

Lukács

*The Ontology
of Social Being
1. Hegel*

**HEGEL'S FALSE AND HIS
GENUINE ONTOLOGY**

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ONTOLOGY

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

This text forms the third chapter of Part One of Lukács' work *Toward the Ontology of Social Being*. It is taken from a manuscript that was corrected by the author himself, though not finally prepared for publication. The footnotes are Lukács' own, although references to German-language works have generally been replaced by the appropriate references to the standard English translations. A contents list for the *Ontology* as a whole can be found at the end of this volume.

The English Hegel vocabulary is not completely standardized, and so in quoting some translations I have inserted the original term. The translation of Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' also uses the more modern 'Concept' for *Begriff*, rather than the traditional but slightly antiquated 'Notion'. Another well-known problem for translators is of course *Aufheben*; I have occasionally used the rather grotesque 'sublation', but whenever the context was clear have preferred the straightforward 'abolition', assuming that English readers today are sufficiently familiar with Hegelian ideas to understand automatically the secondary sense of 'preservation' and 'raising to a new level'.

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1. *Hegel's Dialectic 'amid the manure of contradictions'*

Classical German Philosophy exhibits a certain development, running from Kant's theoretical rejection of ontology to the fully evolved ontology of Hegel. Certainly, this rejection was never something absolute, as is shown by the fact that Kant's moral practice already leads into the realm of ontology. In Fichte's philosophy, this principle was erected into the sole foundation of true reality, the nature of this being conceived as created by active reason and as identical with it. At this point classical German philosophy took up once again the ontological problem of the Enlightenment, though of course between the two stood the abyss of the latter's realization by the French revolution. We can only speak of a continuation of the Enlightenment in so far as the ontological omnipotence of reason once more came to constitute the centre point of the philosophical problematic. It is impossible to understand Hegelian philosophy save in relation to this dual demarcation: the domination and ontological priority of reason, in a world that had been shaped by the French revolution, more specifically by its differently toned Napoleonic realization. The realization of the revolution in this form confronted all Europe with the problem of the developing bourgeois society and its immanent contradictions, in the form of a new reality as against which the Enlightenment's realm of reason, the centre of its philosophical thought, could not but directly break down.

The simplest and most direct reaction to this new situation was to deny the ontological relevance of reason altogether. In replacing reason with irrationalism, the Romantics repudiated the present state of affairs in the world, with its contradictory character, and sought a way back to the past, supposedly a realm of true and still uncontradictory harmony. Thinkers who conceived the new-style present as transitional towards a genuine realm of reason that would overcome the present contradictions represented a different reaction; for example Fichte, who considered his own period as an 'age of complete wickedness', beyond which however shone the future image of the genuine realm of reason. (The great utopians similarly sought, through in completely different ways, an overall pattern of social history that proceeded from the contradictions of the post-revolutionary present and indicated the real overcoming of these contradictions as a future perspective.) Hegel's special position between these two extremes consists in the fact that he sought to demonstrate philosophically the presence of a realm of reason in the present itself, which led to contradiction emerging as the central category in his thought, ontologically as well as logically and epistemologically. Hegel was in no way the first conscious dialectician among the great philosophers. But he was the first since Heraclitus for whom contradiction formed the ultimate ontological principle; and not just something that had somehow or other to be overcome, as was still the case with Schelling's 'intellectual conception'. The foundations of Hegel's thought are thus contradiction as the basis of philosophy, combined with the real present as the realization of reason. The combination of the two has the result that in Hegel logic and ontology grow together with a formerly unknown intimacy and intensity.

This gave rise to the appearance, which for a long while dominated the generally prevailing view of Hegel, that his philosophy had achieved a unification of reason and reality

that had never been previously attained and was quite non-problematic; it is sufficient to recall the widespread idea of his panlogism. On closer consideration this unity, whether it is fascinating or repellent, breaks down, a unity which Marxism criticized from its inception as an opposition of system and method, turning back 'onto its feet' in a materialistic sense Hegel's idealism that was standing 'on its head.' If Hegel is to be effective today as a living force in philosophical thought and in the real world, it is necessary to proceed further along the path that the Marxist classics began. We must treat Hegel as Marx himself treated Ricardo: 'With the master what is new and significant develops vigorously amid the "manure" of contradictions out of the contradictory phenomena.' This 'manure of contradictions' makes its first appearance in Hegel as knowledge of the contradictory character of the present, not just as a problem of thought, but equally as a problem of the reality itself; as a problem, however, which, primarily ontological, points far beyond the present, in so far as it is conceived as the dynamic basis of reality as a whole, hence the foundation not only of reality but also of any rational ontological thought about this. Thus the penetrating emergence of contradiction in his own time was henceforth for Hegel the culmination of a dialectical process starting from inorganic nature and pressing forward, via life and society, to this summit.

This already gives us the first moment of this 'manure of contradictions'. The dynamic of dialectical contradictions is not simply a general becoming, as with Heraclitus, nor a succession of stages in the comprehension of the world in thought, as with Cusanus, but rather—if we leave aside the internally inconsistent attempts of the young Schelling—the first unification of dialectical sequence and real historicity. In this way alone, the dialectic already obtains an ontological importance, as the real vehicle of history, which it could never have had before. Here again a new moment of the

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'manure of contradictions' immediately surfaces within the contradictory reason of this philosophy: the focus on the present as the actually attained realm of reason, on the one hand ejects from the dialectic all—necessarily subjective—elements (such as in Fourier), and underlines its objectively ontological character. On the other hand, the same conception conceals within it a deep and insoluble contradiction: the present can only acquire a genuine ontological foundation as the bridge between past and future; but if the present is the real fulfilment of the inherent potentialities of the dialectic, then this process must come to an end in its fulfilment, and as a consequence of its being fulfilled, and what was up till now the ontological motor of reality itself must abandon the specific forward movement directed towards its intrinsic enrichment, and become a mere moment of a self-reproduction. Now it is clear on the one hand that individual processes of this kind do exist, even if always in a relative manner; both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes of life have a character that is to a large extent similar, if not absolutely so. But it is just as certain on the other hand that the tendencies that govern the existence of individual patterns can in no way just be given a generalized validity for the overall process of reality as a whole.

This dilemma, and the attempt to give it a definite and apodictic solution, necessarily arises continuously in the philosophy of history; it gives rise, for example, to the most varied utopian conceptions, whether these are directed forwards or backwards in time. Of course the antinomies involved in responding to this dilemma are neither homogenous nor equivalent. Utopias that are aimed at re-establishing a past state of affairs must necessarily have an essentially irrationalist character—unless the backward orientation is simply due to imagination, to a misunderstanding of its own basic intentions, as was the case with the ostensible resuscitation of antiquity in the Renaissance era.

If these utopias aim at reviving the past, no matter how deliberate or otherwise this might be, they have to deny the ontological irreversibility of time and hence find themselves right from the start in opposition to any rational ontology. If the 'organic' is taken as a model, as is generally the case with romantic efforts, this contradiction becomes still more acute, since organic development is structured in a most significant manner by the irreversibility of time, and so the two basic ontological principles come into an insolubly antinomic relationship with one another. Irrationalism, as a world view that arises out of this, can only overcome these antinomies in a sham-dialectical and sophistic way; its campaign against reason is precisely designed to make insoluble contradictions of this kind vanish, and to validate now this, now that conception in a completely arbitrary manner.

The Enlightenment ideas of the realm of reason are far more important, both in a general philosophical sense and for understanding Hegel's own basic conception. For the Enlightenment, reason was the ultimate principle of the being and becoming of nature and society. The task of philosophy is to discover and elaborate this principle, so that society will correspond to the eternal and unchanging laws of nature. The practical and actual coincidence of an intrinsically identical nature and reason in the social life of man thus becomes a future demand, and not an ontological characteristic of the present. (The Enlightenment is precisely a philosophy of preparation for the French revolution, not, as with Hegel, a philosophy of its consequences.) Here too, however, there emerges an antinomy that is insoluble on this basis: given the omnipotence of nature, how could man and society ever have departed from it?

This antinomy discloses the ontological ambiguity of the Enlightenment's concept of nature. On the one hand, nature was conceived in the sense of the great development of the

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natural sciences since Galileo and Newton, as purely objective, material, autonomous and law-like, thus providing a secure and firm ontological basis for a world view which radically expelled all teleological and ultimately anthropomorphic conceptions that had been introduced into the study of nature; this managed to put theory on a solid ontological foundation, even if the image of nature was still essentially based on mechanistic principles. On the other hand, however, no ontology of social being could be directly deduced from this conception of nature. In so far as the Enlightenment, basing itself on such great forerunners as Hobbes and Spinoza, still sought at any price to construct a unified ontology of nature and society, its concept of nature suddenly tended to get transformed from the spontaneously clear ontology of Galileo and Newton into a value concept. (This tradition of amalgamation stretches right back into late antiquity.) The unconscious simultaneous use of these mutually exclusive methodologies, whose contradictory character is further reinforced by the fact that the concept of nature as value is not just based on a subjective 'ought', but rather on a similarly spontaneous objective ontology of social being, is responsible for the deepest discrepancies in the Enlightenment world view: first and foremost, the inevitable though unconscious transition from the materialist treatment of nature to an idealist treatment of society and history. The fact that the rational egoism of Enlightenment ethics seems to be a continuation of the objectively materialist (mechanically materialist) conception of nature, and that it actually does contain elements of a materialist doctrine of society, in no way reduces this contradiction; it even deepens it.

It should not be forgotten in this conception that regardless of all these insoluble antinomies, the philosophy of the Enlightenment is still a continuation and extension of those tendencies that, ever since the Renaissance, set out to

construct a this-sided and unified ontology to supplant the former transcendent, teleological and theological one. Behind this project is the great idea that the ontology of social being can only be constructed on the basis of an ontology of nature. The Enlightenment, like all its precursors, came to grief when it conceived the foundation of the former on the latter in too unitary, too homogenous and too direct a manner, and did not manage to grasp the ontological principle of qualitative difference within ultimate unity. The ontological gap within the concept of nature is no more than the mode of appearance of the situation that it is impossible to construct a consistent ontology without understanding this principle of distinction within unity. It is apparent that the rigid and dogmatic unity of the mechanical materialism dominant at that time is most inapposite to this differentiation. Diderot's important leads in the direction of a real dialectic within social being arise, from the standpoint of his consciously proclaimed materialism, only *per nefas*, as it were, and if Rousseau discovered certain essential moments of the social dialectic, particularly the reasons for and the dynamic necessity of the departure from nature, he therewith consciously broke away from the materialist ontology of the time, in so far as nature as the central category of the social and humanist 'ought' is completely cut loose from the materialist ontology of nature, and made into the focal point of an idealist philosophy of history, in a very contradictory fashion, but thus all the more effectively.

It is not the place here to pursue this series of effects, either in connection with the Marat-Robespierre type of Jacobins in the French Revolution or in the course of the German Enlightenment with Herder or Kant. It is simply that the reference was unavoidable here, as the Hegelian theory of nature and history, precisely because it undertook to illuminate the post-revolutionary world in an anti-romantic manner, had unavoidably to link itself up with this

problematic. We do not intend to investigate here how far Hegel's internal debates with Rousseau are mediated via Herder and Kant; we know however the decisive significance given to Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew* as an illustration of the pre-revolutionary mentality, in the *Phenomenology of Mind*. Hegel's polemic against Reinhold in *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems*, moreover, shows that in his youth he judged French materialism (especially Holbach) quite differently, and from a much broader historical perspective, than did German idealism in general. While the latter saw French materialism as a 'mental confusion that is not indigenous to Germany', Hegel considered the French Enlightenment and German idealism to be parallel tendencies, even if they took very different forms as a result of the 'locality of culture'; this meant that the French form 'appears in the local principle of the objective', whereas in Germany, 'it establishes itself in the form of the subjective. . . frequently without speculation.'² The latter remark shows that Hegel did not ascribe the German idealism of the time any dialectical superiority over French materialism; this superiority he found only in his own philosophy, and—at that time—in that of Schelling. He examined this antithesis between the two national developments, and recognized in both a similar conditioning by the national developments of the time. The reason we have had to mention all this is so that the connection between Hegel's problematic and the Enlightenment as a whole will be clearly visible, on the decisive questions. The completely new problems and solutions arise from the contrast between a pre-revolutionary and a post-revolutionary situation.

We shall be able to discuss Hegel's ontology of nature only later, in a wider connection. All that has to be mentioned here is that while this is given an essentially idealist cast, it has nothing in common with the modern fulfillments of Cardinal Bellarmini's demands, or with the Kantian philosophy

of nature based on the antithesis of phenomenon and thing-in-itself. Nature as a whole, for Hegel, has the same non-anthropomorphic objectivity as it has for the great philosophers of the 17th century. In fact it is nature, in its integral being-in-itself, that is to provide both ontological preparation and basis for the development of man, society, and history. As we shall see, Hegel thus aims to develop an ultimately unitary ontology for nature and history, in which nature provides a mute and purpose-less basis and prehistory for human society. In this respect, he maintains the great progressive traditions of the modern era, as last expressed by the Enlightenment before him. But Hegel goes further, in so far as nature only serves for him as a mere basis and prehistory; the dialectic of history certainly develops directly out of nature, but it exhibits so many qualitatively new categories, relations and laws that it can only be derived from nature in a dialectical and genetic sense, and in its content—hence also in the essential forms of this—goes far beyond nature and distinguishes itself qualitatively from it. The ambiguity of nature, interpreted as a value concept in order to serve as a model, is absent from Hegel's world view, which thus represents an important ontological step forward from the Enlightenment position. (We shall examine later how far the inevitable antinomies in Hegel's conception, even in the field of natural ontology, contain in their own specific manner regressive inconsistencies.) The progress is a decisive one for all that, simply because Hegel's overall philosophy is more vigorously and consistently oriented towards society and history than is that of the Enlightenment, which means moreover that the removal of the ambiguity between ontological being and social and moral 'ought' is of the greatest importance for the clarification of the key problems.

We have already noted that Hegel's philosophy sought to fulfil itself in the adequate comprehension of its own historic present. This led not only to the disappearance of the

ambiguous natural 'ought', but also to a very critical relationship to an 'ought' of any kind. Hegel rejected any kind of priority of the 'ought' over the 'is'. This does not just give his treatment of society and history an imposing objectivity, superior to mere wishes and desires. The new ontology is already expressed in this, the ontology whose adequate comprehension is the project that charges Hegel's whole thought: i.e. the central and top-most position of reality in the whole system of categories, the ontological superiority of the facticity of the real world to all other categories, whether subjective or objective. It is not the least of Hegel's magnitude as a thinker that he occasionally recognized this ontological problem in an extremely clear manner, and sought to grasp it in its full consequences. The fact that he found only contradictory and often extremely inconsistent solutions, leading to irresolvable antimonies, is similarly connected with the way that his philosophy of history is oriented towards the present, in strict opposition to both past and future. The dialectical criticism of the 'ought' thus forms, as it were, a kind of preliminary skirmish to this decisive battle for an ontology contemporary with the present. This struggle over the meaning of the 'ought' is part of Hegel's life-long polemic against Kant. For Kant, it is exclusively the moral 'ought' that gives man's ontological position a true (transcendental) reality. Only by fulfilling the categorical imperative, as an unconditional and abstract 'ought', can man raise himself above the world of phenomena, which in his theory is insuperably given, and relate himself to the (transcendental) reality as *homo noumenos*. For Hegel, however, the whole of morality is simply a part of human practice which leads on to a more genuine ethics, and the only real significance of the 'ought' is in so far as it expresses a discrepancy between the human will and 'anything that is'; in the ethical sphere the will becomes identical with its concept, and the central position of the 'ought' is thus overcome, even in the world of

practice.³ We will only be able to deal adequately with the profound correctness of this position, as well as with the equally profound questions it raises, in our own Ethics.

What is already evident at this stage is that both what is correct in Hegel's philosophy, as well as what is questionable, is related to the central position of the present in his ontology. When that which exists in itself in the present takes a form appropriate to the ethical sphere, then the ontological distance between the subject of practice and its essence is abolished, and hence also the 'ought', which means that this is overcome both objectively and for the subject. But is the central position that Hegel gives the present an ontologically tenable one? We know that ever since the dissolution of Hegelianism placed the systematic criticism of his results and methods on the agenda, this question was predominantly posed in terms of the formulation: 'the end of history'. In the criticism made of Hegel on this question, which as we shall see, is essentially justified, a certain misunderstanding frequently arises, in so far as Hegel naturally understood neither the present nor its ultimate character in a literal sense—which would be absurd. It is sufficient to indicate that, in a letter of 1821 to Uexküll, for example, he dealt in detail with the extraordinary future prospects open to Russia, to see that he did not envisage any fixed end to history.⁴ It is clear for all that, however, that in his conception of history, society had become adequate to its idea in his own time, which meant that a fundamental progress beyond this point had to be shown to be logically impossible.

This position rests on two important ontological assumptions. Firstly, that history does not just consist of the directly teleological acts of individuals and groups of men, which as it stands is completely correct; that in teleological projects of this kind something else also arises on top of what is aimed at in the individual and collective acts, a position which is also

an important and in many respects new discovery of Hegel's; but that the overall process as such is also called upon to realize a teleological goal, and that this had already essentially been attained in Hegel's own time. This latter teleology brings Hegel's theory of history back among the old theodictic conceptions; as we shall see on a number of occasions, Hegel's work exhibits path-breaking and new ideas in particulars, while the whole frequently fails to depart from the ground of the superseded old ideas. Secondly, and closely related to the first assumption, this coincidence of fulfilled idea and historical present is founded methodologically on a logic. The criterion for the fulfilment of the idea in the present is not based on any kind of revelation, but on the special character of the Hegelian logic. The latter is right from the beginning a matter of ontology, i.e. not only do the individual logical categories stake the claim to be ultimately identical with real existence, but their combination and succession, and their hierarchical order, are also supposed to correspond exactly to the ontological composition of reality. We shall later return in more detail to the general problem of this relationship of logic and ontology, which is a basic question of Hegel's system and method; here we must simply indicate that the whole plan of Hegel's logic is conceived in such a way that its culmination in the Idea does not represent a precisely definable point so much as a surface on which substantial movement is at times possible, without this level, domain, etc. being abandoned. In his so-called 'pure' logic Hegel deals with the different stages in the path to the Idea (being, essence, notion), distinguishes them from each other according to their structure, and arrives at the following determination of the logical-ontological world of the notion: 'The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other.'⁵ At this point the parallelism between logical and historical ontology is readily apparent: thus the coincidence

of Idea and present does not simply mean for Hegel a denial of movement *tout court*, but simply its reduction to shifts within a system which is essentially no longer decisively changeable.

Of course this does not mean that the antinomy in the conception of the end of history is thereby resolved. Its sharp and insoluble character is not even attenuated, as can be seen if we consider that Hegel is aiming here at a socio-ontological determination of the present, and seeking to give this a philosophical formulation supported by the work of significant historians. What is involved here is that in a general ontological sense, and thus also in the ontology of nature in particular, the present, taken in the strong sense of the term, can be nothing more than a vanishing transition-point, at the same time posited and abolished, between the future and the past. The elementary correctness of this conception of time is shown in science by the fact that an ever more exact measurement of time is necessary in order to grasp phenomena. But this is only the consequence of the correct conception of the ontological nature of time held by 'naive realism'; the measuring (as opposed to what is to be measured) remains a category of knowledge which leaves the being of time in itself completely undisturbed. It goes without saying that this process of measuring, like every other knowledge, arises on the basis of social being, and it assumes a great importance even for the specific phenomena of this sphere. It would be impossible, however, to grasp the totality of socio-historical appearances at a particular present by means of measurements of this kind. Hegel himself characterized the complex of space, time, matter and motion as the primary reality for the philosophy of nature. He remarks that 'Matter is what is real in Space and Time. But these, being abstract, must present themselves here as the First. . .', which already shows an inkling of the correct relationship between complexes and their elements.⁶

In the far more complicated relationships of social historical patterns, this abstraction must appear antithetically and closely linked with movement, with the dynamic change in the forms themselves at a higher level. Since the practically relevant mode of appearance depends on the structure of the movement and what is moved, both in its immediacy and in all mediate forms, the present can only have a relative permanence from the standpoint of the ontology of social being, as a state in which this structure does not undergo or does not seem to undergo, any essential and perceptible changes. The present in the historical sense can thus extend to an entire period, an epoch even, and there can be no doubt that Hegel understood the present in this sense, even if he never directly expressed it in so many words. This change in significance encompasses both future and past in the social being. We can speak in a meaningful sense of nuclei of the future and residues of the past in a present of this kind, and ascribe these a real practical significance. But it should never be forgotten that what is involved here are specific forms of objectivity of social being, which ontologically are ultimately indissolubly based, no matter how mediated they may be, on the actual passage of time. Nature already provides a certain analogy. Forms may have a history with epochs and periods as we can see for example in geology, and as can possibly be ascertained also in astronomy. Here, too, these periods and epochs are related to structural transformations and structural stabilities of matter and motion. Yet the specific accentuation of the present does not arise in this connection. This is the ontological result in social being of the fact that men behave differently as a result of a structural situation or change, and hence actually react back on the basis of their practice. If this relationship to time itself as a mediated component of such structures is arbitrarily severed in thought, then we get the grotesque modern concepts of time whose nature, from Bergson through to Heidegger, we have already explained

earlier. In fact, the starting-point of these concepts is no longer simply these socio-historical transformations of objective time, which naturally already contain subjective components, but rather their further (and more highly subjective) application to the personal life of individuals. If a concept of time of this kind is now put forward as ontologically proper and genuine, then all objective characteristics of time are necessarily stood on their head.

With all this, a few philosophical aspects of the Hegelian convergence of achieved Idea and present time should have been briefly explained. The conception is itself socio-historically conditioned, and the contradiction involved in this basis (combined with Hegel's internally contradictory relationship to it) is what forms the real foundation of the antinomies that emerge here. What is involved is the condition of Germany in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic period. The philosophy of history of the *Phenomenology of Mind* leads from the beginnings, via the Enlightenment and the French revolution, to the Germany of classical poetry and philosophy, of Goethe and Hegel. The chapter that concludes the historical development proper (which is followed by the mental recapitulation of the whole in 're-collection'), is a description of how the French revolution and its Napoleonic sequel were transformed into spirit on German soil. It is this problem that gives rise to the ideal historic coincidence, unification and self-attainment of the Idea, and not only do we have here the linguistic brilliance of this first great work, but simultaneously also the reflection of what seemed to be a period of great upsurge that was under way, guided by the 'world soul' whom Hegel had seen on horseback in Jena, and who seemed called upon to sweep away the entire German wretchedness. In the *Science of Logic* these ideas had already lost much of their lustre and become prosaic, and they became ever more prosaic, in parallel with how Hegel had to replace Napoleon by Friedrich Wilhelm II in the equation: Idea = present. But as

Hegel became personally ever more conservative—though he was certainly never the official philosopher of the Prussian state that later liberalism accused him of being—his theory of history came into painful opposition with real history. At the time of the July revolution he wrote of ‘a crisis in which everything that would otherwise have been valid seems to have been put in question.’ The enthusiasm of one of his closest disciples, Eduard Gans, for the July revolution, began the dissolution of Hegelianism.

This particular problem, which of course was to be extremely important for the fate of Hegel’s philosophy, already indicates the character of its intrinsic contradictions. It shows that it is not possible to view individual assertions, methodological positions, etc. of Hegel’s as correct, and other as untenable. The ‘living’ and the ‘dead’ in his system cannot be clearly separated; but what is right in Hegel and what is wrong are rather inseparably entwined together and united. Their separation, to show where his thought points the way to future philosophy and where it dies out in a blind alley, must be accomplished independently, as it were, for each particular major problem. This is already the case in the question of the convergence of Idea and present, which we have already begun to deal with. Engels’ criticism of the opposition between system and method provides a correct indication as to how that separation is to be effected in this case. From the standpoint of Hegel’s system, the present displays an ideal and logical harmony of society and state, and the result of this in moral practice is that the abstract ‘ought’ loses all sense of authenticity, since the present reality appears reconciled with the Idea. Methodologically, however, i.e. from the standpoint of the inherent dialectic of the basic components of this harmony, we are faced with an insoluble tangle of irreconcilable contradictions. These contradictions directly originate from one of the most progressive aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. He was the first significant thinker who, at

the turn of the nineteenth century, not only incorporated the results of classical English economics—from Steuart and Smith to Ricardo—in his philosophy of history, but made the objectivities and relationships this had discovered into organic components of his dialectic. Hegel thus exhibits a more or less clear conception of the importance of the structure and dynamic of modern bourgeois or civil society as the basis of what it is possible to say about the present in the historic sense. The fact that Hegel remained behind his forerunners in his concrete grasp of the phenomena, and even more so behind the great utopians, does not fundamentally change this state of affairs, the less so, in so far as Hegel was alone in his ability to draw the philosophical consequences of these discoveries. (Fourier certainly did the same thing, but his generalizations are so eccentric, and so sharply removed from the general European development of the theory of categories, that they have so far remained quite without effect; a philosophical analysis and criticism of the categories in Fourier's economic and social conception of the present would be one of the most important tasks today for the history of nineteenth century philosophy.)

Hegel's conception of the present is thus based on the contradiction between civil society and state, and on the sublation of this contradiction. Here we are once more confronted with the same contradictoriness that we have already discussed, in a different, though related form. Hegel's point of departure is the realistic description of bourgeois society, whose dynamic he sees in the regularities that directly arise out of the accidents of individual behaviour; he correctly views this whole sphere as one of particularity, of relative universality in relation to the individuals.⁸ The universality of the bourgeois state now has to be developed out of the immanent dialectic of this sphere; Hegel himself says, and this much is correct: 'But in developing itself independently to totality, the principle of particularity passes

over into universality', though he immediately adds that 'only there does it attain its truth and the right to which its positive actuality is entitled.'⁹ This already indicates that the relationship of bourgeois society and bourgeois state is conceived in a one-sided and mechanical fashion as an absolute and ideal supremacy of the state. At first sight this would seem to be simply a historically conditioned limitation of Hegel's conception, for the classical economists themselves, although they grasped this real-world relationship far more adequately, were in no way aware of the historical character of their categories, but rather took these to be the sole forms corresponding to reason. In this respect the philosopher from what was economically a very backward country was superior to his economic masters. He saw clearly that this particularity which he took as the categorical characteristic of bourgeois society was a specific feature of the present era: to be precise, as the foundation and bearer of the contemporary social forms, in strict contrast to the antique *polis*, in which particularity 'appeared. . . as an invasion of ethical corruption and as the ultimate cause of that world's downfall.'¹⁰ The specific limitations of Hegel's conception are evident rather in the transition from civil society to the state, in the relationship of the former to the latter. The young Marx, long before he became a philosophical materialist, clearly saw this contradiction in the Hegelian system and expressed it as follows: 'He has based his argument on the assumption of the *separation* of civil society and the political state (a modern phenomenon) and has gone on to show it to be a *necessary moment of the Idea*, the absolute truth of Reason. . . He has opposed the absolutely universal interest of the state to the particular interests and needs of civil society. In a word: at every point he draws attention to the *conflict* between the state and civil society.' The other aspect of the antinomy is that 'he aims at *no separation of civil and political life*. . . He

makes the *Estates* into the expression of the *separation*, but simultaneously they are supposed to represent an identity—one which does not exist."¹¹

It would be superficial, and would contradict what is fundamental in Marx's criticism, to simply see in this an accommodation by Hegel to the Prussian state of his time. Economic life in particular, the basis of civil society, Hegel treats with a 'cynicism' reminiscent of Ricardo. As I have dealt with this question in detail in my book on Hegel,¹² a single quotation from the *Philosophy of Right* will have to suffice here: 'It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. its own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble.'¹³ The young Marx treated this question too in a purely objective fashion, proceeding from the central focus of Hegel's methodology. For this reason, it seems necessary to quote the most important aspects of Marx's train of thought at some length: 'The family and civil society make *themselves* into the state. They are the driving force. According to Hegel, however, they are *produced* by the real Idea; it is not the course of their own life that joins them together to comprise the state, but the life of the Idea which has distinguished them from itself. They are moreover the finite phase of this Idea; they are indebted for their existence to a mind other than their own; they are not self-determining but are instead determined by another; for this reason they are defined as "finitude", the "real Idea's" own *finite phase*. The goal of their existence is not that existence itself; instead the Idea divests itself of these its premises "in order to rise above its reality and become explicit as infinite real mind." In other words the political state cannot exist without the natural basis of the family and the artificial basis of civil society. These are its *sine qua non*; and yet the condition is posited as the conditioned, the producer as the product. . . The real becomes

a mere phenomenon, but the Idea has no content over and above this phenomenon. The Idea moreover, has no goal beyond the logical one to "become explicit as infinite real mind". In this paragraph we find set out the whole mystery of the *Philosophy of Right* and of Hegel's philosophy in general.' This has the following result for the construction of Hegel's system: 'Thus the transition does not result from the *particular* nature of the family etc., and the particular nature of the state, but from the *universal* relationship of *freedom* and *necessity*. We find exactly the same process at work in the *Logic* in the transition from the sphere of Essence to that of the Concept. In the *Philosophy of Nature*, the same transition can be observed from Inorganic nature to Life. It is always the same categories which are made to supply now one sphere and now another with a soul. The problem is merely to discover the appropriate abstract determinants to fit the individual concrete ones.' Marx's summarizes the whole problem as follows: 'The concern of philosophy is not the logic of the subject-matter but the subject-matter of logic. Logic does not provide a proof of the state but the state provides a proof of logic.'¹⁴

For today's reader, or even for one brought up on neo-Kantianism, Marx's language may appear very simple: the logic that Hegel developed was one that violated the facts instead of corresponding to them. The long prevalent prejudices against the dialectic, which have still not completely died out today, often find support in such premature and superficial arguments. The real situation is quite different, even if it is similarly clear and simple. Hegel's logic, in other words—and this is something which Marx took as so self-evident when he wrote the critical remarks quoted above that he did not waste words on it—is not a logic in the scholastic sense, not a formal logic, but rather an inseparable intellectual union of logic and ontology. On the one hand, as far as Hegel is concerned, the genuine ontological relation-

ships only find their adequate mental expression in the forms of logical categories, while on the other hand these logical categories are not conceived simply as determinations of thought, but must rather be understood as dynamic components of reality, as stages or steps along the road towards the self-attainment of Mind. Thus the fundamental antinomies which we have already come across, and which we shall also meet again, arise from the collision of two ontologies, which form an unrecognized presence in Hegel's system as consciously put forward, and act on one another in a number of ways. The basis of this confusion of two antithetical ontologies stems from the fact that both arise from the same concrete reality, as far as the history of philosophy is concerned. Hegel's central philosophical experience was that of the magnitude of the post-revolutionary reality. Just as the Enlightenment philosophers were deeply convinced that the transformation of the feudal-absolutist world would necessarily create a realm of reason, so Hegel was similarly convinced that this long dreamed-of ideal of the greatest minds was precisely beginning to be realized in his own present. As he wrote in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind*: 'It is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation.'¹⁵

But Hegel was never a dreamer, fantasist or project-maker, as were many of his celebrated contemporaries; he was a philosopher with a strong and comprehensive sense of reality, with an intensive hunger for genuine reality the like of which may well have not been seen in any thinker since Aristotle. There was scarcely a single field of reality or the science of reality that did not arouse his painstaking philosophical interest; while simultaneously with the appropriation of the

facts themselves it was their categorical constitution that formed the focal point of his attention. Thus as well as developing his comprehensive knowledge, he became ever more intensively aware of the contradictory structure and dynamic of all objects, relations and processes. The primary contradiction was that provided by the present itself: the French revolution and the industrial revolution in England, as well as the contradiction between both of these and the backward and parcellized Germany of the time, which was however already characterized by a violent mental upsurge. The attempt to grasp these various contradictory facts and tendencies in the unity of their facticity is what led to his logic of contradictions, which expressed itself—for the first time in the history of thought—in Hegel's intrinsically dynamic and process-like method, in the knowledge of a universal historicity moving in contradictions. This is what gave rise to the 'Bacchanalian revel'¹⁶ of concepts so frequently mentioned, behind which there is always something profoundly rational at work: the movement in thought, in notion, judgement and syllogism is only the mental side of the intensive infinity of any object, relation or process. The process character of thought is only the consequence of the process character of all reality. Scientific and philosophical knowledge is no more than 'abandonment to the very life of the object.'¹⁷ The reason for this is that it is never 'the mere result [that is] attained in the concrete whole itself, but the result along with the process of arriving at it. . . the naked result is the corpse of the system which has left its guiding tendency behind it.'¹⁸ This represents a great step forward in the direction of a completely new ontology. True reality appears here as a concrete becoming, and genesis is the ontological derivation of any objectivity, without which living precondition this would inevitably remain incomprehensible as a deformed rigidity. The great concluding work of Hegel's early development, the *Phenomenology*, reveals these

ideas on all sides. Engels already correctly remarked that Hegel was the first to raise to the conceptual level the dynamic unity of man's ontogenetic and phylogenetic development.¹⁹ Since we shall concern ourselves in detail in the second section with the central questions of Hegel's new ontology, these remarks can suffice here as an illustration of this internal tendency in Hegel's philosophizing.

It would be an erroneous exaggeration to maintain that what we have described as Hegel's second ontology arose independent of the first mentioned and remained internally separate. On the contrary, both arose, materially and genetically, and indeed socially as well as conceptually, from the same source, and they stand in relation to each other as the mental conquest and the unification of this reality, precisely by explanation of how each of its objective forms was genetically produced through the dynamic and dialectical process of historical development. The point of departure, once again, is Hegel's basic problem, how the world's post-revolutionary present could be the realization of the realm of reason, and had to be so even in its real contradictoriness. Here too a major idea is at work, a significant contemporary extension of the best that the Enlightenment had striven for and constructed in its own thought. We have already seen that Hegel abandoned the Enlightenment's disjointed basic idea of the unity of reason and nature, without sacrificing its most important aspect, i.e. that the realm of reason is the original product of men themselves, in their real activity. The fact that Hegel replaced the rational egoism that the Enlightenment had put in a central position—which moreover remained stuck in economic action, which precisely provided the model for this conception—with the human passions (here, too, not without a link with the Enlightenment), in no way abolished this human this-sidedness, but rather made it broader, deeper and more concrete. 'We assert then that

nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors; and—if interest be called passion. . . we may affirm absolutely that *nothing great in the World* has been accomplished without *passion*.²⁰ The breadth, scope and profundity of mankind that is indicated here is something that the Enlightenment already strove for, although it did not generally attain it and occasionally gave it a purely sophistic foundation; even with Hegel, this attempt remains simply an approximation, and does not undergo an all-round development, particularly from the intensive and internal aspect. Hegel's attempt to conceive and depict the world of man as this-sided and self-created was none-the-less the most far-reaching advance so far undertaken in this direction.

What we refer to as Hegel's second ontology also has its roots in this view of the world. What nature with all its conflicts was for the Enlightenment, mind or spirit [*Geist*] (the Idea, reason) is for Hegel, similarly with all its internal contradictions. These are above all what Hegel saw as the moving and moved contradictions of the genesis of man himself in the process of creating and comprehending his world, i.e. conceptions of the contradictions of the process itself, not contradictions in its conception. (We shall come on to discuss the latter.) In the *Phenomenology* Hegel depicts the process of the rise of human consciousness out of the interaction between man's inherent predisposition and the environment that is in part naturally given and in part created by his own activity; how consciousness develops to the stage of self-consciousness as a result of similar interconnections of a higher order, and how this process of human development gives rise to mind as the determining principle of essential human specificity. Together with mind, and thus of course also with the path leading to it and the dialectical principles that constitute it, the other unintended contradictions of Hegel's ontological orientation also emerge: internal contradictions in the conception of mind itself.

The root of this contradiction lies in the relation between man and society. Hegel does not depart from the objective truth simply because he seeks to give man an ontologically autonomous form as mind, for social being—whatever it may be in itself—does actually have an existence which is independent of the individual consciousness of particular men, and has a high level of autonomously determining and determined dynamic in relation to the individual. But this does not change the fact that the movement of this dynamic is a specific synthesis of individual acts and passions, etc., for although these directly proceed (but only directly!) from the individual consciousness, their causes and results are still very clearly distinct from what the individual himself thought, felt or intended. If this structure is already present in the case of the individual consciousness, which can only exist in a social context, it is present in a qualitatively more intense manner where various individual acts are inseparably entwined together to produce a social movement, no matter whether they are individually intended to support each other or whether they are directed against one another. Hence it is completely justifiable, from the standpoint of an ontology of social being, to ascribe this totality, this dynamic and contradictory relationship of individual acts, a being *sui generis*.

In the *Phenomenology*, in particular, Hegel is completely clear as to this inseparable interconnection between the individual and society: 'This substance [spirit] is likewise the universal product, wrought and created by the action of each and all, and constituting their unity and likeness and identity of meaning; for it is self-existence, the self, action. *Qua* substance, spirit is unbending self-sameness, self-identity; but *qua* for-itself, self-existence and self-determined [*Fürsichsein*], its continuity is resolved into discrete elements, it is the self-sacrificing soul of goodness, the benevolent essential nature in which each fulfils his own special work, rends the continuum

of the universal substance, and takes his own share of it. This resolution of the essence into individual forms is just the aspect of the separate action and the separate self of all the several individuals; it is the moving soul of the ethical substance, the resultant universal spiritual being. Just because this substance is a being resolved in the self, it is not a lifeless essence, but actual and alive."²¹ The fact that its self-supported substantiality already receives a certain over-emphasis here, does still not destroy the correct proportions of the social form called mind. Hegel is also completely on the ground of the real world when he emphasizes the withdrawal of the immediacy of the natural relations that characterize animal life as the essential aspect of social being, of the participation of individual man in mind, in his *Philosophy of History*. 'Spirit is essentially the result of its own activity: its activity is the transcending of immediate, simple, unreflected existence—the negation of that existence, and the returning into itself."²² Of course, in the later development of the *Philosophy of History*, and particularly in the *Philosophy of Right*, the form of mind occasionally or even often receives a fetishized and rigidified stamp; it is severed from its dynamic connections with the activity of individuals, which however are genetically decisive, and becomes a self-consciousness which exists purely for itself, in which the specific components of the construction (in particular civil society) seem to be completely abolished in the universality of mind, and the conceptual dialectic of forms of self-supporting pure mind replaces the real dialectic of society and history.

If we now pose the question as to how such a rigidification and distortion of Hegel's historical dialectic came about, we come on to that complex of problems that we earlier described as Hegel's second ontology. The Enlightenment's principle of nature, which provided a basis for the relationships it depicted and for its whole system, no matter how full of internal contradictions it was, did not necessarily have

to violate the objectivities that formed the system, but the material impossibility of deriving social phenomena from this conception of nature most definitely had to lead to the (mechanical) materialism of this view of nature being transformed in the area of the social into an unconscious and hence philosophically unmastered idealism. The Hegelian Mind eliminated this difficulty, although only at the price of bringing to light whole new difficulties and contradictions. We shall deal only later with the questionable character of the ontological reversal this involved: while the Enlightenment had to proceed from (mechanical) materialism to idealism, classical German philosophy had to transpose even knowledge of nature into the philosophical language of idealism, in order to establish a homogeneous and unified picture of nature and society. Fichte and Schelling made the first significant attempts at such a philosophical systematization; what is immediately new in Hegel's attempted system is that he undertook to give the new ontology a logical basis. This is, as I have shown in detail elsewhere,²³ a new moment in classical German philosophy; Kant, Fichte and Schelling took over the formal logic handed down to them, even if with very different judgements of it, but they expressed what they had to say in the way of ontology in philosophical terms that were essentially independent of this logic; it was only with Hegel that logic, as newly fashioned by him in a dialectical form, became the bearer of the new ontology.

This tendency already decisively emerges at the very beginning of Hegel's work. In his defence of Schelling's philosophical tendency as against Fichte's, the first theoretical manifesto of objective idealism against the subjective idealism of Kant and Fichte, Hegel reaches back programmatically to Spinoza's conception.²⁴ Though he does not mention him by name, but only as 'an earlier philosopher', a proposition of Spinoza's assumes a decisive role in this polemic: "The order and connection of ideas" (of the subjective) "is the

same as the order and connection of things" (of the objective) Everything is only in *one* totality; the objective totality and the subjective totality, the system of nature and the system of intelligence is one and the very same; to a subjective determination there corresponds the very same objective determination."²⁵ This return to Spinoza was designed to reduce Kant's theory of knowledge to a mere episode in the history of thought. Naturally Spinoza's original position only contained the later problematic *in nuce*; the sublime dogmatic and static unity of the world was to imperatively determine its identity, with everything having its adequate thought. It was only with the Enlightenment's theory of mimesis that the subjective and objective moments decidedly branched away from one another, to be reunified epistemologically as the material and formal coincidence of the reflection with its real object. In so far as Hegel is attacking here Kant's theory of knowledge, he could not, as a modern idealist (the idealism of antiquity could still be combined with mimesis) put forward an express theory of mimesis against epistemological and ontological subjectivism of Kant and the Fichte, but had rather to mobilize against this the identity of subject and object, in a further extension of Schelling's path. 'If nature is only matter, and not subject and object, then no scientific construction of it is possible, for this requires that knower and known are one.'²⁶

With the identity of subject and object we have reached the point at which what we have called Hegel's second ontology with its questionable character: makes its appearance. For just as the Enlightenment's mechanical doctrine of mimesis was incapable of explaining the correct reflection in the subject of the objects that existed independent of him in the real world, so the theory of the identical subject and object is a philosophical myth, which has to violate the basic ontological facts to achieve its intended unification of subject and object. In making, at least provisionally, a harsh judgement

on this theory, we should not lose sight of its progressive side, which opened up new paths for knowledge. The reference to Spinoza was in fact no accident: the ultimate this-sidedness of the subject, its inseparable relationship to the real world of objects, and the rise of an adequate conception of the world from the interconnection of two this-sided realities, even though this was all expressed here in the form of a philosophical myth, is nevertheless far more strongly directed towards the objective reality than was Kant's epistemology of transcendental subjectivism, even though this permitted a practice of manipulation at the practical empirical level. The tragedy of classical German philosophy—in terms of the history of philosophy—and of Hegel in particular, is precisely that in the attempt to overcome both the mechanistic aspect of materialism and the transcendental subjectivity of Kantian idealism, it was forced into positing the identity of subject and object, thus to a position which was not only untenable in itself, from the standpoint of a realistic ontology, but which also belonged in many respects to a past and surpassed period, one in which the differentiation, to the point of anti-thesis, between materialism and idealism, had not yet so clearly developed as was the case since the Enlightenment.

This is one reason why Hegel's recourse to Spinoza was inevitably more questionable than was Spinoza's original thesis in his own time. But this became far more questionable in Hegel's own case, for various inter-related reasons. The first of these was that the identity of the order and combination of things and ideas, taken from Spinoza's static philosophy drafted in '*more geometrico*', was burdened with far more discrepancies than its original model when it received from Hegel a historical and dynamic character. The '*more geometrico*' cast an ontological twilight between reality and its reflection that was possible in Spinoza's period, particularly because the natural science of that time could see physical objectivities and their interconnections as far more 'geo-

metric' than was possible at a later date. Even if the physics of Hegel's time had not yet undergone a decisive transformation, the rise of a scientific chemistry, the discoveries in the area of biology, etc., had already considerably distanced the picture of nature from that of Spinoza's era. The contrast in the treatment of social phenomena was still more pronounced. The distinction between correct and incorrect, true and false, good and bad, etc., which in Spinoza was so clear, unambiguously logical and ethically based, acquired a more dynamic and historical character in the wake of the French revolution, and it was not the least of Hegel's achievements, as against his significant contemporaries, that he most decisively, and in the most comprehensive and profound manner, made this complex into a conscious problem. He might well appeal to Spinoza in the text that we quoted above, which still attests to a certain alliance with Schelling, and he might also take this proclaimed unity of subjectivity and objectivity as a general methodological point of departure; but already in this early text he had to proceed further towards an identity of subject and object, and enter a realm where the old twilight, in which the qualitative ontological heterogeneity between the object and its mimesis was imperceptible, vanished in the face of the dazzling illumination of a new and dynamic knowledge.

It is not the place here to present, even in the briefest way, the development of the identical subject-object and its internal necessity. Our task at the moment is simply to show what consequences this conception had for Hegel's ontology. It should immediately be noted that Hegel is even here far more cautious and realistic than was Schelling. While for Schelling, the difference between nature and the human world was that the identical subject-object was in the former the unconscious, and in the latter the conscious bearer of objectivity, its connections, movements, etc., Hegel did not recognize in nature any kind of effective subjective principle.

This is firstly a major step forward from Schelling, for it enables nature to be considered in its subject-free mode of existence, completely indifferent to any subjectivity—even if, as we shall see, on an ontologically illusory foundation. It follows from this, as far as the knowledge of nature is concerned, 'that we stand back from natural objects, leaving them as they are and adjusting ourselves to them.'²⁷ This gives rise, in contrast to the Romantic nature philosophers, to a conception of nature as a whole, and of the possibility and modality of natural knowledge, that could in no way pose a fundamental obstacle for the objective, disanthropomorphizing method, on any particular question of scientific research. (The question as to whether and how far Hegel himself carried this through at the level then possible lies outside the scope of this investigation, and outside the competence of the present author.) What is certain is simply that this basic conception just as little excludes a modern, natural-scientific treatment as does the Kantian, and with the important ontological distinction that for Kant the object of knowledge is simply the world of phenomena, while for Hegel it is intrinsic being itself.

Nature naturally receives the lowest place in the ontological hierarchy of the development of the identical subject-object to its self-attainment: 'Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of *otherness*. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is *external to itself*, Nature is not merely external in relation to this Idea (and to its subjective existence Spirit); the truth is rather that *externality* constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.'²⁸ As Hegel puts it in his *Science of Logic*, 'This is the impotence of nature, that it cannot adhere to and exhibit the strictness of the Notion and runs wild in this blind irrational [*begrifflos*] multiplicity.' This has very far-reaching consequences for the whole Hegelian conception of nature. Closely following on the passage quoted above, Hegel expresses

these very clearly and sharply: 'The manifold natural genera or species must not be esteemed as anything more than the capricious fancies of spirit in its representations. Both indeed show traces and inklings of the Notion on all sides, but do not present a faithful copy of it because they are the side of its free self-externality. The Notion is absolute power just because it can freely abandon its difference to the shape of self-subsistent diversity, outer necessity, contingency, caprice, opinion, which however must not be taken for more than the abstract aspect of *nothingness*.'²⁹ We cannot and do not intend to consider in more detail here the consequences of this starting-point of Hegel's philosophy of nature. It should simply be noted that it is the specific characteristic of this ontological determination of nature that his system requires that makes it impossible for Hegel to perceive and recognize the historicity of nature. Even though he was himself a path-breaking theorist of historicity in the field of society, even though the theory of evolution was already in the air and such contemporaries of Hegel as Goethe and Oken in Germany, Lamarck and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire in France, had already achieved much towards its establishment, Hegel himself not only remained oblivious to this question, but fundamentally rejected the problem as such. 'The way of evolution, which starts from the imperfect and formless, is as follows: at first there was the liquid element and aqueous forms of life, and from the water there evolved plants, polyps, molluscs, and finally fishes; then from the fishes were evolved the land animals, and finally from the land animals came man. This gradual alteration is called an explanation and understanding; it is a conception which comes from the Philosophy of Nature, and it still flourishes. But though this quantitative difference is of all theories the easiest to understand, it does not really explain anything at all.'³⁰

We have now arrived at one of the most important contradictions in Hegel's ontology, the characteristics of which, determined precisely by the place that nature holds in the extremely questionable hierarchy that thus arises, we shall return to shortly. First, as so often with Hegel, we have to indicate the ontologically healthy and correct obverse of his general conception of nature, even though the derivation and execution of this conception leads on the other hand into a labyrinth of irresolvable ontological antinomies. What we have in mind here are the consequences of such a conception of nature for man and for human activity. It was Epicurus, whom Hegel in many places wrongly and unjustifiably condemns, who first formulated the implications of this relationship towards nature for ethics. People who knew Hegel well have correctly understood and agreed with this side of his ontology of nature. As Heinrich Heine recalls in his *Confessions*, speaking of a conversation with Hegel: 'One fine, starry night we stood together at the window, and I, a young man of twenty-two, who had just eaten well and drunk coffee, spoke enthusiastically about the stars and referred to them as the abode of the blessed. The master, however, muttered to himself: "The stars, hm, hm! The stars are just a shiny leprosy on heaven." "For God's sake", I cried, "isn't there a happy place up there, where virtue can be rewarded after death?" He, however, looking fixedly at me with his pale eyes, said cuttingly: "So, you want some kind of tip for looking after your sick mother, or for not having poisoned your brother?" '31 Lafargue also recounts, in his recollections of Marx: 'I often heard him repeat the expression of Hegel, his youthful master in philosophy: "Even the criminal thought of a villain is greater and more sublime than all the wonders of heaven." '32 These were in no way just epigrams of Heine or Marx, but a general feeling of the time. Even the young Goethe has Prometheus say:

*Was haben diese Sterne droben
Für ein Recht an mich
Dass sie mich begaffen?^a*

and in his *'Harzreise im Winter'*:

*Hinter ihm schlagen
Die Sträucher zusammen,
Das Gras steht wieder auf. . .^b*

^a 'What right over me
Have these stars above,
That they should gape at me?'

^b 'The bushes close
Together behind him,
The grass stands up again. . .'

This ethical revival of Epicurus, which was with Hegel neither intended nor historically conscious, but for all that a theoretically pervasive tendency, brought to an end the intermediate period of pantheism in philosophy. The great ontological revolution of the Renaissance essentially destroyed the philosophical idea that the reason involved in human existence and action was the product of a religious transcendence. The basic tendency, however, with certain exceptions, was to replace a dogmatically fixed, religious world view by one that, although free-floating and open to the world, was still often semi-religious. It spontaneously happened that while the transcendent God disappeared from ontology, or at least faded to a complete non-objectivity, he was replaced, again with certain exceptions, by a *Deus sive natura*. When Schopenhauer mischievously but ingeniously called pantheism a polite atheism, he characterized the guiding tendency involved in it, even if only superficially. What appears as the 'deification' of nature, from Giordano Bruno

via Spinoza to Goethe, while it is, considered from the world-historical standpoint, a rearguard action of the religious world view, is at the same time a vanguard struggle for the new relation of man to nature. Despite its transitional character, or perhaps even because of this, it had its roots in a genuine and historically based view of the world. In a summary and simplified way one could say that what unites the otherwise so different pantheisms is the unconditional and happy recognition of the new relation to nature that arose with Copernicus and Galileo, together with a refusal to draw from this any kind of Pascalian conclusions as to the isolation of man in a strange and infinite universe. This is however far more here than a mere rejection of any panic induced by the new view of nature; pantheism is the great attempt to discover a human home in this strange cosmos, to reconcile humanism with the strange, non-human properties of the natural world. (Here, too, Goethe's *Prometheus* marks an important milestone.) Of course we can scarcely even indicate here the development of this tendency. It must be mentioned, however, as the charge of pantheism was often raised against Hegel, and he always took pains to defend himself against this. Rightly so, we believe. Hegel was not a pantheist in the sense of Goethe or the young Schelling. His conception of nature as the Idea in its otherness, i.e. of a nature ontologically estranged from the subject, excludes any form of pantheism and places Hegel's philosophy of nature in this respect on the side of an Epicurean materialism. This is of course only in its opposition to pantheism. We have already indicated the direct results of Hegel's conception of nature, and we shall see later the irresolvable antinomies that this contains as far as his position towards religion is concerned.

We have just described the Hegelian conception of nature as 'estranged', and thus emphasized its distinction from the view of nature held by the new science and by philosophical

materialism, as foreign and indifferent to any human standpoint. (That the greatest pantheists inclined towards such a conception in no way affects this conclusion, any more than the fact that the Hegelian conception in many ways leads to similar results.) The distinction between strangeness and estrangement is intended in a purely ontological sense. It arises from the dynamic and dialectical concretization of the identical subject-object in a process in which the substance is supposed to transform itself into subject. Hegel considers the essence of his system as 'grasping the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well'. 'The living substance. . . is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realized and actual solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite.' 'It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.'³³ This transformation of substance back into subject would be a mystical wonder if Hegel had really and consistently carried it through in an ontological sense. But Hegel was always far too cautious and realistic to do this. When he writes in the *Phenomenology* of the return of substance into subject, there can be no doubt that he has in mind the complete (absolute) knowledge of the substance by the subject, which—from a purely ontological standpoint—is not the same thing as the abstractly proclaimed theory. Hegel says: 'To begin with, therefore, it is only the abstract moments that belong to self-consciousness concerning the substance. But since these moments are pure activities and must move forward by their very nature, self-consciousness enriches itself till it has torn from consciousness the entire substance, and absorbed into itself the entire structure of the substance with all its constituent elements. . . produced these elements out of itself and thereby reinstated them once more

as objects of consciousness.³⁴

And the very alienation of self-consciousness restated here, when it is examined closer and more concretely, is similarly not a mere mystical ontological act, but also a problem within the realm of knowledge; it is, as Hegel says, 'the emptying [*Entäußerung*] of self-consciousness. . . [which] establishes thinghood.'³⁵ But despite this epistemological reservation in certain important particular cases, it would be wrong to assume that Hegel's basic ontological idea existed merely within this rationalizing limitation. In fact, his entire theory of objectivity never abandons the proclaimed ontological basis, which is why the criticism of the young Marx in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* bears on the centre of this logicizing ontology: 'It is therefore a question of surmounting the *object of consciousness*. *Objectivity* as such is seen as an *estranged* human relationship which does not correspond to *human nature*, to self-consciousness. The *reappropriation* of the objective essence of man, produced in the form of estrangement as something alien, therefore means transcending not only *estrangement* but also *objectivity*. That is to say, man is regarded as a *non-objective, spiritual* being.'³⁶ But even in the possibility that Hegel does provide for the re-acceptance and overcoming of estrangement, nature still remains insurpassably estranged, and hence there adheres to all its earlier emphasized ontological determinations the fatal savour of an extremely over-exerted spiritualism.

These analyses already show that Hegel's ontology of the identical subject-object and the transformation of substance into subject has a pronounced logical foundation. We have already mentioned the fact that with this inclination towards an ontology based on logic, an ontology which can find its most adequate expression only in logical categories and logical relations, Hegel stands alone in the development of classical German philosophy. This has the result, on the one hand, that

Hegel alone, in connection with this new knowledge of the world, laid the foundations of a new, dialectical logic, while on the other hand, in so far as this new logic is the vehicle of expression for his new ontology, the logical categories are over-burdened with ontological contents, and ontological relations are built into their connections in an unacceptable way, while at the same time the most important new ontological findings are in many ways distorted by being squeezed into logical forms. Here we have to take issue above all with the antinomies thus arising in the area of ontology; as far as the most essential and anticipatory ontological discoveries of Hegel are concerned, we shall deal with them in the next section. These antinomies are first of all a product of the peculiarity of the Hegelian logic. This is intended on the one hand to preserve the specificity of any logic at the higher level of the dialectic, i.e. to express the most generalized relationships of reality in the medium of pure thought. On the other hand however, in contrast to all traditional logic, for which it was self-evident to take the forms of objectivity of the real world, their relationships, etc. as simply given, as a basis for elaborating specifically logical forms, the Hegelian logic, since it is supposed to be at the same time ontology (and epistemology), gives itself the appearance of not just accepting these objects, etc. and simply treating them logically, but of being at least coexistent with them. The objects should not just obtain in logic an ordering specific to this discipline, but rather their real nature is supposed to arise for the first time by this perfected arrangement. This already has the result that the Hegelian logic, besides its genuine wealth of categories, also treats objects of the real world and their relationships as logical objectivities and relationships, even though the logical can be here at most one moment of their many-sided, essential and material constitution. Thus for example attraction and repulsion are seen as moments of being-for-self, although it is certainly the

case that even here genuine logical relationships are discussed as well as others. What is perhaps most striking is an example that apparently falls on the opposite side. In treating the category of determinate being, Hegel says: 'It is not mere being, but determinate being [*Dasein*], etymologically taken, being in a certain *place*; but the idea of space is irrelevant here.'³⁷ Any Kantian or phenomenologist would have been able to say the same, even though he sought to purify logic of all psychological components. But what is involved here is not the idea of space, but rather the question whether the here and now belongs to the essential objective form of determinate being. A formal logic can deny this, but an orientation to real ontological objectivity cannot; for ontologically there is no determinate being without its here and now. Hegel of course knew this very well, but the ontology of the identical subject-object, in which space and time only appear after logic has been completed, in the philosophy of nature, forbade him from conceding this. Thus in very many of what are most important questions, from the ontological standpoint, Hegel's two ontologies stand opposed to one another, each inhibiting and damaging the other.

This methodological disjunction becomes more acute in so far as the Hegelian logic is simultaneously a theory of knowledge. This is of course not in Kant's sense of the term, and particularly not in the sense of his successors. The logical and ontological foundation of the identical subject-object excludes the 'critical' dualism of this kind of epistemology. It is also not a question of an epistemology of mimesis—at least not in a conscious or deliberate way—which would have the task of establishing correspondence between the reflection and the intrinsically existing reality. On this question, the reaction that followed the dissolution of Hegelianism often saw fit to speak of Hegel's dogmatism—but quite unjustifiably. The assumption of the cognizability of intrinsic existence in no way signifies an uncritical dogmatism. Hegel always proceeds

from the intensive infinity of all intrinsic existence, and is completely aware of the merely approximate character of every act of knowledge; in fact it is precisely his merit that he placed this approximation in the centre of his dialectical epistemology. Simply because of this, epistemology acquires a radically new and extremely fruitful theme, which however could only blossom out fully in the consciously mimetic epistemology of dialectical materialism. But the dialectic itself, which Lenin characterized as Hegel's epistemology, is able to regulate epistemology at some very essential points with respect to certain fundamentally important and correct relationships when it is correctly made dependent on an ontology that is faithful to reality. I am referring in particular, leaving aside for the time being further details that will be discussed later, to the dialectical connection of understanding and reason, where Hegel managed to resolve, with one blow, as it were, the traditional false antinomies between over-extended rationalism and the false irrationalism developed in opposition to this.

Despite this important intervention of epistemological perspectives in Hegel's ontological logic, decisive antinomies nevertheless arise as a result of ontological facts being essentially distorted by their constriction into logical formalism. Here I can only deal with two such cases, although they are extremely important ones; a really comprehensive exposure of the problems arising here would require a comprehensive presentation of the whole of Hegel's logic. The first of these questions concerns the role of negation in the dynamic realization of the dialectic. For Hegel, as for the whole of later logic, Spinoza's '*omnis determinatio est negatio*' is of decisive importance, for precisely in his case negation, and the negation of the negation, are fundamental motors of the dialectical movement of concepts. This is justified both logically and epistemologically. The question now is whether this universal

law also holds for ontology. Hegel himself is to a great extent clear about the difficulties that arise here. Right at the start of his celebrated derivation of becoming from the dialectic of being and nothing he stresses that the nothing present here is in no way 'the nothing of a particular something, a determinate nothing', but rather 'nothing... in its indeterminate specificity'. It is evident, however, even for him, that if the nothing remained simply nothing, then a becoming could never be derived from it (even logically); the nothing must rather pass 'into its other, into being.'³⁸

This does not just provide a 'beginning' fascinating for its paradoxical character, but Hegel betrays—unintentionally and unconsciously—that the nothing can never be taken in the proper, literal sense, but must be attenuated in every concrete case in so far as being is to be understood only as the 'not being of being other.'³⁹ This however blunts the point of the real dialectic of being and nothing, of the dynamic role of negation in ontology. Hegel expresses what are really ontological categories, otherness and being-for-other, in logical language, while claiming to define the latter as a negation of being-in-itself. What is involved is nothing more than a qualitative relation between very abstract concepts of being, the relation itself containing no ontological element of negation. The idea suggests itself, when a real fact is translated into the language of logic or epistemology, to express the differences that manifest themselves—and which ontologically are completely positive—in the form of negation, in which connection it should further be noted that negation is only able to express distinction in an extremely incomplete and indefinite way, which is why in the concrete dialectical derivation, the moment of negation always has to be supplemented from the positive side—*per nefas*. Thus Hegel says of his own celebrated dialectical derivation of becoming from the negation of being by nothing: 'As yet there is nothing and there is to become something. The beginning is

not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning.⁴⁰

Engels illustrated this situation in his clear and popular fashion. He wanted to make clear to Dühring the Hegelian negation that is effected when, for example, the plant that arises out of a barley-corn 'negates' its former existence as a seed: 'Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain.'⁴¹ Thus in the real world, the grain of barley is in innumerable cases *annihilated*; this is the proper ontological expression for the term 'negation', which has a definite logical meaning, but does not mean much ontologically. It is only in a certain concrete situation that the grain of barley gives rise to its biologically normal otherness, the plant. On the one hand, however, the concretely decisive characteristics of this otherness are abstractly ignored if it is considered as the 'negation' of the grain, while on the other hand this real dialectical process is obscured in so far as the term 'negation' brings it into a formal conjunction with cases that have little to do with this process in a material sense. The task facing Engels was thus to separate the ontological, dialectical negation from the innumerable negations of a merely logical and formal character; in this way it becomes evident that there can be no formal, logical or epistemological criteria for this separation, but that it is always necessary to appeal to the real process itself, to the concrete reality; the distinguishing moment is then defined in a purely ontological and positive sense. The subsumption of such heterogeneous phenomena under the logical term 'negation' thus only

confuses the relationships instead of illuminating them.

It is not by chance that this happens, for although the most general and abstract ontological categories are ultimately at the basis of all being, the simple facts of inorganic nature (i.e. not even yet what Nicolai Hartmann describes as patterns) are their purest and most unadulterated mode of appearance. And anyone who considers the ontological features arising here in an unprejudiced fashion must come to the conclusion that there is no such thing here as a negation, but merely a chain of transformations from one form of being into another, a mere chain of relations in which each element has simultaneously an otherness and a being-for-other. The logical and epistemological correctness and significance of Spinoza's method of definition with the aid of negation in no way affects this ontological problem. For even if the concrete nature of an otherness (the plant in Engels' example) is defined in a logical and epistemological sense with the aid of negation, this does not mean that ontologically the otherness is a negation of the earlier state. It should also not be forgotten that even for Spinoza negation was a methodological moment of the definition itself, its necessarily logical mode of appearance; our analysis of Hartmann's conceptions has shown that the rejection of this thesis leads to a complete dissolution of the logico-epistemological definition as well, for negation, when applied to existing, qualitatively specific objects and processes, can in no way be really unambiguous in its definition. So long as it is a question of objects and processes in which the becoming other does not abolish the fundamental mode of being, it seems completely impermissible to us to operate with the category of negation; as the mental reflection of this sphere of being, it does not fit into the mode of being of such ontological objects, which is one to which the subject is foreign. It is only where the becoming other objectively involves a radical transformation and transition in the forms of objectivity or process that this

can also be conceived as negation in an objective ontological sense. For instance, the biological reproduction of a living being involves physical and chemical laws in a transcendent form (i.e. these are subordinated to the laws of biological reproduction); when this reproduction ceases, on death, the constituent material of the former organism is again subject to the normal physical and chemical laws of its materiality. This case involves an objective ontological negation, even though this negation has no subject; it is the negation of the process of self-reproduction, which was what constituted the organism, and the negation does not just give rise to something different, but to something that is ontologically new in relation to this. This situation is repeated at a higher level in social being. Here, however, the negation has a subject, though this subject is not of a mere mimetic character as in the relationships of nature; its activity and the negation involved in this is already here an objective moment of the ontology of social being. The Hegelian logic, with its abstractly universal logical generalization of negation into a fundamental moment of any dialectical process, thereby obliterates the specificity of social being, even though Hegel generally intended to make, and actually did make, his biggest effort precisely in elucidating this. This is first and foremost the case when the negation is related to practical social activity. In purely theoretical judgements based on logic, such as: 'There are no seven-headed dragons', the form of negation corresponds to the real state of things (for I actually deny the existence of such dragons, and nothing more). But if I say something like: 'As a republican I deny the monarchy', then this sentence corresponds to a completely different kind of reality: The monarchy exists, but it should not exist; in other words, a social activity is necessary to make it non-existent. The apparently similar logical expression thus involves very different realities, and can therefore distort specific ontological facts. For what is involved in the real world is some-

thing other and far more than a mere theoretical negation. In everyday practice, this distinction often plays no decisive role. But when real distinctions are expressed in this way, as happens with the Hegelian extension of the validity of negation, then this imprecision leads to a distortion of the facts. Engels, for example, who makes use of similar logical forms in his derivation of the negation of the negation (otherness as negation), himself shows his awareness of the philosophically precarious situation which he has thus manoeuvred himself into. For after he has applied this ostensibly universal law to the most diverse fields, he says: 'When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process.'⁴² But it would be hard to find a genuine universal law whose particular realizations, when compared with one another, produced absurdities. A death from cancer is manifestly different from a hero's death for a great cause; but if I describe both as death (as the real concluding moment of the life-process), this does not generate any form of absurdity. For in the real relationships of being, the counterposing of their generality and their particularity is certainly in no way absurd. (The greatest difference is of course still not absurd.) This is only possible (and in fact necessary) when formal logical similarities are blown up into forms of being. This is why Engels himself indicates the questionable ontological character of his logical derivation of the negation of the negation.

Negation in the birth and death of an organism is the only case known to us of a negation without a subject; it seems to mark the dynamic boundary between two ontologically different levels of being. The negations that we encounter in the realm of social being are not only linked ontologically with the acts of subjects, but their characteristic nature is a

product of the fact that every human social activity is necessarily the product of alternatives, and presupposes a choice or decision in relation to these. The alternative thus gives rise to a bifurcation of the objective world effected by the subject on the basis of the known properties of the object, in relation to the reactions which the interactions with the world induce. This series runs from the opposition of the useful and non-useful, beneficial and harmful, by way of many social mediations, up to the 'highest values' such as good and evil. In order to posit pairs of opposites of this kind, at once linked and distinct, human practice and the thought guiding it must homogenize its environment. The stones that happened to be lying around, from which primitive man selected those suitable for his cutting requirements, and left the unsuitable behind, were in this case suitable or unsuitable by virtue of their natural form, but this property could only be actualized in and by human labour; in the simple existence of the stone it would remain a never realized possibility.

This act, which posits stones as suitable or unsuitable, simultaneously homogenizes a whole section of the real world, by way of practice from this standpoint. The establishment of what is suitable or unsuitable presupposes a mental homogenization in the mimesis which focuses and reduces the objectively present properties of objects, which in themselves, in the natural state, only found the objects' otherness, to this function that they perform; and in the homogenous medium that thus arises, the practical alternatives are answered by way of affirmation and negation. (Not the least reason for the heterogeneity of social being is that the homogenizing spheres of being on which activities are based may relate to each other in completely heterogenous ways.) It can be shown that the most complicated alternatives still presuppose a process of social preparation of the same kind. This means that negation first arises, as an important mental instrument

of human practice, from its interaction with the objective reality, that it is secondly a reflection of the reality that is indissolubly linked with practice and hence with its objective natural presuppositions, but that because of its indispensability for changing reality it cannot be a category of non-social reality that exists ontologically in itself. The homogenous medium in which affirmation and negation arise is one of the most important methodological conditions for a correct reflection of the reality as it exists in itself, hence for a reflection that promises success. The reflection in its specific forms of objectivity may be far removed from the real world (it is sufficient to refer to mathematics or geometry), but if in its reproduction of what is essential in reality, and in its positing of goals, it hits upon what is correct from the human and social point of view, then it can induce actions that acquire an ontologically decisive significance for social being.

The entire Hegelian philosophy is essentially oriented to the knowledge of society and history. Hence its categories are by their very nature adapted to this sphere of being. The fact that they are almost invariably generalized far beyond this sphere, as a consequence of their subordination to logic, and that they are thus distorted as far as the ontology of being-in-itself is concerned, is more than a mere form of appearance of the system. But no matter how severely a critical ontology exposes what is theoretically awry, it should never lose sight of the important underlying intention. The Marxist classics were therefore right to speak, not of rejecting the Hegelian dialectic, but of 'inverting' it, and 'placing it on its feet'. This critical process is of course far more complicated and far more radical than it appeared to those epigones who believed that the buried truth could be brought to the light of day by a mere exchange of external signs. What was needed rather was to go back to the intrinsically existing reality itself, and to disentangle from this basis what was generally a very closely knit tangle of truth and falsehood. Lenin, for

example, accepted such an extreme formulation of Hegel as that practice was a logical syllogism. This acceptance, however, presupposed a spontaneous ontological reversal. It is not that the form of the syllogism is 'realized' in practice, but rather that the most general formal elements that are contained in every practical action are consolidated in the practice of human thought into an ever more abstract form, until finally, 'on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition', they acquire the stability of an axiom.⁴³

Logic is one of the most important homogenous media that human practice and the work of thought have created. There is no single element or relation in it that cannot be ultimately referred back to elements and relations of the real world, and does not ultimately have to be so referred. The effect of logic in the historical development of mankind, however, is that these points of departure seem to become extinguished in the homogenous medium of logic, that this homogenous medium seems to congeal into an immanently closed and self-posed system, whose homogenized system character provides the foundation for its universality. Although we cannot deal more closely here with the extremely complicated questions of agreement with reality and deviation from it, it must be pointed out that the homogenous and systematic character of logic that thus arises has time and again led thinkers into illusions in which a perfected system of the logically homogenized world of ideas is supposed to be able to answer all problems that arise from the real relations of men. Tendencies of this kind can already be seen with Raimundus Lullus, in Leibniz's '*mathesis universalis*', and they are widespread today as neo-positivist theories of universal manipulation, which moreover, as we have seen, deny any kind of ontological reference. Hegel distinguished himself from his predecessors, and all the more so from our contemporary representatives of a universal logical system, precisely in so far as he did not see logic, despite all its determinant supremacy in his system, as the primary point of

departure, in no way sought to construct his universalistic system by a mere extension and completion of the existing logic, mathematics, etc., but rather, on the basis of ontological considerations and insights, sought to create a radically new logic, dialectical logic, in order to arrive at a logical system of being and becoming in the entire field of being-in-itself. The identical subject-object and the transformation of substance into subject are the vehicles of the transformation of the ontological totality into a system of logic.

We have already seen that logic creates a homogenous medium of thought, whose structure must be qualitatively different from that of the intrinsically heterogenous reality, if only because relations in a homogenous medium must be differently disposed from the case where heterogenous objects, forces, etc. really influence one another. We have already discussed the mental operations that thereby become necessary, e.g. a physical interpretation of the real phenomena that have been expressed in mathematical form. What is involved here is that what has been mathematically homogenized must once more be brought into connection with the objective reality by a mental emphasis and clarification of the heterogenous character of its components. (It is unnecessary to stress that this mathematical homogenization can bring to light important aspects of reality that would otherwise not be perceptible.) If the homogenous medium that serves as the foundation of the knowledge relation is a logical one, then the contrast between the homogenous means of knowledge and the heterogenous reality is marked by the special feature that an infinite complex of mutually heterogenous phenomena, which is therefore not immediately capable of being systematized and put into a hierarchical order, is reproduced in thought as a homogenously closed hierarchical system.

What is decisive here is the questionable character of the hierarchy, for the conversion of heterogeneity into homogeneity is a feature of all knowledge and can always be

directed along the path of a correct approximation to the real objects if the means of knowledge are handled properly and in a sufficiently critical way. The question of the hierarchy is something else. For since arrangement in a hierarchic system is only possible in a homogenous medium—this homogenization precisely providing the basis for arranging objects in a higher or lower position from a specific point of view, articulating them below and above one another to form a unity—a perspective on the relationships is introduced which is completely foreign to the heterogenous reality. In the majority of specific questions, as we have seen, science can correct this discrepancy, no matter how abstract and general these might be, but for reality as a whole a correction of this kind is fundamentally impossible. (The particular nature of art, where the extensive or heterogenous totality of reality is mimetically reproduced as a specifically qualitative and intensive totality, homogenous to the senses, I have dealt with in my book *The Specificity of the Aesthetic*. The categories necessary for this transposition, such as the individuality of an art-work, universalization through particularity, through the typical, etc., are not involved in the case of science and philosophy.)⁴⁴

This can readily be shown in the case of what is philosophically a relatively simple constellation. The development of a pattern, an organism or a social formation, is ontologically a question of real genesis. The laws of its birth (and death) are in the first place a characteristic of the specific being in question. In logic, however, one concept is deduced from another, irrespective of whether this deduction proceeds from the general to the particular or from the particular to the general. As long as logic is employed methodologically as something that does not determine reality, but that is obtained from it by abstraction, there is no need for this difference to give rise to anything that distorts our knowledge of reality. (We have of course seen

that this always can happen.) But when, as with Hegel, logic is conceived as the theoretical foundation of ontology, it is unavoidable that logical deductions come to be conceived as the proper forms of ontological genesis. In this way, a systematized logical hierarchy comes to form the basis for the ontological path to the self-realization of the identity of subject and object, and the transformation of substance into subject. Every category must then obtain its characteristic definition and significance, both as a logical concept and simultaneously as an ontological objectivity, from the place that it occupies along this path. The hierarchical order that thus arises is described by Hegel in terms of the later, higher placed category being the 'truth' of the earlier, lower one, so that the logical relationship between two categories constitutes the essential connection of real objective complexes. This hierarchy has in itself nothing to do with the ontological condition that creates real relationships between realities. A coincidence between ontological connections and logical hierarchy can in the best case be only a fortunate accident; normally, it can only give rise to an extremely arbitrary identification. For instance, Hegel writes in the 'Introduction to the second part of the *Encyclopaedia*, the Philosophy of Nature, 'Animal nature is the truth of vegetable nature, vegetable of mineral; the Earth is the truth of the solar system. In a system, it is the most abstract term which is the first, and the truth of each sphere is the last; but this again is only the first of a higher sphere. It is the necessity of the Idea which causes each sphere to complete itself by passing into another higher one, and the variety of forms must be considered as necessary and determinate.'⁴⁵

In this particular concrete example, we see once again Hegel's attempt to extract from the ontology of nature a subordinate basis for human society. On the one hand, however, he distorts the real ontological content of this subordination, by making the accidental rise of life and society on

Earth into a logical necessity, which gives the law-like causal relationship an impermissible teleological accent. Discrepancies of this kind between the logical form of deduction and the ontological content of the relationship in question must also lead to more or less important elements of arbitrariness in the logical deduction itself. Engels already noted that 'the transitions from one category or from one contradiction to the next are nearly always arbitrary.'⁴⁶ On the other hand, and closely related, we should mention here the criticism of the young Marx already quoted, to the effect that Hegel's social philosophy replaces the presentation of the real relationships by the formal application of logical ones, which once again indicates the mental violation of ontology by logic.

Engels' correct and clear-sighted criticism unfortunately deals only with the formal connection of the categories, and not with the ontologically more important question of the position of the categories in the logically hierarchical construction of the system. As we have seen in the question of the position of the Earth in the solar system, this is not a merely formal question of arrangement, but rather one of the essential characteristics of any object, so that the profound discrepancies between logic and ontology emerge quite blatantly here. We shall only mention one particularly important case. Hegel seeks to deduce teleology as the higher principle from the dialectic of mechanism and chemism, in order to pave the way for the transition to the Idea, at the point where, in the case of life, the new relationship of subject to substance, still a natural one, but going beyond organic nature, finds its expression. Teleology thus appears, according to the schema of his system's construction, as the 'truth' of mechanism and chemism.⁴⁷ We are still for the moment in the realm of nature, but at its border; and thus an immanent going-beyond-itself of nature is logically produced. But the dialectical development since Kant had progressed much too

far for the 'examples' of a purpose in nature that the theodiscists of the eighteenth century offered in profusion to be taken seriously. In Hegel's eyes these are 'trifling' and 'trivial'.⁴⁸ He analyses the categorical relationship of end and means, and its connection with the principles of mechanism, in a model way; but he can only do this because his mental model is that of labour. The logical abstractness of Hegel's analysis often conceals this model, although it should actually appear with each step, but Hegel can not carry through this particular investigation without directly coming to refer to labour at decisive points, and to the end and means in it. Here we are confronted once again with the two-sided character of Hegel's philosophy. On the one hand he discovers labour as the principle which expresses the genuine form of teleology, the positing and actual realization of the end by a conscious subject; on the other hand this genuine ontological category is structured into the homogenous medium of a system dominated by logical principles, and according to this system we are still at a stage that has not yet produced life, man and society. For according to the logical principles of development of the identical subject-object, life can only take shape at the stage of the Idea, while the function of teleology here is precisely the logical and systematic one of effecting the transition from the stage of the notion to that of the Idea.⁴⁹ In this way the logical hierarchy leads to the absurd situation of developing the categories of labour before life has come into being in the logico-ontological sequence.

Behind this absurdity there is of course a still deeper discrepancy. On the one hand Hegel has discovered the real ontological form of teleology in labour, and thereby resolved an age-old philosophical antinomy, i.e. the rigid opposition in ontology between a transcendently directed teleology and an exclusive dominance of causality. A real ontology of social being is not possible without a correct contrasting of

natural causality and labour teleology, without the presentation of their concrete dialectical interconnections. Not only did Hegel recognize correctly this fundamental fact of social being, but also that of the dialectical dynamic immanent in it, driving it further and to a higher level. The profound parallelism between classical economics in England and the Hegelian dialectic consists not least in the fact that while the former was the first to put forward an economic and social analysis of this phenomenon, Hegel on the other hand disclosed its ontological significance. It is never sufficiently emphasized that, despite his somewhat mystical sounding formulation, the principle of this ever more intricate, ever more uneven higher development, Hegel's so-called 'cunning of reason', has its ontological foundation and determination precisely in his investigation of labour. This idea already surfaces very early in Hegel's work, even before the *Phenomenology*; he says, for instance, of the significance of the tool, that man 'lets nature wear itself out, looks on calmly and with little trouble simply regulates the whole: *cunning*.'⁵⁰ And in a passage of the *Logic* he indicates quite clearly the upward-driving moments of labour in concrete cases: '... the *plough* is more honourable than are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends. The *tool* lasts, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even though in respect of his ends he is, on the contrary, subject to it.'⁵¹ On the other hand this great path-breaking conception of labour as posited teleology is for Hegel simply an illustration—and in fact, an inadmissible one—for the logical relationship in which teleology still appears within a logicistically conceived nature as the 'truth' of mechanism and chemism, i.e. as a category of nature itself; that what is involved here, as we have already seen, is the logical transition from the notion to the Idea, in no way alters the character of a logically immanent deduction, in

other words the establishment of teleology in nature, which revokes the new and great idea expressed here.

But this is only one form, even if an extremely important one, of the discrepancy between the position of teleology on the logically determined path towards the identical subject-object, and its definition as the category that expresses the difference and opposition between nature and society. It should not be forgotten that this antinomy discloses a fundamental question affecting the entirety of Hegel's philosophy, which the Marxist classics correctly described as a contradiction between system and method. From the standpoint of Hegel's system (of his ontology converted into logic), it is only consistent that logic is the narrower and proper sense forms the starting-point of his system. In other systems, in which logic is not the foundation of ontology, this would be a simple question of arrangement, which did not affect anything essential. But this is not so in Hegel's case. Here the fact that Logic comes before the Philosophies of Nature and Mind has an immediate ontological significance; even though he initially considers logical categories as categories of thought, Hegel is forced by his own system to impress on this ideational character a further ontological essence. He does this right at the start of the *Science of Logic*, in a very decisive and unmistakable way: 'Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.'⁵² Logical categories do not thereby cease to be categories of thought, but they simultaneously acquire the function of the thought which serves as model, and is realized, in the teleological positing of the world. Thus it is only the consistent accomplishment of this conception when, at the conclusion of the *Science of Logic*, at the stage of self-

attainment of the Idea, the latter 'freely realizes itself', and that nature appears by way of this act as the self-positing of the Idea.⁵³

What is of interest for us in this connection is simply that, as a consequence of a positing of this kind, the whole of nature and the entire social world is made into a single teleological process, in which everything that the logical development of the Idea has elaborated in the form of categories becomes real, and as reality, treads once again the path already indicated in the Logic, now enriched by the Idea's own reality. For what forms the conclusion of the system is the repeated self-attainment of the Idea, this time not only as Idea, but simultaneously as its own reality. It is evident that the basic structure of this edifice is strongly reminiscent of the theological system in which God as creator realizes the previously worked-out Idea. Thus the logical system leads Hegel—though only in his basic conception, not in the details of its elaboration—back to a traditional view of the world that was already long superseded. The analysis of teleology in labour, to which we have already drawn attention, makes the contradiction to which this gives rise all the more striking. The 'model' for the earlier teleological and theological systems was similarly also labour (God as 'demiurge'), although in a merely unconscious and spontaneous fashion. Hegel on the other hand correctly recognized and made conscious the essence of labour in a realistic and this-sided way, but he had to set aside his own theoretical discoveries in order to realize his false basic conception. We have already seen, and will often be able to show in what follows, that both the Logic itself and the developmental history of mind are full of particular presentations and disclosures of correct relationships, etc., which contain profound and new ontological insights. These are however, neither individually nor as a whole, in a position to overcome this basic weakness of the system, which has its roots in the

ontology founded on logic. Hegel's influence on the thought of his own time and the following, down to the present day, has been immense and extraordinarily fruitful; but as far as his system is concerned, this has always had an influence inhibiting the development of ideas.

We have seen that the very position of logic in the framework of Hegel's system leads to lending the latter a religious accent. The role of religious elements in Hegel is highly contentious. For a while, a large section of reactionary orthodox theologians based themselves on him, while the radical wing of his followers saw him as a disguised atheist.⁵⁴ Contradictory interpretations of this kind inevitably conceal a profound ambiguity in Hegel's conception of religion. To repeat what we have already said, Hegel's position towards religion has nothing in common with Bellarmini's dilemma in its secularly dominant form. The most striking thing in this connection is that he as good as never troubled himself with the religious need as such: Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion* he treats ironically; he consistently rejects Jacobi's search for a direct knowledge oriented towards religion; his Jena notes are full of extremely distanced ironic remarks on the role of religion in everyday life, etc. Even later, for example in his polemic against immediate knowledge and against related beliefs not based on strictly dogmatic contents, it is clearly visible that he had a only superior contempt for the religious need, and only recognized the contents officially fixed by the church as of primarily social relevance in the Christian belief.⁵⁵ Behind all this stands his ambiguous position towards religion itself. On the one hand he continues the Enlightenment tradition of a rational religion, in a different manner appropriate to the changed conditions. But while the important figures of the German Enlightenment started out from progressive tendencies in the religious needs of the time, in order to find a harmony between these and the demands of reason, which necessarily involved them in

opposition to the orthodox church as well as to the semi-feudal state based on religion, we find in Hegel no kind of polemic against the contents of religion; these are for him historic realities, and therefore steps on the path of mind's self-development. What was reasonable about religion, for Hegel, was simply that it expressed at the lower level of pictorial representation. [*Vorstellung*] the same content that philosophy alone was in a position to raise to the level of the notion. Thus neither contents nor forms of religion were subjected to criticism. Hegel merely showed that the same dialectical categories and relationships could be discovered in them as in philosophy itself, only not yet at the level of the notion. This is expressed most precisely in the *Phenomenology*: 'Pictorial presentation [*Vorstellen*] constitutes the characteristic form in which spirit is conscious of itself in this its religious communion. This form is not yet the self-consciousness of spirit which has reached its notion as notion; the mediating process is still incomplete. In this connexion of being and thought, then, there is a defect; spiritual life is still encumbered with an unreconciled dis-emption into a 'here' and a 'beyond'. The *content* is the true content; but all its moments, when placed in the element of mere imaginative presentation, have the character, not of being conceptually comprehended, but of appearing as completely independent aspects, externally related to one another. In order that the true content may also obtain its true form for consciousness, the latter must necessarily pass to a higher plane of mental development, where the absolute Substance is not intuitively apprehended but conceptually comprehended and where consciousness is *for itself* brought to the level of its self-consciousness;—as this has already taken place objectively or for us.'⁵⁶ Just as the entire *Phenomenology* radiates a Napoleonic spirit, so this conception of religion is deeply influenced by Napoleon's attitude towards religion: recognition of its historical existence and power, in conjunction with

a very far-reaching indifference towards its internal nature. For Napoleonic France, religion was to be integrated into the new bourgeois state; for Hegel's Germany, into the philosophy which mentally corresponded to this.

We know that the present and the existing state remained central categories of mind for Hegel even after Napoleon's overthrow, in the Restoration period. The corresponding definition in the *Encyclopaedia* runs: 'When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded, God is, in point of content, the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit, while in point of form he is, first of all, presented to consciousness as a mental representation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content, on one hand, a separate being, making them pre-suppositions towards each other, and phenomena which succeed each other; their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories.'⁵⁷ Of course the context of these interpretations of the late Hegel is a different one from that of the era of the great Napoleonic aspirations, and the external rapprochement towards religion even culminates in the late lectures on the proofs for the existence of God. Hegel's historic recognition of religion as an effective mental reality constantly increases, but even so, this never results in a more profound internal relation to its contents. Even though writings such as Bauer's *Trumpet*, and memoirs such as Heine's, do not grasp the totality of these connections, they express none the less certain of their decisive moments. The very fact that in defining the difference between religion and philosophy as one between image and notion with the same content, Hegel lays a great stress on the contrast between 'here' and the 'beyond', indicates the quite far-reaching correctness of the anti-religious interpretations.

Later on, of course, Hegel's this-sidedness is no longer so directly to the fore in the general definitions, even though important particular discussions of Hegel's time and again

exhibit similar tendencies. One example of this is given by the discussions of Paradise in the *Philosophy of History*: 'For the state of innocence, the paradisaical condition, is that of the brute. Paradise is a park, where only brutes, not men, can remain. For the brute is one with God only implicitly. Only Man's Spirit (that is) has a self-cognizant existence. This existence for self, this consciousness, is at the same time separation from the Universal and Divine Spirit.'⁵⁸ What is at stake here is again the immanent this-sidedness of human development in contrast to the religious transcendency of original sin. Hegel's conception of religion had nothing in common with the romantic conception of the Restoration. Treitschke, whom no-one would describe as a left-wing radical, remarked of the minister Altenstein, Hegel's chief protector and his pupil: 'At this hospitable table the question would occasionally be coolly raised as to whether Christianity would last for a further twenty or fifty years.'⁵⁹ Even if we can see in the late Hegel, in contrast to the period of the *Phenomenology*, a rapprochement towards official Protestantism, this is not in exclusive opposition to his overall views. For if the prediction made at Altenstein's dinner-table was fulfilled, then mind would have still more completely attained the level of the notion; religion, as *Vorstellung*, could then be treated purely historically as a 're-collection' in the sense of the *Phenomenology*, without this bringing contradictions into the system.

The all-round and detailed investigation of this complex of problems would have to be the task of a history of philosophy. It is sufficient for us to establish this contrast between the teleological beyondness of the logical system and the this-sidedness of the ontologically conceived dialectical method. This contrast explains, and indeed from both sides, how it is that Hegel's philosophy has played, and plays today, as good as no role in the modern ideological struggles to give a philosophical foundation to the religious need. These

tendencies find their support and arguments only in the Romantics and their off-shoots, particularly in Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard, both of them hostile to Hegelianism, whereas Hegel's philosophy has been an important influence on the opposing tendency from Strauss and Feuerbach through to Marx and Marxism, with its earthly and this-sided orientation. The historical necessity of this movement, and its importance for the correct conception of social being, has made uninterrupted critical debate with Hegel a vital question for Marxism in a double and yet unified sense: for the most severe criticism of Hegel's retrograde elements is precisely inseparable from the critical extension of his progressive ones. This is why the young Marx criticized Hegel in his doctoral dissertation, before he had arrived at his own philosophy, and so finally did Lenin in his critical commentaries, particularly on Hegel's *Science of Logic*. These criticisms not only combined positive and negative, but they were also indissolubly linked to the requirements of the day, and therefore always focus on those aspects that have become key questions for the further development of Marxism at the given point in time. Thus in the case of Lenin's criticism of Hegel, for example, it was the epistemological aspect that predominated. After Lenin, this great tradition was forgotten. On the one hand Marxism declined, to the point of vanishing, in its proper home, the workers' movement (this of course only in the capitalist countries), while on the other hand its interpretation was denatured into a formal schematism, scholastically dogmatic while practicist in its content, by Stalin and his followers.

The present study aims at re-establishing contact with the great traditions of Marxism. This is the reason for taking the ontology of social being as its theme, for in the present chaos of ingeniously distorted, superficially reductionist and falsely 'profound' theories, the renovation of Marxism that is needed requires a well-founded and founding ontology that finds a real basis for social being in the objective reality of nature,

and that is equipped to depict social being in its simultaneous identity and difference with nature. Analysis of the profound antinomies in Hegel's system is only a preparation for such an elucidation of the problem. Our task now is to indicate not just the great dialectical discoveries of Hegel in the particular cases where they contradict the false constructions of his logicistic system, but rather the ontological foundations and principles of his dialectic in their essential connections.

2. Hegel's dialectical ontology and the reflection determinations

We have had to study in some detail the distortions caused in Hegel's ontology by the methodological predominance of principles of logic. We now have to use the clarification that this criticism has given us in order to dig out Hegel's genuine ontological positions from the 'manure of contradictions', and present them in as pure a form as possible. Hegel's path-breaking originality, his acute relevance for those questions that ontology has to solve today, particularly an ontology of social being, can only be really illuminated in this way. If even here we will still often have to indicate the distorting effect of the methodological priority of logic in his system, this in no way alters the predominantly positive character of the analyses that have become so necessary. The fate of Hegel in the history of human thought—i.e. the fact that his first great influence was to give the appearance that he had concluded the process of philosophical development, had brought it to the end of its road, whereas he was in reality a discoverer of new territory, a stimulator of secular importance—even though it contradicts his own ideas about himself and those of his first contemporary followers, is however in no way unique in the history of philosophy. How long, after all, was Aristotle not ascribed in various epochs a similarly ultimate character, how often was he not passionately struggled against as an obstacle to further development, and yet his influence extends into our

own time as that of an exceptional innovator, the first to have opened the way to new insights in innumerable fields—even if often in mistaken and confusing forms.

Hegel's position in the problematic of our own day is a similar one. But this position must be made more concrete, if it is not to give rise to any misunderstandings. After the great anti-Hegelian wave of the post-revolutionary era had ebbed, and the extremely questionable nature of neo-Kantianism, which considered itself so orthodox, became evident in the form of ever greater crises, it was first of all among historians that interest awakened in Hegel's comprehensive knowledge and far-reaching conception of concrete reality, and this rising interest gradually developed into a philosophical movement with the aim of reviving Hegel. Without getting into a discussion of this,¹ it should just be mentioned that our own interpretations have nothing in common with these tendencies. The purpose there was to anchor Hegel historically in the prevailing bourgeois philosophy of the time, which involved ascribing an unjustified and excessive importance to his relationships with Kant and with the Romantics; thus Hegel was made for the second time into a philosopher of conservatism. We maintain on the contrary that what in Hegel points towards the future is the influence that he had on the rise and construction of Marxism. This naturally involves a very uneven development. Engels already warned in vain against forgetting the dialectical legacy of Hegel. But Kantianism and positivism repressed the dialectic from the consciousness of the socialists of that time. The second attempt to revive Hegel also failed at first, for the rigidification and distortion of Marxism in the Stalin period had also to transform the image of Hegel into a mask-like caricature. (The efforts of certain individuals in an opposing direction remained episodic, in this era too.) It is only in the last few years that the time seems to have arrived to link up once again with the great

philosophical traditions of Marx. The following discussions of Hegel have this intention; the elaboration of Hegel's ontology, in particular his ontology of social being, is designed to better elucidate the position of the two great thinkers, both in their intimate connection and their qualitative difference, indeed opposition. The fact that ontological problems this time stand to the fore is not due to any thematic preference on the part of the author, rather to the philosophical situation of our time, which gives problems in this field priority over all others.

We begin with a universally known fact, the character of process, as the central category of a new ontology. The great discoveries of the natural sciences, the historical experience of centuries teeming with revolutions, had shaken, even in the concrete, everyday image of the world, the age-old supremacy of an eternal, stationary, unmoved substantiality, the absolute predominance of a primary, thing-like objectivity, as against a motion conceived as secondary. There were certainly occasional attempts in philosophy to adjust itself in this respect to life (it is particularly Leibniz whom I have in mind), but the basic philosophical categories still remained for all that on the level of a world of things that was in and for itself unchangeable. When Kant spoke of the unknowability of reality as it exists in itself, he characteristically referred to this unknowable as a thing-in-itself, and when Fichte sought to introduce into his philosophical system a systematic movement, he only ventured to undertake this from the side of the subject. Hegel was the first major thinker since Heraclitus for whom becoming assumed an objectively greater ontological weight than being; his philosophical stature consists not least in that this overcoming of the priority of being over becoming was not simple and direct in character, but rather gave rise to an all-round and universal method. Hegel was certainly in agreement with all of Heraclitus' theses: 'There is no proposition

of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my *Logic*.² The major methodological value of his late *History of Philosophy* is that Hegel investigated the emergence of this new ontological tendency in its first beginnings, and that he considered its development, from the first approaches and germinal beginnings in what is really the inner history of human thought, as a history of the mastery of objective reality. Hegel's basic metaphysical idea of the identical subject-object, of the transformation of substance into subject, shows its double face only in this connection: on the one hand, as we have already seen, a logically governed ontology whose logicistic and hierarchical rigidity distorts the Heraclitean tendency of the new ontology, but on the other hand the great demand raised that man should live in a world understood as adequately as possible, even though this adequate comprehension arises in many fields through thought learning to understand the foreignness, immanent self-positeness and indifference of the processes going on around the subject. This is why Hegel could discover the rise of the dialectical movement not only in Heraclitus, but also in the Eleatic philosophers who were directly opposed to him, even in the first atomists, Leucippus and Democritus.

But the simple process character that is visible in Heraclitus is only the first and necessarily abstract form of this new understanding of the world. (We shall shortly come on to speak of the new historical and dialectical interpretation of abstractness as an ontological and epistemological category.) It inevitably leads to paradoxes, which are fruitful but insoluble in their immediate form. For the process character of reality is also contradictory and dialectical, and this is why unevenness is an objectively conditioned mode of appearance. It is certainly correct that one cannot step twice into the same river, but it is just as true that the river, precisely in its continuous change, its continuous abolition of its own identity, simultaneously and continuously reproduces

this identity; when Zeno said that a flying arrow is at rest, he expressed certain dialectical contradictions in the relationship of space, time and motion that were similarly fruitful and paradoxical, without being able to give them a dialectical solution. Even the most genial discoveries of particular dialectical relationships, so long as these ultimately remain, for all their general validity, individual relationships, and do not encompass the entirety of being—really as well as in thought—could not fundamentally transform man's view of the world.

Despite these striking advances, this world view remained static in its totality, oriented to substantiality and thing-ness, not to universal process. It was not only the genial beginnings of dialectical thought in antiquity that suffered under this lack of concretely comprehensive universality, but also the attempts that were not satisfied with elucidating particular contradictions in reality, or even depicting the process character of the real in the light of a fundamental contradiction, but which endeavoured to construct a universal system of moving and moved contradiction. From Cusanus to Schelling there arose all-embracing systems that categorically presented the systematic omnipresence of contradiction in the sense of a universal process character of this kind, both for the world and for knowledge of it. But this only apparently raised the process-causing contradiction to ontological predominance, for in so far as the abolition of contradictions made them vanish, the ultimate abolition, in connection with knowledge of the absolute on the basis of the *coincidentia oppositorum* precisely 'in the absolute, brought the world back to a static character. Process and contradiction were degraded, whether intentionally or not, to categorical characteristics of a mere this-sided 'here', a mere finitude, while the absolute as 'beyond' persisted in its superior state in relation to the process character of the 'here', leaving all contradiction far behind it and beneath it.

Right at the beginning of his development, Hegel broke with this conception. His defence of Schelling already states, in implicit opposition to the latter's permanently maintained basic conception: 'The absolute is itself, however, . . . the identity of identity and non-identity; antithesis and unity are simultaneously contained in it.'³ As we shall see, this does not just involve the recognition of a stage of dialectical motion that had not previously been made conscious, but the entire view of the world also thereby undergoes an ontological revolution. If the same law of dialectical process holds for the absolute as it does for the entire finite world, then the difference and opposition of 'here' and 'beyond' vanishes from a consistently carried through dialectical ontology, which means that all objects (processes) of the 'here', of finitude, the earthly, etc., have the same ultimate ontological structure as the absolute itself. Gradations within this ultimate and universal dialectical homogeneity change nothing fundamental in this basic structure. The ontological victory of universal, contradictory process raises the unitary conception of reality as a whole to a qualitatively higher level in comparison with every past attempt.

The category of totality thus obtains a significance that it could never have previously. 'The truth is the whole',⁴ said Hegel programmatically in the *Phenomenology*. But the category of totality, in this abstract and naked state, could in no way form the foundation for a new ontology; in this state it already figured in those dialectical systems that, as we have shown, cut short the dialectical process precisely at its highest culmination. For Hegel, however, the totality was far more than a mere synthetic summarization of extensive universality; it was the basic structure in the construction of extensive universality, and the basic structure in the construction of reality as a whole. Thus reality does not just have a property of totality as such, but it rather consists of parts, or 'elements', that are similarly structured as totalities

in their turn. The whole that Hegel refers to programmatically is a totality built up out of the dynamic inter-connections of relative and partial, particular totalities. It could be said that the real ontological essence of the Hegelian world view in its concrete cohesion is to be found in this principle. This is of course only in its esoteric form; for as we have seen, in carrying through this basic principle, many trains of thought of a logicistic and hierarchical character are hidden in it. But Hegel's own thought process in the concluding passages of his *Science of Logic* shows that we are extracting here the real, if frequently concealed, essence of Hegel's thought, and not smuggling in our own interpretation as its esoteric content. 'By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a *circle* returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles*, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member.'⁵

But simply indicating the idea of totality is not sufficient to give an understanding of this new ontology. For if it is considered purely logically, these partial totalities and the overall totality formed from them could still possess a static, 'thing-like' character. Hegel already defends himself against this in the above quoted general programmatic declaration of the *Phenomenology*, and goes on immediately to adduce some important characteristics of the dialectical dynamic of this conception of totality. 'The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reacting its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development. Should it appear contradictory to say that the Absolute has to be conceived essentially as a result, a little consideration will set

this appearance of contradiction in its true light. The beginning, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first or immediately expressed, is merely the Universal.⁶ Naturally, Hegel remains faithful to his own ontological conception of the absolute as the identical subject-object. But his interpretations have none the less a general sense that goes beyond this; in so far as the absolute is conceived as a result, which can only attain a true content by way of the process of its formation, this process of formation and development is declared to be ontologically primary. Moreover, the being in which this outcome manifests itself as a result, appears as its product. This is further underlined by the fact that the absolute is characterized right at the beginning as the universal, which for Hegel means in no way an ontological perfection, from which the concrete and particular emerge by way of emanation. The universal is meant here expressly in the sense of the merely universal, the not yet concrete, as is already shown by the remark that directly follows the previous quotation: 'If we say "all animals", that does not pass for zoology.' Here, moreover, the path from the universal to the genuine result is indicated only as a process of knowledge, but Hegel treats the process character similarly as the decisive characteristic for both reality and knowledge of it. He thus says later in the same connection: 'While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a human being, it is not by itself [*für sich*] a human being', the path in reality from the in-itself to the for-itself here already determining the precise categorical nature and direction of this ontologically primary process character. This leads on to the further decisive ontological consequences of this thesis: if reality in the ontological sense can only ever be the result of a process, it necessarily follows that this 'result' can only be adequately grasped by way of this process, i.e. by way of its genesis. Any investigation that treats it as an existent, i.e. statically, must necessarily remain stuck at the level of the immediate given,

and will thereby ignore its decisive determinations, the most important of which is precisely the complex process character of reality. We have already seen how frequently Hegel replaces this real genesis by a logical 'deduction'; this has to be criticized, but the ultimate yardstick for this criticism is provided by Hegel's own ontology, which conceives the real genesis as the dynamic foundation of any objectivity (and any result). It is only in this way that Spinoza's identity between the order and connection of things and ideas becomes really dynamic and dialectical, process-like. If we refer in this connection to Hegel's elucidations in his *Logic*, to the effect that the knowledge of the 'members' involves each result being simultaneously the beginning of a new member, then this gives us the measure of this universal process character of Hegel's conception, in which the real, ontological genesis provides the key to knowledge of all 'results'.

The Preface to the *Phenomenology* provides this central question of Hegelian ontology with still further important determinations. What is involved here are directly ontological questions of social being, naturally of course, as is most often the case with Hegel, without a clearly pronounced limitation to this field; indeed some of the examples adduced here seem to indicate that Hegel intended to formulate a general ontological law. Hegel starts his argument with the new situation in the world at the time of writing of his work; in concluding his course of lectures in autumn 1806 he expressed these ideas still more transparently than in the work itself: 'We stand today in an important epoch, a time of ferment, in which the spirit has made a sudden jolt, emerged from its previous form and obtained a new one. The entire mass of former ideas, concepts, and bonds of the world, are dissolved, and crumble away like the image in a dream. A new step forward for the spirit is being prepared.'⁷ The

Phenomenology says of this new stage, that 'the new world makes its first appearance merely in general outline, merely as a whole lying concealed and hidden within a bare abstraction.' For this reason, only an esoteric knowledge by a few individuals is possible: 'Only what is perfectly determinate in form is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody.'⁸ In order to make clear these ideas of his as to the abstract and simple character of the new historic stage, Hegel gives the examples of the child in contrast to the adult, and the acorn in opposition to the oak.

Whether and how far the idea of the abstract character of the new is generally extendable to nature, seems even today still difficult to decide. It is only when the genesis of patterns in inorganic nature is far better known than it is today, when it is thus possible to speak more concretely and definitely of their history, that it will be clear whether and how far the character of the emergent new exhibits a similar simplicity and abstractness. What suggests itself more readily is the application of this idea to organic nature, even though here, too, there is certainly no real homogeneity with human history. The child is not only already a living being, but simultaneously and inseparably from this also a social and historical being. In any case, it is hard to eliminate consciousness from Hegel's analysis of the mode of appearance of the new, but it is a specific characteristic of social being that consciousness is not simply a consciousness of something that ontologically remains completely indifferent towards its being known, but rather itself forms, in its presence or absence, correctness or falsity, a component of being; thus consciousness in the ontological sense is no mere epiphenomenon, irrespective of whether its concrete role in the given case is important or vanishingly small. No matter how this question is decided at the general ontological level, Hegel's thesis signifies, for the ontology of social being, a further, extremely

important and fruitful concretization of the process character. When we come on to deal with labour, we shall have to discuss in more detail how important the category of the new is for the contents, structure and tendency of social being. Its contents aspect has of course often been touched on. But Hegel was the first philosopher who came to speak of this question of structure in general—as structural change, thus once again in the form of process. How important a place these considerations assume in Hegel's overall conception is shown by the way that he immediately directs his chief polemic against the dialectic of Schelling, i.e. against the ultimate form of those conceptions that abolished the process character in the case of the absolute. Hegel expresses this opposition in the sharpest fashion: 'To pit this single assertion, that "in the Absolute all is one", against the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development—to give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black—that is the very *naïveté* of emptiness of knowledge.'

If we now attempt to summarize what is most essential in Hegel's ontology from what has so far been obtained, we arrive at the result that he conceives reality as a totality of complexes that are in themselves, thus relatively, total, that the objective dialectic consists in the real genesis and self-development, interaction and synthesis of these complexes, and that therefore the absolute itself, as the epitome of these total movements, can never reach a standstill of removed indifference towards concrete movements, that it is rather itself movement, process, as the concrete synthesis of real movements—without prejudice to its absolute character, and that the original form of the Hegelian contradiction, the identity of identity and non-identity, remains insurpassably effective in the absolute too. This dialectical ontological core

of Hegel's philosophy stands in evident contrast to the logically hierarchical construction of his system. Hegel himself experienced this opposition on occasions, but he time and again cast it deliberately aside and held to the logical unity of his system. Thus he repeats at the start of the doctrine of the notion, that essence arises from being, and the notion from essence, hence ultimately also from being. He adds, however, interestingly and characteristically, 'But this becoming has the significance of a self-repulsion, so that it is rather the *outcome* which is the *unconditioned* and *original*.'¹⁰ In this admission, which, taken to its logical conclusion, would inevitably overthrow his entire logical system, or at least fundamentally alter it, we have the triumph of the ultimate reality of Hegel's ontological conception, i.e. that reality (the world of the notion) is ontologically primary, that essence is ontologically obtained from reality, and being from essence, by abstraction, and that therefore logic reproduces the true ontological relations in a distorted succession, though one that is necessary from the logical and methodological standpoint. This insight is still more visibly apparent in a similar treatment in the *Encyclopaedia*. Here Hegel directly raises the question as to why, given the priority of the notion, he does not deal with this at the beginning of his system. Here he takes it as self-evident that objectively (ontologically) it is the notion that forms the true beginning, and that being and essence are from an objective (ontological) standpoint its derivatives. He bases his defence of his procedure on the mode of presentation: 'If the Notion were put at the head of Logic, and defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of Being and Essence, the following question would come up: What are we to think under the terms "Being" and "Essence", and how do they come to be embraced in the unity of the Notion? But if we answered these questions, then our beginning with the Notion would be merely nominal.'¹¹ Behind this methodological concession there is of course

more than Hegel himself was aware of. Marx's dialectical materialist treatment of this question was to show that the starting-point of the not yet analysed, ontologically primary and relatively total complex does not exclude the regression in thought to abstracted elements, but in fact precisely requires it. It must simply be completely clear in this connection that the real point of departure was reality itself, that its dissection by abstraction leads to categories of reflection, and that the synthetic construction of these, which provides a path to knowledge of the reality, is not the progression of reality itself, even if the categories and relationships that thus arise must of course, as mental reproductions of reality, have an ontological and not a logical character. The internal division in Hegel's logic has its roots, here too, in the conception of the identical subject-object, which not only does not permit a clear distinction between ontological categories and logical and epistemological ones, not only constantly confuses them, but also permanently subordinates the ontological positions to the perspectives of the logical hierarchy, and in this way violates and distorts them. Where Hegel does find something fruitfully new, in the epistemological sense, this is either consciously or unconsciously directly dependent on his true ontology.

This situation is most clearly evident if we refer to the most important methodological discovery of Hegel, the reflection determinations. We believe, and hope to show in the following presentations, that this is the centre of his dialectic, both the dialectic of the dynamic and structure of reality itself that is independent of consciousness, and that of its different reflections in the subjective consciousness. It is only too understandable that Hegel himself directly poses this question as one of epistemology, even if in the major new sense of his own epistemology, profoundly different from that of his forerunners and followers, i.e. that of his *Phenomenology of Mind*. What is fundamental in this work, however, is the

methodological aspect: how the various stages, categories, etc. of human thought, that are simultaneously products and instruments of the mental and practical mastering of reality, arise, parallel with their own development, in the human consciousness; how their successive partial or total breakdowns lead to the evolution of modes of knowledge better adapted to the true understanding of reality, until a genuine assimilation of reality can arise in the form of the subject. In the following discussion we intend, on the basis of our criticism in the previous section, to set aside the specifically Hegelian solution, the transformation of substance into subject, and analyse only the real results of this process. It is characteristic that Hegel treats the rise of the reflection determinations in the *Encyclopaedia* in a section that also bears the title of 'Phenomenology'. He proceeds here from the view of the world at the level of sense-perception, and investigates how out of the interrelation between reality and the human attempts at mastering it through subjectivity, the latter raises itself to the level of the abstractive intellect or understanding [*Verstand*]. The 'natural' procedure of man is to find individual objects in reality and attempt to grasp these in their directly given form, in their apparent isolation. But this attempt spontaneously produces its opposite, the relating of the directly apparent objects to one another, and it is from this contradiction in the spontaneous behaviour towards reality that the reflection determinations arise. 'The content of sensuous consciousness is in itself dialectical. It is supposed to be *the* single, isolated individual; but. . . just by extending from itself the individual content of another it relates itself to another, proves that it goes out of and beyond itself, that it is dependent on another, is mediated by it and has the other within itself. The proximate truth of what is *immediately* individual is therefore its relatedness to another. The determinations of this relation are those which are called determinations of reflection.'¹² This movement of subjectivity

in the effort to grasp reality in thought gives rise to the understanding, the first immediate home of the reflection determinations.

This seems to involve first and foremost a question of epistemology. One, moreover, that was of decisive significance for the transition in which Hegelian philosophy took shape, not merely in a purely historical sense restricted to this period, but rather as an important and even central question for any serious thought about reality. These reflection determinations thus already surfaced in Kant, particularly in his most dialectical work, the *Critique of Judgement*. Here, of course, they have a purely epistemological character; they are distinguished purely by whether they follow in thought the path from the general to the particular, or vice versa. They have no direct connection with the problem that was decisive for Hegel, that of the transition from understanding to reason. In Kant's case, understanding and reason are placed in exclusive opposition to one another, in a metaphysical way. Pure reason is transcendent towards all phenomena, and can never attain an adequate empirical use. But while Kant's concept of reason carries with it the transcendental dialectic, the denial of any possibility of knowing things in themselves, romantic philosophy, starting with Schelling, generated an irrationalistic transcendence, in which reflection came to be seen as 'the polar opposite and hereditary foe of the absolute method of philosophy.'¹³ In this way, the one-sided criticism of the undialectical character of the mere understanding leads to a leap into transcendent irrationality; what is counterposed to the understanding is not, as with Hegel, a reason that arises out of its own contradictions, the leap is rather made to an abstractly intellectual conception, something that, as we have already remarked in another connection, also led to the abolition of contradictions taking the form of their obliteration in the absolute. Hegel already protested at the time of his collaboration with Schelling against such a

reduction of the understanding. He wrote in his Jena notebooks: 'Reason without understanding is nothing, though understanding is something without reason. The understanding cannot be dispensed with.'¹⁴

For Hegel, reason raises itself above understanding in so far as it recognizes the true—contradictory and dialectical—relationship between what appear to be completely autonomous and independently existing objects, in life, in the corresponding categories and categorical relations in objective reality, and in correct thought. Every act of reason is thus simultaneously a confirmation and an abolition of the understanding's conception of reality. Hegel depicts this opposition in the case of certain particular categories, in the following terms: 'That for the latter [reason], the object is determined in and for itself, is the identity of content and form, of universal and particular, whereas for the former [understanding] it falls apart into form and content, into universal and particular, and into an empty 'in-itself' to which the determinateness is added from outside; that, therefore, in the thinking of the Understanding, the content is indifferent to its form, while in the comprehensive thinking of Reason the content produces its form from itself.'¹⁵ Understanding and reason thus confront the same object world (not as with Kant the world of mere phenomena and that of the unknowable thing-in-itself); they certainly relate to it differently, but this difference precisely grows out of the necessarily contradictory character of the understanding as such, with immanent dialectical necessity, as its crowning and fulfilment (not in the sense of an insuperable opposition between the superficial empirical content of the understanding and a transcendent and irrational abstractly intellectual conception). Naturally, this organic and dialectical connection cannot efface the inherent opposition of the two; the attitude of reason expresses a behaviour towards reality appropriate to the nature of the latter: the knowledge that this consists primarily

of many-levelled dynamic complexes and their multilateral dynamic connections, whereas the understanding is only able to grasp the direct appearance and its abstract images. But however incisive this opposition may be, not only does reason always develop upwards *from* the understanding, but both—being oriented towards the same reality—use the same categories as principles for ordering the same, but differently grasped reality, i.e. the reflection determinations; it is 'only' that the understanding effects this in a falsely direct separation, reason however in a dialectically contradictory genuine coordination.

If we consider Hegel's epistemological path from understanding to reason, its epochal significance is easy to make clear. In contrast to earlier thinkers, or to his contemporaries, Hegel managed to lay the foundations for knowledge of a complex, dynamically contradictory reality, consisting of totalities, something that had defeated the epistemology of his predecessors. He applied the higher level of reason that was now attainable to the entire area of knowledge; he did not remain, as did the Enlightenment, at the level of the understanding; he did not shift rational knowledge, as Kant did, to the unknowable realm of the thing-in-itself, and his criticism of the understanding did not lead him, with Schelling and the Romantics, into the nebulous realm of irrationalism. It is thus quite justifiable to say, with Lenin, that the dialectic is a theory of knowledge.¹⁶ But Marxist epistemology, as a theory of the subjective dialectic, simultaneously always presupposes an ontology, i.e. a theory of the objective dialectic in reality, and since it therefore conceives the process of mimesis as an autonomous form for the reproduction of reality in thought, this thesis needs a certain explanatory supplementation. It is well-known how, in the epistemology of the modern era, mimesis as good as completely vanished; the exception is philosophical materialism, where—if we leave out the genial presentiments of Diderot—it assumed a

restricted, mechanically photographic form. Now it is one of the forward-pointing aspects of the ambiguity that reigns in Hegel's doctrine of the identical subject-object that it contains the germ of dialectical mimesis as a hidden component. For, as the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology* requires, there is an epistemological progression, that of the mastering of the world as a whole in thought, thus also involving the progress from understanding to reason, that runs parallel with that from the direct mode of appearance of reality to its essence. Thus the doctrine of the identical subject-object does not simply permit the recognition of the absolute priority of being-in-itself to its own becoming-for-us in knowledge, but the logic of things itself also produces, in cases of a correct coordination of the subjective and objective principles, the definite, though never consciously elaborated, predominance of the latter. Indeed, while these interwoven parallel courses of subjectivity and objectivity lead close to a mimesis, they lead simultaneously, even if with similar ambiguity, to the overcoming of its modern, mechanical application, and to a rapprochement to the more dialectical one of Aristotle. It should of course not be overlooked in this connection that the German philosophy of this period, since Kant in fact, had begun to elaborate the active role of the subject in the knowledge process. But it should also be noted here that Hegel strictly rejected the creative activity of the subject in the sense of Kant and Fichte. For Hegel, this activity was never more than a moment of the indestructible inter-connection between subjectivity and objectivity, and thus the essence of the activity was to succeed in establishing a relationship to the world that would not prevent the revelation of the world's objective nature, but would rather promote this, precisely by penetrating and transcending the immediate forms of appearance. 'To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn presents a rational aspect.'¹⁷ This is far nearer to the Goethe whom Heine called the

'mirror of the world', than to the one-sided intellectual activism of Kant and Fichte.

It is quite justifiable to consider Hegel's dialectical theory of knowledge independently from ontology; the esoteric approaches to mimesis are only by-products of this ultim te position towards objective reality. Having established this, we can return to the reflection determinations with a greater degree of insight. Everyone knows that these form the central categories of Hegel's doctrine of essence. But essence, even in Hegel's false logicistic ontology, is not the product of thought, but rather of being. The thought that presses forwards from understanding to reason can therefore only grasp the essence—with the reflection determinations essence-appearance-illusion [*Schein*—because, according to Hegel, reality has objectively trodden the path from being to essence, independent of thought. The truth, profundity and universality of these determinations become all the more manifestly valid, the more decisively their true ontological characteristic is liberated from the logicist constraint of the identical subject-object. For in this conception of Hegel's, the ontological transition from completely abstract being to the far more specific and concrete essence remains a puzzling, inexplicable, idealist declaration, whereas on the converse assumption that, although the path of knowledge certainly leads from abstract being to the concrete essence (along the road of abstraction), it is in reality the far more concrete and complex essence that forms the ontological starting-point, from which it is then possible to obtain by abstraction the concept of being (naturally also a primarily ontological concept), this whole logicistic fog is dispelled. (We shall see in the following discussion that this complex and total character of the essence in the ontological sense is also only a relative one, and is determined by the concrete reality.) Thus it is not hard to understand that the categorical construction of the essence, as approximation to a (relatively) total

complex, is based on a reciprocal arrangement of categories that are apparently autonomous, but in reality inseparably condition one another. We are now at the level of reason, and have reached the reflection determinations.

No matter how Hegel may have deduced the existential character of the essence, this is not only conceived as part of, and a step towards, reality (which itself is something new and important), but also at the same time as a complex, and not as an isolated category. Here we precisely have the origin of the reflection determinations. Essence, appearance and illusion, in their existent autonomy, are age-old categories, and it is even no new discovery to contrast them with one another. Agnosticism and scepticism always proceeded from the antitheses perceivable here, which also play a determining role in Kant's theories. Hegel himself stresses this tradition in the history of knowledge in relation to the conception of illusion, appearance and essence, and shows how while this on the one hand contains the entire contents of the existing world, on the other hand the internal correlation with essence is denied and the antithesis one-sidedly put into a central position.¹⁸ Behind these very differing conceptions reigns a theological inheritance that becomes ever more concealed with the passage of time: the comprehension of the essence is specific to a divine thought, while human thought is only able to grasp the world of illusion and appearance. It is clear that with the development of modern bourgeois society and its sciences, this antithesis becomes more and more secularized. But as our earlier analyses have shown, philosophical principles that were originally based on theology did not have to undergo any radical transformation. In the last analysis, what the Bellarminian requirement made of science, which we have time and again found traces of, involves, is that science should leave the exploration of the essence to religion, and content itself with practical research in the world of appearances. The methods involved naturally

get more refined over time. The predominance of epistemological problems even leads to a conception of the essence that makes it apparently accessible to human scientific insight, in such a way that the essence is to be simply an abstraction created by the subject, obtained by abstraction from sense experience, but which, precisely for this reason, has no more to do with reality as this exists in itself than do its own foundations, the experience of the senses in observation and perception; sometimes even less than these. And even when this process of abstraction is separated from experience, and receives an autonomous form—in Kant's case an *a priori* one—the unbridgeable separation of appearance and essence (as ontological categories) remains unchanged. These lines of development, with many variations, run right through to contemporary neo-positivism.

Hegel's philosophical revolution, his discovery of and focussing on the reflection determinations, consists above all in the ontological removal of the chasm of absolute separation between appearance and essence. In so far as the essence is conceived neither as existing and transcendent, nor as the product of a process of mental abstraction, but rather as a moment of a dynamic complex, in which essence, appearance and illusion continuously pass into one another, the reflection determinations show themselves in this new conception as primarily ontological in character. We already know only too well how Hegel treated these ontological connections predominantly in a logicistic complex, to prevent us from perceiving, behind what appear to be purely logical presentations, the ontological relationships hidden in them. In his description, Hegel proceeds from the initial direct and hence abstract and undeveloped givenness of such complexes, but the relationships of essence are already clearly perceptible even at this stage of knowledge: '... what confronts it [essence] is only *illusory* being [*Schein*]. The illusory being, however, is essence's own positing. . . this illusory being is

not something external to or other than essence; on the contrary, it is essence's own illusory being. The showing of this illusory being within essence itself is *reflection*.¹⁹ That essence and illusion, irrespective of their sharp contrast, belong inseparably together, and that the one can in no way exist without the other, provides the ontological foundation for the epistemological path from understanding to reason; the former remains imprisoned at the level of the immediate givenness of contradiction, which is however itself an ontological property of the complex, while the latter gradually raises itself up to comprehend the complex as a dialectical totality—via a series of transitions that cannot be analysed here.

The dialectic of the reality that is recognised by reason thus consists in the moments of reality being simultaneously and inseparably both autonomous and correlated, and their truth is immediately falsified if one of these relations is given an absolute importance that excludes its opposite, and also if the differences and contradictions are obliterated in its purity. Essence, appearance and illusion are thus reflection determinations in so far as each of them expresses their relationship; every appearance is the appearance of essence, and every essence appears in some way or other, neither can be present without this dynamic and contradictory relationship, and each of them continuously preserves and gives up its own existence in so far as it enters into this opposed relation. The reflection determinations, correctly grasped, thus destroy not only the rigid duality of seemingly autonomous entities, which is inherited from theology but is still effective today, but at the same time also the similarly old prejudice that the immediately fixed forms of objectivity, formed by analogy with thing-ness, have some kind of ontological priority over the mere relationships, connections, etc. that separate and unite them, and in which their actual interactions are expressed. These relationships stand ontologically at the same

level of reality as objects in the narrower sense. Both are similarly recognized by reason. and in both cases agreement with reality is the sole criterion of correct thought. In Hegel's view, then, it is no longer possible to speak of objects existing in such and such a way, but their relationships, connections, etc. being mental products of a process of abstraction or some other experience.

It is naturally impossible here to analyse this dialectic in more detail. It is sufficient to establish that with this conception of the connections between essence, appearance and illusion, Hegel indicated the general basis of reflection determinations. The further arguments of this middle section of his *Logic* extend to the most important categories of reality and its adequate knowledge by reason. Here, too, a comprehensive and all-round presentation of the problems is impossible, and we shall have to confine ourselves to a few central points. We have just seen how knowledge of the reflection determinations, as characteristics of the structure and dynamic of reality, provides the dialectical response to an age-old question distorted by theology and crypto-theology. Further concretization in the application of this new method leads us directly into the heart of the dialectic. The relationships that Hegel investigates, in other words, are those in which the most primitive form of being of all objects (including processes, etc.) is visible as that of their relationship to themselves and simultaneously to every other mode of being, in a series of categories of revulsion into objectivity running from identity through to contradiction. Here again, a break is made with the traditional view, in so far as Hegel demonstrates the difference in identity itself, and the implicit presence of contradiction in simple distinction; the reflection character is discovered in the apparently logical and tautological category of identity, while, and closely connected, Hegel discloses the indissoluble reality of the reference to the other. This section in particular is the object of a pre-

dominantly logical development, which arises directly and spontaneously from the ever logical treatment of the material being discussed, but for that very reason more often conceals what is fruitful and new than exposes it, which is why a freer interpretation that sometimes goes beyond the text itself is unavoidable here. We believe, however, that a presentation of this kind can remain completely within the framework of Hegel's ultimate intentions, and does not have to introduce anything foreign into his ideas, or at least nothing foreign to a tendency that is constantly at work in his thought. His Jena notebooks contain a most interesting confession in connection with the relation of actual research to universal principles, which clearly reflects the internal struggle of the young Hegel between logical principles and ontologically conceived objectivity. This passage gives our interpretation a basis in Hegel's own mental conflicts: 'In studying a science, it is necessary not to get distracted by principles. These are general and do not signify much. It seems that only that which is particular is significant. Principles are often even bad. They are the consciousness of things, and things are often better than consciousness.'²⁰

Hegel's polemic against the tautology $A = A$ once again proceeds from the ontological priority of the complex as against its isolated elements. (We should not forget in this connection the decisive role played by logical tautology in neopositivist epistemology.) Hegel's efforts here are directed towards demonstrating that in identity itself, as well as in its relation to the other, difference cannot be eliminated; the logical form in which Hegel expresses this is that 'the law of identity itself, and still more the law of contradiction, is not merely of *analytic* but of *synthetic* nature.'²¹ This already shows that in his eyes identity is a category of existing objectivity, and does not just belong to formal logic. This has two important consequences for the ontological comprehension of this series of problems, which Hegel seldom draws

in his own words, but which are nevertheless implicitly present throughout his arguments.

The first of these could be put in something like the following terms: the persistence and the loss of identity is itself a real process. Here the specifically Hegelian extension of Heraclitus' doctrine of the universality and omnipotence of becoming is expressed from a new angle. In other words, if identity is an objective property (identity of something with itself), and if this object stands in continuous process-like interaction with its surroundings, its very existence being the temporary transient result of an internal process, brought forth by the reciprocal play of its components, then continuous changes will be necessarily brought about, and the question will constantly arise as to whether the object in this state of change is still 'the same'? This question has a special ontological importance, in so far as it must be answered very differently at the different levels of being, according to the very different structure and dynamic involved of the internal and external interrelations. This can give rise to important and interesting questions even at the level of inorganic nature, particularly in the area of what Hartmann called 'patterns'. The situation in organic nature is more complicated, and ontologically more important. Since every organic being maintains its existence in a process of internal reproduction (in the dual sense, both ontogenetic and phylogenetic), while simultaneously involved in continuous interaction with its environment, this persistence or loss of identity is a concrete problem of the kind that any individual science that is to be taken seriously must constantly concern itself with.

Still more complicated interrelations arise at the level of social being. Without even being able to indicate here the dynamic components of this, it is evident that it is a scientific question of the first order as to whether a nation, a class, or any other entity down to an individual, maintains or loses its own identity. It is sufficient to point out how Hegel deals

with the principle of the particularity of the subject. In antiquity this was the decisive moment of the downfall of state and society, while in the present it is the foundation of their existence.²² The fact that what Hegel relates here in an ideological form was later conceived by Marx with scientific exactness as a change in the socio-economic functions of commercial and money capital between these two periods, shows perhaps still more clearly the importance of this problem for the ontology of social being. The preponderantly logicistic treatment that this problem received at the hands of Hegel has had the result that it has usually been either attacked or defended also on logical grounds, generally very unfruitfully. Our present discussions cannot even claim to delineate the concealed ontological aspects extensively, let alone answer them. All that we have tried to do is to indicate the problem itself and its far-reaching consequences, which simultaneously cast light on how decisive for the Hegelian dialectic is its formulation as identity and non-identity.

This leads us to the second problem, the dialectical chain that proceeds from identity, via difference and distinction, to end up with opposition and contradiction. Here too, the later influence of these fundamentally important analyses of Hegel's has been relatively slight, once more because the logical form of his presentation has concealed the ontological contents contained in it, and led to the result that while a lot of attention has been paid to the two extremes of identity and contradiction, the two connecting transition stages have generally been overlooked and ignored. This is all the more striking in so far as a question that is methodologically similar, the transition from quantity to quality, has enjoyed great popularity among Marxists and their opponents. (We shall return later to the epistemological and ontological foundations of this structural affinity.) Speaking quite generally, what is involved is that, in the ontological realm of the reflection determinations, the growth or decline of a moment,

in the dialectical relationship that constitutes any complex, does not take the form of a continuous process; on the contrary, these interactions involve leaps at different points, sudden changes in the structure and dynamic of the complex that vary with the concrete context. These features are what objectively lie at the basis of those of Hegel's arguments that we now have to deal with, and these are at the highest level of generality, unfortunately here too with a predominantly logical form. It is still interesting to observe, however, how here and there important ontological positions break through, and bring to light the hidden ontological foundations of the logical arguments. Thus Hegel says of difference: 'Difference as such is already *implicitly* contradiction; for it is the *unity* of sides which are, only in so far as they are *not one*—and it is the *separation* of sides which are, only as separated in the *same relation*.'²³ The dynamic and dialectical connection that Hegel sees here, i.e. that difference is the form in which contradiction exists in itself, is generally in line with his conception of all development; we can refer to the passages from the *Phenomenology* quoted earlier, according to which everything new at first emerges in abstract form (merely in itself), gradually to develop into more concrete forms. At this high level of generality, developmental tendencies of this kind obtain an increased importance. They show how, in the course of simple growth, certain complexes of objects and their relations can pass through radical and qualitative transformations, which however are not just 'sudden', and not ultimately the product of chance, but are precisely in their decisive becoming other the products of gradual capillary changes. Findings of this kind are extremely significant for ontology as a whole. We may indicate briefly that in the case of higher and more complicated modes of being, these relationships thereby acquire higher characteristics of form. This again produces a series of ever greater and hence qualitatively different complications, running from the simple

forms of objectivity of inorganic nature, via patterns, via the organic world (e.g. the phenomenon of mutation), right through to social being, a series in which—again following the law of the ontological dialectic—the higher forms contain in them something indeducibly new, but which can still only come into being on the basis of the more simple; without being-in-itself, there can be no being-for-itself.

If we now pass on to the third major group of reflection determinations, immediacy and mediation, we are confronted in our presentation by the difficulty that while Hegel deploys this pair of determinations continuously and centrally throughout his philosophy, he nowhere deals with them in particular, not even in connection with the reflection determinations; even though the most fleeting glance is sufficient to perceive what is essential in this pair of determinations, namely their specific property of being objectively inseparable in the case of independent and autonomous modes of appearance, and subjectively their involvement in the elevation from understanding to reason. Hegel naturally also stresses this mode of appearance, drawing attention to the fact 'that, though the two "moments" or factors present themselves as distinct, still neither of them can be absent, nor can one exist apart from the other.'²⁴ In the preceding remarks he has indicated that both of these are to be found 'in consciousness'. Here he touches, though as we shall see in a one-sided way, on an important particularity of these reflection determinations, i.e. their linkage with the knowing subject. Now we believe that this contention of Hegel's is only true in the case of immediacy, and not in that of mediation. Mediation is a most objective and very general categorical summarization of all the forces, processes, etc. that objectively determine the coming into being, the functioning, and the facticity of a complex. Thus there can be neither in nature nor in society any object which is not in this sense—and it is also the sense that Hegel has in mind—a mediated

object, a product of mediations. Mediation in this sense is an objective, ontological category, which must be present in any reality independently of the subject.

Hegel was on the other hand largely correct in defining immediacy as a category of consciousness. Of course, what consciousness conceives as immediacy is similarly linked to definite objective facts, and only induced by them. For on the one hand, all processes of mediation involve the existence of complexes, and this situation exists objectively even if it is not conceived by a consciousness as the immediacy of these complexes. This is particularly relevant for inorganic nature, where an immediacy that exists in itself in this way only becomes in the human consciousness an existence for us, and has no ontological significance for the mediation process. On the other hand, however, there is also a real efficacy of the immediate which does not have to go through any kind of consciousness, and in all cases really does enter into a reflection relationship with the mediation. This is the case with organic nature, where the living being, whether plant or animal, comes into a reciprocal relationship with its environment as a self-reproducing whole. Here complexes are in objectively immediate interaction with other complexes, the transiently complete and functioning whole entering undestroyed into an immediately necessary connection with another similar whole. (The fact that science has gradually discovered the mediations that these relationships of immediacy have with one another does not affect this question.) It is only in specifically human, social being, even if already at a very primitive stage, in labour and in speech, that immediacy and mediations are both separate and combined, and appear as ontological reflection determinations. Here we are thus confronted with a categorical relationship that is characteristic of social being alone, even though, as we have seen, even a specifically social determination of this kind could not be present without having had its 'forerunners' in nature. Hegel

also overlooks the social significance of this reflection determination, as is shown by his analysis of habit as 'second nature' in the *Philosophy of Mind*.

If this sketch is not to extend to an entire volume, it is impossible to interpret the whole doctrine of essence in this sense. As far as this can be taken as a whole, it must just be noted that it is precisely here that the idealist ontology of the identical subject-object exhibits its decisive distorting elements, i.e. the logical 'deduction' of one reflection determination from another, and their consequent hierarchical arrangement (the later, higher category as the 'truth' of the preceding lower one). Besides the anomalies of the logical hierarchy that we have already indicated, this gives rise to a new and most important ontological problem, the problem of the dimensions of categories. We shall only be able to elucidate in the further course of this discussion to what extent genuine ontological categories, as characteristics of an intrinsically heterogeneous reality, are modes of expression of the multi-dimensional character of this. If we take such reflection determinations as form and content, or essence and appearance, it is evident that they are mutually heterogeneous, that they reveal various dimensions of the reality in process, and that they therefore frequently overlap one another; that their mutual connection can only be adequately conceived in thought, in the transient and fundamentally concrete individual case, by analysis of its particularity. Thought, however, just as necessarily homogenizes, as the reality that exists in itself is heterogeneous. This gives rise to very important methodological problems for ontology, which at this level of generality can only be raised, and not solved. What we can emphasize here is that a continuous ontological self-correction of this homogenizing thought is necessary here. And it is similarly evident that the strongest homogenizing tendencies are at work precisely in the formation of logical

and mathematical concepts. This is the reason for the internal discrepancies that we have repeatedly stressed in Hegel's logically oriented presentation of his ontology, as well as, in the opposite direction, for the distortion of reality by neopositivism. The indispensable need for the ontological mode of treatment demonstrates itself in this collaboration as a method that should in no way remain confined to philosophy as such, but should rather emerge spontaneously in each scientific area; thus the requirement that mathematical formulas in physics, biology, economic, etc. should always be interpreted physically, biologically, economically, and so on, if the concrete problems themselves are not to be distorted, has an ontological foundation, but is at the same time an indispensable postulate for true scientific concreteness and exactness, which important scientists, who have held fast to 'naive realism' despite the pressure of prejudices to the contrary, constantly clearly feel, even if they are not always philosophically equipped to express it adequately.

One such question of this multi-dimensionality is concealed in Hegel's treatments of form as a reflection determination. Here Hegel sees a great deal of the ontological complexity of the question, in so far as he discusses form in three ways, as the reflection partner of essence, of matter, and of content. Once again it is the succession and deduction of one determination from the other that is the least fruitful aspect of the presentation. It is certainly correct that these three reflection relations mutually condition one another and pass over into each other, but the relation of form and matter in no way 'follows' from that of essence and form, nor the relation of form and content from the former; the succession and 'conclusion' could equally well be the other way round, for although what is involved here is the generality of the form characteristic, this comes into play in various dimensions that often cross and overlay one another, and has nothing in common with this kind of 'deduction'. All the

more important and consequential, therefore, are Hegel's attempts to give the universality of form a dialectical foundation. This involves him in a dual polemic, both against those who consider the content as the sole determinant of objectivity and ascribe the form a mere accessory significance, and against those who see only in the form an active, working principle, as against which matter is something 'indifferently determined' or passive. We do not have to go into the history of philosophy to see that both these two extremes have played a great role in human thought, and occasionally still do so. Hegel's refutations generally have a predominantly epistemological character; he proceeds from the directly given pictorial representations, analyses the contradictions of the separating and isolating procedure of the understanding, and in this way seeks to grasp the level of reason, the dialectical connection and opposition of these reflection determinations. In this way, he often arrives at genuine dialectical formulations of the reflection relations. 'This, which appears as *activity of form*, is also no less a *movement belonging to matter itself*.'²⁵ Or, regarding form and content, 'The essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and Content is that the content is not formless, but has the form in its own self, quite as much as the form is external to it. . . We are here in presence, implicitly, of the absolute correlation of content and form: viz. their reciprocal revulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion of form into content, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form.'²⁶

The great advance that Hegel's conception of form as a reflection determination represents, consists above all in the fact that the conception of form teleologically conditioned through labour can no longer be projected onto nature, as it so strikingly is in Aristotle's ontology; in this way, too, an end is put to the one-sided and false priority of form as the sole active principle, without its activity and relative

determining function being in this way disparaged. This function now rather appears in almost correct proportions as a moment of a dialectical interaction. If we put in the proviso 'almost', this is because Hegel's frequently correct and profound conception of interaction still suffers from the distorting tendencies of his system. Since the system can only ascribe a really decisive, direction-giving ontological role to the Idea itself, this interaction must be a kind of balance between forces of fundamentally equal status, a kind of static synthesis of dynamic forces. For the real, ontologically significant development, however, the decisive interactions are first and foremost those in which what Marx was later to call the 'predominant moment' comes into play. Hegel, however, only ascribes such a role to the Idea itself, and he therefore inevitably underestimates the ontological importance of this kind of interaction, which is otherwise correctly understood. Hegel expresses his conception in the following terms: 'Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground, supposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should not rest content with applying this relation. If we get no further than studying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity, we are taking up an attitude which leaves matters utterly incomprehensible.'²⁷

This gives the ontological findings produced by reflection determinations, which are so important, a double disadvantage. On the one hand nature appears as something that, considered as a whole, is static, which, as we have seen, corresponds to Hegel's false overall conception; on the other hand it becomes in many cases impossible to investigate correctly the increasing importance of the 'predominant moment' in the interactions and interrelations at the various stages of being. In a few instances Hegel himself sees this as a problem, as when in the *Encyclopaedia*, in the same para-

graph already quoted, he rejects the generalized concept of formlessness, and calls what it is customary to describe by this, 'the defect of the right form.'²⁸ This is completely correct in the case of the ontology of social being, and this is where Hegel takes his example from; but it is only so because here the form proceeds from a teleological project based on the necessary alternatives of right and wrong. Thus for example a deliberate artistic production can be 'formless' in Hegel's sense, while a plant that is stunted because of unfavourable conditions is in no way formless, despite its stunted form. Similar weaknesses could be established as regards Hegel's discussions of part and whole, or external and internal, even though these are in many places extremely important. The direct reason for this is that while Hegel certainly recognized correctly the teleology involved in labour as primary, he expanded this into a quite general principle (teleology as the 'truth' of mechanism and chemism in the philosophy of nature), which led to the essence of teleology and its specific significance in the ontology of social being—'posited' teleology and spontaneously effective causality as reflection determinations—being obscured.

To conclude our analysis of Hegel's doctrine of essence, as the home of the reflection determinations, we must cast a brief glance at his treatment of the categories of modality. Here his genuinely ontological tendencies break through, in particular important passages, still more strongly than in other areas. In particular, he rejects the Kantian conception of their nature as categories of mere knowledge, and decisively directs himself to their ontological interpretation. This is already expressed in the way that he conceives reality as the centre of this area. For it is evident that for both epistemology and logic, necessity must form the focal point of a consideration of modality, while for any genuine ontology, reality is the totality to which all modal determinations, including necessity, must be subordinated. What we have in mind here is

of course a this-sided ontology, immanent in the world, and not a theological or crypto-theological one. For in the latter kind, the universe is first and foremost treated as governed by an absolute necessity; the irrevocable facticity of reality, perhaps its most important immanently ontological determination, thus becomes merely a mode of appearance, if not an illusion, behind which, in various manners according to the various theologies, absolute necessity, purpose, the will of God, etc. are supposedly made visible by way of revelation and results deduced from this. But even theories based on a natural-scientific view of the world, if they conceive the cosmos as governed by an absolute and strict necessity, arrive unintentionally at a similarly fatalistic conception of reality focussed on nature, leading this to lose its immanent, actual character, and seem to be subject to a kind of predestination (without God), whether known or unknown. This latter variant is today predominantly only of historical significance, since the more developed natural-scientific conception has long since passed beyond this position; the defamation only haunts occasional trivial literary fantasies such as Nietzsche's 'eternal recurrence'; in Hegel's time, of course, it was more widespread and influential than it is today.

Hegel's theory of modality exhibits a strong tendency to overcome attitudes of this kind and to give reality the central position that is its due. When he concludes his complicated arguments over necessity with the words, 'it is so, because it is',²⁹ this sentence implies that necessity is based on reality and not the other way round. On the other hand, however, for reasons which we have already discussed in other connections, in dealing with the inconsistency in the treatment of teleology, the question that was later to become celebrated and fruitful, that of 'blind' necessity, is turned into something teleological, or even theological, in so far as the overcoming of this blindness is linked with the revelation of

purpose. Here, although Hegel correctly refers back to his excellent interpretation of labour, his uncritical generalization of this relationship leads him to posit a providence. The transcendence of 'blindness' by insight into necessity loses its rational, concrete sense, and falls back into the old teleology, precisely because the generalization reaches beyond social being, beyond the socially ontological significance of the known necessity. The genuine ontological approach to the subordination of necessity to reality is not consistently carried through.

All this reflects a deep uncertainty which has its source in Hegel's dual ontology. He is on the one hand one of the precursors of those who sought to conceive reality in its entire contradictory complexity—as the complex and dynamic mutual relation of dynamic complexes—while on the other hand the over-extension of reason, which in various forms dominated many earlier philosophies, is still strongly at work in his own. The simplest experiences of ordinary life have taught men that the processes of their existence in objective reality are rationally comprehensible, i.e. that the extension of understanding and reason can be important in the mastering of reality, precisely because these instruments are able to faithfully reproduce in thought what is essential and universal in the facts and their succession. Hence the autonomy of understanding and reason is not illusory, precisely because the essential, universal and lawful are not directly given and simple to reproduce, but must rather be elaborated by means of difficult, autonomous work. The more the rationality of reality is elaborated in thought, the more strongly grows the illusion that the totality of reality can be conceived as a unitary and rational system. Conceptions of this kind are at the basis of many theological and teleological systems, and they also appear in more secularized forms. The increasing concrete knowledge of the facts about nature, society and man refutes this conception with ever

greater force, and is expressed, as we have seen in the case of Hegel, in the conflicting form of an acceptance and a simultaneous rejection of an all-governing universal necessity revealing a unitary reason, and in a recognition of the ultimate, insurpassable facticity of reality. This latter tendency is extremely fruitful in Hegel's work, in particular in the conception of necessity and contingency as correlated reflection determinations, even though in this question, too, he does not carry his own important insights to their conclusion. Naturally enough, we also find in this complex logicistic tautologies, as for example when Hegel defines necessity as 'the union of possibility and actuality.' It is characteristic of his insecurity, which is produced by his own correct critical sense in questions of this kind, that although he takes this as 'rightly defined', he immediately adds that 'this mode of expression, however, gives a superficial and therefore unintelligible description of the very difficult notion of necessity.'³⁰

More important are Hegel's attempts to get closer to the reflection relationship between necessity and contingency. Here Hegel considers the contingent as 'what may or may not be, what may be in one way or in another, whose being or not-being, and whose being in this wise or otherwise, depends not upon itself but on something else.'³¹ Here Hegel certainly grasps one aspect of contingency correctly, although here too the correct intention is not consistently carried through. For the ultimate foundation surely lies in this reference to the other, i.e. in the fact that while an individual causal sequence, considered in isolation, may well be strictly causally determined, it can in reality only work itself out within a complex, in which the relation of the events involved takes the form of contingency. For instance, if a tile from a roof falls on someone's head, its movement is certainly causally determined; so possibly is the fact that the man in question happened to pass this place exactly at that

precise time, perhaps because it is his normal daily route to work. The contingent thus arises only in the context of the concrete complex, in the mutual relation of heterogenous moments of a complex process. On the other hand one can also say that the contingent arises precisely from internal series of determination, in so far as with any species of thing, each individual will possess elements of contingency in relation to the species. Hegel saw clearly this heterogenous richness of nature, but because he rejected a development completed in nature itself, he did not arrive at the dialectic of contingency and necessity that was later to form the categorical basis of Darwinism. His insight was much clearer in the case of social being. He recognized, for example, the 'decisive role' that the contingent plays in speech, in law, in art, etc. However, the already mentioned over-extension of reason led him to consider the abolition of contingency in a purely epistemological way, from the one-sided standpoint of human practice, and hence to see it as actually abolished in the insight into the relationships that cause it, in the practical aptitude of mastering its results, whereas ontologically this is simply a question of knowledge and of the practical domination of contingency. Yet Hegel's correct definitions precisely show that in the complexes that constitute the reality of both nature and society, contingency stands to necessity in an insurpassable reflection relation, and that it is insurpassably entwined with necessity in the facticity of any reality whatsoever. Hegel's two ontologies are also indissolubly entwined: the over-extension of necessity on the one hand, the correct conception of reality on the other, and they bind together in their specific synthesis categories that are heterogenous, but indissolubly linked by reflection determinations.

To this extent Hegel's attempts to apply the method of reflection determinations to the categories of modality have been fruitful. In this connection Hegel always treats pairs of

modalities together, and he thus arrives quite close to correct positions and solutions, when his logicism does not bar the way. His attempt to consider the problem of possibility in a reflexive unity with reality is therefore particularly fruitful. For Hegel, possibility is always something that really exists; it only remains possibility in relation to another, changing reality. 'The actuality which constitutes the possibility of something is therefore not *its own possibility*, but the in-itself of another *actual*; it is itself the actuality which ought to be sublated, possibility as possibility only.'³² This fine and profound train of thought can have far-reaching results for ontology. Hegel hints at these in several places, and at times even expresses them clearly. Thus he defines the concept of property, in a quite other connection, but also in the context of reflection determinations, in the following way: 'A thing has the property of effecting this or that in another thing and of expressing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation to it. It demonstrates this property only under the condition that the other thing has a corresponding constitution, but at the same time the property is *peculiar* to the first thing and is its self-identical substrate [*Grundlage*]; it is for this reason that this reflected quality is called *property*.'³³ Property thus appears here as a possibility, but only in so far as it is related to another existent, as the possibility both of the thing whose property it is, and of another process.

In our belief, the way is now clear for an understanding of the possibility within reality. (This ontological form of possibility must be very clearly separated from that in which specific forms of reflections of reality which are homogeneously reduced to quantity, given that they are not self-contradictory, are able to do service in elucidating the reality, as in the case of mathematics and geometry.) The possibilistic character of property—which is also an example of the fluid boundaries between form of being and form of process for real objects—also enables the difference in levels of being to

be specified categorically, even though Hegel himself made no attempt at this. An ontological analysis of the life process already shows (Hartmann in particular recognized this, despite his mistaken basic conception of possibility in general) that new adaptations, new developments, etc. would be impossible without a certain lability in the internal structure and processes of the living being. Adaptation to radically altered conditions, and the preservation or higher development of individual and species which this involves, thus presupposes certain properties in the life process which, regardless of the extent to which they have been correctly disclosed by science, are in a position to figure as possibilities for such a change, for a becoming other. The persistence of the conditions of life through basic alterations can in certain circumstances also be ontologically conceived in this sense. And it scarcely needs detailed proof that this possibility function of properties increases so far in social being, both extensively and intensively, that quite new qualities emerge.

Here, too, there will be no dispute that the reflection determinations conceived in this way stand in the centre of the Hegelian dialectic. The only question is how great an effect this centre possesses. Hegel himself confines their validity of the middle section of his *Logic*, the doctrine of essence. In a paragraph of the *Encyclopaedia* that summarizes the fundamentals of this question, he traces the hierarchical progress in logic and therewith the area of validity of the reflection determinations: 'Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is *development*: by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present.'³⁴ Without wishing to discuss here the extent to which this division that Hegel makes is tenable from the standpoint of his hierarchical logic, we venture to assert that it decisively contradicts that genuine and fruitful ontology of Hegel's that

we have so far sought to elaborate. We believe that what Hegel formulates as the decisive distinction between the logic of being and the logic of the essence, in other words the 'transition into something else', in contrast to the 'bringing something else to light', is not tenable ontologically.

This untenableness is evident above all in the fact that Hegel is himself forced to anticipate, unavowedly, the method and structure of the reflection determinations, when he investigates dialectically the individual categories of the logic of being. Thus he says of 'something': 'Something. . . stands, therefore, in a *relation* to its otherness and is not simply its otherness. The otherness is at once contained in it and also still *separate* from it; it is a *being-for-other*.' In his further elaborations, Hegel fixes the two opposites 'something' and 'other' in terms of being-for-other and otherness. He correctly maintains that something and other fall apart, and goes on to concretize this relationship in genuinely dialectical terms: 'But their truth is their relation; being-for-other and being-in-itself are, therefore, the above determinations posited as *moments* of one and the same something, as determinations which are relations and which remain in their unity, in the unity of determinate being. Each, therefore, at the same time, also contains within itself its other moment which is distinguished from it.' Hegel concludes this description of the something, it is plain to see, at the level and in the categorical forms of the reflection determinations: 'Being-in-itself and being-for-other are, in the first instance, distinct; but that something also has *within it* the same character that it is *in itself*, and, conversely, that what it is as being-for-other it also is in itself—this is the identity of being-in-itself and being-for-other, in accordance with the determination that the something itself is one and the same something of both moments, which, therefore, are undividedly present in it.'³⁵ I believe there can be no doubt that this quite correct dialectical analysis of the something could have been inserted in the

doctrine of essence without any word being changed. And in concluding this train of thought Hegel himself refers by analogy to his explanations of internality and externality, i.e. as a typical case of a relationship on the basis of the reflection determinations. Here, too, we can not go through the entire doctrine of being to show that the reflection character is at work at every decisive stage of the investigation. We can simply indicate the section on being-for-self, in which Hegel analyses the relationship of this to itself and to other objects that exist for themselves as attraction and repulsion. He establishes the relationship of the two moments to one another, and their coordination, in terms of attraction being at work in the repulsion itself, in which way the duality that would make being-for-self into something exclusive is abolished: 'repulsion as the positing of the many, attraction as the positing of the one', show 'that attraction, too, is attraction only *through the mediation* of repulsion, just as repulsion is repulsion through the mediation of attraction.'³⁶ We believe that this relationship too, taken ontologically, is not essentially different from the cases that are presented as reflection determinations in the doctrine of essence.

The reflection relation arises still more simply and obviously in the most famous and influential part of the doctrine of being, the relation of quality and quantity. It completely corresponds to the principles of construction of Hegel's Logic, as we have described these in the previous section, that he first of all fits quality into the logical hierarchy, and only after he has also deduced quantity, by logical means, does he come to speak, in the chapter on measure and relations of measure, of their concrete dialectical connection, so that it could appear as if quality and quantity were forms of being of objects that were of a different order and independent of one another, and that at a certain stage they come into that reciprocal relationship with one another customarily expressed as the transition of one into the other.

This appearance, however, is a product of Hegel's mode of presentation that we criticized in the previous section, as well as of the false ideas of its ontological character that are linked to this, and which again have their roots in the idealist metaphysic of the identical subject-object. Hegel himself says of measure: 'Everything that exists has a magnitude and this magnitude belongs to the nature of the something itself.'³⁷ Here it is clearly expressed that the quantitative determination of any object whatsoever is indissolubly in a relationship of simultaneity with its qualitative mode of being. Hegel himself explains this mode of being of quantity and quality in unmistakably clear terms, as something that in the case of any object is only separable in abstraction, and not in reality: 'These qualities are related to each other according to their determination as measures—which determination is their exponent. But they are already implicitly related to each other in the *being-for-self* of measure; the quantum in its dual character is both external and specific so that each of the distinct quantities possesses this twofold determination and is at the same time inseparably linked with the other; it is in this way alone that the qualities are determined. They are therefore not only simply determinate beings existing for each other but they are posited as inseparable and the specific magnitude connected with them is a qualitative unity—a single determination of measure in which, in accordance with their Notion, they are implicitly bound up with each other. Measure is thus the *immanent* quantitative relationship of *two* qualities to each other.'³⁸

On reading these and other similar explanations of Hegel's as to the real relation of quality and quantity, it is hard to see how this differs from such typical reflection determinations as that of form and content, internal and external, etc. The fact that it was previously possible to investigate quality and quantity in separation from one another does not speak against this view. Even such typical reflection determinations

as essence and appearance were for a long while counter-posed as independent entities, even in philosophy. It is only too understandable that this is the case also with such elementary and striking characteristics of objectivity as quantity and quality. The only difference is that the former case ascribes the separated ideas to the level of the understanding, while here—for reason of the logical hierarchy of the system—the question of the transition from understanding to reason, to knowledge of the inseparable dialectical correlation of apparently independent moments, is not raised. But this has nothing to do with the essence of the matter. Quantity and quality are, by their ontological nature, typical reflection determinations. Precisely here, the evidence of more primitive stages of development is able to support this ontological position. We have long since learnt from ethnography that, long before counting, i.e. the quantitative comprehension of objects, was developed, human beings practically mastered in a purely qualitative manner, on the basis of qualitative perceptions, those complexes of facts that we are today accustomed to grasp quantitatively; thus for example herdsmen did not count their flocks, but they knew each animal individually, and could thus immediately notice any loss quite precisely, without needing to count. Pavlov's experiments also show that dogs can react to metronome beats of 30, 60, 120, etc. as if to different qualities, without having the possibility of counting. In this respect it is clear that the level of separation of these reflection determinations by the understanding is not only a stage prior to their dialectical unification by reason, but also a progress in civilization in relation to the original directly unitary perception.

If we pass now to a brief look at the third part of the *Logic*, the doctrine of the notion, we must immediately raise a fundamental objection to Hegel's general definition of this

sphere. In connection with the general characterization of the three stages of logic which we have already quoted, Hegel says of the third of these: 'The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other.'³⁹ This thesis too is a logical conclusion from the ontological theory of the identical subject-object. Since the notion is the highest stage in the transformation of substance into subject, it seems logically necessary for the relation of the moments to the whole to approximate ever closer to identity, for the moments to give up their independence and foreignness to one another. But just as we have already demonstrated in connection with the doctrine of being that Hegel impermissibly exaggerates the components of independence, although his correct ontological sense still leads him to quietly ignore these cleverly worked out premises in his concrete arguments, and anticipate the reflection determinations that are closer to reality, so here too, the relationship between the moments and their connection in the form of process, which has been far too homogenized, must be critically reduced. The example given by Hegel himself in the same paragraph offers a good opportunity for him to emphasize that evolution is a relation and a process of this kind, in which this new harmony of determinations is to come into being. While Hegel certainly rejects, in the case of living beings, the mechanical conception that the later developed form of a plant is already really present in the seed, he finds a kernel of truth here, in 'its perceiving that in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition to point of content.'⁴⁰ This may well correspond to the ontology of the identical subject-object, but it does not correspond to reality, even in Hegel's own concrete conception. For it is evident that development precisely constantly raises new problems, and brings about new antitheses and contradictions that were unknown at

lower levels, something that cannot possibly be seen as a mere 'change of form'. Even though Hegel rejects the theory of evolution for living beings, the area of social being is still in his conception a component of the highest level of logic, just as life is, but at a still higher level. This is shown in reality itself by the still more significant emergence of the new, and particularly in the rise of objects and contradictions that in this respect rise above the level of life just as much as this does above the level of inorganic being. It is precisely for the most important objectifications in the logic of the notion that the characterization of Hegel's premise is untenable.

This is clear from Hegel's own arguments, as we shall see. If we compare the discussions in which he seeks to demonstrate the existence of this new in the structure of the logic of the notion, with those in which—in the very same work—he depicts the process of life in the context of nature as a whole, it can be seen that in his dialectical grasp of these complexes and relationships he goes so far beyond his metaphysically confined programme that its refutation and the return to the genuinely dialectical reflection determinations is already visible. Hegel's categorical description of the life process in its totality runs as follows:

'The living being stands face to face with an inorganic nature, to which it comports itself as a master and which it assimilates to itself. The result of the assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a neutral product in which the independence of the two confronting sides is merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough to embrace its other which cannot withstand its power. The inorganic nature which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is *virtually* the same as what life is *actually*. Thus in the other the living being only coalesces with itself. But when the soul has fled from the body, the elementary powers of objectivity begin their play. These powers are, as it were, continually on the spring, ready to begin their process in the

organic body; and life is the constant battle against them.’⁴¹ There are just three moments of this that we want to emphasize. First and foremost, that what Hegel depicts here is a process of interaction, the components of which are simultaneously identical and contradictory. In this identity and simultaneous contradiction of nature’s being-in-itself, the entire relationship seems precisely typical of a reflection determination. Secondly, in this interconnection, the contradictory new emerges with vital necessity, both at its beginning, when the organism constitutes itself as such, and at its end, when it perishes and sinks back into the normal cycle of inorganic nature. The profoundly contradictory character of the new that arises in this dual way is incompatible with the earlier quoted ‘harmonic’ conception of development. To the extent that it differs from the typical cases in the logic of the notion, the dialectical moments of this become still more acute. It should thirdly be noted that, in contrast to his general theory of interaction, which we have discussed earlier, Hegel actually discovers here the predominant moment in it, and hence his presentation comes still closer to the correct understanding of reflection determinations.

In the doctrine of the notion itself, universality, particularity and individuality emerge as specifically new categories. The philosophical content of these categories is extraordinarily important and consequential for Hegel’s entire view of the world, but this also seems frequently to be obscured by logicism, in so far as the decisive applications of these categories are built into the doctrine of notion, judgement and syllogism. It is easy to see, none the less, that Hegel essentially employs these categories as reflection determinations. This is already clear from the fact that, although he presents them as domiciled in the logic of the notion, he already deals with their first dialectical relationships at the conclusion of the doctrine of essence, and the sense of his presentation is certainly to present them as

reflection determinations: 'But because the universal is self-identical only in that it contains the *determinateness* within itself as *sublated*, and therefore the negative as negative, it is immediately the *same negativity* which *individuality* is; and individuality, because it is equally the determinate determinate, the negative as negative, is immediately the *same identity* which *universality* is. This their *simple* identity is *particularity*, which contains in immediate unity the moment of *determinateness* of the individual and the moment of *reflection-into-self* of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the same reflection. . .'⁴² These categories are investigated in precisely the same spirit in the doctrine of the notion; individuality appears as 'already posited by particularity', and particularity in turn is no more than 'determinate universality'. '*Universality* and *particularity* appeared. . . as moments of the *becoming* of individuality.' 'For the same reason the *particular*, because it is only the determinate universal, is also an individual, and conversely the individual, because it is the determinate universal, is just as much a particular.'⁴³ It would however be a one-sided misjudgement of Hegel's intentions to consider this relation simply as one of transition. Precisely in his applications of these categories to the area of social being, Hegel repeatedly indicates, in several important passages, that each of these categories, precisely in their specificity, can ontologically characterize definite structures and structural changes in society; we have already indicated in other connections such a role for particularity as the decisive contrast between antiquity and modern times. Similar examples can be multiplied at will in Hegel's writings.

The further the Hegelian system progresses, from the notion to the Idea, the more clear it becomes that the structural basis of the complexes appearing here, and their contradictions, lies always in the reflection determinations. We have just been able to see this in the relation of the organism

to its environment. Naturally, these relationships only arise, and can only be rationally understood, if the ontology of the identical subject-object is set aside, and Hegel's genial logical intentions are allowed to work themselves out in their true internal dynamic. This is the position, for example, in the case already dealt with of the relation between causality and teleology. If the latter is, in Hegel's words, the 'truth' of mechanism and chemism, then we are faced with a retreat into old-fashioned metaphysics. But if Hegel's example of labour teleology is treated as a relationship exclusively within the context of social being, which is where it alone belongs, then we have a genuine relationship of reflection determinations, which forms the ontological basis for what Marx calls the metabolism between society and nature. However independent, different, and even opposed causality and teleology may be for the understanding, their reflection relationship in labour creates what are for the time being inseparable processes, in which spontaneous causality and posited teleology are dialectically united. Since labour provides the original pattern for social practice, a fundamental determination for the ontology of social being is to be found in Hegel's conception of labour teleology, when this is interpreted in this way. This analysis can not be taken any further, however, for Hegel's social philosophy, as he presents it, contains besides the distorting rule of his purposive ontology, distortions of the real facts in the light of the historical prejudices of his time, so that only a very basic reinterpretation can bring to light what is nevertheless fruitful. Our present discussions must be satisfied with having indicated the general validity and methodological fertility of the reflection determinations for a dialectical ontology, and especially for one of social being.

Our conception of the unitary character of the reflection determinations may seem to simplify the differentiations made by Hegel. In reality, however, it is only by removing

these logicistic schemata that the way is opened to the real differentiation. This would have above all to concretize Hegel's genial dialectical series of identity via difference and distinction to antithesis and contradiction. Hegel himself never accomplished this; it only became operative in the work of the classics of Marxism, and was later again forgotten. The significance of this differentiation cannot be overrated, for the disparagement of the dialectic by its opponents is most often based, and occasionally with a certain justification, on the way that its supporters operate exclusively with the most developed and acute forms of contradiction, and neglect the transitional forms. Furthermore, it is only the unification of the reflection determinations that we have proposed that provides the possibility of differentiating the various forms of appearance of a dialectic understood in this way, according to the various levels of being and their ontological properties. Here, too, the reputation of the dialectic has suffered from the fact that often dialectical relationships that only appear at the highest level of being have been uncritically applied to lower forms of being, while attempts have time and again been made to reduce the complicated dialectical complexes to the simpler ones. This insight finally offers a means of correctly dividing epistemology and ontology, and correctly establishing the independence of the latter from the former. This can be done by explaining the epistemological transition from understanding to reason as a consequence of the objective dialectic of essence and appearance, in so far as the ontological priority of the dialectically structured complexes over their elements, components, etc. compels this epistemological change in the interest of the most adequate possible knowledge of reality. The reflection determinations are the first occasion in the history of philosophy at which this ontological priority of the complexes comes clearly into view.

Related to this, and something that Hegel himself genially

suspected, but did not consistently carry through, is the fact that subject and object are also reflection determinations, which are only operative as such at the level of social being. This suspicion is the kernel of truth contained in the mythology of development that Hegel avowedly proclaims. Hegel's presentation, particularly in the *Phenomenology*, need only be compared with his precursors for this to be seen. For Descartes or Spinoza, this reflection determination was torn in two at the level of the directly given (thought and extension), while with Kant we have the development of an epistemological subjectification of the ontological object world; and if Schelling counterposes nature, as unconscious, to conscious history, he still projects consciousness into nature in the form of the unconscious, in order to develop consciousness from nature in sophistic fashion. We shall see later that the realization of Hegel's suspicion and results was to become decisively important for the ontology of social being.

To conclude, we should simply like to indicate that the elucidation of the character and realm of operation of the reflection determinations can also cast light on an often used, very popular but seldom analysed concept, that of the abolition of contradictions. As we see it, it is necessary to draw a precise dividing line between abolition in the realm of reality itself, and in that of mere knowledge of reality, although in both cases ontological relations of being are involved. If the reflection determinations define a concrete dimension within a complex of being—as is the case for example with form and content—then their abolition can only be an epistemological one, the raising of consciousness from the standpoint of understanding to that of reason, to insight into the actual dialectical connection. An ontological abolition of such reflection determinations is impossible, for even if there is a *de facto* abolition of a really given objectivity, the form-content relation will simply renew itself in the new

objectivity, or new objectivities, that thus arise, with corresponding variations; there will always be a form-content relation. (Concrete study of the new form-content relations naturally remains an important scientific question.)

Of course, real complexes of objectivity, including processes, can also stand in a relation of reflection to one another, from natural forces that are arranged in such a way as to contradict one another through to the coordinated opposing classes in society. Here the ever relative balance determined by the dynamic of contradictions, and its abolition, is just as possible as the total or partial abolition of one complex by the others, and this abolition takes place in reality, and thus changes more or less radically the reality itself, the proportions of abolition and preservation really and ontologically depending on the specific act (or process) of abolition. Thus whereas abolition in thought has a general theoretical character, as with insight into the relation of form and content (which of course can never dispense with the need for concrete investigation of the concrete properties of the reflection determinations in question), the real abolition in nature involves the law-like interaction of complexes which, even if this is necessary, can only have a 'blind' necessity, while in social being, social consciousness is involved in the series of real components of the abolition, whether this is false consciousness or true consciousness. An adequate knowledge of the complexes that press towards or away from abolition can thus in certain circumstances become an ontologically real component in the process of abolition. Naturally, knowledge of natural processes can also lead to real abolitions of complexes; from the science of atomic structure through to the breeding of plants and animals, there is a whole series of such real abolitions. In so far as knowledge permits an active intervention in their dialectic, the process takes place in the field of social being, as the metabolism between society and nature, the indispensable precondition for which is of course the correct comprehension of the dialectic of nature.

NOTES

Section 1

- 1 Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, part III, Moscow, 1971, p. 84.
- 2 *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems*; Hegel-Werke, Frankfurt, 1970 ff.; vol. 2, pp. 119 ff.
- 3 *Philosophy of Right*, trans. Knox, Oxford, 1967; § 108, p. 248.
- 4 *Briefe von und an Hegel*, Hamburg, 1953, II, 297 ff.
- 5 *Logic*, [Part I of *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*] trans. Wallace, Oxford, 1975; § 161, Zusatz; p. 225.
- 6 *Philosophy of Nature* [Part II of the *Encyclopaedia*], trans. Miller, Oxford, 1970; § 261, Zusatz; p. 44.
- 7 Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, Berlin, 1844, p. 416.
- 8 *Philosophy of Right*, § 181, Zusatz, and § 184, Zusatz; pp. 266-7.
- 9 *ibid.*, § 186; p. 124.
- 10 *ibid.*, § 185; p. 123.
- 11 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State', *Early Writings*, Harmondsworth, 1975, pp. 138-9.
- 12 Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, Merlin Press, 1975.
- 13 § 245; p. 150.
- 14 *loc. cit.*, pp. 63-5, 73.
- 15 *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. Baillie, London, 2nd ed. 1931, p. 75.
- 16 *ibid.*, p. 105.
- 17 *ibid.*, p. 112.
- 18 *ibid.*, p. 70.
- 19 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy', Marx/Engels, *Selected Works*, London, 1970, p. 590.
- 20 *The Philosophy of History*, New York, 1956, p. 23.
- 21 *Phenomenology*, pp. 458-9.
- 22 *Philosophy of History*, p. 78.
- 23 Lukács, *The Young Hegel*
- 24 Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, Proposition VII (New York, 1955, p. 86).
- 25 *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems*; Hegel-Werke, vol. 2, p. 106.
- 26 *op. cit.*, p. 105.
- 27 *Philosophy of Nature*, § 246, Zusatz; p. 7.
- 28 *loc. cit.*, § 247; pp. 13-14.
- 29 *Science of Logic*, trans. Miller, London, 1969, pp. 607-8.
- 30 *Philosophy of Nature*, § 249, Zusatz; p. 21.
- 31 Heine, *Werke und Briefe*, ed. Kaufmann, Berlin, 1961 ff., vol. 7, p. 126.
- 32 Paul Lafargue, *Das Recht auf Faulheit & Persönliche Erinnerungen an Karl Marx*, ed. I. Fetscher, Frankfurt-Wien, 1966, p. 62.
- 33 *Phenomenology*, p. 42.
- 34 *ibid.*, pp. 799-800.
- 35 *ibid.*, p. 789.

- 36 *Early Writings*, Harmondsworth, 1975, pp. 386-7.
- 37 *Science of Logic*, p. 110.
- 38 *ibid.*, pp. 83-4.
- 39 *ibid.*, p. 119.
- 40 *ibid.*, p. 73.
- 41 *Anti-Düring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 162.
- 42 *ibid.*, p. 168.
- 43 Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks (Collected Works, vol. 38)*, Moscow, 1961, p. 217.
- 44 Lukács, *Ästhetik I, Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*, Werke Band 11 & 12, Neuwied-Berlin, 1963.
- 45 *Philosophy of Nature*, § 249, Zusatz; p. 21.
- 46 Engels to Schmidt, 1 November 1891; *Selected Correspondence*, London, Moscow, 1965, p. 438.
- 47 *Science of Logic*, p. 747.
- 48 *ibid.*, p. 736.
- 49 *ibid.*, pp. 753-4.
- 50 *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1931, II, 199.
- 51 *Science of Logic*, p. 747.
- 52 *ibid.*, p. 52.
- 53 *ibid.*, p. 843, and *Logic*, § 244; p. 296.
- 54 Cf. Bruno Bauer's pamphlet, *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen*, Leipzig, 1841 [The Trumpet of the Last Judgement on Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist], a work on which the young Marx collaborated with Bauer.
- 55 *Logic*, § 68 and § 73; pp. 104 and 107.
- 56 *Phenomenology*, pp. 763-4.
- 57 *Philosophy of Mind [Part III of the Encyclopaedia]*, trans. Wallace and Miller, Oxford, 1971, § 565; p. 299.
- 58 *Philosophy of History*, p. 321.
- 59 Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, Leipzig, 1927, III, 401.

Section 2

- 1 I have dealt with this question in detail in my *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* [The Destruction of Reason]; *Werke* Band 9, Neuwied-Berlin, 1962, pp. 474 ff.
- 2 *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. Haldane, London, 1892-5, vol. I, p. 279.
- 3 *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems*, loc. cit., p. 96. The earliest known expression of this radically new formulation is to be found in Hegel's fragmentary Frankfurt system, where he writes, 'Life is the union of union and non-union'; H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, Tübingen, 1907, p. 348. The Jena conception is of course more conscious and universal, but his opposition to the Schelling type of

dialectic and its precursors was an achievement of Hegel's youth.

- 4 *Phenomenology*, p. 81.
- 5 *Science of Logic*, p. 842.
- 6 *Phenomenology*, pp. 81-3.
- 7 Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 214.
- 8 *Phenomenology*, p. 76.
- 9 *ibid.*, p. 79.
- 10 *Science of Logic*, p. 601.
- 11 *Logic*, § 159, Zusatz; p. 222.
- 12 *Philosophy of Mind*, § 419, Zusatz; p. 161.
- 13 *Science of Logic*, p. 405.
- 14 Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 546; *Aphorismen aus Hegels Wastebook*, Werke, vol. 2, p. 551.
- 15 *Philosophy of Mind*, § 467, Zusatz; p. 226.
- 16 Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 362.
- 17 *Philosophy of History*, p. 11.
- 18 *Science of Logic*, pp. 396 ff.
- 19 *ibid.*, pp. 393-4.
- 20 Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 545; *Aphorismen aus Hegels Wastebook*, Werke, vol. 2, p. 549.
- 21 *Science of Logic*, p. 416.
- 22 *Philosophy of Right*, § 124 and § 185; pp. 83-4 and 123-4.
- 23 *Science of Logic*, p. 431.
- 24 *Logic*, § 12; pp. 16-17.
- 25 *Science of Logic*, p. 453.
- 26 *Logic*, § 133; p. 189.
- 27 *ibid.*, § 156, Zusatz; p. 219.
- 28 *ibid.*, § 133, Zusatz; p. 190.
- 29 *ibid.*, § 149; p. 213.
- 30 *ibid.*, § 147; p. 208.
- 31 *ibid.*, § 145, Zusatz; p. 205.
- 32 *Science of Logic*, p. 547; cf. *Logic*, § 146, Zusatz; p. 207.
- 33 *Logic*, § 161, Zusatz; p. 224.
- 34 *Logic*, § 161, Zusatz, p.
- 35 *Science of Logic*, pp. 119-120.
- 36 *ibid.*, p. 175.
- 37 *ibid.*, p. 333.
- 38 *ibid.*, p. 340.
- 39 *Logic*, § 161, Zusatz; p. 225.
- 40 *ibid.*, p. 224.
- 41 *ibid.*, § 219, Zusatz; p. 281.
- 42 *Science of Logic*, p. 571.
- 43 *ibid.*, pp. 618 ff.
- 44 Lukács, 'Über die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik', in *Probleme der Ästhetik*, Werke Band 10, Neuwied-Berlin, 1969, pp. 539 ff and 565 ff.

Georg Lukács: TOWARD THE ONTOLOGY OF SOCIAL BEING

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