Gorbachev and the German Question

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SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS, 1985–1990

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To Amy

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Abbreviations

ADN	Allgemeiner Deutschen Nachrichtsendienst (German Public News Service). East Berlin
ARD	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten (Association of Broadcasting Institutions). West Berlin
CC	Central Committee
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPD	Congress of People's Deputies
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DPA	Deutsche Presse-Agentur (German Press Agency). Hamburg
EEC	European Economic Community
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ID	International Department
IMEMO	Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii (Institute of World Economy and International Relations)
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
ISKAN	Institut Soyedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki i Kanada (Institute of the United States and Canada)
MEMO	*Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunardniye otnosheniye* (*World Economy and International Relations*)
MID	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PUWP	Polish United Workers Party
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SShA	*SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologia* (*USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*)
TASS	Telegrafnoye agenstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
UN	United Nations
ZDF	Zweite Deutsches Fernsehen (Second German Television). Mainz

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Introduction

For more than 40 years following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union viewed the division of Germany as the key to peace and stability in Europe. Yet in July 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev met with West German leader Helmut Kohl and accepted the unification of the two German states. This remarkable event marked the culmination of a complex transformation of the Soviet security environment which was at once rapid and gradual.

The change was rapid in historical terms, since geopolitical realities that had stood over 40 years evaporated in a period of months. Likewise, the Soviet vision of international relations which traced its origins back to Vladimir Lenin and the birth of the Soviet state seemingly disappeared overnight. Yet the transformation was gradual in political terms. The Gorbachev leadership came to power with an ideological worldview significantly different from its predecessors. New foreign policy principles began to emerge soon after Gorbachev's promotion, and actual policy changes followed shortly thereafter. Starting in 1988 and continuing into early 1990s, Soviet reformers promoted ideas that broke radically with traditional approaches. In the process, Gorbachev and his supporters drew on the work of international relations scholars dating back to the 1970s.

The period 1985–1991 was the last in a series of dramatic chapters in Soviet–West German relations. One of the first foreign policy acts of the

newly triumphant Bolshevik movement in Russia was acceptance of a humiliating peace treaty imposed by Germany at Brest Litovsk. Between 1918 and 1990, the nature of Moscow's relationship with Germany in large part determined the course of European politics. The Treaty of Rapallo, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and European deténte rank among the most profound events of 20th-century European politics. The devastation that Nazi Germany visited on Russia and then the USSR during World Wars I and II engraved in the collective Soviet memory a fear of German aggressiveness and expansionism. Moscow vowed that war would never again emanate from German soil.

Immediately after the defeat of the Third Reich, Germany was divided into occupation zones controlled by the four victorious powers. This division of Germany, initially conceived as a temporary solution, gradually took on the facade of permanence. The Kremlin came to define Germany's division into two separate states as a core national interest integral to the security of the Soviet state. The leadership of the USSR equated the preservation of the socialist Germany with peace and stability in Europe. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the other members of the Soviet bloc were incorporated into a complex network of political, military, and economic ties with the Soviet Union. The capitalist Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was seen as inherently aggressive and dedicated to re-creating the pre–1939 German nation, which in turn meant the destruction of the postwar European order.

FRAMING THE QUESTION

How then did Moscow come to accept German unification in 1990? Did Gorbachev plan such an outcome from the very beginning? Some former Soviet officials have since claimed that Gorbachev and his supporters saw unification as inevitable as far back as 1985. According to this argument, the new Soviet leader accepted the failure of the Soviet system he inherited and the obsolescence of the traditional Soviet view of international relations. Only by gradually restructuring the economy, democratizing the political system, and integrating the USSR into the advanced capitalist order could the Soviet Union survive.

A contrasting explanation for the peaceful end of Germany's division contends that Gorbachev and his circle never envisioned German unity and did not find it compatible with Soviet national interests.[1] Having completely lost control over events and been overwhelmed by numerous foreign and domestic crises, the Kremlin merely conceded what was already a reality. Germans in the GDR and FRG had unified the two German states on the ground. The Soviet leadership agreed to participate in the pro forma unification process in large part because of the economic incentives offered by the West Germans.

As with any complex political question, there is evidence to support many different explanations. This study falls somewhere between these two poles. Yet the essence of the argument places it closer to the first explanation. The Gorbachev leadership, while forced along by the dizzying pace of change, had accommodated itself to German unity because the outcome was no longer seen as an inherent threat to Soviet security. Moreover, Gorbachev had already demonstrated a more moderate view of West Germany and had transformed the prevailing Soviet vision of international relations before the disintegration of the East German state in late 1989.

When Gorbachev came to power in early 1985, the Soviet elite still regarded the Federal Republic of Germany as a potential threat to European stability. While the economic, political, and security benefits of the Soviet bloc had eroded over the years, the leadership in Moscow still clung to the ideological justifications for the USSR's ubiquitous presence in Eastern Europe. The new Soviet leader and his reformist advisers, however, brought with them a new conception of international relations. Once in office, these individuals continued their ideological transformation. The resulting principles and assumptions, labeled 'new political thinking,"eventually gave rise to a radical revision of Moscow's external goals and policies. The Gorbachev leadership came to acknowledge that West Germany had changed fundamentally and that Bonn could play a key role in reworking the postwar European order. Likewise, the adherents of new thinking acknowledged the costs of past Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and sought an entirely new policy in the region.

The translation of new thinking into more moderate external actions and finally revolutionary changes in the postwar European order was complicated by substantial opposition within the Soviet Union. Powerful political actors remained wedded to the traditional Soviet approach to the German issue. Some politicians genuinely feared the resurgence of German aggression, while others apparently understood that new thinking made their individual experiences and ideological mind-set obsolete. In addition, opponents of Gorbachev's domestic political and economic reforms latched onto the emotional issue of German revanchism in the hopes of weakening the Soviet leader with claims that he had undermined security interests in Europe.

In the face of such resistance, Gorbachev could hardly express in full detail his new vision of Soviet–West German relations. The precise moment, therefore, when Gorbachev arrived at revolutionary conclusions remains difficult to discern precisely. Yet clearly, his reformist thinking ran well ahead of what was politically feasible. Gorbachev's political strategy incorporated deception, maneuver, compromise, and even temporary capitulation in an ongoing struggle to push forward changes in Soviet foreign policy without provoking open conflict with his opponents.[2] As the years passed, Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers became increasingly liberal in their

conceptions of international relations. When the sudden wave of change swept over Eastern Europe in 1989, these Soviet new thinkers were forced to accept the practical implications of their ideological transformations. Moscow's responses to the 1989 Eastern European revolutions and the eventual unification of Germany were indeed remarkably consistent with the principles of new thinking.

This conflict between ideas and politics, or more precisely, the translation of ideas into policies, was made more complex by the interaction of internal and external factors. In convincing the Soviet elite of the need for a new foreign policy paradigm, Gorbachev emphasized the nonthreatening nature of world politics. Constructive Western actions, such as NATO's July 1990 summit in London, allowed the Soviet leader to argue that a unified German nation in NATO would not threaten the USSR. The members of the Atlantic Alliance proved willing to take such a stance only after they were convinced of the genuinely revolutionary nature of Soviet reforms.

In other cases, Western inflexibility aided Gorbachev in proving to his domestic audience that traditional Soviet approaches were ineffective in protecting core national interests. Thus, West Germany's 1986 decision to participate in SDI research, in defiance of significant Soviet pressure, actually assisted Gorbachev in his initial efforts to reform the prevailing approach to European security issues. He was able to contend to the Soviet elite that pressure tactics did nothing to moderate West German behavior, and may even have forced Bonn to follow the US security line even more closely.

The domestic maneuvering of both Gorbachev and his Western counterparts further complicated the picture. Every leader faced the difficulty of coordinating his or her internal and external strategies. Domestic political constraints sometimes necessitated foreign policy inconsistency, which made international cooperation extremely difficult. Very early in his tenure, for instance, Gorbachev attempted to signal his desire for improved relations with Bonn. The new Soviet leader undermined these subtle efforts with statements intended to reassure powerful domestic advocates of the traditional hard-line approach, the very same individuals who had recently elected Gorbachev. These few illustrations demonstrate the difficulty of drawing a single causal arrow from the state to the international system or vice versa.[3]

In constructing this explanation, I focus on the development of Soviet relations with West Germany in 1985–1990, as well as Moscow's broader European strategy with regard to security and economic issues. My account emphasizes public diplomacy more than most studies of this kind. Rather than dismissing summit meetings as hopelessly riddled with propaganda, I believe such gatherings capture the interaction of a leader's domestic and foreign policy approaches and thus offer valuable insights into a leader's political strategies and constraints.

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 examines Gorbachev's emergence as general secretary and his initial continuation of the Germany policy he inherited. Only with the first phase of the political succession behind him did Gorbachev attempt to alter the prevailing policy approach.

As Chapter 3 illustrates, the Soviet leader initiated and encouraged a policy review in early 1987 including a reevaluation of Soviet relations with West Germany. The course of 1987–1988 witnessed an incremental and multifaceted rapprochement with the FRG. Moscow expressed a new willingness to deal directly with the ruling coalition in Bonn, and explored various political, security, and economic opportunities for improving bilateral relations.

Chapter 4 details Kohl's October trip to the Soviet capital, and Gorbachev's reciprocal visit to Bonn in June 1989. These two summit meetings highlighted the evolution in Moscow's view of the FRG. The two leaders developed a personal rapport that contributed significantly to the relatively calm Soviet response to the stormy German events.

The revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, and especially Moscow's reaction to the collapse of the GDR, are the focus of Chapter 5. The Gorbachev leadership failed to predict the swift deterioration of the East German state, but its responses were remarkably consistent with the precepts of new thinking. The Soviet reformers adapted quickly to the revolutionary changes that forced the issue of unification onto the international agenda.

Chapter 6 focuses on the Soviet role in German unification. Domestic political constraints and the logic of international negotiations forced Gorbachev to conceal his attitude toward unification until the middle of 1990. In a dramatic July meeting with Kohl, Gorbachev acceded to German unity and NATO membership.

Finally, Chapter 7 addresses the deficiencies of existing accounts of Soviet–West German relations. I also present conclusions concerning the role of new thinking, the importance of domestic politics, and the interaction of internal and external factors in explaining Gorbachev's evolution in his view of the German question.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In analyzing Soviet foreign policy toward West Germany, I have framed a number of key questions that address the argument put forward in this study. Each question, stated as an assertion, serves as a methodological test, pointing out the relevant evidence and allowing the reader to judge the relative success of my approach in explaining Gorbachev's policies. I offer three general and four leader-centered assertions.

(1) The domestic political situation influenced Gorbachev's foreign policy options in identifiable ways. A leadership struggle, a new leader's

political consolidation, and an established regime all are prone toward distinctive approaches to national security and diplomatic issues.[4] During a period of consolidation, for instance, domestic political preoccupations limit a state's ability to formulate and respond to subtle and complex international interaction. A leader may also delay implementing changes for fear of provoking the formation of an opposing coalition. Differences between Soviet statements in domestic and foreign publications are worthy of close attention. More moderate unofficial statements preceding like-minded changes in policy suggest that the new Soviet leader continued inherited policies only as an interim solution.

(2) Foreign policy issues played an integral role in Soviet domestic political struggles. Officials debated the economic costs of former commitments and the broader needs of the domestic economy. Moreover, clashes, between reformers and conservatives became so politicized that opponents of Gorbachev on domestic grounds automatically opposed Gorbachev's proposed foreign policy moves as well. This kind of generic or "all-purpose" opposition to Gorbachev's foreign policy appeared in the blanket indictments by conservatives, speaking for instance, at CPSU Party gatherings and in publications opposed to Gorbachev's reform.[5] Gorbachev and his supporters also illustrated the importance of foreign policy issues to domestic struggles in their efforts to justify new thinking. Reformers argued that their ideas would not only reduce external threats, but also improve domestic economic conditions through international economic integration and reduced military spending.

Critics of reform often viewed foreign policy more as a political instrument to weaken Gorbachev than as a direct threat to their material interests. This situation explains the lack of domestic backlash over radical external actions such as accepting unification. Gorbachev faced a powerful and diverse conglomeration of political forces in developing his approaches to international relations. After the controversial steps were already taken, the "all-purpose" opposition (i.e., those motivated more by domestic than foreign policy considerations) proved unwilling to risk confrontation over issues that only peripherally affected their own material and political interests.

(3) In addition, external phenomena resonated within the domestic structure. Specific actions by foreign governments and leaders, as well as broader international trends influenced Moscow's approach to foreign policy. Soviet reactions to external events such as Washington's SDI program, or Kohl's 1986 comparison of Gorbachev to Goebbels, demonstrated this impact. General international factors such as Western technological superiority or the development of integration in Western Europe also altered debate in Moscow, as seen by the writings of academics and statements of the foreign policy elite.

Neither reformers nor conservatives necessarily responded appropriately to external factors. A review of specialist writings and the statements of relevant foreign policy officials reveals a number of incorrect assumptions. Many proponents of new thinking, for example, mistakenly assumed that Moscow could correct the pathologies of Soviet-East European relations, and accept greater interaction with the West without undermining the essential foundation of the Soviet bloc.[6] Whether correctly evaluated or not, significant instances of resonance discredit simplistic domestic politics models, by illustrating the frequency and significance of interactions between the domestic and international levels.

(4) More specifically, the network of interaction between domestic and external factors frequently appeared in the actions of the Soviet leader. The timing of major foreign policy moves often corresponded to significant shifts in Gorbachev's domestic political position. The general secretary's compromises in INF negotiations stemmed not from any change in external pressures, but from the new foreign policy coalition he had constructed.[7] Gorbachev's increased foreign policy activism following the 19th Party Conference in mid-1988 coincided with his stronger political position. Clearly Gorbachev's ability to change Soviet foreign policy directly related to his political strength.

(5) A second leader-centered example of domestic-external linkage is the effect of Gorbachev's reforms in the political arena on the foreign policy process. His personnel policies, reform of the mass media, and institutional reforms affected the process of making both domestic and foreign policy. Some appointees, such as Aleksandr Yakovlev, actively pursued increasingly radical change in both domestic and external behavior. Despite the protests of conservative critics, Gorbachev extended *glasnost* to foreign policy issues. In both the domestic and foreign policy arenas, he undermined traditional policy constituencies that opposed his policies, and empowered those who supported them. These conscious attempts to transform the political framework of both the domestic and foreign policy-making processes demonstrated the tactical coordination of his strategies.

(6) In negotiations with the West, Gorbachev's domestic situation served alternatively as a resource and a constraint. Remarks by members of Moscow's foreign policy elite and accounts by Western participants often stressed the domestic opposition the Soviet leader faced, and the possibility that not cooperating with Gorbachev might contribute to his overthrow by a less moderate leader. Gorbachev, in turn, strove to deny the contention, held by some in the West, that Gorbachev should be made to accept massive concessions in view of his domestic economic and political problems. The Soviet general secretary also exploited the West's fascination with *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and *demokratizatsia* to improve his negotiating position. A careful examination of official statements preceding, during, and following major diplomatic gatherings supports these contentions.

(7) Finally, Gorbachev attempted to utilize the international situation and his own popularity abroad for domestic political purposes. The Soviet general secretary focused attention on Moscow's improved image abroad and his own international prestige. The maneuver aided his continuing struggle for tactical advantage by demonstrating to the political elite Gorbachev's indispensability. Internal efforts to downplay the extent of his international concessions or retrenchments also illustrated the potential negative effect of perceptions of the international scene.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Students of Soviet foreign policy have always grappled with the question of what information to collect and how to interpret the limited data. The Gorbachev period presents scholars with new methodological challenges. Reforms liberalized Soviet political communications in this period, but did not completely invalidate previous assumptions on how to read the Soviet literature.[8]

The methodological complexity of studying Soviet foreign policy is compounded, not eased, by the availability of oral histories, memoir literature, and archival material.[9] In order to evaluate the importance of these sources, scholars must draw on the data already at hand. I have made extensive use of the published recollections of former Soviet and German officials.[10] In some cases, the participants confirmed my conclusions based on a meticulous reading of the available Soviet literature. In other instances, the firsthand accounts offer information that could not be divined from the public record. I identify such claims as personal opinions and acknowledge them in the text with qualifiers like "reportedly," "apparently," and "according to." Contradictory or particularly suspect claims are generally confined to the notes.

I have relied most heavily on the following sources: central newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Literaturnaya gazeta*; major journals such as *Kommunist*, *Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, and *International Affairs*, as well as the academic journals *Meimo* and *SShA*. I also utilized translation services such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) daily reports and Joint Publications Research Service for otherwise unavailable TASS reports, transcripts of television programs, and other Russian-language sources.

The German language newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* provided the main West German accounts. Western sources included academic treatments in journals or monographs; journalistic accounts of specific events; and statements or interviews by members of the Soviet foreign policy elite in Western publications.[11] Given the subject area, I paid particular attention to West German sources such as *Europa Archiv*, *Deutschland Archiv*, *Aussenpolitik*, and *Der Spiegel*.

2

Continuity and Change

When Mikhail Gorbachev was promoted to general secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, Soviet-West German relations were marked by acrimony and frustration. The previous Soviet leadership had attempted to punish Bonn for its support of US security policies by distancing itself from the FRG and inhibiting FRG-GDR relations. The dictates of Gorbachev's domestic political consolidation prevented immediate improvement in relations with Bonn. His fragile political position at home demanded first priority and discouraged major challenges to the existing national security coalition. Yet his strategy of domestic reform laid the foundation for the foreign policy transformation that would emerge in later years. Although Gorbachev could not have envisioned that by 1990 Germany would be unified, he consciously placed the USSR on a path of reform which included a radical change in the Soviet leadership's perceptions of the German question and Moscow's policies toward the Federal Republic of Germany.

While the new Soviet leader was unwilling to embark on a major reorientation of foreign policy in his first two years, he did begin to construct the framework for future change. In so doing, Gorbachev introduced greater political activism and a degree of innovation into Soviet policy. He initiated a series of domestic reforms which eventually recast the foreign policy arena. His large-scale personnel changes, the liberalization

of Soviet information policy, and the first cautious efforts to alter the foreign policy process emerged early in his tenure. But they did not have a visible impact on actual Soviet foreign policy until late 1986.

Likewise, signs of new thinking emerged while old-style foreign policies remained in force. These signals included both official foreign policy statements and a heightened profile for certain Soviet foreign policy specialists. Gorbachev and other high-ranking officials adopted numerous foreign policy concepts developed by Soviet academics which implied a radically different approach to international relations. Several newly promoted officials with foreign policy responsibility emphasized the role that Western Europe, including West Germany, could play in transforming European politics. The evolution in Soviet perceptions of West Germany was a precursor to later policy changes. Observers in Bonn, however, saw little on the ground to distinguish Soviet behavior from the confrontational approach in effect since 1984.

The combination of continued confrontation and undercurrents of innovation surfaced in Gorbachev's initial efforts in the security and economic realms. Moscow continued to place security issues such as INF negotiations and the question of West German participation in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research at the center of its relations with the FRG. West Germany's inability to alter Washington's behavior, and more importantly, the growth of cooperative opportunities with the United States, gradually allowed the Soviet leader to abandon this approach. In addition to national security policy, Gorbachev's very early interest in the CMEA and its ties with the EEC presaged his later redefinition of the Soviet role in Europe. Efforts to reform economic interaction within the CMEA further proved the general secretary's intention to break with past Soviet policy.

Toward the end of this first period, Moscow's diplomatic activity indicated that Gorbachev was prepared to improve more energetically relations with West Germany. Building on the success of the 27th Party Congress in April 1986, Gorbachev sought a more productive basis for contacts with Bonn. From the beginning, he had attempted subtly to communicate his willingness to advance these ties. Various unofficial spokesmen pointed out Gorbachev's limited room for maneuver, and stressed the need for West Germany to act responsibly so that relations could improve. The process of reevaluating previous attitudes, aided by Gorbachev's wider room for maneuver, gained momentum in 1987. By the end of 1986, both sides expressed a willingness to accept the realities of the other's position, in effect agreeing to separate economic and political issues from security questions.

THE FIRST DAYS OF GORBACHEV'S GERMAN POLICY

This early period in Gorbachev's approach to West Germany illustrated the dynamic relationship between his domestic political consolidation and

the direction of Soviet foreign policy. One of the clearest indications of this relationship was the media's coverage of the FRG and Soviet-West German relations. While the Soviet press routinely distorted coverage of foreign visitors, its reportage of West German statements and accounts of Soviet-FRG meetings exhibited a recognizable pattern of censorship. Initially, news agencies and newspapers portrayed West German government officials negatively, sometimes deleting conciliatory remarks and distorting comments dealing with security issues. The press recognized the leadership consensus in favor of a strong-arm policy toward West Germany and reflected this view in its reporting. As his political position stabilized and his policy of *glasnost* gained momentum, Gorbachev gradually abandoned the inherited German policy in favor of a more accommodative approach. As a result, a discernible attitudinal lag developed. The Gorbachev leadership came to view the FRG and prospects for relations more favorably, but the mass media continued its distorted coverage. Thus, Soviet foreign policy toward West Germany in 1985–1986 exhibited both continuity and the first hints of change.

Continuing Inherited Policies

Literally from his first day in office, Gorbachev demonstrated his adherence to the Kremlin's preexisting Germany policy. With most heads of state in Moscow for Chernenko's funeral, Gorbachev conducted introductory meetings with the three main West European leaders. The TASS accounts of Gorbachev's sittings with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand differed markedly from his discussions with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The former meetings referred to both sides' commitment to improving bilateral relations and the international climate as a whole. Kohl, however, was not credited with any contribution to the dialogue and was warned that relations depended on "respect for existing territorial-political realities." Gorbachev also emphasized that West German policy involving "the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies will be of decisive significance for the further development of relations between the USSR and the FRG." He thus repeated almost word for word previous Soviet statements.[1] In addition to the harsher tone of Kohl's audience with Gorbachev, the West German meeting with the new general secretary appeared to be intentionally delayed until after Thatcher and Mitterrand's introductions and the FRG delegation was housed in less prestigious quarters.[2]

Moscow's aloofness toward Bonn went beyond matters of protocol. Later in March 1985, several accounts claimed that the Soviet leader would soon visit both West Germany and France, even before any movement was made on a meeting with Reagan. Although the trip to France took place in October 1985, Gorbachev did not meet with Kohl until October 1988. While

in Moscow for Chernenko's funeral, Kohl had invited the Soviet leader to visit West Germany. Gorbachev did not even acknowledge the offer. Apparently, the new Soviet leader had already decided that no summit would take place before the 1987 federal elections.[3] Moscow made its slight of Kohl more obvious just days later, when prominent West German Social Democrat and former Chancellor Willy Brandt received an invitation to meet with Gorbachev.

For his part, Brandt made no secret of his intention to play a central role in constructing a "second détente" in West German-Soviet relations. [4] The meeting with Gorbachev would both heighten Brandt's stature and call attention to Kohl's inability to improve the FRG's relations with the USSR. During his May 1985 visit to Moscow, Brandt was impressed with the new general secretary and chided the West German government for failing to capitalize on the new opportunities in relations with the USSR. He also echoed Moscow's enthusiastic calls for a European centered East-West policy. In his memoirs, Brandt contended that even in 1985 Gorbachev viewed the Germans favorably.[5] Despite the Soviet leader's apparently enlightened personal opinions, he made no public break with Moscow's existing approach to the German question.

The first several months of Soviet–FRG relations bore the markings of a foreign policy on autopilot. In April, a Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin visited West Germany for a week. Zimyanin expressed the familiar dual themes of Soviet interest in improving relations with Bonn, and disapproval over West German references to "an open German question," and "the right of all Germans to self-determination in conditions of freedom." In effect, Zimyanin was saying that, while all Germans were not revanchists, some were. Otherwise, certain government officials would not question the "results of World War II, and in particular postwar borders."[6]

The December arrival of the first Bundestag delegation to visit Moscow in ten years further illustrated the lack of progress. Even during this largely symbolic event, the distorted treatment of the FRG was visible. After days of constructive discussions, Zimyanin, the Soviet host, ended the visit by blasting the West Germans for their revanchist views and charging that Bonn wanted to "devour" East Germany. According to German participants, Zimyanin had spoken extemporaneously until his closing remarks, when another Soviet official handed him a set of notes.[7]

The Bundestag group, headed by Bundestag President Philipp Jenninger, was also unable to meet with either Shevardnadze or Gorbachev, despite the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation had met with Chancellor Kohl in April.[8] A week later, Gorbachev found the time to welcome the president of the French National Assembly to Moscow. During a conversation with the French parliamentarian, Gorbachev hinted at the reason for the differences in treatment of the French and West German officials. In discussing the

possibility of forcing the United States to reconsider its SDI plans, he noted, "The role and responsibility of the governments of Western Europe are exceptionally great in this regard."[9] According to Moscow's calculations, France had exhibited such responsibility, while the FRG had not.

Still unprepared to redefine Moscow's German policy, Gorbachev joined a chorus of Soviet voices critical of Bonn, although without directly accusing the FRG of revanchist intentions. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Moscow Treaty, Gorbachev warned that "any deviation from [the provisions of the Moscow Treaty] would be against the interests of ending the arms race and strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world." Aleksandr Yakovlev, already a close adviser to Gorbachev, accused West Germany of being on "the extreme wing," and implied that Kohl exhibited "chronic shortsightedness." [10] The German chancellor invited such criticism with his blunt remarks regarding East German and Soviet human rights abuses, and the "open nature of the German problem." In addition, Kohl sparked controversy by expressing doubts concerning the sincerity of Gorbachev's advances. He was convinced that "many aspects of the USSR's proposals require clarification and appear to be inadequately considered and prompted by unilateral Soviet interests."[11] The German Chancellor remained skeptical toward Gorbachev's new thinking throughout most of this initial period. Yet when Helmut Kohl did express his willingness to improve relations, the Soviet press did not always give such statements the same attention.

Preceding Gorbachev's upcoming trip to France, the question of a Soviet-West German summit arose repeatedly in the summer of 1985. In early July, Eduard Shevardnadze had replaced long-time Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was moved into the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Shevardnadze's promotion itself was viewed as a turning point for Bonn, since Gromyko's transfer removed a major proponent of the Kremlin's policy of punishing West Germany for its support of Washington.[12] Just days after the change in foreign ministers was announced, Kohl and another high-level CDU official, Wolfgang Schäuble, repeated Bonn's earlier invitation to Gorbachev to visit West Germany.[13] When the Soviet leadership did not respond to Kohl's offer, the chancellor arranged to meet the newly appointed Soviet foreign minister at UN headquarters in New York. The West German chancellor met with Shevardnadze in October 1985, stressing his optimism concerning FRG-USSR relations.[14] The event attracted almost no attention from the Soviet media.

Domestic Constraints on Improved Relations

Part of the explanation for the scant Soviet reportage of Kohl's meeting with Shevardnadze lay in Gorbachev's domestic political circumstances. In

order to change Moscow's German policy, he would need to convince those Soviet officials who feared and resented West Germany that it was not a threat to the status quo in Europe, and confront those opponents who remained unalterably opposed to a more flexible approach to Bonn. Until Gorbachev initiated both phases of this strategy, Soviet coverage of the FRG continued to be unfavorable. An article by the well-connected journalist Aleksandr Bovin supported this contention. After noting Moscow's desire for good relations with all the nations of Western Europe, Bovin admitted that '[t]he degree of their intensity and the extent of mutual trust vary from country to country, reflecting the complex and changeable interweaving of political sympathies and antipathies, and also the effect of many internal and external factors."Thus, poor relations with Bonn involved not only the FRG's behavior, but also 'political antipathies"and 'internal factors." [15] Yet these obstacles to better ties with West Germany were "changeable,"implying that improvements were possible.

In order to redefine Moscow's relations with Bonn, Gorbachev needed not only a firmer political base at home, but also a "cooperative" and "responsible" West Germany. From the general secretary's point of view, this meant Bonn must abandon controversial statements concerning the division of Germany. In addition, Kohl would have to distance himself from the United States on security issues.[16] As one might expect, Kohl viewed these demands as unrealistic. Gorbachev responded in November 1985 by lashing out in a letter to the West German leader which was subsequently leaked to the West German newspaper *Bild*. The Soviet general secretary criticized Bonn for not responding to Moscow's proposals, particularly with regard to security questions. Yet Gorbachev added the hope that 'the FRG government would also make appropriate corrections in its attitude in view of new Soviet initiatives."[17]

The Kremlin's previous preference for the Social Democrats (SPD) over the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU), or even Genscher's Free Democratic Party (FDP), became more pronounced in advance of the 1987 federal elections in West Germany. At that time, the Social Democrats appeared capable of unseating the CDU-CSU. And how could Moscow resist showing partiality to a major West German party that so vehemently opposed Washington's SDI program? Finally, the personal relationships between key Soviet foreign policy officials and West German Social Democrats developed during the 1970s further contributed to the SPD's prominence. Until the CDU-CSU's 1987 electoral victory, Moscow continued to hold the Social Democrats in special regard. Kohl's greater willingness to cooperate after the election and Gorbachev's expanded maneuverability at home gradually allowed the Soviet leader to diversify his contacts in Bonn.

Before this could occur, both Moscow and Bonn needed to reexamine their views of one another. Yet the two leaders faced powerful domestic

forces that made such a policy reappraisal difficult. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev was more capable of abandoning the previous heavy-handed approach to West Germany than much of Moscow's political elite. The Soviet leader thus faced the complex task of laying the foundation for change without alienating the same powerful domestic actors who had brought him to power. This delicate operation entailed sending subtle messages to the West Germans, an effort that was often undermined by Gorbachev's actions to reassure conservatives at home. Bonn, reacting to contradictory signals from Moscow, remained unconvinced of Gorbachev's commitment to reforming Soviet foreign policy. In addition, Kohl was responding to his own domestic political pressures.

The behavior that earned Kohl so much Soviet criticism arose in response to internal and external forces that severely limited West German maneuverability. These considerations tended to take precedence over foreign policy considerations until after the 1987 elections. For the FRG, the nature of Germany's division remained a central political issue. With a federal election approaching, Kohl appeased rightist elements of the CDU–CSU by restating his commitment to the eventual unification of Germany.[18] In addition, the Soviet expectation that Bonn move away from its alliance ties with the United States came at a time when the Federal chancellor felt unable to put any strain on this vital relationship. Reagan's SDI program and the possibility of a zero option in Europe threatened the double disaster of a decline in Washington's nuclear commitment in Europe and a Soviet conventional arms superiority unchecked by NATO missiles. Bonn concluded that the best approach was firm support for US positions in order to enhance its influence over American decision making.

One domestic political incentive for improving Bonn's ties to Moscow was the importance of maintaining the intra-German relationship. This factor was manifest in the chancellor's response to Gorbachev's letter. Though the published portions made no reference to German-German relations, Kohl assured the public that Soviet tactics would not unduly harm the FRG's relations with East Germany.[19] From the chancellor's perspective, Gorbachev's letter indicated that Moscow would deny him improved bilateral relations, which would prevent progress in contacts between the two German states. Indeed, the CDU leadership apparently considered a Gorbachev visit to Bonn as a prerequisite for one by Honecker that had been planned for years.[20] Kohl, the consummate politician, saw the danger not in military threats or a public outcry, but in the political costs of appearing unable to advance relations with East Berlin. The West German leader recognized that Moscow held the key to FRG–GDR relations. Despite this incentive, neither leader was prepared in 1985 to invest the political capital necessary to improve bilateral ties.

DOMESTIC REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY

Although Soviet foreign policy remained much the same, the facade of complete continuity concealed impulses for change. Gorbachev initiated a number of domestic reforms that eventually altered foreign policy and the process by which it was made. The 1985–1986 period offered the first evidence of the intimate connections between the Soviet general secretary's domestic and foreign policies. Rather than simply deriving foreign policy prescriptions from domestic imperatives, Gorbachev developed two political strategies that were conceptually linked. Domestic policies began to have an effect on Soviet foreign policy even before Gorbachev was prepared to confront openly the preexisting consensus on Moscow's external behavior.

Cadre Policy

An increase in personnel turnover characterizes political successions in any number of political systems. In the Soviet Union, the incoming general secretary traditionally removed opponents and appointed supporters as a means of consolidating his hold on power. The centrality of personal networks ingrained in the Soviet political system and the absence of a constitutionally defined succession mechanism enhanced the importance of this tactic. Therefore, Gorbachev's efforts in this regard resulted from the requirements of a particular stage of the political struggle. His policy of invigorating the Soviet elite by introducing more active and flexible officials affected both the domestic and foreign policy realms. Many of his appointees went on to develop and promote programs that broke radically with past Soviet behavior.[21]

Gorbachev moved quickly to make a number of high-level changes in the foreign policy realm. If he expected to achieve significant change in foreign policy, Gorbachev had to remove the prestigious Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko. Given Gromyko's almost three decades at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), appointment of an MID insider risked leaving significant power in Gromyko's hands. Promotion of an acknowledged Gromyko opponent raised the prospect of an open showdown, something Gorbachev consistently avoided. An innovative outsider offered an ideal solution.

In July 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze, without any foreign policy experience, became foreign minister. At the same time, Shevardnadze rose from candidate to full membership in the Politburo. Formerly the first secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia, he had known Gorbachev for 30 years through their work in the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). According to Soviet diplomat Yuly Kvitsinsky, MID insiders were aware that Shevardnadze might replace Gromyko as early as May 1985.[22] Gorbachev was apparently considering this important decision to replace Gromyko no

more than two months after taking office. The promotion to full Politburo member and Shevardnadze's immediate activism suggested that Gorbachev sought a revitalization, rather than a diminution, in the MID's role. Shevardnadze's immediate calls for change in Soviet foreign policy surely added to the criticism Gorbachev was already receiving for moving too rapidly.[23]

The ranks of deputy ministers and ambassadors also experienced a large turnover. In May 1986, two new first deputy ministers were appointed, Anatoly Kovalev and Yuly Vorontsov. From December 1985 to August 1986, seven of the nine deputy ministers were new appointees: Vadim Loginov, Valentin Nikoforov, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Boris Chaplin, Anatoly Adamishin, Vladimir Petrovsky, and Igor Rogachev. In 1985 and 1986, Gorbachev replaced approximately 60 percent of Moscow's ambassadors, including nine of the 16 in NATO countries.[24] This number included the appointment of Yuly Kvitsinsky as ambassador to Bonn in April 1986.

Kvitsinsky had extensive experience in Soviet relations with both East and West Germany and in US–Soviet arms-control negotiations. Working under Valentin Falin, he had participated in the negotiations surrounding the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed in 1971. He had also been Paul Nitze's Soviet counterpart in the famous 1982 "Walk in the Woods" episode, an unsuccessful back-channel attempt to prevent the impending crisis over the US deployment of Pershing 2 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Upon Shevardnadze's replacement of Gromyko, Kvitsinsky was one of those who briefed the inexperienced new foreign minister on arms-control matters.[25] At the time of his appointment, Kvitsinsky was widely seen as an innovative diplomat who quickly accepted the implications of Gorbachev's new foreign policy vision.

Within the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee, responsible for relations with non-ruling socialist parties, Gorbachev's renewal was much more limited. Anatoly Dobrynin, long-time ambassador to the United States, replaced Boris Ponomarev as head of ID in March 1986. Many of the diplomats promoted within MID had worked with Dobrynin in Washington. In addition, in April 1986, Georgy Kornienko was transferred from first deputy foreign minister to first deputy head of ID. This was apparently a result of Kornienko's differences of opinion with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. In the different cadre policies, Gorbachev demonstrated that he expected the Foreign Ministry to play a larger role in the impending foreign policy changes.[26]

In addition to Shevardnadze and Dobrynin, Aleksandr Yakovlev emerged as another innovative new foreign policy actor. He initially held no official foreign policy post, but his experience as an international relations specialist, his closeness to Gorbachev, and his increasing control over propaganda and information policy gave Yakovlev considerable influence in questions of foreign affairs. This authority was formalized in March 1986,

when the CC foreign information department came under his control. In 1988, a reorganization of the Central Committee made Yakovlev responsible for the activities of the entire International Department.

The personnel changes not only affected the foreign policy arena domestically, but also altered international perceptions. The removal of aged Brezhnev-era officials and their replacement with lesser known figures met with approval in the West. Although the new officials were sometimes only slightly younger than their predecessors and their political views were often unknown, the mere fact of significant personnel turnover seemed to demonstrate a desire for change. Gromyko's removal certainly indicated a desire for change in the foreign policy realm. Gorbachev himself acknowledged the damage done by the West's image of the Soviet foreign minister as "Mister Nyet." [27] The appointment of Dobrynin as head of ID was also welcomed in the West, given the former Soviet ambassador's reputation as an urbane and intelligent diplomat.

Information Policy

In addition to large-scale personnel turnover, Gorbachev almost immediately initiated a new information policy. The general secretary devised this new direction, which quickly became known as *glasnost*, as a political instrument in his efforts to consolidate his domestic position. Such elite-driven efforts to mobilize and accelerate the untapped potential of society represented a traditional method of building authority in Soviet politics.[28] His controlled liberalization of Soviet political communications also represented a reformer increasing the range of policy options by weakening the constraints on reform and encouraging pressures for change. Gorbachev's strategy cast the media and particularly the press as a vital tool in restructuring Soviet politics, economy, and society in general (*perestroika*). In so doing, the Soviet leader was attempting to alter a system of party control that constituted a central feature of the political system. Past Soviet leaders viewed mass communication as an obedient servant dedicated to mobilizing support for and propagandizing the achievements of the Communist Party. Historically, the mass media operated within officially enforced guidelines, including a complex system of preliminary censorship.

Gorbachev used his vigorous new information policy to portray himself as a capable and activist leader. He also strove to sell *glasnost* abroad by demonstrating to international observers that the Soviet Union was undergoing genuine change. Liberalization visibly improved the Soviet Union's image and thus made Gorbachev's foreign policy goals more attainable. A 19th Party Conference resolution acknowledged that "*glasnost* is helping the cause of peace and cooperation, promoting the ideas of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, and the shaping of advanced and civilized international relations."[29] In 1987–1988, West German officials repeatedly praised

the new openness as a catalyst in improving relations with the USSR. The new Soviet leader soon learned that the reverse also held true. The reactor explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986, and more importantly the news media's lack of immediate coverage, embarrassed Gorbachev domestically. But the lapse also seriously undermined the improved international image he had cultivated. As the scope of the disaster became clear, government officials and media leaders widely admitted the damage done by the lack of prompt and objective reportage of the catastrophe. The episode impressed on Gorbachev that *glasnost* could not only provide benefits, but also impose costs if not implemented consistently.

The new Soviet approach to political communications did not entail a complete abandonment of political control over the media, but the carefully coordinated utilization of a gradual press liberalization. Thus, new media liberties remained subject to the constraints of the political struggle. Gorbachev's spirited denunciation of Boris Yeltsin in 1987 illustrated his conviction that there was no greater sin than initiating a political attack too early. In fact, Gorbachev viewed reform supporters who deviated from his lead as more dangerous than open conservative opposition. In 1987, Gorbachev reminded media officials that they should immediately address some domestic problems, but leave others until the political timing was right: "We all have our feet on the ground and know the financial situation, the economy, and what we must do. All this must be taken into consideration, so that it won't seem that a person who says, 'Let's go' is a patriot, while someone who thinks about how to do it is not a patriot."Gorbachev also warned, "People wait for someone to make a mistake or commit some inaccuracy. That's why we must be responsible, because this redounds against the whole process of democratization and openness."[30] The Soviet leader repeatedly stressed the absolute necessity of a tactical approach to reform and the calculated use of *glasnost* in the struggle against the opponents of reform.

A second limitation involved the acceptable subjects of criticism. Questioning the leading role of the Communist Party remained off-limits. In addition, Gorbachev warned the media away from topics such as the possibility of a multiparty system, the construction of capitalism in the Soviet Union, and the bankruptcy of socialism. The media did not press these limits initially, but certain reformist editors and commentators later strained against the remaining restrictions. Gorbachev and Yakovlev gradually shifted from encouraging greater openness to scolding excesses in later phases.

While the strategy touched mainly domestic policy in the period from 1985 to 1986, *glasnost* began to spill over into foreign policy beginning in 1987.[31] The goals of greater openness in the Soviet mass media proved equally applicable to questions of external behavior. Revealing past foreign policy failures created momentum for change at home and improved

Moscow's image abroad. Such analyses also weakened the hands of Gorbachev's conservative opponents who desired a continuation of previous policies. Just as the general secretary felt compelled to alter the domestic policy arena, so in foreign policy he sought permanently to transform the foreign policy-making process. Gorbachev did not criticize the first halting steps toward extending *glasnost* into the sphere of international relations. His vigorous campaign to advance this process starting in 1988 indicated that he accepted, and probably had planned, this development. Gorbachev's conservative opponents sensed the danger in this process and vigorously criticized the media liberalization, especially when it embraced foreign policy issues.

The limits of *glasnost* on domestic issues also extended to coverage of international relations, with slightly different effects. Criticism of domestic problems implicated local officials and corrupt bureaucrats. In the foreign policy realm, the highest political elite made the decisions. Thus, any attack of current policy inevitably reflected on Gorbachev or his supporters: there were no middlemen to blame. The possibility that foreign observers would mistake the opinions of journalists for official thinking was an additional concern.[32] By the end of 1986, domestic and foreign policy were still treated differently in the press. Gorbachev had, however, already set the stage for the major reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy of 1987–1988. The visible results also influenced Western perceptions. Confidence in Gorbachev's reformist intentions grew as observers witnessed the Kremlin's diminishing control over what had been a central component of the Soviet authoritarian system.

The Changing Foreign Policy Process

The traditional process by which foreign policy was made in the USSR was extremely closed and centralized. The politburo, with the input of prominent members of the Central Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and sometimes the Ministry of Defense, generally conducted secret deliberations. A small group of leaders often made decisions of profound importance, such as the 1979 decision to invade Afghanistan. Gorbachev's promotions of like-minded foreign policy experts and tacit encouragement of critical discussions of past Soviet external actions signaled a new approach to formulating foreign policy. In addition, the Soviet leader participated in dialogue on international relations that gained speed after the 19th Party Conference in June–July 1988. The speed with which the foreign policy debate commenced, the advanced development of many of the concepts under examination, and the conspicuous involvement of members of the Soviet elite indicated the Gorbachev leadership was aware of, and favorably disposed toward, the pre-1985 academic discourse advocating change in Moscow's external behavior.[33] The Soviet leader and his

supporters, for instance, were ready to consider withdrawing from Afghanistan soon after Gorbachev took office. Yet they waited to act until late 1986–early 1987, after the political succession question was behind them.[34]

Because of the requirements of reform politics, however, Gorbachev's acceptance of certain conceptual changes had little immediate impact on the foreign policy process. Even in this initial phase, Gorbachev was committed to an ambitious reform program. His intentions, though moderate and conventional compared to later years, necessitated a complex process of deception and political maneuvering. He was not yet politically secure enough to challenge openly those who controlled the formation of external policy. Yet the combination of a large personnel turnover and a limited liberalization of political communication combined to produce a significant change in the foreign policy-making process. Eventually, these changes led to a greater role for specialists in foreign policy decisions, greater accountability, and a better informed and politically relevant public.

GORBACHEV'S WEST EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Much of Gorbachev's attention was focused inward as he consolidated his power, reevaluated domestic problems, and formulated programs to address them. Until he completed these tasks, he limited changes in foreign policy to official rhetoric and shifts in emphasis. One of his earliest initiatives involved heightening the attention paid to Western Europe. Soviet policy toward Western Europe had always exhibited a unique character, since it constituted an independent foreign policy arena and straddled broader Soviet strategies toward the United States and Eastern Europe.

During periods of heightened East-West tensions, the Kremlin historically placed Western European states in the middle of US–Soviet disagreements. The INF dual track episode was a prominent example of this tactic. Moscow had attempted to prevent the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe by playing on these governments' reservations concerning the substance and style of US security policy. In his rhetoric, Gorbachev stressed his desire to treat Western Europe as an entity in its own right. Upon taking office, however, he perpetuated the traditional Soviet approach, especially in relations with Bonn. By the summer of 1987, he utilized his greater foreign policy freedom to move away from this strategy. Paradoxically, Gorbachev benefited from the failures of the previous Soviet policy in the INF debacle and Moscow's inability to prevent West German participation in Washington's SDI research. Western Europe also figured in Gorbachev's Eastern European thinking. If West European leaders challenged the postwar order or exploited instability in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev could not proceed with his planned liberalization of Soviet–East European ties. He and his supporters referred to the need for responsibility on the part of EEC nations. For historic, political, and geo-

graphic reasons, the FRG was the most crucial actor, and also the most likely to stir up trouble in Gorbachev's eyes.

New Interest in Western Europe

Even before Chernenko's death, Gorbachev indicated his interest in Western Europe. In December 1984, he led a Supreme Soviet delegation to the United Kingdom. His remarks, many of which were later canonized in new thinking, revealed that beneath the surface in Moscow elements of the Soviet leadership were considering a new approach to Western Europe and to international relations.[35] Gorbachev emphasized the interdependent nature of the contemporary world, the need for governments to recognize the legitimate security interests of others, the connection between a nation's foreign and domestic policies, and the desirability of deideologizing international politics. He also resurrected the Soviet concept of a "Common European Home," where the fates of the USSR and Western Europe were inexorably linked.[36]

Upon taking office, the new Soviet leader began to enunciate his new emphasis on Western Europe. At the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev listed Moscow's relations with Europe as "one of the most important dimensions of our foreign policy."[37] Beyond official statements of intention, the Soviet leader's trips abroad reflected the new emphasis on Western Europe. Gorbachev's trip to France in October 1985, his first foreign visit as CPSU general secretary, formalized Moscow's commitment to improving relations with Western Europe. The trip was presented as "a catalyst for the entire European process."[38] In an interview on French television before the meetings, Gorbachev contended that "the Soviet leadership has in its foreign policies always kept in mind questions of Soviet-European relations, and its relations with the countries of Western Europe. I would even say kept them at the center of its attention."[39]

Aleksandr Yakovlev, whose earlier writings were extremely critical of the United States, spearheaded the new emphasis placed on Western Europe.[40] His influence swayed Gorbachev toward a more multipolar foreign policy, while also injecting a certain amount of anti-Americanism into the Soviet rhetoric. Yakovlev's general denunciation of American moral bankruptcy led him to question whether the United States should remain the focal point of Soviet foreign policy. He predicted that Washington's reckless security policies would force the other leading capitalist states to distance themselves from the United States in pursuit of "the rational guarantee of all their political and economic interests, including security." Yakovlev's influence over Gorbachev may be seen in the similar remarks made by the general secretary at the 27th Party Congress.[41]

No single month more clearly demonstrated the Soviet commitment to improving relations with the states of Western Europe than July 1986, when

French President Mitterrand and West German Foreign Minister Genscher visited Moscow, and Shevardnadze traveled to London to meet with British Prime Minister Thatcher. The Soviet meetings with the "West European orchestra's first violins" began with Mitterrand's visit to Moscow on July 7–10.[42] Gorbachev believed that among all the West European powers, France was most likely to act in accordance with his observation that "Europe has sufficiently great economic and political potential for it to speak more definitely and more confidently on its own behalf and to strive for progress at all the talks now underway."[43]

Shevardnadze's July 14–16 visit to London was the second leg of this triad. He delivered an invitation to Thatcher to make an official visit to Moscow and emphasized that Great Britain was a valued Soviet partner whose cooperation was vital.[44] The visit of Genscher to Moscow on July 21–22 constituted the final piece of this Soviet diplomatic campaign. It illustrated both the increased importance of the FRG to the Kremlin's foreign policy and ongoing obstacles in relations between the two. Although the Soviet foreign minister was invited to visit Bonn, neither the Soviets nor the West Germans publicly invited the other's leader for an official visit. This outcome placed the FRG well behind the French in terms of high-level meetings with Gorbachev, and also a step below the British, since Thatcher had just received an official invitation. Only in July 1987 did this freeze end with Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker's warm reception in Moscow.

The Changing Soviet Approach to Western Europe

By 1987, Gorbachev had subtly transformed his initial interest in Western Europe. Security issues, once central to the Soviet approach, were joined by economic and political questions. Gorbachev made this shift more explicit in an interview with *L'Unita* in May 1986. He first declared that "relations with the West European countries really do occupy a special place in our international policy," and rejected as "nonsense" claims that Moscow was attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Western Europe. He went on to state: "The historically evolved ties between Western Europe and the United States, or, say, the Soviet Union's relations with the European socialist countries, are a political reality. This reality must be reckoned with if a realistic policy is to be constructed. A different approach might disturb the existing equilibrium in Europe."[45] The message emphasized acceptance of "political realities," especially the expectation that the countries of Western Europe would conduct responsible non-provocative political relations with their East European neighbors.

In addition, West Germany had gradually replaced France as the focal point of Gorbachev's efforts. After the FRG federal elections in January 1987 and FRG President Weizsäcker's visit to Moscow in July, the USSR and FRG

had achieved a significant rapprochement. At the time of French Prime Minister Chirac's visit to Moscow in May 1987, the Soviet side warned against an "opportunistic" French policy toward the USSR. [46] Gorbachev held France responsible for what he considered disruptive stances on issues important to Moscow, such as INF negotiations. France had also expelled a number of Soviet diplomats, which the Soviet press portrayed as an effort to damage relations. The general secretary repeated a sentiment that was prevalent in the Soviet mass media throughout this period. As progress in diminishing the military threat in Europe was made in 1987, West Germany and France were warned not to proceed with their plans for military cooperation.[47]

Gorbachev increased the Soviet emphasis on Western Europe for a number of reasons. As noted above, a certain level of anti-Americanism did characterize the first phase of the new approach to Europe. Yakovlev's personal views introduced a degree of hostility toward the United States. Yet anti-Washington statements also served domestic purposes. In differentiating four divergent tendencies toward détente within the Soviet leadership, Jerry Hough observed that the supporters of a combined pro-European and pro-domestic reform program enjoyed the strongest position for pursuing détente.[48] The European orientation and criticisms of the US appealed to hard-liners who might oppose a deténte policy that cast Washington in the central role. Domestic reform could be justified in national security terms. Certain prominent military leaders argued that some economic reform was necessary in order for the USSR to compete with the United States in developing high-tech weaponry. The new general secretary did manipulate this aspect of the new European approach, but only in a limited manner. The military's vision of domestic reform fell far short of that held by the Gorbachev leadership. And prolonged criticism of the US would rapidly become counterproductive by undermining progress toward many of Gorbachev's foreign policy goals that required American cooperation.

Another political explanation for expressions of anti-Americanism involved Andrei Gromyko's national prominence as the architect of Moscow's détente policy in the 1970s. In order to aid his efforts to unseat the longtime foreign minister, Gorbachev may have attempted to differentiate his stated foreign policy goals from those of the preceding period. Logically, a simple return to détente with the West would not require a change in foreign ministers. The appointment of an Americanist to head the International Department and a markedly more European-oriented détente made Gromyko expendable.[49] Again, the Gorbachev team limited the exploitation of anti-American sentiments to breaking Gromyko's hold over the foreign policy apparatus.

The Reagan administration's hard-line policies constituted a more direct and profound factor in the new Soviet emphasis on Europe. Unable to

expect near-term progress in direct relations with Washington, and frightened by the prospect of a renewed, SDI-inspired arms race, Gorbachev turned to Western Europe. Bovin interpreted the new emphasis on Western Europe in the following way: "We have knocked on the US door and it has not been opened. We have knocked again, and again it has not opened. So why do we persist? There are other doors to knock on."Gorbachev did not openly acknowledge the temporary nature of the shift toward Europe, because to do so would have forced him to launch major foreign policy changes before domestic and international conditions were ripe. Even after Gorbachev and his supporters began to move away from suggestions of a genuinely Europe-oriented foreign policy, US intransigence forced Moscow to pressure Western Europe into a role it was not equipped to play. As Bovin put it, "We would like to utilize Western Europe's potential to make good, via the transatlantic channel, the US administration's obvious shortage of common sense."[50]

The Gorbachev leadership attempted to sell this approach to Western European capitals by stressing the possibility of the greater autonomy Moscow offered. While official sources, and especially those in Soviet publications stressed the *responsibilities* incumbent on Western Europe, Soviet statements in Western publications focused on the *opportunities* available.[51] Despite repeated declarations that Western Europe would remain central to Soviet policy, once opportunities in US–Soviet relations increased, the attention paid to other NATO members dropped considerably. Gorbachev's early European approach was not a strategic shift away from the United States, but a second-best means of pursuing desired political goals. The initial desire to exploit NATO's European members as a "transatlantic channel"eventually evolved into a more pragmatic commitment to developing political and economic contacts. Relations with Western Europe, and particularly with West Germany, did not substantially improve until this transformation in Soviet intentions occurred.

SECURITY ISSUES IN SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS

European security issues necessarily played a decisive role in USSR–FRG ties. West Germany, by its existence as much as by its policies, threatened Moscow's control over Eastern Europe more than any other Western European state. The FRG was also the European core of the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, memories of Germany's militarism and territorial ambitions continued to nourish Soviet doubts concerning Bonn's intentions.

The leadership succession following Chernenko's death enhanced the importance of these security concerns. Like shifts in economic and political goals, questions of national security inspire domestic political struggles.[52] Malenkov's espousal of significant changes in Soviet national security policy in the midst of the 1953 succession crisis provided Khrushchev with

winning issues, even though Khrushchev apparently shared these views. In Gorbachev's political consolidation, major changes in military policy risked instigating an opposition coalition of powerful domestic actors.[53] The new Soviet leader studiously avoided this danger by combining a continuation of Moscow's traditional European security policies with a series of new foreign policy concepts and emphases. He addressed the contradictions in this strategy only when his domestic strength allowed.

The Soviet approach to European security which Gorbachev inherited included tactical efforts to separate Western Europe from the United States and generally undermine the cohesiveness of NATO. One aspect of new thinking supported the continuation of this policy. As Stephen Meyer noted in 1987, "Gorbachev's call for increased reliance on political means" of achieving security included "active efforts to divide and weaken NATO politically." This approach represented an area of convergence between traditional and new-thinking attitudes toward European security.[54] Did Moscow strive to break up NATO? This oft-asked question directed attention away from more important issues. Some in the Soviet leadership must have desired the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. Yet as long as this remained a distant possibility, even a definite answer one way or the other would do little to illuminate Moscow's responses to specific and immediate situations.

The Kremlin's vigorous steps to prevent the placement of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe illustrated this aspect of its European strategy. After its failure to prevent the decision, Moscow responded to the INF deployment in 1984 by punishing the West German government for its role by limiting bilateral contacts and obstructing German-German relations. The Kremlin, for instance, pressured East Germany's Erich Honecker to postpone his scheduled visit to West Germany in September 1984.[55] Yet the Soviet leadership exerted this pressure within limited bounds, thus displaying an ambiguity in its attitude toward Bonn which continued into the first years of Gorbachev's reign.

Gorbachev based his desire to enhance relations with Western Europe on the assumption that these states would support his European security initiatives. Moscow promised in exchange a return to the détente of the 1970s. In a statement on arms control, Gorbachev wrote, "It is no accident that a considerable proportion of the new Soviet initiatives are addressed directly to Europe. In efforts to achieve a sharp turn in favor of the policy of peace, Europe could have a special mission. This mission is building détente anew."Shevardnadze reiterated the emphasis on Western Europe in a speech before the 27th CPSU Party Congress. Referring to the prospects for limiting the arms race, he said, "Now is the time for Western Europe to have its say, to show its true face. The measure of its political responsibility is now being seriously tested."[56]

West German Participation in SDI

From the earliest days of Gorbachev's rule, official West German visitors to the Soviet Union left convinced of Moscow's fixation on Washington's SDI program.[57] Gorbachev inherited a complex situation with regard to the American strategic defense initiative. As with the campaign to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe in the 1970s, the United States faced the difficult task of convincing its NATO allies to support SDI. West Germany viewed the entire concept with suspicion. For Bonn, the potential US shift from strategic deterrence to strategic defense undermined West German security by calling into question Washington's nuclear commitment to Europe.[58] Would Washington equate its own security with that of Western Europe if US territory was protected from a Soviet nuclear strike? And would SDI allow the Americans to shift their focus from preventing the outbreak of a conflict to a war-winning strategy? Moscow had hoped to capitalize on the FRG's discomfort and push Bonn not to support or participate in SDI. Moscow may also have pressured Honecker to push Bonn in this direction. In April 1986, for example, a GDR official charged that Bonn's SDI decision had further delayed Honecker's long-awaited trip to West Germany. The implicit message was that Bonn's actions had provoked Moscow to oppose Honecker's visit.[59] Initially Gorbachev continued this policy approach. He and his advisers criticized Bonn for obstructing détente and increasing the threat of war in Europe.[60]

Many West Germans were indeed uncomfortable with the US strategic defense project. The SPD opposed the idea of space-based systems, and especially the participation of West German firms in such research. Genscher and the Free Democrats remained unconvinced by Washington's arguments in favor of SDI. CDU–CSU politicians were divided among themselves over foreign policy issues. So-called "Genscherist" and "Stahlhelm" factions arose partly over the proper West German stance on the SDI question.[61] Kohl's eventual decision to participate in the US program was justified not in terms of any military benefits, but as a way to increase West German influence in Washington's strategic planning.[62] The lack of enthusiasm for the decision, even by its supporters, was in part a result of the significant domestic opposition to West German participation. One survey found a majority of West Germans opposed SDI.[63] Moscow contributed a further reason for hesitancy with its vigorous criticism of Kohl's earlier statements supporting SDI and the veiled threat that bilateral relations would suffer if Bonn played any role in US plans.

Yet as early as October 1985, Gorbachev had already hinted at a retreat from the previous hard-line stance on arms control. In France, he suggested that progress in INF talks need not be linked to a ban on US space weapons. During the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev stated, "We must not let the 'star wars' program be used as a stimulus to further arms race and as an obstacle on the road to radical disarmament." He declared the USSR's

willingness to resolve 'the question of medium-range missiles in the European zone separately—unconnected with the problems of strategic and space-based armaments."[64] At the same time, Moscow chastised Kohl for his statement of support for SDI. In a West German paper, Vadim Zagladin put the Soviet position simply: If Bonn participates in SDI, then relations with the Soviet Union will worsen. If not, 'We offer to all countries, but especially to the FRG, close cooperation in peaceful scientific exploration of space."The Soviet embassy in Bonn reiterated this message in a note to Genscher criticizing the FRG's apparent willingness to participate in US–sponsored SDI research.[65]

Moscow's attacks on West German policy toward SDI had little effect. On 27 March, representatives of the West German and US governments signed an agreement on the participation of West German firms in SDI research. Gorbachev used the stage of the East German party congress to criticize the FRG for supporting SDI more zealously than any other Western European country.[66] In addition, the USSR's ambassador to West Germany, V. S. Semyonov, stated to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher: 'In accepting American medium-range missiles on its territory and now in joining the SDI program, the FRG is assuming grave responsibility for its participation in a chain of US actions that are profoundly hostile in their very essence to the cause of international security, peace and cooperation."[67] Soviet officials stressed that the decision would damage bilateral relations.

The threat of far-reaching repercussions in Soviet–West German relations was hollow. Just days after Semyonov's threatening remarks, he was removed as Soviet Ambassador to Bonn. Yuly Kvitsinsky, his replacement, was widely known for his reformist political connections and experience in negotiations with the West. His appointment sent a clear message about Moscow's interest in West Germany. The moderation in Soviet policy following Bonn's decision to participate in SDI research stemmed from two related factors. The first was the abject failure of Soviet pressure tactics on the FRG which had done nothing to alter Washington's behavior, had hardly affected Bonn's support of the SDI program, and thus had needlessly burdened relations with a powerful West European actor. Second, Gorbachev had achieved a degree of domestic maneuverability which allowed him to confront those Soviet leaders who still favored the discredited hard-line approach to West Germany. The new Soviet flexibility was also evident in INF negotiations.

Progress Toward an INF Agreement

To a greater extent than negotiations surrounding SDI, INF talks illustrated the transformation in Soviet thinking toward West Germany. As with SDI, Gorbachev initially attempted to put pressure on the United States via Western Europe. Assuming that NATO's European members desired an

INF agreement, he sought to gain concessions on space-based missile research in exchange for progress on intermediate missiles in Europe. Again, the gradual abandonment of this position involved a combination of domestic political consolidation and the perceived failure of the existing strategy.

As noted above, the Gorbachev team believed that Western Europe could serve as an effective goad in bringing the United States to the arms control table. In pursuit of this goal, the new general secretary attempted to convince Western European leaders to break with Washington's arms control policies. He suggested in his visit to France that Moscow might hold talks on nuclear arsenals with Paris and London separate from US–Soviet negotiations. In January, Gorbachev went even further, indicating that Moscow would accept an INF agreement that did not include Western European nuclear arsenals if Britain and France would agree not to modernize these forces.[68] These initiatives illustrated the emerging Soviet flexibility on the issue.

Yet the lack of official West European enthusiasm also demonstrated the ultimate ineffectiveness of the strategy. Moreover, Washington's greater willingness to negotiate with Moscow undermined the very rationale for Gorbachev's initial approach to Western Europe. The superpowers, for instance, virtually excluded Western Europe from consideration during their summits at Geneva in November 1985 and Reykjavik in October 1986. Kohl acknowledged his lack of direct input when he reminded Reagan to keep in mind Europe's security interests at the summits.[69] Moscow understandably concentrated on the US administration and saw the lack of progress at the meetings as a function of US-Soviet relations, completely independent from Western Europe.

Despite two US–Soviet summit meetings, Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in which he spoke enthusiastically about the development of a European process of détente and international security, could not hide the lack of progress on INF in 1986. In March 1987, Gorbachev repeated the idea that talks on intermediate nuclear forces might proceed without being tied to progress on strategic weapons on star wars.[70] As the United States and USSR moved forward on this basis, the issue of Bonn's support of SDI no longer stood as an obstacle to improved relations with Moscow. Soviet assessments assumed that Bonn valued progress of any kind in INF negotiations, since West Germany was most threatened by the intermediate range missiles. In fact, the CDU-CSU was unhappy with the INF breakthroughs made at its expense. Under pressure from Washington, Bonn made concessions which it opposed on political and security grounds.[71] West Germany's decision to abandon its Pershing 1A missiles represented one such concession. Moscow's misconceptions of Bonn's attitude toward US-Soviet INF talks further

illustrated the failure of Soviet efforts to use West Germany against the United States. In the end, the FRG played a minimal role in the INF process.

The achievement of an INF agreement in late 1987 did increase tensions within NATO and did require concessions by West Germany. Yet while these by-products profited Moscow, they did not represent a vindication of Gorbachev's initial strategy. This approach had intended to prevent German participation in SDI and increase West German pressure on Washington to deal with Moscow. Gorbachev achieved neither of these goals. In fact by 1986–1987, he was already moving away from this strategy. Gorbachev's domestic maneuverability allowed him to redefine Moscow's European security interests and scrap the discredited hard-line approach. In addition, Reagan's greater willingness to negotiate with Moscow led Gorbachev to abandon his mistaken ambitions concerning the role of Western Europe. In its place, Gorbachev began to develop a more realistic basis for relations with West Germany. This new approach sought to construct more intense economic and political ties independent of broader questions of East-West security.

THE CMEA, THE EEC, AND WEST GERMANY

Unlike security policy, Moscow's external economic relations offered Gorbachev more immediate opportunities for change. First, economic issues were not as politically charged as questions of national security. Second, the leadership agreed in principle that the performance of the Soviet economy had declined by world standards and that this decline undermined Moscow's global position. Finally, while progress in the security sphere required US cooperation, the Soviet Union could pursue improved economic ties with Western Europe independent of Washington.

Gorbachev, however, was not entirely unencumbered by domestic political constraints, since any major overhaul of foreign economic relations would entail domestic economic restructuring. Until the Soviet leader openly embraced radical economic reform at home, the USSR's actual global economic performance would not improve substantially. Nonetheless, Gorbachev quickly lent his support to several concepts concerning international economic relations that became integral to new thinking. The Soviet leader and his supporters spoke repeatedly about the interdependent nature of contemporary international relations, the link between a state's domestic and foreign policy, and the importance of economic strength in global relations. Officials also emphasized the need to rationalize Soviet economic relations on the basis of profitability. By 1987, Moscow had begun incorporating the new principles into policy. As the dominant economy in Europe, West Germany naturally emerged as a focal point for Gorbachev's economic relations with the West.

From the start, the Soviet general secretary strove to transform Moscow's external economic ties, particularly those with Eastern Europe. Gorbachev began almost immediately a program to revitalize the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This effort came in the form of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress to the Year 2000, adopted at a CMEA Council Meeting in December 1985. The Comprehensive Program was designed to raise the technological level and productivity of the CMEA economies through cooperative efforts in specific production spheres. Moscow hoped to improve the CMEA mechanism, while aiding the Soviet economy directly through higher quality imports, and also indirectly by utilizing the technological expertise of the entire Soviet bloc. Yet the plan also demonstrated that the Soviet leadership appreciated the genuine need to restructure relations with Eastern Europe. This fact is most clearly illustrated in Moscow's efforts to establish relations between the CMEA and the European Community.

The Drive for Official CMEA-EEC Relations

Only months after taking office, Gorbachev revealed the Kremlin's new interest in the EEC. He used an unscheduled May 1985 meeting with a visiting member of the Italian parliament to express his desire for improved CMEA-EEC contacts. Days later, in a speech to Italian Prime Minister Craxi, Gorbachev explicitly stated his interest in EEC-CMEA cooperation: "Insofar as the EEC countries act as a 'political entity,' we are prepared to seek a common language on concrete international problems with it."[72] The secretary general of the CMEA, Vyacheslav Sychyov, then sent a letter in June 1985 to Jacques Delors, acting president of the Commission of the European Community, calling for both sides to "reach a joint declaration providing for the establishment of official relations between the CMEA and the EEC that would take into account the powers of the two organizations."[73] Bonn responded to the Soviet openings in June 1985. Genscher came out vocally in favor of political contacts between the EEC and the CMEA, adding that economic contacts would contribute to improved political ties.[74]

Moscow had expressed interest in an official CMEA–EEC document in the past. Yet Gorbachev soon indicated a much greater desire for such an agreement by making concessions that his predecessors had rejected. Attempts to establish official relations had foundered on two main issues. One of these was the status of West Berlin. The Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC, recognized West Berlin as an integral part of the community. The Soviet Union and East Germany had long opposed such a recognition in any agreement between the two organizations. In the process of negotiations, the CMEA gave ground on this point, eventually agreeing to "acknowledge"the EEC's recognition of West Berlin. [75]

The second major problem was the nature of relations. The EEC had rejected any binding, substantive agreement between the two blocs. It had rightly feared that the Soviet Union would come to dominate such an arrangement. The community also contended that the more loosely constituted CMEA was not competent to sign any agreement predicated on its authority to represent the interests of all its members. Thus, the EEC would accept only a minimal agreement establishing relations between the blocs, while leaving more concrete issues to specific treaties between the EEC and individual CMEA countries.[76] As might be expected, the Soviet Union had opposed such bilateral relations. Yet in May 1986, Sychyov expressed the CMEA's willingness to accept this approach in conjunction with the establishment of formal ties between the two organizations.[77] CMEA and EEC representatives met in September 1986 and March 1987, and laid the groundwork for a third meeting in May 1988 that produced a draft document and formal recognition in June.

The Soviet leader's willingness to make these concessions indicated that official relations with the EEC had become more important since similar talks broke down five years before.[78] In effect, Gorbachev sanctioned bilateral agreements between the EEC and individual CMEA states. In so doing, he must have seen that West Germany would play the leading role in this process. The FRG had the most powerful economy in Western Europe and was the most interested in economic ties with the East. Taken together, Gorbachev's initiatives with regard to the activities of the CMEA and the establishment of official relations with the EEC represented the first indications of his altered vision of Soviet relations with the whole of Europe. Gorbachev's conceptualization of the Common European Home, while never precisely defined, envisioned the abandonment of Soviet interference in Eastern Europe, the acceptance of a greater Western European economic role in the Soviet bloc, and the achievement of certain pan-European interests such as decreased tensions by broadening and deepening economic contacts.

The FRG and Soviet Foreign Economic Policy

The strength of its economy made the FRG a natural focal point for Soviet economic relations in Western Europe. As early as October 1985, Shevardnadze hinted that the upcoming CPSU Party Congress would elevate the importance of economic contacts with West Germany.[79] His remarks indicated that, first, the Gorbachev leadership did desire improved relations, and second, pursuit of these opportunities required official authorization at some future date. By 1986, Gorbachev was prepared to separate economic and technical issues from security questions in dealing with Bonn. Fyodor Burlatsky expressed this idea when he observed that "security problems have largely been resolved for the countries of Western Europe by dictation

from Washington, while they have decided problems of economic cooperation primarily by following their own interests."Burlatsky added, "As far as the economic sphere is concerned, and scientific and technical cooperation, here Europe has turned out to be less obedient and this has produced some good results on both sides."[80] Also, economic questions were less likely to play into the hands of Gorbachev's domestic opponents, while the benefits would strengthen him politically. Gorbachev appeared to conclude: If we cannot decrease tensions with the US in order to justify defense cuts, draw down external commitments and improve access to the world market, perhaps we can gain these same financial benefits through more intense economic relations with Western Europe.

Both in constructing relations between the EEC and CMEA, and in Soviet–West German economic relations, Moscow demanded that Bonn demonstrate a willingness to cooperate on Soviet terms and renounce any attempts to promote or encourage instability in Eastern Europe. From early in his tenure, Gorbachev had planned to restructure Soviet relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. For example the CMEA's STP Comprehensive Program required an increased level of economic integration. The program's lack of success did not dampen enthusiasm for greater integration. Instead, the CMEA members accelerated their experimentation with innovative avenues of cooperation, including the creation of true joint ventures. At the same time, Gorbachev was pushing for more extensive relations between the EEC and the CMEA, relations that would offer Western Europe substantial influence in Eastern Europe. In return, he expected proof that the EEC would not abuse this influence by reopening the question of borders or other provocative issues. Therefore, Moscow's condemnation of Kohl's controversial statements was genuine, since the chancellor threatened to undermine a fundamental plank in Gorbachev's planned reforms.[81]

Despite Moscow's apparent desire to improve economic relations with West Germany, both exports and imports declined, due to global economic factors such as falling energy prices. Yet Moscow's inability to provide high-quality exports limited the possibilities dramatically. In ensuing years, politicians in Bonn and Moscow attempted to stimulate economic interaction with mixed results. One of the most highly acclaimed avenues for raising FRG–USSR economic interaction was joint ventures, a concept borrowed from CMEA interaction.

Both sides considered improved financial contacts essential to better political relations. The connection between economic and political ties was central to West Germany's international outlook, especially in its relations with the east.[82] For Gorbachev, his domestic reform intentions and the potential benefits of West German cooperation also pushed economic issues to the forefront of the Soviet–FRG relations. Genscher's trip to the Soviet capital in July 1986 produced a series of agreements involving economic issues. In early 1987, various Soviet officials repeatedly stressed Moscow's

interest in enhanced economic relations with Bonn.[83] In so doing, they emphasized a new eagerness to exploit West Germany's offers of assistance in transforming the Soviet economy. Economic issues also dominated the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Antonov in April. This approach was not limited only to direct contacts with Bonn. In November 1986, for instance, Shevardnadze proposed negotiations between the EEC and Moscow in order to strengthen economic ties.[84] The development of various forms of Soviet–West German economic interaction remained a shared priority in the years to come.

PROMISING SIGNS AND SETBACKS IN 1986

Gorbachev's first year in office produced little visible change in Moscow's external behavior. Only in 1986 did Gorbachev solidify his political position to the point that he was prepared to begin redefining Soviet foreign policy. At the 27th Party Congress in March 1986, the Soviet leader implemented a major turnover in Central Committee personnel. He also incorporated many of his reformist ideas into the party platform, though the tensions within Gorbachev's own report to the party congress suggested that his thoughts on foreign policy remained a contentious issue.[85] Shevardnadze's memoirs later acknowledged that conservative elements in the party apparatus were still able to keep Gorbachev's new initiatives off the political agenda.[86] As Valentin Falin admitted in an FRG newspaper, "A new policy does not establish itself overnight or in an hour, particularly if politicians' new concepts are supposed to be accepted by people who previously thought and had been trained to think in a completely different way. They need time to adapt to new situations."[87]

Amid these signs of opposition surrounding Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives, further promising changes emerged in the spring of 1986. Moscow appointed Yuly Kvitsinsky as the new Soviet ambassador to Bonn. In addition, an important conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1986 strove to improve the implementation of Gorbachev's foreign policy, in the face of either defiance or ineptitude.[88] A number of personnel changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed this meeting.

Soon after these internal changes, Moscow hosted West German Foreign Minister Genscher for talks on 21–22 July. The visit illustrated both the increased importance of the FRG to the Kremlin's foreign policy and the ongoing obstacles in relations between the two. Although the Soviet foreign minister was invited to visit Bonn, neither the Soviets nor the West Germans publicly mentioned a Gorbachev-Kohl summit meeting. Despite this visible void, the meeting appeared to be a productive one. Shevardnadze and Genscher signed two intergovernmental agreements, one dealing with scientific and technical cooperation, and the other establishing a Soviet consulate in Munich and a West German consulate in Kiev. Gorbachev

declared that Genscher's visit opened "a new page" in Soviet–West German relations. Incidentally, Gorbachev's oft-quoted remark on "turning a new page" was not reported in the Soviet press. German diplomats agreed that Gorbachev personally guided the negotiations to a successful conclusion and expressed surprise at the Soviet willingness to allow West Berlin's participation.[89] Bonn also viewed Genscher's visit as a kind of turning point in bilateral relations. The German press reported rumors that Bonn initiated a secret reorientation of West German foreign policy following Genscher's visit to Moscow.[90]

Gorbachev's official remarks demonstrated that he still had not abandoned entirely the previous Soviet rhetoric linking Bonn's support for US security policy and USSR–FRG bilateral relations. Yet Gorbachev and his foreign minister did stress their readiness to accept certain political realities. The Soviet leader noted that the USSR and the FRG must cooperate in improving the situation in Europe, "while remaining loyal to their military and political alliances." Shevardnadze, while noting the common fate of the peoples of Europe, added, "What I have just said is by no means an expression of my desire to cut off the 'European wedge' from the North Atlantic Alliance. We believe that given the present ties between allies, it is necessary to strengthen precisely those threads whose cutting would unravel the entire world fabric."[91] In other words, Moscow accepted that the current geopolitical arrangements ensured a certain stability in a time of rapid change.

A second theme that was gradually emerging in Soviet discussions on Western Europe surfaced during the Genscher visit. Soviet commentators admitted that the West European initiative could not replace the prominence of US–Soviet relations, but had a vital role in economic terms and in its potential to encourage US cooperation with the Soviet Union.[92] Western Europe could serve as a positive example of the benefits of East-West relations. To achieve this, however, West European governments had to swear off stirring up trouble in Europe.

The success of Genscher's trip stemmed from a confluence of factors. Gorbachev, fresh off a major political victory at the 27th Party Congress, had begun to refashion foreign policy. Changes in personnel and in rhetoric began to have an effect on policy. The Soviet leadership was gradually coming to terms with Kohl's decision to participate in SDI research. On every available occasion, officials repeated Moscow's desire to accept the existing political realities, which necessarily included alliance obligations and therefore divergent security requisites. The policy of pressuring Bonn had once again proved ineffective. In addition, interest in more profound domestic economic reform raised the incentives to develop economic ties with West Germany. Bonn stood ready to assist Gorbachev in this regard.

Despite this promising event, Soviet–West German relations soon suffered another setback. The West German chancellor's comparison of Gor-

bachev and Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels in *Newsweek* made Kohl a lightening rod for the Soviets and did significant damage to the already fragile relationship. Kohl said of Gorbachev, "I don't consider him to be a liberal. He is a modern communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels, who was one of those responsible for the crimes of the Hitler era, was an expert in public relations, too." Kohl's further remark, that "the Social Democrats are more Russian than the Russians," suggested the statements may have been motivated by the upcoming federal elections in early 1987.[93]

Shevardnadze captured the official Soviet reaction, charging that the remarks "angered us to the depths of our souls." *Pravda* added that Soviet–West German relations "have been poisoned and at a time when they were beginning to acquire a new dynamic."[94] According to East German records, the CPSU politburo went so far as to suspend temporarily all political contacts with the FRG. The imbroglio was responsible for the cancellation of at least five scheduled high-level exchanges.[95] The Soviet media published irate attacks on Kohl's character and indignant promises that the USSR would not simply overlook Kohl's election ploys.

But the furious official reaction was only half the story. The Soviet response, for all its bluster, was surprisingly muted. The remarks by Shevardnadze did not appear in the *Pravda* version of the TASS report. Gorbachev made no public comment on the incident whatsoever. While the Kremlin was obviously irritated with Kohl's remarks, it seemed interested in downplaying the affair. Falin later claimed that the Soviet leadership actually did de-emphasize the Goebbels incident in order to avoid "a sharp reaction by the Soviet people," since "the damage then would have been much greater and longer lasting."[96] From Bonn, Kvitsinsky expressed hope that the West German government could limit the damage to bilateral relations. He also recalled the recommendation of First Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Vorontsov shortly after the publication of Kohl's interview. Vorontsov, on the basis of his recent conversation with Gorbachev, advised Kvitsinsky to put the controversy to rest gradually. But shortly after this encounter, the Soviet ambassador to Bonn received more authoritative instructions to show no leniency in the matter. Kvitsinsky observed that "in Moscow, two views struggled with one another, and even Gorbachev himself appeared to vacillate."[97]

The relatively short pause in relations suggested that Gorbachev favored overcoming the paralysis as quickly as possible. He apparently waited an appropriate period in order to avoid domestic criticism for not standing up to the West Germans. The earlier strained relations did carry over into the beginning of 1987. But in the course of that year, relations between Moscow and Bonn improved substantially.

A number of factors contributed to this improvement. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev and his supporters had by 1987 more fully elaborated the policy

of new thinking. Drawing on pre-Gorbachev academic literature, certain international relations scholars acting with Gorbachev's blessing were laying out a sophisticated framework on which to structure Soviet foreign policy. These new ideas were given legitimacy in several important speeches by Gorbachev. Second, Moscow gradually concluded that Bonn in particular would act responsibly and would not exploit the instability to the East. Finally as the United States proved more willing to engage the Soviet Union in arms control and other forums, Moscow was no longer forced to pressure the FRG into a role Bonn was ill equipped to play.

CONCLUSION

This first episode in Gorbachev's German policy illuminated the clash between his reformist intentions and the domestic political constraints he faced. Given the nature of social behavior, it is impossible to determine exactly what the new Soviet leader was thinking at any given moment. Yet his willingness to change consistently ran ahead of the inherently conservative bureaucratic apparatus which represented the core of the existing political system. The resulting political struggle became more acute as Gorbachev's reformist intentions developed. From the beginning, the domestic political context profoundly shaped his reform approach. Gorbachev's strategy of gradually solidifying his political base, followed by a process of reform that progressed from moderate to radical, was a manifestation of this phenomenon.

In the foreign policy realm, the realities of Gorbachev's political situation prevented any major foreign policy moves. The succession dynamic demanded Gorbachev's closest attention. Yet even in this first phase, he promoted foreign policy concepts and directions that were consistent with the overall thrust of domestic policy. Decreasing international tensions, finding new solutions to global problems other than confrontation, and abandoning ideological preconceptions would certainly contribute to Soviet domestic reform by allowing the Kremlin to concentrate more fully on internal issues. Yet these foreign policy statements also opened the door to greater Soviet involvement in the global economy, the rationalization of costly external commitments, and the implementation of a less dogmatic definition of Soviet security. Even in this initial period of consolidation, Gorbachev's evolving domestic and foreign policy visions did not exhibit contradictory characteristics. Instead, they appeared to be intimately related.

While still consolidating political power, Gorbachev chose to continue past policy in relations with Bonn. To pursue a bold new foreign policy direction while still politically vulnerable risked instigating an opposition consensus. Therefore, Soviet pressure on Kohl not to support US initiatives and criticisms of West Germany's revanchist tendencies carried over into the Gorbachev period, although their frequency and ferocity generally

declined. Because of this cautious approach, foreign policy issues did not emerge as a central feature of Gorbachev's initial political program.

The new general secretary attempted to combine the inherited German policy with new emphasis on Western Europe, and the promulgation of innovative foreign policy concepts with major implications for the FRG. Gorbachev engineered a subtle effort to convince Bonn of his more moderate intentions. Statements by unofficial spokesmen in Western publications conveyed a willingness to improve relations if West Germany curtailed certain disruptive activity. Gorbachev also indicated his desire for rapprochement in various personnel changes, including the Soviet ambassador to Bonn. The contradictory messages out of Moscow put Bonn in a difficult position.

Finally, internal and external factors continued to interact independent of Gorbachev's specific political strategies. This interaction changes during a consolidation phase, but is not necessarily diminished. A leader's ability to promote or respond to complex cooperative arrangements suffers when he is subject to such demanding political constraints. At the same time, the Berlin uprising in 1953 illustrates the extent to which external events become politicized during leadership struggles. As a form of domestic political struggle, Gorbachev's consolidation phase naturally focused on internal issues. Yet international factors, such as Reagan's hard-line policies or the statements of West German officials, significantly affected Gorbachev's efforts to "sell" his foreign policy preferences to powerful domestic political actors.

Lacking proof that Gorbachev was fundamentally different from his predecessors, Kohl and his CDU–CSU supporters continued to adhere to former perceptions and policies toward the Soviet Union. Kohl saw no decline in the threat from Moscow's military power and domination of Eastern Europe. For this reason, he was suspicious of INF negotiations. A treaty eliminating or reducing NATO's nuclear forces might allow the Soviet Union to exploit its conventional superiority in Europe. Thus, Bonn worked to preserve its relations with Washington by endorsing the participation of West German firms in SDI research. West German officials also repeatedly referred to the "open nature" of the German problem, and publicly expressed doubts about the emerging reformist image of Gorbachev. Taken together, West German actions undermined Gorbachev's domestic maneuvering. His arguments that Western Europe could play a more independent role in decreasing international tensions, and that the Soviet Union was not inherently threatened by the West, lost vigor in view of what Moscow saw as provocative West German actions.

Gorbachev's initial political steps clearly laid the foundation for the much more significant change that quickly followed. The effect of personnel and information policies on the foreign policy process was not incidental. Instead, the influence of appointments of more moderate and flexible

individuals in key official posts and the opening of public policy debates logically flowed from domestic to foreign policy issues. The evidence for this conclusion is threefold.

First, Gorbachev's lieutenants and supporters played the main role in addressing foreign policy issues from a reformist perspective. Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, as well as other Gorbachev advisers, took the first tentative steps toward discussing in a sophisticated manner the challenges facing Soviet foreign policy. Second, Gorbachev did not forcibly resist these changes. In this first phase, he discussed the need for lessening international tensions, but he left the widening of the foreign policy debate to his supporters. Third, powerful political figures such as Ligachev opposed the changes in the foreign policy process. Clearly Ligachev was an early proponent of limited reform. Yet while their initial preferences were compatible, Gorbachev's incipient reform vision was unacceptable to Ligachev and other conservatives. The reformist and conservative lines conflicted both in terms of the nature of the change required and in terms of the breadth of policies requiring reexamination.

In the next period, from January 1987 to July 1988, the Gorbachev leadership moved further away from inherited foreign policy positions and strengthened the reform processes initiated in the first phase. In relations with West Germany, these efforts led to a remarkable transformation of Soviet attitudes toward Bonn. Foreign policy took on renewed vigor and a new domestic political importance, as Gorbachev passed from the consolidation phase into a period of ascendancy.

3

Charting a New Course

By January 1987, Gorbachev had entered a new phase of political activity. For all intents, the Soviet leadership succession was complete. The new general secretary no longer needed to view every political situation as a potential vote of no-confidence, or as a challenge by a likely successor. He was now sufficiently secure to initiate many of his preferred changes. Yet the resulting opposition was more open and vociferous than any he had yet experienced. While in the first episode Gorbachev struggled to appease powerful actors and reassure existing policy coalitions, he now had to confront those who rejected his ideas and replace the prevailing consensus with a new reformist coalition. The 19th Party Conference in June-July 1988 illustrated Gorbachev's increasingly radical thinking and the growing opposition to his proposals.

With regard to foreign policy, Gorbachev initiated a systematic reevaluation of past actions and current operating principles. In so doing, he not only drew on the antecedent work of various Soviet academics, but actually co-opted many of these scholars into the policy review process. In particular, specialists on West Germany played a prominent role in rethinking Soviet-German policy. These policy specialists began to demonstrate greater flexibility on issues such as the permanence of the Berlin Wall and the question of a single German nation. Soviet attitudes toward the West

German ruling coalition also changed. Analysts began to evaluate Chancellor Kohl more favorably. In addition, Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU) and Franz Josef Strauß (CSU) received warm Soviet welcomes during trips to the USSR.

While this "new thinking" about the German issue offered the possibility of a Soviet–West German rapprochement, it undermined Moscow's relationship with the German Democratic Republic. Erich Honecker also stubbornly rejected Gorbachev's domestic reform message. As a result, Soviet-East German ties grew increasingly strained throughout this period. Even as this previously sacrosanct relationship deteriorated, Gorbachev continued to demonstrate his new attitude toward West Germany by pursuing significant changes in Moscow's European security and economic policies.

SOVIET REEVALUATION OF GERMAN POLICY

The beginning of 1987 marked a sea change in Soviet attitudes toward West Germany. The Gorbachev leadership acknowledged the prospects for improved relations present in Bonn's behavior and sent clear signals of its own preparedness for change. Through unofficial remarks, visits by Soviet representatives, and his own actions, the CPSU general secretary embarked on a new path that redefined the nature of Moscow's ties with Bonn, and made possible the summit meetings in October 1988 and June 1989. A complex combination of domestic factors and external influences enabled Gorbachev to initiate this process.

Changes in Gorbachev's approach to reform arose in various contexts. The January 1987 CC plenum, for instance, served as a turning point in Gorbachev's thinking regarding both the extent of domestic problems, and solutions required. He referred to "crisis phenomena" in Soviet society and stressed the need to "democratize" the party in order to address these problems. In the foreign policy realm as well, the Gorbachev leadership initiated a broad policy review. The war in Afghanistan figured prominently in this reevaluation. In April 1987, Gorbachev and Ligachev also demonstrated a distinctly new attitude toward Soviet relations with Eastern Europe by emphasizing the complete independence of these nations. Gerasimov, traveling with Gorbachev in Czechoslovakia, also illustrated the change in Moscow's approach to Eastern Europe by suggesting that the difference between Gorbachev's reforms and those of the Prague Spring was "nineteen years." [1]

The Gorbachev leadership included West Germany in this thorough review of policy. In February 1986, Kvitsinsky was selected as Moscow's expert on the German question. Shevardnadze wanted the Soviet embassy in Bonn to set the highest standard of excellence.[2] In addition, Gorbachev apparently formed a working group to study the issues surrounding Ger-

many's division sometime in late 1986 or early 1987. Accounts in September 1987 reported that the panel was created in January 1987 and included Valentin Falin and Nikolai Portugalov. Falin, a former ambassador to the FRG, was a candidate CC member and head of the Novosti news agency. He later rose to head the CPSU's International Department. Portugalov, a CC adviser on German affairs, was also a candidate member of the CC.[3] Later research claimed that, in late 1986, Gorbachev reactivated a working group that may already have existed under Andropov. This body, which probably included Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Anatoly Chernyaev, was meeting more than once a month by 1988–1989. It examined the ways in which Germany's continuing division hindered Moscow's efforts to end Soviet exclusion from Europe.[4]

This working group did not by its existence indicate Moscow's early willingness to accept German unification. Yet such a commission of prominent foreign policy actors did suggest that the Soviet leadership was ready at least to consider new operating principles and policies with regard to East and West Germany. More concrete signs of a Soviet reevaluation of its German policy also appeared from 1987 through July 1988.

Portugalov, a participant in the Soviet policy review, provided the first noteworthy signal. His February 1987 article in *Moskovskiye novosti* implied that East and West Germans belonged to one German nation.[5] In the past, Moscow had denied this assertion in deference to East Berlin's claim that it had created a new socialist national identity in the GDR. Various official and unofficial Soviet spokesmen called into question Moscow's previous stance on a number of issues central to its German policy, including not only the existence of a single German nation, but also the permanence of the Berlin Wall and the Quadripartite Agreement and the prospects for a meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev.[6] After four decades of experience, every Soviet official knew instinctively that any reference to future changes in Germany's division would spark hope in Bonn (and chagrin in East Berlin). Although nearly every one of these controversial statements received an official Soviet denial, the sheer number of such remarks by Moscow's representatives indicated that Gorbachev hoped to send a clear signal to Bonn of changing Soviet attitudes.

Gorbachev himself contributed to the initiative by offering the vague suggestion that "history will decide what will be in 100 years."[7] The intentional ambiguity of these remarks clearly captivated certain Western audiences, but it also included a genuine new flexibility on previously sacrosanct issues. This new Soviet initiative reflected Moscow's belief at the time that it could effectively control any change in the nature of Germany's divided status. The tactical approach resembles the "nuclear-free world" rhetoric that Gorbachev promoted in arms control. That slogan, long a Soviet negotiating ploy, gained heightened attention after Gorbachev's selection as general secretary. In addition to its propaganda value, Mos-

cow's new arms control stance incorporated unprecedented changes, for instance, in its traditional opposition to on-site verification and asymmetrical cuts.

Moscow matched the enticing remarks concerning the German question with a spate of official visits. During the month of February, Falin and Zagladin visited Bonn. Zagladin echoed Falin's remarks that Moscow awaited Kohl's upcoming government statement as a signal of West German commitment. In April, both Deputy Prime Minister Antonov and Central Committee Secretary Dobrynin traveled to West Germany. Dobrynin's SPD hosts came away convinced that the way was clear for a visit by Gorbachev in early 1988. In addition, an appearance by Shevardnadze was expected in the spring of 1987, although it did not materialize until January 1988.

The changing approach toward the FRG reflected broader changes in Soviet policy toward Western Europe as a whole. The Gorbachev leadership began to elucidate an entirely new conception of foreign policy. Even conservative Soviet commentators acknowledged that Western Europe continually bowed to US pressure. Other observers noted that Western Europe, rather than contributing to US–Soviet relations, sometimes actually undermined potential progress.[8] While the accounts did not mention it, such statements demonstrated the failure of the previous Soviet approach to Western Europe. The Kremlin had accomplished little by basing its relations with the Western European states on their ability to influence US security policy. This widely accepted conclusion opened the door to a significant warming between Moscow and Bonn.

On the West German side, the completion of federal elections in January 1987 eased a constraint on Kohl's cooperation with Moscow. Moreover, Gorbachev's statements and actions began to convince the Germans that the process underway in the Soviet Union was leading to a more moderate international stance. Moscow indicated, for instance, that it desired a "political solution"to the war in Afghanistan. Also, the prospect of significant reform of the Soviet economy made economic cooperation not only more feasible for West German businesses, but also more attractive. The Gorbachev leadership shared Bonn's interest in the economic aspect of relations.

From 1985 to 1987, Moscow's West European policy underwent a significant transformation. The Federal Republic gradually eclipsed France as the focal point of Soviet relations in the region. Chirac's May 1987 visit indicated the limited potential for Soviet-French ties, and France came to replace West Germany as Moscow's main target for criticism.[9] Bonn's status had risen significantly following Genscher's July 1986 visit to Moscow. Soviet acceptance of existing realities presaged the highly successful visit of the FRG president in July 1987. By that time, Kohl had abandoned his burdensome campaign rhetoric and was more convinced of Gorbachev reformist intentions. Thus, he could respond in more productive ways to

Soviet overtures. Likewise, Gorbachev had solidified his domestic political position and could afford to change the policies that made Bonn and others in the West so suspicious.

COMING TO TERMS WITH THE CDU-CSU

Whatever hopes Moscow held for a change in the makeup of the FRG government disappeared with the federal elections of January 1987. The West German population returned the ruling coalition to power, although the CDU tallied approximately 4.5 percent fewer votes than in 1983. The CDU–CSU's electoral success confronted the Soviet general secretary with a political reality. Yet Moscow's perception of the opportunities inherent in Soviet–West German relations had already changed before 1987. The constructive Soviet reaction to this outcome demonstrated that Gorbachev held a profoundly different view of the Federal Republic.

In the past, the Kremlin had dealt only grudgingly with the CDU–CSU, viewing the relationship as a temporary and distasteful necessity. Moscow essentially saw two possibilities in relations with Bonn: stagnant relations with a CDU–dominated government, or improved relations with an SPD–led administration. Under Gorbachev as well, the West German Social Democrats held views more compatible with Moscow's interests. The difference was that an SPD victory in the 1987 elections was a Soviet *preference*, not a precondition for better relations. Kvitsinsky's memoirs claim that in March 1986 he urged the politburo to construct diverse relations with the major political actors in the FRG, instead of continuing to give primary attention to the Social Democrats. At that same politburo meeting, Gorbachev acknowledged that the past Soviet policy toward the FRG was no longer tenable and called for a gradual transformation. Improved relations with West German political parties would send a signal of Moscow's desire for more concrete steps.[10]

By 1987, Gorbachev felt strong enough domestically to introduce into policy a more moderate approach toward West Germany. The Soviet leader had passed the first stage of consolidation. Gorbachev initiated the second consolidation phase in the diplomatic realm by putting forward a foreign policy program that broke significantly with past behavior. The endeavor further isolated proponents of the hard-line approach toward West Germany. While these opponents rarely challenged Gorbachev's positions publicly, they nonetheless influenced Soviet foreign policy. One episode in this period clearly illustrated the existence of deep divisions over foreign policy within the Politburo. Gorbachev abruptly postponed for three days his April 1987 visit to Czechoslovakia, apparently responding to vehement Politburo opposition to his planned speech.[11]

Gorbachev and like-minded officials increasingly emphasized the domestic opposition to reform. In Western publications, Soviet foreign policy

specialists sometimes offered veiled appeals for consistency and moderation in West German behavior to avoid damaging Gorbachev's position at home.[12] Gorbachev reportedly told a visiting West German politician that "I am fighting on several fronts," both at home and abroad. [13] The very fact that officials agreed to discuss the politically sensitive issue of domestic opposition indicated that the general secretary felt ready to face his opponents publicly. By allowing such statements in the foreign press, he created two advantageous situations. In dealings with foreign negotiators, he could exploit the sympathies of those who feared Gorbachev's replacement by an old-style Soviet leader. In his domestic maneuvering, Gorbachev may have discouraged political showdowns by claiming that open Soviet disagreements would undermine Moscow's international negotiating position.

Accepting Chancellor Kohl

The thaw in Soviet attitudes toward the ruling coalition began with Kohl himself. Before the election, many Soviet commentators dismissed the chancellor's inflammatory remarks as a campaign ploy and not a manifestation of his revanchist intentions. Relevant Soviet foreign policy actors refrained from mentioning Kohl's comparison of Gorbachev and Goebbels, stressing instead Moscow's desire to move beyond the prevailing "pause" in relations. These accounts also called for concrete steps by the West German chancellor.[14] A public manifestation of Bonn's commitment to constructive relations would have aided Gorbachev in selling a Soviet–FRG rapprochement to domestic opponents who still saw West Germany as aggressive and untrustworthy. Specifically, Moscow expected Kohl's foreign policy statement before the Bundestag to advance the cause of FRG–USSR contacts.

In fact, the German chancellor's long-awaited speech to the Bundestag offered only a lukewarm endorsement of Gorbachev's programs, withholding judgment until visible improvements in relations emerged. In this way, Kohl believed that Bonn would "neither lose the reality before our eyes, nor chase illusions, or cover over existing differences."[15] Nonetheless, Soviet officials continued to push for better ties with the governing coalition. The FDP's Genscher, speaking in February 1987, encouraged the west to "take Gorbachev at his word."[16] The West German foreign minister's comments gave Soviet Germanists a clear indication that this prominent government official championed the kind of changes Moscow advocated. Both Kohl's brief remarks on FRG–Soviet relations, despite their skepticism, and Genscher's more accommodative speech received considerable attention in the Soviet press.

The chancellor also achieved greater access to official visitors. Although the SPD had officially invited him, Dobrynin met with Kohl for three hours in April. Most importantly, several Soviet officials hinted at the possibility

of a Kohl-Gorbachev meeting, a prime objective of the chancellor's foreign policy.[17] The Soviet general secretary himself expressed hope in this regard in a conversation with West German President Richard von Weizsäcker. Weizsäcker's visit, the first of its kind in a decade, further illustrated the Kremlin's efforts to strengthen its ties with the West German ruling coalition.

Weizsäcker's July 1987 Visit to Moscow

In advance of the visit, the Soviet side gave the impression that, as Margaret Thatcher described Gorbachev, Weizsäcker was a man with whom the Soviets could work. Moscow immediately demonstrated its new commitment to improving relations with the FRG. Gorbachev used his opening remarks to emphasize that Moscow based its approach to Bonn "on a realistic evaluation of the possibilities for the FRG's participation in changes for the better in the situation in the world as a whole and in Europe. And, of course, we are counting on a realistic evaluation by the FRG leadership of the Soviet Union's role and possibilities." In effect, he acknowledged that Moscow would no longer pressure West Germany to break ranks with NATO. Thereafter, Moscow tried to focus on changing the governing coalition's stance on specific issues with which the FRG could reasonably comply. Weizsäcker noted that "after decades of mistrust, confidence cannot simply be prescribed. It has to be developed step by step."[18]

The Soviet side took every opportunity to convince its guest that *perestroika* and *glasnost* were genuine. And Weizsäcker was favorably impressed with the reform efforts underway in the USSR. In particular, he expressed interest in those reforms that would "considerably increase the USSR's opportunities for cooperation with other countries, especially in the economic sphere. Reforms and cooperation are interconnected." This emphasis on developing economic relations coincided with the West German belief that, again in Weizsäcker's words, "disarmament alone cannot lead to peace, but peaceful cooperation in all areas will smooth the further path toward disarmament." Bonn had begun to realize that glasnost, democratization, and new thinking had not only affected the Soviet domestic arena, but were in fact resulting in specific foreign policy changes. The West German president acknowledged this conclusion by noting, "We are convinced that the success of this new thinking will serve not only your own people but also peaceful neighborliness."[19]

Gromyko and Gorbachev both addressed Bonn's determination to go forward with the modernization of its Pershing 1A missiles which had emerged as a major sticking point in US–Soviet arms-control talks. They also warned West Germany not to exploit the emerging instability resulting from Gorbachev's policies. Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet leadership needed "a policy that is not subject to vacillation or opportunistic reactions to transient events and that reflects its own interests, rather than someone

else's."[20] He apparently had in mind at least two specific examples of how West Germany ought to restrain its behavior: first, in relations with Eastern Europe, and second, in military cooperation with France.

With regard to Eastern Europe, the Soviet representatives stressed the importance of this meeting not only for bilateral relations, but also for broader European contacts. Gorbachev desired the establishment of relations between the CMEA and the EEC. And clearly West Germany was the most influential and the most economically powerful member of the EEC. The FRG had a history of constructive relations with Eastern Europe and would be chairing the European Council in 1988. Moscow was offering Bonn greater contact with Eastern Europe if West Germany could refrain from promoting instability. The Soviets also addressed Kohl's mounting military cooperation with France. Gorbachev underscored the damage this behavior would cause at a time when arms control, both nuclear and conventional, appeared so close to fruition. In both these areas, Weizsäcker clearly indicated that disagreements remained, yet these meetings provided the fullest examination of these differences to that time.

In contrast to Moscow's eagerness, Weizsäcker warned against burdening the trip with inflated expectations. This statement probably illustrated Bonn's desire to defuse any Soviet hopes concerning progress on the Pershing 1A issue. The federal president, for instance, refused to discuss nuclear weapons during an interview prior to departing for the USSR.[21] The president's circumspection also reflected West Germany's unique position in the European order: closer relations with the Soviet Union made Bonn's Western allies nervous. West German politicians generally responded by dampening expectations and concealing enthusiasm in their discussions of diplomatic relations with Moscow. Although the competition between Kohl and Genscher over foreign policy is well known, the approaches of the two leaders complimented each other in this regard. Kohl's cautious demeanor reassured the West, while Genscher's outspoken support for better relations encouraged Gorbachev and his supporters.

Weizsäcker also raised issues over which the two sides fundamentally disagreed. In volatile remarks that were cut from the version published in *Pravda*, Weizsäcker discussed the plight of Soviet citizens of German nationality and the continuing existence of one German nation.[22] According to one report, three high-ranking Soviet officials distanced themselves from the censorship episode. During a press conference, Falin admitted that the Kremlin leadership was currently debating whether the official press should publish speeches such as Weizsäcker's.[23] It is worth noting that in the months immediately preceding this event, neither Thatcher's nor Chirac's speeches were censored. The emergence of such a power struggle over the West German president's remarks suggested the extent to which internal political dynamics intertwined with Soviet coverage of relations with West Germany. The eventual decision to print Weizsäcker's remarks in full

did not prevent the repetition of such behavior. In December, Strauß's opinions on the German national question were also removed from Soviet accounts.

Beyond the censorship of these passages, Moscow appeared to be divided over more general questions regarding Soviet policy toward West Germany.[24] Gorbachev may have actually restrained his overtures toward Weizsäcker, since Gromyko was the official host. However, the Soviet general secretary clearly opened the door for a possible summit with Kohl. The two main actors in the drama, Gorbachev and Kohl, seemed more committed than ever to improving relations. The Soviet general secretary further increased West German goodwill, when he cryptically remarked that "history will decide what will be in 100 years." [25]

Strauß Comes on Board

In May 1987, the notorious Mathias Rust created an international incident when he made his sensational surprise landing in Red Square. In late December, another West German Cessna aircraft caused a stir in Moscow. Franz Josef Strauß, the head of the conservative CSU, arrived in Moscow at the controls of his private plane, this time with the blessing of the Soviet government. In inviting Strauß, Gorbachev borrowed a page from Honecker's diplomatic book. The East German leader had invited Strauß to East Berlin in 1983. The move proved lucrative financially, and also served to "co-opt" the staunch West German conservative into the campaign to improve relations.[26]

During his stay, Strauß met with Gorbachev for two and a half hours. They discussed relations between the two countries and the progress of Soviet reform. The visit represented Moscow's continuing campaign to improve its contacts with the governing coalition in West Germany. Gorbachev continued to stress that Moscow accepted the realities of the Soviet–West German relationship. His statement that "ignoring realities can lead, as has happened in the past, to serious consequences" reiterated his renunciation of Moscow's previous pressure tactics. Shevardnadze also acknowledged Strauß's legitimate and powerful role in West German politics.[27]

The Gorbachev leadership further elaborated its evolving German policy, including its great desire for improved economic interaction. Strauß and the West German government shared Moscow's interest in expanding economic cooperation. Bonn viewed such activity as integral to better political relations. The CSU leader added his name to the list of visitors impressed with Gorbachev's reforms which increased opportunities for West German businesses. FRG officials and observers also noted the expectation that this visit was a further step toward a Kohl-Gorbachev meeting.

While the Bavarian came prepared to push these economic issues, he left more impressed by the exchange (actually the lack of an exchange) on the

German national question. Having declared that West Germany remained committed to the concept of one German nation, Strauß was shocked when Gorbachev did not contradict him. The general secretary's nonresponse suggested that, at the very least, he would no longer allow disagreement over the so-called German question to immobilize Soviet–FRG relations. Strauß interpreted the incident as official confirmation of Portugalov's earlier recognition of a single German nation.[28] The exchange, widely publicized in the West, was not carried in Soviet accounts.

The successful Strauß visit crowned Moscow's efforts to construct productive ties with the ruling coalition in Bonn. After the trip, the CSU leader declared that "we are entering a new era." Kohl thanked Strauß for presenting the government's position, and expressed optimism for the future of Bonn's relations with Moscow.[29] Soviet officials, for their part, acknowledged that they could indeed work with the center-right coalition in West Germany. As Zagladin admitted in February 1988, "There are many among them who are realistic thinkers, even though some are conservative and reactionary in their ideas, but nevertheless they are realistic people."[30]

HONECKER TRAVELS TO BONN

Another event of central importance to West German–Soviet relations was Erich Honecker's long-awaited visit to the FRG in September 1987. The process leading up to the East German leader's FRG visit spotlighted the transformation in the Moscow-Bonn–East Berlin triangle. Gorbachev's domestic reform efforts threatened East Germany, which in turn affected relations between Moscow and Bonn. Conversely, the Kremlin's rapprochement with West Germany necessarily undermined the Soviet–East German relationship. Obviously, the German-German relationship exhibited its own internal dynamics.[31] The following section limits itself to those aspects relevant to Soviet–West German relations.

Following Chernenko's death, Honecker found himself caught in the middle of an internal Soviet power struggle. The Soviet Union was committed to limiting East Germany's relations with the FRG. Gromyko and other powerful figures opposed actions that undermined Moscow's efforts to punish Bonn for its INF stance, and those that threatened Soviet bloc cohesion by acknowledging the Warsaw Pact members could maintain special contacts independent of alliance obligations. Yet the SED leadership remained committed to this goal even after Chernenko forced Honecker to cancel his scheduled visit to the FRG in 1984.[32]

If the East Germans thought their plight would be eased by the selection of Gorbachev in 1985, they would soon reconsider that conclusion. Initially, the new Soviet leader perpetuated the preexisting Soviet strategy of dampening German-German relations. Egon Krenz claimed that, in March 1985, Gorbachev's representatives tried to prevent Kohl and Honecker from

meeting while the two were in Moscow for Chernenko's funeral.[33] Until he was politically prepared to confront the confrontational Soviet policy toward Western Germany, the Soviet leader remained opposed to improved German-German relations.

Worse still, Gorbachev added a message of domestic reform that frightened the ever cautious SED leadership. Krenz, then considered Honecker's heir apparent, later acknowledged, "More energy was expended in Politburo meetings discussing 'Gorbachev's errors' than was spent on our own tasks."Honecker rejected the need for fundamental change, because in his mind the GDR had already successfully implemented significant economic reform, and because the problems facing the Soviet Union did not exist, or were not as acute, in East Germany. He hailed, for instance, the dynamism of East Germany's economic development and labor productivity at a time when Gorbachev was lamenting the Soviet economy's stagnation.[34]

Gorbachev's April 1986 attendance at the 11th SED Party Congress demonstrated both aspects of the Soviet approach. He expressed his commitment to reform and pressured the SED to adopt a similar approach. In addition, the Soviet leader pushed Honecker to postpone again his intended visit to West Germany. Gorbachev informed the SED politburo that "now is not the time to improve relations with the Federal Republic." [35] Honecker deeply resented Gorbachev's uninvited advice concerning the need for domestic restructuring and the meddling in German-German ties. The East German leader reportedly complained, "The young man had been making policy for a year, and already he finds it necessary to take on more than he can handle."[36] The plans for Honecker's visit went ahead in 1987. Gorbachev was apparently willing to discuss a date for the proposed trip as early as the fall of 1986. Yet Honecker remained bitter over the Soviet interference.[37]

The split widened visibly in the spring of 1987. In early April, a Soviet leadership dispute forced Gorbachev to postpone briefly a speaking engagement in Czechoslovakia.[38] Perhaps emboldened by the prospect of internal Soviet political warfare, East Berlin publicly asserted its independence from Moscow. On 7 April 1987, *Stern* published an interview with SED politburo member Kurt Hager. He argued that Gorbachev's policies were not relevant to East Germany, adding, "If your neighbor re-wallpapered his apartment, would you feel obliged to do the same?"[39]

In his speech in Czechoslovakia on 10 April, Gorbachev responded directly to Hager's remarks. The Soviet leader charged that, even in a house with a "strong foundation and a reliable framework,"existing conditions dictated that "minor repairs are not enough here: a major overhaul is in order."[40] Later in April, Ligachev traveled to Hungary. Perhaps capitalizing on the contradictions in Gorbachev's East European strategy, Ligachev stressed the autonomy of each member of the bloc rather than the universal

applicability of *perestroika*. Undaunted by Soviet pressure, Honecker repeated his unwillingness to copy the policies of others.[41]

Unfortunately for the leadership in East Berlin, Gorbachev's new foreign policy approach also affected German-German relations. Beginning in 1987, the new Kremlin leadership worked diligently to improve relations with Bonn. This initiative even included a certain retreat on the immutability of the division of Germany. Portugalov's February 1987 acknowledgment of the existence of a German nation reflected a broader Soviet reevaluation of the issue. Ironically, this Soviet policy review came at a time when the CDU–CSU was moving away from its previous focus on the national question.[42]

The SED reacted vigorously to the unofficial Soviet statements. Honecker, for instance, criticized 'false prophets" who linked remarks regarding the 'reunification of Germany" with issues such as eliminating European intermediate-range missiles and freeing Europe from all nuclear weapons.[43] The SED leader was responding to West German reports that certain CDU leaders favored linking progress on the INF negotiations with German reunification. Yet his direct reference to Soviet (rather than West German) foreign policy goals and his failure to attribute blame directly to the FRG or revanchist elements suggested Honecker's target may have been Moscow, as well as Bonn.

At the same time, several prominent FRG politicians, including members of Genscher's FDP, expressed their beliefs that Moscow would *offer* unification proposals. Responding to such claims, Zagladin denied that any Soviet reevaluation had occurred. The International Department official did, however, manage to fuel further speculation by stating that 'neither in the short or medium term" did Moscow envision such an eventuality. [44] Under Gorbachev's direction, Soviet actions undermined not only East Berlin's foreign policy strategy, but even its precarious domestic legitimacy.

This was the context within which Honecker finally made his long-awaited visit to West Germany. The 'working visit," since Bonn would not recognize the encounter as an official state visit, took place on 7–11 September 1987. The two German leaders spent almost nine hours together. For their part, Soviet accounts generally stressed the impact of the improved German-German ties on broader European relations. Gorbachev viewed cooperation between the GDR and FRG as a contribution to his own larger foreign policy goals, such as limiting tension in the region and increasing economic opportunities. While welcoming Honecker's visit, the West German government dampened expectations for fear of creating anxiety among its NATO allies.[45] Yet beyond the tactical effort to downplay hopes for change, the visit did not promise the benefits it once did. Kohl certainly gained domestic political points for finally achieving a significant breakthrough in his *Deutschlandpolitik*. But because the Soviet Union was proving increasingly flexible on everything from arms control to human rights, West

Germans seemed more interested in what Moscow had to offer than in the unreconstructed conservatism of the Honecker regime.

The improvement in USSR–FRG relations and the decline in Moscow's ties with East Berlin were dramatically revealed in the weeks following Honecker's trip to West Germany. Barely three weeks after this historic encounter, Falin and Soviet diplomat Stanislav Chernyavsky created a furor with their explosive remarks. Chernyavsky predicted that the Berlin Wall would disappear in the near future. Falin, in an interview on West German television, suggested that the Quadripartite Agreement, and therefore the relationship between West Berlin and the FRG, could be changed for the better. The interview was intended to allow Falin to assess the impact of Honecker's visit to West Germany.[46]

The day after Falin's interview, West German official Otto Hennig claimed that a January 1987 Soviet planning session had examined the prospects for German unification. Falin quickly denied that any study of reunification had been commissioned, and a close Kohl adviser expressed skepticism concerning Hennig's remarks.[47] Yet Honecker took the report quite seriously. The GDR's ambassador in Moscow, Gerd König, informed Honecker in 1987 that numerous Soviet authors were suddenly calling into question the permanence of Germany's dual statehood. In response to Honecker's query, Gorbachev assured the East German leader that these were merely personal opinions without official backing.[48] Honecker was apparently not placated by Gorbachev's response. In fact, one account of the Soviet working group suggested that East German sources actually started the speculation.[49] Honecker might have hoped that such a maneuver would force the Soviet leadership to reject publicly the charge, restate its support for Germany's permanent division, and thereby dampen West German expectations.

While Moscow denied that any study of unification had occurred, signs of flexibility continued to emerge. In early November, Portugalov said Moscow welcomed cooperation between the GDR and FRG, "with the height of frontier barriers directly depending on the level of their good-neighborly relations." In effect, Portugalov seconded the opinions of late September, with his indirect reference to the fungible nature of the Berlin Wall. Falin added to the verbal initiative by declaring he could "scarcely imagine a European home where there were thick firewalls instead of free access." He stressed that changing historical realities "depends first of all on the two sovereign German states."[50]

Gorbachev served several contradictory ends by focusing on the centrality of German-German relations. The tactic increased the pressure on East Berlin to accept reform by assuring Bonn that the GDR was the main obstacle to change in Europe. It also enhanced the perception that Moscow was irreplaceable given its ability to influence the intransigent Honecker

regime. Moscow, in addition, expected the uncooperative GDR to limit from within the extent and speed of change in central Europe.

Taken together the signs strongly suggested that Gorbachev was giving precedence to Soviet–West German relations at the expense of Moscow's historic ties with East Berlin. Honecker, who considered himself to be the Warsaw Pact's FRG expert, resented the Soviet overtures and felt threatened by the improving Soviet relationship with Bonn. During a meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev in October 1986, the Soviet leader raised the topic of Genscher's recent visit to Moscow. Honecker made a point of telling Gorbachev that Genscher had provided the SED with all the details of the meeting, and had promised to do the same in the future.[51] He apparently wanted to warn Gorbachev that the East German leader was and would remain fully aware of Moscow's efforts to improve relations with the FRG.

Honecker also reacted publicly to the controversial Soviet statements by criticizing Falin, and distancing himself from Gorbachev. Honecker altered Gorbachev's remark (that "history will decide what will be in 100 years"), saying, "I do not know today whether one changes anything in 100 years." Honecker also informed "Mr." Falin that his comments on the Quadripartite Agreement were not appreciated. Falin later acknowledged Honecker's irritation, expressed by addressing Falin as "Mr." instead of "Comrade." [52]

The pattern of both Moscow and East Berlin wooing the Federal Republic carried over from 1987 into 1988. In early October 1987, Gorbachev sent a personal letter to Kohl, stressing the potential inherent in Soviet–West German relations.[53] Immediately following Strauß's Moscow visit, Honecker penned a note to Kohl addressing mutual security concerns, and may also have encouraged calls for a visit by the Federal chancellor to the GDR.[54] For Chancellor Kohl, the GDR could offer the direct benefits of improved cross-border ties. The USSR, on the other hand, held the key to redefining the European order, a fact certain Soviet representatives highlighted in 1987–1988. In return, both Gorbachev and Honecker sought the economic and security advantages stemming from improved relations with Bonn.

While the two leaders shared this basic foreign policy goal, Honecker sensed that Moscow's initiatives might inflate West German expectations and further isolate the GDR. The East German leadership compensated by repeatedly stressing the importance and stability of both German-German relations and SED–CPSU ties. This reaction was especially evident following Kohl's October 1988 visit to Moscow.[55] As Gorbachev's calls for reform became more radical, Honecker's obsession with the dangers of Moscow's foreign and domestic courses took priority over the impulse to protect GDR–Soviet relations.

In April 1988, the SED organ *Neues Deutschland* reprinted a Soviet anti-*perestroika* manifesto originally published in *Sovetskaya Rossia*. The East German leadership also withheld a positive assessment of the CPSU's 19th

Party Conference for almost two months. The belated SED response came during a visit by Vadim Medvedev. Medvedev reportedly expressed to Honecker the Soviet leader's irritation over the GDR's continued rejection of reform and his suggestion that Honecker should resign by the next party congress in 1991.[56] On the eve of Kohl's trip to the USSR, *Literaturnaya gazeta* published what amounted to an official East German criticism of the recent Soviet ambiguity on the German question. GDR Deputy Minister of Culture Klaus Höpcke curtly reminded Soviet readers of the profound differences between East and West Germans.[57]

INF NEGOTIATIONS AND SECURITY POLICY

By the second half of 1987, Gorbachev's political struggle, rather than ending, became more visible and heated as the Soviet leader openly challenged past policies. At that stage in the political cycle, opposition and even occasional setbacks became more widespread, but less likely to threaten Gorbachev's political position. His efforts with regard to foreign policy amounted to a realization of the purported organic linkages between the USSR's domestic and foreign activities. This phenomenon, the development of foreign policy positions conceptually linked with Gorbachev's domestic initiatives, became clear in 1987–1988, even before it was codified by the 19th Party Conference in mid-1988.

In the security realm, the changing Soviet approach resembled the domestic reform process. The new emphasis on flexibility and dialogue had their cognates in the internal political sphere. Moreover, the leadership acknowledged openly the linkage between its domestic policies and the reactions of external actors. Primakov wrote that the so-called Soviet threat evaporated "when viewed against the restructuring and openness in the USSR and the Soviet Union's constructive foreign policy."[58] The Soviet approach to the INF negotiations illustrated the transformation from stubborn immobility to concessions and progress. First, the new general secretary had agreed to exclude British and French nuclear forces from the equation. By the summer of 1987, Gorbachev had abandoned the former requirement linking INF negotiations and talks regarding the US SDI program. Zagladin contended that Moscow made this decision in response to the desire by many West Europeans for progress on INF negotiations. Portugalov added that the Soviet leadership's criticism of SS-20 deployments was also made in deference to West European sensibilities.[59]

The one question on which Moscow refused to yield was West German control over 72 intermediate-range missiles (Pershing 1As). The military significance of these missiles was questionable, given their limited numbers and US control over the actual nuclear warheads. Yet, for Moscow, they took on tremendous symbolic importance. Falin acknowledged that it was "more a matter of principle," adding "one cannot expect us to make more

concessions than we have already made, for example, in connection with the French and British missiles. The range of exceptions that we must concede cannot be extended at will."[60] Even the slightest possibility that Bonn might exercise control over nuclear weapons created political problems for Gorbachev. He had encouraged a visible discourse by various members of the middle elite reexamining Soviet German policy. In particular, the hints that Moscow was softening its view of Germany's division resonated in the FRG. Yet the Soviet leader faced entrenched opposition to major changes in relations with West Germany. The INF negotiations represented one forum in which these two opposing impulses clashed. Gorbachev's preferred strategy was to entice West Germany with the prospect of some change in the European order in the distant future in order to gain Bonn's cooperation in security and economic issues.

Yet the combination of Moscow's perceived flexibility on the German question and its intense interest in arms control led some West German politicians to contemplate a concrete linkage between the two issues. Thus in May, elements of the CDU seriously considered using reunification as a "security concept," directly linked to progress on the INF zero option. [61] To forestall West German thinking along these lines, and to prevent domestic critics from accusing Gorbachev of encouraging West German revanchism, he took a firm stand on the German missiles.

The Soviet initiative to pressure Bonn into abandoning the missiles illustrated the kind of domestic criticisms Gorbachev must have been facing. The tone and substance of the attacks were so out of character for the reformist leadership that it may have been designed to appeal to specific domestic constituencies. The same can also be said for the Gorbachev leadership's response to Franco-German security cooperation. This type of domestic posturing accounted for the swift reversion to more moderate analysis of West German security intentions following Kohl's decision not to modernize the Pershing 1As.[62]

Weizsäcker's Moscow visit in July offered the Kremlin an opportunity to reiterate the importance of the Pershing 1A issue. Soon after the trip, several Soviet spokesmen stressed the importance of the missiles, even linking their elimination with a Kohl-Gorbachev meeting and hinting at the possibility of Moscow's placing an equal number of comparable missiles in East Germany.[63] In a speech at the United Nations, Shevardnadze vigorously criticized Bonn for its position on the Pershing missiles, and warned that 'the Soviet people will never stand for the transformation of West Germany into a nuclear power." The foreign minister added that the Kremlin was concerned by 'the appearance of nuclear weapons in the possession of a state where even today the irrational slogans of revanchism are used to try to suppress the voices of sane politicians, public figures and whole movements that advocate responsibility in European world affairs."[64]

Did these remarks have an effect on the West German government? While it was impossible to rule out some influence, the pressures tactics played at best a minimal role. In 1984, for instance, Andropov's warning that a "palisade of missiles" would line the German-German border did not break Bonn's resolve, even though that was a much more credible threat than that of Gorbachev's spokesmen. In fact, Gorbachev's domestic reforms undermined the credibility of this type of intimidation. Kohl's decision to abandon modernization of the missiles was, to the extent it was influenced by the Soviet Union at all, a product of widespread West German trust in the moderate nature of Gorbachev's international ambitions, which in turn resulted from the remarkable changes going on within the Soviet Union. Washington, rather than Moscow, probably played the key role in convincing Bonn to forego missile modernization. The Reagan administration proved willing to place significant pressure on Kohl in order to achieve a breakthrough.[65]

Chancellor Kohl declared on 26 August that if the US and USSR reached, ratified, and implemented an INF agreement incorporating certain monitoring procedures, Bonn would renounce modernization of the FRG's Pershing 1As. This step removed the final significant obstacle in the INF negotiations. In October, Schulz and Shevardnadze oversaw the drafting of a treaty which was signed by Reagan and Gorbachev at the Washington summit in December 1987. Various Soviet observers drew different conclusions from the episode. Some pointed to the complete failure of Moscow's pressure tactics to influence West German behavior, which implied that a more moderate approach was required. Others credited the FRG government with a major contribution to arms control and the reduction of tensions in Europe. Both interpretations foreshadowed improved Soviet–West German relations.

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE AND THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE

After 1987, Gorbachev attempted to extend principles of his domestic reform program into the foreign policy arena. The political thinking that imbued *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and *demokratizatsia* flowed logically from internal to external policy. This process incorporated many arguments and concepts developed in the reformist academic literature. As the Gorbachev leadership began to bestow official imprimatur on these ideas, conservatives felt compelled to respond. The 19th Party Conference in June–July 1988 illustrated both the extent to which reformers were reformulating past foreign policy approaches and the resulting political clashes with Gorbachev's orthodox opponents.

Gorbachev himself initiated the flurry of theorizing about international relations with his speech at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

The general secretary focused in particular on the nature of capitalism. His views reflected a more moderate view of capitalism's internal contradictions and militaristic tendencies.[66] Given this sanction from above, various reform-minded commentators pushed these new ideas to their logical conclusions. The signs of change in the Soviet dialogue on international relations blossomed in the spring of 1988. Commentators questioned the Soviet definition of national security and offered unprecedented criticism of Moscow's past foreign policies.[67] Admissions of mistakes seemed to indicate an introspection characteristic of predictable and cooperative states. Calls for greater *glasnost* in foreign policy noted that this would lead to more domestically and internationally acceptable external actions. They further suggested that previous transgressions would not be repeated, and even hinted that certain forces in the Soviet leadership desired even more radical changes in the European order.[68]

The ferment in Soviet thinking spread to commentary on West Germany.[69] The FRG was portrayed as trustworthy and serious. Both sides, rather than Bonn alone, needed to overcome stereotypes and advance cooperation. Moscow soon demonstrated its interest in developing an institutional advocate for these ideas regarding West Germany and the whole of Western Europe. In March 1988, the Soviet Academy of Science established the Europe Institute, headed by the politically well-connected Vitaly Zhurkin. The reformist credentials of Zhurkin and his deputy, Sergei Karaganov, suggested that the Europe Institute would not only focus on European issues, but also play a broader role in furthering discourse on new thinking.[70]

Controversial reformist publications and the impending party conference provoked a significant challenge to Gorbachev's authority. An obscure Leningrad chemistry teacher, Nina Andreyeva, wrote a scathing indictment of *glasnost* and *perestroika* which was published in *Sovetskaya Rossia* on 13 March. The circumstances surrounding the publication suggested that powerful political forces supported the so-called "anti-*perestroika* manifesto" as a means of undercutting the approaching conference. Ligachev was widely considered to be the driving force behind the scenes.[71] An expectant pause followed the appearance of the Andreyeva letter, as reform supporters waited anxiously for some official response to the conservative broadside. For all the proclamations that the party and the Soviet people were united behind *perestroika*, the uneasy calm betrayed the fragile nature of Gorbachev reform consensus. As with Yeltsin's dismissal the year before, Gorbachev correctly interpreted the Andreyeva letter as a challenge to his policy initiatives, but not a direct threat to his political position. Nonetheless, the whole episode demonstrated how vulnerable these policies were to united conservative opposition.

In spite of this inauspicious prelude, the 19th Party Conference constituted a seminal political event. Gorbachev's statements and subsequent

Soviet foreign policy actions demonstrated the intimate linkage between the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign policy agendas.[72] In effect, the party conference applied *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and *demokratizatsia* to Soviet foreign policy. Sanctifying previous calls for greater openness in foreign affairs, Gorbachev personally addressed this issue during the party conference: "Objective processes in the world and our capabilities must become the subject of constant scholarly and general discussions involving the public and its organizations."[73] For the Soviet leader, this would provide the direct benefits of a more realistic foreign policy, as well as convince the USSR's partners of its trustworthiness. Dashichev's interview in *Der Spiegel*, published on 4 July, demonstrated the explosive nature of genuine openness with regard to past and also contemporary Soviet international actions.[74]

Another series of concepts, these grouped under the umbrella of *perestroika*, also arose in foreign policy discussions. Gorbachev and others emphasized the need for greater realism in assessing situations, policy effectiveness, improved efficiency, and more flexibility in problem solving. "Just as in domestic affairs, here, too, the Soviet leadership turned to Lenin, to his experience: to act everywhere, in any situation, from a position of realism. Only such a foreign policy can effectively serve *perestroika*."[75]

Kvitsinsky, in his speech to the conference, utilized the new ideas. His remarks revealed a great deal about Gorbachev's strategy and the kind of opposition the Soviet leader faced. The very fact that the Soviet ambassador to the FRG spoke at this prestigious event indicated his political importance and the centrality of West Germany in Soviet foreign policy. Kvitsinsky advanced progressive ideas such as accelerating reform in Soviet foreign economic policy and liberalizing socialist relations, including even establishing "a socialist community parliament elected by the CMEA countries' populations through direct elections."[76] Yet he justified his proposals by referring to the USSR's dangerous disadvantage in the global economic competition and the threatening development of EEC integration. Apparently, conservative listeners were to conclude that radically new solutions were required in view of the threatening international situation. Kvitsinsky thus supported Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives couched in terms that reform opponents could understand and justified by goals that conformed to their ideological vision.

Finally, Gorbachev emphasized the need to widen the foreign policy decision-making process in order to prevent repetition of past errors. Furthermore, this process required more than merely an extension of the existing informal decision process. Instead, "within the framework of the reform of the political system there has to be established an effective constitutionally authorized mechanism for a businesslike and competent discussion of international issues."[77] Later in July, Shevardnadze further elaborated this theme to an MID conference. He explicitly noted that domestic and foreign policy operated under the same principles and ac-

knowledged the "serious damage" done to Soviet foreign policy in the past by "command-administrative methods, the disregard of professional expertise, and an undemocratic, secretive, and willful decision-making style." The Soviet foreign minister also rejected the centrality of class struggle in contemporary international relations in favor of universal values such as nonaggression and noninterference in internal affairs.[78]

This bold challenge to traditional Soviet foreign policy positions demanded a conservative response. The initiator of the opposition response was, not surprisingly, Yegor Ligachev. In August, he directly contradicted Gorbachev by stressing the continuing relevance of class conflict in contemporary international relations.[79] Ligachev's remarks marked the first open and high-ranking challenge to Gorbachev's new thinking. The reformist leadership made clear that it intended to stand its ground. Several prominent Gorbachev supporters publicly rejected the applicability of class-based analyses and stressed the now-familiar concept of universal human values that transcended narrow class interests. Arbatov charged that "making a fetish of class interests is not Marxist, but sectarian and ignorant."[80] In October, Gorbachev firmly suppressed his conservative foreign policy opponents by reshuffling the Central Committee. The process of applying domestic political concepts to the foreign policy arena, which the 19th Party Conference publicized and accelerated, continued apace.

THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME: UNDER CONSTRUCTION

During this very active phase in relations between Moscow and Bonn, the Soviet Union gave its international image a major boost. In early February, Moscow announced that it would soon begin the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. This declaration provided the most concrete evidence to date that Gorbachev and his supporters could translate "new political thinking" into moderate and constructive external actions. Trust in the new Soviet leader further increased throughout the spring of 1988 because of an increasing number of articles critical of past Soviet foreign policy. As Genscher later acknowledged, Moscow's open admission of past mistakes went a long way toward convincing Western politicians that Gorbachev really was different from his predecessors, and that this process could "open the path to modernizing international relations with elements of the philosophy of cooperation."[81]

In early 1988, Moscow returned to the issue of Western Europe's central importance. On Soviet television, Zagladin admitted that, despite Soviet efforts, many West Europeans continued to feel overlooked in favor of US–Soviet relations. Gorbachev himself appeared defensive about this issue, declaring, "We have never relegated European affairs to the background under any circumstances, no matter what was said, despite claims

that the USSR in relations with the West has other, more preferable interests."[82] He attempted to overcome the negative impression by publicly abandoning Moscow's previous strategy. In the past, the Kremlin had pressured Western Europe to reject Washington's lead in order to undermine NATO's cohesion. Now, the Soviet leader contended that "we are very punctilious where Europe is concerned, and have no intention of putting anyone in a difficult situation." Yuly Kvitsinsky rejected the idea that the common European home concept was a "covert invitation to abandon alliance obligations and basic political orientations, or an enticement to pursue 'extremely dangerous neutralities.' The more firmly the Federal Republic is anchored in the Western Alliance, the more stable the existing territorial-political structures in Europe."[83] The Gorbachev leadership embarked on a campaign to demonstrate this new attitude.

Increasingly, Bonn emerged as the focal point of Soviet efforts in Western Europe. And the interest was not one-sided. West Germans exhibited a fascination with Gorbachev and *perestroika*. They were especially intrigued with Soviet economic reforms and the resulting opportunities for economic cooperation, a point not lost on Soviet officials.[84] The lead up to and accomplishments of the 19th Party Conference strengthened this budding relationship. Just as in the fall of 1987, Soviet representatives had made controversial remarks regarding the Berlin Wall and the division of Germany that sparked hopes in Bonn.[85] In relations with Bonn, Gorbachev and his foreign policy specialists began translating many of their new ideas into policy.

The West German Onslaught: February-May 1988

Over the first five months of 1988, some of West Germany's most prominent politicians traveled to the Soviet Union. In February, Lothar Späth, Premier of Baden-Wurtemburg and Vice-Chairman of the CDU, met with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and others. In April, former Chancellor Willy Brandt made the rounds in Moscow. The next month, the Kremlin entertained both Hans-Jochen Vogel, Chairman of the SPD, and Martin Bangemann, FRG Economics Minister and Chairman of the FDP. This flurry of German visitors eventually set the stage for Chancellor Helmut Kohl's long-awaited Moscow meeting with Gorbachev which finally took place in October 1988. The visits by the CDU's Späth and the FDP's Bangemann addressed more substantial issues than did those of the SPD visitors. This fact illustrated Gorbachev's increased ability to deal constructively with the ruling coalition in Bonn.

One of the most striking characteristics of the series of visits was Gorbachev's apparent willingness to consider change in the European order. Consistent with his speeches at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution and at the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev expressed a desire to

move beyond formerly rigid ideological positions and work with cooperative parties toward building a common European home. According to Späth, Gorbachev was attempting "to give signals in all areas that there must be a more constructive opportunity for international balance and international collaboration than the strategic position which is tailored purely for the superpowers."[86] Yet despite his new flexibility, the Soviet leader added, "One should take into consideration that both your and our societies are very touchy about everything that affects the rather complicated relations between our two countries and nations. We must constantly keep that in mind."[87] Thus domestic observers distrustful of Bonn apparently still hindered Gorbachev's efforts at improving relations with West Germany.

A further obstacle facing Gorbachev had emerged by the time of Willy Brandt's visit in April. His meeting with Gorbachev lasted approximately four hours, during which he and his colleague Egon Bahr discussed Soviet–FRG relations with the general secretary. Brandt and Bahr refused to give any details concerning their conversations with Gorbachev until they had returned to West Germany. This circumspection arose in response to the political instability existing in Moscow since the March publication of the notorious anti-*perestroika* Andreyeva letter in *Sovetskaya Rossia*. On Brandt's arrival he was shown this article as well as the authoritative response written by Aleksandr Yakovlev published in *Pravda* on April 5.[88] Gorbachev also informed Brandt that "there is also confusion in minds. Some are panicking. There are people who think everything is collapsing."[89] In this way the West Germans became acutely aware of Gorbachev's political difficulties and had no desire to complicate his position.

The West German visitors continued to draw an explicit link between economic and political relations. The FRG, encouraged by the prospects for movement on political issues, was anxious to participate actively in economic cooperation. This of course was a characteristic West Germany approach to relations with the East. As Genscher observed in October 1988, "The expansion of economic ties with the USSR serves as an effective instrument for the development of political relations between the two countries, and East-West relations in general."Späth contended, for example, that previous progress in disarmament had prepared the way for increasing concrete and constructive economic and cultural exchanges, which in turn "can make a contribution to the solution of political problems and facilitate the creation of an atmosphere of trust and stability in Europe."[90]

Gorbachev viewed economic ties similarly. During Bangemann's stay in Moscow, the Soviet general secretary stated, "Political will alone will not produce reliable cooperation and impart to it the necessary dynamism unless our countries become more 'dependent' on each other."Bangemann, in turn, emphasized that "the Federal Republic regards economic coopera-

tion within the central context of peaceful development of relations with foreign states, including the USSR."[91] Bonn seized this opportunity to improve its economic, and indirectly, its political relations with Moscow. On the eve of Bangemann's departure, the Federal German government granted to the Soviet Union a DM 3.5 billion credit. Just one month after this major step forward, another significant economic event occurred: the establishment of official relations between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

CMEA-EEC Relations

On 25 June 1988, representatives of the CMEA and EEC signed the Joint Declaration of the Establishment of Official Relations Between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Luxembourg. Gorbachev had first expressed his interest in such an agreement three years earlier, only months after he took office. True to the EEC's wishes, the actual document lacked concrete resolutions. Yet the negotiations and the Soviet attitude toward the document indicated an evolving attitude toward Western Europe and the EEC. As CC member Nikolai Shishlin noted, "Talks on this subject [EEC–CMEA relations] have been going on for some time already, at the time when we criticized the Common Market as something illusory, as something full of contradictions. But we have to proceed from reality, and the Common Market is such a reality. . . . It is an economic entity, and if we want to develop economic and trade relations with the West then we have to reckon with this reality."[92]

Traditionally, Moscow had demanded that any formal document serve as the foundation for all agreements between the two organizations. The EEC rejected that position, citing the incompatibility between its integrated structure and the more loosely constituted CMEA. Underlying the community's unwillingness to compromise on this issue was the legitimate concern that Moscow might gain a significant say in EEC affairs through its domination of the CMEA. Soviet acceptance of the European Community's position revealed Gorbachev's willingness to sanction bilateral economic ties between individual East European states and the EEC. While such agreements had already appeared (with Romania and Hungary), Moscow's official stamp of approval acknowledged that Western Europe was now trusted not to exploit instabilities in the Soviet bloc during the critical period of domestic reform. By the same token, Moscow was aware that such a concession would increase Western European trust in the USSR.[93]

The treatment of West Berlin in the EEC–CMEA Joint Declaration again involved a Soviet (and East German) concession, indicating Moscow's willingness to reconsider certain aspects of the postwar European order. The final document recognized that the agreement was valid on that territory the Treaty of Rome recognized as included in the EEC, that is, West

Berlin. Interested CMEA member countries, while signing the agreement, stated that the declaration of mutual recognition did not and could not affect the Quadripartite Agreement on the status of West Berlin.[94] West Germany, which was currently chairing the EEC, welcomed the new Soviet flexibility eagerly. As Genscher noted after signing the declaration, "We have embarked on a new chapter in the history of postwar Europe."[95]

All the same, not every analyst was overjoyed by the EEC's territorial provision. A *Pravda* report in early May 1988 angrily noted that the EEC flag was flying over several official buildings in West Berlin, in violation of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 1971. The author warned that "the old thinking of certain Bonn politicians" constituted "a dangerous delusion." The same author attacked West Germany for hoping that Gorbachev would at some point allow Bonn to represent West Berlin abroad. Such an expectation was equivalent to violating the Quadripartite Agreement.[96]

Another question, not directly related to the negotiations of the agreement, further illuminated Moscow's views toward Western Europe and European integration under the EEC banner. While acknowledging the economic benefits of closer Austrian cooperation with the EEC, the Soviet leadership rejected out of hand Austrian membership in the community.[97] The intensity of Soviet opposition was surprising, especially since no such action was imminent.[98] The Soviet leadership apparently concluded that Austria's entry into the EEC would endanger the common European home initiative. While Gorbachev acknowledged the significance of Western European integration, and in some ways preferred it over excessive European dependence on the United States, the expansion of this integration either through the inclusion of new members or through increased military and foreign policy coordination threatened the general secretary's strategy.

First, the precedent of a neutral Austria reaping the economic benefits of EEC membership might embolden radical reformist elements in Eastern Europe. The resulting domestic political struggles would undermine the stability of the region and even create the conditions for a replay of Hungary's 1956 attempt to secede from the Soviet bloc. Second and related to the first, visible increases in the European Community's status might hinder Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize the CMEA. The Soviet leader hoped both to encourage cooperation between the two economic blocs and to reform the CMEA through a gradual process of change. Austrian membership in the EEC, while not a threatening development in itself, would thwart these efforts.

Finally, although some military cooperation was accepted as inevitable, substantial integration in defense policy threatened to counteract the progress in arms control that Gorbachev had already achieved and hoped to achieve. Increased West German–French interest in military cooperation after the signing of the INF Treaty seemed to illustrate this point. Such actions complicated Gorbachev's task of forcing concessions and even

asymmetrical cuts on his powerful and disgruntled domestic opponents. Austrian membership in the EEC might have added to Gorbachev's problems by transforming a shining example of an economically successful neutral state into a participant in this West European military integration.

AN EXCHANGE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Visits by Shevardnadze to Bonn in January and Genscher to Moscow in July added significantly to the momentum toward a Kohl-Gorbachev summit. The remarks of the two foreign ministers and their respective receptions clearly illustrated the improved prospects for change. Moscow developed further its strategy of hinting at an evolution in the European order while pressing for improved economic and political cooperation. Kohl proved more responsive to this strategy than ever before, both because of domestic political pressures on the CDU leader and because of a growing belief in the authenticity of Gorbachev's stated intentions.

In January 1988, before the barrage of West German visitors to the USSR and before the signing of the EEC–CMEA Joint Declaration, Eduard Shevardnadze made his long-awaited trip to Bonn. One of the main topics of this visit, a summit meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, was of particular importance to the West German leader. Under political fire over domestic political questions, and facing considerable challenges within his own ruling coalition, Kohl sought the highly visible opportunity to meet with Gorbachev. The visits by competitors within the CDU and rival politicians outside his party further heightened the importance of the meeting for Kohl.[99] Yet the two sides agreed to postpone the setting of a specific date until the second half of 1988. Certainly, the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with the upcoming 19th Party Conference at which Gorbachev planned to redefine the nature of Soviet foreign policy. Yet the decision to delay the summit until after the party conference suggested Gorbachev wanted to enhance his foreign policy maneuverability and institutionalize the principles of new thinking before meeting with Kohl.

Beyond the summit question, Shevardnadze signed two minor protocols with Genscher (one on consultations and another establishing consulates in Munich and Kiev). Much of the Soviet foreign minister's time was occupied by economic discussions with Strauß, FRG Economics Minister Bangemann, and a group of West German businessmen. Indeed, by Shevardnadze's own admission, one of the most important occurrences during his stay was that West German officials were more critical of COCOM restrictions than they had been in the past.[100] This emphasis on economic matters was significant. Soviet foreign policymakers were experiencing a certain urgency. The 19th Party Conference in June 1988 would call for an acceleration in the process of transforming the USSR's external behavior. The need to see financial gains from the new foreign policy was

especially relevant in relations with the economically powerful West Germany. Shevardnadze's emphasis on economic ties with the FRG also illustrated the improving atmosphere of relations, since progress could now be made on the foundation of mutual trust and common interests already in place.

Consistent with Moscow's new German policy, Shevardnadze stressed that Moscow sought no change in each side's respective alliance obligations. Nonetheless, the USSR and the Federal Republic should work together to broaden European cooperation and to advance bilateral relations. The Soviet foreign minister did nothing to add to the string of controversial comments on the future of the Berlin Wall and the division of Germany. He gave very conventional responses to standard West German queries. Responding to a question concerning the place of West Berlin in Moscow's European policy, Shevardnadze cited the authoritative nature of the Quadripartite Agreement in regulating the situation in West Berlin and warned against any violation of this treaty.[101]

Yet Genscher was encouraged by the hopeful signals out of Moscow in late 1987. He told Shevardnadze that "we must not look at the partition of Europe as an immutable fact, but must overcome it." In commenting on the Soviets' common European home concept, the West German foreign minister added, "It must be a home in which doors do not bar but open the way to each other." In this context, Genscher reminded Shevardnadze that Western European integration was not motivated, as it was in the past, by a sense of threat, but instead by "the growing potential for making their contribution to the fundamental improvement of East-West relations."[102]

Genscher reciprocated on Shevardnadze's visit by traveling to Moscow in July. Always a favored guest of the Soviets, Genscher earned praise from Soviet officials for again criticizing the COCOM restrictions as too restrictive and NATO's responses to Soviet initiatives as too conservative. The West German foreign minister openly proclaimed the irreversibility of reform in the USSR and contended, "The Soviet Union's greater openness will promote stability in international relations."[103] Yet this public praise may have allowed him to address controversial issues more directly than previous West German visitors. Genscher, for instance, brought up the case of Mathias Rust, arrested in May 1987 after landing his Cessna in Red Square and sentenced to a four-year prison sentence. Rust was released just days after Genscher's visit. This gesture, requested by almost every West German politician to visit Moscow, removed a serious obstacle and demonstrated the Kremlin's interest in improved relations. Falin admitted that Rust's release was "an act of goodwill." Genscher also raised the issue of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union and praised his hosts' willingness to discuss this situation. In addition, he expressed the hope that West Berlin could be included in future bilateral agreements.[104]

The West German foreign minister's outspoken opinions, often at variance with the leadership in Bonn and Washington, also forced him to reiterate that the warming FRG–USSR relationship was not intended to, nor would it be allowed to, undermine West Germany's ties to the West.[105] At the same time, Genscher apparently sought to define a larger international role for West Germany, not merely that of a "spectator." Gorbachev responded by repeating his contention that Western Europe was a primary focus of Moscow's foreign policy.[106] This aspect of the meeting did present a problem for West Germany. While Bonn was seeking to reassure both the United States and France that it was not jeopardizing its Western commitments by deepening its ties with the Soviet Union, the leader of the CPSU was proclaiming that the Federal Republic was seen as a legitimate partner in international relations. The Western unease was even greater than usual since Genscher held views that worried circles in Washington and Paris wary of Soviet intentions.

In receiving the West German foreign minister, Gorbachev expressed concern about planned Franco-German military cooperation and the establishment of a restrictive united market in Western Europe, warning that such activities must not impede progress in overcoming the security and economic divisions of Europe. Genscher calmed these concerns, noting that the EEC's program to create a single market was not exclusive and indeed would increase opportunities for cooperation.[107] In the course of this meeting, Gorbachev referred cryptically to the possibility of addressing political problems in Europe. He stated, 'One should not be afraid to look broadly at the world, to peer into its future. It is time to raise foreign policy to such a level where it will be not only a reaction to current events but also a projection into new international relations in the spirit of new thinking. Such an approach to the forming of foreign policy has already produced the first important practical results, although at first it had evoked skepticism and doubt."[108] West Germans viewed such suggestions as an evolving Soviet willingness to reexamine existing realities and a veiled promise for more actions similar to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

As with previous visits of West German politicians, both sides emphasized the importance of improved economic cooperation, often within the context of Kohl's upcoming visit. Also like earlier encounters, these economic relations were viewed as a means toward political ends. Shevardnadze, for instance, pointed out the political importance of developing economic relations as a means of strengthening bilateral ties between the FRG and the USSR. Genscher also justified the development of economic ties by the fact that Soviet conceptions of economic reform were much more concrete than on earlier visits. Briefed on the meeting while on vacation in Austria, Kohl was 'highly satisfied,"both with preparations for his upcoming visit and with the broader results of the visit.[109]

CONCLUSION

This second episode, from January 1987 through July 1988, gave rise to a major reorientation in Soviet attitudes toward the Federal Republic of Germany. Prominent and often controversial *Germanists* such as Yuly Kvitsinsky, Valentin Falin, and Nikolai Portugalov exerted greater influence over official thinking and even over actual policy toward West Germany. High-ranking Soviet officials expressed public acceptance of the formerly ostracized CDU and CSU. In addition, Moscow abandoned its policy of pressuring Bonn to oppose US initiatives. The Gorbachev leadership's acceptance of the CDU–CSU as a reliable counterpart opened the way for a fundamental improvement in bilateral relations and cooperation in European affairs.

Bonn was encouraged by Moscow's new thinking about the German question. In fact, the Gorbachev leadership was playing a very dangerous game with German expectations. Moscow apparently planned to promote cooperative behavior from Bonn by offering the hope of incremental progress on overcoming the division of Germany. Yet the Kremlin ran the risk of awakening genuinely revisionist German sentiments just when the leading FRG politicians appeared resigned to much more moderate goals. In fact, certain German politicians misread the Soviet overtures, positing some fanciful barter deal trading German unification for the elimination of European nuclear forces. To their credit, Kohl and Genscher maintained a balanced and realistic approach to the opportunities offered by Gorbachev.

Honecker's rejection of Moscow's new initiatives led to a significant rift in the GDR's relations with the Soviet Union. For Honecker, Gorbachev was perpetrating a dual heresy. First, the youthful Soviet leader was embarking on an ambitious program of political and economic reforms. Worse still, the newcomer was pressuring East Germany to adopt similar changes, even though, in Honecker's view, such reforms were unnecessary and dangerous. Second, the CPSU general secretary was reopening the German question and raising hopes in West Germany that some day the division of Germany might be overcome. Gorbachev further increased the heat on Honecker by undercutting the GDR's precarious relationship with the Federal Republic.

The profound changes occurring in the USSR also convinced West German politicians of all the major parties that Gorbachev and his reform program were genuine. The FRG ruling parties expressed ever more willingness to "take Gorbachev at his word." In particular, the Soviet economic reforms evoked great interest in West Germany. Politicians and businessmen followed closely the progress in this area.

Gorbachev's efforts at bettering ties with West Germany benefited from the INF negotiations that ended successfully in December 1987. Giving in to considerable US pressure, Kohl agreed not to modernize West Germany's Pershing 1A missiles. Gorbachev's supporters used two contradictory in-

terpretations to buttress their efforts for a new policy toward West Germany. First, the German chancellor's actions illustrated the failure of the past Soviet approach. Many analysts acknowledged Washington's central role in forcing Bonn to concede. The Kremlin's pressure campaign had failed again, while the Reagan administration had inadvertently demonstrated the benefits of West German membership in NATO. Second, Soviet proponents of a new German policy pointed to Kohl's decision as a clear illustration of Bonn's reasonable bent. Henceforth, Soviet officials credited West Germany with contributing significantly to enhancing peace in Europe.

With the 19th Party Conference, the Soviet leader further strengthened his political hand and advanced radical changes in Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev seized the opportunity to translate the new thinking on, among other things, Moscow's German policy into actual changes in behavior. This process represented the extension of the domestic reform concepts undergirding *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and *demokratizatsia* into the foreign policy realm. The result of this radical restatement of his political intentions was both greater activism in foreign policy and increased opposition from critics of the new course. Gorbachev's opponents indicted both the domestic and foreign policy initiatives. Far from destroying such opposition, Gorbachev was forced to live with significant criticism and silent defiance by ideologues, nationalists, and dispossessed bureaucrats.

Against this political backdrop, the first half of 1988 witnessed significant progress in building the common European home that Gorbachev had been discussing for years. West Germany came to play an ever more central role in this initiative, as seen in the series of prominent German politicians that visited Moscow in the spring of 1988. In June, Moscow advanced another step along this path through the signing of the EEC–CMEA Joint Declaration. The document, which established official relations between the economic organizations of East and West Europe, demonstrated Moscow's fundamentally new view of these contacts.

The exchange of visits by the Soviet and West German foreign ministers revealed the progress made from January 1987 to July 1988. During both Shevardnadze's journey to Bonn in January 1988 and Genscher's reciprocal Moscow trip in July 1988, the possibility of a Kohl-Gorbachev summit received substantial attention. In addition, the two powerful officials graphically illustrated the extent to which relations had improved since 1987.

The foregoing characteristics of this second episode in Soviet–West German relations are consistent with the requirements of the political stage Gorbachev had entered. Initially, his political position made possible an extensive reevaluation of Moscow's German policy, but not necessarily the major policy changes he desired. Gorbachev and his supporters acknowledged that the foreign policy changes in this period amounted to the extension of domestic reform concepts to foreign policy. As such, any

explanation of Soviet policy toward West Germany must incorporate the linkage between Moscow's foreign and domestic policies. In August 1988, Soviet conservative Yegor Ligachev's open opposition to Gorbachev's reforms also drew a conscious parallel between these internal and external policies.

By the end of the period, the reformist leadership in Moscow stood ready to translate the advances of 1987–1988 into major policy changes. In the episode that followed, Gorbachev took this political struggle to a new level. He began to alter Soviet foreign policies radically, including relations with West Germany. In the process, the Soviet leader faced a large bloc of the Soviet elite that opposed his policies, but remained unwilling to challenge openly the reformist consensus.

4

Building a Reserve of Trust

The 12 months from August 1988 through July 1989 witnessed the translation of new Soviet perceptions of West Germany and Gorbachev's new foreign policy latitude into actual policy changes. On both sides, the result was a much deeper appreciation for the evolving relationship and a growing commitment to transform European politics.

In this period, Gorbachev initiated a major reorganization of the CPSU Central Committee. By removing prominent opponents, promoting supporters, and undermining the Central Committee's traditional power structure, the Soviet leader strengthened considerably his political position. In the area of foreign policy, Mikhail Gorbachev weakened the powerful International Department and gave Aleksandr Yakovlev control over the party's foreign policy activities. In early 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies emerged to challenge the party's diplomatic responsibilities. Gorbachev was attempting to place Soviet foreign policy under the authority of the state bodies: specifically the Foreign Ministry, which would eventually answer to the relevant foreign policy bodies of the new legislature. This transfer of power, while still in its infancy, enhanced Gorbachev's prestige both domestically and internationally.

The new intensity and the growing trust between the USSR and FRG were evident in Moscow's European security policy and in its efforts to

improve economic relations with West Germany. In a surprise announcement before the UN General Assembly in December 1988, Gorbachev agreed to cut unilaterally Soviet conventional forces in Europe. Further arms-control initiatives followed, often casting West Germany in a central role in attaining Soviet security objectives. Soviet foreign economic relations and efforts to encourage West German financial participation in *perestroika* also proved the extent to which Moscow had fundamentally redefined its vision of the Federal Republic.

After their often chilly relationship from 1985 to 1987, Gorbachev and Kohl met in both October 1988 and June 1989. Gorbachev's surprising readiness to address topics that were once off-limits, the increasing interest in economic contacts, and the emphasis on incorporating West Berlin into USSR–FRG relations, all presaged a new vigor in the coming years. In June, the Soviet visitor received a hero's welcome in West Germany. Gorbachev's popularity was important both because it demonstrated to domestic critics that his foreign policy could pay dividends and because it put pressure on West German politicians to pursue greater cooperation with the USSR. At the same time, the Soviet leader expressed a veiled willingness to consider change in the postwar European order. The personal relationship that emerged out of the June meeting played a crucial role in the turbulent final episode leading up to German unification.

REORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

Shortly before Kohl's October 1988 visit to Moscow, Gorbachev engineered a major reorganization of the CPSU's Central Committee. In the process, a number of significant changes in the foreign policy elite occurred. While these should not be viewed exclusively within the Soviet–West German context, they do represent an important change in the diplomatic landscape, including a further elevation of the FRG's status. In an emergency session of the Central Committee on 30 September, Gorbachev removed or transferred a number of his most prominent political opponents. The 22 existing departments were reduced to nine, and these were subordinated to one or more of the six newly created commissions. The International Department (ID) was placed under the supervision of the new International Affairs Commission, whose director was none other than Aleksandr Yakovlev. Other commission members included academics Georgy Arbatov (Central Committee member) and Yevgeny Primakov (candidate CC member); Foreign Ministry officials V. Nikoforov (candidate CC member) and A. Kovalev; Ivan Laptev (editor of *Izvestia* and candidate CC member); A. Chernyaev (CC member and Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser); and Valentin Falin. The organizational changes gave one of Gorbachev's closest advisers on international affairs considerable control over the party's foreign policy activities.

At the same time, the International Department's responsibilities were expanded to include relations with the ruling Communist Parties.[1] Yet the overall result of the reorganization was to emasculate the ID. Valentin Falin replaced Anatoly Dobrynin as head of the International Department. Both Dobrynin, as head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Zagladin became personal advisers to Gorbachev. Falin's reputation as an outspoken advocate of new thinking and as a vocal critic of reform opponents suggested that his role was not only that of a manager, but also a lightening rod for conservative opposition in the party. As a further indication of the declining importance of the previously powerful ID, Falin was not made a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, nor even a full member of the Central Committee as his predecessor had been.

West German observers paid considerable attention to Falin's promotion.[2] The former Soviet ambassador to Bonn was the author of some of the most controversial statements regarding the nature of Germany's division. Just one year earlier, Falin had earned Honecker's ire for his remarks concerning the possibility of moving beyond the Quadripartite Agreement. Also, on 21 October 1988, just a day after his promotion was announced, Falin hinted that a better foundation than the Quadripartite Agreement might be possible and that the Berlin Wall might be removed.[3] This particular personnel change involved more than merely bringing a leading Soviet expert on West Germany into a prominent foreign policy role. Instead, as one FRG report noted, Falin's appointment represented a major shift in Soviet foreign policy away from an exclusively US focus and toward a substantial and permanent increase in the importance attributed to Europe.[4] This effect was reportedly compounded by the pause in US–Soviet relations during the US presidential campaign.

The entire range of changes in the organization of the party's foreign policy responsibilities occurred within the context of a broader campaign to institutionalize and increase the state's role in the foreign policy process. Gorbachev and numerous Soviet foreign policy actors called for a greater foreign policy role for the Supreme Soviet.[5] In the months following, serious preparations began for the establishment of the new Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) with significant foreign policy responsibilities.

The campaigns, elections, and meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies represented the genesis of a new political institution within the existing system. It strained against the prevailing power structure, tenaciously embracing its new authority. The success of reformist candidates and the thrust of the first CPD sessions, combined with Gorbachev's shake-up of the Central Committee in September, gave the newly elected legislature enough momentum to begin to carve out policy functions. This pertained to foreign as well as domestic policy. These changes within the Soviet diplomatic establishment diminished the party's role in foreign

policy and began to transfer control into the hands of reformist (and less *Amerikanist*) elements, while oversight functions were gradually shifted from party to state control. In the process, Gorbachev significantly expanded his room for political maneuver, which in turn opened up opportunities for greater foreign policy activism.

SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW

When Chancellor Helmut Kohl traveled to Moscow in October 1988, both he and Gorbachev demonstrated their heightened appreciation for bilateral relations. The summit itself involved a surprisingly open discussion of once taboo issues. Bonn proceeded cautiously in an effort to reassure skeptical NATO allies. Yet the two sides still achieved impressive results, including a number of bilateral agreements. Perhaps most importantly, an enduring personal relationship emerged. The success of the meeting set the stage for this third phase of relations. As Gorbachev remarked at the time, "The ice is broken." [6]

Advance Expectations

In a pre-summit interview in *Der Spiegel*, Gorbachev graphically demonstrated characteristics of a new approach to West Germany. He emphasized the decisive importance Soviet–West German relations had not only in European, but also in world affairs. Falin also acknowledged that Bonn was often represented "indirectly," and hoped that this situation could be remedied without damaging relations with the United States.[7] The Soviet press reinforced this point by paying considerable attention to Kohl's upcoming visit.[8] In addition, Gorbachev hinted at the possibilities for redefining the division of Europe. While domestic political constraints and the sensibilities of allies such as the GDR prevented openly expressing his concern, Gorbachev did implicitly note the conflict between existing obligations and improving relations with West Germany. He emphasized the need for constructive, responsible initiatives and a cautious approach to fundamental issues.[9]

For Gorbachev, "the fate of the Germans is indissolubly bound up with the fate of the whole of Europe and with Europe's progress in conditions of complete security for everyone: that is, with the prospects for building the 'European home.' " Shevardnadze later admitted that Moscow sought to link "the German unity issue with the problem of forming new structures of European security" in dealing with the untenable division of Germany. [10] While the Soviet leader insisted that the German division was a historical reality, many observers read in his rhetoric that the European home would redefine history. While skeptics noted that previous Soviet leaders had also promised change in the post–World War II European structure, West Ger-

man trust in Gorbachev had grown dramatically by October 1988, generating hope for major change in the existing division.[11]

Kohl shared Moscow's opinion that the FRG should play a larger international role. The German chancellor suggested, for instance, holding such high-level meetings on a more regular basis. He also took the opportunity to proclaim that "no one has a greater interest in rapprochement between the divided parts of Europe than we Germans, who seek to overcome the unnatural division of our country within the framework of a common European peace structure."[12] In this structure, the FRG was not merely the bridge that would link East and West, but an active participant in the construction of relations that would bind the two halves of Europe together.

Kohl intended to instill in bilateral relations "a long-term perspective on the basis of the Moscow treaty" through a series of small steps. [13] The emphasis on a permanent upgrading in their contacts indicated Kohl's desire to build upon the existing foundation while also beginning the process of reexamining the basis of this relationship. In an article in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, Kohl declared, "It seems to me especially important to give a new forward impetus to bilateral relations through political dialogue at the summit level."This meant for the West German chancellor that the two should not only discuss bilateral issues but, in order to move *forward*, also address "key questions of Europe's future and of coexistence between people, questions which require joint answers."[14] Both sides should honor documents such as the Moscow Treaty and the Quadripartite Agreement, but should also jointly reexamine the principles enshrined within them.

The emphasis on the gradual nature of this process, and the repeated assurances that the West Germans harbored no illusions about the end result, were designed to soothe the concerns of Bonn's NATO allies. Kohl was reassuring his Western colleagues that there was no threat of West Germany's abandoning its ties and commitments. On Soviet television, he stressed that, particularly on security issues, talks should be conducted by NATO, of which the FRG was only a part.[15] He went on to note that progress between the two alliance systems required mutual trust and that the focus of the summit should be the bilateral construction of such trust. In addition, as was the case throughout the second half of 1988, Kohl purposefully avoided specifics concerning security questions until a new US president could reevaluate NATO's disarmament approach.[16]

Frank Discussions

The meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl was reported to be frank and direct, "without any diplomatic niceties." [17] The most striking feature of these discussions was the openness with which the two leaders addressed previously taboo issues. Only a year earlier, *Pravda* had refused to publish

Weizsäcker's remarks on the German question. During Kohl's visit, however, both Gorbachev and Kohl publicly stated their positions on the division of Germany and the inclusion of West Berlin in Soviet–FRG agreements.

Gorbachev combined hope for progress with an appeal for caution. He publicly reaffirmed that "a shared social system and socialist aspirations bind us firmly to the Germans in the GDR. We are comrades and allies." He hastened to add that despite the tensions of the postwar period, and despite Bonn's membership in NATO, "the objective need to look for a common language and also the changes in the world have been pushing you and us in the right direction. Hence the 1970 Moscow treaty and the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin." Thus, Gorbachev did not portray these documents as a final destination, but as steps in the right direction. One year earlier, Honecker had been incensed by Falin's suggestion that the Quadripartite Agreement was "not the final word" on West Berlin. Gorbachev ended by warning that "attempts to upset what has been created in the process or to push through unrealistic policies is an unpredictable and even dangerous business."[18]

In his response to Gorbachev, Chancellor Kohl reiterated the Soviet leader's suggestion that the agreements forming the basis of FRG–USSR relations represented not ultimate goals, but vehicles for further progress. He went even further, by proclaiming that "it must also become possible for the Germans to overcome the division of their country by peaceful means, as we stated in the letter on German unity on signing the Moscow Treaty." Naturally this goal would require Moscow's approval and active participation. He emphasized that, for the FRG government and people, "this division is unnatural. The community of the Germans is a historical and human reality which politics cannot ignore."[19]

On the question of West Berlin, Kohl decided to press his Soviet host even more vigorously. The Berlin issue obviously remained of central importance to West German politicians, and thus could provide political ammunition for Kohl's opponents if no progress was visible. At the same time, the German leader understood that his NATO allies saw West Berlin as a symbol of the FRG's need for the support of the Atlantic community.[20] By raising the issue, Kohl reassured observers in Bonn, as well as in Washington, London, and Paris, that the status of West Berlin remained a primary concern. He declared that "Berlin must be fully incorporated into the process of developing our relations. That city's situation has always been a gauge for judging the state of East-West relations."[21] As with his remarks on the division of Germany, the West German leader stressed that the existing treaty (in this case, the Quadripartite Agreement) served only as a foundation for solving contemporary problems in new ways.

Gorbachev also faced pressures over the status of West Berlin. In order to prevent a complete and public break with the Honecker regime, the Soviet leader had to distance himself from Kohl's demands. Yet rather than

directly challenging the possibility of change, he merely rejected efforts to make West Berlin "a touchstone" for Soviet-FRG relations, and denounced threats that if Moscow did not make concessions on this issue, relations would be stalled. He labeled such efforts a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement. Moscow was ready to "take into account [West Berlin's] special interests in economic and cultural life. But with the understanding that the city's special status remains unshakable."[22]

While clearly interested in improving relations, Gorbachev signaled that limits still existed. Domestically, he continued to face significant opposition to his reforms and lacked any demonstrable improvement in the economic situation. His foreign policy approach, by deemphasizing traditional actors such as the military and party ideologues, guaranteed that his efforts to loosen Moscow's involvement in Eastern Europe and achieve profitable relations with the West were closely observed by domestic opponents. He was unwilling to provide ammunition for his critics by allowing them to claim that he was abandoning East Germany, or that he was seeking better relations with an aggressive and still revanchist West Germany. As Gorbachev himself stated, "If we want to have a future that would be fundamentally different from the past, there will be a need for a very broad-minded and responsible attitude to the present-day realities."[23]

Kohl, for his part, also expressed a genuine interest in raising the level of Bonn's relations with Moscow, yet he too was responding to political pressures. His remarks on ethnic Germans, the fate of West Berlin, and on the future of the division of the German nation, all played well for various audiences at home and abroad. His willingness to bring up these controversial issues also indicated his belief that the Soviet leader was at least willing to listen to them. Moreover, while West Germany needed the Soviet Union if it hoped for significant change in the postwar order, Kohl believed that the relationship could and should be constructed with due consideration of West German concerns, and with some vision of a future, modified European structure.

The always quotable Valentin Falin again fanned West German hopes. With regard to West Berlin, he expressed a willingness to exploit available possibilities. In the same interview, Falin answered a question on the future of the Berlin Wall by saying, "Mr. Gorbachev once aptly said that before this wall was erected, the West had built a totally different wall [a wall of hate]. If the West now starts to demolish that wall, our friends will probably also think about what is going to happen with this wall, with this border between the GDR and West Berlin." Falin added that, in constructing a common home, "the borders should be only symbolic outlines to show us where the Germans, the French, the Britons, the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, and other peoples live." Moreover, West Germany's role involved making its border with East Germany, also the front line between East and West, "a more reasonable, more peaceful border. Again, both sides should think

about this because if only one side decides or proposes something, this does not solve the problems. If the FRG develops constructive and positive ideas in this respect, rest assured that such ideas will be studied very seriously by the other."[24]

Although the meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl addressed the explosive issues of German unity and West Berlin, neither leader actually based the success of the summit solely on these questions. For all his boldness, Kohl promised only that, sometime in the future, the two sides would include West Berlin in their cooperation agreements in a legally acceptable manner. While Gorbachev charged that Kohl's elevation of the Berlin issue to the status of a touchstone was a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement, he satisfied himself with restating Moscow's commitment to West Berlin's special status. In Kohl's words, the two sides faced a simple choice: "Either we speak only in terms of disagreements—and then there will be no progress—or we say frankly and clearly that, for example on the question of the division of Germany, we have different points of view, but we are prepared to meet each other and cooperate in a rational way and create peacetime values."[25] The personal relationship that emerged from this meeting would play an indispensable role in the events of 1989–1990.

Concrete Accomplishments

In 1988, the bilateral environment was especially conducive for a productive summit. The number of ethnic Germans allowed to emigrate from the USSR rose to 47,472, a threefold increase over 1987.26 Economic contacts also increased, fueled by Gorbachev's economic reforms encouraging external, and especially West German, investment in Soviet enterprises. The series of West German visitors to Moscow in the spring of 1988 served as a stepping stone for further economic agreements.

Kohl arrived in the Soviet capital, accompanied by Genscher and Defense Minister Rupert Scholz. Federal ministers Kiechle, Riesenhuber, and Töpfer, the chairman of the board of Deutsche Bank, over 70 West German businessmen, and more than 400 aides and journalists also made the trip. Beyond the numerous economic agreements between private West German firms and Soviet partners, the two sides signed a series of agreements on cultural, economic, and academic issues. In addition, the Soviet leader promised to free all people designated by the West as political prisoners. Although the West Germans denied any quid pro quo, Kohl then announced that Bonn would support the convening of a human rights conference in Moscow. Much to the delight of his hosts, Kohl also hinted at the possibility of relaxing the COCOM restrictions if the atmosphere of trust continued to grow.[27]

West German and Soviet officials also expressed their intention to draw up a joint political declaration that would be adopted when Gorbachev

visited West Germany in 1989. The preparation of the document emerged as a central focus in the interim between October and Gorbachev's June 1989 arrival in Bonn. In an interview on Soviet television, the West German leader gave a general idea of his interest in a joint political document. First, it would clearly state that each state remained committed to its respective alliance, and thus that political and economic interaction between the USSR and FRG in no way threatened obligations to NATO and the Warsaw Pact or to the EEC and the CMEA. This aspect was then to provide the foundation for a major change in their relations, which would in turn transform Europe. Apparently, Bonn desired a new version of the Moscow Treaty. This updated document would certainly open up new opportunities for both sides.

Not surprisingly, the Gorbachev leadership did not make public its specific intentions for a political document. Gorbachev and his supporters continued to face a political dilemma. On the one hand, they sought to invigorate relations with Bonn, both for economic and political reasons. At the same time, publicly discussing his plans for fundamental change in the European order would only solidify the opposition of his critics at home and in East Germany.

The message received by Bonn was ambiguous. Gorbachev invited the Kohl administration to hope for major changes in the postwar European structure, while also warning that Moscow would not tolerate any irresponsible efforts to bring about such change. Previous Soviet leaders, including Stalin, had sent similar messages. What was different was the growing belief among West German citizens and politicians alike that Gorbachev's desire for change was genuine and, most important, nonthreatening.

Gorbachev and Kohl formed a personal relationship at this summit and demonstrated the importance of USSR–FRG relations for the attainment of their respective goals. Perpetuating the impression of the meeting as the first act in a complex drama, the two leaders did not sign a joint communiqué at the conclusion of the official visit. This summit meeting set the tone for the Soviet–West German relationship that would in the end redefine the structure of Europe.

MOSCOW'S EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Moscow's conception of its security interests in Europe underwent a drastic change in 1988, leading to Gorbachev's speech before the United Nations in December. His domestic political successes at the 19th Party Conference and the reorganization of the Central Committee permitted him such a dramatic gesture. The abruptness of the announcement and the unilateral nature of the cuts suggested that Gorbachev needed foreign policy successes in the face of expanding domestic problems. Moreover, the terms of the debate over unilateral cuts, and the fact that the United States was entwined in a presidential election, indicated the rising prominence of

European considerations in the Soviet security thinking. West Germany was now accorded a more central role in the new Soviet arms control offensive.

While Gorbachev attained wider foreign policy latitude with each domestic political success, he also experienced greater pressures to coordinate his internal and external policies. Each successive stage in his domestic reform strategy required a foreign policy more sensitive to the West. As the leadership acknowledged the severe shortcomings of Soviet economy, the need for beneficial economic relations with the developed capitalist economies grew. This fact, in turn, necessitated redoubled efforts to overcome Western doubts concerning Soviet intentions. Gorbachev's security policy addressed these lingering doubts. And again, the Soviet leader was convinced that a cooperative West Germany could contribute to this process.

The Evolving Security Debate

As the year 1988 began, the Soviet leader was basking in the glow of the recently signed INF Treaty. Yet Gorbachev quickly warned the Central Committee that the Soviet Union could not rest on its laurels.[28] For the Soviet leader, progress in arms-control was inextricably linked with decreasing international tensions, easing defense burdens, and enhancing international economic opportunities. Therefore he encouraged a review of Soviet national security policy by forces sympathetic to new thinking. The INF Treaty was not the culmination of his arms-control strategy, but rather the first step.

Shevardnadze acknowledged the positive role that West Germany had played in the conclusion of the treaty. Encouraged by what he considered a major example of responsible West German behavior, Falin declared that Moscow expected Bonn to play a similar role in negotiations on eliminating completely chemical weapons.[29] Just days after meeting with Shevardnadze, Genscher traveled to Washington and pushed for a total ban on chemical weapons. While no immediate progress was made on this issue, the West German foreign minister did successfully achieve some loosening of the COCOM lists.[30]

Kohl's government demonstrated further that it could stand up to Washington. While the German chancellor sought the acceptance by NATO of an integrated concept of disarmament and arms-control issues, he was making what the Soviets considered a positive contribution. This favorable evaluation of Bonn translated over into other questions. When Kohl and French President Mitterrand signed a protocol establishing a Franco–West German Defense Council in January 1988, for example, Shevardnadze focused his criticism on Paris rather than Bonn. Other Soviet observers criticized Bonn's participation, which purportedly demonstrated its drive to obtain influence over France's nuclear weapons.[31]

In the spring and summer of 1988, *glasnost* finally reached the foreign policy realm. Open criticism of Moscow's foreign policy appeared in the Soviet mass media for the first time. Past security policy also came under fire, including the decision to build and deploy SS-20s and the invasion of Afghanistan.[32] In addition, criticism of Moscow's negotiating approach and the recognition of the West's legitimate fears regarding past Soviet security policy began to emerge.[33] The Soviet Foreign Ministry also became involved in the debate. Shevardnadze laid partial blame for the stalemate in conventional arms talks on the Soviets' inflexible negotiating methods. In addition, he stressed the need for links between the ministry and institutions such as IMEMO and ISKAN.[34] The security debate and the role of prominent civilian specialists in this process became increasingly visible in 1988.

In July, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee agreed on several disarmament proposals, emphasizing in particular its desire to eliminate conventional arms asymmetries.[35] The plan included a series of steps, beginning with an exchange of information, the elimination of existing asymmetries, the reduction of both sides by 500,000 troops, and finally the transformation of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces into defensive postures. At this time, Soviet proposals clearly envisioned a *mutual* elimination of asymmetries.

Soviet officials acknowledged that Moscow expected the FRG to contribute to progress at the conventional arms negotiations in Vienna.[36] The West German government placed great importance on the issue. During his Moscow visit, Kohl labeled the conventional arms imbalance "the main obstacle to European security." He apparently encouraged Moscow to consider unilateral cuts.[37] Despite its obvious interest in Gorbachev's proposals, Bonn acknowledged that progress in the area of conventional arms could proceed only with the active involvement of the United States. Kohl stated explicitly that NATO could not complete its joint arms control and disarmament strategy until after the US presidential election. Genscher, however, supported Gorbachev's suggestion before the Polish Sejm for the commencement of a summit meeting on the topic.[38] The official FRG response was encouragement but delay, emphasizing the need to study the proposals in depth and then proceed cautiously.

Gorbachev's December UN Speech

In early 1988, Gorbachev was politically unprepared to propose unilateral Soviet cuts. Selling such a move to his domestic audience entailed a considerable investment of political capital. Yet events soon undermined this rationale. First, Gorbachev's new conventional arms proposals did not create any movement in the CFE talks in Vienna. This situation threatened to continue for some time as Washington was preoccupied with domestic

political matters. Domestically, Gorbachev achieved two major political victories: the 19th Party Conference in June–July and then the October reorganization of the Central Committee. Finally, despite all the efforts made since 1985, Moscow had yet to overcome the West's lingering distrust. Some dramatic gesture might achieve this breakthrough, and bring with it economic benefits made more vital by the deteriorating domestic economic situation.

Already in his April 1987 speech in Prague, Gorbachev had suggested the possibility of each side's liquidating asymmetries in the military balance.[39] Discussions concerning unilateral Soviet arms reductions emerged publicly in the summer and fall of 1988. Much of the debate within the USSR leading up to Gorbachev's December announcement of unilateral cuts indicated that the move was directed mainly toward improving relations with Western Europe. Key foreign policy figures again questioned whether Moscow was overemphasizing relations with the United States to the detriment of ties with major European states.[40] An account of a Foreign Ministry conference, while contending that the level of attention paid to Washington was "a reflection of objective reality," did acknowledge that Western Europe had recently "been pushed to the sidelines." According to this report, the Foreign Ministry was united in viewing "a reduction in *conventional armaments* as the *No. 1 problem* in [Soviet] relations with Europe (italics in original)." Although opinions among the MID participants were divided, some of these officials favored unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional arms, rather than reciprocal reductions.[41] Outside analysts also began discussing in detail during 1988 the Warsaw Pact's larger numbers of tanks and military personnel.[42]

A debate on Soviet television in July 1988 highlighted the growing prominence of the question of unilateral Soviet conventional force reductions. Vitaly Zhurkin, director of the Institute of Europe, proposed unilateral cuts in both tanks and manpower in Europe. He suggested this step within the context of Moscow's need to focus more attention on Western Europe in its foreign policy. Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky countered that "unilateral actions can only be effective if they are perceived as policies of good examples and when they solicit a response from the other side." Put simply, "the international arena is not a one-man show." Petrovsky cited Gorbachev's unilateral nuclear test moratorium as an example of a Soviet first step to which the West did not respond. In Zhurkin's opinion, this approach threatened to leave the Soviet Union without substantial progress in conventional arms talks, while "we will merely continue to take comfort in the moral side of the cause."[43]

Over the course of the year, several West German officials acknowledged the powerful role that a unilateral cut in Soviet conventional forces in Europe could play.[44] The surprise nature of Gorbachev's announcement, as well as the obvious American inability to embark on bold new negotiations

during the election hiatus, strengthened the argument that the initiative was aimed largely at Western Europe. That such a significant and politically costly action was framed in these terms indicated the importance the Gorbachev leadership placed on these relations.

On 7 December, he announced before the UN General Assembly that the USSR would reduce its armed forces by 500,000; withdraw and disband six tank divisions stationed in Central Europe; and reduce Soviet forces in this region by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks.[45] Soviet commentators observed that the proposed cuts were comparable in size to Europe's most powerful army, the Bundeswehr. As noted above, Foreign Ministry officials remained divided on such unilateral cuts at the July Scientific and Practical Conference. Yet, amazingly, even Shevardnadze seemed unprepared for Gorbachev's announcement. Shevardnadze's response, moreover, revealed that the Soviet foreign minister saw contradictions in some statements, and implied that he had not been intimately involved in the formulation of this major foreign policy announcement. He admitted that he could not answer such basic questions as whether old or new tanks would be cut and how reductions would be verified. He noted that the Soviet leadership had yet to elucidate its vision of international relations and the meaning of universal human values. He also pointed out the circular logic of Gorbachev's remarks.[46] Shevardnadze's apparent exclusion and discontent suggested that the Soviet general secretary may have deferred to other prominent foreign policy officials with more European orientations such as Yakovlev.

Broader Soviet reactions to Gorbachev's announcement varied. The deputy director of the Institute of Europe, Sergei Karaganov, readily admitted that the forces earmarked for removal were designed for offensive operations. In this way, Moscow hoped to "neutralize those forces in the West who are trying to justify the arms race in the West with our offensive capabilities."[47] On the other hand, at least one major military figure, the commander of Warsaw Pact forces, Marshall Viktor Kulikov, criticized Gorbachev's cut for transforming a balance of forces in Europe into an imbalance in favor of the West. Sergei Akhromeyev supported this contention when, in March 1989, he contended that as of the beginning of 1988 the Warsaw Pact forces had 900,000 fewer soldiers than the combined NATO forces.[48] Akhromeyev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, resigned on 7 December, apparently in response to Gorbachev's announcement. General P. G. Lushev, who replaced Kulikov as commander of Warsaw Pact forces in early February, contended that the reductions undertaken by the Warsaw Pact would allow the redirection of resources to the national economy. Other military figures expected the West to reciprocate.[49] The varied evaluations among military officials illustrated that, while certain powerful military leaders remained unalterably opposed to Gorbachev's emerging security policy, the armed forces did not present a single monolithic front.

In general, West German opinion welcomed the declared reductions. Immediately following Gorbachev's speech, all of Bonn's major party leaders expressed approval for the cuts, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Not surprisingly, the SPD's praise was most glowing, while Kohl's reaction was more reserved. The German chancellor apparently modeled his response after that of the United States, calling it a "significant step" which still left an imbalance in favor of Moscow.[50] Genscher characteristically defended Gorbachev from those West German critics who claimed the proposed reductions were too small and those who argued that the Soviet leader could not even deliver what he promised.[51] Overall, the prospect of unilateral cuts in Warsaw Pact forces met with ready West German approval.

Gorbachev's dramatic speech at the United Nations immediately preceded another major European event. In March 1989, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations began in Vienna with a meeting of the foreign ministers of every CSCE state. The head of the Soviet delegation to Vienna praised the rapid progress of the negotiations.[52] One Central Committee military expert later contended that Bonn's decision to cease work on a new missile system to replace the Pershing-1A was a direct response to Moscow's unilateral cuts in conventional forces.[53] Over the course of 1989, the Soviet leader capitalized on his UN declaration in initiating a new arms-control strategy that included a central role for West Germany.

Pushing for Progress in Arms Control

During 1989, the proposed modernization of tactical missiles (specifically the outdated Lance) emerged as a defining issue in East-West security relations. Accounts of disputes within NATO over this issue dominated the international coverage of the Soviet press. Bonn's position that a NATO decision on the question should be postponed until 1991–1992 and the resulting conflicts with Washington and London were presented as a confrontation over fundamental principles of the Atlantic Alliance. Soviet observers noted that Kohl was in a difficult political position, with powerful Western allies clamoring for him to support the US position, while the West German public demanded that Bonn respond to Gorbachev's initiatives.[54]

Continuing the momentum in Vienna, in February, the Warsaw Pact published 'On the Correlation of the Numerical Strength of Armed Forces and Armaments of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and Its Adjoining Waters,"which provided information on the military strength of the two alliances. Encouraged by the course of events, the Soviet foreign minister expressed confidence that the approaching new round of talks offered hope for success. Bonn did not respond with reciprocal enthusiasm. Kohl characteristically cautioned against 'illusions" that progress was assured.[55]

In *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Fyodor Burlatsky addressed the Soviet side's underlying urgency for progress in Vienna. His article, entitled "The Time Factor," contended that further delay would affect not only "the concrete results of the agreement in the area of conventional weapons, but the entire rhythm of forward progress in the matter of constructing a common European home, and a new type of international relations in general."[56] Likewise, Shevardnadze indicated the need for Western gestures to match Gorbachev's December announcement. He hinted at the need to assuage domestic critics by noting, "However substantial the numerical reductions [by the West] might be, their main significance probably lies in the political signal they send."[57] The implicit message: that Gorbachev needed something to bring home, after all the emphasis and concessions regarding international issues. Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov also expressed frustration over the course of the initial March session, pointing out the US–Soviet dispute over which military categories were to be included in negotiations.[58] The United States preferred to include tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers; the Soviet Union: troop levels, tactical strike aircraft, and even attack helicopters. At the same time, Soviet commentators criticized the new Bush administration, which was "already losing the right to call itself new," for its prolonged policy review and subsequent inactivity.[59]

In March, accounts circulated to the effect that NATO leaders had agreed to continue developing a missile to replace the Lance, but not to address the deployment question until 1991–1992. In effect, West Germany had won the day. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group met for two days in late April to address the modernization issue. At a meeting on 30 April, British Prime Minister Thatcher turned up the heat on Kohl, sparking open criticism from other West German officials.[60] For one *Izvestia* commentator, the dispute went beyond the specific tactical question, reflecting instead the Western public's increasing desire for progress in arms control: "Their pressure from below is accelerating the government course, and now we see Bonn acting in the role of the initiator of changes in NATO's traditional strategy."[61] The Social Democrats wasted no time in exploiting Kohl's vulnerable position of reconciling alliance obligations and public opinion. After Kohl announced his arms-control positions to the Bundestag, *Pravda* reported that the SPD labeled his statements a "manifesto of panic," since the ruling coalition remained committed to maintaining limited nuclear forces in Europe against the wishes of the West German public.[62]

At the end of May, the NATO Council agreed on a document that appeared to be a compromise between the FRG and the United States. Most Soviet accounts acknowledged that the FRG was the strongest proponent of compromise with the East within the Atlantic Alliance. In the end, Bonn achieved a partial success in the face of powerful NATO opposition. Shevardnadze acknowledged the positive and negative characteristics of the NATO final document. While welcoming "the new tone in political

statements of the North Atlantic Alliance,"the Soviet foreign minister went on to acknowledge 'It is disappointing that NATO countries confirmed in Brussels their refusal to open negotiations at once" on European tactical nuclear systems.[63] Gorbachev and his supporters remained critical of the pace of progress in arms-control forums. The Soviet side began to seem desperate for a major breakthrough at every turn.[64]

In fact, throughout late 1988 and early 1989, a real sense of urgency surrounded Soviet arms-control initiatives. With the December announcement to reduce Soviet conventional forces in Europe, Gorbachev sought a breakthrough in East-West relations. A bold move might evoke a favorable Western response and increase pressure on the United States to embrace Gorbachev's initiatives more actively. The prospect of the United States immobilized by electoral politics and presidential transitions required Moscow either to postpone any progress for several months or to seek alternative avenues. Finally, in the face of mounting domestic economic liabilities, the Soviet leader needed a foreign policy success, especially one that might improve the country's financial situation by overcoming Western distrust and encouraging economic investment.

West Germany was central to Soviet thinking in this regard. The debate preceding Gorbachev's December UN speech focused on Western Europe, and particularly the FRG. Bonn, and its increasingly sympathetic citizenry, would surely respond positively to unilateral cuts. Public opinion and party politics, as well as West Germany's geographic position, would push Kohl toward supporting progress on arms control even if the United States was uncertain. Finally, Bonn's goodwill made possible significant economic benefits. The Germans had proven more willing than their Western allies to engage the Soviets economically.

Gorbachev's politically costly decision to accept one-sided cuts was not simply forced on him by domestic imperatives. Instead, a combination of internal pressures and external conditions increased the costs of the status quo and raised the possibility of a real breakthrough. The Soviet leader had already made the conceptual changes required to transform traditional Soviet security concepts. Likewise, he did not focus on West Germany out of sheer necessity. The Gorbachev leadership had internalized a new portrait of West Germany as a powerful yet responsible and non-revisionist partner in transforming East-West relations in Europe. This view of the FRG also arose in Soviet–West German economic relations.

SOVIET-WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC INTERACTION

Like the previous analysis of Moscow's changing European security policy, Soviet economic relations with West Germany demonstrated that the Gorbachev leadership had fundamentally altered its conception of the FRG long before the fall of 1989. At the same time, Moscow's foreign economic

relations strategy was one of the policy areas that most clearly demonstrated the conceptual linkage between Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policy strategies. Leonid Brezhnev, for instance, implemented a purely tactical shift in Moscow's international economic policy in the 1970s. Part of the reason for his interest in improved relations with the west involved increasing the flow of advanced technology into the Soviet economy. For Brezhnev, détente offered the possibility of raising living standards without risking fundamental domestic economic reform. Thus, the general secretary's conception of détente involved no redefinition of international relations nor of Soviet economics or politics. The resulting economic gains were inefficiently utilized and, ultimately, ephemeral.

Gorbachev's political strategy incorporated strategic shifts in both external and internal policies. Moreover, these two shifts were complementary. Decreasing international tensions and integrating the USSR into the global economy would carry the benefit of aiding the planned domestic reforms. Thus as his reform vision moved from *uskoreniye* [acceleration] in 1985 to *perestroika* [restructuring] in 1986–1987 and finally to the more radical precepts of *demokratizatsia* [democratization], the importance of profitable relations with the West grew. But unlike Brezhnev's view of such steps, Gorbachev envisioned these as logical requirements of the modern era rather than a temporary concession to domestic necessity. Likewise, domestic economic and political reform improved the Soviet Union's image in the West and focused on the potentially explosive problem of declining Soviet living standards. Yet again, Gorbachev soon acknowledged the inescapability of a massive transformation of the Soviet economy, rather than a series of minor corrections. He explicitly addressed these points during a speech to West German businessmen.[65]

In the process, Gorbachev came to realize that the relationship between his foreign and domestic policies was extremely convoluted. While he achieved a significant lessening of global tensions, he found it surprisingly difficult to translate this success into improved economic cooperation. Likewise, he proclaimed an ambitious economic and political reform strategy that both raised expectations and sparked domestic opposition. The visible opposition raised questions among potential Western economic partners as to the ability of the Soviet leader to deliver on promises. Simultaneously, the higher public expectations compounded the need for foreign policy successes, especially those that might entail economic benefits.

Neither the skeptical Reagan administration nor the cautious Bush administration offered Gorbachev all the successes he needed. For various reasons, the FRG met many of the Soviet leader's needs in foreign economic policy. Specifically, increasing the economic benefits of Moscow's relations with West Germany would prove Gorbachev's effectiveness and indispensability as a leader, while also easing the current economic hardships and spurring on still fragile reform efforts. Similar efforts directed toward

CMEA countries promised few immediate benefits. A growing number of Soviet analyses questioned whether the CMEA could ever contribute to Soviet economic development. The 40th anniversary of the CMEA, for example, met with more criticism of the state of cooperation than celebration of achievements.

Faced with compounding economic problems, instead of retreating on his domestic promises, Gorbachev chose to pursue even more radical reforms. In early 1989, he appointed a longtime economic adviser, Leonid Abalkin, as deputy prime minister to implement a new wave of economic reforms. The selection of Abalkin, head of the Institute of Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, illustrated the rising policy relevance of certain well-connected academics.

In the realm of foreign economic policy, the Gorbachev leadership initiated an ambitious reform strategy. These reforms were intended to increase the quality and quantity of Soviet exports, encourage foreign investment, and improve the importation and utilization of advanced technologies. A series of administrative reorganizations sought to decentralize control over foreign economic activity by breaking the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Reformers also attempted to encourage Soviet enterprises to enter the global market. By April 1989, any firm or organization could engage in importing and exporting. Enterprises were allowed to keep a percentage of the hard currency earned through trade. Also in 1989, the Council of Ministers altered legislation governing joint ventures, dropping the requirement of Soviet majority holding and exclusively Soviet executives.

Despite the numerous steps in this area, performance remained anemic. In large part, the continued deformities of the Soviet command economy, such as distorted prices, lack of unallocated inputs, ease of credit, and widespread corruption, overwhelmed whatever interest in foreign economic relations the reforms might have unleashed. Also, while Gorbachev and those around him accepted the need for integrating the USSR into the global economy, they had no single and detailed plan for how to achieve this goal. The result was lackluster results in trade turnover, foreign investment, and joint ventures. While overall trade turnover increased slightly from 1988 to 1989, the gain was due almost entirely to rising imports, leaving the USSR with a trade imbalance of 3.4 billion rubles. Soviet exports actually declined in the first half of 1990. Equally disappointing, foreign investment in joint ventures amounted to a paltry $2.35 billion by the end of 1989. Moreover, of the 1,500 registered joint ventures, only about 200 were actually operating.[66] Despite the lack of success, the Gorbachev regime continued to pursue improvement in this sector.

Logically, the Federal Republic of Germany arose as a promising partner in achieving these objectives. By Gorbachev's own admission, "the FRG remains in first place among our Western partners."[67] West Germany accounted for 4 to 5 percent of Soviet foreign trade, a larger share than any

other Western economy. While overall Soviet trade levels remained constant in mid-1989, trade with West Germany increased significantly. Soviet imports from the FRG rose by 36 percent, and exports by 12 percent. Approximately one third of the Soviet Union's high technology imports purchased from the developed West came from the Federal Republic.[68] Such goods were vital to Gorbachev's ongoing reform efforts.

More than any other major NATO country, the FRG was favorably disposed to economic cooperation with the USSR. In October 1988, a consortium of West German banks granted a $1.8 billion credit line to the USSR. During Gorbachev's June visit to the FRG, the two sides signed an investment protection agreement to encourage West German businesses to invest in the Soviet economy. There were 72 firms from the FRG involved in Soviet joint ventures in mid-1989, more than from any other country. Ryzhkov admitted that "FRG firms really are the most active participants in joint ventures in the USSR."[69]

Gorbachev and his supporters had come to trust West German intentions, and were willing to accept a certain level of economic interdependence in these contacts. Moreover, they justified these contacts as essential to expanding and solidifying political ties. As Gorbachev said in Baden-Würtemburg, "It is a good thing that we are becoming 'dependent' on each other in the economic sphere. Politics will become more reliable for that—both today and tomorrow."[70] Although many Soviet commentators blamed the sluggish figures on hesitancy by West German firms, both Gorbachev and Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov acknowledged the negative impact of frustratingly slow progress in Soviet economic reforms.[71] Economic issues became a central focus of the October 1988 and June 1989 meetings between Gorbachev and Kohl.

The preceding factors coincided with West German interest in improving economic ties with the Soviet Union. A number of prominent German firms saw reasonable business opportunities in the Soviet economy. Businesses were reassured by the German government's commitment to improving economic ties between the two countries. Bonn wished to solidify Moscow's interest in West Germany as a major European actor and envisioned influencing change in the postwar European order.

Yet the West German interest in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union was again framed as doing Moscow a favor. Kohl noted, "The German economy remains conscious of its significance as the Soviet Union's most important Western partner," and was ready for enhanced involvement in this area. In Gorbachev's accompanying speech, he responded to this attitude by remarking, "There is still inertia to look at us as an economic backwater. This inertia feeds on the outdated stereotypes that the Russians will not be able to manage by themselves."[72] At the same time, West Germans continued to be frustrated with the slow pace of Soviet economic reforms, overwhelming red tape, and also some amount of

bureaucratic opposition. After the first day of the summit, FRG government spokesman Friedhelm Ost noted that West German firms had completed only 16 of 24 proposed agreements, and that the framework for the DM 3 billion credit line offered by West Germany had not yet been signed.[73] Bonn's propensity to view economic interaction in a political context emerged again, when Kohl noted, "Long-standing experience shows that when commercial people lead the way it is always good for politics." Preceding Gorbachev's June 1989 visit to Moscow, Kohl also remarked that "intensive economic cooperation promotes not only the consolidation of the economies of our two countries, but also the stability and predictability of our relations in general."[74]

Both Moscow and Bonn exhibited the political will to improve economic interaction. Moscow made little progress due mainly to ineffective Soviet economic reforms. Yet Gorbachev continued to seek commitments from the Kohl government. The Soviet leader felt a growing need for visible and profitable foreign policy successes. The rising Soviet expectations for economic contacts with the FRG suggested a reordering of the relative importance of East and West Germany in Soviet thinking. By encouraging economic interdependence between the USSR and FRG, Moscow acknowledged that West Germany should be a constructive participant in European affairs.

GORBACHEV'S TRIP TO THE FRG: JUNE 1989

In June, the CPSU general secretary and newly elected president of the Congress of People's Deputies embarked on a remarkable journey to West Germany. This encounter was noteworthy for the political environment surrounding the visit, for the results achieved, and surprisingly, for the tumultuous welcome the Germans gave to Gorbachev. The West German population, only years before denounced for its supposed fascist tendencies, now waved banners reading, "Hello, Misha," and chanted, "Gorbi, Gorbi." Here was concrete proof that the Soviet general secretary had delivered on his promise to decrease international tensions and improve the Soviet Union's image abroad. Gorbachev's visit also strengthened the personal relationship between the two leaders.

The summit's main achievement, the joint political declaration, gave concrete expression to the growing trust between Gorbachev and Kohl. While both remained constrained by domestic and international pressures, each became more convinced that his counterpart was central to achieving his aims in Europe. Kohl, fearful of angering his NATO allies, downplayed the importance of the joint statement. Gorbachev, needing visible successes on the global scene, played up the document's historical significance. In addition, the general secretary continued to send the contradictory message

of respect for existing political realities, while hinting about the possibilities for gradual change in the postwar division of Europe.

Prologue

As with Kohl's trip to Moscow in October 1988, the announcement of Gorbachev's planned West German visit raised public and official expectations.[75] As commentators repeatedly noted, the Kohl and Gorbachev meetings of October 1988 and June 1989 were envisioned as a single unit. This interpretation naturally strengthened the impression that the dual summits should achieve substantive results. Soviet observers also stressed the unique relationship between the peoples of the USSR and the FRG, binding them together at the fulcrum of Europe. Many accounts also pointed to Bonn's increasing prominence, not only as an economic power, but also as a blossoming political heavyweight in European and international affairs. Given the public NATO disagreement over nuclear modernization, such remarks were generally made in the context of arms-control negotiations. Finally, the meeting gained greater significance since it was Gorbachev's first trip abroad as the president of the newly elected Congress of People's Deputies. Prominent members of the Soviet foreign policy elite repeatedly stressed these ideas.[76]

Gorbachev himself called attention to the recent meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies. He went so far as to acknowledge that the gathering, in enhancing the Soviet Union's international image and in stimulating trust by Moscow's external partners, strengthened the new political body and improved its chances for success. "The trust factor introduced into world politics by our restructuring has been legally enshrined as a result of our congress. This gives it extra authority, strengthens it, and creates great opportunities for concerted efforts in solving global problems."[77] In effect, the external reaction to this domestic event improved the Soviet leader's political position. Shevardnadze offered a different illustration of domestic-external linkage. He warned Moscow's diplomatic partners that the introduction of democratic mechanisms into the Soviet foreign policy process might complicate international negotiations. Yet, "the quality of their efforts will be the better for it."[78]

Thus, the same domestic political reforms that inspired external trust for Moscow could also inhibit the West's willingness to cooperate. The visible lack of unity within the Soviet elite concerning foreign policy, while a necessary result of a more open policy process, undermined Western confidence in Gorbachev's ability to deliver on his promises. These Soviet portrayals of the Congress of People's Deputies clearly illustrated the complex linkages between domestic and international influences on Soviet behavior.

West German officials chose to emphasize Gorbachev's accomplishments and commitment over his weaknesses. Like their Soviet counterparts, they placed great significance on Gorbachev's visit. Kohl expected the visit to "lend a new, powerful impulse" to FRG–USSR cooperation. [79] Yet, while praising the atmosphere of expanding trust and cooperation between Moscow and Bonn, Kohl was at pains to prove his loyalty to his Western partners. He pointedly stated that the main goal of East-West negotiations was a "breakthrough on conventional arms reduction talks," and that negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons would commence only after the conventional question was resolved. This position contrasted markedly with Gorbachev's calls for parallel negotiations, coinciding instead with the NATO stance agreed to before the summit. Thus Kohl sought to allay any fears within NATO concerning West German intentions on the eve of Gorbachev's visit. Days before the Soviet leader's arrival, FRG President Weizsäcker was in Washington reassuring the US leadership that the specter of a united and neutral Germany was "complete nonsense." The FRG would remain "the east of the west." [80]

Gorbachev's Visit and Soviet–East German Relations

Events in the summer of 1989 illustrated once again the profound gulf between the views of Gorbachev and Honecker. While the Soviet leader basked in the glow of admiring West Germans, Erich Honecker entertained the Chinese foreign minister. PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and GDR Foreign Minister Oscar Fischer jointly condemned "the recently intensified attempts by opponents of détente to destabilize socialism." [81] Just ten days earlier, Chinese troops had brutally suppressed demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in the name of protecting socialism in China. The dogmatism and immobility of the East German regime contrasted starkly with Gorbachev's visibility at the convening of the Congress of People's Deputy's and his high international profile during visits to Beijing and Bonn. While Honecker did visit the Soviet Union soon after Gorbachev's return from Bonn, the trip only highlighted the disparity in USSR–FRG and USSR–GDR relations.

Just as the West German leader assuaged his worried NATO allies, Moscow addressed East Germany's concerns. Yet the Soviet assurances did not completely calm officials in East Berlin. Zagladin, as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet, stated publicly that "the establishment of new relations between the USSR and the FRG will threaten no one—neither our neighbors nor our allies." A foreign ministry spokesman also lashed out at West German accounts of a Soviet–East German falling-out. [82] The fact that these remarks were not delivered by a more prominent MID representative suggested a lack of Soviet conviction.

Days before Gorbachev's departure for West Germany, Shevardnadze paid a visit to East Berlin. As in previous Soviet–GDR encounters, the two sides stressed their successful cooperation in international affairs, while noting only a detailed "exchange of opinions" on the domestic policies of the two countries.[83] Shevardnadze joined Honecker in demanding unquestioned West German acceptance of the postwar European realities, and in confirming that the USSR and GDR shared a single view on the question of West Berlin. Just before Gorbachev's arrival in Bonn, Shevardnadze repeated that improving Soviet–West German relations need not give rise to "even a shadow of doubt or concern on the part of the FRG's allies, or on the part of our own or third countries generally." Shevardnadze also briefed Honecker on Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Bonn. Foreign Ministry official Afanasevsky presented Moscow's efforts to restate its past commitments to the GDR as a sign of the enduring trust between the two, rather than the opposite.[84]

Even if these gestures mollified Honecker, Gorbachev's triumphal visit to West Germany surely reawakened the SED's concerns. The East German media focused on Shevardnadze's recent stop in East Berlin and Honecker's meeting with Soviet Ambassador Kochemasov, but carried only limited coverage of Gorbachev's stay in Bonn. The warmth of his reception and the proclamations concerning the future obviously disquieted the East German leadership. Gorbachev informed his West German hosts that Moscow would honor its alliance obligations, but added the qualifier "as long as they serve stability in Europe." Kvitsinsky later claimed that he was aware at the time of the implications of Gorbachev's FRG visit for East Germany.[85]

The SED expressed its unease by questioning Bonn's intentions. A week after the conclusion of this trip, SED politburo member Joachim Herrmann expressed his concern regarding the resurgence of neo-Nazism in West Germany.[86] In addition, the East German media attacked Bonn for its alleged reunification "campaign," and implied that the FRG's "disregard for the right of self-determination" undercut the significance of the recently signed Soviet–West German Joint Declaration.[87]

East Berlin also emphasized Honecker's upcoming trip to the USSR in late June. Despite these efforts, Honecker's "working visit" in the Soviet Union paled in comparison to Gorbachev's recent trips abroad, or even to Kohl's October 1988 visit to Moscow. The Soviet leadership wanted little to do with Honecker. While Gorbachev publicly honored his commitment not to interfere in the affairs of other Warsaw Pact states, he had no qualms about slighting the obstinate East German leader. Among those receiving Honecker at the airport, for instance, was Valentin Falin, newly promoted to head of the Central Committee's International Department. Honecker had publicly criticized Falin in October 1987 for his remarks concerning the Quadripartite Agreement.

The Soviet and East German accounts of the meeting between Gorbachev and Honecker differed markedly. In both the TASS and ADN reports published in *Pravda* and *Neues Deutschland*, Gorbachev appeared to chide the East German leader for the GDR's recent claims of revisionist tendencies in Bonn. He contended that "more and more FRG citizens are becoming heartfelt supporters of peace, friendship, and good-neighborliness with the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other socialist states." Yet *Pravda* quoted Gorbachev to the effect that "there is no other way and no alternative to restructuring." *Neues Deutschland* did not publish these remarks, but noted that Honecker declared "the socialist development of the GDR is characterized by political stability and economic dynamism." The ADN version did emphasize "the unanimous support" of the East German leadership and population for the CPSU's 27th Party Congress and 19th Party Conference, but did not include any mention of the recently completed proceedings of the Congress of People's Deputies. *Pravda*, in turn, reported the East German leader's remark that the people of the GDR watched raptly each session of the congress.[88] After only a day in Moscow, Honecker departed for Magnitogorsk, where he repeated his unwillingness to adopt *perestroika*-type reforms. While the brief visit of the East German leader to the USSR offered Honecker the illusion of favored status, the Soviet leader's June trip to the FRG illustrated the shifting importance Moscow placed on relations with East and West Germany.

The Joint Political Declaration

During Gorbachev's stay in Bonn, Soviet and West German officials signed more than ten agreements. The most important of these was the Soviet–West German Joint Declaration. This statement, a focal point of attention in both capitals for months in advance of the summit, illustrated the improvement in relations and set the stage for further progress. The document noted the agreement of the two sides on a series of philosophical principles, including individual human rights, "the right of all peoples and states to freely determine their fate," and that "the primacy of international law must be ensured in domestic and international policies." Other sections addressed the "building blocks of European peace and cooperation," mutual security concerns, and the need to develop bilateral relations through treaties and cooperation.[89]

Gorbachev demonstrated his evolving ideas about the FRG by calling into question the joint statement's relationship to the Moscow Treaty. Abandoning the traditional Soviet position that the founding documents of the Soviet–West German relationship required no improvements, Gorbachev asserted, "We have substantially developed the ideas and concepts of the Moscow Treaty." Moreover, the present document was not the final word, but merely a reflection of the present circumstances. Therefore, further

progress was possible and, indeed, necessary as the two sides achieved their joint political aims. He ended by adding that "the document does not demand that you or we should renounce our uniqueness or weaken our allegiance to the alliances."[90]

Izvestia and *Pravda* offered different interpretations of the document. Although the differences were slight, they suggested a broader conflict over the significance of the joint declaration. *Izvestia*'s commentators viewed the agreement as embodying a "code of conduct" which would lead to a "new phase of European détente." They argued that just as the Moscow Treaty and the series of agreements between the FRG and Warsaw Pact countries made the CSCE possible, the current document would allow the realization of the common European home.[91] In other words, the joint statement was an agreement for a new era, making previous arrangements obsolete.

A trio of *Pravda* writers were more restrained in their evaluation of the joint statement. They interpreted the document not as a code of conduct, but as a "guideline." Readers were reminded of the "complex political and psychological vicissitudes through which Soviet–West German relations passed before reaching their current level." Most significantly, the *Pravda* commentators contended that "the joint statement signed in Bonn is an important complement to the Moscow Treaty which was and remains the basis of the relations between our two countries."[92] Thus, the 1970 Moscow Treaty continued to serve as the foundation of Soviet–West German relations. Gorbachev and the *Izvestia* authors viewed the joint statement as a redefinition of these relations in recognition of a fundamentally changed vision of European politics.

A *Pravda* editorial carried what may have been an official interpretation of the June 1989 agreement. Although not a clear validation of one or the other position, the article stressed that, while the Moscow Treaty established the foundation for Soviet–West German ties, the joint statement and other such agreements must carry forward "partnership cooperation in all spheres on the basis of trust, equality of rights, and mutual advantage."[93] The Soviet foreign ministry supported those in the Kremlin who viewed the joint statement as a historic breakthrough. Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky told a West German newspaper that the joint statement could serve as a model for similar agreements with other states. The document represented a unique level of understanding and cooperation between states with different social systems.[94]

The official West German evaluation of the joint declaration was less effusive. In spite of Gorbachev's remarkable popularity and the obvious German satisfaction with the visit, politicians in Bonn did not praise the document as highly as did Gorbachev and his supporters. The reason for official West German caution was clear. As always, the FRG government labored to assure its Western allies that the agreement would not jeopardize Bonn's commitment to the Atlantic community. West German President

Weizsäcker, for instance, observed that Soviet–FRG cooperation would take into account the alliance obligations of both sides. In his dinner speech, Kohl did go so far as to imply that the two states were on the verge of moving beyond the Moscow Treaty.[95]

In addition to the political agreement, a number of economic agreements were signed. The most significant of these was a guarantee of Western investment in the Soviet economy. Other documents set up economic ties with individual West German states. Ten major political, economic, and cultural agreements made the summit the most productive meeting in decades for the two states. Beyond the concrete results, Soviet and West German officials addressed a series of prominent issues central to bilateral relations.

Discussion Topics

The Existence of Two German States

Kohl broached this controversial issue during his dinner speech on Gorbachev's arrival. He described the continued division of the German nation as "an open wound." [96] Kohl later recalled a private meeting with Gorbachev in the FRG in which Kohl assured his guest that unification was inevitable. It might be delayed, but could not be permanently prevented. According to Kohl, Gorbachev only listened quietly. Instead of responding directly to Kohl's remarks, Gorbachev asked whether he could count on West German economic assistance if he needed it. This exchange, which Kohl later labeled "the decisive moment" in the process of German unification, captured an essential aspect of the unfolding Soviet–West German relationship.

On the Soviet side, commentators, including prominent CPSU officials, questioned with increasing frequency the permanence of the division. Portugalov, for instance, addressed this topic days before Gorbachev's visit to Bonn. Paraphrasing Gorbachev's remark that history would decide the issue of Germany's divided status, the renowned Soviet *Germanist* observed that "in the FRG the programmatic depth of this statement has not yet been fully understood. In particular, it is not understood that we expressly recognize the historical dimension of all questions connected with the German nation and its future existence as a state." He added that "these questions are open in the eyes of history. But history is made by men. How history proceeds depends on their political work." Soviet Chief of General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev also remarked, "History has divided Germany. But, history has to be corrigible. History is made by us."[97]

Of course, Portugalov did not call for the unification of the two German states. Instead he envisioned "two German apartments" open to one another "in the same way as Austria and Hungary are today open to each

other despite their different social systems."[98] The analogy to Hungary and Austria was portentous, since only weeks before Budapest had begun to remove the barbed wire and listening devices along its border with Austria. Dashichev came close to agreeing with Kohl's October 1988 remark that the division was "unnatural." He suggested that "we cannot predict in which way the division of the German nation will be overcome, but for me it is clear that this situation is not normal." He argued also that, "in the course of the development of international relations, a situation might evolve in which both German states come together very closely in the political, social, societal, and cultural fields, and in all other fields. This will benefit not only the Soviet Union, but also the United States and all other European countries, because the roots of the tension in central Europe which exist now will be eliminated."[99]

Gorbachev was also forced to address Germany's division. During a news conference a journalist asked about the possibility of a single German entity within a future European structure. The Soviet leader responded that "everything is possible. Time has left us this world, after the well-known events, after the war, and time itself must deal with it."[100] He added that both the FRG and the GDR must accept the present situation, including postwar realities and the current processes of change in Europe.

The Berlin Wall

Again Chancellor Kohl took the first available opportunity to address this contentious issue. He expressed the desire to create a stable and just European order "under which the artificial demarcation will be eliminated and its repellent symbols like the Berlin Wall will be destroyed."[101] Immediately following Gorbachev's visit, Genscher concluded that "a Europe without division, without the iron curtain, without a wall, and without barbed wire is again possible."[102]

Portugalov's remarks, cited in the previous section, raised the possibility that the Berlin Wall could be removed, just as the border between Hungary and Austria had been opened.[103] Gorbachev likewise suggested that the German-German border might open up. A West German reporter asked whether the common European home could exist while the Berlin Wall still stood. The Soviet general secretary responded that "the wall was built in a specific situation. It was not just dictated by evil intentions. The GDR made the decision by exercising its sovereign rights. And the wall can be removed if the conditions which led to it do not exist any more. I do not see a particularly big problem here."[104] Gorbachev's apparent openmindedness regarding the issue necessarily raised West German expectations.

Kohl and Gorbachev also addressed other formerly taboo issues, including the extent and character of West Berlin's inclusion in Soviet–West German relations and the treatment of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union.

Though the two sides still did not reach complete agreement, each openly expressed its positions.[105]

This Gorbachev-Kohl meeting in West Germany contributed to the further elevation of bilateral relations. Dashichev declared the visit "the most important event in the relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG since the end of the last war." Gorbachev himself acknowledged, "I attach great importance to the personal contacts between the chancellor, Mr. Kohl, and myself because this allows us to discuss virtually every issue openly, comparing our opinions, points of view, and arguments concerning various problems."[106] The powerful personal connection that had emerged by mid-1989 would play an invaluable role in moderating the chaos of the following year.

In addition, the summit produced a major joint statement with broad political implications. Various Soviet observers pointed out that the document might serve as a model for broader European relations. While the Gorbachev leadership exaggerated its significance for domestic political reasons, the joint political statement did formalize new political thinking and consolidate the much improved relationship between Moscow and Bonn.

A final feature of the meeting was Gorbachev's remarkable popularity. Gorbachev attempted to capitalize on this warm reception by linking his domestic reform efforts with "the strengthening of peace and general security."[107] Kohl contributed to the linkage between Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies by acknowledging that "any increase in openness is a new chance for cooperation with us."[108] Gorbachev still had to convince West Germany that he could deliver on his radical plans. The completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan certainly helped in this effort. Moreover, the increasingly revolutionary events in Hungary and Poland reassured the FRG's leaders that Gorbachev would keep his promise not to interfere. In all these instances, Bonn saw the tantalizing possibility that this same flexibility might be applied to overcoming the division of Germany.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the period examined above, the Gorbachev leadership was altering fundamentally its conceptions of West Germany and the German question in general. While the January 1987 reevaluation of Moscow's German policy was conducted in secret, increasingly the 1989 debate took place in public. Portugalov admitted that previously Moscow viewed the FRG "as almost the only potentially revanchist force, ready at any time to call into question the results of the Helsinki conference." He went even further in charging that "in our past static point of view, we considered these results only important as the final chapter of the postwar development in Europe, but not as a strong starting stimulus and first stage of a qualitatively

new overall European process with the prospect of overcoming the division of our continent."[109] Arbatov also noted that the traditional Soviet conception of security was based on an outdated view of the German question.[110] Since Moscow had openly abandoned the previous definition of its security interest, the official position on Germany's division had already been transformed, even if this fact had not been publicly acknowledged.

Following the election of George Bush, US and NATO officials remained unconvinced of Gorbachev's commitment to new thinking. An unnamed senior NATO official, for instance, labeled Soviet efforts to dismantle all short-range missiles as an attempt 'to seduce the Germans away from us."[111] Moscow continued to see the United States as skeptical of new thinking and prone to exploit the instability in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the Gorbachev leadership, the Federal Republic emerged as an appealing partner for the Soviet Union in Europe.[112]

The reasons for West Germany's prominence in Soviet thinking involved more than the FRG's political, strategic, and economic importance. For its part, the West German government convinced the Gorbachev leadership that it would not exploit East European instability. As Genscher stated in June 1989, 'Our aim is not to destabilize our eastern neighbors. That would be irresponsible and unwise. We are interested in ensuring that the transformations in those countries take place without destabilization, since there would otherwise be a threat to the very policy of reform."Kohl's foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, added that 'Soviet policy led by General Secretary Gorbachev is very serious policy. This means that there will be no attempt to split NATO. On the contrary, the Soviet Union expects us not to try to cause a split between its partners in the Warsaw Pact and itself, which is not in our interests, either. Stability and peace in Europe can be secured only if there are no such attempts."Likewise, Weizsäcker denied that Bonn wanted to travel down some "special German road."He noted that 'the FRG is located at the very center of the European continent, and has special geopolitical tasks which must be fulfilled with all responsibility. This means that the FRG can only bring to fruition its own interests if the interests of its neighbors are taken into consideration, and East-West relations generally."[113] Genscher further expressed his gratitude to reform politicians, since 'the greater openness in the USSR and in some other countries of Central and Eastern Europe brought us nearer to the unification of Europe."[114]

Moscow also focused on West Germany because it seemed more capable of limiting its demands on the Soviet leader. In a visit to Bonn, Yakovlev asked for Kohl's support in East-West relations while reminding the chancellor not to demand too much from the Soviet Union. He added, 'Our interrelationship is one of the main stones in the foundation of the European House, and will determine whether this house is earthquakeproof."[115] This relationship should even serve as a model for bilateral and multilateral contacts in the common European home.

While Kohl and the West German public were convinced of the sincerity of Gorbachev's intentions, they had reason to question his ability to succeed. Gorbachev, therefore, made a visible effort to convince his West German hosts that he could deliver on his promises. After years of demonstrating that his desire for change was genuine, he now assured the Kohl government that he was capable of implementing the changes currently under discussion.[116]

In the ensuing months, the Gorbachev leadership would demonstrate its willingness to accept revolutionary change in what was once a core national interest of the Soviet state. Prominent foreign policy actors presaged Moscow's eventual flexibility regarding systemic change in Eastern Europe. Zagladin, for example, contended that 'in East European countries fundamental, sometimes dramatic changes are currently taking place. . . . A people must not be disturbed if it wants to change something, but it also must not be stimulated to do so from the outside."[117] More important for West Germany, Soviet commentators linked the present changes in Eastern Europe, the declining tensions in East-West relations, and the rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn with the problem of a divided Germany. Without doubt, the Gorbachev leadership continued to desire only a more legitimate, and therefore stable socialist East Germany with more relaxed relations with its Western counterpart. Nonetheless, by mid-1989 the Soviet leader and his main foreign policy advisers had removed many of the traditional conceptual obstacles to German unification. Soviet policy illustrated Moscow's changed definition of security in Europe, its desire to enter into interdependent economic arrangements, and its genuine trust in West German intentions. While events soon overwhelmed the existing Soviet strategy, Moscow did not attempt to impede this avalanche *because* of the changes in the Soviet view of West Germany dating all the way back to 1985.

5

The Collapse of the GDR

Soviet acquiescence to the East European revolutions of 1989, and especially the disintegration of the East German communist regime, fundamentally transformed the postwar European order. In the process, Gorbachev demonstrated that he had internalized the principles of new political thinking. Obviously, the Soviet leader did not favor the disappearance of regimes closely tied to Moscow, nor did he plan their demise, and he most certainly did not control the revolutionary processes that he had helped unleash. Accounts of this period, including those of Soviet participants, note the generally reactive nature of Moscow's Eastern European policy.[1] Similar observations would apply to Soviet policy toward the 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia and the Polish unrest of 1979–1980. What was different, obviously, was the content of the Kremlin's response. Gorbachev's reactions consistently upheld the new conception of international relations he had been proclaiming for years. His policies were all the more remarkable given the powerful domestic forces opposed to the revolutionary changes.

Moreover, his statements and actions from early in his tenure demonstrated his changing thinking on Eastern Europe. He sought the development of *perestroika*-like reforms in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Soviet bloc regimes. Yet unlike his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev underwent a profound ideological transformation that included a radical break

from the traditional Soviet vision of international relations. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the GDR and East European communist regimes were considered integral to Soviet security. By 1989, the conceptual underpinnings of this position had disappeared. This gradual redefinition of Soviet national interests occurred *before* the SED regime collapsed in November–December 1989.

Even in advance of this event, there were numerous signals that certain prominent foreign policy specialists favored a form of German-German relations that the GDR government would never have accepted. Gorbachev remained committed to a socialist German state, but only insofar as it was enjoyed political legitimacy. That is, once the East German people renounced the SED's leading role, the Soviet general secretary accepted the outcome. This was possible because, in Gorbachev's view, the security, economic, and political reasons for the Soviet presence in the region no longer pertained.

The Gorbachev leadership's new definition of security included the recognition that spheres of influence no longer ensured Soviet national security and that NATO was not an inherent threat. At Malta in early December, Gorbachev informed the United States that Moscow was prepared to view Washington as a partner, rather than a threat to the Soviet Union. The constructive US approach and West German incentives assisted Gorbachev in accepting unification. Yet throughout this process, powerful domestic opposition burdened Soviet decision making.

MOSCOW'S RESPONSE TO EASTERN EUROPEAN EVENTS OF 1989

Soviet attitudes toward the changes in Eastern Europe were essential to understanding Moscow's view of German unification. The following section is not intended to retrace the entire course of Gorbachev's relations with the Eastern bloc, but merely to demonstrate his thinking at crucial junctures. These illustrations then illuminate Moscow's broader vision of the possible outcomes in Europe including, ultimately, German unification. Soviet foreign policy in this period exhibited a fundamentally new vision of security and the profound impact of various internal and external political forces.

Soviet–Eastern European relations in 1989 have received considerable scholarly attention. To varying degrees, most studies of this period overemphasized the extent to which Moscow was shocked and immobilized by the revolutions in Eastern Europe.[2] The pace was rapid and the outcome disappointing for Moscow. Yet throughout the spring of 1989, Gorbachev had seen the accelerating process of reform in Poland and Hungary, and even warned Eastern Europe's embattled communist leaders against obstructionist policies. The Soviet leader, while still convinced of the desirability of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, seemed capable of accepting

revolutionary transformations in these countries. His operating principles, unlike his predecessors', did not begin and end with the preservation of existing regimes, but instead endorsed controlled change, nonviolence, and even popular sovereignty.

A number of prominent foreign policy experts noted the radical changes underway in Eastern Europe, and implied that even more fundamental reforms could follow. Various party officials, MID members, powerful academic specialists, and high-profile journalists began to discuss the implications of the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Nikolai Shishlin, a Central Committee official responsible for East European affairs, noted that "major transformations are under way in the socialist countries. They could have unexpected results. I believe that the surprises are not over yet."[3] Prominent Soviet spokesmen addressed evolution in the CMEA and Warsaw Pact, Hungarian neutrality, systemic transformations in Eastern Europe, and reform-related political instability.[4] All the participants in this dialogue stressed Moscow's acceptance of East European sovereignty. Even Gorbachev publicly acknowledged the right of each Warsaw Pact state to determine its own course.[5]

Such thinking suggested that Moscow had abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine. According to this political rationale, the preservation of socialist gains was given precedence over the sovereignty of any single member of the bloc. Every Warsaw Pact member possessed only limited sovereignty, while at the same time being duty-bound to protect the other East European socialist regimes. Dashichev contended that the joint political declaration signed by Gorbachev and Kohl in June 1989 represented an official renunciation of this discredited justification for past Soviet interference in the region. The Soviet leader's speech to the Council of Europe in July offered more authoritative proof. According to Gorbachev, "any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states, both of friends and allies, no matter whose it is, is impermissible." Yet it was Gerasimov's pithy assurance that the Brezhnev doctrine had been replaced with the 'Sinatra doctrine"that most succinctly expressed Moscow's willingness to let the governments of Eastern Europe "do it their way." [6]

Even after numerous Soviet assurances to the contrary, Warsaw Pact members continued to expect specific unwritten limits to their reforms. In September 1989, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn wanted to know Moscow's position before proceeding on a solution to the East German citizens holed up in West Germany's embassy in Budapest. Likewise, Günter Schabowski acknowledged that open SED opposition to Honecker grew only as Gorbachev made known his frustration with the dogmatic East German leader.[7]

Western analysts often contend that Gorbachev remained doggedly convinced of the eventual triumph of socialism, citing as evidence Moscow's continued support of reform communist elements. This was espe-

cially evident in the case of East Germany, where no major political force even considered unification an option until the crowds in Leipzig and elsewhere began to force the issue onto the international agenda.

Based on his own statements and those of his closest foreign policy advisers, however, Gorbachev appeared to concede the possibility that one or more countries of Eastern Europe, left to their own devices, might eventually abandon socialism. Yet having internalized such a "heretical" viewpoint, he was wise for political reasons not to acknowledge publicly this as an acceptable outcome. This would explain the relative ease with which the Gorbachev leadership accepted the revolutions in Eastern Europe. It is certainly more convincing than the argument that the Soviet leader, trapped by the swift and completely unexpected turn of events, suddenly jettisoned over 40 years of ideological baggage because the only alternative was the use of force.

In addition, Moscow's continued support of reform communists in Eastern Europe really proved nothing about Gorbachev's view of their ultimate prospects. Certainly some indicators suggested that modified socialism retained a significant amount of political support. If, however, the Gorbachev leadership had admitted to itself the likelihood of socialism's eclipse in Eastern Europe, it still possessed no attractive alternative to continued support. Championing non-communist elements was politically unacceptable and promised no benefits in return. A complete political withdrawal from the region would have meant the renunciation of legitimate economic and security interests and increased the potential for major regional instability. Gorbachev may also have decided that it was easier to have his hand forced by events than to risk the political dangers of openly expressing his opinions beforehand.

In this light, Soviet acceptance of reform processes in Poland and Hungary was profoundly important. Warsaw and Budapest proceeded cautiously, aware that at any point Moscow might object. The USSR did not dictate change in Eastern Europe, but the Poles and Hungarians carefully tracked Soviet reactions. If Moscow had been determined to interrupt or challenge the further progress or direction of reforms, it certainly possessed the means and credibility in the region to do so.

Many later accounts contended that Moscow's unwillingness to use military force accounted for the absence of Soviet intervention in the accelerating disintegration of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In discussing the collapse of East Germany, John Keep argued that "having ruled out the use of force, Moscow had no real alternative but to cut its losses and try to win whatever compensation it could from the goodwill unleashed in the West."[8] This assumption ignored the many other levers the Soviet leadership had at its disposal. First, any number of subtle changes in the disposition of Soviet forces in Europe would have sent an unmistakable message to both communist leaders and political reformers. The Polish

declaration of martial law in December 1981 illustrated that Moscow need not actually employ force in order to exploit its military presence in Eastern Europe. Before Jaruzelski implemented the internal crackdown, Moscow demonstrated its impatience and its resolve. The Soviet leadership orchestrated a series of military manuevers in and around Poland including both Warsaw Pact operations and the mobilization of Soviet forces.[9] These moves played a major role in Jaruzelski's eventual decision to suppress the Solidarity movement.

The Kremlin never employed such an approach in 1989. In fact, even Soviet silence on the possible use of military force might have slowed the pace of change in the Soviet bloc. Instead, Gorbachev stressed in numerous forums that he would not even consider such an option. Of course, any threatening Soviet gestures would have damaged Moscow's relations with the West. But even this consideration indicated a fundamental redefinition of Soviet interests, since in the past, the maintenance of the Soviet bloc was defined as central to the USSR's security.

Beyond military force, Moscow enjoyed several practical means of influencing events in Eastern Europe, the main one being the region's massive dependence on Soviet energy exports. Throughout the 1980s, the USSR supplied the East European economies with over 80 percent of their energy requirements. This vulnerability was compounded by the inefficient energy usage endemic to Eastern Europe's command economies and the vastly higher cost of purchasing oil on the world market. Even a minor interruption in the flow of oil or natural gas from the USSR would have generated major economic disruptions. Again, Gorbachev foreswore any such manipulation. He did so in spite of a previously expressed desire to redress the terms of trade in the energy field. While Soviet energy exports began a steady decline in this period, the drop was attributable to infrastructural problems, poor planning, and a series of pipeline disasters. In no documented instance did the Soviet leadership even attempt to influence the changes in 1989 by exploiting its trade ties within the Soviet bloc.

Finally, the Kremlin has historically relied on political intervention to control undesirable developments. In 1989, the Soviet Union not only refused to dissuade reform advocates, it actually encouraged them. Moscow surely favored the eventual success of reform communism. Yet the possibility of revolutionary transformations was undeniable. In the first half of 1989, the Polish government entered into roundtable talks with Solidarity, while Budapest allowed the formation of independent political parties, announced multiparty elections, and opened its border with Austria.

Solidarity's stunning electoral performance in June and the subsequent formation of a non-communist Polish government demonstrated that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe might not survive.[10] Again, Gorbachev's statements did not indicate any change in his commitment to unlimited sovereignty. In fact, many of Moscow's most categorical signs

that it accepted the autonomy of each East European state came after this momentous event, in the summer and fall of 1989.

Gorbachev, far from denouncing the remarkable changes in Hungary and Poland, actually assured the region's communist leaders that Moscow accepted the unfolding changes in Eastern Europe. Hungary's reformist leadership, for instance, opened its border with Austria in May only after Gorbachev reiterated that Budapest was within its sovereign rights and that Moscow would not support any bloc efforts to punish Hungary or prevent the action. In August, Gorbachev informed Polish party leader Mieczyslaw Rakowski that Moscow accepted the will of the non-communist majority in the newly elected Polish parliament. The result was the first non-communist government since World War II, led by Solidarity's Tadeusz Mazowiecki.[11]

The Soviet leader also pushed hard-line governments in East Berlin and Prague to accept the will of the people and to abandon violence as a means of dealing with dissent. During his stay in East Berlin for the 40th anniversary of the East German state, Gorbachev publicly stressed that 'in each country the people will determine what they need and what to do."On 16 November, CSSR ideology chief Jan Fojtik was informed that Moscow planned to repudiate the 1968 Soviet invasion. This encounter and a series of earlier signals left no doubt that Moscow would not tolerate the use of force in suppressing Czechoslovakia's mounting popular unrest.[12]

Unquestionably the Soviet Union possessed a number of potent instruments with which to influence events. It is unlikely that Moscow could have completely halted the disintegration of the discredited regimes of Eastern Europe, but it is inaccurate to contend that the Kremlin would allow the collapse of the Soviet bloc if it still equated its existence with the security and integrity of the Soviet state. The underlying conceptual supports for the bloc had eroded by 1989.[13] The dizzying pace of change forced reformist Soviet officials to confront the practical implications of their conceptual changes. Moscow's role in the 1989 East European revolutions can be understood only by examining, in tandem, the internal transformations of Gorbachev and his foreign policy advisers, the rapid pace of change and general uncertainty of both participants and observers concerning the eventual outcome, and the political constraints on deviating from Moscow's traditional policy within the Soviet bloc.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE GDR

Throughout the summer of 1989, as events in Hungary and Poland accelerated, observers in both the East and West seemed to await a signal from Gorbachev concerning the limits of reform. The Soviet leader simply repeated his commitment to noninterference and complete sovereignty. But would these principles extend to East Germany as well? After all, the German Democratic Republic was the cornerstone of the postwar European

order. It was arguably Moscow's most important ally, possessed the strongest economy in the Soviet bloc, and ensured the continued division of Germany. As circumstances reached crisis proportions, Gorbachev did indeed consistently apply his new operating principles to the GDR.

Yet the thinking behind this strategy was not clear. Did the Soviet leader labor under the grand illusion of communism's inevitable triumph in Eastern Europe?[14] Or alternatively, had Gorbachev already accepted the SED's imminent and total failure? In all likelihood, Gorbachev's reasoning lay somewhere between these two extremes. Until late November–early December, he probably still harbored hopes that a reformist SED could maintain stability in East Germany at least in the short term. Moscow could then calmly and deliberately manage the unavoidable unification of the two German states.[15] Gorbachev's actions must also be seen against the backdrop of mounting social, economic, and political crises at home. He was effectively surrounded by blazes burning out of control. Soviet behavior with regard to East Germany was, therefore, highly reactive. Yet Gorbachev was certainly not alone in this inability to envision the dizzying pace of change.

The nonviolent disintegration of the East German communist regime was a political event unique in German history.[16] To a considerable extent, the peaceful revolution was driven by internal German dynamics. The Soviet response to this process, however, illustrated a fundamentally new conception of the importance of Eastern Europe and the meaning of security in the nuclear age. Moscow continued to support the communist regime in East Germany into the fall and winter of 1989, but such behavior demonstrated only a policy preference. Nikolai Shishlin, a Central Committee official, demonstrated how Kremlin officials reconciled popular sovereignty with its preference for continued communist rule when he remarked that "one of the bases of our new way of thinking is freedom of choice. And if we want to be honest with ourselves, it means that free elections can lead to different results from one country to another. This does not prevent us from not concealing our sympathy for the Communist Parties."[17]

Throughout the critical autumn of 1989, the Soviet Union was receiving accurate appraisals of the deterioration of the East German communist regime. Markus Wolf, the former GDR spy chief and a vocal proponent of reform in East Germany, apparently had constant high-level access to powerful Soviet officials. In November 1989, Wolfe admitted that the possibility of avoiding the oncoming collapse had passed six months before. Wolfe stated that "I was telling the Russians we could still turn things around here in respect to *glasnost* and *perestroika*. . . . But we were not able to act in time."[18] In addition, diplomats in Moscow's East Berlin embassy were sending home reliable and, therefore, pessimistic evaluations of the regime's prospects.[19] Gorbachev and his advisers did not lack accurate assessments of events.

The failure to change its policy stemmed, in part, from the Gorbachev leadership's lack of viable alternatives. Portugalov later warned an interviewer that "you should not think that we did not have an approximate idea of the direction or of the destination of this trip. We had a very good idea of it." When asked about precautions that might have slowed the process, Portugalov responded, "What precautions would you have been able to take? . . . We really do not want to interfere. We have not only postulated, but also practiced this, for example in Poland and Hungary. If there had been something totally counterproductive that could have made matters even worse, this would have been interference by us, regardless of its form."[20]

While the revolutions in Eastern Europe represented a failure of Gorbachev's policy of supporting reform communism, it was not the strategic defeat that some analysts claim. This leader had already made the conceptual transformations necessary to accept the following conclusion: the events of 1989 did not fundamentally threaten Soviet security in Europe, and in the long run actually served Soviet interests as defined by Gorbachev. Shevardnadze even denied that the revolutions in Eastern Europe constituted a failure since Soviet diplomacy had not attempted to prevent change in that region.[21] Soviet-GDR relations in 1989 illustrated the points outlined above.

Although both sides kept up the pretense that relations were unimpaired by different views of reform, ties between the orthodox SED and the reforming CPSU deteriorated. Following Honecker's ouster, numerous accounts finally admitted to Soviet–GDR disputes throughout the Gorbachev period. At a Foreign Ministry briefing, Gerasimov conceded that "the attitude of the previous [East German] leadership to our *perestroika* was temporizing and negative, with a dose of arrogance."[22]

After Gorbachev embarked on a path of significant economic and political reform, Honecker had attempted to insulate the GDR from what he viewed as corrupt Soviet influences. In 1988, East German officials even resorted to banning certain Soviet publications, including the magazine *Sputnik*. Coming at the same time as Chancellor Kohl's warm reception in Moscow, the contrast was striking. Even Gorbachev's own speeches were sometimes censored, unless Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Vyacheslav Kochemasov personally appealed to Honecker. In mid-1989, the GDR Foreign Ministry also initiated a "total reshuffling" of its Moscow embassy staff, apparently to remove East German diplomats tainted by exposure to *glasnost* and *perestroika*.[23] In addition, prominent Soviet visitors to the GDR such as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Medvedev found it difficult to conduct genuine political discussions with their SED hosts. Gorbachev agreed to attend the 40th anniversary festivities in October 1989 at least partly because of the scheduled meeting with the entire SED politburo.[24] The

Soviet leader had previously not had the opportunity to address directly the broader East German leadership.

In response to Honecker's obduracy, Moscow demonstrated its distaste for the East German regime. Shevardnadze's April 1989 visit to the GDR was postponed until June, just days before Gorbachev's triumphant visit to Bonn. Then the visit merely "satisfied protocol." At the same time, a report announced that the SPD's Vogel and Valentin Falin would chair a committee to examine the closer integration of West Berlin into Soviet–West German relations.[25] In May, Falin did not deny the assertion that the SED was lagging behind the reform process sweeping the Soviet bloc. Instead, he simply noted that Moscow would not impose *perestroika*-like reforms on its allies. Portugalov noted sarcastically that "our friends in the GDR have also long been used to openness, thanks to the FRG television that is present in each living room."[26]

Reports raising the possibility of major unrest in East Germany began to appear before the country's internal crisis became apparent to the rest of the world. Hans-Dietrich Genscher personally warned Shevardnadze in September 1988 that the SED's continued immobility might well lead to large demonstrations by the following year. In April 1989, Dashichev submitted a controversial report to the Soviet leadership which, among other things, predicted serious problems for the GDR if it did not initiate reforms.[27] These remarks were especially important since, according to Dashichev, they actually came to the attention of the Soviet leadership. In June, an unsubstantiated report in *Die Welt* claimed that Moscow had already decided not to interfere in East Germany's impending crisis. *Neues Deutschland* inadvertantly added to the visibility of the rumor by openly denying it and reminding the Soviet Union of its alliance "duties." [28] West German diplomats later admitted that they met with senior Soviet officials in the spring of 1989 to discuss how major unrest in the GDR might be avoided.[29] Well in advance of the explosive summer and fall of 1989, Gorbachev and his advisers were receiving information that foreshadowed major unrest.

East Germany's Refugee Crisis

Following Hungary's decision to open its borders with Austria, East Germans began to use this avenue to escape to the West. A trickle became a flood as thousands of Germans fled through Czechoslovakia into Hungary. *Pravda* and TASS accounts conscientiously supported Honecker and the SED,[30] but other positions were expressed. Several prominent Gorbachev supporters admitted that the East German regime was to blame for the exodus.

According to a West German account, Valentin Falin had already told Soviet political leaders in mid-August that the SED leadership itself was to

blame for the growing exodus, and that it was unable to respond effectively as its citizens continued to leave. He reportedly pointed to a state of "alienation" between Soviet and East German leadership, and predicted serious unrest by the following spring if changes were not made. On another occasion, the controversial head of the International Department warned that "the dynamic development of society always needs renewal; difficulties always develop when the speed of renewal lags behind development."[31] In September, CC official Shishlin rejected TASS's contention that West German propaganda was solely responsible, citing instead "the population's dissatisfaction with the economic situation, the discontent with what is happening in the political situation in the GDR—all this played a part."[32]

Gorbachev's silence on the matter suggested that he could find nothing good to say about an orthodox regime that refused to consider reform even as its youth fled en masse for the promise of the West. Various foreign policy actors, including Shevardnadze, contended that the refugee situation was a "German-German" problem. [33] The implication was that Moscow would not come to the aid of its East German ally as it had in the past. Even in the face of the escalating refugee crisis, the Soviet leadership did not abandon its pressure on Honecker. In September 1989, Ligachev traveled to East Germany. This trip was seen as a signal from Gorbachev that Moscow's commitment to reform was irreversible. The general secretary's main conservative rival clearly stated that there was "no alternative" to reform. [34]

Under heavy pressure from the FRG, the Hungarian government announced on 11 September that it would allow those East Germans stranded on Hungarian territory to exit into Austria. The SED leadership was incensed by the decision that violated a 20–year-old treaty between the two states. Budapest apparently informed the Soviet Union only the day before the announcement. Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn was certain, however, that the East Germans had already apprised Moscow of Budapest's intentions, yet the Soviets made no effort to dissuade the Hungarians from a move that humiliated Honecker and his hard-line regime. Moscow also ignored East German Foreign Minister Fischer's suggestion that Hungary be disciplined.[35]

East Germans continued to exploit the open door to the West. By the end of September, approximately 30,000 East Germans had passed through Hungary to the West. When this escape route was closed, East Germans refugees began to converge on the FRG embassies in Prague and Warsaw. Some 5,000 Germans, including hundreds of children, crammed themselves into the West German embassy compound in Prague. Health conditions rapidly deteriorated, almost forcing the West Germans to close the embassy. Genscher met with Shevardnadze on 28 September, and the Soviet official promised to push East Berlin, Prague, and Moscow for a prompt end to the crisis. Irrespective of any Soviet pressure, Honecker proved anxious to

remedy the embarrassing situation before the approaching festivities surrounding the GDR's 40th anniversary.[36]

The next day, Fischer informed Genscher that East Berlin was ready to resolve the problem. That same day East Berlin allowed the stranded people to complete their journey to the FRG. What resulted was the dramatic scene of special trains carrying the refugees through East Germany and into the West. The circuitous route allowed East Berlin to label the action an expulsion. Almost immediately, the FRG's Prague embassy began to fill up again with East German refugees. The SED responded by requiring East Germans to obtain a visa before entering the CSSR.[37] These and other actions further stoked the fires of East German discontent.

As the pace of revolutionary change picked up in Hungary and Poland, East Germany was pulled in different directions. Honecker refused to consider even the most moderate of reforms. Yakovlev later recalled attempting to convince Honecker of the need for *perestroika*, and the East German leader "stubbornly repeating to me that we were making a mistake."[38] Rather than making concessions to release accumulated tensions, the aged SED leader appeared willing to suppress any public- or elite-generated pressure for political change.

A large number of East Germans, profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo, began to push for socialist reforms. Groups such as New Forum, Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, and the Social Democratic Party addressed such issues while operating on the fringe of legality. In a deadly test of wills, the first large East German public demonstrations took place in late September. Honecker, after a gall bladder operation in August, had disappeared from public and was apparently too ill to respond. The remainder of the SED leadership proved unwilling to act in Honecker's absense. As Gerd König later admitted, "We were all part of a closed system from which it was not so easy to escape."[39]

Yet behind the scenes, Honecker's empty chair and the expanding refugee crisis allowed his SED colleagues to take the first tentative steps toward acknowledging the true situation. According to Schabowski, this process began at a politburo meeting in early September. There was no agreement in advance to discuss the refugee issue, nor did anyone even suggest that Honecker be removed. Instead, "this began to formulate itself naturally as Gorbachev began to play an increasing role."[40] This role apparently amounted to convincing the SED leadership that Moscow would not support a crackdown against the public demonstrations in the GDR and would actually welcome Honecker's removal.

The GDR's 40th Anniversary and the Fall of Honecker

In advance of Gorbachev's visit to East Berlin, *Pravda* published an article by Honecker which proved once again his stubborn rejection of Soviet-style

reform. In the course of his orthodox portrayal of East German economic achievements, he declared that "advising us to seek the benefits of socialism in a regression toward capitalism, with all its flaws, looks to us rather like saying that rain falls upward."[41] Honecker demonstrated once again his woeful inability to assess accurately the unfolding events in the GDR.

While in Berlin for the festivities, Gorbachev did not eschew the opportunity to remind the SED leadership of the need for change. Although no mention was made of the humiliating refugee problem, Gorbachev warned that pressure for reform could not be ignored indefinitely. The Soviet leader also refrained from criticizing the embattled Honecker directly. In his remarks to the SED politburo, he warned prophetically that "one cannot overlook signals of reality. Life punishes those who arrive too late. We have learned this from our development."His public remarks were more circumscribed, but he did stress the need to incorporate the will of the people in addressing pressing realities.[42] Gorbachev, while hoping for change for the better in the GDR, surely did not want to increase the possibility of instability. His June 1989 visit to China and the subsequent massacre in Tiananmen Square must have influenced his remarks.[43]

Gorbachev's admonition that "life punishes those who arrive too late" received a good deal of attention at the time and also in subsequent firsthand accounts. Several of the East German participants in the meeting with Gorbachev denied that the remark was a warning to the SED. It was, in their eyes, a literal assessment of the problems facing Gorbachev at home.[44] Other accounts by Soviets and East Germans believed the comment was directed at the Honecker leadership and its dogmatic refusal to reform.[45]

This question appears at first glance to be insignificant, yet it is important for what it says about the Soviet Union's policy toward East Berlin, and about the credibility of ex post facto accounts of this relationship. The double-meaning interpretation is certainly consistent with the esoteric nature of communications in the Soviet bloc. A purported East German transcript of the meeting also supports this explanation. Finally, Valentin Falin portrayed Gorbachev's speech as blunt and unmistakably aimed at the East German leader, while Honecker's response reportedly contained scarcely veiled insults and continued dogmatism with regard to reform.[46]

The more innocuous reading, that Gorbachev did not intend the remark as an attack on Honecker, probably reflected the desire of various SED officials to counter claims that Moscow played the central role in the eventual removal of Honecker. Schabowski and others were anxious to prove that they were responsible for the radical changes, not Gorbachev.[47] This desire to counter exaggerated claims of direct Soviet participation apparently colored their accounts of the Gorbachev visit, yet even Schabowski admitted that the meeting between Gorbachev and the SED politburo was the pivotal moment in the decision to oust Honecker. The

East German leader's fanciful portrayal of an East German Eden led Schabowski and Krenz to conclude that "Honecker must go." [48]

In any event, Gorbachev left convinced that Honecker would continue to reject reform of any kind, yet his remarks put him on the record protesting against Honecker's immobility. The Soviet visitors apparently also had a number of opportunities to express their frustration to SED officials while Honecker was not present.[49] The Soviet leader did not instruct Krenz and others to oust Honecker, but he did demonstate that the Kremlin desired such a change. Moscow's contribution was profound, though the contents were limited to veiled messages.

Gorbachev's attendance at the anniversary celebration came in the midst of the building confrontation between Honecker and the GDR population. Just days after Gorbachev's visit, the East German regime confronted a genuine crisis of legitimacy. Huge demonstrations began to gather daily in Leipzig. Honecker hinted that he was considering massive violence on the scale of China's infamous Tiananmen Square massacre. After a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin, Honecker drew an ominous comparison between the "counter-revolutionary uprising" in Beijing and the "malicious campaign against the GDR and other socialist states."[50] With his strength returning and his prized anniversary celebration complete, Honecker seemed determined to put an end to the weekly mass expressions of public defiance.

Finally on Monday, 9 October, the crisis reached a boiling point as local officials in Leipzig planned for a large-scale use of force to suppress the massive demonstrations. At the moment of truth, the peoples' representatives and local officials formulated an appeal for peace and constructive dialogue. The riot police and workers' militia on the scene refrained from violence. Perhaps most remarkable, the crowd of over 70,000 apparently exhibited such universal decency that it did not provoke the assembled police forces, and in many cases attempted to engage individual police officers in dialogue. Elizabeth Pond, in a superb account of this dramatic episode, generally downplayed the actual threat of violence and rejected in particular claims that Krenz or Moscow played the decisive role.[51] Yet the key question for this study is not whether the Soviet Union was responsible for preventing violence. The point at issue is whether Moscow actively discouraged the use of force.

The exact Soviet role in the episode remains unclear. Some accounts deny any involvement by Moscow, yet at least one credible Soviet report documented Moscow's open efforts to distance itself from any use of force. On 8 October, Kochemasov, the Soviet ambassador to East Germany, reportedly ordered the commander of Soviet forces in the GDR to confine all military personnel to their bases and prevent any interference in East Germany's internal affairs.[52] Such an action would have been completely consistent with the Gorbachev leadership's repeated assurances that Soviet forces in

East Germany would not under any circumstances become involved in domestic struggles. According to Dashichev, the Soviet defense council resolved in August 1989 that Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe not participate in internal conflicts.[53]

Since even the SED leadership in East Berlin did not have an accurate understanding of the situation on the ground, the Kremlin surely did not prevent violence in Leipzig. Soviet statements and actions nevertheless played a significant role in the crisis. The East German leadership might have been more willing to suppress the demonstrations if it had been sure of Moscow's support. Even Soviet silence might have encouraged diehard East German conservatives to confront and quiet the cries of "*Wir sind das Volk.*" Instead, Moscow's representatives actively discouraged such a course. The GDR's State Security Minister Mielke reportedly lamented, "We are cornered. The Soviet friends are not on our side."[54]

In the face of massive and disciplined public rallies that soon reached astounding proportions, the SED regime unraveled quickly. Honecker was forced to resign on 18 October. Moscow was apparently aware that some sort of leadership shake-up was in the works. East Berlin party chief Günter Schabowski later revealed that he and fellow politburo member Egon Krenz had informed Falin and Gerasimov two weeks earlier that "there will be a change." Then, just one day before the showdown in the SED politburo, one of the conspirators, Harry Tisch, personally informed Gorbachev in Moscow of the planned attempt to unseat Honecker. Gorbachev was reportedly pleased with the news and wished Krenz and the other participants success in the matter. Schabowski, however, denied any Soviet role in Honecker's ouster. An MID spokesman also disavowed any interference by Moscow, including even the expression of personal wishes.[55] After years of calling for reform in East Germany, Gorbachev hardly needed to convey his personal preferences concerning Honecker's removal, but true to his principles of noninterference, Gorbachev and the Soviet government did not participate in the leadership change.

The Berlin Wall: From Rampart to Rubble

Gorbachev certainly welcomed Honecker's forced retirement. It is much more difficult to determine what prospects he gave the new East German leadership. In October, the Soviet leadership probably still believed that the situation could be remedied. Gorbachev expressed the hope that the GDR could solve its problems, but he was also aware of the massive and growing public protests throughout the end of 1989. Whatever his reservations, the Soviet leader remained optimistic in his encounters with Honecker's successors.

Krenz, who replaced Honecker as SED general secretary, immediately attempted to regain control of events. One day after the decisive politburo

meeting, Krenz appeared on East German television acknowledging economic problems, welcoming dialogue with the people, and promising fewer restrictions on travel. Yet the crisis continued to grow, as if fanned by every sign of weakness in the SED leadership. Approximately 300,000 marched in Leipzig rallies in late October.

On 1 November, Krenz met with Gorbachev in Moscow. Most likely, both men still clung to the illusion that the SED regime could regain its balance. Krenz, for instance, believed that his Soviet host was sincere in wishing him and the GDR "the greatest possible success in the renewal of socialism." According to Modrow, who demonstrated a more realistic appraisal of the SED's prospects for success, Krenz did not share the true nature of his situation, while Gorbachev lacked sound information and seemed convinced that the SED would achieve stability. Yet, the Soviet leader did warn Krenz that "communists will be able to find a response to the challenge of the times only if they act decisively and with initiative, and do not lag behind the course of events."[56]

Upon his return to the GDR, Krenz proceeded to announce several high-level resignations and other efforts to restore the SED's legitimacy. Yet, on 4 November, an amazing 500,000 East Germans gathered in East Berlin to demonstrate their disapproval. On 8 November, the entire SED politburo resigned to allow Krenz the appearance of a completely fresh start. A number of those removed were quickly reappointed, attesting to the complete bankruptcy of Krenz's leadership. At the same time, Hans Modrow was named to the politburo and received the nomination for prime minister.

The beseiged SED leadership was now prepared to contemplate a single bold step that would place them in front of events, rather than hopelessly behind them. Since the beginning of 1989, the East German state had been decimated by the flight of over 200,000 citizens. The potential for violent demonstrations grew when CSSR General Secretary Milos Jakes threatened to close the Czechoslovak–East German border to prevent Germans from seeking refuge in West Germany's Prague embassy. The SED politburo hastily produced a draft of a new travel law that would, they hoped, garner some much needed public goodwill.

In a last ditch effort, Krenz hoped to appease the population by radically easing travel to West Berlin and the FRG. Without clearing the decision with the SED politburo or even the prime minister, Krenz abruptly ordered Schabowski to announce that East Germans were free to travel to the FRG and West Berlin after obtaining a visa and showing a valid identity card.[57] Thousands of East Berliners immediately responded by streaming toward the Berlin Wall. Border guards, overwhelmed by the numbers and uncertain about the details of Schabowski's announcement, soon gave up any pretense of checking documents. The Berlin Wall was open.

Schabowski later recalled, "We had no idea at all that the opening of the Wall would signal the beginning of the end of our republic."[58] In fact, the

immediate post-Honecker SED leadership suffered from such a profound shortage of popular support that the decision to open the Berlin Wall only further contributed to its demise. According to Krenz and Modrow, Moscow was not even officially informed of the move until the next day. Soviet Ambassador Kochemasov reportedly called Krenz early on 10 November, first to criticize Krenz's unilateral move, then later to relay Gorbachev's best wishes on the decision.[59]

Several Soviet officials have claimed that Moscow was given some advance notice. Falin later claimed that some time before the East German announcement, Kochemasov reported back to Moscow that the East German leadership wanted to discuss the possibility of easing travel to West Berlin. The foreign ministry responded that the matter was an internal affair of the GDR. Kochemasov asked for more explicit written instructions. Three or four days later, Moscow sent a telegram which read, "The regulation of borders is an internal affair of the GDR."[60]

Falin's account need not contradict those of Krenz and Modrow. Kochemasov would certainly have been aware of the SED's deliberations concerning a more liberal travel law. And Moscow might well have ignored the ambassador's evident concern, thinking that no fundamental change was in the works. Finally, Schabowski's sudden revolutionary announcement would have taken the Soviet leadership, and even Kochemasov, off guard, thus explaining his phone conversations with Krenz. If, as seems likely, Krenz made the decision without informing his own politburo or the Kremlin in advance, the maneuver suggested a leadership in utter disarray.

Whatever the extent of Soviet information, Moscow reacted with relative calm to the news of the opening of the Berlin Wall. In fact, ever more remarkable than Krenz's spontaneous decision was the failure by so many to appreciate immediately the revolutionary impact the move would have. Certainly neither Krenz nor Schabowski predicted the final outcome. Many in Moscow were similarly unable to grasp the importance of the moment. Gorbachev's first concern was understandably the need to prevent any violence. The heady atmosphere might lead to clashes between East German police and the East and West Germans gathered at the Berlin Wall. He also feared that exuberant crowds or extremist groups might instigate conflict with Soviet forces stationed in the area. On the night of 9 November, Gorbachev dispatched messages to Kohl and Brandt regarding these concerns.[61] In the days that followed, Soviet officials denied any role in the decision but welcomed it as a positive step.[62] All in all, Moscow seemed to accommodate itself rather easily to the sudden East German action.

Moscow and the Eclipse of the GDR

The final strands of SED authority unraveled in mid-November and the first part of December. Krenz and the rest of the SED Central Committee

resigned in early December. Gregor Gysi, an almost unknown lawyer, arose as the new head of the SED. As the party disintegrated, Prime Minister Modrow emerged to take the leading role in East German politics. In a feeble gesture to overcome its discredited past, the SED changed its name to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). On 7 December, roundtable talks between the establishment and the protest groups set 6 May 1990 as the date for free multiparty elections. In early 1990, Modrow and this roundtable of East German political forces agreed to move the date up to 18 March to bring a quicker end to the prevailing instability.

The breathtaking speed of change in East Germany in late 1989 caught the Soviet leadership by surprise. Moscow's actions in the process were largely reactive. These responses were, however, consistently moderate and constructive. Gorbachev apparently remained hopeful throughout October and November that the SED leadership could achieve some measure of stability. Unification, though inevitable in the long run, was not an immediate concern. Gorbachev was not alone in clinging to these comforting assumptions, beliefs that were quickly demonstrated to be unrealistic.

In his early November meeting with Krenz, Gorbachev apparently made reference to discussions with his foreign counterparts concerning German unification. According to Krenz's subsequent account, Gorbachev assured him that not a single world leader could foresee a unified Germany. In truth, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had informed Gorbachev in September that she and at least one other Western leader (French President François Mitterrand) favored slowing dramatically any movement toward German unity.[63] Gorbachev may have sought to buoy the embattled East German leader by his categorical rejection of unification, or Krenz may have put a more optimistic spin on Gorbachev's words. In any event, Gorbachev was receiving information that confirmed his own conviction that unification remained a long-term process.

West German politicians labored under some similar illusions relating to the health of the SED regime and the immediacy of unification questions. Helmut Kohl later admitted that, even in late November 1989, he expected the fulfillment of his ten-point plan to take three to four years. Only after he witnessed for himself an East German mass demonstration on 19 December did Kohl realize that unification was rushing forward at a rapid pace.[64] Throughout December, West Germany's main political parties debated the chancellor's Germany policy. Many politicians charged that Kohl's ten-point plan, which would quickly be surpassed by events, was reckless and overly ambitious.[65]

Some evidence suggests that Gorbachev and his advisers accepted rather quickly the implications of the East German changes. The day after the Berlin Wall was opened, Gerasimov demonstrated that Moscow was at least considering the possibility of a non-communist government in East Germany by noting that Solidarity-led Poland continued to fulfill its alliance

obligations. Shevardnadze later claimed that he and Gorbachev had concluded by the end of 1989 that unification was coming soon, but they still had to "manuever terrifically, above all in our official speeches." [66] In an apparent effort to avert a barrage of domestic criticism and to establish the strongest possible bargaining position, Gorbachev did not voice his growing pessimism on the fate of the GDR.

This Soviet posturing may not have made its appearance when Gorbachev met with Modrow on 1 December. Modrow left the encounter convinced that "Gorbachev still harbored illusions. I did not deter him in this regard because I, at least in part, still believed in this idea as well: democratization is a process that would strengthen socialism in the GDR. Indeed I had the fear—he had no idea—that [the process would lead] to a gradual disintegration of socialism in the GDR. Gorbachev thought, now the path is free for *perestroika* in the GDR."[67] The Soviet leader may not yet have foreseen the imminent demise of the GDR. If not, he appeared to reach that conclusion soon after the meeting. Or possibly, Gorbachev had already accepted that the GDR was doomed but chose to hide his reservations. As in the other East European revolutions, Moscow had little choice other than to support reform communism.

GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN LATE 1989–EARLY 1990

The latter half of 1989 was a momentous period not only for the states of Eastern Europe. During this same period, Gorbachev was engaged in an increasingly complex political struggle at home. In October, Kvitsinsky assumed increased responsibility over the Soviet Union's European policy. This change came just in advance of a major reorientation of the postwar European order. Three of the most powerful foreign policy posts in the Soviet establishment were held by those who favored elevating Western Europe's stature in Soviet foreign policy. In addition to Kvitsinsky in the MID, Yakovlev chaired the International Affairs Commission and Falin headed the International Department. The promotion of Kvitsinsky was part of a larger cadre reshuffling.

Just days later, a CC plenum presided over a major change in the party's top leadership. Former KGB head Viktor Chebrikov "resigned" from office, along with the dogmatic Ukrainian first secretary, Vladimir Shcherbitsky. In addition, Gorbachev promoted Yevgeny Primakov to candidate membership in the politburo. Primakov, a prominent foreign policy expert and former head of IMEMO, became another in an increasing list of academic specialists holding powerful political offices.

A major political struggle accompanied these changes in the top leadership. Ligachev, though further isolated by the plenum's results, used the occasion to distance himself forcefully from Gorbachev on a number of

issues. He stressed the relevance of class interests and an enduring faith in socialism while lashing out at any who would change the party's status in Soviet politics. The tone and content of this speech contrasted sharply with Gorbachev's remarks before and after the CC plenum. The two-day delay in the publication of Ligachev's speech further suggested its controversial nature.[68]

The political clash raised a serious question: why did Ligachev remain in office in the face of Gorbachev's evident ability to juggle the membership of the party politburo and secretariat? Two explanations were possible. First, Gorbachev might have questioned his ability to remove the prominent conservative figure.[69] While the Soviet leader's numerous and massive cadre renewals appeared to meet no open opposition, such maneuvers remained delicate and risky operations. Opposition to such tactics grew among frustrated party members. In January 1990, Central Committee member Vladimir Karpov publicly criticized Gorbachev's failure to heed the opinion of the Central Committee and the general secretary's large-scale dismissals of Central Committee members.[70] Defiance and public political dissention within the party elite could paralyze the system and threaten stability.

Second, Ligachev may have continued to serve a purpose in Gorbachev's view. Removing this proponent of more traditional reform methods might completely sever the highest Soviet leadership from the more conservative party apparatus as exemplified by the Central Committee. With Ligachev in a prominent party post, he attracted the fire of those demanding more radical reform, while encouraging opponents of Gorbachev's reforms to continue to operate within the system. The two explanations probably reinforced one another in convincing Gorbachev that the risk and the sacrifice were too great.

In the months that followed, Gorbachev's domestic political problems worsened. He expressed growing frustration with the Soviet mass media. In October, the reformist newpaper *Argumenty i fakty* published an article on the popularity of various Congress of People's Deputies members, including an uncomplimentary portrayal of the Soviet president. Gorbachev, increasingly critical of media "abuses," demanded the resignation of the publication's editor, Vladislav Starkov. In the end, Starkov kept his job, while only days later Gorbachev orchestrated the removal of the most powerful media official in all the USSR, conservative *Pravda* editor Viktor Afanasyev.[71] Gorbachev's media policies in the fall of 1989 illustrated the irony of a moderate reformer who had more control over conservative circles than over the forces for radical reform that he himself had unleashed.

The rising tide of conservative opposition to Gorbachev's programs was not limited to domestic policy. Shevardnadze's October foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet, for instance, referred repeatedly to critics of the MID and recent Soviet foreign policy, including complaints about

endless concessions that undermined the security of the Soviet state.[72] This clash over foreign policy included the Soviet approach to German unification. Shevardnadze's direct response to an unremarkable *Krasnaya zvezda* article suggested that a more heated struggle was going on in private. The author, V. Markushin, criticized unnamed politicians who claimed that "a united German Fatherland will not pose a danger to its neighbors," and that "it will fit in the most natural way into the architecture of Europe." Markushin contended that circumstances might change dramatically in the future to the detriment of Soviet security. "Not just politicians are well aware of this, but also ordinary mortals."[73] Shevardnadze responded that "no sensible person, whether a statesman or an 'ordinary mortal,' " could welcome the threat of instability that accompanied the "unequivocally positive" changes in Europe. What was required was "the utmost attentiveness, imagination, and action."[74]

Criticism of Gorbachev's German policy gained momentum at the February 1990 Central Committee plenum. Ligachev used the forum to warn the party about "the acceleration of reunification" and, effectively, the "absorption" of the GDR. He charged that "it would be unforgivably shortsighted and mistaken not to see that a Germany with vast economic and military potential has begun to loom on the world horizon." He called on "the world's democratic forces" to prevent another "Munich," an allusion to the numerous concessions granted to an aggressive Nazi Germany in the naïve hope that these would satisfy its hegemonic ambitions. Another speaker, V. I. Brovikov, also criticized Gorbachev's foreign policy. Brovikov's position as Soviet ambassador to Poland, and therefore Shevardnadze's subordinate, made his remarks all the more damaging.[75] Ligachev's remarks resembled Gromyko's previous habit described by Georgi Arbatov as "using the Federal Republic of Germany as a whipping boy to demonstrate his 'class' and 'anti-imperialist' convictions."[76]

Both Shevardnadze and Yakovlev appeared anxious to avoid the issue of German unification. When asked if he agreed with Ligachev's remarks, Yakovlev said only "the German question was not discussed" at the plenum. In fact, Shevardnadze was apparently confronted with angry conservatives standing up and demanding: "Why did you and Gorbachev lose Eastern Europe? Why did you surrender Germany?" Shevardnadze limited himself to noting that "negative factors are clearly visible in the positive dynamism."[77] The unwillingness of Gorbachev and his supporters to address the process of German unification indicated how vulnerable they were to conservative attacks over this emotive issue. In addition, Gorbachev had other sensitive subjects on which to concentrate. He apparently chose to marshal his political reserves for a different battle. As a result, he was able to convince the Central Committee to strike down Article 6 of the Soviet constitution which legitimized the leading role of the CPSU. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet agreed to the establishment of a strong

presidency tailor-made for Gorbachev. Immediately following these early February successes, in meetings with first US Secretary of State Baker and then Kohl and Genscher, Gorbachev proved more flexible on the German question.

CONCLUSION

Moscow's role in East Germany's revolution was largely reactive. Gorbachev, like his East German and Western counterparts, was startled by the GDR's precipitous decline, yet his responses were completely in line with his stated principles of noninterference, political over military solutions to problems, popular sovereignty, and mutual security. Gorbachev had numerous opportunities to make a public stand against further change in the GDR. Naturally, such obstruction would have entailed political and financial costs, yet these considerations had never forestalled Soviet interference in the past. Gorbachev, however, steadfastly refused to do so. New thinking apparently applied as much to East Germany as it did to Poland and Hungary.

Some accounts contend that Moscow was inadequately informed or incapable psychologically of foreseeing the GDR's demise. The available evidence tells a different story. The Soviet leadership seemed to have received accurate assessments from a number of sources. Gorbachev and his advisers also appeared to adapt rather quickly to the new situation. They were as startled as officials in other countries and, after coming to terms with East German developments, they responded in an equally pragmatic manner. It is difficult to overemphasize how different Gorbachev's reaction was in comparison with his predecessors'. Communist rule in the GDR and the maintenance of the Berlin Wall were traditionally seen as vital national interests of the Soviet Union. According to some accounts, in 1989 Moscow gave up these valued assets because its sole recourse was military intervention. Gorbachev's actions in the latter half of 1989 clearly refute such an interpretation.

Certainly, Gorbachev did not desire the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but instead sought their rejuvenation. But it would be incorrect to conclude that, by the summer of 1989, "lacking any means short of violence to limit the scope of these democratic tendencies, the Soviet leadership reconciled itself to them."[78] Instead, the Gorbachev leadership accepted the changes because, although they represented the failure of his policy of bloc reform, they no longer were viewed as a threat to any core Soviet security interest. If they had been interpreted as such, no concern over damaging East-West relations or hindering Soviet domestic reforms would have prevented Moscow from acting in its defense. Yakovlev had earlier denied that change was being forced on Moscow against its will. He declared, "No, it has not been forced upon us, even though it is done under

pressure from real, objective circumstances. . . . The fact that we are changing is the result of a conscious decision made as a result of an interpretation of these circumstances."[79]

Moscow's response to the revolutionary changes in Poland and Hungary illustrated the extent to which the Gorbachev leadership had transformed Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leader adhered to the precepts of new thinking. He continued to champion complete sovereignty even as the prospects of reform socialism grew dim. The collapse of the East German communist regime offered a further illustration of these points. Although the end came much more rapidly than most people could have dreamed, Gorbachev proved willing to witness the disappearance of one of Moscow's most important allies. He apparently even participated in the process in an attempt to prevent bloodshed and conflict. The Gorbachev leadership suffered severe domestic political criticism for this behavior, yet Gorbachev and Shevardnadze clung to their radically transformed vision of Soviet national interests. The tenacity of these new views became visible in the ensuing push toward German unification. The collapse of the SED government and the ensuing vacuum inevitably reopened this historically explosive question.

6

Moscow's Acceptance of German Unification

While the Gorbachev leadership was prepared conceptually for the changes in Eastern Europe and Germany, it was certainly caught off guard by the breakneck speed with which the question of German unification moved from a principled debate to the realm of practical politics. What began in the Soviet Union as a fairly cautious examination of options and obstacle soon became a fast-paced and fierce political struggle.

SOVIET CONCERNS OVER WEST GERMANY

For the population and leadership of the Soviet Union, the German question was not simply a political problem. While often overlooked, lingering Soviet concerns over the German propensity for aggression and expansion continued throughout this period to act as a break on significant change in the postwar settlement.[1] As Shevardnadze put it, "The Soviet people remember well the history and tragic lessons of World War II. Our public opinion is highly sensitive to things which affect its results. No one should forget that."[2] These bitter lessons also provided easy ammunition for officials opposed to Gorbachev's policy toward Bonn. The extent to which Soviet officials, including Gorbachev, experienced this same fear is difficult to measure. Certainly many in the West, including British Prime

Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterrand, remained cautious with regard to the rush toward unification.[3] Even West Germany's political parties had difficulty remaining in front of events.

In Moscow, Gorbachev had gradually overcome the past Soviet distrust of West German intentions, yet Soviet confidence in West Germany was shaken by certain of Bonn's statements and actions in the critical period of 1989. In June, threatened by the surprising electoral success of the far-right Republic Party in local elections, the CDU–CSU attempted to shore up political support by championing traditional conservative issues. This campaign included hints that German borders to the east might be changed in the future. This stance would cause Kohl numerous political complications as he consistently refused to guarantee unequivocably Poland's borders until January 1990. Renewed references to Germany's 1937 borders sparked concern in Moscow, although commentators generally acknowledged the political context of the remarks.[4]

Throughout the mounting refugee crisis in the late summer and into the fall, more conservative mass media outlets such as *Pravda* and TASS criticized the FRG with increasing vehemence. This conservative coverage of the emigration problem came to resemble the Soviet reporting of the pre-Gorbachev era. By contrast, some publications avoided laying any blame on West Germany. *Izvestia*'s coverage of the growing refugee problem generally limited itself to noting increasing tension between East and West Germany.[5] Central Committee adviser Nikolai Shishlin denied that West Germany had created the crisis, citing instead economic and political discontent in the GDR. Falin stated only that the West German mass media had "partially exaggerated" the magnitude of the refugee problem for the GDR. *Pravda* immediately responded that "this situation has not come about through the fault of the GDR; the responsiblity for it lies wholly with Bonn."[6]

Some of Bonn's behavior in late 1989 did spark official Soviet concerns. The wave of East German refugees had provoked vigorous debates within and among the Federal Republic's political parties concerning unification. Attempting to convince his party and the West German people that he had created opportunities for overcoming the division of Germany, Helmut Kohl pointed to the joint political statement signed in June. In a September speech to the CDU Congress in Bremen, Kohl declared that "in contrast to the Moscow Treaty, ways to peacefully overcome the status quo and the division of Europe are jointly designated in [the joint declaration]."[7] Kohl's interpretation on the significance of the joint statement was not entirely unfounded, yet the chancellor's political exploitation of this agreement embarrassed the Soviet leader. During his October visit to the GDR, Gorbachev chastized politicians who sought to exploit changes in the Soviet bloc. He added, "Things have even reached the stage of dubious interpretations of the Soviet–West German statement."[8] Kohl's remarks under-

mined the Soviet leader's efforts to convince the East German regime that liberalization was necessary and safe, and validated Soviet opponents of unification. But they also suggested that the German chancellor could not be trusted to act responsibly.

The vigorous Soviet reaction unleashed by the CDU's September party congress in Bremen involved more than Kohl's interpretation of the joint declaration. Other CDU members apparently made controversial remarks concerning Germany's eastern borders. Moscow reacted vigorously to these troubling statements. In a speech before the UN, Shevardnadze criticized revanchist forces seeking to revise Europe's postwar political order, and cautioned "those who willingly or unwillingly encourage these forces."[9] For Kvitsinsky, the congress sent an "alarm signal" of a different sort. He seemed to realize that the CDU was beginning to consider that fundamental changes in the GDR were imminent, and that Moscow should learn from the West Germans' conclusions. According to Kvitsinsky, the Soviet leadership was not yet ready to accept his interpretation of events.[10] The CDU congress provoked Soviet concern but did not alter Moscow's position on the German question.

Finally, Kohl's unexpected announcement of a ten–point unification plan on 28 November 1989 left Moscow uneasy. At a time when Gorbachev was facing vehement conservative criticism over the collapse of the East German communist regime, the unilateral West German proposal provided Soviet hard-liners with powerful ammunition. Throughout the long and difficult process of building trust between Gorbachev and Kohl, the Soviet leader had stressed the need for responsibility and carefully calculated steps with due consideration of the political interests of both sides. Unilateral actions constituted a personal betrayal and complicated any hope of progress. Thus for historic reasons, and as a response to West German actions, Gorbachev and his supporters faced an uphill battle in constructively addressing the issue of German unification.

GROWING EVIDENCE OF AN ALTERED SOVIET VISION

Simultaneously, growing evidence of an altered vision of the German question was emanating from Moscow. Already in April 1989, Dashichev warned the Soviet leadership that without reform in East Germany, the growing contrast between conditions in the FRG and GDR could give rise to demands for a reexamination of Germany's division. In addition, the Soviet academic observed that the complex USSR–GDR–FRG relationship no longer served Soviet national interests. In June, Portugalov also publicly addressed the potential for transforming German-German relations.[11] Such analyses by Moscow's leading German specialists were followed by more concrete signs of change.

Moscow gradually began to consider fundamental change in the postwar structure, including issues regarding a divided Germany. In August, the Soviet Union proposed four-power negotiations with representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France to address "issues related to improvements in the situation in West Berlin, as far as they directly affect the city and do not touch on the GDR's sphere of sovereignty." Soviet sources denied that Moscow had proposed the meeting but expressed readiness to participate.[12] This may have been a Soviet ploy to warn the Honecker regime that, if it continued to reject reform, Moscow could undermine the very legitimacy of the East German state. The fact that the announcement came from the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin would be consistent with this argument.

Yet this incident fit into a greater recognition of quadripartite authority. A month later, a member of the Institute of Europe labeled the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin a demonstration that the founding documents of the postwar European order could be updated to fit prevailing conditions. The scholar implied that, just as the four powers had incorporated changing "political realities" in 1971, they could do the same in the future. These references to four-power authority at least suggested a desire for gradual and controlled change in postwar arrangements.[13] Moreover, in early December, Moscow proposed a meeting of ambassadors from the four powers to discuss the West Berlin question. The participants also addressed Chancellor Kohl's ten-point plan.[14] As the pace of change increased, so did Gorbachev's interest in quadripartite cooperation. Not only Gorbachev, but also Thatcher and Mitterrand, apparently hoped the four-power mechanism would slow the rush toward German unity. Such hopes proved illusory.

By November and December, Soviet commentary on the German problem began to exhibit characteristics of a rudimentary internal debate. Initially, many treatments rejected unification, claiming that the East German public overwhelmingly supported the rejuvenation of communism in the GDR.[15] Interestingly, East German officials abandoned this line of argument much earlier than did the Soviets. Instead they emphasized the two German states' vital role in maintaining European stability.[16] More reformist publications acknowledged the continued dissatisfaction of the East German population, despite the best efforts of Honecker's successors. *Moskovskiye novosti* even cited Jens Reich, a cofounder of the GDR's New Forum and a vocal proponent of rejuvenated socialism, to the effect that "today the question can be posed only as: our state—to be or not to be." [17]

Most Soviet accounts eventually abandoned the argument that the majority of the East German people did not desire unification. As early as November 1989, Zhurkin contended that "the main thing now is how rapidly, skillfully, and effectively the GDR brings reform policy into line with the processes developing spontaneously within the republic," adding "it is still very difficult at present to realistically assess how far the explosive

processes have developed in GDR society."[18] Commentators stressed instead that two German states were integral to European stability. Particularly in the wake of Kohl's surprise announcement of his ten-point plan for eventual unification, Kremlin officials called for a long-term approach to the problem.[19] The Soviet response repeatedly referred to the need to incorporate the German question into the broader process of overcoming Europe's division. This was in part a delaying tactic and a means of preventing Moscow from appearing to be the sole opponent to German unification.[20] Yet increasingly, Moscow focused on a broader European framework as its preferred forum for addressing the undeniable pressure to unify the two German states.

A further example of Moscow's changing evaluation of the German problem was the issue of military alliances. Since coming to power, Gorbachev had supported the traditional Soviet position of calling for the quickest possible dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, by December 1989, the Kremlin had backed off from this demand. According to Falin, the Soviets accepted that NATO and the Warsaw Pact had contributed to stability in Europe, and that "presently and in the nearest future there are no and will be no conditions for the disappearance of these institutions."[21] Facing volatile and rapid change, Moscow saw the two alliances as a stabilizing force in Europe.

THREE DISTINCT APPROACHES

As unification emerged on the international scene, a debate arose in Moscow involving genuine disagreements and distinct policy stances relating to the German question. The Soviet dialogue changed from outright opposition to statements stressing the problems still surrounding unification.

Officially, Moscow continued its outright rejection of German unification as a subject of international diplomacy. According to Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth, Gorbachev declared that unification was "not on the agenda"of international relations. [22] It is unclear to what extent this position reflected the Soviet leader's true convictions, the Kremlin's chosen bargaining strategy, or a concession to domestic opponents. In any event, the stance became more and more difficult to maintain. Following the announcement of Kohl's ten-point plan, Bovin noted some 87 percent of the West German population were in favor of unification, raising the question of how anyone could contend that the issue was "not on today's agenda." [23] In the wake of the Malta summit of 2–3 December, Falin was forced to contend that unification was "on the agenda" in discussions between Gorbachev and Bush, but was "not on the agenda of practical politics." [24]

Three distinct positions began to emerge out the Soviet dialogue on unification. The first was a conservative defense of the status quo. Accord-

ing to many accounts, the question of overcoming Germany's division was a dangerous issue which "brings confusion, creates fears, and spreads distrust and suspicion. And that can have its negative impact on European stability."[25] Some form of improved cooperation between the two German states should emerge out of the GDR's new reformist government, but the sovereignty of the German people did not outweigh postwar political realities, including the existence of two German states.[26] Few Soviet officials publicly admitted to this view of the issue, but most conservatives surely subscribed to it.

A second view, attributed particularly to Nikolai Portugalov, envisioned a confederated structure that would link the two German states in policy areas such as the economy and environmental protection. This would preserve the existence of two German states, while accommodating the natural inclination of all Germans to institutionalize their common nationality.[27] This process must give precedence to the completion of the common European home, including the greater integration of all European economies, and the dissolution of military alliances. Portugalov also noted that in addition to the threat of instability in Europe, "socialism is not negotiable for most GDR citizens."[28]

Third, some analysts came to accept the possibility of unification under specific circumstances. While it remained politically unwise to adhere openly to such a position, commentators merely stressed the need for gradual progress and responsibility.[29] As Zagladin observed, "I do not know to what extent this initiative [Kohl's ten-point plan] can be described as *realpolitik*, but in any case, it is necessary to display moderation at present."Kvitsinsky added that "no treaty exists which excludes the possibility of reunification and none which prescribes it."[30] The main obstacle presented to unification was the membership of the two German states in opposing military alliances. This stance became more prominent as the East German population came to view unification more favorably.[31]

Other Soviet officials stressed the sovereignty of the German people. Just days before Gorbachev's rejection of unity as an option, his foreign policy tsar, Aleksandr Yakovlev, claimed unification was entirely up to the Germans; the Soviet Union would not interfere. In addition, Deputy Defense Minister Valentin Varennikov declared that unification "is a matter for the German people, and how they decide their fate, the fate of the Germans, and the future of their states as they develop—that is their business. I personally consider that no other state is entitled to interfere in the solution of this problem."[32] These individual views presaged the eventual decision to separate the internal and external aspects of German unity.

Shevardnadze emphasized that the process of German-German reconciliation was a "process [that] cannot be separated in some way from the general course of dealings between the East and West of Europe. The more dynamic the process of rapprochement among European states in general

and the formation of the structures of cooperation and good-neighborliness between them, the better the preconditions will develop for similar changes in FRG–GDR relations."[33] By late January 1990, Gorbachev had adopted this general position. He exhibited a distinctly more flexible attitude in his meetings with Modrow in January and Kohl in February.[34]

In examining the Soviet debate on unification, the conservative option of defending the status quo has sometimes been overlooked.[35] Although the pace of events soon outran this alternative, the stance was politically important. Conservatives advocating such a view successfully played on popular fears of a reunified and revisionist Germany in the center of Europe. Gorbachev sought to avoid the impression that Moscow was acceding to such an outcome. He therefore delayed his acquiescence to Western proposals, and offered numerous counteroffers before he finally confronted the domestic political costs of accepting unification.

THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION

The accelerating dissolution of the East German state, the overwhelming victory of parties favoring unification in the March 1990 GDR elections, and Gorbachev's growing domestic problems inspired world leaders to act quickly to keep up with events. Personal relations between the relevant diplomats and statements contributed mightily to the swift but controlled unification that resulted.[36] The process included eight meetings between Genscher and Shevardnadze, eleven by Shevardnadze and Baker, four Bush-Kohl meetings, as well as ten Two-Plus-Four gatherings at the expert and ministerial levels. West Germany benefited greatly from Washington's adept diplomacy in forging agreement among the NATO participants in unification talks.[37] But the ultimate Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany in NATO was made possible by Gorbachev's willingness to incur the wrath of Soviet conservative opposition. Most of the Western security guarantees that finally accompanied German membership in NATO had been in circulation since early 1990. Gorbachev was willing to make this sacrifice because of his trust in Western leaders, his fundamentally altered vision of international relations, and the multitude of domestic problems demanding immediate attention.

German Initiatives

Recognizing that Moscow had moved a considerable distance toward accepting some form of unified German state, Chancellor Kohl decided to seize the initiative. In late November 1989, he and a small circle of advisers began work on a plan for German unification. According to his chief foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, the German chancellor demanded absolute secrecy during the development of the proposal in part to prevent Foreign

Minister Genscher from preempting his announcement.[38] The ten-point plan envisioned a step-by-step process moving from cooperation and free travel, to a change in the East German economic and political order, to the establishment of a contractual community, confederative structures, confederation, and finally the creation of a united German federation. A January 1990 poll of West Germans illustrated how politically significant the issue of unification had become for the Kohl administration. In October 1989, only 28 percent of respondents considered the end of Germany's division possible before 2000. Immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall, this number had climbed to 48 percent, and by January 1990, it reached 68 percent.[39]

Yet, by jumping out in front of the process, the German chancellor opened himself to considerable criticism from a number of the FRG's NATO allies, in particular France. Moscow also expressed its displeasure at the unilateral action. In a press conference following Kohl's announcement, Teltschik had referred to the remarks of Gorbachev adviser Andrei Grachev that "the German question is on the agenda, even if the ranks of politicians in the East and West do not wish to see it so." Grachev promptly reminded Bonn that "for the Soviet Union, for Russia, for the Russians, the German question remains a dramatic one." Portugalov was more colloquial in his criticism of Bonn's recklessness. He remarked of the West Germans, "Sometimes you remind me of lotto players who have got six numbers right and have nothing better to do than to lose their prize in Baden-Baden or Monte Carlo."[40]

Despite Kohl's unilateral actions, he did not completely alienate Gorbachev. Two days after the ten-point plan was unveiled, the Soviet leader warned against "clumsy behavior and provocative declarations" that might damage looming "epochal changes." Yet by February 1990, while noting that a certain anxiety concerning German unification was understandable "historically and psychologically," he added that "one cannot deny that the German people have drawn lessons from the experience of Hitlerite domination and the Second World War. In both German states new generations have grown up to see Germany's role in the world in a different way." He counseled the Germans "to respect not only the interests, but also the feelings of other peoples."[41] Learning from the lesson of 28 November, Kohl worked harder to assure Germany's neighbors, and especially the Soviet Union, that Bonn was to be trusted. This campaign included an effort to place the ten-point plan more visibly into a broader European framework.[42]

In late January, the West German chancellor soothed one major Soviet concern by renouncing any intention of linking border issues with the unification process.[43] A high-ranking Soviet official later claimed that West German's respectful treatment of monuments to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II deprived conservatives in Moscow of another powerful objection to German unification.[44] Nonetheless, Gorbachev's opponents

played upon historic fears by warning against another "Munich" in dealing with the German people's desire to rewrite the postwar arrangement. Ligachev stated this possibility during the CC plenum in February and reiterated the call for precautions "so that there shouldn't be a Munich, no claims on Silesia or the Sudetenland, or many other places. I think you and I do have grounds for apprehension."[45] While numerous officials in Moscow noted the psychological fears of a unified Germany, the official view remained that the Germans had changed since 1945 and could be trusted to abide by international norms of behavior.

The East German leadership, naturally threatened by the prospect of the FRG seizing control of the future development of German-German relations, responded with its own proposal in January 1990. Modrow called for "a treaty-based community, in order to pursue, via this mechanism, the rapprochement of the GDR and FRG on their way to confederation." Kohl's plan incorporated similar ideas, but only as the fourth and sixth steps toward ultimate unity. While Modrow acknowledged that "the prospect of unification lies ahead for us," he refused to give any timetable. [46]

Modrow's statement coincided with a significant shift in the Soviet political spectrum on German unification. As the situation in the GDR became more bleak and the pressure for unification grew, conservatives in Moscow came to accept confederation on the way to some distant unification, if in this way the Soviet Union could incorporate security restrictions in the founding documents of this process.[47] These individuals also emphasized Modrow's remarks on "a treaty-based community," without mentioning the possibility of a more closely integrated relationship.

Those formerly in favor of the confederation scheme came to realize that Germans would determine their own internal arrangements, abandoned talk of the united Germany's domestic structure, and stressed instead the need to lock German developments into an all-European process. By February, Falin acknowledged that "the balance of security is the main issue of the German question, not so much the state form of unification."[48] Analysts who accepted the inevitability of unification, and did not view the unavoidable West German domination of the united German state as threatening, showed increasing willingness to consider various solutions to the German problem that would keep pace with actual events rather than lag hopelessly behind. Daniel Proekter mentioned the need for unification to "take place within the framework of an overall European security program," but this meant merely that "the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act (i.e., the inviolability of border, the nonuse of force, human rights, broad European cooperation, etc.) must be observed by all without exception." He added, "Let us look as soberly and benevolently as possible at Germany's inevitable unification."[49] As Gorbachev acknowledged during Modrow's visit in Moscow, "There is a certain agreement among Germans in East and

West and among the representatives of the four powers that, in principle, German unification is not doubted by anyone."[50]

Gorbachev's remarks glossed over the potentially explosive relationship between the internal and external elements of German unification. This fact was especially evident in the question of military neutrality institutionalized before unity. Soviet conservatives latched on to the East German leader's mention of military neutrality. They apparently hoped to incorporate German neutrality into any eventual arrangement. Gorbachev may have favored this idea, but realizing that Modrow was powerless to institute it, he stressed that Germans must determine the shape of the new Germany. In so doing he may have been trying to defuse the opposition of Soviet conservatives who favored such limitations.

The Agreement on Two-Plus-Four Talks

As East Germany's disintegration became more apparent, observers in the East and West accepted the need to act quickly before events raced out of control. Various statesmen proposed a four-power forum, an all-European summit, and even a European referendum to deal with the issues of German unification. The major powers finally agreed on an arrangement that included the two German states, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. The so-called Two-Plus-Four talks eventually proved the most workable means to address the rapid pace of events. The question of a united Germany belonging to NATO rapidly emerged as the central issue in these proceeding.

The Soviet acceptance of the Two-Plus-Four arrangements was a direct result of the growing confidence in US–Soviet relations. As Shevardnadze noted, "We attach special significance to our mutual understanding with the Americans. Our current relations with that country permit us to work jointly in guaranteeing security in Europe."[51] This improvement began at the Malta Summit in early December 1989. Both Gorbachev and Bush came away convinced of the other's sincerity and trustworthiness. In particular, the US guarantee that it would not exploit the instability in Eastern Europe reassured Gorbachev as to Washington's intentions. At this meeting, the Soviet side noted its anxieties concerning a united Germany. The two sides agreed to the need for a "prudent"policy toward Germany. [52]

Building on the Soviet–US rapprochement, and spurred by the accelerating collapse of East Germany, Washington devised a plan to address the problem which incorporated both German states and the four powers responsible for postwar Germany. The plan acknowledged that the two German states would determine the domestic structure of a united German state. The FRG and GDR then would participate in the four powers' discussions of the external aspects of unification. This became known as the Two-Plus-Four formula. The idea was developed by the US State Depart-

ment, although both British and Soviet officials later claimed to have come up with the idea independently.[53] After discussions with NATO allies, Baker presented the idea to his Soviet hosts during a visit to Moscow in early February. The Soviet foreign minister formally accepted the proposal at the Ottawa Conference on 13 February.

Gorbachev's conditions for the announcement of the Two-Plus-Four approach revealed a great deal about Soviet thinking. The Soviet side demanded that no reference be made to the upcoming East German elections since, in Shevardnadze's words, it would look like Moscow had "effectively predetermined the fate of the current GDR leadership, proceeding on the assumption of its defeat in the elections, and preferring to do business with those forces which are now in the opposition."[54] In addition, Gorbachev emphasized that Poland's special concerns must be taken into account.[55] The objections centered on avoiding the perception that Moscow was abandoning its allies in Eastern Europe. Beyond the understandable unwillingness to undermine whatever East European goodwill for Moscow might remain, the Gorbachev leadership also feared the domestic consequences of such an impression. Shevardnadze, for instance, noted the increasing tendency of opponents of *perestroika* to use the German question and other foreign policy issues "to stop *perestroika* and discredit the country's leadership."[56]

The Soviet willingness to work within this more limited forum represented a movement away from previous proposals. Gorbachev had earlier called for an all-European summit, labeled Helsinki II, to address the German problem. A day after Baker broached the Two-Plus-Four talks with Gorbachev, Gerasimov was still noting efforts to speed up preparations for Helsinki II.[57] Soviet accounts also constantly referred to the need to "synchronize" German developments with the process of uniting Europe. As late as 2 February, Shevardnadze discussed the idea of calling an "all-European referendum" since "not only politicians but also the people should decide the destiny and the future of Europe." Just days after the Ottawa foreign ministers conference, Falin contended that the idea of a European referendum was never a "practical proposal." [58]

Gorbachev's domestic opponents clearly disapproved of the Two-Plus-Four approach. By excluding Poland and other victims of German aggression, Moscow lost potential allies in placing severe restrictions of a united Germany's military potential. In addition, France and Britain might be more willing to express openly misgivings on German unification in a forum of likeminded actors. In limiting outside participants to the four powers, Soviet conservative commentators expected London, Paris, and Bonn to follow the US lead, thus creating the potential for the NATO "four" to bully the Warsaw Pact "two." Gorbachev quickly went on the record to renounce advance agreements between the four Western participants.[59]

Soviet supporters of the status quo may have hoped also that a CSCE forum would have involved more open debates, thus forcing Gorbachev to acknowledge publicly any Soviet concessions. Falin was explicit in noting that many in the Soviet Central Committee "consider postwar Europe as a trophy of the Soviet Union." He added that "if the West tried to neglect our interests, the advocates of the trophy philosophy would say: as long as we advocated our positions in a hard way, they did not dare to use such language in dealing with us, to make such demands on us; this is the beginning of a chain of demands which will end finally in capitulation."[60] And the cumbersome all-European process would have served the conservatives purposes precisely because it was so unwieldy. The sheer bureaucratic bulk of such an arrangement would have drastically slowed the drive toward German unification. Faced with Gorbachev's acceptance of the Two-Plus-Four scenario, conservative commentators pushed for a greater role by the four powers in the domestic aspect of establishing a unified German state: in effect a "Four-Plus-Two" approach. [61]

Accelerating Collapse and Soviet Posturing

The results of the March GDR elections came as a major surprise to many in the Soviet Union. Modrow had admitted in December 1989 that if elections were held at that time, the SED could expect only 19 to 20 percent of the vote.[62] In the event, the Party of Democratic Socialism (or PDS; the former SED) garnered just 16.3 percent. The CDU of East Germany gained 40.9 percent, and the SPD, 21.8 percent. Along with its alliance partners, the CDU had an absolute majority in the East German Volkskammer. The defeat of the SED/PDS removed the last hope of Soviet conservatives.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had reason to bemoan the election results for another reason. The SPD's poor showing relative to the CDU removed the possibility that the Social Democrats could play a central role in defining unification terms. Various West German SPD officials had declared that a unified Germany need not remain in NATO.[63] With the SED/PDS's stunning electoral defeat, Moscow now faced the danger of a "Five Against One" breakdown in discussions on unification. Various Soviet officials and commentators responded quickly by hinting that movement might be possible on the question of NATO membership.[64]

Yet officially, Gorbachev continued to reject full German membership in NATO. The Two-Plus-Four negotiations witnessed the further consolidation of a unified Western stance. In March the first meeting of experts under the auspices of the Two-Plus-Four talks met in Bonn. Another Two-Plus-Four meeting, this time involving foreign ministers, addressed numerous security and military issues, but failed to make any concrete progress. During Gorbachev's discussions with Bush at the US–Soviet summit in June, the Soviet leader finally conceded that the German people could

determine their own alliance commitments. Shevardnadze backpedaled at the Two-Plus-Four meeting on 22 June. He called for the removal in stages of all foreign troops on German territory.[65] Gorbachev clearly refused to commit himself to German membership in NATO until after the 28th Party Congress scheduled for early July. Shevardnadze reportedly admitted as much to Baker.[66] Further progress was delayed until Kohl's trip to the Soviet Union in mid-July.

The barrage of Soviet counterproposals throughout this period demonstrated, not Moscow's bargaining strength, but its vulnerability. At various times, and in multiple forums, Soviet officials called for:

(1) the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by permanent all-European security structures
(2) a European-wide referendum on the international and security aspects of German unification
(3) the neutralization and demilitarization of Germany
(4) a military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France
(5) continued, though modified, exercize of four-power occupation rights in Germany
(6) the formation of a center in Berlin to control all military forces in Germany
(7) membership of Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(8) membership of the Soviet Union in NATO
(9) membership of the FRG in NATO and associate status for the eastern part of Germany in the Warsaw Pact[67]

Gorbachev was apparently searching for ways to advance the German unification process without appearing to give in to Western demands. While Moscow eventually acceded to these very conditions, the Soviet leader was able to do so on his own timetable, that is, after the conclusion of the 28th CPSU Party Congress.

THE 28TH CPSU CONGRESS, JULY 1990

The question of German unification emerged as a central issue during the 28th Party Congress in July. Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and especially Shevardnadze endured often intense criticism over Soviet foreign policy in Europe. Shevardnadze later admitted that German unification was a source of "especially heated discussions." Over half of the questions he fielded concerned this issue. Many of these contained harsh criticisms of Soviet policy.[68] Although Moscow had not yet accepted the Western condition of German membership in NATO, critics blasted the leadership for giving away Eastern Europe and selling the GDR to the West. Despite the sustained assaults, neither Shevardnadze nor Gorbachev backed away from their positive assessments of developments.

It came as no surprise that conservatives latched on to the issue of German unification in their efforts to discredit the entirety of Gorbachev's policies. Portugalov remarked in advance of the party congress, "The settlement of the foreign policy aspects of German unification has a strong domestic policy component in our country. The conservatives in the CPSU are trying to forge an anti-*perestroika* appeal from this."[69] Though most of the vehement criticism remained unpublished, the embattled foreign minister addressed many of the charges in his response to various questions from the floor. Gorbachev himself responded to critics railing against the "collapse of socialism" in Eastern Europe and "leaving there without a fight."[70]

But the fiercest attacks centered on Soviet policy toward German unification. Shevardnadze reported being "cursed" for undermining Soviet security. He labeled such thinking "a throwback to complete chauvinism."[71] His assurances that German unification would not damage the security of the USSR fell on deaf ears.[72] The Soviet foreign minister also declared that "there is no connection between credit agreements and talks on other questions—the German question and the question of arms reductions." He rejected suggestions that "some kind of 'deal' is in progress on the German question and the hints that anyone has 'given' the German Democratic Republic to Bonn and has thus decided its fate."[73] This last remark implicated not only Soviet hard-liners. At the party congress, criticism of Moscow's German policy was not limited to conservatives.

Valentin Falin, the noted *Germanist* and head of the International Department, also pointed out shortcomings in the Soviet handling of German unification. He recalled that Moscow initially demanded a peace treaty with Germany as an integral part of the unification process. According to many Soviet commentators, this approach would have allowed the Soviet Union to incorporate certain restrictions on German behavior, including Germany's military status, into the founding documents of the new German state. Falin added, "Then, all of a sudden, we changed our position for another, where the notions 'peace treaty' and 'peace settlement' are not mentioned at all."[74]

Falin's attack on the "sudden" inexplicable change in Soviet policy supported later contentions that Shevardnadze and Gorbachev alone formulated Moscow's approach to German unification. Not only Falin, but also Portugalov and Kvitsinsky, were closed out of the decision-making process as early as February 1990.[75] Drawing on remarkable access to the participants, Beschloss and Talbott related the opposition of these individuals as Gorbachev began to consider German membership in NATO at the June US–Soviet summit. The Soviet leader and his foreign minister apparently wished to prevent deadlock within the foreign policy circle by centralizing policy in their hands.[76] Thus Gorbachev and Shevardnadze faced not only conservative opposition to and political manipulation of the

process of German unification. They also confronted a number of prominent and moderate foreign policy officials who remained convinced that the Soviet Union could prevent, or at least dilute, German's inclusion in NATO.

Shevardnadze remained undaunted by the fierce and often personal attacks advanced by many delegates. He elaborated his controversial vision of German unification succinctly. He told the congress, "I want you to understand the possible options here, comrades. These are not our wishes, but the feasible options." Reaching an agreement within the Two-Plus-Four framework consistent with Soviet security was "feasible." The use of Moscow's "500,000 troops in the GDR to block unification" meant "disaster." [77] After all, he asked, "Can there be such a reliable guarantee which is based on the artificial and unnatural division of a great nation? And how long can this last?"[78] He pointed to a number of measures designed to protect Soviet security interests, including restrictions in the size of the German military. Nowhere in his discussions did he address the issue of German membership in NATO. This silence was audible to both his domestic and Western audience.

NATO's July summit in London had certainly strengthened Shevardnadze's position. He had earlier informed Baker that the outcome of that meeting would be very important to further progress on German unification.[79] The summit provided a series of assurances for the Soviet Union, including a transitional period in which NATO would not position forces in eastern Germany, a transitional period before the USSR must remove its forces from the former GDR, reductions in conventional arms in Europe, acceleration of talks on short-range nuclear forces, a NATO strategic review, and a firm German pledge to honor present borders. Shevardnadze praised the results at the party congress, calling the final declaration "an important political act." Gorbachev also evaluated it as "a significant step" in the right direction.[80] Although neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze would admit it at the party congress, their official acceptance of Germany's inclusion in NATO was only days away.

THE JULY GORBACHEV-KOHL SUMMIT

This meeting between the two leaders represented Moscow's final acceptance of a united German state integrated into the Atlantic alliance. In committing the USSR to the prospect of German membership in NATO, Gorbachev acknowledged the end of Europe's political and military division.[81] While the final agreement involved compromises by both sides, the Soviet Union surely gave up more than the FRG. The visible chemistry between the two men played a significant role in bringing their divergent positions together. While Moscow's decision-making process remained

unclear, the surprise nature of Gorbachev's acceptance implied a great deal about Soviet reasoning.

Commentaries before Kohl's arrival made much of the personal rapport that the two leaders had developed over the years. Both Kohl and Gorbachev confirmed the importance of this phenomenon.[82] The image of an extremely centralized foreign policy process, perhaps involving only Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, enhanced the relevance of such a subjective factor. From the beginning, Kohl's visit was unconventional. Side trips to Gorbachev's old office in Stavropol and various unscheduled stops led finally to his hunting lodge in Arkhiz. The visit to Gorbachev's birthplace was greeted with excitement in Bonn. Rather than viewing this gesture as style over substance, West German officials concluded that Gorbachev planned some significant gesture.[83]

Even as Gorbachev prepared to take this historic step, evidence of continued Soviet conservative opposition emerged. A *Pravda* article on the day of Kohl's arrival questioned West Germany's motives in offering financial support to the Soviet Union.[84] The implicit suggestion that Moscow was consenting to a "deal" with Bonn over the fate of the GDR echoed criticisms voiced at the recent party congress. One day earlier an unnamed Central Committee expert on Germany chastised the FRG for obstructing progress at the Two-Plus-Four talks and accused Bonn of disregarding Soviet security interests.[85] These examples reflected an undercurrent of disapproval among many Soviet conservatives. Moscow's public relations corps attempted to placate such concerns. A number of the stops on the itinerary included what must have been carefully arranged encounters with Soviet veterans of World War II.[86] The veterans greeted the West German leader and expressed support for improved German-Soviet relations.

Given the magnitude of the meetings results, the actual proceedings were almost anticlimactic. The West German delegation expected prolonged bargaining and intense politicking. Yet according to West German participants, Gorbachev stated his compromise position rather quickly.[87] The two sides agreed that a united Germany would decide for itself which alliance it might join. Germany's choice was not left to doubt since Kohl declared that the new state "would like to become a member of the Atlantic alliance and I am certain that this also conforms with the opinion of the GDR government."[88]

In addition, four-power authority would end at the time of unification; the united Germany and the USSR would conclude a bilateral treaty to negotiate the removal of Soviet troops in the former GDR over a period of three to four years; NATO structures would not extend into eastern Germany as long as Soviet forces remained there; Bonn promised to reduce the united Germany's armed forces to 370,000 in three to four years; and Germany would renounce the production, possession, and siting of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and would remain a member of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. While at that time no mention was made of financial considerations, Bonn had earlier promised $3 billion in trade credits and $730 million to assist in the withdrawal of Soviet troops.[89]

Gorbachev's reasons for dropping the Soviet rejection of NATO membership received various explanations. Some analysts have stressed the importance of Kohl's willingness to reduce unilaterally the unified Germany's armed forces.[90] Agreeing to consider such reductions outside of the Vienna Conventional Forces in Europe framework represented a significant concession for the FRG and United States. The move also corresponded to Shevardnadze's remarks at the 28th Party Congress on the security benefits of a united Germany with imposed force levels.[91] Another argument involved other recent Western actions designed to assuage Soviet concerns. The London NATO summit in early July, for instance, impressed Gorbachev.[92] Yet neither of these factors alone could have motivated such a profound reevaluation.

The Soviet leader provided a further possible explanation when he emphasized the atmosphere of genuine trust that had developed between Moscow and Bonn. In explaining the Soviet decision, Gorbachev noted the intense cooperation between the two states in the past year. He emphasized that a powerful reserve of trust had developed *before* the 1989 crises in Eastern Europe, a "safety margin" that "helped us to act responsibly and constructively" in 1990. The Soviet president also repeated his belief that the Germans "have proved by their entire postwar history that they are open to processes of democracy. . . . That is an important precondition. Without that nothing could take place."[93]

A series of domestic forces also affected the final outcome. The massive opposition by Soviet conservatives to concessions on German unification profoundly influenced the timing of Gorbachev's announcement. The unexpected move came just days after the party congress that roundly attacked the Soviet approach to the German question. Critics of Gorbachev's German policy did not suddenly appear at the party congress. Public expression of their disapproval was simply a visible manifestation of the continuous and powerful conservative presence that had inhibited Gorbachev's actions throughout this period.

The plethora of potentially explosive problems at home also had an undeniable impact on Soviet thinking. Various economic, social, and political crises demanded immediate attention. Removal of a contentious international problem would allow Gorbachev to turn his focus inward. Moreover, the tendency of Soviet officials to make numerous, sometimes contradictory, proposals in German unification negotiations suggested that Moscow was distracted by internal problems. While not necessarily in disarray, certainly the beleaguered resources of the Gorbachev leadership were stretched to the limit.

Finally, both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze appeared genuine in their defense of new political thinking. Their actions demonstrated a fundamentally altered vision of international relations and the nature of Soviet security interests. According to the logic of this doctrine, Germany's unification and inclusion in NATO did not represent an inherent threat to Moscow's interests. Moreover, since these two individuals almost single-handedly formulated Moscow's response to the German question, they had isolated themselves from any opinions at odds with new thinking's precepts.[94]

In fact, all these factors contributed to Gorbachev's decision. The favorable international environment, the strictures of domestic politics, Gorbachev's compounding internal crisis, and the conceptual logic of new thinking were integral to the outcome. Rather than any single decisive point, the change proceeded from the interaction of internal and external forces acting simultaneously on Soviet foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The period from August 1989 to July 1990 incorporated changes in Soviet foreign policy that proceeded with dizzying speed. Drawing on the conceptual and political advances of the preceding phases, the Gorbachev leadership effectively redefined Moscow's position in the world. The culmination of this process was the conditioned Soviet acceptance of united German membership in the Atlantic alliance.

The latter half of 1989 witnessed the accelerating collapse of several socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Disproving the predictions of most contemporary observers, Moscow remained true to the principles of new thinking. What influence Gorbachev did exert was limited to encouraging the notion of popular sovereignty and dissuading embattled communist leaders from using force to retain power. The absence of large-scale Soviet interference did not stem from Moscow's unwillingness to accept the costs of military intervention or from complete unpreparedness for the eventual outcomes. Instead, the Gorbachev leadership had considered the possibility of communism's demise in one or more Eastern European countries and deemed such a result to be consistent with the current conception of Soviet national interests.

East Germany was unique in traditional Soviet thinking since it represented the linchpin in the entire East European security system. Yet in this instance as well, the Kremlin proved willing to accept the collapse of the GDR's socialist regime. Even after Honecker's ouster, Gorbachev continued to receive reliable accounts of the SED's crumbling legitimacy. The evidence suggested that Moscow at least tacitly approved, and perhaps even encouraged, the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In effect, the Soviet leadership had acknowledged the East German population's right to choose their own government. Moscow finally reconciled itself to the

bankruptcy of Eastern Europe's existing socialist regimes because it no longer equated socialist rule with Soviet security in central Europe.

Soon after this the two German states demonstrated that unification was "on the international agenda." Three distinct Soviet assessments of this emerged, ranging from rejection of unification, to support for a confederal solution, to a willingness to accept conditional unification. In the first quarter of 1990, internal German dynamics threatened to outrun the international mechanism created to manage the external aspects of German unity. Following the March elections in the GDR, Moscow was faced with the simple fact that the FRG and GDR had already made some form of German unification inevitable.

A visible shift in the Soviet debate on unity emerged by the spring of 1990. Defenders of the status quo moved to accept some form of confederation as long as various political and security restrictions were sewn into the stitching of the new German state. While the center evaporated, those considering unification a viable option focussed on the remaining obstacles, most notably the West's demand that the new state be a full NATO member. Despite their political posturing, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze consistently denied that unification would damage Soviet security. Having weathered the stormy July party congress, and reassured by constructive Western behavior, Gorbachev unexpectedly removed the final obstacle to Germany's merger by acceding to a united Germany integrated in the Atlantic Alliance. In this way, Gorbachev dramatically capped off a five-year process of redefining Soviet relations with West Germany.

7

Conclusion

This study confirms the contention that '[b]efore behavioral revolutions come conceptual revolutions."[1] Soviet actions and reactions in Europe, and especially those relating to West Germany, were remarkably consistent with the principles of new thinking. Many studies of Soviet–West German relations in this period failed to incorporate this fact. In particular, interpretations of the Soviet response to the changing parameters of the German question suffer from an inadequate appreciation of the evident conceptual changes that predated these crises.[2] As a result, they explain Soviet policy in 1989–1990 as merely imposed on an unwilling or immobilized Moscow. The flawed conclusions arise mainly from two incorrect assumptions: first, that Moscow remained blindly convinced of the eventual success of reform communism in Eastern Europe, and second, that Gorbachev did not act to prevent the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the unification of Germany only because he feared the consequences of military intervention.

The question of Gorbachev's understanding of East European processes had attracted considerable attention. Various scholars have argued that right up until its final defeat, Gorbachev remained convinced of the SED's eventual success.[3] But the evidence I have presented proves that the Soviet leadership was aware of the rapid disintegration of the SED, and received from reliable sources pessimistic evaluations of the party's prospects. Many

analysts pointed to Moscow's continued backing of political forces favoring the rejuvenation of socialism as proof that the Soviet leadership did not envision the collapse of socialism in the GDR. This conclusion does not logically follow from the evidence presented. After acknowledging the possibility of the SED's total disintegration, Moscow had no viable option but to continue support. This response indicated Gorbachev's preference for socialist rule, but not his inability to assess its prospects accurately.

The second support for the prevailing explanation of Gorbachev's response to the disintegration of the GDR are the numerous Soviet statements supporting the new SED leadership. Such an interpretation misreads the political context within which Gorbachev operated. His view of East European events differed markedly from that of his domestic opponents. It was not surprising that the embattled Soviet leader chose to disguise his true opinions. In fact, most accounts of this period agree that Gorbachev disapproved of Honecker's continued rule. These analyses interpret the Soviet leader's remarks complimenting the stubborn Honecker as disingenuous. There is every reason to believe that Gorbachev would similarly conceal his innermost thoughts in dealing with Honecker's successors.

Another component of the flawed interpretation of Soviet thinking toward the collapse of the GDR involves the use of military force. Many scholars contend that Moscow's only recourse in 1989 was military intervention. They add that the Gorbachev leadership rejected this option because such action would damage domestic reform efforts and relations with the West.[4] As the examination of Soviet 1989 actions in Eastern European indicates, Moscow did have a number of powerful tools to influence events in the region. It simply chose not to use them. Fear of alienating the West was not sufficient to explain Moscow's lack of action. If the Soviet leadership had still considered the traditional Eastern bloc as integral to Soviet national interests, it would surely have used any means possible to prevent its disintegration. In the event, Gorbachev concluded that the "loss" of East Germany did not in principle threaten Soviet national security.

Similar problems undermine most accounts of the Soviet decision to accept the terms of German unification. The most common explanation is that Moscow simply "caved in" to Western demands because it had no other recourse. Certainly the pace of events pressured the Soviet leadership to respond to the new circumstances,[5] but this was not a condition exclusive to the USSR. Britain and France ultimately agreed to unification terms that bore little resemblance to the gradual process they initially favored. Moreover, Moscow did retain significant influence in the process. The presence of 500,000 troops on East German soil gave weight to their position. The Soviet Union could also have vetoed any Two-Plus-Four proposal on rescinding four-power authority in Germany. If Gorbachev rejected this option for fear of damaging economic relations with a future united Germany, this justification clearly demonstrated an altered vision of Soviet

interests. In the end, Moscow evaluated specific economic opportunities as more important than the potential threat of a unified Germany. As with the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the final result was remarkably consistent with the Gorbachev leadership's earlier statements and actions. Thus, the "caving in" was conceived as being in line with Soviet interests. [6]

Again the preceding examination of Moscow's relations with Bonn suggests that principles such as the renunciation of force, the interdependent nature of international relations, mutual security, the nonthreatening nature of capitalism, and the sovereignty of the popular will motivated the Gorbachev leadership even as domestic reform foundered. This altered vision of the external arena was not merely a by-product of altered thinking on domestic economic reform, but constituted a fundamental redefinition of Moscow's approach to international relations.

Scholars who underemphasize the importance of politics also seriously misinterpret the basics of Soviet–West German relations. A number of analysts, taking at face value Gorbachev's repeated rejection of NATO membership for a united Germany, place inordinate importance on the FRG concessions at the July 1990 meeting in Arkhiz.[7] Yet an eyewitness account suggests that the Soviet leader was prepared in advance to accept NATO membership.[8] While West German security and financial guarantees did contribute to Gorbachev's decision, these scholars mistook coincidence for causation. The convening of the 28th Party Congress in early July ensured that Gorbachev would not announce any major decision on unification until after the meeting. Thus the specifics of the deal in Arkhiz made easier a decision that had been arrived at before Kohl even arrived in the USSR.

The preceding example illustrates a broader problem with accounts of Soviet–West German relations. Many accounts operated on the assumption that the domestic political constraints on Gorbachev dramatically eased following his consolidation of power in 1986. In fact, the Soviet leader faced serious political pressure throughout the period. Change in the pre-Gorbachev policy toward West Germany emerged only after the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. The Soviet leader announced unilateral cuts in Moscow's European conventional forces only after the successful 19th Party Conference in mid-1988. In July 1989, Gorbachev criticized the Soviet military in a speech to the Supreme Soviet. Even at that late date, the remarks were still considered too politically dangerous to be carried by the mass media.[9]

These constraining forces actually gained strength in 1989–1990 as the Soviet Union experienced mounting domestic problems and as Gorbachev's foreign policy altered international arrangements still considered sacrosanct by Soviet conservatives. The 28th Party Congress proceedings included fierce criticism of Moscow's German policy. Such tactics represented not only an attack on Gorbachev's foreign policy, but also a serious challenge to the political authority of the Soviet leader.[10] Thus Gorbachev's

statements before and after the party congress must be evaluated in the context of the acute political struggle that was in progress.

EXPLAINING GORBACHEV'S GERMAN POLICY

Moscow's German policy cannot be satisfactorily explained by internal or external factors alone. Comprehensive international characteristics such as the impact of nuclear weapons on security, the global scientific and technological revolution, and the dictates of economic interdependence predated Gorbachev's rise to power. This atmosphere had imposed costs on the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The differing interpretations of these factors by the Soviet elite proved that Gorbachev's foreign policy was not dictated by the structure of the international system.

External pressures such as US military spending, increasing costs of support to Third World satellites, growing Eastern European instability, and finally the internal dynamism of Germany's drive for unification also constrained Soviet actions. But these factors cannot account for Gorbachev's specific responses, particularly the decision not to utilize Moscow's remaining resources in the region to disrupt the process of change. In the past, Soviet leaders had responded to similar pressures in fundamentally different ways. Furthermore, Gorbachev himself played a central role in initiating the transformation of the postwar European structure. The Soviet Union had undergone a profound change in the years preceding the dramatic events in Europe.

Likewise, Moscow's international behavior was not merely a derivative of domestic imperatives. Undoubtedly, economic problems, new leadership values, and crises of legitimacy fundamentally influenced the state's external behavior, yet such phenomena alone cannot illuminate the process by which change was initiated, developed, and implemented. Exclusive emphasis on these unit-level variables would take Soviet foreign policy out of its international context. The view that Soviet acceptance of German unification was simply the result of a political system paralyzed by internal conflict excluded crucial elements of the story. To add to the complexity, the interaction of domestic and external factors was not static, but instead was in constant flux. The difficulty of any rigorous theory incorporating all these threads is apparent.

From 1985 to 1990, the Soviet leadership completed a fundamental redefinition of its national interests. Correspondingly, Moscow's foreign relations underwent a revolution that transformed the USSR's position in the international system. This gradual process involved both a conceptual and a political component. Intellectually, Gorbachev and the proponents of new thinking viewed international relations in a profoundly different way from the worldview of their predecessors. Politically, the Soviet leader had to

define and promote specific foreign policy principles, and struggle constantly to translate these ideas into specific and often unpopular policies.

Rather than a gradual learning process, Gorbachev and his supporters brought with them many of their new ideas. The new thinking was in part a result of a generational change in the Soviet leadership from those who lived through the Stalinist era and participated in World War II to those who were too young to have served in the war and whose formative political experiences were the Khrushchev thaw and the 20th Party Congress. The education and professional paths of new thinking advocates also differed markedly from those of their predecessors. These views took hold in Soviet society because of the apparent inability of the traditional thinking to cope with mounting political and economic problems.

The Gorbachev leadership accepted the asymmetrical cuts of the 1987 INF agreement and the unilateral reductions announced in December 1988 because they genuinely believed that reducing international tensions and perceptions of a Soviet threat increased the USSR's security. Although the pace of German unification forced Moscow to move more quickly than it might have liked, the re-creation of a united German state was no longer viewed as inherently threatening. Moscow acknowledged the existence of economic interdependence and accepted the constraints this placed on its autonomy because it considered this a requirement of the modern age. Gorbachev's encouragement of a broader economic role for Bonn in promoting Soviet economic reform illustrated this belief. Ideas motivated Gorbachev's policies toward West Germany, up to and including unification.

Yet this was only part of the story. Ideas motivated the Gorbachev leadership, but they also placed it at odds with a politically powerful bloc of Soviet conservatives. The institutionalization of new thinking was an intensely political process. In transforming his vision of international relations into a policy toward West Germany, Gorbachev had to work within the constraints of the Soviet political system. His skills as a politician, his personnel policy to remove opponents and empower allies, his use of information policy to create pressures for reform, his mobilization of the Soviet intelligentsia, all contributed to changes in Soviet policy.[11] As any successful reformer, Gorbachev was also forced to use a delicate and complex mix of posturing, persuasion, and compromise. In the process, the Gorbachev leadership often had to conceal its true intentions. As Huntington has observed, "It is of the essence of the reformer that he must employ ambiguity, concealment, and deception concerning his goals."[12]

On coming to power, the new Soviet general secretary continued the existing policy toward West Germany. Until he had successfully consolidated power, he limited himself to subtle signals of his desire for change and embryonic efforts to transform the foreign policy arena. Once his position had solidified, he initiated a broad reevaluation of relations with West Germany. The threat of domestic opposition forced Gorbachev to

conceal his attitude toward East Germany's collapse and German unification. Yet his actions before and during these foreign policy crises demonstrated that he viewed these events as consistent with the new thinking.

This political game, moreover, was not played on a single level, but instead proceeded on the domestic and international stage simultaneously. My study has unearthed a number of ways in which internal and external forces interact, intervening variables that are often overlooked by analyses focusing exclusively on one or the other level of analysis. These linkages most often arose during the process of political bargaining at the domestic and international level. The frequency with which these interactions are expressed in negotiations suggests the extent to which politicians universally recognize these relationships between internal and external factors in their daily actions. Many of these examples emerged from a close examination of public diplomacy and summits between Gorbachev and Kohl, an area often overlooked by other scholars.

One of the main internal-external linkages involves the role of international actors in aiding and inhibiting Gorbachev's domestic efforts. First, the actions of West Germany sometimes impeded the Soviet leader's struggle with domestic conservatives. In 1986, when Kohl compared Gorbachev to Nazi Germany's Goebbels, Gorbachev was frustrated in his efforts to convince Soviet conservatives that West Germany was a trustworthy international partner. Likewise, Kohl's November 1989 unilateral announcement of a ten–point unification plan strengthened Soviet critics in the unfolding debate on German unity.

At other times, forces external to the Soviet political struggle assisted Gorbachev in changing Soviet foreign policy. In mid-1990, for instance, Shevardnadze openly pressed US Secretary of State Baker for results at the upcoming NATO summit that would strengthen Gorbachev in his struggle with Soviet conservatives.[13] After the NATO meeting in London, the Gorbachev leadership used this international resource to argue that German membership in the Atlantic alliance would not damage Soviet interests.[14] On another occasion, Shevardnadze threatened his opponents that failure to support *perestroika* would damage Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. A highly visible attack on this line of thinking by a Soviet conservative suggested that this tactic was used fairly frequently.[15]

A second major linkage between the Soviet domestic arena and the international stage centered on the role of Gorbachev's domestic reforms in aiding his international negotiating position. This involved suggestions that if Western actions did not satisfactorily protect Moscow's legitimate interests, Gorbachev's domestic opponents would be strengthened.[16] More common were Gorbachev's calls for financial support predicated on the assumption that the West stood to benefit greatly from *perestroika*'s success.[17]

Driven by new thinking, Gorbachev and his supporters came to perceive German unification in a fundamentally different way from their predeces-

sors. Clearly events forced Moscow to move more quickly than it preferred, yet Shevardnadze and Gorbachev considered the final outcome consistent with their new vision of Soviet interests. Soviet acceptance of this event required Gorbachev to promote an unpopular policy in the face of mounting domestic criticism. The Soviet leader was aided by constructive Western signals, such as the results of the NATO summit and West German security and financial guarantees. Yet these external factors were themselves made possible by the West's heightened trust in Moscow, which derived from Gorbachev's reform policies. The interaction of new ideas, external influences, and political conflict played itself out at the domestic and international level. For Gorbachev, his acceptance of the terms of German unification was a victory of his conception of international relations, aided by constructive Western inputs, and achieved within the demanding arena of Soviet politics.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. For an analysis of Gorbachev's foreign policy which utilized the idea of incompetence to explain Soviet foreign policy, see Vernon Aspaturian, "Farewell to Soviet Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* 40 (November–December 1991): 53–62.

2. On the tactics of reform politics, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 344–362; and Albert Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), 251–275.

3. For discussions of whether international outcomes are best explained by domestic or systemic factors, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). For modifications of this dichotomy, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1988): 427–460; and Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1978): 881–912.

4. George Breslauer labeled the stages "political succession," "ascendancy," and "authority leakage." *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in*

Soviet Politics (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 286–288. See also James Richter's adaptation of Breslauer. "Action and Reaction in Khruschev's Foreign Policy,"Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley, 1989).

5. See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 442–443. Jack Snyder made a similar argument concerning Gorbachev's opposition. "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," *World Politics* 42 (October 1989): 22.

6. Studying an environmental regime in the Mediterranean, Peter Haas described a similar instance in which a "false perception actually facilitated the resolution of the problem." *Saving the Mediterranean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 70–71.

7. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace Through Strength' End the Cold War?," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991): 182–185.

8. David Shumaker, "Understanding Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Methodological Note," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 2 (September 1994): 261–273. See also Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1986), chs. 2 and 9.

9. This study does not utilize archival materials. For balanced assessments of archival research, see Mark von Hagen, "The Archival Gold Rush and Historical Agendas in the Post-Soviet Era," *Slavic Review* 52 (Spring 1993): 96–100; and Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Fall 1993): 1–39. Martha Little detailed the continuing sensitivity of documents relating to Soviet-German relations in "Limited Access to Documents on Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Found in the Foreign Ministry Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Fall 1993): 27, 52–53.

10. On the importance and the pitfalls of oral history, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 13–14; Mark Kramer, "Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 212–216; and Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International History Review* 25 (November 1993): 740–751.

11. Indeed, some of the most interesting insights arise out of a careful comparison of statements appearing in the Soviet and Western press. Moscow's ambassador to Bonn, Yuly Kvitsinsky, provided one of the most dramatic examples of this juxtaposition. See the 1 July speech by Kvitsinsky to the 19th Party Conference in *Pravda*, 3 July 1988, 2; and Kvitsinsky's speech to the CDU foreign policy congress, published in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 May 1988, 10.

CHAPTER 2

1. Gorbachev's remarks to Kohl were in *Pravda*, 15 March 1985, 2. See Gromyko's meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher just days before Chernenko's death in *Pravda*, 5 March 1985, 4. Accounts of Gorbachev's discussions with Thatcher and Mitterrand appeared in *Pravda*, 14 March 1985, 3.

2. "Honecker-Besuch: 'Es gibt nun eine Chance,' " *Der Spiegel*, 18 March 1985, 20. For Kohl's account of the meeting, see "Bonn deutet Gorbatschows Worte nur als Vorführung eines Zusammenhangs," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 March 1985, 2 (hereafter cited as *FAZ*).

3. See Yuly Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), 397. In April 1986, Gorbachev opposed, for similar reasons, a meeting between Erich Honecker and Kohl. See Egon Krenz, "Honecker und Gorbatschow," *Neues Deutschland*, 25 January 1993, 3.

4. "Wohin driftet die Politik des BK?," *Der Spiegel*, 25 March 1985, 17–19. Also "Boenisch: Gorbatschow an Gesprächen mit Kohl interessiert," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26 March 1985, 2. On Gorbachev's rumored visit to the FRG, see "Gorbatschow möglicherweise im Herbst zur UNO-Vollversammlung," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 March 1985, 6 (hereafter cited as *SZ*).

5. Brandt, *Pravda*, 28 May 1985, 2; and *Erinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1992), 407.

6. Zimyanin in "Vstrecha c parlamentariami FRG," *Pravda*, 19 April 1985, 4.

7. "Bonner Parlamentarier," *FAZ*, 7 December 1985, 1.

8. "Moskau is erst von heute an für Jenninger zu sprechen," *FAZ*, 3 December 1985, 1,2.

9. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 13 December 1985, 1.

10. Gorbachev, "Dokument istoricheskovo znachenia," *Izvestia*, 14 August 1985, 4; and Yakovlev, "Vostok-zapad: tsivilizovanniye otnoshenia," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 26 June 1985, 2.

11. On the open German question, see Kohl cited in K. Denisov, "Kopaniye v musore," *Izvestia*, 2 August 1985, 4. Kohl's skepticism toward Moscow appeared in Yu. Yakhontov, "FRG: Povorot inertsiyu," *Pravda*, 31 October 1985, 5. Kohl apparently also described East Germany as "the Russians' hostage"in the West German newspaper *Bild*. See also Ye. Bovkun, "Vazhny faktor evropeiskoi bezopasnosti," *Izvestia*, 13 August 1985, 5; and "Opekaya 'vechno vcherashnikh,' " *Pravda*, 7 August 1985, 4.

12. Michael Sodaro saw Gromyko's rising power as one of the main reasons for the Kremlin's harsh treatment of Bonn since 1984. See *Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 309. One West German account labeled the aged Soviet foreign minister "the brakeman on German-German affairs." "Honecker-Besuch: 'Es gibt nun eine Chance,' " *Der Spiegel* 39 (18 March 1985): 20.

13. See Kohl's remarks on Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 4 July 1985, in FBIS–Western Europe, 5 July 1985, J1; and Schäuble on Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 July 1985, in FBIS–Western Europe, 8 July 1985, J1 (hereafter cited as DPA).

14. "Kohl nach den New Yorker Gesprächen verhalten optimistisch," *FAZ*, 28 October 1985, 1–2. Kohl received criticism at home for his "premature"optimism. See "Kohls verfrühter Optimismus," *SZ*, 28 October 1985, 4. One month earlier, Kohl had reiterated his interest in meeting Gorbachev, amid rumors that the Soviet leader would soon visit the FRG. DPA, 30 September 1985, in FBIS-Western Europe, 1 October 1985, J2; and "Gorbachev to Visit Bonn Before Christmas," *Bild*, 28 September 1985, 1–2, in FBIS–Western Europe, 1 October 1985, J2.

15. Aleksandr Bovin, "Evropeiskoye napravleniye," *Izvestia*, 25 September 1985, 5.

16. Vadim Zagladin, a foreign policy adviser to the Central Committee, integrated all these points into his article "Die Zukunft gehört der Entspannungspolitik," *Vorwärts*, 3 August 1985, 3.

17. Gorbachev's letter in *Bild*, 2 November 1985, 1–3, in FBIS–Western Europe, 9 November 1985, J1; and "Did Gorbachev Send His Letter to *Bild*?," *Bild*, 4 November 1985, 1–2, in FBIS–Western Europe, 9 November 1985, J2. The West German government was convinced that Soviet sources had intentionally leaked the letter. See "'Die Sowjetunion will Bonn unter Druck setzen,' " *FAZ*, 4 November 1985, 5.

18. A. James McAdams offered an extensive discussion of the German question in FRG politics, and especially its importance for Kohl's "catch-all" party, the CDU. *Germany Divided: From Wall to Reunification* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

19. Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Zweite Deutsches Fernsehen (Mainz), 4 November 1985, in FBIS–Western Europe, 5 November 1985, J1 (hereafter cited as ZDF).

20. See "Wohin driftet die Politik des BK?," *Der Spiegel* 39 (25 March 1985): 19. In restating Bonn's invitation to Gorbachev in mid-1985, Wolfgang Schäuble explicitly linked such a visit with the prospects for German-German ties. See DPA, 7 July 1985, in FBIS–Western Europe, 8 July 1985, J1.

21. For an overview of Gorbachev's initial personnel policies, see Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," *Problems of Communism* (July–August 1987): 21–43; and Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority," *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1986): 1–19.

22. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 365. See also Jerry Hough, *Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 223–224.

23. Gorbachev later acknowledged the "very painful" nature of the defense council's early meetings, where military leaders warned him to slow down. See Paul Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev Hints at Troubles in Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1989, 1.

24. Mark Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security," *Soviet Studies* 42 (July 1990): 434.

25. See Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 218–251, 300–322, 371–373. In addition, on the Quadripartite Agreement, see Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), 168–169. For an account of the "Walk in the Woods," see Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1984), 116–151. Shevardnadze referred to Kvitsinsky as "my teacher" during talks with US Secretary of State George Schultz. Cited in Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988), 267.

26. On Kornienko's transfer, see Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 380. Hough discussed the elevation of the MID's role in *Russia and the West*, 226–228. For a contrasting argument, see Kramer, "Role of the International Department," 433–436; and Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in the CPSU ID," *Problems of Communism* 36 (July-August 1986).

27. Gorbachev's May 1986 speech to MID representatives, later published in *Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, no. 1 (5 August 1987): 4–6 (hereafter cited as *Vestnik MID*). See also the interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky in *La Repubblica*, 17 June 1986, in FBIS-SOV, 24 June 1986, R17.

28. See George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 13.

29. *19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Documents and Materials*, a special supplement to *Soviet Life* (Washington, DC: Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1988), 153.

30. "Prakticheskimi delami uglublyat perestroika," *Pravda*, 15 July 1985, 2. Georgy Arbatov noted Gorbachev's disgust with premature political attacks in *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992), 332.

31. See Vera Tolz, "Calls for Change in Soviet Reporting on Foreign Affairs," *Radio Liberty Research* RL 328/87 (5 August 1987): 1–5. Aleksandr Bovin pioneered this initiative. In January 1986, he first called for changes in international affairs reporting. "Byl pervy opyt," *Izvestia*, 18 January 1989, 6. Then in March 1987, he offered one of the first public criticisms of Soviet foreign policy. "Proryv," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 8 March 1987, 3.

32. Bovin later noted this constraint on his coverage of international affairs. "Semi-Glasnost," in *Voices of Glasnost*, ed. Stephen Cohen and Katrina Heuvel (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 222. See also Yegor Yakovlev, "Studio Nine," Moscow Television Service, 20 September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 5 October 1989, 6.

33. On Gorbachev's pre-1985 contacts with the Soviet specialist community, see Nikolai Ryzhkov, *Perestroika: istoria predatelstv* (Moscow: Novosti, 1993), ch. 2; and Sarah Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars," *World Politics* 45 (April 1993): 342–345.

34. Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars,"345-351.

35. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 19 December 1984, 4–5; and "Vizit delegatsii Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR zavershyon," *Pravda*, 22 December 1984, 4. Even in 1984, Hough argued that elements of the Soviet elite supported this kind of combined program of détente and domestic reform. "Soviet Perspectives on European Security," *International Journal* 40 (Winter 1984–1985): 40. George Weickhardt discussed the role of foreign policy issues in the post-Chernenko succession. "Foreign Policy Disputes in the Gorbachev Succession," *Soviet Union* 16, no. 1 (1989): 29–54.

36. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 19 December 1984, 4. Gorbachev's speech borrowed Brezhnev's original statement almost verbatim. See Brezhnev's dinner speech in West Germany in November 1981. *Pravda*, 24 November 1981, 2.

37. Mikhail Gorbachev, "Politichesky doklad tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS," *Kommunist*, no. 4 (March 1986): 59. See Gorbachev, *For a "Common European Home," for a New Way of Thinking* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1987), 28; and "Beseda M. S. Gorbacheva c Redaktorom gazeti 'Pravda' ," *Pravda*, 8 April 1985, 1. See also Eduard Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 31 July 1985, 4; Vadim Zagladin in *Le Matin*, 10 June 1985, in FBIS-SOV, 14 June 1985, CC1; and the roundtable discussion of Fyodor Burlatsky, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Vadim Zagladin in "Vostok-zapad: tsivilizovanniye otnosheniya," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 26 June 1985, 2.

38. Fyodor Burlatsky, "Nakanune vstrechi v Parizhe," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 2 October 1985, 1.

39. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 2 October 1985, 1.

40. Jerry Hough discussed Yakovlev's anti-American and pro-European views in 1984. "Soviet Perspectives on European Security," 40. Years later, Yakovlev characterized these diatribes as products of his impulsive nature rather than tenents central to his thinking. David Remnick, "Gorbachev's Alter Ego: An Intellectual Journey," *Washington Post*, 16 August 1991, A38.

41. Aleksandr Yakovlev's interview in *La Repubblica*, 21 May 1985, 7, in FBIS-SOV, 24 May 1985, CC1. For a similar statement before 1985, see Yakovlev, "Imperializm: sopernichestvo i protivorechia," *Pravda*, 23 March 1984, 3–4. See Gorbachev's party congress speech in *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, 3.

42. Bovin, "Evropeiskoye napravleniye," *Izvestia*, 20 July 1986, 4.

43. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1986, 2.

44. Shevardnadze, "Press-konferentsia v Londone," *Pravda*, 17 July 1986, 4; and "Peregovori v Londone," *Pravda*, 15 July 1986, 4.

45. Gorbachev interviewed by the editors of *L'Unita* in *Pravda*, 20 May 1986, 3. See also Stanislav Kondrashov, "Moskve veryat bolshe," *Izvestia*, 14 April 1987, 4–5.

46. "Zavershenive sovetsko-frantsuzsky peregovorov," *Pravda*, 17 May 1987, 1.

47. For press accounts, see Vladimir Bolshakov, "Chto za initsiativa?," *Pravda*, 21 March 1987, 5; Yu. Kovalenko, "Yadernaya os dlya Evropy," *Izvestia*, 7 April 1987, 5; and Yury Zhukov, "Bezopasnost ili opasnost?," *Pravda*, 23 June 1987, 5. Some observers expanded their criticism, relating efforts at both political and economic integration with military objectives. See, for example, Yu. Kovalenko, "Brigad, os i evrooborona," *Izvestia*, 22 July 1987, 5; and "For the Expansion of Military Cooperation," *Krasnaya zvezda* (first edition), 23 September 1987, 3, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1987, 34.

48. Hough, "Soviet Perspectives on European Security,"40.

49. According to Kvitsinsky, Gorbachev used his May 1986 speech to MID representatives to criticize the Foreign Ministry's overemphasis on the United States and to call for more accent on Europe. *Vor dem Sturm*, 406.

50. Bovin, "Evropeiskoye napravleniye," *Izvestia*, 25 September 1985, 5. For similar remarks, see the interview with Vadim Zagladin, "Europe Speaks of Hope," *Rabotnichesko delo*, 3 January 1986, 1,6, in FBIS-SOV, 15 January 1986, CC5; and ISKAN's Genrikh Trofimenko cited in Harald Hamrin, "West Europe: A Coveted Opponent," *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 October 1985, 16, in FBIS-SOV, 1 November 1985, G10. See also Bovin, "Evropeiskoye napravleniye," *Izvestia*, 20 July 1986, 4–5.

51. For the former, see Shevardnadze in *Pravda*, 31 July 1985, 4–5. Vadim Zagladin offered an illustration of the latter in *Die Presse*, 4 September 1985, in FBIS-SOV, 5 September 1985, AA2.

52. See the discussion of this issue in James Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley, 1989), 1–18. Gorbachev's later remarks indicated that military leaders represented some of his earliest and most powerful critics. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev Hints at Troubles in Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1989, 1.

53. Stephen Meyer made a similar argument in "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security, *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988): 157.

54. Meyer, "Gorbachev's New Political Thinking," 141. See, for example, Yevgeny Primakov, "Filosofia bezopasnosti. XXVII sezd KPSS: razrabotka vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii," *Pravda*, 17 March 1986, 6.

55. Günter Schabowski described Chernenko's 1984 meeting with the SED leadership where he expressed his disapproval with Honecker's planned visit to West Germany. *Das Politburo: Ende eines Mythos* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), 33, 36.

See also Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Détente and Discord," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1985): 743–774.

56. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 16 January 1986, 2; and Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 2 March 1986, 3.

57. See the remarks of Lothar Späth, "Gespräch Späths in Moskau," *SZ*, 26 March 1985, 7; and Willy Brandt, "Brandt plädiert in Moskau für eine Ost-West-Politik aus 'europäischer Perspektive,' " *FAZ*, 28 May 1985, 1.

58. See Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 122–124.

59. See "Honecker kommt vermutlich bereits in Mai oder Juni," *SZ*, 3 April 1986, 1.

60. See Gorbachev's letter to Kohl which was leaked to the German press. "Did Gorbachev Send His Letter to *Bild*," *Bild*, 4 November 1985, 1–2, in FBIS-SOV, 9 November 1985, J1–2. Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin made similar remarks in a visit to Bonn in April 1985. See "Dreggers Eindruck von Simjanin," *FAZ*, 23 April 1985, 2.

61. "Nervositäten in der Koalition vor Bonns Entscheidung über SDI," *FAZ*, 5 November 1985, 1; Karl Feldmeyer, "In der Unionsfraktion geht es weiter um 'Genscheristen' und die 'Stahlhelm'-Gruppe," *FAZ*, 5 December 1985, 2; "Unbehagen in der FDP über SDI–Vereinbarung," *FAZ*, 2 April 1986, 2; and "Strauß widerspricht Genscher," *SZ*, 8 April 1986, 2.

62. "Kohl: SDI-Vertrag ermöglicht Einfluß auf Entwichlung der Militärstrategie," *SZ*, 18 April 1986, 1. Kohl's chief foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, gave similar reasons. "Teltschik sieht SDI als Herausforderung für Moskau, aber auch für Bonn," *FAZ*, 7 December 1985, 2. See also Dregger's remarks in "Bonner Parlamentarier berichten von Erfolgen in Moskau," *FAZ*, 7 December 1985, 2.

63. "Mehrheit in der Bundesrepublik gegen SDI," *FAZ*, 18 February 1987, 4.

64. Gorbachev, "Politichesky doklad tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS," *Kommunist*, no. 4 (March 1986): 57.

65. Zagladin interviewed in *Hamburger Morgenpost*, 16 November 1985, 14, in FBIS-SOV, 18 November 1985, G1–2; and "Sdelano zayavleniye," *Pravda*, 29 December 1985, 5.

66. Gorbachev cited in Hans Ulrich Kempski, "Der Mann aus Moskau droht und winkt," *SZ*, 22 April 1986, 3.

67. Semyonov in "Zayavleniye ministerstvu inostrannykh del FRG," *Pravda*, 5 April 1986, 5. Soviet Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov echoed the message of Moscow's ambassador to the FRG. "Beseda v Kremle, *Pravda*, 9 April 1986, 3.

68. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 4 October 1985, 2; and *Pravda*, 16 January 1986, 1.

69. See "Für Bonn ist nun die Tür geöffnet," *FAZ*, 2 November 1985, 2; and "Kohl, in Washington, Meets with Reagan to Discuss Iceland Talks," *New York Times*, 22 October 1986, 18.

70. Shevardnadze, *Izvestia*, 6 November 1986, 5; and Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 1 March 1987, 1.

71. See Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 117–118.

72. Gorbachev interviewed by G. Chiesa, *L'Unita*, 22 May 1985, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 29 May 1985, L2; and Gorbachev, *Izvestia*, 31 May 1985, 2.

73. Sychyov cited in Sophie Verny, "The EEC and CMEA: The Problems of Mutual Recognition," *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* (Summer 1988): 14.

74. Genscher in "Bonn für Zusammenarbeit EG-RGW," *General-Anzeiger*, 1–2 June 1985, 1.

75. See the Joint Declaration, point 5. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. L157 (24 June 1988): 35.

76. See *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Commission, no. 2 (1986): 76.

77. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Commission, no. 2 (1986): 76. See also AFP (Paris), 2 May 1986, in FBIS-SOV, 7 May 1986, CC10.

78. For an opposing view, see Adomeit, "Soviet Policy Toward the United States and West Europe,"in *Gorbachev and the Soviet Future*, ed. Lawrence Lerner and Donald Treadgold (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 195. Adomeit argued that Moscow was not enthusiastic about this type of cooperation and did not appreciate West German initiatives.

79. The occasion was Shevardnadze's New York meeting with Chancellor Kohl. "Kohl nach den New Yorker Gesprächen verhalten optimistisch," *FAZ*, 28 October 1985, 1. For an early expression of official West German interest, see the comments of Otto Wolff von Amerongen, "Die Atmosphäre hat sich verbessert," *SZ*, 18 April 1985, 56.

80. Burlatsky on "International Panorama,"Moscow Television Service, 4 August 1985, in FBIS-SOV, 6 August 1985, G1.

81. B. V. Flow has argued that such Soviet criticisms served mainly instrumental functions. "Bonn in 'Revanchism' Crossfire over Silesian Issue," *Radio Free Europe* RAD BR/21 (14 March 1985): 1–7.

82. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 149, 224–226. Also Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

83. See Zagladin's suggestions in "Bonn belebt Kontake zu Osteuropa," *FAZ*, 18 February 1987, 5; and Kvitsinsky's interview: "Nicht an Vorurteilen orientieren," *General-Anzeiger*, 7 February 1987, 3.

84. Shevardnadze on AFP (Paris), 21 November 1986, in FBIS-SOV, 24 November 1986, CC1.

85. See Abraham Brecker et al., eds., *The 27th Party of the CPSU: A Report from the Airlie House Conference* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1986), 56–60.

86. Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 47. The Soviet foreign minister was referring to his surprise when remarks concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan disappeared from the congress's political report.

87. Falin interviewed by W. Bell. "Falin: Eine neue Politik etabliert sich nicht über Nacht," *General-Anzeiger*, 31 May 1986, 2. In October, Falin added that reform efforts faced "the persistence of old habits, the force of inertia and the inclination of some bureaucrats to fetter the liveliest idea in a straightjacket of instructions." "Otchevo nedrugami neimetsya," *Pravda*, 6 October 1986, 1.

88. See "Soveshchaniye vneshnepoliticheskikh rabotnikov," *Pravda*, 24 May 1986, 1. See also Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 332.

89. See Gorbachev's "new page"comment in "Gorbatschow: Eine neue Seite in den Beziehungen," *FAZ*, 22 July 1986, 1. For comments by West German diplomats, see Klaus Dreher, "Berlin—in ein Kunstwerk eingebaut," *SZ*, 23 July 1986, 3.

90. See "Bonn tritt Mutmaßungen über seine Außenpolitik entgegen," *FAZ*, 26 July 1986, 1.

91. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 22 July 1986, 1; and Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 23 July 1986, 4. Genscher later noted the tension in Gorbachev's remarks between the desire to chastise Bonn for past actions and to encourage the FRG government to improve relations with Moscow. See Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), 106–107.

92. In his report of the Genscher visit delivered to a politburo meeting on 27 July, Kvitsinsky noted Moscow's improving image in the FRG and stressed the importance of economic interaction with West Germany. *Vor dem Sturm*, 412–414. See also Bovin, "Evropeiskoye napravleniye," *Izvestia*, 20 July 1986, 4–5.

93. "Kohl to Reagan: 'Ron, Be Patient,' " *Newsweek*, 27 October 1986, 29.

94. Shevardnadze in TASS, 10 November 1986, in FBIS-SOV, 18 November 1986, AA1. "Opasny atavism," *Pravda*, 27 November 1986, 4.

95. Dobrynin informed the SED's Hermann Axen of the politburo's decision to freeze contacts with the FRG. Cited in Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 493. On the canceled meetings, see DPA, 26 November 1986, in FBIS-SOV, 28 November 1986, G4.

96. Falin's interview, "Es wäre zuviele harte Töne von Ihren Seite," *Die Welt*, 10 February 1987, 7.

97. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 415-416.

CHAPTER 3

1. Gorbachev's Prague speech was published as *For a "Common European Home," For a New Way of Thinking* (Moscow: Novosti, 1987). For Ligachev's remarks in Hungary, see "Press konferentsia v Budapeshte," *Pravda*, 26 April 1987, 4. Gerasimov was cited in Michael Kaufman, "Gorbachev Alludes to Czech Invasion," *New York Times*, 27 April 1987, 12.

2. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 393. Recall that Shevardnadze later claimed that already in 1986, he viewed unification as inevitable. Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 131–132.

3. Fred Oldenburg examined the remarks of the West German official Otto Hennig in "Neues Denken' in der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik," *Deutschland Archiv* 20 (November 1987): 1154. See also "Hennig vermutet deutschlandpolitische Planspiele im Kreml," *FAZ*, 26 September 1987, 3; and "Berlin—'Nicht das lezte Wort'," *Der Spiegel*, 5 October 1987, 14.

4. Fred Oldenburg citing the findings of E. Schneider in "Moskau und die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands," *Berichte des Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 38 (1991): 7. Falin made a passing reference to such a group meeting during the East German refugee crisis in the fall of 1989. *Politische Erinnerungen*, 489.

5. Portugalov, "FRG posle vyborov," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 22 February 1987, 7. West German reactions to the article included, "Moskau spricht von einer deutschen Nation," *FAZ*, 23 February 1987, 6; and Bernard Küppers, "Neue Töne aus Moskau zur deutschen Frage," *SZ*, 23 February 1987, 6.

6. On the question of a single German nation, see Aleksandr Bovin, "Moskva slezam ne verit," *Izvestia*, 18 July 1987, 5; and Leonid Pochivalov, "Nemtsi i my," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 20 July 1988, 14. Soviet diplomat Stanislav Chernyavsky and academic Vyacheslav Dashichev questioned the permanence of

the Berlin Wall, while Falin stated that the Quadripartite Agreement 'would not be the last word" on West Germany's relationship to West Berlin. Chernyavsky's remarks of October 1987 are cited in Oldenburg, "'Neues Denken,' " 1159; Dashichev's remarks appeared in 'Mauer wird verschwinden müssen," *Die Welt*, 9 June 1988, 8. For Falin's comments, see ZDF, 23 September 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 24 September 1987, 49; and his later remarks in Saarländische Rundfunk, 27 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1988, 32. Both Falin and Dobrynin hinted at an imminent Kohl-Gorbachev meeting. See 'Besuch Gorbatschows in Bonn angedeutet," *SZ*, 10 February 1987, 6; and 'Dobrynin: Alte Vorurteile aufgeben," *FAZ*, 14 October 1987, 4.

7. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1987, 2. Subsequent accounts by Soviet insiders confirm the significance of this remark. See Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 483; and Sergei Karaganov, 'Implications of German Unification for the Former Soviet Union,"in *The New Germany and the New Europe*, ed. Paul Stares (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 337.

8. V. Bolshakov, 'Chevo oni boyatsya?," *Pravda*, 17 January 1987, 4; and Yury Kharlanov, 'Kompromiss ili kapitulyatsia," *Pravda*, 31 January 1987, 5.

9. See, for example, Kovalenko, 'Yadernaya os dlya Evropy," *Izvestia*, 7 April 1987, 5. For a response to France's expulsion of Soviet diplomats, see V. Bolshakov, 'S khvosta spetssluzhb," *Pravda*, 5 April 1987, 4.

10. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 396–397.

11. See Kevin Devlin, 'Division in CPSU Leadership over Prague Visit," *Radio Liberty* RL 140/87 (15 April 1987): 1–3; and 'Did Gorbachev Want to See Dubcek," *Bild*, 6 April 1984, 1, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 6 April 1987, F1.

12. On domestic opposition to Gorbachev, see Philip Taubman, 'Gorbachev Candid About Opposition," *New York Times*, 26 February 1987, A1, A9; 'Sagladin will die Regierungserklärung des Kanzlers 'mit dem Bleistift lesen,' " *Die Welt*, 20 February 1987, 10; and the interviews with Falin, 'Es waren zuviele harte Töne von Ihren Seite," *Die Welt*, 10 February 1987, 7; and 'Reicht Gorbatschows Atem aus?," *SZ*, 19 June 1987, 3. For hints that moderate West German actions could help Gorbachev's political struggles at home, see Falin on Saarländische Rundfunk, 27 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1988, 32.

13. Gorbachev presented his dilemma to Franz Josef Strauß during a December 1987 visit to Moscow. Strauß, *Die Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), 562.

14. See Kvitsinsky, 'Nicht an Vorurteilen orientieren," *General-Anzeiger*, 7 February 1987, 3; 'Kwizinski: Eine Pause in den Beziehungen," *SZ*, 14 January 1987, 1; and Zagladin, 'Sagladin will die Regierungserklärung des Kanzlers 'mit dem Bleistift lesen,' " *Die Welt*, 10 February 1987, 10.

15. Kohl, 'Die Deutschland und Außenpolitik der deutschen Bundesregierung nach den Wahlen vom 25. Januar 1987," *Europa-Archiv* 7 (April 10, 1987): D199–D200. Falin responded on DPA, 19 March 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 20 March 1987, G6.

16. Genscher's speech, 'Taking Gorbachev at His Word," *Statements and Speeches* 10 (6 February 1989): 1–8. Portugalov credited Genscher with moderating the behavior of the CDU. See 'FRG posle vyborov," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 22 February 1987, 2.

17. 'Kommt Gorbatschow 1988 nach Bonn?," *FAZ*, 15 October 1987, 6.

18. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1987, 1; and Weizsäcker, *Tagesspiegel*, 7 July 1987, 6. See also Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 417–424.

19. Weizsäcker cited in G. Kulbitsky, "In the Interests of Cooperation," *Pravda* (first edition), 6 July 1987, 5, in FBIS-SOV, 7 July 1987, H13; and Weizsäcker, *Tagesspiegel*, 7 July 1987, 6.

20. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1987, 1.

21. G. Gavrilkin, "Chtoby ukrepit doveriye," *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, 4 July 1987, 3. See also "Weizsäcker warnt vor zu hohen Erwartungen," *SZ*, 3 July 1987, 7. On Soviet expectations surrounding Weizsäcker's visit, see Falin's interview, "Reicht Gorbatschows Atem aus?," *SZ*, 19 June 1987, 3; and "Moskau mißt Weizsäckers Staatsbesuch 'große Bedeutung' zu," *FAZ*, 4 July 1987, 2.

22. Weizsäcker, *Tagesspiegel*, 7 July 1987, 6. For the censored TASS version, see "Uluchat vzaimoponimaniye i doveriye," *Pravda*, 7 July 1987, 4.

23. Dettmar Cramer noted the leadership defections in "Der Bundespräsident in der Sowjetunion," *Deutschland Archiv* 20 (August 1987): 792. See Falin cited in "West German Pilot to Be Freed Soon, Soviet Says," *Washington Post*, 9 July 1987, A38. See also Falin's interview with DPA, 8 July 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 8 July 1987, H3.

24. See the remarks of West German participants in Claus Gennrich, "Die außenpolitischen Signale Moskaus bleiben unklar," *FAZ*, 13 July 1987, 2.

25. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1987, 2. See also Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 108. Kohl, Weizsäcker, and Genscher all noted the significance of the visit. See "Kohl erwartet Gorbatschow in kommenden Jahr," *FAZ*, 11 July 1987, 1; "Weizsäcker zweieinhalb Stunden bei Gorbatschow," *FAZ*, 8 July 1987, 1; and Genscher in "Gotovnost sotrudnichat," *Pravda*, 11 July 1987, 5.

26. See McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 155-156. An unnamed Soviet diplomat expressed similar intentions in "Wir werden niemals das Schwert erheben," *Der Spiegel*, 4 January 1988, 19.

27. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 30 December 1987, 1. Shevardnadze cited in Werner Adam, "Hussein ist ebenfalls ein erfahrener Flieger," *FAZ*, 30 December 1987, 3. Strauß's memoirs cite an earlier example of Moscow's new respect for him. After printing an article claiming Strauß praised Hitler in his speeches, *Pravda* took the unprecedented step of publicly apologizing. Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, 438–439. The articles were "Straus lobzaet Gitlera," *Pravda*, 22 January 1987, 5; V. Menshikov, "Neochichikovy u prilabka," *Pravda*, 5 April 1987, 5; and "Popravka," *Pravda*, 15 April 1987, 6.

28. Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, 191; and "Gorbatschow nimmt sich viel Zeit," *FAZ*, 30 December 1987, 1. See Portugalov, "FRG posle vyborov," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 22 February 1987, 7.

29. See "Poleznye peregovory," *Pravda*, 31 December 1987, 4; and "Der Bundeskanzler dankt Strauß," *SZ*, 2–3 January 1988, 2.

30. Zagladin, "Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 6 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 10 February 1988, 13. Valentin Zapevalov wrote that a dialogue with conservatives was necessary, especially with a politician as powerful as Strauß. "Politichesky portret: Franz-Iozef Straus," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 9 March 1988, 15.

31. McAdams presented an outstanding analysis of inter-German relations as a function of each side's domestic political situation. See *Germany Divided*, especially chs. 5–7.

32. See Egon Krenz, "Honecker und Gorbatschow," *Neues Deutschland*, 25 January 1993, 3. The political struggle between East Germany and the USSR over this strategy was meticulously traced by Ronald Asmus, "East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute," *Radio Free Europe* (25 August 1984): 1–68. See also Asmus, "The Dialectics of Détente and Discord," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1985): 743–774.

33. See the recollections of Egon Krenz, "Honecker und Gorbatschow," *Neues Deutschland*, 25 January 1993, 3.

34. Krenz, "Die Karre steckte tief im Dreck," *Der Spiegel*, 4 February 1991, 56; and Honecker, "Vmeste s Sovetskim Soyuzom vpered k velikim tselyam," *Pravda*, 6 October 1986, 4,6. See also Krenz, *Wenn Mauern Fallen*, 62.

35. Krenz, "Honecker und Gorbatschow," *Neues Deutschland*, 25 January 1993, 3.

36. See former SED politburo member Gunter Schabowski's recollections in *Das Politbüro*, 34–35. See also Krenz, *Wenn Mauern Fallen*, 62.

37. Schabowski claimed, in April 1986, Gorbachev was still under the influence of advisers opposed to improved German-German relations, and he eventually gave his blessing to the visit in late 1986. *Der Absturz* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991), 214–215; and *Das Politbüro*, 36. Kvitsinsky recalled advising Moscow to drop its opposition to a Honecker-Kohl summit as far back as March 1986. *Vor dem Sturm*, 396. Krenz was convinced that the Soviet leader remained opposed to the visit because Gorbachev did want Honecker to beat him to Bonn. According to Krenz, Honecker simply ignored Moscow's orders. Krenz, *Neues Deutschland*, 25 January 1993, 3. Kochemasov saw the episode as an illustration of Moscow's losing control over Honecker. "'Schmeichelei und Unterwürfigkeit,' " *Der Spiegel*, 16 November 1992, 148.

38. See Devlin, "Division in the CPSU Leadership,"1–3. TASS provided conflicting reports of the circumstances of the postponement, citing both "mutual agreement"by Moscow and Prague, and Gorbachev's "slight cold."TASS, 5 April 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 7 April. 1987, F1.

39. Reprinted as "Each Country Chooses Its Own Solution," *World Affairs* 152 (Spring 1990): 199. *Neues Deutschland* reprinted the remarks on 10 April, the very same day that Gorbachev delivered his remarks in Prague. See Jeffrey Gedmin, *The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1992), 56–57.

40. Gorbachev, *For a 'Common European Home,' for a New Way of Thinking* (Moscow: Novosti, 1987), 5–6. An ensuing roundtable discussion of reformist Soviet spokesmen attempted to assist Gorbachev in reconciling the concept of freedom of choice with the universal necessity to pursue economic and political reform. See Prague Television Service, 12 April 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 16 April 1987, F1–F11.

41. On Ligachev's visit, see Philip Taubman, *New York Times*, 5 November 1987, A1, A14. Honecker's speech appeared in *Neues Deutschland*, 13–14 February 1988, 4.

42. McAdams noted that in the mid-1980s CDU officials, like their colleagues in the FDP and SPD, had largely abandoned references to "reunification"and the re-creation of a German "national state." *Germany Divided*, 171–172.

43. Honecker, *Neues Deutschland*, 23–24 May 1987, 3.

44. For remarks by FRG officials anticipating Soviet initiatives regarding German unification, see "Wiedervereinigung als 'Sicherheitskonzept,' " *FAZ*, 20 May 1987, 5; and "Brunner für aktive Wiedervereinigungspolitik," *FAZ*, 21 May 1987, 2. Zagladin cited in "Sagladin: Kein sowjetischer Plan für deutsche Wiedervereinigung," *FAZ*, 16 May 1987, 5.

45. Wolfgang Schäuble, a West German cabinet minister, later discussed Western concerns arising from the Honecker visit. See "Relations Between the Two States in Germany," *International Affairs* (London) 64 (Spring 1988): 209–215.

46. Chernyavsky cited in Oldenburg, "'Neues Denken,' " 1159; and Falin, ZDF, 23 September 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 24 September 1987, 49.

47. See Hennig's remarks in Oldenburg, "'Neues Denken,' "1159; Falin cited in "'Keine Studien zur Wiedervereinigung,' " *FAZ*, 1 October 1987, 2; Kohl's unnamed confidant cited in "Berlin—'Nicht das letze Wort,' " *Der Spiegel*, 5 October 1987, 14.

48. On König, see Honecker's remarks in Reinhold Andert and Wolfgang Herberg, *Der Sturz: Erich Honecker im Kreuzverhör* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1990), 21. Honecker related his discussion with Gorbachev on ARD (Hamburg), 10 October 1991, in FBIS–Western Europe, 11 October 1991, 6. Drawing on interviews with former members of the SED central committee, Jens Kaiser noted the growing suspicion surrounding Moscow's evolving view of the German question. "Zwischen angestrebter Eigenständigkeit und traditioneller Unterordnung," *Deutschland Archiv* 24 (May 1991): 489.

49. The claim that East Germans started rumors of a Soviet working group appeared in Gary Lee, "A New Mix of Independence and Anxiety," *Washington Post*, 12 October 1987, A30.

50. Portugalov, "Double Strategy—Double Error," *New Times*, 2 November 1987, 15; and Falin's interview with G. Japs, "Wir sagen Ja zum europäischen Haus," *Vorwärts* (17 October 1987): 34–35.

51. See Daniel Küchenmeister's account drawn from East German archival documents. "Wann begann das Zerwürfnis zwischen Honecker und Gorbatschow?," *Deutschland Archiv* 26 (January 1993): 37–38. See also Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 35.

52. Honecker in "Interview Erich Honeckers für finnische Journalisten," *Neues Deutschland*, 29 September 1987, 4. Falin, "The Collapse of Eastern Europe: Moscow's View," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 7 (Spring 1990): 24.

53. "Wir sind bereit, uns an den Verhandlungstisch zu setzen," *FAZ*, 10 October 1987, 2.

54. See "Honecker bekräftigt Interesse der DDR an weiterer Abrüstung," *SZ*, 5–6 January 1988, 1; and "Gegenbesuch Kohls in Ost-Berlin gefordert," *FAZ*, 5 January 1988, 4.

55. See Barbara Donovan, "The GDR's Reaction to Kohl's Moscow Visit," *Radio Free Europe* RAD BR/218, (2 November 1988): 1–2. One year earlier, Honecker had also publicly denied that he differed with Gorbachev over reform. Yet the statement came in the middle of a major conflict with Moscow over controversial remarks by Soviet officials. See *FAZ*, 14 October 1987, 2.

56. On the Andreyeva letter, see Ilse Spittmann, "Wie lange noch auf alte Weise?," *Deutschland Archiv* 21 (May 1988): 470–473. An account of the SED's reaction to the 19th Party Conference was in "Moskau erwartet von Ost-Berlin

Zustimmung zum Kurs Gorbatschows," *Die Welt*, 26 August 1988, 8. For accounts of Medvedev's message to Honecker, see "Verändern, was Veränderung bedarf," *Der Spiegel*, 8 August 1988, 16; and "Gorbachev Sends Honecker 'Ultimatum' on Retiring," *Daily Telegraph*, 29 August 1988, 6, in FBIS-SOV, 29 August 1988, 32–33.

57. Höpcke, "O raznykh nemtsakh," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 12 October 1988, 14.

58. Primakov, "Novaya filosofia vneshnei politiki," *Pravda*, 10 July 1987, 4.

59. Zagladin interviewed by W. Holzer and P. Simonitsch, "Wir können uns keine lange Pause leisten," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2 April 1987, 8; and Portugalov, "Double Strategy—Double Error,"13.

60. Falin interviewed by J. Jagla, "Ein großes Hindernis auf dem Weg zur Verständigung," *Kölnische Rundschau*, 27 August 1987, 5.

61. See "Wiedervereinigung als 'Sicherheitskonzept,' " *FAZ*, 20 May 1987, 5. The FDP also addressed the issue. Otto Graf Lambsdorff even argued that a Soviet offer of reunification was a possibility. "Brunner für aktive Wiedervereinigungspolitik," *FAZ*, 21 May 1987, 2. For a Soviet response, see "International Observers Roundtable,"Moscow Domestic Service, 24 May 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 27 May 1987, CC3.

62. See Yu. Yakhontov, "Ekho na Reine," *Pravda*, 30 September 1987, 4.

63. See Falin in DPA, 9 July 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1987, H10–H11; MID spokesman Boris Pyadyshev, Moscow Domestic Service, 9 July 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1987, CC1; and Gerasimov cited in *Bild*, 19 August 1987, 2, in FBIS-SOV, 19 August 1987, AA1.

64. Shevardnadze in "Na konferentsii po razoruzheniyu, *Pravda*, 7 August 1987, 4. See also Yury Zhukov, "Zakoldovanny krug?," *Pravda*, 8 August 1987, 4.

65. In July, Genscher had hinted at the readiness of Bonn to abandon the missiles. See James Markham, "Soviet Calls the Tune in Duet Set in Germany," *New York Times*, 19 July 1987, E3. On the changing attitudes of the West German public toward the USSR, see Michael Gordon, "Soviet Leads U.S. in Arms Cuts Image," *New York Times*, 7 June 1987, 7. For arguments that the West German concession was imposed by Washington, see Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 117–118; and Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West*, 350. Portugalov even charged that the United States had "passed the buck"by pressuring Bonn to give up the Pershing 1As, which were "of no interest whatsoever"to Moscow. DPA, 18 August 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 19 August 1987, AA2.

66. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroika: revolyutsia prodolzhaetsya," *Pravda*, 3 November 1987, 2–5.

67. The most well-known examples came from Dashichev. See "Vostok-zapad: poisk novykh otnosheny," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 18 May 1988, 14; and "Dorogi, kotorye nam vybirayut," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 19 June 1988, 3.

68. See Dashichev, "October Revolution, Peace, Peaceful Coexistence," *New Times*, 9 November 1987, 7; Stanislav Kondrashov, "Vpered upornaya borba," *Izvestia*, 4 May 1988, 5; IMEMO's O. N. Bykov, "Novoye myshleniye i stariye stereotipy," *Izvestia*, 7 May 1988, 6; and Bovin, "Lyod tronulsya," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 12 June 1988, 6.

69. See Falin, Saarländischer Rundfunk, 11 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1988, 32; Leonid Pochivalov, "Tam, za stenoi . . . , " *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 2 March 1988, 15; MID spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko, "Nerazlichniye vragi ili neprimirimiye druzya?," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 6 April 1988, 14; and *Pravda*'s

Grigoriev, on 'Repercussions,"Moscow Television Service, 7 April 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 12 April 1988, 10.

70. Zhurkin was closely linked to Yakovlev and Arbatov. Author's interview with ISKAN's Aleksandr Danielov, 29 September 1992, Richmond, Virginia; and Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), new introduction, xxxvii–xxxviii. For Zhurkin's ideas, see Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, 'Reasonable Sufficiency," *New Times*, 12 October 1987, 13–15; Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 'Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novye," *Kommunist*, no. 1 (January 1988): 42–50; and Zhurkin, 'Unikalnaya sudba starovo kontinenta," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 6 March 1988, 6.

71. See Michel Tatu, '19th Party Conference," *Problems of Communism* 38 (May–August 1988): 1–15.

72. See Alex Pravda, 'Linkages Between Domestic and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union," in *The West European Community and the Gorbachev Challenge*, ed. Armand Clesse and Thomas Schelling (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989), 92–107.

73. Gorbachev's Report: June 28, 1988, *19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Documents and Materials* (Washington, DC: Embassy of the USSR, 1988), 37.

74. Dashichev interviewed by J. Mettke and F. Meyer, 'So stand der Wagen vor dem Pferd," *Der Spiegel*, 4 July 1988, 123–128. See also Bovin, 'Lyod tronulsya," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 12 June 1988, 6.

75. Gorbachev's Report: June 29, 1988, 32. See also Zagladin, "*Perestroika* and Soviet Foreign Policy," in *West European Community*, ed. Clesse and Schelling, 193–194.

76. 'Vystupleniye tovarishcha Kvitsinskovo Yu. A.," *Pravda*, 3 July 1988, 2. The stark difference between the tone of his speech and his remarks appearing in the Western press illustrated the extent to which Soviet officials routinely tailored their message to fit their audience. See, for example, Kvitsinsky's speech to the CDU foreign policy congress, published in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 May 1988, 10.

77. Gorbachev's Report: June 29, 1988, 37.

78. Shevardnadze, 'Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsia MID SSSR," *Vestnik MID*, no. 15 (15 August 1988): 29, 32, 34. See also Dashichev, 'October Revolution, Peace, Peaceful Coexistence," *New Times*, 9 November 1987, 7.

79. Ligachev, 'Za delo—bezraskachki," *Pravda*, 6 August 1988, 2.

80. Arbatov, 'Peremeny v mire, v evo ponimanii," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 25 September 1988, 5. See also the more authoritative response by Vadim Medvedev, 'Sovremennaya kontseptsiya sotsializma," *Pravda*, 5 October 1988, 4.

81. Genscher quoted in 'Zayavleniye ministra," *Pravda*, 16 July 1988, 4. See also Genscher, 'Bonn-Moskau: Chancen und Verantwortung," *SZ*, 29 July 1988, 10.

82. Zagladin, 'Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 6 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 10 February 1988, 11–12; and Gorbachev in 'Beseda M. S. Gorbacheva s M. Bangemanom," *Pravda*, 17 May 1988, 1. A Foreign Ministry conference in July acknowledged Moscow's neglect of Europe. Anatoli Kovalev, 'First Section. Soviet Foreign Policy Priorities," *International Affairs* (October 1988): 37.

83. Gorbachev in 'Vstrecha s L. Shpetom," *Vestnik MID*, no. 5 (15 March 1988): 5; and Kvitsinsky in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 May 1988, 10.

84. See, for example, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky, 'Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 6 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 10 February 1988, 13.

85. Leonid Pochivalov, 'Tam, za stenoi . . . ," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 2 March 1988, 15; Dashichev, 'Mauer wird verschwinden müssen," *Die Welt*, 9 June 1988, 8; and 'So stand der Wagen vor dem Pferd,"123–127. Also Portugalov, 'Nostalgia Kristofa Bertrama," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 19 June 1988, 6.

86. 'Späth: Moskau will Beziehungen ausbauen," *SZ*, 10 February 1988, 2. In March, Gerasimov spoke approvingly of reducing 'to a minimum both the ideological and associated military confrontation in Europe by establishing economic cooperation."'Leidenskiye motify," *Sovetskaya kultura*, 22 March 1988, 7.

87. Gorbachev, 'Vstrecha s L. Shpetom,"5.

88. 'Offener Richtungsstreit zwischen Parteizeitungen in der Sowjetunion," *SZ*, 6 April 1988, 1. See also, DPA, 5 April 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 16 April 1988, 33.

89. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 6 April 1988, 2.

90. Genscher, 'Za rasshireniye sotrudnichestva," *Izvestia*, 7 October 1988, 5; and Späth on TASS, 10 February 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 10 February 1988, 42.

91. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 17 May 1988, 2. Bangemann on TASS, 12 May 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 17 May 1988, 50.

92. Shishlin on Prague Domestic Service, 15 June 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 16 June 1988, 5.

93. See CMEA Secretary General Vyacheslav Sychyov. *Pravda* (Bratislava), 16 June 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 20 June 1988, 4.

94. V. Sychyov interviewed by V. Robkov and V. Sharov, 'SEV-EES: Vzaimy interes," *Pravda*, 24 June 1988, 7.

95. Genscher cited in Robert McCartney, 'Comecon, EC End Hostilities," *Washington Post*, 26 June 1988, A22.

96. S. Zyubanov, 'Tikhoi sapoi . . . ," *Pravda*, 4 May 1988, 5; and 'Dvizheniye, no kuda?," *Pravda*, 28 August 1988, 5.

97. See Soviet foreign ministry official Aleksandr Bondarenko, 'Das macht uns große Sorgen," *Profil*, 8 August 1988, 16–17; and Yevgeny Primakov interviewed on Vienna Domestic Service, 16 May 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 16 May 1988, 42.

98. Soviet officials even went so far as to censor Vienna's ambassador to the USSR regarding the rationale for Austria's desire to join the EEC. See 'Tass zensurierte Rede von Österreichs Botschafter," *Die Presse*, 28 October 1988, 1.

99. See 'Wir werden niemals das Schwert erheben," *Der Spiegel*, 4 January 1988, 19; 'Klein machen!: Wie Helmut Kohl zum eigenen Machterhang mit CDU–Rivalen umgeht," *Stern*, 24 March 1988, 40–46; and 'Sozialdemokraten: 'Viele fleißige Solisten:' SPD–Politiker versuchen mit Reisen in Ost und West ihr aussenpolitisches Profil aufzupolieren," *Stern*, 30 March 1988, 278–280.

100. Shevardnadze, 'Pozitivny dialog," *Pravda*, 19 January 1988, 4.

101. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 19 January 1988, 4; and *Vestnik MID*, no. 3 (15 February 1988): 26.

102. Genscher, 'Positivny dialog," *Pravda*, 19 January 1988, 4.

103. Genscher in Anatoly Frenkin, 'H.-D. Gensher: 'Perestroika—v tsentre vnimania,' " *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 3 August 1988, 9.

104. Falin, 'Es ist nie zu spät, Gutes zu tun," *Der Spiegel*, 8 August 1988, 26; and Genscher on TASS, 2 August 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 3 August 1988, 33. See also Yu.

Yakhontov, "Doveriye prinosit plody," *Pravda*, 2 August 1988, 5. Recall that TASS had censored Weizsäcker's remarks on ethnic Germans just one year earlier.

105. Genscher's interview with V. Markov, "Gans-Ditrikh Gensher: otnosheniye mezhdu FRG i SSSR znachitelno uluchshilis," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 7 August 1988, 1.

106. See the DPA account of the meeting between Genscher and Gorbachev. DPA, 30 July 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 1 August 1988, 31. See also Gorbachev's remarks to Martin Bangemann. *Pravda*, 17 May 1988, 1.

107. Both Gorbachev and Genscher's remarks appeared in *Izvestia*, 1 August 1988, 1. See also Frenkin, "H.-D. Gensher," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 3 August 1988, 9.

108. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 1 August 1988, 1.

109. Shevardnadze, "V konstruktivnoi obstanovke," *Izvestia*, 1 August 1988, 3; Genscher in Frenkin, "H.-D. Gensher" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 3 August 1988, 9; and Kohl cited in "Kohl: Die Gespräche mit Gorbatschow können zum Markstein in den Beziehungen werden," *FAZ*, 2 August 1988, 1.

CHAPTER 4

1. See Mark Kramer, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," *Soviet Studies* 42 (July 1990): 429–446.

2. See "Neubesetzungen im Moskauer Parteiapparat: Falin tritt am Dobrynins Stelle," *FAZ*, 20 October 1988, 1, 2; and "Falin wird angeblich Nachfolger Dobrynins," *SZ*, 20 October 1988, 7. From his first visit to the FRG in 1987, Dobrynin did not impress West German politicians with his concern for their interests. See Robbin Laird, *The Soviets, Germany, and the New Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 153.

3. Falin interviewed by R. Borngässer, "Zeil muß sein, das Grenzen die Völker nicht trennen," *Die Welt*, 21 October 1988, iii.

4. See Bernard Küppers, "Walentin Falin," *SZ*, 21 October 1988, 4. Falin's attitudes toward the United States evoked some American concerns. See Philip Taubman, "Soviets Promote Ex-Envoy Cool to U.S.," *New York Times*, 21 October 1988, A3.

5. See Gorbachev's remarks in *19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Documents and Materials* (Washington, DC: Embassy of the USSR, 1988), 37; Shevardnadze, "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy," *International Affairs* (October 1988): 3–34; Oleg Bogomolov in "Ot balansa sil—k balansu interesov," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 29 June 1988, 14; Petrovsky on "Studio Nine,"Moscow Television Service, 30 July 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 2 August 1988, 12; and Georgy Arbatov, "Glasnost, peregovory, razoruzheniye," *Pravda*, 17 October 1988, 6.

6. Gorbachev cited in Udo Bergdoll, "Gorbatschow: Das Eis ist gebrochen," *SZ*, 25 October 1988, 1.

7. Gorbachev, "Politiker sollten ihre Worte wägen," *Der Spiegel*, 24 October 1988, 30; and Falin's interview in *Die Welt*, 21 October 1988, iii.

8. See Y. Bovkun and S. Guk, "Nuzhen delovoi podkhod," *Izvestia*, 14 October 1988, 5; Anatoly Frenkin, "Effekt Gelmuta Kolya," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 19 October 1988, 14; and Ye. Grigoryev, "Vozmozhnosti ochevidny," *Pravda*, 23 Octo-

ber 1988, 5. The *Pravda* article offered an unexpectedly favorable evaluation of Kohl. Viktor Afanasyev, the paper's conservative editor, had come very close to losing his job in the recent Central Committee shake-up. See *FAZ*, 20 October 1988, 2. He apparently hoped to soften Gorbachev's dissatisfaction with *Pravda*'s performance by supporting the Soviet leader on an important foreign policy venture.

9. Gorbachev, "Politiker sollten ihre Worte wägen,"26.

10. Gorbachev, "Politiker sollten ihre Worte wägen,"30; and Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 132.

11. See the poll in "Lieber wir Deutsche die Russen?," *Stern*, 20 October 1988, 134–148. For skeptical views of Gorbachev's rhetoric on the German question, see "In der Deutschlandfrage keine Perestrojka," *SZ*, 12 October 1988, 9.

12. Kohl cited in Ye. Bovkun and Ye. Grishin, "Gelmut Kol: My smotrim drug na druga c bolshei nepredvzyatostyu," *Izvestia*, 22 October 1988, 6.

13. Kohl cited in "Nuzhen delovoi podkhod," *Izvestia*, 14 October 1988, 5.

14. Kohl in "Obrashcheniye Federalnovo kantslera FRG Gelmuta Kolya k chitatelyam 'Ekonomicheskoi gazety,' " *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 42 (October 1988): supplement, 1.

15. Kohl in TASS, 22 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 24 October 1988, 17.

16. Kohl cited in "Vozmozhnosti ochevidny," *Pravda*, 23 October 1988, 5.

17. "Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva s G. Kolem," *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, 1.

18. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, 2. See Falin's remarks on ZDF, 23 September 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 24 September 1987, 49; and Honecker's response in *Neues Deutschland*, 29 September 1987, 4.

19. Kohl, "Das gemeinsame europäische Haus muß viele Türen haben," *Tagesspiegel*, 25 October 1988, 6.

20. On the domestic pressure Kohl faced, see Stephan-Andreas Casdorff, "Disput im Kabinett über Berlin-Formel," *SZ*, 21 October 1988, 1. Western and especially US emphasis on the Berlin problem gained heightened visibility before Kohl's Moscow visit. See "Kritik an Moskaus Haltung zu Berlin," *SZ*, 7 October 1988, 8.

21. Kohl, *Tagesspiegel*, 25 October 1988, 6.

22. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, p. 2.

23. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, p. 2.

24. Falin's interview in *Die Welt*, 21 October 1988, iii.

25. Kohl on Moscow Television Service, 26 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 27 October 1988, 30. See also DPA, 25 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 27 October 1988, 35.

26. Cited in Avril Pittman, *From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations Since 1974* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 158–159.

27. Kohl on DPA, 26 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 27 October 1988, 26. A list of the agreements signed appeared in "Peregovori v Kremle," *Pravda*, 26 October 1988, 1.

28. Gorbachev, *Vestnik MID*, no. 5 (15 March 1988): 2.

29. See Shevardnadze in *Vestnik MID*, no. 4 (1 March 1988): 16; and Falin interviewed by W. Kenntemich in *Bild*, 6 January 1988, 1,4, in FBIS-SOV, 6 January 1988, 3.

30. See Moscow Domestic Service, 22 January 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 1 February 1988, 34–35.

31. Shevardnadze in *Vestnik MID*, no. 3 (15 February 1988): 31. For criticisms of Bonn's role, see Yu. Yakhontov, "Na yadernoi osnove," *Pravda*, 31 January 1988, 5. Moreover, claims of West German revanchism did not disappear entirely from Soviet publications. See L. Levadov and M. Zheglov, "Yad revanshizma," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 April 1988, 3.

32. On the SS-20 decision, see Vitaly Zhurkin, "Unikalnaya sudba starova kontinenta," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 6 March 1988, 6; Gerasimov, Budapest Television Service, 15 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 20 October 1988, 6; and Dashichev, "So stand der Wagen vor dem Pherd," *Der Spiegel*, 4 July 1988, 123–127. On Afghanistan, see Dashichev, "So stand der Wagen"; and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, "Panorama,"Budapest Television Service, 20 August 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 22 August 1988, 45.

33. See chief MID arms control expert Viktor Karpov, "Repercussions,"Moscow Television Service, 7 April 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 12 April 1988, 6; Stanislav Kondrashov's two-part series, "Obychnye sily," *Izvestia*, (I) 2 April 1988, 6, and (II) 3 April 1988, 5; Arbatov, "Glasnost, peregovory, razoruzheniye," *Pravda*, 17 October 1988, 6; and arms control official Nikita Smidovich, cited in Michael Grabenströer, "Wir haben die Chance, die da existierte, nicht genutzt," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 21 November 1988, 2.

34. Shevardnadze, "Dogmatismus und Einheitsdenken am Pranger," *Die Welt*, 21 October 1988, i; and *International Affairs*, no. 10 (October 1988): 62.

35. See *Vestnik MID*, no. 15 (15 August 1988): 11–15.

36. See Foreign Ministry spokesman Gremitskikh on TASS, 21 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 24 October 1988, 24. Also Petrovsky on "Panorama,"Budapest Television Service, 19 August 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 22 August 1988, 46.

37. Kohl, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, 2; and Kohl cited in Grigoryev, "Vozmozhnosti ochevidny," *Pravda*, 23 October 1988, 5.

38. Kohl on TASS, 17 July 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 19 July 1988, 54; and Moscow Television Service, 26 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 28 October 1988, 29. Genscher cited in Yu. Yakhontov, "Zayavleniye ministra," *Pravda*, 16 July 1988, 4. Speaking before the Polish Sejm on 11 July 1988, Gorbachev called for an all-European summit meeting focused solely on this topic. *Vestnik MID*, no. 15 (15 August 1988): 6–9.

39. Gorbachev, *For a "Common European Home," For a New Way of Thinking* (Moscow: Novosti, 1987), 25.

40. See Zagladin in "Sagladin: Völlige Abrüstung ist anzustreben," *FAZ*, 7 October 1988, 5; and Zhurkin, "Studio Nine,"Moscow Television Service, 30 July 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 2 August 1988, 14.

41. Anatoli Kovalev, "Soviet Foreign Policy Priorities," *International Affairs*, no. 10 (October 1988): 36–37. See also MID official Boris Pyadyshev on "International Observers Roundtable," Moscow Domestic Service, 16 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 17 October 1988, 5. Earlier, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh had stated his opposition to any one-sided steps, rejecting even the unilateral release of data on conventional forces. "Panorama,"Budapest Television Service, 19 August 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 22 August 1988, 46–47.

42. See Vitaly Shlykov, "On the History of Tank Asymmetry in Europe, *International Affairs*, no. 10 (October 1988): 105–116; and "Strong Is the Armour . . .

(Tank Asymmetry and Real Security)," *International Affairs*, no. 12 (December 1988): 37–48.

43. This debate took place on 'Studio Nine,"Moscow Television Service, 30 July 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 2 August 1988. Zhurkin's quotations appear on p. 14, and those of Petrovsky on pp. 12 and 15.

44. See Kohl's remarks in Grigoryev, 'Vozmozhnosti ochevidny," *Pravda*, 23 October 1988, 5; Genscher in Yu. Yakhontov, 'Zayavleniye ministra," *Pravda*, 16 July 1988, 4; and SPD Chairman Vogel on DPA, 12 May 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 12 May 1988, 44.

45. Reprinted as Gorbachev, 'Statements on Conventional Arms Control," *Survival* 31 (March–April 1989): 171–176.

46. Shevardnadze interviewed by Yu. Bandura, 'Chto zabotit Sovetskikh diplomatov," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 25 December 1988, 8.

47. Sergei Karaganov, Moscow Television Service, 14 December 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 22 December 1988, 2.

48. Kulikov cited in 'Militärs warnen Gorbatschow vor Ungleichgewicht," *Die Welt*, 27 December 1988, 9. See Akhromeyev's comment in 'Sootnosheniye voennikh sil v evrope i perevori," *Pravda*, 2 March 1989, 4.

49. For Lushev's remarks, see 'V interesakh mira i bezopasnosti narodov," *Sovetskaya Latvia*, 18 February 1989, 3; and 'V interesakh prochnovo mira," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 March 1989, 3. Those calling for reciprocation included Colonel General N. Chervov, chief of directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, in TASS, 21 January 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 23 January 1989, 3; and Major General Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna conventional arms talks, in TASS, 29 March 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 March 1992, 2.

50. See 'Kohl: Noch ist keine Parität in Sicht," *FAZ*, 9 December 1988, 2; and 'Washington bekundet Verständnis für die vorzeitige Rückkehr Gorbatschows in die Sowjetunion," *FAZ*, 9 December 1988, 2.

51. 'Genscher dringt auf Gespräche über konventionelle Stabilität," *FAZ*, 12 December 1988, 1.

52. O. Grinevsky cited in S. Tosunyan, 'Vena: Diskussii nosyat konstruktivny kharakter," *Izvestia*, 23 March 1989, 4.

53. See Major General Gely Batenin in TASS, 9 February 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 9 February 1989, 4.

54. See, for example, Ye. Bovkun, 'Esli by FRG skazala 'net,' " *Izvestia*, 7 April 1989, 5.

55. Shevardnadze, 'Dan start Venskim peregovoram," *Pravda*, 7 March 1989, 4; and TASS, 4 March 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 6 March 1989, 3. Kohl cited in 'Ispolzovat shans," *Pravda*, 6 March 1989, 5.

56. Burlatsky, 'Faktor vremeni," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 March 1989, 9.

57. Shevardnadze, 'Dan start Venskim peregovoram," *Pravda*, 7 March 1989, 4.

58. Karpov on Moscow World Service, 26 March 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 27 March 1989, 1.

59. Stanislav Kondrashov, 'Ozhidania novykh proryvov," *Izvestia*, 23 April 1989, 3. Burlatsky suggested US policy was reminiscent of the Brezhnev period. 'Faktor vremeni," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 March 1989, 9.

60. See Weizsäcker's remarks reported in Stanislav Kondrashov, "London, Bonn i 'trety nul,' " *Izvestia*, 5 May 1989, 4.

61. Kondrashov, *Izvestia*, 5 May 1989, 4. See also Ye. Grigoryev and A. Maslennikov, "Nakanune vizita," *Pravda*, 12 June 1989, 5. TASS praised "the responsible position of Helmut Kohl's government" for its stand on the tactical nuclear question. TASS, 12 May 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 May 1989, 29.

62. Ye. Gigoryev, "Shest chasov rechei i sporov," *Pravda*, 28 April 1989, 5. See Egon Bahr's remarks on TASS, 28 February 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1989, 6.

63. Shevardnadze, "Beseda E. A. Shevardnadze," *Pravda*, 3 June 1989, 7.

64. See, for instance, Gorbachev's press conference published in *Die Welt*, 16 June 1989, 8.

65. Gorbachev, "Weitsichtig handelt, wer vorausschaut und ein gerechtfertiges Risiko eingeht," in *Gorbatschow in Bonn: Die Zukunft der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), 38–47.

66. V. Seltsovsky, "USSR Foreign Trade in 1989: A Statistical Review," *Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 15 (April 1990), in FBIS-SOV, 20 April 1990, 57. USSR State Committee for Statistics, "Social and Economic Development of the USSR in the First Half of 1990," *Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 32 (August 1990), in FBIS-SOV, 15 August 1990, 56. On joint ventures, see B. Tuyukin, "Joint Ventures: The Hopes and the Actual Yield," *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*, no. 5 (January 1990), in FBIS-SOV, 13 February 1990, 107; and Georgy Zubkov, "Repercussions," Moscow Television Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 2 March 1980, 65.

67. Gorbachev, "Weitsichtig handelt," 40.

68. "Gorbachev's Turn," *The Economist*, 10 June 1989, 47; and Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power," *Problems of Communism* (July–August 1990): 18–20.

69. For joint venture statistics, see "Official Reports," *Izvestia*, 11 April 1989, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 17 April 1989, 35. Ryzhkov's quote is from Hans-Joachim Deckert and Rainer Nahrendorf, "We Can Contribute to the Construction of the Common European Home," *Handelsblatt*, 12 June 1989, 3–4, in FBIS-SOV, 16 June 1989, 33.

70. Gorbachev, "Stroit novy obshchy dom v Evrope," *Pravda*, 15 June 1989, 3. See also Manfred Schell, "Falin: Wir sind bereit, tiefgreifende Veränderungen durchzuführen," *Die Welt*, 24 January 1990, 6.

71. See "Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva c Kh.-I. Fogelem," *Pravda*, 12 April 1989, 3; and Ryzhkov, interviewed by Hans-Joachim Deckert and Rainer Nahrendorf, "We Can Contribute to the Construction of the Common European Home," *Handelsblatt*, 12 June 1989, 3–4, in FBIS-SOV, 16 June 1989, 31–33.

72. Kohl, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, 2; and Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 25 October 1988, 2.

73. Ost in DPA, 24 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 26 October 1988, 26.

74. Kohl on Moscow Television Service, 26 October 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 27 October 1988, 29; and Kohl, "My otkryty dlya sotrudnichestva," *Izvestia*, 6 June 1989, 3.

75. See Shevardnadze's interview in *Moskovskiye novosti*, 11 June 1989, 6; Zagladin, "Wenn der Dialog die Konfrontation ersetzt," *Die Welt*, 6 June 1989, iii; and Portugalov cited in "Bonner Politiker erwarten eine Vertiefung der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen," *SZ*, 12 June 1989, 1.

76. For various examples of these points, see the remarks by Gerasimov and Portugalov, TASS, 9 June 1989; and Zhurkin, TASS, 11 June 1989; both in FBIS-SOV, 12 June 1989, 24–25. Also Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin and S. Guk, "Vse gotovok k vstreche," *Izvestia*, no. 163, 12 June 1989, 1, 6.

77. Gorbachev, "Wir können kühner nach vorn blicken," *SZ*, 14 June, 1989, 6.

78. Shevardnadze's interview in *Moskovskiye novosti*, 11 June 1989, 6.

79. See Kohl's remarks and those of other leading FRG officials in "Bonner Politiker erwarten eine Vertiefung der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen," *SZ*, 12 June 1989, 1. See also Genscher's interview, "Worten müssen auch bei uns Taten folgen," *Der Spiegel*, 12 June 1989, 22.

80. See Kohl's remarks in an interview with Ye. Grigoryev and A. Maslennikov, "Podderzhivat regulyarny politichesky dialog," *Pravda*, 10 June 1989, 6. On Weizsäcker's visit, see "Osten des Westens," *Der Spiegel*, 12 June 1989, 24–25.

81. See "Freundschaftliche Begegnung mit dem Außenminister der VR China," *Neues Deutschland*, 13 June 1989, 1.

82. Zagladin, *Die Welt*, 6 June 1989, iii; and Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the MID Information Directorate, TASS, 6 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 7 June 1989, 3.

83. "Vstrecha na zemle GDR," *Pravda*, 10 June 1989, 6. For an unconvincing East German article denying any differences with Moscow, see Fritz Wengler, "Maiskiye razdymya," *Izvestia*, 8 May 1989, 4.

84. Shevardnadze's interview in *Moskovskiye novosti*, 11 June 1989, 6. Afanasevsky on "Repercussions,"Moscow Television Service, 20 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 22 June 1989, 13.

85. "Vstrecha na beregakh Reina," *Pravda*, 14 June 1989, 2; Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 12–13. One West German account claimed Gorbachev privately assured his West German hosts that "Erich Honecker will start to move soon."H. Karutz, "Die SED–Führung treibt die Sorge um das 'China-Syndrom' um," *Die Welt*, 21 June 1989, 4.

86. Herrmann, "V bratskikh partiakh," *Pravda*, 23 June 1989, 7. See also "Neonazis in der BDR sind weiter auf dem Vormarsch," *Neues Deutschland*, 20 June 1989, 1.

87. "Osobaya otvetstvennost," *Pravda*, 19 June 1989, 5; and K. von Schnitzler, "Die beiden deutschen Staaten und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht," *Neues Deutschland*, 17–18 June 1989, 2.

88. See *Pravda*, 29 June 1989, 1–2; and *Neues Deutschland*, 29 June 1989, 1.

89. "Sovmestnoye zayavleniye," *Pravda*, 14 June 1989, 1–2. See Garton Ash for an analysis of the content and contradictions of the joint declaration. *In Europe's Name*, 113–117.

90. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2. He showed uncharacteristic bad form in joking that the agreement contained no "secret supplements." "Beseda M. S. Gorbacheva s G.-D. Gensherom," *Pravda*, 14 June 1989, 2. In a symbolic concession, the Soviet side finally acceded to a longtime West German demand regarding the Russian spelling of the Federal Republic of Germany, changing it to *Federalnaya Respublika Germaniya*, instead of *Germanii*. The change implied the existence of a single Germany, rather than two. See Oldenburg, "Vier Tage im Juni 1989,"988.

91. Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin, and S. Guk, "Vizit v FRG nachalsya," *Izvestia*, no. 164, 12 June 1989, 1. The same authors contended that "the FRG's Eastern policy is

becoming as important as its Western policy. This joint declaration is being compared to some extent with the 1970 Moscow Treaty. . . . But the common home does not just presuppose simple good-neighborly relations between the countries of East and West, but their collective participation in creating fundamentally new interstate relations, free of mistrust and the 'enemy image.' In these conditions, the intensification of cooperation with the Soviet Union represents a task on an all-European scale for the FRG." Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin, and S. Guk, "Kredit doveria," *Izvestia*, no. 165, 13 June 1989, 1.

92. Y. Grigoryev, A. Maslennikov, and I. Melnikov, "Slozheniye usily," *Pravda*, 16 June 1989, 1, 5.

93. "Sotrudnichesto vo imya mira," *Pravda*, 19 June 1989, 1.

94. See Petrovsky interviewed by J. Riedmiller, "Bonner Erklärung dient als Beispiel," *SZ*, 23 June 1989, 6; and Gerasimov, TASS, 13 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 14 June 1989, 34.

95. Weizsäcker, "Chance zu gemeinsamer humaner Zukunft," *SZ*, 14 June 1989, 6; and Kohl, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2.

96. Kohl, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2.

97. Nikolai Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen," *Der Spiegel*, 5 June 1989, 172. Moiseyev in R.-M. Borngässer, "Sowjet-General hält die Teilung für korrigierbar," *Die Welt*, 5 May 1989, 12. See also CC expert Zagladin in "Waigel: UdSSR wieder an Bonn interessiert," *SZ*, 26 April 1989, 5.

98. Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen,"172.

99. Dashichev interviewed by Detmar Karmer, Deutschlandfunk Network, 2 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1989, 4–7.

100. Gorbachev on Vienna Television Service, 15 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 June 1989, 23.

101. Kohl, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2.

102. Genscher, "Na puti k edinoi Evrope," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 18 June 1989, 6.

103. Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen," 172. Shevardnadze and Arbatov also expressed new flexibility on the Berlin Wall. Shevardnadze: TASS, 31 May 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 1 June 1989, 13; and Arbatov interviewed by Peter Sissons, ITV Television Network, 31 May 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 2 June 1989, 4.

104. Gorbachev on Vienna Television Service, 15 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 June 1989, 23. Honecker continued to claim that the Wall was a direct response to the imminent threat of a Western invasion. See "Honecker: Die Mauer is Schutz vor Invasion," *FAZ*, 22 April 1985, 2. Soviet officials and commentators had publicly denied the presence of any such threat. In January 1989, Honecker amended his justification for the Wall, contending the SED had the right to protect its citizens from "plunder," referring to the West German exchange rate of one West German mark for seven East German marks. "Schlußbemerkungen Erich Honeckers," *Neues Deutschland*, 20 January 1989, 5.

105. See Kohl, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2; Portugalov on DPA, 11 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 June 1989, 23; and Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin, and S. Guk, "Vse gotovo k vstreche," *Izvestia*, 12 June 1989, 1,6.

106. Dashichev interviewed by Detmar Karmer, Deutschlandfunk Network, 2 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1989, 4; and Gorbachev's press conference, *Die Welt*, 16 June 1989, 8.

107. Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 15 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 June 1989, 22. See also Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 430–434.

108. Kohl, *Pravda*, 13 June 1989, 2.

109. Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen,"170.

110. Arbatov interviewed by Bjarne Stenquist, "Arbatov on Europe Future," *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 April 1989, 11, in FBIS-SOV, 26 April 1989, 5.

111. Cited in Robert McCartney, "Shevardnadze Hits NATO Arms Plans," *Washington Post*, 20 January 1988, A20.

112. Nikolai Shishlin on "International Observers Roundtable," Moscow Domestic Service, 30 April 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 1 May 1989, 15; Bovin, "Diskussii vokrug yubileya," *Izvestia*, 27 April 1989, 4; and Kondrashov, "London, Bonn i 'Trety nul,' " *Izvestia*, 5 May 1989, 4. *Izvestia* also pointed out Western accusations of a "new Rapallo"in Soviet–West German relations. Ye. Bovkun, Ye. Grishin, and S. Guk, "Vizit v FRG nachalsya," *Izvestia*, no. 164, 12 June 1989, 1.

113. Genscher, "Ne dat ostanovitsya protsessu razoruzhenia," *Pravda*, 22 June 1989, 5; Teltschik on "Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 3 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 5 June 1989, 30; and Weizsäcker, Moscow Television Service, 15 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 16 June 1989, 27.

114. Genscher, *Moskovskiye novosti*, 18 June 1989, 6.

115. "Jakowlew nennt Moskauer Verabredungen 'in vollem Umfang' gültig," *FAZ*, 10 January 1989, 2. Bovin was more direct in admitting that the West German response to Gorbachev is unique because "there is the problem of unification for them. They understand that without the Soviet Union this is not possible whatever happens. And from this derives their specific nature in relation to European policy."Moscow Domestic Service, 9 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1989, 45.

116. Gorbachev's new conference on Moscow Domestic Service, 15 June 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 June 1989, 22.

117. Zagladin, "Zur sowjetischen Konzeption eines Gesamteuropäischen Hauses," *SZ*, 12 June 1989, 47.

CHAPTER 5

1. See Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 421–422; and Falin interviewed in "'Die Straße wird regieren,' " *Die Zeit*, 13 March 1992, 17.

2. For example, Charles Gati, *The Bloc That Failed* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Karen Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ronald Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane, *Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991); and Gedmin, *The Hidden Hand*. An exception to this characterization is Glenn Chafetz, *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine* (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1993).

3. Shishlin interviewed in *Liberation*, 22 September 1989, 4 in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 28–29.

4. On Hungarian neutrality, see Oleg Bogomolov, Budapest Domestic Service, 8 February, 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 9 February 1989, 34. Arbatov noted the potential for instability while major changes were underway. Interview with Bjarne Stenquist, "Arbatov on Europe's Future," *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 April 1989, 11, in FBIS-SOV, 26 April 1989, 5. See the MID's Petrovsky on the "social experiment"in

Poland and Hungary. "Bonner Erklärung dient als Beispiel," *SZ*, 23 June 1989, 6. On unfolding "changes in social and political order,"see Zagladin, "Zur sowjetischen Konzeption eines Gesamteuropäischen Hauses," *SZ*, 12 June 1989, 47. Bovin mentioned potential changes in the CMEA and Warsaw Pact on Moscow Television Service, 22 October 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 24 October 1989, 20.

5. See, for instance, Gorbachev's response to a question on democratization in Poland and Hungary. *Pravda*, 7 July 1989, 3.

6. For Dashichev's remarks, see Cologne Deutschland Rundfunk Network, 2 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1989, 5. Gorbachev's remarks appeared in *Pravda*, 7 July 1989, 2. See Gerasimov's statement, Rome ANSA, 8 September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 8 September 1989, 24. See also Oleg Bogomolov, Budapest MTI, 24 April 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 26 April 1989, 39.

7. Gyula Horn, *Freiheit, Die Ich Meine* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991), 326–327; and Schabowski's remarks in Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 93.

8. Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship," *East European Quarterly* 26 (January 1993): 436.

9. See Chafetz, *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine*, 37.

10. See the remarks of Sergei Tarasenko, a close Shevardnadze adviser, in Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 124.

11. On Hungary, see Gedmin, *Hidden Hand*, 91–92. L. Toporkov discussed Gorbachev's telephone call to Rakowski in "Delo za programmoi pravitelstva," *Izvestia*, 23 August 1989.

12. Gorbachev's East German remarks were broadcast on "Vremya,"Moscow Television Service, 6 October 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 10 October 1989, 26; and the account of Fojtik's visit to Moscow appeared in Mary Battiata, "Czechoslovakia: Police Riot Sticks Spawn a Revolution," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1990, A39.

13. Chafetz traced this process in *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine*.

14. See Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After,"435.

15. Kvitsinsky evaluated the Gorbachev leadership's stance in similar terms. *Vor dem Sturm*, 14–15.

16. Noteworthy accounts of this process include Gedmin, *Hidden Hand*; Konrad Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York: Oxford University, 1994); and Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall*. Major East German participants have added to this literature. See Egon Krenz, *Wenn Mauern Fallen* (Vienna: Paul Neff Verlag, 1990); Hans Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur, 1991); and Wolfgang Schäuble, *Das Politbüro* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), and *Der Absturz* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991).

17. Shishlin interviewed in *Liberation*, 22 September 1989, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 28–29.

18. Wolfe cited in Serge Schmemann, "Old Master Spy in East Berlin Tells Why He Backs Changes," *New York Times*, 22 November 1989, A14. Gedmin detailed Wolf's reformist tendencies and his connections with the Soviet leadership. *Hidden Hand*, 84.

19. According to a US diplomat in the GDR, G. Jonathan Greenwald. *Berlin Witness: An American Diplomat's Chronicle of East Germany's Revolution* (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1993), 116, 192, 287. Kvitsinsky claimed, however, that his pessimistic reports were largely ignored. *Vor dem Sturm*, 14.

20. Portugalov, Vienna Domestic Service, 9 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 11 December 1989, 4. See also Shevardnadze, *Future Belongs to Freedom*, 145.

21. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2. See also his interview with L. Pleshakov, "Ubezhdat pravoi," *Ogonyok*, 10–17 March 1990, 4.

22. Gerasimov on Moscow Television Service, 12 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 November 1989, 32.

23. See Kochemasov's interview "Schmeichelei und Unterwürfigkeit," *Der Spiegel*, 16 November 1992, 148. One British account claimed that Soviet diplomats in East Berlin defied Honecker's decree and delivered by hand the banned Soviet publications to East German subscribers. "East Germany Caves in to Bookstall Glasnost," *Sunday Times*, 24 October 1989, 9. On the withdrawal of East German diplomats from Moscow, see "Sah Ost-Berlin Diplomaten gefährdet?," *Die Welt*, 21 June 1989, 10.

24. See Kaiser, "Zum Verhältnis,"490; and Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 484.

25. Greenwald reported the general lack of enthusiasm surrounding Shevardnadze's GDR visit. *Berlin Witness*, 34. On the West Berlin working group, see DPA, 11 April 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 April 1989, 39.

26. Falin interviewed by Josef Kirchengast, "Defense Forces at Lowest Level," *Der Standard*, 11 May 1989, 3, in FBIS-SOV, 12 May 1989, 5. Portugalov's remark was in "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen," *Der Spiegel*, 5 June 1989, 172.

27. See Genscher's recollections in Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 84; and Dashichev, "Enormer Schaden für Moskau," *Der Spiegel*, 5 February 1990, 150.

28. See Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West*, 377.

29. Lally Weymouth, "Germany's Urge to Merge," *Washington Post*, 4 March 1990, C4.

30. See, for instance, TASS, 11 September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 September 1989, 32.

31. Falin cited in "Moskau befürchtet Aufstand in DDR," *Die Welt*, 15 September 1989, 1; and in "Ein Wink Falins an die DDR," *FAZ*, 4 October 1989, 2.

32. Shishlin interviewed in *Liberation*, 22 September 1989, 4 in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 28–29.

33. Shevardnadze cited in "DDR bringt Moskau in die Zwickmühle," *SZ*, 5 October 1989, 4. See also "Falin: Flüchtwelle ein deutsch-deutsches Problem," *SZ*, 6 October 1989, 2; "Portugalov: Reformen in der DDR nicht erzwingen," *SZ*, 6 September 1989, 1.

34. Ligachev, *Neues Deutschland*, 15 September 1989, 2.

35. See Horn, *Freiheit*, 326–327; Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth cited in Gedmin, *Hidden Hand*, 92; and Schabowski, *Absturz*, 222.

36. Frank Elbe, Genscher's close adviser, provided these details of the embassy crisis in Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, *Ein runde Tisch mit scharfen Ecken* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 33–44.

37. Jarausch, *Rush to German Unity*, 21–22. Some Germans became increasingly desperate to flee the GDR. Greenwald even related an incredible instance of East Germans entering the Soviet embassy in East Berlin in the hopes of emigrating west. The "visitors"were "persuaded"to leave. *Berlin Witness*, 191.

38. Yakovlev cited in S. Chugrov, "Kniga Aleksandra Yakovleva i Lilli Marku vo Frantsy," *MEMO*, no. 12 (1991): 141.

39. "'Signale nicht beachtet,' " *Der Spiegel*, 26 February 1990, 172.

40. See Schabowski's interview with Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 93.

41. Honecker, "GDR vstupaet v svoye pyatoye desyatletiye," *Pravda*, 5 October 1989, 4. During his speech at the festivities, the East German leader added, "Advice intended to weaken socialism is of no use to us." *Neues Deutschland*, 9 October 1989, 4.

42. For accounts of the meeting with the SED politburo, see Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 74. A questionable East German transcript of this encounter recorded the remark as, "When we fall behind, life punishes us immediately."See the appendix to Gunter Mittag, *Um jeden Preis: Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991), 367. This "transcript"differs markedly from all existing accounts by participants and must be considered suspect. Its claim to authenticity—the initials "E.H"scrawled in the upper right-hand corner. For Gorbachev's public speech, see "Prazdnik sozidania na nemetskoi zemlye," *Pravda*, 7 October 1989, 4. At the same time as Gorbachev's visit to East Berlin, Zagladin and Portugalov were in Paris proclaiming that every East European state would eventually embrace *perestroika*. See Gedmin, *Hidden Hand*, 98.

43. See Falin's account of Gorbachev's fear that violence might erupt during his visit, and his clear warning to Honecker that Moscow would not support the use of force in East Germany. *Politische Erinnerungen*, 482–488.

44. Schabowski, for instance, saw the self-critical remark as an unsuccessful attempt by Gorbachev to evoke a similar response from a member of the SED politburo. *Das Politbüro*, 74. Gerd König likewise contended the comment referred only secondarily to the GDR. See König's interview: "'Signale nicht beachtet,' " *Der Spiegel*, 26 February 1990, 172. Honecker claimed he knew the remark only from the Western media, but the statement "had nothing to do with the development in the GDR."Hamburg ARD Television Network, 10 October 1991, in FBIS-SOV, 11 October 1991, 7.

45. According to Krenz's account, Gorbachev looked from face to face to make sure his listeners really understood his meaning. *Wenn Mauern fallen*, 87. Modrow described the remarks as having "a signal effect." *Aufbruch und Ende*, 11.

46. Transcript contained in Mittag, *Um jeden Preis*, 365; and Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 486–487.

47. See Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 74–78; and Schabowski, *Der Absturz*, 238–242. Krenz also seemed personally offended by the contention that Moscow played a significant role in East German events of late 1989. See Krenz, "Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer in Herbst 1989," *Osteuropa* 42 (April 1992): 365-369. See also Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 106, 302, note 23.

48. Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 75. See also Hans Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur, 1991), 12.

49. Falin later recalled a private conversation with Krenz. The East German admitted, "Your leader has said everything that had to be said. Our leader understood nothing." Falin responded that "the Soviet guest has done and said more than one can expect of a guest. Everything else depends on you."Falin, *Politische Erinerrungen*, 487. Just before boarding his plane back to Moscow, Gorbachev reportedly implored a small group of SED comrades, "Act!"Krenz was not present at this encounter, but believed the story to be true. *Wenn Mauern fallen*, 96. Schabowski and Modrow rejected the account. See Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 77–78; and Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 303, note 31.

50. Honecker cited in "Erich Honecker empfing den Leiter der Delegation der VR China," *Neues Deutschland*, 10 October 1989, 1.

51. Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 111–120. See also Jackson Diehl, "Leipzig's Leaders Prevent a Bloodbath," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1990, A36.

52. Stanislav Kondrashov, "Nashe mesto v mire," *Izvestia*, 29 April 1990, 7. Both Falin and Willy Brandt claimed that Moscow informed the SED leadership that Soviet forces would not become involved. See Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 483, 487–488; and Brandt's interview, "Warten bis irgendwann nach dem Jahr 2000?," *SZ*, 14 December 1989, 14. Other less credible accounts claim that the Soviet role even included direct efforts to prevent East German units from using force. See Joseph Joffe, "Once More: The German Question," *Survival* 32 (March–April 1990): 129–140, esp. note 2; Weymouth, *Washington Post*, 4 March 1990, C4; and Lally Weymouth, "East Germany's Dirty Secret," *Washington Post*, 14 October 1990, C4. For rejections of such claims, see Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 119–120; and Krenz, "Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer,"365-366.

53. Dashichev cited in Fred Oldenburg, "Die Deutschlandpolitik Gorbatschows: 1985–1991," *Bericht des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 17 (1992): 21. See also Igor Maximychev and Pyotr Menshikov, "One German Fatherland?," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 7 (July 1990): 37. Falin also informed West Berlin Mayor Walter Momper on 30 September that Soviet forces would not intervene in internal East German affairs. See Momper, *Grenzfall: Berlin im Brennpunkt deutscher Geschichte* (Munich: C. Bertelsmann, 1991), 77–78; and Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 488.

54. Cited in Gerhard Wettig, "The Kremlin's Impact on the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany," in *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989*, ed. Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver Neumann (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 161.

55. For the meeting with Falin, see Schabowski cited in Serge Schmemann, "A Wistful Glance Back at When the Wall Fell," *New York Times*, 10 July 1990, A8. Schabowski described Tisch's visit with Gorbachev in *Der Absturz*, 261–262. MID spokesman Yury Gremitskikh on DPA, 19 October 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 20 October 1989, 12.

56. Krenz, "Anmerkerungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer,"366–367; Hans Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur, 1991), 21–22; and Gorbachev, "Druzheskaya vstrecha," *Pravda*, 2 November 1989, 1. See also Jim Hoagland, "The Wall Opens, But on Whose Orders?," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1990, A37.

57. See Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende*, 25; and Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 132–134.

58. Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*, 117.

59. See Krenz, "Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer,"368–369; and Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende*, 25-26.

60. Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 488–489. Schabowski accused Falin of "great power presumptuousness"for this depiction of events. Schabowski, "Laus auf der Lederhaut," *Der Spiegel*, 18 October 1993, 14. For other Soviet claims of advance knowledge, see Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 309 (note 7). For claims that Gorbachev actually advised Krenz to open the Berlin Wall, see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 134; Peter Millar, "Order to Open Berlin Wall 'Came From

Gorbachev,' " *Sunday Times*, 19 November 1989, 1,3; and Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon, 1991), 363. Oberdorfer attributed the claim to SED Central Committee members.

61. See Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 15. US President Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher received similar messages. See Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 365; and Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 793.

62. For Soviet denials, see Gerasimov cited in "Allierte sprechen über die Lage in Deutschland," *Die Welt*, 15 November 1989, 1; and Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 15 November 1989, 6. See also Oldenburg, 'Sowjetische Deutschland-Politik,"71–73.

63. Krenz, "Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner Mauer," 367; and Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 792.

64. Kohl's interview, "Für die 'Operation Deutschland' gibt es in der Geschickte kein Beispiel," *Die Welt*, 28 November 1990, 8.

65. See "Kohls Deutschlandpolitik verliert in der FDP an Rückhalt," *General-Anzeiger*, 4 December 1989, 2; and 'Streit in der SPD-Führung über deutschlandpolitische Aussagen," *General-Anzeiger*, 9–10 December 1989, 2.

66. Gerasimov's press conference was reported in "Moscow Signals It Would Allow Berlin Communists to Fall," *Times*, 10 November 1989, 8. See Shevardnadze's interview, "'Unser Gewissen ist rein,' " *Der Spiegel*, 13 April 1992, 198. Central committee official Aleksandr Tsipko contended that Moscow realized the threat to East Germany's existence only about two weeks after the wall's opening. Cited in Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 364.

67. Modrow, "Abschied von der zweiten Heimat," *Die Zeit*, 27 April 1990, cited in Gedmin, *Hidden Hand*, 115.

68. Paul Quinn-Judge, 'Gulf Widens in Soviet Leadership," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 September 1989, 6. See Ligachev's speech in *Pravda*, 22 September 1989, 6.

69. Ligachev later claimed that the majority of the central committee supported him and would not have allowed his removal. See 'Speeches of Egor Kuzmich Ligachev," *Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies: Occasional Paper*, no. 247 (Fall 1991): 9.

70. Karpov interviewed by D. Gorbuntsov, *Pravda*, 27 January 1990, 2.

71. The article in question was Yu. Kapelyush, 'Obshchestvennoye mneniye o narodnykh deputatakh," *Argumenty i fakty*, 7–13 October 1989, 1. For Gorbachev's revealing announcement of Afanasyev's removal, see "Vesti otkryty dialog s lyudmi," *Kommunist*, no. 16 (November 1989): 3–11.

72. Shevardnadze, "Vneshnaya politika i perestroyka," *Pravda*, 24 October 1989, 3.

73. Colonel V. Markushin, "Nyzhna ostotritelnost," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 January 1990, 3.

74. Shevardnadze, "Evropa—ot raskola k edinstvu," *Izvestia*, 18 January 1990, 5.

75. Ligachev, *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 6; and Brovikov, *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 2.

76. Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992), 171.

77. Yakovlev on Moscow Domestic Service, 7 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 8 February 1990, 50. The accusations hurled at Shevardnadze were cited in Beschloss

and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 182. For Shevardnadze's response, see *Pravda*, 8 February 1990, 3. In referring to German unification, he used the Russian word *obyedineniye* which suggested an association or union. Ligachev's use of *vossoyedineniye*, or reunification, was politically loaded, intended to imply that West Germany sought to remake the German state within its prewar borders. See *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 6. See Shevardnadze's similarly pejorative use of *vossoyedineniye* in *Pravda*, 15 November 1989, 6.

78. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West*, 365.

79. Yakovlev, "Evropeiskaya tsivilizatsia i sovremennoye politicheskoye myshleniye," *Pravda*, 21 March 1989, 4.

CHAPTER 6

1. In an otherwise very thoughtful treatment of the Soviet approach to the German question, Gregory Treverton disregards Moscow's anxiety, while arguing that such concerns were a primary determinant in French foreign policy. *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), ch. 5.

2. Shevardnadze, "Peregovory v MID SSSR," *Izvestia*, 6 December 1989, 4.

3. See the discussion in Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 156–161.

4. See Grigoryev's critical remarks in "Obstrukzia," *Pravda*, 24 June 1989, 5; and "Opasnye virazhi," *Pravda*, 6 July 1989, 5. For an analysis of Kohl's problems with the German right, see Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 229–230; McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 200–201; and Thomas O'Boyle and Terence Roth, *Wall Street Journal*, 31 January 1989, A14.

5. See, for example, "Spory vokrug problemy vyezdov," *Izvestia*, 9 August 1989, 4. The article sarcastically noted that "Bonn must know how humanely the GDR resolves the question of reuniting families in accordance with its laws." Another article praised Bonn for working constructively with East Berlin and Budapest to resolve the refugee problem. F. Lukyanov, "Razreshili pereiti granitsy," *Izvestia*, 11 September 1989, 4.

6. Shishlin interviewed in *Liberation* (Paris), 22 September 1989, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 29; Falin interviewed by H. Karutz, "Die DDR entschied richtig," *Die Welt*, 2 October 1989, 4; and Podklyuchnikov, "Kto oslozhnyaet otnosheniya," *Pravda*, 3 October 1989, 5.

7. Cited in Grigoryev, "Reading the 'Script,' or Something About Bonn's Predictability," *Pravda* (first edition), 23 September 1989, 5, in FBIS-SOV, 29 September 1989, 31. An angry *Pravda* article responded, "No, the joint statement of 13 June this year is not concerned with overcoming the existing status quo in Europe—and certainly not in the sense that some circles in the CDU would now like to impart to it."A. Pavlov, "Ne po toi kolee," *Pravda*, 23 September 1989, 5.

8. Gorbachev, "Prazdnik sozidania na nemetskoi zemle," *Pravda*, 7 October 1989, 5.

9. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 27 September 1989, 4. See also Kiessler and Elbe, *Ein runder Tisch*, 25-27; and Pond, *Beyond the Wall*, 155-156, 313, note 10.

10. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 14.

11. See Dashichev's report, reprinted as "Enormer Schaden für Moskau," *Der Spiegel*, 5 February 1990, 148, 150; and Portugalov, "Perestroika im Bewußtsein der Deutschen," *Der Spiegel*, 5 June 1989, 171–172.

12. See "Die Sowjetunion dementiert Meldungen über eine Entsendung von Unterhändlern," *FAZ*, 5 August 1989, 2.

13. Vladimir Shinayev, deputy director the Institute of Europe, TASS, 2 September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 5 September 1989, 14. See also Greenwald, *Berlin Witness*, 192; and Gorbachev's defense of four-power authority at a press conference following his speech to the Council of Europe. Moscow Domestic Service, 5 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 6 July 1989, 34. Falin also referred to the centrality of four-power authority with regard to German unification in "Verhaltene Glückwünsche aus Moskau," *SZ*, 20 October 1989, 4.

14. Cited in DPA, 11 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 11 December 1989, 17; and TASS, 12 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 December 1989, 38.

15. See Portugalov interviewed by W. Markov, "Zwei Systeme, eine Nation," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 November 1989, 2. See also Moscow Domestic Service, 18 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 21 November 1989, 21.

16. See Krenz, "In großer Offenheit haben wir über alles gesprochen," *Neues Deutschland*, 2 November 1989, 2; and Modrow, "Existenz zweier deutscher Staaten—Grundlage der Stabilität in Europa," *Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1989, 2.

17. Reich interviewed by Yu. Shpatov, "Perestroika, sotsialism, dve Germanii," *Moskovskiye novosti*, 19 November 1989, 6.

18. Zhurkin, "Evropeiskiye gorizonty," *Izvestia*, 24 November 1989, 5.

19. See Zagladin and Portugalov, ANSA (Rome), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 54. Portugalov: "I do not rule out the possibility of developing a confederal structure. . . . But given the geopolitical picture today, I do not think Europe is ready for a united Germany." See also Portugalov in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 November 1989, 2, in FBIS-SOV, 20 November 1989, 34: Reunification is "incompatible with the geopolitical and geostrategic requirements of stability." Petrovsky labeled such proposals "premature." AFP (Paris), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 2.

20. See the remarks of MID spokesman Gremitskikh on DPA, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 31.

21. Falin, "Studio 9," Moscow Television Service, 10 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 13 December 1989, 7.

22. Yet he envisioned changes in intra-German relations following the transformation of the GDR. DPA, 17 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 20 November 1989, 34. Krenz and Modrow repeated Gorbachev's position. See Krenz in *Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1989, 1; and Modrow, *Neues Deutschland*, 12 January 1990, 1.

23. Bovin, "V tsentre Evropy," *Izvestia*, 28 November 1989, 7.

24. Falin interviewed by Wolfgang Kenntemich, "Falin: The Development Is Normal," *Bild*, 4 December 1989, 3, in FBIS-SOV, 4 December 1989, 94.

25. Commentator Viktor Glazunov, Moscow World Service, 6 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 7 December 1989, 48.

26. See Yuri Kornilov, TASS, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 32.

27. See Portugalov, ANSA (Rome), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 29 November 1989, 54; and "The Soviet View: Two Germanys, in Confederation," *New York Times*, 15 December 1989, A43.

28. Portugalov interviewed by Eberhard Laib, "Portugalov: Germans on Both Sides," *Bild*, 15 November 1989, 2, in FBIS-SOV, 15 November 1989, 25. Portugalov even made a similar claim in late January. "Zwei sind besser als eins," *Die Zeit*, 26 January 1990, 31.

29. The exception appeared to be Dashichev, who vocally expressed his opinions that Germany should be unified promptly. See his interviews, "Die deutsche Einheit kommt—wir haben es nur nicht rechtzeitig genug gesehen," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 February 1990, 6; and "'Vereinigung vielleicht schon bis Anfang nächsten Jahres,'" *Die Welt*, 20 March 1990, 9. Both Kvitsinsky and Falin have refuted his claim to be an adviser to Gorbachev. See Kvitsinksy, *Vor dem Sturm*, 13; and Falin, "Ruck ins Tendenlöse," *Der Spiegel*, 13 May 1990, 12–14. Dashichev responded in "Deprimierende Bilanz," *Der Spiegel*, 19 August 1990, 10.

30. "Zagladin: 'Wrong to Force the Pace,' " *L'Unita*, 29 November 1989, 5, in FBIS-SOV, 7 December 1989, 49; and Kvitsinsky, DPA, 17 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 18 January 1990, 40.

31. One poll in TASS indicated that 23 percent of the East German people rejected unification, 29 percent were more opposed than in favor, and 32 percent were more in favor than opposed, and 16 percent favored unification. TASS, 8 December 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 11 December 1989, 19.

32. Yakovlev, *Kyodo* (Tokyo), 15 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 15 November 1989, 24. This had been Yakovlev's position as far back as January 1989. See "Jakowlew nennt Moskauer Verabredungen 'in vollem Unfang' gültig," *FAZ*, 10 January 1989, 2. Varennikov interviewed by E. Powell, BBC Television Network, 3 July 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1989, 46.

33. Shevardnadze, "Evropa—ot raskola k edinstvu," *Izvestia*, 18 January 1990, 5.

34. See "Gorbatschow: Vereinigung der Deutschen wird nicht prinzipiell in Zweifel gezogen," *SZ*, 31 January 1990, 1; and "Kohl erziehlt Durchbruch in Moskau: Der Weg zur Einheit is jetzt frei," *FAZ*, 12 February 1990, 1.

35. See, for example, Boris Meissner, "Das 'neue Denken' Gorbatschows und die Wende in der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik," in *Die Deutschen und die Architektur des Europäischen Hauses* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1990), 75–76.

36. Beschloss and Talbott offer invaluable illustrations of these personal ties, particularly the bond between Shevardnadze and Baker. *At the Highest Levels*.

37. See Alexander Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," *Survival* 33 (November–December 1991): 531–545.

38. Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 49. A transcript of Kohl's speech to the Bundestag in which he announced his ten-point plan appears in *Deutschland Archiv* 23 (January 1990): 149–152.

39. "In Erwartung der Einheit," *SZ*, 23 January 1990, 10.

40. Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 55. Grachev's response appeared in AFP (Paris), 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 3. See also the MID spokesman Gremitskikh in TASS, 29 November 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 30 November 1989, 2.

Portugalov interviewed by Eberhard Laib, "If People Want Unity, It Will Come About," *Bild*, 24 January 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 2 February 1990, 39.

41. Gorbachev, Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 52.

42. See Ye. Grigoryev, "Uvertyura v 'Akvariume,' " *Pravda*, 12 January 1990, 7.

43. "Kohl gibt politische Garantie für Oder-Neiße-Linie," *SZ*, 18 January 1990, 1. For a Soviet response, see A. Blinov and V. Ganshin, "Posle vstrechi v Kemp-Devide," *Izvestia*, 26 February 1990, 4. See also Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 230.

44. Author's interview with former Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, Charlottesville, Virginia, 27 October 1992. See, for example, the fierce criticism of vandalism of Soviet war memorials in East Germany. "Fashisty—von!," *Pravda*, 5 January 1990, 7; and S. Baygarov, "Neofashisti v GDR," *Pravda*, 21 January 1990, 5. See also Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 21.

45. Yakovlev interviewed by Jonathon Dimbleby, BBC Television Network, 15 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 27 February 1990, 6.

46. Modrow, ADN, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 30 January 1990, 22–23.

47. See commentator Aleksandr Zholkver, Moscow Domestic Service, 1 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 March 1990, 9; Captain M. Zheglov, "Voprosov bolshe, chem otvetov," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 March 1990, 3.

48. Falin's interview, 'Sicherheitsbalance—Kern der deutschen Frage," *Neues Deutschland*, 9 February 1990, 6.

49. Proekter interviewed by A. Bogomolov, "'Za' i 'protiv' edinoi Germanii," *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 28 February 1990. See also Bovin, Moscow Television Service, 3 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 March 1990, 4.

50. Gorbachev, ADN, 30 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 30 January 1990, 17.

51. Shevardnadze interviewed by G. Sidorova, "The Arithmetic of Open Skies," *New Times*, 27 February–5 March 1990, 9. For a detailed account of the Two-Plus-Four process, see Stephen Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

52. Gorbachev used this familiar Bush term to described his own German policy. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 157.

53. See Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification,"534–535; and Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 9 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 51.

54. Shevardnadze interviewed by M. Yusin, "V mire vse menyaetsya s golovokruzhitelnoi bystrotoi," *Izvestia*, 19 February 1990, 5.

55. See Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 52. Shevardnadze noted Poland's "moral and juridical right"to participate in those talks addressing the security of neighboring states. TASS, 23 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 26 February 1990, 29.

56. Shevardnadze interviewed by M. Yusin, "V mire vse menyaetsya s golovokruzhitelnoi bystrotoi," *Izvestia*, 19 February 1990, 5. See also Falin's interview, "Für militärische Neutralität," *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1990, 168–172; and the Europe Institute's Sergei Karaganov, "Top Priority,"Moscow International Service, 23 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 26 February 1990, 7.

57. Gerasimov on TASS, 10 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 12 February 1990, 46.

58. Shevardnadze in TASS, 2 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 5 February 1990, 34; and Falin in "Für militärische Neutralität,"171.

59. Gorbachev on Moscow Domestic Service, 20 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, 51. For conservative opposition to the Two-Plus-Four approach, see Yevgeni Babenko, TASS, 21 February 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 22 February 1990, 1.

60. Falin, "Für militärische Neutralität,"171.

61. See, for instance, V. Korionov, "Zanaves podnyat . . . ," *Pravda*, 2 March 1990, 5.

62. Modrow interview, "Nur in den Grenzen von heute," *Der Spiegel*, 4 December 1989, 46.

63. See the remarks of the SPD's Egon Bahr and Manfred Opel in "SPD-Politiker: Einheit kommt vor Bündistreue," *SZ*, 26 January 1990, 2; and Horst Ehmke, in Weymouth, "Germany's Urge to Merge," *Washington Post*, 4 March 1990, C4.

64. See, for example, Portugalov on Vienna Television Service, 20 March 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 21 March 1990, 26. Also Dashichev, interviewed by Manfred Schell, "A United Germany Must Be Bound Within the Framework of NATO," *Die Welt*, 20 March 1990, 9, in FBIS-SOV, 22 March 1990, 29. Daniel Proekter, an IMEMO scholar, had already admitted that German membership in NATO would "create certain difficulties, primarily of a moral and psychological nature." But he still advocated German participation similar to that of France. *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 28 February 1990, 5. Bovin had consistently called for Germany's inclusion in NATO. See "Evropa, Germania, my," *Izvestia*, 23 March 1990, 5.

65. Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification,"540.

66. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 233.

67. Listed in Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification,"11.

68. Shevardnadze interviewed by F. Wechbach-Mara, "We Have Full Confidence in the German People," *Bild am Sonntag*, 8 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1990, 3.

69. Portugalov interviewed by K. Guensche, "Germany: Russians Are Looking for a Compromise," *Bild*, 2 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV, 5 July 1990, 4. In March, Shevardnadze made a similar claim to Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. Horn, *Die Freiheit, die ich meine*, 332.

70. Gorbachev, "Idti dalshe putem perestroiki," *Pravda*, 3 July 1990, 3.

71. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

72. See, for instance, General Anatoli Martovitsky, DPA, 3 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 3 July 1990, 46. Major General Ivan Mikulin charged that "the European military balance has been seriously disturbed, a balance that has for long years served as a reliable basis for security on the continent."Moscow Television Service, 5 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 6 July 1990, 10.

73. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6.

74. Falin, TASS, 12 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV-S, 13 July 1990, 42. Falin later charged that Shevardnadze had received "some sort of financial payoff," and blamed him for convincing Gorbachev to accept full German membership in NATO. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 240.

75. Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, 492–494; Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm*, 24; Portugalov, "Der Dornenweg zur Weltmacht," *Der Spiegel*, 8 October 1990, 186; and Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 186–187.

76. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 220, 239–240. Falin validated this assumption. During a break in the party congress proceedings, he reiterated

his position that German membership in NATO was unacceptable. Cited in Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 297–298.

77. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6. Soviet conservatives remained unalterably opposed to Shevardnadze's position. Years later, Ligachev still contended that, "We could have used political and economic levers and our military presence in East Germany" to control the process of unification. Cited in Gabriel Partos, *The World That Came in from the Cold* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 248.

78. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

79. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 232–233; and Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 300.

80. Shevardnadze: *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6. Gorbachev spoke on London ITV Television Network, 6 June 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1990, 4. See also Bovin's favorable assessment. "Signal iz Londona," *Izvestia*, 9 July 1990, 1, 4.

81. Beschloss and Talbott, for instance, labeled this moment the end of the Cold War. *At the Highest Levels*, 238.

82. Kohl referred to Gorbachev as a "good partner." DPA, 15 July 1990. Gorbachev used their first news conference to confirm that their good personal relationship was "facilitating the discussion of all issues." Moscow Television Service, 15 July 1990. Both in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 32–33.

83. See Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 310.

84. Ye. Grigoryev, "C chem edet kantsler?," *Pravda*, 14 July 1990, 5.

85. Valentin Kopeltsev on ADN (East Berlin), 13 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 10.

86. See Moscow Domestic Service, 16 July 1990, in FBIS-SOV, 16 July 1990, 30.

87. See Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 323–324; and Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification," 10.

88. Kohl, *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, 5.

89. See Claus Gennrich, "Ein Gefühl, als könnte man Berge versetzen," *FAZ*, 18 July 1990, 3.

90. See Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," 541.

91. Shevardnadze, *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, 2.

92. Beschloss and Talbott stressed this point. Given their focus on US–Soviet relations, they understandably emphasized Washington's decisive role in overcoming Gorbachev's reservations. *At the Highest Levels*, 232, 239.

93. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, 5.

94. For a contemporaneous example of moderate individuals critical of new thinking, see A. Kortunov and A. Izyumov, "Chto ponimat pod gosudarstvennymi interesami vo vneshney politike," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 11 July 1990, 14.

CHAPTER 7

1. Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1988–1989): 83.

2. Hannes Adomeit was one of the few analysts to appreciate the importance of the conceptual changes. "Gorbachev and German Unification," *Problems of Communism* (July–August 1990): 7.

3. See John Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship," *East European Quarterly* 26 (January 1993): 435; Jeffrey Gedmin, *The Hidden Hand* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1992), 112–114; and Ronald Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane, *Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), vi-vii.

4. See Keep, "Zheleznovosk and After," 436; Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 365.

5. Yakovlev argued in early 1989 that although Soviet actions often came "under pressure from real, objective circumstances," the changes were "the result of a conscious decision made as a result of an interpretation of these circumstances." "Evropeiskaya tsivilizatsia i sovremennoye politicheskoye myshleniye," *Pravda*, 21 March, 1989, 4.

6. As Kvitsinsky later observed, German unification was "a defeat for the former Soviet policy in Europe, but it was the optimum solution for the Soviet Union under the new circumstances." Cited in Partos, *The World That Came in from the Cold*, 249. See also Nikolai Portugalov, "Der Dornenweg zur Weltmacht," *Der Spiegel*, 8 October 1990, 184.

7. See Keep, 431; and Laird, 173.

8. Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 323–324.

9. See Paul Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev Hints at Troubles in Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 July, 1989, 1–2.

10. In advance of the congress, Portugalov noted, "The settlement of the foreign policy aspects of German unification has a strong domestic policy component in our country. The conservatives in the CPSU are trying to forge an anti-*perestroika* appeal from this." Interviewed by Karl-Ludwid Guensche, "Germany: Russians Are Looking for a Compromise," *Bild*, 2 July 1990, 4, in FBIS-SOV-90–132, 10 July 1990, 3.

11. For a similar argument, see Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars," 328–329.

12. Huntington, "Reform and Stability in South Africa," *International Security* 6 (Spring 1982): 14.

13. See Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 232–233. For a similar instance in US–Israeli relations, see Janice Gross Stein, "Domestic Politics and International Conflict Management," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988): 205.

14. See Shevardnadze's favorable portrayal of NATO at the 28th Party Congress in July 1990. *Pravda*, 11 July 1990, 6.

15. See Shevardnadze, "Foreign Policy and *Perestroika*," *Pravda*, 24 October 1989, 2–4. The conservative attack came from V. I. Brovikov, the Soviet ambassador to Poland, at a central committee plenum. *Pravda*, 7 February 1990, 2.

16. See Falin's remarks concerning the process of German unification. "Für militärische Neutralität," *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1990, 168–172.

17. See, for example, Gorbachev's remarks to West German business leaders. "Weitsichtig handelt, wer vorausschaut und ein gerechtfertiges Risiko eingeht," in *Gorbatschow in Bonn: Die Zukunft der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), 38–47.

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