JEWS TURKS AND OTHER STRANGERS

The Roots of Prejudice in Modern Germany

Jerome S. Legge Jr.

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For Janie and Sylvee

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Preface

Many of my reasons for writing this book came out of teaching "The Holocaust and Contemporary German Politics." I first began teaching the Holocaust in one of my classes in the University of Georgia's Study Abroad Program in Verona, Italy, during the summer of 1997. I attempted to structure the class around the Italian experience with the war and the Holocaust in order to make the class relevant to the program sites. We were fortunate in that we were able to go on-site, and I was able to teach about the Jewish persecution and deportation in such places as the Rome and Venice ghettos in addition to Florence and Verona. Finally, on the way back to the United States, we stayed in Munich for a few days, and the group was able to visit the concentration camp in Dachau. It was to be my last year teaching in Italy, but the experience made me want to offer the course with special reference to Germany and its contemporary politics. That opportunity presented itself two years later during the fall of 1998 in Athens, Georgia, and in the summer of 1999 when I was fortunate enough to instruct freshmen students in the University of Georgia's Foundation Fellows Program in Geneva.

It has now been over fifty-five years since the termination of hostilities in Europe and the end of the Holocaust. In addition to the Allied soldiers who fought against Nazism, a good proportion of both the perpetrators and victims who survived the Holocaust have now passed on. Yet, if one considers the total flow of history, the Holocaust is a recent event that continues to have a strong impact on politics in Germany. Indeed, during the 1990s the Holocaust has been discussed more widely in Germany than in any other decade. Some of the discussion was

prompted by Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, whose major thesis is that ordinary Germans were enthusiastic participants in the slaughter of the Jews during the Holocaust. Despite some of the critiques of the Goldhagen work, the book was widely read in Germany, and its thesis was accepted by a great many citizens. But there were other events signaling that the nation was willing to come to terms with its past, as evidenced by the construction of a Holocaust Memorial in the center of Berlin that specifically acknowledges German responsibility for the "murdered Jews of Europe," the development of compensation for slave laborers, many of whom are not Jewish, and the willingness of the German government to encourage the immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union. As I document in this book, the population of Jews in Germany has risen rapidly, especially in the larger cities, and estimates of the number of Jews in the nation have been as high as one hundred thousand.

But the 1990s were not easy years for Germany. The understandable euphoria following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of the nation led to unrealistic expectations on the part of Chancellor Kohl and many other German politicians about the future performance of the new unified German state both politically and economically. As the socialist economy in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) began to crumble, individuals who were dependent upon the regime for virtually guaranteed employment began to lose their jobs almost immediately, with no prospects for replacement. Many emigrated from the former East Germany into the western portion of the new nation in search of economic opportunities. This had the effect of draining many talented individuals from the already inferior worker pool in the former GDR. In the meantime, western residents were taxed for the cost of rebuilding the east, and the low-valued GDR currency was traded at favorable rates with the western currency in order to hasten economic, as well as political, reunification.

The economic difficulties were experienced during a time when the number of foreigners seeking refuge in Germany increased in great numbers. The war in Yugoslavia greatly accelerated the number of refugees to Germany, which prior to 1993 had perhaps the most liberal refugee policy in the world. Even today, in comparison to the other democracies of Western Europe such as Great Britain, France, and Italy, the Germans admit refugees in far greater numbers. In addition,

because of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, the new German nation was confronted with the problem of large numbers of German ethnics moving from these failed regimes into the new Germany. Known as *Aussiedler,* these descendants of Germans who moved to nations such as Russia, the Baltic states, and Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania some time ago also caused pressure in an economy with increasingly scare resources in terms of jobs, social services, and housing. The Turks are a final group that have a considerable presence in Germany. Although recruited as temporary guest workers during the 1960s, the Turks stayed, mostly because the German government needed them during times of economic expansion. But during the 1990s these opportunities began to contract, and many Germans began to resent the Turks, believing that they were competitors for German jobs.

The 1990s were also a time of expansion for the Jewish community in Germany, although their numbers are much lower than the Turks, German ethnics, or the Yugoslavian war refugees. As the Soviet Union began to collapse, many Jews were permitted to leave; although most went to the United States or Israel, the German government was eager to admit them. One interesting finding of this book is that the Jews are, for the most part, perceived more positively by German citizens than any of the other refugee or immigrant groups. But antisemitic and violent acts against the Jewish community occurred during the 1990s as well.

If one consults the German and Western mass media during the 1990s and views the words of German politicians, there is a widespread belief that much of the negative feelings against minority groups was due to economic resentment on the part of citizens. Since economic opportunities were limited, especially in the former GDR, many felt that the xenophobic incidents that did occur were a natural outgrowth of a stagnant economy and the inability of many Germans to obtain employment. The foreigners were seen as competitors in the job market as well as in housing. In addition, they were utilizing scarce funds for social services that were also needed by native Germans. Early in the process of unification, many observers believed that the economic situation would improve rapidly, and the xenophobia would decline.

As I began my investigation into anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism in Germany, I believed that what I term the "economic resent-

ment" hypothesis was a reasonable place to start. In addition, I believed that this hypothesis would be in greater evidence in the eastern portions of Germany, where the unemployment was the highest and the largest number of attacks on foreigners have taken place. In the end, I found the notion that economic factors are responsible for the negative attitudes we have witnessed is unconvincing at best. Rather, what is at the root of resentment toward foreigners and Jews in contemporary Germany is a traditional racism toward these groups that is rooted in a strong and chauvinistic nationalism. Although the amount of antisemitism and other prejudices has declined since the immediate postwar years, the remaining prejudice is not based on economic causes. If we are to understand the social complexity of the new Germany, it is more realistic to view it as a multicultural society that is having difficulty in integrating these new groups into its mainstream. Although much progress has been made, especially with regard to the Turks and the Jews, the nation still is in the midst of a long struggle with its future identity.

I wish to thank a great many people who have helped me with this work. Professor John A. Clark of Western Michigan University is a collaborator on much of chapter 3. Part of that chapter was published in the *Political Research Quarterly* when we were colleagues at the University of Georgia. I also wish to thank University of Georgia colleagues Markus M. L. Crepaz and Christopher Allen, both of whom I consulted at various stages of this work. Both encouraged me greatly when I began this project, and I have benefited from numerous conversations with them during the years I have worked on this book. I also wish to acknowledge other University of Georgia faculty and staff for their friendship, encouragement, and support. These include Thomas P. Lauth, Hal G. Rainey, J. Edward Kellough, Susan Haire, Richard W. Campbell, Dan Durning, Eugene Miller, Geneva Bradberry, Nancy Thompson, Pamela Smith, and Melanie Hardman. I also must thank my good friend Robert F. Durant of the University of Baltimore for discussing this manuscript (and many other subjects) with me for long periods of time.

I have many graduate research assistants to thank. Brett Evilsizor recorded most of my course lectures when I first began to conceive of writing the book. Doris Finkenzeller, Heike Polster, Sharon Park, Kardam Totev, and Julie Dotterweich were helpful in proofreading the manuscript. Joseph McCrary helped me with my too numerous com-

puter difficulties, including the day I broke my laptop by dropping it. Joe knew how to send it off for repairs—and $600 later, it is working as well as ever.

I gained a great deal of perspective through my attendance at a seminar for teachers of the Holocaust sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington during June 2000. I thank the museum for sponsoring this important seminar and also gratefully acknowledge the wisdom and expertise of Professor Richard Breitman, professor of history at American University, for guiding the seminar so skillfully. I benefited a great deal from his knowledge of twentieth-century Germany and the Holocaust. My classmates at this seminar were a wonderful group of scholars who gave me a variety of perspectives on the causes and consequences of the Holocaust. In addition, they were a joy to be around, and I have pleasant memories of the time we were able to share outside the seminar.

I wish also to acknowledge the contributions of so many of the excellent students I have had the good fortune of teaching in recent years both in Athens and abroad. These include the students I taught in Verona and also the University of Georgia Foundation Fellows students I taught in Geneva, Budapest, and Krakow. I treasured the opportunity to teach "on-site" in so many different locations. These include but are not limited to Auschwitz, Krakow, Budapest, Munich, Dachau, Venice, Florence, Rome, and Verona. I am fortunate that I have been able to travel so frequently and to have learned so much from these bright young people. I extend my thanks to Professor Fred Bates, Dr. Kathleen Harris, and Dr. Steven Elliot-Gower for providing these opportunities.

Of my personal friends I would like to extend a special acknowledgment to Dr. Paolo Jenna of Verona. I cannot say enough about how often he helped me with my teaching while I was in Italy. Paolo, himself a survivor of the Holocaust, was my guide in introducing me to the very small Jewish community in Verona and telling me of its history. He served as a guide on a student field trip to the magnificent but little-known synagogue in Verona just off of the Piazza Erbe. A recent project by the Verona government is restoring the building to its former glory. But the area surrounding the synagogue is sobering as it is the site where Jews were rounded up for deportation to Auschwitz in 1944. In numerous conversations with Paolo, I learned to appreciate the experience of the Jews in Italy and in Europe during the dark days of the Holocaust.

I also must acknowledge the contributions made to my classes by three other survivors and friends. These include Andre Kessler, a child survivor of the Holocaust in Romania, the late Jack Storch, a survivor of the Lodz Ghetto and Auschwitz and winner of the Israel Bonds Survivors New Life Medal, and Mrs. Janine Storch, a French survivor. I have developed close relationships with all three of these wonderful people. Unfortunately, as I was completing the writing of this book in September 2001, Jack died after a long illness, which he fought, as always, with an exceptional bravery. Jack's passing was a great loss for me. First, he was a superb teacher from whom I gained knowledge that could have been acquired in no other way. But, secondly, he was my personal hero because he is an illustration of how one can reconstruct a life from total ruin and loss and still be happy and successful, providing so much joy and life to those around him. I only wish I could be more fruitful in sharing his optimism and affirmation of life. To Dominique, Janine, Rael, Micah, and Chantel, I want you to know how much Papa meant to me and that I never will forget his wisdom, friendship, and love of life.

Children of survivors also frequented my class over the years, and for these efforts I especially would like to thank my good friend Jay Alimbek for his numerous appearances and also Susan Reingold, Helen Kasten, and Gil Holzer. I hope I can continue to call on you.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of my family toward this endeavor. First, I thank my older children, Jessica and Dean, for the joy they have given me over the years. I wish them much happiness in their new lives. I would also like to thank my mother, Jean White, for her wisdom and friendship. Linda Williams has been a wonderful friend and strong source of support for all members of my family. Indeed, Linda is family. But I would like to dedicate this book to my wife, Janie Cohen-Legge, and my youngest child, Sylvee. This acknowledges their strong support for my work and their company on the many trips we have taken together. These now include ten trips to Europe, three to China, and one to Israel, not to mention many junkets through the United States. I have to admit that most times I would have preferred them to stop at fewer jewelry stores, flea markets, or shopping malls along the way. (The pearl shops in Shanghai were especially burdensome.) I am also hoping that some day Janie may find a way to get us home that does not make me a candidate for back surgery on return to the States. But in the end the trips were wonderful, as is our life.

Jews, Turks, and Other Strangers

Introduction

In June 2000 a violent racist incident occurred in the town of Dessau in the eastern *Bundesland* of Saxony-Anhalt. In this state, the extremist right-wing Deutsche Volksunion garnered 13.8 percent of the seats in the April 1998 *Landtag* election. Three skinheads murdered a resident from Mozambique in a drunken orgy of beating and kicking. The victim, Alberto Andriano, was married to a German citizen and was the father of three children. He failed to regain consciousness and died several days after the assault. The three convicted individuals were a twenty-four-year-old who was sentenced to life in prison and two sixteen-year-olds who received nine-year sentences because of their juvenile status. The presiding justice, Judge Albrecht Hennig, noted the lack of remorse on the part of the convicted but also made a statement in his sentencing that linked the cause of the incident to poor economic conditions in eastern Germany. Noting the high incidence of attacks against foreigners in that region of Germany, Judge Hennig stated that "90 percent of far-Rightists are unemployed youths from deprived backgrounds" ("East German Skinheads" 2000). Chancellor Gerhard Schröder visited Andriano's grave in August as part of a two-week tour of the territories of the former German Democratic Republic. During his journey, the chancellor stressed the obligation for Germans to oppose violence against foreigners but simultaneously stressed the need for more economic development in the eastern region.

For all of its horror, the Andriano case is a good example of how the problem of violence against minorities is viewed in Germany, especially by members of the federal government, other appointed or elected officials, and citizens at large. Many believe that if the economy were operating at peak performance, and if useful work were found for young

persons who are currently unemployed, such individuals would lose their resentment against new immigrants, asylum seekers, and guest workers, and the problem would be abated. But the German economy has not operated at a level of peak efficiency for some time. Unemployment has been disastrously high in the eastern region since reunification, and for some time the western portion of the unified nation has not attained the levels of growth it experienced in the immediate postwar period. It is unlikely that the nation will be able to depend upon a drastically improving economy to solve its problems of violence against minorities in the short run.

This book makes the argument that the hypothesis of economic resentment does not explain the current situation of anti-minority prejudice in Germany to the degree commonly assumed. If one examines the survey data presented, the evidence is clear that other factors dominate the explanations of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism in contemporary Germany. In particular, the most persuasive explanation of the prejudice is a traditional racism against foreigners or Jews that has little to do with economic resentment.[1]

In this chapter, I develop the different explanations of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism. I begin with the notion of economic resentment, followed by those who hold that the notion of symbolism best explains prejudice. Finally, I develop the notion of traditional racism as a possible explanation for contemporary group conflict in Germany.

Economic Resentment

Scholars have long noted competition between groups in society. Competition can exist between minority groups or, more commonly, between one or more minority groups and a majority group. The suggestion that ethnic group conflict is not merely a product of racism has been prevalent in the social science literature for some time. In writing about strife between ethnic groups in New York City during the 1960s, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) stated that much of the conflict between blacks, Puerto Ricans, and white ethnic groups (Jews, Italians, and the Irish) could best be understood not as racism but as competition for scarce resources in politics and in the economic and social system. In more recent years "power theorists" have expanded on Glazer and Moynihan's original notion. The "power theory" of intergroup relations views

ethnic or other groups as competitors in the social, political, and economic spheres (Giles and Evans 1986).

But economic resentment and fear of competition from immigrants has served as an explanation for group conflict not only in Germany but in many other Western nations. For example, in writing about Western European societies in general, Castles and Kosack (1985: 430) contend that prejudice and discrimination are rooted in social and economic interests and that "prejudice originates as an instrument to defend such discrimination."

The German experience demonstrates that discrimination based upon economic fears was rare during the 1960s and early 1970s when the Turkish community first became established as a workforce. But attitudinally, sentiment began to change with the advent of the oil embargo of 1973 and the slow growth and high unemployment that accompanied it. Chapin (1997: 57) states that the close relationship between the growth of foreigners and high unemployment led most of the German population to believe that foreigners were direct competitors for German jobs. He cites surveys such as those listed by the *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984–1992* (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1993: 533), which indicated that large percentages perceived "foreigners took jobs from Germans" (Chapin 1997: 57). Regardless of the veracity of this mass belief, the issue began to become politicized and emerged as a main theme that accounted for much of the success of the extremist Republikaner Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Later in the decade when large numbers of refugees fled to Germany to escape the brutality of the war in Yugoslavia, much of the public became convinced that such persons were not political refugees but economic refugees who would attempt to displace German workers and benefit from the nation's generous welfare system (60).

The public perception of the "threat" posed by foreigners has not escaped the notice of scholars with a focus on Germany, especially those interested in German extremism and the problem of prejudice. Stöss (1991), for example, contends that social order can break down and right-wing attitudes can emerge during economically unstable times. More popularly, some authors contend that anti-foreign prejudice is generated by a "victims of modernization" hypothesis (Leggewie 1989; Betz 1991; Heitmeyer 1992). These scholars contend that support for right-wing parties and negative attitudes toward foreigners often are a

function of marginal education and employment, poor levels of group identity, and dim views of the future (Faist 1994). In writing about Germany, Castles and Kosack (1985: 452–53) contend that the deepest fear of German workers, especially unskilled workers, is that immigrants may replace them in employment. The newer refugees who arrived in the early 1990s probably threatened the most marginal positions, but research has demonstrated that although second-generation immigrants continued to be employed chiefly as laborers in heavy industry, many have been promoted to skilled positions. Second-generation immigrants earn roughly the same wages as Germans of similar age and occupation (Seifert 1992). Thus, according to a hypothesis of economic resentment, one would expect that those who are in the most vulnerable economic positions or who are dissatisfied with their economic status would be least sympathetic toward policies that might benefit the immigrants.

Terming the notion of economic resentment a "grievance model," Koopmans (1996: 195–96) provides a succinct definition of the concept: "Explanations for extreme right violence along the lines of the grievance model are not only frequently used in self-justifications of the extreme right, but also dominate the reception of extreme right and racist violence in the media and in politics. In this view, the presence of a large and growing foreign population in Western European countries and the massive influx of asylum applicants in recent years create actual or perceived problems and deprivations for the indigenous population, especially among the lower skilled, who already suffer from the threat of unemployment, bad housing and social marginalization and isolation."

Some scholars have argued that it is the residents of eastern Germany who should be especially vulnerable to the "victims of modernization" hypothesis (Backes and Moreau, qtd. in Roberts 1994: 477). This is because the east continues to lag behind the western portions of the nation economically, with many workers of the former Communist regime not having the skills to compete in a modern economy. With slow growth and an unemployment rate double that in western Germany, many residents of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (I refer to it in the text as the German Democratic Republic or GDR) feel that they have been passed by, and they direct their anger toward their perceived replacement by foreigners, most of whom live in the western region and have benefited from the capital and technology driving that economy. According to the victims hypothesis, these individuals should

harbor more resentment than westerners. However, it remains to be seen if the greater resentment is due primarily because of economic fears or the long years of isolation from democratic principles and government. I argue that the isolation hypothesis is more persuasive. Not only do easterners have little experience with the values that govern democracy, but they have not been familiar with the problems of minorities compared to those living in western Germany. The primary contacts that Germans in the eastern region have had with foreigners have been with citizens of other Communist Bloc nations, including the Soviet Union. They have not had the experience of working with and assimilating large numbers of nonnative Germans into their culture. With reunification, easterners for the first time have had to consider the problem of large numbers of foreigners in the new nation, and it has proved an uncomfortable experience for many of them.

Evidence does exist that tends to support the economic resentment hypothesis with regard to foreigners. For example, a number of scholars have noted that German perceptions of foreign workers changed for the worse following the Arab oil embargo of 1973. The nation moved from a situation in which its labor policy promoting the importation of guest workers (chiefly Turks) was virtually uncontroversial to the existence of increased resentment of this group. Greater portions of Germans wished to see guest workers emigrate back to their native countries. As Chapin (1997: 45–64) argues, the increasingly negative perception of foreign workers coincided with rising levels of unemployment throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Coincident with the rise in unemployment was the gain in public opinion polls that associated foreign workers with social problems, crime, and the belief that foreigners took jobs away from native Germans. Chapin is cautious about the connection between the declining economy, social problems, and crime and the increased resentment of foreigners, but he feels that such problems did have an impact on public opinion (57).

The economic resentment hypothesis also is present with regard to antisemitism in Germany, where there has long been an association between the condition of the economy and anti-Jewish bigotry. Rosenberg (1976), for example, demonstrates the rise of antisemitism coinciding with the economic problems that began with the 1873 depression during the Bismarckian era. Because they were heavily involved in commerce and banking, the Jews in Germany became a natural target for economic

frustration. Perhaps the most obvious example with regard to Germany is Hitler's holding "international Jewry" accountable for the depression of the German economy during the 1920s. This is in addition to his blaming the Jews for German defeat during World War I, alleging war profiteering during that conflict, and holding Jews responsible for the failures of the Weimar Republic.

More contemporaneously, the relationship between individual economic condition and antisemitism is presented by Bergmann and Erb (1997) under the title of "subjective deprivation." Utilizing a 1989 survey from the EMNID Institute, these scholars find a general relationship between one's perception of deprivation and various social pathologies, including antisemitism. For example, of those who viewed themselves as being "disadvantaged," some 46 percent could be described as antisemitic. On the other hand, only 31 percent of the "non-disadvantaged" expressed similar sentiments. In dealing with more specific questions regarding economic status, Bergmann and Erb (218–19) found a relationship between dislike of Jews, Turks, asylum seekers, and Aussiedler (Germans or descendants of Germans who emigrated from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) and perception of one's economic status as being "poor." Somewhat surprisingly, when considered in terms of the economic indicators, perceptions of Jews were not as negative as those for the other groups, leading the authors to believe that the economic explanation of antisemitism is not as powerful as it once was in Germany.

In its entirety, the concept of "social deprivation" is mixed with regard to explaining antisemitism among Germans, according to Bergmann and Erb. Although there is evidence of a stronger connection between economic status and attitudes (unemployment, housing, stress, poor economic conditions) and other non-German groups, there is a weaker relationship with regard to the Jews. Rather, a general measure of whether or not an individual considers himself or herself to be disadvantaged appears to tap antisemitism much more effectively. As I develop in later chapters, these findings may indicate that Jews have been replaced by others (guest workers, asylum seekers, and Aussiedler) as scapegoats for economic discontent and the prejudice that it generates.

Yet, as I argue in chapter 5, the relationship between antisemitism and economic conditions has been a powerful one historically both inside and outside of Germany. This perhaps derives most specifically from Jewish employment as moneylenders during the Middle Ages,

when such an occupation was forbidden to Christians because of prohibitions against usury by the Church. This image has become ingrained in Western culture, as exemplified in such works as *The Merchant of Venice.* Within Germany, the depression of the 1870s and the defeat of the nation in World War I were both blamed on the Jews by wide segments of German society.

Symbolic Racism

In addition to economic resentment, other powerful factors may explain antisemitism and anti-foreign sentiment in Germany. For example, some who study prejudice in the United States and elsewhere rely on the concept "symbolic racism" when describing racial prejudice. Scholars have argued that many citizens are reluctant to express bigotry through traditional stereotyping, which is no longer accepted socially; instead, racism may be expressed "symbolically" through support for conservative policies, ideologies, and parties. It is often argued that these conservative values are "fused" with a negative racial affect (Kinder 1986). For example, opposition to school busing combined with a negative affect toward blacks would be indicative of a symbolic racism. In the literature of political science, sociology, and public opinion, symbolic racism has been variously described as the "new racism" (Sniderman, Piazza, et al. 1991), "modern racism," (McConahay 1986), and "subtle racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), among other descriptions (Sears et al. 1997).

There is much evidence indicating that a conservative political orientation, apart from any racism, may predict reluctance to support policies that may benefit foreigners (Sniderman, Carmines, et al. 1996). Like the symbolic racists in the United States, the "neo-conservatives" in contemporary Germany do not express racism openly but criticize the "Left's agenda of civil rights, emancipation, and democratization" (Minkenberg 1992: 71). As pointed out by Roberts (1994: 480) in contemporary Germany there is an "analytic continuity" between the Christian Democrats and the more extremist parties on certain issues, including immigration. The overlap allowed extremists to influence the policies of the Christian Democrats before and after they lost the 1998 election to the Social Democrats. Since the election of Gerhard Schröder in 1998, the Christian Democrats have at times embraced at least the senti-

ments of the extremists by seeking to limit the options for citizenship on the part of Turks and other foreigners. For example, it was the Christian Democratic opposition that led to the elimination of a dual citizenship provision for Turks prior to implementation of the citizenship reform law on January 1, 2000. In addition, scholarly work from Germany indicates that those with a political orientation on the Right are less likely to express support for liberal social policies including programs that aid refugees and immigrants (Hopt 1994).

But there are conceptual problems with the symbolic approach. As Sniderman and Tetlock point out (1986: 134), it is, of course, possible to be socially conservative and not be a racist. For example, one may be in favor of restrictive immigration and guest worker policies primarily because one has concerns about immigration regardless of race or ethnicity. An individual may favor restrictive immigration because he or she is concerned with the tight supply of housing, overcrowded schools, or the demands that immigrants may put on taxes and services. But these feelings in themselves are insufficient to classify one as a racist. The same may be said of party preference and ideology in Germany when discussing prejudice. Although it is reasonable to hypothesize that those who classify themselves on the Right of the political spectrum or as Christian Democrats as more likely to oppose immigration than those on the Left or those expressing a preference for the Social Democratic Party, it is empirically unsupportable to attribute racism to the more Right-leaning respondents, whether it is considered symbolic or something else. In order to explore prejudice, it is necessary to go beyond attitudinal measurements that have no direct relationship to racism; instead, one must explore more traditional and direct measures of the concept.

Traditional Racism

Overall, much evidence from the United States indicates that the amount of racism (and antisemitism) present in that society has declined over the years (Hagan 1995). But in contrast, some social science literature that describes race relations in the United States argues that traditional bigotry, void of any social subtleties, is alive and well, especially with regard to blacks. The final major explanation for prejudice of native Germans against foreigners and Jews is referred to as "traditional rac-

ism" throughout this volume. Sears et al. (1997: 19) provide a good definition of the concept: "[R]acism is inferred if an individual responds systematically more negatively to attitude objects associated with blacks than to other comparable attitude objects (just as antisemitism is inferred when attitude objects associated with Jews are responded to especially negatively). While some of it may be expressed through more socially acceptable avenues (which admittedly is difficult to discern), traditional prejudices and bigotry continue to be major problems."

Traditional racism has been the subject of multiple terms in attempts to describe it. These include "red neck racism," "old-fashioned racism," and "classical racism" (see Sears et al. 1997: 20–21). In another work, I have referred to the concept as a "base racism" (Legge 1998). In the United States, much of the reason for the persistence of traditional racism stems from the fact that negative stereotypes of African Americans have been maintained by whites, especially in the southern United States (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). But the stereotype problem continues to be widespread. Some responsibility for the development of stereotypes may rest with the media, which portrays African Americans negatively, especially in their description of the poverty problem. Blacks are overrepresented in the media in proportion to their actual incidence of experiencing poverty and are represented in unflattering terms. In contrast, other groups of impoverished citizens, such as the working poor and the elderly, are presented more sympathetically (Gilens 1996a). In evaluating white attitudes toward welfare policy, Gilens (1995, 1996b) examines variables measuring self-interest, individualism, and egalitarianism. He finds that racial attitudes are clearly the most important factors in explaining white attitudes toward welfare recipients and policy. In particular, the stereotype that blacks are "lazy—is still widespread and continues to have a profound impact on whites' political thinking" (Gilens 1995: 994). Gilens's work is supported by Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman (1997), who find that whites who have negative stereotypes of African Americans are likely to judge blacks most severely in crime and welfare policy. But the relevance of race tends to fade when the respondents are presented with evidence that contradicts the stereotype.

In Germany it has also been documented that antisemitism has declined with the passage of time. If one compares the Nazi and immediate postwar period (Merritt and Merritt 1970) to the present day, this asser-

tion is intuitively and empirically correct. Yet such a comparison is difficult because the number of Jews present in the nation was drastically reduced during the war by the Nazi extermination and because most survivors did not return at the end of hostilities. Although the number of Jews in present-day Germany is rising due to immigration from the Soviet Union, most German citizens have not experienced direct social contact with Jews. This book demonstrates that today Germans harbor more intense prejudice against Turks, asylum seekers, and German immigrants from Eastern Europe than they do against the Jews, who experience less prejudice in both eastern and western sections of Germany. But it is not my purpose to measure the amount of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism in Germany as much as to determine which factors are most responsible for these problems.

As is the case in the United States, traditional racism is an important factor to consider in analyzing prejudice against minority groups. Like Gilens, I have found much evidence to support the notion of traditional racism in an earlier study where I attempted to determine the reasons behind German support or lack of support for a "sense of responsibility" for the Jews. Like Gilens, I found that the important determining factors were the most enduring antisemitic stereotypes, including the notion that Jews are "intent on money," that the group has undue influence, that they are responsible for the death of Christ, and that Jews have a lower morality than others (Legge 1998).

Summary

Despite some problems, postwar German democracy has surpassed even the most optimistic expectations. Elections and changes in governments have occurred smoothly, and the level of political extremism has been low. In addition to the Arab oil embargo of the mid-1970s, a major crisis was reached with the unification of the new state in 1990. The former territory of the GDR became an important part of the new Federal Republic of Germany, and this section of the nation has had a radically different experience from the western section in both democratic traditions and the assimilation of non-Germans. Due to the violence that minorities experienced during the initial period of unification, the contemporary German experience at least raises the question as to whether the specter of the past continues to plague the present. Are

the present difficulties with minorities a temporary product of economic difficulties or an expression of the chauvinism and bigotry with clear precedents in the nation's history?

In evaluating problems with minority groups in present-day Germany, perhaps optimists would hold that much of the anti-foreign agitation of the1990s was a simple problem of economic fear. Germans were concerned about losing their jobs, particularly the most marginal ones, to the new groups. Although the conflicts were regrettable in the minds of most Germans, problems would be ameliorated if the eastern and western portions of the nation could be united successfully with a dynamic economy. Pessimists might argue that anti-foreign attitudes and antisemitism, while vestiges of the past, still are present in the belief systems of many Germans and are influential in how they feel Jews and other minority groups should be treated. The most important thesis of this book is that the pushes and pulls of the German economy and individuals' expectations about them have little to do with how citizens feel about minorities. While German democracy has thrived, poor relationships with minorities sometimes manifested in violence can be a very real threat to its stability. In a practical sense, this can be illustrated by the difficulty of coalition formation between mainstream parties at the state level when extremist parties have gained significant portions of the vote.

I begin this book with a general historical treatment of the German economy, minority groups, and Jews in chapter 1. This is followed by a more detailed picture of the German experience with foreigners during the time of the collapse of the GDR and the migrations that took place during that time period.

1

The German Economy, "Foreigners," and Jews

Introduction

The reemergence of united Germany is of tremendous importance for the economic and political vitality of Europe and the West. More than any other event, the tumbling of the Berlin Wall and the merging of the two divisions of Germany symbolizes the intellectual and economic defeat of communism and the rebirth of democracy in central Europe. Although the rebuilding of the former territories of the East German Communist regime is a difficult, long-term task, the economic power and political influence of the reunited nation has unlimited potential. But the arrival of democracy to a unified Germany has not occurred without considerable problems, which have roots in the nation's disturbing past.

The purpose of this book is to describe and explain the major causes of anti-foreign prejudice and antisemitism in contemporary Germany. Although the "economic resentment" hypothesis seems convincing intuitively, other explanations are possible. The argument of this book is that economic factors are not as important as many other variables in fostering prejudice by Germans. I test the economic variables against other plausible theories of prejudice—including German contact and experience with non-Germans and Jews, psychological factors, political orientation, and sociodemographic background and find that the contributions of economic attitudes and status are marginal at best in explaining conflict. In addition to determining the comparative impacts of economic and other variables on anti-foreign attitudes and antisemitism, this study will encourage a fuller understanding of these phobias.

The German Experience with Jews and Foreigners

The German experience with the Jews prior to and during World War II is well known and is documented extensively, particularly the intense persecution and extermination of this group as carried out by the Nazi state. Approximately 6 million Jews lost their lives in the Holocaust, and most of the Jewish community who survived left Europe shortly after the war's close. The history of the Jews in Germany has been a traumatic one, and despite German efforts to put closure on the Jewish persecution, the memory of the conflict is not likely to be resolved quickly or easily.

It was the racial core of Nazi ideology and the alleged genetic and biological inferiority of the Jews that Hitler and others used to justify extermination. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 were established in order to prevent intermarriage or sexual relations between Jews and gentiles and thus prevent the "mongrelization" of the German "race"; yet, a considerable amount of Nazi and, in previous years, other right-wing extremist propaganda exaggerated the economic power of the Jews and frequently blamed them for economic depressions or for taking advantage of an existing crisis. Although not comparable in intensity to that manifested during the Nazi regime, antisemitism has persisted in Germany since the close of World War II (Stern 1992). I propose to explore the various possible causes behind the antisemitism, particularly as it has been expressed since German unification in 1990. As in the case of xenophobic attitudes, my argument holds that economic discontent explains little of the contemporary antisemitism in Germany. More disturbingly, the prejudice that does exist is racially and ethnically based.

Much media and scholarly attention has focused on the plight of refugees and guest workers with the advent of unification. But what frequently is not recognized is that Germany has had a long history of refugees coming to that country in search of work. In addition, it has employed foreign workers for long periods during its national experience.

The Close of the War and Economic Collapse

The end of World War II offers some parallels to the events surrounding 1990 unification in terms of the migration of foreigners, but the period beginning in May 1945 was more desperate and the population shifts more radical in nature.

In May 1945 Germany was a defeated nation, with its territory lying in rubble. Europe itself was in ruins. The United States and the Allies were planning programs to reestablish democratic attitudes in Germany and to rebuild that nation and the rest of the Continent economically. French, British, U.S., and Soviet military forces occupied Germany in four sectors. Berlin also was divided into zones by the Allies. In addition to dealing with the chaos in Europe, the Allies also were pursuing a second and unclosed front in the Pacific, which ended with the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The United States occupied Japan at the close of the war with the similar purposes of instilling democratic values and reestablishing the nation economically.

The loss of life and the chaos created by the war were frightful. Some 52 million civilians and armed combatants lost their lives. The suffering and death in Eastern Europe was particularly catastrophic. The total number of deaths in the Soviet Union was estimated at 20 million persons. Poland, the first victim of Nazi aggression when the war began in 1939, lost an estimated 6 million. Particular minority groups were targets of the Nazi genocide. These included the Roma and Sinti (Gypsies) and the Jews. Historians estimate that approximately two-thirds of European Jewry were exterminated by the Nazis (Hilberg 1985, 338–39). During the summer of 1945 Jews and other refugees who survived the war lived in displaced persons camps until suitable arrangements could be made for their future.

In addition to the physical destruction and political chaos, it was apparent that there was also a nearly complete economic collapse in Europe, especially in Germany. The entire transportation system was in ruins. Roads were impassible, and most of the network of railroads was not operating. Bridges were destroyed, and shipping and transportation on rivers and waterways had stopped. Agriculture was unable to provide basic subsistence, and rationing was imposed. The major cities were destroyed, including Munich, Berlin, Dresden, and Hamburg. A grossly inflated currency was inherited from the Nazi regime, it was difficult for Germans to make basic purchases, and the black market thrived.

In terms of resources it was at first unclear how much the Allied forces, which governed Germany in the immediate postwar period, would be willing to invest in rebuilding the nation. For example, some officials in the U.S. government, including Treasury Secretary Henry

Morgenthau, were opposed to aiding Germany in terms of industry and technology because they feared the rebuilding of the German war machine. An additional aspect of reluctance to aid Germany was rooted in the agreement reached at the Yalta Conference, which took place in the Crimea in February 1945. Attending the conference were the three major Allied leaders: President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, and Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. The agreement at Yalta declared a liberated Europe in which the three Allied nations would work together to solve the economic and political needs of nations that were dominated by the Nazi state or other Axis powers. Under the terms of the agreement, the Allies would work to destroy whatever was left of Nazism and restore self-government to nations in which it had been destroyed. Included in the methods of assistance were the establishment of conditions of internal peace, the carrying out of emergency relief measures, the formation of interim governments until free elections could be held, and the facilitation of democratic elections. The leaders of the three principal Allied nations also stated that it was their intention to invite the provisional government of France into the coalition at the earliest possible time.

But a third provision of Yalta called for the "dismemberment" of Germany. Most importantly, the agreement stated: "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security" ("Protocols" 1955; for a complete text of the agreement see 975–84).

The Yalta Conference also called for German reparations: equipment, ships, tools, transport, and German investments abroad could all be extracted by the Allied powers for the purpose of destroying Germany's future ability to wage war; goods from current production could be extracted for a fixed but then uncertain period; and German labor could be extracted. A reparations committee was to be established in Moscow with an initial sum of 22 billion dollars for the Allied nations. Fifty percent of this amount was claimed by the USSR under the agreement. The Soviet Union was adamant in the enforcement of the war reparations, and considerable industrial assets were transported to that nation.

Most significantly, the German financial system was broken in the

immediate postwar period. The *Reichsmark,* the currency of the Nazi years, was reduced to a small fraction of its original value. Cigarettes became a popular means of currency. Capital was unavailable for rebuilding the destroyed physical structure of the nation or to revitalize the economy. Finally, the labor force was depleted. Some 6.5 million Germans, including both civilian and military personnel, had died during the war, with the majority of this number being males.

Along with the political and economic collapse of Germany came an enormous migration of peoples. For the most part, the refugees at the close of the war consisted of Germans who lived in Eastern Europe or German ethnics from the Baltic States who were desperately attempting to escape the Soviet army. Other German ethnics were forced to leave their homes in the nations that had been occupied by Germany during the war. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary, Germans were driven from their homes and their lands. Anxious also to escape Communist-imposed rule, these expellees (Übersiedler) headed for the Western zones of occupation. According to Münz and Ulrich, data from October 1946 indicate that there were 5.69 million Übersiedler and refugees living in Western zones of occupation at this time, compared to 3.6 million in the Soviet occupation zones (Münz and Ulrich 1998a, 1998b; Seifert 1991, 1992, 1995). Although the movement of refugees and expellees created huge problems for the Allies in a resource-scarce society, they also provided a much-needed pool of laborers who were to be vital in future German economic growth.

Initial Policy: Displaced Persons and Refugees

The utilization of foreign workers was not new to Germany in the postwar period. The Nazi government used laborers from a variety of nations to support the war effort, including Soviet prisoners of war, concentration camp inmates, and foreign workers from other Axis powers. Many of those in the latter group entered Germany in order to enhance the war effort and to find jobs in an economy that had a labor shortage. Most prominent among the foreign workers were Italians, who were at least in geographical proximity, if not in some ideological congruence, with the Nazi regime. With the surrender of Italy to the Allies in 1943 and the occupation of that nation by the Germans in the later stages of the war, the position of the Italian worker became more tenuous.

Since most German males were in uniform, large shortages existed in the labor pool during the war. Foreign workers and Jews were significant substitutes during this time period. As Barkai (1990) illustrates, some of the workers from territories occupied by the Nazis came to Germany because of a scarcity of opportunities for employment in their own nations, but most were coerced. He cites data indicating that foreign workers, including those who labored in concentration camps, constituted approximately 20 percent of the wartime work force in May 1944. This figure does not include foreigners who worked in enterprises in the occupied nations or Jews working in German industry. Those who worked for firms for little or no compensation formed the core plaintiffs in the latest slave labor claims against German industry.

For the Jews, the labor was forced and harsh, and much of the time it was pointless. The objective was to make the victims suffer rather than produce a useful end product (Browning 2000). Perhaps the only compensation for those in a labor camp was that death was spared, at least temporarily. But in labor camps within Germany, such as Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, and Dachau, as in extermination camps, death ultimately was a frequent outcome of work even if life was extended temporarily.

Because of the large mix of foreigners in Germany during and after the war, it was necessary for the Allies to differentiate between displaced persons and refugees for policy purposes during the occupied period in the Western-controlled zones. Refugees were those individuals who were located within the boundaries of their country of origin at the end of the war. For the Germans, these included ethnic Germans who fled Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the war's end. As most of them were coming to Germany in order to reclaim German citizenship, the Allies considered the refugees to be the responsibility of the German government and not eligible for Allied assistance. This posed a problem for the ethnic Germans as not even a provisional German government was functioning until the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949. The refugees were often driven from their homes in their native land by resentful Eastern Europeans and their new Communist governments, and their plight was severe during the occupation years.

It was the second group of foreigners, known as "displaced persons," whom the Allies believed were their primary responsibility. They were

identified as a group worthy of assistance long before the war's end. As stated in an Allied directive of November 18, 1944, the displaced persons were to be considered "civilians outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of the war, who are desirous but unable to return home or find homes without assistance, or [in the case of citizens of enemy or ex-enemy states] to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory" (Burianek 1992: 6). Included in the displaced persons group were former inmates of concentration and death camps and individuals not of German heritage fleeing the Soviet-held territories in Eastern Europe. But as Burianek points out, the situation at war's end in Germany was far more complicated than this classification indicates. A chaotic situation prevailed that was barely manageable (Burianek 1992: 7).

As the war ended, there was basically no governmental control of refugee policy (in the broadest sense of the term) in Germany simply because the state no longer existed. The limited control of policy was in the hands of the Allies. During the war most civilians were desperately attempting to avoid the German army, and after the German defeat by the Soviets, many persons in destroyed Eastern Europe began to head west. The chief aim now was to avoid falling under Soviet control. Many of these displaced persons and refugees from Eastern Europe as well as concentration and death camp survivors ironically landed in Germany at the war's close. Rather than the government trying to discourage displaced persons, the camps had the task of providing care for the refugees, reuniting families when possible, and finding them new homes. Many of the displaced persons, particularly the Jews, emigrated to either the United States or Israel.

Concern for the plight of refugees became more pronounced several years after the war's close as conflict between the Soviets and the other Allied powers intensified and borders became more rigid. A persistent problem from the Soviet point of view was the number of German refugees who poured out of the Soviet sector of Berlin and eastern Germany to areas under Allied control, particularly the western sector of Berlin. By 1961 approximately 2.5 million East German refugees had crossed borders either into West Germany or West Berlin.

In the immediate postwar period, relations between the USSR and the West deteriorated primarily because of the Soviet ambition to control all of Berlin. The first breaking point was reached in December 1947 when the Allies began to hold meetings without the Soviet ambas-

sador, who refused to attend. This was followed by a declaration on the part of the Soviets that the Allied Control Council of Berlin was abolished and that their government would no longer participate in joint governance. In 1948 the Soviets began a blockade of West Berlin to starve the city into submission. This was answered with the successful Allied Berlin Airlift, which began in June of 1948. The tensions in Berlin continued throughout the 1950s and climaxed with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

With the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the new nation had to develop a policy on refugees. The policy was stated in the Basic Law, the constitutional document that defines the rights of citizens and details the organization of government. The generous philosophy toward refugees under the Basic Law was in reaction to two traumatic events: the period of the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945 and the belligerency of the Soviet government and the division of Germany after the war. During the Nazi regime all rights were trampled upon, free expression was not allowed, and organizations such as the Gestapo targeted individuals who challenged the regime. Most tragically, there was no opportunity for persecuted individuals to flee the totalitarian state. This was particularly traumatic for the Jews of Germany, who were given little chance to depart after the mid-1930s. Moreover, the doors of most European nations and the United States were not open to them. During the postwar period, West German citizens were sympathetic to Germans who were able to escape the Soviets or the GDR. After 1961, escape from East Germany became extremely difficult, and many gave their lives in the attempt, but those who were successful in reaching West Berlin or the Federal Republic were welcomed.

When written originally in 1949, the Basic Law gave the Germans perhaps the most liberal refugee policy in the world. Article 16 covers deprivation of citizenship, extradition, and right of asylum. It states "persons persecuted for political reasons enjoy the right of asylum." This provision stayed the same until the pending collapse of the German Democratic Republic and the war in Yugoslavia. The flood of refugees into the western portion of Germany during the early 1990s persuaded the Bundestag to alter the law. Asylum was still a right under the Basic Law, but the Kohl government, believing that many refugees were victims of economic rather than political oppression, asserted that there had to be a more specific definition of "political."

Economic Rebuilding: Currency Reform and the Marshall Plan

It was not only the labor supplied by foreign workers that accounted for the economic success of Germany during the postwar period. Another important development was the currency reform implemented on June 28, 1948. The chief proponent of the new currency and free market economics in the new state was Ludwig Erhard, who studied economics at the University of Frankfurt. At that institution he came under the influence of Wilhelm Roepke, perhaps the foremost academic proponent of an economy operating with little government intervention. Under the terms of the currency reform, the Allies agreed to abolish the inflated Reichsmark, with a new currency based on the Deutschemark. Each citizen was given 40 Deutschemarks to start out and then was paid a second installment of 20 additional marks several months later. The new currency immediately replaced the old in terms of debts and credits, and Reichsmarks could be converted to the new currency at a ratio of 10:1.

In addition to currency reform, Erhard advocated an end to wage and price controls, and the Allies acquiesced immediately on June 29, 1948. The ending of wage and price controls and the currency reform stimulated supply and gave consumers incentives to invest and save. The economy began to expand rapidly, with the number of unemployed dropping and productivity increasing.

Working in concert with the currency and free market reforms was the Marshall Plan. President Harry Truman's foreign policy sought to reconstruct Europe by economic means. An immediate goal was to rebuild from the rubble created by the war. This humanitarian policy received widespread support in the United States. Citizens were comfortable with economic assistance, provided that the German war machine was destroyed. But a second objective of economic assistance was to prevent the spread of communism beyond the borders of Eastern Europe already occupied by the Soviets.

The Truman Doctrine, the primary policy invoked in the postwar period to deal with the problem of an expanding Communist influence in Europe, was instituted by President Truman in 1948 and applied initially to Greece and Turkey. Greece was especially in dire straits because of the destruction during the Nazi occupation. A struggle ensued,

culminating in a civil war, with the Communists as one of the major protagonists. A major focus of communism is to appeal to the less fortunate, and the reasoning behind the Truman Doctrine was that the ideology of communism could be contained if prosperity could be regenerated. But in terms of economic assistance, the more influential foreign policy thrust of the Truman administration was the Marshall Plan.

The central concepts behind the Marshall Plan were introduced in a short commencement address at Harvard University by Secretary of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. Marshall's concept was simple and straightforward: it was necessary and right for the United States to work with the European nations to rebuild the Continent.

A coalition of Republican and Democratic politicians led chiefly by Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg worked to make the plan a reality. The Marshall Plan became operational with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of April 3, 1948. Nearly all European nations participated in the Marshall Plan from the beginning. The exceptions were Spain, which was not invited to participate because of Generalissimo Franco's sympathy for the Nazi regime during the war (although Spain protected its Jewish population), and the Soviet Bloc nations, which refused assistance because they viewed it as an American-led effort to gain control over Eastern Europe. Germany did not participate immediately because it had no self-government at the time and was under Allied control. With the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the western half of the former Nazi state became a full participating member. During the next four years, the United States pumped approximately $13 billion into the European economies. Results were impressive as the gross national products throughout Europe grew rapidly.

The Marshall Plan was a watershed both for American foreign policy and European unity. For the United States, it marked a break from isolationism and indicated that the nation would take a more active role in the international community. European interests were to become one with American goals, and the United States now had a clear national stake in European stability. The new internationalist policy was crystallized further in 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With U.S. participation in a formal collective security agreement for the first time, the NATO agreement stipulated that an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all.

For the Europeans, the Marshall Plan would be viewed as a first

step toward postwar prosperity as well as the beginning of cooperation among the nations. By making the plan a joint venture, Americans not only encouraged cooperation with the United States but also paved the way for Europeans to work with each other to avoid the catastrophes of the past. In this sense, the Marshall Plan was a precursor to the European Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and the emergence of the European Community. For Germany, the economic recovery precipitated a new role. Throughout the postwar period and regardless of the party in power or the chancellor, Germany has been consistent in its emphasis of a unifying role in Europe where the nation would no longer dominate (Glees 1996, 253–79).

The Economic Miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*)

Triggered by the change in currency and Ludwig Erhard's other free market reforms and aided by the Marshall Plan, the economic record of the Federal Republic during the postwar period has been impressive. The Christian Democratic Party, under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer and Erhard (who became the first economics minister of the Federal Republic), was responsible for the creation of a market economy that began to move the nation out of the ashes. In contrast, the GDR was saddled by force with a centrally planned economic system that ultimately failed. As it developed, the new economic system in the FRG acquired its own uniqueness and was not simply a product of American occupation. Although government's role is limited, the German economy has close cooperation between sectors. In contrast to France, Great Britain, Italy, and to a lesser extent the United States, there continues to be a close working relationship between management and labor. During the early years, labor cooperated voluntarily to keep wages low in order to expand the number of jobs. Major decisions regarding the economy tended to be collaborative, with government, management, and labor (mostly in the form of unions) brought into the decision-making process.

The Christlich Demokratische Union combined with the Bavarian-affiliated Christlich-Soziale Union (hereafter referred to as the Christian Democratic Party or CDU/CSU) ruled uninterrupted until a coalition government was formed with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (here after referred to as the Social Democratic Party or SPD) in 1966. But it was necessary for the SPD to reform their socialist princi-

ples and accept the basic tenets of capitalism to become attractive to the electorate. This was accomplished at a party conference at Godesberg in 1959. After that conference, German elections turned on which party would be more effective in bringing Germany to prosperity through markets rather than an either/or choice between radically different systems. Of course, as in the United States, there were differences in the parties and the constituencies to which they appealed. These differences were sharper than in most of the Western democracies. For example, the SPD was more closely aligned with manual workers and unions and desired a stronger safety net than the CDU/CSU. And although the Christian Democrats had closer ties to management and the business community, they too accepted the importance of basic worker security and used social issues to appeal to the more conservative members of the working class.

The nation moved from a situation of destruction and economic collapse to the third largest economy in the world, behind the United States and Japan. The *Bruttoinlandsprodukt* (gross domestic product or GDP) for 2000 for the unified German state was approximately 4,120.6 billion Deutschemarks. Although some have cited that the rate of growth slowed after the immediate postwar period (Braun 1990, 170; Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding 1992), one has to keep in mind that the base beginning in 1945 was extremely low. Growth did "level off," but it is unrealistic to continue to expect the rates that were experienced in the early 1950s, particularly with reunification in 1990. Germany currently captures approximately 10 percent of all international trade, second to Japan. One would guess that with reunification, previously closed markets in Eastern Europe will continue to open. In addition, the nation has a productive reinvestment rate of approximately 20 percent, which outpaces the U.S. rate (*Statistisches Bundesamt*). This enables Germany to develop new technologies to produce improved and innovative products. Considering the destruction of the war, Germany's postwar experience can truly be described as a *Wirtschaftswunder* (an economic miracle).

The Role of Guest Workers and Immigrants

There is some controversy as to the contribution of German "guest workers" (*Gastarbeiter*) toward the prosperous economy. The ravage due to the war was similar in both the eastern and western portions of

Germany, and the shortage of men during the 1950s was complicated by a low fertility rate that was below replacement level. The GDR and the FRG took opposite approaches to solving the labor problem. In the GDR, the solution was more long-term. As in many of the Eastern European nations that experienced destruction and came under the sphere of the Soviet Union, the GDR experimented a great deal with policies to encourage individuals to marry and have children. Incentives included higher taxes for single persons, birth and childcare allowances, and reduction of mortgages in return for procreation (Legge and Alford 1986).

In West Germany, there was a need for a more immediate solution, given the tremendous growth. To a great extent, during the period 1949–1961 the labor shortage was solved by the emigration of GDR residents moving to West Germany. According to Münz and Ulrich (1998a), approximately 3.8 million GDR residents emigrated to the FRG during this period. Many fewer Germans migrated from west to east. Some of this movement was for ideological reasons as the Communist Party was banned in the FRG, while others migrated for the purpose of being united with family. In the end, approximately 300,000 West Germans migrated to the GDR between 1949 and 1961, but overall there was a large net gain for the FRG.

Despite the gain in population, the FRG continued to have labor shortages during the 1950s because the economy was expanding so rapidly. Accordingly, during that decade Germany began to recruit workers from southern Europe. The earliest nation to sign an agreement with Germany was Italy in 1955. By 1960, formal agreements were reached with Greece and Spain. The purpose of recruiting foreign workers was not to integrate them into German society but to fill gaps in the labor market. Most of the jobs assigned to foreign workers were menial in nature, and few Germans were willing to accept such positions. These included manual labor, factory work, domestic work in hotels, busing in restaurants, and other types of blue-collar employment. In addition, the understandings reached with foreign workers and governments stipulated that employment would be temporary and that residence in Germany was limited to one year. The "rotational" model of immigration describes a situation in which workers stay in Germany strictly for a limited time and are then returned to their native lands.

The labor situation in West Germany began to change with the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The flow of emigration from east

to west was halted, and German industry looked for new labor sources to supplement the native workforce. Importantly, a formal agreement with Turkey was reached in 1961, followed by similar pacts with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Turkey was to supply the largest number of workers in the long run, and this group currently constitutes the largest number of foreign residents in Germany at approximately 2.1 million. At first the rotational model applied to these new workers, but as the 1960s wore on and the demand for labor did not decline, employers became weary of training new cycles of workers each year. In 1971 the West German government began to allow those foreigners who had worked in the nation for five years to obtain special work permits that could be valid for up to another five years. This development encouraged more spouses and children to move to Germany and acquire what was to become a permanent residency. Currently, foreigners constitute approximately 9 percent of the German population.

As the education and skill levels of most jobs occupied by *Gastarbeiter* are minimal, it is doubtful that jobs have been taken away from German workers. Perhaps as unemployment has risen in the 1990s with reunification, there has been an increased resentment of foreigners being on German soil. But the idea that the Turkish workers are competitors for positions that would normally be occupied by Germans is doubtful. There is some literature arguing that second-generation *Gastarbeiter*, while still working as laborers in heavy industry, have been promoted to more skilled positions. Additionally, the wage gap between native and foreign-born workers seems to narrow when age is held constant (Steinmann 1994).

A larger question is the contribution that the *Gastarbeiter* have made to the *Wirtschaftswunder.* One major contribution is that during the 1950s the foreign workers assisted in balancing regional growth. They were willing to travel to areas to which native Germans were reluctant to migrate. This was true in southern Bavaria and other southern industrial areas that experienced the most severe labor shortages (Schmidt 1994: 1–20). The *Gastarbeiter* also played a key role in taking positions in manufacturing and construction as native Germans began to move into the service sector. In analyzing the costs/benefits of immigration to the Germans, Steinmann's analysis suggests that there are significant "investment costs" that must be paid by society in the short

run as new immigrants are assimilated into the workforce. But the author argues that "if their time horizon is longer . . . then we can certainly expect that the income benefits brought about by the immigrants will by far outweigh the temporary costs of integrating them into society" (Steinmann 1994: 58).

In summary, the *Gastarbeiter,* whether from southern Europe or from Turkey, seem to have performed a valuable function in contributing to the growth of the German economy in the postwar period. Given the need for unskilled labor, the decimation of German life caused by the war, and the low fertility of the population, the guest workers filled many economic positions that were undesirable to the average citizen.

The Economic Problems of the Postwar Period

Aside from the enormous growth in Germany beginning in the 1950s, there are two time periods when there were major problems in the German economy. A primary crisis occurred following the collapse of the GDR and reunification in 1990. I reserve my discussion of the events surrounding reunification and their economic impact for chapter 2. The other major shift was occasioned by the Arab oil embargo of 1974. The impact of these events can be seen in figures 1.1 and 1.2, which indicate, respectively, the unemployment rate and real growth in gross domestic product (GDP) from 1961 through 2000.[1] The figures indicate that there is an obvious rise in unemployment and a slowing of growth during the 1990s during the effort to unify the nation economically and politically. But perhaps a more striking change can be seen in 1974, the year that marks the first slowing of the *Wirtschaftswunder.* With the imposition of the oil embargo, Germany, which was almost totally dependent on oil imports, suffered grievously. During 1974, unemployment rose above 1 percent for the first time in several years; with the exception of 1979 and 1980, it stayed above 3 percent and mostly was in the range of 6 to 7 percent during the 1980s (figure 1.1). Real growth in GDP dropped from 4.8 percent in 1973 to 0.2 percent in 1974; in 1975 it was a negative 1.3 percent (figure 1.2).

The 1974 recession is important for its profound impact on the *Gastarbeiter.* Although German citizens for the first time since the late 1940s had to become concerned with high unemployment rates, the recession hit the foreign workers harder. The percentage of unemployed foreign

Figure 1.1 Yearly German Unemployment Rate (Total, 1961–2000)



Figure 1.2 GDP: Real Growth in Germany (% yearly variation, 1961–2000)



workers has been consistently higher than for Germans (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) because recessions typically hit unskilled jobs before skilled ones, and because the more skilled positions are often protected by the unions. The second important impact of the 1974 recession is that the government anticipated the embargo and on November 23, 1973, passed a law greatly limiting foreign labor from entering the Federal Republic. The hardest restrictions were placed upon individuals from outside the European Economic Community (EEC) countries, which at that time included Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Despite the fact that these restrictions are largely maintained to this day, very few of the foreign workers opted to return to their native countries, probably reasoning that a worldwide recession would have more severe effects in their home nations than in Germany. Since that time, the number of foreign workers has grown due to a high fertility rate, particularly among the Turks. Like German citizens, they have survived the ups and downs of the German economy. With reunification and the political and economic collapse of the GDR, their position became even more tenuous. Similarly, as I detail in chapter 2, the slowed economy after unification had important consequences for public attitudes toward non-Germans, especially the Turks. The 1990s witnessed a rising tide of resentment and violence against this community. Other groups that were targeted primarily at that time consisted of refugees from the former Communist nations of Eastern Europe and those fleeing the war in Yugoslavia.

Summary

In the postwar period, the Federal Republic of Germany emerged as perhaps the most important economic and political power in Europe. This was accomplished with the aid of the United States and other Allied powers that spent considerable capital rebuilding the nation. The creation of democratic political parties and a successful market economy out of the occupation period were directly responsible for German prosperity. Although low fertility and a decimated male population due to the war were major handicaps in the German labor market, foreign workers have helped to fill the gap. Many view an unproductive economy as the major cause behind the rise of prejudice in the 1990s, but

it is the argument of this book that other factors, including simple bigotry and German chauvinism, are far more important.

What began as a mutually positive and beneficial relationship between Germany and its foreign workers became uneasy following the 1974 recession and deteriorated further immediately following unification in 1990. With mounting difficulties in economic conditions caused mainly by the merger of the GDR and FRG, some Germans turned their anger toward guest workers and refugees. Violent and destructive acts were also directed toward the Jewish community. The events in the early 1990s led to the question of how deeply ingrained both anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism were in both sections of Germany. Were the destructive attitudes that were seemingly instilled during the war receding? Was the prejudice evident during the 1990s a product of economic difficulties the nation was experiencing, or was a traditional racism rooted in the past responsible? Would the future of democracy in Germany be at risk given the crises of the early 1990s? Given the poorer economic conditions in the territories of the former GDR, are citizens more likely to express attitudes that could be considered xenophobic or antisemitic? I explore these questions with available survey data and argue that ultimately the impact of economic factors has been far less important than is commonly supposed. Instead, other variables such as contact with foreigners, political and ideological alignment, German chauvinism and racism toward ethnic groups, socioeconomic characteristics, and psychological predisposition form larger pieces of the puzzle of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism.

2

Reunification with East Germany and the Refugee Problem

Introduction

With the regime changes that occurred in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s came an additional movement of peoples. These individuals consisted of persons seeking better economic opportunities, refugees fleeing the civil conflict in Yugoslavia, those running from oppressive regimes in nations such as Iraq, and ethnic Germans who were free to migrate for the first time in years. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, residents of the former German Democratic Republic also were able to migrate. These migrants landed primarily in the Federal Republic of Germany because of the nation's liberal refugee policy and the economic opportunities offered. I begin this chapter with a discussion of the collapse of the GDR. More than any other event, the end of the former Communist regime greatly accelerated the number of incoming residents who would live in Germany during the 1990s. The huge influx was also said to shape attitudes toward the new residents in an economy that was already strained by reunification. The struggling economy combined with the large influx of foreigners also encouraged the rise of extremist parties and their limited success in the polls during the 1990s.

The discussion of the collapse of the GDR is followed by a description of the migration of peoples that it triggered both within and outside

Germany. I argue that residents of the former GDR, ethnic Germans from the former Communist states of Eastern Europe, and refugees and asylum seekers fleeing primarily from the war in Yugoslavia all entered West Germany at a time when the economy was already lagging. In addition, many Germans were already unhappy with the large number of guest workers (primarily Turks) who were residing in the nation. The pressure of these groups migrating to West Germany led to a great deal of resentment against the newcomers. The negative attitudes toward non-Germans were influential in the support for extremist political parties that won several state and local elections in the eastern *Bundesländer.* But it is a matter of debate as to whether it was the economy or simply bigoted attitudes against the new groups that were responsible for the degree of prejudice and right-wing activities that accelerated greatly during the 1990s. I argue that the prejudice that was manifested against these groups is a product of negative stereotypes and bigoted attitudes toward the non-Germans rather than any dissatisfaction with the economy. Nevertheless, I conclude with the observation that part of the frustration with reunification had to do with the high economic expectations placed on the new state by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other Christian Democratic politicians.

The Collapse of the German Democratic Republic

The collapse of the GDR cannot be viewed in isolation but only as part of a whirlwind of events that happened in the European Communist nations during the late 1980s. Marx stated that capitalism contained within it the seeds of its own destruction. But if this statement may ultimately prove to be true, the same must be said of the former Communist regimes of eastern and central Europe. The most obvious reason for the failure and collapse of the Communist regime in the GDR is that over the long haul a centrally planned, state-managed economy, coupled with a totalitarian political system, could not provide a prosperous and satisfactory life for its citizens, just as it could not in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria. Over the years there was evidence of cracks in the system as evidenced by the strikes and demonstrations in East Berlin and the GDR in 1953, the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, and the Prague Spring in 1968. At least in the short

run, the power of totalitarianism and the military might of the Soviet Union held sway. But it took both a realistic assessment of economic and political conditions and strong leadership to change these systems.

An honest self-examination of the European Communist systems from their leadership began with the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985. Despite the initial optimistic view that Gorbachev would be a reformer or, in the words of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, "someone we can do business with," at least some of the West's initial encounters were difficult. For example, in 1986 a summit was held between President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik. During the two days intense talks were held on arms reductions, but the summit was viewed a failure at that time. The chief difficulty was Gorbachev's reluctance to accept Reagan's proposed "Star Wars" defense proposal, the purpose of which was to develop a technology to thwart nuclear attack. More difficulty was experienced at the Geneva arms negotiations in March 1987. At this conference, it was proposed by the Soviets that all short-range missiles be eliminated, but this suggestion was opposed by Chancellor Kohl, who feared for the security of the Federal Republic.

A turning point was reached on December 7, 1988, when Gorbachev delivered an extraordinary speech before the United Nations General Assembly. He spoke first about developments occurring in the Soviet Union to include the concepts of *glasnost* (limited political freedom) and *perestroika* (experiments with markets), which had been in place since shortly after his taking of power. But perhaps the most striking aspect of the speech is that Gorbachev made clear that the Soviet Union would drastically cut back the role of its military in Eastern Europe. There would be a reduction of 500,000 troops, along with a withdrawal of six tank divisions in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, with their total disbanding by 1991. The Soviet troops stationed in the Warsaw Pact nations would be lowered by 50,000 troops and 5,000 tanks. The troops remaining in these nations were to be "restructured" and become "unambiguously defensive." These reductions would be unilateral regardless of progress in arms reduction talks with NATO. The UN speech went further than troop cutbacks. Gorbachev also stated that the drop in military forces was related directly to economic reform. He spoke of an "internal plan for conversion of two or three defense enterprises" and of publishing "our job relocation of specialists in the

military industry, and also of using its equipment, buildings, and works in civilian industry" (excerpts from Gorbachev's UN speech, December 7, 1988).

The UN speech was received with shock and surprise in the United States and in the other NATO nations. It signaled clearly that the Soviet Union no longer would be able to afford to devote the core of its economy to armaments. But it also sent a message to the Warsaw Pact nations that the USSR would take a far less active role in their governance. The speech caused demands for political and economic reform to build rapidly in these nations.

By the time of the UN speech, the momentum for changes in Communist Europe had already taken hold, with some nations moving much more quickly than others. In Poland, for example, the quest for political freedom began as early as 1980 when Lech Walesa organized workers in the Gdansk shipyards. The Solidarity movement was at first driven underground after General Wojciech Jaruzeluski declared martial law in December 1981. In 1987 U.S. sanctions were lifted against Poland when the military government could no longer hold back the tide of change that was prompted in great part by the visit of Pope John Paul II. By the beginning of 1989, Gorbachev suggested that Solidarity be legalized, and in June the party gained an electoral victory in both houses of its parliament.

Events in Germany were more sudden and unpredicted than in Poland, which had a visible dissident movement for some time. By autumn 1989 many East Germans camped in the West German embassies in Czechoslovakia and Hungary seeking visas in order to cross to West Germany. The event that ultimately seemed to break the will of the GDR regime was the relaxed policy of the Hungarian government, which in October 1989 opened the border between itself and Austria. East Germans who had legitimately traveled to Hungary were now given the option to cross over to West Germany, and thousands did so. This in itself helped create a refugee problem for the FRG. Then, on November 9, East Germany opened the Berlin Wall, and for the first time since 1961 East and West Germans were free to cross to either side of the Iron Curtain. Mass demonstrations demanding free elections simultaneously took place in major East German cities, particularly Leipzig and Berlin. These demonstrations were peaceful and were influential in causing the ouster of GDR party chair Eric Honecker. Although it took another year

of turmoil for unification to occur (October 3, 1990), for all practical purposes it was obvious that postwar East Germany had collapsed by the end of 1989.

New Migrations

With the end of the GDR, the elimination of most legal restrictions on migration in the former Communist nations, and the continual conflict in the Balkans, Germany began to experience the problem of large numbers of individuals seeking entry to that nation. Whereas in the past the "foreigner problem" was expressed in terms of the guest workers, the nation began to feel additional pressure for migration from refugees and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (Aussiedler) who saw reunification as an opportunity to return to the land of their ancestors.

Migration within Germany

One source of migrational pressure was coming from within what was to become the new German nation. In particular, difficulties were experienced from the migration of residents of former East Germany to the western portion of the nation. Some migration occurred from west to east, but it was not nearly enough to compensate for the tremendous drain in human resources in the eastern portion. According to Münz and Ulrich (1998a), approximately 390,000 citizens left the GDR in 1989, the year in which the Berlin Wall was removed. In the following year, 1990, another 395,000 left (see also Seifert 1991, 1992, 1995). This two-year figure exceeded the approximately 600,000 who had migrated to West Germany in the years 1961 to 1988. The majority of the 600,000 consisted of aged pensioners who were allowed to travel freely. Between 1989 and 1993, more than one million Germans moved from the territories of the GDR to the western portion of the nation.

Münz and Ulrich argue that these migrations had little to do with economic cycles. German citizens, while hopeful of new economic opportunities, were not persuaded to move by short-term pushes and pulls of employment possibilities. Rather, the central factor over the years was the political climate, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, the movement of Germans from east to west had two important consequences. First, it caused an enormous drain to the East German economy. The GDR was never able to compensate for the intel-

lectual capital and labor shortages that followed. The regime attempted to counteract by importing foreign workers of its own from other Communist states such as Vietnam and Mozambique, but in terms of education and skill level, these workers simply could not compensate for those who were lost.

A second consequence of the migrations within Germany was that many entered the western portion of the nation at a time when the economic situation was difficult and when other groups coming into Germany were competing for employment and scarce economic resources. These included political refugees from other fallen Communist regimes and Yugoslavia and ethnic Germans who were departing from Russia, the Baltic States, and other Eastern European nations. In addition, the population of guest workers, especially the Turks, had grown considerably since the 1960s due to a high fertility level (especially compared to native Germans) and increased immigration. These groups competed in a German labor market that was not robust. In addition, residents in the western region came to harbor resentment against migrants from and residents of the eastern region because the western residents were subject to additional federal taxes aimed at integrating the eastern region both economically and politically.[1]

The Ethnic Germans

A second source of economic pressure came from ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) who resided primarily in the former Communist nations of Europe, excluding the GDR. In the midst of integration and the growing resentment against refugees and immigrants, large numbers of Aussiedler desired to leave these failed regimes and return to Germany. Existing German law made it relatively easy to return, and the German government has provided considerable support for the Aussiedler since the end of the war. Germans had been in Eastern Europe for some time, chiefly in search of better economic opportunities than were available in the homeland. When Catherine the Great became empress of Russia in 1762, she opened land to other Europeans who wished to farm in that nation. The settlers received free land and local governing autonomy. Nearly 2 million German settlers or descendants of these settlers were living in Russia by the close of the nineteenth century. Also due to an economic wanderlust, large German communities were also established in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and various parts of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire, including what is now the nations of Hungary and Romania.

An essential part of Hitler's foreign policy was expansion to the east or *Lebensraum* (living space), which was detailed in his *Mein Kampf.* As the Slavs were an inferior people, according to Hitler, it was German destiny to expand to the east and rule them. Once conquered, nations such as Poland and Russia were to exist as slave states, with the sole purpose of serving the German people and the Reich. In formulating and carrying out his imperialistic foreign policy, Hitler appealed to the ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe to support him and was largely successful. The most infamous example of his use of the ethnic Germans was in Czechoslovakia, which contained a large German minority in the Sudetenland. This territory consisted of the border area within Czechoslovakia, and during the 1930s a large and organized Nazi militia and mass following was evident. When German troops moved into the Sudetenland after it was ceded to the Nazi regime at Munich in October 1938, they received a warm welcome from the local population. Of course, less than a year later, all of Czechoslovakia was swallowed by the Reich.

The support for the Nazis by the ethnic Germans and the destruction, loss of life, and havoc created by the war caused a great deal of resentment on the part of the native populations at war's end. Rummel (1994) details a great deal of brutality against the Aussiedler during the years following the war. Although some were culpable, a great many innocent individuals were either killed or driven from their land. He states further that the Communist governments then in place either ignored or actually encouraged the atrocities. Because of the persecution, the harsh conditions in Eastern Europe, and the desire for economic opportunity, many Germans were anxious to return to their ancestors' native land, and once it was established, the Federal Republic was highly supportive of the migration, especially with the labor shortage that existed. The Basic Law, Article 16 (Deprivation of citizenship, extradition, right of asylum), states: "No one may be deprived of his German citizenship. Loss of citizenship may arise only pursuant to a law, and against the will of the person affected it may arise only if such person does not thereby become stateless."

As citizenship is actually determined by the citizenship and ethnic background of one's parents (jus sanguinis) and not their residence (jus soli), large numbers of Germans were, and still are, eligible to return.

While the asylum section of Article 16 was amended in 1993 to stem the flow of refugees, the citizenship portion has never changed.

The number of returnees is extremely significant. At the end of the war, large numbers of ethnic Germans were forced out of Eastern Europe, with many being expelled by the governments. Approximately 2.5 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have resettled in Germany. Of this number, somewhere in the range of 1.7 million have resettled since 1989 (Ulrich 1994: 155–77). The greater number repatriating since 1989 is reflective of the collapse of the Communist regimes and the newly acquired ability to migrate for the first time in many years. No doubt because of their language skills, some Aussiedler adjusted more easily to their new life than did, for example, Bosnians fleeing the war in Yugoslavia. But language skills were missing from a great many, particularly the Aussiedler who emigrated from the Soviet Union, causing additional adjustment problems. Of this group, many spoke only Russian, as the German language had faded with the passage of time. In addition, this large number of new residents could not help but put considerable pressure on an already volatile political and economic situation. In the face of rising unemployment, the ethnic Germans competed against Turkish and other immigrants and residents of the former GDR for scarce economic resources. Because of this problem, in 1992 Germany passed a law setting a quota on the number of ethnic Germans who were allowed to enter the nation. The quota was set at 220,000 per year, which is equivalent to the number who entered between 1991 and 1992. Further restrictions were passed concerning those who wished to emigrate from the territories of the former Soviet Union. In addition, those from other nations in eastern and central Europe had to prove ethnic discrimination or political pressure by the country of origin to emigrate. These restrictions appear to have been interpreted liberally. Migration has continued to be strong, albeit at a slightly lower level from the early 1990s.

By the late 1990s, when the German government was no longer willing to provide large amounts of aid to refugees from Yugoslavia, considerable sums were spent on the Aussiedler. In 1996, 178,000 ethnic Germans arrived, with 140,000 of these coming from the former USSR. Government expenditures to assimilate this group during that year was 3 billion Deutschemarks. It was during this year that the government began to speak of limiting the immigrants entering Germany by requir-

ing them to pass a more rigorous German language examination. Horst Waffenschmidt, CDU representative for Russian Germans (this group is known collectively as the Rußlanddeutsche), also proposed that the new arrivals should expect a cut in pensions (Stuttgard 1996). Despite the restrictions, it is likely that some migration of Aussiedler will continue. Given the economic conditions in Russia, a German unemployment rate that is currently slightly under 10 percent would not appear to be dire to them.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

The final groups of migrants who placed a considerable strain on a unified Germany are the refugees and asylum seekers. Germany admitted some individuals whose migrations were prompted by various breakdowns in the Communist bloc. For example, some asylum seekers and refugees were received in response to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, and the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1980. Pressure to accept more refugees accelerated in the late 1980s, prompted not only by the fall of Communist nations and increased conflicts in Yugoslavia, but also by the persecution of the Kurdish minority in southeastern Turkey. Thus, some Turks arrived in Germany as political asylum seekers rather than as guest workers.

By the early 1990s, Germany was carrying a huge share of the refugee population in Europe. The large number of refugees was due primarily to the conflict in Yugoslavia. Refugees were attracted to what they regarded as superior economic opportunities in the new state, despite the downturn occasioned by unification. The liberal asylum provision, Article 16 of the Basic Law, made it difficult for the nation to turn back refugees legally. Table 2.1 makes Germany's refugee situation clear: the nation bore a disproportionate burden of refugees compared to other nations in Europe. Even though there is a remarkable drop in asylum applicants in 1993 and an even more dramatic one in the years following, Germany still admits several times the number of asylum seekers as nations of roughly comparable size, such as France and Great Britain. It was obvious to the Christian Democratic government of Chancellor Kohl that the combination of a liberal refugee provision of the Basic Law and the geographical proximity to Yugoslavia were exerting great pressure on resources and on the patience of the electorate.

Table 2.1 Asylum Applicants in Selected European Countries

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Austria	15,800	21,900	22,800	27,300	16,200	4,400	5,100	5,900	7,000	6,700	13,805	20,129	18,284
Belgium	5,100	8,100	13,000	15,200	17,800	26,900	14,300	11,400	12,200	11,800	21,964	35,778	42,691
Denmark	4,700	4,600	5,300	4,600	13,900	14,300	6,700	5,100	5,900	5,100	5,699	6,467	10,077
France	34,400	61,400	54,800	47,400	28,900	27,600	26,000	20,200	17,200	21,000	22,375	30,830	38,747
Germany	103,100	121,300	193,100	256,100	438,200	322,600	127,200	127,900	149,200	151,700	98,644	138,319	117,648
Netherlands	7,500	13,900	21,200	21,600	20,300	35,400	52,600	29,300	22,900	34,400	45,217	39,299	43,895
Sweden	19,600	30,300	29,400	27,400	84,000	37,600	18,600	9,000	5,800	9,700	12,844	11,231	16,303
Switzerland	16,700	24,400	35,800	41,600	18,000	24,700	16,100	17,000	18,000	24,000	41,302	46,068	17,611
United Kingdom	5,700	16,800	38,200	73,400	32,300	28,000	42,200	55,000	27,900	32,500	46,020	71,160	76,040
Totals	**212,600**	**302,700**	**413,600**	**514,600**	**669,600**	**521,500**	**308,800**	**280,800**	**266,100**	**296,900**	**307,870**	**399,281**	**381,296**

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees.

The major changes to the Basic Law consisted of amendments to include the provisions of a "safe third country" and a "safe country of origin." Procedures also were tightened when individuals arrived at German airports seeking asylum. Finally, the amendments required Germany to seek agreements with other European receiver nations as well as immigrant and refugee source countries. The final practical aspect of the act is that border patrols and checks intensified and accelerated.

The concept of a safe third country is perhaps the most important aspect of the 1993 amendments. Under this provision, refugees are required to arrive in Germany directly from their home nation without any intermediary stops in countries that would be able to accept them safely. In other words, if a Bosnian family were fleeing from the war in Yugoslavia, it would be necessary for them to come directly to Germany rather than make a stop in Austria first. The reasoning of the German authorities is that Austria would be just as "safe" for the persecuted as Germany, and there should be no reasons for the Austrians not to accept first responsibility. Since Germany defined all states of the European Union and all nations contiguous to its borders as "safe," the practical implication of the "safe country" amendment is that one seeking political refugee status would have to arrive at a German airport in order to be considered. Of course, in the case of political refugees, the chance of such an event occurring is small, given the fact that refugees have few economic resources and frequently have been devastated by war. Under these provisions, only the wealthiest and most protected of refugees would have a chance of arriving in Germany in such a manner. As a consequence of the new law, border guards routinely deny entry to such persons not arriving first in Germany. The law stipulates that there are no appeal rights to such decisions. To avoid these difficulties, many apply for refugee status after entering Germany illegally. The same provisions apply to in-country asylum seekers, but authorities often lack the formal proof of the route that the individual took to reach safety. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, to avoid the consequences of the law, many refugees who apply in-country destroy their travel documents and claim that they cannot recall which nations they have traveled through to reach their destination (U.S. Committee 1998).

The safe country of origin provision of the 1993 amendments states that persons are ineligible for refugee status if they originate in nations that are considered "safe" from political persecution. The nations con-

sidered "safe" include some with very limited experience with democracy and with little history of tolerance for either ethnic minorities or political dissent: Poland, the Czech Republic, Ghana, Romania, Senegal, and the Slovak Republic. On May 14, 1996, a federal court decision upheld the constitutionality of the law, stating that applicants must demonstrate "serious doubt" that the German presumption of their native land being persecution free does not apply to them.

The 1993 amendments also carry with them the provision that individuals who arrive at German airports without proper travel documents or who are from safe countries of origin must wait at the airport until federal agents conduct hearings on the claimants. Typically, individuals meet with government representatives within forty-eight hours of their arrival. If the applicants are rejected for entry, they have seven days to appeal the procedure, and an administrative court must make a decision within two weeks. The agents must ensure that applicants have access to legal advice during the proceedings and have the right to appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court. But the appeal in itself does not delay the expulsion of the refugee, who may be readmitted pending the court's decision. Very few individuals are admitted into Germany through the current procedure.

Another interesting aspect of the 1993 amendments is the concept of "agents of persecution." Germany interprets asylum as protecting only those who are persecuted at the hands of a state. Those who are fleeing persecution from nonstate agents are denied refugee status. This practice has impacted the migratory chances of several groups severely, such as Algerians who claim persecution by radical Islamic groups and Afghans who complain of persecution by the Taliban militia. With regard to applicants from Afghanistan, under administrative court decisions the Germans deny refugee status with the reasoning that there is no central government authority that is capable of persecution.

In order to protect the third-country rule, Germany has entered agreements with many of its non–European Union neighbors, including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia. Nonproximate nations include Algeria and Vietnam. These host nations basically agree to readmit rejected asylum seekers. Germany also has entered separate understandings with EU neighbors, but such agreements refer mostly to foreigners in general. The refugee tide has also been abated though stricter

observance of the provisions of the Schengen Convention. This agreement established a procedure enabling nations to determine which state was responsible for reviewing particular asylum claims. Schengen was superceded by the Dublin Convention, effective September 1, 1997, for the entire European Union. Dublin and Schengen stipulate that the member nations permitting the asylum seeker to enter are responsible for processing the asylum request. If the asylum seeker has entered several countries, the first country of entry is responsible. Those applicants who arrive in Germany from other member states are considered inadmissible and are returned to the original nation.

Although many consider the Schengen and Dublin Conventions to be significant reforms in creating order out of the vast numbers of applicants for refugee status in Europe, the agreements did not affect burden sharing among the EU nations to any great extent. For example, under the provisions of Dublin, Germany accepted responsibility for processing 1,121 asylum seekers in 1997. The combined total for the rest of the signatory nations was 66 individuals. But in the end, all amendments greatly reduced the number of asylum seekers compared to the yearly totals existing prior to 1993, even though Germany still was the nation most heavily involved in the process. During 1997, the largest number of asylum seekers (both first time and those resubmitting their applications) came from Yugoslavia (30,962), Turkey (25,937), and Iraq (14,189). Out of 120,048 applicants, asylum was granted to only 8,443 persons, for an approval rate of 7 percent. Applicants from Iran (21 percent) and Turkey (14 percent) were the most successful.

The German government received perhaps its greatest criticism when refugee policy was decentralized in 1996 with regard to Bosnians. During October of that year, the Bonn government rescinded the temporary protection it had given to Bosnian refugees up to this time, and the 16 *Bundesländer* assumed the primary responsibility for repatriation plans for the Bosnians. This new policy was triggered by a Federal Administrative Court decision in August stating that Bosnians who had fled Serb-controlled areas were ineligible for asylum on the grounds that they are safe from persecution in areas controlled by the Bosnian government. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, there was a broad policy consensus designed and adhered to by the federal and state governments. The repatriation plan called for single adults and childless couples to return to their homes first. Married couples with

children and "traumatized" refugees who were under medical treatment were to follow during the summer of 1997. The part of this policy that resulted in the most acute form of criticism involved those Bosnians who were returned to areas under Serb control. In particular, a group of forty-one refugees who were deported from Berlin and Bavaria in March 1997 included among them two heart patients, a pregnant woman, others in need of medical assistance, and several refugees who had fled mass killings in Srebrenica when this safe area collapsed in summer 1995.

Growing Resentment against Immigrants and Refugees

The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by a rise in anti-immigration sentiment and violent acts directed against refugees as well as the Turkish community. Some of the violence involving non-Germans may have been due to the economic problems of unification and the poor economic conditions in the former GDR, but the brutality of some of these incidents suggests that possibly a deeper resentment consisting of racism was responsible for some of the conflict.

With reunification, there was a sharp rise in violence against foreigners. One of the more infamous incidents took place in Solingen in May 1993: the firebombing of a home in which two Turkish women and three children perished. There was no apparent motive in the attack, and no one was ever prosecuted for the offense. During that May there were some four hundred attacks against foreigners nationwide. In December two youths were convicted of a November 1992 firebombing that killed three Turks in Moelln. In Rostock there was a series of attacks on a refugee home by groups of youth in 1993. On the first night of the attacks, windows were smashed in the home, and the number of police present to disperse the rioters was inadequate. More disturbing was the number of locals who did nothing to stop the riots and who, in fact, applauded the violence. Molotov cocktails were employed the second night, and again the police presence was inadequate to stop the disorder. The refugees were finally evacuated after a third night of violence. Although Rostock is perhaps the most infamous location for the xenophobic attacks, it was not a unique case. Following the riots there, more attacks occurred in at least ten other refugee centers in Germany during 1993. For example, on September 2 a refugee center in Ketzin was

burned, and on September 4 another fire destroyed a home for refugees in Leverkusen. Vietnamese refugees, including children, were viciously attacked in Leverkusen, and many were sent to a hospital with serious injuries.

Attacks against Jews were not as frequent during the period of xenophobic violence in the early 1990s. Perhaps this is because the Jews were much fewer in number and, for the most part, could not be distinguished from other citizens. In addition, a wave of primarily Russian Jewish immigrants did not arrive in Germany until later in the 1990s. Yet, there was an increase in attacks on Jewish institutions and monuments that coincided with the xenophobic terror. For example, in August 1993 swastikas were chiseled into a Jewish memorial at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp prior to a speech there by Ignatz Bubis, at that time the head of the German Jewish community. Sachsenhausen had been attacked previously in September 1992, when arson destroyed a museum housed in a former prisoners' barrack. During 1992 there were eighty Jewish cemetery desecrations in Germany. Bubis commented that the number for that one year was equivalent to all the desecrations that occurred between 1926 and 1931, the time coincidental with Hitler's rise to power.

The number and intensity of incidents against both foreigners and Jews declined as the decade wore on. The total number of xenophobic and antisemitic crimes decreased by 9.2 percent in 1999. But on the negative side, the crimes that were committed increased in intensity. During 1999 the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz or BfV) reported 746 violent right-wing offenses, an increase of 5.4 percent over the previous year (*Annual Report* 1999). In addition to the violence against foreigners and Jews, the success of extremist parties at the polls during the 1990s was disturbing.

The Rise of Extremist Parties

When societies face serious social problems, there can be a tendency for demagogic organizations with simplistic solutions to seek power. Such was the case of Germany in the 1930s. Similarly, as Germany's economic and social problems became more complex with rising unem-

ployment and slow growth during the 1990s, extremist parties began to experience some success, albeit limited, at the polls.

The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands

The oldest right-wing extremist party in Germany is the least successful electorally. Founded in 1964, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or NPD (German National Democratic Party) aims to unite elements of the far Right. More radical in its viewpoints than the more contemporary Republikaner or Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) parties, it has historically been more explicit in its support of National Socialism. In addition to its more radical nature, one of the reasons for its failure as an electoral force is simply that its efforts are concentrated primarily at the local level, where it directs activities against foreigners and coordinates antisemitic organizations.

NPD Leadership has been unstable. In October 1996 Udo Voigt was reelected as party chairman. He first came to power in 1995 when the previous chair, Günter Deckert, was removed because of improper use of party funds. Deckert, who has had innumerable problems with the courts over the years because of inciting racial hatred and Holocaust denial, was elected as deputy chair in 1996 while serving a prison sentence for these crimes. Upon leaving prison, he was dismissed from office once again because of internal conflicts with other party officers.

In addition to its main branch, the NPD has maintained an active youth wing, Die Jungen Nationaldemokraten or JN (the Young National Democrats). A key objective of the JN is to unite those organizations that are monitored by the BfV or that have been outlawed. One way this is accomplished is through the maintenance of an Internet Web site, which enables the JN to communicate with youth across Germany and to maintain contact with extremist groups in other European nations.

When the NPD was first organized in 1964, West Germany was enjoying a time of economic growth, and its newly founded liberal democracy was working, with the overwhelming majority of German voters finding comfort by voting for either the SPD, the Christian Democrats, or the Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP (Free Democratic Party).[2] In addition, there were comparatively few foreign workers in Germany, with the first cohort of Turks just arriving. With the advent of the oil crisis in 1974, and with the increased importation of foreign workers, the

atmosphere began to change. Although the NPD was never successful in mobilizing voters, it did post gains in membership in the eastern portions of Germany during the late 1990s, and other right-wing extremist parties scored limited victories in local and municipal elections as the economy worsened. Currently, a federal/state task force is in the process of making a recommendation on banning the NPD in Germany because of their antisemitic and anti-foreigner activities, which seemed to intensify during 2000. This attempt to outlaw the party came as a result of a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in October 2001 declaring that requests made by the Schröder government for the ban are, in fact, legal. But the government's effort collapsed in January 2002 when it was discovered that several witnesses against the NPD turned out to be federal police undercover agents.

The Republikaner Party

The Republikaner Party was founded in Bavaria in 1983 by Franz Schönhuber, an SS officer during the war. A central motto of the party is "Germany for the Germans." Although the party is not overtly antisemitic, it has downplayed the importance of German responsibility for the Holocaust. It is a nationalistic party that demands a stronger Germany, limited rights for asylum seekers and immigrants, and a return of German borders to what they were prior to the war. A change in leadership in 1994 caused the party to steer a more moderate course and separated it to an extent from the more militant elements of the far Right.

Most of the Republikaner electoral success occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s with the surge in German nationalism surrounding unification. Its first victory came in 1989 when it obtained 8 percent of the vote in the Berlin Senate elections and in elections to the European Parliament. It also secured 5.3 percent of the vote in municipal elections in Bavaria in 1990. Given the minority status of the Republikaner Party, these were considerable victories that gained them the 5 percent of the vote necessary to assume seats in the state parliaments. The party also secured seats in some local elections in 1992. For example, it captured a vote of 10.9 percent in the *Landtag* election in Baden-Württemberg and 8.3 percent of the municipal vote in Berlin. But Republikaner success nationally has been less than impressive. In

the election for the first post-unification government in 1990, the party received just 2 percent of the vote.

Toward the end of the decade, the Republikaner Party faded in electoral success. One possible factor in its decline was the change in leadership. In December 1994 Schönhuber was replaced by Rolf Schlierer, and the party assumed a more moderate course, lessening its appeal to extremists. Schönhuber subsequently joined the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU). One notable electoral victory occurred in March 1996 when the party captured 9.1 percent of the vote in the *Landtag* election in Baden-Württemberg. But in its founding area of Bavaria, the Republikaner Party received only 1.8 percent of the municipal vote. In the 2001 state election in Baden-Württemberg, the party failed to receive the necessary 5 percent of the vote to enter the government. Many who had voted for the Republikaner Party in 1996 switched to the Christian Democrats.

The Deutsche Volksunion

A third party, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), has been more successful in exploiting the immigrant and refugee issue during the past several years. The DVU was founded in Munich in 1971 by Gerhard Frey, a publisher. In rhetoric, it is much more explicit than the Republikaner loyalists regarding immigrants by advocating expulsion to solve the economic problems of Germany. Much of its antisemitic and xenophobic themes are expressed in Frey's newspapers, the *Deutsche National-Zeitung* and *Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung.* In addition to diatribes against foreigners and Jews, the papers also publish articles denying the Holocaust.

The party also has a populist economic theme that opposes German participation in the European Union, arguing that further economic integration will cause German industries to move, with a consequent loss of jobs. In addition, they maintain that Germany may be victimized further by the free movement of foreign workers into the nation. The fact that the DVU has stressed economic difficulties has made it more attractive in the eastern region of the country, unlike the Republikaner Party, which was never quite as successful at exploiting citizens' misfortunes. Still, many observers were stunned when the DVU captured 13.8 percent of the seats in the *Landtag* election in Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998.

The vote was surprising on several counts, the first being that the DVU really had no organizational base in the eastern state until a month or so before the election. The second surprise is that the extremist vote was not concentrated totally on the Right; the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), which is made up of reformed elements of the former East German Communist Party, also fared well, capturing 21.6 percent of all seats. The PDS emphasized the problem of economic decline as well and argued for more job creation in the east. Also, the party stressed the cultural uniqueness of the eastern region along with its socialist heritage. Much of the extremist voting seemed in direct response to individual economic distress, as Saxony-Anhalt had an unemployment rate of approximately 25 percent. Of the unemployed, 17 percent voted for the DVU, and 23 percent expressed a preference for the PDS. The DVU voters tended to be disproportionately young and male and to have blue-collar occupations (American Institute 1998). The election was a disappointment for the labor-oriented Social Democrats, who gained only slightly despite the high unemployment; more importantly, it was a major defeat for the Christian Democrats, as the vote was interpreted as a widespread rejection of Chancellor Kohl's economic and unification policies.

The most recent electoral success of the DVU occurred during September 1999 when it received sufficient votes (5.3 percent) to enter the *Landtag* in Brandenburg, an eastern state that surrounds Berlin. In the 1994 election the Social Democrats under soon-to-be-chancellor Schröder won an impressive victory with the SPD promise to improve the unemployment situation. But in Brandenburg, as in many of the eastern states, unemployment continues to hover in the high teens. Economic problems have unfortunately become more intense for Schröder during 2001 and 2002. Despite a comprehensive tax reform (effective January 1, 2001), which slashed corporate and individual income taxes, the policy has failed to stimulate the economy, resulting in near-zero growth and higher unemployment. The lack of growth and the problem of unemployment may cause Schröder continued difficulty from within his own party and the moderate and extreme Right.

One interpretation of the 1999 electoral outcome in Brandenburg is that voters were upset with Chancellor Schröder's and Finance Minister Hans Eichel's plans for an austerity package of approximately 30 billion Deutschemarks. Schröder at present seems to be squeezed between

members of the Christian Democrats who oppose him on political grounds and left-wing members of his own SPD who would like to see more government intervention to lessen unemployment. Some pressure from the Christian Democrats may have eased temporarily because of the scandal involving Chancellor Kohl and his party leadership with regard to their financing of the 1998 election campaign. The exposure of these irregularities has weakened the party considerably. As in Saxony-Anhalt for the DVU, the PDS fared well in Brandenburg, receiving 23 percent of the vote compared to the CDU/CSU's 25 percent. Although both the CDU/CSU and the PDS are potential coalition partners for the SPD, the Social Democrats have tended to align themselves in a grand coalition with the CDU/CSU, finding the PDS positions too extreme and contradictory for its taste. Such coalitions will be more difficult to form in the future as SPD leaders have expressed reluctance to cooperate with the Christian Democrats because of the financial scandal. Most recently, Schröder has ruled out any coalition with the PDS, at least at the national level.

Wither the Extremist Parties?

It is somewhat difficult to determine whether the Republikaner Party and the DVU are merely temporary "protest" parties or whether they are part of a more permanent feature of contemporary German politics. On balance, most of the evidence suggests that they are temporary in nature, at least in terms of electoral impact. For one, the extreme right-wing vote has not increased since the early 1990s. In essence, as Gibowski (1997) suggests, the Republikaner Party and the DVU have "traded places." The vote lag of the Republikaner Party was replaced by a gain in DVU voting in the late 1990s, and the overall number of extremist votes has remained about the same. Other evidence indicates that although Germans are occasionally willing to support a small number of extremist candidates in local or state contests, they are much more risk averse when it comes to national elections. Thus, the extremists not only failed to obtain a significant number of votes in 1990 but also were inconsequential in the national elections of 1994 and 1998.

An interesting question in addition to protest voting is the issue of what the right-wing parties mean for German democracy and the party system in the Schröder government. When the extremist parties gath-

ered a more significant percentage of the vote and the share captured by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats became smaller, the SPD had some unenviable options in selecting coalition partners at the *Bundesland* and municipal levels during the late 1990s. Forming a coalition with the DVU is out of the question for all mainstream parties, but their share of the vote along with substantial voting for PDS in some instances gave the Social Democrats the choice of a "centrist" or "grand" coalition with the Christian Democrats or a "left" coalition with the PDS. The difficulty with working alongside the PDS is that the PDS position on most issues is diametrically opposed to the Schröder strategy of imposing budgetary austerity. Like his critics from the Left within the SPD, the PDS would like to see an increase in spending and more subsidies granted to the eastern region for job creation.

The temptation for a coalition with the PDS was tested in the October 2001 Berlin municipal election. The Social Democrats garnered nearly 30 percent of the vote, but, surprisingly, the PDS nearly outpolled the Christian Democrats, finishing third with 22.6 percent. PDS support was especially heavily in the eastern section of the city. The SPD thought briefly about a coalition with the PDS but in the end decided on a partnership with the FDP and the environmentally focused Green Party. How long this unwieldy coalition (at least in ideological terms) can last is uncertain, but it does demonstrate, convincingly, the SPD dislike for the leftist party. Especially influential in the decision was the fact that the PDS opposes American coalition efforts to attack the Taliban and other terrorists. Chancellor Schröder, a strong supporter of the coalition, did not brief the PDS on German government policy concerning the war.

The SPD at least until recently also had the option of forming a coalition with the Christian Democrats. With the financial scandal weakening the credibility of the CDU/CSU, this choice poses some difficulties. But several coalitions have been formed at the *Bundesland* level, and they are not likely to be dismantled soon. The most recent such coalition occurred in Hamburg, a traditional Social Democratic stronghold. In that state in September 2001 the SPD was denied a majority by the Rechtsstaatliche Offensive, a newly formed "law and order" party that is to the right of the CDU/CSU but is not as extremist as the Republikaner Party or the DVU. Again, the most likely outcome is a centrist SPD/CDU coalition.

In addition to creating problems within the SPD for Chancellor Schröder, this option would seem to pose the problem of a clear identity for the Social Democrats, a characteristic that is vital in most parliamentary systems. Although it is possible that the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats would be able to make progress in cooperating in an austerity program, it is less likely that they would find commonality, for example, on a citizenship policy for longtime residents. In fact, it was Christian Democratic opposition that denied the possibility of a dual nationality in the January 2000 Citizenship Law. Also, as the solidarity of the SPD in once safe areas (such as the Saarland) becomes compromised in the *Landtag* elections, the responsiveness of the Bundesrat (the upper house of the parliament, which represents the state interests) may be lessened. To Schröder and the SPD, it is becoming evident that there are very real economic grievances, and particularly residents in the eastern region are losing faith in his government to overcome the problems with present policies. But with the electoral and financial scandal in which the CDU and former chancellor Kohl find themselves embroiled, the party is less able to mount an effective opposition to Chancellor Schröder. This situation will help buy the chancellor a longer period of time to improve the present economic situation before the next national election. Patience is waning as the January 2001 tax reforms have failed to take hold. Growth is sluggish, and unemployment continues to be unacceptably high. During early 2000, the political situation for the SPD-Green government improved as evidenced by victories in *Landtag* elections in North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. But this may have been a partial fallout from former chancellor Kohl's financial scandal.

Summary

The end of the German Democratic Republic initially produced great euphoria in both East and West Germany. Perhaps a major reason for some of the instability of the 1990s was due to the unrealistic expectations that were created by Chancellor Kohl and other Christian Democratic politicians when unification was first being considered. For example, in a speech delivered on July 1, 1990, Kohl stated the projected consequences of unification: "Nobody would be worse off, but many better off. Only monetary, economic, and social union offers the chance,

indeed the guarantee, that living conditions shall change rapidly and improve thoroughly. By our joint efforts, we will soon turn Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Thuringia into thriving lands agreeable to live and work in" (Nick 1995: 86).

The pressures on Germany following unification were overwhelming by any standard, and perhaps it was unrealistic to expect such a high degree of performance from the German political system. The economic system, although strong, had not performed at earlier levels as unification approached. In the face of these facts, the nation and its leadership were expected to instill democratic values very quickly into a section of the new nation that had not experienced any degree of political liberty for nearly half a century. It was also expected that the Christian Democratic government would be able to promote free market values and instill growth rapidly into an area that operated on bankrupt economic principles, false projections and statistics, and an inefficient allocation of resources for several generations.

The difficult unification occurred in a nation that had become multicultural, at least in the western region. A significant number of foreigners resided in Germany by the time of unification, and in the case of the Turks, a second generation that spoke German and had at least partially assimilated into German society began to assert its place on German soil. Ethnic Germans who resided in countries with collapsing Communist governments simultaneously returned to claim citizenship. The war in Yugoslavia produced a large number of refugees, which other European nations were willing to accept only in very small numbers. The overwhelming burden of these people became the responsibility of the new German nation.

In particular, the ethnic Germans and the refugees from the Yugoslavian war needed economic resources to survive in their new surroundings. In the meantime, many native Germans, now in economic difficulty themselves, blamed the Turks and other foreigners for taking jobs that should have belonged to Germans. In the face of these difficulties, the FRG had the burden of integrating the eastern region, which in actuality was depressed for a great length of time prior to reunification. The financial burden for reunification fell on western residents, who resented it.

The frustration of the populace was expressed at times by their votes for extremist parties, especially in the former territories of the

GDR. The extremist voting can make coalition formation at the *Bundesland* level difficult and causes problems for the majority party in the Bundesrat.

The prejudice and outbreaks of violence in the 1990s were possibly due to some of the economic difficulties of integration combined with the enormous strains placed upon the German political system. The question remains, however, an empirical one. In the next several chapters, we investigate whether the anti-foreign and antisemitic attitudes that were prevalent among the German population in the early 1990s were more likely to exist among those in dire economic straits. I conclude instead in favor of an alternative hypothesis. It is primarily a traditional racism, combined with factors such as exposure to foreigners, psychological and political variables, and sociodemographic characteristics that were responsible for much of the difficulty that Germany experienced during the 1990s with guest workers, Aussiedler, asylum seekers, and Jews.

3

The Question of Economic Threat and Anti-Foreign Sentiment

The Early Years of Unification

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the issue of German attitudes toward refugees, guest workers, and "foreigners" in general. In particular, a major item of inquiry is whether prejudicial attitudes around the time of unification were due to economic fears, as is commonly supposed, or whether the anti-foreign attitudes can be better understood in terms of a traditional racism, or possibly other factors. The chapter begins with a description of German citizens' attitudes toward two questions: which minorities they would support for political refugee status and whether foreign workers should be allowed to work for only a few months a year and then be returned to their homelands. After this description, two complex multivariate models are developed that seek to explain anti-foreign sentiment. The first is a general attitudinal model of anti-foreign prejudice whereas the second measures citizen attitudes in relation to policies that may benefit refugees and workers. In both instances, the economic explanation of anti-foreign sentiment is far weaker than competing explanations.

Basic Attitudes toward Guest Workers and Refugees

A review of chapter 2 makes it apparent that the issue of "foreigners" is a multidimensional topic in contemporary Germany. German citizens are confronted with the problem of dealing with both refugees and guest workers. An additional important group is the ethnic Germans who are not foreign in a legal sense but who must also go through a process of adaptation after moving to the nation. Although we do not have surveys from early in the 1990s that measure the attitude of German citizens toward the Aussiedler, data are available on both guest workers and refugees.

There is evidence to suggest that Germans have less than enthusiastic attitudes toward both the political refugees and the foreign workers. For example, during fall 1991 a survey by the EMNID Institute in Bielefeld asked a number of questions of respondents in both eastern and western Germany regarding their opinions of policies toward both refugees and foreign workers.[1] Regarding refugees, respondents were asked whether the following groups should be recognized as refugees after "'proof'" of their cases: Croats from Yugoslavia, Kurds from Turkey, Albanians from Albania, Gypsies from Romania, and Serbs from Yugoslavia. Respondents were free to "accept" or "reject" each group.

Results are presented in table 3.1, which reveals that most Germans do not favor the granting of asylum to foreign groups, although the level of support varies depending upon the particular ethnic group analyzed.

Table 3.1 German Attitudes toward Refugee Policy

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
Percentage of Germans who support political refugee status for:		
Gypsies	23.3%	24.8%
Albanians	30.1%	34.5%
Serbs	31.2%	36.4%
Kurds	49.0%	54.0%
Croats	61.0%	54.1%
N	1861	944

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

There is also some variation depending upon whether respondents are from eastern or western Germany. Not surprisingly, the Gypsies are the least favored with regard to granting refugee status. The case can be made that throughout Europe, they are the most unpopular minority group. In nations such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, democratization does not appear to have changed their lot, and this group is similarly perceived negatively in Germany. Although Albanian refugees have been identified as a problem to a greater extent in Italy, this group does not trail far behind the Gypsies in popularity in Germany. Kurds are perceived much more favorably. Events in Germany during the 1990s may have caused the Albanians to drop further in popularity, particularly because of the large influx of refugees from the war in Yugoslavia. Although the Kurds are a minority group within the Turkish community, the public may tend to view them more positively than others because they have lived in Germany for so long. The non-Kurdish Turks themselves may hold prejudices against this group, but it is possible that Germans make less of a distinction (Blaschke 1991; Leggewie and Winston 1996). Again, serious political problems between Germans and Kurds occurred later in the 1990s, well before the EMNID poll was taken. The Kurds also evoked sympathy in the United States and Europe because of their oppression by the Iraqi regime before and after the Persian Gulf War.

The remaining groups in table 3.1, Serbs and Croats, were participants in the civil conflict in Yugoslavia, where a huge refugee problem exists both within and outside the territories. The problem, of course, became accentuated in the late 1990s with the war being expanded into Kosovo. In 1992, around the time of the EMNID survey, approximately 2.5 million persons from the former Yugoslavia were considered refugees. This number comprised approximately 10 percent of the world refugee population at that time (Winter 1992). The former Yugoslavian citizens were not processed quickly when they first entered Germany, and as of 1993 most did not qualify as refugees because of the amendments to the Basic Law. Table 3.1 shows that Germans express a clear preference for the Croats over the Serbs in terms of refugee status. Perhaps this is because the Croats are much more likely to be refugees and the Serbs to be perpetrators in the conflict. Alternatively, this attitude may have roots in past alliances during World War II when many Croats were pro-Nazi and the Serbs primarily fought the Germans.

Although differences are not large, residents of the former GDR are generally more supportive of the political refugee status than are western residents. The only exception is that the western Germans tend to view the Croats more positively than those residing in the east. It is possible that the eastern Germans' more negative attitude toward the Croats could be explained by past alliances because during the years of the Communist Bloc the GDR was closely aligned with Slavic groups such as the Russians and the Serbs. For the other refugee groups, the more sympathetic attitudes of the residents of the former GDR may reflect East Germany's long-held status as a captive nation. Prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall, hundreds of thousands fled to West Germany, and until the collapse of communism, many families were divided and had to endure the hardship of separation from relatives. Also, in contrast to West Germany, the GDR did not bear any costs of maintaining refugees.

A second issue also addressed in the EMNID survey is the economic threat that immigrant workers might pose. The question is largely hypothetical. I established in chapter 2 that Turkish guest workers have been present in large numbers in the western section of Germany since the early 1960s, mostly to help with labor shortages. Southern European groups arrived a bit earlier in time. Although there was no movement to give Turks and other worker groups citizenship at the time this survey was taken, the Turks were gradually recognized as a settled group and were unlikely to be evicted by the German government. Yet, some anti-immigrant violence in the early 1990s was directed at them. Thus, table 3.2 indicates that most Germans would like to see *Gastarbeiter* present no longer than required work periods and then returned to the country of origin. There is a little more support for this proposal among residents

Table 3.2 German Attitudes toward *Gastarbeiter*

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
Percentage of Germans who believe that foreign workers should be allowed immigration only for a few months in a year and then be returned to their homeland	66.4%	70.4%
N	1861	944

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

of the former GDR, possibly because economic conditions are more difficult in the eastern section.

Economic Conditions and Anti-Foreign Sentiment

Before we move to the multivariate models, it is useful to review the basic economic perceptions of Germans in the early 1990s. The 1991 data reveal rather mixed economic perceptions on the part of Germans. Since the responses between western Germans and residents of the former GDR are very close, they are presented in the aggregate in table 3.3, along with the codes that are used in the multivariate analysis. The data reveal that an overwhelming majority of Germans, both in the east and the west, are at least "pleased" with their work (approximately 81 percent), and a somewhat smaller majority (approximately 68 percent) are "pleased" with their income. However, the majority of Germans (ap-

Table 3.3 German Economic Satisfaction

	N	*Percentage*
Please tell me from this list how pleased you are with your income.		
1 = Completely unpleased	233	8.2%
2 = Rather unpleased	667	23.5%
3 = Rather pleased	1495	52.7%
4 = Completely pleased	443	15.6%
	2838	100.0%
Please tell me from this list how pleased you are with your work.		
1 = Completely unpleased	185	7.2%
2 = Rather unpleased	312	12.2%
3 = Rather pleased	1406	54.9%
4 = Completely pleased	657	25.7%
	2560	100.0%
How do you judge your economic situation today?		
1 = Very bad	23	.8%
2 = Bad	200	7.0%
3 = So-so	1331	46.3%
4 = Good	1222	42.5%
5 = Very Good	99	3.4%
	2875	100.0%

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

proximately 54 percent) do not view their present economic situation as being "good" or "very good," and a plurality (approximately 46 percent) list their situation as "so-so." Although the economic situation was not viewed by most Germans in the early 1990s as being as bleak as later in the decade, there is enough variation in the responses to judge the impact of differing degrees of economic satisfaction.

But in addition to immigration and refugee policy, the EMNID data reveal the presence of a more general and disturbing anti-foreign sentiment in the early 1990s in Germany, some of which probably cannot be attributed purely to economic dissatisfaction. These attitudes, along with relevant codes, are presented in table 3.4. Again, because the differences between respondents in the eastern and western regions are slight, the attitudes are presented in the aggregate. The responses are unsettling because a majority of Germans express agreement with the

Table 3.4 German Attitudes toward Foreigners in General

Anti-Foreign Sentiment Latent Variable	*N*	*Percentage*
Please tell me whether you agree completely, rather less, or not at all. These foreigners intensify the unemployment of Germans.		
1 = Not at all	342	11.9%
2 = Rather less	843	30.1%
3 = Rather more	1008	35.1%
4 = Completely	657	22.9%
	2850	100.0%
These foreigners abuse the operation of our social systems.		
1 = Not at all	276	9.6%
2 = Rather less	732	25.5%
3 = Rather more	1014	35.3%
4 = Completely	847	29.5%
	2869	99.9%
Most German politicians worry too much about these foreigners and not enough about Germans.		
1 = Not at all	408	14.2%
2 = Rather less	828	28.9%
3 = Rather more	879	30.7%
4 = Completely	752	26.2%
	2867	100.0%

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

statements that foreigners "intensify the unemployment of Germans," that they tend to "abuse the operation of our social systems," and that German politicians are more concerned with the problems of foreigners than those of Germans. These measures may be largely "symbolic" because one who agrees with these statements might not necessarily express them out of pure bigotry. Instead, the responses seem more indicative of a belief that foreigners violate traditional German values, which is a central tenant of the symbolic literature. Yet, responses to these questions raise the possibility that many view the foreign "problem" in simplistic terms without a sophisticated reference to their own economic and social situation.

Factors Explaining Opposition to Foreigners

I tested two models that use the 1991 data to explain attitudes toward foreigners. The first model tests the relationship between economic factors and other variables toward foreigners in general. The second model examines the relationship of the economic variables and other determinants toward immigration and refugee policy. The two models are based upon the Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) technique. LISREL is ideal when a number of different indicators have to be combined into a single variable, especially when the concept being measured is complex. Also, LISREL allows one to test complex relationships between variables simultaneously (Bollen 1989). As such, the technique combines confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling. In this instance it will allow a comparative test between economic and other important factors in explaining anti-foreign sentiment in general and attitudes toward immigration and refugee policy.

Model 1: General Anti-Foreign Sentiment

The LISREL model of anti-foreign sentiment is presented in figure 3.1. The indicators of the latent dependent variables consist of the three measures of anti-foreign sentiment presented in table 3.4. Thus, the primary dependent variable of interest measures anxiety toward foreigners comprehensively in that it taps collectively economic, political, and social fears toward them.

A second variable, economic insecurity, may help explain these negative attitudes (Oepen 1984). Accordingly, I developed a measure of

Figure 3.1 A LISREL Model of Anti-Foreign Sentiment in Germany



Note: All exogenous variables are hypothesized to have a direct effect on German identity. Only the variables with an * are expected to have a direct effect on economic satisfaction.

economic satisfaction to test this hypothesis. Those who are least satisfied with their employment and their income are predicted to have the most negative attitudes. A third measure of this latent variable is personal satisfaction with one's individual economic situation (Alford and Legge 1984). (As already established, there is considerable variation in economic satisfaction).

A third variable, termed "German identity" consists of two indicators. First, respondents were asked to assess German superiority to others and, on a six-point scale, were asked to agree or disagree with a statement regarding keeping Germans pure and preventing them from mixing with others. Table 3.5 indicates that although most respondents disagree with the superiority statement or are ambivalent about it, slightly more than 26 percent indicate that the statement is "somewhat true." Similarly, when a statement is posed that "we should be careful that we keep Germans pure and prevent the mixing of people" (also table 3.5), most persons can be found among the low code numbers, which indicate disagreement with the statement, but a disturbingly high minority express some agreement.

Table 3.5 German Attitudes on "Mixing" and "Superiority"

German Identity Latent Variable	*N*	*Percentage*
Please tell me what you think on the following scale. We should be careful that we keep Germans pure and prevent the mixing of people (high codes indicate agreement)		
1	808	28.3%
2	432	15.1%
3	423	14.8%
4	486	17.0%
5	394	13.8%
6	313	11.0%
	2856	100.0%
If someone says, "we Germans are superior to other people" is that your opinion or can't one say that?		
1 = One cannot say that	1595	55.8%
2 = Undecided	500	17.5%
3 = Somewhat true	765	26.7%
	2860	100.0%

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

The conceptualization of this variable is stronger in terms of racial or ethnic prejudice than in many previous studies that utilized more value-neutral statements to assess identification with the in-group. The value of the more racially laden variable is that it performs a stronger control than "feeling thermometers" or measures of "warmth" or closeness toward an in-group (Giles and Evans 1986). It separates more convincingly in emotional and prejudicial terms the extent to which Germans sympathize with themselves; simultaneously, it taps a more racially laden aspect of hostility toward foreigners.

Finally, by estimating anti-foreign sentiment with economic satisfaction independent of any linear relationship from the more emotionally and racially laden identity variable, one can be more confident that the effects of economic satisfaction, however small, are not spurious. If the economic resentment hypothesis is correct, one would expect the measure of economic satisfaction to have a significant impact on attitudes toward foreigners apart from primarily sociodemographic indicators, symbolic attitudes, or traditional prejudices.

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES Of course, not all attitudes toward foreigners can be explained by considering economic satisfaction and German identity. Other factors also must be considered. Accordingly, eight other variables were selected because they were "exogenous"—not dependent upon other variables in the model—and were expected to have both direct and indirect effects on anti-foreign sentiment. The variables are education, age, gender, religiosity, ideology, vote for the extremist Republikaner Party, occupational status, and region. Education was chosen because of previous studies that have demonstrated its importance in explaining anti-foreign attitudes. In particular, much research has shown that the educated are more likely to express lower degrees of prejudice than others (Adorno et al. 1982; Billiet and Carton 1991). In addition to its potential direct effect on anti-foreign sentiment, education should manifest itself indirectly. Those with higher levels of education should be more satisfied with their economic situation, and because of an emphasis on universalism and tolerance, the educated should be less susceptible to expressing a strong sense of German identity.

I expected that German men would express more anti-foreign attitudes than women, largely on the assumption that women are likely to be less militaristic and nationalistic than men. Also, feelings against foreigners and antisemitism in Germany have historically been associ-

ated with anti-feminism (Pulzer 1988). Regarding age, although some research has found a positive relationship between age and ethnocentrism (Adorno et al. 1982: 140–41; Billiet and Carton 1991), one might expect a negative indirect relationship as well. The elderly have a higher probability of being satisfied economically; in turn, a greater economic satisfaction should result in less anxiety toward non-Germans. It is expected that those who have a right-wing ideology and who vote for the extremist Republikaner Party, although not necessarily having a lower degree of economic satisfaction, would be most inclined to identify strongly as Germans and to express negative sentiments toward foreigners. Religiosity is included because literature suggests that the religious are more prone to express both antisemitic and anti-foreign attitudes (Tuthill 1990). Those fitting the category of "unskilled worker" were thought to be less economically satisfied and more negative toward foreigners because the unskilled are in the most direct competition with the guest workers. In addition, past literature has shown a relationship between the evaluation of immigrants' work and occupation. In particular, unskilled workers are most likely to hold a dim view of the quality of immigrant work and to be less tolerant of them in general (Noelle-Neumann 1981; Castles and Kosack 1985: 430).

A final exogenous variable is region. Because of past and current difficult economic conditions that citizens in the former GDR have experienced, I expected that this group would be less satisfied economically and more inclined to express negative views of foreigners. Thus, I created a binary variable by dividing the respondents into those who live in the former GDR and others.[2] The coding and distributions of the exogenous variables are presented in appendix A.[3]

Does the Model Work Empirically?

Results of the LISREL analysis are presented in table 3.6. To begin, I found that the three latent constructs developed are adequate measures of anti-foreign sentiment, economic satisfaction, and German identity, respectively. Overall, the explanatory power of the model is good, as is the explanation of anti-foreign sentiment. In addition, the fit of the model is adequate. In discussing the results, I consider coefficients having effects that are statistically significant at the .05 level and have a minimum value of .10.[4]

Table 3.6 Estimation of the LISREL Model of Anti-Foreign Sentiment

	Standardized Solution Endogenous Variables		
	Economic Satisfaction	*German Identity*	*Anti-Foreign Sentiment*
Education (γ_{11})	.107		
Region (γ_{12})	−.452		
Age (γ_{13})	.142		
Unskilled Worker (γ_{14})	−.129		
Job (λ^{y}_{11})	.670		
Income (λ^{y}_{21})	.835		
Economic Situation (λ^{y}_{31})	.653		
Squared Mult. Correlation =	.234		
Education (γ_{21})		−.316	
Republikaner Vote (γ_{26})		.153	
Ideology (γ_{27})		.205	
German Mixing (λ^{y}_{42})		.684	
German Superiority (λ^{y}_{52})		.345	
Squared Mult. Correlation =		.215	
Foreigners Hurt Jobs (λ^{y}_{63})			.661
Foreigners Hurt Social Sys. (λ^{y}_{73})			.760
Foreigners-German Polit. (λ^{y}_{83})			.782
Economic Satisfaction (β_{31})			−.106
German Identity (β_{32})			.713
Squared Mult. Correlation =			.596

Number of cases = 2359
Chi-square = 279.63
df = 60
Ratio chi-square/df = 4.66
Goodness of fit index = .986
Adjusted goodness of fit index = .967
Root mean square residual = .052
Total coefficient of determination for the structural equations = .415

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

In considering the relationship between the exogenous variables and anti-foreign sentiment, there are no direct relationships that are significant.[5] Rather, the significant variables work either through economic satisfaction or German identity. Moreover, the impacts of these variables, with the exception of gender and religiosity, which proved inconsequential, affect the endogenous variables as expected. Education exerts a positive effect on economic satisfaction, which, in turn, tends to

discourage anti-foreign attitudes. The relationship between education and German identity proves to be negative, indicating that the educated are less likely to conceive of German identity in bigoted terms. Thus, an important finding is that education works through both German identity and economic satisfaction to discourage anti-foreign sentiment. Age is related positively to economic satisfaction, leading to less negative feelings toward foreigners. Again, as in the case of all the other exogenous variables, there is no direct relationship between age and anti-foreign sentiment.

Two political variables that exert impacts on anti-foreign sentiment are ideology and voting for the Republikaner Party. As I hypothesized, both variables are related positively to the German identity construct. Those on the Right or who express a preference to vote for the Republikaner Party tend to identify strongly as Germans and express more negative sentiments than others regarding foreigners through this variable.

Two other important exogenous variables are region and occupational status because they allow an exploration of the economic competition hypothesis more fully. The direct relationship between region and economic satisfaction demonstrates that those residing in the eastern states of Germany and unskilled workers are less satisfied economically. In turn, since satisfaction is negatively related to anti-foreign attitudes, eastern Germans and unskilled workers are more likely to be anti-foreign. At the same time, a racial link between region and occupational status and German identity is absent. Although the indirect relationships are small, the findings suggest that living in the former East Germany and the low occupational status of the unskilled worker tend to encourage anti-foreign sentiment, perhaps in part because of fear of economic competition from immigrants.

The most important findings concern the relationships between the economic satisfaction and the German identity variables with anti-foreign sentiment. According to those who espouse an economic resentment hypothesis, there should be a negative relationship between economic satisfaction and anti-foreign attitudes, as those who feel in a vulnerable position economically should be the most threatened by the immigrants and view them negatively. This proves to be the case, although in comparison to the German identity variable, the effect is extremely small. The identity variable, which is composed of the attitudes toward Germans mixing with others and German superiority, is positive

and approximately seven times the importance of economic satisfaction in terms of impact on anti-foreign sentiment. These findings indicate that although the economic resentment hypothesis works in the expected direction and the relationship cannot be attributed to chance, negative attitudes toward foreigners can best be understood in terms of extreme views regarding the exclusivity and superiority of the German people.

In summary, model 1 appears to make sense with regard to the economic resentment hypothesis in three relationships in the LISREL model. First, those least satisfied (and perhaps most insecure) economically express more anti-foreign sentiment than others. The "most threatened" explanation seems to work reasonably well when we consider the residents of the former GDR and, to a lesser extent, unskilled laborers. These citizens are less satisfied economically and express more anti-foreign sentiment through economic satisfaction.

But the even less fortunate finding is that German identity is much stronger than any economic variable in accounting for hostile attitudes toward foreigners in general. Much past research has tended to understate negative feelings about minority groups because it is believed that they could be explained largely by economic or political self-interest. But the measure of German identity that we have employed with the 1991 data makes it difficult to dismiss racism, or at least ethnic chauvinism, as the primary explanation of anti-foreign sentiment in general in the German population. I next explore the issues of immigration and refugee policies using a similar, but slightly more complex, model.

Model 2: Immigration and Refugee Policy

To this point, the analysis has concentrated upon feelings of prejudice for foreigners in general. I next focus on support or opposition to policies that may benefit foreigners. With regard to Germany, three factors might explain opposition to policies that benefit immigrants and refugees, the first one being economic self-interest. In terms of the *Gastarbeiter,* a threat is often said to be present among the most marginal of the German workers. The concept of economic self-interest fits the "victims of modernization" hypothesis as espoused by Leggewie (1989) and Heitmeyer (1992), who hold that support for right-wing parties and negative attitudes toward foreigners are a function of an economically marginal status in society (see also Chapin 1997; Koopmans

1996; Willems 1995). Thus, according to the economic resentment hypothesis, one would again expect that those who are in the most vulnerable employment positions or who are dissatisfied with their economic status would be least sympathetic toward policies that might benefit the immigrants.

A second explanation for opposition to pro–immigrant and refugee policies is what might be the measure of traditional racism, which I have termed German identity. In the context of American racism, the argument is sometimes made that individuals may not support policies that benefit African Americans because this group is viewed as being "lazy" or "not trying hard enough" (Gilens 1995). In Germany, stereotypes abound as well, particularly toward the Gypsies, perhaps the most marginal of the refugee or immigrant groups (O'Brian 1988; Grass and Winston 1993). But another important aspect of overt racism in Germany is the extreme nationalism that sometimes manifests itself in expressions of the superiority and exclusivity of German peoplehood. Funke speaks of a German nationalism that is "defensive" and oriented toward the suppression of internal enemies, particularly enemies of German unification (Funke, as cited in Faist 1994). Faist includes in the list groups such as Gypsies, Turks, and asylum seekers. In all, one might expect those who have the strongest views of German peoplehood to be least likely to support generous immigration and asylum policies.

A final theory that might help explain German opposition toward refugees and immigrant workers might be termed "symbolic." In the American politics literature, it has been argued that as individuals are reluctant to express bigotry through traditional stereotyping that is no longer acceptable socially, racism may be expressed "symbolically" through support for conservative policies, ideologies, and parties. It is often argued that these conservative values are "fused" with a negative racial affect (Kinder 1986). The literature on racism is filled with debates regarding the appropriateness of combining the two concepts. Fortunately, the LISREL methodology employed allows the empirical testing of this possibility, but for the moment the assumption is made that the concepts are separate.

Figure 3.2 presents a LISREL model of attitudes toward German immigration and refugee policies. There are two primary dependent variables. The first is an additive index of whether or not an individual supports political refugee status for Gypsies, Albanians, Serbs, Kurds,

Figure 3.2 A LISREL Model of Attitudes toward Immigration Policy (1991 EMNID Survey)



or Croats. The second is a binary variable that asks for a response to the question "What do you think about the proposition that foreign workers should be allowed immigration for only a few months in a year and then be made to go back to their homeland?" In contrast to model 1, I experiment by estimating separate models for eastern and western respondents to see if it is any more successful in detecting economic effects. The reason for the split in the sample is the special vulnerability of the eastern Germans to the economic resentment hypothesis.

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES In line with the three theories of policy support, variables are employed that are thought to be of use in explaining attitudes toward policies that may benefit immigrants. The first set of variables examines the economic threat the immigrants posed. It is a measure of economic satisfaction and is identical to the construct in model 1. Again, the lower the level of economic satisfaction, the greater the opposition to beneficial policies for immigrants and refugees. Also included among the economic variables, but kept separate from the above, are unskilled worker status (defined as in model 1) and the perceived impact that foreigners have on a respondent's finances. It is expected that unskilled workers and those who feel their finances would be better without foreigners in the country would be less likely to support liberal refugee and immigrant worker policies.

The second set of explanatory variables concerns the explicitly racist element of opposition to immigration and refugee policies. It is defined as in model 1 to include a question on "superiority" and Germans "mixing with others."

A third set of exogenous variables tapped the relationship between a conservative political orientation and attitudes toward foreigners. It was anticipated that those identifying themselves as Christian Democratic voters and respondents scoring more on the "Right" on a ten-point ideology scale would be less likely to support the immigration and refugee policies.[6]

As is the case in examining basic attitudes toward foreigners, support for policies cannot be explained by economic discontent and prejudice alone. Accordingly, other explanatory variables were included in model 2. As in model 1, both education and age are included. Some German samples have shown that it is younger persons who are most receptive to immigrants (Hoskin and Mishler 1983), but it is possible that more recently youth are less receptive because they may be threatened eco-

nomically more than established citizens (Watts 1997). In fact, much of the violence that occurred against foreigners in the early 1990s was attributed to youth who were supposedly threatened both by the arrival of the new groups and the collapse of the economy in the former East Germany.

Does the Model Work Empirically?

The results for model 2 are presented in figures 3.3 and 3.4. Since the model contains fewer exogenous variables, they are presented graphically. Despite the fact that the sample was split, differences between eastern and western residents in explaining support for immigration and refugee policy are slight. For one, the economic satisfaction construct, which consisted of satisfaction with employment, income, or individual economic situation, is unrelated to either immigration or refugee policy regardless of section of the nation considered. Very small economic effects are detected in the eastern section, where respondents feel that foreigners have a stronger impact on finances than in the west. This finding again casts doubt on economic dissatisfaction being a major cause of prejudice.

Another interesting finding is that although western Germans separate a conservative political orientation from traditional racism in expressing views on immigration and refugee policies, the eastern Germans tend to "fuse" the two concepts into a single "symbolic" orientation that consists of both traditional racism and conservative orientation. The differences are probably due to the newness of party identification (and voting) in the eastern region and the lag in the former GDR in the development of a coherent ideology that can be relied upon consistently, separate from other political cues (Kaase and Klingemann 1994). Because of the novelty of the democratic parties and their positions, the eastern residents are less successful than the westerners in distinguishing among them as cues for political action.

In summary, the most persuasive of the explanations considered in understanding immigration policy is racism, whether it is expressed in pure "traditional" form by the western Germans or fused "symbolically" with the measures of conservatism in the eastern region. The racial explanation is weaker in the east. Still, compared to the other explanatory variables, it has the strongest and most consistent effects on opposition

Figure 3.3 LISREL Estimates of Independent Variables on Policy Preferences in the Former GDR, Standardized Solution (1991 EMNID Survey)



Figure 3.4 LISREL Estimates of Independent Variables on Policy Preferences in Western Germany, Standardized Solution (1991 EMNID Survey)



to more liberal refugee and immigration policies regardless of which section of the nation is considered. As racism increases, support for immigrant workers and refugees declines.

The results for the German sample parallel research in the United States seeking to explain why some individuals may oppose programs that benefit African Americans. According to Gilens (1995: 1010–11), a chief factor in explaining why some whites may oppose welfare is the stereotyping of blacks, which includes a denigration of their work effort. Similarly, a key concept that explains negative German feelings toward policies that may help refugees or immigrants is a negative racial affect characterized by a feeling of "superiority" and an unwillingness to "mix" with other people.

Also worth noting is that the age variable is of no help in explaining attitudes toward immigration and refugee policy. Its effects also are weak and indirect when considering the more general model of anti-foreign prejudice (model 1). Like the findings for the economic resentment hypothesis, this result flies in the face of conventional wisdom. Along with the notion of economic resentment comes the commonly held belief that youth are more vulnerable to exhibit militant xenophobic behavior. This may be the case with regard to actual physical attacks on foreigners, but it is curious that the 1991 data do not demonstrate any proclivity on the part of youth toward anti-foreign attitudes. Attitudes are not the same as behavior, but the resentment hypothesis could be extended to state that since youth are less established economically, there may be a greater tendency for them to be anti-foreign. But we could find no evidence of this tendency regardless of whether attitudes toward foreigners in general or immigrant and refugee policy are considered.

Discussion

A number of important conclusions emerge from the analysis of general xenophobic attitudes and beliefs regarding immigration and refugee policy. The first is the weakness of economic self-interest compared to ethnic chauvinism in explaining attitudes toward foreigners. Perhaps one fault with the measure of economic self-interest may be that it is defined too narrowly by its exclusive focus on the individual. In Germany and elsewhere it is more often *national* economic conditions that

evoke a political response, such as a vote (Lewis-Beck and Lockerbie 1989). But in this instance the goal is not to explain a vote, and the connection between self-interest and anti-foreign sentiment is more direct. Others have documented the limitations of self-interest in explaining behavior, but what is of little comfort in the German case is the alternative explanation—the power of race and ethnocentrism in expressing anti-foreign sentiment or advocating policies that work adversely against guest workers and refugees (Monroe 1994). Especially in considering policy, the power of ethnocentrism is strong in overriding a rational calculation of its costs and benefits. In the area of immigrant and refugee policy, the economic impacts that are thought to exist are present only among the respondents from the former GDR, and even in that instance the effects of economic self-interest are comparatively weak when compared to the fused symbolic racism construct.

The results for immigration and refugee policy also offer insight in examining the types of racism that explain opposition to policies benefiting non-Germans. The findings offer some support to those on both sides of the issue of whether "symbolic" racism is a legitimate construct that can account for political behavior. The case of Germany suggests that the usefulness and validity of symbolism is highly contextual. In the western region, where the nation has the longest experience with democratic political institutions, the fusion of conservative values and racial hostility is largely absent, and citizens express opposition to refugee and immigration policies through racial overtones that are largely separated from party preference or conservative ideology. In contrast, in the former GDR, where the phenomenon of democratic parties was brand new at the time of this survey, conservative values and traditional racism are combined into one construct that is the most successful factor in explaining policy preferences for immigrants or refugees. In terms of future research, this might lead one to expect that a symbolic view of race in which conservative values and ethnocentrism are merged is most likely in polities with immature democratic political institutions.

A final important implication of this chapter is what the findings may indicate with regard to the notion of policy reasoning. The question is often posed as to how individuals arrive at a policy preference given limited information resulting from a lack of interest in politics and policy questions. The findings suggest that affect toward minority groups may play a role. Many are opposed to beneficial policies toward immigrants

(or have a more generally xenophobic view of them unrelated to policy), but the results presented suggest their hostility may not be due to any rational calculation of economic costs and benefits to the individual. Instead, after determining their attitude toward a particular group, they may "reason backwards" to justify why they advocate a certain policy position (Sniderman et al. 1986). A reason why the economic self-interest explanation is limited in this sample of Germans is that policy preferences may be determined more from the immediate likes and dislikes of an individual toward immigrants and refugees (or minorities such as the Turks) in general rather than the effect these groups may have on one's wallet or job prospects. In the upheaval that Germany experienced during unification in the early 1990s, the emotional explanation seems more plausible.

4

More Recent Evidence of Anti-Foreign Sentiment

The 1996 ALLBUS General Social Survey

Introduction

More recent and comprehensive data are available on attitudes toward foreigners in united Germany. A second survey of public opinion, the German Social Survey (ALLBUS), was conducted in 1996 by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung und Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA).[1] The survey poses a broader range of questions regarding attitudes toward both foreigners and Jews and provides a snapshot of public opinion some five years after the most serious violence following unification. After a description of eastern and western Germans concerning their attitudes toward Italians, Jews, ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, and Turks, I develop several multivariate models of anti-foreign sentiment. In addition to anti-foreign sentiment in general, the analysis attempts to explain which factors impact the desire to have a foreigner marry into one's family, to have a foreigner as a neighbor, and to want equal rights for foreigners, the stringency of naturalization criteria, how much foreigners differ in lifestyle from Germans, and whether foreigners in Germany should receive the communal voting right.

Basic German Attitudes toward Foreign Groups: Eastern and Western Germans

I divided the analysis between eastern and western Germans. A major reason for such treatment is that up until 1990 (and some would argue beyond), the two sectors of contemporary Germany were different nations with separate values and priorities. Table 4.1 confirms that a considerable difference in values exists in terms of what it means to be a German.

Respondents were asked to select from a list of seven items entitled "the things that one can be proud of as a German." A maximum of three selections was permitted. Western Germans tended to select pride in the Basic Law, social progress, and the economy as the top three choices whereas residents of the former GDR selected science, literature, and the achievements of the German athletes. The greater selection of the Basic Law and social programs on the part of the western Germans is not surprising. Those in the east have had little time to experience their benefits, and the Basic Law was developed in the west immediately after the war and has been a cornerstone of German democracy. What is surprising is that there is little difference between the east and the west in their feelings of pride toward the German economy. Again, it is possible that western Germans are less likely to evaluate the economy in terms of their own self-interest but, as much of the literature has pointed out, are more likely to look to the state of the new nation as a whole

Table 4.1 Elements of German Pride: Western Germany and Eastern Germany

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
Characteristics Mentioned		
Basic Law	52.9%	24.1%
Bundestag	6.3%	2.9%
Athletes	22.9%	54.0%
Economy	44.3%	41.2%
Literature	31.0%	53.0%
Science	41.5%	57.7%
Social Progress	48.7%	22.7%

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

(Alford and Legge 1984). Thus, they may not separate the eastern region from the western region in making their evaluation. Of course, economic feelings may affect attitude toward foreigners differentially in the two economies. Also surprising is the low level of pride in the Bundestag. Although there is a difference in the level of pride felt by westerners and residents of the former GDR, the regard in both instances is very low. It is obvious that both sides, especially the west, take more pride in the constitutional structure of the government (the Basic Law) than in the people operating it.

A second reason for dividing the sample is that the difference in experience with foreigners is vast. Although those living in western Germany have experienced large numbers of immigrant workers in the nation since the early 1960s, the former GDR admitted very few. This is confirmed by the respondents themselves, and the gap in experience is presented in table 4.2.

Table 4.2 reveals that there is wide variation in actual contact with foreigners between the eastern and the western residents. Nearly one-fifth of the western German respondents report foreigners as close relatives or members of the immediate family whereas only 6 percent of residents of the former GDR have the same level of contact. By a better than three to one margin, western Germans are more likely to come into contact with foreigners at work and also to state that foreigners live in the neighborhood (37.2 percent versus 7.1 percent). Finally, a little better than 50 percent of the westerners indicate that foreigners are within their circle of friends, compared to only 15.7 percent of the eastern residents. Aside from economic disparities, one alternative explanation regarding these data is that eastern Germans possess a lower level

Table 4.2 Contact with Foreigners: Western Germany and Eastern Germany

Percentage of individuals who report contact with foreigners:	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
In immediate family	19.1%	6%
At your work place	45.4%	13.9%
In your neighborhood	37.2%	7.1%
Circle of friends	50.5%	15.7%

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

of sympathy toward foreigners simply because they have less experience with them.

Lifestyle Differences

A first set of questions that is of interest concerns lifestyle differences between minorities and the majority in Germany. Respondents were asked the following question: "Here on this list are different groups of people. In the following section I would like to ask you some questions about foreigners from these groups which are living in Germany. Would you please indicate how strongly, in your opinion, the lifestyles of foreigners from each of these groups differ from the Germans?"

Results are presented in table 4.3. The table is interesting both in examining the relative ranking of the lifestyles of the groups as well as the differences between the eastern and western regions. The groups include Italians, German emigrants from Eastern Europe, asylum seekers, Turks, and Jews. The respondents were asked to express their degree of need for a change in lifestyle on a seven-point scale, where a "1" indicated that the particular group differed "not at all" from Germans and a "7" indicated that the lifestyle differed "very strongly."

Germans from the western section and the former GDR are consistent in their relative rankings of the various minority groups. In both east and west, it is the asylum seekers whom native Germans believe must adjust their living styles the most to fit into German society. This is not surprising as the problem of vast numbers of asylum seekers is a recent one. Most of those seeking asylum come not from the former GDR and the Soviet Bloc, as was envisioned when the Basic Law was enacted, but from the former Yugoslavia. As was established earlier, the number of these refugees in Germany is much higher both in actual numbers and proportion in comparison to other European Union nations. The Turks are perceived as the second group that Germans believe should adjust their living style. Despite several decades of residence in the western portion of the nation, respondents still feel that the Turks have some way to go to acculturate into society. Of course, for those who follow Islam most traditionally, the shift to a modern Western society is very difficult. One example would be in the area of family structure, where women wear traditional dress, are socially

Table 4.3 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Lifestyle

	Lifestyles of Italians		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	3.47	1.53	2981
Western Germany	3.30	1.52	2023
Eastern Germany	3.86	1.49	922
	Lifestyles of Ethnic Germans		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	4.28	1.55	2986
Western Germany	4.16	1.55	2023
Eastern Germany	4.52	1.52	963
	Lifestyles of Asylum Seekers		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	5.69	1.41	2992
Western Germany	5.73	1.43	2032
Eastern Germany	5.59	1.37	960
	Lifestyles of Turks		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	5.07	1.49	3045
Western Germany	5.08	1.48	2087
Eastern Germany	5.05	1.52	958
	Lifestyles of Jews		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	2.90	1.76	2726
Western Germany	2.93	1.81	1826
Eastern Germany	2.84	1.68	900

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

segregated from the men, and are discouraged from mingling with secular society.

The ethnic Germans, most of whom have arrived from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, rank in the middle of the minority groups considered. Even though the Aussiedler share similar cultural characteristics, the fact that they have not been raised in Western Europe presents some difficulties in adjustment. In addition, there are language difficulties for many, and the sheer number of ethnic Germans who have emigrated in recent years has placed more pressure on employment when the job market has tightened. In addition, the Aussiedler have been blamed for the scarcity of housing in urban areas. The score

for lifestyle differences for the ethnic Germans in both the east and west is considerably higher than that for the Italians, who are at the lower end of the scale. The Italians were among the first immigrant workers in the postwar period, and like the Turks, many have stayed, have advanced to higher levels in the economy, and have established their families for several generations in Germany. Compared to the ethnic Germans and the Turks, they have made a more successful transition in adapting to the host country lifestyle, at least according to German citizens.

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the case of the Jews, who are perceived more positively than the other groups. According to residents of both the east and west, the Jews are closest in lifestyle to the Germans. The German Jewish community remains small. This is despite its growth in recent years in cities such as Berlin and Munich. Most of the population increase is due to emigration from the former Soviet Union. Russian Jews identify with the Jewish community upon entering Germany, but evidence suggests some gradually disappear after obtaining some help in getting settled initially. Nevertheless, with a Jewish population estimated between 70,000 and 100,000 in a nation of 82 million, it is unlikely that many of the respondents have had personal experiences with Jews. Also, they may feel some social pressure in an interview situation to give a positive evaluation of their assimilation and acculturation to German society. But the Jews simply do not have the size of the other groups, particularly the asylum seekers, the Turks, and the ethnic Germans, to make much of an impact on German society in terms of employment, housing, or public benefits. In addition, despite the recent influx of Russian emigrants, long-time members of the Jewish community are much more acculturated and assimilated to German norms than are the Turks or asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the distance in the scale between the highest group, the asylum seekers, and the Jews, is considerable, especially if one considers the German Jewish past.

Another notable feature of table 4.3 is the difference between the residents of the former GDR and others in evaluating the lifestyle changes desirable by foreigners. Although the distances between the east and west regarding Turks and Jews is not marked, there is a significant difference with regard to perception of asylum seekers and much larger gaps with regard to ethnic Germans and Italians. In the instances of the ethnic Germans and Italians, residents of the former GDR believe

that these immigrant groups must go a greater distance in changing their lifestyles compared to the attitudes of the westerners. Again, I suspect that most of these differences are due to the varying levels of experience the two regions of Germany have had with the immigrant groups. Few Italians live in the former East Germany, and most residents there have perhaps only a vague idea of the actual lifestyle of this group. The return of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe was a policy that came directly out of the West German government after the war, and most returning ethnic Germans emigrated to the Western sector. While those in the east have had experiences with Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and other residents of the former Communist Bloc, most ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe did not return to the former GDR immediately after World War II due to the presence of the Soviet Union. Those who may return there now that the German nation is united may be seen as competitors in a resource-scare society rather than as compatriots.

On the issue of asylum seekers, again experience may play a key role in informing attitude—except in this case, those with the greater experience with asylum seekers (the western residents) believe that the group has a longer way to go to adjust their lifestyle to Germany. Although sympathy for foreigners in general is much lower for all groups in the east, it is the western sector of the nation that has received the asylum seekers and grappled with their problems, including the question of whether they should stay in Germany for the short run or if their claim of political persecution is legitimate. In contrast, those in the eastern sector have not had to deal with the problems of refugees from the conflicts in the Balkans to as great an extent. The problems with refugees started with reunification in 1990 when the borders between the east and west collapsed. Still, most of the refugees from Yugoslavia are concentrated in the west, with the exception of those settling in Berlin.

Marriage and the Neighborhood

Results that parallel those for lifestyle are presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5, which examine having a neighbor who is a member of a minority group and the desirability of marriage to an individual member of that group. Respondents were asked the following questions: "How pleasant or unpleasant would it be to you to have a member of one of these

Table 4.4 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Neighbor

	Pleased Your Neighbor Is an Italian		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.78	1.34	3286
Western Germany	4.99	1.33	2173
Eastern Germany	4.36	4.36	1113
	Pleased Your Neighbor Is an Ethnic German		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.39	1.35	3281
Western Germany	4.49	1.38	2169
Eastern Germany	4.20	4.20	1112
	Pleased Your Neighbor Is an Asylum Seeker		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.28	1.53	3281
Western Germany	3.31	1.58	2169
Eastern Germany	3.23	3.23	1112
	Pleased Your Neighbor Is a Turk		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.74	1.51	3285
Western Germany	3.91	1.51	2173
Eastern Germany	3.40	3.40	1112
	Pleased Your Neighbor Is a Jew		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.56	1.40	3271
Western Germany	4.63	1.41	2160
Eastern Germany	4.41	4.41	1111

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

groups as your neighbor? (E.g., How pleasant or unpleasant would it be to have an Italian as a neighbor?) And how would it be if a member of one of these groups married into your own family? To what extent would it be pleasant or unpleasant for you? (E.g., If an Italian married into your own family?)" Again, individuals were asked to rank these possibilities with a score of "1" indicating that it would be "very unpleasant" while a score of "7" suggests that it "would be very pleasant."

With minor modification, the results for neighborhood and marriage are similar to lifestyle. The least desirable group for both eastern and western Germans in terms of neighbors are the asylum seekers. The difference in means is extremely small, with those in the west only slightly more likely to express a positive affinity toward this group. For

Table 4.5 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Marriage

	Marriage to an Italian		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.24	1.47	3279
Western Germany	4.47	1.45	2170
Eastern Germany	3.80	1.42	1109
	Marriage to an Ethnic German		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.98	1.43	3278
Western Germany	4.11	1.44	2169
Eastern Germany	3.71	1.35	1109
	Marriage to an Asylum Seeker		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	2.86	1.55	3275
Western Germany	2.86	1.60	2167
Eastern Germany	2.86	1.44	1108
	Marriage to a Turk		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.05	1.58	3277
Western Germany	3.14	1.64	2164
Eastern Germany	2.88	1.45	1108
	Marriage to a Jew		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.91	1.52	3263
Western Germany	3.99	1.56	2156
Eastern Germany	3.76	1.43	1167

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

the western Germans, the Turks rise considerably over the asylum seekers, approximately 0.6 on the scale. The Turks rank higher for the residents of the former GDR as well, although they are closer to their own evaluation of asylum seekers than they are to the western German assessment of this group. The ethnic Germans are perceived much more positively as neighbors in both the eastern and western sectors, as are Jews and Italians. In terms of the ranking of preferences, residents of the former GDR are most favorably inclined to accept Jews as their neighbors, and respondents from the west are more likely to express a preference for Italians.

Overall, there are considerable differences between the east and the west, with the possible exception of asylum seekers. In the case of all

the minority groups, including the Jews, the western Germans are more likely to desire having them as neighbors.

Consistent results also are evident with regard to marriage, a more intense social relationship than just merely living in the neighborhood. There is virtually no difference between residents of the former GDR and those living in the west with regard to asylum seekers. Further, as marriage prospects for one's family, the asylum seekers rank lowest of all groups for both eastern and western Germany. Again, for western Germans, the most desirable partner for a family member would be Italian, but in contrast to their views about neighbors, the eastern Germans would also prefer a family marriage to an Italian, although the Jews do not trail far behind. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of asylum seekers, the residents of the western sector of Germany express a higher preference for marriage in their families to all groups, including the Jews and the Italians. The differences are large and statistically significant.[2]

General Perceptions of Behavior

A number of questions were posed regarding the behavior of minority groups in Germany and the impact of that behavior on society. Again, respondents replied on a scale ranging in value from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating "absolutely do not agree" and 7 demonstrating "completely and totally agree." Results are presented in table 4.6.

In general, the data suggest that western Germans possess a greater sympathy toward foreigners compared to residents of the former GDR. To a substantial and statistically significant degree, residents of the west believe that foreigners "do the unpleasant work" not wanted by other Germans, that the foreigners enrich the German culture, and that these groups actually support the social security system. Similarly, western residents are more inclined to disagree that foreigners "strain our social net," "take away jobs," and commit crimes more often. Interestingly, easterners are the most negative on jobs, with a mean score of 4.70 compared to a mean of 3.55 among the western respondents. In contrast, those in the west seem more sensitive on the issue of housing, with a mean of 4.24, compared to the score of 4.02 for residents of the former GDR. Again, this may be based upon the reality of western

Table 4.6 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: General Social Behavior

	Foreigners Do the Unpleasant Work		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.37	1.87	3210
Western Germany	4.41	1.83	2397
Eastern Germany	4.28	1.97	1113
	Foreigners Strain Our Social Net		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.09	1.96	3499
Western Germany	3.84	1.94	2391
Eastern Germany	4.63	1.88	1108
	Foreigners Enrich Our Culture		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.91	1.94	3502
Western Germany	4.01	1.95	2389
Eastern Germany	3.71	1.90	1113
	Foreigners Take Up Housing		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.17	1.98	2501
Western Germany	4.24	1.96	2392
Eastern Germany	4.02	2.01	1109
	Foreigners Support Social Security		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.10	1.98	3492
Western Germany	4.28	1.92	2386
Eastern Germany	3.70	2.04	1106
	Foreigners Take Away Jobs		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	3.91	2.04	3508
Western Germany	3.55	1.93	2394
Eastern Germany	4.70	2.04	1114
	Foreigners Commit Crimes More Frequently		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.02	2.06	3484
Western Germany	3.77	2.05	2387
Eastern Germany	4.54	1.99	1108

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

Germans actually living with foreigners and the eastern Germans not having the experience of foreigners squeezing them out of housing.

The Question of Qualifying for Naturalization

A number of questions were posed concerning criteria for the naturalization of foreigners. Not surprisingly, there are considerable and statistically significant differences between eastern and western respondents. As demonstrated in table 4.7, those residing in the west, with some exception, are more permissive toward naturalizing foreigners.

Easterners are more inclined to insist that the individual being naturalized should be born in Germany. Perhaps this is because the former GDR received a comparatively low number of ethnic Germans seeking repatriation, and respondents are less sympathetic to the traditional definition of German citizenship. Eastern respondents also are supportive of the notion that those naturalized should be of German descent. Again, this may point to the differing experiences of the two sections of Germany. Although the western question of naturalization is most focused on the Turks, those in the eastern section have had almost no experience with this group and are poorly informed of its contributions. Residents of the former GDR are more inclined to use the issue of whether or not an individual has committed criminal offenses in considering whether the state should grant citizenship and to believe it is important that the individual be able to maintain himself or herself financially. On this latter item, the differences between the east and west are slight.

But on certain items, the western German respondents are more rigorous in their criteria for naturalization. For example, the western residents are more likely to insist that the individual be able to speak German well and have lived in Germany for some time. They are also concerned that the candidate for naturalization show adaptation to the German lifestyle. In considering the differing responses between east and west, it is evident that the western respondents show more practical concerns, such as whether the individual is ready for citizenship in terms of language skills, lifestyle adaptations, and length of residence. In contrast, the eastern respondents' concerns are more emotional. There is interest in birthplace, descent, and criminal record. In short, the data indicate that the respondents in the west are probably more ready to

Table 4.7 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Naturalization Criteria

	Naturalization: Should Be Born in Germany?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.76	2.22	3281
Western Germany	4.66	2.22	2168
Eastern Germany	4.96	2.21	1113
	Naturalization: Should Be of German Descent?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.54	2.19	3275
Western Germany	4.47	2.14	2164
Eastern Germany	4.68	2.18	1111
	Naturalization: Should Speak German?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	5.09	1.89	3277
Western Germany	5.37	1.75	2166
Eastern Germany	4.54	2.01	1111
	Naturalization: How Long Lived Here?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	5.36	1.72	3278
Western Germany	5.45	1.66	2165
Eastern Germany	5.19	1.84	1113
	Naturalization: Adopted Living Style?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	4.94	1.92	3278
Western Germany	5.03	1.89	2165
Eastern Germany	4.78	1.98	1113
	Naturalization: In a Christian Church?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	2.05	1.59	3273
Western Germany	2.19	1.66	2161
Eastern Germany	1.76	1140	1112
	Naturalization: No Punishable Acts?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	6.15	1.47	3273
Western Germany	6.08	1.49	2163
Eastern Germany	6.29	1.41	1110
	Naturalization: Particular Living Maintenance?		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
Overall	5.72	1.67	3276
Western Germany	5.70	1.69	2165
Eastern Germany	5.76	1.63	1111

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

accept the naturalization of some immigrant groups, regardless of where they were born. Again, in the east there is probably not enough experience with immigrant workers and other groups for them to be as sympathetic.

A final item asks whether a criterion for naturalization should be membership in a Christian Church. Despite the fact that this would rule out naturalization for nearly all the Turks living in western Germany, the eastern Germans show less support for this criterion than western residents, although enthusiasm for church involvement is not strong in either section of the nation. The eastern response is also probably reflective of the suppression of religion in the GDR by the Communist government and the comparative lack of religious affiliation in that section of the nation.

Political and Legal Rights

Another part of the survey posed the question of whether various minority groups living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans in all respects. Again, the question ranged on a scale from 1 to 7. The differences between residents of the former GDR and western Germans are presented in table 4.8.

The results are interesting. Residents of the former GDR express less sympathy for both Italians and ethnic Germans than do western respondents. These findings are consistent with what has been presented to this point regarding economic and social equality. But in contrast, the eastern Germans are slightly more likely to express sympathy in legal terms for both Jews and Turks and to support legal rights for asylum seekers by a wide margin over residents of the west. What might account for the differing findings?

The answer may lie with the fact that although the Turk may pose an economic threat and the Jew a social one (in terms of marriage or living in the neighborhood), no such fears exist in terms of legal rights. Legal and political rights were denied easterners beginning with the establishment of the Third Reich in 1933, and this repression existed at least until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In terms of asylum seekers and the wide gap existing between the eastern and western regions, it has to be kept in mind that in a legal and political sense, it was the citizens of the GDR who were asylum seekers until very recently. As

Table 4.8 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Equal Rights for Minority Groups

	Equal Rights for Italians		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	4.59	1.93	3273
Western Germany	4.66	1.94	2160
Eastern Germany	4.46	1.89	1113
	Equal Rights for Ethnic Germans		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	4.74	1.91	3272
Western Germany	4.83	1.92	2160
Eastern Germany	4.56	1.87	1112
	Equal Rights for Asylum Seekers		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	2.93	1.87	3271
Western Germany	2.80	1.84	2159
Eastern Germany	3.19	1.89	1112
	Equal Rights for Turks		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	3.78	1.98	3269
Western Germany	3.76	1.99	2158
Eastern Germany	3.82	1.97	1111
	Equal Rights for Jews		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	5.04	1.94	3253
Western Germany	5.01	1.96	2141
Eastern Germany	5.08	1.89	1112

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

such, it may make sense for them to be in tune with the *political* aspirations of these groups to some extent, although they still may view the asylum seekers negatively in an economic or social sense. The close score for the western and eastern Germans on the Turks and the Jews may also reveal that although westerners may be more in sympathy with the economic and social aspirations of the minorities, they still may have a great deal of ambivalence regarding the extension of full political and legal rights.

A final question concerning political and legal rights is presented in table 4.9. The question is posed as follows: "All foreigners in Germany—regardless of their nationality—should have the communal voting right; that is, they should be allowed to take part in the election of state and local officials."

Table 4.9 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans: Communal Voting Rights

	Foreigners Should Have Communal Voting Rights		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	3.59	2.29	3279
Western Germany	3.52	2.27	2167
Eastern Germany	3.71	2.32	1112

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

Again, despite the lack of sympathy residents of the former GDR exhibit on most social and economic measures, they are more willing than the westerners, to a significant degree, to extend communal voting rights. I can attribute this only to the fact that the easterners themselves were denied a legitimate and meaningful vote for so long and thus may have more sympathy for disenfranchised foreigners.

Judging the Sensitivity of the Economy: Three Situations of Discrimination

I argue in chapter 3 that the economy, or at least one's perception of it, is not a strongly determinative force in producing anti-foreign sentiment among the German public. But the 1996 ALLBUS Social Survey allowed this hypothesis to be tested well beyond the measures utilized in the 1991 data. To judge the relevance of the economy, I began with questions regarding three hypothetical social situations involving an action of discrimination. Respondents were asked how they judged the following three situations.

A manager refuses to render services to foreigners.
Parents forbid their daughter to date a Turkish teenager.
An employer who has to cut down on personnel dismisses foreign employees first.

Respondents were allowed four options:

1 = I think it is completely right;
2 = I am inclined to say it is right;
3 = I am inclined to say it is not right;
4 = I am inclined to say it is absolutely not right.

The results are presented in table 4.10. Listed in the table for each variable are the percentages indicating that such behavior is "not right" or "absolutely not right." I reasoned that if a faltering economy is a major cause of anti-foreign sentiment in Germany, fewer would be inclined to disagree with the correctness of dismissing the foreign employees versus the case of refusing to serve foreigners or forbidding a youngster to date a Turkish teenager. This should especially be the case in the eastern region, where it has been argued that part of the reason for xenophobia and prejudice against foreigners lies with economic frustration.

Table 4.10 illustrates a statistically significant difference between the eastern and western sectors when a manager refuses to serve foreigners. Although the overwhelming majority of Germans, both eastern and western, believe that flat-out refusing to serve a foreigner is wrong, it is disturbing that a much lower percentage are disinclined to grant permission for social interaction among teenagers. But what table 4.10 also establishes very clearly is that there is a substantial gap between eastern and western Germans on the economic measure. The difference of 8 percentage points between east and west cannot be ignored with regard to service to foreigners, but there is an even greater separation (approximately 12 percentage points) between the two regions in accepting the morality of firing "foreigners first." Indeed, the westerners believe it is

Table 4.10 Percentage of Germans Who Believe Various Discriminatory Acts Are "Not Right" or "Absolutely Not Right"

	A Manager Refuses to Render Services to Foreigners
All	67%
West	70.7%
East	62.7%
	Parents Forbid Their Daughter to Date a Turkish Teenager
All	38.5%
West	39.1%
East	37.5%
	An Employer Who Has to Cut Down on Personnel Dismisses Foreigners First
All	37.8%
West	41.8%
East	30.1%

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

more moral to forbid their child to date a Turkish youngster than to dismiss foreigners from employment in a discriminatory manner.

Thus, in all three issues involving discrimination, the eastern German respondents are more likely to accept the legitimacy of a biased action against foreigners. But the gap between the eastern and western respondents is far larger regarding an economic situation that would potentially benefit them. The economic issue also is explored with regard to unemployment.

Economic Anxiety in the East and Discrimination

There are a number of hypotheses regarding anti-foreign feelings with regard to the differences between eastern and western Germany. During the first chapter I developed the notion that in the east, citizens may be less sympathetic to foreigners because of important non-economic factors. What I now term a "contact-isolation" hypothesis suggests that because of their long separation from democratic rule and their inexperience with non-Germans, residents of the former GDR are less likely to express favorable feelings toward minorities than those in the west. The economic resentment hypothesis holds that easterners are less favorable to foreigners because the economic situation, particularly unemployment, is far more dire in the former GDR than in the western region and that the attitudes of eastern Germans toward foreigners are likely to be especially colored by this experience. Of course, there are many factors other than contact-isolation and economic resentment that are important in explaining anti-foreign sentiment, which I develop in the subsequent multivariate model.

As in most surveys, the actual number of people currently unemployed is too low to analyze, but the 1996 General Social Survey presented a question that asked whether or not an individual had been fearful of losing his or her job. One way to test these competing hypotheses is by looking exclusively at those who expressed fear of losing their jobs versus those who expressed no fear. There was some difficulty in using this measure because those who were self-employed or not gainfully employed were not included in this question, and this caused the number of cases for the former GDR residents to drop, making it more difficult to gain statistical significance. But table 4.11, which compares the attitudes of eastern Germans who fear losing their jobs to those who

Table 4.11 Responses of Former GDR Residents, by Level of Job Anxiety, on Various Measures of Anti-Foreign Sentiment

	Foreigners do the unpleasant work		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	3.39	2.05	204
fear losing job	3.00	1.90	389
	Foreigners strain our social net		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	4.27	1.87	387
fear losing job	4.67	1.89	204
	Foreigners enrich our culture		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	4.03	1.92	390
fear losing job	3.75	1.98	204
	Foreigners take up housing		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	3.60	1.97	388
fear losing job	3.90	2.03	204
	Foreigners support social security		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	3.93	2.06	387
fear losing job	3.47	2.14	204
	Foreigners take away jobs		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	4.27	2.05	388
fear losing job	4.73	2.08	204
	Foreigners commit crimes more frequently		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
no anxiety	4.14	1.99	388
fear losing job	4.71	1.99	204

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

do not, indicates that there are wide and substantial differences between the two groups on the issues of foreigners and their social behavior.

Those who fear losing their positions are less likely to feel that foreigners "do the unpleasant work" not wanted by citizens, are less inclined to believe that foreigners "enrich our culture," and support the social security system. In contrast, those eastern Germans who fear losing their jobs are much more inclined to state that foreigners take up housing, strain the social net, take away jobs, and commit more crimes. Interestingly, the mean difference on crime between the economically

threatened and Germans expressing no anxiety is larger than the difference on jobs. This may indicate that fear of losing a position multiplies prejudices in other areas.

I examined a number of other economic variables such as how the individual felt about his or her own economic condition and the state of the nation either at present or in the future. While eastern respondents tended to be less satisfied overall economically, the differences were smaller than I anticipated. Perhaps the difficulties of unification have affected both sectors of Germany more uniformly than commonly supposed. In any event, the analysis of those who were fearful of losing jobs and the social situational variables demonstrate that without considering other factors, there is a strong difference between eastern and western respondents with regard to perceptions in explaining prejudice. However, other variables have to be taken into consideration to ensure that these differences are not spurious. Below I utilize a number of multivariate models to examine the impact of the economic variables along with other important factors to determine their effects on anti-foreign sentiment more completely.

Multivariate Analysis: A Description of the Variables

The 1996 General Social Survey presented a large number of dependent variables concerning immigrant and refugee groups, in contrast to the 1991 EMNID study. Because of its greater complexity, I utilized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in an attempt to obtain estimates of the effects of the economic and other variables. The dependent variables consisted of a general scale of attitudes toward foreigners and attitudes toward marriage to a foreigner, having a minority group member as a neighbor, equal rights for foreigners, qualifications for naturalization, and lifestyle differences. The scales were composed of the identical variables utilized in the univariate analysis. They were tested for reliability and found adequate.[3]

The independent variables were divided into five categories. The first group is termed "contact" and consists of the level of interaction an individual has had with foreigners and the question of whether a respondent resided in the former territories of the GDR. It was expected that those who have foreigners in their families or in their circle

of friends would be more sympathetic toward them whereas those who reside in the eastern region would be less favorably disposed, mostly because of a lack of experience with foreigners.

Some of the anti-foreign sentiment from the eastern sector may be due to economic conditions, but the multivariate analysis allows the opportunity to test for the effects of living in the eastern region separately from economic status and perceptions regarding the economy. Some of the differences in the east apart from economics can be explained by the long anti-democratic conditions of both Nazism and communism, which would not make an individual sympathetic to minorities. But what might also help in understanding the easterners is the literature of center-periphery cleavages as developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and others (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Much of this work was written before the fall of communism and concerned primarily the democratic nations of Western Europe. But in developing hypotheses about voting, Lipset and Rokkan state: "In one case the decisive criteria of alignment is *commitment to the locality and its dominant culture:* you vote with your community and its leaders irrespective of your economic position" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 13).

Although voting may not be based exclusively upon economics (or party, for that matter), it is my hypothesis that prejudice toward foreigners and Jews is probably more complex than a simple economic explanation would warrant. In making the case for the importance of territory, Rokkan and Urwin state that the division of Germany at the close of the war perpetuated past cultural divisions: "One consequence of the defeat of the Reich in 1945 was that the Prussian core was again separated from the Western city belt: the highly polycephalic Bonn Republic inherited the traditions of the old leagues, while the monocephalic Democratic Republic conserved several traits of the old centralized Prussian monarchy" (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 38). Thus, I expect that there will be more anti-foreign sentiment evident from residents of the former GDR than will be found in the west, apart from economic situation. Again, this is due primarily to their lack of experience with foreigners.

A second category for the independent variables is sociodemographic. In general, it was expected that the greater the level of education for the individual, the more favorable the attitude toward immigrants and refugees. Income also is included with the hypothesis that

those of greater affluence would be more likely to be identified with conservative lifestyles and political ideologies and would be less favorably inclined to accept foreigners. Because of greater potential competition in the workplace, it is hypothesized that men would be less accepting of foreigners than women. With regard to age, it is hypothesized that older Germans would be less accepting than younger ones.

Four psychological variables are included. One is a scale of antisemitism. It is anticipated that those who are more antisemitic would be less favorably disposed toward foreigners. This is based partially on the stereotype of the Jew as a foreigner with little loyalty to the host state. Of the variables in the model, antisemitism measures the racial affect of Germans toward foreigners the most directly. Respondents were asked the following question:

> Occasionally one hears different opinions about the Jews. Would you please tell me . . . to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.
>
> Jews have too much influence in the world.
>
> I am ashamed that the Germans committed so many crimes against the Jews.
>
> Many Jews are trying to use the past of the Third Reich to their advantage and to make the Germans pay for it.
>
> With regard to their behavior, the Jews are not entirely innocent in their pursuits.

Possible responses ranged from a score of 1, where the respondent indicated that he or she "absolutely" did not agree, to 7, in which case the respondent stated that he or she agreed "completely and fully."

A second psychological variable is tolerance. The tolerance of an individual was measured by a composite index that inquired about the right to a free press and the right to assemble to express revolutionary views. It was anticipated that those with greater tolerance would be less apt to express anti-foreign sentiment. A third variable that measured responses to the statement "we should be thankful for authority figures who can tell us what we should do and how we should do it" was indicative of authoritarianism. Here the assumption was that those with greater authoritarianism would have a less favorable attitude toward foreigners. Finally, respondents were asked to estimate the number of foreigners living in western Germany at the time of the survey. It was rea-

soned that those who stated the correct category (between 0 and 9 percent) and did not exaggerate the number of foreigners would be better informed on the issue and would be less likely to be extreme about it. It is this group that should be most favorable to immigrants and refugee groups.

The political variables consisted of a standard Left-Right ideology scale as well as intention to vote for the extremist Republikaner Party or the PDS. In general, it was expected that those on the ideological Right or who expressed the intention to vote for the Republikaner Party would be less likely to demonstrate a pro-immigrant attitude. It was anticipated that those who intended to vote for the PDS would be more in favor of the immigrants.

As the primary concern of this book is the testing of the sensitivity of economic measures, these require a bit more explanation. First, individuals were asked about their economic circumstances. Four questions were posed. Two of these were oriented in the present, with one questioning the economic situation with regard to Germany as a nation and a second inquiring about personal circumstances. The questions are as follows.

How would you, in general, categorize the economic situation in modern Germany?
And [how would you categorize] your personal economic situation today?

Possible answers were "very good," "good," "so-so," "bad," or "very bad." Economic questions such as these have been used in many studies of voting behavior. As a general proposition, it is believed that voters "punish" leaders or parties that are performing poorly by voting against them and "reward" parties that are performing competently (Fiorina 1978, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). If the economic explanation of anti-foreign sentiment is sound, one would expect that those who are not faring well economically or who perceive that the German state is performing less than optimally would be more inclined to express anti-foreign sentiment (Alford and Legge 1984).

Two other perceptual questions tapped futuristic expectations of the economy. Political scientists have found that in addition to evaluating

the economic situation retrospectively, voters also look forward to what the economy may look like in perhaps six months or a year (Chappell and Keech 1985; Lewis-Beck 1986; Lewis-Beck and Lockerbie 1989; Lockerbie 1991, 1992). Again, the futuristic questions were phrased so that both individual and general evaluations of the economy would be provided.

What do you expect the economic situation to be like in Germany in one year?
And [what do you expect] your personal economic situation [to be] in one year?

Again, it was expected that those who forecast their personal or the general economic situation to be grim would express a higher level of anti-foreign sentiment than those whose forecast was more positive.

In addition to the perceptual variables, two other economic variables were created. These include whether the individual has been unemployed during the last ten years. It is reasoned that if an individual had experienced unemployment, this respondent would feel more threatened by foreigners. A second question measures whether or not the individual fears unemployment or having to alter his or her career in the future. For those who work for others in a salaried position, the question was posed as to how great was the threat of unemployment. In the case of self-employment, the question was asked concerning the extent of fear of having to alter one's career. Individuals who either feared unemployment or having to alter their career patterns due to the economy are hypothesized to be more prone to anti-foreign perceptions compared to those who feel more secure about their employment.[4]

Does the Model Work Empirically?

As I have outlined, explaining anti-foreign sentiment in Germany is not an easy task. Economic discontent is one possible factor, but to investigate the relationship fully one must also examine an individual's experience with foreigners, sociodemographic characteristics, psychological predispositions, and political behavior. Only with all such variables included can a model of attitudes toward foreigners be specified completely.[5]

Contact with Foreigners

Results of the multiple regressions are presented in table 4.12. A persuasive case can be made for the "contact-isolation" hypothesis. With the exception of the lifestyles dependent variable, those who have foreigners in their circle of friends or among their family are much more likely to view minorities positively than those lacking such familiarity. Thus, those who are familiar are more inclined to accept foreigners as marriage partners and neighbors, to favor equal rights for them in Germany, to be less stringent in concern for the standards of naturalization, and to have a generally favorable attitude toward immigrant and refugee groups. The second independent variable measuring contact is being a resident of the former GDR. Earlier it was established that those living in the former GDR had a more negative view of foreigners, but in the univariate analysis it was not possible to separate simple residence from economic perceptions, status, and anxieties. The multiple regression equations by and large demonstrate that those residing in the former GDR are less favorably inclined toward foreigners in general, are less prone to accept them as marriage partners or neighbors, and are more apt to feel that refugees and immigrants must undergo many lifestyle changes to become like Germans. They also favor more stringency in the requirements for naturalization. Although living in the GDR is not as consistent as the measure of contact, its effects are controlled fully for the economic measures. In other words, former East German residents are inclined to view foreigners less favorably *apart from any effects related to perceptions about present economic conditions or future economic prospects.* Thus, the more negative attitude toward foreigners that is expressed consistently by residents of the former GDR may be in large part attributable to their long years of isolation, inexperience with foreigners living in their midst, and lack of democratic institutions and predispositions. Another possibility is that the hostility toward foreigners is not so much a consequence of economics but a breakdown of old structures and support systems in the eastern sector, with the newer foreigners being viewed as "free riders" (Staab 1998: 146–49).

Sociodemographic Background

The impact of the sociodemographic variables is not as consistent as the contact variables, although some exert clear effects across equations. The impact of income is extremely weak. It reaches significance

Table 4.12 Regression of Contact, Sociodemographic, Political, Psychological, and Economic Variables with Measures of Anti-Foreign Sentiment

	Political-Social Rights	General	Marriage into Family	Have as Neighbor	Equal Rights	Naturalization Criteria	How Strong Lifestyles Differ
Contact							
Former GDR Resident	.008	1.53***	−1.270***	−.145***	−.349	−1.39***	.931***
	−.011	.140	−.120	−.152	−.025	−.074	.102
	(.583)	(8.20)	(−6.40)	(−7.84)	(−1.32)	(−3.84)	(4.74)
Contact with Foreigners	.810***	−.176***	1.60***	1.21***	1.44***	−2.39***	−.091
	.105	−.165	.156	.131	.108	−.131	−.011
	(5.53)	(−9.78)	(8.39)	(6.83)	(5.66)	(−6.90)	(−.50)
Sociodemographic							
Gender	.007	.336*	.254	.198	−.006	1.47***	−.035
	.010	.032	.025	.022	−.001	.082	−.004
	(.60)	(2.10)	(1.50)	(1.25)	(−.03)	(4.74)	(−.22)
Age	−.132*	.702***	−.488***	−.039	−.039	1.10***	.205*
	−.040	.153	−.111	−.009	.007	.141	.055
	(−2.09)	(4.13)	(−5.97)	(−.45)	(.36)	(7.42)	(2.56)
Education	.177**	−.646***	.120	.085	.495***	−.446**	−.018
	.053	−.141	.027	.024	.086	−.057	−.005
	(2.77)	(−8.41)	(1.47)	(.26)	(4.54)	(−3.00)	(−.23)
Income	.000001	−.00005	−.00001	−.000009	.000004	.000005	−.0001*
	.004	−.017	−.004	−.003	.001	.006	−.048
	(.23)	(−1.08)	(−.22)	(−.17)	(.06)	(.32)	(−2.43)

Psychological							
Tolerance	−.001	.060**	−.038	−.060**	−.04	.004	.104***
	−.014	.042	−.026	−.048	−.022	.018	.082
	(−.82)	(2.79)	(−1.59)	(−2.80)	(−1.30)	(1.05)	(4.31)
Knowledge	.456*	−.470*	.469*	.115	.420	−1.23**	.122
	.043	−.032	.033	.009	.023	−.049	.011
	(2.48)	(−2.09)	(1.97)	(.52)	(1.31)	(−2.82)	(.538)
Authoritarianism	.006	.245***	.032	.077	.163**	.456***	−.185***
	.031	.087	.012	.032	.046	.095	−.080
	(1.80)	(5.63)	(.69)	(1.80)	(2.66)	(5.44)	(−4.09)
Antisemitism	−.186***	.234***	−.245***	−.204***	−.340***	.214***	.173***
	−.263	.240	−.261	−.242	−.278	.129	.219
	(−14.25)	(14.68)	(−14.44)	(−12.91)	(−15.02)	(6.96)	(10.49)
Political							
Ideology	−.339***	.379***	−.358***	−.275***	−.479***	.632***	.155**
	−.160	.130	−.127	−.109	−.131	.126	.065
	(−8.92)	(8.15)	(−7.23)	(−5.99)	(−7.25)	(7.02)	(3.21)
Republikaner	−.550	2.79***	−.105	−.290	−1.22	2.58*	.552
	−.018	.066	−.003	−.008	−.023	.035	.017
	(−1.02)	(4.35)	(−.15)	(−.46)	(−1.33)	(2.07)	(.87)
PDS	.809*	−.572	.168	.270	.997	−.649	−.040
	.043	−.022	.007	.012	.030	−.014	.002
	(2.43)	(−1.40)	(.38)	(.67)	(1.72)	(−.82)	(−.09)
Economic							
Fear of Losing/changing	−.135	.114	−.384	−.372	−.121	.519	−.079
Job	−.011	.007	−.024	−.026	−.006	.018	.006
	(−.64)	(.44)	−1.40	(−1.46)	(−.33)	(1.04)	(.30)
Unemployed	.399	.242	−.494	−.083	.531	−.502	.252
	.018	.008	−.017	−.003	.014	−.010	.010
	(1.08)	(.54)	(−1.04)	(−.19)	(.84)	(−.58)	(.53)

Table 4.12 Continued

	Political-Social Rights	General	Marriage into Family	Have as Neighbor	Equal Rights	Naturalization Criteria	How Strong Lifestyles Differ
Present-Sociotropic	−.240**	.264*	−.365**	−.279**	−.245	.834***	−.087
	−.050	.040	−.058	−.049	−.030	.074	.016
	(2.79)	(2.51)	(−3.26)	(−2.68)	(−1.64)	(4.09)	(.80)
Present-Personal	−.328***	.432***	−.251*	−.239*	−.463**	.313	.249*
	−.066	.064	−.039	−.041	−.055	.027	.045
	(−3.55)	(3.85)	(−2.10)	(−2.15)	(−2.90)	(1.44)	(2.12)
Future-Sociotropic	−.006	.075	−.220	−.168	−.337*	−.202	.474**
	−.012	.001	−.034	−.029	−.040	−.018	.088
	(−.67)	(.68)	(−1.88)	(−1.54)	(−2.15)	(−.95)	(4.19)
Future-Personal	.007	−.104	.224	.019	.304	.228	−.112
	.012	−.013	.029	.003	.030	.017	−.017
	(.664)	(−.790)	(1.60)	(.149)	(1.625)	(.897)	(−.826)
Constant	12.90	4.55	21.68	22.08	22.66	26.61	12.98
R^2	.193	.365	.222	.164	.181	.190	.111
Adjusted R^2	.187	.361	.217	.159	.176	.185	.104
N	2967	2953	2969	2967	2964	2957	2553

t-scores are in parentheses
*-significant at .05 level
**-significant at .01 level
***-significant at .001 level
The first coefficient is the unstandardized regression coefficient.
The second coefficient is the standardized regression coefficient (beta).

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

only in the case of the lifestyles equation. In that case, the higher the income, the less an individual believes that lifestyles between the minority groups and the Germans differ a great deal. In two out of the nine equations, gender is significant, and as hypothesized, women express more affinity toward foreigners than men. However, the beta coefficient for the general scale is very small. More consistent impacts are evident for age and education. In four of the eight equations for education and five of the eight for age, there are significant impacts on the dependent variables in the hypothesized directions. In general, the more educated a respondent, the more favorable the attitude toward immigrants and refugees. In contrast, the older the respondent, the less positively inclined toward the non-Germans. There appears to be a clear generational effect present, with younger Germans having a much more positive attitude toward minorities in their midst.

Political Variables

The primary political variable that exerts a clear and consistent impact on all measures of anti-foreign sentiment is ideology. With the exception of antisemitism, it is the only independent variable among all those considered that is significant in the direction hypothesized for all equations. Those who are on the Right politically have a less favorable view of foreigners in general, would not like them as marriage partners or neighbors, would be more prone to oppose equal rights for them, believe that there is more of a gap in lifestyles between immigrants and refugees and Germans, and are in favor of more stringent criteria for naturalization. Within each equation, the size of the ideology variable is roughly equivalent in terms of contribution to variance explained (partial r^2) and impact (beta) as the GDR variable but is more consistent.[6] The ideology variable illustrates that if economic factors are important in determining attitude toward foreigners, political factors also must be considered. If, as in the American politics literature, one considers ideology as a symbolic variable, it is obvious that symbolism exerts a strong and consistent effect on one's attitude toward foreigners. Although it is not true that all those scoring on the "Right" side of the index are bigots, there is certainly less enthusiasm for accepting foreigners as equals among this group of respondents. This includes both social acceptance and welcoming minorities into full citizenship. The performance of the extremist parties are weak in comparison. Intention to vote for the Re-

publikaner Party has a significant impact on the general index of attitudes toward foreigners (with Republikaner voters liking foreigners less) and the naturalization variable (with intended Republikaner voters being in favor of more stringent regulations for naturalization); however, it fails to have an impact on all remaining dependent variables. Similarly, intention to vote for the PDS behaves in the expected direction, with those voting for the reformed Communists being more in favor of equal rights. However, the impacts are extremely small and insignificant for all of the other dependent variables.

Knowledge of Foreigners

More consistency is demonstrated by those with knowledge of the immigration issue. Respondents were asked to choose the percentage of the population in western Germany who are foreigners. If the respondent guessed correctly that it was in the 0 to 9 percent range (it is actually approximately 9 percent), he or she was deemed knowledgeable about the immigration-refugee issue. If the person exaggerated the percentage, it is hypothesized that he or she would be less sympathetic to foreigners. Although this is not as consistent or as strong as the variable that measures ideology, those who are more knowledgeable about the question of foreigners tend to be more sympathetic to them in general, favor more political and social privileges, view them more favorably in terms of marriage, and are less stringent in the criteria for naturalization. In contrast, those who exaggerate the percentage of foreigners express more anti-foreign sentiment with regard to these dependent variables.

Psychological Factors

The psychological variables also exert impact on the dependent variables. The effect of the tolerance measure is slight; it impacts only three of the dependent variables: the general scale of sympathy for foreigners, attitude about having foreigners as neighbors, and lifestyle. In each of these cases, the less tolerant have lower sympathy for foreigners than others. Among the reasons that the variable is ineffective in accounting for the other dependent variables are the items in the scale. One item consists of allowing individuals who wish to overthrow the government the right of free expression, and the second item is a question on the right of extremists to publish books in which they express their views. Although these items are clearly measures of *political* tolerance, they say little about social relationships that are more complicated.

The other psychological variables demonstrate greater and more

consistent impact. For example, the measure of authoritarianism is significantly related to all the dependent variables except the desirability of marriage and political and social rights.[7] As hypothesized, those who express agreement with the statement "we should be thankful for authority figures who can tell us what we should do and how we should do it" are less prone to like foreigners in general, wish not to have immigrants and refugees as neighbors, and favor more stringent requirements for naturalization than others. Finally, it is the opinion of the more authoritarian respondents that foreigners have a greater gap in adjusting their lifestyles to those of the native Germans. Thus, although a considerable amount of time has passed since the original studies by Adorno and colleagues (Adorno et al. 1982) on the authoritarian personality, there is evidence with this sample of Germans that authoritarianism is related to a less favorable view of foreigners. Although the data are too complex to suggest an "authoritarian personality," they do indicate that those with higher levels of authoritarianism can have more restrictive views of minority groups than others.

The variable that exerts the greatest power in all of the equations is a psychological one—antisemitism. How one feels about Jews is a very strong indicator of perception of foreigners. The effect is consistent and present in all equations. Those who have antisemitic feelings have strong reservations about foreigners in general, oppose their political and social rights, and would not like to have foreigners as neighbors or to marry within their families. In addition, respondents who score higher on the scale of antisemitism are more opposed to equal rights for foreigners, believe there are strong lifestyle differences between foreigners and native Germans, and are more stringent in their own preferences for naturalization standards. With the exception of naturalization, antisemitism emerges as the strongest standardized regression coefficient within each equation. This finding increases my confidence considerably that it is a traditional racism that determines anti-foreign prejudice more than any other variable, economic or otherwise. The multiple regression analysis suggests that some German citizens tend to group both Jews and "foreigners" collectively and view them negatively.

Economic Impacts

The primary impacts of the economic variables occur with the perceptual indicators. I utilized both unemployment and fear of losing one's present job or having to alter one's career as actual behavioral economic

variables, but, surprisingly, if one accepts the theory of economic motivation in developing negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, these exerted virtually no effect on any of the dependent variables.

Most of the literature in political science on economic perceptions focuses on *retrospective* (past-oriented) or *prospective* (future-oriented) evaluations of the economy. The situation with regard to the present data is a bit different because in addition to a future-oriented item, respondents were asked a question oriented toward the *present.* Also, many studies investigating economic perception involve voting behavior, and the question often contains some reference to government. Although the questions in the ALLBUS study contain no reference to government, it would seem not to pose a problem. The research question involves linking perception of economic misfortune not to government but to the economic competition posed by foreigners. Thus, the main hypothesis with regard to the perceptual variables is that voters will more likely react negatively to foreigners if they are having economic difficulty. What do the coefficients suggest?

Although some research indicates that prospective evaluations are more valuable in explaining vote choice, the ALLBUS data suggest that present orientations are more relevant in explaining attitudes toward foreigners. Two of the future-oriented coefficients are significant and in the correct direction; in contrast, this is true of eleven of the fourteen present-oriented evaluations. Those who perceive their economic fortunes or those of Germany in general as being poor are more likely to express anti-foreign sentiment than those who perceive themselves as faring well. One reason for the greater effects of the present orientation may be that it was extremely difficult to predict what the situation in Germany would be in a year at the time the survey was given. After the initial optimism of 1990, there has been a great deal of volatility since that time, with unemployment high, especially in eastern Germany.

Whether one considers personal economic perceptions or evaluations of the entire German economy, the "present" orientations of the respondent demonstrate a good deal of consistency, and the effects of the personal and collective perceptions exert approximately the same amount of weight within each equation. But compared to the other categories of variables in the model, including living in the eastern sector and sociodemographic, psychological, and political variables, the effects of the economic perceptions are relatively small as judged by the stan-

dardized regression coefficients and the contribution to explained variance in each one of the models (see table 4.12).[8] Although the perceptual variables are consistent, they generally do not compare to the contact variable, the Left-Right scale in the political category, or the antisemitism scale in the psychological category. Indeed, simple contact with foreigners, which is nowhere near as strong as antisemitism within each equation, often exerts more than twice the effect of either personal or collective evaluations of the economy.

Conclusions and Discussion

At this point, after analyzing the 1991 and 1996 surveys, the question might be asked whether economic effects are at all important in assessing anti-foreign sentiment among the German public. The answer is that some economic effects are present but not to the degree commonly assumed. I have considered a large number of possible factors within the multivariate models for both time periods and have found the economic variables to be of small to moderate importance at best. Particularly striking is the fact that those most vulnerable to economic misfortunes (the unemployed and those who fear losing their jobs or altering their careers) are not any more likely than others to express anti-foreign sentiment. Virtually all the significant economic impacts come from variables that stem from the perceptions of individuals rather than their objective status in the economy.

The findings are in agreement with those of two economists, Ira N. Gang and Francisco L. Rivera-Baitz (1994). These scholars utilize a number of economic variables, including unemployment, as well as a variety of sociodemographic variables to determine whether attitudes toward foreigners are linked to economic conditions. First, the authors investigate the presence of foreigners in the labor market and the likelihood of a German resident being unemployed. There is no relationship. More importantly, they find that at least with respect to foreigners in general there is little relationship between labor market status and attitude, although there are increased relationships when particular groups of foreigners (e.g., the Turks) are identified. The weak relationship between labor market status and attitude "could be taken to imply that non-economic variables linked to prejudice and discrimination—toward those particular groups—may lie behind the attitudes" (150). Gang and

Rivera-Baitz do not have measures of prejudicial attitudes such as anti-semitism or measures of ideology. The significance of these variables in the present analysis makes apparent their importance in understanding anti-foreign sentiment in Germany.

The implications of the findings are perhaps obvious. When judging the strife that took place in the early 1990s and in examining the negative feelings toward immigrants and refugees that continue to be manifest today, one has to look beyond economic position or attitude to understand the situation. Anti-foreign attitudes are composed of a great many divergent factors. For example, it is important whether an individual has resided in the former GDR territories and to determine if he or she has had any contact with foreigners. The multivariate analyses from both 1991 and 1996 suggest that strong feelings against foreigners are associated with residence in the former GDR *irrespective of any economic factors.* Much of the anti-foreign sentiment stems from a lack of familiarity with foreigners and their cultures and the long anti-democratic traditions of both Nazism and communism in the GDR. This argument is bolstered by the finding that contact with foreigners either in one's family or close circle of friends dramatically reduces xenophobic feelings, again regardless of an individual's economic fortunes or perceptions. Familiarity with the problem helps as well. Those who are better informed about the actual presence of foreigners in their midst are more able to live with foreigners.

Membership in extremist parties does not inform attitudes with great consistency, especially in the 1996 sample. Part of the reason for the failure of the Republikaner variable is that the party faded rapidly after the early 1990s and was not an electoral force by the middle of the decade. The DVU had been successful in several local elections in 1998, but at the time that the 1996 survey was taken, they were not a competitive party and were not posed as a choice to respondents. In contrast, the Left-Right ideology scale is extremely important in evaluating attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. In both the 1991 and 1996 analyses, basic political orientation is of far greater help than economic situation or perception, suggesting that respondents view refugees and immigrants with a political as opposed to an economic lens. This indicates that respondents may perceive the foreign "problem" as a policy issue that has more to do with their view of the rights and potential of noncitizens in the German state than rational (or irrational)

evaluation of the impact these individuals have on jobs or the present or future economy. This may be due to the fact that in reality the foreign workers are not much of an economic threat to nearly anyone, except for the most marginal of native German workers.

This does not mean, however, that traditional prejudice is absent in the German view of foreigners. Both the 1991 and 1996 analyses suggest that a strong, traditionally based prejudice is present, and this is what should concern both policymakers and students of the new German state.

5

An Economic Theory of Antisemitism?

Exploring Attitudes in the New German State

Introduction

Economic explanations are among the most prominent in accounting for antisemitism. In contemporary Germany, the belief that economic conditions generate such prejudice seems persuasive, although so far I have found little evidence to support this hypothesis with regard to immigrants and refugees. While psychological, political, and contact variables are more important to this point in the analysis, much historical work has suggested that antisemitism is especially likely to arise in times of economic difficulty. During economic scarcity and decline, antisemitism has been more prevalent in both Germany and other Western nations. The large number of refugees and foreign workers in the new German state has not only generated fears of economic competition but has encouraged simultaneously the growth of a chauvinistic nationalism and an increase in extremist group activity (Betz 1990; Westle and Niedermayer 1992; Hagan, Rippl, and Boehkne 1999; Halemann 1997; Chapin 1996, 1997). In the past, German nationalism and xenophobia have been associated with antisemitism.

During the 1990s, in addition to the murders and violent acts perpetrated against East European refugees and members of the Turkish community, Holocaust memorials were destroyed, Jewish cemeteries were desecrated, and threats to Jewish citizens increased markedly.

Antisemitism, like xenophobia, is of interest because such attitudes affect the capacity of the new German state to reinforce democratic norms and govern effectively.

In the present chapter, I first present different economic stereotypes of the Jew that may form the basis of antisemitism. I analyze the 1991 EMNID survey and develop a comprehensive model to explain German antisemitism, again employing a LISREL model. As is the case with the analysis of anti-foreign sentiment, the economic explanation is less than persuasive.

Economic Stereotyping of the Jews

Like most social prejudices, any economic explanation of antisemitism is not entirely straightforward. Although many may blame "the Jew" for their own precarious financial state, there are a number of conflicting and distorted beliefs as to why the Jewish community is perceived as being responsible. Economic antisemitic perceptions can be divided into three categories: the Jew as the moneylender or "middle man" in the economic system, the Jew as the capitalist; and the Jew as the power, particularly the economic power, behind the throne.

The Jew as the Moneylender

The Jew as the moneylender is perhaps the most traditional stereotypical image used in describing the role of the Jewish community in the economy. Because clergy and the Catholic Church hierarchy in the Middle Ages viewed lending money for interest as sinful, Jews often assumed this role by default. Shakespeare illustrated this popular stereotype with the Shylock character in *The Merchant of Venice.*

In perhaps the most extensive attitudinal study of antisemitism and prejudice, Adorno et al. (1982) confirmed the moneylender stereotype empirically, utilizing data gathered in the United States. These scholars contended that at least to working-class respondents, the Jew is often viewed as a "misfit bourgeois" and as "an agent of the economic sphere of the middle man." It is the Jew who "presents the bill." The Adorno research is several decades old, but some evidence exists in the EMNID data that Germans are especially sensitive to the skills of Jews in business. Respondents felt especially positive about Jewish industriousness and discipline, but a clear majority also believed that Jews were "intent

on money" (see table 5.2). These data provide evidence that supports the Adorno results, even though some time has passed.

Although Gordon (1984) tends to dismiss the attitudinal findings of Adorno and others in their search for a "distorted German mind" or "German character" to explain antisemitism, she concludes that the "middleman" role was important in accounting for German antisemitism in the 1930s and before. In addition to the middleman perception, Gordon (16) points to data indicating that German Jews were employed disproportionately in commerce and were less likely to have manual labor positions than the remainder of the population. These conditions, coupled with a more favorable income distribution for Jews compared to other Germans, tended to create an environment that encouraged exaggeration, stereotyping, and assessment of blame when the economy soured. For example, in the middleman role, Jews were accused of war profiteering between 1914 and 1918 (16, 53). The threatening economic position led many Germans to believe that Jews possessed disproportionate political power as well (Arendt 1966). If the power was not believed to be present in Germany, many held that Jewish economic and political power was "international" and thus could not be controlled by either German politicians or citizens.

The Jew as the Capitalist

Werner Sombart (1982), the German sociologist-economist, was influential in developing a theory that the Jewish people were uniquely suited and linked to capitalism. Sombart was discredited in his later years for embracing National Socialism (he died in 1941), and his *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (*Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*) was based on many negative stereotypes of Jews. However, the overall tone of his work is not overtly antisemitic, and one must search for statements outside of his writings that demonstrated his beliefs that the Jews could not be reconciled with or assimilated into the German nation (Mendes-Flohr 1976). According to Sombart, Judaism and capitalism contain the same "spirit." In particular, both rely heavily on rationalism, and in contrast to Christians, Jews appear naturally endowed with a gift for entrepreneurship. Sombart admits that, unfortunately, this talent for commerce occasionally caused problems for Jews. For example, he cites public opposition that forced the repeal of the 1753 Naturalization Act in England, which made it possible for Jews to become citizens. Many

at that time asserted that if left intact, the act would cause many English citizens to lose their livelihoods because it would have the effect of enhancing the Jewish competitive edge even further.

The widespread and often erroneous perception that Jews were disproportionately influential in the development of capitalism led to the assignment of responsibility when these modern economic systems experienced periodic failure. For example, Dawidowicz (1986) states that the expansion of capital in 1870s Germany led to charges that Jews were using their newly acquired rights to exploit German citizens. After the Jewish community was held largely responsible for the harsh depression that began in 1873 and extended for six years, the perception of the Jew as the unscrupulous "international financier" became much more prevalent in German society.

Incidents such as the 1873 depression and accusations of profiteering during World War I led to a broader, uglier economic image of the Jew. This stereotype is captured most accurately by Postone (1986: 306):

> [A] careful examination of the modern anti-semitic world view reveals that it is a form of thought in which the rapid development of industrial capitalism is personified and identified as the Jew. It is not merely that the Jews were considered to be owners of money as in traditional anti-semitism, but that they were held responsible for economic crises and identified with a range of social structuring and dislocation resulting from rapid industrialization. . . . In other words, the abstract domination of capital—particularly with rapid industrialization—caught people up in a web of dynamic forces they could not understand, became perceived as the domination of international Jewry.

Before and during the Nazi regime, Hitler blamed the economic failures of the Weimar Republic on the Jewish community. He also accused the Jews of disloyalty and war profiteering during World War I. Paradoxically, it was Jewish capitalism and Jewish Bolshevism that were touted simultaneously by the Nazi Party as the twin evils causing Germany's loss of the war and its decline thereafter.

The Jew as the Economic Power behind the Throne

A final antisemitic economic stereotype concerns the exaggeration of the role Jews played in the financing of the developing state and their subsequent position in the modern, particularly European, polity. Hannah Arendt believed that Jews were influential in the ascendance

of absolute monarchies and in the development of the contemporary nation-state (Feldman 1978: 24). When old class structures declined, Jews financed the beginnings of the nation-state and linked their own futures to its development and success. Arendt (1966: 25) makes the point that to the broader citizenry in Europe, the Jews became identified as "the state" and were an easy group to oppose. Although not holding formal positions of power, they supposedly controlled the purse strings. Again, limited historical fact led to wild exaggeration of Jewish power. Sombart (1982: 49) commented that "when speaking of these modern statesmen and rulers, we can hardly do so without perforce thinking of Jews: it would be like Faust without Mephistopheles. Arm in arm, the Jew and the ruler stride through the stage historians call modern." Feldman contends that because Jews were widely perceived as interested primarily in making money through this partnership, any appreciation for being a "statebuilder" was widely discredited. The Jews were perceived as being out for themselves, and loyalty was viewed as not toward any specific government as citizens but with governments as authorities and aids in the quest for economic fortune. Thus, the Jew was perceived as "foreign," "international," and largely "rootless" (Feldman 1978: 25).

Based upon the economic stereotypes, I expect that those who are of the most marginal economic status, including the unskilled worker, and those dissatisfied with their income, employment, or economic situation in general would be more likely to seek "scapegoats" than other members of the majority group who perceive themselves as being more fortunate. If the economic thesis of antisemitism makes sense in the German context, it is the most marginal citizens who should express antisemitism.

The LISREL Model

The Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) model is presented in figure 5.1. The model is described beginning with the endogenous variables.[1] Again, the endogenous variables are of primary interest as they are the measures to be explained.

Endogenous Variables

ANTISEMITISM–HOLOCAUST INTERPRETATION The primary variables I wish to explain are the measures of antisemitism. Antisemitism is a complex concept that is difficult to measure, especially because

such a large array of indicators has been proposed (Adorno et al. 1982; Okami 1992). Further, some seem applicable primarily to the American context. The German situation is unique because the most virulent form of antisemitism—the annihilation of the Jews—took place over fifty years ago. For this reason, two latent variables measuring antisemitism are proposed. The first attempts to capture antisemitism based on historical reinterpretation in that it measures the individual's perception of the Holocaust, especially as it relates to Jews. In the literature on genocide, a theme of denial exists (Smith, 1989; Lipstadt 1993). In particular, governments or individuals who were responsible for extermination attempt to reinterpret history, either to deny guilt or place responsibility upon the victims. Accordingly, a "Holocaust interpretation" latent variable estimates one form of antisemitism. In constructing this measure, I reasoned that those who have more positive evaluations of the Third Reich and who feel less guilt and shame for the crimes committed against Jews are more antisemitic than those with a more accurate historical interpretation.

A second latent variable attempts to measure what might be termed "classical" antisemitism. These indicators typify stereotypes about Jews that have been held through the ages (Langmuir 1990). To compose the measure of classical antisemitism, I chose three indicators. To begin, respondents were asked to rate Jews on two indices as to their trustworthiness and desire for money; thirdly, respondents assessed Jewish blame for the death of Christ.

The distribution and coding of the indicators comprising the antisemitism constructs are presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2. Taking the antisemitism–Holocaust interpretation variable first, it is clear that the German public retains some very mixed feelings about the Holocaust and the war. The first item attempts to ascertain the effect of Nazism "in total." The indicator is an improvement over the surveys taken immediately after the war when 47 percent of the German population thought that Nazism was "basically a good idea gone wrong" (Merritt and Merritt 1970). In the EMNID study, approximately 56 percent of the respondents felt that Nazism as a whole had "only bad sides," or "bad sides mostly." While only 2.3 percent believed that Nazism had mostly good sides, almost 42 percent believed that Nazism had "good and bad sides." There are, unfortunately, no direct follow-up questions as to what these "good" sides are, but the 42 percent is larger than one might expect, given the success of contemporary German democracy.

Table 5.1 Distribution of the Indicators of the Antisemitism–Holocaust Interpretation Variable

	N	Percentage
If today you look back on the Third Reich what would you say—If you look at Nazism in total do you see only bad sides, mostly bad sides, good and bad sides, or mostly good sides?		
1 = Only bad sides	463	16.4%
2 = Bad sides mostly	1120	39.7%
3 = Good and bad sides	1171	41.6%
4 = Good sides mostly	64	2.3%
	2818	100.0%
There are various opinions about the guilt of the Germans under the Third Reich for the Jewish experience. Of these choices, please tell which is closest to your personal views?		
1 = Guilt falls on all Germans, even those born after the war.	117	4.1%
2 = Guilt is borne by every group of that generation.	525	18.6%
3 = Guilt falls only on those Germans who knew about the crimes against the Jews.	917	32.5%
4 = Guilt falls only on those Germans who participated in transgressions against the Jews.	1263	44.8%
	2822	100.0%
I am ashamed that the Germans committed so many crimes against the Jews. (Low codes indicate agreement)		
1	1187	41.7%
2	547	21.0%
3	440	15.4%
4	258	9.1%
5	188	6.6%
6	79	6.3%
	2849	100.1%

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

The second component of the antisemitism–Holocaust interpretation variable is related to the concept of collective guilt. The number of Germans who state that guilt falls on those born after the war is extremely small, possibly because the choice is understandable only if the guilt concept is extended to some form of general responsibility for the Jews. Those born after the war could not possibly have participated in the crimes of the Holocaust. The largest number indicate that the majority of guilt falls only on those who were responsible for the transgressions against the Jews, but a substantial number suggest that those who knew about the crimes against the Jews, even though they may not have participated, also share a burden.

The final indicator under the Holocaust interpretation variable measures the concept of shame. A clear plurality of Germans (41.7 percent) selected the highest category of shame, and a majority (approximately 78 percent) selected one of the first three categories. This demonstrates that the majority of the German population feel a sense of shame for the crimes committed against the Jews.

"CLASSICAL" ANTISEMITISM Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the four indicators comprising the "classical" antisemitism variable. The first measures the extent to which the respondents believe that Jews are responsible for the death of Christ. This is one of the most enduring issues of antisemitism and perhaps is the paramount factor that divided Jews and gentiles until recent times. It was only through the leadership of Pope John XXIII at Vatican II during the early 1960s that Jews were largely absolved of the deicide charge. Very few Germans (3.4 percent) believe that "all Jews in general" are responsible for the death of Jesus. Rather, many believe that it is "wrong" to speak in this way (22.1 percent) or that guilt lies with those "who convicted him at that time (18.7 percent). But the plurality (42.5 percent) indicate that they simply have not thought enough about the issue to give an answer. Of all questions in the survey, the item regarding Jewish responsibility for the death of Christ evoked the greatest ambiguity as demonstrated by the reluctance to take a position.

The second indicator of "classical" antisemitism concerns Jewish influence. The sample is clearly split on this concept, with the respondents nearly equally divided into the "not true," "undecided," and "true" categories. Perhaps the responses depend partially upon what types of influence the respondent perceives that the Jews exert. The wording of the question makes this somewhat unclear.

Figure 5.1 A LISREL Model of Antisemitism in Germany



*These are the only exogenous variables which are estimated through economic satisfaction.

The final indicators of "classical" antisemitism consist of two scales with which respondents were asked to describe the Jews in terms of their trustworthiness and how much they are "intent on money." These indicators tap the stereotype of the Jew being crafty, skilled in business, and obsessed with money. The trustworthiness scale demonstrates a normal distribution with regard to German attitudes toward the Jews. That is, the Jews are just as likely to be considered trustworthy as untrustworthy. It is a bit difficult to judge how Germans would view other groups compared to the Jews simply because no questions were asked concerning these perceptions in the 1991 EMNID data. But on the question regarding Jews being "intent on money," it is clear that the responses are skewed in the direction of perceiving that the Jews are, in fact, overly concerned. Forty-seven percent of the sample chose category 7, indicating the highest category, and 83 percent chose the highest three categories. In contrast, only 3.6 percent chose the three lowest categories, which indicates the respondents believe that the Jews are not so intent. Thus, the vast majority of Germans clearly cling to the age-old stereotype of the relationship between Jews and the economy.

ECONOMIC SATISFACTION Economic satisfaction is a second latent variable that I attempted to explain. I hoped, ultimately, to utilize this variable to assist in the explanation of the antisemitism variables, but economic satisfaction also depended on some exogenous variables. The economic satisfaction variable consisted of indicators with which the respondents were asked to evaluate their individual employment, income, and economic situation. It is identical to the economic satisfaction variable utilized in chapter 2 to explain anti-foreign prejudice. If the economic explanation of antisemitism is persuasive, the satisfaction variable should have strong direct and indirect effects on the latent constructs of antisemitism. Those most threatened in their current economic position in German society should be the most antisemitic; simultaneously, there should be a strong indirect effect through the final endogenous variable, anti-foreign sentiment.

If one accepts the validity of an economic explanation, it would seem logical that those who are dissatisfied economically should feel a threat from immigrant and refugee groups in Germany. To the most economically marginal of the Germans, particularly those in the eastern region, the refugees could be perceived as a threat to economic well-being.

Table 5.2 Distribution of the Indicators of the "Classical" Antisemitism Variable

In the Bible, the Jews are guilty of the death of Jesus. What is your opinion?		
1 = It is wrong to speak about Jewish guilt in the death of Jesus.	623	22.1%
2 = Guilt lies with the Jews who convicted him at that time.	526	18.7%
3 = I don't know, I haven't thought about it.	1199	42.5%
4 = Guilt lies with the Jews who lived at the time.	372	13.2%
5 = All Jews in general are guilty for the death of Jesus.	98	3.4%
	2818	99.9%
Jews have too much influence in the world.		
1 = Not true	974	34.2%
2 = Undecided	921	32.3%
3 = True	953	33.5%
	2848	100%
In the following, we are concerned with the qualities which characterize the Jews. How would you describe the Jews?		
Intent on money . . . not intent on money (High codes indicate intent on money)		
1	15	.6%
2	19	.7%
3	63	2.3%
4	362	13.3%
5	326	12.0%
6	652	24.0%
7	1276	47.0%
	2713	99.9%
Trustworthy . . . untrustworthy (High codes indicate untrustworthiness)		
1	111	4.1%
2	247	9.2%
3	514	19.1%
4	927	34.5%
5	407	15.2%
6	315	11.7%
7	165	6.1%
		99.9%

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

Exogenous Variables

OTHER ECONOMIC VARIABLES Two exogenous variables were utilized to detect the impact that economic conditions have on antisemitism. The first variable relates to employment status. It was anticipated that those who are classified as "unskilled workers" would be more threatened by foreigners and more vulnerable to antisemitism because of economic insecurity. A second exogenous variable related to economic conditions is region. With an economy that is inferior to the western half of the nation and with years of isolation from democratic principles, eastern Germans, I believed, would be most likely to express antisemitic attitudes.

CONTROL VARIABLES The remaining variables in the model functioned as controls. In the past they have been important in explaining antisemitism. Because much literature has demonstrated that education plays a large role in reducing antisemitism (Gibson and Duch, 1992; Sivanandan and Marable 1993), I hypothesized that those with a higher degree of education would be less likely to be anti-foreign and consequently would have less negative perceptions of Jews. In addition, the education variable could have a direct relationship to antisemitism that is not mediated by anti-foreign sentiment.

I hypothesized that older Germans would be more likely to manifest antisemitism, especially with regard to the Holocaust latent variable (Weil 1980). In line with the literature on denial, those who lived through the most intense era of Jewish persecution are most likely to reinterpret it. In considering gender, I hypothesized that on average German men more than women would express antisemitic attitudes. This relationship was expected because historically antisemitism has been associated with an anti-feminism (Pulzer 1988). Also, it is probable that women are less militaristic and nationalistic than men, possibly leading to less intense xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes.

A great deal of literature links antisemitism with religiosity: the more religiously involved a person, the more likely the expression of antisemitism (Tuthill 1990). There are numerous reasons to expect this relationship. For example, Terman (1984) states that the Jewish faith stands as a direct challenge to the principles of Christianity and that the Jew represents the role of "questioner, free-thinker, and dissenter." Religious conflict, especially the reluctance of Jews to accept Christ as the

Messiah or the son of God, has been a cause of much bloodshed throughout history. A second reason for religious antisemitism is that historically the Jew has been held responsible by many for the death of Christ, a variable that is one of several composing the measure of "classical" antisemitism (Tractenberg 1989). To test this hypothesis, I utilized a variable that measured the degree of church attendance: the greater the church attendance, the more likely the individual would be to express antisemitism.

A final exogenous variable is ideology that has been associated with antisemitism in other Western nations, such as France, where a "right" ideology has been linked to a scale of "ethnocentrism" including an item that "Jews have too much power in France" (Michelat 1993). In addition to the latent variable of anti-foreign sentiment, ideology helps determine the extent to which nationalism may be responsible for antisemitism as opposed to economic factors. Although some literature has cited the antisemitism of the Left (Keilson 1988), I hypothesized that given the German experience, those on the Right would be more prone to express such attitudes.

Does the Model Work Empirically?

Control Variables

Results of the LISREL analysis are presented in figure 5.1.[2] To begin, the model performs as expected with regard to a number of the control variables thought linked to antisemitism. Education exerts a direct effect on anti-foreign sentiment and less consistent impacts on the measures of antisemitism. The direct effect on anti-foreign sentiment is substantial, indicating that education tends to discourage xenophobic attitudes. The indirect effect of education on antisemitism through anti-foreign sentiment also illustrates the substantial negating effect of education on antisemitism, whether one considers Holocaust interpretation or classical antisemitism. Those who are more educated tend to be less anti-foreign, and in turn, German citizens who are less xenophobic tend to be less antisemitic. As expected, education tends to discourage reinterpretation of the Holocaust, although, surprisingly, there is no direct link to classical antisemitism.

A second control variable that demonstrates an important impact is age. Although there is no relationship between this variable and

antisemitism related to the Holocaust, the older German citizens, as expected, demonstrate a greater level of classical antisemitism than others. This finding is in contrast to previous work regarding age and anti-foreign attitudes. In describing the anti-foreign violence that has occurred, especially in eastern Germany, the media have often stated that disgruntled youth are responsible. But this analysis finds just the reverse, at least with regard to antisemitism. I attempted to interact age with unemployment and location and, similarly, could find no relationship to either anti-foreign attitudes or antisemitism. Despite experimentation with different specifications, no significant linkages were found between the religious or gender variables and xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes.[3] The finding with regard to gender also is interesting for much of the anti-foreign violence has been blamed on male youth. The 1991 data suggest that there are no differences between the genders in their attitudes regarding the Jews or foreigners.

Economic Variables

With regard to the economic explanation of antisemitism, the results suggest that the linkage is weak. Unskilled workers and those who reside in the former GDR express less economic satisfaction than others. But at this point the economic explanation collapses. First, there are no significant paths extending directly from the economic satisfaction latent variable to either measure of antisemitism. I experimented by making this construct exogenous and also substituted unemployment as a measure of economic satisfaction but was unsuccessful in establishing a causal linkage.[4] The economic situation in Germany in the 1990s that was and continues to be widely acclaimed as a "cause" of antisemitism and xenophobia is evidently in serious doubt if we are to believe the attitudes of the mass public.

The limited evidence that was found regarding the impact of the economic variables was small and contradictory. Small indirect relationships exist between economic satisfaction and both antisemitism constructs through anti-foreign sentiment. But these relationships are dwarfed by the strong direct effects of anti-foreign sentiment. Those residing in eastern Germany are more likely to be antisemitic in a classical sense but less so when one considers antisemitism with regard to Holocaust interpretation. It is unlikely that these findings are due to economic factors as neither works through the economic satisfaction

latent variable. The relationship appears to be the opposite when one considers unskilled workers who are less antisemitic classically but more so in terms of Holocaust interpretation.

Symbolic and Traditional Prejudice

A more persuasive explanation of the antisemitism existing in Germany may reside in variables linked more closely to nationalism. Some are symbolic, as is the case of ideology, while others are evidence of a more traditional bigotry. In particular, ideology impacts the classical antisemitism construct positively and directly. Those on the Right are likely to express the highest degree of antisemitism. In addition, the ideology variable is related in the hypothesized direction to anti-foreign sentiment. In turn, moderate indirect effects also are evident in the relationship of ideology to both measures of antisemitism. These findings, coupled with the large direct and indirect effects of anti-foreign sentiment on both measures of antisemitism, suggest that the antisemitism existing in contemporary Germany is a by-product of xenophobia. Although substantial antisemitism continues to exist, perhaps the less visible Jews have been replaced by Turks and Eastern Europeans as the primary targets of prejudice and hatred. As in chapter 4, those who harbor resentment against Jews have the same sentiments toward other non-German minorities.

A final relationship that appears important is the moderate one between the classical antisemitism and the Holocaust interpretation variables. It has been demonstrated in this analysis that the impact of the explanatory variables is by no means uniform on the two antisemitism constructs, perhaps strengthening the argument that they are separate concepts. Nevertheless, those who express more classical negative attitudes toward the Jews are more likely to reinterpret the Holocaust.[5]

Conclusions

Given the current economic difficulties with German reunification, the history of antisemitic stereotypes, and the influx of refugees during the early 1990s, some have expected that economic factors are an important link in helping to understand antisemitism in Germany. In this analysis, economic satisfaction is sensitive to some exogenous variables thought to predict it, but the model fails beyond this point. This conclu-

sion addresses the weakness of the economic explanation; moreover, I argue why a racial or "German chauvinism" explanation of antisemitism is more convincing.

Regarding antisemitism, one possible reason why the economic explanation fails is that hatred of Jews has always existed, whether they are primary agents in the economy or not (Prager and Telushkin 1983). For example, aside from Germany, the most extreme manifestations of antisemitism have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, nations where Jews traditionally have been restricted in their occupations and pose the least economic threat to the rest of the population. Yet, pogroms in this part of Europe have been the most severe, and the Nazis had little difficulty in getting cooperation from the local population in deportations or killings. In contrast, where Jews have more affluence, such as in the United States, antisemitism and violent attacks against them are much less frequent (75). A disturbing implication of the present analysis with regard to Germany is that if economic conditions improve to the levels of prosperity prior to unification, it does not necessarily follow that it will trigger a reduction in antisemitism. This argument already has some limited empirical support. In the western portion of Germany, unemployment dropped during 2000, but several notorious incidents of antisemitism occurred that summer, including the bombing of a Düsseldorf transit station, which injured six Russian Jews and three other non-Germans, and the desecration of cemeteries in Rockenhausen and Dielkirchen. In addition, during fall 2000 and coinciding with the time commemorating unification, two synagogues were attacked. Gasoline bombs were thrown at a synagogue in Düsseldorf, and windows were smashed at the Kreuzberg synagogue in Berlin. These events, coupled with the bombing of an Erfurt synagogue earlier that spring, raised fears in the Jewish community and prompted government officials to consider more forceful action against radicals, including a ban on the NPD. The overall attitude of the public was manifested by strong condemnations of these events as manifested by demonstrations in support of the Jewish community.

A strong theme emerging from the analysis is that the negative attitudes toward foreigners that have swept across Germany in recent years are closely related to antisemitism in the mass public. More than any of the other sociodemographic variables, anti-foreign sentiment has the strongest direct effect on both measures of antisemitism and has a sub-

stantial indirect effect on the Holocaust interpretation construct. Although an economic rationale to the prejudice is absent, it is obvious that those most threatened by foreigners are among the most antisemitic. Rather than economic, the threat that right-wing ideology and anti-foreign sentiment may reveal is that the foreign population constitutes a barrier to those who advocate a strong German nationalism. Thus, it may not be fear of unemployment or low income that bothers many Germans as much as concern for the solidarity and composition of the new German state. The "nationalism" explanation of German antisemitism also is reinforced by ideology that has both direct and indirect effects on classical antisemitism. The perception of the Jew as a threat to nationalism is that he or she represents the outsider with little allegiance to the modern German state. In defining *völkisch* (national) ideology, Gordon (1984: 25; emphasis added) states that Jews have been viewed traditionally as "rootless, soulless, materialist, aggressive, ugly, weak, dishonest, unassimable, shallow, loud, urban, internationalist, liberal, conspiratorial, evil, godless, competitive, abstract, insincere, cosmopolitan, sneaky, shrewd, lazy, usurious, opportunistic *and most important, alien.*"

The strong impact of anti-foreign sentiment pushes one toward the conclusion that contemporary antisemitism is largely a consequence of hostility toward foreign cultures and immigrants and that Jews have been replaced partially by others as direct targets of prejudice. Strongly influencing this new and less direct antisemitism is the fact that so few contemporary Germans have regular contact, socially or commercially, with Jews. Even though the Jewish community is increasing rapidly in terms of population, it is still very small. As Silbermann and Sallern (1976) argue, this lack of contact permits the transmission of a "handed down Jewish stereotype" that is maintained in a latent fashion. Thus, in modern Germany "the Jew" may be a symbol—a stimulus that triggers positive or negative feelings based on socialization rather than direct experience (Lasswell 1960).

6

Antisemitism in Germany at the Millennium

Introduction

As a decade, the 1990s were interesting times for Germany and the "Jewish question." The Holocaust and German responsibility for the destruction of the Jews were discussed extensively and publicly for the first time since the close of the war. Before examining the data for this chapter, I review some of the key issues of German and Jewish relations during the latter part of the 1990s and the early 2000s. These include the debate on the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, the response of the German public to the publication of Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1997), the growth and change in character of the German Jewish community, and the documentation of antisemitic incidents. These topics are important because collectively they deal with the ability of a united Germany to cope with the Holocaust and to maintain its democratic progress. Following this discussion, I examine several multivariate models that seek to explain general antisemitism, the extent to which an individual would like a Jew to marry into his or her family, the question of having a Jew as a neighbor, the question of equal rights for Jews, and how strongly Jews differ in lifestyle from Germans. I analyze the extent to which economic factors may explain this prejudice compared with other variables. Again, the economic competition hypothesis is found wanting.

By the end of the 1990s, the violent attacks on foreigners as well as frequent desecration of Jewish memorials so characteristic of the early part of the decade had abated.[1] Some of the reduction can perhaps be

attributed to the 1993 amendments to the Basic Law, which slowed the flow of refugees. But those well-publicized and repeated incidents in the summer of 2000, mentioned in the previous chapter, demonstrated that right-wing violence against Jews and foreigners was far from over. In fact, during the entire year 2000, Internal Affairs Minister Otto Schily documented that violent attacks on non-Germans increased by nearly 40 percent over 1999. Half of the violence occurred in eastern Germany. In addition to the assaults on the Jewish community, there were several highly visible attacks on foreigners, including the murder Alberto Andriano by the three skinheads in Halle in Saxony-Anhalt. During this time, German officials attempted to rally the larger citizenry against extremism. In particular, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called for the "silent majority" of Germans to demonstrate *Zivilcourage.* The vast majority of German citizens oppose violence and hatred and have little tolerance or elective support for extremist parties. The only recent exceptions have been *Landtag* elections in the eastern sector during the 1990s. In contrast, in the 1998 national election, the extremist vote was minimal, and power was smoothly transferred from Chancellor Kohl and the CDU/CSU to a coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens. Thus, German democracy continues to thrive, but the topics of antisemitism and the Holocaust continue to be lively and controversial as the 2002 election approaches.

The transfer of the German capital from Bonn to Berlin in the summer of 1999 stimulated discussion on the part of many citizens about the past and what they wanted for the future of their nation. In particular, how to reconcile past memories of the Nazi regime with the future of the Berlin Republic concerned many. Although the establishment of Berlin as the capital evoked memories of Germany's past achievements as well as the triumph of unification, it also brought a cautionary note on the part of some regarding past and present German chauvinism and the excesses of the Nazi state.

The first official state visit following transfer of the capitol was made, ironically, by the then new Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, on September 21–22, 1999. The prime minister stated that his visit was evidence of closer ties between "the new democratic Germany and the state of Israel that emerged from the ashes of the Holocaust" (Cohen 1999). But although ties are closer, the symbolism of Barak's visit was significant. Rejecting an opportunity to meet with German business

leaders during his two-day visit, the prime minister instead chose to visit the former concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, which is located outside Berlin. Barak was accompanied to the camp by a number of survivors. He termed his visit to the camp a "moral necessity" and urged the German government to move quickly to settle the claims of slave laborers who worked for German corporations during the war without compensation. Chancellor Schröder, who was often criticized during the 1998 national election campaign for insensitivity to Holocaust issues and caution on the construction of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin, stated that although the generation of perpetrators no longer was in power, every generation has "a duty to remember" (Cohen 1999).

The Berlin Holocaust Memorial

With the unification of the German nation, an important issue is memory. In particular, a debate emerged in the new state as to the most appropriate way to commemorate the sufferings of the victims of the Holocaust, especially the Jews. The fact that it took nearly ten years to reach final consensus to build a memorial in the heart of Berlin tells of the division and strife the Holocaust continues to wreak upon the German people.

The idea for a Holocaust memorial was conceived in 1989, the year before unification. The concept originated and received a significant boost from talk show host Lea Rosh, who helped found *Förderkreis zur Einrichtung eines Denkmals für die ermordeten Juden Europas.*[2] In answer to her critics, who argued that a memorial was not necessary and was only being discussed to appease the Jewish community, Rosh contended, as have many others since, that the memorial was more for Germans than for Jews. Only by acknowledging responsibility for the past would the Germans be able to reunite and move forward as a nation.

It took five years from the initial conception of the memorial for the selection committee to hold a competition from which a suitable model was selected. In 1994, there were 528 submissions, and in 1995, two artists were selected: Christine Jackob-Marks and Simon Ungers. In June 1995 Jackob-Marks was named the grand prize winner after the designs were exhibited. Her design consisted of eighteen boulders imported from Masada, superimposed on a 108,000 square foot concrete

tombstone. Each boulder was to represent a death or concentration camp. The names of 4.2 million death victims would be engraved on the stones. But, ultimately, controversy about the project led to its abandonment. One criticism of the memorial was that it was too large. It was designed to be 330 feet long and 330 feet wide, and its sheer size was one reason that Chancellor Kohl lost his enthusiasm for the project. Some argued that more would be accomplished by a simpler memorial or perhaps a museum and center for scholarship such as the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. Another problem with the Jackob-Marks design is that despite its size, the memorial was not large enough to include the first and last names of all victims. At one point it was suggested by the project selection committee that just first names be included, but this decision was ultimately dismissed because it would fail to personalize the tragedy and would not give a proper identity to the victims. To raise money for engraving, Rosh suggested that at least some of the artwork be sponsored by donations, with the government paying for the first hundred thousand names. This suggestion was met with the wrath of Ignatz Bubis, then head of the Jewish community in Germany, and many others who felt that such contributions would commercialize the Holocaust and desecrate the memory of the victims. This criticism continued until a second competition was held in 1997. A final decision was reached in 1999, although the winning design of Peter Eisenman rivals the Jackob-Marks project in size.

The Eisenman design was embraced by Chancellor Kohl and was ultimately selected by the committee in June 1999. The monument will be constructed with 2,700 concrete pillars of different size and will resemble a field of tombstones. It is to be located at the center of Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate, a central East-West crossing point. It stands near where the Berlin Wall divided the two sectors of the city until 1989.

The Holocaust memorial became an issue during the 1998 national election, with Chancellor Kohl wanting a monument erected as quickly as possible (even though he had earlier opposed the Jackob-Marks design) and challenger Gerhard Schröder expressing a preference for a small-scale memorial or a study center. At numerous points in the campaign, Schröder suggested that although the crimes of the Holocaust should not be forgotten, it was time for Germany to "move on." The idea of "moving on" fit well with Schröder's more general theme that

Kohl had been in office for too long a period and that his policies had outlived their usefulness.

In addition to size, other objections to the memorial centered on its scope and a more secondary problem of the difficulty maintaining Holocaust sites that already existed in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. It was a decision of the committee that mandated the site be titled "The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe." This title raised the issue of the absence of a memorial or an inscription to the other victims of Nazism, including Communists, socialists, gays, Roma, Sinti, and members of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Some in the Jewish community, such as Rabbi Andreas Nachama, president of the Berlin Jewish community from 1997 until May 2001, hope that the memorial will help to represent the other victims as well as the Jews, but others feel that separate sites are needed for the other groups. The Christian Democratic mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen, who has generally opposed any memorial being placed in Berlin for the Jews, wants sites for other victims to be outside of Berlin. Some suggestion has been made, for example, that a memorial for murdered Roma and Sinti more properly belongs in Stuttgart, the major site of their imprisonment prior to deportation.

Many Holocaust sites in Berlin and elsewhere suffer from a lack of maintenance or development. One example of inferior maintenance is the camp at Sachsenhausen, which deteriorated under the Communist government prior to reunification. In more recent years, there has been difficulty in securing adequate funding to make it a viable historical site. Perhaps there is great potential in Sachsenhausen as a future memorial to other victims, for most of the inmates at the location were not Jews but were political dissidents such as Communists, Social Democrats, and labor leaders. In addition, it is located only a short distance from Berlin. Another important site that has not received attention is Wannsee, the Berlin suburb where Reinhard Heydrich, Adolf Eichmann, and other Nazi leaders planned the details of the Final Solution in January 1942. It was argued by some that if the government is unable to commit sufficient funds to restore Sachsenhausen and develop Wannsee, it is questionable that a large amount of money (the cost of the Eisenman memorial is $8 million) should be devoted to a site in Berlin, exclusively for Jewish victims.

The length of time taken to agree on a memorial prompted many to accuse Germany of insensitivity and reluctance to commemorate the

Holocaust. But it should be remembered that other memorials, such as the U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington, also took a long time in both planning and implementation. Similar issues were debated, including cost, size, contents of the museum, and the inclusion of victims other than Jews. The creation of the museum involved a complex political process, and many Jewish critics, such as first chairman Elie Wiesel, questioned the integrity and intentions of the different presidential administrations regarding the museum. In the end, a highly regarded museum was produced, along with a Center for the Study of the Holocaust. But this process was long and complicated. The museum was originally a product of the Carter administration but was not completed until 1993, when the Clinton administration was in power. Although the political issues were not identical to the German case, a long process was necessary to identify and solve complex issues (Linenthal 1995).

The Holocaust: The Larger Question

The Holocaust Memorial in Berlin is perhaps symptomatic of a more general question facing the German nation at the millennium: What is the proper balance between the acceptance of responsibility for the past and the need to move forward? The issue was most starkly faced by two events that occurred in the late 1990s. The first was the publication of a doctoral thesis by Harvard graduate student Daniel Jonah Goldhagen entitled *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1997). The second event was the debate occasioned by the comments of writer Martin Walser, a winner of Germany's most prestigious literary prize.

Hitler's Willing Executioners

During the late 1970s, it was the extensive television movie *Holocaust*, starring Meryl Streep, Michael Moriarty, and many others in an excellent cast, that stimulated extensive discussion of the war and the Jewish extermination in Germany. Prior to this film, the Holocaust had never been treated with such explicitness and in so convincing a fashion. Although the film was released more than thirty years after the end of the war, a great many Germans who were active participants in the conflict and who were responsible for the crimes against the Jews confronted their participation. Discussion and media coverage about *Holocaust* was extensive. In the same fashion, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*

(*Hitlers willige Vollstrecker*) was the *Holocaust* of the 1990s to a Germany increasingly removed from the war. Goldhagen's work was translated into German in 1997, but extensive discussion in the German media began in 1996, shortly after the book's publication in English (see Eley 1997).

The Goldhagen work is notable for several reasons. First, the book focuses primarily on police battalions, which were a part of the mobile killing units in eastern Poland, rather than on killers in the death camps. The author argues persuasively that past studies of perpetrator motivation have been skewed because of a nearly exclusive focus on the death camps. Much previously ignored evidence is available on police battalions and other mobile units. Goldhagen describes the characteristics of the men in the police battalions and attempts to generalize their behavior to the larger population of Germans. For instance, Goldhagen found that the police battalions were composed of men who were much older than the typical conscript (1997: 206). In Police Battalion 101, the average age of the men was 36.5 years. This fact seemed to eliminate the possibility that young conscripts, who would be easy to train ideologically and simple to manipulate, carried out the killings. In contrast, most of these men tended to be reservists and were not much more likely than the "typical" German in the population at large to be Nazi Party members; only a very small percentage of the total battalion (3.8 percent) were members of the SS. Their occupational profile was similar to that of the rest of German society. Their political views could not be ascertained, although many members of Police Battalion 101 came from Hamburg, a city with a history of more tolerance than many other major German cities and with a great deal of traditional electoral support for the Social Democrats. Finally, as the battalion was involved frequently in the murder of children, it is noteworthy that 99 percent of the battalion were married at the time of the killings and, shockingly, nearly three-quarters were fathers. Moreover, Goldhagen provides examples of situations where a few police battalion members opted out of the killing and were not punished for refusing to murder (chapter 8). The same is true of behavior on death marches toward the end of the war. Even though head of the SS Heinrich Himmler gave orders that Jews not be killed, nevertheless the murder of prisoners occurred with great enthusiasm.

Goldhagen's argument is that since police battalions such as 101 were composed of "typical" Germans, there was little moral difficulty

in the killing because of a past history and deep socialization of an "eliminationist antisemitism." Even before the emergence of Germany as a nation-state in 1871, there was a long history of intolerance toward the Jews. This included a deep suspicion of the desirability of their citizenship, coupled with a belief that the Jews were subverting Germany and acting in their own interests to achieve economic gain and disrupt the establishment and growth of the nation-state. According to Goldhagen, the desire to eliminate the Jew from German society, which developed very early in the nation's history, is the main factor explaining the motivations of the killers and, indeed, the behavior of German society in general during the time of the Third Reich.

The major criticism of Goldhagen is that he has a tendency to generalize from the personnel in the battalion to the entire German people. He stated, "The makeup of political battalions—as their method of recruitment suggests and as the demographic sample here confirms—means that the conclusions drawn about the overall character of the members' actions can, indeed must be generalized to *the German people in general.* What these *ordinary* Germans did also could have been expected of other *ordinary* Germans" (Goldhagen 1997: 402; emphasis in original). Here one faces a basic problem of inference, however. Goldhagen has no real knowledge of how these units were selected or the psychological makeup of the unit's members. One could take the actions of Lieutenant William Calley's platoon in Vietnam, which was responsible for a massacre of Vietnamese civilians during the Tet Offensive in 1968, and argue that the platoon's composition was similar to Americans in general. (For the most part, the unit consisted of conscripts.) Like Goldhagen, a similar conclusion could be reached that Americans in general would behave like Calley and his men in a similar situation. In an empirical sense, one in fact has no way of knowing. One must accept that considerable numbers of Germans had to cooperate with state policy to exterminate 6 million Jews and many others. A vast network existed to accomplish this task organizationally. Also, the massacres of the roving killing squads were extensive and repetitive. But it is beyond the realm of knowledge to contend that those who were not present at a particular incident would have behaved in a certain way.

Another criticism is that Goldhagen's assertion could be made about many other societies in Europe because the situation in Germany before the rise of Hitler was not markedly different in the relationships be-

tween Jews and other citizens. In fact, the case could be made that the situation was somewhat better between Jews and gentiles in Germany than elsewhere. There was considerable assimilation between Germans and Jews, with approximately thirty thousand intermarried couples in the nation at the time of the intense persecution in the 1930s. Approximately one out of every ten Jews was married to a gentile (Hilberg 1985: 51). It is at least partially for this reason that the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 established separate categories of persons of mixed heritage. The offspring of Jewish-German unions were known as *Mischlinge,* and according to Hilberg (51–52), these individuals were protected from wearing the Star of David as identification and were exempt from deportation. One can also point to the extensive business relationships between gentiles and Jews in Germany prior to the time when businesses were "Aryanized." Jews also attempted to change in order to become more like Germans. Conversions were commonplace (usually along with intermarriage), and the Reform movement originated in nineteenth-century Germany. Reform Judaism attempted to make the Jewish services less traditional, incorporating the vernacular tongue, music, and greater participation on the part of women. The nationhood concept of the Jewish people was de-emphasized simply because many Jews wanted to be seen primarily as German citizens.

The Browning Argument

Also utilizing Police Battalion 101 as a research focus, Christopher Browning in *Ordinary Men* (1992) argues that the reasons for the killings were based on a more complex psychology than the "eliminationist antisemitism" later espoused by Goldhagen. The Browning volume first appeared in 1992 and analyzed the same data as *Hitler's Willing Executioners.* Browning contends that although antisemitism may be one factor in the killings, other variables have to be considered to understand the actions of the police battalion. Among these variables is the fact that to the Germans the conflict of World War II was defined largely as a "race war," where the enemy was not the Poles, the Soviets, or the French but "international Jewry." Because international Jewry was not distinguished by gender or age, it became justifiable in the Germans' minds to kill women and children.

A second factor was the Nazi regime's totalitarian nature, which made it difficult to resist government and military authority. An interest-

ing aspect of Police Battalion 101's experiences, which both Browning and Goldhagen discuss extensively, is that individuals were given an option of opting out of the killing if their conscience so dictated. The data demonstrate that few chose not to become killers. Of those who declined the opportunity to kill, the tendency was not because of moral revulsion; rather, it was because of their own personal discomfort or for their personal or economic self-interest.

According to Browning, a final and persuasive factor that helps to explain the killings involves the dynamics of individuals in a military situation being reluctant to disappoint their fellow soldiers. The documentation indicates that the group experience in killing in Battalion 101 caused the process to become more comfortable and to intensify with time. In combat situations, the "courage" to kill grows out of the concept of one's being a part of a group process. Although the killing may be repugnant, the soldier views his participation as part of his solidarity with fellow troopers. Because much of military training involves establishing a well-coordinated and motivated unit, the soldier may tend not to view each action as an individual moral act, but as part of a support for a greater unit. The murders perpetrated by Police Battalion 101 should not be viewed as "combat" in any conventional sense; members of the battalion obviously were not in any danger of losing their lives when confronting the "enemy." But the psychology of killing may work somewhat the same, especially given the fact that the enemy is defined as "international Jewry." Despite the fact that women and children were Police Battalion 101's first victims, killing could be partially justified in their minds because of their commitment to the solidarity of the unit.

Despite the limitations mentioned above and those highlighted by Browning's work, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* makes a powerful contribution in that it documents the participation of the military, as well as the SS and Gestapo, in the killings. It also concentrates on an aspect of the Holocaust that is usually neglected by the emphasis on the death camps—the mobile killing squads. Although this has been documented previously in a number of other works (Browning 1992; Dawidowicz 1986), the emotional intensity of Goldhagen's presentation makes it especially convincing.

Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis

An important issue in Germany is how that nation remembers the past. In this light, two of Germany's more notable personalities became

involved in a debate on the Holocaust in September 1998. The controversy was sparked at the 1998 Frankfurt Book Fair, where Martin Walser received the prestigious Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. Walser, a well-known and critically acclaimed writer, is not particularly known for making political statements, although the theme of Germans readjusting to postwar realities is a strong one in much of his writing. One example is his novel *Dorle and Wolf,* which has an espionage theme and could be interpreted as a criticism of a divided Germany. In a 1988 speech, Walser was one of the few who called for the rapid reunification of Germany. While acknowledging the responsibility of Germany for the past, he did not view the division of the nation as a necessary consequence of past misdeeds: "Despite all kinds of terrible events, it is still Germany and one cannot erase all the terrible things that have happened here by dividing the country. . . . I have . . . said that we as a nation, on the whole, have our history and that we have to accept our history in its entirety if we want to overcome the division" ("Martin Walser" 1998).

In accepting the Peace Prize, Walser made a critique of how Holocaust language is used in everyday German life. In particular, he stated that "Auschwitz" and the powerful symbolism it evokes should be used more carefully in everyday parlance. The speech made clear that Walser was particularly disturbed when the symbolism of Auschwitz is used to cut off debate on political issues, a good example perhaps being that Germany deserved postwar division because of the Holocaust and Auschwitz. According to Walser, Auschwitz has become a German version of "political correctness" from which it is difficult to discuss any issue related to the past. But the author raised the ire of many when he contended that Auschwitz should not be exploited for political purposes and used as a "moral cudgel" or turned into "routine threats."

Although many in the political and literary community defended Walser, one vocal critic was Ignatz Bubis, who served as the chairman of the Central Council of Jewish Organizations in Germany until his death on August 13, 1999, in Frankfurt. Bubis was a Holocaust survivor who lost his father and siblings in the Treblinka death camp. He survived ghettoization and internment in a labor camp, working in a munitions factory in Czestochowa, Poland. After he was liberated by the Soviet Army in January 1945, he returned to Germany at the end of hostilities and worked to rebuild what little was left of the Jewish community. He was largely responsible for its growth, especially the resettlement of So-

viet Jews in major cities from the late 1980s through the 1990s. Bubis was active in opposing the right-wing forces that espoused xenophobia and attacked foreigners and Jews in the early 1990s. Immediately prior to his death, he continued to be involved in obtaining satisfactory compensation for Holocaust victims, particularly in the former Communist Bloc nations, as well as for those who worked as slave laborers for no compensation during the war. He also was active in supporting the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin and was enthusiastic when a decision was made to build one. He spoke on numerous occasions to a younger generation of Germans, stressing their responsibility to prevent future atrocities while at the same time holding them blameless for the past. At a memorial service, Chancellor Schröder eulogized him: "He was a moral authority, a lawyer for minorities and persecuted peoples, which won him respect not only in Germany, but also in Israel and around the world. I bow to his memory" (Boehmer 1999).

Bubis stated that Walser was guilty of "intellectual arson" and pandering to the far Right. The exchange between these two respected individuals resulted in an outpouring of debate in the press on the need to acknowledge responsibility for the past versus the need for a modern Germany to move beyond the Holocaust. Thus, the debate was symptomatic of a larger problem in German society that also spilled into the national election, with Schröder taking a position opposite Kohl on the need for the Berlin Memorial. Like Schröder, Walser preferred a museum-like structure that would serve a largely educational function whereas Bubis expressed frustration with the entire process of selecting a suitable memorial. In the end, the design selected would seem to satisfy both parties in that the site offers both commemoration and education. The Walser-Bubis exchange, like the Goldhagen work, prompted a thoughtful if passionate discussion of Germany's past and future. As such, it accomplished a great deal in clarifying and extending the discussion of the Holocaust into contemporary Germany.

The Historians' Debate (Historikerstreit)

The Bubis-Walser debate and the arguments stated by Goldhagen are perhaps best seen as an extension of a larger question in German society that has existed since 1986. The debate, known as *Historikerstreit* (the historians' debate), was prompted at least in part by President Ronald Reagan's visit to the Bitburg cemetery in 1985, where he and

Chancellor Kohl honored the German war dead. The cemetery contained graves of members of the Waffen SS, and the visit launched a debate in the United States as to whether President Reagan should have made the trip. In addition, it raised German consciousness about the past. In attempting to use the Reagan visit to reconcile Germany's past with the United States, Bitburg was a diplomatic blunder by Kohl.

The *Historikerstreit* debate can also be traced to philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who disputed the assertions of two historians, Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber.[3] The essential argument of Nolte, Hillgruber, and others is that although the crimes of the Holocaust were enormous, what had occurred was not different (except in terms of scale) from the Turkish massacre of the Armenians in 1915–16 or the crimes of Pol Pot in Cambodia. Nolte, Hillgruber, and others argued that the twentieth century was a time of genocide and that the Holocaust was but one example of mass killing. Thus, the Holocaust was typical and not unusual, and Germany should be considered a "normal" nation, or at least not different or more culpable morally than other nations that were guilty of similar crimes. A second aspect of this revisionist argument is that the Holocaust, and Hitler's actions toward the Jews, were a product of Communist exterminations of minority groups such as the kulaks in the Soviet Union, which occurred during the 1930s. It was argued that Hitler feared that Stalin would attempt similar mass killings in Western Europe, and Nolte asserted that Hitler was acting in a rational fashion in viewing the Jews as enemies. One reason cited was Chaim Weizmann's 1939 declaration at the World Zionist Congress that Jews would fight on the British side against Germany. The revisionist historians argue that Hitler's real target was the Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks, and what happened to the Jews was an unfortunate byproduct of the war.

By stating that the excesses of National Socialism were caused by the challenge of the Bolsheviks and that the Nazi regime and German nation were worse than but not essentially different from other totalitarian systems, Nolte and Hillgruber, according to Habermas, were attempting to help contemporary Germany escape moral responsibility. The *Historikerstreit* is extremely complex and goes beyond the issues that are raised in this text.[4] The Walser-Bubis debate seems to be on a different dimension in that it does not deal with the causes of the Holocaust or the enormity of the crimes. Rather, the theme seems based

more on what might be called "political correctness"—when is it legitimate to use the symbolism and reality of Auschwitz in dealing with questions regarding contemporary Germany? To Bubis, the reality and the symbolism are always present; to Walser, the reality is present, but the symbolism is excessive and inapplicable to many current problems, such as the question of whether East and West Germany should have been united in light of Auschwitz.

The Growth of the Jewish Community in Germany and the Continuing Problem of Antisemitism

Most members of the Jewish community in Germany prior to unification were displaced persons from Eastern Europe who had come to Germany at the war's end or were their descendants. Beginning with the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, Jews who left the Soviet Union were given the chance of going to Israel or a few other nations, including the United States and Germany. Many Soviet Jews, mostly from Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltics, viewed Germany as affording a good economic opportunity. An agreement was formalized between the federal and *Bundesländer* governments and the Central Committee for Jews in Germany. Under the agreement, Jews may apply at a German consulate and then move to Germany permanently. Once in the nation, the newcomers are distributed to the *Bundesländer* in proportion to the overall German and non-German population within its boundaries. Thus, states such as the Saarland received the smallest number of Jews while Berlin, with the largest Jewish population, received the most. There are approximately ten thousand Jews in Berlin, with the largest concentration in the eastern portion of the city.

The growth of the Jewish community in Germany has been steady since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is expected by some that the community will expand to over one hundred thousand over the next several years. This number includes those who are actually registered in the Jewish community and Jews who have assimilated into German society unaided. The new immigration from the Soviet Union has had the effect of revitalizing many urban Jewish communities including Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, and even smaller localities such as Mainz. For the first time in over fifty years, religious leaders have been recruited to minister to German Jews, including rabbis, cantors, and reli-

gious educators. In addition to conducting services, there is a tremendous demand on religious leaders to provide basic Jewish educational services because many Russian Jews were raised in a society that is largely atheistic and thus are ignorant of the practices of Judaism. Social services are needed to help these new immigrants adjust to German society. Some help is available from the German government in language instruction, but other assistance is needed to include job placement and the support of the new immigrants until suitable employment can be located.

The number of crimes committed against Jews, guest workers, and asylum seekers seemed to subside as the 1990s ended. During 1999, the total number of criminal offenses with a proven or suspected right-wing extremist background declined to 10,037 from 11,049 (*Bundesamt* 1999). This represents a reduction of approximately 9.2 percent. But the number of violent crimes increased by 5.4 percent from 1998. In 2000 the violent attacks against foreigners, which occurred primarily in eastern Germany, increased by nearly 40 percent. Most of the violence earlier in the 1990s seemed directed primarily against foreign workers and asylum seekers rather than Jews, but several synagogue bombings and the assault on Jews in a Düsseldorf train station during 2000 were antisemitic incidents that received high visibility and caused much fear in the Jewish community. On the positive side, these events prompted the government and the public at large to take more active stances against antisemitic and anti-foreign extremists, and the number of demonstrations against these groups increased greatly in the early 2000s. This support is vital if the Jewish community is to retain its confidence in living in Germany, for the incidents reported in 2000 indicate that the struggle against antisemitism and xenophobia in Germany is far from over.

Antisemitism in Germany: East versus West

Compared with the data on attitudes toward foreigners in the 1996 German Social Survey, there is less information available on Jews. Also, there are almost no questions regarding the war and the Holocaust as in the 1991 EMNID data set. Although memory still is obviously a very important issue to Germans, the question of foreigners, including immigrants and refugees, had become a more visible practical public policy issue by the middle to late 1990s. The Jewish community has grown,

but the number of foreigners presently represents approximately 9 percent of the population in Germany, which accounts for their greater representation in the questions. Still, there are a number of interesting questions regarding attitudes toward the Jews. I again begin by comparing attitudes between citizens in the former GDR and those in the western sections of Germany.

In chapter 4, I analyzed attitudes Germans had toward Jews regarding marriage, residence in the neighborhood, lifestyle, and political rights. These were presented along with opinions concerning "foreign" groups. Antisemitism was used as a predictor variable for anti-foreign sentiment. In this chapter, the antisemitism scale is the variable to be explained. Again, the items are the following:

Jews have too much influence in the world.
I am ashamed that the Germans committed so many crimes against the Jews.
Many Jews are trying to use the past of the Third Reich to their advantage and to make the Germans pay for it.
With regard to their behavior, the Jews are not entirely innocent in their pursuits.

Possible responses ranged from a score of 1, where the respondent indicated that he or she "absolutely" did not agree, to 7, in which case the respondent stated that he or she agreed "completely and fully."

Overall, the scores that are attained by residents of both the eastern and western portions of Germany are mixed with regard to the types of antisemitism they indicate. For example, it is encouraging that the mean score for both eastern and western Germans is well below the middle possible score of the index (4) on the items that Jews "have too much influence" and that Jews "are not entirely innocent in their pursuits." In other words, more Germans are likely to score on the side of disagreement when presented with these questions. Also, there is a very high level of shame for the crimes that were committed against the Jews. This is in agreement with a similar measure used in the 1991 data. On the other hand, western Germans are likely to agree with the statement that Jews are taking advantage of the past and attempting to make Germans pay for it.

The results shown in table 6.1 also are interesting in that western Germans exhibit more antisemitism when confronted with questions re-

Table 6.1 Mean Differences in Responses between Eastern and Western Germans on Measures of Antisemitism

	Jews Have Too Much Influence		
$\bar{x}$	sd	N	
All	3.14	1.95	3243
Western Germany	3.27	2.02	2141
Eastern Germany	2.90	1.76	1102
	Shame about German Crimes against Jews		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	2.21	1.74	3265
Western Germany	2.36	1.84	2155
Eastern Germany	1.92	1.49	1110
	Jews Exploit German Past and Try to Make Germans Pay		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	4.24	2.03	3255
Western Germany	4.41	2.06	2149
Eastern Germany	3.91	1.91	1106
	Jews Not Entirely Innocent in Their Pursuits		
	$\bar{x}$	sd	N
All	2.60	1.83	3237
Western Germany	2.65	1.88	2133
Eastern Germany	2.50	1.71	1104

Source: 1996 ALLBUS General Social Survey

garding the Holocaust. It is the western Germans who are more likely to believe that the Jews have too much influence, that they exploit the German past and victimize other citizens by doing so, and that the Jews "are not entirely innocent in their pursuits."

If one reviews the findings from chapter 4, it is a bit of a paradox that the western Germans, who are more likely to want Jews as neighbors and to have them marry into their families, also hold stronger and more negative stereotypes than former residents of the GDR when confronted with explicit statements of antisemitism. What might account for these resentments? I believe that it reverts to the fact that the westerners have had more of a history with the Holocaust and have had to grapple with the consequences while the rulers of the GDR acted as if it never occurred. It was the West German governments of Adenauer and Brandt that took moral responsibility for the Holocaust and made attempts to atone for it. It was the West German government that supported the state of Israel and paid reparations to that nation and that

continues to pay for past injustices. At the same time, it is true that many in western Germany have sought to move the nation on from the Holocaust, particularly since reunification. Although many in the west are ready to accept Jews as marriage partners and neighbors (given the low numbers of Jews, this is a remote possibility for most), they have come to resent the Holocaust and the war as political issues. In its broadest sense, this is illustrated by controversies over the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, the question of relocating the capital, the Goldhagen book, and the debate between Bubis and Walser over the symbolism of Auschwitz.

Multivariate Analysis

Compared to the multivariate analysis utilized in analyzing anti-foreign sentiment with the ALLBUS data, there were a more limited number of dependent variables. The indicators of antisemitism that are presented in table 6.1 were combined into one additive index and treated as a dependent variable entitled "general antisemitism."[5] Also analyzed were the familiar questions of whether an individual would like a Jew as a neighbor or as someone who would marry into their family. Finally, the questions of equal rights for Jews and lifestyle differences also were treated as dependent variables.

A number of explanatory variables were eliminated in comparison with anti-foreign sentiment because they were not related directly to the question of Jews in Germany. Many of these were related exclusively to foreigners. Thus, although a question was available that queried respondents about their contact with foreigners, such an item was unavailable pertaining to the important question of familiarity with Jews. Also missing was a question regarding knowledge of the number of Jews. In assessing anti-foreign sentiment, some of the dependent variables were partially explained by the level of knowledge an individual had about foreigners. If the respondent had correct knowledge of the percentage of foreigners in western Germany, there was a tendency for less anti-foreign sentiment. Such a question would similarly have been useful in analyzing antisemitism. Another difference is that antisemitism was used as a predictor variable for anti-foreign sentiment. In order to predict antisemitism, a general anti-foreign sentiment scale was included. The scale consisted of the following items:

Foreigners living in Germany should try to make their lifestyle fit the German lifestyle a little better.

When jobs become scarce, foreigners living in Germany should be sent back to their homeland.

Foreigners should be forbidden to participate in all political activities.

Foreigners should choose their spouses from people of their own nationality.

With these exceptions, the explanatory variables employed are identical to the anti-foreign sentiment equations in chapter 4.

The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in table 6.2. One obvious characteristic of the antisemitism analysis is that more success is achieved in explaining anti-foreign sentiment than antisemitism. This is evident from an examination of the total variance explained in each equation. Although success is attained in explaining general antisemitism in that nearly 25 percent of the variance is accounted for, much less variation is explained in the other equations. Most disappointing is

Table 6.2 Regression of Contact, Sociodemographic, Political, Psychological, and Economic Variables with Measures of Antisemitism

	General Antisemitism	Marriage into Family	Have as Neighbor	Equal Rights	How Strong Lifestyles Differ
Contact					
Former GDR	−1.95***	−.112	−.141*	.269**	−.175*
Resident	−.173	−.053	−.047	.066	−.047
	(−9.82)	(−1.87)	(−2.45)	(3.52)	(−2.20)
Sociodemographic					
Gender	−.789***	.203***	.169***	.153*	−.139*
	−.074	.066	.060	.040	−.039
	(−4.51)	(3.83)	(3.34)	(2.27)	(−2.00)
Age	.300***	−.056*	.065**	.118***	−.030
	.064	−.041	.052	.070	−.020
	(3.49)	(−2.15)	(2.60)	(3.57)	(−.899)
Education	−.545***	.027	.084***	.163***	−.120***
	−.115	.020	.067	.095	−.078
	(−6.31)	(1.05)	(3.36)	(4.90)	(−3.53)
Income	.0001*	.000004	.00001	.00002	−.00002
	−.035	.004	.012	.021	−.015
	(−2.07)	(.213)	(.619)	(1.16)	(−.707)
Psychological					
Tolerance	−.005	−.009	−.011	−.003	−.005
	−.003	−.022	−.027	−.007	−.010
	(−.208)	(−1.26)	(−1.52)	(−.385)	(−.516)

Table 6.2 Continued

	General Antisemitism	Marriage into Family	Have as Neighbor	Equal Rights	How Strong Lifestyles Differ
Authoritarianism	.006	.003	.016	.023	.016
	.024	.004	.020	.022	.016
	(1.41)	(.234)	(1.15)	(1.23)	(.830)
Anti-Foreign	.302***	−.091***	−.059***	−.114***	.060***
Sentiment	.294	−.311	−.219	−.309	.183
	(15.43)	(−15.49)	(−10.47)	(−15.24)	(7.95)
Political	.340***	−.085***	.045**	−.067***	.017
Ideology	.113	−.099	−.056	−.062	.017
	(6.49)	(−5.73)	(−2.94)	(−3.33)	(.812)
Republikaner	3.15***	.296	.326	−.291	.068
	.071	.023	.028	−.108	.005
	(4.34)	(1.34)	(1.54)	(−1.04)	(.244)
PDS	−.035	.054	.172	.187	−.390*
	−.001	.007	.024	.019	−.040
	(−.078)	(.392)	(1.30)	(1.06)	(−2.14)
Economic					
Fear of losing/	−.114	−.090	−.083	−.166	−.038
changing job	−.007	−.018	−.018	−.027	−.007
	(−.393)	(−1.04)	(−.998)	(−1.49)	(−.334)
Unemployed	−.463	.108	.042	.177	.078
	−.015	.012	.005	.016	.007
	(−.912)	(.697)	(.288)	(.899)	(.372)
Present–sociotropic	.216	−.034	.009	−.018	−.054
	.032	−.018	.006	−.077	−.025
	(1.83)	(−.974)	(.294)	(−.394)	(−1.17)
Present–Personal	.316	−.053	−.068	−.063	.017
	.045	−.027	−.037	−.025	.008
	(2.50)	(−1.41)	(−1.86)	(−1.28)	(.347)
Future–sociotropic	−.053	−.044	−.013	−.052	.062
	−.008	−.023	−.007	−.021	.028
	(−.473)	(−1.19)	(−.377)	(−1.10)	(1.27)
Future–personal	.597	−.038	−.031	−.038	.088
	.072	−.016	−.014	−.013	.032
	(4.06)	(−.869)	(−.728)	(−.668)	(1.50)
Constant	5.74	6.03	5.32	6.21	2.35
R^2	.497	.390	.080	.138	.061
Adjusted R^2	.243	.152	.075	.133	.054
N	2940	2970	2974	2963	2523

t-scores are in parentheses
*-significant at .05 level
**-significant at .01 level
***-significant at .001 level
The first coefficient is the unstandardized regression coefficient.
The second coefficient is the standardized regression coefficient (beta).

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

that only 7.5 percent of the variance in "neighbor" is explained, and approximately 5 percent of the variance is accounted for in "lifestyles." "Equal rights" and "marriage" fare slightly better, with approximately 13 percent and 15 percent of the variance explained, respectively.

One reason why antisemitism cannot be explained better is the lack of effect of the economic variables. These variables behave much more uniformly than was the case for anti-foreign sentiment in that *none* of these variables are helpful in understanding antisemitism. Despite all of the literature and stereotypes of the Jew being disproportionately influential in economic affairs, Germans fail to make the connection regardless of whether they have a job, are fearful of losing employment, or are satisfied with their own economic condition or the situation of the Federal Republic as a whole. Although the variable of being a resident of the former GDR *is* helpful in understanding antisemitism, the effect of this variable is separated from economics by virtue of the control afforded in the multiple regression analysis. In addition, I experimented by testing for an interaction effect between being a resident of the former GDR and all of the economic variables, but I was unsuccessful in finding a relationship (data are not shown). Moreover, the results for the GDR variable mirror the bivariate findings. When all other variables are controlled, the eastern Germans are less likely to be antisemitic in a general sense, to want equal rights for Jews, and to believe that the Jews have fewer lifestyle differences to overcome to function in German society. As in the bivariate analysis, the eastern Germans are less likely to want Jews as family members or neighbors.

If one compares the multiple regression equations for antisemitism to those that were estimated for anti-foreign sentiment, there are some remarkable consistencies but some interesting variations as well. For example, in order to explain antisemitism, I was, of course, unable to employ the measure of antisemitism used to predict anti-foreign sentiment as a predictor variable. Instead, I substituted the above measure of anti-foreign sentiment to predict the dependent variable. Results are consistent in that anti-foreign sentiment is a significant and consistent predictor of antisemitism across all the regression equations. The greater the anti-foreign sentiment, the less the sympathy for the Jews. This finding gives support to the LISREL analysis in chapter 6 that suggests that anti-Jewish attitudes are prompted in great part by the belief that the Jew basically is still a foreigner who is alien to German

culture and nationality. The anti-foreign variable tends to dominate the regression equations in table 6.2, as evidenced by the size of the beta coefficients.

Another variable that works with great consistency in explaining both anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism is ideology. Those who tend to identify with the Right ideologically have higher levels of general antisemitism, show less support for a Jew marrying into their families, are less likely to desire a Jew as a neighbor, and are less supportive of equal rights for Jews. The only equation that is an exception is the one explaining lifestyles. Education also behaves with more consistency than was the case for anti-foreign sentiment, as the more educated show lower levels of antisemitism in general, are more desirous than others in having a Jew as a neighbor, would be more in favor of equal rights for Jews, and believe that Jews have fewer lifestyle differences separating them from Germans.

Gender is another variable that behaves more consistently in explaining antisemitism. In general, women express lower levels of general antisemitism than men. In addition, women are more likely to welcome Jews into their families as marriage partners, are more inclined to want them as neighbors, are more in favor of equal rights for Jews, and are less likely to feel that Jews have strong lifestyle differences from Germans. Although the beta coefficients are not large, their consistency across the equations gives them greater credence as having an impact.

Age is another variable of interest. Often the popular literature and mass media suggest that it is younger persons who are responsible for much of the anti-foreign and anti-Jewish violence in Germany in the 1990s. But at least in terms of attitude, table 6.2 suggests that the opposite is the case. Older persons demonstrate higher levels of general antisemitism and are more opposed to having Jews as neighbors or marrying into their families. The one anomaly is that as age increases, there is more support for the Jews to have equal rights.

In addition to the economic variables, several others do not work well at all in explaining antisemitism. These include authoritarianism and tolerance, which were more effective in explaining anti-foreign sentiment. The weakness of these variables tends to undercut some of the more traditional arguments on the characteristics of the antisemite, which suggests that such a person is usually intolerant or authoritarian (Adorno et al. 1982).

The Republikaner Party, which gave many Germans cause for concern earlier in the 1990s, is successful only in predicting the general level of antisemitism. The reason for its weakness is that by the time this survey was taken, the party was in the midst of being replaced by the Deutsche Volksunion as the representative of the radical Right. Also, the PDS variable fails in four of the five equations. On the matter of lifestyles, those who prefer the PDS assert that the Jews have fewer differences from the Germans. Here, too, it is important to remember that in 1996 the PDS had not reached a strength that it showed by 1999 when it started to acquire more votes in *Landtag* and municipal elections in the east. With the growing unpopularity of the SPD government's austerity program, it has started to become an alternative to both the SPD and the CDU/CSU.

Conclusions and Discussion

Because of their mutual historical experience, the troubled relationship between Germans and Jews will not fade for some time. Yet, the conflict between Jews and Germans differs from recent German problems with "foreigners," "immigrants," or "refugees." In the sense that government must act in some public policy capacity, the issue of the "foreigner" is much more on the current government's agenda. Indeed, this issue has been a point of intense contention since unification in 1990. On the other hand, the Jewish question is more a problem of remembrance. It causes the German nation to attempt to separate the past from the present and struggle to move on as a nation. Although the Berlin Holocaust Memorial does enter into the public policy arena, it is symptomatic of a much larger issue that public policy is unable to address in any neat fashion.

The growth of the Jewish community in Germany has been remarkable during the 1990s. Yet, despite this growth, it has not triggered the widespread resentment that the increased numbers of "foreigners" have, particularly the refugees from the war in Yugoslavia. Instead, although many are not eager to revisit the slaughter of the Jews during World War II and the German responsibility for it, there is some evidence of a renewed interest in facing the "Jewish question," as demonstrated by the keen interest and debate generated by Goldhagen's work. There also is some revitalized interest in Jewish culture. Although antisemitism

certainly is present, as this book has illustrated, there is also a certain amount of philosemitism (Lamping 1997).

Although government may not be able to act in terms of public policy in solving the "Jewish question," it is clear from this analysis that many Germans do not separate the two issues. Those who hold high anti-foreign sentiment are among those most likely to be antisemitic, with all other factors controlled. The reverse is true as well: the antisemitic are more averse to non-Germans in their midst. This gives reinforcement to the old stereotype that the Jew is unable to become a citizen in the minds of many because of loyalties to the Jewish people rather than the nation of residence. But, on the other hand, the Germans in this sample separate the Jews from foreigners and refugees and seem to be generally more sympathetic to the Jews. Indeed, most would rather have a Jew as a neighbor or as a family member than they would many other categories of people including Turks and asylum seekers. In an immediate sense, the Jews seem much less on the minds of the Germans in this sample. It is perhaps because they are less visible than the asylum seekers and the Turks and present less of a threat at the current time. On the other hand, the Jews and their past relationship to the Germans present a threat to the legacy of the German nation, but it is one for which many, particularly the younger generation, do not feel a sense of responsibility except in an indirect sense. As these data illustrate, for the older generation the Jew presents a problem that they would like to forget.

To some extent, the growth in the German Jewish population is a "foreign" problem because nearly all new members of the community originate from Russia or other parts of the former Soviet Union. Ironically, there is some resentment among the native members of the German Jewish community when financial and other aid is given to many of the newly arriving Russian Jews, who sometimes disappear from the community once they are settled and earning an income. It will be interesting to observe how the future growth in the community will affect it and whether its further enlargement will prompt more antisemitic incidents in the future. It also will take some time to determine if the Russians will change the nature of the present German Jewish community. At the moment, the community has a largely Orthodox identity, although the actual practice of Judaism varies widely. The Russian Jews, who were raised largely in a secular society, may not assimilate into

current community practices easily. It also will be interesting to see how much the current wave of Jewish immigration is motivated by economic opportunity currently not present in Russia rather than religious conviction. Although the current unemployment rate in Germany is unacceptable, the opportunities for Russian Jews are probably much better there than they are presently in their native land, which is in economic ruin.

What is most evident from this analysis is that the antisemitism that does exist in present-day Germany is the product of forces that are not economic in nature. Although the economy is not performing well, and has not been for several years, individuals fail to make the connection between a failing economy in either a personal or national sense and antisemitism. Thus, the threat that Jews present in the minds of antisemites are products of more longstanding pathologies. These include residence in and socialization to the anti-democratic values of the eastern sector, right-wing political and ideological leanings, and psychological factors such as a general anti-foreign prejudice.

7

The Economy, Minorities, and the German Future

Introduction

This final chapter discusses the implications of this book for Jews and foreigners in Germany in light of the disappointing performance of the German economy in the 1990s. The most recent evidence suggests that the economy improved slightly during 2000, but the amount of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism was not reduced significantly, especially if one considers violent acts against persons and attempted destruction of property, such as synagogues and cemeteries. In addition, some highly publicized right-wing crimes occurred in the more prosperous western sector during 2000. In contrast, as the economy hovered near recession toward the end of 2001 (with the third quarter of 2001 experiencing negative growth), highly visible acts of antisemitism and xenophobia did not occur. The relationship between the economy, anti-foreign sentiment, and antisemitism is summarized, and I undertake a brief discussion of the study limitations. I summarize a new citizenship law that was passed during the first year of the Schröder government. This law gives many of the longtime guest workers, chiefly the Turks and their children, an opportunity to become German citizens. Finally, I discuss the future of the Germans and the Jews.

The Performance of the German Economy since Reunification

In contrast to the optimistic forecasts of Chancellor Kohl and others, the German economy has experienced serious difficulty since the reuni-

fication of October 3, 1990, with especially severe problems in the territories of the former GDR. These events provide support for the questions raised by some scholars who have had serious concerns about the soundness of the German economy as a whole for some time (Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding 1992; P. Smith 1998).

There were a number of difficult economic problems with reunification that few anticipated. Perhaps most importantly, the residents of the former GDR were not prepared for the shocks that were produced in the transition from a centrally managed economy to capitalism (Collier 1991; Dornbusch 1993; Hallett and Ma 1993; Behrend 1995). In the west, many Germans grew resentful of the large transfer of Deutschemarks from the prosperous western sector to the east. Up to a certain point, the federal government traded eastern currency at parity with the Deutschemarks. Despite this generous policy, the eastern economy has had a great deal of difficulty getting off the ground.

Not all current economic news is negative, however. Inflation appears under control as the consumer price index increased only slightly over the last several years.[1] There was a jolt in 2001, however, which was occasioned by increases in the price of oil. The state privatization agency, the Treuhandanstalt, was able to transform small publicly owned enterprises in the eastern sector—such as restaurants, pharmacies, movie theaters, and smaller corporate units—very rapidly during the first few years of the new state's existence. Much less progress was evident, however, in the privatization of larger industries. Calls have been made repeatedly by left-wing elements of the SPD and the PDS for the state to subsidize failing industries, particularly as the 1990s closed, but it is unlikely that the Schröder government will heed these pleas. Instead, the current policy is to put into place an austerity program that is reducing state spending by approximately 30 billion Deutschemarks.

The new central policy developed by the government to stimulate the economy nationwide is a major lowering of corporate and individual income tax rates beginning January 1, 2001. As of summer 2002, the reform had not had the intended impact, and it was unclear whether the reform would have differential effects in the eastern section. In impact, there is still likely to be a difference between east and west, given the stronger economic infrastructure and resources in the west.

From 1998 through 2001, economic growth in the former territories

of the GDR was positive but still lower than the rate for the western portion of the nation, resulting in a widening gap between the sections of the German state. Eastern German growth has slowed considerably since the middle 1990s when, for example, the former GDR territories attained growth rates of 9.9 percent and 5.3 percent, in 1994 and 1995, respectively. It must be remembered, however, that the former GDR started from an extremely low base, making rapid growth more possible in the earlier years. With growth rates presently lower than those in the west, the disparity between the two regions is becoming more pronounced. In addition, the declining growth rates have made it difficult to expand employment. Although there have been some improvements in the rise in self-employment and some development in the service industry, the eastern economy has been slowed by a decline of construction investment. The difficulties in the construction industry apply both to commercial construction and the housing market and are forcing many construction firms out of business. The service industry has suffered because of competition from more experienced western German enterprises. Data reveal that per capita productivity in the eastern *Bundesländer* is 55 percent of the west (*Micro and Macroeconomic* 1998). The lower skill level of the eastern German worker makes it difficult for that region to close the economic chasm with the west.

The most disappointing economic aspect of reunification is the unemployment rate gap between the eastern and western regions. The high unemployment rates have occurred despite a policy of subsidization of wages by the federal government. In addition, the FRG has aided many in the transition to retirement by providing additional benefits to encourage an early cessation of working life. In particular, in the former territories of the GDR, many individuals of a comparatively young age were forced to retire. This was especially the case for those who worked in the larger-scale public enterprises. It also included intellectuals, particularly university faculty, civil servants, and workers in nonproductive, older industries (van der Meer 1995). Despite the policy preferences of the PDS and some in the left wing of the SPD, subsidies cannot be a major policy instrument of the future as it would further lead individuals to respond to government as opposed to the market. This can result in a more difficult transition to capitalism and can make it problematic to reduce dependency on the government in the long term.

Recent unemployment statistics are presented in table 7.1. Although

Table 7.1 Annual Unemployment Rate in Germany and the United States, 1994–2001

	Unemployment Rate*			
Year	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Germany	United States
1994	8.2%	15.2%	9.6%	6.1%
1995	8.3%	14.0%	9.4%	5.6%
1996	9.1%	15.7%	10.4%	5.4%
1997	9.8%	18.2%	11.5%	4.7%
1998	9.3%	17.4%	10.9%	4.3%
1999	9.9%	19.0%	11.1%	4.2%
2000	7.8%	17.3%	9.6%	3.9%
2001	7.5%	17.6%	9.4%	4.5%

* Total civilian labor force, December figures except for 2001, where figures are calculated through September.

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, U.S. Department of Labor

the consumer price index in Germany has on average been lower than in the United States for the last several years, it is evident that Chancellor Schröder faces a significant policy problem with regard to unemployment. Germany, which was the envy of the United States in terms of the unemployment rate for much of the 1970s, now has a rate that is more than double the U.S. rate. In addition, the Social Democrats face the problem of a huge disparity between eastern and western Germany. As is evident in the table, the east has approximately double the unemployment rate of the west.

Because the Social Democrats are the German party traditionally most sympathetic to the unemployed, much was expected when they defeated Chancellor Kohl and the CDU/CSU in 1998. The unemployment rates in 2000 show some improvement, but they deteriorated the next year. The rates are unacceptably high, and there is a large gap between east and west. One criticism of the new government was that while it initially decreased the tax burden on households, it raised corporate taxes, cutting the potential for expansion and providing a disincentive to increase the number of workers. With the tax reform, corporate taxes have been lowered, and the government hopes that this will have an impact on the unemployment rate. But thus far, no improvement has occurred.

The Economy, Anti-Foreign Sentiment, and Antisemitism

The failure of the economy to improve, particularly in the eastern sector, has been viewed as the key causal factor in the minds of the public, the media, and German politicians in explaining anti-foreign violence and more latent xenophobic attitudes. In addition, the sluggish economy has also been perceived as an explanatory factor in accounting for antisemitic acts, especially since German Jews are becoming a more "foreign" group with the addition of Russian newcomers.

The most recent data released by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) is repetitive of information presented earlier in the decade regarding the relationship between the state governments of Germany and the occurrence of right-wing extremist crimes. Figure 7.1 demonstrates that there is a clear relationship between crime and *Bundesland,* with violent antisemitic and xenophobic crime much more likely to take place in the depressed eastern states. One exception is Berlin. Although it had a rate of violence that was in accord with other eastern *Bundesländer* in 1998, the rate is reduced considerably in 1999, and the western *Bundesländer* of Breman and Hamburg score higher. Berlin's improvement might be explained by the movement of the capital to that city and the fact that there is considerable economic development now taking place there.

In examining these data, one paradox is that violent attacks on foreigners and other acts of terrorism are most likely in territories that have little experience with non-Germans. This finding is somewhat in contrast with social science literature with regard to other instances of group conflict in nations other than Germany. For example, there has been considerable investigation of the "racial threat" hypothesis in the southern United States. Some literature suggests that lynching in the South was most common in areas that had the greatest concentrations of blacks (Blalock 1967; Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983). In addition, white support for extremist candidate David Duke was strongest in those Louisiana parishes (counties) with the greatest concentrations of African Americans (Giles and Buckner 1993). Based on this hypothesis, there should be more problems in western Germany. But just the opposite is the case. In addition, the work of Tolnay and Beck suggests that violence against blacks in the southern United States was predicated upon varia-

Figure 7.1 Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation per 100,000 Inhabitants—by Bundesländer



tions in the price of cotton. When the price of cotton dropped, the economic burden on the lower and working-class whites increased, possibly enticing them to place blame on blacks and commit lynching and other violent crimes (Tolnay and Beck 1995). Yet in this present volume I have found little evidence of an economic effect in explaining negative attitudes toward foreigners and Jews in Germany. What might account for the anomalies?

On one level, the issue is conceptual. Although this book has concentrated on anti-foreign and antisemitic attitudes, it does not explain the violent criminal acts against nonnative groups that have taken place in Germany in recent years. One may reasonably expect a correlation be-

tween having a negative attitude toward non-German groups and committing acts of violence against them, but it does not follow that all who harbor prejudices will react in a combative manner. On a second plane, exposure to non-German groups and a history of toleration imbued in democratic institutions matter. In western Germany, with its well-developed political institutions, citizens have found ways to temper prejudice and negative feelings. By living with non-Germans and attempting to accommodate their demands in a democratic setting, the westerners are able to have a more successful relationship. Although there are fears and resentment, the western Germans are in a better position to note the positive contributions that foreigners have made to the German society, particularly the economy. But in the former territories of the GDR, lack of exposure to foreigners and a historical absence of democratic institutions to cope with diverse groups have led to more problems.

For the most part, this book has found that the linkage between economic conditions and prejudice against Jews and minority groups is weak when compared to the impact of other factors. But the economic situation in the eastern states has not helped the problems of relations between Germans and immigrants and refugees. One reason for the lack of a finding of an economic effect again may have to do with the level of analysis. This book has concentrated on economic perception with regard to individual or national economic fortune and its relationship to *attitudes* toward Jews and other non-Germans in an individual context, but the more visible problems are the high unemployment rates coupled with *criminal attacks* on foreigners, Jews, or their property. The symbolism of both a weak economy coupled with "foreigners" is strong in Germany, but recent evidence has suggested that this is far from a firm relationship, even at the aggregate level. For example, in examining the amount of right-wing violence against foreigners in Germany from 1971 through 1995, McLaren (1999) found no relationship between unemployment and violence unless there was a simultaneous increase in the total number of foreigners in Germany. In such a situation, Germans in the aggregate did seem to respond to the symbol of immigrants and commit more acts of violence.

Partially because of the violent acts against foreigners during the 1990s, there were calls for reform with regard to their lack of citizenship

status. The major proponents of change were the Social Democratic Party and the new chancellor, Gerhard Schröder.

A New Citizenship Law

A major early accomplishment of the SPD government under Chancellor Schröder was a new Citizenship Law, which was passed by the Bundestag on May 7 and by the Bundesrat on May 21, 1999. According to the Office of Consular and Legal Affairs, a major objective of the law is to guarantee social and domestic peace in Germany.[2]

Under the terms of the Citizenship Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2000, children who are born in the nation to foreign nationals may receive citizenship when one parent has resided in Germany for a minimum of eight years and holds entitlement to residence or has an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Most of the children of these parents also will acquire the parents' original citizenship under the principle of descent at the time of birth. For example, most Turkish children under the new law would also have Turkish citizenship when they are born. When the law was originally written, it was the intent of the SPD leadership to make it possible for children to hold dual citizenship when they become adults, but opposition from the Christian Democrats eliminated this provision. Accordingly, before these young adults reach age twenty-three, they must choose between German citizenship and the citizenship of the parents' country of origin. If the foreign citizenship is retained, the German citizenship is lost.

The Citizenship Law applies to those born after December 31, 1999. For non-Germans born prior to this date, there are special provisions for possible naturalization. As of January 1, 2000, children born of foreign residents could apply for naturalization if they are less than 10 years of age and their lawful place of abode is Germany. Parents or guardians were required to submit documents prior to January 1, 2000. Children who receive German citizenship under these provisions of the law likewise must decide whether they want to retain it or opt for the nationality of their parents or guardians before they reach their twenty-third birthday. Prior to the passage of the Citizenship Law, foreign nationals were provided the possibility of naturalization only after they had resided in Germany for fifteen years. The new law liberalized the naturalization

process in that individuals are entitled to apply for naturalization after residing in Germany for eight years and meeting the following requirements:

1. They must be loyal to Germany and the Basic Law and must not have been involved in any activities that are hostile to the constitutional order of the state.
2. They must hold a residence permit or a right of unlimited residence.
3. They must have renounced previous citizenship.
4. They must be capable of self-support and may not receive unemployment or welfare benefits from the state, unless it is determined that they are not responsible for needing assistance.
5. They may not have committed any major criminal offenses.
6. They must have a command of the German language.

Finally, there are special "hardship" provisions in the law that make it possible for foreign nationals to hold citizenship in two countries. Exceptions may be made for individuals in the following circumstances:

1. Older persons who have special difficulty in making an effort to renounce foreign citizenship
2. Refugees who are recognized by the FRG or those who are persecuted politically (it will no longer be necessary to prove in each case that being released from foreign citizenship constitutes an unreasonable demand)
3. Individuals whose release from foreign citizenship depends on excessive or unacceptable conditions (including situations when high fees or demeaning terms are demanded)
4. Individuals whose release from foreign citizenship would entail substantial penalties (particularly proprietary or economic penalties)

The Citizenship Law makes de jure what in fact had been a reality for some time—that Germany has become a nation of many cultures with significant contributions from foreign groups. The law would seem to benefit Germany in both the short and the long term. The recognition of Turks and other foreigners will help create "new" Germans in a nation

where fertility has not kept pace with the death rate for some time. This is especially true in the western part of Germany, which had not experimented with a government pro-natalist policy as had the eastern sector until relatively recently. This is an important policy problem because the native German population continues to age and constitutes the major bulk of the citizenry. The new citizens, being much younger, will be able to contribute greatly to the financing of pensions and services for this group.

The law also makes possible the recognition of the important contributions that foreign workers have made to the *Wirtschaftswunder*—the economic miracle of postwar Germany. In this light, their contributions have been substantial. It is difficult to see how the labor shortages of the late 1950s and 1960s could have been compensated for without the *Gastarbeiter.* The new legislation allows these minorities to share in the benefits of the German state more fully in allowing them to vote and otherwise participate in the political life of the nation as active citizens, privileges that have been denied for years. The new law also separates the oldest foreign residents—the Turks—from the newer refugees by rewarding those who have been in Germany the longest with the possibility of citizenship. It remains to be seen whether the refugees from the war in Yugoslavia will be accepted as well, but this initial policy is also in line with citizen wishes. As this book has demonstrated, German citizens are much more likely to be in sympathy with the older immigrants—the Turks and Italians—than they are with refugees from Eastern Europe.

No doubt, the law is likely to be criticized as a "threat" to the average German who may be said again to resent the *Gastarbeiter* because of economic insecurities. Although I have uncovered some evidence that economic factors play a role in building resentment toward foreign workers, the research presented indicates that economic factors, compared to other factors, are of extremely low impact. The data show that the important factors that account for a far greater effect are area of residence, antisemitism, Left-Right predisposition, and contact with foreign groups. Perhaps Germans will continue to be wary of newer foreign groups (particularly refugees) coming into the nation, especially because Germany has become home to such a disproportionate share of them compared to the rest of the European Community. But the resentment that exists does not derive primarily from fear of losing one's job. In-

stead, political, social, and psychological (especially racial) predispositions are likely at the roots of the prejudice.

The Future of the Germans and the Jews

In terms of the future of Germans and Jews in Germany, this study has demonstrated some interesting findings. First, the traditional stereotype of the Jew as a powerful economic actor is not evident in both the 1991 and 1996 samples of Germans. Whatever economic effects exist have been found primarily in the case of anti-foreign prejudice. Even with regard to foreigners, the evidence is weak when compared to other factors. But the alternative explanation is somewhat unsettling. That is, antisemitic (and anti-foreign) prejudice is a behavior that is beyond the control of self-interest. Thus, it is individual predispositions, such as a right-wing ideology or an antipathy for cultures other than their own, that drive Germans toward antisemitism. But the results are striking in that in comparison to foreign groups, the Jews are accepted to a much greater extent than anyone except for the Italians, who have had a more visible presence in Germany during the postwar period.

Several generations have passed since the end of the Nazi era, and for the most part the younger, more educated Germans of the present day demonstrate far more enlightened attitudes than their ancestors on the matter of the Jews. Indeed, these data confirm that age can be a significant factor in explaining attitudes both toward the Jews and foreigners. Unfortunately, the transgressions against foreigners and Jews that have occurred during the 1990s have been perpetuated primarily by younger Germans who are members of youth gangs or extremist groups, and the attitudes of such groups as a whole are not captured by the data analyzed in this book (Watts 1997; Bergmann and Erb 1997). An additional dilemma is that although younger Germans, beginning perhaps with the generation of Chancellor Schröder, feel historical responsibility for the Holocaust they do not harbor personal guilt and are anxious to move on. What issues remain on the contemporary scene that would improve relations to a greater extent?

The crimes against the Jewish people cannot be forgotten or forgiven, neither by the victims themselves nor their descendants.[3] Furthermore, antisemitic incidents in Germany, such as cemetery desecrations, will never be stopped completely, and such crimes have also

occurred many times in other Western democracies such as France and the United States. But there are several currently unresolved issues, which could help to foster closer understanding between Germans and Jews.

One immediate issue that should help to heal the past is the settlement of the slave labor dispute. During the Third Reich Jews and others worked for German industries—including Daimler-Benz, Audi, BMW, Volkswagen, Deutsche Bank, Degussa, Siemens, Bayer, and even foreign firms such as General Motors and Ford Motor Company—but received little or no compensation.[4] Prior to the 1990s, it was difficult to resolve this issue because many of the laborers lived in the former Communist regimes. Moreover, the German government would assume no responsibility for the transgressions of private industry. With the change to the SPD in 1998, the government agreed to help establish foundations to compensate victims. The U.S. and German governments mediated the talks, and governments of Eastern Europe and Israel were also participants. After lengthy negotiations, made difficult by wide disagreement on the amount to be paid by the industries, a settlement was reached in December 1999, and a compensation fund was established in July 2000. The total amount of money in the fund was $5.2 billion (U.S.) dollars, which was contributed by the German government, industries, and the Evangelical Church, which is the main Protestant denomination in Germany. The church admitted its guilt in using slave laborers during the war and agreed to contribute approximately $4.7 million to the fund. After some reluctance, the German Catholic Church also admitted the use of slave laborers and contributed approximately $5 million.

The Bundestag approved the fund by an overwhelming majority in July 2000, and the first payments were made to Ukrainians in August 2001. Under the terms of the agreement, the former concentration camp slave laborers receive approximately $6,800, while those who worked involuntarily in factories receive in the range of $2,700. These amounts are, of course, small in terms of what was lost, and the bureaucratic mechanisms by which a victim may receive compensation have slowed the process. Virtually all former laborers are advanced in years, and many have already died. But this settlement does demonstrate the seriousness of the current German government in dealing with the past. Recent evidence compiled in a survey for *Der Spiegel* (Spörl 2001) dem-

onstrates that a majority of Germans believe that the compensation is either "too low" or an appropriate amount. Only one-quarter of the sample felt that the compensation was "too high."

Some healing also will take place as the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin is completed. The site offers the opportunity for the Germans to commemorate the victims in a fitting way. In other nations where the Holocaust took place, such as Poland and the former Soviet Union, native populations and governments have been slow to recognize Jewish suffering or have behaved insensitively. Examples of this behavior include the lack of a monument at Babi Yar during the years of Soviet rule in the Ukraine, where Ukrainian militia cooperated with the Nazis in the massacre of some 33,000 Jews during the period surrounding Rosh Hoshana in September 1941. In addition, many accused the Catholic Church of insensitivity when a convent was erected at Auschwitz, the death camp and slave labor complex that accounted for approximately 1.3 million Jewish deaths during its time of operation. Even today, with the removal of the convent, a problem still exists with the placing of crucifixes, both small and large, at the site.

With the coming of the memorial, the Germans can demonstrate that their society can get past previous insensitivities. Handled in an appropriate manner, the memorial can be a proper tribute to the victims and can serve as an educational vehicle to visitors from around the world, much like the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. Education has already made great strides with the opening of the National Jewish Museum in Berlin in September 2001. But as was stressed in the debate by proponents of the memorial, the site will be important to the Germans themselves. It will educate the younger generations about the past and may enable the nation as a whole to face its future more confidently in the twenty-first century.

But the memorial itself does not close the door on debate; nor should it. Some of the arguments presented in the *Historikerstreit* are disturbing to many, including the Jewish community in Germany, Israel, the United States, and elsewhere. It is difficult to consider, let alone accept, the arguments that Hitler may not have targeted the Jews at first for extermination and that their ultimate fate was determined largely by factors extraneous to Hitler and his regime. It also is painful to hear arguments that the Jews were not singled out for extermination but should be seen as only one group of victims. But as disturbing as these

assertions can be, they have brought to light powerful counterarguments on the part of distinguished intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas and Günter Grass. Grass's winning of the Nobel Prize for Literature has elevated his prestige considerably across the globe. He has been a strong moral force for the continued acceptance of German responsibility, to the chagrin of many of his countrymen who despaired when in the late 1980s he stated that Germany should not be united because of "Auschwitz" (Grass 1990).

While the *Historikerstreit* has been hurtful to many, it is my opinion that it has served a useful function. Prior to the historical debate, the state of intellectual discourse was avoidance. The avoidance existed on the part of not only the Germans but of the victims as well. Although the German Jewish past was discussed in the media, in other areas of German life such as literature the theme received scant attention. It is only by recognizing that the Holocaust is a political as well as a deep moral issue that these historians have been able to place it on the agenda of the German government for some time. Without the *Historikerstreit,* it would have been difficult for advocates of historical responsibility to be as forceful. Their arguments have resulted in a continued dialogue about the Holocaust, and from these conflicts a certain degree of momentum has been attained. This is evidenced by progress in compensating the previously ignored slave laborers and the creation of the Berlin Memorial. It also helped expose issues such as the Nazi regime's looting of Jewish assets and their storage in Swiss banks. The banks subsequently compensated the victims, albeit after additional debate over the appropriate amount of funds.

The final issue concerns future relations with the German Jewish community. Although there were numerous instances of violence against the Jewish community during the 1990s, Bergmann (1997) correctly argues that Jews for the most part were caught in a wave of xenophobic violence, not necessarily in an increase in antisemitism. Yet, the idea that Jews are considered a part of a "foreign" element and that antisemitism and xenophobia are strongly linked was demonstrated convincingly in this book. Encouragingly, as the Jewish community in Germany has grown for the past few years with the arrival of primarily Russian immigrants, it does not seem that anti-Jewish violence has increased correspondingly. Admittedly, the Jews are a small group compared to foreign workers. But in future years, the Jewish community is likely to

grow, with more Jews leaving the Soviet Union. Much of the xenophobic violence was prompted by the large number of immigrants in the workforce and the high visibility of the refugees who poured into Germany with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union as well as the conflict in Yugoslavia. As the Jewish community increasingly becomes more visible, it will be of interest to see whether antisemitism rises correspondingly and if incidences of violence become more frequent. It is a major challenge to German democracy to continue to make progress with the Jews while this community is growing and to limit incidents of antisemitism.

Postscript

The 2002 National Election

The 2002 German national election was extremely close, with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder barely retaining his position. The Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic Party ran virtually even, with the outcome decided by the slight edge the Green Party held over the Free Democrats. In the new Bundestag, the number of seats held by the SPD/Green coalition will be 306, compared with 295 seats secured by the Christian Democrats and the Free Democratic Party. With a narrower majority than in the previous government, there will be more pressure on the Red/Green coalition to produce in terms of economic reform.

Although there has been some reduction in unemployment since the coalition took power in fall 1998, the performance of the economy during the last four years has fallen far short of even SPD/Green expectations. Unemployment figures in 2002 exceeded those of the previous year, and Chancellor Schröder failed in his pledge to reduce the total number of jobless individuals to 3.5 million. On the day of the election, unemployment exceeded 4 million, with the greatest concentration in eastern Germany. Moreover, data from the first two quarters of 2002 reveal that Germany has barely moved out of the previous year's recession. (The growth rates were 0.2 percent and 0.25 percent, respectively). In addition, like the similar Bush policy in the United States, the Red/Green coalition's considerable slashing of personal and corporate income taxes failed to stimulate the economy to the anticipated degree.

European election campaigns are mercifully shorter than those in the United States. Perhaps because of the brevity of the German elec-

tion campaign, Chancellor Schröder was able to capitalize on several issues that are extraneous to those raised in this book. For example, he picked up considerable support by opposing German involvement in or cooperation with an American invasion of Iraq, while candidate Stoiber seemed to waffle on the issue. Another important issue that Schröder was able to maximize to his advantage was the flooding that occurred in August in the eastern portions of Germany. While the PDS was expected by some to gain a sizeable vote in the eastern *Bundesländer,* Schröder's empathy with the victims and his management of the situation probably helped to thwart a sizeable left-wing protest vote. In the end, the PDS was unable to garner the 5 percent of votes necessary to enter the Bundestag. The "risk averseness" of the German voter toward extremist parties in national elections was demonstrated in 2002 as well as 1998. In contrast to many state and local elections discussed in this volume, German voters shunned extremist voting at the national level in 2002 and attempted to find solutions to policy problems by voting for either the Red/Green coalition or the Christian Democrats and FDP. This illustrates a maturing of the political system, especially in the eastern region. But Schröder probably benefited from the fact that both Iraq and the floods took some focus off of unemployment and weak economic growth during the short time frame of the electoral campaign. Moreover, he demonstrated considerable political skill in shifting the focus of the issues.

The problems of anti-foreign sentiment and antisemitism that are central to this book have not disappeared nor have they been solved. Given earlier right-wing voting during 2002 in both France and the Netherlands, one would have expected more extreme voting to take place in Germany. It seems that at the present time, the German political system is accommodating anti-immigrant prejudice and antisemitism to a better degree than other European polities. But these issues did arise during the election year, and given the closeness of the election, it can be argued that antisemitism was decisive in helping swing the election toward the Red/Green coalition. One particular incident in May that hurt the chances of defeating the Social Democrats occurred among officials in the FDP. The party was accused of antisemitism when its deputy leader, Jürgen Mölleman, stated that Jewish talk-show host Michel Friedman encouraged antisemitic attitudes with his "intolerant, spiteful style." Party officials rushed to apologize, but the FDP's stand-

ings in the polls started to evaporate. Also not helping the cause was the fact that Mölleman had previously praised Austria's Jörg Haider and the Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands. The possibility of the FDP taking the place of the Greens in a left-wing coalition became unfeasible, and several officials of the Christian Democrats quickly distanced themselves from Mölleman's comments. Because in Germany the post of foreign minister is usually filled by the minor party in a coalition, concern was raised as to the suitability of an FDP member assuming this post. Up until this time, the FDP was seen as a valuable potential partner, particularly for the Christian Democrats because their free market attitudes were viewed by many as being vital in reforming the German economy, which is mired deeply in government regulations. In the general election, the party was outpolled by the Greens (8.6 percent to 7.4 percent), which also benefited from the flooding and Iraq issues.

The continuing symbolism of the Holocaust was also made evident by the reaction to comments by SPD justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin, who shortly before the election compared the foreign policy stance of President George W. Bush toward Iraq to the foreign policy strategies of Hitler. It was alleged that Däubler-Gmelin argued Bush and Hitler were similar because they both utilized foreign policy to cover domestic failures. Although the minister claimed that the comments were taken out of context, she resigned shortly after the SPD-Green victory, stating that she did not wish to be a burden on the new government.

Immigration policy also was a factor in the campaign, although it did not impact the final results to the extent of the FDP controversy. To distract the public from American policy on Iraq and the flooding in eastern Germany, Stoiber attempted to introduce immigration as an important issue late in the campaign and link it to the continuing high unemployment. But whatever success his initiative had, it was not sufficient to turn the election. The fact that immigration did not emerge as a defining issue in this election and that extremist voting was almost non-existent in a time of high unemployment further supports my thesis that prejudice is not strongly stimulated by negative economic factors. In the long term, the German economy is likely to improve, and the eastern *Bundesländer* are likely to resemble the west more closely economically. But anti-foreign prejudice is not likely to disappear and will likely continue to be generated by other factors.

Because of Germany's low fertility, its future is tied closely to immigrants and guest workers. To once again achieve a vibrant economy, it is vital that non-Germans continue to be a strong component of the workforce. In terms of being a successful modern democracy, Germany is likely to be judged by how well these individuals are treated and how open the nation is to having more than one cultural community. The extension of citizenship was an important achievement in Schröder's first term, but a great deal of work remains.

Appendixes

Notes

References

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Appendix A

Coding and Distribution of the Exogenous Variables

Variable	*Codes*	*N*	*Percent*
Education	1 = Elementary school without apprenticeship	353	12.1%
	2 = Elementary school with apprenticeship	1,093	37.4%
	3 = Further schooling without completing exams	865	29.6%
	4 = Completed exams for secondary school	259	8.9%
	5 = Studium	353	12.1%
		2,923	100.1%
GDR	0 = Resides in the West	1,930	66.1%
	1 = Lives in the territories of the former GDR	993	33.9%
		2,923	100.0%
Gender	0 = male	1,400	47.9%
	1 = female	1,523	52.1%
		2,923	100.0%
Religiosity–Church Attendance	1 = Never attends	168	5.9%
	2 = Attends family celebrations	299	10.5%
	3 = Attends on special church holy days	763	26.7%
	4 = Attends several times but at least once per month	675	23.6%
	5 = Attends every or nearly every Sunday	951	33.3%
		2,856	100.0%
Republikaner vote	0 =Does not intend to vote for Republikaner Party	2,769	97.8%
	1 = Intends to vote for Republikaner Party	62	2.2%
		2,831	100.0%
Ideology*	A 10-point scale with high scores indicating a right-wing ideology		
Worker	1 = unskilled worker	302	10.3%
	0 = all others	2,621	89.7%
		2,923	100.0%

Age was coded as exact age at time of survey. The mean age was 42.15.
* The mean score for ideology was 5.17.
Due to rounding, the percentages do not always total to exactly 100%.

Source: EMNID Survey, 1991

Appendix B

Codes and Distributions of Predictor Variables (Noncontinuous Variables Only)

Contact	*N*	*Percentage*
Former GDR Resident		
0 = Western Germany	2,177	66.2%
1 = Former GDR territories	1,113	33.8%
	3,290	100.0%
Contact with Foreigners		
0 = Have no foreigners in family or circle of friends	2,002	61.0%
1 = Have foreigners in family or circle of friends	1,280	39.0%
	3,282	100.0%
Sociodemographic		
Gender		
0 = Female	1,605	48.8%
1 = Male	1,685	51.2%
	3,290	100.0%
Age		
18–29	593	18.1%
30–44	992	30.2%
45–59	890	27.1%
60–74	625	19.0%
75–89	178	5.4%
90 and over	6	0.2%
	3,284	100.0%
Education		
1 = Ended school without graduating	43	1.3%
2 = Graduated from elementary school	1,492	45.7%
3 = Graduated from middle level school	1,003	30.7%
4 = Vocational/Technical school	184	5.6%
5 = Diploma from gymnasium or extended high school	531	16.3%
6 = Other graduation	11	0.3%
		99.9%

Contact	*N*	*Percentage*
Psychological		
Knowledge		
0 = Does not know correct percentage of foreigners in western Germany	2,817	85.5%
1 = Knows correct percentage	473	14.4%
	3,290	99.9%
Authoritarianism		
We should be thankful for authority figures who can tell us what we should do and how we should do it		
(1 = absolutely do not agree . . . 7 = complete and total agreement)		
1	1,233	37.6%
2	492	15.0%
3	414	12.6%
4	526	16.0%
5	292	8.9%
6	155	4.7%
7	168	5.1%
	3,280	99.9%
Political		
Republikaner		
0 = Do not intend to vote for Republikaner	3,342	98.5%
1 = Intend to vote Republikaner	48	1.5%
	3,390	100.0%
PDS		
0 = Do not intend to vote for PDS	3,164	96.2%
1 = Intend to vote for PDS	126	3.8%
	3,290	100.0%
Economic		
Fear of losing/changing job		
0 = Does not fear changing/losing job	2,428	89.0%
1 = Fears changing/losing job	362	11.0%
	3,290	100.0%
Unemployed in last ten years		
0 = employed	3,195	97.1%
1 = unemployed	95	2.9%
	3,290	100.0%
Present–Sociotropic		
How would you, in general, categorize the economic situation in modern Germany?		
1 = very good	26	0.8%
2 = good	387	11.8%
3 = so-so	1,599	48.9%
4 = bad	1,042	31.9%
5 = very bad	217	6.6%
	3,271	100.0%
Present–Personal		
And your personal economic situation today?		
1 = very good	64	1.9%
2 = good	1,562	47.6%
3 = so-so	1,295	39.4%
4 = bad	281	8.6%
5 = very bad	82	2.5%
	3,284	100.0%

Contact	*N*	*Percentage*
Future–Sociotropic		
What do you expect the economic situation to be like in Germany in one year?		
1 = very good	9	0.3%
2 = good	321	10.0%
3 = so-so	1,262	39.3%
4 = bad	1,388	43.2%
5 = very bad	235	7.3%
	3,215	100.1%
Future–Personal		
And your personal economic situation in one year?		
1 = very good	26	0.8%
2 = good	416	13.0%
3 = so-so	2,128	66.1%
4 = bad	575	17.9%
5 = very bad	69	2.2%
	3,206	100.0%

Source: ALLBUS General Social Survey, 1996

Appendix C

Questions and Variable Coding

Endogenous Variables

Antisemitism Holocaust Interpretation

If you look back on the Third Reich what would you say—if you look at Nazism in total do you see only bad sides, mostly bad sides, good and bad sides, or mostly good sides? 1 = only bad sides; 2 = bad sides mostly; 3 = good and bad sides; 4 = good sides mostly.

There are various opinions about the guilt of Germans under the Third Reich for the Jewish experience. Of this list, please tell which of these is closest to your personal views. 1 = Guilt falls on all Germans, even those born after the war; 2 = Guilt is borne by every group of that generation; 3 = Guilt falls only on those Germans who knew about the crimes against the Jews; 4 = Guilt only falls on those Germans who participated in transgressions against the Jews.

Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 6 whether you completely agree or disagree. I am ashamed that the Germans committed so many crimes against the Jews (1 = agree . . . 6 = disagree).

Classical Antisemitism Latent Variable

In the following we are concerned with qualities that characterize the Jews. How would you describe the Jews? (1 = trustful . . . 7 = mistrustful) (1 = not intent on money . . . 7 = intent on money).

In the Bible, the Jews are guilty of the death of Jesus. What is your opinion? 1 = it is wrong to speak about Jewish guilt in the death of Jesus; 2 = guilt lies with the Jews who convicted him at that time; 3 =

I don't know, I haven't thought about it; 4 = Guilt lies on the Jews who lived at that time; 5 = All Jews in general are guilty for the death of Jesus.

Economic Satisfaction Latent Variable

Please tell me from this list how pleased you are with your income (work). 1 = completely unpleased; 2 = rather unpleased; 3 = rather pleased; 4 = completely pleased.

How do you judge your economic situation today? 1 = very bad; 2 = bad; 3 = so-so; 4 = good; 5 = very good.

Anti-Foreign Sentiment Latent Variable

Please tell me whether you agree completely, rather less, or not at all.

These foreigners intensify the unemployment of Germans.

These foreigners abuse the operation of our social systems.

Most German politicians worry too much about these foreigners and not enough about Germans.

1 = not at all; 2 = rather less; 3 = rather more; 4 = completely.

Exogenous Variables

Education: 1 = elementary school without apprenticeship; 2 = elementary school with apprenticeship; 3 = further schooling without completing exams; 4 = completed exams for secondary school; 5 = studium.

GDR: 0 = resides in western Germany; 1 = lives in the territories of the former GDR.

Worker: 1 = unskilled worker; 0 = all others.

Gender: 0 = male; 1 = female.

Religiosity–Church Attendance: 1 = never attends; 2 = attends family celebrations; 3 = attends on special holy church days; 4 = attends several times but at least once per month; 5 = attends Sunday or nearly every Sunday.

Age was coded as exact age at the time of the survey.

Ideology: 1 = Left . . . 10 = Right.

Notes

Introduction

1. I am using the term "racism" in its broadest sense to include antisemitism and anti-ethnic affect against foreigners.

Chapter 1. The German Economy, "Foreigners," and Jews

1. The source for these data is the *Statistisches Bundesamt.* As reliable unemployment data for the GDR are unavailable before 1990, the data in figure 1.1 consist of only the states that were part of the FRG prior to unification. The growth data in figure 1.2 consist of the FRG states before unification and the united Germany after 1990.

Chapter 2. Reunification with East Germany and the Refugee Problem

1. In general, references made to the German nations before reunification in 1990 are to "East" and "West" Germany. References to the united Germany are to "eastern" and "western" Germany and to "eastern" and "western" Germans.

2. The Free Democratic Party has been the most frequent coalition partner of both the SPD and CDU/CSU in postwar German governments. It is at present out of the government. The FDP has tended to stress economic conservatism and a free market strategy along with an emphasis on political liberty and rights.

Chapter 3. The Question of Economic Threat and Anti-Foreign Sentiment

1. The survey was conducted by the EMNID Institut for *der Spiegel.* Neither institution bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations pre-

sented in this book. The data consist of a random sample of German citizens gathered from November 30 through December 17, 1991. Of 2,933 subjects, 993 lived in the territories of the former GDR at the time of the survey. Factorial weightings were applied in the sampling procedure to attain the correct representation of different demographic groups.

2. Since some of the literature suggests that those most exposed to the presence of a minority group are likely to be most threatened and consequently to express hostile attitudes and behavior, I experimented by dividing Germany a number of ways (see Quillian 1995: 586–611). For example, I developed a dummy variable consisting of areas such as the Saarland and Nordrhein-Westfalen and coded them as 1 and all other areas as 0. These areas are highly industrialized, with large numbers of foreign workers. But I found that these citizens were no more sensitive than others. Thus, it is possible that the significant findings for the former GDR may illustrate something beyond economic dissatisfaction. I develop this theme more fully in chapter 4.

3. Appendix 3.1 illustrates the small number of respondents classified as unskilled workers or voters for the Republikaner Party. While the variables would seem to present a problem in terms of skewness and kurtosis, the model was insensitive as to whether or not these variables were included. I experimented by excluding one or both and in the end believed more was gained by leaving them in the model. The fit of the model is very good regardless. See Bollen's (1989: 434–39) discussion of the skewness problem with categorical variables.

4. We utilized standardized coefficients. Gamma (γ) represents the impact of the exogenous (x) variables on the endogenous (η) variables. β measures the impacts between the endogenous variables. The γ coefficients are regression coefficients in the relationships between the latent constructs and each of the observed measures of y. To estimate the coefficients of the three latent constructs, I fixed the values of "job," "German mixing," and "foreigners hurt jobs" at 1.

Overall, the explanatory power of the model is good with a coefficient of determination of .415, and the explanation of anti-foreign sentiment is very good. The squared multiple correlation coefficient is .596. The ratio of chi-square to the degrees of freedom is within the bounds of acceptability, although it is not as strong as the other measures of fit.

5. Only three exogenous variables had a bivariate correlation with anti-foreign sentiment. These are education ($r = .343$), Republikaner vote ($r = .162$), and ideology ($r = .184$). The LISREL analysis demonstrates that these variables are mediated either through German identity or economic satisfaction. Thus, the relationship of all exogenous variables to anti-foreign sentiment is indirect.

As indicated in figure 2.1, the assumption of independent error terms was violated in two of the latent variables. By not treating the error terms as independent of each other in these cases, the fit of the model was improved in

terms of chi-square, and there was no appreciable change in the direction or magnitude of the coefficients in the model.

6. Variables are coded the same in model 2 as model 1. The exceptions are the following.

Return workers to homeland: What do you think about the proposition that foreign workers should be allowed immigration for only a few months a year and then be made to go back to their homeland? 0 = disagree; 1 = agree.

Deny refugee status: I am now showing you a list of some ethnic groups of other countries. Please tell me whether members of these groups after proof of individual cases should be recognized in the Federal Republic as refugees or whether they should in principle be rejected: Croats from Yugoslavia, Kurds from Turkey, Albanians from Albania, Gypsies from Romania, Serbs from Yugoslavia: 1 = accepted; 2 = rejected. Additive scores were calculated by summing the responses for each individual.

Foreigners' effect on finances: Assuming that there were no foreigners in Germany, do you believe things would be better for you financially, worse, or would it not change your finances? 1 = better; 2 = would not change; 3 = worse.

Chapter 4. More Recent Evidence of Anti-Foreign Sentiment

1. The data were collected by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung und Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA). German Social Survey (ALLBUS), 1996 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1996. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1997. The original collectors of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for the uses of this collection or interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.

2. The statistical tests are not included in the table but are available from the author. In all of the data analysis in all chapters, I include only those respondents who hold German citizenship.

3. The reliability coefficients for the indices are as follows:

general anti-foreign sentiment $\alpha = .725$
lifestyle $\alpha = .653$
neighborhood $\alpha = .823$
marriage $\alpha = .859$
naturalization $\alpha = .748$
equal rights $\alpha = .881$

4. Coding for these noncontinuous independent variables is presented in appendix 4.1. The tolerance variable was composed of these two items: There

are a few people whose views would be considered extreme by most people's standards. Think about persons who would wish to destroy the government through a revolution. Please tell me to what extent these people should be able to perform the following actions:

Hold public assemblies in which to express their views
Publish books in which they express their views

Possible answers are: 1 = should not be allowed in any case; 2 = should actually be disallowed; 3 = yes, it should be allowed; 4 = should be allowed in every case. $\alpha = .865$.

5. A recent work that stresses the importance of reconciling different approaches to prejudice is Sniderman, Peri, et al. (2000).

6. Because of the complexity of table 4.12 as it already exists, partial r^2 statistics are not included. Again, these data are available from the author on request.

7. In the case of political and social rights and the desirability of having a foreigner marry into the family, both coefficients do not meet the .05 level of significance, but they are different from zero at the level of .10.

8. Again, the partial r^2 statistics are available from the author.

Chapter 5. An Economic Theory of Antisemitism?

1. Variable coding is presented in table 5.1.

2. Results are essentially the same regardless of whether the insignificant paths are eliminated. Figure 5.2 indicates that the assumption of independent error terms was violated in the economic satisfaction latent variable. By not treating the error term as independent in this construct, the fit of the model was improved in terms of chi-square, and there was no substantive change in the interpretation of the model. For the exogenous constructs, the values of "job," "German mixing," and "Christian Democrats" were fixed at 1.

For the "deny refugee status" endogenous variable, I attempt to develop a latent construct in which each group (Gypsies, Albanians, etc.) would be estimated as a separate factor loading. While policy support across groups was highly correlated, using an unmeasured variable proved impossible because of the highly correlated error term between immigrant groups. It produced an astronomical chi-square and an unstable model fit. Accordingly, I treated the refugee variable as an additive index. Chronbach's α for the scale is .850 in the western region and .868 in the eastern region.

3. I suspected that church attendance perhaps was an inadequate measure of religiosity, and I substituted church membership into the LISREL model. Those who did not identify with a religion were coded as 0 while all others were coded as 1, but this procedure failed to discern an effect on antisemitism.

Also, both variables were entered into the model simultaneously, and no effect was detected on the latent variables. Finally, I experimented by coding dummy variables for either Catholics or Protestants and similarly was unable to detect any substantial effect on the dependent variables.

4. A possible reason why I may be unable to detect economic effects is that some research has shown that voters are more likely to respond to the national as opposed to the individual economic situation; however, assessing prejudice against Jews and foreigners is a bit different from determining a vote choice. In any event, no sociotropic questions are available in the EMNID survey. See Alford and Legge (1983).

5. I tested for a number of reciprocal relationships to include this one. I believe it makes the most sense substantively to specify the model in this way.

Chapter 6. Antisemitism in Germany at the Millennium

1. One important exception was the desecration of the Weissensee cemetery located in the eastern part of Berlin. It was opened in 1880 and contains the bodies of approximately 135,000 Jews. Included among those buried are Rabbi Leo Baeck, leader of the German Jewish community during much of the Third Reich. On the weekend that included October 3, 1999, the ninth anniversary of the unification of Germany, approximately a hundred gravestones were overturned, desecrated, or smashed. Antisemitic graffiti also was present. As I write, no one has been charged with the crime.

2. The translation is "a sponsorship in order to create a memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe."

3. A good summary of the basic issues surrounding the *Historikerstreit* is contained in Peter Baldwin's *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust and the Historians' Debate* (1990).

4. A broader issue beyond the *Historikerstreit* concerns "intentionalists" who believe that the Holocaust was planned by Hitler from the very beginning. On the other hand, the "functionalists" believe that the tragedy was a combination of evil intention and other related and unrelated historical events that made the slaughter of the Jews possible.

5. The reliability coefficient α for this index is .656. In item 2, "I am ashamed that the Germans committed so many crimes against the Jews," the codes are reversed to make them consistent with the other items.

Chapter 7. The Economy, Minorities, and the German Future

1. Price and unemployment data were gathered from the Statistisches Bundesamt. Time series data on a variety of economic indicators are available at their Web site at http://www.zr.destatis.de/.

2. The site for the Office of Consular and Legal Affairs is at http://www.germanembassyottowa.org/cala/citizen.html (October 20, 2002).

3. A classical discussion of issues of forgiveness and reconciliation are found in Wiesenthal (1976).

4. A suit against Ford Motor Company that originated in the United States has been thrown out of court by a federal judge who ruled that the United States did not have jurisdiction over violations of the law in Germany.

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Index

German Studies / Economics / Jewish Studies / Ethnic Studies

"A well-written analysis of anti-Semitism and xenophobiain contemporary Germany, presenting findings that challenge prevalent stereotypes."

CHAIM I. WAXMAN, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

SCHOLARLY, OBJECTIVE, INSIGHTFUL, AND ANALYTICAL, *Jews, Turks, and Other Strangers* studies the causes of prejudice against Jews, foreign workers, refugees, and immigrant Germans in contemporary Germany. Using survey material and quantitative analyses, Jerome Legge convincingly challenges the notion that German xenophobia is rooted in economic causes. Instead, he sees a more complex foundation for German prejudice, particularly in a reunified Germany where perceptions of the "other" sometimes vary widely between east and west, a product of a traditional racism rooted in the German past. By clarifying the foundations of xenophobia in a new German state, Legge offers a clear and disturbing picture of a conflicted country and a prejudice that not only affects Jews but also fuels a larger, anti-foreign sentiment.

JEROME S. LEGGE JR. is professor and associate dean of the School of Public Affairs and Policy at the University of Georgia.

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