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Troels Engberg-Pedersen
Cosmology and Self in the
Apostle Paul

The Material Spirit

COSMOLOGY AND SELF IN THE APOSTLE PAUL

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TROELS ENGBERG-PEDERSEN

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For
Dale B. Martin
il miglior fabbro

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Preface

This book attempts to synthesize what can be known of Paul's overall world-view, not least to be understood in concrete, cosmological terms, and to connect his world-view with his notion of self as this emerges in his accounts of his own conversion. What binds together world-view and self in Paul is a constant focus on body and bodiliness. Building on an earlier work that I edited, entitled *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (2001), the book argues that Paul's world-view, which is certainly a Jewish, 'apocalyptic' one, can be more fully understood when one sees that parts of it are also spelled out by Paul in terms of Greco-Roman philosophical cosmology, in particular that of Stoicism. For instance, in both Paul and the Stoics a material, bodily notion of *pneuma* ('spirit') plays a central role. The book thus presents the other side of the coin that I introduced in another earlier work, *Paul and the Stoics* (2000). Where that work focused exclusively on cognitive schemes in Paul derived, so I argued, from Stoic ethics, the present book makes a similar case by focusing on bodies and a material world-view. In this way it complements the earlier work and constitutes a kind of sequel to it. However, the book also stands completely on its own feet and any relevant connections—such as seeing the cognitive and the material aspects precisely as two sides of the very same coin—are fully explained where they come up.

The book has had a long gestation. It began in the spring of 2001 when I spent a sabbatical as a Fulbright Scholar at Yale Divinity School and began to study Paul's language on the body. I also spent a considerable amount of time on its ideas in 2003–7 as part of a research project on 'Philosophy at the Roots of Christianity' generously sponsored by the Danish Research Council for the Humanities. Here I had the extremely fruitful opportunity of discussing the issues in a small group of cooperating scholars: Henrik Tronier from the Department of Biblical Exegesis, and the two Ph.D. (now postdoc) students, Gitte Buch-Hansen and Stefan Nordgaard Svendsen. I am most grateful to all of them for what I learned during these conversations. The book was finally written in its present form in 2008–9, when I again had research leave, this time as part of a major project on 'Naturalism and Christian Semantics' (2008–13) that has been generously sponsored as a 'Centre of Excellence' by the University of Copenhagen. I thank the Rector

of the University for this opportunity, and my 'co-principal investigator', Niels Henrik Gregersen, and the various graduate students attached to the Centre for stimulating discussions that have helped to sharpen my thinking on all relevant issues.

During the first decade of this century I have given papers in a number of places on issues pertaining directly to this book: the British New Testament Conference in Manchester (September 2001); conferences in Oslo (October 2001), Helsinki (August 2003), again Oslo (November 2004), Jena (September 2006), Aarhus (January 2007), and Rome (April 2008); guest lectures at King's College London (March 2002, hosted by Judith Lieu), in Durham, UK (March 2006, hosted by John Barclay), and Aberdeen (May 2006, hosted by Francis Watson); at various meetings in the spring of 2007 and May 2008 of a research project led by Turid Karlsen Seim at the Centre for Advanced Study in Oslo, of which I was fortunate to be a member; the annual conference of the Society of New Testament Studies in Lund (August 2008); and more. Papers directly relevant to this book were also given at the annual meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature in Philadelphia (November 2005), Washington, DC (November 2006), San Diego (November 2007), and Boston (November 2008). I am grateful to all those who have listened and reacted to my various attempts on these occasions, not least to Stanley Stowers with whom I have been discussing issues of 'practice' over all these years.

As I said, the idea of focusing on Paul and the body began to take form at Yale in the spring of 2001. I had the wonderful chance then to get to know the 'new Yale' in the field of the New Testament in the form of Harry Attridge, Adela and John Collins, Judith Gundry, and a new group of splendid Ph.D. students—all of whom reminded me of my first stay at Yale in the autumn of 1988, which led to my earlier book on *Paul and the Stoics*. One person, in particular, has stood out to me at the 'new Yale': Dale Martin. This is not only because he had written the book on *The Corinthian Body* (1995) which, I am sure, made me see in the first place the general importance of the body to Paul, but also because our acquaintance, which had begun already in the 1990s when he came to Copenhagen on several occasions, led to further visits to Copenhagen through the next decade, beginning with a Fulbright Professorship at the Department of Biblical Exegesis in Copenhagen in the momentous autumn of 2001. Martin and I have been discussing Paul endlessly over all these years and we shall never agree with regard to philosophy and Paul. It remains a fact, however, that

I am constantly learning from his theoretical sophistication and enormously grateful to him for the willingness with which he has brought the best of his great country to our shores. As a small token of this gratitude, I dedicate the book to him.

Troels Engberg-Pedersen

Copenhagen
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Introduction

Wittgenstein famously took as the starting point for his analysis of the notion of ‘seeing as’ in the *Philosophical Investigations* an intriguing drawing of the head of an animal, the *R-D Head*. Looked at from one perspective, it shows the head of a *rabbit*. Looked at from another perspective, it shows the head of a duck. But what is being looked at is one and the same drawing.

This book argues that we need to introduce a similar double perspective on Paul. On the one hand, there is a basically metaphorical or, if not metaphorical, then at least cognitive way of understanding Paul’s language. On the other hand, there is a non-metaphorical, concrete and basically physical—or as I shall call it, cosmological—way of understanding that language. The book argues that in very many cases, the metaphorical understanding should be exchanged for the non-metaphorical one. In many cases, however, a cognitive reading should be kept in place—but then also as supplemented by a non-metaphorical and concretely physical one. But it is one and the same Pauline expression or phrase that should receive both readings. What differ are, to begin with, our ways of seeing that expression as employing those different types of language.

Take as an example the central Pauline idea of ‘being in Christ’. If one is unhappy (as I am) with operating with a purely metaphorical sense of this expression in Paul, and even more with calling it ‘mystical’, one may legitimately attempt to spell it out in cognitive terms on the basis of what Paul says in the immediate context of any given use of the phrase. Here it may stand, for instance, for seeing oneself as belonging to the group of people who are in a fundamental way marked—and here again in cognitive terms—by their relationship with Christ. However, ‘being in Christ’ may also be understood in purely physical terms. Here it will mean having one’s body, which is literally informed by the physical ‘spirit’ (pneuma), be a material part of Christ, who is himself pneuma. Or it may mean having one’s body be a material part of the ‘body of Christ’, which is itself made up of the physical pneuma, too. The book argues that for an adequate reading of Paul we need

to have both the cognitive and the purely physical perspectives in place far more often than we are accustomed to thinking.

Is this kind of double perspective on the Pauline text only ours? Does it not have any actual foothold in the text itself? It certainly does. The argument of the book is that both aspects form an intrinsic part of what Paul actually meant to say. In this respect the two aspects differ from all other perspectives of a modern kind which may also—and quite legitimately—be applied to the Pauline text, whether they be sociological, anthropological, political, psychological, literary, or whatever. The cognitive and the concretely cosmological readings are together required for a full and adequate interpretation in very many cases where readers of Paul are used to adopting a cognitive reading only, or even to finding only metaphors in what he is saying.

That was the first overall profile of the book. The next is that it operates with a distinctly philosophical approach to the Pauline texts. It is an exercise in what I call ‘philosophical exegesis’. This means that it is constantly looking for ways of making sense of what Paul is saying in terms of the best available concepts, concepts that articulate a defensible world-view. ‘Philosophy’ is here understood as a discipline that seeks the best defensible answers to questions of the form ‘What is . . . ?’. It is concerned with the fundamental shape of the world in the broadest sense, as this is accessible to human reasoning.

This approach is also in fact adopted when readers of Paul apply the many modern methodological perspectives that have enriched our understanding of Paul over the last thirty to forty years. For these all build—though often only implicitly—on philosophical accounts of the world, in the sense of modern theories of what the world is actually like, whether one is looking at the Pauline texts as literature (e.g. ‘What is a text?’) or as input in social history (e.g. ‘What is the shape of social phenomena?’) or in any other way among those that are currently available. One might also say that even more traditional exegetical readings of Paul are in fact philosophical in this sense since they at least presuppose as valid certain ways of thinking about what the world is actually like—only here this philosophical component is almost never brought to light. Instead, it is just presupposed.

The challenge issued by philosophical exegesis is a double one: first, that interpreters should always attempt to articulate the broader conceptual framework (world-view) within which they are operating, and second, that they (we) are under a constant obligation to try to find the best defensible framework within which to operate. This challenge is a hard one, and I am fully aware that I do not myself live up to it very convincingly in the present

book. Ideally, it requires that interpreters of Paul become philosophers in their own right, or at least that we all do our very best to acquire as solid and defensible a world-view as possible—as it were before we try to articulate what Paul himself was talking about.

I will take up this challenge explicitly in the second half of the book (Chs. 5–6), where I will lean on a couple of modern thinkers, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, whose relevant ideas on the ‘habitus’ and ‘subjectification’ I consider to be philosophically defensible in their own right. In the first four chapters, we shall do the same, but here rather by drawing on certain philosophical ideas that are derived from the ancient world itself, in particular from Stoicism. There is an important distinction here in that whereas the ideas we shall adopt from Bourdieu and Foucault are—as I take it—valid in themselves, the ideas to be introduced from Stoic cosmology, physics, and philosophy of mind are not, certainly not those from cosmology and physics. Still, in bringing in this material, we will be doing philosophical exegesis in the sense that we shall try to show that Paul’s various claims may in fact be adequately and illuminatingly interpreted in the light of a conceptuality that is a philosophical one. Only, here it is philosophy contemporary with Paul himself that is brought in as an analytical tool—with the consequence that what is said in those terms will not immediately be valid in itself. Philosophical exegesis of both kinds constitutes the second main profile of the book.

‘I cannot think of anybody in antiquity who spoke so much about the body as Paul did.’ This observation, which was made several years ago by Wayne Meeks, has stuck in my mind. I believe that Meeks is right that Paul was almost obsessed with the body, and certainly not just the ‘fleshly’ body as something to be subdued; rather, his thought as a whole was focused on bodiliness. Thus it is a main aim of the present book to try to work out all the different ways in which bodiliness is an intrinsic part of everything Paul says on the *other* side of the fleshly body, that is, in Christ believers who, like Paul himself, had precisely left behind the world of the fleshly body. In Paul’s view, these people were just as bodily as anybody else, only in quite different ways. Focus on the body constitutes the third main profile of the book.

In Chapter 1 we shall develop the ontology of Paul’s notion of *pneuma* (‘spirit’) by analysing the cosmology that appears to be invoked in his account in 1 Corinthians 15 of the specific (ontological) shape of the resurrection body, the ‘pneumatic’ body. We shall find that Paul understood the *pneuma* as a through and through material, bodily phenomenon. We shall also situate him in relation to Greco–Roman philosophy of his own day. In two Alexandrian Jewish

Hellenistic writers who were slightly earlier than Paul, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* and Philo, we find a first-century BCE/CE, incipient interest in and influence from Plato that eventually issued in first- to second-century CE ‘Middle Platonism’. Something a little bit like that can be found in Paul, too. But we shall see that his basic, philosophical reference point was materialistic and monistic Stoicism—which indeed was importantly present in the two other writers, too—rather than immaterialistic and dualistic Platonism, which in Philo’s case, at least, had the upper hand.

Chapter 2 takes the materialistic understanding of the resurrection body and the *pneuma* into the broader field of all the genuine Pauline letters (apart from the letter to Philemon), from 1 Thessalonians, over Galatians, 1–2 Corinthians, and Philippians to Romans. Do we find signs of the same understanding there, for example, in Philippians 3 and 2 Corinthians 4–5? How is the *pneuma*—on such an understanding—related to Christ? And how to God? Furthermore, if believers have in fact received the *pneuma* literally and cosmologically from above already in the present life as a ‘first instalment’, then when and how did that happen? Finally, once believers have it, does it play a role also in their address to God in the other direction, in prayer? All through this, we shall be trying to get as clear a view—and in quite mundane, philosophical terms—of the cosmology that Paul is presupposing and drawing upon in his *ad hoc* remarks on these various issues.

In Chapter 3 we shall extend our interest in Paul’s world-view even further and try to sort out the philosophical relationship between the different types of superhuman entities that people Paul’s world. In addition to the material *pneuma*, Christ, and God, there also were demons of various sorts, including Satan. And in addition to speaking in physical terms, Paul also speaks in cognitive terms about these entities, and indeed in personal terms, which are certainly not the least important. How does all that go together? Is it possible to hold these superficially very different ways of speaking together within a single, coherent world-view? Or should we leave Paul with a world-view that is even more incoherent than in most others? We shall see that some of the problems here are self-created, as if there were some necessary inconsistency in speaking about certain figures such as demons in both physical and personal terms. In addition, we shall see that Paul focuses on cognition in a manner that allows for both the physical and the personal ways of speaking while also giving pride of place to the kind of relationship of human beings with superhuman figures that is cognitive.

This point is developed in Chapter 4, where we shall focus on a specific issue that lies at the heart of the relationship between human beings and the

‘powers’ of the world: the extent to which human beings are subject to the governance of those powers or—quite the opposite—free in relation to them. Here, too, we shall employ philosophical input—in this case the reflection on human freedom to be found in Paul’s near-contemporary, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus—to show that in human beings, who precisely have the capacity for cognition, the superficially hard and fast contrast between subjection and freedom breaks down. We shall see that this point, which I, for one, consider valid in itself philosophically, fits Paul’s own handling of the issue, too.

With Chapter 5 we shall extend our investigation in another direction, which constitutes something of a change of gear. In the first four chapters we have been concerned with Paul’s overall world-view as seen from the outside and as we may gather it from this or the other particular passage irrespective of the role the passage plays within the text itself to which it belongs. This, of course, is not good enough if our ultimate goal is first and foremost—as it is—to understand better the Pauline text itself. In Chapters 5–6 we shall make up for this lack. We shall consider how the various features we have discovered of Paul’s objective cosmology enter into three themes that belong directly to the level of the Pauline text itself. The three themes are (1) Paul’s accounts of his own conversion experience (including his reception of the *pneuma*), (3) the picture he gives of the way his addressees should similarly be structured both mentally and physically, and in between these two themes, (2) that of the way in which (in his so-called ‘moral exhortation’, *paraenesis*) Paul brings about the latter result (3) through his letter-writing itself on the basis of his self-account (1). In connection with all three themes, which focus on the subjective perspective from the inside out, we shall see that Paul nevertheless does presuppose and introduce central features of his overall world-view into his development of these themes. Here the objective, cosmological world-view and the subjective experience of the world are combined.

In arguing for these claims in Chapter 5, we shall make use of three concepts that are contested in modern philosophy. The notions of ‘religious experience’ and ‘self’ (both to be used in analysing Paul’s self-accounts) are generally contested, that of ‘*habitus*’ (to be used both in connection with Paul and the addressees) is only locally accepted. I shall present an understanding of the three concepts that will, it is hoped, be accepted as an adequate tool for analysing Paul in the way I intend all through: as showing his thought to make sense philosophically, even where we cannot (necessarily) accept it as part of our own world-view.

In Chapter 6 we shall summarize our findings under the rubrics of the double perspective of cognitive and physical analysis; of Paul's attempt to articulate a new habitus for himself and his addressees as seen in relation to others that were available in his immediate context (in particular, a Hellenistic Jewish one and a Greco-Roman philosophical one); and finally, of his idea of his own letter-writing as a case of bodily, missionary practice.

With the kind of philosophical approach that has been sketched, will the proposed reading of Paul also be theologically relevant to readers who may have that particular kind of interest in the apostle? My own answer will be a ringing 'Yes'. What I aim to provide in the book is a coherent reading of Paul that reflects the best available conceptual tools for understanding the world, both his and ours. If the operation is successful, it will lay bare what sides of Paul's own thought we must ourselves roundly reject and what other sides may by contrast constitute an 'option for us' (in the phrase of the British philosopher Bernard Williams), at least when they are duly reformulated *analogically* to take account of the fact that in Paul himself they go closely together with those other sides that do not constitute such an option. I cannot see otherwise than that clarity about this whole issue is of the utmost importance theologically.

A word about the book's organization: the six chapters are to be understood in their character and presentation as 'double lectures'. I constantly aim to clarify to readers where we are going and I also provide copious translations of the texts to be discussed that will enable readers to follow the argument without having too much relevant knowledge beforehand. (In the endnotes, by contrast, I write for fellow scholars, giving further references, arguing certain issues, and discussing interpretative options.) I should perhaps warn readers that they are in for quite an amount of actual interpretation of particular Pauline texts. In fact, several crucial texts (e.g. Philippians 3 and Romans 7–8) will come up for repeated discussion in different chapters. It is important to emphasize, however, that the book is not one of ordinary exegesis. Instead, I am repeatedly putting pressure on some of the same texts in order to see how they come out in relation to the various systematic issues addressed in the different chapters.

This procedure can be fairly easily defended. Paul was not a philosopher (and certainly not a Stoic). I argue that he did think philosophically more often than is regularly recognized and also that he presupposed a number of broadly philosophical ways of thinking. But the character of his writing is practical rather than theoretical (here he is not unlike Seneca in his letters or

Epictetus in his discourses), and this fact combined with the sheer urgency of his writing means that the various purple passages are filled to the brim with content to such an extent that sorting out all the strands requires repeated careful consideration.

This leads to a further point about the understanding of Paul that is being articulated throughout this book. The book addresses both ideas (primarily in Chs. 1–4) and bodily practices (primarily in Chs. 5–6) in Paul. This should not be understood, however, as if these were two separate or separable entities that might then be brought together in some kind of synthesis. Rather, as Chapter 5 will show, the ideas (as we may still call them) are ideas *of* or *in* the body; they are body-experienced ‘ideas’ (or in fact the cognitive content of a Bourdieuesque habitus) that have their full meaning only as part of bodily experiences. In Paul, more than anywhere else, the supposed gap between ‘ideas’ and ‘practices’ is non-existent.

1

A Stoic Understanding of the Pneuma and Resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15

LOOKING FOR A REAL WORLD-VIEW

Rudolf Bultmann—the most distinguished New Testament scholar of the twentieth century—famously argued that in order to make use of the New Testament texts in our own time, one had to discard the ancient world-views reflected in them, since these had been completely overturned by the achievements of modern science. Instead, one should focus on the ‘existential’ claims of the ancient texts. Although these claims were made within the terms of the ancient world-views, they might—self-identically—be reformulated in more adequate, modern terms.¹ Bultmann’s proposal, which attacked head-on a real, hermeneutical problem in the modern use of the ancient texts, had the unfortunate consequence of directing scholarly interest away from the superseded world-views themselves. Why spend too much time on them if they were in any case to be discarded?

Later, for instance in Bultmann’s very influential pupil, Ernst Käsemann, the ancient world-view was reinstalled as an important category for the interpretation of the early Christian texts, but now in the form of Jewish ‘apocalypticism’, which Käsemann famously took to be ‘the mother of Christian theology’.² According to Käsemann, however, ‘apocalypticism’ was not just one world-view among others. It was, as it were, a specifically religious world-view, one in which the battle over the world between God and the evil powers was being fought. Thus, for instance, when Käsemann used the term ‘cosmic’, he did not intend it in the sense of ‘cosmological’, as pointing to some construal of the actual world that might be placed at the same level as and compared with other such construals. Rather, it captured a particular, religious or even theological, understanding of the world that stood in a category of its own.³

In this and the next two chapters, we shall be going in the opposite direction of both Bultmann and Käsemann. Against Bultmann, we shall make the Pauline world-view our focus and try to get as clear a picture of it as possible. Paul never provides a detailed account of his world-view. Neither do most of us. However, by trying to tie together snippets of information that he does give and seeing them in the light of broadly contemporary ideas that they seem to reflect, we shall become able to articulate the basic shape of the Pauline world.

With Käsemann and his followers we shall accept that Paul's world-view is indeed deeply indebted to what we call Jewish 'apocalypticism', which is the mother of Pauline theology, too.⁴ Nobody who has read, for instance, the account given in 1 Corinthians 15 of the resurrection events can doubt that (15:51–2, NRSV):⁵ '(51) Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, (52) in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.' Moreover, if we decide that the Pauline concept of the *pneuma* ('spirit') is also an apocalyptic one, which would make very good sense in itself, then, as we shall see, Paul's thought becomes 'apocalyptic' through and through. However, we should reject the suggestion that an 'apocalyptic' world-view was—almost by theological definition—different in type from any other world-view in the ancient world, whether 'scientific', 'philosophical', 'magical', or something else. On the contrary, 'world-view' is a slippery term and, just because of its slipperiness, it is more likely than not that all kinds of world-view in antiquity would lie within the same pool, ranging from the simpler world-views of traditional folklore to ever more 'scientifically' or 'philosophically' developed world-views among the technical experts of the ancient world (astronomers and philosophers who wrote about 'nature' or the 'cosmos').⁶ One idea in particular we should resist: that Paul's world-view was, as it were *beforehand*, unique and different in kind—for the theological reason that it reflected *the* proper understanding of God, *our* God. Instead, we should try to see it as one among others, to look carefully at what is concretely being said in the Pauline letters about his world-view and to keep our minds open for any kind of comparison with Paul's many contexts that may help us ascertain what his world actually looked like.

There is no doubt that Paul's world-view was focused on God and what he had done and would do. This does not in the least set him apart from so many others in antiquity. Still, Paul's various statements on this topic have

traditionally been brought together by theologians to provide a more or less coherent picture of Paul's understanding of what has then been called the 'history of salvation', a term that immediately distinguishes this type of 'history' from any other.⁷ We shall begin from a brief summary of the main shape of Paul's picture of the history of salvation since we need to have it in front of us. It constitutes an understanding of the world that is undoubtedly there in Paul. But we must not absolutize it for theological purposes. Next we shall analyse what Paul says of certain basic features in that picture (the resurrection, the judgement, the understanding of God himself and Christ and of God's will), always with the aim of making what he says come out as being as concrete and immediately intelligible as possible. For this purpose we shall bring in a range of material from ancient philosophical texts that helps to give a more precise meaning to Paul's statements. What we want to avoid are large, theological gestures. What we want to get, by contrast, are as many precise particulars of a concrete world-view as possible.

A 'HISTORY OF SALVATION'

Paul's earliest surviving letter—the one to the Thessalonians—in many ways provides the best entry into his thought world.⁸ The Thessalonians have, so Paul says quite early in the letter (1:9–10), '(9) . . . turned towards God from idols to serve a living and true God (10) and to wait for his son from the heavens, whom he raised from the dead: Jesus, who rescues us from the wrath to come.' This early text states the events that also constitute Paul's central claim: that Jesus was raised from the dead; that he is now present in heaven; that he will return from heaven; and that he will save believers from (God's) wrath. In addition, the text states Paul's central, underlying claim about God: that he is a 'living' God, that is, one who is concretely active in the world (as is already made clear in v. 10), and the one 'true' God, that is, one who has no *other* gods to compete with since they are merely 'idols' and only wrongly taken to be gods. God's agency and his superiority to the other gods are themes to which we shall return.

Later in the same letter Paul spells out his central claim about Jesus (4:13–17, NRSV with one change):

(13) But we do not want you to be uninformed, brothers, about those who have died, so that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope. (14) For since we believe

that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have died. (15) For this we declare to you by the word of the Lord, that we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord, will by no means precede those who have died. (16) For the Lord himself, with a cry of command, with the archangel's call and with the sound of God's trumpet, will descend from heaven, and the dead in Christ will rise first. (17) Then we who are alive, who are left, will be caught up in the clouds together with them to meet the Lord in the air; and so we will be with the Lord for ever.

This passage captures perfectly the flavour of so-called 'apocalyptic' thinking, speaking as it does in highly graphic terms—the call, the trumpet, etc.—of the 'return' (the *parousia*, 'presence' or 'arrival') of the Lord. For our purposes, two points should be noted. First, in terms of its content, the passage is about the rescue from God's wrath announced back in 1:10, which takes the form of bringing believers—whether already dead or still living—into a state of eternal life together with the Lord 'in the air'. (By contrast, as Paul goes immediately on to say of non-believers: 'When they say, "There is peace and security", then sudden destruction will come upon them, as labour pains come upon a pregnant woman, and there will be no escape!', 5:3, NRSV.) Second, in terms of its 'ontology' in the vague sense of the world-view that it reflects, one might initially consider it to consist of a curious mixture of a 'mythic metaphor' in v. 16 (the trumpet) and a rudimentary 'cosmology' in v. 17 (the air). However, that would go against our basic methodological approach. Instead, we should—initially, at least—attempt to take everything wholly literally, the trumpet no less than the air. Later we shall discuss in some detail exactly how this literal cosmology should be understood.

After the passage just quoted and some intense—and characteristically 'apocalyptic'—verses on when to expect the Lord's return (5:1–6), Paul summarizes the picture we have already been given in the two quoted passages, after having enjoined the Thessalonians to 'put on the helmet of faith and love and as a headcovering hope for salvation' (5:8). Here is 5:9–10 (NRSV): '(9) For God has destined us *not for wrath* but for obtaining *salvation through* our Lord *Jesus Christ*, (10) who *died for us*, so that *whether we are awake or asleep* we may [come to] *live [together] with him*.'⁹ The neatness of this summary—indicated by my italics—is striking. It suggests that already in this early letter Paul had a fairly clearly worked out picture of the Christ event, both its theological purpose and its cosmological form.

One more element in Paul's 'apocalyptic' world-view receives some emphasis already in 1 Thessalonians. At 3:13 he prays that God may 'strengthen

your hearts (to be) blameless in holiness *in front of God*, our Father, at the *parousia* of our Lord, Jesus, with all his holy ones'. And at 5:23 he prays that 'the God *of peace*' (as opposed to wrath) may 'make you holy all through and that your spirit (*pneuma*), your soul (*psychē*), and your body (*sōma*) may be kept blameless at the *parousia* of our Lord, Jesus Christ'. In both texts the reference to blamelessness and holiness plays on the judgement that will take place as part of the final events.

In these very simple quotations from Paul's earliest letter we have the whole basic system of his 'salvation historical' world-view from the moment of Christ's death and resurrection to the final salvation of believers. Later in this chapter and in the one to follow we shall analyse a number of passages in other letters that describe the individual elements of the system in more detail: 1 Corinthians 15 on Christ's resurrection and that of believers, including the specific form the latter will take; 2 Cor. 5:1–10 on the same theme and that of the final judgement; and Romans 1–8 on God's wrath, which God has himself exchanged for his gift (*charis*, 'mercy'). In all these passages we shall see how Paul attempts to fill in the basic, 'apocalyptic' and rudimentarily cosmological account given in 1 Thessalonians by drawing on material from his philosophical context. Fundamentally, however, the overall picture remains the same as it was, including its basic point: that at the *parousia* only believers will be saved in the very concrete and wholly literal sense that *they will live on* in the upper regions of the cosmos, while all others will be destroyed and die. That is pure 'apocalypticism' that goes back, at least, to Dan. 12:2–3 (NRSV): '(2) Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. (3) Those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the sky, and those who lead many to righteousness, like the stars for ever and ever.' As we shall see, however, Paul also fills it in philosophically.

A story of the world from the moment of Jesus' death and resurrection onwards does not constitute a full 'salvation history'. Due to his struggle with fellow Jews over the role of the Mosaic law after the coming of Christ, Paul felt forced to try to construct a picture also of God's dealings with mankind (or at least with the Jews) *before* Christ, as these dealings were witnessed by the Jewish scripture. That can be seen in his letter to the Galatians and is repeated with variations in his letter to the Romans. For polemical reasons, and because the law of Moses had such a central place in the imagination of his fellow Jews, he chose to play down its role and partly almost to denigrate it. Instead, wanting—in a move that is also on record for Jesus (see e.g. Mark

7 and 10)—to play up a figure that was *earlier* than Moses and *better* than him, Paul focused on Abraham. That already gave him the basic props for a ‘salvation history’ that reached far back from Christ: to Moses and then to Abraham. We see this in the central chapters (3–4) of his letter to the Galatians, where the basic issue precisely concerns the question of whether or not to follow the Mosaic law with respect to practices that traditionally separated Jews from non-Jews, not least circumcision (cf. Gal. 5:3). No, says Paul. For Abraham had prefigured what later happened through Christ (3:6–29). But then, in Romans where for reasons of his own Paul once more addressed the theme of the law, he added Adam to his salvation historical scheme (Rom. 5:12–21), in a move that probably derived from the fundamental contrast of Adam and Christ that he had at that time already drawn in 1 Cor. 15:21–2, 45–9.

That yields the whole of Paul’s salvation historical picture. With Adam, sin and death came into the world (cf. 1 Cor. 15:21–2 and 55–6; Rom. 5:12–14). Abraham, however, stood out long before the Mosaic law was given as a future ‘type’ for Christ-believers, to whom salvation would be granted from faith (like Abraham’s) and without the law (Romans 4, taking up Galatians 3). Then came the law, which only served, however, to exacerbate the situation of living under sin and death (Rom. 3:20, 4:15, 5:20, taking up Galatians 3–4 and eventually resolved in Rom. 7:1–8:13). And then came Christ (cf. Rom. 3:21), who died ‘for us’ (1 Thess. 5:10) or ‘for our sins’ (Gal. 1:4), with the result that Christ-believers will no longer die, but will live (eternally, ‘in the air’, etc.). Down (Adam) and up (Abraham) and down (Moses) and up (Christ): but from now on it will only be up—to such a degree that even those Jews who do not at present accept Jesus as the Christ will eventually be saved (Romans 9–11).

We have only given here a superficial sketch of the general shape of Paul’s salvation historical picture. As will be immediately clear to anyone who knows the texts referred to, the picture is something of a harmonized and slightly systematized version of a set of ideas that are not always set forth clearly, explicitly, and coherently by Paul. Instead, they enter in many quite contorted ways into his immediate line of argumentation, which is directly focused on his rhetorical purposes: where for reasons of his own he wishes to bring his addressees. Still, it is valid to ascribe to Paul, on the basis of his last letter (the one to the Romans), an overall picture like the one sketched here of the development of the world vis-à-vis salvation, a development that is engineered by God and to be understood as a change from death to life.¹⁰

In the next chapter we shall consider what may be gleaned from the Pauline text concerning the kind of world-view that underlies the first half (that of death) of his salvation historical scheme. Meanwhile, we should at least note that Paul saw all of this as genuine history, fully on a par with any other kind of history in the ancient world that worked, for instance, with the idea of a fall of humankind from an original ‘golden age’ into gradually more and more miserable ages.¹¹ Adam, Abraham, Moses, and Christ were all real people who felt and acted in the ways described by Paul. And death did come into the world with the first of them, only eventually to be overcome by the last in the line. We shall come back to all that. In the remainder of this chapter, however, our main focus will be on the second half of the scheme—that of life. Since it is this half that bears the brunt of Paul’s argument, as we saw already in 1 Thessalonians, it is also here that he is most specific about the overall world-view that underlies his ‘history of salvation’.

MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PAULINE PNEUMA

In order to get us nearer to the general cosmology that seems to underlie Paul’s thought, we shall focus particularly on his understanding of the *pneuma* (‘spirit’), a concept that—as soon as one has spotted it—appears to be everywhere in Paul. In the rest of this chapter we shall discuss in some detail 1 Corinthians 15, in which Paul addresses the question with what body believers will be resurrected. His famous answer is that it will be a body (*sōma*) that is ‘pneumatic’ (or ‘spiritual’), a *sōma pneumatikon*, and not a more normal body of flesh and blood, which he calls a ‘psychic’ body, a *sōma psychikon*. Our guiding question will be how we should understand the *sōma pneumatikon*, and hence the *pneuma*. The answer to this question will turn out to have huge consequences for everything else we should say about Paul. To bring that out is the topic of the rest of this book.

The most common assumption among scholars is probably that Paul’s use of *pneuma* reflects either a Hebrew Bible framework—going back to God’s ‘spirit’ in Genesis 1 that swept over the waters (1:2)—or else an ‘apocalyptic’ one that hangs on the idea that God will eventually infuse his ‘spirit’ into those who are to be saved.¹² Here key references will be to Ezekiel 36:26–7, Isaiah 44:1–5, and Joel 3:1–5. This view depends heavily on one of the

dichotomies that we should do our utmost to avoid getting entangled in: the dichotomy between properly 'Jewish' ideas and non-Jewish, Greco-Roman ideas. In this connection, let it be clearly said already here that we should not for a moment doubt that Paul's talk of the *pneuma* is in a general way heavily indebted to his specifically Jewish tradition. What is wrong is the dichotomy.

The dichotomic view is strongly present in one of the classic—and in itself extremely informative—accounts of the ancient concept of *pneuma* by Kleinknecht, Baumgärtel, Bieder, and Schweizer (1959) in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*.¹³ Most often this view is then assumed to imply that Paul's use of *pneuma* will therefore differ from a philosophical understanding of it—since (Greco-Roman) philosophy almost by definition differs from 'apocalypticism' and the religion of the Hebrew Bible—and also that it is intrinsically wrong to ask for any amount of philosophical precision concerning *pneuma* in Paul: what he actually took it to *be*. This is one front in the traditional thinking about the Pauline *pneuma*. It ties in well with Bultmann's position, from which we began: do not pay too much attention to the question of world-view since that is not what really matters. In fact, it is noteworthy that in Bultmann's magisterial and enormously influential *Theology of the New Testament*, the analysis of the *pneuma*, *including* its role in Paul, is placed *before* the account of Paul proper. Apparently, in Bultmann's view there was in principle not more to be said about Paul's understanding of the *pneuma* than what holds for early Christianity in general.¹⁴

This intimately fits—and probably directly reflects—the interpretation of the *pneuma* proposed as early as 1888 by Hermann Gunkel in his classic book on 'The Effects of the Holy Spirit According to the Popular View of the Apostolic Times and the Doctrine of the Apostle Paul'. Here Gunkel wished to connect Paul's understanding of the *pneuma* with the 'popular view' of the other early Christians. Interestingly, but problematically, Gunkel also wished to emphasize the experiential character of the *pneuma* among early Christians. And he *contrasted* this with views on the *pneuma* in the Hebrew Bible or Hellenistic Judaism.¹⁵ Here, then, we have another dichotomy (between Judaism and Christianity), which gives the impression that—according to the early Christians, at least, if not to Gunkel himself—the *pneuma* erupted more or less out of nowhere. Or perhaps not quite out of *nowhere*. For in Paul, Gunkel claims, the *pneuma* is a divine power that is 'supernatural' and 'transworldly'.¹⁶ However, this only yields yet another

dichotomy—now between the ‘supernatural’ and the ‘natural’—that is even more problematic.¹⁷

Other claims of Gunkel’s were far more on target. For instance, he took it that the pneuma was conceived as a material phenomenon in the early church and in Paul.¹⁸ And he also strongly argued that in Paul, as against the early Christians more generally, the pneuma was understood to direct the whole life of believers.¹⁹

What we see in Gunkel, then, is a curious mixture of perspicacity and dichotomic thinking. What surprises most is his insistence on the uniqueness of the pneuma to the early church as reflected in its texts. After all, was not Gunkel one of the fathers of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* who should have delighted in contextual comparisons?

Another front than the pro-Jewish, or in Gunkel’s case pro-Christian, anti-philosophical one takes it that if one were to align Paul with some kind of philosophical understanding of the pneuma, it would have to be Platonism. In particular, it would have to be an understanding that saw the pneuma as an immaterial entity issuing from the immaterial God.²⁰ Initially, this claim would appear to be slightly counterintuitive since the term ‘pneuma’ does not make any very strong appearance in Plato.²¹ By contrast, as we shall see in a moment, it lies at the heart of Stoic cosmology. However, so the argument would go, the Pauline pneuma should be explicitly contrasted with a Stoic, material or physicalist understanding of the pneuma, which sees it as something as lowly as a body. And so the best philosophical candidate with which to align it would be Platonism.²²

Few have argued specifically for the view that the Pauline pneuma should be understood along distinctly Platonist lines. What we have here is rather a position that has ancient forebears, apparently starting in the Wisdom of Solomon and coming to full flowering in Philo of Alexandria (see below), from whom it migrated into the church fathers and later tradition. This only goes to show that if, as I shall argue here, Paul’s understanding of the pneuma is in fact much more like the Stoic one, then we are up against a huge, Jewish and Christian, *Platonizing* tradition with roots in the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo—a tradition that has left us with an exceedingly vague and unclear, ‘spiritual’ meaning of the term.

Finally, there is a third front that was articulated in 1995 with gusto by Dale Martin to the effect that the crucial passage of 1 Cor. 15:35–49 shows that Paul probably had a material understanding of the pneuma like most other people in the ancient world, not least philosophers. Thus, at the

eschaton, 'Christians will have bodies without flesh, blood, or soul—composed solely of pneumatic substance—light, airy, luminous bodies' (D. Martin 1995: 132). This, as we shall see, is quite right. And Martin's account, in the major part of his chapter on 1 Corinthians 15, of the contextual background to Paul's argument in 15:35–49 is masterly and a mine of information.²³

Unfortunately, at the very end Martin (*ibid.* 133) slips into a form a dichotomic reading that he, of all people, should have been able to avoid:²⁴ 'Paul . . . was no ancient philosopher or scientist . . . He shares certain physiological and cosmological assumptions with other ancient thinkers; but when push comes to shove, he slips into a discourse of Jewish apocalypticism that would have struck Greek and Roman intellectuals as bizarre in the extreme.' Here Martin gives expression to a dichotomy between Jewish 'apocalypticism' and Greco-Roman philosophy that does seem to underlie his book as a whole. Nobody can criticize Martin for naivety. He sees clearly (on the same page) that 'Paul's language and arguments shift quickly back and forth between Jewish scripture and Greek rhetorical commonplaces, between Jewish apocalyptic and Greco-Roman popular philosophical *topoi*.' Still, 'when push comes to shove', Martin places Paul on the side of 'apocalypticism' in a distinctly non-philosophical—and in fact basically Marxist—reading which turns Paul into a spokesman for the social non-elite over against upper-class members of society, to whom philosophers would in principle belong. Though Paul himself was very well educated, seen from Martin's perspective he spoke from below on behalf of 'common folk' and presupposed their mentalities and perceptions.²⁵ Thus the philosophically sounding, cosmological understanding of the *pneuma* that Martin (*ibid.* 135) has rightly unearthed ends up appearing more and more like a concession: 'The tendency towards cosmic revolution inherent in Paul's apocalypticism must bow to some aspects of cosmological hierarchy. Paul's theology is constrained by his physiology.'

It is curious to note the extent to which the various modern positions on the *pneuma* that we have considered appear to be informed by theological concerns. In the case of the Jewish, Hebrew Bible and/or 'apocalyptic' understanding of the *pneuma*, what lies behind it is the traditional attempt to keep the early Christian writers free of any contagion from Greco-Roman patterns of thought and practice, as if Jewish and Greco-Roman could in this period be kept neatly apart from one another.²⁶ In Gunkel's case, it was rather the attempt (also a traditional one) to keep early Christianity free of

any contagion from Judaism, an attempt that has fortunately come to be seen to be completely wrongheaded. In the Platonizing case, it is the attempt to keep the divine aloof, that is, free of any direct and tangible contact with the world. Finally, while in Martin's case it is the opposite, intrinsically highly commendable, endeavour of placing the divine directly in the world, it also appears that the distinctly unpredictable, 'apocalyptic' and 'folkish' character of the divine on this view, which matches the underlying, Marxist-inspired opposition between lower and upper classes, reflects a traditional opposition of 'religion' to 'philosophy' which is highly problematic in relation to the ancient world. All in all, there is a need for a renewed attempt to situate Paul's talk of the *pneuma* in its broadest possible context while also steering wide as far as possible of dichotomic thinking.

One recent substantial discussion of the *pneuma* in Paul stands somewhat apart from these various trends: Friedrich Wilhelm Horn's magisterial book, *Das Angelnd des Geistes* (1992a). Here, among many other things, Horn helpfully distinguishes between six uses of *pneuma* in Paul:²⁷ a functional one (where the *pneuma* is active in making believers act or speak the way they do),²⁸ a substantive one (when the *pneuma* is said to 'live in' believers),²⁹ a material one (as applied in sacramental contexts),³⁰ a 'hypostasis' use (of the *pneuma* as distinct from God and believers),³¹ a normative one (where the *pneuma* has ethical implications),³² and an anthropological one (where Paul speaks of 'my' or 'your' *pneuma*).³³ The reason why Horn does not fall so clearly into the trap of dichotomic reading is that he is careful to keep apart those various uses without trying to force them into a single mould. Conversely, what one may miss is at least some attempt to hold the different uses together at a sufficiently general level in a single grip.³⁴ For instance, is the Pauline *pneuma* active, that is, does it function in believers, *by* being present as a substance in them? Does it function, and is it substantively present, in them *as* a material entity? If so, is it perhaps in *all* cases an 'anthropological' entity? And is it in this form that it has a normative function, too? Finally, if the answer to all the other questions is positive, how is the *pneuma* in this form related to the *pneuma* as 'hypostasized' and a messenger between God and men? This list of questions in effect provides the agenda for several chapters in the present book. Let us now go directly back to the question of the *pneuma*, 'apocalypticism', and philosophy in connection with the future-facing half of Paul's salvation historical picture.

In the rest of this chapter we shall discover that a Stoic-like, philosophical understanding of the Pauline *pneuma* is what fits the evidence best. We

should insist, however, that there is no intrinsic contrast between such a picture and Hebrew Bible and ‘apocalyptic’ understandings of God and eschatology. On the contrary, in 1 Corinthians 15 Paul sticks to the kind of ‘apocalyptic’ scenario that we have already met in 1 Thessalonians 4. Only, he now also fills it in philosophically and, indeed, Stoically.³⁵ We should also insist that there is no necessary contrast with broader materialist understandings of *pneuma* as reflected, for instance, in the ancient medical writings. After all, it is well known that the fundamental corporeality of Stoicism was to a large degree an articulation of a more popular ontology in the ancient world.³⁶ By contrast, a Platonist reading of the *pneuma* in Paul is excluded. As we shall see, Paul came before that trend in the church fathers, which had only been prepared for by such avant-garde Hellenistic Jews as the author of the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo when they drew upon and helped to articulate the resurgence of Platonism among philosophers that began in the first century BCE. To this extent the views of Gunkel, Martin, and (to some degree) Horn were right: Paul’s world-view—and here his understanding of the *pneuma*—was anything but ‘idealistic’. Instead, it was materialistic, concrete, and tangible.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT: CICERO ON PNEUMA AND GOD

We need to take stock of a few items in Paul’s philosophical environment that will turn out to be directly relevant to his analysis of the resurrection body in 1 Corinthians 15. We may begin from what appears to have been *the* orthodox philosophical understanding of theology and cosmology around 50 BCE, the Stoic one reported by Cicero in *De Natura Deorum* Book 2.³⁷

The Stoic cosmos was constituted by a hierarchical *scala naturae* within a thorough-going materialism (monism). There were the four ‘elements’ (earth, water, air, and fire) and four types of ‘thing’ made out of the elements: inorganic ones, plants, sentient but non-rational animals, and finally human beings. At the top of the *scala* there was an especially ‘mobile and pure’ part of the world, called ‘aether’ in Cicero, which constitutes the matter of heaven and the heavenly bodies: the moon, the stars, and the sun (2.39–41). Though a material element, it was also what gave rise to both perception (*sensus*) and intelligence (*intellegentia*). The heavenly bodies, says Cicero, were themselves

living beings, percipient and intelligent and in fact gods (2.42–3). How, then, should we understand the aether? From Cicero's account it is clear that it is something 'hot and translucent' (since this is what the heavenly bodies are themselves said to be: *calida atque perlucida*, 2.39). In fact, it is a form of fire, though in contrast with ordinary fire. Where the latter is 'a destructive agency', the heavenly fire is like 'that which is contained in the bodies of living creatures', which is 'the universal preservative, giving nourishment, fostering growth, sustaining, bestowing sensation' (2.40–1). Elsewhere, the fire that makes up Cicero's aether is called 'designing fire', which 'constitutes the substance of the stars' and is what makes them 'intelligent and prudent'.³⁸ Elsewhere again, this 'designing fire' is identified as *pneuma* that is 'fiery and artistic'.³⁹

The four sublunary types of thing just listed differed not only by the composition of their elements, but also by the way they are kept together. The designing fire was in fact not restricted to a position at the top of the world. Instead, it literally and physically spread downwards as *pneuma* (see 2.23–8). There, too, it accounts for the presence of both perception and intelligence (2.29–30). In human beings its name is 'soul' (*psychē*) and 'reason' (*logos*) or 'mind' (*nous*), respectively. In non-rational animals it is merely 'soul' (*psychē*).⁴⁰ Even further down, the same *pneuma* is responsible for the different types of unity to be found in organic and inorganic objects. In the former its special name was *physis* ('nature'), in the latter *hexis* ('state').⁴¹ This self-identical element, energy, or power (*dynamis*),⁴² which holds together the whole world and everything in it and sustains it and directs its individual life is—viewed as a material entity—the Stoic *pneuma*; viewed more comprehensively as a structuring (but still material) feature of the world, it is Stoic 'Nature' as a whole (*physis*); and viewed more specifically as an intelligent (but still material) power, it is the Stoic *God*.⁴³

In accordance with this general picture, a human being as seen from below was understood as a being with a body (*sōma*), a soul (*psychē*), and with that highest power of the soul (*nous*) which in Philo's rendering of the Stoic view is 'perhaps shared with the more divine natures, too, but among mortal beings is peculiar to man'.⁴⁴ What distinguishes *nous* and *psychē*—and indeed, *physis* and *hexis*—from one another as so many forms of the material *pneuma* is the degree of 'tension' (*tonos*) to be found in either.⁴⁵ In *nous* the tension of the *pneuma* is so strong that it may cover the whole world and reach the stars.⁴⁶ All human beings have *pneuma* with the degree of tension that is required for intelligence. Still, many people go wrong in their

reasoning. For as Cicero has it (2.167), 'no man has ever been great (*magnus*) without having experienced some portion of divine inspiration (or inbreathing: *sine aliquo adflatu divino*)'. That, then, is required for human beings to see completely aright: a particularly strong 'portion' of the pneuma of the stars 'blown into them' from above, which will generate the proper tension in their *nous*.⁴⁷

Two special points should be added to this general picture, one on the fate of the individual human soul after death and one on the eventual fate of the world as a whole. Together they give the basic features of what one might call the Stoic version of a 'history of salvation'.

Like the Platonists, the Stoics said that at death the soul of a human being is separated from the body. The soul would then live on for some time, 'the soul of the virtuous up to the dissolution of everything into fire, that of fools only for certain definite times'.⁴⁸ By 'soul' they meant the so-called commanding-faculty,⁴⁹ the locus of rationality which was both tied to the pneuma in the way we have just noted and also had been 'blended' in the living body with that body's 'cohesive and vegetative (soul) pneuma',⁵⁰ that is, with the body's *hexis* and *physis*. At death, however, the blending would dissolve into its parts and the commanding-faculty would survive in separation from the body, rising 'balloon-like from the corpse'.⁵¹ In the individual, then, death meant separation of the soul from the body, just as Platonists would have it, but with a consistently materialistic interpretation of these events.

It is different in the famous Stoic conflagration of the whole world that will occur from time to time.⁵² Here the matter of the world is rather consumed *into* God. Cicero explains this very concretely as a cosmological process that leads to a state in which 'nothing is left but fire (*ignis*), by which, as a living being *and God*, once again a new world may be created and the ordered universe be restored as before' (*De Natura Deorum* 2.118). Thus the conflagration is to be understood as a change of the whole world into 'flame' (*phlox*, so Cleanthes) or 'light' (*augē*, so Chrysippus).⁵³ Chrysippus even explicitly contrasted what happens at the death of the individual with what happens at the conflagration, when 'the soul of the world [that is, the pneuma] is *not separated* but grows continuously until it has completely *used up* its matter on itself'.⁵⁴ Then, as Seneca says, 'the world is dissolved and the gods have been blended together into one . . . nature comes to a stop for a while' and Zeus 'reposes in himself given over to his thoughts'—until he begins once more to create the world.⁵⁵

In drawing this general picture of the unity and development of the world, we have basically been relying on Cicero. It is a fascinating story, not least because of the wholly concrete way in which it should be understood. Fifty years ago, it inspired the physicist Shmuel Sambursky to a brilliant reconstruction of the *Physics of the Stoics*, in which he celebrated the Stoic doctrine of the dynamic character of the notion of continuity as ‘one of the great original contributions in the history of physical systems, transcending by its implications the boundaries of pure physical thought and anticipating in many respects the approach to continuity which dominated the scientific ideas of Descartes, Huygens, Faraday and Maxwell’.⁵⁶ Not everyone in antiquity, however, was happy with the materialist continuum view of the world. Let us now take note of two dissidents.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT: THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON AND PHILO ON PNEUMA AND GOD

A quarter of a century after Cicero we find in Alexandria a Jewish Hellenistic writer, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, who adopted a number of concepts from the Stoic materialist cosmology but apparently also wanted to reinterpret them in accordance with a Platonic, immaterialist sensibility that had just begun to be articulated precisely in Alexandria.⁵⁷ The beginning of the work shows how the author basically describes its theme, wisdom, in categories directly derived from Stoic accounts of the *pneuma* (*Wis.* 1:6–8, NRSV with my parentheses):

(6) For wisdom is a kindly spirit (*pneuma*), but will not free blasphemers from the guilt of their words; because God is witness of their inmost feelings, and a true observer of their hearts, and a hearer of their tongues. (7) Because the spirit (*pneuma*) of the Lord has *filled the world*, and *that which holds all things together* knows what is said, (8) therefore those who utter unrighteous things will not escape notice, and justice, when it punishes, will not pass them by.

Note here how verse 7 backs up in directly Stoic, ontological terms the claims made in the two surrounding verses that God hears what the unrighteous say, sees what they think, and will punish them for it.

However, in a later passage (7:15–8:1) the author mixes Stoicism and Platonism in a striking manner. Here is part of the passage (Wis 7:22–8:1, NRSV with a change in 29b):

(7:22) There is in her [*sc.* wisdom] a spirit (*pneuma*) that is intelligent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, mobile, clear, unpolluted, distinct, invulnerable, loving the good, keen, irresistible, (23) beneficent, humane, steadfast, sure from anxiety, all-powerful, overseeing all, and penetrating through all spirits that are intelligent, pure, and altogether subtle. (24) For wisdom is more mobile than any motion; because of her pureness she pervades and penetrates all things. (25) For she is a breath (*atmis*) of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty; therefore nothing defiled gains entrance into her. (26) For she is a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of his goodness. (27) Although she is but one, she can do all things, and while remaining in herself, she renews all things; in every generation she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets, (28) for God loves nothing so much as the person who lives with wisdom. (29) She is more beautiful than the sun, and is above any position of the stars. Compared with the light she is found to be superior, (30) for it is succeeded by the night, but against wisdom evil does not prevail. (8:1) She reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and she orders all things well.

Note here that while he continues the Stoicizing practice (see e.g. vv. 22–4),⁵⁸ the author also suddenly brings in a way of describing wisdom that is both distinctly Platonic (v. 26)⁵⁹ and also almost explicitly contrasts wisdom with the Stoic understanding: Wisdom is ‘*more* beautiful than the sun’ and ‘*above* any position of the stars’ (v. 29).⁶⁰ Thus, in spite of the fact that the author starts out thinking in Stoic terms, he aims to add a Platonist perspective—meaning an immaterial one—literally on top of the Stoic picture. While a Stoic picture of wisdom as *pneuma* is used to account for wisdom’s concrete *activity* in the *world* (see 7:24 and 27 and 8:1), a Platonic picture is employed to celebrate wisdom’s *beauty* and divine status as reflecting her relationship with *God* (see 7:25–6). The latter point is precisely what lies behind the author’s claim in 7:29 that wisdom is even *more* beautiful than the sun and consequently has her ontological base *above* any position of the stars. Here Platonism is almost explicitly said to be preferable to Stoicism, on which the author is nevertheless *also* drawing quite heavily.

In a later passage, 13:1–9, he in effect makes clear both his admiration for the Stoics and his distress that since (13:2, NRSV) ‘they supposed that either fire or wind (*pneuma*) or swift air, or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water, or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world’, they were

ignorant of God himself, the master and maker of these beautiful and powerful things, who is himself far better inasmuch as he is the ‘originator of their coming into being’ and indeed ‘created’ them (13:3–4). ‘For from the greatness and beauty of created things, the author of their coming into being is seen by analogy’ (13:5). This they should themselves have realized.

The author’s philosophical position at this point is a curious one since the idea he uses against the Stoics—that they did not see the creator *behind* the beautiful things created—was in fact a Stoic one, used by the Stoics themselves in an argument for the existence of God, as may be seen, for instance, in Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum* 2.33–9 and 57–8. The author’s reversal of this argument suggests that the target of his criticism was not just Stoicism in general, but rather the specific kind of God for which the Stoics argued, namely, a materialist one of the type he describes in 13:2. Instead, he in effect claimed (though not very convincingly since he presupposes what should be proved) that they should have concluded from the beauty of things created to a *Platonic* type of God, namely, the Jewish creator God. It is him they should have seen behind the beautiful things created.

In all this we find—though only in tantalizingly suggestive form—an attempt to fit the Jewish figure of ‘wisdom’ and the Jewish God into a Greek philosophical framework. The result is not just the position we normally identify as ‘Middle Platonism’, in which Stoic and Platonic elements often lie side by side in intricate configurations.⁶¹ Or rather, it *is* that as long as one recognizes that this particular text also aims to make a very specific point. What the author wishes to say is that one may well employ Stoic terminology to describe the way ‘wisdom’ works in the world: God, however, should be understood in Platonist terms, as distinctly opposed to Stoic ones.

This movement from Stoicism to a form of Platonism that continues to rely substantially on Stoic terms and ideas was brought to its first full flowering in the great Philo of Alexandria, who takes us into the time of Jesus and Paul. Philo was generally quite disparaging when speaking of the Stoic views of the world (cosmology) and God (theology). For instance, he in effect describes Abraham’s move away from ‘the Chaldaeans’ as a kind of a move *back* from Stoicism to Platonism that parallels Socrates’ own move, as described by Plato himself in the *Phaedo*, from the earlier philosophers’ physicalistic interest in astronomy and *forward* to the genuinely Platonic, idealistic philosophy.⁶² Still, Philo also uses Stoic vocabulary quite extensively, even in a cosmological context.⁶³

This fact raises a problem. A main reason why Philo preferred Platonism to Stoicism in the account of all the upper spheres of the world (God, partly heaven and the heavenly bodies,⁶⁴ the rational mind, and human beings in so far as they participate in that) was that only in this way could he achieve the kind of separation of God from the world that seemed required by the Jewish Bible. Bluntly put, a Platonic, immaterial God was 'transcendent' in relation to the world in a way that the Stoic, 'immanent' and material God could never be. Here Philo correctly saw what was at stake in the original formulation of Stoicism.⁶⁵ For the Stoics had precisely objected to Plato that it was impossible to understand the relationship between God and the world if the former was taken to be an immaterial entity and the latter a material one.⁶⁶ Philo accepted this charge with alacrity. God *cannot* in fact be fully understood. Hence, let us be Platonists!

The problem, then, lies in understanding exactly how God and the world are related to one another. When Philo employed Stoic terms to describe both the operations of the mind (*nous*, which he fundamentally understood in Platonic, immaterial terms) and also the sublunary world, which even on a Platonic understanding is *also* a material entity, the world of the senses (*kosmos aisthētos*) as opposed to the 'noetic' world (*kosmos noētos*), exactly how did he think that the interaction took place between the immaterial and the material dimensions of that world? The question cannot probably be answered. Philo himself made no attempt to develop an answer. (Nor, for that matter, did Plato.)⁶⁷ Thus there will always remain a deep unclarity at the heart of Philo's philosophizing, just because a genuine combination of Stoicism and Platonism in these matters verges on being a contradiction in terms.⁶⁸

We do not know yet that Paul should in fact be understood within the philosophical context I have now sketched: from standard Stoicism in Cicero, via an incipient combination of Stoicism and Platonism in the Wisdom of Solomon to full 'Middle Platonism' in Philo with its peculiar blend of Platonism and Stoicism. It seems likely that Paul had read the Wisdom of Solomon. Twice in 2 Cor. 5:1–10 he appears very close to a particular passage (9:15) in that work, and his account of Gentile (lack of) knowledge of God in Rom. 1:19–23 also appears to be drawing on it.⁶⁹ We shall also see later that a passage such as 1 Cor. 15:44–6 betrays awareness of a Hellenistic Jewish tradition of philosophical interpretation of Gen. 2:7 which is most clearly known to us from Philo. This already situates Paul to some extent within a context of cosmological thought that is both

Platonic (2 Cor. 4:16–5:10) and Stoic (Rom. 1:19–23)—and indeed also ‘apocalyptic’ in both cases. But we do not know yet whether this (Hellenistic Jewish) philosophical context was of any major importance to Paul; nor do we know whether—if it was—we should place him in the traditional Stoic camp or in the more modern, Stoic cum Platonist camp that is preferred by both the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo.

We must now look at 1 Corinthians 15. Since the claim for a specifically Stoic background to Paul’s construal of the resurrection body as a ‘pneumatic body’ relies on the precise shape of his argument, we need to go into some detail on the text itself. That is not a pity, however. Close analysis of this particular text will show how carefully Paul argues when he is in what we must surely call his philosophical mood. Also, the resulting picture of Paul’s ‘apocalyptic’ and Stoic world-view is an utterly fascinating one in all its concreteness. And to anybody who knows snippets from this text in the setting they receive, for example, in Handel’s *Messiah* or Brahms’s *German Requiem*, it will probably come as quite a surprise to see what Paul himself had originally meant when he spoke of the coming ‘mystery’ as part of the world-view that was apparently his.⁷⁰

STOIC COSMOLOGY IN 1 CORINTHIANS 15:35–49

Paul is responding to some Corinthians who had claimed that there is no (general) resurrection of the dead (15:12). Only some components of his response are relevant to us: the ‘apocalyptic scenario’ of 15:20–8, the more ‘scientific’ account of 15:35–49, and the ‘apocalyptic scenario’ of 15:50–5.

Consider 15:35–49, where Paul begins like this (15:35, NRSV): ‘But someone will ask, “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?”’ This double question makes excellent sense on almost any ancient understanding of death, including a philosophical one, whether Platonic or Stoic. How may the dead, or even corpses,⁷¹ that is, dead *bodies*, from which the ‘soul’ (*psychē*), which originally made them alive, has been separated, be ‘raised’ or come alive again? With what *new* body will these people come forth?

Paul immediately answers (15:36–41, NRSV):

(36) Fool! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. (37) And as for what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare seed, perhaps of wheat or

of some other grain. (38) But God gives it a body as he has chosen, and to each kind of seed its own body. (39) Not all flesh is alike, but there is one flesh for human beings, another for animals, another for birds, and another for fish. (40) There are both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the heavenly is one thing, and that of the earthly is another. (41) There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; indeed, star differs from star in glory.

Here Paul gives certain premisses for answering the two questions. (1) In other cases, like that of sowing, things die before coming alive (15:36–7) and God gives to each of them their own kind of body (namely, when a new body grows forth from the dead seed, 15:38). (2) In fact, there are several kinds of bodies, both here on earth (the ‘flesh’—*sarx*—of human beings, animals, birds, and fish, 15:39, in short ‘earthly bodies’, *sōmata epigeia*, 15:40) and in heaven (the bodies—*sōmata*—of the sun, moon, and the stars) with each their own ‘glory’ (15:40–1).

Paul continues (15:42–3a, NRSV): ‘(42) So it is with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. (43a) It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory.’ Exactly how is it with the resurrection (15:42a)? Paul’s answer is shrewd. He constructs two contrasts (15:42b–43a). One draws on the first premiss between being ‘sown’ in ‘corruption’, so as to die, and being raised in ‘incorruption’, so as to live. The other draws on the second premiss between being ‘sown’ in ‘dishonour’ and being raised in ‘glory’. This already implies that human beings are ‘sown’, that is, lead their lives to begin with, under dishonourable or ‘lowly’ bodily conditions connected with earth and dying—in fact, one must suppose, as physical and sensible beings of ‘flesh and blood’ (cf. 15:50); eventually, however, they will be raised to a glorious state of eternal life that is connected with heaven and, one suspects, with the heavenly *bodies*. Basically, then, Paul is relying on a single, straightforward contrast between an earthly kind of body connected with death and a heavenly kind of body connected with eternal life.

Next he brings in two further contrasts that have not been explicitly prepared for in what immediately precedes (15:43b–44a): ‘(43b) It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. (44a) It is sown as a psychic body, it is raised as a pneumatic body.’ Here the former contrast has in fact been *implicitly* prepared for in the contrast between the ‘*naked seed*’ (weakness!) of 15:37 and *God’s giving* it a body (power!) in 15:38. The latter contrast has

been prepared for far back in the letter: at 2:14–15, where Paul distinguished between ‘psychic man’ and ‘the pneumatic (man)’. But how may Paul bring in the two contrasts here without any more immediate preparation? One answer might be that he generally took the resurrection to be a sign of God’s *power* (*dynamis*) that acts through his pneuma.⁷² In that case the ‘pneumatic body’ is a body that in some unspecified way stands under the power of God’s pneuma.⁷³ However, considering the careful way in which he lays out his argument, it seems that he must have had a more precise idea in mind when he contrasts a ‘psychic body’ with a ‘pneumatic’ one. This suggests that this contrast was *already* contained in the basic contrast he drew in the second set of premisses between ‘earthly bodies’ and ‘heavenly bodies’. A ‘psychic’ body belongs *on earth* as exemplified by the ‘earthly bodies’ mentioned in 15:39; and a ‘pneumatic’ one belongs *in heaven* as exemplified by the ‘heavenly bodies’ mentioned in 15:41. Or to be even more precise: a ‘pneumatic body’ is a heavenly body like the sun, moon, and stars.⁷⁴

Underlying this construal of the resurrection body there clearly is an idea that is well known from ‘apocalyptic’ literature: that those who are being saved will be raised to obtain the status of—precisely—stars in heaven.⁷⁵ But why will Paul’s ‘heavenly bodies’ be specifically ‘pneumatic’? As far as I can see, only one answer is possible: because Paul is also presupposing the specifically *Stoic* idea that the heavenly bodies that are situated at the top of the hierarchical *scala naturae* are distinctly made up of pneuma, as we saw in the texts from Cicero. Here, then, is the essence of the argument: (a) The contrast in 15:44a between a ‘psychic’ and a ‘pneumatic’ body is only prepared for in what immediately precedes it if it is *already* implied in the contrast between ‘earthly’ and ‘heavenly’ bodies; (b) and it is a distinctly Stoic idea that ‘heavenly’ bodies are also ‘pneumatic’ ones.⁷⁶

Next, Paul makes a number of moves (15:44b–6): ‘(44b) If there is a psychic body, there is also a pneumatic body. (45) Thus it is also written, ‘The first man, Adam, became a living *psychē*, the last Adam became a life-producing pneuma. (46) But it is not the pneumatic that is first, but the psychic, and then the pneumatic.’ Paul’s first claim here (15:44b)—that *if* there is a ‘psychic’ body (as everybody agrees), then there also is a ‘pneumatic’ one—is not an argument proper for the claim already made in 15:44a (‘a psychic body is sown, a pneumatic body is raised’). Instead, it should be taken as a way of introducing the reference to two ‘Adams’ that he goes on to give in 15:45, based on Gen. 2:7. There *is* a ‘pneumatic’ body; that is ‘also’ (Greek *kai*) what Scripture says: ‘The first man, Adam, became a living being etc.’

Paul's second move is to derive from Gen. 2:7 ('then the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being', NRSV) a reference to *two* 'Adams', a 'first' one, who is the 'Adam' actually described in that text as having been made into a 'living soul', and a 'last Adam' (Christ), who—Paul claims—is described in the same text as having been made into something else, namely, 'life-producing pneuma'. The latter claim—that Gen. 2:7 speaks of *two* men and indeed of a 'last Adam' who is Christ and connected with pneuma—is so startling, and is introduced in such an off-hand way, that it does seem to presuppose some kind of tradition of interpreting Gen. 2:7, and in fact one that is most substantially known to us from Philo.⁷⁷

However, the exact idea underlying Paul's extremely daring reading of that verse is not the same as any of the distinctions between 'types of men' that Philo had drawn on the basis of Gen. 2:7.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the strong emphasis on chronology is in fact not found in any Philonic reading of Gen. 2:7 either. That is something Paul has himself read into the verse for his own purposes, by adding 'first' (in 'the first man') to the Genesis text itself (Paul: 'and the *first* man became a living *psychē*') and then expanding it from his own resources ('and the last Adam [became] life-producing pneuma').

Paul goes on to spell this idea out in 15:46, by stating that the 'pneumatic' state or situation is *not* 'first'; rather, the 'psychic' one is 'first' and *then* comes the 'pneumatic' one. Why does he introduce this verse by saying '*However*, the pneumatic is not first', when he has already made this point clear in 15:45 through his addition of 'first' and 'last'? The best answer is probably that he is presupposing both the whole of Gen. 2:7, which does speak *first* of the 'inbreathing', that is, of the pneumatic event, and only then of the living *psychē*—and also an interpretation of that verse of the *kind* suggested by Philo.⁷⁹ 'However' then means: 'However, against the impression given by Gen. 2:7 as developed by some, etc.'

This way of connecting 15:46 directly with the quotation of Gen. 2:7 given in 15:45 fits with the other noteworthy feature of 15:46: that it does not speak directly of a pneumatic or psychic *body* (which is after all Paul's overall topic), but instead of 'the pneumatic' and 'the psychic' (state or situation) as such.⁸⁰ Similarly, in 15:45 Paul's focus was on the fact that the first 'Adam' became a 'living *soul*' (not a soul-enlivened *body*) and the last one became 'life-producing pneuma' (not a 'pneumatic' *body*). In fact, once Paul has given in 15:44a what amounts to his answer to the question concerning the resurrection *body*, he takes his assertion in 15:44b that there

is a 'pneumatic' *body* as a springboard for bringing in the *broader* idea that there are two 'Adams' and that there is a general contrast between 'the psychic' and 'the pneumatic' as such and a chronological distinction between them. Only gradually does he come back in the course of 15:47–9 from speaking of the two 'men' (15:47) and their respective descendants (15:48) to the point of the whole account from 15:45 onwards: that just as 'we' were made to wear the 'image' (*eikōn*) or visible form—that is, the *body*—of the first 'Adam', so we shall eventually be made to wear the body of the second one (15:49).⁸¹

Here is the text (15:47–9, NRSV with a change from 'dust' to 'soil'):

(47) The first man was from the earth, a man of soil; the second man is from heaven.
 (48) As was the man of soil, so are those who are of soil; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. (49) Just as we have borne the image of the man of soil, we will also bear the image of the man of heaven.

In spite of the suggested development, we may note that the transition to focusing once more on the body does *begin* already in 15:47 when Paul connects the first man with earth and soil and the second one with heaven. This goes directly back to the contrast between heavenly and earthly bodies in 15:40 and shows that the basic contrast all through is precisely the one between earth and heaven, earthly bodies and heavenly ones.

Note also how tight the connection in fact is between heaven and pneuma. In 15:44a Paul's conclusion concerning the resurrection body presupposed the idea of taking the heavenly bodies to be specifically pneumatic. But the connection also goes the other way round: from speaking of pneuma in 15:45 to speaking of heaven in 15:47. Paul presupposes that this move makes immediate sense. It follows that when he said in 15:45 that the last 'Adam' (Christ) became 'life-producing pneuma', what he meant is that Christ became the kind of heavenly 'stuff' called pneuma that may eventually change the dead, earthly bodies (corpses) of human beings and turn them, too, into pneumatic, heavenly, eternally living bodies.

To summarize so far, in the whole of 15:35–49 Paul does three major things. He first (15:36–44a) answers the question concerning the resurrection body in terms of a distinction between earthly bodies and heavenly bodies, where the latter are also, by implication, pneumatic ones. This answer, as we have seen, presupposes a Stoic cosmology. Next (15:44b–6), he relates his answer to a tradition of interpretation of Gen. 2:7 that we know best from Philo. From this general tradition he apparently got the idea of two 'Adams',

one 'pneumatic' and the other 'psychic'. But he also corrected the tradition by insisting on a chronological sequence, with the 'pneumatic' 'Adam' coming last. Here, of course, he is already speaking specifically of Christ in a manner that has been prepared for earlier in the chapter, particularly in 15:22 (NRSV): 'For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ.' In effect, what 15:44b–6 does is to describe the Christ event in the light of philosophical speculation about Gen. 2:7. Finally, in 15:47–9 Paul *combines* the cosmological tale of 15:36–44a with the content of 15:44b–6. He fits the two traditions he is relying on (Stoic cosmology and a Jewish, philosophical Genesis tradition) into his Christ event conception of a chronological sequence of the two 'men' (Adam and Christ) by articulating the idea of a *change* in human beings: *from* wearing the visible appearance of the earthly 'clay' man *to* wearing that of the 'heavenly' man (15:47)—namely, a body that is pneumatic.⁸²

That is not all, however. By 15:49 Paul has not yet fully answered the two questions from which he began in 15:35. The second one has in fact been answered: (2) the dead will come forth with a pneumatic body. But (1) exactly how will the dead be raised?

STOIC COSMOLOGY IN 1 CORINTHIANS 15:50–5

The third (15:50–5) of our three passages harks back to the first one (15:20–8) in its elaborate use of 'apocalyptic' imagery, including the idea of finally conquering death. But it also directly continues the second one (15:35–49), thus helping to answer the question that has not yet been fully answered. By saying 'What I mean is this . . . ' (15:50), Paul explicitly states that he is now going to *spell out* what he has just said.⁸³ And indeed, the overall theme of 15:50–5 is precisely that of the future *change* (15:51, 52). In 15:53–4, however, Paul also adds a specific, philosophical point about the 'pneumatic' body that had not been so clearly stated in 15:35–49. We should conclude that whereas we moderns may feel that the 'apocalyptic' section of 15:50–5 speaks an entirely different kind of language from the ostensibly more 'scientific' language of 15:35–49, Paul himself did not see any such difference.

Here is the text (15:50–5, basically NRSV):

(50) What I mean, brothers, is this: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable. (51) Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, (52) in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed. (53) For this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal body must put on immortality. (54) When this perishable body puts on imperishability, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will be fulfilled: 'Death has been swallowed up in victory.' (55) 'Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?'

Three points are made in 15:50–5. 'Flesh and blood' (*sarx kai haima*, 15:50), meaning the ordinary, corruptible body, cannot 'inherit' the kingdom of God and incorruption. Instead (15:51–2), there will be a change, which will touch both the dead and the living. And this change (15:53–4) will mean that '*this* corruptible (something)' and '*this* mortal (something)' (meaning this *individual* body) puts on 'incorruption' and 'immortality'. Here the process that Paul has in mind is the one that in the Aristotelian tradition was called 'substantive change': that the whole substance changes into an altogether different, new substance.⁸⁴ Thus Paul had the idea that '*this*' individual body of flesh and blood, *this* 'clay' body made out of earth, will be *transformed* so that what is *self-identically the very same body* will become a body made up of pneuma. It is not that the flesh and blood will in some sense be 'shed' in such a way that it is only what *remains* that will be resurrected.⁸⁵ No, the individual body of flesh and blood will be *transformed as a whole* so as to become through and through a pneumatic one.

Where did Paul get this idea, exactly how should it be understood, and does it somehow fit into the basically Stoic cosmology that we have ascribed to him?

As we have interpreted it so far, Paul's understanding of the resurrection differs from the Stoic idea of life after death. Where the Stoics spoke of a separation of the soul *from* the body of flesh and blood, Paul's speaks of a transformation *of* that same body. It is true that the net result does not differ very much. In Stoicism, the soul of the wise man leaves the body of flesh and blood behind and rises 'balloon-like from the corpse' to take its place in heaven alongside other heavenly bodies made up of pneuma. In Paul, the body of flesh and blood is transformed as a *whole*—*but* into the very *same* state as in Stoicism. This similarity is due, of course, to the fact that Paul's understanding of the resurrection body as a pneumatic body is fundamentally in accordance with the Stoic cosmology. Still, there is a difference, on which

Paul places much weight in 15:50–5. Is it possible, then, to account for the difference, too, in terms of Stoic cosmology?

Here one might be tempted to bring in Philo's account of the post-mortem existence of especially egregious people like Moses. Of him Philo says towards the end of *The Life of Moses* that as the time came when he was going to be sent from earth 'to heaven' to 'become immortal' after 'having left this mortal life behind', he was summoned thither by the father, who 'resolved (Greek *anastoicheioun*) his twofold nature of soul and body into a single unity, transforming his *whole* being into mind, pure as the sunlight'.⁸⁶ The idea itself seems closely similar to Paul's, even though the precise vocabulary is also different. Is Philo not here saying that God *transformed* the *whole* of Moses' twofold nature into one thing, namely 'soul', which in Philo is also soul proper or mind (*nous*), in such a way that no body (or corpse) was *at all* left behind? (Moses was traditionally seen as one of those very few people who *disappeared* at death.) In fact, yes.

However, it is more difficult to decide whether Philo is speaking as a Platonist or a Stoic here. The term *anastoicheioun* is a Stoic technical term (see below), and had Philo spoken of *pneuma* instead of *nous*, everything he says might have been given a Stoic interpretation (even though the Stoic picture of the wise man's life after death is *not* the same as Philo's depiction of Moses' fate). However, the fact that he also speaks of *nous* and 'becoming immortal' (with all the Platonic overtones of both terms in Philo) suggests that as usual Philo is after all thinking rather more in Platonic terms. But then again, since Plato, too (like the Stoics), thought of death as a separation of soul from body, Philo can hardly be said to be rigorously Platonic here. Nor is it at all clear how, within the framework of ancient philosophical thinking, Philo's picture of a transformation of the *physical* body into *immaterial* mind (*nous*) could at all be spelled out in Platonic terms.

Thus, while the idea itself of a total transformation of the mortal being of flesh and blood into an immortal being consisting only of the one 'uppermost' element is the same in Philo and Paul, Philo's account is characteristically his own and one that does not fit neatly into any of those philosophical ways of thinking on which he manifestly drew. So, is there any other way of making sense of Paul's own picture?

There is a way, a Stoic one. The Stoics spoke of the wise man's fate after death, but the wise man was as rare as the phoenix.⁸⁷ Philo spoke of Moses as a quite exceptional kind of being. Paul, by contrast, speaks of all human beings (or rather, as we shall see in a moment, all Christ-believers). Indeed, he

casts his net even more widely if we may judge from the first of our three Corinthian passages: 15:20–8. To begin with, he here speaks of the resurrection of human beings (15:20–2). At the end, however, when death itself has been conquered, what will now be subjected to God is *everything* (15:27–8), which leads to the idea that ‘God is (now) everything in everything’. Apparently, then, the transformation of human bodies described by Paul later in the chapter should be placed within a setting which comprises *everything* in the world. Can we build that much on a few references to ‘everything’ and the idea of God’s becoming ‘everything in everything’? Fortunately, Rom. 8:19–22 shows that Paul did have the idea of the ‘creation’ as a whole undergoing a change at some point in the future. Here is what he says (NRSV with a few changes):

(19) For the creation waits with eager longing for the revelation of the children of God; (20) for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope (21) that the creation itself will also be set free from its bondage to corruption and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. (22) We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labour pains until now . . .

Such a change is just what the whole idea of a movement from death (corruption in Rom. 8:21) to eternal life is all about.

If this is Paul’s picture, then there is indeed a closely comparable idea in Stoicism: that of the conflagration (*ekpyrōsis*), when everything in the world—including the earth with all its earthly bodies—will be transformed into the single, ‘uppermost’ element of *pneuma*, which constitutes the essence of God himself.⁸⁸ This is the Stoic *anastoicheiōsis* in its proper, technical sense: the ‘resolution’ of the whole world into God.⁸⁹

This gives us our thesis: Paul’s idea of the change, and indeed the transformation, of individual bodies of flesh and blood into pneumatic bodies should be understood on the model of the Stoic idea of the transformation of the whole world into (*pneuma* and) God at the conflagration.⁹⁰ The arguments for this proposal that we have considered so far are two. One was that Paul after all does speak of a transformation of the world as a whole, and not just once, but in several places. Another is that the idea of a genuine *transformation* of individual bodies of flesh and blood *into* pneumatic bodies seems to require a Stoic-like outlook. After all, both the starting point and the end point of the process are explicitly said by Paul to be bodies. And

transformation of bodies constitutes the essence of Stoic physics with its emphasis on the physical continuum that binds everything together.

But what about fire, which is of course the core phenomenon in the idea of conflagration? Do we find anything like that in Paul? In fact, we do, towards the beginning of 1 Corinthians itself. In a passage (3:4–4:6) in which he is comparing his own credentials as an apostle with those of Apollos, an apparent competitor for the loyalty of the Corinthians, Paul suddenly begins to speak about fire (1 Cor. 3:12–15, NRSV with a few changes):

(12) Now if anyone builds on the foundation [which Paul has himself laid] with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, straw—(13) the work of each builder will become visible, for the Day will disclose it, because it will be revealed with [or ‘in’] fire, and the fire will test what sort of work each has done. (14) If the work that has been built on the foundation survives, the builder will receive a reward. (15) If the work is burned up, the builder will suffer loss; he will himself be saved, but only as through fire.

Apparently, Paul imagined the day of judgement as a day that involves fire, a day in which Christians will, as it were, go through fire. Some things in the individual that are traces of his ‘works’, or his actual behaviour in the world, will then be burned up, others will stay intact, but in all cases the person who builds on the proper foundation will himself be saved.⁹¹ Should we then understand the day of judgement as being different from the day of the *parousia* of Christ? The first of our three passages in 1 Corinthians 15 might suggest as much since it appears to be speaking of a drawn-out process which begins with Christ’s own resurrection (15:23), which has of course already taken place, next mentions that of ‘those who belong to Christ’, which will take place ‘at his *parousia*’ (15:23), and ‘then’ refers to that of ‘the rest’ (15:24), ‘when’ Christ will hand over the kingdom to God, the Father (15:24). However, the extended process, which in 15:25–8 ends with Christ destroying the ‘last enemy’, which is ‘death’ (26), is in the last of our three passages contracted into more or less a single moment (15:54, NRSV): ‘When this perishable body puts on imperishability, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will be fulfilled: “Death has been swallowed up in victory.”’ And in any case, all these things will happen, ‘in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet’ (15:52, NRSV). It seems more likely, therefore, that although Paul might well distinguish—even chronologically—between various parts or aspects of the final events, he also saw them as constituting a single process. In that

case, 1 Cor. 3:12–15 shows that this process was one that was filled—as seen in physical terms—with fire.

By now, that should come as no surprise. For in Stoic physics, *pneuma* is a form of fire. And so, since the Stoic conflagration is a process in which the *pneuma* as fire fills the world by burning up everything that is not constituted by *pneuma* (and in that sense transforming everything *into* *pneuma*), the fact that Paul suddenly begins to speak of fire in connection with the final events confirms the claim that we should understand his whole account in 1 Corinthians 15 in the light of the Stoic idea of the conflagration, too. Paul's reference to fire in 3:12–15 constitutes the third argument for that claim.⁹²

One more point will bring out the quite striking character of what Paul is imagining in 1 Corinthians 15. We saw that Paul's specific theme from 15:35 onwards was the 'how?' and 'with what body?' of the resurrection from the dead. But of course his overall theme is somewhat grander than that. It is the destruction of death and the inauguration of eternal life. And he indicates as much at the beginning of his argument: 'Fool! What you sow does not come to life unless it (first) dies' (15:36). We can now see the quite literal sense in which this is to be understood. Death will be destroyed in the sense that everything in the world that is made up of elements that may both themselves undergo destruction and may also cause the things made up of them to undergo destruction—everything of that mortal kind will itself be burned up by the mighty *pneuma* and in that way transformed *into* *pneuma*. And it will all happen very soon and in the twinkling of an eye when Christ returns as 'life-producing *pneuma*'. No wonder Paul ends up exhorting the Corinthians to keep 'steady' and be 'immovable' (15:58)!

A final question concerns the fate of non-believers. Will they be saved, too, even though possibly 'through fire'? The answer that follows logically from Paul's concrete way of imagining the final events—and not least, the role played here by the *pneuma*—is unfortunately No. The reason why the people described in 1 Cor. 3:12–15 will be saved even in spite of any bad works they may have done is that they build on the proper foundation. Understood in physical terms, that corresponds to the fact that they have received the *pneuma* 'as a guarantee' (e.g. 2 Cor. 5:5 in its context). Thus *they* will be saved 'through fire' because they *already* have a portion of the *pneuma* that itself stands for eternal life.⁹³ By contrast, non-believers, who do not have this portion of *pneuma*, will be burned up, not only their works, but they

themselves. This gives an extra reason for Paul to end up exhorting the Corinthians to keep ‘steady’ and be ‘immovable’. Similarly, in Phil. 1:27–8 he exhorts the Philippians to ‘stand firm in one pneuma’ (27) and in no way be intimidated by their opponents, ‘which is proof of destruction for them and of your own salvation’ (28). There is precisely no *hope* (cf. 1 Cor. 15:18–19 and 1 Thess. 4:13) for those outside the circle of Christ. That hope has been established by the gift of the pneuma.

‘APOCALYPTIC’ AND PHILOSOPHICAL COSMOLOGY IN PAUL

This overall reading of 1 Corinthians 15 gives us a number of things, of which we should here retain two. The first thing is a Paul who throughout the chapter argues, in addition to whatever else he is doing, in a manner that should be called distinctly philosophical. His notion of the pneumatic resurrection body presupposes Stoic cosmology. His idea of a substantive change belongs within an Aristotelian tradition of physics. And his conception of the ultimate change has its closest counterpart in the Stoic idea of *ekpyrōsis*.

The second thing is a Paul who in addition to presupposing Stoic philosophy also draws on many other kinds of input: philosophical speculation on Genesis in the Jewish wisdom tradition reflected in Philo, projections concerning the end of the world that make use of traditional, ‘apocalyptic’ imagery, and finally—what we are used to calling—‘eschatological’ speculation focused on the resurrection and second coming of Jesus Christ.

Apparently, however, there was no friction at all in Paul’s mind between these ostensibly different ‘thought worlds’. On the contrary, there appears to have been a frictionless fusion.

Or perhaps we should rather put it like this. In 1 Thessalonians, Paul’s basic idea was that Christ-believers would be saved from God’s wrath in the sense that no matter what would happen to the world at large, *they* would at least be raised (whether already dead or alive) to be forever together with the Lord in the air. By 1 Corinthians 15, however, Paul had the idea that God would become everything *in everything*. But how should that be imagined? Here the Stoic theory of *ekpyrōsis* provided an attractive way of thinking that also matched what Paul would now say in more detail about the way in which

individual bodies would be raised (whether already dead or alive). By Romans 8, then, he felt that he could even hear the whole of creation groaning (8:22) to be 'set free from its bondage to decay' (8:21, NRSV). Viewed in this light, it is easy to see why Paul put so much emphasis in 1 Corinthians 15 on the total transformation at the resurrection of the individual body of flesh and blood. The moment one thinks of the question in the simple and straightforward cosmological terms we have now seen to be Paul's, one sees that what he wanted to talk about was *the generation of an altogether new pneumatic world* of eternal life in which *everything* that was tied to the lower elements of the present world of corruption and death would be transformed into a wholly different kind of heavenly existence, indeed, into an altogether different *world*.⁹⁴ This would indeed be a 'new creation' (Gal. 6:15, 2 Cor. 5:17), not only of humankind, but of the whole world. And of course such a change would include present bodies of flesh and blood whether dead or alive—if, that is, they were fit for it. In order to bring out both points, Paul drew on a number of basic ideas in Stoic cosmology.

Can one build so much on a single chapter in 1 Corinthians? In the next chapter we shall focus more exclusively on the material *pneuma* itself and consider whether the Pauline letters as a whole support the picture of it that we have presented here.

2

The Bodily Pneuma in Paul

BROADER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PNEUMA

The argument of the previous chapter claimed that as Paul describes the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15 and the way it involves the pneuma, he must have understood the pneuma itself as a bodily entity with the physical constitution of the stars and other heavenly bodies. We derived this claim from a consideration of Paul's cosmology. But was that understanding of the pneuma Paul's considered view or was it just something he made up for the special purposes of his argument in that text? Do we find this cosmological understanding of the pneuma expressed everywhere Paul speaks of the resurrection? Or did he not have any clear view on the matter? We may also broaden the question: if a cosmological understanding of the pneuma was his considered view with regard to the future event of the resurrection, what about the present? Did he also think of the pneuma along similar, cosmological lines with regard to its presence in the world here and now, in its relation with Christ and God and also—and not least—in and among believers?

In this chapter we shall range broadly over all the main letters in order to answer these questions: Philippians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Romans. We must constantly ask ourselves whether it is better to understand what Paul says of the pneuma in its various contexts along the lines of contemporary Middle Platonism (like in Philo), which would make the pneuma come out as a distinctly non-bodily, immaterial phenomenon.¹ Or should we in fact rather understand Paul's idea of the pneuma in exclusively 'apocalyptic' terms with the consequence that there is little point in asking about its ontological character?² The hypothesis to be pursued in this chapter continues to be that a Middle Platonic, immaterial understanding does not fit the facts. An 'apocalyptic' understanding certainly does fit. But if Paul's general talk of the pneuma matches that of 1 Corinthians 15, then we already have enough initial warrant for bringing in the various features of a more

specifically developed, philosophical, and indeed Stoic, bodily understanding of the pneuma. Then the question will be whether those features will genuinely illuminate what Paul does say, not only with regard to the future resurrection but also to the various fields of operation of the pneuma here and now.

We shall first look at a few passages—Philippians 3 and 2 Cor. 4:7–5:10—that speak directly of the resurrection. Since they also talk about life in the present in the light of the resurrection, we shall also consider what they say of the pneuma as part of Christian life in the present. We shall conclude this part of the investigation by looking at a few passages in Romans 6 and 8 that address the present life of believers in the light of the resurrection. Thus, while we are trying to corroborate our findings from 1 Corinthians 15 with regard to the resurrection, we are also following in Paul’s own footsteps back from the future to the present, asking about the role of the pneuma in the life of believers here and now.

Next we shall try to bring out the view of the pneuma that is implied in what Paul says of its relationship with Christ and God. Is the risen Christ himself a pneumatic being? If so, is he also a bodily one? And what about God himself? We shall also consider what Paul says in passages where he speaks of the pneuma ‘itself’, that is, as a phenomenon above human beings, the very pneuma that qualifies as *hagion* (‘holy’) or God’s (or Christ’s) pneuma. Does this pneuma—to the extent that it differs from the pneuma in its other roles—come out as a specifically bodily thing, too, along the Stoic lines?

Finally, we shall look at the pneuma as it enters—through an intervention from above—those human beings who are thereby themselves made *hagioi*: when and how does this happen? Here we are moving back from the future via the present to the past: to the moment when the *hagioi* were first set on their forward-looking path. We shall end by considering whether this intervention from above is in some way matched by a communicative function of the pneuma in the opposite direction when human beings address Christ and God from below in prayer.

One further initial observation is this: the present chapter will focus on the various issues listed as seen from the outside and in factual terms (by Paul’s lights), precisely as part of a cosmology. We shall not yet apply the perspective of how the various objective events posited by Paul were subjectively experienced by himself or his addressees, such as how it felt to live in the present animated by a pneuma that would eventually resurrect them.

By distinguishing between these two different perspectives we are later forced to go back to some of the texts we shall be looking at in the present chapter since they also speak to the subjective experience. But there is no way around that. In fact, it is only by adopting this procedure that the distinction between the two perspectives can be maintained with sufficient clarity.

THE PNEUMA AND RESURRECTION IN PHILIPPIANS AND THEIR PRESENT IMPLICATIONS

Paul intersperses the letter to the Philippians with a number of more or less veiled references to the final events. What do they imply for his understanding of the pneuma both as operating in the future and as being present now? Three passages in the first three chapters are particularly relevant. They show that just underneath his more or less innocent-looking ways of speaking there is a more precise set of ideas that reflects a wholly concrete and bodily understanding of the pneuma.

The first passage: In the letter's exordium Paul places the life of his addressees very strongly under the coming 'day of Christ Jesus' (1:6,10). Paul himself is in dire straits, he says (1:12–17). He is hard pressed between two options: his 'desire to depart [that is, die] and be together with Christ' (1:23) and his staying 'in the flesh', which he considers the more necessary option for the sake of the Philippians (1:24). Though it looks as if he is presupposing that immediately upon dying he would be 'together with Christ'—which of course was the eventual goal in 1 Thess 4:17, too—one need not, perhaps, take him so literally. At least, we shall see that later in the letter he describes the final events in ways that fit in closely with the description given in 1 Corinthians 15, where those who die before Christ's parousia will not *immediately* go to stay with him (see 1 Cor. 15:52).

Note then the precise way in which Paul speaks of the pneuma just before he sets up his two options. He knows, so he says, that his difficult situation 'will turn out to salvation for me through your prayer and (your) supply (or provision) of the pneuma of Jesus Christ' (1:19).³ For he both expects and hopes that 'Christ will be exalted now as always in my body, whether by life or by death' (1:20, NRSV). In 1:19 Paul is clearly speaking of his future salvation, which will be brought about through the amount of Christ's pneuma that the Philippians will help him to have. In 1:20 he rather speaks

of his present situation, in which Christ will be exalted no matter what happens to Paul. But note that Christ will be exalted 'in my body'. It is difficult not to combine the two statements about the future and the present and take Paul to be saying that *by the presence of Christ's pneuma in Paul's body, Christ will be exalted in it now and Paul himself will be saved in the future*. Thus Paul is speaking of a present takeover by the pneuma of his body, which he also links with the idea of his future salvation. Why then should he make the former claim if it were not because he intuitively thought that the pneuma is precisely a thing that operates *on the body*, and both now and in the future? This already shows the close tie between the idea of the future salvation and the present state of believers. And it strongly suggests that Paul conceived of the pneuma as a physical entity in both cases.

The second passage: In the so-called 'Christ hymn' (2:6–11), Paul famously states that Christ has left behind 'the shape (*morphē*) of God' (2:6), taken on 'the shape (*morphē*) of a slave', become 'in the likeness (*homoioōma*) of human beings' and been found 'in form (*schēma*) as a human being' (2:7). What are these shapes and forms? Paul does not tell us, but the fact that he repeatedly uses these fairly technical terms suggests that he did have something specific in mind. Should we then take it that Christ's divine shape was a pneumatic one and that his servile, human shape was one of flesh and blood? Is Paul thinking as concretely as that? So far, this suggestion must remain a guess.⁴

The 'hymn' contains further concrete cosmological indications when it speaks of 'beings in heaven, on earth and under the earth' (2:10), who will bend their knees before the Christ whom God has 'exalted above' everything (2:9). Here Paul presupposes a traditional tripartite world-view, which implies that Christ is placed quite concretely in heaven, in full accordance with the picture we know from 1 Corinthians 15. That is not very surprising in itself. It is noteworthy, however, that a few verses later, when he is again referring to the 'day of Christ' (2:16), he enjoins his addressees to be 'blameless and innocent, children of God without blemish in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, *in which you shine like stars in the world*' (2:15, NRSV). Apparently, by acting here and now in conformity with Christ's resurrection into heaven, which has already taken place, and with a view to their own future salvation (cf. 2:12–13), the Philippians already proleptically appear *like* having the form that they will eventually have *in fact* when they have left this crooked and perverse generation behind. There is not a single word here about the pneuma. Still, the whole section of 1:27–2:18, which

constitutes a connected whole, begins with a reference to the ‘one pneuma’ in which the Philippians must now stand steadfast (1:27) in order to gain future salvation (1:28), and continues with a reference to the ‘sharing in the pneuma’ here and now (2:1) that underlies Paul’s exhortation (paraenesis). If the pneuma is already present now among the Philippians—as what is elsewhere called a ‘down payment’⁵—when they shine *like* stars, then we are very close to the idea we found in 1 Corinthians 15 to the effect that the pneuma will eventually turn those who are resurrected *into* ‘stars in the world’. Then they will no longer shine *like* stars: they will *be* stars—through the operation of the pneuma. Conversely, we may claim, what *makes* them shine like stars already here and now is precisely the actual presence in them of the pneuma as a ‘down payment’.⁶

The third passage: Chapter 3 of Philippians again shows that the pneuma continues to be present just below what Paul says by other means and, indeed, that it informs what he says of both the future and the present. Philippians 3 is one of our purple passages, to which we shall return in connection with Paul’s own religious experience. Right now our focus will be on the future-oriented ideas and the ways they play back into what Paul says of the present, but all through as seen from an external perspective that aims to bring out how these issues appeared to Paul, not as part of a subjective experience, but of an objective stocktaking of the world.

He concludes the chapter by speaking in a way that closely recalls 1 Corinthians 15. Certain opponents of both Paul and the Philippians ‘think only earthly things’, which is why ‘their end will be destruction’ (3:19). Paul has already said as much in 1:28, where the same people were contrasted with the Philippians who stand ‘in one pneuma’ and will therefore gain salvation. This already suggests that he is thinking in concrete, cosmological terms. The opponents *belong* on earth and will therefore eventually suffer physical destruction, that is, death. By contrast (3:20–1),

(20) . . . our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting the Lord Jesus Christ as saviour, (21) who will transform (*meta-schēmat-izein*) the body (*sōma*) of our lowliness (*tapeinōsis*) so that it becomes shaped like (*sym-morphon*) the body (*sōma*) of his glory (*doxa*), by the activity (*energeia*) that reflects his power (*dynasthai*) also to make all things subject to himself.

What is this power? In view of the very close connection between the picture given here and in 1 Corinthians 15 of the field of operation of this power (bodies and various ‘forms’ and ‘shapes’ of bodies), there can be

no doubt that it is in fact the pneuma. It is true that in 1 Corinthians 15 Paul did not explicitly identify the power behind the change from a psychic to a pneumatic body as being the pneuma itself. But his description of the mechanics of the resurrection makes the identification virtually certain (1 Cor. 15:43b–4a): ‘... it is sown in weakness, it is raised *in power* (*dynamis*); (44) it is sown as a psychic body, it is raised as *a pneumatic body*’. Elsewhere, in fact, the idea of the pneuma as the power of the resurrection is spelled out explicitly, namely, in Rom. 8:11, which speaks of the presence and operation of the pneuma in the past, present, and future: ‘If the *pneuma of him who raised Jesus* from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead *will also make your mortal bodies alive through his pneuma that dwells in you*.’ Seen in this light, the similarity becomes noteworthy of the description Paul gives at the end of Phil. 3:21 of Christ’s ‘power...to make all things subject to himself’ with his account in 1 Cor. 15:24–8 of the way Christ will (once more) ‘subject’ everything to himself, including the ‘last enemy...death’ (1 Cor. 15:26 and 54–5). Once again, neither 1 Corinthians 15 nor Phil. 3:21 explicitly identifies the power that lies behind Christ’s subjecting ability as the pneuma. But we now know that the power that raises believers is the pneuma. And Phil. 3:21 shows that it is the same power that will do this and will also subject everything to Christ. It follows that it is the pneuma, too, that lies behind Christ’s subjecting ability as spelled out extensively, for instance, in 1 Cor. 15:24–8. That power belongs with Christ in heaven *from* where it will come with him to perform the bodily changes (in believers) and subjections (of non-believers) that are described both here and in 1 Corinthians 15. This all shows that Paul was thinking in wholly concrete, cosmological terms.⁷

But again: he does not actually *speak* of the pneuma! Well, at the beginning of Chapter 3 (3:3–4) he has placed the whole chapter under the contrast between pneuma and ‘flesh’ (*sarx*), moreover he has specifically done this in such a way that those who have ‘confidence in the flesh’ (3:3, including something as concrete as circumcision, 3:2–3) come out as being identical with those who are later said to ‘think only earthly things’ (and whose ‘God is in their belly and their glory in their shame’, 3:19). Here is the text (3:3–4): ‘For it is we who are the circumcision, those who worship God *in God’s pneuma* and boast in Christ Jesus and have no confidence in the flesh— (4) even though I, too, have reason for confidence in the flesh.’⁸ With this way of starting the chapter, Paul has presented a contrasting pair of pneuma

and sarx to begin with, which is then directly connected with a contrasting pair of heaven and earth at the end. Thus throughout Philippians 3 he thinks of the pneuma as being present both now and in the future and all through as a concrete, cosmological entity.

The idea of the presence of the pneuma here and now comes up in a particularly striking manner in the middle of the chapter. When Paul spells out in 3:4–11 his own change from having confidence in the flesh (3:4) to a new state of ‘knowing Christ Jesus’ (3:8) and further describes that state as one of ‘knowing him [Christ] *and the power of his resurrection*’ (3:10), then that power is nothing other than the pneuma. This is made clear by the reading just given of the ‘power’ in 3:21 and the way Paul has in 3:3 placed the whole of Philippians 3 under the sign of the pneuma.⁹

We shall come back much later to Phil. 3:10–11 as part of Paul’s subjectivist description of his own change in 3:4–11. Staying with his objective world-view, we may note a striking point about the two verses that falls directly under our attempt in the present chapter to clarify the exact physical connotations of the way Paul brings his understanding of the pneuma in connection with the resurrection back into his picture of the present life of the person who has received the pneuma. The text runs thus: (10) ‘[... the righteousness] of knowing him [that is, Christ] and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his sufferings, by becoming conformed (*symmorphizomenos*) to his death, (11) if somehow I may attain to the resurrection from the dead’.

Here we meet for the first time the striking, Pauline motif of ‘through death to resurrected life’. The passage plays exceedingly closely together with the precise description of the mechanism of the resurrection given in 3:21. In both texts the theme is that of possessing a ‘form’ (cf. *-morphizomenos* in 3:11 and *-morphon* in 3:21) that is ‘similar to’ (*-sym* in both verses) that of Christ, whether in his death or in his resurrected life. We shall see in a moment in connection with 2 Cor. 4:7–5:10, where Paul spells out the motif much more clearly, that his idea was the stark one that Christ-believers’ bodies of flesh and blood literally die—or atrophy—while they are living here on earth in order to become fit for the final transformation that will occur in the future. That dying is what is referred to by the talk of ‘sharing’ in Christ’s sufferings and becoming ‘conformed’ to his death. But the real starkness of Paul’s idea lies in the fact that he took the two processes of ‘becoming conformed to’ Christ’s death (in the sarx) and getting to ‘know... the power of his (Christ’s) resurrection’ (in the pneuma) as taking place simultaneously in Paul’s body—as, indeed, the present text suggests, too.

We should conclude that there are clear indications throughout Philippians that Paul saw the pneuma as a power that would be operative at the resurrection. Chapter 3:21 provides a picture of this event that is closely similar to the one given in 1 Corinthians 15. We should also conclude that he took the pneuma to be present in believers both in the future and also in the present. In addition, we have seen that a physicalist understanding of the pneuma seems implied all through. After all, it is constantly described as operating on bodies. As for its presence here and now, we have found a hint (to be corroborated later) of a striking *co*-presence in believers of a dying away of the physical body of flesh and blood in conformity with Christ's suffering and dying—and a corresponding takeover of the same body by the pneuma, which will eventually lead to its final transformation into a body of glory. When that happens believers will literally come to shine like stars in heaven.

THE PNEUMA AND RESURRECTION IN 2 CORINTHIANS 4:7–5:10 AND THEIR PRESENT IMPLICATIONS

In 2 Cor. 4:7–5:10 Paul argues—for reasons that we need not consider now¹⁰—that in spite of the fact that he has a 'treasure' (4:7) of an internal illumination (4:6) in 'clay jars' (4:7), that is, in sufferings connected with his 'body' (4:10, *sōma*) or 'mortal flesh' (4:11, *thnētē sarx*), he does not in the least give up preaching the gospel (4:13) and generally acting on behalf of his immediate addressees (4:12, 15). For he also has that other, positive side that was given to him as a 'treasure': knowledge of Christ's resurrection and faith in his own. This is explained in 4:7–15 and then again in 4:16–5:10, where Paul makes explicit the overall missionary point of his self-account (4:16: 'That is why we do not lose heart . . .'; cf. already 4:1) and spells out further the contrast between his present affliction (4:17), which includes his groaning under the burden of bodily existence (5:4), and the future glory. The fact that this has a hortatory purpose throughout is very important for a proper understanding of the text. But we will only return to that later.

In 4:7–15 belief in the resurrection is explicitly referred to at 4:14 when Paul explains why—as he has just stated in 4:13—he 'speaks' on the basis of

faith: 'because we know that the one who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus, and will bring us with you into his presence' (4:14, NRSV). Note then that in 4:13 Paul has just referred, for no apparent reason in the argument itself, not just to his 'faith', but to the 'pneuma of faith' as what explains his 'speaking'. We shall discuss later—in fact, in two rounds—the precise relationship in Paul of pneuma and faith, but here the reason for bringing in the pneuma presumably is that while faith has as its object the resurrection of Jesus (cf. 4:14), the resurrection itself was—as we have seen—*operated by* the pneuma. Apparently, however, this same pneuma is also connected with Paul's own faith as something he already 'has'.¹¹ Paul has the pneuma, presumably as part of the 'treasure' that he has in his 'clay jars', that is, in his body of flesh and blood.

Earlier in 4:7–15, the resurrection has been referred to in a manner that is both striking and enigmatic when Paul claims that he is constantly 'carrying around in his body the death of Jesus, in order that the life of Jesus, too, may be made visible in our body' (4:10); indeed, while living, he is always being given over to death because of Jesus, 'in order that the life of Jesus, too, may be made visible in our mortal flesh' (4:11). Since the 'life of Jesus' is in this context clearly the life of the resurrected Christ, the idea is that this life is made visible in Paul's body, and indeed, in his mortal flesh. Is he referring here to something occurring in the present or something that will only happen in the future at the resurrection proper? That is quite difficult to determine.¹² Still, though an indeterminacy may perhaps be intended, it seems certain that Paul does wish to bring out that the 'life of Jesus' is in some way present—and indeed, visible—in his mortal flesh already now. But how? The fact that he has just explained the presence of his 'treasure' in 'clay pots' as showing (4:7) that 'this extraordinary power' (NRSV: *dynamis*) belongs to God and not to the apostles suggests that the entity that accounts for the presence of the 'life of Jesus' in Paul's mortal flesh is nothing other than the pneuma. And indeed, in 4:16–5:10 he explicitly states that it is God 'who has prepared us for this very thing' (5:5a, NRSV), namely, the resurrection, by '*having* given us the pneuma as a down payment' (5:5b). Thus the pneuma was understood by Paul to be present already now *in his body* (4:10) *and mortal flesh* (4:11). In that case, the pneuma must have been conceived all through by Paul as a physical entity.¹³

This picture has striking implications for the way we should understand Paul's famous claim in 4:16 for an 'inner renewal' that corresponds to an 'outer withering away': 'That is why we do not lose heart, but even if our outer human being is wasting away, our inner (human being) is at least being

renewed day by day.' What is being renewed day by day in Paul will be the pneuma in his interior. What is withering away is his sarx, his body of flesh and blood.¹⁴ But note then that these two things are said to occur simultaneously. Paul's body is literally dying (atrophying) *while* the pneuma that he has received gradually fills out more and more of that body.

This idea gives an extra dimension to 4:10–11. Indeed, it helps one to see something that is actually to be found there once one knows what to look for. Not only is the 'life of Jesus' becoming visible in Paul's body: this process also has the other side to it that the same body (of flesh and blood) is gradually dying. This is the precise idea underlying Paul's statement (4:11) that 'we, the living, are always being given over to death because of Jesus in order that the life of Jesus, too, may be made visible in our mortal flesh'.

Here Paul takes the motif of 'through death to resurrected life' in its most literal sense and his idea is that with the arrival of the pneuma, the body of flesh and blood is at one and the same time undergoing two opposed processes: dying (as flesh and blood) and coming to life (as a pneumatic body).

Second of the more intriguing passages in Paul is Cor. 4:7–15 is one. But many questions fall into place if one takes it as basically contrasting two features of Paul's own body here and now: its fleshly character which makes it belong to the earth (the 'clay jars' etc.) as a burden to Paul himself and its character as nevertheless already being filled with pneuma in anticipation of the future resurrection. But Paul also sharpens the contrast quite dramatically when he claims that the body of flesh and blood is actually dying at the same time as the resurrected 'life of Jesus' is gradually coming to be more and more visible in it.

The second half of our passage, 4:16–5:10, then describes in fascinating detail the precise form in which we should imagine the resurrection. What is particularly noteworthy here is that Paul makes use of a number of turns of phrase with a distinctly Platonic flavour and pedigree. So, is he here thinking of the resurrection in Platonist terms, as opposed to the Stoic ones that we found to be present in 1 Corinthians 15? Not at all, as we shall see.

Let us take note of the relevant expressions. There is the contrast between Paul's 'outer man', which is being ruined day by day at the same time as his 'inner man' is being renewed (4:16).¹⁵ There is the contrast between Paul's looking 'not at what can be seen but at what cannot be seen; for what can be seen is temporary, but what cannot be seen is eternal' (4:18, NRSV).¹⁶ There is a contrast between 'our earthly tent-house' (meaning the body of flesh and blood) and the 'building (or house) that we have from God', 'a house not

made with hands, eternal in the heavens' (5:1, NRSV).¹⁷ Finally, there is the idea that 'while we are still in this tent, we groan under our burden' (5:4, NRSV).¹⁸ All of this looks rather Platonic. So, has Paul suddenly forgotten about the bodily resurrection?

Not at all. His favoured term for what will happen is 'to be clothed *over*' (Greek *ep-en-dysasthai*, 5:2, 4) and he specifically says that 'we' groan under our burden, because 'we wish not to be "*un*-clothed" (Greek *ek-dysasthai*, 5:4)', or to *lose* our earthly body, 'but to be clothed *over*', or to have something done *to* that body so that this very same body now appears differently, namely, as we may suspect, transformed.¹⁹ This is exactly the idea that was spelled out in 1 Cor. 15:50–5. It is no wonder therefore that in 2 Cor. 5:4 Paul immediately continues as follows: 'in order that what is mortal may be *swallowed up* by life' (5:4c, NRSV), where Paul's use of the term of 'swallowing up' refers directly back to 1 Cor. 15:54.²⁰ Nor should one be surprised that he immediately continues with the reference to the pneuma in 5:5 quoted above.

Against this background, the contrast in the following verses between being 'at home in the body'/'away from the Lord' (5:6) and 'being at home with the Lord'/'away from the body' (5:8) should certainly not be understood as necessarily speaking of one form of existence that is bodily and another that is non-bodily. On the contrary, they may very well both be bodily, though in different ways. Thus when 'all of us must appear before the judgement seat of Christ, so that each may receive recompense for what he has done through the body, whether good or bad' (5:10), we may well imagine believers standing before Christ as the heavenly and pneumatic bodies of 1 Corinthians 15 to undergo trial in the way described in 1 Corinthians 3. In fact, 5:10, where Paul speaks of what will happen when they are 'with the Lord', contains a curious—and difficult—locution that suggests that he is precisely thinking of believers as *bodily* beings when they stand 'before the judgement seat of Christ'. What he says is—literally translated—that each will receive as recompense '*the things through the body* in proportion to what (each) has done, whether good or evil'.²¹ Since the latter part of this statement obviously refers to what each believer has done on earth, and since the former part is about what each will receive as recompense, it seems that the 'things through the body' must refer to something happening in heaven to resurrected *bodies*. What could that be? We cannot really know. But there is at least a chance that Paul is once more referring to the idea voiced in 1 Cor. 3:13–15 that on the day of the Lord there will be some reward (or the opposite) operating on the

bodies of resurrected, pneumatic believers. In that case, being 'with the Lord' will itself be a bodily state.

What we see in this passage, then, is a Paul who makes excellent use of traditional Platonic vocabulary in order to bring out the contrast he aims to draw for rhetorical purposes between his own present state, which is a sore one where he is groaning under the burdens of a this-bodily life, and 'the eternal weight of glory' (4:17, NRSV) towards which he is looking. To bring out this contrast, Platonizing language was particularly helpful since a certain deprecation of the earthly body was built into Platonic ontology. Still, in terms of the ontology itself of the resurrection body Paul sticks to the Stoically inspired conception that he had developed in 1 Corinthians 15. Indeed, the virtuosity with which Paul handles these different types of philosophical input is quite impressive.²²

A counter-question: is Paul's framework not rather an 'apocalyptic' one, with its emphasis on 'a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens' (5: 1c) which is quite literally waiting to be inhabited by believers? Well, he does speak of being 'clothed over', and this immediately raises the question of what is supposed to happen to human *bodies*. Also he twice in the two verses speaks explicitly of a house, building, or dwelling in heaven (5:1–2) as coming *from* God or *from* heaven (5:1–2, Greek *eklex*). What does that mean? That some kind of *house* will actually move down from heaven to be inhabited by believers and then return to heaven since they also have an eternal house *in* heaven? Hardly. Paul's way of speaking makes far better sense if he is in fact referring—as he himself seems to indicate in 5:5—to the pneuma as being sent from God in heaven to be 'inhabited' by the Corinthians by its coming to inhabit *them*. Just as the 'earthly tent-house' refers to the body of flesh and blood,²³ so the heavenly 'house' (etc.) refers to the body that has been transformed by the pneuma. Thus, while the general language of a heavenly 'dwelling' is no doubt 'apocalyptic', the idea itself is a rather more precise and developed one. The eternal house not made with hands that believers have in the heavens actually consists of their bodies of flesh and blood as transformed by the pneuma when this has been sent down to earth by God at the parousia of Christ. In fact, once one allows oneself to bring in the pneuma in conformity with the understanding developed in 1 Corinthians 15, Paul's argument in 2 Corinthians 4–5 becomes quite precise in a manner that removes it fairly drastically from the level of operation of ordinary 'apocalyptic' writings. That in itself is the best argument for the reading.

Note, however, that such a reading does not in the least imply a rejection of a clear-cut, 'apocalyptic' contrast between the earth and the heavenly world. On the contrary, what we see in Paul is a philosophically based development *of* that 'apocalyptic' contrast.

We should conclude that 2 Cor. 4:7–5:10 supports rather than weakens the picture of the resurrection we developed on the basis of 1 Corinthians 15. But we have also seen how Paul brings that picture back into the present where it results in an intriguing and complex tension in the bodies of believers—as exemplified by Paul's own body—between their earthly character and their character as already containing the pneuma that will eventually bring about their complete transformation. Believers' physical bodies of flesh and blood must literally die—atrophy—in the present *in order for* the (pneumatic) life of Jesus Christ to become visible in them already now. Similarly, Paul described himself in Phil. 3:10–11 as sharing in Christ's sufferings and being conformed with Christ's death *in the hope that* he would eventually reach the resurrection from the dead. In all this there is very strongly present a concrete, physicalist understanding of the operation of the pneuma both now and in the future.

CONFORMITY WITH CHRIST IN HIS
DEATH AND RESURRECTION: ROMANS
8:10, 8:14–30, AND 6:2–6

I can imagine that this wholly literal and tightly physicalist reading of a number of phrases that might in themselves well be understood more metaphorically—for example, phrases such as 'carrying around the death of Jesus in the body'—will generate some scepticism. Let us therefore consider three passages from Paul's last letter, Romans, that point fairly explicitly towards the literal and tighter reading.

The most striking passage is perhaps 8:10. For reasons that we need not consider yet, Paul aims to emphasize the Romans' possession of the pneuma. At 8:9 he has said that they (9a) 'are not in the flesh, but in the pneuma inasmuch as the pneuma of God dwells in you'. That is not enough, however. Christ's pneuma needs to be brought in, too: (9b) 'But if someone does not possess Christ's pneuma, that person does not belong to him [or: is not his].' But that is not enough, either. Christ himself has to be brought in: (10) 'But

if Christ is in you, then the body is dead (*nekron*) because of sin, but the pneuma is life because of justice.' What does this mean? The Greek term '*nekron*' that Paul uses of the Romans' bodies means 'dead', not 'mortal' (cf. 7.8), as some commentators have it.²⁴ Of course, the Romans are not literally dead. Their bodies remain alive in some form or other. However, Paul is telling them that *if* Christ's pneuma is in them, then their bodies are only a hollow shell—and in this sense actually dead—to be contrasted with the pneuma inside the shell, which stands for life. We should take this as literally and concretely as we can. Just as Paul had said of himself in 2 Cor. 4:16 that his outer human being was withering away, so he is now transferring the same basic idea to the Romans. Their bodies are actually dead—atrophied—and what gives them life both now and in the future is the pneuma within them that they have received as part of having been made righteous.

Consider then the second passage: Rom. 8:14–30.²⁵ At 8:29 Paul again employs the term *symmorphos* just as he did in Phil. 3:10 and 21 (see above) and again—in fact—in connection with the resurrection (8:28–30, NRSV):

(28) We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose. (29) For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed (*sym-morphoi*) to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family. (30) And those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.

Believers will be glorified (*doxazein*) in the future when they are 'conformed to the image of his [God's] Son'. In the light of Phil. 3:21 one immediately suspects that this should be understood both literally and physically as speaking of a transformation into a 'glorious' body, which we saw to be a pneumatic and physical one. But Paul does not in the Romans passage speak of the pneuma at all. However, he has in fact just done so quite extensively (8:23–7), reminding his addressees that (23) 'we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the pneuma, groan inwardly while we wait eagerly for adoption, the redemption of our bodies' (basically NRSV). Moreover, 8:28–30 takes up 8:14–17, in which the theme is precisely that of the reception of the pneuma in baptism, which makes the baptized people both (16) 'children of God' and (17) 'if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ—if, in fact, we suffer with him *so that* we may also be glorified with him'. Here we

again meet—and very explicitly—the Pauline motif of gaining eschatological glory at the resurrection *through* present suffering. And this idea is tied very closely to reception of the pneuma in baptism. Thus Paul's 'baptism cluster', as we may call it, includes the ideas of reception of the pneuma, which is a pledge of future glory when the baptized will become 'conformed to the image of' Christ (8:29) and indeed will be glorified together with him (8:17), but also of present suffering, in which they will suffer together with Christ (8:17)—in short, the motif of 'through death to resurrected life'.

However, is the pneuma understood in all this as a physical entity? There are no unmistakable indications that it is. Nor, certainly, are there any indications that it is not. What there are, are turns of phrase that recall similar expressions from elsewhere that we know to have physical connotations and that become pregnant with meaning once they are understood in that way. An example would be the contrast in 8:21 between slavery to 'destruction' (cf. Phil. 3:19) and the freedom of the 'glory' of the children of God (cf. Phil. 3:21), terms that we took to have a concrete, cosmological meaning in Philippians 3. In addition, Rom. 8:14–30 is one of the passages where Paul states that 'we have the first fruits of the pneuma' (8:23), an idea that we have elsewhere seen to have a distinctly physical meaning (see 2 Cor. 5:5 in context). Furthermore, of course, the whole passage follows immediately on 8:10–11, where the physical character of the pneuma comes out very strongly. Finally, we may note the very precise meaning of Paul's talk of 'the redemption of our body' (8:23) on such an interpretation. What he means is both a deliverance *from* the physical body of flesh and blood and also a 'deliverance' *of* it in the sense of its transformation from its present state into the future state of pneumatic glory.²⁶

We should conclude that the whole of Rom. 8:14–30 trades on the picture we have found elsewhere. The (physical) pneuma they have received (8:14) is present in believers' flesh-and-blood bodies that suffer in the present (8:17–18) in slavery to destruction (that is, death, cf. 8:21). At the same time, believers are moving towards a deliverance from and of their bodies (8:23) that will eventually make them have the same form as (the image of) Christ (8:29) and become co-heirs with Christ (8:17). For 'we [literally] co-suffer (with him) *in order that* we may also become [literally] co-glorified (with him)' (8:17). The whole picture becomes concrete and strikingly intelligible as soon as we understand the pneuma literally as a physical entity.

The third passage: Many of the ideas we have just noted are in fact present earlier in Romans in Paul's account in chapter 6 of the meaning and effect of

baptism. There is one important difference, however, in that whereas 8:14ff. is basically directed towards the eschatological future, 6:1ff. constitutes the introduction to a section of the letter that is paraenetic and thus directly concerned with the present life of Paul's addressees.²⁷ However, that only makes the similarities in the ideas all the more striking. Obviously, Paul understood baptism as an initiation into an 'eschatological life'—even in the present. Here we need only consider his invocation of baptism (6:2–6) in response to the question he has himself raised whether believers should 'continue to sin in order that grace may abound' (6:1):

(2) By no means! How can we who died to sin go on living in it? (3) Do you not know that all of us who have been baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into his death? (4) Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death, in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life. (5) For if we have grown together with him in a death that is similar to his, we will certainly also (grow together with him) in a resurrection (like his), (6) since we know this: that our old human being was crucified together with him in order that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin. (NRSV with some changes)

This passage contains some of the ideas in the 'baptism cluster' that we already know quite well: the idea of dying *in order to* come to live a 'resurrected life' (6:4; here it is specifically a present 'resurrected' life that Paul has in mind due to the paraenetic direction of his argument); the idea of 'growing together' with (elsewhere being 'conformed' to) Christ in his death through something that is a simulacrum (Greek *homoiōma*) of his death; the idea that this means the crucifixion together with Christ of 'the old human being' and the destruction of the 'body' of sin (which is of course the body of flesh and blood). Again the question arises whether these various phrases should be understood only metaphorically or in fact literally.

It is certainly true that Paul is explicitly addressing himself to the Romans' cognitive understanding, for example in 6:6 ('since we know') and also in 6:9 (not quoted), where Paul again says 'since we know', and finally in 6:11, where he brings out his paraenetic point: 'So you also must *think of yourselves* as (being) both dead to sin and also living for God in Christ Jesus.' However, this may be taken in two ways. Either they should think of themselves as being something they in fact are not—they are not literally dead; and sin goes with the physical body, which remains in place; still, they should think of themselves as if they *were* dead to sin. Or else they should think of themselves

as being something they in fact are—dead to sin and living for God.²⁸ Since sin is tied to the physical body, this will mean that they *are* dead—or at least that they are literally and physically dying. Of these two options it seems clear that it is the second that captures Paul's meaning best. After all, their 'old human being' *has* been crucified with Christ. It is more than likely, therefore, that a physically sounding expression such as that of being 'grown together' with Christ in a death that is a simulacrum of his should be taken at face value. Pauline baptism was not just a 'symbol' of Christ's death. It was a ritual in which things happened that meant that the body of flesh and blood began to decay whereas that same body as now also harbouring the pneuma began to gather strength. It is this set of events that the Romans should 'think of' as having already taken place in themselves.²⁹

This ends our exploration of passages that speak more or less directly of the operation of the pneuma in connection with the future resurrection. These passages (in Philippians 3, 2 Corinthians 4-5, and Romans 8) all give support to the picture of the resurrection that we articulated in Chapter 1 on the basis of 1 Corinthians 15.

We have also seen, however, that Paul does much more in those same passages; in particular, that he brings his picture of the operation of the pneuma in the future back into the present. And here we discovered a quite striking idea to the effect that when the physical pneuma, which has been received in baptism, is in operation in believers, their physical bodies of flesh and blood are literally in the process of dying away: atrophying. The takeover by the physical pneuma that will be completed at the resurrection is already under way.

We shall now leave on one side for a while the relationship of the pneuma with human beings and turn instead to its relationship with Christ and with God and its status as an entity in its own right (the pneuma 'itself'). With these issues in place we will return to human beings and the question of when and how the pneuma is received by them *from* God and Christ and what its role is in communication in the opposite direction: in human prayer.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRIST AND THE PNEUMA

In our attempt to get the firmest possible grasp of Paul's understanding of the pneuma, we must ask about the relationship between the pneuma and the

resurrected Christ. We know from 1 Cor. 15:45 that ‘the last Adam’—Christ—became or turned into (compare the Greek: *egeneto... eis*) ‘life-producing pneuma’. Similarly, as we just saw, in Rom. 8:9–10 Paul tells the Romans that (9) ‘if somebody does not have the pneuma of Christ, then that person does not belong to him [or: is not his]. (10) But if Christ [and now not just ‘the pneuma of Christ’] is in you, then...’ So, are the resurrected Christ and the pneuma one and the same entity? And does such a view fit the idea of the bodily character of the pneuma? What about Christ as a person? Is Christ perhaps a person with a pneumatic body?

That the resurrected Christ himself is a bodily being comes out in a passage we already know well: Phil. 3:21, where Paul states that the returning Lord, Jesus Christ, will ‘transform our lowly body so that it may obtain *the same shape as his glorious body*’. We have already suggested that the body of human beings that will possess the same shape as Christ’s glorious body is the physical, pneumatic resurrection body of the type mentioned in 1 Cor. 15:44. Thus the resurrected Christ will himself be a physical, pneumatic body. But are Christ and the pneuma just identical?³⁰

Here we must pay attention to the fact that the verse in Philippians speaks of Christ’s ‘glorious body’ or ‘body of glory’. That fits 1 Corinthians 15 where the idea of heavenly bodies (15:40) was immediately connected with that of different types of ‘glory’ among heavenly bodies (15:40–1). We saw that the notion of heavenly bodies led on to the notion of a pneumatic body. We should now ask about the role in this of the ‘glory’ of those heavenly bodies. Is the ‘glory’ in some special way connected with the pneuma?³¹

A famous passage in 2 Corinthians just before the one we have considered suggests that pneuma and ‘glory’ do go closely together in a way that shows that while Christ and the pneuma may well be identified (Christ *is* pneuma), nevertheless they may also be distinguished. In 2 Cor. 2:14–4:6, an extensive contrast is drawn between Paul’s own pneumatic service to Christ and the previous service of Moses to the law. Paul ends with a number of references to people ‘turning to the Lord’, that is, converting (3:16–18, 4:4 and 6), which is not our present theme. But he does give some indications of the ontological character of the object of that conversion—as it were, what one converts *to*.

Having quoted Exodus 34:34 for the notion of turning to the Lord (3:16), he states that ‘the Lord [in the quotation] is the pneuma, and where the pneuma of the Lord is, there...’ (3:17).³² And then he continues (3:18, NRSV): ‘And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as

though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.³³

A little later he states that unbelievers are kept from 'seeing clearly the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ, he who is an image of God' (4:4).³⁴ By contrast, in Paul himself God has 'shone forth in our hearts to generate the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (4:6).³⁵

What is it that believers see (as exemplified by Paul himself)? Answer: the glory of God, which has been given to Christ and is now also the glory of Christ; this they see on the *face* of Christ. And what is this 'glory'? It is something shining, corresponding to the fact that it is 'clearly *seen*' and is also *brought* to shine by God's 'shining forth' in Paul. Seeing this 'shine of the Lord', this shine on the face of Christ, who is himself an image of God, believers are—by 3:18—continuously being transformed into the same image (that is, into Christ) by themselves coming from a shine and by moving into a further shine, all of which is engineered by the Lord, who is (the) pneuma.³⁶ What, then, is it that believers see? What is the shine? Answer: the pneuma itself, which is both what the resurrected Lord, Jesus Christ, himself now *is* and also a shine generated on the face of this humanly conceived Christ *by* the pneuma, which now constitutes his 'body of glory'. As an example of this kind of shine we may quote Paul himself: the shine ('glory') of the sun (1 Cor. 15:41). And remember: a Stoically conceived pneuma is partly made up of fire, which does give off a shine.³⁷

So, the resurrected Christ is a pneumatic being and a shining one. He is also a bodily being: a pneumatic body and a 'body of glory (shining)'. What accounts for the bodiliness is both the fact that he is made up of pneuma, which is itself a bodily thing, and also the fact that he is shining. For the shining character is something that can be physically seen—once one's eyes have been made able to see it by God's 'shining forth' to one. It is true and important that these various events—the shining forth on God's part (4:6) and believers' corresponding seeing the illumination (*phōtismos*) contained in the gospel of Christ's shining (4:4) or in the knowledge of God's shining on the face of Christ—are all events that occur '*in our hearts*' (4:6). But the shining is certainly *seen* in a bodily sense (though in the heart): there is a genuine *illumination* in both cases.

How should we conceive of this kind of seeing? The question merits more extensive analysis than it can receive here. The seeing is certainly not just a

matter of ‘thinking’, as in the vague, modern locution of ‘seeing’ something ‘in the mind’s eye’, that is, imagining it more or less vividly. As Paul describes it, some real kind of seeing must be involved. Neither is it certainly of any help to begin to speak of some kind of ‘mystical’ experience. What Paul aims to express is rather a form of seeing that both has a real object and that one may also engage in, initially, at least, with one’s eyes shut. Initially, it is the mind that sees, not the eyes (compare Paul’s claim in 2 Cor. 4:4 that ‘the God of this aeon has blinded the *thoughts* (*noēmata*) of non-believers’). But this is not because there is nothing to be seen directly. Rather, it is probably because the mind is better equipped—through infusion of the pneuma, one might suspect—actually to see it. Eventually, then, when the physical eyes, too, have become pneumatic, they, too, will become able to see what has actually been there all along.

Nobody can know whether Paul had something like this in mind in those passages. My only aim has been to speculate and to present a certain line of thought that might hopefully lead somebody to investigate whether one can find traces anywhere in Paul’s broader context of such a way of thinking about ‘mental seeing’. For instance, is there any indication that some Stoics actually thought of thinking as some ‘extended’ form of seeing?³⁸

However, let that be. For present purposes we may conclude that the resurrected Christ is both a body made up of pneuma and also one that—as being pneumatic—has a special, shining character. The shine that is seen *is* that of the pneuma, of which the resurrected Christ is himself made up. Still, in spite of being in this way understood as a physical, bodily being, the resurrected Christ is definitely also taken to be a person, for example as someone ‘before’ whose judgement seat believers will appear and on whose ‘face’ the pneumatic shine can be seen. Thus he is clearly also something more than just pneuma.³⁹ What matters right now is only that if we ask about his ontological character, the answer should be that he is both a person and also a body made up of physical pneuma, which can be seen on him as a (physical) shine.⁴⁰

PAUL’S CONCEPTION OF GOD

Christ is the ‘image’ of God (2 Cor. 4:4). Similarly, believers are transformed ‘into the same image’ when they see the shining of Christ, the Lord, and are

moved from one degree of shining to another by the activity of the Lord, who is (shining) pneuma (2 Cor. 3:18). Is God himself, who lies behind these images, then also pneuma?

God is God. And God 'has' pneuma (e.g. Rom. 8:9, 11). Moreover, the pneuma operates—in ways to which we shall come back—as an intermediary between God and human beings. Things become more difficult when we ask about of the general, ontological character of God and of the exact ontological way in which we should think of the relationship between the bodily pneuma and God. Of the latter we can say only that the pneuma has a number of functions in relation to God: it is an instrumental tool of his (cf. Rom. 8:11); it is also a cognitive tool (for revelation and the like), as we shall see in a moment; and it plays a role in prayer (see at the end of this chapter). But there is no indication of any precise ontological underpinning for these functions. That is unsurprising if there is no actual ontology of God in Paul, either. But is that the case? Did Paul in fact not conceive of God in any other way than as a person who is pre-eminently active, which is also the way he thought of Christ, though there with additional ontological determinations?

An obvious place to go for a possible ontology of God is the passage in Romans 1 (1:19–23, 25) where he appears to be reflecting the more directly philosophically oriented Wisdom of Solomon that we already discussed in Chapter 1. There are two important differences between the target of criticism in the two works. In Wisdom 13–15 the author divides the people he is criticizing into two groups. There are those who 'give the name of "gods" to the works of human hands' (13:10). These people are severely and extensively criticized and an explanation is given of how their practice has developed through the history of human culture (13:10–15:19). Before that, however (13:1–9), the author criticizes another group of people, towards whom he is more lenient (13:6–9, NRSV):

(6) Yet these people are little to be blamed, for perhaps they go astray while seeking God and desiring to find him. (7) For while they live among his works, they keep searching, and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful. (8) Yet again, not even they are to be excused; (9) for if they had the power to know so much that they could investigate the world, how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?

We already know from the account given of them in 13:1–5 that these people were Stoics. Where they went wrong was in their inability to conclude from

the ‘works’, which they did admire in the Stoic way, back to the ‘artisan’. In Chapter 1, we noted the somewhat oblique character of this argument since the author is here relying on a Stoic argument for the existence of God to refute the Stoics and blame them for ‘ignorance of God’ (13:1). The likely reason for this dubious move was that he wanted to insist on a God who is really ‘the one who exists’ in the sense intended by the author himself, namely, a *Platonist* sense which removes God completely from creation. It is only if one understands his notion of (the Jewish) God in this way that he will be right in claiming ‘ignorance of God’ (13:1) for the Stoics. Thus the Wisdom of Solomon separated its target into two groups and reproached even the better group of the two with ignorance of God.

In Romans 1, Paul does something different. He targets one group only, which combines the two features of the two groups distinguished in the earlier work. But differently from Wisdom, he does not reproach his targeted group with ignorance of God. On the contrary, they did know God—but nevertheless went wrong. Here is what they did see (Rom. 1:19–21):

(19) For the part of God that can be known is apparent among them. For God made it apparent to them. (20) For the parts of him that are invisible have been seen by the mind since the creation of the world through the things he has made: namely, both his eternal power (*dynamis*) and his divinity (*theiotēs*). So they are without excuse; (21) for though *they knew God (gnontes ton theon)*, they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him . . .

Here is Paul’s combination of the two groups that were separated in Wisdom (1:21–5):

(21) but they became futile in their thinking, and their uncomprehending heart was darkened. (22) Believing to be wise, they became fools; (23) and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an image of a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles . . . ; (25) they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever! Amen.

Seen from a Stoic point of view, both Wisdom and Paul do injustice to the Stoic position, Wisdom by presupposing a loaded understanding of ‘the one who exists’ and Paul by suggesting that the position described in 1:19–21, which corresponds to the Stoic one, led more or less directly to worship of idols as described in 1:21–5. What is more interesting to us is that the two

authors did employ the Stoic argument itself. Even more: differently from Wisdom, Paul allows that the Stoic argument did lead them to an understanding of God, his eternal power, and his divinity. It is true that this admission might be for strategic reasons only since Paul aims to focus on the point that the criticized people are 'without excuse' (1:20, cf. the use of the same motif in 2:1 when Paul turns to the next group he wishes to criticize). But this hardly does justice to the careful description given in 1:19–20 with which he states and affirms the Stoic argument from God's 'works' to his eternal power and divinity. Paul apparently did take it that the criticized people 'knew' God.

Then we can ask: if Paul accepted the Stoic argument for God's existence, did he also accept the specifically Stoic *ontology* of God, which connects God directly with the pneuma? No. There is no indication of this in Romans 1. Nor can I find any such indication elsewhere. It appears, therefore, that although he knew the Stoic argument for the existence of God, Paul simply understood God as an acting person without engaging in any further speculation about his ontological status. Or differently put: Paul's God was just the Jewish God.⁴¹ If that is the correct conclusion, it is probably also unlikely that there is any ontological underpinning in Paul for his understanding of the functional relationship of the pneuma with God.

With that result, how should we understand the (holy) pneuma 'itself' to be taken as an entity that operates *between* God and human beings? In particular, does it in fact come out distinctly as a physical entity in the way we have been led to expect?

THE ONTOLOGY OF THE PNEUMA 'ITSELF'

The pneuma as an independent messenger between God and human beings has first of all two functions. One follows immediately from our argument earlier in this chapter to the effect that the 'power' that is operative in the resurrection is the pneuma. Here the function of the pneuma is an instrumental one. We saw that the idea is explicitly stated in Rom. 8:11: 'If the pneuma of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also make your mortal bodies alive *through his pneuma that dwells in you.*' Since we still need to defend the claim that the pneuma is a physical entity through and through, we may spend a

moment here on spelling out what is shown in that regard by this important verse.

Paul's point in the verse is that God will eventually make alive the mortal bodies of the Roman believers. He also produces two distinct ideas to support his point, first, that God has raised Christ and, second, that God's pneuma dwells in believers. The importance of these ideas is brought out by the fact that Paul states them twice. In fact, while he just places them indiscriminately together in the first half of the verse ('the pneuma—of him who raised Christ—dwells in you'), in the second half he distinguishes them in order to bring out as strongly as possible the directly instrumental character of the pneuma: 'he who raised Christ . . .' plus '*through* his pneuma that dwells in you'. What we get, then, is the idea of the pneuma that dwells *in* believers and will also—in that form—be *operating on* them. And not just that: operating on their bodies, indeed, on their *mortal* bodies.

Now mortal bodies are physical objects. In fact, on almost any ancient conception—whether in the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition or a Stoic or Epicurean one—what makes them mortal is precisely their physicality: that they are subject to 'generation and destruction'. These physical objects, then, will be made alive by the pneuma. We already know from 1 Corinthians 15 that Paul conceived of the actual result of the pneuma's operation as itself being a physical object (the 'pneumatic *body*'). And we concluded from that that the pneuma itself was understood to be a physical entity. But even if we did not know that, the strong emphasis in Rom. 8:11 on the sheer intimacy of the pneuma with the individual physical bodies of believers (it dwells *in* them and will transform them in their *mortality*) would make it clear that he understood the pneuma itself in its instrumental role as a physical entity.

The first function of the pneuma, then, is the directly instrumental one, where the pneuma as a physical entity dwells in and operates on mortal bodies. The second function is a revelatory and cognitive one. Through the pneuma God 'reveals' to believers his 'secret and hidden wisdom' (1 Cor. 2:7). 1 Cor. 2:10–16 is a crucial passage:

(10) To us God has revealed [what no eye has seen etc.] through the pneuma; for the pneuma searches everything,⁴² even the depths of God. (11) For which human being knows what belongs to any (given) human being except the pneuma of the human being itself that is in him? Similarly, too, nobody knows what belongs to God except God's pneuma. (12) But we have received not the pneuma of the world,⁴³ but the pneuma that is from God, in order that we may understand the gifts that have been bestowed on us by God. (13) Of these things we also speak, not in words taught by

human wisdom but taught by pneuma, interpreting pneumatic things through pneumatic means [or words]. (14) The psychic person, by contrast, does not accept the things that belong to the pneuma of God; for they are foolishness to him and he cannot understand them since they are discerned pneumatically. (15) The pneumatic person, by contrast, discerns all things, but is himself discerned by nobody. (16) For *Who has known the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?* We, however, *have* the mind of Christ.

In this passage the pneuma is understood as something that human beings may 'receive' from God. And that reception is a prerequisite for an act of understanding, namely, of the 'depths' of God or his gifts (where the most important gift is presumably the Christ event itself). The basic idea is that the pneuma is instrumental in generating *cognition* (cf. 2:10: through the pneuma God has *revealed* his gifts, that is, brought human beings to understand them). It makes excellent sense, therefore, that Paul should end with his ringing affirmation that 'we have the *mind* (Greek: *nous*) of Christ'. Even more: although he takes over the term *nous* from a quotation from Isaiah, the fact that he may use that term in the present context suggests that he was well aware that the pneuma and the *nous* could be understood as two words for the same thing. And so they in fact were—in Stoicism.⁴⁴

We shall come back later to the distinction between psychic and pneumatic people. Here we may ask—in the light of what we said about the pneuma in its purely instrumental function—whether there is any indication in this passage of a specific ontological character of the pneuma in its cognitive role. It is obvious (cf. 2:10–12) that the pneuma plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between God and human beings. The pneuma *of God* knows the 'depths' of God (2:10); and by receiving the 'pneuma that is *from* God' (2:12), human beings obtain cognitive access to God's gifts: they now *understand* God. But is there any indication in the passage of a specific ontological character of this pneuma? Or should we leave the pneuma in its cognitive form with the rather indistinct ontology that we gave to God?

In 2:10–16 itself there is nothing that points directly towards a specific ontology of the pneuma. In the light of Rom. 8:11, however, it seems noteworthy that in 1 Cor. 2:10–16, too, Paul does give an instrumental role to the pneuma (namely, as *generating* cognition) and also that he seems to imply (in 2:11–12, but not 2:11 alone) that the pneuma that believers receive from God will dwell *within* them.⁴⁵ This immediately raises the question of the exact way in which these things will happen. Is it in fact through a literal infusion from above of a physical object (an elemental 'energy' or power)?

One indication to this effect may be drawn from the fact that the distinction in our passage between a psychic person (Greek: *psychikos anthrōpos*) and a pneumatic one is taken up directly in chapter 15 of the letter. There, as we know, Paul does provide the two terms with a highly distinct, cosmological ontology as being connected with two distinct types of body. If one is allowed to read this back into the present passage, and if we can also take it on the basis of Rom. 8:11 that Paul does rely on the idea of the pneuma itself as a physical entity in its purely instrumental role, then what one gets in 1 Corinthians 2, too, is a conception of the pneuma as a physical entity even in its cognitive role. What makes a human being pneumatic (at least to the extent that the pneumatic person of 2:15 may be said to be on the way towards becoming completely pneumatic at the resurrection) is an infusion of physical pneuma that *also* provides cognition.

Is this combination of physicalism and cognition a problem? Not at all, as we shall see in a moment. One can certainly have a conception of the pneuma as being both physical and cognitive. Perhaps one might also mention here the sharpened sense of 1 Cor. 2:13 on a physical understanding of the pneuma. Now the theme is not just Paul's speaking on the basis of an abstract and metaphorical contrast between words 'taught by' human wisdom and 'taught by' the pneuma. Instead, he may be presupposing a distinct theory about the way the pneuma—for instance, as the Stoic 'internal reason' (*en-diathetos logos*)—may directly place certain words on his lips, for instance, as the Stoic 'uttered word' (*prophorikos logos*).⁴⁶ More on this in Chapter 5.

However, is there any more solid indication in the present passage that Paul also thinks of the pneuma in its cognitive role as a physical entity? There is. In the lines (2:1–5) just before he begins to speak (from 2:6 onwards) of the divine sort of wisdom that has been revealed through the pneuma, he describes his missionary strategy when he came to Corinth for the first time. He did not make any use of 'plausible words of wisdom' (2:4, NRSV), but instead of a 'demonstration of pneuma and power | in order that your faith might rest not on human wisdom but on the power of God' (2:4–5). What does this enigmatic 'demonstration of pneuma and power' refer to? In the letter to the Galatians, Paul moves into the same territory when he begins to speak of what had happened when the Galatians first came to faith (3:5): 'The one who supplies you with the pneuma and works his powers [that is, miracles] among you—(does he do it) as a result of works of the law (on your part) or faith on the basis of what you heard?' Clearly, the Galatians now

had the pneuma and were able to work miracles through its means, but all on the basis of the faith they had previously received. Similarly, when Paul came to Corinth, he made a 'demonstration of pneuma and power' in order that they might *obtain* faith based on their seeing the power of God. Here the pneuma is connected with working miracles, which is not just a cognitive thing. The most striking miracle of all—God's raising the crucified Christ, of which Paul *must* have told the Corinthians when he preached his message of 'Jesus Christ crucified'—was of course something wholly real.⁴⁷ It did something to the crucified body of Christ. Thus the idea in 1 Cor. 2:4–5 seems to be that Paul had demonstrated the power of God's pneuma in raising the crucified Christ. The Corinthians had then come to faith. But 'we' also *received* the pneuma (on the basis of faith, cf. Gal. 3:5), thereby coming to *understand* God's gifts (in raising the crucified Christ).⁴⁸ That is, God's pneumatic power that raised Christ was also received by believers *as one and the same thing*, thereby generating an *understanding* of the Christ event. Since we already know that in its first, purely instrumental role, this pneumatic power was a physical entity, it seems wholly likely that Paul understood it the same way in its second role, where it was instrumental in generating cognition.

This leads us to a fundamental point about the Pauline pneuma, to which we shall repeatedly come back: that there is absolutely no inconsistency in understanding it as a physical entity and as a cognitive power that generates understanding. At least, that is exactly the picture one gets in the *Stoic* understanding of the pneuma, which is both a material entity and a cognitive one. Indeed, one might even say that this Stoic conception fits particularly well the Pauline understanding of 'revelation' as a grasp that is generated from above by a literal infusion of pneuma that reveals the 'depths' of God: his gift of staging the Christ event. God did it—through the physical pneuma purely instrumentally understood. And God showed it—through *the same* physical pneuma cognitively understood.

We should conclude that no matter what we can say of the ontology of Paul's God, the two passages we have considered from Romans 8 and 1 Corinthians 2 prove that he understood the pneuma as a physical entity both in its purely instrumental and in its cognitive roles.

THE PNEUMA OUTSIDE AND WITHIN HUMAN BEINGS

In a single chapter of Romans Paul may speak of 'God's pneuma' (8:9, 14), 'Christ's pneuma' (8: 9)—both of which may dwell *in* believers (8:9, 11; 8:9–10)—'the pneuma itself' (8:16, 26) and 'our pneuma' (8:16). Much of this is unproblematic. The basic idea is probably that of God's pneuma (or Christ's or Christ) dwelling in believers. For special purposes Paul may then also speak of the pneuma 'itself' as being in some way distinct from God (if not necessarily from Christ's pneuma or Christ), and of 'our' pneuma as an entity of its own. It is in fact the ontology of the pneuma 'itself' as a messenger between God and human beings that we have been studying up to now in this chapter. However, let this be clearly stated: the pneuma 'itself' is of course in no way different from God's pneuma—it *is* God's pneuma, but as in some sense seen on its own (more on this below); similarly, 'our' pneuma is not different from God's pneuma (or indeed, from the pneuma itself)—it *is* God's pneuma, only now as present in human beings. Still, we may well ask what specific point Paul is making when he speaks of the pneuma 'itself', and what ontology he is presupposing, for example, when he says (Rom. 8:16): 'The pneuma itself bears witness together with our pneuma that we are God's children.' In the immediately preceding verse Paul has stated that the pneuma that believers have received (in baptism) is a pneuma of sonship in or by which they cry out 'Abba! Father!' Seen in that light the point of the quoted verse will be that when believers make that cry in an act of speech which evidently reflects the state of their own pneuma, then it is in fact the pneuma 'itself', *that is*, not *just* their own pneuma, but *God's* own pneuma, that bears witness *vis-à-vis* God on believers' behalf and *together with* their own pneuma. Here the pneuma 'itself' both acts on behalf of and in solidarity with believers—and so, it has entered into a relationship with their pneuma—and is also in fact *God's* own pneuma. In this way 'the pneuma itself' *ties together* believers and God extremely closely while also emphasizing their difference. It *is* God's own pneuma—but it enters into contact with the pneuma of human beings. Both features enter into the definition of the pneuma 'itself'.

The same picture comes out a little later (8:26–7):

(26) In the same way, too, the pneuma helps us in our weakness. For we do not know what to pray for in the way it should be done, but the pneuma itself intercedes

(for us) with sighs too deep for words. (27) But God, who searches people's hearts, knows what the pneuma has in mind, because it is in accordance with (the will of) God that the pneuma intercedes for the saints.

Here, too, the pneuma 'itself' is seen as being intimately connected with believers and as acting on their behalf vis-à-vis God. It is present within people's hearts and results in their deep, wordless sighs. It is also, however, directly connected with God since it is in accordance with his will that it intercedes on behalf of believers and since God, who searches people's hearts, may therefore also know what the pneuma has in mind *as* present in those hearts and as coming to audible expression in those inarticulate sighs.⁴⁹

In both texts, the pneuma 'itself' is God's pneuma, but understood as being intimately present in human beings and as acting in a symbiosis with their own pneuma. Is this pneuma also the 'Holy Spirit' (Greek: *to hagion pneuma*)? Evidently yes, but not thereby as something different from 'God's pneuma', 'Christ's pneuma', or Christ himself (as pneuma).

And the ontology? There is little to add here to what has already been said. The pneuma 'itself' is a physical entity that operates in cooperation with people's own pneuma, which will be a physical entity, too. *Perhaps* one can see its special ontological character of a directly physical entity in the two facts that it suddenly makes baptized believers speak Aramaic ('Abba!'), that is, in a language that is not their own, and that it comes to expression in sighs that are precisely *inarticulate*. Still, even when it is conceived as a physical entity, it does have cognitive content, which is what God sees. God himself, however, is distinct from the pneuma. Nor can we say anything about his own ontology on the basis of these two texts.

From these lofty heights let us move down to human beings and the question of their reception of the gift of the pneuma from above: exactly when and how does this happen?

THE GIFT OF THE PNEUMA: WHEN?

Galatians 3–4 articulates a theory of the reception of the pneuma according to which faith results in people's becoming sons of God (cf. 3:26), and sonship (4:5) implies God's sending the pneuma (4:6). The basic feature of the theory—that faith results in reception of the pneuma—is stated in 3:2, 5, and 14, ending with the precise statement of the relationship in 3:14b: 'so

that we might receive the promised pneuma *through* the faith'. A slightly more complicated version of the theory that also brings in sonship is stated in Gal. 3:26–4:7 in a manner that connects the whole process with baptism. And it is here, in baptism, that the pneuma obtains its proper role. So what is the precise relationship between faith, sonship, pneuma, and baptism according to the full version of the theory?⁵⁰

In 3:26–4:7 Paul draws a basic contrast between being a slave under a 'pedagogue' in the form of the Mosaic law (3:22–5 and again 4:1–3 and 7) and being a free-born son (3:26, 4:5–7), who is also an heir (3:29, 4:7) to the promise given to Abraham (3:29—going back to 3:6ff.). From the way Paul begins in 3:26 it might seem that there is a progression here: faith → sonship → pneuma. For he says this: 'For you are all sons of God through the faith.' However, he immediately adds '(and by being) in Christ Jesus' and it is this specific idea that carries what follows (3:27–9):

(27) For by being baptized into Christ, you have been clothed in Christ. (28) There is neither Jew nor Greek among you, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female. For you are all *one* in Christ Jesus. (29) And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise.

Paul's target is to show that the Galatians are all one and for that precise reason also Abraham's offspring (whom Paul has earlier said is in fact Christ, 3:16) and hence heirs. That target is achieved by claiming that they are 'in' Christ Jesus (26) by having been 'clothed in' Christ at their baptism (27). Since their being heirs will equal their being sons, the idea in 3:26–9 will be that through faith (that experience remains basic) *and* by having been 'clothed in' Christ and hence come to be 'in' Christ, they have become *one* in Christ and *thereby* sons of God and heirs.⁵¹ How, then, have they been clothed in Christ at their baptism since this is apparently what makes them be 'in' Christ, and hence 'one in Christ' and so sons and heirs?

The answer is given in 4:4–7:

(4) . . . God sent out his own son . . . (5) in order to ransom those under the law, in order that we might receive (the status of) sonship. (6) And because you [plural] are sons, God sent out the pneuma of his son into our hearts crying out 'Abba! Father!' (7) So that you [singular] are no longer a slave, but a son, and if a son, then also an heir, through God.

Here again Paul's focus is on sonship. But here it is achieved through reception of the pneuma in baptism.⁵² Since baptism was also mentioned

in 3:27, we may conclude that the way in which the Galatians had become 'one in Christ' was through having the pneuma infused into their hearts by God in an act that resulted, once more, in their speaking Aramaic. Thus the proper sequence is in fact this: faith, baptism, reception of the pneuma, sonship (and being 'in' Christ and 'one' in him). That is also implied in the closely comparable passage of Rom. 8:15 when Paul states that the Roman believers did not 'receive a pneuma of slavery . . . but you received a pneuma of sonship (*pneuma hyiothesias*) in which we cry out "Abba! Father!"' Reception of the pneuma gives sonship.

The important conclusion is that 'being in Christ'—and indeed, 'being one in Christ'—as a result of 'having been clothed in Christ' should be understood as having a quite concrete ontological underpinning, which is that of having received the material pneuma. Or the other way round: one is 'clothed in' Christ, is 'in' Christ, and 'one in' Christ (with other believers) *because* one has received God's pneuma—or again: 'his son's pneuma' (Gal. 4:6), 'Christ's pneuma' (Rom. 8:9) or indeed, Christ himself (Rom. 8:10)—in one's heart, and because through that reception the pneuma has come to 'dwell in' one. This is all very physical, which explains, of course, why Paul may also speak of believers as together forming a single 'body', the 'body of Christ'. That is for later, however. But it is just worth noting in passing Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 12:13 that 'in the one pneuma we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, slaves or free'. Baptism and pneuma hang intrinsically together and they generate the one physical body to which all baptized believers belong when in a wholly literal sense they are 'in Christ'. There is nothing 'mystical' about this, as Albert Schweitzer would have it. It is all a question of elemental pneumatic cosmology.

This, then, is how the pneuma is received by believers: at baptism, to which people will go on the basis of faith. It is probably this event to which Paul refers when he speaks of God's 'giving the pneuma in our hearts as a first instalment (*arrabōn*)'. The full form is at 2 Cor. 1:22; 2 Cor. 5:5 omits the reference to the hearts; Rom. 5:5 has the hearts, but not the first instalment, which is only given in Rom. 8:23 (though with a different term: 'first fruits', *aparchē*).⁵³

However, Paul apparently also had the idea that God would give the pneuma not just once but on a continual basis. At least, God is described in 1 Thess. 4:8 as somebody who 'also *gives* his holy pneuma to you'. Here the 'gives' has been corrected by later textual witnesses to 'has given'.⁵⁴ But that only shows that 'gives' is the correct reading and that it precisely has the sense of an ongoing gift.

The idea that God is constantly active vis-à-vis believers is strikingly stated in Phil. 2:13: 'For it is God who is working in you both to will and to work for his good pleasure.' Here there is no mention of the pneuma, only the idea of God being at work (Greek: *energein*). In 1 Cor. 12:4–11, by contrast, the pneuma is everywhere, and here in close combination with the same idea of God's being at work (again *energein*):

(4) There are varieties of gifts, but the same pneuma. (5) There are varieties of services, but the same Lord. (6) There are varieties of activities (Greek: *energēmata*), but the same God who is working (*energein*) everything in everything. (7) To each (individual) is given [in the present tense and presumably by *God*] the *manifestation* of the pneuma for the common good. (8) For to one is given *through* the pneuma the utterance of wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same pneuma, (9) to another . . . faith . . . healings . . . (10) . . . miracles . . . prophecy . . . discernment of spirits . . . various kinds of tongues . . . interpretation of tongues. (11) All these things are worked (*energein*) *by* the one and the same pneuma, which divides up to each one individually just as it chooses.

It is difficult not to conclude that when God is constantly working everything in everything (cf. Phil. 2:13), he does it *through* his pneuma (cf. 1 Cor. 12:4–11), which is constantly being given and works everything in each individual just as it chooses. After all, we know that the pneuma is God's *dynamis* (power), and we know (in fact, from Aristotle) that a *dynamis* will manifest itself in *energeiai* (being 'at work').

THE GIFT OF THE PNEUMA: HOW?

Are there any positive indications in the specific texts on God's giving the pneuma (other than 1 Corinthians 2, already discussed above) that Paul did think of this particular event as a concretely physical one? We have already found plenty of ways of speaking in other areas involving the pneuma that show that in a general way Paul did have a physical conception of it. But how in the case of God's giving it?

Consider in its context one of the texts that speak of God's giving the pneuma, Rom. 5:5: 'Hope does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the holy pneuma that has been given to us.' The context of this verse is justification by faith at one end (5:1, 6–9) and eschatological hope for salvation in the form of life instead of death at the

other end (5:9–11). The wider context is Rom. 8:14–39, which spells out the eschatological hope introduced at 5:1–11 and as we already know is full of talk of the pneuma.⁵⁵ However, Paul begins to speak of the pneuma already in 8:1–13, which in itself constitutes the conclusion to 6:1–8:13.⁵⁶ Where Romans 5 and 8:14–39 address what has happened to believers and its consequences for the eschatological future, 6:1–8:13 focuses on what has happened and its consequences for the present. What, then, do 8:1–13 (for the present) and 8:14–39 (for the future) tell us about the precise character of the event celebrated in 5:5, the giving of the pneuma which started the whole thing?⁵⁷

The passage 8:1–13 celebrates (for paraenetic purposes) the change from living under the Mosaic law (cf. 7:7–25) to living ‘in Christ’ and the pneuma.⁵⁸ An early contrast in the text is between ‘us, who walk (*peripatein*) not according to (*kata*) the flesh but according to the pneuma’ (8:4). Immediately, however, the contrast is sharpened into one between ‘being (*einai*) according to (*kata*) the flesh’ versus ‘according to the pneuma’ (8:5). A few verses later this is sharpened even further into ‘being in (*en*) the flesh’ (8:8) versus ‘not being in the flesh but in the pneuma’ (8:9), which is brought about—as we know—by having God’s pneuma ‘dwell in’ one, by ‘possessing’ Christ’s pneuma (8:9) and by having ‘Christ (himself) in’ one (8:10) with the result that one’s body is dead. Next, in the verse we have also already considered (8:11), these descriptions of life on earth are directly connected—in a brief flash forward that serves as a promise for a successful eschatological outcome—with what will happen to the mortal bodies of believers at the final stage. And it all leads to the claim that ‘if by the pneuma you put to death the acts of the body, you will live’ (8:13).

We have already referred to 8:11 for the physical character of the pneuma as it is envisaged in its future role at the resurrection. A similar argument might be drawn from the development in 8:5–10 with regard to the presence of the pneuma here and now in the bodies of believers. Then we may also produce an argument with regard to the initial reception of the pneuma: if Paul understood the present consequences of having received the pneuma in the way described in 8:5–10, it seems overwhelmingly likely that he also thought that the reception itself would have taken the same form of a physical, literal takeover (if only an incipient one) brought about by a literal infusion of physical pneuma coming from above.

Consider then the remainder of chapter 8, which we know to be looking towards the eschatological future. There is first a repetition of the moment believers received the pneuma in baptism (8:14–17). Then there is a discussion of the present sufferings in comparison with the future glory (cf. 8:18), which first considers the present longing of the whole of creation (8:19–22). There is no mention here of the pneuma as present in non-human creation. But we already know from the previous chapter that the best way of understanding how creation may be ‘set free from its bondage to decay’ to ‘obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God’ (8:21) is by reading it together with sections from 1 Corinthians 15 in the light of the Stoic understanding of the conflagration. And that event is very much brought about by the pneuma. With 8:23 Paul returns to human beings and believers who while having the first fruits of the pneuma (8:23) wait longingly and with hope for the final sonship (8:23–5). The pneuma ‘itself’ helps them pray for the final consummation (8:26–7) and Paul affirms that believers *know* that to ‘those who love God’ (8:28—which brings us back to 5:5, from which we began) everything will work out for the best.⁵⁹

The overall theme in all this is eschatological sonship, which is already in a sense present in the form of pneuma in believers (8:15). But here too, as we have previously seen, Paul focuses on the body and its present decay as it waits for its final, complete transformation, not only in human beings, but even in non-human creation, which is nothing *but* a body. That is, he understands the present suffering of the whole world in the light of its coming bodily transformation and deliverance that will be generated by the pneuma. And then again the argument: if this constitutes Paul’s picture of the whole world both now and in the future, it seems more than likely that he will have understood in the same way what happened in the past when God’s love was poured into the hearts of believers through his giving of the pneuma. For this, it seems, is where all the later transformations began. In that case we should understand in a completely literal sense the idea of God’s pouring his love into the hearts of human believers as stated in 5:5. God’s love *arrived in* believers in the form of physical pneuma to which they responded by crying ‘Abba! Father!’

We may conclude that the initial reception of the pneuma in baptism was almost certainly understood by Paul as a directly physical event that quite concretely began a transformation of the bodies of believers that would be played out in their present lives and eventually completed at the resurrection. At the beginning, God’s love was *literally* poured into their hearts through the pneuma.

PRAYER AND THE PNEUMA

We have spoken of God giving the pneuma and human beings receiving it. Interestingly, there is also something like a Pauline theory of communication in the other direction: from human beings to God. In what Paul says of prayer it appears that the pneuma plays an important role, too. This should come as no surprise since Paul gives a role in Rom. 8:26–7 to the pneuma ‘itself’ precisely in connection with prayer concerning the final events: the pneuma intercedes on behalf of believers when they do not know how to pray in the proper way. Still, it is worth pursuing the topic a little further since it shows that there is in fact something like a theory just underneath Paul’s innocent-looking ways of speaking.

The basic picture is presented by 1 Thess. 1:2–3 and 3:9–10 (NRSV):

(1:2) We always give thanks *to* God *for* all of you and mention you in our prayers, constantly (3) remembering *before* (Greek: *emprosthen*) *our God and Father* your work of faith . . .

(3:9) How can we thank God enough *for* you in return for all the joy that we feel *before* (again *emprosthen*) *our God* because of you? (10) Night and day we pray most earnestly that we may see you face to face . . .

Paul’s praying and thanking are evidently directed *to* God. But quite importantly, they also occur *before* God—whatever that means. 2 Cor. 2:10 apparently expresses something like the same idea (NRSV): ‘Anyone whom you forgive, I also forgive. What I have forgiven, if I have forgiven anything, has been for your sake *in the presence* (Greek: *en prosōpōi*) *of Christ*.’ What does Paul mean? How are we to imagine it?

Phil. 1:19 may provide part of the answer. As we know, Paul is in a dire situation but feels certain that he will survive with help from the Philippians: ‘For I know that this (present situation) will turn to my salvation through your prayer and (your) supply (or provision) of the pneuma of Jesus Christ.’⁶⁰ Apparently, praying is a matter of having direct contact with God by means of the pneuma, even to such an extent that through prayer the Philippians may *supply* Paul *with* Christ’s pneuma (or at least with more of it than he already has). Prayer, then, is engaging the pneuma.⁶¹ We already know that the result of this act on the part of the Philippians will be that

‘Christ will be exalted now as always in my body’ (1:20, NRSV). It is likely, therefore, that Paul conceived of the pneuma as a directly physical entity also in the role it played in prayer.

The connection with the pneuma of prayer and thanks comes out, finally, in Rom. 1:8–9:

(8) First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ for all of you, because your faith is proclaimed throughout the world. (9) For God, whom I serve with my pneuma by announcing the gospel of his son, is my witness that I constantly make mention of you, (10) always asking in my prayers that . . .

Again Paul is in direct communication with (‘my’) God, thanking him *for* the Romans and making mention *of* them, to such an extent that God may serve as a (direct) witness to the truth of his claims. But how does this communication occur? By Paul’s drawing on the relationship he has with God through his pneuma. Indeed, it may just about be this that is meant when Paul claims to be thanking God ‘*through* Jesus Christ’ *for* the Romans. He is not thanking God *for* Christ, but *through* him. Is this because Christ *is* pneuma (and also a person)?

In summary, it seems that Paul took it that in praying to God and giving thanks to him believers drew on God’s pneuma, which was present in them, and through that means—to be literally understood as a duct or channel transporting pneuma back and forth—came directly into the presence of God (or Christ) so as to stand ‘before’ God (1 Thess. 1:3, 3:9) or ‘face to face with’ Christ (2 Cor. 2:10). It would be worth trying to discover some contextual set of ideas that might be taken to underpin this picture. But even before one gets that far, it seems certain that a theory of some kind does underlie Paul’s rather precise ways of speaking in this area, too.

3

Physics, Cognition, and Superhuman Persons

THREE TYPES OF DISCOURSE

The previous chapter took the core idea about the pneuma that we discovered in Chapter 1 on the basis of 1 Corinthians 15 into a broader field where the pneuma was not just connected with the future resurrection, but also seen to be operative in different ways as part of the present life of believers, going back to the moment they received it in baptism. The pneuma itself remained in focus all through. And we saw that a single conception of it (as both a physical and a cognitive entity) was able to account for Paul's highly variegated use throughout all the main letters.

In the present chapter we shall move around more freely, trying to cover more or less everything that can be said about Paul's world-view. Our concern will not be so much over the details, but rather with a set of topics that reflects the philosophical question of the relationship between three types of discourse that we shall find Paul to be employing. One such topic is the relationship between physics and cognition since—as we already saw—the pneuma is very much *also* a cognitive phenomenon. Another topic will be the relationship between a physical cum cognitive description of the world and a description of it in terms of people: superhuman persons who act in relation to human beings in various ways. This will gradually lead us into a more and more colourful field, via a relatively traditional understanding of the world as being made up of things in heaven, on earth, and under the earth (Philippians 2 and Romans 10) over Paul's account of his own heavenly journey (2 Corinthians 12) and his rejection of life under the 'elements of this world' (Galatians 4) into his mainly negative attitude to the angels and demons that fill up the present world and interact with human beings in various detrimental ways (all the letters): the powers which (as we know from 1 Cor. 15:24–8) will finally be crushed by the resurrected Christ before he 'hands over the kingdom to God the Father' (15:24, NRSV). The more colourful this whole account becomes (we should not call it 'mythical'

since Paul probably took it all quite literally as part of his overall world-view), the more ‘apocalyptic’ it also becomes. The basic question is, then, whether—and if so how—one may combine this ‘apocalyptic’ outlook with the more ‘philosophical’ and ‘scientific’ view (both terms to be taken in their ancient senses) from which we will begin. Should we, as it were, assign Paul’s physical and cognitive discourse to Greco–Roman philosophy and science and his personalistic and ‘apocalyptic’ discourse to Jewish ‘apocalypticism’? Or is that another dichotomy that we should go beyond? If so, how may the three types of discourse actually be fused?

This question might seem sufficiently important to hold together our look at the many sides of Paul’s world-view. We shall see, however, that there is a single theme in everything Paul himself says in this whole area that keeps it together in any case: the theme of human freedom. Here, too, the ‘scientific’ view of the pneuma from which we begin will show its importance. For it is the element of cognition in the pneuma that in the final event explains the possibility of human freedom. We will consider this topic further in the next chapter under the title of the relationship between divine (or more broadly superhuman) and human agency. But we need to raise it already here in order to show where the real distinctions are to be found.

At the end of the present chapter we will move down from the general world-view to Paul’s anthropology as part of that world-view: his early talk in 1 Thessalonians 5 of believers as being made up of pneuma, *psychē* (‘soul’) and body (*sōma*), his later talk in 1 Corinthians 2 of a ‘pneumatic’ and a ‘psychic man’ and his even later, basic contrast in Romans 8 between ‘being in’ the pneuma and ‘being in’ *sarx* (‘flesh’). Here the point will be that Paul’s anthropology is a straightforwardly cosmological and material one. To that extent it belongs under his world-view, which is why we will discuss it here. At the same time, and due to the cognitive character of the pneuma, the anthropology *also* opens up directly for the whole field of moral psychology, which is of course very comprehensively present in the Pauline letters in connection with his paraenesis. That line, however, will only be taken up later.

THE COGNITIVE ROLE OF THE PNEUMA

We saw in the previous chapter that one of the places where Paul brings out the physical character of the pneuma—both in its future and present roles—

is Rom. 8:1–13. However, the relationship between that passage and the immediately preceding text (7:7–25) raises further questions. In 7:7–25 it seems that Paul uses terms that are basically cognitive (see below) to describe life under the Mosaic law as constituting an insoluble problem. Then 8:1–13 is brought in as providing the solution to the problem. But how may a thesis about an influx of material pneuma solve a problem that is basically cognitive?

Rom. 7:7–25 is one of the most hotly disputed texts in the New Testament.¹ Here I must presuppose my view that the problem Paul is describing is the cognitive one of ancient ‘weakness of will’ (*akrasia*): that of a (non-believing) Jew who will evidently ‘delight in the law of God in my inmost self’ (7:22), but will also—at least from time to time—‘see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members’ (7:23, NRSV).² The term ‘see’ (*blepein*) is crucial here since it shows the fundamentally cognitive character of the experience described by Paul, which is also clearly stated at the beginning of his account when he speaks of sin as being ‘*shown* (or made *appear*) to be sin’ (7:13—the term is *phainesthai*) and says that ‘I do not *understand* my own actions’ (7:15). It is no valid objection to this emphasis on the cognitive side of the problem to point out that Paul also speaks of ‘sin dwelling in me’ as the entity that is concretely active (7:17, 20), namely, when he acts akratically. For as we shall see, there is absolutely no contrast between speaking of an external, demonic, and personal agent (here: sin) invading the agent and speaking of the same phenomenon in cognitive terms.³

What we need here is only agreement that no matter what else is implied in 7:7–25, Paul *also* describes the problem of living under the Mosaic law in cognitive terms—and as I would say very strongly so: he is describing the almost schizophrenic experience of wanting to follow the law but actually *seeing* some other power overcoming the will of his mind.⁴ How, then, may that problem be solved through a reference to an influx of material pneuma, as the result of such an influx is described in 8:1–13?

Here again it is certainly possible to say that the pneuma as the power of God is just stronger than the other power of sin that was earlier operating in the person’s ‘limbs’. And so, what we have is a straightforward, ‘apocalyptic’ battle between powers. In fact, this is not only possible but actually right, as long as one does not take the ‘just stronger’ to imply that there is no cognitive aspect at all to the process—that it is ‘*just*’ a matter of one power vanquishing another (in whatever way: people who take it thus owe us an

account of how it happens). In itself such a reading would run counter to the manner in which Paul has set up the problem that is solved by the Christ event. Why emphasize the cognitive dimension of the problem, as he without doubt does in 7:7–25, if the solution is not going to have any cognitive dimension at all? Furthermore, Paul's whole account of the solution as given in 8:1–11 leads up to two verses (8:12–13) that are strongly paraenetic: '(12) So then, brothers, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh—(13) for if you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the pneuma you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live. [So, do that!]'⁵ These two verses not only appeal to the understanding of the addressees—as does the whole passage and indeed 7:7–25, too: they also tell them what they must *themselves* do *by means of* the pneuma, which they do have. If the pneuma was *only* a physical entity (like a liquid or something similar) or some wholly external 'power', such exhortation would make no sense. Instead, Paul is presupposing that the physical pneuma which dwells in his addressees also has a cognitive side to it. It is to this side that he directs his appeal.

What could the content be of this cognition? What is it one knows when one has received the pneuma? We have already learnt the answer from 1 Cor. 2:12, where Paul says that believers have 'received . . . the pneuma from God in order that we might understand [NRSV for the Greek: *eidenai*] the gifts bestowed on us by God'. It is the same insight that Paul is describing more comprehensively in Rom. 8:1–11 itself: the insight that God sent his son in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in believers and they might thereby gain salvation (see 8:3–4).

We should take it, therefore, that Paul understood the pneuma as having both a physical and a cognitive side to it. We already know that such a dual understanding of the pneuma is entirely possible since that is how the pneuma was also understood in Stoicism, where the whole point was to hold the cognitive and the material aspect together in a single grasp. We cannot claim, however, that Paul's presupposed cognitive understanding of the pneuma in itself *requires* an influence from Stoicism. There might well be other, less technical patterns of thought on which Paul might draw. Still, if his account of the pneumatic body in 1 Corinthians 15 does presuppose Stoicism, as we argued in Chapter 1, then his presupposed cognitive understanding of the pneuma fits in as hand in glove. Moreover, on such an assumption one can immediately understand why Paul's account in 8:1–11 of the presence of the physical pneuma in believers leads directly on to a

cognitive, paraenetic point in 8:12–13. For Stoicism lies behind Paul's practice of paraenesis, too.⁶

We may conclude on Rom. 8:1–13 in relation to 7:7–25 that the relationship of problem (7:14–25) and solution (8:1–11) shows that corresponding to the cognitive character of the problem, the solution, too, presupposes a cognitive understanding of the pneuma in addition to the physical understanding with which it also clearly operates. We may also conclude—without going deeply into the anthropological side of Paul's analysis of *akrasia* in 7: 7–25—that Paul's understanding of the phenomenon of *akrasia* was Stoic rather than Platonic: his argument in 7:7–8:13 as a whole presupposes that a change in *cognition* (in effect: a conversion) may—as it were momentarily, and that means: without requiring any long process of *habituation*—result in a person's moving completely from the state described in 7:7–25 into the one described in 8:1–13; and it is only Stoicism that allows for this.⁷ Here it is no use objecting that the change is not just a cognitive one, but one that is brought about by God's engineering an influx of pneuma from above. That is certainly true. But the divine influx precisely *also* generates a change that is cognitive.⁸

One might spend more time on Pauline texts that presuppose a cognitive understanding of the pneuma. But the operation would be otiose. The point was already clear enough in our remarks on 1 Cor. 2:6–16 in the previous chapter, where the pneuma is about nothing if not cognition, namely, revelation. And Rom. 8:1–13 makes no sense on any other view. It may, however, be worth looking at a single passage in Paul's earliest letter that can be seen to make the same presupposition in spite of the fact that it does not even speak of the pneuma. Here is 1 Thess. 2:13 (NRSV, with Greek added): 'We also constantly give thanks to God for this, that when you received the word (*logos*) of God that you heard from us, you accepted it not as a human word (*logos*) but as what it really is, God's word (*logos*), which is also at work (*energeisthai*) in you believers.' It is the last part of this text that makes one think of the pneuma, which—as we saw in the previous chapter and as Paul himself states later in 1 Thessalonians (4:8)—is continuously being given to believers by God. What is 'at work' in the Thessalonians with the very pregnant sense of the term used here—after all, it *acts* (*energeisthai*)—*should* be the pneuma. But is it? Well, it is God's 'word' (*logos*), which apparently came to full expression in Paul's own 'word', the one they received from him. But that is hardly all there is to be said about it. Earlier in the letter Paul has spoken quite a lot about the way the Thessalonians had received himself and his 'word'. Here is 1 Thess. 1:4–6:

(4) For we know, brothers beloved by God, that he has chosen you, (5) because our message of the gospel (*euangelion*) came to you *not in word (logos) only*, but also in *power* and in *holy pneuma* and with full conviction; just as you know what kind of people we proved to be among you for your sake. (6) And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for you *received the word (logos)* in much suffering (but) with the joy of *the holy pneuma*.

Clearly, what made the ‘word’ operative so that the Thessalonians received it in the proper way was a certain fact about it: that it was somehow borne to them *by* the pneuma, that the pneuma was somehow present in Paul’s missionary speech—which was not, therefore, merely a matter of *words*. We shall come back to this idea later.⁹ Here we may just conclude that the *logos* which is at work in believers is not just a ‘word’, certainly not when it is also said to be ‘truly God’s word (*logos*)’ (1 Thess. 2:13). The Greek word *logos* does not just refer to any kind of babbling but to a meaningful word and—if it is God’s ‘word’—a word that is even necessarily true about the world. In fact, of course, *logos* also means reason. That sense must also be heard in Paul’s use of the term. It is the rational, cognitive content of Paul’s missionary ‘word’ or speech that the Thessalonians understood and grasped when they first heard him. And what accounts for that grasp was (so Paul himself almost says in 1:5–6)—the pneuma.

In short, in 1 Thess. 2:13, where Paul does not at all speak of the pneuma, he nevertheless presupposes not only the notion of the pneuma itself but also its cognitive side, which is what enabled the Thessalonians to understand the full cognitive content of Paul’s missionary ‘word’ so that they both saw and received it for what it truly is: God’s own (cognitive or rational) ‘word’. No wonder, therefore, that when he later (in 1 Corinthians 2) introduces the kind of ‘wisdom’ that one may speak of among believers (*if* they are able to receive it), he immediately brings in the pneuma—and, as we remember, correlates it with *nous* (‘mind’, 2:16). What is perhaps even more striking is the fact that so much of what is spelled out in later letters is already present *in nuce* in 1 Thessalonians—once one allows oneself to see it.

PHYSICS, COGNITION, AND PERSONHOOD

Thus the first basic feature of Paul’s overall world-view is that there is no contrast between the physical nature of the world and its cognitive character.

Or at least, that feature holds true of one of the most fundamental elements of Paul's world that does have a physical nature: the *pneuma*. The second basic feature is that the various 'powers' with which he operates have a personal character: they are (superhuman) people. God is the obvious example, and Christ, too, as we have already seen. But in addition there is a veritable host of superhuman beings—angels, demons, and Satan himself—who populate the upper (and possibly also nether) regions of Paul's world and may intervene and shape things on earth. Human beings are situated in a power field where a battle is being fought that is ultimately about eternal death or life.

The question we will address in this connection is how—if at all—these various ways of thinking about the world may be correlated with one another. Are they distinct ways of thinking which cannot be made to work together? If so, is their supposed distinctness external in the sense that while we (or even some of Paul's contemporaries) cannot bring together these different ways of thinking, Paul himself might not have felt any intrinsic problem at all? Or should we rather say that while speaking in physical, cognitive, or personalistic terms certainly means adopting different types of discourse, neither Paul *nor we* need see this practice as being intrinsically incoherent? Here we will adopt and argue for the latter position.

The strategy will be to discuss a range of examples where Paul appears to be moving back and forth between using a physicalistic, a cognitive, and a personalistic way of speaking. And the underlying idea will be that within our comparative Stoic framework, too, there is no intrinsic contrast between those ways of speaking.¹⁰ Just to give one example, it is widely acknowledged that the Stoics identified God (Zeus) with 'fate'.¹¹ But of fate they gave an account that was distinctly physical, indeed, fate is the essence—namely, the causal sequence—of the physical world as the Stoics understood this. In addition to identifying fate (physical discourse) with Zeus (personal discourse), they also ascribed 'providence' (that is, cognitive discourse) to Zeus, taking it that God's providence was operative *through* fate, which they even called 'the *mind* of God'.¹² But not only that: the Stoics also identified fate with the goddess *Moirai*, who was of course the traditional goddess of 'Fate'. For—as they said—'everybody prays to *Moirai* as a goddess'.¹³

We need not claim that Paul operated with the three levels of discourse in exactly the way the Stoics did. Nor need we claim that he had the idea of operating in this way from them. In Paul, the level of personal discourse is generally much more strongly present. Moreover, in many cases—at least

with regard to God, angels, demons, and Satan—he does not attempt to match speaking of them as people with some form of physical discourse. (We already saw that for God.) Indeed, this fact constitutes a major difference between Paul and the Stoics in this area inasmuch as the Stoics were at least in principle wedded to a theory of allegoresis that was aimed at explaining—in the sense of making transparent to reason—the personalistic discourse that was part of their culture.¹⁴ The fact is, however, that even when they came from a physicalistic cum cognitive understanding of the world, the Stoics did *not* see any intrinsic contrast between the three levels of discourse nor did they at all aim to do away with the personalistic way of speaking.¹⁵

We should conclude that there is no necessary conflict between making use of all three levels of discourse and hence that Paul need not have felt so either. Then the question becomes whether the particular content of what Paul says in personalistic terms is of such a kind that it generates a fundamental contrast with a Stoic world-view. Most significantly, does God not have a kind of metaphysical *freedom* in Paul that has no counterpart in Stoicism, but is very important since it finds expression in the basic features of the Christ event itself: God's 'sending' his son and 'raising' him after his death on the cross? We shall consider this whole issue in the next chapter when we discuss the relationship between divine and human agency in Paul. There we will end up seeing that although there is in fact a striking difference with regard to God's freedom of action, the human capacity for cognition in effect gives to human beings a kind of (rational) freedom of understanding or misunderstanding that matches God's freedom of action. Here it is cognition that matters. In both Paul and the Stoics it is the human capacity for cognition that makes it possible for these thinkers to operate with all three types of discourse without generating any intrinsic kind of conflict.

One issue that arises in this context is whether and to what extent Paul's use of personalistic discourse should be understood metaphorically and not literally. To take but one example from Romans 1–8, when Paul speaks of 'sin' as dwelling in him (7:17, 20), that is, in his flesh (7:18), and as constituting 'another law in my members (which is) at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members' (7:23, from NRSV), is the personalistic language of being at war and taking captive meant to suggest that 'sin' is a personal power on the level, say, of Satan? Or is Paul rather speaking *quasi*-personalistically, but in fact metaphorically?

At a general level it seems very difficult to find any criteria for answering that kind of question since Paul never addresses the issue directly and since

he does speak extensively of personal powers (God, Christ, angels, demons, Satan) in ways that cannot just be understood metaphorically. For our purposes the challenge will be to take Paul to speak literally in all cases like the one mentioned. And since my hunch is that this is quite often also actually the case, for the sake of the argument we shall always start out from the literal interpretation. In fact, it seems generally advisable as a methodological principle to adopt this line of interpretation since our own intuitive penchant for the metaphorical reading makes us less susceptible to finding traces of the literal one that may point towards Paul's own understanding.

So, the overall question to be addressed is this: when Paul speaks of personal powers—and this in principle includes cases such as that of 'sin' (or indeed of 'death', with which the power of sin is often connected, cf. Rom. 5:12–14)—do we after all find a conflict between his use of physical, cognitive, and personal discourse?

EXAMPLES OF OVERLAP—AND THE TRUE CONTRAST

We may begin from what Paul says about God. We have already seen that there is no ontology of God in Paul, whether a physicalistic or a non-material one. Instead there is an overwhelming sense of God as a person.¹⁶ As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, however, there is no idea that God is in principle inaccessible to human understanding. On the contrary, and as we know, through possession of God's *pneuma* (having it dwell in them) believers have access to the depths of God's mind so that they may fully understand his gifts. Thus there is no inherent contrast between God's activity as a person and human cognition.

Of Jesus Christ Paul may speak at all three levels of discourse. The risen Christ is *pneuma* and hence, by now unsurprisingly to us, a physical entity. But of course the risen Christ, who is also *Jesus* Christ, is and remains a person. Finally, in his risen form Christ is completely accessible cognitively to human beings. For 'we have Christ's mind (*nous*)' (1 Cor. 2:16). Here, too, we are not forced to find any conflict between Christ's different types of being.

Then there is the *pneuma* itself. It is both physical and cognitive. Is it also a person? That depends. At least, the *pneuma* itself *behaves* as if it were

‘witnessing’ on behalf of believers (Rom. 8:16), ‘helping’ them in their weakness, and ‘interceding’ on their behalf (8:26). Is there any necessary contrast here between such behaviour on the part of the *pneuma* and its physical and cognitive character? Why should there be?

The world, then. In between the two references in Rom. 8:16 and 8:26 to the *pneuma* ‘itself’, Paul gives a strikingly ‘personalistic’ description of the created world as a whole (8:19–22, NRSV with some changes):

(19) For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God; (20) for the creation was subjected to futility (not of its own will but by the will of the one who subjected it), in hope (21) that the creation itself will also be set free from its slavery to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. (22) For we know that the whole creation has been groaning in labour pains until now.

Is the created world a physical entity? Probably yes, in so far as it is subject to death and decay. However, that does not prevent Paul from describing it also in cognitive and personalistic terms as ‘waiting with eager longing’, ‘hoping’, and ‘groaning in labour pains’. Is this mere metaphor? Who knows? But we have decided not to consider it immediately like that. What we have, then, is a picture of the whole world of physical nature behaving like a person and hoping for freedom from its present slavery to death and decay. Such a hope is probably not a fully and self-consciously cognitive one—that only comes when Paul turns in the next verses to give a similar description of human believers, who have already and individually received the *pneuma* as a guarantee—but it is still directed towards the same goal of possessing ‘the glory of the children of God’. Should we understand this along Stoic lines as presupposing a kind of ‘panpsychism’ that would combine the material and cognitive perspectives of the world at a low level of intensity? And if so, would there be any ancient objection to seeing the whole world of physical nature as, in a way, a person, too? After all, the Stoics themselves (and other philosophers) did speak of the ‘world soul’.¹⁷

After God, Christ, the *pneuma*, and the world there are the powers on the other side: angels, demons, and Satan himself. We shall come back to these since they require more extended treatment. For present purposes we may mention a single text that shows that even if there may not be more of an ontological view of these powers to be found in Paul than in the case of God, he was at least keen on maintaining the connection between the cognitive (or psychological) and personalistic description of them.

In 1 Cor. 7:5 Paul discusses the sex life of married couples and advocates an only intermittent abstention from sexual intercourse (NRSV): ‘Do not deprive one another except perhaps by agreement for a set time, to devote yourselves to prayer, and then come together again, so that Satan may not tempt you because of your lack of self-control.’ Lack of self-control (*akrasia*) is the proper term in contemporary Greek moral psychological discourse to describe what Paul is after. Apparently, however, the matter might also be described as a case of being ‘tempted by Satan’ without its being implied that these two ways of speaking were making any different points. On the contrary, if one were asked to explain why Paul employs both locutions if both are saying the same, one should probably reply that the reference to lack of self-control serves the purpose of narrowing down what Paul has in mind out of the many different areas where one might be said to be ‘tempted by Satan’. That only shows that the two ways of speaking are not in conflict but rather support one another.

We may conclude that, so far at least, we have seen no reason to find any intrinsic, logical contrast between the three types of discourse employed by Paul. It does not seem to have occurred to him that these would be intrinsically conflicting ways of speaking. Nor is it at all immediately obvious that they should be taken that way.

Where they do open up for conflict, it is of a different kind. This has to do with a kind of potential conflict between human cognition, on the one side, and the physical structure and behaviour of the universe *or* the agency of external (or even internal) personal powers, on the other. Are not human beings quite often constricted and constrained by the way of the world, for instance as leading to their death, or by the intervention of personal powers, both God and negative powers, who may also—at least in the case of non-believers—lead human beings to death? However, as we shall see in much more detail when we discuss the relationship between divine and human agency, there is no conflict here either. For God’s agency, which is of course supreme, is responded to positively and *freely* by believers, who have precisely become able through their reception of the *pneuma* to grasp its whole point. And while it is responded to negatively by non-believers (who will receive their due punishment for this), they also do what they *want* to do (which is precisely why they are ‘without defence’ and themselves responsible for both their doings and the consequences of these, see Rom. 1:20). And so, they are not constrained either (at least, not superficially so). Their slavery to sin and death is, as it were, self-willed.

What accounts for this intriguing situation is the fact that human beings—both believers and non-believers—have cognition. And so it is only in the case of non-cognitive beings that one may really speak of a conflict between the physical nature of the world *or* personal powers, on the one side, and those beings themselves, on the other. That is precisely what Paul does in his description of creation as being subjected to death and decay and in genuine slavery to them. Creation does not (quite) have the capacity for cognition that makes human beings, on their side, capable of *willing* what is being *done* to them—either positively by God or negatively by God or evil powers.

However, this was moving forward somewhat rapidly—in fact, into the next chapter. What it shows is that cognition is at the heart of the matter. Not only is the physical *pneuma* also a cognitive phenomenon, but within the intrinsically non-conflicting triad of physics, cognition, and personhood Paul's basic focus is on human cognition. If human beings understand the world in the way it is revealed to them by God through the *pneuma* (which of course only happens to believers), then there is no conflict between their understanding and the way the world actually is. And so they are free in relation to the world (and to God). If human beings do not understand the world as revealed to believers, then they will live in slavery both to God and to the world and its powers, which will lead to their death. But since they will not themselves understand this kind of life as one of slavery, there will be no *sense* of slavery either and no conflict between their own understanding and the way the world actually is.

All of this points towards the centrality not only of cognition but also of the pair of slavery and freedom. True cognition leads away from slavery—whether under physical necessity or evil personal powers—to the freedom that has been made available by God. False cognition leads into slavery no matter whether this is recognized or not. And true freedom is indistinctly hoped for even by non-cognitive creation: the state in which it will have escaped from death and decay by being transformed (at the final conflagration) into possessing the 'glory of the children of God'.

With this additional spin on our discussion of the possible contrast between speaking in terms of physics, cognition, or personhood, it should have become completely clear that there is no such contrast at all. Whether Paul speaks in physical or in personalistic terms, the basic contrast lies elsewhere: in the difference between living under the powers of the present world (no matter how these are conceived), which is a state of affairs that enslaves people, whether they themselves realize it or not, and living in

cognitive conformity with God's rule (as revealed to one through the power of the pneuma), which is the state of true freedom.¹⁸

CHRIST IN THE UNDERWORLD, PAUL IN HEAVEN

The cognitive character of the physical pneuma and the overlap between the discourses of physics, cognition, and personhood constitute two premisses for our analysis of the remaining elements in Paul's world-view. Let us begin from two features that make a brief, but striking appearance.

In the Philippians hymn (2:6–11) Paul suddenly speaks in a way that indicates that he had a traditional view of the world as a whole as consisting of heaven, earth, and the underworld. This is tied closely to his understanding of God's resurrection of Christ (2:9), or perhaps rather to the whole scenario that we know from 1 Cor. 15:20–8 of what will happen at Christ's return (the parousia). Then, 'at the name of Jesus every knee [will] bend of beings in heaven, on earth, and under the earth' (Phil. 2:10). Here the term for beings under the earth (Greek: *katachthonioi/a*) is the traditional one for everything that belongs in the 'nether world'. That concept was Paul's, too.

In the light of 1 Cor. 15:20–8 the idea may not be quite so off-hand as it initially appears. It is at least possible that one of the 'beings under the earth'—possibly even the most important one—is death itself, which according to 1 Cor. 15:26 is the last enemy to be vanquished by the returning Christ. That would also fit the end of 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul precisely celebrates Christ's and believers' victory over death (15:54–7, NRSV): '(54) . . . then the saying that is written will be fulfilled: "Death has been swallowed up in victory." (55) "Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?" (56) . . . (57) But thanks be to God, who gives us victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.' Death might fit the 'nether world' 'under the earth' not just because that is where the dead are actually placed, but also because earth and water are the inanimate elements as opposed to air, pneuma, and fire. Admittedly, it is perhaps stretching the imagination a bit to think of death itself as 'bending its knee' and 'confessing that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father' (Phil. 2:11). But if one remembers the overlap in Paul between speaking in naturalistic and in personalistic terms, then why not? In any case, with Christ's victory over the last enemy and his handing over of the kingdom to God, the Father (1 Cor. 15:24), God will

himself become ‘everything in everything’ (15:28). So perhaps the question whether death is destroyed in the final conflagration—which is perhaps the more likely solution—or subjected (cf. 15:27) into confessing Jesus Christ as Lord becomes a somewhat inconsequential one. In both cases, God’s heavenly power as present in the returning Christ—and this, as we know, is nothing other than the *pneuma*—will be sufficient to vanquish even death and other powers of the nether world.

The same triple world-view and the same connection between resurrection (here Christ’s own) and the underworld are expressed in Paul’s rewriting of Deut. 30:12–14 in Rom. 10:6–7 (NRSV):

(6) . . . the righteousness that comes from faith says, ‘Do not say in your heart, “Who will ascend into heaven?”’ (that is, to bring Christ down [for that has already happened, cf. the Philippians hymn]) (7) ‘or “Who will descend into the abyss?”’ (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead [for that, too, has already happened, see again the Philippians hymn])

We should conclude that without elaborating it to any very great extent, Paul did have the idea of an underworld where death would reign until he/it was vanquished by the returning Christ. Christ’s resurrection from the dead constituted the first fruits of the resurrection of those who had themselves already died (1 Cor. 15:20) but who at the *parousia* would enter the line that would lead—*by* that later resurrection of believers—to a complete overcoming of death it- or himself.

That was the underworld. But Paul also famously had the idea that he himself had visited heaven on one of those ‘heavenly journeys’ that formed an essential part of the ‘apocalyptic’ imagination.¹⁹ In a rhetorically very complicated text (2 Cor. 12:1–10), he both boasts and desists from boasting of an experience he himself had fourteen years earlier: of being caught up into Paradise (12:4) in the third heaven (12:2); of hearing ‘words that are not to be spoken, that no mortal is permitted to repeat’ (12:4); of three times appealing to the Lord (probably Christ) that he take away a thorn that had been given to him in his flesh (12:7–8); and of receiving the Lord’s reply: ‘My grace (*charis*) is sufficient for you, for my power (*dynamis*) is fulfilled in weakness’ (12:9). Paul accepted this reply with its appeal to his idea of ‘through death to resurrected life’ (12:9, NRSV): ‘So, I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, so that the power of Christ may dwell in me.’

The existence of a ‘third heaven’, which is here probably supposed to be the highest one, is part of traditional ‘apocalyptic’ lore.²⁰ It is not clear that

Paul felt the need to try to connect it with any specific cosmological understanding of the world. Nor does it really matter if he did or not. Just as we saw him to be operating with traditional religious (or ‘apocalyptic’) figures without necessarily tying them in with his cosmological views, so it seems likely that he might also relate exceptional experiences such as the present one without trying to situate it very precisely within a complete cosmology. Nevertheless, it is worth putting some slight pressure on what he does say in order to see whether there are vestiges in it of a more coherent world-view. What matters for our purposes are two possibly interconnected issues: Paul’s twice repeated claim of ignorance about the precise character of his experience (‘whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows’, 12:2 and 3, NRSV) and his repeated reference to Christ’s ‘power’ (*dynamis*) as present in him. What would a bodily journey to the third heaven be like? And what about a non-bodily one?

Since only God knows, it may be presumptuous to hazard a guess. On the other hand, in the latter half of the passage Paul clearly speaks of two things that we already know: his ‘flesh’ (*sarx*), which is being tormented by the famous ‘thorn’ that Paul describes as an ‘angel of Satan’ (12:7), and Christ’s ‘power’. We know that the latter is almost a technical term for the *pneuma*, and Paul describes its dwelling in him (*episkēnōn*) by using a term that refers back to his talk earlier in the letter (5:1) of the *earthly* ‘tent’ (*oikia tou skēnous*) that will be exchanged for a heavenly dwelling. This we have already understood to refer to the pneumatic body. Seen in that light, it seems likely that the basic contrast in 12:7–10 is the one between flesh and *pneuma*. In that case, the two alternative forms of Paul’s heavenly journey are likely to be these: either ‘*in* his body’, namely, as *transformed* by *pneuma*, or ‘*out* of the body’, but in *pneuma* alone. Since these two forms are in actual fact pretty close to one another (as we have understood Paul’s notion of a pneumatic body), one can well understand Paul’s lack of certainty whether he had been travelling in one form or the other. Still, there is a precise difference between the two forms. For travelling *in* a body—as transformed by *pneuma*—would be like having proleptically been made to inhabit the *resurrection* body, whereas travelling *out* of the body would mean having momentarily left the *mortal* body *behind* in order to do the journey exclusively by some form of heightened interaction between one’s ‘own’ *pneuma* and the *pneuma* ‘itself’ (which is of course also the *pneuma* ‘from’ God and Christ): as it were gliding up and down the *pneuma* itself.

This is almost completely speculative. But it does show, as so often, that just below a fairly innocent-looking Pauline turn of phrase there may be more of a coherent view than immediately appears.

BEYOND THE ELEMENTS OF THE WORLD

Another equally famous idea with apparently cosmological implications is found in Galatians 4. Speaking to a group of non-Jewish believers who had been converted by Paul himself and wanting to dissuade them from also adopting the Mosaic law, Paul states that just as the Jews had previously been ‘enslaved under the elements of the world (*ta stoicheia tou kosmou*)’ (4:3) when before the arrival of Christ they were living under the law, so the same holds of his addressees (4:8–9, NRSV, though keeping ‘elements’ instead of ‘elemental spirits’):

(8) Formerly, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to beings that by nature are not gods. (9) Now, however, that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly elements (*stoicheia*)? How can you want to be enslaved to them again?

Scholars have spent much energy on trying to determine what Paul is referring to under those ‘elements of the world’, and for good reason since he here appears to be distinguishing his own view of God from the world-views implied by his main competitors, Jews no less than non-Jews.²¹ So he does, though in the case of the Jews not so much with regard to God himself—after all, it is the *Jewish* God who is said to have ‘sent his Son . . . when the fullness of time had come . . . in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children’ (4:4–5, NRSV)—but rather with regard to the law, of which Paul claims that it functioned in the same way for Jews as did the ‘elements of the world’ for non-Jews. What, then, are those ‘elements’? And how might the Mosaic law be said to have functioned for Jews in the way the ‘elements’ did for non-Jews?

There are basically two ways of reading the ‘elements’, either as ‘elemental spirits’ or as ‘elements’ in the proper cosmological sense.²² It is unclear, however, that these are necessarily genuine alternatives. Depending on the degree to which one sees Paul’s world as being filled with ‘spiritual beings’ (the *Geisteswesen* in Paul to which Martin Dibelius devoted a classic

monograph in 1909), it seems entirely possible that he should have seen the ‘elements’ as personal (and in that sense ‘spiritual’) beings at the same time as he may also have understood them in more directly cosmological terms as physical elements. At the same time, Paul’s description of the ways they functioned for the Galatians in their previous life suggests that they are to be understood as something slightly more systematic than *merely* ‘spiritual (or personal) beings’. First, they were apparently taken to be gods—which *by nature* they were not. So, do they have another place within a systematic view of *nature*? Second, they are claimed by Paul to be ‘weak and beggarly’ as if they merely belonged to a lower level than that of God himself within the same kind of overall structure. Third, they would normally be celebrated by festivals of ‘special days, and months, and seasons, and years’ (4:10, NRSV), which also points to a more structured system than merely seeing them as personal beings of whatever sort. All in all it seems that Paul had a fairly definite understanding in view as his target for a mistaken conception of God. But which one?

Here it is worth noting the similarity of Paul’s description with what is said in the Wisdom of Solomon in a passage we have already considered. Wisdom’s criticism of people who ‘supposed that either fire or wind or swift air, or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water, or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world’ (13:2) fits well Paul’s description of the Galatians as having been enslaved to ‘beings that by nature are not gods’. And Wisdom’s criticism of people who were amazed at the ‘power and working’ of the elements to the detriment of the ‘much more powerful’ one who created them (13:4) fits Paul’s description of the elements as being ‘weak and beggarly’.²³ We saw, however, that in Wisdom the target is very likely to have been the Stoic conception of the gods. Since the disputed phrase of ‘the elements of the world’ seems to point strongly in the direction of being about cosmological elements, and since that fits a Stoic hypothesis for Paul’s target, too, a Stoicizing reading of the Galatians’ previous position has much to be said for it. But it probably cannot be regarded as proven. What matters here is rather that *if* it is adopted, then the picture we get in the present passage of the relationship of God to the world of cosmology is the same as the one we obtained from Romans 1: that God, who does not himself receive any cosmological determination, is above and more powerful than the world as cosmologically understood.

This reading may or may not be accepted. If one rather decides for seeing the ‘elements’ as personal ‘spirits’, the resulting picture becomes somewhat less clear-cut. But the net result is the same. For what really matters to Paul is

that he may describe the earlier religious behaviour of the Galatians as one of slavery (4:8–9). That is precisely what allows him to compare their previous lives with the kind of life under the Mosaic law that they may be on their way to adopt. For that life, too, was one of being ‘enslaved under the elements of the world’ (4:3) since, as he has already explained (3:22–4), the law, too, had an enslaving effect. Thus, no matter whether one takes the ‘elements’ in a cosmological sense or in the sense of personal spirits, the basic point stands that life under those ‘elements’ means slavery, whereas the life of sonship generated by the *pneuma* that Paul has described in between (3:25–9 and 4:4–7) is one of freedom (see 5:1 in particular). Thus we again find that there is no fundamental contrast between a picture of cosmological physics and one of personal spirits. The contrast lies elsewhere: between the freedom generated by God’s (physical, cognitive, and quasi-personal) *pneuma* and enslavement under any other force.²⁴

THE PAULINE *GEISTERWELT*: ANGELS, DEMONS, SATAN

The hierarchy between God and the lower elements of the world that Paul brings out in Galatians 4 may serve as a bridge into a brief discussion of the remaining figures in his view of the world: angels, demons, Satan. In his remarks in 1 Corinthians 8–10 on the proper handling of food sacrificed to idols, Paul begins from the view that goes into full ‘knowledge’ (*gnōsis*, 8:4, basically NRSV): ‘Now, as to the eating of food offered to idols, we know that “no idol in the world really exists”, and that “there is no God but one”.’ This view is immediately both qualified and confirmed (8:5–6, NRSV):

(5) Indeed, even though there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth—as in fact there are many gods and many lords—(6) yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.

The net result here is that there are in fact many so-called gods in heaven (meaning the gods of the non-Jewish world) and many so-called gods on earth, namely, political *lords*. But for believers there is only one *god*, namely, God, the Father, and only one *lord*, namely, the Lord, Jesus Christ. Or in other words, the remaining supposed gods and lords are all *under* God and Christ.²⁵

That Paul does not in the least reject the existence of the supposed gods in heaven comes out clearly towards the end of his discussion of idol food after he has strongly warned the Corinthians against the worship of idols (10:14) and in fact tried to dissuade them from eating idol food (10:15–18). He then collects himself (10:19–20, basically NRSV):

(19) What do I imply then? That food sacrificed to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything? (20) No [he might as well have said: Yes], I imply that what pagans sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God. And I do not want you to be partners with demons.

Thus the supposed gods in heaven are in fact demons and to that extent wholly real and existent. Only, their power is not that of God—if one does not give them a foothold by sharing in food that is theirs.

The reality and concreteness of Paul's thinking on angels, demons, and Satan cannot be sufficiently emphasized. These were real beings, most probably at home in the heavenly sphere (possibly in its sublunary part), but also directly influential in the earthly sphere on and in human beings in particular. As was also emphasized by Martin Dibelius (1909), these powers were regularly understood by Paul to be malevolent and maleficent ones. They were God's enemies, who would in the end be vanquished by the returning Christ. Are these ideas then of such a kind that they cannot be fitted into a cosmological world-view? Are they even intrinsically opposed to it?

Before looking at the various types and functions of superhuman powers in Paul, we must note that the idea itself that there are such powers around was definitely not foreign to more strictly philosophical views of the world than Paul's. Plutarch is an obvious case in point, but for our purposes it is particularly noteworthy that in Stoicism, too, one finds a number of ideas that both fit with Pauline ones and also quite explicitly try to explain the presence of demons in cosmological terms.²⁶ (1) Like Plato, Pythagoras, and Xenocrates—so Plutarch claims—Chrysippus too 'followed the theologians of old' and spoke of Typhon, Osiris, and Isis as 'major demons' who were 'stronger than human beings . . . and much exceeding our nature in power, yet did not possess the divine quality unmixed and uncontaminated'.²⁷ (2) Elsewhere, Plutarch claims that like Empedocles and again Plato and Xenocrates, Chrysippus too 'allowed for bad demons'.²⁸ (3) The Stoics also took it that 'there are certain demons who are in sympathy with human beings and overlook human affairs'.²⁹ (4) The reason for the difference between bad and good demons is that like "Thales, Pythagoras, and Platon, the Stoics too took

it that demons are psychic beings' in the sense of 'souls separated from bodies; and good (demons) were good (souls), bad (demons) bad (souls)'.³⁰ (5) This ontology of demons was then further developed cosmologically in an account of how the souls would 'live in the area under the moon' and 'like the other stars' feed on 'the vapours coming from the earth'.³¹

It seems fair to conclude that the whole set-up is so close to the Pauline one that there is no reason to expect any intrinsic and radical contrast between Paul's demonology and his cosmology. On the contrary, when Paul speaks of himself (or the apostles more generally) as having become 'a spectacle to the world, to angels, and to mortals' (1 Cor. 4:9), the basic shape of his world-view is not different from the Stoic one. There are human beings on earth and angels (which like the Stoic demons may or may not be malevolent) 'up there'. Compare for this general scenario, for instance, 1 Cor. 13:1: 'If I speak with the tongues of mortals *and of angels*, but do not have love . . . ' (NRSV) or Gal. 1:8: 'But even if we or *an angel from heaven* should proclaim to you a gospel contrary to what we proclaimed to you . . . ' (NRSV). We shall see later that there are—initially, at least—important differences in the Pauline and the Stoic perception of the world. But they do not pertain to its basic shape, rather to its normative quality, its goodness or badness. Here Paul is more straightforwardly pessimistic in a genuinely 'apocalyptic' vein, whereas the Stoics were rather more optimistic—though perhaps less so than it is normally taken.

Let us try to sort out the various types of superhuman beings referred to by Paul and consider their functions. Dibelius distinguished between 'angels', 'Satan and demons', and 'the rulers of the present aeon'. This is fair enough, but it is perhaps even more important to build upon Dibelius's own recognition that 'angels' may be both benevolent and malevolent and divide them up accordingly.³² In fact, of the nine references to 'angels' discussed by Dibelius the three we just noted are presumably neutral in their normative quality; three are positive—the reference in 1 Thess. 3:13 to Christ returning 'with all his holy ones'; in 1 Thess. 4:16 to the 'archangel's call' at Christ's return; and in Gal. 4:14 to the Galatians' initial reception of Paul 'as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus'—and two are negative: the reference in Gal. 3:19 to angels who transmitted the law to Moses and in 1 Cor. 11:10 to angels who must be warded off by women's wearing a head-covering during service. A final reference in 1 Cor. 6:3 to angels as coming to be judged by believers is almost too good to be true and will occupy us in a moment.

Looking at Dibelius's group of 'Satan and demons', one notices that Satan is far more important than the demons. It is also noteworthy that out of

twelve references to Satan, nine are to be found in 1 and 2 Corinthians. Fortunately, there are also two references in Paul's earliest letter (1 Thess. 2:18 and 3:5) and one in his latest (Rom. 16:20). So the general picture probably remains intact all through. The role allotted by Paul to Satan is in fact quite simple. In 1 Thess. 3:5 Satan is the 'tempter' who might tempt the Thessalonians to turn away from Paul's message. And in 1 Thess. 2:18 he is the one who has 'blocked' Paul's coming back to the Thessalonians as he had wanted to again and again. Thus Satan works distinctly against Paul's divine mission. Fortunately, therefore, Satan is also one whom 'the God of peace will shortly crush . . . under your feet' (Rom. 16:20, NRSV).

This—in itself quite unsurprising—picture of Satan as the arch-opponent of God (and Paul) is then given free rein in 1 and (particularly) 2 Corinthians. Moreover, it is here explicitly connected with the present world as a whole: Satan is 'the god of this aeon', who has 'blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God' (2 Cor. 4:4, NRSV); he is 'Beliar', with whom Christ can have no agreement (2 Cor. 6:15), wherefore believers, too, must 'come out from' unbelievers and 'be separate from them' (6:17);³³ finally, as 'the god of this aeon' Satan is presumably the one who will be vanquished by Christ who 'gave himself for our sins to extract us from the present evil aeon' (Gal. 1:4). Until that finally happens, however, he is constantly active in laying snares to believers, for instance by disguising himself as an angel of light (2 Cor. 11:14) in the form of Paul's opponents, the 'false apostles, deceitful workers, (who are only) disguising themselves as apostles of Christ' (11:13). Faced with such an opponent, believers must constantly be on their guard 'so that we may not be outwitted by Satan; for we are not ignorant of his designs' (2:11, NRSV).

The basic message in all this is that as the arch-opponent of God Satan is the god of the present evil aeon. Thus the present world as a whole—with all its human inhabitants, malevolent angels, and demons—is under his rule. Only in one place within that world is Satan's power broken: where God's *pneuma* dwells in believers and in the channel established by the *pneuma* 'itself' between them and God. And only in one place outside the present world is Satan's power broken: in heaven, where God rules together with Christ, and from where Christ will finally come to vanquish Satan and free the present world from slavery to death and decay by transforming it into the state of freedom 'of the glory of the children of God'.

This exceedingly pessimistic picture of the present world (if 'pessimistic' is the proper word) is of course an 'apocalyptic' one. That does not imply,

however, that it is not also cosmological. In fact, it is. Satan is the god of death and decay. And that idea is given a thoroughly cosmological meaning by Paul. When he speaks of creation's slavery to 'corruption' (*phthora*, Rom. 8:21), he means just that: physical decay, which is the fate of the sublunary world of water and earth. Conversely, God is the god of life and eternity. And that idea, too, is given a cosmological meaning focusing on the pneuma and the upward-moving, pneumatic transformation of the world.

The same 'apocalyptic' cum cosmological picture is expressed in the texts that belong to Dibelius's third group: those that speak of the 'rulers of the present aeon'. Here we find, for instance, the reference in 1 Cor. 2:6–8 to 'the rulers of this age, who are doomed to perish' together with the reference in 1 Cor. 15:24–6 to 'every ruler and every authority and power' which Christ will destroy before handing over the kingdom to God, with the last one being that of death. The group culminates in two passages in which Paul celebrates the victory of believers over the whole gamut of opposing forces: death, life, angels, rulers, things present, things to come, powers, height, depth, and anything else in all creation (Rom. 8:38–9) or again the world, life, death, the present, and the future (1 Cor. 3:22). How does this 'victory' come about (for the term see Rom. 8:37, or indeed 1 Cor. 15:57)? And in what does it consist?³⁴

Both passages in fact give the same answer. In Romans 8 the victory is brought back to God's love for human beings (8:37 and 39) as spelled out in 8:32–6 and before that in 8:28–30. But when the theme of that love was first brought in (in 5:5), Paul also mentioned the proper vehicle for it, which is the pneuma. We have discussed the verse before: 'God's love has been poured into our hearts through the holy pneuma that has been given to us.'³⁵ As we also know, the theme of the pneuma is central in 8:14–27, too.³⁶ Thus the basic message is that believers will gain victory over all the opposing forces listed by possessing the cosmological pneuma that literally transports love back and forth between God and believers. Love is the emotional and also cognitive side of the physical pneuma, which will also eventually *literally* make believers gain 'victory' over any opposing cosmological forces whether on earth or in the sublunary sphere of heaven. They will be transformed and carried away from the earth, which will itself be transformed at the conflagration by God's powerful love.

Similarly, in 1 Cor. 3:21–2 it is the pneuma that secures for the Corinthians a position *above* anything in the world: '(21) . . . all things are yours, (22) whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life etc.—all belong to

you'. For Paul has just appealed to the fact that the Corinthians are 'God's temple and that God's pneuma dwells in you' (3:16). Presumably it is this special status and direct connectedness with God that gives the Corinthians their exalted position in relation to everything else. This is probably also the idea behind the text we noted earlier to the effect that believers will 'judge angels' (1 Cor. 6:3). At the final events, believers, who will by then be fully pneumatic beings in heaven, will take part together with Christ in the final judgement of everything *literally below* themselves in the present evil world, including its angels. What makes this passage almost too good to be true is the fact that it *literally* places believers *above* those angels they will judge, that is, directly in heaven.

It should be noted here that after celebrating in 1 Cor. 3:22 the exalted position of the Corinthians, Paul makes a vital addition (3:23, NRSV): '... all belong to you, (23) and you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God'. This expresses Paul's basic idea. As human beings of flesh and blood, who are therefore also subject to death and decay, believers belong to the present evil world *were it not for* God's loving intervention in sending his son *and* his pneuma to tear them out of that world. But God did do this. And so believers have achieved an exalted position literally high above the present world. Still, it was *God* (and Christ) who did it. And so, believers remain under Christ, just as Christ remains under God.

We should conclude that there is no contrast whatever between Paul's world-view as incorporating a complete, 'apocalyptic' *Geisterwelt* and his cosmology, including his cosmologically informed conception of God's pneuma, which as it were bypasses the *Geisterwelt* from above, links believers directly with God, and will eventually transform them and tear them out of the present world, which is ruled by Satan, in order to situate them in a cosmologically imagined heaven of pneumatic, heavenly bodies. If we bring in the notions of 'apocalypticism' and cosmology in the proper places in the following quotation from Dibelius, we can see that he got the overall picture exactly right in his comment on Paul's distinction in 1 Corinthians 12 between the pneuma and the *pneumata* ('spirits'), which Dibelius linked with demons:

For the [cosmological] Spirit [German: *Geist* referring to the pneuma] is a power that is poured out over human beings, enters them, and then comes to expression through the medium of the individual person in this or the other way. Whereas sin, evil, illness, and death [as cosmological phenomena generated by the lower cosmological

elements] may be transmitted by an angel or by Satan, the believer knows that in this fundamental experience he is *free* of any influence from an ['apocalyptic'] inferior spiritual being. Here only one power rules: God's Spirit.³⁷

IS THE STOIC PICTURE OF THE WORLD MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN PAUL'S?

Paul's view of the present world was not very optimistic. Was it less optimistic than the Stoic one? Everybody knows that one basic formula for the human good in Stoicism is that of 'living in accordance with nature'. Is that not utterly different from anything one may find in the apparently far more pessimistic Paul? Indeed, if one were to introduce some properly philosophical outlook for comparison with Paul, should it not be Platonism, rather than Stoicism? And have we not already seen traces of this 'Platonistic' understanding of the present world in 2 Cor. 4:16–5:10, even though we claimed that there, too, Paul sticks to his basically Stoic-like conception of the resurrection? Even more, as we may add, though the Stoics may have been operating with bad demons, is there anything in Stoicism (or in Platonism, for that matter) that corresponds to Satan in Paul?

This whole issue is far more complicated than it appears through the spectacles of the rather facile dichotomy between 'Platonism' and 'Stoicism' of much scholarly imagination. We cannot sort this out properly here since it raises the huge question of how to understand so-called 'Middle Platonism' and in particular the relationship between Stoicism and Platonism in the period covered by that rubric, say from 100 BCE to well into the second century CE. But we can at least put some pressure on the distinction in order to throw doubt on an all too self-confident use of it.

For 'Platonism' it may be sufficient to quote the last few lines from the master's own *Timaeus*, which is probably the Platonic dialogue that had the greatest influence on philosophical thinking about the world for the next many centuries (even including Stoic thinking).³⁸ Here is 92C4–9, with which the work ends, as translated by F. M. Cornford:

Here at last let us say that our discourse concerning the universe (*to pan*) has come to its end. For having received in full its complement of living creatures, mortal and immortal, *this world* (*hóde ho kosmos*) has thus become a visible living creature (*zōion horaton*) embracing all that are visible and an image of the intelligible (*eikōn tou*

noētou), a perceptible god (*theos aisthētos*), supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection, this Heaven single in its kind and one [or: this one Heaven, an only child].³⁹

This world, a god, Heaven, the greatest and best, the most beautiful and most perfect: this is Plato, but not ‘Platonism’ as traditionally conceived. In the light of this text it is not too much to say that in ‘The School of Athens’ Raphael should have painted Plato with one hand pointing upwards and the other downwards!

For ‘Stoicism’ it is important first of all to recall that stating the human good to be living in accordance with nature does not imply that nature itself is *good*. What is good is *living in accordance with nature*, where ‘nature’ stands for everything there is. ‘Living in accordance with nature’ in fact articulates the Stoic ‘reality principle’. It is true that nature itself is also ‘good’ in the sense that nature follows a systematic pattern that is rational as exhibiting a system of causal laws. Moreover, it is this system that may be grasped by human beings since they themselves are rational, which is also what makes it possible for them to live in accordance with nature. But what *happens* in nature (that is, the individual events that make up the total system of nature)—that is not ‘good’. In fact, in some cases it may actually be counter-productive vis-à-vis the best imaginable state of some phenomenon in nature. For instance, it is an unfortunate fact of nature that the heads of human beings are as fragile as they are.⁴⁰ Similarly, it is unfortunately intrinsic to what it is to be a human being that for a whole lot of in themselves fully intelligible reasons that themselves exemplify the systematic pattern of nature, human beings very often *fail* to grasp the human good. In short, saying that the human good is living in accordance with nature is very far from just saying that nature itself—that is, the present world as it is—is good.

Still, were the Stoics not in some fundamental way positive in relation to the present world as it really and actually is? Here it is curious to note that the relationship of the Stoic wise man to the present world that we have just sketched can be looked at in two rather different ways. One can see the natural infelicities we noted as facts that are certainly unfortunate, but nevertheless do not detract seriously from the other fact that through the use of reason and by grasping the *overall* system of nature, human beings are able to relativize the importance of the infelicities and to celebrate instead the overall system as a whole. This is the attitude one should probably ascribe to such a person as Chrysippus.⁴¹ We may see it as emphasizing ‘the view

from above' and note that this view is very strongly emphasized by such a person as Marcus Aurelius.⁴² Within this view the infelicities do not really matter.

However, one may also adopt what is actually the same perspective, but now with an emphasis on the *tension* between the infelicities and that other way of understanding the world as a whole which helps one overcome the infelicities. Here adopting the view from above does not quite cancel out the importance of the infelicities and so one overcomes them only by looking *away* from them and in fact literally turning one's gaze *towards* what lies elsewhere, namely, above. This is completely possible within Stoicism, where the wise man literally does belong in heaven, and this perspective differs only fractionally from the earlier one. Nevertheless, it begins to look far more 'Platonic' on the ordinary understanding of 'Platonism'. And that only serves to emphasize that the contrast between 'Platonism' and 'Stoicism' in this field is far more complicated than it is usually taken to be.

Seneca has a text that seems to adopt as 'Platonistic' a perspective on the present world as anything one could imagine. But Seneca definitely was a Stoic, and even though the relationship to one another of Platonism and Stoicism is a complex matter in a figure such as Seneca, who after all did live in the period when 'Middle Platonism' was being articulated, Seneca himself would surely have seen his position as a fully Stoic one.

Here is the text (from *Ep. Mor.* 102). It is so striking that it deserves extensive quotation. Seneca is describing a dream he is supposed to have had (102.1–2). That it is a dream may itself be relevant to the style of his account (102.21–8, LCL tr.):

(21) Tell me rather how closely in accord with nature it is to let one's mind reach out into the boundless universe! The human soul is a great and noble thing; it permits of no limits except those which can be shared even by the gods. . . . The soul's homeland is the whole space that encircles the height and breadth of the firmament, the whole rounded dome within which lie land and sea, within which the upper air that sunders the human from the divine also unites them, and where all the sentinel stars are taking their turn of duty. (22) Again, the soul will not put up with a narrow span of existence. 'All the years,' says the soul, 'are mine; no epoch is closed to great minds; all Time is open for the progress of thought. When the day comes to separate the heavenly from its earthly blend, I shall leave the body here where I found it, and shall of my own volition betake myself to the gods. I am not apart from them now, but am merely detained in a heavy and earthly prison.' (23) These delays of mortal existence are a prelude to the longer and better life. As the mother's womb holds us for ten

months, making us ready, not for the womb itself, but for the existence into which we seem to be sent forth when at last we are fitted to draw breath and live in the open; just so, throughout the years extending between infancy and old age, we are making ourselves ready for another birth. A different beginning, a different condition, await us. We cannot yet, except at rare intervals, endure the light of heaven; (24) therefore, look forward without fearing to that appointed hour—the last hour of the body but not of the soul. Survey everything that lies about you, as if it were luggage in a guest-chamber: you must travel on. (25) Nature strips you as bare at your departure as at your entrance. You may take away no more than you brought in; what is more, you must throw away the major portion of that which you brought with you into life: you will be stripped of the very skin which covers you—that which has been your last protection; you will be stripped of the flesh, and lose the blood which is suffused and circulated through your body; you will be stripped of bones and sinews, the framework of these transitory and feeble parts. (26) That day, which you fear as being the end of all things, is the birthday of your eternity. . . . (27) . . . Why be downcast? This is what ordinarily happens: when we are born, the afterbirth always perishes. Why love such a thing as if it were your own possession? It was merely your covering. The day will come which will tear you forth and lead you away from the company of the foul and noisome womb. (28) Withdraw from it now too as much as you can, and withdraw with pleasure, except such as may be bound up with essential and important things; estrange yourself from it even now, and ponder on something nobler and loftier. Some day the secrets of nature shall be disclosed to you, the haze will be shaken from your eyes, and the bright light will stream in upon you from all sides. Picture to yourself how great is the glow when all the stars mingle their fires; no shadows will disturb the clear sky. The whole expanse of heaven will shine evenly; for day and night are interchanged only in the lowest atmosphere. Then you will say that you have lived in darkness, after you have seen, in your perfect state, the perfect light—that light which now you behold darkly with vision that is cramped to the last degree. And yet, far off as it is, you already look upon it in wonder; what do you think the heavenly light will be when you have seen it in its proper sphere?

What a prospect! In spite of the fact that Seneca is recounting a dream of his, he is probably giving expression to a sentiment that he genuinely shared. We may therefore conclude that what we have from Plato's own hand in the *Timaeus* is an expression of the value of the present world that most people would probably see as being specifically Stoic. And what we have from Seneca's hand in the quoted letter is an expression of the value of the present world that most people would probably see as being specifically Platonic. The lesson should be clear.

And Satan in Paul? Does he not fall completely outside anything one may find in either Stoicism or Platonism? Undoubtedly, yes. But so, for instance,

does Christ. And of course, the aim of the present chapter has never been to claim that there is a one-to-one match between, say, Stoicism and Paul. Rather, it has been to suggest that there is more of a match than is normally recognized. It is certainly true that Paul speaks of superhuman persons rather more than did the philosophers. Indeed, they would probably charge him with unduly personalizing the powers. (He himself, however, probably took them to *be* persons.) But as we have seen, it to a large extent remains possible to fill in Paul's talk of superhuman persons by adopting the cognitive and directly cosmological ways of speaking preferred by the philosophers (though not to the exclusion of the other type of speaking). In both Paul and the philosophers there is a considerable amount of fluidity between these types of discourse.

PAUL'S COSMOLOGICAL CUM 'APOCALYPTIC' ANTHROPOLOGY

Now that we have seen the basic features of Paul's overall world-view, it seems appropriate to consider a specific part of it, which is his anthropology. It is sometimes claimed either that Paul did not have an anthropology at all since his perspective was essentially that of an 'apocalypticist' or else that if he had one it was crucially informed by his 'apocalypticist' perspective. The former claim is odd when already in his first letter Paul prays that the Thessalonians' '*pneuma* and soul (*psychē*) and body (*sōma*)' may 'in its entirety' be kept blameless at the coming of Christ (1 Thess. 5:23). The latter claim is fair enough, but hardly with the expected bite. For if Paul's 'apocalypticist' perspective is also a cosmological one, then which ancient philosophical anthropology could one cite that was *not* also cosmologically informed? It is perfectly reasonable, therefore, to ask for a more detailed understanding of the triadic anthropology suddenly voiced in 1 Thess. 5:23.

Unfortunately, 1 Thessalonians as a whole has very little to say about this.⁴³ One is almost completely forced to extrapolate from the later letters. On the other hand, as already noted in connection with the *pneuma*, it is quite striking how many themes that Paul has just broached in 1 Thessalonians he will take up in later letters and spell out more comprehensively there. So perhaps our attempt at extrapolation stays within the limits of the admissible. In that case, what Paul is saying in 1 Thess. 5:23 is in fact quite

simple. The Thessalonians have a body and they have a soul. There is nothing strange about that and everybody in Greco–Roman antiquity would concur. But they also have something else: *pneuma*. What is that? We already know the answer. It is a bit of God’s own *pneuma* that has been infused into them. If one were to describe in more detail how that will work anthropologically, one is probably helped best by bringing in the Stoic idea of the human being as consisting of body and soul that are interfused with one another but may also—in certain special people: the wise—be overlaid with a portion of God’s own *pneuma* (that is, ‘soul-*pneuma*’ of a particularly high degree of ‘tension’) in such a way that when the pneumatic souls of such people are separated at death from the body, these souls will live on as stars in heaven until the conflagration.

Then, however, we should also remind ourselves of the difference from the Stoic conception. For in Paul there is no idea of a separation of the soul from the body. Instead, he prays that the ‘*pneuma* and soul (*psychē*) and body (*sōma*)’ of each individual believer may be kept blameless ‘in its entirety’ at the return of Christ.⁴⁴ Here Paul is almost even more monistically Stoic than the Stoics themselves. But if we then ask how *that* is more concretely to be imagined, we are brought directly forward to 1 Corinthians 15, which does provide an answer: neither the body nor the soul will be present as distinguishable entities after the meeting with Christ, when both will together be transformed into a pneumatic body. Up until that meeting, however, they will to some extent be present as distinguishable entities. Like everybody else the (living) Thessalonians will during that period have a body with a soul (which is what makes the body a living one) and in addition they will also have a bit of God’s *pneuma* in their ensouled bodies. What Paul is praying for, then, is that this bit of *pneuma* may gradually inform their souls and bodies more and more so that at the parousia of Christ each of them will eventually stand blameless. Then the situation of their bodies and souls will become different in the sense that they will now at long last be completely transformed into a pneumatic body. We already saw in Chapter 1 that this conception is in fact different from the Stoic one, where the body will be distinctly left behind. However, the difference between these two conceptions is in fact not greater than the one entertained by Paul himself when he speculated whether he had visited the third heaven ‘in’ or ‘outside the body’.

In any case, we may conclude that there is a quite straightforward anthropology in 1 Thess. 5:23: a body and a soul (as everybody had) and in addition (for Christians) a bit of God’s *pneuma*.

Another famous anthropological distinction in Paul is the one in 1 Corinthians 2 between ‘psychic man’ (2:14) and the man who is ‘pneumatic’ (2:15). On the basis of our overall reading of the *pneuma* in Paul and his resumption of the contrast from 2:14–15 in the distinction in 15:44 between a ‘psychic body’ and a ‘pneumatic body’ (15:44), we can make immediate sense of the former contrast. A ‘psychic man’ is a person of flesh and blood—or body and soul—who has not received a portion of God’s *pneuma* from above, in fact, as Paul himself goes almost immediately on to say, an ordinary human being ‘of the flesh’ (*sarx*) (3:1, 3). A ‘pneumatic’ man, by contrast, is a person who *has* received a portion of God’s *pneuma* in the way described in 2:12. This account is so embarrassingly simple that one hesitates to give it. What makes it simple, however, is only the fact that we have become able to give some real content to the contrast between being ‘merely’ psychic and being (fully) pneumatic, by drawing on the whole Stoic theory of cosmological elements and their interaction in the individual human being. With that theory on board, Paul’s distinction between a ‘psychic’ and a ‘pneumatic’ man gains a content that gives a real sense, for instance, to his use of ‘psychic’. A person is ‘psychic’ who is only made up of body and soul in the ordinary way.

The last anthropological distinction to be considered is also the most important one to Paul: the one between ‘flesh’ (*sarx*) and *pneuma*. However, there is no need to spend very much time on this distinction here, since we have already had it defined to us. *Sarx* stands for the ontological composition of the ordinary human being who is made up of body (*sōma*) and soul. *Sarx* constitutes the essence—in the human sphere—of this present evil world. It is the physiological and psychological base on which the powers of this world are operating in all those ways that eventually lead to sin, death, and destruction. In the individual human being it is also particularly intimately connected with the body since as Paul uses the term ‘soul’ (*psychē*) in the relatively few places where that happens, the soul itself is insolubly tied to the body.⁴⁵ Thus there is at least one powerful line of thought in Paul that places the human body (*sōma*)—together with its soul—squarely on the side of *sarx*.

A few remarks on Romans 7–8 may clarify the relationship between *psychē*, *sōma*, and *sarx*. In 8:1–13 the basic contrast is the one between *sarx* and *pneuma*. But the *sōma* also makes its appearance when Paul states that to those who have ‘Christ in you’ (meaning Christ’s *pneuma*), the *sōma* is dead because of the sinfulness that attaches to it (8:10). A little later he contrasts ‘living in accordance with *sarx*’ with ‘putting the acts of the *sōma* to death by means of the *pneuma*’ (8:13). This view of the physical body itself (*sōma*) as

inherently ‘sarkic’ and hence evil fits the picture given in 7:14–25 of the person who is ‘of the flesh’ (*sarkinos*, 7:14). Although he wills the good, he sees evil ‘in his members (*melē*)’ (7:23), which are, of course, part of his concrete body (*sōma*). And this leads him to the exasperated cry to be rescued from ‘this *body* (*sōma*) of death’ (7:24). In all this, the *sōma* is seen as inherently ‘sarkic’.

Paul does not speak in 7:14–25 of ‘soul’ (*psychē*). His final realization, however, is that ‘with my mind (*nous*) I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh (*sarx*) I am a slave to the law of sin’ (7:25, NRSV). It is immediately clear that both the *nous* referred to here and also the whole self-reflective train of thought that he describes throughout the passage belong precisely to the level of *psychē*. And that just makes the point: in the person who has not (yet) received the pneuma, the level of the *psychē* is insolubly tied to the body. That is just what Paul realizes in the account he gives of—precisely—*weakness* of will in 7:14–25, where the idea is that the *psychē* is not strong enough, but constantly subjected under the body. It is true that in the abstract, or as a way of bringing out the schizophrenic character of the experience he is describing, Paul may say that he serves *God’s* law with his *nous* and only the law of sin with his flesh. But it is precisely the flesh that wins out, as he realizes when looking concretely at the ‘members’ of his body. And so his *nous* is in fact taken *captive* (cf. 7:23) by his body. Thus it both holds that the ‘soul’ (here exemplified by the *nous*) is insolubly tied to the body and also that soul and body together come to no more than *sarx*. Paul did *not* have a very positive view of the body. How could he when it belonged where it did within his cosmological hierarchy of the world? It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in the case of the contrasting situation of believers, who have received from above the pneuma that has already begun its transformative work, the body (*sōma*)—as we saw—is literally *dead* (8:10).

We should conclude that Paul’s anthropology was inherently cosmological and also that it was in fact quite simple: body (*sōma*) and soul (including the *nous*) belong in the earthly sphere and are therefore intrinsically ‘sarkic’ (though with the usual differentiations one finds in ordinary people: some are *just* bad, others are merely weak, etc.); in believers, body and soul have received an infusion of divine, heavenly pneuma, which has then begun its transformative work; eventually, this may render both body and soul pneumatic through and through, thereby removing them completely from the earthly sphere of *sarx*.

In the next chapter we shall see that the divine pneuma is also what gives human beings freedom.

4

Divine and Human Agency and Freedom

OVERVIEW

Paul's world was filled with powers. We saw in the previous chapter that it did not matter much whether these powers were understood in physicalist or personalist terms. What really mattered for the human being who would constantly be living in relation to the powers was cognition: whether the person would be exposed to the powers and serve them in slavery without being able to shape or thwart their influence or whether through knowledge of God's ultimate power the person would become free of those lesser powers. On the one side we had slavery, on the other freedom.

In the present chapter we shall focus more sharply on the cognitive side of this contrast in order to bring out that the new freedom on the side of human beings is not just a matter of being under the stronger power (God)—that in itself might generate a kind of actual freedom from the lesser ones—but precisely of something more: *understanding* the stronger power of God and the lesser one of the other powers, *seeing* this hierarchy among the powers, and *willing* that of God, in short, *siding* with God.

This is a kind of internal or personally experienced freedom from constraint as opposed to a form of freedom that is only, as it were, observed from the outside. And it comes with cognition. Nothing external may any longer constrain believers since they *know* that God is ultimately leading the world towards its final resolution in a state that constitutes the best for them. Nor, of course, may God himself constrain them since by knowing his ultimate aims on their own behalf they cannot but will them. How can one see and know—with the conviction of the convinced believer—that the best for oneself lies in the way in which the world is in fact organized and not will that way? Thus the freedom that human beings have through cognition is not only a freedom from the lesser powers, but in fact also a freedom vis-à-vis God—though not in the form of an opposition to God, but rather of alignment with him.

However, we must also ask about the freedom, not of human beings, but of God himself since in that respect, in particular, there seems to be a fundamental difference between Stoicism and Paul. Where the Stoic God is supremely predictable—which is what makes possible the cognition of God that yields human freedom—the Pauline God appears to be majestically unpredictable and thus to possess a freedom that is wholly his own. In that case, if human cognition of God is in fact excluded, how is a human freedom based on such cognition possible, after all? We shall see that while the difference is there, it is also in the end much smaller than we might expect.

There is a special reason for focusing in this chapter on cognition in relation to the powers of the world. Most often the issue of the relationship of human beings with the powers is taken to be part of Paul's 'apocalypticism', according to which people are either 'under' this or that power (the lesser ones or God) in such a way that it is those powers that ultimately govern people's *agency*. Then this picture of the human being in the world is contrasted with a different one, according to which the person is 'autonomous' in terms of agency vis-à-vis the world, no matter how 'powerful' the world may itself be taken to be. Here, it is supposed, the individual person is free and ultimately responsible for his or her acts since people themselves ultimately govern their own agency. The result is a contrast between 'superhuman agency' and 'human agency', where 'apocalypticism' belongs with the former and 'philosophy' belongs with the latter.¹

This contrast lies at the core of the perception of a supposed gap separating 'apocalypticism' from 'philosophy', a perception that I am doing my best to destroy throughout this book. In this chapter we shall fundamentally question this picture with respect to the supposed contrast between 'superhuman agency' and 'human agency'. Our analysis of cognition will show that it has no grip in ancient thought. Rather, it appears to reflect a far later opposition between 'religion' and a Kantian conception of human 'autonomous agency'. We should of course readily grant that Paul was an 'apocalypticist' in a number of respects: his world was filled with the powers we have discussed; the ultimate power of God and its concrete expressions must be understood through 'revelation' initiated by God; God is directing the world as a whole towards a radical change that will destroy or transform the present world forever; and also—though this is not strictly 'apocalyptic'—the point that God is the ultimate initiator and agent both at a macro- and a micro-level. But we shall reject the supposed contrast between 'apocalypticism' and 'philosophy' in terms of agency by coming to see that in two paradigmatic

figures in ancient thought—Paul the ‘apocalypticist’ and Epictetus the Stoic philosopher—one does not find the intrinsic opposition between divine (‘external’) and human (‘autonomous’) agency that is often taken to capture the essence of the contrast. On the contrary, both thinkers operate with the idea of an *overlap between divine and human agency* that trades on the specific character of human cognition. In both thinkers true human cognition is an understanding of the world as governed by God as an agent, and the kind of human agency that *reflects* such an understanding is truly willed and free in the way suggested above. Here there is absolutely no opposition between divine and human agency. On the contrary, when human cognition grasps God’s government of the world, it stretches out *towards* it, thereby creating the kind of positive overlap just mentioned. In ancient thought, human ‘autonomous’ agency is not in the least to be contrasted with divine agency.

In this way cognition yields a form of experienced freedom that goes far more to the core of what it is to be a human being—on the ancient conception—than merely switching from one power to another. And it binds together ‘apocalypticism’ and ‘philosophy’ as two closely similar ways of saying the same thing. In both Paul and Stoicism, cognition—operating through the *pneuma*—*aligns* human beings with God, *thereby* giving them a freedom of genuine agency that is also always in accordance with God.

There are several reasons for focusing in this chapter on a single Stoic and comparing him with Paul. For one thing, the topics to be addressed in this chapter are central to Epictetus, in particular.² For another, in Epictetus we for once have a more extended body of thought (as opposed to the usual fragments) with which to compare Paul. In addition, though slightly younger than Paul, Epictetus’s life (around CE 100) lies within the Pauline time-span. Also, he is a curious mixture of Roman and Greek since he lived part of his life in Rome, but taught in his native Greek, presumably both while in Rome and also during his exile in Nicomedia (in modern Albany), from which period the transmitted texts derive. All in all, Epictetus constitutes an obvious point of comparison with Paul on the issue of freedom, as scholars have repeatedly seen over the last more than hundred years.³

Was Epictetus an ‘orthodox’ Stoic? The question has been repeatedly raised.⁴ It is true that there are differences between Epictetus and what we learn from the sources about, for instance, Chrysippus (third century BCE), who may serve here as the exponent of Stoic orthodoxy. It seems likely, however, that the differences were mainly those of vocabulary and emphasis, although the latter includes the basic profile of Epictetus’ thought, which is

hortatory and 'practical'. As an example, there is no Stoic precedent for using the concept of *prohairesis* ('choice') as the central technical term it has become in Epictetus, who may in fact have adopted it from Aristotle.⁵ Moreover, *prohairesis* plays a crucial role, as we shall see, in Epictetus' hortatory and practical project. But there is nothing to suggest that what he expresses by means of this concept does not fall squarely within Stoicism.

We shall consider Epictetus first, then turn to Paul, and finally compare the two. As we know—we might call it the *lex Malherbe*—comparison in this field requires a thorough knowledge of each figure to be compared in his own right and on his own premisses. For this reason we shall spend some time on considering the overall shape of Epictetus' doctrine in this area. Only in that way may the genuine similarities *and* differences come to be seen.

EPICTETUS: THREE QUESTIONS

In a striking passage, *Disc.* 4.1.99–104, Epictetus discusses what it means for a person to 'attach himself to God'.⁶ The answer lies in grasping that God has given everything one has and then living one's life in relation to one's body (and the rest of the world) and to God himself in a manner that reflects that grasp. We may focus on various aspects of this answer by asking three questions.

1. What is the relationship between God and human beings with respect to *human autonomy*? In the middle of the passage (4.1.100), Epictetus distinguishes between on the one hand something God has 'given me *for my own* and *subject to my (own) power* (Greek: *autexousion*)', namely, 'the objects of choice (*proairetika*)', which 'he has made up to me, unhampered and unhindered', and on the other hand something 'he [has] left for himself', namely, 'my body (*sōma*)', 'my property, my equipment, my house, my children, my wife', which 'he has subjected . . . to the revolution of the universe'.⁷ Here is the complete text (4.1.99–100):

(99) How do you mean 'attach himself [to God]'?—Why, so that *whatever God wills, he also wills*, and *whatever God does not will, this he also does not will*.—(100) How, then, can this be done?—Why, how else than by observing God's impulses (*hormai*) and his governance (*diōikēsis*)? What has he given me for my own and subject to my (own) power, and what has he left for himself? The objects of choice he has given me and made up to me, unhampered and unhindered. But my body that is made of clay,

how could he make that unhindered? Therefore he has subjected it to the revolution of the universe—my property, my equipment, my house, my children, my wife.

Here we find the distinction that is central to Epictetus between what is ‘up to me’, ‘my own’ or ‘in my own power’ (*autexousion*), namely, whatever falls within the sphere of my own ‘choice’ (*prohairesis*)—and all the rest, including my own body (*sōma*).⁸ The former half of this contrast is quite often identified by Epictetus under the concept of ‘freedom’ (*eleutheria*).⁹ But then, exactly how is the idea of human ‘freedom’, ‘self-power’, and ‘autonomy’ to be understood in Epictetus, not least if it is also correct to speak (with A. A. Long) of the ‘theonomic foundations’ of his thought?¹⁰ In particular, does Epictetus’ idea of human freedom and autonomy contain ideas that contrast with the picture of human agency vis-à-vis God that we find in Paul?

2. What is the relationship between God and human beings with respect to *the human body*? When Epictetus speaks in 4.1.100 of God’s having subjected my body (plus my property, equipment, etc.), or later (104) my ‘little portion of paltry flesh’ (*sarkidion*),¹¹ under the revolution of the universe, is he giving expression to an understanding of the human embodiedness (as distinct from the area of human freedom and autonomy) in relation to God that differs from what we find in Paul?

3. Finally, what is the relationship between God and human beings with respect to *the present world and human life in that*? In 4.1.104 Epictetus brings together the two sides of the human being—that of the ‘mortal being’ who lives ‘with a little portion of paltry flesh’ (cf. (2) above) but may also act as a ‘spectator of God’s governance’ in virtue of having or being a *prohairesis* (cf. (1) above)—into the idea of living in a manner described as ‘joining with God in his pageant and festival’. Here is the complete text (4.1.103–5):

(103) And so, when you have received everything including your very self (*auton seauton*) from another, do you yet complain and blame the giver, if he were to take something away from you? Being what, and having come for what purpose (do you blame him)? (104) Did he not bring you into the world? Did he not show you the light? Did he not give you fellow-workers? Did he not give you senses also? And reason? And as what did he bring you into the world? Was it not as a mortal being? Was it not as one destined to live on earth with a little portion of paltry flesh, and for a little while to be a spectator of his governance and join with him in his pageant and festival? (105) Are you not willing, then,

for so long as has been given you, to be a spectator of his pageant and his festival, and then when he leads you out, to go, after you have made obeisance and returned thanks for what you have heard and seen?

In a text such as this, is Epictetus giving expression to a manner of living in this world in relation to God that differs from what we find in Paul?

Thus we have three questions that focus on the human being as situated 'between' God and the world.

EPICTETUS: THE HUMAN BEING ON THE *SCALA NATURAE*

Epictetus' starting point throughout is God. In addition to speaking of 'theonomic foundations', A. A. Long is wholly right to speak of the basically 'theological orientation' of Epictetus' thought, and indeed of his 'theist' and 'personalist' conception of God.¹² Within the world created by God, however, a special place is reserved for human beings, 'to whom God has made the additional gift of the faculty of understanding' (Greek: *parakolouthētikē dynamis*, 1.6.15). Epictetus is fond of the term *parakolouthēin* ('follow in thought', 'attend to', 'understand').¹³ It identifies the faculty of reason as a second-order capacity of 'following' in consciousness some other thing, for instance, the immediate kind of information delivered (even to irrational animals) by the senses. In this way reason is a *critical* faculty.¹⁴

The result is that the human being may be described as belonging in two worlds, as divided between 'the body, which we have in common with the animals, and reason (*logos*) and opinion (*gnōmē*), which we have in common with the gods' (1.3.3). The two sides of the human being are not of equal value, of course. Rather, 'we are all *primarily* begotten of God, and God is the father of human beings as well as of gods' (1.3.1). Human beings 'alone share by nature with God in common (and reciprocal) association with him, being (reciprocally) intertwined (with him) through reason' (1.9.5).¹⁵ In spite of this emphasis on the special kinship (2.8.11) of human beings with God, however, the bodily side remains in the picture.¹⁶ It is not highly valued in itself.¹⁷ Still, the body too is the result of God's creation and part of God's created order. In this ontological picture, then, there is a strong asymmetry between the two sides of the human being. But there is no rigid dualism.

EPICTETUS: PROHAIRESIS

Things look different when we move on to bring in Epictetus' peculiar notion of the true human self. That is a more restricted notion than the one of the human being considered so far. And it involves a genuine anthropological dualism. Epictetus never himself speaks of a 'true human self', but there are passages, as we shall see, where he comes close to doing so.¹⁸ Instead, his anthropological dualism focuses on the notion of prohairesis. The true human self is that of prohairesis. In a way everything we need to say on Epictetus in our context falls under an elucidation of different sides of the notion of prohairesis. Let us rapidly identify the most important of these sides.

Prohairesis is a faculty or capacity (a *dynamis*) that is very closely related to the capacity of *parakolouthēsis* ('understanding'), but it is not just identical with it. What makes the 'parakolouthic' faculty 'prohairesis' is the fact that as 'prohairesis' it focuses on the *value* of a thing (cf. 2.23.11) and the concomitant question of whether to *act* in relation to it, how to do it, at what time etc. (2.23.11–15).

A further feature of prohairesis is that having this or the other prohairesis (making this or the other choice) is entirely 'up to us'. Prohairesis is 'by nature' free from hindrance and constraint (see 1.17.21). This feature is derived from a characteristic that prohairesis shares with both assent, desire, and impulse: that they are all so many different forms of a belief and that a belief is wholly one's own. Nothing can force one to give up any belief—other than another belief (1.17.26): 'It is your own belief (*dogma*) which compelled you, that is, [one] prohairesis [another] prohairesis.'

A third feature of prohairesis follows directly from this: that it gives mastery or power. A human being is 'one who has nothing more masterful [or powerful, *kyriōteron*] than prohairesis [= the prohairesis faculty], but has everything else subjected to that and this prohairesis itself free from slavery (*a-douleuton*) and subjection [namely, to anything other than one's own prohairesis]' (2.10.1).

A fourth feature of prohairesis is that it involves a strong idea of the self. Speaking of the 'things that fall outside the sphere of prohairesis' Epictetus says that they are 'nothing to me' (1.30.3). By contrast, '*you* are not flesh, nor hair, but prohairesis' (3.1.40).

This is the idea of the true human self. It is a genuine self, which stands in a clear and unmediated contrast with everything else in the world, even the person's own body. So here we do have a dualism. The reason why Epictetus has such a heightened awareness of the self in comparison with other Stoics is probably that he focuses so strongly on the human freedom of mind which translates directly into the notion of individual mastery and power.¹⁹ This intrinsic connection of a heightened awareness of self with freedom of mind and mastery, even in relation to one's own body, is expressed very clearly in 1.19.7–9, which gives a good impression of Epictetus' style of thinking:²⁰

(7) What is it, then, that disturbs and bewilders the multitude? Is it the tyrant and his bodyguards? How is that possible? Nay, far from it! It is not possible that that which is by nature free (*to physei eleutheron*) should be disturbed or thwarted by anything but itself. (8) Rather, it is a man's own judgements (*dogmata*) that disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, 'I will chain your leg', the man who has set a high value on his leg replies, 'Nay, have mercy upon me', while the man who has set a high value on his own prohairesis replies, 'If it seems more profitable to you to do so, chain it.' 'Do you not care?' 'No, I do not care.' (9) 'I will show you that I am the master (*kyrios*).' 'How can *you* (be my master)? I have been set free by *Zeus*. Or do you really think that he was likely to let his own son be made a slave? Of my dead body you are the master, so take it.'

We have already suggested that this notion of the true human self implies a genuine dualism. But note two things. First, what is contrasted with the world is the human self in the form of prohairesis as we have treated this so far: as the purely formal capacity for deciding and choosing for oneself how to evaluate experiences of the world and how to react to them. Second, what is contrasted is only the individual human being (who of course has a body etc.) *to the extent that* he or she has completely identified with the formal capacity and with that alone. These are very important qualifications, as we shall gradually see. Epictetus' 'true human self', which he does not even speak of in those very terms, is certainly not just this or that individual, but rather a kind of 'self' that is self-identically shared by all human beings who operate human cognition in the proper way.

This leads to a fifth feature of prohairesis, which is now a matter of the substantive result in each individual human being of his or her actual use of the formal capacity. In addition to speaking of prohairesis as a formal capacity, Epictetus may also call a prohairesis 'bad' (e.g. 2.1.6). A bad prohairesis is one that is false or wrong in its ascription of evaluative

properties to the impressions the person has received from the world (1.29.3, 3.3.19). Correspondingly, a prohairesis may be good (1.29.3) or morally right (3.1.41). That happens when its evaluative judgements are correct (1.29.3), and this means: when people place ‘the good’ *in* the correct prohairesis itself (3.3.8), when they judge that ‘the goods’ *consist in* ‘a prohairesis as it should be and (the proper) use of external impressions’ (1.30.4). Thus a substantive prohairesis (an individual person’s moral choice) is ‘good’ and ‘morally right’ if and only if it *maintains* the *formal* capacity for freedom and mastery that the prohairetic faculty is, the capacity that is always one’s own, in one’s own power, and gives one authority (*exousia*, ‘power’) over oneself in the matters of good and evil.²¹ In this way Epictetus does everything he can to salvage human freedom. Our question should then be exactly how this freedom is to be understood in two relations that lie in two opposite directions: vis-à-vis the body and the world, on the one side, and vis-à-vis God, on the other.

EPICTETUS: PROHAIRESIS AND THE HUMAN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BODY AND THE WORLD

With the understanding of prohairesis we have presented, exactly how should we characterize the relationship with one’s own body and the world at large in the person whose prohairesis is the correct one? There are two things to be said here. The first flows directly from the precise character of the freedom and self-mastery that goes with the notion of prohairesis. If one asks about the degree of direct, in the sense of wholly unmediated, engagement in or concern with one’s body or the world at large that is involved here, Epictetus’ answer is that one should ‘eradicate desire utterly’ and ‘pursue none of the things external’.²² This is the famous Stoic doctrine of ‘apatheia’ (freedom from passion). In its most overt meaning, which it never loses, it stands for a stark disengagement from one’s body and the world, corresponding to the dualism of which we spoke. Thus Epictetus at one point insists that one must never give up the principle of not ‘depending’ on (Greek: *kremasthai* in the sense of being ‘wholly taken up with’) anything other than oneself (3.24.58). This is the feature of prohairesis in relation to one’s body and the world that is most directly relevant to our theme. Do we not find here the kind of stark self-sufficiency, or even self-reliance, that theologians, at least, are prepared to

connect with 'the' supposedly philosophical notion of a specifically human, 'autonomous' type of agency and to contrast with the proper, Christian relationship with God?

However, the second thing to be said is that even with regard to the body and the world, Epictetus' principle of freedom and non-dependence is rather more complex than it sounds. In a moment we shall see that it does not in the least exclude a close relationship with God, as it were in the other direction. But of more immediate relevance to one's living in the world is the fact that the principle of non-dependence does not either in the least exclude an attitude of real care and love for other human beings, that is, of being genuinely 'affectionate' towards them.²³ The traditional view that Epictetus' fundamentally Stoic form of 'self-sufficiency' somehow excludes caring for and loving other human beings is just wrong. He himself addressed the issue head-on, for example, in 1.19.11–15, which begins like this: 'This [attitude that he is arguing for] is not self-love (Greek: *phil-auton*)'. Ultimately, it is true, one needs to consider the whole Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* (with which Epictetus himself ends in the quoted passage: 1.19.15) in order to grasp this point.²⁴ But even without that, it is obvious that the self-sufficiency Epictetus is talking about relates only to one's body and ordinary values in the world—not to other human beings (or God). The net result is that the person who has the proper *prohairesis* is both completely independent of the world at large (including his own body and everything that pertains to that) and also one who cares for other human beings.

With this account we have already approached the issue of the relationship of the true human self in the other direction, with God. Here we come across some striking formulations. The true human self is both free in relation to the world, caring for other human beings—and also 'a servant of' God and indeed 'subject unto' God (3.24.65). Here is a bit of text (3.24.60 and 64–5):

(60) Did not Socrates love (*philein*) his own children? But as one who is free, as one who remembers that it was his first duty (*dei*) to be a friend (*philos*) to the gods. . . .

(64) Come, did not Diogenes love (*philein*) somebody . . . ? But what was the manner of his loving? (65) As became a servant (*diakonos*) of Zeus, caring (*kēdomenos*) for men indeed, but at the same time subject (*hypotetagmenos*) unto God.

How is this combination to be understood? If we now understand Epictetus' view of the true human self and the relationship with the body and the world (compare our initial questions (2) and (3)) that is involved in identifying with

one's prohairesis, namely, complete independence and freedom, then what relationship with God and divine agency (question (1)) is involved in this self-identification? In what sense is the true human self 'self-sufficient' vis-à-vis God?

EPICTETUS: PROHAIRESIS AND THE HUMAN RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD

We may sharpen the issue like this. In a number of passages Epictetus states that the freedom that goes with a correct, substantive prohairesis is so absolute that it places the true human self *on a par* with God.²⁵ At the same time Epictetus also introduces an idea of dependence on God, as we just saw. In 2.17.23–9, for instance, he enjoins his audience to let 'Zeus and the other gods . . . exercise control' (*kybernan*) over their desires (25) and ends like this: '(29) I am satisfied if I shall be free to live untrammelled and untroubled, to *hold up my neck* in the face of the facts like a free man and to *look up to heaven* as a friend (*philos*) of God, without fear of what may possibly happen.' How should we understand this combination of a notion of genuine human self-sufficiency, where the human being is said to be on a par with God, and the idea of letting Zeus and the other gods exercise control, which seems to imply that one subjects oneself to them? Again, is the person who has identified completely with the true human self also completely self-sufficient in relation to God? Is the same person not in any way dependent on God?

If we recall the precise content of Epictetus' true human self, we can see that with respect to the relationship with God the dichotomy between self-sufficiency and dependence is a false one. In relation to the world and one's own body, the true human self is completely self-sufficient and independent by possessing an understanding that cannot be forced by anything other than the way the person him or herself actually sees things. But then, God too is essentially a possessor of understanding or even rationality itself. Epictetus' Stoic God *is* the kind of rationality that permeates the world. Thus the only difference between the rationality of the true human self and that of God is one of scope. If this is the underlying picture, the true human self cannot be self-sufficient in relation to God in the way it is in fact self-sufficient in relation to the world. How could a local case of understanding

close itself off from the wider rationality of the world as a whole? Nor can we say that the true human self is dependent on God in the sense of dependence according to which the true human self is *not* dependent on the world. A local case of understanding cannot be 'governed' or 'directed' or in any way *constrained against* its will by the *wider* rationality of the world. On the contrary, it will seek to fit itself *into* that wider rationality.

Instead of speaking either of 'self-sufficiency *against*' or of 'dependence *upon*' on the part of the true human self in relation to God, we therefore need a different conception, one that brings out that the true human self and God lie on a single scale but at different ends with regard to comprehensiveness or scope. The first fact makes them qualitatively identical, the second renders them quantitatively different. We shall see in a moment that Epictetus does have a term for such a conception. He speaks in relation to human beings of (in Greek) *tetásthai*, which we may render as their 'directedness' (their being 'stretched out' or 'directed' towards or 'intent' upon). The Greek term elegantly captures two different dimensions of Epictetus' talk of God, his personalist conception and the underlying physicalist one (see more below). The true human self will be personally intent upon God. But the true human self will also be stretched out physically towards the all-comprehending structure of the whole world, which is also God. The basic feature, however, of the human relation with God that is being expressed by the term *tetásthai* is the cognitive one, which corresponds to the third dimension of Epictetus' talk of God, his cognitivist conception of him as being rationality itself. Seen in this perspective, *tetásthai* expresses the cognitive relationship of fitting one's local cognition into the wider rationality that is God's. The conclusion should be that in radical opposition to speaking of either self-sufficiency or dependence of the true human self vis-à-vis God, we should rather speak of a movement that goes in the opposite direction: that of *directedness*. From the very beginning the true human self lies on the side of God.

Note once more that in this analysis we have been talking not of the individual self just like that, but of the true human self, and thus only of the individual self or person to the extent that this person has identified with the true human self of prohairesis. It is this through and through cognitive self that is directed towards God. The sense in which this self and God lie on a single continuous line is so strong that it is difficult, in the final outcome, to draw a clear line between them.²⁶ Thus when Epictetus discusses, in a very interesting text (1.14) that would deserve detailed analysis, the relationship between a number of entities: the self (or person who is being addressed),

each person's 'particular daemon' within the person (1.14.12), 'God within' (who may or may not be different from the daemon, 1.14.14), and the outside God, he ends up (1.14.15–16) more or less identifying God with the person him- or herself. What does that mean? The best reading seems to be that when Epictetus speaks of the person, what he has in mind is precisely not this or that individual self but rather what we have called the true human self or what A. A. Long calls 'the ideally rational and normative self'.²⁷ In connection with this self there is neither self-sufficiency vis-à-vis God (as there is towards the world) nor dependence on him (in the sense there is *not* towards the world). Instead, there is a directedness *towards* him that reflects a qualitative *identity* with him.

EPICTETUS: A PERSONALIST (AND PHYSICALIST) CONCEPTION OF GOD—AND A COGNITIVIST ONE

This relationship of the true human self with God reflects Epictetus' special conception of God. Focusing now directly on God we may summarize as follows the picture of him that was already contained in what has just been said.

Epictetus' conception of God is first of all a personalist one. God has personally acted with regard to the individual (2.8.21–3):

(21) Do you bring dishonour to the creation (or work of art, *kataskeuasma*) of this craftsman (*dēmiourgos*), when you are yourself that creation? Nay more, do you not only go so far as to forget, not only that he created (*kataskeuazein*) you, but also that he entrusted and committed you to yourself alone—(22) but you even bring dishonour to your trust? Yet if God had committed some orphan to your care, would you so neglect him? (23) Now he has given you yourself, saying, 'I had no one more faithful than you; keep this man for me unchanged from the character with which nature has endowed him—reverent, faithful, high-minded, undismayed, unimpassioned, unperturbed'. After that do you fail so to keep him?

Epictetus himself paradigmatically responds in the way we would expect (3.24.114): 'When I have been appointed to such a service (*hypēresia*), am I any longer to take thought as to where I am, or with whom, or what men say about me? Am I not *wholly intent upon God* (*holos pros ton theon tetamāi*), and his commands and ordinances?' However, Epictetus' conception of God is also a physicalist one even though he only rarely alludes to the Stoic,

physicalist world-view.²⁸ He does do it, however, a sufficient number of times to indicate that it was his, too.

Much more important is the conclusion we may draw from the analysis we have just given of the relationship of the true human self with God. We saw that God is essentially rationality and that the question of understanding the relationship between God and human beings turns on the relationship between rationality as present in the world as a whole and far more locally in individual human beings. We also saw that the two forms of rationality are qualitatively identical but quantitatively different. In addition to a personalist and a physicalist conception of God, we therefore also spoke of a cognitivist one. Moreover, it is this conception of God that is Epictetus' central concern, as becomes clear, for instance, in 1.14 where he speaks of the self, the 'daemon within', 'God within', and the outside God and ends up more or less identifying them all. They all refer to one and the same thing: rationality.

With this conclusion we are finally ready to ask about the meaningfulness in Epictetus of speaking of divine and human agency as two opposed phenomena.

EPICTETUS: DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY

Does the distinction between these two types of agency have a grip in Epictetus? If we go by the personalist story from which we began a moment ago, it seems that the answer should be positive. God has created and fashioned the world and everything in it, including human beings. In so doing, he has given them certain capacities. Human beings, therefore, must respond by using these capacities to their full extent. God has given and human beings should respond. This whole perspective would itself seem to trade on the distinction between the two types of agency and to put a heavy emphasis on the divine type.

A similar conclusion might be drawn with regard to human agency when one considers the theme on which Epictetus spends most of his time: what it is that God has given to human beings, in particular. God has given the 'parakolouthic' faculty, and indeed the faculty of prohairesis, but in such a way that it is now wholly their own (1.6.40): 'He has put the whole matter under our control [or up to us, *eph' hēmin*] without reserving even for himself any power (*ischys*) whatever to hinder or prevent.' This is as stark an

expression as anyone could wish of the notion of human self-sufficiency and 'self-power' (the *autexousion*). So, do we not have here the idea of a specifically human agency, originally given to human beings by God and thus in its origin reflecting the divine agency, but now distinctly a matter of human agency and nothing else? Is this not something that human beings now have for themselves, even *over against* God?

No. For here we must recall the content of God's gift, which is rationality as a capacity for cognition. In fact, what Epictetus is talking about is not so much (though it is also that) God's having *given* this capacity and human beings' having *received* it and being in *possession* of it as their own. Rather, when he speaks about human beings as being on a par with God and the like, his theme is the fact itself of human cognition: the situation in which human beings do understand God's world (as God has himself made them able to do). Such cognition binds God and human beings together in a special mode where issues of distinct agency or any other kind of opposition and contrast are no longer relevant. Instead, what is relevant here is simply whether human beings understand or not, and the extent to which they do. If they do by having their capacity for cognition 'directed towards' God, then they are (in principle) on a par with God. One cannot, however, say that this is a result of any agency on their own part. One does not *act* so as to understand. Either one understands or one does not. Neither can one say that the fact of human understanding is itself generated by God so as to reflect a specifically divine form of agency. After all, no matter how this understanding is 'achieved' (or indeed *happens*), it is in any case a matter of their own understanding. Correspondingly, if human beings do *not* understand, one cannot either put the blame on anybody's agency, neither their own nor God's.

The conclusion should be that in relation to the fact of human understanding the distinction between divine and human agency has no grip. Instead, what Epictetus is stressing when he claims self-sufficiency for human understanding is that it cannot be forced in any direction from the outside, not even by God. Any given piece of understanding is always one's own. It can only be forced to undergo change by one thing: the facts themselves *as perceived* by the person in question. That perception is always in people's own power, in the power of their cognition.

The secret in all this lies in seeing that Epictetus is throughout fundamentally speaking of cognition. If we then focus—as Epictetus himself so strongly does—on the (cognitive) content of what God has given to human beings for their own, namely the faculty of *prohairesis*, we can see that there is a kind of

logical movement in his story. It goes *from* 'God has given' (and human beings should respond accordingly—that is: 'divine agency') *to* 'it's all their own' (that is: 'human agency')—and *from* there *to this*: the fact itself of human cognition, when the human being is cognitively 'stretched out towards' God and understands; here there is no distinction of agency between divine and human nor is it in fact at all proper to speak of agency. All three moments of the story are there and should be left standing. But the third is the one to which Epictetus gives his most sustained attention since this is where it becomes clear what he is most fundamentally talking about: the fact itself of human cognition. In relation to that, the distinction between divine and human agency has no grip.

With regard to self-sufficiency and power, then, we should conclude that in relation to the body and the rest of the world, there should be in human beings, according to Epictetus, a complete self-sufficiency of the radically dualist type: a disengagement or turning one's back on those things, which does not, however, exclude the kind of mediated engagement and concern with the body, the world, and the others that we have noted. In relation to God, however, there is neither self-sufficiency nor dependence. Instead, there is the relationship of being cognitively directed towards God, which may ultimately make human beings on a par with God. This is the precise shape of Epictetus' dualism: placed between the world and God, the true human self belongs only with God. And it belongs there cognitively, which means: beyond the distinctions between self-sufficiency and dependence or human and divine agency.

PAUL: INTRODUCTION

Turning now to Paul, we may move fairly rapidly to the central issue of the possible meaning in the apostle of the distinction between divine and human agency. If we bring in the notion of self-sufficiency that played such an important role in connection with Epictetus, we shall find that at least with regard to the body and the world, fundamentally the same picture may be found in Paul. When he says that 'those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh together with its passions and desires' (Gal. 5:24), he is giving expression to the same kind of radical disengagement from the body that is a recurrent theme in Epictetus. And when he says that through Jesus

Christ (or his cross) 'the world (*kosmos*) has been crucified to me and I to the world' (Gal. 6:14), he is giving expression to the same kind of disengagement from the world at large as we found in Epictetus. Furthermore, Paul's talk of 'belonging to Christ Jesus' already suggests that this disengagement from the body and the world is the other side of some kind of unity with God, as was the case in Epictetus, too.

There should be nothing strange about this comprehensive similarity between the two patterns of thought. It reflects the idea of a directedness towards God that lies at the heart of either pattern. We shall see how it is spelled out by Paul, but we already know it from his treatment of the *pneuma*, which both physically *and* cognitively establishes a direct link between God and the believer, a link that as it were bypasses the world and the believer's own body. Still, the similarity is of such fundamental importance for everything that is said by the two thinkers that it immediately sets a certain parameter for any further comparison and any dissimilarities one may come across.

One point of similarity that follows from the fundamental one should just be mentioned in passing. In both patterns there is plenty of room for concern for others.²⁹ Indeed, such concern is in both cases *derived* from the directedness towards God.

This brings us immediately to the much more taxing question of the exact shape in Paul of the human relationship with God and Christ in the fields of cognition and agency and, indeed, of his whole conception of God in that respect. Here, surely, we shall find some important differences from Epictetus? Both yes and no. Let us focus our efforts on this issue. In the greater part of the following discussion, we will take up a number of important texts in which Paul appears to rely on an explicit distinction between divine and human agency. The motifs voiced in these texts form part of Paul's own discourse. They express his own perspective and thus reflect the supposed distinction as seen from within. We must ask whether it is possible to develop a coherent picture of the many different sides of the relationship between divine and human agency that seems to be invoked within this perspective. One cannot take it for granted that there is such a picture. As always in Paul, the rhetorical purpose of each particular passage lies uppermost. Still, there seems to be enough consistency at the uppermost, rhetorical level to make it worth attempting to articulate a more comprehensive picture.

Let us note here that since many of the texts to be discussed are about God's distinct agency in issuing a call to believers (including Paul himself)

and in their conversion to that call, they will come up for further discussion in later chapters when we turn to these themes. In the present context, however, what matters is only the relationship between divine and human agency that they articulate.

At the end of this attempt we shall make a comparison with Epictetus and point out both similarities and dissimilarities. Here we shall see that the comparison with Epictetus helps us pinpoint a certain tension in the understanding of God within Paul's thought itself. In some respects he thinks of God as being predictable in a manner that is closely comparable with Epictetus' way of thinking, in others not.

All through, however, the underlying question and the proposed answer are the same: that nothing like a fundamental and radical opposition and contrast between so-called divine and human agency is involved in all this; neither Epictetus nor Paul aims to contrast the two types of agency in any of the ways in which this has been done in later thought, both within theology itself and in the battle between theology and humanism or (non-theological) philosophy;³⁰ on the contrary, since the two types of agency are in both thinkers focused on cognition, they interweave in numerous and complex ways that together point towards an idea of mutual alignment of human beings with God instead of contrast. Thus there is no basis at all in this for drawing a deep contrast between 'apocalypticism' (supposedly stressing divine agency) and 'philosophy' (supposedly stressing human agency).

As we did with Epictetus, we need to follow the lines of Paul's own thought before we come to the overall point of the comparison.

TRANSFERRALS OF AGENCY

In five texts Paul performs what I shall call a 'transferral of agency'. Here are the texts:

(Gal. 4:8–11). (9) Now, however, having got to know God, *or rather having been known by God*...³¹

(1 Cor. 8:1–4) (2) If somebody believes that he has *got to know* something, he has not known it the way he should know it.³² (3) But if somebody loves God, then this man *has been known by him*.³³

(Phil. 3:12–14) (12) . . . I hunt for it if only I can grasp it, *just as I have also been grasped by Christ Jesus*. (13) Brothers, I do not reckon that I have myself grasped it.³⁴ But this I do: forgetting about what lies behind and stretching out instead towards what lies before, (14) I hunt towards the goal, the prize of God's upward calling in Christ Jesus.

(1 Cor. 13:12) Up to now I know in part (only); but then I shall know fully, *just as I have also been fully known*.³⁵

(1 Cor. 4:6–7) (7) For who makes you something special? *What do you possess that you did not receive?* And if you did receive it, why do you boast of it as if you had not received it?

Let us note the following points about these texts.

First, and most obviously, they are saying that God has *acted* and some human beings have *reacted*.

Second, and very importantly, the texts are speaking of how those human beings have acquired *knowledge* of God (or Christ for the Philippians text). The theme is one of cognition, of the acquisition of knowledge.³⁶ Paul is speaking of the way in which, in conversion, his addressees and he himself have come to 'know God' as a result of God's 'knowing *them*' at that very moment. We may suppose that he is relying here on what in modern philosophical terminology has become a distinction between two types of knowledge: (1) knowledge by (direct) acquaintance and (2) propositional knowledge or knowledge *that* (something is thus and so).³⁷ His idea may be that in conversion human beings have acquired propositional knowledge of what God is like *based on* direct acquaintance with God, moreover a kind of acquaintance that has been brought about by God himself. This is a theme to which we shall come back in later chapters. There we shall see that Paul did have the notion of a kind of direct acquaintance with either God or Christ—based on the *pneuma*.

Third, in answer to the question of how God has brought this about, we may guess that with regard to Paul's addressees (cf. the two first texts), God has acted, among other things, by sending Paul as an apostle to them, proclaiming what God has (also) done to the world in the form of the Christ event. With regard to Paul himself (cf. Phil. 3:12–14 and 1 Cor. 3:12), God has, among other things, literally shown Christ to him (cf. the next two texts to be quoted). These are again themes for later discussion.

Fourth, the shape of the human knowledge of God takes the form of a *directedness towards* God (cf. the Philippians text) that literally leaves any earthly concerns behind (cf. Phil. 3:19–20 just after that text). This

directedness is both a matter of intentionality (as in ‘hunting for the goal’) and also involves—as we shall see in much greater detail in the next chapter—an understanding of the self as belonging with Christ and God (cf. Phil. 3:7–9 just before the quoted text).

Fifth, we should never forget that Paul has a clear rhetorical purpose in all these texts, which is to place a truth-claim for the knowledge of God that he, Paul, is himself articulating vis-à-vis his addressees. When they have come to know God (cf. the first quoted text)—namely, in the way Paul is articulating—then they have been known *by God*: then it is *God’s own* knowledge (of himself) that they have been made able to grasp.

DIVINE AGENCY IN CONVERSION

In addition to the five texts that perform a transferral of agency with regard to the generation of knowledge, there are two that recall Paul’s own conversion without explicitly tying it together with issues of knowledge. Instead, it seems, Paul is more concerned here about emphasizing divine agency on its own. Should we take it, then, that Paul might speak of divine agency vis-à-vis human beings in ways that were not intrinsically connected with imparting knowledge? In fact not, as we shall see.

(1 Cor. 15:7–11) (10) By the gift of God, however, I am what I am; and his gift towards me did not become inefficient, on the contrary I have struggled more than them all—*not I (myself), however, but God’s gift together with me.*³⁸

(Gal. 1:11–16) (12) For I have neither had it transmitted (to me) from some (other) human being, nor have I had it taught (to me), but (I have received it) through a revelation of Jesus Christ. . . . (15) But *when God decided*—he who *set me apart* from my mother’s womb and who called me through his gift—(16) to reveal his son in (or to) me . . .

Two brief points about these passages. First, Paul is once more clearly making the rhetorical move of backing up his own knowledge of God with a claim about what God, on his side, has done. Second, on closer inspection these two texts, too, are very much about the imparting of knowledge. Exactly what has God done to Paul? In what does his gift consist? The simple answer must be that God has revealed Christ to Paul in a vision. Christ was ‘seen by’ Paul (1 Cor. 15:8), and the gospel preached by Paul was revealed to him directly

by God (Gal. 1:12, 16). Moreover, the last act presumably constitutes the very content of God's having 'called' Paul 'through his gift' (1:15). Thus in this context God's gift is very much a matter of cognition, of God's concretely doing something to a person so that the person will understand. In itself this claim is not very surprising. After all, receiving a revelation is necessarily about coming to understand something. But we need the point that Paul's talk of God's activity vis-à-vis human beings is primarily concerned with questions of cognition.

We may add one point from the last text quoted to the picture we obtained from the first five texts: that God has set Paul aside from the very beginning of his life as a future recipient of God's gift of cognition. This point raises the question of predetermination, which will come up importantly in the later texts.

DIVINE AGENCY VIS-À-VIS NON-CHRIST-BELIEVERS

Two texts from Romans broaden the picture considerably. Here Paul is speaking of non-Christ-believing Gentiles (Romans 1) and non-Christ-believing Jews (Romans 9–11), and he both goes back to the creation of the world (Romans 1) and looks forward to an unspecified future time (end of Romans 11, not quoted below).

(Rom. 1:18–21) Here Paul speaks of the way Gentiles had in fact come to know God (21) on the basis of God's having made manifest to them what may be known of God (19)—but without glorifying him and giving him thanks (21).

(Rom. 8:28–30, 9:6–12, 9:16–24, 10:12–11:7) Here Paul speaks of the way God has chosen those whom he has known beforehand (8:28–30), including only *some* Jews (9:6–12), since his is the power (*exousia*, 9:21) to choose whomever he wishes (9:16–24) and to call them through his apostles (10:12–15), the result being only a small remnant of Jews who have been elected through God's gift while the rest were hardened (10:16–11:7).

Three rapid points can be made about these rich texts.

First, all through when he speaks of what God has done—and will further do (cf. 2:1–11)—Paul is concerned with the transmission of knowledge of God.

Second, in a way God is himself responsible for the human *lack* of understanding since he has himself *chosen*—and chosen *beforehand*—those who *will* understand.

Third, that does not mean, however, that they are not also themselves responsible for their lack of understanding. They most decidedly are, as Paul goes out of his way to emphasize (e.g. 1:20–1 and 2:1).

We may take it from both texts paraphrased that Paul *saw* the possibility of claiming human non-responsibility on the basis of his own insistence on God's predisposing people to grasp or miss the signs of the true nature of the world that God has himself given. We may also take it that Paul explicitly *rejected* this possibility. The fascinating question raised by this state of affairs is how we should understand Paul's insistence on both divine predetermination and human responsibility. Since he cannot have seen a contradiction in this insistence, the question becomes one of constructing a sense of either claim that will allow us to insist on both. We shall address this question below when we summarize the Pauline picture.

DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY AFTER CONVERSION

The two last texts to be quoted bring us from divine agency vis-à-vis non-Christ-believers via divine agency in conversion to divine agency in Christ-believers themselves after conversion. Here we shall meet again some of our earlier motifs, but also particularly strongly the idea of what we may from now on call an *overlap* of divine and human agency. This idea may also underlie the insistence we noted on both divine predetermination and human responsibility. If divine and human agency overlap in the situations described by Paul, the risk of an inconsistency in speaking of divine predetermination and human responsibility will tend to evaporate.

Here are the two texts, which we have already considered in Chapter 2:

(1 Thess. 2:13) For that reason too, we thank God unceasingly: that having had transmitted (to you) from us God's word of proclamation, you received it as what it genuinely is, *not a word of human beings, but God's word*, which is also *in operation* in you who believe.

(Phil. 2:12–13) (12) . . . work energetically with fear and trembling on your own salvation; (13) *for it is God who is at work in you* making you both will and work in accordance with his wish.

We might repeat here a number of points already made, in particular, that here, too, Paul's theme is in fact knowledge of God.³⁹ What is added in these

two texts is the claim that God (or his word) continues to be at work in believers. It is not stated exactly how this occurs. We have already seen that in the Thessalonians passage, at least, it is likely that Paul is in fact referring to the presence of the *pneuma* in Christ-believers, working in the ways it sees fit. However, what matters most for our present purposes is that already in this early text we are given a picture of something coming from God that is active *within* believers, *in and through* their faith. In other words, God and the human believers are being active *together*. That claim fits the idea we introduced of an overlap between divine and human agency.

Similarly, in the Philippians passage there is no direct indication of the precise way in which God is at work in the Philippians to make them wish and do what they should. In this letter there is much more material on the *pneuma* than in the early letter to the Thessalonians. But this material is not brought into direct contact with the text on the overlap of agency. What matters most for our present purposes is again the fact that this text explicitly states the principle of such an overlap in believers after conversion.

SUMMARY ON PAUL

We may summarize and tighten our findings about Paul in the following way.

There is first a group of motifs that revolve around *divine agency*. (1) God's agency is emphasized all through. God has done and will do a number of things in the world, from its creation onwards, via the sending of Christ, to the day of judgement. (2) However, all these things are not done just for their own sake. Rather, they are everywhere connected with the purpose of generating knowledge in human beings. This holds for non-Christ-believing Gentiles, to whom God's works were made manifest (Romans 1), as well as non-Christ-believing Jews, to whom prophets, too, were sent (Romans 9–11). But it also holds, of course and quite generally, for Christ-believers, to whom Christ was sent and made manifest (cf. Rom. 3:21–6). (3) God has also been more concretely active vis-à-vis individual Christ-believers—e.g. Paul's addressees and Paul himself—in order to generate knowledge in them. He has sent them a vision of Christ (e.g. to Paul, 1 Corinthians 15, Galatians 1) or apostles of the good news of Christ (e.g. Paul himself to his addressees, Romans 10). To those who have come to faith he has also sent the *pneuma*

(cf. e.g. Gal. 3:1–5), which—as we have argued—is likely to be what now guides their desires and acts (1 Thessalonians 2, Philippians 2). (4) God has also been concretely active vis-à-vis groups and individual human beings in the way that he has chosen or rejected them *beforehand*. In accordance with the overall emphasis on knowledge, this is often expressed by saying that they have themselves been ‘known’ by him beforehand (Romans 1 and 9–11). It is this general activity on God’s part—and not least the one referred to under point (3)—that is captured in the recurrent motif of *transferral of agency* (the first five texts).

Does Paul speak of a form of divine agency that is not related to human knowledge or lack thereof? At least not to any very large degree. And that, surely, has its reason. What Paul’s God, no less than Paul himself, was concerned about was *that he be understood*, and of course in the way he should (according to Paul). In Paul, divine agency is fundamentally about generating knowledge.

Next there is a group of motifs revolving around the *human reaction* to God’s agency. Here there are three integrated concepts: responsibility, action, and knowledge. They lie on a logical line that goes back to knowledge. (5) Human beings are responsible for their ways—whether right or wrong—because they have been given the means for understanding (Romans 1 and 9–11). This holds in spite of the fact that their knowledge or lack thereof is also said to have been generated by God beforehand (cf. point (4) above). Already here we may begin to see the special idea in Paul that we have identified as one of an overlap between divine and human agency. God is responsible, but human beings are responsible, too. (6) Human beings are responsible because they themselves also *act*. The actions performed by human beings—whether right or wrong—are their own. *They* are acting whenever they act. However, here too there is the notion of an overlap. When human beings act the way they should, it is also God who is acting ‘in’ them (Philippians 2; 1 Cor. 15:11). (7) The reason why we should say that human beings themselves act (though also ‘together with’ God)⁴⁰ is that they have also themselves either acquired or missed the proper knowledge of God that this is all about. This is the crucial point. God *knows* beforehand those he has elected. When this knowledge on God’s part is ‘met’ by the chosen ones, then they also have knowledge (*gnōsis*) of God. In order for the kind of action that flows from this knowledge to be people’s own and in order for them to be therefore also themselves responsible for their ways, the knowledge must be their own, too, in addition to having clearly been generated by God. Let us

therefore stay with this issue and ask in what sense this meeting-point of shared knowledge that Paul is trying so strongly to articulate may (also) be said to be people's own.

Is human knowledge divinely or humanly generated in Paul? The first and obvious answer is that it is divinely generated. Everything we have said above points in this direction. God has known beforehand and done a host of things in order that human beings may come to know. The same is true for lack of knowledge. It is when we turn to the other half of the question that we begin to see that *the question itself is misleadingly put*. It would clearly be wrong to say that this kind of human knowledge has been humanly *generated*. Knowledge in a human being, in the sense of 'oneself coming to see something', is not the kind of thing that *can* be *generated* by the person who undergoes the experience. We already saw that in connection with Epictetus. The idea of 'self-generated coming to see' is meaningless. Still, and this is the point, while not self-generated, any given piece of real understanding, or the kind of knowledge one has when one has come to *see* something, is so intimately tied in with oneself, it is so intimately one's own that this fact in itself suffices to make also the acts that flow from it one's own and hence also more broadly to render one responsible for one's own ways. Thus the kind of knowledge we are talking about may be said both to be divinely generated and also—as a piece of genuine understanding—to be distinctly and intimately one's own, without this requiring that it has also been humanly *generated*. It is this special feature of knowledge underlying individual action and responsibility that explains why one may in their case speak of an overlap between divine and human agency. The human act of understanding is both one's own and also one that meets the God who has brought it about.

In a passage in 2 Corinthians which we have already partly considered, Paul ends up describing his own experience of coming to the true insight in a way that brings out particularly strongly the way this experience, which has certainly been generated by God, is also particularly and intimately Paul's own: 2 Cor. 4:1–6. This passage culminates in a verse (4:6) in which Paul brings out very clearly the character of an inner vision and illumination that he understands as being characteristic of the kind of knowledge (*gnōsis*) he is trying to identify: 'It is God who said, "Let light shine out of darkness", who has shone in our hearts to bring to light the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.' Everything in this description is about (inner) illumination, apart from the single word '*gnōsis*', which the rest is precisely intended to elucidate. Just as we see in the immediately preceding verse 4:4,⁴¹

so here too there is a clear division between what God has done (shining forth in the interior in order to bring to light) and the resulting knowledge in the form of a vision, which is very much (also) the person's own experience. This text, then, shows us in what way the proper knowledge is both generated by God (or prevented by the god of the present world, for 4:4) and is also very much the person's distinctly own experience, even though not *generated* by him or her. We should conclude from this second group of motifs that the reaction of human beings to God's agency in terms of responsibility, action, and also knowledge is very much their own.

Finally, there is a third theme in all the texts we have been studying. This pertains in particular to the question of the *rhetorical purpose* of Paul's talk of divine agency in relation to knowledge. Again and again Paul brings in the idea of divine agency in generating the knowledge for which he is arguing. The purpose is clearly to insist that what Paul presents as the true knowledge is in fact this, just because it has been generated by God himself. It is not some merely 'human knowledge', but 'God-knowledge'. What Paul himself reveals or makes manifest is the actual truth (cf. 2 Cor. 4:2) *because* it has been directly generated by God. The importance of this theme is vast. But the strong and exclusive emphasis on God's agency in generating the proper knowledge must not be taken to obliterate the other result we have also reached: that the knowledge generated in this way in human beings by God is also distinctly their own, and indeed, that when they do have this knowledge, then *they are aligning themselves* (and of course also *being aligned*) with God.

COMPARISON WITH EPICTETUS

We saw earlier that there are considerable similarities between Paul and Epictetus with regard to the relationship of human beings to their own bodies and to the rest of the world. This is also relevant to the question of the relationship with God in either thinker, but here we also find some rather interesting dissimilarities that are due to differences in the conception of God himself. What is the role of God vis-à-vis human knowledge? How should we organize the similarities and dissimilarities between Paul and Epictetus with regard to this question?

1. First, we should repeat a point already made regarding the phenomenological quality of the human knowledge of God with which both thinkers are

concerned. In this respect the similarity is quite close. In both thinkers, the formula for this knowledge is *alignment with God*. The basic description of this alignment is also rather similar. In both thinkers, it is a matter of an inner understanding of the self and its belonging which both reflects and is directed outwards to a God who is himself understood as being (also) external to the psyche. It is this fundamental similarity in the proper relationship with God—directedness *towards* God—that explains the broader similarity we noted to begin with regarding the relationship with one's own body and with the rest of the world: that of *disengagement* and turning one's back on it. This comprehensive similarity is a major one. It is what accounts for the sense that thoughtful people have had since antiquity itself to the effect that Stoicism and (Pauline) Christianity are sufficiently similar for it to be worth noting.

We may focus the similarity by pointing out that the understanding of self-sufficiency in connection with this knowledge that we elaborated in our analysis of Epictetus may be brought over wholesale into Paul. In Epictetus, as we saw, a person who has the proper knowledge is certainly self-sufficient in relation to his body and the rest of the world, but distinctly not in relation to God. Here we should rather speak of a directedness that is not dependence either. Exactly the same picture is given by Paul in Philippians 4 (4:10–20) when he spells out the manner in which he himself—as he claims—is 'self-sufficient' (even down to the very same Greek word: *autarkēs*, 4:11): entirely unconcerned about his bodily and worldly situation (4:12), but instead being (literally) 'empowered' by God (4:13) in such a manner that, as a consequence, he aligns himself with him, as when he speaks of 'my God' (4:19).

2. Turning now to questions of epistemology rather than mere phenomenology, we may note a dissimilarity with regard to the way the proper knowledge is acquired. This dissimilarity is a very important one. It reflects a different conception of God. It is also the fundamental difference that underlies all claims to the effect that Stoicism and (Pauline) Christianity after all express quite different world-views. We must be particularly careful, however, in the way we specify the difference.

Let us begin from one of the two texts in which Epictetus explicitly refers to the Christians.⁴² He is discussing freedom from fear (4.7) and asking why a child or an adult who wishes to die will not feel fear when they come into the presence of a tyrant surrounded by his guards (4.7.2–3). Next he asks the same question for a person to whom it is completely the same whether to live or to die (4.7.4). What, then, if 'due to some madness or complete lack of

sense' (4.7.5) somebody should have the same completely indifferent attitude towards his property, children, wife, and so forth as the other one had towards his body? Would he too not be complete free from fear? (Yes . . .):

(*Disc.* 4.7.6–7) (6) Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind towards the things just mentioned, and also habit (*ethos*), as with the Galilaeans, cannot reason (*logos*) and demonstration (*apodeixis*) teach a man that God has made all things in the world and the whole world itself so that the latter be free from hindrance and complete in itself (or perfect, self-sufficing: *autotelēs*), whereas the parts of it (should) serve the needs of the whole? (7) Now all other animals . . . but the rational animal . . .

Epictetus' reference to the 'habit' of the Galilaeans is mysterious. Perhaps he means that the Christians were brought up more or less blindly, that is, without 'reason and demonstration', to have their strange beliefs. But he also implies that it is one and the same attitude to worldly affairs that one may acquire *either* from madness *or* from Christian 'habit'—*or*, indeed, in Epictetus' own proper way: from reason and demonstration.

Let us then bring in again a famous passage in Paul that we have already considered, in which he describes the character and content of his message to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 2:4–5) when he came to them the first time: '(4) And my speech and my proclamation did not consist in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration (*apodeixis*) of pneuma and power, (5) in order that your faith be not in the wisdom of human beings, but in the power of God.' The interplay between these two texts is so close that they may serve together to bring out the clear contrast between the two points of view. Where Epictetus relies on the idea of a 'rational demonstration' (*logos* and *apodeixis*) that may 'teach' people the proper kind of knowledge and as such reflects Epictetus' notion of God, Paul rejects this as 'wisdom of human beings' that is stated in 'persuasive words of wisdom'. Instead, Paul's 'logos', which is a proclamation, is a 'demonstration (*apodeixis*) of pneuma and power' that will generate something other than Epictetus' 'learning', namely, faith. The contrast seems stark and uncompromising. Indeed, the two patterns of thought appear to stand here in what looks like a *direct* confrontation.⁴³ But we must be very careful in specifying the exact content.

Paul himself provides valuable help in the immediately preceding ch. 1 of the letter (1:18–25), where he has stated that the *logos* of his proclamation (1:18, 23) is a case of 'foolishness'—where Greeks expect wisdom—and

weakness—where Jews expect divine power. As we know, the weakness lies in the message of a crucified Christ (1:23, cf. 2:2). In the text just quoted, however, which follows almost immediately upon this, Paul's proclamation is then said to be a demonstration of *pneuma* and divine *power*. As we already know, the solution to this apparent paradox lies in keeping the two halves of Paul's message together: the crucified Christ (weakness) and his resurrection (power). In this way Paul may be said to be operating—so far, at least (but see more below)—distinctly within the Jewish framework he has himself introduced of weakness and power; only, while sticking to this framework he is turning it around: what Jews *take* to be weakness is *in fact* power. By contrast, when seen in relation to the *Greek* framework of wisdom and foolishness both the message of weakness and that of power are an example of the latter. They are foolishness.

This—the contrast between God's power and Greek wisdom (what Paul calls merely 'human wisdom' in the last quoted text)—is the contrast we need in order to make sense of the two different pictures given by Epictetus and Paul of God's ways of making human beings acquire the proper knowledge. Epictetus' God is, as it were, a predictable God. Indeed, he is eminently the guarantee of the predictability of the world. This predictability, furthermore, constitutes the very essence of (Greek) wisdom. And it is what lies behind the idea that knowledge can be acquired through 'reason and demonstration'. Paul's God, by contrast, is an unpredictable God.⁴⁴ As Paul explains in Romans, God's ways are inscrutable (11:33–6). And as he has also explained earlier in the same letter (4:17–25), this inscrutability is reflected in the fact that Paul's God is able to generate life out of death, as reflected in the story of Abraham *and*, precisely, in the fate of Christ. God's unpredictability lies behind the idea that the proper knowledge of God can only be acquired through 'revelation'.

It is obviously this difference of predictability and unpredictability in the conception of God that has struck people—rightly—throughout the ages as constituting a major dissimilarity between, for instance, Paul and Greek philosophy. It is also this difference that is nowadays often expressed by claiming—again rightly—that Paul was thinking within an 'apocalyptic' framework. As we have already seen, he does rely on the language of 'revelation' (*apokalypsis*). Moreover, just as he speaks in the language of the 'apocalypticist' of God's 'mystery' at the end of Romans 11 (v. 25) where he is also describing God's inscrutability, so he again refers to a 'mystery' right in our 1 Corinthians passage (at 2:7) immediately after he has spoken of God's power.

Here, then, we have a strong and clear difference in the conception of God and the concomitant understanding of the way human beings may acquire the proper knowledge. On the one side we have 'learning through reason and demonstration' by considering the regular pattern of how God has from the start constructed the world and continues to manage it—and the relevance of that for human beings.⁴⁵ On the other side we have hearing and believing a message that consists in a 'demonstration of pneuma and (God's) power', focusing on what God has *unpredictably* (though in accordance with his general character) done in the Christ event and the relevance of that for human beings. In spite of the shared anchorage of the overall picture in what God has done, the difference is also very clear. *However*, the immensely important point is that in Paul this whole picture of God and the way human beings may acquire the proper knowledge is only one half of the whole story. We must now look at the other half, which will once more bring Paul back into close proximity to Epictetus.

3. If there is the difference we have just noted in point (2) in the way human beings may acquire the proper knowledge, it remains the case that *once they have acquired it*, they are in a state that is very similar epistemologically within the two systems. Here we are not just talking, as in point 1 above, about the phenomenological character of the state in terms of the relationship it implies with the body, the world, and God. Rather, it is its character of knowledge itself that is in view. In Epictetus, of course, the state that human beings may acquire in the way explained above is one of genuine knowledge. Similarly in Paul, the acquired state is *also* one of genuine knowledge. It is not just a matter of faith or belief (Paul's *pistis*) in the sense of accepting a statement at face value without any further understanding. On the contrary, it is a state that may well have begun as faith, but has now turned into a case of understanding. It is faith *with* understanding. We have repeatedly seen that Paul describes this state as one of *gnōsis* (knowledge). As we recall, it is a state in which human beings meet with *gnōsis* the *gnōsis* with which God has met them, from the beginning and now at the very moment when they acquire it. Then it is strikingly revealing that in 1 Corinthians 1–2, immediately after 2:4–5 and after he has just denounced the Greek search for *sophia* (wisdom), Paul himself begins to speak of *sophia*, though 'not the wisdom of the present world nor of the rulers of the present world, who are doomed to perish' (2:6), but 'God's wisdom in a mystery, the hidden one which God determined beforehand from the beginning of time for our glory' (2:7). Is this talk of *sophia* just a nice linguistic paradox? Does Paul not really think of the new

knowledge as a case of *sophia*? He does. For he goes on (2:10–16) to anchor it in the new epistemological capacity that we already know: the pneuma. And here he ends, as we know, with the startling claim that ‘we’, that is, pneumatic believers, ‘possess Christ’s *mind* (*nous*)’, that is, Christ’s (faculty of) understanding. *Sophia* and *nous*: *through the pneuma*, received directly from God, believers are now in a state that is one of genuine knowledge; they fully know and understand what God has wanted them to understand; they *have God’s* knowledge.

This point needs emphasis. We saw that Paul described God as unpredictable. That feature of his conception of God must remain in place. But we must also now say that *once* human beings have acquired the proper knowledge—through God’s unpredictable agency—they will have a knowledge that will either dissolve this unpredictability or at least push it into a subsidiary position. Such people *know* God. They have *understood* God’s character as revealed in his unpredictable acts. And Paul never entertains the possibility that they may still be wrong about *that*.

In this way the comparison of Paul with Epictetus ends up locating a number of similarities *and* dissimilarities between them. Point (1): there is similarity in the phenomenology and content of the state of knowledge that is in focus in both systems with regard to the relationship of the knower with his or her own body, with the rest of the world, and with God. And there is similarity in the precise kind of self-sufficiency that goes into these relationships. The knower is truly self-sufficient in relation to the body and the world, but instead cognitively directed *towards* God in a state of knowledge that *aligns* the knower with God. Point (2): there is dissimilarity in the conception of God that underlies the picture in either system of how human beings may *acquire* the proper knowledge. In the one case God is predictable and may be grasped by rational demonstration, in the other case he is unpredictable and may be grasped only by direct revelation. Point (3): but then again there is similarity in the level and kind of knowledge had by human beings once they have been brought by divine intervention to acquire the proper knowledge. In both systems, these people genuinely know God. Their state of mind reflects genuine *sophia*.

The aim of this whole analysis has been twofold. What we have tried to do is to tease out similarities and dissimilarities in the handling of divine and human agency in Epictetus and Paul in order to avoid generalizing statements, of which there are far too many. We have also addressed both thinkers

at the same level of discourse in order to see what comes out of treating them as players in the same game, one that is not beforehand categorized as being either a 'religious' or an 'apocalyptic' or a 'philosophical' one. We have seen that the last attempt fits the attitude adopted by the two thinkers themselves. While they are both more or less explicitly rejecting the other position, they also in fact make basic claims that are fundamentally similar and—even more strikingly—claims that they themselves knew to be similar. Epictetus knew that there was a similarity between what the 'Galileans' believed 'from habit' and what he himself thought could be proved. And Paul knew that his own position was sufficiently similar to the Greek one to qualify as a form of 'wisdom', though an alternative one. It is as part of this shared level of discourse, with its many similarities, that the equally important dissimilarities should be understood.

CONCLUSION

We asked whether the fact that Paul's 'apocalyptic' world was filled with powers that might directly intervene in people's lives should make it intrinsically different from a 'philosophical' world-view. And we decided to address this issue at what appears to be its heart: in a supposedly radical contrast between 'divine agency' that goes with 'apocalypticism' and 'human autonomous agency' that goes with 'philosophy'. In addressing this issue it also appears that we are at the heart of Paul's overall world-view: what is the exact function of the *pneuma* that is transmitted to believers by God and makes all the difference to their understanding of the world?

Our result has been that there is no idea in either Paul or Epictetus of human agency and self-sufficiency of a more modern kind, that is, in *opposition* to and over *against* God and *his* agency. In other words, the distinction itself between divine and human agency has no grip in either thinker. Instead, there is an idea of a (true human) self which is able to reject the world because in being *directed towards* and *aligning itself with* God it has the self-sufficiency of God. This self is 'the ideally rational person' (for Epictetus) or the 'pneumatic man' (in Paul). In spite of the stated difference in the way it is formed (in the one case by 'reason and demonstration', in the other by revelation through the *pneuma*), its crucially cognitive character makes it closely similar in its two forms and functions. And it is this shared cognitive

character that brings it about that in subjecting itself to God this self also experiences freedom. Since this 'subjection' is grounded in cognition, it is in fact free.

It is this precise understanding of freedom that lies behind Paul's repeated claim that Christ-believers are free:

(Gal. 5:1, NRSV) For freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm, therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery.

(Rom. 8:15) For you did not receive a pneuma of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a pneuma of sonship, in which we cry, 'Abba! Father!'

Believers are free because they themselves understand—through the physical influx of the cognitive pneuma—that in the world as a whole, including the present world that is animated by evil powers, the ultimate power is God's as is shown by his acts, including the Christ event. The freedom of believers therefore is a freedom of understanding and it consists in following God in the precise sense of directing oneself to God by responding with love of God to the love of humankind that God has shown in the Christ event and in the gift of the pneuma itself. If believers respond like that, then in becoming sons of God and brothers of Christ, they will also come to be *above* any 'apocalyptic' power in the present world: death, life, angels, rulers, things present, things to come, powers, height, depth, and everything else in all creation. Then they will truly be free.

We have employed Epictetus here to bring out this precise cognitive and cosmological sense of freedom in Paul. For the idea itself that cognition gives freedom is central to Stoicism and particularly clearly elaborated in its religious dimension by Epictetus, who focused more strongly than any other Stoic on the relationship between human beings and God. The idea itself underlies the general Stoic account of 'the good': that it is 'following nature'. For this means *understanding* nature and *willing* it *because* one understands it.⁴⁶ Similarly it underlies Epictetus' idea of being 'directed towards God' since this idea is also about understanding God and willing what he wills because one understands it. Similarly, as we have seen, Pauline freedom is the Stoic freedom of understanding God's acts that lifts human beings out of any form of servitude to the powers of the present world—and indeed to God himself. Instead, it *aligns* them with the new world that is literally to come—and *with* God.

5

From the Self to the Shared

A CHANGE OF GEAR

So far we have been concerned to establish a picture of the main features of Paul's world-view. We have addressed the Pauline letters as if they were a quarry where one might dig and find precious stones. Then we tried to put the individual finds together to form a coherent whole. The procedure has been somewhat traditional, but can be defended. We all have some kind of world-view; but we rarely, if ever, attempt to set it forth in coherent form. If somebody were to attempt to do that for us, the result would probably be just as fuzzy as in Paul's case. However, our procedure with regard to Paul has left out an altogether vital element, which is that whenever he informs his readers of any particular feature of his world-view, it always happens for a purpose. Hitherto we have completely neglected this rhetorical function. And that is bad.¹

In this chapter we shall begin to make up for the deficiency. We shall move from describing Paul's world-view more or less in the abstract to considering what he says directly about himself and his addressees and their relationship. We shall not forget the world-view, however. We saw at the end of Chapter 3 that Paul's general anthropology is a direct reflection of his cosmology. When we now turn to his accounts of his own self and the selves of his addressees, seen as it were from the inside, we shall find that in those accounts his overall world-view is concretized and informs even his most intimate conception of self, which in turn acts as a model for his addressees. More than that, we may even speak of a direct, Pauline strategy here. The procedure of first bringing together his general view of the world and his view of his own self and then bringing both to bear on the self-understanding of his addressees is a crucial feature of Paul's rhetorical strategy in the letters.

Towards the end of the chapter we shall consider directly the single entity under which the individual Christian selves are all subsumed, the

'body of Christ'. We shall discover that there is a cosmological dimension to this new concept too. The general point lies in seeing both that there is an inside perspective in the Pauline texts that requires us to speak of a self and selves and the way they enter into 'the shared'—and also that underneath this perspective, the more external, cosmological perspective we have hitherto explored remains in place and should in fact be directly connected with the inside perspective. What Paul describes as something he has himself experienced and that leads more or less directly to the establishment of a 'body of Christ' is—the objective arrival (in his body) of the *pneuma*.²

In addition to making the change of perspective from external to internal and back again, we shall add in a different way to our procedure so far. In the discussion of Paul's overall world-view, the methodological focus was on comparing it with contemporary ideas of his own time and place, in particular those found in Stoicism. When we now move down from the cosmos to consider what Paul says about himself and his addressees, we need some more modern tools as well. The primary reason is that two concepts that we shall make heavy use of have been strongly (and rightly) problematized in late twentieth-century thought, both historically and systematically: those of 'religious experience' and 'the self'. Thus one simply cannot speak of either in connection with Paul without clarifying how, within a range of possibilities, one wishes the two notions to be understood.

I shall begin this chapter by presenting and defining three modern concepts that we shall employ for the elucidation of Paul's handling of his own self and those of his addressees. These concepts are: Pierre Bourdieu's 'habitus', the notion of '(religious) experience', and finally 'the self' as seen in the light of Michel Foucault's concept of 'subjectification'. I pick out these concepts because I take them to be particularly helpful in clarifying what is going on in the Pauline letters. There is a kind of hermeneutical circle here. On the one hand, there are important ideas in Paul's letters that stand out very clearly once the letters are analysed in the light of the modern conceptuality. These ideas are not just imported into the letters. They are there and almost beg to be lifted into consciousness. On the other hand, they are best seen to be there when the modern conceptuality has been brought in. So, why employ, for instance, Bourdieu's concept of habitus for the analysis of Paul? Answer: because it fits in the sense that it helps us see better something that is in fact there.

BOURDIEU'S CONCEPT OF HABITUS

The 'habitus' is Bourdieu's alternative concept for the 'self'.³ For our purposes there are three features of this concept that are particularly relevant—in addition to the basic point that Bourdieu spoke of habitus in order to distance himself from the traditional, philosophical, and (in a French tradition) existentialist notion of the self, which brought with it a heavy dose of modern individualism.⁴

The first feature is that the habitus is a sociological notion that focuses on the experiences and perceptions that are shared within a certain group.⁵ Since, as we shall note in a moment, it is tied to the human body, the habitus is in fact an individual entity in the sense that it consists of the experiences and perceptions of a human individual. But it precisely consists of such experiences *as* shared with other members of the group.

The second feature is the one just noted: that the habitus is a bodily phenomenon, a state (*habitus* in the original Latin sense) of the body.⁶ There are two points here. It is certainly correct to speak of 'experiences and perceptions' in connection with the habitus. But the concept aims to include any kind of awareness, from the most rudimentary and unself-conscious at one end of the scale to the most self-conscious at the other. In particular, it places great emphasis on those perceptions that lie at the back of the mind as a result of social inculcation, perceptions that show themselves in practice or in the most rudimentary statements about 'our way of doing things', but are only rarely self-consciously present at the uppermost level of the mind.⁷ The other point is that this very broad kind of awareness is intimately linked to the body. It shows itself in the innumerable ways of carrying and handling one's own body. And it is located in the body in a manner that makes it impossible even to conceive of it apart from the body. It is (socially) generated in the body. It is a state of the (individual) body. And it informs and shapes the body's (individual cum social) practices.⁸

The third feature is that in spite of having the two other features, the habitus is not a deterministic state that is completely unchangeable by the individual human being.⁹ Bourdieu repeatedly discussed individuals in European culture—Baudelaire, Manet, Heidegger—who as masters each in his own social and cultural 'field' (another Bourdieuesque concept) were both brought up with a given habitus and also able to change it into a fresh one, thereby *generating* a new, non-individualized, and social habitus.¹⁰

All three features of the habitus are relevant to Paul. The first one meets the fact that there is no self-conscious notion of 'the self' in Paul and that he thinks in terms of membership of groups: Jews, Gentiles, Christ followers. The second meets the fact that the body is strongly present in Paul's accounts both of the states (in fact, the habitūs) of people who are in one way or another outside Christ and also of those who are 'in Christ'. Finally, the third feature meets the fact that Paul may himself be seen as a person who was precisely working in his letters to generate a new habitus, one that he himself instantiated and that he aimed to transmit to and, indeed, literally generate in his addressees.¹¹ We shall see, however, that in doing this Paul did develop something like a self-conscious notion of a self.

THE PAULINE LANGUAGE OF EXPERIENCE

The analysis we shall give of Paul's notion of a self will rely on the concept of 'experience' (including 'religious experience'). It is in accounting for a religious experience of his own that Paul articulates most clearly a notion of the self. But how may we speak of a religious experience in relation to Paul?¹² What we have from Paul's hand (or mouth, since he dictated) are letters that from time to time and for rhetorical purposes of their own give an account of something that is described in such a way that it is difficult not to call it a 'religious experience'. Phil. 3:4–11 is a good example of this, as we shall see in a moment. This fact about the source for Paul's religious experiences already means that they come 'as described'. They are deeply embedded in the language that was available to Paul and we have access to them only through that language. Thus initially, at least, when we talk about religious experience in Paul, we will not be talking about something that as a matter of objective fact just happened like that, but rather about Paul's own more or less tentative conceptualizations in the language that was available to him of events he took to have occurred to and impinged upon himself. We may call this a concept-focused understanding of Paul's religious experience.

Among those tentative conceptualizations, there is one type that makes it particularly relevant to speak of experiences if we understand this term along the broad lines that also define Bourdieu's concept of habitus, namely, its bodily character.¹³ We shall see that Paul quite often employs language with distinctly bodily connotations to describe his own call or conversion. In some

cases, for example, in 2 Cor. 4:6, it would even be natural for us to speak of a 'vision'. Now a vision is a phenomenon of sense perception and to that extent by ancient definition (whether Aristotelian or Stoic) a bodily matter (and of course also a cognitive one). We shall see, however, that Paul uses bodily language far more extensively than that, even where he is apparently not speaking of a vision. In a way this should not surprise us. If Paul ascribed to the *pneuma* the cognitive *and* physical character of the Stoic understanding of *pneuma*, and if he gave it the central role in his cosmology and anthropology that we have also seen, then one would expect that when for rhetorical purposes of his own he went on to describe how he had himself changed from having a negative to a positive relationship with Jesus Christ, he would also conceptualize this in bodily form, as a change (of which he was aware) to and in his own body. If the awareness of such a bodily change is a paramount example of our concept of an 'experience', then the fact that Paul does describe what happened to himself in those terms allows us to use the term 'experience' in connection with that language.¹⁴

May we conclude from this that the fact that Paul chose experiential language of a bodily kind to describe what had happened to him can be taken as indicating that something had in fact happened to or in his body (in the brain or wherever) which he then went on to conceptualize in that way? That is, may we claim that Paul's conceptualizations were precisely that: conceptualizations *of* events of one type or other in Paul's body? If so, we might call this a body-focused understanding of Paul's religious experience. We are not here talking of Paul as having experienced anything in the world *outside* his own body and mind. It is true that he himself describes his experience as having been directly generated from the outside by either God or Christ, but we cannot conclude from Paul's account that it was in fact so generated.

With the bodily experience itself, however, the matter may be somewhat different. After all, one's own body is distinctly closer to oneself than either God or Christ. Moreover, it does not seem that Paul had any direct and obvious predecessors for describing what happened to him in precisely the terms we shall find him using, for instance, in Phil. 3:4–11, even though the general vocabulary was of course given to him by the tradition. This suggests that one reason why he employed experiential language of a bodily kind to describe his change was that he had in fact undergone a bodily change (of whatever sort)—which he then attempted to capture by describing it in what he felt to be the most adequate kind of language.

It goes without saying that there need not be any very precise relationship between the bodily events themselves and Paul's account of them. What actually happened in Paul's body is irretrievably lost in history. What we have are only Paul's conceptualizations. But we cannot exclude the possibility that something did happen which Paul then went on to conceptualize as best he could (and for his own rhetorical purposes). Or to put the point somewhat differently: it may be that one reason why Paul adopted a way of describing his experience that fits the double perspective adopted in Stoic philosophy of mind of combining the conceptual and the bodily levels of description was—that something had in fact happened in his body.¹⁵

We need not decide here whether we wish to stay with the concept-focused understanding of a religious experience in Paul or also to operate with a body-focused one. The aim of bringing in the latter possibility is primarily to leave open the kind of realism that is involved here: that Paul's sense that something had happened to him—something that he himself then took to be about his own relation with the outside world (God)—might itself have an internal, bodily correlate, whose meaning he was then trying to articulate in his conceptualizations.¹⁶

The basic point in all this is that we should not let ourselves be tempted by all the different, in themselves quite justified queries that have been raised during the twentieth century around the notion of a 'religious experience' to give it up altogether in analysing Paul. It is certainly true that religious experiences always come as described and therefore also as being heavily contextualized. It is also true that one must not start out from the idea of a phenomenology of religious experience that one hopes might yield an understanding of it that lies *before* any given description of it, as it were 'inside' or as the kernel of all descriptions. That is clearly a mistake. Instead, one should start from 'the outside' in the form of the given description of a religious experience in the conceptual language in which it is given. To a large extent one should probably also stay there. Still, one should not in principle give up the idea that accounts of religious experiences may be accounts of *something*—for instance, as perhaps in the case of Paul, of bodily changes of which the possessors of those bodies are themselves aware. The bodily character of Paul's descriptions in itself points in that direction, and in any case this view fits the Stoic understanding (which has clear roots in Aristotle) of 'experiences' (*pathē*) as having both a cognitive and a physical or bodily component.¹⁷

FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIFICATION

Like the notion of religious experience, that of the self has been intensely discussed during the latter half of the twentieth century.¹⁸ Once more, the general trend has been—in itself quite rightly—towards doubting that there is any solid phenomenon here that can be identified cross-culturally and independently of any given representation. One major representative of this so-called ‘contextual approach’ to self and identity is late Foucault in the two last volumes of *L'Histoire de la sexualité* (Foucault 1984*a, b*). Foucault is particularly relevant here since he developed his theory in relation to empirical material that was roughly contemporary with Paul—and, indeed, highly relevant to him.¹⁹ We need not, however, consider all the elements in Foucault's theory. In the form in which his ideas have been generalized and operationalized by the British sociologist Nikolas Rose, we may retain from them the following four points.²⁰

The first point is the notion, on which there is fairly broad agreement, that the self is no transhistorical, substantive subject or object of reflection that could, as it were, have been self-identically discovered at any given point in history if it were not already conceptually available.²¹ In fact, from within a Foucauldian perspective the self is no distinct entity at all. Thus in complete accordance with Foucault himself, Rose (2000: 313) even declines to speak of ‘the historical construction of the self’. Rather, one should analyse ‘the history of *the relations* which human beings have established with themselves’ (ibid., Rose's italics). The point of this distinction is to get away from understanding the self as an ‘entity’ and to emphasize instead the processes—or, indeed, practices—through which human beings may come to relate reflexively to themselves. Instead of speaking of ‘selves’, one should speak of ‘subjectification’, to be understood, in Rose's words, as ‘all those heterogeneous processes and practices by means of which human beings come to relate to themselves and others as subjects of a certain type’ (314). We shall see that use of this notion of subjectification will in fact lead one naturally to speak of a concept of self in Paul, albeit a low-key one.

The second point is that the processes and practices that go into subjectification are all concerned with governing conduct and hence, necessarily, the body. In a Foucauldian perspective, the world of human beings is full of more or less rationalized schemes or ‘regimes’ that seek to shape the normative understanding of human beings and hence their conduct. An example, which

would also be relevant to Bourdieu's concept of habitus, is that of manliness vis-à-vis femininity. The difference between Foucault and Bourdieu here is that in the view of the latter, the Foucauldian 'regimes' form part of the bodily habitus themselves. They are not most basically situated outside the body.

Even in Foucault, however, the regimes do not operate in the abstract (though probably not directly *in* people's bodies either). Rather, and this is the third point, they operate through institutionalized practices whose purpose it is to make the human beings at whom they are targeted operate *on themselves* through 'technologies of the self'.²² Rose defines these technologies as 'means [that] have been invented to govern the human being, to shape or fashion conduct' (315) and he notes the fundamental Foucauldian point that it is through the operation of such technologies by human beings on themselves that people begin to acquire 'selves' in the sense of a relationship to themselves: 'our very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of persons . . . is the outcome of a range of human technologies . . . that take modes of being human as their object' (315). Among such (self-)disciplinary technologies one might mention those of 'the school, the prison, the asylum'—and of course also of religion.

A fourth point that is highly relevant to Paul is the idea that the practices that are intended to govern conduct constantly refer to various authorities as warrants for the conduct that is being enjoined. Such authorities may of course be extremely diverse. They are crucially important, however, since it is through them that the disciplinary technologies may acquire the power that is required to turn them into self-disciplinary technologies of the self.

Rose summarizes his account of Foucault's theory thus (316): 'Against those who suggest that a single model of the person comes to prominence in any specific culture, it is important to stress the heterogeneity and specificity of the ideals or model[s] of personhood deployed in different practices, and the ways in which they are articulated in relation to specific problems and solutions concerning human conduct.' We shall see that this observation is highly relevant not only to Paul in general, but also more specifically to a distinction we should draw between the process of subjectification as it is played out in the case of Paul himself and in that of his addressees. For the addressees, one may well see the Pauline 'paraenesis' (exhortation) that takes up so much space in the letters as a disciplinary technology that aims to generate the proper self-discipline among its targets. And here the authority that is directly in play is that of Paul himself. For Paul, by contrast, the regime

is of a different kind since it goes directly back to God's selection of him as an apostle of the Christ message. Here both the disciplinary and self-disciplinary practice and the authority behind that practice are different. We must keep this distinction in mind when we begin to look at the Pauline texts from this perspective. It is certainly not a hard and fast distinction, and the idea itself of a kind of movement from God to Paul and (with him as a medium) on to the addressees is enormously important in the letters. Still, it will be helpful to keep the two stages apart analytically.

OVERVIEW: THREE TEXTS, THREE TOPICS

In this chapter we shall go back to some passages we have considered before, and also introduce some new ones: Phil. 3:4–4:1, Galatians 1–2 and 5–6, Rom. 7:7–8:13. There are three new topics that we shall constantly keep in mind. One is the way Paul describes his own call or conversion in terms of a religious experience that generates a notion of a Pauline self. We shall see how the bodily character of Paul's description of his religious experience connects with his belief that it was generated by the influx of the *pneuma*. The second topic is the way Paul uses this self-account for 'paraenetic' (hortatory) purposes directed at his addressees. Here too we shall find that underlying his paraenetic address there is a theory to the effect that this address has the character of providing a further transmission by the apostle to his addressees of the *pneuma* that he and they have received to begin with. The third topic is the state that will be the result in Paul's addressees of his missionary effort if successful: the Christian *habitus*, that is, a state of their bodies that is informed by the *pneuma* and anticipates their final, resurrected state in heaven. All through, we shall be concerned to bring out the physical understanding that underlies everything Paul says about conversion (self), paraenesis, and Christian identity ('being in Christ').

PHILIPPIANS 3:4–11: PAUL HIMSELF

We already know the general shape of Philippians 3, in particular how the *pneuma*, which Paul introduces at 3:3, turns up again (though without being explicitly mentioned) later in the chapter.²³ We also know that he begins and

ends the chapter by speaking collectively of 'us': 'for we are . . .' (3:3) and 'for ours is . . .' (3:20). In 3:4, however, he violently breaks off his account of 'us' true Christ followers as people who put no confidence in the flesh. He suddenly brings in himself:

(3:4)—even though *I myself* have reason to put confidence in the flesh, too. If anyone else wishes to put his confidence in the flesh, *I myself* (might do so) all the more: (5) circumcised on the eighth day, a member of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews; as to the law, a Pharisee; (6) as to zeal, a persecutor of the church; as to righteousness—that under the law—I became blameless.

Paul does not speak of a 'self' here, only very emphatically of 'I myself' (Greek: *egō*, twice in 3:4). However, in the light of a Foucauldian theory of subjectification it is difficult not to understand the emphatic use of 'I myself' as expressing an awareness on Paul's part of himself as a subject. In that case, we may note that this awareness arises—at least as it is expressed in the present passage—in two ways. First, it is clearly an 'I myself' that is articulated in a context of conflict and contrast with Paul's opponents. If *they* want to boast of their fleshly accomplishments, so could *I*! Second, it is an 'I myself' that is articulated in relation to a normative system that governs conduct (in Foucault's sense): that of the Mosaic law. The Pauline 'I' becomes an 'I myself' through the kind of relationship with oneself that is generated by living under a normative system like that of the law and monitoring one's own behaviour in relation to that. *I was in fact blameless!* In both cases the 'I myself' is strongly marked. But should one also speak here of a genuine sense of self? That may at least be debated.

In the text that immediately follows, however, Paul goes on to describe the change that occurred to him 'because of Christ'. And here, where he celebrates how he has himself been, as it were, subsumed into Christ, he speaks in a manner that suggests that we should in fact ascribe to him a more fully developed sense of a self. Here is this famous text:

(3:7) Yet whatever gains I had, these I have come to regard as loss because of Christ. (8) More than that, I regard everything as loss because of the surpassing character of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord, because of whom I have suffered the loss of all things and regard them as dirt, in order that I may gain Christ (9) and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own—the one that comes from the law—but the one that comes through Christ faith, the righteousness from God based on faith (10)—that of knowing him and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his

sufferings, by becoming conformed to his death (= like him in his death), (11) if somehow I may attain to the resurrection from the dead.

We must attend to a number of somewhat overlapping features of this striking text: some exegetical points, the experiential quality of Paul's account, the kind of subjectification that it reflects, finally Paul's picture of the new habitus that he is attempting to articulate.

The first major section runs from the beginning until 'be found in him' (3:7–9a). It may be subdivided into 3:7–8a (until '... my Lord') and 3:8b–9a. As so often, Paul thinks in terms of contrasts. Here there is a basic contrast between gains and losses, which is combined in 3:7 with the contrast between I/me and Christ: what were *gains* to *me* I have come to consider a *loss* because of *Christ*. Also important is the term 'regard' or 'consider' (Greek: *hēgeisthai*), which is repeated in 3:8. To begin with, at least, the change Paul is describing is a cognitive one. The cognitive character is continued in 3:8 when Paul spells out 'because of Christ' from 3:7 as actually meaning 'because of the surpassing character of the *knowledge* of Christ Jesus, my Lord'. Apparently, he now wants to focus precisely on the character of the *knowledge* of Christ as what lies behind and explains his having come to 'consider' his previous assets as losses. And he uses a very important term for this knowledge: *gnōsis*. At the same time his way of describing this knowledge in 3:8 begins to move the account distinctly away from the fairly neutral level of 'considering' something either a gain or loss. The notion of the 'surpassing' quality of the new knowledge suggests a level of bodily metaphoricity (something *above* Paul to which he now relates). The idea of knowledge (*gnōsis*) of Christ Jesus itself also suggests that we have to do here with what has far later been called 'knowledge by acquaintance' (as opposed to merely 'propositional knowledge': knowledge *that* ...), a kind of knowledge that directly relates the knower and the thing or person known to one another.²⁴ This is further suggested by the striking juxtaposition of Christ and Paul in the expression 'Jesus Christ, *my* Lord'. One may gather the strength of this by asking whether Paul might just as well have written '*our* Lord'. Surely not! The effect of 'my Lord' is the quite different one of connecting Paul *himself* exceedingly closely with Christ. He is quite unconcerned (here) about how his addressees might relate to Christ.

The sense that Paul is attempting to express his experience of a personal relationship with Christ is increased in the second subsection (3:8b–9a) when Paul states that (1) *I* have suffered loss of everything, (2) that *I* now consider

all the previous assets *dirt*, (3) in order that *I* may gain *Christ*, (4) in order to be 'found' *in* him.²⁵ (1) If Paul has been deprived of everything, then what remains of the 'I'? Has Paul been completely taken over by Christ? (2) 'Dirt' is (as Mary Douglas famously said) 'matter out of place'. It is something that one definitely wishes to leave behind or get *away* from. The metaphoricality is very powerful here. (3) Correspondingly, while the meaning of Paul's wish to 'gain' Christ is somewhat unclear, it is at least clear that he wishes to establish an exceedingly close and intimate relationship with Christ, a kind of overlap with him. (4) This sense is then explicitly stated to be that of 'being found *in* him'. Here we run up against the constant problem in understanding Paul of ascertaining whether he is speaking 'merely metaphorically' or (also) literally. The fact itself that the expression comes as the conclusion of the whole development from 3:7 that gradually became more and more experiential suggests that Paul is not just speaking metaphorically. Apparently, he aims to be literally found *in* Christ—whatever that means. We shall see that 3:10–11 supports this reading and we shall come back to the question of what the sense may be if the expression is in fact to be understood literally.

In 3:9b Paul reverts to the language of righteousness employed at the end of 3:6 just before he began the account of his change. He now wishes to contrast two types of righteousness in a manner that corresponds completely with the contrast he has drawn between his own earlier assets (3:4–6, cf. 3:7–8) and his new gain, which is Christ and which in a way has nothing to do with himself. What Paul now says about these two types of righteousness is simple and straightforward: he does not have 'his own' righteousness, which is precisely the one that was tied to the law and that Paul did have; instead, he has a righteousness which is the one derived from *Christ's* faithfulness (vis-à-vis God), the righteousness that comes from *God* (to the believer) 'in accordance with (the believer's) faith'. This just summarizes the basic contrast between I/me and Christ (and God) from which Paul began, but now in relation to the issue of righteousness.²⁶ The seamless coherence of this with everything that comes before (and, indeed, after), not least with the heavily experiential and personal language in 3:8b–9a, shows that the old contrast between the supposedly 'forensic' language of righteousness and a different kind of language of 'being in Christ', participation, and indeed 'mysticism' is completely empty.²⁷

Following on this little excursion into the language of righteousness, Paul in 3:10–11 takes up and continues from 3:8–9a the use of experiential

language of knowledge by acquaintance. With one possible way of understanding the initial genitive of the infinitive in 'that of knowing', one may take him to be *spelling out* the idea of the proper kind of righteousness in the experiential terms of 'knowing' Christ etc.²⁸ Fortunately he also explains how that knowledge should be understood. What Paul 'knows' is first the power of Christ's resurrection. We have already discussed what this means: surely not just '*that* Christ was resurrected' or even '*that* Christ was powerfully resurrected' or—in an unspecific sense—the 'power' of the event of Christ's resurrection; rather, the power that Paul aims to 'know' more fully is the power that *engineered* Christ's resurrection, that is, the pneuma. We shall return in a moment to the question of how one 'knows' the pneuma.

Having spoken in 3:10a of knowing Christ and 'the power of his resurrection', Paul goes on in 3:10b to speak of two other things he knows: Christ's suffering and death and Paul's own sharing in that suffering and becoming conformed to that death here and now *in order that* (3:11) he may himself, as he hopes, reach the resurrection from the dead in the future. We already know that Paul is here talking literally of the gradual dying away of his own sarkic body (*sōma*) of flesh and blood. Now, however, we should note that coming, as it does, after the account of Paul's own change in 3:8b–9a, with all its bodily overtones, and taking explicitly up from those verses the idea of 'knowing' (by acquaintance) Christ etc., the language of 3:10–11 as a whole comes out as being extremely experiential. One can almost feel Paul's sense of 'knowing' Christ and the pneuma and his 'knowing' a sharing in Christ's sufferings as he is gradually obtaining the same shape as Christ in his death. Paul is merging into Christ.

In the light of this, there are two things to be said about the two expressions we left on one side: 'being found in' Christ and 'knowing the power' of his resurrection. The first is that the two expressions are likely to refer for their objective meaning to one and the same thing, namely, Paul's becoming more and more like the pneuma (of the resurrection), which is also identical with Christ. This is the cosmological meaning of those expressions. The other is that Paul is describing his own subjective, experiential *sense* or *feeling* of that objective event, that is, of the takeover by the pneuma. This is the experiential meaning of the two expressions.

This double reading explains why Paul does not actually mention the pneuma in 3:7–11. As we know, he almost, but not quite, mentions it in 3:10. The reason is that he is keen on spelling out and explaining to his addressees what his change *means*—and certainly as *engineered* by the

pneuma—both cognitively and, not least, *experientially*. He *could* have spoken directly of the pneuma. But he wants to do something more: to describe what reception of the pneuma *is like*, namely, that at the same time as it is a reception of a (physical) power that, it is hoped, will in the future generate the resurrection in the proper bodily form (as it has already done to Christ), it is also a reception of something that has concrete and wholly specific effects here and now that are both cognitive *and directly experiential*. You can actually *feel* the pneuma and it makes you *see* the world entirely differently, as it were from the inside out. Paul's knowledge of Christ was derived from a physical takeover that could actually be (physically) *felt*—just as it could also be directly seen in his body here and now (as he claims).²⁹

Let us then ask: is there a self in Paul's account of his change in 3:7–11? And can we speak of a process of subjectification here? Curiously, the answer should be that precisely because Paul is so strongly concerned to describe how he himself has been subsumed into Christ, it does become natural to speak of a heightened awareness on Paul's part of himself as having a self: the something that sees itself as having been deprived of all its previous identificatory features and as considering them now to be rubbish in order that he may *himself* be found somewhere *else*, namely, in Christ. It is the fact that Paul describes from his new perspective and reflects extensively on a radical change in himself that touches on what we would call his most fundamental identity markers (*from being* one thing *to being* another thing), it is this fact that makes it natural to speak of an awareness of self in Paul in this passage.

We may also describe what is taking place in the passage in terms of subjectification. As Paul describes himself, he is, as it were, *made* a subject by an authority—Christ—who is external to himself, namely, by the experience of having been taken over by that authority.³⁰ This is a fairly straightforward case of Foucauldian subjectification. In addition, we may recall Paul's intense elaboration of the felt quality of the takeover, which we connected with his sense that it was a matter of receiving the pneuma.

Then we may combine the three points. *Because* Paul considers it appropriate to describe himself as having been taken over by the external authority of Christ and because he develops his way of *feeling* the takeover (by the pneuma), *therefore* he also in fact arrives at a conception of his self as the naked entity deprived of all its previous identificatory features that has now been subsumed into Christ. This formulation puts great emphasis on Paul's description of himself as having been taken over by Christ and as himself feeling the takeover. It is the idea of a takeover by an external authority and

Paul's sense of the bodily, physical character of this takeover (by the *pneuma*) that gives him a concept of self in this passage. We may capture this concept by speaking of a 'self of conversion' or a 'converted' self.

PHILIPPIANS 3:12–4:1: PAUL AND THE ADDRESSEES

After his account of his own total change, Paul retraces his steps somewhat (3:12–14):

(12) Not that I have already obtained it or have already become perfected; but I press on to see if I can grasp it, just as I have also (myself) been grasped by Christ Jesus. (13) Brothers, I do not consider that I have myself grasped it; but this one thing I do: forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead, (14) I press on towards the goal of the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus.

Exactly what is the 'it' that Paul has not yet grasped (the 'it' itself is not expressed in the Greek)?³¹ Let us consider the possible referents. In 3:11 Paul has spoken of the resurrection from the dead that he is hoping to arrive at. We know that in the description of the resurrection that he gives at the end of the chapter (3:21) this future event implies a change that is not just cognitive but also bodily and physical. Is it this physical change, then, that Paul has not yet reached or grasped? Is he speaking in material terms of reaching or grasping the *resurrection*? Or is he rather speaking in cognitive terms of grasping *Christ*, corresponding to the fact that he has himself been grasped *by Christ*?

Neither suggestion fits entirely. As for the resurrection, it would be too obvious for Paul to make a point of saying that he has not reached it. And as for Christ, his account in 3:8 of his knowledge of Christ practically excludes that he could now also say that he has *not* yet grasped Christ in cognitive terms. So what is it? It must clearly be something that is both cognitive and physical and also connected with the physical resurrection, which lies in the future. The best candidate seems to be—once again—the *pneuma*. What Paul has not yet grasped is neither the resurrection as such nor Christ without any qualification. Rather, it is the *complete* possession of the *pneuma* that will eventually transform Paul's body at the resurrection, and this complete possession of the *pneuma* is also the *complete* possession—both in a cognitive and a physical sense—of Christ. With such a reading, we may see the latter

half of 3:12 as saying precisely what we have now seen its former half to be implying. Paul is pursuing the pneuma in order to get completely hold of it *since* Christ Jesus, too (in the form of the pneuma), has initially got hold of him.

We may conclude that throughout 3:12 Paul is speaking of a real, pneumatic grasp—and in two ways: his own complete grasp of the pneuma, which lies in the future, and Christ's initial pneumatic grasp of him, which happened to begin with. Thus Paul is bringing out explicitly the idea of a literal takeover by Christ which was also his actual theme in 3:7–11. Why, then, does he articulate this idea only here, and only in a kind of summarizing fashion?

The reason is that he now aims to install himself as a model to his addressees.³² For this purpose he as it were redescribes himself: in spite of having been grasped by Christ in the way he has just explained, (1) Paul himself is in fact not yet perfect; (2) nevertheless, he is striving forward and forgetting about everything that lies behind—and so should they do, too. Although Paul continues to speak of himself in 3:12–14, he has in fact veered round from focusing only on himself in relation to Christ (the converted self) to something different: describing himself *explicitly* as a model to his addressees. This comes out very clearly in the immediately following verses, in which he turns directly to his addressees, first with an inclusive first person plural and then with an explicit second person plural (3:15–17):

(15) We who are perfect: let us think this. But should you in fact think differently about something—this, too, God will reveal to you. (16) Only let us walk in the same field at which we have arrived. (17) Brothers, become imitators of me together with (me), and observe those who live according to the example [or model, Greek: *typos*] you have in us.

The basic point from 3:12 onwards is made explicit in 3:17. Just as Paul himself is not *completely* perfect, but nevertheless presses on towards the final goal, so his addressees who—like Paul himself—fundamentally *are* perfect should imitate Paul and press on together with him.³³ Paul is a *typos*, an example or model, and they should imitate *him* in pressing forward to the goal. Thus although in 3:12–14 Paul describes himself as pressing on in the direction of Christ, he is in fact speaking only of himself here with an eye on his addressees: *they* should become imitators of Paul and do the same as him. Correspondingly, whereas in 3:4–11 he described himself distinctly in a direct relationship with God and Christ, his account of his addressees focuses

on their relationship with *him*, and not at all directly with God and Christ. It is certainly true that they should take Paul as a model for something else, namely, their own relationship with God and Christ. Still, they should engage in that relationship *through* having Paul as their model.

What kinds of selves are involved here, if any? On Paul's side we have what we may call an 'apostolic' self which—on the basis of his having been grasped by Christ (3:12)—*contrasts* himself (cf. 'I myself' in 3:13) with the addressees and characterizes himself as an example or model to them. We should also notice, however, that Paul at the same time also aims to integrate them with himself. That is also implied in the injunction of 3:17 that they become 'imitators *together with me*'.³⁴ In other words, the apostolic self both contrasts and integrates.

This fits the fact that on the side of the addressees we have only a weak notion of selves. Individuals with individual opinions there may well be (cf. 3:15) and those opinions may also differ from Paul's. But there is nothing that would call for speaking distinctly of selves here. Indeed, the basic point seems to be that the addressees should behave and think of themselves rather as participants in a collective group. That group is several times identified by Paul's use of the first person plural (3:15 and 16). And it is of course this collective group that Paul celebrates in 3:20–1 when he inserts himself and his addressees into his underlying world-view with its expectation of resurrection into a heavenly abode. In that collective group there do not seem to be any distinct selves, not even that of Paul's own apostolic self. However, that self is never far away. In 4:1 Paul once more veers back to his apostolic persona when he speaks of his addressees as *his own* (apostolic) joy and crown and enjoins *them* to 'stand firm in this way in the Lord'.³⁵

THE UNDERLYING MISSIONARY LOGIC OF PHILIPPIANS 3:4–4:1

In all this we have not spoken of Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. It is time to bring it in now. As Paul describes himself in 3:4–11, he is describing his bodily *habitus*: with a personal, bodily knowledge of Christ and the *pneuma* of his resurrection and with a similar sharing in his sufferings and bodily conformity with him in his death (3:10). Similarly, as Paul describes himself

and his addressees together in 3:20–1, he is describing their present, bodily habitus which—no matter to what extent it may already be transformed by the pneuma that they do have—is a lowly body (*sōma*, 3:21) in which they *expect* their saviour (3:20) to return and transform their body into his own glorious one, just as Paul himself was *hoping for* the resurrection from the dead (3:11). There is in fact a very close parallelism between 3:11 and 3:21, which means that Paul's self-account in 3:4–11/12 is also meant as an account of the state or habitus into which he aims to bring his addressees. This duality of Paul *and* his addressees is very precisely expressed at 3:17 when Paul enjoins the Philippians to be *co-imitators* (of Christ or the movement towards the resurrection) *together with him*. Thus he has described his own forward-striving habitus in order to make the Philippians adopt the very same forward-striving habitus. It is also this habitus to which Paul refers when he concludes the whole passage with the final injunction that they should 'stand firm in this way in the Lord' (4:1). Here 'in this way' means: as having the pneuma, *but* in a lowly body—but *also* as striving forward towards the final transformation. The state in which they should 'stand firm' is the Christian habitus, which is both present now and turned towards the future. We thus have a Pauline self-account at one end, which articulates his sense of the Christian habitus in his own case by drawing on his cosmology of the pneuma. This was our first overall topic. And we have an account of Paul and his addressees together at the other end, which articulates the same Christian habitus as a present state in which they should stand firm while also striving (as Paul himself does) towards the final cosmological transformation of their bodies. This was our third overall topic. How, then, should we understand the process itself through which Paul aims to bring his addressees into the habitus that he depicts to them? If Paul had the pneuma and aimed to strengthen in his addressees a pneumatic state (the Christian habitus), did he understand the process of paraenesis itself as a transmission of pneuma? This was our second overall topic.

Well, he certainly understood it as a cognitive process, as of course it was. 'We who are perfect: let us *think* (*phronein*) this', he says. And 'should you in fact think (*phronein*) differently about something, then . . .' (3:15). However, we already know from 1 Cor. 2:10–16 that in Paul's view what lay behind the proper cognitive understanding on the part of Christ-believers was in fact the pneuma, which *reveals* the truth.³⁶ We also know that the reason why the Thessalonians had first received God's word (*logos*) from Paul 'not as a word of human beings but as what it truly is: a word of God, which is also active

[namely, *now*] in you who have faith' (1 Thess. 2:13) was that they had received the pneuma (cf. 1 Thess. 1:6).³⁷ Seen in that light, it is noteworthy that in Phil. 3:15 Paul ends up saying that if the Philippians should think differently about something, 'then God will also *reveal* that to you'. In all this it seems as if Paul is tying true cognitive understanding to the possession and activity of the pneuma. In that case, not only did Paul experience the pneuma in his own self at his conversion and aim to transmit his own pneumatic habitus to his addressees by recounting that experience: he also very likely thought that the pneuma he was aiming to transmit was operative in the transmissionary act itself, in his paraenesis.³⁸

THE CONVERTED SELF IN GALATIANS 1–2 AND 6

We have spent some time on Philippians 3 in order to sort out some of the different, but connected aspects that go into that paradigmatic passage. We might spend even longer on the letter to the Galatians, were we to show in detail how the same missionary logic underlies the whole of that letter. Instead we shall focus specifically on a few passages that bring out particularly sharply some of the individual aspects of the complete logic.

The letter operates with the same two selves that we found to be hidden beneath Paul's use of 'I' in Philippians. One is the apostolic self, the persona through which Paul addresses the Galatians as an apostle who transmits to them the gospel of Christ (cf. 1:6–9). This self is a genuine self only to the extent that it presupposes a clear distinction between Paul and the Galatians, reflecting the fact that he has an acknowledged, special relationship with God, who has commissioned in particular *him* to the task of preaching to (among others) *them*. The apostolic self relies on this relationship with God, but focuses on the relationship with the addressees. It is, as it were, a public, representative, and extrovert self. Behind the apostolic self, however, lies a different self, which is in fact far more of a real self: the converted self, who has had Christ revealed to him and whose apostolic task has been given to him in that particular way. Here it is the relationship of an individual with God that is in focus. And this self is a more private one, intimately connected in its inner recesses with God. Still, Paul of course publicizes this self for overt, rhetorical purposes. He even begins the letter by introducing that self (1:1, NRSV): 'Paul an apostle—sent neither by human commission nor from

human authorities, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead . . .’ And he spells out its character in the account he goes on to give of his own call (1:11–16, NRSV with a few changes):

(11) For I want you to know, brothers, that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origin; (12) for I did not receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ. (13) You have no doubt heard of my earlier life in Judaism. I was violently persecuting the assembly of God and was trying to destroy it. (14) I advanced in Judaism beyond many among my people of the same age, for I was far more zealous for the traditions of my ancestors. (15) But when God, who had set me apart before I was born and called me through his grace, was pleased (16) to reveal his Son in me (*en emoi*), so that I might proclaim him among the Gentiles, I did not confer with any human being . . .

The crucial point here is that of a revelation of Christ (cf. 12 and 16) engineered directly by God and not through any human intermediary. Paul is not very specific about the character of the event. However, in the light of Phil. 3:7–9 and not least 2 Cor. 4:6, we may guess that he is referring to a visual experience of Christ—basically, perhaps, in the way it was understood and presented by Luke in Acts. It is not clear whether he intends to describe this experience distinctly as a ‘inner’ one. The Greek phrase *en emoi* in Gal. 1:16 may be translated as either ‘to me’ or ‘in me’.³⁹ In one way, the difference is only marginal. Even if Paul meant ‘in me’, he would not be implying that Christ was not there externally to be seen—he was definitely not talking about an experience that was *only* an inner one. A little later in the letter, however—at 2:20, to which the whole section that begins at 1:11 is leading up—Paul says that ‘Christ lives *en emoi*’, and here the phrase can only mean ‘in me’. It is likely that he had the same idea in mind in 1:16. And this emphasizes the private character of the experience he is recounting.⁴⁰

In that case we may say that Paul is describing an ‘I’ (himself) as having undergone a change (from his earlier life in Judaism to his new task and life) that is presented as a radical transformation exactly in the way of Phil. 3:4–11, and moreover, a transformation of and in the body. Since this transformation was effected exclusively by God, we may also draw the almost paradoxical conclusion we have noted before, that when a person self-reflectively accounts for a change that he or she takes to have *happened* to him or her from the *outside* (but also *in* the person him- or herself), then that person is working with the notion of a self: the something (myself!) *to* and *in* which this change has happened.

This is the converted self. It is not a very substantial self, but precisely one that results from a process of Foucauldian subjectification, reflecting Paul's sense of an authority (God) who has done something to him that he has himself experienced and on which he now reflects. We may also note that Paul's account of this self takes place, once more, when he is confronting the issue of the validity of the Mosaic law. Apparently, it was the conflict over the continuing authority of the law (here between Paul, the law-abiding Jew, and 'God's assembly', cf. 1:13) that generated the kind of religious experience that brought Paul to articulate a notion of the self.

Paul comes back to his own conversion in 2:19–20 as part of an account in 2:15–21 of what is at stake in the particular situation addressed by the letter. The overall issue remains the continued relevance of the Mosaic law, but now focused on a conflict between the apostle Peter and Paul himself (2:11–18). Then he explains about himself (2:19–20):

(2:19) I, however,⁴¹ died to the law through the law, so that I might live for God. I have been crucified with Christ; (20) it is no longer I who live: Christ lives in me. And so far as I now live in the flesh I live in the faith(fulness) of the Son of God,⁴² who felt love for me and gave himself over for me.

This passage contains a fascinating array of 'I's, which we may sort out as follows.⁴³ There is first the idea that 'I am dead, namely, 'crucified together with Christ'. This 'I' stands for the 'old' 'I' which, as v. 20 shows, was in some way connected to the flesh. Call this 'I' I¹. That 'I' is left behind and gone. But then there is another 'I': the one that was meant to live for God. This 'I' is in fact a dual one. It is partly an 'I' that now does live for God, is 'crucified together with Christ' and henceforth lives in Christ faith. Call this 'I', which is in direct contrast with I¹, I².

However, we should probably say that another 'I' is involved, too. This 'I' has two sides to it. First, it is that same 'I' which before conversion *was* there as being alive to the law (now, by contrast, it is dead to the law) and which now *is* alive to God. Or again: which *has been* crucified together with Christ, but now also *is* crucified-together-with-Christ (whatever that means).⁴⁴ Or again: which *no longer* lives—but *still* is there for Christ to live in it (in '*me*'). We may see this self-identical 'I' as an entity that *underlies* the change of which Paul is speaking, in a sense of 'underlying' that harks back to Aristotle's notion of the *hypokeimenon* that 'underlies' substantive change. Second, this underlying 'I' also seems to appear in the role of a kind of superior 'I' of second-order reflection: an 'I' that from the very beginning

enables Paul to give his description of that change in himself. Both the general description of the change with its intense focus on a very marked 'I' (*egō*, *emoi*) and in particular the markedly second-order character of the phrase 'to the extent that I now live in the flesh' seem to presuppose such a kind of self-reflective awareness. Now these two features—of an 'I' that underlies the change and of the second-order reflection on the change—would appear to be two sides of the same idea in the precise way that the postulate of an underlying 'I' may be *derived* from the second-order reflection. We may call this dual 'I' $I^{-/+}$. It expresses on the one hand the notion of an empty, abstract, underlying 'I' (hence ' I^{-} '), which may in one instantiation be '*filled in*' to become the fleshly I^1 and in another instantiation become the Christ-believing I^2 . On the other hand, it is also an 'I' of a more powerful kind of second-order reflection, hence ' I^{+} '.

What we see here is that in order to describe his own conversion—in a setting of concrete intellectual conflict—Paul in fact introduced and presupposed in his description a notion of two different kinds of 'I': a concrete, 'filled' one, which may take two opposed forms as either I^1 or I^2 , and an abstract, empty one, I^{-} , which underlies the change from I^1 to I^2 and is also an 'I' of second-order reflection, I^{+} .

Let me face an objection here. Could we not do with only two 'I's to make sense of the Pauline text: I^1 and I^2 ? Some second-order reflection is evidently involved in the text, but do we need to proliferate 'I's by postulating an extra awareness of a supposedly underlying 'I', I^{-} ? My answer would be that the issue is not of an either/or. The facts are there. Paul is obviously engaged in some kind of self-reflection. He is describing a change from one kind of 'I', I^1 , to another, I^2 . And he is clearly implying that it is one and the same 'I' that *was* present in one form and now *is* present in another. The logic of these facts taken together seems to require the kind of picture I have given. On the other hand, since Paul is not himself explicitly doing the kind of




Figure 5.1

philosophical reflection engaged in here, we might well settle for the simpler picture if we want to stay closer to the immediate level of the text itself. What speaks for the fuller picture, however, is the fact that it draws out some rather evident implications of what is actually being said.

The self-reflective function in all this is important, for it is the element of reflective distance from the change itself together with the fact that the change is understood to have taken place in oneself ('I'/'me') that makes it reasonable to speak of a Pauline notion of the self here, even though he does not himself use any such term. What yields the notion of a self is the phenomenon of (self-)reflection on a radical transformation undergone by the person him- or herself who is giving the account, a transformation that has the form of a takeover by an external agent (Christ) that eradicates the 'I' in one form (I¹) and results in an 'I' in another form (I²).

Are there any indications in this passage that the character of the transformation is specifically bodily? And is there anything to suggest that Paul is in some way also speaking of the *pneuma*? We may take the two questions together. What we see in the passage is the same movement that we found in Phil. 3:7–11 towards an alignment with Christ that appears to be a distinctly bodily matter. First, there is a dying *to* the law in order to come to live *for* God. This might well be initially taken as being wholly metaphorical. Immediately, however, the change is said to consist in Paul's being crucified *together with* Christ. Even more: *he* no longer lives (*at all*), but *Christ* lives *in* him. It seems unmistakable that Paul is here rehearsing the same bodily experience as in Phil. 3:7–11, a sense that he has been taken over in his whole body by Christ. Does this also mean that the *pneuma* is once more involved? In fact, yes. This is suggested by Paul's claim that 'in so far as' he now lives in the flesh, he lives in faith(fulness), *pistis*. For, first, he does not *just* live in the flesh. After all, Christ lives in him. But the usual contrast to the flesh is the *pneuma*, and in any case we know Christ to *be* *pneuma*. This already suggests that Paul does have the *pneuma* in mind. And second, if he lives in *pistis*, then this will itself imply that he also has the *pneuma*. This is made clear immediately after, at the beginning of chapter 3, when Paul suggests that the Galatians received the *pneuma*, not through works of law, but through *pistis* (3:2, 5). If *they* have received the *pneuma* through *pistis*, surely Paul himself has done so, too.⁴⁵

We should conclude that Gal. 2:19–20 expresses exactly the same idea as we found in Phil. 3:7–11 of a Pauline (converted) self that is articulated in connection with a conflict over the continued authority of the Mosaic law,

with Paul's removing this authority from the law to God through Christ and with his spelling out the difference in terms of a physical change in his own body that aligns him (through the *pneuma*) with Christ. In this way Paul rearticulates the new *habitus* of 'being in Christ' (cf. Phil. 3:9) as one of 'having Christ live in one' (cf. Gal. 2:20). The two formulations come to the same thing. And they should be understood wholly concretely as referring to the presence in Paul's body of the *pneuma*.

The concretely cosmological sense of Paul's self-account comes out again at the end of the letter when he once more speaks of his own 'crucifixion together with Christ'. Here is the passage (6:14–15, NRSV with some changes): '(14) May I never boast of anything except the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world. (15) For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything; only new creation is.' The whole cosmos has been crucified 'to' Paul, and he to it, *through* Christ and his cross, which means 'new creation'. If Paul speaks of the whole cosmos and of creation, we should take him seriously. Just as Christ has been literally crucified to the whole world, and then of course *lives elsewhere*, so Paul too, through being aligned with Christ, has died (been crucified) to the world and (now) lives in a way that means new creation. We know, of course, that this is a somewhat hyperbolic way of putting it. After all, Paul to some extent still lives in the flesh, as he himself has said (2:20). (Indeed, whenever *that* suits him, he may very well stress his present *sufferings*—as indeed he goes immediately on to do here in 6:17.) But try to take it literally. What it then means is that Paul now lives as being filled up by Christ (cf. again 2:20), who is both literally dead and literally alive (in heaven). Paul now lives—so he hyperbolically claims—in the way he will eventually come to live when Christ has come to snatch him out of the present evil 'age' and world (cf. 1:4). He already lives as he will come to live in heaven. And how? By being filled up by the *pneuma*, which is the tool of this complete change in all its aspects.

THE SHARED HABITUS IN GALATIANS 5

We know that Paul regularly uses his accounts of his own conversion for paraenetic purposes. So he does in Galatians, too. His introduction in 5:5–6 to the paraenetic section proper—which is 5:13–6:10—is noteworthy since it

both closely resembles and differs from his summary of the converted self in 6:14–15.⁴⁶ Here is the text: '(5:5) For we eagerly wait with *pneuma* (deriving) from *pistis* for the justification for which we hope. (6) For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any power; only *pistis* that is active through love.' There are three important differences here from the picture given in 6:14–15. First, Paul is not just speaking of his own converted self, but instead of himself *and* his addressees: 'we'. In other words, chapter 5 of Galatians repeats the pattern from Philippians 3 of moving from Paul himself (as in 2:19–20 and 6:14–15) to the group, of which he is himself also a member. Second, whereas in 6:14–15 Paul speaks as if he has already gone into the new state, in 5:5–6 he is explicitly speaking of the situation of believers in the present when they can only hope and eagerly wait for the final events (justification). That makes it even more important, and that is the third point, that he explicitly mentions the *pneuma*, both in 5:5 (which evidently underlies 5:6) and also in the paraenetic section proper. The *pneuma* is present already now and its presence underlies everything Paul says of the present state of the addressees.

This all means that the *pneuma*-possessed life that Paul has described in himself in both 2:19–20 and 6:14–15 as an anticipation of the resurrected life (the new creation) must also find expression in the 'ethical' behaviour of his addressees in their present life here and now. That is of course a central Pauline point: life here on earth now (in the Christian group) must *reflect* life in the future, resurrected state in heaven. But even more importantly we see that in Galatians, too, Paul develops his self-account of his own conversion in order to put it to use later in connection with his paraenesis of the addressees.

This move comes out particularly clearly when he goes on to spell out the exact content of 5:6 in the following paraenesis (5:13–6:10). The move is most clearly seen in 5:24: 'Those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.' Paul has just described the 'fruit of the *pneuma*' (5:22–3), which the addressees must adopt in their behaviour (cf. 5:16: 'walk in the *pneuma* . . .'). As it turns out, however, they *will* do this since by belonging to Christ they have themselves already done what Paul also described himself in 2:19–20 as having done: crucified the flesh (by being crucified together with Christ). Thus Paul here brings into his paraenesis an account of his addressees that is directly taken over from his own conversion account. And it is an account that draws directly on the idea of a bodily change (crucifying the flesh) that goes with having received the *pneuma*.

May we then also speak in all this of a *habitus* that Paul aims to generate in his addressees? Indeed, yes. It is true that—just as in Philippians 3—the new *habitus* is not explicitly focused on or described as a ‘body of Christ’. On the other hand, the transformative role of the *pneuma* is much more directly evoked in chapter 5 of Galatians with regard to the state of the addressees than in Philippians 3.⁴⁷ What these similarities and differences show is that Paul did have a fairly rigorously worked-out idea of the various stages in the Christian identity—and that his idea was thoroughly cosmological. We on our side should recognize the comprehensive cosmological understanding that informs Paul’s account of these various stages. In addition, we may fruitfully identify his understanding of himself and his addressees by means of such terms as ‘religious experience’, ‘self’, ‘subjectification process’, and ‘*habitus*’.

A GENERALIZED SELF-ACCOUNT AND ITS PARAENETIC PURPOSE IN ROMANS 7–8

In the present context there are two basic issues that should concern us about the fascinating passage of Rom. 7:7–8:13 as a whole. The first is the kind of subjectification that one finds in Paul’s famous account of his pre-conversion ‘I’ in 7:7–25. The second is the purpose he has with that account. We are still concerned with our three basic topics: the self-account, the paraenetic use of that account, and the picture he provides of the new state (*habitus*).

Is there a self to be found in Rom. 7:7–25? Definitely yes! The word *egō* (an emphatic Greek form of ‘I’) is used extensively throughout the passage and towards the end Paul even uses the phrase *autos egō*, meaning ‘I myself’, where *autos* emphasizes the meaning of ‘(my-)self’. Also, there are indications that Paul’s account fits closely with the passages from Philippians and Galatians that we have analysed as being direct self-accounts on Paul’s part. On the other hand, it is one of the most fundamental insights in twentieth-century Pauline scholarship that Rom. 7:7–25 is *not* just a Pauline self-account. The text should not be read as describing or depicting a set of experiences that Paul had himself had when he was living under the Mosaic law before his conversion. So whose self is Paul depicting? The answer lies in seeing that what we have is a text that presents—from the perspective of Paul’s post-conversion understanding—a *construction* of a ‘Pauline’ experience with the

Mosaic law, that is, an account of what—as seen in hindsight—life under the Mosaic law *should* have been experienced as being like by someone who delighted in the law of God in his inner human being (cf. 7:22), but nevertheless found that he from time to time transgressed it.⁴⁸

If Paul's account is a construction in the first person singular that has nothing to do with any real experiences that Paul may himself have had, then why did he make that construction?⁴⁹ Why did he present life under the law in that way? There may well be several reasons for this, but the most obvious is probably that Paul apparently wanted to present to the Romans for paraenetic purposes the conversion pattern of describing his own change from one state to a new one that we already know from Philippians and Galatians. Since this was what had happened to himself (so he fictively avers), his addressees should see themselves in the same light and practise the consequences of what had happened—paradigmatically—to Paul. We may also note that in addition to being paraenetic, Rom. 7:7–8:13 is about exactly the same theme as Phil. 3:4–11 and Gal. 2:19–20, namely, the relationship between the Mosaic law and Christ. Both facts explain why Paul constructed a self who is only a fictive one. Paul himself makes the fundamentally fictional character of his 'self-account' clear at 8:2 when he states that 'the law of the pneuma of life in Christ Jesus' has freed '*you*' from 'the law of sin and death'. Had he been giving a genuine self-account as in Phil. 3:7–10 and Gal. 2:19–20, he would have written 'me'. Instead, the 'I' of 7:7–25 is a rhetorical fiction presented *as if* it were Paul himself. And in 8:2 Paul addresses this fictive 'I' as 'you' in order to lead over to his direct address to the Romans later in the text (at 8:9).

The important conclusion is that in spite of the fact that Rom. 7:7–25 presents a fictive 'I', whom Paul even generalizes into being the 'wretched human being that I am' of 7:24, he gives the whole account *as if* he were describing a set of experiences *of his own*. It is thus not at all surprising that although this text is not a self-account on Paul's part, it brings out very strongly an idea of a self that we can then go on to ascribe directly to Paul, the writer of this fictional account. Let us note some of the most salient features of the Pauline notion of the self as displayed by this famous text.

The passage describes an awareness of unconquerable sin as present in the body of the person who is giving the description. This awareness is the result of the Mosaic law's telling the person what he must and must not do (cf. 7:7). Thus the first feature of Paul's notion of the self in this text is that of an awareness of the person himself brought about by an external authority. This

is a clear case of Foucauldian subjectification under the regime of the rule of law. The second important feature is derived from the fact that the person's self-awareness is a quite complex one. This is reflected in the several 'I's that are needed to account for Paul's argument. The uppermost 'I' is the one that is giving the account—I⁺ in our discussion of Gal. 2:19–20. The drama of Paul's account is encapsulated in the fact that this 'I' is both able to give an account of itself—a task that requires some degree of control—and also forced to recognize that it is itself split between two sides of itself, the harmonization of which it can *not* control or bring about. This duality is stated with exemplary precision at the end of the text: '(7:25) So then, I—being one and the same—am a slave with my mind to the law of God, but with my flesh to the law of sin.'⁵⁰ The duality is already implied at the beginning of Paul's detailed account when he states that while the law is 'pneumatic', 'I (myself: Greek *egō*) am fleshly, sold into slavery under sin' (7:14). And Paul spells it out with increasing—and eventually quite overwhelming—force that leads to the exasperated cry in 7:24 of 'Wretched human being that I am!'⁵¹

In addition to I⁺ as the uppermost 'I' which describes its own ineffectual attempt to control itself, there are two other 'I's in the account which are precisely those that I⁺ attempts to harmonize. One of these is the 'I' that acts out of control. This 'I' is similar to, but definitely not the same as, I¹ of our discussion of Gal. 2:19–20 since the latter was not presented as being split. The other 'I' is the one that *should* have been in control. This is similar to, but again definitely not the same as, I² of our previous discussion. '(7:15) What I [I¹] bring about I [I⁺] do not know. For what I [I²] want, that I [I⁺/I¹] do not do. But what I [I²] hate, that I [I⁺/I¹] do.' The similarity and dissimilarity with our previous discussion are due to the fact that what Paul is describing in Romans 7 is a split *within* I¹ of the Galatians account. Whereas in Galatians he was talking of the change that goes into conversion, in Romans 7 he is only talking of the pre-conversion stage. But there is also a similarity. For I¹ of the Galatians account is precisely *dominated* by I¹ of Romans 7, and conversely I² of Romans 7 points—but precisely ineffectually—*towards* I² of the Galatians account.

Thus understood, Romans 7 celebrates a schizophrenic split realized by the person himself (I⁺) between two incompatible desires that are connected with two opposed 'I's (I¹ and I²). Both features justify the claim that a Pauline notion of the self is being expressed here.

We may also note that Paul separates out the two opposing 'I's in a manner that is both similar to the one we found in 2 Cor. 4:16 and appears to be

equally bodily. This happens when he declares that 'I [I^+ / I^2] rejoice in the law of God in my inner human being, but I [I^+] see something different 'in my members (*melē*)' (7:22–3). The contrast between the 'inner human being' and the 'members' is closely similar to the one between inner and outer human being in 2 Cor. 4:16. But again, of course, Paul is speaking in Romans 7 of the pre-conversion state, as he is not in 2 Corinthians 4. Note then that Paul is opposing the 'inner human being' to the (external) *members*. In this way he ties the desires that are his primary target closely to the body. They are—precisely—bodily desires.

What then about the opposing wishes and rejoicing of the inner human being, which is twice (7:23 and 25) connected with the 'mind' (Greek *nous*)? How should we understand their ontological status? Are they 'noetic' in the Platonist ontological sense of being immaterial? Paul gives no completely unequivocal indication of how to answer that question, but we have already seen that his general view of both body *and* soul (*psychē*), which on an ordinary Greek understanding included even the mind (*nous*), was that they *together* were earthly phenomena which he contrasted with the pneuma. Since the pneuma itself was a physical entity, so—a fortiori—would the soul be. In fact, it makes excellent sense to see the difference in Rom. 7:7–8:13 between the person described in 7:7–25 with 'members' and '*nous*' and those described in 8:8–13, who have the pneuma, as corresponding closely to Paul's distinction in 1 Cor. 2:10–16 between the 'psychic human being' and the 'pneumatic' one. And again, if the latter was understood physically by Paul, so will the former be. It is also noteworthy that Paul summarizes his picture of the split self by asking who will deliver him from the '*body* of this death' (7:24). Here the 'body' (*sōma*) does not refer merely to the 'members', but to the whole 'human being' (*anthrōpos*), who consists of both the 'inner human being' (the *nous*) and the 'members'. This makes it virtually certain that Paul thought of the *nous* too as part of the body.⁵²

Let us then briefly note the use Paul makes in Romans 8 of his 'self'-account in Romans 7. We already know the gist of it: the Romans and Paul himself ('we') have been removed from the deplorable situation depicted in Romans 7 by having received the pneuma (8:9–11, 15–17, etc.). And we also know the effect of this: the Romans' bodies are literally dead (8:10).

Romans 7:7–8:13, then, once more brings all our three topics into play. There is the 'self'-account, which (by implication and because it is about a pre-converted self) focuses on the *lack* of the pneuma. There is the use of the 'self'-account for paraenetic purposes. And there is a very forceful working

out of the new habitus, which is defined by the presence of ‘God’s pneuma’ (8:9), ‘Christ’s pneuma’ (8:9), and even Christ himself (8:10) in the bodies of believers.

Do we also find any traces of the idea that the paraenetic process itself was understood by Paul as a transmission of pneuma, that on the basis of his own Christian habitus he was in his paraenesis directly transmitting pneuma to his addressees that was meant to strengthen their habitus? We may find this idea strange or we may even dislike it, but we have already seen indications in other texts that Paul could have something like this in mind. Moreover, the idea would both fit and give extra point to a claim Paul has made earlier in the letter: ‘(1:11) For I long to see you in order that I may impart (*metadidonai*) to you some (of my own)⁵³ pneumatically bestowed favour (*charisma* . . . *pneumatikon*) so that you may be strengthened.’ In answering this question we must take note of the strongly experiential quality of Paul’s writing in our passage. He has stated very clearly the general shape of the passage just before it begins, with 7:5 anticipating 7:7–25 and 7:6 anticipating 8:1–13:

(5) For when we were in the flesh, the experiences (*pathēmata*) of the sins—those brought about by the law—were active in our limbs so that we bore fruit to death. (6) Now, however, we have been set free from the law, having died to that in which we were held captive, so that we are (now) serving in the new state of pneuma (*en kainotēti pneumatos*) and not in the old state of the letter.

That, as it were, is the ‘title’ for what follows. It states its actual content. However, when Paul spells out this content and explains its meaning, his language becomes far less factual and objective, and instead turns extremely experiential and indeed subjective: he delves into the person he is presenting and describes the subjective self-reflection of this person in the way we have seen. Indeed, the whole point of Paul’s account seems to lie in making his readers themselves experience the experiences of the self that he is recounting. Now we know that the described person is not Paul himself—but also that the description presupposes the new state of the pneuma-possessed Paul. It seems, therefore, that what we are witnessing in this passage is precisely a case of pneumatic transmission by Paul of his own pneuma through the medium of experiential language: Paul is, as it were, trying to make his readers convert in exactly the self-generating and pneumatic way that he has elsewhere described for his own case.⁵⁴

I can imagine that this reading will be roundly rejected by scholars. I can only reply that I have a strong sense that exactly here we are extremely close to

Paul's own understanding of what is going on in this text. If he were present, he would have nodded.

THE CHRISTIAN HABITUS IN 1 CORINTHIANS

We have seen that two elements in what we are calling the Christian habitus are clearly present in the three conversion texts we have analysed from Philippians, Galatians, and Romans. The first is the collective character ('we') of the state that Paul aims to bring about or strengthen in his addressees. The other is the bodily character of this state, which derives from the fact that it is a state of the body (*sōma*) of flesh and blood that is progressively being transformed by the *pneuma*. What we have not found, however, is an explicit formulation of this habitus. This we get in 1 Corinthians when Paul speaks of the Corinthians as a 'temple of God', of their body as 'a temple of the holy *pneuma* in you', and of themselves as the 'body of Christ'. Question: Why there? And why not in the other letters?

There are in fact excellent reasons why Paul articulates the collective group in 1 Corinthians as a temple or (single) body. For there his aim is precisely to overcome divisions within the group (*schismata*, 'schisms', 1 Cor. 1:10).⁵⁵ And that aim runs through the whole of the letter. It is as part of this aim that Paul introduces (in chapter 12) the notion of the group as a 'body' (*sōma*), precisely the 'body of Christ' (12:27). The way he develops this in the same chapter draws heavily on a similar elaboration in contemporary Stoic sources of the notion, which in itself is quite old in the Greek world, of a 'social body'.⁵⁶ All in all, then, one can easily understand why Paul develops the notion of a single temple or body precisely in 1 Corinthians. Conversely, if Paul was not directly targeting any internal divisions in the other letters, there may have been no incentive for him to articulate the notion itself there.

Well and good, but do Paul's various formulations in 1 Corinthians really articulate the notion of a Christian habitus? Would it not be far simpler to say that he is using the terms 'temple' and 'body' metaphorically in the way one may, for instance, speak of the 'ship of the state' (or of Chaiman Mao as 'the Great Helmsman')? No. If we look at the most relevant passages in slightly more detail, we will see that he has something far more concrete in mind.

The first passage is 3:16: 'Do you not know that you are God's temple [or: a temple of God] and that God's *pneuma* lives in you?' There is every reason

why Paul mentions the *pneuma* here since he has just (3:1–3) chided the Corinthians for being ‘fleshly’ when they should be pneumatic. Also, it is likely that Paul thought that what would save each individual Christ-believer on the day of judgement even if his individual acts should be burned up in the fire (3:12–15) is precisely the fact that he does possess *pneuma*.⁵⁷ Still, the combination in 3:16 of being God’s temple and having the *pneuma* live in one indicates that Paul understood the Corinthians as being God’s temple *in the sense that*—and *because*—they possessed the *pneuma*. In other words, the temple that Paul has in mind here is that single thing which is shared by all *pneuma*-possessed Christ-believers. What is that thing? The *pneuma* itself *as* present in them.

This understanding is strongly supported by the next relevant passage: 6:15–20. Paul is discussing prostitution (*porneia*), which he for good reason describes as an extremely bodily affair. The whole section of 6:12–20 is to the point and might deserve closer analysis since it shows how Paul saw ‘Christ’ as being directly connected with the body (6:13–14): ‘(13) the body (*sōma*) is not for prostitution but for the Lord [that is, Christ], and the Lord is for the body. (14) And God raised both the Lord and will also raise us [that is, as bodily beings] through his power [*dynamis*—that is, the *pneuma*].’ Paul continues (6:15–20):

(15) Do you not know that your bodies [plural] are Christ’s members (*melē*)? Should I then go and make Christ’s members the members of a prostitute? Never! (16) Or do you not know that the one who has sexual intercourse with a prostitute is one body (with her)? . . . (17) But the one who has sexual intercourse with the Lord is one *pneuma* (with him). (18) Flee prostitution. Every sinful act that a person may do is outside his body. But the fornicator sins towards his own body. (19) Or do you not know that your body [singular] is a temple of the holy *pneuma* in you that you have from God, and that you do not belong to yourselves? (20) For you were bought for a price. So, praise (*doxazein*) God in your body [singular].

One might spend hours on this passage.⁵⁸ For our purposes it unmistakably shows that the temple of which Paul speaks consists of the single body that is made up of the individual bodies of the Corinthians as transformed by the *pneuma*. When the Corinthians are enjoined to *doxazein* God ‘in their body’, Paul is telling them to activate the shared *pneuma* as present in each of them in order to meet with that *pneuma* God from whom they have received it. When they do that, there is no longer room for any other use of their bodies. Clearly, the temple ‘of the holy *pneuma* in you’ *is* the *pneuma* and just as much of a bodily thing as their individual bodies themselves.

Let us move from there directly to chapter 12, where Paul brings in the conceit of the ‘social body’. He introduces this notion in 12:12–13 in this way:

(12) For just as the body (*sōma*) is a single thing, but has many members (*melē*), and all the members of the body are a single body even though they are (also) many, so it is with Christ, too. (13) For we were all baptized in a single pneuma into a single body—whether Jews or Greeks or slaves or free—and we were all given a single pneuma to drink.

This passage virtually states that the single body (also called ‘Christ’) that believers *are* is made up of the single pneuma. This does not, of course, mean that there are no individual differences at all between believers, differences that are tied to the individual bodies of flesh and blood, to their social locations, and the like. This is precisely what Paul presupposes in the account he goes on to give (12:14–31) of how the individual members of the single body should behave in relation to one another. Still, he has already insisted in 12:4–11 that although individual believers may have very many different functions, it is ‘one and the same pneuma’ that distributes these functions to each individual ‘as it sees fit’ (12:11). In short, ‘Christ’ and the ‘body of Christ’ *is* that ‘one and the same’ pneuma that is present in the bodies of all baptized believers, thereby turning them all into a single body.

This body is the Christian habitus. And everything Paul says in the letters is directed towards spelling out what it consists in for the purpose of bringing it about in his addressees. It is to this single pragmatic end that Paul does all the things ‘with words’ that he does in his letters. In the next chapter we shall consider the bodily character of this missionary practice in more detail.

6

Bodily Practice

THE SPECIAL CONTOURS OF THE CHRISTIAN HABITUS

The aim of this concluding chapter is to generalize our findings so far and to bring them to their final destination, which is an elucidation of Paul's bodily practice in the writing of his letters.

We shall begin from some remarks on the traditional reading of Paul, which—consciously or unconsciously—understands many central concepts in Paul metaphorically. Next we shall consider how the concretely cosmological reading proposed in this book relates to another type of reading—which I have myself propounded quite extensively—that insists on the cognitive and (in a broad sense) 'ethical' dimension of the letters. In both cases we must ask how the cosmological reading relates to these others readings. Does it rule them out? Does it supplement them? Or is it in some way even more intimately connected with them? As it turns out, we shall find that at least the cognitive cum 'ethical' reading and the cosmological one do go intimately together since they bring out two sides of one and the same phenomenon: the Christian bodily habitus that is Paul's constant theme. And we shall consider some topics in Paul that show this, for instance the idea of the saving power of *gnōsis* ('knowledge').

Still at the generalizing level, we shall also try to articulate the exact contours of the Christian habitus in comparison with two other (ideal) types of habitus that lie behind it and from which Paul developed the new one: (1) a Jewish habitus of a Pharisee and 'apocalypticist' who would be living in the Greco-Roman world of the first century CE and (2) a non-Jewish habitus of an intellectual who would be living in the eastern half of the Greco-Roman world during the same period.

In concluding this part of the chapter we shall ask about the social significance in our own day of the kind of analysis of Paul we have given, since the Pauline habitus contains a number of elements that are very distinctly tied to their own time and place. This question certainly touches on 'theology' as a modern, normative enterprise, but it also addresses the broader issue of the advantage and disadvantage of history for life ('Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben') that Nietzsche raised so forcefully.¹

All these issues pertain to our modern reading of Paul: the categories we should use for understanding his thought, how we should see it in comparison with other contemporary patterns of thought that appear relevant, and finally, the usefulness to ourselves of the whole interpretative enterprise in addition to its purely cognitive benefits. All through, our focus will be on the precise understanding of the Christian bodily habitus that Paul is striving in so many ways to articulate. Indeed, one advantage of employing Bourdieu's modern notion of the habitus is that it allows us to keep together those many ways of acting and speaking. They are all ways of generating a bodily habitus.

However, Paul himself should have the last word. In the light of Bourdieu's understanding of the relationship between ideas and practice, we shall attempt to lay bare an understanding (even a mini-theory) that Paul may himself have had of his own missionary practice, which was also a distinctly bodily practice, both when he transmitted the gospel to people for the first time and they responded with *pistis*, and also when he wrote letters to them (also a bodily practice, in fact a spoken one) in order to strengthen them in their *pistis*. We shall end by analysing a single, somewhat larger Pauline text (2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 as part of chapters 1–7 of the letter), which is also one of the most fantastic texts in Paul in all senses of the term, in order to elucidate his actual bodily practice in this missionary text.

METAPHORICAL SPEECH IN PAUL

Let us consider once more a passage we discussed towards the end of the previous chapter: 1 Cor. 12:12–13.

(12) For just as the body (*sōma*) is single thing, but has many members (*melē*), and all the members of the body are a single body even though they are (also) many, so it is with Christ, too. (13) For we were all baptized in a single pneuma into a single body

(*sōma*)—whether Jews or Greeks or slaves or free—and we were all given a single pneuma to drink.

Here Paul begins with a straightforward comparison: ‘just as . . . so it is . . .’. By verse 13, however, the entity (‘Christ’) which was compared with a normal, physical body has itself *become* a body, one that is constituted by the pneuma. Since the pneuma is itself a physical entity, the body that is Christ is in fact a real, physical body—it is coextensive with (if not just identical with) the pneumatic body that Paul will go on to talk about in chapter 15 of the letter. On this reading (for which I am not here arguing), Paul’s talk of the ‘single body’ in verse 13 is not just a case of metaphorical speech. He intends it literally as referring to an entity that is a (tri-dimensional) body just as much as a normal, physical body, only it is made up of a different kind of ‘stuff’ from a body of flesh and blood.²

So, the ‘body of Christ’ is not a metaphor in Paul. The same goes—and that has been part of the argument all through this book—for the central phrase of ‘being in Christ’. That expression, too, will be speaking of the pneuma: of *having* it in one’s own body and of *thereby* being concretely and literally *in* the pneuma that is also around in the world and is Christ.

One might go on like this. Take the phrase ‘the *ekklēsia* of God’. Depending on the extent to which the term ‘*ekklēsia*’ was closely and specifically tied in Greek to the political ‘assembly’ that was a central feature in the Greek city-state (*polis*), one may certainly say that the Pauline phrase constitutes a kind of metaphorical transfer from one social field to another. Indeed, that would probably be a correct description even if Paul had been preceded by a Hellenistic-Jewish use of the term for the ‘people of God’.³ But is ‘the *ekklēsia* of God’ *just* a metaphor of that kind? Hardly. As is well known, Paul was exceedingly conscious of the boundaries around the *ekklēsia*, which helped to constitute it.⁴ That does not remove the use from the metaphorical level, however, since the same kind of consciousness of boundaries is part and parcel of the Greek use of the term, too. But with the strong emphasis Paul generally puts on reception of the pneuma in connection with baptism and hence with entry into the *ekklēsia*, it seems likely that the term will also—in Paul’s mind and use—have been understood to refer directly to those who possess the pneuma. Understood in this way, while the expression ‘the *ekklēsia* of God’ retains its partly metaphorical character, it is also not *just* metaphorical since as part of its meaning it refers to something (possession of pneuma) that *makes* those who fall under the term members of the group that

it names. In that sense ‘the *ekklēsia* of God’ is something wholly real in the world—and indeed something that is more real *independently* of its metaphorical character than, say, the ‘leg’ of a table (which in itself is, of course, also real enough). ‘The *ekklēsia* of God’ stands for those who have the *pneuma* and who *therefore* constitute the quasi-political—and to that extent metaphorical—group of God’s *ekklēsia*.

So, does Paul never employ metaphors that are, as it were, nothing but metaphors (such as the ‘leg’ of a table)? What about the expressions ‘dying to the law’ (e.g. Gal. 2:19, Rom. 7:4) or ‘dying to sin’ (Rom. 6:2, 11)? Once again the best answer appears to be that these expressions have both a metaphorical and a literal meaning. The metaphorical meaning lies in the idea itself of ‘dying to’ something, in the sense of being removed from the field where some given thing (e.g. the law) has application. To speak of this as ‘dying to’ the thing is to make use of a metaphorical transfer from beings, namely, organic beings, which can in fact die and in this sense be removed from their previous relationship with other beings or things. On the other hand, we have seen that there is good reason to think that Paul chose precisely this (metaphorical) way of speaking because he took it that some *real* dying (or at least ‘half-dying’) was in fact involved in dying to the law or sin, namely, a dying of the body of flesh and blood of the person of whom he is speaking.

So once more, does Paul never employ metaphors just like that? Of course he does. To speak of believers as having been ‘buried’ together with Christ in baptism (Rom. 6:4), as having ‘grown’ together with the image of Christ’s death (6:5), as having been ‘crucified’ together with him (6:6), and much more is indeed to speak metaphorically. However, and this is the basic point, it is possible far more often than people normally take it to be the case to understand Paul to be *also* referring, by the use of these metaphorical expressions, to concrete, bodily events that can be spelled out directly in the physical language of his cosmology. In that case, one has to be extremely careful about taking him to be speaking ‘only metaphorically’.⁵

THE PHYSICAL UNDERPINNING OF PAUL’S COGNITIVE AND ‘ETHICAL’ LANGUAGE

That lesson has wider implications. In an earlier book entitled *Paul and the Stoics* (2000), I argued that underlying Paul’s many arguments in the letters

to the Philippians, Galatians, and Romans there was a structural or logical pattern or conceit focusing on cognition that had a close parallel in a similar pattern that holds together the basic ideas in Stoic ethics. I even attempted to show that a number of ideas that are present on the surface of Paul's text actually derive from Stoicism.⁶ Thus the claim was that Stoicism and Pauline thought are not just two patterns of thought that happen to resemble one another, but that Paul had used a number of basic ideas in Stoic ethics (together with a large number of other, non-Stoic ideas derived from other corners of Paul's context) to articulate his own message, which was, of course, not just a Stoic one. (The Stoics did not speak about Jesus Christ.)⁷ I continue to believe that this theory is basically right even though it has not been accepted wholesale by many. If so, how does the cognitive picture of Paul's thought presented there fit the one that has been developed here? Do they just lie side by side? Are they rather opposed to one another? Or are they perhaps even more closely connected?

The previous book did not speak at all of the *pneuma*. It also set aside as not being within the field of focus everything that had to do with God's intervention in the world, Christ's resurrection, the resurrection of believers, Paul's apocalypticism in general, and much more of the same kind. Instead, the cognitive focus was directed more narrowly at what in traditional terms would be called Paul's 'anthropology' and 'ethics'.⁸ The two categories were placed in scare quotes, however, since I rejected the view that what Paul says within those categories thereby falls outside his 'theology'. 'Theology', 'anthropology', and 'ethics' cannot be separated in Paul. And indeed, the experience of Christ was given a crucial role in the overall picture of both Paul himself and his addressees.

Here is an ultra-brief summary to help us articulate the comparison between the relatively traditional approach adopted in the earlier book with its strong focus on cognition and the one that has been presented here with its emphasis on the physical body.

The logical starting point was an analysis to be found in both Paul and Stoicism of two different forms of self-awareness, two different forms of relating the self to the world. In one form (that of a human 'sinner' or of 'natural man'), the self or 'I' found its basic values in itself, that is, within a way of looking at self and world that started out distinctly from the 'I' itself. There was no questioning here of the immediate sense that it was the perspective of the 'I' itself that would deliver the fundamental values on the basis of which everything else in the world should and would be seen and

evaluated. This comprehensive attitude was not the same as that of modern individualism for the very good reason that it was only the first half of a story that situated the true norms in something larger than the individual. Rather, it was a theory to the effect that the initial perspective on the world of human beings before they underwent a crucial change (or at least *might* undergo such a change) was 'self-centred' in the sense given, by nature and in a similar form in all human beings. Here the human being was—generically—directed *at* itself or at others *like* itself or as belonging *to* itself. I termed this self-centred pole of awareness the I-pole. This is in fact the type of self-awareness that Paul describes with great force and imagination (but also with a false use of examples) in Romans 1 (18–31).

Then there was an entirely different way of relating the self to the world. In Paul, this is captured in the notion of *pistis*, which stands for a relation to God and Christ that has the form of being intentionally 'directed' towards them. In this movement, the 'I' itself is left behind as the locus of valuation. Instead, the person now sees itself as belonging to or with Christ, which means that the (individual) features that previously marked the person as an individual 'I', including the person's own body, are no longer given any significance as identity markers. The person has now become a 'Christ person'. The same kind of movement may be found in Stoicism, and here to a level of self-understanding where the individual will look at itself 'from above' in a way that similarly relativizes any individual identity markers, including the body.⁹ The natural 'I' of the body of flesh and blood with all its local, social situatedness is eradicated. I termed this pole of self-awareness the X-pole. It is obviously spelled out differently in either system of thought, as Christ in Paul and as *logos* (rationality) in Stoicism with all the different implications of each. But its function is the same in the crucial respect that it generates the movement away from the I-pole to a view 'from above' of the individual self.

Finally, there was a third way of relating to the world, which is actually implied in the movement from I to X. Both in Paul and Stoicism the intentional movement from the individual self to Christ and the *logos* respectively is at the same time a turn towards other people, either (for Paul) those who have the same intentional directedness to Christ as oneself or (for Stoicism) those—and these are in principle *all* human beings—who possess reason just as one oneself does. Via the relationship with X, both other Christ-believers and other rational beings come to be seen to *belong* to oneself, which means, conversely, that the individual no longer belongs merely to him- or herself (or immediate kin), but precisely also to the others,




Figure 6.1

irrespective of their distance in other respects. The gap between the self and the shared has been removed. This movement constitutes the central content of the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiōsis* (‘socialization’), which focuses on shifts in the understanding of what and who ‘belongs’ to the self (is *oikeion* to it)—or, conversely, where the self itself belongs.¹⁰ Paul too once employs the same term when he speaks of the proper behaviour towards those ‘belonging’ to the *pistis*, the *oikeioi* of the *pistis* (Gal. 6:10). I termed this social pole of self-awareness—which definitely continues to be a matter of *self*-awareness—the S-pole.

It will be immediately clear from the explication given above that this picture has been stated in terms that are cognitive and ‘ethical’, with a mixture of terminology that derives both from Stoic ethics and from far later philosophy of mind (for instance notions such as ‘intentional directedness’). At the same time, I claimed in the book—and still claim—that both types of philosophical input help to lay bare a set of ideas that are manifestly there in Paul himself and that receive a pregnant meaning when they are seen as part of the larger pattern.

Then the question: how does this picture of a basic, logical, underlying structure of a cognitive and ‘ethical’ kind in Paul fit with the quite different focus on cosmology and the physical body that has been the theme of the present book?

Answer: these two perspectives are the two sides of one and the same coin. With the focus of this book on the *pneuma* and the body, we have articulated a physical pattern that underlies—like body to mind—the cognitive pattern described in the earlier book. Nor should this connection between the two perspectives be at all surprising. For if Paul was influenced by Stoicism in his articulation of the various elements that constitute the cognitive pattern, and

if he was also influenced by Stoicism—as argued here—in his articulation of some of the crucial elements that constitute the physical pattern, then there is every reason to expect that the double aspect theory of body and mind that is central to Stoicism has left its mark on Paul, too.¹¹ That is, we should directly *expect* that when Paul speaks, for instance, of *gnōsis* ('knowledge'), he would also have in mind some physical counterpart of this cognitive state (in fact, a state of the pneuma) that would explain why it was appropriate to speak of *gnōsis* in the first place.

And that is precisely what we have found. As an example, we may remind ourselves of the relationship we have noted between Rom. 7:7–25 and 8:1–13. Where the former text describes the problem of weakness of will primarily in cognitive terms of self-awareness, the latter text solves the problem partly in terms of God's act in the Christ event (cf. 8:4), partly in terms of the physical result of this event in believers: that they have the pneuma. The underlying premiss that explains why problem and solution can be given in such different terms is that Paul presupposed an understanding of the mind like the Stoic one, where body and mind are two sides of the same thing.

Against this background we can see that the relationship between the earlier picture of Paul and the one given here is very simple—there is one thing that underlies the intentional, cognitive movements described in the earlier picture: physical participation in the pneuma. We may bring out the double-aspect connections by considering the logic of a narrative that encapsulates the most important parts of Paul's world-view.

The central story told by Paul begins, as it were, on the left side of Figure 6.1, with God's intervention through the Christ event.¹² That, as we know, is a pneumatic event through and through: God's resurrection of the crucified Jesus. This crucial stage in the story could be marked on the left-hand side of Figure 6.1 by a broken line going down perpendicularly from God to the I-pole.

The next stage is that of human beings coming to *pistis* in relation to the Christ event. There are two substages of this that we should distinguish. One concerns Paul the apostle himself. We have seen that he elaborated his account of his own conversion, which was a cognitive event of moving from the I-pole to the X-pole, in terms that suggested that he also saw it as a matter of receiving the pneuma in his own body directly from God. Here the bodily and the cognitive change went together as two sides of the same event. This elaboration articulated what we called the 'converted self' for Paul himself. But it was also this event that, as it were, 'sent him out' to announce the

gospel event to others (cf. Rom. 10:14–15). Thus in Paul's own case the 'converted self' turned into an 'apostolic self'.

The other substage concerns the recipients of Paul's announcement. Here too the pneuma was taken to be present in ways we have already noticed and shall develop in a moment. The message of the Christ event was transmitted by the apostle through the pneuma; and it was also received by believers through the pneuma. Finally, this change in believers was confirmed when they received the pneuma in baptism.

All these events had the combined effect of removing both Paul and his addressees from the I-pole. In other words, their intentional directedness towards Christ was the cognitive side of their being filled with the pneuma. They now strove—with Paul as their model—fully to grasp the pneuma (that is, Christ at the X-pole), corresponding to the fact that they had themselves been grasped by Christ (Phil. 3:12). Here we may note how strikingly the connection between the physical and the cognitive sides comes out in Paul's use in Phil. 3:12 of the term 'grasp' (in its verbal form—Greek: *katalabein*), since that term has exactly the same connotations in Greek as in English of an event that may be both physical and cognitive. In addition we may note that the corresponding substantive, 'grasp' (Greek: *katalēpsis*), is in Stoic epistemology *the* technical term for the 'true grasp' that yields knowledge.¹³

The third stage of the story is that of believers who are presently situated at the S-pole in recognition of the fact that through their reception of pneuma they all relate in the same way to Christ (who is himself pneuma) and through that to one another. Here the difference between Paul and his addressees has been removed. They are now all seen as taking part together in the one thing that they shared, which was the pneumatic Christ; and their shared sense of this participation breaks down any walls between them. Just as in Stoicism the presence of *logos* in all human beings makes them kin to one another, so in Paul the presence of pneuma in believers makes them brothers with one another through their relation to the 'firstborn' brother among them, Christ (cf. Rom. 8:29). This present state of believers is the one that is captured by speaking of the Christian habitus of their bodies.

The fourth and final stage, then, is the future state of the resurrection when believers' pneuma-informed bodies of flesh and blood will finally undergo the complete change that makes them pneumatic through and through. This stage lies to the right of our drawing, but it has been the argument of this book that what Paul says of this stage (primarily in 1 Corinthians 15) informs everything he says of the stages that lie before it.

Thus the purpose of developing the picture presented in this book has not at all been to cast doubt on the validity of the cognitive (and indeed also the metaphorical) way(s) of reading Paul to which we have become accustomed. Those kinds of language are evidently there in Paul, and perhaps even to a larger extent than they are normally taken to be: cognition, at least, is at the core of Paul's thought.¹⁴ Instead, the aim has been to argue for a radical extension of the traditional way of reading so as also to include a whole dimension (the physical and bodily one) that has hitherto not been given its due. The term 'dimension' works well here since it points to the need for a change of perspective on the Pauline text that is both in itself a radical change from the more traditional ones and also one that does not in the least exclude the cognitive perspective. On the contrary, it adds to it as constituting the other side of the same coin.

As an example of this connection we may spell out in the following way some of the implications of the remarks made above about *gnōsis* (and *katalēpsis*). In Paul, knowledge (*gnōsis*) saves. That claim might initially seem counterintuitive. Is salvation (Greek: *sōtēria*) not a matter of being with Christ in heaven? Indeed, yes. But the two things go together. *Gnōsis* is a pneumatic state of the body of flesh and blood, which has been brought about *by* the pneuma. And at the resurrection it is also the pneuma that will turn the fleshly body into a fully pneumatic body, which is no longer one of flesh and blood. So, *gnōsis* saves. Is that claim then *only* one about physics? Of course not. *Gnōsis* is *gnōsis* and thus also a cognitive state. Moreover, it is also as a cognitive state that it saves. There is no either/or here, only a both/and.¹⁵

The conclusion to be drawn from all this takes the form of a double, closely connected challenge to readers of Paul. One must constantly do two things. The first is to keep an open eye on any physical implications of Paul's language when he is otherwise speaking at the cognitive and 'ethical' level that we are used to taking to be the only relevant one. As we have seen throughout this book and just spelled out above, there is a comprehensive story about the behaviour and functions of the physical pneuma that underpins what Paul says at the other level. That perspective must always be factored in. The second necessary thing is to keep an open eye on any connections between what Paul says of the physical pneuma and of bodies of flesh and blood. One must constantly look for the ways in which the pneuma was thought by Paul to relate to other physical entities, not least the fleshly bodies of believers. It is here, at the level of the handling of bodies, that Paul's thought has its ultimate focus.

PAUL'S CHRISTIAN HABITUS IN CONTEXT: A BREAKTHROUGH

Before we come to consider Paul's actual practice in the handling of bodies, we may step back for a moment and try to bring out the specific shape of Paul's comprehensive, Christian bodily habitus, the one he aims to install in his addressees and the one out of which he acts when he addresses them. How is this habitus similar to and different from others in Paul's context? Here we may once more draw our inspiration from Bourdieu, in particular the way he in a number of different works analysed how certain specific individuals—Baudelaire, Manet, Heidegger, among others—created a new habitus out of the one in which they were brought up. Differently from Bourdieu, however, but in accordance with the general insight that one must constantly go 'beyond the Judaism/Hellenism divide' in one's analysis of Paul, we may try to articulate Paul's new, 'Christian' habitus—with 'Christian' in scare quotes since Paul was precisely only in the middle of articulating a specifically Christian position in the letters themselves—in relation not just to a single preceding habitus, but to two: a 'traditional Jewish' one and a Greco-Roman, philosophical one.¹⁶ The artificiality of this lies immediately at hand. Is there any such thing as a 'traditional Jewish' habitus of this time and place? And what about a Greco-Roman, philosophical one? Indeed, are we not here reifying phenomena that were in reality much more subtle and vague? Or even worse, are we not actually *re*introducing the Judaism/Hellenism divide into the question itself? However, everything hangs on the execution, and even more on the result: whether we will end up feeling that we have learned something about Paul that we did not see so clearly before. Basically, the value of the whole operation is heuristic. So, let us proceed.

In addition to the habitus, we need to have a few more notions from Bourdieu in place. The first is that of a 'field' (*champ*).¹⁷ A field is made up of a special set of practices performed by a special type of people and backed up by a special type of institution. In modern Western society, law is such a field, scientific knowledge is another, art is a third. As will be immediately clear, such fields may on the one hand overlap each other; on the other hand they do not have clear boundaries. Neither fact, however, detracts from the heuristic value of the concept. If we try to apply it to Paul, we may say that ancient Judaism in the time of Jesus and Paul was such a field. By contrast, it is perhaps less illuminating to speak of 'Hellenism', or the Greco-Roman

world as a whole, as a field. It is just too broad and variegated, including as it does even the field of Judaism. Another field might be the kind of enterprise we understand under the rubric of Greco-Roman philosophy. Also, one might perhaps think of ancient religion (Jewish *and* non-Jewish) as a field. But then if, as seems necessary, an ancient field of religion would also incorporate theoretical reflection on religion—what we call theology—there would be an overlap here not only with the field of Judaism, but also with that of Greco-Roman philosophy. Let us therefore stick here to the two other fields we have identified: Judaism and Greco-Roman philosophy contemporary with Paul.

Consider now the ‘practices’ that are being performed within a field and in fact reflect one or the other habitus within the field. Two features are of special interest. The first is that such practices cover any kind of human intentional behaviour from the most instinctive one to the most abstract flights of reason. For present purposes, we may distinguish here (this is not directly in Bourdieu) between (a) ‘gut reactions’, (b) behaviour reflecting an everyday perception of ‘the ways in which we normally live’, and (c) specifically intellectual activity, often in the form of second-order reflection on (a) and (b) (and on (c) itself). From Bourdieu’s perspective all this behaviour is tied to the human body.¹⁸ It is in fact a direct expression of the habitus. The relationship to the other types of behaviour (a–b) of reason and rational activity in the form of reflection (cf. (c)) is of great importance for our analysis of Paul and also one that has engaged Bourdieu a great deal. Its importance lies in the fact that while such reflection is derived from the habitus itself, on Bourdieu’s view it plays a particularly important role when an individual, who will by definition share his habitus with many others, attempts to break through and change that habitus in order to bring about a genuine change in the field as a whole. Note here that it is precisely this kind of self-reflection that is expressed in Paul’s accounts of his own conversion. In spite of this particular capacity of the human being, however, Bourdieu constantly emphasized the situatedness of human behaviour in the bodily habitus and its ‘practical sense’ (*sens pratique*).¹⁹

The other important feature of practices within a field is that they are fundamentally to be understood as exercises in a ‘symbolic fight’ (*lutte symbolique*) for mastery or power (*pouvoir*) within the field.²⁰ Bourdieu often used terms from the field of games: ‘game’ itself (*jeu*), ‘trump’ (*atout*), and so on. He also employed terms from economics (and indeed from Marxism): ‘capital’ (primarily *symbolic* capital), ‘profit’, and so on. This all goes to show

that it is the deadly seriousness of the exercise that was in focus. Bourdieu's proposal is that we should basically see all practices within a field as so many bids for asserting the position of the habitus that is being active in each practice. It is not, of course, that everybody is constantly specifically fighting everyone else, or even that there is always some specific opponent in view. But all practices are so many 'positionings' (*prises de position*) that aim to put themselves through to the disadvantage of other positionings. In all this Bourdieu is constantly emphasizing the symbolic side of practices. It is no wonder, therefore, that he also addressed language itself, seeing it explicitly as an instrument in service of establishing power relations.²¹

How may this be used to illuminate Paul? Let us consider a description Bourdieu gives of Heidegger and the way to understand his attempt to revolutionize the field of contemporary philosophy. Here we find Bourdieu operating with the notions of a field, of the various positions that constitute the field, of a practical mastery of all these positions and a sense of the game internal to it, and finally of Heidegger's ability to integrate different positions within this field that had hitherto been perceived as incompatible. Suppose we insert Paul directly into this quotation (very inappropriately, I admit) and speak of a field of ancient theology instead of modern philosophy. What we then get is the following:²²

Thus, in order to grasp [Paul's] thought, one must understand not only all the 'received ideas' of his time . . . but also the specific logic of the [theological] field (*champ*) in which the great specialists were confronting one another (*s'affrontaient*) . . . In order to pursue the 'conservative revolution' that he was generating in [theology], [Paul] had to rely on an extraordinary technical inventiveness, that is, an exceptional [theological] capital (*capital*) . . . and a just as exceptional aptitude for giving his positionings (*prises de position*) a form that was [theologically] acceptable, a form which in itself presupposed a practical mastery (*maîtrise pratique*) of the totality of the positions of the field, a formidable sense of the [theological] game (*jeu*) . . . [Paul] in fact *integrates* a number of [theological] positionings that had up to then been perceived as incompatible, into a new [theological] position. This mastery of the space (*espace*) of possibilities . . .

Before we proceed directly to Paul in the light of this suggestive account, we should note the importance of the fact that Bourdieu saw even the ethereal philosophizing of Heidegger as an expression of a (new) habitus. The point is that even reflective practices that appear as far removed from social and bodily reality as one can possibly imagine were taken by Bourdieu to be

part of the habitus of the reflecting person. There is a quite general point here about the relationship between ideas and practice that is enormously suggestive and also highly relevant to Paul, in whom (as we have them) the ideas are *literally* part of a practice (namely, that of letter writing). The point is that ideas should in principle *always* be seen as part of practices. Together with all other, less articulate types of cognition, they enter into the bodily habitus that is expressed in practices. This point is also important for the following comparison of Paul's new habitus with the other two that we have identified: contemporary Judaism and Greco-Roman philosophy. For these, too, should be construed as genuine habitus in Bourdieu's sense: states of real people who had ideas at various levels of explicit articulation, but were also leading bodily and social lives of which the ideas were a part. It is certainly true that this whole perspective on ideas may be questioned on theoretical grounds. For instance, one may ask exactly how the ideas are supposed to relate to the rest of a person's bodily and social state. Also, is there any real way of validating or invalidating this whole perspective? These questions are certainly worth exploring. Here, however, we will stay with the suggestiveness of Bourdieu's proposal, not least because it seems to fit exceedingly well with Paul's constant mixture of talking of ideas and the body.

How, then, may we apply Bourdieu's analysis of Heidegger to Paul? How may we 'reconstruct the problematics (*la problématique*)' of Paul's work, 'the space of possibilities (*l'espace des possibles*)' in relation to which that work is constructed and the effect of the specific field (*l'effet du champ spécifique*) which has given the work its precise form? If we can do that, perhaps we may also discover 'the principle (itself) that underlies the work (*le principe sous-jacent à l'œuvre*)'.²³ Even more, since 'understanding completely the behaviour of an agent who is operating within a field, understanding the *necessity* under which he acts, means *making necessary* that which to begin with appears contingent', if we can discover the principle that underlies Paul's work in Bourdieu's sense, we shall have gone a long way towards explaining it.²⁴ Then we shall also have found what one might perhaps call Paul's necessity: the lack that led him to articulate what he himself took to be the true form of Judaism in a way that allowed non-Jews to get in *as* non-Jews without becoming Jews in the traditional sense.

Let us take Philipippians as an example and note some features throughout the letter that reflect two positions (two positionings or *prises de position* corresponding to two different objective positions or *positions objectives*) that have traditionally been distinguished fairly sharply as belonging to the two

different fields we identified: Jewish 'religious' discourse and Greco-Roman moral 'philosophical' discourse. To begin with the last item, we find in Philippians a number of ideas and usages of concepts that seem to fit Paul into Greco-Roman moral philosophical discourse.

At the most superficial level there is his use of the notion of 'progression' (*prokopē*) and the concomitant notion of a 'goal' (*skopos*) or end (*telos*).²⁵ At the same level there is also his play on the discourse of politics when he speaks of the way his addressees should *politeuesthai* ('live together', Phil. 1:27) in the present while they are having their real *politeuma* ('citizen body or commonwealth', 3:20) elsewhere. Finally, and still at the level of actual use of philosophical terms, there is his play on his own *autarkeia* ('self-sufficiency').²⁶ At a somewhat deeper level, one might mention his actual use of a number of motifs that fall under the ancient theme or *topos* of friendship (*philia*).²⁷ Here too belongs his easy handling of the letter practice of doing paraenesis, with the many sub-motifs that fall under that (e.g. presenting himself as a model).²⁸ Lastly, and at an even deeper level, there is the rather more comprehensive scheme that underlies much of Paul's writing throughout the letter and which I attempted in the earlier book to bring out by speaking of the I-Christ-We model ($I \rightarrow X \rightarrow S$) referred to above (with its affinities to Stoicism).²⁹

Objectively seen, all this ties Paul pretty closely in with Greco-Roman positionings within the comprehensive set of fields in which he and they were operating. But then, of course, there is another side to his thought that connects him even more closely with a specifically Jewish form of discourse. That side has its focus in the idea we studied in Chapter 4 of direct and quite concrete divine agency (God's direct *intervention* in the world), an idea that is presented in a number of different forms and with a range of further ramifications throughout the letter. God has himself acted directly and decisively on the world and he will continue to do so. We need only refer briefly to the main occurrences of this idea: the Christ event itself (Phil. 2:9; 3:9), the idea of the future 'Day of the Lord' (Phil. 1:6, 10–11; 2:16), the notion that God will reward the Philippians (4:19), and more of the same kind (e.g. 2:13). Objectively seen, this all reflects a discourse that may not be just traditional, but is at least thoroughly Jewish. It is, as we would say, 'Messianic' and 'apocalyptic', and it reflects a thoroughgoing monotheistic understanding of God.

Are the two sides of Paul's discourse, which are objectively there and which in themselves reflect two different traditions in his cultural context, then

merely left side by side by Paul? Clearly not. Paul integrates them, and indeed quite seamlessly. As we have also seen, he even operates with a single cosmological notion (the *pneuma*) that holds together his ‘apocalypticism’ and his reflections on the ‘self’ and ‘ethics’. Oversimplifying quite dramatically, we may schematize this integration as in Figure 6.2.³⁰

The claim of this figure is that Paul integrated the *habitus* of Jewish monotheism with that of ethical perfectionism in Greco–Roman philosophy in a manner that combined two *habitus* that taken as wholes were intrinsically incompatible.

However, this is all only half the story. If we now ask about Paul’s own positioning (his *prise de position*) in the specific sense of his own view of his relationship with the two sides of his cultural context that we are working with, we should say on the basis of passages in 1 Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans that he saw his own project as being a fundamentally Jewish one. (Compare e.g. 1 Corinthians 15 as a whole, Gal. 6:16 on ‘God’s Israel’, and Romans 9–11.) Correspondingly, even though he employed a range of specifically or originally Greco–Roman motifs, he fairly clearly saw his project as being at some distance from the Greco–Roman side of his cultural context. (Compare e.g. 1 Cor. 1:18–2:5.)

Does this understanding of Paul’s positioning fit with Philippians, too? It does, once we bring in Bourdieu’s idea of a symbolic fight (*lutte symbolique*). In Philippians too, Paul is striving to bring out, and indeed bring to victory, his own understanding against rival ones. However, he is in fact addressing only one rival: that of (non-)Christ-believing *Jews*.³¹ Moreover, he is addressing *that* rival in rather fierce terms. Here we may even speak of Paul’s gut reactions (*habitus*!), for instance when he adopts—from his own guts—a traditionally Jewish, strongly derogatory way of speaking of non-Jews—and then turns it around to be hurled against those Jews who do not follow Paul’s own understanding of the true form of Christ-believing Judaism: *they* are the ‘dogs’ (3:2). In terms of Bourdieu’s understanding of the kind of symbolic




Figure 6.2

fight in which Paul is engaged we should clearly see the Jewish side as being *closer* to Paul than any Greco–Roman one. That is why he reacts from the guts and that is why he attempts to beat the *Jews* (whether Christ-believing or not) in the fight over symbols that the letter to the Philippians is also about. *They* constituted the real threat—because they were the ones with whom Paul and his whole project were in the closest affinity.

By contrast, were we to ask about his own attitude to the Greco–Roman side, which he does draw on regularly in the way we noted, we should probably say the following. While Paul does use Greco–Roman ideas, he would probably also have claimed, if asked, that his own use of them was better than the one from which they were derived.³² For here he would bring in his Jewish trump card, claiming that all those ideas fall satisfactorily into place only when they are employed within a framework that is defined by the idea of the monotheistic God's direct and quite concrete agency in the world. Still, in his letters Paul was rarely in this kind of direct confrontation with non-Jews. Their views were, in a way, too distant for that.

It is highly noteworthy that where Paul *is* in direct confrontation with somebody, namely, other (Christ-believing or non-Christ-believing) Jews, he may employ exactly the trump card that we suggested he might have used against non-Jews. This happens, for instance, in Phil. 3:19–21 when he brings in against his Jewish opponents the idea of what belongs and comes from *above* and demotes the Jews to a merely earthly status. In the Christ event, God has acted directly and concretely from above. The Jews, however, who do not recognize Jesus Christ in Paul's way have not understood this sufficiently. They therefore belong at an earthly level. By contrast, Paul himself and those he is addressing of course belong precisely above, *with* Christ and God, and as we know, quite literally so: in the heavenly *politeuma*.

We may draw two conclusions concerning Paul's 'Christian' habitus in relation to other habitus in his context. At the level of Paul's actual positionings within the field of objectively possible positions, he should be seen as having drawn extensively on both the (originally) Jewish and the (originally) Greco–Roman sides of his cultural context. By contrast, at the level of the symbolic fight as perceived by Paul himself, he should be seen as having been closer to his own original side, the Jewish one—which is why he attacked this side all the more furiously and from the guts. His relation to the Greco–Roman side was more distanced. We also noted that Paul used a Jewish trump card against those (Christ-believing) *Jews* with whom he disagreed, thereby in effect demoting them to the status of non-Jews. This move reflects

the answer we should give to the question of why he admitted non-Jews *as* non-Jews on an equal footing with Jews: to Paul, *Christ* was the *only* thing that mattered. Jews who did not recognize Jesus Christ the way they should, thereby became *like* the non-Jews—whereas conversely non-Jews who did recognize him became like the Jews, ‘*real*’ Jews, without following those Jewish patterns of life that had now become irrelevant. The two conclusions may be held together logically by means of Bourdieu’s neat distinction between *positions objectives* and *prises de position*.³³

We are now ready to identify exactly how Paul’s ‘Christian’ habitus and *prise de position* relates to the other *positions objectives* around him. The picture we should adopt from Bourdieu is that of Paul feeling forced to bring together elements that in themselves had their proper place within the two sides (the specifically Jewish and the specifically Greco–Roman, philosophical one) of his overall cultural context, elements that had never been similarly combined and would traditionally have been seen to stand in opposition to one another. At a very basic level there are two such elements: the traditional Jewish idea of things directly and actively done by the monotheistic God, and the Greco–Roman philosophical idea developed since Socrates of ethical perfectionism. Note, however, that Paul was not in the least striving to ‘combine’ these cultural elements from the outside as if such a ‘combination’ were a goal in itself. Rather, he was trying to identify and articulate from inside his own habitus what the Christ event meant. In doing that, he brought out what (the Jewish) God had directly and actively done in that event *by* developing and focusing on the (Greco–Roman) element of conversion to perfection. What God had done in the Christ event was this: to call human beings to the kind of direct relationship with God himself that Paul describes as *gnōsis* of Christ. The whole thing was about God’s acting on the individual person from above and that individual’s responding with his whole person from below both physically and cognitively in the way we have seen. That and that alone was now what constituted the true form of Judaism. (Unbeknownst to Paul, however, by developing *this* particular kind of Judaism, the apostle of Christ in effect laid the ground for a new religion that would no longer *be* a form of Judaism.)

What kind of necessity might be involved in Paul’s ‘feeling forced’ to articulate the Christ event in this particular way? Let us consider some of the possibilities.

Was it a psychological necessity? Paul himself describes it as just that in 1 Cor. 9:15–18: ‘(16) A necessity (*anankē*) lies upon me. Woe upon me if I do

not preach the gospel.' So, the necessity was certainly a psychological one. Paul says so. But it was definitely also more than that.

Was it a kind of missionary necessity that required Paul to give up insisting on the Mosaic law in order for him to fulfil his God-given task *vis-à-vis* non-Jews? 1 Cor. 9:19–27—on how Paul became 'everything to everybody', Jews no less than non-Jews—might be cited in support of such a view. So too might the account of his own conversion that we know from Galatians 1, where he states that he was given the task of preaching the Christ gospel among the Gentiles (Gal. 1:16). That would clearly place a kind of missionary necessity upon him. But why exactly to Gentiles *as* Gentiles? The Galatians, for instance, who were in fact Gentiles, were apparently also quite willing to entertain the idea of conforming to the Mosaic law. Thus the fact that mission to the Gentiles was a God-given task cannot constitute the whole content of Paul's necessity.

Without excluding these two kinds of psychological and experiential necessity, we should rather be looking for the logical point of Paul's peculiar combination of the pre-existing cultural *habitus* that we have noted. One such suggestion might be that the point is a fairly straightforwardly theological one. Paul's emphatic exclamation in Rom. 3:29 might support such a view: 'Or is God only the God of Jews? (Is He) not also (the God) of Gentiles? Yes, also of Gentiles.' Thus Paul would be responding to a theological necessity. God is the God of both Jews and Gentiles. Both groups, then, had to be brought in. Still, one might well continue to ask from a more traditionally Jewish side: why Gentiles *as* Gentiles?

Another suggestion might therefore be that the necessity was a more broadly culture political one (as opposed to the more narrowly missionary necessity just noted). The Jewish God was surely meant to be the God of all. But for that to become an actual possibility, he would have to be a God for Jews as Jews and for Gentiles as Gentiles. However, this suggestion will hardly work, either. In itself it might seem to find support from a combination of Rom. 3:29 with 1 Cor. 9:15–27. But it is far from evident historically that the argument would in fact have had the appeal to non-Jews that it is taken to have. As we noted, the Galatians, at least, were apparently quite attracted to the suggestion that they should go the whole way and become Jews. More importantly, the suggestion seems to share with the others a certain superficiality that does not do justice to what Paul appears to be after. Once again, was Paul's necessity at base nothing more than a purely strategic one? Did it

not have a point that was intrinsic to the set of considerations that made it a necessity in the first place?

This is where Bourdieu's picture may help us forward. It suggests that there was some 'problematic' (*problématique*) in the other available habitus, something missing from them that could perhaps only be seen to be missing once a new habitus had been constructed to fill out what was missing. Paul should be seen to be striving to articulate such a new habitus. In itself this picture is not very different from the traditional one in Pauline scholarship that trades on the notions of 'plight' and 'solution'. It even shares with E. P. Sanders's articulation of the new perspective on Paul the famous claim that the 'solution' came before the 'plight'.³⁴ However, instead of pursuing this line further in accordance with other insights reached within the new perspective, we should try to state here along the lines of the present analysis what the 'solution' might be that forced Paul to insist on this new form of Judaism that would be open to non-Jews *as* non-Jews.

Here is the proposal: Paul saw the call of the monotheistic Jewish God in the Christ event to be of such a kind (its force, its power, its overwhelming demand) that it only *could* be adequately responded to by being yielded to *completely* in both mind and body by the person who was struck by it, that is, in a response that would imply 'ethical' perfectionism. Nothing less than a complete takeover on God's part and a complete yielding on the part of human beings would do. In either case what was taken over and yielded was the person as a whole, the self, the bodily 'I'. From that vision, which had the kind of extreme and unshakable character that would turn it into a necessity, all the other necessities noted above would follow. It is precisely this vision that Paul sets forth in his retrospective accounts of his own conversion in Phil. 3:4–11 and elsewhere.

Thus, building on those accounts, we may draw out two elements that we should hold together as constituting the essence of Paul's vision, of the new habitus that he was articulating: the monotheistic God's direct intervention from above in the Christ event, which constitutes God's call and which was transmitted to Paul himself through the pneuma; and the complete human response from below of the whole human, which implies 'ethical' perfectionism and came to expression in Paul himself by the dying away of his fleshly body. As we can now see, both elements centre on the pneuma. They have a physical no less than a cognitive content. This vision held Paul in its grip to such an extent that it would constitute a necessity for him. But it was articulated as part of a symbolic fight within Paul's own original field. In that struggle he was driven to create a new conceptuality that would extend

the original field by incorporating into it ideas that were more broadly present in his mixed cultural context. Thus understood the vision itself would also have a certain cultural necessity to it along the lines of Bourdieu's picture. And if that general picture is convincing, then this whole way of finding a cultural necessity in Paul's vision will also serve to explain it.

Then one can actually see even more. Not only is there the necessity of the vision itself, but also of its consequences.

1. Most importantly, one can now answer the question of why Paul had to insist on access to the Christ-belief for non-Jews *as* non-Jews: a complete yielding to God's call just meant that a requirement to follow the Mosaic law would be entirely beside the point. Why, if a person had been taken over ('grasped'!) *completely* by God and his will, should one set up certain *specific* demands to be fulfilled?

2. One can also now understand why Paul would insist, as he does, on bringing in the Mosaic law again through the back door once he had first denied it access through the front door: what Christ-believers would actually do would certainly include all those parts of the Mosaic law which consisted of 'moral' behaviour—of the same kind as the Greco-Roman form of 'moral' behaviour that would follow from such a complete change in the Greco-Roman picture, too. For they all expressed God's will.

3. Further, one can understand the correctness of a point about Paul's general picture that most scholars tend to reject: that the new habitus he had managed to articulate was of such a kind that it would also *necessarily* be acted upon. When God had taken over everything and the human being had given up his whole person or self (body and mind), how could this person *not* do what God wanted the person to do?³⁵

4. Finally, one can understand a feature of Paul's combination of elements in his new habitus that had an enormous influence on later Christian thought. This is the idea that the final fulfilment, which in much other Jewish 'apocalypticism' was placed at a moment that was distinctly later than the present, was in fact already present here and now in the life of believers in the group. This idea is implied in that of 'ethical' perfectionism. But we have also seen that it was given specific form in the concrete, cosmological way in which Paul spelled out the content of his 'apocalyptic' vision: that it was a matter of reception of and transformation by the pneuma—which *had already, basically, happened*. This is the fundamental point where Paul's articulation of the 'Christian' habitus does constitute a breakthrough to a new one.

PAUL'S CHRISTIAN HABITUS NOW?

If we have a sufficiently clear grasp of what Paul's 'Christian' habitus looked like in its own time and place and as seen in relation to other relevant habitus in his context, will we also be able, as modern readers of Paul with a possible, existential interest of our own in his picture, to transfer that picture into our own time and place?

In the book referred to on *Paul and the Stoics*, I asked to what extent Paul's thought might constitute what I there called a 'real option for us'.³⁶ In the present book I have tried to develop certain cosmological elements in Paul that definitely do not constitute such an option. The cosmology, say, of Stoicism just cannot be ours.³⁷ Faced with such a situation, one might decide to forget about cosmology if one is looking for 'real options' and focus instead on something apparently more attractive, for example, Paul's critique of human bodily, social, and political life in the present, earthly world. However, the net result of our analysis is that this side of his thought is in fact completely mixed up with his cosmology. So, there is not much to be gained from making such a move.

I am convinced, however, that there is something wrong (though not *everything* wrong) with looking for a 'real option for us' in Paul. If we cannot immediately adopt Paul's cosmology, neither can (or should) we adopt his views on the body, on social life, and even on politics *just as they were*. But this should not necessarily prevent us from *learning* from studying him if that is our aim.³⁸ The one thing that has always struck people about Paul is his radicality. When he speaks, for instance, of a 'new creation' (Gal. 6:15), he means it, and he means it quite concretely. True enough, it is not yet *quite* there. But it *is* there already, and to such an extent that what is still lacking is of no real concern to him.³⁹ However, this 'enthusiasm' of his did not prevent him from looking very closely at the real world, too. Paul was also a realist. And so, being suspended between his conviction that an altogether different world had already been established and his realization of what the world actually looked like both inside and outside his communities, he spent an enormous effort on *spelling out* to his addressees, and even in philosophical terms, what it was that *had* taken hold of them: a genuinely new creation here and now to be found in a new 'Christian' habitus that should inform his addressees just as it had informed himself. When he fulfils this task of spelling out his message, the audacity and radicality of his thinking are truly breathtaking.

So, Paul should himself have the last word. We shall now go back to what was his fundamental activity: missionary practice. We shall see how Paul saw this as a bodily practice from beginning to end, from the moment he addressed the Christ message to people for the first time to the moment he dictated his letters to them in order to ensure that what he had brought about to begin with might remain in place and even be further strengthened. All through we shall see that he is ultimately concerned about one thing only: transmission of the *pneuma*. We should not forget our modern conceptuality, however. Instead, we should also note that all aspects of Paul's missionary practice may be linked together as being so many different ways—operating at so many different conceptual levels—of generating in his addressees the *habitus* that had to begin with been created in himself.

THE INITIAL TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION

We may begin by picking up a thread from two texts in Paul's earliest letter that we have already discussed (from a different perspective) in Chapter 3. Here are the two texts:

1 Thess. 2:13 (NRSV, with Greek added): We also constantly give thanks to God for this, that when you received the word (*logos*) of God that you heard from us, you accepted it not as a human word (*logos*) but as what it really is, God's word (*logos*), which is also at work (*energeisthai*) in you believers.

1 Thess. 1:4–6: (4) For we know, brothers beloved by God, that he has chosen you, (5) because our message of the gospel (*euangelion*) came to you *not in word (logos) only*, but also in *power* and in *holy pneuma* and with full conviction; just as you know what kind of people we proved to be among you for your sake. (6) And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for you *received* the *word (logos)* in much suffering (but) with the joy of *the holy pneuma*.

As we noted in Chapter 3, these texts suggest that Paul took his initial 'word' and 'message or announcement of the gospel' to be borne to his addressees by the *pneuma* and to be received by them 'in' the *pneuma*. What this means is that the *pneuma* became present in them and brought it about that they understood Paul's 'word', that is, what he literally said, as *God's word*, that is, as stating what God had actually done. We have already suggested that underlying this picture there may be a theory concerning

Paul's own preaching of the 'word' not unlike the Stoic one of 'inner reason' (*logos endiathetos*) that is transmitted in 'uttered reason' (*logos prophorikos*) or reason 'brought forward', namely, as words through the mouth. In Stoicism, the movement from inner to outer would be physically operated by *pneuma*. A comparable theory for Paul would make immediate sense of what he does say of himself.

If that guess is correct, we should probably also take it that when his addressees, on their side, understood Paul's word as God's word, that is, believed what he said, and, as he says, 'received the word . . . with the joy of the holy *pneuma*', the idea would be that they had directly, literally, and physically received the *pneuma* (presumably through the ears) and *because* of that responded to Paul's word in the way he had hoped.

There is no actual proof in the two texts that a theory of this kind underlies what Paul says here. But it does fit what he says, and in any case we already know that Paul took the *pneuma* to be directly and physically responsible for the *higher*-level kind of cognitive grasp, namely, 'revelation' of Christian 'wisdom', that he speaks of in 1 Cor. 2:6–16. In that case, if the *pneuma* is responsible for higher-level knowledge, will it not be involved at the initial stage too, as the two texts from 1 Thessalonians do appear to suggest?

This argument might be countered by referring to Galatians 3–4. Did we not already find that Paul had the idea that reception of the *pneuma* took place in baptism *after* a person had come to *pistis*? In fact, the sequence appeared to be this: *pistis* → baptism → *pneuma* → sonship.⁴⁰ Now this is probably something Paul does want to say in that text. Moreover, he makes it quite clear in the introduction to chapter 3 (see below) why he should want to present the matter like that. It does not follow, however, that he would not *also* want to say that in fact the *pneuma* would also be involved in coming (and bringing people) to faith in the first place.

Consider 3:2–5:

(2) The only thing I want to learn from you is this: Did you receive the *pneuma* by doing works of the law or by believing what you heard? (3) Are you so foolish? Having started with the *pneuma*, are you now ending with the flesh? (4) Did you experience so much for nothing—if it really was for nothing? (5) Does he who supplies you with the *pneuma* and works miracles (*dynameis*) among you—(does he) really (do it) by (your doing) works of the law or by (your) believing what you heard?

This text reveals the basis for Paul's strategy throughout chapters 3–4. He wishes to set up a clear choice: was it by works of the law *or* by 'hearing and

believing' that the Galatians received the pneuma in the first place? Implied answer: the latter. So stick to that! With such a set-up one can understand why Paul should separate reception of the pneuma from hearing and believing. And of course, in the scriptural discussion that immediately follows it is precisely the sufficiency of *pistis* that is at stake.

However, just before 3:2–5 Paul has begun his whole discussion in a manner that says something more, and in fact quite striking, about the way in which the Galatians did 'receive the pneuma . . . from hearing and believing'. Here he presents the precise way in which he himself transmitted the message that generated this 'hearing and believing': '(3:1) You foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you, before whose very eyes Jesus Christ was proclaimed in crucified form?' How was Christ proclaimed in crucified form before their very eyes? A passage later in the letter shows that Paul is thinking of his own weak, bodily appearance and how the Galatians saw that:

(4:13) You know that it was because of a weakness of my flesh that I first announced the gospel to you; (14) though the condition of my flesh might have tempted you, you did not scorn or despise me, but welcomed (or received) me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus. (15) Where, then, is all your praise (of me)? For I testify that, had it been possible, you would have torn out your eyes and given them to me.

The reference in 4:15 to the Galatians' eyes shows that the theme is the same in 3:1 and 4:13–15. And the same goes for the point in 4:14 that the Galatians received the weak Paul 'as Christ Jesus'. In short, what we have in both texts is a claim that the crucified Christ was proclaimed to the Galatians in Paul's own afflicted person. Well and good. But then we have once again come across the idea that we also found in 1 and 2 Corinthians to the effect that this afflicted bodily state is the other side of possession of the pneuma, namely, the *power* that is from *God*. Then we may also surmise that Paul took it that this power was *already* involved when the Galatians received Paul's proclamation with 'hearing and believing'. And then we may conclude that even though Paul has for strategic purposes separated reception of the pneuma from 'hearing and believing', he nevertheless also stuck to his basic belief that the pneuma was present—as the other side of his own weak physical appearance—in his own preaching and that it was transmitted to his addressees through that appearance as a prerequisite for their coming to 'hear and believe'.

This argument relies directly on the view that Paul *could* not have taken the effect of his preaching to be derived from a tale or vision of suffering and

crucifixion *alone* (Christ's and Paul's own in conformity with that). This view is likely to be rejected by scholars who stand in a long and powerful tradition of theologians who emphasize Paul's *theologia crucis*. My reply is the same as when the issue came up in connection with 1 Cor. 2:1–5. There we saw that for that passage to make coherent sense (including its reference to the pneuma and power of God in 2:4–5), Paul's preaching the crucified Jesus Christ *must* have contained the claim that Jesus, the crucified Christ, was also raised from the dead. (There are excellent contextual reasons, however, why Paul should concentrate in that passage on the sufferings aspect of the 'word of the cross'.) Similarly, in the present passage the meaning will be that when the Galatians saw Paul for the first time in all his physical weakness (cf. 4:13–14), they literally saw *more* with their eyes (cf. 3:1 and 4:15) than just a physically weak human being, which is why they did not react to his misery with the normal scorn, but instead 'received me as an angel of God, as Jesus Christ' (4:14). What did they see? We know the answer if we may extrapolate from all the other passages where Paul places the pneuma in his own dying body. What they saw will have been the resurrection glory of the pneuma. But in that case, their response of *pistis* to Paul's preaching will itself reflect the fact that this preaching has already transmitted a portion of pneuma to them. Just as God's secrets could only be fully grasped by those who have the pneuma (according to 1 Cor. 2:6–16), so the initial grasp could only be made by those who had been made able to see something that was *not* just there to be seen with normal eyes: the glory of the pneuma in Paul's miserable body.

We should conclude that the actual sequence that Paul had in mind in Galatians 3–4 is this: (initial) pneuma/*pistis* → baptism → (full) pneuma → sonship.

If this picture is correct, then we may fill in with references to the pneuma the kind of sequence of the missionary process that Paul himself states in Rom. 10:14–15. He has just formulated what is almost the core of his message as follows (10:12–13): '(12) For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; for the same (person) is Lord of all and enriches all who call on him. (13) For, "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved."' He then picks up the term 'call on' (10:14–15): '(14) But how may they *call on* someone in whom they have not come to *believe*? And how may they *believe* in someone of whom they have not *heard*? And how may they *hear* without someone *proclaiming* (him)? (15) And how may they *proclaim* (him) unless they are *sent out*? . . .' If we turn around this series of verbs, we

have the set of events in the proper, chronological order: somebody (Paul) is sent out (as an apostle, Greek: *apostalēnai*), he proclaims (Greek: *kēryssein*), they hear (Greek: *akouein*), they believe (Greek: *pisteuein*), and they call on the Lord (Greek: *epikaleisthai*). We know that the pneuma was active when Paul was sent out (compare our reading of Phil. 3:4–11). We know that it is active in his proclamation (compare above on 1 Thess. 1:4–6 and 2:13). We have suspected that it was literally active when his addressees heard what he said and came to believe it. And we know (compare our earlier remarks in chapter 2 on the pneuma and prayer) that it is through the pneuma that believers call on God. In short, the missionary process is about transmission and reception of the pneuma.

PAUL'S BODILY PRACTICE IN 2 CORINTHIANS 1–7

What, then, about Paul's letter-writing practice? Did he also see this as a matter of transmission of pneuma to his addressees? And if he did and also saw the pneuma as a physical entity, did he see his letter-writing (or letter-dictating) practice itself as a physical, bodily practice aimed at influencing his addressees *through* the physical pneuma that it transmitted? We shall explore these questions via a slightly more extended analysis of the core of 2 Corinthians 1–7. Unsurprisingly, the argument will be that these questions should be answered in the affirmative. More interesting, then, is the question of exactly how Paul aimed to achieve that end.

The core of 2 Corinthians 1–7 is 2:14–7:4. It is still not fully recognized by scholars that this extended passage belongs exactly where it stands: between Paul's account of his travel from Ephesus to Troas (2:12) and from there *in the direction of* Macedonia in search of Titus (2:14), who was expected to bring news from Corinth—and then his account of his arrival in Macedonia and the battles he had to undergo there (7:5) until he finally received divine encouragement by the arrival of Titus (7:6), who was able to give him good news about Corinth (7:7).⁴¹ The theme in 7:5–16 of Paul's encouragement (*paraklēsis*) and joy (*chara*) ties this section closely together with 1:1–2:13, where he similarly starts out from the encouragement given him by God (1:3–7) in response to all his suffering (*thlipsis*, cf. 1:4), a suffering that already began in Ephesus (1:8–11) and extended through his recollection of his earlier dealings with the Corinthians (1:12–2:11). And it is the same

two themes of encouragement and joy in response to suffering that constitute the point towards which everything in 2:14–7:4 is directed, as this is spelled out in 7:4 (*paraklēsis*, *chara*, and *thlipsis* are all actually mentioned in 7:4) *just before* Paul takes up in 7:5 the line from 2:13 of his being on his way to Macedonia and arriving there. In short, 2:14–7:4 spells out *Paul's attitude to the Corinthians*, as it were on the ship itself as he was crossing into Europe plagued by harrowing doubts about their constancy (his *thlipsis* in their regard). Together with the resolution of those doubts as stated in 7:5–16 (and strikingly anticipated in 7:4), 2:14–7:4 describes what one might call a Pauline 'psychodrama':⁴² his anxiety about the Corinthians, the certainty of his own reliance on God, his renewed turn towards them—and their positive response.

The crucial insight, however, is that Paul is not just telling a story about his attitude to the Corinthians *then* (when he was standing on the ship!). Instead, *by* telling the story *now*—in the letter itself—he aims to bring something about in them that will *justify* (as it were, backwardly) the sense of relief about them that he says he felt *then* when he heard the good news from Corinth. The question that should guide our reflection on this great—and exceedingly complex—text is therefore this: how may Paul's account *now*—in the letter—of his suffering and doubts about the Corinthians *then* serve his aim of making them live up *now* to the *confidence* in them (the encouragement and joy) that he ended up having *then* (as he says)?⁴³

Let us note some of the salient themes in 2:14–7:4.

Paul begins (2:14–17) by affirming that in his missionary practice and speech he is led by God (2:14), which means, in particular, that what he says is spoken 'as from God' and 'in openness towards God' and 'in Christ' (2:17). Indeed, and this is a key theme in the whole passage, it is spoken 'as from sincerity (or purity, *eilikrineia*)', namely, of Paul's own mind (2:17). It is this that makes Paul 'competent' (cf. 2:15) to preach his message. So, Paul is competent as an apostle because he stands in a relationship of complete openness towards God that comes *from* God and a corresponding openness towards those he is addressing (in contrast with the behaviour of other people who are 'peddling God's word', 2:17, cf. 4:2). Paul preaches his message with an inner sincerity that reflects a direct relationship with God. Paul comes directly from God and the concern for the Corinthians that he will end up articulating derives from this fact.

In the first main section of the psychodrama (3:1–4:6) Paul then spells out the background in his own case for this 'competence' (cf. 3:5–6), which is

nothing other than the fact that he has received the pneuma from God (3:6). The pneuma places Paul himself and his service above that of Moses and the latter's service through the law (3:7–18), a claim that leads to the striking account in 3:18 of how *all* Christ-believers who possess the pneuma are continuously being transformed by the pneuma into Christ, who is himself pneuma. It is this ultimate experience that lies behind Paul's own missionary practice (4:1–6) as he has earlier addressed himself to the Corinthians—and as he also does now. Thus 3:1–4:6 begins (3:1–6) and ends (4:1–6) with Paul's missionary practice vis-à-vis the Corinthians: 'Therefore . . . we do not give in . . .' (4:1). In between Paul describes what his mission is ultimately about in terms of its content, and this description itself *explains* why his missionary practice is the way it is: with a complete openness (on Paul's own part) 'towards every inner self-awareness (*syneidēsis*, 'conscience') of human beings in the face of God' that goes with 'disclosure (*phanerōsis*) of the truth' (4:2). Once again the ultimate claim about Paul's way of addressing himself to the Corinthians is that it reflects a complete openness on his side derived from the pneumatic character of his message itself.

In the next main section (4:7–5:10), which we already know quite well, Paul describes—with himself as an example—how his inner treasure is admittedly still to be found in a 'clay jar'. Nevertheless, since he has the pneuma of *pistis*, he speaks (4:13), and everything he does is in fact something done for them (4:15): 'That is why we do not give in . . .' (4:16). For this whole attitude is built upon the secure knowledge (cf. 5:1) that 'we shall all be disclosed (or appear, *phanerōthēnai*)' at the resurrection before the judgement seat of Christ (5:10). What the second main section adds to the picture given in the earlier one are two things: first the idea that the content of his own message, which was previously identified as a continuous pneumatic transformation (3:18) and an inner vision of Christ's glory (4:6), is present in frailty in his dying body of flesh and blood (4:7–15), and second the idea that this frailty is utterly insignificant in view of the certainty of the resurrection (4:16–5:10). The essential message is that in his mortal body Paul already *has the pneuma* (4:13, 5:5), which will eventually bring him (like them) into being 'disclosed' 'in front of the judgement seat of Christ. All the earthly hindrances will fall away and Paul (and they) will stand *directly* in front of Christ.

It is this idea of disclosure and openness that leads into the third and concluding main section (5:11–7:4), which finally spells out the point of all the talk about sincerity at the human level (2:17, 4:1–5) and pneumatic

possession at the divine level (3:7–18, 4:6–5:10). Here is 5:11: ‘Since, then, we know the fear of the Lord, we (try to) persuade human beings and are laid bare (or disclosed, *pephanerōmetha*) to God. But we hope that we are also laid bare (or disclosed, *pephanerōsthai*) in your consciences (*syneidēseis*).’ In short, and that is the ultimate rhetorical point to which everything is geared, how is it on the *Corinthian* side with the kind of openness into the innermost recesses of the heart that Paul has described in his own case: his having experienced the Christ event in the heart (4:6) and his being continuously transformed by the pneuma (3:18) on the way towards the final *dénouement* when *all* will stand ‘disclosed’ (NB) face to face with Christ (5:10)? Do *they* respond to all this in the way Paul himself does, by being laid bare towards God (5:11), speaking to every conscience of human beings in front of God (4:2)—and as Paul hopes, also being laid bare to *their* consciences (5:11)? Do *they respond* to Paul’s openness towards *them* in the only way that will reflect the actual content of his message?

Once again Paul goes on (from 5:12) to spell out certain ideas that are central to his message, in particular the point that his own openness towards the Corinthians reflects the central meaning—namely, *agapē* (love)—of Christ’s death ‘for all’ (5:12–15). By Christ’s dying ‘for all’, all are dead (*apethanon*, namely, to the old world, 5:14) in order that living now (*zōntes*, namely, in the new world) they may no longer live ‘for themselves’ (5:15). Indeed, there is now a ‘new creation’ (5:17) so that believers no longer ‘know’ (and care about) anything that is in accordance with the flesh (5:16). With these formulations, which issue in the idea of a ‘new creation’ of human beings, Paul has articulated the ultimate point of his message, arrived at through an account (5:12–13) of his own behaviour towards the Corinthians. His own behaviour—*his* behaviour!—*accords with* the ‘new creation’. And the ‘new creation’ is *generated by* the Christ event itself, which is here explicitly said to consist in both Christ’s dying for all and *also* his being resurrected (5:15). Once again Paul aims to ground his own missionary behaviour towards the Corinthians in the basic content of his overall message, both the Christ event and the ‘new creation’. Furthermore, what particularly matters to him is that in that behaviour he stands in a direct relationship with both God and Christ.

From 5:18 onwards Paul works directly towards his concluding exhortation of the Corinthians, which comes in 6:11–7:4. This is one of the most fantastic passages in the Pauline literature, which in its self-aggrandizement shows his psychic kinship with another great religious reformer, Nietzsche. He begins by placing himself as the direct mouthpiece of the God who

has engineered the Christ event in order to reconcile the world to himself (5:18–20). The idea of divine reconciliation is of course introduced here because the whole of the Pauline psychodrama in 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 is about reconciliation between the Corinthians and Paul himself.⁴⁴ The psychodrama powerfully expresses that from *his* side everything is ready for such reconciliation, and it is an exercise in finally achieving the longed-for reconciliation through the letter itself. So, once Paul has introduced the notion of God's act of reconciliation (5:18–19), which also included God's 'placing the word of reconciliation in us' (5:19), he immediately inserts himself into this scheme vis-à-vis the Corinthians: '(5:20) So, then, we serve as an ambassador (*presbeuomen*) on behalf of Christ *as if it is God (himself) who is encouraging (you) through us*: we beseech (you) on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God.' That is not enough, however. For the issue is not just reconciliation with *God*. And so Paul continues in a manner that leads directly on to his intense address of the Corinthians. Here is the introduction (6:1–2): '(1) But working together (with God) we also encourage you not to have received God's grace in vain. (2) . . . Look here: now is the happy moment! Look here: now is the day of salvation!' Then he embarks on a huge sentence of eight verses (6:3–10) that leads up to a complete break in the syntactical logic, which is followed by two more introductory verses (6:11–12).⁴⁵ And then, finally, comes the climaxing plea for the Corinthians' reconciliation with Paul himself. In order to get hold of Paul's actual missionary practice in this text, we need to have it in front of us in its entirety.

Here is the run-up sentence (6:3–10):

(3) Putting no obstacle in anyone's way, so that no fault may be found in our ministry; (4) rather, having commended ourselves in everything as servants of God: through great endurance, in afflictions, in hardships, in calamities, (5) in beatings, in imprisonments, in riots, in labours, in sleepless nights, in hunger; (6) in purity, in knowledge, in generosity, in goodness, in holy pneuma, in genuine love, (7) in truthful speech, in the power of God; with the weapons of righteousness for the right hand and for the left; (8) through honour and dishonour, through ill repute and good repute; as impostors, and yet truthful, (9) as unknown, and yet well known, as dying, and yet, see—we are alive, as punished, and yet not killed, (10) as pained, yet always rejoicing, as poor, yet making many rich, as having nothing, and yet possessing everything:

Here are the two further introductory verses and the final climax that follow directly on the run-up sentence (6:11–13):

(11) My mouth stands open towards you, Corinthians, my heart lies spread out (towards you). (12) You are not cramped in us, you are cramped in your own innards. (13) Give me the same recompense—I speak to you as (my) children—let yourselves be spread out (towards me), too.

Much could be said about Paul's run-up sentence. Let us just note here that after a repetition of the account he has just given of his status as a servant of God (6:3–4a) and a catalogue of hardships (6:4b–5) that takes up his self-description from 4:7–12 as having his treasure in clay jars, Paul in 6:6–7a describes two things: (1) his inner purity, knowledge, generosity, and goodness and (2) his external behaviour that expresses pure love, speaks the truth, and is governed by God's power. In between stands the one thing that lies behind it all: his possession of the holy pneuma. In the rest of the sentence Paul celebrates his customary duality (like the treasure in the clay jar): that he both has nothing and also possesses everything (6:10). And it all leads up to his final exhortation.

What matters in all this is Paul's concentrated focus on his inner state, which he wants the Corinthians to meet on the basis of a similar openness in their own inner state. Paul, it seems, is literally filled up with pneuma that finds expression both in those inner states (point (1) above) and in the corresponding external behaviour (point (2))—but particularly, and most directly relevantly, in his attitude of total openness towards the Corinthians. Moreover, this openness is one that the Corinthians should be able to feel directly. It literally streams out of Paul's mouth towards them. It comes with the holy pneuma, with Paul's pure love, with his truthful word, with the power of God. In response, 'let yourselves be spread out (towards me), too'. That is, let your own interior have the same openness from your side. Then . . . what? Then the two parties will finally be reconciled, then they will in fact be (at) one.

One may like this or not. Personally, I am more intrigued than attracted. But the point should be clear. First, Paul is in fact here presupposing that his speech itself streams out of his mouth as a kind of conveyor belt for the pneuma, a pneuma that is both his own and the holy pneuma and one that he literally aims to place or reactivate in the Corinthians. Here, however, everything depends on whether they on their side are prepared to let the pneuma act on them in their own bodily interior. Second, Paul is evidently trying literally to convey the pneuma (his pneuma) to the Corinthians *through his literary practice itself*: the huge running-up sentence of 6:3–10, the violent imagery of 6:11–12, which has both a literal *and* an imaginary quality to it, and

much more. It is almost as if he wants to overwhelm them with his pneuma, to take them by force.

Can we be certain that Paul thought of his own interior and that of the Corinthians in such bodily terms? At this point of the analysis it seems fair to say that there are at least five terms in 6:11–13 that in themselves point so strongly in that direction that one needs to produce a very strong counter-argument to avoid those connotations. The five terms are: ‘mouth’, standing ‘open’ (in the present context), being ‘spread out’, being ‘cramped’, and the ‘innards’. If this is not sufficiently convincing, Paul himself helps us out in 7:2 when—after a text (6:14–7:1) to which we shall come back in a moment—he takes up directly the line from 6:13. What he says is this: ‘Find room for us’, that is, ‘Contain us’, ‘Take us into yourselves’.⁴⁶

The directly bodily character of this is in an interesting way brought out by the intervening passage (6:14–7:1).⁴⁷ Here Paul warns the Corinthians against mixing with non-believers. They must not be ‘yoked together with’ them and so incline in their direction. No ‘sharing’ is possible between justice and injustice, no ‘communality’ between light and darkness (6:14). No ‘agreement’ is possible between Christ and Beliar (6:16), no ‘consent’ between God’s temple and idols: ‘For we are the temple of a living God’ (6:16). And then the conclusion (7:1): ‘With these injunctions [as stated in quotations from the Hebrew Bible given in 6:16–18], my beloved ones, let us *purify ourselves from all defilement of flesh and pneuma by perfecting holiness* in fear of God.’ What Paul does in the passage as a whole is to articulate the place or location of the ‘new creation’ of human beings that he spoke of in 5:17. It is to this place that he aims to bring the Corinthians by his own missionary practice. Where is it to be found? In the congregation itself, understood as the temple of God where there is no contact whatever with non-believers, idols, or anything of a similar kind, and where there is no ‘defilement’ of flesh and pneuma.⁴⁸ When they constitute the temple of God, the Corinthians will have turned their backs on every aspect of the social world outside the group itself, all of which represents so much bodily defilement. The last point is revealing. Clearly, the ‘new creation’ is to be found in a social group that is also a bodily state, in fact, in the concretely located Christian habitus—with all its various aspects, including that of bodily purity—that Paul is aiming to develop. That habitus constitutes the temple of God. And it is ontologically made up of pneuma.⁴⁹

‘Take us into yourselves’ (7:2). With this summarizing injunction Paul rounds off his whole account of the psychodrama he underwent on his way to

Macedonia. He has great liberty of speech in relation to the Corinthians, so he says (7:4)—a liberty of which he has just made extensive use. But he also has great reason to boast of them (for the way he would get to know that there was in fact no reason to worry), indeed, he is filled up with encouragement, full to the brim of joy after all his suffering (7:4). In short, please let them also respond in that way *now*—when they will *read* about his former anxiety in their regard.

This is habitus-creation (or -strengthening) at its most intense. If we look back over 2:14–7:4, we can see that Paul attempted to strengthen the Corinthians' habitus in basically three ways. (1) At the highest level of abstraction he appealed to their rational understanding by referring to certain basic doctrinal ideas, including the central cosmological ones, like that of Christ's having died 'for all' (5:14), God's having reconciled the world to himself (5:19), or that of the final judgement (5:10). (2) Even here, though, his appeal was in fact rather to their imagination, since he wanted them to see the practical relevance of those ideas to themselves (e.g. 5:14–15 and 5:20–1). However, at this level of appealing to the imagination, the most important strategem by far was to bring to the Corinthians' mind the picture of how Paul had himself applied the basic doctrinal facts to his own missionary practice. Paul himself became the central figure to be imagined, as he literally embodied the cosmological events both physically (the pneumatic transformation and corresponding deterioration of his body of flesh and blood) and mentally (the complete openness towards God—and the Corinthians). The imaginative power of this self-presentation is tremendous. But it is also always related to the Corinthians (e.g. at 3:1–3, 4:1–5, 4:12). (3) Finally, and at the most concrete level, the appeal to imagine Paul as instantiating what the whole thing was all about was expressed quite literally in the form of Paul's writing itself. And here, in chapter 6, this literally literary way of expression was brought directly to bear on the Corinthians, both in its content (the self-presentation as backing up the direct exhortation) and also in its direct, literary form (the huge sentence of 6:3–10 and the literal/metaphorical violence of the appeal). If all this could not boost the Corinthians' habitus, what could?

PAUL'S LETTER WRITING AS A BODILY PRACTICE

In this chapter we have discovered traces in the letters of the way Paul understood his missionary practice when he spoke to people for the first

time: as a transmission of pneuma that would lead to *pistis* and from there—through baptism and a fuller reception of pneuma—to a more comprehensive and solid ‘Christian’ habitus. At the end of the chapter, our reading of 2 Corinthians 1–7 has indicated that Paul might conceivably have understood his later letter-writing practice in exactly the same way.

This result suggests that Paul’s conception of writing was diametrically opposed to that of, say, Jacques Derrida. Where Derrida famously favoured writing, Paul probably believed in the primacy of speech and saw any results obtained through letter writing as, in effect, the ‘oral effect’ of writing. This would not at all be surprising in the light of the primacy of orality in the ancient world. And as we know, Paul’s letter-writing practice was in fact one of dictation; furthermore, the letters themselves were meant to be read out aloud. Still, can we be sure that we are on the right track in putting this emphasis on orality and bodily practice?

There is at least one passage that supports such a view. In 1 Corinthians 5 Paul is handling a case of sexual immorality among the Corinthians of which he has been told. He is shocked and asks why the Corinthians have not themselves mourned the case and taken steps to ensure that ‘the one who has done this thing might be removed from your midst’ (5:2). Paul continues (5:3–5):

(3) I on my side, though absent in body, but present in pneuma, have already judged, as if present, the one who has done that in that way: (4) in the name of our Lord, Jesus, when you and my pneuma are gathered together, with the power of our Lord, Jesus—(5) to hand such a type over to Satan for the destruction of his flesh, in order that the pneuma may be saved on the day of the Lord.

There is some unclarity about exactly what punishment Paul had in mind. But he is at least referring to exclusion from the congregation.⁵⁰ Nor is it quite clear whose pneuma should be saved on the day of judgement. It might conceivably be the man’s own pneuma, compare 1 Cor. 3:15, where Paul does speak of somebody’s act (Greek *ergon*, as also at 5:2) as being ‘burned up’ while the person him- or herself will be saved. But it might also be the pneuma of the congregation, which must not be allowed to become polluted by this single sinner (cf. 5:6–8). Indeed, it probably *is* the latter since Paul continues directly with that idea. But then again, it might also be both.⁵¹ What matters to us is rather the fact that Paul apparently took it that he might be present in Corinth with his pneuma and that the effect of that would be that when the Corinthians *and* Paul’s pneuma were formally

gathered together, they would decide what Paul had himself *already* decided as if he *were* present, namely, to exclude the offender. Moreover, these things would happen by means of the letter in which Paul *states* his view of the matter. As so often, it is possible to understand what Paul is saying in a far more metaphorical way (as 'present in spirit' and the like). But the sheer density of the writing suggests that he had something more specific in mind: his *pneuma* literally being at work in Corinth. If this is correct, then this passage articulates just the view of Paul's letter-writing practice that we have found reason to ascribe to him. Basically, he saw his letter writing as a bodily practice through which the *pneuma* might (once more) be transmitted to his addressees.

This also seems reflected in his way of addressing the Galatians when he considers that they might be on their way towards giving up altogether their allegiance to Paul. How was it when he was present with them for the first time (4:18, *pareinai*, 'being present', as in 1 Cor. 5:3)? Would that he could be present with them now (4:20, again *pareinai*)! Meanwhile, however, he addresses them like this in and through his letter (4:19): '... my children, with whom I am once more in labour until Christ may (again) be shaped in you.' Christ as a 'shape' in the Galatians—we know what Paul has in mind: that the *pneuma* might once more be found in them as transmitted to them by Paul's own letter.

However, just as we took it to be the case with Paul's concrete, cosmological conception of the resurrection, so here too we cannot make his understanding of the concrete, *pneuma*-transmitting character of his letter writing our own. None of us could conceivably believe that we would be actually *sending* our *pneuma* to somebody else by means of a letter. Perhaps, though, if this was Paul's own conception we can better understand why the Pauline self—his 'converted' self merging into his 'apostolic' self—feels so strongly present in his letters. His theory of his own letter writing may well have contributed to a style of writing that made that self be most vividly present. One feels that he is almost there.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. The basic statement was Bultmann 1948 (1941). A more immediately accessible version is Bultmann 1958.
2. Käsemann 1970 (1960), esp. 100.
3. See e.g. how Käsemann places not only Paul's 'anthropology', but also his 'cosmology' under the sign of the world as being 'not a neutral space, but a battle ground', a fact that is best captured by calling it 'apocalyptic' (Käsemann 1972 (1969)), esp. 46 and 48).
4. For the definition of Jewish 'apocalypticism', see the classic discussions in J. J. Collins 1979 and 1998, and Rowland 1982.
5. I note all the places where the translation follows NRSV. Where no mention of the translation is made, it is my own.
6. For the latter, see e.g. the helpful overview in M. R. Wright 1995.
7. For a wholly justified criticism of the concept, see Mildenerberger 2000. Käsemann (1972 (1969), esp. 47–8), by contrast, precisely emphasizes Paul's 'plan of history' ('Geschichtsplan'), which he connects with his 'apocalypticism'.
8. The best modern commentary on the letter is Malherbe 2000. For critical discussion of the scholarly issues, see Donfried and Beutler 2000.
9. It should go without saying that the use of italics in translations and quotations from ancient texts is my own. I will not repeat the point.
10. The rhetorical (v. 'systematic') character of the Pauline letters is by now fortunately a commonplace in Pauline scholarship. Cf. e.g. the work done in the four volumes on 'Pauline Theology' published between 1991 and 1997 (Bassler 1991, Hay 1993, Hay and Johnson 1995, Johnson and Hay 1997). However, emphasizing rhetoric does not preclude that one may also be looking for some degree of systematic coherence. It is impossible, for instance, to understand the letter to the Romans unless one acknowledges such an urge in Paul himself. For the chronology of the letters, I am presupposing that 1 Thessalonians is early, Galatians, 1 Corinthians, Philippians, and 2 Corinthians belong closely together (probably in that order), and Romans is the last one (cf. e.g. Hyldahl 1986).
11. For the direct relevance of this idea to Paul (in particular Rom. 1:18–2:16), see ch. 3 (83–125) of Stowers 1994*b*.
12. One example is Kremer 1983: 282: 'Im NT ist π . wesentlich durch das hebr. Äquivalent *ruah* und dessen Verwendung im Judentum geprägt.' This approach

is spelled out in both Isaacs 1976 and Philip 2005, the latter of whom focuses, as the appropriate ‘background’ to Paul, on Ezek. 36:26–7, Isa. 44:1–5, and Joel 3:1–5 in the Hebrew Bible and Qumran, Jubilees, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Philo in Hellenistic Judaism. In spite of their overall Jewish focus, both works end up stating that the ‘Jewish background’ only goes so far towards explaining the New Testament (and Pauline) understanding of *pneuma*. Far more interesting is Levison 1997, both because he focuses explicitly on the ‘spirit’ in the Judaism of the first century CE (that is, Pseudo-Philo’s *Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum*, Philo himself, and Josephus) and also because he is quite open to operating ‘beyond the Judaism/Hellenism divide’, for instance by bringing in Plutarch (and Middle Platonism), Seneca (and Stoicism), and others. The result, as he states at one point (83), is ‘a complex coalescence of convictions about the divine spirit [in Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus] that does not divide neatly into concise categories [of Palestinian Judaism, Diaspora Judaism, and the Greco–Roman world]’. With his nuanced attention to both cultural traditions and his focus on Jewish texts from the first century CE Levison 1997 is by far the best introduction to the context for understanding the *pneuma* within yet another emerging tradition: that of the earliest Christians. It should be noted, however, that something of the same kind of open-mindedness is to be found in the *ABD* article on ‘Holy Spirit’ by Friedrich Wilhelm Horn (1992*c*). The difficulty of the whole issue comes out clearly in Barclay 2004. His declared position is quite straightforward: ‘In this, as in much else, early Christians were drawing from a biblical and Jewish linguistic reservoir’ (160). Similarly, while ‘the only context in which the adjective [namely, *pneumatikos*] is deployed with frequency in non-Jewish Greek is in Stoic physics’, Barclay also declares that ‘the Pauline sense of the term seems worlds apart from the Stoic notion’ (163). However, his remarks on Philo, where he does note ‘echoes’ of the Stoic sense of *pneuma* (164), do not really get to grips with the wide range of uses and meanings in Philo that led earlier scholars like Verbeke 1945 (see below n. 20) and before him Leisegang 1919 (see Ch. 2 n. 1) to focus extensively on Philo in connection with the ‘spirit’. The reason is presumably precisely the fact that the Pauline sense of the term does seem ‘worlds apart’ to Barclay from the Stoic notion. (This criticism does not, however, touch the aim of Barclay’s article, which is to develop the *social* significance of Paul’s use of ‘*pneuma*’ and ‘*pneumatikos*’. Here he is right on target.)

13. For example, see this statement: ‘Eine gewisse Parallelität in den Vorstellungsformen [of the Greek and the New Testament concept of *pneuma*] . . . fällt nicht ins Gewicht gegenüber der *ganz anderen* Herkunft sowie dem entsprechend *andersartigen* Wesens- und Wahrheitsgehalt, der *profan*[!]-griechisches und neutestamentliches *πνεῦμα* trennt’ (355, my italics).

14. Bultmann 1984 (1948–53) §14, 155–66 under ‘Das Kerygma der hellenistischen Gemeinde vor und neben Paulus’. Bultmann does discuss the *πνεῦμα* briefly under Paul (§18, 206–10), but mainly in order to make the point, of which he was so fond (but which I find quite questionable), that Paul’s moral psychological terms—e.g. ‘body’, ‘soul’, and *πνεῦμα*—often just stand for ‘die Person’ or ‘das Ich’.
15. Gunkel 1888: 76–9 (‘Old Testament’) and 79–82 (‘Hellenistic Judaism’).
16. Ibid. ‘supernaturalistisch’ (75), ‘Supernaturalismus’ (101), ‘übernatürlich’ (73, 75, 99).
17. Gunkel does realize that ‘auch für die urapostolische Anschauung die Grenze des Uebernatürlichen und Natürlichen der Natur der Sache nach nicht immer scharf gezogen werden konnte’. Seen from our perspective, this observation should have led him to query the distinction itself.
18. Gunkel 1888: 43–9, for the early church (‘ein übersinnlicher Stoff’, 44; ‘stofflich oder an ein stoffliches Substrat gebunden’, 47) and 99–101 for Paul (the *pneuma* is ‘mit einem himmlischen Stoff verwandt’, 101, cf. 99, where Gunkel also uses the term ‘verwandt’). Note, however, that while he recognizes this aspect of Paul’s understanding of the *pneuma*, Gunkel criticizes Holsten, Lüdemann, and Pfeleiderer for having made ‘die Stofflichkeit des Geistes zum Ausgangspunkt der Schilderung . . . der paulinischen Lehre vom *πνεῦμα*’, 101.
19. Gunkel 1888: 75: ‘[D]as ganze Leben des Christen ist eine Wirkung des *πνεῦμα*, das bedeutet: das ganze Leben des Christen offenbart eine gewaltige, überweltliche, göttliche Kraft’. According to Gunkel, this idea was Paul’s own invention.
20. An excellent example of this line is Verbeke 1945. He notes to his satisfaction that ‘[I]es exégètes se sont tournés d’abord vers la philosophie stoïcienne [to determine the ‘origin’ of Paul’s pneumatology], mais ils ont bientôt aperçu que la doctrine stoïcienne du *pneuma* est totalement [!] étrangère aux conceptions pauliniennes’ (403). He then settles for the Wisdom of Solomon as the nearest parallel: ‘le *πνεῦμα σοφίας* du livre de la Sagesse, *avec les échos que nous en trouvons dans la pensée philonienne*, est beaucoup plus près de la véritable pensée de S. Paul que toutes les sources païennes [!] qu’on a suggérées’ (405, my italics). His earlier analysis of Wisdom (223–36) shows that what Verbeke is after is an understanding of *pneuma* as something ‘immaterial’: ‘le livre de la Sagesse constitue une étape décisive dans l’évolution de la doctrine du *pneuma*, car, nous y rencontrons pour la première fois un *πνεῦμα* qui *n’est plus rivé au monde matériel*, comme celui des stoïciens et des médecins grecs, mais qui, étant de la même nature que le Dieu du judaïsme, *transcende les réalités sensibles*’ (236, my italics).
21. Plato speaks of *pneuma* in *Tim.* 84 C–E in connection with bodily illness. This (1) follows the understanding of *pneuma* in Greek medicine (the Hippocratic

writings) and (2) has nothing to do with a cosmic immaterial entity issuing from the immaterial God. Plato does speak of ‘mantic’ ἐπιπνοια (inbreathing, *Meno* 99 C–D; for the general idea, see also *Apology* 22 C, *Ion* 534 B–E, *Phaedrus* 244 A–C) and in so doing he may well be said to have laid the ground for ‘the profane, Greek understanding of [divine] inspiration’ (Kleinknecht et al. 1959: 345; cf. Levison 1997: 43, 122–5). He does not, however, address the ontology of the ἐπιπνοια.

22. Cf. Verbeke 1945 as quoted in n. 20.
23. In general, Martin casts his net very widely in order to find material that is comparable with Paul’s view of the body, thus including also medical texts (see his ch. 1). In relation to 1 Corinthians 15, however, he mostly focuses on philosophical views (of celestial bodies and the like)—rightly, as we shall see, since this is where the similarity with Paul in 1 Cor. 15:35–55 is the closest. Troy W. Martin (2006) presents some of the same medical material as the other Martin, in particular texts from the ancient medical Hippocratic corpus that speak of ‘reception of the pneuma’ and the pneuma as responsible for movement, rationality, health, and life, all of which may then be correlated with Pauline views on the pneuma. This is both helpful and on the right track. However, what we need is a biological, medical trajectory focusing on the way the pneuma works on and in human bodies *in combination with* a cosmological trajectory that speaks of the activity of the pneuma in the world as a whole. That points distinctly in the direction of Stoicism, where we find both the cosmological interpretation of pneuma and also close contact with medical writings on the human body and soul (for which see splendidly von Staden 2000). Long and Sedley’s comment is apt: ‘Medical theory and Aristotelian biology had made much of the “vital” powers of “breath”, but the extension of these to the world itself, as with the “vital heat” of Cleanthes, was a Stoic innovation’ (Long and Sedley 1987: 287–8). Long and Sedley are here repeating a point that was thoroughly established by Hahm 1977, which remains a classic on Stoic cosmology. (Troy Martin’s reference to ‘cosmological speculation about *pneuma*’ in the Hippocratic text *Breaths* [*Flat.* 3.6–31] only brings out the difference from the fully developed Stoic view, Martin 2006: 112.)
24. ‘Of all people’: Dale Martin did a wonderful job in his 2001—where the theme was ‘the Judaism/Hellenism dichotomy’—to lay bare the many types of ideology that very often underlie dichotomic readings.
25. For the ‘common folk’, compare this sentence where Martin attempts to blur the line of a dichotomy which nevertheless remains in place: ‘I do not want to give the impression that there were no beliefs held in common by philosophers and “common folk”.’ (D. Martin 1995: 117).
26. For the whole issue, see e.g. Engberg-Pedersen 2001. (By now, the point should be banal. Unfortunately, bad habits do not go away so easily.)

27. The following references are all found in Horn 1992*a*: 60.
28. e.g. 1 Thess. 1:5–6, Gal. 5:22, 1 Cor. 12:11, 14:2.
29. e.g. 1 Thess. 4:8, 1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19, Rom. 8:9, 11.
30. e.g. 1 Cor. 10:4, 12:13, 2 Cor. 1:21–2, 3:8, Rom. 5:5.
31. e.g. 1 Cor. 2:10, Rom. 5:5, 8:26–7.
32. e.g. Gal. 5:5, 6:1, 1 Cor. 4:21, Rom. 8:4, 15:30.
33. e.g. 1 Cor. 6:20 v.l., 16:18, Rom. 1:9.
34. As against this, Horn explicitly finds—and argues all through the book—that only a developmental perspective can explain the different aspects of the pneuma addressed in the letters: ‘Solange . . . dieses Werden [*sc.* ‘der pl Briefe’] und die situative Bedingtheit der pl Aussagen missachtet werden, muss der Exeget bei der Feststellung *eines Nebeneinanders unterschiedlicher Aussagen* stehenbleiben’, 429 (my italics).
35. With this thesis I am both developing Gerald Downing’s well-founded insistence on ‘common strands’ in ‘pagan’, Jewish, and Christian eschatologies in the first century (1995*a* and 1995*b*) and also sharpening the claims made by Howard Clark Kee (1985) for important relationships between ‘apocalyptic’ and Stoic thought within Paul’s eschatology. Though Kee is far more open than others to the presence of ‘Stoic-like’ ideas in Paul, he also remains wedded to the traditional dichotomies: ‘In striking contrast to the inevitable process of conflagration and renewal as the Stoics pictured it, Paul sees the transformation occurring as the successful outcome of the conflict of God and his agents with the powers of Satan, in a thoroughly apocalyptic manner’ (Kee 1985: 152). That is the kind of contrast I aim to dissolve.
36. Cf. Long and Sedley 1987: 163: ‘In making corporeality the hallmark of existence . . . the Stoics are in a way reverting [from the view of ‘Plato and his successors’] to popular ontology.’
37. In what follows I give specific references to Cicero (in the LCL edition) only where it seems particularly needed. To call the Stoic theory ‘*the* orthodox philosophical understanding of theology and cosmology around 50 BCE’ might seem questionable on a number of counts. What about Epicurus (not to speak of Cicero’s contemporaries, Lucretius and Philodemus)? And what about Plato, whose dialogue *Timaeus* continued to make an impact even in the Hellenistic period proper? The Epicurean tradition is a chapter of its own, which I will not engage here. Plato and Aristotle, by contrast, only began to come into their own from the time of Cicero onwards, when over the next 200 years they would eventually oust Stoicism. To the extent that they remained in the picture before the time of Cicero, they were to a considerable extent read through Stoic spectacles, as has been shown, for instance, by Reydam-Schils 1999 with special regard to the *Timaeus*. Thus, Epicurus aside, *the* orthodox, doctrinal philosophical understanding of theology and cosmology around 50 BCE was the Stoic

one. As we shall see, the two Jewish Hellenistic text corpora of the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, which I proceed to compare with Cicero's picture of Stoicism, support this picture. There are fine overviews of the essential features of Stoic cosmology in Lapidge 1978, Todd 1978, and Todd 1989.

38. See LS 46D (Stobaeus; LS tr.). 'Designing fire' is *πῦρ τεχνικόν*.
39. See *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (SVF) 2.774 (Diogenes Laertius): *πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδὲς* (quoted below in n. 54). The question of the relationship between 'aether', 'fire' (*πῦρ*), and *pneuma* is an intriguing one. In the official definition, *pneuma* is made up of two elements: fire and air (cf. e.g. SVF 2.786 from Alexander of Aphrodisias). It is in this form that *pneuma* penetrates everything in the sublunary world and helps to keep it together (cf. SVF 3.370 from Sextus Empiricus and n. 45 below). However, this is only the sublunary form of the basic active principle (both air and fire are active in contrast to water and earth, which are passive, cf. 2.418 from Nemesius; cf. also SVF 2.416 from Galen). In its heavenly form the active principle is nothing but fire and in its purest form it is aether, which constitutes the location of the heavenly bodies (cf. SVF 2.527 from Stobaeus). Aether is, one might say, air which in its upward-going movement has become so rarefied that it begins to burn (cf. Chrysippus in SVF 2.579 from Plutarch). By contrast, in its sublunary form as *pneuma* it is mixed with air and may hence enter into all the bodies of the world. For more on the relationship, see Hahm 1977: 156–9 (on Chrysippus' conception of the *pneuma*). Hahm rightly quotes SVF 2.471 (from Stobaeus) for the statement that 'both *aether* and *pneuma* "come under the same definition"' (158). Cf. also Wright 1995: 119–21, who concludes: '*Pneuma* was thus the vital ingredient of the Stoic cosmos, maintaining the whole as well as the bodies within it' (120). Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias in SVF 2.441: the Stoics claim that 'the whole is both unified and held together by the fact that *a certain pneuma* permeates the whole'. Or again Alexander in SVF 2.448: 'if, that is, *a certain single thing* holds together both the whole universe and also the things in it . . .' White 2003: 136, however, concludes that 'the relation between *pneuma* and "creative fire" remains obscure. It may be that, as Lapidge [1973: 273] has suggested, the former actually replaced [through the intervention of Chrysippus] the latter as an account of the cosmic active principle or aspect.'
40. See SVF 2.785 (Alexander of Aphrodisias) for *psychē* as a body (*sōma*) in the form of 'either fire or fine-grained *pneuma* . . . that moves through the whole of the ensouled body (*empsychon sōma*)'. Possession of *psychē* is what defines an animal (*ζῷον*), which is 'an ensouled substance with sensation' (see SVF 2.633 from Diogenes Laertius; cf. also SVF 2.845 from Tertullian). Although there are two types of animal, one that is irrational and one rational, it is 'one and the same power (*δύναμις*)' that is 'in one respect mind (*νοῦς*) and in another sensation (*αἴσθησις*)', see SVF 2.849 (from Sextus Empiricus). That power is the *pneuma*.

41. For the four states of the uppermost element (*hexis*, *physis*, *psychē*, and *logos* or *nous*), see, for instance, SVF 2.458, which quotes two passages from Philo. By comparing these texts with SVF 2.439–44, one sees that the element itself may either be called *nous* (in its cognitive character) or indeed *pneuma* (in its material character).
42. For the term ‘power’ (*δύναμις*), see SVF 2.311, which also identifies this *δύναμις* as God.
43. *Pneuma*: SVF 2.439–44. *Physis* (in the comprehensive sense): *De Natura Deorum* 2.81–7. God: *De Natura Deorum* 2.45, 57–8.
44. *Leg.* 2.23 (also in SVF 2.458).
45. As noted, the *pneuma* is the ‘power that holds together’ (ἡ συνεκτικὴ δύναμις) by being made up of air and fire (SVF 2.439 from Plutarch) or the ‘cause that holds together’ (ἡ συνεκτικὴ αἰτία; SVF 2.44, from Plutarch). In this form the *pneuma* ‘moves through all bodies’ (SVF 2.442, from Alexander of Aphrodisias). Its effect of turning bodies into unified entities (the Stoic *ἡνωμένα*) is due to its ‘tensive movement’ inwards and outwards (τονικὴ κίνησις in SVF 2.451 from Nemesius), which in the lowest type of inorganic objects generates a *hexis*. A similar effect of the *pneuma* is found in the *physis* of plants and the *psychē* of living beings, the latter of which the Stoics defined as ‘*pneuma* that is hot and fiery’ (SVF 2.773 from Nemesius) or as ‘*pneuma* that is intelligent (*νοερόν*) and hot’ (SVF 2.779 from Aëtius). Diogenes Laertius shows (7.158, see SVF 2.766) that in connection with perception, too, there is a *tonos* of the *pneuma*: ‘(They say that) sleep occurs when the perceptual *tonos* around the commanding-faculty [the *hēgemonikon*] gives in.’ For *nous* see the next note.
46. The Stoics spoke of ‘the pneumatic *tonos* that permeates (*διήκειν*) and holds together (*συνέχειν*) the universe’ (SVF 2.447 from Clement of Alexandria). They also said that ‘*nous* permeates (*διήκειν*) every part of it [the universe]’ (SVF 2.634 from Diogenes Laertius). These are two different descriptions of the same thing.
47. In this passage (2.164–7), Cicero is arguing that divine care is bestowed not only on the human race in its entirety, but also on individuals (2.164). His argument is that this is shown by those ‘remarkable men’ (*singulares viri*, 2.165) of which Rome has so many. Thus he is basically speaking of what is bestowed as the *characters* of these people, which are stable mental states as opposed to occurrent experiences of intermittent events such as the ‘portents of future occurrences’ and ‘warnings’ of which he also does speak (2.166). This direction of the argument comes out at the end of 2.167 when he states that ‘great men (*magni viri*)’—the same term as in the quoted phrase—‘always prosper in all their affairs, assuming that the teachers of our school and Socrates, the prince of philosophy, have satisfactorily discoursed upon the bounteous abundance of wealth that *virtue* bestows’ (LCL, my italics). For *virtue*, of course, is a stable

mental state. Cf. for this whole idea Seneca, *Ep.* 41.4: ‘If you see a man who is unterrified in the midst of dangers [etc.] . . . and views the gods on a footing of equality, will . . . you not say: “ . . . A divine power has descended upon that man (*Vis isto divina descendit*)”?’ and 41.5: ‘Just as the rays of the sun do indeed touch the earth, but still abide at the source from which they are sent; even so the great and hallowed soul, which has *come down* in order that we may have a nearer knowledge of divinity, does indeed associate with us, but still cleaves to its origin (. . . *animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum, sed haeret origini suae*)’ (LCL).

48. SVF 2.809/LS 53W (Arius Didymus; LS tr.).

49. See LS 53F (Sextus Empiricus).

50. I take this phrase from the helpful analysis in Long 1996*a*: 40.

51. In another felicitous phrase by Long (1996*a*: 53).

52. See LS 46. For fine overviews and discussion, Mansfeld 1979 and Long 2006.

53. See LS 46M (SVF 1.511), which comes from Philo, *Aet.* 90.

54. SVF 2.604/LS 46E (Plutarch; LS tr.). SVF 2.774 (from Diogenes Laertius) shows that the Stoics did think of the ‘world soul’ as consisting of pneuma: ‘They think that (a) Nature (*φύσις*) is a technical fire, going methodically on its way to create (*πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν*); which is equivalent to pneuma that is fiery and artistic (*πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές*). But (b) soul (*ψυχή*) is <a nature that is> capable of perception. Now (b) the latter (they think) is the pneuma that is naturally united with us (*τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα*). That is why it [i.e. the soul] is both a body and survives after death, but is still perishable. (a) But that [i.e. the soul] of the universe is imperishable, of which the individual souls of animals are parts’. Here ‘Nature’, ‘pneuma’, and ‘world soul’ are identified.

55. SVF 2.1065/LS 46O (*Ep.* 9.16, LS tr.): *resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis* . . . (cf. below on the Stoic theory of *ἀναστοιχείωσις*, ‘resolution into one’).

56. Sambursky 1959: pp. vii–viii.

57. For the dating of the Wisdom of Solomon, I rely on Hübner 1999: 15–19. The modern classic on ‘Middle Platonism’ is Dillon 1977.

58. e.g. this: *Ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα . . . λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον . . . παντοδύναμον . . . καὶ διὰ πάντων χωροῦν πνευμάτων νοερῶν καθαρῶν λεπτοτάτων. . . διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων . . .*

59. I take the following description of the pneuma that goes into *sophia* (cf. 7:22–3)—or of *sophia* itself as just described in Stoic terms (7:24: *πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία, διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα*)—to be distinctly Platonic: *ἀπαύγασμα γὰρ ἔστιν φωτὸς αἰθέρου καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ* (7:26). Hübner 1999 is good on Wisdom’s changes between Platonism and Stoicism (cf. also Levison 1997: 144–5), but he does not see that Wisdom intends to ‘transcend’ Stoicism.

60. ἔστιν γὰρ αὕτη ἐμπρεπестέρα ἡλίου καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσαν ἄστρον θέσιν. NRSV translates the last part of this as follows: ‘and excels every constellation of the stars’. Instead, we should probably take it literally as a statement about the actual abode of wisdom *above* the stars.
61. That this is so is clear from Dillon 1977. The Wisdom of Solomon and Philo (see below) are clear examples of this, which also shows that the exact relationship between Stoicism and Platonism in a ‘Middle Platonic’ writer must always be separately ascertained for each particular author (or even work).
62. e.g. *Migr.* 176–95, esp. 178–81. (Seeing Philo’s ‘Chaldaeans’ as also partly Stoics is my own proposal.)
63. Just one example: *Leg.* 1.31–42 is Philo’s famous exegesis of Gen. 2:7 (see below), in which he basically employs Platonic categories in his analysis of the immaterial *nous*. At 1.42, however, he connects *nous* with *pneuma* and contrasts *pneuma* with the *pnōē* of Gen. 2:7 by the following *technical* Stoic terms: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα νενόηται κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ εὐτονίαν καὶ δύναμιν.
64. Note the characteristically Platonizing idea underlying ‘partly’ here. Cf. *Opif.* 144, where Philo describes certain ‘rational and divine natures (λογικαὶ καὶ θεῖαι φύσεις), some (of which are) incorporeal (ἀσώματοι) and visible to mind only (νοηταί), some *not without* bodies (οὐκ ἄνευ σωμάτων), such as are *the stars*’.
65. See LS 27 and 45 with the remark quoted in n. 36.
66. See e.g. LS 45A (SVF 1.90): ‘Zeno also differed from the same philosophers [Platonists and Peripatetics] in thinking that it was totally impossible that something incorporeal . . . should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was capable of acting or of being acted upon’ (LS tr.).
67. See *Tim.* 50C4–6. Speaking of the things that enter into and pass out of the ‘receptacle’ (that is, uninformed matter), Plato says that those things are τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὃν εἰς αἰθῆς μέτιμεν.
68. For a good example of how in his analysis of the ‘spirit’ Philo might move from ‘an affirmation of Stoicism’ to ‘a qualification of Stoicism’ to a downright ‘rejection of Stoicism’ in the light of Plato and his own conception of God, see Levison 1997: 144–51 (esp. 149), as part of his ch. 6 on views of ‘the spirit and philosophical transformation’ in the Jewish diaspora of the first century CE.
69. Wis. 9:15 (NRSV): ‘for a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind (φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα).’ Cf. 2 Cor. 5:1 and 4, where Paul twice speaks of σκῆνος and twice (with 4:17) of βάρος. In both contexts Nestle-Aland 27th edn. rightly refers to ‘Sap 9,15’. Furnish 1984: 269, is in a way right (as we shall see much later) that ‘one must not conclude too quickly that . . . [Paul] shares the Platonic view reflected in Wis and other Hellenistic

literature'. It seems unlikely, however, that Paul does not draw on that passage. Similarly, Dunn (1988: 53) seems right on Rom. 1:18–32 that 'the influence of Wisd Sol 11–15 is particularly noticeable'. The general point remains contested, but see the list of similarities in Byrne 1996: 64–5.

70. For two general, but very informative accounts of the two traditions that lie behind Paul's discussion of life after death in 1 Corinthians 15, see Cavallin 1974 (for the Jewish tradition from the Book of Daniel through to the Rabbinic literature) and Hoven 1971 (for the Stoic tradition from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius).
71. D. Martin 1995: 122–3, rightly emphasizes this meaning of οἱ νεκροί. His whole exposition of the ancient cultural assumptions surrounding the idea of life after death is masterly (104–29).
72. Cf. e.g. 1 Cor. 6:14 with Rom. 8:11. Cf. Bultmann 1984: 158: 'Fast kann man sagen, dass πνεῦμα mit δύναμις synonym ist...'
73. Thus e.g. Tom Wright (2003: 352) reads 'pneumatic' as meaning 'animated by' (*and not* 'composed of'). The theological background to this comes out clearly in Crouzel's presentation of the same idea. Crouzel 1976: 506 (my italics), considers the possibility that the risen Christ may transform the bodies of those he connects with his own resurrection into 'pneumatische Körper... angetan mit Herrlichkeit, Unvergänglichkeit u. Macht'. But he hastens to add: 'Das soll *nicht* besagen, dass das Pneuma ihre *Substanz* sei, sondern dass sie *durch* den G. [*Geist*, i.e. pneuma] verwandelt sind, womit *die schöpferische Tat Gottes* zum Ausdruck kommt.' Even more: 'Wenn mit Pneuma eine neue *Existenzweise* bezeichnet wird, so handelt es sich dabei um *ein Geschenk Gottes* u. *nicht* um die Wirklichkeit, die *in der Verfügung des Menschen* steht; soweit diese Theorie Hellenismus enthält, ist dieser *mehr im Ausdruck* als im Gedankengang selbst zu sehen.' This is pure Bultmann.
74. Scott 1991 is a fine collection of texts on the life of the stars from the Presocratics to Origen. However, his analysis (for instance, of the Stoics and Philo) is less helpful since he quite often aims at diagnosing 'confusions' in the sources (e.g. 42).
75. The locus classicus for this is Dan. 12:2–3 quoted above, but the idea itself was held far more widely. (For a brief overview, see Wright 1995, 121–5.)
76. Distinctly Stoic: (1) For Plato and Aristotle as predecessors who did *not* describe the heavenly bodies in terms of pneuma, see Hahm 1977: 92–3. (2) I have been unable to find the term itself 'pneumatic' employed in Stoic sources in direct connection with the heavenly bodies. However, this is in fact not very surprising in view of the official definition of pneuma as being made up of fire and air and hence belonging further down in the world. The argument for the claim that Paul is nevertheless moving within a distinctly Stoic orbit is that Stoic pneuma proper is a kind of downward *extension* of the material 'aether' of which the

heavenly bodies *are* made up in Stoicism (cf. n. 39). When the Stoics were not talking specifically of the generation of the elements at the beginning of each new world cycle, they (or at least Chrysippus) were quite happy to use the term ‘pneuma’ of the *single* thing that keeps together both the universe as a whole and each thing in it. Cf. again n. 39. See also SVF 2.546 from Cleomedes: ‘if it [the universe: *kosmos*] were not kept together by a single “tension” and if the pneuma were not naturally united through the whole [δι’ ὅλου . . . συμφυές] . . .’; and SVF 2.715–16 from Galen on three types of pneuma: *ἐκτικόν* that holds together inorganic things, such as stones, *φυσικόν* that nourishes plants and animals, *ψυχικόν* that makes ensouled things capable of perception and movement—and that finally, as *νοῦς*, reaches out (*διήκει*) to every part of the universe, according to SVF 2.634 (from Diogenes Laertius). See finally SVF 2.638 (from Galen), which speaks of the universe (*κόσμος*) as ‘possessing the leading and first-generating pneuma that goes through all of these [sc. the four elements] (*τὸ διήκον . . . διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν ἀρχηγόν καὶ πρωτόγονον πνεῦμα*)’ and is called ‘the first pneuma’ (*πνεῦμα τὸ πρῶτον*). These texts reflect the basic Stoic tenet of the *unity* of the world as a whole—with pneuma as the force that unifies *everything*.

This is also the best place to set out the relationship between the overall reading of 1 Cor. 15:35–58 for which I am arguing and the one given in Asher 2000. On 26 March 2009—ridiculously late in the process of my own research—I finally got hold of Asher’s excellent book, which in many ways confirms the results I had myself reached. There is one important difference, however. The book, which is based on a Chicago dissertation from 1999 supervised by Hans Dieter Betz, shares the approach I had adopted in a number of crucial respects. First, it convincingly explains Paul’s argumentation in the second half of 1 Corinthians 15 in terms of Greco–Roman philosophical cosmology, emphasizing the tension or ‘polarity’ (in Asher’s title) that Paul is working with between earth and heaven, both to be understood wholly concretely. I could not agree more. In this connection it also emphasizes that while the Corinthians to whom Paul is responding may have had their doubts about a resurrection body for philosophical reasons, Paul’s counter-argument is itself of a philosophical type. (This point was already seen by D. Martin 1995.) Again, I agree very strongly. Second, Asher sees that there are two basic features of Paul’s argument in the passage: the ‘polarity’ element just noted and the idea of a transformative change (as also in Asher’s title), which Paul brings in, as we saw, in 15:49 and then spells out in 15:50–5. And here Asher even introduces (as I shall go on to do) Aristotle for comparison with respect to the kind of ‘substantive change’ that Paul is talking about. Again, I could not agree more. There is one major difference, however, which is of great importance to the argument of the present book: Asher does not tie the pneumatic body—and the pneuma in general—particularly to Stoicism.

(Nor, of course, does he *use* an insight into the character of the pneuma in the way I go on to do in the rest of this book, since he is concerned only with Paul's argument in 1 Cor. 15:35–58.) It remains the case that Asher's book is wonderful confirmation of the reading proposed here—or, indeed, the other way round! Here it may be countered that this convergence is only due to the fact that we both start out from the perspective of Greco–Roman philosophical cosmology and consider the Pauline text in that light. (In fact, Asher's book is a mine of information for Greco–Roman philosophical cosmology from Plato onwards.) The point is well taken. But the implication—namely, that our knowledge of this dimension of Paul's context skews our reading of the text—is false. What comes out of applying that perspective is vindicated by the way it gives Paul a coherent and persuasive argument vis-à-vis his dialogue partners. So, it is not just a matter of 'applying one possible perspective among so many others'. Of course, other perspectives should *also* be applied, for instance the Jewish 'apocalyptic' one (which is not Asher's concern). As I keep saying, Paul is *spelling out* his 'apocalypticism' in philosophical terms. But after Asher's splendid book (and, I hope, the present one, too) the perspective of Greco–Roman philosophical cosmology cannot be neglected by anyone who seeks to understand 1 Cor. 15:35–58.

77. For an extensive argument that something like Philo's analysis of Gen. 2:7 lies behind these Pauline verses, see Sellin 1986: 95–181 (with references to, among others, Sandelin 1976 and Horsley 1976). However, Sellin ties the Philonic interpretation, which Paul in one respect corrects in 15:46 (so Sellin rightly, 179), to Paul's Corinthian addressees instead of Paul himself. This—together with the whole apparatus in Sellin of 'Urmenschen', 'Gnosis', and the like—seems unnecessary for understanding the passage. Paul is out to establish the existence of a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* that goes beyond a normal *σῶμα ψυχικόν*. To a Jew with Paul's knowledge of Scripture, this made it virtually impossible not to bring in Gen. 2:7, which precisely spoke of the creation through God's breath of a 'living *psychē*'. Paul's additions of 'first' and 'last' in 15:45 then made room for his new idea. This idea does seem to presuppose that Paul knew of attempts to find more in Gen. 2:7 than immediately meets the eye. But it is actually only verse 15:46 (with its emphatic 'But', *ἀλλά*, on which see later in the text) that clearly shows that Paul was aware of something like a Philonic interpretation of Gen. 2:7, from which he felt the need to distance himself.
78. One Philonic distinction is between two types of men: 'noetic' man (as it were, the Platonic idea of man), which on Philo's reading is referred to not in Gen. 2:7, but in Gen. 1:23, and 'moulded' man (man as found in this world), which is the subject of Gen. 2:7 (cf. *Opif.* 69–71 and 134; also *Leg.* 1.31). Another distinction is one Philo found in Gen. 2:7 itself between the human being as a living, sentient animal and as a being into whom God has blown immortal reason through his pneuma (cf. *Opif.* 135–40 and *Leg.* 1.32; for the latter

passage, see Sellin 1986: 103–5). In relation to the latter interpretation one may perhaps say that the ‘pneumatic being’, meaning that into which God blows his *pneuma*, comes *first*, cf. *Leg.* 1.32: ‘We must understand the “man from the earth” [of *Gen.* 2:7] as standing for *mind* (!, *νοῦς*) that is *being mingled with* body, but is *not yet* blended with it (*νοῦν εἰσκρανόμενον σώματι, οὐπω δ’ εἰσκραμμένον*)’. Apparently, man as found in this world only comes *second*, *once* God has done whatever was needed to make him a living, *rational* being—what Philo therefore calls a ‘soul . . . [that is] *rational* and *truly* alive (*ψυχὴν . . . νοερὰν καὶ ζῶσαν ὄντως*)’.

79. This relates to the second of the two Philonic interpretations of *Gen.* 2:7 mentioned in the previous note.
80. Also noted by Sandelin 1976: 46. See the extensive discussion by Sellin 1986: 176–80.
81. Incidentally, note the *un*-Platonic use of the term *εἰκὼν* here (in comparison, for instance, with *Wis.* 7:26 as quoted in n. 59).
82. This is probably the best place to note my agreements and disagreements with the relevant parts of Alan Segal’s analysis of ‘Paul’s Vision of the Afterlife’ in Segal 2004. I both applaud and continue to learn from Segal’s emphasis on Paul’s ‘mysticism’ in his sense of the term: that Paul is part of a broad Jewish mystical tradition in antiquity that Segal knows better than most. But I cannot see the justification for saying that Paul ‘stayed in the apocalyptic-mystical world of Judaism, defending and sharpening that notion in view of the Greek assumptions about the continuity of life after death’ (423). Of course, if ‘Greek’ means ‘Platonic’ (referring to the ‘Platonic analysis of the immortality of the soul’, 423, also 429–30), Segal has a point. *But ‘Greek’ should not always be taken to equal ‘Platonic’*. Since, as Segal sees (431), ‘[t]he transformed in Christ will have . . . the same substance as the stars, which are luminous and spiritual [?] in nature’, there is another obvious ‘Greek’ point of comparison: Stoicism. Still, Paul also continues to be ‘apocalyptic-mystical’. It is not an either/or. (It rarely is.)
83. NRSV rightly translates *Τοῦτο δέ φημι* . . . as ‘What I am saying . . . is this: . . .’ Similarly they translate the same expression at 1 Cor. 7:29 as ‘I mean . . .’ At 2 Cor. 9:6, they translate the elliptical *Τοῦτο δέ*, namely, *φημι*, as ‘The point is this: . . .’ This is correct all through. (REV has the excellent ‘What I mean . . . is this . . .’ in the two first places, but the rather odd ‘Remember: . . .’ in the last text.) For discussion and counter-argument, see Thiselton 2000: 1290–1, who rejects seeing 15:50 as ‘explanatory or explicatory’ of what comes before and therefore translates as if something entirely new was beginning: ‘this I affirm’
84. The contrasting kind of change in Aristotle is so-called ‘qualitative change’: Socrates (being one and the same substance) was previously white, but is now black (sunburned or the like). For substantive change in Aristotle, see *De*

Generazione et Corruptione 1.4.319b10–18: ‘there is “alteration” when the *substratum* is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties . . . The body, for instance, although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and now ill . . . But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a *substratum*, and *the thing changes as a whole* (when, for instance, the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such an occurrence is no longer “alteration”. It is a *coming-to-be* [γένεσις] of one substance and a passing-away [φθορά] of the other’ (tr. H. H. Joachim in Ross 1930).

85. Here I agree with Asher 2000: 156 n. 20, against Martin (and a host of others): e.g. Martin 1995: 126 (sarx and psyche have been ‘sloughed off along the way’) and 128 (‘shed’). (Incidentally, in both passages Martin is very close to seeing—and even saying—that the notion of a heavenly, ‘pneumatic body’ was a Stoic specialty among ‘the philosophers’.) Asher sees quite clearly that Paul’s view is that the earthly body of flesh and blood will be *transformed into* a celestial substance of pneuma. Another recent, careful reader of 1 Cor. 15:35–58 is A. Johnson 2003*b*. Although he rightly insists that the present human body will *not* be ‘sloughed off’, but transformed (306), in the end he backs off from the concrete cosmological implications of his analysis: ‘Paul never speaks about believers permanently *ascending into heaven* so that their bodies would have to meet the requirements of some sort of celestial existence. Even in 1 Thess. 4:17, following the meeting in the clouds, the context implies a descent, not an ascent’ (306, his italics). Here Martin and Asher are on safer ground.
86. *Mos.* 2.288, basically LCL tr. Χρόνους δ’ ὕστερον, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀποικίαν ἔμελλεν εἰς οὐρανὸν στέλλεσθαι καὶ τὸν θνητὸν ἀπολιπὼν βίον ἀπαθανατίζεσθαι μετακληθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὃς αὐτὸν δυνάδα ὄντα, σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, εἰς μονάδος ἀνεστοιχείου φύσιν ὅλον δι’ ὅλων μεθαρμοζόμενος εἰς νοῦν ἡλιοειδέστατον, . . .
87. See SVF 3.658 (from Alexander of Aphrodisias). Also Sen. *Ep.* 42.1.
88. Here ‘pneuma’ should be understood as consisting of either the ‘aether’ of which the heavenly bodies are made up or else the ‘flame’ or ‘light’ that is all there is when God is alone with himself. (Cf. above nn. 39 and 54.)
89. See e.g. SVF 2.618 (Philo, *Aet.* 94, quoting Chrysippus).
90. After I had hit upon this solution, I came across Mansfeld 1983, which at least shows that there is a complex intertwining in post-New Testament Christian texts (e.g. Clement of Alexandria) of talk of Stoic *ekpyrōsis* and Christian *anastasis* (resurrection). Mansfeld even speaks of an ‘*interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic doctrine’. I am suggesting that this may have been prepared for by input from the Stoic doctrine of *ekpyrōsis* into Paul’s own thinking about the resurrection and the eschaton.
91. Note the similarity of this thought with the one contained in 1 Cor. 5:5, where Paul advocates that the Corinthians should hand over a sex sinner to Satan‘ for

the destruction of the flesh, so that his pneuma may be saved on the day of the Lord' (NRSV with a change from 'spirit' to 'pneuma').

92. After I had convinced myself that Paul might in fact think of the final events along the lines of the Stoic idea of the conflagration, I came across the splendid article in which van der Horst (1998) discusses 'The Idea of Cosmic Conflagration in Hellenism, Ancient Judaism, and Early Christianity'. Van der Horst does not address Paul to any degree (but of course—among New Testament writings—2 Peter). But it seems fair to say that his article provides strong support for the *possibility* of Paul's making creative use of the Stoic idea. As van der Horst convincingly shows, the idea was certainly around. (For *ekpyrōsis* in relation to the *Sibylline Oracles*, see J. J. Collins 1974: 101–15.)
93. Cf. again 1 Cor. 5:5.
94. Once again, however, non-believers would probably not undergo this transformation. They would rather be burnt up.

CHAPTER 2

1. In addition to Verbeke 1945 (cf. here Ch. 1 n. 20 and his 236–60), the classic treatment of the pneuma in Philo is Leisegang 1919. (Cf. also Rüsch 1930: 364–401.) While Leisegang sees more clearly than Verbeke the extent to which Philo's understanding of the pneuma was indebted to Stoicism, they agree that a Platonistic perspective gains the upper hand in Philo's view of the pneuma. Leisegang (1919: 20–4) takes as his starting point what he considers to be a dual understanding of the pneuma in Philo (based on *Gig.* 22–7), first as 'ein Element... etwas Geschaffenes, ein Bestandteil des Kosmos, etwas Materielles...', and second as 'die lautere Erkenntnis, ἐπιστήμη und σοφία, also etwas rein Geistiges, eine Idee...' (23). He admits that even as 'Erkenntnis', the pneuma was conceived by Philo as 'eine göttliche Kraft, die nicht nur im Menschen, sondern auch im Kosmos wirkt. Sie [that is, the divine power] wird an stoische Vorstellungen anklingend verglichen mit dem Feuer, und es werden ihr die Attribute der materialistisch aufgefassten Weltvernunft zuerteilt' (23). Still, Leisegang finds it appropriate to go on speaking of the 'rein spiritualistische[n] Seite [of the pneuma] als Erkenntnis und Weisheit' (24). In Verbeke, then, the classic move is taken from Stoicism to Platonism to 'Judaism', 'the Bible', 'religion', etc. First this: 'C'est également sous l'influence de la Bible et [NB] du νοῦς platonico-aristotélicien que la spiritualisation du pneuma s'est produite définitivement...'. Then this: 'Nous ne méconnaissons pas les mérites de Cléanthe et de Posidonius dans la préparation de cette spiritualisation [that was Stoicism]; nous ne nions pas non plus la possibilité d'atteindre des réalités immatérielles et d'en pénétrer la nature par la réflexion purement philosophique [that was Platonism]; mais nous constatons

qu'*effectivement* cette spiritualisation [in Philo] s'est produite sous l'influence de facteurs paraphilosophiques, en l'occurrence par l'idéologie religieuse du judaïsme' (259, Verbeke's italics). The question of how to reconcile Stoic and Platonic elements in Philo's picture of the pneuma is a huge one, which cannot be addressed here. It may well be that both Leisegang and Verbeke are basically right in emphasizing first Platonism and next Philo's Jewish heritage. What is very troublesome, however, is the way both take for granted a 'purely spiritual' understanding of the pneuma (as if we knew what that was) and also a solid contrast between philosophy and religion. (For a splendid account of Stoicism as a philosophical religion, see Babut 1974.)

2. For the pneuma in Qumran, see e.g. Schreiner 1965, Sekki 1989, and Kvalvaag 1998.
3. The Greek is *διὰ τῆς ὑμῶν δεήσεως καὶ ἐπιχορηγίας τοῦ πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. NRSV translates 'through your prayers and the help of the Spirit of Jesus Christ'. LSJ rightly translates *ἐπιχορηγία* as *supply, provision* and quote our passage as *διὰ τῆς ἐ. τοῦ πνεύματος*, thereby showing that they took it in the sense I have given. Fee 1995: 132–5 provides a convincing discussion of the issues which supports this reading.
4. Commentators seem not to be asking for any specific meaning of these terms. For instance, Fee 1995 takes it that *morphē* in 2:6–7 means 'the "essential quality" of what it meant to be' God or a slave (211). Like *homoiōma* ('likeness') in 2:7, which he describes as a 'troubling word' (213), *schēma*, which Fee translates as 'appearance', is 'yet another of the troubling words in this passage' (215). NRSV seems more on target when it translates both *morphē* and *schēma* as 'form'. The aim should be to understand the meaning of such terms—initially, at least—as concretely as possible.
5. See 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5 and Rom. 8:23, all of which are quoted in n. 53 below.
6. Fee 1995 at least hears Dan. 12:1–4 behind this verse (246–7)—rightly, to my mind. He does not, however, bring in the pneuma. As we shall see later, 2 Cor. 3:18 and the meaning of *doxa* ('shine') in Paul suggest that the pneuma may in fact be in the background here. (Another argument may be derived from Paul's claim in Phil. 2:13 that it is God who 'energizes' in them 'both to will and to work for his good pleasure' (NRSV). For as we shall see, the medium for God's work is the pneuma.)
7. Thus both 'lowliness' (*ταπείνωσης*) and 'glory' (*δόξα*) in Phil. 3:21 have distinctly cosmological overtones. This connotation of *ταπείνωσης* recalls Paul's account of Christ in the 'hymn': *ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν* (2:8), which—coming as it does just after the description in 2:7 of Christ's becoming in the 'shape' and 'form' of a human being—does not have an *exclusively* 'moral' meaning. (Doble 2002 is right to develop the 'moral' meaning. However, my argument in this book is that the cosmological and 'moral' meanings go intimately together. In the present passage, the cosmological meaning has the

upper hand.) Similarly, the cosmological connotation of *δόξα* directly recalls 1 Cor. 15:40–1.

8. The oldest text out of the various possibilities in the manuscripts will be *οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες* as against *οἱ πνεύματι θεῶ λατρεύοντες* or *οἱ πνεύματι λατρεύοντες* (thus rightly Fee 1995: 288 n. 10). Since Paul elsewhere (see Rom. 1:9 and 1:25) uses the verb with a complement, and not absolutely, one might consider the following text as having given rise to the oldest transmitted text by haplography: *οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ < θεῶ > λατρεύοντες* ('... who serve God by the pneuma of God'). I have translated accordingly.
9. This is a good example of the kind of concrete reading of Paul that I am advocating: the 'power of his resurrection' directly *refers* to the pneuma.
10. We shall consider this far more extensively towards the end of Ch. 6.
11. The text of 4:13 runs: *Ἔχοντες δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον . . . καὶ ἡμεῖς πιστεύομεν, διὸ καὶ λαλοῦμεν*. In a free paraphrase, this probably means: But since we possess the same pneuma of faith as is stated in Scripture [*—I came to faith, therefore I spoke—*], we, too, have faith and that's why we speak. (Cf. e.g. Furnish 1984: 257–8.)
12. The two verses raise several issues. (1) Does *φανερωθῇ* refer to the present or the future? Since Paul speaks of 'our mortal body/flesh', it seems a priori more likely that he is thinking of the present. (Otherwise, the meaning would have to be 'in our mortal flesh'—*once it has been transformed*. Note, however, that this *is* a possibility.) Gunkel 1888: 87 already took it that way. (2) How, then, will the life of Jesus become manifest in Paul's mortal flesh? Furnish provides a good example of what is in fact only a paraphrase: 'The power of Jesus' (resurrection) life is disclosed already, precisely in Paul's sufferings' (256). Is Furnish here speaking of the *future* 'power'? Or is he just speaking metaphorically? But it looks as if it should be possible actually and concretely to *see* 'the life of Jesus' in Paul's mortal flesh in the present? For a possible understanding of that, see further down in the main text.
13. We shall return to the specific question of how the life of Christ may be made *visible* (or be *shown*) in Paul's body.
14. This reading of the 'inner man' is rejected by Hans Dieter Betz 2000: 'the indwelling of the spirit is identical with the indwelling of Christ . . . this indwelling is not identical with the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*' (333) and 'the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* is not identical with the indwelling Christ. *Christ is not an earthly ἄνθρωπος*, but the divine *κύριος present in the heart through the πνεῦμα*' (334, my italics). But does the italicized sentence not virtually imply that the 'inner human being' *is* the pneuma/Christ as present in the heart of the believer? Samuel Vollenweider 2002 accepts this reading: 'Den vielleicht deutlichsten Ausdruck gewinnt das dynamische Verständnis eines pneumatischen Selbst im "*inneren Menschen*" von 2Kor 4,16' (186, Vollenweider's italics).

15. For the Platonic pedigree of this expression, see Betz's discussion of, among others, Duchrow 1970, Heckel 1993, Marksches 1997, and Burkert 1999 in Betz 2000: 317–24.
16. It is a good question whether the ideas stated in 2 Cor. 4:18 are in fact specifically Platonic. Comparison should be made with Rom. 1:20, the general argument of which is Stoic, but which also has the two ideas of 'seen/unseen' (though with different terms: *ἀόρατα* and *νοούμενα καθοράται*) and the 'eternity' of the unseen world (though again with a different term from here). The 'apocalyptic' text 2 Enoch also operates with the distinction between visible and invisible (see 24, recension A), but there probably under the influence from Greek ideas. In Philo, of course, the distinction is also important (see e.g. *Plant.* 22 and also *Migr.* 179–81, which is directed *against* what Philo takes to be the Stoic conception of God). But there is no text in Philo that ties Paul's terminology in 2 Cor. 4:18 directly to Plato. Perhaps the combination with the talk in 4:17 of the eternal 'weight of glory' points in that direction. Characteristic Platonic expressions of the distinction are found e.g. in *Phaedo* 79A1–11 and *Republic* 6.509D1–5. Thus *Phaedo* 79A6–7 distinguishes between *δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδές and *Republic* 6.509D4 distinguishes between *διττὰ εἴδη*, ὁρατόν, νοητόν —with a terminology that is in fact quite close to Paul's in Rom. 1:20!
17. For a helpful discussion of the vocabulary in this verse, see Aune 2001: 223–9. Aune compares with Wis. 9:15 (see next note) and rightly speaks of 'Paul's familiarity with this Hellenistic Jewish mediation of Platonic tradition'. He is also right, however, in his claim that 'Paul's conception [of a postmortem heavenly dwelling] is clearly similar to the late Platonic and late Stoic conceptuality of Plutarch and Seneca' (228–9, my italics).
18. Cf. Wis. 9:15, which is surely very Platonic in sentiment: *φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα.*
19. It is generally recognized that *ἐνδυσάμενοι* is a better reading than Nestle-Aland's *ἐκδυσάμενοι*. Paul's clothing metaphor seems to presuppose that what puts on the clothes is the 'person', 'I' or 'we', with the first set of clothes being the body of flesh and blood and the second set the new form *of* that body. With such an understanding one could well see oneself as 'naked' if one did *not* manage to put on the second set of clothes.
20. Cf. 2 Cor. 5:4 *ἵνα καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς* with 1 Cor. 15:54 *τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος· κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νίκος.*
21. This is basically the translation of Furnish; cf. his discussion in Furnish 1984: 276. Aune 2001: 233–4, is in agreement. Both take it that *τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος* refers to what each has done through the body, namely, in his or her mortal life. (Thus Aune supplies *ἐπραξεν* after *τὰ*: *τὰ <ἐπραξεν> διὰ τοῦ σώματος*. Better would have been this: *τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος <πραχθέντα>.*) However, I suggest that *τὰ*

διὰ τοῦ σώματος may rather mean ‘the things that come about through (or in) his body’, namely, the *transformed* one. On this reading the point of διὰ is to emphasize that the recompense is—precisely—a *bodily* one.

22. After I had arrived at this conclusion, I came across Christopher Gill’s (2007) fine discussion of Stoic and Platonic elements in Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations*. Gill’s argument is to a large extent similar to my own, e.g. 192: ‘In the light of the longstanding contribution of Platonic thought to Stoicism [a point for which Gill 2006 has argued convincingly while also maintaining the fundamental ontological distinctions], Marcus may see Platonic-style language as a resource or instrument to formulate distinctively Stoic ideas.’
23. This is beautifully shown by Aune 2001: 224–6.
24. The interpretations of 8:10 by commentators are myriad. For instance, Fitzmyer 1993 translates the first half concessively: ‘*though* the body be dead because of sin, the spirit has life because of uprightness’ (479, my italics), and comments: ‘Without the Spirit, the source of Christian vitality, the human “body” is like a corpse because of the influence of sin . . . *but* in union with Christ, the human “spirit” lives, for the Spirit resuscitates the dead human body through the gift of uprightness’ (491, my italics). Fitzmyer at least takes νεκρόν to mean ‘dead’. By contrast, Byrne 1996 in his otherwise excellent commentary translates ‘while the body may be *mortal* because of sin’ (234, my italics) and explicitly obtains this meaning from θνητά in 8:11 (245). But νεκρόν does mean ‘dead’. Rossetti 2003: 332 (his italics), is an example of a quasi-metaphorical, ‘origenistic’ reading, which takes ‘[l]a *morte* del corpo’ in 8:10 as equivalent to the ‘*spirituale* morire con Cristo’ of 6:4–7. Jewett 2007: 492, concludes that ‘no completely satisfactory explanation of all the details [of 8:10] is currently available’. Perhaps this is because scholars have baulked at Paul’s wholly concrete and quite stark idea.
25. Please note that my remarks on this very complex passage only aim to address the present issue of how to understand the pneuma. For an attempt to situate Romans 8 within the letter as a whole, see Christoph 2005. As I see it, Christoph’s (traditional and in itself thoroughly justified) decision to understand the pneuma as having great ‘semantische Flexibilität’ (64–7) basically means that she has not asked herself what the pneuma, of which Paul speaks so much in the chapter, actually is.
26. This interpretation just brings in the complete theory of the resurrection body developed in 1 Corinthians 15. Commentators regularly settle for one meaning only (the objective genitive: . . . of). Lietzmann 1971: 85, took it that 2 Cor. 5:8 and ‘the ancient parallels’ spoke for the other meaning (‘Befreiung vom Leibe’), but also found that there is no substantial difference, as of course there is not within the way of thinking we know to be Paul’s. I think his sense is right that Paul wishes to emphasize here—as indeed in 2 Cor. 5:1–10—the ‘Befreiung von dem Vergänglichem’.

27. For a discussion of the role of 6:1–8:13 within the letter as a whole, see Engberg-Pedersen 1995.
28. It is interesting to consider the relationship between Paul's claim in 6:11 that the Romans should think of themselves as being 'both dead to sin and also living for God' (as they are) and his injunction in 6:13 that they should 'present themselves to God *as if* they were living *from* the dead (ὡσεὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ζώντας)'. I take the latter, but not the former, to refer to the actual resurrection, which after all does lie in the future.
29. Why does Paul not actually speak of the pneuma here? Answer: because he apparently wishes—for very good paraenetic reasons—to spell out in cognitive terms the graspable meaning of the underlying physical process.
30. In discussing the expression 'the life-giving Spirit' in 1 Cor. 15:45, James Dunn (1998: 262) says this: 'Paul intended to represent the risen Christ as in some sense taking over the role of or even somehow becoming identified with the life-giving Spirit of God.' I agree, but take the connection to be rather more direct and concrete. This point also relates to the otherwise fine discussion of 1 Cor. 15:45 in Fatehi 2000: 275–89.
31. For the Jewish context of Paul's talk of 'glory' (*doxa*), see Alan Segal's very helpful overview of the Jewish traditions concerning God's Glory or *Kavod* before, including, and later than Paul in Segal 1990: 39–52. Segal does not, however, address the role of the pneuma in this connection. Similarly, Hegermann 1980: 832–41, in his entry on δόξα in *Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, never mentions the pneuma, not even in connection with 1 Corinthians 15 (836), 1 Corinthians 2 and 2 Corinthians 3–4 (838), or Romans 8 (838–9).
32. In Greek: ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν. οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου . . . The meaning of this phrase is a minor storm centre in Pauline scholarship. See e.g. Dunn 1970 and Moule 1972, both of whom deny that the 'Lord' is Christ since they take ὁ δὲ κύριος to refer back to the 'Lord' in the quotation from Exodus 34 just given in 3:16. More recently, Fatehi 2000: 289–302, has argued extensively for the traditional reading, which I have also adopted. The secret lies in seeing, as Fatehi does, 296–98, that ὁ δὲ κύριος may very well refer back to the 'Lord' in the Exodus quotation *at the same time as* it stands for Christ. For the quotation itself is *already* part of an *application* of the Exodus text to present situation. I am sceptical, though, about Fatehi's general thesis to the effect that since the risen Christ and the Spirit in Paul are, at least partly, dynamically and even ontologically identical (302–7), and since the Spirit and God are just as intimately connected as in earlier and contemporary Jewish literature (47–163), 'Paul had a "divine" Christology' in the sense that 'Christ would be included within the Godhead, rather than posited somewhere alongside God' (331). What is troublesome is not so much the various readings, which are often solid enough, but

rather the conceptual framework (that of a ‘Trinitarian theology’, 333, however tentative) with which the issue is addressed. A clear sign of the problem is the fact that Fatehi constantly uses scare quotes around the term ‘divine’, for instance when he speaks of Paul’s “‘divine’ Christology”, his ‘view of Christ as a “divine” person’, and the like (332).

33. In Greek: ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος.
34. In Greek: . . . ἀυγάσαι τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ.
35. In Greek: . . . ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ [Ἰησοῦ] Χριστοῦ.
36. καθάπερ probably means ‘in keeping with’ (the fact that it occurs) ἀπό, that is, ‘by’ (the Lord, who is pneuma). Cf. Furnish 1984: 216.
37. Remember also that the ultimate presence in Stoicism of God at the conflagration is variously described as a ‘flame’ (*phlox*, so Cleanthes) or ‘light’ (*augē*, so Chrysippus), see Ch. 1 at n. 53.
38. The Stoics did have the idea that the mind could be extended to cover the whole of the world. Could it just possibly be that in analogy with that idea, the Pauline pneuma, which comes from heaven, makes it possible for human beings literally to *see*—with the pneuma-filled mind—what takes place *in* heaven?
39. Here I agree with the thorough investigation in Fatehi 2000.
40. I have not come across any scholarly suggestion that Paul’s language should be understood as concretely and literally as this. It seems to me that the fact that one may well interpret it in this way (on the basis of a Stoicizing reading of Paul’s pneuma that does not in the least go against the various traditions in his Jewish context) and the striking concreteness of the resulting picture in themselves constitute pretty strong arguments in favour of the suggestion.
41. In a way we should applaud this conclusion. Paul was not a systematizing thinker who wanted to proceed *more geometrico*. But this fact should not prevent us from pressing in a systematic direction where the text appears to open up for that.
42. For this specific idea compare the Stoic notion that the human mind may cover the whole world.
43. The idea that there is a bad pneuma ‘of the world’ to be contrasted with the pneuma that comes from God has repeatedly been canvassed against the Stoicizing understanding of Paul’s conception of pneuma for which I am arguing. It would certainly provide an excellent counter-argument if one could be sure that Paul did work with such a notion. There is no sign of this elsewhere, and I suggest that we should understand Paul’s phrase differently here. ‘We did not receive the pneuma of the world, but the pneuma that is from

God' means this: 'The pneuma that we received is not of the world, but one from God.' Cf. for such a reading Rom. 8:15: οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον ἀλλὰ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας . . . Is there a πνεῦμα δουλείας, or should we rather translate 'For the pneuma you received was not one of slavery . . . but one of sonship . . .'? Cf. also 2 Cor. 4:4 and 7:1.

44. Cf. e.g. SVF 2.443 (from Plotinus): 'they themselves witness . . . when they posit that the pneuma is noetic (ἐννοῦν) and a thinking fire (πῦρ νοερόν)'.
45. The argument: by 2:12 believers have received the pneuma from God, which gives them access to his secrets. By 2:11, however, such an access presupposes that they have also taken God's pneuma into themselves. Thus the reception in some sense takes place *within* them.
46. Here, of course, it is very important to notice that in Stoicism it is one and the same thing, namely, *logos* ('reason', 'rational speech'), that is present within and as uttered. For the Stoic distinction between 'uttered *logos*' (λόγος προφορικός) and 'internal *logos*' (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), see SVF 2.135 (from Galen) and 2.223 (from Sextus Empiricus).
47. The reason for the parenthesis is that Paul has just claimed in 1 Cor. 2:2 that 'I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus (as the) Christ and that he was crucified.' There are special rhetorical reasons (going back to 1 Cor. 1:18) why Paul here stresses the crucifixion part of his message. But even stating that Jesus 'Christ' was crucified implies the resurrection part of the message. In any case, preaching *only* that Jesus was crucified would hardly ever generate any form of 'faith'. (And, indeed, 'faith' in *what*?)
48. 1 Cor. 1:18–4:21 is Paul at his fascinating best. Here we need only note the relationship between 1:18–2:5 and 2:6–16: that Paul's initial message of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ was merely meant to generate 'faith' in God's power (cf. 2:1–5), but that the deeper *meaning* of the Christ event was then revealed to believers through the pneuma. (This the Corinthians should have understood, but unfortunately their behaviour shows that they did not: chs. 3–4.)
49. Thus the pneuma itself very precisely *bridges* between God and his pneuma and human beings and their pneuma, as the two things were described in 1 Cor. 2:11.
50. Dunn 1998: 455–7, is right to warn against putting too much pressure on the texts in order to find an *ordo salutis* in Paul. Still, it seems that the concrete understanding of the pneuma that we have reached may help us achieve a little more precision here.
51. I read 3:26 as follows: 'For you are all sons of God through your faith [and that means: by being] in Christ Jesus.' Note that in 3:26 'through your faith' refers back to 3:22–5, whereas 'in Christ Jesus' refers forward to 3:27–8.
52. This claim presupposes a special interpretation of Gal. 4:4–7, in particular the "Οτι ('that' or 'because') that introduces 4:6. On the face of it, Paul's sequence

appears to be this: God sent his son—the son ransomed those under the law—we acquired the status of sons—and *because* we are sons, God sent the pneuma of his son into our hearts, etc. In order to explain the transaction between Christ and the ‘sons’, one may then insert faith into the sequence as what *provides* the status of sons. In that case, baptism and reception of the pneuma comes later and “Οτι (meaning ‘because’) states the *cause* why God sent his son’s pneuma into human hearts. *However*, the passage may also be read differently. Paul’s aim (from 4:1) is to show that his addressees have undergone a change from slaves to sons and heirs. First (4:1–3), ‘we’ were slaves. Then (4:4–5), through the Christ event ‘we’ became sons. That is the crucial change, which Paul therefore states in a general form (cf. ‘we’) in 4:4–5. 4:6 then adds how this change has become relevant to his immediate addressees (cf. plural ‘you’): ‘And *that* you are sons . . . God sent, etc.’ Or even more explicitly: ‘And (proof) that you are sons (is the fact that) God sent, etc.’ Here the “Οτι is taken with the alternative meaning ‘that’. Finally (4:7), Paul draws out the consequence: the change from being a slave to a son and heir, but now as applied to the *individual* Galatian addressee (singular ‘you’). At issue in all this is whether one can become a ‘son of God’ by faith alone, *without* having received the pneuma, or whether sonship actually presupposes possession of the pneuma (cf. Rom. 8:15–16). It may very well be that Paul had no finally worked-out answer to this question. Still, considering the role of the pneuma in his overall view, it seems probable that sonship proper was achieved through reception of the pneuma (though evidently on the basis of faith and baptism). Otherwise—that is, if faith was without further ado *sufficient* for sonship—one cannot really see why Paul should at all bring in the pneuma in Gal. 3:1–4:7, as he repeatedly does.

53. 2 Cor. 1:22: (. . . God,) ὁ καὶ σφραγισάμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ δοὺς τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν. 2 Cor. 5:5: ὁ δὲ κατεργασάμενος ἡμᾶς εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο θεός, ὁ δοὺς ἡμῖν τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τοῦ πνεύματος. Rom. 5:5: . . . ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν. Rom. 8:23: . . . αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες, ἡμεῖς καὶ αὐτοί . . .
54. From διδόντα to δόντα.
55. For this way of taking Rom. 5:1–11 and 8:14–39 together, see the basic article by Dahl 1951. Cf. also my own analysis of the structure of Romans 5–8 in Engberg-Pedersen 1995: 479–82 and 489–92.
56. For arguments concerning the position and (paraenetic) character of 8:1–13, see Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 187 (with 354–55) and 247–53.
57. Note that this question reflects the argumentative strategy we have adopted in Chs. 1 and 2: to begin from Paul’s statements about the resurrection, then to move back from that to his account of life in the present in the light of the resurrection and now to move even further back to the moment when the whole thing started.

58. We shall have occasion to come back to Rom. 8:1–13 several times since it is such a revealing passage in a number of respects. Here we may just note the extent to which the description of ‘those who are in accordance with or in the flesh’ in 8:5–8 *directly* takes up and continues the description of the ‘weak-willed’ person in 7:14–25. With his contrast in 7:5–6 between the time ‘when we were in the flesh’ (7:5, which is a direct prelude to 7:14–25) and the present when we live ‘in the newness of the pneuma’ (7:6, cf. *νυνί* here with *νύν* in 8:1), Paul has himself in effect shown that 7:7–25 and 8:1–13 together constitute a single unit.
59. For a defence of the (very important) claim that 5:5 speaks of human love of God (like 8:28) in response to God’s love for human beings, which is the uppermost theme in 5:5, see Engberg-Pedersen 2008*a*: 33–9.
60. For the translation, see n. 3 above.
61. Dunn 1998: 48–9 and 437–9, sees the intimate connection between prayer and the pneuma, but only somewhat indistinctly, as is natural when one’s notion of the pneuma is only ontologically vague. He does refer to 1 Cor. 14:2 and 28 for the idea of ‘speaking to God’ in glossolalia (49). But he makes nothing of the last bit of 14:2, which is otherwise quite revealing: *ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν γλώσση οὐκ ἀνθρώποις λαλεῖ ἀλλὰ θεῷ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀκούει, πνεύματι δὲ λαλεῖ μυστήρια*. As always, this should be taken quite literally.

CHAPTER 3

1. See e.g. most recently Wasserman 2007 and 2008.
2. I have argued for this interpretation (in conversation with, among others, Theissen 1983*b*, Meyer 1990, and Stowers 1994*a*) in Engberg-Pedersen 2002.
3. It is certainly worth exploring whether ‘sin’ is in fact to be understood in this way in Paul. Here I am hypothetically adopting this view since it is the most ‘extreme’ one, which I wish to incorporate into the general picture.
4. Paul shows this in three waves that with increasing force lead to the exasperated cry of 7:24: 7:15–16, 17–20, 21–3. See the detailed analysis in Engberg-Pedersen 2002: 46–53. (There is a somewhat disconcerting lack of consensus among scholars on how to divide up Paul’s argument. I am happy to note that Lambrecht, who is always good at giving a careful exegetical reading of a Pauline argument, has reached the same conclusion, see his 2004.)
5. For the paraenetic point of this, see Ch. 2 n. 56.
6. For the specifically Stoic dimension of paraenesis, see Engberg-Pedersen 2004*a*.
7. One of the main differences between a Platonic/Aristotelian and a Stoic moral psychology is that where the former is—as it were, separately—both cognitive and desiderative, the latter is only cognitive in the sense that it provides a cognitive interpretation also of all the phenomena that in the Platonic/

Aristotelian tradition are ‘located’ in the desiderative ‘part of soul’. The basic point here is that in the older tradition a change in a person’s overall moral position requires time since the desiderative ‘part of soul’ cannot be completely changed at will at a single moment from one state to the other. In Stoicism, by contrast, a change of understanding *eo ipso* implies a change of the ‘will’. That is why Stoicism, in particular, fits the notion of a ‘conversion’: a change in the understanding that is so comprehensive that the person both sees everything else in the light of the new insight and also acts upon (and hence wills) it.

8. In the next chapter we shall discuss the relationship between divine and human ‘agency’ in connection with this change.
9. For the Stoic distinction between *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*, which is relevant here, see Ch. 2 n. 46.
10. I will not, however, attempt to pursue here the question whether we ourselves may perhaps learn from this ancient practice.
11. Cf., for instance, SVF 2.931 (from a scholium on the *Iliad*): Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δέ φασιν ὡς ταῦτὸν εἰμαρμένη καὶ Ζεὺς.
12. SVF 2.929 (from Proclus): . . . τὴν εἰμαρμένην. ταύτην γὰρ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ Διὸς νοῦν προσηγορεύκασιν.
13. SVF 2.930 (from a scholium on Hesiod).
14. For Stoic allegoresis, see e.g. Long 1992, Boys-Stones 2001: pt. I, and, not least, Ramelli and Lucchetta 2004.
15. This is beautifully brought out in Babut 1974.
16. When I first began studying Paul, I felt that Christ was more important to Paul than God since Paul to such a large extent *identifies* with Christ. At some point, however, I realized that God is in fact the more important of the two. Cf. e.g. Rom. 8:28–39. Christ is ‘the first-born among many brothers’ (8:29), but it is God who lies behind everything. And even Christ’s love (8:35) is ‘*God’s* love, the one *in* Christ Jesus, our Lord’ (8:39).
17. See e.g. SVF 2.604 (from Plutarch), where Chrysippus is quoted as speaking about ἡ . . . τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή. According to Cicero (*Nat. Deor.* 1.37, SVF 1.530), Cleanthes gave the name of ‘God’ to the ‘mens atque animus’ of the whole of nature.
18. The previous couple of pages are only a kind of preview of the argument of Ch. 4. The purpose of making the point in the present chapter is to show where the distinction between the three levels of discourse has real bite.
19. See e.g. Rowland 1982 and, in particular, Himmelfarb 1993.
20. See e.g. A. Y. Collins 1996: ch. 2.
21. For an excellent, up-to-date discussion, see de Boer 2007.
22. A classic proponent of the former view is Dibelius 1909: 78–85. A classic proponent of the latter view is Schweizer, e.g. 1988 with references to his earlier treatments.

23. I had noticed these similarities before hearing them introduced by de Boer (in 2006, cf. id. 2007: 219–20) in a lucid analysis of the meaning of the disputed phrase within the context of the letter. De Boer does not, however, specifically identify the opponents as Stoics, as I go on to do.
24. On this reading, what turns a life ‘under the elements’ into one of slavery is not the fact that the elements are conceived as entities that are material. For so is the *pneuma*. Rather, it is the fact that the four elements basically belong in the sublunary world, whereas God (and his *pneuma*, too) has his special place even higher up in the cosmos.
25. Schrage 1995: 239–40, is good on the presupposed reality of the ‘so-called gods’. He rejects, however (240–1), the suggestion that the ‘lords’ refers to ‘irdische Obrigkeiten’. Here he seems to miss the fact that Paul speaks of *λεγόμενοι θεοί* who may be found not only in heaven, but also *ἐπὶ γῆς*. Who could that be if not ‘irdische Obrigkeiten’ who at the same time had some form of (quasi-)divine status? The argument for taking specifically human beings to be referred to by the ‘lords’ of 8:5 is that in that way there will be a perfect match between not only the ‘many gods’ of v. 5 and ‘the one God, the Father’ of v. 6, but also ‘the one lord, Jesus Christ’ of v. 6 (who was after all also a human being) and the ‘many lords’ of v. 5.
26. A good overview of Plutarch’s religious ideas, including his ‘daimonology’, is Brenk 1987, with extensive bibliographical information.
27. SVF 2.1103 (from Plutarch, *De Iside* 360 E). According to Plutarch, these thinkers—including Chrysippus—thought of the demons as being ‘with a share also in the nature of the soul and in the perceptive faculties of the body, and with a susceptibility to pleasure and pain and to whatsoever other experience is incident to these mutations, and is the source of much disquiet in some and of less in others’ (LCL trans. and text). This is all understood cosmologically.
28. SVF 2.1104 (from Plutarch): ... *φάυλους μὲν... δαίμονας οὐκ ἔμπεδοκλῆς μόνον ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος...*
29. SVF 2.1102 (from Diogenes Laertius). In what this text says of the ‘heroes’, it shows the directly cosmological way of understanding these various superhuman figures. First on the demons: *φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τινες δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων*. Then on the ‘heroes’: *καὶ ἥρωας τὰς ὑπολειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχὰς*.
30. SVF 2.1101 (from Aëtius): *Θαλῆς Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικὰς. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἥρωας τὰς κεχωρισμένας ψυχὰς τῶν σωμάτων. καὶ ἀγαθοὺς μὲν τὰς ἀγαθὰς, κακοὺς δὲ τὰς φάυλας*.
31. SVF 2.1105/812 (from Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9.71–4). In recounting the Stoic argument for the existence of God, Sextus states that it is ‘in accord with facts’ that at the death of human beings their souls ‘soar lightly to the upper

regions' (71). There they 'inhabit the region below the moon' and 'because of the pureness of the air they continue to remain for a long time, and for their sustenance they use the steam which rises from the earth, as do the rest of the stars (ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα), and in those regions they have nothing to dissolve them' (73, LCL trans.). 'If, then, the souls persist, they become the same as daemons (δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται). And if daemons exist, one must declare also that Gods exist' (74, my trans.).

32. The general division is in Dibelius 1909: 7–114, the division of angels *ibid.* 7–37.
33. I take 2 Cor. 6:14–7:1 to be both genuine and transmitted in its proper place. For references, see Ch. 6 n. 47.
34. In two fine articles, Chris Forbes (2001, 2002) has analysed the characteristically Pauline conceptual framework of such personified abstractions as 'principalities' and 'powers', and also 'sin', 'law', and 'death'. He argues that they have their nearest parallels in the Middle Platonism of Philo and Plutarch and that the Pauline conceptual framework and terminology 'forms a very early example of the appropriation of Popular Hellenistic philosophy by Christian thinkers attempting to express their cosmological and christological ideas' (2001:88). Forbes thus takes Paul to be 'working creatively between the angelology and demonology of his Jewish heritage, and the world-view of the *thoughtful Greco-Roman philosophical amateur*' (2002: 73, my italics). The latter point is very well taken. And it is certainly appropriate to bring in Philo and Plutarch for comparison. However, do we know that the personified abstractions that one finds in either writer were understood in a specifically Platonic way as distinctly 'immaterial' beings? After all, in what they say about the sublunary world, 'Middle Platonic' writers were in general quite strongly influenced by Stoicism, which is understandable since the Stoics themselves apparently learned a lot from Plato's *Timaeus*. One cannot, therefore, take it for granted that if Paul was to some extent influenced by 'Middle Platonic' ways of thinking, he would immediately be operating with a 'spiritual realm' (Forbes 2002: 73) where, for instance, the 'powers' would be 'in no sense material' (72).
35. See above, Ch. 2, under 'The Gift of the Pneuma: How?'
36. See above, Ch. 2, under 'Conformity with Christ in his Death and Resurrection'.
37. Dibelius 1909: 74, my italics.
38. For the subsequent role of the *Timaeus*, see Runia 1986 and Reydam-Schils 1999.
39. The Greek for the last few words is this: εἰς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὦν. The comparison with John 1:14 is irresistible.
40. This was noted in different ways both by the Stoics and by Plato (in the *Timaeus*: 75 A–C).

41. When ‘the world’ (*ho kosmos*) is understood either as the active principle (God, in effect the *pneuma*) that survives even the conflagration or else as ‘everything there is’, Stoics will say that ‘nothing is more perfect than the world’ (SVF 2.641, from Cicero *Nat. Deor.* 2.39) and *τέλεον ὁ κόσμος σώμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη* (a quotation from Chrysippus himself in SVF 2.550 = Plutarch, *Stoic. Repugn.* 1054 E–F).
42. For the general theme see ch. 9, ‘The View from Above’, of Hadot 1995. For Marcus Aurelius (and Seneca), see Hadot 1995: 244–5, and Engberg-Pedersen 1998. Marcus has the idea explicitly at 7.48, 9.30, and 12.24.3. For example, 7.48: *Καὶ δὴ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια ὥσπερ ποθὲν ἄνωθεν . . .*
43. It is noteworthy that in 1 Thess. 3:13, where Paul also speaks of being ‘blameless’ in holiness at the parousia of Christ, what should be blameless are not the Thessalonians’ *pneuma*, *psychē*, and *sōma*, but their ‘hearts’ (*kardiaī*). The anthropology of 5:23 *is* a lonely bird in the letter. Still, it can be fitted into Paul’s general conception. Le Père Festugière (1932) has provided an extremely informative collection of material for illuminating the Pauline trichotomy. He is particularly strong on Stoic texts that might be adduced for comparison (1932: 204–5, 210–11), but nevertheless ends up rejecting the Stoic connection. And why? Because of its material, non-‘spiritual’ character: ‘Il est remarquable que le sens physique de *πνεῦμα* se maintient jusque dans les dernières formes du stoïcisme, en un temps pourtant où le sens spirituel s’était diffusé’. . . ‘Il n’y a donc point à parler d’influence stoïcienne sur S. Paul quant au *πνεῦμα*’ (211). This is a *petitio principii* of major dimensions. Festugière then goes on to find the real context for Paul’s anthropological use of *pneuma* elsewhere: ‘La vérité est qu’on a ici un concept juif . . . Philon nous le prouve . . .’ (212). Festugière’s further analysis (however brief) is a sort of blueprint for the quite recent, extensive investigation of the Pauline trichotomy by van Kooten (2008) that explains it through a comprehensive comparison with Philo. There is absolutely no doubt that Philo is in general an enormously important point of comparison for the proper understanding of Paul. But he was, after all, quite a bit more philosophically orientated than Paul. Moreover, he had clearly taken the ‘Platonic turn’ that one does *not* find in Paul (as I am arguing throughout this book). In addition, and far more concretely, Paul’s prayer that God may preserve the Thessalonians’ *pneuma*, soul, and body without blemish ‘in its entirety’ fits a non-trichotomous, monistic anthropology much better than a dualistic, trichotomous one.
44. As Malherbe (2000: 338) notes in his commentary, the term translated ‘in its entirety’ (*ὁλόκληρον*) probably modifies not only the *pneuma*, but also the *psychē* and the *sōma* and it corresponds with *ὁλοτελής* earlier in the sentence.
45. For instance, in Phil. 2:30 and Rom. 16:4 NRSV rightly translates *ψυχή* as ‘life’ (versus death), that is, the normal physical life of a living body. (For other

Pauline uses, see BDAG s.v. on Rom. 2:9, 1 Thess. 2:8, 2 Cor. 1:23 and 12:15.) Bultmann 1984: 204–6, is good on Paul's use of *ψυχή*. He rightly sees that *ψυχή* signifies 'die Kraft des (natürlichen) Lebens bzw. dieses Selbst'. He also thinks that Paul employed the term 'durchaus im Sinne der alttestamentlich-jüdischen Tradition', but fortunately adds: 'was übrigens dem alten griechischen Sprachgebrauch entspricht' (205). In fact, that was probably the current meaning in Greek also in Paul's own time, even in Stoicism which—as we know—did have the idea of a separation of the (material) soul from the body at physical death. In general, Bultmann's account is informed by the dichotomy between a *Platonically* inspired 'dualism' of body and soul, on the one hand (which he more or less takes to be 'the' Greek one in Paul's own time), and an 'Old Testament' meaning, on the other, where the soul (together with the body) stands for the (whole) 'person' ('Person, Ich', 205). This dichotomic reading deserves a far more extensive deconstruction than it can get here. Let it just be noted that even the Platonic understanding of the immaterial soul (as articulated, for instance, in the *Phaedo*) also allowed for understanding 'soul' as what made a physical body a living one.

CHAPTER 4

1. I believe that this (traditional) contrast underlies many of the contrasts drawn in a far more sophisticated manner in D. Martin 1995. The present chapter is an attempt to respond, as it were on the side of 'philosophy', to the challenge of that book.
2. For this reason Vollenweider 1989 (rightly) gives pride of place to Epictetus in his wide-ranging account of 'freedom' in Paul. My own attempt in the present chapter focuses more narrowly on how to understand what grounds Paul's sense (and celebration) of freedom in the various contexts where he brings it in.
3. The classic discussion of Epictetus' ethics is Bonhöffer 1894. A splendid new contribution is Long 2002, with which I shall be in constant dialogue. On Epictetus and the New Testament see in particular Bonhöffer and the discussion between Bultmann 1912 and Bonhöffer 1912. Long, who rightly emphasizes the 'theonomic foundations' of Epictetus' ethics (e.g. Long 2002: 186–9), also has some remarks (145–7, esp. 145) on 'a number of radical differences' from 'the great monotheistic religions', primarily Christianity. These remarks reveal the still current wide gap between the modern study of ancient philosophy and the New Testament. My own aim is to do justice to both, which will also lead to a very different picture from that of either Bultmann or Bonhöffer. With Bonhöffer 1911 and Long 2002, I shall presuppose that 'in spite of numerous verbal affinities' between Epictetus and the New Testament, 'there are no decisive grounds for positing any direct influence of one on the other' (Long

2002: 176). In fact, the actual similarities become far more interesting on that presupposition.

4. See e.g. Sorabji 2006: 165 and 181–95.
5. See *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2–3.1111b4–1113a14, and VI.2.1139a15–b13.
6. The term is τῷ θεῷ προσκατατάξαι ἑαυτὸν (4.1.98 and 99). Unless otherwise noted, I am using the text of the LCL edition of Epictetus (1925–8) by W. A. Oldfather.
7. My own translation, which draws heavily on Oldfather. The remaining translations from Epictetus have the same dual parentage.
8. The term αὐτεξούσιον is used in the following places: 2.2.3 and 4.1.56, 62, 68, and 100 quoted above. Long 2002: 218–20, either leaves *prohairesis* untranslated or translates it as ‘volition’. I prefer the translation ‘choice’.
9. Cf. e.g. 4.1.56: ‘Does freedom (ἐλευθερία) seem to you to be something in your own power (αὐτεξούσιον) and self-governing (αὐτονόμον)?’
10. See Long 2002 in n. 3.
11. This is one of the places where Epictetus uses the diminutive of Paul’s term for ‘flesh’ (Greek: Paul’s *sarx* → Epictetus’ *sarkidion*).
12. Long 2002: 142 and 156; and ch. 6 as a whole.
13. See e.g. 1.6.12–22 as a whole; also e.g. 1.28.20 and 2.8.6.
14. Cf. e.g. 1.1.6 and 1.6.18 for the term διακρίνειν.
15. The term for ‘common (and reciprocal) association’ is συναναστροφή. Epictetus is probably quoting here from some earlier Stoic, but with full endorsement. For the notion of ‘the seeds of being’ having ‘fallen down’ ‘primarily’ to human beings see 1.9.4. And for its consequence that all human beings are ‘brothers’ as ‘sons from the same seed’ see 1.13.3.
16. Kinship: σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου.
17. See e.g. 1.9.11 together with 1.9.16–17.
18. Long, too, speaks in connection with *prohairesis* of ‘the self, what each of us is, as abstracted from the body’ and rightly says that Epictetus’ ‘conception of human beings is dualistic’ (2002: 28). Elsewhere (ibid. 29, 159, 237) he uses the phrase ‘our essential selves’.
19. Cf. Sorabji 2006: 157–71.
20. It is this ‘diatribal’ feature that Bultmann found (in 1910) to be very close to Paul’s—as it were, before he became afraid of making too close a comparison between the two (as in Bultmann 1912).
21. See 4.12.7–8, ending in the strong claim that ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἑμαντοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίαν ἔχω μόνος (‘I myself alone have authority over myself in these matters’).
22. Cf. e.g. 4.4.33 and 4.12.15.
23. This is, rightly, a recurrent theme in Long 2002, not least in ch. 9.

24. For two passages that directly *connect* the relationship with God and the others see 3.24.60 and 3.24.64–5, in which Epictetus speaks of his two heroes, Socrates and Diogenes.
25. See for this e.g. 4.1.81–2 (with 4.1.90), 1.12.26–7 (with 1.12.21) and 2.19.26–7.
26. See e.g. 2.18.19 and 4.4.47.
27. Long 2002: 166.
28. This is also noted by Long 2002: 148–9.
29. I have argued this more broadly in Engberg-Pedersen 2005 in response to Esler 2004.
30. Within theology the most famous form of the contrast is the one between human ‘faith’ (πίστις), to be seen as essentially initiated by God, and human ‘works’ (ἔργα), which are conceived as being essentially initiated by human beings. I believe that this traditional contrast underlies even Francis Watson’s stimulating recent contribution to the debate in Watson 2004, to which I have responded in Engberg-Pedersen 2006*b*.
31. Note in this passage that the Galatians’ having been ‘known by God’ apparently does not exclude that Paul himself has been mightily operative as an agent, too (v. 11). Indeed, he has ‘struggled’ with them. This duality is expressed even more clearly in 1 Cor. 15:9–10 quoted below.
32. Clearly, the perfect (ἐγνώκα, ἐγνώκεναι) of γινώσκειν, which I have translated ‘get to know’, must have a pregnant meaning here. Is the point one that would have come out more explicitly if Paul had written εἴ τις δοκεῖ αὐτὸς ἐγνώκεναι τι (‘if somebody believes that he has *himself* got to know something’)? Probably not. 1 Cor. 3:18–19 has the same phrase ‘If somebody believes (εἴ τις δοκεῖ) that he is wise (σοφός)’ and here the contrast is explicitly stated to be one between what counts as knowledge with God and in the world. Anticipating a little, we may therefore take it that in 8:2, rather than opposing a peculiar ‘one-self’ to God, Paul is claiming that a way of understanding that is not *God’s* knowledge, but one that belongs instead to this world *alone*—is not in fact (genuine) knowledge.
33. This sentence, then, does raise the issue of divine *agency*.
34. Namely, as contrasted with Paul’s interlocutors.
35. Note the predicate ‘fully’ here (ἐπι-) and the time difference. Paul has apparently *already* been *fully known*, but will only himself come to *know fully* in the future. What does that mean?
36. This holds for 1 Cor. 4:6–7, too. (1) The overall theme of 1 Cor. 1:10–4:21 is the question of who has the proper knowledge of God, Paul or those Corinthians he is addressing. (2) 4:7 repeats the essential content of 3:18–23 half a page earlier, where the theme is explicitly that of who has the proper kind of knowledge or wisdom (σοφία), the one to be found ‘with God’ as opposed to

this world (3:18–19). The person who has this knowledge will never ‘boast among human beings’ (3:21), and that is precisely what the person criticized in 4:7 does. (3) Through its connection with 3:18–23, 4:6–7 is also fairly clearly connected with 1 Cor. 8:1–2, as we already noted.

37. For further explanation and references, see Ch. 5 n. 24.

38. There are two transmitted versions of the last phrase: (1) ἀλλὰ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σὺν ἐμοί and (2) ἀλλὰ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ σὺν ἐμοί. The former text, which is the one I have adopted, is better attested. Also, one can perhaps explain the latter text as an emendation to prevent anyone from thinking that Paul was contrasting God’s χάρις and himself. As we shall see, however, the emendation was unnecessary since Paul himself precisely did not think in terms of such a contrast.

39. (1) Receiving (in the Thessalonians’ case) the word of the proclamation *as* God’s word is a matter of understanding. (2) And when God makes the Philippians both ‘will’ and ‘work’ in accordance with his wish, he is presumably achieving this end *through* their own ἐπίγνωσις (insight) and every αἴσθησις (perception, see Phil. 1:9) so that they may δοκιμάζω... τὰ διαφέροντα (discern the differences) and become irreproachable on the day of Christ (1:10) to the glory and praise of God (1:11).

40. This is the phrase employed for my notion of overlap in 1 Cor. 15:10. One might of course speak of ‘synergy’ instead of ‘overlap’, which would be very close to Paul’s own phraseology. I am wary of the connotations, however, and prefer a more neutral term.

41. 2 Cor. 4:4: in the case of those who are being destroyed, ‘the god of this aeon’ has ‘blinded’ their thoughts so that they cannot (namely, themselves) see the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ, etc.

42. The other passage is *Disc.* 2.9.19–21.

43. I am not saying that Epictetus knew Paul, rather that Paul knew what somebody *like* Epictetus would be likely to say.

44. I have borrowed the notion of predictability/unpredictability from the title of Meeks 1990.

45. Note that this is the way Paul himself says in Romans 1 that Gentiles both should *and could* have reached the proper knowledge of God.

46. This, in a sense, is the essence of the interpretation of the Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* that I presented in Engberg-Pedersen 1990.

CHAPTER 5

1. We should never forget the specific genre of the Pauline writings, which is that of ad hoc letters written to specific addressees and for specific purposes, though also with an ambition on Paul’s part to explain himself more comprehensively to

his addressees. In this book I have in fact never forgotten this, even though the point has not come out explicitly so far. That omission will be remedied to some extent in the last two chapters of the book.

2. Please remember that I am constantly only speaking, as it were from inside Paul's own perspective, of the way he took these things to be.
3. Bourdieu constantly both repeated himself and developed his views. I shall draw on the account given in one of his books entitled *Réponses: Pour une anthropologie réflexive* (Bourdieu 1992). Together with the later book, *Méditations pascaliennes* (Bourdieu 1997, English trans. 2000), *Réponses* constitutes the most accessible introduction to Bourdieu's main ideas. For his theory of habitus see e.g. ch. 3, 'Habitus, illusio et rationalité', of *Réponses*, 91–115. Habitus is one of Bourdieu's founding concepts, for instance as developed in the book, *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique* (Bourdieu 1972, English trans. 1977, see in particular ch. 2).
4. This is expressed with characteristic intellectual savagery in ch. 1, 'Critique de la raison scolastique', Bourdieu 1997: 21–59.
5. In spite of the broadly anthropological character of his famous analysis of the Cabylean house and the way it expresses a whole world-view (see Bourdieu 1970), and in spite of his philosophical curiosity, which is evident throughout, Bourdieu was first and foremost a sociologist, cf. Bourdieu 2004 (*Esquisse pour une auto-analyse*), which was first published in German (2002) with the title *Ein Soziologischer Selbstversuch*.
6. Cf. e.g. ch. 4, 'La Connaissance par corps', Bourdieu 1997: 153–93.
7. This is the overall theme of Bourdieu 1980, with the revealing title of *Le Sens pratique*. The question of the role of reason in relation to the kind of cognition that is tied to the body and the habitus—as all cognition is—is one that was in sharp focus for Bourdieu in the last period of his life when he engaged directly in philosophy of science, for instance in *Méditations pascaliennes* and in his last completed work, *Science de la science et réflexivité* (Bourdieu 2001).
8. These ideas are present throughout Bourdieu's work. To give but one example, in ch. 5, 'Violence symbolique et luttes politiques', Bourdieu 1997: 197–244, he invokes Pascal for the realization that 'l'ordre social n'est que l'ordre des corps' (201).
9. Cf. e.g. Bourdieu 1992: 107–12.
10. For one nice example of this kind of change see the analysis of Baudelaire in the postscript to ch. 2 of *Méditations pascaliennes* on 'Comment lire un auteur?' (Bourdieu 1997: 101–9).
11. For Paul as a person who—like, say, Heidegger—articulated a new habitus within his 'field', see the next chapter.
12. Cf. for the general issue Flannery, Shantz, and Werline 2008 and my own attempt there (Engberg-Pedersen 2008*b*) to find a defensible way of speaking of

‘religious experience’ in connection with Paul. Key players in my own thinking on the issue have been Lindbeck 1984, Proudfoot 1985, and J. Z. Smith 2004*c*. Theissen 2007*b* is a far more ambitious (and conceptually precise) attempt to make the phenomenon of ‘religious experience’ fruitful for giving a comprehensive ‘psychology of early Christian religion’. In comparison with this full-blown, theoretical account, my own attempt to elicit an experiential dimension from the texts remains far more local and tentative, though in fact, as I think, in closer contact with the texts themselves.

13. These lines are very broad, indeed. In fact, I am presupposing here that an ‘experience’ is a momentary, occurrent phenomenon in the sensual apparatus of human beings, much in the way Aristotle understood a ‘*pathos*’, which is an occurrent awareness of the world that has a certain evaluative ‘colour’ (of pleasure or pain) attached to it. (For Aristotle’s understanding of a ‘*pathos*’, see *Nicomachean Ethics* II.5.1105b–1106a.) A ‘religious experience’ (not a concept to be found in Aristotle) is an experience in whose description there is some form of reference to divine or ‘superhuman’ beings. By contrast, Bourdieu’s *habitus* is, in Aristotelian terms, a more or less permanent ‘state’ (Greek *hexis*), which underlies and generates particular experiences (and actions etc.). In spite of this obvious and important difference, the bodily and sensual character of an experience places it at the same conceptual level as the *habitus*, just as the two mental phenomena are closely connected by Aristotle.
14. Here I am presupposing for our own understanding of an experience something like the Aristotelian understanding of a ‘*pathos*’. I am not trying, though, to find more than necessary conditions for something to be rightly called an experience.
15. For the double aspect understanding of the Stoic philosophy of mind, see Ch. 6 n. 11.
16. This is in line with the warning against the fallacy of philosophical ‘idealism’ that Proudfoot 1985: 70, rightly issues. In the present case the ‘idealist’ position will take it that what is real about a religious experience is *just* the interpretation with which any example of a religious experience necessarily comes.
17. Note, however, that Paul never speaks of his (supposed) religious experiences as *pathē*. The comparison with Aristotle’s and the Stoics’ conception of a *pathos* is my own. It may be justified by considering the actual way in which Paul describes those (supposed) experiences.
18. An excellent textbook that prints and explains the positions of a number of key players in the field (mainly from within a French orbit of structuralism, psychoanalysis, and post-structuralism, e.g. Mauss, Althusser, Bourdieu, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, together with Stuart Hall, Anthony Giddens, Homi Bhabha, Judith Butler, and others) is Gay, Evans, and Redman 2000. For a synthesis of the earlier, historical development, see R. Martin and Barresi 2006

with the revealing title *The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity*.

19. His thorough—but also contested—research into the ancient world comes out clearly in the posthumously published transcript of his course at the Collège de France given in 1981/2, which lies behind the two last volumes of *L'Histoire de la sexualité* (Foucault 2001).
20. Rose 2000. In this section, page references given in the text are to this work.
21. This general point comes out very well in the classic account by Taylor 1989.
22. The notion of ‘technologies of the self’ (‘techniques de soi’) is presented in the introduction to vol. ii of *L'Histoire de la sexualité* (Foucault 1984a: 9–39, esp. 17), in which Foucault reconceived the *History* itself. He had planned to make it the focus of his further work, cf. L. Martin, Gutman, and Hutton 1988.
23. See Ch. 2 above.
24. See Sainsbury 1995. Sainsbury uses the distinction between *connaître* and *savoir* as a comparison for the distinction between knowledge that we acquire by acquaintance on the one hand and that which is acquired by description on the other: ‘We are not acquainted with Sir Walter Scott, so we know him only by description, for example as *the author of Waverley*. By contrast, we can know *one of our experiences* ‘by acquaintance’, that is, without the intermediary of any definite description. More generally, to know a thing by description is to know *that* there is something uniquely thus and so; to know a thing by acquaintance is for it to *come before the mind* without the intermediary of any description. Knowledge by description involves knowledge of *truths*, whereas knowledge by acquaintance does not: it is knowledge of *things*.’ (My italics apart from those in ‘the author of Waverley’.) The distinction was made by Russell 1910–11. Note that even when something is known by acquaintance, it does come before the mind in some interpreted form or other, only it is not explicitly ‘described’, that is, taken or stated to *be* this or that, as in ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’.
25. Note, incidentally, the very precise *progression* here from (1) to (4).
26. Sanders 1985: 44, rightly insisted that Paul is not at all concerned with ‘self-righteousness’ here, only with contrasting what Paul (himself) previously *had*—with what has now been revealed by God.
27. What is void is only the opposition, not the point that there are two somewhat different types of discourse here. Important steps towards overcoming the contrast were taken by Schweitzer 1930 (on ‘mysticism’) and Sanders 1977 (on ‘participation’) by the very fact of their stressing the non-righteousness side. I can find no large-scale attempt, however, to show that the opposition as such is void, even though the time should be more than ripe for that. In fact, Sanders himself *stated* that the opposition is void, see 1977: 440, his italics: ‘Schweitzer did not see the *internal connection* between the righteousness by faith terminology and the terminology about life in the Spirit, being in Christ and the like

(terminology which here will be called “participationist”, which seems better than the controversial term “mystical”), a connection which exists in Paul’s own letters.’ For one recent article that does go strongly in the required direction, see Schnelle 2001. Please note that the point about overcoming the opposition is certainly not that pneumatic participation is a Greco–Roman idea whereas righteousness is a Jewish one and that the two may be combined under the banner of going ‘beyond the Judaism/Hellenism divide’. Paul’s thinking about the *pneuma* is *itself* both ‘Greco–Roman’ and ‘Jewish’. And the same probably also holds, though in other ways, for his notion of righteousness. The point is rather that within Paul’s own thinking the idea of cosmological and bodily change generated by the *pneuma* *fills in* the talk of righteousness.

28. Fee 1995, who has a very substantial and careful analysis of 3:10–11 (326–36), takes *τοῦ γινῶναι* as ‘a simple complementary infinitive of purpose’ (327), which he subordinates to the *ἵνα* of 3:8 (327–9). However, if *μὴ ἔχων* can be subordinated to the *ἵνα* -clause (as it must) as explaining the circumstances under which that clause will hold, then *τοῦ γινῶναι* can also be subordinated to *μὴ ἔχων* with a similar meaning. The advantage of this is that the various phrases are read in their logical sequence. It is noteworthy that Blass/Debrunner/Rehkopf lists *τοῦ γινῶναι* both as having a final meaning and an epexegetical one (§ 400.^{7,10}). Such vacillation is probably to the point.
29. One scholar who has consistently emphasized the experiential quality of Paul’s writing is Alan Segal, both in his 1990 and later also in his 2004. Just one example is Segal’s comment on Phil. 3:7–8: ‘This is not only a conversion but it is one that Paul himself ascribes to a religiously altered state of consciousness (RASC)’ (Segal 2004: 402). Note also the immediately following sentence, where Segal states explicitly what we have spent some time on bringing out: ‘He has received this conversion as a gift of the Spirit.’
30. The idea of a takeover is certainly present already in 3:7–11. It is explicitly articulated, however, in 3:12b, on which see more below.
31. Fee 1995 takes the ‘it’ to refer to ‘the eschatological conclusion of present life’ (341) or ‘the eschatological realization of the goal’ (343). But of course Paul has not taken hold of that! (Incidentally, Fee also translates 3:12b as follows: ‘I press on if I also may take hold of . . . *that for which* I also have been taken hold of by Christ Jesus’ (339). Surely, the three words I have italicized here are a mistranslation. *ἐφ’ ᾧ* means ‘because’ here, as e.g. NRSV has it.)
32. This general function of Paul’s ‘autobiographical’ accounts was splendidly brought out (with special reference to Galatians 1–2) in Lyons 1985. The point that Paul need not always be ‘defending’ himself against ‘opponents’ (whom one might therefore identify by mirror-reading) is a very important one. Lyons’s conclusions were later supported through a broader consideration of all the undisputed Pauline letters in Dodd 1999. Here the role of the

- 'I' statements as providing a model for the addressees to imitate is brought out convincingly in its various forms. However, neither Lyons nor Dodd combines his insight into the rhetorical functions of Paul's 'autobiographical' 'I' statements with the strongly experiential, pneumatic content of those statements.
33. Fee 1995: 340 n. 11, sees that all Christians, including Paul, may be 'mature' (Greek: *teleioi*) without this implying that Paul himself is fully 'completed' (Greek: *teteleiōmai*).
 34. The Greek is wonderfully precise: *Συμμιμηταί μου γίνεσθε, ἀδελφοί, κτλ.*
 35. It is on purpose that I speak here of a Pauline 'persona'. The concept of 'persona' (Greek: *prosōpon*) is important in considering ancient notions of the 'self'. See in particular Gill 1988 (on the theory of *personae* in Panaetius and Cicero). In the same line lies Epictetus' use of the concept, e.g. in *Disc.* 1.2.8–24, cf. the excellent discussion in Sorabji 2006: ch. 8. I am claiming, however, that *behind* the Pauline persona of the 'apostolic self' (and of course Paul does not explicitly speak of either) lies the 'converted self' that he is articulating in Phil. 3:4–11.
 36. See above, Ch. 2.
 37. See above, Ch. 2.
 38. We shall consider transmission of the pneuma in more detail in the next chapter.
 39. Betz 1979: 71, perceptively ends up preferring 'in me'. Thus also Dunn 1993: 64.
 40. I employ the term 'private' here on purpose. The burden of my argument in this chapter is that Paul does operate with a notion of something that has happened to *himself* and in his *interior*—and that he then *uses* this conceit for various public purposes. The issue here is not one of (ontological) individualism, nor of a modern existentialism. If we want to talk about ontology, we should do it in the terms elaborated earlier in this book, of reception in the individual body of pneuma literally coming from above. Seen in rhetorical terms, however, Paul is in fact developing events that have happened to *himself* (a religious experience in the body of his converted self) and contrasting *his own* apostolic self to others. If this kind of focus on the individual cannot find a place under the modern notion of the ancient 'dyadic' understanding of the person, then that notion has to be adjusted. For the notion of a 'dyadic personality', see its classic formulation in Malina 1981: 51–70. What Malina cannot find in the New Testament is any statement that 'contains psychological, introspective, uniquely personal sorts of explanation, explanations that would be typically personal in our culture. It would seem that the New Testament (like the Bible in general) simply lacks any uniquely personal, individualistic motives or introspectively generated explanations for human behavior' (57–8). Very much hangs here on how all these difficult terms are spelled out.
 41. The introductory γάρ (usually: 'for') in 2:19 calls for comment. In 2:18 Paul has said this: 'For if I again build up the things I tore down, I institute *myself* as a

transgressor.’ (Commentators regularly do not see the importance of ἐμᾱυτόν here.) It seems most likely that he is speaking of tearing down and building up again the Mosaic law, and that while speaking of something he *might* himself do, he is in fact rather thinking of what his opponent in this passage, Peter, is actually doing (as seen from Paul’s perspective). Then in 2:19–20 ‘Paul presents the basic elements of *his own* theological position’ (Betz 1979: 121, rightly, with my italics). In that case, the γάρ will have the kind of *contrastive* force that one sees from time to time. (Cf. e.g. 3:10, which Betz (137) rightly translates: ‘By contrast, those who . . .’)

42. The battle continues to rage over whether to understand *pistis Christou* in Paul as ‘faith in Christ’ (the traditional translation, with a so-called objective genitive of ‘Christ’) or ‘faith(fulness) of Christ’ (with a so-called subjective genitive of ‘Christ’). It may by now be reasonable to go back to one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the modern discussion, Sam K. Williams, who in his Galatians commentary concludes that ‘Paul’s phrase is a double-sided expression, referring first to the faith of Christ himself but including as well the answering faith of those who are in him’ (Williams 1997: 70; see also his general discussion, 65–70). To bring this out Williams introduces the happy translation ‘Christ-faith’. Williams does recognize that in 2:20 Paul is speaking of ‘Jesus’ own believing/faithfulness’ (1997: 69 and 75). As he notes, Paul defines the *pistis* here with a ‘that-clause’ (1997: 75), to which I would add that the ‘that’ (τῇ) precludes that Paul is speaking of ‘faith in’. ‘I live in *pistis*, that . . .’ *must*, so it seems, be followed by a ‘that *of* [Christ]’ instead of ‘that *in* [Christ]’. Ulrichs 2007 is a careful and judicious attempt to bring together the English-speaking and the German discussion of the issue. One may wonder, however, whether there is any likelihood of progress until one decides to place in parentheses to begin with the whole gamut of traditional theological concepts: soteriology, Christology, justification, grace, works, etc.
43. I am reproducing here a few paragraphs from Engberg-Pedersen 2008*b*.
44. Note the perfect tense in the Greek *synestaurōmai*: I have been crucified, but also now *am* crucified.
45. The reason why he speaks of *pistis* instead of *pneuma* in 2:20 is, of course, that the theme of 2:15–21 as a whole is precisely this: through works of law or through *pistis*?
46. For argument and references for seeing 5:13–26 (plus 6:1–10) as the paraenetic section proper in Galatians, see Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 326.
47. One thing that is of crucial importance for understanding Gal. 5:13–26 is the fact that the ‘fruit’ of the *pneuma* of which Paul speaks (5:22–3) is a stable *state* of mind, as is clear from its instantiations: love, joy, peacefulness, etc. See my analysis in Engberg-Pedersen 2004*b*. Of course, the *habitus* *is* a state.
48. The classic treatment of the ‘I’ of Rom. 7:7–25 is Kümmel 1974 (1929), which has been corroborated by Stowers 1994*a* and *b*. Theissen 1983*b*: 194–204

provides an important qualification of reading the ‘I’ as a ‘purely fictive I’. Meyer 1990: 64–5 agrees with Kümmel that ‘the passage is not autobiographical in any sense that allows it to yield details about Paul’s personal life, either before his conversion or after. Paul is employing rather a rhetorical style in which the self functions in a representative way as a type or paradigm for others’ (64). But Meyer also rightly insists that it is ‘impossible to dismiss all personal nuances from his use of “I”’ (65). Paul is precisely *imagining* what—as seen from his new perspective—it *would have been* like, *as it were* for himself, to live under the law—now that a wholly new possibility has opened up.

49. The understanding of the ‘I’ in Rom. 7:7–25 advocated by Dodd 1999: 222–30, seems far too catholic: Paul’s “I” is a composite of various elements which defy a single identification. The “I” of Romans 7 incorporates elements of Adam’s story, elements of Paul’s experience, and is somehow intended to relate to the experience of Jewish, *and perhaps Christian* [!], believers’ (230, my italics). In fact, the reason I proceed to give for Paul’s speaking of ‘himself’ here fits immediately into Dodd’s focus on the ‘I’ as a model.
50. My own translation. NRSV has: ‘So then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin.’ It appears that they did not at all translate *αὐτὸς ἐγώ* (‘I myself’, ‘I being one and the same’)!
51. As noted in Ch. 3 (n. 4), it is most important for a proper understanding of Paul’s argument to get the structure of the text right. As I see it, Paul offers three steps of a growing recognition of one’s own sinfulness: 7:15–16, 7:17–20, and 7:21–3 (cf. Engberg-Pedersen 2002: 46–54). (This goes against a majority division, which runs 7:14–17, 7:18–20, and 7:21–3.) What we get are three waves that lead with increasingly overwhelming force to the exasperated cry of 7:24a.
52. It fits with this that when he divides the ‘I myself’ up in 7:25, the two parts are (again:) *nous* and (now:) *sarx* instead of ‘members’. Apparently, he wishes here to reserve the term *sōma* for the whole consisting of both. Another argument for a corporeally conceived *nous* may be derived from 1 Cor. 2:16, where the *nous* (Christ’s *nous*) that believers have is, by implication, identical with the (physical) *pneuma*. (Incidentally, I consider this understanding of the *nous* in Romans 7 to be one of the stronger arguments against reading that chapter in the light of ‘Middle Platonism’, as Wasserman 2007 does.)
53. Note the precise sense of *metadidonai*: to give somebody a *share with somebody* (quite often oneself) *in* something. Paul *has* it. And he wishes to give the Romans a *share in* it—together with himself.
54. The whole reading is closely connected with the view that both Rom. 7:7–25 and its resolution in 8:1–11 are fundamentally paraenetic in the sense that they provide the backing for Paul’s exhortation in 8:12–13. Paul aims in the two passages to make the Romans both see and feel the change that they have ex

hypothesi already undergone—and should indeed now show in practice. In general, of course, Paul presupposes throughout the letter that his addressees have already been converted. For distinctly paraenetic purposes, however, he as it were invites them to repeat that experience.

55. The classic treatment of this is Mitchell 1991.
56. For the Stoic material see the thorough discussion in Lee 2006.
57. I am presupposing here the unfashionable view that Paul's talk of being saved 'as through fire' should be taken completely literally. By contrast, Thiselton 2000: 315, considers it 'unlikely, although possible that *ὡς διὰ πυρός* means simply *like someone who comes through the fire intact*. It is far more likely that the phrase had become a metaphor like "brand plucked from the burning" (Amos 4:11) [thus also Hays 1997: 56], comparable to "saved by the skin of one's teeth" (Thiselton's italics). But 3:13 unmistakably shows that there will be some fire on the day of judgement. And how will a person's work be touched by that fire if the person him- or herself is not?
58. There is fascinating, Foucauldian analysis of it in Moxnes 2003.

CHAPTER 6

1. See Nietzsche 1980. This is the second piece of Nietzsche's *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*. It remains strikingly *zeitgemäss*.
2. Contrast e.g. Fee 1987: 604–6, who takes Paul's mention of being 'baptized into a single body' and being 'given a single pneuma to drink' to refer to one and the same experience (which turns out to be that of conversion) and argues that since the latter clause has a 'clearly *metaphorical* sense', one should also opt for 'a metaphorical rather than literal, meaning for "baptism" in the first clause' (605, Fee's italics). (Cf. his comment: 'There is, after all, no experience called "drinking the Spirit"!', 605 n. 29.) Schrage 1999: 218, ends more or less in the same place. He has a better grasp of 'Christ' in 12:12 as actually being short for the 'body of Christ' (210–13). But then again the 'body of Christ' comes out as swimming around between having a literal and a metaphorical meaning (even though Schrage in principle denies the latter): 'Auch wenn man über das Neben- oder Ineinander von bildhafter und eigentlicher Rede diskutieren mag, so ist doch vom Leib als *lebendiger Wirklichkeit des Christusleibes der Gemeinde* nicht zu abstrahieren' (211). What do the words I have italicized actually mean? How much easier it is to take Paul to be referring to an actual body constituted by the pneuma (and to be speaking of both baptism and the Lord's Supper)!
3. The classic discussion of the contextual background to Paul's use of *ekklesia* is Schmidt 1938. For remarks that focus on Paul's own use and emphasize the ritual connotations, see Oekland 2004: 135–7.

4. Boundary-drawing is particularly clear in 1 Corinthians, for instance in chs. 5–6 and 8–10. This is an extremely important aspect of Paul's thought that has been highlighted in the wealth of sociologically and anthropologically informed analysis of Paul that has been given during the last three decades, following on the founding works by Theissen (e.g. Theissen 1974*a*, *b*, 1975*a*, *b*, 1983*a*), Meeks 1983, and those from the Malina school (e.g. Malina 1981, 1986).
5. My argument here is completely in line with the splendid discussion in Adams 2007 of the notion of 'cosmic catastrophe' in the New Testament and its contextual world. Adams's book is a forceful defence of the need to take quite literally the various descriptions of cosmic catastrophe to be found in ancient Jewish writings from the Jewish Bible onwards. (He also has a fine discussion of the Stoic notion of cosmic conflagration, 114–24.) Adams is directing his analysis against the metaphorical reading that has been advanced by Tom Wright in a number of books, not least Wright 1992, where Wright claims, for instance, that 'there is virtually no evidence that Jews were expecting the end of the space-time universe'; instead, there is 'abundant evidence that they . . . knew a good metaphor when they saw one' (ibid. 333, quoted in Adams 2007: 7). To my mind, Adams has conclusively shown that this reading cannot be maintained. In addition, of course, the whole project of the present book presupposes that all these 'apocalyptic' ideas were in fact (also) concretely cosmological ones. Adams has been a pioneer in making us focus on the concrete cosmology of the New Testament texts, including Paul (see already Adams 2000).
6. Examples of distinctly (or at least originally) Stoic ideas that are present on the surface of Paul's text are 'progress' (*prokopē*, Phil. 1:12 and 1:25) and 'inappropriate acts' (*ta mē kathēkonta*, Rom. 1:28). I have also argued (Engberg-Pedersen 2004*a*) that the whole field of Pauline 'paraenesis' ('moral exhortation or encouragement') belongs here in spite of the fact that Paul himself does not employ the Greek terms *parainein* or *parainesis*, but instead prefers to speak of *parakalein* and *paraklēsis*. The argument is that the way Paul in fact understands and practises his *paraklēsis* follows closely the specifically Stoic *theory* of *parainesis*—which is then reflected in the fact that *later* Christian tradition did *call* Paul's *paraklēsis* . . . *parainesis*. This is a good example of the important fact that similarities between Paul and Stoicism are not in the least tied to cases of Paul's using the same *terms* as the Stoics. In fact, the most important similarities are to be found where there is no identity of terms.
7. Fundamental reflection on 'comparison' is found in Smith 1990: 33–53, which is a mine of insight. Smith's claim that a 'comparison is a disciplined exaggeration in the service of knowledge' (52), which focuses on a specific issue 'with respect to' (51) which the comparison is done and always serves 'the scholar's intellectual purpose' (53) certainly holds true of any comparison of Paul and

Stoicism that I have been engaged in. What I have been after in all this is the form of life (with respect to world, group, and self) that came out of Paulinism and Stoicism, respectively, and the differences and similarities of *that*. That is the reason why the failure of Stoics to speak of Jesus Christ is completely immaterial to the comparison. Correspondingly, it would be just silly to say that Paul was a Stoic, or indeed a philosopher at all. Note, however, that the fact that a comparison is always made for ‘the scholar’s intellectual purpose’ does not, of course, in the least imply that there are no real or actual similarities or differences to be discovered *through* operating for such a purpose.

8. This is a very abbreviated form of the argument in Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 22–8, which to some extent resembles the *criticism* that has been made of that book. In the present work I have attempted to take the criticism seriously, no matter whether it was justified or not.
9. For the idea itself, see Hadot, ch. 9, ‘The View from Above’, in Hadot 1995: 238–50. Hadot cites various Stoics (Marcus Aurelius, Seneca), people influenced by Stoicism (like Philo of Alexandria), and Cynics.
10. I have myself explored this theme in Engberg-Pedersen 1990. Not everyone has been persuaded by that reading, e.g. Brennan 2005: 231, who calls it ‘impressive but, I believe, wholly misguided’. The doyen of modern Stoic studies, A. A. Long, is in far closer agreement with my understanding, even though he disagrees on one important point, see his ‘Postscript 1995’ in Long 1996*b*: 177–8.
11. By speaking of a ‘double aspect’ theory of body and mind in Stoicism, I am referring to their combination of a material monism, which also covers the *pneuma* in its most rarefied, ‘rational’ form, with ways of speaking that made extensive use of an ordinary mental vocabulary. Long 1996*a* on soul and body in Stoicism raises many of the central questions. I am not convinced, however, that his gradual move towards speaking of a ‘dualist strain’ (248) in the Stoic philosophy of mind does justice to his own recognition of ‘the purely corporeal which strictly is the only kind of existence the Stoics recognised’ (249). On this point I am more in line with Annas 1992, whose general account of the Stoic philosophy of mind is excellent (e.g. 37–70 on ‘The Soul and the Mind’ and 71–87 on ‘Perceiving and Thinking’). Here is Annas: ‘It is central to the Stoic analysis that when I perceive an object, one and the same item, the appearance, is both a physical alteration of my soul-*pneuma* and an item realizing propositional content, which can be assented to and produces a true or false belief. There have to be items *with both these aspects*’ (78, my italics in the last four words).
12. I neglect here the earlier parts of Paul’s attempt at constructing some form of ‘salvation history’, as seen most clearly in Romans 1–11 (see above in Ch. 1).
13. See e.g. SVF 2.90 (Sextus Empiricus). The explanation for the term itself given by the founder of the school, Zeno, was famous: ‘Then, when he had closed his

hand and made it a fist, he said that that was a grasp (Latin *comprehensio*). From that similitude he gave that phenomenon a name which it had not had before: *katalēpsis*.' (Cicero, *Academica Priora* 2.144, SVF 1.66).

14. This is one reason why a philosophical interpretation of Paul such as Bultmann's, which developed a more traditional understanding in an 'existentialist' direction, does capture something important that is genuinely there in Paul. For Bultmann's existentialist account (see e.g. his 1984) was, of course, thoroughly cognitive. What was wrong was Bultmann's hermeneutically governed decision to focus on this aspect alone to the exclusion of all others, including the concrete cosmology.
15. This interpretation of the ontology and role of *gnōsis* in Paul seems to me highly preferable (because of its basic simplicity) to the otherwise fascinating one proposed in D. Martin 1995: 179–89. According to Martin, 'Paul's view of gnosis is quite unlike that known from moral philosophy, but it has much in common with the view found in the magical papyri' (186). At least as used in 1 Corinthians 8–10, it 'reflects the logic of prophylaxis revealed in the magical papyri far more than that taught by the philosophers' (187): 'gnosis . . . serves as a prophylactic talisman to protect the possessor from the very real danger of daimonic pollution' (186). It is 'a commodity' (189). Much as I have learned from Martin's splendid book, I just cannot make this understanding of *gnōsis* fit the broader understanding of Paul for which I have argued in this book. In that understanding Paul does come out as being rather more 'philosophical' (as Martin is, of course, well aware).
16. For 'beyond the Judaism/Hellenism divide', see Engberg-Pedersen 2001.
17. For the notion of champ see Bourdieu 1992: ch. 2, 'La Logique des champs', 71–90.
18. For this I have earlier referred to Bourdieu 1997: ch. 4, 'La Connaissance par corps', 153–93.
19. Cf. Bourdieu 1980 (*Le Sens pratique*).
20. Cf. e.g. Bourdieu 1992: ch. 4, 'La Violence symbolique', 116–49.
21. Cf. Bourdieu 1982 (*Ce que parler veut dire: L'économie des échanges linguistiques*).
22. I am quoting from Bourdieu 1992: 127, in my own translation (but with Bourdieu's italics in the word 'integrated'). Bourdieu is reproducing the analysis of Heidegger he had given in Bourdieu 1976.
23. Quotations here are from Bourdieu 1992: 129.
24. Quotations here are from Bourdieu 1992: 171 (my italics). The full sentence reads in French: 'Comprendre pleinement la conduite de l'agent agissant dans un champ, comprendre la nécessité sous laquelle il agit, c'est rendre nécessaire ce qui apparaît d'abord comme contingent.'
25. *Prokopē*: Phil. 1:25 and 12. See on this my remarks in Engberg-Pedersen 2008*b*. *Skopos* and *telos*: Phil. 3:14 and 12 (τετελείωμαι) and 14 (τέλειοι).

26. For the Greco–Roman, philosophical origins of this term see my remarks in Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 101. Cf. also Malherbe 1996.
27. See, in particular, Fitzgerald 1996.
28. For some of the latest views on Pauline paraenesis, see Engberg-Pedersen 2004a.
29. See Engberg-Pedersen 2000: chs. 4–5.
30. Note two things about this figure. First, the Greco–Roman side of the figure is somewhat complex. We should distinguish Greco–Roman religion from the special perception that went into Greco–Roman philosophy. (The latter is italicized.) There was no special or intimate connection between Greco–Roman religion and ethics, as there certainly was on the Jewish side. By contrast, there was an intimate connection between theology and ethics in the philosophers. Second, I presuppose an understanding of Jewish law-observance as being less than perfectionist.
31. I take it that Paul is referring to the same group of opponents in Phil. 1:28–30, 3:2ff. and 3:18–19. The description in 3:2ff., in particular, makes it certain that this group is specifically Jewish (though also Christ-believing since Paul calls them ‘workers’, *ἐργάται*, 3:2). Whether the group is only fictive is irrelevant to our purposes. However, the fact that Paul describes them as ‘your opponents’ (*οἱ ἀντικείμενοι*, 1:28) seems to suggest that they were real enough.
32. This strategy is pervasive in Philo, who of course employed Greco–Roman ideas far more extensively than Paul did.
33. For the distinction between *positions objectives* and *prises de position* see e.g. Bourdieu 1992: 81: ‘Le champ des positions est méthodologiquement inséparable du champ des prises de position, entendu comme le système structuré des pratiques et des expressions des agents. Les deux espaces, celui des positions objectives et celui des prises de position, doivent être analysés ensemble et traités comme «deux traductions de la même phrase», selon la formule de Spinoza. Cela dit, en situation d’équilibre, l’espace des positions tend à commander l’espace des prises de position.’ Nevertheless, revolutions are possible that genuinely change the field understood as the space of objective positions. ‘Tout champ constitue un espace de jeu potentiellement ouvert dont les limites sont des *frontières dynamiques*, qui sont un enjeu de luttes à l’intérieur du champ lui-même’ (ibid. 80, his italics). I go on to suggest that Paul was engaged in this kind of fight from within the field of Judaism, but also that he developed features that originally belonged within other fields in an attempt to extend the limits of his own field along the lines indicated by Bourdieu.
34. The classic statement is in Sanders 1977: 442–7, ‘The solution as preceding the problem’.
35. I am repeating here the point made in Engberg-Pedersen 2000 that in the Pauline picture, the Christ-believing life is fundamentally one of sinlessness, in which sin has been left completely behind.

36. See *ibid.* 16–30.
37. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the modern physicist Shmuel Sambursky (1959: p. vii) argued strongly that Stoic physics ‘anticipated basic ideas which have governed physical thought since the seventeenth century’. The strength of Stoic physics (including the theory of seeing the world as a continuum) may also explain why it was felt to be so attractive by a would-be Platonist such as Philo.
38. The hermeneutical tool we need to make sense of our both using Paul for contemporary purposes and also not using him directly is that of *analogy*. We can find analogies in our own world to what Paul was saying within the confines of his own time and place. (We should also, however, be prepared to *reject* parts of Paul’s views even where they only have their counterparts in analogical form.)
39. τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρήλθεν, ἰδοὺ γέγονεν καινά (2 Cor. 5:17).
40. See above, Chapter 2.
41. The classic discussion of the place of 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 within the letter as a whole is Bieringer 1994a: 67–105 (‘Teilungshypothesen zum 2. Korintherbrief. Ein Forschungsüberblick’), 107–30 (‘Der 2. Korintherbrief als ursprüngliche Einheit. Ein Forschungsüberblick’), and 131–79 (‘Plädoyer für die Einheitlichkeit des 2. Korintherbriefes. Literarkritische und inhaltliche Argumente’). A more recent, fascinating (but to me in the end unconvincing) attempt to allocate various parts of 2 Corinthians to different stages in the history of proceedings between Paul and the Corinthians, is Mitchell 2003 and 2005. An even more recent statement of the ‘Einheitlichkeit’ with new and persuasive arguments that say a lot about 2:14–7:4 is Vegge 2008.
42. I owe this happy term to my friend and colleague, Geert Hallböck.
43. Note that his present account of his sufferings then vis-à-vis the Corinthians is actually formulated as part of his letter to them now. When he speaks, for instance, of his *parrhēsia* (‘liberty of speech’) in relation to them (3:12, 7:4, in fact also 4:2), he is referring to what he is telling them *now*.
44. This point was seen clearly by Fitzgerald 2001, whose n. 88 (p. 325) deserves full quotation: ‘My analysis of Paul’s use of reconciliation language supports the position that 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 is neither a digression nor part of an originally independent letter sent to Corinth. This important unit functions to undergird his efforts to reconcile the Corinthians to himself and is a crucial component of his appeal to them for reconciliation.’ I confess that I almost leapt for joy when I read this.
45. I have suggested elsewhere that Paul makes use of syntactic anacolouthia for stylistic purposes in places of high tension. One excellent example is the way Rom. 8:3a leads up to 8:3b: ‘What was impossible for the law . . . : God sent his own son’ etc. Another example, which is closer to 2 Cor. 6:3–10, is Rom. 12:6–9, where verses 6–8 lead up, I take it, to the summarizing point in verse

9. (Cf. Engberg-Pedersen 2006a: 164–5. Berding 2006 does not consider this possibility at all. It is based on the *δε* at the beginning of 12:6, which Berding unsuccessfully attempts to get around, 437–8.) 2 Cor. 6:3–10 is the most striking example of this use of ‘anacolouthic crescendo’. When one has read (or heard) the long list of participles and prepositional phrases in 6:3–10, 6:11 comes with tremendous force *because* of the logical stop or ‘hole’ just before it.
46. *Χωρήσατε ἡμᾶς*.
47. The classic, summarizing discussion of the arguments for and against finding 6:14–7:1 in its proper place is Bieringer 1994*b*, who favours the present position. In a more general discussion of introductory questions to 2 Corinthians (Engberg-Pedersen 1996), I ended up (somewhat to my surprise) finding very good reasons for the same view. For a thorough discussion to the same effect, see Thrall 1994: 25–36. A recent restatement of the opposite view (that 6:14–7:1 is misplaced) is Schmeller 2006.
48. In discussing the meaning of Paul’s warning against ‘defilement of flesh and pneuma’, Furnish 1984: 365, states that ‘*spirit* is used anthropologically, and the combination *flesh and spirit* refers either to the totality of human existence or to its outward and inward aspects’. I think it makes better sense to see Paul as, in effect, warning against the kind of ‘defilement of the flesh’ he has described in 1 Corinthians 5, which precisely risked defiling the pneuma itself. And here the pneuma is definitely not just an ‘anthropological’ ‘spirit’, but *the* pneuma itself.
49. Contrast with this Hubbard 2002, who argues that the ‘new creation’ should be understood ‘not in terms of an *ontological transformation*, but in terms of a *pneumatological restoration*’, where the point is that ‘the Spirit is not an impersonal force whose irresistible will compels obedience, but a personal being... *whose promptings can be resisted*’ (235, his italics). This account draws on several contrasts (ontology/pneumatology; impersonal/ personal; compulsion/freedom) that I have found to be spurious.
50. The various issues with regard to 5:5 are extensively discussed by Thiselton 2000: 395–400, who (like Fee 1987: 208–13) rejects the possibility that the ‘destruction of his flesh’ refers to the delinquent’s physical death. However, is it in fact clear that there are two alternatives here (expulsion and death)? If a person is expelled from the congregation and left outside in the satanic world of *sarx*, then he will in fact literally die at one point or another as opposed to obtaining eternal life through the pneuma. As Phil. 3:19 has it, the end of those who ‘think earthly things’ is destruction (Greek: *apōleia*, from the same verbal root as the ‘destruction’, Greek: *olethros*, of 1 Cor. 5:5).
51. Thiselton 2000: 397 ends up accepting this possibility. One thing that recommends this view is the fact that the pneuma is hardly very strongly individualized. There is not much point to speaking of the pneuma as ‘my pneuma’ in the sense of ‘my own pneuma’.

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The Bibliography lists works that are quoted in the book. It also contains a number of unquoted works from which I have learnt or against which I have tested my own views. The fact that a given work is not actually quoted does not, of course, imply any adverse opinion on its quality or importance. In this way it is hoped that the bibliography may function as a helpful tool of further research.

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