The Jews of France Today

Identity and Values

Erik H. Cohen

BRILL

The Jews of France Today

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In Memory of

Prof. Annie Kriegel

After serving as my PhD advisor, she devoted herself unstintingly to my studies on Jewish education and especially on French Jewry, from 1986 until her death in 1995. I cannot exaggerate her historical and sociological input.

Prof. Shlomo (Seymour) Fox

His help in the pioneer research on French Jewry during 1986–1988, when I finished my studies at Jerusalem Fellows, was decisive and most influential, especially in helping me address the community leadership dimension of the results.

It was an honor and an immense opportunity to learn under the inspiration of these mentors.

May these pages serve as a modest reminder of their blessed memory!

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Steven M. Cohen

Prof. Steven M. Cohen is a research professor of Jewish social policy at Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion.

The prevailing and most resonant images of world Jewry have been typically framed and dominated by their two largest communities comprising 80% of the global Jewish population—Israeli Jewry and American Jewry. As anyone reading Erik Cohen's masterful and insightful analysis of the Jews of France today knows, an exclusive focus upon the two largest Jewish communities seriously misses the complexity, distinctiveness, and seeming paradoxes presented by the third largest Jewish population in the world today.

The Jews of France consist of approximately 500,000 individuals, roughly as many Jews as are now found in the United Kingdom and the Former Soviet Union combined. Not only home to a rich history; France is also home to a community rich in terms of culture, religion, and politics today. In so many ways, this Jewish population and this Jewish community are so remarkably unlike those found elsewhere, be they in Israel (as might be expected) or other parts of the Diaspora (as might not be readily appreciated).

As Prof. Cohen tells us, in terms of sheer numbers (over 350,000), this is the largest Sephardi community outside of Israel. With upwards of 70% of its members identifying as Sephardi, it is also the most proportionately Sephardi community in the Jewish world. (This observation includes Israel, where only a minority of the Jewish population is of Sephardi origin, even if we include as Sephardi the "Eastern" or "Mizrachi" Jews, whose Sephardi connection is, in fact, tenuous.)

Upon a bit of historical and geographic reflection, one can readily understand how France became the ultimate destination for contemporary Jews descended from ancestors who built a thriving culture in Spain several centuries ago. Following their expulsion in the 15th century, thousands of Sephardi Jews migrated to Morocco and other North African countries. Of course, years later, these Mediterranean regions came under the political control and cultural sway of France.

In the mid-20th century, their Jews migrated en masse to France, even as others among them headed east to the newly founded State of Israel. In France, the new arrivals' demographic, religious, political, and cultural character provided a sharp contrast with—and in many ways confronted and supplanted—the highly modernized and Westernized indigenous population, one with its own local origins that extends back for centuries. The Ashkenazi population is one which reflects decades of ongoing Jewish migration, mostly from Eastern Europe, a process which has left its own imprint in religio-cultural strata reflecting varying degrees of integration into France. In France, over the last 60 years, the Jews of Spherad (Hebrew for Spain) met and, in many cases, contested with the Jews of Ashkenaz (Hebrew for what is now Germany). France, then, has become the meeting ground of two proud, historic Jewish civilizations.

In France, as in no other countries, the highly complicated relationships with the larger society and with the local population are powerful and ever-present factors influencing the ongoing construction of Jewish identities. Perhaps more vividly than elsewhere, official and popular France has long sent a contrasting dual message of conditional acceptance to its Jews and other minorities. On the one hand, since 1789, French elites have portrayed the Republic as democratic and tolerant. On the other hand, the ethos of civic inclusion comes with an explicit and forceful expectation of conformity. It is a message that, at least to minorities, expresses a lack of welcoming, to say the least, to the perpetuation of serious group differences. It is a message that has had special consequences for the Jews, both historically and in our own times.

This dual message extends back as far as 1789, when Count Stanislas-Marie-Adélaide de Clermont-Tonnerre, known as a liberal and inclusivist in his time, famously proclaimed, "We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals." As he went on to explain, "We must refuse legal protection to the maintenance of the so-called laws of their Judaic organization; they should not be allowed to form in the state either a political body or an order. They must be citizens individually."

Only in France could the head of state demand—as did Napoleon in 1806—that a specially assembled body of Jewish notables provide, in effect, assurances that Jews could function as loyal citizens and assimilable members of the larger society. Today's clashes over official French policy toward Muslim practices and dress, then, can be seen

as standing in direct line with the parallel issues and debates that centered on French Jews fully two centuries ago.

Writing about American Jewry, the late distinguished social scientist Charles S. Liebman wrote that American Jews were torn (and hence deeply ambivalent) about two competing urges. One is the desire to fully integrate as Americans, and the other is to construct a way to survive as Jews. If the urges for social integration and group survival have proved problematic and anxiety-provoking for American Jews—and they have—they have proved equally, if not more, problematic for French Jewry. Whatever the divisions within American Jewry about how best to achieve integration and survival, the polarization within French Jewry around the acute tensions of integration and survival are even sharper, more keenly felt, contested and contentious.

Adding to the distinctive group anxieties of French Jewry is the historic and contemporary presence of anti-semitism, whose depth and pervasiveness are hard for American readers to readily appreciate. Like much of Europe—and very much unlike the United States—anti-semitism in France has deep and long-enduring roots and origins, extending back centuries and woven deeply into the culture and social thought of the country. Whereas blacks are the quintessential minority group for the United States, Jews are the classic minority for France (and its neighbors). The Dreyfus case—to take a single outstanding example—is, after all, a sordid chapter in the history of France and takes its place as among the best known incidents in the history of modern anti-semitism outside the Shoah. Moreover, it was in France (unlike in the UK), where thousands of area Jews tragically perished in the Holocaust, abetted in their destruction by French officialdom and the local populace. Most recently, the immigration of literally millions of Muslims, reaching a size that dwarfs the local Jewish population several-fold, has helped bring about new heights to feelings of uneasiness and vulnerability among the highly disparate and diverse population that is French Jewry.

As Erik Cohen teaches us, these and other factors have produced some remarkable contrasts in Jewish identity among French Jews. We see the emergence and crystallization of particularly distinctive configurations of Jewish identity, patterns that bear instructive analytic parallels with that found in the US and elsewhere, even if they are unique to France today.

Indeed, the peculiarities of French Jewry abound. This is, after all, as Prof. Cohen reminds us, a community that dwells amidst

extraordinary popular antagonism to Israel yet, of all large Diaspora communities, maintains the thickest and richest connection to Israel and its society. It is a place where almost a third of children attend Jewish day schools (more than the US, but not all that different from levels elsewhere), while as many attend Catholic schools—another oddity that sharply differentiates French Jewry from its counterparts around the world.

Most provocatively, Cohen develops what he calls an "axiological typology" of Jewish identity, divided the Jews of France into Individualists, Revivalists, Traditionalists and Universalists. The suggestive schema, based on universal values rather than a specifically Jewish scale, may well allow for comparisons of Jewish and non-Jewish populations in France, as well as with Jews elsewhere. In this and other ways, this study offers an in-depth survey of the French Jewish population and a theoretical platform for international or cross-cultural comparisons.

For all these reasons and more, *The Jews of France Today: Identity and Values*, by Erik H. Cohen, provides a highly readable and highly insightful analysis of an important Diaspora Jewish community. It is one that has been under-researched by social scientists, and poorly understood, even by local experts, to say nothing of leading thinkers, communal figures, and otherwise well-informed Jews around the world. This concise yet comprehensive examination of the varieties of ever-changing Jewish identities in France today not only illuminates some of the mysteries of French Jewry. The original social scientific monograph by Prof. Cohen provokes a rethinking of the very meaning of contemporary Jewish identity around the world in the early 21st century.

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We also consulted many scholars and experts, each of whom revealed to us a particular aspect (historical, sociological or political) of Jewish life in France today. Dozens of leaders and employees of the community were kind enough to meet us. For us, these conversations were particularly fruitful.

Such a study would not have been possible without the devotion and professional work of our staff, whose names we mention in the book, and to whom we offer heartfelt gratitude.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF FRANCE

The Jewish community of France is the second largest and one of the most vibrant Diaspora communities in the world today.[1] This study about the Jews of France would appear to be the first of its kind in the field of Jewish social demography. It attempts to address as many issues as possible in order to provide a wide-ranging, relevant, accurate and up to date picture of the Jews of France.

First, a brief history of the Jews in France and overview of the political and cultural climate is given, particularly to orient non-French readers to the basic socio-historical context. Some of the key questions and concepts, regarding French Jewish identity and life are introduced, along with a summary of the sociological, psychological and philosophical debates and discussions surrounding these issues. Major prior surveys and their findings are summarized.

The main part of the book presents the results and analysis of a national survey of the Jews of France conducted in 2002 and several follow-up studies. Through interviews, it brings out some little-known episodes in the history of the Jews of France, on both a large and small scale.

Analyzing data on demographics, religious practice and community involvement is one way of understanding how French Jews think about and express Jewish identity. The results of the empirical survey give insight into daily life of the Jews in France today. Another equally

[1] According to DellaPergola's estimate (2004), France is home to just under half a million Jews, while Russia has just under a quarter of a million Jews. Other sources estimate the Jewish population of Russia as significantly higher, possibly making it the second largest Diaspora. Thus, the U.S. State Department 2005 Religious Freedom Report estimates between 600,000 and 1 million Jews remaining in Russia. The Jewish Virtual Library website reports 717,000 Jews in Russia. Based on my familiarity with DellaPergola's work and methods, I accept his figure as the most accurate, but recognize the inherent difficulty in assessing the number of Jews remaining in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The complex and sensitive issue of counting France's Jews will be addressed in greater detail later.

important way is to read what French Jews are writing on the subject. Therefore, a section of the book is dedicated to presenting an overview of some of the pivotal philosophical writings about being a Jew in France.[2] This section of the book differs significantly in tone and style from the empirical study. It is philosophical rather than sociological, and distinctly "Continental" in tone and flavor. This section was included to broaden and enrich the picture of French Judaism today.

While the other major Diaspora communities—the United States, Russia, Argentina, Canada, and the United Kingdom—are all predominantly Ashkenazic, the French Jewish community represents the largest predominantly Sephardic Diaspora population in the world; over 70% of French Jews today are of Sephardic background. Paris and its suburbs (where the preponderance of French Jews live) is the largest Sephardic-Jewish urban center in the Diaspora. Due to the numerical significance of this community and its unique history, an understanding of the values and identity of French Jewry is critical to the field of contemporary Jewish studies.

Taken together, the book gives a broad view of a community that is varied and important, but little known (despite all the commonplace opinions about them). We would like to draw attention to the difference between "the Jewish population of France" and "the Jewish community of France". The former includes everyone who declared themselves Jews or *Israélites*[3] irrespective of their idea of Jewish identity or their religious status. The latter concept is used here to indicate those who said they attend Jewish institutions in France, whether frequently or only occasionally. Using these definitions, a person who declares him or herself to be Jewish or *Israélite* yet never participates in any Jewish institutions would be considered part of the "Jewish population of France" but not part of the "Jewish community of France." This necessarily means that the "Jewish population of France" is

[2] This book is about sociology and not about theology or philosophy. What interests us here is how Jews perceive and define themselves. By the same token, the book does not seek to be normative. Its purpose is not to say what Jews ought to do, believe or think, but rather to provide current information on the activities that characterize the Jews of France at the beginning of the 21st century.

[3] Translator's note: While the term "*Israélite*" literally means Jew, it has an acculturated sense, and has no exact equivalent in English. Where possible it will be retained, to highlight a contrast with "Juif". The implications and interpretations of these two terms are discussed in greater detail on pages 22–26.

larger than the "Jewish community of France".[4] The phrase "French Jewish households" refers to all Jewish heads of family in France who answered this survey.

Of course, every sociological study, by dint of circumstance, is impacted by its time. It could be argued that the data is already outdated and that the analysis was distorted by the political climate that prevailed at that time. In fact, the data collected is not just circumstantial. The studies reported in this book allow for a perspective over a span of time which emphasizes both stable and fluid states. Communal and religious practices can certainly be impacted by the social climate. However, by comparing the results of the main study conducted in 2002 with those of a previous study in 1988 and follow-up studies conducted through 2007, we found that social behavior was more stable than one might have thought. The "hard" socio-demographic data, such as age and place of birth, are *a priori* even more stable. Nevertheless, even if the social atmosphere did not directly affect the socio-demographic data, there is no doubt that the malaise and problems experienced in recent years by French Jews are certainly discernible in several areas.

The comprehensive empirical surveys of the Jews of France presented here offer the most recent data available and a rich analysis of this fascinating segment of the Jewish population. There are several original features of this study. First, representative samples from the Jewish population have been surveyed longitudinally. Second, it is both quantitative and qualitative. Third, the empirical data is analyzed using sophisticated multi-dimensional tools and techniques, facilitating the development of typologies of French Jewry. Fourth, an axiological typology is developed, based on universal values rather than a specifically Jewish scale, which allows for comparisons of French Jewry to other populations, Jewish and non-Jewish. Thus, this study offers an in-depth survey of the French Jewish population and a theoretical platform for international or cross-cultural comparisons.

Our hope is that this holistic study will let us get closer to the French Jewish community and to know French Jews better.

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[4] The concepts of the "French Jewish community" and the "Jewish population of France" are often employed indiscriminately, often simply for convenience. Moreover, the concept of the "French Jewish community" is also used to indicate all the institutions of French Jewry.

1. *A Brief History of the Jews in France*

Archeological evidence of Jews living in the region of what is now France has been found from as early as the first century CE. Evidently, Jews moved throughout the Roman Empire and eventually to the Gaul region following the defeat of the Israelite kingdom and the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE. Though their numbers in the Gaul region remained low, Jews developed important trade enterprises and professions, and some had close relations with the royal families and their courts. As the Catholic Church gained political strength in the area, from the sixth century CE on, Jews were subject to legal restrictions and taxes, as well as to periodic violent attacks, forced conversion attempts, blood libels, and expulsions. Nevertheless, Jewish communities slowly grew through immigration from other European countries and some conversion to Judaism, and the Jews maintained relative autonomy over their daily lives.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, French Jewry experienced a golden age of Torah study, producing such luminaries as Rashi[5] and his disciples, as well as famous religious schools in Paris and Provence. The Crusades sparked waves of violence against Jews, and in the late Middle Ages a series of expulsion orders were issued against the Jews of this region, eventually reducing them to a few small, scattered and isolated communities subject to restrictive laws such as those requiring them to wear distinctive clothing and confining those who did not leave to ghettos. However, as the French Crown annexed territories, neighboring Jewish communities were brought into the kingdom. Thus, while the Paris region had very few Jews, there were larger Jewish communities in such areas as Alsace-Lorraine, the city of Metz, Bordeaux, the papal cities and surrounding regions of Avignon, Carpentras, Cavaillon and the Comtat Venaissin. Due to their important economic role and the ability of the new territories to maintain some control over local laws, Jews were allowed to remain in these areas, despite the official expulsion of Jews. For example, in Bordeaux, Sephardi Jews were tolerated under the euphemism "Portuguese merchants."

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[5] Rashi (an acronym for Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki) wrote commentaries on the entire Torah and Talmud which, to this day, are considered among the most important sources in Jewish religious study.

Over the centuries, the French Jewish population fluctuated from highs of up to 100,000 to lows of several thousand individuals. On the eve of the French Revolution there were an estimated 40,000 Jews in France, primarily in two regions: the German/Ashkenazic Jews in Alsace-Lorraine and Sephardic Jews in the southern part of the country.[6]

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the ideas of the Enlightenment, which led to the eventual fall of the *Ancien Régime*, also shifted attitudes and official policies towards the Jews. Thus, in 1791, shortly after the French Revolution, France became the first European country to grant political emancipation to the Jews. According to the philosophy of the French Republic, this newly granted civic equality required that all allegiances to religion or ethnic group be subordinated to allegiance to the State. As Clermont-Tonnerre stated to Constituent Assembly on December 23, 1789, "We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals… the presumed status of every man resident in a country is to be a citizen".[7] Welcoming the freedoms and political rights accorded them by the Republic, the Jews of France assimilated into this secular political culture that relegated Jewish identity and ritual practice to the private realm. This philosophy still guides the cultural political environment of France, and forms the ideological background against which the modern Jewish French community has emerged.

The Reign of Terror that followed the Revolution saw the suppression of all religious institutions, including Jewish ones. Then, after Napoleon crowned himself emperor, he established the Central Consistory (*Consistoire Israélite*)[8] that centralized supervision of local Jewish

[6] Summary of the early history of the Jews in France compiled from: Ayoun (1997); Benbassa (2000); Blumenkranz (1972); Encyclopedia Judaica (1971); Green (1984); Schwarzfuchs (1975, 1979, 1989); Schechter (2003).

[7] Quoted in Hunt (1996: 88).

[8] The Consistories were created by Napoleon by decree in 1808, making binding the 1806 regulation of the Assembly of Jewish Notables, which was the organizing body of the Jewish religion. The Central Consistory of France, located in Paris, is made up of three Chief Rabbis and two lay members. The regional Consistories are headed by a Chief Rabbi and three lay members, appointed by 25 notables who in turn have been elected by the members of the Jewish communities. Since the law of 1905 separating Church and State, the General Consistory and the regional Consistories have become associations, (Jewish Religious Association, known by the French initials ACI), which cover the Jewish religion, the Chief Rabbinate of France and the Rabbinical College.

communities and convened an assembly of Jewish rabbis and leaders, named after the ancient Israelite governing body the Sanhedrin (named after the governing body in ancient Israel), to endorse and legitimize his policies for integration and assimilation of France's Jews as full citizens of the regime.[9] The consistorial system established by Napoleon had profound, long-lasting implications for the structure of community life of modern French Jewry. "To this day French consistorial Judaism has maintained religious diversity, a situation which has always curbed the few attempts to establish dissident, Reform or Orthodox, communities. This flexibility later enabled the integration of immigrants from North Africa".[10]

During this time period, Jews from other European countries and Russia moved to France, although not in great numbers. The immigrants were often criticized, not only by French non-Jews but also by native French Jews, for not assimilating quickly enough or thoroughly enough into French culture, for remaining ethnically and religiously distinct. In fact, instilling French cultural values and patriotism towards the State were important goals of Jewish educational and community institutions in France.[11] These goals were achieved with much success, and the Jews of France were, on the whole, well acculturated and strongly patriotic. The dominant French Jewish institutions, such as the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* created in 1860, distanced themselves from Jewish nationalism as embodied by the emerging Zionist movement.

A century after their political emancipation, the Jews of France largely viewed themselves as fully integrated French citizens. French Jewry moved into the heart of France both geographically—concentrating more in the Paris region, particularly after Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine—and economically, becoming part of the French bourgeois and academic elite. However, the persistence of anti-Semitism was revealed, particularly during the infamous "Dreyfus Affair." This began in 1894 with the accusation and conviction of treason against Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French Army. Although Dreyfus was eventually cleared of the charges, the affair

[9] Regarding intermarriage, usury, and French civil law see Encyclopedia Judaica (1971); Hyman (1998).
[10] *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971: 29).
[11] Hyman (1979, 1997).

brought to the surface expressions of virulent and wide-spread anti-Semitism, including riots against Jews.[12]

Nevertheless, conditions were better for the Jews in France than in most of Europe. In 1905 (partly in reaction to the Dreyfus Affair), France passed a law separating Church and State. French Jews became prominent in artistic and literary circles. Jews came to France from Russia following the Communist Revolution and between the First and Second World Wars. As anti-Semitism moved across Europe, Jewish immigration to France from other European countries increased dramatically, by some estimates doubling the French Jewish population.[13]

Then, in June, 1940, France surrendered to the invading German Nazi forces. Power was given to Marshal Philippe Pétain and the Vichy regime was established.[14] During the occupation from 1940–1944 the Vichy regime collaborated with the Nazis. More than a quarter of France's Jewish population was deported or killed. In a notorious raid in 1942, over 12,000 French Jews including some 4,000 children, were arrested, and held at the Vélodrome d'Hiver before being deported; most died in Nazi death camps. The educational and institutional structure of the Jewish community was almost completely destroyed.[15] There was, of course, resistance to the Nazi occupiers, including Jewish resistance, Charles de Gaulle's Free French Forces and French citizens who sheltered Jews (the town of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon has been particularly recognized for sheltering thousands of French Jews from deportation and death). Nevertheless, the French Jewish community was decimated; the psychological impact of the betrayal of the slogan of *liberté*, *fraternité*, and *égalité* was no less devastating.

After World War II, displaced Jewish French citizens returned, along with refugees from central and eastern European countries.[16] However, the revitalization of the French Jewish community was brought about largely by the mass immigration of Jews from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria during the 1950s and 1960s. Jews had lived in North Africa since the period of the Roman Empire. In addition to their religious basis in Rabbinic and mystical teachings (Talmud and Kabbalah),

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[12] Marrus (1971).

[13] *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971); Schor (1985); Hyman (1998); Schwarzfuchs (1998).

[14] Birnbaum (1982); Hyman (1979); Marrus (1981).

[15] Cohen, E.H. (1991). For the author's publications related to the Jews of France, see separate bibliography following the general reference list.

[16] Hyman (1979, 1998).

the North African Jewish communities were influenced by the many cultures with whom they came in contact: Oriental, Arab, Berber, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian. During the colonial era, France had annexed Algeria (in 1848) and established protectorates over Tunisia (1881) and part of Morocco (1912). Many Jews of the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria, became French citizens during this time. The *Alliance Israélite Universelle* established schools for Jews in French North Africa, which emphasized French language and culture. As each of these countries gained independence (Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Algeria in 1962) and came under the sway of distinctly Muslim-Arab nationalist movements the majority of Jews left, most migrating either to Israel or to France. Of those who remained in North Africa after its independence, most left following Israel's Six Day War (1967). (For a brief history of the Jews in North Africa see pages 134–137).

Although the Jews of North Africa arrived in France as citizens, fluent in French, and familiar with the culture, patriotic and supportive of the ideals of the Republic, they and their children also have a strong sense of Jewish identity and connection to Israel.[17] Their presence was a major catalyst for the rebuilding of Jewish institutions in France: synagogues, community centers and Talmud Torahs.[18]

Today, together with France as a whole, the Jewish population is struggling with fundamental questions related to national, ethnic and religious identity.

2. *The Current Social, Political and Cultural Climate*

Next, we shall take a brief look at the socio-political climate in which contemporary French Jewry exists. It should be noted that the survey was conducted in January 2002, which was a stressful period for the Jewish community of France. "Never before, in post-war France, have anti-Jewish elements emerged in so many social settings and encountered so little political and intellectual resistance, as since the autumn of 2000," wrote Pierre-André Taguieff, director of research at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique, in January 2002.[19] A study

[17] Bernheim (1997); Shurkin (2000); Laborde (2001); Cohen, E.H. (1986, 1991).
[18] Hyman (1998).
[19] Taguieff (2002: 11); see also Trigano (2002).

of anti-Semitism in France recorded 300 "hostile acts" against Jews in the Paris region between September 2000 and November 2001.[20] A French Ministry of Education report noted explicitly the danger faced by Jewish students, particularly in certain regions. Most of these hostile acts were committed by young Muslim immigrants, who ideologically link their violence towards Jews with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The management of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France,[21] however, has been careful not to link anti-Semitic outbursts in France to problems in the Middle East. If there was a link between the outburst of anti-Semitic acts in France in 2003 and events in the Middle East, an analysis of the data for 2004 showed that the relationship is less direct. "The number and type of incidents that occurred in 2004 and the rate with which they occurred appears to be less connected to outside causes. It appears that these occurrences of anti-Semitism are structurally deep-rooted and no longer draw on current political or military affairs."[22]

It must be recalled that the President of France during the time of the survey, Jacques Chirac and his government did make efforts to address and improve the situation. President Chirac did not miss an opportunity to recall the country's fight against racism and anti-Semitism. In fact, the website of the President of France[23] lists no less than 38 speeches by Jacques Chirac on this topic in the years 2000–2004. For example, speaking to a graduating class of police officers he said, "We have commenced this struggle, and we are firmly resolved to continue it by setting up this year an independent authority responsible for fighting

[20] A list of incidents affecting the country's Jewish communities since the beginning of the Second Intifada was first published in the *Observatoire du monde juif* (2001). In February 2002, the front page headline of *Le Monde* referred to a study of anti-Semitism in France (*Le Monde*, 2002). As for anti-Semitic acts in France, data collected in 2002 indicate that 21% of French Jews suffered anti-Semitism personally during the previous five years. This is a figure of great weight, substantially confirming the trend recorded during 2000 and 2001. CRIF (2004); UEJF (2002).

[21] The creation of CRIF goes back to the German occupation of France in World War Two. In July 1943 the General Committee for Jewish Defense was formed. An agreement with the central Consistoire (France's general synagogue organization) then led to the clandestine formation of CRIF In 1944 its charter was drawn up. Between 1944 and 1947 CRIF supported war victims. Today CRIF acts as the umbrella federation for over sixty Jewish organizations.

[22] Analyse des actes et des menaces antisémites: Année 2004. http://www.crif.org/?page=articles_display/detail&aid=4508&returnto=articles_display/detail_th_type&thid=4&artyd=5.

[23] http://www.elysee.fr/.

every sort of discrimination. By reaffirming in schools and in government and public departments, the principle of secularity, which allows everyone to live and practice their religion, sheltered from any pressure. And severely suppressing all acts of racism and intolerance, whatever they are."[24] Moreover, he spoke on the subject directly to the CRIF in May 2003. Chirac foresaw the danger of an explosion of violence, and assured his listeners that the state would ensure the right of everyone to their choices, attachments and origins, in complete safety. The State, said Chirac, is "much too precious for us to allow breaches to appear that in the long run would threaten our national cohesiveness. That is why the Government is exercising and will continue to exercise the greatest firmness towards all anti-Semitic acts and words, whether addressed towards people, symbols or property. We will not be apologists for crime or hatred. France is not an anti-Semitic country."[25] One year later, in July 2004, Chirac had to admit that firmness does not always bear fruit and that anti-Semitism had certainly increased in France. "Today, odious and despicable acts of hatred still sully our country. Discrimination, antisemitism, racism, every sort of racism, are again spreading out insidiously. They have affected our Jewish compatriots in our country since time immemorial. They affect our Muslim compatriots who have chosen to work and live in our country. In fact, they affect us all."[26]

Roger Cukierman, President of CRIF, acknowledged the efforts of by the French authorities. "I believe that France is today aware that attacks on Jews are attacks on France. The President has said this, the Prime Minister has said it, and it is very true. The Jews are the sentinels of the Republic. When things go badly in education, it is the Jews who encounter the first difficulties. When there is violence, it is

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[24] Similarly, on the occasion of the award of the rank of Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur to Mr. Steven Spielberg. Elysée Palace. Sunday, September 5, 2004, President Chirac said, "In this difficult period where we are witnessing the rise again of intolerance, racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and fanaticism, it is essential that the cinema, which affects each of us to the depth of our beings, must remind us of the horrors of the indescribable." Speech by President Jacques Chirac at the graduation ceremony for the 197th class of police officers at the National Police College in Nimes. Monday, November 8, 2004.

[25] Speech by President Jacques Chirac on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF). Elysee Palace. Thursday, May 22, 2003.

[26] Speech by President Jacques Chirac, given in Chambon-sur-lignon—Haute-Loire—on Thursday, July 8, 2004.

the Jews who are struck first, and very soon afterwards it is the turn of democracy. So I hope that France will revolt against the violence carried out by a part of the North African population."[27]

However, the statistics attest to the fact that such a 'revolt' against anti-Semitism has not taken place. According to figures from CRIF, there were 503 anti-Semitic acts recorded in 2003, and 590 in 2004.[28] For the President of the Paris Consistory, Moïse Cohen, the situation of the Jews in France is worrying but not hopeless. Worrying, he told us during a conversation in Paris, because on account of the resurgence of anti-Semitism, "…since the start of the second Intifada in October 2000, things have happened that we haven't seen in 60 years, since the Shoah. But even if I am not entirely reassured, I am today a bit calmer, because I can see that the rate of attacks is declining." Moïse Cohen attributes this reduction to the beginnings of a counter-offensive by moderate Islam in France.

In addition to physical attacks, the French Jewish community feels itself on the defensive in light of the pervasive anti-Israel sentiment, particularly in the Left and on university campuses in France. The ongoing debate as to a possible distinction between "anti-Zionism" and "anti-Semitism" touches on deep issues related to French values. As mentioned earlier, French Republican philosophy demands loyalty to the State of France alone, and French Jewish identification with the State of Israel may be considered to some extent disloyal. Even strong identification with a local ethnic community may be seen as conflicting with French values. Jews are sometimes accused of being "communitarian." This label, as pointed out by Wieviorka implies that it is necessary to choose between identifying with "the one and indivisible Republic and the community".[29] In this context Jews (and members of other minorities) may find their loyalty to the State questioned on the ground of their involvement with their ethnic or religious community.

The issue was the subject of a manifesto issued by some of France's most prominent intellectuals. Published in *Le Monde* in 2003, in a piece entitled "French Jews and France: Confidence Needs to be

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[27] Roger Cukierman, president of CRIF Paris, February 2004.

[28] Statistics from a summary of complaints lodged with the SPCJ (Department for the Protection of the Jewish Community) and matched against data from the Ministry of the Interior. The Director of CRIF, Haim Musicant, provided these figures to us.

[29] Wieviorka (1998, 1999).

Reestablished"[30] they asked, "How in fact can one not see a direct link between the 'new anti-Semitism' and the crisis of national identity? Not just because the growth in France of Islamic anti-Semitism is the effect of an integration crisis, but also because the rejection of the Jewish state is as though conjured up by the group mentality?" They go on to say that French Jews stimulate a sense of outsiderness among their non-Jewish compatriots, who are shocked to see Jews defining themselves vis-à-vis the French, and even against them. The signatories emphasized that there is an inflated tendency to "deplore the effects of the sickness while cultivating the virus." Namely, that the outbreak of anti-Semitism should not only be seen as linked to events in the Middle East, but also and especially to a deep national identity crisis and the decline of the nation's emancipating vision. "Thus through a tragic misinterpretation, some Jews believed that there was little to a possible alliance between affirmation of Jewish identity and the celebration of minorities and localism, in a word, the 'Other' against the nation."[31]

An analysis by Pierre Birnbaum is slightly different but it arrives at the same conclusions. France and the Republican model are undergoing a profound transformation, and the crisis of confidence between the state and the Jews only reflects that. Jews, says Birnbaum, are not divorced from a process taking place throughout French society, which favors civil society and a return to all forms of community life and distinctive cultures. "Jews too, in this process of a general return to cultures, have done everything to get back their own personality, which for various reasons they consider has been denied by the state.... In coming back to it today, in putting the emphasis on a return to society, in the climate of the times that is heavy with threats, one can imagine all sorts of inter-communal clashes that should not occur in French republican society."[32]

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[30] Les Juifs de France et la France, une confiance à rétablir. Manifesto signed by Gilles Bernheim, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Philippe de Lara, Alain Finkielkraut, Philippe Raynaud, Paul Thibaud, Michel Zaoui. Appeared in *Le Monde* of December 29, 2003. Available at http://www.in-nocence.org/pages/documents/juifsdefrance.html.

[31] Les juifs de France et la France, une confiance à rétablir. *Le Monde*, Op. cit.

[32] Pierre Birnbaum: "Les juifs sont à un tournant de leur histoire" [Jews are at a turning point in their history], http://www.uejf.org/tohubohu/archives/numero1/fils/pierrebimbaum.html. See also: Birnbaum (1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2002).

In fact, not only the French Jewish community but all of contemporary French society is facing an "identity crisis." The Jews of France form their individual and communal identities within the context of the larger debates surrounding multi-culturalism, religious fundamentalism, Republican values, and international politics.

3. *Relationship with Israel*

One of the key arenas in which such inter-communal clashes are occurring in contemporary France surrounds the issue of Israel and the relationship of French Jews to the Jewish State. It is true that a major aspect of contemporary Jewish identity in any contemporary Diaspora community is the relationship with Israel. For French Jews, this relationship has been particularly difficult to navigate.

In the international context, Israel-Diaspora relations have undergone a series of stages. Zionist ideology predicted and advocated the "negation of the Exile" following the establishment of a Jewish state. As it became apparent that significant numbers of Jews, particularly in Western democracies, were not going to relocate to the State of Israel, a new type of relationship had to be established between the State of Israel and Jews who voluntarily remained in Diaspora communities. Emphasis was placed on financial and political support for the new state and its immigrants. The Six Day War of 1967 marked a turning point and a new stage in Israel-Diaspora relations. Following Israel's victory, feelings of pride and identification with Israel intensified, one indicator of which was the sharp increase in participation in educational tours to Israel during the years following the war.[33]

Once it was recognized and accepted that significant numbers of Jews would choose to remain in Diaspora communities, Israel began sending emissaries to work in Jewish educational settings throughout the Jewish world, further increasing interaction between Israel and the Diaspora. By the 1980s, a reciprocal relationship had developed between Israel and Jewish Diaspora communities. Israel offered both a refuge for Jews (e.g. from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) and a central reference point for Jewish identity. Diaspora Jews became more vocal regarding social and political events in Israel, and began

[33] Lederhendler (2000); Cohen, E.H. (2002, 2008).

donating to specific causes rather than to general funds. Following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the relationship between Israel and the various Diaspora communities was again reassessed. Questions regarding the conflict between the obligation of Diaspora Jews to unconditionally support Israel as opposed to their right to criticize events there, and issues of loyalty to Israel during times of crisis, were vigorously debated in the Jewish press and in Jewish communities throughout the world.

The Israel-Diaspora relationship has not only changed over time: it is not homogenous throughout the Diaspora. Attitudes towards and images of Israel are impacted by the host societies within which the various Diaspora Jewish communities live, and by the nature of the local Jewish communities and their educational systems. The relationship of French Jews to the State of Israel, one of the issues which is explored in-depth in the surveys analyzed in this book, is inextricably tied to the social climate and political culture of France.

4. *French Jewish Philosophy on Jewish Identity and "The Jewish Fact"*

Part of the social culture includes the ways in which French Jews think about their individual and communal identities. There is a great deal of discussion and debate on French Jewish identity in Jewish homes, communties and institutions, and in the French Jewish media and literature.

The sociological data and analysis presented in this book can most fully be understood and appreciated—perhaps can *only* be fully understood and appreciated—in the context of a larger, ongoing discussion in France on the nature of identity. This discussion has been going on for over two centuries and the Jews have always been very 'visible' in French political discourse. Certainly since the time of the French Revolution and Emancipation, the case of the individual Jew and the Jewish collective in French society has been a subject of much interest and debate, and has served as a sort of barometer of the political climate. Following the Vichy Regime and the Shoah the issue gained a special urgency. It is no less discussed today.

One indication of the extent to which French Jews have acculturated is their participation in and contribution to the distinct genre of French philosophical literature. Alongside the many well-known non-Jewish French philosophers who have pondered questions of personal

and social identity, French Jews of course have been most prolific and have written profoundly and passionately on the subject. Numerous French Jewish philosophers have wrestled with questions such as: Who is Jewish and what makes one so? What does it mean to be a Jew? Is is possible to stop being Jewish? If it is, why choose to remain Jewish? How does Jewish identity interact with French identity? And, as Vladimir Rabi asks, "What's the point of Judaism? Why, and for what purpose, this opinionated resistance by a minority to survive within a natural, unfavorable or hostile environment?"[34]

These writings show the substantial content of the issue as it is perceived by the highly educated French Jewish community. The complex and sometimes abstract musings of such writers may be seen as the humus which has nourished contemporary conceptualizations of French Jewish identity. They express the conceptual basis on which French Jews have built their collective and individual identities, especially since World War II.

Jews have always had some difficulty knowing themselves, though not through any lack of introspection. Questioning one's identity is in fact so widespread among Jews that it is frequently seen as obsessive. Jewish self-consciousness is certainly in a permanent state of stress, to the point of being divided or even split. The Jew who observes himself is in fact the plaything of two contradictory forces. On the one hand he feels a sort of ephemeralness or fragility. His flimsy identity can shatter at any moment; it is malleable and in constant flux down to the level of his everyday being. A Jew thus knows that Jewish identity is not a given but a constant effort of being. On the other hand, Jewish identity is heavy, it sticks to the skin. This identity is there even without wanting it, and a Jew cannot get rid of it. When he thinks he has managed to distance himself from it, he finds it is still there, on his back like a shadow.

The struggle to determine who is Jewish and why they identify as such can be seen in the following excerpt from an interview we conducted with a company director from the Paris area highlights some of the identity issues with which French Jewry grapples. The man is the son of a Jewish militant communist married to a non-Jewish woman. He is also married to a non-Jewish woman and they have two children.

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[34] Rabi (1962: 319).

– "You meet people…Friends…Acquaintances…I come from anywhere etc. Ah, you're Jewish…Yes…And you…Now me, well…I…Yes, my father is Jewish, but I…I am not…In any case I always end up joking…to find those little things that make you feel like an accomplice…Now it bothers me…I say to myself…Wait, stop messing around…I am Jewish, yes or no?"
Interviewer: So what do you say today?

– "I don't know. I would say not more and not less. That's not the question. But I find that…especially as my children…Yes perhaps the biggest (5 years old), he had a *Shabbat* once at my sister."
Interviewer: What do the children know?

– "We have already told them a bit…But at their age it doesn't really go in."
Interviewer: Do you go to Jewish places?

– "No, I have Jewish friends. Whom I see once or twice a year. And a new business relationship. Let's say to make things simple that A.M. runs a small start-up. When we met the first time I gave him my name. He said, oh so you're Jewish! I started explaining my origins to him. And he answered, Ah yes. Me too. What do you mean, me too? You converted. And he started to explain that his Jewish mother had married a non-Jew. So that certainly creates something. But what we really had in common to consider ourselves Jews, I don't know how to say it, is truly secondary, minimal. Let's just say, "of origin". What's funny is that my sister married a Tunisian Jew and became religious. And he has a twin brother who keeps *Shabbat*. That is to say, he keeps *Shabbat* but he is not religious."

We may ask ourselves, why *is* this questioning about Jewish identity so pervasive? Do Americans, Englishman or Gypsies continually ask themselves if, why and how they are American, English or Gypsy? Why should these distinctive affiliations be in contradiction with the universality of being human? It is possible that Americans, Englishmen and Gypsies also ask themselves these questions, but if they do so it is quietly, whereas the questioning of Jewish identity is very loud. This fuss about identity is not by chance, but doubtless caused by the intensity and depth of the questioning. Through the trials and tribulations of their history, Jews have developed a highly sophisticated questioning about identity.[35] It sometimes even becomes contagious; this "Jewish obses-

[35] Mucchielli (2003); Hayoun (1995, 1996).

sion" with self-questioning has in fact passed over to other groups.[36] In France, Catholics too are asking questions about their identity. For example, the scholar Guy Michelat asks, are there not several ways of being Catholic?[37] Danièle Hervieu-Léger examines the various degrees of religiousness in France, considering independent factors such as the ongoing erosion in practice, the demographic collapse of the clergy and the break-up of the parish-based civilization that had shaped France.[38] The familiarity of this questioning of Catholic identity is curious. If in Guy Michelat's article we were to change "Catholics" to "Jews", we would find some of the same emphases on questions of identity that we associate with Jews. However, that is where the similarity ends. Beyond the act of personal faith, being Catholic means belonging to a group, whereas for a Jew, neither the act of faith nor belonging to a group are sufficient, even together, to define Jewish identity.

The sense of an identity crisis does not come, (as in the Catholic case) from any lack or erosion of interest in religious feeling. On the contrary, (as will be shown in results of the empirical survey) synagogues in France have never been so full. The problem is thus elsewhere, in the depths of consciousness. For someone who defines himself as both a Jew and an atheist, a Jewish identity defined by faith is meaningless. For Jews who are geographically or culturally isolated, what does belonging to a group mean? And for those who claim nothing—no belief or sense of group belonging—yet are still considered Jews, what is this Jewish identity?

At first, the identity question appears to lead to a dead end, or to an endless loop of objective and subjective arguments. Robert Misrahi goes to the heart of this issue right at the beginning of the introduction to his highly influencial book *La condition réflexive de l'homme juif [The reflexive condition of the Jewish man]*. He postulates that "…objectively there is an interest in the Jewish fact in contemporary thought,"[39] despite its tiny political and demographic scope. In this statement

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[36] On this subject see the Biblical story told in the section *Vayetzeh* (Genesis 23:1–7), in which the patriarch Jacob besieges shepherds like himself with questions, and how, according to the Midrash they "get rid of him" by suggesting he go talk with Rachel, (*Midrash Rabbah*).

[37] Michelat (1990a, 1990b).

[38] Hervieu-Léger (2001); Hervieu-Léger & Davie (1996).

[39] The concept of "Jewish fact", a highly heuristic concept, deserves an historical analysis in its own right. Léon Askénazi used this phrase as early as 1948 in his examination of traditional Jewish concepts of the name for the Jewish collective. Cf. Askénazi (2005: 245).

Misrahi is not simply noting the disproportionate attention given to Jews: his choice of words is telling. Here he uses the phrase "Jewish fact" rather than "Jewish condition", as in the title of his book. Later in the book he further complicates matters by adding another phrase, "Jewish phenomenon" which he uses interchangeably with "Jewish fact".[40] One could certainly differentiate between a "fact" and a "phenomenon"—the classic distinction sets the fact of *what is* against a phenomenon, or *what appears to be*. In this way, the "Jewish fact" should be clear-cut, defined, with its contours delineated, unchanging and stable, whereas the "Jewish phenomenon" would be more fluid, moving from one fact to another.[41] Misrahi's indiscriminate use of the phrases indicates the difficulty of trying to define the Jewish 'fact', 'phenomenon' and 'condition'.

Jews have always handled their search for identity in a radical manner. "To be Jewish is to have to justify your existence", wrote Edmond Jabès.[42] This is the essence of the issue, and it is particularly true in France, where Jews have had to choose: between Universal Man and Jew; between French and Jewish; between religious and secular; between France and Israel. Thus whether they like it or not, Jews live a permanent state of identity confusion, and it is this confusion that brings on the persistent self-questioning. It would appear that there is something in the Jewish consciousness that is forever disturbing and preventing any repose. To illustrate, we quote one example (taken from among thousands of others) of how this disarray and identity crisis is articulated in French literature. In *La greffe de printemps*,[43] one of the novels by Roger Ikor, the protagonist Yankel, a Polish immigrant (referred to as a "Pollack" in the novel), is going to have a child. Ikor writes, "No, it's not because of hygiene that he would circumcise Fernand. Not just because of hygiene. For memory's sake. So that the little one would never be tempted to forget his origins, to repudiate his own. French by nationality, yes; but also Jewish.—No, not Jewish as a noun, like French; Jewish as an adjective, like Christian. *So Jewish by religion?* No! Oh no! When a Frenchman says he is Catholic or Prot-

[40] The discussion of what differentiates a social fact from a phenomenon and the sociological and philosophical implications of these concepts for Jewish identity is revisited in the chapter French Jewish Philosophical Writings on Jewish Identity, pages 149–182.

[41] Lalande (1988: 765).

[42] Jabès (1963: 77).

[43] Ikor (1955).

estant, that does not necessarily mean that he goes to church, that he does what the priest or vicar tells him. It means… Actually, it doesn't matter what it means. Fernand will not be a French Jew but a Jewish Frenchman, just like there are Protestant Frenchmen. That's it!"[44]

This internal dialogue of a Polish Jew who came to France between the two world wars is still relevant. We can understand that in this question and answer session, every word, every letter, every part of speech (adjectives, nouns) have their own importance. Because these minor details reflect a world, a view of life. We can see here that this dialogue, in all its simplicity, sets up all the basic ingredients of the self-questioning. However, the cornerstone, the raison d'être of the questioning is how it is passed on. It is in the effort to understand and ensure one's paternity (in the case of Yankel), or the permanence of a tradition (in general cases) that the search for Jewish identity is played out. In the best of cases, it brings on a sort of uneasy feeling, and in the worst case, a real identity crisis.

It would not in fact be serious if the identity problem did not take on the appearance of an acute crisis in times of uncertainty. In Europe in the 1930s it was obvious that one should not announce publicly one's Jewish origins. In France today one no longer needs to hide one's Jewish identity, even if the first years of the new millennium have been difficult. Yet the same unease about affirming one's Jewish identity is still present, just it has another look. This excerpt of an interview with a Parisian couple in their fifties conveys the confusion unease surrounding even the basic question of whether or not they are religious. She is a housewife and tries to maintain some traditions. He is a doctor and clearly "very French", and does not like being asked if he is religious.

Husband: We are not at all observant. Not *Shabbat*.[45] Or the rest…

Wife: So everything I do to mark the *Shabbat* counts for nothing!!!… Ever since the mad cow disease you have been eating *Kasher*.

Husband: No, that's not it. It's that we are eating *kasher* meat on plates that are not. We don't have two sets of crockery. We are not really *kasher*… The children didn't go to the Jewish school, they went

[44] Ibid., p. 301.

[45] Translator's note: the Sephardi spelling has been adopted throughout, to reflect the majority of the surveyed population.

to the Alsatian one. But since we've had children, we have said the *Shabbat* prayers on Friday night and eat *kasher* meat. And that's about all we do as far as religious observance goes under normal circumstances.

Wife: And the High Holy Days!

Husband: The High Holy Days. We keep *Yom Kippur*.

Wife: And *Rosh Hashanah* and the *Seder* on *Pessach*.

Interviewer: And with all that, you define yourself as non-observant?

Husband: Sure, yes! We do not eat *kasher*. I eat pork…Yes it's observance, but it is not really religious observance. It's traditional observance. It's not as though when we had children we asked ourselves how we could tell them we were Jewish if we didn't do all that…

Interviewer: Yes, that's clear. But what's interesting is that you still consider yourself non-observant.

Wife: I do not agree with my husband that he defines us as non-observant. Let's rather say we are not very observant. What we do is very close to the tradition.

Husband: On *Yom Kippur* my father both worked and fasted. That was the only religious education I received during my childhood. My mother used to give my father a glass plate: just manage, this is where you eat your seafood. And that's how it was. A Jew lives with his contradictions.

Interviewer: An entirely "mainstream" attitude!

Wife: You know, the Diaspora leads to craziness. My grandmother was completely *kasher* and all that. But on Sunday morning she got up. She went to find oysters that she brought in on a dish for my father.

Interviewer: So if I have understood correctly, though non-observant you still follow the tradition much more than your parents.

Husband: My father did not make *Kiddush* on Friday night. Of course he knew it. I don't know it and I do it. He knew and didn't do it.

Interviewer: And how would you now define your children?

Wife: Our two daughters do not eat prohibited foods. And now with their little Sephardi girlfriends, my husband feels obliged to have *kasher* meat every day. However, when at their grandparents they are obliged to adapt so as not to hurt their feelings.

The challenge is to prepare a sociological presentation of the "Jewish fact" which finds itself, as Raymond Aron wrote in his *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, "de-individuated, rationalized and sometimes

even systematized"[46]—that is, a reality in which the objective mind asserts priority over the individual mind and creates a community. In creating this community, "Communal representations achieve clarity in and by individuals; communities are created in and by them, which always precede and go beyond them."[47] Thus, while systematizing the "Jewish fact", the sociologist must consider that its representations in the Jewish community are created by its members and yet are larger and longer-lasting than any individual. "These facts are immanent to each person, made up of voluntary behavior, often crystallized by habit or imposed by barely conscious ideas or convictions. However, we adopt such behavior spontaneously, we are aware of its usefulness or function for us. It puts us in line with others and with social rules, though we do not know its origins or history…"[48]

Following Emile Durkheim's *The Rules of Sociological Method*,[49] a sociologist who is studying a social reality must consider such essential and limiting social facts, which he defined as "…ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual, which are invested with a power of coercion, as a result of which imposes itself on the individual." The social fact, according to Durkheim, consists of the sum total of individuals in the social group. Each individual is fundamentally different from the social group, but at the same time is impacted by it. In this way, the Jewish fact must be considered as a "thing" in its own right, distinct from the ways in which individuals perceive it, but constituting the sum total of those individuals. Thus, the "Jewish fact", to paraphrase Durkheim, takes into account the ways of acting, thinking and feeling of individuals who define themselves as Jews. At the same time, in the final analysis, this Jewish fact, which impacts the ideas individual makes about their Jewish existence, pre-exists the individual and is external to individual consciousness.

Shmuel Trigano changes the Jewish fact into a cultural fact: "The Jewish fact is the entire reality of being, existence, the development of the Jews, and their *modus operandi*. It is not actually structured by compliance with an outside standard, but rather by its recurrence and internal regularity. Within the Jewish fact are to be found sections, political, legal, spiritual, economic and more (each of which might

[46] Aron (1948: 74).
[47] Ibid., op. cit., p. 94.
[48] Ibid., op. cit., p. 90.
[49] Durkheim (1977).

be motivated by different tactical currents); and each of which are underpinned by original processes of formation, endurance and balance, which suppose a special understanding of reality. It is the unity of the Jewish fact that makes possible the reciprocal comparisons of the manifestations of Jewish history, making them comprehensible and comparable within the same epistemological matrix."[50]

So the sociologist must consider the Jewish fact in its own right, separate from the conscious subjects that picture it, and also examine it externally, "like a thing", because that is how it appears to us. However, we are well aware of the criticism aroused by Durkheim's approach. Gaston Bachelard cautions against the dangers of a naïve and magical approach to facts: "It was sufficient to speak of an object for us to believe we were objective," he writes at the beginning of *La Psychanalyse du feu (The Psychoanalysis of Fire)*.[51] This is not sufficient for a scientific mind. As Bachelard writes, "…irrespective of what one might assume, in the life of a science, problems do not arise by themselves. It is precisely this that marks out a problem as being of the true scientific spirit: all knowledge is in response to a question. If there were no question, there would be no scientific knowledge. Nothing proceeds from itself. Nothing is given. All is constructed."

In more direct terms, an examination of the Jewish fact poses two questions. The first is inward facing, intimate and concerning the meaning being Jewish for the individual. The second is public and outward facing, asking what social or communal duties are imposed by the Jewish condition.

To further complicate matters, it becomes necessary to differentiate between "Jewishness" and "Jewry", as noted by Albert Memmi for whom Jewry means "…all Jewish *people*; either, in a broad sense, the totality of Jews dispersed around the world, or a local, geographical grouping of Jews…." while Jewishness is the "…fact of *being* Jewish, all the sociological, psychological and biological characteristics that make up a Jew."[52] Jewry thus refers to a Jewish group, while Jewishness concerns the individual Jew. In his writings, as a general rule, Memmi uses "we" to speak about Jewry and "I" in reference to Jewishness. However, this apparently clear distinction itself poses numerous

[50] Trigano (1984: 26).
[51] Bachelard (1938: 9).
[52] Memmi (1966).

questions: How do those individuals that we put together under the overall concept of Jewry define themselves? Inversely, how does the Jew define himself outside of the Jewry to which he belongs? What is the essence of this Jewishness? Does it pre-exist Jewish reality? What should one think of "the Jewishness of the Jew" (a phrase which could make one think there are Jews without Jewishness). In Memmi's writings, the concept of Jewishness goes through various metamorphoses.

At the beginning of his book *Portrait d'un Juif: l'Impasse (Portrait of a Jew: An Impasse)*, Memmi portrays Jewishness as an individual process, "…the fact of being Jewish, all the characteristics (…) that make up a Jew."[53] By the end of the book, the definition of Jewishness is broader and less individual: "…a group of facts, behaviors, institutions, that I find within myself but especially outside of me, throughout my life."[54] And in his subsequent book *La libération du Juif (The Liberation of the Jew)*, Jewishness becomes "…the manner in which each Jew lives, both subjectively and objectively, his belonging to both Judaism and Jewry."[55] Thus, the definition is both attitudinal (the subjective part of belonging) and behavioral (the objective dimension). This distinction recalls two essential terms in the sociology of groups as developed in American sociology, namely reference groups and membership groups.[56]

In the sociological analysis presented in this book, we attempt to consider these various approaches. We follow Durkheim in considering the Jewish fact as a thing, and as a construct according to Bachelard.[57] We investigate the various ways in which Jews define themselves, individually and as part of the group, and thus explore the "fact" of French Jewishness and Jewry.

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[53] Ibid., p. 17.
[54] Ibid., p. 264.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Cf. on this topic the works of Shibutani (1955) and Schmitt (1972).
[57] Certainly, as Raphael Lellouche has commented, "Religion is not a "fact", that's the trouble! (it's a value)" (Lellouche, 2004). However, the two approaches are less contradictory than they appear. Religion is a value: for whoever follows and practices it. However, when that religion is followed and practiced, it becomes a fact for others, and it would appear for itself too. Cf., Trigano (2004); Hervieu-Léger & Willaime (2001); Bauer (1999).

5. Juif and Israélite: *Shifting Representations of Identity*

In France there have historically been two main terms by which one may identify as Jewish: *Juif* and *Israélite*.[58] These two terms have different connotations and—to further complicate the issue—there has been a certain amount of slippage or shifting in their connotations over time. The 'official' definitions of the two terms are similar. *Littré*, a leading French dictionary, defines the "Jew" as someone who belongs to the Hebrew People, which once inhabited Palestine, or someone who follows the Jewish religion; the word "*Israélite*" refers to someone who belongs to the People of Israel. Another well-regarded dictionary, the *Petit Robert*, defines "Jew" as the descendents of Abraham, namely a monotheistic, Semetic people who used to live in Palestine, while "*Israélite*" means the descents of Israel. As these dictionaries do not distinguish clearly between the two words or between related concepts such as "Palestine" and "Israel" or "Jewish" and "Hebrew", the definitions are not very enlightening for our purposes.

The use of term *Israélite* may be traced back two pivotal events in French history. One was Count de Clermont-Tonnerre's famous statement in 1789 that everything should be given to individual Jewish citizens, but nothing to the Jews as a collective group within the nation. The Constituent Assembly thus rejected the historical dimension of the Jew and prohibited French Jews from organizing as a national group. On March 8, 1807, the Grand Sanhedrin assembled by Napoleon invoked the term *Israélite* when they "…met today under his powerful protection and in his great city of Paris. We number 71 doctors-in-law and notables of Israel, and we constitute the Grand Sanhedrin, in order to find between us the means and the strength to make the religious decision in accordance with our holy laws, which would serve as both a rule and an example for all *Israélites*. Such rulings will teach the nations that our dogmas can be reconciled with the civil laws under which we live, and do not separate us from the rest of society."[59]

Thus during the Revolution, the "Jew" metamorphosed into the "*Israélite*", fully accorded civil rights including the right to practice their religion, but with no rights as a group. The Jews were offered the

[58] These two terms are also used in other European countries. It would be enlightening to investigate their usages and meanings.

[59] http://www.napoleon-juifs.org/DecretReponse.htm.

route to emancipation and, correspondingly, to assimilation. At this time, therefore, the term "Jew" referred to someone strongly dedicated to religious practice and tradition, whereas the *Israélite* was fully integrated into French society. In his definition of trends within Judaism—Assimilationism, Israélitism, Reform, Orthodoxy and Zionism—Rabbi Philippe defined Israélitism according to the traditional consistorial approach. Israélitism is seen as the desire to simultaneously assume the religious and the civic dimension at the price of watering down the religious dimension. According to Haddad, "The *Israélite* is an optimist in his relationship with the university (Joseph in Egypt)…the *Israélite* compromises between the faith of the Hebrews and the values of modernity, while the Orthodox takes the techniques from modernity but rejects its values. The *Israélite* takes History as it comes, placing responsibility on man in the face of God…"

In present day usage the term "Jew" does not necessarily refer to someone who is voluntarily and actively following the Jewish religion. Similarly, the term "*Israélite*" is not consistently used for someone with a passive and largely assimilated relationship with Judaism. At the end of the 1970s, André Harris and Alain de Sédouy, in their book *Juifs & Français (Jews & Frenchmen)*, found the concept of "*Israélite*" to be almost non-existent among the people they questioned, who called themselves either French Jews or Jews in France.[60] However, Dominique Schnapper found both terms in use in her study *Juifs et Israélites*, which was conducted around the same time. Schnapper found that self-identification as a "Jew" was defined by practices (religious, cultural or activist), whereas self-identification as "*Israélite*" was characterized by a malleable identity lacking in vigor.

André Neher in *L'existence juive, solitude et affrontements (Jewish Existence)* deems the term *Israélite* to be just a "universal term".[61] *Israélites*, he writes, have lost sight of their true individuality and personality, in favor of universal values. Emmanuel Lévinas, in Judaïsme privé (Private Judaism), a reflection about the efforts of Diaspora Jewry to create a *vita nuova*, ignores the concept of "*Israélite*" which he deems an impossible enterprise.[62] Similarly, writers such as Robert Misrahi and Albert Memmi gave little or no consideration to the "*Israélite*".

[60] Harris & de Sédouy (1979: 6).
[61] Neher (1962: 253).
[62] Lévinas (1950: 293).

Even Rabi, a perceptive observer of post-war French Jewry, did not emphasize the Jew—*Israélite* dualism. He was more concerned about identifying primary aspects of contemporary Jewish ritual (individual ritual, group ritual, and a historical dimension), that can be seen in "the retention of a certain calendar that is both religious and historical, that makes up the elements of a group religious observance in which faith is not always present."[63] Thus Rabi anticipated perhaps by 20 years the roots of the well-known phenomenon of "Yom Kippur Jews" who join the community, essentially, once a year.

We shall introduce here a third option, the simultaneous, rather than dualistic, use of the terms, and identifying as "Jew *and* Israélite". As will be shown in greater detail later, those refusing to make a choice are becoming increasingly numerous, indicating that there is no irreconcilable difference between the two terms. At the same time, there has been constant erosion in self-definition as *Israélite* in favor of Jew. If "*Israélite*" is seen as a subset of "Jew", respondents tended to chose the broader rather than the narrower definition. If there is no other conclusion concerning the use of the concepts "Jew" and "*Israélite*", we can state that they have changed over time.

6. *Previous Surveys of French Jewry*

In addition to philosophers investigating the "Jewish fact", political scientists, psychologists and sociologists also have much to say about Jewish life in France. But it is necessary to pause and acknowledge that two of the main tools employed in these fields, statistics and demography, pose problems of cardinal importance. The methodological question of *how* to count the Jews conceals another much more complex: who should be counted? Even once the definition of the subject has been settled (even partially), another question must be addressed with delicacy: How does one identify subjects and create a representative sample of the French Jewish population without invoking the trauma associated with the counting of the Jews carried out by the Vichy authorities under Nazi occupation? Sociologists of French Jewry are not faced with an easy task.[64]

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[63] Rabi (1962: 318).

[64] For more details see especially Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986: 11–21). The chapter includes a good bibliography. See also Tapia (1977).

Since the emancipation of the Jews of France in 1791, the French authorities have tried on several occasions to count the number of Jews in their territory. Beginning in 1830 the Ministry of Religion has attempted to count the Jewish population. There were three general censuses of the population under the Second Empire—in 1851, 1861 and 1866—with each including a question about religious affiliation. The last census on the state of religion was in 1872.[65] At that time eighty-six thousand Jews were counted in mainland France, comprising 0.2% of the total population of thirty-nine million. Thereafter, apart from some lists drawn up in Alsace and Lorraine, there were no censuses of Jews until the Vichy government headed by Philippe Pétain ordered a census of the Jews of France. A memorandum dated July 10, 1941 reminds census takers of what methods to use and notes "a very poor motivation concerning the next census of the Jews."[66]

Thus we see that research about the Jews of France has long taken place, but the early surveys did not include figures on socio-economic structures or cultural features. Without such data it is difficult and even dangerous to have a structured discussion about issues such as emancipation, integration and assimilation.

How does one assess the number of Jews in France? Today, the official French census, by law, does not record religious affiliation. Neither can a "master list"[67] be constructed from lists drawn up by Jewish organizations because, according to the leaders of French Jewish organizations, their membership is only estimated at 10% of the Jewish population. At any rate, the membership lists are usually confidential. Given these conditions, the criterion adopted in most statistical surveys of French Jews over the last 25 years has been the self-identification or self-definition of the interviewee as a Jew. This methodological choice comes at a price: persons not meeting the rabbinical definition of who is a Jew[68] could be included in the sample thus created, while others who meet all the criteria of Jewish law might not identify themselves as Jews, and therefore are not counted. Nevertheless, this seems to be the most feasible method for ascertaining who comprises the Jewish population of France.

Some of the major demographic and sociological surveys of French Jewry conducted over the past several decades will be summarized here,

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[65] Bourdrel (1974: 191).
[66] Bourdrel (1974: 571).
[67] Schnapper (1987: 328–329).
[68] According to rabbinic law, children of a Jewish mother are Jewish.

along with excerpts from interviews with some of the head researchers, giving insights into the methodologies employed, the issues covered, and the researchers' insights into French Jewish society and their predictions for its future.

6.1. *A Political Approach to Jewish Identity:* Anatomy of French Judaism *(1962)*

Vladimir Rabi's *Anatomie du judaïsme français [Anatomy of French Judaism]* was one of the first attempts at a political approach to Judaism. Rabi's work does not directly address the question, "What does it mean to be Jewish?" (even though the problem is to be found in his work), but rather "Why remain Jewish?" Rabi posited that there is a biology of history. He considered Judaism in terms of vitality and not of dogmas, not calling his book *Autopsy* but *Anatomy of French Judaism.* He analyses the 'anatomy' of French Jewry after it was left 'bloodless' from the loss of an estimated quarter of its population during WWII (against the background of the far greater losses throughout Europe), then was re-infused by the mass immigration of North African Jews.

Rabi starts with a broad, historical recapitulation starting on September 27, 1791, the date French Jews became French citizens, and ending about one hundred and fifty years later at the end of the Second World War. He concludes with this sentence that says everything, "The Liberation for us was not a day of joy, it was a day of truth."[69] Rabi speaks of "the great test": faced with the destruction of European Jewry, it would be a matter of retaining at least this single claim, "Remember that I was innocent". Rabi was in fact asking, while the memory of the Shoah and WWII is certainly present in the second generation, what will be with the third? In order that the third generation does not forget, it is imperative that the Jew connects with memory. This leads one to suppose that the Jew belongs effectively to a human group united by history, and having taken everything into account, "the true basis of Jewish identity would therefore be history." This "great test" seems to be behind the persistent question that runs through this work from beginning to end: does French Jewry have a chance of survival? What is more, asks Rabi, does the world really need the Jews, their testimony, their affirmation?

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[69] Rabi (1962: 147).

The second part of *Anatomy* is an exhaustive political analysis of the structures of French Jewry, of the Jewish-Christian dispute, antisemitism and the Israel-Diaspora dialogue. All the religious, cultural, social and political institutions of French Jewry are reviewed. The author also carries out an international comparison, which sharpens understanding of the special nature of French Jewry, which he says provides a direction: "A Judaism founded upon optimism, a capacity for action, and enthusiasm for new values and a moral code that governs relations between people."[70] Rabi concludes that if "American Jewry can define itself by its structural framework, Israeli Jewry by its connection with the Holy Land, Soviet Jewry by resistance to duress,"[71] then European Jewry must transform its weakness into strength. French Jewry in specific, "on the go since 1791, constantly defining and redefining itself, stumbling on the contradictions of society and the fundamental paradoxes of its condition",[72] does a constant balancing act between integration and assimilation, between the development of communal structures and the definition of Jewish ethical content, and between the universal and the particular. Rabi asserts that it is for the Jew to reinstate the course of history while maintaining an open Judaism. Clearly, he knows that this is insufficient and he remains aware of the danger of seeing "particularism" dissolve into the "universal." Thus the author states that if recourse to ethics is needed, it alone will not be enough to ensure the existence of a community.

Closely studying the French Jew, Rabi reckons that the future of Judaism is to be found in the balance between the ethical and the practical: "In the synthesis between ritual and prophecy, both are equally necessary."[73] Rabi notes three levels of contemporary Jewish ritual: first, personal ritualism, with *brit mila* (circumcision), *chupa* (the traditional marriage ceremony) and *kaddish* (the prayer said on the anniversary each year for the dead), second, group ritualism marked by the fast of *Yom Kippur*, the festivals of *Chanukah* and *Purim*, and the Passover *seder* and lastly an historical dimension with the commemoration of the revolt in the Warsaw Ghetto and of the independence of the State of Israel. Rabi is in fact sketching a first draft of what he calls Neo-Judaism. This Neo-Judaism "is seen in the retention of a

[70] Ibid., p. 321.
[71] Ibid., p. 320.
[72] Ibid., p. 321.
[73] Ibid., p. 311.

certain religious and historical calendar, which makes up the elements of a group ritual in which faith is not always present."[74] In a way, a secular Judaism based upon practice whose sacred elements have been removed, and this definition, 50 years later, is still topical.

To the question regarding the point of remaining Judaism in a non-Jewish, often hostile, environment, he gives a secular answer based upon the will and independence of the individual: "Everything occurs as if the Jewish world remembered, instinctively, that the vital process leads the individual to the group, and not vice versa."[75] In our days the formula negates what is called communitarianism,[76] understood as a necessary membership of a group. However, for Rabi it was the individual in a free and voluntary movement that joins a group. It is this membership that ties him to history, thereby ensuring the Jewish fact is long-term. This is provided, of course, that history is understood not as a frozen past but as a permanent aspect of the future. As an example Rabi offers the *Minyan*, which "links the Jew to his brethren in space", whereas *"Yizkor*, the prayer said in memory of the dead, links Jews to their ancestors." He provides another example with the slavery of the Jews in ancient Egypt, which has educational value because it has been included in religious texts such as the *Seder* ceremony, thereby continually inserting this aspect of Jewish history into sacred time.

6.2. *The Sofres Studies (1976 & 1980)*

In 1976, Sofres (a leading French marketing and opinion group), headed by Emeric Deutsch, carried out a survey of French society, and which addressed the religious and ethnic identities of respondents. The survey consisted of six rounds during which a total of 23,554 people were contacted. Among the interviewees, 326 declared themselves "Jewish" and/or "*Israélite*".[77] Making allowance for sampling errors, Deutsch estimated that French Jewry in 1976 came to between 600,000 and 700,000.[78] However, the higher estimate was widely quoted, particularly in the popular media. For example, the daily information bulletin

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[74] Ibid., p. 318.
[75] Ibid., p. 318.
[76] "Communitarianism" in France is currently employed to describe a sub-group that separates itself from the wider society.
[77] See footnote 3 and discussion of terms on pages 24–26.
[78] Deutsch (1977).

of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency published the results on February 11, 1977 under the headline *Who are the Jews of France?*[79] in which it was written: "The Jews of France represent 1.38% of the French population aged over 15. Extrapolated to the total 51 million Frenchmen and women (in 1976) who have an individual, main address (communities excepted), the Jewish population of France is about 700,000 people, of whom 380,000 are in the Paris region." The Editor-in-Chief of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency emphasized the importance of the event. "For the first time in their history, the Jews of France have been surveyed, resulting in an exact portrait of this national minority."[80] The continuation of his comments seems to be even more important: "While community leaders and sociologists have until now estimated the numbers at between 450,000 and 550,000, the survey has revealed that there are in France about 700,000 Jews."

Beyond the numeric estimate (and the controversy surrounding it), the Sofres survey provided many interesting details about the socio-demographic aspects of the Jews of France. It was found that the Jewish population was relatively younger than the overall French population (27% under the age of 25 in the Jewish population, as against 21% in the overall population). The age pyramid of course makes sorry reading, revealing the impact of the exterminations during the Second World War. At the socio-professional level, there were relatively few Jewish manual workers, storekeepers or industrialists. However, Jews were becoming increasingly well-represented in the professions and among senior management. Additionally, the survey showed that in 1976 intermarriage was already one of the French Jewish community's main concerns, with one third of couples being mixed.

To go deeper into these results, in 1980 Deutsch carried out another survey—the first to address specifically the number and socio-demographic make-up of France's Jewish population. A sample of 400 Jewish homes was selected at random from the records of the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié*. Interviews, conducted in person, addressed the degree of involvement with the community, attitudes towards Israel, levels of religious practice and attitudes towards mixed marriages.[81] In an interview we conducted with Deutsch, he discussed some of the

[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] A summary of the results of this survey was published in an article in *L'Arche* (1980).

challenges and limitations of these surveys, and gave his insights into French Jewry based on his research experience.

Deutsch: We carried out two surveys, the first by polling, the second with a sample of Jews in contact with the community.... Unfortunately, since then no survey employing the same reference method has taken place in France. We therefore have no way of measuring any changes. It is true that this type of survey is very expensive. It involves contacts within the framework of repetitive surveys that are known as omnibus, each one addressed to 2,000 representative adults from the French population, dealing with a range of different subjects. During these surveys, the persons interviewed were asked to identify themselves with one or more ethnic or religious groups from a list, of course including the groups "Jew" and "*Israélite*". The 326 Jews who were referenced in this way thus represent 1.38% of the French population. Today, to find the same number of Jews would require many more contacts, corresponding to the growth of the general French population. The only interest in such a survey would be to analyze the changes. In fact all the samples used in surveys by polling involve a bias, from which derives the interest to compare results obtained using the same method in successive periods.

– *When you carried out the survey in 1976, were you aware of these problems?*
Deutsch: Of course, I made it quite clear that my sample was not at all representative of all French Jews, but only of those who were in contact with the community. Which by estimate is around one third.

– *But you are talking about the second survey.*
Deutsch: Yes. In the first survey, the method used was the only correct one from a statistical point of view. Then, we defined a Jew as someone who identifies himself or herself as such. And today, proportionally, there might perhaps be more that would identify themselves as Jews, because at that time it was not so respectable to identify yourself in that way.

– *Did the question of affiliation surprise or embarrass anyone?*
Deutsch: The interviewers did not get that impression. Incidentally, some identified themselves as both *Israélite* and Jew. However, there were certainly some Jews who censored their Jewishness, whereas today there might perhaps be a tendency to boast about it. The Jew

is better rated than back then. So I believe that overall our results reflect well the present reality… Sergio Della Pergola found less Jews using purely theoretical calculations. However, we have a base whose statistical value we know.… If we had been able to work on 40,000 contacts that would certainly have been more accurate. That is to say, the margin for error would have been smaller. But I am of the opinion that it was the only method, and today it is still the only way if you want to do serious work.

– *However, of the 600–700,000 range, it is the figure of 700,000 that is remembered.*

Deutsch: I am not responsible for that. That suited the media, the number was more spectacular. However, I stated quite clearly that in an estimated range of 600 to 700,000, the result was close to 650 and not 700.

– *How was this estimate received in France and within the community?*

Deutsch: It did not make waves! There were discussions about the breakdown by age, profession, level of education, that's what was interesting. Because the educational level of Jews was considerably above the average. Whether there were 600,000 or 700,000 Jews in France, I do not see how that changed anything.

– *Notwithstanding that the figure impacted on people.*

Deutsch: Because you have to refer to something. Personally, I have spoken of the range when I have presented things. It was IFOP[82] that always spoke about election surveys from the mid-point of the range. Yet statistically there is no mid-point, there is a range, and that's it! There is a tendency to confuse precision with accuracy and to think that what is apparently precise is also accurate. The range of 600 to 700,000 expressers very well the statistical uncertainty of the estimate.

– *Did anyone reckon the estimate too low?*

Deutsch: I don't think so. On the contrary, if you consider the potential of the Jewish organizations. If in fact there are 600,000 Jews in France, that in any case makes 120–130,000 homes. The FSJU list has about 38–40,000 and that of the Consistory approximately the same

[82] French Institute of Public Opinion.

number. As the two lists largely confirm each other, the large margin that exists between the Jewish population and that covered by these two major organizations can be seen. These results thus allowed us to put numbers on a phenomenon we had previously only felt, the distancing of Jews from communal bodies, and the trend only to interest themselves in them in times of crisis. Like today, for example, there is certainly a stronger community sense than at the time of our survey.

– *How would you analyze today the situation of French Jewry?*

Deutsch: What has been happening in Israel and antisemitic acts in France have conditioned attitudes beyond religious positions. A part of the Jews are drifting further and further away from the Jewish community—because they are opposed to the policies of the State of Israel. They have adopted a position close to that of the French Left. This group would appear to represent about a quarter of the Jewish population. The other part supports Israel and is becoming increasingly aware of its Jewishness. In some cases this goes as far as to feel cut off from the national community. On the other hand, a unique phenomenon is noted, religious radicalization that affects just a small minority but is no less sensitive for that. A similar trend exists in all Jewish communities, including in Israel.

– *Does this mean that the core of the community would be made up of 60% of the Jews of France?*

Deutsch: No, that seems to be an overestimate to me. The hard core is about 20 to 30% of the Jews of France. The rest are on the periphery, nearer or further from this core. Furthermore, the organized community does not really offer them anything attractive. In fact, it must not only respond to requirements, but must also be able to anticipate them. As my father used to say, a community's market is supply and not demand. It is one of the Consistory's major problems that it manages requirements, whereas a Jewish community must also be able to predict and stimulate demand among those who theoretically make it up. In a nutshell, there is nothing on offer—supply—suited to Jews who are far removed.

– *If one compares it with the 1976 results, nothing has really changed, many Jews have become assimilated while a small, hard core maintains a community life.*

Deutsch: This core appears to be larger and more varied today. However, I believe that Jewry is measured not by quantity but by quality.

Because all that is needed are a few initiatives that innovate and have an influence. Jewry has never excelled in numbers, but rather by its qualitative contribution.

– *OK, but how do you visualize the French Jewish community in 20 years time?*

Deutsch: Firstly, I would say that if you had asked me in 1970 if I would give a cent for the future of French Jewry I would have hesitated a great deal. Whereas in 1970 following the arrival of the Jews from North Africa, the picture started to change. At that time I thought that since a large proportion of them spoke French and were even French citizens, that would give them a good start for quicker assimilation than their European brethren. However, I was mistaken. I had misconstrued the strength of their attachment to traditions and their lack of complexes when faced with western culture. On the other hand, the Israeli victory in the Six Days War had a catalyzing effect on Jewish awareness.[83] You can see the difficulty in making forecasts about Jews. This apart, it seems to me that this polarization between the trends of assimilation and religious radicalization will continue. Further, as France is going through a process of Islamization, this will pose serious problems for part of the Jewish population. Young people will be looking to leave, though only some will settle in Israel, with most preferring the USA or Canada. Aside from Islamization, Europe is in decline and the Jews do not like that.

– *If you had to redo a new survey today about the Jews of France, aside from the issue of the method to be used, what would you want to know?*

Deutsch: Three things. The first is the level of fear, concerns and anxiety for the present and the future. I would be extremely interested to build an anxiety scale and to be able to compare positions over time on such a scale. Not anxiety for today, even though in some areas life has become impossible, but anxiety for the future, both personal and communal. The second thing I would like to know is the level of attachment to Israel, the points of attraction and the reasons. This is all the more important since, apart from the Orthodox who live their Judaism through practice, it is after all Israel that makes the heart race of most Jews who are not very observant. The third major theme is more complex. This is the way in which they live their Judaism. For

[83] See Cohen, 2011, pp. 81–120.

example, in the 1976 questionnaire I asked about the attitude towards intermarriage. How do they feel and do they observe *Shabbat*, the festivals, *kashrut?* How open are they to Jewish knowledge? I would like to know not just about practice, but the differences they feel in their lives between the holy and the secular. In other words, the way they view their Jewishness. Such a survey ought to take place every four or five years to monitor developments. If we had such a tool available, we could work on and think about the future of the community based upon hard data, rather than being satisfied with guesses based upon speculation.

6.3. *The Jewish Population of France: Social Demography and Identity (1984)*

Doris Bensimon and Sergio Della Pergola carried out the second major socio-demographic survey of the Jews of France. Though the survey was carried out between 1972 and 1978, the results were only published in 1984, almost seven years after the Sofres survey. Roberto Bachi, at that time professor of statistics and demography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, analyzed with exemplary clarity the mass of data provided by Bensimon and Della Pergola.[84] Bachi wrote, "It emerges from this analysis that the Jewish population of France is in general multifaceted, with at the extremes some highly orthodox, small groups and at the other end of the spectrum people for whom their Jewish origin has almost no impact on their way of thinking, living and acting."[85]

This illustrates how during the 1970s the Jews of France were subject to countervailing forces that pulled some closer to the heart of the community and pushed others away. Bensimon and Della Pergola suggested treading with caution regarding the "Jewish revival" commonly accepted to have been triggered by the massive influx of Jews from North Africa. They wrote, "If by 'Jewish revival' is meant greater religious observance, this survey shows us that the majority of Jews actually observant are recruited from among those who had always remained faithful to the religious side of Judaism. If we were to extend the idea of 'Jewish revival' to Judaism's varied cultural, national and ideological aspects, we would note that most French Jews are looking for new expressions of their identity, which would allow them to live as

[84] Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986).
[85] Roberto Bachi, in Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986: 7).

Jews in the Diaspora."[86] In other words, centripetal forces work in favor of those who were traditionally religiously observant; others, under the effect of centrifugal forces, seek new forms of Jewish identity.

As far as method was concerned, Bensimon and Della Pergola also chose the interviewee's self-definition as Jewish, though in their case, the survey unit was the family. Bensimon and Della Pergola deemed a Jewish household, "any domestic group that included at least one member who identified himself or herself as Jewish. The individuals making up the household thus constituted the Jewish population in the broadest sense." As far as the referencing of interviewees, the two authors opted for the "onomastics of Jewish names". The method employed was to draw up a list of 18,000 Jewish names from the lists of various French Jewish organizations, and then to divide the names into three categories. Firstly the "certain" Jewish names that appeared several times on the lists, then the "dubious" Jewish names that only appear once, and finally names that are typically non-Jewish. Finally the sample was made by drawing the "certain" Jewish names that appeared on the electoral rolls, to whom were added a very small percentage of typically non-Jewish names.

The story of this survey is fascinating in its own right. Towards the end of the 1960s, the project was launched as a scientific cooperation between INED (the French National Institute of Demographic Studies) and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Very quickly the INED project coordinator, Claude Levy, met resistance from some leaders of the French Jewish community; they considered themselves French and could not understand why a public body should carry out a survey of the Jews of France. In the end, INED dropped out of the project. Since the questionnaires, method and a trial run had already been updated, Sergio Della Pergola rescued the project. In 1972 he suggested cooperating with a central institution of French Jewry, the FSJU, as he had previously done with the Committee of Italian Jewish Communities for a survey of Italian Jewry. To restart the project, Della Pergola teamed up with the sociologist Doris Bensimon, who was already experienced in the sociology of French Jewry.

It should be noted that this survey did not cover the entire country. The two researchers chose to concentrate on those areas with large Jewish populations. In Paris, 15 out of 20 of the capital's arrondissements

[86] Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986).

were fully covered[87] in two surveys held in 1972 and 1974. The Paris suburbs were covered in 1976 by a representative sample of 18 localities out of the 278 local councils making up the Greater Paris region. Then in 1977–78 the survey was carried out in five cities outside the Paris region with a presumed Jewish population of over 10,000 (Lyon, Marseille, Nice, Strasbourg and Toulouse). The results were processed over the next three years, 1979–1982, and published officially in 1984. Sergio Della Pergola explains that from this point of view the survey was atypical, because it covered a period of six years. The method employed, however, was consistent. He added that the purpose was less the accuracy of the numbers than determining certain trends. Bensimon and Della Pergola estimated French Jewry consisted of some 535,000 people representing 1.1% of the total population.[88] France's Jewish population had been estimated at 225,000 in 1950, and 360,000 in 1960, an increase of 60%. The Bensimon and Della Pergola survey indicated that between 1970 and 1980 the French Jewish population stabilized around 535,000. The reason for this relatively stability was the gradual drying up of immigration, a drop in the birth rate[89] and erosion caused by intermarriage. Paradoxically, it was not the trends noted but the number of Jews in France that aroused interest.

In an interview Sergio Della Pergola linked the controversy over the Sofres study with the question of the number of French Jews.

Della Pergola: Sofres published its survey when we were analyzing our Paris data and completing our own poll. The Sofres data did not appear at all acceptable to me in terms of method. There were two or three points that were completely unacceptable for a demographer. This was a survey based exclusively on adults, from which were extrapolated figures for the entire population, without taking into account possible differences in the age structure. That was my main criticism, but there were other things, in particular the definition of

[87] Excluding arrondissements 1, 7, 8, 11 and 13.

[88] Ibid., p. 35. See below the estimates of Della Pergola and his colleagues for the years 2000–2010. These are very close to those of this survey.

[89] In 1967–71, the birth rate in the Paris region was 1.7 and 1.2 children per Jewish woman born respectively in North Africa and Europe (ibid.: 143). These figures apply to women who are still in the younger, child-bearing age group. For women aged 40–45, the averages were: total for Jewish women, 2.6; women with a European background, 2.0; women from North African backgrounds, 3.1. Women aged 40–45 in 1975 would today be aged 70–75. For them we found a very similar fertility rate: 2.42. In 2002, we found an average of 1.99 children per adult Jewish woman of any age.

the group. It in fact pushed me to publish a summary of our results in an article.[90]

– *So in 1984 you officially published the results in an enormous volume entitled The Jewish population of France: social demography and identity. How did the French Jewish community accept this survey?*

Della Pergola: It was received with very mixed feelings. It should be noted that in the chapters about numerical growth and those on the history of the French Jewish population, we also used other sources. Doris Bensimon had worked on historical demography in both France and Algeria. Her contribution thus provided a perspective that I lacked. I could thus make an estimate of the number of Jews in France based on the data we had gathered, supplemented by other sources such as international emigration, and analysis of *Aliyah*, as well as Israeli and historical data. Accordingly, the result was quite different from Emeric Deutsch's at Sofres. Of course, just the number of Jews in France attracted attention, eclipsing everything else. I have to say that we have a difference of almost two hundred thousand people. Incidentally, Emeric Deutsch had been asked about those 700,000 French Jews, and he stated that he had never announced the number 700,000, but more or less 600,000. Of course, it had become *perhaps* 700,000. Our assessment had been 535,000. In the *Tribune juive* or *Information juive*[91] Deutsch completely demolished our work. The article's subtitle was, "What a nerve!" I had enormous respect for Deutsch—my criticism was not personal, demography has certain laws—but you cannot invent a community. It can only be read and understood in context and subject to gradual development, which Deutsch had totally ignored. He had discovered a Jewish community out of the blue. It must also be said that Emeric Deutsch was not just a statistician; he was also someone very influential and active within the Jewish institutional community. (…)

In any case, the scientific community received our study very well. The CNRS[92] does not publish such a work[93] without providing a reviewer, because it is a scientific and academic publication. In fact, in terms of analytical detail there are many results that are not to be

[90] Della Pergola & Bensimon (1978).
[91] Translator's note: two leading French Jewish newspapers.
[92] The French National Center for Scientific Research.
[93] Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986).

found in the majority of scientific works. It was of course an analysis of a sample, however, we pushed to the limit the degree of resolution of the analysis with a detailed presentation of the sampling errors. It must also be said that it was based almost exclusively on cross-tabulations. I did not use multi-variable analysis, while at the time I was not acquainted with the methods of Guttman.[94] It was therefore a classic data text, presented in the most conventional way, even though on certain points such as the calculation of the total fertility rate, it was an analysis that went beyond the plain, cross-tabulated data. In my opinion, based upon current works on the Jews of France, this work is still applicable.

– *What is interesting in the analysis of your data is that Roberto Bachi notes two issues. Firstly that France's Jewish population is undergoing a process of polarization, while on the other hand the claimed large-scale Jewish renewal is non-existent. Didn't his conclusions stimulate debate?*

Della Pergola: No, because the results apparently conformed to the view of the situation held by community leaders. The truth is, I do not know how many people actually read the work that came out in 1984, aside from a group of researchers. Yet in any case it was a very interesting stage in the inter-communal dynamic.

– *What is your reading of the current situation of the Jews of France?*

Della Pergola: There are two discussions. The first is about socio-demography and identity. What strikes me about what we have learned from subsequent surveys of the Jews of France is the continuity. It must be acknowledged that the French Jewish community can maintain itself, which cannot at all be said about the Jewish communities of Western Europe that have disappeared or the American Jewish communities, where the erosion processes of the Jewish population are much greater. There are of course regressive trends within the French Jewish population, but they are not extreme. The second discussion is about the socio-political and socio-cultural context in France. While this does not depend upon demography, it can affect it. On the one hand we see the Jewish community at the peak of a successful integration process and social climbing. Every indicator confirms this: the virtual disappearance of manual workers, the growth in mixed marriages among

[94] This refers to the Facet Theory and related methods developed by Louis Guttman. These are discussed in the methodology chapter on page 56.

new immigrants and a general drop in the birth rate in the Jewish population. Notwithstanding all that, this is a strong community. On the other hand, we could speak of the Jewish community's lack of confidence in the State. There is a sort of rupture, which some perhaps for the first time express as a desire to leave France. Today it is a matter of a crisis of confidence between the community and French society, though this might still change. The construction of a European area might represent a chance for the Jewish communities.

In fact, in this connection, a Jewish European identity and a space accorded the Jews might not be impossible, at least in conceptual terms. I had a very interesting experience. For the first time in my life I agreed to go to Germany, for a conference organized by the Central Council of Jews in Germany. And I have to say that in Berlin, where I was only two days, I saw a city with about thirty monuments to the Shoah, which were very visible and could not be ignored. It's very impressive. The central site is the size of a football pitch, and while it may not be very lovely, it is still located just 200 yards from the Brandenburg Gate. Imagine a football pitch size Shoah memorial 200 yards from the Louvre in Paris. Secondly, there are other, more discreet monuments, but it is just as remarkable that they are spread throughout the town. So it has to be acknowledged that the Germans, in public, and perhaps in Berlin more than elsewhere, have carried out a task of thinking things through and working them out, which is reflected not only explicitly but also courageously. The Austrians have done nothing and the French very little. Where is the *Vel d'Hiv*?[95] I visited the place and saw a very attractive residential area. There might be a plaque somewhere, but it is not very visible. Yet if Germany views the new Europe this way, it is nonetheless encouraging. In this connection, it is difficult to know what choices France will make, because Muslim immigration has become irreversible. France can no longer limit the damage. By the way, I find the anti-veil legislation quite ridiculous. It is exactly what not to do, even if I know that displaying a religious sign in school goes against France's secular values. But I would rather permit displaying signs of identity as part of respect for law and order.

[95] Short for Vélodrome d'Hiver the Bicycle Racing Stadium in Paris that was used as a holding station for Jews to be deported to the concentration camps during WWII.

– *If you had to carry out a new survey on the Jews of France, what would you be looking for?*

Della Pergola: That's not very complicated. Two things have to be done in a survey. Firstly, you have to ensure the comparability of data, thereby creating an historical series of indicators in order to study trends. For example, you have to see how typologies change. But you also have to add questions that come up. The question to be examined in greater depth today is that of potential emigration to other countries: on the one hand Israel, and on the other, the USA, Canada or—why not—Germany. We need to see how Jews behave in a situation that is stronger than they are. There is in fact a dependency, with the Jewish public basically depending upon the state's institutional framework. We tend to forget that and think we are independent. In the future, Jewry might also become dependent on the European framework, if the nation- state becomes less dominant and Europe starts to take on a personality of its own. Which, however, is not yet evident. For example, does the European constitution provide room for religious values? The draft European constitution only includes Europe's cultural, religious and secular values; but why should it not guarantee European paganism, which is considerably older? There are thus efforts on one side and countervailing forces on the other side, and the future will tell if Europe will be capable of providing minorities such as the Jews, who have no territorial representation on European soil, with a consolidated, institutional space. If Europe can grant such a space, the Jews will perhaps have opportunities in Europe, but if not there will no place for Jews there.

It is this second hypothesis, that there will not be a place for pluralism, which characterizes France for us. My final observation is about how far behind are the Jews of Europe and their leadership. They have to understand that what is needed is a European communal organization within the European Union. There needs to be a Union of Jewish Communities of the institutional European Union and not a virtual Europe between Lisbon and Vladivostok, by way of Casablanca and Istanbul.

6.3.1. Jews and Frenchmen *(1979)*

André Harris and Alain de Sédouy conducted a study, published under the title *Juifs & Français (Jews and Frenchmen)*, in which they wrote, "We went out looking for 'French people of the Jewish persuasion', as it is still known in official terminology, and we found a community that

above all considered itself 'Jewish'. Many to whom we spoke referred to themselves as 'French Jews', while others used 'Jews in France'."[96] It could be argued that the authors of *Jews and Frenchmen* (who are not Jewish) suffered from an illusion, even a methodological presupposition that would find its source in the misleading "official terminology"? Based upon their stated "…concern to get to know this community better…" it seems that perhaps they only approached interlocutors who identified themselves as Jewish. Additionally, the book is based on face-to-face interviews, better suited to revealing identity than telephone surveys.

At any rate, the authors' "discovery" of the Jews of France in the early 1980s provoked astonishment. They concluded that *Israélites* had become Jews, and that they comprise a distinct community. At the beginning of the book, they quote a provocative, even subversive, statement by one of the young French Jews they interviewed: "For me, France is nothing more than a passport…" The authors cite the end of "Republican messianism" as one of the main consequences of the Third Reich and Vichy. Making this statement at that time, in fact, required a certain amount of courage. *Jews and Frenchmen* came out a few years Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton's exposé study of the Vichy regime, which stimulated a debate that shook the French Republic to its foundations.[97] It took almost another 15 years before President Jacques Chirac acknowledged the responsibility of France regarding the Vichy regime, and the eternal debt the country had to the victims and their heirs.

Jews and Frenchmen showed that almost 40 years after Liberation, the Jews of France were still victims of anti-Semitism, what the authors call "…the distortion that the prejudiced apply to reality." They note that Charles de Gaulle was aware of the impossibility of completely stamping out anti-Semitism in France and that, while he himself was not an anti-Semite, "…that did not prevent him from being totally impervious to the true nature of Jewish identity."[98] While the anti-Semitism encountered at the time of this study was certainly less violent than that manifest under Vichy, it was nonetheless biting and gnawing, as expressed in the words of one of their interviewees: "There are days

[96] Harris & de Sédouy (1979: 6).
[97] Marrus & Paxton (1981).
[98] Harris & de Sédouy (1979: 6).

when I tell myself, 'You are above all French,' when I think my Jewishness is just a culture, a religion. And then, hardly a week later, I was stuck in a traffic jam at the entrance to the Bois de Boulogne, and a jogger passes between the cars and calls out to me, 'Get a move on, with your dirty Jewboy face!' That day I felt just Jewish."[99]

Thus *Jews and Frenchmen* reflects the renewal of the Jewishness of French Jews, or the attrition of the national feeling among French people of the Jewish persuasion. There was a re-found pride in the fact of being Jewish, coupled with a sense of a promise betrayed by France.

A statement by another interviewee underlined the eternal sense of insecurity experienced by the French Jewish community: "What do I feel today? Difficult to say. But I often feel much more Jewish than French. I have never forgotten what happened to us under Vichy, when the quota system was instituted. I was put in a school where there were only Arabs. My father, who had kicked up a fuss at the time, came to fetch me during class, and with a whole hullabaloo took me away saying, 'You're not French, you're Jewish, get out of here!'[100]

Jews and Frenchmen offers an irrevocable diagnosis, "For today's Jews everything has changed and nothing has changed."[101] That is perhaps the most surprising thing in this account. In the French-Jew, the "mental androgyne", to use the expression of Harris and de Sédouy, the Jew is essential and the Frenchman accidental. As one young woman asked herself, "Can you get to no longer feeling Jewish?"[102] Yet another interviewee told the researchers, "I do not consider myself French. I am the son of Russian and Polish emigrants who shuttled from one 'haven' to another, and I am only French by an accident of history. I am Jewish, totally Jewish, and not at all French." In other words, *Jews and Frenchmen* is not the description of a pair in which both partners are equal.

6.3.2. Jews and Israélites *(1980)*

Dominique Schnapper continued the work done by Harris and de Sédouy on the relations between the Jews and France. Her book *Juifs et Israélites (Jews and Israélites)* could have been the sequel to *Juifs & Fran-*

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[99] Harris & de Sédouy (1979: 102).
[100] Ibid., p. 299.
[101] Ibid., p. 33.
[102] Ibid., p. 116.

çais. However, Schnapper adds an inside look at the Jews of France, given her Jewish background. The analysis is based on 90 interviews conducted between 1975 and 1978 with French citizens who defined themselves as Jewish. *Jews and Israélites* is based upon observation and anthropological analysis, not survey statistics. That being the case, Schnapper has certainly ensured a certain degree of representativeness by diversifying the origins of the interviewees to include seven distinct sub-populations: the community of French origin in Lorraine; the community in the Southwest which was originally Ashkenazi but which has become a Sephardi majority; the Sephardi community in the Paris region; the Parisian activists; leaders of national organizations; new *Israélites*; and lastly the working class community.

One of the most significant contributions of the book is her typology of French Jewry. The author concedes, "I have no pretension of dealing exhaustively with the problem of Jewish identity and the various ways of being Jewish, what became the special traditions of Jewish culture today in France among those who declare themselves Jewish."[103] Schnapper based her typology on the differences in practice, letting the respondents define how they wished to address their Jewish identity. Deeming Judaism to be a way of life based upon an ethical code and metaphysics, the author constructed three model "types" defined in relation to the Jewish traditions: 1) the *observant*, who practice the religion; 2) *activists*, who have passed Judaism's ethical code and metaphysics into the political arena; and 3) *Israélites*, by which she refers to "a weakened, sometimes ambiguous form of identity and participation, whether imposed or assumed."

Each of these model types spawn sub-groups based upon a series of five essential variables: number of generations one's family has been in France (reflecting the successive waves of Jewish immigration); relationship to Judaism; relationship to Israel; communal membership; and cultural level. Within the 'observant' model type, Schnapper distinguished between *local observant* "…who have been educated in France" and *transplanted observant*, whose "approach to Judaism has been developed in another social and cultural context."[104] Looking at 'relationship to Judaism' enabled a differentiation between the *traditionally religious* and the *newly religious.* 'Relationship with the community'

[103] Schnapper (1980: 29).
[104] Ibid., p. 55.

distinguishes those *associated with the community* from those who are *marginal*. Within the *activist* model type, the relationship with Israel provides an essential differentiation between *pro-Israelis* and *anti-Israelis*. Among the *Israélites*, the cultural level determines two subgroups: *new Israélites* at a higher social level, and *business people*.

Schnapper states that within each of the three model types (*observant*, *activists* and *Israélites*) the sense of belonging to the Jewish People is maintained, even with the disappearance of specific practices. She says this happens "…as if the reduction in compliance with Jewish law was compensated by a strengthening of the Jewish character of certain behavioral types."[105] This phenomenon is particularly marked among *Israélites*. The *new Israélites* are mainly assimilated in objective terms; nevertheless, they retain a very strong sense of a community of destiny. The second *Israélite* subgroup, the *business people*, who are largely lacking in anything Jewish, still continues to maintain a Jewish social circle. In other words, among the *Israélites* there is "compensation between loss of faith and religious practice on the one hand, and on the other hand the perpetuation of Jewishness, which is seen as a culture or series of practices and attitudes."[106] The two other categories (*observant* and *activists*) can be considered Jews with a high cultural level and thus a special relationship with Jewish knowledge. Beyond this description of categories of French Jews, Schnapper analyzes the process that facilitates maintaining or returning to traditions and particularisms. She predicts that maintenance of tradition and a return to special cultural practices will be increasingly common among French Jews, facilitated by their economic progress and their high cultural level in comparison to parallel social groups of non-Jews. In the modern, industrial world, "…the return to special practices and beliefs, which by definition are no longer experienced in the traditional way, can only be the result of intellectual awareness and knowledge."[107] In making this argument, she quotes Bernhard Blumenkranz, who posits that the history of the Jews, through its special features, both announces and summarizes the social transformations of the Western world: "The minority group announces through its special experiences the overall changes that are coming."[108]

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[105] Ibid., p. 234.
[106] Ibid., p. 234.
[107] Ibid., p. 246.
[108] Blumenkranz (1978).

Among four features that characterize industrial societies (material prosperity, a special life style, entertainment, and the large-scale, global raising of cultural levels), Schnapper emphasizes the influence of the cultural level upon the maintenance or rediscovery of special characteristics. It can thus be understood that maintaining traditions or a return to special cultural practices will be very frequent among Jews whose cultural level has always been higher than that of the same non-Jewish social categories. In a nutshell, Schnapper posits that economic progress and especially raising of the cultural level strengthens the desire to express a personal identity that has becoming increasingly difficult for them to express in their professional lives.

6.4. Reflection on the Jewish Questions *(1984)*

In *Réflexion sur les questions juives (Reflections on the Jewish questions)*[109, 110] a collection of the works of Annie Kriegel on the fact of being Jewish, the author developed the concept of 'community' in contrast to a minority or micro-society. She defines a community as, "a type of group in which the degree of belonging involves very variable degrees—from practically 0 to 100; in which the means of belonging are also very different in their outward manifestations."[111] Entry into a collective structure of this sort is voluntary, as is departure, because "…participating in a very extended space that stretches from the center to the periphery does not have the permanence of a perpetual commitment."[112] Even if participation in the community is voluntary, that does not mean it has no repercussions. According to the author, the advantages of a collective status go together with an acceptance of constraints. In other words, "the distinctive sign that certainly characterizes community living is its dependence" on a reality that goes beyond it and encompasses it. This means that the Jewish community must remain aware of its connections with the Jewish world while remembering that it is one of the components of French society.

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[109] Translator's note: this title is a play on words on the original French title of Sartre's *Antisemite and Jew*, which in French was literally "Reflections on the Jewish Question".

[110] Kriegel (1984).

[111] Ibid., p. 131.

[112] Ibid., p. 131.

In October 1983 Kriegel was interviewed by Shlomo Malka, as part of a series of interviews entitled *To be Jewish today*.[113] The conversation called *ultima verba* is the conclusion of *Reflection on the Jewish questions.* Malka asked Kriegel "If Judaism does not just exist through antisemitism, by what does it exist?" Kriegel answered, "Today, in the calm of the coming age, for me the fact of being Jewish is to be in the living stream of immemorial history, it is to be totally involved in passing on what I have received as a heritage in an unbroken tradition, in a word, continuity."[114]

There are two elements within this simple yet powerful definition of the fact of being Jewish. Firstly, there is a biographical element, when Kriegel states, "In the calm of the coming age". The perception of the fact of being Jewish is also a generational matter, depending on how the individual perceives his or her history. The second element, related to the first, about the fact of being Jewish is "continuity". It of course depends upon what Kriegel intended by continuity. Later on in the interview, the term 'continuity' seems synonymous with loyalty. Kriegel explains that even if in one's family religious feelings dry up, the values remain the same, simply translated into a secular language. This is why loyalty to marrying within the fold has remained strong.

What is notable is the connection Kriegel makes between continuity in the biological sense and loyalty to values. This link between the biological and spiritual is indeed present throughout the conversation. Explaining that religious feeling has not been drained away, just concealed, Kriegel uses her own physical handicap (deafness) as a metaphor for describe spiritual weakness: "Perhaps I am deaf from birth, or through a lack of exercise and education in the religious music of the soul."[115]

6.5. *Jewish Studies and Education in France (1991)*

One of the key viewpoints from which to observe a group of people is their educational system. In 1986–1988, I conducted a pioneering national systemic study of the Jewish educational system in France. The study provided a picture of the French Jewish community through an in-depth examination of its educational institutions. Three

[113] Malka (1984).
[114] Kriegel (1984).
[115] Ibid., p. 625.

main research questions were explored: 1) what are the services and educational settings provided to the French Jewish community by its institutions? 2) How do the decision-makers and professionals of the community evaluate and analyze Jewish education? 3) What are the attitudes and behaviors of the French Jewish public regarding Jewish education?

Eight distinct types of Jewish education were covered in the survey: a) Jewish day schools; b) Talmud Torah (supplementary or Sunday schools); c) youth movements and organizations; d) summer and winter camps; e) Jewish studies programs and research at universities; f) *ulpanim* (intensive Hebrew studies programs); g) Jewish student associations; and h) informal study groups. Each of these settings was studied separately, as a single approach would not applicable across such a wide range in terms of students' age, program intensity and goals, etc. Questionnaires and interviews were designed and administered as appropriate for each. Some 2600 individuals were surveyed or interviewed, including people in positions of authority on the national, regional and local level. Additionally, 524 decision-makers participated in a panel organized as part of the study. In this way, the study included people on all levels of involvement, from student through national decision-maker, individuals of both genders and of all ages, from kindergarteners through senior citizens, living in every geographic region of France.

This was the first study of its kind carried out by the French Jewish community or indeed anywhere in the Jewish world. It was commissioned by three partners: the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee (which has been active in France since WWII), and a special committee on Jewish education in France (which included representatives from all the major organizations including the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié*, the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, the *Consistoire Israélite*, and the chief rabbi of France).

Ten separate reports, consisting of some 1200 pages, were prepared. The main results were published (in French) under the title *L'étude et l'éducation juive en France, (Jewish Studies and Education in France)*. Twenty years later, this study still provides basis for analysis of the Jewish educational system in France. It also informed parts of the survey of Jewish heads of households (in 2002 and the follow-ups in 2005 and 2007) which dealt with issues of education. The institutional part of the 1986–88 study of Jewish education emphasized the educational setting as the unit of study. In the latter studies, the unit considered

was the family. This second approach enabled us to follow the educational itinerary as students move through different types of educational settings.

One of the main findings of the survey was that participation in Jewish education has been enormous. In 1988, when the survey was conducted, 44% of young French Jews were in contact with some Jewish educational body (*Talmud Torah*, summer camp, youth group[116] or Jewish school). Almost three quarters (74%) of French Jews between the ages of 20 and 29, said they had received a partial or complete Jewish education by the time they reached 19 years of age. Further, this survey documented the undeniable growth of Jewish schools in France during the 1980s. In 1988 almost 16,000 Jewish children and youngsters attended Jewish schools full-time. The significance of this figure is clear when compared with previous decades: in 1972 the figure was less than half this (7,992 students). In 1950 there were only 400 students who attended a Jewish school in France full time.

The growth of Jewish schools also represented a change in identity. When Jewish schools in France reopened their doors in 1945 they were virtually exclusively Orthodox. However, this changed with the arrival of the North African Jews and the forging of a connection with the State of Israel. Students were increasingly recruited from traditional but not Orthodox backgrounds.

The 1991 study found that the institutions that manage the educational network of France's Jewish community were varied, from orthodox to traditionalist to liberal and the Jewish educational opportunities they provided came in various forms. It included a formal system (kindergarten, full time Jewish schools under contract to the State, independent Talmudic schools, with professional teaching), a semi-formal structure (*Talmud Torah*) and informal structures (Jewish youth groups and organizations, study groups, summer camps). Thus, the influence of Jewish education was not limited to that of religious tradition.

The survey identified three concentric circles of users of the French Jewish educational system: observant (15%), traditionalists (49%) and non-observant (36%). However, it is difficult to compare these results of the two previous surveys (1976 and 1984), because Sofres did not ask the question of denominational affiliation, and the survey by Doris Bensimon and Sergio Della Pergola did not include the same categories.

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[116] There are only a few serious, scientific studies of French Jewish youth groups. We would mention the doctoral thesis by Auron (1979).

The survey of Jewish education found that Jewish schools were considered to be of high quality and that there was amazing potential for expanding participation. 68% of the parents of school-aged Jewish children surveyed in 1988 stated that if a good, free Jewish school opened in their neighborhood, they would have no problem in principle in sending their children there.[117] This indicates a major shift, as sending one's children to public school had long been considered a basic value in French society.

The discovery of the rapid growth in Jewish education in France called into question the widespread belief that French Jews are not interested in belonging to a community. The survey showed that the Jews of France have a pragmatic approach to communal structures. Even if they are not amenable to being committed to institutions, they are nevertheless major consumers of communal services. They distance themselves when they have no need and get closer in accordance with life cycle events (birth, marriage, death). In this context the Jewish educational network plays a central role. Educational organizations are seen as a communal service that provides children what their parents are unable to do at home.

The growth of Jewish educational structures causes a parallel and reciprocal strengthening of communal life. In 1988, 22% of French Jews said they regularly (once a month or more) attend a Jewish community institution. This group, comprising the core of the community, comprises the major consumers of organized communal life and community activists. Another 30% of French Jews said they attend communal institutions a few times a year. This group is made up of what is called in communal circles, "occasional visitors". The other 48% of the French Jewish population—those who never or only rarely attend communal institutions, are at the far periphery of the community, sometimes called "Yom Kippur Jews".

The previous studies and explorations of French Jewish identity provide a basis and context for the large-scale national survey of French Jews which is the main focus of this book. The current study explores various facets of the demographics, community structure, identity, and values of French Jews based on empirical data analyzed in the historical, political and cultural context outlined above.

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[117] Cohen, E.H. (1992).

CHAPTER TWO

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE JEWS OF FRANCE AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

1. *Methodology*

1.1. *The Surveys*

The majority of the data presented in this study was collected in the course of a large socio-demographic and attitudinal survey conducted among a representative sample of French Jewry during the month of January 2002. This study was undertaken at the initiative of the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié*, the United Jewish Appeal of France, the *Aliyah* Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel, with the support of the L.A. Pincus Fund for Jewish Education in the Diaspora. This comprehensive survey included questions on issues such as Jewish identity, Jewish life, Jewish education and relationship to Israel. Potential interviewees were selected on the basis of family name.

Using a list of over 85,000 donors provided by the AUJF in February 2001 and another list provided by the Rabbinical Council of Nice in April 2001, we drew up a geographical distribution of valid names and addresses. Ten Jewish family names (five Ashkenazic and five Sephardic) were chosen. We searched for these names in every French Department on the lists of electronic directories available on the Internet. A comparison of the two lists indicated that the geographic distribution of the AUJF donors was basically the same as that of the ten selected patronymics. The number of Jewish patronymics was then increased to 50 (25 Ashkenazic and 25 Sephardic)—the same patronymics as had been previously used in the survey of Jewish education in France.[1] Inclusion of all variant spellings and composite forms of these names generated 685 distinct patronymics. Families with these 685 names represent approximately 17% of the households in the AUJF list.

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[1] Cohen, E.H. (1991).

Thirty French Departments were then selected for the survey: the seventeen that had been included in the 1988 study, plus thirteen additional Departments from across the country. Using Minitel (an online service provided by the *Poste, Téléphone et Télécommunications*), we searched for these 685 patronymics, identifying 32,026 addresses in the 30 departments. From this preliminary list, names were randomly chosen from each department. Each address was given a random number ranging from 1 to 10 million. The addresses for each department were then put in order according to the random numbers. For each region, we selected the first *x* addresses (*x* being proportionate to the total number of addresses in that region). The final sample thus reflected the regional presence of Jews of France. The list of names selected from the electronic directories and the AUJF list yielded virtually the same structure of regional distribution.

A pilot study of 15 households taken from the random lists was conducted in order to enable adjustments to the final questionnaire. Once the questionnaire was finalized, the full study was conducted via telephone between January 13–31 2001 by a team of 23 interviewers, supported by three administrators and five examiners. A total of 7,907 phone calls were made. There were two requirements in order to be included as a participant in the study: potential interviewees had to be Jewish and/or *Israélite* according to their own self-definition and they had to be either the head of the household or his/her spouse. The response ratio to the phone survey was 1:7. The scientific commission that oversaw the survey considered this ratio to be more than sufficient to ensure that the sample and the data were accurate and representative.

3,447 potential interviewees were absent at the time of the call. 262 telephone numbers were incorrect. 351 were not heads of households and therefore did not meet the criteria for participation. 1130 potential interviewees (25.3%) refused to participate in the study after hearing the interviewer's introduction, even before answering the initial question concerning self-definition. This refusal rate was higher than that in 1988, which was 16.2%. It is possible that the climate of hostility felt by the Jews of France on the street and in the media in recent years dissuaded some from taking part in the study. 580 asked that the interview take place at a later date, but were not contacted again. 54 people began the interview but did not complete it, and therefore their responses are not included in the final analysis.

The first question asked was whether or not the potential interviewee is Jewish. The patronymic approach was only a first screening, as clearly not everyone in the phone directory with a last name common among Jews is necessarily Jewish. Of those individuals with Jewish patronymics who were contacted, 846 said they were not Jewish (18.9% of those contacted).[2] In the 1988 survey, 15.5% of those contacted said they were not Jewish or *Israélite*. None of those contacted who said they are not Jewish or *Israélite* was included on the AUJF national list. It is therefore plausible to say that the populations contacted in the course of the two studies are comparable.

1132 phone interviews were completed with heads of household in the 30 geographical French Departments. A comparison of the percentage of certain categories with absolute numbers available on Jewish life in France provided an external validation. We strove to achieve gender balance (577 men and 555 women participated in the study) and age distribution reflecting the percentages of the previous study.

The data gathered in the study was weighted in order to accord with certain traditional socio-demographic distributions. A table presenting the main socio-demographic indicators before and after weighting is given in the appendix.

1.2. *Additional Studies*

A follow-up study commissioned by the Jewish Agency was conducted between January 25 and February 24 2005.[3] We were able to re-interview 600 (53%) of the heads of households interviewed in the first study, ensuring a high level of representation of the survey population. In a very few cases the spouses of the original respondents were interviewed in the follow-up study.

Additional data considered in this analysis are drawn from an ongoing survey of participants in Israel Experience youth educational

[2] It might be hypothesized that the reason why these individuals replied in this fashion was out of fear or suspicion as to the survey's bona fides. It must be said that all of those contacted by phone were able to check the survey's credentials with the FSJU. However, in total just 15 people called the phone number for the FSJU office in order to check that this was in fact a survey being undertaken by French Jewish community institutions. This figure strengthens the assumption that these 846 people were not Jewish.

[3] Cohen, E.H. (2005a).

tours;[4] a survey of French tourists commissioned by AMI in 2004; a study commissioned by the Jewish Agency in 2005 concerning attitudes towards Israel and particularly towards immigration among French Jews practicing "liberal professions" (primarily law and medicine;[5] a study of French students (high school and post-high school) studying in Israel commissioned by Sacta-Rashi Foundation; and last but not least, a study commissioned by the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié* conducted in January–February 2007 among 980 heads of Jewish households (national sample). We have also drawn on certain items that were confirmed in a survey commissioned by the Sacta-Rashi Foundation about the needs of French Jewish high school students in Israel.[6] This study, which appeared in the *Observatoire du monde juif* in 2006, highlights the special nature of the *Aliyah* of young French Jews in recent years. This book is thus the sum total of data gathered and analyses undertaken about the Jews of France in the years 2002–2007.

1.3. *Data Analysis Methods*

The analysis is based on Facet Theory, a systematic approach providing a rationale for a hypothesis of a correspondence between a definitional framework and an aspect of the empirical data. The two main FT data analysis techniques utilized are described in brief.[7]

1.3.1. *Smallest Space Analysis (SSA)*

Smallest Space Analysis graphically portrays the structure of data by plotting a set of variables in a cognitive map ('smallest space') according to their correlations.[8] SSA begins with the construction of a correlation matrix for the selected variables. The correlations range from –100 to +100, with 0 indicating no correlation between a pair of

[4] Cohen, E.H. (2008).
[5] Cohen, E.H. (2005b).
[6] Cohen, E.H. (2006a).
[7] For more detailed explanations see; Guttman, (1959, 1982a); Levy & Elizur (2003); Levy, (1994). For a mathematical guide to use of Facet Theory techniques see: Amar (2005). For a comprehensive bibliography of Facet Theory publications see: Cohen, E.H. (2009) http://www.facet-theory.org/files/wordocs/Bibliography2009.pdf.
[8] Guttman (1968).

variables.[9] A computer program[10] then plots the variables as points in a cognitive map (a Euclidean space called 'smallest space') in such a way that closely correlated variables are close together and weakly or negatively correlated variables are far apart.

The program simultaneously takes into account the entire correlation matrix for all the selected variables. The computer program can generate a number of SSA maps in various dimensions and along various axes. The researcher may consider several possible maps to determine which shows the structure of the data most clearly. In SSA, the lower the dimensionality necessary to recognize a structure, the stronger it can be said to be. In general, it is preferable to find a structure in two or three dimensions.

Once the map is generated, the researcher looks for contiguous regions of semantically related variables. The researcher does not look for clusters defined only by distance, but regions that respond to a semantic criteria and which form a coherent overall structure. While the placement of the points is objective, based on the correlation between the data, the interpretation of the map is subjective, reflecting the theoretical basis of the analysis.

The regionalization of SSA maps is analogous to that of geographic maps, whose fixed features may be divided into regions according to political boundaries, natural features, population density, etc. For example, towns which span the borders of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany are in different regions according to maps divided along political boundaries but would be in the same region of a map showing natural habitat types. The divisions are determined according to the purpose of the map.

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[9] I have found the monotonicity correlation (MONCO) to be particularly applicable. MONCO is a regression-free, non-linear coefficient of correlation. MONCO measures whether or not two items vary in the same direction (i.e. both increase) (Guttman 1986: 80–87). It recognizes a wider variety of correlations as 'perfect', and therefore MONCO correlations are always higher in absolute value than linear correlations. An SSA may also be done successfully using the more common Pearson coefficient.

[10] The Hebrew University Data Analysis Package HUDAP data analysis software package developed by Reuven Amar and Shlomo Toledano, Computation Authority of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A manual on the use of HUDAP (Amar 2005) may be downloaded free of charge from: http://www.facet-theory.org/files/HUDAP%20Manual.pdf.

1.3.2. *Comparing Sub-Populations: External Variables in the SSA Map*
Using the graphic representation of the set of primary variables as a base, sub-groups of the survey population may be compared by introducing them as 'external variables'.[11] This is a unique feature of the SSA procedure, and distinguishes it from other multi-dimensional data analysis tools.

A correlation array is calculated between each external variable and the set of primary variables. The external variables are then introduced into the map, which is 'fixed' so that its structure is not affected. As with the primary variables, external variables are placed in such a way that they are close to items with which they are strongly correlated and far from those with which they are weakly or negatively correlated. In placing each external variable, the computer program considers its correlation with all the primary variables simultaneously.

1.3.3. *Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Base Coordinates (POSAC)*
POSAC ranges profiles of the survey population and graphically portrays the structure of the set of profiles. A *profile* consists of the individual's responses to each of the selected variables. Profiles may be *comparable* or *non-comparable*. A pair of profiles is comparable if one profile is higher the other on at least one item and not lower on any other item. Two profiles are non-comparable if and only if one profile is higher on at least one item while the other profile is higher on at least one other item. For example, the profiles 1-1-1 and 2-1-1 are comparable (the second being 'higher'). 1-2-1 and 2-1-1 are not (it cannot be determined which is higher). Since in empirical studies sets consisting of all comparable profiles are rare, POSAC was designed to deal with sets of comparable and non-comparable profiles by finding the 'best fit' among them. POSAC preserves as accurately as possible the 'partial order' (the order in a set of comparable and incomparable profiles) in as few dimensions as possible.

[11] Cohen & Amar (2002).

2. *Demography of the French Jewish Community Today*

2.1. *Size of the Population*

As seen in the discussion of the previous surveys, the question of how many Jews live in France is a complex and controversial one. A statistical study of Jewish community organizations (synagogue, community center, association) omits those who are not members of community institutions. A survey of larger social circles in which Jews are present entails the inherent problem of locating and accessing these circles. Interviewing a representative sample of the entire French population and asking interviewees if they consider themselves Jewish or if they were born Jewish would be exorbitantly expensive in terms of money and time. It was therefore necessary to adopt a research strategy that was both reliable on the scientific level and realistic on the operational level.

In order to ensure the highest possible degree of accuracy, we used three methods to estimate the number of Jews in France. The first two take a conventional, reliable approach. The third method is more innovative but also more problematic. We mention it nevertheless because it evaluates the number of Jews of France in a reasonably range close to the first two evaluations.

The first method is the patronymic, based on family names, as described above. This method was used in the study carried out between 1972 and 1978 by Bensimon and Della Pergola as the primary tool in the creation of their sample. Based on this method, they estimated that at the time there were 535,000 Jews in France.[12]

In our online search for the 685 Jewish patronymics identified, we found 32,026 listings in the 30 selected Departments, representing approximately 17% of Jewish households in France, that is, a total of 188,388 households.[13] We made a complementary Minitel search based on the ten most common Jewish family names in all 95 Departments, including those overseas. In this search we identified 16,164

[12] Bensimon & Della Pergola (1986: 35). To simplify matters, this study, which was undertaken in the field from 1972 to 1978, will be referred to in subsequent tables by the average date of 1975. See also the estimates by Della Pergola, Rebhun and Tolts (2000) for 2000–2010. These figures are very close to those of the present study.

[13] The figures were 50 baseline patronymics and 685 variants and derivatives generated by these patronymics.

addresses. Of these, those households identified in one of the 30 Departments covered by the in-depth study represented 82.2% of the total population. While we know that Jewish culture and education are much less developed in the 65 Departments not covered in the study,[14] an estimation of 17.8% of French Jewish households in these 65 Departments seems high; however, as no other figures are available for these Departments, we shall adhere to this estimate. Thus, adding to the 188,388 Jewish households mentioned above 17.8% for the other Departments, we obtain a figure of 229,182 households. As we learned in the survey, the average density of the households in the Departments covered by the present study is 2.57 (again, assuming that Jewish households in the other Departments have the same average density); hence, we arrive at an estimation of 588,997 Jews in France.

The second method is based on the number of students in Jewish schools. In 2002, 28,391 Jewish children studied in Jewish schools in France.[15] We also found that 26.2% of children and adolescents who live in households covered by our study attend a Jewish educational institution. We therefore obtain a figure of 108,400 for the number of Jewish children in this age group (3–18). The children of this age group represent 22% of people in the households studied. We thus obtain a figure of 492,000 for the number of Jews in France. To this figure, we must add 17.8% as above, thereby obtaining a figure of 598,540 for the number of Jews in France. Finally, the survey revealed that due to intermarriage, approximately 13% of members of Jewish households are non-Jews. Subtracting this 13% yields a final estimate of 520,730 Jews in France.

The third method was suggested to us by our colleague Chris Kooyman, of *Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk* (a Jewish organization based in the Netherlands). This method uses an algorithm to estimate the total population based on a comparison of two independent lists, in

[14] For example, Jewish schools are practically non-existent in these departments, as they lack a minimum student population. According to the figures of the Department of Education of the FSJU, only 426 students who attend Jewish schools live in one of the 65 Departments not covered by the in-depth study, representing 1.5% of the population of Jewish schools in France. Furthermore, the rate of intermarriage is higher in these 65 Departments.

[15] Personal communication, Patrick Petit-Ohayon, Department of Education, FSJU, July 2002.

this case the Minitel and the AUJF.[16] Using this method, we obtained an estimate of 559,848 Jews in France. This methodology, while interesting, has two problematic aspects. The first relates to the particular nature of the Alps-Maritime region, which cannot be generalized to other regions with any certainty. The second problem is even more serious. In the framework of the present study, it was not possible to verify whether or not members of various sub-groups (i.e. age groups) were equally likely to be included in one of the sample populations. The results are, therefore, only indicative. Nevertheless, as the estimate is in fact similar to the estimates of the other two methodologies, it further strengthens our estimate. A summary of the findings using the three methods is shown in Table 1.

As already noted, the 65 Departments not covered by the in-depth survey undoubtedly represent less than the 17.8% of the Jewish population of France. It is thus plausible to conclude that in 2002 the population of the Jews of France was approximately 500,000.[17] If

Table 1: Population of the Jews of France: A summary of the methodologies

	Weight of selected Patronymics	Extrapolation from number of students in Jewish day schools	Minitel/AUJF comparison
Estimated population	512,427	520,730	559,848

[16] The algorithm used to compute the population is as follows:
a) number of identical patronymics = x population 1
b) population 2 = total population x
See also Bishop, Feinberg & Holland (1975); Seber (1973: 59–70); Smit, Brunenberg & van der Heijden, (1996).

[17] Della Pergola et al. (2000) came up with the following results (projected average birthrate, zero migratory balance—assuming that the number of immigrants and those returning from Israel correspond to the figure of new immigrants from France).

Population	Year (January 1)
525,000	1995
520,000	2000
502,000	2010
482,000	2020
455,000	2030

non-Jewish spouses are included, the "expanded" Jewish community may consist of approximately 575,000 individuals.[18]

This estimate represents a decrease of 6.5% compared to the evaluation made 25 years ago by Bensimon and Della Pergola. It should be noted that the present study covers 30 Departments, thereby facilitating a more accurate estimation. That being the case, there are demographic factors, which may be responsible for the decline in the Jewish population of France. First, the rate of reproduction has declined. In 1967–71, the birth rate in the Paris region was 1.7 children among Jewish women born in North Africa and 1.2 children per Jewish woman born in Europe. In 2002, we found the following rates for the number of children with mothers in these age groups: 18–29 years: 0.49; 30–39 years: 1.67: 40–49: 2.22; 50–59: 2.41; 60 years and over: 2.42. It is known that, in order to ensure the reproduction of a population, an average of 2.1 children per woman is necessary.

Second, over the last 20 years, the Jewish population has grown older (as will be discussed later), thereby lowering the rate of natural increase. The third reason is emigration. Between 1975 and 2002, more than 35,000 French Jews migrated to Israel (though some returned to France), and an unknown number settled in other countries, particularly in North America. Since the late 1960s, Jewish immigration to France practically ceased, though there were small numbers of immigrants from Morocco and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the figures for the Jewish population of France are very stable. Commenting on the results of this survey, demographer Sergio Della Pergola said, "We are a long way from the revolutions that took place in Eastern Europe, with the departure of 1,400,000 Jews, while at the same time in Israel and Germany the Jewish population suddenly jumped on account of the same migratory movements."[19] He

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[18] Deutsch's estimation in the 1977 Sofres study that there were 600,000 to 700,000 Jews in France was based on the level of belonging to Jewish identity through culture, conviction or tradition. In this discussion, reference must be made to Schnapper's (1987) comment about the demography of the Jews, which in connection with an IFOP study of the Protestants underscored the problems of studying a small group which is scattered throughout the overall French body. The IFOP study identified two million individuals with close connections to Protestantism, while sociologists generally estimate their number at 800,000. The difference in estimates explains the "standard elasticity of a group's symbolic identity."

[19] Della Pergola (2003a: 13) He proved that French Jewish community was the largest in the Diaspora today after that of the USA, and larger than that of the community in the Former Soviet Union, where today there are about 395,000 Jews. See http://www.jpppi.org.il/publications_and_press/publications_category.asp?fid=419).

noted that the number of French Jews had declined by only 5% since the start of the 1990s. This is not the case in many other Diaspora populations, as documented in the comparison between 1970 and 2004 figures published by the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (2005). For example, a number of Diaspora communities, such as the US, Argentina, Hungary, South Africa and the former Soviet Union (particularly Russia and the Ukraine), are experiencing significant demographic decreases. In a few, most notably Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand, the Jewish population has grown over the last several decades. However, as will be seen, stable does not mean static.

Having established a reasonable estimate of the number of Jews in France (between 500,000 and 550,000 Jews), we may begin to examine the makeup of this population in greater detail.

2.2. *Country of Birth*

Twenty years ago, the Jewish community of France consisted largely of new immigrants from North Africa since between 1955 and 1965 the Jewish population of France doubled with the arrival of Jews from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. By the end of the 1960s, immigration of Jews to France quickly dropped off. In 1988 60% of the heads of French Jewish households were born outside metropolitan France. By 2002, this number had dropped to barely over half (50.25%). Taking into account the number of children under the age of 18 in Jewish families, most of whom were born in metropolitan France, one can say that, in terms of absolute numbers, the majority of French Jews were born in metropolitan France. The largest percentage of those born outside metropolitan France was born in Algeria, followed Morocco and Tunisia. It should be noted that almost 2% of heads of Jewish households residing in France today were born in Israel. Virtually all (96.34%) are French citizens. Table 2 shows the place of birth of French Jews and, for immigrants, the year of immigration.

2.3. *Geographical Distribution*

French Jews tend to concentrate in certain geographic regions of the country. 72% of the Jewish population of France lives in just nine of the 30 Departments studied. More than a quarter of French Jews (25.81%) resides in Paris. Four Departments in the Paris region are home to relatively large percentages of the Jewish population:

Table 2: French Jewish population by place of birth and year of immigration

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Percentage of Sample	*49.71%*	*11.69%*	*20.75%*	*10.71%*	*7.14%*	*100%*
Migrated in 1920–1955	–	8%	15%	6%	37%	15%
Migrated in 1956–1961	–	23%	26%	38%	21%	27%
Migrated in1962	–	6%	52%	8%	4%	26%
Migrated in 1963	–	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%
Migrated in 1964–1970	–	26%	1%	36%	5%	15%
Migrated in 1971–present	–	34%	1%	6%	31%	14%
Total	–	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Hauts-de-Seine (7.10%), Val-de-Marne (6.75%), Seine-St-Denis (5.63%) and Val-d'Oise (3.52%). Other major Jewish population centers are Lyon, Marseilles, Nice and Strasbourg. The majority of the remaining 28% of the Jewish population is distributed among the other 21 Departments studied. Few live in the other Departments. In the provinces, the highest Jewish populations are found in Bouches du Rhone (8.72%), Alpes-Maritimes (6.68%), Rhone (4.08%), and Bas-Rhin (3.80%).

We found that the Jews living in Paris are somewhat more economically and culturally integrated than those living in the periphery of the capital or the provinces. The reasons for this need to be examined in future research.

2.4. *Age*

Like the French population as a whole, the Jewish population of France has grown older in recent years, as shown in Table 3. Indeed, the "papa-boom" is even more pronounced among the French Jews. However, while there are a slightly higher percentage of people over the age of 65 among French Jews as compared to the general French population, there is also a slightly higher percentage of French Jews under the age of 20. As shown in Table 4, in 2002, 29.16% of French Jewish households were headed by someone 65 or older, up almost five percent from 23.39% in 1988. During the same time period, the percentage of French Jewish households headed by someone under thirty dropped from 14.62% to 12.29%, perhaps also indicating delay in marriage and starting a family.

Table 3: Age distribution of the general population of France (1990 and 2002) and the Jews of France (2002)

	Under 20	20 to 64	65 and over	Total
General French population 1990*	27.8%	58.3%	13.9%	100%
General French population 2002*	25.3%	58.5%	16.2%	100%
2002 Jews of France	27.9%	53.1%	19.0%	100%

* data from INSEE

Table 4: Distribution by 5-year age groupings of heads of households in the population: Study of the Jews of France 1988, 2002 and general French population 1999

	Jews of France 2002	Jews of France 1988	General French population* 1999
Ages 18–19**	0.72%	0.47%	0.40%
20–24	4.17%	4.56%	3.50%
25–29	7.40%	9.59%	7.40%
30–34	9.48%	11.11%	9.00%
35–39	11.35%	12.16%	9.70%
40–44	7.40%	10.18%	9.80%
45–49	7.54%	5.96%	10.10%
50–54	9.63%	7.49%	9.70%
55–59	7.47%	6.67%	6.80%
60–64	5.68%	8.42%	6.70%
65–69	7.97%	5.96%	7.10%
70–74	9.55%	5.15%	6.80%
75+	11.64%	12.28%	13.10%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

* Data from the INSEE
** In the INSEE 1999 survey this includes ages 15–19

2.5. *Marital Status*

The majority of heads of Jewish households in France are married (58%), as shown in Table 5. However, since 1975, there has been a constant, though slight, increase in the number of couples cohabiting. As with the rest of the French population, the phenomenon of divorce is increasing among the Jewish population. One third of the heads of Jewish households do not have spouses or partners (i.e., they are single, separated, divorced, or widowed). This figure is similar to the national average.

Table 5: Marital status of Jewish heads of households, 1975, 1988, 2002

	2002	1988	1975
Married	58%	63%	63%
Cohabiting	9%	4%	*
Widowed	10%	9%	6%
Divorced	9%	7%	1%
Single	14%	17%	30%
Total	100%	100%	100%

* The question was not asked

Table 6: Marital status of Jewish heads of households according to gender, 2002

	Male head of household	Female head of household
Married	69%	48%
Cohabiting	6%	11%
Widowed	4%	15%
Divorced/Separated	6%	12%
Single	15%	13%
Total	100%	100%

When the data are broken down by gender, as shown in Table 6, we see a greater percentage of female heads of households who are widowed, divorced or living with their partners. This probably reflects a tendency to define married men as the "head of household." Female interviewees who identified themselves as "head of household" were more likely to be unmarried, thus affecting the distribution of these results.

2.6. *Size of Family*

In 2002, the average size of the Jewish households stood at 2.57, slightly higher than that for the general French population, as shown in Table 7. According to the population census conducted by INSEE (1999), the average size of French households has tended to decrease in the last twenty years (2.7 in 1982, 2.6 in 1990 and 2.4 in 1999).

Large families are not a characteristic of the Jewish community of France. As seen in Table 8, the average is just 1.89 children. Large families with four children or more represent no more than 15% of the total number of Jewish households. Fifty percent of Jewish households have two to three children. Almost one quarter of Jewish families have no children (23%). This pattern is similar to the non-Jewish French population.

Table 7: Number of people per household according to the gender of head of household

	Male head of Jewish household 2002	Female head of Jewish household 2002	Jews of France 2002 Total	General French population 1999*
One	22%	32%	27%	31%
Two	39%	29%	34%	31%
Three	13%	13%	13%	16%
Four	14%	14%	14%	14%
Five	8%	9%	9%	6%
Six and over	4%	4%	4%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Data from the INSEE survey March 1999

Table 8: Number of children per family in Jewish-French households, 2002

Number of Children	Percentage
None	23%
One	15%
Two	29%
Three	21%
Four	7%
Five and over	5%
Total	100%

Our sample enabled us to count 700 children aged 3 to 18. The distribution of these children by school age is indicated in Table 9. The pyramid of children's ages would seem to indicate a rise in the birth-rate in recent years.

2.7. *Level of Education*

French Jews have taken an avid part in the country's higher education system. In fact, the educational level of the Jews of France is considerably higher than that of the rest of the population. It should be noted that the figures for the Jewish population apply to the stated educational level of heads of families or their spouses aged 20 or over, while the figures for the general French population apply to the entire population and to diplomas acquired. While the INSEE data and

Table 9: Distribution by age of children in Jewish-French households, 2002

Age	Percentage
1	8.14%
2	6.57%
3	6.96%
4	5.20%
5	5.20%
6	5.78%
7	5.88%
8	5.10%
9	4.41%
10	8.33%
11	4.12%
12	5.98%
13	4.90%
14	4.51%
15	6.67%
16	4.61%
17	3.33%
18	4.31%
Total	100.00%

that collected in our survey of heads of households are not strictly comparable, they do provide a general picture of the educational level of the Jewish population and the general French population.

Two thirds of French Jews have at least a bachelor's degree, compared to only 29% among the general French population. The figure for Jews residing within Paris is even higher: 73%, compared to 50% of the general population. Table 10 shows the level of education among French Jews and of the general French population in Paris and around the country.

According to the figures published by the Ministry of Education, the educational level of the French population has risen steadily over the past several decades. In 1911, only 1.1% of college age Frenchmen obtained a bachelor's degree. By 1970 this number had risen to 20%. Already then French Jews were attending college in far greater numbers, and in 1970, 61% of French in the appropriate age group had a bachelor's degree. During the 1980s, as a result of increased investment in education, participation in higher education rose significantly. In 1989, 38% of French students in this age group earned a bachelor's

Table 10: Level of education of Jewish heads of households aged 20 and over and in general French population

Level of Education	*Entire country*		*City of Paris*	
	French Jewish population 2002	General French population 1999[20]	French Jewish population 2002	General French population 1999
Less than Bachelor's degree	34%	71%	27%	50%
Bachelor's degree	18%	12%	12%	12%
Bachelor's degree +2	17%	8%	13%	10%
Bachelor's degree +4	31%	9%	48%	28%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 11: Level of studies of Jewish heads of households according to age

Level of Education	Aged 18–29	Aged 30–39	Aged 40–49	Aged 50–59	Aged 60 +
Less than Bachelor's degree	15%	19%	23%	33%	55%
Bachelor's degree	21%	11%	20%	22%	18%
Bachelor's degree +2	24%	27%	25%	18%	6%
Bachelor's degree +4	39%	44%	33%	28%	20%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

degree. This rose to 63% by 1995 and 70% by 2000. 82% of college-aged French Jews went on to earn a bachelor's degree.[21]

[20] The INSEE data refer to diplomas/degrees, not to levels of education as is the case in the present study. This obviously makes an accurate comparison of the two populations more difficult. However, two comments must be made regarding any wish to compare the two populations in terms of bachelor's degree qualifications. In the case of French Jews who reported that they had achieved an educational level of bachelor's degree +2 or +4, it would appear obvious that in all such instances, they must have gained their bachelor's degree. Along the same lines, in the case of those French Jews who said that they had not achieved bachelor's degree level, they might have a diploma but certainly not the bachelor's degree. Hence there is still some question about those respondents who said that they had the baccalaureate, where we do not actually know whether or not they have this qualification. However, since this group is very small, it does not call the entire comparison into question.

[21] Data downloaded from France's Education Ministry site: http://www.education.gouv.fr/default.htm. See also the speech by M. Xavier Darcos, Minister with Special Responsibility for School Education, at the conference on "High School Students in France 1802–2002" organized by the University of Paris IV—Sorbonne, Wednesday July 10, 2002. http//www.education.gouv.fr/discours/2002/lycees.htm. According to

The phenomenon of increased higher education from generation to generation can also be seen in the different level of education achieved by the various age groups, shown in Table 11.

These figures show a particularly high level of education for the Jewish population of France. We shall see later the consequences of this level of education on modes of Jewish identification.

2.8. *Employment*

Just over half of Jewish heads of households in France (53%) are employed, very slightly less than the level of employment among the general French population (55.1%).[22] One should note that members of the lowest and highest age groups (under 20 and 65 and over), that are usually not employed, are greater in number in the Jewish population of France than is the employed age group (20–64). Thus, the non-employed group (students, retirees, and the unemployed) represents 44.50% of heads of Jewish households. In 1988, 34% were non-employed. This represents a radical change, most likely explained by the age shift within the Jewish population, rather than by increased unemployment among those of working age. As discussed above, the older and younger age cohorts have both grown in recent years; hence, there are more pensioners and students among the French Jewish population than there were 15 years ago. As in other parts of the Western world, there are serious social and policy issues related to care of the elderly.[23]

Table 12 shows the breakdown of types of employment held by French Jews, showing the relatively high representation of French Jews in academic, executive, managerial and liberal professions. This is even more obvious in Table 13, which only takes into account those who are employed. Table 14 shows changes in field of employment

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the SOFRES data, 24.4% of the French population for heads of households aged 18 or more have a bachelor's degree or more (information provided by Prof. Emeric Deutsch).

[22] INSEE (1999).

[23] This made headlines in a particularly tragic way when almost 15,000 people in France, mostly elderly, died during a heat wave in August 2003. The high death toll was largely attributed to elderly left alone while their families went on vacation, as well as understaffed medical facilities during the vacation season Cheung (2003); Kosatsky (2005). Date of submission: The death toll among the French Jewish population mirrored that of the general population (Carmel, 2003).

Table 12: Socio-professional status of Jewish heads of households, 2002

Profession	Percentage
Artisans	1.65%
Merchants	5.22%
Managers	3.15%
Senior executives	6.08%
Liberal professions	7.08%
Middle executives	7.30%
Intellectual professions	7.87%
Employees[24]	13.45%
Unskilled Workers	0.93%
Retired	30.26%
Seeking employment	2.43%
Unemployed	11.52%
Students	2.72%
Total	100.00%

Table 13: Socio-professional distribution of employed Jewish heads of households, 2002

Profession	Percentage
Artisans	3.00%
Traders	9.96%
Managers	6.00%
Senior executives	11.46%
Liberal professions	13.78%
Middle executives	13.78%
Intellectual professions	15.01%
Employees	25.24%
Workers	1.77%
Total	100.00%

over the last quarter century. The percentage of French Jews who are workers or merchants has steadily dropped, while employment as senior executives and in the liberal and intellectual professions has grown.

[24] Employee positions by way of example: air conditioning technician, civil servant, commercial assistant, commercial traveler, computer graphics designer, consistorial assistant, cultural center employee, dental assistant, driver, food attendant, freight clerk, hotel maintenance, investigator, legal secretary, management assistant, nurse,

Table 14: Evolution of socio-professional categories of the Jewish population of France, 1975–2002

	2002		1988		1975
Artisans	3.00%	*18.96%*	8.30%	*30.50%*	*21.40%*
Traders	9.96%		19.40%		
Industrialists/Managers	6.00%		2.80%		
Senior executives/liberal & intellectual professions	40.25%		38.90%		25.30%
Middle executives	13.78%		18.10%		18.40%
Employees	25.24%		11.10%		24.50%
Workers	1.77%		1.30%		10.30%
Farmers	0.00%		0.10%		0.10%
Total	100.00%		100.00%		100.00%

A study of French Jews practicing the "liberal professions" (physicians, dentists, medical experts and advocates) found that these individuals, particularly those in the medical profession, are more actively involved in their local Jewish communities and are more open to the idea of immigration to Israel than the general French Jewish population. However, professional and economic obstacles prevent many from actually making this move, or to delay the move until after retirement.[25]

2.9. *Ethnicity*

Among the demographic changes being undergone by the Jewish population of France, the Ashkenazic/Sephardic divide is continuing to evolve in favor of Sephardim, as seen in Table 15.

Whatever socio-cultural differences between Sephardim and Ashkenazim exist are becoming less marked than in the past. The Sephardi immigrants who came to France in the 1950s and 1960s are somewhat less integrated than the Ashkenazim, who have been in France for several generations. Thus, the Sephardim have somewhat lower levels of education and income.[26] However, compared with other migrant

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presenter/demonstrator, production technician, salesperson, secretary, social worker, stylist, technician.

[25] Cohen, E.H. (2005b).

[26] In this respect, it may simply be stated that, as far as profiling is concerned, place of birth (in France or outside Metropolitan France) is slightly more useful in making distinctions than ethnic origin (Ashkenazic or Sephardic).

Table 15: Distribution of Ashkenazi and Sephardi in French Jewish Population 1988 and 2002, and educational level of Ashekenazi and Sephardi French Jews in 2002

	Ashkenazic	Sephardic
Percentage of the French Jewish population 1988*	34%	50%
Percentage of the French Jewish population 2002*	24%	70%
Level of education, 2002		
Less than the baccalaureat	27%	37%
Baccalaureat	15%	18%
Baccalaureat +2	18%	18%
Baccalaureat +4	40%	27%
Total	100%	100%
Family Income		
Low	21%	34%
Average	57%	55%
High	23%	11%
Total	100%	100%

* The figures do not total 100% because a small percentage of respondents in each year declared themselves either both Sephardi and Ashkenazi or neither.

populations in France, the Jews from North Africa are well integrated and assimilated into French society.

2.10. *Political Tendencies*

Respondents were asked to indicate their political position within the spectrum from extreme left to extreme right. Only a tiny minority define themselves as either 'extreme right' or 'extreme left'. However, as seen in Table 16, there has been a distinct shift towards the right among France's Jews. In 1988, 44% described their political tendency as 'left'; by 2007 this had fallen to 20%. The percentage describing themselves as 'right' rose from 14% to 38%. Cumulatively, those who left-of-center fell from 59% to 30% while those right-of-center rose from 24% to 57%. Those who described themselves as centrists fell by 5%.

The political shift to the right of France's Jews was reflected among the larger society, as seen in the elections of 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy of the center-right UMP Party (*Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*) defeated the Socialist Party candidate.

Table 16: Political tendencies of heads of French Jewish households, 1988, 2007

	1988	2007
Extreme left	1%	1%
Left	44%	20%
Center-left	14%	9%
Center	17%	13%
Center-right	9%	19%
Right	14%	38%
Extreme right	1%	0%
Total	100%	100%

2.11. *Political Attitudes Regarding Israel*

While French Jews expressed almost universal support for the existence of the State of Israel, they were divided in their opinion regarding specific political questions in Israel. In 2002, almost half of Jewish heads of households said they favored the idea of Israel handing over territories in exchange for a credible peace with the Palestinians, while 39% opposed the idea. The remaining 14% said they think it is not up to Jews living in France to give an opinion on the issue.

It should be noted that the educational level of the people interviewed impacted the positions they took on the conflict. 60% of the Jews of France who completed university studies favored handing over territory in exchange for peace, while only 35% of those who do not have a bachelor's degree share the same view. This is indicative of the dominant attitudes towards Israel in the French academic world: even if French Jewish academics are generally supportive of Israel, they are likely to take more left-leaning positions.

3. *Jewish Identity*

3.1. *What it Means to be Jewish*

According to *Halakha* (Jewish law), a person is Jewish if he/she was born to a Jewish mother or is a convert to Judaism.[27] For sociologists,

[27] Ben-Rafaël, 2001.

the question is more complex. In this study, any respondent who identified him/herself as Jewish is considered Jewish, regardless of halakhic status (which, in any event, we could not verify in the framework of this survey). This reflects a subjective feeling of belonging to the Jewish people, rather than a legalistic definition.[28]

There are numerous sociological approaches to the concept of identity. One such approach emphasizes definition of group boundaries and the system of social relations.[29] According to this approach, an individual may express different identities depending on the set of circumstances. Another approach considers identity *within* the group, the values, behaviors, and attitudes which define the internal social context. Identification may be based on the network of relationships between people or affiliation to a given group (based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.). Since relationships within and between groups are often inconstant, the evolutionary nature of identity should be considered.[30]

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[28] In the framework of the present study, it is possible for somebody whose mother is Jewish not to consider themselves Jewish. Similarly, somebody whose mother was not Jewish may consider themselves Jewish.

[29] Schlesinger (1987: 235) says, "Identity is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion, and the critical factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups…not the cultural reality within those borders.… All identities are constituted within a system of social relations and require the reciprocal recognition of others. Identity…is not to be considered a 'thing' but rather a 'system of relations and representations'…Identity is seen as a dynamic, emergent aspect of collective action." On constructing ethnic identity see also Nagel (1994). On the threshold that separates difference from similarity and names given to these differences, particularities, resemblances and similitudes, see Peressini (1993: 16): "It is precisely because it constitutes a simplifying fiction, which creates homogeneous groups with the heterogeneous, clear-cut borders with the continuous, and which turns groups into immutable essences, that identity is necessary and essential to social actors. Like the concepts which we use in order to name things and express ideas, categories of identity make it possible to grasp and understand reality. Faced with a world in constant flux, it is these which make it possible, nevertheless, to name oneself and to name others, to make oneself an idea of what we are and of what others are, and lastly to determine our place and that of our fellow human beings in the world and in society."

[30] As de Montaigne observed over four hundred years ago: "I have nothing to say entirely, simply, and with solidity of my self, without confusion, disorder, blending, mingling, and in one word, *Distinguo* is the most universal part of my logic…We are all framed of flaps and patches and of so shapeless and diverse a texture that every piece and every moment plays its part. And there is as much difference found between us and ourselves as there is between ourselves and others." In Michel (1990).

How do the Jews of France identify themselves?[31] In relation to whom and what do they identify themselves? We examined forms of identification among Jews as well as modes of identification of Jews in relation to non-Jews. This process enabled us to establish the basis for a typology of the Jews of France and thereafter to draw a picture of Jewish identity.

3.2. *Jewish*/Israélite

As discussed in the introduction, there are two terms in French for a member of the Jewish people: "*Israélite*" and "*Juif* (Jew)" Each has its own connotations, as a result of which they have gained or lost popularity during various phases of recent history. Following the French Revolution, the term "*Israélite*" widely replaced "*Juif*," which at the time often bore derogatory connotations. The term *Israélite* was thought to represent a synthesis of respect for the French Republic, which emancipated its Jews, and loyalty to the Mosaic religion. It represents a sort of "regenerated Judaism," in the terms of the French Revolution: an essentially denominational Judaism, whose members have the status of co-religionists to one another. Schnapper used the term *Israélite* to designate "Jews who, for the most part, were born in France to French parents, are neither observant nor militant, and adopt the manners of non-Jews of the same social background."[32]

The Jews from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia who immigrated to France in the 1950s and 1960s were much more traditional and religious than native French Jews. While they quickly assimilated into French culture in many ways, North African Jews did not fully accept consistorial Judaism, which allows Jews to be Jewish in the synagogue and at home but to be only French in public. For the North African Jews, family, tradition and community were equally important as state,

[31] Levinas (1963: 73) notes an inherent paradox in studies of Jewish identity: "To ask questions about Jewish identity is already to lose it. But it also means to care about it, for without this one would not ask questions. Between what was and what is still to be, one finds the extremity, stretched like a tight rope, on which the Judaism of Western Jews dares to venture." Ultimately,… we can never truly objectify identity and we can only grasp at the traces it leaves when it expresses itself—the material or spiritual signs and symbols that incarnate identity in social life," (Simon 1998: 16).

[32] Schnapper (1980).

Table 17: Self-definition of identity by Jewish heads of households 1977, 1988, 2002

	1997 *(SOFRES)*	1988	2002
Jewish	57%	63%	67%
Israélite	32%	5%	5%
Both	11%	32%	28%
Total	100%	100%	100%

nation and democracy. On the whole, they did not adopt the term "*Israélite*."[33]

As shown in Table 17, in 1977, one third of the Jews of France still preferred the term "*Israélite*." By 1988 only 5% defined themselves as "*Israélite*" and 32% used both terms. As of 2002, use of the term *Israélite* continued to diminish. While the percentage that prefers the term *Israélite* remained unchanged at 5%, the percentage of those who use both terms fell slightly.

Furthermore, in 2002 we found a difference in propensity to use the two terms among respondents from various age brackets. A full 50% of those who called themselves *Israélite* were 60 years or older; 41% of those who used both terms were in the oldest age bracket. Table 18 shows the frequency of the use of the identity-terms among the various age groups. The term "Jew" alone was the most common choice among all ages. Older respondents were more likely to call themselves *Israélite*, either using this term alone or, more frequently, in conjunction with the term "Jew". The dual term was chosen by a full third of those aged 60 or older.

Given the implications of the terms, this shift may express a very real and profound change in the norms, values and consciousness of the Jews of France, a hypothesis explored by Mesure and Renaut.[34] Alternatively, it may be that the term "*Israélite*" was never truly internalized by the Jews of France. As expressed by Simone Veil, member of a well-established Jewish-French family and active in French and European political institutions, "We never used the word *Israélite*.[35]

[33] On this issue, see Bensimon (1996).
[34] Mesure & Renaut (1996: 15).
[35] Veil (1998: 55).

Table 18: Self-definition of identity by Jewish heads of household, 2002, by age

	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60+	Total
Number	*170*	*287*	*209*	*239*	*490*	*1395*
Jew	72%	74%	71%	64%	61%	67%
Israélite	2%	2%	5%	6%	7%	5%
Both	26%	24%	24%	30%	33%	28%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 19: Self-definition of identity and observance of Kashrut, 2002

	Jew	*Israélite*	Both
Always	24%	21%	62%
Often	12%	14%	9%
Rarely	10%	15%	8%
Never	44%	40%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%

I never heard this word in our home. We would say 'We are Jewish, we are French.' We were one hundred percent French. Even patriots." Her recollection reveals the public nature of the term "*Israélite*." It was not used at home, the most private of domains. This sheds light on the 28% of respondents who say they use both terms. Self-identification depends on the context. It may be that in private, they define themselves as Jews while in public they define themselves as *Israélite*.

To further examine the implications of these terms, we may look at the practices of those who define themselves as Jews, *Israélites* or both. The results show that the simplistic dualism of Jew as traditional and *Israélite* as assimilated is insufficient to describe the complexity of the ways in which the terms are used. Those who defined themselves as *both* Jewish and *Israélite* were by far the most likely to say they always keep kosher. This group was also (to a less dramatic degree) the most likely to be in an endogamous marriage. Those who called themselves *Israélites* were in fact only slightly less likely to say they keep a kosher home or to be in an endogamous marriage than were those who chose the term Jew to define themselves.

We found that the behavior of "Jews" and "*Israélites*" are also similar in terms of communal attendance: "Jews" are *not* more numerous than "*Israélites*" in visiting communal institutions. This further refutes

Table 20: Self-definition of identity and marriage patterns, 2002

	Jew	*Israélite*	Both
Spouse Jewish	64%	68%	82%
Spouse non-Jewish	36%	32%	16%
Never married	44%	40%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 21: Self-definition of identity and communal attendance, 2002

	Jew	*Israélite*	Both
Never or rarely	41%	46%	25%
Occasionally or quite often (2–5 times/year)	34%	28%	24%
Very often	25%	26%	41%
Total	100%	100%	100%

the a priori assumption that "*Israélite*" would be the term employed by assimilated Jews, while more active ones in terms of identity would prefer "Jew". Again we see that the group which is the most distinctive at the behavioral level is the one choosing to define as *both* "Jews and *Israélites*". Their contacts with community institutions are much more frequent: 41% visit 'very often'—they are the closest to the community core. Those who opt to define themselves *either* as "Jew" or "*Israélite*" are further away; just over a quarter of them may be considered the community core based on attending community institutions 'very often'.

3.3. *'Born Again As…'*

As another way to explore the attitude of French Jews towards Israel, we posed a hypothetical question to the people we interviewed regarding the religious identity and nationality they would chose, if given a choice. The results are shown in Table 22. This question enables respondents to express attitudes about their feelings about Israel, France and Judaism without taking practical issues into account.

42% of heads of households said they would prefer to be born again as Jews in France or in another Diaspora country. People in this group, apparently, believe that their identity as Jews is compatible with the French political system and culture and that it is unnecessary for

Table 22: If you could be born again, how would you wish to be born?

	Percentage
Jewish in the Diaspora	42%
Jewish in Israel	38%
Identity and place are not important	19%
Non-Jewish	1%
Total	100%

them to abandon either their specific ethnic-religious identity or their nationality, both of which they acknowledge. A slightly lower percentage, 38%, would choose to be born again as Jews in Israel. Whether or not they in fact move to Israel, these French Jews express a feeling that being Jewish in the Jewish state would be somehow preferable. Almost one fifth says that nationality and religion are not important to them. These French Jews seem to have internalized universal values. Only 1% of respondents would specifically prefer not to be Jews.

3.4. *Jewish Education*

Choice of school is another important indicator of French Jewish identity, with deep and far-reaching implications. Public schools socialize students to French ideals of citizenship, universalism and secularism. Sending one's children to a religious school is viewed by some as bordering upon the unpatriotic.[36] However, the institutionalized secularism of the public schools may present problems for traditional families. For example, neither students nor faculty members are allowed to display outward signs of religious affiliation such as *tzitzit* or a *kippah* and classes are held on Saturdays.[37] Non-religious Jewish families may opt for private school because of the atmosphere of violence, drugs and anti-Semitic incidents that plague some public schools.[38]

The Jewish school system, essentially destroyed by the end of World War II, has been rebuilt and is growing at an exponential rate. The

[36] Laborde (2001); Shurkin (2000).

[37] Shurkin (2000); Wasserstein (1996).

[38] In a follow-up survey of the Jews of France, commissioned by Fonds Social Juif Unifie which I conducted in 2007, it was found that up to a third of French Jews send their children to non-Jewish private schools, predominantly Catholic schools (Cohen, E.H. 2007). The reasons for and implications of this finding require further investigation. The figure was quoted in Lefkovits (2007).

1991 survey found that 15,907 students were enrolled in the Jewish educational system.[39] By 2005 over 30,000 children attended a Jewish day school in France, an increase of over 88% over the last 15 years.[40] The development of the French Jewish educational system has strengthened the nucleus of the community, and its momentum has not yet slacked.

The families included in the comprehensive survey included 817 school-aged children. Of these, 134 are enrolled in Jewish day schools, while the other 633 are not. The majority of the latter attend public school, though some attend other private schools or are schooled at home.

A comparison of the attitudes expressed by parents whose children were enrolled in Jewish day schools and those whose children were not revealed significant and interesting differences, highlighting the connection between Jewish education and identity (Table 23).

Those with children in Jewish day schools were more religiously observant and more involved in the local Jewish community than those whose children were not in Jewish day schools, although almost half of the families with children in public or other schools describe themselves as "traditional." Parents who enrolled their children in Jewish day schools were more like to say they feel close to Israel. They were far more likely to be considering moving there and/or to say they would encourage their children making *Aliyah*. In response to the hypothetical question discussed in the previous section, in which respondents were asked what religion and nationality they would choose if they could be born again, a much higher percentage of parents with children in Jewish day schools said they would prefer to have been born Jewish in Israel. Those whose children are not enrolled in Jewish schools were more likely to say that they do not care into which religion and nationality they would be born. In addition, they were less firmly opposed to their children marrying non-Jews and more likely to be intermarried themselves. Each of these last items may be considered an indication of internalization of the universal values emphasized in the French public school system.

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[39] Cohen, E.H. (1991).

[40] The conclusion of the previous study indicates that in 1986–1988 it appeared that "counting on 50%–100% extra Jewish pupils in Jewish schools is a perfectly plausible hypothesis" (ibid.: 153).

Table 23: Comparison of behaviors and attitudes among parents of children enrolled in French Jewish day schools and parents of children in other French schools

	Children not in Jewish day school	Children in Jewish day school (kindergarten, elementary or secondary)	Total population of parents of school-aged children
Number	*629*	*188*	*817*
Traditional	47%	68%	52%
Orthodox	9%	29%	13%
Always eat kosher at home	48%	95%	59%
Regularly light *Shabbat* candles Friday night	55%	95%	64%
Regularly make *Kiddush* Friday night	60%	98%	69%
Regularly refrain from working on *Shabbat*	49%	87%	58%
Feel "very close" connection to Israel	43%	66%	48%
considering making *Aliyah* "very soon"	5%	30%	11%
Considering making *Aliyah* "later"	17%	34%	21%
Would encourage my children to make *Aliyah*	44%	60%	48%
"If you could be born again, what would you choose to be?"			
• Jewish in the Diaspora	36%	23%	34%
• Non-Jewish	0%	0%	0%
• Jewish in Israel	44%	72%	50%
• Identity and place not important	19%	5%	16%
Participate in local Jewish community very often	34%	72%	42%
Volunteer in the Jewish community	25%	48%	30%
Religion of partner			
• Jewish	66%	99%	74%
• Non-Jewish	33%	1%	26%
Would vehemently oppose my children marrying non-Jews	24%	58%	32%

4. *Forms of Solidarity*

4.1. *Community and Solidarity*

Expressing identification and solidarity with a specific ethnic, religious or national group is a delicate and controversial concept in French Republican society. The term "communtarian" has generally negative connotations and is used to indicate someone whose loyalty lies with a minority group rather than with the State. In contrast to this negative notion of "communitarianism," Weber defines a process of "communalisation," formation of a social relationship based on participants' subjective feelings of belonging to the same community.[41] The notion of community involves a shared vision of a common goal, the existence of norms, and a concrete form of solidarity between its members. Boudon and Bourricaud try to resolve how "diffuse forms of solidarity" are sustained—for example, by dedicating time and resources to community affairs.[42] It must be remembered that the solidarity of which we speak is primarily voluntary.[43]

While there are complex sociological and theoretical discussions regarding the nature of various types of solidarity our main goal in this study is to understand the basis on which Jewish solidarity is built and to define the form of relationship the Jews of France have with one another.[44] What are the major principles on which the perception and expression of solidarity is based in Jewish households? Is the emphasis on personal or communal motivations?

The data from the survey includes a number of items which may be considered indicators of solidarity with the Jewish people: participation in the local Jewish community, philanthropy to Jewish/Israeli causes and institutions (particularly as compared with donations to general charitable causes), commitment to Israel (indicated by visits, attitudes

[41] Weber [1914] (1971: 41).
[42] Boudon & Bourricaud (1982).
[43] This development regarding concepts of community, communalization, solidarity (both mechanical and organic), to mention just a few, is obviously brief and preliminary. Reference should also be made to the classic works of Karl Tönnies, Max Weber, Alain Touraine, Etienne Balibar, Claude Tapia, and others.
[44] Durkheim ([1893] 1984).

towards *Aliyah* and political position on Israeli politics), and the level of importance attached to Jewish education.[45]

4.2. *Participation in the Local Jewish Community*

Community participation, like all social phenomena, is multidimensional. A well-developed community with diverse members offers multiple opportunities for involvement. Jews may participate in their local communities for a variety of reasons, which may be characterized as religious, familial, cultural, or social.

The surveys of French Jews carried out between 1988 and 2002 consistently included a series of questions on religious practice and communal attendance. Based on the results, three groups were defined within the French Jewish population. The outer periphery covers those who during the year "never" or only "very rarely" attend at the institutions or bodies of the French Jewish community. Next is the middle band, covering those who visit "occasionally" or 2 or 3 times a year, or "quite often", which is 4 or 5 times a year. The communal core is made up of the loyalists who attend communal institutions "very often". This approach was inspired by Annie Kriegel, one of the first sociologists to perceive Jewish belonging as a scale, from the center to the periphery.[46]

This quasi-geographical approach facilitates locating commitments in relation to the intensity of contacts: the more numerous the contacts, the more important the proximity of the interested party to communal institutions. It will need to be verified whether this relationship also extends to cultural and religious identity practices. For the time being, this approach proposed by Kriegel considers communal practice to be voluntary, without the permanence of a perpetual commitment. Our surveys in 1988 and 2002 on the frequency of community

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[45] It cannot be denied that the importance attached to financial contributions and children's Jewish education is indicative of "attitudes." However, the same visits can be interpreted as expressing an attitude of solidarity. Many studies have been undertaken in the United States into philanthropy. Inter alia, we can cite Rimor & Tobin (1991: 51) who have come to the conclusion that synagogue membership and visiting Israel are factors which are more indicative of philanthropy than having Jewish friends, the level of religious observance, and religious affiliation: "It seems that the four variables—synagogue attendance, organizational membership, synagogue membership, and visiting Israel—are more basic in explaining contribution behavior than having Jewish friends, religious practices, and denominational affiliation."

[46] Kriegel (1984: 131).

visits confirmed that the overwhelming majority of French Jews have an instrumental approach to communal institutions and services. At a family event such as a birth, marriage or the death of a relative, French Jews increase the number of contacts and come closer (also in a physical sense) to the communal core. When such family obligations end, they tend to distance themselves. We could talk about an "elastic Judaism". The behavioral approach to the means of identification of French Jews tells us different things.

Almost 30% of the heads of Jewish households surveyed stated that they participate frequently (once a month or more) in activities within a Jewish community setting. 18% said they never participate. These figures indicate a slight increase in participation in local community events since the 1988 survey, when 28% said they participate frequently in local Jewish community events and 35% said they never participate in the local Jewish community. The percentage of those who said they participate occasionally or frequently (between 2–5 times a year) rose by 5% between 1988 and 2002. The percentage of those who participate 'very frequently' and therefore may be considered part of the community nucleus rose by 8%.[47] These findings confirm the feeling expressed by many community leaders that there has been a strengthening of the community nucleus in recent years. This may be seen as an acceleration of the process of communalisation.

This process, however, is not unilinear. In a previous study I used the concept "Jews in eclipse", which took into account the intensity and elasticity of community participation.[48] In Kriegel's definition of

[47] During several visits to Nice during the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashana) period, I had the opportunity to be present at an event which undoubtedly deserves to be studied on its own. This is the *Tashlich* ceremony, during which Jews symbolically cast all the faults of the previous year into a deep place (hole, river, etc.). Some 15 years ago, I attended a *tashlich* ceremony conducted on the beach by the late Chief Rabbi Jean Kling. There were some 80 to 100 people, all men, at the water's edge. There is no denying that the presence of these men, most of them bearded and garbed in festival attire, at the water's edge, surrounded on either side by practically nude men and women, was a very striking sight. But that was not the main point here. In 2002 I had another opportunity to attend *tashlich* in Nice. Imagine my surprise when I saw more than two thousand people there, men, women, children, ultra-Orthodox and traditional alike, a few men—not very many—without a skullcap, listening to the Shofar and a sermon by Chief Rabbi Mordekhai Bensoussan, most of which was about Israel. This was a very remarkable community event, a virtual community center, the chance to have a pleasant get-together, where many people were there before the ceremony started and just as many stayed on after the ceremony was over.

[48] Cohen, E.H. (1991: 82).

community, "…the level of belonging can vary from almost 0 to 100 degrees … the place where each person chooses to position himself on a very broad scale extending from the center to the periphery does not have the fixed character of a permanent commitment."[49]

Synagogues are by far the most common community institutions in which French Jews are likely to be involved: for 80% of France's Jewish population, Jewish communal participation means going to synagogue. Fewer numbers are involved with community centers, Jewish associations, or study groups.

Heads of households who frequently participated in a local Jewish community institution tended to identify themselves as religious and even as more religious than their parents while those who participated less frequently were less likely to identify themselves as religious. They described themselves as either equally religious as their parents, or less religious than their parents.

In respect to religious observance, we found a correlation between attendance at communal institutions and observance of religious tradition: 77% of those who never visit Jewish communal institutions do not keep *kashrut* at home, while 79% of those who attend very often do. However, even if the correlation is clear, it is difficult to answer the question of what comes first.

Another general trend found among French Jews is that all parameters of community life (community attendance, Jewish education, respect for *kashrut*, etc.) were stronger in large families and, particularly, in families where children study in the Jewish educational network. It appears that those with children in Jewish day schools were also the main users of Jewish community institutions in France.

4.3. *Philanthropy*

Contribution of money and time are another indicator of the level and direction of involvement in the social arena. The generosity of the Jews of France towards general (i.e. not Jewish or Israeli) charitable or social institutions and organizations was found to be almost identical to that of the larger French population.[50] French Jews' contributions

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[49] Kriegel (1984: 131).

[50] The questions in the two surveys were not phrased in exactly the same words, but were similar enough to allow for a comparison. On the SOFRES survey, the question was: "Do you help through financial gifts, gifts in kind or by devoting time,

Table 24: Comparison of contributions to general (not specifically Jewish or Israeli) charitable organizations by general French population and French Jewish population

Frequency of Contribution	General French population (SOFRES 2000)	French Jewish population 2002
Several times a year	28%	27%
Approx. once a year	21%	19%
Every two or three years	3%	3%
Less often	6%	9%
Never	41%	42%
Total	100%	100%

to specifically Jewish or Israeli organizations were much higher, as seen in Table 24.

4.4. *Connections to Israel: Tourism, Family and* Aliyah

Connection to Israel is a particularly complex issue. As mentioned, affiliation with any political entity other than the French Republic is perceived negatively in French culture and "dual loyalties" are subject to suspicion. Support for Israel, specifically, is highly controversial. Nevertheless, the Jews of France in general have strong ties to Israel. 86% said they feel close to Israel and 49% "very close." This connection was not hypothetical, but is based on family connections and frequent visits.

It is important to note that the much discussed "Israel-Diaspora relationship" is far from homogenous. In comparative studies of various Diaspora youth populations, I have consistently found that French Jewish youth not only feel 'close' to Israel, they also have a realistic

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organizations, causes or people in distress who are not members of your family or friends?" In our survey of French Jewish heads of households we asked "How often do you make financial contributions or do voluntary work to non-Jewish or non-Israeli organizations or institutions?" It should be noted that the question asked by SOFRES concerned all forms of solidarity (contributions in the form of money, time or kind). In the present study, we asked two specific questions: one on financial donations, the other about time and voluntary work. If we take these two questions together—financial donations and volunteer activities by Jewish heads of households and outside the Jewish community—the data become comparable with the overall French population (SOFRES, 2000).

image of Israel, particularly compared to that of American-Jewish youth. For example, in a study conducted in the summer of 2000, shortly before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, I explored the differences in the images of Israel found in various Diaspora communities. In questionnaires distributed to 5,648 young Jews at the outset of "Israel Experience" tours, participants were asked to indicate which items from a list of places, names and symbols expressed their image of Israel. While the American participants had a highly idealized image of Israel as the Holy Land and a pilgrimage site, the French participants held a much more balanced image of the modern State of Israel and were far more likely to consider Israel as a possible home.[51]

Almost three quarters of French Jews have relatives living in Israel: 6% have children living there, 47% have other close relatives in Israel, and 23% have more distant Israeli relatives.

More than three quarters of the surveyed heads of Jewish households have visited Israel at least once. Nearly 30% have made six or more visits, for vacation (59%) or to visit family (38%). In the follow-up survey of French Jews conducted in 2005, we asked respondents the year of their most recent visit to Israel. Almost a quarter (24%) had visited Israel within the previous year. 16% had visited most recently between 2000 and 2003. This illustrate that even during the worst years of attacks against Israeli civilians during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, when overall tourism rates to Israel declined drastically, significant numbers of French Jews continued to visit. 30% visited most recently between 1982 and 1999, while 9% visited most recently before 1981. Only 21% said they had never visited Israel.

In October 2004, I directed a survey of French tourists in Israel. We interviewed 2,109 French Jewish tourists aged 15 years and older who were vacationing in seven major Israeli cities. These tourists had strong Jewish identities. Most defined themselves as traditional, were frequent participants in their local Jewish community, and enrolled their children in Jewish educational settings.

As a major result of this last survey, using the data gathered among the sample, together with general data from the Ministry of Israel Tourism, it was possible to establish that at least a quarter of the Jews of France visited at least one time Israel during the single year

[51] Cohen, E.H. (2003).

of 2004.[52] The majority said they considered making *Aliyah*. Three-quarters of the adolescents surveyed said they do not envision their future as being in France, and a third hoped to make *Aliyah* "very soon." Three quarters of the tourists surveyed said they hope their children will come to study in Israel.

Thus we see that tourism and *Aliyah* are linked phenomenon among French Jews, as repeated visits serve not only as vacations or religious pilgrimages, but also as preliminary steps towards a more permanent move among those who are considering *Aliyah*.

Aliyah: Intention of settling in Israel. One important area of interest in a sociological study of French Jews concerns attitudes and practice regarding *Aliyah*. *Aliyah* refers to immigration to Israel, but the Hebrew term, which literally means 'to go up', has strong ideological connotations, intimately linked with Zionist ideology. Making *Aliyah*, of course, is a major step with large and complex implications, economically, logistically, personally, and ideologically.[53]

Data provided by the Jewish Agency for Israel show that between 1948 and 2009, a total of 88,792 Jews from France have made *Aliyah*. This may be broken down as follows: from the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 until the Six Day War of 1967 (widely considered a turning point in Diaspora-Israel relations), 10,316 French Jews moved to Israel; from 1968 to 1987, the figure more than tripled, to 38,665; and between 1986 and 2009, another 41,161 French Jews moved to Israel. The period of the surveys was one of high *Aliyah*, with a peak in 2005, when over 3000 French Jews made *Aliyah*.

In the surveys conducted in 1988 and 2002, respondents were asked their intentions regarding the possibility of moving to Israel. As seen in Table 25, only a small percentage of French Jews said they intend to make *Aliyah* "very soon", but this figure doubled between 1988 and 2002. At the other end of the spectrum, the percentage who said they have no intention of making *Aliyah* also grew to over half (an increase of 18%), showing the extent to which opinions on this issue are polarized. In fact only a minority said they had never thought about it, and this minority grew smaller during the years between the two surveys, from 21% in 1988 to 16% in 2002.

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[52] Cohen E.H. (2005c).

[53] Making *Aliyah* does not necessitate renouncing one's French citizenship, as it is possible to hold dual French and Israeli citizenship.

Table 25: Immigration of French Jews to Israel since the creation of the state of Israel. Data from the Jewish agency for Israel Annual Report

Year	N	Year	N	Year	N	Year	N
1948	640	1964	731	1980	1430	1996	2052
1949	1665	1965	830	1981	1430	1997	2279
1950	672	1966	700	1982	1682	1998	1990
1951	401	1967	893	1983	2094	1999	1557
1952	246	1968	2523	1984	1539	2000	1366
1953	196	1969	5292	1985	1017	2001	1144
1954	201	1970	4414	1986	927	2002	2481
1955	206	1971	3281	1987	888	2003	2083
1956	199	1972	2356	1988	920	2004	2415
1957	267	1973	1473	1989	900	2005	3005
1958	274	1974	1345	1990	864	2006	2838
1959	326	1975	1382	1991	966	2007	2717
1960	371	1976	1416	1992	1182	2008	1876
1961	372	1977	1226	1993	1372	2009	1894
1962	580	1978	1302	1994	1512	**Total**	**88792**
1963	546	1979	1648	1995	1933		

To simplify the analysis, we classified the respondents into three categories. The first group, those who said they intend to make *Aliyah* "very soon" may be considered *candidates for Aliyah*, with a high probability of moving to Israel within the next ten years. The second category, those who are *favorably disposed towards Aliyah* in principle, but do not necessarily intend to make this move in the near future, includes 1) Jewish heads of households who answered that they want to make *Aliyah* though not immediately, 2) those have considered *Aliyah* but decided they cannot currently make the move (this may be, for example, due to family obligations or financial considerations, rather than ideological opposition to *Aliyah*) and 3) those who have not really considered *Aliyah*, but are not opposed to the idea. Lastly, there emerges from the data a third group, those *opposed to Aliyah.* This category brings together those who reject the idea of emigrating to Israel and have no intention of making *Aliyah*.

According to this categorization, in 2002 6% of French Jews could be considered *candidates for Aliyah.* Together with those who are *favorable to Aliyah*, 42% of French Jews said they are, to varying degrees, open to the idea of living in Israel.

The collected data refers only to the heads of families. If we want a real picture of the impact of *Aliyah*, we must consider the entire

Table 26: Intention of making *Aliyah* (settling in Israel) among French Jewish heads of households, 1988 and 2002

	2002	1988
Yes, very soon	6%	3%
Yes, later on	12%	19%
I have considered it, but relinquished the idea	8%	17%
Have not thought about it yet but not against	16%	21%
No intention of making *Aliyah*	58%	40%
Total	100%	100%

Table 27: Intention of making *Aliyah* (settling in Israel) among French Jewish heads of households, 1988 and 2002 (simplified categorization)

	2002	1988
Candidates for *Aliyah*	6%	3%
Favorable to *Aliyah*	36%	57%
Opposed to *Aliyah*	58%	40%
Total	100%	100%

household (parents, children and other family members). Extrapolating from the data, the percentage of *candidates for Aliyah* among the French Jewish population reaches approximately 7.2%. Based on the estimate of a French Jewish population of 500,000, this means that in the near future 36,000 French Jews can be expected to settle in Israel. Based on the same principle, French Jews who are *favorable to Aliyah* rises to 39% (about 195,000), while those Jews who are *opposed to Aliyah* goes down to 53.7% (290,000 people). (This is because those who are opposed to *Aliyah* tend to have smaller families).

There is an empirical connection between attitudes regarding *Aliyah* and the reality of moving to Israel. We saw that in the 1988 surveys 3% of the respondents said they intended to make *Aliyah* soon.[54] That figure represented 15,000–20,000 *candidates for Aliyah*. The data published by the Jewish Agency confirms this estimate, because between 1988 and 2002, 20,382 French Jews made their *Aliyah*, which is a bit more than 3% as established by the independent survey. This data suggests that we should take extremely seriously the 2002 estimates of

[54] Cohen, E.H. (1991).

the 6% of French Jews who have announced their intention of settling in Israel.

To give another perspective on these findings, we may compare the data on intention to make *Aliyah* with responses to the hypothetical question regarding what religion and nationality French Jews would choose if given the chance. Most respondents in the category of *candidates for Aliyah* also said would have preferred to be reborn as Jews in Israel (84%), as did over half (57%) of those who were *favorable to Aliyah* (57%). In contrast, only 20% of Jews *opposed to Aliyah* would want to be reborn in Israel, while 54% said they would choose to be reborn as Jews in the Diaspora and 26% replied that place and identity were unimportant. This gives further confirmation for our *Aliyah* forecast, and shows that intention to make *Aliyah* corresponds to the desire to realize a strongly felt dream.

4.4.1. *Socio-Cultural and Economic Impacts on Attitudes towards* Aliyah

There were no fundamental socio-economic differences between the heads of household included in these three categories of attitudes towards *Aliyah*. For example, where people live (Paris, the Paris suburbs, away from Paris) did not appear to have any direct impact. Jews are neither more nor less Zionist in Paris than in the suburbs or outlying areas. However, one can note that Jews *opposed to Aliyah* tended to have more academic degrees and higher incomes while *candidates for Aliyah* tended to be younger and have lower incomes (though the differences between the three categories is not great). Professional and economic success in France likely serves as a deterrent to moving to Israel, while young adults less firmly established may be more willing to consider relocating.

It is important to note that if we also consider residence, there was even less difference between those in the three categories, highlighting the lack of influence of place of residence on the attitudes of French Jews towards *Aliyah*.

4.4.2. *Religious Practice*

If as we have seen socio-economic influences were weak, the influence of ideological and religious attitudes was fundamental. Almost all those who wanted to make *Aliyah* very soon (*candidates for Aliyah*) defined themselves as traditionalists or orthodox in terms of religious practice. We can indeed say that in France, secular Zionism is not

Table 28: Attitudes to *Aliyah* and level of religious observance, heads of French Jewish households, 2002

	Candidates	Favorable	Opposed
Non-practicing	0%	14%	42%
Reform	6%	13%	18%
Traditional	78%	64%	39%
Orthodox	16%	9%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

popular. None of the *candidates for Aliyah* defined themselves as non-practicing Jews and only 6% as reform (liberal) in practice. At the other end of the spectrum, 60% of those who were *opposed to Aliyah* defined themselves as non-practicing or reform.

The correlation between the various levels of religious practice and the intention to make *Aliyah* is consistent: considering *Aliyah* goes together with a deep commitment to the Jewish tradition. A few examples will serve to confirm this point. *Candidates for Aliyah* were more likely to say they observe *Kashrut* and *Shabbat* as compared with those who were *opposed to Aliyah*. 88% of the *candidates for Aliyah* said they fully observe the laws of *kashrut* at home and 68% also kept kosher when eating outside their home. Among Jews who were *opposed to Aliyah* only 24% said they observe kashrut at home and 14% outside the home. The trend is identical for keeping the Sabbath. On Friday night, 91% of French Jews who are *candidates for Aliyah* regularly light candles, (while only 34% of those *opposed to Aliyah* do); 92% regularly recite *Kiddush* (compared to 34% of those *opposed to Aliyah*), and 86% said they regularly have a family *Shabbat* meal (48% of those *opposed to Aliyah*). We should note lastly that there is an even stronger correlation between *Aliyah* and a return to religion or intensification of religious feelings. That those contemplating making *Aliyah* said they feel more religious than their parents and more religious than they themselves were in past years.

Considering the issue of intermarriage, it was found that 60% of the *Candidates for Aliyah* was firmly opposed to the idea of one of their children marrying a non-Jew. Only 27% of those *favorable to Aliyah* and 9% of those *opposed to Aliyah* were opposed to the idea of their children intermarrying. The contrast between the three categories of attitudes towards *Aliyah* is so marked that we can advance the theory that fear of intermarriage might be one of the main motivations for *Aliyah*.

Table 29: Attitudes to *Aliyah* and religious feelings compared with parents, heads of French Jewish households, 2002

	Candidates	Favorable	Opposed
More religious	50%	28%	12%
AS religious	35%	41%	42%
Less religious	15%	31%	46%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 30: Attitudes to *Aliyah* and level of religious feelings compared with recent years, 2002

	Candidates	Favorable	Opposed
More religious	70%	43%	18%
AS religious	23%	45%	60%
Less religious	6%	13%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%

4.4.3. *Jewish Social Relationships and* Aliyah

Even more than the level of Jewish religious observance, looking at patterns of participation in the Jewish community is a key to understanding motives for making *Aliyah.* For instance, we found that the more French Jews took part in local communal life, the greater was their desire to make *Aliyah*: one third of the *candidates for Aliyah* come from the "hard core" of the Jewish community. As noted, the synagogue is the most attended Jewish institution in France; this is particularly true for the *candidates for Aliyah*, 91% of who attend synagogue. Other communal institutions were also frequently attended by *candidates for Aliyah*. Jewish study groups and circles were attended by 38% of *candidates for Aliyah* (compared to 14% of the entire French Jewish population). Attendance at Jewish organizations was 34% among *candidates for Aliyah* (25% for the whole population).

Forging and emphasizing Jewish social relationships was strongly correlated with *candidates for Aliyah*. This included both marriage (endogamy) and friendships with other Jews. None of the *candidates for Aliyah* had a non-Jewish spouse. By comparison, among those who were *opposed to Aliyah*, there was a 37% intermarriage rate. In the same way, *candidates for Aliyah* have created around themselves a type of "mini Jewish community". One third of them only have Jewish friends.

We also asked French Jewish heads of households how they would react if one of their children decided to make *Aliyah*. This gives additional insight into the attitudes of French Jews towards the idea of immigration to Israel. Adults with homes and businesses may not think they can consider making *Aliyah* themselves, yet may hope that the next generation will do so. Almost 70% of respondents said they would be happy if their children moved to Israel. Another 13% say they would not be happy but would not oppose the idea.

Taken together, the findings show that for the Jews of France, *Aliyah* is not circumstantial but rather the result of a long process of identity building. Identity building in France today is mainly achieved around religious and traditional practice. Participation in French Jewish communal institutions (which are mainly religiously oriented) seems to function as a preparation for the *Aliyah* process. In other words, the decision to settle in Israel is generally one that has matured and been prepared over a long period of time. *Aliyah* is often only the final act in the gradual but systematic creation of a Jewish social fabric, of a Jewish environment.

4.4.4. *Jewish Education and the Potential for* Aliyah

Yet another indicator that the desire to move to Israel grows from a process of communal identity-building is the clear correlation found between attitudes to *Aliyah* and Jewish education. The percentage of those considering making *Aliyah* rises to 12% if one takes into account only households with school-age children and to 28% for households where children are educated in Jewish schools.

The fact that *candidates for Aliyah* have received a more extensive Jewish education (both formal and informal) than those *opposed to Aliyah* is highly significant. Their Jewish education certainly provided them with the tools for considering *Aliyah*. It is indubitable that French Jewish schools provide a setting where the idea of *Aliyah* is formed and strengthened. Over half those French Jews who are *candidates for Aliyah* went to Jewish schools (51%), compared to only 20% of those *opposed to Aliyah*. The same goes with attendance at a *Talmud Torah* (68% of *candidates for Aliyah* and 39% of those *opposed to Aliyah*). The results are no different in respect to informal education. For example, 46% of *candidates for Aliyah* were active in Jewish youth movements, as compared to 33% of those *opposed to Aliyah*. In addition to their own educational backgrounds, we found that the *candidates for Aliyah* were more likely

Table 31: Attitudes to *Aliyah* and type of schooling for children, 2002

	Parents of children who do not attend Jewish schools	Parents of children in Jewish schools
Candidates for *Aliyah*	5%	30%
Favorable to *Aliyah*	43%	52%
Opposed to *Aliyah*	52%	19%
Total	100%	100%

to enroll their children in Jewish schools. As seen in Table 31, among parents of Jewish day school students, 30% were *candidates for Aliyah*.

4.4.5. *Social Concerns and* Aliyah

In general we found that for French Jews, the desire to make *Aliyah* does not result from social or economic distress. On the contrary, the data shows that the French Jews who planned to make *Aliyah* in the coming years (*candidates for Aliyah*) were significantly more likely to describe themselves as happy and satisfied with their lives than were those who rejected the idea of *Aliyah* (*opposed to Aliyah*). However, half the *candidates for Aliyah* said the personally experienced anti-Semitism within the previous five years. Interestingly, only a quarter of those *favorable to Aliyah* and even an even smaller percentage—17%—of those *opposed to Aliyah* said that they had recently suffered from anti-Semitism. (One reason for this difference may be that the *candidates for Aliyah* are more likely to send their children to Jewish schools and to attend synagogue, and such Jewish settings are targets of anti-Semitic acts).

While these figures do not necessarily mean that the rise of anti-Semitism in France is a primary reason for considering *Aliyah*, it does indicate that the recrudescence of racist intolerance and anti-Semitism in France has contributed to a polarization of the position of French Jews in regards to *Aliyah*. As will be discussed in greater detail later, (pages 103–106 and Figure 4), the concerns and worries of French Jews may be grouped into two general categories: general or universal concerns (such as pollution, food security, unemployment, AIDS and drugs) and those fears more specifically related to Jewish life, such as the future of Israel, intermarriage, racism, terrorism, anti-Semitism, the Islamic movement and foreigners. In a structural analysis of this data we found that those who were *opposed to Aliyah* were more closely associated with universal concerns. It is logical that those primarily

concerned with these types of issues would not consider leaving France for Israel, since these problems exist everywhere and a move to Israel would not seem to offer a solution. Those who were *favorable to Aliyah* were most closely linked with situational concerns such as foreigners and Islam, which for years have pushed many French Jews to state that they are pessimistic about their own future in France. They were expressing a deep discontent with France and were considering emigrating because have trouble envisioning their future there. We could say that some were more favorably disposed to emigration in general than to *Aliyah* in specific—that is, some were considering moving to other places, such as the USA or Canada. The *candidates for Aliyah* expressed concern for issues traditionally linked to Judaism (racism, anti-Semitism, intermarriage, and Israel's future). Considering a move to Israel is one way of addressing such concerns. "Tell me your fears and I will be able to perceive your relationship with Israel" is the message that emerges from this analysis.

4.4.6. *Diaspora or Israel: A Topic of Discussion among French Jewish Youth*
It should not be thought that the decision to make *Aliyah* is an easy one. Rather, it emerges from an identity strengthening process in every sense of the word (educational, cultural, religious, institutional). While the *candidates for Aliyah* expressed concerns regarding their future in France, this cannot conceal a serious discussion about the difficulties of *Aliyah*, such as the economic, political and social situation of Israeli society and separation from one's family. There is also, of course the issue of the importance of maintaining Jewish life in the Diaspora.

One way to portray discussion regarding *Aliyah* among young French Jews is to give a sample of the questions and comments posted on internet chat sites:[55]

16/10/2004–7:00, szdavid: I would like to make *Aliyah* under the Law of Return by starting with the status of temporary immigrant; no one in fact can guarantee that I will integrate into society, that I will find a job in IT in which I could blossom. I'm in my final year of computing studies. Could you tell me a bit about the formalities,

[55] http://www.uejf.org/modules/forum/viewtopic.php?start=15&t=524 retrieved in October 2005.

the documents to be provided, the time necessary for the bureaucracy in France?

19/10/2004 11:14, Avi S.: Could you just tell us your reasons for *Aliyah*? Religious, activist?

29/10/2004 6:30, *szdavid*: Not activist, of that I am certain; a bit religious, but above all because I love that country, in the same way that I am also tempted by Quebec.

30/10/2004–8:49, Franck Waserman: Your position is interesting. I love that country, and even much more than that. But going to live there seems to me a very difficult decision to take, and I must confess that I am convinced that if I settled there, I would miss France. And you should know that in Canada the problems of antisemitism are as serious as elsewhere, contrary to what some others seem to believe!

02/11/2004–6:37, szdavid: I am not in fact leaving France out of fear of antisemitism, but for the affection I have for that country, though I think the comment about Quebec is interesting. It's true one doesn't hear it spoken about much.

08/11/2004–3:51, rudy_n: I must say that your "contributions" on this forum make me think of mental masturbation, which is totally symptomatic of your Diaspora pathology. So dear "activists", I have some advice for you: If you want to be useful to yourselves, to the readers on this forum and the entire Jewish people, make *Aliyah*!

09/11/2004–8:59, FranckW: I am scared by what you write, rudy_n. Firstly, I want to state, for myself, that I in no way suffer from a claimed Diaspora pathology. I consider myself to be profoundly Zionist, as much as you, even if it is true that we are not at the same stage. Contrary to others, I do not believe the Diaspora holds any interest whatsoever for Jewry. Remaining in the Diaspora is not the result of an ideological choice. It is more an easy solution. Rudy_n, I am not going to teach you that life in Israel is very hard. Some Israelis want to leave, you know. Do not be so quick to criticize the Jews who still live in *Galut*,[56] the world is not made up of saints! I hope that's clear.

11/11/2004–12:38, Avi S.: The peril for Jewry exists as much in Israel as in the Diaspora, just it appears differently. In fact, in France, according to a survey by the Fonds Social Juif Unifié, mixed marriages affect 30% of the French Jewish population, and 40% of those between the ages 18–30. In the USA today Jews marry more with Christians

[56] Translator's note: Diaspora; literally Exile.

than with Jews. The intermarriage rate is 52% (a more conservative calculation gives 47%, but the demographic effect is essentially the same). In 1970 the rate was 8%. Moreover, according to this survey, among couples that are not mixed, only one in four was brought up in the Jewish tradition. The sole future for Jewry in the long-term is clearly in Israel. For all that, while waiting the coming of the Messiah, there must always be a Diaspora, however small it might become, on the one hand to let the world understand the importance of retaining the memory of what once was, and on the other hand the importance of maintaining as many historical Jewish places as possible that today are threatened, especially in the Ukraine and in most Eastern European countries, but also in France, with continuous attacks affecting for example the status of the Rue des Rosiers,[57] and lastly to have a single argument for Jewry and the State of Israel.

11/11/2004–10:15, FranckW: rudy_n writes, "You are playing at the teaching others what to do". I cannot of course support you visceral rejection of France, which I feel I detect as I read you. In my previous post, I deliberately tried to distort your idea about the histories of languages. Clearly, your reply was well taken and deserved. On the other hand, by adopting the same strategy, you lay yourself open to the same consequences. When I spoke of the difficulties of making *Aliyah*, I was not speaking about the difficulty of going to live in Israel. Going there has in fact never been easier. I was speaking about the difficulty of living in Israel… unfortunately, Israeli society is far from being the ideal society we dreamed of, and on a daily basis the war situation with the Palestinians makes things even more difficult. I am not speaking from personal experience, but am relying on what members of my own family there have told me. But clearly, Rudy, you know all this… To wind up, I would say that I am not convinced what is the role of the Diaspora. It still exists, and the maximum must be done so that Jewish identity in the Diaspora can be retained and develop under the best possible conditions—is that not so? Rudy, do you disagree with that?

12/11/2004–1:00, rudy_n: I in fact believe that everything has to be done to preserve and develop Jewish identity among Jews in the Diaspora communities. It's a way of "winning over" a generation or two, as against the mortal danger of assimilation. It's a transitional and

[57] Translator's note: Once perhaps the best known Jewish street in Paris.

provisional solution. The real answer to the Jewish Question is the one that has proven its success, Zionism. To be a free and independent people, on the historic Land of Israel, a full and equal member of the community of nations. Your solution isn't one. I see it more as a means, which like all means has an end. Strengthening Jewish identity must be achieved through *Aliyah* and the Return. Certainly not with the objective of just managing to exist and letting communities give themselves the illusion that authentic Jewish life is possible in the Diaspora; an illusion that in any case has started to fade away over the last 4 years. In fact, the events of the last four years have been very worrying and have begun an historic change in the relationship of the world and the old, Christian Europe in particular with the Jewish people. We need to know how to get a handle on this and to make the decisions that need to be taken. Rudi.

12.11.04–4:30, FranckW: Rudi, there are things that attract me to Israel, and other things that keep me back in France, in particular my family, who would not necessarily leave with me. I know that Israel has been built by people who have been torn from their environment, who have lost their roots. But you have to admit that the circumstances were different. In France, I miss Israel; in Israel I would miss France, definitely so though doubtless in a different way. France or Israel, there perhaps is the biggest choice and the one with the most consequences in our lives. Rudy, if it is easy for you, understand not everyone has the same luck as you! The choice, Rudy, is all the more painful, and here I think we would agree, because in truth, for a Jew there is no alternative…

As seen in the previous email discussion, being favorably disposed to *Aliyah* can sometimes take surprising routes. We would like to end this discussion of *Aliyah* with a tribute to a French Jew whose relationship to the concept of *Aliyah* illustrates the complexity of the issue. Charles Mopsik, editor of a series of Jewish texts in French (including the *Zohar* and Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed*) was widely recognized as a lover of France. However, among the many reports received after his death in June 2003, that of the publisher Michel Valensi provides a new light on Mopsik's relationship with Israel. "There is also another way, which he could only talk about but not do, and he told me about it just a few days before he died, at which point it represented his most cherished desire: to finally find a land for this heaven of letters whose contours he had sketched out. For a long time that land had for him

been France. I remember how he would say, "I am doing that for France", which had a Gaullist touch to it, and he knew how to laugh about it too. However, France distanced itself from this heaven, and he thought for some time of leaving it to come (perhaps) to settle in Israel, not just as someone who was a political Zionist, but because here could now be the place where he thought that lightness of spirit might be able to take hold. I no longer ask myself the question, whither France? Because there is no longer a France. There is just a mummified France, which has usurped the name and tries to pass itself off as it. I think that in Israel there is still some common sense. Which is totally missing in France, which has lost its way and does not even see that it is drowning", he wrote to me at the end of April."[58]

4.5. *Marriage and Endogamy*

The choice of spouse in a reference group is a widely used indicator of identity and group affiliation.[59] In general, intermarriage is continuing to rise among the Jews of France. As seen in Table 32, the data gathered by the present survey shows that 69% of Jewish heads of households had a Jewish-born spouse, compared to 75% in 1988. Looking more deeply into the social dynamics of endogamy, the data collected in this study shed light on a complex situation.

First, it seems that cohabitation (i.e., without wedlock) is a form of sidestepping the problem of intermarriage. Of those who were married, three quarters had a Jewish spouse, while of the couples who cohabit (9% of the survey population), only 17% had a Jewish partner. Additionally, intermarried couples were less stable than endogamous couples: endogamous marriages had a divorce rate of 8.2%, while exogamous marriages had a divorce rate of 20%. French Jewish men were more likely to marry non-Jews than were French Jewish women. This has important consequences for future generations, given that, according to Jewish law, Judaism is matrilineal.

Jews living in the provinces had a higher intermarriage rate than those in Paris or the area right around the capital, reflecting the greater likelihood of meeting a Jewish partner in the marriage market

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[58] Written on the death of Charles Mopsik 13 Sivan 5763 (13 June 2003).

[59] Blau, Beeker & Fitzpatrick (1984); Reitz (1980); Romano (1988); Spickard (1989).

Table 32: Religion of spouses of Jewish heads of household, by marital status

	Married	Cohabitating	Widowed	Divorced Separated	Total
Jewish spouse	76%	17%	87%	50%	69%
Non-Jewish spouse	24%	83%	12%	46%	30%
Converted spouse	1%	0%	1%	4%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

in a place where there is a greater concentration of Jews and these are more likely to be involved in the local community.

The birthrate in marriages of two Jewish parents was higher than in mixed marriages. 20% of those in exogamous marriages had no children, as against only 7% of those in endogamous Jewish marriages.

In-married Jews had significantly higher levels of religious observance than out-married Jews and had stronger social ties to the Jewish community. They were far more likely to regularly attend community events and synagogue, and had a greater proportion of Jewish friends, underscoring the interrelationship among the various indicators of community affiliation.

In their 1977 study of intermarriage in France, Bensimon and Lautman noted that "intellectual circles undoubtedly represent a particularly favorable terrain for Jewish-Christian marriages." As seen in Table 33, this was clearly the case among French Jewish women, with endogamy sharply declining among women with the highest level of education. In fact, although Bensimon and Lautman noted that couples in which the wife was Jewish and the husband non-Jewish were an exception to the rule, endogamy rates were essentially the same among men and women with two or more years of study past the bachelor's degree. However, we did not find a consistent correlation between education level and intermarriage among French Jewish men. While it is true that those with the highest level of education (BA + 4) were more likely to be married to non-Jews than those without higher education, those who continued for two years past the level of bachelor's degree had higher rates of endogamy than those with just a bachelor's degree. This unexpected result indicates that the relationship between education and intermarriage is more complex than anticipated, and deserves further exploration through a specific in-depth study.

Table 33: Endogamy and educational level (percentage with Jewish spouse)

	Less than Bachelor's degree	Bachelor's degree	Bachelor's +2	Bachelor's +4
Among entire Jewish population	75%	70%	75%	59%
Among Jewish men	66%	58%	73%	59%
Among Jewish women	84%	82%	74%	58%

Taken together, these findings show how a behavioral approach is advantageous in stipulating the methods of identity affirmation. The scale of communal participation, for example, was highly revealing of the religious and cultural practices of France's Jews. A clear correlation exists between the level of attendance at communal institutions and the level of religious or cultural practice. Similarly, we find that intermarriage was much more frequent on the outer periphery of the community and in the middle band (almost half of marriages), whereas in the communal core it was almost non-existent (7%). Of course we cannot really know what is cause and what is effect; that is, if people who chose partners outside the group were then less inclined to visit communal institutions, or if because those who were less communally involved were more likely to out-marry.

5. *Social Issues*

5.1. *Happiness, Satisfaction and Worry*

This chapter addresses the psychological well-being of the Jews of France and the social issues with which they are primarily concerned. We asked Jewish heads of households in France whether they were happy, worried or satisfied with their lives. We compare the answers with objective parameters (age groups, income level, and marital status). The matrix of correlations (see appendix) showed that while happiness or "subjective wellbeing" strongly correlated with satisfaction with life, the two concepts are not completely synonymous.[60] Even

[60] Veenhoven (1997).

Table 34: Happiness, satisfaction and worry by age groups

	18–29	30–39	40–49	50+	Total
Very happy	34%	30%	26%	17%	23%
Happy	63%	64%	68%	72%	69%
Not happy	3%	6%	5%	9%	7%
Not at all happy	1%	0%	0%	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very satisfied	18%	19%	12%	15%	16%
Satisfied	77%	73%	73%	73%	74%
Not satisfied	5%	7%	11%	10%	9%
Not at all satisfied	0%	1%	3%	2%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very worried	12%	9%	9%	13%	11%
Worried	47%	50%	58%	56%	54%
Not worried	32%	32%	25%	25%	28%
Not at all worried	9%	9%	8%	6%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 35: Happiness, satisfaction and worry by income level

	Low income	Average income	High income	Total
Very happy	19%	28%	27%	21%
Happy	69%	69%	71%	69%
Not happy	11%	3%	2%	9%
Not at all happy	2%	1%	0%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very satisfied	13%	20%	17%	15%
Satisfied	72%	76%	83%	74%
Not satisfied	12%	4%	0%	9%
Not at all satisfied	3%	0%	0%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very worried	13%	10%	5%	12%
Worried	53%	54%	56%	53%
Not worried	26%	32%	27%	27%
Not at all worried	8%	4%	11%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

more, being happy and satisfied with one's life does not mean to be free of worries. While the large majority of the Jews of France said that they were happy, they also articulated deep feelings of concern, thus expressing a state of "worried happiness" as Veenhoven calls it.

Table 36: Happiness, satisfaction and worry by marital status

	Married	Cohabitating	Widowed	Divorced	Single	Total
Very happy	26%	29%	10%	12%	20%	23%
Happy	68%	66%	65%	72%	71%	68%
Not happy	5%	5%	19%	14%	8%	7%
Not at all happy	1%	0%	6%	2%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very satisfied	20%	10%	8%	6%	13%	16%
Satisfied	73%	82%	74%	66%	76%	74%
Not satisfied	6%	7%	13%	25%	10%	9%
Not at all satisfied	1%	2%	5%	3%	2%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very worried	11%	12%	18%	10%	10%	11%
Worried	55%	40%	56%	65%	51%	54%
Not worried	27%	40%	21%	21%	31%	28%
Not at all worried	7%	9%	5%	4%	9%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In general, the Jews of France are happy and satisfied with their lives. Indeed, 92% of Jewish heads of households affirm that they are happy (23% very happy). Similarly, 90% of Jewish heads of households affirm that they are satisfied with their lives (15% very satisfied). On the other hand, 65% of the respondents said they are worried, 11% "very worried."

As seen in Table 34, the older cohorts are progressively less likely to describe themselves as "very happy" than the younger heads of households, and were somewhat less satisfied.[61] Table 35 shows that those with average or high incomes were happier and more satisfied than those with below-average incomes, thus confirming a slight correlation between happiness and educational and income levels. Ruut Veenhoven, for his part, affirms that, in rich countries, the correlations between educational and income levels are weak. Interestingly, worry does not seem to follow the same pattern. Among the Jews of France, even the happiest, most satisfied groups also express high levels of worry.

The only factor which seemed strongly linked to worry was marital status, as seen in Table 36. Those with a partner (married or

[61] This goes against Veenhoven's (1997) hypothesis which states that "contrary to general opinion, life does not seem less satisfying with age, even in very old age".

cohabiting) were the least worried, while those who were divorced and especially those who were widowed were the most worried. Those with partners were also happier and more satisfied than those alone (whether through divorce, death or never having been married).

5.2. *Issues of Concern*

What specifically worries the Jews of France? We gave respondents a list of possible issues of concern and asked them to indicate to what degree they worry about each. Among those issues directly related to Jewish identity that most worry the Jews of France, terrorism, anti-Semitism, racism, and the future of Israel topped the list, highlighting the troubling political-social climate of contemporary France, including the sometimes aggressive hostility of certain sectors of the French population as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Table 37). In addition, 21% of heads of households affirmed having personally suffered from anti-Semitism during the last five years. It should be noted that "foreigners" were not an issue of concern for the Jews of France. Indeed, some interviewees said they didn't understand the question since they themselves had been foreigners. The phenomenon of intermarriage, however, was at the bottom of the list of worries, which leads us to presume that the Jews of France are primarily worried about what they feel are external threats to Jewish existence.

Table 37: Issues of concern for French Jews, 2002 (percentage answering "very worried")

Issue of concern	Percentage 'very worried'
Terrorism	77%
Anti-semitism	76%
Racism	70%
Future of Israel	64%
AIDS	50%
Drugs	50%
Islam	46%
Unemployment	32%
Pollution	31%
Food insecurity	22%
Intermarriage	24%
Foreigners	11%

6. *Values: An Axiological Typology*

6.1. *Values of French Jews*

In the next section, we deal with the basic values held by the Jews of France. Rather than focusing on specifically Jewish values (which were dealt with in the section on Jewish identity), we selected universal values, similar to the lists of values included in such international surveys such as the World Values Survey[62] and the European Values Study.[63] In this way, we were able to create an axiological typology of the Jews of France comparable to typologies of other populations.

The term "value" is used here in the sociological sense of "the criteria by which a group or society judges the importance of people, models, goals and other socio-cultural objects".[64] According to Boudon and Bourricaud, "Values are nothing more than collective preferences, which emerge in an institutional context and which, because of the way they develop, contribute to the regulation of this context."[65] Rokeach defines a value as the persistent belief that a specific mode of conduct or life goal is personally or socially preferable to another.[66] Guttman and Levy define a value as a particular type of attitude toward any object that is judged in greater or lesser terms of importance.[67]

We asked heads of Jewish households in France to assess the importance of imparting various values to their children. The results are shown in Table 38. At the top of the list, one finds behavioral qualities directed at others: *tolerance, sense of responsibility, a*nd *generosity*, and a personal, behavioral quality: *perseverance.* These are followed by qualities related to personal expression and creativity: *spontaneity, imagination, independence*. *Religious faith, obedience* and *sense of economy* received the lowest ratings.

This same question has been posed, for some years, in the French section of an international survey (EVS, European Value Survey) and carried out by ARVAL (the Association for Research on Systems of

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[62] Inglehart (2004).
[63] Halman (2001).
[64] Fichter (1971).
[65] Boudon & Bourricaud (1982: 644).
[66] Rokeach (1976).
[67] According to Guttman and Levy, the *range* for replies (from very important to not at all important) itself defines the subjects of the question in terms of the values attached to them. See: Guttman (1982); Levy (1990, 1994).

Table 38: Importance of qualities which parents should impart to their children as assessed by French Jewish heads of households, 2002 (average rating: not important = 1, important = 2 or very important = 3)

Quality to be imparted to children	Average rating
Tolerance and respect for others	2.78
Sense of responsibility	2.61
Generosity	2.48
Determination, perseverance	2.46
Dedication to work	2.39
Good manners	2.38
Independence	2.28
Imagination	2.22
Spontaneity	2.16
Religious faith	2.06
Obedience	2.03
Sense of economy, not wasting money or things	1.94

Values).[68] The system of values of the Jews of France is, in general, similar to the system of values of the society in which they live, as seen in Table 39. This confirms a finding of Wach and Hammer (2003) who, using Schwartz's model to analyze the values of the approximately 6,000 French interviewed during the period 1994 to 2000, found a similarity between the structure of values of the French and the Jewish population.[69]

The top two values chosen by the Jews of France were the same as those chosen by the French in general: *tolerance and respect for others* and *sense of responsibility* (although a higher percentage of the general French population selected each of these). There were, however, a number of differences. Most graphically, the Jewish population put more emphasis on instilling *religious faith* in their children, compared to the strongly secular general French population.[70] In addition, the Jews of France gave somewhat more emphasis to values that contribute to individual

[68] The survey was administered by Research International between March 23 and April 10, 1999 to a national sample of 1,615 individuals who were representative of the French population, aged 18 and above, and supplemented by a sub-sample of 206 young people aged 18–25 (total number of people: 1,821). Representativity was assured by a quota method (sex, age, occupation and socio-professional categories).

[69] Schwartz & Bilsky (1987).

[70] Prof. Paul Ritterband (CUNY, Haifa University) has confirmed that in the USA, Jews tend to be less religious than their non-Jewish counterparts.

Table 39: Qualities which parents consider "very important" to impart to their children: Comparison of European Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1999 and survey of the Jews of France 2002

	EVS 1981	EVS 1990	EVS 1999	French Jewish heads of households 2002
Tolerance and respect for others	59%	78%	85%	79%
Sense of responsibility	39%	71%	73%	62%
Good manners	21%	53%	68%	43%
Dedication to work	36%	53%	50%	42%
Generosity	22%	40%	41%	49%
Determination, perseverance	18%	39%	39%	48%
Sense of economy	54%	36%	37%	18%
Obedience	18%	n/a	36%	23%
Independence	16%	27%	29%	35%
Imagination	12%	23%	18%	32%
Religious faith	11%	13%	7%	36%

success: *independence, determination and perseverance* and *imagination* and less emphasis on *obedience* and *good manners.* They placed more emphasis on generosity and significantly less on thriftiness (*sense of economy*)—an interesting point in light of common stereotypes of Jews.

In addition, we asked the interviewees to assess 14 values by scale of importance. The average of the responses to each is shown in Table 40. The responses to this list of values form the basis for a typology of French Jewry, to be discussed in depth in the next sections.

The two values which had the greatest importance to the Jews of France were related to the family nucleus: *honor your parents* and *founding a family*—two fundamental traditional values. Parents and family have always been considered the principle pillars of social organization and they involve values such as respect and authority. Next came two elements related to the individual: *studying* and *being oneself.* These were followed by two variables relating to social law: *Helping others* and *Being useful to society.* Lastly one finds the values: *caring for one's appearance, going away on holiday, engaging in sport* and *earning a lot of money.*[71] These values, egoistic in the real sense of the word, were not considered among the most important among by the Jews of France.

[71] On the computer-generated map, we gave the name "region" to a set of variables characterized by a common semantic criterion.

Table 40: Importance of values, French Jewish heads of households, 2002 (average rating: not important = 1, important = 2 or very important = 3)

Value	Average rating
Honor your parents	2.73
Founding a family	2.61
Studying	2.55
Being oneself	2.52
Helping others	2.42
Enjoying life	2.37
Doing what I like	2.31
Being useful to society	2.24
Having a good time with friends	2.18
Believing in God	2.14
Going away on holiday	2.04
Caring for one's appearance	2.01
Engaging in sport	1.76
Earning a lot of money	1.70

6.2. *Structure of the Value System of the Jews of France*

To further investigate the value structure of the Jews of France, several multi-dimensional data analysis techniques were used. Smallest Space Analysis (see data analysis methods page 56) was used to graphically portray the correlations between the values as expressed by the respondents. In the matrix of correlations among the 14 variables (given in the appendix), there were only three relatively weak negative correlations. This confirms that we are dealing with a coherent system of values.[72]

The correlation matrix is then plotted in a cognitive "map" according to an intuitively understandable principle: strongly correlated variables are plotted close together and weakly correlated variables are far apart. This map allows the researcher to recognize distinct semantic regions. Its apparent simplicity simultaneously represents the spatial relationship between the correlation pairs. The cognitive map of the responses of French Jews to the 14 value items is shown in Figure 1.

The distribution of the variables over the entire graph shows that the semantic terrain was well covered by the questionnaire. Six axiological regions emerge. At the center of the map is a region consist-

[72] Gratch (1973); Guttman & Levy (1982).



Figure 1: Axiological Graph, Geometric Representation (WSSA1) of the Values of the Jews of France

ing of one value: *Making the most of life*. The multi-faceted nature of this largely consensual value enables individuals to impart different meanings to it. For some it means enjoyment and for others it may mean enrichment through study or work.[73] Surrounding this center

[73] *Making the most of life* is a value which is undoubtedly linked to an ethic of the present which is extremely important in Judaism, and profoundly grounded in Jewish awareness. To cite just two examples, we will first quote the comment by Neher (1962: 262), to the effect that Jewish metaphysics is set apart by a "geotropism which prevents it from becoming disembodied, on whatever level. Neither theology, nor ethics, nor collective history, or the individual's existential destiny are envisaged, in Judaism, outside the physical universal and its progress." Some might advance the contrary argument by referring to the concept of *Olam ha-Ba* (the world to come), which would be the reward of all those who have lived according to the principles and rules of the Torah. This comment was frequently directed at Yeshayahu Leibovitz, who would reply that the notion of *Olam ha-Ba* is not to be found in any of Judaism's texts, or even in the *Yom Kippur* and *Rosh Hashana* prayers. However, Leibowitz (1999: 274) gave an explanation for this concept by quoting Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, one of the disciples of the Vilna Gaon. "Our Masters say: all of Israel have a part in the world to come.

are five regions: materialism (*caring for one's appearance, earning a lot of money*); tradition (*belief in God, honor your parents, founding a family*); altruism (*helping others, being useful to society*); authenticity (*being oneself, studying*); and enjoyment. The enjoyment region is divided into two sub-regions: recreation (*going on holiday* and *engaging in sport*) and social life (*having a good time with friends, doing what I like*).

In modern society, the values of autonomy, subjectivity, and self-fulfillment have become largely consensual. One might have expected to find the variable *Being oneself* at the center of the graph of values. But for the French Jewish population self-fulfillment is not a nodal value. Instead it is linked to study and training, through which an individual forges his future. Similarly, the value most directly linked to individual liberty, *Doing what I like*, is correlated with social conviviality, *Having a good time with friends.* One may thus assume that *Doing what I like* does not mean exercising one's freedom or having total power over one's destiny, but relates more to a value that represents relaxation, pleasure, a state in which an individual frees himself from social constraints and moves towards autonomy.

The same graphic representation may be interpreted complementarily in another way. (An important feature of the SSA technique is that, while the placement of the variables is objective, based upon the correlations between the data, the interpretation of the map is subjective, enabling the researcher to look at the same set of results from different theoretical approaches.) The graph of the values of the Jews of France may be read according to two diagonals that represent choice of values: a political diagonal, which deals with collective life in an organized group and a social diagonal, dealing with relationships with others.[74] We may thus define four poles that organize the graph of values, as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.

They say: *in* the world to come, and not part *of* the world to come, which would make it sound as if the world to come exists as something on its own, ready from the outset, and part of which is granted, as reward, to the righteous. In truth, the world to come is the work of man himself, who by his acts extends, increases and builds up his own part." Thus, the world to come is given this name because an individual is not born in that world but reaches it through his works which are guided in heaven's name. See an interesting letter of Yeshayahu Leibovitz where he explains this notion of "the world to come" as built up by deeds in the here and now (1999: 274). Lastly, some see in the notion of "making the most of life" a response to the Holocaust, a 614th *mitzvah* or commandment!

[74] Lalande (1985: 101, 412).

The two poles of the political diagonal are:

* **Autonomy**: an individual (or a collective) defines his own principles of behavior and obeys only the rules chosen after examination. (*Having a good time with friends*, *Doing what I like*, *Studying*, *Being oneself)*;
* **Authority** (heteronomy): an individual (or a collective) looks to the outside for principles and rules. This is the pole of values that are imparted; it is thus the pole of tradition and authority. In other words, duty, discipline, and respect for values based on imitation and continuation (*Founding a family*, *Honor your parents*, *Belief in God*).[75]

The two poles of the social diagonal are:

* **Altruism**: an individual (or a collective) places the most emphasis on the wellbeing of others (*Being useful to society* and *Helping others*).
* **Egoism**: an individual (or a collective) makes the interest of the individual the main guiding force of his behavior (*Going away on holiday* and *engaging in sport*, *Caring for one's appearance* and *Earning a lot of money*).

This interpretation of the map is particularly useful, as it defines core issues within the French Jewish community and, indeed, within many communities and societies today.

6.3. *Axiological Typology: Profiles of the Jews of France*

This structure of values was then used as the basis for an axiological typology of the Jews of France. The axiological typology presented here differs in several important ways from previous typologies of the Jews of France. Nevertheless, these previous studies provide an important basis for the current study and are worth briefly reviewing. The best known is the distinction made by Schnapper between *observers*

[75] Reflecting on identity, Kundera (1993: 21) asks two questions. What is an individual? Where is that individual's identity to be found? In order to provide some form of answers to these questions, Kundera refers to Thomas Mann, who observes that it is memory and myths which guide us from what he calls the "well of the past": "We will find ourselves facing a phenomenon which we would be tempted to call one of imitation or continuation, a view of life according to which everyone's role is to resuscitate certain mythical outlines drawn up by our ancestors, and enable them to be reincarnated."

(representing a continuation or return to tradition), *militants* (who pass on tradition by political means), and *Israélites* (who associate primarily with non-Jews of the same social group).[76] More recently, Hannoun distinguishes between *militant* Jews, *spectator* Jews and *indifferent* Jews.[77] This intuitive methodology is limited because it is essentially based on the level of attendance at community institutions. Others prefer a scientific approach. Azria examines the typology of traditional practices and distinguishes two axes.[78] The first is based on traditional Judaism, *Halakha* (Jewish religious law) as opposed to *Minhag* (Jewish traditions). The second axis distinguishes between individual and collective practices. The advantage of this methodology is that it does not consider modernity as the antithesis of religion. Indeed, Azria believes that modernity produced two apparently inversed results: the decline of religion and, simultaneously, its reactivation in the form of new modalities. Hers is a typology that is based on adherence to the law and has, as its center of reference, the observant Jew or world of observance.[79]

An axiological typology presented here has several advantages over typologies based on religious practice or ethnic behaviors. First, as previously mentioned, the question of values presented to the Jews of France has already been investigated among other populations, enabling development of a universally applicable typology which may be used in cross-cultural comparisons. Second, the axiological typol-

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[76] Schnapper (1980).

[77] "First of all there are militant Jews. Those who are aware both of their Jewishness and of the duties that it requires, play a more or less active role in the life of social, religious, cultural, sports etc. community organizations. These militant Jews are to be found in all age groups, from childhood (normally via their parents) to adolescence and adulthood. These are the ones whose beliefs are an integral part of their day-to-day lives. Secondly, I would refer to the onlooker Jews. They have an awareness of their Jewishness, but this does not always make them want to put it into practice. They accept others, but rarely give of themselves. They are the 'thought Jews.' Rarely the Jews of action. Lastly, the third face, which is also represented in the Jewish community, is that of the indifferent Jews. They are the ones who, although aware of their Jewish origins, do not allow any consequences of the latter to affect their lives in terms of how they think or act in any form in terms of such implications as cultural, social, religious, philosophical or others. They happen to be Jews but essentially do not experience any difference between them and the non-Jews. In this since it would be wiser to call them un-different rather than indifferent." Hannoun (2000).

[78] Azria (1991, 2003).

[79] We would also draw attention to the work of J.W. Berry, who addressed the dynamic of how the migrant population relates to the surrounding culture and the original culture: Berry (1990, 1997); Berry & Sam (2003).

ogy avoids the debate on the nature of Judaism (a body of practices or a feeling of belonging, a religion or a culture, etc.). In this sense, it is scientifically more objective and more neutral, as it does not presuppose an "ideal" Jewish model. Third, as we shall see below, the axiological typology enables the construction of non-hierarchical categories. The typology avoids classifying the populations according to a one-dimensional scale (along the lines of more religious/less religious, more observant/less observant, etc.), offering instead a multidimensional approach.

Several previous typologies of values conducted among general (not specifically Jewish) populations guided this analysis.[80] Rokeach identifies 36 values which he divides into two categories: personal or social end values, and moral or beneficial instrumental values.[81] Schwartz and Bilsky[82] expand the list to 56 values and propose a division into ten groups: autonomy, universalism, kindness, conformism, tradition, security, power, self-fulfillment, hedonism and stimulation. Finally Schwartz and Bilsky identify four major moral positions: the desire to surpass oneself, conservatism, self-improvement and openness to change. Guttman and Levy depicted the various axiological tendencies on a geometric graph as polarities, with the different domains revolving around a center.[83] The main polarities on this graph are: authority/autonomy; altruism/egoism. This basic structure has been verified many times all over the world, indicating that the universe of values is fundamentally structured in the same way in all human societies.

The current typology was developed using a combination of multidimensional scaling techniques. Other data analysis procedures were used to transform the regions of the SSA map into indices, which were then used to identify various profiles of the interviewees. Based on an analysis of the values of the Jews of France according to a procedure described in the appendix[84] we were able to distinguish four profiles among the Jewish population of France.[85] These are used to further

[80] See for example: Epstein (1989); Kluckhohn (1951); Levy (1990).
[81] Rokeach (1976).
[82] Schwartz & Bilsky (1987).
[83] Guttman & Levy (1982).
[84] For details on these procedures see: Canter (1985); Cohen & Amar (2002); Guttman (1968); Levy (1985, 1994); Shye (1978).
[85] The way that these different groups define themselves as well as their preferred approaches is an interesting case of social representation along the lines of the theory developed by Moscovici (1981, 1988).

examine the issues related to French Jewry discussed in previous sections.

Profile 1 indicates those who placed emphasis on the values *Going away on holiday*, *Engaging in sport*, *Earning a lot of money* and *Caring for one's appearance*, which are related to pleasure, self-gratification, material comfort and personal satisfaction of the individual. One may even call them egotistic and hedonistic values. We call this group *Individualists.*

Those in Profile 2 placed emphasis on autonomy and favors sociability values based on independence and the freedom to choose, explore and create, such as *Having a good time with friends*, and *Doing what I like*. The individual is not an end, but a means, a part of the whole and society in general. Thus we chose to call this group *Universalists.*

Profile 3 refers to those who placed emphasis on *Belief in God, Honor parents* and *Founding a family*. It could be said that they defer to an external authority for their concept of existence, behavior and feelings. Their system of values was not linked with individualistic or liberal notions. They rejected values such as *Doing what I like*, a value that is characteristic of contemporary society, favoring submission to rules and respect for tradition. We have called them *Traditionalists.*

Profile 4 bridges the poles of Authority and Autonomy: individuals fitting this profile put as much emphasis on belief in God, parents, and family as on conviviality between friends and freedom. This is a profile with a double heritage: Jewish tradition and Republican tradition. We call this group *Revivalists.*[86]

Table 41 shows the distribution of these four profiles among the surveyed Jews of France. It should be noted that these four profiles are balanced, with only a slightly higher representation of Traditionalists.

The four profiles identified may be used to better understand some of the general issues discussed in previous sections, such as religious observance, community participation, attitudes towards Israel, etc.

Significantly, there is no correlation between the profiles and political leanings (right/center/left) of the interviewees, as seen in Table 42.

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[86] In this connection we would draw attention to one of the conclusions of Guy Michelat's study about the Catholic identity of the French: "In the old days, there were few differences between the parents' religious system and that of the children. Today, this is no longer the case: the strictly religious content is being watered down and losing its structured nature, and there are more and more instances where individuals patch together [Michelat uses the verb *bricoler*, from *bricolage*] a personal version of their religion, combining the system that they have inherited with elements from other systems" (Michelat, 1990b: 630).

Table 41: Distribution of the four axiological profiles among the survey population

Profile	Percentage
Profile 1: Individualists	22%
Profile 2: Universalists	24%
Profile 3: Traditionalists	31%
Profile 4: Revivalists	23%
Total	100%

Table 42: Political tendencies and the profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Extreme left	0%	3%	1%	1%
Left	42%	47%	40%	46%
Center-left	12%	16%	15%	14%
Center	22%	14%	15%	17%
Center-right	12%	10%	9%	6%
Right	12%	11%	18%	16%
Extreme right	0%	0%	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

This is a somewhat unexpected result, for one could put forward the hypothesis that political tendencies reflect fundamental value choices. But this hypothesis does not hold for the Jews of France. The Traditionalists were just as likely to espouse leftist politics as the Universalists; the Universalists were just as likely to espouse center-right or rightist tendencies as the Traditionalists. This seems to indicate that the traditional left/right division in politics is no longer an accurate or relevant way to distinguish social groups, at least not among the Jews of France. The categories of political tendencies are not relevant to the values held by French Jews.[87]

In preliminary presentations to various Jewish groups in France, this typology was met with widespread favor and intuitive understanding. It is hoped that it can be further verified among Jewish populations in other parts of the world and among non-Jewish populations in France and in other countries, possibly leading to the development of a universal

[87] Indeed, it may be that these political categories are not relevant to the values held by the general French population, and their usefulness as social categories are outdated.

axiological typology. Rather than seeing social stratification along lines of political ideology and assuming that certain sets of ideas and doctrines are particular to a given social group or class, it appears that sets of general values are more useful in differentiating between groups. One may even talk about an ideology of values. Indeed, Boudon and Bourricaud describe the major function of ideologies as offering a justification for values on which a consensual social order may be founded, particularly in societies where the social order is not traditional.[88]

A summary of each profile is given, followed by a series of tables (Tables 44–47) in which the data for a wide selection of the items included in the survey, according to the profiles, are given.

6.3.1. *Individualists*

Respondents in this profile were most commonly born in the 1940s (i.e., in their 50s or 60s at the time of the survey). The majority were born outside metropolitan France and therefore educated for at least some of their school years outside France. They have an average level of education and average or lower than average income. They have a fairly high rate of intermarriage (40%) and consider it acceptable for their children to marry non-Jews. Their Jewish educational background was similar to that of the Universalists, but with slightly higher percentages who attended more intensive settings, such as Jewish day school or *Talmud Torah*. They were somewhat more likely to attach importance to giving their children a Jewish education, although only a small minority (13%) enrolled their children in Jewish day schools.

They are well integrated socially, with many non-Jewish friends, though they have a somewhat higher rate of participation in the local Jewish community than the Universalists. They are distinctly more traditional than the Universalists, but less so than the Traditionalists or Revivalists. Their level of contribution to non-Jewish institutions is similar to that of the Traditionalists and Revivalists, while their level of contribution to Jewish/Israeli institutions is similar to that of the Universalists. Despite their lower economic status, the Individualists visit Israel more often than the Universalists. This may be related to their age and their greater likelihood of having close relatives in Israel. Like the Universalists, the Individualists tend to prefer the social

[88] Boudon & Bourricaud (1982).

Table 43: Comparison of the values of Ashkenazi and Sephardi individualists

	Ashkenazic Individualists	Sephardic Individualists
Belief in God		
Not important	65%	39%
Important	32%	46%
Very important	3%	15%
Total	100%	100%
Honor your parents		
Not important	2%	2%
Important	63%	52%
Very important	35%	46%
Total	100%	100%

aspects of Judaism to the religious ones (i.e. family *Shabbat* dinners as opposed to refraining from working on *Shabbat*). Close to half said they can read Hebrew, though far fewer speak or write it, indicating the emphasis on Hebrew as a language of prayer and study. Few were considering making *Aliyah*.

Interestingly, we found a distinct difference between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Individualists regarding the importance of belief in God and honoring one's parents, as shown in Table 43. While strongly linked to material values and diametrically opposed to the altruistic values, the Sephardic individualists were far less likely to say that belief in God is not important and were more likely to say that honoring their parents is very important. This relative traditionalism even among "secular" Sephardic Jews has been noted in other surveys, such as a study of Israelis in public high schools.[89] The Jews of North Africa did not experience the ideological split of the European Enlightenment, during which the rationalist and secular worldview became opposed to a religious worldview; in other words, secular Sephardic Jews are not necessarily atheists. However, such a graphic difference in values between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews was not found in the other three profiles, and the relative prevalence of these two traditional values among Sephardic Individualists may be linked to the fact those fitting this profile were somewhat older and therefore more closely linked to the traditional North African culture.

[89] Cohen, E.H. (2008b).

Individualists were the least likely to say they are "very happy" and "very satisfied." The social isolation which may result from an individualistic worldview tends to lessen their happiness and satisfaction with life.[90]

6.3.2. *Universalists*

Of those fitting the Universalist profile, the majority was born between 1960 and 1970 (i.e., are between 30 and 40 years old at the time of the survey). Most were born in France. This is a function both of their age (the waves of immigration from North Africa having already dropped off by the time most respondents fitting this category were born) and of the relatively high representation of Ashkenazic Jews among the Universalists. In Paris there was a higher percentage of Universalists than of any other profile.

Only half the heads of households fitting this profile were married, the lowest rate of the four profiles. They were the most likely to be cohabiting, and the most likely to have no children. They tend to have an above average level of income and were the most likely to have completed higher education.

They are well-integrated into general French society, with many non-Jewish friends and the lowest rates of participation in the local Jewish community. They were the most likely to regularly donate to non-Jewish organizations, indicating a mark of gratitude towards the general French society and expressing a certain emotional distance from the Jewish community. When asked the hypothetical question about being able to choose a religion and nationality if they could be reborn, one third of Universalists answered that identity and place of birth would be of no importance. Half would wish to be reborn Jewish in the Diaspora and a little less than a quarter Jewish in Israel. They indicated that they were largely happy and satisfied with their lives, and were the least worried of all the profiles.

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[90] See Gauchet's conclusion (1985: 302): "The cost of the decline in religion is the difficulty of being oneself. […] Because this is a society which is psychologically exhausting for individuals, where nothing helps them or provides them with support any longer in the face of the question which constantly hammers them […]. What am I to do with my life when I am the only one to decide? […] We have vowed to live henceforth naked and in anguish, which is something that we were more or less spared since the beginning of the human adventure through the grace of the gods. Every one has to work out his own responses on his own behalf."

The level of observance among Universalists was the lowest of all the profiles, and they were the most likely to describe themselves as "non-observant." Half said they are less religious than their parents. They have the highest rate of intermarriage and only one in ten would disapprove of one of their children marrying a non-Jew, illustrating the Universalists' weak ties to Jewish traditions. Nevertheless, even among this relatively non-religious sub-group over a quarter described themselves as religiously traditional. 36% said they regularly have a family *Shabbat* meal, 24% regularly recite *Kiddush* and 20% regularly light candles on Friday night, confirming the prevalence of religious tradition, not strict observance, among French Jews. The number is lower regarding the religious aspects of *Shabbat*: only 10% said they do not watch television on *Shabbat* and even fewer (6%) regularly attend synagogue on *Shabbat*. The Universalists have the weakest Jewish educational backgrounds, far less than the Traditionalists and Revivalists and slightly less than the Individualists, although 65% did receive some form of Jewish education. Few speak or write Hebrew and just over a third can read Hebrew. They were the least likely to have their children enrolled in Jewish day schools and expressed little interest in doing so, even if a free, quality, convenient Jewish day school were available. They were the most likely to say giving their children a Jewish education is "not important."

The Universalists were the least likely to be considering making *Aliyah*. They were the most likely to say that Israel should exchange territory for a peace treaty. At the same time, over three quarters of Universalists described their connection to Israel as very close or fairly close, and two thirds have visited Israel at least once. Though somewhat weaker than the connection seen among the more traditional profiles, this indicates that like French Jewry as a whole, they have a strong connection to Israel.

In summary, this group is characterized by a high level of social integration within the general society. It could be said that Universalists are the heirs of the traditional *Israélites* as defined by Dominique Schnapper: that is, Jews who have adopted the values of their social environment. However, 80% preferred the term "Jew" to "*Israélite*," the highest of any of the profiles. This seems to indicate that the term "*Israélite*" may no longer have the same connotations it once had, and that the younger generation of integrated French Jews do not relate to this term even if they embody the attitudes it once represented. It

seems that "universalist French Jew" is today a more appropriate way to describe this group than "*Israélite*."

6.3.3. *Revivalists*

Like the Universalists, this profile was most common among younger heads of households, particularly those between the ages of 30 and 40 at the time of the survey. However, the Revivalists were more likely to be Sephardic. They also had a lower average income and level of education.

The majority of Revivalists defined themselves as traditional and they are far more similar to the Traditionalists than to the two other profiles. They have a relatively low rate of intermarriage (less than 20%) and were slightly more opposed than Traditionalists to the idea of their children marrying a non-Jew. Interestingly, the higher endogamy rate among women mentioned earlier does not hold true for the Revivalists: among this profile the males had a slightly higher rate of being married to another Jew.

Most Revivalists abide by the laws of *kashrut* in and out of their homes and adhere to the laws and traditions of *Shabbat*. The number of Revivalists who never watch television or work on *Shabbat* was only slightly lower than that of Traditionalists. Their level of participation in the local Jewish community was almost equal to that of Traditionalists, and almost half were part of the community nucleus. They have the highest levels of Jewish education and attach great importance to giving their children Jewish education. Over a third sent their children to Jewish day schools, four times the rate found among the Universalists. Their social life includes many Jewish friends. Almost one-quarter said all their friends are Jewish. They donate frequently to Jewish organizations. A greater percentage of Revivalists than of any other profile said they feel very close to Israel. They were the least likely to have never visited Israel, the most likely to have visited six or more times and the most likely to be considering *Aliyah*. They have the greatest proficiency in Hebrew.

The Revivalists were the happiest and most satisfied with their lives. This may be because they are connected with a cultural/religious tradition and community while at the same time well-integrated into general French society. At the same time, the Revivalists were more concerned with every one of the problems in the list than were those in the three other profiles. (Interestingly, although the percentages of respondents in each profile who indicated they are very worried about

the various issues varied, the order of priority is essentially the same among all four profiles.) Their involvement in both Jewish and general French society may widen the range of issues with which they are concerned. Revivalists were also the largest group to say that they have personally suffered from anti-Semitism in recent years.

6.3.4. *Traditionalists*

This profile was most common among those aged 50 and older with lower income and level of education. The majority of Traditionalists was born outside metropolitan France and has a relatively low level of education and income. 44% do not have a bachelor's degree. In the areas surrounding Paris and in the provinces the Traditionalists were more numerous than any other profile.

The Traditionalists are religiously observant, the large majority adhering to the rules of *kashrut* both in and out of their homes and keeping *Shabbat*.[91] They have a high level of Jewish education and one-third sends their children to Jewish day school. They are active in the local Jewish community. We find in this group the highest proportion of those who define themselves as Orthodox, although the vast majority defined themselves as traditional. It must be remembered that the profile Traditionalist cannot be equated with the traditional religious stream, but rather indicates a traditional set of values which does not necessarily include religious observance.

Almost fifty per cent of Traditionalists said they are more religious than in the past, yet barely one-third said that they are more religious than their parents. (The rest are equally divided between those who said they are as religious and those who said they are less religious than their parents.) This may indicate a return in middle age to the religious behavior patterns with which they were raised, which may have played a lesser role in their younger years.

The Traditionalists indicated that they feel far closer to Israel than do the Universalists and Individualists, but somewhat less so than the Revivalists. Their Hebrew skills are only slightly less than those of the Revivalists. Again, we see an emphasis on reading over writing and

[91] We found that the watching television on *Shabbat* is a significant discriminating practice among the French Jewish population. This indicator differentiates between those who have family traditions surrounding *Shabbat* but do not strictly adhere to the laws concerning work on *Shabbat*, and those who rigorously observe religious laws and therefore do not watch television on *Shabbat*.

Table 44: Regional distribution of the four profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists	Total
Paris	20%	33%	25%	23%	100%
Paris region	26%	17%	23%	34%	100%
Provinces	21%	23%	22%	34%	100%

Table 45: General demographics and the profiles of French Jews

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Gender				
Male	59%	53%	45%	42%
Female	41%	47%	55%	58%
Ethnicity				
Ahkenazic	34%	33%	16%	15%
Sephardic	60%	58%	80%	80%
Both	6%	9%	4%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Marital status				
Married	58%	50%	60%	65%
Cohabiting	10%	12%	9%	5%
Widowed	9%	6%	7%	15%
Divorced/ Separated	7%	10%	9%	8%
Single (never married)	17%	22%	15%	8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of children				
None	25%	33%	25%	14%
One	15%	15%	14%	14%
Two	35%	34%	25%	22%
Three	16%	14%	20%	28%
Four	4%	3%	10%	12%
Five or more	4%	1%	6%	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Family income				
Below average	24%	25	40	38
Average	62%	54	52	54
Above average	13%	21	8	8
Educational level				
Less than bachelor's degree	34%	18%	37%	44%
Bachelor's degree	20%	14%	18%	20%
Bachelor's degree +2	14%	19%	21%	15%
Bachelor's degree +4	32%	49%	24%	21%

Table 46: Jewish identity indicators and the profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Preference for term				
Jew	70%	80%	58%	61%
Israélite	6%	4%	3%	5%
Both	24%	17%	38%	34%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Friends				
None are Jewish	7%	10%	6%	4%
Most are NOT Jewish	31%	36%	12%	15%
Half are Jewish	33%	29%	24%	26%
Most are Jewish	21%	20%	33%	33%
All are Jewish	7%	5%	24%	22%
Participation in local Jewish community				
Rare	47%	57%	22%	26%
Average	37%	29%	33%	33%
Part of community nucleus	15%	14%	45%	41%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Level of religious observance				
Non-observant	41%	59%	11%	11%
Liberal	18%	13%	13%	15%
Traditional	40%	27%	70%	64%
Orthodox	1%	1%	6%	10%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hebrew skills				
Can read Hebrew	46%	37%	61%	53%
Can speak Hebrew	16%	18%	31%	28%
Can write Hebrew	10%	13%	31%	28%
Donate to Jewish or Israeli organizations				
Several times a year	36%	35%	59%	57%
Once a year	17%	18%	16%	19%
Every two-three years	4%	4%	3%	5%
Less	11%	8%	6%	5%
Never	31%	35%	15%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Size of donations to Jewish or Israeli organizations				
No contribution	53%	54%	32%	34%
Small contribution	18%	19%	17%	16%
Average contribution	19%	14%	25%	21%
Large contribution	9	8	17	21
Very large contribution	2	4	9	8
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 46 (*cont.*)

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Donate to non-Jewish organizations				
Several times a year	17	26	17	14
Once a year	24	26	24	18
Every 2–3 years	3	5	3	4
Less often	13	10	8	8
Never	43	34	48	56
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 47: Jewish education and the profiles of French Jews

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Jewish educational background				
Attended any Jewish educational institution	67%	65%	79%	75%
Jewish day school	23%	18%	36%	34%
Talmud Torah	43%	36%	53%	49%
Jewish youth movement	32%	34%	49%	43%
Jewish camp	27%	28%	36%	30%
Yeshiva	2%	3%	4%	6%
Jewish student movement	7%	14%	17%	14%
Currently have enrolled their children in Jewish educational system	13%	8%	34%	33%
Would enroll children in a good, free, convenient Jewish day school	*64%*	*33%*	*9%*	85%
Importance of giving children Jewish education				
Very important	34%	32%	77%	73%
Fairly important	46%	38%	19%	21%
Not important	20%	30%	4%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Preferred level of Jewish observance of Jewish day school for one's children				
Total observance	14%	12%	21%	29%
Mostly observant	28%	21%	40%	38%
Partial observance	46%	49%	37%	28%
No observance	12%	18%	2%	4%

Table 48: Intermarriage and the profiles of French Jews

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Religion of spouse				
Jewish	58%	52%	79%	80%
Non-Jewish	40%	48%	19%	20%
Convert to Judaism	1%	0%	2%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Jewish men with Jewish spouse	56%	47%	83%	75%
Jewish men with non-Jewish spouse	44%	53%	25%	17%
Jewish women with Jewish spouse	66%	58%	80%	83%
Jewish women with non-Jewish spouse	34%	42%	20%	17%

Table 49: Indicators of connection to Israel and the profiles of French Jews

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Connection to Israel				
Very close	36%	31%	64%	57%
Fairly close	46%	46%	27%	34%
Fairly distant	16%	15%	8%	7%
Very distant	3%	8%	1%	2%
Family or friends in Israel				
Children	5%	2%	7%	8%
Close relatives	43%	36%	58%	52%
Distant relatives	24%	27%	21%	20%
Close friends	8%	12%	6%	6%
No-one	20%	23%	8%	14%
Number of visits to Israel				
None	27%	33%	19%	25%
One	22%	16%	11%	15%
Two	13%	13%	11%	9%
Three	6%	9%	8%	8%
Four	4%	6%	8%	7%
Five	3%	5%	6%	5%
Six or more	25%	20%	37%	32%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 49 (*cont.*)

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Intention to make Aliyah				
Very soon	3%	0%	10%	9%
In the future	5%	4%	21%	17%
Considered it but changed my mind	7%	7%	9%	8%
Not considering it, but not opposed to the idea	16%	12%	15%	19%
No intention	69%	77%	45%	47%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Attitudes towards children making Aliyah				
Would be happy and encouraging	33%	33%	54%	53%
Would be happy but cautioning	40%	38%	34%	36%
Would not be happy but would not oppose	23%	19%	9%	7%
Would not be happy and would try to dissuade	4%	9%	3%	3%
Would strongly oppose	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Should Israel exchange territory for credible peace guarantees?				
Yes	56%	61%	36%	42%
No	28%	25%	53%	46%
It is not up to Jews living in France to say	16%	14%	11%	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 50: Satisfaction, happiness and worries of French Jews, by profile

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Happiness				
Very happy	15%	22%	33%	22%
Happy	77%	70%	60%	68%
Not happy	7%	8%	6%	8%
Not at all happy	1%	0%	2%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 49 (*cont.*)

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Satisfaction				
Very satisfied	10%	18%	21%	15%
Satisfied	79%	73%	72%	72%
Not satisfied	10%	8%	6%	11%
Not at all satisfied	1%	1%	1%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Worried				
Very worried	8%	5%	13%	16%
Worried	53%	50%	54%	57%
Not worried	31%	35%	27%	22%
Not at all worried	10%	10%	6%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Very worried about				
Terrorism	63%	72%	89%	83%
Antisemitism	58%	69%	89%	83%
Racism	59%	66%	85%	71%
Future of Israel	54%	52%	75%	72%
AIDS	38%	48%	64%	51%
Drugs	37%	41%	63%	55%
Islam	41%	36%	61%	47%
Unemployment	24%	28%	44%	33%
Pollution	21%	30%	41%	32%
Food insecurity	14%	19%	34%	23%
Intermarriage	12%	8%	36%	38%
Foreigners	4%	8%	17%	13%

speaking, attributable to the importance of being able to read Hebrew prayers and religious texts.

Traditionalists are slightly more likely to say they are not happy or satisfied. The Traditionalists who are unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives (still a small minority, less than 15% of those fitting this profile) may be unable to bridge the cultural gap between the traditional society in which they were raised and the modern, predominantly secular culture in which they live.

It is worth noting here that the data on attitudes towards Jewish education shown in Table 40 indicate possible developmental strategies for Jewish schools. There is a large pool of parents of potential students, particularly among the Traditionalists and Revivalists who are discouraged from sending their children to Jewish schools by distance and cost. There also seems to be a significant number of Individualists



Figure 2: Axiological Typology with Profiles as External Variables

and, to a lesser extent, Universalists who, in addition to these material difficulties, prefer a school that is not overly religiously observant.

6.4. *Profiles of French Jews in the Structure of Values*

These four profiles were introduced as external variables into the graph of the values, as shown in Figure 2. External variables are introduced into an SSA map in such a way that they do not affect the structure of the primary variables.

The Traditionalists are located at the periphery of the map, at the authority pole of the political diagonal, in the tradition region. The Universalists are in the Social life region, close to the Autonomy pole of the political diagonal. The Individualists are between the Materialism and Social Life regions, close to the Egoism pole of the social diagonal. They are disassociated with the political concepts of authority and autonomy. The Revivalists are also in the Tradition region, but closer to the center of the map. Their position near the center of

the map indicates an equally strong correlation with all (or most) of the values listed. They create a synthesis between the political poles of authority and autonomy (though with a slightly stronger emphasis on authority) and between egoism and altruism (though with a slightly stronger emphasis on altruism). Within the context of French Jewry, the Revivalists may be said to have an integrative approach to identity while the Traditionalists and Universalists have oppositional approaches to identity. The individualists may be said to have a passive approach to identity.

These four profiles may be seen as two sets of oppositions: Universalists who stress the principle of autonomy opposite Traditionalists who stress the principle of authority; and Individualists who constitute a rather "disconnected" profile opposite Revivalists who combine all the elements together. These value systems represented by these profiles impact the modes of identification and varied practices of the Jews of France and expressions of feelings of solidarity.

The order of the profiles on the graph does not indicate the character of the members of the group. This geographic organization simply highlights tendencies, propensities, which we call the dominant traits. This does not mean that the members of these profiles are authoritarian or autonomous. It means that these profiles have a greater tendency to conform to principles of authority or autonomy.

It should be noted that no profile is positioned close to the altruism pole. This does not mean that the expression of Jewish identity does not take into account the welfare of others. It simply means that it is the pole that is least correlated with the profiles. Can we see, in this, a sign that traditional community activism (for Israel, human rights, the liberation of Soviet Jews, etc.) has lost strength as an identity modality? This may be linked to the decline of voluntarism in favor of the growing professionalism of community institutions.[92] A concrete expression of this may be seen in the virtual disappearance of youth movements from the community landscape, previously a site for community mobilization. The decline in such informal educational structures may be expected to have a profound influence on the values of the Jews of France.

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[92] "The return to specific practices and the specifically Jewish reinterpretation of Judaism which has been taking place in the last decade are very striking, insofar as they appear to call into question an age old development… Right now, the heads of the [Jewish] organizations are more likely to be observant than militant." Schnapper (1991: 112).

The Individualists are primarily distinguished by their antipathy to authoritarian values and the low level of importance they attach to such traditional values as faith in God, family and parents. They are passive regarding values of autonomy, not a militant group that is actively promoting social individualism. Their main characteristic is a negative attitude towards traditional values, which they nevertheless have not fully rejected and which they maintain to some extent. Their level of religious observance is relatively low, and yet there are as many Individualists who define themselves as religiously traditional as those who say they are non-observant. To some extent they are still tied to the values of more traditional societies, yet emphasize individualistic values.

6.5. *Profiles of French Jews and Socio-Economic Factors*

The SSA program was used to graphically portray the relationship between several basic socio-economic features of the French Jewish community: age, educational level, income and whether they were born in or outside metropolitan France. The map, shown in Figure 3, is structured along two axes. The vertical access corresponds to age; the horizontal axis corresponds to both income and education levels. The four axiological profiles were then introduced as external variables. Each profile occupies a distinct place in the socio-economic structure, indicating that values are simultaneously linked to education, economic status and age. The Universalists and Traditionalists are of a similar age group, but the Universalists have a much higher level of education and income. Therefore we can say that, among this generation, higher level of education corresponds to adoption of more universal values, and rejection of traditional values.

Yet similar levels of education and income do not necessarily produce the same value structure among different generations. The Individualists and Revivalists are similar in terms of education and income level, yet the Revivalists, who tend to be much younger, are *more* closely tied to tradition, and balance between values that emphasize the individual and those that emphasize religion and community. It seems that for the older generation, education and economic success was tied to rejection of traditional values in favor of individualist values among the middle socio-economic class, and in favor of universalist values among the highest educated and most financially successful. Among the younger group of French Jewish heads of households, however,



Figure 3: Geometric Representation (WSSA1) of the Socio-Cultural Positions of the Jews of France with the Axiological Profiles as External Variables

education is not tied to a rejection of traditional values, but rather to the development of a value structure blending their religious tradition with the universalist and individualist values of the society in which they were raised.

6.6. *French Jews Born in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia: A Comparative Analysis of Values*

Because of its unique history, France's Jewish community represents a meeting of the political culture rooted in French Republican values, which France's Jews largely accept, and the more traditional Jewish values brought from North Africa by the waves of immigrants in the 1950s–1970s. How has the radical demographic shift influenced the values of the Jewish community in France? To what extent has the traditional religious value system developed in North Africa persisted and to what extent has the Republican value system of France been adopted? Can the North African or "Maghreb" Jews be viewed as a homogenous

population, or are there differences between the values and assimilation of immigrants from the various North African countries?

This chapter explores the values, attitudes and behaviors expressed by Maghreb Jews living in France and compares between those from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Among the previous studies of this population[93] there were no sociological studies which specifically dealt with their value structure. The data and analysis of this pioneer research may, therefore, provide a baseline for future studies, which will hopefully further contribute to our collective knowledge of this important and fascinating segment of Diaspora Jewry.

6.6.1. *Jewish Communities of North Africa: A Brief History*

The Maghreb: During the colonial era, France established its influence throughout much of North-west African, including the Mediterranean countries of modern-day Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Though the Jewish populations in each of these three countries had its own particular history, which impacted reasons for migrating to France and which give each a distinctive character within the larger community of Jewish citizens of France, several common themes and trends may be noted for the Jewish experience across North Africa.

We cannot here deal in detail with the rich and varied history of the Jews in the Maghreb throughout the centuries.[94] This brief historical note is given as background for the more immediately relevant historical events of the 19th and 20th centuries that preceded and led to the migration of significant portions of these populations to France.

Jews have been documented as living in North Africa for over two millennia, since the earliest days of the Diaspora. In the 7th century BCE, the Muslims conquered North Africa. As neither Muslims nor 'infidels', the Jews were accorded a second-class citizen status. Depending on the nature of the successive local Muslim rulers, the Jews' political and economic security and freedom to practice their religion waxed and waned throughout the centuries. They were often restricted to *mellahs* (ghettos) and taxed heavily. Many worked as

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[93] Abitbol & Astro (1994) deals with some of the historical aspects of the migration of North African Jews to France. Other sources on North African Jewry in France include: Deldyck (2000); DellaPergola (2003b); Pinkus & Bensimon (1992). See also the anthropological analysis of Bahloul (1983) and the numerous books published by the Dahan Center at Bar Ilan University. See also Laskier (1994).

[94] For more information on the history of the Jews in North Africa, see: Hirschberg (1974); Levy (2002); Stillman (1979).

traders or artisans. In the 15th and 16th centuries, large numbers of Jews fled to North Africa from the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, altering the character of the local Jewish communities. In addition to their religious basis in Talmudic (rabbinic) and Kabalistic (mystical) teachings, the North African Jewish communities were influenced by the many cultures with whom they came in contact: Arab, Berber, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian.

As the French established control of the Maghreb in the 19th century, they generally improved the status and conditions for local Jews. A French Jewish organization, the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, established schools emphasizing secular education and assimilation into French culture. Many Jews living in North Africa became French citizens, mainly those living in Algeria, who were granted French citizenship in 1870 with the Crémieux Decree.[95]

Nationalistic movements, distinctly Arab and Muslim in character, gained momentum in the mid-20th century. Since Jews were perceived to be associated with the French colonial power, the situation of North African Jews' was threatened. As each of the countries became independent, large percentages of the Jewish populations emigrated. After Israel's Six Day War (1967), violence broke out against the remaining Jewish populations, and most left at this time. The majority went to either Israel or France, and many extended families were split between these two. Only a few thousand Jews remain in North Africa today. Several million Muslims also migrated to France before and after independence.

Morocco: Jews have been in Morocco longer than in the other two countries, first settling there after the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem (586 BCE). In 1912 Morocco was divided between French, Spanish and international 'zones of influence'.[96] In the French region Jews were granted citizenship, though they were still subject to periodic bouts of violence.[97] Morocco became independent in 1956 and established ties with other Arab nations, making uncertain the future for its Jewish population. Jewish emigration was prohibited from independence until 1961. When the prohibition was lifted, a large percentage of Morocco's remaining Jews fled. Most went either

[95] Named for its originator Adolphe Crémieux, first president of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and minister of justice in the French Second Republic government.

[96] Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1961).

[97] Sand (2004).

to Israel or to France, though some went to other European countries: the US, Canada, and Latin America.[98] Most of the remaining Jews left after Israel's Six Day War in 1967. A population of several thousand Jews remains in Casablanca today.

Tunisia: Jews have lived in Tunisia since at least the second century BCE. Unlike the other two countries, Tunisia received an influx of Jewish immigrants from Italy in the 16th century and the Jewish community became divided between the native Tunisians and the Italian immigrants.[99] Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881. After the First World War, Tunisian Jews were offered French citizenship, and approximately a third became French citizens between this time and Tunisian independence.[100] During WWII the Germans invaded Tunisia, and deported much of the Jewish population to labor camps and seized their property. The Jewish community began to rebuild itself following WWII, but when Tunisia became independent in 1956, they declared Islam as the state religion and outlawed or destroyed most Jewish institutions. Today there is a small Jewish community in Tunisia with several schools and synagogues.

Algeria: Algeria, too, had a Jewish community for more than two thousand years. During the years of the Spanish Inquisition Spanish Jews migrated to Algeria (as to other North African countries). France took over Algeria in 1830. The history of French rule in Algeria—and therefore the experience of Jews living there—differed from that of the other two countries discussed. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, many French, Spanish and Italians settled in Algeria (*pieds-noirs*) and land grants were given to encourage settlement by Europeans. Throughout the colonial era there were periodic rebellions and oppositions to French rule, and French response to the rebellions was heavy-handed (*régime du sabre*). In 1848 France annexed Algeria, making it into three civil administrative units (departments) of France, as opposed to a colony. As such, French citizenship was available to residents of Algeria. Citizenship meant acceptance of the French legal code, which conflicted some traditional and religious laws and customs. Few Muslim Algerians became French citizens. However, following the 1870 Crémieux

[98] Sand (2004); Gold (2004).
[99] Rosenzweig (2001).
[100] Shaked (2000).

Decree, the 40,000 Jews living there accepted French citizenship. This set them further apart from the Muslim population. Because of Algeria's status as a part of France and the large number of *pieds-noir*s living there, Algeria's war for independence was met with more resistance than that of Tunisia or Morocco and was far more drawn-out and bloodier. The war in Algeria is still considered traumatic in France.[101] Almost the entire population of *pieds-noirs* (by this time numbering a million people) and Algerian Jews left *en masse* when independence was declared in 1962.[102] Since the Jews of Algeria had already obtained French citizenship, they were not officially considered 'immigrants'; they moved between departments of the French state. It is estimated that fewer than 100 Jews remain in Algeria.[103]

6.6.2. *North African Jews in France*

Thus, at the time of immigration, many North African Jews had already taken advantage of the opportunity to become French citizens and the rest were able to gain citizenship after taking up residence in metropolitan France. Most already spoke French and were familiar with French culture from their education in the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* school system. At the same time, while most have embraced Republican ideals and the political rights granted them, North African Jews tend to express a stronger public Jewish identity than Jews who were raised in secular French Republican society.[104]

In this chapter, we compare sub-populations of French Jews born in France and in each of the three North African countries, which had previously been under French jurisdiction. In order to better determine the influence of the single variable of country of birth, only data from French Jewish heads of household who identified themselves as Sephardi are included in this section of the analysis. The axiological typology described above is applied to examine the differences between French Jews born in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and those born in France.

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[101] Smith (2003).
[102] Metz (1993); Alba & Silberman (2002).
[103] U.S. Department of State (2000).
[104] Bernheim (1997); Shurkin (2000).

Table 51: French Sephardi Jewish heads of household, by country of birth and year of immigration

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Other	Total
Percentage of sample	*49.71*	*11.69*	*20.75*	*10.71*	*7.14*	*100*
Migrated in 1900–1954	–	3%	13%	5%	10%	8%
Migrated in 1955–1962	–	32%	81%	47%	34%	58%
Migrated in1963–1966	–	14%	6%	26%	0%	12%
Migrated in 1967–1972	–	18%	0%	18%	7%	9%
Migrated in 1973–present	–	33%	1%	5%	48%	12%
Total	–	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

6.6.3. *Demographic Comparison*

Among the sample, half the heads of Sephardi French Jewish households were born in France and half in other countries, overwhelmingly the three North African former colonies. Table 51 shows the breakdown of country of birth among our survey sample and the pattern of immigration over time.

The Jews born in Algeria were most likely to have immigrated during the war leading to that country's independence or in 1962, the year Algeria became independent. Few are more recent immigrants. Of the 7% who moved to France after 1962, it is likely that they may not have remained in Algeria, but rather migrated first to Israel or another country before taking up residence in France.

The bulk of Jewish immigration from Tunisia to France began with Tunisia's independence in 1956 and culminated around the time of Israel's Six Day War, when there were riots against Jews in Tunisia.[105] Though a wave of immigration followed Morocco's independence, also in 1956, Moroccan-born Jews are the most recent immigrants to France, 63% of them having come later than 1962. Of the Jews who have come to France since 1971, 57% were born in Morocco. Only 6% came from either Tunisia or Algeria in the past three decades.

Most of those in the "other" category, which includes almost half of the most recent Sephardi immigrants, were born in various European countries, the former Soviet Union, or Israel.

Few of these immigrants retained citizenship in their birth country (only 6% of those from Morocco and Tunisia). The Algerian Nationality Code passed in 1963 did not allow Jews or *pieds-noir* to retain

[105] Bard (2005).

Table 52: Selected demographic and social data on Sephardi French Jews, by country of birth

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Other	Total
Education						
Less than baccalaureate	23%	39%	51%	49%	15%	37%
Baccalaureate and four or more	34%	28%	23%	18%	31%	27%
Family status						
Married	55%	69%	58%	70%	59%	61%
Living together	16%	6%	4%	1%	9%	8%
Widowed	1%	8%	19%	16%	3%	9%
Divorced	6%	13%	13%	9%	6%	9%
Single	21%	5%	6%	4%	24%	12%
Intermarriage						
Married/living with non-Jew	34%	22%	25%	17%	13%	26%

Algerian citizenship.[106] 4% of Moroccan-born Jewish French citizens hold dual citizenship in the State of Israel, compared to only 1% of those born in Algeria or Tunisia.

The various sub-populations of Jews in France were not spread evenly throughout the country. Certain groups were concentrated in certain departments. Algerian Jews were more integrated into departments with populations of native-born French Jews, while the Moroccan and Tunisian Jews were concentrated in other areas. Historically, the Jews in Algeria were quite assimilated into the French colonial political structure and culture, which has apparently facilitated their integration into French culture in France.[107] Table 52 shows some basic demographic and social data on the various sub-groups of Sephardi French Jews.

Of the three groups of North African immigrants, the Jews born in Morocco had the highest level of education. French-born Jewish heads of households were significantly more likely to be single or living with a partner than those born in any of the North African countries. The higher percentage of widows among those born in Algeria is likely a demographic result of the age of this population, who migrated at least forty years ago. Rates of intermarriage or living with a non-Jewish

[106] Parolin (2009: 95).
[107] Stillman (1979).

partner were similar for Jews born in Morocco and Algeria: lower than for French-born Sephardi Jews but higher than for those born in Tunisia.

6.6.4. *Political Tendencies*

In terms of political attitudes, French Jews born in the three North African former colonies were similar to one another and to the Sephardi Jews born in France. Almost none from any of the sub-groups defined themselves as either extreme left or extreme right (see Table 53). In 2002, over half called themselves leftists. All three of the North African-born populations were more likely to consider themselves leftists than the French-born Jews. Moroccan and Tunisian-born were slightly more likely to identify as right-wing than those born in Algeria. As noted earlier, there has been a distinct swing to the right among French Jews: future studies may track the political shift among these particular sub-groups.

Table 54 shows the responses of the various sub-groups to a number of questions related to religious practice, belief and involvement in the local Jewish community. Overall, the Jews born in the North African countries were more traditional (but not Orthodox) than those born in France. The Algerian-born Jews were found to be less traditional than those born in Morocco or Tunisia. Their responses were similar to those of Sephardi French born Jews, though they were slightly more likely than the French-born to keep a kosher home, perhaps due to family concerns. They were also somewhat more opposed to their children marrying non-Jews. The Algerian-born were the least likely to have children enrolled in Jewish day schools, even in comparison to the French-born. Their level of participation in Jewish community institutions again fell between that of Jews born in France and those born in Morocco or Tunisia.

French Jews born in all of the Maghreb countries were significantly more likely to have close family in Israel than are those born in France. As mentioned above, when the Jews left North Africa, many families were split between France and Israel. The Moroccan and Tunisian French Jews were both more likely to have visited Israel, and to have visited multiple times, than either the Algerian French Jews or the French-born. The Algerian born were the least likely to be considering making *Aliyah* to Israel, even fewer than among the French born who, in this case, were similar to the Moroccan and Tunisian-born Jews. Jews from Tunisia were the most likely to say they would have preferred to have been born in Israel. Those from Morocco and Algeria

Table 53: Political attitudes of Sephardi French Jews, by country of birth, 2002

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Other	Total
Extreme left	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Left	40%	47%	49%	50%	35%	45%
Left center	13%	18%	14%	10%	15%	13%
Center	20%	7%	19%	13%	15%	17%
Right center	6%	9%	6%	10%	15%	8%
Right	18%	17%	11%	18%	19%	16%
Extreme right	2%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 54: Religious practice, belief and community involvement of Sephardi French Jews, by country of birth

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Non practicing	22%	15%	22%	10%	19%	19%
Liberal	18%	6%	14%	13%	16%	14%
Traditional	52%	71%	61%	70%	65%	61%
Orthodox	7%	8%	3%	7%	0%	6%
Always keep kosher at home	44%	59%	48%	67%	45%	51%
Always keep kosher out	32%	43%	32%	44%	32%	36%
Vehemently opposed to intermarriage re their children	21%	32%	16%	33%	26%	23%
Children in Jewish day school	23%	26%	17%	28%	12%	23%
Participation in JC often/very	41%	60%	50%	59%	59%	53%

Table 55: Attachment to Israel, by country of birth

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Never visited Israel	29%	12%	25%	16%	20%	23%
Visited Israel three or more	48%	64%	45%	60%	49%	53%
Have very close family in Israel	40%	65%	63%	66%	64%	55%
Considering *Aliyah* (soon, later)	24%	27%	15%	26%	37%	23%
Would prefer to be born in Israel	39%	50%	51%	62%	32%	47%

are similar (half would chose to be natives of Israel). Almost 40% of those born in France would prefer to have been born in Israel.

A comparison of the responses to the list of values as ranked by respondents born in the various countries shows the strong emphasis on family values among *all* of France's Sephardi Jews. Those from Morocco and Tunisia were most likely to value honoring their parents

Table 56: Values of Sephardi French Jews, by country of birth

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Values						
Honoring one's parents	74%	83%	79%	83%	82%	78%
Starting a family	68%	75%	67%	69%	82%	69%
Studying	61%	61%	45%	52%	65%	55%
Being oneself	63%	52%	46%	46%	71%	54%
Helping others	47%	53%	44%	45%	58%	47%
Belief in God	43%	60%	47%	59%	53%	50%
Making the most of one's life	45%	41%	36%	36%	38%	40%
Doing what I like	43%	45%	31%	21%	43%	37%
Contributing to society	22%	43%	33%	30%	38%	30%
Having a good time with friends	28%	30%	22%	25%	35%	26%
Going on holiday	22%	25%	19%	23%	32%	22%
Caring for one's appearance	15%	28%	22%	18%	21%	20%
Engaging in sports	17%	15%	14%	8%	12%	14%
Earning money	11%	9%	8%	6%	3%	9%

and those from Morocco were particularly likely to choose the value 'starting a family'. A closer look reveals the complex nature of Jewish identity among French Jews born in North Africa. For example, alongside their strong values of family, community and belief in God, the Jews born in Morocco were also the most likely to value individualist values such as 'doing what I like', 'going on holiday' and 'caring for one's appearance'.

At the same time, those born in Morocco placed significantly more value on contributing to society, having a good time with friends and helping others than any of the other groups. They also placed a higher value on caring for one's appearance than the other groups did, which may be linked to community standards. Their emphasis on study is the same as that among Sephardi French-born Jews, and higher than either the Algerian or Tunisian-born. Those born in Tunisia were similar to the Moroccan-born in terms of family and religion, but were far less individualistic. Interestingly, Jews born in Algeria were most similar to French-born Jews in terms of 'belief in God' but in other cases were more like those born in Tunisia ('being oneself', 'making the most of one's life', 'contributing to society'). They placed the least value on studying, friends or going on holiday.[108]

[108] It would be interesting to compare the values of Jews who immigrated to France from North Africa with those of Muslims immigrants from the same former colonies.

Table 57: Profile of Sephardi French Jews, by country of birth

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Individualist	18%	17%	21%	22%	15%	19%
Universalist	25%	13%	20%	10%	18%	19%
Traditionalist	30%	34%	40%	47%	30%	36%
Revivalist	27%	36%	20%	21%	36%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The relationship between self-definitions, stated values and reported behavior is complex. For example, though 70% of the French Jews born in Morocco said they are religiously 'traditional', their reported level of practice of some basic traditions such as keeping kosher and *Shabbat* show a more liberal or casual adherence to the *mitzvoth* than one might expect. The self-label 'traditional' therefore must indicate something other than a simple link to traditional religious practice.

Table 57 shows the percentage of each sub-population that fits each of the four profiles in the axiological typology. Of the various sub-groups, the Moroccan-born Jews have the highest percentage of Revivalists, who combine traditional and autonomous values. They have almost as many Traditionalists as Revivalists (approximately a third corresponds to each of these types). The other two types, Individualists and Universalists, were less well-represented among the Jews born in Morocco.

Among the Tunisian-born Jews, we found the highest percentage of Traditionalists and the lowest percentage of Universalists. Those born in Algeria were most likely to be Traditionalists, with the remainder evenly divided between the other three types. French-born Jews were most likely to be Traditionalists, followed by Revivalists, Universalists and finally Individualists.

Figure 4 shows SSA representation of values with sub-populations according to country of birth introduced as external variables. Those born in the North African countries emerged as quite similar to each other in terms of values. Compared to those born in France, all three of the North African-born populations are closer to authoritarian values such as belief in God, family and parents. Nevertheless, some

A study of attitudes of French Muslim women found that even discussions of issues directly related to Muslim identity were often couched in the terms and ideals of French culture rather than of traditional North African culture. See Killian (2006).



Figure 4: Geometric Representation of Values of Sephardi French Jews, with Countries of Origin

differences may be perceived. Those born in Morocco are the furthest from the autonomy side of the autonomy-authority axis. They are approximately equidistant from altruism and egoism. Jews born in France are closest to the center of the map.

We see that no simplistic images can accurately portray the complex reality of the Maghreb Jews of France, which in fact contains several distinctive sub-populations. The Jews born in Algeria are a particularly interesting case, as they were found to be more like native-born French in some respects, while similar to their Moroccan and Tunisian-born compatriots in others. While generally more traditional and religious than the Jews born in France, North African French Jews also value autonomy and individual freedom, and even these first-generation immigrants have adopted to a large extent the core values of French society. It will be of great interest and importance to see what direction the French Jewish community takes over the next few decades as the

children of those surveyed here take their places as the heads of the next generation of Jewish families in France.

6.7. *Issues of Concern among Profiles of the Axiological Typology*

Figure 5 portrays the structural relationship between the items on the list of concerns. There is a clear distinction between general concerns (AIDS, pollution, etc.) and those more directly related to the Jewish community (anti-Semitism, future of Israel, etc.) This indicates that the Jews of France, concern with terrorism, Islam and racism are linked with other concerns related specifically to the Jewish community. The item "foreigners" lies on the border between the two, hinting at the ambivalent or conflicted perception the Jews of France may have of this issue given the high percentage of immigrants among their own population.



Figure 5: Graphic Portrayal of Concerns of the Jews of France with Axiological Profiles, Happiness and Satisfaction as External Variables

Individualists and Universalists are more closely correlated with general worries. The Universalists are at the extreme edge of the map, far from the specific Jewish-Israeli concerns. The Traditionalists and Revivalists are more closely correlated with concerns related to the Jewish community and Israel. However, both these profiles, and particularly the Revivalists, are close to the center of the map, indicating that the general issues concern them also.

The "very happy" respondents are closer to the Jewish Israeli concerns, while the "very satisfied" are in the region with the general concerns. In studies of subjective wellbeing, researchers have gradually begun to include multiple indicators of this complex psychological phenomenon, differentiating between satisfaction (general and with specific life areas such as family or work) and happiness (experiencing pleasant emotions, lack of negative emotions).[109] The unhappy and not satisfied are also in the region with the general worries, far from the Jewish Israeli concerns.

7. *Summary of the Empirical Survey*

The ongoing in-depth research of French Jewry presented here has revealed a comprehensive picture of the community not readily apparent even to those living in France. Research on French Jewry has evolved, methodologically and conceptually, from early studies essentially limited to demographic descriptions, through the development of increasingly sophisticated indices and typologies of Jewish identity and community belonging.[110] The current survey has built on these, including both a rigorous investigation of demographics and a multifaceted exploration of identity.

The French Jewish community, concentrated in Paris and the surrounding departments, consists of slightly more than half a million individuals. The population has experienced a slight decline over the past quarter of a century due to low birth rates, the end of the waves of immigration, and the parallel emigration of French Jews (primarily to Israel).[111] The French Jewish population is overwhelmingly Sephardi:

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[109] Diener (2000).

[110] Especially Schnapper (1980) and Hannoun (2000).

[111] As Bensimon (1989: 265) noted: "While in the past French Jewry always had the possibility of renewing itself through the influx of immigrants from traditional com-

made up of immigrants from North Africa and their descendents. Their immigration, mainly in the 1950s–1970s, revitalized Jewry in France after the psychological trauma and physical destruction of World War II. Their relatively open and public style of Judaism has raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of French Jewish identity, which must be addressed against the background of the public debate regarding French identity and the accommodation of ethnic-religious minorities in the Republic.

French Jews are a highly educated, financially successful and socially well-integrated population, generally happy and satisfied with their lives. Yet they are also deeply worried about terrorism, anti-Semitism, racism and the future of Israel, indicating a level of disquiet with the current atmosphere in France.

The survey of basic values among provides a universally applicable instrument to explore the specifics of the French Jewish community. The typology developed based on multi-dimensional analysis of the core values held by French Jews provides a framework for understanding the dynamics within the community. This typology of four categories (Individualists, Universalists, Revivalists and Traditionalists) seems more useful in describing segments of the population than do classic divisions such as the political left/right spectrum.

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munities, today these migratory waves have virtually ended. French Jewry must now find the strength to affirm its Jewishness and to fight against the demographic factors that threaten it from within its own ranks."

CHAPTER THREE

FRENCH JEWISH PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS ON JEWISH IDENTITY

We may note that French authors referring to the Jewish theme often use the phrases "Jewish question" or the more ominous "Jewish problem". To discuss questions of identity in terms of a "problem" suggests that there is something complex, awkward and cumbersome in the Jew of which he needs to divest himself; that the Jew needs to solve this identity problem. Similarly, the "Jewish question" indicates a need for some sort of answer, and as Maurice Blanchot writes in *The Infinite Conversation*,[1] "The question awaits the answer, but the answer does not appease the question, and even if it puts an end to it, it does not put an end to the expectation that is the question of the question."[2]

So in this context, how is one to evoke the written and spoken words that count in the identity debate? How is one to read or reread the works? How to hear and listen to the comments? These texts about the question of Jewish identity are carefully lined up, and sometimes forgotten, on the bookshelves of the Jews of France. You could bring them all together in an immense library; they represent a literary genre in their own right, and reading them draws us into an identity labyrinth.[3] What would be the criterion for choice of reference books on the identity question? Some of these are being revisited almost half a century after their publication. The ink dried and the pages yellowed, time has done its work, and we have to retrace their historical context in order to invest them with some freshness, and put them in perspective. Some of these reflections appear dated or, in retrospect, naïve. However, others have no need for putting back into context because the questions they ask are fundamental and they still retain an amazing depth and honesty.

These writings are not merely simple accounts about Jewish identity. There are no monographs or narratives; most of these books are

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[1] Blanchot (1969).
[2] Ibid., p. 16.
[3] Parienté (1999).

true *acts of thought* about the fact of being Jewish. As such they are open to comment, which for over two centuries has not been lacking. Indefatigably, Jews observe themselves and ask themselves questions. They ask themselves from where comes this imperative to identify, to distinguish and to separate. They look themselves up and down and want to know what they are, who they are and why they are. "In any case we are well and truly Jewish, even before being in a position to talk about it. Amazing. It has worked like this here for a long time, a morbidity that is at the same time a source both of affliction and gratification. . . . Now, the narratives are coming thick and fast. Contact has been made with the *pre*-Holocaust period . . . Bit by bit, memory is being formed. The buzz of stories goes together with placing a new Jewish existence in perspective."[4]

The covers of some of the most widely known books give a first indication of how the issue of being Jewish is portrayed. For example, the cover of *Le Juif imaginaire (The Imaginary Jew)* by Alain Finkelkraut has a small boy drawing a multi-colored Star of David with chalk on the sidewalk, making the reader wonder: Is it a game? Are there other children around this Jewish "hopscotch"? The photo suggests at least two things: Judaism is pluralist (as indicated by the multi-colored Star) and it is something with which one is involved in creating and interpreting from childhood. Another striking example is *Juifs & Français (Jews & Frenchmen)*. The title is in thick, black letters on a white cover with the & in red. What do these scarlet graphics say? Is it a connection or juxtaposition? Is it a question, a provocation or quite simply is this color is letting us know about the discovery of something new and unique?

Such books have provoked, initiated and fed the debate on being Jewish. They provided support and moved the survivors after World War II and then fascinated a demanding youth that explored them and annotated them in smoke-filled cafés. Today they are commented on, studied and taught by an entire generation that has been brought up in a community environment. These books inform, exasperate, reassure, comfort and provide a dialogue with a Jewish community that is eager to know itself.

Among the features of this dialogue are public declarations of affiliation with Judaism and ruminations on what that means, particularly

[4] Rabinovitch (1979: 63).

for non-religious Jews. Journalist and author Michèle Manceaux, for example, officially claimed her Jewish identity in the daily *Le Monde*[5] and, in her subsequent book entitled *Histoire d'un adjectif (History of an adjective)*,[6] she wrote "Today I am Jewish. I declared it in the *Le Monde* newspaper on August 31, 2001. Today I highlight that adjective and apply it to myself. Yet what does it mean to be Jewish? Apart from Jews for whom it is firstly a faith and a religion, the initial, general and spontaneous reaction of atheists can be summed as, 'It's complicated.' There follows a simple consequence, the natural tendency to banish complications, not to ask yourself any more questions."[7]

To stop questioning and not even try to understand anymore means to take refuge in a radical strangeness, the strangeness of perpetual wandering which does not reveal a refusal but a lack of identity. As author and filmmaker Georges Perec put it, "I do not know exactly what it is to be Jewish, what it does to me to be Jewish. It is something obvious, but of rather poor obviousness, a label that does not connect me to anything particular, to anything concrete; it is not a sign of belonging, it is not tied to a belief, a religion, observance, culture, folklore, history, destiny or language. It would more likely be an absence, a question, a questioning, a looseness, an anxiety; an anxious certainty behind which is silhouetted another certainty that is abstract, heavy and unbearable, that of having been singled out as a Jew, and because a Jew, a victim, owing life only to chance and exile."[8]

The form and purpose of the questioning attest to a permanent identity issue. The disarray of identity was not born with the Shoah. It started with Emancipation when Jews, suddenly escaping a condition that had been imposed upon them, were faced with choices. Those who had never had to choose were suddenly called upon to decide on their identity: Jew, Universal Man or French Citizen.[9] While

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[5] *Le Monde*, 31 August 2001.

[6] Manceaux (2003); the title refers to a comment by Soviet Jewish writer Isaac Babel, that if he wrote an autobiography he would title it "History of an Adjective".

[7] Ibid., p. 17.

[8] Perec (1979: 53).

[9] In 1889, at the centenary of the French Revolution sermons were preached in every synagogue in France. Collected and published by the Community, one can read there this terse statement by Rabbi Kahn of Nimes, "It is our exodus from Egypt, it is our modern Passover" (Mossé, 1890: 100). The French Revolution was the undeniable basis of the collective Jewish presence in France. It is the source of the ritual side of the call to or use of the revolutionary mythology of 1789, because it was to the drum rolls of the Jacobins that the Jews entered the land of modernity. It is therefore not at all

these three options are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the need to choose prompted by the Emancipation and the political culture of the French Republic caused a split in the identity of the Jews. It would appear that the need to pose questions was born of this split. While the split began with Emancipation, during the second half of the 20th century the identity question has taken on a special form and intensity. The sharpness of the questioning appeared following the conjunction of two events, the Shoah[10] and the creation of the State of Israel; as discussed in the analysis of the empirical survey Israel and Auschwitz were found to serve as widespread symbols, anchors of French Jewish identity.

Georges Perec insists that identity questioning is not necessarily done vis-à-vis non-Jews. It is not always a matter of measuring the gap with the 'other' or the distance with someone who is far off. Sometimes one has to gauge the gap that exists with someone close, with someone who ought to be the same. In such a case, being Jewish is not so much being different from others, but rather different from one's own. Perec notes the torments caused by the integration gap. Generation after generation, children do not resemble their parents. The grandfather

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surprising that this change-advent stayed so long in the Jewish imagination as something particularly happy. We should bear in mind that the French Revolution was clothed in traditional Jewish messianic symbols. The Festival of *Pessach* (Passover) acts in the Jewish historical and spiritual consciousness as the founding myth of Hebrew identity. The Revolution of 1789, wrote Isidore Cahen, "There is our second giving of the Law at Sinai," (Cahen 1880: 363). In the same vein, the historian Maurice Bloch (1904: 20) stated that "the Messianic Age had arrived with the French Revolution! The Messianic Age came with this new society, which replaced the old Trinity of the Church with another trinity whose names we read on every wall. Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!" For a reaction that could be diagnosed as cognitive dissonance (wanting to stay Jewish and assimilate at the same time), French Judaism solved this dilemma by positing that the Revolution was true and a liberator, in a word messianic: you do not lose your identity by assimilating into the larger project of France. On the contrary, you fulfill yourself! For other quotations in this vein see Marrus (1971). Trigano (1982: 99–100) insists on the fact that "it is this intertwined fantasy that is the bluff, the *ideology*."

[10] We have chosen the Hebrew term "Shoah" (meaning catastrophe), because it is theologically and psychologically neutral, and which today is generally accepted in Jewish circles, for example, Neher (1977: 154–188). See also issue 97 of the journal *Hamoré*, October 1981, pp. 8–40, whichis given over almost entirely to the teaching of the Shoah, and the film Shoah of Claude Lanzmann. The term *Holocaust* that is generally used to describe the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis is laden with dubious theological innuendos that are unacceptable to many Jews, as the word is rooted in a Greek word for a religious sacrifice. Scherr (1980) wrote in anger against the use of the term Holocaust because the death of six million Jews was not an expiatory sacrifice offered up to redeem an evil intention!

was a Polish or a Tunisian Jew. The father became a French *Israélite*. The children defined themselves as French Jews or at least of Jewish origin, and they are grappling with difficult questions of identity.

In the 1960s, a number of prominent texts dealt with Jewish identity issues. The titles alone give a good indication of the direction of the discourse at the time (some of these works are discussed in more detail below): *Anatomy of French Judaism; The Jewish Existence; Portrait of a Jew; Difficult Liberty; The Reflexive Condition of the Jewish Man; End of the Jewish People?; De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews; Is it Possible to be Jewish Today?*[11] The following decade saw other works come out, no less essential for understanding the place of Jews in French society: *To Be a People in Diaspora; The Jews and the Modern World; Jews and French; Jews and Israélites*.[12] And during the 1980s *Between Crystal and Smoke*; *The Testament of God, The Jewish Imagination* and *The Republic and the Jews*[13] became etched in people's memories.

In the past two decades, few texts of this type have been written. On the other had, it is interesting to note the proliferation of translations of basic, classic texts of the Jewish tradition. During the 1980s Editions Verdier launched its "*Les dix paroles*" series, edited by Charles Mopsik, with the publication of *Guide to the Perplexed* by Moses Maimonides.[14] Under the headline, *Jewish Tradition and Greek Philosophy*, Shmuel Trigano presented the work in the *Le Monde* newspaper[15] by asking the question, "Why bring out Maimonides again today?" His answer was significant, because he suggested that a new age was opening up for French Jews. "He (Maimonides) attempted the same enterprise as Philo of Alexandria or, in a way, Spinoza…to open up Judaism to the Greek tradition by acclimatizing one to the other…Such attempts always appear at turning points in Western history, and they start, as in the cases mentioned, a new era (for Philo, ten centuries of Christian philosophy, for Maimonides, an important role in the period preceding

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[11] The original French titles are*: Anatomie du judaïsme français; L'existence juive; Portrait d'un Juif; Difficile liberté; La condition réflexive de l'homme juif; Fin du peuple juif?; De Gaulle, Israël et les Juifs; Peut-on être juif aujourd'hui?*

[12] Original French titles: *Etre un peuple en Diaspora; Les Juifs et le monde moderne; Juifs & Français; Juifs et Israélites*.

[13] Original French titles*: Entre le cristal et la fumée; Le testament de Dieu; Le Juif imaginaire* and *La république et les Juifs*.

[14] Moses Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, translated into French from the Arabic by Salomon Munk, followed by *The Eight Chapters*, translated into French from the Arabic by Jules Wolf. New edition revised by Charles Mopsik.

[15] *Trigano* (1980).

the Renaissance, and for Spinoza, modernity). There can be no doubt that today we are living in such an age. That is why it is completely normal that a figure like Maimonides appears on the horizon and is so appealing…" Another forty or so translations of traditional Jewish texts into French would follow, including *Aggadot of the Babylonian Talmud, Lessons of the Fathers* and of course the *Talmud* and *Zohar.*[16]

Naturally, this overview of French Jewish writing is not meant to be exhaustive or comprehensive. In this format, only a sample of some of the most important books and authors can be briefly noted. Similarly, there is no attempt to fully represent the philosophy of individual writers. For that, the reader is encouraged to refer to the various authors' full works, which are increasingly—if belatedly—becoming available to English readers. Also, we do not refer here to history books[17], novels or autobiographies.[18] The purpose here is to give an overview of the discussion in France on the subject of Jewish identity, as articulated by French Jewish intellectuals and philosophers. A few common themes may be noted. They all address fundamental questions of what makes a person a Jew, whether or not Jewishness can be escaped or evaded,

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[16] The reader in French has four translations of the Bible. *La Bible*, Complete text, 1899 translation of the French rabbinate or "Zadoc Kahn" for the name of the Chief Rabbi who led it at the end of the 19th century; *La Bible des belles lettres*, Complete text, Samuel Cahen, original translation dating from the French Revolution, on which Zadoc Kahn is said to have relied *inter alia* for his own translation; *La Bible* from Pléiade, under the direction of Edouard Dhorme. The first volume of this Bible brought out in the "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade" series includes the Pentateuch in its entirety, and the second volume the Four Great Prophets. *La Bible*, Complete text, André Chouraqui. A translation that stays close to the original Hebrew and thus makes the text very different from the classic translations. Today there are also no less than three French translations of the Talmud. There is the one of Artscroll, the Rabbinate's edition under Elie Munk, and that of Adin Steinsaltz (note that this edition was a joint initiative of the Israeli Institute for Talmudic Publications, the Ramsay publishing house and the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié*).

[17] There is no lack of history books or monographs about the Jews of France. We shall only mention some of the best known general studies. Benbassa (2000); Bensimon (1989); Hannoun (2000); Hyman (1979, 1988); Korcaz (1969); Schechter (2003); Schnapper (1991); Strenski (1997); Szajkowski (1970); Trigano (2006).

[18] We shall mention an arbitrary selection of several novels and autobiographies: Arnothy (1997) *J'ai 15 ans et je ne veux pas mourir*; Bober (1993) *Quoi de neuf sur la guerre?*; Goldman (1975) *Souvenirs obscurs d'un juif polonais né en France*; Gray (1997) *Au nom de tous les miens*; Halter (1983) *La mémoire d'Abraham*; Joffo (1973) *Un sac de billes*; Lunel (1926) *Nicolo Peccavi, L'affaire Dreyfus à Carpentras*; Modiano (1968) *La Place de l'Étoile*; Modiano (1981) *Livret de Famille*; Modiano (1978) *Rue des Boutiques Obscures*; Moscovici (1995) *Voyage à Pitchipoï*; Schwarz-Bart (1959) *Le dernier des justes*; Uhlman (1978) *L'ami retrouvé*.

how being a Jew corresponds to being a French citizen and to being a universal human.

1. *Réflexions sur la question juive* [Anti-Semite and Jew] *(1946)*

Jean-Paul Sartre's famous book *Réflexions sur la question juive* was pivotal for post-war French Jewry.[19] It may be asked whether this book should be included in a list of books on Jewish identity, since Sartre was not Jewish and Sartre's work does not deal with Jewish identity. However, he analyzes the image of the Jew in the anti-Semitic imagination, which clearly influenced generations of Jews, from the Libération from the Nazi occupation until today. Numerous Jewish writers and philosophers reacted to *Anti-Semite and Jew*, a book, which in a way made the century.

For Sartre, at the end of the Second World War, if asked what the contemporary Jew is, you would have to ask the Christian conscience, "What have you done with the Jews?" This is a nuanced question, because it posits acceptance of the Jew as a fact without looking to make a problem out of the Jewish condition, and directs the issue to the world's conscience. Sartre's thesis is thus aimed at the anti-Semite and not at the Jew, who is largely ignored. This disregard respects the Jew's choice without seeking to impose upon him a solution. Sartre explains that anti-Semitism is not a commitment triggered by experience. Rather, for the anti-Semite, it is the preconceptions about Jews that create an experience. This leads Sartre to state that "if the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him".[20] He has to invent the Jews because the anti-Semite is "…someone who is afraid. Definitely not of Jews; of himself, his conscience, his freedom, his instincts, his responsibilities, solitude, change, society and the world, of everything except Jews. He is a coward who does not want to admit to his cowardice, a murderer who represses and censors his tendency to murder without being able to hold it in check, only dares kill in effigy or from the anonymity of a crowd, a malcontent who does not dare revolt out

[19] Published under the English title *Anti-Semite and Jew*, though a more direct translation would be *Reflections on the Jewish Question*.

[20] Sartre (1954: 14).

of fear of the consequences of his revolt. An anti-Semite has not just adopted an opinion, he has selected a persona for himself."[21]

Anti-Semitism is made up of hate, anger and disgust. This commitment upon encountering the Jew is based on nothing. In fact it is not a matter of an opinion about Jews, but an emotion, even affection. And what is more, this emotion has not been provoked but clearly chosen. It is exaggerated and fed by the pleasure or pain felt or imagined in something. The anti-Semite contents himself with the idea of a Jew. In other words, there is no need for a Jew to make an anti-Semite. The conclusion of *Anti-Semite and Jew* does not concern Jews directly, but denounces the anti-Semite and through the phenomenon of anti-Semitism, the very nature of society. In fact, the essay defended republican and democratic principles. In any case, this is how Sartre's approach needs to be understood. In the conclusion to *Anti-Semite* he writes, "No Frenchman will be free as long as the Jews do not enjoy their full rights. No Frenchman will be safe so long as a Jew, in France and anywhere in the world, has to fear for his life."[22]

In *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Sartre illustrates that he knows next to nothing about Judaism, its history, thought traditions and laws. The author is incapable of extracting himself from the fictitious Jew created out of the anti-Semite's reality. Sartre's Jew only exists in the perception accorded by the anti-Semite. This is a person we love to hate. If Sartre exactly identifies the historical and religious nature of every community, he has a problem understanding that the Jews form a community not only because they are all in the same situation. When he tries to define Jews as a community, Sartre grants them the status of community, however, an "abstract community", because, as he writes, "these twenty centuries of dispersion and political powerlessness prevented them from having an historical past. If it is true, as Hegel said, that a community is historical insofar as it has the memory of its history, the Jewish community is the least historical of all societies because the only memory it has is of a long martyrdom, which is a long period of passiveness. It is neither their past, nor their religion, nor their land that unite the children of Israel. However, if they have a shared connection, if they all deserve the name Jew, it is because they share a common situation as Jew, that is to say they live in a community that

[21] Ibid., p. 62.
[22] Ibid., p. 185.

considers them Jews."[23] There can only be a de-realization of the Jew because there is still no Jewish community and no longer a Jewish people. "The Jew is someone who others consider to be a Jew: here is the simple truth that must be the starting point. In this sense, the democrat is right when against the anti-Semite, because it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew."[24]

Nevertheless, Sartre does note one of the fundamental points about Jewish identity—the impossibility of ridding himself of it. Whatever he does, Sartre explains, the Jew is launched upon a route. "He can decide to be brave or cowardly, sad or happy, he can decide to kill Christians or love them. But he cannot choose to not be a Jew. Or rather, if so chooses, if he declares that the Jew does not exist, if he denies—violently and desperately—that he has the Jewish character, it is exactly here that he is Jewish. Because I am not a Jew, I have nothing to deny or prove; instead, if the Jew has decided that his race does not exist at all, it is for him to prove it. Being Jewish is to be thrown into the Jewish situation and forsaken, and at the same time to be responsible in and by his own persona for the destiny and very nature of the Jewish people."[25]

Emmanuel Lévinas was one of the first French Jewish writers to react to this book. The philosopher gave credit to Sartre and to existentialism. "It is obviously very pleasant when, being Jewish—authentic or not—one hears someone of the talent and breadth of Sartre utter amicable truths that nonetheless were not pronounced in order to flatter."[26] In fact, what at bottom pleased Lévinas was that Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew* "returned the Jewish problem from outdated horizons where it is often to be found, to the heights of where the true and fascinating history of the 20th century is taking place. The anachronism is complete."[27]

However, notwithstanding its wide success, Sartre's approach has troubled a large number of Jewish intellectuals. For example, Marek Halter was beside himself after having read *Anti-Semite and Jew*. He decided to go to Sartre to lay out his objections. "Why has he taken

[23] Ibid., p. 81.
[24] Ibid., p. 84.
[25] Ibid., p. 107.
[26] Lévinas (1947, 1994).
[27] Lévinas (1994: 104).

from me, a Jew, a stranger, this freedom? Why does he delineate me by religion or by the attitude of others?"

"Yes, it's true", replied Sartre, "but because I analysed the situation of the Jews from outside, you need to analyze it from the inside."[28]

Roger Ikor was the most critical. In *Can you be Jewish today?* Ikor writes, "Outside of history, which is outside of Time, a point of accessible truth for whoever attempts to understand human facts. . . . That's why *Anti-Semite and Jew* by Sartre on the Jewish question, with best and most generous of intentions, when it crosses path with the truth, is constantly wrong, and above all leads only to a void."[29]

André Neher is calmer in the face of Sartre's hypotheses. "The Jew is neither 'as he sees himself' nor 'as he is seen by others', but 'as he is seen by God'." Living the life of a Jew is not a misfortune but a privilege, a difficult happiness, continues Neher.

Lastly, Annie Kriegel, a seasoned observer of the situation of the Jews in France, abandons the inaccessible horizon of the identity question fashioned by Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*. She prefers to speak, making a play of words on the French title of the book, changing it to *Réflexion sur les questions juives*, with a reflection (in the singular) on Jewish questions (in the plural). Kriegel in fact believes that the Jewish question in the singular sounds like a "quasi-metaphysical question that exists in the heaven of philosophical speculation and has hardly anything to do with the actual behavior of flesh and blood individuals."[30] The "*Reflection*" proposed by Kriegel, as against the "*Reflections*" of Sartre, is evidence of the persistence of the questioning. In her opinion, permanence and constancy would best define the questioning about Jewish identity.

2. *L'existence juive: Solitude et affrontements* [Jewish Existence] *(1962)*

This classic text on Jewish identity, though somewhat dry, had the greatest impact on its times and the questions it poses continue to be important. To define the place of *Jewish Existence*, André Neher proposes starting at the beginning: analysis of the Jew "…should be sub-

[28] Halter (2002).
[29] Ikor (1968: 25).
[30] Kriegel (1984: 10).

ject to the methods of rhetoricians. When they examined a problem, they asked an *a priori* question, the justification, what was the basis of the problem? *An sit*? the doctors of Latin used to say. Does the object exist? In the circumstances, history and psychology combine to make necessary this *a priori* question, is there Jewish Man? Can we talk about a Jewish Man? Does the Jewish Man exist?"[31] A radical question, but before answering, Neher notes that something complicates his situation, and "That something is suffering."[32]

In another work[33] Neher adds that after Auschwitz, the shame of being complicated the Jew's situation. "To be Jewish after Auschwitz firstly means to be. Existing an existence that ought to have been the Being of six million Jews, but who were criminally cut down—and why was I not murdered? Why did I survive? The sense of survival goes beyond the raw fact of being. By placing survival in me, I am the spokesperson, and the 'silence-person'[34] of the six million, whose stifled dream might be born again in the future through my presence, a Jew, whose life at this very moment is *ipso facto* proof of Hitler's failure. The first submission of an infinite responsibility. To exist after Auschwitz is to have to exist."[35]

However, Neher understood very well that to define a Jew solely by suffering, tragedy and persecution is inconceivable and inconclusive. Almost ten years later, Neher took up again the theme of Jewish identity in a small work for laymen,[36] in which he concludes that many Jews claim the epithet "Jew" neither adds nor changes anything in their condition as a person. And yet, adds Neher, "history and experience teach us that the Jew is not a myth, he is a real being of flesh and blood, that a Jew is not just a man, but rather something complicates the simplicity of his human condition."[37]

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[31] Neher (1962: 131).
[32] Ibid., p. 132.
[33] Neher (1989).
[34] The French contains a play on words that indicates the duty of witnessing and the impossibility of doing so because it is impossible to put it into words.
[35] Ibid., p. 15.
[36] Neher (1977).
[37] Ibid., p. 9.

3. *Portrait d'un Juif: l'Impasse* [Portrait of a Jew] *(1962)* and *La libération du Juif* [Liberation of the Jew] *(1966)*

Albert Memmi's works on Jewish identity offer a view of the identity that has been rarely equaled for its relevance. The first book, as suggested by the title is personal, while the second book deals with the Jew in general. In these two books Memmi examines Jewishness, oppression and liberation asking "Is there a way out of the Jewish condition?" For Memmi, this question is apparently insoluble, as the Jew will remain a Jew whether he likes it or not. This is the sense in which Albert Memmi speaks of the misfortune of being Jewish, as it is an emphatic condition.

The first book, *Portrait of a Jew*, caused a controversy, though it was a controversy based on a misunderstanding. *Portrait of* ***a*** *Jew*—an individual—was widely understood to mean *Portrait of* ***the*** *Jew*—a type. The actual title used by Memmi is more personal and rings truer. The misunderstanding was compounded when the second book, *Liberation of* ***the*** *Jew* was published. In the second case, Memmi indeed wrote, as the unchanged title suggests, about the Jew in general. However, as the public was not always aware of the subtleties of French, the two books were widely misunderstood.

He goes on to pose the question: Is there a difference between "separation" and "difference"? In *Portrait of a Jew*, Memmi asserted that as a Jew he was indeed separate,[38] and that this separation is dynamic. "Despite the protestations of this large number of curious Jews, who claim both their original identity and their complete integration, who for example deny any hostility, yet I am well aware that there is a clear dialectic between the two terms: separation calls upon and feeds difference; difference accentuates and appears to legitimize separation. When separated, the Jew can only sense difference and others can only end up concluding that he is different. Could I in some way figure out the frequent uneasiness of the non-Jew faced with a Jew? I can understand if not justify his impatience when faced with this troubling witness, who has been there for centuries."[39] He concludes that what is important to know is that it is neither good nor bad to be different. After having examined all the hypotheses, the conditional Jew, the

[38] Memmi (1962).
[39] Ibid., p. 67.

Jew defined by the anti-Semite etc., he says it is possible at last to be simply aware of the self, to be aware of oneself as different, because "to be is to be different."[40]

Thus Memmi finally arrives at the essential point of the issue, and decides to address it positively. "I say he exists, all in all, someone who wants to live as a Jew. I discover it in myself, I discover it around me, among others of the Jewish corpus. You can talk about it, be surprised about it, minimize it or make an issue of it, but first you have to acknowledge the fact: this people is stubborn, it persists in living within an astonishing continuity that it is made to recognize by others, and recognize itself over so many centuries." In passing, Memmi replies scathingly to Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*, writing, "Believe me, the Jew exists, Jewishness resists."[41] In other words, Memmi ended *Portrait of a Jew* with this assertion of the wish to live as a Jew that does not need to justify itself, because evidently it was present in the consciousness. Yet it was this very obviousness that clashed with social reality. Being oppressed, the Jew is separated from himself and separated from others, "a being torn apart in its culture and its history."

Portrait of a Jew is not very optimistic, to say the least. In the second volume, published four years later, *The Liberation of the Jew*,[42] Memmi introduced a bit of hope into this view of the Jew, namely through Zionism. In this book Memmi manifests his belief that, "the special liberation of the Jews is a national liberation, and for the last ten years this national liberation has been called the State of Israel." However, Memmi sees this not really as a solution but rather a necessity in the face of an insoluble problem: since it is impossible for the Jew to live among others—that is, to assimilate with others—he has to distance himself, to withdraw.

4. *Difficile liberté: Essais sur le Judaïsme* [Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism] *(1963)*

Essays and articles written by Emmanuel Lévinas between 1949 and 1963 were brought together in a collection that appeared under the

[40] Ibid., p. 76.
[41] Ibid., p. 244.
[42] Memmi (1966).

name *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*.[43] It is not just the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas that can be read in these pages, but also the dilemmas and discussions that at that time disturbed the communal atmosphere. Lévinas was a prominent figure in the French Jewish educational system,[44] schooled in both Talmud study[45] and philosophy.[46]

Difficult Freedom was Lévinas' first book about Judaism.[47] In it, he formulates as one of the main questions: "How is Judaism possible?"[48] He postulates as unequal the share of energy given over to France (the nation, public order and political life), and that for intimacy (religion, the private, interior life). He finds that Judaism has been reduced to a religion with no resonance in daily life and that the Divine has been domesticated, leaving only "a private chat with God." The essay *Pièces d'identité* (Identity documents) is among the most important parts of *Difficult Freedom*. In this essay he formulates the opinion that a Jewish cultural policy in France must be built on educational texts and not on religious "relics or the silt of the past".[49]

Lévinas grapples at length with the paradox of Jewish identity, stating that, "Asking yourself about Jewish identity is to have already lost it. However, it is still there, without it we would avoid the question. Between the already and the still the limits are demarcated, stretched

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[43] Lévinas (1963).

[44] Starting in 1946 he ran the *Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale*, belonging to the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, with which he was associated for 30 years. The *Alliance Israélite Universelle* was set up in 1860 and still today is one the main international organizations in the field of education and Jewish culture. Its objective remains the spread of Judaism that remains faithful to its tradition, but that is tolerant and open to the modern world. The Alliance also contributes to promoting French language and culture outside France. It is involved as a major player in the fight to defend human rights and in inter-faith dialogue. It works through its network of schools, the College of Jewish Studies, the Library and its publications.

[45] Lévinas studied Talmud with M. Chouchani (see Salomon Malka, *Monsieur Chouchani*, Edition Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris, 1994) and others, which expanded his horizons.

[46] Through force of circumstances and with regret, Lévinas put aside his Jewish studies. He published a number of important philosophical writings which are not directly connected to Jewish identity. In 1930 Lévinas put aside his Jewish studies. In 1930 he published *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*. He continued his work with the publication of *Totality and Infinity*.

[47] More works on Jewish studies followed, along with other philosophical texts. In 1968 *Quatre lectures talmudiques (Four Talmudic Readings)*, in 1975 *Du sacré au Saint cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques (From the Sacred to the Holy: five new Talmudic Readings)*, and in 1982 *L'au-delà du verset (Beyond the verse)*.

[48] Lévinas (1963: 267).

[49] Ibid., p. 275.

out like a tightrope on which the Judaism of Western Jews ventures out and puts itself at risk."[50] He developed the concept of "Jewish facticity"[51] by which he describes an identity that is "radical", "tear-resistant" and "a belonging that precedes any allegiance."

The reader who is reassured that simply by posing the question he or she is still Jewish is misunderstanding an incomplete thought, because Lévinas' continues with an even more important question: *what* Jewish identity does he or she have? His answer brooks no appeal. "People are the same because, prior to any comparison, they are themselves. So you are in Jewishness as you are in yourself. You do not even join, because joining would refer to too much prior distancing. It does not possess you, because belonging bends within destiny. The radical intimacy that connects the Jew with Judaism is seen through the wrong it even inflicts on itself, and can be perceived as the daily, professed happiness, or if you prefer, as a choice."[52]

Lévinas's conclusion comes as a provocation, "You are born Jewish, you do not become Jewish." We can already hear the cries of racism, for does not this statement link belonging to the Jewish people to blood ties? However, Lévinas explains, "Because you well and truly become a Jew, but you become it as though there had never been a conversion. Does one belong to being human? Some Jews have a way of saying 'Jew' when you would have expected 'Man', as though they took Jewishness as the subject and humanity for the predicate."[53] Lévinas thus states that it is this belonging without an act of joining that the West cannot bear. He in fact glimpses what the West does not wish to accept, identity without choice. Thus refusal, expressed for example by the Existentialists, involves a complex approach. It is that of the reflexive condition described by Robert Misrahi (further discussed below), through which, as Lévinas states it, "You must now accept yourself spontaneously, and accordingly distance yourself from yourself, look at yourself from outside, think about yourself; compare yourself to others, thereby reducing this personal identity for which we have so many signs, attributes, content, qualities and values; to analyze

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[50] Ibid., p. 73.

[51] This concept was introduced in the famous text *Pièces d'identité [Identity Papers]*, in the collection *Journées d'études sur l'identité juive [Study days on Jewish identity]*, published in 1963 by the French Section of the World Jewish Congress. It was then taken up in *Difficult Freedom*.

[52] Ibid., p. 74.

[53] Ibid., p. 74.

yourself."[54] Lévinas warns us that this manner of identification, this summary of what we are and what we feel comes with a price: that is, a "Judaism that is compromised, alienated, forgotten or disturbed or even dead for the essence of Judaism," constituting a type of identity that Lévinas describes as an "original belonging" which only refers to itself and ignores the attributes.[55] In addressing the question of identity, the Jew always comes up against something irreducible and difficult to comprehend.

5. *La condition réflexive de l'homme juif* [The Reflexive Condition of the Jewish Man] *(1963)*

Robert Misrahi's book *The Reflexive Condition of the Jewish Man* was written as a reply to Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew.* The back flap of the book summarizes its essence in a single sentence: "We have been led to attempt a phenomenological description for a social fact."[56] Misrahi introduces a relatively important element into the identity discussion. He takes up again the theses of existentialism: it is not the (Jewish) essence that precedes (Jewish) existence, but the reverse. "Being Jewish is not a matter of belonging to a class of Jewish beings, nor of deploying within the being a particle of Jewish substance, nor being oneself a substance or thing whose entire essence is in fact Jewishness."[57] A Jew is not a thing, he is the wish following due consideration to make himself Jewish. But how? "Starting with an initial minimum of Jewishness (defined by family and past), Jewish man, ever since the Emancipation, has been constantly sent back into himself by others, at the very time when he is coming out of himself."[58] The phenomenology of the social object is applied to the Jew. A Jew is someone who considers himself Jewish (reflexivity), subject to having family antecedents. Misrahi posits the affirmation of Jewish identity as the negation of something else,

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[54] Ibid., p. 75.

[55] This concept of "original belonging' recalls similar concepts in other French Jewish writings, such as Léon Askénazi's "evidences that do not require elucidation" (http://www.manitou.org.il), the "resistance of Judaism" or "familiar evidence" of Albert Memmi, the "indeterminate particularity" in Robert Misrahi, the "irreducibility" of Roger Ikor and the "magical obviousness" described by Alain Finkelkraut.

[56] Misrahi (1963: 23).

[57] Ibid., p. 251.

[58] Ibid., p. 252.

hence the Jew ought first to accept what he has of the universal in him. Thus, sought out in his individuality, the Jew responds with his universality. As Misrahi puts it, "The fundamental problem today is to know whether the Jew is identical to the non-Jew."[59]

However, paradoxically, as soon as it is asked, this questioning destabilizes the search for the identical and irremediably attracts attention to the differences. "For me, the beginning is a negative act if I look for its meaning in the other. The mirror of my question, the other who ought to be the friend is surprised, takes a step back, in his turn distances himself and asks himself, to what purpose? Why my question, why my thought, why my movement? Friendship should exclude my question; I deny the friendship from the moment I am determined to be a Jew, I turn back in on myself and deny I am a non-Jew. In other words, before even explaining myself (and I must explain myself), the Christian, the communist, the democrat, the intellectual all contest my undertaking in the name of friendship; and me, it's in the name of friendship that I undertake it! They perceive a sort of subtle aggression in what for me is only the expression of confidence and movement of thought: at the very time that I try to approach them, they feel that I am distancing myself."[60]

Thus, Misrahi poses the Jewish question from the viewpoint of assimilation as conceived by the non-Jew. "This represents a negation, an annihilation, and an identification of the minor substance with its major substance."[61] In other words, Jews efface themselves when they identify themselves.[62] "Beneath the mask of culture and liberty, it was a matter of the very existence of the Jews."[63]

Misrahi's analysis starts to take shape with the entry of a fourth person, who joins the non-Jew, the assimilated Jew and the Orthodox Jew: this is the anti-Semitic Jew, today defined as a self-hating Jew, a Jew seeking in the hatred for his fellows that freedom that would provide him with entry to the majority group. Misrahi says that the anti-Semitic Jew he is afraid "of being irremediably Jewish among the Jews."[64] In this way, the assimilated Jew provides a mirror image of

[59] Ibid., p. 15.
[60] Ibid., p. 7.
[61] Ibid., p. 27.
[62] From the point of view of the orthodox Jew, the question is clear. It is effacement or elimination through absorption.
[63] Ibid., p. 32.
[64] Ibid., p. 77.

the anti-Semitic Jew. "The assimilated Jew "meditates"; he turns on to himself that attention he had previously addressed to the other and asks himself quite naturally the radical question, and what about me? 'And what about me' means from the viewpoint of the Jew's thinking that a possibility exists that his universalism too has a special style, a concrete form, without real resolution. Just as a Jew can be anti-Semitic as a Jew, could not he also be *quantenus* (to use an expression of Spinoza meaning *"in his capacity as"*)—cultivated, assimilated, universal, identical and integrated, but in his capacity as a Jew? Misrahi concludes that it would be exactly there, in that strange, unresolved specialness that the ontological status of the French Jew is located. The assimilated modern Jew has no theoretical or cultural content, and according to Misrahi is only an "affirmative awareness."

6. *Peut-on être Juif aujourd'hui?* [Can you be Jewish today?] *(1968)*

In the title of his book Roger Ikor asks *Can you be Jewish today?*[65] He answers more emotively than rationally. His answer is negative and the book is a blistering attack, leaving the reader troubled. According to him the choice lies between assimilation and emigrating to Israel. The book was written at the height of the crisis that followed Israel's Six Day War with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. The Jews of France were being questioned about dual allegiance. The positions taken by the Gaullist establishment required them to answer whether they considered themselves Jews or Frenchmen. They had to decide, to make a choice and take sides. Many showed their solidarity with Israel, rediscovered a lost identity and a certain pride. Some became volunteers in Israel at the time of the Six Day War or in the *Yom Kippur* War in 1973.[66] The question does not only concern the possibility of being Jewish in the contemporary world. It also involves something deeper, the very enigma posed by the "Jewish condition". Ikor asks himself about this persistence. How is it that I continue, against all odds and every danger, to identify as a Jew, when it is impossible to sort out what is Jewish and what is French in me? Ikor considers this Jewish part to be irreducible, because, as he says, there is no way to

[65] Ikor (1968).
[66] Cohen, E.H. (1986).

get rid of it. So there is nothing left but to make use of it. The author does not lay claim to this irreducibility through any herd instinct, or from religious conviction, or even to conform to some idea of the community. No, explains Ikor, "what I retain by continuing to lay claim to my Jewishness is my self-respect, to the extent that it forces me not to reject those who have made me what I am, not to be ashamed of myself for being ashamed of them, not to erase from me that part of my being that is them. Which part? I do not know, and it is irrelevant, since I know it is irreducible."[67]

In other words, he concludes, "I am Jewish because my parents made me that way, a link in the chain, the last one in a roped together group. A roped together group that is not connected to the 'collective Being', but rather to the ancestors, to men taken one at a time". Beyond this recognition of enduringness, Ikor says a great deal more about it when he describes the irreducible part of his Jewish being, the part that refuses assimilation. He refuses to betray those who were "victims" dressed in the clothes of the "master" or even in those of the "executioner". Here we get closest to the question. Identity is neither a little, internal secret nor what is hidden or buried deep within the self. The Jewish part of identity for Ikor is that which expresses itself, presents and indicates. "I cannot accept what disfigures me and erases their mark."[68] In other words, paradoxically what betrays is what identifies. This Jewish part of the being is also the 'weakest' part, because the face is the uncovered part of the body and thus never hidden.

Can the Jew escape his exceptional lot? "Will he manage to find again a normal life of man like the others? That of course without being obliged to retract. To be what you are without being overwhelmed by it, to be what you are without others turning that into a crime or a defect, that is exactly what I call to live normally."[69] For Ikor the choice was clear, because a Jew must not remain ambiguous. A religious person should be religious, as Christians are. Others, the non-observant, must choose between what he calls integration and nation. If the Jew opts for integration he is first and foremost French. If he chooses nation, he must choose Israel. "Lastly, I do not see in either French or Yiddish a term that would let me, an unbeliever,

[67] Ikor (1968: 249).
[68] Ibid. p. 250.
[69] Ibid. p. 135.

name another Jew in a relevant manner. Compatriot, fellow citizen, coreligionist, none work. Should I invent a word? That could only be 'Co-Jew', which quite frankly acknowledges within its own structure the complete inability with which we find ourselves to define what is a Jew; my 'Co-Jew' is Jewish like I am, and Jewish is Jewish, that's it."[70] However, if the Jew leaves his "portable ghetto", that does not mean adopting a pride and identity super-awareness. For Ikor, who was non-observant but had a heartfelt solidarity with Israel, clear-cut behavior did not mean assimilation. What characterized "the most striking change in the Jewish mentality since the war",[71] he wrote, was the refusal to keep up the Marrano status of the hidden Jew. We thus understand better the answer offered by Ikor to the question, "What is a Jew?" that is true for everyone: it is simply a matter of being yourself.

7. *Etre un peuple en Diaspora* [To Be a People in Diaspora] *(1975)*

Written amid the volatility of the 1970s and its extreme left, separatist and regional movements, Richard Marienstras' book *To Be a People in Diaspora* (published by an extreme left-wing imprimatur) positions Jewish identity in the political debate of the period. Even today it is still perceived as anti-establishment, and it offers an outlook that remains up to date. The book's title, from which the word Jewish is missing, appears to summarize the author's thinking. If in fact it is a question of existence, it is not really of the Jew but of the people in the Diaspora.[72] The author argues the case for the primacy of the Diaspora vis-à-vis the Zionist principle of the centrality of the State of Israel. For him, when claiming a special or unique identity, Jews are no different from other minorities living within a greater national unit. He defends the legitimacy of the identity question. Must all groups of peoples (Gypsies, Catalans, Basques, Bretons, Indians, Slovenians, Armenians, Jews, in this second half of the 20th century etc.) be helped to survive and to continue and accentuate their differences? Yes, replies Marienstras, because "the wish to live does not have to prove its right to life."[73]

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[70] Ibid., p. 222.
[71] Ibid., p. 217.
[72] Marienstras (1975).
[73] Ibid., p. 61.

Richard Marienstras opens his analysis with a long chapter about Hitler's genocide, which created a formative event (or 'matrix' event as Marienstras called it, borrowing a phrase from historian Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie) around which the unity of the survivors was reconstituted.[74] This is a consideration of the uniqueness of the Shoah as compared with other massacres. Was the Shoah unique because of the scope of industrial means employed? Or was it because it supposed the total extermination of a people, the final solution? One of the central points in this reflection is the difficulty, if not sometimes the impossibility of making others including some Jews understand what was unique about the Shoah. "For many Jews in fact and for most other people, the Nazi genocide of Jews was not quantitatively different from thousands of other war crimes, which have been committed in various places."[75] The Shoah made French, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and other Jews understand that thinking they were citizens like any others in their countries was an illusion. Thus by a strange reversal of events, the Shoah reconstituted the historical unity of the survivors. This formative 'matrix' event holds extreme implications for the Jewish identity question. Following Emancipation, it seemed that the time for assimilation had arrived because "…affiliation to Judaism (as any religious affiliation) appeared to be a choice made by an individual or a group, whereas affiliation to the majority culture was felt to be a destiny. It was inevitable and hence natural to be French, it was thus artificial to be Jewish."[76] However, in the second half of the 20th century, following the shock of two world wars, the Shoah, and the triumph of individualism, society developed in the opposite way: minority identity became natural, while the majority culture was

[74] The preface written by Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1975) to the book *Etre un peuple en Diaspora* (Marienstras 1975), emphasizes the uniqueness of Auschwitz. "In the entrance to the museum the visitor is informed that people of all nations and all religions were deported here…The visitor will clearly quickly realize, because the museum, I repeat, is an honestly presented documentary collection, that the innumerable papers, luggage and clothes in glass display cabinets, do not mainly belong to Jean Dupont or Ivan Popov, even though they too were also here, but to that indefinable yet recognizable group called "Jews", and of course to the Gypsies." A comment that leaves no doubt about the uniqueness of the Shoah, but which nevertheless leaves hanging a question mark about Jewish identity itself. Why write Jew in inverted commas? Why is it Jews that are nicknamed when that is not done for the Gypsies? Could there be some doubt about the reality of the Jew?

[75] Ibid., p. 10.

[76] Ibid., p. 93.

felt to be artificial. It should be noted within this trend that like the Jews, other various regional movements first felt the sense of national belonging before moving on to cultural reconstruction.

However, out of this identity work is born confusion and impasse. "So, when several Jews get together to start off on one of their favorite occupations, asking themselves who they are, what it is to be Jewish, what is Judaism and Jewishness, they are in fact seeking to formulate a definition that would allow creating a whole in which each part, on the one hand defined with almost legalistic objectivity, would on the other hand subjectively facilitate recognizing itself within the definition. This search is entirely contradictory and cannot succeed. It in fact involves being Jewish according to a double definition: at one and the same time as a stone is a stone—namely that one has an immutable essence wherein the 'Jewishness' is embedded—and as a Frenchman is French—namely that one has a status defined by convention and hence arbitrarily."[77] The concern about combining what appears to be an immutable presence with a status acquired by convention makes the identity quest become infinite. Using this double set of rules, the Jew is not defined but rather in search of definition. Marienstras states that we are Jewish according to a double mimicry: the repetition of previous Jewish teachings and the repetition of the customs and language of the host society. The Diaspora Jew thus suffers from structural imbalance. Each individual takes up the identity question in the intimacy of his or her own conscience and "now the Jew could only, in any circumstances, define himself through dialogue with that which he is not—which is not him *in himself*, and which is not him *around him*".[78] However, Marienstras warns that this internal dialogue is not without consequences. "What allows us to say 'us' is not always visible or detectable in the gesture or speech, but is no less valuable for all that."[79] It is just enough that the "hidden will" provides itself with a name, a form and institutional rules. Marienstras concludes, "Because it is in the act that one is counted."[80]

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[77] Ibid., p. 50.
[78] Ibid., p. 50.
[79] Ibid., p. 50.
[80] Ibid., p. 52.

8. *Le Juif imaginaire* [The Imaginary Jew] *(1980)*

Everyone thinks they know the story of this imaginary Jew: a child born at the Liberation, whose father, a Polish Jewish leather worker, was a former deportee to Auschwitz. Yet the child was not traumatized by it, "With Judaism I have received the most beautiful gift a child could dream of after the genocide. I inherited a suffering that I had not undergone."[81] Some books are the victims of their title. Thus *The Imaginary Jew* became a concept; those who have never read it refer to it or identify with it, and say that nothing in their Jewishness is real and that what remains is virtual.

Yet that is not the sole theme of Alain Finkelkraut's book. The protagonist of *The Imaginary Jew* takes advantage of his situation. "It's true, from as far back as I can remember, Jewishness was never a burden for me."[82] He took advantage freely of the moral high ground that resulted from the suffering of his forefathers. Aware of this trick, he defined himself and those of his generation in a not very flattering way. What is Jewish in them is not the aspects they would like to think of, such as the wisdom, the wandering and the sadness of persecution, but rather the importance of a "fat baby, overprotected, dolled up, pampered and talced, right up into old age."[83] This young Jew is more the object of a protective Jewish mother than someone who has chosen to be Jewish. Having loudly claimed his origins, the youngster realizes that it is a sort of lie. The authenticity of origin says nothing for the authenticity of content. Based on this *quid pro quo* between these two authenticities, the exalted young person constructs his existence. Every lie can be justified and Finkielkraut recalls the intellectual excuses he gave himself. "I was a well-behaved young Jew, nicely settled in the comfort of a revolt without dangers and an abstract nomadism, but I felt no unease. Sartre had given me the wherewithal to feel praiseworthy, he had whispered to me the words of my own. Without having done anything for it, I had come into possession of an amazing history, and moreover I was entitled to find that difficult! I was enraptured by my own image, I would immerse myself in a dream to which *Réflexions sur la question juive* gave reality a rough and manly face: the thinker of

[81] Finkielkraut (1980: 13).
[82] Ibid., p. 17.
[83] Ibid., p. 22.

authenticity served my bravado, the man who knew how best to track down the tricks of bad faith had for a long time authenticated my most conceited, show-off attitudes. The expert had given his verdict: my megalomania was shown to be legitimate, because my gestures were acts and my theater a commitment."[84]

Two moments, however, shook up this soft, Jewish ambiguity. Firstly, the famous, "We are all German Jews!" chanted in the streets of Paris in 1968 by students from the Sorbonne to Nanterre, destroyed the harmonious awareness. The young man suddenly understood that "the role of the just had become accessible to whoever wished to take it on"[85] and it was impossible to treat the others as usurpers without including himself in that usurpation. The story of this imaginary Jew is that of a Jew caught between a usurped authenticity and a lost authenticity. To describe this usurped authenticity, Alain Finkielkraut speaks of *magical evidence*, of *an eternal decree*, and of *invisible separation*. The author in this way leads us to believe that the authenticity was not really usurped so that it would be alien to him. On the contrary, it is part and parcel of him, and like some family relic it pre-exists deep within his consciousness. It is fact less a matter of authenticity than of familiarity. The author thus has to divorce himself from his double not in order to stop being a Jew, but "so that this identity does not make me more the landlord of suffering or the official trustee of absolute justice."[86]

Into this beautiful spring landscape the thunderclap of a summer storm already announces the end of the adventure. The youth becomes a young man and like everyone else sees the world changing around him. His parents are getting older, and he understands that this world he had not known, that had given him suffering and made it interesting, mysterious and special was in the process of disappearing. His parents would soon no longer be there to be its guarantors. The very idea of this absence then made him realize something else that was missing: evidence that also risked being swallowed up. The world, history and culture of which his parents were the bearers would then become a secret. "I now know that once my family will have disappeared, I will not be able to resuscitate the culture that in all frankness

[84] Ibid., p. 16.
[85] Ibid., p. 25.
[86] Ibid., p. 44.

I had believed myself to be the heir. Innocent and stylish, I used to put on Jewishness like a made to measure suit, until the day—late—when I realized my parents were not immortal. So in fact the world of which they were the bearers no longer seemed to me a fact, but rather a secret, with a special, perishable quality, and that I would never be able to take possession of it."[87] So after a long, subjective detour, Alain Finkielkraut finally concluded that the question is not "by what miracle, after what traumatic event, did I become a Jew, because for longer than I could remember I had always been one. This is the opposite question of what is at the beginning of the book, how is it that *I have come to miss the* Judaism, the country where I thought I had been born."[88]

The reversal is amazing. The imaginary Jew, who had appeared to be completely shallow and unsettled, abandoned his search for the Jew and threw himself into the quest for Judaism. But at the same time, at that point, facts start to look like secrets. The eternal decree, the one that conferred an inalienable identity had changed its nature. The facts become a secret, thereby taking away from the individual all arranging of himself. "Judaism was not only a matter of expression or personal sincerity."[89]

9. *La nouvelle question juive* [The New Jewish Question] *(1979)* and *La demeure oubliée: Genèse religieuse du politique* [The Forgotten Home] *(1984)*

One of Shmuel Trigano's first works concerning Jewish identity was *The New Jewish Question*.[90] Vacillating between concepts of "Jewish existence", "Jewish awareness" and "Jewish experience"—seen as the re-appropriation of Jewish history—he writes, "There is no Jewish history, in the sense that history is a wish, going somewhere, a movement. The entire future of Jewishness now appears to be being played outside of itself: in the look of the other—and it is its alienation because it is from the other (and what "other"!) that its identity comes—, in the empire of the other—and it is its servitude, because even in

[87] Ibid., p. 209.
[88] Ibid., p. 209.
[89] Ibid., p. 208.
[90] Trigano (1979).

independence its destiny escapes its will."[91] His answer to 'the new Jewish question' is what he terms the *big return*, which is Jewishness taking leave of its exile. In concrete terms it is a matter of the return to Zion through "the creation of an independent community that is master of its own life, in which the Jewish idea will be incarnated, among men, and no longer in the Institution."[92] Trigano refers to both political Zionism—physical return to the modern State of Israel—and a metaphysical Zion, representing redemption and the end of Exile.

A few years later, his book *The Forgotten Home*[93] introduced a new set of questions. What is the relationship between Western and Jewish modernity? How to take Jewish studies, the science of Judaism, back to its roots in order to found a way of thinking "suited to answer the new conditions of existence of the Jewish people and of awareness in general"?[94] He no longer simply offers Jewish politics as solution, but rather promotes a way of thinking that would serve as a wake-up call. Trigano thus changes tools and goes from politics to philosophy, from the "Jewish question" to the "Jewish fact". In this approach, the "Jewish fact" is of course conceptualized, it is seen as a totality.

Trigano argues that the reality of the Jewish fact does not come from its compliance with some outside norm, but from its "recurrence and internal regularity". The author explains this expression: "It is the definition of what we understand by the Jewish universe, the concept of a differentiated whole, of which the men who appear there are an integral part, and which even structures their understanding of the world, whether they want it to or not…" Here there is a repetition of the calls made by Emmanuel Lévinas for the creation of a Jewish culture produced by a new type of Jewish school, in which the texts would teach and would no longer be considered "relics or silt from the past."[95]

Trigano takes note of the imperative nature of the Jewish fact, adding to it the idea of totality, which he calls the "pertinence principle". This is expressed through various attributes: *universal originality*, *centrality*, *universality*, *absolute understandability* and *presence*. Two of these five attributes appear to be essential. Firstly, *universal originality*, which is the

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[91] Ibid. p. 22.
[92] Ibid. p. 211 et seq.
[93] Trigano (1984).
[94] Ibid. p. 25.
[95] Lévinas (1963: 275).

irreducibility of the Jewish fact into anything else. Then *presence*, an immediate of the Jewish fact that facilitates bringing together without intermediary the archeological look with the prophetic vision. It thus appears that Trigano is playing the entire question of intelligibility and the meaning of Jewish history, because "it is a matter of showing at each juncture the way in which the Jewish fact is present for itself, the world and the observer."[96]

10. *Etre Juif: Etude Lévinassienne* [Being Jewish] *(2003)*

Benny Lévy revisits the idea of the Jewish fact based on a consideration Jewish being in a book called, quite literally, *Being Jewish.* In this work Lévy starts, like Lévinas, by differentiating Jewish existence that can only be understood by the past and modern existence that only sees "the rupture of the present".[97] Lévy thus describes the same process, only in more graphic terms. "Like a child pulling on a double knot rather than untying it. To be in the modern world is to tear away from the past. You tear the string. You cut the knot rather than carefully untying it."[98]

For Lévy, Jewish history unfolds like this: "the horizon of assimilation is the present, the Jewish horizon is the past." Once the return of being has been achieved, it remains to reveal the Jewish fact, which forces Lévy to make the comment, "A fact cannot turn itself into an act; it is done, always done. Jewish facticity: I have done well, I am done, the lot is cast. The Jews are facts. A Jew is done—like a rat—when he tries to escape the Jewish condition. The only problem is to catch oneself, not too late, so that the price will not be too high."[99]

Lévy noted, "the secret of the Jewish fact lies in the facticity of the fact. That is Sartre's starting point. From these first texts he suspects a Jewish way of being in the world."[100] Sartre's facticity is neither a contingency nor a necessity, but a condemnation to freedom.[101] Sartre explains the paradox: "I cannot either totally refrain from what I am

[96] Trigano (1984: 28–29).
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Lévy (1984: 158).
[101] Sartre (1943: 569).

(for the other)—because to refuse is not to refrain, it is to take upon oneself—nor suffer it passively (which in one sense is the same thing); in the fury, hatred, pride, shame, the disgusted refusal or joyful claim I must choose to be what I am."[102]

Rereading Lévinas, Lévy concludes that Jewish existence is a radical antecedence: "The Jewish question is a question produced by modern thought, by the secularization of Christianity. We are not dealing here with the Jewish question; it is the universal that is in question. The universal question signifies the end of the world. The answer is Jewish, which means that the Jew has anticipated the end of the world."[103]

For Lévy, anticipation is a method of survival within the authentic, within "the perpetuation of eternity" that is celebrated by the Jewish calendar and liturgy. Lévy adds to his reflections on the Jewish fact a historical dimension suggested by his reading of Lévinas. "I cannot not be Jewish. Simple, we are in existing. There is nothing simpler than existence; yet Jewish existence is differentiated from modern existence. Jewish existence is a facticity that can only be understood based upon the past, whereas modern existence can only be understood based upon the torn shoelace, the rupture of the present. . . . The use made by Hitler's anti-Semitism of the racial myth reminded the Jew of relentlessness of his being. Not being able to flee his condition—for many this was a form of dizziness. Through misfortune, because it has been awoken!"[104]

By defining Jewish existence as facticity, Lévy picks up Husserl's meaning. The word designates the human condition, insofar as man "is in the world" contingently since he does not choose to exist.[105] "He [Sartre] is perhaps right to question that the Jew has his own essence. However, if Sartre leaves him a bare existence like all other mortals and the freedom to make an essence for himself—whether by fleeing or by accepting the situation created for him—we are entitled to ask ourselves if the bare existence does not allow for any differentiation. Is not Jewish 'facticity' nothing other than the 'facticity' of a world that is to be understood based upon the present?"

In Jerusalem in January 2001, during his weekly seminar on "Time: from phenomenology to messianic eschatology" given at the Institute

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[102] Ibid., p. 586.
[103] Lévy (2003a: 26).
[104] Lévy (2002).
[105] Lalande (1985: 1249) in the supplement "*Facticité*".

for Lévinas Studies, Lévy commented on Lévinas's essay, "Being Jewish", which had appeared in 1947 in the journal *Confluences*. This "grandfather text", as Lévy calls it, ought to have remained secret and therefore not to have appeared in *Difficult Freedom*. Lévy read it as one would study a religious text, phrase by phrase, word by word, and then posits the theory that this text remained in the shadows because in it one can read the hesitation and even the tug that Lévinas felt between philosophy and Judaism. In fact, Lévy stated, the text "appears to deconstruct each proposal advanced that year in philosophical writings."[106]

In a final anecdote, during a seminar in July 2003 given by Bernard-Henri Lévy at the Institute for Lévinas Studies, the theme selected was, "In what way am I Jewish?" This topic so intrigued the public that Benny Lévy, the director of the Institute, explained the choice by saying that his two friends, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Alain Finkielkraut, took so much pleasure making fun of his religious orthodoxy that he had issued a challenge to Bernard-Henri Lévy and called on him to answer the question, "In what way are you Jewish?" Bernard-Henri Lévy accepted the challenge and firstly read out a long text,[107] and then patiently replied to a large number of questions. He firstly explained that he had not been victim either of a mystical crisis, an initiation event or a trauma brought on by anti-Semitism. No, "this Jew has come to Judaism by a completely different process, which has nothing to do with that—he came to Judaism after what I will call a thought event."[108] This thought event has a name, *God's Testament*, in which he develops four basic themes: Totalitarianism, History, Evil and the Subject, which structure his philosophy that is thus translated by a refusal of historical optimism, progressivism, and great suspicion of nationalisms and ideologies of roots. This response is interesting and even exciting, but we have brought it here in order to position the context of our account. In fact, in the final analysis it is a small phrase stated in the middle of explanations and philosophical theories that state best the "In what way am I Jewish?" of Bernard-Henri Lévy and doubtless of many French Jews (or not): "I am Jewish by this invisible pact that connects me to Jews throughout the world; Jewish despite

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[106] Lévy (2002).

[107] See the chapter *Comment je suis juif?* [In what way am I Jewish?] in Lévy, B-H. (2004).

[108] Lévy, B-H. (2004: 395).

everything, Jewish despite myself, Jewish before having been, Jewish without being it and Jewish after having been it; Jewish today and Jewish by my philosophy."[109]

11. *The Oral Tradition*

Finally, we cannot close this chapter on the identity question without mentioning the oral tradition. Speech in fact plays a decisive role in Judaism. It is not only a tool of communication, but above all is made for listening and thereby constitutes a teaching tool. Since speech has educational properties, the identity discussion is also carried out here. What we will call identity teaching methods was practiced by men such as Robert Gamzon (Castor), Itzhak Pougatsh,[110] Paul Roitman,[111] Edgard Guedj,[112] and of course Léon Askénazi (Manitou).

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[109] Ibid., p. 413.

[110] Isaac Pougatch was born in Kiev, where he escaped the 1905 pogrom. A year later he found refuge in Switzerland and settled in Geneva. During the Second World War, he ran a farm-school for Jewish children in the Tarn & Garonne department. He returned to Geneva at the end of 1942 and looked of Jewish refugee children in Switzerland. After the war he ran the training school at Plessis-Trevisse, and then was the creator of the children's magazine "Ami". He died in 1987. Inter alia, read Pougatch (1980).

[111] Paul Roitman was born in 1920 in Tarnow, Poland. While still a child his family settled in Metz. Towards the age of 14 he was active in the religious Zionist youth movement (Bahad—*Brit Halutzim Dati'im*). At 18 Paul Roitman was active in the Zionist Youth Federation at the national level and pro-Palestinian [Jewish]. When war broke out he took refuge in Bordeaux, but he was eventually arrested by the SS during a mission and deported to the Drancy camp in 1942. Freed by miracle, he returned to the Tarn area to help Jewish families living in hiding. A few months after the Liberation, he settled in Paris. He gave up medical school for the Rabbinical College. He then became involved in Jewish education and militancy among the youth. In particular youth from North Africa who were arriving in France at that time.

[112] Guedj Edgard. Originally from Algeria, he settled first in Morocco and then in France. He was an administrator and educationalist, contributed to the development of youth movements in Morocco by dreating the Educational Department for Jewish Youth (DEJJ), which grew considerably up until the 1960s. Following his immigration in France he helped set up community centers in the major cities. To develop the cultural and educational side of the FSJU, he transplanted the DEJJ to France to help in the integration the young members of families that recently settled in the country.

12. *Robert Gamzon (Castor)*

Robert Gamzon[113] was born in Paris in 1905. He founded the first Jewish scouts troop, which in 1923 became the *Eclaireurs Israélites de France*, the Jewish Scouts of France. He was an officer in the French Army in 1939–1940, and reorganized the Jewish scouts in the Free Zone following France's defeat by Germany 1940. In January 1942 he was appointed to the Committee of the General Union of the Jews in France (UGIF).[114] In the summer of 1942 he set up an underground network to save Jews from the Gestapo. In May 1943 he went to Paris where he organized the activities of the Jewish Resistance. In December of that year, using the code name "Lieutenant Lagnes", he set a *maquis* unit in the Toulouse region [the *maquis* were the French anti-Nazi partisans]. The following year the network, which was well trained, equipped and associated with the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), was made up of 120 combatants. On August 19, 1944, the unit of the Jewish Scouts commandeered a munitions train of the German Army and two days later took part in the liberation of the towns of Castres and Mazamet. In 1946 Robert Gamzon set up the Gilbert Bloch d'Orsay School (*Ecole d'Orsay*). In 1949 he settled in Israel together with a group of fifty Jewish scouts.

The teachings of Robert Gamzon do not pose the Jewish identity question theoretically. A small booklet entitled *Tivlioul*[115] (Hebrew for harmony) written at the end of the War and published in 1945 for the Jewish Scouts of France dealt above all with generating educational activities and the bases for Jewish sociability in the Jewish Scouts of France (EIF) movement.[116] Even though the style was essentially

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[113] For the life of Robert Gamzon see Pougatch (1971).

[114] By the law of November 29, 1941 the Vichy regime created the *Union Générale des Israélites de France*, the General Union of the Jews of France. Set up within the office of the Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, the UGIF's mandate was to represent the Jews to the authorities. For the role of the UGIF, see Laffitte (2003).

[115] Gamzon (1945).

[116] *Eclaireurs et Eclaireuses, Israélites de France* (E.E.I.F.) (Jewish Boy Scouts and Girl Guides of France). During the summer of 1922, when visiting a camp of Protestant Unionist scouts, Gamzon had the idea of creating a specifically Jewish scout movement. This young Parisian, aged only seventeen, set up a first troop, whose "official" inauguration took place on February 4, 1923. The growth of the movement was very fast. In 1924 a first pack (for children aged eight to eleven) was set up in Paris, followed in 1925 by a second troop, and in 1926 by a section of Girl Guides. From 1927 the movement ceased to be restricted to Paris with the creation of troops in Tunis, Oran, Mulhouse and Strasbourg. Within a short time the Jewish Scouts became the

educational, various basic principles can be elicited. In first place came, as the booklet's title indicated, harmony. Robert Gamzon, under his scouting pseudonym Castor, provided a quick but very perceptive definition of harmony. He believed the principle of harmony to be essential in Judaism. "You have to live materially to love God; life and happiness depend upon this love; the just reside within this harmonious cycle. This happy life is possible, it suffices to follow the law God has given us and which has been made us, men".[117]

Thus at the end the Second World War and following one of the greatest catastrophes to befall the Jewish people, Gamzon gave back the hope of a full and happy life, and describes the Jewish people as "the sum in space and time of all its children."[118] If we had to select two terms to summarize the teaching of Robert Gamzon, we would choose Harmony and Permanence. These two principles combined are perhaps the key to the social life of the French Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, which among themselves and in their actions they call the "shared minimum". A minimum to ensure being able to live together (harmony) and to follow the rules of the past (permanence).

13. *Léon Askénazi* (Manitou)

Léon Askénazi was born in 1922 in Oran, Algeria, where his father was Chief Rabbi, and was well known within the Jewish community by his scouting pseudonym, *Manitou*. He was one of the key people in the reconstruction of the Jewish community in France after the Second World War. Manitou spent his life teaching. Those who attended his lessons attested to the theoretical and conceptual richness of his thinking. Serious thought, but not free of humor. Manitou liked to play with language, manipulating Hebrew and French, making original meanings and concepts emerge. Thus like the Sages of tradition who "did not break the connection between the thought and the words that express it"[119] Askénazi throughout his life developed a special relationship with the language in order to maintain intelligible and trans-

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community's largest youth movement. In 1930 it already had 1,200 members, reaching 2,500 prior to the outbreak of WWII. See Orjekh (2001); Michel (2003).

[117] Gamzon (1945: 10).

[118] Ibid., p. 35.

[119] Askénazi (1999: 28). See also Askénazi (2005).

missible thought. He liked quoting the Talmudic dictum, "the Torah speaks in the language of Men. It is the certainty of this evidence that alone can turn the thought of a Jew into Jewish thought. It is then of little importance in what language it is stated, as long as it is still able to speak of the Torah in terms of salvation, at a time when the world needs the teachings of Israel."[120]

Among many other endeavours, Askénazi—Manitou—ran the Gilbert Bloch d'Orsay School (*Ecole d'Orsay*) between 1950 and 1959. In 1967 he made the decision to settle in Israel, in Jerusalem, where he lived until his death in 1996. A route from Oran to Jerusalem via Paris, exemplified what he called a mutation of identity, "I was born an Algerian Jew—though a French citizen—and throughout the entire first part of my life, which took place in Algeria up until the Second World War, I was known, without paying too much attention to such definitions, as a Frenchman from Algeria of the Jewish religion. The second part of my life—after the War—took place in France, where I discovered the vast, sociological complexity of the Jewish people and its history, when I encountered Ashkenazi Jewry (I am a Sephardi by origin). The third part of my life is taking place in Israel, as an Israeli. Thus it is a special style, an example of the mutation of identity that in our time changes the Jewish People into a Hebrew Nation, or more precisely, transforms a Jew into an Israeli."[121]

In a way, this identity mutation formed the spinal column of Manitou's set of problems. However, this mutation is not the simple effect of identity and geographic moves. It is supported and maintained within a tradition, a history. For Askénazi this history took the form of a text that is not merely current, but is a permanent revelation of identity. "Those who are familiar with the historical narrative of the Bible know that when the Bible brings us a story from our ancestors, it is not in order to tell us what existed in a past understood and desired as a bygone past, but to tell us about problems with our profoundest identity, as happens from the first occasion in history, so as to be that man that the Bible calls Israel. Whatever the index of the cultural period in which we are living, it is always this existence, this way of being that is in play in our history."[122]

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[120] Askénazi (1999: 28).
[121] http://www.manitou.org.il/.
[122] Askénazi (1999: 28).

We should note a lesser known side of Askénazi's contribution, namely his penchant for sociology. He tried throughout his career to truly understand the collective situation of the Jews at a given time and specific place. He thus became fond of defining key concepts, thereby making intelligible the analysis of the collective situation of the fact of being Jewish.[123] An example of the definitive remarks that during a thought he inserts into his articles, "Since the time of Abraham, Israel was destined for dispersion, foreseen not in the form that we have lived it, but rather in the form of a vocation, a *function* (in italics in the original). A function is a vocation on a group scale, which perhaps at the individual level is unconscious; it only becomes a vocation when the person as individual is required by circumstances to be clearly aware of it."[124]

There is a recurrent theme in Manitou's work, namely the composite nature of Jewish identity, "Wherever they are, Jews assume their own being when they gather and don the ways of man, of all times and all places."[125] Summarizing this attitude, he emphasizes, "Jewish identity is a mixed identity. There has never been "Jew"; there has only been a Jewish-someone else.[126] It is a composite identity, of several different aspects".[127] The same year, taking up the same idea, Manitou summarized it in a lapidary formulation, "We have been the Jewish-all of mankind".[128]

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[123] See the chapters "La communauté juive traditionnelle" originally written in 1948, (Askénazi 2005: 241); "La notion de communauté", originally written in 1961 (ibid., p. 237) and "De l'identité juive à la communauté", written in 1963 (ibid., p. 247).

[124] See the chapter "Golah d'Ismaël et golah d'Edom" ["Exile of Ishmael and exile of Edom"], written in 1963, (ibid., p. 62).

[125] "Le visage français de l'universel humain" ["The French face of the universal man"], written in 1966, (ibid., p. 58).

[126] The original idea is of hyphenated identity, namely "Jewish-someone else" and also "Jewish-all of mankind".

[127] "L'identité d'un peuple" ["The identity of a people"], written in 1984, in ibid., p. 142.

[128] "Les porteurs de l'unité" ["The bearers of unity"], written in 1984, ibid., p. 290.

CHAPTER FOUR

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE JEWS OF FRANCE AT THE TURN OF THE THIRD MILLENIUM

The Jewish population of France is experiencing a major transformation; yet another chapter of change in their long, rich and sometimes difficult history. Studying the French Jewish community at this juncture in its history and witnessing the changes firsthand is fascinating and exciting. In this book I have endeavored to draw a picture of the "Jewish fact" in France at the turn of the millennia, based on empirical studies analyzed within the historical, political, philosophical and cultural context. At the same time, it may be acknowledged that the observation of Jewish reality is not neutral, particularly if the observer is Jewish. As a researcher, I also understand the culture from within, having been raised in a Jewish family in France and educated in the public school system through university. Since making *Aliyah* in 1973, I have closely observed the situation in France and its Jewish community with both professional and personal interest. The issues explored in this book are of primary concern not only to French Jews, but by extension to both Jewish world at large and to Europe. They relate to the large projects of nation-building and integration, and the development of personal and social identities within a rapidly changing socio-political environment. To speak of Jewish identity is to speak of social production and individuality in respect to social structures, and to say, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, that "habitus is socialized subjectivity".[1]

The principle of the existence of the Jews of France is based upon socialized subjectivity. Shmuel Trigano, in *L'avenir des Juifs de France [The future of the Jews of France]*, describes it as a double impasse: "On the one hand not to leave citizenship or disassociate oneself from the

[1] Bourdieu (1992: 101). Bourdieu (1971: 183) defined 'habitus' as: "A system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems."

nation; on the other hand not to take advantage of the representation of the Jews committed to a communal life."[2] For Trigano, if one of the terms in this equation changes, the entire existence of French Jews is put into question. Socio-political analyses sometimes envisage catastrophic scenarios. The approach of this book seeks to be different and considers that irrespective of changes in the socio-political environment in which individuals develop, they remain subject to the rules of social logic.

1. *Jews and* Israélites

One of the most profound and at the same time perplexing findings concerns the shifting uses and understandings of the terms "Jew" and "*Israélite*". The complexity of the issue became apparent to me when I prepared to give a short lecture on use of the two terms; I realized that it was almost impossible to explain current use of the terms based on prior definitions. Someone employing the term "*Israélite*" is no longer necessarily a non-religious, assimilated Jew, and the "Jew" is no longer the subject and object of an institutional "communitarianism".

After great consideration, I would advance a theory that those who identify as "Jew" (an increasing proportion of the population) correspond to the type which once was called "*Israélite*", an assimilated Judaism focused on the general society, while those actively practicing a Jewish life built around religious and cultural traditions employ a dual definition of "Jew and *Israélite*". Does use of the dual term "Jew and *Israélite*" represent adoption of a strategy of double identification representing the fundamental principle so dear to the Count de Clermont-Tonnerre, limiting the Jew to the private sphere while placing the *Israélite* in the public domain? If so, it may be that those using both terms call themselves "Jew" within their community and "*Israélite*" to the outside.

The generally accepted meanings and definitions do not explain the complexity of the social phenomena. If the two terms are opposed to each other, the duality does not leave much room for nuances. The term *Israélite* would be the expression of the Judaism of the Consistory, born in the 19th century, a faith practiced at the individual level,

[2] Trigano (2006: 304).

without any group identification while the self-definition of Jew is the expression of a collective cultural Judaism. Yet, the double term "Jew and *Israélite*" is not what one might have thought at first glance, the sign of a hesitant approach to identity. On the contrary, it denotes a strong identity, irrespective of the parameters selected to account for Jewishness. If the reality hiding behind the two terms is vague, the duality nonetheless gives them a heuristic strength. The Jew—*Israélite* identity pair has important implications for the research into the Jews of France.

2. *A Behavioral Approach: From Core to Periphery*

While a typology of French Jewry based upon self-identification is instructive in terms of expressing identity, it is nonetheless insufficient for the reality and practice covered by the terms Jew and *Israélite*. Such a typology, based upon a self-definition of the individual, says almost nothing about the feelings, knowledge or behavior associated with each identity choice. One could define oneself as a Jew and be completely assimilated, or be very observant and choose the term *Israélite*. Actual behavior has to be studied, measured and reported, to see what lies behind the three terms, "Jew", "*Israélite*" and "Jew and *Israélite*". Therefore, a large part of this study took a behavioral approach, considering a set of voluntary, individual practices that vary on a scale of intensity and frequency.

The behavioral analysis found that self-defined "Jews" and "*Israélites*" are similar: the two groups display almost the same identity behaviors and practices. They do not emphasize their differences from French society. There is no process of 'communitarization' or withdrawal. Both seem to have adopted the Consistory approach. We thus encounter a paradox: those who chose each of the two 'opposed' terms of identification resemble each other, while those who don't make a choice, that is, those who use both terms, are distinctive.

A behavioral approach has the advantage of stipulating the methods of identity affirmation. Religious or cultural behavior is an excellent identity marker, facilitating grasping the identification process. Observance of religious rituals is experienced as a way of setting oneself apart. That is the essence of the laws and dictates of *kashrut*. From a religious point of view, they are perceived as rites whose function in Judaism is to delineate difference. Pierre Bourdieu notes that what is

important with a rite is not the passage but rather the line it creates, "thereby consecrating the difference".[3] At the same time, behavior alone cannot tell us about the exact form of identification of individuals, nor can it explain their social aspects. The manner of identification provides meaning to individual practices by placing them within the logic of the reference group. The relationship between practice and identity is the relationship between the individual and the group. To identify oneself is to accept the choice of individual practices, which is an individual, voluntary decision, and is part of the social context.

Based upon experience and empirical knowledge of behavior, researchers coined another term, that of the "Yom Kippur Jew". This expression has enjoyed much success. It reflects what happens on the Day of Atonement, when suddenly the synagogues, little visited during the year, fill up to the point that there is no space left and overflow services have to be organized in borrowed or rented halls. It should be emphasized that the term "Yom Kippur Jew" does not indicate "point zero" in the expression of French Jewish identity. Benny Lévy said that if the Yom Kippur Jew is fully assimilated into modernity, the return to the community on Yom Kippur nonetheless marks the core of his or her identity.[4] For Lévy, the Yom Kippur Jew is not an atheist, or as he prefers to call it a "negative Jew". In fact, the Yom Kippur Jew also combines the two dimensions of Jew and *Israélite*, but at the end of the behavioral spectrum with little daily practice or community participation. The expression "Yom Kippur Jew" evokes a sort of religious, denominational Judaism, which leaves aside secular and cultural aspects of Jewish life. It suggests a characterization of the Jews of France by the frequency of their institutional contacts: the core-to-periphery approach described by Annie Kriegel and upheld by the data on participation in Jewish settings. This facilitates locating commitment in relation to intensity of contacts.

As we saw, the scale of communal participation is highly revealing of the religious and cultural practices of France's Jews. A clear correlation exists between level of attendance at communal institutions and level of religious or cultural practice. For the sociologist, what is essential is what is missing. Interest is drawn to the meaning of the intensity of identity practices. For the time being, this approach,

[3] Bourdieu (2001: 176).
[4] Lévy, Brenner, & Finkielkraut (2003).

following Kriegel, considers communal practice to be voluntary, without the permanence of a perpetual commitment.

3. *Values and the Axiological Typology*

Although the behavioral approach described above characterizes identity related behaviors such as marriage patterns, ritual observance and community participation, it does not explain why individuals or groups behave as they do. Many questions remain unanswered, such as why some groups observe religious or cultural rules more than others. It was shown that those who identified themselves as both "Jew and *Israélite*" display more identity related behaviors such as endogamy, keeping kosher, etc. and tend to be closer to the communal core than those choosing only one of the identity labels. Why is this so? What is the engine of identity behavior?

Explanation of behavior is made, according to Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein's Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)[5] by observing attitude and subjective norms that interfere with choices. An attitude is thus made up of the favorable or unfavorable assessment of an individual's behavior. The subjective norm is the pressure exerted by the surroundings on an individual's decision, to behave in one way or another. This norm depends to a large extent on the reference groups with which the individual identifies and which provide the values system underlying his or her attitude.

Taking into account the connection between attitudes, values and behaviors, the typology of values and its four profile categories of French Jews may help enrich the discussion of the dual Jew-*Israélite* identity. The demographics and attitudes represented by each of the four profiles tell us much about the nature and evolution of the French Jewish community and help explain the manners of identification and behavior identity. As discussed, the Jewish population of France may be positioned along two axes: a political one, Heteronomy / Autonomy, which has to do with collective life in an organized group, and a social axis, Altruism / Egoism, understood as the nature of relations with others. These have allowed us to define four profiles: Individualists, Universalists, Traditionalists and Revivalists.

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[5] Fishbein & Ajzen (1975).

It seems that the older generation of heads of French Jewish households tend to be either Traditionalists or Individualists, while the younger household heads tend to be either Universalists or Revivalists. These profiles may reflect Azria's observation that modernity produced two apparently inverse results: the decline of religion and its simultaneous reactivation in the form of new modalities.[6] Like the older Traditionalists, young Revivalists are religiously observant, but they have integrated into French society to a greater degree and at the same time Israel plays a relatively larger role in their Jewish identity. They represent a bridge between the traditional religious value system and the secular Republican value system alongside an intimate connection with Israel.

Among the less observant pair, the older cohort tends to be Individualists while the younger cohort tends to be Universalists, an interesting ideological and attitudinal difference. The former stresses personal success and the interests of the individual as opposed to the collective. The latter stresses personal freedom and enjoyment, embracing a global (or perhaps more accurately in this case French Republican) worldview, as opposed to a particular Jewish worldview.

These axiological profiles help explain the manners of identification and identity behaviors. For example, those who correspond to the attitude poles of Autonomy and Egoism are most likely to distance themselves from the community's institutions. It would appear that the importance accorded to money, appearances, sport, vacations and friends among these profiles does not encourage involvement in French Jewish communal institutions. On the other hand, those who accept the principle of authority, who subject themselves to an external norm (heteronomy), for whom what is essential is faith in God,

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[6] "Traditionally, on the one hand we specify an array of knowledge inherited from the past, accumulated over the centuries and handed down to our days in the form of written and oral teachings. On the other hand, there is the whole array of practices comprising gestures, rites, customs and beliefs, also handed down from one generation to the other. Jewish observance: a religious definition which will by necessity be restrictive and normative. For the purposes of the restrictive definition, Jewish observance can be summarized as the practice of the religious prescriptions contained in the Law (*halakha*) whereby the specific modalities for their implementation have been laid down by acknowledged rabbinical authorities, for the time and place in question, and by custom (*minhag*), a more or less extensive and non-normative definition. It recognizes as Jewish observance any gesture, behavior, attitude, social practice, which is part of the group's culture, indicative of Jewish affiliation, identity, and specificity," Azria (1991: 63).

respect for parents, and family, are the most numerous within the core of the community.

The importance that Universalists accord Autonomy tells much about their flexible relationship with the rules of Jewish tradition. The desire for autonomy marks an assimilationist trend. Universalists prefer to do what suits them, rather than what the tradition tells them to do. They are disinclined to keep *kashrut* with all the limitations that it involves: the overwhelming majority of Universalists never or very rarely keeps kosher at home. Similarly, they are more likely to marry non-Jews. Their behavior is the inverse of those who advocate traditional values (belief in God, respect for parents, the family), and who mainly keep kosher and marry Jews.

Considering the profiles of the axiological typology in relation to the two classic terms of identification, it was found Traditionalists and Revivalists were relatively more likely to use the dual term, while Individualists and especially Universalists preferred the single self-definition of "Jew". Contrary to what one might have thought from the previous connotations associated with the term "Jew", this manner of self-definition is widespread among Universalists and Individualists, who demonstrate largely assimilated behavior and who embrace the values of French society.

4. *Youth and Education*

Currently, less than half of French Jewish school children attend public schools. This is highly significant, as public school is one of the fundamental cornerstones of French society, one of the setting in which Republican values are most effectively transmitted. In the past, to send one's children to a parochial school bordered on betrayal.

However, the story is far from simple. Sixty percent of Jewish children attend private schools, but only 30% attend private Jewish schools. The other third go to private Catholic schools.[7] This shocking finding says much about the state of educational affairs and represents one unanticipated strategy of adaptation to the new cultural landscape in France. The public schools, particularly in certain areas,

[7] This data was found in the follow-up survey I conducted in 2007 among 980 French Jewish heads of household. The figure was quoted by Lefkovits (2004).

have become unpleasant and even dangerous for Jewish students. A ten-year old girl we interviewed talked about her brother being called a 'dirty Jew', of threats and attacks by youth gangs near the schoolyard, of carrying pepper spray to protect himself. The newspapers are full of similar stories. There has been a self-defensive withdrawal of one's children from such an environment. This problem is not anecdotal: in an official report submitted in 2005 Jean-Pierre Obin, Inspector General of the French Ministry of Education declared the situation "extremely grave" and that "It is in effect, under our eyes, a stupefying and cruel reality: in France, Jewish children—and they are alone in this case—can no longer be educated in just any school." (because of anti-Semitic acts).[8]

It is clear why Jewish parents may pull their children out of public schools: but why do so many opt for Catholic schools over Jewish ones? Part of the answer is logistical. There is simply not enough space in Jewish schools. It is true that the Jewish educational system in France has increased manifold and has diversified over the past few decades, but it is still not sufficient for the growing need. In some places, where the Jewish population is low, there are no Jewish schools at all. In places with high Jewish population, registration is effectively closed. Starting new schools is time-consuming, costly and cumbersome. In the meantime, many parents have elected to send their children to private Catholic schools. These schools are widely available, academically strong, and are openly competing with the public schools for new students. They have welcomed Jewish students, adopting a 'soft' approach to religious studies (allowing Jewish students to skip prayers, and not making any attempt to convert them). In the absence of a practical Jewish option, these schools may be seen as preferable to the public schools; a strong statement in itself.

However, a clear difference was found in the characteristics of Jewish heads of household with children in private Jewish and Catholic schools. A third of those with children in Catholic schools are intermarried. Overall, they resemble the parents whose children go to public school. They are significantly less traditional than the parents who send their children to private Jewish schools: they are less likely to keep kosher, participate less frequently in Jewish community institutions, etc.

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[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/international/26antisemitism.html.

Education, as mentioned above, is an excellent viewpoint from which to observe a community. Tracking trends and changes in school choice among France's Jews is an important indicator of the situation in the Jewish community and in the public schools.

5. *Symbolic Departure*

This withdrawal from the public school system is one symptom of a larger 'symbolic departure.' The outbreak of violent anti-Semitism in France which erupted along with the second *Intifada* in Israel took many Frenchmen, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, by surprise. Yet the warning signs were there, and had in fact been noted by myself and others intimately familiar with the political and historical context of French Jewry.[9] This resurgent anti-Semitism, along with the media portrayal and government response to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict has led to a level of alienation and insecurity among French Jews.

As a result, we are witnessing a kind of symbolic departure of the Jews from France. Indeed, a rising number are considering the possibility that their future, or their children's future, may not be in France. *Aliyah* rates are climbing. Travel to Israel is so common as to be virtually universal and seems, particularly among the younger generation, to represent a sort of intermediary step or trial period for potential *Aliyah*. Within France, involvement with local Jewish communities has intensified, despite enduring Republican values which discourage such "dual loyalties."

The symbolic departure of Jews of France is far from the type of mass exodus witnessed among the Jews of the former Soviet Union or the Muslim nations of North Africa. Most French Jews are remaining in France. However, the French society to which they so successfully acculturated is changing rapidly, and the Jews, like their non-Jewish French compatriots, must find ways to adapt to the new situation.

In her preface my book on Jewish education in France, Kriegel wrote, "…under the shock of external and internal events and at the end of a process full of hesitancy, circumvolutions, and rebounds, as soon as this community began to reconstruct itself following the Holocaust, it largely cut itself off from what was its destiny—that is,

[9] Such as Trigano (2006).

to slowly, inexorably, and inexcusably blend among the mass of the French nation. We accorded this a metaphorical significance, for the concept of community became charged with a reality that was enriched, structured and much more stable than we believed possible."[10] Two decades afterwards, it seems that this prediction has been largely confirmed.

6. *Possible Implications of the Research and Analysis*

In addition to their sociological interest and importance, the data and analyses presented in this book have policy implications for the contemporary French Jewish community. The purpose of this chapter is *not* to make specific policy recommendations, but rather to locate the main issues that on the basis of my research, I concluded should be considered by community leaders and policy makers. The empirical data in this book may be used to inform the necessarily sophisticated process of policy-making which involves the decision-makers, leaders and policy researchers of the local community and is guided by a given agenda and direction.

6.1. *Frequency of Visits to Israel*

As we saw, a large percentage of French Jews visit Israel on a very regular, even yearly, basis. Clearly, this information is helpful in understanding the character of French Jewry, particularly in comparison to other Diaspora populations which do not visit Israel in equal numbers or with equal frequency. The rate of visitation to Israel has a number of policy implications. Lay and professional leaders in local French Jewish communities may find that during vacation times a significant percentage of their constituency is in Israel. In order to plan appropriately, leaders and decision-makers should take note of whether a large number of their community members are absent during vacations, how many are regular visitors to Israel, and who remains at home during the vacations. It may be that major campaigns and community activities need be planned for other times of the year, when the vacationers have returned home. Activities conducted during the vacation

[10] Cohen, E.H. (1991: 12–13).

months may need to be tailored for a subpopulation of the community which is less likely to be visiting Israel. This may include the elderly, those whose occupations do not allow for frequent trips to Israel, and/or those with a less strong attachment to Israel.

Additionally, a community may choose to partner with organizations and institutions in Israel in order to offer activities (i.e. seminars, workshops, *Shabbat* gatherings, etc.) specifically for French Jews. These activities may be designed to also strengthen the local community in France. In general, the activities and policies of the French Jewish community should take into account the strong attachment of French Jews to Israel.

6.2. *Caring for the Elderly and Socially Isolated Individuals in the Community*

My survey of French Jewry found that a third of the heads of French Jewish households live alone. These are primarily elderly people, especially those who are widowed or divorced. Given demographic trends, it may be assumed that this population will continue to increase. These individuals are often socially isolated and disconnected from the community. The tragedy which befell France during the summer of 2002, when thousands of elderly who lived alone died during a heat wave, revealed the crucial importance of addressing the issue of caring for the elderly and socially isolated. No less than for society as a whole, this presents a major challenge to the French Jewish community. Public and highly visible campaigns often bypass the needs of this population. The work needed on their behalf is often virtually invisible. However, this work touches on core values of the French Jewish community (parents, family, caring for others). There are numerous alternatives—organizing volunteers to visit the elderly in their homes, hiring professional social workers, founding a community center with activities specifically organized for the elderly with the necessary outreach to those who live alone. Community leaders and policy makers need to consider the best ways for their particular community to address this growing issue.

6.3. *Jewish Students in Catholic Schools*

The survey found that approximately a third of French Jewish students attend Jewish day schools and some 40% attend non-denominational public schools. The remaining 30% are enrolled in other private

schools, predominantly Catholic. That such a significant portion of French Jewish children are being educated in religious, non-Jewish settings is a surprising finding of this study, with profound and far-reaching implications. Jewish leaders and educators must assess the extent of this phenomenon within their own communities and decide what course of action (if any) to take in order to address it. Is there a need for expansion of the Jewish day school system? Is there a desire for a wider variety of Jewish day schools (i.e. for various levels of religiosity)? Are there problems of anti-Semitism in the public schools which the Jewish community may address? Are the Jewish community leaders and institutions going to try to discourage the enrollment of Jewish children in non-Jewish private schools, and if so, how?

6.4. *The Decline of Informal Education*

For the past two decades there has been a steady decline in the extent and impact of informal Jewish educational settings (youth movements, summer camps, etc.) in France. In part, this decline is the result of previous policy decisions. The budget for the entire network of informal Jewish educational settings in France is less than the budget of a single Jewish day school. However, Jewish day schools are reaching only a third of Jewish students. Informal and extra-curricular activities provide settings to reach a wider segment of the youth population. For those who do not attend Jewish day schools, such informal settings may be the primary or only Jewish education they receive. Informal activities are equally important for those who *are* day school students, adding an essential affective dimension to their Jewish education. There is a wealth of research in Jewish Diaspora communities around the world attesting to the importance and strength of informal education.[11]

It should be stressed that it is not necessary to take an either/or approach: a community may decide to simultaneously strengthen the formal and informal educational systems, prioritizing and compromising as necessary given budgetary and logistical restrictions. There are numerous ways informal Jewish educational settings may be

[11] See among many others Ackerman (1986); Chazan (1991); Cohen & Schmida (1997); Cohen, E.H., (1992, 2008); Cohen & Horenczyk (1999); Kahane (1997) Lorge & Zola (2006); Reisman (1990).

strengthened, including training counselors who may become future community leaders, encouraging participation in group tours to Israel, revitalizing youth movements, organizing summer day and sleep-away camps, etc. Local leaders and policy makers may determine which particular forms of informal education are most appropriate for their community.

6.5. *Endogamy/Exogamy*

As in many other Diaspora populations, exogamy rates are climbing in France. In particular, we found that a large majority of Jews who are living with but not married to someone has a non-Jewish partner. Exogamy has already become a crisis for the Jews of the United States and even more so among the Jews of the CIS. Currently intermarriage rates are lower in France, approximately 30% for the whole population (varying, as noted, in different segments of the population according to age, level of religiosity, education and more). I would suggest that now is the time to formulate a policy on this issue. How may young Jews be convinced of the importance of marrying a Jew? What social opportunities to meet Jewish potential spouses may be offered? What position will Jewish community institutions take regarding involvement of non-Jewish spouses? How will they relate to children of intermarriages (particularly if the mother is not Jewish and thus the children are not Jewish according to Halakha)? How will Jewish educational settings present and address the issue of intermarriage?

7. *Directions for Future Research*

Many areas remain unexplored. In particular, the cognitive and affective aspects of identity should be addressed in greater depth. The behavioral approach, documenting communal attendance, forms of philanthropy and communal solidarity, religious observance, etc.[12] cannot fully represent the holistic world of identity.[13] Expression of identity is made up of three combined dimensions: cognitive, affective

[12] The behavioral approach has been emphasized in many previous studies of identity, such as Bubis and Marks, 1975; Chrisman, 1981; Petrissans, 1991; Wilder, 1996; Wertheimer, 1997.

[13] Horowitz (1999); London & Chazan (1990).

and behavioral. The cognitive and affective dimensions represent the psychological aspect of identity, while the behavioral dimension is the sociological side.[14]

We still do not know how the Jews of France live on a day-to-day basis, what makes up their cultural environment. Bourdieu's classic fieldwork revealed much about French society of the 1960s and 1970s by focusing on the standards of distinction and taste.[15] A similar exploration could be made among French Jews. Do they prefer television, movies or theater, reading or studying? We do not know their preferred eating habits beyond observance of *kashrut*. Have they maintained the culinary traditions of their parents' countries of origins (gefilte fish, couscous etc.) or do they eat the same style food as their non-Jewish neighbors? Does the interior layout of their homes resemble that of French non-Jews of the same socio-economic status or do French Jews retain, adopt or create special styles? We have some general knowledge of their professional, economic and social status, but we know nothing about their habits as consumers. We know nothing about their economic choices (credit, savings, expenses), the technologies they use (telephone, computer, TV etc.), and their aesthetic choices (clothing, vacations, entertainment etc.).

Further—and this seems essential—we only know a little about the extent of their knowledge of French culture and Jewish culture. There remains a host of questions about the spirituality and beliefs of France's Jewish population. It would be interesting to know if the Jews of France believe in God, if they are waiting for the Messiah, what they think about resurrection, and whether they regard the Bible as a holy book or a history book.

It is hoped that the empirical surveys, literature reviews and analyses presented in this book open the way for future explorations of this population. Much is changing quickly: the growth of an 'ultra-orthodox' (haredi) population in France; the increased rate of *Aliyah*, the choices being made regarding schooling, community participation, profession, residence, and more. We must be wary of conceptualizations of identity, as was shown regarding the shifting connotations of the "Jew" and "*Israélite*" terminology. The Jews of France are not simply purchasing standardized "off the rack" identities. Their commu-

[14] London & Chazzan (1990).
[15] Bourdieu (1979).

nal and individual identities are being shaped by and simultaneously reflect changes in French society and in the Jewish world. Based on the observation that the Jews have always tended to adapt most quickly to the dominant culture of the host society, Lipset[16] recommended that someone wishing to observe the political system of America should study the Jewish community of America and thus will understand system in its entirety.

The same may be applied here. As noted, the political shift to the right of France's Jews "predicted" the results of the 2007 election, when Nicolas Sarkozy's center-right party defeated the Socialist Party. This is only one example. This is only one example. The relationship of the Jews to the public institutions of France, to local Jewish community institutions, and to Israel, says much about the state of French society as a whole. To understand France, understand her Jews.

[16] Lipset (1963).

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A: Geographic distribution of interviewees at different stages of construction of sample

	Paris	Paris Region	Provinces	Total
1988 Study 50 patronymics 17 Departments	30.0	26.0	44.0	100.00
2002 sample 10 patronymics 95 Departments	24.6	28.6	46.8	100.00
2002 sample 50 patronymics 30 Departments	26.1	32.9	41.0	100.00
2002 sample 50 patronymics 17 Departments	26.8	34.7	38.5	100.00
List of donors AUJF	32.9	35.6	31.5	100.00
2002 Study (non weighted) 17 Departments	31.3	32.2	36.5	100.00
2002 Study (weighted) 17 Departments	31.5	31.4	37.1	100.00
2002 Study (non weighted) 30 Departments	27.4	29.1	41.5	100.00
2002 Study (weighted) 30 Departments	27.7	29.7	42.5	100.00

Table B: Details of telephone interviews

Departments	1 Not head of household	2 Refuse	3 Incomplete interview	4 Non Jew	5 No résponse	6 Fax	7 Call back	8 Wrong number	9 Interviews	Total
01	0	103	0	16	26	2	11	2	8	160
04	0	5	1	1	22	0	4	2	4	35
06	28	32	5	28	232	2	17	23	76	367
13	55	61	5	40	274	1	47	17	110	500
21	0	14	0	17	32	1	4	3	8	71
31	1	12	0	24	119	7	12	6	25	181
33	0	17	0	10	51	1	5	7	15	91
34	2	28	0	18	41	2	13	7	19	111
35	0	6	2	11	19	4	8	2	8	52
38	3	10	1	13	30	0	10	1	17	68
42	0	7	0	26	24	0	0	4	8	61
44	1	13	2	25	67	1	9	2	15	120
53	0	2	0	5	8	0	2	0	2	17
57	0	23	0	18	37	0	6	5	16	89
62	1	18	0	23	28	4	4	2	6	80
63	0	15	1	19	38	0	2	2	8	77
64	0	1	0	5	34	0	1	2	10	43
67	0	27	4	57	146	4	14	6	42	258
68	22	15	2	86	94	7	6	2	13	234
69	6	40	0	22	71	1	22	22	52	184
74	6	12	0	8	50	2	4	2	13	84
75	109	316	10	129	1128	46	197	75	311	2012
77	0	8	2	72	46	3	20	5	19	156
78	0	30	0	16	73	3	12	3	27	137
83	0	16	4	30	35	0	12	7	19	104
91	0	56	4	26	67	1	5	2	22	161
92	26	98	4	44	168	5	33	13	77	391
93	14	55	1	22	193	2	43	17	62	347
94	21	56	3	21	187	1	38	11	78	338
95	56	34	3	14	107	3	17	10	40	244
Total	351	1130	54	846	3447	103	580	262	1132	7907

1 – The person contacted does not fulfill the criteria of head of household.
2 – Interviewee refuses to participate in the study following the introductory presentation.
3 – Interview interrupted – the interviewee does not wish to complete the interview.
4 – The person contacted does not define him/herself as Jewish or *Israélite*.
5 – No answer.
6 – Fax.
7 – No time to answer the questionnaire; the interviewee asks to be contacted later.
8 – Wrong number.
9 – Completed interviews.

Table C: Interviews carried out in the 30 departments, by gender, 2002

Departments	Men	Women	Total
01	2	6	8
04	2	2	4
06	39	37	76
13	55	55	110
21	4	4	8
31	10	15	25
33	7	8	15
34	8	11	19
35	4	4	8
38	8	9	17
42	5	3	8
44	6	9	15
53	1	1	2
57	10	6	16
62	2	4	6
63	3	5	8
64	5	5	10
67	18	24	42
68	7	6	13
69	25	27	52
74	6	7	13
75	156	155	311
77	9	10	19
78	13	14	27
83	9	10	19
91	11	11	22
92	37	40	77
93	31	31	62
94	40	38	78
95	20	20	40
Total	555	577	1132

Table D: Postal codes of interviewees (N and %)

code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%
1000	1	.07	33360	3	.21	64260	1	.07	77340	1	.07	92800	5	.35
1210	1	.07	33400	1	.07	64320	1	.07	77440	1	.07	93000	4	.28
1220	2	.14	33520	1	.07	64600	1	.07	77550	3	.21	93100	3	.21
1280	1	.07	33600	1	.07	67000	34	2.41	77670	2	.14	93110	2	.14
1400	5	.35	33710	1	.07	67100	2	.14	77680	2	.14	93120	2	.14
1700	1	.07	33800	2	.14	67110	2	.14	78000	5	.35	93130	6	.43
1800	1	.07	34000	3	.21	67200	1	.07	78100	1	.07	93140	5	.35
4100	3	.21	34070	3	.21	67300	1	.07	78120	1	.07	93150	2	.14
4110	1	.07	34080	1	.07	67380	3	.21	78130	2	.14	93170	9	.64
4510	1	.07	34090	2	.14	67400	1	.07	78150	2	.14	93190	4	.28
6000	23	1.63	34110	1	.07	67500	5	.35	78180	2	.14	93200	2	.14
6100	14	.99	34130	1	.07	67600	1	.07	78220	2	.14	93220	4	.28
6110	6	.43	34160	1	.07	67700	2	.14	78230	2	.14	93230	1	.07
6140	2	.14	34170	1	.07	67800	3	.21	78240	2	.14	93240	1	.07
6160	3	.21	34200	2	.14	68000	1	.07	78260	2	.14	93260	2	.14
6200	4	.28	34280	3	.21	68100	6	.43	78280	1	.07	93300	2	.14
6250	1	.07	34350	1	.07	68160	1	.07	78310	3	.21	93310	4	.28
6270	7	.50	34420	1	.07	68300	3	.21	78320	1	.07	93320	2	.14
6300	3	.21	34500	1	.07	68400	4	.28	78400	3	.21	93330	1	.07
6400	15	1.06	34920	3	.21	68600	2	.14	78420	2	.14	93340	1	.07
6510	1	.07	35000	3	.21	69000	1	.07	78450	1	.07	93360	1	.07
6560	1	.07	35131	2	.14	69001	2	.14	78460	1	.07	93380	2	.14
6600	4	.28	35133	2	.14	69004	3	.21	78580	2	.14	93390	1	.07
6610	1	.07	35235	1	.07	69006	3	.21	78600	1	.07	93420	2	.14
6700	3	.21	35400	1	.07	69007	4	.28	78700	1	.07	93430	1	.07
6800	4	.28	35600	2	.14	69008	3	.21	78790	1	.07	93460	2	.14
13000	2	.14	35700	1	.07	69009	2	.14	78800	2	.14	93500	4	.28
13001	2	.14	38000	6	.43	69100	20	1.42	78940	2	.14	93600	3	.21
13003	2	.14	38100	4	.28	69120	1	.07	83000	2	.14	93700	3	.21
13004	4	.28	38130	2	.14	69150	2	.14	83100	2	.14	93800	5	.35
13005	3	.21	38170	3	.21	69200	2	.14	83140	2	.14	94000	21	1.49
13006	5	.35	38200	2	.14	69300	1	.07	83200	1	.07	94100	3	.21
13007	4	.28	38230	1	.07	69330	2	.14	83300	2	.14	94110	2	.14
13008	23	1.63	38330	1	.07	69350	2	.14	83400	4	.28	94120	6	.43
13009	8	.57	38400	1	.07	69360	1	.07	83440	3	.21	94130	7	.50
13010	12	.85	38500	1	.07	69500	1	.07	83500	5	.35	94140	3	.21
13011	6	.43	42000	2	.14	69530	1	.07	83520	1	.07	94150	1	.07
13012	5	.35	42153	4	.28	69630	1	.07	83690	1	.07	94160	3	.21
13013	13	.92	42300	5	.35	69660	1	.07	83700	1	.07	94200	6	.43
13014	2	.14	42400	1	.07	69800	1	.07	91000	2	.14	94210	2	.14
13066	1	.07	42700	1	.07	69960	2	.14	91080	2	.14	94220	5	.35
13090	3	.21	44000	7	.50	74000	7	.50	91140	3	.21	94240	2	.14
13100	2	.14	44100	2	.14	74014	1	.07	91160	2	.14	94270	2	.14
13122	1	.07	44300	1	.07	74100	4	.28	91190	1	.07	94300	5	.35
13127	1	.07	44320	1	.07	74160	1	.07	91210	2	.14	94320	1	.07
13130	1	.07	44340	1	.07	74200	2	.14	91270	2	.14	94340	5	.35
13170	2	.14	44400	2	.14	74220	1	.07	91300	2	.14	94350	2	.14
13200	2	.14	44600	1	.07	74240	1	.07	91350	2	.14	94360	1	.07
13260	1	.07	44700	1	.07	74550	1	.07	91370	3	.21	94370	2	.14
13290	1	.07	44770	1	.07	74940	2	.14	91380	1	.07	94400	2	.14
13300	1	.07	44800	1	.07	75000	4	.28	91390	2	.14	94440	2	.14
13340	2	.14	53120	2	.14	75001	1	.07	91560	1	.07	94490	1	.07
13390	2	.14	53150	2	.14	75002	3	.21	91600	1	.07	94500	6	.43

Table D (*cont.*)

code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%	code	#	%
13400	4	.28	57000	5	.35	75003	4	.28	91700	1	.07	94600	1	.07
13510	2	.14	57070	3	.21	75004	3	.21	91800	2	.14	94700	3	.21
13600	1	.07	57100	2	.14	75005	14	.99	91860	2	.14	94800	2	.14
13610	2	.14	57200	2	.14	75006	4	.28	92100	8	.57	95100	1	.07
13740	2	.14	57400	1	.07	75007	9	.64	92110	8	.57	95110	1	.07
13821	1	.07	57500	1	.07	75008	3	.21	92120	3	.21	95140	5	.35
21000	5	.35	57520	1	.07	75009	13	.92	92130	5	.35	95170	1	.07
21120	2	.14	57600	3	.21	75010	18	1.28	92140	1	.07	95200	24	1.70
21121	1	.07	57690	1	.07	75011	27	1.91	92150	1	.07	95350	1	.07
21150	1	.07	57720	1	.07	75012	39	2.77	92160	5	.35	95360	1	.07
21300	1	.07	62200	3	.21	75013	21	1.49	92170	2	.14	95380	2	.14
21430	1	.07	62360	1	.07	75014	14	.99	92190	2	.14	95400	3	.21
31000	11	.78	62400	1	.07	75015	31	2.20	92200	11	.78	95500	3	.21
31100	1	.07	62580	1	.07	75016	20	1.42	92220	3	.21	95560	2	.14
31170	2	.14	62920	1	.07	75017	25	1.77	92230	2	.14	95570	1	.07
31200	5	.35	63000	1	.07	75018	12	.85	92240	2	.14	95590	1	.07
31270	1	.07	63100	2	.14	75019	60	4.26	92260	2	.14	95800	2	.14
31280	2	.14	63160	1	.07	75020	39	2.77	92270	4	.28	95870	1	.07
31300	2	.14	63400	2	.14	75116	4	.28	92300	10	.71	99220	1	.07
31400	5	.35	63500	1	.07	77000	5	.35	92310	2	.14			
31500	2	.14	63530	1	.07	77135	1	.07	92320	2	.14			
31780	1	.07	63600	1	.07	77160	3	.21	92340	1	.07			
33000	4	.28	63800	3	.21	77166	2	.14	92360	2	.14			
33270	1	.07	64000	2	.14	77170	1	.07	92400	6	.43			
33290	1	.07	64100	1	.07	77178	2	.14	92500	3	.21			
33300	1	.07	64140	4	.28	77185	1	.07	92600	7	.50			
33310	2	.14	64200	3	.21	77200	2	.14	92700	9	.64			

Table E: Comparison of certain weighted and non-weighted variables

	Non weighted	Weighted
Men	51.06	49.22
Women	48.94	50.78
	100.00	100.00
Provinces	44.26	44.07
Paris	27.56	26.01
Paris region	28.18	29.92
Total	100.00	100.00
Lessthan the Baccalaureat	35.03	34.14
Baccalaureat	17.96	17.78
Baccalaureat + 2	17.34	17.39
Baccalaureat + 4	29.67	30.72
Total	100.00	100.00

Table E (*cont.*)

	Non weighted	Weighted
Aged 18–29	12.58	12.21
Aged 30–39	20.52	20.83
Aged 40–49	15.43	14.94
Aged 50–59	16.59	17.17
60 and over	34.88	34.84
Total	100.00	100.00
Jewishspouse	75.05	68.28
Non-Jewishspouse	23.75	30.60
Convertedspouse	1.20	1.12
Total	100.00	100.00
Community participation		
Never	15.48	19.97
Rarely	14.04	17.52
Occasionally	18.27	16.73
Frequently	19.35	16.65
Veryfrequently	32.85	29.43
Total	100.00	100.00
Ashkenazi	18.12	24.06
Sephardi	72.20	69.89
Neither	9.68	6.05
Total	100.00	100.00
Married	60.50	58.35
Live together	5.99	8.74
Widowed	9.56	9.59
Divorced / Separated	8.49	8.96
Singled	15.46	14.36
Total	100.00	100.00

Table F: Distribution of school age children by department, 2002

Departments	School age Jewish children
01	2.24
04	0.47
06	5.67
13	10.98
21	0.83
31	1.89
33	1.30
34	0.83
35	0.59
38	0.47
42	1.53
44	0.71
57	0.24
62	0.35
63	0.71
64	0.71
67	5.67
68	0.94
69	4.60
74	2.36
75	21.49
77	2.24
78	2.48
83	1.30
91	1.65
92	6.26
93	7.67
94	7.08
95	6.73
Total	100.00

Table G: Correlation matrix for the values of the Jews of France

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Studying	1	100	44	45	9	29	23	5	25	57	28	27	16	36	41
Doing what I Like	2	44	100	21	32	45	40	–17	22	46	15	53	31	9	12
Family	3	45	21	100	28	18	19	53	12	38	63	34	19	33	47
Money	4	9	32	28	100	20	34	14	10	–5	16	28	41	–1	–2
Friends	5	29	45	18	20	100	54	–9	28	34	19	48	22	32	33
Vacation	6	23	40	19	34	54	100	2	34	24	11	44	33	13	6
Belief in God	7	5	–17	53	14	–9	2	100	7	8	67	13	31	20	42
Sports	8	25	22	12	10	28	34	7	100	32	17	35	29	2 6	22
Being oneself	9	57	46	38	–5	34	24	8	32	100	52	49	8	41	53
Parents	10	28	15	63	16	19	11	67	17	52	100	56	38	44	65
Making the most of life	11	27	53	34	28	48	44	13	35	49	56	100	44	34	38
Appearance	12	16	31	19	41	22	33	31	29	8	38	44	100	35	25
Community	13	36	9	33	–1	32	13	20	26	41	44	34	35	100	85
Helping others	14	41	12	47	–2	33	6	42	22	53	65	38	25	85	100

Typology: Methodology

The process by which we established a typology of the Jews of France involved 11 stages, which we shall describe in brief.

We asked the interviewees to assess fourteen values. The question was formulated in the following way:

I shall read you a list. Please assess whether the following are not important, important or very important in your life?

	Not Important	Important	Very important
1. Studying	1	2	3
2. Doing what I like	1	2	3
3. Founding a family	1	2	3
4. Earning a lot of money	1	2	3
5. Having a good time with friends	1	2	3
6. Going away on holiday	1	2	3
7. Belief in God	1	2	3
8. Engaging in sport	1	2	3
9. Being oneself	1	2	3
10. Honor one's parents	1	2	3
11. Make the most of life	1	2	3
12. Caring for one's appearance	1	2	3
13. Being useful to society	1	2	3
14. Helping others	1	2	3

Stage 1: The examination of the values of the Jews of France enabled us, with the use of the Smallest Space Analysis method of the HUDAP statistical package, to create a very pertinent structural order for these diverse values and present them graphically. Six regions with a central value "Making the most of life" emerged. See the axiological graph presented in the body of the study as Figure 1 on page 111.

Stage 2: The variables for the same region are semantically linked and can thus be transformed into an index. Because the central variable "Making the most of life" can be taken in many senses, it was not retained in the following stages. Six indexes were thus constructed, one for each region. For example, Index 1 adds together the variables 3, 7 and 10, all of which were placed in the region labeled Tradition in the axiological graph.

Stage 3: Once the six indexes were constructed, we verified their different frequencies. Since each of the three questions, which are the basis of this index, consist of three categories, the minimum of their total equals 3 and the maximum equals 9.

Here, for example, is the distribution of Index 1.

3	.09
4	.90
5	7.50
6	14.54
7	19.51
8	22.13
9	35.32
Total	100.00

Stage 4: We then calculated the average for each index. We found an average of 7.6 for Index 1.

Stage 5: Each index was binarised, that is, transformed into two categories: one category representing answers below the average and one category representing answers above the average. In respect of Index 1, answers 3 to 7 were transformed into 1: answers 8 and 9 were transformed into 2.

Stage 6: Using the POSAC (Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Base Coordinates), a unique program from the HUDAP statistical package, we were able to establish a partial order of the 64 profiles assigned to each interviewee on the basis of the six indexes.

Below is the list of 64 profiles, their identity number, score, and frequency.

Table H: Profiles of respondents by POSAC indices

id	Index1	Index2	Index3	Index4	Index5	Index6	Score	Frequency
1	2	2	2	2	2	2	12	78
2	2	2	2	2	1	2	11	24
3	2	2	2	1	2	2	11	24
4	2	2	1	2	2	2	11	39
5	1	2	2	2	2	2	11	21
6	2	1	2	2	2	2	11	21
7	2	2	2	2	2	1	11	13
8	2	1	2	2	2	1	10	19
9	2	1	2	1	2	2	10	16
10	2	1	2	2	1	2	10	13
11	2	1	1	2	2	2	10	33
12	1	2	2	1	2	2	10	11
13	1	2	1	2	2	2	10	20
14	2	2	2	2	1	1	10	8
15	2	2	1	2	2	1	10	17
16	2	2	1	1	2	2	10	13
17	1	2	2	2	2	1	10	3
18	1	1	2	2	2	2	10	12
19	1	2	2	2	1	2	10	18
20	2	2	2	1	2	1	10	8
21	2	2	1	2	1	2	10	33
22	2	2	2	1	1	2	10	5
23	1	1	2	2	1	2	9	7
24	2	2	1	1	2	1	9	6
25	1	2	1	2	1	2	9	32
26	2	2	1	2	1	1	9	10
27	2	1	1	2	1	2	9	44
28	1	2	2	1	2	1	9	8
29	1	2	2	1	1	2	9	15
30	2	2	1	1	1	2	9	8
31	1	1	1	2	2	2	9	11
32	2	1	1	2	2	1	9	18
33	2	1	2	1	1	2	9	6
34	1	2	1	1	2	2	9	9
35	1	2	2	2	1	1	9	8
36	2	1	2	1	2	1	9	16
37	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	2
38	2	1	2	2	1	1	9	4

Table H (*cont.*)

id	Index1	Index2	Index3	Index4	Index5	Index6	Score	Frequency
39	1	1	2	2	2	1	9	4
40	2	1	1	1	2	2	9	22
41	1	2	1	2	2	1	9	7
42	1	1	2	1	2	2	9	7
43	1	1	1	2	2	1	8	11
44	2	1	1	2	1	1	8	35
45	1	1	1	2	1	2	8	47
46	1	2	1	1	1	2	8	19
47	2	1	1	1	1	2	8	22
48	2	1	1	1	2	1	8	20
49	1	2	2	1	1	1	8	10
50	1	1	1	1	2	2	8	9
51	2	2	1	1	1	1	8	9
52	1	1	2	1	1	2	8	3
53	2	1	2	1	1	1	8	8
54	1	1	2	1	2	1	8	8
55	1	2	1	2	1	1	8	16
56	1	2	1	1	2	1	8	2
57	1	1	2	2	1	1	8	3
58	1	1	1	1	1	2	7	35
59	2	1	1	1	1	1	7	35
60	1	1	1	2	1	1	7	30
61	1	2	1	1	1	1	7	12
62	1	1	2	1	1	1	7	4
63	1	1	1	1	2	1	7	7
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	53

The non-linear correlations (MONCO) between the six indexes can be seen in the following matrix.

Table I: Correlation matrix for the six indices

		1	2	3	4	5	6
	+						
Index	1	1.00					
Index	2	.03	1.00				
Index	3	.24	.49	1.00			
Index	4	.22	.30	.08	1.00		
Index	5	.48	.29	.56	.13	1.00	
Index	6	.08	.41	.24	.34	.21	1.00

The 64 profiles identified by the statistical package can be seen in partial order in the following scalogram.



Scalogram 1: The Spatialization of the Various Profiles

Profile 1 appears on the top right-hand side of the scalogram. This is the "biggest" profile. Profile 64, the "smallest," appears opposite it diagonally. Between these two extreme profiles, the statistical package identified the remaining 62 profiles, according to their partial order.

Stage 7: The statistical package enables one to make a more in-depth analysis and to locate the axes of the scalogram.

It emerges that the axes are perfectly correlated with Indexes 1 and 2 (the first designates the index of variables, *Belief in God, Founding a Family, Honor one's Parents*: the second designates *Doing what I Like, Having a Good Time with Friends*).

As a result, the statistical package divides the scalogram according to these two indexes, as seen in the scalogram below.



Scalogram 2: Regionalization of the Space of the Various Profiles According to the Two Most Discriminant Variables

If one refers to the list of 64 profiles shown above, one can see that the distribution is almost perfect. Nearly all the profiles below the horizontal line fall into Category 1, Index 1. Similarly, nearly all the profiles to the left of the vertical line fall into Category 1, Index 2.

Stage 8: On the basis of this result we created a new variable (TYPO), including 4 categories. Each of these categories refers to a specific region of the second scalogram. For instance, the profiles 26, 30, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63 and 64 of the bottom-left quadrant are included in category 1.

The distribution of the profiles into these four quadrants made it possible to recognize four distinct categories of profiles, or profile-types. The profiles below the horizontal axis have a weak correspondence to the values *belief in God*, *founding a family* and *honoring parents*. The profiles above the horizontal axis have a strong correspondence to these values.

The profiles to the left of the vertical axis have a low correspondence to the values *doing what I like* and *having a good time*. Those to the right of the vertical axis have a strong correspondence to these values.

Beginning at the upper left quadrant, the profiles in this quadrant DO correspond to *belief in God*, *starting a family*, *honoring parents*, but DON'T correspond *to doing what I like* and *having a good time.* This category was named *Traditionalists*.

Continuing clockwise, the set of profiles in the upper right-hand quadrant DO correspond to *belief in God*, *starting a family*, *honoring parents*, and also DO correspond to *doing what I like* and *having a good time*. This category was named *Revivalists*.

The set of profiles in the lower right hand quadrant DON'T correspond to *belief in God*, *starting a family*, *honoring parents* and DO correspond to doing what I like and having a good time. This category was named *Universalists*.

Finally, the set of profiles in the lower left hand quadrant DON'T correspond to *belief in God*, *starting a family*, *honoring parents* and also DON'T correspond to *doing what I like* and *having a good time*. This category was named *Individualists*.

Stage 9: The new variable TYPO was crossed with all the variables of the questionnaire in order to verify their discriminant character.

Stage 10: On the basis of the second scalogram, we built four binary dummies, each representing one of the quadrants.

Stage 11: These four binary dummies were inserted as external variables, one by one, in the SSA of the values [external variables are

introduced into a fixed SSA map on the basis of the correlation array. See page 58 for details on the external variables procedure]

Table J: Correlation array for the profiles and the values of the Jews of France

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Universalists	32	71	−46	7	58	33	−90	19	28	−53	25	−10	−4	−23
Traditionalists	−32	−77	46	−11	−73	−50	79	−25	−25	66	−26	−3	−2	26
Revivalists	65	74	88	41	72	59	78	49	64	94	62	56	52	62
Individualists	−58	−57	−68	−39	−54	−38	−67	−39	−64	−72	−63	−54	−60	−80

Table K: Correlation matrix for the concerns of the Jews in France

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Unemployment	1	100	54	46	49	38	58	48	45	24	52	21	17
Anti-Semitism	2	54	100	39	84	58	46	76	39	24	52	42	34
Pollution	3	46	39	100	57	18	51	25	63	8	34	6	0
Racism	4	49	84	57	100	54	55	66	44	12	49	20	17
Israel	5	38	58	18	54	100	34	58	38	22	38	39	40
AIDS	6	58	46	51	55	34	100	63	58	15	59	12	1
Terrorism	7	48	76	25	66	58	63	100	56	29	69	56	34
Food insecurity	8	45	39	63	44	38	58	56	100	31	44	22	18
Foreigners	9	24	24	8	12	22	15	29	31	100	34	54	44
Drugs	10	52	52	34	49	38	59	69	44	34	100	38	31
Islam	11	21	42	6	20	39	12	56	22	54	38	100	44
Intermarriage	12	17	34	0	17	40	1	34	18	44	31	44	100

Table L: Correlation array for the profiles and the concerns of the Jews in France

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	+												
	I----------												
Universalists	I	−11	−24	3	−8	−29	−5	−17	−13	−26	−31	−26	−66
	I												
Traditionalists	I	5	31	−4	1	22	1	23	2	17	18	3	45
	I												
Revivalists	I	22	48	28	45	25	27	50	28	26	37	35	39
	I												
Individualists	I	−21	−44	−29	−31	−17	−27	−41	−24	−30	−24	−16	−44

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Sebag, Ariel
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Tordjman, Thierry
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Lucien Khalfa	Culture department director, F.S,J.U.
Allon Lev	Director A.U,J.F.
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Jo Tolédano	Director, Institut André Neher
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Prof. Emeric Deutsch	Psychoanalyst
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Hoffman, Alan	Educator
Patrick Klugman	Consultant
Ezra Kopelowitz	Sociologist
Chris Kooyman	Sociologist
Rivon Krygier	Rabbi
Barbara Lefèvre	Teacher in history and geography
David Messas	Chief Rabbi of Paris
Claude Richard	Attorney
Prof. Michael Rosenak	Philosopher
Jacques Tarnéro	Historian
Prof. Shmuel Trigano	Sociologist
Danielle Salomon	Sociologist
Prof. Shalom Schwarz	Psychologist

Jewish Laypersons and Professionals in the Paris Area

Lucien Alezra	President of Meudon Jewish community
Sylvie Attia	Centre Ohalei Yaacov
Sauveur Benzerki	Centre Communautaire Juif
Simy Bitton	Association "Clubs de l'Amitié Juifs de France"
Charles Bunan	Vice-president of Boulogne Jewish community
Moïse Cohen	President, Consistoire de Paris
Judith Cohen-Solal	U.EJ.F. consultant
Henri Cohen-Solal	Founder of Ganénou and Bait Ham
Roger Cukierman	President, C.R.I.F.
Sammy Gozlan	President, Bureau de vigilance
Menahem Gourary	Director, Jewish Agency for Israel, Paris
Robert Israel	President, of Rosny/Bois Jewish community
Liliane Klein-Lieber	Coopération Féminine
Alex Moïse	Director, AMI France
Haïm Musicant	Director, C.R.I.F.
Michele Naccache	Coopération Féminine/A.U.J.F.
Michel Nahon	Centre Communautaire Juif
Imanuel Pajand	Réseaux EZRA (Seine Saint Denis)
Rachel Rimokh	CASIL/F.S.J.U. (Lyon)
Nathalie Serfati	Aide à la Régularisation d'étrangers
Catherine Schulmann	EZRA (IDF)
Jean-Jacques Wahl	General director, Alliance Israélite Universelle
Jo Zrihen	Vice-president, F.S.J.U. and C.R.I.F.

Jewish Day Schools in Paris and Environs

Eliahu Bellahsen	Ecole Yabné
Rachel Cohen	Ecole Juive AIU (Pavillon/Bois)
Mme Nissenbaum	Ecole Beth Hanah (Paris)
Gérard Souffir	Ecole Yabné, Agence Juive pour Israël
Mr Teboul	Collège Habad
Sophie Zrihen	Ecole Gabriel (Paris)

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David Barre, Pr.	President, Loge Gugguenheim (Bnai-Brith)
Anne Benoualid	Teacher in history and Hebrew
Marcel Dreyfuss	President, A.C.I.-Tilsitt
Prosper Kabalo	Vice-President, Radio-Judaïca-Lyon
Aimée Meyer	President, WIZO
France Palmer	President, Young WIZO

Youth Movements in Lyon

Philippe Aim	UEJF (Lyon)
Samuel Ayache	UEJF (Lyon)
Michael Barer	IAFE (Lyon)
Laure Drai	OASIS (Lyon)
Michael Fartouch	BETAR/TAGAR (Lyon)
Aude Layani	DEJJ (Lyon)
Ella Schlesinger	DEJJ (Lyon)

Youth Movements in Nice

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Representatives	Bné Akiva, Dror, E.E.I.F.

Jewish Laypersons and Professionals in Nice

Raphael Bitoun	UEJF/DEJJ/Beit Ha Limoud (Nice)
Charles Bouchara	F.S.J.U. (Nice)
Sarah Brami	UEJF (Nice)
Lise Gomel	Coopération Féminine/Mouvement Massorti
Julie Guedj	UEJF (Nice)
Robert Guedj	Centre Culturel (Nice)
Gilles Israel	DEJJ (Nice)
Yoram Niddam	SECOM (Nice)
Martine Ouaknine	CRIF (Nice)
Sandra Sarfati	UEJF/UNEF/MJS (Nice)
Yohann Sebaagh	UEJF (Nice)
Guy Toubiana	Consistoire

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