BEYOND THE WALLS

Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein on the Significance of Empathy for Jewish-Christian Dialogue

JOSEPH REDFIELD PALMISANO, SJ

Beyond the Walls

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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Abraham Joshua Heschel

MNA	*Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion*
GSM	*God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism*
Prophets	*The Prophets*
WM	*Who is Man?*
Essays	*The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence*
MgSa	*Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity*
BGM	*Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism*
MQG	*Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism*
Poems	*The Ineffable Name of God: Man, Poems*
PT	*A Passion for Truth*
IEE	*Israel: An Echo of Eternity*
TMH	*Heavenly Torah: as Refracted Through the Generations* (*Torah min ha-shamayim be-aspaklaria shel ha-dorot*)

Works by Emmanuel Levinas

OB	*Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*
DF	*Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*
NT	*Nine Talmudic Readings*
EN	*Entre Nous: On-Thinking-of-the-Other*
AT	*Alterity and Transcendence*
TI	*Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*
OE	*On Escape*

Works by Jean-Luc Marion

GB	*God without Being*
RG	*Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*
ID	*The Idol and Distance: Five Studies*
BG	*Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*
PC	*Prolegomena to Charity*

Works by Edith Stein

Life	*Life in a Jewish Family*
EW	*Essays on Woman*
OPE	*On the Problem of Empathy*
HL	*The Hidden Life: Hagiographic Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts*
Letters	*Self-Portrait in Letters*
KF	*Knowledge and Faith*
PPH	*Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*
FE	*Finite and Eternal Being*
SC	*The Science of the Cross*
PA	*Potency and Act*

Other Works

Broken	*"Broken Continuities: 'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'"*
DwO	*Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue*
Eclipse	*"The Eclipse of Difference: Merton's Encounter with Judaism"*
FCF	*Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*
HGU	*Humani Generis Unitas*
PB	*Person and Being*
Symbol	*Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence*

Beyond the Walls

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Introduction

On August 2, 1942, Edith Stein is forcibly remanded out of her Carmel in Holland by the Nazis and murdered at Auschwitz for being a Jew seven days later, on August 9, 1942. In this "portrait," Stein incarnates her phenomenological and mystical theory in the most soberly germane of ways, and stands as a prophetic "sign for our times" for the interreligious dialogue. The movement out of Carmel—the kenosis of Edith Stein—is a movement from the familiar to the foreign that is familiar for she goes to Auschwitz with her Jewish people.

One may draw the analogy from Stein's experience to the interreligious dialogue for "dialogues and conversations with people of other faith traditions usually begin with the familiar" and move towards "a progressive encounter with the unfamiliar . . . a movement—literal as much as metaphorical—over the threshold into a world where one's sense of identity is questioned."[1] Hence, through the hermeneutic of Stein's phenomenological theory and praxis we may enter the ebb and flow of the dialectic of giving and receiving that widens memory for us through Stein's interreligiously important narrative. Stein incarnates a way of loving in both her writings and her praxis that responds to the givenness of another. Norris Clarke argues that any "particular action, if done consciously and responsibly, is inescapably my action." By these repeated actions "the whole person behind the act" will "gradually construct an abiding moral portrait" of oneself, "like an artist's self-portrait."[2] Stein's narrative portrait is one of *empathy*.

This raises the question: what is necessary for a Christian and Jewish "prophetico-mystical" *rapprochement* for *contemporary* interreligious dialogue and witness, especially when the approach is attempting to locate itself in the midst of a horizon of murder and estrangement, the *Shoah*?

I would like to propose, by way of encouraging this movement towards a renewed empathy between Catholicism and Jewish otherness, that one way of strengthening the bonds of friendship and dialogue is through a

more detailed consideration of the thought of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–1972) and Edith Stein (1891–1942). Heschel and Stein have a contribution to make precisely on the question of how our relationship is to be more empathic with the other. Heschel, a Jewish philosopher and scholar, argues:

> God does not reveal himself in an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world . . . God does not stand outside the range of human suffering and sorrow. He is personally involved in, even stirred by, the conduct of faith and man . . . pathos denotes, not an idea of goodness, but a living care, not an immutable example but an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man.[3]

Correspondingly, the philosopher Edith Stein argues in her phenomenology on empathy:

> Now, in the act of love we have a comprehending or an intending of the value of a person. This is not a valuing for any other sake. We do not love a person because he does good . . . Rather, he himself is valuable and we love him 'for his own sake'.[4]

Their perspectives dialectically complement one another's contributions in the key of prophetic witness.

Our methodology is phenomenological and narrative in approach, and is therefore necessarily contextual insofar as it takes seriously the post-*Shoah* situation. Heschel's call for a prophetic return to living from God's pathos finds a prophetic response vis-à-vis Edith Stein's interreligiously attuned scholarship and witness of empathy, as drawn against the horizon of the *Shoah*.

Heschel's ecumenically expansive style, and positive reception of the other(ness), when communicated through the nomenclature of pathos—"not an idea of goodness, but a living care . . . an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man"—may serve as an interreligiously attuned hermeneutical lens through which to view the empathic portrait of response created by Edith Stein's theory and praxis of empathy. Why is a consideration of empathy, an amorous and therefore ambiguous virtue, important to grasp for Jewish-Christian dialogue?

Jacques Dupuis has argued that the "pluri-ethnic, pluri-cultural and pluri-religious world" requires a kind of "mutual conversion" of oneself and the other. But what is meant by mutual conversion? Dupuis argues,

> First of all it requires a true "sym-pathy" or "em-pathy", which will help us to understand the "others" as they understand themselves, not as we, often due to

> tenacious traditional prejudices, think that we know who they are. In a word, what is required is a welcome, without restriction, of the "others" in their difference, in their irreducible identity.

An authentic, renewed empathy is part of an eschatological project—"in a word, we must proceed through encounter rather than through the confrontation of the past."[5]

We therefore cautiously venture to name our project as an interreligiously attuned phenomenology on empathy. And yet, this is also a *theological* inquiry insofar as a *hermeneutics from empathy* encourages a *fundamental* engagement with the other. In this way, a harmonization between theology and phenomenology may occur at the crossroads of ethics vis-à-vis the considerations of Heschel and Stein.

It is also an intersection where we may *retrieve* one another's holiness by *returning* to one another through *teshuva*. The call to enact an interreligiously attuned remembering through a more profound empathy (*Einfühlung*), as Dupuis suggests, may be one way of cultivating a wider mindfulness for the other that is essential to a more compassionate and righteous embrace of the world.

A "mutual conversion" to greater understanding and appreciation among Christians and Jews may be hastened through the very renewal of a hermeneutics from empathy. While the renewal of empathy is a "language-transforming proposal"[6] (i.e., when we feel our way into the life of the other, our dialogue with the other, and our dialogues about others, will change), it is also an *action-transforming proposal*. Living from empathy challenges us towards the humble reception of the other.

We begin our reflections by situating Heschel's *The Prophets* as a response-cum-theodicy to the discontinuity of the *Shoah*. We bring David Tracy into dialogue with Heschel on what is constitutive of a "prophetic" interreligious witnessing. Considering Heschel *with and through* Tracy's hermeneutic on a "prophetico-mystical" approach provides us with a dialectically sensitive and interreligiously attuned lens for considering both *The Prophets* and Stein's later theory and praxis of empathy. In particular, we examine how *The Prophets'* treatment of Second Isaiah and Jeremiah reveals the motif of a God who remembers. This motif is progressively widened through a consideration of how a literary descendant to *The Prophets*, Heschel's speech to the Quakers, *Versuch einer Deutung/A Search for a Meaning* (1938), challenges the interreligious prophetic witness towards an ethical remembering of oneself with the other.

In Chapters 2 and 3 we move deeper into Heschel's *oeuvre* through a consideration of Heschel's metaphysical commitments and phenomenology on

subjectivity. Heschel's approach to the receptivity of, and givenness to, the Other allows us to locate Heschel's own argument on subjectivity while moving us towards a critical reflection on Heschel's predominant thesis: the prophetic witness becomes the object of God's concern, and the object—God—who is more than being-*qua*-being, becomes the Subject (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 we assemble a personalist hermeneutic by way of Emmanuel Mounier's *Personalism*. Mounier's personalist hermeneutic gives us a lens for examining how pathos may call the prophetic witness—as a *person*—into relationship with the divine Subject. Through this call-and-response dialectic, we examine the *nature and kind* of the prophet's "sympathetic" response with a critical question for Heschel in mind: if God is the Subject, then may the prophetic witness also be qualified as a subject beyond the reification of being an unqualified "prophetic" extension (*vasum Dei*) of the divine?

Stein's articulation of the prophet as a unique, independent center of action pushes Heschel to consider how the prophet may enter an authentic—as he argues, *transubjective*—situation with the divine, beyond the "non-mutual" category of becoming a *non-self*. How is the personhood of the prophet maintained while being transformed into a *vasum Dei* for God's word and action in the world? Furthermore, this examination sets the stage for critically advancing Heschel towards a contemporary, interreligiously attuned vision of what it means to be a prophetic witness through the middle term of empathy.

A reference to Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy* in *The Prophets*—vis-à-vis a footnote in Scheler—on what distinguishes a prophetic sympathy is a demonstrable association between Stein's and Heschel's projects, yet it is a link that needs confirmation and testing. It provides us with a necessary critical opening for considering the following question: how might a phenomenology of empathy creatively extend Heschel's thesis *beyond a prophetic sympathy* that is arguably forgetful of the prophet's personhood?

This marks a turning point in our explorations. In Chapters 4 through 7 we discuss precisely how empathy, through the theory and praxis of Edith Stein, may reveal a prophetic way of witnessing that, beyond any reduction to the same, is responsive to the contemporary needs of Jewish-Christian understanding and dialogue.

Having laid forth a "call" hermeneutic by way of an appeal to Heschel's category of pathos, we narratively begin to explore in Chapter 4 Stein's "response" from empathy by considering her autobiography *Life in a Jewish Family*. Stein's autobiography reveals how a theory of empathy was *already* manifesting itself as an ever-widening *lived empathy* since childhood.

We then move to a more systematic consideration of the concept of empathy by way of Stein's dissertation *On The Problem of Empathy*. Our methodology focuses on unpacking Stein's concept of empathy as arising "con-primordially": I become one *with* the other by turning to the content of the event of the other *as if* I were the subject. A reprise with Heschel on *prayer as empathy* reveals how the concept is not external to his categories, and from this we may argue that Heschel's concept of "trans-subjectivity" actually speaks to what Stein wishes to accomplish through the use of "con-primordiality." Ultimately, Stein's thesis of empathy secures the mutuality of an authentic "trans-subjectivity": it is a dialogical concept; where empathy may mean a prolonged attentiveness and mindfulness that contributes to genuine interreligious partnership and cooperation.

Against the horizon of her theory on empathy, we continue with a methodology of walking with Stein through her life's narrative of conversion and entrance into Carmel in Chapter 5. We examine how a desire for religious transcendence progressively deepens in and through her conversion, manifesting itself in a *wider* concern-for-others: reflections on the contemporary role of women in the Church and society; and her letter to Pope Pius XI on behalf of the Jews (1933), as comparatively read through Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung*, bears out this thesis.

In light of the interreligious *inclusio* of call and response formed by Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung* and Stein's 1933 letter, we consider how Stein's Thomistic metaphysical reflections, *Finite and Eternal Being*, in concert with Heschel's insights on *depth theology*, are a prophetic text-*qua*-hermeneutic for examining the lights and shadows of the draft encyclical *Humani Generis Unitas*, further revealing how Stein's *oeuvre* evinces fidelity to Judaism, even from her position of being behind the walls of Carmel.

In Chapter 6 we explore the question of how Stein enacts empathy in the midst of the *Shoah* by facing up to, rather than eclipsing, the memory at issue: Stein is one who accepts the sign of the cross in her life as *Sr. Teresa Benedict a Cruce*. We argue that Stein's *way* of witnessing to the cross, through her own kenotic and phenomenological considerations in *The Science of the Cross* (*Kreuzeswissenschaft*), and her own praxis of going to Auschwitz, enacts an interreligious solidarity with suffering others that is consistent with her *hermeneutics from empathy*.

After the action of narratively considering Stein's life, we reflectively take a step back in order to discern the interreligious significance of Stein's response. We do this by reading Stein's praxis through Marion's hermeneutic of *intergivenness*. The hermeneutic of intergivenness provides us with a way for discussing how Stein rises as a "mandorla" figure—as one

capable of dialectically bridging sameness with otherness—conveying an *empathos* in word and deed that is less narrow and more interreligious in kind, precisely because her martyrdom is as *rememberer* (*smar*) with the religious other(s) who is same: she neither distances herself nor denies her consanguinity with the Jewish people. Stein's Jewish *and* Christian fidelity, while being an archetype for interreligious relations, also challenges Catholicism to do the *teshuva* work of remembering (*qua* embracing) its Jewish heritage through new categories of witnessing and belonging with otherness.

This reception of the other, with their various opinions and life experiences, opens up our daily and eschatological horizons to review and renewal; an encouragement to live from a new depth; a deep-down concern[7] for others and the world. A hermeneutics from empathy encourages me to respond to the summons to be God's partner in promoting peace and compassion. This is a project that was dear to Dr. Heschel.

CHAPTER 1

Towards Pathos

Preliminary Considerations

Abraham Joshua Heschel matriculated at the University of Berlin in April 1928 and earned a doctorate in Philosophy in 1935.[1] It was this doctoral dissertation on "prophetic consciousness," published in 1936 under the title *Die Prophetie* (On Prophecy), that may be considered a passionate and creative return to addressing the contemporary problems of the inter-war years of the twentieth century.

John Merkle reports that "[t]he main themes of Heschel's dissertation and of his later book on the prophets are divine pathos—God's being affected by human beings even to the point of suffering—and human sympathy for and identification with divine pathos."[2] Heschel scholar and biographer Edward K. Kaplan tells us "Heschel hoped that his alternative theory of prophetic insight" in *The Prophets* "would dislodge the prevailing neo-Kantian rationalism" of the time through an appeal to "the thought of Max Scheler, a moral philosopher and phenomenologist who developed subtle analyses of religious experience and author of *The Nature and Forms of Sympathy* (1913; 1923)."

Scheler details the phenomenon of fellow-feeling that Heschel, in turn, phenomenologically amplifies as "an intuitive method" that "allows the reader" of *The Prophets* "to grasp, through empathy the prophet's experience of God."[3]

After having elaborated this horizon for dialogue as a way of being sensitive to the tension between sameness and otherness, vis-à-vis Abraham Joshua Heschel and David Tracy, we will need to consider two preliminary concerns:

namely, how Heschel's *The Prophets* and *The Meaning of This Hour/Versuch einer Deutung*, contextually situate themselves as a response-cum-theodicy to the discontinuity of the *Shoah*. How is this response grounded in a "personalist metaphysics"? God is presented as standing behind mystery as unnamable yet *all* personal: "'what' does not mean 'who.' There is an anticipation of a 'who' in the question of religion."[4]

Rather than simply jumping directly into a consideration of the phenomenological relationship of divine pathos to sympathy—what Jürgen Moltmann calls Heschel's "dipolar theology" where "God is free in himself and at the same time interested in his covenant relationship and affected by human history"—a preliminary exploration of Heschel's metaphysical and theodicean presuppositions within the text will help us to further "situate" how the prophet's "sympathetic" response to the call of divine pathos may be critically advanced through Edith Stein's *hermeneutics of empathy*.[5]

THE PROJECTED OTHER AND THE PROPHETIC MYSTICAL OPTION

In his essay "Dialogue and the Prophetic-Mystical Witness," David Tracy sketches out the demands of an authentic Jewish-Christian prophetic praxis by first examining what may be considered parameters for the postmodern (interreligious) dialogue. Tracy argues that dialogue presupposes the question of how one interprets reality in relation to the other. Tracy argues that a hermeneutical approach reveals for us "how dialogue remains the central hope" for any important dialogue where our desire is to honor "the other *as* other, the different *as* different." When one does this, one is also witnessing to how the other's "world of meaning is, in some manner, a possible option for myself."[6]

The would-be dialogist would therefore do well to be cautious of any deliberations that are not rooted in the "praxis" of a "critical reflection," where one's interpretative methodological approach towards the other is not constantly being challenged and revised by *this* other. To recognize the "other *as* other," to allow the other to testify to herself beyond reification allows "me" and "the other" to enter "that unnerving place" of dialogue, where the very act of responding, and being responded to, allows for the possibility of living a more meaningful life for and with the other.

This meaningful *pas de deux* happens through living with the other. Dialoguing with the other—allowing oneself to be met by the other's otherness—makes "it possible to revise aspects of [one's] tradition which need revision and to discover often forgotten" memories of the other: "the irretrievably Judaic (and especially prophetic-eschatological) character of Christianity."[7]

In regards to this specific question of Jewish-Christian dialogue, Tracy warns us, "the problem can be that the Christian . . . may be tempted to believe that the dialogue partner is so similar to us as barely to be other at all." Therefore, this reduction of the other to the same is "a serious Christian mistake" precisely because the Jewish other "has too often functioned as the 'projected other' of the Christian."

Tracy responds to this concern of "projected otherness" by focusing on a "prophetic-mystical" option for dialogue and praxis. Prophetic agency, according to Tracy, "demands an agent who possesses authentic freedom." He argues, "Since the time of Paul, the issue of the true freedom of the Christian can be interpreted summarily as the gift of freedom in Christ that both empowers and commands the agent to act responsibly before God and for others."[8]

The prophetic agent enters into the dialectic between empowerment and call. The agent freely says, here I am *and* I am ready to respond to you. Freedom-empowering-response, concomitant with freedom-opening-one-to-the-call, extends and universalizes prophetic agency beyond any particularized confession. Where does one find the phenomenological evidence of such praxis?

We need not look much further than the twentieth century to see how passion and suffering extends and overflows the borders of any particular confession into a world where the other is asking the prophetic agent for a response. Tracy argues that for a Christian "the passion narratives are the first place to look"—for through the *kenosis* of Christ "Christians discover their principal clues to who God is and who human beings as free agents are empowered to become."

What is the Christian agent to become for the other? In the person of Jesus the prophetic agent affirms (i) "sufficient freedom to be responsible to God and others"; (ii) "to be able (and commanded) to respond in and through Christ to God and to neighbor"; (iii) thereby affirming "the self-as-responsible agent." The prophetic witness may begin by asking herself, "*What is `my' response to the-other-made-naked by the apocalyptic dramas of our time?*" while also asking herself, "*What is inwardly guiding my praxis?*" Tracy argues for the latter, interior "strophe" through a phenomenological appeal to a mystical grounding for prophetic praxis vis-à-vis the Gospel of John.[9]

In the Gospel of John one finds a "meditative and mystical rereading of the common passion narrative." The prophetic enters into dialectical tension with the mystical. That is to say, a "strong sense of agency" in reading the prophets, and Jesus' prophetic agency, enters into a dialogical relationship with the mystical "Johannine model of a loving, meditative self-losing-and-gaining-itself-in-a-new-union-with-the-God-now-construed-as-love." Tracy argues,

(i) Without the prophetic core, the struggle for justice and freedom in the historical-political world can be lost in mere privacy.

while

(ii) Without the mystical insistence on love, the spiritual power of the righteous struggle for justice is always in danger of lapsing into mere self-righteousness and spiritual exhaustion.

For one's response to the call from the other to be an expression of true solidarity, the agent is therefore part prophet (i) *and* mystic (ii).

In this sense, the prophet-mystic balances the dialectic between *the seen and the unseen*. A dynamic and dialectical agency of this caliber successfully holds in tension the demands of the exterior life with those of the interior life. An agency extending beyond a "mere privacy" and subtending the universal and mystical concern for a love where "self-losing-and-gaining-itself-in-a-new-union" is actualized. This prophetic-mystical option may be significant to the overall project of interreligious dialogue.

If Jews and Christians are going to take the risk of entering into dialogue, then the Christian dialogue partner must be willing to experience Christian theology anew; beyond projection. As Tracy argues, "Christian theology must move past both liberal historical consciousness and neo-orthodox hermeneutical historicity and move again—as Christian theology—into the concrete histories of suffering and oppression." The suffering of the other, and how one responds, challenges an antipathy towards otherness. This reality is the data for a prophetic-mystical response from the interreligious dialogist. Indeed, the face of the other begins to rattle the "'ego' of the purely autonomous modern self" from a solipsistic silence towards engagement.[10]

PROPHETICO-MYSTICAL DIALOGUE: THE DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVINE

So how do we, who are of "different religious commitments," engage with others beyond narrowing, confessional commitments? Heschel argues that "we meet as human beings who have much in common: a heart, a face, a voice, the presence of a soul, fears, hope, the ability to trust, a capacity for compassion and understanding, the kinship of being human." And the encounter may be "a major challenge to mind and heart" because one must recall "what [one] normally forgets," that this person "I" am encountering

is "not just a specimen of the species *Homo sapiens*. [She] is all of humanity in one . . . "

The human person "is a disclosure of the divine, and all . . . are one in God's care"; when we meet one another as persons-to-persons we begin to actualize a transcendence through dialogue. Our desire for height and depth may also be said to be horizontally inclined, for in being-towards-transcendence "I" am correspondingly, and somewhat mysteriously, committed along the vertical axis of a *pathic* involvement with otherness. This is to say, one's flesh-and-blood response to the other is also a response to a divine concern: "[t]o meet a human being is an opportunity to sense the image of God, the presence of God."

Even in dialogue, where we may "disagree in matters sacred to us," we must appeal to a wider, personal context: "does the image of God I face disappear? Does God cease to stand before me? Does the difference in commitment destroy the kinship of being human?" Jewish-Christian dialogue ought to respect this difference while also being a reverence-filled pilgrimage with one another towards mutual, empathic points of contact and kinship: "to inquire how a Jew out of his commitment and a Christian out of his commitment can find a religious basis for communication and cooperation."[11]

Heschel presents four "dimensions" of "religious existence" or "necessary components of man's relationship to God" that may be relevant to further cooperation and communication:

(a) *the teaching*, the essentials of which are summarized in the form of a creed, which serve as guiding principles in our thinking about matters temporal or eternal, the dimension of the doctrine;
(b) *faith*, inwardness, the direction of one's heart, the intimacy of religion, the dimension of privacy;
(c) *the law*, or the sacred act to be carried out in the sanctuary, in society or at home, the dimension of the deed;
(d) *the context* in which creed, faith, and ritual come to pass, such as the community or the covenant, history, tradition, the dimension of transcendence.

Heschel details each of the following dimensions: in regards to the *law-as-deed* (c), "there are obviously vast areas of cooperation . . . in terms of intellectual communication, of sharing concern and knowledge"; in regards to the *teaching* (a) "we seek to convey" to one another "the content of what we believe in"; while in regards to *faith* (b), we seek to come to a greater awareness of, and empathy with, the presence of the holy in the other—that is, "we experience

in one another the presence of a person radiant with reflections of a greater presence." Yet, these three dimensions—creed (a), faith (b), and ritual (c)—are concomitantly sublated, and held together, in and through an appeal to the *dimension of transcendence* (d):

> I suggest that the most significant basis for meeting . . . is the level of fear and trembling, of humility and contrition, where our individual moments of faith are mere waves in the endless ocean of mankind's reaching out for God, where all formulations and articulations appear as understatements . . .[12]

Notice how Heschel's approach to dialogue is, with Tracy, prophetic and mystical: prophetic in the sense of being "exteriorly" (i) responsive to the dimension of living out *the teaching* through *a deed* (a, c), and mystical in the sense of being "interiorly" (ii) responsive to an element of *inwardness* and *transcendence* (b, d); an approach that leaves room for the mystery of otherness through an appeal to the category of humility, and this humility is made manifest through a humble service, a devotedness to otherness.

An approach of being grounded in one's own tradition—while being aware of our growing, eschatologically focused "interdependence" for and with one another—may be referred to as Heschel's "concrete universalism." It is a universalism where the dialogist "maintain[s] a creative tension between the universal and the particular" such that "no abstract universal" could trump the religious reality of the other and the otherness of her tradition.[13]

Abstract universalizing, as Tracy confirms, is challenged by "a new hermeneutics of mystical retrieval through prophetic suspicion." It is the "*retrieval* of the sense of history as rupture, break, discontinuity." Yet, it is a hermeneutics where suspicion may also mean prophetic *rapprochement*. This means nothing less than "the concrete praxis of discipleship in and for the oppressed."[14] It is a retrieval of the "concrete" other—where I find "my" very self through empathically responding to the call of the other.

It strikes us that it is precisely in sensing our recent history as a disruptive event that ought to be of primordial concern to both Jews and Christians in dialogue. Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks offers us this searching reminder, "Judaism was organised around something other than history. Its key word was *memory*. History is what happened to someone else. Memory is what happened to me . . . the past made present to those who relive it."[15]

And it is the prophetic-mystical agent who has a special role in this way of remembering:

> What is the essence of being a prophet? A prophet is a person who holds God and men in one thought at one time, at all times. Our tragedy begins with the segregation of God, with the bifurcation of the secular and the sacred . . . [w]e think of God in the past tense and refuse to realize that God is always present and never, never past; that God may be more intimately present in the slums than in the mansions, with those who are smarting under the abuse of the callous.[16]

Prophetic remembering is therefore capable of sensing a rupture where the present-tense holding together of "*God and us*" reveals itself as an enduring memory that implicates God with humanity in a mutual concern and desire for divine justice (*theo-dicy*) in the midst of discontinuity. *The Prophets* is an attempt to respond to *the* contemporary manifestation of discontinuity: the *Shoah*.

TOWARDS A WIDENING OF CONCERN: THE CONTEXT FOR DIVINE PATHOS

In the introduction to *The Prophets*, Heschel explains that what his study aims to explore is the very "understanding of what it means to think, feel, respond, and act as a prophet," where the dynamic of pathos may be understood as a "situation"—an event—a drama, "composed of revelation and response, of receptivity and spontaneity, of event and experience" between God and humanity vis-à-vis the prophet.

Heschel's approach employs a "method of phenomenology" whereby one is being drawn to a new depth of reflection through a diachronic horizon:

> Conventional seeing, operating as it does with patterns and coherences, is a way of seeing the present in the past tense. Insight is an attempt to think in the present. It is in being involved in a phenomenon, being intimately engaged to it, courting it, as it were, that after much perplexity and embarrassment we come upon an *insight* . . . What has been closed is suddenly disclosed. It entails genuine perception, seeing anew.[17]

"Seeing anew" is conveyed as a "being involved" and "intimately engaged" with a situation in the *present tense*, for the prophet's "essential task is to declare the word of God to the here and now; to disclose the future in order to illumine what is involved in the present."[18] Heschel is sensitive to this *continuum*, where the future is disclosing itself in light of the past in a present-tense way.

The Prophets is written from the hope of rearticulating the relevance of a divine concern against the horizon of the *Shoah*. Robert Eisen argues,

> [*The Prophets*] is dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust, and there is undoubtedly theological significance to this dedication. It is in *The Prophets* that Heschel lays out his notion of divine pathos in greatest detail, and it would seem that, by dedicating this work to the victims of the Holocaust, Heschel is telling us that the best way to combat the evil of the Holocaust is to open ourselves up to the God of pathos who is in search of us.[19]

Heschel's methodology is therefore cognizant of the rupture and discontinuity caused by genocidal collapse.

The prophetic witness is drawn into the mutual concern between God and humanity where rupture with the past need not mean *a forgetfulness of the past* but a *resituating of the present in light of the past* so that a more dialogical and ethical future with Otherness—both God and others—may emerge. It is precisely for these reasons that a review of prophetic praxis will have a contemporary relevance to the Jewish-Christian dialogue.

THE PROPHET'S THEODICY: A "ROBUST" AND DIALOGICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND THE PROPHET(S)

Towards the beginning of *The Prophets*, Heschel reminds us that the substance of the prophetic agency described in Second Isaiah "is of no age." The prophecy has relevance for contemporary hearers of the word because it is "clearing a way for understanding the future in spite of the present." Isaiah's prophecy is "tempered with human tears, mixed with joy that heals all scars." Isaiah calls all of us to engage in the project of *tiqqun olam*, in a healing of the world for one another.

Heschel reminds us that Second Isaiah is indeed concerned with God's remembering: "The suffering servant 'opened not his mouth, like a lamb that is led to the slaughter' (53:7). Yet, Second Isaiah does not passively accept Zion's lot. Far from being silent, he challenges the Lord, putting the Lord in remembrance."[20] In the midst of collapse and rupture the prophet rouses the memory of the Lord for the people. For calling out to God, even with a voice of protest, is legitimate: it is a way of reengaging God with a concern that reignites meaningfulness in the midst of death and destruction—that is, "[m]ore excruciating than the experience of suffering is the agony of sensing no meaning in suffering, the inability to say, 'Thy rod and Thy staff, they comfort me.' Can He

Who 'has destroyed without mercy all the habitations of Jacob,' Who has 'become like an enemy' (Lam. 2: 2,5), still be trusted as the God Who is our Father?"[21]

Notice here how *The Prophets* reads the prophetic discourse of Second Isaiah through the lens of the Book of Lamentations. In *Reading the Hebrew Bible After the Shoah*, scripture scholar Marvin Sweeney argues that Second Isaiah appears to "presuppose" the Book of Lamentations. The "five dirges" of lament take one "through the expression of mourning and suffering" both from "the standpoint of the personified city of Jerusalem, through the expression of the city's representative" and ultimately "through the people who constitute the community of the Temple . . . to culminate in appeals for restoration."[22]

Heschel's methodology here of reminding us of Lamentations' *embeddedness* within Second Isaiah heightens the significance of prophetic agency. Ricoeur argues, in *Figuring the Sacred*, that while narratives may "provide the eschatological anticipation of the 'new' era," prophetic discourse "within the narratives themselves" may further aid us in recognizing and appreciating "the potential of unfulfilled promises that reorient the story of the past toward the future." And the "reenactment" and "recounting" of "narratives" through "nonnarrative modes of discourse" (e.g., "psalms" and dirges of "lamentation") is a way, Ricoeur concludes, of "complet[ing] the complex intertwining between" the two.

The tessellation of non-narrative with narrative modes of discourse makes possible the "transfer from mere storytelling to the grasping of the enduring signification of the story."[23] Heschel's method of punctuating a treatment of Second Isaiah with multiple and direct references to Lamentations sharpens and heightens the "transfer" or "enduring signification" of a community's need: a need for a divine concern, the desire for a response from God, for many "promises" are yet to be "fulfilled."

In taking the following example of Jeremiah's complex relationship with the divine, Heschel brings us further into the theme of how we may *remember* God with humanity via pathos.

At times, Jeremiah rejoices in God's nearness and solidarity with him—"'The Lord is with me a dread warrior, therefore my persecutors will stumble; they will not overcome me' (Jer. 20:11)"—while, at other times, Jeremiah is "exasperated by the mysterious remoteness of the Lord," even questioning God's ability to save: "'Wilt Thou be to me like a deceitful brook? Like waters that fail?' (Jer. 15:18)."

Heschel concludes "it is one of the essential paradoxes of prophetic thinking" where the prophet may speak "continually of the people's guilt and of dreadful punishment in store for them" while, almost at

the same time (e.g., after a "disaster" befalls a people), the prophet is capable of being "stunned, puzzled, unable to justify completely the full measure of suffering." Evidently, prophetic agency also means that the prophet will "not hesitate to complain" to God about God's own ways.[24]

A prophetic dialogue therefore necessarily "points to a robust relationship" where God and prophet may "express themselves, forcefully and deliberately, when either perceives wrongdoing on the part of the other."[25]

In "reorienting the story of the past toward the future" through sharpening a concern for "unfulfilled promises," prophetic praxis, whether it be Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, or contemporary manifestations of the same, deepens the eschatological significance of pathos vis-à-vis a complaining/protest to God. Heschel's sensitivity to a prophetically minded continuum, where the future is disclosing itself in light of the past in a present-tense way through prophetic living, is driven by a sense of urgency for the universal problematic of *forgetfulness for the other*. This methodology, as Ricoeur argues, is "continuing the transfer" of the narrative's importance into contemporary situations.

Heschel's proposal in *The Prophets* of a *present-tense* way of belonging to one another through a greater sympathy with God and others becomes a way of responding to a callous way of living—a way of living without *a memory for the other*, a way of living that set the conditions for the possibility of the *Shoah*: "the incapacity to sense the depth of misery caused by our own failures, is a fact which no subterfuge can elude. Our eyes are witnesses to the callousness and cruelty of man, but our heart tries to obliterate the memories, to calm the nerves, and to silence our conscience."[26]

While Heschel's theodicy is arguably implicit, it would be perfunctory to read *The Prophets without* recourse to a post-*Shoah* hermeneutic. This reconceptualizing of prophetic praxis reveals an approach that is less concerned with the craft of the historical reporter: a past-tense detailing of prophetic praxis. Rather, through phenomenologically elucidating the *sym-pathetic* relationship between God and prophet, Heschel wants to show us how the intentionality of prophetic agency has a contemporary relevance: a dialogically expansive reception of otherness incites an ethical witnessing *for others in the present in light of the past*. A talk given in 1938 prophetically alerts us to Heschel's growing theodicean preoccupation for divine justice and ethical righteousness, further inciting a desire for the humble *remembering* of oneself with the victims of the *Shoah*.

THE MEANING OF THIS HOUR/VERSUCH EINER DEUTUNG

A shallow reading of Heschel's *oeuvre* denies a contemporary eschatological and prophetic sensitivity to a widening concern that situates itself at the nexus between God and humanity where both are implicated to respond. He writes as a younger man in a poem from 1930: "You are meant to help here, Oh God! But You are silent . . . So help me to help!"[27] The drama of the encounter between God and prophet—"a form of living, a crossing point of God and man"—captivates Heschel's theological imagination and poetic articulation on the need for justice and respect of the other.[28]

We see this dialectic most eloquently balanced in a speech given in February 1938 to a group of "pacifists recently returned from the Second World Conference of Quakers held in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania"[29] entitled *Versuch einer Deutung/A Search for a Meaning* or *The Meaning of This Hour*.[30]

In the speech, Heschel decries, with powerful rhetoric, a "monstrous" sense of mistrust for one another that seems to be gripping humanity (§1: "*[f]ellowmen turned out to be evil ghosts, monstrous and weird*"). Humanity, however, may begin to repair the breach by acknowledging what is "evil" in ourselves; for in acknowledging the necrotic, objectifying tendencies within myself, I inaugurate a process of turning from them (§3: "*If a man has beheld evil, he may know that it was shown to him in order that he learn his own guilt and repent; for what is shown to him is also within him*."). Proceeding in *teshuva* through a discerning self-examination is constitutive of prophetic agency, for "[p]eople of conscience can recognize radical evil within everyone (including themselves)" and from this new depth of self-knowledge may "oppose the torturers more vigorously."[31]

Heschel goes on to argue that organized religion is not without its own faults in settling for a forgetfulness for the other. When the prophetic substance of the message becomes confined through a stultifying institutionalization (§4: "*[God's voice] was trapped and imprisoned in the temples! How often It was drowned or distorted! Now we behold how It gradually withdraws*"), there is all the more a need for a response to the situation through a prophetic praxis.

A theodicy of protest against injustice—what Kaplan calls a "theology of distress"[32]—rises in the text. It is a questioning of God's seeming absence in the midst of genocide (§5: "*The day of the Lord is a day without the Lord. Where is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter? It is so hard to rear a child, to nourish and to educate. Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill?*"). And this questioning of God flows into the indictment of "modern dictatorship" (§6) where the worship of force and the despising of compassion have become our daily way of murdering others "on the altar of war" (*cf*. §7).

Table 1.1 THE MEANING OF THIS HOUR

§1: Emblazoned over the gates of the world in which we live is the escutcheon of the demons. The mark of Cain in the face of man has come to overshadow the likeness of God. There has never been so much guilt and distress, agony, and terror. At no time has the earth been so soaked with blood. Fellowmen turned out to be evil ghosts, monstrous and weird. Ashamed and dismayed, we ask: Who is responsible?

§2: History is a pyramid of efforts and errors; yet at times it is the Holy Mountain on which God holds judgment over the nations. Few are privileged to discern God's judgment in history. But all may be guided by the words of the *Baal Shem*:

§3: If a man has beheld evil, he may know that it was shown to him in order that he learn his own guilt and repent; for what is shown to him is also within him.

§4: We have trifled with the name of God. We have taken the ideals in vain. We have called for the Lord. He came. And was ignored. We have preached but eluded Him. We have praised but defied Him. Now we reap the fruits of our failure. Through centuries His voice cried in the wilderness. How skillfully It was trapped and imprisoned in the temples! How often It was drowned or distorted! Now we behold how It gradually withdraws, abandoning one people after another, departing from their souls, despising their wisdom. The taste for the good has all but gone from the earth. Men heap spite upon cruelty, malice upon atrocity.

§5: The horrors of our time fill our souls with reproach and everlasting shame. We have profaned the word of God, and we have given the wealth of our land, the ingenuity of our minds and the dear lives of our youth to tragedy and perdition. There has never been more reason for man to be ashamed than now. Silence hovers mercilessly over many dreadful lands. The day of the Lord is a day without the Lord. Where is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter? It is so hard to rear a child, to nourish and to educate. Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill? Like Moses, we hide our face; for we are afraid to look upon *Elohim*, upon His power of judgment. Indeed, where were we when men learned to hate in the days of starvation? When raving madmen were sowing wrath in the hearts of the unemployed?

§6: Let modern dictatorship not serve as an alibi for our conscience. We have failed to fight for right, for justice, for goodness; as a result we must fight against wrong, against injustice, against evil. We have failed to offer sacrifices on the altar of peace; thus we offered sacrifices on the altar of war. A tale is told of a band of inexperienced mountain climbers. Without guides, they struck recklessly into the wilderness. Suddenly a rocky ledge gave way beneath their feet and they tumbled headlong into a dismal pit. In the darkness of the pit they recovered from their shock only to find themselves set upon by a swarm of angry snakes. Every crevice became alive with fanged, hissing things. For each snake the desperate men slew, ten more seemed to lash out in its place. Strangely enough, one man seemed to stand aside from the fight. When indignant voices of his struggling companions reproached him for not fighting, he called back: If we remain here, we shall be dead before the snakes. I am searching for a way of escape from the pit for all of us.

Table 1.1 (*continued*)

§7: Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes. We did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago, and the snakes have sent their venom into the bloodstream of humanity, gradually paralyzing us, numbing nerve after nerve, dulling our minds, darkening our vision. Good and evil, that were once as real as day and night, have become a blurred mist. In our every-day life we worshiped force, despised compassion, and obeyed no law but our unappeasable appetite. The vision of the sacred has all but died in the soul of man. And when greed, envy and the reckless will to power came to maturity, the serpents cherished in the bosom of our civilization broke out of their dens to fall upon the helpless nations.

§8: The outbreak of war was no surprise. It came as a long expected sequel to a spiritual disaster. Instilled with the gospel that truth is mere advantage and reverence weakness, people succumbed to the bigger advantage of a lie—"the Jew is our misfortune"—and to the power of arrogance—"tomorrow the whole world shall be ours," "the peoples' democracies must depend upon force." The roar of bombers over Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, was but the echo of thoughts bred for years by individual brains, and later applauded by entire nations. It was through our failure that people started to suspect that science is a device for exploitation; parliaments pulpits for hypocrisy, and religion a pretext for a bad conscience. In the tantalized souls of those who had faith in ideals, suspicion became a dogma and contempt the only solace. Mistaking the abortions of their conscience for intellectual heroism, many thinkers employ clever pens to scold and to scorn the reverence for life, the awe for truth, the loyalty to justice. Man, about to hang himself, discovers it is easier to hang others.

§9: The conscience of the world was destroyed by those who were wont to blame others rather than themselves. Let us remember. We revered the instincts but distrusted the prophets. We labored to perfect engines and let our inner life go to wreck. We ridiculed superstition until we lost our ability to believe. We have helped to extinguish the light our fathers had kindled. We have bartered holiness for convenience, loyalty for success, love for power, wisdom for information, tradition for fashion.

§10: We cannot dwell at ease under the sun of our civilization as our ancestors thought we could. What was in the minds of our martyred brothers in their last hours? They died with disdain and scorn for a civilization in which the killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun, for a civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self.

§11: Tanks and planes cannot redeem humanity, nor the discovery of guilt by association nor suspicion. A man with a gun is like a beast without a gun. The killing of snakes will save us for the moment but not forever. The war has outlasted the victory of arms as we failed to conquer the infamy of the soul: the indifference to crime, when committed against others. For evil is indivisible. It is the same in thought and in speech, in private and in social life. The greatest task of our time is to take the souls of men out of the pit. The world has experienced that God is involved. Let us forever remember that the sense for the sacred is as vital to us as the light of the sun. There can be no nature without spirit, no world without the *Torah*, no brotherhood without a father, no humanity without attachment to God.

(*continued*)

Table 1.1 (*continued*)

§12: God will return to us when we shall be willing to let Him into our banks and factories, into our Congress and clubs, into our courts and investigating committees, into our homes and theaters. For God is everywhere or nowhere, the Father of all men or no man, concerned about everything or nothing. Only in His Presence shall we learn that the glory of man is not in his will to power, but in his power of compassion. Man reflects either the image of His Presence or that of a beast.

§13: Soldiers in the horror of battle offer solemn testimony that life is not a hunt for pleasure, but an engagement for service; that there are things more valuable than life; that the world is not a vacuum. Either we make it an altar for God or it is invaded by demons. There can be no neutrality. Either we are ministers of the sacred or slaves of evil. Let the blasphemy of our time not become an eternal scandal. Let future generations not loathe us for having failed to preserve what prophets and saints, martyrs and scholars have created in thousands of years. The apostles of force have shown that they are great in evil. Let us reveal that we can be as great in goodness. We will survive if we shall be as fine and sacrificial in our homes and offices, in our Congress and clubs as our soldiers are on the fields of battle.

§14: There is a divine dream which the prophets and rabbis have cherished and which fills our prayers, and permeates the acts of true piety. It is the dream of a world, rid of evil by the grace of God as well as by the efforts of man, by his dedication to the task of establishing the kingship of God in the world. God is waiting for us to redeem the world. We should not spend our life hunting for trivial satisfactions while God is waiting constantly and keenly for our effort and devotion.

§15: The Almighty has not created the universe that we may have opportunities to satisfy our greed, envy and ambition. We have not survived that we may waste our years in vulgar vanities. The martyrdom of millions demands that we consecrate ourselves to the fulfillment of God's dream of salvation. Israel did not accept the Torah of their own free will. When Israel approached Sinai, God lifted up the mountain and held it over their heads, saying: "Either you accept the *Torah* or be crushed beneath the mountain."

§16: The mountain of history is over our heads again. Shall we renew the covenant with God?

This forgetfulness seems to be rooted for Heschel in the negative outcomes of the Enlightenment's epistemological commitments. Pessimistic, individualizing, and, consequently, totalizing tremors (§10: "*[where] the killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun, for a civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self*.") reverberate like a new "gospel," being expounded in a fashion where "truth is mere advantage," "suspicion" is "dogma" and "contempt the only solace" (§8).

Humanity's desire for transcendence is believed to be a primitively imposed, imaginative category of escape, and nothing more than "a pretext for a bad conscience" (§8). The face of the Other-and-others is obscured and lost (*cf*. §1) such that "people succumbed to the bigger advantage of a lie—`the Jew is our misfortune'—and to the power of arrogance—`tomorrow

the whole world shall be ours,' . . . The roar of bombers over Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, was but the echo of thoughts bred for years by individual brains, and later applauded by entire nations" (§8).

What is rightly needed to counter this necrotic epistemology of objectifying, nearly religious, belief is a response to this apocalypse of forgetfulness through a new solidarity: a *remembering* of the "sense of the sacred" through perceiving God's involvement (§11: "*The world has experienced that God is involved. Let us forever remember that the sense for the sacred is as vital to us as the light of the sun*.").

A sense of the sacred for Heschel is really a call to involvement. Humanity needs to begin again to cooperate with God in the pathic project of redemption by living beyond the "satisfactions" of an individualistic self-concern (§14: "*God is waiting for us to redeem the world. We should not spend our life hunting for trivial satisfactions while God is waiting constantly and keenly for our effort and devotion*."). Humanity may begin living again from this concern for others by "involving" oneself in the collaborative project of "redeeming" the world. By doing so, humanity will necessarily be living (again) from a prophetic consciousness.

Most poignantly and eloquently, in reflecting on the horror of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Heschel concludes in an interview with Carl Stern some years later, "we should not rely on God alone; *we* have to respond. It is so important that all of us, regardless of our religious affiliation, remember that we all stand under the hand of God and must *act* with this in mind. As important as it is to discuss theological subtleties, it is much more important to know how to save men from being liquidated."[33]

Heschel's poetic and rhetorical style suggests that humanity's pathic involvement with God's project of redemption is the "answer" to the prophet's calling on God for justice (*theo-dicy*). The answer is *already* contained within the prophet herself through her own prophetic response to the call. If "we" involve God in every aspect of "our" everyday, then God gets involved:

> God will return to us when we shall be willing to let Him into our banks and factories, into our Congress and clubs, into our courts and investigating committees, into our homes and theaters. For God is everywhere or nowhere . . . (§12).

God makes *teshuva*. God makes a pilgrimage of *return* to the people, and this return is often announced through the voice of the prophetic witness.

By "interpret[ing] the crisis" of the *Shoah* and impending war in "theological terms," Heschel formulated a relevant "call to action" in "The

Meaning of This Hour" for a "predominantly non-Jewish audience" (§15: "*The martyrdom of millions demands that we consecrate ourselves to the fulfillment of God's dream of salvation*."). We hear in the speech Heschel's own "certainty in the existence of a God of pathos" and his "empathy with prophetic consciousness." Furthermore, Heschel's "distinctive blend of faith and ethical courage" in the speech allows him to construct a *prophetic call* for a non-Jewish audience that has an "immediate" resonance. Heschel "believed that God accompanied humankind in suffering" for a "people with faith is a strong people, dedicated to the world's redemption." The Christian listener may therefore begin to bear the weight of responsibility for the *Shoah*, and make *teshuva* through the renewal of an ethical witnessing, through an appeal to Heschel's searching words.[34]

CONSENTING TO LOVE

Heschel's "method of phenomenology," his "new way of seeing," as evidenced in our treatment of Second Isaiah in *The Prophets*, along with "The Meaning of This Hour," allows him to "deconceptualize" and "reconceptualize" prophecy as being both the communicating of a call to a people while, at times, a protesting to the One who calls, especially when the people of God are left to suffer.[35] This response, as protest to the Other and as the necessary condemnation of the injustices by some against others, radicalizes the message of peace and justice through the *personal* response of the prophet.

Such prophetic respondents move beyond "impartiality" and indifference, and into the world through the sharing of an enlivened word of justice: "the prophet's existence is either irrelevant or relevant. If irrelevant, I cannot truly be involved in it; if relevant, then my impartiality is but a pretense." Indeed, it is a word capable of subverting injustice through the proclamation of God's reign. The prophetic witness's response to the call means being in harmony with the divine pathos, for ultimately God has an enduring concern, and because of this concern God may never be unsympathetic to humanity. God's silence never means God is forgetful: "God himself is described as reflecting over the plight of man rather than as contemplating eternal ideas . . . [i]n the prophet's message nothing that has bearing upon good and evil is small or trite in the eyes of God." If, then, "nothing that has bearing upon good and evil is small or trite in the eyes of God," neither is it inconsequential to the prophet.[36]

The Hebrew prophet (and the contemporary prophetic witness) stands at the nexus between God and humanity, breaking the silence of God on

behalf of humanity and vice versa, where dialogue is more *tria-logue*: God—prophet—people. The prophet must therefore dialectically balance a hermeneutic of suspicion with a hermeneutic of trust, or empathy: a *hermeneutics of empathy* where we may begin again to see the mystical and the prophetic strophes in a larger, dialectically related Jewish, and also Christian, context.

Tracy's perspective may therefore withstand further extension towards the Jewish other through a dialectically sensitive hermeneutics of empathy where an interpretation of rupture-as-forgetfulness is "mystically retrieved" through a *re-membering* of one community together with another community. A shared memory, that "slow and silent stream,"[37] lapping against the shores of both Jews and Christians, is orienting us, even mysteriously so, towards an eschatological future—that is, "[t]he prospect of all men embracing one form of religion remains an eschatological hope. What about here and now? Is it not blasphemous to say: I alone have all the truth and grace, and all those who differ live in darkness and are abandoned by the grace of God?"

This eschatological hope, and our participation as Jews and Christians in this hope-filled project of building the Kingdom, requires an empathic concern and appreciation for one another's uniqueness: "does not the task of preparing the Kingdom of God require a diversity of talents, a variety of rituals, soul-searching as well as opposition?"[38]

While Heschel wants to maintain a Jewish difference, his approach is also dialectically nuanced in bringing theological reflection to a new interreligiously attuned depth. He tells us in 1966:

> The supreme issue today is not the *halacha* for the Jew or the Church for the Christian—but the premise underlying both religions, namely whether there is a *pathos*, a divine reality concerned with the destiny of man . . . The crisis engulfs all of us. The misery and fear of alienation from God make Jew and Christian cry together.[39]

We are being pushed towards a deeper consideration of the "locus" of pathos—a nexus of mystery and memory, where God's concern "mysteriously impinges" on us.

This exploration may challenge Christians, as if for the first time, to listen for love from the place of otherness: "Jewish difference challenges Christians not first to speak but to hear speech not their own, not simply to love but to consent to the prospect of being loved by an other."[40]

The "intergivenness"[41] of loving and being loved pushes us towards a new depth. Heschel concludes that the "*first and most important prerequisite of interfaith is faith*. It is only out of the depth of involvement in the

unending drama that began with Abraham that we can help one another toward an understanding of our situation. Interfaith must come out of a depth, not out of a void of absence of faith."[42] If prophetic agency is going to be responsive to a contemporary interreligious *milieu*, then it must also be *freed* for being an agency that is responsive to the *interfaith* situation.

A *hermeneutics from empathy* will largely be drawn from the example of Edith Stein. Stein's *modus vivendi* in theory and praxis, and most significantly during the moments leading to her deportation and subsequent internment(s) in Westerbork and Auschwitz, witnesses to an *(em)pathos finding an* ethos that dialectically bridges sameness and otherness. It is a response of a woman who is able to hold in dialectical tension her dual affirmations of being a daughter of Israel *and* Carmel.

We will come to consider in subsequent chapters how Edith Stein responds in a dialectically sensitive way to the demands of a divine pathos from the place of both her Jewish and Christian commitments. From the outset, however, we may conclude, *pace* Tracy, that the "mystico-prophetic construal of Christian freedom" already has an antecedent(s) in the face of the Jewish other. This is to say, if one is going to "honor" the "other as other," then the "issue of true freedom"—a freedom that both "empowers and commands the agent to act responsibly before God and for others"—*is* a real concern prior to "the time of Paul."

Heschel's considerations on prophetic agency, and his own prophetic voice in condemning the Nazi terror, reveals how the Jewish other, without having to *become* Paul, is an agent *who acts responsibly before God and for others*. In this sense, Christians inherit a freedom that is being continually guaranteed and widened by the *eternal flowing presence* of the promise to Judaism: "[w]ith the passing of time the Covenant assumes an ever more universal value, as the promise made to Abraham takes form: 'I will bless you and make your name great, so that you will be a blessing . . . All the communities of the earth shall find blessing in you' (Genesis 12: 2–3)."

The Prophets, with both its antecedent and descendant texts, situates itself as a contextualized response to the *Shoah*, and from this horizon we are beginning to appreciate how the prophet's response to God bespeaks a *personal* relationship; "*out of the depth of an involvement in the unending drama*" between God and humanity. This involvement sets the stage for a consideration of *The Prophets'* "personalist metaphysics."

CHAPTER 2

Towards a Hermeneutics of Empathy

Mystery, Being, Subjectivity

Heschel's thesis *Die Prophetie* was awarded a doctorate in 1935. The same year, Emmanuel Levinas, in an article for *Paix et Droit*, argues the following:

> *Paganism is a radical powerlessness to get out of the world*. It consists not in denying spirits and gods but in situating them in the world. The Prime Mover, which Aristotle nevertheless isolated from the universe, was able to carry to the heights only the poor perfection of created things. Pagan morality is only the consequence of this basic incapacity to transgress the limits of the world. The pagan is shut up in this world, sufficient unto himself and closed upon himself. Israel's sentiment in regard to the world is entirely different . . . The Jew does not have, in the world, the definitive foundations of the pagan. In the midst of the most complete confidence accorded to things, the Jew is tormented by a silent worry. As unshakeable as the world might appear to those one calls healthy minds, it contains for the Jew the trace of the provisional and the created. This is the madness of the faith of Israel.[1]

In 1961, Levinas published his *Habilitation*, entitled *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (published in English in 1969). Soon after, Heschel translated into English an extended *Die Prophetie*, to be published as *The Prophets* in 1965. Heschel, like Levinas, is attempting to redress this *incapacity for transgressing the limits* through an appeal to the Other who is beyond being; the one who is more *primordial* and *personal* than any *idea* of

transcendence—that is, "without the sense of the ineffable there are no metaphysical problems, no awareness of being as being, of value as value."[2]

NOT BEING BUT THE MYSTERY OF BEING

Heschel argues in *The Prophets* that any consideration of *being-qua-being* is ultimately a penultimate concern for "[b]eing points to the question of how being is possible." Behind the "concept" of being *qua "petitio principii"* is a more primordial concept, an ultimate principle: "[t]he act of bringing being into being, creation, stands higher in the ladder of problems than being."

While Heschel concedes that "[c]reation is not a transparent concept" he also wonders "is the concept of being as being distinguished by lucidity?" Heschel's desire *to get beyond being*, in the sense of getting beyond the idolatry of an ahistorical concept, is essentially a desire rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures: "Biblical ontology does not separate being from doing. What *is*, acts." And the Hebrew Scriptures speak of God's "acts of pathos" where God is not being conceived as a "'true being'. . . . but as the *semper agens*."[3]

The Hellenistic appreciation of *being as being* is tautological and self-enclosed, an inquiry of penultimate concern. And only an *idea* of being is capable of being "isolated" in being. This self-enclosed system amounts to "the dehumanization of humanity and the depersonalization of God."[4] What is needed, alternatively, is the cultivation of a remembering sensitivity for the subjective quiddity of the Ineffable, the cultivation of a kind of *habitus* for a mystery that is mysteriously *personal*: "[t]he sense of the ineffable does not stand between man and mystery; rather than shutting him out of it, it brings him together with it."[5]

And this "sense" for "the ineffable" may not be considered "an esoteric faculty but an ability with which all men are endowed," for just as we have "the ability to know certain aspects of reality" so, too, are we "endowed with the ability to know that there is more than" what we could possibly know.

Our minds may be "concerned" with "the ineffable as well as with the expressible," and this "awareness" for the ineffable comes as a givenness in "radical amazement"—"a sense of perpetual surprise at the fact that there are facts at all," a kind of being in a "state of maladjustment to words and notions," a sometimes speechless sensitivity to the *plenum*: "to all of reality; not only to what we see, but also to the very act of seeing as well as to our own selves." And this sensitivity to a more mysterious givenness is just as "universally valid" and rationally grounded as is "the principle of contradiction or the principle of sufficient reason."

While the ineffable offers "resistance to our categories," one's "sense" for the ineffable allows her to nevertheless "perceive . . . something *objective*" and although this "object" may not be "conceived by the mind nor captured by imagination or feeling," it is "something real," and the *realness* one is made aware of "is not our self, our inner mood, but the transubjective situation." It is "*transubjective*" because one's being "radically amazed" is already a response—an "awareness"—to the exhaustive inclusiveness of "mystery" (e.g., "the grandeur of the sky"; "the mystery of birth and death," etc.)—in "every valuation of reality," where valuation means a deepening involvement with a world of otherness: "[w]e do not create the ineffable, we encounter it."[6]

This "awareness of the presence of the mystery" does not therefore easily fit into a notionalistic category of *conceptus*, and "may be contrasted with Hegel's characterization of the transition of the Egyptian to the Greek religion. 'The enigma is solved; the Egyptian sphinx, according to a deeply significant and admirable myth, was slain by a Greek, and thus the enigma has been solved.'"[7]

An "awareness" for "the extreme hiddenness of God," while capable of being intellectually recognized as a presence-within-a-veil, nevertheless remains beyond a rational, objectifying, grasping-for-*It*. Rather, *Deus absconditus:* this God may not be set in stone.

And yet, this awareness is subtended, as Heschel argues, by a more expansive divine sensitivity "which is neither the construction nor the object of our controlling reason."[8] It is a sensitivity capable of being experienced by humanity through the awareness of a divine *pathos*: "yet His concern, His guidance, His will, His commandment is capable of being experienced by [human beings]."[9]

RAHNER'S *VORGRIFF*: "EXPERIENCING" THE INEFFABLE

The hiddenness of God *as impenetrable, and yet capable of being "experienced"*: this echoes themes found in Rahner's treatment on how human beings have an "awareness" of the mystery vis-à-vis a pre-grasp ("*Vorgriff*") of mystery.

Rahner tells us the human person is "a transcendent being in so far as his knowledge and all of his conscious activity is grounded in a pre-apprehension (*Vorgriff*) of 'being.'" And while this pre-grasp is "unthematic," or, as Heschel might put it, not "capturable" by our imagination, it nevertheless accommodates a "present knowledge of the infinity of reality" where we are "presupposing that this infinite pre-apprehension is not grounded by the

fact that it can apprehend nothingness as such."[10] The subject's "unthematic" knowledge of being is a grasp of *something* and not "nothing."

Nicholas Adams is helpful on this point: "[t]he conditions or 'grounds' for thinking (the German *Grund* has a wide range of meanings including 'reason,' 'condition,' and 'ground') are a prior grasping, at some level, of reality, which is not yet the explicit focus of thinking . . ." So while "the subject is finite" he is still "capable of grasping the idea of infinity." And if this idea does not "arise from something finite" then neither may it come "from 'nothing.'" Adams concludes that the idea "must therefore originate *outside* the subject."[11]

The human person will experience the "categorial" or contingent realities of "emptiness" and "inner fragility": the conditions of being human. Nevertheless, he is also grounded in *something more*: the dynamic, unthematic movement of a transcendent hope, one "draw[ing] and mov[ing] and set[ting] in motion" a *reality* that he experiences "as his real life and not as nothingness."[12]

The person experiences a "kind of absolute . . . within himself"[13] whenever "in his transcendence he experiences himself as questioning, as disquieted by the appearance of being, as open to something ineffable." When this occurs it becomes much more difficult for him to posit "nothingness" as his primordial ground. Furthermore, it throws into question the human's self-understanding of "himself as a subject in the sense of an *absolute* subject . . ."

Rather, the "questioning" and "disquiet" places the subject within a wider horizon of relationality. The subject makes the *exitus* from the narrow confines of self *qua absolute* subject and she begins to embrace her primordial subjectivity as being a receiver, for one is a subject "only in the sense of one who receives being, ultimately only in the sense of grace."

A person's pre-grasp is therefore somehow an unthematic reminder to oneself that she has already been called into a relationship beyond one's self and into communion. The subject is being called into the "silent and uncontrollable infinity of reality" we call "mystery."

This mystery opens up the possibility for a dynamic relationality with the world. Rahner may conclude that being grasped by being is the condition for the possibility for a greater openness and freedom to both the transcendent and the categorial, an opening to a life of grace where grace means "freedom" from "the ground of being," a freedom "which gives being to man." And this transparency towards grace, this openness, is an "a priori openness" that is "present precisely when a person experiences himself as involved in the multiplicity of cares and concerns and fears and hopes of his everyday world."[14]

The "silent and uncontrollable infinity" we call mystery opens to us in self-communication. God becomes the eternally-being-revealed-answer to our insatiable desires and never-ending questioning. The face of the other, the sorrowful and joy-filled realities of our everyday—all moments of God's "self-communication"—are "offers" being "made to every man," and in accepting the offer one becomes "divinized in the ground of his existence."[15]

One responds to this communication by launching out on the pilgrimage of life as the prophet-mystic.[16] While this journey aims at a reunion with transcendence and bespeaks a *reditus* back towards the Absolute—"[f]rom the absolute within himself man can set out on his way to the absolute which is God"—it is also an openness in transparency towards others.[17] Grace finds the category of our flesh and blood, and the prophet communicates with grace through a life of involvement and concern with the cares of the world, a seeking-and-finding the face of God in *every* face.

Our metaphysical inquiries may therefore be essentially pointing us towards a theological inquiry into "being as creation." An exploration of the *drama* of being where, following Rahner's considerations, the flowing presence of being is a *creative* act "precisely when a person experiences herself as *involved* in the multiplicity of cares and concerns and fears and hopes." Or, as Heschel argues, "there is no being as being; there is only continuous coming-into-being. Being is both action and event."[18]

Norris Clarke argues that there is "an immense innate dynamism in the very nature of actual being." We may cultivate an awareness of this dynamism "[w]herever an act of existing is found, participated or unparticipated—to pour over into self-expression, self-communication of its own inner perfection or goodness."[19] This dynamic (neo-Thomistic) retrieval may corroborate Heschel's point on being and acting: the "immobility" of thought-thinking-itself is surpassed by action: "[m]ovement, creation of nature, acts within history," and eclipses "absolute transcendence and detachment."

An exploration of being as creation will therefore carry with it an ethical weight through the intentionality of acting subjects. And yet, it must be acknowledged, metaphysics customarily has a different starting point. In speaking of the attributes of God in the Thomistic system, for example, one begins with an understanding of who we are as finite human beings, whereas in Heschel's system something beyond our finitude is already wooing us: "[i]t is not 'the finitude of being which drives us to the question of God,' but the grandeur and mystery of all being."[20]

Oliva Blanchette argues that any description of the *attributes* of God, "such as God's simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity, immutability,

eternity, or unity," is attributive of God because it may *not* be said of persons. Through sustained and intense inquiries into *our* beingness (i.e., "what we know about composite, imperfect, finite, mutable, temporal, and multiple being") we will come to discover that there is a difference between us and God, and we come to know and appreciate God's difference from us by coming to know ourselves.

This anthropologically grounded "negative theology," this difference-in-relation, "opens up to us a broader understanding of *what* we are as finite beings, [and] creatures of God" while somehow "leav[ing] untouched the essence of God as God or of the uncaused Cause, which is the ultimate mystery of being."

Blanchette assures us that starting with a consideration of finitude and moving up towards God on an ever-widening *via negativa* need not characterize "a mean theology." Rather, it is a theology "informed by all that we know of finite being and, through it, of the *act* of being."[21] As Heschel argues, the "supreme and ultimate issue is not *being* but the *mystery of being*."[22]

The person-as-*microcosm*, however, as the condition for the possibility for what we may say (or may *not* say) about God's attributes is, again, not Heschel's starting point. God is *moving towards humanity*; an involvement *ad extra*, one capable of shattering "our solipsistic pretensions," and drawing us into a concern larger than our limits, inciting a response from us that is to be both pathic and kenotic (i.e., prophetic). There is a reversal of perspective: humanity is drawn into the awe-filled *macrocosm* of God the "Subject":

> Man's experience of the ineffable can provide the change of inner attitude, the reverse of Kant's "Copernican Revolution," which is a prerequisite for understanding God: the *thaumatic shock* can bring about the awareness in man that reality is not grounded in his individual or generic mind, but that the existence and functioning of his own mind and person are themselves a mystery in need of com-prehension. The reality of God can then be grasped not as the consequent, but rather as the premise of human thought.[23]

Heschel's approach begins from the marvel (*thauma*) that there is a certain mysterious ground in each human person that may be comprehended by the "Subject" (and, correlatively, but not completely, by others). While "Heschel perceives all created reality as existing within the sphere of God's presence and that God's presence permeates all things," he is nevertheless careful not to equate mystery with God.[24]

Speaking of an "uncaused Cause" or the "Mystery" *as* God is, for Heschel, a category mistake. He argues, "[i]n the biblical tradition, God was not immured in a conception of absolute transcendence. The Lord who

created the world manifests his presence within the world. He is concerned with man and is present to history."[25] The "grandeur and mystery of all being" is a ground, but nevertheless a penultimate ground: "*God is a mystery, but the mystery is not God*. He is a *revealer* of *mysteries* (Daniel 2:47). 'He reveals deep and mysterious things; He knows what is in the darkness and the light dwells with Him' (Daniel 2:22)."[26] A-God-who-has-a-concern is standing behind mystery as the ultimate Subject, ontologically presupposed as being the marrow wherefrom *pathos* flows.[27] There is a reversal of intentionality.

GOD THE SUBJECT, MAN THE OBJECT

In *Man is Not Alone* (1952), Heschel asks, "Who is 'I'?" Heschel argues that in "saying 'I,' my intention is to differentiate myself from other people and other things." But, Heschel contends, the self can never be objectively separated from one's *self*: "the self can be distinctly separated only at its branches; namely from other individuals and other things but not at its roots." There is something primordial, stable about the I: "[l]ike the burning bush, the self is aflame but is never consumed." The subject is "in travail with the ineffable," consistently struggling to answer the concern, "[s]omething is meant by the simile of man. But what?"

Existence itself is all too contingent, not giving up any answers to the primordial question of who "I" am: "[t]o exist implies to own time. But does a man own time? The fact that time, the moment through which I live, I cannot own." This brings us up against an incongruity with existence, challenging "my" stability, "if life does not belong exclusively to me, what is my legal title to it? Does my essence possess the right to say 'I'?"[28]

Heschel is arguing that the individual "I" is really separated from external reality. The self only "becomes aware of itself" through my "relation to existence." Yet in becoming aware of being a self, "I" also discover that "what I call 'self' is a self deception." The "self" believes that "I" can master and control existence. But this lie has often led to the dominance of others where, as Heschel argued for in *The Meaning of This Hour*, the "*killing of civilians could become a carnival of fun*" by a "*civilization which gave us mastery over the forces of nature but lost control over the forces of our self*" (*cf*. Chapter 1; *AH§10*).

Through "penetrating the self" *I* come up against the "monstrous deceit" that the "self in itself" as *individuum* is an incomplete story. In reality, "the self is something transcendent in disguise." Ultimately, the self cannot live abundantly as "an isolated entity, confined in itself, a kingdom ruled by our will."

While that which "is higher in us" has, in some ways, been "suspended" through ego-living, with this Heschelian insight humanity may begin again—as Rahner argues, "from the absolute within" herself—to set out towards "the absolute which is God." This way of being characterizes the *homo viator*, the pilgrim towards the ineffable: "Clear-sighted souls, caught in the tension of the lavishly obvious and the clandestine stillness, are neither dazzled nor surprised. Watching the never-ending pantomime that goes on within an ostentatious, turbulent world, they know that the mystery is not there, while we are here."

I steadily come to realize that "life is something that visits my body, a transcendent loan . . . the essence of what I am is not mine. *I am what is not mine*. I am that I am not." While *I* may daily "claim that my acts and states originate in and belong to myself," it is through "penetrating and exposing the self" that *I* come to realize that "the self did not originate in itself, that the essence of the self is in its being a non-self, that ultimately man is not a subject but an *object*." God may never be the "object" of the *I's* thought. While "[t]o think means to set aside or separate an object from the thinking subject," the "setting [God] apart" through an abstraction will allow us to "gain an idea and *lose Him*."[29]

We lose God whenever we put God at a distance. This *abstracting* is a way of controlling God by "bracketing" God in an idea. What is needed then is an overturning of our epistemological intentionality: "Thinking of God is made possible by his being the *subject* and by our being His *object*." All is contained within God as Subject: "In thinking of Him, we realize that it is through Him that we think of Him. Thus we must think of Him as the subject of all, as the life of our life, as the mind of our mind."[30]

Rothschild instructively concludes on this point: "In knowledge the subject 'takes' the object and incorporates it into his own self as an 'idea' . . . Thinking about God, however, is different. [God] is neither a thing nor an idea."[31] Heschel continues to argue for the epistemological reversal of intentionality in *The Prophets*. The drama between God and humanity points toward a "mutual inherence of the 'I'" where "an intention of man toward God produces a counteracting intention of God toward man." Yet, it is here "all mutual relations end," for in turning toward God, God is *always already* turning toward humanity: "man's awareness of God is to be understood as God's awareness of man, man's knowledge of God is transcended in God's knowledge of man, the subject—man—becomes object, and the object—God—becomes subject."

The divine Subject first proffers for relationship: "[e]very apprehension of God is an act of being apprehended by God, every vision of God is a divine vision of man. A mere human aspiration toward God, apart from God's loving election of man, is wide of the mark." While this relationship may be

characterized as one where there is a "dual mutual operation, a twofold mutual initiative" between God and humanity, it is God's primary initiative and appeal—a "transcendent divine attention to man"—that is the "ultimate element in the object of theological reflection" for Heschel.[32]

The religious person will therefore come to an "awareness" that she is "known by God," in being "an object, a thought in [God's] mind." *I* am contained within the Other, and this other's consciousness is *my* consciousness. It is the *I's* "knowledge of [God]"—where knowledge means "comprehend[ing] *only* what God asks of man"; this alone "is the essential content of prophetic revelation."[33]

Heschel tells us in *The Prophets* regarding the Subject's *pathos* that "God's role is not spectatorship but involvement. He and man meet mysteriously in the human deed. The prophet cannot say Man without thinking God." And God "discloses" to the prophet "a *divine pathos*." It is precisely this *pathos*—"the unity of the eternal and the temporal, of meaning and mystery, of the metaphysical and the historical. It is the real basis of the relation between God and man, of the correlation of Creator and creation"—that is made manifest to a prophet on behalf of a people, for "[t]he God of Israel is never impersonal . . . God is involved in the life of man . . . an interweaving of the divine in the affairs" of humanity.[34]

Kasimov argues that Heschel's "entire theological structure rests on the assumption that there is a personal God, a God who commands and makes demands on human beings, who is concerned and involved with human beings."[35] In light of this *personalist* horizon, we may take the next step and consider the phenomenological contours of *the call and response of pathos*. For Heschel, God's pathos is set forth as an invitation, as a call, and the prophet responds to this call. God's "I am" is met with the prophet's response: "here I am." Heschel's *mystagogy through mystery* brought us to resituate God as Subject.

The subverting of intentionality, this recentering of subjectivity in a God who has a concern for human persons, has far-reaching implications for a constructive (and metaphysically charged) postmodern ethics. Heschel argues,

> Man is not an all-inclusive end to himself. The second maxim of Kant, never to use human beings merely as means but to regard them also as ends, only suggests how a person ought to be treated by other people, not how he ought to treat himself . . . if the idea of man being an end is to be taken as a true estimate of his worth, he cannot be expected to sacrifice his life or his interests for the good of someone else or even a group.[36]

Again, this perspective overturns subject–object intentionality, overtly challenging the *cogito*'s drive to conquer and control. Indeed, "the bondage

of a fixed self" is exposed through Heschel's anthropologically frank considerations, for most individuals are an admixture of "polymorphous desires"—and "[w]e need to be aware of the fascist within us all and within theology, that is the desire to control desire in the other and the understanding of God."[37] The givenness from the Other will never submit to control. In this sense, the I may no longer master the Otherness in others by delimiting the very givenness of God. Furthermore, an autonomous, ego-driven way of living is *challenged* into being "decentered" by a more communal, empathic, and interreligiously sensitive way of living-with-others: "[i]f man is not more than human, then he is less than human."[38]

Yet, overturning and reimagining the intentionality of the relationship with Heschel's *conceptus* where *God is the "Subject" and Humanity is the "Object"* is an idea-picture that may obfuscate what is a strikingly more dynamic relationship between humanity and God.

One might consider the question from an anthropological point of view: What happens when *I* the subject becomes the Subject and, in turn, subjugates the other?

REPRISE: A LEVINASIAN ECHO IN HESCHEL?

In terms of the ethical relationship with the other person, for example, the gaze—issuing from the eyes—of the destitute other says to me in an originally sincere way: I need you. Levinas argues, "[t]he eyes break through the mask—the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks." Language is primordially "the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face." The other's *revelation-from-need* marks "me," but not primarily with vocalized words: "I need your help!"

The epistemic marking-event is prophetic and issues forth to "me" in the real-time "*fix your eyes on me!*" command from the other. The call is prophetic, for the gaze commands something radical from "me": "my" very *self*. At this juncture, the I is called, Levinas argues, into a "relation between me and the other beyond rhetoric," and it is at this point that one feels the powerful all-or-nothing undertow of the Levinasian ethical system issuing as a call from the other. Levinas argues,

> This gaze that supplicates and demands . . . deprived of everything because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes in giving . . . this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a face. The nakedness of the face is destituteness [*La nudité du visage est dénuement*]. To recognize the Other is to recognize hunger. To recognize the Other is to give.

The suffering other calls "into question . . . my joyous possession of the world" and puts everything about the everyday I call "life" into question. The presence of the other causes a rupture to the comfortable circle of being, calling persons beyond "egoist and solitary enjoyment," and into a hospitable solidarity. The I comes to know there is an other, and this other is in need.[39]

The other says, "Here I am!" so to speak, and overflows my own identity in the moral call. Levinas concludes, "The presence of a being not entering into, but overflowing, the sphere of the same determines its "status" as infinite . . . this overflowing presence is effectuated as a position in face of the same . . . as a moral summons."[40] Vocalized language therefore presupposes the originality of the face. The face of the other speaks to me, and invites me into relation.

The overflowing presence of the *visage* invites one into an experience of life, where the greeting *shalom* is to be spoken against and beyond objectifying totalities as "the infinity" of the other's "transcendence." Levinas argues, "[t]his infinity, stronger than murder . . . in his face, is the primordial *expression*, is the first word: 'you shall not commit murder.'" Recourse to words is somehow insufficient and superfluous; the call from one to the other in the language of the face-to-face has *already* taken place.

The "total nudity" of the other's otherness as communicated through his or her "defenceless eyes" disarms the "I," and draws one beyond resistance and into an ethical relationship directed towards the needs of the one who has been persecuted and rendered defenseless. Levinas says, "[t]hus I cannot evade by silence the discourse which the epiphany that occurs as a face opens . . . 'To leave men without food is a fault that no circumstance attenuates; the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary does not apply here,' says Rabbi Yochanan." The other arrives as an event, as a real-time phenomenological existent who appeals "to me with [his] destitution and nudity—his hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal."[41]

It is against the above radical claims in *Totality and Infinity* that Levinas subsequently articulates a rather passive perspective on subjectivity. In his perspective, the overflow of one's identity is essential for empathy, and reaches completion as long as I substitute myself for the other.

Indeed, there seems to be a sleight of hand in the theory: the passive moment of receiving the Other as my teacher or "Master" who "subtends" "my" freedom, is, in turn, subtended through "my" substitution for the other in the moment when "I" take responsibility for this other.[42] Levinas concludes, "substitution for another is the trope of a sense that does not belong to the empirical order of psychological events, an *Einfühlung* or a

compassion which signify by virtue of this sense. *My* substitution—it is *my own* that substitution for the neighbor is produced."

In moving from one extreme to the other, Levinas argues for a contradiction—"the subjection or subjectivity of the subject"—while at the same time arguing for the accomplishment of *Einfühlung* through "my" subjective substitution as "hostage." He seems to misread the dialogically free, "feeling-with," nature of empathy, and thereby re-introduces the primacy of the "I" through substitution.[43]

In the Levinasian system, therefore, the 'I''s passive harmlessness to the "overflowing" call of the other seems to be "forgotten" in the empathic moment when the "I," rather than "feeling with" the other, accomplishes the annihilation of the other through substitution. Michael Barnes registers a similar critique: "[i]s it possible for Levinas to avoid replacing the violence which would make the same the centre with the more subtle, but equally constricting, violence which would paralyse the self—what Gillian Rose criticises as a 'passivity beyond passivity'?"[44]

A replacement theory ethic misses the dialogical and communicative nature of the ethical relationship, and substitution reinforces the subtle violence of a one-sided "I think" translated into dialogical terms: "*I always know what's best for the other*." Substitution, therefore, does violence to the other for it reintroduces the primacy of the *cogito*, and destroys any possibility for empathic solidarity. For Levinas, empathy is not a "feeling with" the other. Rather, the "I" feels responsibility for the other, and substitutes his *self*: "I" replace my *self* for the other, and thereby re-introduce the hidden primacy of the "I."

The possibility for an ethical dialogue is reduced to a one-sided monologue when Levinas keeps the other as a face. Barnes thus concludes that Levinas may be "implicated in a neo-Kantian transcendentalism which leaves him always deeply suspicious of an account of phenomenality anchored in the visible, but equally uneasy about giving any account of the numinous on the grounds that to do so is to fall back into immanence and ontology."[45]

As we have seen, Levinas argues, "[t]o recognize the Other is to recognize hunger. To recognize the Other is to give."[46] It is about what "*I* give"—and in the moment of "me" doing what "I" have to do for the other, namely *giving*, I recognize the other. Again, "my" very recognition of the other is constituted through "me" and what "I" do. But does not one recognize the other in *the first moment of reception*, in first *seeing* the givenness of this unique, irreplaceable other?

Indeed, reception makes possible a loving givenness to the other, and vice versa. Levinas, however, would rather maintain the vast difference

between the phenomenal and the numinous. He says himself, "[d]iscourse is not love. The transcendence of the Other, which is his eminence, his height, his lordship, in its concrete meaning includes his destitution, his exile [*dépaysment*], and his rights as a stranger."[47]

While "there is a coinciding of the revealer and the revealed" in Heschel's approach—God the Subject does recognize the "face" of the other, in a *receptive moment*—the other is nevertheless constituted or "apprehended" by God as an object. God therefore carries out "the subjection or subjectivity of the subject" by becoming the Subject. The Divine Subject is therefore "the very over-emphasis of a responsibility for creation." God is the *Overemphasized*.

The question needs to be asked: Does Heschel hold "hostage" all other forms of subjectivity through substitution in this overemphasis? In nearly answering his own question that we posed earlier, "*[s]omething is meant by the simile of man. But what?*" Heschel responds, "[m]an is more than what he is to himself . . . he stands in relation to God which he may never sever and which constitutes the essential meaning of his life. He is a knot in which heaven and earth are interlaced."

Heschel also argues that "*To be* implies to *stand for*, because every being is representative of something more than itself; because the seen, the known, stands for the unseen, the unknown." Existence means to stand for something as someone, to stand as some *one* for an *other*.[48]

While embracing God as Subject amounts to the "*repersonalization* of God," one is left to wonder if, *pace* Heschel, an argument from where "man is object" is a subtle "dehumanization of humanity." Is there a truly "mutual inherence of the "I"? Does "*To be*" *really* imply to "*stand for*" justice and compassion as a witness *with* God? That is to say, does Heschel's approach through pathos maintain a transubjective situation between God and the prophet, or will Heschel's approach need to be creatively extended?

While the "resituating" of God in the key of pathos is indeed a positive "translation" of a divine concern into a (post)modern context, it nevertheless strikes us that the concretization of pathos may only happen through the "existence" of the *person* of the contemporary prophetic witness.[49]

The prophet's embodiment of pathos gives an ear to the divine call—and not only an ear, but also a voice of reproach and compassion. She is empowered by God to respond to the injustices of our contemporary world. Cohen argues, "There is to our view no faith, no wonder, no amazement, however radical and extreme, which can survive unless founded upon the immediacies of man's everyday existence." Indeed, God's subjective givenness towards the prophet will need to be met by humanity's givenness *back* towards God and the world. If "pathos seems to be all on God's side," then,

Cohen concludes, there will inevitably be a "deficient sympathy and compassion for those who are trapped in their unknowing and disbelief."[50]

The prophetic witness will be a first responder, as it were: one who courageously addresses what is unjust, negative, and "controlling" in our (post) modern *milieu*.[51] It is in this context where the prophetic witness realizes "the need of being needed," and from this realization one begins to embody a "striving to give rather than to obtain satisfaction."[52]

One unique face who realizes the "need of being needed" is that of Edith Stein. Hers is a portrait of a woman who incarnates a way of loving—in both her writings and her praxis—that responds to the givenness of another. We will come to consider how Edith Stein is a point of encounter, and gives a message today to Jews and Christians, theologians and others, on how we may go about the interreligious dialogue with one another.

We will examine Stein's phenomenological in-breaking through the lens of Marion's hermeneutic of "intergivenness." Intergivenness dialectically relates the two following points:

(i) To receive the Other—that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given and receiving oneself from it; no obstacle stands between the Other and the gifted.

AND

(ii) There is more: the gifted himself belongs within the phenomenality of givenness and therefore, in this sense, gives itself, too, in a privileged way.[53]

Through her writings and praxis, Stein's way of loving arises as a kenotic donation; that is to say, *an emptying that gives*.

In phenomenological terms, the givenness of Edith Stein "appears to the degree that it arises, ascends, arrives, comes forward, imposes itself, is accomplished factically and bursts forth—in short, it presses urgently on the gaze." This is most dramatically seen in her empathic way of being given through a loving self-surrender in solidarity—not substitution—with her Jewish brothers and sisters at Auschwitz.[54]

Stein promotes a way of "doing solidarity" that advances beyond a one-sided theory on empathic orientation: the problematic of the *locum tenens* of the "I" who "substitutes," "stands in," or "takes the place" for the other. Stein's relationship with the divine is of "constant and unremitting awareness," where God as personal and pathic is closer and more *knowable* ('*l'eida*')[55] to her than *her innermost thoughts* (*cf*. Psalm 139). Or, as Rabbi

Halevi teaches, in what has come to be regarded as a "classic formulation": "*Ana emtsa'ekh: U-be-tsateti li-qratekh li-qrati matsatikh* ('In going out toward Thee, toward me I found Thee.')."[56]

God's subjective givenness towards the prophetic witness is indeed met by the subject-*qua*-prophet's givenness in *giving back* a prophetic witness to God and the world. This praxis does not attempt to control with an "idea of God" that ultimately loses God. Rather, it is a confluence; the prophet is incited into action through this "unremitting awareness of God": "It is as bearers of compassion that we become the partners of [God] in Creation."[57]

Yet, before taking up Stein's theory and praxis in greater detail, we still need to clarify the following concern: what is the nature of this "sym-pathetic" call-and-response relationship between God and prophet in Heschel? A personalist hermeneutic, as derived from Mounier's *Personalism*, provides us with a lens for examining how pathos calls the *person* of the prophetic witness into relationship with the divine Subject.

While Heschel allows the prophet to respond with *prophetic sympathy* to God's call, one wonders as to the nature and kind of the prophet's "sympathetic" response. If God is the Subject, then may the prophetic witness also be qualified as a subject beyond the reification of being an unqualified extension (*vasum Dei*) of the divine? May the prophet's response be authentically "personal"? Is it possible to maintain a parity of esteem between God and the prophet *as subjects* if one interlocutor has become the "object" of all concern?

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CHAPTER 3

Pathos and Sympathy

Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950), formerly a professor of philosophy, founded the journal *Esprit* in 1932. *Esprit* became Mounier's platform for developing personalism as "'a philosophy of engagement . . . inseparable from a philosophy of the absolute or of the transcendence of the human model (Mounier, *Be Not Afraid*, Harper and Brothers, p. 135).'"[1] *Personalism*, published posthumously in 1950, is arguably a distillation of Mounier's insightful reflections on being-in-relation.

Mounier proposes that a "series of original actions" is inherent to a trans-subjective beingness with other persons. Our considerations thus far with Heschel have led us to consider whether or not it is "proper to apply the term 'personal' to God[.]" While the mystery of creation is ineffable the cause is all personal: "God is never an 'it,' but is constantly given as a personal spirit, manifesting Himself as subject."[2] But what could Heschel possibly mean by stating that God is "all personal"?

May a reasonable creative tension between transcendence and immanence be maintained when arguing for a personal God in Heschel? Is the call of divine pathos from a Divine person, and the subsequent response in prophetic sympathy from the prophet (who is presumably also a person), a relationship characterized by a truly creative trans-subjectivity beyond non-mutuality? If this is not the case, then what category—other than sympathy—will sharpen and maintain a dialectically more subtle intergivenness? Is there a phenomenologically more viable way of acknowledging both God's and humanity's subjectivity in one another's midst? Is God and humanity forevermore the object of the other's projected similitude, or may we re-imagine the relationship as a true partnership vis-à-vis a hermeneutics

from empathy, insofar as the prophet may be considered as an independent center of action who is responding to the call of this Other?

The enumeration of Mounier's "original actions" on what being a person means may give us two important tools for answering these questions: it may provide us with a personalist hermeneutic through which we may phenomenologically consider divine pathos (1); and a reading of pathos through personalism may give us further parameters for considering how God may be described as a person—apropos of God's relationship to the person of the prophetic witness (2). To that end, let us first present our interpretive tool of a personalist hermeneutic for considering pathos vis-à-vis Mounier's *Personalism* so that we may address the above questions.

THE PERSONALISM OF PATHOS

(i) *Going out of oneself*—The person is capable of detachment from oneself, of self-dispossession, of decentralizing itself in order to become available for others.

(ii) *Understanding*—This is ceasing to see oneself from one's own point of view, and looking at oneself from the standpoint of others. Not looking for "myself" in someone else chosen for his likeness to "me" . . . but accepting his singularity with "my" own, in an action that welcomes him, and in an effort that recenters myself.

(iii) *Taking upon oneself—sharing*—the destiny, the troubles, the joys or the tasks of another; taking him "upon one's heart."

(iv) *Giving . . . In generosity of self-bestowal*—ultimately, in giving without measure and without hope of reward. The economic of personality is an economic of donation, not of compensation nor of calculation. Generosity dissolves the opacity and annuls the solitude of the subject . . .

(v) *Faithfulness*. Devotion to the person, therefore, love or friendship, cannot be perfect except in continuity. This continuity is not a mere prolongation or repetition of the same thing, like that of a material or logical generalization: it is a perpetual renewal. Personal faithfulness is creative faithfulness.[3]

In light of the above we may begin to read pathos through personalism.

In regards to *Going out of oneself* (i) Heschel argues pathos as *transitive*. Pathos is "not a self-centred and self-contained state; it is always, in prophetic thinking, directed outward; it always expresses a relation to man . . . [i]t has a transitive rather than a reflexive character." This transitive concern, this *capability of detachment . . . of self dispossession*

(i) bespeaks an effusive concern for others. And this "elemental fact" in God is pointing towards a divine desire for solidarity with otherness: "[t]he predicament of man is a predicament of God." Theologically, pathos as *transitive* is "signifying God as involved in history," and this "insight" is realized "in the light of the prophet's awareness of the mystery and transcendence of God."[4]

In regards to *Understanding* (ii), the prophets "had no theory or 'idea' of God. What they had was an understanding . . . [t]o the prophets, God was overwhelmingly real and shatteringly present. They never spoke of Him as from a distance." The prophets "experienced the word as a living manifestation of God," where experiencing the divine "recenters" (ii) the prophet. The prophetic witness may therefore develop an "increased sensitivity" to the situation or "standpoint" (ii) of others through coming to know the divine Other.

Knowledge in the divine Person is therefore "not an impersonal knowledge," for God not only possesses "intelligence and will" but is also capable of *being possessed* along a pathic curve. That is to say, the divine Person may be "intimately affected" *with and for* humanity.[5]

The *Sharing* (iii) and *Giving* (iv) of divine pathos is *situational* and not attributive to God "as something objective, as a finality with which man is confronted." Rather, both sharing and giving are service (*diakonia*)—they are "an expression of God's will." Both are a form of service to the other, and are a "functional rather than a substantial reality . . . not an unchangeable quality, not an absolute content of divine Being, but rather a situation or the personal implication in His acts." So God's pathos is *situational*. And because God's pathos is situational it is also "ethical" because it is full of concern for persons: "God is absolutely personal—devoid of anything impersonal."[6]

It is "a reaction to human history"; "a response, not a cause" where God takes upon God's self *the* comprehensive reality of humankind: *the tasks, the joys, the troubles, the destiny of others* (iii). God as person engages with this reality *through the* economics—*or production—of a personality where donation, not compensation or calculation* (iv), is the *regula vitae communis* between the divine Person and persons. God, who is "the source of justice," is therefore capable of "taking human pathos and giving it an ethos for flourishing."[7] If the divine Person's "inner law" is inherently a "moral law"—where God's pathos is the ethos of *generosity* (iv)—then the translucence of pathos is capable of *annulling the opacity* (iv) of the self-enclosed subject.[8]

Finally, in regards to *Faithfulness* (v), pathos may be regarded as God's *continuous devotion to the person* (v), for "never in history has man been

taken as seriously as in prophetic thinking. Man is not only an image of God; he is a perpetual concern of God." Humanity experiences the echo and recall of the *continuousness* of God's memory for persons (v). This dynamic and recurrent initiation (*Einführung*) of God's pathos is not *a mere prolongation or repetition* (v); rather, it is *creative* (v) because it "adds a new dimension to human existence . . . [t]he import of man raises him beyond the level of mere creature. He is a consort, a partner, a factor in the life of God."[9]

The human person as God's consort "is constantly worked upon by God's spirit, and hence can never be altogether indifferent to the problems of religion" for pathos means that "God is never neutral . . . He is always partial to justice," for God's pathos "is something the prophets meet with, something eventful, current, present in history as well as nature."[10] Heschel commentator Matthew Schimm concludes, "divine pathos, though real, is an aspect of God's relationship with humanity rather than of God's essence . . . [w]hat is known of God in Scripture is knowledge of God's interactions with humanity."[11]

For Heschel, pathos is the "inspired communication of divine attitudes to the prophetic consciousness" while *also* being the "ground-tone of all these attitudes." Pathos is a divine effusiveness, the manifestation of the Other to others, a revelation not in "an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world." And in and through this personal relationship God does not "simply command" or "expect obedience." Rather, the relationship is one of compassion: the divine Person is "moved and affected by what happens in the world" and "reacts in an intimate and subjective manner."[12]

Pathos is a self-effusive givenness in concern, an understanding for the situation of the other manifesting itself as a real, not notional, presence. It is a divine concern impregnating itself in the human situation vis-à-vis the prophet's concern—where the joys and hopes and fears and anxieties of a people are already God's own.

The "slow and silent stream" (*cf*. Chapter 1) of memory is full of the living waters of pathos, an eternal concern touching the shores of *both* God and humanity as a perpetual promise: "*you shall be my people, and I will be your God*" (Ezekiel 36:28). It is a universal creative fidelity beckoning for the would-be prophet's sympathetic present-tense response to this mystery from the "past"[13]—yet a mystery that is full of "meaning"[14] in the present.

Pathos "expresses the conviction that the Deity cannot be understood through a knowledge of timeless qualities of goodness and perfection, but only by sensing the living acts of God's concern and his dynamic attentiveness in relation to man, who is the passionate object of his interest."[15] This

sensing and intuitive *feel* for the pathos of the living acts of God, and the response this intuition awakens in the one-other-than-God, is prophetic sympathy.

SYMPATHETIC SOLIDARITY

The "central endeavor" of prophetic praxis is to "set forth" God's "divine life" before the people as a concern—"not only a covenant, but also a pathos; not the eternal immutability of His Being, but the presence of His pathos in time" (i.e., God's "direct relatedness to man"). For ultimately "*all expressions of pathos are attempts to set forth God's aliveness*."

The prophet, having been "ineluctably placed within the field of divine perception," sets forth to the nations God's divine life through a remembering mindfulness: "Divine concern remembered in sympathy is the stuff of which prophecy is made." Remembering and reminding: remembering God's desire to be with the people, and reminding the people of this desire, incites a memory for the divine.

The prophetic witness is "living in the perpetual awareness of being perceived, apprehended, noted by God, of being an object of the divine Subject." This being "noted by God"—being able to "experience oneself as a divine secret"—is "the most precious insight" for the prophet.[16]

This *being* aware of God as the one called upon to remind both God, and a people, to remember the covenant they share provokes "a powerful active response" in the prophet. It is nothing less than a "voluntary self-alignment with the divine pathos" coming as a flesh-and-blood response to a call: *Henani*! ("*Here I am*"). Heschel calls this prophetic response sympathy, where "the human predicament is also a predicament of God" such that the prophetic witness "responds with *sympathy* and makes God's concern his own." This sympathetic "union" stands "[a]gainst *mystical union* where man attains a state of identity with the divine, and against the *idea of incarnation* where the divine becomes man." Through this divine and human coupling, "man's personality is not annihilated." Rather, the prophetic witness becomes "identified with the divine essence . . . feeling of complete solidarity with God's purpose" encouraging a "new kind of divine-human partnership."[17]

The prophet, by taking upon herself the "concerns" of God, makes God's concern her own. The "predominant and staggering aspect" the prophet "encounters" is one of being called to a "divine-human partnership," and this becomes the "central feature" of the prophet's *modus vivendi*.

The prophet *undergoes* a being called; God calls with the voice of pathos, and this voice bespeaks a total "involvement" of the prophet's entire

"religious consciousness." The prophet's "attitudes, hopes, prayers"—his entire being—is "stirred by an intimate concern for the divine concern."

There is a meeting of concerns: "the demand" is spoken to the prophet, and these "moments of revelation" are responded to in the "essential mode" of sympathy. There is an alignment of responsibility; an immediate and unmediated feeling with (*sym*-pathos) the divine: "*Epoché* in the face of divine involvement would be callousness to the divine." The prophet has a compassion-filled "awareness" for the "unity of the psychical life" wherein "passions" may "form an integral part of the human structure." The prophet, who is the sympathetic-other-to-God *per definitionem*, will necessarily find "an emotional religion of sympathy" to be more agreeable than "a self-detached religion of obedience."[18]

The prophetic witness not only "apprehends the divine pathos" but is also "*convulsed*" by the call. The prophet becomes "an *ish haruach*, a man driven and emboldened by the spirit of God,"[19] where the word "breaks out in him like a storm in the soul."[20] It is a convulsion inciting *not* a "mental appropriation" of the divine pathos but rather a "harmony of his being with its fundamental intention and emotional content."

The "*homo sympathetikos*" as opposed to Stoicism's "*homo apathetikos*" is attributed with emotions, and the divine pathos "takes possession of his heart and mind." This being possessed, as it were, by a divine concern, may enable the prophet to respond in the midst of opposition—that is, "with courage to act against the world."

The prophet, we may conclude, undergoes pathos: it is "an overflow of powerful emotion which comes in response to what he sensed in divinity." The prophet feels a concern "weighing upon *my* shoulders," where the "only way to intuit a feeling is to feel it." And furthermore, in "contradistinction to empathy"—where empathy implies "living the situation of another person"—"sympathy" intends a "living with another person."

But who is this person Heschel keeps telling us the prophet is "living with"? Prophetic sympathy is "a state in which a person is open to the presence of another person"; the prophet becomes available to the "presence and emotion of the transcendent Subject" where God is understood to be the Subject. This person-to-person openness between the prophet and God-*qua*-subject has a "dialogical structure." It is an "interpersonal relationship" phenomenologically evincing itself in two ways: (i) "a relationship between the one who feels and the one who sympathizes with that feeling" of the other; and (ii) "a relationship of having a feeling in common." And yet, both expressive nuances of sympathy are primordially a "feeling which feels the feeling to which it reacts." The prophet reacts, and by doing so feels the immanence of the transcendent Subject's divine pathos.

As distinct from a "religion of quietude or adoration," sympathy evokes "an attitude of many facets" that "knows no bounds within the horizontally human" situation. It is a response of "action" where *knowing no bounds* means responding to "the world's misery, society's injustice [and] the people's alienation." And the "religious legitimization" of the prophet's "feeling and affection" towards others is already underwritten by a transcendent concern: "from the vertical dimension within which pathos moves." The intersection of these horizontal and vertical dimensions "creates a marvel of intense existence" where call and response are being given to one another as a *feeling-with* and a *feeling-for* God's concerns. Within the prophetic consciousness "'mystical and rational thinking is combined'" in such a way that it "'puts to shame all slogans about rational and irrationalism.'"[21]

There is nothing less than an "emotional harmony and concord" with the Subject, and this sympathy "presupposes some sort of knowledge of the nature of the pathos" on behalf of the prophet. It may be a kind of "prophetic sense." And yet, this presupposed sense of pathos is not necessarily an "innate faculty" for sympathy. Rather, it is ultimately a response to a call: "the prophet has to be called in order to respond, he has to receive in order to reciprocate," and this reciprocity (i.e., the "prophet's communion" with God) is "complete surrender and devotion."

Yet is Heschel's philosophy capable of holding in tension "complete surrender" with a contemporary prophetic praxis, especially when cast against a dialogically sensitive, postmodern interreligious horizon? Kaufmann reminds us, "[d]espite its literary antecedents, the concept of God in search of man is not congenial to the modern mind. Few people today experience the irresistible compulsion of being seized by God, as did the ancient Hebrew prophets."[22]

TOWARDS A CONTEMPORARY PROPHETIC WITNESS: SYMPATHY AS SURRENDER?

Heschel argues for a necessary distinction between God and humanity (i) while also arguing for the "nonself" of the person-*qua*-prophet in his being given for God (ii).

In regards to (i): "it is mistaken to consider the duty of oneself and the will of God as opposites as it is to identify them. To serve does not mean to surrender but to share,"

while

> In regards to (ii): "[w]e have suggested that the outstanding feature of a person is his ability to transcend himself, his attentiveness to the nonself. To be a person is to have a concern for the nonself,"[23] for "[s]elf-centeredness is the tragic misunderstanding of our destiny" and the person will remain "spiritually immature" until "it grows in the concern for the non-self."[24]

Heschel's response-as-surrender may have the quality of being both kenotic and eschatological where God, understood to be the Subject, empties God-self into the other. The prophetic agent, as the aim of God's concern for justice and righteousness, also becomes the prophetic agent's concern. God's desire becomes the prophet's goal. And her response in striving towards this end bespeaks a radical givenness: she gives all of herself to *the concern* of the Other through a living for and with others. Indeed, through the decentralization of oneself the prophet becomes available for others, as argued for by Mounier. Such dynamic self-emptying stands in contrast to a formalized interiority as envisaged in the *cogito*.

The relevance of prophetic sympathy comes in a response that may be likened to "an undoing of the substantial nucleus of the ego" where, as Tracy argued (*cf*. Chapter 1), the "'ego' of the purely autonomous modern self" is undone through a prophetic witnessing to the other.[25] The prophetic witness becomes assigned to a future not of her own making through responding to the other.

Heschel argues, "[p]rophetic experience is more than an encounter or a confrontation. It is a moment of being overwhelmed by the tremendous arrival . . . it is more accurate to describe it as *the sense of being overpowered* by the word."[26] The Other, in a sense, energizes the prophet and stimulates her response, which is a response that tears her from the narrow circle of self.

The self-thematization of concern for only *what I need* is laid open to the wider campaign of the Subject's transcendent desire for justice and peace. Levinas concludes that the prophet "exhausts" herself in the saying, "here I am" for you from beyond "my" own needs, while Heschel refines the dynamic of being *exhausted* vis-à-vis the phenomenological category of being *exposed*: "in penetrating and exposing the self, I realize that the self did not originate in itself, that the essence of the self is in its being a non-self, that ultimately man is not a subject but an *object*."[27] The "directness"—this "being overpowered"—by "divine acts of expression" habituates the prophet to accept God's "expressions" with an "immediacy that does not require analogy"; that is, prophetic consciousness may affirm "the essential unknowability of God" while concomitantly holding for "the possibility of understanding Him by reflective intuition." Heschel concludes,

> Since the time of Descartes it has been asserted that the understanding of the other selves takes place through analogy. While it is true that we do not experience a person independently of his bodily actions or expressions, yet through, and in connection with, these expressions, other selves are experienced with the same immediacy with which we experience our own selves. Our conviction as to their existence is based upon directly experienced fellowship, not upon inference.[28]

For example, the "neutral observer" may come to a "comprehension" of what it means to be in love from another person who is in love "by way of analogy." The beloved, however—"the person for whom these expressions are intended"—this person has an "immediate understanding" of the intentionality: "the intuitive knowledge which the beloved person possesses [from the lover] is a primary factor in the act of understanding" that she is being loved. And so, in this sense, sympathetic understanding is comprehended at a new depth; it is realized as "solidarity (*Einverständnis*)" between lover and beloved in the present situation.[29]

WAYS TO KNOW GOD: PARTNERING WITH GOD AND THE WORLD

Edith Stein questions in *Knowledge and Faith: Ways to Know God* whether or not "we should speak of knowledge of God at all." For while one may hold for a "natural" and "personal experiential" knowledge of the divine, in prophetic experience this knowledge "will always be taken as coming from God." The prophet who receives the revelation "knows that he is undergoing divine action." For example, "Isaiah looked upon God himself and heard his word . . . *he became certain in his innermost being that God himself was present*. And only when this happens may we speak of a personal experiential knowledge of God." In Stein's account the prophet gradually becomes "certain" of God's presence and pathos as a unique *center of action*. There is (i) a looking upon God; (ii) a hearing of the word; and (iii) a reception of the word. The prophet gains a *personal* and *experiential knowledge* of God as a subject. The prophetic witness is a person endowed with critical abilities, as one going on pilgrimage *with* God for the sake of the world.

Undergoing "divine action" for Heschel, however, means a being "convulsed" *into surrender*. In Stein's view, however, the prophet passes through "various degrees and transitions" wherein "[e]ach higher stage represents a richer, deeper self-revelation and commitment of God to the soul." This will mean "an ever deeper and fuller penetration into God and acquaintance with him, which demands from the soul an ever more total surrender."[30] In this sense, surrender is neither a once-and-for-all immediate event, nor does it mean the

forced capitulation of one's unique "I." It is a gradual deepening of a subject-to-subject relationship with the divine, where a partnering with God will also mean a partnering with the world for the sake of God: "*Here, the Divine and the human are joined together: both are redeemer and both are redeemed* . . . the center of religious obligation for us lies in the realm of *beyn adam le-ḥavero*, the realization of divinity through deeds within the human community."[31]

How could it be otherwise? How may one surrender a "nonself"; unless, of course, one's subjectivity has been completely reduced to the level of an object? But the prophet needs to be more than a means to God's end. The prophetic witness, rather, also gives meaning to the divine project. The contemporary prophet, knowing herself as an independent center of action, and yet a partner of God, balances this call to responsibility with personal freedom so that her response may be inclusive of the human situation.

Stein concludes, "in faith divine and human freedom meet" and faith "as mediated encounter . . . awakens a longing for an immediate encounter with God . . . the very content of faith awakens desire." And yet, this longing for immediacy never trumps freedom. Stein, therefore, while arguing for the distinct and real possibility of a prophetic givenness in sympathy, is also phenomenologically frank in considering the real possibility of non-reception that happens between persons:

> But in the case of any knowledge of persons, rather than disclosing [*erschliessen*] oneself, one may *close* oneself [*verschliessen*]—even withdraw behind one's own work. In this case the work still means something, retains an objective significance, but it no longer opens up to access to the person, it no longer provides the contact of one mind to another.[32]

If Heschel is going to maintain God under the nomenclature of divine Person, then the question arises as to whether or not the prophet's knowledge of God, as presented as solidarity-through-sympathy, is illustrative of a person-to-person, transubjective relationship, or is the prophetic witness a mere extension of God's pathos? Are "other selves," even God, really "experienced with the same immediacy with which we experience our own selves"?

Prophetic sympathy, if it is personalist, will respect the Divine Person's distance and belonging to other persons. The intergivenness of love, authentic trans-subjectivity, works within the dialectical nexus of relating-in-unity what is distinct such that a *being exposed* does not mean the "annihilation" of selfhood. Mounier puts it well: "the person, by the movement which is its being, *ex-poses* itself." And this exposure of itself shows itself to be "communicable": "I exist for others, and that to be is, in the final analysis, to love."[33]

SYMPATHY *SHAPING* PATHOS: BEYOND SURRENDER THROUGH MUTUALITY

While Heschel argues for an *Einverständnis* (e.g., "to serve does not mean to surrender but to share" and "[t]he culmination of prophetic fellowship with God is insight and unanimity—not union," where God is more a mutual "partner"[34]), in other places, "in contradistinction to empathy" he argues for the "meontology"[35] of surrender: *the self is exposed, overpowered; one is greeted with the* "immediacy" *of becoming a* "nonself" through the giving of oneself.

If the God of the philosophers may be likened to one who "thinks, but does not speak"—as one who "is conscious of himself but oblivious to the world"—while the God of the Hebrew Bible is "the God of Israel . . . a God Who loves, a God Who is known to, and concerned with, man,"[36] then an argument from *non-mutuality* ("the subject—man—becomes object, and the object—God—becomes subject" so that "all mutual relations end," *cf*. Chapter 2), especially in light of Heschel's personalist horizon, subtly undercuts the prophet's freedom to respond as *this* irreplaceable person who is partnering with God.

While the prophet's mission is coextensive with the *missio Dei* in building the reign of justice and peace, their personalities, the divine and human, are not contiguous. If God's pathos is, as Heschel has been arguing, situational "as an expression of God's will" in time, a "functional reality" capable of responding to the *this-ness* of the world, then one must believe that the "critical capacities" of *this* particular contemporary prophetic witness at this *particular* moment in time are indeed needed for the world project of *tiqqun olam*.[37]

Lest we overstate the case, Heschel's personalist argument *does* protect God from being "conceived as an abstract principle or process," and (re)situates the divine "as the *living God*."[38] Heschel concludes in *The Prophets* that prophetic experience is ultimately "a feeling of subjective presence, a perception of what may be called *Someone here* . . . [God] is all-Subject, not the object of man's quest," for it is God "[w]ho is in search of man."[39] Indeed, the prophetic witness need not live from the hope of drawing out the Unmoved Mover through a unidirectional love: "[t]he final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved (*kinei dê hôs erômenon, kinoumena de talla kinei*)."[40] This one-way desire, *my* subjective hyper-kenotic givenness towards the Unconcerned and Unresponsive Deity, subverts a more dialogical understanding of *pathos;* this, too, is a way of loving *beyond mutuality*.

For the personalist view, however, Heschel commentator Fritz Rothschild's pithy turn of phrase recommends itself in describing the God who

is *living* as *Someone here*: "[t]he pathetic God as distinguished from the God of Aristotle is not the Unmoved Mover but 'the *Most Moved Mover*.'" The Most Moved is qualified beyond the self-sufficiency of the "inner *logos*" of *Nous-Nousing-Nous*. In this sense, this Living Other may be "called a *person*."

And yet, is Heschel's attribution of God *as Person* "strictly correct"? Personhood "usually denote[s] the essential structure of a human being which determines his modes of behavior. God, whose essence is incomprehensible and who is known only by his acts and expressions, cannot properly be called a person."[41] Eliezer Berkovits, in a rather trenchant review of *The Prophets*, sharpens this perspective in a critique:

> Jewish theology begins when one realizes the implications of the presence of both aspects, that of the Absolute and of the Personal, in the biblical concept of God . . . the fundamental challenge to Jewish theology through the ages has been how to reconcile the awareness of God's transcendence with the awareness of God's livingness and concern, which are one in the Jewish concept of God. It is this challenge that gave no rest to the outstanding Jewish philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages; it is this challenge that is completely ignored by Dr. Heschel.[42]

This raises the necessary *proviso*: how far may Heschel's analogy of God as person really go? Does the Divine Person's subjectivity trump the very God-given subjectivity of the prophet?

Is the prophetic witness an independent center of action that is in an increasingly greater communion and communication with God and others, or is she a kind of mere extension or "conduit"[43] for the divine pathos; as if the prophet "were not present" but rather simply "a repository of information," where one behaves toward another as though he were an object, "which means in effect, despairing of him"?[44]

The prophet needs to be more than a *vasum Dei* of a God who seemed silent in the face of genocide. The prophetic witness, who will also be part mystic in contemporary, dialogical situations, will need to feel the "freedom" of being given to the interfaith dialogue. The prophetic witness is then rightly challenged by contemporary exigencies to be one who attends to God's concern where faithfulness *is creative faithfulness* (v). And if *personal faithfulness is a creative faithfulness*, then the prophet's response to the many vicissitudes of everyday living ought to have a concomitant shaping influence on God's pathos.

In this sense, God's pathos is in *perpetual renewal* (v) insofar as the divine Person's getting-together with humanity is responsive to the plurivocal, multiform, unity-in-diversity structure of interpersonal relations. So

when the *I* regards the other as a subject—or when the *I* regards God's regard for the other as subjective—this is "to treat [the other] *as a subject, as a presence*—which is to recognize that I am unable to define or classify him, that he is inexhaustible."[45] While Berkovits' criticism raises our attention to the further necessity of relating how God's immanence may be "situated" in a sharper dialectical tension with transcendence, we also believe that to view such a "distance" as insurmountable would be facile at best.[46]

Indeed, Heschel's *oeuvre* shows an increasing desire for a more dialectically subtle articulation of how God's immanence is subtending God's transcendence precisely because of what is at stake for a post-*Shoah*, Jewish and Christian understanding of prophetic praxis: "transcendence in reference to God means difference, not distance . . . the more transcendent God is, the more immanent—as every mystic knew."[47]

NEITHER SELF-ABNEGATION NOR SELF-INFATUATION: MUTUALITY

Stephen G. Post, in challenging the idea of non-mutuality, appeals to Heschel's own insights on a pathic God in arguing that a "'spontaneous and unmotivated,' 'pure and disinterested'" love, divine or otherwise, remains immutable love. Post concludes that a "[m]utual love" is the "only appropriate fundamental norm" not only for "human interrelations" but also "for the divine-human encounter as well." If God's pathos is "all personal" then the prophet's love will be selfless and also self-regarding:

> While the egocentric love of self that places the "I" at the center of the universe is anathema, so also is the abandonment of all self-concern that confuses the valid prohibition against selfishness with selflessness. It is as much a moral violation of the equilibrium that mutuality entails to negate the "I" as it is to ignore the "Thou." Mutuality, not mere giving, is the goal of love.[48]

The sameness and otherness of both God and the prophet, where one's sameness is related to the other's otherness "along a range of varying distances in the relation between self and others,"[49] is verified by Post's more discriminative approach from mutuality.

Neither God's *self-infatuation* nor the prophet's *self-abnegation* (or vice versa) is an adequate approach. A dialectically sensitive mutuality tempers any surrender to non-otherness for only subjects-in-relation, where "[t]he *thou*, which implies the *we*, is prior to the *I*—or at least accompanies it,"[50] may be "a pattern" for humanity's relationship with the divine.[51]

It is therefore our contention that Heschel's perspectives may be critically advanced towards a more contemporary, interreligiously attuned vision of what it means to be a prophetic witness through the *tertium quid* of empathy. Moreover, the beginning of the response may *already* be found in Heschel's phenomenology on sympathy through an indirect appeal to the concept of empathy in Edith Stein's phenomenology vis-à-vis Max Scheler.[52]

EMPATHY: "REAL LOVE IS CREATIVE OF DISTINCTION"

In *The Prophets*, Chapter 7, "Religion of Sympathy," Heschel argues, following Max Scheler, that sympathy may be articulated as a "fellow feeling, or sympathy *for* God." This sympathy of fellow-feeling "involves the prophet's intentional reference of the feeling of joy or sorrow to God's experience." God's pathos is presented as "my" pathos "in an act of understanding," where understanding God's pathos means *undergoing* God: "my" "primary commiseration is directed" towards, as we have argued, an *Einverständnis*: an understanding-towards-solidarity with God.

This structure is "complex": pathos and sympathy are happening simultaneously in real time, where there is "an articulation of God's view and identification with it." It is an articulation of compassion: "in taking God's part [the prophet] defends the people's position, since in truth God's pathos is compassion. For compassion is the root of God's relationship to man." Heschel concludes that this "is the true meaning of the religion of sympathy—to feel the divine pathos as one feels one's own state of the soul . . . there is no fusion of being *unio mystica*, but an intimate harmony in will and feeling, a state that may be called *unio sympathetica.**"[53] The asterisk refers to a footnote in *The Prophets* in which Heschel tells us: "'I am not "one with" the acrobat; I am only "with" him' (Edith Stein, quoted by M. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy* [New Haven, 1954], p. 18)."

The example of the acrobat Scheler refers to, and Heschel references in the footnote, is originally from Edith Stein's doctoral thesis, *On the Problem of Empathy*. Being "*with*" the acrobat versus being "*one with*" the acrobat is illustrative of the subtle distinction(s) Stein contributes to a more comprehensive consideration on the dynamics of empathy, in contradistinction to sympathy.

This would highlight, even from within Heschel's text, that the prophet's sympathetic response to the call of divine pathos is necessarily sensitive to distinctions. Even Scheler will conclude that any direct parallel between divine and human "personalities" will ultimately need to be differentiated because anything less renders "a two-fold error in that it involves

a naturalizing of the divine personality, as well as the human, and thus a total or partial privation of the spiritual element."

While not wanting to overstate the "ontological gulf" that "true mysticism" hopes to "retain," an appreciation for distinction between subjects—even between the Subject and subject—may be pointing us towards a consideration of how Heschel's use and appeal to the category of sympathy (as being self-regarding while also being *other*-regarding) may be less akin to the prophet's direct sympathy vis-à-vis "fusion" with divine Person and more about "participat[ing] in the divine activity" through an empathy with the *missio Dei*.[54]

Jodi Halpern concludes that this "distinction between empathy and sympathy is important." While sympathy is descriptive of the phenomenon of "shared emotion," it is "empathy" that is concerned with "understand[ing] the perspective" of the other: "*Empathy is a process in which one person imagines the particular perspective of another person. This imaginative inquiry presupposes a sense of the other as a distinct individual*."[55]

Empathy is a kind of phenomenological preamble to love precisely because it is a category that remembers for us the distinctiveness of the other as other. Mounier is helpful on this point: "They are mistaken who speak of love as self-identification. That is only true of sympathy, or of those 'elective affinities' in which one is seeking to assimilate more of some good quality, or to find some resonance of oneself in someone similar. *Real love is creative of distinction*."[56]

'CON-PRIMORDIALITY': THE NON-DISSOLUTION OF THE "I"

When we turn directly to Scheler's text (*The Nature of Sympathy*, Chapter 2) on "The Classification of the Phenomena of Fellow-Feeling," with particular reference to the question of "Emotional Identification" (part 4), one is immediately drawn into the question: what is "the true sense of emotional unity"? Scheler employs Stein's argument against Theodore Lipps' example of "the acrobat" in order to argue against Lipps' understanding of "emotional unity," where the identification of oneself with the other really means the *loss* of self to the other. Lipps' acrobat example runs as follows according to Scheler:

1. the absorbed spectator of an acrobat in a circus performance identifies himself with the acrobat such that,
2. the spectator reproduces these movements within oneself, in the character of the acrobat such that,

3. only the *real* self remains, while
4. the spectator's "*conscious* self has *sunken* completely" into that of the acrobat.

This *sinking* of the "*conscious* self" leads to the annihilation of mutuality. Scheler argues that this is "infection": one's otherness is simply reduced to the same. It is an "involuntary" and "unconscious" identification of one with the other that amounts to the loss of the conscious self.

Scheler, in wanting to guard against this reduction of the self, employs Stein's insight on empathy, as presented in her doctoral dissertation, *Neues zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Freiburg, 1917), as a way to triangulate his criticism of Lipps. Scheler says that Edith Stein:

> . . . has interposed a just criticism [of Lipps] on this point. "I am not", she says "one with" the acrobat; I am only "with" him. The correlated motor-impulses and tendencies are carried out by a fictional "I," which remains recognizably distinct as a phenomenon from my individual self; it is simply that my attention is passively fixed throughout on the fictional "I," and by way of this, on the acrobat.[57]

We must acknowledge that it is from within this context that Heschel's asterisked footnote on the nature of prophetic sympathy is obtained. Stein's horizon is concerned with preserving the distinctive qualities and attributes of "*my* individual self," while nevertheless acknowledging, at the same time, that *being* a self is being one who is "with" others in relation—that is, genuine empathy "annuls the solitude of the subject." This is the essential dynamic that a phenomenology on empathy hopes to explore and clarify.

Stein also addresses the acrobat example. To make evident the distinction of being "*one* with" the acrobat *versus* being "with" the acrobat, here Stein introduces us to the dialectic of primordiality/non-primordiality in order to balance a relatedness to the other that remains respectful of self-consciousness. In *On The Problem of Empathy* she argues, "I do not go through [the acrobat's] motions but quasi," and "what 'inwardly' corresponds to the movements of the [acrobat's] body" is *given* to my "primordial" experience "that 'I move,'" in a "non-primordial" way. Stein argues, "in these non-primordial movements I feel led, accompanied, by [the acrobat's] movements."

Stein will conclude that "what led Lipps astray in his description was the confusion of self-forgetfulness, through which I can surrender myself to any object, with a dissolution of the 'I' in the object." Stein, along with Scheler, is

eager to guard against the "dissolution" of the subject through an over-eager self-forgetfulness. Empathy is therefore not a feeling of complete *oneness* but rises, as we will come to consider with Stein, "con-primordially."[58]

Empathy may therefore be a dialectical *tertium quid* insofar as it may help instigate a deeper reflection on how sameness and otherness subtend one another. Stein argues through "con-primordiality" that one's zero point of orientation is indeed the other. As *Knowledge and Faith* revealed, Stein's approach as a scholar is methodical and sober, carrying with it the intentionality of a phenomenological sincerity for exploring how life is lived, not in brackets, but in the everyday.

Stein's own empathy-in-praxis conveys a contemporary, interreligious significance, revealing how the renewal of empathy *in* dialogue, an ethics of empathy,[59] or an *Einfühlungsethik*, may be constitutive to the twenty-first-century Jewish-Christian project of engagement.

To recall from Tracy, a "[h]ermeneutics"—or an *interpretation from empathy*—may help us recognize "the 'possibilities' (and therefore, the live options) which any serious conversation with the 'other' and the 'different' can yield." Halpern argues,

> [E]mpathic curiosity pushes one to differentiate one's own from another's experience. In order to take an interest in the distinct perspective of another, one has to recognize that each person's life experience positions her differently . . . [a] critical step in rehumanization is to view another person as a complex, nonidealized individual.[60]

Heschel also argues: "Both communication and separation are necessary. We must preserve our individuality as well as foster care for one another, reverence, understanding, cooperation."[61] The sharing of narratives bespeaks a genuine "esteem for the otherness of others and a tolerance which does not exclude the search for dialogical discourse which is to establish more coherence for the search for truth." It is a dialogue that fosters a kind of "identity in partnership (*Identitätspartnerschaft*)," as von Brück suggests, whereby "tolerance is not a careless 'letting be' but the openness for the other and the own so as to work out the creativity of possibilities."[62]

Stein's empathically minded scholarship and praxis, the narrative of her work and life, points to a dialectical way of belonging *transubjectively*: from her newfound place of Christian otherness, she remembers and shows a concern for her Jewish sameness.

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CHAPTER 4

On Empathy

Edith Stein was born on October 12, 1891, in Breslau. Her birth coincides with one of the most important holy days for the Jewish people: The Day of Atonement, *Yom Kippur*.[1] Stein says the "correlation of events was so important to her mother that it was the paramount reason why [she] held her so dear." Stein, the youngest in a family of eleven, was a "willful" and "headstrong child" who often became "infuriated when she could not have her own way." Always at the top of the class in the *Gymnasium*, this willfulness develops into an insatiable curiosity and desire for truth in her adult life.[2]

The courses of both Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler have a seminal effect on Stein during her Göttingen University days (1913–1915). Scheler teaches Stein a "'feeling for values' (*Wertfühlen*)" and a way of feeling one's way into living "which breaks through all systems and concepts and a priori notions to reveal the fullness of being to 'the seeing eye and empathetic heart.'"[3]

An empathically attuned philosophical attitude, if it is to be truly personalist (i.e., directed towards real others), will *value* that a subject is always a subject in relation: "[b]eing is either open to, or dependent on, what is more than being, namely, the care for being, or it is a cul-de-sac, to be explained in terms of self-sufficiency."[4] Under the guidance of the "Master" Edmund Husserl, phenomenology becomes a first teaching; and she discovers a new vehicle for appreciating the interconnectedness of persons.

This methodological inquiry into the existential event-horizon(s) of human living, where "[a]ction is experienced as proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person," eventually comes to inform Stein's own way of living in the world. She becomes radically "given" to a way of

living, even from behind the walls of Carmel, that bespeaks a prophetic kenosis towards *real others* who are being persecuted by the genocidal totality of Nazism.[5] Stein's predisposition towards the *real* makes her increasingly more suspicious of an idealistic philosophical inquiry. She remarks in 1913 during her student years at Göttingen:

> [Husserl's] *Logische Untersuchungen* had caused a sensation primarily because it appeared to be a radical departure from critical idealism . . . [i]t was considered a 'new scholasticism' because it turned attention away from the 'subject' and towards 'things' themselves. Perception again appeared as reception . . . All the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists. However, the *Ideas* included some expressions which sounded very much as though the Master wished to return to idealism. Nor could his oral interpretation dispel our misgivings. It was the beginning of that development which led Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called "transcendental Idealism" . . . [t]his was a path on which, to his sorrow as well as their own, his earlier Göttingen students could not follow him.[6]

Stein *qua* phenomenologist is very much interested in exploring and delineating one aspect of the phenomenon of reciprocal subjectivity between persons because "[p]henomenology wants to address the whole question of the experience of and the encounter with 'other subjects' (*Fremdsubjekten*)."[7] She therefore makes the move from perception to reception through a phenomenological inquiry on the reciprocity of givenness, under the psycho-spiritual category of empathy. She says about her project,

> Now the question needed to be settled: what did I want to work on? I had no difficulty on this. In his course on nature and spirit, Husserl had said that an objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively, i.e., through a plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in a mutual exchange of information. Accordingly, an experience of other individuals is a prerequisite. To the experience . . . Husserl gave the name *Einfühlung* [Empathy]. What it consists of, however, he nowhere detailed. Here was a lacuna to be filled.[8]

Dermot Moran, in an essay on the phenomenology of empathy entitled "The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," frames the question for us: "the problem is: how do I constitute someone else as the *alter ego*, as another ego (*Ich*), with its own 'centre' and 'pole' (*Ichpol*) of psychic experiences, affections and performances?" It raises the question: how do I "grasp" the other's "*cognitive* and what in German is called *Geistigesleben*, 'spiritual life'"?[9]

Stein completed the dissertation in 1917, entitled *On The Problem of Empathy*. Stein's academic pursuit in phenomenologically describing empathy awakens a deeper appreciation within herself for the world of inwardness: "All that constant drilling about looking at everything without prejudice and throwing away our blinders hadn't been in vain. The bars of the rationalistic prejudices I had unconsciously grown up with collapsed, and there, standing in front of me, was the world of faith." This "collapse" of "prejudice" awakens in Stein a growth of trust in others. It is this trust-in-others that ultimately embraces an ever-widening interreligious continuum of Jewish–Christian relationality. And it is precisely this renewed sense of faith in otherness that she eloquently describes in her dissertation on empathy.[10]

Empathy as truly being *Einfühlung*-in-action; a kenotic given-for-ness into the heart of the world of otherness—a response to a need in a "moment of crisis"—resounds throughout Stein's life as a profound *conatus essendi*; a "struggling for life" against the horizon of the *Shoah*. What becomes the fertile ground for her theoretical reflections on empathy was *already* being prepared through an ever-widening *lived empathy* as a Red Cross nurse during the First World War (1914–1918). She eloquently describes this *pilgrimage towards the other* in her autobiography, *Life in a Jewish Family*.

BEGINNINGS OF *EINFÜHLUNG*: LIFE IN A JEWISH FAMILY, THE LAZARETTO[11]

Stein immediately conveys to the reader in *Life in a Jewish Family* the awareness that the fate of the Jews could soon be her own fate. In the preface of the book, Stein chides a friend for her inability to understand how Hitler came to his blind hatred of the Jews. Stein challenges this friend to open her eyes to the "horrendous caricature" that was looking out at them, and all Jews. The "programmed writings and speeches of the new dictators" were a monstrous indication of the things to come. This new reality encourages Stein to witness to her consanguinity with Judaism by writing *Life in a Jewish Family*. She gives the following reasons for doing so:

> Recent months have catapulted the German Jews out of the peaceful existence they had come to take for granted. They have been forced to reflect upon themselves, upon their being, upon their destiny . . . Repeatedly in these past months, I have had to recall a discussion I had several years ago with a priest belonging to a religious order. In that discussion I was urged to write down what I, child of a Jewish family, had learned about the Jewish people since

> such knowledge is so rarely found in outsiders . . . Last March [1933], when our national revolution opened the battle on Judaism in Germany, I was again reminded of it . . . I would like to give, simply, a straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one testimony to be placed alongside others.[12]

It is interesting to note the date of this foreword to her autobiography: Breslau, September 21, 1933. On October 14, 1933, less than a month later, and ten years after her conversion to Catholicism, Stein enters the Cologne Carmel. The writing of *Life in a Jewish Family* was her first major project as a Carmelite: "a strange project for a postulant to undertake, at her superiors' urgings . . . a detailed memoir of a Jewish upbringing." [13] Stein writes her Jewish story from the place of her adopted otherness: Carmel. This text-as-witness, beginning with the very title, *rightly remembers* a life of being Jewish. Stein's flesh and blood *anamnesis*, as conveyed to us in her own words, challenges the lies about the Jewish people that were being programmed into the German nation while keeping *alive* the memory of being Jewish.

In July of 1914 we find Stein reading at her "small desk, immersed in Schopenauer's *The World as Will and Idea*." Stein plans to attend a lecture when, at five o'clock in the afternoon, she receives the news of war. Stein skips class and journeys back home from University to Breslau where she unreservedly presents herself for Red Cross service ("I placed myself unconditionally at their disposal"). Stein desires to give herself completely to something bigger than herself: "The first such grandeur she encountered was the Great War . . . It was clearly Edith Stein's desire to disappear into devotion to a greater good."[14] Her immediate desire is to go to the front ("preferably to a field hospital") but she first needs to train in the art of nursing. She spends several weeks at All Saint's Hospital [*Allerheiligenhospital*], and immerses herself in the work of caring for others ("everywhere I found plenty to do. One never felt like a fifth wheel."). As in studies, Stein proves herself to be both an efficient and caring nurse: "I got the impression that the sick were not used to getting loving attention and volunteer helpers therefore could find endless opportunities to show their own compassion and love of neighbor in these places of suffering."

In 1915 she receives a call to report to a place of great suffering: a lazaretto (*Seuchenlazarett*) at *Mährisch-Weisskirchen* in Austria. Stein faced heavy opposition from family and friends, including a warning from the chief academic officer for the local humanistic *Gymnasiums*, Privy Councilor Thalheim: "Do you know what goes on in a lazaretto?" Stein retorted

to Councilor Thalheim that although she "did *not* know" what war was like, there is nevertheless someone in *need*: "I found it even more essential that persons with a serious attitude should go to work there . . . I would permit nothing to divert me from my course." Both the Stein family and Councilor Thalheim meet with Stein's determined willfulness. She reported to the field hospital in April 1915.[15]

Stein "got along well" with the other nurses and carries out her duties with uncompromising dedication. She wonders about the devotion of other staff members ("one had the impression that in this they were motivated more by ambition than by a love for humanity"). At the same time, she freely agrees to take on more work ("I cheerfully accepted any kind of duty entrusted to me and was always happy to substitute for others"). One nurse in particular, Susanne Mugdan or "Suse," comes to enjoy a mutual and profound friendship with Edith Stein.

Stein is taken up with Suse's *Jewish–Christian* background. Suse's mother "had all her children baptized Protestant after her husband died." While Stein wonders as to why Suse's mother ("Frau Mugdan") had her children baptized ("out of a peculiar mistaken maternal solicitude to insure for them a more prosperous future") she also concludes that Frau Mugdan, "a kind and benevolent woman," did not baptize her children for "her own advantage." But this situation "was never a source of gratitude" for Suse, and proves frustrating: "[Suse's] genuine straightforward soul rebelled against changing one's religion except from *an inner conviction*." Even in the midst of "anti-Semitic remarks," occasionally thrown about the lazaretto—an insensitivity that drove Suse to silence—Stein never denies her roots ("the ability to come forward with a simple acknowledgement that I was Jewish").[16]

It is easy to gloss over the importance of the context wherefrom Stein writes the above acknowledgement of being a Jew: again, it is from her newly adopted post-Catholic, post-Carmel situation where she reaffirms her consanguinity with Judaism vis-à-vis the portrait of her friendship with Suse in *Life in a Jewish Family*. While Stein's subsequent conversion to Catholicism (1922) is one of *inner conviction*, it also becomes a way of belonging to otherness with greater confidence and courage. She freely belongs to others, Gentile or Jew, and her real-time kenosis towards others, through a widening empathy as a nurse, frees her for completing her considerations on empathy, a project she began entertaining as early as 1913–1914.

After returning from the war, in late 1915, she takes up her study of empathy from a new less-limited and tranquil point of view; from a space widened by compassion. She tells us:

> In *Weisskirchen* I used to get anxious indeed when I leafed through the pack of abstracts and outlines. And the winter, that dreadful winter of 1913–14, was not yet forgotten. Now I resolutely put aside everything . . . and began, entirely at rock bottom, to make an objective examination of the problem of empathy . . . Oh, what a difference compared to my former efforts! . . . I was like a tiny dot in limitless space . . . I lay as far back as I could in my chair and strenuously focused my mind . . . After a while, it seemed as though light began to dawn . . . and as soon as one point became clear, new questions arose in various directions (Husserl used to call these "new horizons").[17]

What was the difference? Husserl argues in *Cartesian Meditations*, "the *cogitatum qua cogitatum* is never present to actual consciousness [*vorstellig*] as a finished datum; it becomes 'clarified' only through explication of the given horizon" and the continuous awakening of these new horizons ["*der stetig neu geweckten Horizonte*"]. Furthermore, the "predelineation" of *the what* (cogitatum), while "at all times imperfect" or "indeterminate," nevertheless "has a *determinate structure*."

Husserl provides the following helpful example drawn from observing a gaming/casino die for describing a process for how one may "look" for the "new horizons" in and through the "structure" of one's experience:

> For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as coloured, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This 'leaving open', prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the 'horizon'.[18]

Prior to her wartime service, Stein comments in 1912–13, "what I had learned about phenomenology, so far, fascinated me tremendously because it consisted precisely of such a labor of clarification . . . one forged one's own mental tools for the task at hand."[19] And yet, it is Stein's *praxis of service* to others at the lazaretto that helps to instigate the subsequent creative unfolding, or "clarification," of her theory on empathy. The other or others of the lazaretto breaches that which was like an *impregnable wall*. The "new horizon" of otherness awakens knowing at a new depth: Stein comes to reflect upon her own experience: "*after a while, it seemed as though light began to dawn . . . and as soon as one point became clear, new questions arose in various directions*."

We have been arguing that Stein's theoretical considerations on empathy have an antecedent, experiential ground during the years of the Great

War. Most notably, Stein's service to others at the lazaretto shapes her scholarship on the "phenomenology of human personality."[20] It is precisely the distillation of this newer horizon into a theory on empathy that will serve as a kind of *magna carta* for how she will live the rest of her life. We must therefore take some time in appreciating this important text on empathy.

This consideration may further assist us in underlining how Stein's *subsequent* praxis of *living empathy*, of standing with others in a dialectically attuned, *intersubjective* matrix of relating sameness and otherness, is grounded in this "clarified" theoretical ground. This consideration may further reveal how her prophetic response to the call of *pathos* runs with and through her Jewish identity and into her Christian belonging.

THE GIVENNESS OF *EINFÜHLUNG*

Stein opens the question of describing the "certain character" of the empathic event with the following descriptive example in order to draw us into a consideration of *how* we may describe the phenomenological process of empathy. That is to say, what goes on in "me" when "I" enact empathy?

> A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain. What kind of an awareness is this? I am not concerned here with going into the basis on which I infer the pain. Perhaps his face is pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained. Perhaps he also expresses his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but they are not my concern here. I would like to know, not how I arrive at this awareness, but what it itself is.[21]

We know from experience that the expression of pain on the face of the other, whether it be drawn from the above example or our own experiences, is only a visible pointer into the hidden "other." The pain he or she is feeling *here and now* is unique and intimate to them.

The fact that "I" am there to recognize and "take in" this pain is a necessary prerequisite for empathy. Moran argues, "this temporal coincidence is an important structural feature of empathy . . . The empathised experience is experienced as being in the same *now* as my own experience. The other experience is given in a presentified 'now' which is identified with my 'now.'" And in this same *now* "I" undergo the experiencing of "my" friend's concerns as she is in pain. Her concerns become "my" concerns. The heave and pitch of giving and receiving is the enacted language of this

concern, drawing "me" beyond a "solipsistic world," and into the drama of intersubjectivity.[22]

This present-tense presence, the other's face, heightens *pathos*: a transcendent concern in "me" for the other(s). "I" therefore take the first step towards *Einfühlung* in orienting "my" self around *the look* issuing forth from the other. There is a "natural unity" between the other's countenance and the other's feelings. For example, "The sad countenance [on the face of the other] is actually not a theme that leads over to another one at all, but it is at one with sadness." And "my" preliminary orientation towards the other's look, as an outwardly perceived event, is a first *real* signpost on the journey into *Einfühlung* with the other.

Stein argues that the other's givenness already "implies tendencies" for the other "to advance to new givennesses." In this we hear the echo of Husserl. The other is a "new horizon," and this horizon will leave "further particulars open" for further observation and incorporation. The successful execution of empathy will necessarily depend upon how open and sensitive—in a word *given*—"I" am to the multifaceted horizon of the other. Stein, however, does insist that the experience of pain in one's own life is ultimately of a unique and personal nature. She argues, "[y]et, in principle, I can never get an 'orientation' where pain itself is primordially given" in the first person other.[23]

So while "empathy is a first-person experience" it "does not have the same intentional structure as a sense perception." [24] Empathy is "my" experience, and is drawn from, as a reaction to, the experience of the other. But my experience is not the same as the other's original sense experience. What then is the trajectory of empathy's givenness? It is somehow the same, and yet uniquely distinct from, the primordial experience of the other. Stein proposes a nuanced position—situating "my" givenness of empathy as being "con-primordial": *as arising from myself* and *the other*.

EINFÜHLUNG AS CON-PRIMORDIAL: DYADIC

Empathy arises as both primordial—as "my" unique "present" experience of the other—and also "non-primordial in content," for the experience first and foremost belongs to the other. The experience "arises before me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I 'read in another's face'). But when I inquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content, having pulled me into it, is no longer really an object." [25] "I" become one *with* the other by turning to the

content of the event *as if* I were the subject. Stein delineates the process of *Einfühlung* as follows:

(i) The content of an experience, upon reflection, pulls "me into it," and thereby ceases being an object of reflection.
(ii) Rather, the content "I" examine takes a secondary position—i.e., "I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it,"
(iii) And the "I," in turn, becomes "the subject of the content in the original subject's place."
(iv) Stein concludes, "only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object."

The unique expression on the other's face, her entire countenance, calls me into a preliminary reflection on what is being revealed before "my" eyes (i). Then a movement happens that may be described as a *metanoia* towards the other; a comprehensive *turning towards*. A new givenness as conversion to the subjective experience of the other wherein the "I" gains a "new image" of the other insofar as the "I" stands in solidarity with the other (ii).

While I may never be the other, or substitute myself for the other, the experience of the other's content moves to be "my" experience in a "con-primordial" way. I become *the subject of the content in the original subject's place* (iii). Stein concludes that the empathized content will "again face me as an object" (iv). But what is really facing me again? What objective state does that which, through empathy, "ceases to be an object" we return to?

Stein argues vis-à-vis this new third term of con-primordiality that when I interpret the other from her point of view, the other's "spatial world" becomes "a new zero point of orientation" for "me." By "empathically projecting myself" into the life-world of the other "I shift my zero point to this place" and "empathically, non-primordially" achieve this "new image" or deeper insight and understanding of the other while nevertheless "retain[ing] my 'primordial' zero point and my 'primordial' orientation."[26]

Einfühlung may therefore mean a dynamic "intergivenness" in a world of otherness. It is the kenotic *feeling of one's way* into the life of the other where one and the other enter a "new horizon" of relationality. Empathy consists in a *double movement* where the friend who is mourning, for example, presents herself to a preliminary "being seen by the I" (i), whereas "being seen" subsequently unfolds into a more intimate and radical givenness to "me" from the other (ii).

EMPATHY'S DYADIC STRUCTURE

It strikes us that if empathy is con-primordial then it may be considered as having a dyadic structure, for the empathic act is both extraverted and introverted.

The extraverted ground of empathy, as we have seen, may be described as the moment when the "I" sees, for example, another person in mourning (i), followed by the subsequent objective (and preliminary) reflection on her status before "me" in space and time (ii).

The introverted ground of empathy may be described by the following movements: the "I" takes the objective data presented "out there" (e.g., "there is another in pain for her grief" (i)) and renders oneself *given anew* to the data in a subjective way (ii). One's subjective givenness to the data of the other thereby brings one to a new "meeting point": the very place of the primordial subject herself.

Empathy brings the profound lesson from the other to me in an intimate way, as a feeling, as a concern, and "I" show this teaching as a lesson learned through my own physical, psycho-spiritual reorientation: a *being given anew* towards the one with whom I empathize. It is the way "human beings comprehend the psychic life of their fellows. Also as believers they comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts of their God in this way."[27]

What "I" know will remain "blind, empty and restless" unless it points back to "some kind of experienced, seen act. And the experience back to which knowledge of foreign experience points is called empathy." Empathy is a deeply intuitive realization about the status of another *as other*.[28]

The *I* has experiences in the real world where any notion of a "pure I" is an "empty" concept, for 'I' depend on an "experience of an outer world and of an inner world." Stein commentator Mary Catherine Basehart concludes,

> The *I* is revealed as the subject of actual qualitative experiences, with experiential content, lived in the present and carried over from the past, experiences which form the unity of the stream of consciousness . . . this consciousness is body-bound consciousness. The body given in consciousness is sensed as 'living body' (*Leib*) in acts of inner perception and in acts of outer perception. It is outwardly perceived as physical body (*Körper*) of the outer world; but this double givenness is experienced as the same body.[29]

The moment of "my" primordial experience of the other—arising from the real-time extraverted phenomenality of the other—is the necessary prologue to the more non-primordial and self-reflective experience of the other. In the con-primordial moment, the self, as a physical and

psycho-spiritually transcendent self, makes a pilgrimage towards the other where "I" "greet" the other as she greets "me," with her own inner and outer modes of being given in the situation. It may be argued, therefore, that empathy is a kenotic response of living from one's interiority with givenness. I give myself freely to the place of the subject as prompted by the former; the original phenomenon, the other's unique call and countenance.

The con-primordiality of empathy is nothing less than a double-givenness where extraverted and introverted moments of empathy are dialectically related beyond the authority of "my own perceptions": "[i]f I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice: once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy as originally foreign." Stein concludes that "this non-primordiality of empathized experiences causes me to reject the general term 'inner perception' for the comprehension of our own and foreign experience."[30]

Empathy reaches beyond inner perception and towards transcendence by grounding itself in a world of values.[31] Stein argues, "this 'self'-experiencing 'I' is not the pure 'I,' for the pure 'I' has no depth. But the 'I' experienced in emotion has levels of various depths."[32] What makes this *world of values* transcendent for Stein is a *feeling for and with the other*, beyond a highly privatized, solipsistic *cogito* where "I think" never means "I am feeling" into the terrain of the other, where this empathy informs and challenges prior epistemological commitments on who or what the other and otherness is and means for "me."

HESCHEL ON EMPATHY

In a fashion corresponding to Stein's thesis on empathy, Heschel refines his categories in speaking of prayer as "an act of empathy" where "our reading and feeling the words of the prayers" is accomplished through "an imaginative projection of our consciousness into the meaning of the words." In this way we may con-primordially *feel* "the ideas with which the words are pregnant." Heschel argues, "[a]t first, the words and their meaning seem to lie beyond the horizon of the mind . . . [w]e must, therefore, remember that the experience of prayer does not come all at once. It grows in the face of the word that comes ever more to light."[33] Notice the correspondence between Heschel's and Stein's perspectives. "I" imaginatively project "myself" towards the Other in prayer. And just as one rises to the "greatness" of the words in the prayer of empathy, we rise to the greatness of the other when our prayer becomes the deed of a *living* empathy.

Edmond La B. Cherbonnier, in commenting on Heschel's thesis of prayer as empathy, argues for the natural "empathy" between prayer and prophetic-action-in-the-world: "Feelings can be conveyed by inarticulate sound and gestures, as they are by animals . . . Prayer is primarily about action-God commissioning men to action ("Here am I-send me"), or men asking God's help. This kind of communication cannot get very far without words."[34] Heschel concludes that words "demand an intensity of dedication which is rarely present." But so does our devotion to otherness: "Judaism stands and falls with the idea of the absolute relevance of human deeds . . . *Imitatio dei* is in deeds. The deed is the source of holiness."[35]

The deeply subjective, introverted moment, "the private, the intimate dimension of the word, the subjective side of the message,"[36] as "*my* moment of reflecting on the reality of the other before me," allows for the radical "breaking in" of another's reality into my psycho-spiritual being.

The introverted moment of "me" being given to the datum of the other is a "new horizon" that is simultaneously reverberating outward as a call *towards the real other*. The call points me directly back to the *living word*: the extraverted reality of this other whom *I* am endeavoring "to feel with"; *her pain as my pain, her joy as my joy, her suffering as my suffering*. And yet, as Cherbonnier argues, empathy is more than a feeling, for "the best way to express mutual empathy is through deeds (*mitsvoth*)" but "deeds require interpretation."

While "in a close relationship between two people the significance" of a mutual empathy "becomes self-evident," a greater "clarification" of what one shares with the other may be required in other situations. For example, "in case of misunderstanding" or in the complexity of interreligious interactions, "the meaning" of empathy will need to be "put into words" through the deed of the dialogue.[37] Empathy delineates a dialogical and dialectical *trans-subjectivity*, where the physical and spiritual worlds of oneself and another begin to meet across a widening range of sociopolitical and theological perspectives.

EMPATHY'S DIALOGICAL STRUCTURE: TRANS-SUBJECTIVITY'S REPRISE

Alastair MacIntyre, in his study *Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922*, argues that in empathy there is a "closer relationship between first-person and third-person accounts"[38] where "closer" means devotion, while also meaning an ever-more-subtle "differentiation"[39] between oneself and another. Empathy between the first and third positions, in dialogue, may necessarily point towards further clarification and debate, with renewed dedication, to a common cause. This pursuit of a greater understanding

through an empathic engagement may point towards a more sustainable dialogical sympathy between the first- and third-person(s) perspectives. Let us take the following example of the globe from MacIntyre:

> Here I lay myself open to what is presented to me in a perceptual experience and report what I see. What I see is a revolving globe with rapidly changing patterns of color. When I report the successive colors, someone else observing the same globe says, 'Between the yellow and green was a very thin line of purple which you missed. Look again!' I look again and see the purple. My first-person report is corrigible in the light of the third-person reports.

Here one thinks of Husserl's casino die. In this case, however, "I" am looking at the data with others. Whether it be a die or a globe, our looking together at the same thing, and our reflection back to one another on what we "see," opens up the world of dialogue. The dialectic between the first and third person(s) is a creative tension where, in personalist terms, the "understanding of ourselves is open to correction by what we learn about ourselves from others through our empathetic awareness of their view of us."

This "iterated empathy" of how others "view us" is a way of being dialogically given to the other for "what we had hitherto taken for granted about our own motives" submits itself to a cross-examination of sorts through the simultaneity of living together as persons in "first and third" dialogical situations. Through the ebb and flow from oneself to another—in "becoming aware of the evaluations of others, including their evaluations of us"—we may begin "to question our own evaluations."[40]

Stein concludes that the process of empathy may be described along "three levels or modalities." And these modalities are: (i) the emergence of the experience, (ii) the fulfilling explication, and (iii) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience.[41] In regards to (iii) Stein argues, as we have been considering, that "only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object" (*cf*. Heschel, Chapter 3).

Once empathy has been accomplished the other faces me again as an object. In light of MacIntyre's considerations, it strikes us that the dynamic between "the first and third" perspectives, as being constitutive of a discerning empathic engagement, would put to question a return to the level of objectification. *Pace* Stein, a "comprehensive" objectification may subtly (re)introduce an *undoing* of the pathic mutuality conceived by Stein in her third term of con-primordiality.

We have been critically wondering with Heschel as to whether or not "mutual" and "personal" may be attributive of God in his thought. We

concluded that the "overturning" of a relational trans-subjectivity in favor of a "Subject to object" intentionality between God and humanity makes the argument for non-mutuality all the more plausible. Might this mean that there is also a subtle return to the "non-mutual" in Stein through a return to a comprehensive objectivity?

At variable and unpredictable degrees in Heschel, the "intergivenness" between God and the prophet seems to oscillate between two poles. An undifferentiated and direct *sympathos qua* non-mutuality ("here all mutual relations end"); at other times, Heschel raises the possibility of the prophet and God being in a transubjective situation. This raised the following question: may the prophet's "sympathetic" response to the call ever be completely personal? As a response issuing from a prophet who is an independent center of action—or, as Stein would argue, as a response from *my* "zero point of orientation"—and towards a God who is also mutual because he is personal?

Empathy in the key of transubjective mutuality strikes us as being a phenomenologically more viable category when speaking of the relationality between personal subjects. Furthermore, trans-subjectivity is another way of naming what Stein is accomplishing by way of the *via media* of con-primordiality. As she herself says, "Husserl had said that an objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively . . . he gave it the name Einfühlung."

MacIntyre concludes that Stein's thesis of empathy, to be sure, argues for a dynamic interpersonal mutuality capable of recognizing the following: "[t]he 'I', whether as perceiver or as agent, is partially constituted in and through relationships with others." And this being constituted relationally "involves situating myself bodily in relation to others and to those objects which are shared objects of perception by myself and by those others" in such a way that these "*different types of social relationship into which we enter make a significant difference to the kind of human being that we become*."[42]

That which was once solely the other's is now something that is being shared between subjects. The other's primordial experience is "*still there*, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience." And there it will remain as being primordial in the other while being con-primordially given to "me." Any return to the objective level must therefore be a return *through* the subject, so what faces "me" again as an object may no longer carry with it a sense of the "objective" that connotes indifference or "detachment."

Take, for example, the act of loving and being loved. Norris Clarke, in *Person and Being*, a creative *rapprochement* towards a more dynamic Thomism, argues that "once one crosses the threshold into personal being the picture begins to change significantly. Once one begins to analyze love,

in particular the highest mode of love, the love of pure friendship, it is clear that mutuality is of the essence of this love."[43] A return to an empty spatial-temporal perspective of before-being-loved would seem to be impossible to accomplish *after* the experience.

It would be an attempt to deny the memory of the other in oneself. One's relationship with the other does *make a significant difference to the kind of human being that I become*. In this sense, the other "I" love may *never* completely return to the status of being "comprehensively" objectified by "me." "I" may never place the other on the shelf marked before "I" loved "you."

While we do not believe that there is a subtle return to non-mutuality in Stein, we would nevertheless want to strenuously preserve the doctrine of con-primordiality for *Einfühlung*. Con-primordiality begins to balance a necessary distance-in-relation constitutive of an empathic response while also challenging a forgetfulness-for-the-other that is accomplished in non-mutuality. Stein's doctrine of con-primordiality pushes us to acknowledge that within the perichoretic drama between the "first and third perspectives," "my" assumptions become open to the possibility of being challenged by the other. Ultimately, I must acknowledge that "I" am involved in the process of *Einfühlung*, and this experience of *my* empathy with the other changes "me."

It is precisely the idealism implicit in Husserl's approach, where a return to a comprehensive objectivity regarding *this* other becomes untenable when considered in light of Stein's "con-primordiality." MacIntyre is instructive on naming this objection to Husserl's approach: "The 'I' of the phenomenological standpoint is always and necessarily subject and not object. How can this 'I' have the same reference as the 'I' and the 'me' of individuals who are always subjects and objects? It is of course true that the end purpose of the phenomenologist is to give an impersonal account of the nature of the experience of joy as such, of what it is for anyone to be joyful. But a condition of the phenomenologist's report being true is that what *he* has inspected is *his* joy, for otherwise it would not be 'subjective' in the required sense."

The "I" is in fact being converted towards a greater receptivity of otherness in its variegated forms:

> Like the Sleeping Beauty, we must first be touched by another before we can wake up to ourselves. This process of awakening from latent to explicit self-consciousness is one that unfolds slowly, spread out over several years of time. And it seems that the explicit awakening to self-awareness as an 'I,' as a self, can only be done by another human person, reaching out to us with love and treating us as a person, calling us into an I–Thou relation.

This "being awakened" by the other does not vitiate self-possession but heightens it, for it encourages oneself and the other to be more completely human.[44]

EMPATHY'S INTENTION: THE REHUMANIZATION OF THE OTHER

Jodi Halpern argues that "empathy serves as a normative ideal for a rehumanized view of the other" where empathy shows forth in "the ability to individualize rather than stereotype."

Empathy encourages the cultivation of a *habitus* for "tolerance of ambivalence" and challenges an "organization of experience through feelings of resentment, anger, or fear." Above all, empathy is realized, *not* "in an intense moment of sympathy, but in living together and genuinely attending to another's perspective over time. Such an understanding seems to be the basis of genuine social cooperation." The give and take between oneself and the other "rehumanizes" the "We" within the "I and Thou" relationship.[45]

We considered with Stein that when one encounters the friend grieving, the "I" first objectively *sees* the other grieving. But the "I" must move beyond an intentional objectivity by allowing the *givenness of the other* to do kenosis towards "me." That is to say, in being open to her givenness "I" may begin to "feel with" the pain of this friend in mourning. Thus, the lover-loving-the-beloved, and being loved in return, is a complete portrait of giftedness, and exhibits the reciprocity of giving and receiving beyond substitution and towards a transubjective solidarity. Empathy results in more than a mutual exchange of "*objective* information."

Stein's phenomenology evinces a way of being in the world where the possibility for solidarity, the communicative and reciprocal praxis of empathy, is no longer foreign: "But 'I,' 'you,' and 'he' are retained in 'we.' A 'we,' not an 'I', is the subject of the empathizing."[46] In other words, "the *thou*, which implies the *we*"—that which is "prior to the *I*"—is empathy's desired interpersonal horizon *(cf*. Mounier, Chapter 2*)*.

Correspondingly, Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenological concept of "intergivenness" may be one of the more helpful hermeneutical keys for appreciating how *Einfühlung* encourages a conversion towards the "we": the one who enacts empathy, "receive[s] the Other—that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given," and, reciprocally, the one receiving empathy, "the gifted," "belongs within the phenomenality of givenness." The gifted, in turn, "gives [herself]" to another, and/or back to, the original empathizer.[47]

Empathy may be related along the following personalist contours:

(i) "I" become aware of the concerns to the O/other subject.
(ii) "I" take "the original subject's place" in being given to the concerns of this O/other.
(iii) Where taking "the original subject's place" means being given *transubjectively* (Heschel) and con-primordially (Stein) to the other; it is an *intergivenness* between one's self and the other.
(iv) This intergivenness is a self-regarding and self-effusive givenness towards a world of otherness; a freely given response to the call of the other who, while in relation to "me," always remains *free* and *other*.

This exchange, beyond economy, and kenotic in nature, is the very exchange of the gift of love from one to another. Mounier likewise argues that the "communion of love" between persons "liberat[es] him who responds to it" while it also "liberates and reassures him who offers it." And through this intercommunication "love is not only reassur[ing] me simply of a state of being in which I find myself, *for it gives me to someone else*. Love is the surest certainty that man knows; the one irrefutable, existential *cogito*: I love, therefore I am."[48] "Being gifted" therefore opens up the possibility for a transformative "being as communion" with otherness.[49]

We have been arguing that there is a dynamic "intergivenness" presupposed in *Einfühlung*. No return to a "comprehensive" objectivity, where comprehensive could be interpreted as meaning a quasi-denial or "forgetfulness" of the prior experience of the other, is possible. The erasure of the memory left by "you" on "me" and vice versa would (re)introduce a "barren" concept of a solely self-sufficient "I," who, on the level of the "we," risks mutating into totalitarianism.[50]

Stein's phenomenology of empathy "begins with the awareness of one's own being that is concomitant with the acts of consciousness."[51] Yet, it is her devotion to *real* persons that challenges an *epoché* of forgetfulness for the other.

Stein, in following Husserl's lead, "focuses on the 'things' of experience . . . and probes them by way of descriptive analysis." But it is precisely these "'things' of experience" that "presuppose" a real world. Just as there is a "correspondence" in knowing, where givenness arrives in relation, between what is *being given*, and what is meant and intended by the *being-given* through an "act of reflective apprehension" so, too, is there a necessary dynamic "intergivenness" among persons in the world. This "correspondence," this partnership-in-giving among persons, may serve as a kind of "*Grund*" that makes the

"fulfillment, corroboration, confirmation" and interpretation of knowledge possible across an ever-widening continuum.[52]

Stein recognizes the human person as uniquely capable of fulfilling a vocation for transcendence through being "pathic" towards others, for "only the person as spirit can go beyond the self and relate cognitively and affectively to others in the full sense of these relations."[53] She argues for the "unified givenness" of the "I." That is to say, the "I" is an undivided "center of orientation" and action. Yet, it is "the awareness" of the self as an "*I*"-in-relation-to-others—as one who is "brought into relief" by "the otherness of the other"—that becomes the data for Stein's exploration of empathy.[54]

Edith Stein's more theoretical vision of empathy finds a flesh-and-blood givenness through her own praxis from the time of her conversion, entrance into Carmel, and subsequent death at Auschwitz. Her work, not only significant for phenomenology, has a contemporary importance for Jewish–Christian dialogue.

In particular, Stein's middle-way of con-primordiality not only allows the subject to move beyond the level of self-containment, but opens the "I" to the possibility of experiencing "*me*" *being contained in the other*, and *the other being contained in* "*me*." In a word, it inaugurates a being open to dialogue.

At the outset, we may conclude that a living *Einfühlung* in *interpersonal* encounters may be a "school of the heart" wherefrom one may emerge as more dialogical, compassionate, and remembering—that is, a more-completely-given "rehumanized" other—in a world of others. From this perspective, it would seem that Heschel's concept of "transsubjectivity" actually speaks to what Stein wishes to accomplish through the use of "con-primordiality." Heschel's poem "I and You," considered "emblematic" of the "shared pathos" between God and humanity, gives us a powerful poetic insight into how an empathic desire longs for solidarity among persons:

> Transmissions flow from your heart to Mine,/trading, twining my pain with yours./Am I not—you? Are you not—I?
>
> My nerves are clustered with Yours./Your dreams have met with mine./Are we not one in the bodies of millions?
>
> Often I glimpse Myself in everyone's form,/hear My own speech—a distant, quiet voice—in people's weeping,/as if under millions of masks My face would lie hidden.
>
> I live in Me and in you./Through your lips goes a word from Me to Me,/from your eyes drips a tear—its source in Me.
>
> When a need pains You, alarm me!/When You miss a human being/tear open my door!/You live in Yourself, You live in me.[55]

This desire for living in solidarity—*When a need pains You, alarm me! When You miss a human being tear open my door!*—signals a new way of prophetic witnessing. Stein's way of witnessing will mean cultivating a praxis that is constitutive of being *more than* religion's stereotypical *vasum Dei* while also being *nothing less than* a genuine collaborator; an epicenter of freedom and creative faithfulness, where "my" encounter with the other will incarnate a genuine intersubjective communion that is sensitive to the interreligious situation.

Stein's prophetic witnessing resonates well with Heschel's vision: one's response to a divine concern is transitive insofar as it may be localized as a kenotic concern; a radical concern-for-others-as-openness-to-death. This is evident throughout Stein's life, even before she goes behind the walls of Carmel.

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CHAPTER 5

A Finite and Eternal Being

Conversion and Carmel

In the spring of 1917, Edith's dissertation, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*, was published in Halle, Germany. Adolf Reinach was killed on November 17, 1917, in the Ardennes Forest. While Stein was greatly disturbed by the death of her professor and friend, she recalls how deeply impressed she was by the faith-filled response of Anna Reinach: "rather than appearing crushed by her suffering, the young widow was filled with a hope that offered the other mourners consolation and peace."[1]

After his death she "came to stay with his wife and sister for a while since they had asked her to classify the professor's manuscripts."[2] The death of this friend, mentor, and one-time chief assistant to Husserl "affected an opening for her" because it was during this time when Stein discovered, "in the course of classifying [Reinach's] papers, some 'Notes on the philosophy of religion' which astonished her."[3] Reinach writes, "*Man muss keine Angst vor den letzten Gegebenheiten haben*, 'One must not be afraid of the ultimate realities.'"[4]

REINACH'S PERSONALISM: A NEW HORIZON

John M. Osterreicher, theologian and drafter of *Nostra Aetate*, writing in 1952, some ten years before the Second Vatican Council, argues that there is an abiding Jewish and Christian significance in Reinach's notes on the philosophy of God. Reinach, a Jewish convert himself to Christianity,

articulates metaphysical vision in personalist themes. One comes into contact with the absolute of transcendence in living from a pathic personalism.

On May 16, 1916, Reinach writes from war: "[d]escription of piety, (a) the opening of oneself, receptiveness, (b) the *absolute* direction upward, upward to an absolute above, symbolized in the look of the sky."[5] Reinach "returned again and again to the concept of the absolute." The absolute, limitless in and of itself, provides a "frame" wherein "love, goodness, gratitude, trust, dependence, weakness" become "thinkable" as givennesses varying in "strength and height" to this immeasurably "absolute" given.

While "no one who has ever plunged into the idea of God's love can say that it can grow in breadth or length or height or depth," human love does, however, strive for "new heights and depths," towards fulfillment, in being given to the other: "one stretches toward infinity, the other holds infinity within itself." When one reaches in love towards the other, one is reaching towards the absolute. Reinach writes on June 23, 1916: "In regard to the transcendent world, the human person is pure receiving; in regard to this world, both receiving and giving."

The "intergivenness" presupposed in human loving reawakens a sense of empathy with the absolute. The self-sufficiency of the subject, "the desire to be lost in a gelatinous world . . . to be drowned in a state of endless stupor, to be sustained *not* by the living God—Person caring for person—but by the dreary, unconscious and loveless expanse" is a pessimism that is not capable of dissuading Reinach—even while in the Ardennes—from a more expansive view.[6]

Reinach's philosophy of God anticipates later Christian theologizing on the absolute (and here one thinks of Rahner) while also echoing similar pathic and personal themes in Heschel and Stein's work. We may only conclude that Stein's exposure to Reinach's notes inflamed a desire within herself to seek and find the unconditional horizon of understanding and compassion.

Against this horizon, Stein decides to resign her position as Husserl's assistant at the beginning of 1918. She had hoped to stay on at Göttingen, and applies for a professorship. However, her application and thesis, which had garnered a *summa cum laude* in 1917, were left "unexamined." Despite this troubling setback, Stein dedicates herself over the next ten years (1918–28) to scholarship, and in the process earned "an international reputation" in the academies of Europe.[7]

As early as 1919, when humanity seemed to be turning away from one another and towards the idols proposed by World War I and the Russian Revolution, Stein begins to develop and articulate themes at various forums and meetings on her current research that was originally inspired by her

Göttingen thesis on *Einfühlung*. Stein communicates these themes "by asserting the 'inextinguishable uniqueness' of the human person who lives at the same time in a state of spiritual 'interconnectedness' with the rest of reality."[8]

By the summer of 1921, and while visiting a friend and mentor from her Göttingen days, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, in Bergzabern, she happens upon, "at random, *The Book of Her Life* by St. Teresa of Jesus [Avila]." The book made Stein's discernment complete. She decided to be baptized as a Catholic and to enter the Carmelite order. Stein saw the two—baptism and Carmel—as "inseparable" to her commitment to loving others.

She was baptized on January 1, 1922, in the church of St. Martin, Bergzabern, by Fr. Eugen Breitling. Not long after her baptism, in 1925, Stein shares correspondence again with a friend and Göttingen colleague, Fritz Kaufmann. Kaufmann felt somewhat estranged from Stein because of her conversion, and had not been in communication with her since 1919. Stein nevertheless reassures him how much she looks forward to meeting him again in person in order to tell him about the past five years of her life.

She comments in one of the letters that she had finally "found the place where there is rest and peace for all restless hearts." *How* she found this "place" of tranquility demanded more elaboration, but she begs Kaufmann's indulgence for not saying more in the letter: "How that happened is something you will allow me to be silent about today." One may only surmise, from the context of the letter, that Stein is speaking of a newfound psycho-spiritual "space" of freedom, for in the letter she references the year 1919, and herself being in a "pitiable state" during those days.[9]

We know that 1918–19 is a personally frustrating time, as her thesis went unexamined for a professorship at Göttingen. She is also experiencing a "growing dissatisfaction" with Husserl's working methods, for he "found no time to review" his papers and manuscripts that Stein had "so painstakingly put in order."[10] Stein's assent to a more peace-filled existence "involved both a new direction and a new ordering of goods . . . everything that had been of importance in her adult life up to this point was to find some place in her new life."[11]

Stein's baptism—this newfound "place" of peace—incites her subsequent desire for Carmel. Carmel provides a way for embracing the world on a deeper level; it was an avenue for contact with the *absolute* horizon—"symbolized in the look of the sky." Stein tells us, "[i]t is just the people who at first passionately embrace the world that penetrate farthest into the depths of the soul . . . they are taken into their innermost selves."[12]

At the heart of the Teresian system that Stein falls in love with is a powerful *empathic givenness* for the world. Teresa of Avila tells us in *The Interior Castle*:

> I think, that we should really be loving our neighbour; for we cannot be sure if we are loving God, although we may have good reasons for believing that we are, but we can know quite well if we are loving our neighbor. And be certain that, the farther advanced you find you are in this, the greater the love you will have for God . . .

Teresa insists that love of God issues forth in a lived empathy with others. She counsels her discalced sisters, in prophetic-like, Heschelian terms: "If you see a sick woman to whom you can give some help, never be affected by the fear that your devotion will suffer, but take pity on her: if she is in pain, you should feel pain too; if necessary, fast so that she may have your food." Teresa concludes that such praxis is "true union" with God in love.[13]

It is during this time immediately after Stein's conversion, when the thought of Teresa is still fresh in her heart and mind, where we may acknowledge the following account of Professor Gertrud Koebner's experience of Edith Stein. Koebner, a young Jewish philosopher, meets Stein on a regular basis for private lessons in phenomenology. Koebner tells us that when they read Teresa of Avila together,

> Edith revealed a little of her own interior life to me. You could see that it absorbed her utterly . . . [y]et she never distanced herself from her family or lost any of her immense affection for them. Even after she had fully decided on her future course . . . she never let anything interfere with her love for her sisters and brothers and their children . . . Even [Edith's] mother, who found it horrible to see her adored Edith become a Catholic, couldn't condemn it as a selfish act.

Stein's continued relationship with Koebner gives us an insight into her ability to relate to her Jewish sameness from her newfound place of otherness, and reveals her widening regard for all of humanity: "Nothing was allowed to stand in the way of this intention, neither social distinction nor any other obstacle. Only eternal values counted for her . . . Edith knew that I would never abandon my Jewish faith and scrupulously avoided any attempt to draw me away from it. She knew that this was the basis on which our friendship could endure."[14]

After Stein's baptism and confirmation she takes up a teaching position at St. Magdalena's Teacher's College for women in Speyer from 1922 until 1930. Her time in Speyer may well be considered a preparation for her

entrance into Carmel. Her *feeling* for the intergivenness of love of God/love of neighbor finds further deepening in Speyer in her daily interaction with both her students and the poor of the city.

During these days, in echoing Teresa, Stein writes, "'[o]n the question of relating to our fellowmen—our neighbor's spiritual need transcends every commandment. Everything else we do is a means to an end. But love is an end already, since God is love."[15] Even as she follows her journey towards the cloister of Carmel, she sees it as a journey "out of oneself," as Mounier argues, and towards otherness.

Indeed, Stein *qua* contemporary philosopher of human relationality *and feminist*, was already provoking *aggiornamento*.[16] For example, Stein's "careful attention to contemporary topics" during these days before Carmel, to topics such as "women's roles" as "professionals" and "responsible co-workers in the Church," may now be considered "forerunners" and "vital issues" that Catholicism came to regard with a deepening theological and pastoral seriousness at Vatican II.

STEIN ON WOMAN: A COMPREHENSIVE SYMPATHY

At the fifteenth convention of the Bavarian Catholic Women Teachers Association in April 1928 at Ludwigshafen, Stein gives a talk entitled "The Significance of Women's Intrinsic Value in National Life."[17] The themes of the talk are personal and feminist, echoing her own life experience on the frontlines of war and academe. This progressive address contextualizes and advances the prophetic role being "strongly demanded"[18] of women during the inter-war years.

In the lecture she argues that while man "appears more objective"—in the sense of being more inclined "to dedicate his faculties to a discipline" like "mathematics or technology"—the woman's "*attitude is personal*." Being personal suggests a comprehensive concern for oneself and others. Women have a "particular interest for the living, concrete person . . . for her own personal life and personal affairs as for those of other persons." It is, as we've considered with Heschel, a *transitive* concern, a concern directed towards others.

Here again we hear the echo of Stein's work on empathy. A desire for personal fulfillment is constituted by a "two-fold direction" where the woman "would like to become herself a complete human being, one who is fully developed in every way; and she would like to help others to become so." This introverted *and* extraverted praxis is, above all, about "doing justice to the complete human being whenever she has to deal with persons."[19]

Whereas with men, Stein argues, there is a "one-sided development" through an over-emphasized devotion to one discipline, in women there a

distinctiveness that tends towards living and viewing life with a more complete, all-embracing hermeneutic: "there lives a natural desire toward *totality* and *self-containment*," and this "*personal attitude*" and "*tendency to completeness*" is an attitude that may be "objectively justified and valuable because actually the human person is more precious than all objective values."[20]

Yet just as men may be challenged to cultivate a more complete *personal attitude* so, too, Stein argues, are women called to occupations of "thoroughly objective work." Through a radical givenness, the "whole person" may, in "all moods and dispositions," become "subordinate" to something bigger than oneself. Stein claims that in giving oneself over to a vocation, one loses "something of the *hyper-individuality* and has attained a definite freedom of self; while at the same time she has attained an inner depth."[21]

She informs her audience, with an example drawn from her Great War nursing days, that the vocation of the "medical woman," one of the professions "considered earlier as masculine monopolies," is being "mastered" by women. Women working in the medical field have a unique ability for attending to the entire person: "the sick who visit or send for a doctor do not seek merely to have a particular organ healed . . . one feels himself 'out of line' in his entire system; one seeks healing of body and soul, and one also desires a friendly, comprehensive sympathy." This "comprehensive" sympathy, in showing attention to the entire person, "can attain much more than healing the actual illness." Stein argues that the reason for this is because the medical woman "receives insight into diverse human situations." From this perspective, "she necessarily gets to see material and moral need."

To be sure, Stein is neither arguing for only women medical professionals nor is she saying no men are empathic. While the "drive" for "comprehensive sympathy" is "particularly strong in woman" it is, lest we overstate the case, constitutive of all: "each human being is called naturally to this total humanity, and the desire for it lives in each one of us."

So while it does signify "a wide area for authentic feminine activity," it also "signifies Christian charity at the same time." And if this is the case—*that this praxis signifies charity*—then what does a comprehensive sympathy say about God's givenness?

Stein concludes, in categories reminiscent of Heschel's personalism, "all beauty is beheld and measured by persons . . . [a]nd behind all things of value to be found in the world stands *the person of the Creator* . . . [and] the human being is the highest among creation since his personality is created in the image of God. It is the *whole person* about whom we are speaking: *that* human being in whom God's image is developed."[22]

This universal Person-to-person regard for the other was also influencing how Stein views her own givenness to the world. In a letter dated

February 28, 1928, she writes, "I have gradually come to the realization that more is asked of us in this world, and that even in the contemplative life, one may not sever the link with this world . . . the deeper one is drawn to God, the more [one] needs to go out of [herself]—out into the world, to carry the divine life into it."[23] For Stein, "love is an end"; it is this ultimate end that is "drawing" us into a world of others who we regard as ends in themselves. As Heschel argues, "[t]o a person who regards himself as an absolute end a thousand lives will not be worth more than his own life," while the one who lives life with "the *certainty of being needed*" is able to gratuitously live life for others. The person "who thinks that he is an end in himself" will ultimately unleash the wrath of totalitarianism on others, for he will, as an individual or as part of a group, "use others as a means" to an end.[24] Stein's own certainty of being needed, her way of "carrying the divine life into the world," is through a radical and empathic givenness—for love "is more than co-operation, more than feeling and acting together. Love *is* being together, a mode of existence, not only a state of the soul."[25] It is precisely her remembering *Einfühlung* that will place Stein in direct confrontation with Nazism's "depersonalization."[26]

BEHIND THE WALLS OF CARMEL: KENOTIC FRAGMENTS OF A WIDER, PATHIC CONCERN

In 1929, she writes "Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas," and in 1931, at the recommendation of Jesuit philosopher Erich Pzywara, SJ, she undertakes the translation of Aquinas' *Disputed Questions on Truth* (*Questiones Disputatae de Veritate*).

Stein leaves Speyer in 1931 with the hope of finally being received at a university. Yet the year is "spent in unsuccessfully applying to the universities of Freiburg and Breslau." Again, similar to her Göttingen experience in 1918, anti-Semitism is "at work behind the scenes" in blocking any appointment to a professorship.

Fortuitously, she is offered a position at the Educational Institute of Münster. During this time Stein offers "her colleagues a preliminary series of lectures on philosophical anthropology in an attempt to situate the mystery of the human person . . . in the context of the European tradition." Just as Stein is engaging in this reflection, by 1933 she would "look on horrified as university students began violently attacking Jews."[27]

We hear Stein prophesying her own future to a friend, Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, in a letter dated February 16, 1930. Stein writes,

"After every encounter in which I am made aware how powerless we are to exercise direct influence, I have a deeper sense of the urgency of my own *holocaustum*. And this awareness culminates increasingly in a: *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus*."[28]

In commenting on this letter, Josephine Koeppel, the translator of Stein's autobiography and Carmelite contemporary, writes, "The remembrance of Nazi infamy will always be associated with the name 'Holocaust;' but for Edith, twelve years before she died during that reign of terror, the word was a challenge to be generous in her everyday life, not only at some moment of extraordinary heroism. That does not lessen the awe we feel at her use of the word, as though she had some chilling premonition of her destiny."[29] It is against this horizon wherefrom we may now begin to appreciate how an empathic *Identitätspartnerschaft* with Judaism characterized Edith Stein's life and death in Auschwitz.[30] It is a partnership forged through a comparative reading of Heschel's Frankfurt address with a letter from Edith Stein to Pope Pius XI.

"IF THE SILENCE CONTINUES": EDITH STEIN'S 1933 LETTER TO POPE PIUS XI

In 1933, just prior to her entrance into the Carmelite monastery of Cologne, Stein writes to Pius XI asking him to condemn Nazism by way of an encyclical. [31] The papacy eventually issued an encyclical condemning racism four years *after* Stein's letter. By this time the programmatic genocide was becoming a horrifying *fait accompli*. In this passionate letter, and in themes that presuppose Heschel's *Frankfurt Meditation*, she calls on the Pope to speak out against the Nazi persecution already happening all around Germany.

It was only during this century, on February 15, 2003, that the Vatican Archives released Dr. Stein's letter to the public. In reading Stein's letter alongside Heschel's 1938–39 inspirational "call to arms," *Versuch einer Deutung* (*The Meaning of This Hour*), we may begin to appreciate how the Jewish (*and* Christian) call for a more prophetic witnessing is receiving a response (and not unlike Heschel's) in Stein's letter:

We phenomenologically "hear" in Stein's letter the beginning of a prophetic response to the call of the other. Prophetic witnessing is, as we considered with Heschel, "a form of living, a crossing point of God and man." Stein's response exhibits an increased sensitivity for "the meaning of this hour," an hour when the world seemed silent in the face of evil.

Let us reconsider the following vivid example from Heschel's *Versuch einer Deutung*:

Table 1.1 EDITH STEIN'S LETTER HOLY FATHER!

§1: As a child of the Jewish people who, by the grace of God, for the past eleven years has also been a child of the Catholic Church, I dare to speak to the Father of Christianity about that which oppresses millions of Germans. For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor. For years the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews. Now that they have seized the power of government and armed their followers, among them proven criminal elements, this seed of hatred has germinated. The government has only recently admitted that excesses have occurred. To what extent, we cannot tell, because public opinion is being gagged. However, judging by what I have learned from personal relations, it is in no way a matter of singular exceptional cases. Under pressure from reactions abroad, the government has turned to "milder" methods. It has issued the watchword "no Jew shall have even one hair on his head harmed." But through boycott measures—by robbing people of their livelihood, civic honor and fatherland—it drives many to desperation; within the last week, through private reports I was informed of five cases of suicide as a consequence of these hostilities. I am convinced that this is a general condition which will claim many more victims. One may regret that these unhappy people do not have greater inner strength to bear their misfortune. But the responsibility must fall, after all, on those who brought them to this point and it also falls on those who keep silent in the face of such happenings.

§2: Everything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis originates with a government that calls itself "Christian." For weeks not only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics in Germany, and, I believe, all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church of Christ to raise its voice to put a stop to this abuse of Christ's name. Is not this idolization of race and governmental power which is being pounded into the public consciousness by the radio open heresy? Isn't the effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our Savior, of the most blessed Virgin and the apostles? Is not all this diametrically opposed to the conduct of our Lord and Savior, who, even on the cross, still prayed for his persecutors? And isn't this a black mark on the record of this Holy Year which was intended to be a year of peace and reconciliation?

§3: We all, who are faithful children of the Church and who see the conditions in Germany with open eyes, fear the worst for the prestige of the Church, if the silence continues any longer. We are convinced that this silence will not be able in the long run to purchase peace with the present German government. For the time being, the fight against Catholicism will be conducted quietly and less brutally than against Jewry, but no less systematically. It won't take long before no Catholic will be able to hold office in Germany unless he dedicates himself unconditionally to the new course of action.

At the feet of your Holiness, requesting your apostolic blessing, (Signed) Dr. Edith Stein, Instructor at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy, Münster in Westphalia, Collegium Maria

A tale is told of a band of inexperienced mountain climbers. Without guides, they struck recklessly into the wilderness. Suddenly a rocky ledge gave way beneath their feet and they tumbled headlong into a dismal pit. In the darkness of the pit they recovered from their shock only to find themselves set upon by a swarm of angry snakes. Every crevice became alive with fanged, hissing things.

> For each snake the desperate men slew, ten more seemed to lash out in its place. Strangely enough, one man seemed to stand aside from the fight. When indignant voices of his struggling companions reproached him for not fighting, he called back: If we remain here, we shall be dead before the snakes. I am searching for a way of escape from the pit for all of us. Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes. We did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago, and the snakes have sent their venom into the bloodstream of humanity, gradually paralyzing us, numbing nerve after nerve, dulling our minds, darkening our vision. Good and evil, that were once as real as day and night, have become a blurred mist. In our every-day life we worshiped force, despised compassion, and obeyed no law but our unappeasable appetite . . . (§*AH6–7*)

Notice Heschel's words: "[w]e did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago." Correspondingly, Stein argues: "For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor. For years the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews." Observe Stein's temporally charged language. It is as if she's *remembering for* the Christian church, and thereby reminding the Pope: the *present* crisis is not a *new crisis; the* "seed of hatred" was "germinated" long ago (§*ES1*). Her remembering is an anamnesis that does justice: she both *names* the source of evil ("National Socialism") while further implicating this totality of making a "mockery" of Jewish and Christian values (e.g., "justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor" [§*ES1*]).

Yet it is both the persecutors and *those who remain silent* in the face of persecutions who are to be held accountable (§*ES1*: "*But the responsibility must fall, after all, on those who brought them to this point and it also falls on those who keep silent in the face of such happenings*"). This responsibility most heavily weighs on Christians: "*Everything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis originates with a government that calls itself `Christian'*" (§*ES2*). The church therefore needs to respond: "*For weeks not only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics . . . all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church of Christ to raise its voice*" (§*ES2*). Stein calls on the church to be a prophetic witness in naming as "open heresy" the "idolization of race and governmental power" being advocated by National Socialism (§*ES2*). The church's continued silence vitiates *an empathic Judeo-Christian consanguinity*: "Isn't the effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our Savior[?]" (§*ES2*).

It is against the above horizon that Heschel and Stein encourage us to embrace the prophetico-mystical option in becoming witnesses with open

eyes. Heschel provokes us into considering our fall into blindness: the deriders of compassion "sent their venom" into humanity, "darkening our vision" such that the difference between good and evil has become like "a blurred mist." And this blindness breeds silence: "silence hovers mercilessly over many dreadful lands . . . [w]here is God? Why didst Thou not halt the trains loaded with Jews being led to slaughter? . . . Why dost Thou make it so easy to kill? Like Moses, we hide our face; for we are afraid to look upon *Elohim*" (§*AH5*). Stein warns the Church that those "who see the conditions in Germany with open eyes, fear the worst" for all people. The destruction of the Jews will eventually mean the "no less systematic" destruction of Christians, and all people of good will, for "silence" will never "purchase peace" from evil (§ES3).

Heschel also wisely draws our attention to the fact that "Nazism at its very roots was a rebellion against the Bible," and destruction of the Jew will also mean the eventual destruction of the Christian, for it is Judaism and Christianity "that implanted attachment to the God of Abraham and involvement with the Hebrew Bible in the hearts of Western man. Nazism resolved that it must both exterminate the Jews and eliminate Christianity."[32] An attack on Judaism is an attack on Christianity. And yet, there is a way "out of the pit" (§*AH11*)—if we would only open our eyes so that we might again see *Elohim* in and through the face of the other.

"Someone has Survived," a poem by Dr. Renata Katz read at the Holocaust Memorial Day Commemoration in Ballymena, Northern Ireland, expresses this desire for remembering their faces:

> I cannot see their faces/I never had a chance/I never met them but have seen them on the old photograph/There was no time to know what they were really like./I cannot see their faces/And what way it was for them not knowing what happened to their children./I cannot see their faces/Their blue eyes and unusual accents/But I have seen it in their child./I cannot see their faces/I cannot imagine their horror in knowing that that was it and they were going to disappear/In dust over Poland!/The only reminder is one old photograph,/It and the memorial plaque but/No headstone and no grave because they disappeared in dust./It is so painful to imagine that there was no humanity/During that time!/I cannot see their faces/But I wish to feel their spirits around me to let them know that someone has survived/And the legacy of that time is passed and will survive/In generations to come![33]

In "seeing again their faces" we begin to prophetically challenge the totality of silence. This is not an either/or option, "for evil is indivisible. It is the same in thought and in speech, in private and in social life," and the "task

of our time" is breaking the silence, for "God is everywhere or nowhere" (§*AH12*).

The prophetic witness's empathic "engagement for service" (§*AH13*) is actualized in partnering God (§*AH14:* "God is waiting for us to redeem the world"). Through this partnership, the prophetic witness works at "establishing" (§*AH14*) the reign of God in an interreligious world: "the glory of man is not in his will to power, but in his power of compassion" (§*AH12*). Stein claims herself in the letter as "a child of the Jewish people" who is "also" a "child of the Catholic Church" (*§ES1*). By responding to *the* call of her Jewish people she reminds Christians of the necessity for a dialogical way of being.

This portrait of call and response reverberating through Stein's *Letter* and Heschel's *The Meaning of this Hour* opens up a wider space for a Christian identification with the suffering of the Jewish other, and this solidarity empowers a new kind of prophetic living, even in the midst of discontinuity. The prophet's voice, even in the midst of collapse, is *already* a voice with an eschatological resonance, one reverberating into a *not-yet*-realized future where hope tells humanity that there will be a "renewal of the covenant with God" (§*AH27*) through a renewal of trust and solidarity among people. God needs humanity's collaboration in the work of redemption. Even the prophet's protest to God, when *justice is being denied*, speaks to the prophet's sensitivity to the *not-yet* situation. Stein's empathic intentionality of dialectically belonging to both Judaism and Christianity is also revealed through her Thomistic study, *Finite and Eternal Being*.

HUMANI GENERIS UNITAS AND *FINITE AND ETERNAL BEING*: A HERMENEUTIC OF CONTRAST

Not long after Stein's 1933 entreaty to Pius XI, which went unanswered, she enters the Carmelite convent in Cologne. She was forty-two years old. On the eve of her entrance into Carmel we find Stein reassuring her family and others, through the person of her young niece, that this decision is not to be regarded by them as a kind of escapism from the world. Stein says, "I will always be close to you, to the family, to the Jewish people. And don't think that my being in a convent is going to keep me immune from what is happening in the world."[34] The cadence of life in Carmel allows Stein to prophetically challenge, both in word and deed, the depravity of forgetfulness for the other that is about to sweep the world during World War II.

Stein was a prodigious writer from behind the walls of Carmel. She was granted permission to continue her work in the intellectual apostolate

during the hours of manual labor. Along with a very healthy correspondence, Stein continued with philosophical and theological reflections in relative peace. In 1935, two years after entering Carmel, Stein comments on her life, "You cannot imagine how embarrassed I am when someone speaks of our life of 'sacrifice.' I led a life of sacrifice as long as I had to stay outside . . . [o]f course, there are Sisters among us who are called upon to make great sacrifices daily. And I do await the day when I shall be allowed to feel more of my vocation to the cross than I do now, since the Lord treats me once more as if I were a little child."[35]

It was during this time when she makes a return to Aquinas and completes a reflection on Thomism entitled *Finite and Eternal Being (Endliches und Ewiges Sein)* in 1937. This study, however, remained unpublished until 1950.[36]

In a review of *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI* by G. Passelecq and B. Suchecky, Roland Hill of the London-based weekly *The Tablet* suggests an interesting possibility: "[a]s late as September 6, 1938 [Pius XI] had addressed his famous statement on anti-Semitism to a group of Belgian pilgrims: 'Anti-Semitism cannot be supported. Spiritually, we are all Semites.' The words may have been suggested to him by Edith Stein . . . [s]he had already urged the Pope, in 1934, to write an encyclical against racism and anti-Semitism."[37]

The death of Pius XI on February 10, 1939, hastened the departure of the draft encyclical *Humani Generis Unitas* (*HGU*) to the Vatican archives. Edith Stein's phenomenologically attuned Thomism may not have had a significant influence on the draft encyclical. Nevertheless, the constructive, empathetic sections of the document exhibit a language that is both personalist and pathic, a language also attributable to Stein's *oeuvre*.

Johannes Nota, a Dutch Jesuit priest and philosopher who knew Edith Stein personally in Echt, Holland, and spent his academic career reflecting on her thought, "found the part [of *HGU*] concerning the unity of the human race 'very good' . . . But the sections on the Jews and anti-Semitism seemed to him so mediocre—the all-too-traditional theology used in them led to positions he described as 'deplorable.'"[38]

While Stein's Thomism explicitly appeals to Jewish concepts and themes similar to those we find in Heschel, it also critically complements an ecclesial documentary tradition that may be considered historically androcentric in authorship and apathetic, or at least distancing, in language and perspective. The positive anthropology within the encyclical, read through Stein's phenomenological anthropology from *Finite and Eternal Being*—and a critical rejoinder from Heschel's articulation of a depth theology—gives us a bright horizon against which to view and critique the negative anthropology in *HGU*.[39]

THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: THE POSITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF *HUMANI GENERIS UNITAS*

The draft presents a broad and progressive vision on the unity and plurality of human persons. Reminiscent of what would come years later in *Gaudium et spes*, the document says that the Church "finds herself here in accord with all other types of society, since by her very nature all are rooted in history, in tradition, in the temporality of our social life; and the same can be said of the Church's accord, both internally and positively, with nations."[40]

The Church sees itself in solidarity-from-below with the temporal concerns of humanity. This *embedded and observing Church* is conscious of the other, regardless of faith or creed. Whenever there is a loss of human dignity, when the totalizing desires of the collective supersedes the good of the person, all of humanity experiences a loss. Humans become robbed of "their lofty status as persons" and become reduced to "nothing more than simple parts of a whole, numbers in endless files of other similar numbers."

The draft appeals to "the spirit of unity," calling humankind into a progressive unity with diversity: "the unity of a large number of members, each one distinct and personally responsible, with his own destiny, but all of them internally organized toward common goals . . . [t]his unity in plurality is what humanity is." The draft argues that scripture affirms unity in diversity by affirming the "single, unifying stream of bodily life—the blood stream as it is called—that God set into movement in the world, and in which all men are plunged, is such a powerful agent of unity." The blood, therefore, "links all men by that which is deepest in them, namely their relationship to God." Ideologies "seek to erect insurmountable barriers between the different communities of blood and race" such that humanity's consanguinity is rendered forgettable.[41]

On the issue of consanguinity—this "unifying stream of bodily life"—the document has a prophetic and contemporary relevance. This metaphor has, as Heschel argues, "pretheological" implications. All people are "plunged" into the world by this "powerful agent of unity" linking them with something bigger than themselves. Religion's primordial locus—its "true sanctuary," prior to any confession—is therefore deeper and more expansive than any one "place." Religion, at its best, when it hasn't been "reduced" to a stultifying institutional expression, will be relevant to all people at a "presymbolic depth of existence."

Our consanguinity—*this blood we share*, so basic to our existence, and yet the very ground from which we begin as children "to sense the truth" and "authenticity of religious concern"—mysteriously unites humanity on

the same corporeal plane. In this sense, Jews and Christians share *the memory of the blood* where "*the antecedents of religious commitment*, the presuppositions of faith" are unitive categories that draw us into a shared "depth theology" with one another.

A *depth* connotes a vigor and strength, a beginning again *ex radice*. It bespeaks a concern for "the total situation of man and his attitudes towards life and the world."[42] While blood secures a biological empathy, depth carries the promises of a transcendent solidarity. While "[t]heologies" have the capacity to "divide us" when they become reduced to ideology, it is "depth theology" that "unites us": "depth theology seeks to meet the person in moments which the whole person is involved, in moments which are affected by all a person thinks, feels, and acts. It draws upon that which happens to man in moments of confrontation with ultimate reality."

The texture of living with one another acquires a depth when we give ourselves over to the art of living *for* one another. Collapsing the distance between oneself and the other—this, too, is the work of empathy. Stein argues, let us recall, in *On the Problem of Empathy* knowing will remain "blind, empty and restless" unless it points back to "some kind of experienced, seen act," and "my" apperceptive understanding for, and givenness to, this "foreign" experience is empathy. "I" am given to this new depth of the other while analogously being given anew to myself. This foreigner draws "me" away from myself and into an inward distance.

The desire for transcending the immaturity of self-centeredness intends an emptying of all that is "non," or inauthentic, within the self, an emptying of all those objectifying tendencies that makes "me" capable of "fixing" myself and others as a "non." Kenosis, in this now-qualified Heschelian sense, is a way of being "attentive to a nonself" (*cf*. Chapter 3).

No longer frightened by the complexity of the other, we move together as persons beyond a shallow way of relating and into the deep brilliance of a more universal concern(s): "[w]hen the people of Israel crossed the Red Sea, two things happened: the waters split, and between man and God all distance was gone. There was no veil, no vagueness. There was only his presence: This is my God, the Israelite exclaimed."

Heschel concludes that while "[m]ost miracles that happen in space are lost in the heart," depth theology "evokes" the "spontaneity of the person." Without this "responding and appreciation"—this "inner identification" with the ineffable—*without this deep memory*, all ritual and observance "crumbles between the fingers." This transcendent psycho-spiritual consanguinity therefore "links" all people by that which is "deepest in them," "their relationship to God" and one another.[43]

The "insurmountable barriers" that totalitarianism erects are ultimately a subtle *amnesia for the other* that slowly chisels away at the solidarity of being(s)-in-relation. When forgetfulness sets in, the activity of any group will ultimately devolve into "a matter of me controlling you on my terms . . . as domination of the weak by the strong." We lose the face of the other through our desire to control: "the dignity of the person as *imago Dei* is warped by an effort to be 'like God.'"[44]

Here, too, a Jewish prescience challenges the idolic desire to control: God created people in God's image and likeness; the symbol of God *par excellence* is the *human person*, *every person*. Heschel argues that God created humanity in the "image (*Tselem*)" of God-self. And Heschel reminds us of the significance of *tselem*, a term "which is frequently used in damnatory sense for a man-made image of God is employed in denoting man as an image and likeness of God."[45] There can be no greater *imago Dei* than the human person herself—and her "*tselem*" may not be limited or obscured for it is a likeness flowing from the transcendent depth of the Divine Other's face. Correspondingly, Stein's Thomistic metaphysics considers God in a Jewish key, and does this through a phenomenological reading *qua* application of how the Tetragrammaton gives persons the status of being *imago Dei*.

STEIN'S HERMENEUTIC: "I AM WHO I AM"—GOD'S BEING-IN-PERSONS

Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein's inquiry into "the meaning of being", and her approach is attentive to both the Thomistic tradition and to the contemporary milieu of interreligious dialogue. [46] In Section 4.3 of Chapter VI, "The Meaning of Being," Stein takes up the "ontological question" of God from the perspective of the Hebrew Scriptures.

She takes as her "frame of reference that name by which God has designated himself: 'I am who I am.'" Stein wants to posit, "he whose name is 'I am' is *being in person*." It is obvious to Stein how the "first existent" must be a reasonable and free person for only a person "can create, i.e., call into being by virtue of his will . . . only a knowing and willing being can posit ends and ordain certain means to these ends." To bolster her argument, she turns to the phenomenon of naming oneself "I." She says "I" [*Ich*] is the name "by which every person designates himself or herself *qua* person," and only a being who is awakened to "its differentiation from every other existent can call itself an 'I.'"

The incommunicability of the self-accusative "*is a peculiar characteristic of being* . . . which we call *life*." The introverted strophe of the "I" allows for

"my" unique unfolding as an individual: "every I *subsists for itself*." The "I," however, is in need of being drawn into community with others. The introverted strophe of the "I" is "deficient" in so far as the "I" remains empty of content from "the 'external world.'"

The "I" must therefore navigate the world as spirit *and* flesh, and embed oneself in the complexities of the day—"life comes out of one darkness and moves into another darkness." Stein's insistence on the inherent dialectical tension between the extraverted and introverted moments of living becomes an essential rejoinder to a negative, one-sided anthropology. One strophe set over and against the other may produce the following existential condition (i, ii):

> (i): An unyielding introversion selfishly locks the subject into oneself: I am loving, I am vulnerable becomes I am impenetrable. The self-accusative "I" closes to the other's "*help me!*" The givenness of empathy is never realized, and a shared striving for the good life is an enigmatic project.
>
> (ii): Conversely, a mindless extraversion denies the unique complexities of every "I"'s personal, psycho-spiritual way of being. No individual may be considered unique in and of themselves. The innate human dignity of every person receives a subtle decategorization: never "my" beloved; "they" as "collective" are kept at a distance.

If humanity forgets the necessary dialectical tension between *both* strophes, then an impersonal ideology has the potential of effacing the "I"'s dignified status of being a flesh and blood icon (*tselem*) of the Transcendent: the human person "bear[s] a closer resemblance to divine being than anything else that lies within the reach of our experience."

It is against this horizon Stein posits the human person as *imago Dei*. Stein makes the radical claim that "no finite communion or community is a strictly defined and circumscribed triunity." She prefers to hold that a more "perfect" image of God-in-relation may be "the image that is found—by virtue of the indwelling of the Divine Persons—in the individual soul in the life of grace and glory." The actualization of the *imago Dei qua* humanity is through "genuine and natural" communion with others—and this givenness *presupposes* the empathy of a "personal self-giving." The person reaches toward the fullness of being by living well with other human beings (i.e., "[t]he 'I am' means: I live, I know, I will, I love").[47]

Stein's argument is a further echo of Heschel's conceptual disposition towards the human person. Heschel argued that the person "is all of humanity in one" and "a disclosure of the divine." And "I" begin to get a "sense" for "the image of God, the presence of God" through "my" engagement with

the other. Grace and glory come from the givenness of being open to *the other*: the Jewish other, the Catholic other, and so forth. This communion with otherness through a mutual self-giving brings me closer still to the realization that "truth [is] something to be found through every human encounter (*ezehu hokham ha-lomed me'kol adam*)." This living from a prophetic perspective, with open eyes, allows for "seeing truth in multiple and even contradictory manifestations (*shiv'im panim la'torah, elu ve'elu*)."[48]

As Stein says, even the "lacunae" of life "which cannot be filled" create a space wherefrom the human person may reach toward the fullness of being *imago Dei*.[49] This "spacious" way of living from truth, of living from a sense of givenness-as-communion to the world, threatens the closed system of an extensive totality.

So the evidence of the *HGU*'s positive anthropology leaves one all the more perplexed and confused when reading the following negative statements from the same document, in a section of the draft entitled "Position of the Church with Regard to Judaism [(iii), (iv)]":

> (iii) §142: [The Church's] ardent hopes for their eventual salvation in the future, do not blind her to the spiritual dangers to which contact with Jews can expose souls, or make her unaware of the need to safeguard her children against spiritual contagion . . .
>
> (iv) §142: The Church has warned likewise against an over-familiarity with the Jewish community that might lead to customs and ways of thinking contrary to the standards of Christian life.

This "deplorable" language nullifies an *imago Dei* theological anthropology. The draft exhibits the bias of an ecclesial reclusivity. The language of "spiritual danger," "spiritual contagion," and "over-familiarity" locks the draft into an unyielding introversion. Does not the draft of the encyclical itself argue that "we rather frequently find a certain systematic depreciation of man's personality, a mistrust toward it expressed in both speech and writing"?[50]

Conversely, the indiscriminate extraversion of fearing a projected other nevertheless buries the following fundamental memory: in speaking of "them," Christianity is also speaking about itself. This negligence in remembering our consanguinity is nothing more than the continuance of the "age-old process of dejudization of Christianity" where "obsolescence and abrogation of Jewish faith became conviction and doctrine; the new covenant was conceived not as a new phase or disclosure but as abolition and replacement of the ancient one . . . Contrast and contradiction rather than acknowledgement of roots."[51] This profanity allows for the narrowing and

ultimate loss of fidelity to a wider memory. To all appearances, the echo of a Marcionite desire for "obsolescence and abrogation," and the document's anxious vacillations between a language of continuity and discontinuity with Judaism is being heard (even if the document was never published) when combined with the Church's own contemporary disquietude around *how it remembers* itself with Judaism.[52]

Stein's dynamic and interreligiously minded Thomism, joined with the positive anthropology of *HGU*, and read through Heschel's depth theology, encourages us to live more completely from a *hermeneutics of empathy*. A *logic for feeling with the other*, this interpretive key for unlocking memories, may help us remember again our consanguinity, and continuity, with Judaism.

Heschel's poem "The Forgotten" is an elegiac rallying cry to become a rememberer with the other:

> Man, forgotten by everyone—/like a gas lamp burning in daylight,/(they had forgotten to extinguish it) . . . /today he smoldered at my door./Softly beat his heart:/Open, open your friendship to me!/There is still, in my love,/so much room and so many words for you./Your entire world can fit/into my open, spread-out arms./Come, plant your gaze in me,/Make a home for yourself in my memory.[53]

A life that is "compatible" with transcendence, Heschel suggests, is one that "moves always under the unseen canopy of remembrance, and the wonderful weight of the name of God rests steadily" on this person's entire being.[54] Stein herself defies absence by opening herself to others in solidarity. She makes a home for others through incarnating a remembering empathy *qua* solidarity.

Stein's theory and praxis thus far in our considerations demonstrates a way of being in the world where the possibility for a peace-filled solidarity with the other becomes a live option through the communicative and reciprocal praxis of empathy: "But 'I,' 'you,' and 'he' are retained in 'we.' A 'we,' not an 'I', is the subject of the empathizing."[55] So while "mineness could be designated as the primary distinctive feature of personal memory," *ourness* may be designated as the empathic feature of shared memory.[56]

Angela Ales-Bello, the dean of the school of philosophy of the Lateran University, and specialist in Husserl and Stein, argues the following: "Edith Stein is not removed from the world. Her complex personality did not allow her to forget any element, either human or religious. She knew how to combine human, worldly and political interests with spirituality. Herein lies her great current importance."[57]

Edith Stein opens herself up to a wider Jewish-Christian *pathos*. I suppose she could have left behind the Jewish question for someone else to take up once she had entered behind the walls of Carmel. But this would have been a betrayal of her inter-subjective instincts with the Jewish people. Indeed, she chooses to acknowledge her *Jewishness*, the "sameness" she shares with a people. Stein's givenness is nothing less than a kenotically communicative praxis—that is, an emptying that gives, an emptying that gives Christians an example of how we may live within the ebbing and flowing of God's pathos.

The undertow of empathy draws us into a deeper memory for our consanguinity with Judaism. *Finite and Eternal Being* is written by a *Jewish woman* who is well able to hold in dialectical tension her dual affirmations of being a daughter of Israel *and* Carmel. Yet, our reflections on Stein's scholarly givenness from behind the walls of a Carmel is progressively leading us to consider her givenness *beyond the walls*.

CHAPTER 6

Beyond the Walls of Carmel

In 1938 Teresa Benedicta a Cruce or *Teresa Blessed by the Cross*, known in the world as Edith Stein, remarked on this religious name she chose in 1933 upon entering the cloister of Carmel. She said, "[b]y the cross I understood the destiny of God's people which, even at that time [1933], began to announce itself. I thought that those who recognized it as the cross of Christ had to take it upon themselves in the name of all. Certainly, today I know more of what it means to be wedded to the Lord in the sign of the Cross. Of course, one can never comprehend it, for it is a mystery."[1] The cross she is speaking of is that of the Nazi persecutions being carried out against the Jewish people—her people. It is a heavy icon, weighing upon us, calling us to re-imagine God as a God of *pathos*, a God who is empathy-in-action, a living kenosis into the woundedness of the world.

In May 1987, William Keeler, Archbishop of Baltimore, the chair of the U.S. Catholic Bishops Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, issued an "'advisory' to the nation's Catholics indicating appropriate understandings for Catholic veneration" of this Jewish woman, convert, and Carmelite who considered herself as *blessed by the Cross*. The advisory reminds Catholics that Stein's murderers "were, by and large, baptized Christians whose consciences, in the [John Paul II's] phrase, had been 'lulled' by centuries of negative theological polemics against Jews and Judaism emanating from all levels of the Christian community." In the advisory, the Cardinal invites Catholic and Jewish theologians to reflect on the significance of her life for the interreligious dialogue. Firstly, he reminds us that "[a]s a Church, we cannot pretend that she died as anything other than one of the millions of Jews murdered in the Shoah." The theologian therefore needs to keep proper perspective when examining the relevance of Edith Stein's life. Keeler states:

> Edith Stein, it is important for the Church to say, died both as a "daughter of Israel" and as a Christian martyr. We need the reminder of Christian sinfulness that the first affirmation brings with it, as well as the spiritual challenge of the second affirmation. But we need also to remember, sensitively and compassionately, that the Jewish people do not see it that way. Nor, of course, do they need the reminder of the Shoah in the same way we do.

Yet, Jewish and Catholic theologians are being further challenged to examine carefully how Edith Stein stands between two worlds as both dialectically "same" and "other." Against the horizon of her martyrdom, Jews and Christians may engage in a meaningful dialogue where stakeholders may raise "theological issues which go to the heart of the dialogue. What do we mean by redemptive suffering? By redemption itself?" Keeler leaves theologians with this final proposal: "I would suggest just as deferentially that the dialogue over Edith Stein engaged in by Jews and Catholics does not and must not end with the recognition of difference." Indeed, it is the work of theologians to unmask the "deeper commonalities of revealed insight for Judaism and Christianity alike. This is the unending hope of dialogue between us, and the unending goal of reconciliation."[2]

We have been attempting to take up Keeler's request by "unmasking these deeper commonalities" through our reflection on the meaning and significance of the theory and praxis of Edith Stein's life as read *with and through* Heschel's perspective on pathos. But what of her death at Auschwitz? It is the following memory, coming from the lips of Stein's own niece and hagiographer, Suzanne Batzdorff, that sharpens Keeler's perspective, and helps us focus our attention on what Christians need to *remember* as we carry on the project of (re)creating an interreligious empathy: "[m]y remarks to the media were repeated in newspapers all over West Germany and in many countries [on the occasion of Stein's beatification on May 1, 1987]. One short, but widely reported article concluded with these words: 'The Christian religion to which Edith Stein converted was in our eyes the religion of our persecutors.'"[3]

What do Christians interested in dialogue *do* with this memory being uttered from the lips of Stein's niece? Pass over it in silence or honor it? The horror of this memory may subtly move us towards a forgetfulness so as to make it more manageable for ourselves.[4] Batzdorff's memory—*the Christian religion was the religion of Stein's persecutors*—is a memory that Christianity needs to pass through and embrace. It is a memory "reckoning the soul," inaugurating *a perpetual anamnesis* for the Christian church.[5] It is a memory calling Christianity to *re-turn* and *re-member* itself with Judaism.

Our recovery of the Jewish-Christian significance of Edith Stein will mean facing up to, rather than eclipsing, the memory that Stein converts and accepts the sign of the cross in her life. We need to embrace and honor this part of her story for, as Metz argues, "there are things that we try to forget and to erase from our minds. And when these things are such that they cannot be wholly erased or forgotten . . . then our urge to forget them becomes a malady and a wound in the human psyche." Our "deliberate effort to forget" this *part* of the memory only encourages death as forgetfulness. Rather, what is needed is a new relationship grounded in *teshuva* because the "unnoticed sway" of forgetfulness "over the human race embodies the profound depths of man's depravity and depravation."[6] The past needs to be *resituated* through memory in order to make us more vulnerable to how we may improve our relationship with one another.

Edith Stein's canonization, it must be acknowledged at this juncture, leaves the impression of a church interested in drawing a line around Stein, as if we could claim her as *our* own. This "troubling insensitivity" in forgetfulness for her Jewish roots makes it less likely for our Jewish brothers and sisters to see the "real benefit of contemplating her death." And yet, while Stein "has been folded into the canon of the church" she is "needed exactly where she placed herself: in between."[7] One is reminded of Gertrud Koebner's words about Stein: "Only eternal values counted for her . . . Edith knew that I would never abandon my Jewish faith and scrupulously avoided any attempt to draw me away from it. She knew that this was the basis on which our friendship could endure" (cf. Chapter 5).

It is this narrative, devoid of any "whiff of evangelism," of a woman who has "no desire to convince anyone of anything—nor to persuade, and absolutely not to convert," who interprets her context from empathy. Stein is, above all, a woman of faith, and "what continued to happen to her thanks to the daily grace of liturgical and contemplative prayer, was a mystery. It was simply to be lived." This mystery-filled narrative—*her* story—calls Christianity deeper into the memory: we are being called as pilgrims to return to a primordially Jewish terrain through a *con-primordial* intentionality: "[i]f you do boast, remember that it is not you that support the root, but the root that supports you (Romans 11:18)." Stein's narrative is all about empathy and honoring her origins: "[f]or Edith Stein, Judaism and, more to the point, Jews are not subject to judgment. They *are*—and are human. Therefore, to be honored in their persons and in their beliefs."[8]

Even Stein's entrance to Carmel, a charism rooted and grounded in the original inspiration of Elijah, reveals how Judaism *ex radice* is "treasured" in Stein's "own personal life and memory." And Stein's intentionality in going to Auschwitz re-creates the pathos of God through an interreligiously

sensitive kenosis in her givenness to "another suffering population." Yet they are *her people*, and Stein goes to Auschwitz with them. And it is precisely for this reason: the Jews are not *another population*—whereby Stein's givenness-in-death may challenge Christianity from the inside to do the *teshuva* work of revising and extending our self-understanding of what it means to be a martyr, of what it means to be a witness in empathy with the other, a witness to truth. Hampl concludes, "the propriety of the church's claiming Edith Stein as a martyr of the church rests fundamentally on 'the problem of empathy,' Edith Stein's defining subject. For if the church cannot see itself as it is reflected by another suffering population, and if it refuses to acknowledge the judgment of that gaze, then it fails in this essential spiritual relation of empathy."[9]

Batzdorff, Stein's niece, is optimistic that "by the manner of [Stein's] death, she may have inspired a sincere search for peaceful coexistence and improved relations between Christians and Jews, for cooperation instead of crusades, understanding in place of inquisition and *autos-da-fe*, brotherhood instead of holocaust."[10] Indeed, Christianity's ability to acknowledge—without preconditions and biases—empathy's dialectically interreligiously attuned *denouement* in the life *and death* of Stein, vis-à-vis her receptivity for the suffering of *her people*, is a lesson in kenotic witnessing for the entire Christian church.

While it has *not* been our specific purpose in our explorations to comprehend the interreligious significance of the symbol of the cross—if one may even speak of its interreligious significance for a Jewish-Christian dialogue—it nevertheless strikes us that Stein's *way* of witnessing to the cross, of witnessing to suffering, is consistent with her *hermeneutics from empathy*. She may become through this praxis "the focal point of an act of contrition still desperately needed by the Western world in response to the midcentury horrors committed against Jews and Jewish life in Christian Europe."[11] In death, Stein subverts and widens (i.e., she *re-imagines*) the intentionality of Christianity's cross through her own empathic cruciform givenness.

The phenomenological weight of Stein's example is most exquisitely revealed, or felt, when one looks at how Stein *listens and responds in an interreligious way* to the Jewish and Christian call at the time of the *Shoah*. As phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion argues, while "it is important to maintain the difference between these two calls (one Christian, the other Jewish), it is even more important to hear in them the unique word from which they both issue: 'Listen, Israel, Jahweh our God, Jahweh alone (Deuteronomy 6:4).'"[12] Stein's givenness in death therefore draws us into a respectful reflection on how sameness and otherness reaches through the

chiaroscuro of death and discontinuity, and finds a dialectically subtle way of being related to one another. Karl Planck argues in a rather provocative essay, "Broken Continuities: 'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'" that the

> crucifixion, be it the cross of Jesus or the nocturnal Golgotha of Auschwitz, breaks the moral continuities by which we have considered ourselves secure and whole. To mend these fragments of human experience lies outside our power. We cannot repair the broken world. Yet, as we yield these broken continuities to narrative—to memoir, to literature, to liturgy—we begin to forge a new link that binds storyteller and hearer, victim and witness. But here we must be most careful. We rush to tell the story, confident that it is ours to tell when, in fact, it is ours to hear.[13]

The "dangerous memory"[14] of Stein's narrative opens us up to the possibility of a harmless hope; hers is an anamnesis subverting a Christian forgetfulness, a memory dis-arming us, and pushing us towards a new future, even in the midst of discontinuity.

Contemporary Christian theologizing on crucifixion as anti-sacrifice explores how the cross is being con-primordially given with the genocides and violence of the twentieth century as a call: *stop this destruction of the world and one another*! Can the cross be an icon that disassembles violence and exposes the necrotic nature of sacrifice *qua* scapegoatism? May this reimagination of the Crucifixion result in the widening of empathy as testified by Stein's own givenness at Auschwitz? A hermeneutical key for beginning to respectfully explore these questions is Marc Chagall's *White Crucifixion*.

A CHRISTOLOGY OF ANTI-SACRIFICE: EMPATHY'S KENOSIS TOWARDS A RENEWED JEWISH-CATHOLIC SOLIDARITY

In 1938, the same year Stein completed *Finite and Eternal Being*, Marc Chagall's "White Crucifixion" was exhibited in Brussels. The exhibition is meant to recollect the sufferings of the Jewish people. The painting is a figure of a serene Christ on the cross, bathed in white light, and covered in a *tallit* (Jewish prayer shawl). The painting depicts an event—around the cross a melee of persecution against the Jews is occurring:

> Like the *arma Christi*, or the tools and implements shown in traditional crucifixion scenes, images of confusion are grouped about the cross. Revolutionary hordes with red flags rampage one village, looting and burning houses. Refugees

> in a boat shout for help and gesticulate wildly. A man in a Nazi uniform is desecrating a synagogue . . . Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew, is passing by in silence, stepping over a burning Torah scroll. Old Testament figures are seen hovering, lamenting against the background of desolate darkness. Still, a bright beam of light breaks from on high, illuminating the white and unblemished figure of the cross.

In this painting we have a sincere sign of the times, for in "its very use of scenes of the times, the picture becomes an integrated whole and achieves the timeless depth of an icon."[15]

The painting gives itself over to the viewer on any number of levels through a depiction of the givenness of the Jewish people. Critics conclude that "the devotional painting 'White Crucifixion' . . . feels its way into that suffering." Chagall himself says, "[i]f a work of art has total authenticity, symbolic meaning will be contained in it of its own accord."[16] But why does Chagall—born into a Jewish family in Vitebsk, Russia, in 1887—employ the imagery of a *crucifix*? One exegesis of the painting argues that Chagall uses the imagery of the crucified with a universal goal in mind: "[i]n the figure of Christ on the cross, symbolizing the passion of the prophet of the Jews and the death of the Christian God who took on the form of man, Chagall located a universal emblem for the sufferings of this time."[17]

In *Symbol and Sacrament*, Louis-Marie Chauvet attempts to resituate our understanding of the cross beyond sacrifice: "Christ revealed a non-violent God in the sense that God is not motivated by the desire for punishment or revenge." Jesus' passion and death "is non-sacrificial, in unmasking the violence of humankind with the aim of pushing the violence to its end . . . Even to its paroxysm."[18] God therefore enters sacrificial rejection *qua* crucifixion as a way of ending the never-ending cycle of recrimination and vengeance.

Similarly, James Alison argues that in the cross there is a moment of "anthropological revelation"—whereby a movement beyond sacrificing one another and contemporary victimhood becomes a possibility—that is, "what Jesus was doing was actually *revealing* the mendacious principle of the world. The way human structure is kept going is by us killing each other, convincing ourselves of our right to do it, and therefore building ourselves up over and against our victims."

The intentionality of the cross intends a world of genocide, racism, sexism, and all forms of scapegoatism: "what [Jesus] was beginning to make possible was for us to begin to live as if death were not, and therefore for us not to have to protect ourselves over against it by making sure we tread on other people." The cross ultimately reveals that "God was entirely without vengeance . . . he was giving himself entirely without ambivalence

and ambiguity for *us*, towards us, in order to set us 'free from our sins'—'our sins' a way of being bound up with each other in death, vengeance, violence and what is commonly called 'wrath.'"[19]

Irish theologian Enda McDonagh eloquently concludes that "[t]he victim of Calvary pronounces the death of victimization by the power of loving," and this way of loving "demands vulnerability even in God . . . *Vulnerabilis et vulneratus* remain the critical Christian criteria of the genuinely loving being, divine or human."[20] But what kind of "vulnerability" could the cross possibly demand from the Jew?

If the Jewish-Catholic dialogue is truly going to be a *dialogue towards anti-sacrifice*, then it occasions us to ask the following unsettling question: what is the symbolic efficacy of an image like "White Crucifixion" for our Jewish dialogue partners in a post-*Shoah* context? While some, even the artist himself, would want to consider "White Crucifixion" as a universal icon, one has to raise the unsettling question, as demanded by our hermeneutic: *how universal*?

Planck argues that there is "also a need to avoid those Christological excesses for which the suffering of the Jew is considered meaningful in light of the passion of Christ, as if Auschwitz were nothing but a stage in the Christian economy of salvation."[21] To reduce or qualify the uniqueness of the Jewish cry of abandonment in the *Shoah* to the sameness of Christianity's *Eloi, Eloi* may only increase our distance from their memory of suffering.

The critique that "symbols not only reveal what they symbolize but also—and, at the same time—conceal that reality" is not unwarranted in terms of "White Crucifixion."[22] Yet when faced with the contemporary genocides of Darfur, Rwanda, and with increasing hostilities in the Middle East among Christians, Muslims, and Jews, we need, as Christian theologians and dialogists, to be able to work within the *between places of revealing and concealing*, for "language does not take us into the essence of things, but into the materiality and messiness of history, in which relations, though not 'hidden', are not visible either."[23] So, too, a dialectically minded hermeneutic from empathy would also be pushing us to consider how "White Crucifixion" may be speaking in a new language to us dialogists.

Is the painting trying to vocalize through symbol a way of belonging to one another that dialectically relates sameness in otherness on the same canvas, as it were? Is it not advocating the (inter)givenness of a broader interreligious solidarity? The symbolic intentionality of the painting renounces the self-sufficiency of the all-knowing subject, and "makes no guarantees in the present about the future"—and yet all the protagonists in "White Crucifixion" share a solidarity under the banner of suffering that the cross somehow typifies.

Let us recall from the painting: we see Ahasverus wandering and passing by in silence while other plaintive figures from the Hebrew Scriptures are floating against a dark horizon—all of whom are being-lost-in-the-world. Even the *Torah* and *Menorah*, *along with the Crucifix*, lack a fixity to the ground—and yet all seem to be caught up with one another, sharing in a wider Jewish and Christian dialogical matrix with the historical contingency of each other's temporal pain and suffering.

Let there be no mistake, Christianity will need to continually *undergo* a recovery of its Jewishness through *teshuva*. It is the work of asking for forgiveness while humbly pointing towards the possibility of a shared eschatological future, a future that eschews any hope of forcing conversion—that is, "Ours is a season for listening and silence. Not when we speak to victims but when we listen to their testimony do we truly perceive the cross, the cross that breaks our moral certainties and shatters our continuities of power."[24] Now is the time for listening to the voices of those who stand between sameness and otherness, those whose lives are painted on a broader canvas, giving testament to the iconic intentionality of "the unifying stream of bodily life . . . the blood stream . . . which all men are plunged . . . this powerful agent of unity."

Edith Stein's final work from behind the walls of Carmel, *The Science of the Cross*, proposes the "reimaginization" of the cross's intentionality in kenosis as having a natural *Einfühlung* with a more universally relevant, and interreligiously significant, way of witnessing. Furthermore, this treatise gives us a theoretical basis for our considerations on her own mode of kenotic givenness at Auschwitz.

THE "SCIENCE" OF KENOSIS: STEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL CHRISTOLOGY

By 1938, the same year as the *début* exhibition of "White Crucifixion," Stein begins to feel her vocation more to the cross. While National Socialism was seizing the hearts and minds of German people at *Kristallnacht*, Edith Stein and her younger sister Rosa were making preparations to leave their beloved Carmel in Cologne for the safer haven of a Carmel in Echt, Holland.

On December 31, 1938, Edith and Rosa Stein left Cologne for Echt, arriving in time for the New Year. Like the wandering Jew Ahasverus, Stein finds a momentary safe haven in this Dutch Carmel. Yet it was during this time in Echt when she wrote her final work, *Kreuzeswissenschaft, The Science of the Cross, A Study of St. John of the Cross*.

In this work, as in other works, Stein's personalism encourages a movement of humanity beyond a closed and autonomous "what's-in-it-for-me" praxis into something more interpersonal and responsible to the other. The kenotic intentionality of *Science* is also a practical phenomenology for it presupposes, and helps us appreciate more deeply, Stein's own way of witnessing in the midst of the *Shoah*.[25]

In a section of the study entitled "The Soul, the 'I,' and Freedom" (Chapter 13, Section d), Stein reflects on the theme of the ego. In the language of a phenomenologist and metaphysician, Stein stresses the necessity of free choice in ethical praxis. She says that the "egocentric" individual's "own self is all that matters to him. To the superficial observer it may seem as if such a man were especially near to his interior, yet for him the way there is perhaps strewn with more obstacles than any other type." For example, this kind of individual might "be asked to give up a pleasure in order to help someone else."[26] Yet, when the "sensual" or egoistic person is "approached by something that belongs to a completely different area of values," say, a request from another in need, he may begin to feel the challenge to respond. Yet, he will venture a response to this other only when he "has gone over to an ethical attitude, that is, the attitude of one who wants to recognize and do what is morally right." But to make this leap into action the self-enclosed "I" will have to "take up a position deep within himself." Stein's position here seems counterintuitive. Getting beyond "myself" and into the world of otherness by going deeper into "oneself"? This going deeper, or becoming more completely oneself, is a matter of turning—that is, it is a "turning" toward God in such a way where "one does not look at [God] in the light of any single article of faith, rather one is surrendered to [God], the incomprehensible one." One surrenders herself to a God who is "the embodiment of all articles of faith and yet surpasses them all in his incomprehensibility."[27]

This "turning" is a comprehensive reorientation of one's life to a different value-set where the "believer" comes to know that "there is One whose vision is not limited . . . who embraces and penetrates everything." Stein concludes that God grants the believer "a personal encounter through a *touch* in" one's "inmost region."[28] Going deeper will therefore mean a coming into touch with one's own capabilities for living a more meaningful life. It is a "turning" in empathy towards one's own transcendence. That is to say, one surrenders to the possibility of living a larger life, of living from the memory of the Other, not just of oneself. Kosuke Koyama's reflections on the "crucified mind" in his study *Water Buffalo Theology* complements Stein on surrender with a further Christo-kenotic insight on the *touch*.

TOWARDS A "CRUCIFIED" MINDFULNESS

Crucified mindfulness is an eschatologically attuned givenness to the other in the midst of pain and suffering. Koyama, in turning to the Pauline canon, suggests, "[The crucified mind] is expressed in the life-style of the apostolic discipleship; 'when reviled, we bless, when persecuted, we endure, when slandered, we speak kindly . . . Have this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus . . . (Phil 2:5–11).'" It is a mindfulness that expresses itself through the kenotically charged *agape*: a loving not limited by creed, status: "It is *love* seeking the benefit of others. This mind sees a person 'as he is seen' (1 Jn. 4:20)."[29]

The crucified mind means radical givenness for the other, even towards death: "[w]e are to live according to the painful pathos of God's saving will expressed in the striking images at the crucial moments of salvation history." If crucified mindfulness is to be a meaningful response to the world's *pathos*, and not some lofty platitude, then it necessarily incarnates love through the touch. Koyama concludes, "[w]hen Christ touches *one*, and *one* is led to touch him in faith . . . that person is restored to wholeness, to the abundant life in the covenant relationship with God."[30] The dynamic of giving and receiving relaxes the classicist and missionary posture of regarding religious otherness as *threat* or to be converted. God incarnate may be found in the distressing proximity and tactility from the other. They are genuine signs, and prophetic embodiments, of the *missio Dei*.

Koyama's insights help create space for a more profound reflection on the dialectical relationship between the kenotic *and* prophetic moments that should mark Christian praxis and interreligious engagement. Indeed, crucified mindfulness ought to be constitutive of Christianity's twenty-first-century rendezvous-with-otherness.

Through the touch, in the giving of the heart, a "crossover" or "formal transformation" happens in the human being: "this may not even be possible in a natural way, but only on the basis of an extraordinary *awakening*."[31] One is surrendering to a being "awakened" to a new solidarity through the touch. It is an awakening that is "a breakthrough to something new." It is a *breakthrough*, in themes reminiscent of Heschel, into the sometimes "*painful pathos* of God's saving will." Stein argues,

> [God] is himself a person, his being is personal being; the inmost region of the soul is the heart and fountainhead of her personal life. It is only possible for one person to touch another person in their inmost region; through such a touch one person gives the other person notice of his presence. When one feels

> one has been touched interiorly in this manner, one is in lively *sentience* with another person.

It is a turning towards a personal encounter, an encounter with a personal God.

We recall with Heschel, "God does not reveal himself in an abstract absoluteness, but in a personal and intimate relation to the world . . . [God] is personally involved." God is being creatively reimagined as being pathically involved through this personalist approach, found in Heschel, and now in Stein. God's *pathos* is "not an idea of goodness, but a living care, not an immutable example but an outgoing challenge, a dynamic relation between God and man." Stein's position speaks from a Jewish ethos, because her "sensitivity" for *mutuality* in surrender (e.g., "[i]t is a union of persons that does not end their independence, but rather has it as a prerequisite, an *interpenetration*") creatively verifies Heschel's pathos as trans-subjectivity, yet in the language of empathy.[32]

These "kenotic" presentations on the journey towards empathy with another, through a subjective mutuality, also helps us appreciate how within the dialogical encounter of "getting a handle" on the other we are "*not* getting a handle on one another." Koyama argues that

> commitment belongs to the world of 'I-Thou-relationship' (I and the Buddha, I and Allah) and not 'I-It-relationship' (I and desk, I and car), to put it in the language of Martin Buber. 'It' can be comparatively treated. 'Thou' cannot be. I can compare this 'it' with that 'it'. But I am confronted with a completely different situation when I wish to compare this 'thou' with that 'thou'. I can 'handle' the former situation, while the latter I cannot, since it points to the relationship of encounter, meaning and commitment . . . Religious faith cannot be 'it-ized.'[33]

This "interpenetration" between the I and Thou, or, to use familiar terms, this "mutuality" in "intergivenness," points us towards a *shared* surrender: "in surrendering one's own person, one takes possession of God."[34]

As we considered with Stephen Post, the mutuality of love is the "only appropriate fundamental norm" for appreciating how a subject relates to another subject. The sharing between subjects may therefore be qualified as an "I–Thou" relationship because there is something of the other that I cannot get a "handle" on or figure my way into—and this introverted ground, this space inhabited by mystery, is something not exclusive to the other. It is a space that "I" inhabit within myself, and yet it is also a communal space, where part of the mystery of my being becomes interpenetrated with the mystery of the other. Such is the dynamic of an inter-kenotic way of being.

Correspondingly, this pathic intentionality of kenosis may never be envisioned as static and unidirectional, for one's givenness towards another will, hopefully, coax and incite a return givenness from the other. The kenosis of the "I" may therefore mean a decentering of the "I" where *Einfühlung* with God will also mean a reciprocally grounded *Einverständnis*, or solidarity, with the world. This movement of both towards the center, or as Hampl argued, into the "in-between" place of "you" and "me," is a lively and transformative feeling-with the other on the way towards transcendence.

"LIKE A FIRE BURNING": A *HABITUS*-FOR-LOVING

The development of this *habitus* for transcendence ultimately shows itself as a disposition for both spiritual and actual self-surrender, an emptying that gives oneself over to God as prompted by the very givenness of God through kenosis. The goal that any religiously motivated agent is rightly striving towards is fully realized in and through the agent's surrendering to a mystical love-union with the Infinite.

Not surprisingly, the calculus for this way of loving is derived by Stein from the equanimity inherent to personalist categories, "[f]or the property of love is to make the lover equal to what he loves. . . . [i]t is equality in friendship in which the possessions of both are held in common." The surrendering of oneself in the union of love may be characterized then as an exstasis of the self towards the face of the other, and towards the One who originally prompted the remembering movement towards the other.

Stein argues, in themes rising from the Hebrew scriptures, that one's "transformation in love is the *habitus*" or the "lasting condition" into which the "I" is placed, and this transformation is like a "fire that burns in her constantly." While "[t]he *simple union* of love alone is like the 'fire of God in Zion' (Is 31:9)," those who cultivate the *habitus* for loving are to burn with "this fire of charity" for others; that is to say, they will be lovers in the world, surrendering love for love.

This love of service to others, and the desire to live from this love, is also a desire reaching out towards an eschatological reality. It is a "vision of peace" where the "'furnace of God in Jerusalem'" is "blazing in the perfection of love," the fulfillment and coalescence of all things in justice and peace. Loving union with God will also mean union with the other, and over time may develop into a universally applicable *habitus*-for-loving. The desire for loving union with the divine strengthens one's capacity for ethical agency.[35]

REMEMBERING THE WOUNDEDNESS OF THE WORLD

Stein ultimately concludes *Science* in arguing that "the *new self* " of the one who has surrendered to love "carries the wounds of Christ on the body: the remembrance of the misery of sin out of which the soul was awakened to a blessed life."[36] Is Stein's sense of "remembering" the misery setting up a subtle challenge to anti-sacrifice? In one sense, remembering the misery is a way of heaping onto one's self guilt upon guilt. But this is nothing more than a perverted form of vanity, to make it *all* about oneself.

Yet, Stein's sense of remembrance does not mean that one continues the sacrifice of the self to the necrotic torture of beating oneself up for past faults. Rather, a *remembrance for the misery* is also about remembering the suffering caused to, and endured by, others. The important message here is that the new self is a remembering self. Stein concludes that "whoever, in deep recollection, enters into the attitude" of Christ's kenosis is at the threshold of feeling one's way into "the love that surrenders itself to the limit."

Yet, this "self-surrendering love" is not only interested in "self-fulfillment" as "union with God," but *surrendering* also means engagement; a working "*and laboring for the union of others with God and for their self-fulfillment*." A concern for the self, united with a concern for the fulfillment of the other, "*belong[s] inseparably together*."[37] The way of remembering God's wounds is through remembering the woundedness of the world. In this sense the surrendering of oneself is nothing less than a being made vulnerable to the memory of the other.

In *Science*, the large and wide thoroughfare of the *via negativa* of kenosis intersects with the *via positiva* desire for an ethically grounded prophetic witnessing. One cannot be accomplished without the other. Kenosis from the self designates a possibility for an ethical witnessing, while an ethical witnessing, a *laboring* with and for others, makes kenosis meaningful, increasing and widening its depth in the world.

Kenosis is an emptying that gives a visible manifestation of the invisibility of love. Stein's own praxis during the Holocaust is a prophetic expression of how kenosis may also be solidarity with a world of (inter)religious otherness. Her theory and praxis therefore gives "the long tradition of apophatic or negative theology" a necessary *aggiornamento*.[38] She gives herself to this "furnace" as one who is remanded with *her people* to the conflagration of Auschwitz.

BEYOND THE WALLS OF CARMEL

By 1939 the question had been settled once and for all for Stein. She writes to her new prioress at the Carmel at Echt from a desire for spiritual surrender. On Passion Sunday, March 26, 1939, Stein requests the following: "allow me to offer myself to the heart of Jesus as a sacrifice of propitiation for true peace, that the dominion of the Antichrist may collapse, if possible, without a new world war, and that a new order may be established? I would like [my request] granted this very day because it is the twelfth hour."[39] Indeed, it was the "twelfth hour." Between May 10 and 19, 1940, the Nazi forces invaded Holland, and by 1941 the Nazi authorities decreed that "all non-Aryan Germans resident in Holland were stateless; they were to report by December 15 for deportation from the country."[40]

Against the horizon of this apocalyptic drama Stein counsels love. She advises a member of another religious order in 1940, "Should we strive for perfect love, you ask? Absolutely. For this we were created . . . What can we do? Try with all our might to be empty: . . . directed to God in the straightforward gaze of faith; the will (as I have already said) surrendered to God in love."[41]

She writes, in nearly apocalyptic metaphors, on the feast of the Holy Cross, September 14, 1939:

> The world is in flames. The conflagration can also reach our house . . . The world is in flames. Are you impelled to put them out? Look at the cross . . . Make your heart free by the faithful fulfillment of your vows; then the flood of divine love will be poured into your heart until it overflows and becomes fruitful to all the ends of the earth. Do you hear the groans of the wounded on the battlefields in the west and the east? You are not a physician and not a nurse and cannot bind up the wounds. You are enclosed in a cell and cannot get to them . . . You would like to be an angel of mercy and help them. Look at the Crucified . . . Bound to him, you are omnipresent as he is. You cannot help here or there like the physician, the nurse . . . You can be at all fronts, wherever there is grief, in the power of the cross. Your compassionate love takes you everywhere . . .[42]

Your compassionate love takes you everywhere . . . on July 26, 1942, the Catholic Church of Holland issued a formal protest from the pulpit against the genocide being perpetrated against the Jews.[43] The following day, the *Reichskommissar* ordered all Catholic Jews, numbering approximately 722, to be deported because of the Bishops' "interference" in the governing of the country.

This deportation would be in addition to the 6,000 Jews already deported from Holland. Edith Stein is taken from beyond the walls of Carmel and goes to Auschwitz *in* solidarity with her people. Yet this desire to be

present "at all fronts" is a way of living that Stein began to cultivate in her service at the lazaretto during the First World War. For example, in 1939, she writes as if she is *already* feeling what the prophetic radicality of witnessing in kenosis would mean for the rest of her life: "At the same time I always have a lively awareness that we do not have a lasting city here. I have no other desire than that God's will be done in me and through me. It is up to him how long he leaves me here and what is to come then. *In manibus tuis sortes meae*. <My days are in your hands. (Ps 31:15)> There everything is well cared for. I need not worry about anything."[44]

Stein's givenness during these final days may be described as coming in the form of an empathy that exhibits the kenosis of an effusive compassion for others. Heschel is instructive on this point:

> When the soul of man is asked: What is God to you? there is only one answer that survives all theories which we carry to the grave: He is full of compassion. The Tetragrammaton, the great Name, we do not know how to pronounce, but we are taught to know what it stands for: 'compassion' . . . Only one attribute is reserved for God: he alone is called in the Bible *rahum* the Merciful One.[45]

Stein undergoes the call to pathos, and so does God. God's *rahum* con-primordially belongs *within* the relationship between prophetic agent and God. The interior apophatic experience of surrendering to her God in prayer finds an exterior kenotic agency.

On August 2, 1942, the Nazis came for Edith and Rosa Stein. Edith Stein is called beyond the walls of her beloved "lasting city" of Carmel. Koeppel relates, "the evening hour of mental prayer began, as usual, at 5 p.m. Sister Teresa Benedicta [Edith Stein] read the point of meditation . . . A few minutes of silence followed. Then, heavy pounding at the door resounded . . . The S.S. men had come; almost before the nuns realized what was going on, Sr. Benedicta and Rosa had been taken away."[46] Thus, the conflagration reached the home of Edith and Rosa Stein, and a prophecy she once spoke of to her friend Baroness Uta von Bodman in 1930, on the night the Nazi forces marched in Speyer, came to fruition.

Nota relates the story as told to him by Baroness von Bodman in 1982. Bodman relates, "Everybody was excited about the regained freedom, symbolized in the parade of the German soldiers to the light of torches' flames. Edith Stein, however, was very quiet." When von Bodman asked her why she was not as enthusiastic as the rest of the crowd, Stein responded, "'they are going to persecute first the Jews, then afterwards the Catholic Church.' Her friend could not believe it. 'Wait and you will remember my words,' Edith said."[47]

Waltraud Herbstrith, in her biographical study of Stein, turns to first-hand accounts of her final day. Herbstrith relates,

> It was five in the afternoon when the prioress was summoned to the parlor where two S.S. officers waited to question her about Edith Stein. Assuming they had come to discuss the emigration [to Switzerland], Sister Antonia sent Edith Stein to speak to them. The officers immediately ordered her away from the grille, giving her five minutes to pack her things . . . By the time she reached the convent gate, Rosa [Edith's sibling] was already waiting . . . Surrounded by the crowd and unable to fully absorb the situation, Rosa began to grow disoriented. Seeing this, a neighbor recalled, Edith Stein took her by the hand and said reassuringly, "Come, Rosa. We're going for our people."[48]

We may recall from Stein's phenomenology: "words 'ought' to point out something to me. Now they are no longer merely the expression of something objective, but at the same time are the externalization or the announcement of the person's meaningful act as well as of the experiences behind it." Yet, on a deeper level, even if Stein had not uttered these precise words, it is clear that her actions annunciate a solidarity. Stein's words are made meaningful through her reception to the call issuing from the Jewish people.

The community to whom she finds herself given is not readily available to her as a phenomenological "we" or "them." The only "face" grasping Edith Stein in the moment is that of her sister Rosa. Rosa's state of affairs in the moment is one of confusion: "surrounded by the crowd and unable to fully absorb the situation, Rosa began to grow disoriented." Edith Stein becomes the "zero-point" of orientation for her sister. Edith grasps her hand and re-orients Rosa towards an unknown future of solidarity with others.

When Stein writes to the Echt Carmel from Drente-Westerbork, "now we have a chance to experience a little how to live purely from within," we find a woman mysteriously capable of dealing with the growing, all-enveloping discontinuity of Auschwitz.[49] The experience of otherness in the event is dialectically related, at a deeper level, to the sameness being shared among those crowded on the train.

The reality of life outside the walls of Carmel on a crowded train *en route* to death illustrates well the otherness in which Stein finds herself, and yet before and after the experience of being arrested we find Stein identifying through her writing and praxis with the Jewish people, with the place of sameness—*my people*: "[t]he Jew does not stand alone before God; it is as a member of the community that he stands before God. Our relationship to Him is not as an I to a Thou, but as a We to a Thou."[50]

By August 7, 1942, Edith and Rosa Stein are well on their journey to the East. The train line passes near or through Edith's home of Breslau. On this day, a local postman named Johannes Wiener is "standing in the switching area of the railroad depot in Breslau" next to a train with Dutch markings that is waiting for servicing by the engineers. The Nazi guards came and opened the sliding doors on the cars. Wiener relates,

> Then a woman in nun's clothing stepped into the opening. Wieners looked at her with such commiseration that she spoke to him: "It's awful. We have nothing by way of containers for sanitation needs." Looking into the distance and then across the town, she said, "This is my beloved hometown. I will never see it again." When he looked at her, questioningly, she added, very hesitantly: "We are riding to our death."[51]

Once at Auschwitz, we see an Edith Stein who continues to respond to the other. Posselt tell us that one witness, Julius Marcan, notices the "complete calm and self-possession that marked her out" from many others. Edith ministers to others, especially to women and children. She "immediately set about taking care of these little ones. She washed them, combed their hair and tried to make sure they were fed and cared for."[52] Even in the midst of human deprivation, Edith Stein manages to reach beyond the totality of genocide, and into the life of another.

In one last vignette from the camps we see one of the best examples of her universal concern for intergivenness. Again, it is an example of Edith Stein encouraging us to be like her by balancing the opposites by moving dialectically beyond and between traditions towards infinity through prophetic agency. The eyewitness relates,

> From the moment I met her in the camp at Westerbork . . . I knew: here is someone truly great. For a couple of days she lived in that hellhole, walking, talking and praying . . . like a saint . . . During one conversation she told me, "For now, the world consists in opposites . . . But in the end, none of those contrasts will remain. There will only be the fullness of love. How could it be otherwise?"[53]

Rosa and Edith Stein are murdered and cremated at Auschwitz-Birkenau on August 9, 1942.[54] We may only conclude with the eloquent words of Nota, who was attempting, as late as July 1942, to secure emigration for Stein and Rosa to Switzerland from Echt:

> Edith Stein's obedience to her conscience led her to travel on unaccustomed paths. If the Jewish people seem to stand alone again today, her life and martyrdom are

> clear testimony that God's election of her people is an enduring one. She was a woman who gave herself fully to this world, yet always remembered that she and her fellow human beings were on their way to God.[55]

Stein's way of proceeding, receiving and loving those who have been made "not others" by totality—her everyday praxis in the midst of the *Shoah*—reveals a way of doing *mitzvoth* through an *empathic belonging*. Furthermore, Edith Stein, as a point of encounter, as a woman of intergivenness, is a dialogist who gives Jews and Christians, theologians and others, a message on how we may go about the interreligious dialogue with one another. She shows us, in recourse to a Jewish sensibility, how "*Empathy*, rather than expression is the way to piety," and this way to piety is accomplished through the act: doing a *mitzvah*, a good deed: "a *mitzvah* is a task . . . an act that *ought to be* done." To do a good mitzvah is to enact an empathy with God, to "affect God," for while "[s]ymbols evade, *mitzvoth* transcend reality." The essence of Judaism is the *mitzvoth*—"it is a demand rather than a creed. It emphasizes the centrality of the act . . . God asks for the heart, not for the symbol; . . . for deeds, not for ceremonies."[56]

Stein's way of responding is all about empathy. One reaches out in service to the world from one's own primordial ground. By so doing, one is striving to touch the primordial ground of the other. In reaching out from her depth, the prophetic witness is hoping to collapse the distance between "I" and Thou in order to incarnate the new solidarity of the con-primordially realized "We." Stein responds from this empathic depth in responding to the other. Indeed, we may continue to hear the echo of empathy in the following from Stein:

> Human beings are called upon to live in their inmost region and to have themselves as much in hand as is possible only from that center-point; only from there can they rightly come to terms with the world.

One who "knows oneself," who is in touch with her own depth at the "center-point," may more completely and radically reach out from her "center-point of orientation" in order to accomplish a compassion-filled solidarity.

The person who is in command of oneself, who is reaching out towards the world from one's indivisible ground will "address herself to another spirit with whatever has become an *interior word*" for her life. One ultimately addresses the other, Stein concludes, with "the intention of sharing with another what one has in oneself."[57]

Through a *kenotic intentionality*, *an emptying that gives*, God "turns" towards us, and aims to *give God-self*. We, in turn, attempt to recreate this givenness in solidarity. Stein is arguably an exemplar of this praxis, for

> everything suggests that Edith Stein was an unusually integrated person, capable of a high state of contemplative prayer. It seems clear that she adapted naturally to the core of prayer: she understood her vocation as an act of solidarity (or, her old word, empathy) with the suffering of the world.[58]

Stein's science of kenosis speaks the word of solidarity while also accomplishing what the word intends; namely, an ever-more-radical *Einfühlung* through the practical activity of a *flowing presence*, a presence speaking protest to God and man: this "absurdity" is the murder of "six million" holy witnesses.[59]

Our hope rests upon the kenotic presence of witnesses like Stein who remind us that *beyond all "diaspora"*[60] *there is communion:* "This is the task: in the darkest night to be certain of the dawn, certain of the power to turn a curse into a blessing, agony into a song . . . Faith is the beginning of compassion, of compassion for God. It is when bursting with God's sighs that we are touched by the awareness that *beyond all absurdity* there is meaning, Truth, and love."[61] *Teshuva* reaches out for solidarity; it is a return to the other that overturns displacement through an empathic inter-kenosis. The "manner" of Stein's life and death as *witness* is challenging us to see how empathy is a way of remembering oneself with the religious other. How, in turn, may her example be helpful to the interreligious dialogue?

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CHAPTER 7

Stein's Kenosis

Reimaging Witnessing

What would it have been like if Stein's response on August 2, 1942, was, "I am not a Jew, these are no longer my people"? Stein's response accomplishes anamnesis—a remembering, a witnessing *in the going*.

Abraham Joshua Heschel was once asked in an interview, "[w]hat can Christianity learn from Judaism?" He responded that a Christian may learn how "[t]o be a witness to the God of Abraham, of Sinai." One may learn an "openness to God's stake in the ongoing history of the Jewish people . . . the idea of witness, that is, sensitivity to God's presence, is, above all, the primary existential aspect of Judaism."[1] Edith Stein's witness affirms, and does not deny, who she is and continues to be. And her witness comes in the form a response to the one universal and personal call of love that is consistent from Abraham to Jesus: '*Henani*!' "*Here I am*!"

If Stein had engaged in a deliberate effort to erase the memory of her consanguinity with Judaism, then she would have become like many others who were swept up, and trapped by, the genocidal idol of Nazism's "depravity and depravation" of forgetfulness for the other (*cf*. Chapter 6). Stein does not shirk from being identified as a "Jew." She embraces her identity. The "unpredictable landing" of the *Shoah* breaks upon her and the Jewish people as a disorienting *fait accompli*, a ghastly certainty, "—the danger, whose fact is accomplished [*dont le fait s'accomplit*]—."[2] Neither does she run from the scene of the crime, nor does she want to substitute Catholicism for her Jewishness. She intentionally exposes herself beyond

confessional boundaries, and she finds herself thrown into a reality that is not of her own making; she says, "the destiny of this people was also mine."[3]

We have been "reading" Stein's givenness through her own perspective on kenosis. She argues in *Science of the Cross* that "[w]hat approaches from the outside has a certain right to claim [my] attention, and, depending on its *weight*, the value, and meaning it has in itself and for the soul, it deserves to be admitted to an appropriate depth of the soul." The *weight* of the other claims Stein at her "deepest point," at the "place of her freedom." It is from this depth, this *place of conscience*, where the "I" may "collect her entire being and make decisions" about itself and what actions the "I" is going to take: "only at the deepest point can one possibly measure everything against one's ultimate standards . . . anyone who does not have herself completely in hand can not decide in true freedom but rather, allows herself to be determined by outside factors."[4] Indeed, Stein's own confidence in givenness, as we have gathered from her writings and praxis, and exceptionally heard in the words, "Come, Rosa. We're going for our people," highlights an interior center of orientation in Stein wherefrom she may respond with a remembering Jewish-Christian mindfulness for her people: "Edith Stein clearly understood—as mystics of all faiths and 'ways' do—that the end point of contemplative life is the oneness that unites the individual with the fullest reality. With God, yes. But with the suffering world as well."[5]

THE KENOSIS OF CARITAS

In terms of reading Stein's praxis through a hermeneutic of intergivenness, Marion argues, (1) "To receive the Other—that is equivalent first and before all to receiving a given and receiving oneself from it; no obstacle stands between the Other and the gifted," and (2) "There is more: the gifted himself belongs within the phenomenality of givenness and therefore, in this sense, gives itself, too, in a privileged way" (*cf*. Chapter 2). Marion, to clarify how "the gifted" (namely, the one who receives the given phenomenon) gives herself back to the original giver, lists three phenomenological points of description:

> (i) It gives itself first in as much as, like every phenomenon, it arises from the given.
>
> (ii) It gives itself next par excellence, since it alone can and should respond in turn to the givens that appear as such only by showing themselves to it.

> (iii) Above all, the gifted can glimpse the possibility of giving itself to an exceptional given—the given that would show itself in the mode of the gifted, it too is accustomed to receiving itself from what gives itself to it.[6]

Against the horizon of our hermeneutic, it is obvious that Stein as gifted fulfills the requirements of (i): she gives herself as a respondent to the excessive phenomenological given of the *Shoah*. Stein "can and should" (ii) respond, and she does—she reaches across the borders of religion in her kenotic and empathic praxis of solidarity, an example of intergivenness *par excellence*. In regards to (iii), Stein does give herself over to an "exceptional given": the suffering Jewish other, as envisaged by Edith Stein in Rosa's face; the face of the other who is also family, the face of consanguinity. Stein is "gifted" through this "exceptional" Jewish call, a call issuing forth from a people in the voice of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

Marion's phenomenology of the gifted, however, may be critically challenged in light of the real-time example of Edith Stein. For example, Marion argues that the gifted is "accustomed to receiving itself from what gives itself." But is Stein's identity as the "gifted" solely dependent upon the given, as if she were to receive her very *self* from the "given"? By overstressing the sheer givenness of each face beyond reification, Marion runs the risk of dissolving the selfhood of the receiver. He thereby reintroduces the Heschelian problematic of passivity from the point of view of givenness (or, in Levinasian terms, substitution). While he argues that "[t]o have done with the 'subject,' it is therefore necessary not to destroy it, but to reverse it—to overturn it," he also holds that "at the center stands no 'subject,' but a gifted, he whose function consists in receiving what is immeasurably given to him, and whose privilege is confined to the fact that he is himself received from what he receives." This ambiguity on subjectivity would lead us to conclude that the subject is overturned by becoming "the gifted." But why does Marion want to deny to "the gifted" what he seems to retain for "the subject"; that is, a subjectivity?

Our reflections with Stein on empathy have been strongly suggesting that we need to preserve the subjectivity of the subject as *not only* being a receptive pole of sheer givenness but also as being an independent center of action. Marion, however, says, "I will oppose to it the claim that it does not hold this center but is instead held there as a recipient . . . as a pole of givenness, where all givens come forward incessantly."[7]

From this perspective, everything therefore depends on the surprise of what is given to the subject. Marion says,

> [I]f I knew in advance that it is Being or other or God or life that was summoning me, then I would escape the full status of the gifted since I would be free of all surprise. Knowing in advance (or at least immediately) with what and with whom I am dealing when dealing with the word heard, I would know (what) or I would respond (who) according to the surplus of constitution or the equality of dialogue, but without the interlocuted passivity of surprise. In short, I would then become an I who delivers itself from the status of a me.[8]

But does not this perspective frame the subject as a *subject always waiting*, waiting for her *self* from another? I would agree with Marion that in certain phenomenological instances, "the glory of the visible weighs down with all it has . . . to the point of making one suffer"—that is, at times, the only proper posture and intentionality is one of reception. It would be difficult, however, to agree with Marion that the subject receives her *self* from the call. From such a perspective, the weight of the call crushes the identity of the receiver and reintroduces the violence of substitution from the "pole of givenness."[9]

Through the overwhelming givenness of the given we lose the receiver ("the gifted"), or, at the very least, we lose her ability to give the gift of a *free response* in the "yes, I will go." At the extreme, solidarity is rendered empty under the totality of reducing the subject who receives the content (or "givenness") of the call to the sameness of that content. Stein's hermeneutics of empathy, however, is a more sober and relevant interpretation of how the phenomenon of givenness aims for a dialectically balanced reciprocity of (i) giving and (ii) receiving:

> (i) The manner and measure of receptive appropriation depends, of course, not only on the recipients but also on the givers. The latter may give themselves wholly or without more or less reserve. They may withhold some of their knowledge, their personal convictions, their individuality. Their self-communication may be in the nature of an imperious conquest or of humble service.
> (ii) We are not defenseless prey to that which, by means of the phenomenon of expression, tries to force itself upon us from the outside. Nor are we compelled to surrender or communicate unreservedly all that which is alive within us.[10]

For Stein, the givenness of the other will never overwhelm "me" to the point where "my" self-identity becomes a clone of (or crushed under) the given.

Against the horizon of the *Shoah*, these exigencies call us to a phenomenological frankness, so to speak. There exists the possibility of saying "no" to the other. Marion's *passivity to the surprise* here hides the phenomenological

reality that some say "no" to the given, the call from the other. Some individuals never leave the narrow circle of the "I." Their passivity to the surprise of the destitute other is not a passivity through which they receive themselves from the excessive givenness of the given. Rather, their passivity is characterized as a disregard for the call. In the "no," the "I" denies *the showing* of the other that gives itself in a call. Indeed, this too is a violence perpetrated against the given, for it illustrates a lack of openness and generosity to the call.

Edith Stein stands in direct contrast to the "no" and incarnates a solidarity and empathy that presupposes a diversity existing among individuals who give themselves—beyond substitution—to one another in an empathic way. If the Jewish call—the given—shows itself in "the mode of the gifted," then Stein's response is a real "mode" or way of being given in response to the original call. But her generous orientation in solidarity towards the call is not constituted by the sheer givenness of the Jewish call. Her intergivenness places her between sameness and otherness: the Jewish woman now Carmelite nun receives the call, and gives herself anew to the Jew and the Christian as a Jew and a Christian. Stein says, "All mutual relations and all intercourse among human beings are founded upon bodily-physical expressions and manifestations of the inner life, making intimate contact possible and (within certain limits) even a union of minds."[11] Stein is at home in the moment for she is able to feel her way into the reality, not as a substitute but as an interreligious empathizer.

In terms of Jewish-Christian dialogue, and in the language of Stein's study, we could say that Christianity's non-primordial experience of God's pathos is announced by Judaism's own primordial experience(s), and this "continuum memory"[12] is emancipatory. The "continuation" of the "biblical narrative" over this empathically charged "give-and-take" field of meaning becomes, for Christians and Jews, "a memorial (*zikkarôn*) of freedom and redemption."[13] Thus, Stein provides a middle way based on the phenomenological reality found in the exigencies of the everyday where one may respond to the other either with a free "yes" *or* with a free "no." When someone says "I" he or she is "designating" himself or herself as unique from every other, and it is only when a being differentiates itself from every other existent that it may properly call itself "I".[14]

Catherine Cornille argues in her study *The Im-Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue* that "the notion of empathy quickly fades from hermeneutical discourse" when the *inter* of inter-subjectivity is not held in proper dialectical tension. Cornille concludes that "[i]f the self and other are always already interconnected, there is no radical 'other' to be understood and all understanding must be conditioned by one's own subjectivity."[15] And yet, every particular expression of love and action on behalf of an other, on

behalf of justice, enlaces a particular individual and/or community with the suffering of the *entire* world—that is, "truths may be revealed in one culture and preached in another. They may be revealed in the styles and fashion of one differentiation of consciousness, defined by the church in the style and fashion of another differentiation."[16] This differentiation challenges the heterology of distance, discretion, and isolation, and yet encourages (and respects) a necessary transcendence towards the other. This diversity-in-unity is desperately needed today—that is, "A more profound empathy, which is not however a fusion (a pure *pathos*), brings into being a co-singularity via a process of co-singularization."[17]

Our critical dialogue with Heschel and Stein has been revealing the appropriateness of *Einfühlung*, in contradistinction to sympathy, as a *Grundkonzept* for interreligious dialogue. Stein's unique embodiment of Jewish-Christian fidelity is providing our reflections with a necessary hermeneutical key for unlocking how empathy may be paradigmatic to a Jewish-Christian way of witnessing in an interreligiously complex world. Let us continue to reflect on how Stein's embodiment of empathy may itself be a metaphor for how Catholicism may proceed in dialogue with otherness.

EMBODYING EMPATHY: A WIDER RELATIONALITY

Susan Ross argues in *Extravagant Affections: A Feminist Sacramental Theology*[18] that the involvement of women in the church since Vatican II has been both "practical and symbolic." Participative women are "symboliz[ing] the sacred." This *re-presentation* of the sacred may subtly challenge the *sensus fidelium* to imagine beyond a fixed androcentric *imago Dei*. Ross argues that "women have tended to function, in language as well as in symbols, as objects of men's thoughts and desires," and have not had the opportunity to experience or actualize their "relational subjectivity" through active modes until recent years. Ross provokes us to reflect on how "gendered structures and dynamics" within theology have worked to "prevent women as women from emerging as subjects at all."

Stein's pre-*aggiornamento* perspective and subsequent givenness, now argued for by Ross, concurs: "women *do* speak and act as subjects," and may be exemplars of a dynamic, relational way of being. Ross argues,

> [w]omen's persistence in speaking and acting symbolically constitutes a resistance to such structures as well as the construction of a language that dares to speak of a God whose affection for humanity is so extravagant that this God takes up a home in the body of a woman.[19]

The symbolic order of a living ritual, through the body of the feminine, "puts together" (*sym-ballein*)[20] the word of God while also affecting a creative distance from ritual's traditional embodiment(s) of God. Moreover, the generative extravagance of God's voice not only overturns relationality but opens it up to a new word and deed, where women are conveying a "sense of self" that is "more communal than individualistic."

The *sensus femininus* creatively deepens and buttresses a liturgico-ethical anamnesis insofar as women are embodying (i.e., making present) an essential mark of the wider, *male and female* ecclesia. Stein's theory and praxis indeed argues for a vigorous and dynamic "interdependence" of all upon all as the body of the One whose body is the church. The feminine insistence for a wider relationality conveys, then, the ethos of a God who is imagined *beyond* the xenophobia of "self-subsistence, impassibility and immutability," and is being made known from *within* the human embodiments of compassion and empathy.[21]

A METAPHOR FOR STEIN: THE "MANDORLA" WITNESS

Many of our older brothers and sisters within Judaism would hold that what Stein accomplishes in her conversion to Christianity was precisely a self-imposed exile-in-forgetfulness from the religion of her ancestors. The *Shoah* certainly demands from Christianity an emptying of any misconceptions and subtle *apologias* around her death. Furthermore, one would not want to uncritically *melt* Stein's self-acknowledged Christian difference into her Jewish ancestry, as if to eschew her conversion.

Yet, Stein's "speaking and acting" symbolically "constitutes" a form of "resistance" to a language that wants to make God's pathos less extravagant and more narrow. Apropos of Ross, we have been examining in this study how Stein does convey a "sense of self" that is indeed "more communal than individualistic." Stein's theory and praxis is precisely a living from a wider interreligious empathy because it "dares to speak of a God whose affection for humanity is so extravagant that this God takes up a home in the body" *of both oneself and the other*: Gentile and Jew.

Edith Stein is rising for us as a kind of "mandorla figure" revealing how Christianity *already* has something of the other within itself. The mandorla is "the almond shaped figure created by the overlap of two circles and represents the experience of unity between two apparent opposites." It is the mandorla that symbolically "teaches us . . . not to eradicate tensions, but to hold tensions in such a way that we live in the experience of their unity."[22] We know from geometry that a mandorla is formed by two circles,

two circles that intersect such that the center-point of each circle lies on the circumference of the other circle. What is primordial to one circle, its center-point, is given con-primordially to the other circle. One circle's center becomes the other circle's boundary—one encompasses part of the other and creates something new. What was a "non-place"[23] before the intergivenness of the two now becomes the nexus, a new center-point of orientation.

Stein, as a mandorla figure, "stands at the midpoint of the evils of the midcentury . . . a figure forever calling Christians towards contrition—the proper Christian response to the Holocaust."[24] Her life and death encourages a more limit-less memory for the other. This non-place she has been pushing us towards is *a new place*. Georges Cottier argues, "[t]he subject who remembers is involved in remembrance by his or her choices, fears, dreams, honesty or cowardice. Remembrance is not neutral, and it is not always innocent. In summary, one can say that it is legitimate to speak of the ethics of memory."[25] While "I" may have sympathy with "my" own memories, the memory of the other calls for empathy—a givenness beyond myself to the new place of the other.

The *a priori* of the other, her un-substitutable reality, calls *me* beyond impassibility through the giving of *a* response. The kenosis of loving, the emptying that gives, may never be considered an utter loss. The gift of loving, while reciprocal, is not meant to return to "me." There is a kenosis, starting from "me" and going towards "you," that is reciprocal, assuming nothing and beyond substitution.

An *inter-kenosis* is made visible between the lover and the beloved. While loving may lead to a loss of *temporal* presence, as in the case of martyrdom, it is never a loss of identity. Stein's emptying allows her to enter a place beyond privilege, beyond the power of a Christian substitutionism through a *flowing presence*. And Stein enters this space as a *rememberer*. Her life is a lesson in mandorla-living, revealing how Christians may enter the conversation with Judaism and other religions.

Michael Barnes ratifies this position. What is needed is a new way of being kenotic for the religious other. He says,

> Christian eschatology overturns any notion of a privileged place or a privileged moment of time. Now every place and every moment speaks equally of God to those who learn how to discern and witness to the 'seeds of the Word', the signs of the in-breaking of the Kingdom . . . In a sense, the purpose of Christian places is that they become 'non-places', to be places of *kenosis* and negation which impel disciples away from an attachment to the concrete and a desire to go 'elsewhere' in obedience to Christ's call to follow.[26]

The Christian subject enters the dialogue motivated by the kenosis of love and commences as an interreligious dialectician with "a project of engagement with areas of passivity and otherness which continually arise and return."[27] This remembering, bringing "you into me," and vice versa, awakens a wider eschatological horizon.

Thomas Josef Götz tells us, echoing the thought of Aloysius Pieris, that "'genuine conversation'" may happen only when "'the existential achievement of his or her selflessness and self-emptying begins to speak, and with it the selflessness and self-emptying of Christ. The chance for both lies in letting go of self' . . . Spiritual exchange makes possible the encounter in and with the very heart of the religions."[28] Edith Stein's way of being a witness (martyr) compels her beyond a static attachment. She domiciles in the other. The other is a fluid locus, a dynamic subject, one pushing and compelling her towards those non-places of kenosis.

THE *SMAR* IN MARTYR: WITNESSING AS REMEMBERING

Above all, however, Stein is a *rememberer*. Stein's *hermeneutics from empathy*, her emptying that gives, has been challenging us to deepen and widen our understanding of what it means to be a prophetic witness. Stein's response calls the Christian church towards a *teshuva ex radice*, a return to our roots through repentance for the past: to hear anew the inner voice of our ancestors. Cottier argues, "the judgment of the past cannot be disassociated from self-evaluation in the present. They are combined to the extent that the past, for better or worse, weighs on the present. Remembrance, seen from this perspective, is a dimension of conscience."[29] This, truly, is the significance of Stein's martyrdom, a call to remember our consanguinity, *our empathy*, with Judaism as being a matter of conscience, of interreligious integrity. Hampl insightfully offers us the following:

> [t]he Greek root of the word *martyr* is often invoked: it means to witness. But in a deeper recess of the word's etymology there is also a related Sanskrit derivation—from *smar*, to remember. A fierce act of memory then—the will to remember—is the hidden kernel of the martyr's calling.[30]

A memory, and "my" empathy with the memory, is necessarily "point[ing] back to the past primordiality" of the event—or, as she concludes, "this past has the character of a former 'now.' Accordingly, memory posits and what is remembered has being."[31] Memory lives, it breathes, and is being

given to "me" through an *Einfühlung* with the event *as a memory*, an event being remembered with my "now," if you will.

The givenness of *Einfühlung* is nothing less than the incarnation of *a remembering love*. Stein says on empathy as loving, "I do not 'forget' my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world. My love for them is living even when I am not living in it. It influences my actual being and conduct." Stein goes on to formulate this praxis negatively, "out of love for someone, I can abstain from activities which would cause displeasure without 'being conscious' of this."[32] For Stein, there is no economy of love. One may never measure out love.

Stein argues in *On Empathy*, "Now, in the act of love we have a comprehending or an intending of the value of a person. This is not a valuing for any other sake. We do not love a person because he does good . . . Rather, he himself is valuable and we love him 'for his own sake.'"[33] Thus, the person is given through the dynamic of love, where the originary concern of love opens a depth—a givenness to dialogue, a givenness bespeaking a generosity in listening, and a givenness unto death. Stein's martyrdom is a *witnessing from one who testifies to a wider memory through a studied and loving empathy*. Correspondingly, Heschel argues that the

> most important decision a thinker makes is reflected in what he comes to consider the most important problem. According to Albert Camus, "There is only one really serious philosophical problem: and that is suicide." May I differ and suggest that there is only one really serious problem: and that is martyrdom. Is there anything worth dying for?

Truth, at times in our lives, may call us to the radical witness of a kenotic surrender but "*[w]e can only live for the truth if we have the power to die for it*." In death, Stein is revealing for us what she has been consistently living for: a wider, interreligiously attuned empathy. Stein reaffirms life in her prophetic "here I am" through death. Her praxis at the time of her martyrdom, and her martyrdom itself, is a reaffirmation of life, of all life. Heschel concludes that Judaism would want to hold that "the greatness of man is his capacity for *kiddush hashem*, readiness to die for the sake of God, for the sake of the Name."[34]

If a memory is therefore capable of reverberating over a wider "field of meaning," then it may be capable of drawing *others* into a wider (but dialectically sensitive) relationship, so that both sameness and otherness may critically relate to each other across an ever-widening *temporal field of meaning*, where a new relationship may mean the realization of a shared eschatological future.[35]

Stein's manner of being given, her own readiness, and our memory of her witnessing, is challenging us to consider how this type of witnessing may be significant for how Christians remember and witness to their consanguinity with Judaism.[36]

One may only respectfully submit that it would be an *unexpectedly unnuanced position* to simply conclude that Stein is irrevocably cut off in conversion from her Jewish sameness because of the acceptance of a Christian otherness.[37] For example, Gideon Goosen wonders, "would those who converted from one world religion to another be able to reject their religious past in a definitive way? Was Edith Stein able to reject her Jewish past so that it did not colour her post-conversion religiosity?"[38] While Stein is one who accepts the religion of her persecutors, she may also be likened to a kind of subversive agent who is reimaging for us what an end of scapegoatism would look like, for her praxis is grounded in a way of witnessing-as-remembering ("*smar*") that is challenging contemporary Christianity beyond a present-day Marcionism. Her example is encouraging us to do the *teshuva* work of remembering ourselves with our Jewish heritage through narrative and dialogue.

HESCHEL'S EMPATHIC REPRISE FOR CHRISTIANITY: *KAVANAH*

Jews and Christians are being challenged to find a way beyond the possibility of *not* receiving the other. On February 23, 2003, the Joint Commission for the Jewish-Catholic Dialogue renewed the dialogue at *Grottaferrata*:

> The basis for our ongoing dialogue must be truthfulness and honesty, respecting our different religious identities. We are dialoguing as people of faith having common spiritual roots and patrimony. Dialogue is a value in itself and excludes any intention of converting . . . We take into account our different traditions and respect each other in our otherness. We feel the call to proclaim testimony to the One God in the world and we are willing to cooperate in fostering common religious values, peace with justice, truth and love.[39]

When Jews and Christians say together *we feel the call to proclaim testimony to the One God in the world and we are willing to cooperate in fostering common religious values*, one may not help but be drawn to a deeper appreciation for the category of *kavanah*.

Heschel describes *kavanah* as an "inner participation," a participation "of the heart," where ritual and deed come together through the "awareness" of the Other. The prophetic witness is one who approaches life with a *kavanah*

intentionality: "*kavanah* is awareness of an ineffable situation."[40] One experiences the "work" of the ritual as a deepening of awareness, an *awakening* to the presence of God—that is, "awaking in the presence of God, we strive not to acquire objective knowledge, but to deepen the *mutual* allegiance of man and God."[41]

Through the intentionality of *kavanah* we "pour our perception, volition, memory, thought, hope, feeling, dreams, all that is moving in us, into one tone" so that the "devotion of the heart" might again "correspond" to God's pathos in the world. And this devotion comes in a form of "self-expression" that ought to be respected. Heschel argues in 1954, in an essay entitled *The Person and the World*,

> What we said about self-expression applies to empathy. There is no such thing as *absolute* empathy, as empathy without expression. Genuine response to the liturgical word is more than an automatic echo; it is an answer of the whole person. Empathy, moreover, is evocative; it calls up what is hidden.

The intentionality of *kavanah* presupposes a kind of *empathic* awakening. And please notice here that an "*absolute*" empathy—an empathy *without* the "I"'s unique "expression"—is nothing more than the "automatic echo" of a direct *sympathos*. The inwardness of *kavanah*-participation, perforce, disposes us towards otherness.[42]

Correspondingly, Stein argues that the person calls up "what is hidden" in oneself through *turning towards* absolute being. Stein argues (and one hears the echo of Reinach) that "a free turning toward absolute being" means "liberation," where a *turning towards* is akin to, in Heschel's terms, being empathically awakened to a world of otherness: one is "motivated in a positive attitude that belongs to the personal being toward some being."[43] And the existential turning towards the other presupposes an intellectual openness to the memory of the other.

Stein says on memory: "My freedom of memory consists in my ability to turn to the thing that comes to mind, to concern myself with it in an intention that makes it present and in a whole series of intentions that go with it and pass into one another as they are motivated."[44] Through the act of remembering, the proverbial pebble is dropped into the still pond. I *concern* myself with a memory. Yet this memory reverberates outward, encouraging other memories and broadening my intentionality. In terms of *kavanah*, the prophetic (interreligious) witness's self-expression of "empathy with [her] people and their past" incarnates a remembering love.[45] The "inner participation" of "my" heart *turns towards* an outward-oriented participation with the other. This ever-increasing memory of the other, and the

praxis this entails, reminds "me" that "I" am "not alone" but in solidarity with otherness.[46] Stein argues, "intellectual openness enables us to follow and understand—not just be affected by—the life of the soul of others . . . It is not merely life as such that is united here but to a much greater degree a specific life; I am referring to the spiritual activity involved in sharing . . . feelings etc." with one another.

And through this "unity of life" I come to know others not as "analogues of myself," but I come to "know them in such a way that with them I have more 'power,' for their mere presence strengthens me."[47]

Beyond any idea of "absolute empathy," the presence of the other as other strengthens me. The richness of diversity in self-expression is the very heightening of being. This turning towards the fullness of being human through an increasing concern for otherness, through the intergivenness between oneself and the diversity of others, may ultimately mean "a heightening in being, a raising to a higher mode of being" that "we call *'grace.'*"[48]

The intentionality of *kavanah* may help theologians and dialogists realize that our *turning towards* a new relationship with Judaism is a turning towards a privileged place that is already full of grace, wonder, and memories.[49] And the context of Jewish remembering (*zkr*) creates the condition for the possibility of Christian remembering (*mnemoneuein*).

The liturgico-ethical/political reflections of Bruce Morrill, which follow the comprehensive survey of Nils Dahl, tell us the frequent use of *mnemoneuein* in the New Testament is due to the pervasive influence of the Jewish remembering matrix, most notably expressed through the verb "*zakar*, 'to remember.'" *Z[a]k[a]r* connotes "the calling forth 'in the soul' of a thing or event such that what is remembered effects the subject's disposition, decision, and action."[50] The Jews called for God in praise and worship by remembering *God as the One who remembers*: God remembers the covenant, and when the people remember God's memory "we" have solidarity with the One who chooses "us," for God does not forget "us" (e.g., Psalm 105:8). The God of Israel is never divorced from the present situation of God's people, and a consoling, empathic remembering of how God is "intervening on their behalf" is of "fundamental importance to [Jewish] religious practice."[51] Furthermore, Metz tells us, "I would describe the Jewish spirit as the power of memory . . . Jewish memory resists forgetfulness of the forgotten. In the final analysis, for it, wisdom is a form of sensing absence." Memory lives and grows in its straining, and even becomes a subversive agent in building of the Kingdom of God because our "*memoria passionis*" is able to speak the truth to unjust structures of sin. *Have we cultivated remembrance for the other in the world? Have we formed and defended a "remembering-structure" in the*

intellectual and cultural spheres in such a way whereby *tiqqun olam*—the healing of the world—is a mandate that we come to view as being given to Christianity by its Jewish inheritance?[52]

In an age of Auschwitz, when "God did not depart of His own volition; He was expelled. *God is in exile*," the question of humanity's effacement as a contemporary form of idolatry takes on a renewed importance.[53] In particular, "[h]as the memory of Auschwitz transformed us in our existence as Christians? Are we in fact a church after Auschwitz?" The memory of suffering, suffering *caused to*, and *suffered by*, others, may be all too overwhelming for us to hear—so overwhelming that we may be tempted to *regulate* or reverse our remembering into forgetting, allowing our memories to become nothing more than shadows on a wall, something that is formless and distant, in the past. Jacques Dupuis argues,

> Purification of memories is not easily achieved. Peoples and religious groups cannot be asked simply to forget what they have suffered at the hands of the other religious traditions, including Christianity, if not by way of the extermination of populations, often at least by the destruction of their cultural and religious patrimony. To forget would amount to betrayal. The personal identity of a human group is built on the foundation of a historical past which cannot in any way be cancelled, even if we should desire to cancel it. But memory can be healed and purified by a common determination to initiate new and constructive mutual relations, built on dialogue, collaboration, and a true encounter.[54]

A contemporary, interreligiously attuned Christian remembering is radicalized through the *Shoah*; it is "not only a question of recalling the past" but flows into a concern for living from an eschatological sensitivity that is truly interested in mutual relations, dialogue, and collaborative encounter. It is a way of living together into the future—that is, "[t]he common future of Jews and Christians demands that we remember, for 'there is no future without memory'. History itself is *memoria futuri*."[55]

Christianity's "encounter with Israel" should therefore be an encounter that heightens Christianity's awareness of "the suffering caused by centuries of Christian anti-Jewish hostility [which] forces the community of Jesus' followers to rethink itself at the very root, or better still to rethink the root itself that bears it, according to Paul's expression (Rom. 11:28)." This "reciprocal attention" of Christians with Jews "to the pain that was *inflicted* and *endured* during the *Shoah*, and to the anxiety induced by the gradual realization of the immediate and remote causes of that tragedy, are required to ensure that our attention is authentic and our dialogue sincere."[56]

The question may therefore be, as Metz suggests, the following: when we hear the cry of the *Shema Israel*, do we as Christians appreciate how "for the first time and in a unique way in the religious history of humanity, the name God was laid upon human beings"? And do we appreciate this call as one issuing from "a pathic monotheism, with a painfully open eschatological flank," rather than from "a monotheism of power politics"?[57] A calling from an *other* who has something unique and irreducible to give? Rabbi Ricardo Di Segni is helpful to Christianity in reminding us of this important point:

> For the Christian, the encounter with Judaism entails a rediscovery of the roots of his faith; for the Jew the encounter with Christianity confronts him with something entirely different, grown out of what are effectively his own religious roots. Theologically the Christian cannot do without Israel; the Jew, in his faith, must do without Christ if he does not want to deny his own faith.[58]

But if the Jew is able to do "without Christ," then does it necessarily follow that the Jew is able to do without the Christian? Is the world able to do without a renewed Jewish-Christian friendship? Heschel persuasively argues, "[t]he religions of the world are no more self-sufficient, no more independent, no more isolated than individuals or nations . . . all religions continue to challenge and to affect every religion. Horizons are wider . . . *No religion is an island*."[59] And so, the following question rises: is there not a need for the development of a "religious memory," or a way of remembering "that could strengthen the link of affection and esteem uniting the diverse world of Christianity and the equally diverse world of Judaism?"[60]

It is arguable that, some forty years on, Vatican II's document *Nostra Aetate* set the conditions for the possibility of a deepening link with Judaism through the deepening of a shared memory of a God who is pathic towards otherness. If there *is no future without memory*, then Christianity's "adjustment" of theological perspective may mean (re)considering *how* we remember. This will entail a deepening Christian acknowledgment of what we share with Judaism: a common memory. This primordial Jewish remembering-structure, a-way-of-remembering-a-God-who-compassionately-remembers, both *contours and tones* our Christian way of remembering. Moreover, Christianity is being challenged to *remember* in a way that is pathic with the memories of the past century.

The twenty-first century, against the horizon of much dialogue and jubilee requests for forgiveness, may be a time for us, as Jews and Christians together, to make an even greater return (*teshuva*) to one another. We may leave

our exile from one another through a remembering solidarity, where the path of empathy may be our way of taking "seriously both ecclesially and theologically" the "catastrophe" that is Auschwitz.[61] Heschel reminds us: "*[n]one of us can do it alone*." Christians and Jews "must realize that in our age anti-Semitism is anti-Christianity and that anti-Christianity is anti-Semitism."[62]

Developing the dialogue may only reveal how "the growing awareness of the moral and religious meaning of the Shoah" is resituating "the tragic event from the supreme obstacle to dialogue into a, so to speak, privileged instrument to understand what had to be changed and what had to be emphasized and appreciated anew."[63] The *Shoah* may continue to open up the possibility for a more profound contact between Christians and Jews while also challenging Christianity into a self-understanding that is more eschatologically generous in embracing otherness; as James Bernauer argues, "Catholicism's desire for a new beginning with Judaism is also the desire for a new relationship with itself."[64]

A *kavanah*-intentionality therefore needs to be the intentionality of the Catholic dialogist with Judaism. Donald Grayston argues, "Anti-Semitism eclipses kinship; hyper-empathy eclipses difference. Thus when the partial eclipse of difference is acknowledged and we move back from it, we can see how kinship and difference can stand in right relation to each other."[65] Now is the time for deepening a "mutual allegiance," an empathy with Judaism that leaves room for self-expression and uniqueness.

Heschel, soon after the promulgation of *Nostra Aetate*, concluded that all people of faith and goodwill are "marked" with an eschatological sensitivity to diversity:

> Religion is a means, not an end. It becomes idolatrous when it becomes an end in itself . . . Does not the all-inclusiveness of God contradict the exclusiveness of any particular religion? The prospect of all men embracing one form of religion remains an eschatological hope. What about here and now? Is it not blasphemous to say: I alone have all the truth and the grace . . . Does not the task of preparing the Kingdom of God require a diversity of talents, a variety of rituals, soul-searching as well as opposition? Perhaps it is the will of God that in this eon there should be diversity in our forms of devotion and commitment.[66]

Heschel's words may only encourage Jews and Christians to move closer towards the eschatologically charged mystery of sharing Pasch. We may do so by firstly leaving behind any "messianic calculations," and then engage in the eschatologically *humble* task of *tiqqun olam*[67]—a repairing of the world through an engagement that searches for an ever-deepening inclusivity. It is an *Einfühlung* in the midst of a widening plurality.

By painting a portrait of Edith Stein's real-time givenness, we have charged our reflections with Heschel et al. with an eschatological metaphoricity that echoes to us from the *tremendum* of the *Shoah*. This echo, I would like to suggest, may orient and direct how we may become, Jews and Catholics alike, more hospitable towards one another as theologians and dialogue partners in our quest for truth "in the mode of searching for it." At the boundary of truth we rub up against mystery, the fullness of truth.

Stein's "inscape"[68] reveals a certain interreligious coherency in responding to the prophetic call as witness. Are we willing to exhibit the kind of "readiness" we see in Stein? Are we willing to engage in the *kiddush hashem* of *remembering* our Christian selves with our Jewish roots? The memory of the *Shoah* is weighing on our present and future. Is the *weight* of the other, as Stein argued in *Kreuzeswissenschaft*, capable of claiming us at our "deepest point"?

The twenty-first-century interreligious dialogue is just beginning to unpack the theological significance of living from the depth of a dialectical belonging, and its relevance for a Jewish-Christian future. Stein responds to *the* call *qua* phenomenologist, prophet, mystic, and, ultimately, martyr, and her response to *the* call advocates a kenotic intergivenness between lover and beloved. It is nothing less than an intergivenness that respects the communicative dialectic of giving and receiving happening between persons. Furthermore, her intergivenness may reveal the "immediacy" of a common interreligious concern, the concern of atonement. These concerns compel Catholicism to reconsider, with twenty-first-century *teshuva* eyes, what we share with Judaism. The praxis of Edith Stein, as critically read through the thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel, may only humbly encourage these future projects.

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Towards a Conclusion

Empathic Witnessing as Interreligious Dialogue

Foucault scholar Henrique Pinto argues in a timely essay, "Roman Catholicism and Inter-faith Dialogue," that "the *self* cannot exist without the *other*, neither can *otherness* ever be excluded from the dialogical processes through which we exist."[1] Indeed, dialogue is "*not* the imposition of one voice upon another (found in all religions to some degree)," for the imposing totality of us versus them "is at the heart of the hatred, injustice and violence operating in the world." This may therefore mean, from the Catholic perspective, the movement away from an individualistic self-sufficiency that encourages the maneuvers of distance and discretion and towards a more radical, kenotic givenness: "[w]e have to enter again the paschal journey of self-emptying . . . [t]his self-emptying reaches out to our concepts, theologies, institutions, theoretical or devotional worlds."[2] The *Shoah* reminds us, with all the despondency of Yeats, that "*Turning and turning in the widening gyre/The falcon cannot hear the falconer;/Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold*."[3] And yet, out of this collapse, new forms of faithfulness and respect emerge for the religious other. In terms of interreligious dialogue, a reverence is born out of "a faithfulness given by means of a permanent critique of one's theological positions in 'agnostic respect' for the *other* of one's religion, and the *other* of other faiths."[4] New centers of dialogue and interaction, real-time epicenters of empathy, are created out of the ashes of such non-places.

Recent genocide-driven conflicts spur Jewish-Christian dialogists to move *deeper* and concomitantly *wider* in our shared search for truth because a dialogical and interreligious theology is "not a discourse on

truth, on the '*adaequatio rei et intellectus*'" in the sense of it being a *direct correspondence-tending-towards* the "subordination to a perennial *verbum externum*."[5] Rather, as von Brück argues, "truth is conditioned by language, and language is metaphorical, i.e., notions such as space, time, causality, matter, being, consciousness, truth etc. are metaphors related to each other and conditionally interdependent." And these concepts are "not merely descriptive but they imply a contextual reflection," and therefore "[t]he result is that when we talk about truth . . . we are not talking only about the possible congruence of thinking and facts (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*), but about a communication of experiences."[6] An interreligious theology will therefore value experience—the intergivenness of the one to the other in dialogue, and not be *forgetful* of the other's experience of pain and suffering.

Our theologizing around experience will need to be a "critical and subversive language"[7] insofar as it embraces the "post-ontological conditions" in which it finds itself, and adopts "a critical epistemology" in the midst of a "plurality of truth claims."[8] Holocaust scholar Zev Garber argues that "[f]or the Church, it is the Easter faith, spirit over matter, that enables victory to be proclaimed over Golgotha and Auschwitz. For the Synagogue, it is the covenantal oath at Sinai, uniting spirit and matter and resulting in everyday acts of holiness, that permits Zion to triumph over Auschwitz."[9] Catholics nevertheless have to ask themselves: are we more concerned with *an* "*escape*"—a *getting out* of temporality and the world of otherness?[10]

One has to respectfully wonder, in light of the above horizon, why it seems that the position of Catholic dialogists, at times, has been to hold up the atemporal over and against the provisional as if to suggest the messiness of history could be fixed through naming broad, universal principles for *everyone* while dialoguing with *no one*. The constant default to a fixed position ensures the future of a more or less narrow, ahistorical and therefore irrelevant dialogue(s) that may amount to nothing more than a thinly veiled proselytism.

Being open to transformation, and undergoing the process of being *re-centered*, challenges idealism's fixity as a self-sufficient ideology—an ideology willing to tread on other people in order to maintain uniformity of opinion, place, and even time—as if *all is mine*. Such an ideology assembles a sound barrier blocking and silencing the new voice of dialogue. But a barrier-building ideology secretly hopes for an attempt at a breach, for just at the moment when it seems as if the barrier will begin to crumble, creating a space for something new, the walls become higher and wider. The voices from the inside cry *threat* and these cries stir up a *righteous anger* against *other* voices. But let's name this for what it is: this necrotically driven,

self-constituting system is essentially the violence of "me" against "you"—it is really nothing more than another permutation of the *vengeance* and *wrath* that is characteristic of racism, religious intolerance, and scapegoatism. Indeed, such a system builds wider and stronger walls precisely with the bodies of those it has silenced—*the now-forgotten, faceless others*.

In contradistinction to this wall stands the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. For Heschel the wall's "very being is compassion," and he shares the following:

> The Wall . . . At first I am stunned. Then I see: a Wall of frozen tears, a cloud of sighs. Palimpsests, hiding books, secret names. The stones are seals. The Wall . . . The old mother crying for all of us. Stubborn, loving, waiting for redemption. The ground on which I stand is Amen. My words become echoes. All of our history is waiting here. No comeliness to be acclaimed, no beauty to be relished. But a heart and an ear. Its very being is compassion. You stand still and hear: stones of sorrow, acquaintance with grief. We all hide our faces from agony, shun the afflicted. The Wall is compassion, its face is open only to those smitten with grief . . . These stones have a heart, a heart for all men. The Wall has a soul that radiates a presence . . . What is the Wall? The unceasing marvel. Expectation. The Wall will not perish. The redeemer will come.[11]

On the May 12, 2009, Pope Benedict XVI prayed at the Western or Wailing Wall of the Temple in Jerusalem. Following the Jewish tradition, the Holy Father placed a handwritten prayer in a crevice of the wall that read:

> God of all the ages, on my visit to Jerusalem, the "City of Peace," spiritual home to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, I bring before you the joys, the hopes and the aspirations, the trials, the suffering and the pain of all your people throughout the world. God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, hear the cry of the afflicted, the fearful, the bereft; send your peace upon this Holy Land, upon the Middle East, upon the entire human family; stir the hearts of all who call upon your name, to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion. "The Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him" (Lam 3:25)!

Compose the place in your imagination: Benedict's white-soutaned right arm reaching a hand forward; reaching with a hand displaying, on the third finger, the Ring of the Fisherman, a ring bearing the image of the apostle, the Jewish man, Peter, fishing from a boat; a hand reaching out, reaching out with a crisply folded piece of paper containing a memory, a prayer, a hope: "*stir the hearts of all who call upon your name, to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion*." Benedict reaches, touches the wall; a prayer reaching out, reminding God and humanity:

"*The Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him (Lam 3:25)!*" Even in the midst of trials, "[i]t is good to wait in hope for [God's] mercy to show itself," for *every believer* "achieves hope by recalling the mercy of God."[12]

Benedict's prayer is a *re-membering* of the Christian with the Jew; a memory enacting a "flowing presence"[13] towards the other. The wall is "*a soul that radiates a presence*": we are already with the eternal. Touching the wall is touching a presence.

A touch breaking open "the seals," a wall becoming a doorway; an "expectation"; a reaching beyond the walls of the isolated self; a border becoming porous through memory; filtering through as an effusive concern for others. An *Einfühlung*: "*the hearts of all who call upon your name desire to walk humbly in the path of justice and compassion*." A straining together, as Christians and Jews, towards a wider eschatological hope: "*[This] Wall will not perish. The redeemer will come*."

Empathy's coherence in gathering us together *for* one another, as we have now examined through the theory and praxis of Edith Stein and Abraham Joshua Heschel, both critically extends a hermeneutic of suspicion and encourages Jews and Christians towards the *plenum* of a more embracing eschatological horizon vis-à-vis our real-time ethical practice—that is, "[in] addressing the problems of the *here and now*, life is summoned to become that which is *not yet*." For "[w]e are not moving back, unlike in Pseudo-Dionysius, 'to the Unity of the One' . . . Instead, we are losing ourselves"[14]—and we are losing ourselves in the sense of being *given-for* anew to the process of "*dis-assembling*" the barriers that prevent us from experiencing the converging ways we are *already* sharing with one another but do *not yet* fully realize.

The appropriation of a radicalizing *given-for-ness* in challenging the structures that keep us from one another may begin to accomplish the empathically charged work of *teshuva*. This is a mission that Catholics were given to embrace vis-à-vis Vatican II's *Nostra Aetate*. Professor Edward Kessler reports in *The Tablet*, on the fortieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, "*Nostra Aetate's* present-tense citation of Romans 9:4—'to them belong the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law'" is the basis "for a revised teaching that Jews are beloved of God and have received an irrevocable calling."[15] The church is constantly being challenged to move into the present tense by undergoing *aggiornamento*.

In recent years, part of the *aggiornamento* has been *teshuva*. Thomas Casey argues, "The fact that the Messiah came 2,000 years ago does not make any difference to me personally if he does not come to me today: and here is where we can learn from Jews. We can be more humble, for although

the Messiah is already here, at the same time he is not yet in our hearts half as much as he should be."[16]

While a consideration of how a hermeneutics of empathy is (or is not) at work in the development of *Nostra Aetate* is the beginning of another study (and granted, with the hindsight of forty years), one would be remiss to not wonder, from the outset, exactly *how* the 2008 "revision" of the Good Friday prayer, to name just one example, *confirms* empathy with Judaism. How could it not be interpreted by our Jewish friends as a regressive step back towards a *locum tenens* position of conversionism through liturgy?[17]

Stein and Heschel—*heard in the present*—serve as a prophetic call against the totality of fear that keeps us from embracing otherness. God's pathos heard in the present tense indeed challenges Christians to *keep searching*. And the searching embrace of empathy is humanism *par excellence*.

This dynamism of compassion-for-others sets the condition(s) for the possibility for a locus of "pure gratuity" wherein we may begin to find ourselves *given anew* to a "plurality of interactive voices, from where not only us (the same) but they too (the other)—indeed, all reality—come to life." And it is from within this place of gratuity, this disassembling matrix, whereby we may come to revisit our narratives with one another in the real-time "messiness" of dialogue. A "return" to the "narratives" of the prophetic voices of our forerunners in the contemporary Jewish-Catholic dialogue, like Edith Stein and Abraham Joshua Heschel, may provide us with a model. Indeed, the "'best' embodied expressions" for how "we ought to *be-with-[others]-in-dialogue*" may teach us anew how to go about the actual dialogue.

This *resourcement* need not entail a "return to the interpretation of . . . dogmatic and fixed meanings, but to the telling and retelling of the practices in which they first came to life, and of styles of living through which, in conflict with them, peoples have managed . . . not to solve the ambiguity, pain and uncertainty of existence, but to live meaningful lives." Precisely in the sharing of narratives we keep alive how, as Pinto argues, life is being called to become what it is *not yet* through a more profound 'identity-in-partnership' (*cf*. von Brück in Chapter 3).[18]

While we do live life in dialogue with a great amount of "ambiguity" and "uncertainty" around "existence," is not dialogue something more than the "telling and retelling" of "practices" and stories for one another? Pinto himself argues:

> [i]t is only through participation, metaphoricity, and the practice of embodied openness towards the other, that we can be faithful and honour the finite infinity of the divine in history. If this has to be said in relation to the church's

> dialogue with the *other of itself*, how much so in relation to the encounter between religions.[19]

So while being in dialogue incorporates the "telling and retelling" of "practices" and stories for one another, Edith Stein's life, in particular, tells us that dialogue may also take the form of *searching* for identity-in-partnership, a pilgrimage towards a shared futurity that is mindful of the past and present and yet still open to something new.

God's "searching memory" is calling us towards a renewed awareness for how God's empathy is finding an ethos through dialogue.[20] Being open to the *not yet*—a future in unity with no prescribed outcomes—may mean being open to a future that will already be charged with the presence of a God who enters as love for all within and through the gratuity of dialogue. Von Brück concludes, "Knowledge of the truth is a matter of the eschatological future i.e. in the present we have truth in the mode of searching for it."[21] But what does this mean for the future of Jewish-Christian dialogue? If knowledge of the truth is also a matter of the *not yet* —that is to say, an eschatological future—then I would like to suggest that it is precisely through exploring what I call our shared Jewish and Catholic "eschatological metaphoricity" whereby we may come to appreciate how we share truth "in the mode of searching for it."

Jewish metaphoricity gives rise to an image of God whose temporally charged remembering *qua* empathy conveys an eternal givenness and solidarity with a people—for example, "God means: No one is ever alone; the essence of the temporal is the eternal; the moment is an image of eternity in an infinite mosaic. God means: *Togetherness of all beings in holy otherness*."[22]

James Bernauer, in a lecture given to mark the fortieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, "The Holocaust and the Catholic Church's Search for Forgiveness," makes the following astute point: historically, the "attitude" of "Christendom" was one that generated a "fortress Christianity" mentality whereby the church "best interpreted itself through a particular form of European culture that asserted its spiritual surpassing of Judaism."[23] Is there a risk of reintroducing a "fortress" mentality such that *our* way of proceeding may be easily perceived as being minatory and dismissive of Judaism?

Heschel, for one, did not approach naïvely a new relationship with Catholicism. He too realized that whatever Vatican II said, the church would still have to deal with the question of difference, of meeting Jews as Jews:

> Why is so much attention being paid to what Vatican II is going to say about the Jews? Are we Jews in need of recognition? God himself has recognized us as a

> people. Are we in need of a "Chapter" acknowledging our right to exist as Jews? . . . It is not gratitude that we ask for: it is the cure of a disease affecting so many minds that we pray for.

Following Heschel, Plank concludes, "if one overcomes distance by suppressing alterity then one simply creates another form of indifference by effacing the distinctiveness of the other's experience." Is it possible then to move into a shared future together while respecting difference? [24]

The intentionality of a remembering empathy, which is a remembering love, the deep intention of *Nostra Aetate*, runs the risk of being compromised if our response to our Jewish brothers and sisters continues to oscillate between an ecclesial, hierarchical ratification of Catholicism's consanguinity with Judaism, and a hidden desire to supersede it. What is needed is a change of heart.

While official statements are helpful in naming what the hopes are for a new relationship, the intention of empathy encourages a devotion to Otherness, what Heschel calls *kavanah*. The empathic intentionality of *kavanah* may move us closer to the eschatological realization of peace and justice among people of faith: "*Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more (Isaiah 2:3–4)*."[25] As Purcell argues, "theology," and the theological endeavor of authentic interreligious dialogue, "will only ever be worthy of the name when it is attentive to the holiness of neighbour, that is, when it is ethically redeemed."[26]

A Catholic ecclesio-theological *rapprochement* towards a concept of God who is *always, already* in dialogue with otherness respectfully recognizes, and engages with (and is not threatened by), Catholicism's own Jewish otherness. This frank and mature affirmation allows for Jews to be our partners in dialogue *as Jews*, without any expectation, as Vatican II argues, for conversion. And yet, this basic affirmation has the power today of being subversive in the sense that our sharing of narratives with one another creates a richness in diversity that subtly challenges the postmodern isolationism of a life fragmented by fear of the other. Jewish and Christian stakeholders have been engaging with one another, especially since Vatican II, through a narrative exchange. The personal narratives and faith narratives, stories about self and community, have built up the bonds over the years.

There will always be a complexity to the relationship, for "[t]he work of empathy is precisely trying to imagine a view of the world that one does not share, and in fact may find it quite difficult to share. Notably, while empathy involves perceiving the other's complex point of view, it does not require accepting the other's views."[27] Nevertheless, the empathy we enact with one another through the sharing of stories may move us towards a

new *depth* when we consider how this relationship is being narratively or dialogically accomplished within the dialectical matrix of "belonging and distance."

Croatian-born theologian Miroslav Volf, in a striking first-person narrative example, and reminiscent of an empathic giving and receiving, shares with us the following helpful insight:

> Both distance and belonging are essential. Belonging without distance destroys: I affirm my exclusive identity as Croatian and want either to shape everyone in my own image or eliminate them from my world. But distance without belonging isolates; I deny my identity as a Croatian and draw back from my own culture. But more often than not, I become trapped in the snares of counter-dependence. I deny my Croatian identity only to affirm even more forcefully my identity as a member of this or that anti-Croatian sect. And so an isolationist 'distance without belonging' slips into a destructive 'belonging without distance.' Distance from a culture must never degenerate into flight from that culture but must be a way of living in a culture.[28]

Jewish and Catholic partners in dialogue have to struggle, together, to move beyond the "snares of counter-dependence" and an isolating "self-sufficiency,"[29] and towards a dialectically minded interdependence where empathetic dialogue could then "include conditions for regaining trust, for voicing disagreement, and for securely developing relationships over time."[30] Jacques Dupuis concludes that "the grace of dialogue between religions consists in the possibility of a mutual enrichment."[31] This level and kind of praxis moves us beyond fear, and towards *metanoia:* a *turning* towards a new way of being with others.

One is drawn into the intersubjectively attuned, yet arguably complex, way of being given towards otherness in empathy. "My" reception of the other's otherness, through the drama of embrace, reveals to "me" how this otherness is somehow mysteriously grounded in the sameness of our shared humanity.

Interreligious dialogue, and the Jewish-Catholic dialogue in particular, is a personalist project. It is very much about how we accept one another as human beings. If a person is an end in him/herself, then the goal of every stakeholder regarding an interdependently minded way of proceeding will only be realized insofar as the different dialogue partners become vulnerable for one another through the drama of embrace. But creating a larger space for the other will take time, and it is a process that may all too easily be romanticized.

Marc Gopin concludes that the "critical importance of empathy in Western religious and secular traditions cannot be overestimated." Whether it is

in "advocacy," "long-term education," or "the conflict workshop setting," the "experience" of embrace one offers another through a "relational empathy" may serve as a foundational, orienting concept (*Grundkonzept*) that "informs" the "methodologies at work" for the given circumstances. In terms of conflict resolution, for example,

> Empathy is evoked by the painful story of the other party, and, in [a] religious setting, both parties refer to God's role in their lives. This, in turn, generates a common bond between enemies that has often led, with subtle, careful guidance, to more honest discussion and relationship building.

Gopin contends that "one could explore a means to view" an empathy that leads to "rehumanization" (*cf*. Hampl in Chapter 4) and reestablishment of relationships between oneself and the other. This mutual process, Gopin concludes, may be "an easy leap for many religious value systems."[32]

At other times, however, our desire for empathy with the other will also mean simply waiting for, not forcing, the other to dialogue. And *waiting* is itself an empathic stance, an approach rooted and grounded in the silent and humble solidarity with "[t]he powerless." It is a *teshuva* of listening where a return to a shared future becomes possible only "[w]hen we become the victims' ally." Through the intentionality of listening to the victims we may "receive the reconciling gift that only they can offer: the possibility of waiting together for the inbreaking of the Messiah's reign. Waiting together, we effect not redemption, but the community that is its annunciator and first fruits."[33] The real-time work of reestablishing ethical relationships between oneself and many more others is our future, hope-filled work in Jewish-Christian dialogue. The theory and praxis of Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein, against the horizon of the *Shoah*, have given us an action-transforming principle for this project: our dwelling together in empathy. Our con-primordial presence with one another in the world may only assist us in hastening slowly towards a deeper presence in the world, a way of being with one another and with the powerless from within the twenty-first century.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Michael Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 203.
2. W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being* (Marquette University: Marquette University Press, 1993) 54–55, hereafter *PB*.
3. Abraham Joshua Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 389–390, hereafter *Prophets*, 3–4.
4. Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 3, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1989), 102, hereafter *OPE*.
5. Jacques Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter," *The Tablet, Open Day Lecture 2001* (October 20, 27 and November 3, 2001): <http://www.thetablet.co.uk>; accessed October 26, 2006.
6. Stanley Hauerwas, "Peace: A Theological Analysis," lecture given at The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin (September 19, 2007).
7. Stein, *Potency and Act*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 11, eds. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2009), 209, hereafter *PA*.

CHAPTER 1

1. See the well-informed biographical portrait of Heschel's life and thought by Fritz Rothschild in Heschel, *Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism*, fwd. by David Hartman, intro/ed. by Fritz A. Rothschild (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 7–32; 7–8, hereafter *BGM*: "Born in Warsaw on January 11, 1907, he was the descendant of a long line of outstanding leaders in Hasidism . . . [g]rowing up in the closed theonomous world of Jewish piety, Heschel gained in the formative years of childhood and youth two things that are manifest on every page of his published work: a knowledge and an understanding. The *knowledge* of the Jewish religious heritage was acquired through an undeviating attention during most of his waking hours to the study of rabbinical literature. At the age of ten he was at home in the world of the Bible, he had acquired competence in the subtle dialectic of the Talmud, and had also been introduced to the world of Jewish mysticism, the *Kabbalah*. The *understanding* for the realness of the spirit and for the holy dimension of all existence was not primarily the result of book learning but the cumulative effect of life lived among people, who 'were sure that everything hinted at something transcendent' [Heschel, *The Earth is the Lord's* (New York: Henry

Schuman, 1950), 56]; that the presence of God was a daily experience and the sanctification of life a daily task . . . His study on Hebrew prophetic consciousness, *Die Prophetie*, which had earned him a Ph.D. degree at Berlin University, was published by the Polish Academy of Science in 1936 and hailed as an outstanding contribution by leading Biblical scholars . . . A mass deportation action in October, 1938, found Heschel himself expelled by the Nazis together with the rest of the Polish Jews resident in Germany . . . [a] call to join the faculty of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, received in April 1939, enabled him to leave Poland before the Nazis overran the country . . . in 1945 Heschel joined the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York, where he held the title of Professor of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism. There he taught until the time of his death, influencing a significant number of rabbis and educators in the Conservative movement of American Jewry . . . Heschel played an important part in the delicate negotiations before and during Vatican Council II. He established cordial relations with Cardinal Bea, whose office was responsible for drafting the declaration concerning the Jews. On September 14, 1964 when a watered-down version of the declaration was about to be introduced, Heschel was received in a special audience by Pope Paul VI and pleaded for a strengthened and more just declaration by the Council."

2. John C. Merkle, "Abraham Joshua Heschel: Witness to God in Word and Deed," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 3–12; 5 from <http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/>; accessed on October 1, 2008.
3. Edward K. Kaplan, Samuel H. Dresner, *Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic Witness* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 259–260.
4. Heschel, *Prophets*, 339–340.
5. Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1974), 272. *NB:* There is a noteworthy ecumenical meeting of minds on the question of divine pathos. Jürgen Moltmann's confessional approach to Heschel's argument against *apatheia* in God finds a Catholic sympathy in Hans Urs Von Balthasar: "Protestant polemics is directed, not against the natural knowledge of God, but against a picture of God understood as *apatheia* along the lines of the ancient world, which is then elevated into a norm for Christianity. Moltmann *is right to protest against this*, pointing to God's 'pathos' in the Old Testament (as interpreted by A. Heschel and even by the Rabbis)," from *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 4: The Action*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 295, 41n.
6. David Tracy, *Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-religious Dialogue*, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 1 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), 41, hereafter *DwO*.
7. Tracy, *DwO*, 95, 98.
8. *Ibid*., 48–49, 110.
9. *Ibid*., 114–115.
10. *Ibid*., 117–119.
11. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 238–239.
12. *Ibid*., 239.
13. See: David Hartman's helpful foreword in *BGM*, 4: "Heschel realized that you could no longer build a viable isolated faith experience in a world of interdependency . . . [h]is was a concrete universalism, one that sought to limit—rather than destroy—particular religious passions and commitments."

14. Tracy, *DwO*, 119.
15. Jonathan Sacks, "Only by bringing the past alive can we be sure to keep our future free," *The Times* (London: April 22, 1995): 9.
16. Heschel, *BGM*, 93.
17. *Ibid*., xxiv, xxii, xxv.
18. *Ibid*., 15.
19. Robert Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology As A Response To The Holocaust," *Modern Judaism* 23/3 (Oxford University Press 2003): 211–225, 214.
20. Heschel, *Prophets*, 185.
21. Marvin Sweeney, *Reading the Hebrew Bible After the Shoah: Engaging Holocaust Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008), 167–187; 184: The first "subunit" in Lamentations 2, vv. 1–10 "begins with a third-person description of [G-D's] actions against Jerusalem, again portrayed as the young woman, Bat [Daughter] Zion. Such a portrayal highlights Jerusalem's suffering as a victim of war, particularly since women in the ancient world were the survivors of war—the men having been killed by the attacking forces—leaving the women defenseless at the mercy of invader. Here [G-D] becomes the enemy, rejecting the altar and the sanctuary and handing over the city to the attackers as Bat Zion and the women of Jerusalem sit in silence on the ground in dejection and mourning."
22. *Ibid*., 183: "Lamentations itself would have originated in mourning rituals for the loss of Solomon's temple in 587/6 B.C.E. insofar as it appears to be based in part on the experience of those who were in the city of Jerusalem at the time of the Babylonian siege and destruction."
23. Paul Ricoeur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 243–248; 245–246.
24. Heschel, *Prophets*, 225–226.
25. Sweeney, *Reading the Hebrew Bible*, 187.
26. Heschel, *Prophets*, 5; *NB*: Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology," 221: "*The Prophets* is Heschel's attempt to deal with the Holocaust as a universal problem for all humanity. Given the revered status of the biblical prophets among Jews and Christians alike, these figures were the perfect focus for this purpose."
27. From: Heschel, "Help," in *The Ineffable Name of God: Man, Poems*, trans. Morton M. Leifman, intro. Edward K. Kaplan (New York: Continuum 2004), 33, hereafter *Poems*. "Help" was dedicated by Heschel to the memory of "Yitzhak Levin, may his soul be in paradise."
28. Heschel, *Prophets*, 6.
29. Kaplan, *Abraham Joshua Heschel*, 259–260.
30. Heschel, "The Meaning of This Hour," in *Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism* (Santa Fe, NM: Aurora Press, 1998), 147–151, hereafter *MQG*. Also regarding the context of the lecture see: Kaplan, "Sacred versus Symbolic Religion: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Martin Buber," 220: "Heschel truly succeeded [Martin] Buber as religious philosopher one evening in February 1938. Buber had been invited to speak before a meeting of Quaker leaders in Frankfurt by his friend, Rudolf Schlosser, a German Quaker and pacifist. But Buber was sick with a severe influenza and he designated Heschel to address the group, among whom were the Schlossers and the widow of Franz Rosenzweig. A participant describes 'Buber's assistant' as 'a very serious young man, with strong inner concentration, [who] attempted to fathom the meaning of this new persecution of the Jewish people.' . . . Heschel's idiom, recalling Buber's sometimes abstruse and portentous terminology,

defines his bold, relentless theological judgment. The Nazi terror—whose full extent the world could only begin to recognize four or five years later—condemns contemporary civilization as a whole. Trivialization of religion had atrophied our moral sense . . .” Also see: Kaplan, “God in Exile: Abraham Joshua Heschel, Translator of the Spirit,” in Amy Colin and Elizabeth Strenger (eds.), *Bridging the Abyss: Essays in Honor of Harry Zohn*, *Brücken über den Abgrund: Festschrift für Harry Zohn* (Munich, 1994).

31. Heschel, *MQG*, 147–151: “The essential part of this essay was originally delivered in March 1938 at a conference of Quaker leaders in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. It was expanded and published in 1943.”
32. *Ibid*.
33. Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” from *Theologians at Work*, ed. Patrick Granfield (New York: Macmillan, 1967) in Susannah Heschel, ed., *Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), hereafter *MgSa*, 381–393; 390; See: Merkle, “Abraham Joshua Heschel: Witness to God in Word and Deed,” 6: “Heschel was convinced that biblical and post-biblical Jewish references to God being affected by creatures, even to the point of suffering with them, make more theological or metaphysical sense than the standard claim of classical Greek-inspired metaphysical theology that God is unmoved by the plight of creatures. Heschel’s philosophical theology, unlike classical metaphysical theology, was born not of abstraction from human experience but of an analysis of it, particularly an analysis of the experience of the biblical prophets and pious Jews down through the ages.”
34. Kaplan, *Abraham Joshua Heschel*, 260–261.
35. Edward K. Kaplan, “Heschel As Philosopher: Phenomenology and the Rhetoric of Revelation,” *Modern Judaism* 21 (2001): 1–14; 1: Heschel’s methodology is a “creative process manifested in a plurivocal expository style that combines critical analysis and literary methods—appealing to both rational and intuitive faculties. This discourse fulfills contradictory tasks: it ‘deconceptualizes’ theology in order to foster insights beyond language. Critical dialectics expose gaps between received ideas and the ineffable; at the same time, Heschel reconceptualizes such insights in order to participate in sacred tradition. Heschel thus maneuvers the reading process itself to effect the transition from concepts to an encounter with the divine presence.”
36. Heschel, *Prophets*, xxv, 6.
37. Heschel, “Jewish Theology,” 154–163; 161.
38. Heschel “No Religion is an Island,” 243–244.
39. *Ibid*., 263. *NB: Halakhah*: “Literally, ‘the path’ or ‘the walking.’ The system of Jewish religious praxis as codified in sacred law.” From: Arthur Green, *Seek My Face: A Jewish Mystical Theology* (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2003), 267.
40. Karl Plank, “The Eclipse of Difference: Merton’s Encounter with Judaism,” in *Merton and Judaism: Holiness in Words: Recognition, Repentance and Renewal*, ed. Beatrice Bruteau (Louisville, KY: *Fons Vitae*, 2003), 67–82; 82, hereafter *Eclipse*.
41. Jean-Luc Marion, *Being Given, Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 324, hereafter *BG*.
42. Heschel, “No Religion is an Island,” 241.

CHAPTER 2

1. Emmanuel Levinas, “The Living Relevance of Maïmonides,” [*L’actualité de Maïmonide*], *Paix et Droit*, 4 (1935): 6–7 in *On Escape* [*De l’évasion*], intro. Jacques Rolland, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 90–91, hereafter *OE*.
2. Heschel, *BGM*, 47.

3. Heschel, *Prophets*, 338–340.
4. Michael A. Chester, *Divine Pathos and Human Being: The Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2005), 119: "[Heschel] attacked the 'Greek-German way of thinking' for its wide-sweeping emphasis on the power and ability of human reason, and for its analytic approach to the questions of humanity and God, which resulted in the dehumanization of humanity and the depersonalization of God."
5. Heschel, *MNA*, 38.
6. Heschel, *God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism* (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), 45–47; hereafter *GSM*.
7. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, p. 122 in *Ibid*., 49.
8. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 14.
9. Heschel, *BGM*, 49.
10. Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1978), 26–35; 33–35; 33, hereafter FCF.
11. Nicholas Adams, "Rahner's reception in twentieth century Protestant Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner*, eds. Declan Marmion, Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 211–224; 217.
12. Rahner, *FCF*, 33.
13. Raymond Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith of Karl Rahner," *Milltown Studies* (Summer 1982): 121–129; 122.
14. Rahner, *FCF*, 34–35.
15. Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith," 126.
16. See: Alan Brill, "Aggadic Man: The Poetry and Rabbinic Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel," *Meorot: A Forum of Modern Orthodox Discourse* 6/1 (Shevat 5767/2006): 1–21; 5 §10: "In Heschel's belief that every committed Jew becomes a hearer of revelation, one sees a similarity to Karl Rahner's belief that every Christian is a mystic." See: Rahner, *Hearers of the Word* (New York: Continuum, 1994).
17. Moloney, "The Intelligent Faith," 122.
18. Heschel, *Prophets*, 338–340.
19. Clarke, *PB*, 8.
20. Heschel, *Prophets*, 339–340, 341.
21. Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2003), 548–549.
22. Heschel, *Prophets*, 338.
23. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 27, 14–15.
24. John C. Merkle, "Heschel's Monotheism vis-à-vis Pantheism and Panentheism," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 26–33; 30 from <http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/>; accessed on October 1, 2008.
25. Heschel, *Prophets*, 465.
26. Heschel, *BGM*, 49.
27. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 15: "Heschel describes the method of becoming certain of God's reality as an *ontological presupposition*: it is not in going forward from premises to God as a conclusion, but a withdrawal from the conceptualizations of everyday life to their underlying premise, a 'going behind self-consciousness and questioning the self and all its cognitive pretensions . . . Just as there is no thinking about the world without the premise of the realness of the world, there can be no thinking about God without the premise of the realness of God.' [See: Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 205–206, 121f]."
28. Heschel, *MNA*, 45–46.

29. Heschel, *MNA*, 46–48, 128, italics added.
30. *Ibid*., 128–129.
31. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 15.
32. Heschel, *Prophets*, 624.
33. Heschel, *MNA*, 128–129, italics added. See: Eisen, "A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology," 213: "Heschel critiques the notion ubiquitous in Western culture that man is the subject and God is the object and that our religious quest consists in our search for Him. It is this ego-centered way of thinking that Heschel feels is the root cause of human evil in the modern period. For Heschel, the truth is precisely the reverse. We must think of God as the subject and humans as the object and that it is God who is in search of us. We must recenter subjectivity on God in order to see ourselves as the objects of God's concern. God's inner life is defined by His pathos, in that He is emotionally involved with human beings."
34. Heschel, *Prophets*, 29, 298, 29.
35. Harold Kasimow, "Heschel's View of Religious Diversity," *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations*, 2/2 (2007): 19–25; 23 from <http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/>; accessed on October 1, 2008.
36. Heschel, *MNA*, 194.
37. Jeremy Carrette, "Beyond Theology and Sexuality: Foucault, the Self and the Que(e)rying of Monotheistic Truth," in *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience*, eds. James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2004), 217–232; 227.
38. Heschel, *MNA*, 211.
39. Levinas, *TI*, 66–67, 75–76.
40. *Ibid*., 196.
41. *Ibid*., 199–201. Levinas quotes Rabbi Yochanan's Treatise *Synhedrin*, 104b.
42. *Ibid*., 101.
43. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981), 125–126, hereafter *OB*.
44. Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, 70. Barnes is quoting from Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13–14. See: Rose, "Is there a Jewish Philosophy," in *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 11–24; 14.
45. Ibid., 70–71.
46. Levinas, *TI*, 76.
47. Ibid., 76–77.
48. Heschel, *MNA*, 211, 31.
49. See: Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity," *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology*, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3–25; 15: "postmodern iconoclasts do not abandon reason; they merely remove it from its pedestal and *situate* it."
50. Arthur Cohen, "The Rhetoric of Faith" in *The Natural and the Supernatural Jew: An Historical and Theological Introduction* (New York: Behrman House, 1979), 234–258; 237, 251.
51. Michael J. Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," *The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview*, ed. Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 229–237; 233: "The modern philosophical project of total comprehension of reality would absorb God into a pseudo-explanatory system that amounts to idolatry. The modern desire to 'control' the world is part of the pathology of anthropocentrism, the fruits of which have been all too obvious in the postmodern twentieth century."

52. Heschel, *MNA*, 214.
53. Marion, *BG*, 131, 323.
54. *Ibid*., 159.
55. Edith Wyschogrod, "Repentance and Forgiveness: The Undoing of Time," *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion* 60 (2006): 157–168; 163–164: "Is belief to be taken as reflecting a more tentative commitment to a truth claim than 'to know' where the latter is understood as philosophical understanding? As Soloveitchik sees it, Maimonides' dictum 'to know that there is a God,' does not imply that each worshipper become a philosopher but rather that 'to know' (*l'eida*) means constant and unremitting awareness of God's existence, that allows for no inattention."
56. Reuven Kimelman, "Rabbis Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Abraham Joshua Heschel on Jewish-Christian Relations," *The Edah Journal* 4:2/*Kislev* 5765 from <http://www.edah.org/backend/ JournalArticle/4_2_Kimelman.pdf>: 1–21; see endnote 72, accessed on October 8, 2008.
57. Green, *Seek My Face*, 93.

CHAPTER 3

1. See: Mark and Louise Zwick, "Roots of the Catholic Worker Movement: Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, and the Catholic Worker movement," *Houston Catholic Worker* (July–August, 1999): <http://cjd.org/1999/08/01/emmanuel-mounier-personalism-and-the-catholic-worker-movement/>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
2. Heschel, *Prophets*, 622.
3. Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2001), 20–21.
4. Heschel, *Prophets*, 290–292.
5. *Ibid*., 286–287.
6. Heschel, *Prophets*, 297.
7. See: Don E. Saliers, *Worship as Theology: Foretaste of Glory Divine* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 29.
8. Heschel, *Prophets*, 290–291.
9. *Ibid*., 292.
10. *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et spes*, The Vatican (December 7, 1965): <www.vatican.va>; §5; *Ibid*., 298.
11. Matthew R. Schimm, "Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Hermeneutics in Biblical Theology," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 69 (2007): 673–693; 687.
12. Heschel, *Prophets*, 288, 286.
13. William E. Kaufman, "Abraham J. Heschel, The Meaning Beyond Mystery," in *Contemporary Jewish Philosophies*, fwd. Jacob Neusner (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 142–174; 158: "Just as the collective faith of the Jewish people is based on its memory of unique, unrepeatable events, so in our individual lives our faith rests on our memory of those moments when we experienced the Divine . . . To be open to this possibility in the past, one must be open to the mystery in the present."
14. Heschel, "Jewish Theology," *The Synagogue School*, 28/1 (Fall 1969): 4–18 in *MgSa*, 154–163; 163: "The supreme issue is not whether in the infinite darkness there is a grandeur of being that is the object of man's ultimate concern, but whether the reality of God confronts us as a *pathos*—God's ultimate concern with good and evil—or whether God is mysteriously present in the event of history. Whether being is contingent upon creation, whether creation is contingent upon care, whether my life is

dependent upon His care, whether in the course of my life I come upon his guidance. I, therefore, suggest that God is either of no importance or of supreme importance. God is He whose regard for me is more precious than life. Otherwise He is not God. *God is the meaning beyond the mystery*."

15. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 24.
16. Heschel, *Prophets*, 355, 279, 619.
17. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 26.
18. *NB:* The following section is quoted from Heschel, *The Prophets*, 393–398, unless noted otherwise. Kaufman reminds us, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery," 146–147: "[Heschel] attempted to analyze the form and content of the prophetic experience without making any judgment as to whether the event happened in fact as it *appeared* to the prophets." However, as *The Prophets* progresses, Heschel argues that "[c]onceptual thinking, taken by itself, is inadequate. It must be complemented by situational thinking." The above therefore suggests that the pure reflection of a classical phenomenological method gives itself over, in Heschel, to a more "situational" phenomenology. "Bracketing" the *realness* of the prophet's experience from prophetic consciousness is therefore deemed to be an unnecessary fissure of one aspect under consideration from the other. For Heschel, consciousness and a religious praxis are inextricably united.
19. Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 272.
20. Heschel, *Prophets*, 395, italics added.
21. R. Kittel, *Gestalten und Gedanken in Israel* (Leipzig, 1925), 505 in Heschel, *Prophets*, 397.
22. Kaufman, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery," 156.
23. Heschel, *Prophets*, 622.
24. Heschel, *BGM*, 399.
25. Tracy, *DwO*, 119.
26. Heschel, *Prophets*, 570.
27. Levinas, *OB*, 143; Heschel, *MNA*, 48.
28. Heschel, *Prophets*, 287–288.
29. *Ibid*.; Rothschild, *Introduction*, 26. See: Kaplan, *Abraham Joshua Heschel*, 164.
30. Stein, "Ways to Know God: The 'Symbolic Theology' of Dionysius the Areopagite and Its Objective Presuppositions," in *Knowledge and Faith*, eds. L. Gelber and Michael Linseen, trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2000), 105–106, hereafter *KF*.
31. Green, *Seek My Face*, 172.
32. Stein, *KF*, 113–114, 105–106.
33. Mounier, *Personalism*, 20.
34. Heschel, *Prophets*, 287.
35. Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence*, trans. Patrick Madigan, Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1995), 500, 502, hereafter *Symbol*: "the sub-human condition of *mē on* ('non-being' see 1 Cor 1:28; Isa 52:14; Ps 22:6)."
36. Heschel, *Prophets*, 289.
37. Kaufmann, "The Meaning Beyond Mystery," 162: "It is true that our concepts cannot capture the essence of God, but the attempt to frame a concept of God is one of the noblest aspirations of the human mind . . . [w]hy does Heschel demean man's critical capacities? The reason is that his yardstick is the past [Heschel, *GSM*, 222]: 'In calling upon the prophets to stand before the bar of our critical judgment, we are like dwarfs undertaking to measure the heights of giants.' To be

sure we must examine figures of the past with reverence. We cannot dismiss the past as obsolete . . . The most appropriate attitude is phenomenological—an attempt to understand the life-world of the prophets . . . But just as we are not giants and they are not dwarfs, we are also not dwarfs and they are not giants. Our critical judgment is our highest faculty. Why should it be demeaned? Why can't a reverential attitude be taken both to our present reality and our past history? They need not be mutually exclusive."

38. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 25.
39. Heschel, *Prophets*, 621.
40. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7; 1072b4, The Internet Classics Archive: <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.12.xii.html>; accessed on November 1, 2009.
41. Rothschild, *Introduction*, 25.
42. Eliezer Berkovits, "Dr. A. J. Heschel's Theology of Pathos," in *Tradition*, 6/2 (Spring-Summer, 1964): 67–104; 79–80.
43. *Cf*. Stephen G. Post, "The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God's Suffering and the Theory of Love," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 56/2 (Summer, 1988): 213–228; 214: "Neither mutual nor reciprocal, the source of this saintly love is not human but divine-divine agape flows downward through the believer to the anonymous neighbor. Nygren, for instance, refers to the moral agent as a 'tube' or 'channel' (735). 'All that can be called agape,' writes Nygren, 'derives from God' (736). This divine love is, we are told, 'spontaneous and unmotivated,' 'pure and disinterested.'" See: A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros* [orig.: *Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna: Eros och Agape*], trans. Philip S. Watson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
44. Mounier, *Personalism*, 22–23.
45. *Ibid*.
46. Alan Brill, "Aggadic Man: The Poetry and Rabbinic Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel," *Meorot: A Forum of Modern Orthodox Discourse* 6/1 (Shevat 5767/2006): 1–21; 5. Brill argues that in Heschel's view "prophecy describes a fundamental phenomenological orientation to the divine as a form of sympathy with God," such that "the prophetic sensibility equals revelation" where revelation "has three options in the modern world: a return to a medieval sensibility, a comparative religion category of paranormal consciousness, or a direct experience of a God-infused mystical and poetic life." Brill concludes that within Heschel's system "the subtleties of the relations between the three options are not fully worked out," and it seems as if "Heschel oscillates between R. Ishmael's rejection of metaphysics and R. Akiva's acceptance of a mystical heavenly Torah before returning to the experiential approach," and these "wavering theological reflections on revelation and prophecy have not been superseded." Rather, any theologizing on who the prophet is or should be for today, or on what prophetic praxis means in a post-Shoah, interreligious context has settled for the "safety of historicism." But it strikes us that Heschel in *Heavenly Torah: as Refracted Through the Generations* (*Torah min ha-shamayim be-aspaklaria shel ha-dorot*, hereafter *TMH*), ed. and trans. with commentary from Gordon Tucker and Leonard Levin (New York: Continuum, 2007), is precisely attempting to move beyond the "safety of historicism" by dealing with the Ishmaelian/Akivan split by continually asking, and further exploring, questions like: Is the Prophet a Partner or a Vessel (Chapter 26, pp. 478–497)? *TMH* commentator Gordon Tucker tells us in Chapter 26's introduction the following: "The Israelites, for their part, were considered by the Akivans to have been overwhelmed by the divine word, their

minds taken over and penetrated by God's will. The Ishmaelians, however, maintained that the Israelites never lost their powers of reasoning and in fact processed the divine thoughts coming through Moses' words in a natural, human way. The different styles of the prophets, not to mention the times when prophets confronted God, must all be dealt with as this controversy develops, and Heschel sets out the texts and the ideas for us. We thus have two different views of what prophecy actually is. It is a subject that had claimed Heschel's attention ever since he wrote *Die Prophetie* in Germany." Heschel argues dialectically in attempting to hold the two approaches in balance. For example, on the matter of whether or not the prophet is a vessel or partner, Heschel argues, pp. 479–480: "We have been given two approaches to prophecy: (1) Moses our master was merely a vessel that the Holy and Blessed One used, a trumpet that God played; he neither subtracted from, nor added to, what was spoken to him; and (2) Moses our master was a partner in the matter of prophecy. According to the first approach . . . The persona of the prophet is like the appearance of the moon. Just as the moon receives its light from the sun, not having any light of her own, so the prophet receives divine orders or divine inspiration; he is passive, devoid of initiative . . . His own vital forces leave him, and the spirit of God enters into him, plucks his vocal chords, and the words emanate from his mouth. Under Philo's influence this idea entered the Christian literature on prophecy. Athenagoras (ca. 177 C.E.) believed that the holy spirit enters into the prophet just as a flutist blows into the hollow of a flute [Athenagoras, *A Plea Regarding Christians* ch. 9, in *Early Christian Fathers*, ed. C.C. Richardson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953) 1:308.] . . . On the other hand, the verse 'You represent the people before God' (Exodus 18:19) was expounded in the school of Rabbi Ishmael as follows 'Be for them as an instrument filled with utterances [*MI Amole* (*Yitro*) 2].' Now at first glance it would appear that the masters of the midrash and Philo had the very same intent. But it is not so. The meaning of the phrase 'instrument of song' is not the same as that of 'instrument of utterances'. 'Instrument of song' means just what it says: it emits only what is played on or through it; its denotation is a will-less vessel, a mere mass devoid of initiative. By contrast, it is clear that the phrase 'instrument of utterances' was not intended to express that Moses was a mere will-less vessel, *vasum Dei*. For as we have seen above, it was taught in the school of Rabbi Ishmael that Moses our Master did things on his own authority." *Pace* Berkovits, it would appear from the above example(s) that the types of fundamental challenges "that gave no rest to the outstanding Jewish philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages" are neither being ignored by Heschel, nor is he eschewing the task of grappling with the hermeneutical interplay between the Akivan-Ishmaelian exegetical projects. While, in this instance, Heschel's commentary would appear to be more deferential towards the Ishmaelian approach, his desire to strike a meaningful, dialectical balance between the two schools consistently exercised him: "Rivka Horwitz, in an early review of the first two volumes [of *TMH*] put her finger on this: 'Often . . . we have the sense that we are facing an impassioned poet [in Heschel] who speaks of matters that tug at his own heartstrings,' from 'Iyyun Hadash Bemakhshevet ha-Tannaim,'" *Molad* 23 (1965): 242 in *TMH*, xxv.

47. Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," 233.
48. Post, "The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God's Suffering and the Theory of Love," 214–216. Like Post, Jürgen Moltmann recovers the idea of pathos for Christianity. He argues for an essentially pathic and kenotic *agape* that is neither self-seeking

nor self-regarding, where *apatheia* means positively, yet counter-intuitively, freedom in transcendence towards otherness, *The Crucified God*, 269: "[W]hat Christianity proclaimed as the *agape* of God and the believer was rarely translated as *pathos*. Because true agape derives from the liberation from the inward and outward fetters of the flesh (*sarx*), and loves without self-seeking and anxiety, without *ira et studio*, *apatheia* could be taken up as enabling ground for this love and be filled with it. Love arises from the spirit and from freedom, not from desire or anxiety."

49. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004), 131.
50. Mounier, *Personalism*, 20.
51. Heschel, *Prophets*, 293: "The Holy is otherness as well as non-otherness. This is why it is possible to speak of God's holiness as a pattern for man."
52. See: Mayer I. Gruber, "Mordecai M. Kaplan and Abraham Joshua Heschel on Biblical Prophecy," *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* [*ZAW*] 116/4 (2004): 602–609, 609: "Through empathy we aim at discerning, in one single act of certain recognition, complex psychological configurations which we could either define only through the laborious presentation of a host of details or which it may even be beyond our ability to define."
53. Heschel, *Prophets*, 402–403; 408–409.
54. Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath (London: Routledge & Paul, 1954), 34: "The strictly naturalistic and pantheistic type of mysticism maintains that its deification of existence (by fusion of the soul with God) is truly adequate, compared with the (inadequate) endeavour to invest conduct and character with deiformity by participation in the divine activity ('In Thee we live and move and have our being' [Acts 17:28] or Saint Paul's 'I live, yet not I, but Christ in me' [Galatians 2:20])."
55. Jodi Halpern, Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26 (2004): 561–583; 568, italics added.
56. Mounier, *Personalism*, 23.
57. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, 18, italics added.
58. Stein, *OPE*, 16.
59. John May, "Sympathy and Empathy: The Compassionate Bodhisattva and the Love of Christ," (Manuscript) 1–12; 8–9: "Searching lexika and encyclopaedias for entries on *Mitleid* (the German term for 'compassion'), the Tübingen moral theologian Dietmar Mieth found almost none. Such a simple and basic ethical attitude as *com-passio* is apparently not rated as highly as one might assume in Christian theology. Yet, as Mieth goes on to argue, an 'ethic of sympathy' (*Sympathieethik*) is an indispensable complement to Kant's rationally grounded categorical imperative. A *Mitleidsethik* certainly needs continual rational reflection as a means of controlling emotional impulses, but reason alone does not suffice as either a source or a motive for ethical action [Dietmar Mieth, "Mitleid," eds. J. B. Metz *et al*. [Lothar Kuld, Adolf Weisbrod], *Compassion. Weltprogramm des Christentums. Soziale Verantwortung lernen* (Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 2000), 21–25]."
60. Halpern, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," 574.
61. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 241.
62. Michael von Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," in *Converging Ways? Conversion and Belonging in Buddhism and Christianity*, ed. John D'Arcy May (Klosterverlag, EOS: Sankt Ottilien, 2007), 181–206, 202.

CHAPTER 4

1. Rabbi Leon Klenicki, "Can Jews Forgive After the Holocaust? Historical Experience, Reckoning of the Soul and Reconciliation." *Ecumenical Trends*, New York: Graymoor Ecumenical and Interreligious Institute, 31/11 (2002): 1–5, 2: "The Jewish notions of forgiveness and repentance are rooted in the Hebrew Bible. The word "forgiveness" stems from the cultic terminology of cleansing. The verbs are *tiher* (purify, Jeremiah 33:8); *mahah* (wipe, Isaiah 43:25); *kibbs*, *rahaz* (wash, Isaiah 1:16); *kipper* (purge, Ezekiel 16:63). To forgive then, in the biblical sense, entails a cleansing of the individual to be forgiven. It is done by God, but it involves the person's conscience and rituals of personal penitence such as weeping, fasting and rending clothes (II Samuel 12:16 or Ezra 9:3ff)."
2. Freda Mary Oben, "Edith Stein the Woman," *Carmelite Studies* (ed. John Sullivan), vol. 4, Washington: ICS Publications (1987): 5.
3. Eric Przywara, "Edith Stein," *In und Gegen* (Nuremberg: Verlag Glock und Lutz, 1955), 49 in Waltraud Herbstrith, *Edith Stein, A Biography* (trans. Bernard Bonowitz) (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 20.
4. Heschel, *Who is Man? The Raymond Fred West Memorial Lectures* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 91, hereafter *WM*.
5. Mary C. Baseheart, *Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy of Edith Stein* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
6. Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family: 1891–1916* (trans. Josephine Koeppel) (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986), 250, hereafter *Life*.
7. Dermot Moran, "The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," in *Amor Amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship. Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy* (eds. Thomas A. Kelly and Phillip W. Rosemann) (Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), 269–312; 269–270. Also see in Moran: (i) footnote §10: E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, hrsg. Stephan Strasser, *Husserliana* vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), trans. D. Cairns, *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), Meditation 5, §44; and (ii) 269: "The German term *Einfühlung* is of more recent provenance. The Munich philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps is usually credited with coining it from the Greek *empatheia*, literally: 'feeling into' *Einfühlung* thus refers to the phenomenon of feeling (or thinking) one's way into the experiential life of another." Also see footnote §4, also on p. 269: "Empathy is formed from the Greek prefix '*em*', a rendering of '*en*' ('em after 'p') meaning 'in', and '*pathos*' (feeling). In German *Sich einfühlen* is a reflexive verb which literally means 'to feel one's way into'. A.J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond*."
8. Stein, *Life*, 270.
9. Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 270.
10. Stein, *Life*, 260.
11. The quotes in this section are from *Life*, chapter 15, pp. 318–367, unless otherwise noted.
12. Preface, *Life*, 23–24.
13. Patricia Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals." In Joyce Avrech Berkman, ed., *Contemplating Edith Stein* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 59–75; 71.
14. *Ibid*., 60.
15. Stein's determination also meets her mother's "loving opposition" in the following poignant vignette, *Life*, 319: "I had heavy opposition from my mother. I did not even tell her it was a lazaretto . . . She was well aware that no suggestion of hers that my life would be endangered could ever induce me to change my plans. So as

an ultimate deterrent, she told me all the soldiers arrived from the front with clothes overrun by lice and that I could not possibly escape infestation. Naturally that was a scourge I dreaded . . . When this tactic failed, my mother declared with all the energy she could muster: 'You will not go with my permission.' My reply was every bit as determined. 'Then I must go without your permission.'"

16. Stein, *Life*, 343; italics added.
17. Stein, *Life*, 377.
18. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations* [*Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, 1929] in Donn Welton, ed., *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 109.
19. Stein, *Life*, 222.
20. Rachel Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance: Four Women Confronting the Holocaust* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 24–25: "According to Stein, the [primordial] core—or particular potential of a person—is an invariable given. Its potential cannot be affected by external factors, such as historical circumstances, but the development of the potential may be either enhanced or curtailed by external circumstances."
21. Stein, *OPE*, 6.
22. Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 285, argues that "Husserl himself will say in his *Intersubjectivity* writings, in constituting myself as a body, I am constituting a 'solipsistic world'; whereas, in order to constitute an intersubjective world, I must employ empathy . . ." See: *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928*, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 8.
23. Stein, *OPE*, 77, 57, 7.
24. Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 274.
25. Stein, *OPE*, 10.
26. *Ibid*., 57 italics added; 61.
27. *Ibid*., 19, 11. Also see: Moran, "Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein," 271: "*Einfühlung* was seen to reach even into theology, when both Scheler and Stein saw it as involving the question of the relation of the person to God. Scheler writes that the interactions of persons with persons extends to God: 'But it is precisely the realm of spiritual actuality that is articulated as strictly personal, substantive, and intrinsically individual, right up to God, the Person of persons (*The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 75).'"
28. Stein, *OPE*, 19, 11.
29. Basehart, *Person in the World*, 38–39.
30. Stein, *OPE*, 34.
31. See: *OPE*, 108 and following.
32. *Ibid*., 98.
33. Heschel, *MQG*, 27–30; 28.
34. Edmond La Beaume Cherbonnier, "Heschel As a Religious Thinker," *Conservative Judaism*, 33/1 (Fall, 1968): 25–39; 34–35.
35. Heschel, *MQG*, 29, 109.
36. Heschel, *Prophets*, xxii.
37. Cherbonnier, "Heschel As a Religious Thinker," 34–35.
38. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913–1922* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 82.
39. May, "Sympathy and Empathy," 7: "Scheler's analysis of the relationship between moral values and feelings, in particular the *Nachfühlen* that allows us to reproduce in our own sensibility what the other is experiencing, which provides the basis of

Mitgefühl, empathy with the objectively grasped suffering of the other, and eventually of *Einsfühlung*, identifying oneself with the psychic reality of the other (see: Stegmüller [*Hauptströmungen der Gegenwärtsphilosophie. Eine kritische Einführung*. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 2nd rev. ed.] 1969: 106–110). The presupposition of this act of empathy which makes sympathy possible is not a primary self-awareness; rather, Scheler anticipates Levinas in maintaining that the reality of the other is given as immediately evident to an inner perception which precedes self-awareness of one's own *ego*; one thus perceives one's own self 'as if I were another' ('als ob ich ein anderer wäre,' Stegmüller 1969: 110). Within the framework of Husserl's phenomenology Edith Stein developed an even more differentiated analysis of empathy (Stein [*OPE*] 1989). She, like Levinas, begins with the 'look' perceived in the face of the other, which leads the person of empathy from what is outwardly seen to the other's inner disposition, from objective intentionality to a subjective 'con-primordiality', the realisation that the other's primordial experience, while not my own primordiality, is equivalently primordial for him or her."

40. MacIntyre, *A Philosophical Prologue*, 82–83, 86.
41. Stein, *OPE*, 10.
42. MacIntyre, *A Philosophical Prologue*, 136–137, italics added.
43. Clarke, *PB*, 85.
44. MacIntyre, *A Philosophical Prologue*, 45, 60.
45. Jodi Halpern, Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26 (2004): 561–583; 583.
46. Stein, *OPE*, 18.
47. Marion, *BG*, 323.
48. Mounier, 23, italics added.
49. Clarke, *PB*, 85, nn57–58: "[I]f person A timelessly gives perfection X to person B, then B does not first lack perfection and then later receive it, but *always* possesses it in *act*. And if we add that B receives X in equal fullness to A's possession of it, then no potency is involved at all. There is only the possession of perfection X plus the purely positive relationship of active, grateful welcoming of it as a gift from A. In a word, the love relationship, if properly understood, opens up the capital metaphysical and psychological insight that to be gifted and to be grateful are in themselves not a sign of inferiority or deficiency at all, but part of the splendor and wonder of being itself at its highest actualization, that is, being as communion." *Cf*. Gerard O'Hanlon, "Does God Change? Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Immutability of God," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 53 (1987), 161–183, 171; *The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
50. May, "Sympathy and Empathy," 7: "The fundamental importance of this convergence is perhaps best illustrated when we contemplate a world utterly devoid of the empathy that makes sympathy possible and prepares the ground for both love and compassion. The fascist and communist regimes of the twentieth century were examples of the attempt to purge society of such 'soft-hearted' virtues."
51. Basehart, *Person in the World*, 37–38.
52. Edmund Husserl, *Lecture 5 from The Idea of Phenomenology* [*Die Idee der Phänomenologie*], Husserliana II (trans. and intro. Lee Hardy) (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 49–55; 54–55: "This evident act of seeing is itself knowing in the most precise sense; and objectivity is not something that is in knowing like something is in a sack as if knowing were a completely empty form—one and the same empty sack—into which one thing is put, and then another.

Rather, in givenness we see that the object constitutes itself in knowing, that one can distinguish as many basic forms of objectivity. Moreover, the acts of knowing, more broadly apprehended as acts of thought in general, are not free-floating particularities, coming and going in the stream of consciousness. Rather, essentially related to each other, they display the teleological forms of interconnection and corresponding connections of fulfillment, corroboration, confirmation and their counterparts. And everything depends upon the interconnections that present intelligible unity."

53. Basehart, *Person in the World*, 40.
54. Stein, *OPE*, 42.
55. Heschel, "I and You," *Poems*, 14, 31.

CHAPTER 5

1. Herbstrith, *Edith Stein*, 24.
2. Henry Bordeaux, *Edith Stein: Thoughts on Her Life and Times*, trans. Donald and Idella Gallagher (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce, 1959), 22.
3. Florent Gaboriau, *The Conversion of Edith Stein*, trans. Ralph McInerny (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 52.
4. Adolf Reinach, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921), xxvii from "Adolf Reinach: Seeker of the Absolute," in John M. Osterreicher, intro. Jacques Maritain, *These Walls Are Crumbling: Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1952), 100–133; 103.
5. *Ibid*., 126–127; 127: "None of his notes written in the din and mud of war speaks explicitly of Reinach's inner life, nor does his paper on the absolute—still, they show that its core was the experience, the knowledge and feeling of sealed shelter, of a home in God, *restloser Geborgenheit in Gott*. This made Reinach, a Jew by blood, a Jew according to the spirit, tying him to the Old and New Testaments, with their glad news for the house of Israel and for all those who are raised to its dignity [Romans 3:28–29], that God himself is their keeper."
6. *Ibid*., 123–124, 130, 103.
7. Stein, *Life*, 418–419; 418: "The Master [Husserl] gave her a sincere letter of recommendation as she now sought for a professorship, beginning her search in Göttingen where she was so well known . . . her application was ignored by the faculty. Her thesis went unexamined, and the record makes it clear that there was more than a rejection of a woman behind the move."
8. See: Stein, "Psychische Kausalität, Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften," in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. V (Halle: Niemeyer, 1922; reprint Tübingen, 1970), 43 in Herbstrith, 29.
9. Stein, Letter #38a, "Letter to Fritz Kaufmann," September 13, 1925, in *Edith Stein: Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916–1942*, trans. Josephine Koeppel, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1993), hereafter *Letters*.
10. Stein, *Life*, 417–418.
11. MacIntyre, *A Philosophical Prologue*, 170.
12. Stein, *Life*, 420; Edith Stein, "Die Seelenberg," in *Welt und Person: Beitrag zum christlichen Wahrheitsstreben*, Edith Steins Werke, Bd. VI (Louvain: Nauwelaerts/ Freiburg: Herder, 1962), 66–67, in Waltraud Herbstrith, *Edith Stein: A Biography*, trans. Bernard Bonowitz (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 31.
13. Teresa of Jesus [Avila], *Interior Castle*, *The Complete Works of St. Teresa of Jesus*, trans. E. Allison Peers, vol. 2 (London: Sheed and Ward, 1978), 261–263.

14. *Edith-Stein-Archiv*, Karmel Köln in Herbstrith, *Edith Stein*, 35.
15. Teresia Renata Posselt, *Edith Stein. Eine Grosse Frau unseres Jahrhunderts*, ninth edition. (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna: Herder, 1963), 59, in Herbstrith, 39.
16. Stein, *Life*, 419.
17. Stein, "The Significance of Women's Intrinsic Value in National Life" in *Essays on Woman*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 2, trans. Freda Mary Oben (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1996), 253–265, hereafter *EW*.
18. In a related essay entitled, "The Separate Vocations of Man and Woman According to Nature and Grace," in *EW*, 59–86; 83. Stein proposes a phenomenologically cogent consideration regarding women's ordination in the Catholic Church: "In common usage we say priests and religious must be especially *called*, which means that a particular call must be sent to them by God. Is there any difference between the call sent to man and that to woman? Women just as men have been called to the religious state at all times. And when we consider the manifold ramifications of contemporary religious life, when we acknowledge that the extremely diverse works of charity in our times are practiced by the feminine orders and congregations, we can see only one essential difference which still exists in reality: the actual priestly work is reserved for men . . . In the early church, women played an active part in the various congregational charities, and their intense apostolate as confessors and martyrs had a profound effect . . . We are witnessing a decided change here in recent times: feminine energies are now strongly demanded as help in church charities and pastoral work. In recent militant movements, the women are demanding that their activities be recognized once more as an ordained church ministry, and it may well be that one day attention will be given to their demands . . . It seems to me that such an implementation by the church, until now unheard of, cannot be forbidden by *dogma*."
19. Stein, *EW*, 253–265; 255.
20. *Ibid*., 255–256. See: Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance*, 164: "Stein claims that women's greatest contribution to society lies in cultivation of their distinctiveness from men. While she is in favor of the emancipatory gains of the suffrage movement, she strongly objects to undifferentiating equality of men and women. Absolute indiscriminateness between men and women signifies obliteration of distinctions between the genders and therefore amount to complete disregard of the needs, roles and capabilities of women . . . [Stein's] notion of woman's defeat when feminine particularity is erased recurs in the argumentation of today's thinkers, such as Ivan Illich [*Gender* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), 178], who claims that 'in the games where you play for genderless stakes . . . both genders are stripped and, neutered, the man ends on top.'"
21. Stein, *EW*, 257.
22. *Ibid*., 262, 256, 263, 256.
23. Stein, Letter #45, "Letter to Sr. Callista Kopf, OP," February 28, 1928.
24. Heschel, *MNA*, 194.
25. *Ibid*., 206.
26. Feldhay Brenner, *Writing as Resistance*, 166: "Stein's cultural and emotional affiliation with Jewishness and with Jewish women placed emphasis on ethnic and gender identity, an attitude that countervailed the intent of the perpetrators to depersonalize the victim."
27. Herbstrith, 56, 59, 62.
28. Stein, Letter #52, "Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, Freiburg-Günterstal." Trans. note: *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus: "Rhodes is right here, perform your phenomenal leap here!"* [from *Aesop's fable*].

29. Stein, *Life*, 422.
30. Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 202.
31. John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 140: "[Stein] thought of her conversion to Christianity as existing 'not only in a spiritual sense, but in blood terms.' . . . [f]rom the cloister she wrote a passionate letter to Pius XI, begging him to 'deplore the hatred, persecution, and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews, at any time and from any source.' Her letter drew no response. Four years were to pass before he came to issue the tardy encyclical on anti-racism, *Mit brennender Sorge*."
32. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 236.
33. Renata Katz, 'Someone has Survived,' a poem read by Shoshanna Appleton, from the *Proceedings of The 2009 Holocaust Memorial Day Commemoration*, The Braid, Ballymena Town Hall, Museum and Arts Centre (January 27, 2009): 1–10; 3–4. *NB:* The author is originally from the former Czechoslovakia, and has lived in Dublin for over twenty years. When she looks at the faded photograph, she thinks of members of her family who perished in the Holocaust. The poem is dedicated "in memory of my Rosenthal grandparents and the six million others who perished."
34. Suzanne Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith Become Teresa, Blessed Martyr of the Church," *Moment* (September, 1987): 46–53; 50.
35. Stein, Letter #192, "Letter to Gertrud von le Fort, Baierbrunn im Isartal," January 31, 1935.
36. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent To the Meaning of Being*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 9. eds. L. Gelber and R. Lueven, trans. K. F. Reinhardt (Washington: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2002), xviii, hereafter *FE*.
37. Roland Hill, "The Lost Encyclical," *The Tablet* (November 8, 1997): <http://www.thetablet.co.uk/article/6576>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
38. Johannes H. Nota, "Edith Stein und der Entwurf für eine Enzyklika gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus," *Freiburger Rundbrief*, 1975, 35–41, quoted from G. Passelecq, B. Suchecky, *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI*, trans. S. Rendall, intro. Gary Wills (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1997), 12.
39. Stein, *FE*, 13.
40. *Humani Generis Unitas*, §79, quoted from *The Hidden Encyclical*, hereafter *HGU*. Also see: *HGU*, Section 5. "The Unity of the Human Race" at: <http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/humani_generis_unitas.htm>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
41. *HGU*, §27, §72, §75.
42. Heschel, "Depth Theology," first of a series of lectures delivered during a visiting professorship (Spring 1960) at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, originally printed in *Cross Currents* (Fall 1960), in *The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1967), 115–126; 115–116, hereafter *Essays*.
43. *Ibid*., 119, 118.
44. David Hollenbach, *The Global Face of Public Faith: Politics, Human Rights and Christian Ethics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 55–71; 58, 63.
45. Heschel, *MQG*, 124.
46. The following is quoted from Stein, *FE*, 342–346, unless noted otherwise.
47. *Ibid*., 466, 344–345.
48. See: *Mishna Avot 4:1*; *Talmud Bavli Yevamot 14a*, on the relationship of the house of Hillel and the house of Shamai; *Num. Rabbah 13*; *Talmud Bavli Eruvin 13b*, in Marc

Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 178.

49. Stein, *FE*, 344–345.
50. *HGU*, §46.
51. Heschel, "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View," from *The Christian Century*, vol. 80, no. 49 (December 4, 1963) in *Essays*, 168–178; 169.
52. See: Mary C. Boys, "Does the Catholic Church Have a Mission 'with' Jews or 'to' Jews?" *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations* 3 (2008): 1–19; 8–9: <http://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/scjr/article/view/1482>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
53. Heschel, "The Forgotten," *Poems*, 41.
54. Heschel, *MNA*, 284.
55. Stein, *OPE*, 18.
56. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 126.
57. Angela Ales-Bello, "Edith Stein, a saintly thinker waiting to be discovered," *The Pilot* (Boston, Massachusetts: December 13, 2002): 20. *NB: BBC Radio 3* aired on January 26, 2003, "Sunday Feature: Edith Stein—the Philosopher Saint." An Adaptation of Stein's life by Hatti Naylor, produced by Kate McCall. With Fiona Shaw as the voice of Edith Stein.

CHAPTER 6

1. Stein, Letter #287, "Letter to Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Dorsten," December 9, 1938.
2. William Keeler, "Advisory on the Implications for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the Canonization of Edith Stein," Bishops Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs (Washington, D.C.: September, 1998): <http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/1998/98-205a.shtml>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
3. Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith," 53.
4. *NB: Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews*, "We remember: a Reflection on the Shoah" (Vatican City State: March 16, 1998), §IV, italics added: "It was this extreme ideology which became the basis of the measures taken, first to drive the Jews from their homes and then to exterminate them. The *Shoah* was the work of a thoroughly modern neo-pagan regime. *Its anti-Semitism had its roots outside of Christianity* and, in pursuing its aims, it did not hesitate to oppose the Church and persecute her members also."
5. See: Dennis Hevesi, "Leon Klenicki, Rabbi Who Bridged Gaps Between Faiths, Dies at 78," *The New York Times* (January 31, 2009): <www.nytimes.com>; accessed on January 31, 2009.
6. Johannes B. Metz, *The Advent of God*, trans. John Drury (New York: Newman Press, 1970), 2–3.
7. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.
8. *Ibid*., 67.
9. *Ibid*., 71, 61.
10. Batzdorff, "Watching Tante Edith," 53.
11. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.
12. Marion, *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1998), 197, hereafter *RG*.
13. Karl A. Plank, "Broken Continuities: 'Night' and 'White Crucifixion'," *Christian Century* (November 4, 1998, [p. 963]): <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1069>; accessed on February 9, 2008, hereafter *Broken*.

14. See: Metz, *Faith in History and Society* (New York: Seabury, 1980); "The Future in the Memory of Suffering," in J.B. Metz and J. Moltmann, *Faith and the Future* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 3–16.
15. Ingo Walther, Rainer Metzger, *Marc Chagall 1887–1985, Painting as Poetry*, (Koln: Benedikt Taschen, 2000), 62, 65.
16. Chagall quoted in *Ibid*.
17. Walther, *Marc Chagall 1887–1985, Painting as Poetry*, 62. Also see: Cornelia and Irving Süssman, "Marc Chagall, Painter of the Crucified," *The Bridge: A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian Studies*, ed. John M. Oesterreicher, vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955): 96–117; 106: "'[Chagall] has painted the entire universe, and left out nothing,' writes Raïssa Maritain in a poem on Marc Chagall, and she continues with a poignant description of the great *White Crucifixion* [see: Raïssa Maritain, *Chagall ou l'orage enchante* (Paris: Editions des Trois Collines, 1948), 32–33]. Down its center descends a great shaft of light—Raïssa Maritain calls it 'a great space of ivory in a wasted world'—and in it rises the cross with Christ nailed to it; at His feet stands a lighted candelabrum with flames so firm, radiance so bright, for here is the Light that all the world's horror cannot put out. Around his loins is the Jewish prayer shawl, and about his Head the glory, and over it, in Latin and in Hebrew, 'Jesus of Nazareth King of the Jews.' Below the cross, beneath His arms of compassion, there are victims of persecution: a Jew clasping the Torah, looking around desperately, not knowing where to flee; another running to save the little that is in the sack on his shoulder; a third paralyzed with fear, bearing a sign on his chest, 'Ich bin Jude'; an old rabbi, his hands to his eyes; and a woman, clutching her child to her heart. On all sides ruin and havoc: the synagogue on fire, the burning houses upside down, people and chairs and books tumbling out of them, and a threatening band of assassins flourishing like banners and weapons over the village. In the sky hover figures of Jews, old and grief stricken. Are they the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and is the woman with them Rachel the mother, 'weeping for her children' (Jer 31:15)? On the water drifts an overloaded boat, with no place to go. Where can Jews go? There is no place for them on earth, no place on earth where Jews are wanted."
18. Louis-Marie Chauvet, *Symbol*, 305–308; 306. Chauvet is reflecting with, in particular, "Discussion avec René Girard," *Esprit* 429 (November 1973): 528–563; 553–556.
19. James Alison, "Some Thoughts on the Atonement" (Talk given in Brisbane, Australia: August 2004): <http://www.jamesalison.co.uk/texts/eng11.html>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
20. Enda McDonagh, "Is Love Still Central?" from *The Gracing of Society* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1989), 28–47; 38.
21. Plank, *Broken*.
22. James B. Nickoloff, "Commentary on Goizueta: The Paradoxical Character of Symbols, Popular Religion, and Church: Questions for U.S. Latino/a Theology," in *Practicing Catholic: Ritual, Body and Contestation in Catholic Faith*, ed. Bruce Morrill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 179–182; 180–181.
23. Henrique Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us: Foucault, Roman Catholicism and Inter-faith Dialogue," in *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience*, 191–213; 196.
24. *Ibid*.
25. Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), *The Science of the Cross, a Study of St. John of the Cross (Kreuzeswissenschaft, Studie über Joannes a Cruce)*, trans. Hilda Graef, eds. L. Gelber and R. Leuven (London: Burn and Oates, 1960). The translator

(hereafter Graef trans.) remarks in the preface, ix: "The reader feels that what she [Edith Stein] says about suffering and the Cross are not mere words, no detached analysis of St. John's doctrine, but part of her own life; for while she was writing this book she had frequently to present herself before the Nazi authorities in occupied Holland and suffered all the humiliations that were inflicted by them on the members of her race. Nevertheless, she preserved her calm even in this time of fear and anguish."

26. *Ibid*, 123; *cf*. Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), *The Science of the Cross: A Study of St. John of the Cross*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 6, trans. Josephine Koeppel, ed. L. Gelber and R. Leuven (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2002), 163–164, hereafter *SC*.
27. Stein, *SC*, 163, 135.
28. *Ibid*., 177.
29. Kosuke Koyama, *Water Buffalo Theology: Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition, Revised and Expanded* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 150–170; 150, 159.
30. *Ibid*., 166, 168.
31. Stein, *SC*, 164.
32. *Ibid*., 177; 179 italics added.
33. Koyama, "The Spat-upon Jesus Christ," *No Handle on the Cross: An Asian Meditation on the Crucified Mind* (London: SCM Press, 1976) 87–97; 89.
34. Stein, *SC*, 179.
35. Stein, *SC*, 189, 187, 189.
36. *Ibid*., 273.
37. *Ibid*., 284.
38. Scanlon, "The Postmodern Debate," 233.
39. Stein, Letter #296, "Letter to Mother Ottilia Thannisch, OCD, Echt," March 26, 1939.
40. Stein, *Life*, 430.
41. Stein, Letter #311, "Letter to Sr. Agnella Stadtmüller, OP, Speyer," March 30, 1940.
42. Stein, "III.2 Elevation of the Cross, September 14, 1939: *Ave Crux, Spes unica* [Hail Cross, Our Only Hope]," *The Collected Works of Bl. Edith Stein: The Hidden Life: Hagiographic Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts*, vol. 4, eds. L. Gelber and M. Linssen, <http://www.karmel.at/ics/edith/stein.html>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
43. Stein, *Life*, 430: "The Bishops informed the Dutch citizens that together with nine other denominational churches in Holland, they had sent a telegram to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Commander of the Nazi Occupation in Holland, demanding a cessation of measures being taken against the Jews."
44. Stein, Letter #300, "Letter to Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Dorsten," April 16, 1939; Letter #330, "Letter to Mother Ambrosia Antonia Engelmann, OCD, Echt," presumably in December 1941 she writes to her prioress in Echt, shortly before the Nazis come for her (on August 2, 1942), "A *scientia crucis* [knowledge of the Cross] can be gained only when one comes to feel the Cross radically."
45. Heschel, *MNA*, 148; See: footnote "**" on 148: ". . . The term [compassion] is probably related to the word rehem, womb, and may have the connotation of motherly love. In the Babylonian Talmud, Rahmana, the Merciful One, is frequently used to denote both God and Scripture, Law, or the word of God. The Law *is* Mercy."
46. Stein, *Life*, 430–431.
47. Nota, "Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," *Carmelite Studies*, vol. 4, ed. John Sullivan (Washington: ICS Publications, 1987): 51.
48. *Kölner Selig-und Heiligsprechungsprozess der Dienerin Gottes Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce—Edith Stein*, eds. Teresia Renata Posselt, Teresia Margareta Drügemöller

(Cologne, 1962) in Herbstrith, 103. See: Hampl, 72: "*Reichskomissar* Seyss-Inquart ordered all Catholic Jews to be deported before the week's end. The official Nazi memorandum listed 722 Jews registered as Catholics throughout the country. A further memorandum, dated July 31, claimed that 4,000 Jews registered as Christians had been gathered in one camp. This information was seen as a threat to induce the bishops to stop their protest of the general deportations."

49. Stein, Letter #340, "Letter to Mother Ambrosia Antonia Engelmann, OCD, Echt," August 4, 1942.
50. Heschel, *MQG*, 45. *NB:* "There are many I's but there is no I-Thou relationship. Kant, who introduces the concept of the ethically responsible person in his concept of the kingdom of God (*Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason III, 1.4*), or sees it, rather, as constituted by such persons, does not grasp the idea of concrete community, since his concept of person is apersonal," in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio: A Dogmatic Inquiry into the Sociology of the Church* (London: Collins, 1963), 232–233.
51. Stein, *Life*, 434.
52. Posselt, *Edith Stein*, 178 in Herbstrith, 105.
53. Report of Mr. Wielek in the Dutch newspaper *De Tijd*, 1952, in Herbstrith, 107.
54. *NB:* Just as Edith's birthday, on *Yom Kippur*—the Day of Atonement—has a certain significance, it is important to note that August 9, 1942, the approximated day of Edith and Rosa's death at Auschwitz, was the Jewish feast of *Tish'a B'Ab*. Koeppel remarks in the translator's afterword to *Life in a Jewish Family*, 443: "The month of *Ab* approximates the height of summer in the Jewish calendar; in the Gregorian one, its counterpart would be the weeks ending July and beginning of August. *Tish'a B'Ab*, the Ninth day of the Month of *Ab*, is an annual day of black fast in mourning memory of the destruction of the first and second Temples in Jerusalem. The ninth day of August in the year of 1942 saw the destruction of Edith and Rosa Stein, with countless other temples of the Spirit in the infamy of Auschwitz."
55. Nota, "Introduction" in Herbstrith, xii.
56. Heschel, *MQG*, 134, 138–139.
57. Stein, *SC*, 160.
58. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 70.
59. Heschel, *A Passion for Truth* (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2004), 300–301, hereafter *PT*.
60. Süssman, "Marc Chagall, Painter of the Crucified," 105, 112.
61. Heschel, *PT*, 300–301.

CHAPTER 7

1. Heschel, "Interview at Notre Dame," in *MgSa*, 381–393; 386.
2. Marion, *BG*, 138; 146: "[u]npredictable landing—not the uniform arrival, but the unforeseen, spastic, and discontinuous arising and appearing—in the end emphasizes that the given gives itself."
3. From: Nota, "Edith Stein und der Entwurf für eine Enzyklika gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus," *Communio*, 5 (1976): 154ff, in Nota, "Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger," *Carmelite Studies*, 52.
4. Stein, *SC*, 159, 160.
5. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 69.
6. Marion, *BG*, 323.
7. *Ibid*., 322.

8. *Ibid*., 299.
9. *Ibid*., 204, 322.
10. Stein, *FE*, 414–415.
11. *Ibid*., 414.
12. By the use of the term "continuum memory" I am drawing analogy here from the helpful point made by Jewish-Christian dialogue scholar Irving Greenberg on "continuum truths." He argues, "I believe that all theological concepts (even those that we may unequivocally assert are the product of revelation—if such truths exist) are continuum truths. Their message extends over a field of meaning. At one extreme of the spectrum, we can imagine a divine communication almost unaffected by the human medium and—extending over to the other pole where human energy overwhelmingly supplies the information. The place where a particular religion, ritual, spiritual concept, or text falls along the continuum may vary from faith to faith, from culture and civilization to culture and civilization . . . [w]herever you locate on that continuum, I intended to speak to you and affirm that it was God's will/human energy that Judaism and Christianity work side-by-side as covenantal, parallel partners whose task is to redeem the world," in "On the Divine Plan and the Human Role in Development of Religion: A Response to Tom Indinopulos," *Explorations and Responses*, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 42/3 (Summer 2007): 458–462; 460.
13. Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Representatives of the Jewish Community," Rotunda Hall of John Paul II Cultural Center, Washington D.C. (April 17, 2008): <www.vatican.va>; accessed on September 23, 2008.
14. Stein, *FE*, 343.
15. Catherine Cornille, *The Im-Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue* (New York: Crossroad, 2008), 137–176; 150.
16. Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971), 325.
17. Natalie Depraz, "The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis," in *The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness* (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 1999), 95–110; 107.
18. Susan A. Ross, *Extravagant Affections: A Feminist Sacramental Theology* (New York: Continuum, 2001), 164–165.
19. *Ibid*., 165–166.
20. See: Chauvet, *The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 13–17.
21. Ross, *Extravagant Affections*, 165–167.
22. David Ranson, "The Invitational Light of Easter" *The Furrow* 60/2 (February 2009): 90–97; 96–97.
23. See: Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, 252.
24. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 62.
25. Georges Cottier, "The Great Jubilee: A Time of Remembrance." In Joseph H. Ehrenkranz and David L. Coppola, eds., *Religion and Violence, Religion and Peace: Essays from the Center for Christian-Jewish Understanding Conference in Auschwitz, Poland, May 1998* (Fairfield, CT: Sacred Heart University Press, 2000), 129–137; 134.
26. Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions*, 252.
27. *Ibid*., 203.
28. Thomas Josef Götz, "Catholic Monk, Buddhist Monk: The Monastic Interreligious Dialogue with Japanese Zen," in *Converging Ways*, 11–23; 23.

29. Cottier, "The Great Jubilee: A Time of Remembrance," 133.
30. Hampl, "Edith Stein (Poland, 1942): A Book Sealed with Seven Seals," 74.
31. Stein, *OPE*, 8.
32. Stein, *OPE*, 74.
33. Stein, *OPE*, 102.
34. Heschel, *WM*, 92.
35. See: Greenberg, "On the Divine Plan and the Human Role in Development of Religion: A Response to Tom Indinopulos," 460.
36. Heschel, *WM*, 92.
37. See: Zev Garber, "The Problem of Edith Stein: Jewess and Catholic Saint," in *Women and the Holocaust: Narrative and Representation*, ed. Esther Fuchs, *Studies in the Shoah*, vol. 22 (Oxford, UK and Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 1–7.
38. Gideon Goosen, "Towards a Theory of Dual Religious Belonging," *Ecumenics from the Rim*: *Explorations in Honour of John D'Arcy May*, eds. John O'Grady and Peter Scherle (Berlin: LIT, 2007), 238–245; 243.
39. *Joint Statement* (Roma, Grottaferrata: February 23–27, 2003): <www.vatican.va>; accessed on April 7, 2008.
40. Heschel, *MQG*, 136–137. See: Rabbenu Yonah, *Commentary on Alfassi*, *Berachoth*, Ch. 4, beginning, in *MQG*, 84: "In the words of the Mishnah, *kavanah* means '*to direct* the heart to the text or content of the prayer.'" Also see: Rivka Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," *Modern Judaism* 19 (1999): 293–310, 301–302: "Heschel's thought emphasizes *kavanah*-intention. In this respect he is close to Maimonides who was in many ways his mentor and whom he quotes. The affinity between Hasidism and Maimonides, and their reliance on him is an important theme which has not yet been sufficiently studied [See: Heschel, *Man's Quest For God*, p. 66; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, "Tefillah," 4, 15]. In the *Laws of Tefillah* 4, 15, Maimonides wrote: 'Prayer without kavanah is no prayer at all. He who has prayed without *kavanah* ought to pray once more. . . . If one is weary or distressed, it is forbidden to pray until one's mind is composed.' Maimonides cites the sages who considered that one should wait three days without praying when one returns from a journey. Rabbinical authorities after Maimonides did not follow this line of spontaneity as they were more eager to emphasize regularity. Wanting to stress *kavanah*, Heschel returns to Maimonides. This approach is typical to early Hasidism and is an attitude with which Heschel grew up and a learning that he absorbed and followed. Heschel used early Hasidism and Maimonides to moderate Halakha and make it more tolerant. Not only did he use Maimonides to strengthen *kavanah*, he also quotes him to teach a person how to prepare for it: 'One must free his heart from all other thoughts and regard himself as standing in the presence of the *Shechinah*. Therefore before engaging in prayer, the worshipper ought to go aside a little in order to put himself into a devotional frame of mind, and then he must pray quietly and with feeling, not like one who carries a weight and throws it away and goes farther' (*Tefillah*, 4,16) [see: Heschel, *MQG*, p. 87] . . . Heschel emphasizes the need to seek God, the demands of the heart. He wishes to awaken the Jew to inwardness: 'God seeks the heart,' *Rahmana liba bae*. He criticizes those who claim that meticulous attention to the laws is the main thing in Judaism: the observance of the *Shulhan Aruch* [*halacha*] should be accompanied by inwardness."
41. Heschel, *MQG*, 12.
42. *Ibid*., 32.

43. Stein, *PA*, 216.
44. *Ibid*., 368.
45. Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," 300: "By using the term 'prayers of empathy,' he distances himself in a way from the Halakhic commandment, perhaps so as not to lose contact with the modern Jew. When a Jew prays out of empathy with the Jewish community, Heschel says he prays out of empathy with his people and their past. Prayers of empathy allow us entry into our own prayer book, in which we will find the spirit of Israel: the thought of the Prophets, of the great Zaddikim and of the learned masters of all generations."
46. Stein, *PA*, 387: "At times we realize for the first time that we are not alone when we are inwardly affected this way. What does 'not alone' mean? I sense contact with something like myself and what is more with something whose life is one with my own. I sense along with it, 'so to speak,' what befalls it, what threatens it."
47. Stein, *PA*, 389, 387–388.
48. *Ibid*., 217.
49. Horwitz, "Abraham Joshua Heschel On Prayer And His Hasidic Sources," 303: "The emphasis, according to Heschel, is on *kavanah*, on the heart, on communion, on the duties of the body which are related to the duties of the heart."
50. Nils Alstrup Dahl, *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976) 12–14; 13 in Bruce T. Morrill, *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue* (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 149.
51. Morrill, *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory*, 150.
52. Johann Baptist Metz, *A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity*, trans. J. Matthew Ashley (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1998), 121–132; 130–131.
53. Heschel, *Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951), 153, hereafter *MNA*.
54. Jacques Dupuis, "Christianity and Religions: From Confrontation to Encounter," *The Tablet, Open Day Lecture 2001* (October 20, 27 and November 3, 2001): <http://www.thetablet.co.uk>; accessed February 28, 2012.
55. Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, *We Remember: a Reflection on the Shoah* (Rome: March 16, 1998) §1: <http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_16031998_shoah_en.html>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
56. Massimo Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow Upon and a Stimulus to Jewish-Christian Dialogue," *The Catholic Church and the Jewish People: Recent Reflections From Rome*, eds. Philip A. Cunningham, Norbert J. Hofmann, Joseph Sievers (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 54–70; 54–55.
57. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 127.
58. Riccardo Di Segni [Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community in Rome], "Steps Taken and Questions Remaining in Jewish-Christian Relations Today," from lectures given in the series *The Catholic Church and the Jewish People from Vatican II to Today* delivered at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome between October 19, 2004, and January 25, 2005, under the auspices of the Cardinal Bea Centre for Judaic Studies (October 19, 2004, 5 Heshwan 5765): <http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/center/conferences/Bea_Centre_C-J_Relations_04-05/DiSegni.htm>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
59. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island" [originally given as inaugural lecture as Harry Emerson Fosdick Visiting Professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York,

and appearing in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 21/1, part 1 (January 1966): 117–134] in *MgSa*, 235–256; 237.

60. Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow," 68.
61. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 121; italics added.
62. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 236.
63. Giuliani, "The Shoah as a Shadow," 60.
64. James Bernauer, "The Holocaust and the Catholic Church's Search for Forgiveness," given at Boston College (October 30, 2002): <http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/cjrelations/resources/articles/bernauer.htm>; accessed on February 28, 2012.
65. Donald Grayston, "Thomas Merton, The Holocaust, and the Eclipse of Difference," in *Merton and Judaism*, 83–104; 96.
66. Heschel, "No Religion is an Island," 244–245.
67. Heschel, *IEE*, 163–166: "There is, moreover, a passage in the New Testament that seems to reflect the belief of the early Christian community in the restoration of the kingdom to the Jewish people. According to the Book of Acts, the disciples to whom Jesus presented himself alive after his passion, asked him: 'Lord, is it at this time that thou restorest the kingdom of Israel?' And he said to them: 'No one can know times and seasons which the Father fixed by His own authority' (Acts 1: 6–7). What is the meaning of this question and this answer? It was a time when Jerusalem was taken away from the Jewish people, the holy temple destroyed, Jews sold into slavery. Pagan Rome ruled in the Holy Land. But there was hope, a hope of deliverance from the pagans, there was the promise offered by the prophets, of returning Jerusalem to the kingdom of Israel. It was the most urgent of questions. So when they saw Jesus for the first time in these extraordinary circumstances, it is understandable that this was the first question they asked, their supreme concern: 'Is it at this time that thou restorest the kingdom?' In other words, they asked about the restoration. Jesus' answer was that the times of fulfillment of the divine promise were matters which lay within the Father's sole authority. So, earlier, he had assured them that he himself did not know the day or hour of his parousia. 'But of that day or the hour [of the parousia] no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father' (Mark 13:32). A similar awareness is common in Rabbinic literature. 'Nobody knows when the house of David will be restored.' According to Rabbi Shimeon the Lakish (*ca*. 250), 'I have revealed it to my heart, but not to the angels.' Jesus' answer is as characteristic of the Rabbinic mind of the age as the question . . . the simple meaning of the entire passage has a perfect *Sitz im Leben*, and both question and answer must be understood in the spirit of their times. The Apostles were Jews and evidently shared the hope of their people of seeing the kingdom of God realized in the restoration of Israel's national independence. So now, hearing their Master speak of the new age, they asked if this was to be the occasion for restoring the kingdom of Israel. We can scarcely fail to realize or to understand the naturalness of their question. The expectation was burned into their very being by the tyranny of the Roman rule. The answer confirms the expectation that the kingdom will be restored to Israel—an expectation expressed again and again in ancient Jewish liturgy. The point in history at which that restoration will take place remains the secret of the Father [see: F.F. Bruce, Commentary on the Book of the Acts (Grand Rapids, 1954), 38.] . . . Jesus' answer is not a rebuke of the Apostles' hope; it is, rather, a discouragement of Messianic calculations (see Luke 17:20–21)."

68. Elaine Murphy, "Gerard Manley Hopkins: a legacy to the twentieth century," delivered at the Annual General Meeting of The Hopkins International Summer School, *Studies*, vol. 86, no. 344 (1997): <www.gerardmanleyhopkins.org>; accessed on December 12, 2007: "Hopkins' youthful interest in Architecture and Art; his earlier training in sketching and the influence of Ruskin had taught him a way of observing and seeing. Central to his poetry was *Inscape*, a word which he himself coined to refer to the significant elements which unified and gave its subject its character and form."

CONCLUSION

1. Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 194.
2. Adolfo Nicolás, "Christianity in Crisis: Asia. Which Asia? Which Christianity? Which Crisis?" *Concilium* (2005/3): 64–70; 70.
3. William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," from <http://www.cs.rice.edu/~ssiyer/minstrels/poems/289.html>; accessed on October 31, 2007.
4. William Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault," in *The Later Foucault*, ed. Jeremy Moss (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998) 108–128, 122 in Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199.
5. Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199, 202.
6. von Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 201.
7. Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault," in Pinto, "The More Which Exceeds Us," 199.
8. Brück, "A Theology of Multiple Religious Identity," 191.
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