as far as the same language reaches, the exchange of the manifold forms of what in its innermost core is the same."

Boeckh also explores in the same text (*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Bd. IV, pp. 264f.) why this understanding of the essence of nationality has been developed most clearly by the German people, and concludes: "It was easier for the German thought, once liberated, to discover the form in which the spirit of any one nation is embodied most truly and determinedly, the form [11] that marks every individual whose spirit moves within it, as a member of the nation."

## [2.2 Additional Arguments concerning Descent, Language, and Spirit]

Elaborating on Boeckh's argument, I want to add two arguments from our own essay on the subject, against descent and for the relevance of language.

“The answer to the question What is a nation? seems in the first place to refer to a classification of the human species to be made in the style of natural history according to its varieties and its less and less numerous differences and forms, and the respectively increasing similarity and unity; it seems to be about a scale of greater or lesser difference and unity, and in the same way that one asks what two plants or animals ought to have in common in order to be counted as *one* family or *one* species, so people think they ought to ask, what ought two human beings have in common in order to belong to *one* nation? Such a classification of the human species seemingly has to be a genealogical one. But the class *nation* does not exist on such a scale of similarity, the sequence of less and less numerous classes, because it is not based on these natural relations, because almost every nation is governed by different forms of genealogy, because the concept of the nation is not at all formed from the corporeal, zoological perspective, but from a spiritual one. Therefore the question is posed wrongly if it focuses on descent; it cannot be answered but must be reframed.”

I only want to highlight the following on language as the most important objective [12] element of the formation of national unity (*Zeitschrift* Bd. 1, pp. 41f.): “One<sup>2</sup> can distinguish content and form of consciousness. The content consists of sensations and the notions and concepts that are formed from them, and the feelings that are attached to them. The form consists of the movement of this content through the consciousness, or in the connections between its elements. National specificity manifests itself in form as well as content of language, in form, though, more finely, more tenderly and more intensely than in content. All elements of national consciousness—religion, customs, constitution—are thought content; language only, though, represents in the words, their inflection and in syntax not only notional content but also thought form and movement of thought. Language not only contains the world-view of a people, but also represents the perceptive activity itself. Only late in the development of the culture of a people scholarship and science emerge and continue the psychic movement that had expressed itself in language on a general level, on the level of single individuals.”

And still, although we, too, acknowledge the crucial importance of language

as a mark of nationality, we reject the claim that language, let alone language on its own, can determine the essence of nationality and the boundaries of nations.

The true nature and essence of nationality can only be understood as residing in the spirit. (*Zeitschrift* Bd. 1, pp. 34f.)

"Spirit, freedom and history intervene in the natural distribution of the human species according to races, tribal groups, tribes, clans, families. They separate what by nature would belong together and mix and assimilate what by nature would be different. Spiritual community and difference are therefore independent from genealogical community and difference. [13] The concept of the nation is grounded on the interventions by spiritual, historical constellations into naturally given differences; and what makes a nation a nation are not objective conditions such as descent or language as such but the subjective ideas of the members of the nation who are joined in *considering themselves* a nation. The concept of the nation rests on the subjective view of the members of a nation of themselves, of their identity [Gleichheit] and communal belonging together. Plants and animals are classified by the natural historian according to objective criteria, but we ask human beings which nation they see themselves as belonging to. The researcher determines also human beings' belonging to race and tribe with the same objectivity; national belonging, though, one determines subjectively and on one's own terms, one counts oneself into a nation."—"Do not be surprised by the subjective character of our definition of the nation. Although the nation is not independent from material conditions, it is a purely spiritual entity that does not have anything that could be called—except by analogy—its body. It is a spiritual creation of the individuals who constitute it; they are not a people, they *constantly create* one. To be more precise, the nation is the first product of the national spirit: for the individuals do not create the nation as individuals but only by overcoming their isolation. The awareness of this self-transcendence and of the individuals' dissolution into a general national spirit expresses itself in the notion of the people. The national spirit creates the notion and with it also the actuality of the nation."

Our task is therefore not to develop out of an examination of objective

gives our own definition of the nation as a discrete, objective concept as if corresponding to a concrete object, but we have to interpret the existing subjective definitions that nations implicitly give of themselves. It is obvious that not every individual nation needs to have the same concept of the nation, [14] as every nation develops out of particular conditions. The French recognize individuals as French according to one set of criteria, the Germans according to another, etc. (Compare Boeckh's argument on the German emphasis of language as the mark of nationality.) Every nation has its particular self-consciousness, as does every individual, and as the individual is made a particular person by it, so the nation is made a particular nation by its particular self-consciousness. Self-consciousness—of the individual as of the nation—is based on specific objective content; self-consciousness emerges from consciousness, its strength and dignity depends on the latter; the nation's self-consciousness will therefore always base itself on objective conditions such as descent, language, political life and so on; the crucial issue, though, namely the light in which the self-consciousness illuminates itself, is the subjective, free act of self-awareness as a whole and as a people."

The subjective unity in the spirit of a nation is thus based on, developed and experienced through the nation's history in the widest sense of the word. Insofar as an individual—or an individual with his family—over generations participates in history passively and actively, the subjective bond of belonging grows. When illness and famine hit a country they do not ask after religion, descent or language but as common destiny they unite the minds. The blessings of peace and the burdens, sorrows and sacrifices of war are shared by all, and all share as well the virtues that war has demanded and strengthened. Fighting shoulder to shoulder, the men grow hearts fit for the unity of the historical deed. Even separate and hostile tribes proceed toward national unity. Will—that most personal, most [15] character-forming element of the human mind—alone, the will of the tribes, decides. In the German Reich, will alone, proven in deed, has made those, who less than a decade ago had fought each other as mortal enemies, a unity. Not least, as we Germans know best, the common history of intellectual life joins individuals and tribes together to form the unity of the nation. Shared subjects and levels of education, the

exchange of the forces and the products of spirit, the communal elevation of the mind and purification of attitudes through poetry and philosophy, incessant mutual support in exploring the same things and exchange in exploring different things—in short, the flow of the intellect that forms the inner life creates in everybody, according to the degree of their participation, the consciousness of their national-spiritual unity.

### [2.3 The Nation according to Rümelin]

*Gustav Rümelin*, chancellor of the university of Tübingen, who holds views different from ours on various other important subjects, is in complete agreement with our view on the essence of the "nation." His speech on the concept of the nation given in 1872 offers a fine and profound argument that is based on the richest knowledge of reality as one would expect from this renowned statistician.

"The development of most peoples," he begins, "lies in time immemorial not accessible to research. But even in cases where historical documents are available, one tends to show us only how specific constellations have developed, but takes for granted and leaves unexplored what are the actual grounds of the formation of peoples. These grounds can only lie in the natural predisposition and aptitude of the human species and are a matter not for the [16] historian but the psychologist." *Rümelin* points to "the specific and momentous fact that nature has planted into our hearts the inclination to join a defined group of fellow creatures but has left it open what kind of group that would be. The motives for acting thus have been left open to us and we see them change through all ages; one could even think the changing of the dominant motives for building human groups constituted the course of world history."

"If we recall now, apart from the already mentioned longing for spiritual community, the drive for group building and, as a third (which is actually the first), the natural underpinnings of human sociability: spatial community, speech, exchange of needs and the means of subsistence, geographical influences and the inheritance of characteristic traits (underpinnings that cannot constitute a bond of minds but an intertwining of interests and



customs to which higher relationships can easily attach themselves), then we have exhausted the list of elements which psychology points to as the first and most effective germs of the formation of peoples. A lot must come together to conjure up the conditions for the full concept, but the latter also allows for gradations depending on whether one or the other element is still lacking. Not every birthplace is a homeland, not every land of the fathers is a fatherland. I can be chained through the community of state and law to people whose language I do not understand, whose customs, culture and belief are alien to me.

*“Human freedom again stands above all these individual powers of attraction; I can break away from it all, join strangers and talk to King David’s ancestress: Your people be my people and your God be [17] my God. The concept of the nation is not objectively defined but also depends on subjective sentiment. My nation are those whom I consider to be my nation, whom I call my people, to whom I know myself joined by unbreakable bonds. And this is where a division, a contradiction of sentiments is possible: one motive can pull me to this, another to that group. Faith can draw me to a group from which the bonds of community, state and descent separate me. (Examples are Catholicism and Protestantism.) But our mind will experience and deplore any such division and fission in its modulation as a disturbance; it will always feel a silent longing for a full, unitary community of life. It will aim at the ideal of a central group that encompasses all matters of life, the pivot of all particular motives for getting together, in which we have a complete sense that these are our people, the kin by whom we stand, with whom we endure, whose fate we share, from whom to part would be an intolerable thought.*

“Our German word *Volk* in its deeper meaning refers to this ideal aim of the universal group, of the full community of life, without though excluding those less perfect forms that are constituted by the individual main characteristics. And thus we may well accept that in the classifications of natural science any group that differs from its neighbors in descent and language, and in political discourse any multitude that is governed by a state, are called a nation or people. We also have to accept, although grudgingly, the confusing

effects of such use of language, such as that an individual can belong to two or three peoples, or that it can be said that the Belgian people consists of two peoples, the English [18] people and the Swiss people consist of three peoples, the Austrian and Russian of I-don't-know-how-many peoples." Rümelin's conception, which we can wholeheartedly embrace, is summed up most perfectly in the following: "Many elements need to come together to correspond to the ideal type, and *reality never more than approximates it*." The ideal type, in brief, is the following: "A country large and fertile enough to feed a dense, numerous population, fit to defend itself against all its neighbors, varied enough to warrant a multiple development of economic and intellectual life; on this soil, a linguistically unified population that works it and has struggled for it and knows itself united in common deeds and sufferings; this multitude protected and ordered through a unified state sprung from its womb and intertwined with its interests and memories; based on secure statehood, the flowering and cultivation of all those ideal goods of humanity and of intellectual, moral and religious life [growing] in free and manifold forms, including contradictions and struggles that strengthen a sense of community spreading in sovereignty and reconciliation—this is what it means to be a nation."

With this we conclude the theoretical exploration of the essence and the concept of the nation, and also under the perspective of the ideal of national belonging as developed above, I may now try to apply these considerations to a second, a practical question: what are we, the German Jews?

### [3.1 Descent Does Not Define the Nation: The Talk about Blood Has to Be Rejected as Materialist]

[On Treitschke]

Of what nationality are we? Gentlemen, we are Germans, nothing but Germans. When talking about the concept of nationality, we belong to only one nation, the German one.

[19] Let us momentarily leave to one side the still somewhat problematic conception of the pure subjectivity of the national spirit, according to which

nationality is only about what one sees oneself a part of, let us stick with the more commonly accepted one as advocated by *Boeckh*: that language is decisive. Gentlemen, what are we then? Germans, that's what we are, and we neither want to, nor can be anything else. And it is not only the language that makes us Germans. The country we inhabit, the state we serve, the law we obey, the science [Wissenschaft] that teaches us, the education that enlightens us, the art that elevates us, they all are German. Mother tongue and fatherland are German, the two sources of our inner life; here is where our cradles stood, here are the tombs of the many generations of our progenitors. The *beginning* and the *ending* of our life are here. Only our descent is not German, we are not Germanic; we are Jews, i.e. Semites. But neither are the other parts of the German nation Germans by descent, and certainly not pure Germans; they are not even all Germanic. Only by descent do we differ from the other Germans; but although we differ by descent from all others, all others are not the same, and anyway the concept *German* cannot today anywhere or anyhow meaningfully be used as if it referred to *descent*. There may be many people of purely German descent but they are not recognizable as such, they cannot be distinguished from the others who are considered to be of German nationality like themselves; they too belong to the German nation not *because of* their purely German descent. On one hand, one can belong to another nation, or at least not belong to the German nation in spite of German descent: like a Swiss or an American. On the other hand, one can belong to the German nation [20] without being of German descent. The Slavs from the Elbe region, the Prussians etc. have been of another nationality but have become Germans. Or else are not "the Leibnitz and all those" with names ending on -itz, -witz, -itzsch, -ky and -ow of obviously un-German descent but of German nationality? Are not all those whose fathers or grandfathers had been Wends or Lithuanians, whose grandmothers or ancestors had been Kassubes, Sorbs etc., but who speak, think and live German today, German nationals?

I don't want to talk about that fraction of the nation, small in numbers but eminent in achievement and positioning, that stems from the miscegenation of Germanic and Jewish blood. Rather, think of the French settlers

who live in our vicinity and in other parts of Germany; who would dare to deny them the German nationality? They *descended* from the French, but they *are* Germans, although their families have lived a much shorter time in German countries than most Jews.

Would it not be found ridiculous, and indeed treason of the German nation, if one wanted to make the claim that Kant does not belong to it because he descended from Scots? His ancestors, of whose immigration he was aware, and even his father had still spelled their name Cant.

Also *our* ancestors were immigrants; many arrived hundreds of years ago, others later; the Berlin community for example was founded a little more than two centuries ago. It is well known that the Germans too immigrated, some even later than that; however, they conquered the land, and conquest is supposed to constitute the only true entitlement. Whether conquest is ethically superior to the settling of immigrants who have been welcomed by the inhabitants of a country would be a worthwhile question for a morally inclined person to think about; but this is not now our subject. We Jews immigrated as strangers; [21] but did we come in order to remain strangers? Our fathers came searching for a homeland and a homeland is what they found. Throughout seven generations their will has proven itself through never-failing loyal obedience to the state, through common work with the nation, through common fate. Gradually one has expanded and ennobled their duties, from the Jew tax to the highest patriotic service with life and limb; but we have welcomed every new and higher duty as a holy privilege that we celebrated as one of the high aims in our lives.

Our blood, though, one opines, remains Jewish even when it flows on the battleground for the German cause; we are and we remain Semites.

Those who use the words Semites and Semitic in a derogatory way ought to consider—if they are Christians—whether they are not setting out to insult their own religion.

For it is an undisputed fact that all the authors of the New Testament just as those of the Old Testament were Jews, Semites without exception. I do understand, though, that those who, of a strictly naturalistic mind-set, have discarded Christian beliefs completely, might want to wish that the German

people shed Christian or Semitic morality and adopt one that seems more suitable to them. But who still finds the ideal of human morality developed in the Holy Script, the New Testament, ought never to forget that this ideal is a product of the Semitic spirit. Anti-Semitism is anti-Christianism for Christ the founder himself and all the apostles are Semites.

Anyway, this blood-and-race theory is in its entirety a product of a general coarsely sensualist-materialist worldview. Those who—on the one hand—argue for a revival of ideality are critically wrong if they—on the other hand—do not recognize that materialism has to be fought [22] lock stock and barrel and replaced by a higher and purer worldview. Who admits on the one hand—out of hatred or stupidity—that the moral and cultural characteristics of different nations or fractions of the same nation are determined by blood and heredity, cannot expect on the other hand that people will acknowledge and confess to the victorious power of the idea, the effective forces of thought and mind. The arousal of the meanest and basest antagonism, of racial or tribal hatred are the effect, sometimes even the cause of this materialism, always its accompaniment. I call it the meanest and basest because it is the most bestial, because it flares up among animals for no reason other than *difference*. Even dog and cat, having lived in a peace-breathing human habitat, learn how to get along; humans, however, in whom the feeling of humaneness has not yet arisen or is already stifled, see an enemy in every human being who is different, even if the latter intends no challenges at all to his rights.

If we have to talk about blood then—for my part I declare solemnly that blood means bloody little to me, while spirit and historical evolution mean almost everything when it comes to the value and dignity of humans, individuals or tribes—then I dare say that the Semitic blood is among the finest that ever ran in human veins. This is not only a Jewish but also a Christian conviction.

### [3.2 Judaism and Christianity]

I could not find a better witness for my case that this is a genuinely Christian conviction, and indeed would not need any further ones, than Dr. Martin

Luther. In the Erlanger edition of his writings, vol. 29 pages 47ff.; 74, we read: [23] "We may think highly of ourselves, but we are still heathens, while the Jews are of the lineage of Christ; we are in-laws and strangers; they are kin, nephews and brothers of our Lord. *If it were proper to boast of flesh and blood*, the Jews belong more to Christ than we; the Jews are blood-relations of our Lord; so also Paul, Romans 9. God has also demonstrated this by His acts, for to no nation among the Gentiles has He granted so high an honor as He has to the Jews. For from among the Gentiles there have been raised up no patriarchs, no apostles, no prophets, indeed, very few genuine Christians either. And although the gospel has been proclaimed to all the world, yet He committed the Holy Scriptures, that is, the law and the prophets, to no nation except the Jews." Let us also quote what *Luther* put before these sentences:

"I hope that if one deals in a kindly way with the Jews and instructs them carefully from Holy Scripture, many of them will become genuine Christians and turn again to the faith of their fathers, the prophets and patriarchs. They will only be frightened further away from it if their Judaism is so utterly rejected that nothing is allowed to remain, and they are treated only with arrogance and scorn. If the apostles, who also were Jews, had dealt with us Gentiles as we Gentiles deal with the Jews, there would never have been a Christian among the Gentiles. Since they dealt with us Gentiles in such brotherly fashion, we in our turn ought to treat the Jews in a brotherly manner in order that we might convert some of them. For even we ourselves are not yet all very far along, not to speak of having arrived." Likewise (p. 74): "I would request and advise therefore that one deal gently with them and instruct them from Scripture; then some of them may come along. Instead of this we are trying only to drive them by force, slandering them, accusing them of needing to have Christian blood in order not to stink, and I know not what other foolishness. [24] So long as we thus treat them like dogs, how can we expect to work any good among them? Again, when we forbid them to labor and do business and have any human fellowship with us, thereby forcing them into usury, how is that supposed to do them any good?

"If we really want to help them, we must be guided in our dealings with

them not by papal law but by the law of Christian love. We must receive them cordially, and permit them to trade and work with us, that they may have occasion and opportunity to associate with us, hear our Christian teaching, and witness our Christian life. If some of them should prove stiff-necked, what of it? After all, we ourselves are not all good Christians either.”<sup>3\*</sup>

Only our descent is thus not German; I nearly said, also our religion. But this would be a logical mistake. There is no such thing as a *German* religion; Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism are just as French, English, Italian etc. as they are German. The same [25] is true of Judaism: it is French, English, Italian because the French, the English, the Italians are Jews, *Judaism is just as German as Christianity is German*. Today, every nationality comprises several religions, as every religion several nationalities.

Should Judaism prevent us, out of all people, from being fully and wholly Germans, French, English? Does Christianity hinder the German, the French, the English in their nationality? But the Jews, they say, are a community of faith and tribe at the same time. Do not also the Germans, English, Dutch and Danes share the Germanic racial background as well as the Protestant religion? Their nationalities are, though, different indeed; country, state, language, history separate them, just as us Jews. Only the history of religion connects those as Protestants, these—Germans, French, Spanish—as Catholics; the same is the case with us Jews.

In the Jewish case, though, the boundaries of religion coincide with the

\*We are well aware that *Luther* in his later years also made hefty anti-Jewish speeches; no wonder! He felt disappointed in his (see above) often stated expectation that the Jews would convert in droves now that a purified Christianity was available; he found reproachful that dogma would even now keep them apart, as he thought he had shown that the teachings of the New Testament could unequivocally be delineated from the Old Testament. As his own interpretation seemed to him the only possible one, he could not accept another interpretation and, respectively following from it, another faith. His absolute confidence in his own reasoning is not a psychological riddle. His ability to tolerate other opinions could not but diminish as he was forced to do more and more fierce battle for the newly founded church, to conquer not only outwardly new territories for the redeeming truth but also inwardly its purity and solidity as he conceived it, in particular to protect it with his interpretation from deviations such as those of the followers of Zwingli and Calvin. To posthumous onlookers the emergence of differing opinions may appear as cause for rethinking one's own opinion; whoever stands in the thick of battle will strengthen the truth of his convictions through tightening them.

tribal boundaries; in God's world, though, does this have anything to do with the nationality of those who belong to the different nations? Does the French Jew somehow change depending on whether or not there are also Jews in Abyssinia? Does it make a difference whether there are not only—just as in the case of the Christians—French, English, Armenian, but also Moroccan and even Persian Jews? Do the English and the Germans become less English and less German when they spread Christianity also among the Iroquois?

Only in one respect there is actually a difference: the religion of the Jews is the *product* of their own race. This one may point out as our particular achievement, if one so wishes. I think, though, that Christianity can be as alive in the soul of a truly religious [26] Teuton, deeply, intensely, powerfully penetrating his whole inner life, as Judaism does in the heart of a Jew, although Christianity is not of Germanic but of Semitic origin.

### [3.3 Judaism, the State, and National Economy]

Individual-civil, political and national activity of any human being, including the Jew, is independent from religion; especially if this religion neither grants to, nor demands anything from any power or dominion, and therefore as religion can never come into conflict with the state. The precise formulation that shows that this is the case for Israel has been repeated very many times—allow me, Gentlemen, to throw in that the need ever again to repeat the same thoughts, as also the accusations are ever the same and are fed by ever the same sources, is what makes self-defense so terribly boring (veritable martyrdom for a thinking and feeling human being!); the same mistakes, the same lies, the same ignorance, the same falsifications ever need to be answered with the same responses—this precise formulation is the one which *Mar Samuel* has given more than 1600 years ago: the law of the country's government, of the state power, is the law for the Jew. This was not an expression of mere subservience: since Israel has recognized God as the director of the fate of the world, it has also revered in him the king of the kings and has seen all legitimate government that is based on right as an imposition by, even a reflection of God himself. This is undisputed



Jewish tradition. Descent and religion do not hinder thus the Jew to fully belong to the German nationality; we experience no history but the history of the German people, whatever good or bad happens to it, its troubles, its struggles, its triumphs are also ours since the constitution has made us full citizens of the country. *Rümelin* (p. 114) correctly points out [27] that the Germans have only most recently become “a nation in the genuine and true sense of the word”—namely in the sense of the scale of qualitatively increasing meanings of the concept of nationality—“a nation of which we know and feel ourselves to be members, which gives us a fatherland,” and it is our pride and cause of incomparable satisfaction that we German Jews have been able fully and in every respect to take part in this last, highest formative act of the German people.\* We fought on the battlefield, we discussed in the parliaments, we sometimes even governed on the communal level, we worked in the laboratories, healed in the hospitals, taught in the universities. But we participate also in all national works of peace, to all ideal interests of the nation we have for a long time now, and the longer the more widely, contributed our full share. Whatever we do we do as Germans; when we earn fortunes on the world market—something people like to point out so much—then we increase the wealth of the nation. Trade and commerce, crafts and industry, arts and sciences fill our lives, and whatever kind of work we do, everyone according to his means, we work as Germans, whether we like it or not.

But we do not participate in every type of work to the same extent; in agriculture, the honorable foundation of national economy, we hardly do. But it is unfair to see in this a deliberate shortcoming of the Jewish race. Even a man like *Boeckh*, whose humanitarianism is of impeccable integrity, let slip the sentence (*ibid.*, p. 289): “The Jews have maintained their preference and expertise in trade even after [28] agriculture and the crafts were opened to them, while they excel in scholarship as soon as inhibiting legislation is abolished.” I have long ago, in the psycho-ethnographical interest, suggested

\*On the participation of Jews in the German-French war of 1870–71 see the *Book of Memories* for German Israelites by Dr. L. Philippson, Bonn. The book is a treasure of not only historical and statistical data but also good, patriotic thoughts.

to leading statisticians whether one could compile data on occupational change in family histories. *Spielhagen* once rightly remarked that "it is as much a part of natural history as any other that the son of the schoolteacher will become priest, the son of the sergeant cadet." This piece of natural history of man should be examined thoroughly; then the facts cannot anymore be interpreted unfavorably to the Jews. If one wants to look at facts justly, then the statistical question must not be: what is the share of Jewish and non-Jewish farmers in relation to the overall population?, but one will have to ask, what is the share of the sons of urban residents, artisans, scholars, businesspeople, who are moving to the countryside to turn to farming? Then one will inevitably find that the share will be the same among Christians and Jews whose parents and ancestors were not allowed to own agricultural property nor even to live on the countryside. Are Jews not subject to the same psychological laws as other people?

### [3.4 The Jewish Contribution to German Intellectual Life]

The statistician *Boeckh* emphasizes that "they excel in scholarship as soon as inhibiting legislation is abolished." How surprised we were lately to read that "among the leading men of arts and scholarship, there are not many Jews." How big ought it to be? Herr v. *Sybel* has given a well-known experience succinct expression when he wrote (*Vorträge und Aufsätze, Berlin bei Hofmann*, p. 44): "The state concentrates all of Germany's best academic minds at the universities, so that the phenomenon of a renowned scholar without academic position, common in England and France, [29] is *in Germany a very rare exception*." Everybody knows though that Jews were excluded from academia until one generation ago; should those very rare exceptions be recruited from the Jews alone? Indeed they have been, often rather than very rarely. I am not talking about those Jews who are currently holding academic positions although most of them have received their academic training much earlier than the right and the hope for a lectureship. I don't want to remind you of *Valentin* and *Traube* as they were at least able to study medicine with the prospect of subsequently practicing it; I don't want to remind you of *Munck*, *Franck* and *Oppert*, German Jews who studied in

Germany and then, being excluded from academia in Germany, rose in France to be members of the Institute. As the academic inclination and capability of Jews is being questioned, I should perhaps mention *Eduard Gans*, or, as the latter is less well regarded these days, even more so *Stahl*, the intellectual leader of the Conservative Party in Germany, and *August Neander* and the physicist *Magnus*. However, I keep silent about all these; I merely ask you to consider the following:

The Jews constitute about one and a third percent of the population of Prussia; until 1848 they were excluded from academic careers; the highest institution in the country with respect to original research activity is the Akademie der Wissenschaften. It currently has 45 members: 21 in the sciences, 24 in humanities; among them five Jews, all of them trained before 1848 (*Peter Rieß, Kronecker, Borchardt, Ewald* and *Pringsheim*). Can numbers talk louder than that? Can they give stronger evidence? And yet the number of leading scholars among the Jews [30] is not very big? How big ought it to be?

Of course history talks in vain to one who mentions *Felix Mendelssohn* and is silent about *Moses Mendelssohn*. It is now customary to measure *Mendelssohn* against Kant and Hegel and to find him rather petty. *Mendelssohn* was certainly not one of the great philosophers; he can be compared neither with the German *Kant* nor with the Jewish *Spinoza*. One must not forget *Mendelssohn*, however, when one is concerned with the evolution of the specifically German national spirit, the development of thought in the German language, however little one likes to remember him. His presentation is a model of a purely German philosophical style, still today rarely matched, whose clarity and beauty promote the elevation of the thought rather than to compromise its depth. *Kant* himself, who assured M. in a letter of April 8, 1766, that he will “never write anything that I do not think,” wrote to him (August 18, 1783), “few are so lucky as to be able to think for themselves and at the same time in others’ stead, and to find the expression that is most adequate for all. *There is only one Mendelssohn*.” Many other witnesses could be quoted; but they would be superfluous for some, in vain for others. Another remark from the same letter by *Kant*, though, ought to be mentioned especially in our context, in which he states “with how much

admiration for its acuity, refinement and prudence he read 'Jerusalem.'" "I think of this book as the revelation of a big, though slowly progressing future reform which will affect not only your nation but also others. You have understood how to combine your religion with such an extent of freedom of consciousness as one would not have expected to be possible, and of which no other can pride itself etc" (Kant's Collected Works [31] edited by Rosenkranz and Schubert, vol. XI, I, 17). Still, *Mendelssohn* is not a great philosopher; but the consistency of the thinker, the intimate connection of a noble strength of will, purity of attitude and depth of soul with the clarity and acuity of intellect, i.e. the unity and totality of the philosophical character has rarely since been matched. Not what is being created on the level of systems, but on the level of personality (on which *Mendelssohn* shares so much with *Socrates* as described by Plato) enjoys lasting and never ageing life in the spirit of the nation. It was fortunate for *Mendelssohn* and his time that he lived in it and was seen by it as a sage rather than a philosopher; his contemporaries and immediate successors hardly ever called him anything other than that honorable epithet. He appears almost like a psychological miracle, if one considers the circumstances of his upbringing, his life and thought; but *Mendelssohn* is not a miracle but merely a *German Jew* of the most noble kind. It will be the task of better times, in which unprejudiced, level-headed and truthful research of facts will again be conducted, to explore the particularly profound and momentous affinity between the Germanic and the Jewish spirit. Nobody will deny that lately it carries rich fruit also on the dark side of human activity. Materialist theory has promoted and anticipated an alienated and materialist lifestyle. Whoever still directs his life toward ideal purposes will deeply regret this; he will also indict this tendency and attitude; but sense of justice will prevent him from accusing the whole racial or faith community on this or that side.

### [3.5 Jewish and German Religious Thought]

All better Jews, though, used as they are to remembering history on a large scale, are aware of and [32] grateful for this affinity to the German spirit. After all, that one field of scholarship that is still particularly interesting to the Jews,

as it concerns their religion, the philological and historical exploration of the Old Testament, has blossomed in the German spirit more than in that of any other nation. The Jews are so devoted to both reception and production of German scholarship and culture as a whole that an inner separation from it appears to them totally unthinkable and incomprehensible. Even our efforts and our contributions to that one field that separates us from the majority of our fellow citizens, religion, feed into the general interest. First of all, when we look after the religious education and religious institutional life of our coreligionists—or can the nation as a whole be indifferent toward whether and how the religiosity of one of its parts is promoted? Alas, if only we were more successful in this! then many of the legitimate complaints about us—which are illegitimate only in their generalizing form—would have to fall silent. But we also care for the blossoming and the welfare of the Christian religion, and for the same reason; namely, we recognize the high value of religion for the ideality of a society in general. We do not always have an adequate understanding of what is the best of the Christian church, or the different churches; the prudent ones among us will not utter any opinions on these issues and interfere in the debates among religious factions. But not only in our hearts can we wish every church whatever will be best for it; but also with our judgment—very discreetly and modestly pronounced—can we, completely impartially, take sides with whatever represents the higher, more dignified, more beneficial stage of the religious development of humanity. In all modesty and in all decency we are allowed to prefer the religion of *Lessing* over that [33] of *Göze*<sup>4</sup>; and if we wish in the innermost of our hearts that the former may triumph over the latter, then we can be confident that reason and the future will fulfil this wish. The different religions, and the differing factions within them, may struggle about possession of the truth; adherents of a third religion will not interfere in the struggle but will wish that any religion, whatever the specific content of its teachings, may reach the highest purity and intensity of the *religious mind* of which it is capable. Individuals, but also historical epochs, differ from each other religiously not only with respect to which dogmas they hold to be true but also by kind, degree and profundity of religiosity. We can acknowledge, revere and

even admire the *religiosity* of an adherent of another faith irrespective of the specific content of his faith; we even can be strengthened or elevated by the intensity of faith, the devotion of the adherent of another faith through exemplarity and teaching. Perhaps this is because in all religions, religiosity itself is the ultimate and the deepest and it is what is common to all of them. It is what strives toward the highest in humanity.

Nevertheless we have been accused again lately that we despise Christianity. We, we should have hostile feelings about Christianity? The Talmud (Baba Kamma p. 92) tells occasionally that it is not permitted to the Jew to talk badly about the Egyptian, and underpins this with the saying, you must not throw a stone into the well from which you drank. And we, who drink daily from the wellsprings of the German spirit, one of whose deepest sources is Christianity, we should want to throw a stone into it? The causes of the former and long-lasting, increasing antagonism are well known; I will only briefly point to them. When, in the beginning, [34] the new religious community split from the old one, of course there were animosity and bitterness. One only has to recall Rome and Wittenberg! And—I ask this again—are not the same psychological laws valid for all times, do not the same causes have the same effects? Then came the long period we call the Middle Ages. We do not need to go into any detail about how domination of the Jews was exerted then. I quote only one out of all the witnesses, Luther; in his powerfully earthy manner he wrote (*ibid.*, p. 46): “Our fools, the popes, bishops, sophists and monks, the crude asses’ heads, have hitherto so treated the Jews that any good Christian would have wanted to become a Jew. And if I had been a Jew and had seen such dolts and blockheads govern and teach the Christian faith, I would sooner have wanted to become a hog than a Christian.—For they have dealt with the Jews as if they were dogs rather than human beings; they have done little else than deride them and seize their property. When they baptized them they showed them nothing of Christian doctrine or life, but only subjected them to popishness and monkery *etc.*”

This is over! The mutual appreciation of Christianity by the Jews, slowly also of Judaism by Christians, especially by the more prudent on either side, increases annually, in spite of small interruptions. How would we,

who again and again accumulate evidence that our ethical teachings are the same as those of the Christians, despise the latter? Would a mother despise her own child? Is not the morality of Christianity, in spite of differences in dogma, spirit of our spirit? We have often, heavily and deeply had to suffer not from Christianity and its doctrine but from their corruption, inversion and decay (see *Peschel Völkerkunde*, p. 315). And this is true not only of ethical doctrine. [35] Do not the whole religious practice and experience still carry traces of common origin? Go and visit the churches! There, too, whenever the soul most intimately rejoices in the Lord of all creation, when the mind is most deeply touched, the spirit most highly elevated, whenever the religious ardor most violently bursts into flames, the words used are Halleluja and Hossanna! And the deepest affirmation is the Amen! And we should not respect this religion?

### [3.6 The Logic of Generalization]

If, though, some Jewish writer is stupid or crude enough to make an improper or unfair judgment on Christianity, is it permissible to say that “the Jews” despise the latter? The very same Dr. *August Rohling*, professor of Catholic theology in Prague, who wrote a few years ago “The Talmud Jew,” made in his book *Antichrist* of 1875, published with the consent of his church authorities, the following judgment on Protestantism: “Wherever Protestantism sets foot the grass dies; intellectual vacuum, decaying of morality, horrendous wretchedness of the hearts are its fruit; a Protestant who follows *Luther’s* recipes *is a monster*; vandalism and Protestantism are synonyms.”

Would one be allowed to say, on the basis of this evidence, all Catholics, or “the” Catholics despise Protestantism?

When will the barbaric logic finally disappear from people’s heads, which prioritizes generic judgment over the experience of the individual or the particular? What is the good of logic, where is the nobility of scholarship, where the dignity of thought, if one simply writes, facetiously mocking logic and justice, *the Jews* instead of *a Jew* or *some Jews*, at a crucial moment where well-being, honor and reputation of thousands upon thousands are at stake?

Had an education existed that would have saved [36] human beings from that one logical mistake, to put the generic in the place of the particular, rivers of tears and blood would have remained unshed.

But alas, this logical mistake is not one of the intellect but one of the heart.

The general prison of generic judgment into which all are thrown although only some are guilty, tends to have a small back door through which some can escape after they bribed the logical prison warders with their good characteristics. One admits that there are exceptions, which one might even accept as "friends."

I for my part declare explicitly that I prefer to be among the least and the lowest, the most simple and unrefined, if they are decent men; I very much prefer to be among those accused anonymously and condemned without hearing than among the flock of those who are pardoned as "exceptions."

### **[3.7 German Nationality as an Unfinished Project and the World-Historical Role of the Jews]**

What, then, might it mean that we are asked "without reservations to be Germans"? And being asked that in the same breath with talking about us, harshly and unkindly, as a separate whole, an alien body. Or can there be anything more harsh and unkind than telling somebody, "you are my misfortune"!

The concept and the ideal of nationality, also that of the German nation, are, as we have seen, capable of being permanently deepened and elevated. In the striving for that deepening and elevating all of us who care for the ideal and its fulfillment ought to unite; we should struggle together against all those who fail to participate truly and energetically in the national idea, against all those who hinder and damage the ideality through their base attitudes and their mean ways of living and acting. But sincere and base attitudes, high and low elements [37] of the people do not correspond to confession or descent; the separation into confessions—Christians and Jews, Catholics and Protestants—is wrong and detrimental here, and will deeply damage the idealist forces that ought to win the struggle together. Let the highest development of the idea of German nationality be the standard



around which we flock. But we aim at a Germanity that must be *free of any felony against received traditions as well as against universal human principles*. True Germanity must not be narrow-chested, fainthearted and short-sighted, it must not be distorted by base envy and petty meanness, it must be high-minded and generous. *Burke* once said in the English parliament: “To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.”<sup>5</sup> We love and we praise the German nation—although one belongs to it, one is allowed to praise one’s own nation as one ought to love it—as the most noble in terms of spiritual power and depth, we praise and worship it because we think it is the one that struggles most ardently for the fulfillment of a human ideal. Therefore we are glad to be sons of this nation, which we uphold with all our soul and of which we are proud.

*Rümelin* has, as I believe, depicted succinctly the true ideal of the German nation (in the conclusion of the already cited text). “The idea of humanity stands higher even than any nationality, humanity displays its riches in the chain of spirits of peoples who have forebodings of it. Never, though, had the particular spirit of any one people a more direct relationship to this idea of humanity than the particular spirit of the Germans has. Other nations might have served humanity unintentionally. The particular course of our history has led us, though, directly and consciously to embrace the idea of humanity as our trademark. [38] We have often been reprimanded for not esteeming our own but instead admiring the alien; it has never been possible to vaccinate us with a decent dosage of national pride, and after having accomplished the greatest deeds we hardly even bring up the enthusiasm to celebrate and commemorate them. With all the will in the world we do not manage to despise the alien, to answer the hate of the enemy with equal hate; we cannot help searching for and acknowledging the good wherever it may be. We have been led to a consciousness of our national task by cosmopolitanism and world literature. The poetry of no other people has as directly aimed at the heights of humanity; the scholarship of no other is of such universal and international character. Germans, you hope in vain ever to form a nation, we were told by Schiller, Strive instead, as you can, to a state of greater freedom than that: Strive to be humans. Some of our

characteristics hold us back or throw us off course, but this ideal trait, the love of truth and justice and humanity, will always lead us back onto the right path. And given this particular drive toward the generically human we are perhaps allowed to hope that we will not undertake the coming severe struggles and the tasks that are awaiting us all alone, but that the genius of humanity will be at our side as our silent ally."

We German Jews can and ought to contribute to the fulfillment of this most supreme ideal of German nationality in full accordance with ourselves. In order to be perfect, most efficient Germans, we not only can but must remain Jews. We are not only entitled but obliged to maintain what intellectual particularity we own as a race, what inherited virtue and wisdom we own as a religion, in order to put it to the service of the German national spirit as a part of its strength. Every nationality that is meant to reach a high level of development must be [39] equipped with a large variety of communities, aims and tendencies. The differentiations of coastal and interior areas, of mineral-rich mountains and fertile valleys and planes must be matched by a diversity of spiritual talents and their respective inclinations and capabilities to cultivate arts, sciences and trades richly and variedly. It has long been established, too, that the most diversely mixed peoples tend to be culturally and historically strongest. Seeing this as an effect of merely the mixing of blood, though, is stupid and limited. No! Nations climb higher stages of the performance of humane ideals when intellectual abilities, moral drives, the view of the world as it is given and the longing to shape it take individual form in tribes or races and are united in continuous struggle and growing harmony.

From this point we can now, I believe, understand the determination of the Jewish race in the diaspora, the Jewish religion in its continuity. I don't like being one of those who pretend they sat in the Council of Providence and listened to the determination of the times and peoples. But that Providence had a part to play in that this tiny tribe continued to exist while on all sides large and powerful empires and nations fell apart, must seem plausible to everyone who still thinks that Providence is more than just an empty word.

More than anything else, though, we must wish to recognize and build on the moral benefit that can be drawn from this.

I don't even want to talk about the fact that people, whose vision and purpose are limited to the short day of their existence and their petty personal ambitions, judge the legitimacy of the existence of that race [40] whose testimonies are nearly the oldest and that has survived the rise and fall of the old great historical peoples.

How natural and self-evident it must have seemed to the Romans that they, who thought they had expanded their power over the whole world and eternally, would be able to grind this little nation to nothingness. Where are the *Romans* now? The Jews though enjoy everywhere in Europe the sun of liberty and a multifaceted energetic life.

But sometimes we witness these days even serious, far-sighted people make narrow-minded judgments about Israel. The main reason for this is that most people form their judgment on the character of the Jews merely with reference to their own view of Christianity and their, and their peers', relationship to the latter. The fact that Jewry is the mother of Christianity has caused only in few minds a simple sentiment of grateful recognition, or at least made them grant uninhibited, unimpeded continued existence. Most people think that with the successful creation of Christianity the sole reason for the existence of Jewry has ceased. After having fulfilled its world-historical mission, which they celebrate highly, they think Jewry should have disappeared. But does a mother have to die after she gave birth to a child?

Ewald<sup>6</sup>—certainly not a friend of the Jews—assigns them a continuing mission (*History of the People of Israel*, 2nd edition, vol. 7, p. 445): "Jewry had a right to continue to exist next to Islam although it was initially imprudent enough to flatter it; likewise it still has that right today next to all the flawed forms of Christianity. Nothing is without its usefulness, and the existence of Jewry still today can and should remind us to what little an extent our own contemporary Christianity already is what it should be, in scholarship as in life."

But even here the goal of Jewry is looked for [41] only in its relationship to Christianity. Jewry as the mother of Christianity is supposed through its critique to further its education and upbringing. I will not go into any detail about how narrow and unpleasant this merely critical task is.

### [3.8 Cultural Diversity as a Value in Itself]

Certainly, one might argue that being a mother is a woman's essential destination, and having given birth to a child her greatest achievement. But is she only a mother? Is she not also a human being in her own right? Must she only live for the child, not also the child for her? This whole viewpoint is flawed by a false presupposition: by that petty and narrow worldview which may sometimes talk about humanity and totality but views their whole history merely as instrumental to the purposes of its own self or its own little community. The whole great diversity of spiritual life and production is supposedly not valuable in itself but merely as a step that is part of the development toward something else.

Here lies the deepest root of all intolerance. This is why for the Catholic, Protestantism is *nothing but* secession and heresy, while for the Protestant, Catholicism is but a preparatory stage. Has Protestantism not engendered countless sects? And always the same antagonism: one camp shouts secession, heresy, decay; the other, backward, retarded preparatory stage. The same is true with respect to culture in general: it has been held as an ideal that the whole world should adopt the culture of one people: all should become Roman or French. True culture, though, consists in *diversity*.\*

\*This mistake of the notion of "a step that is part of the development toward something else" is one of the noble mistakes as it derives from the best intentions. It is the drive toward knowledge and truth which seeks them as absolutes.

For one, it is only an ideal to find an absolute, eternal truth that is accessible to all in the same way. While it is possible to find an exact and therefore complete truth with respect to simple objects, actually given things, the same is not possible with respect to ideals, insights of the infinite within the particular. One must not deny the obvious fact that the absolute is always grasped in individual ways in these higher spheres; absolutely progressing perhaps, but not absolutely fixed.

Furthermore, the absolute is not limited to knowledge and truth. There is art, too, which not only allows but demands in its progressing development individuality and diversity. Would we talk about a blossoming of the arts if it allowed for only one kind of creativity, form and representation, even if it was a most perfect one? The same goes for ethics. Mores, customs, strivings, lifestyles can, may and should be diverse; they will have to be objectively different because they are meant to be the ultimate, the most pure, the most certain for everyone.

Everybody ought to seek justice for everybody, sympathy for everybody. Everybody ought to *seek* with equal zeal, with equal zeal *confess* the truth; the diversity of knowledge, opinion and belief will never then do any moral harm, and the cause of truth itself will be served best.

How will truth grow if not through spiritual struggle, through the struggles of different insights, through the competition of forces?

[42] Stages of development, progress, developments toward something higher do exist. The ultimate though consists for humanity not in unity, the *one* culmination, but in totality, in the various *manifestations of the highest ideal*, just as the natural givens (from the soil, the position of the sun and water compared to human beings) include a diversity which cannot, indeed should not be, destroyed.

From this can be deduced a *permanent vocation* of the Jews, which, in itself diverse, leads to an ongoing enrichment through the participation in various national spirits.

*Every nation* can learn from every other nation; *the general* gains from this process; but they remain, in the first place, separate nations.

The Jews, however, totally immerse themselves into the particular cultures, and draw therefrom heightening and deepening of their own. The particular characters of different nations share essential moments of generality, and because the particular character of the Jews has been fed by many diverse influences, [43] and is therefore closest to the general, they are able to reinforce anywhere, in any particular nation, the element of generality. Although the Jews differ from each other in language and thus form of thought, they are able to strongly affect each other and mutually increase their impact on others because they share an ethical-religious content that towers in power and dignity over any individual deed.\*

The Jews do not have a nationality of their own anymore; there simply is no Jew anymore who has an exclusively Jewish spirit. They draw therefore

\*The church created a similar constellation for all European peoples in the Middle Ages; the difference is that the use of a single language—Latin—that was alien to all of them, has alienated the peoples from their own nationality, or rather has prevented them from developing it. Shared intellectual work decreased and separate intellectual work increased only in the modern period when national difference conquered and individualized linguistic form as well as the common content of thought. The Jews did not have the same kind of shared base in the Hebrew language, not even in the Middle Ages, let alone in the modern period: even in the Middle Ages the Iberian Jews used Arabic for their principal works, and the difference between the Hispanic and the Provençal schools will have been shaped considerably by the use of different written languages, in spite of regular translating. In the modern period Jews write even their theological and ethical works in vernacular languages, while Hebrew is used only occasionally to clarify their interpretation, rarely to facilitate common creation, although it remains the shared source of inspiration.

by necessity on all the national spirits of which they have become parts and react upon them; even in their religion, which is what is most exclusively and originally their own, they are essentially also individualized according to the nations within which they live,\* and are therefore able the more energetically [44] to transform their receptive participation in culture into a productive one. *Philo* wrote Greek, *Maimonides* Arabic, *Spinoza* Latin, *Munck* and *Dernburg* French, *Mendelssohn* German.

Their specific capability owes itself not to their being aliens but to their being an individually shaped distinct element inherent to each nation, reciprocally and individually appropriated. This capacity for appropriation and assimilation, this quality of being nutritious to the other spirit and in turn hungry for it, certainly is a prominent trait of the already mentioned affinity between the Jewish and the German spirit. "Most things and the best of what our education-proud time can boast of still comes from the heritage of those three classic nations, the Jews, the Greeks and the Romans" (*Rümelin*).

The notion of One Shepherd and One Flock—God as the father of all humanity—of a universal empire of peace, all these have their birthplace in the Jewish spirit. And if it was Christianity that developed the most poignant articulation of these thoughts as an ethical system for the whole of humanity, it must be acknowledged, too, that this happened in the New Testament which was written by Jews only.

In the ancient people of Israel these thoughts struggled with those dictated by political praxis, and at a time when governance by the cruel Romans burdened them heavily, this burden threatened to suffocate them. The Christian community had voluntarily withdrawn from the national struggle; the Jews suffered a devastating defeat. That rabbi may have had a foreboding of the true destination of the Jews who said that the Messiah was born on the day the temple was destroyed. The ideal [45] concept of humanity was the Phoenix that was reborn to the Jews out of the ashes of the temple on Zion.

\*Just listen to what the Jews call each other: this one is a Pole, that one a Russian, that one a German. Only in a geographical sense? No! this refers to *character*, *spirit*, even the ways of reading the Talmud. Even differences in ritual, or of the agendas of the synagogue, are given national names—just read the front pages: French, Spanish, German, Polish, Moravian, Bohemian etc.

### [3.9 The Proximity of the Ideals of Judaism to Those of Christianity and of the Modern State]

I do not want to explain to you how modern Jewry defines its relationship to the nation and that of the nations with each other in my own words but with the quasi official formulation from the first and second Israelitic Synods:\* “The Jewish Synod understands that Jewry is in accordance with the principles of the new society and the constitutional state, as these principles have been pronounced in Mosaism and developed in the teachings of the prophets, i.e. in accordance with the principle of the unitary character of the human race, the equality of all before the law, the equality of all in duties and rights against nation and state, and the complete freedom of the individual in his religious beliefs and their enactment; the Synod sees the development and realization of these principles as the most reliable sureties for Judaism and its adherents in the present and the future, the most vital conditions for the unrestricted existence and the highest development of Judaism; the Synod sees therefore peace among all religions and confessions, mutual respect and equality, and a struggle for truth that is fought with spiritual weapons only and in a strictly ethical manner as among the principal aims of humanity.” The first sentence of the resolutions taken by the second Synod at Augsburg\*\* reads: “Judaism has since its inception in early [46] pre-history gone through different phases of development and in these has progressively unfolded its inner essence. Another most significant turning point has occurred in its history. The spirit of true knowledge of God and of pure morality is spreading more and more in the consciousness of humanity as a whole and shows itself more and more clearly in the life of the nations, in state and civil society, in the arts and sciences. Jewry gladly recognizes in this an approximation to the goals that have always directed its own historical path.”

Like the determination of any higher community, that of Jewry is an ideal,

\*The first topic on the first Synod’s agenda, Leipzig 1869, was the following resolution tabled by Dr. *Ludwig Philippson*, as edited by a commission, that was accepted *unanimously*.

\*\*Tabled by Dr. *Jacob Auerbach*, Frankfurt/M, edited together with Dr. *Szántó*, Vienna, and unanimously accepted.

which is realized only with difficulties and slowly. On whether or not those who confess to this determination bring with them the necessary character, leaning, ability and progressing achievements, on this issue I want to quote now some *non-Jewish* voices.

They are rare. It is difficult to find one's way into the essence of the appearance-less Jewish idealism. *Pompeius* was surprised not to find an idol when he came to Jerusalem and entered the temple, even in the Holy of Holies; the god without an image was invisible to his inner eye. The evidence of cases in which non-Jews correctly understood the spirit of Judaism is rare but important.

I want to point again to *Luther's* words as already quoted above (page 23). Then *Goethe*. He cannot be suspected of having been a philosemite (*Wanderjahre* vol. 2, chapter 2): "The people of Israel," he said, "has never been much good at anything, as its leaders, judges, governors, prophets have reprimanded it a thousand times (of this later more); it possesses few virtues, and most of the flaws of other peoples . . ." (nevertheless he continues:) "... but it is without equal when it comes to autonomy, steadfastness, courage, and when all these do not suffice, doggedness. It is [47] the most tenacious nation on earth; it is, it was, and will be existing in order to celebrate the name of Jehovah through the ages." Do these words not almost recall what *Jeremiah* said (31, 35): "Thus spoke the Eternal: "Who gives the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night, who stirs up the sea so that its waves roar, the Eternal of hosts is His name: Only when these ordinances depart from before Me then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before Me for ever."

But what is it that gives that Jewish tribe its eternal destination?

The most important ethnologist of recent times, the sadly much too early departed *Peschel* has expressed a main thought as follows (*Völkerkunde* p. 302): "The high significance of Israel's history lies in that this people has been forced to develop an ever deeper and purer understanding of the concept of God by what it had to experience and suffer. From among all the ancient nations only the Jews own a history that aims to recognize the forces of a ethical world order in earthly events." And furthermore (p. 307):



“An inclination to clemency and humanitarianism emerges already in the older Talmudic writings, an inclination that Christianity in particular has elevated to an idealist dogma of consolation of the oppressed and from which it has drawn its best impulses for the last eighteen centuries. Those Talmudic passages stem from the time of the Babylonian captivity, of misery and oppression: the purifying school of one’s own misfortune has made its authors *just* and *soft, tender* and *loving* of others.”

Let us now hear, with a feeling of joyous gratefulness, how (a long time before *Peschel*) a German philosopher, Professor *Hermann Lotze* of Göttingen, has looked deep into the Holy of Holies of Judaism. In the third volume of his *Mikrokosmos* (page 147) he wrote: “Among the peoples of the Orient governed by theocracies [48] the Hebrews appear to us like sober people among drunks; in antiquity, though, they appeared to be the dreamers among those awake. The others had looked into the beginnings of the world, the origins of its becoming and undoing with profound imagination, and as they felt themselves to be members of the big divine body of the world they lived in accordance with all the spasms of its mysterious life, the annual metamorphoses of a dying and returning nature, the struggle of light and beneficial, against dark and hostile powers in extravagant cults of sensuality or asceticism. And the discreet science of the priests promised further countless mysteries beyond the wisdom known by life. The Hebrews were utterly indifferent to all this; the powerful and zealous God who wants the justice of the hearts and persecutes sin because it is sin had also, of course, created the world, all those plants and animals, stars and planets large and small so that all may be good; but the imagination of the people did not concentrate on this creation which expressed His magnificence only in passing; it saw God as a God of history, to whom nature is merely a stepladder of his power, but the life of humanity, his chosen people, the sole focus of his Providence. The Hebrews threw away all the useless luxury of the mysticism of the philosophy of nature that had bogged down the other religions of antiquity, in order to meditate on the sole riddle of the inner world, that of sin and justice before God; they felt subject not to the whirl of the eternal cycles of nature but the progressing of a history; they were bothered not so

much by the mysteries of past events but much more by those that concerned the tasks of the future; and these were not meant to remain secret but divine inspiration drove the prophets to announce the future coming of the Kingdom of Heaven to all people as a consolation, and God's commandments [49] as atonement." And, further down: "Classical civilization's meaningful mythology and philosophical concepts of God lacked the immediate belief in their reality, and it came to take notice of a people that owned the living conviction that it lacked to such an extent, and that did not see the notions of God and His Kingdom as poetic adornments of a completely secular worldview but as profound and most serious reality."

This concerned the moral character of the Jewish religion. Concerning the system of morality itself, though, *Ernst Renan* (Life of Jesus, page 122f. of the German translation) wrote that Jesus "... had little to add to the teachings of the Synagogue in terms of charity, piety, good deeds, clemency, peacefulness, complete altruism of the heart"; and further: "... but he knew how to lend novelty to long known aphorisms through his mild tone." This is absolutely true. He continues: "Christian morality is in itself hardly original, as it can almost completely be restored from older maxims, but nevertheless it remains the highest creation that ever sprung from human consciousness, the most beautiful law book of perfect living ever written by any moralist."

Whenever anyone wants to attack the Jews, talk turns to the Talmud; the accusations against the latter have been refuted as null, void, unjust a hundred times—in vain. Every time a thorough refutation of the attacks has been accomplished, one thinks: So! Now at least no one who makes claims to being scholarly can refer to *Eisenmenger* and *Pfefferkorn* as authorities! All in vain! The Hydra of Jew-hatred lacks heart; [50] one may cut off as many heads as one wishes, Hydra-heads always grow back.

I have already mentioned Mr. *Rohling*; I quoted his assessment of Protestantism above (p. 35), which, as I believe, has clearly enough demonstrated his intellectual capabilities and reliability; and yet—what noble impartiality!—Protestants quote the same Mr. Rohling as witness and judge against the Talmud.

Rather than sharing with you my own judgment, which you might be

able to anticipate anyway, I want to quote a few passages from Professor *Delitzsch* of Leipzig, without doubt one of the foremost and most thorough experts on the Talmud in Germany.\* He writes: Rohling's "The Talmud Jew" "is a sin. It is not born out of the spirit of Christ nor the spirit of truth. Firstly, the author attributes to the Talmud much that comes from the national point of view of Old Testament morality and can thus equally be used to attack the Old Testament, especially the Mosaic Law; secondly, he has swept all the scandalous things that are voiced in the Talmud—a book that is actually a parliament and more than a thousand years old—onto one dung heap without looking at the pro and contra that is articulated there, and without paying attention to the many sentences that approximate the spirit of Christianity; not being able to read the Talmud himself, he has excerpted *Eisenmenger* and has ignored other works such as those by *Lightfoot* and *Hottinger*. Thirdly, he acts against Judaism like someone who wanted to indict Christianity through excerpts from the Jesuit casuists whose works contain much more abject principles and conclusions than the Talmud [51] if compared to the morality of Jesus and the apostles." Furthermore: "What Rohling (p. 44 etc.) makes the Talmud say about the Messiah, these two pages alone show how ignorant he is or how irresponsibly he pretends to be ignorant." Finally, Professor *Delitzsch* writes (on the occasion of his review of Dr. *Bloch's* "Professor Rohling's Forgery in Talmud Studies"): "This work shows that Prof. Rohling knows neither the Talmud nor rabbinical literature, that he has manipulated rabbinical sentences for his purposes and even fabricated some himself."

On the post-Talmudic period I want to be short. Among others, we possess an excellent short contribution by the well-known philosopher and botanist, Professor *Schleiden*: "The Significance of the Jews for Preservation and Resuscitation of the Sciences in the Middle Ages," Leipzig, published by Baumgärtner. I allow myself to remind you that this contribution must not be missing in any Jewish house. Not only the men but especially the women, too, should be familiar with the history of Jewish intellectual life; they ought to know that once it looked much more splendid than today. Admittedly, and fortunately,

\**Zeitschrift f. d. Mission der Kirche an Israel*. "Saat auf Hoffnung." 14. Jahrgang, S. 183]

we do turn toward general sciences lately quite a lot, but we neglect the science of Judaism so much that the flame of this intellectual activity only burns on small stoves. Throughout the Middle Ages both took place in parallel, exercised by the same persons; let me quote one example, not even one of the more important ones: the same Mr. *Minz* who had to leave Germany for Italy—in Germany there was no space for his activity—was rabbi in Padua for 47 years and at the same time professor [52] of philosophy at the university there. The good man died in 1508 when he was more than a hundred years old. We could quote many more examples like this, and I think it is our task to continue to cultivate the inherited core of our intellectual life.

As for the spirit of Judaism in the more narrow sense of the word and its progressing, ascending development over the centuries and especially in the latest times, I want to quote again the words of a Christian, a Catholic; a man who was in his days a seminary director, then a member of government and minister of education in the Swiss republic of Aarau. He wrote the book *The Moral Theology of the Jesuit Priest Cury, Explored by Dr. A. Keller*, Aarau 1869. It contains a chapter that explicitly criticizes the morality of this Jesuit textbook where he writes for example (pp. 167f.): "The founder of Christian morality has already kept dividers and numbers of the old rabbinism away from its laws. Among his students he does not know a top one, and in the Kingdom of God no-one is *the greatest*." Furthermore: "I have mentioned 'old rabbinism.' Alas, we should be silent about it in embarrassment! The sages of Israel have risen these days so far above dead formalism; this is evident in the words, spoken on the fourth of July of this year by the president of the first Israelitic Synod in Leipzig, the philosopher" (here follow some lines which modesty forces me to omit, but the same modesty must not stop me from quoting the passages<sup>7</sup> which Keller is referring to) "in his concluding speech, under the applause of the theologians of his religion": "We have to look upon the inner, rather than merely the outer form . . . I am firmly convinced that all ideality culminates in religion, all ideas are in the service of religion, and religion in turn lends them their glory. By religion I mean, though, not merely the confession, the dogma, [53] the conventions, but religiosity itself, that generically human elevation and deepening, that rise onto the higher planes of humanity, the ascendance

from the small to the great, from the everyday to the sublime, from the finite to the infinite, from the secular to the eternal. . . . What has destroyed other religions? The deeper moral content that people recognized after they had already formed their religion, received either through foreign ideas that were brought to them through immigration, as it happened to the Romans, or, as in the Greek case, through their own intellectual development. The deeper moral content destroyed the belief in the lesser moral content of their own religions. The spirit of the people itself spoke out against the spirit of its own religion. The living blew up the dead . . . when a seed happens to fall into a crevice and finds enough soil to develop into a plant, sometimes a tree might grow from it that will explode the rock. A small seed! But the living overcomes the dead; this is the power of life.”

Now, one may assume that only we who attended the Synod and confessed to these principles were the progressive ones while the orthodox Jews are lacking behind and still remain on the standpoint of that old rabbinism which initially may have blossomed with the most noble ethical illuminations but then, evolving through severest circumstances, under external pressure, ossified. Far from it! The orthodox may impose limitations onto their own way of life and follow strictly, perhaps too strictly, the ceremonies; but they too acknowledge the writings of *Cabriel* and *Maimonides*, of *Bachia* and *Albo*, and all the other philosophers of religion of the Middle Ages; they too have inherited [54] the whole development of the idea throughout the centuries rather than merely its most ancient core, only perhaps a little bit more than they are ready to admit to themselves.

The gist of the dynamism and progressing profundity of the Jewish spirit thanks to the work of men such as those just mentioned can be gleaned from the following sentences by *Renan*, quoted from his latest work, volume six of *Origin of Christianity* (p. 247 of the original edition): “. . . There are excellent maxims in the Talmud, and more than one precious pearl of the kind that Jesus idealized by making them his own. The Talmud played a larger role for the preservation of the ideality of the Jewish people than any other book in the history of any people. Dispersed from one end of the world to the other, the Jewish people soon had no other nationality than that of—the Torah. An

iron chain was needed to hold together this dispersed nation without clerics, without bishops, a pope, a holy city, or a theological central college. Nothing is as firmly connecting as shared duty, and this is pronounced in the Torah. The Jew who carried his religion with himself, who needed neither temple nor clerics for his cult, was incomparably free in his emigrations into all parts of the world. His absolute idealism made him indifferent to all things material; loyal memory of his tribe, the schema and the practice of the laws sufficed. When one attends service in a synagogue, one finds everything on first sight modern, borrowed, banal. The Jews have never tried to settle for a style of building places of worship that could be called distinctly their own. Their prayer leaders resemble priests; their sermons are borrowed from the Catholic pulpit; the interior of the synagogues is made by the same artisans who provide benches, chairs and lamps for the [55] neighboring church. Nothing in their music and singing reaches further back than the fifteenth century. Even some elements of the cult emulate the Catholic cult. Originality and tradition, though, erupt in the chant of 'Listen Israel! Adonai, our God, is unique; holy be His name!' This obstinate proclamation, this penetrating call is the one and all of Jewry. This people has laid the foundations of God, and yet there has never been a people less busy discussing God than the Jews. It is indeed a sign of great reasonableness to make practice rather than dogma the basis of religious confession. Christian is connected to Christian by shared belief; Jew to Jew by shared observance. Excommunication happened among Jews normally on the basis of deeds, not opinions.

"Cabbala always remained a voluntary discipline; it has never become an obligatory belief. Immortality of the soul has always been seen as a mere consolation and hope. A famous scholar was even allowed to doubt redemption by the Messiah; the Talmud quotes him without reprimand. An obligation to believe in something is a real nonsense, whereas greatest strictness about forms can apparently go together with complete freedom of thought. This is the reason of the philosophical independence that is a characteristic of medieval Jewry and still of today's. The famous scholars and oracles of the Synagogue, such as *Maimonides* and *Mendelssohn*, were pure rationalists. A book such as the 'Iccarim' (the Fundamental Principles) by *Josef Albo*,

which explains religion and prophesy as symbolism that is meant to contribute to the moral betterment of man; which calls revelation a mere mode of presentation of inner reasoning; which holds that all divine laws can be modified [56] and that individual punishments and rewards in future life are mere images; that such a book can reach fame and is not anathematized, *that is a feat that no other religion has achieved.*”

The already quoted comment of Kant’s on “Jerusalem” (p. 30) and Keller’s on the Synod should be sufficient proof that the progressive *deepening* as well as simultaneous *liberation* of the spirit has not come to a halt within Jewry until the present day; we trust that our Hochschule will help both to continue in the future, too.

#### [4. Conclusion: Self-Criticism as a Jewish Virtue]

Today I have spoken almost exclusively about Jewry rather than about the Jews. We could say much in their favor, but also against them; perhaps another time. I don’t want to praise our virtues, and there is no need to highlight our flaws as they are more obvious even than our virtues, especially for one particular reason: the Jews have always been the classic people of self-criticism. They cannot find the same among any other people. This benefit is paid for by a severe disadvantage; our self-praise has been justly reprimanded, but our self-reprimand has unjustly been affirmed. Like in *Goethe*, as quoted above, it is often argued that the Jews must be so much worse than other peoples as their prophets, orators, leaders have accused them of their baseness time and time again. Perhaps, though, our faults were not bigger but only their critique more open and more severe than among other peoples. Anyway, the Jews have criticized themselves not merely through their prophets and judges but self-criticism has become part of vernacular culture. Today unfortunately it has become much less so; I [57] wish we had continued the custom more. You will all remember: whenever anything unfortunate, tough luck, bad coincidence, or even a perfectly obvious injustice by anybody else happened to our parents and grandparents their first word when talking or hearing about it would have been, “because of our many sins!” One used to think of oneself as primary and essential cause of the misfortune. Emulating their

prophets whose example was present in front of everybody's soul, the Jews have always been *proud* of their ideal but humble about the reality, including their own historical reality as a whole, as I could prove with countless examples. Other nations also tended to be eulogists of past times; only the Jews said in prominent places: "We and our fathers have sinned!"

Even for our forefathers they had open confessions, not eulogies. Who would want to claim that a similar attitude has been articulated in the vernacular or the literature of any other ancient people? No literature is even remotely as rich in reprimands and admonitions as the Jewish literature from ancient times to the present. One will not want to compare Aristophanes' comedies or the Roman satire to the Prophetic reprimand. The Greek and Roman discourses are sophisticated, beautiful, sweet, flattering, but the word of the Prophets is powerful and stirring. The penitential hymn and sermon of the Christian church is almost completely based on and draws on the Psalms and the Prophets. Today we are not lacking the art of the prophetic word but its bloodcurdling power. If as monstrous a deed of moral degradation as the attempts on the most honorable head of the nation would have happened in the times of the Prophets, sounds of enormous power would have arisen, whose ringing we would still be hearing today like we still today hear the penetrating call of Jeremiah and [58] Isaiah. Perhaps somewhere in a German mind a spark of that ardor might still be glowing under the ashes of the centuries; it might light up—even if less bright—and illuminate for us the path of justice and clemency and be to the benefit of the whole German people: may God bring that to pass!

#### Appendix on Jewish Immigration and Emigration in Prussia

It sounds so eerily beautiful that "... the Eastern border of our country is invaded year after year by multitudes of assiduous trouser-selling youths from the inexhaustible cradle of Poland, whose children and grandchildren are to be the future rulers of Germany's stock exchanges and Germany's press; this immigration is rapidly increasing and the question becomes more and more serious how this alien nationality can be amalgamated with ours."

But is this *factually* true? That is the first question.



I remember the same fear was voiced in the 1850s and was then answered with a statistical survey. Its results were that between 1834 and 1843 the number of immigrating Jews exceeded the number of emigrating Jews by 2,394. Between 1843 and 1855 inclusive the number of emigrating Jews exceeded that of immigrating Jews by 12,870 *so that in the whole twenty-two year period (1834 to 1855) 10,476 more Jews emigrated than immigrated*. I concentrate on the essential point; the details can be found in the “Calendar and Yearbook for the Jewish communities of Prussia,” edited by Ph. Wertheim, third year, 1859, Veit u. Co, pages 159ff, by Dr. S. Neumann.

For the period from 1855 to the present currently no complete survey exists, but there are enough data to suggest [2] that emigration continued to exceed immigration. In 1858, 242,365 Jews lived in Prussia, as against 254,785 in 1861, an increase of 12,420. Births have exceeded, though, deaths by 13,147, which means that emigration exceeded immigration by 727.

In 1864, 262,001 Jews lived in Prussia, which means an increase as against 1861 of 7216, while births exceeded deaths by 12,516; in these three years 5,300 more Jews must have emigrated than immigrated.

For the period 1865 to 1867 the same calculation results in an excess emigration of 9,267 persons.

After 1866 the argument is more complicated due to the extension of the territory of the Prussian state, and especially because data on births and deaths have not been differentiated with respect to confession between 1868 and 1872.

The numerical share of the Jews to the overall population of the Prussian state is perfectly clear: in 1855 the Jews made up 1.361% of the population; in

1858	1.366%
1861	1.377%
1864	1.360%
1867	1.305%
1867 in the old provinces	1.335%
1867 in the new provinces	1.182%
1871	1.321%
1875	1.322%

The Jewish share in the population clearly has not increased; as births exceed deaths much more among Jews than among non-Jews, it has to be assumed that emigration exceeded immigration even more than suggested above in order to explain that the Jewish share of the population remained stable or even decreased.

[3] I do not believe any statistical surveys and calculations are ultimately reliable; but compared to those vague claims that are inspired by deadly fear and are supported by no evidence at all, they can be seen as actual facts.

But even if all these statistical data were wrong, even if a handful more Jews were actually coming to Germany every year, what danger would it be? And I am not invoking here the concept of humanitarianism toward strangers, which certain circles seem not to appreciate anymore at all. What I mean is that an Englishman would laugh into our faces if we suggested that he control the immigration of some group of foreigners into the British Isles. He might consider it an insult to his nation to suggest that a handful of foreigners could corrupt the ideals, morality and character of his people. If, though, also in Germany it is "impossible to make the hard German heads Jewish"—what's the noise about then? Why the fear?

The heightening of national consciousness is a serious issue; a purified and energetic sense of nationality is an ideal for the German as well as for any other people; it is an important task to inspire ever expanding strata ever more strongly and deeply with it. Can this task be helped, though, by arousing antagonism in one part of the population *against* another one? Is it a sign of that authentic national consciousness that we long for, can it be a means of strengthening it, to alarm the imagination with a strong fear of facts that are not facts at all?

Appendix 3. Open Letter on the Jews by Löb Baruch (Dr. Ludwig Börne)  
to the Member of the German Reichstag and Heidelberg Professor  
Dr. Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke (Berlin, 1880)

*Motto: In this dispute time will win, as it always does—and love always wins as love alone is immortal.*

Our fools, the popes, bishops, sophists and monks, those coarse asses, have hitherto treated the Jews such that a good Christian would have wanted to become a Jew. And had I been a Jew while such idiots and good-for-nothings were ruling the Christian faith, I would rather have wanted to convert into a sow than a Christian.—MARTIN LUTHER

Nathan: We must, must be friends! Are Christian and Jew Christian and Jew more than they are Humans?—GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING

The Jews are Germans, nothing but Germans. German is their mother tongue and German is their fatherland. In Germany stands their cradle, in Germany lie their ancestors' tombs. Their beginning is here and so is their ending. They have no other history than the history of the German people. One likes reproaching the Jews for gaining big fortunes. But they merely increase the wealth of the nation. When they work they work for the better of the German. In scholarship, the arts, crafts, and industry, they do so as Germans, intentionally or not, and they are very aware how much they owe to the specific nature of the German spirit.—PROF. LAZARUS

ELYSIUM, IN ADVENT 1879

Dear Professor!

It is half a century since I wrote the words, “I beg you, do not despise me my Jews.” Back then of course a German Reichstag did not exist yet in which a liberal professor from Heidelberg could have taken a seat, but the good old German Bundestag ruled over the Germans like a father, and like a stepfather over the Jews.<sup>1</sup> Had you studied in Heidelberg at my time I am sure because of only a fraction of the liberal ideas that you hold now you would have been caught up in the persecutions of the “demagogues”; had you published your “Gesellschaftswissenschaft” or your historical and political essays at the time when I studied for my doctorate at Giessen you would have been given ample opportunity for practical research on solitary imprisonment; and I am afraid your “Prussian Annals” would have meant penitentiary unless you had preferred like myself to cross the border at Kehl and to make the journey via Lüneville and Dormans to Paris. For your sake I feel sorry we missed the chance to write my “Letters from Paris” together; perhaps you would have been granted a little plaque at the pedestal of my monument in Frankfurt—some immortality is not at all to be despised, not even for a professor from Heidelberg. Well, at least you wrote about “The Acid Test of the North German League,” while I merely put the Bundestag to such a test, and even found its nightgown and nightcap indestructible. You gave an answer also to the question, “What do we demand of France?” and you had some good thoughts on the subject. You would have had ammunition for another ten thousand brochures; so what drove you to rage against “my Jews”?

[5] Did I hear you say that I, Löb Baruch, am partisan and the whole affair was none of my business? Fine! But then at least listen to what I once wrote, a long, long time ago—you as a professor of history should know what half a century means—when people were not yet calling me the Psalmist of Passion. On “The Poor Germans” I wrote back then: “As they live on the ground

floor and the weight of the very large number of higher estates burdens them, speaking of people even lower than they, of those who inhabit the basement, eases their anxiety. At least not to be Jews is their consolation for not even having become Court Councillor. No, having been born Jewish has never embittered me against the Germans. I would not be worth the light of the sun were I to reward the great mercy God showed me when he made me a German and a Jew at the same time with base moaning—because of an insult I have always looked down upon, because of suffering I have long overcome. No, I appreciate the undeserved luck of being a German and a Jew, to be able to strive for all the virtues of the Germans without having to share any of their faults. Yes, having been born a serf I understand liberty better than you do. Yes, having been trained in slavery I understand freedom better than you do. Yes, having been born without a fatherland, I wished a fatherland more fervently than you do, and as my birthplace was as small as the *Judengasse* [the ghetto in Frankfurt/Main], and as behind the locked gates the foreign parts began, the town would not suffice for me as a fatherland, nor the region, nor the province; nothing less than the whole wide fatherland would do, as far as its tongue reaches. And if it was in my power, I would not tolerate that even a path as wide as my hand would separate region from region, German tribe from German tribe; if it was in my power, I would not tolerate that a single German word had to reach my ear from beyond the borders.”

Are you perhaps even more national than that, Professor? It took a long time before some of my dreams became realities. When I once observed that the Jews and the Poles were fighting for freedom while the Germans were passively looking on, I wrote: “That really takes the biscuit, this is the sublime ridicule that German history has been waiting for, that Jews are leading the German people’s struggle for liberation.” OK, I was exaggerating, but have they not taken part bravely in the struggle? Professor! [6] “I beg you, don’t despise me my Jews.” Think of 1870 . . . did you hear Kutschke speak of Jews or Christians? Germany has buried in the Reformation the League of St. Sebastian, and likewise will it bury the League of Antisemites, and you, Professor, should be careful that you don’t get buried with them! It is bad to be dead during one’s lifetime!

Baptism could not wash off from me my understanding of Judaism. But you do not even understand that the bell of general freedom could not toll before in the modern state the Jew was liberated!

In 1807, when I was a student, I applied in Frankfurt for a passport to travel via Mainz to Heidelberg. I came from the life of freedom, returned into it, and touched upon the land of equality. The scrivener in the town hall who issued the passport was a monster with the spiteful face of a toad. When I received the passport, I read: *Jew of Frankfurt* [Juif de Francfort; French in original] . . . my blood stood still. I took an oath in my heart: you wait! One day I will write you a passport, too, you and all of your kind—and have I not, have I not kept my word?

Don't you agree, Professor? You do not love the Jews. It is bad for the Jews that even educated Germans are subject to the relentless government of their hearts. Even to be just, the German needs to love. But the champion of truth and justice ought to be able to master his heart, too!

You think a Jew can't teach you anything? Jew, Jew! That is the last penny in the pathetic piggy bank of your intellect. After all, I wish I could ask back the three *Loisd'or* that I gave the priest as the fee for my Christianity. I am baptized and it doesn't help me at all. Three *Loisd'or* for a place in the German loony bin! Talk about a stupid waste of money!

What does "pure Christianity" mean? There is only one pure spring, and from it spring the manifold streams of the religions, which by and by wash off the mud from the riverbanks and muddy themselves with whatever dirty people throw into them.

[7] Supposing you know this, and as a professor of history you ought to, why are you so arrogant? Are you afraid of the Eternal Jew because you are a Christian or because you are a German scholar?

You know that I have been moved a thousand times in my lifetime to the exclamation, "The Eternal Jew"!

When at the time a Jewish merchant went bankrupt, the courts pronounced: the Jewish company N.N. went bankrupt. Was a Jew a doctor or a lawyer, the almanac would designate him as a doctor of the Jewish nation or a lawyer of the Jewish nation. Did a Jew steal something, and it was asked who did it, the answer was, a Jew did it. Was a Jew well mannered and educated, the

detractors would say “and yet he remains a Jew,” and the benevolent would say, “he does great honor to his nation.” If a Jew went to a tailor and ordered a coat, the tailor would unfailingly point out that some Jacob or Isaac has had made a similar coat. If a Jewish woman bought flowers, the gardener would let her know that Mrs. Esther bought a rose tree just a few days ago. When a Jew died in Frankfurt, was born or married, the gazette would have separately printed *Judengassen* for those moving in or out, and thick walls of ink would separate Jewish cradles, coffins and wedding beds from Christian ones. If one sat down at a restaurant table in Stuttgart, Munich or Vienna, or any other place where people were educated and unprejudiced, not preoccupied with talking about Jews, and a traveler from Frankfurt was among the patrons, the Frankfurter would have started a vivid discussion on the Jews even before the beef roast arrived. Whoever, like myself, has observed this foolishness for decades, has become accustomed to exclaiming, with anger or smiles, with censure or with pity: the Eternal Jew!

I have been up here now for forty-two years, far removed from worldly turmoil, glad that even the Jews are now slowly enjoying full equality, and you cross my path, so that, whether I like it or not, I have to address the Christian-Germanic professor: Oy! Eternal Jew! You should have your thoughts on the Jews printed as a clean copper-plated pocketbook, entitled “Mutual Love and Friendship,” so that Christian women would inadvertently pick it up: they would then start loving the Jews on the grounds of their enemies’ dullness.

[8] Jew-hatred is one of the Pontine Swamps that pollute the beautiful spring country of our freedom. One can see the most hopeful friends of the fatherland stumble around ill and pale-faced. The German intellect lives on top of the Alps, but the German soul is panting about in humid marshes. The Dutch phlegm in our hearts does not like the crisp air of the mountains. This is sad because liberation comes not from the intellect but from the heart. Jew-hatred is the whetstone on which every blunt mind tries to sharpen itself, and on which every sharp one tries to give them a hiding. But the stone is too hard, it has made the sharp minds jagged, and they have not managed to make amends. In this dispute time will win, as it always does—and love always wins as love alone is immortal.

Don't you agree, Professor, that everything written today against the Jews, and everything that could possibly be written, is merely a collection of dated views, set in faded letters, covered by the dirt of the thousands of hands through which they have passed? There is not a single new coin, not a single shining penny. Without the powerful drive of homespun ideas people would never be able to muster the perseverance to write ever new invectives: the lust for speculation rules them more than hatred. The bad thing is that in this case intellectual dullness inevitably brings immorality with it.

Should you think now, Professor, that I failed to understand your point, then I promise you I will not contradict you in this. I never understood the *Hep-Hep*, wherever I encountered it. Do *you* understand how one can divide the world into two parts, call the one Jewry, the other non-Jewry?—the worse for you, because that means you fail to understand the world! And you want to teach world history?

To the enemies of the Jews, non-Jewry is the solid ground on which flowers and plants flourish, birds sing, springs murmur and peaceful shepherds live innocent lives; Jewry however is to their dizzy glances a savage sea where sharks attack and hypocritical crocodiles cheat. They say that hatred, envy, miserliness, greed, malice, brutality, godlessness, and all other vices are steady companions of the Jews. Surely there are among them also noble human beings but they are not to be regarded as Jews [9] but as quasi-Christians. They would also admit that all these failings and illnesses of the human spirit and heart can also be found among Christians but such degenerate people are not Christians but are to be regarded as Jews. Could Jews not argue likewise? They could say: greed, envy, stupidity, vanity, malice, rashness, and the other vices not mentioned here attach to the Christians. There may be a few exceptions but they are noble Jewish souls and cannot be counted as Christians. Also among ourselves there are good-for-nothings, but such rabble do not deserve the epithet of Jew, they are Christians. Well, if this is not insane then open wide the doors of your madhouses and let their inmates step out, so that they become teachers, preachers, judges and writers. If it gives you pleasure, so divide humanity into sheep and goats, and put the one on the right side, the others on the left side; but declaring that all who



happen to stand on the right are sheep and all who are standing on the left are goats—that is terribly godless, and you do not deserve to be spoken to as a rational human being.

Things are not better in literature. When Christians write something in favor of the Jews then the Jew-haters inevitably say it was written by Jews in disguise; but if the writers are Jews, they say they belong to the most unpolished class of human beings and they point to their unbounded audacity and their unparalleled cheek. I have read only few Jew-pamphlets, either pro or contra the Jews. Most of them I have chosen *not* to read because I find it equally ridiculous to write massive volumes to prove that two and two are four as it is ridiculous to try and prove the opposite. Either bored me.

In my times, Professor, it used to amuse me to see that writers against the Jews first climbed the heights of argumentation by trying to prove that the sun, the moon and the stars are part of the big Jewish conspiracy, and soon thereafter came down a bit and could be seen in a dirty little dead-end street, in a sugar barrel, in a money-changing booth, a storehouse. First they discussed death and immortality, man's destiny, theocracy and morality, they showed that Jewry is an atmospheric poison that envelopes the whole of the earth; then they came to admit that the atmosphere is different at any given place, and they aimed to defend specific anti-Jewish interests in every single town, even in every single street [10] in every single town. In this street Jews should be allowed to live, but not in that one; here they should be allowed to live on the right side but not on the left; on this right side they should be allowed to own houses but not houses on the corner; in the houses with two entrances they should be allowed to trade on one door but not on the other; at that door they should be allowed to trade in this commodity but not the other—and thus the big log of stupidity was cut into a thousand match-size pieces.

Well, many things have turned out for the better, Professor, should not one day all be fine? Or do you, too, believe in Jewish domination, the dangerousness of rabbinical dogma, the triumph of the Talmud?

You ask me what's to be done?

An old children's fable shall give you the answer: the fable of the sun, the

storm and the wanderer. The storm and the sun had an argument about who was more powerful. The storm tried to snatch away a coat from a wanderer—in vain; the more it blew the more the wanderer wrapped himself into the coat. The sun came out in its light and mildness—the wanderer took off the coat. The Jews are such wanderers, Rabbinism is their coat, you are the storm—but the sun has started to shine!

When the Jews write bad books, then the critics shall shout *Hep-Hep*, but the state shall not intervene. Let them do their business, let them do their business, Jews and Christians. If it was up to me I would grant the German professors a monopoly in the trade with paper so that they may earn more from selling the paper than from filling it with words.

Nobody knows whether there are more usurers among the Jews than among the Christians. I do not have to defend the world of commerce. I profoundly hate its Jewishness—that manifestation of the demon of money, this heightened fury of greed, this bodily devil of gold—whether it comes in Hebrew, Muslim or Christian shape. But is this Jewishness the sole flaw and responsibility of the Jews? Is it not the nitrogenous atmosphere that surrounds the whole world of trade, maintaining life because it restores life but deadly when it occurs split off? You nag and say that the Jews are the priests of Mercury and bag the sacrificed [11] monies. Well, if so, then they are smarter than you, but not more malicious. Not the priest makes the idol but the adoration. Overthrow your idols, destroy its temples, and the Levites whom you hate so much will lose hold of the meat fork. Among the Greeks and Romans, the slaves did the trading, but you are slaves to trade, and you earn nothing but money and despise. You say: we have connected continents, made peoples become friends, made mores alike, discovered the hidden and brought the discovered over here. Well done! If you want to limit yourselves to being the carters of wisdom, and receive only the transportation costs of all life's goods, then your modesty must be applauded. But do not pride yourselves of lofty ideals, virtue and piety, when you are driven only by base greed and vulgar sensuality. The Jews may well be hate-worthy but it is not for you to hate them.

One has stopped demanding from you to be Christians, but it is truly

ridiculous when you demand from Jews the Christian values that you do not hold!

I used to mock people who sit like you, Professor, in the headquarter of the Jew-haters, by saying: slit open a Jew, however much your own heart would be bleeding about it; convince yourselves that lungs and liver, heart and kidneys, brain and stomach are shaped and located just like those of Christians, and then tell me where is nature's instruction not to treat the Jews like human beings. But my irony can't sharpen anything, truth is sharp enough already. On reading the latest hate-pamphlets, one finds that their authors deal with the Jewish bodies no different than with the Jewish souls. They are horrified by the increase of the Jewish population and explain it by the Jewish habit of often eating onions. They call them unclean although cleanliness is demanded by their religion. They opine that it is necessary the state founded washing and bleaching houses for the Jews. When one of them observes a small pustule on the lip of a sweet-toothed Jewish girl, he makes an elephant from a fly as the saying goes and claims the clean-cut kid had elephantiasis. If a louse crosses his liver, which happens quite a lot, he claims it was a Jewish one, and that all Jews had that infamous illness of which, among other crowned heads, Herod, Philipp II and the Roman dictator Sulla died. The Jews are supposed to suffer from countless illnesses, and from all this you conclude that one ought to drive [12] the Jews from the streets of the towns and kick them out. Back to Palestine! So feverish is the aristocratic delusion!

It is feared that the Jews want to become princes or even senators in the free towns. I value the truth over everything else, and what is right must remain right. The Jews were close to the princes even in my time, and they get closer by the day. I personally knew a rich Jew who extended his garden within seven years by four acres of field, which clearly betrayed his plans to hand the garden to his children as a Duchy. But claiming the Jews wanted to become senators of free towns would be an exaggeration. Madness and ruthlessness have limits. There are innate sentiments of the human heart which not even the basest villain can suppress. The Jews are arch-villains enough in wanting to become arch-dukes; but *Senators*! No, unbelievable, man cannot sink that low.

All the things I am currently hearing about the Jews' domination of the press, the power of their money and their humanitarianism which culminates in their international association, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, I have already heard quite similarly fifty years ago. Already then it was said that the Jews were aiming at editor positions in many periodicals and newspapers, were trying to enter state publications, to win over censors, to make men write apologetics for them who do not know anything about Judaism, to gain control of the theaters through New Christians in order to satirize anything not Jewish. Finally they had tried to enter the book market in order to gain complete control over the world of ideas, thinking of the effects of which must make anyone shudder. The fear has also been voiced that the rabbis combine and vote for a Jewish Pontifex Maximus who will subsequently rule the world. I wrote then what is true today, too: there is no urgent need for spiritual and secular government by the Jews. As long as there are government bonds the High Priest can leave the sword in its shaft, the Jews tend to avoid dangerous sabers; and for the censor, the High Priest may throw as much smoke as he likes, *the Jews don't let dust be thrown into their eyes!*

Rothschild, back then, kissed the hand of the Pope and [13] on leaving expressed in most gracious expressions how highly satisfied he was with Peter's successor. Everything fell right into the order that God had had on his mind when he first created the world: a poor Christian kissed the Pope's feet, and a rich Jew kissed his hand. Had Rothschild received his Roman bond on 60 instead of 65 percent, and had thus been able to donate another 10,000 ducats to the cardinal's treasurer, he would have been permitted to fall the Holy Father round the neck.

We all know that money always played a role among the Jews. Among whom not, though?

The ancient Jews from Abraham to Solomon the Wise always appeared to me as if they intended to travesty general world history. Read the books of Joshua and Kings and you will find how Blumauerisch everything in there looks.<sup>2</sup> That was bad enough. But the modern ones, by God, they at the very best parody the travesty. There are three things they appreciate: firstly, money, secondly, money, and thirdly, money. As the pinnacle of their

wit they translate Hamlet's soliloquy as "To cash or not to cash, that is the question!"

Is money anything other than the expectation of pleasure, as well as the pleasant remembrance of its laborious acquisition? Is it not past as well as future, and does one want to deprive a poor Jew who has no present of these, too? Is money not the tomb that is common to all, that welcomes kings and paupers, happy and unhappy, persecutor and persecuted? Is not shared decomposition what mixes Jews and Christians and overcomes the signs of their separation?

Professor, you have the rights of nature, of nations, and of the state *in your view* (although I cannot actually testify to this), but you certainly fail to have them *in your heart*. There is no doubt that you find it easy to fill many pages with comments against the Jews (you have shown often enough that filling pages is no problem for you).

But I do not accept that human rights should be so different from civil rights, as well as religious from political toleration, or that one could have claims to the one while not to the other. You do not believe this yourself. Basically you have always been a hater of the Jews, but intellectually you have made progress: now you try to justify your hostility. You do not hate the Jews because they deserve it; you <sup>[14]</sup> hate them and then you try to prove as well as you can *that* they deserve it. And you hate them—because they *earn*.

Remember what I wrote on the human rights of the Jews! What you call human rights are merely animal rights: the right to find food, to eat, to digest, to sleep, to propagate. These rights are also enjoyed by the animal of the wilderness—until you shoot it, and these are the rights you intend to grant the Jews, too. Only civil rights are human rights: for man becomes man only in civil society. This is where he is born, and he is born a citizen. This is the principle of England, France and any free state. The exercise of these rights cannot be conditional on anything but the complete development of intellectual power, and the latter must be presupposed as given as soon as the physical powers appear mature. Every human being is therefore a citizen upon maturity. You say the Jews don't reach maturity because nature had condemned them body and soul to eternal childhood—granted, but also

among Christians there are many lost sons of nature; let them not be citizens then, create classes. After all, you enjoy creating classes, and you rejoice when you find yourself one class above anyone just below you, even if you are hundred classes below any higher class. Because you are slaves, you cannot make do without slaves. Your civil rights are no human rights because they are inhuman rights. In your world, the tailor's pin, the shoemaker's awl, the shopkeeper's yardstick make the citizen; the shroud is your toga, and you turn into social beings only in your graves! You profess to exercise *religious toleration* against Jews, but when did you adopt this language? Since you stopped caring about religion, and since you stopped caring whether the Jew adores a true or a false God, since your only concern is that Jewish haggling does not outperform Christian haggling. Your ancestors were better than you. They burned Jews and heretics on the stake, but they did it for God, although of course for *that* God *they* were deluded enough to invent; but they were not as unscrupulous as to venerate publicly the heathen god of the thieves and merchants while at the same time teaching that one ought to slaughter the Jews in order to stabilize the market. It is the German way to derive everything from egomania. As the Germans lack a public life, every public deed and speech is looked at as if it were a domestic one; because they always sit by the oven they get a stiff neck from the smallest draught of liberty, [15] and every wind seems a villain to them; and finally, because they know from experience that talking doesn't lead to anything when dealing with their kith and kin, they think every reasonable person should share this knowledge, and anyone who still speaks must therefore be suspected of a hidden agenda. When anybody claims not to hate the Jews but only rabbinical Judaism, we may believe this claim. But why does this person not then distinguish rabbinical Judaism from physical Jewry? Rabbinical Judaism does not have an eye to cry, no heart to be hurt, no flesh to be wounded, no honor to be injured; feel free to persecute it as much as you like. But the actual, living Jew has eye, heart, flesh and honor which to spare humanity demands. You say the Talmud is a hard, indigestible stone that lies in the stomachs of the Jews, and one needed to kill them in order to take out that stone. But what are the Jewish stomachaches to you? Do rabbinical teachings

lead their adherents to crimes that are beyond the reach of penal law? I would not know of any; they are silly but harmless. Furthermore, you receive all your knowledge from your nannies, you don't know modern Jewry. Today's Jewish youth in its entirety is ignorant of the Talmud, or at least does not follow it, and in another thirty years Jews will remember the Talmud only in order to have a laugh. It should be very easy for you to prove that the business of Christian merchants gains from limiting that of Jewish ones; but what exactly did you prove thereby?—your advantage, not your right. *Fiat justitia pereat mundus* [Justice shall be, even if the world has to die for it]—that is what you say yourself whenever it suits your interests; whenever it doesn't, you say *vivat mundus pereat justitia* [Long live the world, justice may die]! In the past you used to savage against Catholics the same way you savage now against Jews; well, time has forced you to become more humane, and you even stopped complaining about this compulsion; truth and right have so many attractions that one only needs to get close to them to start loving them. Don't you think that the day will come which will command you to consider also the Jews as your equals? But you want to be *forced*. The German is deaf, and although the driver of time's carriage can shout at the top of his voice asking you to give way, he shouts in vain; you do not start to feel before the wheel has smashed your limbs. You do not follow voluntarily, fate must grab your chest and drag you here and there. Under French rule the Jews of Hamburg and Frankfurt enjoyed full civil rights [16], and—as I have seen with my own eyes—you lived peacefully with them and cider sealed many a fraternal bond. After a few more years of equality you would have overcome your weakness completely. But times changed again; the cat left the house and the mice danced on the table; you were liberated; you went back to your old principles that had dried and shriveled like old bread; you watered them to make them look fresh; but they are now soggy and tasteless and only a beggar of the mind would have them. Shame on you!

The Jews did well to disaccustom the world of this their own name, because it was irredeemably laden with the notions of slavery and dishonor, and *words*, those awful secret rulers of the world, govern in the subconscious. The name *Israelites* is not blasphemy; it does not imply men that are *above*

God but men who are *likenesses* of God. The Bible gives the necessary information. Jacob the Patriarch once traveled by night and encountered a man with whom he had a fight. When morning broke the man said to Jacob: now let me go, as I must leave, and here is a memory for you, and he dislocated Jacob's hip. Jacob asked, man, what is your name? And the man responded, you need not know that, but your name shall henceforth not be Jacob any-more but Israel, "as you have competed in struggle with divine beings *and* with men and you showed that you can hold your ground." A divine being though means nothing here but a strong man, a hero. Furthermore, Jacob was meant to be called Israel not only because of that but also because he fought with men. Jacob obviously had to deal with a street robber, as the man disappeared when day broke in order not to be caught by the Arabic police, and refused to give his name in order not to be detected. Jacob was limping henceforth, and, as we still say, was a man marked by God. Still the Jews do not eat from the hindquarter of any cattle out of respect for their forefather. One may think of this gesture as not being too flattering, but one should consider that drawing a parallel between a man and an ox is not insulting; as is known from mathematics, parallels never meet.

[17] I address you who do not talk but only act against Jews in hostile ways. And indeed, acting stupidly is less stupid than talking stupidly because acts cannot be proven wrong. I do not love the Jew, or the Christian, *qua* being Jew or Christian: I merely love them because they are human beings and born to be free. Freedom has ever been the soul of my pen.

*To live is to love, but you are slaves of your own hatred!*

You are serfs of habit, and habit is a severe mistress. Wanting to be free is being free. Your heart is too small to love thoroughly even a single person, but your chest harbors the hatred of thousands. You are standing safely on the beach, looking out into the stormy sea; you see ships fighting the waves, human beings fighting death—and what occupies your mind are the pettiest quarrels of the old days of a complacent peace? You see rich load drifting toward the threatening abyss, and you are able to argue about small change? The foam of a raging sea covers your feet, *you need to look straight ahead in order to save yourselves, and you look back thousands of years?* Time is ripe



with great things. Lucky you—you need not be among the reapers who, soaked in sweat, bring in the harvest, you merely turn up on Thanksgiving. *Love one another and unite*. But you are *compelled* to hate, hatred is the sour dough of your life, the one thing that gives it taste and smell; well, then hate what is worthy of hatred: falseness, violence, egotism. Be whatever you wish to be—good or evil, decent or unscrupulous, a sage or a madman—but be something! Be mulled wine or fresh water from the well, but not the stale water that is disgusting to anyone—*don't be philistines!*

The persecution that the Jews suffer in ignorant Germany is not a freshly reinvigorated one; it merely has pulled itself together once more in its last death throes. The fire of hatred lit up once more before being extinguished forever. This may console those who suffer. Shakespeare and his sister Experience say:

Before the curing of a strong disease,  
Even in the instant of repair and health,  
The fit is strongest; evils that take leave,  
On their departure most of all show evil.  
[Cardinal Pandulph in *King John* 3.4]

I expressed once the hope, dearest Professor, that one day all people who write diatribes against the Jews will be locked up in the penitentiary or the madhouse; |18| later I hoped that in fifty years' time the talk about the Eternal Jew would come only from a drunken wine tourist or a discontented road sweeper. I was wrong. It faces me now in the shape of a German professor. Nothing is too insane that some professor would not take it up and propose it in scientific form. Professors smell the soul but they don't feel it. Hail the soul of the League of Anti-Semites that it entered the body of a professor! In order to keep Germany disunited God would have made a professor Imperial Chancellor, not a representative of the Brandenburg or Pomeranian nobility. The "Eternal Jew" is now embodied by a Jew-hating professor—this is too much for Ahasverus! This is his last hour!

How lucky has the wicked cobbler been so far!

I always thought it blasphemous to suggest that the Messiah, the god of

love, compassion and reconciliation, would take so terrible revenge for a brief insult that happened to him on his way to eternal life that he would condemn the offender to never-ending misery. The Jewish cobbler Ahasverus was a timid man, like all Jews and sedentary artisans, and he silenced his compassion and acted toward the tyrant's sublime sacrifice the way he did perhaps only so that governor Pilate would not suspect him of involvement in demagoguery. Ahasverus is not, though, as unhappy as generally assumed, if one disregards of course the suffering caused to a man of great understanding and decency by having to witness the stupidities and acts of malice of all times and peoples, including even Jew-hating professors, without being able to heal the former or punish the latter. The Eternal Jew says "I am an Israelite from the tribe of Zabulon.<sup>3</sup> I left Jerusalem in the year 33 of the common era and have since traveled incessantly and have to continue doing so until the end of the world. This is my fate; this is the irreversible decree pronounced to me by a voice coming from the skies on the day I left Jerusalem. I was 45 years old then and have not grown older since. Death and illnesses have no force over me; I am incombustible and cannot be injured; I eat and drink only for pleasure not for need; I never sleep; I am never tired; I understand and speak all languages." Listen to this! Can you call *that* man unhappy who is never beyond his best years, who is never hungry [19] but always enjoys good appetite, who never needs a doctor or a pharmacist, who does not leave behind a laughing widow; who never burns his fingers; whom Cupid's arrow cannot injure; whom no boring book can send to sleep; who does not have to rely on bad translations as he reads all languages, and who can pile debts upon debts because he cannot be imprisoned, given he cannot stay more than three days at the same place? Such a man must be called fortunate and many would want to swap their fate for his. And yet, the man is sick of his life, or else he would not have entered your mortal body, professor!

*Stupid people, comical world!* They pride themselves of their liberty; but whenever they do the bad thing they absolve themselves of the responsibility by declaring themselves slaves of destiny. How often were these and those people told, you understand your wrong and acknowledge your mistake;

why don't you make good this, why don't you abandon that, why don't you leave behind your prejudices? They respond, this will come with time, it will happen by and by. But why not straightaway? If you think of yourselves as free, then don't sit in the carriage of fate to be taxied to that last stop, maturity. Swift travel gives you vertigo, millions fall off the wagon, whole generations get trampled over by the hooves of the horses and the wheels of the carriage. Therefore walk, and you reach the goal faster and without exhausting anyone. Destiny has business also in other worlds, and if you are too lazy to walk you may have to stand and wait for centuries until it will give you a lift. If you are free, anticipate time! If you are not free, then don't complain! *Stupid people, comical world!*

*Religion* is love and reconciliation; it is in the word: it *re-aligns* what used to be separate. If all people were equally wise, talented and likewise inclined, religion was unnecessary. It is the unity of the manifold, the eternity of the finite, the gravity of the unsteady; it forgives guilt and dissolves sin into the general light. But what have people made of it! A river of blood flows through eighteen centuries, and Christianity has populated its banks. How they have dishonored the most holy! Religion has been used as a weapon for robbery and murder. How they have insulted the god of love and abused his teachings as the laws of their domineeringness, as the rules and regulations of their greedy traders' law! [20] Has Christianity ever served as anything other than either the tool of persecution, or the last consolation of defenseless victims of slaughter? *Reconcile its sects, and it becomes impotent; destroy Judaism, and Christianity dies.* Destroy the religions, and religion is destroyed. Or is Christianity only the violent plowshare of humanity? How laborious and painful has then been the cultivation of that land, and until the day of harvest will come, I cry at a low and suffocated voice: *Stupid people, comical world!*

Has it been of any use, or not, Professor, that I instructed you out of my old writings? I do not know.

Thinking minds will applaud my instruction, but those whom I wish to reach do not *think*. Your hatred and contempt of the Jews is a drive, implanted by nature or by nurture, that has never taken account of itself. To provoke this to happen, this is my wish!

*The cause of the Jews must be turned from an object of sentiment into an object of reasoning, then the good cause will have been won; for whoever is able to reflect upon his dreamings, stops dreaming.*

You have been dreaming, Professor, and you continue to dream!

Go on sleeping!

Hate the Jews or love them, oppress or uplift them, show them benevolence or persecute them: all this is left to your arbitrariness. But one thing I tell you:

*Try and see how far you get with the liberty of the German lands, as long as liberty is not meant to be for all!*

Good night, Professor!

Your awake *commilitio*

Dr. Ludwig Börne

## Appendix 4. The Berlin Antisemitism Dispute in the Literature

Almost every book or essay on the development of antisemitism in the Bismarck period makes at least a passing reference to the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute and adds another layer to the now more than 120 years of interpretations of Treitschke's remarks. Increasingly in recent years, scholars have also commented on the statements of those who responded to Treitschke, usually concentrating on Mommsen, while Lazarus tends to receive the second-biggest share of the attention.

In one of the classic anti-antisemitic statements from within German liberalism, "On Antisemitism: A Pentecostal Contemplation" (originally of 1893), Gustav Freytag contrasts "the patriotic complaint of a well-meaning man of sincere intentions" to the concerns of "angry and discontent agitators."<sup>1</sup> As can be concluded from the context, this "well-meaning man" was Freytag's political and personal friend, Treitschke (the "angry agitator" was the anti-liberal cleric, Stöcker). Similarly positive was the assessment by the socialist Franz Mehring, formulated already in 1882.<sup>2</sup> Like his National Liberal opponent, Mehring contrasts Treitschke favorably to Stöcker, against whom he fiercely polemicized: Treitschke fulfilled "a serious political obligation to bring into the open the hatred that was smouldering under the ashes." To have done this, and "in the only dignified manner possible, namely with manly frankness and scientific seriousness, is the great and unforgettable contribution of Treitschke" and a "patriotic deed." Mehring held that Treitschke analyzed "the Jewish question as a contemporary phenomenon under

scientific, historical, psychological, social aspects” while Stöcker made it “the substance of political party strategy,” which meant playing with the fire of “unleashing the beast” of “the three most potent sources of hatred known in history: a religious, a racial, and a class conflict.”<sup>3</sup>

Both Mehring and Freytag, leading representatives of the socialist and liberal traditions, respectively, are themselves well known for having harbored anti-Jewish feelings. More surprising might therefore be the mild judgment on Treitschke by Julius Bab, the influential left-wing liberal cultural and theater critic in Berlin in the years before and after World War I. In his book *Leben und Tod des deutschen Judentums* (Life and Death of German Jewry) (written in 1939 but not published until 1988), Bab argues that Treitschke (“an intellectually eminent [geistig hervorragenden] German”) broke from the liberal tradition but still stood “unconditionally” behind legal emancipation. He emphasizes Treitschke’s distance from what later became National Socialism with the astonishing remark (considering that his formulation “the Jews are our misfortune” sat on the front-page heading of every copy of the Nazi publication *Der Stürmer*) that Treitschke would “without doubt end up in the concentration camps of the Third Reich.”<sup>4</sup> Bab writes that Treitschke “was critical merely of the literary attitude of the Jews” and their “lack of nationalism.”<sup>5</sup> A similar, if less amicable, view was expressed by Theodor Wolff in his book *Die Juden* (written in 1942–43 but not published until 1984). He, too, points first of all to the massive difference between antisemitism then and in his own time, little more than half a century later. Wolff makes fun of Treitschke’s affirmation that he did not want to see Jewish emancipation reversed: “One cannot rely even on Treitschke. . . . Compared to today’s standards, what half-heartedness, what hesitation, what inability to get away from Humboldt’s humanistic spirit, from culture! A little thunder, a few lightnings, and Treitschke confesses to the acquired rights, to the fact of emancipation!”<sup>6</sup>

Very different was the assessment by the Marxist sociologist Arthur Rosenberg in 1930. Seventy-five years after its publication, Rosenberg’s essay on Treitschke’s antisemitism remains one of its most intriguing interpretations. Rosenberg relates Treitschke’s rejection of “Jewish-German

mixed culture” to his view of Christianity as the “rejection of the bourgeois spirit” and of “the Jew” as that spirit’s “most obvious embodiment.”<sup>7</sup> Rosenberg argues that the discovery after 1871 that the Prussian state and military apparatus, not the political organizations of the bourgeoisie, had proved to be the backbone of successful German national unification, led to an identity crisis among the German educated classes. A fraction of the academic “support troops of the bourgeoisie” now gradually endorsed an (imagined) aristocratic life-ideal from the vantage point of which they reinterpreted the (commercial and industrial) bourgeoisie as greedy, selfish materialists: “aristocratic man” as opposed to the bourgeois “does not indulge in haggling and usury but obediently serves Emperor and Fatherland. He does not mock but he believes. He secures discipline and morality in household and family, in community and state.” Treitschke and others attacked “the Jew” so heavily “because they want[ed] to liberate themselves from the ‘Jew’ that inhabit[ed] themselves.”<sup>8</sup> Rosenberg’s analysis implies that Treitschke and other (former) liberals who drifted to the far right failed to understand that Bismarck’s struggle against the liberal parties did not indicate a “fundamental split with the bourgeoisie.”<sup>9</sup> In this perspective, Treitschke’s position appears as an over-assimilation to a perceived anti-liberalism on the side of Bismarck’s government. Rosenberg points to two decisive elements of understanding the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute: first, a growing discrepancy between the politics adopted by an increasingly bourgeois state and the specific politics of the liberal parties that for a significant period had managed to determine that state’s politics decisively; and second, the identification (by Treitschke and others) of “the Jews” with core elements of the political liberalism that seemed now a hindrance to, rather than an instrument of bourgeois progress. However, Rosenberg overstates his case: Treitschke and other right-wing liberals did not have to abandon bourgeois values altogether in order to reject the “excesses” of bourgeois society that they saw embodied in “the Jews.” As this study has shown, they merely rearticulated them.

Rosenberg’s analysis reverberates in the most recent publication on the subject, by Uffa Jensen (2005), who subjected it, though, to the “cultural

turn”: like Rosenberg, Jensen takes an identity crisis of the educated bourgeois (such as Treitschke) as his starting point and argues that they perceived assimilated Jews as *doppelgänger* onto whom they projected their doubts, ambivalences, and uneasiness about their own identity and role in a crisis-ridden society.<sup>10</sup>

The original impulse of Rosenberg’s sociological interpretation lives on strongest in Detlev Claussen’s assertion that Treitschke “articulates the contradictions of German liberalism: in the conflict between nationality and liberality, the national remains triumphant.”<sup>11</sup> He points out that Treitschke’s opponents, like Treitschke himself, cannot but argue “within the national framework.” Claussen suggests that this reflects the fact that liberal “social progress”—although theoretically not national in character—has to realize itself within the limits of the concrete historical framework, which is that of the nation-state. Claussen sees as Treitschke’s underlying aim the desire to homogenize “antagonistic capitalist society” into a strong national state.<sup>12</sup> Treitschke wants the necessity of assimilation to be pronounced “consciously as an imperative,” while his liberal opponents “from Harry Breßlau through Bamberger to Mommsen” expect “assimilation and integration into the national state” to take place “spontaneously.” Claussen likens the two positions to “the moderate and the brutal face of bourgeois society.” The “liberal arguments against Treitschke” are limited by the “illusion of a perpetually moderate form of nationalism.”<sup>13</sup>

Coming from a similar background, Jan Philipp Reemtsma points to the—perhaps surprising—prominence of religion in Treitschke’s argument: Treitschke’s antisemitism is religious as well as nationalist.<sup>14</sup> The case of Treitschke is therefore an important reminder that modern antisemitism cannot simply be opposed to (allegedly pre-modern) religious forms of Jew-hatred, nor can it be assumed that even late-nineteenth-century nationalism and liberalism were entirely secular. Furthermore, with his demand that the Jews “become Germans,” Treitschke “merely reformulates in a nationalist manner an idea that had formed the basis of many approvals of Jewish emancipation: giving up one’s own traditions is the price for the ending of civil discrimination.”<sup>15</sup> In a similar vein, Gary A. Abraham writes that



Treitschke's attitude toward the Jews "contains both liberal and antisemitic elements." Not unlike Stöcker's or Marr's, it combined "many of the old, Christian-inspired charges" with "new, essentially secular fears of national diversity."<sup>16</sup> Abraham points out that "not far in the background in these discussions was the *Mischvolk* idea," that is, the conception widespread in the nineteenth century (and subsequently taken up by Max Weber) that a nation draws strength from having multiple cultural or racial origins. While most liberals interpreted the *Mischvolk* idea culturally, Treitschke (like Hermann Cohen in his response) argued for racial mixing. Treitschke may therefore have been a "racist," but he was "not a proponent of race purity." His "proposals for legislative exclusion of Jews" were designed to further "miscegenation."<sup>17</sup> Hans-Joachim Salecker asserts that in the context of the Dispute, the *Judenfrage* was a *Kulturfrage*. The question was whether or not the Jews made adequate use of their civil rights, and whether they needed to be taken care of by the state in a specific way "like criminals or those of ill health."<sup>18</sup>

Sanford Ragins writes that Treitschke was "a liberal with impeccable credentials" who attacked the Jews from within liberalism. His concern was neither with race nor with religion but with the Jews' "maintaining *national* traits that were alien to the German character."<sup>19</sup> While Jews "should have equal rights in the state, he maintained that membership in the German nation was a different matter." However, because Treitschke saw "no room for double nationality" on "German soil," the Jews had to fully assimilate into the German nation or emigrate. Ragins asserts that "Treitschke's assault was particularly serious" because it was "an attack on the *emancipated* Jew mounted from within liberalism."<sup>20</sup> He "was in truth the spokesman for a major tendency within German liberal Protestant circles." For them, "Christianity still had to be the foundation of the state by acting as a moral and educational force suffusing all areas of life with religious self-consciousness."<sup>21</sup>

Donald L. Niewyk argues that the position held in common by Treitschke, Stöcker, Wagner, and de Lagarde was "more a demand to accelerate the pace of amalgamation than a threat of reprisal."<sup>22</sup> He underlines that antisemites in 1879 had more in common with the defenders of Jewish emancipation

than with later Nazi-style antisemites: likewise, the principal complaint of the liberal “notables” in their anti-antisemitic Declaration was that antisemitic demagoguery slowed down the process of assimilation. Albert S. Lindemann notes, too, that Treitschke was a “liberal in the Junkerized sense of the time” and finds that his argument was “relatively sober and intelligent.”<sup>23</sup> Most of what Treitschke brought up in 1879 and 1880 “had already been widely discussed by liberal intellectuals in the 1860s.” Treitschke merely reformulated “in a more forceful language—and in a much more emotion-filled context”—the common liberal concerns that many Jews “seemed unwilling to sacrifice enough of their sense of separateness” in order to blend into the German nation. Treitschke was like most liberals “torn between the demands of personal liberty and those of state power.” Lindemann writes that “conceivably, if men of the caliber of Treitschke, Cohen, and Mehring had set the tone of the debate in the ensuing generation, some happier resolution or at least diminution of the tensions between Jews and non-Jews in Germany at this time might have emerged.”<sup>24</sup> Lindemann asserts that “German Jews themselves, in seeking to limit the influx of *Ostjuden* in Germany, had often made points similar to those of Treitschke, especially that Jews from Eastern Europe were too much attached to the idea of Jewish nationhood to be absorbed into German national feeling.”<sup>25</sup> Lindemann’s presentation is directed by his desire to make the point strongly that the antisemites of the nineteenth century were not “proto-Nazis” and that antisemitism was not a quasi-inherent trait of a specific “German culture” (as, e.g., Paul Rose argues in *German Question, Jewish Question*). Similar to writers from the Marxist tradition (Massing, Horkheimer, Adorno, Claussen, Reemtsma), Lindemann presents antisemitism as part of the normality of liberal society. Due to the absence, though, of a clear critique of liberal society (that would have to include that of antisemitism), some of his formulations could be construed as apologetic of antisemitism.

Klaus Holz, who provides a detailed analysis of the semantic structure of Treitschke’s first statement, argues that the national-statist framework of Treitschke’s thinking held back its ethnic-ontological undercurrent: Treitschke could not allow himself to conclude that emancipation should be revoked,

because this would have destabilized the national state and its constitution. Holz writes that Treitschke's is a founding text of a specific "worldview" that he refers to as "national antisemitism." Within the broader category of "national antisemitism," Holz characterizes Treitschke's position as "post-liberal antisemitism."<sup>26</sup> Holz argues that Treitschke's (modern, national) antisemitic "worldview" is both "anti-liberal" and "post-liberal" insofar as it "inherited some essential characteristics of the liberal world-view": it is "historical, national and secular." Treitschke's "attractivity" was that he was "a formerly liberal" thinker who challenged the liberals' "predominant emancipatory self-perception . . . from within."<sup>27</sup> "Post-liberal antisemitism" takes up and stresses the older liberal demand for the Jews to assimilate, while it reevaluates the other side of the older liberal position, legal emancipation, without challenging it directly. In spite of his embrace of "system theory," Holz's contribution is more or less close to the critical theory tradition of Massing, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Claussen, but the addition of the prefix "post-" does not further the understanding of liberalism. Holz's attempt to refashion what the latter describe as the intrinsic dialectic of the liberal position as a contradiction between "liberal" and "post-liberal" elements merely translates the problem into a nondialectical language that is less suited to grasp the dynamics of the historical process.

It is only rarely suggested in the literature that Treitschke had clearly "distanced himself"<sup>28</sup> from the liberal tradition or that he opposed "modern liberal society."<sup>29</sup> Such statements are misleading, as they overstate the anti-liberal elements of Treitschke's thinking and distract from what is essentially at stake in this discussion: the complicity of liberalism and liberal nationalism in their own undoing. One of the questions most often discussed in the literature is whether or to what extent Treitschke was "a racist." Treitschke is rarely seen without qualification as a representative of racist antisemitism.<sup>30</sup> A majority of commentators seems to have come to the consensus that Treitschke did not employ a concept of race. Michael A. Meyer asserts that "Treitschke's criticism of German Jewry arises neither from racism nor from a desire to strengthen Christianity" but mainly from a concern "with the strength of the nation": "Since he equates diversity with divisiveness,

he must consider the Jews a distinct danger to German national life.”<sup>31</sup> Hans Liebeschütz underlines that both Treitschke and Mommsen “demand undivided loyalty” to the modern nation-state and holds that Treitschke’s “emphasis on the religious aspect . . . raises a problem” when at the same time “his leading ideal, the power and health of the state, belonged to the secular sphere.”<sup>32</sup> For Liebeschütz, “Treitschke did not profess a philosophy of racialism.”<sup>33</sup> Stanley Zucker refers to the same observation when he states that for Treitschke as well as Mommsen, “Christianity and modern nationalism were so intertwined that to be truly a national, one had to become a Christian.”<sup>34</sup> Peter Pulzer argues that Treitschke gave a merely indirect service to (racial) antisemitism by promoting aggressive national pride.<sup>35</sup> Many of these contributions, however, seem to be informed to some extent by the unacknowledged assumption that Treitschke’s antisemitism could be motivated either by religion, racism, or nationalism. The detailed textual analysis has demonstrated, though, that Treitschke was indeed able to be all of the above at the same time.

The other dimension of the Dispute, the ways in which Treitschke was responded to, is much less developed in the literature.<sup>36</sup> From among the respondents, Theodor Mommsen has most often been commented upon. Bab and Wolff made enthusiastic remarks about Mommsen that can be explained by the specific context of their writing,<sup>37</sup> while more recent positive assessments of Mommsen seem rather unwarranted: Kampe sees Mommsen as the defender of Enlightenment and tolerance.<sup>38</sup> Mosse held the view that Mommsen “castigated” Treitschke for his nationalist views, while Dorpalen writes that he “gently slapped his hand.”<sup>39</sup> Wehler, apparently in a fit of wishful thinking, finds that Mommsen “campaign[ed] uncompromisingly against the ‘delusion.’”<sup>40</sup> Jensen calls Mommsen an “upright liberal.”<sup>41</sup> Langer finds Mommsen’s intervention “a true masterpiece of liberally minded political publicizing,” although “even” Mommsen’s liberalism had its limits: “The limitations of even a determinedly enlightened liberal of the nineteenth century become apparent here: he sees the continued existence of a particular minority that is bound together by religion and tradition . . . as a danger for the existence of a society that is modeled on the ideal of the nation and the

national state. He has not yet managed to progress towards the belief in a peaceful coexistence of different religious and cultural milieus on an equal footing.”<sup>42</sup> The “not yet” seems to indicate that Langer considers the lack of enthusiasm for cultural diversity an infantile disorder of liberalism that has since been overcome.

Most of the literature, though, tends to stress the commonalities between Treitschke’s and Mommsen’s positions. Meyer asserts that pluralism seemed a danger for Mommsen and that Cohen, Breßlau, and Bamberger held views close to Treitschke’s.<sup>43</sup> Meyer notes that the “Jewish reaction” to Mommsen was “quite critical,” because Mommsen, like Treitschke, “could see only danger in cultural pluralism.”<sup>44</sup> In his discussion of the Dispute and its context, Uriel Tal draws on a range of important primary sources otherwise not discussed or mentioned anywhere.<sup>45</sup> He discusses especially Mommsen and Cohen in detail as well as the concept of the *Mischvolk*, later taken up by Abraham (*Max Weber and the Jewish Question*), for which he gives relevant early-nineteenth-century references. He comments on Mommsen’s formulation of the Jews as a ferment of national disintegration: “the question arises whether it is purely accidental that precisely these words should lend themselves to an interpretation that is diametrically opposed to the one originally intended.”<sup>46</sup> Abraham points out that Mommsen was “no more pluralist than Treitschke.” While both see the nation as based on unitary culture, Mommsen reproaches Treitschke merely for escalating social antagonism.<sup>47</sup> Keith H. Pickus writes that Mommsen rearticulated the Enlightenment argument about Jewish “character defects” that needed amelioration.<sup>48</sup> Volkov writes that the similarity between Mommsen and Treitschke “is undeniable,” and Schoeps also stresses the similarity between Treitschke and Mommsen.<sup>49</sup>

Georg Geismann argues that Mommsen as well as Cohen failed to defend liberal principles against Treitschke. He criticizes Mommsen’s demand for “toleration of Jewish particularity” as inconsistent with the concept of liberal right: “Wherever there is right, the talk of toleration is suspect and dangerous.”<sup>50</sup> Geismann finds Cohen’s failure to oppose Treitschke “incomprehensible and shocking” and believes that the Kantian philosopher Cohen

should have been expected to defend the liberal notion that the state is obliged to “grant” civil rights to every citizen on the grounds that human rights included a claim to civil rights.<sup>51</sup> As Treitschke’s relinquishing of any concept of universal right remained unchallenged, the Dispute marks for Geismann the final stage of a long decline of the tradition of *jusnaturalism*.<sup>52</sup> Ulrich Sieg points out the philosophical strengths of Cohen’s position and the strategic limits of Lazarus, the Jewish and German aspects of whose position he argues contradicted and destabilized each other. He concludes that in the Dispute “leading Jewish philosophers” reacted with an “ideology of compromise” to the fact that large sections of society moved from humanist to anti-emancipatory values and politics: “Rather than assertively defending their political rights, they emphasized universal ethical principles and the inner relatedness of German and Jewish spirit. This offered little, though, in terms of strategies for solving the problems of a politically fractured and culturally girded class society.”<sup>53</sup> Christhard Hoffmann—closer, for example, to Claussen’s position—goes further and explains the inability of liberals to oppose modern antisemitism (for which Mommsen’s contribution is emblematic) in terms of the rejection by liberals of “cultural pluralism.” Furthermore, he argues that liberals could not explain the “dynamism of the antisemitic movement” because they “lacked a theory of its [liberalism’s] own crisis.”<sup>54</sup>

Ragins sees Lazarus’s speech as “an eloquent restatement of emancipation ideology and, in particular, of the Jewish understanding of German nationalism.” Lazarus “reaffirmed Jewry’s long-established self-perception of the compatibility of Jewish identity with full German identity.”<sup>55</sup> Ragins notes that Lazarus’s position “was to underlie all subsequent justifications of Jewish self-defence.” Meyer writes that Lazarus’s speech displayed “considerable ingenuity in showing the logical inconsistencies of any argument that would make the Jews a special case.”<sup>56</sup> He underlines that, on the other hand, Lazarus makes Judaism “fit the pattern of the Christian denominations,” while strongly arguing for cultural pluralism. Van Rahden finds that “no one developed a more fundamental critique of Treitschke than . . . Moritz Lazarus.”<sup>57</sup> Bacharach writes that Lazarus harbored “spiritual racism” and

“spiritual chauvinism” but that Cohen went even further in the anti-liberal direction and demanded racial unity for the state.<sup>58</sup> Langer, however, sees Lazarus’s speech as a strong and influential rejection of “narrow-minded nationalism.”<sup>59</sup> Hamburger writes that the “most militant refutation of Treitschke’s pamphlet” was by Paulus Cassel.<sup>60</sup>

## Introduction

1. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 23.
2. From the “Declaration of the Notables” (“Erklärung,” 202, 204).
3. I translate *Völkerpsychologie* as “psycho-ethnography” (rather than “ethno-psychology”) because it is concerned with the “souls” of peoples, not with ethnographic aspects of the psychology of individuals.
4. The scholarly literature on the Dispute is discussed in appendix 4.
5. The type of general argument I am proposing cannot easily be verified or falsified on an empirical level, as it is arrived at on a conceptual level. If antisemitism did not gain hegemony in other nation-state contexts, this is because other factors, or the absence of other factors, prevented this from happening. Which factors these were, and how relevant these are in the present period, cannot be discussed here. It must suffice to point to the existence of antisemitism even in quintessentially bourgeois and liberal countries such as the United States and the Netherlands, and the fact that some postcolonial nationalisms are now more antisemitic than any nineteenth-century European nationalism, the German case included, ever was.
6. The only exception as far as my selection of texts is concerned is Naudh, “Professoren über Israel.”
7. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 26, 23.
8. The term “cultural code” was coined by Volkov (“Antisemitism as a Cultural Code,” 25–46), but I use it in the sense it is presented in Volkov’s “Antisemitismus und Antifeminismus,” which seems to me clearer than the original version. The main point is the difference from radical, potentially violent antisemitism that is directly targeted at Jews. Volkov chose “cultural code” as an alternative to “ideology” or “worldview.” In 2006 (differing from earlier versions of the argument) Volkov defines “subculture” or “milieu” as that of which antisemitism is a “code” (*Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 111).
9. See appendix 4.



10. The more theoretically informed contributions are few: Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*; Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*; Reemtsma, “Die Falle des Antirassismus”; Claussen, *Grenzen der Aufklärung*; Salecker, *Erfahrung der Differenz*; Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*; Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*.

11. Pulzer, “Third Thoughts,” 146, 154.

12. This quote is from “Elements of Antisemitism” (Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 179; *Dialectic of Enlightenment* [1997], 200, [2002], 165). This remark is made in the context of Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that in the 1880s antisemitism started to turn into merely a “plank in the platform” of “the whole Fascist ticket” while the antisemitism of liberals (such as Treitschke)—the “most recent,” i.e., in this sense the last genuine, bourgeois form of antisemitism—still was “a competing motif within a range of subjective choices” (*Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 179; *Dialectic of Enlightenment* [2002], 166). The argument that “there are no longer any antisemites” (in the same paragraph) is based on the theory that market capitalism and the individualist subjectivity that it brought forth have irreversibly been replaced by (fascist) monopoly capitalism, a conception that has been shown to be flawed (Postone and Brick, “Critical Theory and Political Economy”). The distinction between (still sort of) bourgeois-liberal and (already sort of) fascist forms of antisemitism cannot be maintained in the strict fashion proposed by Horkheimer and Adorno in “Elements of Antisemitism.” This adds further urgency to the effort to understand the former.

13. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (2002), 166.

14. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 270; *Negative Dialectics*, 274.

15. The text that would become the afterword of Boehlich’s book was published earlier the same year in the journal *Der Monat*.

16. Recent German *gesellschaftsgeschichtliche* and *kulturgeschichtliche* scholarship tends to include all the various disputes on antisemitism in Berlin at the time, such as those that refer to the priest Stöcker and the so-called Berliner Bewegung (the efforts to reorganize the conservative far right and the more populist attempts to found specifically antisemitic parties) into the concept (K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit”*; Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*). My interest in maintaining the distinction between these different discourses on antisemitism certainly results from the stronger interest in the problems and limitations of specifically the liberal tradition of social and political thought that I share with Boehlich.

17. Most of the texts I am looking at were published in high-profile journals and newspapers, and often subsequently also as brochures with high circulations (whereas those without access to the “official” media, such as the petit bourgeois antisemites Naudh and Endner, were published, as it were, in do-it-yourself mode, by which they could nevertheless also reach considerable circulations).

18. Neither in English nor in German has such an account been attempted so far. In 2004 and 2005, after I completed my research, two works were published in Germany

that will need to be consulted by future examinations of the Dispute: the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, Berlin, published a two-volume, 900-page *Kommentierte Quellenedition*, edited by Karsten Krieger, and also Uffa Jensen's study (*Gebildete Doppelgänger*) of the antagonism of Protestant and Jewish members of nineteenth-century "bürgerliche Bildungskultur" is based on a presentation of the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute. Both publications provide additional and previously unpublished source material, chiefly from private correspondence and other archival materials. By and large, these additional sources confirm the general picture established in the existing literature.

19. Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, 115.

20. The influence of the Dispute on Weber is discussed in Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*.

21. I take this term from Balibar ("Racism and Nationalism" and "The Nation Form"). "Nation-form" implies that "the nation" is a social form, i.e., the form taken by a specific (modern) kind of state and society.

22. In the same vein, I understand "the state" to be the specific (institutional) *form* taken by a specific society. This use of the concept "form" implies, vice versa, that the "essence" of the state is society in its totality, i.e., the social-historical dynamism whose specific (if not exclusive) institutional expression is "the state." The perplexing characteristic of this specific "form" is, of course, that it also has a separate existence of its own: the dialectic between "form" and "essence" must, in this sense, be kept alive and open. They are non-identical without actually being separate entities.

23. At the very least, the commodity is that of labor-power.

24. I consider "patriotism" a near synonym that differs only insofar as it tends to carry an implicit claim to a high degree of individual, rather than collective, commitment. This seems to be an echo of the original implication of a personal relation to a *pater patriae*; the word *Landesvater* is still used in German along with *Vaterland*. A look at the now huge literature on "liberal nationalism," much of which has been formulated in debates about Yael Tamir's examination of this concept in the context of Israel (*Liberal Nationalism*), confirms my position. See, e.g., Levinson, "Is Liberal Nationalism an Oxymoron?"; Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*; Vincent, "Liberal Nationalism"; and Varouxakis, *Mill on Nationality*.

25. The most powerful recent challenge to this residue of "Whiggish triumphalism" is Anthony W. Marx's *Faith in Nation*.

26. For a discussion of the contents of the article "Our Prospects," see pp. 91–94. For a complete translation of the section presented here, see appendix 1.

27. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 19–21.

28. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 21–22.

29. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 22–23.

30. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 23–26.

31. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 26–27.

32. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 27–28.

33. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 41.

34. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 367.

35. Compare Adorno's characterization of "The Essay as Form": the essay's "efforts reflect the leisure of a childlike person [die Musse des Kindlichen]. . . . Luck and play are essential to it. It starts not with Adam and Eve but with what it wants to talk about; it says what occurs to it in that context and stops when it feels finished rather than when there is nothing left to say" (*Notes to Literature*, 4; *Noten zur Literatur*, 11). The essay "finds its unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them over" (16–17; 35–36). Its "transitions repudiate conclusive deductions in favour of crossconnections between elements. . . . It co-ordinates elements instead of subordinating them" (22; 46–47).

36. Talking of the *Sonderweg*: when I consulted Collins German dictionary of 1991 for an equivalent of *Gretchenfrage* (Gretchen's all-important query how Faust felt about religion) I found "crunch question" and "\$64,000 question."

37. This split in the National Liberal Party is discussed in White, *The Splintered Party*, 5–6.

38. See chapter 9.

39. Ruggiero, *History of European Liberalism*, 264.

40. Joël was the successor of the more liberal Abraham Geiger (Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 143).

41. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, xii.

42. Ragins calls Lazarus the first representative of "the leadership of the established community" to speak out against Treitschke (*Jewish Responses*, 29). Lazarus gave up a promising academic career in Switzerland, where he had been *Professor Ordinarius* (i.e., salaried) from 1862 to 1866 to become in 1866 a *Professor Honorarius*, i.e., professor without salary in Berlin. The reasons seem not quite clear; probably he wanted to have more possibilities of public influence (Belke, "Einleitung," xxvi). He was a celebrated speaker and entertained after his return home ["in die Heimat"] "one of the last Berlin salons" dedicated to literary, scholarly, and political discourse (xxxii).

43. M. Meyer, *Response to Modernity*, 188. Because of the war, a second synod was delayed until 1871. After Augsburg no further synods were held due to "a lack of sufficient drive" (190). One of the results of the synods was the foundation in Berlin in 1870 of the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums (191) as a more liberal alternative to the theological seminary at Breslau.

44. In his later text *An die deutschen Juden*, Lazarus claimed that "What Does National Mean?" was the first public reaction against the antisemitic current (3). In this text he defended his support for a coalition government that included antisemites because the left-liberal Freisinnige Party needed to be fought on the grounds of being "unpatriotic." Lazarus plays down the danger of antisemitic influence on government policy with the argument that "a state that has climbed the ethical height of the German Reich cannot possibly fall back behind that height" (19), a strong example of the confidence that National Liberals still shared in this period.

45. Ragins, *Jewish Responses*, 29; Belke, “Einleitung,” xlvii.

46. Lazarus argued here that the fundamental characteristic of “*Germanic* national spirit” was the drive to assimilate all previous history into a harmonious synthesis. The “*German* national spirit” constitutes the most successful amalgamation of the *Germanic* spirit with Christianity, and the Prussian state, dubbed “the state of intelligence,” was its most adequate manifestation (Belke, “Einleitung,” xlviii).

47. Compare note 3 above.

48. Kalmar, “The *Völkerpsychologie* of Lazarus and Steinthal,” 674, quote on 675.

49. Bunzl suggests that Lazarus’s and Steinthal’s specific biographical experience as small-town German Jews of a traditional background who were “exposed to the radical program of Jewish reform emanating from Berlin” (“*Völkerpsychologie* and German-Jewish Emancipation,” 63), leading to a lifelong process of self-transformation, may have influenced their idea that *Volksgeist* and culture are dynamic, “malleable,” not static categories.

50. Although Lazarus borrowed the word *Gesamtgeist* from Hegel, the concept was different from Hegel’s: “objective spirit” in Lazarus’s usage meant “all intersubjective [überindividuellen] articulations and objectifications of spirit [des Geistigen] in a community [Gemeinschaft]”; it is an empirical concept (Belke, “Einleitung,” 1). Lazarus’s positivist rearticulation of Hegel’s concept was certainly an expression of the intellectual climate of the 1850s and 1860s (Belke, “Einleitung,” 1v). The *Völkerpsychologie* as founded by Lazarus and Steinthal is influenced by Comte’s psychological sociology and more especially by the similar conception developed in about the same period by Johann Friedrich Herbart, who emphasized the mutual determination of individual psyche and society (while he described society as if it was an individual “soul” writ large) and the central importance of language and tradition (see Belke, “Einleitung”). Belke notes that Lazarus’s case for “diversity” in his contribution to the Dispute contradicted his own advocacy of Prussian and Protestant supremacy and his view of Catholicism as a “retarding element” in German history (“Einleitung,” lxviii).

51. Boehlich, *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit*, 244.

52. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 282; most of the articles quoted were unsigned or editorials. It is assumed here that they were written by Philippson. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* was the preferred reading of “the acculturated German-Jewish educated bourgeoisie” (K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 102). On Philippson see also Penslar, *Shylock’s Children*, 85–89, 145–58, 161.

53. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 153.

54. M. Meyer, “Graetz and Treitschke,” 1.

55. M. Meyer, “Graetz and Treitschke,” 6; Graetz, like many others of the time, refers to the Jews as *Stamm*, *Volk*, and *Rasse* interchangeably (10).

56. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 143.

57. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 151.

58. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 152.

59. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 154.
60. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 219.
61. According to K. Krieger, *Der "Berliner Antisemitismusstreit"*, xvii.
62. The writer (and German liberal patriot) Ludwig Börne was born as Löb Baruch in 1786 and died in 1837.
63. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 206, 207.
64. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 208.
65. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 212.
66. Zucker, "Ludwig Bamberger," 342.
67. R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 244.
68. R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 245.
69. Jansen, "Ludwig Bamberger," 207.
70. Jansen, "Ludwig Bamberger," 247.
71. Jansen, "Ludwig Bamberger," 210.
72. Jansen, "Ludwig Bamberger," 249.
73. Pulzer, *Emancipation and Its Discontents*, 8.
74. R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 250.
75. R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 251.
76. Quoted in R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 251.
77. R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger," 259;
78. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 317.
79. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 267.
80. This publication drew together several articles published since 1871, when Oppenheim first coined the term *Kathedersozialisten*. On *Katheder* socialism see the section "Liberal State Socialism in the German Reich" in chapter 3.
81. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 268.
82. Braun-Wiesbaden, "Obituary for Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim."
83. He notes that "we have to discover" that "among us, too, the Germans, the people of poets and thinkers, and even in the metropolis of the German Reich and of German intelligence, there still exist remnants of the waning Middle Ages which poison the air and threaten to draw us down onto the same level as that Jew-eating mob in Bucharest and Jassy" (Braun-Wiesbaden, "Obituary for Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim," 228). Jassy lies in Romania.
84. Fischhoff, "Hermann Cohen," 107.
85. Hackeschmidt and Sieg, "Hermann Cohen," 161.
86. Fischhoff, "Hermann Cohen," 112.
87. Heinrich Heine's *On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany* (1836) is a classic expression of this tradition. Cohen had published—shortly before the Dispute—a hostile criticism of Lazarus's work *Ethics of Judaism* (Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 214).
88. Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 217.

89. “Cohen remained an ardent German nationalist all his life” (Fischhoff, “Hermann Cohen,” 114); during World War I he argued in a widely read pamphlet that German and Jewish cultures were identical and that therefore Jews everywhere ought to support the German cause (115). He was also a steadfast opponent of Zionism (129). In his later years he became known as an advocate of universal manhood suffrage and a theorist of “ethical socialism” and the *sozialer Rechtsstaat* (the constitutional and welfare state), a conception of the state as bound by law as much as committed to social reform (Hackeschmidt and Sieg, “Hermann Cohen,” 160).

90. The *Handbuch der Judenfrage* by Fritsch states that Naudh is assumed to be a pseudonym for the agriculturalist Heinrich Nordmann, of whom otherwise nothing was known, and adds that Lothar Bucher, an adviser of Bismarck, was allegedly involved in writing *Die Juden und der deutsche Staat* (Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage*, 10). The forty-second edition of the *Handbuch der Judenfrage* (1938) suggests that Bucher was the author and refers to Nordmann’s authorship as hypothetical. Emil Weller’s *Lexicon Pseudonymorum* gives H. Nordmann for Naudh (Weller, *Lexicon Pseudonymorum*, 379), as does the *Deutsches Pseudonymenlexikon* by Holzmann and Bohatta (193), quoting Weller, *Lexicon Pseudonymorum*. However, the *Deutsches Anonymenlexikon* by the same editors lists two possible authors for *Die Juden und der deutsche Staat*, Marc Anton Niendorf and H. Nordmann (Holzmann and Bohatta, *Deutsches Anonymenlexikon*, 169). Jacob Katz writes that Johannes Nordmann is the author of *Die Juden und der deutsche Staat* (Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, 213, 356n), quoting Theodor Fritsch’s introduction to the thirteenth edition (1920) of *Die Juden und der deutsche Staat*. Katz also quotes Fritsch saying that the pamphlet seems to have been written in cooperation with Herman Wagener, a former editor of the *Kreuzzeitung*. I have not been able to see Fritsch’s edition of Naudh’s pamphlet, but if Katz quotes correctly then Fritsch must have made contradictory statements on its authorship. Johannes Nordmann was apparently the pseudonym of an Austrian poet, Johann Rumpelmayer, an unlikely candidate to be Naudh. There was also at the time another pamphletist called M. G. Nordmann who wrote on the agrarian question, which is of course much closer to our topic.

91. The bound edition of the first year’s issues shows on the cover a different subheading: *Monatsschrift für nationale Entwicklung* (Monthly for National Development).

92. *Deutsche Wacht*, February 2, 1880, quoted in K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 391. This is from an article that attacks the satirical magazine *Kladderadatsch* for ridiculing Treitschke while in the same issue running advertisements for erotica and condoms.

93. K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 445.

94. K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 193.

95. Regneri, “Neumann’s Statistical Challenge,” 132.

96. Regneri, “Neumann’s Statistical Challenge,” 133.

97. It is not clear from Regneri’s account which party he represented, if any.

98. Belke, “Liberal Voices on Antisemitism,” 61–62. In February the synagogue of

Neustettin in Pomerania was burned down only days after one agitator of the same group held meetings in the area (Hoffmann, “Political Culture and Violence,” 75); in the summer of 1881 a series of riots broke out in Pomerania and West Prussia, again apparently fanned by agitators from the same group. Although initiated by an assemblage of radical antisemites of diverse backgrounds, the petition gained popularity, according to Hamburger, because it “merely demanded the legalization of what was the predominant administrative practice anyway” (*Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 37), such as that only converted Jews should be admitted to state office.

99. Treitschke, “Die jüdische Einwanderung in Deutschland.”

100. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 319. The Declaration is documented with the list of signatories in Liebeschütz, *Das Judentum im deutschen Geschichtsbild*, 341–42, and also in K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit.”* An English translation is in Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 326–27. It was published one week before the Prussian Diet debated the antisemitic petition that demanded curbing Jewish emancipation (the *Antisemitenpetition*). It was primarily motivated by the debate on the petition, among other related debates, but also contained a passage that referred to Treitschke, linking the dispute on Treitschke to other current disputes on antisemitism.

101. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 34.

102. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 88.

103. Quoted in Minogue, *Nationalism*, 72.

104. Deuerlein, “Die Konfrontation,” 230.

105. Quoted in Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 120.

106. Quoted in Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 120.

107. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 126–27.

108. Volumes 1–3 were published between 1854 and 1856, a fourth volume was never written, and volume 5 appeared in 1885.

109. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 89.

110. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, 529–30 (vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 11).

111. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, 529–30.

112. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, 529–30; Hoffmann points out that the notion of the Jews as *Gärungsmittel* (ferment) being instrumental to the development of Western civilization was already developed by Moses Hess in his *Europäische Triarchie* (1841) (Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 95); in Hess it is of course not an antisemitic topos but a source of Jewish pride.

113. The first three volumes of *Römische Geschichte* formed a narrative that culminated in Caesar’s epoch, while volume 5 presented the histories of separate provinces in the Imperial time.

114. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 106.

115. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 108.

116. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 109.

117. Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 112.

118. Treitschke, “Zur Judenfrage.”

119. In his lectures on *Politics*, Treitschke paraphrased Mommsen’s argument exactly in the sense Mommsen insisted his remarks on the Jews should be understood (Hoffmann, *Juden und Judentum*, 98). Treitschke might in the context of the Dispute have deliberately changed his reading of Mommsen’s argument in order to use it as support for the antisemitic discourse. Liberal defense of the Jews was henceforth vulnerable to pointing out the embarrassing fact that Mommsen himself had provided a formulation that had become a much-used antisemitic slogan (Hoffmann points to references by Lagarde, Ahlwardt, Hitler, and Goebbels [102]).

120. “vollkommenen Verschmelzungsprozess,” in the words of its longtime president, Georg Gotheim.

121. Brenner, “Gott schütze uns vor unseren Freunden.” In a letter to Treitschke, the orientalist Karl Geldner pointed to another passage in Mommsen’s *Römische Geschichte*: “The Semitic tribe (Stamm) stands below and yet also outside the peoples of the old classical world” (vol. 3, beginning of chap. 1; quoted in K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 427).

122. Quoted in Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 184.

123. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 184.

124. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 184.

125. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 186.

## 1. Liberals, Antisemites, and “Educated Men”

1. The *kleindeutsche* position refers to a Prussian-led Empire that does not include the German-speaking areas of the Habsburg Empire. After the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866 (and before Hitler) this was generally accepted as the shape a German nation-state had to take. Had a German Empire been founded in the nineteenth century that included what later became Austria, it would have been less clearly Prussian and Protestant in its demographic character than the small-German Reich of 1871.

2. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 18.

3. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 18–19. The final phrase reads “das Volk will sich nicht mehr von Coterien gängeln lassen.”

4. Boehlich, Nachwort, 240.

5. “Unterdessen arbeitet in den Tiefen unseres Volkslebens eine wunderbare, mächtige Erregung. Es ist als ob die Nation sich auf sich selber besänne, unbarmherzig mit sich in’s Gericht ginge” (Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 19).

6. The boom period of the Gründerzeit began in 1867 and intensified massively after the Franco-Prussian war. Pulzer translates *Gründer* (more commonly translated as “founder”) as “promoter,” which seems to be the correct technical term denoting a person who participates in the foundation of a company and for that purpose “promotes” this company for fund-raising (*Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 19).

7. Treitschke alludes here to the attempts on the life of the kaiser.



8. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 20.

9. Treitschke “wanted workers to have no more than an elementary education. Better educated labourers might wish to rise above their place in society, endangering the existing order” (Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 33). His point can be illuminated by a sequence in a text by the similarly “liberal” antisemite Otto Glagau from 1881: “even the peasant is now meant to become educated; . . . a whole army of ‘the educated’ march up and down the country, and step by step, by giving a bad example, dissolves the order of the productive classes, infinitely expanding its own useless numbers” (quoted in Weiland, *Otto Glagau und “Der Kulturkämpfer,”* 146).

10. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 20–21. Otto Mittelstädt, a judge in Hamburg, rejects in his pamphlet “Gegen die Freiheitsstrafen: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des heutigen Strafen-systems, *Pro Libertate!*” (Against Prison Sentences: A Contribution to the Critique of the Contemporary Penal System, *For Liberty!*) the ideas that underlie nineteenth-century reforms of the justice system. In the absence of general religious consciousness (which he does not seem to deplore) only strict assertion of an ethical “categorical imperative” (26, 29) can warrant social order: punishment ought to be understood as a punitive evil (“Strafübel”) that creates justice, deters, and neutralizes (“Unschädlichmachung”), not as a form of “forced education” (27, 71). He also argues that the state should not exclude the use of the death penalty (75), deportation (77), and corporal punishment (81). He argues that prison confinement is an infliction of corporal suffering that can be worse than corporal punishment; he denounces the denial of this as liberal bigotry (81).

11. “die unerbittlich strenge Majestät des Rechts”; Treitschke had argued for death penalty already in 1870 (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 144).

12. “gegen das Judentum” (Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 21); German words ending on *-tum* (or *-thum*) are ambivalent as to whether they refer to an abstract, spiritual entity or a concrete object: *Judentum* can be “the Jews” just as well as “Judaism” or even a “Jewish principle” of whatever sort. Anti-Jewish rhetoric seems to play on this semantic ambiguity. (Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 177–80, states that *Judenthum* only refers to an abstraction as opposed to “the Jews.” Judging from Treitschke’s use of the terminology, I do not find this convincing.)

13. See chapter 8.

14. The number of Jews involved in the publishing business was certainly higher than the Jewish share of the overall population (in Germany less than 1 percent), but the idea of “Jewish domination” is without grounding in reality.

15. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 22. In the elections to the Prussian Diet in October 1879, “the Left Liberals lost one of the city’s three seats to a candidate supported by both the National Liberals and the Conservatives,” after an increasingly antisemitic campaign (Rahden, “Words and Actions,” 420).

16. Johannes Pfefferkorn (1469–1523) converted to Christianity and wrote a number of anti-Jewish works. Johann Andreas Eisenmenger (1654–1704) is the author of “Entdecktes Judenthum” (“Jewry Uncovered”; 1700) and was wrongly assumed to have been a converted Jew (Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 190n).

17. Paulus Cassel interpreted this statement as proof of Treitschke's particular dislike of converted Jews. Cassel insinuates that the basis of this dislike is envy of the person who deliberately adopts a particular belief, suggesting that this belief might be stronger or "truer" than merely received belief (*Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 17). Joël ("Offener Brief an Treitschke") also rejects the allegation that many of the anti-Jewish pamphlets have been written by Jews.

18. Hitler used this phrase in a September 1919 letter to Adolf Gemlich; quoted in Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 190–93.

19. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 26.

20. Treitschke might be alluding to Luther, who had referred to the Jews as a "misfortune" in his "Von den Jueden" (Hilberg, *Destruction of the European Jews*, 17). Treitschke might also have picked up the term "misfortune" from reading for example the following in a *Kreuzzeitung* article from 1878: "Modern Judaism that denies its ancient faith and its ordinances, vaunts its enlightened liberalism and marches everywhere in the vanguard of progress, is a real misfortune for our people. Judaization is making giant strides, and this is furthered by liberalism . . . the children of Israel . . . have become a curse to the nations" (quoted in Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 155). Volkov comments that Treitschke applied here "the familiar propaganda technique of the 'wrong metaphor.' The 'Jewish Question' was not one problem among others, but the essence of all evil. A quick turn of the pen made a single problem stand for all others . . . a stroke of genius. By using a simple rhetorical technique, an unsatisfactory situation was suddenly made comprehensible" (*Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 99).

21. Treitschke had used a similar formulation in a letter from August, 25, 1879: "The hate against this alien being that has usurped the domination over our press and public opinion erupts from one hundred thousand Germanic hearts like a sound of nature" (H. Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit*, 107).

22. This text is predominantly a response to Breßlau, Lazarus, and Cassel.

23. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 49.

24. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 49.

25. Graetz, "Erwiderung an Treitschke," 26; S. Meyer, *Ein Wort an Treitschke*.

26. Breßlau, "Zur Judenfrage," 58.

27. The actual name of the so-called *Kreuzzeitung*, the voice of orthodox Prussian Protestantism, was *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, founded in 1848. The articles are in nos. 148–52 (June 29–July 3, 1875). One of the editors of the *Kreuzzeitung* was Hermann Goedsche, who had published the novel *Biarritz* (1868), which was later used as one of the sources of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (Mosse, *Crisis of German Ideology*, 128). At the time there were two Conservative parties: the "Free Conservatives" (officially called *Deutsche Reichspartei* since 1871) (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 920), the "*Partei Bismarck sans phrase*" (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 921), which cooperated with the National Liberals; and the "Old Conservatives" (since 1876 officially called *Deutschkonservative Partei*), which was anti-liberal, anti-state, and anti-modern,

and defended, for example, clerical control of education. Their organ was the *Kreuzzeitung* (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 918). The articles followed a massive election defeat of the Conservative parties by the National Liberal Party and the Catholic Center Party. The antisemitic articles of the *Kreuzzeitung* seem to have been a deliberate offer of cooperation to a new potential ally reflecting the new situation.

28. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 56–57; the Catholic journal *Germania* argued that the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* had been a device deployed by the Jews “to distract the attention of the German people in order to be able to exploit it properly at the same time” (Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 56). Breßlau suggests that the Catholic press obviously hoped to improve its positioning in the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* by joining Protestant conservatism for an anti-Jewish campaign.

29. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 57.

30. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 58; in his response, Treitschke (“Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 48) exploited the extent of agreement that Breßlau conceded and the rather defensive tone of his text. Endner applauded Treitschke’s defiant response but stated that Breßlau “deserved a more gruff reprimand [derbere Zurechtweisung]” (“Zur Judenfrage,” 123). Seligmann Meyer (*Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 5) reproached Breßlau for having published a brochure on the *Judenfrage*—because there is no such thing. He declares that Breßlau’s “recognition by the enemy is for a reason [ist erklärlich].” Naudh sarcastically “acknowledge[d] the reconciliatory tone” used by Breßlau (Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 180). However, he writes that “practical problems” should not be left in the hands of professors (such as Treitschke and Breßlau), who tend to find “a convenient formula” that would merely cover up and perpetuate “the evil.”

31. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 92.

32. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 92.

33. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 21–22.

34. S. Meyer, *Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 3.

35. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 181.

36. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 181.

37. “If history was not a *fable convenue* [a story/narration agreed upon because it is convenient] but really the science of what has actually happened, then its students would be able to understand or at least to sense what is happening in the present from what has happened in the past, and Herr von Treitschke would not have had to continue spinning yarns [fabuliren] for so long, and it would not have taken him so long to discover to his great surprise that liberalism was fatally disgraced by the Jews [dass der Liberalismus an den Juden zu Schanden geworden sei]” (Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 181). Naudh does not, though, indicate how this methodological criticism (betraying a positivist understanding of the concept of “science”) relates to his (unsupported) claim that “the Jews” disgraced liberalism.

38. Naudh expresses similar reservations about the organizers of the *Antisemitenpetition*.

He claims that the petition is also an expression of a popular sentiment but its immediate purpose of merely changing legislation is rather too “moderate” (“Professoren über Israel,” 183).

39. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 183.

40. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 184.

41. Bamberger and Oppenheim are the only contributors who referred to the argument of “Our Prospects” as a whole.

42. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 156–57.

43. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 156, 158.

44. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 157. Lasker (1829–84), a lawyer and former 1848 radical, had been a member of the Progress Party and was one of the founders of the National Liberal Party in 1866. He was one of the main authors of the liberal legal framework of the Bismarck Reich.

45. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 175–76.

46. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 177.

47. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke.”

48. Gerson Bleichröder was a financial adviser to Bismarck. Oppenheim points to his own article on this subject in *Die Gegenwart* from October 2, 1875.

49. Oppenheim’s distinction between the older, as it were more honest antisemitism and its current, disingenuous form sounds a lot like the formulation by Horkheimer and Adorno quoted above (see 390n12).

50. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 3.

51. Oppenheim implies that Treitschke’s text is like a piece of badly written fiction: “The lowest ranking novelist would be obliged to motivate such a psychological turn in his characters” (“Stöcker und Treitschke,” 3).

52. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 4.

53. This is quoted from the second part of Oppenheim’s article, which was published in *Die Gegenwart* on January 10, 1880 (p. 17).

54. Philippson argued similarly against the notion that there has been a fundamental change in the public mood (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1879, 785). He suggests that a number of writers from the ultramontane, reactionary, and radical camps have increased their clamor while the apparent weakness of the liberals has encouraged all Jew-haters to join in. The current anti-Jewish agitation in the press also proves wrong all claims about Jewish domination of the press: there is nothing that would explain why Jewish domination would suddenly have given way to an antisemitic campaign. (Philippson was the editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* and—I presume—wrote in this function the editorials, which are, however, unsigned. Most of what I attribute to Philippson is from unsigned articles and editorials.)

55. “La sauvagerie est toujours là à deux pas, et, dès qu’on lâche pied, elle recommence”; quoted in French by Oppenheim.

56. On the concept of *realpolitik* see pp. 223–30.

57. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 2.
58. He suggests that simply the judiciary might have become more effective, rather than that the people have become more vicious.
59. Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 8, 9.
60. “man gönnte ihnen die Freiheit nicht . . . man war selber nicht frei”; Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 11.
61. “Pharisäischer Neid gebraucht das alte Vorurtheil”; Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 12.

## 2. Jew-hatred and Nationality

1. Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 7.
2. Treitschke, “Zur inneren Lage am Jahresschlusse,” 225.
3. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1879, 785.
4. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 18, 1879, 737. Bourdeau wrote in the cited article that after emancipation the French Jews did not dissolve into “our purely French community” but still developed into useful and loyal citizens. He asserted that emancipation turned the Jews of France into the most “ameliorated” of all Jewish groups. Bourdeau suggested the Germans should not resent the high level of involvement of Jews in the life of the nation but appreciate its usefulness: the Jews “unite the religious and the practical spirit, the taste for metaphysical and for financial speculation” (739).
5. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* (November 23, 1880, 741–42) documented the complete text of the Declaration, including all seventy-five signatures, introduced with the comment: “Finally there seems to be light on the horizon! Finally the nightmare that weighed on the minds is being shaken off!” On November 30, Philippson comments that the Declaration “is written in the most noble style and despite its briefness it touches upon all relevant moments with satisfying determination” (753–54). On December 7 he adds that the Declaration “already is a momentous fact like Lessing’s ‘Nathan,’ the Prussian constitution or the German Imperial law” (778). In the December 14 issue he writes: “Every sincere patriot is deeply hurt to observe the confusion and divisiveness [Zerfahrenheit und Zerrissenheit] in the German fatherland that has grown so hugely through the latest agitations against the Jews, and the humiliation of the German spirit which this perpetration constitutes. On top of this now comes the regret that these weaknesses and the weakening of the German nation is being watched and condemned abroad; Germany’s prestige, honor and her civilizational influence suffer so much from this” (785). This comment is followed by several quotes from the English press (786).
6. “nothwendigen Zusammengehörigkeit”; Pulzer (*Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 326) translates this as “essential community.”
7. “in treuem Zusammengehen mit der Nation die Sonderart abzuwerfen.”
8. “Erklärung,” 202.
9. The use of the formulation “Jewish fellow citizens” also seems to exclude from the defense Jewish immigrants who are not citizens.

10. “Erklärung,” 202–3.

11. It is significant that for the Declaration these two attributes seemed not to contradict each other. “Racial hatred” was then not generally recognized as a specifically modern (as opposed to medieval) phenomenon as it is now.

12. The image that everyone should enjoy “the same sun in competition” seems to connote that a social order based on merit and competition is a natural order—under the sun (i.e., out there, in the open field, in the real world), after all, every human being has the same opportunity. This is, of course, an ideological mystification not only of society but also of nature.

13. The Catholic journal *Germania* emphasized in a comment on the Declaration that it is wrong to denounce the current antisemitic movement as “medieval”: today, as opposed to in the days of Lessing, “the religious side of the question” has been resolved “as religious freedom is constitutionally guaranteed.” The issue is “national as well as social,” it is a question of “culture and economy”: the people want the state to save them from immorality and exploitation (quoted in K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 574–75).

14. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 210. Mommsen writes that he does not want to contribute to the more public debate on the Jews, which he refers to as a “hullabaloo [Charivari]” “to whose dissonances the rabble [Pöbel] on either side contribute to the best of their capacities” (210) and a “machination” against which “a single voice” can hardly hope to be heard. His concern is exclusively with the debate among former (National Liberal) allies and friends, that is, the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute in a more narrow sense: “I will be happy when the few words that I want to make will explain my attitude to this affair to those who want to know it. It separates many, who have otherwise been close and long time allies, and separation hurts. Although the word of conciliation [Verständigung] will fade away in general, it will perhaps find its destination here or there on a personal level” (210).

15. In Germanic mythology, the three sons of the god Mannus are the founders of the Germanic tribes.

16. This is a technical term meaning the priest as representing church authority.

17. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 211. “Kultur” and its composites are at the time still sometimes spelled with “c”.

18. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 211; this seems to have been a widely used image in contemporary comments on the “Terror” of the French Revolution, immortalized in Francisco Goya’s painting from 1821–23.

19. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 211.

20. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 22.

21. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 23.

22. As Holz (*Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 199) writes, the commonality of trade and journalism is that both are activities of mediation.

23. “Wie wir dies fremde Volksthum mit dem unseren verschmelzen können.” *Volksthum*

was coined as a neologism around 1800 and became commonplace through Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's book *Deutsches Volksthum*, from 1810 (Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 200). The term refers to the *Wesen* of a *Volk* as well as the (everyday life, cultural) appearances of the *Wesen*.

24. I usually translate *Stamm* as “tribe,” but when it refers to the distinction between Ashkenazim and Sephardim I translate it as “branch” (the primary meaning of the German word *Stamm* is the trunk of a tree). Since Mommsen, e.g., also refers to the German *Stämme* (in contemporary academic parlance, one would probably write “ethnic groups”), *Stamm* seems to be mostly descriptive and value-free, though from a National Liberal perspective with a connotation of being anachronistic. Rahden writes that *Stamm* “was a central concept in German debates about national unity and diversity between the mid-nineteenth century and the late 1920s” (“Germans of the Jewish *Stamm*,” 29). He suggests that Jews in particular invoked the concept of *Stamm* because of “its very vagueness” (31): it was a way of expressing the particular character of the German Jews’ ethnicity after the relative decline of “religious visions of community.” In the 1819 edition of *Brockhaus* encyclopedia, nations emerge from the mixing of tribes (*Stämme*) (Rahden, “Germans of the Jewish *Stamm*,” 36).

25. Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 204.

26. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 24. Treitschke gives two examples: the example for Jewish arrogance is his colleague, the historian Heinrich Graetz; the example for harmfulness is the current Jewish involvement in the economy.

27. “dieser beiden alten Culturvölker.” Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 27. On December 24 the *Vossische Zeitung* published an open letter by Ad. Neubauer, assistant librarian at Bodleian in Oxford. In the name of the English Jews he rejects Treitschke’s compliments (quoted in *Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 13, 1880).

28. See chapter 10.

29. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 17, 1880, 108.

30. “Ein Drängen zum Licht ist jedem Menschen natürlich und sein Recht.” Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 16; for Cassel, though, “the light” might mean not only the better living standard but also the Christian mission of Berlin.

31. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 162. It seems that Bamberger found the use of the imagery of the “flood” adequate for the case of the Chinese immigration to California.

32. Graetz had already pointed out that Jews enjoyed legal equality in Galicia and are therefore “little inclined to emigration” (Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 28).

33. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 163.

34. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 57–60; the section quoted here is from the “Appendix: Statistical Data on Jewish Immigration and Emigration in Prussia,” which was added to the printed version of Lazarus’s speech.

35. For several decades the Prussian statistical office had paid little interest to the “confessional or racial make-up of immigrants and emigrants” (Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*,

195). However, there was evidence that Jews emigrated in larger numbers than their share in the population would warrant, which—given that overall immigration numbers were known—allowed the conclusion that emigration most probably exceeded immigration. An increase in the number of Jews could therefore only be explained with higher birthrates and lower mortality rates than with immigration. Nevertheless, the Prussian statistical office had published in 1877 an essay (“not too consistent,” as Hacking writes) arguing the case of Jewish mass immigration. However, the statistical office of the city of Berlin strongly rejected the immigration theory in its yearbook of 1880 and subsequently supported Neumann (see below) against the Prussian office (Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, 197).

36. Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, 197; British society has of course never been as relaxed about (Jewish) immigration as Lazarus suggests here; his reference to the laughing Englishman must have been rhetorically powerful, though, particularly in an ideological context that tended to idealize the political culture of Britain.

37. Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 26; furthermore, Graetz (“Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke”) states that Treitschke relies on questionable source material, that the increase of the Jewish population in Prussia is actually in keeping with that of the population in general, that there is virtually no emigration from Poland into the Prussian provinces bordering on Poland, and that the history of the Jews in Poland actually was less bleak than Treitschke implied. Graetz quotes a historical source from the sixteenth century suggesting that the Jews in Poland were engaged in agriculture as well as in trade and the sciences. Similarly, Seligmann Meyer (*Ein Wort an Treitschke*, 29) writes, addressing Treitschke directly: “And if we have to read in foreign papers that the Germans are narrow-minded, driven by racial hatred and trapped in prejudices, then this is your responsibility!” Philippson also argues that the anti-Jewish campaign dishonors “the great German nation” by depicting the nation as being overpowered by only a handful of Jews (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1879, 787). Later (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1880, 178) he writes that German Jew-hatred must be mere pretense, because the Germans cannot seriously believe that a nation of forty-three million could be endangered by half a million of Jews.

38. Cassel similarly remarks that many of “the German heads” have been “seduced” and have adopted “French frivolity” which proves that they are “actually not very hard at all” (*Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 23).

39. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 31–32; Treitschke added in the fourth edition of the booklet version of the text (“Ein Wort über unser Judenthum”) at this place a footnote on Salomon Neumann’s text.

40. Treitschke states that the migration from the provinces into the cities increases Jewish influence on the nation’s commercial and social development (“Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 33). On average, greater wealth ensures better education of the Jews, which in turn ensures greater influence in the press and the financial institutions. Treitschke concludes that, irrespective of population statistics, “the Jews in Germany are more powerful than in any other country in Western Europe” (34).



41. S. Neumann, *Die Fabel von der jüdischen Masseneinwanderung*, 3; Neumann writes that every year between 1822 and 1840, three hundred more Jews immigrated than emigrated, which is roughly equivalent to the corresponding ratio among the general population (6). The numerical extent of net immigration is thus relatively small in this period. From 1840 to 1871 emigration clearly exceeds immigration for all groups of the Prussian population, while the excess is much higher for the Jews than for the overall population (7–9). Neumann argues that large-scale immigration is generally unlikely during times of significant emigration (15). Immigration into Prussia was generally very low in the period, and there is no evidence to suggest that Jewish immigration was above average. Also, the statistics about residents who are born abroad confirm that there was no significant Jewish immigration from the East (18).

42. Treitschke, “Die jüdische Einwanderung in Deutschland,” 234.

43. Treitschke, “Die jüdische Einwanderung in Deutschland,” 234–35.

44. Treitschke, “Die jüdische Einwanderung in Deutschland,” 234–35; Adolf Wagner in his review of Neumann’s brochure (1880) wrote that for “cultural reasons,” internal migration could also be counted as “immigration” (Regneri, “Neumann’s Statistical Challenge,” 147), which supports Treitschke’s argument. Treitschke returned to the issue in November 1883 (“Die jüdische Einwanderung in Preussen”). Here he reasserted his initial position with reference to statistical material that has—he writes—been published in the meantime.

45. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 18.

46. Treitschke, “Die jüdische Einwanderung in Deutschland,” 19; emphasis in the original.

47. Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 27.

48. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1879, 786.

49. *Die Gegenwart*, January 10, 1880, 17.

50. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 58.

51. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 59–60.

52. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 60.

53. Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 27. Nadyr (*Offener Brief*, 15) also points out that the Jews in Poland were not persecuted until 1648.

54. Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 28.

55. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 35.

56. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 35.

57. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 35.

58. This argument is reminiscent of the Hegelian concept of “historyless peoples.”

59. Treitschke is particularly unimpressed when Graetz defends the lack of patriotic loyalty on the side of the Jews of the Eastern Prussian provinces in the war of 1806–7 (Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 42). While Graetz suggests that they had no incentive to be loyal to Prussia, Treitschke argues they should have been loyal irrespective of their specific positioning and interests. Graetz in his reply (“Mein letztes

Wort an Treitschke”) defends his approval of the disloyalty of the Jews of Eastern Prussia in the Napoleonic Wars that had particularly aroused Treitschke’s anger: “Suspensions about my [lack of] patriotism I have to reject” (50). He points out that he had referred to the Duchy of Warsaw only, not, as Treitschke insinuated, to the whole of Poznan and Western Prussia: Warsaw had only briefly been a province of Prussia, which—according to Graetz—helps to explain that both Poles and Jews welcomed Napoleon as a liberator. The Jews also had the obvious reason that France had generally taken a more positive attitude toward emancipation than Prussia at the time.

60. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 46.

61. Seligmann Meyer points out that on another occasion Treitschke had quoted Disraeli’s boastful remarks on the superiority of the Jews, which contradicts his claim that boastful remarks by Jews were only imaginable in Germany (*Ein Wort an Treitschke*, 36).

62. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 47.

63. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 48.

64. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 51–52.

65. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 93–94.

66. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 168.

67. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum,” 215.

68. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum,” 216.

### 3. German-Jewish “Mixed Culture”

1. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 23.

2. Treitschke notes that more contemporary examples could be added, but he does not do so.

3. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 23.

4. Treitschke seems to hesitate before he goes into more detail about what he has to say about these “circles” and finds it necessary to warn preemptively: “Even conciliatory words are easily misunderstood here.”

5. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 25.

6. For “writers,” Treitschke uses the derogatory term *Poetaster*.

7. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 25.

8. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 25.

9. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 25.

10. “in sich aufzunehmen und zu verarbeiten vermochte”; Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 171–72.

11. Bamberger quotes from “Essay on the Origin of Language”: “wenn die Kette fremder Cultur nicht so nah an uns gedrängt und mit der Gewalt ganzer Jahrhunderte uns genöthigt hätte, mit einzugreifen.” The quote is from near the end of Herder’s text (Zweiter Teil, Viertes Naturgesetz; Herder, *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache*, 120).

12. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 172.

13. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 172.
14. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 61.
15. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 62.
16. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 63; the possibility of secular Jewish nationalism does not even seem to occur to Breßlau.
17. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 63.
18. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 64.
19. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 65.
20. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 65.
21. Lazarus adds that the Jews have this in common with the Germans (*Was heisst national?* 65; 44).
22. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 41; Lazarus introduces this idea with the analogy that although “one might argue that being a mother is a woman’s essential destination [wesentliche Bestimmung],” “a woman is also a human being in her own right” (41).
23. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 41.
24. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 42.
25. “Erhöhung und Vertiefung des Eignen”
26. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 43.
27. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 44.
28. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 36.
29. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 36–37.
30. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 36–37. Lazarus quotes from Rümelin.
31. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 38. This is also from Rümelin.
32. “Zur Nation euch zu bilden, ihr hofft es Deutsche vergebens; / bildet, ihr könnt es, dafür freier zu Menschen euch aus” (my translation). This epigram (titled “Deutscher Nationalcharakter”) is number 96 of a set of 414 mostly polemical distichons and other short poems called “Xenien” that Goethe and Schiller wrote in close cooperation and published in the *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1797* (a literary almanac) in 1796. The title is an allusion to the title of book 13 of the “Epigrammata” (85 CE) by the Roman poet Valerius Martialis; a *xenion* is a gift to be given to a guest, which is here ironic given the polemical character of the “Xenien.” The preceding epigram (95) is called “Das deutsche Reich”: “Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es? Ich weiss das Land nicht zu finden; / Wo das gelehrte beginnt, hört das politische auf” (Germany? Where does it lie? I don’t know / where to look for that place; where the scholarly starts, the political ends).
33. In this context, a comment on the same subject in the Catholic journal *Germania* in December 1880 is interesting: “Where is the man of taste who could get angry at the diversity of sorts of wine in color, richness, and bouquet and would advocate the production of a wine unrelated to any particular place of origin! Go ahead and decompose the sorts of wine, you will end up with a unified sort indeed—vinegar!” (quoted in K. Krieger, *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit*, 723).
34. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 184.

35. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 184.
36. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 185.
37. With this claim Naudh is in agreement with many nineteenth-century historians, as Bernal (*Black Athena*, 341–42) and Burkert (*The Orientalizing Revolution*, introduction) show.
38. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 186.
39. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 187.
40. On the petition see p. 23.
41. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 187.
42. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 188.
43. "setzen sich mit ihrem Gotte *auseinander*" (emphasis in the original).
44. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 188–89.
45. Naudh refers here to 5 Moses (Deuteronomy) 7:16. From the context of the formulation quoted by Naudh it is clear that according to Moses, God is meant to give Israel only those peoples "to eat" that are *enemies* of Israel. The presupposition of the covenant is that Israel is the weakest and lowest of all peoples but that adherence to God will guarantee Israel divine support against attackers and oppressors.
46. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 190.
47. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 189, 190; Naudh rejects the climate theory of skin color, but he got his (eighteenth-century-style) geo-ethnography wrong: if one thought of skin color as an effect of climate, then one ought to expect that the "Negroes" as well as the "Whites" in America should have become "Reds."
48. The concept of *Arbeitsehre* seems to be a mixture of "work ethics" and the pride of doing productive and good quality work.
49. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 191.
50. Unclear reference; probably to the "Young Germany" as subsequently discussed.
51. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 54.
52. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 162.
53. "Denn mit keinem Volke haben sie sich auch nur entfernt so eng zusammengelebt, man könnte sagen identificirt, wie mit den Deutschen"; Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 162.
54. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 164–65.
55. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 165–66; Bamberger's remark on abstract thinking and mercantile economy as two dimensions of "speculation" (implying a common root) seems to echo a "young-Hegelian" theme that can be found in the writings of Heine, Börne, and (the young) Marx. It also anticipates an argument of Marxist theory as developed much later by George Thomson (*First Philosophers*) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel (*Intellectual and Manual Labour*). In their version of the argument, however, "abstract" and philosophical thinking are understood as effects of the specific social practices of an emerging commodity economy—the Greeks of Miletus and Athens "invented philosophy" not because they "owned" the spirit of speculation but because they were at the

forefront of developing commodity and money economy. In the young-Hegelian version of the idea as echoed by Bamberger, the “mystery of speculation” is simply “possessed” by some peoples, not by others.

56. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 166.

57. “schnellblütigen, kecken, bis zur Frivolität gesteigerten Humor”; Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 166.

58. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 167.

59. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 168.

60. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 32.

61. “dem Höchsten im Menschenthum zustrebende”; Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 33.

62. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 32–33.

63. He adds: “And I am asking in turn, are not the same psychological laws valid for all times, do not the same causes have the same effects?” (Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 33–34).

64. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 34.

65. The Jews’ role in the Gründerkrach was a principal obsession of Otto Glagau especially (see pp. 217–19).

66. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 50. Treitschke reproaches Börne and Heine for slandering “the country that protects them” and adds that such “contempt for the German Goyim” is “not the opinion of a single fanatic.” He suggests that the role that Jews allegedly played in the *Gründer-Unwesen* (the deliberately risky and sometimes fraudulent business practices in which, though, Jews were apparently less strongly involved than their share among businesspeople would have led one to expect) was a result of their “contempt for the German Goyim.”

67. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 24–25; in his response, Cassel remarked drily: “It is really not fun these days to run a pawnshop” (*Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 17).

68. The most important formulation of the concept of *Arbeitsfreude* is by Heinrich Riehl (*Die deutsche Arbeit*) (see Campbell, *Joy in Work*). Dorpalen points out that Treitschke’s reference to “gemüthliche Arbeitsfreudigkeit” relates to his concept of a harmonic but hierarchical society: as long as the working classes will find “happiness” in their subordinate function and do not become envious of “the few thousands” (who do the thinking, painting, etc.), the continued existence of the social hierarchy is safe (*Heinrich von Treitschke*, 242). Ludwig Philippson, who was an enthusiastic supporter of the anti-socialist laws of 1878, promoted a similar concept of work: he also found that “Social Democracy was a degenerate, corrupting force, preaching hatred of labor as opposed to the authentic Jewish (read bourgeois) love of honest work” (Penslar, *Shylock’s Children*, 152). In this respect, Philippson’s liberalism seems cut from the same cloth as Treitschke’s. At the same time he often expressed scorn for the Jewish financial elite and tried to distinguish a heroic “banking Jew,” a beneficiary to humanity, from the unscrupulous “stock-market Jew,” whose showy lifestyle and shady practices aroused envy and antisemitism and thus damaged the Jews (Penslar, *Shylock’s Children*, 156).

69. The meaning of *Gemüth* lies in between mind, character, nature, soul, disposition, warmheartedness, and sentiment.

70. See Postone (*Time, Labor, and Social Domination* and “Rethinking Marx”) for Marx’s take on this idea, and Campbell (*Joy in Work*) on Fourier’s.

71. This article, written either by Marr or, more probably, by Naudh/Nordmann (judging from comments in the journal, Marr seems to have been replaced as editor as early as April 1880), does not directly refer to the Dispute.

72. *Deutsche Wacht*, 435, 437–38.

73. *Deutsche Wacht*, 438.

74. *Deutsche Wacht*, 439.

75. “Proletariat” means here simply “the poor.”

76. *Deutsche Wacht*, 442.

77. *Deutsche Wacht*, 443.

78. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 22–23.

79. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 20.

80. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 65.

81. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 66.

82. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 67.

83. From the *Revue des deux mondes*, March 1, 1880 (*Allgemeine Zeitung* March 23, 1880, 177–78).

84. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1880, 178.

85. The term *Kathedersozialisten* (socialists of the lectern) was coined in 1871 by Heinrich Bernhard Oppenheim as a sarcastic nickname for various proponents of state-led social reform. Treitschke had famously taken up Oppenheim’s position and added his own polemic against *Kathedersozialismus*; on *Kathedersozialismus* see the section “Liberal State Socialism in the German Reich” in chapter 9.

86. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 20; Treitschke’s “Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner” (Socialism and Its Patrons) took up arguments previously formulated by Oppenheim.

87. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 20.

88. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 164.

89. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 163.

90. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 163–64.

91. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 164.

92. In a similar if curiously reversed fashion, analyses by Social Democrats in the following decades occasionally speculated that antisemitic agitation would indirectly (and ironically, i.e., against itself) further socialist consciousness amongst non-working-class poor (i.e., those whom Social Democratic teaching cannot reach) by proving itself to be an inadequate (namely, petit bourgeois) criticism of capitalist society. Some liberals and some socialists shared the notion that antisemitic anti-capitalism would by necessity prepare the ground for, and perhaps turn into, a more adequate, or more dangerous, namely, proletarian, anti-capitalism (see Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 99).

93. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 185–85; emphasis in the original.

94. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 196.

95. Naudh, "Professoren über Israel," 196.

96. Endner, "Zur Judenfrage," 112. Endner made these remarks in the context of his rejection of Breßlau's argument that apart from the Jews there existed other ethnic minorities within Germany, too, such as the Wends in the Prussian district of Lausitz. Endner argues that they are the remnants of an indigenous "tribe" in an area that was conquered by "Germany" moving eastward and that continued to exist "as a solid group" (111). By contrast, the Jews are immigrants and dispersed anywhere among the Germans (112). Furthermore, the Wends are productive, the Jews are not.

97. Endner, "Zur Judenfrage," 117–18; his suggestions included that the Sabbath should be moved to Sunday and that specific Jewish holidays as well as ritual washings should be given up, as well as any specific choice of food, circumcision, and membership in the "Alliance Israélite Universelle," which he holds to be a Jewish nationalist institution, membership in which is incompatible with German nationality.

98. Endner, "Zur Judenfrage," 118; emphasis in the original. Lazarus (*Was heisst national?* 27) had already taken up the issue that only few Jews went into agriculture even after the laws that had barred Jews from doing so had been abolished. He writes that this statistical fact does not prove the alleged Jewish unwillingness to turn to "productive work." One should not look at the absolute numbers of Jews and Christians in agriculture but rather at the numbers of urban residents moving to the countryside and then examine how many of them are Jewish and how many are Christian. His argument implies that in times of overall decreasing significance of agriculture a movement toward the countryside among any group of the urban population would be minute.

99. Endner, "Zur Judenfrage," 110.

100. From Treitschke's *Politics*, quoted in K. Krieger, *Der "Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,"* 611.

101. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 28–31; Oppenheim writes similarly: "How many Humboldt, Ritter, Helmholtz, Ranke does even the ingenious [geistesgrosse] German nation produce in a century! Since the Jews in Germany constitute just a bit more than one percent of the population . . . it is highly honorable for them to be represented at all" ("Stöcker und Treitschke," 19).

102. Breßlau, "Zur Judenfrage," 68.

103. Breßlau, "Zur Judenfrage," 68–69.

104. "Never in my lifetime has any Jewish publication equaled the polemical perfidy of the Roman Jesuit paper, which carries to the shame of the German people the name *Germania*, nor the malignant slander of the *Reichsglocke* by Herr Gehlsen nor the arrogant scorn of any national feeling in the *Vaterland* edited by the ur-Germanic Herr Dr. Sigl!" (Breßlau, "Zur Judenfrage," 68–69).

105. Breßlau, "Zur Judenfrage," 71–72.

106. Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94) was a legal theorist and defender of absolutism; like Treitschke, he was from Saxony.

107. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 72.

108. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 53. In his second reply to Treitschke, Breßlau remarked drily: “I do not think that the Jews who are generally held to be good in business base their decisions about the placement of advertisements on other criteria than the highest possible circulation of their advertisements; and as subscribers they can hardly have a significantly larger influence on the press than corresponds to their numerical strength in the German Reich” (“Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 94). Similarly, Philippson wrote in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* on February 17, 1880, “Herr Treitschke knows little about business,” adding that advertisements obviously go wherever they are most effective.

109. Treitschke wrote later in his response to Mommsen: “Who fights today in the press the arrogance of the Jews does not misuse the power of the mightier but stands one against a hundred” (“Erwiderung an Mommsen,” 229).

110. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 55.

111. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 56–57.

#### 4. State, Nation, Race, Religion

1. Treitschke and his editor found these considerations on daily affairs important enough to include them unabridged in the volume *Deutsche Kämpfe: Neue Folge* (Treitschke).

2. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 5.

3. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 1.

4. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 3.

5. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 5.

6. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 8.

7. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 8; the formulation is quite typical for Treitschke’s habit of invoking anthropological-psychological home truths.

8. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 9.

9. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 11.

10. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 12.

11. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 13–14.

12. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 15.

13. “Schein”; this seems to be a reference to the Shylock myth. See note 4 for chapter 5.

14. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 26.

15. Seligmann Meyer argued in his response to Treitschke that the Sabbath is a bulwark of idealism and of the idea of God, and thus against atheism and materialism. Christian teachers who prevent children from celebrating the Sabbath promoted materialism (*Ein Wort an Treitschke*, 10).

16. He claims that the emancipated Jews demand “literal parity [buchstäbliche Parität].” The examples he gives are quite telling, too: he complains about the removal of Christian pictures (from public buildings or state schools), a measure that seems in perfect keeping with the concept that state and public sphere be secular.



17. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 27.

18. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 49.

19. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 50.

20. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 50.

21. Seligmann Meyer points out that Treitschke’s complaint that since emancipation conversions have become more rare contradicts his earlier claim that the Jews’ old religion is respected as sacred (Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 23; Meyer, *Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 7). Naudh expresses in this context “the hope that his [Treitschke’s] healthy German nature will more and more outgrow the liberal straitjacket” (“Professoren über Israel,” 199). Naudh points to a small shift in Treitschke’s argument between the first and second contributions, which he interprets as the foreboding of a more fundamental shift to come: “[Treitschke] acknowledges now that the feeling of living unity that is necessary for national consciousness is incompatible with a contradiction in the most holy questions of the mind [Gemüth], and after more consideration about the issue, he will further acknowledge that this contradiction of the mind [gemüthliche Gegensatz] is a matter of natural disposition. Therefore it cannot be overcome by baptizing, which always remains something external if it happens without the [natural/racial] disposition, contrary to the opinion that Treitschke [still] seems to hold. The spiritual [gemüthliche] and even the physical difference between Germans and Jews will always spoil the feeling of ‘living unity’” (200). Naudh suggests that Treitschke’s insistence on a religious-spiritual difference will inevitably lead him to acknowledge biological and racial difference.

22. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 50; Philippon comments that Treitschke’s remark that the state had the “natural right” to decide who takes part in its leadership is “nonsense” (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 17, 1880, 100).

23. Seligmann Meyer points out that Treitschke refers here to an incident at the Catholic primary school in Linz on the Rhine that is also attended by Jewish children (*Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 9–10). The local synagogue complained that teachers used a book which stated that Jesus had been crucified by the Jews. (Obviously, Jesus was crucified by the Roman administration, irrespective of whatever one might believe was the role played by different Jewish groups and institutions. The gospels do not claim that “the Jews” were responsible for the death of Jesus; only Paul in the first letter to the Thessalonians introduces this notion, apparently as a reaction to his own expulsion from Jerusalem [Thieme, “Die religiös motivierte Judenfeindschaft,” 49–50]).

24. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 51; Philippon points out that only a few years earlier Treitschke had argued in a way completely opposed to his current position. In the context of the *Kulturkampf*, Treitschke had urged the state to break church influence on education in order to avoid a “new religious war” and to ensure that principles of peaceful toleration are central to education. Also, in his earlier essay on “Liberty,” Treitschke had written that the “moral content [sittliche Gehalt]” of Christianity had less and less to do with the actual church but was being represented by the (secular) people (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 2, 1880, 132).

25. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 6, 1880, 211.

26. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 6, 1880, 212. This seems to be an aside on the Kantian concept of religion as promoted by Cohen (“Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 126–27, 146–47).

27. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 1880, 225.

28. Carl Vogt (probably the famous zoologist and “physiological materialist,” former member of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament, who then held a professorship in Switzerland) also reproached Treitschke in a newspaper article (reprinted in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 6, 1880, 212) for “excessive patriotism.” He describes him as a “Slavonic German” who “throws their race in the faces of the Hebrew Germans [der den von Hebräern gezeugten Deutschen ihre Race an den Kopf wirft].” Vogt points to two different motivations for Treitschke’s anti-Judaism. First, Treitschke is the “mouthpiece of the country squires of the Brandenburg Marches [uckermärkischen Krautjunkertums]” (Uckermark is a landscape north of Berlin). These are people who live beyond their means and therefore consider the “economical, industrious and business-minded [geschäftsgewandte] Jews” their biggest enemy. Second, Treitschke is a professor: Christian scholars in Prussia lost their monopoly on the profession just a few decades ago, and “competition from Jews is growing because they are more versatile, faster in taking up a trend that is guaranteed to bring fame and they possess better means to survive the hard [unpaid] times of being a *Privatdozent*.” He adds that the Protestants in France have exactly the same role in academia that the Jews have in Germany.

29. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 1880, 226.

30. Philippson, who defends in this text the *liberal* concept of the state, wrote in another article (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 6, 1880, 210) that the “lust for conversion [Bekehrungslust],” which can be observed in the “most recent movement” against the Jews, is motivated not by religion but by the existence of the state. Philippson seems to have intended to contrast the actually existing state with the concept of the liberal state. He adds that a determined attempt at Jewish conversion first emerged when Christianity became a *state* religion.

31. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 53–54.

32. Breßlau adds in a footnote that he understands those to be “Jewish” who have both parents born as Jews (“Zur Judenfrage,” 54) and refrains from using the concept “Semite” as popular and imprecise parlance.

33. Endner, “Zur Judenfrage,” 99.

34. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 149–50.

35. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 150; “dies Hereinragen [literally: peeping or sticking into] eines Stückes ältester Zeit in die Gegenwart.”

36. “das vom Banne befreite Element”

37. This seems to refer both to the religious wars and to the national fragmentation before 1871.

38. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 157.

39. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 158.

40. Even Bamberger, though, was not free of the sentiment against “Eastern Jews” shared by many assimilated German Jews at the time. Zucker quotes him writing that “the entry of this ‘inexhaustible . . . oriental proletariat’ into academic studies ‘threatens our Jewish West with embarrassment’” (“Ludwig Bamberger,” 349).

41. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 159; Joël argued similarly to Bamberger: “All the talk about the difficulties of amalgamation is professorial doctrinairism anyway. We Jews living here are Orientals to the same degree that today’s Germans are Asians. We are supposed to be aliens because our fathers allegedly lived in Palestine eighteen hundred years ago. *Allegedly* because it is well known that there were large Jewish communities in Europe before the emergence of Christianity. Actually these made possible the dissemination of Christianity in the first place. . . . Is Herr von Treitschke able to tell where his fathers were eighteen hundred years ago? . . . Does a modern nationality exclusively consist of individuals of the same descent? . . . Are the English not a great nation because they are a mixed people, are they not perhaps a great nation for that very reason?” (“Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 20).

42. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 159–60.

43. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 160. In his original contribution, Treitschke had written about this congress at length and very positively (“Unsere Aussichten,” 5).

44. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 161.

45. Lazarus later claimed (in *An die deutschen Juden*) that his was the very first one.

46. Lazarus draws on contributions published in the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which he cofounded in 1859. When the discipline of *Völkerpsychologie* was newly created it had to define its object of research, namely, *Völker* (Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 7). Lazarus draws on an article published in the fourth volume of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* by R. Boeckh, who argues that language is the most significant category defining a nation. In the subsequent section of his lecture, Lazarus elaborates on Boeckh’s approach using a programmatic essay by himself and the coeditor, Steinthal, published in the first issue of the *Zeitschrift* from 1859.

47. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 8–9.

48. In April 1880 the *Deutsche Wacht* published a detailed critique of Lazarus’s “What Does National Mean?” that is signed “N.” (probably Naudh/Nordmann; *Deutsche Wacht*, 386). The text argues against Lazarus that every schoolboy knew “that ‘national’ is derived from ‘nascor’ and refers to the innate [Angeborenes].” “N.” claims that Lazarus wants to “sidestep” this obvious fact and gives the sarcastic advice that Lazarus should better ask “What does people [Volk] mean,” because “with the concept *Volk* it is possible to operate more by sleight of hand [mehr Taschenspieler-Tricks zu spielen] than with the simple concept national.”

49. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 12.

50. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 10.

51. “mannigfachen Ausbildung des innerlich Einen”

52. Lazarus uses *Volk* synonymously with *Nation*.
53. “in naturgeschichtlicher Weise gemachte Eintheilung der Menschenart”
54. *Varietäten*; the term “variety” was then also used as a synonym of “race.”
55. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 11.
56. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 12.
57. “ist auch das Abbild der anschauenden Thätigkeit selbst” (Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 12).
58. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 12.
59. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 13; emphasis added.
60. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 13.
61. “und damit auch die Sache Volk” (Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 13).
62. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 13.
63. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 14.
64. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 14–15.
65. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 15.
66. “uns in eine geschlossene Gruppe unserer Mitgeschöpfe hineinzustellen”; Lazarus quotes from a text by Gustav Rümelin, a “longtime liberal” who embraced Malthusian population control policy (i.e., he demanded “limitations on the poorer classes’ right to marry”) and celebrated rural life (Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 197). Rümelin was the chancellor of the University of Tübingen.
67. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 16.
68. This is an allusion to the book of Ruth.
69. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 16–17.
70. “Aber unser Gemüth . . . wird stets von einer stillen Sehnsucht begleitet sein nach einer vollen einheitlichen Lebensgemeinschaft. Es wird ihm als ein ideales Ziel die zentrale, alle Lebensziele umschliessende Gruppe vorschweben, in welcher alle die einzelnen Gruppierungsmotive ihren Halt-und Sammelpunkt finden, in der wir das volle Bewusstsein haben: das sind die Unsrigen, die Angehörigen zu denen wir stehen, mit denen wir ausharren, deren Geschick wir theilen, von denen zu scheiden ein unerträglicher Gedanke wäre. Diess ideale Ziel der Universal-Gruppe, der vollen Lebensgemeinschaft, ist es nun, was unser deutsches Wort Volk in seinem tiefern Sinn bezeichnen will, ohne sich darum auch jenen unvollkommenen Formen, die durch die einzelnen Hauptmerkmale bestimmt werden, zu verschließen” (Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 17).
71. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 17–18.
72. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 18. Lazarus’s text—be it a unique intervention or just mirroring a general trend of thinking—shows how much the contemporary discussion of the nation in the social sciences is rooted in the nineteenth century. It would be worthwhile exploring how this strikingly contemporary-sounding definition was received throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, whether it was preceded by or paralleled by similar formulations, and especially whether or to what extent Ernest Renan’s lecture from 1882 and Otto Bauer’s *Nationalitätenfrage* (1907; 2000), which seem

to echo it, were directly influenced by it. Alfred Leicht writes in his book on Lazarus that Renan's lecture (1882) was consciously based on Lazarus's lecture, a copy of which Lazarus had sent to Renan (Leicht, *Lazarus*, 19–20). Renan also sent a copy of his 1882 lecture to Lazarus. Although Renan failed to mention Lazarus, the close affinity between the texts was observed by contemporaries, who urged Lazarus to complain (which he did not do).

73. "grobsinnlichen Materialismus der Welt-und Lebensanschauung überhaupt"

74. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 21–22.

75. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 22.

76. Lazarus suggests that it is the form common among animals, who hate each other "for no reason but their difference." However, "living in a peace-breathing human habitat [friedensathmenden Menschenwohnung], dog and cat learn how to get along." "A human being, however, in whom the feeling of humanity has not yet arisen or is already stifled, sees an enemy in every human being who is different." Lazarus's argument is based on a dualism of a bestial-material natural substratum on which- and in opposition to which- humans develop spirit and sociability. The power of spirit over matter is so strong that it even extends to animals when they are being domesticated.

77. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 22.

78. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 25, 26; Lazarus anticipates and rejects the possible counter-argument that only the Jews constitute a community of belief *and* tribe ("sind Glaubens-und Stammesgenossen") *at the same time*. Against this he argues that also the Germans, the English, the Dutch and the Danes share "tribal" background as well as Protestant religion ("sind germanische Stammes-und protestantische Glaubensgenossen"). Furthermore, for the actual life of a French Jew it does not make a difference whether or not there are Jews in Abyssinia, and neither do (Christian) Germans become less German because Christianity might be spreading amongst the Iroquois. The relation of a group of people to the particular state they inhabit is not necessarily affected by the existence of another group of people of the same tribe or religion (or both) in another state.

79. This dictum by Mar Samuel, who taught in the third century CE, can be found in the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Kamma 113b. It says that *dina demalkhuta dina*: "The law of the land [lit.: kingdom] is [recognized as part of Jewish] law." (I am grateful to Prof. Bernard Jackson for this information.) Belke comments that Lazarus overstretchs the meaning of the sentence in a quasi-Protestant direction ("Einleitung," lxx).

80. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 27; page 3 of the appendix of Lazarus's text.

81. As if complementing Lazarus's discussion, or perhaps as a discrete criticism of it, Philippson (in a review of new pamphlets on the "Jewish question," taking up the formulation in the title of a pamphlet under review) suggests replacing the discussion of "What Does National Mean?" with the more pragmatic one, "What Does Alien [fremd] Mean?" (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 5, 1880). He argues that anyone who is born in a country to parents "who belong to this country [die diesem Lande angehören]" and who has been raised and educated there and in its language "is not alien." This "high

and holy right” is unaffected by anyone’s definitions and discussions of the concept of “nationality.”

82. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 57–59.

83. Treitschke’s lecture notes titled “Politics” contain a very similar passage that uses slightly stronger language: only “Jewish presumptuousness” has “by a sleight of hand [Taschenspielertrick] confused *Religion* with *Konfession*” (quoted in K. Krieger, *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit*, 290).

84. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 57–58.

85. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 58.

86. “in dem angehobenen Gange ihrer christlichen Gesittung”; I am not clear about the exact meaning of “angehobenen Gange.” Obviously, it expresses some kind of superiority; *Gang* could either be “pace,” “movement,” or “stance.” The imagery could either be that Christians—further ahead in evolution—walk upright while Jews tend to stoop, or that Christians walk “at a faster pace” than Jews. The strange formulation “angehobenen Gange” occurs in a passage from Fichte’s *Die Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältnis des Urstaates zum Vernunftreiche* (1813), which Treitschke quotes in his 1862 essay “Fichte and the National Idea” (269): “Eine Menschenmenge, durch gemeinsame, sie entwickelnde Geschichte zu Errichtung eines Reiches vereint, nennt man ein *Volk*. Dessen Selbständigkeit und Freiheit besteht darin, in dem angehobenen Gange aus sich selber sich fortzuentwickeln zu einem Reiche”: “A multitude becomes a people through common history; its autonomy and freedom consist in its self-guided development [in dem angehobenen Gange], toward becoming an empire.” The closeness of the idea to Treitschke’s thinking is evident, and it seems quite likely that he picked up the unclear image of the “angehobenen Gange” from this passage by Fichte.

87. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 59–60.

88. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 60.

89. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 133.

90. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 130.

91. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 130–31. Cohen seems to be following here Kant’s argument that it is essential for the state that there is religion but that the subtleties of differing confessions (*Glaubensarten*) should not be the state’s concern (see Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 30–33, 44–67; this is Abschnitt 1,II).

92. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 130–31.

93. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 134; Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 57.

94. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 134.

95. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 135.

96. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 136; compare Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 36–37.

97. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 137; emphasis in the original. Cohen refers here to Lazarus (*Was heisst national?* 37): “Burke once said in the English parliament:

to make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.” “Country” is rendered as “Vaterland” in the German, “lovely” as “liebenswert.” Lazarus uses this formulation in the context of his argument that the German nation is more committed to humanist ideals than is any other nation, i.e. it is—as long as it maintains this commitment—particularly “liebenswert,” literally: worth loving. This formulation can be found in Burke’s “Reflections on the Revolution in France” (*Reflections*, 241; this is page 116 of the first edition of 1790, roughly one third into the overall text). Whether there is also a source in a speech by Burke I do not know. Burke argues here against “mechanic philosophy,” “that sort of reason that banishes the affections,” and for the preservation and cultivation of “public affections” and particular “manners.”

98. “Erster Laut den ich gelallet, süßes, erstes Mutterwort!” Cohen paraphrases the folksong “Muttersprache” (Mother Tongue) by Max von Schenkendorf (1783–1817, born in the Eastern Prussian town of Tilsit). The first verse of the song goes: “Muttersprache, Mutterlaut, / wie so wonnesam, so traut! / Erstes Wort, das mir erschallet, / süßes, erstes Liebeswort, / erster Ton, den ich gelallet, / klingest ewig in mir fort.”

99. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 137.

100. The chain of five reasons—all introduced by “because”—is largely tautological and of a rhetorical character—quite out of the ordinary in the context of Cohen’s usually rather sober, neo-Kantian discourse.

101. By extension, Cohen’s critique could be applied to the rhetoric that is characteristic of the discourses of the missions and “burdens” taken on by European imperialism and, more recently, of the “humanitarian” military interventions mounted by the “international community.”

102. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 137.

103. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 138.

104. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 138.

105. “des Volkes, zu dem wir verschmelzen wollen”

106. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 139; emphasis in the original.

107. “Missgewächs.” This metaphor somewhat resonates with Mommsen’s notion of antisemitism as the “Missgeburt” of “national feeling” (see p. 50); the almost identical image serves in the one case to denounce too much nationalism, in the other, too little.

108. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 139.

109. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 141.

110. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 141; “Die Sittlichkeit eines Volkes ist eine nationale Einheit, oder strebt einer solchen zu. Innerhalb einer nationalen Gemeinsamkeit kann und darf es eine individuelle Sittlichkeit geben. Aber keine in besonderen religiösen Gruppen oder Sekten substantiierte ist wünschenswert.”

111. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 142.

112. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 146–47.

113. “Seinem Staate dienen zu können, muss als heilig gelten, wie Gottesdienst.”

114. “zu rechter Unbefangenheit in euch lebendig werden”

115. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniß in der Judenfrage,” 147; this passage is from the concluding section of Cohen’s text, which consists of three admonitions: two addressed to specific groups within Jewry (Orthodox and Reform Jews), and one toward Jewry in general. The passage quoted here is addressed to the Orthodox Jews, which helps to explain the emphasis on the relevance of the state. The parallel sequence that is addressed to the Reform Jews emphasizes the relevance of religion (see note 192 below).

116. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 200; emphasis in the original. Naudh is probably quoting from Hegel’s *Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (127), “Das Material seiner [des Geistes] Verwirklichung.” If this is what Naudh quotes, he is misquoting: Hegel does not leap (like Naudh does) from “state” to “people” but explicitly talks here about *states*, not *peoples*.

117. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 194.

118. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 194–95.

119. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 195.

120. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 193.

121. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 193, 194.

122. On the *Kulturkampf* see pp. 261–62.

123. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 193.

124. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 192.

125. See pp. 169–70; compare Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 56–57.

126. With “ethno-class” I mean that Naudh’s argument evokes the existence of a group of concrete people who are at the same time an economic and an ethnic group, as in “caste.”

127. “die Empfindung der grossen Zusammengehörigkeit”; Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 212.

128. Quatrefages’s work was based on craniological research (Mendes-Flohr and Reinhartz, *The Jew in the Modern World*, 287).

129. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 213.

130. The untranslatable *eben* marks this as a universally accepted, indisputable statement.

131. Quoted in Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*, 128–30; the poem was first published by Karl Marx in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* and subsequently widely disseminated as a leaflet, despite being banned in Prussia.

132. “Und Alles feig durch euch verscherzt was trotzig wir errungen!” (Cravenly you threw away what our defiance had gained!)

133. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 213.

134. Mommsen silently identifies here “the state in antiquity” with the Greek and Roman examples, which have been either city-states or empires. His formulation “even beyond the demise of their [the Jews’] state,” however, presupposes that at least the Jews had a national state back then. Because he does not develop this, it is not clear whether



Mommsen is aware of this inconsistency; he might have thought of the ancient Jewish state as an exception—a national state *avant la lettre*.

135. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 214.

136. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 215.

137. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 216.

138. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 217.

139. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 217.

140. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 218.

141. It appears that even Bismarck shared the underlying notion of nation formation. He is quoted with saying (in 1892): “The Jews bring into the mix of the different German tribes a certain *Mousseux* that should not be underestimated” (Wawrzinek, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Antisemitenparteien*, 31).

142. “allem deutschen Wesen feindlich”; Treitschke, “Erwiderung an Mommsen,” 228.

143. Treitschke, “Erwiderung an Mommsen,” 228.

144. Treitschke, “Erwiderung an Mommsen,” 228.

145. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 28; Treitschke is here not quoting Tacitus literally; see the exact quotation in the following.

146. “odio humani generis convicti sunt”; Graetz, “Erwiderung an Treitschke,” 27; Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 24.

147. The first thirteen chapters of book 5 of *Historiae* deal with Judaea. The thrust of Tacitus’s attitude here is clearly that the Jews have no *religiones* (holy customs) but only the *superstitio* that consists in the (for Tacitus) abstractly monotheistic belief (“Iudaei mente sola unumque numen intellegunt”). Tacitus opposes the Jews’ “mos absurdus sordidusque” (grotesque and ugly customs) to the “festos laetosque ritus” (festive and happy rites) of a local Gentile cult. He suggests that the Jews’ purely spiritual (“mente sola”) *superstitio* produces an antisocial, anti-state, and anti-patriotic mind-set: this is the meaning of “most disgusting” (“taeterrima gens, sordidus mos”) in this context. Tacitus interprets the Jewish religion thus as a social institution and evaluates it from the perspective of the necessities of the imperial state. Although there is without doubt an element of continuity in anti-Jewish sentiments and reasoning from antiquity to the present, particularly insofar as the relation of the Jews to the state is concerned, the claim of an uninterrupted essential continuity is untenable because there have not been two continually existing unchanging parties—“the Jews” and “the non-Jews.”

148. “Judenhetze,” in quotes in the original; Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 181.

149. Naudh quotes Tacitus calling the Jews a “deterrima gens.” Actually, the text reads “taeterrima gens,” a “most disgusting people” (“deterrima” is not a Latin word).

150. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 36.

151. Treitschke refers to *Annales* 15:44, a notoriously difficult passage; it is impossible to assess this here as a problem in its own right. Tacitus refers to the “Chrestianos”; it is unclear whether this means “Christians,” because there seems to have been another Jewish

sect with a similar-sounding name (followers of a Jew called Chrestos) at the time in Rome (see Feldman, “Contribution of Professor Baron,” 22). My feeling is that Treitschke has a better reading of Tacitus: whoever the “Chrestianos” were, there seems to be an anti-Jewish sentiment involved that is shared by Tacitus. The aristocratic republican Tacitus can be expected to dislike any religious sect that would separate itself from the official Roman imperial doctrine, something that would have been interpreted as “odium generis humanae”: a refusal to adapt to the ruling ideology—if it is “universalist” like the Pax Romana ideology was—would have been interpreted as directed against humanity. Neither the “ethnic” background of the adherents of such cults nor any theological subtleties would have been relevant for Tacitus. Feldman points out that secure assessments of the extent of dislike of Jews in the ancient world is impossible (“Contribution of Professor Baron,” 10). We cannot know how relevant and representative the anti-Jewish remarks are that we know of, and there also seem to be many pro-Jewish statements.

152. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 37; as the alleged quintessence of anti-Jewish attitudes “throughout all of recent history,” Treitschke quotes a line by the Roman writer Juvenal stating that the Jews despise Roman law and “teach, follow and fear” only Jewish law (38).

153. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 37–38.

154. This specifically nineteenth-century idea of a temporal unity of a historical entity called “Europe” or “Occident” from the Greek city-states to the present is what Samir Amin (*Eurocentrism*) calls “Eurocentrism.”

155. If the Roman imperial elite disliked the Jews, it was because of their significant success in making proselytes, i.e., because of their *not being* a static, limited “ethnic group.”

156. It is more than tempting to see in this analysis—perhaps the most sympathetic thing Treitschke ever says about the Jews—a projection from his own account of the history of the German people.

157. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 47.

158. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 47.

159. This formulation is borrowed sarcastically from Juvenal (Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 26).

160. Cassel, *Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 26.

161. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 44.

162. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 44–45.

163. The first synod took place in 1869 in Leipzig, the second in Augsburg in 1871.

164. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 45.

165. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 46; Lazarus adds to this some quotes taken from Goethe, the ethnologist Oskar Peschel, the philosopher Hermann Lotze, and finally Ernest Renan, all of whom testify to the affinity of Judaism to Christianity and the principles of the modern state.

166. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 50–51. Lazarus argues that the modernist spirit of the

first Israelitic Synod had been shared by all participants irrespective of their allegiance to one of the strands within Jewry, including the Orthodox Jews, who embrace and appreciate “the whole of the development” of Jewish thinking, “only perhaps a bit more than they themselves would know” (54). Lazarus quotes, among others, Ernest Renan’s praise of the Talmud and Judaism in general for its rationalism: a religion that links its adherents through the praxis of observing rules in everyday life rather than through dogma is a “reasonable” religion.

167. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 40.

168. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 41.

169. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 22.

170. Lazarus emphasizes that Luther demanded that the Jews be given equal economic rights so that they would not be driven to usury: one should allow the Jews “to participate in trade and production so that they could gain reason and space enough to dwell with and around us [mit lassen werben und aerbeiten, damit sie Ursach und Raum gewinnen, bei und umb uns zu seyn]” (*Was heisst national?* 24).

171. Treitschke, “Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 61–62.

172. Cassel’s job, though, was to convert Jews, which prompted some Jewish commentators to reject his “support” as unwelcome. The fact that Treitschke attacks so aggressively a converted Jew whose business is to convert more Jews to Protestantism (he accuses Cassel of “quarrelsome offensive racial arrogance” [händelsüchtiger, beleidigender Ras-sendünkel]) [“Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage,” 60]) seems to be motivated by ill-feeling toward the converted.

173. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 185–86. In an interesting twist, Naudh lauds the Catholic Church for having withheld the Jewish Bible from believers, while the fanaticism typical of Protestantism stems from its recourse to the Hebrew sources.

174. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 186. Although “monotheistic elements” do not make monotheism, this observation is not wrong, but it merely illustrates the interconnectedness of *all* ancient mediterranean cultures irrespective of “race” (or rather, of the grammatical structure of the “Semitic” or “Indo-European” languages people used).

175. Cohen asserts that his profession as a teacher of “German philosophy” obliges him to “confess” (“Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 126). Since his teaching is intrinsically related to religious issues, he feels he has to legitimate himself before the “Protestant men who not only granted me citizenship but also the religious trust to be teaching as one of them amongst their number.” Cohen will argue not as a representative of a “Jewish party” but as a “representative of philosophy at a German university who confesses to Israelitic monotheism.” Although this is “painful [peinlich]” to him, he will also have to criticize “in some points” his coreligionists. Nevertheless, Cohen confesses to the moral obligation to take sides with the “coreligionist who is threatened in his belief” (145).

176. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 125.

177. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 130.

178. Seligmann Meyer stresses that the differences between Protestantism and

Catholicism have been no less murderous than those between Christianity and Judaism (*Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 17–18).

179. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 130.

180. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 126–27. Cohen quotes (without reference) a footnote from Kant’s “Perpetual Peace (First Supplement: On the Guarantee of a Perpetual Peace)” (Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 114). Reiss translates Kant’s term *Glaubensarten* with “confessions.” Compare also the reference quoted in note 91 above.

181. “sittliche Ideal des Menschengeschlechts”; Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 127.

182. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 128.

183. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 129.

184. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 131; emphasis in the original.

185. In an aside on Felix Mendelssohn, Cohen plays down the relevance of conversions. He asserts that Mendelssohn did not care much about his Jewishness and seems not even to have been aware of his grandfather’s (Moses Mendelssohn) relevance; however, it was not conversion to Christianity but his (Jewish) “religious blood” turning him “toward oratorio not opera” that enabled him to direct Bach’s *St. Matthew Passion*.

186. “in einem modernen Culturvolk”; Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 133; emphasis in the original.

187. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 144; emphasis in the original.

188. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 146.

189. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 149.

190. This argument seems to anticipate Durkheim’s *chosisme*.

191. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 149.

192. This argument parallels his address to the Orthodox Jews stressing the relevance and ethical gravity of the state.

193. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 147.

194. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 148; Philippson (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 16, 1880, 162–64) points out that Cohen is ambivalent about whether Protestantism is already the higher form of Christianity that would allow Judaism to “dissolve into it,” or “not yet.” Nevertheless, Philippson remarks sarcastically, Cohen seems to see himself already there, ahead of the field. He holds against Cohen that any “higher unification” with Judaism is not immediately imminent, because Protestantism itself is divided into many sects and subdivisions (163). Philippson accuses Cohen of “wishful thinking” in this context. In particular he takes issue with Cohen’s formulation that Christianity needs to take “a purer form” (164). He suggests that Cohen uses the concept “form” to make the necessary process appear easier and more imminent than it actually is: he argues that form corresponds to and follows from essence (except in the case of “empty” forms that simply collapse and disappear), and concludes that Christianity is in need of “a purer essence” rather than just “a purer form.”

195. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 174.

196. “sich selbst vergötternde Menschen.” Joël names Feuerbach, Moleschott, and Vogt, none of whom were Jewish.

197. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 17.

198. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 24–25; Treitschke (“Unsere Aussichten,” 25) finds any critique of Christian religious affairs on the part of Jews particularly inappropriate and a “busybody” intervention in what should be none of their business. Against this claim, Seligmann Meyer points out that even the ultramontanist press has acknowledged that Jews in official positions—Lasker is being mentioned as an example—have always remained neutral in Christian religious affairs, such as in the consultations on the legislation concerning Catholic cult (*Zurückweisung des dritten judenfeindlichen Artikels*, 8–9).

199. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 13.

200. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 15.

201. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 30.

202. The phrase “cultural insiderism” is used by Werner Sollors in *Beyond Ethnicity*; quoted by Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic* (3).

203. Treitschke backhandedly excuses Graetz’s anti-German approach with his Jewishness: “a historian who looks at German things from a specifically Jewish perspective must inevitably perceive some things oddly and one-sidedly”; “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 39.

204. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 39.

205. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 41. Treitschke takes particular offense at Graetz’s (actually quite perceptive) comment that Friedrich Schlegel’s novel *Lucinde* is a sibling (*Zwillingsschrift*) of Schleiermacher’s *Speeches on Religion* (both 1799). While the Protestant Treitschke unsurprisingly holds Schleiermacher’s theology in highest esteem (in contrast to Graetz, who is conservative in religious affairs), both authors agree on condemning *Lucinde*: *Lucinde* challenged traditional morality and gender conceptions as much as Schleiermacher’s *Speeches* revolutionized the Protestant discourse on religion.

206. “in seinem zufälligen Geburtslande vollständig aufging”; Treitschke, Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 41–42.

207. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 43.

208. Graetz replied that his remark that “Börne was more than Lessing” had meant that Börne contributed more to (national) liberation; Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 51.

209. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 43.

210. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 44; this is the last sentence of the last chapter in volume 11 (Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, 582). Graetz discusses here the popular movements in February and March 1848 that, as he writes, regularly demanded the emancipation of the Jews. The last two sentences are: “Die Freiheit ist für sie [die Juden] errungen, sie selbst scheinen als Wächter derselben eingesetzt; die Erringung

der Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit steht noch bevor. Die Anerkennung der Juden als vollberechtigte Glieder ist bereits so ziemlich durchgedrungen; die Anerkennung des Judenthums aber unterliegt noch schweren Kämpfen.”

211. Graetz rejects Treitschke's interpretation of his claim and asserts that what he meant was that “Jewish religion or doctrine is not yet recognized, that Judaism is not recognized as a religion or confession, that Jewish clergymen here and there are not on an equal footing with Christian ones. You however insinuate that I was talking about *Jewish nationality*, as if I wanted *Jewish nationality to be recognized*. But is Jewry/Judaism (Judenthum) identical with [Jewish] nationality?” (“Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 51; emphasis in the original). Graetz denies the ambivalence that might be found in his formulation “recognition of Judaism” and claims that Treitschke's interpretation is “malicious.” Treitschke's interpretation of the particular quote is indeed at least one-sided. Seligmann Meyer points out—against Treitschke's interpretation of Graetz's remark that “Judenthum” still remained officially to be recognized—that Judaism as a religious cult was at the time formally recognized only in Alsace-Lorraine, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Hessen, and Nassau but not in Prussia. In Prussia only the local communities (*Synagogengemeinden*) but not the religious community as a whole (*Religionsgenossenschaft*) are recognized—to the effect that Jewish priests, teachers, and so forth did not share the privileges in taxation and public protocol that their Christian colleagues enjoyed. Meyer argues that this is what Graetz was referring to (*Ein Wort an Treitschke*, 32–33).

212. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 44–45; emphasis in the original.

213. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 45.

214. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 46.

215. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 43–44.

216. Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 24.

217. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 48.

218. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 49.

219. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 49.

220. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 50.

221. Graetz, “Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke,” 28.

222. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 13, 1880.

223. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 13, 1880, 21.

224. “als Geschichtsforscher Parteigänger und Romantiker”

225. In a supplement to the *Allgemeine Zeitung* dated February 10, 1880, a very angry letter by Graetz can be found followed by a response stating that Graetz is “unable to understand the modern times.” The author of the response indicates that the conflict with Graetz is about the “unification of Judaism [Judenthum] with the life of nation and state, [which means] the sincere entry [of the Jews] into the life of culture” (page 2 of the supplement).

226. Graetz as quoted by Nadyr (*Offener Brief*), 19). The reference is to Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, 369.

227. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 24.
228. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 18.
229. S. Meyer, *Ein Wort an Treitschke*, 10.
230. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 18.
231. Bamberger, “Deutschtum und Judentum,” 153.
232. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 5. As Lazarus mentions at the beginning, the lecture was “by invitation only.” Because Lazarus intended to contribute to self-clarification among the Jews “with the calm of scientific contemplation” instead of “entering the field of struggle,” “only Jews were invited.” Lazarus uses *Volk* and *Nation* as synonyms.
233. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 6.
234. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 19.
235. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 21.
236. Lazarus, *Was heisst national?* 57–58.
237. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 124. He writes that he feels obliged on two levels: on a general (patriotic) and a personal (professional, academic) level.
238. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 124.
239. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 125.
240. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 140.
241. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 139; this seems to be a reference to what would now be called proto-Zionists.
242. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 9, 1880, 148–49.
243. Very similar arguments can be found in Philippon’s immediate response to Treitschke’s first article (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1879).
244. Oppenheim, “Stöcker und Treitschke,” 18; compare Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 27.

## 5. Emancipation, Assimilation, and the Concept of Rights

1. Treitschke, “Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 38.
2. It is in this context that Treitschke attacks Graetz as a representative of those who maintain an anachronistic claim to separate Jewish nationhood. Treitschke restates this point later on in the same text: “Our state . . . has granted them [the Jews] civil equality only in the expectation that they will make an effort to assimilate to their fellow citizens [dass sie sich bestreben würden, ihren Mitbürgern gleich zu sein]” (“Herr Graetz und sein Judenthum,” 44–45). Also, on two later occasions in the Dispute Treitschke rearticulates his understanding of the issue of emancipation in similar terms. In a “response to a students’ solidarity address” (from November 19, 1880) he states that for him Jewish emancipation “was indeed grounded in the nature of the modern state. But the difficult process does not end with formal emancipation: the point is that the Jews become Germans inwardly, too [dass die Juden auch innerlich Deutsche werden]” (“Antwort auf eine studentische Huldigung,” 120). In a response to Mommsen (“Eine Erwiderung,” 123–25; dated November 19, 1880, the same day that Mommsen’s letter in the *Nationalzeitung*

appeared, but published on the 21), Treitschke stated: “The core of my considerations on the Jewish question consisted in the sentence: ‘what we have to expect from our Jewish fellow citizens is simply: they should become Germans and feel simply and straightforwardly German.’ I do not share the pessimistic opinion of my colleague Mommsen that everywhere in the world ‘Jewry constitutes an effective ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition.’ . . . Rather, I hope that in the course of the years, emancipation will be followed by inner amalgamation and reconciliation.” In this letter Treitschke presents himself as standing firmly in the liberal tradition of emancipation.

3. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 23; Treitschke, “Unsere Aussichten,” 26.

4. The exchange character of emancipation is implied in the notion that one receives a *Schein* on whose cashing in one has to insist. Nadyr (*Offener Brief*, 26) points out that Treitschke alludes in this formulation to Shakespeare’s character Shylock. He writes that in *The Merchant of Venice* Shakespeare turned Paulo Maria Secchi (the merchant in one of the sources used by Shakespeare) into the Jew Shylock in order to demonstrate the effects of denying the nobility of human beings. He emphasizes that Shakespeare had no anti-Jewish intention (a typical liberal nineteenth-century reading of the play). In another pamphlet Graetz points out that the original theme of the Shylock myth did not contain any opposition of Jewish and Christian ethics. Its early literary manifestations seem to be based on opposing the strictness of Roman law to the notion of mercy that is Mosaic as well as Christian (Graetz, *Shylock*).

5. “der Jude ist sozusagen auch ein Mensch”; Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 25.

6. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 12, 1880, 641.

7. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 12, 1880, 641.

8. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 12, 1880, 643.

9. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 143.

10. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 143.

11. Cohen, “Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage,” 144; Cohen adds that Treitschke’s conception that excludes the Jewish *Glaubensart* is basically unreligious in the Kantian sense of *Religion*. This is also why Cohen does not want to appeal to Treitschke (whom he never actually names but refers to as “the editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*”): “from the point of view of general religiosity no words can be found to express adequately the disgust at such an attitude” (142–43).

12. Ludwig Börne was born Löb Baruch in 1786 and died in 1837. For the full text, see appendix 3.

13. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 6.

14. “Börne’s” sarcastic remark can also be applied to the rhetoric of present-day anti-racism, which often exhorts us to “like” and be “friends with” or even “love” foreigners—evidence of a post-liberal lack of trust in the persuasive power of the discourse of human rights or legal equality and in stark contrast to Kantian ethics, whose specific achievement it had been to search for ethical categories that are not dependent on the vagaries and precariousness of liking, loving, and befriending (while *ipso facto* liberating love and



friendship from the burden of having to be ethical). Unfortunately, the *ersatz*-rhetoric of post-liberal anti-racism never works: one can not be friends or in love with whole groups of the population (such as “foreigners”). Liberal Enlightenment universalism that has not been transcended and critically preserved in an emancipatory direction regresses into naive pre-political phraseology.

15. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 10. This passage, like most of the text, is taken from (the real) Börne’s brilliant text “Der ewige Jude” (the title means literally “The Eternal Jew,” which in Börne’s detournement means “And on and on they go about the Jews,” a somewhat tongue-in-cheek moan) of 1821. Börne reviewed in this text a 459-page-strong antisemitic volume by Ludolf Holst, *Judenthum in allen dessen Theilen, aus einem staatswissenschaftlichen Standpunkte betrachtet* (Jewry/Judaism in All Its Parts, Examined from a Political Science Perspective). Judging from Börne’s polemic, Holst anticipated many of Treitschke’s positions; this allows the anonymous pamphletist of 1880 to exploit Börne’s text. The simile is introduced in Börne’s original text as a children’s morality tale (“Der ewige Jude,” 35–36). The last sentence of the passage quoted from the 1880 pamphlet is different in Börne’s original of 1821: “but the sun has started to shine” has been changed from “and the sun—is now forced to shine in America” (36).

16. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 10. This is taken from Börne, “Der ewige Jude,” 41.

17. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 10.

18. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 13–14; emphasis in the original. This is taken from Börne, “Der ewige Jude,” 51.

19. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 13–14. This is taken from Börne, “Der ewige Jude,” 51.

20. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. John Stuart Mill writes in the introductory chapter of *On Liberty* that “this doctrine” (his) is “meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties,” i.e. not to children or “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians” provided it serves their “improvement” (Mill, *On Liberty*, 52).

21. I understand that “Börne” argues that one’s attaining civil rights (on reaching maturity) is one’s moment of “birth” as a citizen, i.e., as a *Man*. His equating of human rights and civil rights leaves him with the contradiction that before actually attaining civil rights, human beings are “Men” in only an incomplete sense.

22. Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 14.

23. “Das Leichentuch ist eure Toga, erst im Grabe bekommt ihr Gemeinwesen!”; Baruch, *Börne und Treitschke*, 14.

24. Nadyr similarly sees the anti-Jewish campaign as scapegoating the Jews for the faults of a political system that produces in Germany economic downturn despite the monetary benefits from the military victory of 1871 (*Offener Brief*, 11).

## 6. The Riddle of Treitschke's Intentions

1. Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten," 27.
2. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 61–62. This is a polemic against interdenominational schools (*Simultanschulen*).
3. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 62; Treitschke refrains from publicly endorsing the measures demanded by the antisemitic agitators of the *Antisemitenpetition* that was widely circulated in the second half of 1880.
4. Treitschke, "Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage," 62–63. On this subject, Cassel makes the reverse claim that "the Jews have lost their pious Semitic spirit among the Germanic heathens" and that after emancipation, many Jews "have been infected by the frivolous spirit of our century" (*Wider Heinrich von Treitschke*, 22–23).
5. Treitschke, "Zur inneren Lage am Jahresschlusse," 226.
6. Treitschke, "Zur inneren Lage am Jahresschlusse," 226–27. After Mommsen explicitly appealed to Treitschke to distance himself publicly from the antisemitic petition, hoping Treitschke could be cleared of the generally held belief that he supported it "because we are proud of having such a teacher and such a man among us" ("Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum," 223), Treitschke lauded the "moderate parties" and the government for keeping silent on the issue of the *Antisemitenpetition*, and dismissed the more straightforwardly antisemitic contributions in the journal *Grenzboten* (generally a publication closely mirroring Bismarck's policies) as "aberrations" for which Bismarck was, Treitschke thought, not responsible ("Zur inneren Lage am Jahresschlusse," 225).
7. Treitschke, "Zur inneren Lage am Jahresschlusse," 227.
8. Treitschke, "Erwiderung an Mommsen," 229.
9. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 151.
10. "für alte unreflektierte Misgefühle nach neuen Rechtsgründen zu suchen"; Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 152.
11. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 153.
12. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 154.
13. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 155.
14. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 155.
15. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 156.
16. indicative (*realis*): "ist"
17. subjunctive (*irrealis*): "hätten recht"
18. "der grossen socialistischen Vermögenstheilung"
19. Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 174–75.
20. Bamberger, too, had just published an anti-Social Democratic pamphlet, "Germany and Socialism" (1878).
21. His ambiguity manifests itself in the flawed grammar of his formulation that mixes a *realis* "if" clause and an *irrealis* main clause: "Wenn es ausführbar ist, Religion wiederherzustellen, hätten sie jedenfalls insoweit recht."

22. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 218.
23. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 219.
24. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 219.
25. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 220.
26. “die wesentlichere Toleranz gegen die jüdische von ihren Trägern nicht verschuldete, ihnen als Schicksal auf die Welt mitgegebene Eigenartigkeit”; Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 221.
27. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 219.
28. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 224.
29. Mommsen, “Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 224.
30. Mommsen was born in the northwestern German state of Holstein, whose annexation by Prussia in 1866 marked one of the major steps toward German unification.
31. Compare Ghassan Hage’s (*White Nation*) concept of the liberal “white worrier” in the context of Australian “multiculturalism.”
32. In its most basic structure, both forms of this argument are a continuation of the line of thought begun by Hobbes: the warlike society of competing individual producers needs either a Leviathan to keep it from destroying itself or a more sublime alternative that prevents a full-blown Leviathan from becoming unavoidable. The better disciplined and regulated “civil society” is—i.e., the more “civilized”—the less ruthless the Leviathan needs to be (see Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*). Spinoza, e.g., knew from the Dutch experience that circumstances permitting, the Leviathan can stay in the cupboard (see S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*).
33. Although Mommsen avoids using the actual term, his allusions are clear enough; he ridicules Graetz’s historiography as “talmudistic scribbling of history [talmudistische Geschichtsschreiberei]” (“Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum,” 214).
34. Joël, “Offener Brief an Treitschke,” 25.
35. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1880, 178.
36. He refers to speeches given by Napoleon on April 30 and May 7, 1806; Naudh quotes from the journal *Reichsbote*.
37. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 196–97.
38. Popular bird mythology seems to differ in English and German vernacular. German ravens are held to be thieves (like the magpie in both German and English), but they act in swarms, not alone (like the magpie).
39. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 197.
40. Naudh, “Professoren über Israel,” 198. All Jews were made liable to obtain annually a license for doing business, and their freedom of movement was restricted. Napoleon’s deliberate destruction of the economic existence of the Jews of Alsace, five-sixths of the French Jews, was, whether intentionally or not, a cover-up of his failure to solve the problem of peasant indebtedness by a programme of agrarian credit (J. Cohen, “Review”).
41. In the context of his rejection of a “mixed culture,” Endner actually suggests the “elimination [Ausmerzungen]” of the “Jewish element” from the “German body” (“Zur Judenfrage,” 114). What precisely he meant by this is not clear, however.

42. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 53.
43. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 73.
44. He denies, however, that anti-Jewish agitation is generally shared throughout Germany.
45. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 75.
46. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 75–76; Breßlau tells about his experience with a man who was “highly educated and very favorably minded” toward himself who still made him the “questionable compliment” that he was “not really a Jew.”
47. Breßlau, “Zur Judenfrage,” 76.
48. Wasserman, “Jews and Judaism in the *Gartenlaube*.”
49. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 95.
50. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 95–96; emphasis in the original.
51. Breßlau, “Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage,” 96.

## 8. Antisemitism

1. Quoted in Cahnmann, “Grundlagen,” 677.
2. Bernal, *Black Athena*, 344; the term was taken from the catalog of peoples in Genesis 1:10, whose author seems to divide all peoples known (or relevant) to him into three groups named after the three sons of Noah, one of whom is called Shem (Nipperdey and Rürup, “Antisemitismus,” 130). For the historical linguists of the eighteenth century, taking up this reference must have been an obvious choice, because in Genesis 1:10 language is one of the main determinants of “a people.” The speakers of languages that modern scholarship refers to as “Semitic” are, however, not identical with the peoples listed there as the descendants of Shem.
3. Sterling, *Judenhass*, 126. An important proponent of the concept of a “Semitic race” (modeled on the linguistic account) was Ernest Renan. Renan supported Jewish emancipation and was not “consciously antisemitic” (Almog, “Racial Motif,” 257). Nevertheless, he gave academic credibility to notions typically held by antisemites, such as that “the Jewish nation” was collectively responsible for the death of Jesus (263) and that Jesus might not have been Jewish after all, given that Galilee was a “racially mixed” province (270). He asserted that language is founded in insurmountable racial difference and hierarchy (266). However, he was prepared to allow some leeway for cultural dynamics and historical change: the Israelite “who has become French, or even better, European” has thereby culturally transcended his lowly racial background (267); in his celebrated speech on the concept of the nation (1882) Renan emphasized that politics ought not to be based on racial categories. Almog suggests that Renan’s professing of individualist-liberal values were part of his public-political agenda but did not “penetrate into [the] deeper levels” of his scholarly thinking (268), nor did it keep him from sharing antisemitic notions of the (modern) Jewish character (271–72).
4. However, Marr had announced an “Anti-Jewish journal” and started using the word “antisemitic” in publications only from the spring of 1880. The journalist of the

*Allgemeine Zeitung* seems to have learned the word from another source and used it for his reporting on Marr's publication (Nipperdey and Rürup, "Antisemitismus," 138). Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr*, chapter 7, discusses the specific context.

5. Volkov, "Antisemitism as a Cultural Code," 39. Zimmermann suggests that the word "antisemitism" may initially simply have been a device for "evading the accusation of engaging in something improper" (*Wilhelm Marr*, 94).

6. Halevi, *History of the Jews*, 132.

7. I follow Blaschke's suggestion (*Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 269) that the term "anti-Judaism" be reserved exclusively to the medieval attitude that treats the Jews as objects of (princely or patrician) patronage and Christian mission, not in any way as "an active factor in politics, economy and culture."

8. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 75–76.

9. Quoted in Bieberstein, *Die These von der Verschwörung*, 113, and in Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 31.

10. They were also anti-Hegelian: they considered Hegel's philosophy an instance of "French-Jewish foreign domination" (Claussen, *Grenzen der Aufklärung*, 127).

11. From a counterrevolutionary publication of 1795 (quoted in Bieberstein, *Die These von der Verschwörung*, 107). Those who accepted this theory could point to Napoleon's efforts to instrumentalize Masonic infrastructure for his own purposes while at the same time promoting Jewish emancipation in the occupied territories. In German anti-French literature of the same period the coincidence of both—despite the fact that most lodges did not admit Jews—was transformed into the notion that Masons and Jews together were instances of the French occupation (108). Not unlike "Jew," the concepts "Freemasons" and "Illuminati" were often used at the time in a loose and metaphorical sense (115). Christian clerics interpreted Napoleon's initiative for a "Big Sanhedrin" in 1806 as further evidence of this conspiracy, identifying the Napoleonic Sanhedrin with the Jewish institution of the same name in Jerusalem that in their view had been responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus.

12. Bieberstein, *Die These von der Verschwörung*, 110.

13. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 20. Furthermore, there have been specific periods in history (e.g., in Poland before 1795) when such an alliance actually existed.

14. Sterling, *Judenhass*, 115.

15. Sterling, *Judenhass*, 117; there seems to be some congruence, and possibly historical relationship, between this ambivalence of pre-1848 German liberalism (mostly a small-town phenomenon anyway) and traditional petit bourgeois resistance to modernizing changes (such as the introduction of new working practices) that in turn seems to have been implicated as early as in the heretical movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that were predominantly supported by artisans (Kofler, *Zur Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*).

16. "die Juden mit den eingebornen, nationalen Menschen nie innigst verschmelzen, und ein Theil jenes harmonischen Ganzen werden [können], den wir einen bürgerlichen

Verein nennen”; quoted in Rohrbacher, “Deutsche Revolution und antijüdische Gewalt,” 38.

17. Rohrbacher, “Deutsche Revolution und antijüdische Gewalt,” 39.

18. The expression “Hep-Hep” might refer to the slogan “Hierosolyma est perdita” (Jerusalem is doomed) from the Crusades against the Jews in the Rhineland in 1097. Claussen (*Grenzen der Aufklärung*, 159) suggests that the perpetrators of the pogroms more likely thought of the sounds with which people call animals.

19. Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 73.

20. Rohrbacher, “Deutsche Revolution und antijüdische Gewalt,” 35.

21. Rohrbacher, “Deutsche Revolution und antijüdische Gewalt,” 43.

22. It is also noteworthy that the anti-Jewish riots of 1848–49 happened in places that were not main places of the revolution (Rohrbacher, “Deutsche Revolution und antijüdische Gewalt,” 31, 36). James Harris demonstrated in *The People Speak!* the existence of a “broad-based, popular and remarkably well-organized” political movement that prevented Jewish emancipation in Bavaria in 1849 and that was not directly related to any form of economic crisis (Rahden, “Ideologie und Gewalt,” 17–18). Richard S. Levy (“Continuities and Discontinuities”) discusses the controversy between those who emphasize socioeconomic context over ideology and those who argue the other way around. As so often, which aspect weighs heavier depends on the specific case in question.

23. Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, 90.

24. Sterling, *Judenhass*, 135, 136.

25. H. Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit*, 91.

26. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, xxi.

27. Jochmann, *Gesellschaftskrise und Judenfeindschaft in Deutschland*, 52. As an example of late-nineteenth-century conservative antisemitism, Smith and Clark describe an influential populist writer in Baden in the 1890s who presented rural Jews as “exemplary for their devotion, for their work, and for their abstinence from drink” while he directed his “antisemitic diatribes” against city Jews as well as “other city people: Old Catholics, Freemasons, Protestant professors” (“The Fate of Nathan,” 12).

28. Claussen, *Grenzen der Aufklärung*, 144.

29. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 33.

30. Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, 115.

31. Rürup writes that antisemitism as a worldview had the function “to allow for a criticism of the existing conditions without questioning their real foundations” (*Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, 116). “Post-liberal mass-based” antisemitism rejected using antisemitism for merely tactical purposes and made it “the goal and content of its struggle” (116), having accepted “the positivist attitudes to law and religion and the notion of mass participation in politics” and also being “more violent, more prophetic, more apocalyptic,” no more respectful of Junkers and cardinals than it is of Jews and Liberals,” being “atheist without being rationalist” (Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 55).

32. It became fatally influential, of course, after World War I.

33. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 75.

34. White, *The Splintered Party*, 137–38.

35. White, *The Splintered Party*, 138.

36. On the urban middle class, Massing writes: “The interests of petty bourgeois high school and university graduates, who coveted jobs and positions as teachers, judges, lawyers, journalists, physicians, engineers, administrators and politicians, were at variance with the old-fashioned notion that religious conversion and political reliability, honesty, and public-mindedness established civil equality” (*Rehearsal for Destruction*, 76).

37. H. Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit*, 97.

38. Wallerstein, *After Liberalism*.

39. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 75–76.

40. Blaschke suggests (in *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*) distinguishing between “openly confessing” racial antisemitism (*Bekennntnisantisemitismus*) and consensual, habitual antisemitism (*gebundener Antisemitismus*). The latter does not typically adopt the rhetoric of “race” but is more fundamental: insofar as it is the “deep structure” (*Tiefenschicht*) of antisemitism (71), it deserves more attention than the former, not less.

41. Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 76; whenever the concept was available at all, there has been a range of views within the framework of Christian theology on whether religious difference is a symptom of racial difference, or race a product of religion (or of a divine master plan) (76). Either way, *both* religion and race mattered and were seen as interrelated.

42. Hilberg, *Destruction of the European Jews*, 17.

43. “Intrigues, cabals, the perfidy of one man, the courage and virtue of another—that is what determines the course of their business, that is what determines [in their thinking] the course of the world” (Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 37). Conspiracy theories come from people who find it plausible that society as a whole is run by intrigues because they understand correctly that their own section of society—the bourgeois spheres of family, business, and political racket—is structured by betrayal, lies, and conspiracy. The extrapolation of this experience to the course of society as a whole, though, is a fetishistic delusion. Sartre’s argument implies that the very concepts of “race” and “racial essence” are intrinsically conspiratorial.

44. This was before it was discovered that electricity is not matter but merely difference of charge, or a relation between antagonistic poles. The analogy is striking. Sartre alludes here to Marx’s concept of “commodity fetishism”; he writes that the bourgeois “behave toward social facts” like followers of fetishistic religions “who endow the wind and the sun with little souls” (*Anti-Semite and Jew*, 37).

45. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 38; the etymology of “race” is unclear; on the various theories see Sommer (“Rasse,” 137–38). Apart from occasional use of the word “razza” etc. from the thirteenth century (in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and French), “race” is increasingly used only from the sixteenth century (from then also in English) in the meaning of (royal or aristocratic) family or lineage (137–38). The aspect of superior

quality is central to the concept: it could also refer to groups of the same (high) social status that were not related by kinship. The use of the word for human beings and for animals (especially horses) seems to have developed in parallel (141). It has not, however, been used in an anthropological sense (i.e., today's sense) before the end of the eighteenth century.

46. Nipperdey and Rürup, "Antisemitismus," 131.

47. The only probable exception is Spain, where a specific historical constellation created the conditions for a specific and, as it were, more modern—i.e., more explicitly racial—discourse.

48. Nipperdey and Rürup, "Antisemitismus," 131.

49. Perhaps the most influential in a series of endeavors to "Aryanize" Christianity included Hegel's essay "Athens and Judea—Should Judea be the Teuton's Fatherland?" (1795), his later identification of Jesus with Socrates, and subsequent comments by Goethe, Dühring, and Chamberlain (Schwarzschild, "Theologico-Political Basis," 77).

50. For example, the liberal Gutzkow wrote in a novel from 1835 that "character" is based on "tribal psychology [Stammespsychologie] and probably has a corporeal basis." He also argued for "racial purity [Racenreinheit]" (Sterling, *Judenhass*, 100–101).

51. Reemtsma, "Die Falle des Antirassismus," 303; see also Graetz, "Mein letztes Wort an Treitschke," 47; Bamberger, "Deutschtum und Judentum," 161–62.

52. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (2002), 172. This is from the final paragraph of "Elements of Antisemitism."

53. The Spanish case, in which the wider populace was not sufficiently mobilized in religious frenzy in order to build mass allegiance to the emerging modern state, was the model from which Spain's more successful competitors England and France learned how to do it better, namely, with more grassroots fanaticism and mass slaughter (Marx, *Faith in Nation*).

54. Reemtsma, "Die Falle des Antirassismus," 305. The same seems to be true of the (formerly Muslim) *moriscos*.

55. "Limpieza de sangre" (purity of blood), seems to have been first demanded already in 1414 by the University of Salamanca from its students. The concept developed in the context of and in interrelation with those of the purity of religious doctrine—a specific understanding of "pure" Catholicism—and the identification of the Spanish nation as its defender (Schilling, "Nationale Identität und Konfession," 212). Post-*reconquista* Spanish theologians did not challenge the Catholic doctrine that all human beings descended from Adam but argued that having fallen from the belief in Christ has irredeemably corrupted the blood of those who only recently (re)converted to Christianity (Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*, 12–13).

56. It is important to note that the exclusion and persecution of *conversos* and *moriscos* was in the first place a struggle over the composition of the ruling elite. Although "Jewish race" clearly implied inferiority (at least that of holding the wrong belief), this "race" was still construed as a faction within the elite, i.e., was connected to how the



word was generally used before the late eighteenth century (Reemtsma, “Die Falle des Antirassismus,” 314).

57. Reemtsma, “Die Falle des Antirassismus,” 315.

58. Langmuir, “Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,” 88.

59. Reemtsma, “Die Falle des Antirassismus,” 320; Reemtsma at this point suggests that the concept of “fighting racism” may better be given up, since it leads to lumping together very different histories of persecution. “Fighting racism” is at best a very imprecise way of putting what needs to be done: taken literally, “fighting racism” means fighting the ways the perpetrators explain their practices to themselves. What need to be fought, however, are specific practices of persecution, exclusion, and exploitation and their specific causes in specific contexts.

60. Smaje, *Natural Hierarchies*, 140–48. Different demographic and socioeconomic relations in different colonies produced different concepts of “race” that cannot be mapped out here. In this section I refer only to the case of the Anglo-American colonies. On the connections between the emergence of the concept of “race,” early colonialism, and the transformations in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe—particularly Spain and England—see Wood, “If Toads Could Speak”; Lewis, “Spanish Ideology and the Practice of Inequality”; Goldner, “Race and the Enlightenment: From Anti-Semitism to White Supremacy” and “Race and the Enlightenment: The Anglo-French Enlightenment and Beyond”; and Smaje, *Natural Hierarchies*.

61. Scheit, *Verborgener Staat*, 559; in the beginnings of this specific discourse in the sixteenth century, the different “races” of slaves were shorthand for differential market price: the main racial characteristics that Europeans bothered to record were related to a prospective slave’s usefulness for specific labors. Although being of “black” (or otherwise “colored”) “race” implied primarily being “predetermined” to be a slave, the concept is not implied in the institution of slavery as such: no slave economy before the American plantation system seems to have developed a “racialized” concept of the people who would be slaves simply, because there was de facto no such predetermination: who would become a slave depended on *fortune de guerre* (Scheit, *Verborgener Staat*, 562–63). Skin color and similar (otherwise irrelevant) features were in the first place mere (“arbitrary” in the linguistic sense) signifiers (Scheit, *Verborgener Staat*, 566). The speculative reversal that changed skin color from a signifier to the supposed *cause* of someone’s “racial make-up” occurred later. On the shift from the “legal” to a “biological” concept of race see especially Guillaumin (*Racism, Sexism, Power, and Ideology*, 37–49).

62. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*.

63. The “socioeconomic” argument that the concept of the “black race” originated from plantation slavery (Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*) does not rule out there having been some kind of “anti-black prejudice” beforehand that *went into* the making of the modern concept of “race.” However, the former needs to be distinguished from the latter.

64. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*, 3; the system of indentured servitude in the colonies “was taken from the cities of Europe, where apprentices agreed to work for

their master for seven years before being admitted to the master's trade" (Tompsett, "1606 and All That," 32). The system "deteriorated" in the colonial setting, where "none of the social forces which kept abuse of the system in check" existed and "paved the way for slavery." In the 1620s, about fifty thousand indentured servants were shipped to the American colonies (38).

65. Skin color came to be significant as a mark denoting, first, "a slave from Africa" as opposed to a slave from Europe, and then, when slaves stopped being recruited in Europe, just "slave" (Guillaumin, *Racism, Sexism, Power, and Ideology*, 138). Subsequently, what had been simply a mark of a social relation—slavery—came to be seen as the origin and legitimization, or even the cause, of that social relation (142). Allen (looking at the different development of racialization in the English colonies on the Caribbean islands and on the American continent) argues that in both cases, the slaveholders were far outnumbered by their slaves and needed a middle stratum to keep the considerable potential for resistance in check. In the case of the islands, this function was taken by a "mulatto" stratum, and on the mainland it was taken by what came to be construed as a "white" propertyless class (*The Invention of the White Race*).

66. Tompsett, "1606 and All That," 28; first all *non-Christians* were turned into lifelong slaves, then all servants who were not *born* as Christians (39). After the slave trade (and then also slavery) had been abolished, the concept of the "white race" in the American context became more complex, especially due to large-scale immigration of Europeans in the nineteenth century.

67. Conze, "Rasse," 157; Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*.

68. Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*, 13. The crucial difference is that in the French case a much wider section of the population was actively involved.

69. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 162–63.

70. Sieyes in "What Is the Third Estate," quoted in Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*, 28. Sieyes is of course being polemical. It cannot be inferred that he took the myth of the Frankish origin of the high aristocracy at face value, although others might have. On Sieyes see Sewall, *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution*.

71. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 166; Arendt suggests that nationalism reinforced by race-thinking developed due to the protracted period during which the formation of a unified German nation-state failed to occur: it is a form of "frustrated nationalism" (166).

72. Sokel, "Dualistic Thinking."

73. "Ontological antisemitism" is perhaps no more than a more precise term for what above has been called "weltanschaulicher Antisemitismus."

74. Hage develops in *White Nation* the argument that the concept of "race" does not in itself imply an imperative for action.

75. This distinction is crucial but cannot be fully developed here. The idea of communism as articulated by Marx—aiming at the creation of the "social individual"—is modernist, as it aims at the *Aufhebung* (sublation, supersession, preservation) of liberalism rather

than its suppression. “Primitive” notions of communism that have existed throughout the history of Christianity on the fringes of, or outside, the church as an organization but within the framework of Christian theology (see Kofler, *Zur Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*) have since the nineteenth century been absorbed by anti-individualist, anti-liberal reaction. Primitive communism refers to the Christian notions of (cosmological and metaphysical) “natural right” and universal human equality. Their absorption by reactionary anti-emancipatory movements since the nineteenth century arguably was helped by their theological roots: the ideal of universal equality was contradicted by the fetishism and obscurantism characteristic of religious thinking *tout court*, as well as the more or less authoritarian character of religion’s specific organizational forms.

76. Blaschke, “Antikapitalismus und Antisemitismus,” 116; this idea had two elements that would typically but not necessarily appear together: the Jews are *historically* responsible for having caused, and they are of *the same essence* (*wesensgleich*) with liberalism, individualism, and capitalism. It seems difficult to establish whether Christian conservatives on the whole have been (or are) more prone to endorsing antisemitism (on grounds of reinforcing Christianity) or opposing it (on grounds of defending religion).

77. This was not the case, incidentally, within the (comparatively marginal) bourgeois strand of nineteenth-century Catholicism. As the parallel existence of bourgeois Catholicism proves, nineteenth-century Catholicism did not *have to be* “anti-capitalist” as far as the theology as such is concerned. The economic elements of antisemitism also existed in the Protestant context, especially in Lutheranism, although apparently less pervasively.

78. Blaschke, “Antikapitalismus und Antisemitismus,” 122.

79. Blaschke, “Antikapitalismus und Antisemitismus,” 124.

80. Quoted in Blaschke, “Antikapitalismus und Antisemitismus,” 142. The Catholic version of anti-capitalist antisemitism was not so much traditional but rather a product of *Traditionalisierung*, i.e. the “inventing” of tradition, a conscious nineteenth-century tendency to reappropriate elements of medieval thinking (also as part of a revival of Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy) (135).

81. The classic contribution to the analysis of “anti-capitalist” antisemitism is Massing (*Rehearsal for Destruction*), formulated in parallel and in dialogue with Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which also touches on the subject repeatedly, especially in the chapter “Elements of Antisemitism.” The most compelling theoretical account based in the same tradition is Postone (“Anti-Semitism and National Socialism” and “The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century”); see also Bonefeld (“Notes on Anti-Semitism” and “Nationalism and Anti-Semitism”). The most important historical accounts are Leuschen-Seppel (*Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus*) and Wistrich (*Socialism and the Jews*).

82. The Catholic doctrine itself has roots in classical Greek thinking, in particular Platonic conservatism, which expressed hostility to certain forms of (classical, i.e., not capitalist) commodity production. Nineteenth-century Catholicism could mobilize such

elements from the legacy of the thinking of classical Mediterranean civilization (which it inherited via Aristotle via late-medieval Islam and Judaism) that had been preserved within the body of Christian thought (for a similar argument see Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 84–91). However, such ideas could only become relevant because of a specific receptivity to them in the mind-set characteristic of members of modern bourgeois society.

83. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 213.

84. Toussnel, from “Les Juifs, rois de l’épogue,” quoted in Wistrich, “Radical Antisemitism,” 112, 114.

85. In a polemical remark about the commercially minded bourgeoisie of the wealthy trading place Hamburg, Heinrich Heine (in a letter from 1816) adopted the traditional imagery in a playful and sarcastic way that can stand for countless similar (although less witty) remarks by others: “I call all Hamburgers Jews, and those whom I call baptized Jews—in order to distinguish them from the circumcised ones—are *vulgo* called Christians” (quoted in Aschheim, *Culture and Catastrophe*, 48).

86. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 213.

87. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 13; e.g., the antisemite Otto Glagau, who attacked “predatory capital,” presented himself as a spokesman of the petit bourgeoisie (12).

88. Achinger, *Gespaltene Moderne*, 339.

89. Achinger, *Gespaltene Moderne*, 341–43.

90. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 37; in contrast to Germany, a significant portion of the (very few) French Jews were members of the upper bourgeoisie. An explosive social development during and after Napoleon’s “continental system” of blockading trade with Britain (from 1806), accompanied by huge demand for money capital, warranted their economic success, which—due to census-vote—translated into what came to be seen as political privilege, too. This is the background for nineteenth-century France’s “becoming the breeding ground of new anti-Jewish moods, tendencies and ideologies” (Schenck, “Nationalismus und Antisemitismus,” 710). Similarly, von der Dunk points out that France, where modern, “ideological” antisemitism originated (with Proudhon, Fourier, Blanqui, Toussnel, Tridon and others), was the only place where consistently realized emancipation actually created the conditions for the full integration of wealthy Jews into the upper bourgeoisie (“Antisemitismus zur Zeit der Reichsgründung,” 81–82). In Germany, by comparison, similar arguments anticipated the effects of Jewish emancipation *before* it had a chance of becoming a reality. Arendt writes that only the necessity to take sides against clerical, reactionary, anti-republican antisemitism in the context of the Dreyfus affair ended the long tradition of antisemitic republican-socialist thought in France (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 47), more or less.

91. Documented in Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 277. This formulation betrays in particular clarity how the antisemitic argument is indebted to Aristotle’s discussion in the first book of *Politics*, chapter 3, of the distinction between the two forms of acquisition of property, one natural, limited, and necessary, the other artificial and infinite

(39). Aristotle develops here the distinction between the use of a thing as what it was intended to be used for (as a shoe is being used as a shoe when it is being worn) and the use of the same thing for exchange. Exchange that goes beyond the bartering of surplus in order to acquire something that is needed for subsistence leads to the development of money and trade and becomes (unnatural, unnecessary, and unethical) “wealth-getting.” Its most abominable and unnatural form is “usury,” the earning of interest, which is “money born of money” (51; 1258b). Aquinas restated Aristotle’s argument in the thirteenth century and made it part of modern Catholic doctrine, although the extent to which he followed Aristotle’s prescriptions seems a matter of contention (see Neves, “Aquinas and Aristotle’s Distinction on Wealth”; Kirschenbaum, “Jewish and Christian Theories of Usury”).

92. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 103.

93. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 102.

94. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 43; Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 102.

95. Stöcker quoted in Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 12.

96. In Marx’s dialectical view (such as in the *Communist Manifesto*), the “real” social movement of communism *is* in its essence the dynamism of capital—namely, the antagonistic relation of capital and labor.

97. Talmon, “Mission and Testimony,” 154.

98. Pulzer refers here to the conservative antisemite Constantin Frantz (*Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 256).

99. For a number of reasons, the process of developing industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century did (then) not lead to significant antisemitism in the Netherlands, where the Jews constituted up to 3 percent of the population (three times the ratio of Germany, and a multiple of the French figure), with Jews constituting up to 13 percent of Amsterdam’s population (and continuing to speak Spanish and Portuguese apart from Yiddish) (von der Dunk, “Antisemitismus zur Zeit der Reichsgründung,” 86–87). Among the various reasons for this might have been a centuries-long non-agrarian and non-aristocratic history that did not stigmatize money and moneymaking (helped by the bourgeois-Calvinist ethos that went with it). It is an interesting facet of Treitschke’s ambivalence that he celebrated the Dutch bourgeoisie for exactly the reasons that seem to have made them immune to overt antisemitism. Anti-aristocracy immunized the Dutch (like the revolutionary, postcolonial Americans) only temporarily, though: recurring cycles of capitalist crisis force all modern societies into the same boat, however heroic and revolutionary their individual pasts may have been.

100. On the concepts of value and productivity see Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination* and “Rethinking Marx”; and Rubin, *Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value*.

101. Bermann (*Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus*, 19) writes that the rabbinical ethics of classical Judaism can best be understood as the “corporate ideology of artisans,” as it emphasizes more than most other religious traditions the value of work,

and there are many rabbinical injunctions against the money trade (18). Differing from the Christian interpretation, the rabbinical tradition asserts that Adam was working even in Paradise (Genesis 2:15). Maimonides in the twelfth century praised physical labor even, and perhaps especially, for intellectuals and the wealthy (20).

102. Leon, *The Jewish Question*, 123.

103. Berman, *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus*, 25; see also Leon, *The Jewish Question*, 123.

104. Initially the church had only banned *clerics* from taking interest (Cahnmann, “Grundlagen,” 640). For the late Middle Ages the rule was: “When the Christian took interest it was a sin and could be repented. When the Jew did the same it seemed natural; from him nothing good was expected” (643). However, the ban on interest was sidestepped in many ways whenever moneylending was an attractive option.

105. Lazare, *Antisemitism*, 60.

106. Such conditions could be the occurrence of intense pressure from the value-producing classes combined with a very high rate of profit. It is significant in this context that in the post-Fordist/postmodern period the chatter about “ethical” trade, prices, wages, etc., has increased and has established a moral discourse on the economy that occasionally serves as a gateway into renewed forms of “anti-capitalist” antisemitism.

107. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the guilds managed to have the Jews driven out of most German towns onto the countryside (Bermann, *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus*, 30). The word “usury” (the German *Wucher* literally means “growth, increment”) did only successively adopt the moral meaning of “excessive” interest. Drawing on sixteenth-century cases, Po-Chia Hsia asserts that the agitation against Jewish usury did not primarily come from the lower classes that were directly engaged with Jewish moneylenders but from parts of the clergy and the guilds who feared the Jewish competition in selling small consumer goods (former pawns) cheap (“The Usurious Jew,” 165). Many of the sixteenth-century texts quoted by Po-Chia Hsia jump without much mediation from a religious anti-Jewish to an anti-usury discussion that is explicitly directed at Christian as well as Jewish usurers, both called “Jews.” To say that only Jews tended to be usurers in certain rural areas is to say nothing other than that only Jews were giving credit when others saw no creditworthiness. Precarious small-scale credit always carries a higher interest rate than more secure forms of credit. Sterling mentions that in 1836, large-scale landowners in the Prussian Rhineland managed to persuade the state to ban Jewish usury, referring to the misery it allegedly brought on the peasants, to the effect that the latter had to sell off their land to the same landowners because of a lack of cash flow (*Judenhass*, 33). On the migrations of the Jews in general see Halevi, *History of the Jews*.

108. Leon, *The Jewish Question*, 137.

109. Leon, *The Jewish Question*, 153.

110. Schenck, “Nationalismus und Antisemitismus,” 698–99; Cahnmann, “Grundlagen,” 649.

111. Penslar, *Shylock's Children*, 19–20.
112. Penslar, *Shylock's Children*, 21.
113. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 104.
114. On the petition see pp. 000–000.
115. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 37; in practical terms and despite legal emancipation, only converted Jews tended to be admitted to state office in the German Reich. Conversion was seen in this context as proof of an individual's readiness to function as a loyal and disinterested bureaucrat (Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 98)—for the Jews, of course, it was an *additional* and particularly painful test of commitment.
116. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 14.
117. On the *Kreuzzeitung*, actually called *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, see note 27 for chapter 1.
118. In the elections to the Prussian Diet (1873) and those to the Reichstag (1874), Conservative seats were slashed by roughly two-thirds (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 918).
119. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 17. The relevant editions of *Germania* are 174, 185, 189, 190, 201, 203, and 228, all in August–October 1875.
120. *Kreuzzeitung* 148 (1875), quoted in Bernhardt, “Die Juden sind unser Unglück!” 36.
121. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 14–15.
122. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 15; see also Zumbini, *Die Wurzeln des Bösen*, 142–50.
123. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 18.
124. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 76. Pulzer writes that Mehring, Engels, and Bebel thought highly of this book when it first came out.
125. Rudolf Meyer had previously (1874–75) published a pioneering and sympathetic work on the labor movement in Europe and the United States, *Der Emanzipationskampf des vierten Standes* (The Fourth Estate's Struggle for Emancipation) (Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 75). After the publication of his book on the *Gründer* period he was forced into exile.
126. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 78. Meyer was a disciple of Rodbertus and became in the 1890s a contributor to the Social Democratic *Neue Zeit*. Mehring reported that Meyer had influenced Stöcker but did not support him (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 215).
127. Retallack, “Anti-Semitism, Conservative Propaganda, and Regional Politics.”
128. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 22. On *Katheder* socialism see the section “Liberal State Socialism in the German Reich” in chapter 9.
129. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 23.
130. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 90; the word “Workers” was dropped from the party's name in 1881 after workers failed to turn up.

131. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 93. Stöcker understood that the “enemies of democratic rule now had to make use of the democratic process to maintain the old structure of power” (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 27). However, antisemitism was not in the foreground of his rhetoric as long as he tried to target workers.

132. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 29–30; see 278–87 for a translation of the speech.

133. In a letter written in September 1880 (but published only in 1895), Stöcker said that he wanted to attack “only frivolous, godless, usurious, fraudulent Jewry which, indeed, is the misfortune of our people” (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 30). (He seems to allude here to Treitschke’s formulation.) Stöcker later claimed that Bismarck’s social welfare policy was his political victory (44). The apogee of Stöcker’s movement was in 1881; it was already in marked decline by 1884.

134. Quotes taken from Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 279–87.

135. Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, 222.

136. Katz, *Emancipation and Assimilation*, 281.

137. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 10; Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 105. *Gartenlaube* means “summer house” or “bower,” implying that this publication is meant to be read in leisurely and recreational surroundings.

138. Wasserman, “Jews and Judaism in the *Gartenlaube*,” 48.

139. Wasserman, “Jews and Judaism in the *Gartenlaube*,” 52; it presupposed that its readers were used to an undemanding, light version of religion that was more or less indifferent to any specific religious content—a petit bourgeois clientele who would not have the stomach for either actually believing or not believing in a religion. Like the *Grenzboten* in the same period, it shifted from liberal to conservative in the course of the 1880s (Wasserman, “Jews and Judaism in the *Gartenlaube*,” 55). On the *Grenzboten* see note 150 below.

140. Katz, *Emancipation and Assimilation*, 285.

141. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 53.

142. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 212. As Katz writes, Glagau’s often-quoted formulation, “The social question is nothing but the Jewish question,” was made not in the *Gartenlaube* but in the book only (*Emancipation and Assimilation*, 285). While in the form that Glagau’s articles appeared in the *Gartenlaube* (edited by its liberal editor) they were not anti-liberal and not aggressively antisemitic (285; see also Wasserman, “Jews and Judaism in the *Gartenlaube*,” 60), Glagau seems to have developed a straightforwardly antisemitic discourse only when he experienced that his audience responded positively to anti-Jewish formulations.

143. Quoted in Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 94; Claussen and Massing seem to be quoting from the book version of Glagau’s articles.

144. Quoted in Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 11.

145. From “The Stock Exchange and Speculation Fraud in Berlin,” quoted in Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 97.



146. “aber ich will sie revidiren, und zwar funditus revidiren”; Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 103–4.

147. This example shows how the antisemitic discourse connects the notion of Jewish inferiority with that of Jewish superiority: the Jews are (effectively) superior through being (morally) inferior. This stands against the often-repeated suggestion that the concept of antisemitism ought to be strictly demarcated from that of racism because racists see their objects as inferior, whereas antisemites see their objects as superior. This paradox has been most clearly pronounced by Nietzsche: “The Jews are beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race now living in Europe. They understand how to persevere under the worst conditions, because of certain virtues which one should like to call vices” (in “Der Antichrist,” quoted in Baron, “Changing Patterns of Antisemitism,” 20).

148. From 1880 to 1889 Glagau edited an antisemitic middle-class magazine called *Der Kulturkämpfer* (The Culture-Struggler) (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 212). On this, see also Weiland’s *Otto Glagau und “Der Kulturkämpfer,”* which contains several of Glagau’s texts as documents.

149. Weiland, *Otto Glagau und “Der Kulturkämpfer,”* 66. The title *Der Kulturkämpfer* implies that antisemitism was an extension of the (anti-Catholic) *Kulturkampf*. Weiland’s *Otto Glagau und “Der Kulturkämpfer”* offers the currently most useful general presentation. She points out that the opposition of a “good German liberalism” to a “bad Jewish liberalism” especially in Glagau’s brand of antisemitism helped liberals to embrace antisemitism without having to deny their past (143).

150. Beginning in 1848 the *Grenzboten* was edited by Gustav Freytag and Julian Schmidt and targeted a bourgeois readership that the editors aimed to educate toward national self-consciousness and the trust in Prussian liberalism (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 242). *Grenzbote* means “messenger from the border.”

151. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 195.

152. They were first published anonymously, but in subsequent book publications they appeared under Busch’s name (Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 96).

153. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 84. This seems to mean that the Bismarck camp at this point took steps to recuperate antisemitism from the right-wing Conservatives.

154. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 47; Pulzer and Massing, as well as most other scholars, seem to quote from a twelfth edition of 1879. Pulzer and Massing suggest that there was a first edition in 1873, while most others suggest that all twelve editions are from 1879 (Nipperdey and Rürup, “Antisemitismus,” 138; Zimmermann, “Two Generations,” 91; Katz, *Emancipation and Assimilation*, 281; Bernhardt, “Die Juden sind unser Unglück!” 37). In his own “testament” of 1891, Marr states that it was first published in 1879 and went through eleven editions selling less than twenty thousand in all (Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr*, 133, 166). A facsimile of the eighth edition (1879) is downloadable from [www.gehove.de/antsem/](http://www.gehove.de/antsem/). More important than whether or not there was an edition of 1873 is that the

text went through a large number of editions in 1879, the year it gained a mass audience.

155. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 53.

156. “Marr’s extreme hatred of Catholicism was no less virulent than his attacks on Judaism.” In his youth he had been “preaching a confused atheistic utopia to German artisans in Switzerland” (Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, 533).

157. I quote from the bound edition of the first year’s issues (Berlin, 1880).

158. The article is not signed, but most probably written by the editor.

159. *Deutsche Wacht*, 3.

160. *Deutsche Wacht*, 4. The word *Verjudung* was coined by Richard Wagner already in the original version of “Das Judentum in der Musik” (1850), but it became common currency only in the 1870s (Aschheim, *Culture and Catastrophe*, 46).

161. On Nordmann see note 90 for the introduction.

162. It first appeared anonymously, and the fifth edition is from 1862. Naudh claims its authorship in his *Israel im Heere* (1879). In a pamphlet from August 1879, an opponent of antisemitism (Scholl, *Das Judentum und die Religion der Humanität*) claims that Marr’s text merely emulates Naudh’s publications. Naudh’s argument is indeed more sophisticated than Marr’s.

163. The same is true of Richard Wagner. Wagner had published in 1850 (under a pseudonym) the essay “Das Judentum in der Musik” (Judaism in Music) (in the specialist publication *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*), which had a small circulation and provoked few responses. It was mostly a polemic against “Hebrew taste” and attacked the works of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Heine, and Börne. In 1869 Wagner published (under his real name) a largely rewritten and longer version of the virtually forgotten text as a pamphlet, and this received many more—mostly negative—responses. This revised version was much more straightforwardly racist (although the word “race” does not occur) and became a point of reference for the emerging antisemitic movement. Because of its style and musical references, it hardly met a mass audience. (The edition by Fischer documents, annotates, and contextualizes the two versions of the text.) The “*ne plus ultra* of antisemitic extremism” (Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 50) of the time was, however, the philosopher Eugen Dühring’s atheist work, *Die Judenfrage als Rassen-, Sitten- und Kulturfrage* (The Jewish Question as a Question of Race, Morality, and Culture [1881]; compare Claussen, *Was heisst Rassismus?* 64). Dühring proposed a “sort of ‘national’ Socialism” based on national self-sufficiency in a controlled economy (Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 50) that differed from that of the *Kathedersozialisten* through a stronger affirmation of populism. He stressed that it is “precisely the baptized Jews who infiltrate furthest,” which was why he saw need for a strictly racial form of antisemitism (quoted in Mendes-Flohr and Reinhartz, *The Jew in the Modern World*, 273). Against Conservatives, and also against Treitschke, whom he did not regard as a serious fellow antisemite, Dühring insisted that antisemitism should be more than a tactical instrument of anti-liberalism.

## 9. Liberalism and National Liberalism

1. Quoted in Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 19.
2. On “anti-capitalism,” compare Postone, “History and Helplessness”; Bonefeld, “Nationalism and Anti-Semitism.”
3. Quoted in Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 33; in particular, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch was known as a follower of Bastiat, but it seems Bastiat was generally more popular in Germany than in any other country at the time.
4. Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 34.
5. Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 35.
6. Bastiat’s concept of “economic harmony” is closely related to his rejection of classical political economy’s labor theory of value (Smith, Ricardo), since the concept of surplus value (and its appropriation) inevitably implies the concept of class antagonism. In a form of liberalism based on Bastiat’s theory, separate working-class organization will appear as unnatural disturbance of a *presupposed* natural harmony (while politics based on classical political economy tend to be more prepared to defuse separate class interests by recognizing them, and accept independent social and political organizations of the working class as partners in the process of *creating* “economic harmony” through negotiation and bargaining). Zucker’s (*Ludwig Bamberger*) detailed charting of Bamberger’s journeys among Smith, Proudhon, and Bastiat is particularly interesting to read, keeping these basic contradictions within liberal political economy in mind.
7. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 13.
8. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 20.
9. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 21.
10. Bramsted, “General Introduction,” 37.
11. A detailed historical comparison would be needed to decide to what extent the developments described here and the brand of National Liberalism they produced are “German peculiarities.” My contention is that all the elements that made liberalism illiberal in Germany seem to have been, and indeed seem to be, present in similar form in other national contexts. Modern society is a global phenomenon as much as it is a national one; some of the implications of this suggestion will be discussed in the conclusion.
12. Berger, *The Search for Normality*, 28–29. On the contradictions of the 1848–49 revolution see Siemann (*Die deutsche Revolution von 1848/49*) and Dreßen (1848–1849). On the “Prussian school of history” see Ping (*Gustav Freytag and the Prussian Gospel*).
13. Quoted in Berger, *The Search for Normality*, 29.
14. Before 1848 the liberals who subsequently formed National Liberalism rather optimistically expected “Prussia to be absorbed in Germany,” being “rejuvenated” by the breath of liberal, “free German life” and even being “dissolved into its various provinces which would become in their own right part of the united Germany” (Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 139–40).
15. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 28–33.

16. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 37.
17. Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*, 74.
18. Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*, 113; literally, they “throttle liberty.”
19. Thompson, *Customs in Common*.
20. Dreßen, 1848–1849, 159.
21. Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*, 128.
22. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 46.
23. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 137.
24. Engels, “Die deutsche Reichsverfassungskampagne.”
25. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 138.
26. Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 131.
27. Quoted in Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 131.
28. Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 141; Kohn argues that the discussion concerning Poland in July 1848 was “one of the most important turning points” in which the sea change became apparent. The province of Poznan had been given to Prussia in 1815 by the Vienna Congress “as an autonomous province, preserving its Polish character.” The older liberal position that a Polish nation-state should be restored was only maintained by a minority in July 1848, while a majority appealed to “the right of conquest by plough and sword” (142–43) and voted for annexation. This decision anticipated the other two territorial questions that would become decisive issues over the following decades, Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine.
29. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 55. Riesser had been the vice-president of the National Assembly.
30. The 1850 version of the text reads “luxuriöses Geistesspiel”; in the revised 1869 version (which became much more influential than the original text) “luxuriöses” is replaced by “nicht sehr hellsehendes [not so far-sighted].” The passage is from the second paragraph of the original text.
31. 1850: “disputierten”; 1869: “wir . . . uns ergingen [we enthused ourselves]”
32. 1850: “blossen Gedankens”; 1869: “allgemeinen Gedankens [a general idea]”
33. Wagner, “Das Judentum in der Musik,” 144–45.
34. Quoted in Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 59.
35. Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 10.
36. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 31.
37. Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*; twentieth-century “third-worldist” theories of intensive state-led “development” did indeed refer back to List and the exemplary ascendancy of Germany as industrial world power; see, e.g., Chirot and Hall, “World-System Theory.”
38. Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 8–9, 12.
39. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 61. As a student, von Rochau participated in the storming of the Frankfurt Hauptwache in 1833; he became a member of the Reichstag in 1871 (Dreßen, *Gesetz und Gewalt*, 200–201).

40. To be sure, this is not to be confused with “might is right” or with the Nietzschean perspective that right *originates* in material power relations (which is a sort of criticism of idealism). Rochau says that right (still conceived of in a bourgeois-idealist fashion) minus might equals empty talk. His claim is that the idealism of bourgeois right *also* needs guns.

41. This is obviously an instance of the kind of “historical irony” favored by Hegel. The *double* irony is that in the *very* long run the *kleindeutsche* National Liberal trajectory came true: Germany is now undeniably a hegemonic modern liberal power, but its journey in the twentieth century included historical experiences of the most illiberal kind in dimensions that no one—neither the most ruthlessly Machiavellian National Liberal nor the most sensitive critic—could have anticipated.

42. Baumgarten wrote in 1870: “Unity, power of the state, national independence are the highest of all political goods” (Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 182). During the 1870s he had second thoughts, and by 1882 he had become a fierce critic of Treitschke’s second volume of *Deutsche Geschichte* (German History) (183). Baumgarten’s development is in this similar to Mommsen’s.

43. In 1859 the Nationalverein (National Association) was founded as a “one-point” coalition uniting liberals and democrats “by avoiding a programme of domestic policy” (Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 83). The Fortschrittspartei (Progress Party) was formed in 1861 by left-wing members of the older “Liberal Party” and some moderate democrats. It gained considerable popularity by opposing the increase of military spending, but lost much prestige when it gave in to Bismarck (who became minister president in 1862) in the “constitutional conflict” (1862–66). After the war against Austria (1866) the right wing split off and founded a “National Party” that subsequently fed into the “National Liberal Party” in the Reichstag of the Federation (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 210).

44. The strength of liberal pro-Prussianism is most impressively illustrated by the fact that almost without exception Jewish deputies of all German states—even in countries that were predominantly anti-Prussian, such as Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hessen—fought for a *kleindeutsches* Reich under Prussian leadership (Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 249). Gabriel Riesser said in the speech that was instrumental in convincing the National Assembly to vote for hereditary monarchy and against the secret and equal ballot in 1849 that German unification was a priority from the achievement of which Jewish emancipation will follow by necessity (Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 182).

45. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 743.

46. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 745; the Latin word *liberalis* had the two meanings “to do with liberty” and “generous; as is proper for a free born man.” *Liberalitas* was “noble, liberal-minded and generous attitude” (745), a characteristic of an individual and referring to the public sphere, not the political sphere. It was connected to prestige and public standing. Under Julius Caesar it became also a political term denoting “Caesarian” spending politics.

47. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 742.

48. This has led Janik to suggest that “liberalism” is a concept of the type of “essentially contested concepts” that merely constitute a specific discussion and a range of disagreements that are considered legitimate within the framework of that discussion (“Liberalismus und Aufklärungswelt,” 67). Janik writes that liberalism is best understood as a relational element within a dynamic range of concepts from “reactionary” through “conservative” and from “liberal” to “radical.” At any given moment, the precise meaning of any of these concepts depends on how all of them are related to each other by discursive practice.

49. Mosse, “German Jews and Liberalism in Retrospect,” xiv. On the concept of *Bildung* see Sorkin, “Wilhelm von Humboldt.”

50. Jarausch and Jones, “German Liberalism Reconsidered,” 13.

51. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, xiii.

52. Arblaster, *Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism*, 11–14.

53. Janik, “Liberalismus und Aufklärungswelt,” 70–77.

54. Wallerstein, *After Liberalism*, 1.

55. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 749.

56. Quoted in Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 747.

57. Quoted in Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 747.

58. “der einzelne Bürger sich doch überreden kann, dass er nach seinem eigenen Sinne lebe und bloss seiner Neigung gehorche”; Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 747.

59. Quoted in Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 747.

60. “erweitert sich mit dem Geschäft auch der Gesichtskreis”; quoted in Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 748.

61. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 751.

62. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 751. In England, a journal called *The Liberal* first appeared in 1822. The Whig Party was officially referred to as “the liberals” for the first time in 1847.

63. Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 152.

64. Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 158.

65. Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 162.

66. Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution*, 60, 61.

67. Quoted in Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution*, 61.

68. It was only later referred to as the “Manchester School.” It is probable that this concept was brought into the German discussion by Ferdinand Lassalle, who first learned it from Karl Marx (Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 806). Also, the term “liberal economics” was first used by Lassalle in 1864 as a near synonym for free-trade politics. Lassalle also used the term “the political and the economic bourgeois doctrine.” In the 1870s there are more references for this use of the term “liberal.” A systematic use of the concept of liberalism “as economic doctrine, party and epoch concept” can be found in the Social Democratic press, e.g., in Bebel’s writings. Bamberger, in *Deutschland und der Socialismus*, was the first

writer in Germany who tried to use the term “Manchester liberalism” in an affirmative, positive sense, without much resonance. The first textbook of economics that referred (in Germany) to “economic liberalism” was published in 1895 (Walter, *Exkurs*, 810).

69. Quoted in Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 755–56.

70. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 757.

71. Vierhaus, “Liberalismus,” 758.

72. The concept “bourgeois society” is itself ambivalent, as it denotes on the one hand a generic category (the community of family fathers, owners of property, as opposed to “the state,” whatever the specific historical form and content of either may be) and on the other hand the specific form that bourgeois society (in the generic sense) has *in the bourgeois period*, i.e. (much more specifically), the society of right-bearing, commodity-owning, and commodity-selling individuals facing the *modern* state. I usually mean *modern* bourgeois society when I write “bourgeois society”; when I want to emphasize the modern in distinction from other (“pre-modern”) forms of bourgeois society, I use “modern” or “liberal” bourgeois society.

73. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 4.

74. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 6.

75. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 12.

76. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 46; see also Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, on the “ambivalent” liberalism of master artisans.

77. Wallerstein, *After Liberalism*, 97.

78. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 107.

79. Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 178.

80. Quoted in Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 165.

81. Quoted in Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, 187.

82. Quoted in Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 42.

83. Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 43.

84. Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 18.

85. Seeber, *Zwischen Bebel und Bismarck*, 46.

86. The *Rechtsstaat* already had repeatedly been violated by the majority faction of both liberal parties in the contexts of the *Kulturkampf* as well as the regulations concerning the civil rights of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. Lasker (and Richter and Hänel from the Progress Party) managed to get a majority against the *Sozialistengesetz* only in the first instance. Only in 1886 did Liberals vote against the law at a point when it had become obvious that it did not work against Social Democracy anyway but did good service against liberalism.

87. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 265. Only Treitschke and Rudolf Gneist voted for the first version of the *Sozialistengesetz* (Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 209).

88. The liberal opposition to Social Democracy actually decreased to the same extent that the party embraced—against Marx’s admonitions to the contrary and increasingly after his death—state socialist reformism.

89. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 21.

90. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 21.

91. Oppenheim's attack was directed at Gustav Schönberg, who was one of the bourgeois proponents of social reform and a critic of Manchester liberalism. The institutional base of *Katheder socialism*, the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy), was founded in 1873. It emphasized in its beginnings rural problems and tended to stress the role of Jews in rural small-scale credit as a particular problem (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 218). Massing holds however that the Verein was not straightforwardly antisemitic.

92. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 256.

93. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 44.

94. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 258–59.

95. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 259. F. Neumann (*Behemoth*, 90–91) also counts Friedrich List as a *Kathedersozialist*. Because List combined racialism, imperialism, and state socialism, Neumann calls him “the first articulate National Socialist.” The connection is warranted by the fact that Adolf Wagner, the most influential of the *Kathedersozialisten* and cofounder of Stöcker's Christlich Soziale Arbeiterpartei, was influenced by List. Zucker (*Ludwig Bamberger*) is most informative on Bamberger's role in the debate about *Katheder socialism*. The Marxist critique of state socialism can be traced back to an article by Marx and Engels from September 12, 1847 (*Deutsche Brüsseler Zeitung* no. 73), in which they argue that “the rule of the bourgeoisie” is preferable to “the present . . . rule of bureaucracy” because it puts the proletariat in a better position to fight the bourgeoisie as a “recognized party.” They referred to this article in 1865 when they refused to cooperate with the Lassalleans. They criticized the Lassalleans for failing to attack the Conservatives as strongly as the Liberals (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 251).

96. Quoted in Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 261, and in Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 290.

97. Quoted in K. Krieger, *Der “Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,”* 603. Thomas B. Macaulay (1800–1859), a Whig politician and historian, opposed working-class suffrage but was in favor of Jewish emancipation.

98. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 101. Treitschke reproduces here an argument classically formulated by Heinrich Riehl (*Die deutsche Arbeit*) (see Campbell, *Joy in Work*); see note 68 in chapter 3.

99. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 102.

100. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 205.

101. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 208.

102. Iggers, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 71.

103. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 211.

104. In his five-part essay on “Bonapartism” (published between 1865 and 1868) (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 212–13).



105. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 213.
106. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 223.
107. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 239, 240.
108. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 275; Langer argues this with reference to a letter by Treitschke to Gustav von Schmoller.
109. Both Schmoller's speech and Treitschke's polemic were first published in *Preussische Jahrbücher*.
110. "Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts," a formulation Schmoller had used in 1872 (quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 277).
111. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 279.
112. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered," 310–11.
113. Quoted in Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution*, 69. Turgot was a major influence on Adam Smith and classical political economy.
114. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 283.
115. Perhaps as a specific *bildungsbürgerliche* facet of his liberalism, Treitschke saw the aristocracy—within the context of established bourgeois society, i.e., under the conditions of a society that was *not* aristocratic—as allies in the effort to counterbalance the mind-set and the social dynamism that a booming capitalist economy brought: the "excesses" of capitalism, such as "speculation" or "usury."
116. "die Freiheit des Menschen im freien Staate" (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 183).
117. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered," 305. "Börne" made the same point. The point is indeed central to the liberal tradition as a whole; for a contemporary articulation, see Saunders, "What Does Liberalism Inherit," which argues that law and state formation on which it depends were preconditions for creating autonomous individuals in the first place.
118. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered," 308–9.
119. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered," 309.
120. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered," 310.
121. Iggers, "Heinrich von Treitschke," 67.
122. Iggers, "Heinrich von Treitschke," 78.
123. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 106; from *Die Freiheit* (1861), which is an extended review of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859). Treitschke rejects Mill's utilitarianism but acknowledges Mill's indebtedness to German idealism and presents large parts of Mill's argument as support for his own. In the revised version of the text from 1864 there are some shifts of emphasis. In the first version, Treitschke had written (in a Kantian vein) that "the citizen must never be used by the state as a mere means to an end" and "the personal well-being of the citizen is the touchstone for the dignity of the state"; the second version contained neither statement (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 106).
124. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*; the last quote is from the revised version of 1864.

125. This is from a chapter on Hegel in the third volume of *Deutsche Geschichte* (1885). Treitschke's defense in 1885 of individualism against Hegel is a piece of evidence against the suggestion of some that Treitschke had been a liberal earlier on and abandoned liberalism sometime in the 1870s. It is also interesting to note that Treitschke credits Christianity with having introduced individualism, a claim typical of (Christian) liberalism with roots in the Enlightenment. To the extent that liberals believed this genealogy to be true, it is hardly surprising that they would be less than enthusiastic about Judaism.

126. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 257.

127. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 155; this is contained in his *Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft: Ein kritischer Versuch* (Social Science: A Critical Essay) of 1858.

128. "sittliche Bewusstsein des Volkes" (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 179).

129. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 107.

130. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, 68; Treitschke accepted Mill's statement that "mankind" is only "warranted . . . in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number" for the sole purpose of "self-protection" (*Considerations on Representative Government*, 72–73) but found it too unspecific, because Mill failed to provide the criteria by which to judge when a case for self-protection could be made. He concluded that "there is no absolute limit to state power" but only *relative*—i.e., historically specific—limits. The limit of state power was the acceptance on the side of the citizens that they felt their own agency to be respected by the state's and that they were not being used in a merely instrumental way.

131. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 181.

132. From a text of 1854 (quoted in L. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, 366). In a lecture on Fichte given in 1862 (published in *Die Grenzboten*), Treitschke quotes approvingly Fichte's statement that "in Germany there will arise a true Empire of Right [Reich des Rechts] and of personal freedom, based on the equality of all human beings" (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 91).

133. Quoted from a letter from Treitschke's student days in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 78.

134. Treitschke came from a patriotic Saxonian (and rather anti-Prussian) family. He did not act out of a received Prussian patriotism or chauvinism.

135. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 84.

136. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 85.

137. "Mit dem Begriffe des Staats ist der Begriff des Krieges schon gegeben, denn das Wesen des Staats liegt in der Macht"; quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 139.

138. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 123.

139. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 122.

140. "die weiche Masse der Kleinstaaten"; "mit all' seiner rauhen Grösse, seiner Härte und Schroffheit als einen festen Kern" (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 120). This anticipates the brutal, masculinist language that Theweleit (*Male Fantasies*) describes.

141. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 124, 125.

142. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 123. When some critics of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein argued it should be up to the population whether they wanted to be a Prussian province, Treitschke stated that the right to self-determination should not be overemphasized: asking the population for its opinion leads to “anarchy,” and liberals who abhor universal suffrage as an “instrument of Caesarism” (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 112) should not at the same time call for referendums.

143. Occasionally, Treitschke would criticize more cautious fellow liberals (such as Haym, then editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*) for not opposing a censorship law such as the one imposed by the Prussian king in 1863 (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 98). At the congress at Gotha in June 1848 the majority of moderate liberals, including Heinrich von Gagern, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, and Karl Mathy, decided to pursue small-German, Prussian-led unification (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 214). Ludwig Bamberger analyzed the “Gotha” tendency in his 1866 pamphlet *Über Rom und Paris nach Gotha; oder, die Wege des Herrn von Treitschke*.

144. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 136.

145. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 71.

146. Iggers, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 69.

147. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 71.

148. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 369; for Treitschke, the most abominable character traits of the English tradition are hypocrisy and trade-mindedness. Treitschke labels England (in the fifth volume of *Deutsche Geschichte* [1894]) the “new Carthage” (Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 371). For the antisemitic overtones of this notion see Bernal (*Black Athena*, 341–42): Phoenician is a Semitic language. An affinity between Carthage and England was seen by many in the nineteenth century on both sides of the Channel. Likewise, Bernal describes what could be called nineteenth-century British philo-Phoenicianism, as follows: “Many Victorians had a positive feeling towards the Phoenicians as sober cloth merchants who did a little bit of slaving on the side and spread civilization while making a tidy profit” (*Black Athena*, 350).

149. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 140, 141.

150. Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 251.

151. Wallerstein stresses that all over Europe after 1848, Liberals and Conservatives came to a form of “reconciliation” based on the recognition by Liberals of the centrality of protecting property and by Conservatives of the utility of liberal reform for Conservative purposes (*After Liberalism*, 87). The more liberalism succeeded in becoming “the dominant ideology of the world-system,” the more party-political liberalism disintegrated. It is crucial that this process “was in fact put into effect by the combined effort of conservatives and socialists,” including “enlightened Conservatives” like Disraeli and Bismarck (101). Especially the transformation of existing states into modern nation-states could only be completed by socialist and conservative movements in the last decades of the nineteenth century: only they could effectively integrate “the ‘outlying’ zones (in a geographical as well as social sense) of what were to become national societies. The

irony of this process is that “liberalism” could only succeed by destroying the hegemony of “Liberalism.” This more general observation also throws a distinct light on the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute.

152. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 377.

153. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 380, 382, 384.

154. Quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 5.

## 10. Nationalism and the Reich of 1871

1. Of course, civic nationalism was formulated in the context of the French Revolution in the consciousness that it constituted a conception that was closely intertwined with the discourse of “popular sovereignty.” For example, in the debate on the future of Avignon in 1791 the “wish of the inhabitants of the city of Avignon to become part of France was held to override international law, in this case the Pope’s ownership of Avignon” (Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 12). In this context it was argued that the will of “the nation” is superior to all other (“legitimist,” traditional, historical) rights. Brubaker adds that the principle of self-determination was “invoked to justify the territorial gains of 1791–1793” as well as the acquisition of Alsace in the seventeenth century (*Citizenship and Nationhood*, 7). The common element of all these discourses is the revolutionary consciousness that tradition can be undone and replaced by something new that is based on the willing and aspirations of people in the present (whatever that may mean in particular).

2. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 146. Ludwig Philippson argued in an article in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 1871) not only that Alsace-Lorraine was German due to linguistic, cultural, and historical ties but also that the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine were resident in that area only because it had been under German rather than French rule at the time when France was expelling the Jews (Cresti, “Kultur and Civilization,” 103).

3. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 147–47.

4. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 31.

5. Almog, “Racial Motif,” 256.

6. Renan saw his own book *La vie de Jésus* (1863) as an extension and complement of *Das Leben Jesu: Kritisch bearbeitet* (1835–36) by David Friedrich Strauss, whom he admired until the Franco-Prussian war changed his attitude to the German intellectual world.

7. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 31.

8. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 31.

9. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 33.

10. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 34.

11. Etienne Balibar argues in a comment on Finkelkraut that the liberal-idealist conception of the nation as immortalized by Renan—nation building as the progressive overcoming of the ethnic notion of man as “a captive of history”—is based on a misunderstanding of the “ethnic” mode of nationalism: “ethnic nationalism” does not simply lock human beings into their being-so. Rather, it accommodates a vision of transcendence,

too: racist nationalism defends the transcendence of the state of “animality” that humanity has already achieved against elements that threaten it with a regression into animality (both from within the particular people that the racist-nationalist is concerned about, and from without). Furthermore, racist nationalism often invokes a human ideal that it hopes to realize in the future, although inspiration for this may come from the (imaginary) past. These characteristics make “ethnic nationalism” perfectly compatible with both liberalism and socialism (Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism,” 57).

12. Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, 45–46.

13. On Renan see Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, 133–38. Renan’s antisemitism was religious as well as racial: in his 1863 book, *Vie de Jésus*, he wrote that “intolerance is essentially not a Christian fact. It is a Jewish fact”—Jewish obstinacy and intolerance were responsible for the death of Jesus (quoted in Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, 135).

14. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the image of Germany as an anti-liberal power traditionally obsessed with race and ethnicity seems to have been solidified in the context of World War I. This was also when the thinking of Hegel, Nietzsche, and indeed Treitschke (“Nitch and Tritch”) came to be seen as straightforwardly reactionary (Moore, “The Super-Hun and the Super-State”).

15. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 10.

16. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 10.

17. Breuilly, “The National Idea,” 23; similarly Gall: the “reactive nationalisation” in Spain, Italy, and Germany followed “the same pattern as the nationalisation of France under the banner of the French Revolution” (“Liberalismus und Nationalstaat,” 212).

18. See Anthias and Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries*.

19. As Anthony D. Smith (*Theories of Nationalism*) does, following Max Weber.

20. After all, *natio* is just Latin for the Greek word *ethnos*. Both words meant in antiquity a community of descent (*nasci*: to be born) and of culture/custom (*ethos*) or living together (*ethein*) when probably for most people culture—i.e., the ways of living together—was as much a given as other inherited aspects of their lives. Likewise, it makes sense that both nationality and ethnicity refer in the modern context to cultural community, which is less based on descent; this simply reflects the reality of sociality in the modern period.

21. Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth,” 61.

22. Quoted in Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth,” 61.

23. Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth”; see also Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation,” 198, 208. When in the French Revolution Abbé Grégoire reported on “the necessity and means of abolishing the *patois* and universalizing the use of the French language,” he was addressing—in the name of civic equality—a crucial aspect of culture.

24. A. D. Smith (*The Ethnic Origins of Nations*) proposed such a typology.

25. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, 7.

26. Norbert Elias had stressed already in 1936 the forgotten presence of nationalism in contemporary sociological theory: “Many twentieth century sociologists, when speaking

of ‘society,’ no longer have in mind (as did their predecessors) a ‘bourgeois society’ or a ‘human society’ beyond the state, but increasingly the . . . nation-state” (quoted in Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 53).

27. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, 6, 7.
28. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, 16.
29. F. Neumann, *Behemoth*, 87.
30. F. Neumann, *Behemoth*, 87.
31. Larner quoted in Sayer, *Capitalism and Modernity*, 128.
32. Schilling, “Nationale Identität und Konfession,” 237.
33. Schilling, “Nationale Identität und Konfession,” 240.
34. Schilling, “Nationale Identität und Konfession,” 197.
35. Schilling, “Nationale Identität und Konfession,” 241.
36. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 42.
37. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 43.
38. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 43.
39. M. L. Anderson, “Living Apart and Together in Germany,” 320.
40. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 234.
41. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 44–45.
42. Arndt in 1814, quoted in Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 52.
43. Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 55.
44. Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 59.
45. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 45. The German Reich that ended in 1806 was inhabited by 60 percent Catholics, the German Bund of 1815 by roughly 50 percent, and the Reich of 1871 by one-third (Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 51). However, they constituted much less than a third of the educated bourgeoisie (Becker, “Konfessionelle Nationsbilder,” 391).
46. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 45.
47. Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 36.
48. The German word *Frömmigkeit* initially had the meaning of “hardworking goodness and honesty” (Hölscher, “The Religious Divide,” 36). The centrality of individuality, personality, dignity, and the urge to find individual expressions of belief (36–37) was in itself rather typical of the Protestant confession. It was in this context that family and educational institutions gained more influence on an individual’s religiosity, while the relevance of the church as such correspondingly decreased (39–40). Religious orthodoxy (Jewish as well as Christian), on the other hand, tried to defend whatever had survived from pre-modern religion as an aspect of everyday life that is formal-objective and spiritual-subjective at the same time.
49. Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 49.
50. Walkenhorst, “Nationalismus als ‘politische Religion?’” 524.
51. Walkenhorst, “Nationalismus als ‘politische Religion?’” 517.
52. Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 31–41.

53. Altgeld, "Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism," 49–50.

54. H. W. Smith and Clark, "The Fate of Nathan," 13.

55. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 238.

56. Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 31.

57. Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus*, 40.

58. Gross, "The Catholics' Missionary Crusade," 245. These movements were largely connected with the name of Pope Pius IX. The landmarks of ultramontanistism were the endorsement of the doctrine of Immaculate Conception (1854), the anti-liberal *Syllabus Errorum* (1864), and the declaration of papal infallibility (1870). The ideological struggle between liberalism and anti-liberal Catholicism constituted a "pan-European" phenomenon (Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 200). The death of Pope Pius IX in February 1878 gave Bismarck a good opportunity to phase out the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* (Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 195).

59. They benefited from the Prussian constitution of 1850, which ended state intervention in ecclesiastical affairs.

60. Rudolf Virchow, one of the founders of the Progress Party, who seems to have coined the term *Kulturkampf*, defined its aims in a speech of 1873 as "(1) to liberate religion from the domination of the church and secular life from the domination of religion; and (2) to urge the national state to recognize its duty to bring about such a liberation and to impose it on the nation as a whole." This "struggle in behalf of secular culture" might even necessitate a "dictatorship of ministers" (Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 82; Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 214). Blackburn translates *Kulturkampf* as "struggle of civilizations." Against the conventional view, which is derived from the liberals' own perspective, he holds that "the piety of German Catholics during the *Kulturkampf* was not traditional" ("Progress and Piety," 144) and that therefore this was not the struggle of modernity against tradition but between antagonistic aspects of modernity itself. Modern piety as invented in the second third of the nineteenth century (147) was itself part of a general modern process of disciplinization. "Spontaneous" elements of popular piety "cut across the lines of clerical authority" (154); see also Gross, "The Catholics' Missionary Crusade" and *The War against Catholicism*. As Penslar points out, the *Kulturkampf* had a prehistory in internal Catholic attempts at reform in the late eighteenth century. Penslar quotes a text from 1783 by Peter Adolph Winkopp, a former Benedictine monk, aiming at the amelioration of monks. According to Winkopp, monks constitute a state within the state, are incapable of being citizens of the states in which they live, are both immensely wealthy monastic orders being capital-owning institutions and impoverished as mendicant monks who are possessed of an "unquenchable thirst for money." They are unproductive, immoral, given to laziness, avarice and "onanism, that is, the spending of seed, the most egregious and shocking form of waste" (something of which Jews were also sometimes accused) (Penslar, *Shylock's Children*, 30–31). While all this closely resembles the discourse on the amelioration of the Jews, Winkopp was rather unique at the time in pointing to the Jews as a positive example that the monks should emulate.

61. Quoted in Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 200.
62. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 16.
63. Eley, "State Formation," 69.
64. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 202.
65. Hobbes defined (in *Behemoth*) religion that did not serve the rational purposes of the state as "superstition" (Horkheimer, *Between Philosophy and Social Science*, 355).
66. Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 72.
67. Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 74; this constituted an "unprecedented confessional interventionism" on the part of the Prussian king, as Clark writes (74).
68. Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 75.
69. Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 77. See also Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, chap. 15.
70. Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 79. This notion anticipates, for example, the kind of "liberation theology" formulated a century later by Khomeini for the Iranian revolution; compare Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, and Retort, *Afflicted Powers*. Khomeini's doctrine is better described as a form of "Third World" populism than as "fundamentalism," and on this level its antisemitic elements become explicable: they fit into a general pattern of populist doctrines that aim at the mobilization of mass opposition to the established sociopolitical order on the basis of the preservation of middle-class property and anti-Marxism and characterized by political pragmatism and opportunism (Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 17).
71. Stahl applauded the emancipation edict of 1812 for exemplifying the generosity of the Protestant spirit but still safeguarding the state's Christian character. His concept of the "Christian state" was reflected in article 14 of the Prussian constitution of 1850 (which remained valid after 1871), which stated: "The Christian religion is taken to be the basis of those institutions of the state that are connected with the practice of religion, regardless of the freedom of religion guaranteed in article 12" (Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 83).
72. Becker, "Konfessionelle Nationsbilder," 394, 395.
73. Becker, "Konfessionelle Nationsbilder," 396.
74. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 402.
75. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 238.
76. Becker, "Konfessionelle Nationsbilder," 404.
77. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict* 235.
78. Bonifatius was an English monk, missionary, and reformer who contributed in the first half of the eighth century to the popularization of Christianity in only superficially Christianized areas of the Germanic parts of the Frankish Empire. Catholics see him as the "Apostle of Germany." His work helped establish the foundations on which the Carolingian Holy Roman Empire was founded. Using vernacular language for sermons, he seems to have played a role somewhat similar to Luther's but in the name of a rising, not against a decadent, Roman church.
79. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 239.



80. On the question of the extent to which these features are “peculiarities” of the German case or can also be found in other national contexts, see Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*; Faulenbach, *Ideologie des deutschen Weges*; Ruggiero, *History of European Liberalism*; Eley, “What Produces Fascism?”; Eley, “The British Model”; Eley, *From Unification to Nazism*; Eley, “Rosenberg and the Great Depression”; Eley, “Is There a History of the *Kaiserreich*?”; Eley, “German History”; Blackbourn, “Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie”; Breuilly, *Labour and Liberalism*; Berger, *The Search for Normality*; Evans, “Whatever Became of the *Sonderweg*?”

81. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 12.

82. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 940.

83. As Hughes argues, the idea that nationalism caused—or at least was one of the causes behind—the unification of Germany is a myth: “at least until the last quarter of the [nineteenth] century, nationalism was a minority movement, deeply divided and with only a marginal impact on German political life” (*Nationalism and Society*, 2). Breuilly suggests that the emergence of German patriotism had been prevented earlier in the nineteenth century by “loyalties to confession, region, narrow self-interest, and traditional rulers” (“The National Idea,” 8). At the time of the foundation of the Reich, not even the middle classes were completely supportive of German nationalism: still in the 1870s Bavarian deputies in the Reichstag would refer to Bavaria as their “nation”; only in the 1890s was the concept of Germany as “the nation” completely hegemonic (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 952). The German Reich also lacked at the time a national anthem and a national flag (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 957). Furthermore, the concept of the Reich implied not so much national unity (*Völkergemeinschaft*) as a federation of peoples (*Völkergemeinschaft*) (Buschmann, “Auferstehung der Nation?” 357).

84. Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 131, 135. Gramsci famously described the strategy involved in this process as “passive revolution.” See note 125 below.

85. Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 3.

86. Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 84–85.

87. Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 94.

88. Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 96.

89. Carr, “The Unification of Germany,” 94–95.

90. Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 8.

91. Quoted in Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 163.

92. Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 144.

93. Georg Gottfried Gervinus’s “Memorandum on Peace” (1871) is an example of a minority view within liberalism that did not welcome German unification in the form of the Reich (Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples*, 109–10). Gervinus argued that centralization should be avoided and federalism strengthened—with not Berlin but “a city which would symbolise a policy of peaceful civilization” being the capital: an anticipation of Weimar and Bonn, as it were—in order to prevent a vicious circle of militarization of European politics.

94. Breuilly, *Labour and Liberalism*, 289.
95. Hardtwig, "Der deutsche Weg," 12.
96. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 942. For some specific groups of the population, "Germany" became much earlier an "experiential space" because they were traveling a lot across state borders: in the course of university education, scholarly contacts, as part of an administrative career, or through exile (Echternkamp, *Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus*, 504). This was the case for most 1848 deputies. Trade obviously needs to be added to the list.
97. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 946.
98. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 948.
99. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 958, 949.
100. Eley, "State Formation," 79.
101. Hardtwig, "Der deutsche Weg," 27.
102. Hughes, *Nationalism and Society*, 156.
103. Deuerlein, "Die Konfrontation," 255.
104. Their basically conservative anti-nationalism could position itself alongside or against antisemitism. This old-fashioned intellectual tradition found a last apogee in Hannah Arendt.
105. Of course the two concepts coincide to the extent that the specific *content* of the normative concept of culture is formulated in a particular national context, and the latter is construed as normative by those who inhabit it.
106. Pulzer translates *Gründer*, literally "founder," as "promoter," which seems to be the correct technical term denoting a person who participates in the foundation of a company and for that purpose "promotes" this company for fund-raising (*Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 19).
107. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 18.
108. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 5. Between 1850 and 1875 "the value of bank notes in circulation in Prussia increased from 18 million to 290 million *Taler*" (Blackbourn, "Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie," 181). Before 1871 there were eight different silver-based currencies in the German League. In the 1860s the relative values of silver and gold were quite unpredictable (one factor was the gold rush, another the flow of silver to Asia); the transition to a unified gold currency seemed a way of handling this. Furthermore, the smaller German states endangered currency stability by being able to print paper money at will (R. Weber, "Ludwig Bamberger"). Zucker describes the struggles over the reform of the currency in the context of his biography of Ludwig Bamberger, its main architect.
109. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 32.
110. Blackbourn, "Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie," 182.
111. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, 190.
112. There has been a long scholarly controversy whether there was a "Great Depression" from 1873 to 1896 (H. Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit*; Wehler,

*Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*) or whether this is a myth (Saul according to Wolfgang Mommsen, *Imperial Germany*, 105; see also Eley, “Rosenberg and the Great Depression”). Mommsen in his summary assessment states that most scholars tend to reject the notion. He emphasizes that there have been repeated ups and downs in the period and that the development of different sections of production was extremely uneven due to the growing integration of the German economy into the world market. Even within the most dynamic areas, such as metal industry, only a small number of companies ever did extremely well. Even if aggregate data suggest an economic boom during most of any given period, this does not at all mean that most companies, let alone most people, did (or *thought* they did) well. It seems safe to say, though, that there was a period of stagnation between 1873 and 1878 and that 1879—the year of the Dispute—was the year of a weak economic recovery. The agricultural crisis began in the 1870s (W. Mommsen, *Imperial Germany*, 107) and peaked in 1894. Nevertheless, in the whole period agricultural productivity rose significantly. The absolute number of people employed in agriculture increased slightly. “Generally speaking, the agricultural sector remained comparatively strong up to 1914” in Germany, contrasting sharply with the development in Britain, for example: “until 1914 the German Empire was both an agrarian *and* an industrial state” (108).

113. The introduction of protective tariffs in July 1879 “represented the first modern piece of legislation in Germany to bear the stamp of a top-level business organization all over it” (Wehler, *The German Empire*, 86).

114. The social powers behind the turn toward protectionism were mining and textile industry and to a lesser degree industrial agrarians (Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 14). The petition was based on a compromise: tariffs on foodstuff (that increase the costs of livelihood and thus wages) were meant to be balanced out by tariffs on finished products, allowing industry to offset the increased wage costs. Two weeks later, a conference of the German Chambers of Commerce in Berlin also departed from free-trade policies. The free traders’ counterattack “reached a high point” in May 1879 when representatives of seventy-two German cities—the grass roots of German liberalism—met in Berlin and “voted overwhelmingly to oppose any tariff on foodstuffs” (Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 187).

115. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*, 271.

116. See Winkler, “Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus,” 16.

117. Quoted in Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 195.

118. Kocka suggests “Sanderweg” should best be rendered as “the German divergence from the West” (“German History before Hitler,” 11).

119. Hardtwig, “Der deutsche Weg,” 11; “Prussia [at the time of German unification] was not associated only with the barracks and the spiked helmet; it was broadly identified with the cause of modernity in fields ranging from education and communications to the scientific management of forests” (Blackbourn, “The German Bourgeoisie,” 19).

120. Blackbourn, “The German Bourgeoisie,” 22.

121. Breuilly, *Labour and Liberalism*, 293; see also Kocka, “The European Pattern,” 27.

122. Breuilly, *Labour and Liberalism*, 287.

123. Evans, “Whatever Became of the *Sonderweg*?” 17.

124. Eley, “German History,” 93.

125. Eley, “Modernity at the Limit,” 45; emphasis in the original. Compare as well: “the appropriate comparative context for considering German liberalism should be . . . the trans-European conjuncture of constitutional change, nation forming, and state making in the 1860s, powerfully overdetermined by the global process of capitalist boom, spatial expansion, and social penetration, articulated through the patterns of uneven and combined development. *This* context, rather than the binary contrast with some misleading and idealized construct of liberalism in the English-speaking world, will allow the specific characteristics . . . of German liberalism between 1860 and 1914 to come into view” (Eley, “German History,” 6–7). Eley hints that the critique of the *Sonderweg* thesis may have been inspired by the debate on Gramsci’s comments on Bismarck’s politics as “passive revolution” (i.e., reformist state-led modernization in the interest of a ruling, but not socially and culturally hegemonic, old elite) (Eley, “The British Model,” 88). See also Buci-Glucksmann, “State, Transition, and Passive Revolution” and “Passive Revolution and the Politics of Reform”; Davis, “Introduction”; Ginsborg, “Gramsci”; Sassoon, *Gramsci’s Politics*; Rehmann, *Max Weber*.

126. Evans, “Whatever Became of the *Sonderweg*?” 18.

127. The fact that the nation-state left “millions of ethnic Germans outside its boundaries,” providing extreme nationalists with an idealist-sounding and superbly tempting excuse for conquest and expansion, was a further “peculiarity.”

128. I refer here specifically to nineteenth-century history as opposed to the history after World War I.

## Conclusion

1. The notion that Treitschke is a “liberal Tory” stems from Petersdorff’s entry on Treitschke in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (General German Biography) of 1910 and has been adopted by Hans Herzfeld; quoted in Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 5.

2. “Die Harmonie der Gesellschaft, zu der die liberalen Juden sich bekannten, mussten sie zuletzt als die der Volksgemeinschaft an sich selbst erfahren”; Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997), 169–70; *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 152; translation amended.

3. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 280–81.

4. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (1978), 103.

5. From *The Earliest Programme for a System of German Idealism*. Apparently written by Schelling, perhaps together with Hölderlin, it survived in Hegel’s handwriting; quoted in S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 187.

6. Hegel quotes in this essay Tacitus’s formulation “odium generis humani” (“hate of the human species,” allegedly the “soul of Judaism”; on Tacitus, see pp. 126–29). Furthermore, Hegel identifies Kant’s ethics with Judaism’s view of the law originating from

a source wholly outside mankind. When Kant thought he had replaced the despotism of external law with the obedience to an inner law, Hegel now argued that Kant had not eliminated but merely internalized the formerly external despot (S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 189). In this early essay Hegel attacks any form of legalism as so many denials of “individuality” and “life as it is” of particular persons; he suggests that Christianity’s doctrine of love constituted a crucial departure from the (Jewish) “spirit of legalism.” It seems plausible that many nineteenth-century antisemites took the reference to Tacitus, and parts of Hegel’s argument, from this essay. Even in his later writings, in which Hegel recognizes the Jewish contribution to the evolution of humanity’s consciousness of freedom, Judaism is presented as a form of consciousness that has had its day: the Protestant articulation of the idea of “inner freedom” has rendered all other religions so many stepping stones from the past to the present.

7. Quoted in Altgeld, “Religion, Denomination, and Nationalism,” 54.
8. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 158; *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997), 176, (2002), 144.
9. H. W. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*, 8.
10. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 4, 3.
11. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 4.
12. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 172.
13. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 175; Mendelssohn also makes the case for pluralism and diversity which are “evidently the plan and purpose of Providence” (177). Apparently reflecting on the North American experience, he writes that the demand for religious uniformity was at odds with human nature.
14. S. B. Smith, *Jewish Identity*, 195.
15. Dohm quoted in Rürup, “Jewish Emancipation and Bourgeois Society,” 72; translation amended.
16. Möller, “Aufklärung, Judenemanzipation und Staat,” 134.
17. See Salecker, *Erfahrung der Differenz*, 73–74.
18. Rürup, “Jewish Emancipation and Bourgeois Society,” 79–80.
19. Jersch-Wenzel, “Die Lage von Minderheiten,” 365.
20. Dahlmann quoted in Sterling, *Judenhass*, 88.
21. Birnbaum and Katznelson assert against a “nationalist current in Jewish historiography,” which tends to equate emancipation with the “end of the Jewish people,” that “there was no near-complete eradication of Jewish culture in the societies in which the Enlightenment and emancipation left their most striking marks,” namely, North America and France. “Modernization” as such changed the meaning of, but did not extinguish, Jewishness (“Emancipation and the Liberal Offer,” 18).
22. Leuschen-Seppel, *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus*, 26.
23. Quoted in Sterling, *Judenhass*, 81.
24. Sterling, *Judenhass*, 85.
25. Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, 77.

26. Pulzer, *Emancipation and Its Discontents*, 5.
27. Quoted in Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, 80; also in Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 58.
28. Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, 89.
29. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 53, 81.
30. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 60.
31. Quoted in Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 75.
32. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 79.
33. Levene, "Limits of Tolerance," 40.
34. In his comment on the draft of the "Prussian Edict of Emancipation" (1809), Humboldt suggested three means for resolving "the Jewish condition": "amalgamation [Verschmelzung], "destruction of their ecclesiastical organization [Zertrümmerung ihrer kirchlichen Form], and "re-colonisation [Ansiedelung]" (Humboldt, "Ueber den Entwurf," 96).
35. The article appeared first in the February 2004 edition of *Prospect* and was reprinted with the different title, "Discomfort of Strangers," in the *Guardian* on February 24.
36. The debate in the United Kingdom on "community cohesion," "cohesive citizenship," and so forth was intensified by the uprisings in northern English towns in the summer of 2001. Mainstream media subsequently used as a focal point for this discourse the more spectacular issues of "9/11" and "terrorism," arguably because the social complexity of the northern uprisings is more obvious and thus more difficult to translate into stereotypes.
37. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.
38. Arguably this has been a concern crucial (not exclusively) to the discipline of sociology since it first emerged; see Therborn, *Science, Class, and Society*, and Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*.
39. Blunkett, "Integration with Diversity."
40. Eagleton, "Those in Power."
41. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997), 200.
42. It goes without saying that the presence or absence of further conditions determined whether or not this potential was realized in one country but not in another. The present discussion abstracts from this particular problem.
43. Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake*, 23–24.
44. Lloyd and Thomas, *Culture and the State*, 1.
45. Lloyd and Thomas, *Culture and the State*, 3.
46. Lloyd and Thomas, *Culture and the State*, 5.
47. Lloyd and Thomas, *Culture and the State*, 14. Lloyd and Thomas see this conception best expressed in Matthew Arnold's synthesis of Hobbes's concept of civil society as the "war of all against all" with Friedrich Schiller's idea (from the fourth "Letter on the Aesthetic Education of Man") that the state represents the "ideal man" whom every individual carries within him- or herself but is unable to realize except as a member of a state (47, 117).

48. Lloyd and Thomas, *Culture and the State*, 146.
49. Aronowitz, *Roll over Beethoven*, 7.
50. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997), 169–70; *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 152.
51. See Sewell, *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution*.
52. Similar arguments apply to the “red republicanism” of classical Marxism; see Stoetzler, “Review,” and Tamás, “Telling the Truth.”
53. Gray, *Enlightenment’s Wake*, 25.
54. Hall, “Conclusion,” 228–29.
55. Parekh, “Integrating Minorities,” 6. Parekh rejects both the “proceduralist” view of the state as “culturally neutral” (2) and the “bifurcationist” notion (3) that citizens should merely share a common *political* culture “whereas diversity belongs to the private realm.” Parekh suggests that a “pluralist mode of integration” (3) may be able to reconcile the state’s need for cohesion and the minority communities’ legitimate demand to “preserve their culture”; it should effect a revision of the prevailing political culture and its values, suggesting that “we” must be “loosened up” while also concerning the private realm, the state should not be indifferent to the minority cultures but must offer them “public recognition, encouragement and material support” in order to allow their members “to make uncoerced choices” whether or not to maintain particular cultural practices.
56. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 280–81.
57. Jacoby, *End of Utopia*, 39–40.
58. Jacoby, *End of Utopia*, 55.
59. Kallen seems to have formulated his position in opposition to the more violent metaphor of the melting pot, which was the title of a play by Israel Zangwill of 1908. Zangwill, too, was the son of an orthodox rabbi, and both Kallen and Zangwill were members of different strands of the Zionist movement (Niethammer and Dossmann, *Kollektive Identität*, 253).
60. Gray, *Enlightenment’s Wake*, 25.
61. Kant, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte,” 31.
62. When Adorno and Horkheimer write that “culture developed in the sign of the hangman” but insist that it can violate and transcend its own violent logic (*Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 227), they merely reformulate a conclusion drawn by Marx in an article on British rule in India of 1853: “Has the bourgeoisie ever . . . effected a progress without dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation? . . . When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, . . . then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain” (quoted in McCarthy, “Liberal Imperialism,” 20–21).
63. Eley, “What Produces Fascism?” 82.
64. “In the period of industrialization itself the implied ideal of a ‘pure’ capitalism without precapitalist admixtures (the ‘modern bourgeois or civil society’ that Germany

is supposed not to have been and against which German history is measured) never existed” (Eley, “What Produces Fascism?” 63).

65. Habermas quoted in Eley, “German History,” 71.

66. Eley, “German History,” 71.

67. More recently, Habermas seems to have found that the Germans can now afford to cool down their enthusiasm for the liberal West and help strengthen emerging European identity under the sign of the social state, in opposition to what used to be called “English conditions” and “Manchesterism” now represented by “Washington”; see D. Levy, Pensky, and Torpey, *Old Europe*.

68. Emphasis in the original; Eley, “Contexts for German Antisemitism,” 118.

69. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 82.

70. White, *The Splintered Party*, 200.

71. White, *The Splintered Party*, 211.

72. White, *The Splintered Party*, 220, 221. Fritz K. Ringer argued similarly in 1969: “The peculiarity of the German social situation . . . was only a matter of degree, and so was the consequent difference in intellectual orientations” (*Decline of the German Mandarins*, 84).

73. Horkheimer and Adorno, “Vorwort,” vi–vii.

74. Horkheimer and Adorno, “Vorwort,” vi–vii.

75. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 67.

76. Eley, “Contexts for German Antisemitism,” 122. Pulzer endorses this view: “In German-speaking central Europe, a ‘modern antisemitism’ has existed only since the emergence of ‘modern’ politics—that is, since about 1870, with a qualitative intensification in the second half of the first World War and a transformation into genocide after 1939” (“Third Thoughts,” 166–67). Oded Heilbrunner points to another aspect of historical discontinuity: nineteenth-century antisemitism in Germany was mainly an “antisemitism of the provinces”; a nationwide form of antisemitism did not exist because there was not even “an all-embracing German culture” or “a German national character” (“From Antisemitic Peripheries,” 560–61).

77. Eley, “Contexts for German Antisemitism,” 119, 121, 124.

78. Eley, “Contexts for German Antisemitism,” 122.

79. Hage, *White Nation*.

80. Habermas, “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity.”

81. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*.

82. *Die Deutsche Wacht: Monatsschrift für nationale Kulturinteressen—Organ der antijüdischen Vereinigung*, July 1880, 629. The quote is taken from an article on Stöcker’s *Christlich-Soziale Arbeiterpartei*.

83. Hage, *White Nation*.

84. Preston King quoted in Hage, *White Nation*, 85.

85. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 57.

86. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 58; emphasis in the original.



87. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, 56–57.

88. Postone, “The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century,” 94.

89. Poole, *Morality and Modernity*, 94.

90. This concept is from Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, quoted in Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, 56.

91. I use here the words “concrete” and “abstract” in analogy to their use in Marx’s concepts of concrete and abstract labor (see Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*): “concrete” as in “in itself, in its specificity”; “abstract” as in “irrespective of its specificity, with regard only to its function within a societal structure of domination.”

92. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (1978), 103.

## Appendix 1

1. This is where the text published in Boehlich’s *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit* begins.

2. This is where the version of the text as published in 1880 as a brochure (“A Word about Our Jewry”) and also Lederer’s translation begin.

## Appendix 2

1. As it has not been possible to determine any regularity in Lazarus’s use of *Volk* and *Nation*, which seem to be synonymous (see, e.g., top of page [7] in the original pagination), in the English text “nation” and “people” have been used likewise. *Stamm* is sometimes given as “race” and sometimes as “tribe,” depending on what seems more adequate to context: *Stamm* can refer to the smaller units that constitute, or dissolve into, the nation (such as the people of Holstein), but with reference to the Jews it has a peculiar double meaning: Lazarus makes on the one hand the suggestion that the Jews are just one of the tribes that constitute the German nation, like the people of Holstein, but unlike the latter of course they are also a much larger entity with a much longer and more impressive history, culture, religion, etc., present all over the world. The only alternative to translating this as “race” would be “people,” but Lazarus quite explicitly does not refer to a Jewish *Volk* or nation. *Geist* and *geistig* are most often given as “spirit” and “spiritual,” only sometimes when these would make very odd English, as “intellect” or “mind,” respectively. The English word *mind* usually stands for *Gemüth*. *Judenthum* is given as “Judaism” when it clearly refers to Judaism as a religion or body of thought only, otherwise, i.e., in all ambiguous cases, as “Jewry.”

2. This opening quotation mark is missing in the original text.

3. These quotes, and also the following one further down, are from Luther’s 1523 essay “That Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew.”

4. Johann Melchior Goeze, 1717–86, an orthodox Lutheran theologian, was the object of a famous polemic by Lessing (1778).

5. On the reference to Burke see note 97 for chapter 4.

6. Georg Heinrich August von Ewald (1803–75) was a leading orientalist and theologian. An anti-Prussian Protestant liberal, he had been one of the Göttingen Seven and later was a member of the Reichstag.

7. Passages from Lazarus’s speech as president of the synod.

### Appendix 3

1. Treitschke had been a professor at Heidelberg University from 1867 to 1874, when he moved to Berlin. Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 24.
2. Aloys Blumauer (1755–98) was an Austrian dramatist, poet, and writer of the Enlightenment. The reference here seems to be to the more burlesque side of his work on explicitly mundane subjects, such as digestion and fleas. A famous poem celebrates the stomach as the god that is loved by all peoples.
3. Zabulon is the sixth son of Jacob and Leah. Ahasver, the wandering Jew, is supposed to be a descendant of Zabulon. The legend of the wandering Jew seems to have taken its definite, modern form in the thirteenth century, a period when the church made strong efforts to reinforce beliefs that supported the unity and singularity of the faith, while the name “Ahasverus” seems to have been associated with this figure since it was used in a publication of 1602 (G. K. Anderson, *Wandering Jew*, 42).

### Appendix 4

1. Freytag, *Über den Antisemitismus*, 12.
2. Having been a Lassallean, Mehring did not join the Social Democratic Party in 1875 because of its predominantly Marxist orientation. He kept aloof from it until the mid-1880s (Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 185–86), after which he became one of the party’s most influential intellectuals.
3. Quoted from the translation in Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction*, 313–16.
4. Bab, *Leben und Tod des deutschen Judentums*, 71.
5. Bab, *Leben und Tod des deutschen Judentums*, 72; Bab adds that he was for many years a friend of Treitschke’s daughter, who was “an equally passionate patriot as her father.” He relates that she let a part of Treitschke’s private library pass into his “Jewish hands” as evidence for the complete lack of an antisemitic spirit “in today’s meaning of the word” in Treitschke’s household.
6. Wolff, *Die Juden*, 119.
7. A. Rosenberg, “Treitschke und die Juden,” 78, 80.
8. A. Rosenberg, “Treitschke und die Juden,” 80. Rosenberg distinguishes academic antisemitism from the economic antisemitism of the lower middle classes. Unlike the latter, academics were not threatened economically due to the restrictive and conservative routes of access to academic positions. Rosenberg also points out that antisemitism had not been a defining characteristic of Bismarck’s outlook nor that of the aristocracy in general—dislike of Jews (but also of Gentile bourgeois *homines novi*) notwithstanding.
9. A. Rosenberg, “Treitschke und die Juden,” 82–83.
10. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 38.
11. Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 130.
12. Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 132.
13. Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*, 134.

14. Reemtsma, "Die Falle des Antirassismus," 307.
15. Reemtsma, "Die Falle des Antirassismus," 308–9.
16. Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*, 93, 94.
17. Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*, 97.
18. Salecker, *Erfahrung der Differenz*, 395.
19. Ragins, *Jewish Responses*, 15, 14–15; emphasis in the original
20. Ragins, *Jewish Responses*, 16; emphasis in the original.
21. Ragins, *Jewish Responses*, 16–17.
22. Niewyk, "Solving the 'Jewish Problem,'" 338.
23. Lindemann, *Esau's Tears*, 133.
24. Lindemann, *Esau's Tears*, 132.
25. Lindemann, *Esau's Tears*, 138.
6. Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 12.
27. Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*, 171, 172.
28. Kampe, "Jews and Antisemites."
29. Nipperdey and Rürup, "Antisemitismus."

30. The strongest is perhaps Boehlich's statement that Treitschke's views were not essentially different from those of clerical and racial antisemites. Boehlich writes that although Treitschke did not think of himself as an antisemite, "his opponents as well as his supporters did" (Nachwort, 240). Berding argues that Treitschke rejected racial and clerical antisemitism only verbally and that although he rejected the more explicitly racist articulations of antisemitism, "he used the same phrases to the same effects" (*Moderner Antisemitismus in Deutschland*, 114–15).

31. M. Meyer, "Great Debate on Antisemitism," 144–45.
32. Liebeschütz, "Treitschke and Mommsen," 172, 173.
33. Liebeschütz, "Treitschke and Mommsen," 156.
34. Zucker, "Theodor Mommsen and Antisemitism," 237.
35. Pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 243.

36. Discussions of the Dispute that include a larger number of contributors are few (Michael, "Graetz contra Treitschke"; Boehlich, Nachwort; Meyer, "Great Debate on Antisemitism"; Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus*; Lenk, "Antisemitismusstreit"; Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*; Hoffmann, "Geschichte und Ideologie"; Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*; Salecker, *Erfahrung der Differenz*; Zumbini, *Die Wurzeln des Bösen*; Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*). A detailed textual analysis has only been done for Treitschke's first contribution (Holz, *Nationaler Antisemitismus*).

37. Bab, *Leben und Tod des deutschen Judentums*, 74; Wolff, *Die Juden*, 117–20; Bab quotes Mommsen's assertion that the German Jews are indeed Germans and concludes that "these magnificent words that betrayed once more in Germany the ideas of a free mind of genuine historical awe are today [i.e. 1938] more than worth listening to (diese prachtvollen Worte, in denen die Anschauung eines freien Geistes von echter geschichtlicher Ehrfurcht sich noch einmal in Deutschland kundtat, sind heut mehr als je hörens wert" (*Leben und Tod des deutschen Judentums*, 74)).

38. Kampe, "Jews and Antisemites," 47.
39. Mosse, *Crisis of German Ideology*, 202; Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 244.
40. "Kompromisslos zog er gegen den 'Wahn' zu Felde" (Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 928).
41. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 308.
42. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 320–21, 322.
43. Breßlau's statement, Michael Meyer writes, "sympathizes with Treitschke's desire that the Jews hasten the process of their own amalgamation into the German nation" ("Great Debate on Antisemitism," 149). Meyer states that Cohen's "conception of German culture was much closer to Treitschke's own than was that of Lazarus or even Breßlau" (151). Meyer points out that Treitschke "was well pleased with Cohen's position" while the Jewish press regarded it "more as a betrayal than a defence" (151)
44. M. Meyer, "Great Debate on Antisemitism," 168.
45. Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 48–78.
46. Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 53.
47. Abraham, *Weber and the Jewish Question*, 104; Abraham emphasizes that "Mommsen's statement is important because it shows the limits of German liberalism at the time on the question of so-called national minorities" (101). In Mommsen's use of the *Mischvolk* concept, "ethnic pluralism seems to be a transitional phase in the development of modern nations." In a similar vein, Alfred D. Low writes that Treitschke and Mommsen engaged "in ideological combat with each other" merely about "tact and tactics." He asserts that "the nineteenth-century German demand . . . for the assimilation and ultimate merger of the Jews with the Germans sprang also from the seemingly progressive, liberal, and national programme for a strong, unitary, homogeneous nation. It aimed at the demise of all territorial, cultural, national, and religious peculiarities and differences" (*Jews in the Eyes of the Germans*, 411). Low argues that most Germans, including many Jews, "held that any alien nationality on German soil had the duty to work towards its own cultural and national extinction" (412).
48. Pickus, "Jewish University Students in Germany," 68.
49. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites*, 163; Schoeps, "Das 'Evangelium der Intoleranz,'" 293.
50. Mommsen, "Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum," 223; Geismann, "Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit," 379.
51. Geismann, "Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit," 372, 373.
52. Geismann, "Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit," 380.
53. Sieg, "Bekenntnis zu nationalen und universalen Werten," 637.
54. Hoffmann, "Geschichte und Ideologie," 249.
55. Ragins, *Jewish Responses*, 30.
56. M. Meyer, "Great Debate on Antisemitism," 147.
57. Rahden, "Germans of the Jewish *Stamm*," 28.
58. Bacharach points out that Lazarus's demand that the Jews *should* cultivate "a feeling

of belonging to the German people” logically presupposes that “belonging” is to a high degree subject to choice (“Jews in Confrontation,” 199). On the other hand, he raised an argument that “did not differ much from ‘spiritual racism’” (199; Bacharach translates Lazarus’s *Stamm* [tribe] as “race”) and displayed “a form of spiritual chauvinism” of a Herderian kind (200). Bacharach points out that Cohen in his response to Lazarus even went beyond the form of “chauvinism” displayed by Lazarus; he “yearned for national unity within which ‘racial unity’ [Raceneinheit] would prevail” (200). Cohen, as Bacharach underlines, stressed “physical singularity” as part of a “more sublime inner unity” promoting the development of “the racial type.” Bacharach concludes: “Naturally we must not attribute to Hermann Cohen racist trends of thought such as those spread by racial antisemitism. But we cannot ignore his use of this dangerous form of argument. The vagueness and the undefined quality of these phrases led to an ambivalent understanding of Cohen’s words, and it is this very ambiguous, mystical quality which comprises the theory of national racism” (200–201).

59. Langer, *Heinrich von Treitschke*, 308–9.

60. Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands*, 219; Roemer discusses the debate on Graetz (*Jewish Scholarship and Culture*, 84–88).

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