

GERMANS FROM THE EAST

STUDIES
IN SOCIAL LIFE
XV

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GERMANS FROM THE EAST

A STUDY OF THEIR MIGRATION,
RESETTLEMENT, AND
SUBSEQUENT GROUP HISTORY
SINCE 1945

By

HANS W. SCHOENBERG



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*To the Memory
of my
Father
LEOPOLD SCHÖNBERG*

PREFACE

Who, in 1945 and 1946, could have foreseen that the economic and social integration of the millions of Germans from the East expelled into West Germany after World War II would largely be accomplished in a few years? And, who could have foreseen that many years after this accomplishment the political repercussions of the expulsions would go on? Yet, surprisingly enough, this is what has happened.

In 1969, as usual, the major issues of the federal election campaign in West Germany hardly reflect any specific economic and social concerns of the expellees, not even those bruited about by the *NPD* (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*). At the same time, however, all the political parties vying in the campaign, with the exception of the newly founded, less influential *DKP* (the new German Communist Party), pay considerable deference to the political interests of the expellees in the German question. Whether these interests represent the opinion of most of the expellees and whether the expellee associations in fact speak for many voters is another matter.

Why are these questions rarely posed? Why, despite the economic and social integration of the expellees, do the East German Homeland Provincial Societies — the *Landsmannschaften* — retain much influence? The explanation of this phenomenon becomes increasingly clear if one reads the intelligent and superbly documented analysis by Hans Schoenberg.

Relatively little comprehensive research has been done on the expellee problem by sociologists and political scientists in general, and by German scholars in particular. When Dr. Schoenberg, an American, began his many years of research on the expellee movement, he had to fear that he might not complete his study until after a number

of others, devoted to the same or related topics, had already been published. Nevertheless — and in spite of delays which, unfortunately, have meant an appreciable gap between the end of the period covered by the book and the date of its publication — his study constitutes the first really scholarly work about the movement, its press organs, and the expellees as an organized pressure group. A part of the problem not enlarged upon by him — namely, the co-operation of expellees in local, non-expellee political groups and associations in West Germany and the position taken by local chapters of the expellee organizations with regard to these groups — will be dealt with in a French dissertation by Jean-Claude Hervé whose research is based on intensive field work and is being directed by Raymond Aron.

A German scholar, more than a foreigner looking at the problem from outside, would perhaps be tempted to neglect the basic connection between social and foreign policy, because he would consider himself competent in only one of the two fields, or because he would fear that discussion of a controversial political subject within a sociological framework might not be considered objective. If he takes a conservative stand on the German question, he might not be conscious of the contradiction between the pursuit of the integration of the expellees and the brakes their organizations impose on West German foreign policy. If he takes a progressive stand on the German question, he probably would be primarily concerned with the generally modern problem of "the consumer society" rather than with the specifically German problem of the expellees — a problem determined more by historical than sociological factors.

Integration of the expellees has been the largest economic and social policy task fulfilled by the Federal Republic. One could, of course, argue that the great mass of expellee workers constituted an economic advantage for the West German government, once the German economic recovery had begun after the currency reform of 1948. But the achievement of integration remains, an achievement that has not been sufficiently recognized outside West Germany, with perhaps the exception of France after 1962. When the French lost Algeria, they suddenly discovered what it means to have to absorb a million compatriots. In dealing with the problem, they wished to know just how the Germans, who had had to absorb many millions of people, had been so successful. Even so, however, France could

not fully appreciate the German effort, because, given the favorable conditions of the French economy at the time, the reception of French from Algeria proceeded with relative ease, and did not call for such critical measures as the "equalization of burdens" policy in a devastated post-war Germany.

The federal government itself, as well as the political parties in West Germany, has always been reluctant to exploit the achievement of integration: a successful policy of integration has necessarily amounted to a policy of renunciation in respect of the homelands of the expellees. Was it really conceivable to integrate the expellees and at the same time keep them ready to return home?

The contradiction posed by this question reveals Bonn's difficult foreign policy position: "To be sure, we are not promoting irredentism, we are integrating!" "Then, why do you fail to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and why do you leave doubt as to the annulment of the Munich Agreement?" "Because, really, we cannot completely destroy all the hopes of the expellees." "Then, the integration you speak of is not genuine." "But it is, because we are doing what the Arab governments have never done: we are moderating the political problem by means of integration. The integration brings slowly to an end the feeling of the injustice the expellees have suffered." "Then, why do you promote the *Landsmannschaften* and why do you continue to use the old maps in the schools?"

Anyone wishing to influence the course of German affairs, even if only by trying to clarify the situation in Germany, finds himself compelled to use two different approaches: one for the German public, and another for the French, or the Americans, or the Dutch, etc.

To the Germans, on the one hand, he must argue that the expulsions were indeed cruel, but that they did not condemn the Germans from the East to abandonment in a foreign country. To be sure, neither Bavaria nor Württemberg is the homeland of the Silesians or the Pomeranians, but they are definitely not emigrants coming as aliens to a new fatherland. To take the opposite view would imply that Germany does not exist.

Several questions may be put to Germans:

(1) Why have their ministers, their administration, and their parties not been more courageous in putting an end to the insidious phenomenon of financial support for the expellee organizations? Financial support derives from sponsors who are not always sure whether

these organizations are representative of the expellees. Such support leads to a stronger voice, more influence, and an appearance of widespread additional financial support.

(2) Why have the responsible leaders not been more courageous in dealing honestly with the border question? True, the Great Coalition has moved forward in the right direction, but the defeat of the expellee political party, the *BHE*, at the polls in 1957 would have been an earlier, better opportunity for a more decisive gesture.

(3) Why have the responsible leaders not been more courageous in tackling the problem Hans Schoenberg refers to in terms of "the common memories" shared by the expellees as a group? These memories are held in common by the generation of Germans from the East who recall their lost homelands and who consciously suffered the expulsions. But are these memories *really* shared by their children who were born in the Federal Republic? Official West German statistics count these children among the expellees, but this may lead to a sort of self-deception, especially when one attempts, as is done, to nourish or even create in the young generation the conviction that the lost provinces are still German and continue to be the *Heimat*. Indeed, "*Ostkunde*" in West German public schools is often quite similar to the themes of the *DJO* — the East German youth organization.

To the non-Germans, on the other hand, one must seek to explain the logic and legitimacy of German feelings: melancholy over loss of the homeland provinces, grief over the resultant disintegration of distinctive homeland cultural values, and bitterness over indifference abroad to this fate. The Germans resent the two-faced talk in many countries, and definitely not only the Eastern ones, which, while they support militant Arab irredentism, scorn at German grief as war propaganda. The Germans are disappointed when every painful move toward renunciation is often merely noted in passing as if it were a foregone and morally due conclusion. Surely, nothing can be less self-evident and less justifiable than recognition of a *de facto* situation created by brutal force, even if this force was applied in reaction to a more barbarian force, for which post-war Germany bears not the guilt but the liability.

To understand and to be able to explain these problems one must know what is happening, what is being thought and felt and done. For this one needs a study such as that by Hans Schoenberg: a sen-

sible and comprehensive piece of research in which the scholar has combined the necessary scientific objectivity with a no less necessary sympathetic understanding.

Paris, 1969

Alfred Grosser

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During most of the time that the author has prepared this study, he has lived and traveled in West Germany and other European countries. He has visited most of the academic institutions engaged in research on East German and East European affairs and has worked in some of them. He has consulted ministries and agencies of the West German Federal Government as well as main and local offices of the East German expellee organizations. He has also attended many large reunions and other smaller gatherings held by the expellees and has spoken with many of their leaders.

For their expert guidance, the writer is particularly indebted to Dr. C. Grove Haines, Dr. Paul Linebarger, Dr. Alfred Grosser and other members of the faculty at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and in Bologna, Italy. He is also indebted to the many individuals in the West German Federal and State governments, in the offices of the East German Homeland Provincial Societies in Bonn, in the Göttingen Circle of East German Scholars, and in other West German institutes of Eastern European research who made available much necessary documentation and offered explanations and comment whenever requested.

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Washington, D.C., 1968

H. W. Schoenberg

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CHAPTER I

FORCED MIGRATIONS IN MODERN HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION

A. "CENTURY OF THE HOMELESS MAN"

The twentieth century has appropriately been called the "Century of the Homeless Man."¹ The total number of displaced persons is startling. Before 1939 approximately thirty million people were forced to leave their homes. This does not include the Chinese migrations in the nineteen thirties. During World War II nearly forty million civilians were shifted from one place to another, and since then an additional sixty million persons have been affected. Thus, in half a century more than one hundred and thirty million people have been uprooted and scattered throughout more than forty different countries. About fifty million of them have been displaced as a result of divisions, annexations, or other boundary changes and territorial rearrangements.

This phenomenon has not been confined to just one part of the world. In Asia and the Pacific vast numbers have been involved. The largest involuntary mass migration in modern history took place in China during the invasion of Japanese forces in 1937 affecting large parts of the civilian population. The exact number of Chinese who fled or were driven from their homes is unknown. Estimates range from twenty to forty million.²

Since 1945 another ten million people have been forced to migrate as a result of wars in Indonesia, Tibet, Vietnam, and Korea. More

¹ Elfan Rees, "Century of the Homeless Man," *International Conciliation* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 515) (New York, November 1957). This issue summarizes major refugee movements since 1945.

² Bruno Lasker, *Asia on the Move* (New York: Holt, 1945), pp. 36 ff.

than a million Chinese from the mainland have sought refuge in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and fifteen million inhabitants of India and Pakistan have been resettled since the political divisions of the sub-continent into separate Hindu and Moslem states in 1947. Almost a million Arabs have migrated from Palestine, now Israel, to the Near East and Africa; about a quarter of a million Algerians have fled to Morocco, Tunisia, and France; and nearly 150,000 other Africans seeking to escape bloodshed in the Congo and Angola have emigrated to Ghana and several of the other new African states.

Partitions of national territories in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Germany have created circumstances leading large groups of people from one part to seek refuge in the other. Opposing government leaders within these divided countries dispute one another's sovereignty and aspire in different ways to liberate the people in the other part of the country on the grounds that they are being denied the so-called "right to self-determination." The government of the new state of Israel is faced with a stubborn movement on behalf of Arab refugees who wish to recover land in which they insist they have the right to live and perpetuate their own political and religious traditions. India continues to experience political and religious disagreements and even armed conflict that one of the largest population exchanges in history was intended to eliminate. Emigre leaders from Cuba as well as from the former Baltic states and other East European countries under communist control have formed political groups in the West that are encouraged to embarrass the communist states by continually demanding realization of the "right to self-determination" for their respective peoples. Claims of Italian, South Slavic, German, Greek, and Turkish minorities that this presumed right has been denied to them have led to international tension, bloodshed, and migrations from Trieste, in the Italian Tyrol, and on Cyprus respectively.

Since the end of World War II, governments, international organizations, and religious and charitable institutions have become increasingly concerned with both the welfare of refugees and the effective protection of their basic human rights. Under the auspices of the United Nations, organizations such as UNRRA and IRO and subsequently the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees have worked to alleviate material hardship suffered by victims of forced migrations. Special efforts have been made — such as the World Refugee Year for 1959–1960 or the International Year for Human

Rights in 1968, for example – for the general purpose of increasing world-wide awareness of the human hardships resulting from the exercise of nationalist intolerance and for the specific purpose of persuading governments to facilitate the reception and integration of homeless peoples, guaranteeing them civil rights.

Effective protection of human rights has been problematical. In spite of formal treaty guarantees in 1947, civil rights have allegedly been ignored in Italy, Hungary, and Rumania, and appeals for redress of hardships rejected on the grounds that they are tantamount to interference in matters of domestic state concern.

Parochial nationalism and racism continue to aggravate the misfortunes of large numbers of people dislocated by two world wars and subsequent political upheavals. Whether or not groups of displaced persons have become economically and socially integrated into their new homelands, they have – as the following study will show – often continued to be a source of great internal instability and international friction and to represent major political and social burdens.

B. SCOPE AND APPROACH

This study will focus attention on the background and political aims of a group referred to in the Federal Republic of Germany as "East German Expellees." Specific answers will be sought to such questions as these: What is the history of their expulsion from East Europe and their influx into Germany? How complete was their transplantation and how effective their integration into a divided Germany? What are their political aspirations? And how important has their influence been on internal West German politics and especially international affairs?

A comprehensive study of the political goals of the East German expellee group has not yet been made. Migrations of Germans from the East have been all but halted only since 1961. While the emigres were achieving a large measure of economic and social integration into West German society, the political aspirations of the East German leadership were more clearly emerging, and a number of treatises dealing with both economic and political aspects of their influx was published. The majority of these were premature, however, and therefore generally inadequate and limited in scope; they are now, for the most part, out-of-date.

The present study consists of two main parts: an account of the population movement itself and an account of the subsequent history of the expellee group. The first part begins by examining events before and during World War II leading directly to flights and expulsions of Germans from their homes. It documents their fortunes during this migration, describes their reception in occupied postwar Germany, and reports on their resettlement and assimilation into the Federal Republic. The second part surveys the political activities of these Germans, reviews the origin and development of their emigre organizations, and discusses the ideals and aims of their leaders. Finally, the significance of these events is assessed, and reactions in West Germany as well as in other Western and communist countries are evaluated.

Except for a section dealing briefly with original settlements of Germans in the East, the study covers a period from the last months of World War II in Europe, when the mass transfer of Germans was begun, to the summer of 1961, when the government of Communist East Germany, now called the German Democratic Republic, closed the last gap in the Iron Curtain by building the Berlin wall. Also in 1961 the fourth federal elections and the second nationwide census were held in West Germany, suggesting this year as a logical terminal point for the period covered by the study, although important events and sources after 1961 will be taken into account.

Like everyone who writes on contemporary affairs, this writer lacks the perspective of distance in time. Yet he has had the advantage of having been on the scene. The recent nature of many of the events to be considered has permitted the use of sources that may subsequently become unavailable and techniques that the passage of time will invalidate.

Materials used have had to be extracted from a disorganized abundance of information that is incomplete in spite of its immense volume. West German sources offering facts on original German settlements in East Europe are numerous. Notwithstanding the incompleteness or unavailability of Soviet sources, the political background of expulsions of Germans has been summarized as well as available documents and studies have allowed. Numbers of migrants as well as places of departure and destination have been determined by using sources which compare official statistics of the different countries involved, thus giving a reasonable idea of the extent of the exodus.

The specific character of the migrations, including the treatment accorded to the migrants by the victors, has had to be gleaned from assembled personal testimonies and diaries of victims, from occasional references in memoirs of Allied military leaders or statesmen, and from official directives and enactments governing the expulsions. Documentation of the reception of East Germans and their economic and social integration is, again, fairly extensive as far as West German sources are concerned. Current statistics on expellees are numerous, and many specialized studies on various aspects of their assimilation have been published. In contrast, the German Democratic Republic has devoted little attention to them.

The major part of this study, which tells the political story of the expellees and investigates the impact of their political ambitions on West German domestic and foreign politics, is based primarily on reports from the expellee press and other communications, from special archives and documentary collections as well as from the German press in general. A large number of pertinent topical treatises and articles has been considered, and film, radio, and television reports, as well as impressions from personal attendance at expellee reunions and interviews with expellee and other political leaders, constitute part of the source material.

Aware of the pitfalls in interpreting contemporary history, the writer is equally aware that the time has come to evaluate what he sees as one of the significant consequences of World War II and to draw attention to its implications, which he believes are essential to an understanding of the German question today.

C. GENERAL BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of World War II over eighteen million Germans were driven from that part of Germany east of what is presently called the Oder-Neisse line or from their homes elsewhere in East Europe. This displacement constitutes the largest forced migration across national boundaries in modern European history and together with the subsequent division of Germany represents part of a major historical process: the westward thrust of Soviet military power in response to Axis aggression and the extension of Soviet Communist domination to a substantial part of Europe in response to self-proclaimed communist goals.

1. Political Emigration

Contemporary forced migrations were preceded by the spread of expressions of parochial, nationalist intolerance in the nineteenth century that often made it impossible for individuals, families, or groups having different thoughts and ideals to continue living in their homelands. Political dissenters and revolutionaries from such countries as France, Russian Poland, Germany, and Austria-Hungary were forced into exile. Compared with subsequent emigrations their numbers were relatively small. The emergence of new totalitarian states after 1917 gave rise to considerably larger political flights. Increasing nationalist intolerance provoked hundreds of thousands of regime opponents, including Russians and other East Europeans, Italians, Germans, and Spaniards, to migrate.

Nationalist discrimination was not just limited to nonconformists. Governments eventually promoted policies designed to effect the total removal of alien minorities on the grounds of actual or presumed opposition to their power. The post-Reformation concept of *cujus regio, ejus religio* was replaced by the modern concept of *cujus regio, ejus natio*, though with an important distinction: earlier, the individual normally had a choice between his home and his religion, whereas now he was invariably at the mercy of decisions made by governments, often in the interests of power polities and sometimes under the influence of nationalist wrath.

2. The Balkan Minorities

The first forced mass migrations of the twentieth century involved the hopelessly intermingled Balkan and Turkish populations, among whom ethnic and religious conflicts had traditionally made minority-majority relations extremely difficult. During the Balkan Wars from 1912 to 1913, nearly 300,000 Turks, Greeks, and Bulgars either fled or were expelled from their homes. Provisions for emigrations or exchanges of minority groups were enumerated in subsequent peace treaties but often served only to legalize *de facto* situations even though the population transfers were characterized as voluntary. During and after World War I, 250,000 Moslems left the Balkans, and well over 600,000 Greeks were uprooted from Thrace and Asia Minor. Some returned only to be expelled again. At the same time

1,600,000 Armenians were massacred or expelled from Turkey. In an effort to restore order, the Allies, in the treaties of Sèvres and Neuilly, concluded in 1919, obligated Turkey and Bulgaria to come to an agreement with Greece providing for "voluntary reciprocal emigration" of their respective ethnic and religious minorities. During the Greco-Turkish war from 1920 to 1922 the mass flight of Greeks from Anatolia showed that the desired effect was not achieved, however, until Turkey, under Mustapha Kemal, requested and concluded with Greece in 1923 the Lausanne Convention on "compulsory population exchange" of Greek and Turkish minorities. An international commission established earlier under the League of Nations administered these and other Balkan population exchanges, and also attendant property settlements. By the time the commission completed its work in 1932, well over four million people in the Balkans and Turkey had been involved in subjugations, flights, deportations, and forcible exchanges. About one and a half million perished.³ The presence in Greece of more than a million Orthodox Christian refugees continued to burden the Greek economy for more than a generation. Though severely criticized at the time in England, France, and the United States, the Greek-Turkish Lausanne Convention established a precedent for subsequent international agreements on population exchanges in eastern and south-eastern Europe.⁴

3. Forced Mass Migrations under Nationalist and Communist Totalitarian Systems

After World War I many Western statesmen viewed the fate of minorities with growing concern. Their efforts to reorganize Euro-

³ C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 430-449; Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes 1917-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 248 f.; and Sir John Hope Simpson, "The Work of the Greek Refugee Settlement Committee," *Journal of Royal International Affairs* (London) 1929.

⁴ Details in Kurt Rabl, "Bevölkerungszwangsaustauschverträge zwischen 1913 und 1943 in ihrer präjudiziellen Bedeutung," in *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, ed. Kurt Rabl ("Vorträge und Aussprachen herausgegeben im Auftrag des Albertus Magnus Kollegs, Königstein und der Evangelischen Akademie, Arnoldshain") Vol. IV (Munich: Lerche, 1960), pp. 23-62, 168-282; for text in part of Lausanne Convention see pp. 177-183. The author lists two earlier treaties between Spain and Portugal (1750), and France and Germany (1911), providing for expulsions or compulsory exchanges of groups of aliens in ceded colonial areas.

pean populations more often tended to create new centers of friction, however, than to alleviate human hardships and resolve political problems. Boundaries were redrawn around some ethnic groups, other minorities were moved across them, and remaining alien groups were assured a measure of cultural autonomy and a certain international protection. Emigration and naturalization practices were refined, and plebiscitary privileges as well as the right of individual option were granted. Nevertheless, the European population pattern was too complex to achieve favorable ethnographic conditions under a system of national states. Strong nationalist feelings hindered the emergence of any general spirit of toleration, and under such dictators as Hitler and Stalin there developed a mania for power and a disregard for people that are reminiscent of earlier attitudes in societies where conquests, eradication, or enslavement of aliens was regarded as inevitable and practical. Seventeenth century religious dissenters and nineteenth century political emigres had many safe havens to which to turn; many of the Balkan groups eventually managed to find places where they could escape harassment, and some of their migrations were even conducted under international supervision. In contrast, victims of Nazi and Stalinist oppressions had none of these alternatives.

Mass flights and forcible resettlements of millions of non-Germans began all over Europe as a consequence of the literal and figurative German blitz during World War II. As the self-styled German master race gained control of larger areas of Europe, more millions of people were uprooted. Vast numbers of them were detained in German concentration camps in which more than six million people, mainly Jews, perished before the end of the war.⁵ The systematic persecution and extermination of opposing Germans, captured aliens, and innocent Jews at the hands of the Nazis have no precedents in modern

⁵ Nazi political and racial persecutions extended outside of Germany to the entire area under German military occupation. European allies participated in racial persecutions in varying degrees. All, except Rumania, initially resisted active persecution and deportation of Jews. Bulgaria countenanced deportations of Jews from 1943; Vichy-France and Hungary from the time they were occupied by German forces in 1942 and 1944 respectively; and Italy from 1943 when its northern provinces fell under German control. Finland never permitted any deportations of Jews. See Lothar Gruchmann, *Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung – die Konstruktion einer deutschen Monroe-Doktrin* (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte No. 4) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1962).

history. Hitler's mass deportations, especially from Russia and Poland, to assist his war effort by boosting the German industrial and agricultural labor force surpassed in numbers and ruthlessness any similar contemporary practice. On the conclusion of hostilities in 1945 there were about nine million non-German forced laborers in Germany who were later termed displaced persons.⁶

Similarly, the Stalin era in the Soviet Union was characterized by deportations of millions of people. Reverting to Czarist practices, Soviet leaders uprooted and removed about five million Russians to Siberia and Central Asia during the political purges before the outbreak of World War II. Between 1939 and 1941 and, again, between 1944 and 1945 they deported more than one and a half million Balts and Southeast Europeans, and subsequently transplanted and dispersed even larger numbers of their own people.⁷ The Hitler-Stalin agreements concluded after 1939 on reciprocal minority exchanges in East Europe and also the Potsdam Protocol of August 1945 on expulsion of East Germans were patterned after earlier treaties on migration and exchanges of Balkan minorities. Most of these wartime migrations were forced, and some were carried out under extremely harsh conditions.

The close of World War II did not end forced migrations in East Europe. In order to fill gaps created by expulsions of East Germans

⁶ Some facets of Hitler's treatment of the Russians, Poles, and Jews actually resemble the kind of animalism that motivated ancient nomadic and pagan hordes. The primitive practice of subjugating and exterminating peoples had occasionally reappeared throughout history. For example, there were the savage suppressions of collective internal heresies by the Roman Catholic Church, such as that of the Albigensians from 1208 to 1228 and that during the Inquisition, both of which are reminiscent of pagan purification rites. The medieval enslavement systems of oriental despots bring to mind the "human cattle" of early nomads and the slave forces of Egypt and Sparta. Similarly, Nazi deportations and concentration camps constituted a major relapse in the treatment of a presumed adversary. The virtual eradication of Jews and the continued oppression of other peoples to preserve the ideal of a pure "master race," which Hitler believed fate (*die Vorsehung*) had ordained him to revive, repeated practices of earlier, more primitive societies that succeeded, sometimes for long periods, in repressing peoples of "lesser" races.

⁷ Transplantations and dispersions of people were common in Czarist Russia. The Imperial government would move allegedly hostile groups of landowners from territories added to its domain to the interior or to remote borderlands. It would then settle trusted subjects in their stead. The first such forced migrations occurred during the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505). The practice was continued under the Romanovs (from 1613) into modern times.

and to vacate territories subsequently shuffled between East European states, communist governments resettled about nine and a half million of their people. Further, in consequence of the military defeat of the Axis Powers, of the presence of Soviet and Yugoslav armed forces, and of the activities of communist partisans, about one and a half million Balkan people were forced to flee to Italy and Turkey or to move elsewhere on the Balkan Peninsula. Over 400,000 Finns had to leave their homes in Karelia when it was ceded to the Soviet Union. It is estimated that by 1955 the Soviet government alone had deported, interned, or resettled eight million people from Poland, the Baltic areas, and the Soviet Union itself.⁸

These recent population displacements lacked effective international supervision. Unlike under the earlier League system of minority protection, unwanted population groups were disposed of as separate national interests saw fit. Powers noted for their respect of the rights of man, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, were either not directly involved or gave qualified support to these measures.⁹ The problem was no longer one that elicited the concern of the international community.¹⁰

⁸ In addition, close to 200,000 refugees left Hungary during the 1956 uprising. See Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, *Genocide in the USSR - Studies in Group Destruction* (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1958).

⁹ Cf. however indication of the West's direct involvement particularly in "the infamous forced repatriation to the Soviet Union of Russians who were in Allied hands at the end of World War II," in U.S. *Congressional Record*, Extension of Remarks, July 3, 1968, which also quotes an editorial from the *Chicago Tribune* of June 30, 1968.

¹⁰ Inis L. Cline, Jr., *National Minorities an International Problem* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), especially Chapter X.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND, FLIGHT AND EXPULSIONS OF EAST GERMANS AND ETHNIC GERMANS

The uprooting and resettlement of East Germans was designed to avenge and exorcise forever Fascist ambitions and to solve once and for all the problem of German minorities in East Europe. Towards this end the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe acted jointly to eliminate the German-speaking population from their national territories.

A. GERMAN SETTLEMENTS IN EAST EUROPE

Forced migrations of Germans affected mostly individuals and families who had lived in East Europe for many generations. Eastward expansion of German Christians, primarily Saxons and Bavarians, had begun as early as the ninth century. At that time European settlements of Slavic tribes extended into Central Europe as far as the Elbe River in the north, the Alps in the south, and the Bohemian Forests in between, thus defining a border roughly coinciding with the Iron Curtain from 1945 to 1948. By the end of the Middle Ages, North Germans, Saxons, Westphalians, and Thuringians had densely populated an area that corresponded roughly with that of the Second Reich prior to World War I. Large groups of Germans were located in the Baltic and Sudeten areas and in Bohemia-Moravia, Poland, and Hungary. Germans had established monasteries and numerous towns within a wide circle encompassing Königsberg, Memel, and Riga in the north and extending along the Bug and Dnestr Rivers as far east as Brest Litovsk and as far southeast as Kamenez-Podolsk.

Proliferation of German settlements in the East markedly slowed

down in the fifteenth century due to wars and strife in Central and East Europe, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Turkish expansion in Southeast Europe served to bring them to a standstill. After the second futile Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, however, such settlements of Germans were vigorously resumed, primarily under the sponsorship of the Hapsburg emperors. Germans settled in Hungary and in the area along the military frontier maintained against the Osmanlis, that is, in Slavonia, in Croatia, north of Bosnia and Walachia, and west of Moldavia. Similarly, under the Prussian kings, German farmers and townspeople continued to settle in East Prussia, the Memel area, Pomerania, and Silesia. After the divisions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795 and the subsequent decline of Prussia, the Hapsburgs encouraged Germans to move to Galicia and the Bukovina. Catherine II and subsequent Russian rulers sponsored the settlement of farmers, mostly from North Germany, near St. Petersburg, in Volhynia, the Volga steppes, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Caucasian provinces.

Small numbers of German farmers continued to settle in Polish and Russian areas during the nineteenth century without the encouragement of state sponsorship, but major eastward migrations of Germans had ceased. As conflicts between Slav and German nationalism emerged, small German minorities, primarily in towns far removed from areas densely settled by Germans, were gradually absorbed and vanished as distinctly German groups. Conversely, non-German minorities in Eastern Germany and Austria were assimilated and eventually adopted the German language and culture. Prior to 1914 populations in Austria and in most eastern provinces of the German Empire were German by origin. So-called Germanized minorities existed in East and West Prussia, Lausatia, and Upper Silesia. West Prussia also contained a significant number of Poles, as did the province of Posen. A contiguous and dense settlement of Germans had grown up in the Sudeten area, and large numbers of German people had settled in Hapsburg Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia, Rumania (Dobrudja), and Russia, where in addition to concentrations of Germans already mentioned, large groups had relocated to Bessarabia and the area immediately north of Odessa. Other Germans were scattered throughout the Czech and Slovak areas of the Hapsburg Empire, in Russian Poland and the Baltic provinces.

B. 1914 TO 1942: CHANGES AND PLANS

World War I and its aftermath brought unrest to virtually all inhabitants of Eastern Europe. After the defeat of Russia, the expansionist plans of the Central Powers were clearly revealed. The Peace Treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest, concluded in February and March of 1918 respectively, and the Supplementary Agreements of Berlin, formalized in August of the same year, contained German imperial blueprints for a "New Order" in the East. The Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland attained nominal independence; with the exception of most of Finland and Georgia, their territories remained under German or Austrian armed control. What remained of European Russia was to be isolated by a belt of lesser border states dependent on Germany. Russia and Rumania were to become mere economic vassals.¹ German political and economic influence, thus extended far to the East, was to be strengthened by the presence of numerous German settlers in the Ukraine and around the Black Sea.² Closer to the Reich more stringent measures were to be taken along strategic and ethnic (*völkisch*) lines. Further German plans formulated in late 1914, when a separate peace with Russia seemed possible, called for annexation or *de facto* control of a large "border area" immediately east and northwest of the German frontiers of 1914 and consisting of parts of the western and northern Polish provinces, of Lithuania, and of Courland. This area was to be "subtly Germanized" by removing certain Poles and Jews and replacing them with reliable German colonists who would operate as a "German Dam" against the Slavs.³

The Allies proved to be no less capable of imperialist designs than the Central Powers. Territorial penalties dictated at Versailles to Germany and Austria initiated major migratory movements, which

¹ A system of German governmental and quasi-public economic syndicates or other "coordinating" entities was emerging in Russia; German control of ports and vital communication lines had already been extended from the Ukraine to beyond the Asow and Black Seas.

² This idea seems to have been uppermost in the minds of German military leaders who conceived *inter alia* of an independent Crimean State in which the German element and influence would be preponderant. See Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht – Die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (2nd ed.; Düsseldorf: Droste, 1962), pp. 128 ff.

³ Imanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914–1918* (Lübeck: Historische Studien, 1960), as referred to in Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 340 ff.

continued intermittently in the inter-war period. The loss of the Eastern German provinces to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania in 1919 and the separation of Danzig in the same year resulted, aside from a painful diminution of material assets, in the reduction of the German resident population by one and one quarter million persons. Many Germans in Volhynia and the Autonomous Socialist Republic of Volga Germans established by the Soviet Union fled or were deported. The German population in Austrian Silesia and the Sudetenland areas was lost to Czechoslovakia and Poland. Large groups of German settlers in Central Hungary, in the Banat, and in Transylvania became small minorities under Czech, Hungarian, Yugoslav, and Rumanian rule.

Hitler and his followers poured oil onto the fires smouldering amidst East European populations and minorities by proclaiming the biological superiority of all Germans as members of an alleged "Germanic Aryan" race. As earlier politicians of Weimar-Germany had done, Hitler raised the "unsolved question" of the 1919 East German borders. His declared aim was a new Greater German State that would embrace all persons of German blood by expanding its borders eastward and westward. This new, enlarged state, in his opinion, was to enable the Germans to advance their culture and to exercise their presumed superiority over other peoples whom he considered to belong to "inferior races."

Various methods were employed to effect this expansion in the East: (1) Attachment or reattachment to Germany of large areas primarily inhabited by Germans. This led to the *Anschluss* of Austria, the cession to Germany of the Sudetenland, the return of the Memel territory and Danzig, the reconquest of the pre-World War I East German provinces by invading Poland, and even the seizure of areas east and south-east of the pre-1919 German borders.⁴ (2) Germanization of areas contiguous to and occupied by Germany before the outbreak of war with Russia in June 1941. This included the seizure in March 1939 of the rest of Czechoslovakia (*Protektorat Böhmen-Mähren*) and the establishment of a German administration (*General-gouvernement*) over the rest of Poland as far east as the German-Soviet demarcation line of 1939-1941. Hitler's plans also called for complete penetration of these areas by Germans (*Eindeutschung*) within

⁴ This included, on the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the attachment to Germany of parts of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola.

a period of ten to twenty years. Alien populations and Jews were to be gradually removed, and reliable German elements were to be settled in their place.⁵ (3) Resettlement of original German minorities from the East within the area thus expanded and termed Greater Germany. As mentioned earlier this was achieved to a large extent between 1939 and 1942 on the basis of agreements with the Soviet Union and lesser Northeast and Southeast European states. These agreements affected over 300,000 ethnic German settlers east of the German-Soviet demarcation line – in the Baltic area, former Eastern Poland, the Northern Bokovina, and Bessarabia – as well as about 150,000 Germans in areas west of that line – in the vicinity of Lublin and in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. A large number of these German minorities trekked to what was formerly Western Poland (West Prussia and Warthegau) and resettled there or in the *General-gouvernement*, Upper Silesia, and Lower Styria. Later, some of them again migrated eastward and settled around Bialystock in White Russia.⁶

In four years, from 1938 through 1941, the German Reich had successfully expanded eastward. The German population in its Eastern domain had increased from about ten million to nearly twenty-two million. About 3,400,000 Germans were still left outside the Reich, primarily in Southeast Europe where many did not participate in the resettlement schemes, but also in Russia where many were removed even further east by the Soviet government. With the advance of German forces into Russia and into the Balkan Peninsula the total

⁵ This would have entailed the expulsion of about eight million Poles from their homes in western Poland. Actually, about 750,000 Poles were displaced or deported by 1944. For details, see Martin Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939/1945* (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, No. 2), (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1961).

⁶ Germany concluded similar agreements with Italy on the resettlement of Germans from the Italian Tyrol (*Alto Adige*). These latter endeavors met with only partial success, but westward migrations from east of the German-Soviet demarcation line proceeded as intended. In addition, the German armies advancing into Russia evacuated about 350,000 German settlers to the west. Between 1939 and 1943 a total of about 770,000 Germans were brought west. Of these only about 400,000 could be resettled where Polish or Slovenian farmers had been uprooted by the German authorities. The rest found employment in Germany or remained in German camps where they were still awaiting resettlement at the end of the war. For details, see Reichskommissar zur Festigung deutschen Volkstums (ed.), *Kleiner Umsiedlungsspiegel*, January 1944, cited in Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), *Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958), pp. 41 f.

population of East and ethnic Germans added to the Axis power, including Germans in former Austria, was over twenty-four million.

Subsequently, 700,000 were moved to East Europe to begin the implementation and administration of Hitler's territorial plans for German *Lebensraum* in the East. These plans exceeded by far the ambitions of the German imperial government twenty-five years earlier. In Eastern Europe the Polish, Czech, and Baltic peoples were to be "Germanized" or dispersed. Indigenous populations in Russia proper, White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasian provinces were to be kept at the lowest possible economic and cultural levels by a German administration. All alien inhabitants were to be evacuated from the Crimea and replaced by Germans who were to ensure control of the Black Sea and secure the Russian mainland for economic exploitation by Germany. The smaller Southeast European states such as Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia, were to remain economically dependent on Greater Germany. German minorities that remained in these countries were to retain or receive full political and cultural autonomy. Yugoslavia was to remain partitioned between Germany and Italy, and Albania was to continue under partial Italian control.⁷

Even before the blueprints for a final and lasting national socialist "New Order" in Europe were being refined, Hitler's elite was engaged, as indicated in the preceding chapter, in removing or exterminating entire radical and ethnic groups within his domain. Only the defeat of Germany could frustrate his fantastic imperialist plans.

C. THE WESTWARD FLIGHT: 1943 TO 1945

I. Military Operations in Eastern Europe

After the Russian victory in Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 and the failure of the last German offensive near Kursk in the summer

⁷ There were indications of even more grandiose designs. The wording of the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan in September 1940 suggests some of Hitler's and Mussolini's basic ideas for the further political rearrangement of the Old World. Reciprocal recognition of such vague intentions as a "new ordering" of Europe by Germany and Italy on the one hand and of Greater Asia by Japan on the other resembled in method the medieval arrangement concluded by Portugal and Spain in 1496 to effect division of the New World into spheres of respective interest.

of 1943, the Red Army swiftly reconquered the Ukraine and the Crimea. The subsequent Russian offensive was begun three days after the Allied invasion of France, on June 9, 1944. By the time it came to a halt, extensive Russian forces had already penetrated far westward. In the north Finland had asked for an armistice. Karelia, much of former Lithuania, and parts of the Memel territory and East Prussia had been seized. In the center the Russians had stopped immediately east of Warsaw; in the south they had crossed Rumania and Bulgaria, pushed through the Carpathians into Hungary, and established contact with Tito's forces in Yugoslavia. German forces began to withdraw from Finland and most of the Balkan Peninsula. Belgrade and the outskirts of Budapest were occupied by the Russians in winter.

Hitler's futile winter offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 and his attempt to reconquer Budapest and protect the Hungarian oilfields in January 1945 had used up most of his reserve manpower and weakened the German Eastern Front to such an extent that in some places the ratio of Russian to German forces was as high as ten to one.

The last Russian offensive began on January 12, 1945, progressing from the Baranow bridgehead in West Galicia across the Vistula into Poland. After the occupation of Warsaw and Lodz, Soviet forces moved north to cut off East Prussia and pushed west across the Oder river toward Berlin. In early February the Soviets had seized, virtually intact, the industrial areas of Upper Silesia; they were approaching Breslau (now Wroclaw), and had crossed into Pomerania. The city of Breslau resisted until early May, but most of Silesia and part of Pomerania fell in March. German resistance in Danzig (now Gdansk) and East Prussia weakened, and Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) capitulated on April 9. German forces farther west and north in Courland stemmed the Russian tide and remained in control of coastal areas and bridgeheads until the general German capitulation on May 9.

In the south the Russians had been able to roll over most of the German Danube front capturing Budapest by February 13. Vienna and much of Austria were conquered in April. The armistice declared in Italy on April 28 and the end of German resistance in Bavaria opened Austria to British, French, and United States forces, and the latter pushed as far into Czechoslovakia as Budweis and Karlsbad.

On April 16 the Soviets began the drive to Berlin from the bridge-heads on the Oder River. By April 25 they had encircled the city, and following a last fierce resistance on the part of German forces the capital fell on May 2. Meanwhile, Canadian, British, and American forces had forged eastward across the Rhine into the industrial heart of Germany, and the Russians and Western Allied fronts had met. Germany was defeated.

2. Evacuation, Flight, Subsequent Events

By 1942-1943 the total German population of the East German provinces and the East European countries was approximately seventeen million (see Figure 1). There were in addition approximately 400,000 ethnic Germans (within the pre-1939 borders of the Soviet Union) who were the first to be involved in the exodus.⁸ Their fate was actually decided in August 1941 when the Soviet government dissolved the autonomous Volga German Republic in the face of the German attack and – just as they had done on a smaller scale in 1919 – ordered the deportation of close to 600,000 Germans from the Volga steppes, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea areas to Siberia and Central Asia. Of those not deported in 1941 about 350,000 were evacuated to the west by the German armies retreating from Russia in 1943. In turn most of them were overtaken by the Soviet armies and subsequently deported to the east.

Aside from a small number of Germans in the Baltic areas and sizeable groups east of the Vistula in Central Poland, the two million ethnic Germans in Southeast Europe were the next persons to be affected by the advance of the Red Army. Beginning in August 1944 about 500,000 of them fled or were evacuated by German authorities. Most of the Germans in Rumania and Hungary and about a third of the Germans in Yugoslavia remained, but in early 1945 some 140,000 of them were deported by the Soviets to work in Ukrainian labor camps.⁹

⁸ To these may be added the 700,000 from Central or West Germany, who, as said earlier, had come to work for the German administration in East Europe. Moreover, an equally substantial number of German families and staff of industrial establishments had been evacuated to the east because they had lost their German homes in airraids or as a safety precaution.

⁹ Theodor Schieder *et al.* (ed.), *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost- und Mitteleuropa*, (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1953 to 1961) Vols. II, III, and V, pp. 34E-44E, 64E-80E, and 85E-97E, hereafter cited as Schieder Documents.

The Russian offensive of January 1945 in the northern and central parts of the front was so sudden and forceful that earlier evacuations of Germans proved to be relatively unimportant. The Soviet forces brought chaos to the remaining fourteen million East and ethnic Germans, of whom nearly half tried to reach Central or West Germany. It is estimated that nearly two million of these refugees were overtaken by the Russians and, on the termination of hostilities, attempted to return to their homes. Over 200,000 were promptly deported to Soviet labor camps in the northern part of Russia proper, in the Ural mountains, the Caucasus, and even as far off as Turkmenia. Most of the other millions who had remained were driven from their homes, which were expropriated by the newly established national governments. Thousands were arrested or detained, and many were convicted of Nazi crimes or otherwise punished for membership in Nazi organizations. Virtually all were under strict control. Many lived in ghettos and labor camps or else were imprisoned to await the final phase of the exodus — the expulsion.¹⁰

During these involuntary migrations, detentions, and deportations, the Germans incurred considerable hardships inflicted by Soviet and other East European peoples. The mentality of the East German expellee can be more readily understood in view of the difficulties he was forced to undergo. For obvious reasons West German scholars have gathered every possible piece of information on this matter. As a result, a large number of pertinent documents are available in West Germany. These frequently vary in quality but are never wholly irrelevant. The most impressive in terms of size and content is that assembled by Professors Theodor Schieder, Hans Rothfels, Rudolf Laun, and others, of the universities of Cologne, Tübingen, and Hamburg respectively, as part of a study sponsored by the Bonn govern-

¹⁰ Schieder Documents, especially Vol. I/1, pp. 26E-59E and 69E-135E, and Vol. IV/1, pp. 17-107 and 172-176. Vol. IV/1, p. 81 n. 2, lists 26 internment camps in Czechoslovakia; cf. report of a Jewish witness on conditions in Theresienstadt (a former Nazi concentration camp) in *ibid.*, p. 81; further, see findings of the American High Commissioner's Court for the Munich area regarding conditions in the Czech internment center in Budweis, which, "while it contained no gas chambers and was not a place of organized and systematic extermination, . . . served as a center of brutality, violence, and sadism," in *Office of the United States High Commissioner For Germany v. Vaclav Hrnecek, Opinion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Sentence, Munich (Germany), May 26, 1954*, pp. 33 ff.

ment.¹¹ Schieder's papers, as well as similar reports and collections,¹² make rather unpleasant reading, because they demonstrate that events during these months, especially in the territories immediately east of the Oder-Neisse line, were characterized by profound personal tragedies in connection with – among other crimes – arson, looting, murder and rape. Such behavior was frequently regarded as a form of retributive punishment for earlier Nazi deeds. For many of the victims it represented an exercise in revenge that was both arbitrary and unmerited.¹³

Several factors contributed to the disastrous character of the population movement. The substantial weakening of the German eastern front by Hitler's military campaigns in the winter of 1944–1945 left no force that could either halt or delay the Russian offensive. The swift advance toward Berlin and the infiltration of the Balkans were therefore virtually unimpeded, and the civilian population was inescapably subjected to none-too-lenient or merciful treatment by Russian troops, Polish and Czech militias, and Yugoslav partisans.

In Germany itself practically no plans for effective evacuation of civilian populations had been elaborated, and desperate, belated

¹¹ See Schieder Documents (English: *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line* (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, n.d.).

¹² Note especially Johann Kaps, *Tragödie Schlesiens 1945/46*, in Dokumenten, (Munich: Christ Unterwegs, 1952); by the same author, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Erzbistums Breslau in den Schicksalsjahren 1945–1950* (Munich: MS, 1950), and *Martyrium und Heldentum ostdeutscher Frauen 1945/46* (Munich: MS, 1954), all of which cover events in Silesia; on Czechoslovakia, see Wilhelm Turnwald, *Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen* (Munich: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen, 1951), and J. W. Brügel "Die Aussiedlung der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart), April 1960, pp. 134–164; on Rumania, see Hartl, *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Rumänien, 1938, 1945, 1953* (Göttingen: Holzner, 1953).

¹³ Schieder Documents, especially Vols. I/1, II, III, IV/1, and V, pp. 60E–86E, 41E–44E, 75E–80E, 28–66, and 90E–96E; see also pp. 51 ff. in *ibid.*, 3. Beiheft, "Ein Bericht aus Ost- und Westpreussen 1945–1947 – Aufzeichnungen von Hans Graf von Lehndorff" (English: Hans Graf von Lehndorff, *Token of a Covenant* (New York: Regnery, 1964)) for a particularly vivid account. The arbitrariness of the exodus is illustrated by the fact that several thousand nuns, priests, and even some Jews (who managed to escape the Nazis) were among the expellees; see *ibid.*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 97–104; also Johann Kaps, *The Martyrdom of Silesian Priests – 1945/46* (Munich: Kirchliche Hilfsstellen, 1950), pp. 28–30, and 108; further, Statistische Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – 1959* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1959), p. 41.

efforts in this direction were often frustrated and even punished by fanatical Nazi Party functionaries. The Hitler government led many of its people to believe that a miracle-weapon would still save Germany and that somehow the Russians would be prevented from setting foot on German soil. As late as February and March 1945, Goebbels and other high Nazi officials were still demanding that civilians offer passionate resistance to the enemy. A special people's militia (*Volkssturm*) was established, and Hitler proclaimed the "scorched earth tactics." The German people were kept poorly informed as to the actual state of their defense, particularly during the last months of the war.

Wartime diplomatic manoeuvres and conferences on the part of the Allies with regard to the anticipated surrender and subsequent fortunes of Germany — although known to the government and the military high command — often received only such publicity as was likely to bolster German resistance. Thus, when East Germans fled their homes, many of them expected that they would be able to return. The few planned evacuations¹⁴ and the mass flight were further complicated by the fact that the retreating, dissolving German army and air forces were not in a position to help the refugees; only the navy was able to render assistance on a large scale.

In fact it seems that the rescue from the Red Army of as many German civilians and soldiers as possible was the primary consideration which led Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz — who headed the German interim government through May 23, 1945, after Hitler's suicide on April 30, 1945 — to attempt a delay of the surrender to the Soviets by offering separate earlier surrenders of his armed forces to the Western Allies. In any case, by utilizing the continuously mobile German Navy in the Northeast European waters during the last phase of the war for one of the largest rescue operations in modern times, he enabled many hundred thousands of East Germans to complete their westward flight.¹⁵

¹⁴ Without the knowledge of the Nazi Party some evacuations of East German areas had been planned by the German Reich Ministry of Interior and a government agency called "Reichsstelle für Raumordnung;" see comment and map in Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (ed.), *Dokumente deutscher Kriegsschäden* (Bonn: Federal Government, 1960), Vol. II/1, p. 715.

¹⁵ See the autobiography, Karl Dönitz, *Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage* (Bonn: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1958) (English: *Ten Years and Twenty Days* (London:

The refugees themselves consisted primarily of women, children, and older or disabled men. Disorganized and in panic, the vast majority of them trekked westward in the bitter winter of 1944-1945, most by horse and wagon or on foot, some by rail, a few by auto - all exposed to the cruel vicissitudes of total war.¹⁶

D. THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE AND THE EXPULSIONS

Postwar territorial and population changes in East Europe were made possible by the Soviet Army. Allied conferences during the latter part of the war - just like those concerning Balkan minorities in the period from 1913 to 1923 - to a large extent merely ratified a situation that already existed, and the diplomatic prelude to the Potsdam Conference therefore does not require close examination.¹⁷ It is

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959)), especially p. 465; and the biography of Dönitz' last personal adjutant, Walter Lüddecke-Neurath, *Regierung Dönitz - die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964), 3rd ed., chap. 7. When proclaiming his take-over of the government to the German people, Dönitz asserted that "the rescue of Germans from the annihilation of the advancing Bolshevik enemy (was) his first task (and that) only for this purpose (did he) continue the military struggle." Between January and August 1945, he reports, the navy had evacuated a total of over two million persons via the Baltic Sea to the western parts of Germany; Lüddecke-Neurath estimates that up to three million may have been rescued during the last days of the war. See *ibid.*, especially pp. 73 and 132. For a detailed account, see Cajus Bekker, *Flucht übers Meer - Ostsee, Deutsches Schicksal 1945* (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1959); Bekker documents the rescue across the sea of approximately 2,200,000 Germans including 600,000 soldiers, from the end of January through May 9, 1945.

¹⁶ Russians and Western Allied airraids and bombing took an especially heavy toll as, for example, in Dresden, where tens of thousands of people, primarily East German refugees, are reported to have perished during the attack.

¹⁷ The subject is well covered in Wolfgang Wagner, *Die Entstehung der Oder-Neisse Linie in den diplomatischen Verhandlungen während des zweiten Weltkrieges*, (Stuttgart: Brentano, 1953) English: *The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line - A Study in the Diplomatic Negotiations during World War II* (Stuttgart: Brentano, 1957)). Cf. also Herbert Marzian, "Grossbritannien und die polnische Territorialfrage von 1939 bis zur Moskauer Konferenz 1943 - Studien zur internationalen Politik," *Mensch und Staat in Recht und Geschichte* (Festschrift für Herbert Kraus zum 70. Geburtstag) (Kitzingen: Holzner, 1954), pp. 375-393. Also, Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin - The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought and Between War and Peace - the Potsdam Conference*, both (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1957 and 1960 respectively. For documents see *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1955), and *The Conference of Berlin [The Potsdam Conference] 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1960), 2 Vols.

sufficient to say, as has been suggested above, that the transfer of East German provinces to Poland, the return of the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, and the elimination of German minorities were the principal aims of the Polish and Czech leaders, at least since the time that Germany had invaded their countries in 1939. The Polish government-in-exile desired an enlarged postwar Poland that "besides direct and wide access to the sea" would require "such borders as necessary to guarantee its security" and "an economic potential corresponding to the size of its population."¹⁸ Conferring with President Roosevelt in December 1942, General Sikorski requested, on behalf of Poland, the German areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, including Stettin (now Szczecin).¹⁹ A similar anti-German policy was advocated by Communist Polish leaders in the Soviet Union after Stalin had broken relations with the Polish exiles in London. Having explored various alternatives, Stalin eventually decided that a reconstructed Poland with an eastern border corresponding to the Curzon line of 1919 and a substantial share of Germany's eastern provinces added as compensation would best serve to assist Soviet plans for expansion into Central and Western Europe. The Polish and German questions were discussed at the Allied Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow in October and November 1943 and during subsequent conferences at Teheran and Quebec. At Yalta in February 1945 the Big Three finally decided upon the Curzon line as an eastern border for Poland and agreed to consider the Oder-Neisse line as a basis for negotiating a western border for Poland at a future peace conference. The transfer of the resident German population that was desired by the Polish exile governments in both London and the Soviet Union was also agreed to in principle at Yalta.

Similarly, exiled Czech leaders thought it best to solve the German problem by means of expulsions. Even before the British and French governments repudiated the Munich Agreement, both Beneš and Masaryk had requested the removal of all Sudeten Germans and other

¹⁸ Policy statements on December 20, 1939 (in Paris) and September 24, 1941 (in London); see Herbert Marzian, *Zeittafel und Dokumente zur Oder-Neisse Linie, 1939-1952/53* (Kitzingen: Holzner, 1953), pp. 5 and 7 f., hereafter referred to as Marzian Documents.

¹⁹ Marzian Documents, pp. 10 f; *Dziennik Polski* (London), December 9, 1942.

German minorities from Czechoslovakia, and by June 1943 each of the Big Three had approved their proposals in principle.²⁰

In accordance with the Yalta agreements and on the basis of subsequent international understandings, the four Allied Powers eventually assumed official control over Germany. In a formal statement dated June 5, 1945, their respective zones of occupation were demarcated within Germany's borders as of December 31, 1937.²¹ Nevertheless, the Russians were preparing, at least since January 1945, to confront the West with territorial and population changes involving Poland and East Germany. During the conference at Yalta, the Communist Provisional Government of Poland, which had moved westward to Lublin in the summer of 1944, had already begun to prepare for the administration of what was referred to as "recovered Western territories." On March 14, 1945, the Soviet leadership officially transferred administrative control of these territories to the Poles. Contrary to previous understanding, Stalin had in fact created a fifth zone of occupation.

At Potsdam, Truman and Churchill (succeeded by Attlee) protested in vain against this unilateral action. Notwithstanding the fact that millions of Germans were still under the control of the new Polish government, Stalin argued that while "on paper" the Oder-Neisse areas constituted German territory, "for all practical purposes they were actually Polish . . . since there was no German population."²² That nothing short of joint United States and British military action could reverse "the Soviet *fait accompli*"²³ soon became evident.

The final Protocol of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945 left the German provinces that are east of the Oder-(Western) Neisse line,

²⁰ Eduard Beneš, *From Munich to New War and New Victory* (London, 1954), pp. 206 f.

²¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945. A map dividing Germany into four zones of occupation, with the provinces east of the Oder-(Western) Neisse line under Polish and the area around Königsberg under Russian administration, was released by the U.S. State Department on August 15, 1945.

²² To this Admiral Leahy remarked to President Truman, "of course not . . . the Bolsheviks have killed all of them!" in Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), Vol. I, pp. 368 f. Also, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 655 and Stalin's comment earlier, during the Crimean Conference, to the effect "that there were no Germans in these areas as they had all run away," *ibid.*, p. 374.

²³ Leahy, cited in Boris Meisner, *Russland, Die Westmächte und Deutschland* (Hamburg: Höcke, 1953), pp. 62 f.; see also James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper Bros., 1947), pp. 79 f.

including Danzig, under Polish, and the northern part of East Prussia under Russian administration, with the "final delimitation of the . . . frontier (to) await the peace settlement."²⁴ The German civilians "remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were to be transferred in an orderly and humane manner." Since the influx of "a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities," the Allied Control Council was first to "examine the problem with special regard to the question of their equitable distribution among the several zones of occupation." The Czech, Polish, and Hungarian authorities, were to be requested "to suspend further expulsions" until receipt of the reports from their representatives on the Control Council.²⁵

Large-scale expulsions had begun before the Potsdam Conference, however, and continued after it. These affected in the main those Germans who had stayed in the Oder-Neisse territories, Central Poland, Danzig, and Czechoslovakia, or who had returned to these places. In spite of the agreement at Potsdam to suspend further expulsions, approximately 1,400,000 more Germans fled or were expelled from these areas.²⁶

At its twelfth meeting in Berlin on November 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council for Germany finally approved "a plan for the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Poland into the four occupied zones of Germany." According to this plan 6,650,000 Germans were to have arrived in Germany during the seven-month period beginning December 1945.²⁷

Germans from Poland and the Oder-Neisse area were permitted to take with them "whatever they could carry in their hands" plus currency not in excess of 500 Reichsmarks. Germans from Czechoslovakia were allowed to take up to 1,000 marks as well as personal effects not in excess of 110 pounds. Jewelry and other valuables were not permitted to be taken out. Those from Hungary were allowed

²⁴ Sections V and VIII B of the "Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945, of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference July 17 to August 2, 1945," in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1951), United States Government collection, pp. 42-44.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Section XII, pp. 45 f.

²⁶ Schieder Documents, especially Vol. I/1, pp. 78E f., and Vol. IV/1, pp. 112, 134 ff.

²⁷ Allied Control Council for Germany, *Enactments and Approved Papers*, 1945 to June 30, 1948, Vol. I, pp. 199 ff. Details as to what area constituted Poland are not given in either this document or in the Potsdam Protocol.

220 pounds per person as well as jewelry and valuables, and no limit was fixed on amounts of currency they could take with them.²⁸ Usually these people had to travel in box cars containing thirty persons. They were to be assured sufficient food and medical attention en route.

Obviously, in war-ravaged Europe a transfer of this size could not be carried out within seven months. By the end of 1946 less than half of the projected number of persons had been expelled. Many more left in smaller groups between 1947 and 1950. Whether any of these organized transfers were in practice conducted in an "orderly and human manner" is doubtful. General Clay, then Military Governor of the American Zone, spoke of trainloads of "hungry and destitute" and of "inhumane conditions."²⁹ The Americans tried to make improvements³⁰ until the transports from Czechoslovakia and Hungary were halted. They were stopped altogether in the winter of 1946, when, according to Clay, it became impossible to receive more people under humane conditions.³¹ Henceforth, the frontiers of the American Zone remained officially closed to mass movements, and only "individual transfers of German nationals" who qualified under a policy of family reunion were allowed.³²

²⁸ "Agreement between British and Polish Representatives of the Combined Repatriation Executives (CRX) of February 14, 1946," Schieder Documents, Vol. I/1, pp. 147E f. For relevant information on Czechoslovakia see *ibid.*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 328-333; on Hungary, "Allied Directives to Control Councils in Austria and Hungary," in *Ausländische Dokumente zur Oder-Neisse-Linie*, a collection edited by the Deutsche Friedensbüro (Stuttgart: mimeographed, 1949), pp. 144-148. See also, "Aussiedlungsverordnung" and "Durchführung der Aussiedlung" by the Minister of the Interior of the Hungarian National Government based on the Allied Control Council plan of November 20, 1945, Anlagen 5 und 6, Schieder Documents, Vol. II, pp. 91E-104E.

²⁹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 312 ff.; compare an account based largely on British sources in Elizabeth Wisemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors* (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 125; see comment in Schieder Documents, Vol. IV/1, p. 119 n. 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV/1, pp. 120 f., 334-336; Vol. II, p. 63E, reports nos. 42 and 49.

³¹ Office of U.S. Military Government (OMGUS), Cable CC-19914, Clay, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-316.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 316; see also Council of the Allied High Commission, *Selected Papers* (Munich: mimeographed, 1950), for a restatement of American policy regarding transfers in a memorandum by the Political Affairs Committee, dated November 21, 1949.

E. REASONS AND REACTIONS

1. *The Allied Leaders*

Initially, the United States, "although not viewing with favor the unilateral or indiscriminate expulsion of Germans from the east," approved "the transfer to Germany of German population, or elements thereof, in order to avoid giving rise to dangerous minority problems." And, faced with the Russian *fait accompli*, the United States government did what it could to ensure that inevitable transfers were conducted in a more humane and orderly manner and to facilitate the reception in Germany of the large masses of westward migrants.³³

On the British side there was likewise an interest in attempting to solve the problem of national minorities in Eastern Europe, especially in the hope of helping to build a "strong, happy, prosperous, and free" Poland. However, to Churchill, the prospect of moving millions of people was so shocking³⁴ that he considered insisting on the Eastern Neisse rather than the Western Neisse line, at the risk of a "showdown" or even of a "public break," since it would have spared about three million people from the fate of expulsion.³⁵ The French, who acceded to the Potsdam Protocol after the conference and who later resettled relatively few expellees in their zone of occupation, did not object to the forcible transfers.

Both the desire of many East European statesmen to eliminate potentially dangerous German minorities and to punish the Germans collectively for their misdeeds is understandable. Upon viewing films of German devastations and atrocities in Russia, Beneš said that "all these things could not be forgotten and for all of them there had to be

³³ Department of State, *Occupation of Germany - Policy and Progress, 1945-46* (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 24-26.

³⁴ It would also hopelessly complicate the problems of German supply and reparations, see Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 374, 656, 666; that was initially also Truman's view, Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

³⁵ Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 672; Churchill, subsequently as leader of the opposition in Parliament, was one of the first statesmen openly to attack the Potsdam decisions; see his statements in the House of Commons on August 15, 1945, and in Fulton, Missouri, on March 6, 1946, both in Marzian Documents, pp. 40, 43.

a reckoning.”³⁶ An inscription on the gate of the Czech Internment Center at Budweis read: “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”³⁷ Stalin spoke to Truman of “taking revenge . . . for the injuries the Germans had caused . . . over the course of centuries.”³⁸ The very ease with which some of the important wartime negotiations had been conducted suggests a rather common acceptance, at least in communist quarters, of belief in collective punishment: “That’s a trifle, that’s easy!” was Molotov’s reaction to a proposal to move two million or more Sudeten Germans into the Reich.³⁹

2. *Reaction in the West*

From the start, expulsions of East Germans evoked earnest public concern throughout the West. Pope Pius XII publicly protested “the ignominious insults and inhuman treatment to which so many German women and girls had been subjected.”⁴⁰ After Churchill expressed his misgivings, other British and American officials, politicians, and educators likewise went on record as having endorsed “with greatest reluctance” (Bevin) population transfers that were carried out “under conditions which must mean death on a large scale” (Sir Arthur Salter); which were “repugnant and unacceptable” (W. Bedell Smith); for which “some day . . . the people of (the United States) will hold (its) administration to strict accountability” (Brownell); and under which Americans “perhaps unwillingly allowed (themselves) to be influenced by . . . heartless totalitarian political philosophy” (Catholic Bishops of the United States). Still others objected to mass transfers as a dangerous method of eliminating minorities.⁴¹

An American “Committee against Mass Expulsion” was formed. Similar groups that were motivated in part by concern for the welfare

³⁶ Eduard Beneš, *Memoirs* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, n.d.), p. 280.

³⁷ U.S. HICOG v. Hrnecek, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³⁸ Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

³⁹ Eduard Táborský, “Beneš and Stalin – Moscow 1943 and 1945,” *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Springfield, Colorado) Vol. XIII, 1953/54, p. 167; cf. Beneš, *Memoirs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 f.

⁴⁰ Papal communication of November 1, 1945, in *Amtsblatt der Erzdiözese München und Freising*, No. 1, January 20, 1946.

⁴¹ See citations in Committee Against Mass Expulsion, *The Land of the Dead* (New York, n.d.), pp. 7, 21, 30 f.; also Isaiah Bowman, “The Strategy of Territorial Decision,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24, 1945/46, especially pp. 187, 189; Hans Rothfels, “Frontiers and Mass Migrations in Eastern Europe,” *The Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, Indiana), January 1946, pp. 56, 59, 67.

of expellees and in part by anti-Roosevelt sentiments grew up in the United States. They expressed dissatisfaction with "the policy of mass deportations now practised in Europe" and urged that aid be given to the East German expellees.⁴² Such aid, as will be shown, eventually came from public and private sources in the United States. The interest of American public opinion which this reflected⁴³ as well as continued criticism elsewhere in the West was certainly a decisive factor in encouraging Western foreign ministers to try at least to ameliorate the situation in Poland and East Germany during the early postwar conference, an effort that met with little success.

3. The Red Army

The well-nigh incredible breakdown of discipline in many Red Army units in their encounter with German civilians can conceivably be explained in terms of revenge. It is generally true that the most thoughtless, severe treatment of Germans tended to occur in places where, earlier, Nazi persecution had been especially ruthless (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia).⁴⁴ An American general who served in

⁴² Committee against Mass Expulsion, *op. cit.*, p. 3; this Committee, which was dissolved in 1950 or 1951, criticizes "the deportations" from Eastern Germany. An introduction to one of its booklets was signed by Roger N. Baldwin, John Dewey, Christopher Emet, Hans V. Kaltenborn, Eustace Seligman, Norman Thomas, Dorothy Thompson, and others; further of their publications were *Men without Rights of Men*, *Tragedy of a People*, and *Memorandum on the German Refugee and Expellee Problem* (all New York, 1947-1949). Other similar American groups were the National Planning Association and the National Council for the Prevention of War; their publications respectively: Jane Perry Clark Carey, "The Role of the Uprooted People in European Recovery," *National Planning Pamphlets*, No. 64 (Washington, 1948) and A. Boeker, "Mass Deportations - A Bitter Tragedy," *Peace Action Pamphlet* (Washington, 1946); along the same lines see an account, sponsored by a "Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.," Freda Utley, *The High Cost of Vengeance* (Chicago, 1949) (German: *Kostspielige Rache* (Hamburg, 1950)).

⁴³ For some of the U.S. press comment see *The New York Times*, September 18, 1945; *New York Herald Tribune*, December 3, 1945; *Time - The Weekly News Magazine* (New York), August 13, and October 2, 1945; also readers' comments in *The New York Times*, August 5, 1945; and *ibid.*, October 23, 1945, the article by Anne O'Hare MacCormik, "Horrors without Precedent in History."

⁴⁴ Treatment of Germans in Hungary and Rumania - both former allies of Nazi Germany - seems to have been much less severe. Such smaller groups of civilians and soldiers (largely former members of the *Waffen SS*) as were interned

Germany together with Soviet soldiers observed in them "a hatred which stemmed from their knowledge . . . of German atrocities in their homeland (and from) the thought that revenge was a privilege." He compared some of their "savagery . . . to that of . . . barbaric hordes."⁴⁵

There is no question that the Red soldiers were well informed about the destructive effect of earlier Nazi occupation and administration in Russia. Beginning in the winter of 1941-42, when the Russian Army was for the first time able to recover some areas west of Moscow previously overrun and ravaged by German forces, it became clear that the Germans indeed constituted a reckless adversary. Official reports at the time, as well as prose and poetry by such noted literary figures as Boris Pasternak, Konstantin Simonov, and Ilya Ehrenburg reflected despair and anguish at the sufferings inflicted on the Russians and preached a hatred of the Germans that tended to increase toward the end of the war as more of Russia was liberated.⁴⁶ Revenge of Nazi war crimes probably originated with Soviet guerilla forces whose persecution at the hands of German occupation was ruthless. It was thenceforth stepped up and culminated in what may have been an official call for revenge action. There is some indication that during the winter of 1944-45, prior to the offensive, Russian troops had been encouraged by certain commanders to advance and destroy recklessly. Especially Ilya Ehrenburg and Alexei Tolstoi seem to have supported this call by further inflammatory writings. Whether such appeals had limited military significance or were part of a larger political scheme (presumably to

are reported in general to have been treated correctly, if not with forbearance. There were no significant expulsions from Rumania; those groups of Germans who elected to flee from the Russians were able to do so without hindrance; see Schieder Documents, Vol. I/1, p. 55E, and Vol. III, p. 75E.

⁴⁵ Major General Frank A. Keating, "The Soviet Army's Behaviour in Victory and Occupation - The First Phase," in *The Soviet Army* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1950), especially pp. 185 f.

⁴⁶ Alexander Werth, *Russia at War 1941-1945* (New York: Dutton, 1964), especially pp. 963-966. As correspondent of the British *Sunday Times* this Russian-born author traveled and wrote war reports in the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945. Parts of his book, recently published in the German news weekly *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), aroused much positive, but also much critical comment; the latter especially on the part of former German officers; cf. *Der Spiegel*, July 21, 1966, pp. 7 and 9; August 18, 1965, pp. 7 ff.; August 25, 1965, pp. 7 ff.; and September 1, 1965, pp. 12 f.

help consolidate the Polish, and thereby Soviet, position as far west as possible before the end of hostilities) is still an open question.⁴⁷

On the other hand it does not seem that the attitude of the invading Soviet armies toward the Germans differed materially from that toward non-German civilians, such as Rumanians and even Yugoslavs.⁴⁸ When, at the end of the war, Milovan Djilas wanted to discuss the Red Army's "many serious assaults on citizens and on members of the Yugoslav Army" with General Korneev, Chief of the Soviet Mission in Belgrade, he drew sharp protests and charges of "Trotskyism" from the Soviet leaders. Stalin personally accused Djilas of having insulted the Red Army, asserting: "Does Djilas not . . . understand if a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle?"⁴⁹

During their negotiations, Western leaders could not fail to appreciate such feelings. Truman wrote of Germany as a "god forsaken country" and found it hard "to think that millions of Russians, Poles, English, and Americans were slaughtered all for the folly of one crazy egotist."⁵⁰ Eisenhower, when he flew across Russia to visit Zhukov

⁴⁷ See the account of a former Soviet journalist Boris Olshanski, *My prik-hodim s Vostoka, 1941-1951* (We Are Coming from the East) (Buenos Aires: Nasha Strana, 1954), especially pp. 211-213; also, Schieder Documents, Vol. I, p. 61E; for a suggestion of premeditated, organized revenge on the part of the Russian Army cf. Adenauer's conclusion on the purpose of the expulsion, in his *Journey to America* (Washington, D.C.: German Diplomatic Mission, 1953), p. 64; note, further, the observations on revenge actions in Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 95, 98 f., 102 f. Apparently Soviet soldiers had official permission to loot Königsberg; see Lehndorff, *op. cit.*, p. 54 and n. 2, cf. 55, n. 4. Schieder *et al.* conclude that the Soviet call for revenge subsided in spring 1945 when military discipline was being restored, and that thereafter treatment of East Germans seized by Soviet soldiers was not quite as harsh as it had been in the winter, see Schieder Documents, Vol. I, pp. 68E and 69E, n. i.; cf. also Werth, *op. cit.*, pp. 966-968.

⁴⁸ Kulischer, *op. cit.*, p. 34 discusses a similar breakdown of discipline in the encounter of Russian civilians by the Russian armies in 1917.

⁴⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1962), p. 95; Yugoslav statistics on the "lawless acts of Red Army soldiers" revealed, *inter alia*, 111 cases of rape with murder and 1204 cases of looting with assault, see *ibid.*, pp. 88 f., p. 110. As a comparison note the reaction of the Communist German puppet government in East Berlin to similar problems in the Eastern Sector of Berlin, in Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1955) pp. 346-377.

⁵⁰ Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 394, in a letter to his family, sent from Potsdam, dated July 28, 1945.

in Moscow in 1945, remarked that "all this (devastation) would have embittered any people; it would have been completely astonishing if the Russians had not had a more direct and personal vindictiveness toward the Germans.... Proud of their victories, the Russians always remembered with bitterness their cost."⁵¹ And, later, during the occupation, Clay pointed out that "if there had been no German aggression . . . the (expellee) problem would not exist."⁵²

F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

For some time estimates of the toll exacted from East and ethnic Germans varied appreciably, but there was agreement that it was very great indeed. A recent Federal German report, based on a critical selection and comparison of official German, American, and East European statistics, authenticates the misfortunes of all but one of the expelled groups (see Figure 1).

By 1944-1945 a total of approximately 16,500,000 Germans were living in the areas affected by the mass exodus, excluding only the Soviet Union. From the end of the war to 1950 over 11,500,000 of these people had actually fled or were expelled. In 1950 more than 2,500,000 were known to have remained in or near their homes. Some of the deportees were still being detained by the Russians. In 1950 about 2,200,000 people were not accounted for and many of them probably perished during the exodus.⁵³

Relatively the heaviest human toll was exacted from the ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia, more than one fourth of whom were not found, and from the ethnic Germans in the Baltic area, more than one fifth of whom were unaccounted for. In both these areas treatment of Germans had been especially ruthless at the hands of Yugoslavs and Russians respectively.

Data now available on the German minority group in Russia are still insufficient to allow a full report. The group numbered approxi-

⁵¹ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Permabooks, 1952), p. 516.

⁵² Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁵³ Note, however, that the validity of these and similar figures have been challenged in Czech and Polish sources. See especially Radomir Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans - A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962* (New York: N.Y. University Press, 1964), Part IV; and Stanislaw Schmitzek, *Truth or Conjecture? German Civilian War Losses in the East* (Warsaw: Western Press Agency, 1966).

FIGURE 1. *Diminution of East and Ethnic German Population*
(Excluding Germans from the Soviet Union)

	Reich Germans Oder-Neisse Territories ¹	Sudeten Germans Czechoslovakia	Ethnic Germans East Europe ²	Total
Germans Present, 1939-1945:				
German Population, May 1939	9,575,200	3,477,000	3,946,300	16,998,500
Plus Natural Growth to End of War	382,000	156,000	108,400	646,400
Subtotal	9,957,200	3,633,000	4,054,700	17,644,900
Less War Casualties ³	667,500	180,000	252,000	1,099,500
Total German Population at End of War	9,289,700	3,453,000	3,802,700	16,545,400
Germans Accounted for, 1945-1950:				
Number Removed	6,817,000	2,921,400	1,865,000	11,603,400 ⁴
Number Retained ⁵	1,134,000	258,700	1,324,300	2,717,000
Total Germans Accounted for	7,951,000	3,180,100	3,189,300	14,340,400
Germans not Accounted for, 1945-1950	1,338,700	272,900	613,400	2,225,000

¹ East Prussia, East Pomerania, East Brandenburg, and Silesia.

² Baltic Area including Memel, Danzig, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

³ Civilians and Armed Forces.

⁴ To the Federal Republic and West Berlin 7,900,000 (68%); to the Soviet Occupied Zone 3,200,000 (27%); to Austria and other Western countries 500,000 (5%).

⁵ Including POW's and other detained Germans.

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Die deutschen Vertriebungsverluste*, op. cit.; cf. footnote on p. 32.

mately 1,400,000 in 1939. As pointed out above, 350,000 of these trekked or were evacuated to Germany before 1943. Many of them were apprehended again by the Soviets and returned to Russia. War casualties among the entire group were estimated at over 150,000 persons, while natural population growth was deemed relatively insignificant. This left a theoretical figure of about 1,250,000 such persons in Germany and Russia at the end of the war. Actually, less than 100,000 are believed to have been able to remain in or flee to the West; by 1950, less than 70,000 of them were residing in the Federal Republic. For a time it was estimated that not more than 300,000 would still be alive somewhere in the Soviet Union. As of late, however, there are indications that the number of persons of German origin in the Soviet Union is between 1,600,000 and 1,700,000 which would be even more than before the war and would constitute, as earlier, the largest Western minority in the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

Thus it would seem that in 1950 there were still over four million Germans in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1960, over 450,000 of these were allowed to leave and join their families in the Federal Republic.⁵⁵ These transfers are continuing, although very slowly and in small numbers.

The present net effect of the exodus of the Germans from the East is roughly this: of the entire East and ethnic German population living at the end of the war (after deducting a relatively small number of individuals who moved to other western countries) about half now live in the Federal Republic of Germany, less than one fourth in the

⁵⁴ Official Soviet data show 1,427,000 ethnic Germans in 1939 and 1,620,000 in 1959; an inquiry of the third German Federal Legislature estimates that the Soviet 1959 census figure of 1,620,000 includes 400,000 Germans from areas which did not belong to the Soviet Union in 1937. Karl Stump, "Die heutigen Wohngebiete und berufliche Aufgliederung der Deutschen in der Sowjetunion," *Heimatbuch der Deutschen aus Russland - 1959* (Stuttgart: Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland, 1959), pp. 5-15; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich) (hereafter referred to as *SZ*), November 18, 1964, p. 3, and, on the recent "rehabilitation" by the Soviet Government of the Volga Germans, January 7, 1965, p. 3; *The New York Times* (International Edition), March 6, 1963, reports 1,600,000 Germans in Russia.

⁵⁵ Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (hereinafter called "Bundesvertriebenenministerium"), *Tatsachen zum Problem der deutschen Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge* (Bonn, 1961), Table 9 (English: *Facts Concerning the Problem of the German Expellees and Refugees* (Bonn, 1961)).

German Democratic Republic, and over one fourth elsewhere in East Europe, including the Soviet Union.

Before World War I the ethnic German minorities in East Europe and Russia, excluding those in the Memel and Danzig territories, numbered approximately 8,300,000. The German population east of the Oder-Neisse line now numbers over four million. Over one million of them are living in the former provinces of East Weimar-Germany. Most of the others, the ethnic Germans, of course no longer live in the same contiguous rural settlement areas which they occupied and owned before. Under communism they no longer constitute the same closed ethnic units with their traditional solidarity, cultural heritage, and rights of autonomy. It is reported that they are, at times, restricted in their freedom of movement, such as in the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ In other locations, such as in Rumania, they may even enjoy limited cultural privileges. Nevertheless, they are still recognizable as alien minorities. Thus, the elimination of the German population from East Europe, assuming this to have been the principal objective of the forcible migrations, has been only partly achieved.

In view of the political reverberations to which so radical a measure as the mass expulsions of East Germans gave rise, its appropriateness must be questioned. It is true that the alleged toll of over two million suffered by the East Germans in the course of their flight and post-war expulsions seems not surprising, especially if compared with the World War II losses of Russian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Jewish civilians, numbering together over fourteen million. Yet both the loss of East German civilians and the continued retention of large groups of them under the sway of communism were major causal factors in the evolution of expellee political organizations in West Germany.⁵⁷ After the arrival of the East Germans and as soon as a measure of integration into West German society was achieved, a peculiarly redemptive mood grew out of and spread from these organizations, serving to harden the division of Germany and of Europe and rendering the solution of the German question increasingly difficult.

⁵⁶ Over 500,000 of them, mostly in the USSR, have applied for emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany; see Kurt W. Böhme, *Gesucht wird: Die dramatische Geschichte des Suchdienstes (des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes)* (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965), p. 291; cf. also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (hereafter referred to as FAZ), September 18, 1965; and SZ, April 6, 1965.

⁵⁷ Of the over two million Germans originally not accounted for (see Figure 1), 863,340 were reported as still missing in spring 1966. See *Der Schlesier* (Recklinghausen), August 11, 1966, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

RESETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION

The masses of expellees arriving in the Federal Republic after the war fell into three different groups: (1) *Reichsdeutsche*, or German citizens from the provinces immediately east of the Oder-Neisse line that were part of Germany on December 31, 1937; (2) *Sudeten-deutsche*, or Germans from the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia who became German citizens in 1938; and (3) *Volksdeutsche*, or ethnic Germans who had lived in, and in many cases had been citizens of East European countries (see Figure 1). This distinction is important because it later constituted the basis for participation in many of the expellee political organizations that evolved.

Another distinction – time and mode of arrival – will help to explain variances in political attitudes among the expellees (see Figure 2). Transfers of ethnic Germans and evacuation of East German nationals planned by the Nazi government affected less than a million persons. Subsequent arrivals due to flight and expulsion amounted to 4,800,000. These affected in the main Reich and Sudeten Germans, most of whom arrived by the winter of 1946, after which the Western Allies refused to accept more expellees. This refusal suggests that the migrations between 1945 and 1946 took place under more adverse conditions than the ones before or after. The Sudeten Germans fared worse than other groups. Three fourths of them were involved in the flight and expulsions before November 1946. In comparison about two-thirds of the Reich Germans were affected. This of course does not take into consideration the many Silesians who initially fled to Czechoslovakia and suffered both the flight and subsequent expulsions. In a sense the ethnic Germans may be said to have been more fortunate than the other groups. Only

FIGURE 2. *Arrivals of Expellees in West Germany by Origin, Type of Migration and Military Occupation Zones*

Type of Migration	(Estimates)			Total
	Reich Germans	Sudeten Germans	Ethnic Germans	
Planned Evacuation (Before End of War)	300,000	200,000	400,000	900,000
Flight and Expulsion (Through October 1946)	3,000,000	1,400,000	400,000	4,800,000
Arrivals 1947-1950	1,100,000	300,000	800,000	2,200,000
Total in West Germany (1950)	4,400,000	1,900,000	1,600,000	7,900,000
Thereof US Zone	1,000,000	1,700,000	800,000	3,500,000
British Zone	3,200,000	200,000	800,000	4,200,000
French Zone	200,000	*	*	200,000

* Insignificant numbers.

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Vertriebungsverluste, op. cit.*; *Statistisches Taschenbuch über die Heimatvertriebenen*, Wiesbaden, 1953; *Statistische Berichte VIII/20/34*, Wiesbaden, 1949; Schieder Documents.

one fourth of them were involved in the flight and early expulsions.¹

A. RECEPTION

The expellees found themselves in a chaotic, cheerless world. The scene of their arrival, it will be remembered, reflected the aftermath of total war, so stubbornly fought that it had left its ravages almost everywhere. The shortages of food, shelter, and jobs have no precedent in modern European history. Communications and administration were completely disrupted. Besides the expellees, millions of demobilized troops and homeless civilians were seeking a place to live and something to eat.² More than eleven million non-Germans, including refugees, displaced persons, and liberated prisoners of war also burdened the economy. Initially, the large, victorious Allied armies were moving about everywhere claiming available quarters and supplies for their needs.

The indigenous population invariably treated the Germans from the East with reservation, if not resentment or hostility. The expellees were poor and lacked social identity in the world into which they had been thrown. They competed for food, housing, and jobs, and they seemed to be Germans of a different kind. They spoke strange dialects and did things in unfamiliar ways. They were in fact strangers to the West, and both they and their neighbors began to discover that the concept of a "Greater Germany" was more of a myth than a goal that could be realized.

In 1939 the largest of the three groups, the Reich Germans, numbered over 9,500,000. This group includes East Prussians, East Brandenburgers, Pomeranians, and Silesians, of whom eventually close to 4,500,000 resettled in West Germany. Before their flight, the East Prussians, primarily descendants of Northern German colonists, lived in an extensive, sparsely populated agricultural region known at that time as Germany's granary. Two-thirds of them (about 2,500,000 in 1939) inhabited rural plains areas, living mostly on small farms

¹ It should be noted, however, that roughly half of the ethnic Germans transferred later came from the Baltic states and Yugoslavia and, judging from a relatively high rate of diminution, suffered minimal conditions of survival.

² The total number of German evacuees is given at 8,900,000; see *Dokumente deutscher Kriegsschäden*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II/2, pp. 302-336. This figure included about two million evacuees who were directed into the eastern provinces of Germany as late as December 1944.

and in villages of less than 10,000.³ The only large city in the region was Königsberg. Apart from a fishing industry the area was relatively backward economically. Many farm laborers had begun to move westward seeking industrial employment, but most of the population remained rooted to its native soil. On the whole, the East Prussians had Protestant backgrounds. The reformation had brought Lutheranism and secularism to the region, and the influence of both orthodoxy and Pietism had produced a peculiarly conservative devoutness within the small rural congregations. In contrast to other parts of Western Europe, however, absence of militant Calvinism, relative geographical isolation, and recourse to government subsidies during material emergencies had developed a sense of obedience and trust among the people in their relations with public authorities and employers.⁴

Following World War I, Germans in the central and western parts of the country often referred to East Prussia as an island. Though in some respects the mentality of the East Prussians might understandably be characterized as insular, they nevertheless felt close to the German nation. This was clearly demonstrated by the plebiscites held after the First World War.⁵

About 1,300,000 East Prussians arrived in West Germany, for the most part in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, both essentially rural, Protestant areas. Tension soon arose from the encounter between this uprooted, dispossessed group and a rich, well-established farm population, proud of its possessions and conscious of its traditions. Many East Prussians also found their way to North-Rhine Westphalia where their influx into a largely urban, industrial, pre-ponderantly Catholic society produced even greater conflicts.

The Pomeranians from east of the Oder-Neisse line, initially nearly 2,000,000 persons, had likewise belonged to a predominantly rural society. Stettin (now Szczecin) was their only large town. Well in the fold of the Reich, they had not had direct contact with its adversaries

³ G. Rhode, "Staatliche Entwicklung und Grenzziehungen," *Die Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1955), pp. 149 f.

⁴ An attitude referred to as *Staatsgläubigkeit* (faith in public authority) in Herbert Krimm, *Das Antlitz der Vertriebenen* (Stuttgart: Steinkopf, 1949), pp. 18 ff.

⁵ In 1920 a plebiscite was held in the Allenstein district in the south of East Prussia in which nearly 98 percent of the inhabitants voted to remain in Germany.

since 1813. They, too, were Lutherans, but, unlike the East Prussians, tended to accept the state's word in matters of faith also. Thus, during Hitler's regime, they are said to have been increasingly influenced by anti-clerical thinking.⁶ Docile and obedient, well-removed from contested borderlands, they possessed a sense of security and had never had reason to doubt that their land would remain German. Less than 900,000 of them arrived in West Germany, again for the most part in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower-Saxony. This was also the eventual destination of the much smaller group, the East Brandenburgers.

Unlike the Pomeranians, the Silesians, particularly those from Upper Silesia, had lived, worked, and fought with Slavic elements for a long time. The largest single group among the Reich Germans, they numbered over 4,500,000 in 1939. A varied country of mountains, streams, and fertile plains, Silesia protruded geographically into a foreign realm. Important industrial and trade centers had made it a focal point for contention in German relations with Eastern Europe. Especially after World War I, a strong Polish minority in Silesia was a source of considerable strife among rival national groups. About 2,000,000 Silesians resettled in Lower Saxony, Westphalia, and Bavaria. A versatile, quick-witted, easy-tempered group, in these places they encountered a slow-witted, more conservative people. Conflicts naturally arose, and these were aggravated by religious differences such as between Protestant Lower Silesians and Catholic Westphalians and Catholic Bavarians.⁷

Of the Germans from Czechoslovakia (initially about 3,500,000), nearly 1,700,000 arrived in the American Zone, settling mostly in Bavaria. They comprised a large group of Sudeten Germans from Bohemia-Moravia and Austrian Silesia and a small group of ethnic Germans from Slovakia referred to as Carpathian Germans. Both groups were genuine German minorities, until 1919 under the political control of Austria-Hungary. Since that time the former group had been known as Sudeten Germans, and discord between them and the government of the new Czechoslovak state had increased steadily until 1938-1939, when the wealthy industrial area they inhabited was incorporated into Germany. The Germans from Czechoslovakia came from a largely industrial, Catholic society. The Bavarians among

⁶ Krimm, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff.

⁷ P. J. Bouman, G. Beijer, and J. J. Oudegeest, *The Refugee Problem in Western Germany* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 3 f.

whom they found themselves were also predominantly Catholic, but a decidedly rural, provincial people. The tensions created by this combination were no less explosive than those resulting from similar population mixtures elsewhere in West Germany.

Of nearly 4,000,000 ethnic Germans, 1,600,000 finally arrived in West Germany, settling in almost equal numbers in the U.S. and British Zones. In addition to the integration problems encountered by Reich Germans, the Sudeten and ethnic Germans faced special difficulties in reconciling their views and feelings about the concept of a "Greater Germany" to the new reality. One authority speaks of clashes with West German particularism and parochialism. For the average Bavarian, Westphalian, or Hessian the idea of a "Greater Germany" had remained a pretentious claim without much practical significance.⁸ For the ethnic Germans in Southeast Europe it had been an ideal, and for the Germans from Czechoslovakia it was an ideal that had been fulfilled.⁹

Few of the expellees, including the East Prussians, had ever been in the central part of Germany. Some may have had brief impressions of it. Many doubtless had been proud of a German heritage and culture they thought they were defending during the war. Now they had been forced to leave their homes and often were separated from or had lost their families. Not only were they impoverished but also politically and even morally disillusioned. Moreover, along with other Germans, they faced, at least in the early years after the war, the sometimes bitter realities of military occupation.

B. POLICY UNDER THE ALLIES

The formulation of policy regarding the expellees reflects a change from a crusading spirit on the part of the Western occupation powers to more realistic political attitudes prompted both by the huge economic and social problems associated with expellee integration and by the gradual revelation of Soviet ambitions in Germany and Central

⁸ "Grossdeutsches Fühlen (stiess) auf binnendeutsches Verhalten," in Peter Paul Nahm, *Die sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Wirkungen der Vertreibung in den Gemeinden der Bundesrepublik* (Mannheim: Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1954), p. 17.

⁹ It can be considered to have been similarly fulfilled for the Germans from Danzig, parts of West Prussia and the Memel Territory which were incorporated into Greater Germany in 1939.

Europe. If military and political actions in Eastern Europe had been motivated more by reason than by aggressive and vengeful impulses, there would not have been any mass migrations and deportations. Authorities now faced the dual task of somehow bringing order to the ubiquitous chaos of postwar Germany and somehow compressing an unprecedented mass of immigrants into a greatly diminished, largely devastated national area. Obviously, a Germany whose industrial capacity was to be emasculated, as Morgenthau had originally recommended, would be unable to solve such a task.

At first the attitudes of the occupation powers toward the expellees were apprehensive. Secretary Marshall summed up the fears of the West at the 1947 Moscow meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers, commenting: "Our problem is . . . to avoid unjustified *economic upset* and to minimize inescapable *irredentist pressure* in Germany."¹⁰ Bidault saw in the expellees a source of "feelings of hatred and revenge" and advocated dispersing large numbers of them throughout other countries by means of mass emigrations.¹¹ S. N. Evans, speaking as a Member in the House of Commons, expressed the conviction that a seed for a new war had been sown by the expulsions.¹² General Lucius Clay, U.S. Military Governor for Germany, argued that the expellees would be incapable of convincing themselves that they were "forever exiled," and that instead they would continually look "homeward." Of those already urging the formation of political groups he said that they were "reactionary and certainly planning to go back home."¹³

Since returning the expellees seemed out of the question, a constructive policy of assimilation was called for. The military authorities recognized the problem as one of "tremendous proportions." It is even possible that after the Potsdam Conference at least some U.S. military authorities were for a time under the misapprehension that

¹⁰ "Consideration in the Council of Foreign Ministers," statements by Secretary Marshall, Moscow Session, April 9, 1947, in *Germany 1947-49, The Story in Documents* (Washington, D.C., 1950), pp. 146 ff., emphasis added.

¹¹ Cornides and Volle, "Um den Frieden mit Deutschland - Dokumente zum Problem der deutschen Friedensordnung 1941-48 mit einem Bericht über die Londoner Aussenministerkonferenz vom 25. XI. bis 15. XII. 1947," in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), Vol. VI, 1948, pp. 17 ff.; also in J. B. Schechtman, "Resettlement of Transferred Volksdeutsche in Germany," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, October 1947, pp. 262-284.

¹² House of Commons, *Official Reports* (London), Vol. 413, col. 743.

¹³ Clay, *op. cit.*, pp. 312 ff.

FIGURE 3. *Development of the West German Population 1939 to 1950 by Selected Lihauer Group*
(Excluding West Berlin and the Saar)

	January 1946	January 1947	September 1950	1939	1950
Expellees	2,617,000	6,251,000	7,876,000	—	—
Soviet Zone Refugees	—	1,019,000	1,555,000	—	—
Total Population	40,978,000	44,846,000	47,696,000	39,338,000	47,696,000

	Selected Land		Percentage of Expellees or Soviet Zone Refugees of Total Land Population	Number of Inhabitants per Square Kilometer
Schleswig-Holstein	27	32	33	101
Lower Saxony	12	23	27	96
North-Rhine Westphalia	2	7	10	351
Hesse	3	14	16	165
Baden-Württemberg	1	10	12	153
Bavaria	1	19	21	100
Federal Republic	6	14	16	160
Soviet Zone Refugees	—	2	3	194
Total Percentage	6	16	19	—

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Taschenbuch*, op. cit., and *Die Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Jahren 1946-1953*, Cologne.

the "refugees" (as the expellees were then called) "might be able to get back to their own communities."¹⁴ Arbitrary distribution of expellees throughout West Germany increased population density where least practical, and the unforeseen, constantly growing number of Germans fleeing from the Soviet Zone made the complex task of expellee settlement and integration even more difficult. Before the establishment of the Bonn government, nearly 1,250,000 Soviet Zone refugees arrived in West Germany. Together with nearly 8,000,000 expellees, they accounted for almost one-fifth of the total West German population. As a result, some of the federal states (*Länder*) in West Germany experienced an increase in population of up to 50 percent (see Figure 3). In fact, within a few years after the end of the war the total West German population had grown by nearly 10,000,000 people or a quarter of its prewar size.

Four principles sum up the policy of the Western occupation forces with regard to immigration and resettlement of East Germans. (1) Admission of expellees was to continue under the jurisdiction of the occupation forces, but integration was to be essentially the responsibility of the German authorities.¹⁵ (2) All expellees "of German extraction" were to be granted "German nationality (sic) with full civil and political rights."¹⁶ (3) The military government was "to assist the German authorities in effecting a program of interstate resettlement" as long as deemed essential. (4) Organizations of expellees for political purposes were not to be authorized.¹⁷

These principles turned out to provide a sound basis for an effective program of integration and eventually offered valid guidelines for the provisions enacted by the federal government. They made clear that East Germans were to have the same social and economic

¹⁴ See U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET), G 5 Div., Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, *Proceedings of the First Military Government Conference Hq. USFET, August 27-29, 1945* (issue of *USFET Weekly Information Bulletin*).

¹⁵ Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* (Revised Edition, April 1945), Part II, Sec. 376 (b).

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1779 of July 15, 1947, Sec. 13 (F), in *Germany 1947-49, op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹⁷ This policy decreed by the Office of Military Government U.S. Zone (OMGUS), in its Regulations under Title 3-210 was based on JCS Directive 1067, released October 17, 1945, providing in sections 9 (a) and (b) that "no political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized (by the Military Governor and) . . . propagation in any form of Nazi, militaristic or pan-German doctrines" shall be prohibited. See *Germany 1947-49, op. cit.*, p. 25.

rights and obligations as all other Germans. The cost of integration was, however, to be met exclusively by the West German economy, and unlike non-German refugees still present in West Germany, East Germans were not to profit from United Nations assistance. This restriction, as well as the prohibition of expellee political organizations, proved highly unpopular with the expellees as they became more interested in having an authoritative voice in politics. During the early period of their resettlement, however, they created little if any political or other disturbances.¹⁸

Nearly half of all the expellees arrived in the United States Zone, and most of them eventually settled there. At first, integration was conducted on local levels. A Council of States (*Länderrat*) convened in Stuttgart in October 1945 to formulate suitable legislative and administrative policies for the participating states — Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria, the governments of which were then being formally established. Each subsequently adopted special measures according with the principles laid down by the military government for admissions of expellees and refugees and subject to its approval. Governmental departments were set up in each state to superintend the reception and integration of East Germans, and welfare was coordinated by a Special Committee (*Länderausschuss*) attached to the Council of States. In March 1947 a fourth government, that of the city-state of Bremen, was established in the United States Zone, and virtually full legislative, executive, and judiciary powers were conferred upon all four states. Also, with the adoption early in 1947 of the first expellee law providing for uniform integration criteria and implementation procedures on a zonal rather than a state or local basis, the United States authorities decreed the issuance of special expellee passes and the formation of special advisory boards (*Beiräte* and *Ausschüsse*). These were to be created at all legislative and administrative levels to oversee refugee and expellee affairs and were to be composed of equal numbers of West Germans

¹⁸ Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany 1945–1953* (Darmstadt: German History Division of Headquarters US Army Europe, 1953), especially pp. 58–61 where the author, speaking for the US Zone, reports that “the most dangerous threat to public order during the first year of occupation was not subversive activities but juvenile delinquency, black marketting, depredations by Displaced Persons, and assaults by American soldiers.”

and expellees.¹⁹ Whether or not it was so intended, this measure was largely responsible for facilitating the successful integration of expellees into West German governmental and legislative positions, a facet of the assimilation process that, as will be shown, gained particular significance when the expellees eventually were allowed to form political organizations.

Later in 1947, another special working and consultative body (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Flüchtlingsverwaltungen*) was formed as part of the Council of States. It was to coordinate the work of all departments engaged in expellee and refugee work in both the United States and British Zones.

More than four million expellees resettled in the British Zone, mostly in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony. Postwar governments had been set up in these two states and in North-Rhine Westphalia in 1946. Provisions were made for special state sections or departments to deal with expellee and refugee problems, a practice later followed by the city-state government of Hamburg when it was formally established. Although the British occupation powers pursued an integration policy similar in principle to that of the United States Military Government, overall central planning and coordination was delayed until the merger, effective January 1, 1947, of the two zones of occupation by agreement of the British and United States Military Governors and until the creation of the working and consultative body attached to the Council of States.

French occupation authorities did not contribute much towards assimilation. The number of expellees eventually allowed to settle in the French Zone was relatively small (see Figure 2). In the three original states comprising the zone (the Rhineland Palatinate, part of Baden, and part of Württemberg) no special administrative departments for expellee affairs were organized, and effective coordination with appropriate agencies in the other zones was virtually lacking until 1949, when the West German government began to function.

In 1949, in the course of the administrative reorganization that

¹⁹ OMGUS, *Monthly Report* (Berlin), No. 19, December 11, 1946 to January 31, 1947; for text of this and related public enactments, see F. Thomas, *Das Recht der Vertriebenen*, Schriften zur Sozialforschung, Sozialforschungsstelle der Universität Münster (Dortmund: Soziale Welt, 1950). Note in this context the use of the term "expellees" by the U.S. occupation authorities who elsewhere mostly referred to the East Germans as "refugees" or as "transferred Germans."

preceded the establishment of the new federal government, a central department for handling expellee problems (*Amt für Fragen der Heimatvertriebenen*) was set up in Frankfort. This office absorbed the aforementioned Stuttgart working body attached to the Council of States and was the precursor of the new Bonn Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims created in September 1949.

The sensational effect of such forceful expressions of indignation over the expulsions as those made by Winston Churchill and Pope Pius XII of course wore off, but Americans and Europeans continued to show concern for the welfare of the expellees.²⁰ The United States government sent former President Hoover on a mission to Germany in 1947 that resulted in his recommending Congressional support for programs providing assistance to occupied Germany.²¹ In addition privately sponsored programs in the United States such as CARE (Cooperative for American Remittance to Everywhere) and CRALOG (Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany) and government-sponsored programs such as GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) helped considerably to alleviate the economic difficulties of the expellees. Though never officially designated during the occupation to assist the expellees, they nonetheless constituted a timely source of help to them as well as to other Germans. Subsequent decisions to have Germany take part in the European Recovery Program (1948) and to discontinue prohibitions against German industrial development (1949) substantially, if in-

²⁰ Fritz Peter Habel (ed.), *Collapse of a Civilization* (Munich: MS, 1955) (a collection of press releases and other documents, hereafter referred to as Habel Archives), offers ample evidence of the free world's interest in the expellee problem. Also, for American interest and reactions in particular see *USA Pressestimmen über das deutsche Vertriebenenproblem*, ed. by the Federal Government (Bonn, 1950/51) (English: *American Public Opinion on the German Expellee Problem* (Bonn, 1951)). The American Friends Service Committee, sponsored by the Quakers, expressed its concern in *The Problem of 12 Million German Refugees in Today's Germany* (Philadelphia, 1949) and *After Seven Years* (Philadelphia, 1952) both by Betty Barton. Among reactions in other Western countries, note that of the Swiss Red Cross, *Das Schweizerische Rote Kreuz – Eine Sondernummer des deutschen Flüchtlingsproblems* (Bern, 1949), and *Volk ohne Raum – Berichte aus deutschen Flüchtlingslagern* (Bern, 1949). Note further Dutch Queen Juliana's plea, on behalf of the German expellee, addressed to President Truman, in the *Department of State Bulletin*, 1951, pp. 572 and 701.

²¹ For a report on Hoover's mission and other U.S. efforts, see Lucius D. Clay, "Chapter in Humane Relations," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1954.

directly, promoted the integration of the expellees. United States aid from 1946 through the early years of the West German Federal Government amounted to nearly four billion dollars; additional contributions by the British and French were relatively small.²²

The slow progress of German economic recovery in the early years after the war redirected the attention of United States authorities to the expellee groups and to the refugees from the Soviet Zone. Congressional inquiries began. These continued until after 1949, when the West German Federal Government was already in operation, and thus extended into the second phase of the occupation. Two official reports were published subsequently. The first, usually referred to as "The Walter Report," is a brief study submitted to the House of Representatives in March 1950 by a subcommittee.²³ It summarizes the background of the expulsions, condemning them as inhuman but declining any responsibility for them on the part of the United States, and advocates accelerating the process of integration. The second report, usually referred to as "The Sonne Report," is much more detailed. Prepared by a specially formed technical assistance commission of the Economic Cooperation Administration, it was submitted to Chancellor Adenauer in 1951.²⁴ In analyzing the economic and social problems of the expellees, the report states that of nearly nine million "refugees" who arrived in West Germany up to 1950, over forty percent were employable but only thirty percent had found jobs. It goes on to say that 3,500,000 East Germans desperately needed better housing and that nearly 400,000 were still living in camps or other types of temporary quarters. Finally, it proposes creating more jobs, constructing at least 900,000 new housing units for East Germans and resettling 700,000

²² Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of German Revival* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), Chapter 13.

²³ The report derives its unofficial name from the chairman of the investigating House subcommittee, Francis E. Walter. Cited in U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 1841, *Expellees and Refugees of German Ethnic Origin* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950) (hereafter referred to as Walter Report).

²⁴ Named after the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. H. Christian Sonne. The report is officially titled *The Integration of Refugees into German Life, Report and Appendices*, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Technical Assistance Commission on the Integration of the Refugees in the German Republic; it was submitted to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on March 21, 1951. (German: *Die Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in die deutsche Gemeinschaft – Bericht* (Bonn, 1951)). With the exception of the Appendices the pages cited hereafter are from the German version.

of them within the Federal Republic. The commission encouraged the Bonn government to adopt these proposals as part of an improved program for nation-wide integration, the cost of which was estimated at twelve billion Deutschmarks to be financed over a period of six years for the most part by deficit spending.²⁵

Finally, some consideration was also given to the possibility of alleviating the expellee problem by means of emigration. In the early years after the formation of the German Federal Republic this alternative was widely discussed. In the interest of liberalizing procedures for the admission of German expellees the United States even modified its immigration policies.²⁶ The social and economic feasibility of this solution was soon called in question, however, and emigration of expellees was subsequently discouraged by both German and Allied authorities.²⁷ Meanwhile, concerted efforts, begun by West German officials in 1949, to launch several major government programs for interstate resettlement and equalization of burdens among East and West Germans, went on. As will be seen presently these were to have a decisive effect in later years, when West Germany's economic revival had gained momentum.

C. POLICY UNDER THE BONN GOVERNMENT

1. Major Economic Measures

Economic integration of the expellees, a primary task of West German government on all levels, was encouraged not only by representations of the occupation authorities but also by pleas from the expellees themselves. Between 1950 and 1961 their number had

²⁵ See also the recommendations in ECA Team on Fiscal Problems of Germany, *Fiscal Problems of Germany - A Report Prepared During the Summer of 1951*, submitted to the Minister of Finance of the Federal German Republic of Germany, September 24, 1951.

²⁶ For the discussion on this change see *Eighty-second Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization* (Washington, 1952); also, F. L. Auerbach, "The Refugee Relief Program - A Challenge to Voluntary Social Service Agencies," in *Department of State Bulletin*, May 24, 1954, pp. 797-800. A limited number of ethnic Germans had already been entitled to emigration to the United States under the provisions of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act.

²⁷ Werner Middelmann, *Die internationale Flüchtlingsfrage* (Berlin: Gehlen, n.d.), p. 10; and Hilde Wander, *The Importance of Emigration for the Solution of Population Problems in Western Europe* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1951).

increased by nearly one million owing to further arrivals from the East and to natural growth. Within the first decade of the newly constituted Federal Republic nearly thirty billion Deutschmarks were invested in or committed to the welfare of expellee groups. These funds were in addition to assistance rendered earlier from West German and Allied sources.²⁸ The results were significant. By means of voluntary interstate migration the government removed almost one million expellees from overcrowded to less crowded and from agricultural to industrial regions (see Figure 4). Moreover, it provided housing for almost ten million East Germans — about one-fifth of the total population — in two million old and nearly one million new housing units.²⁹

Employment opportunities were considerably broadened, and by 1961 the West German labor market had absorbed nearly four million employable expellees (see Figure 5). Unemployment was reduced from about 500,000 in 1950 (that is, 16 percent of all employable expellees or 36 percent of all unemployed Germans) to less than 20,000 in 1961 (that is, about one-half percent of all employable expellees or 18 percent of all unemployed Germans).³⁰ Appreciable movement of expellees from lower to higher paid em-

²⁸ For details on government and other integration measures see Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding (eds.), *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland — Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben*, 3 Vols. (Kiel: Hirt, 1959). For details on the legal bases of integration see Thomas, *op. cit.*; Bode, Siegmund, Dietl, *Das Recht der Vertriebenen, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigten* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1954); Preise, Bussmann, *et al.*, *Der Lastenausgleich, Gesetze, Rechtsverordnungen, Anweisungen, Kommentar und Nebengesetze* (Regensburg: Kohlhammer, n.d.); *Jahresberichte* and *Volkswirtschaftliche Berichte der Lastenausgleichsbank* (Bad Godesberg: Silva, annuals); and Leo W. Schwarz, *Refugees in Germany Today* (New York: Twayne, n.d.).

²⁹ For relevant data see publications by the West German Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, "Die Wohnverhältnisse der vom Krieg besonders betroffenen Haushalte," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September, 1957, pp. 478-482; "Bauwirtschaft und Wohnungen," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, April 1958, pp. 232-234; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, annual), 1955, 1958, 1959, and 1964; Fachserie A, *Bevölkerung und Kultur*, *Vorberichte zur Volkszählung vom 6. Juni 1961*; also Werner Nellner, "Grundlagen und Hauptergebnisse der Statistik," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 61-144.

³⁰ The unemployment problem can be considered solved. Since 1959 the total number of jobs to be filled exceeds by far the number of unemployed. See the records and reports of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung in Nuremberg.

FIGURE 4. *Expellees in the Federal Republic Before and After Interstate Resettlement by Selected Länder*
(Including West Berlin and the Saar in 1961)

	1950 September	1961 June	1950	1961
Total Population	47,696,000	56,175,000	—	—
Thereof Expellees	7,876,000	8,956,000	—	—
Percentages	16	18	—	—
<i>Selected Land</i>				
		Percentage of Expellees of Total Land Population	Percentage of Total Expellees	
Schleswig-Holstein	33	26	11	7
Lower Saxony	27	24	23	18
North-Rhine Westphalia	10	15	17	26
Hesse	16	17	9	9
Baden-Württemberg	12	16	11	14
Bavaria.	21	18	24	18

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statisches Taschenbuch*, *op. cit.*; *Die Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Jahren 1946-1953*, *op. cit.* and *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, *op. cit.*

ployment categories occurred during this period as well as a marked relative decrease in the number of nonemployable expellees depending on public support.

By means of grants and loans to expellee entrepreneurs, the government helped to start or keep going nearly 130,000 small businesses. These ranged from industrial undertakings to crafts, trades, and services. By 1960, over 60,000 expellee farmers had been resettled on close 2,500,000 acres or arable land.

2. *Economic and Social Position of Expellees*

Judging by employment categories, the economic and social status of the expellees remains on the whole below what it was before the expulsions (see Figure 6). After sixteen years, a majority of those who were formerly self-employed — largely as farmers — still occupied economic and social positions inferior to the ones they had held in the homeland. In the period from 1945 to 1950 the number of blue-

FIGURE 5. *Expellees among Employable and Non-Employable West Germans*
 (In Numbers and Percentages)
 (Excluding Military Personnel)

	September 1950		June 1961	
	Total	Expellees (% of Population)	Total	Expellees (% of Population)
Employable Persons	22,074,000	14	26,420,000	15
Thereof Male	14,125,000	16	16,533,000	16
Self-Employed	3,258,000	5	3,238,000	7
Assisting Family Members	3,184,000	2	2,658,000	5
Civil Servants	872,000	14	1,246,000	18
White Collar Workers	3,268,000	12	6,459,000	15
Laborers	10,042,000	21	12,799,000	19
Unemployed *	1,326,000	32	102,000	18
Non-Employable Persons **	5,728,000	20	6,356,000	
Thereof Welfare Recipients	585,000	53	762,000	23

* Data for June 1951 and October 1962, respectively.

** Data for 1950 and 1956-1957, respectively.

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Taschenbuch*, op. cit., and *Die Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Jahren 1946-1953*, op. cit.

FIGURE 6. *Employment Categories of Expellees in West Germany Before and After Expulsion*
(Percentages of Total Employed Persons)

	1939-1945	1946	1950	1956	1961	1967
Laborers	37.6	—	75.0	66.9	60.4	54.2
White Collar Workers	21.4	—	14.3	20.0	24.7	31.0†
Grand Total	59.0	93.8	89.3	86.9	85.1	85.2
Civil Servants.	7.7	1.6	3.7	5.5	5.7	6.0
Self-Employed*	33.3	4.6	7.0	7.6	9.2	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Including assisting family members.

† Including apprentices.

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Taschenbuch*, *op. cit.*, and *Die Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Jahren 1946-1953*, *op. cit.*; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, *op. cit.*

collar workers among the expellees doubled and only thereafter began to diminish.

A comparison of Figures 5 and 6 reveals that there are sixteen expellees out of every hundred employable West Germans and that there are only seven self-employed expellees and as many as nineteen expellee laborers out of every hundred West Germans in these categories. Thus, though as pointed out, an appreciable degree of amelioration has taken place in the social and economic positions of expellees since their arrival in West Germany, they still have not, as a group, achieved a relative share of the jobs on different employment levels that is proportional to their numbers among the West German employable population.

It is interesting to note that among the expellees the social integration problem affects women much less than men. As of 1957, 31 percent of the male expellees occupied positions inferior to those they had held prior to their removal to West Germany, 8 percent had acquired better positions, and the remaining 61 percent had managed to find roughly equivalent positions or else had retired. In contrast, primarily because of marriage or retirement, as many as 89 percent of the female expellees had managed to retain status in the same category or else had been able to improve their status.

Since 1957, job status and income of both men and women among

the expellees have improved.³¹ Information on actual income in expellee households is based largely on representative statistical surveys or samples. Available data indicate that a substantially larger percentage of expellees fell within higher income brackets of this decade than in 1950 (see Figure 7). Also, it should be said that the number of expellees sharing in marked increases of wages, salaries, and other household incomes after 1950 was not unduly disproportionate to the number of Germans in equivalent income brackets.

Other than employment, prestige, and income, housing is an important yardstick for measuring progress towards integration. Improvement of the housing situation of East German expellees since 1950 has been remarkable (see Figure 8). Many have bought or are buying their own homes. Of over half a million small, private homes and apartments built from 1952 through 1956 with the help of publicly sponsored, tax-privileged building loans or similar assistance, 300,000 have been bought and occupied by expellee families.³² By 1965 about two million East German expellees, or over one fifth of their total number, lived in their own homes as compared with less than one third of all West German families.

Finally, supplementary representative surveys conducted by German polling institutes since 1955 indicate that expellees on the whole own just about as many clothes, motorbicycles, sewing machines, radios, and television sets as other West Germans, and that they bought just about as much life insurance, travelled as often and as far on vacation, and generally lost as many hours' sleep over "money matters."³³

3. *Self-employed Expellees*

One integration problem for which there seems to be no final

³¹ See a special publication of the Federal Statistical Office, *Die berufliche Eingliederung der Vertriebenen im Bundesgebiet – 1954/55*, Ergebnisse der statistischen Auswertung der Antragsformulare zum Bundesvertriebenenausweis (Wiesbaden, May 1958); and Friedrich Edding and Eugen Lemberg, "Eingliederung und Gesellschaftswandel," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 156–173.

³² Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 436.

³³ Otto Lenz, *Die soziale Wirklichkeit*, Aus einer Untersuchung des Instituts für Demoskopie (Allensbach-Bodensee, n.d.); summary in *Die politische Meinung*, Heft 3, 1956 (Cologne: Staat und Gesellschaft, serial); also, *DIVO Presse-dienst*, II, February 1957, p. 5, and February 1958, pp. 7 f. (Frankfort: Divo Institut, serial).

FIGURE 7. *Household Incomes of West Germans and Expellees*
(In Actual Amounts and Percentages)

Income DM per Month	1950		1957		1960	
	West Germans	Expel- lees	West Germans	Expel- lees	West Germans	Expel- lees
Up to 600 . . .	94%	95%	88%	94%	59%	60%
600 to 900 . . .	6%	5%	7%	4%	25%	25%
900 and up. . .	—	—	5%	2%	16%	15%

Sources: Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 156-173 and Vol. II, pp. 418-557; *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (Stuttgart), September 1962, pp. 530 f.

FIGURE 8. *Housing of West Germans and Expellees*
(In Percentages)

	West Germans			Expellees			
	1950	1956	1965*	1950	1956	1960*	1965*
Own House or							
Own Apartment . . .	60	28	31	22	10	17 †	23
Rented Apartment . . .	49	60		53	64	68	
Sublet Room(s). . .	34	20	9	64	31	19	9
Temporary Housing.	6	3	**	14	6	**	**

* Based on official sample survey.

** Less than 1%

† Including some temporary units.

Sources: Georg Mueller and Heinz Simon, "Aufnahme und Utnerbringung," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 300-446, especially p. 440; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September 1957, *loc. cit.*; Statistisches Bundesamt, *Arbeitsunterlagen aus Vertriebenen- und Flüchtlings-Statistik* (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, September 1968), mimeographed, Table 2315.

solution in the foreseeable future in spite of government assistance is the relatively backward assimilation of many expellees who formerly were self-employed (see Figure 9).

The problem varies in degree of seriousness depending on the type of enterprise — that is, whether it is the crafts, industry, commerce, services, or agriculture. Prior to the Second World War over 180,000 craft shops were to be found in the Eastern provinces of Germany alone. By 1957, however, expellees from there, the Sudetenland, and

other East European countries combined owned only 60,000 of more than 800,000 craft shops in West Germany – that is, only about eight out of every hundred. For the most part these belonged to tailors, shoemakers, barbers, hairdressers, butchers, and carpenters.³⁴

Large-scale industrial enterprises in the east had been concentrated primarily in Silesia, where mining and related heavy industries were important, and in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, where textiles and other consumer goods industries were predominant. Industrial enterprises in the remaining East German provinces and in other countries in East and Southeast Europe had been relatively small and largely based on agricultural undertakings. Data from 1936 indicate that industries in Eastern Germany alone accounted for nearly 10 percent or 3.4 billion Reichsmarks of total net value of German industrial output. In 1955 close to 7,000 enterprises with a total labor force of more than 200,000 were owned by expellees; 95,000 West German plants were in existence at this time with a total labor force of almost 7,000,000 workers and an overall business volume of more than 150 billion Deutschmarks. Thus, expellees owned only 7 percent of the plants and employed only 3 percent of the workers. They captured only 2 percent of the business volume. By 1958-59 expellees owned 7,400 plants, primarily in the textiles, foods, construction materials, and glass industries, and employed about 250,000 workers, among a total of 100,000 plants with 8,500,000 employees operating in West Germany. Thus, the proportionate share of expellee entrepreneurs in West German industry did not improve in the nineteenfifties and continued to be quite low in comparison with the prewar situation.³⁵

Expellees are also engaged in commerce and services, particularly in wholesale or retail trade of food and textiles. They own, however, only about 10 percent of the firms and employ less than 5 percent of the work force in these sectors of the economy.³⁶

Developments in the field of agriculture have been even less favorable. Before the war East German families owned about 172,000 farms (of sizes from five acres up to large estates) exceeding probably a total of twenty million acres. All these farmers were dispossessed and most of them expelled. Following the formation of the Bonn

³⁴ Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 181 ff.

³⁵ *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1958, p. 184; Erich Dittrich, "Verlagerungen in der Industrie," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 298-374.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 209, 211; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1959, pp. 156 ff.

FIGURE 9. *Numbers and Percentages of Expellee Farms and Non-Agricultural Enterprises among Comparable West German Enterprises*

	1950	1960	West Germans	Expellees	West Germans	Expellees	%
Farms:							
Above one Acre	2,012,000	37,000	1.9	1,762,000	60,000	3.4	
Above 250 Acres.	14,000	200	1.4	13,000	200	1.8	
Gardens*	1,024,000	41,000	4.0				
Non-Agricultural.	2,054,000	164,000	8.0	2,099,000	191,000	9.0	
With no Employees	927,000	101,000	10.9	726,000	70,000	9.7	
With One to 50 Employees	1,105,000	62,000	5.6	1,333,000	119,000	8.9	
With Above 50 Employees	22,000	1,000	4.8	40,000	2,000	4.7	

* Approximately averaging one-fourth of one acre, never exceeding one acre.

Sources: *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, April 1959, pp. 192 ff.; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1959; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1959; Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 53-165; cf. also Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevölkerung und Kultur* (Stuttgart: Kohlhaasser, December 1967), Reihe 4, "Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge - Bevölkerungs-, Kultur- und wirtschaftsstatistische Ergebnisse 1954-1966."

Government only 13,500 of these families had managed to resettle in West Germany on owned or leased farms that totaled less than a million acres. By 1958, expellees, not all of whom were formerly independent farmers, owned or leased 46,000 farms in West Germany of a size exceeding one acre each. Less than one-fourth of these were taken over from West Germans; the rest were newly developed. In all, they represented only slightly more than 2 percent of the total number of West German farms. In terms of land expellees held about 1,500,000 acres, or less than three percent of nearly 55,000,000 acres of arable farming and forestry areas. Some improvement in this situation has been observable since 1958 but it is not very significant (cf. Figure 9).

The adverse situation of the expellee farmers has been the subject of much comment and criticism. In 1951 the possibilities of resettlement of refugees in agriculture were studied in Finland by a special West German mission. On the cession in 1944-45 of Finnish Karelia to the Soviet Union nearly half a million Finns, mostly farmers, left for Finland proper. This number represented about 12 percent of the entire Finnish population. The West German mission reported that under a rigorous "equalization of burdens" legislation most of these farmers could be swiftly and successfully resettled on land either granted by the state or transferred from private owners. The critics of West German agricultural integration measures argued that the government should have (1) generously given of its own arable and forested areas, (2) should have rigorously reassigned private land, and (3) should have more realistically assessed the value of the lost East German farms.³⁷ It should be noted that the assessed value of a property lost by an East German, which controlled eventually the amount of his restitution under the socalled Federal German Equalization of Burdens legislation, was invariably based on a theoretical figure from a 1935 list of taxable "unit values" (*Einheitswerte*). The actual West German resale values (*Verkehrswerte*) of real property exceeded these theoretical values by several hundred percent.³⁸

³⁷ Linus Kather, *Die Entmachtung der Vertriebenen* (Munich: Olzog, 1964) Vol. I, esp. pp. 201 ff, 181-293, and Vol. II, esp. chap. 15. Also Antilla, "Die Neuansiedlung der Karelier in Finnland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eingliederung in die Landwirtschaft," and Axel v. Gadolin, "Vollzogene Integration der finnischen Karelier . . .," both in *Integration - Bulletin International* (Vaduz: Fürst von Liechtenstein Stiftung, serial), 1959, Heft 1-2, pp. 13-22 and September 1968, pp. 123-138 respectively.

³⁸ Hans-Heinrich Herlemann, "Vertriebene Bauern im Strukturwandel der

In contrast, expellees in professions, whether self-employed or not, have fared better. According to available data, over 90 percent of all physicians and dentists and about 80 percent of pastors and teachers have resumed their professions. Engineers, architects, and government lawyers (judges and prosecutors) have on the average a 60 percent rate of reemployment in their professions after removal to West Germany. Among artists this rate is only a little over 50 percent.^{38a} The integration of East German pastors, teachers and scholars, as well as that of journalists and civil servants, will be dealt with in more detail below because of its special cultural and political importance.

The decline in numbers of self-employed ought to be viewed, however, in the context of a similar trend frequently to be described in economic developments in contemporary Western industrial societies. As a matter of fact the number of West German entrepreneurs has steadily declined from 37 percent of employable persons in 1925 to 22 percent in 1961.³⁹ The decline in numbers of self-employed, particularly in the crafts and agriculture, is not surprising in view of the postwar trend toward more employment opportunities, chiefly in industry and other non-agricultural sectors of the economy. The expellees and Soviet Zone refugees might be responsible for accelerating it.

4. Germans from Communist Germany

For about fifteen years – until August 1961, when the Berlin wall all but prevented further crossings – migration of German refugees

Landwirtschaft," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 51–165; cf. also Wilfried Schlaub, *Heimatvertriebenes Ostdeutsches Landvolk* (Marburg: Elwert, 1955).

^{38a} *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, April 1958, pp. 207–212; also, Willi Albers, in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 442 f. Note in latter the following comparison of incomes in 1954:

Profession	Average Gross Annual Income in DM	
	West Germans	Expellees
Lawyers and Notaries	20,100	13,800
CPA's	17,900	12,900
Physicians	19,400	16,500
Dentists	11,800	10,100
Veterinarians	10,300	9,100

³⁹ Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 164 f.

from the communist part of Germany further increased the numbers of East German expellees present or arriving in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. Though the subsequent fate of these refugees falls outside the scope of this study, the fact of their arrival in large numbers materially affected the social, economic, and political development of both parts of Germany and demands attention. The mass migration through the figurative Iron Curtain that was drawn across the middle of Germany has no precedent in European history except for the last division of Poland, which prompted flights and mass deportations from both sides of the line of demarcation between 1939 and 1945.

These migrants from Communist Germany consist of two groups termed "Soviet Zone Immigrants" (*aus der SBZ Zugewanderte*) and "Soviet Zone Refugees" (*Sowjetzonenflüchtlinge*), a distinction originally made on the basis of whether or not the person arriving was actually forced to leave to escape political persecution. The former group is now referred to as "Germans from the Soviet Occupied Zone" (*Deutsche aus der SBZ*). The last West German census in June 1961 counted over three million persons who had fled from Communist East Germany to West Germany or West Berlin. No expellees are included in this figure. Those expelled into East Germany who later came to West Germany are contained in total figures for expellees (see Figure 10).

Arrivals of these refugees have varied in frequency over the years in accordance with the political situation in East Berlin and in the part of Germany behind the Iron Curtain. Between 1950 and 1960 the lowest number of monthly arrivals, 7,200, occurred in January 1952; the highest, 58,600, in March 1953. During the June 1953 uprising and the three months immediately preceding it over 170,000 East Germans crossed into West Berlin and West Germany. Another peak was reached in August 1961 when over 47,000 fled before the wall went up beginning August 13.

The age composition of Soviet Zone immigrants is of interest. As of 1961, 23 percent were below the age of fifteen and 71 percent were between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five. Half of the employable persons had had jobs, largely in the metal industries, the crafts, and commerce. In the critical half of August 1961 about 25,000 of such young people made the crossing.

FIGURE 10. *Expellees and Germans from Communist Germany*
(As of June 1961)

<i>Expellees</i>		
	Total in West Germany	Thereof from the Soviet Zone*
Male	4,233,000	1,264,000
Female	4,723,000	1,502,000
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 8,956,000	<hr/> 2,766,000
<i>Refugees from the Soviet Zone</i>		
	Total in West Germany	Thereof Recognized Refugees
Male	1,500,000	437,000
Female	1,599,000	410,000
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 3,099,000	<hr/> 847,000
<i>Expellees and Refugees</i>		
	Total in West Germany	Thereof from the Soviet Zone*
Total Male	5,733,000	2,764,000
Total Female	6,322,000	3,101,000
<hr/> Grand Total	<hr/> 12,055,000	<hr/> 5,865,000

* Since 1949, the German Democratic Republik.

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Vorberichte für die Volkszählung 1961*, *op. cit.*; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1964; Günter Granicky, "Die Zuwanderung aus der SBZ," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 475-510; Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsbeschädigte, Sonderdruck aus dem Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundesregierung, in *Deutsche Politik 1960*, and *Die Flucht aus der Sovietzone* both (Bonn: Federal Expellee Ministry), 1961 and 1965.

The 1961 total of Germans, both expellees and Soviet Zone refugees, involuntarily transferred from the East was over 12,000,000.⁴⁰ This represents more than 21 percent of the entire West German population.⁴¹

D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As a historical presentation, at this point this study will limit itself to drawing some obvious conclusions about the economic and social impact of the mass migrations on West German life and to examining to what extent the integration effort has been successful in settling a large, uprooted and therefore unstable population element. The total number of individuals having the status of expellees of Soviet Zone refugees is actually somewhat higher than that shown in the last census, since, in contrast to earlier practice, only those who applied for and received expellee passes were counted in 1961. To complicate matters, definitions of "expellee," "refugee," and "German from the Soviet Occupied Zone" have at all times included children even if they were born after the expulsion or flight of their parents.⁴² There-

⁴⁰ It must be noted that between 1953 and 1960 over half a million of these refugees arrived in West Germany through regular crossing permitted by inter-zonal traffic regulations in effect then as between the Federal Republic and the communist part of Germany. It can be assumed that many of these were not compelled to leave; this is also reflected in the fact that only 847,000 of over 3 million were "recognized" as refugees who could prove to the West German government that they had suffered or were about to suffer persecution at the hands of the communists (see Table 10); cf. Rudolf Thierbach, "Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts zum Flüchtlingsstatus," in *Der Wegweiser* (Troisdorf), Zeitschrift für das Vertriebenen- und Flüchtlingswesen, herausgegeben vom Arbeits- und Sozialministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Schriftenreihe für das Vertriebenen- und Flüchtlingswesen, Arbeitsheft Nr. 48).

⁴¹ Since the 1961 census there has been a small but fairly constant influx (5,600 in 1962) of ethnic Germans from East European countries. They are classified as expellees upon arrival but left their respective countries legally at their own request. Migration or flight from the Soviet Zone has been virtually halted by the Berlin wall and increased communist vigilance. Nevertheless since August 1961 several thousand more Germans have attempted the dangerous crossing into West Berlin and West Germany. Many have been killed or wounded; a number of them have succeeded in making dramatic escapes.

⁴² For a description of applicable definitions and modification and variations of them, see *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, December 1963, pp. 742-747. A recent projection by the Federal Statistical Office estimates an increase in the number of expellees since 1961 of nearly one million. The 1964 total of expellees including children and expellees without passes is given at approximately 9,900,000. See *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September 1966, pp. 565-570, "Her-

fore, for the purpose of this study, which attempts to evaluate the potential political stability and influence of the population element represented by the expellees, it will be appropriate to consider briefly the effect of this inclusion of children.

1. Expellees and Refugees in West Germany

As of June 1961 over two million or 22 percent of all expellees were reported as being below age fifteen. This means that either they were born after the expulsion of their parents or else they were infants at the time their parents were forced to leave their homes. Thus, the number of expelled East Germans still alive in West Germany in 1961 was probably closer to seven million than to nine million, and the number of those who can today actually recall the events associated with the expulsions is even less. The same is true of Germans who left Communist Germany. Moreover, in 1961 about half of both groups were younger than thirty-five, and about 10 percent of all expellees were over sixty-five.

In terms of their share of the population among West German youth, young expellees are well integrated into public schools and universities as well as into jobs. The incidence of marriages among expellees is higher than among West Germans. Intermarriages between East Germans and West Germans are frequent. In fact, nearly 10 percent of the new expellee farms mentioned earlier have been acquired through marriage. Special studies made between 1950 and 1956 reveal that of more than two million expellees who have married in the last ten years, half have chosen West Germans as partners.⁴³

Divorce and death rates are lower and birth rates higher among expellees than among West Germans. Generally, inside the Federal Republic expellees are a more mobile population element than West

kunftsgebiete der Vertriebenen — Ergebnisse einer im Rahmen des Mikrozensus 1964 durchgeföhrten Zusatzbefragung." For the latest estimates based on an official sample survey see Statistisches Bundesamt, *Fachserie A, Bevölkerung und Statistik*, Reihe 4, "Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge — Bevölkerungsstatistische Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 1967."

⁴³ For reasons that are not clear female expellees are somewhat more reluctant to engage in such mixed marriages. See *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, May 1959, p. 235; *Vertriebenenstatistik 1953*, p. 46; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1958, p. 42; Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 130; *Statistisches Taschenbuch*, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

Germans. For a number of years they also accounted for over a third of the emigration from West Germany to other parts of the free world. Emigration has, however, been on a relatively small scale, amounting to only 93,000 persons from 1953 to 1957, and the expellees' share in it has been declining since 1953.⁴⁴

Given the adverse economic situation of occupied West Germany during the early years after World War II and leaving aside for the moment the failure to assimilate at their previous, accustomed social levels farmers and other formerly self-employed East Germans, integration of expellees and Soviet Zone Germans can on the whole be considered a success. The attitude of the indigenous West German population has become more sympathetic toward the East Germans as their integration has progressed and as economic conditions in general have improved. With an unprecedented scarcity of manpower and nearly a million imported, non-German workers, the West German labor situation today radically differs from that of the early post-war years. The younger generation among the displaced East German population has doubtless helped to promote the process of expellee assimilation by taking, as might be expected, firmer and faster roots in their new environment. Assuming continued economic progress, the relatively large proportion of young East Germans may prove to be a special factor in ensuring political stability.

The overall economic and social effect of expellee integration has been the slowing down and further complication of West Germany's recovery from the devastation of total war. Without the arbitrary mass influx of people in the early postwar years it might have proceeded at an even faster pace. On the other hand, by their very presence the Germans from the East have stimulated further domestic and foreign demand, raised aggregate national product and income, and contributed to overall stability and progress in industrialization. Thus, in other words, their absence as an economic force in Eastern Europe has meant, somewhat ironically, that they have been a productive force in the West European market. Relatively few of their plants, shops, and farms were reestablished, but important expellee undertakings helped to expand West German exports at a time when hard foreign currency was most needed. Similarly, refugees from the

⁴⁴ See Oberländer, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff. and p. 83 f.; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1958 and 1964, p. 43 and p. 51 respectively; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September 1958, pp. 506-509; and Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 130 f.

communist part of Germany eventually became something of an asset to West Germany while their absence was a burden to the Soviet Zone economy because of the increasingly younger ages at which they sought to escape and the drain they made on the more selective occupational specialities in the East German economy. The large numbers of newcomers also helped to speed up reconstruction of housing; to promote construction of new, modern schools, churches, and other public buildings; and to encourage more rapid expansion of means of transport and communication. They spurred urbanization.⁴⁵ A number of completely new West German towns such as Waldkraiburg and Neu-Gablonz in Southern Germany emerged – built, inhabited, and industrialized by East German expellees. As a side-effect, the interstate resettlement program hastened the dissolution of centuries-old zones of religious denomination.

Signs attesting to progress towards complete assimilation include a favorable incidence of intermarriage accompanied by a relatively high birth rate, increasing home ownership, steady improvement in earning power despite abrupt, extensive changes in occupational levels, and, finally, a substantial degree of integration (to be explored more fully below) into the West German civil service. The Germans of course had some past experience with resettlement of refugees. As pointed out earlier, the Versailles territorial and colonial settlements and the Hitler-Stalin and related agreements on German minorities in Eastern Europe led to a migration into Germany of about two million people. Between 1918 and 1925 transfers of East Germans and others returning from former German colonies created an especially heavy burden on a war-torn German economy. Integration measures inaugurated by the Weimar government⁴⁶ – partly in ful-

⁴⁵ In 1953 about two million expellees or approximately one-fourth of their total number lived in towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants; over one million thereof, in cities with more than 100,000. Since interstate resettlement, involving movements from rural to urban areas, the number of expellees in cities has considerably increased and approximates the ratio between West German urban and rural population: in 1961 about one-half of the entire population was to be found in towns of 20,000 or more inhabitants; nearly one-third in cities of 100,000 or more. See *Vertriebenen-Statistik*, 1953, *op. cit.*, p. 58 and *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1965, p. 45.

⁴⁶ These included personal welfare benefits, agricultural resettlement and credits, and legislation on restitution of war damages; for the latter see Bundesvertriebenenministerium, *Dokumente deutscher Kriegsschäden*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II/1, pp. 530-549.

fillment of obligations under the Versailles Treaty – served as a precedent for similar provisions made by the Hitler government. Though inadequate for meeting growing problems of war damages to civilians and bearing traces of political and radical discrimination, these were continued throughout World War II.

The success of the current integration process is due in no small measure to the expellees' own initiative and parsimony, but could not have been achieved without initial, substantial assistance rendered by the Allies and subsequent, equally substantial sacrifices made by West German citizens. Of over eighty billion Deutschmarks (roughly equivalent to twenty billion U.S. dollars) allocated by the federal and state governments during the past fifteen years to alleviate individual social and economic burdens growing out of the war, more than half has gone towards accelerating the assimilation of expellee and refugee groups. An amount exceeding forty billion Deutschmarks has been derived from special levies on West German businesses and individuals whose real property and other assets remained intact during the war. These levies have been imposed as part of a special equalization of burdens program (*Lastenausgleich*) begun under the Bonn government and designed to run for thirty years. On its conclusion in 1979, an estimated eighty-five billion Deutschmarks will have passed from West to East Germans. Of this amount, nearly twenty percent will have been invested in expellee housing, new jobs, and reestablishment of East German undertakings and enterprises. Approximately the same share will have been contributed to old-age pensions and related benefits for East Germans. Eventually, however, the major part of the funds will go towards direct restitution to East Germans for loss of homes, property, or other assets sustained as a result of expulsion or flight.⁴⁷

Some appreciation of the relative size of the integration effort may be gained from a comparison with the cost of West Germany's own war damages. From 1948 to 1960, the German federal, state and local governments paid over 250 billion Deutschmarks toward what has been termed "amortizing the mortgage of the last war and of national socialist oppression." This figure does not include the cost of the early occupation nor of the reparations and restitutions made

⁴⁷ See Albers, *op. cit.*, and Armin Spitaler, "Probleme der Aufbringungsseite des Lastenausgleichs," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 396–417; also *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1964, p. 425; 1965, p. 437.

to recipients outside Germany. Most of it was financed by the German Federal Government, primarily to furnish social welfare support for millions of war victims and needy survivors. Thus far, annually, about a fourth of the West German federal budget has been allocated for such support in the form of pensions, additions to the social security fund, and other social and welfare purposes. Recently, total annual expenditures for social insurance by federal, state and quasi-public social insurers amounted to roughly sixteen percent of West Germany's gross national product. These commitments have benefited East German expellees and refugees in due proportion to their numbers and in addition to their receipts from aforementioned equalization funds levied on West German citizens.

Current total annual receipts garnered by East Germans solely from benefits and indemnifications are estimated at three to four percent of national income.⁴⁸ Critics of government integration measures have stressed that the system of special levies to finance the equalization of burdens program does not and cannot represent a genuinely equitable distribution of capital, since its proportionate share of national income is too small to constitute a real sacrifice.⁴⁹ In fact, as will be seen, distribution of capital in favor of expellees created considerable controversy among expellee legislators themselves. Regardless of criticism and controversy, however, the net effect of contributions from the people of West Germany, whether in the form of government taxes or levies for the equalization of burdens fund, is undeniably positive. If these efforts continue as planned, complete integration of East Germans into the West German economy will be achieved in the foreseeable future.

2. *East Germans Outside West Germany*

A discussion of integration ought not to overlook completely those East Germans unable to participate in the recovery and expansion of the West German economy. As said earlier, over four million Germans in the East were not expelled. This happened partly because

⁴⁸ Albers, *op. cit.*, pp. 423 f.; see also *Bulletin des Presse-Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), January 9, 1964 and May 12, 1965, p. 655, and summary of a report by the Federal Finance Ministry in *SZ*, April 10, 1962.

⁴⁹ See in particular Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. 15; also Albers, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 422-435.

of protests to Western Allies, partly because of the need to retain them as skilled workers (for example, in the industries of Upper Silesia), or partly because they had been deported into or relocated inside the Soviet Union. Relatively little is known about the nearly 1,500,000 East Germans said to be living in the Oder-Neisse and Danzig areas, in Central Poland, and in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰ Of the over 1,100,000 Germans living under Polish jurisdiction, the Poles recognize only about 100,000 as Germans and designate the remaining 1,000,000 as "autochthonous."⁵¹ West German sources reported them as having been subjected to forced Polonization.⁵² It is, however, believed that their living conditions are now about equal to those of the indigenous population, and they are said to have regained certain freedoms in the use of the German language in schools and in the press.

Over three million East Germans arrived and remained in Communist Germany. The number of those who found their way to non-communist countries outside West Germany is relatively insignificant. That expellees in Communist Germany have no special or privileged status or identity as refugees need not be dwelled upon here. Suffice it to say that from the start they were referred to simply as "migrants" (*Umsiedler*).⁵³ However, the continued total presence of over seven million Germans in the communist part of Germany – frequently referred to as "Central Germany" by West Germans – in the lost East German provinces, in Central Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and in other East European countries, as well as in the Soviet Union, looms

⁵⁰ For an opinion about the fate of Germans in Czechoslovakia see Sudetendeutscher Rat e.V. (ed.), *Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei* (Munich: Wolf & Sohn, 1957).

⁵¹ Hans Joachim von Körber, *Die Bevölkerung der deutschen Ostgebiete unter polnischer Verwaltung*, Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958), note esp. chapter 3, pp. 82 ff., notes 422–424; on the problem of citizenship see summary by Curt Poralla, "Zur Staatsangehörigkeit der Deutschen in Polen," *Osteuropa-Recht*, Deutsche Gesellschaft der Osteuropakunde, serial (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt), Sonderdruck, Heft Nr. 1, 1958.

⁵² Werner von Harpe, "East Germany under Polish Administration," offprint of *East Germany – A Handbook*, ed. by Göttingen Research Committee (Würzburg: Holzner, 1960), Vol. IV, pp. 203–235.

⁵³ P. H. Seraphim, *Die Heimatvertriebenen in der SBZ* (Bonner Berichte aus Mitteleuropa) (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1955).

as a significant factor in the stabilization of European political alignments.

Both West German and expellee political leaders presume that these large groups of East Germans are not integrated into their respective non-German societies, are not free, and therefore are potentially reclaimable, together with their compatriots in the German Democratic Republic, for a free, non-communist Germany after its reunification and the final settlement of its eastern borders. As integration in West Germany progressed to the point where the most basic material needs of the East Germans were met, expellee leaders began to question why they should not be able to reunite with their fellow men beyond the Iron Curtain, regardless of whether this would mean that the latter were allowed to emigrate to West Germany or, better still, that the expellees themselves would be able to return in freedom, and with whatever material means they had repossessed, to their lost homelands. While the political organizations that lent expression to these aspirations were taking shape and their influence growing and expanding even into non-expellee circles, economic and social integration of their membership continued. What happened to avowed pan-German interest and its influence outside expellee circles as assimilation progressed faster and further is interesting to recount.

CHAPTER IV

EXPELLEE ORGANIZATIONS

The original motives behind the formation of expellee groups were social and economic. East Germans were haphazardly scattered all over Germany. Populations of whole provinces, cities, and villages, as well as entire families, were separated. As said above, reception of East Germans on the part of their West German compatriots was largely hostile, and conditions of resettlement were extremely difficult. Initially, newly established West German local and regional administrations were very slow in making improvements. Even the aforementioned special expellee advisory boards did not in the beginning appreciably accelerate the process of integration. Some form of expellee organization was needed. Independent spokesmen outside the government had to be chosen to make expellee needs known.

Cultural considerations also played a role. The new environment of the East Germans contained little or nothing that reminded them of their lost homeland, and ways of bridging this gap had to be found. The thinking among expellees was that the sooner they could re-associate with their fellow countrymen in familiar forms of work and worship and identify socially with and actively participate again in a group of their own people, the sooner they would develop the peculiar qualities of mind needed to meet the challenge of their displacement and to start a new life in a strange land. Revival of East German customs and art was deemed essential as a means of maintaining a conscious sense of tradition among the expellees, in particular among the younger generation, and of affording West Germans some idea of the spiritual and social values of persons from the East.

Inevitably, political motives were also a factor in the dynamic growth of expellee organizations. The expellees felt that their West

German compatriots and indeed the rest of the world ought to be made aware of the story behind their arbitrary expulsions. Interest in the lost provinces had to be kept alive, and eventually claims for recovery had to be asserted.

A. ORIGINS

The Western Allies feared that the expellees would become active in politics if allowed to organize formally, and at first the occupation authorities refused to license any expellee political organization in any form. However, despite this restriction the East Germans succeeded in forming political pressure groups almost as soon as the first sizeable contingents of them arrived in West Germany. In fact, it was naive to assume that so large and dissatisfied a group would not attempt to do so.

Organizations of East Germans in the West evolved in three ways: on the basis of residence before the expulsion, on the basis of residence in West Germany, and on the basis of vocation or profession.¹ At first, small groups of expellees from the same East German community gathered locally, forming committees, clubs, or informal circles to compile lists of addresses of other East Germans in occupied Germany known to be from the same place. Numerous collections of addresses were made wherever expellees were concentrated for the purpose of tracing lost relatives and friends. Administrative services for assembling and processing these files, known as *Heimatortskarteien* or *Suchdienste*, soon made contact with subsidiaries of the German Red Cross and the churches, helping to handle requests for personal information and exchanging or verifying facts on missing or located persons and former or current places of residence. These address collection centers became recognized institutions, which, though later affiliated with other East German organizations formed for other purposes, to this day serve as indispensable, authorized sources of information needed by expellees not only to bring families and communities together but also to help the government ascertain the official status of expellees. This in turn assisted in proving eligibility for government benefits and other privileges extended to expellees to facilitate their economic integration.

¹ For a summary description of this development "in three columns" see Karl O. Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse der Heimatvertriebenen* (Kitzingen: Holzner, 1953), pp. 219 ff.

Other groups also formed and grew. Church congregations, company staffs, or just persons who had happened to remain together during flight, internment, or expulsion met periodically, sending information circulars to or otherwise seeking contact with neighboring or related expellee groups. Early church groups, organized primarily to help alleviate individual hardships, were particularly influential among Protestant expellees from Southeast Europe and Poland who had traditionally maintained close ties with others in their congregations. Between 1945 and 1948 over thirty Catholic and Protestant groups called Liaison or Action Offices (*Verbindungsstellen, Arbeitsstellen*) and Committees-in-Aid (*Hilfskomitees*) sprang up.² By and large these groups reconstructed the familiar patterns of organization that existed in the old homelands. Aside from establishing important links with the expellee address collection and tracing centers and the Red Cross, their main task was to revive and perpetuate the religious and cultural heritage that had united the East Germans before they were dispersed. These church organizations will be discussed further in connection with the role of the German churches in fulfilling of expellee political aspirations. Here it is important only to note that early church welfare groups, especially the Protestant ones, served as a model for the cultural and political organizations of expellees subsequently to evolve.

In fact, long before political organizations of expellees were officially allowed, informal political circles were already in the making, at times with the tacit consent of a church group. Often, these were disguised as social clubs, singing societies, aid associations, or some such ostensibly apolitical organizations.³ In time, a complex network of expellee social and cultural associations grew up, that, like the system of expellee church organizations, is for the most part still in existence today. Invariably, both kinds of groups emphasized a specific local or regional cultural heritage. Since they were formed

² Max Hildebert Boehm, "Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 521-605; and a collection of documents, notes and comments of Manfred Wambach, *Die Vertriebenenverbände in der Politik* (Berlin: MS drafts, n.d.) (hereafter referred to as Wambach Archives), especially material on "Hilfskomitees."

³ The formation of such groups was permissible under OMGUS policy MGR Title 9-1001; see Walter Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-63; also, Jane Perry Clark Carey, "The Political Organization of the Refugees and Expellees in Western Germany," *Political Science Quarterly* (New York), June 1951, pp. 191-215.

primarily on the basis of their members' geographic origins, they, too, served as a model for the development of the Homeland Provincial Societies, which were to play a leading role in West German political life.

Paralleling evolution of religious, cultural, and political circles in West Germany on the basis of former contacts was that on the basis of new contacts. West German regional groups de-emphasized revival of traditional ways of life, stressing instead practical measures aimed at effecting social integration into postwar West Germany. One of the earliest of these expellee groups was the East German's Emergency Association, which began to operate in Hamburg in June 1945, about a month after Germany's capitulation. In the beginning its membership consisted primarily of East Prussians and Silesians. Its founder and first chairman was Linus Kather, a lawyer from Königsberg in East Prussia who was later to become a prominent, if controversial, expellee leader. This association eventually absorbed other interest groups that had evolved in the British Zone, such as those of the Pomeranians, Balts, and Brandenburgers. Thus enlarged, in February 1946 it renamed itself the Cooperative Association of German Refugees. Ordered dissolved by the British Military Government in May 1946, it reconstituted itself in March 1948 as the War Victims Reconstruction Association and opened its membership to both expellees and West Germans seeking redress for material damages suffered as a consequence of the war.⁴

In time, similar interest groups organized themselves in other parts of West Germany,⁵ especially in Bavaria, where a rather militant anti-expellee political attitude developed. Numerous other expellee Emergency Associations (*Notgemeinschaften*) swiftly grew up on county and regional levels and insistently demanded "equality, justice and equalization of war burdens." Until the end of 1948 about a hundred of these *Notgemeinschaften* were licensed under a variety of names, such as Emergency Committee for Aid of Bombed-out Persons, War Cripples, and Unemployed, an organization based in

⁴ The three successive organizations were the "Notgemeinschaft der Ostdeutschen," the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Flüchtlinge" and the "Aufbaugemeinschaft der Kriegsgeschädigten," all under the chairmanship of Mr. Kather; see Linus Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 19-39; Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁵ Such as the "Interessengemeinschaft der ausgesiedelten Deutschen (IDA)" in Württemberg-Baden, or the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ostvertriebenen (AGO)," cf. Kurth, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

Munich. No mention was usually made of expellees who, after the license had been granted, joined freely. Finally, so-called State Associations attempted to group expellees regionally within each of the new Federal West German States, inaugurating, in effect, a drive on the part of both provincial and regional types of organizations to establish themselves on the national level.⁶

Evolution of organized expellee groups on the basis of occupation or profession was less complicated. Professional interests were quickly represented in interest groups (*Interessengemeinschaften*) of displaced educators, professors, students, pharmacists, physicians, publishers, artists, and the like. Large vocational organizations representing interests of displaced East German industries and crafts and of uprooted, formerly independent East German farmers also originated in these years.⁷ These organizations soon attempted, as did all others, to coordinate their affairs and goals with those of the economic interests of the expellees in general. Larger national concentrations were now only a question of time and opportunity.

B. STATE AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Thus, in spite of initial apprehension on the part of the occupation authorities and at times some resistance on the part of churches, local and state governments, and political parties, even before the West German Federal Government was established in 1949 a large number of economic and political expellee interests groups had come into being, openly or tacitly, with – purportedly in all cases – non-partisan and – in many cases – non-denominational ties. In August 1948, in an open attempt to combine forces on a national level, a Body Representative of Expellees from the East was created in the British Zone.⁸ It consisted of delegates from all types of expellee groups and was headed by a prominent Silesian politician and former government administrator, Hans Lukaschek, who, in the following year, was to become first director of the new federal expellee ministry. Though major consolidation of expellee groups was not to occur for at least

⁶ Walter Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff.

⁷ Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, material on "Heimatvertriebenen-Wirtschaft" and "Der Bauernverband der Vertriebenen;" also Böhm, *op. cit.*

⁸ The "Gesamtvertretung aller Ostvertriebenen" which was established in Bad Godesberg on August 10 and 11, 1948; Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 f.

another ten years, this early effort illustrated the reappearance of the traditional political leadership associated with the provincial societies. Such men as Ottomar Schreiber, an East Prussian, and Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, a Sudeten German, were experienced leaders who had gained a measure of renown during ethnic conflicts in the Memel area⁹ and in Czechoslovakia. Herbert von Bismarck, a grandnephew of the Iron Chancellor, came forward to represent the Pomeranians. A prominent personality among former East German land-owning nobility, he had civil service experience as a politician and top government administrator.

In 1949, under growing pressure from expellee spokesmen and in view of progress toward the establishment of the Bonn government, occupation authorities were faced with the alternative of halting the movement altogether or allowing not only its further development but also the formation of a genuine expellee political party. The question naturally arose of whether such a party would delay integration, for although it might promote economic integration by pressing successfully for "equalization of burdens," it might at the same time make social assimilation more difficult by allowing the East Germans an independent political voice, which, very likely, they would use to advance a nationalist irredentist foreign policy. The problem therefore reduced to whether or not the new federal government should begin operating with so heavy a political liability.

In May 1949 the new Federal German Constitution took effect guaranteeing among other things freedom of political association. Subsequent developments in the expellee movement were swift. The so-called cultural and traditional East German clubs, associations, and circles suddenly matured into large, important politico-cultural groups called Homeland Provincial Societies (*Landsmannschaften*). Formed on the state level, they subsequently established national headquarters. Among these groups were Pomeranians, East Prussians, East Brandenburgers, Sudeten Germans, some Silesians, Balts, and other ethnic German groups. In August 1949, again under the chairmanship of Lukaschek, their national organizations combined to form a national federation, called United East German Provincial

⁹ According to the expellee leader Linus Kather, Ottomar Schreiber directed in the interwar period the Chamber of Industry and Commerce at Memel city and was chairman of Provincial Government; see Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 69.

Societies.¹⁰ Other well-known members of the East German elite joined the rank and file of the new federation. They included Baron Georg Manteuffel-Szoegge, a prominent representative of the old Baltic-German nobility who had been active in the post-World War I Baltic freedom movement and had risen to academic and government posts during World War II; the late Axel de Vries, who had also been active in the military groups that had supported the Baltic freedom movement in the period from 1918 to 1920 and who had subsequently been a journalist and editor on the leading German-language newspaper in Reval; and Erik von Witzleben, a West Prussian nobleman, officer, and landowner who had lost his large properties in 1945.

Most regional expellee interest groups combined in April 1949 into a Central Association of Expelled Germans¹¹ with Linus Kather as chairman. About the same time, in June 1949, the largest expellee Emergency Association in Bavaria proclaimed itself "a political party functioning on the *Land* level," reportedly "without being authorized by the Military Government."¹²

After the first federal elections in September 1949 the American Military Government formally delegated its responsibility for licensing political parties to the new Bonn Government.¹³ Early in 1950 the British and French occupation authorities followed suit. This promptly led to the founding of an expellee political party in the British Zone: the *Gesamtdeutsche Block* – *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entreichten*, or briefly *BHE*, by Waldemar Kraft. One of its influential members was Theodor Oberländer, who later succeeded Lukaschek as Federal Minister in Charge of Expellee Affairs. As true of many expellee leaders, both Kraft and Oberländer had until 1945 held top academic and government posts in Poland and in Danzig and East

¹⁰ "Vereinigte ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften" (*VoL*) which was re-named "Verband der Landsmannschaften" (*VdL*) in 1952.

¹¹ "Zentralverband vertriebener Deutscher" (*ZvD*), renamed "Bund vertriebener Deutscher" (*BvD*) in 1954.

¹² See report of German News Agency (*DANA*) on June 8, 1949, in Walter Report, *op. cit.*, p. 62, indicating that Franz Ziegler, chairman of this emergency association, proclaimed it a political party without requesting prior approval, because the new Federal German Constitution, which took effect May 8, 1949, in his opinion allowed political parties to be freely established.

¹³ The expellees' express right to form political parties had been affirmed earlier in an official opinion not published at the time. See *OMGUS, Selected Opinions*, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 61, item dated December 12, 1948.

Prussia respectively. They were prominent again in Adenauer's government until both were reported to have been affiliated with Nazi organizations, and Oberländer was even accused of having been involved in Nazi war crimes. Both men retired prematurely from their government posts.

To sum up, in the new Federal Republic, four different types of expellee organizations emerged on state and national levels: (1) The Homeland Provincial Societies, Cultural Associations and related institutions primarily concerned with East German cultural and political activities; (2) regional expellee interest groups aimed at promoting economic and social integration; (3) vocational and professional groups representing special economic interests, and (4) a political party, which sought the votes of the expellees as well as of other dispossessed Germans and desired to gain representation on the national level.

In view of progress toward economic integration the expellee party and the regional and many vocational interest groups that were founded chiefly for the purpose of alleviating economic hardship became relatively insignificant.¹⁴ Therefore their organizational history need not be described here. The system of societies, associations, and other groups that grew up on the basis of former homeland provinces requires special attention however, because of its background and motivating traditions.

Towards the end of 1952, the national federation, by then renamed Federation of Homeland Provincial Societies (*Verband der Landsmannschaften*) (*VdL*) and located in Bonn, included twenty Provincial Societies as corporate members. Some of the Homeland Provincial Societies had their own national assembly of local or regional delegates and a board of directors. The latter was usually headed by an elected Speaker (*Sprecher*) or National Chairman (*Bundesvorsitzender*), sometimes by both. The societies also had national secretariats and established regional and local offices in West German states in which a sufficient number of members made this practical. Each society was represented in the Federation in Bonn by a speaker and other special delegates. In due time the *VdL* stabilized its complex organizational structure and devoted more attention to public

¹⁴ This does, for example, not apply to the Expellee Farmers Association which is continuing vigorously to press toward speedier integration of East German farmers.

relations and lobbying. Several expellee committees, liaison offices, and advisory councils began operating in Bonn, and top expellee provincial leaders became members of state and federal parliaments, gaining access to key federal legislative committees. The details of this expansion will be discussed later. What is important to stress at this point is that in the very formative years of the West German Federal Republic, for better or worse, a massive, organized system of expellee pressure groups began to make itself felt.

Amalgamation of expellee groups on a national level was just what the Western Allies had hoped to delay, if not avoid. Apart from initial prohibition of expellee political organizations and early effort to foster equitable economic and social integration the occupation powers aimed at forestalling the economic and political unrest that a dissatisfied group of several millions of dispossessed Germans might create among the rest of the West German population. Thus, evidence suggesting that the Military Government exercised censorship over reports of the expulsions and subsequent plight of the East Germans is not surprising. Release of such information, at least in the American Zone, seems in fact to have been closely controlled by the Military Government. An interesting survey made in Munich shows that up to 1948 local newspapers reported only briefly and without commentary on the arrival of "refugee transports" and that little information was ever made public on the evolution of expellee organizations. The following incident is typical of United States Military Government news control practices at the time. On June 4, 1946, Werner Friedmann, then editor-in-chief of the Munich daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, gave details on adverse conditions of the expulsions in an editorial entitled "Sie ernten Hass . . ." (They Harvest Hatred), and expressed the desire that occupation authorities would not close their eyes to be plight of the expellees. As a consequence of this article, the Office of Military Government in Bavaria sent a reprimand to the newspaper on June 22, 1946, accusing it of having acted in disrespect of the Military Government and in "flagrant violation" of established occupation policies and binding ordinances, ordering that the size of the newspaper be reduced to four pages per issue for thirty days, and threatening to withdraw its license to publish. It was indeed not until 1949 that these problems were dealt with fully in the press.¹⁵

¹⁵ Brigitte Bötzer, *Das Vertriebenenproblem in der Münchner Tagespresse, 1945-1953* (Munich: Diss. MS, 1957); for the Friedman incident see pp. 11 f.

Subsequent developments in the expellee movement were viewed with increasing concern. In 1949, the United States High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), succeeding the Military Governor, said in his first report:

Unfavorable conditions of refugee life are beginning to have serious political repercussions within Germany and may vitally and adversely affect the international political situation . . . The repeal of the United States Military Government law requiring licenses of political parties (has) opened the way for . . . more vociferous and definite demand on the part of the refugees for political expression.¹⁶

Their strength, then about 17 percent of the population, could not longer be ignored. Later, he observed how on the one hand "the urge to retain their identity with their lost homeland was expressed in their membership in . . . *Landsmannschaften*" and how, on the other, the fact that they constituted "the largest and potentially most explosive have-not group" might make them "politically malleable" and easily susceptible to being "swayed by political extremists who offer a possible solution to their problems." In fact, the United States High Commissioner found that in Germany's external relations they had already exerted "constant *irredentist pressure* through their determination to return to their former homes if political changes should make it possible."¹⁷ The Allied authorities apparently felt that the expellees should accept their fate as one that was morally justified. On the contrary, that "they and coming generations" would continue to press for restitution of what they deemed "to have been wrongfully taken from them"¹⁸ was becoming increasingly clear.

In the United States and elsewhere in the West, too, a disposition to comment adversely on the expellee political movement continued.¹⁹

Note also Senator Langer's speech commenting on the censorship of the Office of War Information (OWI) in *Congressional Record*, Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 1541-1565.

¹⁶ Office of the U.S. High Commissioner, *Report on Germany*, 1st Quarter, September 21 to December 31, 1949 (Washington, D.C., HICOG, n.d.), pp. 38 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4th Quarter, July 1 to September 30, 1950, pp. 30 ff. (emphasis added), and September 21, 1949 to July 31, 1952, pp. 166.

¹⁸ Habel Archives, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁹ Anne O'Hare MacCormick, "The Voice of the Refugees Rises in Germany," in *American Public Opinion on the Expellee Problem*, *op. cit.*; J. Raymond, "Refugees Stir German Fears," *ibid.*; George Weisz, "The Evolution of Refugee Political Parties, 1945-49," an expert's opinion included in the English version of the *Walter Report*, pp. 55-63; also, see the article by Carey, *op. cit.*, in chapter II, notes 8 and 12; Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, especially chapters 19 and 20.

That the Communist world always was, and still is, vigorously opposed to it, calling it "revisionist," "revanchist," and "imperialist," hardly needs stressing at this point.

The movement in any case was well under way and not to be halted simply by facile criticism or pointless namecalling. Prohibitions had only delayed its coming to maturity. In his recent autobiographical study Kather states that Allied objections to the formation of expellee political organizations and initial support of these objections by, as he puts it, "German parties and their rank and file," were responsible for the particularistic growth of the expellee movement. This may be true in part. Yet, whether the delay resulted in "emasculation" of the expellee political movement, as the title of his book seems to suggest, remains to be seen.²⁰

C. THE HOMELAND PROVINCIAL MOVEMENT

The mentality of members of the Homeland Provincial Societies exhibits a peculiarly irrational and subjective mixture on the one hand of homeland sentimentality and provincial folk pride, often with religious overtones, and on the other of nationalistic zeal and politically adolescent messianism. Though direct causes and connections are difficult to trace, a brief examination of earlier, similar movements offers some insight into the concepts underlying these associations and focuses attention on the element of ideological contagion in the political climate that produces them. Comparable, for example, are many of the fraternal orders of ethnic German students existing in Central Europe since the seventeenth century and often using the same term, Homeland Provincial Society (*Landsmannschaft*), to designate themselves. These were groups whose membership was limited exclusively to students with the same provincial, regional, or national origin who pledged to perpetuate the culture and traditions of their homeland.²¹ Eventually, many of these organizations deviated from strictly territorial membership requirements and redesignated themselves Student Corps. However, with the advent of the Second Reich, the old type of student *Landsmannschaft* re-emerged and federated on a German national basis. By the mid-nineteen thirties, over one

²⁰ Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 27 f.

²¹ Christian Wilhelm Kindleben, *Studenten-Lexikon – Worigetreuer Abdruck der Originalausgabe, Halle 1781* (Leipzig: Weigel, 1899), especially p. 120.

hundred such provincial student associations were to be found in Germany proper, as well as in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.²² Their politico-cultural activities included everything from cultivation of local academic traditions to propagation of racist-ethnic (*völkisch*) philosophies and exclusiveness. Their parochial spirit was eventually submerged in the national fervor of similar groups called Student Associations (*Burschenschaften*) that sprung up in Central Germany in the early nineteenth century. Influenced by the cultural and nationalistic ideas of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, founder of the German Gymnasts Association, the *Burschenschaften* stressed German national consciousness and Christian beliefs and aimed at uniting students irrespective of intra-national origin or cultural background.

Passions generated in such organizations by a combination of parochial, ethnic, and national pride acquired a messianic orientation both from traditionally inherited Christian values and from the spirit of the political movement known as Irredentism. East German expellees have been suspected of irredentist designs inside and outside of Germany. Modern Irredentism – an outgrowth of the *Risorgimento* – was a dynamic, national-liberal, militant, and, at times, secret movement, with an appreciable following among Italians. It radicalized during the Near-Eastern crisis of 1875–78. It almost drew Italy into war against Austria-Hungary over the Trentino and Istria, areas declared objects of redemption (*terre irredente*) by the irredentists. The movement derived its philosophy from mid-eighteenth century liberal ideas and ideals advocated by Associations of Freethinkers (*Freigeistige Clubs*) notably in the Tyrol, and of Freemasons. Given impetus by the French Revolution and subsequently encouraged by Napoleonic intervention in Austria and Southern Europe, the irredentist movement eventually infected the Tyrol, Nizza, and Corsica. After the conclusion of the Triple Alliance the movement's nationalist and expansionist organizations operated from both sides of the Austro-Italian border protesting Italy's partnership with Austria-Hungary and agitating for the restitution of the disputed Austrian provinces. The activities – often disguised as cultural or educational – increasingly strained Italian relations with the Hapsburg

²² The national federal organization was the *Deutsche Landsmannschaft* (1908–1936) which was preceded by the *Coburger Landsmannschafter Convent* (1873–1908). Discontinued under the Nazis, the system has been revived in 1951 under the *Coburger Convent*.

Empire and contributed to Italy's decision in 1915 to enter the war on the side of the Allied Powers. By that time Irredentism had also spread to the Balkan peninsula, finding support among Serbian and Rumanian groups and thus speeding the downfall of Austria-Hungary and confounding the hopeless entanglement of national rivalries.²³

The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1870 gave rise to similar tendencies. French foreign policy concepts of maintaining a "sacred fire of revenge" and of "never speaking, but always thinking of war" were aimed at restoration of this province. Irredentism in reverse may be said to have been practiced by the Francophile Protestors of Alsace-Lorraine who opposed the cession and requested a plebiscite (*Protestler Bewegung*).

A similar spirit can also be traced to national drives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the Pan-Slav and Pan-German movements, and to related jingoistic societies. For example, the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*), formed by Heinrich Class in 1890, was a racist-imperialist group that laid down a conceptual basis for German Imperial and Nazi Annexationism in the First and Second World Wars by giving rise to prepossessing irredentist claims and activities. Associations close to the Pan-Germans, such as the Eastern Borderland Association (*Ostmarkenverein*) were particularly active in promoting pre-World I Prussian-German "colonization" in Poznan.²⁴ Also, the aims of many smaller cultural organizations existing alongside the more universal Pan-German movement – parochial and provincial societies of ethnic German minorities in Austria-Hungary and Russia, for instance – resemble those avowed by the East German Homeland Provincial Societies today.²⁵ The Prussian-German and ethnic German groups

²³ On irredentism generally see Michael Mayr, *Der italienische Irredentismus – sein Entstehen und seine Entwicklung vornehmlich in Tirol*, (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1917) 2nd ed.; Augusto Sandonna, *L'irredentismo nelle lotte politiche e nelle contese diplomatiche italo-austriache* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1932–38) 3 vols.; on the movement at its high points, Angelo Vivante, *L'irredentismo adriatico* (Firenze: Libreria della voce, 1912); see also C. Grove Haimes, "Italian Irredentism During the Near-Eastern Crisis 1875–78," *Journal of Modern History*, IX, March 1937, pp. 23–47.

²⁴ Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 1963), pp. 120 ff.

²⁵ *Handbuch des Alldeutschen Verbandes* (Munich, 1914) lists nearly one hundred such groups, including the *Verein der Deutschen aus Ungarn*, the *Bund der Deutschen Nordmährens*, the *Bund der Germanen in Wien*, the various as-

continued their activities through World War I using their missionary zeal to support German imperialist eastern policies.

German territories ceded to Poland after World War I became the object of considerable irredentist activity with forceful emotional appeals to compatriots made on both sides of the newly demarcated boundary. Veritable national revival movements ensued. The mood seized the imagination of the public, and the press was flooded with irredentist claims. Subsequently, East German boundaries and post-war reparations continued to be a matter of special concern to almost all Germans and ranked first on a long list of injustices felt to have been suffered collectively as a result of the Versailles Treaty.²⁶ This led to an intensification of border and minority conflicts ostensibly in search of the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination. As a result, a number of interest groups emerged as forerunners of the post-World War II German expellee movement. In one way or another these interwar groups reflected the harsh, ominous temper of the time. Aside from ethnic associations, in East Weimar Germany and elsewhere in East Europe, military and paramilitary formations sprang up for local protection of civilians against non-German armed bands. Organized primarily in or near contested East German border areas and in the Baltic provinces, these quasi-vigilante groups consisted primarily of volunteers from disbanded regular army units. They called themselves Contingents for Self-Protection (*Selbstschutz*), Civil Defense (*Bürgerwehr*) and Free-Corps (*Freikorps*). Similar groups termed *Vaterländische Verbände* and *Vaterländische Front* also formed in Weimar Germany and Austria. When the Polish armed groups took premature possession of Poznan Province and later became active in Upper Silesia Germany organized Homeland Protection Squads (*Heimatschutzverbände*) engaged in border fights and civil war.²⁷ These German forces and groups dissolved with Hitler's accession to power. It is worth noting, however, that the spirit of paramilitary resistance attracted certain elements of the Autonomous Youth

sociations (*Vereine*) of Germans in Livonia and Courland, and in the cities of Riga, St. Petersburg, and Moscow.

²⁶ See René Martel, *Les Frontières orientales de l'Allemagne* (Paris, n.d.) and the *Journal Official de Haute-Silésie*, beginning February 1920; examples of strongly irredentist appeals are also to be found in *Schriften zu Deutschlands Erneuerung*, especially No. 3, ("Unsere blutenden Grenzen") and in Manfred von Killinger, *Kampf um Oberschlesien* (Leipzig: Köhler, 1934).

²⁷ Broszat, *200 Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik*, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 f.

Organizations (*Bünde*) which systematically advertised ideas on the preservation of German folkdom (*Volkstum*) to German minority groups, especially in Southeast Europe, even after the border fighting and ended.²⁸ Similar politico-cultural attitudes and activities continued to radiate from west to east — probably from east to west, too — through the Association for German Folkdom Abroad (*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* or *VDA*), a German organization that evolved from the General German School Association for Preservation of German Folkdom Abroad (*Allgemeiner deutscher Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Ausland*) founded in 1881 in Berlin. The latter was patterned after the Austrian German School Association (*Deutscher Schulverein*) established in Vienna with the aim of strengthening feelings of national cohesion throughout the German-language area by propagating German culture and education.²⁹ Originally, the *VDA*'s activities were more culturally than politically inclined and not especially conducive to promoting irredentist sentiments. But political groups close to the *VDA* and supported by the Weimar government became particularly active in promoting Germandom in provinces lost to Poland.

When the Nazis took over, these and other associations fell prey to ethnic-racist pressures emanating from powerful organizations in the Hitler government.³⁰ Ethnic German as well as non-German national groups in the countries controlled by or dependent upon Nazi Germany had to subordinate their aspirations to the overall pattern of Hitler's aggressive imperialism.

The self-proclaimed military resistance movement did not crop up again after World War II.³¹ But organizations resembling the nationalist youth groups and other right radical organizations were

²⁸ Walter Laqueur, *Young Germany — A History of the German Youth Movement* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), especially pp. 144 f., 149, and 238 f.

²⁹ The Association set up German schools, particularly in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Carinthia, and Transylvania. It also competed with the Italian irredentist *Pro Patria* Association (*Società "Pro Patria"*) which latter was active in the Southern Tyrol and Trentino Province.

³⁰ The *VDA* was renamed *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland* and eventually became an affiliate of the Nazi Party.

³¹ Total defeat of Germany in 1945 made revival of these groups as such impossible. The only exception is the *Wehrwolf*, a resistance group that consisted mostly of German recruits or volunteers from the Hitler Youth organization and that sprung up for a brief time towards the end of the war.

established in the Federal Republic. Their activities will be dealt with later in assessing the political significance and influence that they wield today.

Aside from a new right radicalism in West Germany, post-World War II revival of an aggressive political movement in the Southern Tyrol, the cradle of Irredentism, suggests similar thinking elsewhere in the German-language area. The situation there is in reverse of that before 1919. Now German speaking groups under Italian sovereignty forcefully, at times violently, demand regional autonomy or return to Austria. Tyrolese irredentist organizations operate on both sides of the Brenner Pass.³²

Against this background and political climate the expellees set out to form postwar organizations on the basis of the traditions, experience, and personal talent that went into the making of their cultural, social, and political associations before the expulsions. As a result of earlier westward migrations of Germans from the East, they had, moreover, scattered population elements that they could rely on. In preparation for post-World War I plebiscites on East German border lands, East and West Prussians as well as Upper Silesians had become politically active in central and western parts of Weimar Germany, appealing to East German compatriots away from home but eligible to participate in the plebiscites to vote for Germany. Some East German organizations to which this activity gave rise – for example, the Reich Association of Loyal East and West Prussians (*Reichsverband der heimattreuen Ost- und Westpreussen*) – existed in various forms throughout the Third Reich. Other such groups, especially among ethnic German minorities, possessed still older ties with the East. Germans from the Baltic area who fled to Central Germany in the late nineteenth century to escape Czarist pressures for Russification reestablished minority social and cultural groups that also served as a basis for post-World War II organizational developments in the expellee movement.

Forced to move westward for similar reasons, Germans from Rumania who had a veritable ethnic movement, including youth and

³² Though no conclusive evidence of connection with East German expellee organizations in Austria and West Germany is available, the charge has been made recently in the Italian press. In any case latent danger exists that feelings and implications of present-day anti-Italian violence will spread, influencing expellee groups and extreme rightist political elements in Austria and West Germany.

student fraternal associations, going in their homeland, found little difficulty in reviving many of its activities after arriving in West Germany. Finally, Germans from the Sudetenland, politically active since World War I because of a protracted conflict with the Czechs, found themselves able to contribute both experience and leadership to many of the new post-World War II cultural and political organizations of expellees.

The impact of these separate traditions will be examined further in connection with a more detailed look at each of the homeland groups. The Homeland Provincial Societies and related associations fall into four categories: a Northeast German group, a Silesian group, a Sudetenland group, and an ethnic minorities group from Southeast Europe, subsequently referred to as the Southeast German group.

1. The Northeast German Group

The Northeast German group consists of Germans from East Weimar Germany and Danzig (now Gdansk), as well as ethnic groups from Poland and the Baltic – that is, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Of the East Weimar Germans, the East Prussians claim to represent the largest number of expellees. Of more than 2,500,000 inhabitants of East Prussia over 1,300,000 from this area were registered in the Federal Republic as expellees in 1950. Their Homeland Provincial Society established itself on the national level in October 1948, opening headquarters in Hamburg. The organization chose the legal form of so-called registered association that was usually adopted by the Homeland Provincial Societies.³³ The nationwide *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen* absorbed as corporate members a number of the East Prussian Homeland County Societies (*Heimatkreisgemeinschaften*) that had grown up in the different West German states. Each of the County Societies elected a delegate who served as an elector for a national chairman or speaker and for a board of directors.³⁴ Until the end of World War II East Prussia was divided

³³ This type of organization is officially designated as *eingetragener Verein* (e.V.), pursuant to Paragraph 21 ff. of the German Civil Code. To qualify legally it must have at least seven members, elect a board of directors, and adopt a constitution or by-laws (*Vereinssatzungen*) containing, *inter alia*, purpose, name and place of venue. On registration at the local court registry the *Verein* becomes a juridical person.

³⁴ See the by-laws in *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen, 1948-1958* (Hamburg: Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen, n.d.), pp. 76 ff.

into some forty county administrative units comprising over four thousand local communities. This same administrative pattern emerged in the formation of the emigre county societies, each of which had numerous local subgroups representing former communities. These were often spread over several West German states, and eventually central offices called Land Groups (*Landesgruppen*) were set up in the states to coordinate activities on the local and country levels. The overall organizational scheme was therefore amazingly complex. Though the number of dues-paying members in these local and county groups probably did not exceed 140,000, their contacts with the remainder of the East Prussians were far-reaching.³⁵

Following the tradition of the prewar societies, the East Prussian *Landsmannschaft* retained the system of emigre county societies with a view towards facilitating the eventual resettlement of expellees in East Prussia, which it held to be one of its goals. Its leaders were, as noted above, prominent men in the old homeland. The society's speaker, Alfred Gille, is an East Prussian lawyer and former member of the Second Federal German Lower House (*Bundestag*) who succeeded Ottomar Schreiber in 1951. Its financial resources were reported to be rather large, stemming primarily from receipts of the society weekly newspaper, which, as will be shown, continues to be an important publication.

Unlike the East Prussians, the West Prussians, who established their national *Landsmannschaft* in Lübeck in 1949 and later moved to Münster, encountered appreciable difficulties in organizing their compatriots. Most of the pre-World War I West Prussian Province, it will be remembered, was ceded to Poland, under the 1919 Versailles territorial settlement. The former provincial capital became the Free State of Danzig, and the parts on its eastern and western fringes that remained German were incorporated into Weimar East Prussia and Pomerania respectively. After the invasion and conquest of Poland in 1939, most of the old Province of West Prussia was reestablished as part of Greater Germany in the form of the *Reichsgau Danzig-West-*

³⁵ The *Landsmannschaften* are reluctant to release official membership figures. Numbers can be estimated, however, on the basis of total sales of *Landsmannschaften* newspapers and information gained in interviews. In the Wambach Archives materials on the *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen* give the number of dues-paying members for 1959 as 135,000; since these are primarily heads of households, the actual total number of contacts are estimated at nearly a million East Prussians.

preussen. In 1944 about 900,000 East Germans lived in this province. Nearly 500,000 of them found their way to the Federal Republic after the war. In keeping with a history of provincial divisions, their affiliation with the East German Homeland Provincial Societies is also characterized by fragmentation. Many initially joined the East Prussian and Pomeranian Homeland Provincial Societies. Those who remained in the area ceded to Poland after 1919 joined the Vistula-Warthe Provincial Society formed by ethnic Germans from Poland. Of the remainder most joined the West Prussian Homeland Provincial Society, but former inhabitants of Danzig formed their own *Landsmannschaft*. This splintering was later to influence the development and effectiveness of the national expellee movement.

Like the East Prussians, the West Prussians also set up numerous county and local groups. These are scattered over ten of the eleven West German states. The society has roughly 50,000 paying members. It had several speakers in rapid succession, most of whom, like the above-named Erik von Witzleben, were well-known former West Prussian political leaders. One of them, Hans Kohnert, was prominent among the German minority group that remained in the Polish Corridor in the interwar period.

In general, West Prussians from Danzig, through their own association called *Bund der Danziger*, pursued different aims from those of other West Prussian expellees. Their group was licensed in Lübeck by British authorities in 1948, having grown out of an organization called *Gemeinschaft der Danziger* which had formed illegally as early as June 1945. In 1947, displaced members of the Danzig Senate, the upper house of the earlier city-state legislature, set up a Council of Danzigers in Hamburg. Formerly, they had represented the principle political parties in Danzig with the exception of the communists. Possibly because of the Nazi orientation of the Danzig Senate in the thirties, the activities of the Council were initially viewed with suspicion by the occupation authorities and the new federal government. Nevertheless, the group was eventually allowed to remain in existence.³⁶ In all, over 200,000 Danzigers resettled in West Germany. The number of dues-paying in their association is estimated at

³⁶ Boehm, *op. cit.*, pp. 547 f. For an account of the role of the Danzig Senate from 1933 through 1937, see Ernst Sodeikat, "Der Nationalsozialismus und die Danziger Opposition," *Vierteljahrsschriften für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. XIV, pp. 139-174.

50,000, a figure that indicates relatively high participation, about twenty-five percent.

Total membership in the Homeland Provincial Society of ethnic Germans from Central Poland is over 300,000. This includes some West Prussians. The organization emerged in 1949 as an extension of Protestant Committees-in-Aid formed in 1945 to safeguard religious and cultural interests of German Protestants from Poland. It did not include Catholic Germans from Upper Silesia, who, like the Danzigers, organized separately. The group officially called itself the Vistula-Warthe Homeland Provincial Society (*Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe*). Wambach reports that its registered membership was less than 30,000 in 1958. The group's first speaker was the aforementioned Waldemar Kraft. He was eventually succeeded by Hans Koch, noted Protestant theologian and authority on East European affairs. Formerly at the Universities of Königsberg and Breslau, after 1949 Koch headed the East European Institute at Munich. Until his death in 1960, he was an important foreign policy adviser for the National Federation of Homeland Provincial Societies. The present speaker of the Vistula-Warthe Homeland Provincial Society is Hans Freiherr von Rosen. The association's national headquarters is located in a small Westphalian town.

Like the East Prussian expellees, Germans from the two remaining provinces in East Weimar Germany, Pomerania and East Brandenburg, met with little difficulty in finding members for their societies. In 1950, the larger of the two groups, the Pomeranians, numbered about 900,000 in West Germany. Initial steps to organize were taken in 1945. After a temporary prohibition by the state government of Schleswig-Holstein, the *Pommersche Landsmannschaft* established itself in 1948. In a manner similar to the *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*, it accepted as corporate members a number of local, county, and state groups that had formed on the basis of current residence. In addition, it absorbed a number of groups that had formed on the basis of pre-World War II administrative patterns in Pomerania.³⁷ The Pomeranians elected what they called a National Parliament (*Pommersche Abgeordnetenversammlung*) to choose a speaker and a national board of directors. In 1950 they requested the West German

³⁷ *Pommersche Landsmannschaft*, Kulturabteilung, ed., *Zehn Jahre Pommersche Landsmannschaft, 1948-1958* (Hamburg: Pommersche Landsmannschaft, 1958).

Federal Government to raise the status of their group under public law to a corporation. If granted, this would have given the *Landmannschaft* quasi-governmental status. The number of dues-paying members in the *Pommersche Landsmannschaft* is estimated at only 60,000. Its first speaker, Herbert von Bismarck, was succeeded in 1953 by Oskar Eggert, a former high school teacher and member of the *BHE*, the expellee political party. The group's national headquarters is located in Hamburg.

Both the Pomerian and East Brandenburg Homeland Provincial Societies include German refugees from west of the Oder -- that is, from provincial counties now part of Communist East Germany. The *Pommersche Landsmannschaft* has two cultural affiliates: the *Hans-Lange-Bund*, named after a legendary East German figure, and the Society for the Study of Pomerian History and Art (*Gesellschaft für Pommersche Geschichte, Altertumskunde und Kunst*), an organization founded in Stettin in 1824 and rehabilitated in Hamburg in 1954.

Together with refugees from East Berlin, East Brandenburg expellees established the *Landsmannschaft Berlin-Mark Brandenburg* in 1949. Its national headquarters is located in Kiel. The group numbers over 130,000 persons in West Germany, of whom about 25,000 are paying members of the *Landsmannschaft*. The society's first speaker was Walter von Keudell, former Minister of the Interior in the Weimar Government who also became first president of the national organization known as the United Homeland Provincial Societies of Central (East) Germany, (*Vereinigte Landsmannschaften Mitteldeutschlands* or *VLM*), a federative association of German refugees from the Soviet Zone.³⁸ At the same time Keudell held a number of other key political positions, such as chairman of the Federal Expellee Advisory Board (*Bundesvertriebenenausschuss*) of the government party (*CDU*). In 1957, Heinz Kiekebusch, an active member of the expellee party (*BHE*) and the Schleswig-Holstein state legislature, took over offices held by von Keudell in the *Landsmannschaft* movement.

³⁸ In addition to groups from Central (East) Germany in the Pomeranian and East Brandenburg *Landsmannschaften* the following Central (East) German Homeland Provincial Societies (*Mitteldeutsche Landsmannschaften*) are federated with national headquarters as indicated: *Landsmannschaft Mecklenburg, Hamburg*; *Bundeslandsmannschaft Sachsen, Hamburg*; *Landsmannschaften Provinz Sachsen und Anhalt, Hanover*; and *Bundeslandsmannschaft Thüringen, Siegen*.

Germans from the Baltic established two separate Homeland Provincial Societies. One represents Germans from Lithuania, the other, Germans from Latvia and Estonia. As already pointed out, most Germans from the Baltic were transferred westward between 1939 and 1941 under agreements. Eventually, a little over 30,000 Lithuanian Germans resettled in West Germany. The *Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Litauen* was formed in 1952 with a national headquarters in Hanover. Its membership numbers less than five thousand. This does not include Germans from the Memel area, most of whom belong to the East Prussian Homeland Provincial Society.

Germans from Latvia and Estonia are more numerous. In 1950, more than 40,000 were in West Germany.³⁹ The organization representing their interests is called the *Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft*. Wambach estimates its paying membership at 20,000, a figure that indicates unusually high participation in the expellee movement — about fifty percent. This is not surprising in view of close traditional ties with minority organizations, some of which have been mentioned previously. It has also been pointed out that several of this group's earlier political leaders such as Baron Manteuffel-Szoege and Axel de Vries continued to figure prominently in postwar West German political life.

Important to recall in this regard is that as early as the turn of the century a veritable Baltic Colony consisting of an emigre ethnic German political and cultural elite from the Livonia and Courland areas of Czarist Russia had grown up in the Reich. Characteristic of this group was a distinct element of social cohesion that later served to facilitate the development of formal organizations. In the interwar period, Baltic German activity was concentrated primarily in Berlin and Munich, where a number of organizations such as the Baltic Council (*Vertrauensrat*), the Baltic Association (*Baltenverband*), the Baltic Fraternity (*Baltische Brüder*), and the Carl-Schirren Commemorative Society (*Carl-Schirren Gesellschaft*) came into being. Though temporarily inactive under the Nazis, some of these organizations survived World War II and subsequently circumvented the prohibitions of British occupation authorities.⁴⁰ Eventually, they associated

³⁹ Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften* (Göttingen, 1951), pp. 7 f.

⁴⁰ Clara Redlich, *Deutsch-Baltische Arbeit 1945-1955* (Bonn: Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaften, 1957).

with or became corporate members in the Baltic German Homeland Provincial Society, the nationally federated *Landsmannschaft* established in 1950. As a collateral development, a large network of some thirty cultural, academic, youth, and student organizations with more than 150 state, county, and local offices, sprang up almost simultaneously, principally in Northwest Germany.⁴¹ In addition, the Carl-Schirren Society was revived, and an Academy for the Study of East German Culture (*Ostdeutsche Akademie des Norddeutschen Kulturwerkes*) was founded in Lüneburg.⁴² The leading figures in these organizations were Max Hildebert Boehm and Kurt Stegmann. Boehm, a Baltic German intellectual and scholar, was a prominent "neo-conservative" in the early years of the Weimar Republic.⁴³ He held a chair in ethnic sociology at the University of Jena in the nineteen thirties. Stegmann first rose to prominence in 1932, when he founded the *Carl-Schirren Gruppe* in Kiel. Schirren had been spokesman for the German Balts when they began to oppose Czarist Pan-Slav pressures in the late nineteenth century. It should be noted that Russian pressures had made Russophobes of many German Balts and that after their arrival in the Reich this attitude not only drove some of them into the folds of the Pan-Germans but also brought to the fore such emigres as Alfred Rosenberg and Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, leading mentors in Hitler's new right radical movement.⁴⁴

Though the Baltic German group as a whole is small in numbers, its importance in the Northeast group of eight Homeland Provincial Societies merits attention. The Northeast group includes East-Weimar and ethnic Germans of immensely varied backgrounds, and for that reason a coordinating organ answering to the central federal body of all East German *Landsmannschaften* was deemed necessary. A Northeast German Council (*Nordostdeutscher Rat*) was created for this purpose in Lüneburg in 1951. Each of the eight Homeland Pro-

⁴¹ "Die Organisationen des baltischen Deutschstums," Sonderdruck aus *Baltisches Jahrbuch*, 1958. *Inter alia*, 22 student and alumni organizations at or near several West German universities are listed.

⁴² Boehm, *op. cit.*, pp. 549-884.

⁴³ Boehm was affiliated with or close to the "June Club" in 1920 and editor of a neo-conservative newspaper in the Weimar Republic; see Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism - Its History and Dilemma in the 20th Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 107 ff.

⁴⁴ Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany - A Century of Conflict* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), especially pp. 31 and 57 ff.

vincial Societies is represented on the council by two special delegates, but the council works in close cooperation with the Baltic German leadership of the Northeast German Cultural Association, which sponsors the East German Academy.

The community of interests among the Northeast German Homeland Provincial Societies, their Cultural Associations, the Lüneburg Academy, and the Protestant Committees-in-Aid has been an important factor in furthering the growth of the expellee movement and at the same time retaining its particularist provincial emphasis. That the Northeast German expellees are a preponderantly Protestant group has meant that alongside the eight Northeast German Homeland Provincial Societies, an equivalent number of the aforementioned Protestant Committees-in-Aid, most of which were formed in 1945 and 1946, have continued their special welfare, religious, and cultural activities until this day.

2. *The Silesian Group*

The Homeland Provincial Societies of Silesians and Sudeten Germans represent, in that order, the largest groups of Germans from the East now settled in the Federal Republic. Of the original pre-1945 population of nearly 8,000,000 Silesians and Sudetenland Germans, less than half arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany by 1950. About 2,000,000 settled in Communist Germany, over 1,000,000 were detained by the Poles and Czechs, and nearly 1,000,000 remain unaccounted for.⁴⁵ Silesian expellees in West Germany number about 2,000,000. They began their organizational activities in 1946 in Westphalia under the guidance of an association called "Wir Usinger" (All of Us Usingers), a nickname identifying Silesians. Subsequently, a number of different regional groups established themselves throughout the Federal Republic, setting up a national headquarters in Munich in 1950 that was later moved to Bonn. The first speaker of the group was the late Walter Rinke, who had been a member of the post-World War I Upper Silesian Plebiscite Commissariat and a leader of the United Association of Loyal Upper Silesians (*Vereinigter Verband heimatreuer Oberschlesier*), a group active in Germany during the interwar period.⁴⁶ Following the Second World War, Rinke

⁴⁵ See Figure 1 above.

⁴⁶ Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften, op. cit.*, pp. 20 f.

became a *CDU* member and representative in the Federal German *Bundestag*. He was succeeded as head of the Silesian Homeland Provincial Society by Julius Doms, who was also serving as chairman of the expellee legislative advisory board (*Landesvertriebenenbeirat*) in North-Rhine Westphalia. Doms was in turn succeeded by Erich Schellhans, a functionary in the expellee party (*BHE*) and State Minister for Expellee Affairs in Lower Saxony.

Wambach suggest that the relatively frequent change of speakers in the Silesian group in the beginning indicates dissension resulting from a mixed membership of East Germans from Lower Silesia in West Germany and ethnic Germans from the contested area of Upper Silesia, which was ceded to Poland after the post-World War I plebiscite. In any case, the Upper Silesians soon broke away, forming their own Homeland Provincial Society, the *Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier*, whose national headquarters is in Bonn. The Upper Silesian faction was headed by Otto Ulitz, a former police official who founded and directed the Peoples League for East-Upper Silesia (*Volksbund für Ost-Oberschlesien*) in 1920. This organization advocated loyalty to Weimar Germany in the post-World War I Upper Silesian plebiscite. In 1922, after the area had been awarded to Poland, Ulitz represented the ethnic German Upper Silesians in the Sjem, the national Polish legislature at the time.⁴⁷

In contrast to the East-Weimar German *Landsmannschaften* of the Northeast group, the Silesians did not set out to resurrect the old administrative patterns of local and county homeland groups. Both Lower and Upper Silesian national organizations initially accepted as corporate members state and local groups that had evolved in the eleven German states. Eventually, however, Homeland County Organizations (*Heimatkreisorganisationen*) formed on the basis of members' previous residence. This often led to overlapping with local groups whose members gathered on the basis of present residence.

Since Lower Silesians continue to claim representation for all Silesians, including ethnic Germans from Polish Upper Silesia, organizational complications result. Paying members numbered approxi-

⁴⁷ Boehm, *op. cit.*, p. 560, and Johann von Reichenbrand, *20 Jahre deutsches Ringen vom Weltkrieg über Versailles zur Nationalen Erneuerung* (Berlin: Franke, 1934), p. 387. For comment on other East German leaders involved in the ethnic German-Polish strife during the interwar years, see articles in *Unser Oberschlesien* (Bonn), the official press organ of the Upper Silesian *Landsmannschaft*, June 21, 1958, and November 12, 1959.

mately 300,000 in 1950, but this figure probably includes some of the 170,000 Upper Silesians who, it is believed, are also paying dues to the *Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier*.⁴⁸ Thus, about twenty four percent of the Silesians in the Federal Republic actively support their Homeland Provincial Society. A measure of coordination among the Silesians and with the North East German Group is achieved through a Congress of East German Land Representatives (*Kongress der ostdeutschen Landsvertretungen*) recently established in Brunswick to look after the political interests of all Reich-German expellees.

Welfare and religious interests of the Silesians have been looked after by both Catholic and Protestant groups. The Catholics, chiefly Upper Silesians, founded a Homeland Action Group of Silesian Catholics (*Heimatwerk schlesischer Katholiken*) in Cologne. Similarly, the Lutherans formed a Community of Evangelical Silesians (*Ge-meinschaft evangelischer Schlesier*) in Hanover.

Cultural interests of Silesian expellees are safeguarded by the Silesian Cultural Association (*Kulturwerk Schlesien*). Cultural activities clearly differ among the Homeland Provincial Societies. The Northeast group with its Academy in Lüneburg emphasizes practical contacts with West Germans, frequent academic reunions and seminars, and critical and material support for contemporary German artists from the East. In contrast, the Silesian group, whose cultural activities are centered in Bavaria, is more backward-looking. Poets from the East such as Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857), Gustav Freytag (1816-1895), Gerhard Hauptmann (1862-1946), and Hermann Stehr (1864-1940) are glorified. In doing so stress is laid on a peculiar Silesian romanticism or pessimism, if not fatalism, that purports to be an all-pervading, if essentially obsolescent, mystique. Veneration of these literary figures is institutionalized in such special cultural foundations, associations, and literary circles as the *Eichendorff-Stiftung*, the *Gustav Freytag Gesellschaft*, and the *Gerhard Hauptmann Kreis*. The activities of these organizations are coordinated and sponsored by the aforementioned *Kulturwerk Schlesien*, which was founded and headed by Kraft Graf Henckel-Donnersmarck whose family owned one of the largest estates in East Germany.

⁴⁸ Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften*, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 f. See also Horst Schmidt, *The East German Landsmannschaften in the German Federal Republic: Their Origin and Influence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Diss., MS, 1959), p. 39, which, without stating the source, gives total Silesian membership at over 470,000.

An important link between Silesian political, religious, and cultural activities and related academic interests was established in 1950 with the formation of the Johann Gottfried Herder Research Council in Marburg. Built on the traditions of the Silesian Historical Commission and similar research organizations that evolved after World War I, this organization is a cooperative venture of scholars on East German and in particular Silesian affairs.⁴⁹ The Research Council is named after an eighteenth century East Prussian theologian and poet famous for his influence on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, his romantic conceptualization of modern history, his naturalistic interpretation of art, and his insistence on perpetuating ethnic culture, language, poetry, and folksongs. The Marburg group – established outside the German university world, just like the Northeast German Academy in Lüneburg – specializes in historical, political, and social research on the Oder-Neisse areas and other parts of East Central Europe.

3. *The Sudeten Group*

The Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society (*Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft*) set up a national headquarters in Munich in 1950. This organization consists primarily of West German regional groups and only secondarily old homeland groups. As indicated earlier (see Figure 2 above), about 1,900,000 expellees arrived in West Germany after the war from the Sudetenland and adjoining areas. Of these, a relatively large proportion became active in their Homeland Provincial Society, the membership of which, according to Wambach, reached 350,000 (180,000 in Bavaria) in 1960. The first speaker of the group was the aforementioned Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, a German Bohemian right-wing conservative.⁵⁰ In 1959 von Auen was succeeded by Hans Christoph Seeböhm, member of the Lower Saxon state legislature and the German Party (*Deutsche*

⁴⁹ Other Historical Commissions formed after World War I to promote historico-political research on areas affected by the Versailles Treaty were those on the Baltic Area, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, the Posen Province and Poland, and the Sudetenland. See Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrat, *Aufgaben – Einrichtungen – Arbeiten* (Marburg: Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut, n.d.).

⁵⁰ Boehm, *op. cit.*, p. 563; Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, p. 180; and Rudolf Hilf, *Die Presse der Sudetendeutschen nach 1945 und ihre Stellungnahme zum Schicksal der vertriebenen Volksgruppen* (Munich: Diss., MS, 1950), p. 96.

Partei or *DP*), a rightist conservative group of regional importance. Seeböhm also became a member of the Federal German *Bundestag* and eventually switched his allegiance from the German Party to the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union*) (*CDU*). He became Minister of Transport in the Bonn Government and was, until his death, as prominent and controversial a figure as Linus Kather. A native of the Sudeten German area, he was educated in Munich and Berlin and worked as a mining engineer and business executive in Silesia and Central Germany.⁵¹

Affiliated with the *Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft* are a Sudeten German youth group that is part of a national expellee youth organization called German Youth of the East (*Deutsche Jugend des Ostens*) and an expellee cultural organization in Munich, the Adalbert-Stifter Commemorative Association (*Adalbert-Stifter-Verein*). A number of Associations of Sudeten German Cobelievers (*Sudetendeutsche Gesinnungsgemeinschaften*) are linked to the *Adalbert-Stifter-Verein*, and a special Sudeten German Council (*Sudetendeutscher Rat*), whose activities are closely coordinated with those of the *Landsmannschaft*, also exists.⁵² Finally, an academic group, the *Collegium Carolinum*, and a historical organization, the Sudeten German Archives (*Sudetendeutsches Archiv*), must be mentioned. Both were established in 1956 in Munich, the former by Sudeten German scholars who had been active in institutions of higher learning in Bohemia and Moravia. Like the academicians from the Oder-Neisse and other Northeast European areas, those associated with the *Collegium* were resuming scholarly activities carried on during the interwar period by corresponding groups in the homeland, in this case the German Society of Science and Arts (*Deutsche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft und Künste*); the Sudeten German Institute for the Research on Provincial Characteristics and Folkways (*Sudetendeutsche Anstalt für Landes- und Volksforschung*); several associations, primarily in Prague, pursuing historical studies (*Geschichtsvereine*); and the German University of Prague, named as is the *Collegium*,

⁵¹ Fritz Sänger (ed.), *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestags* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1954), third edition (2nd Bundestag), especially p. 311; also Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, p. 198; Horst Kliemann and Stephen Taylor, ed., *Who's Who in Germany* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1960), pp. 1335 f.

⁵² This Council grew out of the Action Group for Safeguarding Sudeten German Interests (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen*), established earlier in Munich.

after the medieval ruler Charles IV.⁵³ Like the aforementioned institutes in Lüneburg and Marburg, the *Collegium* and the *Sudetendeutsches Archiv* have contributed to creating the academic and historical basis – a highly valued tool often used by the expellee elite to support their political aspirations.

The Sudeten German Council is composed of some thirty Sudeten German delegates from the three largest political parties in West Germany – the Christian Democrats (CDU), the Social Democrats (SPD), and the Free Democrats (FDP). As a collective sounding board and corporate foreign policy adviser for the Homeland Provincial Society, it ensures a representative cross-section of political views. The interrelationship between the *Landsmannschaft* and other West German pressure groups is evident from the composition of the Council. Besides the speaker, several co-presidents are active in both the Sudeten movement and West German party politics. One is Hans Schütz, who was a delegate of the German Christian Social Party to the Prague Parliament and a functionary of the German Christian Textile Workers Union of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. In 1946 he became a member of the Christian Social Union (*Christlich Soziale Union*) (CSU), the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and, as such, later became a representative to the Federal *Bundestag*. For a time, Schütz also presided over a Sudeten Catholic group called the *Ackermann Gemeinde* (Ackermann Congregation).⁵⁴ This important organization will be described in detail presently. Another co-president with ties outside the *Landsmannschaft* is Almar Reitzner, who is active among Sudeten German youth and in the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD).⁵⁵

Like the Upper Silesians and the Baltic Germans, the Sudeten

⁵³ Jens Hacker, "Osteuropa-Forschung in der Bundesrepublik", Beilage zu *Das Parlament* (Hamburg), September 1960.

⁵⁴ *Handbuch des Bundestages*, *op. cit.*, 4th Bundestag, p. 423. Walter Habel, *Wer ist Wer – das deutsche Who's Who* (Berlin: Verlags GmbH, 1958), p. 170.

⁵⁵ *Mitteilungs- und Informationsdienst für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte* (hereafter referred to as MID), Bonn, March 26, 1966. This is a special information service on expellee and refugee affairs, apparently not connected with any expellee organization. Almar is the son of the late Richard Reitzner, a Sudeten German teacher and leader in the German Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia, during World War II Secretary of the Sudeten Democratic Committee in England, and on his return to Germany member of the *Bundestag* and Bavarian State Undersecretary in charge of refugees.

Germans capitalized upon past political experience and talent in developing their post-World War II organizations and asserting specific group interests. The complex history of the present Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society and its affiliates need not be traced here. For the purposes of this study, it is enough simply to summarize the traditional political trends that continue to shape Sudeten German political aspirations.

Formal groups of Sudeten co-believers in a way not unlike the Adalbert-Stifter Commemorative Association, absorbed the different political factions that were traditionally active in the ethnic German minority struggle in the Sudeten area under Hapsburg and Czech dominance. Members of the cultural organization named after the Bohemian poet Adalbert Stifter (1805–1868) and co-believers in the *Witiko-Bund*, which is named in honor of one of Stifter's epics, represent the right center to right wing of the Sudeten German faction. In *Witiko*, published in 1865, Stifter, apparently in an effort to challenge the political conditions of his time, gave concrete form to self-proclaimed ideas of old-fashioned (*zeitfern*) humanitarian idealism, advocating the need for an exemplary state in which justice, law, and order would contrive to permit the unimpeded development of the individual. When, however, a younger generation of Sudeten Germans revived Stifter's ideas after 1945 and established the *Witiko-Bund*, they were in effect salvaging remnants of such pre-World War II Sudeten German youth groups as the racist-ethnic (*völkisch*) Comrade's Association (*Kameradschaftsbund*) and the national socialistic Circle for Fundamental Political Change (*Aufbruchkreis*). Both organizations advocated forceful political upheaval in favor of the Sudeten German minority, and together with the Sudeten German Homefront (*Heimatfront*) – renamed Sudeten German Party under Konrad Henlein, an active supporter of Hitler's prewar annexationism – played an ominous role in the Czech-German crises between 1937 and 1939. The ideology of these organizations was based on the philosophies of the Austrian sociologist Othmar Spann (1878–1950), a neo-romantic and neo-conservative publicist, who was also a Nazi-sympathizer.⁵⁶ One of the founders of the *Witiko-Bund* was Walter Becher. Allegedly an extreme rightist in his earlier years, Becher became an active member in the expellee political party (*BHE*) and,

⁵⁶ Boehm, *op. cit.*, p. 564; von Klemperer, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 f., 204 f.

as such, a delegate to the Bavarian State Legislature. As this brief background suggests and as subsequent exploration will confirm, post-World War II Sudeten German right-wing factionalism combined a racist-ethnic element (growing out of the early German youth movement and inherent in Nazi philosophy) with an element of nationalistic romanticism.

Sudeten German center and left center factions were institutionalized in the aforementioned Ackermann Congregation (*Gemeinde*) and the Seliger Commemorative Association (*Seliger-Gemeinde*) respectively. The Ackermann group is an informal Catholic association of Sudeten German priests and laymen with roots in the pre-1939 Sudeten German Catholic youth movement and the Christian Workers' Union.⁵⁷ Through publications, seminars, and meetings, often held in small Bavarian towns, it seeks to further general interest and understanding in the Sudeten German cause. The *Seliger-Gemeinde* developed from German Social Democratic and Socialist elements active in Czechoslovakia during the interwar period. Josef Seliger, an ethnic German from Bohemia, had been an important labor leader under the Hapsburg Monarchy. He was originally a Marxist and close to Karl Renner at the turn of the century. After 1919 he was actively engaged as a Social Democrat in furthering the cause of the Sudeten Germans in a post-World War I drive for collective self-determination.⁵⁸ Seliger and other leaders such as the late Wenzel Jaksch, who was Chairman of the National Federation of Expellees, belonged to the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party. After 1933 they received and supported the emigre rank and file of the German Social Democratic Party who had sought refuge in Prague from Hitler's persecution. Jaksch, Richard Reitzner, and others later joined that group in London.⁵⁹ There Jaksch had numerous conversations with

⁵⁷ The name stems from the title of a noted medieval Bohemian epic *Der Ackermann aus Böhmen*.

⁵⁸ Kurt Rabl, *Das Ringen um das Sudetendeutsche Selbstbestimmungsrecht 1918-19* (Munich: Lerche, 1955), especially pp. 75 ff., for an interesting parallel with Seliger's views and the recommendations made by Archibald Coolidge, American head of the diplomatic mission to the former Hapsburg areas, in the matter of minorities and self-determination in Bohemia-Moravia.

⁵⁹ The London group was led by Erich Ollenhauer, who, after the death of Kurt Schuhmacher, became chairman of the post-World War II German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in West Germany; see Lewis J. Edinger, *German Exile Politics - The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).

Eduard Beneš, then the exiled President of Czechoslovakia. These ended in fierce controversy over the projected mass expulsions of the Sudeten Germans.⁶⁰

4. *The Southeast German Group*

Like the Northeast German, the Silesian, and the Sudeten Homeland Provincial Societies, the remaining group—the Southeast German Homeland Provincial Societies—drew and developed from a tradition of minority conflicts. The experiences of ethnic German minority groups in Russia and Southeast Europe were, however, rather different from those of the large Reich and ethnic German groups of Silesians and Sudeten Germans. Therefore their revival in the post-World War II era in West Germany assumed a different form and character.

The Southeast German group consists of ethnic Germans from Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, large numbers of them had trekked into Poland under World War II Soviet and Rumanian population transfer agreements with Germany. By 1950, over 500,000 of them had arrived in West Germany.⁶¹

Of approximately 150,000 ethnic Germans living in Slovakia, an independent state from 1939 until the end of the war, about 70,000 arrived in the southern part of West Germany. The ethnic German minority in Slovakia had been scattered throughout the country's wooded highlands in small, isolated population groups. Economic difficulties in Slovakia after the post-World War I establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic led to migrations of Germans, especially from the Zips (Szepes) and North Carpathian regions, to Hungary and the United States.⁶² Primarily to safeguard cultural autonomy in

⁶⁰ Beneš, *Memoirs*, *op. cit.*, especially pp. IX, 213–221, 320–334.

⁶¹ For special comment and statistics regarding the Southeast Germans, see Hans Otto Göllner, *Die Katastrophe des Südostdeutschtums* (Graz: Alpenland, 1957), and Ludwig Schumacher, *Donauschwaben und Karpathendeutsche* (Stuttgart: Bund der Vertriebenen, n.d.).

⁶² Slovakian German emigres presumably stemming from the Lutheran Saxons of the Zips region founded the Zips Association in America (*Zipsper Bund in Amerika*) which gave financial support to furthering the cultural activities of their brethren in Slovakia. On this and the following see Schieder Documents, Vol. IV, No. 1, especially pp. 144 ff.

the face of Hungarian and Slovak influence, Slovakian Germans sought representation in the Prague Parliament through the Carpathian German Party (*Karpathendeutsche Partei*). This move apparently did not succeed until 1935, however, after the party coalesced with the Sudeten German Homefront, later known as the Sudeten German Party or *SdP*. The leader of the Sudeten German Party in Slovakia was Franz Karmasin, who later headed the German Party (*Deutsche Partei*), which emerged when Slovakia became a state in 1939. More under the influence of the Nazi Party of Germany proper than its predecessor organization, the German Party eventually gained the support of most of the ethnic Germans in Slovakia. One of its members was Adalbert Hudak, a Lutheran theologian who had studied and taught in Pressburg, Slovakia.⁶³ After the expulsions he joined the German Party (*DP*) in the Federal Republic and became a member of the *Bundestag*. Active Lutherans such as Hudak as well as Catholics formed the church aid societies out of which the Carpathian German Homeland Provincial Society (*Karpathendeutsche Landsmannschaft Slowakei*) eventually emerged in 1949. Church leaders were members of the *Landsmannschaft* Board of Directors. Some still are. The organization probably has not more than 10,000 paying members.

Following the First World War, ethnic Germans in Hungary numbered over 600,000. About 140,000 of them arrived in West Germany after the Second World War. Smaller numbers reside in the communist part of Germany and in Austria, and about 300,000 remained in Hungary. The background of ethnic Germans in Hungary is closely tied up with government pressures toward assimilation begun in the second half of the nineteenth century and intensified after the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* in 1867. During the interwar period ethnic Germans in Hungary set up a number of formal and informal organizations advocating the preservation of German customs and folklore. Some were liberal, that is pro-Hungarian, like the Hungarian-German Educational Association (*Ungarländisch-Deutscher Volksbildungverein*). Others were nationalist, that is pro-German, like the Ethnic German Comrades Union (*Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft*),

⁶³ See *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages*, *op. cit.*, and *MID*, October 9, 1965. The *Deutsche Partei* (*DP*) of West Germany, which has no connection with the former party of the same name in Slovakia, merged with the West German expellee party (*BHE*) in 1961.

which was succeeded in 1938 by the *Volksbund* of Germans in Hungary.⁶⁴ The latter groups eventually became fully open to Nazi influence and penetrations. This divergence in political attitudes helps to explain why a relatively large number of the German minority was able to escape the expulsions and remain in Hungary. The same division seems to exist among the post-1945 expellees, most of whom have settled in the southern part of West Germany. Initially, the *Landsmannschaft* of Germans from Hungary, established in Munich in 1951, was jointly directed by Ludwig Leber as National Chairman and Heinrich Reitinger as Society Speaker. Leber represented the pro-Hungarian faction; Reitinger the German nationalist faction. Because of persistent internal dissension, Leber eventually resigned from the chairmanship of the *Landsmannschaft* and in 1956 set up his own group in Württemberg called the Council of Germans from Hungary (*Rat der Ungarndeutschen*). This group does not belong to the National Federation of *Landsmannschaften*, but together with the pro-German Society is closely connected with Catholic and Protestant provincial church organizations and committees-in-aid. The rivalry between the two factions that began in the nineteen twenties has persisted since the expulsions and has weakened both organizations, whose active memberships are relatively small.⁶⁵

The organizational development of ethnic Germans from Rumania is somewhat more complex because of post-World War I and subsequent territorial changes. During World War II well over 700,000 Germans lived in Rumania. That expulsions were not officially agreed to at Potsdam may explain the fact that about 400,000 are still there. By 1950, about 100,000 had arrived in West Germany. Approximately the same number live in the Soviet Zone of Germany or elsewhere, and 100,000 remain unaccounted for.

Rumania here is taken to mean the original kingdom plus the enlargement effected by post-World War I territorial settlements. Within this area several ethnic minority groups can be distinguished. Three of them — Germans in Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Southern Dobrudja — came under Soviet or Bulgarian sovereignty when these regions separated Rumania in 1940. Before Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 most living in these regions were

⁶⁴ Schieder Documents, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 18E-31E.

⁶⁵ Boehm, *op. cit.*, pp. 570 ff.; Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften*, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff.; Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*

evacuated into German-occupied Poland under the aforementioned transfer agreements. Of the remaining groups, some Germans in Transylvania (*Siebenbürgen*) eventually fell under Hungarian control when the northern part of Transylvania was ceded to Hungary under the Second Vienna Award in 1940.⁶⁶ Other groups comprised ethnic Germans from Southern Bukovina, Southern Transylvania, Central Rumania, Northern Dobrudja, and the Banat in the Southwest.

In 1949 Catholic and Protestant aid associations made contacts with over 40,000 Germans from the Bukovina who had arrived in West Germany. The churches then prepared the way for the establishment of the Homeland Provincial Society of German Resettlers from the Bukovina (*Landsmannschaft der deutschen Umsiedler aus der Bukowina in Deutschland*). This was remanned the *Landsmannschaft der Buchenlanddeutschen* in 1951, and a national headquarters was set up in Munich. Its first speaker was Rudolf Wagner who was also an active member of the *BHE* and as such became a delegate to the Bavarian State Legislature.

Similarly, with the assistance of the Evangelical-Lutheran Committee-in-Aid, small groups from Bessarabia and Dobrudja set up a Homeland Provincial Society in Stuttgart, later splitting into the separate societies, one called *Landsmannschaft der Bessarabien-Deutschen* and the other *Landsmannschaft der Dobrudja- und Bulgarien-Deutschen*, both with national headquarters in Stuttgart. Members of these societies stem from strongly conservative, partly Protestant, partly Greek-Orthodox backgrounds. Their ancestors strove to retain German customs, language, and folkways amidst a bewildering mixture of races and religions in the Black Sea area, stubbornly competing with Turkish, Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Russian influences. Unlike that of East Germans in some of the larger *Landsmannschaften*, active participation of Bessarabian and Dobrudja Germans in their respective Homeland Provincial Societies is high. Of some 70,000 Germans from Bessarabia, over a third belong to the Bessarabian Society, indicating that almost every Bessarabian family in West Germany is represented. Of about 8,000 Germans from Dobrudja, nearly one half are active *Landsmannschaft* members, suggesting, as in the case of the Baltic Germans, that some expellee households in the group have more than one paying member.

⁶⁶ Northern Transylvania was retroceded to Rumania under the 1947 peace settlement.

The Homeland Provincial Society of Banat Swabians (*Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben*) with headquarters in Munich, is a small, largely Catholic group and thus has had much support from their Catholic Action Office. Parts of the original Banat region were ceded to Rumania and Yugoslavia by Hungary under the post-World War I Peace of Trianon. Together with Swabians in the Sathmar (Satu Mare) area, German Swabians who as a result came under Rumanian sovereignty constituted the largest group of Germans in Rumania. Most of them, about 350,000, remained there. Only about 30,000 arrived in West Germany and less than 20,000 in Austria by 1950.

Most of the Transylvanian Germans, particularly those in the southern part of the province, also still live in Rumania. Roughly 26,000 resettled in West Germany, about 20,000, in Austria. Efforts of those in the Federal Republic to organize were actively supported by the German Red Cross and the Evangelical Lutheran Church, leading in 1951 to the formation of the Homeland Provincial Society of Transylvanian Saxons in Germany (*Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürgen Sachsen in Deutschland*). The first speaker of the organization was Heinrich Zillich, an ethnic German intellectual and an impassioned Transylvanian Saxon poet. It is believed that a majority of the Transylvanian Germans in West Germany are active, paying members of the *Landsmannschaft*.⁶⁷ If the estimate is correct, about three fourths of them – or more than two in every household – belong to the *Landsmannschaft*, giving them the highest degree of participation in the expellee movement. This is not surprising since Germans in Transylvania have traditionally been an extremely conservative, socially cohesive group. Like other German minorities in Southeast Europe and the Balkans, they stem from old, deeply rooted agricultural families, some of which trace back to the twelfth century. Their ancestors perpetuated German culture, religion, and folkways in spite of pressures from Tartars, Mongolians, and Osmanlis, and Transylvanian Germans customarily refer with pride to the medieval fortified villages and churches of their forebears as a bulwark of Christendom. Early communal and religious life was subject to especially rigid group rules – a social influence apparently still felt today. This tribal closeness helps to explain why some Transylvanian

⁶⁷ Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, who gives their membership at just over 3,000.

Saxons in West Germany decided to return to Communist Rumania. It was an imperative aspect of their nature and background to wish to rejoin members of their family or community from whom they had been separated.

The different heritages and traditions of the Rumanian German groups are of interest inasmuch as they shaped the spirit of their new post-World War II expellee societies. Century-old roots and a sense of belonging together made them a politically important ethnic element, which, until the end of World War I, was involved in minority struggles within the Hapsburg Empire. Subsequently, they were affected by the efforts of Allies and Associated Powers to strengthen Rumania by giving it much of the Bukovina and Transylvania areas at the expense of Hungary. Used to perpetuating their customary German ways, they had resisted Magyarization and, in the interwar period, the Romanization policies of their respective sovereigns. One may say that, as a result of this, all these groups became accustomed to maintaining, even across periods of major upheaval, their astonishing degree of social and cultural cohesion and organizational experience. Thus, for example, the Germans from Transylvania pride themselves on having been able to resist Hungarian assimilation policy with success in the nineteenth century.⁶⁸ The Bukovina Germans to this day point to their German cultural activities and achievements: their German schools, their system of German cultural centers, and their initially German university and theater in Czernowitz. The network of cultural and religious organizations, including youth groups and student fraternal orders, has been referred to briefly above. Some of these have been revived in one form or another in West Germany.⁶⁹

Existing political factions reflected the minority tensions of the era. The German nationalistic elements among the Rumanian Germans were preponderant long before the expansion of Fascist and National

⁶⁸ Erwin Tittes, "Die Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen," in *Die Ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften*, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 f.

⁶⁹ Such as the Czernowitz Academic Fraternities "Arminia" (founded 1877), the Catholic "Frankonia," and the "Teutonia," which, after the expulsion, associated with corresponding student groups in Munich, Erlangen, and Berlin respectively; see especially "Tradition des Czernowitzter Studententums," and subsequent articles in *Buchenlanddeutsche Landsmannschaft* (ed.), *Warum Raimund-Kaindl-Bund? Sinngebung Donau-Karpathenländischer Gemeinsamkeiten* (Munich: n.d.), pp. 30 f.

Socialist influence to Southeast Europe. In fact a German national movement institutionalized itself as early as 1897 as the Association of Christian Germans in the Bukovina (*Verein der christlichen Deutschen in der Bukowina*) with subsidiary nationalist youth, gymnasts, and teachers' groups. Other unions, associations, or councils of ethnic Germans in Transylvania, Bessarabia, and in the Banat were active during the interwar period to secure or improve promised minority protection. Catholic and Protestant church groups also participated actively in the anti-Romanization struggle. A significant development took place among Germans in Transylvania, where a German nationalistic Protestant Renewal Movement⁷⁰ eventually clashed with its more extreme rightist wing which separated and founded a party called the German Peoples Party of Rumania (*Deutsche Volkspartei Rumäniens*).⁷¹ This party became inactive in 1938 when parliamentary government was suspended in Rumania, but the ethnic German renewal movement, then called Union of the Germans in Rumania (*Volksgemeinschaft der Deutschen in Rumänien*) gradually radicalized – though not without considerable internal discord – until the Nazis took over completely.⁷² Political tensions among the Transylvanian Germans and between them and the Bukovina groups persisted until World War II. Some of these differences even survived the expulsions.

The two remaining Homeland Provincial Societies in the Southeast German group are those representing Germans from Yugoslavia and Russia. Ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia suffered considerable diminution as is clear from their part in the expulsions. More than half a million were in Yugoslavia at the time of World War II; by 1950, about 80,000 were retained and less than 300,000 were expelled, of whom about 150,000 arrived in West Germany and 120,000 in Austria. These expellees included Slovenian Germans from the northern areas of the Gotschee and of Lower Styria, primarily around Ljubljana (formerly Laibach), and from the Batschka (Backa) and the Southern Banat areas in the northeast, primarily around the city of Novi Sad (formerly Neusatz). They also included Germans from the areas of Slavonia and Syrmia adjoining the Southern Banat, and from

⁷⁰ Led by the Transylvanian Saxon Fritz Fabrizius.

⁷¹ Hugo Weczerka, *Die Deutschen in Buchenland* (Würzburg: Holzner, n.d.) (Schriftenreihe des Göttinger Arbeitskreises, Heft 51), especially pp. 30 ff.

⁷² Schieder Documents, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, especially pp. 27E–40E.

the Bosnia-Herzegovina region. An appreciable number of Germans elsewhere in Serbo-Croatia had been evacuated under population transfer agreements with the Nazi-German government during the early period of World War II. After 1945 it was, again, the Evangelical-Lutheran Church Committee-in-Aid that supported these ethnic Germans and that in 1949 helped to set up the *Landsmannschaft der Jugoslawien-Deutschen*. Wambach estimates the original membership of this society at 22,000, a figure that probably grew to 35,000 with the subsequent arrival of many Jugoslavian Germans from Austria. The first speaker of the *Landsmannschaft* was Franz Hamm, a highly placed West German Protestant Church official, who had been a German delegate in the Rumanian government party after 1938.⁷³

The German expellees from Yugoslavia were also experienced organizers. In Yugoslavia they had had well-developed systems of German schools, economic cooperatives, and cultural associations. Like many other German minority groups, they had their own German-language newspapers. In the interwar period the German Party in Serbo-Croatia and Slovenia – a liberal democratic party – became active but dissolved again when, in 1929, the Royal Government assumed authoritarian forms. One of the significant organizations was the Swabian-German Cultural Association (*Schäbisch-deutscher Kulturbund*), founded in 1920 in Neusatz and renamed *Volksbund* after the German invasion of the Balkans in 1941. As elsewhere among the German organizations in Southeast Europe, the Southslav German cultural movement was weakened by a split into a liberal and a radical faction later increasingly influenced by the militant nationalist climate in Germany and reflected in the trend toward totalitarianism in the Balkan and Southeast European area.⁷⁴

Most of the Germans from Yugoslavia had been part of a wider group of ethnic Germans, who had settled in the Central Danube area. After 1919 this group, often referred to as Danube Swabians, included ethnic Germans in Hungary and in the Rumanian Banat. Most of them had originally come together in an organized fashion under Hapsburg dominance. When the new post-World War I borders were drawn around them and in between them, they lost whatever contact and cohesion they had had and became largely isolated from one another. Since their emigration to West Germany, the Danube

⁷³ Cf. Schieder Documents, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, especially pp. 27E-44E.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Swabians have wanted to overcome this split. Their Homeland Provincial Societies, including ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia, Hungary, and the Rumanian Banat, associated within a Danube Swabian Working Community (*Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*). This loose federation displeased a number of expellee leaders, who apparently had the especially acute "Danube-Swabian sense of belonging together" and "strong ethnic tribal consciousness" (*Stammesbewusstsein*) usually attributed to these groups. Thus, in 1958, the Association of Danube Swabians (*Verband der Donauschwaben*) was set up in Ulm.⁷⁵ It sought—but has not yet succeeded—to incorporate the three Homeland Provincial Societies of Danube Swabians on a national basis.⁷⁶ This tendency for expellee organizations of Germans from the central Danube area to unite nevertheless goes on. A Danube Swabian Homeland Provincial Society has existed for some time on the state level in Baden-Württemberg and a Danube Swabian Youth organization (*Donauschwäbische Jugend* or *DsJ*) has constituted itself as part of the East German youth movement.

As was shown, large numbers of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union were affected by the 1939 to 1940 population transfers. Most of them were deported to the east by the Soviets before and during World War II, and the remainder were eventually carried westward with the retreating German armies. In 1950, Protestant and Catholic aid groups working together helped to set up a Homeland Provincial Society of Germans from Russia (*Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland*) with a national headquarters in Stuttgart. Of less than 70,000 Germans from Russia residing in West Germany, probably not more than 2,000, a very low relative number, are believed to be active members.

In order to create some degree of unity among the nine different *Landsmannschaften* in the so-called Southeast German group, expellee leaders established a Council of Southeast Germans (*Rat der Südost-Deutschen*) in 1951. The council constitutes an assembly of delegates from each of the *Landsmannschaften*. The executive com-

⁷⁵ For details on their constitutive assembly and text of the by-laws, see *Der Donauschwabe* (Aalen), one of the Yugoslavian German newspapers, August 17, 1958.

⁷⁶ For intersocietal conflicts in connection with this unification movement, see *Mitteilungen für den Deutschen aus dem Donauraum* (Karlsruhe), a monthly press organ of the Yugoslavian German Homeland Provincial Society, September 15, 1958.

mittee or presidium of the Council was initially chaired by Rudolf Wagner, Josef Trischler, and Heinrich Reitinger. After 1938, Trischler was German delegate to the Yugoslav government party and after 1942 to the Hungarian Parliament.⁷⁷ He later became Speaker of the Yugoslav-German *Landsmannschaft*. Reitinger was the Hungarian-German speaker and a former adherent of the German nationalistic minority faction in Hungary.

Cultural-religious activities continue to be directed by a Catholic institution, the so-called Working Group of Southeast German Catholics (*Arbeitskreis Südostdeutscher Katholiken*), which was later renamed *Gerhardswerk* (after St. Gerhard, a missionary in Hungary) and by eight Protestant Committees-in-Aid. Politico-cultural activities are guided by the Southeast German Cultural Association (*Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk*) in a manner similar to that in the Northeast German group. This association was founded in Munich by the late Fritz Valjavec, a historian and scholar who was previously associated with the Universities of Munich and Vienna and who was a specialist on the history of the Danube area.

Valjavec also was the first director of an academic group called the Southeast Institute (*Südost-Institut*) which was established in Munich in 1951. Unlike the aforementioned Northeast German Academy and the other scientific institutions, which continued activities carried on in East Germany and East Europe, the Southeast Institute was revived through a Bavarian foundation which had supported research on Southeast Europe since 1930.⁷⁸

Thus, the four major groupings among the twenty Homeland Provincial Societies sought to coordinate various provincial activities by maintaining cross-connections along political, social, religious, and cultural-historical lines. All this, in turn, was tied in with the national Federation of all *Landsmannschaften*, the *VdL*. From Bonn, the seat of its Central Office, the Federation attempted to pull together these provincial connections. It established ties with new East German youth movement, *Deutsche Jugend des Ostens* (*DJO*) and an East German students' organization, *Verband heimatvertriebener deutscher*

⁷⁷ Schieder Documents, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 36E; *Wer ist Wer*, *op. cit.*, p. 1292.

⁷⁸ Hacker, *op. cit.*; the Southeast Institute is close to the Southeast Europe Association (*Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft*) founded also in Munich a year later. The Association, some two hundred scholars from West Germany and Austria, promotes scientific research of East European problems.

Studenten (VHDS), later renamed East-Political German Students Association (*Ostpolitischer deutscher Studentenverband*) (ODS).⁷⁹

Moreover, the *VdL* kept in touch with both the other large West German regional expellee organizations, which were based on members' present rather than past residence, with the vocational expellee groups, and with the expellee party. There was in fact much organizational overlapping and duplication of memberships. In order eventually to bring more concentrated pressures to bear on the government, even closer coordination on both national and state levels of all cultural, youth, and vocational activities, and establishment of contacts abroad were required. Further endeavors to unite the expellee organizations and to harmonize their aims and purposes were, however, often as different and contradictory as their origins.

D. EXPANSION OF THE MOVEMENT

Differences in the geographical origins of the expellees, their diverse political and social traditions and attitudes, made organization of an integrated political movement in West Germany difficult from the start. The political elite among the expellees realized that they could not simply capitalize on past political experience but must venture into new political depths. No sooner had the Bonn government begun to operate than numerous interest groups began to scramble and clamor for power and prestige. Compared to the task of forerunner minority organizations the job of the new groups was much more complex. Expellee political leaders had no longer to deal with the problem of large groups of Reich Germans getting along under a dictatorship or of small groups of ethnic Germans existing in defensive or aggressive isolation under foreign governments in small East European states. Rather, in Bonn, they were faced with mastering the refined technique and manifold processes of modern democratic lobbying necessary to compete in a whirlpool of conflicting political currents. This meant that, with the exception of some Sudeten Germans who may have gained useful political experience in the Czech democracy in the interwar period or while exiled in France or England, most expellee leaders as well as West German politicians

⁷⁹ The *VdL* also established links with the aforementioned federation of provincial societies founded by German refugees from Communist Germany and called the United Central German Homeland Provincial Societies (VLM).

had to start from scratch. To improve the lot of the expellees economically and in addition gain favorable consideration for their political aspirations was an enormous undertaking requiring optimum concentration and coordination of diffused expellee groups and their activities, larger registered memberships, more money, better mass media, more intimate connections with West German parties, and increased integration into government positions at all levels.

1. The New National Federation

Almost from its inception the Federation of Homeland Provincial Societies (*VdL*) sought to combine with the large Central Association of Expelled Germans (*ZvD*, subsequently *BvD*). For years both organizations worked at plans to merge in one form or another. The very long and complex story of this effort need not be told here. Suffice it to say that after about ten years of internal wrangling the merger took place in July 1959.⁸⁰ What evolved was a comprehensive new national organization called the Federation of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen* or *BdV*).

(a) *Structure.* The new *Bund* combined the twenty Homeland Provincial Societies and eleven Regional State Associations as corporate members with subdivisions into some fourteen thousand county and local affiliates organized on the basis of members' current residence.⁸¹ The speakers or chairmen of the Homeland Provincial Societies and the deputies or chairmen of the Regional State Associations became members of a governing Board of Directors.

The superstructure of the organization on the national level reveals the efforts of the organizers to interweave homeland provincial and West German regional interests. Both the Homeland Provincial Societies and the Regional State Associations are represented in a Federal

⁸⁰ For terms of a merger planned in 1953 see *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen* (Göttingen: Göttinger Arbeitskreis), an Expellee Press Service hereafter referred to as *HVP*, November 27, 1952, March 12 and 26, 1953. For some of the difficulties involved in the ultimate merger see "Zwist der Vertriebenen-Verbände," *SZ*, August 30-31, 1958, pp. 2 f. A constituant assembly was set up in Berlin on December 14, 1958, to make preparations for the final merger. See *Informationen des Verbandes der Landsmannschaften*, bulletin of the *VdL* (Bonn) (hereafter referred to as *VdL*), November 28, 1958, p. 2; note the actual termination of both the *VdL* and *BvD* as of July 12 and 18, 1959, respectively.

⁸¹ Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 211. The twenty Homeland Provincial Societies are listed in Plate I below.

Assembly (*Bundesversammlung*) by delegates having an equal number of votes (fifty-two each).⁸² The Assembly is charged with such internal matters as election of the Board of Directors, supervision of finances and membership, and legislation of by-laws. The Board of Directors (*Präsidium*) consists of a President, four Vice-Presidents, and additional representatives of the Homeland Provincial Societies and the Regional State Associations. Each Vice-President represents one of the four general groups of Homeland Provincial Societies mentioned previously. The principal decisions are, however, made in a group called Federal Representation (*Bundesvertretung*) which assembles the key political figures of the expellee movement. It consists of the aforementioned speakers or chairmen of each of the Homeland Provincial Societies, the chairman and deputies of each of the Regional Associations, the members of the Board of Directors, and other delegates from affiliated organizations.⁸³

The daily work of the Federation is carried on by a group of specialists who head offices (*Referate*) such as that on Cultural Affairs, which maintains connections with the four major expellee cultural associations described earlier and is also linked with a group in Bonn called the East German Cultural Council (*Ostdeutscher Kulturrat*). The Cultural Associations and the Cultural Council in turn keep in touch with some forty East German cultural or commemorative organizations and archives, exhibits, club halls, and educational groups, serving both the expellees and the Soviet Zone refugees. Other *BdV* offices implement what is called Homeland Policy (*Heimatpolitik*), keep contact with the expellee press, deal with social and economic questions, and oversee matters relating to Berlin. The expellee youth and student organizations with their numerous homeland provincial and West German local branches, as well as a women's work group are corporate members of the *BdV*, and special departments exist for them. The German Youth from the East (*DJO*) was founded in 1951 on a national basis and organized along both West German regional and homeland provincial lines. Its local youth groups accept as members East and West German boys and girls between the ages of six and eighteen. The East-Political German Student Association (*ODS*) incorporates local homeland provincial

⁸² For distribution of *Landsmannschaften* votes see Plate I.

⁸³ See the by-laws of the Federation, *Satzung des Bundes der Vertriebenen* (Bonn: mimeographed, n.d.).

chapters of East Prussian, Pomeranian, Silesian, Sudeten German and ethnic German students from the Baltic area and South East Europe as well as refugees from the Soviet Zone. The Expellee Farmers Association and the Representatives of Expelled Industries are also affiliated. In addition, the *BdV* maintains close contacts with some fifty East German church and welfare organizations, with the expellee tracing services, and with a large number of vocational expellee or refugee groups. Moreover, a number of commissions (*Ausschüsse*) and councils (*Beiräte*) entertain advisory and lobbying functions with government offices, legislatures, West German churches, schools and academic institutions. Of these, the Parliamentary Council (*Parlamentarischer Beirat*) is especially important because it maintains continuous relations with the federal legislature. These numerous outside connections that exist on the federal and lower levels are not limited to contacts with establishments in West Germany but also extend abroad to other Western countries. Thus, the possible channels of information and spheres of influence for the expellees are considerable.

(b) *Membership and Finances.* Size and composition of membership has been another important factor in determining the expellee movement's effectiveness. As said earlier, the Homeland Provincial Societies are widely scattered over the eleven West German Federal States (see Figures 3, 4, and 11). In 1961, the *BdV* listed over one hundred national and state offices for the twenty Homeland Provincial Societies.⁸⁴ These are to be found in over twenty large (more than 200,000 inhabitants) and forty smaller towns, for the most part in Bonn, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Munich, and Stuttgart. In addition, many thousands of county and local subgroups are spread throughout towns and villages in each of the West German Federal States, naturally being most numerous in those places having the heaviest concentrations of expellees.

Most of the expellee groups remain close-mouthed about exact membership figures as well as about their finances. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably established that in the 1950's the twenty Homeland Provincial Societies had from one million to 1,400,000 paying members.⁸⁵ The then still separate Central Regional Federation

⁸⁴ *BdV, Material- und Personal-Katalog, op. cit.*

⁸⁵ Based on data obtained in *Landsmannschaft* offices during personal inter-

(*ZvD/BvD*) claimed 1,500,000 members in 1953 and 1,800,000 in 1955.⁸⁶

If true, this would mean that altogether around three million East Germans were paying dues to homeland provincial or West German regional expellee organizations during the 1950's. That these figures include an appreciable number of double memberships is suggested by the sharp decline in paying memberships observable at the time that the *VdL* and *BvD* finally merged. In June 1959 the total number of paying members was reported at 1,500,000; and less than a year later the *BvD* claimed a total membership of at least 1,800,000. More recently, up to 2,500,000 members were claimed, but it is conceded that only 1,500,000 pay "full dues."⁸⁷ Table I and Figure 11 herein estimate total membership conservatively at 1,330,000 on the basis of arrivals in 1950, and at 1,520,000 on the basis of arrivals in 1961. As is evident from these figures, most of the Reich German *Landsmannschaften* have a relatively lower active participation while some of the small ethnic German societies have more paying members than there are families or households in the group. Counting an average of three persons to a common household would mean that roughly half of all the expellees in West Germany are in contact with the expellee homeland provincial movement.

In addition, appreciable numbers of expellees and refugees joined the expellee party (*BHE*) (for the duration of its existence), the Homeland Provincial Societies of Germans from the Soviet Zone (over half a million members), and the more than 100 other political and non-political expellee and refugee organizations mentioned above, especially the expellee youth movement and student's groups. In 1958 the *DJO* claimed approximately 200,000 members, which included a relatively small number of West Germans. More recently, its total membership was given as 158,000 including 38 percent West Germans.⁸⁸

views; for 1949, paying memberships were listed at 1,250,000. See *Archiv* (Göttingen), October 20, 1949, p. 6.

⁸⁶ See Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 317; in its bulletin *VdL*, November 21, 1955, the Federation challenged the validity of this figure, alleging that the *BvD* actually received dues during that year from only 942,000 members. The *BvD* claimed elsewhere to receive dues from "a little over one million" members. See *BvD - Seine Organisation und seine Tätigkeit* (Bonn, n.d.), pp. 1 f.

⁸⁷ Information received from *BdV* in 1960 and 1967.

⁸⁸ Data received from the *DJO* in 1959, 1961, and 1967.

It seems that the smaller and farther away the East German group was, or the more it was involved in the minority struggles of the inter-war period, or the greater the number of fellow Germans left in the old homeland, the higher is the degree of participation in the current expellee political movement. Similarly, in West Berlin, where East-West tensions are felt more directly than in any of the other federal states, participation of East Germans in the movement is twice as high (thirty-three percent) as the national average and three times as high as, for example, in the quiet agricultural haven of Schleswig-Holstein (see Figure 11).

FIGURE 11. *Membership in Homeland Provincial Societies by Federal West German States*

(Approximate Numbers and Percentages of Participation Based on Total Expellees in 1961)

Federal State	Total Arrivals	Membership	Percent
North-Rhine Westphalia . . .	2,300,000	400,000	17
Bavaria	1,650,000	300,000	18
Lower Saxony	1,600,000	230,000	14
Baden-Württemberg	1,200,000	230,000	19
Hesse	800,000	160,000	20
Schleswig-Holstien	650,000	70,000	11
Rhineland-Palatinate	300,000	50,000	17
Berlin (West)	150,000	50,000	33
Hamburg	200,000	20,000	10
Bremen	100,000	10,000	10
Saar	*	*	
Totals	8,950,000	1,520,000	17

Sources: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 51; *MID*, June 6, 1959; information received from State Statistical Offices and BdV.

* Numbers are relatively insignificant.

The effectiveness of the expellee movement also depends on its financial resources. In the main, these come from dues, voluntary contributions, and government subsidies. Other sources of revenue are admission fees, collections, and profitable sales of commemorative emblems at large expellee gatherings, as well as returns from expellee newspapers, periodicals, and books published by the Homeland Provincial Societies.

On the basis of information received at different levels within the Homeland Provincial Societies and the Federation, it can be estimated

that the current annual receipts from dues, private contributions, surplus returns from meetings, and the expellee press and other sources total roughly 14 million marks. This amount merely covers current operating expenditures. Most of the receipts from membership dues (about 80 percent) are used to cover expenditures at local and county levels of the *Landsmannschaften*. The remainder are made available to national headquarters, and a very small portion of them – perhaps not more than a few percent – goes to the *BdV* national and land offices. The major share of these receipts (an estimated 70 percent) is applied to personnel costs, the rest to office rents, utilities and similar expenditures. In 1960, the *BdV* confirms, a total of nearly 400 full-time employees worked in the Federation's headquarters, its eleven state offices, and the national *Landsmannschaften* offices. On the state and county levels the *Landsmannschaften* employed an additional 550 persons, some 300 in state offices and 250 either full- or part-time in county offices. No evidence of paid employees on the local level exists. Since there are over 10,000 County and Local Groups (*Kreis- und Ortsverbände*), a very large share of the movement's work on the lower level must be done by volunteers.⁸⁹

The nature of the political propaganda, cultural material, and research work produced by the expellee movement and the staff of specialists required for this purpose are such that costs could not possibly be financed by what small amounts from dues and other private receipts may remain uncommitted. It is therefore estimated that the Federal Government in Bonn and different state and local governments throughout West Germany have been regularly contributing millions of marks to the expellee movement. These contributions are made through different federal and state ministries as well as through county and local governments. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that many expellee cultural and academic associations, with relatively small receipts from membership dues and contributions, partially, if not fully, enjoy the support of the government. The *BdV* national headquarters, which, to be self-supporting,

⁸⁹ Nearly 200 paid employees and a much larger number of honorary workers are active in the expellee cultural and academic affiliates described above. In all, the total number of paid employees (including executives) within the entire movement (including vocational interest groups) was estimated at 1,200 to 1,300 in 1960. Recent interviews indicate that the number of paid staff has increased slightly on the national and federal levels of the Homeland Provincial Societies.

would have to absorb a substantial share of the receipts from its federated and incorporated member organizations, is generally assumed to derive what additional funds it requires from public sources. Government subsidies also benefit the movement, going towards the financing of specific political or cultural projects, such as the Schieder documentation of the expulsions and the Lemberg symposium on integration, both cited earlier in this study. Specific data on government support – rarely published and incomplete – will be given later in discussing governmental reaction to expellee aspirations.

2. Expellee Press and Reunions

Expellee newspapers and reunions have been mentioned earlier as possible sources of additional income for the Federation of Expellees. Like the expellee organizations themselves, they have considerable tradition behind them. The principal activities of the Homeland Provincial Societies on the Federal state, county and local levels have consisted in advising member and non-member expellees of their rights and acting as liaisons between them and local welfare associations, churches, and government agencies; representing expellee interest in general before local, county, and state governments; and arranging social, cultural, and political meetings. The latter are still of special importance in the Homeland Provincial Societies, because, it must be remembered, the desire to be together has been the primary motive force behind expellee efforts to organize, and as the problem of material needs has gradually been resolved, cultural and political aspirations have inevitably come to the fore.

In a large town or county seat hardly a week would pass without a gathering of some sort by the local group of East Germans. These meetings ranged from very small, informal social gatherings, open to members, dependents, and friends, to more formal, closed sessions bringing together a select group of expellees to discuss organizational or business matters. On the national level, reunions have been held at which the participants have numbered anywhere from a few thousand to 400,000 and more, depending upon the size of the particular Homeland Provincial Society involved and the location chosen for the meeting. National reunions or conventions usually take place once a year, on Pentecost Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, in different places all over West Germany. Especially in the early years of the

movement, they offered opportunities for finding relatives or coming across old friends and neighbors. They also provided suitable occasions for the dedication of monuments to East Germans, for reminding the public of the need for reunification, for exhibiting the colorful aspects of East German culture (homeland songs, costumes, dances, and plays), for presenting decorations and honors to youths and letting them build bonfires and parade with lighted torches. At the same time they have invariably served as effective forums for local, state, and federal politicians. In these ways the annual national reunions have come to be a convenient method of communication within the *Landsmannschaften*.

Before the two large expellee federations, the *VdL* and the *ZvD* (*BvD*), merged, the latter infrequently organized a different type of reunion, gathering members together for protest marches on Bonn. Usually, these were undertaken to urge materially for the East Germans or to hasten consideration of pending remedial legislation. This type of reunion was nevertheless a relatively rare phenomenon. Kather speaks of three "silent marches" to Bonn between 1952 and 1956, the purpose of which was to secure assurances from the government of a more equitable, faster-working equalization of burdens program. He states that over sixty thousand expellees "filled the Bonn Market Square" each time.⁹⁰ Another type of gathering, purely political, brought groups of expellees or active sympathizers together with other West Germans to welcome the head of a foreign state or an equally important personality from abroad. For example, in 1959, when Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of the United States, visited the Federal Republic, the expellees in a cheering crowd of people greeted him with large posters blazoning the names of the lost Oder-Neisse areas which they wanted restored to Germany.⁹¹

Particularly in the mid-fifties, when attendance was probably highest, the annual reunions and conventions have meant financial as well as physical inconvenience for participants, since as the *BdV* asserts, they do not receive any expense money for the trip. On the contrary, as said before, admission fees are charged, and programs,

⁹⁰ Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 154-158. The author implies that this attendance does not compare "with the (larger) annual conventions of the Homeland Provincial Societies."

⁹¹ For a photograph of that occasion see *Der Spiegel*, September 2, 1959, p. 17.

pictures, emblems, and other mementos are sold to help finance costs. If these are low — for example, because of a minimal rental fee for the convention hall — the organization may stand to gain a windfall. The Federation estimates that almost 680,000 persons trekked to national conventions (sometimes called *Deutschlandtreffen*) in 1962 and that they spent a total of thirty million marks for their travel, room and board, and attendance at the meetings.⁹²

A reasonable estimate of annual attendance at national conventions of expellees in the period from 1953 through 1955 is over one million persons each year.⁹³ Probably, these large meetings are attended primarily by expellees, the number of West German visitors being relatively small. This is not necessarily true in the case of smaller meetings at state and local levels. The trend towards increased participation continued until the middle of 1950, when it reversed itself, appearing again only after 1958. Considering that attendance at reunions is voluntary and often costly to the individual, in some cases the number of participants is indeed impressive and has perhaps been unequalled at any other mass meetings in West Germany with the exception of one or two church conventions and May Day gatherings in West Berlin.⁹⁴ Still, these mass reunions are less a part of the East German tradition than the smaller weekly, monthly, or quarterly local gatherings: the evening table talks, the Sunday afternoon beer garden picnics, the local youth group's or women's meetings, the social dances, and the group hikes or bicycle rides. These are the ways in which the Germans from the East enjoyed themselves "back home," and these are some of the folkways they have sought to perpetuate.

As with the reunions, the traditions and experience behind East German newspapers go back some distance in time. Karl O. Kurth of the Göttingen Circle of East German scholars, reports that in the thirties over one thousand daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers and

⁹² According to information from the *BdV*.

⁹³ Estimates of aggregate attendance at the largest or otherwise most important gatherings from 1950 to 1962 are given in Figure 12.

⁹⁴ One of the largest reunions was the Sudeten German National Convention (*Sudetendeutscher Tag*) in June 1955. On June 4, 1955, *Der Sudetendeutsche*, a *Landsmannschaft* newspaper published in Munich, printed an impressive photograph of the meeting which took place in Nuremberg on the Zeppelin Field — the earlier site of Nazi Party National Conventions. The Sudeten Germans claimed an attendance of 600,000 persons.

FIGURE 12. *Estimated Attendance at Expellee Conventions*
(Annual Participation by Origin and Percentages of Expellee Population)

	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1959	1962
<i>Reich Germans</i>							
East Prussians	—	—	—	—	—	14,000	—
West Prussians *	—	—	—	—	30,000	—	15,000
Pomeranians	—	7,000	150,000	—	60,000	7,000	100,000
East Brandenburgers	—	—	25,000	—	—	—	—
Silesians	150,000	300,000	230,000	100,000	—	300,000	—
Upper Silesians	—	30,000	200,000	70,000	120,000	—	130,000
<i>Sudeten Germans</i>	30,000	—	500,000	—	200,000	290,000 **	400,000
Subtotals	180,000	337,000	1,105,000	170,000	410,000	611,000	645,000
Estimated Total Attendance	250,000	600,000	1,250,000	800,000	550,000	690,000	740,000
Percentage of Expellees †	4.8	11.2	22.3	13.4	8.9	10.7	12.3

* Including ethnic Germans from Poland.

** Excluding residents of Austria.

† Age 18 to 70.

Sources: HICOG and US Embassy Reports; West German, expellee, and Swiss newspapers; Habel Archives, *op. cit.*; correspondence with *Landsmanschaften*.

periodicals were being published in the German provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse line, in the Sudeten area, Slovakia, and other East European countries.⁹⁵ Press coverage in the provinces did not differ much at the time from that in the central and western parts of Germany, but the newspapers, journals, and circulars of the ethnic Germans outside Germany proper were traditionally a means of expressing their particularity in the midst of foreign influences. In fact, all these publications were in a sense the individual voices of different groups in different homeland areas. Some of them, such as the handwritten *Geschriebene Zeitungen* in Danzig, date back to the sixteenth century; others, such as the *Neue Zeitungen (sic)* in Prague, to the seventeenth century. The ethnic German daily newspaper *Rigasche Zeitung*, which served Germans in the Baltic, had its origins in the eighteenth century. Most of the important German language newspapers, magazines, and periodicals originated, however, in the nineteenth century. In the Sudeten area, until the middle of the nineteenth century, twice as many newspapers were published in German as in Czech. By 1880, about 200 newspapers in each language were published, and just before and during World War I twice as many (about 1,200) were published in Czech as in German.⁹⁶ Similarly, in Southeast Europe influential news organs were traditionally maintained, especially by the Danube Swabians and the Transylvanian Saxons. Typical examples of German language newspapers serving a dynamic ethnic revival movement are those published in Transylvania on the initiative of Fritz Fabrizius.⁹⁷ In Russia, German language press coverage existed until 1917.⁹⁸ Thereafter all foreign language publications came under the direct control of communist authorities and the Soviet censorship apparatus.

Post-World War II revival in West Germany of the East and ethnic German press parallels that of expellee organizations. Frustrated by

⁹⁵ Kurth, *op. cit.*; see also, by the same author, *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Presse ausserhalb Deutschlands* (Würzburg, 1956), and an article, "Die deutschsprachige Presse in Osteuropa," *HvP*, January 26, 1956. Of a total of 1,077 newspapers known to have appeared before 1940, two-thirds were Reich and the rest ethnic German.

⁹⁶ Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse der Heimatvertriebenen*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁹⁷ These include the *Selbsthilfe*, first published 1922, the *Kampfblatt*, and the *Deutsches Bürger- und Bauernblatt*; see Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse*, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁹⁸ The *St. Petersburger Zeitung* and several other newspapers printed in Odessa which date back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively.

prohibitions of occupation authorities against expellee political organization and subjected to military government, licensing of newspapers developed slowly. Since the expulsions, the publications of East Germans have never matched their forerunners either in terms of circulation and frequency of issues or in terms of the number of them being printed.

As early as 1945, displaced East German pastors and priests who were founding church groups and wished to reach as many of their old parishioners as possible distributed mimeographed sheets and even handwritten letters among the expellees. Later, scattered cultural groups of East Germans – not actually recognizable as such – obtained licenses for small circulars. An expellee press news service, the *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen*, first appeared in 1947 in Göttingen. Then publication of monthly church bulletins – largely Protestant – started. Larger, regional (i.e., not associated with a particular homeland province) Catholic newspapers sprung up at the same time. In 1949, after abolition of the ban on formation of expellee political organizations, expellee newspapers and periodicals in general rapidly proliferated and the size of their circulation and frequency of publication increased.

No daily publications yet exist as part of the expellee press. The large newspapers are mostly weeklies or bi-weeklies. Many expellee publications are also issued monthly, bi-monthly, and quarterly either in the name of a particular *Landsmannschaft* or of some related association. Others are “independent,” that is, not tied to any particular homeland province or organization. Expellee publications fall into four categories: general interest newspapers having relatively wide circulation and mostly constituting official press organs of the different *Landsmannschaften*; religious newspapers usually issued in the name of homeland church groups; small homeland news letters or circulars (*Heimathriebe* or *Heimathlättter*) containing items of limited, local significance; and information bulletins such as the *Deutscher Ostdienst* issued by the expellee federation in Bonn. A few special newspapers exist for youth as well as a number of illustrated journals. Finally, a handful of more sophisticated periodicals are published by church, cultural, and academic groups to reach a more select, intellectual circle among expellees and non-expellees in West Germany.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ These include the *Ostbrief* of the East German Academy in Lüneburg; the

Except for recently discontinued expellee party publications and those of religious groups, most expellee newspapers still claim to be non-partisan and dissociated from particular religious interests. Among so-called independent newspapers, *Der Neue Weg* (Frankfort) and *Die Brücke* (Munich) appeal primarily to Social Democrats. The *Volksbote* (Munich) is closer to the point of view represented by the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU). In some cases government agencies have taken over or introduced periodicals. *Der Wegweiser*, published bi-weekly by the State Government of North-Rhine Westphalia in Düsseldorf, is an example. *Der Fachberater für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte*, published by the Federal Expellee Ministry in Bonn, is another. Some expellee newspapers, periodicals, and bulletins are printed in foreign languages. The English language *Sudeten Bulletin*, published in Munich since 1952 by the Sudeten German Council, is an example.¹⁰⁰ Others are issued abroad. Nearly a dozen East German newspapers appear in Austria, for instance.

It has been said that there are as many expellee newspapers, circul-
lars, bulletins and periodicals as there are days in the year. Estimates
for the ten-year period between 1950 and 1960 range from 280 to
350.¹⁰¹ From the beginning expellee newspapers associated with the
Homeland Provincial Societies were the most numerous. Their total
number was somewhat over 200,¹⁰² as compared with some 50

Protestant bi-monthly *Der Remter*, published in Hanover; and the Catholic periodical *Der neue Ackermann*, published by the Ackermann Congregation in Munich.

¹⁰⁰ This Bulletin has been renamed recently *Central Europe Journal*.

¹⁰¹ The most detailed information is to be found in Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse der Heimatvertriebenen*, *op. cit.* His report to the Lemberg symposium shows that the number of expellee newspapers grew from 333 in 1953 to 348 in 1957; see his "Presse, Film und Rundfunk," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-434. Smaller studies, such as by Isoide Stangel "Die Presse der Vertriebenen," *Der neue Ackermann* (Munich), June 1955, pp. 17-24, and Peter Loviscach, "Die Presse der Heimatvertriebenen," *Publizistik* (Bremen), ed. by the Deutsche Gesellschaft Publizistik, March-April 1961, pp. 95-106, are also worth consulting. *Deutscher Ostdienst* (Bonn: the official organ of the BdV, hereafter referred to as *DOD*) of June 5, 1961, p. 2, asserts that over 360 expellee newspapers and periodicals are in existence. For a more recent inventory of 199 expellee newspapers see *Gesellschaft für wirtschaftspolitische Beratung, Dr. Brillinger, Bericht über die Bestandsaufnahme der Vertriebenenpresse in der Bundesrepublik* (Bonn: mimeographed, October 25, 1966).

¹⁰² See Table II.

newspapers considered to be independent.¹⁰³ In terms of numbers of organs, most, that is over 60 percent of the Homeland Provincial newspapers, are small monthly homeland local news letters or circul-lars. At times some of these have possessed incredibly sentimental names such as The Memel Steamboat (*Memeler Dampfboot*), a news-letter that appeared in Oldenburg; The Old Homeland Cow Pastures (*Alte Heimat Kuhländchen*), a small Sudeten German newsletter published monthly since 1947 in Munich; and *Wu die Wälder ham-lich rauschen*, an even smaller homeland letter (Heimatbrief) ad-dressed to a few hundred ethnic Germans from a montainous region in Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁴ Homeland Echo, Homeland Call, Homeland Sound, and Homeland Messenger are other typical names of these newsletters, which make up more than half of the *Landsmannschaften* press.

Consideration of numbers of expellee newspapers alone is how-ever, misleading. Their comparison in terms of total circulation reveals a different emphasis. Estimates of printed circulation vary between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000 copies.¹⁰⁵ For the purposes of the following analysis, the author estimates total circulation (total number of copies printed per single issue) conservatively at about 1,400,000 for 1956-1957 and approximately 1,600,000 for 1958, with the number of issues slowly declining after that.¹⁰⁶ In order to compare conclusively the circulation figures of the different expellee papers it is necessary to take the fact of their varying frequency into account. The author has therefore computed the total number of copies printed per news organ over a one-month period.¹⁰⁷ On the basis of this it appears that although there are fewer (26) weekly or bi-weekly expellee newspapers of the general interest type than there are local

¹⁰³ This includes about a dozen newspapers and bulletins now discontinued, which were published on a West German regional basis by the dissolved *ZvD/BdV*.

¹⁰⁴ The name of this newsletter is expressed in the German dialect of the region. A reasonable translation would be "Where the soft rustle of the forests reminds you of home."

¹⁰⁵ See Kurth, as confirmed in Loviscach, *op. cit.*; and *BdV* estimate in *DOD*, June 5, 1961. For a more recent list see Willy Stamm (ed.), *Leitfaden für Presse und Werbung* (Essen: Stamm, 1965), esp. pp. 164-169.

¹⁰⁶ Brillinger, *op. cit.*, estimates total circulation in 1966 at 1,400,000.

¹⁰⁷ This means that a weekly with a circulation per issue of, say, 50,000 has a total monthly circulation of 4 to 5 times that high depending on the number of weeks in a month; a bi-weekly with the same circulation per issue number has, however, only twice as high a monthly circulation.

newsletters (130), the former are much larger organs and have by far a greater total monthly circulation than the latter, which are also much smaller in size.¹⁰⁸ While the former account for nearly two thirds of total circulation, the latter have only about one fifth. This relationship has changed gradually in favor of the larger *Landsmannschaft* newspapers, which appear less sensitive to economic strains recently apparent in the expellee press.¹⁰⁹

Table III lists the most important press organs of the Homeland Provincial Societies and compares their printed circulation between 1953 and 1965. It shows that East Prussian and Silesian newspapers increased in circulation till 1958 and have since then declined. The West Prussian and Pomeranian newspapers steadily increased till 1965. It is also notable that two large newspapers, one Silesian and one Sudeten German, stopped publishing in the names of their respective *Landsmannschaften*. They were recently reported to have been taken over by the extreme right radical West German weekly *Deutsche National Zeitung und Soldatenzeitung* (German National and Soldiers News), which is published by Gerhard Frey in Munich.¹¹⁰ Defense of expellee homeland provincial interests and claims by non-expellee right radical groups and press organs is a significant, new phenomenon in West Germany to be dealt with separately when discussing the reactions of radical organizations.

The most important newspapers of other expellee organizations were the *Wegweiser für Heimatvertriebene*, formerly issued by the now dissolved *ZvD/BvD*, and such independent organs as *Ost-West Kurier* (Bremen and Frankfort), and *Ostdeutsche Zeitung* (Hamburg). By 1954 they had reached a total monthly printed circulation of approximately 1,300,000, bringing at that time aggregate circulation of important expellee newspapers to over 2,500,000 per

¹⁰⁸ There are still 83 different *Heimatbriefe* in circulation for the Sudeten Germans alone. See Ackermann Gemeinde (ed.), *Die Sudetendeutschen Heimatbriefe* (Munich: Ackermann, 1966).

¹⁰⁹ This may not be true of homeland religious newsletters and periodicals, which usually appear in the name of a church Committee-in-Aid or given *Landsmannschaft*. The number printed has declined, but total circulation has increased. Carl Brummack (ed.), *Die Unverlierbarkeit evangelischen Kirchentums aus dem Osten* (Ulm: Unser Weg, 1964), pp. 117-121. Analysis based on Kurth's figures, material obtained at the *VdL*, *BdV* and the Göttingen Circle, and own computations.

¹¹⁰ Information received from the Federal German Ministry of the Interior; see also *MID*, January 5, 1963.

month.¹¹¹ Circulation of independent and regional newspapers subsequently declined by about one third, but this was not true of homeland press organs; by 1965 aggregate monthly printed circulation of all independent, regional and homeland provincial newspapers amounted to nearly 3 million.¹¹² In fact the overall development tended to favor the homeland press. The organ appearing most frequently and enjoying the largest circulation was and still is the weekly general interest type *Landsmannschaft* newspaper. This process paralleled the trend towards more concentration and closer coordination of the Homeland Provincial Movement.

3. *Cultural Relations and Contacts Abroad*

On the national level coordination of cultural activities, both inside and outside West Germany, gained special importance. Special mention will be made here of expellee relations with three independent, private institutions, because they illustrate the variety of uses to which academic tools can be put and their utility, whether or not so intended, to the expellee elite. The institutes are each of a different type and engage in different fields of research. The first organization, the *Osteuropa Institut* (East European Institute), was founded in Munich in 1952, presumably with a grant from the Bavarian state government. The late Hans Koch, a specialist in East European history, was its founder and first director. After 1945 Koch was, as said earlier, a speaker and adviser in the expellee movement and, eventually, became a key adviser to the Bonn government on foreign policy matters. In setting up the *Osteuropa Institut* in Munich he was seeking to revive interest in East European studies, especially in history and the humanities, disciplines that were traditionally important at the German universities of Königsberg and Breslau. Apparently, he succeeded in this task. The *Osteuropa Institut* has grown steadily and established many national and inter-

¹¹¹ Sources as listed under Table III.

¹¹² Stamm, *loc. cit.* Cf. Brillinger, *op. cit.*, whose inventory, based on questionnaires answered by expellee newspaper publishers, reports an actual total circulation (irrespective of publication intervals) of over 1 million. This represents a computed monthly total circulation of approximately 2 million which does, however, not account for the newspapers whose publishers have not received or have not answered his questionnaires.

national academic ties. Its library and its publications, especially on Russia, are of note.¹¹³ Use of these facilities is recommended by the *BdV*.¹¹⁴

The second organization, the *Institut für ostdeutsche Volkskunde* (Institute for the Study of East German Folklore), in Freiburg grew out of the Central Office for Study of Expellee Folklore, established in 1950 and headed by Johannes Künzing, a scholar and specialist on German folkways. This institute is engaged in a unique effort to reconstruct on tape, film, and other modern recording media the traditional art, songs, and literature of the different East German and ethnic German groups uprooted from their native soil. The Institute claims – and many expellee leaders believe – that “reliable judgment of new trends is possible only where one is well familiar with the substance and manifestations of earlier forms of human existence” and that it is therefore important “to harvest the treasures of traditional folklore” for the benefit of all Germans.¹¹⁵ In other words, those East German settlers farthest removed from the mother country have preserved and re-imported, as it were, folklore that has long since been forgotten and lost in Germany proper.¹¹⁶ The thinking is that the minority group whose folklore has withstood generations of foreign influence offers a proven way of coexistence abroad and that study of the traditions and customs involved might constitute a timely, though apolitical, contribution to “finding a new concept of living together with eastern neighbors.”¹¹⁷ The Institute’s library and archives consist of tapes with folk music and fairy tales in the dialects of the homeland provinces, as well as slides and films of native costumes, dances, and scenes of life as it was.

The third organization, the Göttingen Circle of East German

¹¹³ Hacker, *op. cit.*; the Institute is now headed by Professor Hans Raupach, a native of Prague who was educated in Breslau and Berlin, taught at the universities of Halle, Brunswick and Wilhelmshaven and is now at the University of Munich.

¹¹⁴ See *BdV, Material and Personal Katalog, op. cit.*, p. 189.

¹¹⁵ Johannes Künzig, “Volkskunde der Ostdeutschen,” *Schlesien*, quarterly of the Silesian Cultural Association (Neumarkt), Vol. IV, 1956.

¹¹⁶ This peculiar emphasis on keeping alive or giving new life to archaic folklore is also found in some German homeland groups outside Germany, especially in the United States and elsewhere. Figures of speech, poems, and songs often recall nineteenth century or earlier German social life.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*; also *Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen* (Salzburg: Müller), Vol. II, 1956, pp. 169–174.

Scholars, briefly called the Göttingen Circle (*Göttinger Arbeitskreis*), is the oldest and most important. It is devoted exclusively to research and publications with the avowed aim of supporting and lending academic depth to expellee claims for resurrection of a unified Germany within the 1937 boundaries and on the basis of the right to self-determination and "to the homeland" (*Heimatrecht*). The Circle's library, archives, and especially its collection of expellee newspapers and periodicals are impressive. The caliber of some of its scholars, such as Herbert Kraus, Karl O. Kurth, and Herbert Marzian, has been noted. Others, such as the late Professors Hans Fritz and Valentin Müller, were formerly associated with the German universities at Königsberg, Breslau, and Prague. Interestingly enough, the Circle emerged after Western Allied authorities had requested expert German help for a background study needed in connection with the 1947 Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and dealing with the economic importance of East Prussia for Germany.¹¹⁸ Since then the volume of academic and quasi-academic publications issued by the organization has steadily grown, and its Expellee Press Service in several languages has found wide distribution and use in West Germany and abroad and has had considerable influence on the contents of the homeland provincial press.¹¹⁹

Connections abroad, with both German and non-German expellee, refugee, and emigre organizations, and contacts with persons in foreign governments have been matters of considerable interest to the Federation as well as to individual *Landsmannschaften*. For obvious reasons, efforts to make such contacts have been primarily concentrated on Austria, where a similar German political expellee movement exists, and on the United States, whose support *vis-à-vis*

¹¹⁸ Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis, "Fünf Jahre Arbeit für den deutschen Osten," *Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg/Preussen 1952* (Göttingen), Annual, Vol. II.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*; also "Tätigkeitsbericht 1956-57," *ibid.*, Vol. VIII and *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (the information service of the Bonn Federal Government, hereafter referred to as *Bulletin*), May 3, 1960, p. 803; April 29, 1961, p. 780; and May 5, 1962, p. 704. The Circle's Weekly Press Service for West Germany includes the *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen (HvP)*, *op. cit.*, and the *Archiv-Informationsdienst des Göttinger Arbeitskreises* (hereafter called *Archiv*); it is one of the sources of information for *Landsmannschaft* organs. See also the English language edition, *Expellee Press Service* (hereafter called *EPS*), and the Spanish *Noticias APG*, issued through Agencia Periodistica Garza in Buenos Aires Province.

the Communist East is thought to be indispensable. Connections have existed for some time with Homeland Provincial Societies of East German expellees in Austria. It was therefore to be expected that expellees from areas contiguous to Austria would be particularly active in establishing links. Groups of Sudeten Germans as well as Germans from Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Soviet Russia arriving in Austria numbered about 330,000 by 1953.¹²⁰ As in West Germany, expellee Homeland Provincial Societies and similar organizations evolved. The Association for Sudeten German Action (*Sudetendeutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft* or *SAG*), the Association for Danube Swabian Action (*Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft* or *DAG*), and the Homeland Provincial Societies of Transylvanian Saxons and Slovakian Germans are examples. Also, a number of Central Advisory Offices for Ethnic Germans (*Zentralberatungsstellen der Volksdeutschen*) were set up. Some still exist in different Austrian provinces.¹²¹ Eventually, other homeland groups organized themselves locally, especially among the Sudeten Germans and Danube Swabians. In 1960 the federative type of organization known as Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society in Austria (*Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft in Österreich*) tied these local groups together.¹²² Apparently, contacts continue between the Sudeten German leaders in Austria and those in West Germany. In 1959 the annual national convention of Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Societies in West Germany took place in Vienna. Since it was attended by nearly 300,000 expellees, the event aroused much international critical comment, particularly on the part of the Soviet Union.¹²³

Also, close contacts seem to obtain between the Danube Swabian Homeland Provincial Societies in Munich and Stuttgart and similar

¹²⁰ Tony Radspieler, *The Ethnic German Refugee in Austria: 1945-1954* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), see especially pp. 35 and 45. Together with German-speaking refugees from the Southern Tyrol (about 35,000), ethnic Germans represent about five percent of the total population of Austria.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 165 ff. These offices apparently coordinated the welfare and advisory activities of the Homeland Provincial Societies in their regions and acted as liaisons between the ethnic Germans and the appropriate government offices to which they were to appeal for support.

¹²² *Archiv*, June 9, 1960, p. 4.

¹²³ The Soviets claimed that the meeting had violated the neutrality which derives from the 1955 Austro-Russian State Treaty.

groups in Austria, notably in Vienna, Linz, and Salzburg.¹²⁴ As early as 1948 the Danube Swabians began to publish a weekly in Salzburg called *Neuland*, which is one of the influential newspapers in the East German Homeland Provincial Press abroad (cf. Table III).

The Danube Swabians are known to have been active in organizations in the United States and in Argentina. Among ethnic Germans who emigrated to the United States from West Germany and Austria were about 50,000 Germans from the central Danube area. In addition to American Catholic and Protestant welfare associations, such organizations as the Steuben Society and the United Friends of the Needy and Displaced People of Yugoslavia offered them assistance. A German-American, Peter M. Wagner, who became President of the Society of Danube Swabians in Chicago, Illinois, has been lauded by Danube Swabians in Württemberg for this initiative in helping poor ethnic German immigrants in the United States as well as expellees in West Germany.¹²⁵

Aside from steps taken in favor of ethnic Germans from the Danube, the *VdL* and some other *Landsmannschaften* wished to set up permanent offices for lobbying in Washington, D.C.¹²⁶ Although this project seems to have fallen through, occasional visits of expellee leaders¹²⁷ and other Germans (sometimes members of the

¹²⁴ See the circular of the *Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben aus Rumänien*, *Banater Heimatblätter* (Munich), 1952, 1. Folge, p. 6.

¹²⁵ *Landsmannschaft der Donauschwaben*, *Festschrift zum Tag Donauschwaben in Ulm: 5. bis 10. August 1958* (Ulm, 1958), p. 10; and *Mitteilungen für die Deutschen aus dem Donauraum* (Karlsruhe), September 15, 1958. Unlike the Danube Swabians in the United States who were primarily active for welfare reasons, the groups in Argentina, especially in or near Buenos Aires, seem to have gathered for social reasons only. These include associations of Swabians, Batschka Germans, and Transylvanian Saxons and the Argentinian Cultural Association of Danube Swabians. *Banater Heimatblätter* (Munich), Sequence 1, 1952. According to the Federal German Embassy in Buenos Aires, Homeland Provincial Societies of Sudeten Germans, Pomeranians, and Germans from Mecklenburg also exist in Buenos Aires Province.

¹²⁶ A *VdL* foreign office (*Aussenstelle*) was intended to "represent homeland political interests." See *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, No. 43, 1955. According to information from the *VdL*, Richard Sallet, a retired German Foreign Service Official remained in Washington, D.C., in 1955 as an envoy of the East Prussian Homeland Provincial Society.

¹²⁷ Wilhelm Turnwald, a Sudeten German scholar left for Washington, D.C. to help prepare an "expellee foreign representation," *Bulletin*, December 14, 1955.

West German Federal Government) have, as will be explained in discussing further reactions to the expellee movement in the United States, made some inroads and won some friends for the expellee cause not only among German-Americans¹²⁸ but also among influential Americans in the government and Congress.¹²⁹

Contacts with foreign governments, international organizations, and leaders in exile from states or former states behind the Iron Curtain have also been attempted by expellee leaders, but by and large these endeavors have not been fruitful since they often seem merely to aggravate already existing conflicts. Little chance of understanding existed, for example, between the expellee elite and Polish leaders exiled in London. The enduring years of tensions between them need not be described in connection with this study. An exception to this pattern was a political working accord of sorts reached in 1950 in Wiesbaden, the capital of Hesse, between Sudeten Germans and Lev Prchala, a former Czech General who was at this time head of the Czech National Commission in Exile. This accord will subsequently be described in detail along with the specific political program of the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft*. It is mentioned at this point as an illustration of the attempt to expand the expellee influence to areas and persons outside the Federal Republic and of the elite's social imagination and flexibility, frequently evident in associations of this kind.

In spite of occasional political advantage made possible because of highly placed friends in the United States or co-sympathizers among non-German exiles in Europe, the progress of a movement such as that of the East German expellees would clearly have to derive from home. As shown, the domestic organizational set-up had matured by 1960. A substantial following had been gained and a comprehensive expellee newspaper and periodical press had achieved a large circulation. Cultural, religious, and academic coordination existed on different organizational levels. One other important aspect typical of this interest group remains to be explored before examining

¹²⁸ Such as the late president of the Chicago Catholic Kolping Organization, Father Emmanuel J. Reichenberger an American of East German origin who published prolific condemnations of the expulsions, or Austin J. App, professor, at the time, of LaSalle College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who made similar publications.

¹²⁹ Such as the late House Representative from Tennessee, B. Carroll Reece, and others, to be discussed below.

in greater detail the political designs of the expellee movement – that is, the integration of its elite into the nation's public life.

4. *Expellees in Public Life*

The influence that East Germans and in particular the expellee leaders have gained in the government, in the schools, and in the churches of West Germany will be dealt with in that order.

(a) *Expellees in Government and Politics.* From the beginning the government geared its organization on all levels to the existing economic and social needs of the expellees and refugees; on the federal level, also to their political aspirations. As indicated earlier, special expellee or refugee advisory boards, administrative departments, and even ministries for expellee affairs came into being on the state and on the federal government level. In addition a Ministry for All-German Questions was established in Bonn. This organization still devotes itself to working on economic and political plans for future integration with the German Democratic Republic in the event of its merger with the Federal Republic. These and other government agencies and offices concerned with expellee and refugee affairs were the first employers of East Germans as civil servants. As pointed out (see Figure 5), integration of expellees into government service has been favorable for East Germans, but it can reasonably be assumed that the percentage rates of integration into these special expellee offices are even more favorable than elsewhere in the civil service.

In general, the West German Federal Government is constitutionally bound to employ civil servants "in due proportions from all Federal States."¹³⁰ This applies especially to top federal departments and offices. But it is also under another special obligation: to integrate into government service expellees and refugees who held German civil service positions before the expulsions.¹³¹ As a result, as early as 1952 about twenty out of every hundred civil servants on the federal and state levels were expellees.¹³² By 1959 the situation had consider-

¹³⁰ This obligation is pursuant to Article 36 of the West German Federal Constitution (Basic Law).

¹³¹ This obligation arose in connection with Article 131 of the German Basic Law.

¹³² On the county level, the proportion was 13 to 100. The term civil servant as used here includes both government civil servants (*Beamte*) and public service employees (*öffentliche Angestellte*).

ably improved in the federal civil service. Over twenty out of every hundred civil servants (*Beamte*) in so-called High Federal Employment (*Obere Bundesbehörden*) were expellees; in so-called Highest Federal Employment (*Oberste Bundesbehörden*), twenty-seven out of every hundred.¹³³ If civil servants who are refugees from the communist part of Germany are included, these figures jump to twenty-five and thirty-five respectively. Highest Federal Employment means employment in the Bonn Ministries or equivalent governmental departments. Comparable data available on expellees and refugees in the West German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) reveal an even more favorable ratio. In 1958 twenty-seven out of every hundred volunteers that make up the larger share of military personnel, including officers, were expellees (25%) or refugees (2%).¹³⁴ Recently, however, over three-fourths (*sic*) of all professional officers were reported as having been born outside West Germany. It is assumed that these include mostly East Germans and Germans born in the territory of the Communist German Democratic Republic.¹³⁵

The mere presence of a relatively large number of expellees and Soviet Zone refugees in the Federal Government¹³⁶ of course does not prove that East German influence is exercised by these persons in the sense of or in accordance with the aims of the expellee movement. But while it focuses primarily on expellee integration into government civil service, it also suggests that considerable chances exist for expellee leaders to be placed in key government positions. That this is actually the case was pointed out above where names of expellee leaders in high government or party positions were noted. Some are still members of the Lower House of the Federal German Legislature (*Bundestag*) as well.

Election of expellees to federal and state legislature is therefore of interest. In the *Bundestag* expellees and refugees from the Soviet

¹³³ See "Landsmannschaftliche Herkunft der Bundesbeamten," in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September 1961, pp. 523-525; see also Figures 5 and 6.

¹³⁴ Correspondence with Federal Defense Ministry in 1958.

¹³⁵ SZ, August 26, 1966, p. 5. The author inquired of the Bonn government whether this unusually high ratio (76%) of non-indigenous officers is correct and to what extent it applies to expellees. He has received no reply.

¹³⁶ Among over 12,000 federal civil servants, there were nearly 3,000 expellees and nearly 700 refugees. See *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, September 1961, *op. cit.*

FIGURE 13. *East German Expellees and Soviet Zone Refugees in the Bundestag*
(By Election Year, Party and Origin. In Numbers and Percentages)

	Federal Election Year				
	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965
Expellee and Refugee Party Mandates:					
CDU	15	25	25	21	36
FDP	13	11	9	13	7
SPD	33	31	28	28	38
BHE	—	24	—	—	—
Other	16	3	4	—	—
Total, All Parties .	77	94	66	62	81
Thereof:					
Reich Germans	44	49	34	36	23
Ethnic Germans*	17	25	19	13	25
Soviet Zone Refugees .	16	20**	13	13	33
Total Expellees and Refugees . .	77	94	66	62	81
Total Mandates***.	421	509	519	521	518
Percentage of Expellees and Refugees	18	18	13	12	16

* Includes Sudeten Germans.

** Includes one expellee from Alsace-Lorraine.

*** Includes non-voting members from West Berlin.

Sources: *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages*, *op. cit.*; *MID*, September 30, 1961 and September 25, 1965; Information from the *BdV*.

Zone have always succeeded in securing mandates although in changing proportion to their total numbers. The total number of expellee members in the *Bundestag* has steadily declined but that of Soviet Zone refugees among them has increased as Figure 13 shows. Noteworthy also is the relatively high share of ethnic German *Bundestag* members, most of whom are Sudeten German expellees.

The relative number of East German expellees and refugees in the different state legislatures is not as high, though in places it is increasing. By 1958 expellees and refugees held 131 or less than ten percent of 1,343 possible mandates in the eleven state diets. Of these, only twelve were held by Soviet Zone refugees. By 1961 the overall number of mandates held increased to 172 or about thirteen percent

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FIGURE 14. *East German Expellees and Soviet Zone Refugees as Members of Selected West German State Diets*
(By Election Years and States. In Numbers and Percentages)

State	1946-1949		1954-1958		After 1961	
	Total Mandates	Expellees and Refugees	Total Mandates	Expellees and Refugees	Total Mandates	Expellees and Refugees
Schleswig-Holstein	70	18	69	18	69	26
Lower Saxony	149	9	157	19	149	32
North-Rhine Westphalia	208	8	200	10	200	14*
Bavaria	180	5	204	34	204	36
Total	607	40	630	81	622	108
Thereof in Parties:						
CDU	12		11			28
FDP		5		5		12
SPD	11		27		36	35
BHE		—	36		2	33**
Other	12		7		2	—
Percent Expellees and Refugees				13		17

* Fifth Election

** None after 1962-1963 elections.

Sources: Information received from state diets and the *BdV*.

of the total mandates. In states in which most of the expellee population resides the percentage has been higher and tending to increase. Of the 81 expellee and refugee delegates in the period from 1954 to 1958, only about a third came from the German areas east of the Oder-Neisse line; the remainder were either Sudeten or ethnic Germans from East Europe or else Soviet Zone refugees (see Figure 14).

That the middle-class parties did not gain an appreciable advantage over the Social Democrats until the expellee party (*BHE*) began to decline is of interest. Except for six mandates held until recently by the expellee party in Hesse,¹³⁷ the *BHE* is not represented in other state diets nor on the federal level. After its founding in 1950, the party had its first success in the state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, where it gained more than twenty-three percent of the votes cast, thus becoming the second largest party in the state with the heaviest concentration of expellees.¹³⁸ It scored another success the following year in Lower Saxony, the state with the second heaviest concentration of expellees, capturing at the expense of the middle-class parties about fifteen percent of the votes. In Schleswig-Holstein that year the expellee party coalesced with a middle-class party group, the *CDU-FDP-DP*,¹³⁹ and in Lower-Saxony with the *SPD*.¹⁴⁰ It continued to gain mandates in the following years, again in Northern Germany, as well as in Hesse and South Germany, and it sought wherever possible to participate in the government by coalescing either at the right or at the left. The only time it was represented in the *Bundestag* was when it won twenty-seven mandates in the Second Federal Elections in 1953.¹⁴¹ As its original name suggests (a literal translation would be All-German Block – League of Expellees and Those Deprived of Their Rights), the party appealed primarily to victims of damage caused by the war and the military occupation – this includes expellees and Soviet Zone refugees –

¹³⁷ Cf. *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1965, p. 148. The party lost these mandates in the last state elections; see *SZ*, November 7, 1966.

¹³⁸ Thirty-three percent, see Figure 4.

¹³⁹ Ludwig Bergstätter, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland* (Munich: Olzog, 1952), pp. 291 ff.; Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber & Klaus Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte – Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953* (Berlin: Vahlen, 1957), pp. 183 ff.

¹⁴⁰ Alfred Grosser, *La Démocratie de Bonn 1949–1957* (Paris: Colin, 1958), pp. 111 ff.

¹⁴¹ Of which 24 were expellees or refugees (see Figure 13).

promising to effect for them a just and speedy alleviation of the material and social hardships they had suffered. The party also affirmed the right to self-determination and in substance supported the foreign policy position of most of the other expellee organizations as it is outlined below. Because its program never took concrete shape, because other, larger parties made similar efforts and appeals, and because the economic and social integration of the East Germans steadily progressed, the *BHE* eventually failed. In 1961, attempting to reverse the trend towards its decline, it merged with the German Party or *Deutsche Partei* (DP). Under the new name of All-German Party or *Gesamtdeutsche Partei* (GDP), however, it could not muster enough votes to gain the place in the *Bundestag* which it had lost in 1957.

The party's most prominent expellee leaders, including Kraft (its founder), Oberländer, and Kather, were mentioned earlier. Both Kraft and Oberländer eventually left the *BHE* for the *CDU*; both became Federal Ministers in the Bonn Government. Kather, in turn, left the *CDU* in 1954, by his own admission as a form of protest to the Federal Chancellor that Oberländer had succeeded Lukaschek as Federal Expellee Minister instead of himself.¹⁴²

More need not be said of expellee political activities not on the federal level, since in the following chapters this study will concentrate primarily on expellee influence in foreign affairs. Rather, for this reason, a brief inquiry into the extent of expellee membership on important federal legislative committees in the *Bundestag* is in order.

Figure 15 shows that expellee leaders have been represented on important committees for both external and internal affairs in fairly constant total numbers. Their membership has naturally been heaviest on the Committee on Expellee Affairs, which they have completely dominated since the last federal elections, and on the Committee on Equalization of Burdens (through 1961). Both committees deal primarily with legislation providing for the cultural, social and economic needs of the expellees. Matters bearing on external affairs seem to attract fewer but higher ranking expellee leaders. Their membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been steadily growing. During the second legislative term, for example, the presidents of both top expellee organizations, the Central Association (*ZvD-BvD*) and the Old Homeland Federation (*VdL*), were members

¹⁴² See Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 21-38.

FIGURE 15. *Expellees as Members of Important Standing Legislative Committees in the Bundestag*
(By Electoral Terms, In Numbers)

	External Affairs			Internal Affairs			Since 1965			
	1949-1953	1953-1957	1957	Members	Total	Expellees		Members	Expellees	Refugees
Foreign Affairs	21	1	29	4	31	6	2			
All-German Affairs	21	2	29	6	32	5	4			
Defense*	—	—	29	2	31	1	1			
Total	123	33	162	34	165	33	8			

* In 1953-1957 called Committee on European Security.

** Committee on Social Policy.

Note: Soviet Zone Refugees shown for 1965 only

Source: *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages*, *op. cit.*

of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. During the current term, the late Wenzel Jaksch, Social Democrat, President of the new Homeland Provincial Federation (*BdV*), and former Sudeten German minority leader was one of the Committee's expellee members. Moreover, a special subcommittee on the question of establishing diplomatic relations with East European countries was set up in 1959 in which the late Baron Manteuffel-Szoegé, Jaksch, Hans Krüger and other expellees were members.¹⁴³

As a matter of fact East German members of the Federal and State Parliaments or Administrations are often expellee leaders – in some cases, even heads of political parties.¹⁴⁴ In addition, they sometimes hold important government jobs. Mention has already been made of Waldemar Kraft, who was simultaneously a State Minister and later a Federal German Minister (without portfolio); chairman of the expellee party, which he established; and an active member and, for a time, speaker of the Vistula-Warthe Homeland Provincial Society. Similarly, Hans Krüger, a Pomeranian lawyer, rose quickly to the national level in the Homeland Provincial Movement becoming eventually President of the Federation (*VdL*). At the same time he was a member of the *Bundestag* (CDU). He relinquished the presidency of the *VdL* only in 1963, when he became Federal Expellee Minister.¹⁴⁵ The active Silesian expellee leader Erich Schellhaus was State Minister of expellee affairs in the West German Federal State of Lower-Saxony. Walter Stain, a Sudeten German, became State Labor Minister of Bavaria. Hans Christoph Seebohm, Federal Minister of Transport, was one of the most outspoken expellee leaders. His widespread political activity and place within the government-party hierarchy has already come up in this study. As Speaker for the Sudeten German group, he was elected a member of the *BdV* presidium.¹⁴⁶ Another member of the *BdV* rank and file, Josef

¹⁴³ See A. W. Walcak, "The Conception of *Heimatpolitik* in the Foreign Policy of West Germany," *Polish Western Affairs* (Poznan), ed. by the Institute of (Polish) Western Affairs, Vol. III, No. 1, 1963, pp. 38–79.

¹⁴⁴ The same applies no doubt also to members of the local legislative bodies (*Kreistage* and *Gemeinderäte*) and local administrations; official statistics are, however, lacking.

¹⁴⁵ Like his ministerial colleague Oberländer, Krüger was subsequently alleged to have engaged in Nazi wartime oppression. As a result, he was suspended from federal service in 1964. In both cases the allegations came from communist sources.

¹⁴⁶ *MID*, May 16, 1964. Seebohm died recently.

Stingel, one of the younger Sudeten German leaders, rose within the *CDU* from the county level to chair such important party policy committees as the *CDU* State Association on Oder-Neisse Affairs (*Landesverband Oder-Neisse*) and the *CDU* Social Policy Committee. During his career he held such important outside posts as Vice-President of the Eightieth German Catholic Conference.

Two other cases reveal the many combinations of expellee political activities and party and government or related incumbencies that are possible from the local level up. Walter Becher, an economist from the Sudeten area referred to earlier in connection with the formation of the *Witiko Bund*, joined the *CSU* after the expellee party, in which he had been active, deteriorated. As a *CSU* member, he became a delegate to the Munich County Diet (*Kreistag*). A very active Sudeten German expellee, in addition to the *Witiko Bund*, he had earlier helped to set up the important Sudeten German cultural groups, the *Adalbert Stifter Verband*, as well as the Action Group for Safeguarding Sudeten German Interests, the forerunner of the Sudeten German Council, of which he also became a member. Becher succeeded Seeböhm as Sudeten German Speaker in 1968. Outside the expellee movement Becher was for many years a member of the Bavarian Radio Network Advisory Board (*Bayerischer Rundfunkrat*), the top organ controlling certain German radio personnel and making policy decisions.¹⁴⁷ The second example is Reinhold Rebs. A native of East Prussia and a lawyer in Königsberg during the interwar period, he became active in politics after the expulsion and won a mandate in the Schleswig-Holstein Diet. As a member of the *SPD* he was subsequently elected to the *Bundestag*. Meanwhile, he was also Deputy National Chairman of the East Prussian *Landsmannschaft* and became President of the aforementioned Northeast German Cultural Association. On the national level of the expellee movement he became Chairman of the important policy-making *BdV* Commission on All-German Affairs (*Gesamtdeutscher Ausschuss des BdV*) in 1961 and was subsequently elected a Vice-President of the *BdV*.¹⁴⁸ Most important, as a member of the *Bundestag* since 1953, he was frequently Chairman of the *Bundestag* Committee on Refugee Matters. He recently succeeded Wenzel Jaksch as President of the

¹⁴⁷ *MID*, October 9, 1965.

¹⁴⁸ *DOD*, November 13, 1961; *MID*, May 16, 1964.

BdV. Similar examples of combinations of expellee movement with party functions could be enumerated.

(b) *Expellees in Education*. The possibility of infusing East German and ethnic German concepts of cultural and religion into West German life was foreseen by the expellee elite and, as shown, is reflected or realized in a complex system of relations and contacts, actual or intended, between East German political organizations and cultural and religious groups. The hopes for such an infusion, for a reciprocal cultural reaction in West German society, are the *raison d'être* of the expellee movement. Cultivation of German folklore and religious practices and also self-development and self-improvement by education and training have traditionally been primary concerns among German borderland groups and German minorities in foreign countries, and the successful integration of East German pupils and teachers into West German schools thus offers a valuable index of this hope and the direction it has taken.

As pointed out earlier, East German youth is on the whole well integrated into the West German educational system. Integration of East German teachers is even more favorable in comparison with the total number of East Germans. In the 1953 twenty-three out of every hundred German grade school teachers and about twenty out of every hundred high school teachers were East German expellees. In West German states with large concentrations of expellees these rates go as high as forty or more expellee teachers out of every hundred; for temporary grade school teachers, as high as fifty.¹⁴⁹ In Bavaria seventy percent of all of directors of part-time or evening colleges (*Volkshochschulen*) were reported to be Sudeten Germans. Eugen Lemberg, a Sudeten German and former professor at the University of Prague who is well known in West Germany and elsewhere for his scholarship in sociology points out that this "invasion of expellees" is a temporary phenomenon in West German adult education. Nevertheless, he stresses that many East Germans, especially those previously involved in ethnic minority struggles, think of education as an "indispensable prerequisite for survival."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ See *Statistisches Taschenbuch*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78 f.

¹⁵⁰ Eugen Lemberg, "Das Bildungswesen vor neuen Aufgaben," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 366-401. Similarly, in Bavaria expellee groups were operating more than a hundred bookmobiles as early as 1950 without support of public funds. See Karl Heinz Gehrmann, "Kulturpflege und Kulturpolitik," *ibid.*, pp. 159-203.

Importation of certain educational concepts held by East Germans goes hand in hand with their emphasis on homeland provincial cultural activity.

Efforts of East German teachers were not limited to achieving a fair measure of integration for themselves. No sooner had most of them resettled in related jobs than they concluded that existing curricula were insufficient to convey forcefully enough what they believed to be "the image of the German East." According to Lemberg, groups of expellee educators and politicians were not long in proposing what they termed proper methods for school instruction in matters concerning East German and East European Affairs. In time discussion of these proposals spread to educators in general. Together with state-sponsored groups, such as the *Steinbacher Kreis* in North-Rhine Westphalia, East German cultural organizations such as the Göttingen Circle, the Lüneburg Academy, and Herder Institute in Marburg, contributed rules and recommendations for instructions. These eventually reached the *Bundestag* and the State Ministries of Culture where the responsibility for the conduct of education in the West German Federal States lies. By the mid-fifties public discussion of what the East Germans called their "Petition for Enlightenment" (*Bildungsauftrag*) was in full swing. These endeavors continued through all possible cultural, academic and denominational channels and are currently coordinated by the Federal Working Association for Instruction on German Eastern Studies (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft für deutsche Ostkunde im Unterricht*).¹⁵¹ That they have not been without effect is evident as will be seen from the reaction of the schools and the government as well as from the contents of certain textbooks.

Integration of East Germans into West German academic institutions and research and study centers for East European Affairs has not been quite as successful. Former German universities such as in Königsberg (*Albertina*, founded in 1544), Breslau (*Friedrich Wilhelm Universität*, 1811), and Danzig (*Technische Hochschule*, 1904), and East European German-language universities such as in Prague

¹⁵¹ This "roof organization" is said to have seventeen member organizations including the *BdV* itself, most of the aforementioned East German academic and cultural institutions and associations, the expellee youth and student organizations, the Sudeten German Catholic *Ackermann* Congregation, and three expellee and refugee teachers' organizations. See *BdV, Personal und Material Katalog, op. cit.*, pp. 192 f.

(*Carolina*, 1348) and Brünn (*Polytechnikum*, 1873) had German faculties totaling nearly 1,000 persons, two-thirds of whom held full professorial rank, in addition to about 800 German professional research assistants. Aside from Berlin, Königsberg and Breslau were centers of pre-World War II research on East Europe. For reasons difficult to assess, German scholars from the East at first met with reluctance on the part of universities to absorb them into existing vacancies.¹⁵² By 1953, out of approximately 11,500 university professors and research assistants in West Germany, only about 700 or less than seven percent came from East German institutions. In the 1950's about 70 of more than 6,000 chairs at West German universities were specializing in East European Studies.¹⁵³

This situation was of course the reason behind the formation of such interest groups as the Emergency Association of Expelled University Teachers (*Notverband vertriebener Hochschullehrer*) which was founded by Max Hildebert Boehm. Similar organizations – the aforementioned *Steinbacher Kreis* and the *Ostdeutsche Akademische Arbeitskreis* in Freiburg, for example – helped to further public discussion of the plight of East German scholars and the need for revival of teaching and research on East European Affairs.

Like the call for modifications in grade and high school instruction, that for increased research on East European Affairs (*Osteuropa-forschung*) has been widely discussed on federal and state government levels. Meanwhile, slow integration of East German scholars into West German universities and halting development of facilities and opportunities for research on East European Affairs have contributed to the separate establishment of the numerous aforementioned East German cultural and academic institutions and promoted closer ties between and the Homeland Provincial Movement.

(c) *Expellees in the Churches*. The special ties that the expellee movement maintained with the West German Churches developed within special organizational bounds. As explained many Homeland

¹⁵² Max H. Boehm, "Verluste und neue Ansätze der Wissenschaft," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 204, 223. As a rule, professors in Germany have permanent civil servant status, but university departments have much to say in personnel matters and evidently could not be persuaded to speed up integration. Doubts of occupation authorities and West German faculty members about the political reliability of East Germans may have played a role.

¹⁵³ Primarily in Slavic languages, literature, and history; see *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1958, p. 90 and *Vertriebenenstatistik* 1953, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

Provincial Societies emerged out of or were patterned after Protestant or Catholic welfare organizations founded in most cases by expelled priests or pastors and church elders. Expulsions of Protestants and subsequent communist domination of the East German and East European homelands signified the virtual eradication of militant German Protestantism from these areas. Except in Scandinavia the relatively advanced position of German Protestantism in East Europe was destroyed. Before the war German Lutherans constituted one of the world's largest Protestant denominations, numbering over 42,000,000. The *Lutherische Landeskirche* of East Prussia was the world's oldest Protestant church. Two-thirds of the population or 6,000,000 persons in the Oder-Neisse territories were Lutherans. Before and during the war they were spread over 2,800 communities and served by an almost equal number of pastors. After the expulsion most of their churches were dissolved, expropriated, or confiscated by the Polish government.¹⁵⁴ The German Lutherans were driven westward, many beyond the Elbe. All of Central Germany, including Wittenberg, the cradle of Lutheran Protestantism, fell under communist sway.

The Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Germany continues to make efforts to console refugee members (about 4,000,000 in 1950) by keeping alive the cohesive spirit of old homeland congregations. This has led interestingly to the development of a church within the church. Nineteen East and ethnic German exiled provincial churches have founded separate expellee church groups within the framework of the territorial organization of the parent church. These church groups offer a valuable, if poignant, example of the strange dualism that pervades the entire expellee movement, with on the one hand the practical need for integration into a new world and on the other the emotional need for social identity with the old one vying for attention and effort.

¹⁵⁴ Probably not more than 200,000 German Lutherans remain in the entire area, scattered throughout one hundred communities and served by some ninety pastors. The situation is similar in other Eastern European countries and in the Soviet Union. See Max H. Boehm, *et al.*, *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft*, Vol. II (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1956), especially p. 101; also, "Der Kirchenkampf in Polen," *Informationen des evangelischen Presseverbandes* (Göttingen, 1952), No. 5; *Kirchliches Jahrbuch* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1956), especially the article by Professor Kruska, "Zehn Jahre Kirchendienst Ost," pp. 198-260; and Theodor Heckel, *Kirche jenseits der Grenzen - Aus der deutschen evangelischen Auslandsdiaspora* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1949).

From the beginning, East German Lutheran clergy and laymen refused to defer to what has been called "the annulment of a thousand years of history," by "acts of violence."¹⁵⁵ They held continued existence of Evangelical Lutheran Churches from the East (*Ostkirchen*) as "question of fate" for the entire German people. As early as 1946, expelled East German pastors and church representatives resolved to encourage the development of evolving Homeland Provincial Church Committees-in-Aid, considering them "migrating congregations" (*Kirchen auf der Wanderschaft*). Corresponding West German congregations were to act as hosts for them, receiving their clergy, laymen, and church members. The central body of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Germany approved this position in the name of the different state churches it represented.¹⁵⁶ By 1955 nearly 1,700 or almost twenty percent of some 8,700 pastors in Evangelical churches in nine states were East Germans.¹⁵⁷ Together, East and West German pastors and deacons made considerable efforts to promote the problematic social and spiritual integration of expellees.¹⁵⁸

This task as well as the avowed goal of East German clergy to safeguard the "heritage of the homeland church" (*das heimatkirchliche Erbe*) called for much organizational work. Three central church bodies were eventually set up to guide and coordinate the welfare, cultural, and spiritual activities of the Homeland Provincial Church Committees-in-Aid. The first to be created, the Aid Organization of the Evangelical Church in Germany (*Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland*), was conceived toward the end of the war, even before the expellee problem existed, in anticipation of the im-

¹⁵⁵ Pastor Herbert Girsensohn, "Memorandum zur Frage der Eingliederung der Ostkirchen," in Carl Brummack (ed.), *Die Unverlierbarkeit evangelischen Kirchentums aus dem Osten* (Ulm: Unser Weg, 1964), pp. 42-56; and Pastor Friedrich Spiegel-Schmidt, "Religiöse Wandlungen und Probleme im evangelischen Bereich," in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 23-91.

¹⁵⁶ The *Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland* (EKD), centrally organized under this name after the war, included also churches in the communist part of Germany, thus maintaining one of the few links with Germans east of the Elbe river.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53. This percentage was higher - up to forty percent - in some Northwest German regional churches.

¹⁵⁸ This has probably been facilitated by the relatively large and increasing percentage of expellees among church elders (*Kirchenvorstände*), for example, from 20 to 35 percent in the Northwest German regional churches. See "Zahl der Vertriebenen in den Kirchenvorständen nimmt weiter zu," in *Evangelischer Pressedienst* (Bethel), October 1, 1966.

mense job of social and spiritual rehabilitation that lay ahead.¹⁵⁹ Establisher in the summer of 1945, it undertook financial support of the Homeland Provincial Church Committees-in-Aid beginning to emerge and coordinated their welfare activities. Subsequently, in the autumn of 1946, a special Committee on East German Churches (*Ostkirchenausschuss*) was formed to guide these groups and their special delegates to the state churches and to assist the expellee clergy and deaconry during "a period of transition for the German people in promoting spiritual and ecclesiastical support for expellees."¹⁶⁰ Finally, the Convention of Dispersed Eastern Evangelical (Lutheran) Churches (*Konvent der zerstreuten evangelischen Ostkirchen*) was established in 1950 to advise "authoritative representatives of East German Churches concerned with the ecclesiastical, social, and political activities of expellees."¹⁶¹ This Convention eventually took in most of the expelled non-German Protestant church groups, including Latvians, Estonians, Poles, and Hungarians.

These three central organizations and their subsidiary offices formed lasting contacts with the Homeland Provincial Societies and expellee cultural and academic establishments on the one hand and with West German churches (both Protestant and Catholic) and government agencies on the other. They also affiliated themselves with the international ecumenical movement. Frequently, the Convention of Dispersed Eastern Evangelical Churches invites representatives of the Homeland Provincial Societies to speak at meetings. Topics range from such uncontroversial subjects as ministerial care of the homeless to more sensitive problems such as relations between Church Committees-in-Aid and secular associations or the meaning of the concepts underlying the terms homeland and folk and underscoring expellee claims for return of lost lands. Members of East German youth organizations, highly-placed government officials, and

¹⁵⁹ The *Hilfswerk* is patterned after the ideas and proposals of Eugen Gerstenmaier, a West German Protestant theologian, member of the resistance against Hitler, after 1945, *CDU* member, and since 1954 President of the *Bundestag*. From 1945 to 1961, he headed the organization. See *ibid.*, pp. 61 ff., and Hermann Naurer, "Das Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirche," *ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 254-263. Gerstenmaier resigned from the *Bundestag* Presidency very recently.

¹⁶⁰ See By-Laws of the Committee on East German Churches, Brummack, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

scholars and theologians from both East and West Germany are also often invited to speak.¹⁶²

Some of these meetings have attracted internationally or nationally distinguished figures such as Elfan Rees, European Representative of the Committee of Churches on International Affairs and Adviser on Refugee Affairs to the World Council of Churches; the late Herbert Grgensohn, who was head of the Baltic German Church Committee-in-Aid and a professor at Bethel Theological Seminary; Gerhard GÜLZOW, a high Protestant Church official and currently Chairman of the Committee of East German Churches; and the aforementioned Franz Hamm, former Speaker of the Yugoslavian German Homeland Provincial Society and Chairman of the Convention of Eastern Evangelical Churches. Expellee scholars such as Eugen Lemberg, H. Schienger, and Kurt Rabl, all associates of the *Herder Institut* in Marburg or the *Collegium Carolinum* in Munich, have lectured, conducted seminars, or otherwise taken part in these meetings.

All this activity on the part of Protestant groups is not without precedent. Homeland provincial churches were a logical part of the political and cultural organization of ethnic German minorities in Eastern Europe. From the nineteen thirties, the disposition of some groups, especially Germans from Russia and Bessarabia, can be compared with that of congregations among the Diaspora. Resettlement in Polish areas under transfer agreements of the early war years and subsequent life under Nazi control did not end their isolation. The first Church Committees-in-Aid were established during this time by ethnic Germans from Bessarabia and Yugoslavia.

East German Protestant churches are not separate legal entities in West Germany. They are perpetuated in name only. Nevertheless, the reaction of the West German churches to expellee political goals has precipitated the evolution of an East German, pro-expellee faction among the Evangelical clergy. This group has unhesitatingly contributed a well-defined point of view to the internal debate in West Germany on the validity of concepts underlying the expellee

¹⁶² For example, at the meeting in Travemünde, October 12 through 14, 1952; see the documents and comments of Franz Hamm in *ibid.*, pp. 12-39. Similar meetings were called by the *Ostkirchenausschuss*, on "work with young people in both (Protestant and Catholic) churches and the tasks regarding the teaching (in public schools) of German Eastern Affairs within the framework of religious instruction," in 1960 in Tutzing, Bavaria; *ibid.*, p. 93.

movement, often forcefully taking issue with West German theologians.

Like the Protestant groups, the Catholic Church in West Germany promptly organized a special program to assist those of its members who had been expelled from the east. They numbered over 500,000. Of 6,000 German priests beyond the Oder River before the war, 3,000 were eventually removed to the Federal Republic.¹⁶³ The immediate problem was of course to integrate them into the existing system of West German Catholic churches. They formed a group inside the West German clergy and chose "official representatives" who publicly protested the expulsion and requested "the authorities in charge" to enable their return as well as that of their congregations to their "centuries-old homeland." They based their appeal on a "God given natural law," a "Christian moral law," and on the inalienable rights of mankind.¹⁶⁴ As in the Evangelical Church, the notion of a continuing existence in exile prevailed among expelled Catholic congregations. From the beginning, it had, however, the undivided support of the clergy in West Germany and the full sanction of the Holy See. As mentioned earlier, Pope Pius XII had strongly objected to the expulsions. Since his appeals to responsible parties to put an end to the migrations had clearly been in vain, he decided, pending a final peace settlement, not to formalize *de facto* changes in the Church in East Europe brought about by the defeat of Germany. In effect, this meant that expelled Catholics could, as laymen, join West German congregations but that expelled priests officially remained heads of East or ethnic German churches and could not, like Protestant ministers, take charge of West German parishes. Instead they became active in welfare groups throughout West Germany and the Soviet Zone, worked in Homeland Provincial or regional Church Action Offices or assisted otherwise in the spiritual care of expellees. The expelled Bishop of Breslau resettled in Görlitz in the Soviet Zone where he was able to administer the small area of his Silesian bishopric west of the Oder-Neisse line. The Bishop of East Prussia

¹⁶³ Adolf Kindermann, "Religiöse Wandlungen und Probleme im katholischen Bereich" in Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 92-158, see charts on pp. 118 f.

¹⁶⁴ See "Rückkehrforderung des vertriebenen deutschen Klerus aus dem Jahre 1947," *Königsteiner Blätter*, 1959, Nos. 2 and 3.

(Ermland), Maximilian Kaller, and the Prelate of Schneidemühl,¹⁶⁵ Franz Hartz, moved to West Germany, retaining legal ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the priests from their dioceses.¹⁶⁶ In 1948 the Holy See appointed West German Cardinal Joseph Frings, former Archbishop of Cologne and Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops, High Papal Protector for the Entire Refugee Problem in Germany. Under him, Bishop Hartz acted as coordinator of the spiritual and material welfare of all displaced East German Catholics and priests. A Working Association for Catholic Refugee Assistance (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft für katholische Flüchtlingshilfe*) and a Catholic Refugee Council were formed to guide the work of the different expellee church organizations. Currently, a Working Association of Catholic Expellee Organizations (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der katholischen Vertriebenenorganisationen*) oversees the activities of five homeland provincial religious and cultural organizations, five West German regional welfare associations, and one East German Catholic youth group.¹⁶⁷

Through material contributions from Catholic expellees themselves and from West German and even non-German sources, Catholic administrators were able to go a step further than Protestant clergy, setting up a number of special institutes devoted to expellee interests and problems. These have been called "a microcosm" of the German Catholic East, "an oasis" for East and ethnic German expellee clergy and layman, and "a crystallization point" for all Catholic endeavors for expellees.¹⁶⁸

Aside from promoting the formation of homeland provincial and regional church groups, West German bishops established a Church Assistance Office (*Kirchliche Hilfsstelle*). Initially, it was headed by Albert Büttner, a West German prelate in charge of ministerial care of German-speaking Catholics outside Germany. He and Adolf Kindermann, a Sudeten German prelate and former Professor of Ecclesiastical Law and History at the German University of Prague, encouraged training young priests from among the expellees and

¹⁶⁵ A *prelatura nullius* west of the 1937 Polish-German border covering the area of the former administrative division of *Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen*.

¹⁶⁶ See *ibid.* and *Katholischer Flüchtlingsrat in Deutschland*, "Die Oder-Neisse Linie und ihre Bistümer," in *Zum deutschen Vertriebenenproblem* (Würzburg: *Katholischer Flüchtlingsrat in Deutschland*, 1961), pp. 1-5.

¹⁶⁷ BdV, *Material und Personalkatalog*, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, especially pp. 123-129.

refugees in order to maintain a reserve large enough to go on leading exiled congregations of East Germans with a view towards returning them eventually to their homelands. As a result, in 1946 the Holy See approved the opening of a Special Seminary and College for training a new generation of priests for German churches in the east.¹⁶⁹ Those ordained after such training, currently conducted at the *Albertus-Magnus Kolleg* in Königstein, are temporarily incardinated into West German parishes on the specific pledge that they will return to head their appropriate East German homeland parishes as soon as feasible.¹⁷⁰ Thus, in assisting integration of expellees into West German congregations, young priests are expected and trained to inculcate in them a willingness and readiness to return to the East. For this purpose, "retention and cultivation of the religious and cultural heritage of the old homelands" is emphasized. In keeping with this policy, an Institute for the Culture and History of East Central Europe (*Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas*) was established. In addition, two special Silesian and Sudeten German organizations called *Priesterwerke* engage in public relations work aimed at encouraging young expellees to attend seminary. They also sponsor theological and academic projects and publications and attempt to promote closer ties between priests and members of homeland dioceses.¹⁷¹

Like the Evangelical ministers, the Catholic clergy pushed discussion of the expellee problem beyond national boundaries. The situation of East German priests was brought to the attention of Catholics in other European countries through an organization called Help for Priests from the East (*Ostpriesterhilfe*).¹⁷² International congresses are held annually at Königstein on the theme "The Church in Distress." At these congresses, Catholic expellee groups such as the Sudeten German Ackermann Congregation and the Silesian Eichendorff Commemorative Association meet with other expellee

¹⁶⁹ The project was begun modestly with an initial contribution of \$3,000 from the Vatican; according to a letter of May 6, 1946 from Montini (*Segretaria di Stato, Vaticano*) to Büttner, Kindermann, who headed the program, subsequently has recently been given the status of Titular Bishop (*Weihbischof*) of Hildesheim. See *Volkshotz*, August 13, 1966, p. 8.

¹⁷⁰ Kindermann, *op. cit.*, especially p. 125.

¹⁷¹ BdV, *Material and Personalkatalog*, *op. cit.*, pp. 215 f.

¹⁷² As material conditions improved in West Germany, this organization concentrated its efforts on housing construction for expellees.

groups, interested West Germans, and Catholics from countries in both the East and West to discuss problems such as Bolhevism, coexistence, and communist persecution of Catholic priests.¹⁷³ Academic contacts including those with Protestant groups and institutions, are widespread. Detailed studies of the right to self-determination and the so-called right to the homeland have been jointly carried out by German and non-German scholars of both denomination. Often, they have been jointly sponsored by the *Albertus-Magnus Kolleg* and the Evangelical Academy in Hesse-Nassau.

Because of the hierarchical pattern of the Church and the Vatican's firm guidance in matters of policy, the German Catholic clergy, unlike the Protestants, is not openly divided on the expellee issue. The result is a set of common political goals among expelled Catholic Germans from the East. In surveying these goals it will become clear that because the Church views the entire problem against the background of persecution by and struggle against communists in East Europe, it represents a major source of support for the expellee movement.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The churches of the two principal denominations in West Germany doubtless play a major role in the entire expellee political and cultural movement. After a period of what was often involuntary inactivity during the Hitler era, the end of the war brought them a measure of disaster and of challenge. For Germany, at first without a government and a trusted, politically organized leadership, they constituted the logical force to take the initiative in coping with the enormous social problems brought about by the expulsions. The system of organization that emerged to provide assistance to expellees closely followed familiar patterns of homeland provincial groupings and associations. This was in part the result of the way in which the Germans from the East were dispersed and in part the result of the instinctive response to regroup on the basis of traditional ties. Without retention of identity with their comrades, East Germans probably would not have regained as much as fast as they have in

¹⁷³ See *ibid.*, pp. 213 f.; Kindermann notes that in 1956 representatives of twenty-six different nations participated. In 1966 a total of 3,000 participated in some 50 seminars.

their new environment. Their clannishness not only permeated their religious organizations but spread to their political and cultural organizations as well, thus having far-reaching effects on the entire expellee movement.

The Germans from the East desperately needed the material and spiritual support of the church. It amounted to both first-aid and protection, in addition to affording them a kind of psychological therapy for the mental and physical havoc of having their world go infinitely wrong during and after the war. Prior to westward migration, Germans in East Europe sought help from the churches simply in order to exist as ethnic groups. The kind of anti-communist ecclesiastical irredentism which developed in West Germany, especially among Catholics, was in a sense nothing new for expellees. It revived the spirit of earlier crusades against a hostile, sometimes belligerent, status quo. Moreover, it was ideally suited to the aims of their political leaders, because it would serve as a base from which to launch broad political as well as selective intellectual offensives in the guise of cultural pursuits. The religio-cultural partnership evolving, perhaps at times even unconsciously, was of a kind that the occupation powers found unobjectionable. In fact, the initial, four-year prohibition against the formation of expellee political groups seems only in the long run to have strengthened the spiritual and intellectual resources of the Germans from the East. The result is a political movement that developed haltingly at first and not without creating jealousies and conflicts within its own ranks as well as among those of West Germans, but that has made friends and gained a measure of representation in government and politics, in the schools, and among Germans and non-Germans elsewhere in all walks and stations of life. Closely associated with Soviet Zone refugee organizations, it has established contacts outside West Germany, the most important of which are those with similarly motivated groups in Austria.

Differences in political goals among the Homeland Provincial Societies were inevitable. Once the problem immediately confronting the expellees — subsistence — was on the way to being solved, political claims were bound to arise. The political aspirations of German farmers from the Black Sea area obviously could not coincide with those of former inhabitants of Danzig or Königsberg. That expellee political leaders have somehow managed to house under one emigre

roof the diverse particularistic interests and parochial outlooks of the Germans from the East is unquestionably a major organizational achievement. Continued emphasis on cultural and religious heritage and traditions offered a common denominator to work with that has not only proved to be reliable but has gained for the expellees much respect from West German compatriots.

The very special situation of the expellees predisposed them to a privileged position. Their special plight called for and earned the immediate attention of the West German churches, as it did that of the government whose long-term program of rehabilitation worked to facilitate admission of East Germans into government ranks. Leaving aside the question of whether or not expellees who were formerly civil servants were entitled to placement in corresponding positions, the matter reduced to one of the administration at all levels simply needing their expertise and experience. Implementation of a comprehensive program of integration would have been impossible without precise information on expellees and refugees. To determine eligibility for government and other assistance, they had to be identified. Places of origin and family status had to be ascertained. This monumental detective work was accomplished in large part through tracing services and address collection centers, which, as explained, were run by expellees, often with the support of the churches and the Red Cross.¹⁷⁴ Only administrators who were themselves Germans from the East could verify extremely complicated expellee claims for restitution. Even the military governments, as said earlier, allowed the establishment of governmental advisory boards with expellees as members. Finally, the size of the group meant that no judicious politician could afford to ignore its interests. It also meant that East German leaders had frequent chances for legislative candidacies in the West German political parties at all governmental levels. Accession of expellees to key legislative posts was only a question of time and ability.

Size of membership makes expellee organizations, especially *Landsmannschaften*, relatively important, although they do not

¹⁷⁴ By 1958 twelve of these establishments (*Heimatortskarteien*) had traced and collected the addresses of a total of 14,000,000 persons. Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, und Kriegsgeschädigte, ed., *Zeittafel der Vorgeschichte und des Ablaufs der Vertreibung sowie der Unterbringung und Eingliederung der Vertriebenen und Bibliographie zum Vertriebenenproblem* (Bonn: 1959) (hereafter called Chronological Table), Vol. I, p. 196.

constitute the largest interest group in the Federal Republic. The Catholic and Protestant Churches, the labor unions, the agricultural associations, and the organizations for war veterans and disabled have larger paying memberships. The expellee youth organization (*DJO*), too, has an appreciable membership, although in terms of size it is smaller than the denominational and labor union youth organizations. In terms of copies sold, expellee publications probably do not compare favorably with newspapers or journals related to entertainment, sports, or fashion or with many periodicals addressed to industry, the trades and crafts, labor, education, and science. The expellees, it should be remembered, are only one of hundreds of interest groups competing for favor in Bonn and the state capitals. The practice of lobbying seems so widespread in the Federal Republic that political scientists have inquired critically into it as a possible "dominance of associations" within a democracy.¹⁷⁵ Though it should be recognized, government support of expellee cultural, academic, and political activities ought not to be overestimated. Such assistance may not be out of proportion to that given by the government to other projects and groups. Moreover, continued public assistance may give rise to increasing dependence on it. As seen, receipts from expellee membership fees are so modest that the organizations, including some of their press organs, cannot function without public subsidies. This of course means that facets of expellee activities are subject to government scrutiny.¹⁷⁶ The presence of numerous expellees in high government positions and on legislative committees is likewise a two-way proposition, since they may be used by the government to make its influence felt on the expellee movement. Simultaneous holding of several different offices by expellees with resultant cross connections and influences is useful for them but also leads to a measure of outside control over their interest. The

¹⁷⁵ See, for example, Theodor Eschenburg, *Herrschaft der Verbände?* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1956); also Rupert Breitling, *Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik: Ihre Arten und ihre politische Wirkungsweise* (Meisenheim: Hain, 1955).

¹⁷⁶ Expellee leaders seem to be concerned about being too dependent on government support. They speak of the need for "financial independence," object to being "boarders" of the Federal Republic, and request their members to make great efforts and financial sacrifices. See *MID*, June 6, 1959; *VdL*, December 14, 1958, p. 2; and *Der Schlesier*, No. 43, 1954, p. 2. The fact that an increase in postal rates gives rise to protests by some of the expellee press organs shows how urgently they need outside help. See *MID*, October, and November 12, 1966.

public focus in which some expellee leaders have thus been placed has invited criticism and revealed the movement's vulnerability, especially when it has given rise to charges of former Nazi activities. Actually, the movement has by now become so interwoven into the government, politico-cultural and religious associations, and educational system that it is difficult to tell precisely who is influencing whom.

In terms of its organizational history the movement has been characterized by flexibility. It developed on the basis of voluntary and insofar as known democratic procedures. Alleged ex-Nazis, when publicly criticized, often left the movement, and other personalities, apparently not open to such accusations, took over. Continued pressures for further economic integration of East Germans went hand in hand with growing emphasis on foreign policy issues. Offices of expellee organizations are as widely spread as East Germans within West Germany. In addition to national and state offices in some sixty towns, including all large and important West German cities, there are well over 10,000 county and local groups and contact points. Thus, influence can radiate from virtually every part of the country. Another advantage lies in a rather high degree of social cohesion, especially within the smaller cultural and political groups, which attract entire families. As a result, the expellee press has a large following. Scholarly periodicals, information services, and books also reach a select but fairly extensive circle of West German intellectuals. Archives offer more information, documentation, and pictorial material for those interested in the homeland provinces. Expellee reunions, especially annual national ones, are rather remarkable in terms of the crowds that they continue to draw. Though a peak in terms of absolute numbers of participants was reached in the mid-fifties, the trend is again upward.¹⁷⁷ Considering the chaotic traffic situation that often characterizes West German urban areas, especially on holidays and week ends, and the numerous pastimes that otherwise occupy the time and attention of West Germans two decades after the war, attendance figures at these mass meetings cannot be fully and reasonably explained.

¹⁷⁷ A recent expellee press report quotes the communist Polish news agency *ZAP* as expressing bewilderment at the large attendance figures registered for expellee conventions. "After all," the report stated, "approximately 100,000 transferees are dying per year." *EPS*, August 18, 1966, p. 1.

Some aspects of the organizational set-up and its media of communications have something irrational about them. For the pietistic Lutheran from Bessarabia, the Transylvanian Saxon farmer, or the small-town West Prussian the past is kept alive through innumerable poems and pictures in small homeland periodicals. The government's failure to integrate many expellee farmers contributes to this tendency. Such looking backward — often found in uprooted groups exiled in foreign countries — enhances their affinity for romanticism and for glorification of the past and may set — as will be seen shortly — the stage for politically unrealistic claims and action. It is safe to assume that it will be primarily the older generation who will be so affected, but it does not necessarily follow that with progressing social integration and the takeover by the younger generation of East Germans all these memories and feelings will vanish. Many of the expellee elite, including former East German politicians and minority leaders, have passed away, but, as has been shown, young talents of like minds succeeded them. In his history of the German youth movement, Walter Laqueur pointedly says that "every youthful experience is strong and lasting."¹⁷⁸ Although they differ as individuals, many young East Germans collectively remember the ethnic or tribal consciousness (*Stammesbewusstsein*) out of which they have grown and the injustice of the expulsions. If they are too young to recollect the flight or expulsion themselves, they will undoubtedly know of it from vivid descriptions by parents and East German friends.

Existence, even intensification, of this tribal consciousness twenty years after the expulsions and emphasis on an ethnic heritage of a bygone era seems anachronistic today in the face of increasing urbanization, apparent de-emphasis on ethnic nationalism, and the growing phenomenon of European regionalism. Consequently, the expellee movement is not without signs of obsolescence and even decline of interest among its participants. These will be explored later. Nevertheless the ethnic group spirit is still a pertinent reality in many quarters. It is reflected most clearly in the activities and in the political aspirations of the Germans from the East. As major economic problems neared solution, the expellee party dissolved and West German regional organizations were absorbed. The Homeland Provincial Societies prevailed because no other organizations in Germany could give the expellees what they thought they still needed.

¹⁷⁸ Laqueur, *Young Germany*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

During migration and resettlement, in time of impoverishment and improvisation, and in the face of ill-will and distrust on the part of their new neighbors, many expellees turned to their traditions and culture. These were understood by the East Germans as being based on "Christian ethics," as protecting them from "blending with the masses," and as thereby enabling them as individuals to "improve their character."¹⁷⁹ Many felt they had to do this as part of a political and cultural task that still lay ahead. "The translation from tradition into a messianistic idea (had) succeeded."¹⁸⁰

In 1952, after most of the expellee organizations had been established and were recognized as legal, in a Congressional report, presumably informed Americans deemed it "surprising that . . . there (had) not yet developed a chauvinistic movement to reconquer the areas from which they (had) been expelled."¹⁸¹ It is true that during their many mass reunions and their marches on Bonn the expellees were not reported to have smashed any windows or turned any cars upside down. Outward manifestations of "a chauvinistic movement to reconquer" their lost areas, may have been wanting. But, as the following chapter will show, claims to recover the lost homelands or claims to the right to return there have been made by the expellee organizations from the very beginning. Chauvinistic, radical, or openly violent outbreaks were not called for nor were they thought necessary. Since 1945, organizational developments alone have implied full rejection of the territorial situation which the Yalta and Potsdam agreements confirmed and which the East European Communist states implemented through expulsion.

¹⁷⁹ The original reads in part "Der landsmannschaftliche Gedanke hat seine Basis in der bedingungslosen Anerkennung der christlichen Ethik . . . und . . . ist . . . insbesondere dadurch persönlichkeitsbildend, dass er die persönliche Tatkraft und Initiative . . . als primäre Werte anerkennt." See Karl O. Kurth, "Wesen und Bedeutung des landsmannschaftlichen Gedankens," in Göttinger Arbeitskreis (ed.), *Wesen und Bedeutung des landsmannschaftlichen Gedankens* (Munich: Christ unterwegs, 1952), p. 17.

¹⁸⁰ "Die Übersetzung von Tradition in Sendungsidee gelang," see Katholischer Flüchtlingsrat, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁸¹ Eighty-second U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, *Report on Germany*, a special study mission to Germany and certain other countries, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, 1952), p. 9.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL AIMS OF THE EXPELLEES

The East European communist states, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, viewed developments in the expellee movement in West Germany with growing apprehension. In 1947 and 1948, for example, the Polish Military Mission to Berlin complained in a series of notes to the Four-Power Allied Control Council of "irrefutable proof of illegal activities on the part of German transferees." Citing the circulation of secretly printed leaflets, the holding of clandestine meetings, and the formation of revisionist associations, the Poles contended that "revengeful propaganda" was being made and would perpetuate unrest among the "transferees," preventing their peaceful resettlement and encouraging an "atmosphere of constant anti-Polish agitation." Concerned that existing legal provisions were insufficient to combat "the revisionist aspirations of the transferees," the Polish military mission warned that countenancing such activities, even tacitly, would in the long run "favor the rebirth of militant pan-Germanism and constitute a lasting danger to the peace-loving neighbors of Germany and to world peace."¹

Similarly, in December 1947 Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis reported to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak National Assembly on political activities of expellees from the Sudetenland, describing what may now be termed the beginnings — behind the facade of welfare and religious organizations — of expellee efforts to assert foreign policy claims. Like the Polish officials, Clementis seems to have been well informed, pos-

¹ *Poland, Germany and European Peace: Official Documents 1944-1948* (London: the Polish Embassy, n.d.) pp. 50—56. See especially the notes dated October 23, 1947, and June 11, 1948.

scssing detailed information on organizational arrangements and being apprised of names of expellee church and political leaders. This is significant when one recalls that during the first two or three years after the war relatively little was published about the expulsions or the expellees in the West German press and that prohibitions against the formation of political organizations made expellees reluctant to advertise foreign policy goals in print. Polish and Czech officials clearly thought it necessary to keep a close watch on expellee activities and obviously found the means to do so. Clementis also expressed concern that instead of working for economic and social integration, Germans "deported" to the American Zone from Czechoslovakia would claim a right to return, collect documents on the expulsions and on property left behind with a view towards publishing them and demanding reparations, and protest the removal of Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia from their homes to the interior of the country raising the vexed question of their minority rights. Fearing the emergence of a revisionist movement directed against Czechoslovakia, he said that he had sought and received assurances from the American occupation authorities that formation of independent expellee political organizations would not be allowed. Clementis concluded from this that "the revisionist and irredentist activities" of the expellees were "insignificant," adding that in any case their ideas were "absurd" and had no "moral or legal basis." He said finally: "For us as well as for the rest of the world this chapter is finally closed."² Events in West Germany were soon to prove him wrong. Until today, concerned Poles, Czechs, and Russians have continued to accuse the expellees of "revanchism" and "revisionism." A look at expellee claims affords some idea why.

A. COMMON TENETS

Expellee claims fall into two general categories: internal policy goals relating to economic and social integration into West Germany and foreign policy goals relating to issues with international impli-

² Foreign Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic, *Czechoslovak Sources and Documents* – No. 29 (Prague: 1947), pp. 21 ff., as quoted in Deutsche Jugend des Ostens: Sudetendeutsche Jugend, *Dokumente zur Sudetenfrage* (Munich: Lerche, 1961), 2nd ed., hereafter referred to as Sudeten German Documents, pp. 122-126 (quotations are re-translated from the German).

cations such as the nature of the expulsions, the right to return to the East, and the recovery of the lost provinces. The former need not be analyzed in detail. That integration has progressed so well makes it evident that expellee efforts in this direction have brought favorable, effective government response. Moreover, since the late 1950's these claims have yielded in frequency and importance to those relating to foreign policy. Many of the social and economic issues that have concerned all East and ethnic Germans are, of course, still alive. As pointed out in the chapter on integration, the Equalization of Burdens Program — a major government effort at promoting integration — is not yet concluded. Some formerly self-employed individuals, especially farmers, are still grieved. A small but constant number of German "resettlers" keep arriving, especially from Poland, and need housing and other support.

Foreign policy claims may be divided into two major groups; those alleging violation and demanding restoration of human rights with respect to the lost homeland provinces and those asking for restoration of historical rights. The former are asserted in one form or another by virtually all expellee political, cultural, and religious organizations, particularly the Homeland Provincial Societies; the latter generally are not, but if asserted, vary considerably in definition depending on the origin and experience of the expellee group concerned.

In making these claims, expellee speakers and writers often manifest differing degrees of emotional involvement, employ different approaches and emphasize different aspects of issues at stake. Perhaps apprehensive of not getting their message across, the East Germans have left few of their political and artistic resources untapped. That a large number of talented and articulate intellectuals was to be found among a group of 9,000,000 Germans is not surprising, but the volume of their writing on expellee claims, dating from the time their political activities were declared legal, is well-nigh astounding. The following comparisons aim to show that the quality of these writings ranges from effectively designed political statement, with objective insights and convictions, to highly emotional formulations in prose and poetry documenting deep-seated griefs and prejudices. Both types of expression are significant inasmuch as they reflect the ambitions of the movement as well as the mood in which these ambitions are sometimes pursued.

1. Basic Policy Statements

So-called expellee foreign policy may be said to have been first unveiled in August 1950 when delegates of the existing Central Association of Expelled Germans (*ZvD*) and its subsidiary West German regional organizations together with representatives of the Homeland Provincial Societies and tens of thousand of East Germans gathered in Stuttgart in the presence of officials of the churches, the government, and the legislatures and proclaimed what has since been called the Charter of the German Expellees.³ In this "solemn declaration to the German people and to the entire world" the expellees defined "both the duties and the rights" which they consider to constitute "their basic law and an absolutely indispensable condition for the establishment of a free and united Europe." The statement reads in part:

1. We, the expellees, renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation. Our resolution is a solemn and sacred one, in memory of the infinite suffering brought upon mankind, particularly during the past decade.
2. We shall support with all our strength every endeavour directed towards the establishment of a united Europe, in which nations may live in freedom from fear and coercion.
3. We shall contribute, by hard and indefatigable work, to the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.

We have lost our homeland. The homeless are strangers on the face of the earth . . . We have suffered and experienced this fate. We, therefore, feel competent to demand that the *right to our native land* be recognized and realized, as one of the basic rights of man granted to him by the grace of God.

The declaration concluded with demands for a "just and reasonable" distribution of the burdens of the last war among the entire German people.

Ten years later, in August 1960, expellee organizations within the *BdV* commemorated this charter at a similar meeting held in Bad Cannstatt near Stuttgart. They reiterated their adherence to the principles of the charter and stressed that now, as ever, they wished

³ *Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen*, (Bonn: Rheindruck, 1950), four-language edition. There is also an eleven-language edition, with texts in English, French, and other European languages.

to return home. Deploring the continuing "dismemberment of Germany" and "the bondage of sisters and brothers beyond the Iron Curtain," they argued that "more than a hundred million persons" remained "defenseless and at the mercy of a regime of terror to the east of Germany's frontiers" and that a united Europe "in which nations could live without fear" could only be achieved if the "right to self-determination proclaimed in the statutes of the United Nations" were granted "without reservations to all peoples" — that is, "also to the German people." The declaration concluded:

The reunification of all those parts of Germany which have been separated through despotism and force must be achieved, in spite of all obstructions and all opposition.

Between 1950 and 1960 the basic claims expounded at the beginning of the decade were reaffirmed and given more clear-cut, broader interpretations. For example, in 1955 the Constituent Assembly that was to combine the two existing national federations of expellees declared in the Berlin Resolution that reunification "in peace and freedom" of "arbitrarily created parts of Germany" was the unanimous desire of all Germans. "Without a united Germany there can be no peace in the world." The resolution declared further that "true peace" must be achieved through justice, which was taken to mean "the right of every people to chose freely the political and social order" to which it aspires as this right is "guaranteed under international law and in the Atlantic Charter . . . for all nations including the German nation." The resolution ended:

Millions of people have been deprived of their home (*Heimat*) in violation of all human rights and all divine and moral laws. The right to the homeland (*Das Recht auf die Heimat*) must therefore be recognized and realized by all nations . . . as a human right. Every people is entitled to preserve and develop in freedom its own values and thereby to make its contribution to culture and humanity.⁴

Also, in 1959, the newly emerging *BdV* declared in the Kassel Resolution that it supported most of the claims enunciated earlier by

⁴ "Berliner Entschließung," *VdL*, December 14, 1958, proclaimed in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the expulsion and Germany's partition. This resolution was reaffirmed five years later; *Berliner Resolution — Tag der Heimat 1960* (mimeographed, September 3, 1960).

expellee groups and added that a "just and lasting peace" with "an undivided Germany" must be negotiated by the four former occupation powers. Reunification of all parts of Germany was thus posited as a precondition for peace negotiations. The Kassel Resolution went on to proclaim:

The right to self-determination . . . and claims to the homeland (*der Anspruch auf die Heimat*) . . . demand that territorial changes not in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned cannot be made. Annexations are therefore prohibited . . . Expulsions are crimes against humanity, no matter by whom and against whom they are perpetrated . . . The conditions created by the mass expulsions may not be sanctioned by a peace treaty.⁵

The resolution further proclaimed that those who will participate in future peace negotiations must decide between a "negotiated or a dictated peace, a peace of law or . . . one of violence." It ended with the admonition that "the consequences of Versailles" should serve as "a historic warning."⁶

Many expellee policy statements have been formulated in response to specific national or international events or to outright accusations of vindictiveness. Thus, though undoubtedly based on strong convictions, the 1950 Charter, in renouncing aspirations for revenge, answered earlier communist charges of revanchism and anticipated subsequent ones. Similarly, a memorandum of the *BdV* written on the occasion of the 1960 Four Power Summit Conference in Paris and published under the title "The True Facts" refuted charges of revanchism and revisionism and called attention to expellee claims.⁷

In the memo, the *BdV* dismisses accusations of revanchism as "intentional slander" and stresses that expellees, having formally renounced a disposition or intent to retaliate in their charter profess only "to the peaceful solution of all problems resulting from the expulsions." In replying to the charge of revisionism, the *BdV* points out that, in principle, request for revision of frontiers is a legitimate political undertaking under international law. This was not, however,

⁵ *VdL*, May 8, 1959.

⁶ "Die an Friedensverhandlungen beteiligten Mächte stehen vor der Entscheidung: *Verhandlungsfriede oder Diktatfriede – Rechtsfriede oder Gewaltfriede – Die Folgen von Versailles sind ein geschichtliches Menetekel*," in *ibid.*

⁷ *Der wahre Tatbestand – Memorandum des Bundes der Vertriebenen anlässlich der internationalen Konferenz in Paris im Mai 1960* (Bonn: *BdV*, n.d.).

to be confused with "the claim to a right." Request for a revision, the *BdV* explained, aimed at change of a legally recognized frontier. The expellees were not requesting such a revision. Rather, in view of the fact that "the frontiers of the German states area in the east remained legally unchanged," what they were requesting was "recognition of valid international law."⁸ Consequently, the *BdV* asserted, "the Soviet allegation that Germany has entered territorial claims against other states is a reversal of the facts." The four powers, the *BdV* went on, by virtue of their agreement of June 5, 1945, recognize the continued existence of Germany "within its frontiers as they existed on December 31, 1937." Since Germany's "eastern neighbors" treat parts of the German state's area as their own territory, it was they, and not Germany, the *BdV* argued, who "raised 'territorial claims' in respect of a foreign, i.e., the German state's, area." Also, the *BdV* contended, mass expulsions of Germans from areas which they had inhabited "for hundreds of years" could not create binding legal changes with respect to the areas abandoned since international law prohibits enforced mass expulsions and deprivation of property. For these reasons, the *BdV* concluded, expellees were entitled to rectification of "the injustice" inflicted upon them, meaning primarily restoration of the *status quo ante*, or in other words "the right to return (*das Recht auf Rückkehr*)."⁹

The West German federal elections also provided a favorable opportunity for expellee leaders to restate and elaborate their claims. A special pamphlet entitled "Requests and Demands of the Expellees" was distributed prior to the 1961 federal elections.¹⁰ In it the *BdV* said that it could only "promote those candidates in all parties who profess to homeland-political goals." Besides a number of economic and social demands directed at a speedier conclusion of pending integration measures, the pamphlet insists on the right "to self-determination and . . . to the homeland," urging that expellees be consulted by the government in all matters concerning German foreign relations in East Europe, particularly on questions relating to the eastern borders; that the expellees' right to return should be firmly anchored in international law; and that all European nations should

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁰ *Bundestagswahl 1961 – Forderungen und Wünsche der Heimatvertriebenen* (Bonn: *BdV*, 1961).

be protected against aggression and enforced expulsions. The pamphlet further reads:

Germany's claims to its eastern territories under Polish and Russian administration are . . . reinforced by the fact that (they) have historically belonged to the German Reich and by the fact that Germans have peacefully developed them during a thousand years of work. The population of these areas was German. These areas continue to belong to Germany. The German Reich did not cease to exist in 1945; therefore no other state can have legally . . . obtained any rights with respect to these territories.¹¹

With regard to the Sudetenland the pamphlet stressed that the 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans "settled in Bohemia and Moravia for a thousand years" were included in Czechoslovakia against their will and subsequently tried persistently, if unsuccessfully, to gain cultural autonomy. The 1938 cession of the Sudetenland to Germany is seen primarily as a reaction to "twenty years of Czechoslovak nationalist policy," the expulsions in 1945, as "the climax of expansive Czech nationalism." Any solution of the problem, the pamphlet concluded, must be based on "rights to be homeland and to self-determination" and must be "freely consented to" by the Czech people and the Sudeten Germans.

Public discussion aroused by expellee claims raised other questions. Were the expulsions not a reaction to similar crimes committed earlier by the Nazis? What was the precise meaning of the claims? Would not realization of some of them logically exclude others? How, for example, could expellee demands for integration into West German life tally with demands to return "home"? Clarification of such issues was not long in coming. In answer to criticism from England,¹² the Federation of Homeland Provincial Societies announced that while expellees deplore losses inflicted upon other nations through war and expulsions "with or without German guilt," they are forced to take exception "to being made collectively responsible" for them. Expellees, the statement went on, cannot understand how anyone can condone the vengeful uprooting to which they have been subjected.¹³ Similarly, in answer to the alleged conflict

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *The Times* (London), January 6, 1959.

¹³ Statement by Hans Krüger (at that time President of the Federation), *Der Schlesier*, January 14, 1959.

between expellee demands for economic integration in West Germany and for eventual return to the East, one of the cofounders of the expellee movement commented that they pose "no real dilemma," that the "two aims are not mutually exclusive, but designate two successive tasks which concern not only the expellees, but the entire German people: first, integration, and then, the Lord willing, peaceful resettlement of East German lands."¹⁴

The idea of the so-called "right to return" or "right to the homeland" likewise needed clarification. Efforts to define the concepts led to a series of comprehensive research projects into the question of human rights. (Because of their special importance these will be dealt with separately below.) What East German leaders sought to convince the German people and the world of was the existence of an internationally binding legal precept deeming expulsions illegal and in violation of a man's right to live, without fear of molestation, in his native land or in the land that he had voluntarily chosen as his domicile.

Aside from the two principal expellee federations and their national successor organization, the *BdV*, both the expellee party, the *BHE*, and the East German youth organization, the *DJO*, came forward with similar declarations on principal foreign policy positions as part of the campaign for the 1957 federal elections. The now virtually defunct *BHE* demanded "reestablishment of all of Germany (*Gesamtdeutschland*) within the boundaries to which it is legally entitled," adding that this was to be achieved in two phases: first, through "re-unification with the Soviet Occupied Zone," and second, through "termination of foreign governance, established in violation of international law, over the eastern territory of the German Reich and inclusion of these areas into . . . Germany by peaceful means."¹⁵

By comparison, the *DJO*, in its 1953 Berlin Declaration of Principles, sounds rather bland: "In terms of foreign policy we think that questions raised by frontiers . . . and wars must be solved through negotiation between nations or their governments with due regard

¹⁴ From a speech at a meeting in Hanover on October 10, 1954 in Ottomar Schreiber, *Erbe und Aufgabe des Deutschen Ostens – Reden und Aufsätze*, ed. by Fritz Gause (Munich: Gräfe und Unzer, 1955), pp. 15 f.

¹⁵ From the party's "Guiding Principles on Foreign Policy" (*Aussenpolitische Leitsätze*), *VdL*, April 5, 1957, as quoted in Marzian Documents, *op. cit.*, June 1956 to May 1957, p. 28; also Sudeten German Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

for human rights in all areas.”¹⁶ In its Kiel Principles, published two years later, the youth group expresses its belief in “a Europe as a union of free peoples,” pledging its readiness “to struggle for justice and understanding” wherever “historic and existing rights cannot be contested.”¹⁷

Yet in the *DJO*’s “Principles for Work” it is stressed that German boys and girls should pursue the same goal: “*Recognition of the Right to the Homeland.*” The principles state: “We, German girls and boys, must be willing and able to return to the German homeland provinces which are withheld from us.” They conclude that “the native land is the key to a man’s soul, as there are men who are the key to their native land.”¹⁸ When “authoritative politicians” raised doubts about East Germans claiming the lost homelands, speakers of the *DJO*, at one of its national reunions, said that the group could only oppose such “immaterial assertions.” It was declared that the legal status of the old Reich provinces should be made known and that also “the Sudetenland . . . is an area of Germany . . . in accordance with valid international and constitutional law.” The documents comprising the 1938 Munich Agreement ceding the Sudetenland to Germany were cited in support of this contention.¹⁹

When the *DJO* was labeled as a revisionist organization by a Polish youth committee, Ossi Böse, as *DJO* President, denied the allegation, asserting that East German youth did not propose “to change any legally existing status,” but wanted to ensure that the rights of mankind were also observed in East Europe. “Our organi-

¹⁶ Bundesführung der deutschen Jugend des Ostens/*DJO* (ed.), *Die deutsche Jugend des Ostens/DJO* (Bonn: n.d.); also Grundsätze der *DJO* (Berliner Erklärung), in Sudeten German Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

¹⁷ The original German reads in part: “Wir . . . glauben . . . an Europa, als einer Vereinigung der freien Völker . . . Von diesem Leitbild . . . aus sehen wir auch unsere Aufgabe im Osten. (Wir) werden . . . dort zum Verzicht bereit sein, wo wir dem ureigensten Anspruch eines anderen Volkes begegnen und dort um Recht und Verständnis ringen, wo unser geschichtliches und gegenwärtiges Recht nicht bestritten werden kann,” pp. 145 f., also in *Arbeitsbrief* (internal *DJO* organ published from Munich), 1/1965, part B.

¹⁸ “Wir Mädel verfolgen gemeinsam mit den Jungen in der deutschen Jugend des Ostens das gleiche Ziel: *Anerkennung des Rechts auf Heimat* – Wir deutschen Mädel und Jungen müssen willens und fähig sein, in die uns vorenthaltenen deutschen Heimatgebiete im Osten zurückzukehren . . . Die Heimat ist der Schlüssel zur Seele des Menschen, und es gibt Menschen, die der Schlüssel zu ihrer Heimat sind,” in *DJO*, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ “Erklärung des Bundesjugendtages in Saarbrücken,” dated June 16, 1956, *ibid.*, pp. 146 f.; also in (*DJO*) *Arbeitsbrief*, January 1965, part B.

zation," he said, "is pursuing the same goals as the Polish government (in exile) did in . . . 1941: it demanded then that the Polish population, which had been recklessly expelled, must be given the opportunity to return . . . to the land of their ancestors."²⁰

Similarly, the expellee student organization (*Ostpolitischer deutscher Studentenverband*) insisted that the West German Federal Government never recognize the Oder-Neisse line and never give up the East Germans' right to self-determination.²¹ When admonished that such commonplace approach would hardly yield practical success, but cause anguish and mistrust among Germany's eastern neighbors, the students frowned upon such a "conciliatory" (*versöhnlerische*) attitude. Instead they emphasized that "to uphold a legitimate claim without hope of its realization is still better practical politics (*realpolitischer*) than to renounce it without the least reciprocation."²²

2. *Varying Interpretations*

In contrast to the carefully prepared statements made in the name of the national expellee organizations, the more offhand remarks of individual expellees create quite a different impression of avowed aims. Some speeches made in August 1950, for example, on the occasion of the proclamation of the Charter of the German Expellees, sound rather less moderate than the document itself. To the accompaniment of homeland songs and with cheerleaders waving homeland provincial flags, protests were voiced against "the cruel expulsions – derisive of any justice – of fourteen million human beings" from a homeland which had been theirs "for a thousand years and longer." Apparently at the time both the speakers and the crowd were infuriated by agreements entered into shortly before by the newly established Communist German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and Poland. These renounced all German territorial claims and recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the final "frontier of peace

²⁰ See letter Böse to Cepulis, dated November 14, 1960, in Sudeten German Documents, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 f.; also in *Arbeitsbrief*, January 1965, part. C.

²¹ Wambach Archives, *VHDS* submission to members of the German *Bundestag* dated October 15, 1959 (mimeographed).

²² See *Studenten Greif* (Berlin/Hamburg), *VHDS* mimeographed newsletter, March 1, 1958, and *Studenten Greif* (Heidelberg/Göttingen), July 1959.

and friendships.”²³ Noting “with disgust” this “treason,” expellees demanded “return of the areas torn away.” Admonitions to “remember your dead” and to “hold on to your ancestors’ homes” were hurled at the crowd.²⁴

One reporter describes as “the most touching moment” of the reunion the point at which three older East Germans came forward with urns containing earth from the Sudetenland and Silesia and placed them in the cornerstone of an expellee memorial to be erected as a reminder of the occasion.

Memories of the flight, the expulsions, and post-War I minority struggles have continued to arouse the indignation of East Germans, collectively and individually. The many documentary collections on the migrations would not exist if it were not for the testimonies given by tens of thousands of individual expellees. In the 1950’s, for example, the press of the Danube Swabians was replete with embittered references to the fate of their uprooted groups.²⁵ The Upper Silesians have not stopped publishing full-page reports deplored the fate of their dead whose names appear in long lists, revealing “The Truth about the Polish Hell,” and describing in gruesome detail the “bestial torture and murder of powerless Germans.”²⁶ Under such headlines as “The Murder of Children in the Polish Concentration Camp of Lamsdorf” accusations are made against “Polish murderers,” and the question is raised: “When will these crimes be atoned for?”²⁷ Nearly

²³ In a declaration of June 23, 1950, both Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic rejected all German territorial claims and the German Democratic Republic recognized that resettlement of Germans from the Czechoslovak Republic was “irrevocably just and final.” The Communist German Polish Frontier Agreement was signed at Görlitz (Zgorzelec) on July 6, 1950. The text of the “Prague Declaration” is to be found in *Sudetendeutscher Rat* (ed.), *Die Sudetenfrage in der deutschen Politik* (Munich: Wolf & Sohn, 1965), Mitteleuropäische Quellen und Dokumente, Band 9, pp. 43 f.

²⁴ “Vergesset Eure Toten nicht . . . Haltet fest an der angestammten Heimat!” See report on the meeting in *Fränkischer Tag*, August 8, 1950.

²⁵ “Everyone help with the documentation” is one of their pleas. “Help so that the world will learn about the cruel fate of the Germans from Yugoslavia.” See *Der Donauschwabe*, June 15, 1958, and April 27, 1958, respectively; also *Neuland*, April 20, 1958.

²⁶ “Die Toten von Lamsdorf O/S,” *Unser Oberschlesien*, April 3, 1959, p. 3. Also “Die Toten von Lamsdorf rufen!” *ibid.*, November 3, 1966, p. 1.

²⁷ “Der Kindermord im polnischen KZ Lamsdorf – Bestialische Untaten der Polen nach Kriegsende – Wann werden diese Verbrechen ihre Sühne finden?” *ibid.*, April 30, 1959, p. 3, a nearly full page report. Cf. also *ibid.*, November 3, 1966.

sixteen years after the end of World War II and over forty years after the end of World War I, Hans Christoph Seeböhm, then speaker of the Sudeten *Landsmannschaft* and until recently member of the West German Federal Cabinet, reminded his fellow citizens that on March 4, 1919, "Sudeten German men and women had bled to death, cut down by the bullets of Czech soldiers."²⁸ Seeböhm complained that a double standard of justice was at work, preventing the world from recognizing the expulsions as a crime.²⁹ All the world, he said, still spoke of Lidice as "the epitome of criminal inhumanity," but hardly anyone mentioned Aussig in Czechoslovakia, where, according to him, more than two thousand men, women, and children were shot, or driven into the Elbe river on August 30, 1945.³⁰

Loss of their homes (*Heimat*) is a particularly explosive subject with the expellees. At the 1952 National Party Congress of the *BHE*, National Chairman Waldemar Kraft chose to use the phrase "Forever Undivided" in the Northeast German dialect³¹ as title for his oral presentation to the Congress. His speech was billed as "the principal foreign policy expose" of the meeting. In it he said:

Our fatherland is torn in parts. For this reason our demand is for re-establishment of a united Germany. Germany, for us, is West, Central, and East Germany . . . We have lost our homes. The homeless are strangers in this world. The Lord has placed man into his homeland. To separate man from his home by force means to kill his spirit.³²

Those willing to renounce or oppose claims for recovery of the

²⁸ *MID*, January 28, 1961. On March 4, 1919, the Constituent Assembly of the newly established Austrian Republic convened. The casualties referred to by Seeböhm were Sudeten Germans participating in rallies in Bohemia (then becoming part of Czechoslovakia) in protest against being denied the right to self-determination. See Rabl, *Das Ringen um das Sudetendeutsche Selbstbestimmungsrecht 1918/19*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.

²⁹ Under treaties with the Allies presently in force, West German courts cannot legally deal with claims of acts of expulsion committed against East Germans by citizens (or former citizens) of the United Nations.

³⁰ *MID*, March 6, 1955; see similar charges by Danube Swabians and the Vistula-Warthe *Landsmannschaft*, in *MID*, December 14, 1963, and February 27, 1965, respectively; for another recent illustration see "Eine Traueranzeige klagt an," in *Der Südmährer* (Geislingen), December 15, 1965, p. 824.

³¹ "Up ewig ungedeelt," in *Gesamtdeutscher Block/BHE, Das Echo von Goslar – Der Bundesparteitag 1952*, campaign document published by the expellee party, pp. 37-47.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

lost provinces were to be harshly reprimanded: "Think of it. He who forgets . . . becomes a *traitor*. He who loves Upper Silesia will be ready to *fight* for the homeland."³³ More recently, the designation "renunciative politician" (*Verzichtspolitiker*) is increasingly used to describe anyone who proposes giving up claims to any human or historic rights to the homeland provinces.

Silesian leader Erich Schellhaus -- former Expellee Minister for the State of Lower Saxony, *BHE* member, and representative to the State Diet -- has even been reported to have suggested that those who renounce claims to German territory should be put in prison.³⁴ The same source cites other phrases frequently used to denigrate those willing to forgo claims to the homeland, mentioning in particular such derogatory formulations as "tramp without a homeland" and those who "soil their own nest."³⁵

Such extreme language has become fairly common among members of the East German elite who in matters other than expellee claims are judged to be relatively moderate in their views and comparatively sophisticated in their actions. The late Baltic German leader Axel de Vries spoke of the "deceit" and the "dictate" of Potsdam.³⁶ Hans Schütz, as chairman of the moderate Sudeten German Catholic Ackermann Congregation, spoke of "the bleeding frontier in the East."³⁷ Reinhold Rehs, currently one of the most prominent East Germans, has condemned the arbitrariness of Potsdam as "irreconcilable with history and justice" and as "an example of injustice that must poison the spirit of nations as long as it is not removed."³⁸

³³ *Unser Oberschlesien*, No. 14, September 1954, p. 4 (in space reserved for matters concerning youth activities), emphasis added.

³⁴ "Gefängnis für 'Verzichtspolitiker,'" in *SZ*, July 3, 1962, p. 3.

³⁵ "Vaterlandsloser Geselle" and "Das eigene Nest beschmutzen."

³⁶ "Tag der Trauer um die Heimat -- Der Betrug von Potsdam," *Ostdeutsche Zeitung* (an independent expellee newspaper, published in Hamburg), August 6, 1950, article by Axel de Vries.

³⁷ *Volkshöre* (Munich), August 6, 1955.

³⁸ The German text reads in part: "Wir haben auch ein historisches Recht, wenn wir das Diktat von Potsdam als rechtllos erklären, als einen Gewalt- und Willkürakt, der mit Geschichte und Recht unvereinbar ist und der als Beispiel des Unrechts die Seelen der Völker vergiften muss, solange er nicht beseitigt ist." See *Ostpreussen-Gemeinschaft*, Nr. 9, August 6, 1955, article by Reinhold Rehs, then chairman of the County Association Flensburg of the East Prussian *Landsmannschaft*, as quoted in Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (ed.), *10 Jahre nach der Vertreibung: Äusserungen des In- und Auslandes und eine Zeittafel* (Bonn: author, 1956), p. 10, emphasis added.

The so-called right to the homeland and claims to recovery of lost German lands are often subject to debate. Views expressed frequently exceed the official position adopted by the expellee organizations.³⁹ Specific territorial claims of each of the *Landsmannschaften*, if any, will be examined separately, but the claims made by the expellee party deserve attention here. Under the headline "The 1937 Frontier Would Not Constitute a Real Solution," the *BHE* contended that it was downright foolish to claim the frontiers of 1937, because this would jeopardize Germany's rights to the Sudetenland, West Prussia, Danzig, and the Memel territory. The *BHE* further suggested that it would be even more foolish to claim the frontiers of 1914, because this would open the way for political attacks.⁴⁰

Concepts of a "United Europe," a "New Order," and similar innovative communities that would bring recovery of the lost German lands are in most cases ill-defined. With the important exception of Sudeten German leaders, whose concept of a "New Europe" will be analyzed below, tension existed between East Germans advocating a so-called "New European Order" and those advocating restoration of the so-called "Old European Order." The former group, called "new conceptionists" by their critics, gradually lost ground. To be sure, most expellee political leaders were and still are in favor of West European economic integration and German rearmament within NATO, but when it comes to the question of German borders in the east, they insist on formally fixed state frontiers and balk at any new arrangement in Europe that might deemphasize the importance of national territorial integrity.

Until the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954, some expellee groups, in particular the Lower Silesians, urged that "a new spirit" and "a new social order" were needed, arguing: "This world must finally be freed from nationalism." They spoke impatiently of the Council of Europe at Strassbourg, referring to it as a "debating club," and called for a more effective instrument for promoting European political union.⁴¹ Yet when in 1954 a draft

³⁹ See Plate IV (Map 1) below for areas claimed by the East German Homeland Provincial Societies. See Plate V (Map 2) below for areas claimed by the Central German Homeland Provincial Societies (Soviet Zone Refugees).

⁴⁰ *Gesamtdeutscher Block/BHE - Nachrichtendienst der Partei* (Bonn), June 5, 1953, p. 1.

⁴¹ *Schlesische Rundschau* (Stuttgart), November 15, 1951; see also May 5, 1951, and August 5, 1952; also *Der Schlesier*, September 25, 1952.

European Statute for the Saar territory was put before West Germany for acceptance, the issue immediately arose among the expellees of whether this would constitute "a prejudice to future solution of questions relating to the East." One faction, led by Linus Kather, flatly rejected it and together with the *BHE* and *SPD* voted against it in the *Bundestag*.⁴² Other expellee leaders gave their qualified approval, ostensibly because they considered it "an interim solution" guaranteeing a measure of self-determination to the people of the Saar. Since, however, the London and Paris Agreements, of which the Statute was a part, opened the way for West Germany's acceptance into NATO, they could not reject it. After all, acceptance into NATO meant termination of the occupation and this would lead to West German rearmament. Such support of West Germany's position, it was felt, would bring with it an improvement in the situation of the expellees with regard to homeland policy.⁴³ When creating the new Europe, a West Prussian spokesman said, one should not aim at establishing a "unified European state" but at maintaining "the single peoples within their national states."

Other East Germans spoke of "the need for a fatherland" and "the right to patriotism."⁴⁴ Discussion of the need for a fatherland reawakened afterthoughts on the fate of Prussia. Many expellee leaders from Prussian provinces apparently never reconciled themselves to the formal dissolution of the State of Prussia.⁴⁵ Now they maintained that reestablishment of Prussia would not contravene the evolution of a European federation. By including the German Eastern Provinces, Prussia would contribute to the regeneration of the German people, set a halt to the westward "withdrawal of the Occident,"⁴⁶ and become "a collection center for forces radiating to the

⁴² The Statute provided, subject to a plebiscite vote by the Saar population, a French-German economic condominium within the Western European Union (Brussels Treaty). Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 48-73.

⁴³ See *Das Ostpreussenblatt* (Hamburg), October 5, 1954; *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, September 4, 1954; and opinion of the *VdL* as quoted in Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 56.

⁴⁴ *VdL*, August 23, 1954.

⁴⁵ The *Land Preussen* was dissolved as of February 25, 1947 by Allied Control Council Law No. 46.

⁴⁶ Hermann Rauschning, "Deutscher Osten in künftigem Frieden," *Der Schlesier*, No. 2, January 1953. Rauschning, a native of Thorn, West Prussia, was President of the Danzig Senate in 1933.

East.”⁴⁷ In fact, a retired speaker of the West Prussian Landsmannschaft, Erik von Witzleben, failed to see why “a good Prussian of the old stock (*vom alten Schrot und Korn*) could not, at the same time, be a good European.”⁴⁸ This nationalist attitude remained essentially unchanged and – given the subsequent frustrations in the course of European economic integration – expellee leaders became increasingly sceptical of “a cure-all in Europeanization.”⁴⁹

The expellee leaders’ concern for national security grew with their increasing nationalist aspirations. They did not oppose German rearmament and pledged the cooperation and participation of the East Germans, provided their homeland political interests were safeguarded.⁵⁰ The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) was generally deplored by the East Germans. Voting by expellee delegates on the Paris and London Treaties in the Federal Parliament was nearly unanimous in favor of their adoption.⁵¹ Having subsequently supported NATO, they favored the draft and a strong armed force integrated with Western forces on the basis of equality.⁵² In the 1958 *Bundestag* debates on Russian and Soviet Zone peace proposals and on the Rapacki Plan, which envisaged the two Germanies in a European zone free of nuclear weapons, expellees (and West German politicians close to them) supported the West German Federal Government’s rejection of these schemes. Instead some even deemed “atomic arms to be an unconditional necessity as long as the Soviet Union continued to veto genuine disarmament.” The principal aim

⁴⁷ *Der Schlesier*, No. 4, January 1953.

⁴⁸ *Der Westpreusse*, October 1, 1954.

⁴⁹ *Bulletin*, May 7, 1960, p. 849, Reinhold Rehs, addressing expellee legislators.

⁵⁰ Early expellee reaction to proposed West German rearmament was essentially positive but conditional; thus, the Pomeranians affirmed the idea, provided the Allies discontinued dismantling and reparations in West German, *Pommernbrief*, November 1948; similarly, “Kein Wehrwille ohne gleiches Recht,” *Ostdeutsche Zeitung*, November 26, 1950; “before we join a German army we would like to know what guarantees we have for an all-German *Heimat* in case of a hot war,” *Schlesische Rundschau*, July 5, 1951; or “Erst Heimatrecht und soziale Ordnung,” *Ostdeutsche Zeitung*, February 24, 1952.

⁵¹ *Stenographische Berichte des 2. Bundestages*, pp. 3939 ff., 72nd session.

⁵² In the *Bundestag* debate of the West German military draft bill (*Wehrpflichtgesetz*, Drucksache 2303) the expellee party (GB/BHE) supported the Adenauer Government’s proposal since it fulfilled West Germany’s legitimate defense obligation and cooperation with NATO. See reports of the 2nd *Bundestag*, 143rd session on May 4, 1956; cf. also subsequent reports of the debates on July 4, 6, and 7, 1956.

was "assurance of freedom, reunification in . . . freedom, and prevention of a surrender to Bolshevik power."⁵³

Samples from the prose and poetry of the East Germans render an even better impression of the political tenets and motives of the expellees. Organized festivities often provide an opportunity for making formalized sentimental appeals. At its many reunions, the expellee youth organization (*DJO*), with Nordic runes, torchlights, and drums, conjures a romantic mood reminiscent of the German Youth *Bünde* and *Wandervogel* era that may be quite impressive for a receptive participant. "A liar is he who imputes that we will not return to the homeland of our parents, to *our* homeland," proclaim the East Prussian Youth.⁵⁴ Silesian Youth are told: "Youth troop from the East . . . conspire . . . to stick together until, one day, fate will lead you back to your homeland."⁵⁵ In a short play entitled *The Land in the East is Living! (Ostland lebt!)*, "The Negativist" argues with "The Faithful One" that "the land in the East is dead and forgotten." Since fathers and sons have conquered and shed their blood for the land in the East, "he who gives up the homeland, gives up himself," for "the land in the East is living – and stays alive in us!"⁵⁶ A guide for organizing youth meetings is reported to contain this story: Czech school children want to compel a Sudeten German boy to kiss the Czech national flag and threaten to beat him to death if he does not do so. "Should he give in? No, a German boy does not surrender, he would rather die!"⁵⁷ A "call to Germany" before some 5,000 young East Germans in Nuremberg in 1956, challenged "to awaken," telling them they had "slept enough" and must prepare "to wage a battle for justice (*Rechtskampf*) over the thousand-year old settlements in Bohemia, Moravia, and all the German Eastern Provinces."⁵⁸

⁵³ See remarks of the Pomeranian *Bundestag* delegate Hans-Joachim Merkatz, then deputy chairman of the rightist German Party (*DP*) and Federal Secretary in various ministries including, subsequently, the expellee ministry, in the reports of the 3rd German *Bundestag*, 19th session on March 21, 1958, pp. 981–988; also *SZ*, March 22/23, 1958.

⁵⁴ "Bekenntnis der Ostpreussischen Jugend," *Unser Arbeitsbrief*, September 1957, Folge 9.

⁵⁵ Ulrich Plötzke, "Ostlandjugend," in *Der Schlesier*, No. 46, November 1954.

⁵⁶ H. E. Wendler, "Ostland lebt! Ein Feierspiel," *DJO* (ed.), *Der Jugendkreis: Blätter für Gruppenarbeit* (Hameln: Der Pfeil, n.d.).

⁵⁷ *SZ*, November 13, 1961, p. 10.

⁵⁸ *DJO, Pfingsttreffen Nürnberg 1956* (Hameln: Der Pfeil, n.d.).

The nostalgic poems that often articulate expellee claims help to define the concept of the homeland or *Heimat*. *Heimat* is the permanent home, soil, or property that has been secured, maintained, and defended against non-Germans by hard work. *Heimat* also consists of traditions, spiritual experience, and a common destiny. A man grows up in the *Heimat*, his roots are in it, he can't escape its formative influence. Whoever loses it is uprooted, is in "misery."⁵⁹ Though left behind, the homeland is never to be deemed lost. Too much fighting has been done to protect it against intruders:

Once encircled by the Mongols
Bulwark of the Christian West
Stemming *Polish greed and hatred*
And a wall to stop the Hussites.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Every effort has been made to explain the concept: see Kaps *Tragödie Schlesiens*, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-22; Rabl (ed.), *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, first three volumes; also Kurt Stavenhagen, *Heimat als Lebenssinn* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1948). The strangely romantic flavor surrounding much of the *Heimat* discussions in the expellee press is well illustrated by Harald Kohtz in his poem "Heimat," in *Der Westpreusse*, October 15, 1954, p. 3:

"Du bist der Sinn, du bist die Seele,
du bist der Glaube und die Glut.
Du bist der Weg, den ich mir wähle,
du bist der Morgen und der Mut.
Du bist die Freude und der Friede,
du bist die Flur, du bist der Fluss,
In deinem Lächeln, deinem Liede
erblüht mir Blume, Blut und Kuss.
Du bist das Heil, du bist die Helle,
Du bist die Liebe und das Licht.
Du bist der Wald, der Wind, die Welle,
du bist Gedanke und Gedicht."

⁶⁰ Georg Gabschuss, "Noch ist Schlesien nicht verloren," *Der Schlesier*, Christmas issue 1954, p. 9; the last stanza reads:

"Einst, umbrandet von Mongolen,
Abendländscher Christen Wehr;
Wall gen Hass und Gier der Polen
Und Hussiten ringsumher;
Hold in Flur und Wald und Bergen,
Von der Oder mild getränkt,
Ward es heilige Muttererde,
der sich deutsche Kraft geschenkt."

Emphasis added. The Hussites, it will be remembered, were the nationalist Czech reformers under Johann Hus who invaded German neighboring areas in the course of the Hussite Wars, 1419-1436.

For the First Federal Congress of the United East German Provincial Societies (*VOL*) in 1951, the Transylvanian German leader and poet Heinrich Zillich wrote a eulogy entitled "In Honor of the Dead," an extreme but therefore effective summary of the feelings and aspirations of many East Germans:

Here they stand, Germans from the East, chased and escaped from horrors, sacked and homeless. Here they stand, united before the world, raising their voice. Our homeland reaches across the Baltic to the Black Sea. It is where the Dvina, Vistula, and Oder flow; it is at the Volga and Bug. It bloomed on both sides of the lower Danube and at the fringe of the Balkans. It gave us food at the Pregel, the Neisse, the Havel, and the Moldau.... And today its forest and fields are running to waste.

Think of it! The eastern marches of the Occident flourished under our plows.

We speak for ancestors who planted in the wilderness of the East a better life, morals and law, and cities. We speak for the cathedrals, for the numberless treasures of art, for the beautiful communities, . . . the villages, the craft shops, and for each brook, at which we played as children. . . . We speak for the universal, reforming spirit of our *Heimat*, for Copernicus, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Herder, . . . Joseph von Eichendorff, and Adalbert Stifter. For the farmers we speak, for the laborers, the burghers, the nobles . . . of many provinces, and we do not forget the peoples whose teachers and helpers we were. Ever since we have left them . . . oppression has been their lot. They are yearning for us, secretly; are cursing those who tortured us — the assassins in their midst. . . .

We have long been protectors of the continent. Error, guilt, and arrogance of the great, and finally the stroke of the pen at Potsdam destroyed the fruits of a millennium. No human tribunal can atone for this. We do not accuse. The most horrible deeds are judged by God. May he avenge us upon those who expelled us. . . .

But we . . . must awaken the conscience of Europe. . . . Sixteen million were expelled, and every fourth one was murdered. . . . We cried for help, . . . but the world was silent. . . .

In awe and grief think of the martyrs at the bulwarks of Europe, think of the soldiers . . . and think of those who were destroyed (*vertilgt*), defenseless, against law and mercy! . . . Think of the immense countries in the East (now) sinking into obscurity! Martyrs, arise from your sleep, awaken the hearts of the world, liberate the Occident for us! ⁶¹

⁶¹ Vereinigte Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (ed.), *Reden und Vorträge gehalten auf dem ersten Bundeskongress der VOL* (Frankfort, 1951), pp. 11-13.

The generally accepted ideas and goals of expellees may be summarized as follows: Expellees maintain that they have suffered a great injustice because they resided lawfully in their native lands as protectors of a superior Western civilization which their pioneer ancestors developed over past centuries. They were driven from these lands in violation of international law, and many feel that they are martyrs for the Western cause. They regard as unlawful the *de facto* annexation of the German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line. In their opinion, Germany continues to exist — legally at least — within its 1937 frontiers, and the Big Four remain obligated to reunite it under a final peace treaty. While some responsibility for earlier, similar persecution on the part of Nazi Germany is recognized, collective guilt on the part of the German people is strictly denied, and every thought of revenge and retaliation for the expulsions is forsown. With the East German "mission in the East" terminated, they believe their homelands have sunk into obscurity. Expellees have therefore sought reparation in the form of an equitable share from the entire German people for immediate material burdens and demanded the exercise as soon as practicable of the right collectively to co-determine the final political disposition of the Oder-Neisse territories in accordance with the principles of self-determination expressed in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. They have demanded, further, that their right to the homeland be internationally recognized and legitimized. If attained, this would mean that they could return to and live freely in their native lands.

3. Implementation

Expellee organizations have only general notions how they will achieve these goals. Until German reunification and a final peace with an all-German government are imminent, East German leaders apparently feel that there is little they can do or plan to do by way of specific actions to achieve their foreign policy goals. Thus implementation of policy is still primarily conceived of as in a preparatory stage and is therefore limited mostly to information campaigns, cultural work and lobbying.

The *Landsmannschaften* were to evolve into large, dynamic groups of idealists — "the hard core troops of the Free World" in its struggle against Bolshevism. Engaging the interest of all West Germans was

deemed their "most urgent task."⁶² In this endeavor the *Landsmannschaften* realized early that they should first overcome party-political, denominational, and ethnic differences among their own followers in order to work together effectively for the common goal. Once these differences had vanished the movement would take in all Germans and – backed by their collective will – its success would merely be a question of time and opportunity.

The *BdV* has worked out policy guidelines in harmony with this thinking. These concern essentially cultural policy (*Kulturarbeit*) and foreign policy. The designation "homeland policy" (*Heimatpolitik*) is also used interchangeably in both areas of concern but obviously applies mostly in reference to foreign affairs. Close connections with East German cultural, religious, and academic establishments aim at safeguarding "cohesion and tribal consciousness among members of a homeland province." Training the younger generation is given special attention so that youth may not only be "politically prepared" to demand return of the homeland but stand up for this demand with "passion in its heart."⁶³ Awakening and intensifying "the determination of pioneers" among youth eventually to resettle the East German provinces is often considered the most important task of *Kulturarbeit* (cultural work).⁶⁴

Cultural work among the expellees involves a wide variety of activities, ranging from special church services using East German liturgy and literary and musical presentations to picnics, hikes, and week end rallies that feature native dances and at which homeland costumes are worn. Homeland symbols such as flags, escutcheons and monastic crosses are thought to be of particular value.⁶⁵ For numerous occasions throughout the year special projects designed to appeal to both young and old are launched and program guides and

⁶² Walter Rinke, "Unsere vordringlichste Aufgabe," *Der Schlesier*, October 25, 1951.

⁶³ See *BdV*, "Grundsätzliches und Arbeitshinweise zur Kulturarbeit," in *Arbeitsbrief*, No. 3, Frühjahr 1960, p. 5; also "Leitsätze der Kulturarbeit," *VdL*, September 26, 1958.

⁶⁴ *VdL*, December 14, 1958.

⁶⁵ *HvP*, October 5, 1950, Beilage. When in 1950 Lower Silesians celebrated one of their "homeland weeks" in Cologne, a German refugee girl, just arrived from the East, presented a bowl with Silesian earth and an apple harvested in Silesia to the *Landsmannschaft* speaker (then Walter Rinke) "to symbolize his trusteeship over the sacred Silesian soil," *Schlesische Rundschau*, October 20, 1950.

suggestions issued. Besides Christmas, New Year's Day, Easter, and Pentecost, they include German Unity Day, June 17; a day in the first week in August commemorating the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference; a day called "Homeland Day" (*Tag der Heimat*); Memorial Day (*Volkstrauertag*) in November; and numerous anniversaries of births or deaths of famous East Germans.⁶⁶

Efforts to implement foreign policy goals led relatively early to the establishment of contacts with the West German Minister of Foreign Affairs and the *Bundestag*. Already the former West German Regional Association (*ZvD/BvD*) and the *VdL* had worked out detailed foreign policy procedures and created special internal committees charged with foreign policy campaigns.⁶⁷ Aside from expellee leaders being members of or delegates to West German political parties, special expellee groups have emerged within the important West German parties, and a special union of all East German parliamentarians has been established. East German expellee leaders insist that "the government must not take any decision concerning the future of the areas from which Germans were expelled," unless the expellees had "a chance to cooperate."⁶⁸ In the next chapter the efficacy of expellee policies will be gauged in terms of the government's reaction. First, however, it is necessary to look at the political aspirations of the various homeland groups.

B. HOMELAND PROVINCIAL CLAIMS

In spite of centralized efforts to achieve congruity, the political aims of the *Landsmannschaften* naturally reflect differences of origin and experience. For purposes of surveying their particular homeland provincial goals, the subgroupings of Reich Germans, Sudetenland Germans and ethnic Germans from other East European states will again be used. The last group will be dealt with first.

⁶⁶ BdV, *Arbeitsbrief*, No. 5, November 1960 and No. 8 November 1961. Most expellee newspapers and periodicals have special Christmas and New Years issued; *ibid.*, No. 7, June 1961; *MID*, September 4, 1965; *VdL*, June 7, 1954; *ibid.*, No. 8, November 1961; see also the *BdV* appeal to celebrate the 150th birthday of *Reichskanzler* Otto von Bismarck, *MID*, March 27, 1965.

⁶⁷ Letter, dated April 2, 1952, by Helmut Gossing, member of the *BvD* Presidium, to the *Landsmannschaft* speakers, mimeographed; also "Aussenpolitische Richtlinien . . .," *HvP*, March 5, 1953.

⁶⁸ *VdL*, November 12, 1956.

1. Ethnic Germans

The goals advanced in the name of a particular *Landsmannschaft* begin with statements of purpose in constitutions or by-laws. Most *Landsmannschaften* generally hesitate to advertise avowals that might be construed to be irredentist in character. The greater the distance from the homeland, the less specific have been declared foreign policy goals. In their by-laws most of the twelve Homeland Provincial Societies of ethnic Germans from Russian and North- and Southeast Europe refrain from making specific claims for recovery of lost lands or their right to return to them. Instead, emphasis is almost exclusively laid on social and economic assistance and cultural and educational needs. The idea of course is to promote integration into West German society. Keeping alive homeland traditions and making them generally known are nonetheless considered of primary importance. The by-laws of the Yugoslavian German *Landsmannschaft* pledge to further "spiritual and social relations with the indigenous (West German) population."⁶⁹ Similarly, as a chief aim, Germans from Rumania and Bulgaria stress guidance in integrating youth into West German crafts, agriculture, and industry.⁷⁰ The Banat Swabians wish to see that the interests of Germans left behind in Rumania are safeguarded. The Society of Baltic Germans simply calls for "protection of the social and cultural interests" of its members. The only exception is the Danzig Homeland Provincial Society, which outrightly declares that it will "promote all endeavors toward recovery of the homeland."⁷¹

It will be recalled that ethnic Germans number about one-fifth of all expellees in West Germany (cf. Figure 2) and that many initially belonged to groups resettled under the Hitler-Stalin agreements. Since they were not actually expelled after 1945, they do not possess the same rights as other expellees. As a result, their main concern has been to attain improved legal status in an effort to facilitate economic integration into West German life. This shapes the special, non-extreme character of their by-laws.

⁶⁹ *Satzung der Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien* (mimeographed, n.d.).

⁷⁰ This applies especially to Homeland Provincial Societies of ethnic Germans from Transylvania, Dobrudja, and Bessarabia.

⁷¹ *Satzung des Bundes der Danziger, e.V.* (mimeographed, n.d.).

In their press and publications and in their speeches at meetings and congresses, a similar reluctance is to be found among expellees to claim specifically restoration of their lost homelands. Some groups express their aspirations to return and to recover material losses in terms of what is hoped for: "If it should please the Lord ever to return to us . . . our ould homeland, we will be ready, alongside our neighboring peoples, to work and make sacrifices."⁷² Those who left under the force of German resettlement plans in the period from 1939 to 1941 almost without exception restrict their pretenses to furthering integration into West Germany: "It is our main goal to help every compatriot obtain a just property settlement . . . , as well as his own home and an independent livelihood."⁷³ To press more effectively for settlement of material claims, the Bessarabian Germans insisted that homeland provincial meetings always be well attended, demonstrating solidarity and "firm union."⁷⁴

Apart from concern for material welfare, the attitude of Germans from Russia and Yugoslavia reflects the tragic experience of the uprooting, the losses of lives sustained in the course of the flight and expulsions, and the break-up and separation of families, enforced since the end of the war. "Release the members of our families — our wives, our husbands, and our children!" is the plea made by Germans from Russia.⁷⁵ The very name of their central press organ, *People on the Road* conveys their sense of transience and hints of their awareness that most of their compatriots left behind have been dispersed further East.⁷⁶ The year 1962 marked the 200th anniversary of the first German agricultural colonies in Russia,⁷⁷ and special pleas were made by Germans from Russia urging restoration of basic human rights for over 1,500,000 compatriots in the Soviet Union

⁷² Statement by Hans Diplich, speaker of the *Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben*, in *HvP*, August 2, 1951, p. 1.

⁷³ Christian Kalmbach, president of the *Landsmannschaft der Bessarabiendeutschen*, in *HvP*, March 19, 1953, p. 2; see also *HvP*, Artikeldienst, September 5, 1951.

⁷⁴ *Mitteilungsblatt des Hilfskomitees der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche und der Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Bessarabien* (Hanover), August 1, and August 15, 1958.

⁷⁵ *Volk auf dem Weg* (Stuttgart), No. 6, June 1955, p. 8.

⁷⁶ See "Volk immer noch auf dem Weg" (A People Still on the Road), in *Volk auf dem Weg*, June 1958.

⁷⁷ *Volk auf dem Weg*, No. 6, June 1962, published facsimiles of decrees issued by Catherine II in 1762 and 1763 in German requesting foreigners to settle in Russia and granting special settlement tax and cultural privileges.

denied "the freedom of movement" guaranteed to their ancestors.⁷⁸ Similarly, deplored the fact that several thousand children below age sixteen were left behind in Yugoslavian camps while their parents were expelled to West Germany, Germans from Yugoslavia vowed to persist in reminding the world of their right to the homeland until "the last German has left Yugoslavia."⁷⁹

Since there was a flight but no expulsions of Germans from Rumania, the majority of them remained behind. In this case, the break-up of families led, particularly among Transylvanian Saxons, to a tendency to abandon West Germany in order to return and rejoin families in Rumania.⁸⁰ Relatively insignificant, the resulting eastward migration did not offer a suitable way out for many ethnic groups who in consequence eventually petitioned the Bonn government to open diplomatic relations with Rumania for the purpose of discovering an alternative answer to being separated from their kinsmen.⁸¹ Others simply could not reconcile themselves to being homeless, alluding with pride to relatives left behind in Rumania.

Cultivation of homeland provincial heritage continues to be a universal preoccupation among all these ethnic groups: "It is one of the main tasks of the *Landsmannschaft* to see to it that the cultural heritage of our forefathers is not lost in Germany."⁸² But none of these groups has managed to be quite so articulate on the subject as the Baltic Germans. After many years of "indescribably cruel expulsions," while still uprooted, they manifested "an unbendable will," "a firm position between heritage and the promise of the future."⁸³ Looking back, they point with pride to the successful formation of "the state in the German Northeast", in which "Balt and Slav elements melted . . . , colonial classes were overcome, and a uniform, culturally rich and strong society evolved."⁸⁴ They maintain that this

⁷⁸ *Volk auf dem Weg*, No. 7, June 1962.

⁷⁹ "Kinder im Schatten," *Unser Arbeitsbrief* (DJO organ), 1957, Folge 11, pp. 34 f.

⁸⁰ For details on this trend, see *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* (Munich), May 30, 1956, and *Neuland*, June 9, 1956.

⁸¹ *Bundestag-Drucksache*, 3. Wahlperiode, No. 2740, p. 11.

⁸² Jakob Jelinek, federal president of the *Landsmannschaft der Buchenlanddeutschen*, in *HvP*, May 10, 1951, p. 2.

⁸³ Nordostdeutsche Akademie (ed.), *Die Begründung der Norddeutschen Akademie in Lüneburg am 31. Oktober 1951* (Lüneburg: Nordostdeutsche Akademie, 1951), pp. 7 f.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 19 and 25.

society was shaped by its "extremely dangerous frontier position toward Asia" and that it "secured protection" for the German West and South, enabling them to perpetuate their "richer, easier, and more joyful existence" in the face of the "challenge" from the East. Neither are the cultural achievements of this society forgotten: in science (Copernicus), music (Heinrich Schütz), painting (Caspar David Friedrich), literature (Herder), and philosophy (Kant). All this leads to serious doubts about whether the world really knew what was happening when this northeast German Society was uprooted and expelled: "Does it know what it is doing . . . as it is giving up a part of the Occident? . . . This hill now erected on top of the past is not a pyramid resting by itself. It is a volcano."⁸⁵

In a somewhat different vein Germans from West Hungary recall with bitterness the territorial arrangements concluded under the Treaty of St. Germain and ceding most of their land to Hungary. Denouncing the post-World War I plebiscite in the Ödenburg district as "an immense fraud,"⁸⁶ the expellees nevertheless found that the expulsions, "aside from all the sufferings . . . that they caused," brought this achievement: "The Germans from West Hungary, now in their mother country, are freed from earlier frustrations, are politically openminded, and have become self-assured." This, it was felt, offered a unique chance to realize "the mistake made in the past" and to seek new political ways toward a better solution for the co-existence of peoples in the Danube and Carpathian areas.⁸⁷

Carpathian Germans from Slovakia early expressed their interest in a new future political arrangement that would permit them "to live peacefully" with the Slovak people.⁸⁸ Like their Sudetenland German neighbors, they established contacts with exiled Slovak politicians.⁸⁹ In contrast to Germans from Yugoslavia and Russia,

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁸⁶ Allegedly perpetrated by the International Plebiscite Commission, which collaborated with the Hungarian authorities. See *Komitee der Deutschen aus Westungarn, Festbrief – 1. Bundestreffen der Deutschen aus den west-ungar-ländischen Komitaten Wieselburg, Ödenburg und Eisenburg am Pfingstsonntag 1954 in Ludwigsburg* (Ludwigsburg, 1954), pp. 10 and 22.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸⁸ Anton Birkner, "Die Karpathendeutsche Landsmannschaft Slowakei," in *Göttinger Arbeitskreis, op. cit.*, pp. 24–26.

⁸⁹ In an essay commemorating the 75th birthday of the then Sudeten German speaker Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, one of the Slovak leaders wished for "mutual respect, tolerance, and creative and neighborly reconstruction within a

those from Central Poland shunned commenting on the life and sufferings of the past and seemed to advocate more realistic views: "The times of riding over the East are past," said Hans Koch, then their speaker.⁹⁰ Another of their leaders warned of a typical homeland provincial weakness: "We must avoid self-pity. We should not consider ourselves to be the center of world attention . . . nor turn over old leaves of family albums."⁹¹ Nevertheless, still others urged an active general interest in "the fight for justice" and in "reunification of Germany."⁹²

By comparison, Germans from the Free City State of Danzig seem extraordinarily conservative and particularistic. Forming a government in exile, they contested the validity of Danzig's reunification with Germany, demanded "evacuation of (the Poles from) their homeland province"⁹³ and requested in addition that the United Nations reestablish their Free State.⁹⁴ Their claims have always been well defined. In terms of territory they insist upon their right to possess the entire area of the city of Danzig now known as Gdansk, as well as adjacent land formerly part of the Free State.⁹⁵ Restoration

future Europe of freely (united) peoples." Matus Cernak, "Der Europäische Weg – Zu den Deutsch-Slowakischen Beziehungen," in Albert Karl Simon (ed.), *Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag des Sprechers der Sudetendeutschen Rudolf Lodemann von Auen* (Munich: Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, 1953), pp. 79–83. Cernak was assassinated in Munich in July 1955.

⁹⁰ *Münchener Merkur*, August 31, 1953.

⁹¹ Johannes Scholz, speaker of the *Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe*, in *Schwäbische Landeszeitung*, August 31, 1953.

⁹² *Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe*, October 1958, Folge 10, p. 2.

⁹³ *Lübecker Freie Presse*, August 2, 1950; also notes by Fritz Rossberg in the archives of the Göttinger Arbeitskreis entitled "Der Kampf der Danziger um ihr Recht – Bund der Danziger fordert Räumung des Heimatgebietes;" and "Danzig muss wieder frei werden," *Unser Danzig* (Lübeck), August 1954, and February 1955.

⁹⁴ On the formation of the Danzig government in exile and its pleas to the United Nations for international recognition see Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse*, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 f., and *Unser Danzig*, August 1955, p. 3. For a more recent reassertion of these claims, see *VdL*, June 19, 1959, "Tag der Danziger in Kiel," pp. 5 f. and *DOD*, August 24, 1959, "Danzig und die UNO," p. 9, in which it is held that the unilateral renunciation of the Free City status on August 23, 1939, and subsequent reunification with the German Reich had no international legal validity. See also a statement of concurrence with this view in terms of the legal details by Kurt Rabl, *Die gegenwärtige völkerrechtliche Lage der deutschen Ostgebiete* (Munich: Isar, 1958), pp. 59 f.

⁹⁵ The total area of the Danzig Free State extended from the Baltic Sea, between the town of Zoppot in the West and the so-called Haff (lake separated from the Baltic by long narrow strips of land) in the east, southward as far as the

of this land would mean, in their view, recovery of the public and private property which is rightfully theirs.

2. *Reich Germans*

In contrast to the ethnic groups, virtually all those groups from the provinces of post-World War I Germany eventually pressed, with varying degrees of insistence, for recovery of their homes. With the exception of the Lower Silesians, the national by-laws of the six Reich German Homeland Provincial Societies revealed far-reaching foreign policy goals. Simply stated, the Pomeranians and East Prussians demanded recovery of their homeland provinces and all other Eastern German territories. Upper Silesians and East Brandenburgers alluded to legal claims, citing the injustice done to their groups, pledging to work for compensation of losses, and encouraging compatriots to strive to return to their homes.

None of the *Landsmannschaften* give specific descriptions of territorial claims, except the West Prussians, who do so in an effort to clarify the internal organization of their society. The West Prussians are in fact the only group who describe the structure of their organization in their by-laws by defining their territory of origin and enumerating all the counties, including those in the Polish Corridor, of which their homeland province was composed before the end of World War I. Among the Reich groups, only the Pomeranians state that they represent and intend to safeguard the interests of their people behind the Iron Curtain. (Among the ethnic groups, only the Rumanian Swabians do so.) Finally, except for the Silesians, the Homeland Provincial Societies of the Reich groups provide for exclusive membership – that is, literally interpreting and applying the term *Landsmann* (compatriot), they usually admit only those individuals who stem from the territory of origin designated in the name of the *Landsmannschaft*.⁹⁶

town of Dirschau (now Tczew) and beyond the town of Marienburg (now Malbork). See map subtitled "The Recovery of our Homeland is the Goal of the Union of Danzigers" ("Die Wiedergewinnung unserer Heimat ist das Ziel des Bundes der Danziger"), in *Unser Danzig*, November 1, 1958, frontpage. This policy position has not changed since then. See the socalled Greenbook distributed by the Danzigers in 1967, *Gerechtigkeit für Danzig – Das Problem der freien Stadt Danzig*; cf. *SZ*, June 12, 1967.

⁹⁶ The prerequisite, for example, for membership in the Upper Silesian *Landsmannschaft* is that the applicant must either be an Upper Silesian or "feel in

The political aspirations of the Reich German expellees are explicitly defined in public statements and writings. The groups from East Prussia, Pomerania, and East Brandenburg (about one-fourth of all expellees) clearly wish to see their homeland areas reestablished within a united Germany encompassing at least pre-World War II frontiers. East Prussian leaders continue to demand "final settlement" of Germany's eastern frontiers in accordance with "the principles of the Atlantic Charter."⁹⁷ On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen* they reiterated their contention that in 1945 East Prussia and the other East German Provinces were "incontestably a part of the German state."⁹⁸ Aside from the Atlantic Charter, in support of their territorial claims they cite the Four-Power Declaration of June 5, 1945, which provided for the division of Germany into four military occupation zones within Germany's frontiers as of December 31, 1937, and the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights of December 10, 1948. As a further argument, they call attention to Notes sent to the Soviet Union by the Western Allies in 1952, in which it is made clear that Germany's frontiers were not settled at the Potsdam Conference but await "the final determination" of a peace treaty.⁹⁹ East Prussians also advert to the overwhelming German vote recorded in the post-World War I plebiscite by the population of East Prussia and stress its economic importance as an agricultural supplier for Germany.¹⁰⁰ Finally, they point out that the southern and eastern frontiers of East Prussia had

solidarity" with them. See *Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier e.V. — Satzung* (n.d.).

⁹⁷ See, for example, *HvP*, June 14, 1951. Reference is frequently made to the first two principles of the Atlantic Charter which affirm that the participating countries seek "no aggrandizement, territorial or other . . . (and) no territorial changes not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."

⁹⁸ *VdL*, May 2, 1959; p. 5.

⁹⁹ *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen* (ed.), *Ostpreussen — Eckpfeiler Europas* (Hamburg, n.d.); pamphlet *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen, 1948-1958* (Leer, Ostfriesland, n.d.), after p. 40. For the text of the Notes see U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 — Basic Documents* (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, 1957), publication 6446 (General Foreign Policy Series 117) Vol. II, pp. 1797 f. and 1809-1813. Together with similar notes from the British and French they constituted a reply to the Soviet Union's German peace proposals of March 10, 1952.

¹⁰⁰ This refers to the 1920 plebiscites in the West Prussian district of Marienwerder and the East Prussian district of Allenstein. Only a small percentage of the votes favored Poland.

already existed for 700 years and that this fact contradicted all assertions of "aggressive German pressure" toward the east. In the northeast, moreover, East Prussia's frontiers had been "finally determined" in 1422. Thus, they conclude, East Prussia possessed "the oldest unchanged border in Europe."

That area claimed is shown on a map of East Prussia within its pre-1919 frontiers. The map includes the Memel territory in the northeast and all the districts that were part of West Prussia. A description of the *Landsmannschaft* contains a list of the homeland provincial counties retained within the organization. Judging by the list, all four counties in the Memel territory, which was retroceded to Germany by the German-Lithuanian Treaty of March 22, 1939, are considered as belonging to East Prussia.¹⁰¹

Like the Baltic Germans, the East Prussians have spared no efforts to insist on the importance of the German East for West Germans. Their first leader, Ottomar Schreiber, took great pains to enlighten the West German public about East Germans in general and East Prussians in particular. He argued that the German East had not been "a mere collection of provinces" but a part of the German nation that distinguished itself culturally and historically.¹⁰² Unlike the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks, who conquered "with the sword," he said, Germans in the East settled their provinces "with the plow and the axe." No other people in Europe could point to such an achievement, he maintained, and therefore no other people in Europe could "better justify" its continued existence in an area.¹⁰³ This idea of the valuable, non-aggressive service performed by Christian pioneers in the German East is unrelentingly stressed:

From the time that Lithuanians and Poles became Christians to the year 1939 no invasions occurred on the part of the East Prussians by force of arms — not even in 1914. The history of our homeland began neither in 1772 nor in 1920. It began when a helpless Polish sovereign of a partial state called for the German Order of Knights (*Ritterorden*)

¹⁰¹ Whether the town and area around Soldau in the south and the former West Prussian counties of Elbing, Marienburg, Stuhm, Marienwerder, and Rosenberg are also claimed is not clear. They are shown on the map as belonging to East Prussia but are not contained in the roster of homeland provincial counties. See *ibid.*, pp. 82–84, and Plate IV (map I) below.

¹⁰² Schreiber, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁰³ See text of his speech in Frankfort on Homeland Day in 1949, *ibid.*, pp. 51–53 and 67.

because he could no longer protect himself on his own strength from . . . the attacks of pagan neighbors from the north. It began when the Order took possession of the pagan land, in the emperor's name and with the Pope's blessing, which conveyed legitimate title under the international and moral law known in the middle ages. It began when through this action it merged with (the history of) the *corpus christianum*, the family of nations of the Christian Occident.¹⁰⁴

Just as this heritage should not be forgotten, so, it is said, contributions of East Prussians to German and Western literature, art, and science should also be remembered.¹⁰⁵ In light of this background, the expulsions of East Prussians and the seizure, partition and occupation of East Prussia by Poland and the Soviet Union is regarded as "a monstrous misdeed" and all East Prussian compatriots are called upon to make clear "every day" to West Germans and the rest of the world that "East Prussia *was* German, *is* German and will *remain* German."¹⁰⁶

Spokesmen for the Brandenburgers and Pomerians leave no room for doubts about just what they claim. They wish for Germany to be reunited with the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, generally within its 1937 frontiers. The Pomeranian *Landsmannschaft*, moreover, wishes for Pomerania to remain within its administrative boundaries of 1938, at which time it was enlarged by certain regions in the southeast taken from Brandenburg and West Prussia.¹⁰⁷ Therefore the territorial claims of the Pomerians conflict with both those of the

¹⁰⁴ See the introduction to Ottomar Schreiber, *Heimat Ostpreussen* (Munich: Gräfe und Unzer, 1948).

¹⁰⁵ Towards this end the *Landsmannschaft* established the Order of the Prussian Shield to honor those who earn special acclaim for the homeland. It was first awarded in May 1957 to, among others, poetess Agnes Miegel. Subsequently it has been awarded on February 25 of each year — ostensibly as a protest against the Allied Control Council's dissolution of the Prussian state on that day in 1947. See *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-26.

¹⁰⁶ "Ostpreussen bleibt deutsch," *Das Ostpreussenblatt*, May 18, 1957, p. 1, as reproduced in *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*, *op. cit.*, p. 58. This attitude has not changed essentially. See especially comment in the same organ after the Czech crisis of August 21, 1968.

¹⁰⁷ The Pomerania Province also included areas west of the Oder-Neisse line. For definitions of territorial demands, see the map entitled "Pommern 1938 (1818-1945)," in *Pommern — eine Denkschrift* (Hamburg: Pommersche Landsmannschaft, n.d.), p. 31; also *Pommernbrief* (Hamburg), November and December 1948; and *Das Pommernblatt* (Hamburg), January 1, 1953, in an article entitled "Wir melden unsere Forderungen an" (We Register Our Claims) in which the administrative boundaries as of September 1, 1939, are requested. See also *Pommersche Zeitung*, May 16, 1959, pp. 1 f.

Brandenburgers and the West Prussians.¹⁰⁸ The Pomeranians nevertheless do not temper their assertions in any way. In fact, of all the *Landsmannschaften* they seem to be the most self-assured group. Describing the expulsions as "an infamy of distress and death," they argue that they have been 'banished' from their homeland and are, like other Germans from the East, victims of an international crime.¹⁰⁹ They emphasize that a return to Pomerania can only materialize after German reunification and dissolution of Polish and communist German administration of the province.¹¹⁰ They reject any compromise by which such a return might otherwise be made practicable.¹¹¹ They desire friendly relations with the Poles¹¹² and even want "to help them raise their standard of living."¹¹³ But having never lived with strangers they insist that they have no intention of ever sharing their homeland with them.¹¹⁴ "If Gomulka can choose cynically to declare that it was no disaster when Germany was divided, then we can state with equal frankness . . . that Poland should be delimited to the frontiers of the Versailles Treaty."¹¹⁵ It is added that without Germans in the German East there can be no peace in Europe.¹¹⁶

Like many other East German allegations the claims of the Pomeranians are backed up with detailed legal explanations. Histori-

¹⁰⁸ Plate IV (Map 1) illustrates the conflict of demands. See also *Zehn Jahre Pommersche Landsmannschaft, 1948–1958* (Hamburg, 1958), p. 95, in comparison with the organizational roster of counties in the Brandenburger Homeland Provincial Society as attached to its by-laws, *Satzung der Landsmannschaft Berlin–Mark Brandenburg e.V.* (mimeographed, n.d.).

¹⁰⁹ *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 31, 1958, pp. 2 and 69.

¹¹⁰ "Rückkehr des ungeteilten Pommern in den deutschen Reichsverband," (Return of the Undivided Pomerania to the United German Reich), in *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 31, 1958, pp. 2 f. See also *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 16, 1959, in "Wir fordern," a list of demands in response to proceedings at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, May–June, 1959, *Further EPS*, June 26, 1959, p. 1; and *Pommersche Zeitung*, May 23, 1959, pp. 1 and 3.

¹¹¹ "Das Bekenntnis der Pommerschen Landsmannschaft," *Pommern 1954*, ein Haus- und Jahrbuch (Leer, 1953), p. 3.

¹¹² *Zehn Jahre Pommersche Landsmannschaft, 1948–1958*, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 f.

¹¹³ *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 31, 1958.

¹¹⁴ In an article entitled "Bekenntnis und Forderung" (Confession and Demand), *Das Pommernblatt*, May 15, 1953, a medieval saying is cited: "The Pomeranians do not belong among the Poles, have never lived together with the Poles, although they have suffered much at the hands of the Poles."

¹¹⁵ *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 31, 1958, pp. 2 f.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 25, 1955, p. 1.

cal entitlement to the province is said to derive from the fact of continued settlement in and cultural development of the area, beginning with its Christianization in the twelfth century. The illegality of the expulsions and subsequent annexation under international law is still stressed; in support of this contention the opinions of West German scholars and authorities in the field of international law are sought and exploited.¹¹⁷ Pomeranian leaders seem particularly eager to keep their *Landsmannschaft* active and militant. As one of the first homeland provincial groups to request the West German government to give them the status of a public corporation, they insisted on their right to recognition as a separate nation (*Staatsvolk*) inside the German State (*Staatsverband*).¹¹⁸ The Pomeranian Homeland Provincial Society, their leaders stressed, was not to degenerate into a mere club.¹¹⁹ Slogans such as "Forever Undivided" were frequently used at meetings and as catch phrases for special projects.¹²⁰ One of these involved deploying hundreds of billboards throughout Lower Saxony in 1960. The billboards featured a map showing a threefold division of Germany into West Germany, Central Germany (the present Democratic Republic), and the Eastern German provinces and bore the caption: "Divided Threefold? Never!"¹²¹ The Pomeranians have been one of few groups actually to go ahead and begin what they refer to as preliminary planning for their future return to the East, gathering experts to make "practical recommendations for the event of reunification and return to the homeland."¹²²

Opposition to the views of the Pomeranians must often reckon with fierce comebacks. As early as 1948, a church official wrote in a Pomeranian newsletter that anyone who does not remain loyal to his homeland is a traitor.¹²³ This led to considerable debate in the

¹¹⁷ See, for example, Herbert Kraus, "Die rechtliche Grundlage der deutschen Ostpolitik," in *Pommern*, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 ff.

¹¹⁸ *HvP*, May 17, 1951, Artikeldienst; *Lübecker Nachrichten*, June 5, 1951.

¹¹⁹ "Die Pommersche Landsmannschaft – kein Heimaterinnerungsverein," from a report on a reunion in Kiel, *Kieler Nachrichten*, July 28, 1952.

¹²⁰ "Auf ewig ungeteilt!" in *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 25, 1955.

¹²¹ *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 28, 1960, p. 1; also special handbill.

¹²² This "planning work" was organized along the pattern of the former Pomeranian Chamber of Agriculture. See *Zehn Jahre Pommersche Landsmannschaft*, *op. cit.*, p. 68. This complemented similar work on "Central Germany" carried on for some time by the Federal Minister of All-German Affairs.

¹²³ Geistlicher Rat Göbel, "Nicht auswandern – sondern rückwandern," in *Pommernbrief* (Hamburg), December 1948.

press. At the 1954 Evangelical Congress in Leipzig, Claus von Bismarck, a highly placed member of the Protestant clergy and himself an expellee who had lost a large estate, said that "in all honesty" he saw no way to return home "without a war." He did not want to pay that price to return and expressed the opinion that what God had taken could not necessarily be demanded back as a right. The Pomeranian press reacted furiously. "Otto von Bismarck (Chancellor of the Second Reich) would turn round in his grave," exclaimed one spokesman. "We Pomeranians should, together with the old Bismarck, side with those who would fight for their homeland until the injustice of Potsdam and Yalta is eliminated."¹²⁴ A considerable controversy arose in the Evangelical Church over this incident, and the issue was passionately discussed in the West German as well as the Pomeranian and other expellee newspapers.¹²⁵ Besides indicating the division of opinion among members of the Protestant clergy on the question of the German East, these two debates illustrate the fervor with which articulate expellees resist appeals to modify or limit their foreign policy goals. This resistance seems to draw its strength from a particularly stubborn ethnic pride and sense of historic mission: "I am a Prussian," said one Pomeranian in criticizing the Allied Control Council's action dissolving the Prussian state. "The Prussian sentinel in the East" proved effective in times of distress, he argued, and since there is again a time of distress, "a Prussian mentality" is required.¹²⁶ This attitude has remained basically unchanged.¹²⁷ Only recently have the Pomeranians agreed that once returned to their land they would tolerate Polish inhabitants who wanted to stay in Pomerania.¹²⁸

The notion of recovering an undivided homeland province is shared with equal determination, though with somewhat less noise, by the Brandenburgers, who continuously pointed out that East

¹²⁴ *Das Pommernblatt*, August 5, 1954. See equally adverse reaction in *Ostpreussenblatt*, August 14, 1954, p. 2.

¹²⁵ See Pastor Lic. Larms Retmold, "Was sagt die Kirche dazu?" in *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, September 20, 1954, p. 6; "Irre Claus von Bismarck an Gottes Wort!", *ibid.*, October 5, 1954, p. 9; and *FAZ*, December 4, 1954, p. 4.

¹²⁶ *Pommernblatt*, March 1, 1953.

¹²⁷ "Pommersche Abgeordnete gegen Verzichtspolitik," in *Archiv*, June 1, 1966, pp. 4 f.

¹²⁸ From an address by the Pomeranian Deputy Speaker in Kiel, August 1966, see *Pommersche Landsmannschaft* (ed.), 6. *Bundespatenschaftstagung* (Hamburg, n.d.); also *Die Welt* (Hamburg), August 18, 1966.

Brandenburg – that is, the counties of that province located east of the Oder-Neisse line – did not develop independently of its western counties. “The nonsense of the Oder-Neisse line is clearly apparent in the fact that a province that had a common history was torn apart.” Like the other groups, the Brandenburgers stress with pride their people’s “great cultural and political achievements.” They urge “national loyalty, consciousness of Prussian traditions, and love for the homeland.”¹²⁹ Their society sees itself as “a refuge and source of strength and reassurance in difficult times” for thousands of compatriots. “Always and everywhere, it’s Brandenburg!” is their principal slogan.¹³⁰ They claim their entire province as it was within the national German frontiers and administrative boundaries of 1937. This claim, as said, conflicts with that of the Pomeranians.¹³¹

Conflicting territorial claims resulting from overlap of differently dated administrative boundaries have sometimes led to considerable tensions among the *Landsmannschaften*, especially among West Prussians, Pomerians, and Danzigers.¹³² Leaders of the West Prussian Homeland Provincial Society have always lobbied for reestablishment of their homeland province in its original entirety – that is, as it was prior to 1919.¹³³ Specifically, they claim five different territories: (1) the counties west of the Polish Corridor that remained German after 1919,¹³⁴ but were incorporated into Pomerania in 1938 and are therefore also claimed by the Pomeranians; (2) the counties east of

¹²⁹ D.Dr.h.c. von Keudell, “Die Landsmannschaft Berlin-Mark Brandenburg,” in *Die ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff.

¹³⁰ See “Hie guet Brandenburg allewege!” in Berliner Landesverband der Vertriebenen e.V., *Aus der Geschichte der Vertriebenen in Berlin* (Berlin, n.d.), pp. 14 f.

¹³¹ See “List of Homeland Province County Chairmen” attached to the Society’s By-laws, *op. cit.*

¹³² On tensions between the Danzig Society and the West Prussians see *Der Westpreusse*, July, September, and October 1949, and October 1951. See also “Um die Aufnahme in den VdL,” in *Unser Danzig*, July 1954, p. 4. Similarly, on tensions between West Prussians and Pomeranians, see *Der Westpreusse*, July 1954, p. 8.

¹³³ For maps and description, see Heinz Neumayer, *Westpreussen – Ein Blick auf seine Geschichte* (Lübeck: Landsmannschaft Westpreussen, n.d.), p. 13; also the by-laws, *Verfassung der Landsmannschaft Westpreussen Bundesorganisation* (mimeographed, n.d.), Section 2.

¹³⁴ Deutsch-Krone, Flatow, and Schlochau Counties (*Kreise*) were part of the Province Grenzmark Posen Westpreussen from 1920–1938; see Map 1 below.

the Corridor that remained German after 1919;¹³⁵ (3) the territory of the former Free City State of Danzig, also claimed by former inhabitants of Danzig; (4) the Corridor area that extends south from the Baltic Sea between Pomerania and Danzig and that was part of West Prussia until 1919 and from 1939 to 1945; and (5) the remaining Corridor area that was part of West Prussia from 1772 to 1807 and from 1939 to 1945.¹³⁶ The West Prussians have always opposed the German national frontiers of 1937 on the grounds that the separation of the Corridor and Danzig areas from their province without a plebiscite was a grave injustice. They maintain that the inhabitants of what became subsequently the Danzig and Corridor areas would never have agreed to be added to Poland if they had been given the chance to express their collective will in a plebiscite. This denial of the principle of self-determination, they say, eventually led to World War II.¹³⁷ They are greatly preoccupied with that they believe to be a general lack of understanding in the West of the division of their provinces at Versailles. They even go so far as to say that the Western Allies have so little knowledge about East Germany and its problems that they cannot well be entrusted with decisions concerning the fate of the homeland. "*This is the basic law of our West Prussian Homeland Provincial Society: We cannot take an interest in half a solution bearing the seed of new conflict.*"¹³⁸ A general antipathy towards restoration of the Corridor thus exists among West Prussians, who feel that it would merely mean recovery of a fraction of their homeland. With this in mind, they demand

¹³⁵ Five counties of the former *Regierungsbezirk* Westpreussen: Elbing, Marienburg, Stuhm, Marienwerden, and Rosenberg.

¹³⁶ The former counties of Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) and Wirsitz (Wyrzysk) were part of the province of Posen (Poznan) from 1807 to 1919; this claim duplicates the efforts of the *Landsmannschaft* of the Germans from Central Poland which already represents the interests of the inhabitants from these counties, see *Jahrbuch der Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe* 1957 (Munich, 1957), pp. 149 f.; see also Map 1 below.

¹³⁷ *HvP*, August 31, 1950, p. 5 and *Der Westpreusse*, September 1950. In an article on the problem of war guilt, one writer claims that the Poles were "silly" to resist when Hitler requested an extra-territorial highway to connect Germany with East Prussia across the Corridor. He argues that it would not have infringed on Polish sovereignty and would have spoiled Hitler's rationalization for a war against Poland. See *Der Westpreusse*, February 1953.

¹³⁸ *Der Westpreusse*, June 1953.

reestablishment of Prussia as it was in 1772.¹³⁹ Opposing views are not tolerated. Suggestions that the problem of frontiers be examined in the light of new concepts of an integrated Europe are rejected.¹⁴⁰ Instead, West Prussian leaders demand that the West German government "put into action" measures to effect their "right to the homeland" and assert that "Prussia lives on and will be resurrected."¹⁴¹

The aspirations of the Silesians, the remaining group of Reich Germans, likewise reflect tensions resulting from rejection by a part of them of the 1919 territorial settlement. That they eventually split into two groups was due in no small measure to differences over policy goals, the Upper Silesians believing the Lower Silesians to be too half-hearted and soft in this regard. Upon its inception, the *Landsmannschaft* purported to represent the interests of the entire group. Its leaders pledged to fight for the unity of West, Central, and East Germany within its old ethnic boundaries (*Stammesgrenzen*); to demand public cognizance of the legitimacy of claims to the German East through commemorative postage stamps, codes of arms, maps, pictures, and posters; and to seek by all possible means to increase feelings of uneasiness among the Poles for "their unlawful possessions."¹⁴² Upper Silesian leaders soon frowned upon these vague claims, however, feeling that the supreme task of Silesians in the West is to continue "the fight for self-determination" lost after World War I. On March 20, 1921, they argued, a majority of the population of Upper Silesia voted to remain German; yet, six months later, the Allies disregarded this vote, ceding East Upper Silesia to

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, September 1950; see also *HvP*, August 31, 1950, p. 5; and Neu-meyer, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁰ *Der Westpreusse*, September 1 and October 15, 1954.

¹⁴¹ For details on similar demands voiced at a national congress see *VdL*, July 19, 1954, pp. 1 f. More recently the West Prussians' goals have been formulated somewhat less directly, but the "claim of the German people to (all of) Westprussia remains." See Walter K. Nehring, "Unsere Heimat Westpreussen," in *Westpreussen Gestern-Morgen* (Münster: *Landsmannschaft Westpreussen*, 1964); cf. also map entitled "Die Verteilung Westpreussens 1919/20" (The Quadripartition of Westprussia 1919/20) and "Leitsätze der *Landsmannschaft Westpreussen*," in pamphlets distributed by them in 1968.

¹⁴² "Grundsatzserklärung der *Landsmannschaft Schlesien*," attached to its by-laws, *Satzung der Landsmannschaft Schlesien (Nieder- und Oberschlesien)* (mimeographed, n.d.); also *HvP*, July 2, 1959, pp. 7 f.

Poland.¹⁴³ Also without a plebiscite, the said Silesia had lost a small area in the southwest to Czechoslovakia.¹⁴⁴ Upper Silesians maintained that they had never accepted these decisions.¹⁴⁵ Lower Silesians, on the other hand, would not hear of such an approach.¹⁴⁶ As a result, a separate *Landsmannschaft* of Upper Silesians formed and the strife between the two groups continued.¹⁴⁷

Like the East and West Prussians, the Upper Silesians made much of the post-World War I plebiscite in their homeland.¹⁴⁸ On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the plebiscite, for example, a special periodical was issued containing a solemn pledge not to relinquish the right to the homeland but to await the hour when justice would be forthcoming.¹⁴⁹ Filled with articles commemorating the plebiscite, the publication reproduces Weimar propaganda leaflets and recalls the era when "the waves of the battle" in Upper Silesia "swept high." It reports on Polish insurrections heroically put down by German frontier squads and describes random assassinations of Germans by the Poles. It tells of destruction of the German village of Anhalt, the mass murders of Germans at Josephstal, and the treatment of Germans in Polish internment camps. Similarly, in 1956, on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the plebiscite, Upper Silesians addressed an "irrefutable warning to the

¹⁴³ This refers to the decision by the Allied Plebiscite Commission expressed in an Interallied Note to Germany dated October 20, 1921, ordering the incorporation of Eastern Upper Silesia into the Polish territory; the result of the plebiscite of March 20, 1921 was 707,000 votes for Germany, and 479,000 for Poland. See F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, Vol. I (London, 1952), p. 152.

¹⁴⁴ This refers to the so-called "Hultschiner Ländchen," ceded to Czechoslovakia by virtue of Article 83 of the Versailles Treaty and taken back by Germany in November 1938; Map 1 shows that this may be an area of possible conflict with future Sudeten German schemes.

¹⁴⁵ *Unser Oberschlesien*, March 1, 1956.

¹⁴⁶ This was true even though their speaker, at the time Walter Rinke, was an Upper Silesian.

¹⁴⁷ *Der Schlesier* No. 48, 1953 refers to "indivisible Silesia" and condemns the split. So also does Justinus, "Der Zwietracht mitten ins Herz," *ibid.*, No. 51/52, December 1954; see also *ibid.*, March 54, p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Note the conflict in the names of the two Homeland Provincial Societies *Landsmannschaft Silesia* – *Lower and Upper Silesia*, and the *Landsmannschaft of the Upper Silesians*; see Plate I.

¹⁴⁹ Hans Niekrawietz, poem entitled "Widmung" (Dedication), in Karl Schodrof (ed.), *Das Ergebnis der oberschlesischen Volksabstimmung* (Neumarkt: Kulturstelle Schlesien, 1951).

world . . . not to repeat on a large scale what had been horrid and bitter on a small scale."¹⁵⁰ Two years before this it was claimed that the division of the Upper Silesia in 1921 was the cause for World War II; two years after, that "the mistakes of 1919" were raised to the degree of exorbitancy by the expulsions.¹⁵¹

Upper Silesians call for restoration of their homeland province as it was within pre-World War I boundaries.¹⁵² In support of this claim they cite the familiar catalogue of arguments: centuries of German presence in the area, cultural and political contributions to the German nation and Western civilization, and violation of national and international rights.¹⁵³ Conflicting views are customarily rebutted, and too narrow interpretations of claims by compatriots rejected.¹⁵⁴ Though the tone of their associative propaganda has become less reckless, the avowals and aims of the Upper Silesians remain unchanged: "Upper Silesia will never be given up!"¹⁵⁵

Lower Silesians were not directly involved in the minority strife with the Poles after World War I, but this circumstance has not precluded nationalist ambitions on their part for recovery of territory now under Polish control. It is true that they restrict their claims to restoration of the frontiers of 1937. But it is equally true that they insist on recognition of the major precept of expellee homeland provincial policy — that is, the right to self-determination. More modest than Upper Silesians in articulating their aspirations, Lower Silesians do not subscribe to notions of new political arrangements: "For us, restoration simply means going home. In our view, we don't need 'a new and more just order.'"¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ "Vor 35 Jahren," *Unser Oberschlesien*, March 1, 1956.

¹⁵¹ "Versailles war schuld am 2. Weltkrieg," *Unser Oberschlesien*, September 1954 and November 17/18, 1958.

¹⁵² See Map 1 below. See also the front-page map in *Unser Oberschlesien*, November 10, 1952.

¹⁵³ *Unser Oberschlesien*, April 3, 1959.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1953, a special reprint explaining and justifying separate establishment of a *Landsmannschaft* for Upper Silesians; also June 20, 1963, a refutation of reports on West German radio and television criticizing *Landsmannschaft* goals.

¹⁵⁵ "Oberschlesien wird niemals aufgegeben!" *ibid.*, No. 7, 1956; more recently, "Unsre Ansprüche auf Oberschlesien," *ibid.*, April 3, 1959; "Kein Verzicht auf unsere oberschlesische Heimat," *ibid.*, April 30, 1959; "Wir verzichten nie! Oberschlesien gehört uns!" *ibid.*, September 9, 1965, and "Unvergessenes Kattowitz," *ibid.*, September 14, 1967.

¹⁵⁶ "Was heisst Restauration?" *Der Schlesier*, No. 20, 1954, p. 2.

For all Silesians in West Germany, a matter of particular concern is the presence of nearly 900,000 compatriots beyond the Oder-Neisse line. In this respect, their situation compares with that of Germans from Rumania. In both groups countless members of families remain involuntarily separated from one another more than twenty years after what is for them ironically known as the conclusion of hostilities.

Silesian intellectuals like to quote the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke, who, according to one of them, admires "the peaceful settlement of Silesia," seeing it as "*the greatest feat in the history of the German nation*," because it was accomplished "without a stroke of the sword."¹⁵⁷ They emphasize that they were not merely aggressive colonizers but a Christian people. Like the East and West Prussians, they continue to speak of the post-World War I peace settlement, in particular the failure to hold plebiscites in important parts of contested border areas as a disaster. Like the other Reich groups, they believe that the Polish settlers realize "the illegality" of the expulsions and "*hesitate to regard the territory as their own*."¹⁵⁸ While stressing their intention to be good neighbors with Poland, Silesians do not relinquish their claims to legal and moral rights to Silesia. The desire to return home is even said to be found among Silesian youth in West Germany, presumably because of their parents' overwhelming consciousness of ties with the homeland. Yet nothing concretely is planned for a future return. Adapting the old Polish saying "Poland is not yet lost!" to the present situation, Silesians in the West look fondly homeward, admonishing Poland and by extension the world that "*Silesia is not yet lost!*"¹⁵⁹

Thus, the ethnic groups of expellees aim at promoting more effective integration into West Germany; the Reich groups, at establishing a unified Germany that would include the provinces in the East and enable them to return home. A third attitude is to be found among the Sudeten Germans, the largest single expellee group in West Germany.

¹⁵⁷ Wolfgang Jaenicke, *Right and Freedom for Silesia* (Göttingen: The Göttingen Research Committee, 1959), p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20 f. For a more recent re-assertion of the Silesians' claim to their homeland province see "Schlesier wollen nicht verzichten," *SZ*, October 21, 1968, p. 17.

3. Sudeten German Policy

Unlike the Reich German groups, who wish to see restoration of the old order and possess little, if any, interest in a new one, Germans from Czechoslovakia support the contention that a new political arrangement is necessary for Europe. This idea is given primary importance in the preface to the by-laws of their society. The purpose of the Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society is (1) to work for a just order among European peoples; (2) to make good the right to the homeland *by regaining* it and insisting upon the concomitant right to self-determination; (3) to claim compensation for stolen property on behalf of the group and individual members; (4) to provide economically and socially for the welfare of compatriots; (5) to represent the ethnic group's interest in the new homeland (West Germany); and (6) to keep up traditions (customs, dialect, culture), to pass them on to youth and further the group's cultural life.¹⁶⁰ Sudeten Germans maintain that the Munich Agreements of 1938 continue to be legally valid, and on this basis demand restitution of their homeland "within the language and settlement boundaries of 1937."¹⁶¹ They believe that only after this condition is fulfilled will practicable German-Slav relations in the framework of a new European arrangement be created.¹⁶² With a view toward planning a new European federation, in 1950 Sudeten Germans succeeded in coming to a formal agreement with the aforementioned non-German, Czech exile group headed by General Lev Prchala.¹⁶³ Both Czechs

¹⁶⁰ Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, *Satzung* (mimeographed, n.d.). Emphasis added.

¹⁶¹ See maps of area claimed in Sudeten German Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 71, and Sudetendeutscher Rat, *Mitteleuropäische Quellen und Dokumente*, Band 8, München 1938 (Munich: Wolf, 1965), after p. 16; also map in *Sudetendeutscher Atlas*, ed. by E. Meyen, (Munich: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen, 1955), p. 52. cf. also Plate IV (Map 1) below.

¹⁶² See the "Eichstätt Advent Declaration" issued by Sudeten German leaders in December 1949. This was preceded by the "Heppenheim Resolution" of June 12, 1948, claiming the right to self-determination and full reparation of damages and losses. The "Detmold Declaration" of January 24, 1950, supplemented previous policy statements pledging the Sudeten German group to perpetuate its claim to the homeland and for this purpose to muster "the full support of the entire German people as well as that of other nations ready to defend the rights and dignity of man." For the texts see Sudeten German Documents, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-121.

¹⁶³ This agreement was made between the Czech National Committee in

and Germans denounced concepts of collective guilt and vengeance, and agreed on the following goals: (1) return of Sudeten Germans to their homeland after liberation of the Czech people from Bolshevism; (2) "reparation for damages" sustained by Czechs and Sudeten Germans and punishment for crimes committed against either group; (3) establishment of a Federative Planning Commission (*Föderativ-ausschuss*) consisting of equal numbers of Czech exiles and Sudeten German expellees for the purpose of elaborating a new political order for the areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and former Austrian Silesia; and (4) submission of such a new plan to both peoples for approval after the liberation and resettlement.

The dimensions of the homeland to which Sudeten Germans would have a right to return, before participating in the final decision as to its political status, were not defined in the 1950 Wiesbaden Agreement. This question and consequently that of the validity of the Munich Agreements continued to be the subject of much heated discussion. Addressing an annual Sudeten German convention in 1955, Lodgman von Auen, then Speaker of the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft* said that Adolf Hitler had proclaimed in 1938 that Germany would no longer tolerate "suppression of Sudeten Germans by the sham Czech democracy." Sudeten Germans were not asked specifically to vote on the Munich settlement, Lodgman went on, but they welcomed it and should not now be ashamed of it. Lodgman stressed that the Munich accords had meant "liberation from foreign oppression" for his compatriots. The subsequent establishment of a German protectorate over the rest of Czechoslovakia had nothing to do with the Sudeten German group, he added.¹⁶⁴

The Sudeten German group also made numerous attempts to come to understandings with other East European political groups in exile, such as the Slovaks, the Ukrainians, and the Yugoslavs.¹⁶⁵ Their

London and the Association to Safeguard Sudeten German Interests (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen*), a forerunner of the Sudeten German Council. Text in *ibid.*, pp. 122 f.; see also *HvP*, August 31, 1950, and Lev Prchala, "Aufruf des tschechischen Nationalausschusses an die tschechische Öffentlichkeit," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, January 1, 1951, pp. 78-80. The agreement with Prchala was made in Wiesbaden, August 1950.

¹⁶⁴ This convention was one of the largest expellee gatherings ever; attendance was estimated at 470,000. See *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, June 4, 1955.

¹⁶⁵ Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, *What We Are Trying to Do* (Munich, n.d.), pp. 5 f.

activities in this direction led increasingly to heated feuds with the so-called Beneš Czechs who opposed the Prchala group's approval of the 1950 Wiesbaden Agreement.¹⁶⁶ It was not until 1955 that the Federative Planning Commission was in a position to begin to work.¹⁶⁷ In 1957, however, following considerable internal discord, the Sudeten German elite, though maintaining its stand on the continued legal validity of the Munich Agreements, publicly consented to exclude the question of German national frontiers from future discussions of Sudeten and East European problems.¹⁶⁸

This point of view was doubtless arrived at because of the influence of non-nationalist factions such as the Catholics and the associations of Sudeten German co-believers. It is also probable that the advice of Sudeten German scholars such as Eugen Lemberg, formerly a professor of sociology at the University of Prague, played a role. As early as 1949, Professor Lemberg insisted in lectures and writings that political groups in exile often were afflicted with a condition of stagnation with regard to their historical views. Living abroad in quasi-isolation, he argued, they were likely to ignore important changes that had taken place in their homelands since their expulsion and to develop uncompromising pariotic attitudes that sometimes gave rise to extremely passionate, if not grotesque, political ideas.¹⁶⁹ Lemberg therefore urged Sudeten Germans to reassess their role as an ethnic group before and after World War II, keeping in mind that the epoch of nation-states begun during the Renaissance was ending, having reached a climax in 1938 with the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland by Germany, creating, however temporarily, the German National State. Its dissolution in 1945 brought with it expulsions of Germans from some East European states, leading the peoples of these states to believe, that after decades of struggle they

¹⁶⁶ *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, April 7, 1956, p. 1. For attacks on exiled Czechs employed at Radio Free Europe in Munich and opposed to the Sudeten and Prchala groups, see *ibid.*, 1955, April 6, 9, 23; May 7, 14, 21; and June 6, 25; cf. also *SZ*, December 14, 1960, p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ "Föderativausschuss nimmt die Arbeit auf," *ibid.*, April 6, 1955, p. 1. The Committee was composed, on the Czech side, of General Lev Prchala, K. Locher, and Captain Kervitzer; on the Sudeten German side, of the Speaker, Lodgman von Auen, Richard Reitzner, Hans Schütz, and, until May 1959, Rudolf Hilf.

¹⁶⁸ Resolution of the Sudeten German Council issued on April 17, 1957, as part of the by-laws, *Satzung, op. cit.*

¹⁶⁹ Eugen Lemberg, *Völker und Volksgruppen im Exil* (Munich: Volksbote, 1953), Schriftenreihe der Ackermann Gemeinde, Heft 5.

had achieved a new national purity and independence — if, again, only briefly, for since that time they had all become mere adjuncts to a superpower.¹⁷⁰ In view of this entry into a new historical phase of large, contending power blocks, Lemberg said, individual folk groups had to assume new roles. Little but anachronism could result, he thought, from expellee groups reverting to national minority struggles, since, in any case, the lost lands were no longer the same. A new idea of the homeland provinces must emerge, he concluded, transforming the image of expellees from the victims into that of martyrs, from that of disinherited into that of prophets, from that of expellees into that of pioneers of a new order.¹⁷¹ This would not come about, he admonished, if they looked to past glories; such defensive thinking ought to be avoided:

Today, the epoch of the Renaissance of nations in Middle and Eastern Europe is past, and the question is one of a new order. We who have been done wrong by the loss of our homeland must proclaim tenets that will still be valid after we have been requited or after we have died and that will do us justice among people.¹⁷²

The world, Lemberg insisted, has little time for self-pity; if expellees wish to gain recognition for their rights, they must adjudicate them within the framework of a new order that will guarantee justice for all — that is, for other peoples as well.¹⁷³

Other Sudeten German scholars, such as Wilhelm Turnwald, cautioned against aspirations to reconstitute an order such as existed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and asserted that a new federative or confederative arrangement stood the best chance of succeeding:

It would be a fatal mistake to believe that nothing has changed since 1945 and that after . . . liberation of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain

¹⁷⁰ Eugen Lemberg, "Selbstbestimmung und Geschichtsbewusstsein der Sudetendeutschen," *Sudetendeutsches Geschichtsbild in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Munich: Volksbote, 1954), Schriftenreihe der Ackermanngemeinde, Heft 7, pp. 14–37; also "Die Sudetendeutschen im Exil," *Sudetendeutsche rufen Europa* (Munich: Volksbote, 1950), Schriftenreihe der Ackermann Gemeinde, Heft 2, pp. 35–46.

¹⁷¹ Lemberg, *Sudetendeutsches Geschichtsbild*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 f.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 35 f.

¹⁷³ Lemberg, "Völkerpsychologische und weltgeschichtliche Aspekte," Lemberg-Edding, *op. cit.*, pp. 582 f.

it would be possible to start out for a third time with the same men and the same ideas that have already twice shown their inability to solve the problems of Central Europe. A new catastrophe would be the result.¹⁷⁴

Such ideas led to reflections on certain prejudices extant among both Czechs and Sudeten Germans. It was said that to make a new order work Sudeten German expellees would have to abandon their feelings of superiority toward the Czech people; that in view of what happened under the Nazis, Sudeten Germans today had all the more cause to efface such attitudes; that the notion of Germans as a bulwark against the Slavs should be forgotten in favor of recognizing that both peoples now faced a common danger calling for a fast alliance. Czechs, on the other hand, would have to abandon the idea that their national character was superior to that of Germans; that they were peaceful, democratic, and progressive, while Germans were domineering, reactionary and brutal. After the persecutions and expulsions of Sudeten Germans in 1945-46, the Czechs, it was maintained, could hardly arrogate unto themselves such collective goodness.¹⁷⁵

To arrive at common political goals, some compromise was deemed necessary on both sides. Thus, the image of a new order in which Czechs and Germans were to coexist was emerging more concretely. Veteran Sudeten German leader Lodgman von Auen initially saw its realization in three stages: (1) acceptance of the German claim to possess a right to the homeland; (2) de-emphasis of national interests and ethnic folkdom; and (3) political subdivision of the area between the Baltic and Aegean Seas and the Adriatic and Black Seas into three parts: a Polish-Baltic area, a Danubian-Sudetenland area, and a Balkan-Mediterranean area. In each of these three areas, Lodgman believed, different peoples and minority groups would live together in "an ethnic federation" rising above the disposition of the nation-states in 1918.¹⁷⁶

The idea of subdividing East Europe into three regionally federated

¹⁷⁴ Wilhelm K. Turnwald, *Renascence or Decline of Central Europe* (Munich: Wolf & Sohn, 1954), p. 77.

¹⁷⁵ Hans Schütz, "Referat," *Genossenschaft gleichberechtigter Völker - Tschechisch-Sudetendeutsche Beziehungen als Problem westlicher Friedens- und Freiheitspolitik* (Munich: Wolf & Sohn, 1956), pp. 92-100.

¹⁷⁶ Rudolf Lodgmann von Auen, "Ein deutsches und europäisches Ostprogramm," *Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart), 1953, pp. 770-778.

groups of nations had already been advanced by some non-German exiles from the area. The Hungarian National Council in New York explored the concept as early as 1948.¹⁷⁷ Other non-German exiles from Slovakia, Croatia, and Austria have gone on record as agreeing in principle with such a federative arrangement. In speaking about a future Danubian political order, Archduke Otto von Habsburg, then exiled in Germany, warned specifically against a return to "the artificial constructions" of the post-World War I period and advocated "a (federative) union of strong states." This, of course, presupposed recognition of expellee rights to their homeland territories, the Archduke commented. The return of expellees to their homes was not only dictated by reason, but constituted a precondition for "the Christian renewal of Europe," without which "communism cannot be overcome."¹⁷⁸

Sudeten German student and youth groups meanwhile have come forward with separate policy declarations. The Sudeten German Youth Organization of the *DJO* solemnly professes to seek any new order only in cooperation with the Czech nation.¹⁷⁹ The Action Circle of Sudeten German Students (*Arbeitskreis sudetendeutscher Studenten*) resolves that return of Sudeten Germans to their homeland is a matter of legal entitlement and that a precondition for any new order is a specific guarantee by the Czechs that Germans may continue freely to exercise their independent right to self-determination. This course might well result in the establishment of a federal state that could either become part of a federated Czechoslovakia or part of a federated Germany.¹⁸⁰

Thus, though Sudeten German blueprints for political reorganization of East Europe vary greatly in emphasis and interpretation, one idea seems common to them all – that is, that the post-World War I system of nation-states is unfeasible for the future. What Sudeten Germans strive for, in effect, resembles the ideas of the Moravian Karl Renner and the Bohemian Josef Seliger, both Austrian Socialists, who, in 1899, proposed transforming an unsatis-

¹⁷⁷ Paul von Balla, "Die ungarische Einstellung zur Zukunft des Donauraums," *Festschrift*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–100.

¹⁷⁸ Otto von Habsburg, "Die europäische Aufgabe des Donauraumes," *Festschrift*, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–78.

¹⁷⁹ "Bekenntnis der Jugend zum Sudetendeutschen Tag 1956 in Nürnberg," Sudeten German Documents, pp. 136 f.

¹⁸⁰ Sudeten German Documents, p. 159; see also *DJO* interpretation, p. 158.

factory political entity, the Hapsburg Monarchy, into a democratic union of federal states of separate nationalities. Each state was to have home rule and an equal voice in a central parliament, as contrasted with inter-war minority protection arrangements.¹⁸¹

The basic position of Sudeten Germans has undergone little change over the years. Above all, the so-called Three R's – that is, Return, Restitution, and Rehabilitation – continue to count as the preconditions for any new order that the Sudeten German group might enter into with the Czechs or other nations.¹⁸² As Germans who had been settled in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for more than 700 years, they contend, they had tried in vain to win economic security and cultural autonomy under the Czech constitution, adding that England and France would never have imposed the cession agreed to at Munich if it had not been in accordance with the principles of self-determination.¹⁸³ Seizure by Hitler of the remainder of the Czech State in 1939 continued to be condemned:

Annihilation of the freedom and political independence of the Czech people by the National Socialist Regime in March 1939 was a reprehensible act of violence contrary to the right of self-determination. We support without reservation reparation for this within the framework of international law and human rights. We likewise condemn unreservedly all measures and schemes of the National Socialist Regime directed against the human rights or the national existence of the Czech people.¹⁸⁴

Sudeten Germans hope to be vindicated under an arrangement that historically fulfills European responsibility for nineteenth century nationalism. The various schemes for bringing about such an arrangement are being explored, but efforts to incorporate Germans and Slovaks into a centralized nation-state in which they would be second-class citizens are to be renounced as not in accordance with

¹⁸¹ Wenzel Jaksch, "Die Sudetendeutsche Frage im mitteleuropäischen Kräftespiel," *Genossenschaft gleichberechtigter Völker*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-29.

¹⁸² *Sudeten Bulletin*, January 1955, p. 4-5.

¹⁸³ "Die 20 Sätze der SL," *DOD*, May 22, 1961. An English text is contained in "An Approach to the Sudeten German Question: The 20 Points Passed by the Plenum of the Sudeten German Council on January 15, 1961," *Die Sudetenfrage in der Politik (The Sudeten German Question)* (Munich: Wolf & Sohn, 1965), pp. 79-83.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 80 f.; see also *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, September 27, 1958, p. 5.

the right to self-determination. Nevertheless, expulsions of Sudeten Germans by Czechs are viewed as an act of "connivance with Soviet imperialism," which constitutes "a million times over a violation of basic human rights." Sudeten Germans together with the German people as a whole, it is proclaimed, will never countenance the expulsions, and appeals for justice and self-determination will never be silenced.

C. ASSERTION OF GERMAN RIGHTS

"Having solemnly renounced all thoughts of revenge and violence," said one expellee leader, "the law is our only strength."¹⁸⁵ Use by expellees of historical and legal documentation to support their avowed goals in fact constitutes a case study in scientific, if not abstract policy formulation. Germans from the East have always rejected the notion that victorious powers could invoke general principles of international justice for themselves and not apply the same standards to the vanquished. So-called victor's rights, which imply a double standard of justice, have been deplored not only by expellees but also by West German theologians, historians, political scientists, and jurists. Again, as was the case with the development of expellee organizations, the clergy of the two German churches provided the impetus. They started what eventually became a nation-wide discussion of the legal ramifications of the entire expulsion problem. Inside the Catholic Church, the discussion even acquired world-wide dimensions. Conducted on the basis of throughgoing academic research, often begun as a cooperative project of the Catholic and Protestant Churches or of different West German institutes of higher learning, it still goes on.

Such undertakings aim generally to prove to West Germans and the world that expulsions of Germans from the East and expropriation of their homelands was illegal. They aim, moreover, to assert formally expellee claims for requital of historical and human rights. After nearly twenty years, the result is a considerable body of legal thought, comprising, as does historic documentation of the expulsions, a large number of treatises and studies emphasizing different aspects of the problem. Though varying appreciably in quality, many

¹⁸⁵ Waldemar Kraft, in *BHE, op. cit.*

of these are incisive, scholarly works and some of them merit special attention within this context.

The principal legal arguments to be found in the most important of these works fall into two groups: precepts of positive law governing an individual's or state's behavior and protecting an individual's or state's interests as defined by international law and generally recognized to be binding in international relations, and precepts of natural law dictating inalienable human rights, the validity of which is either claimed or urged but not generally recognized as binding in international relations. From the standpoint of legal categories, three elements must be distinguished: (1) the right to the homeland, (2) the right to self-determination, and (3) the present legal status of the lost German provinces.

1. The "Right to the Homeland"

Many German scholars condemn the expulsions and ask for reparation by reason of principles of both natural and positive law. The latter are expounded primarily by jurists; the former, mostly by theologians. Theories of natural law have been explicitly formulated, particularly by the Catholic Church. Even before the full impact of the enforced exodus of Germans from the East could have become evident, the Catholic Church expressed concern about "the shipwreck of so many souls," asserting that the Church could not fail to act on their behalf. As early as 1945, the Vatican insisted that man, in accordance with God's will, should not be uprooted lest he should lose his safety, his strength, and thereby his dignity. "Stability on native soil and attachment to inherited traditions" were deemed "indispensable for the sound integrity of man" and considered "fundamental elements of the human community."¹⁸⁶ The expulsions were therefore not only deplored by the Pope but met with his unequivocal opposition. In a special message to the German bishops he expressed

¹⁸⁶ From a Papal address to newly elected cardinals, in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XXXVIII (1946) (hereafter referred to as *AAS*), 141–151, as quoted in Karl Braunstein, *Die Vertreibung im Lichte des Naturrechts* (Königstein: Königsteiner Blätter, 1959), pp. 67/Vf.; original text in part: "il naufragio di tante anime dà tristemente ragione a questa materna apprensione della Chiesa e obbliga a concludere che la stabilità del territorio e l'attaccamento alle tradizioni avite, indispensabili alla sana integrità dell'uomo, sono anche elementi fondamentali della comunità umana.

particular concern over the type of collective punishment inherent in the mass expulsions and causing people to suffer who were "neither responsible for the war nor for any other crime."¹⁸⁷ At Christmas in 1945 the Pope again clearly condemned the expulsions and invoked principles of natural law as binding both the victors and the vanquished:

He who demands expiation for guilt through just punishment of criminals as retribution for their crimes must be meticulously careful not to do the very same which he reproaches the others with accusations of guilt and crime. He who wishes reparation must demand it on the basis of moral precepts and respect for inviolable natural law to which those who surrendered unconditionally to the victors also have a right.¹⁸⁸

Insisting on man's natural or divine right to his inherited land and traditions and condemning mass uprooting, the Pope logically concluded that people so banished should be allowed to return to their homes.¹⁸⁹ Alluding again to similar crimes perpetrated by the Nazis between the Vistula and Volga rivers during the war years, the Pope, as a matter of principle, questioned the appropriateness of revenge. "Was it permissible," he asked, "to chase twelve million people from hearth and home and expose them to pauperization as a counter-measure?" and was it "unrealistic to wish and to hope that these actions will be made good insofar as reparations are possible?"¹⁹⁰ Such pleas for respect of the right to unencumbered domicile and for reparation for the expulsions wherever possible recurred in numerous Papal messages and proclamations after the war.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ *AAS*, XXXVII (1945), 278-284; especially 283, as quoted in *ibid.*, p. 74/V.

¹⁸⁸ *AAS*, XXXVIII (1946), 15-25, especially 22, original reads: "Chi dunque esige la spiazzazione delle colpe con la giusta punizione dei criminali in ragione dei loro delitti, deve avere ogni cura di non fare egli stesso ciò che rimprovera ad altri come colpa o delitto. Chi vuole riparazioni, deve chiederle sulla base dell'ordine morale, del rispetto a quel' inviolabili diritti di natura, che rimangono anche in coloro, che si sono arresi incondizionatamente al vincitore."

¹⁸⁹ *AAS*, XXXVIII (1946), 154, as quoted in Braunstein, *op. cit.*, p. 83/V.

¹⁹⁰ From a Papal letter to German Bishops dated March 1, 1948; extracts in BdV. *Das Recht auf die Heimat - Eine Dokumentation* (Bonn: BdV, 1961), p. 31.

¹⁹¹ For further Vatican statements, see Kindermann, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 109-115. See also appropriate extracts from the Encyclical "Pacem in terris" issued by John XXIII on April 11, 1963, in BdV. *Das Recht auf die Heimat, op. cit.*, p. 41.

In subsequent elaborations of official Vatican policy, Catholic theologians furnished historical and theoretical background and thereby contributed to clarifying the concept now known in West Germany as the right to the native land or homeland. Recent examples of forced migrations deemed in contravention of this right have already been cited. Catholic scholars point out that adverse treatment of peoples has recurred since antiquity. At least since the beginning of the Christian era, they say, man's right to unmolested presence and pursuit of life in his native land has been manifested. This right, they argue, was defined in the Justinian Code.¹⁹² It imposed a complementary duty upon authorities not to infringe upon it except as in just punishment for crimes.¹⁹³ This situation has not changed. Man's God-given entitlement to an inherited or voluntarily chosen place of abode, the argument runs, was as much a basic factor of the order of things as other human rights and freedoms that were enunciated in time and eventually came to be part of modern constitutional systems in the Christian West. In contrast, one of the aims of the totalitarian materialistic system is to uproot and disperse population groups whose loyalty to Christianity conflicts with the rigid exercise of absolute power. Consequently, materialism means spiritual homelessness and reduces man to mere matter amenable to arbitrary transplantation.¹⁹⁴ In the face of anti-Christian Bolshevism and traditionally anti-Marxist Vatican policy, the concept of the right to the homeland thus derives special political importance from its spiritual implications.

Similarly, Protestant theologians sought to rationalize the idea of natural rights. Like the Catholic clergy, they were appalled by the political and social damage done to their spiritual communities by the communist takeover of East Europe. In both churches there was the danger that the uprooted and disinherited would turn away from religion by the millions. Thus the expellee problem became a vital question for their fate in Germany. The previously mentioned notion

¹⁹² *Codex Just.*, X, 40, 7, as quoted in Braunstein, *op. cit.*, p. 59/V.

¹⁹³ Such international law writers as the famous Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) are cited to affirm the traditional existence of this right and deny the legitimization of mass expulsion on the basis of presumed collective guilt. See Kaps, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

¹⁹⁴ See the message of Pope Pius XII to the German Catholic conference held in Berlin in 1952, in *AAS*, XXXXIV (1952), 726, as quoted in Braunstein, *op. cit.*, p. 60/V.

of "the church in distress" evolved, and every possible source of spiritual strength was tapped to resist the anti-Christian onslaught.

Aside from important organizational features discussed earlier, through which the old homeland congregations of both Churches continued to survive intact in exile, enunciation of the principle of inalienable rights to the homeland afforded a source of spiritual renewal. Protestant theologian Herbert Girsengrohn, a Baltic German who headed the initial Baltic-Evangelical Church Committee-in-Aid, maintained that man had no rights before God, because life on earth was a matter of divine grace, but that among men God's commandments were intended to protect life and property. The expulsions, in his opinion, amounted to an unjust exposure of men to ruin. Applied to an ethnic group they corresponded to genocide. Since, however, they could not be considered an isolated event, the question of German guilt would have to be raised. Nevertheless, though East German Christians might come to think of expulsions as a judgment of God, they should retain the right freely to advance their claims or to renounce them.¹⁹⁵

The question of whether German guilt forfeited the right of Christians to maintain that they had been wronged was widely debated among Protestant theologians resulting in opposing views.¹⁹⁶ In one view, expellees should renounce such claims, because German guilt constitutes a deeper guilt than the expulsions and could only be atoned for by earnestly seeking to reconcile the opponent. Moreover, fulfillment of remedial claims could only conflict with domiciliary rights now vested in those settled in the lost German homelands and could not be achieved without a new war. In the opposite view German guilt unquestionably exists as a factor helping to explain what provoked the expulsions but does not detract from the fact of their enormous injustice. Christian appeal to the conscience of the world is therefore proper, for no one can be expected to proclaim a wrong as a right. Naturally, reparations are problematical and to a large extent out of the question, but the fact of the injustice as a matter of principle must nevertheless be maintained. In this view the

¹⁹⁵ Herbert Girsengrohn, "Das Recht auf die Heimat in christlicher Sicht," in Brummack, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-137.

¹⁹⁶ Thesis also expounded by Arnold Toynbee, as referred to in Gerhard Gülow, "Unsere evangelische Verantwortung für die heimatpolitische Lage," in *Was sagt die Kirche zum Recht auf Heimat?* (Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1961), Heft 26 der Schriftenreihe "Kirche im Volk," pp. 49-61.

idea of collective guilt is rejected, and it is held instead that individual guilt existed on both the German and the non-German sides. Moreover, "to deny another's guilt, because of one's own guilt constitutes a false act of mercy" that might frustrate the necessary final reconciliation between Germans and former opponents. Because of the communist presence in the East, renunciation of claims would probably not even be believed. Under the circumstances, all the expellees can do is cultivate common ties with the people now living in the East and wait for an opportunity to achieve honest mutual forgiveness.¹⁹⁷

The split of the German Evangelical Lutheran theologians into two factions has persisted. Consequently, the ethics of expellee legal and political claims have come under attack by those of the Protestant clergy who oppose their views. In 1956, Martin Niemöller, then presiding over the Evangelical Church in Hesse, travelled in Poland and the Oder-Neisse provinces and was reported to have made remarks suggesting that he accepted the Oder-Neisse line as a final frontier. This resulted in expressions of indignation on the part of expellee organizations and eventually in a disavowal of his statements by the Hesse synod.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, a group of Protestant clergy together with West German lay scholars asserts that neither a right to the homeland nor a prohibition of expulsions exists in positive international law and that derivation of such concepts from principles of natural law is at best ambiguous, not to say spurious.¹⁹⁹ German claims to the Oder-Neisse provinces have also been proclaimed doubtful, if not hopeless, since even reunification with the closer part of Germany cannot be achieved.²⁰⁰ The end of this debate is not in

¹⁹⁷ See examples of this view as articulated by the theologians Gerhard Gülow and Friedrich Spiegel-Schmidt with dissenting opinions formulated by Dieter Munschmid and Ludwig Landsberg in *Was sagt die Kirche zum Recht auf Heimat?* *op. cit.*

¹⁹⁸ Brummack, *op. cit.*, p. 85; *MID*, April 13, 1957; see also Associated Press report dated February 22, 1957, as quoted in Federal Expellee Ministry (ed.), *Zeittafel*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 168.

¹⁹⁹ Ludwig Raiser, "Das 'Recht auf die Heimat' als Schlüssel zum deutschen Ostproblem?" in Rabl (ed.), *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, Sammel- und Ergänzungsband (hereafter referred to as Vol. V), pp. 298-304.

²⁰⁰ Thoughts expressed November 1961 in the "Tübingen Memorandum of the Eight." This memo was conceived, without the specific prior authority of the Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany, by a group of eight Protestant clergy and laymen; cf. W. Schweitzer, "Ideologisierung des Rechts auf die Heimat?" *Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik*, Vol. VI, pp. 36 ff.

sight. It will doubtless continue to contribute to a clarification of the diverse opinions prevailing in West Germany on the entire German question.

At conferences held in 1958-59 in Hesse, alternately in the Evangelical Academy of Arnoldshain and the *Albertus Magnus Kolleg* of Königstein, fourteen Catholic and Protestant scholars – mostly theologians, sociologists, and jurists – met to formulate what subsequently became known as “Preliminary Theses on the Right to the Homeland.”²⁰¹ A remarkable five-volume compendium grew out of their work.²⁰² It reports on the historical and sociological background of the right-to-the-homeland concept and furnishes a concise legal definition of its content, seeking to show that it is nationally and internationally binding as a human right according with established positive legal precepts.

The theses summarizing the findings of the conference have been widely distributed in West German government, church, and expellee circles. In substance they designate the right to the homeland as *ius domicilii securitatis* – individual or group security against threats or violence forcing people to leave their permanent residence.²⁰³ The concept of the homeland (*Heimat*) is defined as a territorial unit in which an individual or group is socially and economically rooted. Involuntary breakup of established residence disrupting personal and social relationships is deemed a wrong subject to reparation. This applies either to original or acquired residence. In either case, persons are said to be entitled to unmolested presence in their place of residence, the only exception being lawful imprisonment or other lawful removal.

Guarantees of a right to the homeland vary from state to state. Kurt Rabl, for one, elucidates relevant differences on this question in

²⁰¹ “Vorläufige Leitsätze zur Frage des ‘Rechts auf die Heimat.’” Five of these scholars were non-Germans (Swiss, Czech, and Austrian) and of the nine Germans only three were expellees. Among the German participants were professors Walter Künneth (Protestant, University of Erlangen), Georg Siegmund (Catholic, Theological Seminary, Fulda), Wilhelm Brepohl (Institute of Social Research, University of Münster), Friedrich von Bodelschwingh (Protestant Pastor at the Bethel Institutions, Bielefeld), Wolfgang Kretschmer, jr. (psychologist, University of Mainz), and Peter Schneider (jurist, University of Mainz).

²⁰² Kurt Rabl (ed.), *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, for the “Theses” see Vol. V, pp. 243-254 and 335-348.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 335, n. 3.

Anglo-Saxon states and countries in the communist bloc.²⁰⁴ He points out that in the United States entitlement to remain in one's residence has traditionally been associated with guarantees of human rights also affording protection against forceful removal without due process of law. As evidence, he cites United States Supreme Court decisions, including *Ex parte Endo* (1944). The latter condemns relocations of the Japanese minority inside the United States during World War II and indemnifies the complainants.²⁰⁵ According to Rabl, no such guarantees exist in municipal law practice in communist states, and temporary or permanent deportations of persons are often carried out in these places for economic or security reasons. He notes that the Soviet government has annulled some but not all of the war-time deportations that took place inside the USSR, considering them irreconcilable with Marxist-Leninist principles of inter-ethnic relations.²⁰⁶

International protection of the right to the homeland was regarded by most of the participants in the Protestant and Catholic conferences at Arnoldshain and Königstein as either directly or implicitly established by the Hague Rules of Land Warfare in 1907 and the London Charter (establishing the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal) in 1945, both of which prohibited or declared deportations of civilians in time of war as crimes. The 1949 Geneva Convention for Protection of Civilian Persons in Wartime was thus held not to constitute new protective law but to consolidate an already existing one and to affirm an internationally binding precept outlawing ex-

²⁰⁴ Kurt Rabl, "Die Frage des Rechts auf die Heimat in den angelsächsischen Staaten und in den Ländern des Ostblocks," *ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 75-121.

²⁰⁵ This and related cases dealt with detention of American Japanese in so-called Relocation Centers because of presumed disloyalty. American scholars subsequently accused the Supreme Court of having blundered seriously in the Hirabayashi, Kosematsu, and Endo cases by failing to declare the entire War Relocation Program unconstitutional and thereby countenancing a situation in which a citizen of the United States "might be set apart from his fellows because of race, expelled from his home, evicted from his native community, forcibly transported to a concentration camp, and there detained against his will, at least until his loyalty has been established." See Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, *The American Constitution - Its Origins and Development* (New York: Norton, 1948), p. 821.

²⁰⁶ Rabl, "Die Frage des Rechtes auf die Heimat . . .," in Rabl (ed.), *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 75-121; *ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 248 and 340.

pulsions.²⁰⁷ Population transfer treaties providing for compulsory exchanges were held to be "incompatible" with the present stage of international law development.²⁰⁸ This included post-World War II transfers of East and ethnic Germans whose expulsions could not be legalized by the Potsdam Protocol.²⁰⁹ The 1949 Six-Power London Agreement dealing with "provisional rectifications" of the West German frontier was, however, held to accord with current international law, because, it was argued, in contrast to the Potsdam Protocol and earlier similar agreements, it provided for free choice of nationality, protection of property rights, and security of residence for nationals as well as foreigners. Denial of or infringement upon the right to the homeland was thus viewed as just cause for claiming reparations in the form of either return to the lawful domicile or other compensation for the loss sustained. Apart from American and Soviet examples, other cases were enumerated in which European states have previously taken remedial action to indemnify violations of the right to the homeland.

The Preliminary Theses conclude that acts committed by the Nazis in disregard of the right-to-the-homeland principle furnish a "historico-political explanation" of subsequent expulsions and expropriations affecting Germans from the East but do not justify them legally. Mutual recognition of these injustices is seen as an essential precondition for a necessary reconciliation. Reconciliation in turn must entail mutual and equitable reparation of damages inflicted on both sides. The Theses are prefaced by a reference to the 60,000,000 people who were either deported or forced to flee or emigrate from their homes since 1913.²¹⁰ The editor writes that "the supreme goal to be aimed at, if possible in *common* with the nations in the East, is to see to it that henceforth compulsory mass migrations do not become . . . a legitimate institution under international law."²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Rabl, "Zur Frage des Verbots von Massenzwangsaussiedlungen nach gelgendem Völkerrecht," in Rabl (ed.), *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 136-163, 247-250, and 340-342.

²⁰⁸ Kurt Rabl, "Bevölkerungszwangsaustauschverträge zwischen 1913 und 1943 in ihrer präjudiziellen Bedeutung," *ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 23 ff.

²⁰⁹ Peter Schneider, "Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung und Beurteilung der Artikel IX und XIII des Potsdamer Protokols," *ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 70 ff., Vol. V, pp. 169-190.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 333 f.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 243 and 335.

The Protestant and Catholic conferences at Arnoldshain and Königstein were not the only forums for discussion of the right to the homeland. Written contributions on the subject by other East and West German scholars are numerous. Since, however, they arrive at essentially the same or similar conclusions as to the validity or desirability of the concept, they need not be explored here.²¹² Mention should be made however, of a conference held in 1961 under the sponsorship of the Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem (AWR).²¹³ At its Eleventh Congress, the Association's International Committee of Experts on Legal Questions met in Athens to determine whether protection from expulsion constitutes a relevant institution in international law.²¹⁴ They prepared a document containing reports and declarations concerning "facts in international law" relating to the right to protection from expulsion and expressed the hope that their work would create some basis in the field of human rights for eradicating causes of flight and expulsion.²¹⁵ The

²¹² Aside from literature already cited, see Johann Kaps, "Kirche und Heimatrecht," in Kaps, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-522; also Rudolf Laun, *Das Recht auf die Heimat* (Hanover: Schrödel, n.d.); Hartwig Bülck, "Das Recht auf die Heimat," *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht*, Vol. III, 1954 (Nachtragsband 1950-51); and Julius Doms, *Heimatrecht und Vertreibung im Lichte internationaler Rechtsdokumente* (Bonn: Landsmannschaft Schlesien, 1957), and *Gedanken zum Recht auf die Heimat - nachgewiesen an den internationalen Dokumenten* (Düsseldorf: Wegweiser, 1953). See also Dieter Fukas, *Gibt es im positiven Völkerrecht eine Norm des Inhalts, dass der Mensch in der Heimat nicht aus ihr vertrieben werden darf?* (Erlangen: diss., 1959). These works offer a variety of explanations of the *Heimat* concept. On the expulsions, in particular, see works by the East German scholars Hermann Raschhofer, "Massenvertreibungen," in *Göttinger Arbeitskreis* (ed.), *Das östliche Deutschland - ein Handbuch* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1959), pp. 97-124 and Herbert Kraus, "Massenaustreibung und Völkermord," in *Jahrbuch der Albertus Universität*, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-138.

²¹³ The AWR or *Association Européenne pour l'étude du problème des réfugiés* (AER), is sponsored by the Fürst Franz Josef von Liechtenstein Stiftung in Vaduz.

²¹⁴ Fürst Franz Josef von Liechtenstein Stiftung (Fridtjof Nansen-Institut), Vaduz, *Das Recht auf die Heimat als völkerrechtlicher Tatbestand - The Right of Domicile as an Institution in International Law - Le Droit au domicile une donnée du Droit international public* (Vienna: Braumüller, n.d.), reprinted from *Vertreibung, Zuflucht, Heimat - Expulsion, Refuge, Domicile*, Treatises on Refugee Problems, Vol. IV, ed. by AWR Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem, prepared by Theodor Veiter.

²¹⁵ In finalizing the document, the group of Austrian, German, Greek, and Swiss lawyers apparently terminated a project that the Association had begun in 1955 at a General Convention in Helsinki and continued at further meetings in Berlin in 1959 and Weggis in 1960.

document is drawn up in the form of a draft international declaration asserting the inviolability of a person's domicile. Incidences of what are termed "internationally admissible causes for expulsion" are defined together with what are termed "the claimant's rights to restitution" in the event of illegal dislocation. These rights are said to comprehend voluntary repatriation as well as payment of material damages.

Defense of private domicile by international organizations was nothing new. In 1955, for example, the International Committee of Jurists resolved that "minimum conditions of a juridical system in which fundamental rights of human dignity are respected" must guarantee that "the residence is inviolable and that no one can be expelled, deported or exiled from it except in the case of a court decision."²¹⁶ Nevertheless, the draft resolution of the AWR conference which put the term "the right of domicile" (*Das Recht auf die Heimat*) into international usage, gained the widest publicity in West Germany and came to constitute a key document for expellee organizations in their efforts to promote the right to the homeland.²¹⁷ Propagation of this argument from the concept of human rights, together with the assertion of the illegality of the Potsdam settlement, caused considerable concern outside the Federal Republic, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such international reactions likewise centered on the two remaining categories of legal argument purported to underly expellee claims.

2. *The Right to Self-Determination*

Efforts of German scholars to elucidate the principle of national or ethnic self-determination and to tell the story of its patent denial to Germany in connection with post-World War I and World War II territorial losses are nearly as copious as those attempting to clarify the concept of the right to the homeland. Again, the churches, in this instance primarily the Protestant Church, initiated and sponsored much of the academic inquiry and research and writings on the subject.

²¹⁶ *Report of the International Congress of Jurists* (The Hague: International Committee of Jurists, 1956); note especially "Resolutions of the Committee on Public Law," pp. 152-155.

²¹⁷ Text of the AWR document is to be found in BdV, *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 17 f.

At its annual conference in Hanover in 1960, the Convention of Dispersed Evangelical Churches from the East discussed the validity and desirability of the concept of self-determination from a Christian view point. Subsequently, in 1961, the so-called Königstein Circle of German professors and Catholic scholars formulated a set of theses holding that the right to self-determination is a fundamental principle of the current international order.²¹⁸ The United Nations Charter, as well as practical experience since World War II confirmed the universal character of the concept and it was emphasized that even Soviet officials had agreed earlier that the attempt to impose an alien political, economic, social, or cultural arrangement on all or part of a people would be in violation of international law. Consequently, of course, it is said that the German question could only be solved on the basis of the right to self-determination. In a reference to the German Democratic Republic the theses also hold that "separation of a part of Germany . . . without the explicit and freely declared consent of its population . . . constitutes a striking infraction of the principle of self-determination . . . since the Soviet Zone regime is a product of foreign determination and not self-determination." The theses conclude with an appeal to all members of the United Nations to heed the dangers inherent in a disregard of the principle in the case of Germany.

After termination of the Arnoldshain-Königstein conferences on the concept of the right to the homeland, the same institutions cooperated again,²¹⁹ arranging seminars of experts for purposes of examining the practical significance of the concept of self-determination. Like the previous conferences, these were declared to be non-denominational, non-partisan efforts of a purely scientific nature aimed at making fuller knowledge of the principle involved available to responsible governments and at overcoming specious interpretation

²¹⁸ This group includes professors Werner Weber, a jurist from Göttingen; Boris Meissner, a jurist and Kremlinologist from Kiel; and Hermann Raschhofer, a jurist originally from the Sudetenland. See "Thesen des Verfassungsausschusses des Königsteiner Kreises zur Frage des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker," in Kurt Rabl, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* (Munich: Bergstadtverlag, 1963), pp. 161, 220 f.

²¹⁹ Co-sponsor was the Research Unit on Questions of Nationality and Language (*Forschungsstelle für Nationalitäten und Sprachenfragen*), Kiel.

and intentional falsification of it.²²⁰ The experts surveyed the history of national and ethnic self-determination, enumerating and evaluating cases on a world-wide basis.²²¹ Their conclusions accord for the most part with those of the Königstein Circle. However, in their report, more stress is laid upon the period of post-World War II decolonization, which gave birth to over forty new independent states, as evidence of the contemporary historical validity of the principle of self-determination. That such extensive application of the principle seems to have eluded Europe is deplored. Rather, it is pointed out, in Europe many important territorial and population changes during and after the two world wars were enforced without any inquiry into the will of the peoples affected. The report also analyzes different schools of thought on the legal validity of the concept of self-determination, admitting that it is not universally recognized as binding and suggesting that this is not so much because of objective uncertainty as to application and interpretation but rather because of the unwillingness of states to lose control over the people in their domain who desire to invoke the principle on their own behalf. At present, it is explained, parts of the people of Korea, Vietnam, and Germany aspire to self-determination in areas where public power is wielded in spite of, if not in contravention to, the desires of the population. Therefore, the report insists, it is in the interest of freedom to promote the idea of self-determination.²²²

Other studies on the concept of self-determination either examine the principle in a general context or else concentrate on its relevance to a specific national area.²²³ Most of them support expellee claims

²²⁰ Kurt Rabl (ed.), *Inhalt, Wesen und gegenwärtige praktische Bedeutung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker* (Munich: Lerche, 1964), *Studien und Gespräche über Selbstbestimmungsrecht*, Band I, p. 12.

²²¹ The group included professors Adolf Kindermann, founder of the East German Catholic Königstein institutions; Hubert Armbruster, jurist, Mainz; Boris Meissner, jurist, Kiel; Paul Kluge, historian, Frankfort; Bolko Freiherr von Richthofen, Silesian-born expellee leader; and several non-German scholars from Austria, Switzerland, and the U.S.A. See *ibid.*, p. 244.

²²² *Ibid.*, especially pp. 127, 237-243, and 254-263.

²²³ To the former groups belong the following works: Herbert Kraus, "Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker," in Göttinger Arbeitskreis (ed.), *Das östliche Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-96; Hermann Raschhofer, "Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht - sein Ursprung und seine Bedeutung," *VdL*, Nos. 15 and 17, April and May 1959; Günther Decker, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen* (Göttingen, 1955); and Eberhard Menzel, "Das Selbstdeterminationsrecht der Völker und das Annexionsrecht," *Jahrbuch der Albertus Universität*, *op. cit.*, V,

to the right of self-determination. Since the principle of self-determination, like that of the right to the homeland, is a cornerstone of expellee foreign policy, this literature is widely circulated, often free of charge, by the Homeland Provincial Societies. The same is true of works dealing with the third category of argument, the legal status of Germany.

3. The Legal Status of Germany

Where the foreign policy goals of the Homeland Provincial Societies touch upon the matter of restoration of the lost East German provinces, expellee claims rest upon what they consider to be solid legal grounds. As early as 1947, West German international lawyers resolved that "the German Reich, after the unconditional surrender of its armed forces . . . continued to be a state with its own citizens and as such a legal subject under international law."²²⁴ German jurists held subsequently that annexations of the state's territory were illegal unless consented to by the state or internationally recognized as admissible.²²⁵ In support of this argument, the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941, in which the participating Allied Powers pledged to renounce territorial aggrandizement, are invoked on behalf of Germany, though their application to Germany was not initially intended and though specific exemptions to the Charter on behalf of Poland were agreed to at Yalta and Potsdam. At Potsdam, an exemption was also made on behalf of the Soviet Union, promising it a part of German East Prussia. It is pointed out that the Big Four declared not to annex but merely to occupy Germany within its 1937

1955, pp. 173-224. To the latter group belongs Boris Meissner's special study *Sowjetunion und Selbstbestimmung* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1962); also Hermann Raschhofer, *Die Sudetenfrage - Ihre völkerrechtliche Entwicklung*, (Munich: Isar, 1953), perhaps not as detached as may be expected of a jurist's account (cf. review in *Politische Literatur*, No. 5/6, 1954, p. 479); further Rabl, *Die Coolidge-Berichte und andere Urkunden der Amerikanischen Delegation bei den Friedensverhandlungen von 1918-19*, *op. cit.*; "St. Germain und das sudetendeutsche Selbstbestimmungsrecht," Göttinger Arbeitskreis (ed.), *Das östliche Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 885-930; and *Das Ringen um das sudetendeutsche Selbstbestimmungsrecht 1918/19*, *op. cit.*

²²⁴ "Entschliessungen der deutschen Völkerrechtslehrer auf der ersten Nachkriegstagung vom 16./17. April 1947 in Hamburg," BdV, *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²²⁵ "Entschliessung der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht auf der Tagung vom 26.-28. April 1950 in Hamburg," *ibid.*, p. 15.

frontiers²²⁶ and that the Potsdam Protocol specifically provided for a final determination of the German boundary in a future German peace treaty. The territorial changes envisaged at Germany's expense are looked upon as inconsistent with the Allies' self-proclaimed policy of non-aggrandizement as well as illegal under international law as currently conceived.²²⁷ Though war and annexations were internationally accepted under so-called classical rules of international law, modern rules prohibit them. By virtue of the Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellog Pact) and subsequent international instruments culminating in the United Nations Charter, war of aggression has, since 1928 at least, been generally outlawed, and annexations resulting from it were not recognized (Hoover-Stimson Doctrine) unless specifically consented to by the defeated aggressor nation. Thus, Germany's wartime annexations were considered annulled in the light of the Nuremberg verdict. On the other hand, an internationally recognized defensive war did not authorize annexations by the victorious defender state since this would exceed the limitations of what can be legitimately meant by self-defense. Special victor's rights, in other words, do not exist. Since Germany continued to remain a state, inside its December 31, 1937 frontiers, and did not, as such, cede any of its territory, it follows, in this argument, that the *de facto* annexations of Eastern provinces of Germany by Poland and the Soviet Union were illegal and do not merit international recognition. In fact, the Western Allies have not recognized them *de jure*. Vis-à-vis Russia they insisted officially, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, that only a peace treaty to which Germany as a whole is party can bring a final territorial settlement.

Theories advanced by communist states to justify the annexations are viewed as inadequate by expellees. Poland argues that apart from what it regards as the final settlement of the frontier question at Potsdam, it possesses historical title to the German Oder-Neisse provinces, which it today calls its Recovered Western Territories, and that, moreover, the acquisitions represent a just punishment for previous German deeds. In rebuttal, it is said that, if at all, historical

²²⁶ Allied Powers Declaration, June 5, 1945, *op. cit.*

²²⁷ For some early accounts along these lines see Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen, *Die völkerrechtliche Lage der deutschen Ostgebiete* (Stuttgart, 1949), Vorabdruck; also a report by Reinhart Maurach in *Ostwärts der Oder und Neisse*, (Stuttgart: v. Schrödel-Siemau, 1952), pp. 89-127.

rights can only be claimed in respect of areas disputed in the same historical epoch and that the right of one state to punish another is inadmissible, since it presumes collective guilt.²²⁸

Other such legal analyses address themselves to the question of what constituted the Eastern provinces of Germany at the time of the military surrender. They show that the 1937 German frontiers, a concept introduced by the Allies, do not necessarily provide a correct circumscription of post-World War II Germany. In one of his historico-legal works, Kurt Rabl investigates the case of each of the disputed German provinces and determines its legal status between September 1, 1939 and May 8, 1945.²²⁹ He concludes that the Oder-Neisse territories, consisting of the German provinces of East Prussia, Silesia, East Pomerania, and East Brandenburg, were, without any doubt, legally a part of the German Reich, but that the territory of the former Free State of Danzig, as well as that of East Upper Silesia, was not. Danzig's incorporation into the Reich on August 23, 1939, was not in accordance with the constitution of the Free State, says Rabl, and Upper Silesia – a part of the Reich prior to World War I – became a part of Poland under a valid international agreement.²³⁰ He adds that the Memel Territory, which was outside the 1937 boundaries, effectively became a part of Germany by virtue of the German-Lithuanian treaty of March 23, 1939, which, according to him, was legitimate and corresponding to the will of the majority of the inhabitants.

Similarly, the Sudetenland no doubt legally belonged to Germany, but the Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate did not.²³¹ Under the Munich Agreement of 1938, the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany had been agreed to and legally recognized by the United

²²⁸ See Eberhard Menzel, "Das Annexionsverbot des modernen Völkerrechts und das Schicksal der deutschen Ostgebiete," in Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Das östliche Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–56.

²²⁹ This particular contribution was sponsored by the Munich Political Science Academy (*Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften*). See Kurt Rabl, *Die gegenwärtige völkerrechtliche Lage der deutschen Ostgebiete* (Munich: Isar, 1958), *op. cit.*

²³⁰ The Geneva Convention of May 15, 1922, on East Upper Silesia; Germany and Poland participated. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–43.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, especially pp. 43–59; also Otto Kimminich, *Die völkerrechtliche Beurteilung des Münchener Abkommens* (Würzburg: Arbeitskreis sudetendeutscher Studenten, 1963), special reprint from a serial of the Arbeitskreis sudetendeutscher Studenten, Heft 1.

Kingdom, France, and Italy. As in the case of Memel, the transfer was effected in accordance with the will of the majority of inhabitants. Any later unilateral Allied declarations of annulment of the Munich Agreement did not effect a juridical change in its status. Moreover, Rabl points out, the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) treated the Sudetenland, by implication, as part of Germany.²³²

Rabl expresses doubt that the Allies acquired lawful power to dispose of German state territory by virtue of Germany's unconditional surrender, which he terms an act between military commanders and not between states. In any case, he reasons, the Allies subsequently went on record as not having annexed Germany. Thus, the territorial changes envisaged in the Potsdam Protocol cannot legally bind Germany unless and until it agrees to them in a final, formal peace settlement.²³³ Moreover, in accordance with currently applicable international law, no German government can agree to any cession of the provinces in question unless and until it can be proved that the populations of the affected areas favor such cessions (to Poland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia).

Learned legal analyses such as those cited are enthusiastically welcomed by expellee organizations. "For us expellees this book is a great help in the fight for our rights," said a Silesian spokesman about one of the Rabl treatises.²³⁴ Generally, they support expellee aspirations and enhance their claims. The impact they have on the public is often considerable.

²³² The author holds that the IMT, by charging the German leaders with lack of compliance with the Hague Rules of Land Warfare in Bohemia-Moravia, but not in the area of the Sudetenland, implied that the latter was a part of Germany to which territory the Hague Rules would not apply; see *ibid.*, pp. 54 f.; see also, by the same author, *Die amerikanische Politik und die sudetendeutsche Bevölkerung im Jahre 1945*. Sonderdruck aus *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft*, Vols. III/IV, especially pp. 4 f.

²³³ For Germany the Potsdam Protocol is deemed *res inter alios gesta*.

²³⁴ "Grosse Hilfe im Kampf um unser Recht," *Der Schlesier*, August 13, 1958, commenting favorably on Kurt Rabl, *Die gegenwärtige völkerrechtliche Lage der deutschen Ostgebiete*, *op. cit.* This book, as other such studies cited herein, is given away free by the expellee organizations and the Federal Government to institutions and scholars in West Germany.

D. SUMMARY, REACTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In spite of past political roots and declared emphasis on cultural traditions, the expellee elite wishes their political movement to be somewhat of novelty.²³⁵ They understand it to represent an organizational scheme in which members can be both exiled leaders and domestic politicians. Existence of a Sudeten German Council, a Pomeranian Parliament, or East German *Land* Representatives desiring formal recognition as a public entity and even separate seating in the West German Federal Parliament suggests the continued efforts of ethnic groups outside their homeland to protect their minority rights in a foreign country:

So does our homeland stay with us in foreign lands
 And lives with us as we thrive on its love,
 As we share mutually those of its strengths
 That we received from it so long ago.²³⁶

Theirs was to be the double task of retaining the social and cultural identity of their homeland groups and at the same time integrating them economically into their new environment. Once the bare essentials of life were secured they were to spring into overt political action from bases of illegitimate or quasi-legitimate welfare and religious groups. National movements for the reunification of Germany,²³⁷ the rebirth of Prussia, and the renewal of the German Reich²³⁸ were to begin. Constant protestations of the injustices inflicted upon Germans from the East were to be made to all the people of West Germany. This nation-wide activity was to provide a democratic mandate for the West German government to make the ex-

²³⁵ Hans Schuster, "Gestalt und Bedeutung der Landsmannschaften," Göttinger Arbeitskreis (ed.), *Wesen und Bedeutung des landsmannschaftlichen Gedankens, op. cit.*, p. 29.

²³⁶ See Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Karpathendeutschen aus der Slowakei, *800 Jahre Slowakei, Karpaten Jahrbuch 1952* (Stuttgart, 1952), for this last verse of a poem by J. R. Luchs:

"So bleibt die Heimat auch im fremden Land
 und lebt mit uns, wo wir in ihrer Liebe leben
 und gegenseitig uns von jenen Kräften geben,
 die wir empfingen einst aus ihrer Hand."

²³⁷ *VdL* circular, dated May 13, 1954, entitled "Volksbewegung für die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands."

²³⁸ Declared purpose in *BHE* by-laws: "Die Partei will . . . der Erneuerung des deutschen Reiches dienen," *Satzung der Gesamtedutschen Partei (GP-BHE), Landesverband Bayern* (mimeographed, n.d.).

pelée struggle for reparations an all-German affair.²³⁹ Recovery for a reunited Germany of each of the Reich provinces and free self-determination for the Sudetenland were to loom as foreign policy goals worthy of passionate concern for every German. "Silesia — an all-German obligation!"²⁴⁰ "Everyone must remain loyal to Pomerania!"²⁴¹ Beyond this a universal crusading spirit was to be kindled, especially among the younger East Germans. Once the fight for legal rights had been won, they were to be prepared to move East again to liberate the Occident from communist oppression for Germany and for a united Europe. The great liberation movement was not merely to be limited to effecting a favorable settlement of Germany's eastern borders but was to help implement the right of the East European peoples now under communist control to self-determination.

In this endeavor expellee leaders took great pains to absorb the particularistic interests of their different organizations. Through constant warnings against fragmentation and group egotism, they succeeded in achieving a large measure of organizational stability and apparent common adherence to some basic foreign policy goals.²⁴² Still, between the insistent recollections of "the choir of the dead," aimed at fostering a sense of personal sacrifice, and the constant exhortations that Germany must again include all of Germany, aimed at awakening a sense of challenge, there was room for flexibility.²⁴³ Though the enforced flight and expulsions were considered a grave injustice, there was to be no revenge. All twenty Homeland Provincial Societies and all other expellee organizations agreed on this. Interpretations of this policy would nevertheless range from "Love Thine Enemy"²⁴⁴ to "The most horrible deeds are

²³⁹ Kurt Rabl, "The Tasks of the Expellees," *Der Niedersächsische Minister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte* (ed.), *Die Barsinghausener Gespräche* (5-7) (Leer: Rautenberg, 1962), p. 31.

²⁴⁰ "Schlesien — eine gesamtdeutsche Verpflichtung," from an article in *Schlesische Rundschau*, October 25, 1951.

²⁴¹ "Jeder muss sich zu Pommern bekennen," from *Das Pommernblatt*, August 1, 1953.

²⁴² "Schluss mit der Zersplitterung," *Schlesische Rundschau*, August 5, 1950; "Dieser Verbandsegoismus ist von Übel," from *Der Schlesier*, No. 46, 1955.

²⁴³ Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, "Chor der Toten," BdV, *Arbeitsbrief, op. cit.*, No. 8, November 1961, p. 10; "A song of German Unity," *ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁴⁴ "Liebet Eure Feinde," from a pre-Christmas article in *Schlesische Rundschau*, December 10, 1949.

judged only by God, and let Him avenge those who expelled us!"²⁴⁵ Neither did such renunciations of vindictiveness prevent the Sudeten Germans from demanding the prosecution and conviction of those who had committed crimes during the expulsions.

The right to the homeland was generally recognized as sacrosanct. Under present circumstances its fulfillment would mean that Transylvanians would return to a Communist Rumania, that Germans still in Russia and Yugoslavia would at last migrate West, and Slovakian and Sudeten Germans would return home under a new non-Communist European Federation. For most of the Reich German groups this right would include restoration of the old legal order. The Pomeranians, for example, would see little room in any scheme of reparation for the Poles presently inhabiting their province.

The right to self-determination also meant different things to the different groups. Germans from Upper Silesia and from West Hungary would demand a correction of the old frontiers, reasoning that these had been revised on the basis of a fraud perpetrated in connection with the post-World War I plebiscites. The West Prussians and the East Prussians would demand the return of areas where plebiscites had not been permitted under the Versailles agreement as well as those where plebiscites had produced an overwhelming pro-German vote. The East Prussians would include the Memel Territory in their demands, thereby, along with the Upper Silesians, claiming restoration of pre-World War I East German frontiers. The West Prussians would demand return of the Polish areas that had been part of Prussia from 1772 to 1807. The Danzigers would request reestablishment of their Free State as it had existed during the inter-war period. That area would, however, be claimed at the same time by the West Prussians. Similarly, the territorial claims of the Pomeranians and the East Brandenburgers for restoration of the 1937 East German frontiers would conflict with the demands of the West Prussians and with each other (see Map 1). Finally, the Sudetenland Germans would not exclude the possibility of remaining a part of Germany by invoking the right to self-determination if the prospective Danubian Federation failed to work out.

Defending Germany's pre-World War II legal status and supporting the concomitant rights of the Germans from the East, then,

²⁴⁵ From VOL, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

meant seeking an extension of Germany's eastern borders considerably beyond those tentatively fixed "as of 1937" by the Allies. Thus, if resurrected in accordance with the wishes of the Homeland Provincial Societies, Germany might again control the Baltic Sea nearly as far north as the 5th parallel; take most of the former Polish Corridor, including all the Polish ports; and recover all of the Upper Silesian industrial region. If need be, in this scheme, the frontiers of a reunified Germany might even be moved from the west, north, and east into Czechoslovakia toward Prague.

Concrete plans for realization of these aims — migration and settlement of Germans and disposition of the non-German population now in the lost East German provinces — are not yet available. Apart from the Sudeten Germans and Pomeranians, the Silesians and East Prussians are alleged to have done such planning.²⁴⁶ Since details on desired German resettlements are wanting, attendant problems of property regulation, school and church questions, and other aspects of local administration, as well as exercise of self-determination and homeland rights by non-Germans through plebiscites or other options in what would be the recovered East German provinces, are open. It can only be inferred from general expellee policy declarations, such as no-revenge and no-war pledges, promises to protect "innate rights of other nations," and to guarantee individual freedom and option privileges, that human rights, as idealized by the East Germans, are intended to apply universally.²⁴⁷

Thus the movement appears still to be in an early — that is, preparatory — phase. Appeals for action and reference to future plans are generally vague. Whether recovery of the homeland is pictured as "peaceful resettlement," "peaceful fight," or as "liberation of the Occident" by "elite troops of the uprooted," up to now no actionable issue has been articulated as a rallying point. The retention or revival of East German culture and the "fight for German rights" are part of this phase. The protracted period of inaction may be leading to a decline of ideological verve and thus eventually to the movement's stagnation. A look at important *Landmannschaft* news-

²⁴⁶ Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, notes on *Landmannschaft* Resettlement Committees (*Rückstiedlungsausschüsse*).

²⁴⁷ See *The Road to Peace and Unification*, *op. cit.*, p. 9. How this would work in a case, such as Pomerania, where East Germans would refuse to live side by side with Poles, is anything but clear.

papers over a longer period in terms of emphases in different content categories rather than specific statements, seems to show that from the 1950's press reports about past events in the native eastern provinces were more numerous than current political issues. Items concerning the present consist more of advice on integration measures, current group activities, or family news than of irredentist appeals.²⁴⁸ These appeals are in the main directed at expellees in West Germany, frequently at West Germans, seldom at Germans east of the Elbe, and rarely at Germans behind the Oder and Neisse rivers. Moreover, one has the impression that challenges, pledges, and demands – though often in the center of attention on newspaper front pages, in special reprints, or in other communications – are at times submerged in lengthy nostalgic reminiscences.²⁴⁹ It is probable that many of the expellees who are not active in the movement prefer to read of their lives in the past rather than of possible ambitions for themselves in the future.²⁵⁰ They seem to enjoy hearing and reading about the homeland more as it used to be than as it is now, and reports about its present conditions are more likely to be critical than positive.

Yet, however general or vague, however modest or forthright, expellee public statements of homeland policy had specific effects outside the movement. Much of the vocabulary that came into use with the articulation of claims reminds of the ominous precedents of Weimar Germany and the Third Reich. The "dictate of Versailles" became the "dictate of Potsdam." The "bleeding eastern frontiers of 1919" became the "bleeding eastern frontiers of 1945." The traitorous "fulfillment politicians" of the 1920's became the traitorous "renunciation politicians" of the 1950's.²⁵¹ Glorification of German

²⁴⁸ This does not fully apply to the Upper Silesians and Sudeten Germans – both Homeland Provincial societies actively involved in pre-war minority strife.

²⁴⁹ As good examples see *Der Westpreusse*, especially in 1953, 1954, and 1958, when its front pages invariably showed large photographs of old homeland scenes; similarly *Unser Danzig* (1954) and *Das Ostpreussenblatt* (1950).

²⁵⁰ *Archiv* and *HvP* abound in reports about past homeland events, commemorating mid-nineteenth century East German press articles or even earlier local events. See currently "Dokumentation: Die Presse meldete aus dem Osten," in *Archiv*; and *Ostdeutsches Feuilleton zum HvP*. See also such contributions as Wilhelm Brachmann, *Beiträge zur Apothekengeschichte Schlesiens*, Beihefte zum *Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität zu Breslau*, Band V, (Würzburg: Holzner, 1965).

²⁵¹ The concept of *Erfüllungspolitik* was in particular associated with the policy of meeting the requirements of the Versailles Treaty during the era of Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth.

or Prussian-Christian achievements ignored non-German Christian and communist achievements then and now. The fight for freedom and the drive toward national self-determination were causes urged earlier by Hitler and his associates. The schemes for a New Order in the East, particularly if suggested as part of "understandings" with groups of non-German exile politicians from East Europe, reminded of imperial Germany's conspiratorial efforts to promote insurgency and foster revolutions among the nationalities under the rule of the Entente Powers.

1. Reaction in East and West

The expellee organizations were not surprised at adverse reactions to their political aspirations, particularly those emanating from the Communist East.²⁵² In fact, they always took note of them, carefully documenting the constant hardening in attitude towards their groups and the eventual *de jure* recognition of the Oder-Neisse line inside the communist bloc.²⁵³ The agreements in 1950 between the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Polish and Czech governments were followed by mutual reassessments of their continued validity.²⁵⁴ Even before the formal establishment of the German Democratic Republic, the Oder-Neisse line had been recognized as final at the Warsaw Conference of June 1948. At this conference, the Soviet Union and the other East European Communist States collectively branded the activities of West Germany with regard to this border as revisionist. Contrary to the claims of the expellees, as well as to the official position of the West German government and the Western

²⁵² For the Polish reaction, see the special survey of comments on *Landsmannschaft* conventions in the Polish press, Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Heimatkundgebungen der Vertriebenen während des Sommers 1953 im Spiegel der polnischen Presse* (Göttingen, mimeographed, n.d.).

²⁵³ Note that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the Communist Party operating in the Soviet Zone, first opposed any diminution of German territory and did not recognize the Oder-Neisse line until early 1949. See Federal Expellee Ministry, Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 37, 43 and 75.

²⁵⁴ These included a Polish-Czech Declaration on May 7, 1957, and a Communist German Democratic Republic-Polish-Czech Statement on May 11, 1957. See also Marzian Documents, *op. cit.*, June 1956 to May 1957, p. 31. For the occasion of a German Democratic Republic-Czech-Polish Conference of Foreign Ministers in Prague in April 1958, see Federal Expellee Ministry, Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 192.

Allies the Soviet Union, Poland and other East European Communist States regard the Potsdam Protocol as having finally settled the Polish-German frontier. Russia and Poland formally incorporated the disputed areas into their respective national administrations.²⁵⁵ In its various communications and draft proposals concerning a final peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Union has always insisted that the Oder-Neisse line was not to be revised, that the Munich Agreements were to be held invalid, and that so-called revanchist organizations advocating reexamination of Germany's boundaries were to be prohibited.²⁵⁶ This stand has remained unchanged and has been reiterated whenever a rejection of what is termed expellee vengefulness has been deemed timely.²⁵⁷ The communist nations view the political aims of the expellees as "absurd" and allude to their meetings as "veritable orgies of chauvinism."²⁵⁸ Rejecting expellee disavowals of violence, the Communists fail to see how, unless by war, the expellees expect to challenge the Oder-Neisse line in the face of the staunch resistance offered by the Communist East European states. Efforts to justify the claims made by the Germans from the East are discredited by the communists.²⁵⁹ The Poles in

²⁵⁵ Cf. Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 114, interpretative note 1. The Soviet Union integrated the northern part of East Prussia, termed the Kaliningrad Area, into the RSFSR in 1946; the Poles integrated the Oder-Neisse provinces, termed Recovered Western Territories, by provisional administrative decrees in 1945 and by act of parliament in 1949. On the Polish measures, see Schieder Documents, *op. cit.*, Vol. I/3.

²⁵⁶ See documentation prepared by Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *Sowjetische Aufassungen zur Deutschlandfrage* (2. erg. Aufl. Bonn, 1954); also *VdL*, January 23, June 19 and 26, and July 3, 1959.

²⁵⁷ See, for example, a communiqué by Khrushchev and Gomulka published in April 1964 in Moscow with a proposal for renewal of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship of 1945 for another twenty years, in *SZ*, April 20, 1964.

²⁵⁸ *MID*, February 21, 1959; Göttinger Arbeitskreis, *Die Heimatkundgebungen der Vertriebenen*, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁹ For Communist Polish accounts on the seizure of the Oder-Neisse areas, see Stefan Arski, *The New Polish-German Border – A Safeguard of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Polish Embassy, 1947); also Polish Institute for International Affairs, *The Polish Population in the Recovered Territories – Its History and Present Development* (Washington, D.C.: Polish Embassy 1953); and Marja Kielczewska and Andrzej Grodek, *Oder-Neisse – Die beste Grenze Polens* (Poznan, 1946) – an attempt to justify the frontier legally and ethnographically. The Western Press Agency in Warsaw (*Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa* or *ZAP*) has recently published numerous accounts on and rejections of the expellees' activities and policy: See for example Aleksander Drozdynski and Jan Zabrowski, *Oberländer – A Study of German East Policies* (1960); Andrzej Lesnews-

particular attempt to rebut the legal arguments raised by East and West German scholars.²⁶⁰ Polish politicians in exile have participated in these debates, siding more often than not with their communist counterparts.²⁶¹ In fact, a Council of National Unity formed by Poles outside Poland pledged to do research projects on the so-called Recovered Western Territories and to popularize them with those in exile from Eastern Central Europe and the Oder-Neisse areas.²⁶² Communists defend the expulsions, which they refer to as resettlements, arguing that such legal, if painful, surgery was made necessary by the fact that the Germans could not live together with the Poles.²⁶³ They dismiss German claims of the right to the homeland arguing that the Poles and Czechs now inhabiting the disputed areas similarly

ki, *Self-Determination as Smoke-Screen for Ostpolitik* (1963); Collective work, *German Revisionism on the Move* (1960); and Collective Work, "Heimatrecht" – *Instrument of Revisionism* (1963).

²⁶⁰ For a communist rebuttal of the legal rights theories adopted by the expellee elite, see Alfons Klafkowski, *Die Rechtsgrundlage der Oder-Neisse Linie auf Grund von Jalta und Potsdam* (Poznan: Western Institute, 1947); see also communist legal rebuttals published in West Germany: Remigiusz Bierzanek, "Volksgruppenrecht und Heimatrecht," in *Der niedersächsische Minister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte* (ed.), *Heimatrecht in polnischer und deutscher Sicht* (Leer: Rautenberg, 1962), *Schriften zur deutschen Frage*, Band 7, pp. 10–38; and the articles by Professor Ludwik Ehrlich (University of Cracow) and Vladimir Kopal (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague), in Rabl (ed.), *Das Recht auf die Heimat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257–267 and 268–297 respectively. See also Bolesław Wiewióra, *Polish-German Frontier from the Standpoint of International Law* (Warsaw: ZAP, 1959); and Andrzej Leśniewski, *Western Frontier of Poland. Documents – Statements – Opinions* (Warsaw: ZAP, 1965).

²⁶¹ See Z. Jordan, *The Oder-Neisse Line: A Study of the Political, Economic, and European Significance of Poland's Western Frontier* (London: Polish Freedom Movement, 1952); and Stanisław Kudlicki, *Upper Silesia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945); Robert Machray, *The Problem of Upper Silesia* (London: Allen & Urwin, 1945). See also opinions in favor of a revision on behalf of Germany (Kitzingen: Holzner, 1953) and Josef Mackiewicz, "Polen und Deutschland in meiner Sicht," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 1, 1954, pp. 13–19.

of the Oder-Neisse line, as expressed in Władysław Studnicki, *Das östliche Polen*

²⁶² See "Das exilpolnische Aktionsprogramm" (The Polish Exiles' Program of Action), *Der Schlesier*, No. 20/2, May 1955, and *Archiv*, 19/1955, p. 4.

²⁶³ See, especially, Bierzanek, *op. cit.* Varying opinions of international jurists on the legitimacy of compulsory population transfers are to be found in *Annuaire de Droit International. Session de Sienne* (Basel: Éditions juridiques et sociologiques, 1952), II.

enjoy the right to stay and could not be removed without being uprooted.²⁶⁴

Just as they have kept informed of communist reactions to their political goals, the expellees have closely followed opinions in the West. The Western Allies, while understanding the early economic plight of the expellees, remained concerned about, even suspicious of, their political ambitions.²⁶⁵ In contacts abroad expellee leaders found genuine interest in their current economic problems but little encouragement for their ultimate political aim — restitution of the lost East German areas and fulfillment of the right to the homeland. The United States and England officially maintain that Germany continues to exist within its 1937 frontiers and that a final determination of Germany's frontiers must be agreed upon at a German peace conference in which a freely elected all-German government must participate. The West German Federal Government is still considered by them to be the only legitimately elected government in Germany.²⁶⁶ In fact, as early as 1947, when reporting on the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall warned that cession to Poland of all the disputed German areas gave "militant German nationalist groups the chance to gain a hold on another generation of German Youth."²⁶⁷ When reporting subsequently on the London Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Marshall said that the final Polish-German territorial settlement should be such as not to destroy hopes for good relations between the two nations. He called for the establishment of "a frontier that

²⁶⁴ For a recent summary on the developments in the so-called Polish Western and Northern Territories see Tadeusz Derlatka and Józef Lubojanski, *Die West- und Nordgebiete Polens — Tatsachen und Zahlen* (Warsaw: ZAP, 1966).

²⁶⁵ For U.S. press reaction on the German expellee problems see Göttinger Arbeitskreis (ed.), *USA Pressestimmen über das deutsche Vertriebenenproblem* (mimeographed, n.d.).

²⁶⁶ For a summary regarding the fate of the Oder-Neisse provinces at post-war conferences through 1955, see Zoltan Michael Szaz, *Germany's Eastern Frontiers — The Problem of the Oder-Neisse Line* (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), pp. 154-164. See also "Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany" signed at Bonn in 1952, and "Documents Relating to the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany" signed at Paris in 1954, in *London and Paris Agreements* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1954), Publication No. 5659.

²⁶⁷ As quoted in Szaz, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

reduces irredentist sentiment to a minimum and promises to be lasting.”²⁶⁸

Marshall may have intended eventually to propose return of a major part of the Oder-Neisse provinces to Germany, but political events led to a virtual stalemate in the inter-allied diplomatic negotiations concerning a final settlement, and in time skepticism was to be heard from important quarters in the United Kingdom, where expellee demands were thought of as unrealistic.²⁶⁹ Efforts to legalize the loss of the Oder-Neisse provinces in order to relax East-West tension and help speed up reunification with the former Soviet Zone have not been wanting. For example, in 1953, James P. Warburg published a plan in which he recommended that the Germans give up at least East Prussia and Upper Silesia.²⁷⁰ When in 1956 Poland succeeded in getting some freedom of action inside the Soviet Bloc, John McCloy, former United States High Commissioner in West Germany, suggested that the Germans relinquish their official claim to the disputed area and instead take a “cool and dispassionate” attitude towards the situation in order to help speed up reunification with the communist part of Germany.²⁷¹ He warned that these claims made any Polish cooperation with the West increasingly difficult.²⁷² Both these plans of course met with severe criticism on the part of expellee organizations.²⁷³

On the other hand, unusually strong support for the expellee cause, particularly that of the Sudeten Germans, came from such

²⁶⁸ As quoted in *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

²⁶⁹ For example, Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the Labor Party, when touring the United States in 1957, see *Der Volksbote*, February 16, 1957; cf. also *The Economist* (London), December 22, 1956.

²⁷⁰ See plan by James P. Warburg, “Plan for German Unity – An Expert’s Proposal,” *Nation*, 177 : 541–4, December 19, 1953; for similar suggestions by Warburg, see his *Germany, Key to Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1953) (German: *Der Warburg Plan* [Göttinger Arbeitskreis, ed.]). For reference to a subsequent similar project by Hans Morgenthau see Werner Feld, *Re-unification and West German-Soviet Relations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 164.

²⁷¹ John McCloy, former High Commissioner for West Germany, in a preface to a book by H. L. Roberts, *Russia and America – Dangers and Prospects* (New York: Harpers, 1956).

²⁷² In his book *Russia and America*, as commented upon in Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Munich: Ehrenwirth, 1963), p. 257.

²⁷³ Statements of opposition against Warburg are to be found in *Der Schlesier*, No. 44–45, 1953; *Archiv* and *HvP Artikeldienst*, No. 12, 1953; against McCloy, in *Archiv*, July 5, 1956, pp. 2 f.; also, “Der McCloy Plan,” *Archiv*, May 31, 1956, pp. 2 f.; and “Stellungnahme des VdL zu McCloy,” *VdL*, June 4, 1956.

United States legislators as the late William H. Langer, Senator from South Dakota, and B. Carroll Reece, Representative from Tennessee. Naturally, their statements were reproduced almost verbatim by expellee press organs.²⁷⁴ Reece submitted a detailed report, entitled "On German Provinces East of (the) Oder-Neisse Line, and Economic, Historical, Legal, and Political Aspects Involved,"²⁷⁵ to the Congressional Record. The gist of his thinking may be gauged from a letter he wrote to John McCloy in 1956 protesting McCloy's suggestion that Germany renounce its claim and arguing that the Oder-Neisse line was a product of "momentary expediency" rather than "international justice," and that the situation therefore dictated a judicious return to international law and the status of Germany and Europe as of 1937.²⁷⁶ Reece always staunchly defended the right of Sudeten Germans to their homeland, denouncing Beneš and the expulsions as "unscrupulous" and "inhuman"²⁷⁷ and maintaining that the Oder-Neisse provinces had never ceased to be German land, to which the Germans from the East had legal title.²⁷⁸

Opinions such as these, encouraging as they were from the expellee point of view, lost their force in the company of others by Western statesmen. As early as 1947, for instance, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault expressed doubts that territorial changes in East Germany resulting from the war could be reversed.²⁷⁹ Similarly, President de Gaulle expressed the desire to see the Oder-Neisse line remain the final German-Polish boundary.²⁸⁰ President Eisenhower

²⁷⁴ See Federal Expellee Ministry, *Zehn Jahre nach der Vertreibung*, *op. cit.*, quoting Senator Langer as deplored "The Forgotten Millions," of expellees, *Congressional Record*, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, May 24, 1951.

²⁷⁵ See special reprints bearing this title circulated by the *BdV* and the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft*; also *Internationales Recht und Diplomatie*, Heft 2, 1957, pp. 126-163.

²⁷⁶ *EPS*, September 7, 1956; cf. also "USA-Abgeordneter weist auf das Unrecht der Vertreibung hin," *VdL*, February 27, 1956.

²⁷⁷ See especially B. Carroll Reece, "The Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans," *Sudeten Bulletin*, September 1958, pp. 162-189; also "U.S. Congress Alerted to Sudeten Heritage," *Sudeten Bulletin*, October 1957, pp. 1 f.

²⁷⁸ *Unser Oberschlesien*, May 27, 1960, p. 1. For congratulatory messages sent by other United States Congressmen to the Tenth Sudeten German Congress (in Vienna), 1959, see *Sudeten Bulletin*, July-August 1959, pp. 156 f.

²⁷⁹ Statement made on December 20, 1947 in a report to the French Parliament, *Marzian Documents*, *op. cit.*, 1939-1953, p. 51.

²⁸⁰ For de Gaulle's opinion on Germany's frontiers, stated at a press conference on March 25, 1959, see *The New York Times*, March 26, 1959, p. 8; and *SZ*, March 26/27, 1959, p. 1, and other German dailies on and after that date.

likewise expressed the belief that top-level negotiations ought not to be complicated by discussions of the Oder-Neisse problem. On a visit to Bonn in 1959 Eisenhower said that discussion of the East German border at that time could only contribute to a prolongation of the Cold War.²⁸¹

By 1959, it should have been clear to the expellees that the West deemed other international questions more important, at least for the time being.²⁸² And when, in 1961, the Berlin wall went up, closing the last gap in the Iron Curtain without interference from the West, there could be no further doubt that the communist position on German problems reduced unalterably to maintaining the status quo. The general military and political situation in Europe and the imminent involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia made it all the less likely that any further political discussions among the Allies on the final disposition of the Oder-Neisse territories would yield results favorable to the interest of the expellees.

Somehow, nevertheless, expellees failed to draw the kind of conclusions from these political realities that one might have expected, and their specific foreign policy goals thus remained essentially the same. Perhaps the only exception to this was that in general they laid more emphasis on the legal rights approach. Doubtless they were in part encouraged by outside circumstances. The United States, West Germany's most important ally, maintained, at least officially, its policy of non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and a second German state, notwithstanding its appreciation of the political contingencies in such a course. Apart from the fact that non-recognition is implicit in the West German Federal Constitution and the basic international agreements of 1952 and 1954 between Bonn and the Western Allies, East German leaders have felt that the rationale of

For expellee objections, see "Eine unerfreuliche Osterüberraschung – Unverantwortliche Erklärung de Gaulles zur Oder-Neisse," *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, April 4, 1959, p. 1, and November 21, 1959, p. 1; also see *EPS*, April 17, 1959; *VdL*, April, 1959, pp. 3 f.; and *Bulletin*, April 7, 1959.

²⁸¹ *FAZ*, August 29, 1959, p. 3; also, "Eisenhower – Niemand jubelt so gut," *Der Spiegel*, September 2, 1959, pp. 155 f. Note also the photograph on p. 17 of this article showing the large posters bearing the names of the lost regions. These were paraded by expellee organizations along the streets traveled by Eisenhower in Bonn, as said earlier.

²⁸² Otto Graf Pückler, "Die Amerikaner und der deutsche Osten – Eindrücke von einer Blitzreise durch die Vereinigten Staaten," *VdL*, June 26, 1959, p. 6.

the United States for this policy of non-recognition is, in theory at least, closely related to the aspirations of expellees for observance of human rights and fulfillment of self-determination. Similarly, the Vatican's insistence on the viability of the natural rights of man, together with its condemnation of the expulsions and its refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse territorial changes, has served to affirm the legitimistic approach taken by the expellees to the formulation of foreign policy.

The Vatican's policy of non-recognition merits further attention. The fiction of a continuing existence for both Protestant and Catholic congregations of Germans from the East obtains in West Germany. The Catholic ecclesiastical set-up, with its exiled East German episcopacy and its improvised centers in West Germany for training young priests to return to the Oder-Neisse provinces, gives an impression of greater organizational refinement than that of the Protestants. To meet the situation in predominantly Catholic Poland, the Vatican, logically, could not decree *de jure* changes that would contradict arrangements initiated with its advice and consent, by the German clergy from the East in West Germany. In practice, this meant, then, that the Vatican – having recognized Bonn as the only legitimate German government – was obliged to conduct its relations with West Germany pursuant to the Reich Concordat of 1933 and with Poland on the basis of a concordat made in 1925. After World War II the new Polish government served notice that it was terminating the 1925 concordat, and requested the Vatican to change the administrative boundaries inside the Polish episcopacy to correspond with the *de facto* situation in the so-called Recovered Western Territories – that is, in the Oder-Neisse provinces. The Vatican refused and continues to do so on the grounds that by tradition it was "accustomed not to make final changes in its dioceses as long as possible questions of international law regarding these areas are not regulated in treaties which have received full recognition."²⁸³ Administration of the Polish Catholic Church in the Oder-Neisse areas was then taken over by so-called provisional apostolic administrators. Because of these provisional arrangements, with Polish clergy serving in areas officially designated as still belonging to Germany, already difficult contacts between the communist government and the Catho-

²⁸³ *Annuario Pontificio per l'Anno 1959*, p. 167. See footnote, as quoted in BdV, *Der wahre Tatbestand*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

lic Church in Poland were further complicated. The fact, moreover, that the Vatican continued to recognize the Polish Exile Government in London contributed to aggravating the situation. Observers on the scene and in West Germany spoke of a veritable *Kirchenkampf* between the Catholic Church and the government in Poland. The details of this conflict need not detain us here.²⁸⁴ Suffice it to say that the concession the Vatican has made thus far is its agreement to raise Polish administrators serving in the disputed areas to the status of so-called "titular bishops charged only with the spiritual care" of inhabitants.²⁸⁵ These actions were concluded under Archbishop, later Cardinal, Stefan Wyszyński, but the fact that they did not redesignate German church administrative districts as Polish bishoprics aroused the scorn of the Polish government.²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the old East German bishoprics were kept intact though their officially designated incumbents had to leave them and reside either in the German Democratic Republic or West Germany.²⁸⁷

Not surprisingly, expellee organizations, remembering the Vatican's anti-communist and pro-German attitudes since 1933, have often interpreted Vatican policy as opposed to the Oder-Neisse line and favoring their political aspirations. A spokesman for Catholics from Upper Silesia said in 1956 that the only binding forces under international law in this respect are the Prussian and Reich Concordats

²⁸⁴ Differences became especially sharp after the 1950 Görlitz frontier agreement between Poland and the communist part of Germany. Also, see Gotthold Rhode, "Bistumsgrenzen ostwärts von Oder und Neisse," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, May 1951, pp. 300-308; "Der Kirchenkampf in Polen," in Evangelischer Presseverband (ed.), *Informationen des evangelischen Presseverbandes für Deutschland*, No. 5, 1952; also *Der Schlesier*, No. 9, 1956.

²⁸⁵ This meant, for example, that the bishopric of Archbishop Kominek, who now served in Wrocław (formerly Breslau, Silesia) was not the area around Breslau, but some remote, then actually vacant, bishopric *in partibus infidelium* in the Near East or Africa, see Gotthold Rhode, in a special reprint from *Die politische Meinung*, February 1966, page 8. See also Maxime Mourin, *Der Vatikan und die Sowjetunion* (Munich: Nymphenburg, 1967), p. 241.

²⁸⁶ The provisional districts were Wrocław (Breslau) and Opołe (Oppeln) in Silesia; Gorzów (Landsberg) and Olsztyn (Allenstein) in the areas north of Silesia. The same provisional arrangement applied *mutatis mutandis* to the East Polish territories ceded to the Soviet Union in 1945; also the seizure by Russia of the northern half of the Ermland Bishopric (East Prussia) was not recognized by the Holy See.

²⁸⁷ Note the different situation in the diocese of Danzig (Gdansk) which is not covered by the Reich Concordat and where a Pole became ordinary bishop only after his German predecessor had died.

of 1929 and 1933 respectively.²⁸⁸ He stressed that the Holy See might well have decided to ask for a change in or even the nullification of these concordats, thereby fulfilling Polish desires by invoking the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* in order to acknowledge extraordinary *de facto* territorial changes. But instead it declined to do so, maintaining the old legal order and, in addition, condemning the expulsions. This, he concluded, amounted to a more concrete move to protect the German state area within its 1937 frontiers than the Western Allies had ever been able or willing to make.²⁸⁹ When the legality of the Reich and Prussian concordats was subsequently challenged in the West German Federal Supreme Court, expellees warned against giving up what they termed "the strongest hope and support for the realization of legal title to the stolen areas." Those West Germans opposing the concordats (for reasons not connected with the expellee or the Oder-Neisse problem) were severely criticized. On the other hand, gratitude was frequently expressed by expellees to the Pope for his manifest acknowledgement of the German character of the areas beyond the Oder-Neisse line through loyal and strict observance of the treaty.²⁹⁰

The situation of the Catholic Church in Poland continued to be of particular concern for expellees, who, in their assessment of the Vatican's role, may have been guilty of some misunderstandings.²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ Emil Brzoska, "Die einzige wirksame völkerrechtliche Klammer – Das preussische Konkordat von 1929 und das Reichskonkordat von 1933 in ihrer Bedeutung für die deutschen Reichsprovinzen östlich der Oder- und Neisse," *Unser Oberschlesien*, No. 4, February 1956, p. 4; also *VdL*, No. 7, 1956, p. 7; cf. *EPS*, November 21, 1958.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.* the original statement reads in part: "Aber in der Frage der deutschen Konkordate geht es dem Heiligen Stuhl um den deutschen Gebietsstand in den Grenzen von 1937, um den völkerrechtlichen Gesamtbestand von Deutschland. Die westlichen Alliierten halten zwar an ihm fest, aber sie können nach Lage der Dinge nichts tun, um ihre Rechtsauffassung *de facto* wirksam werden zu lassen . . . Die Alliierten des Westens sichern uns die deutschen Reichsprovinzen jenseits der Oder-Neisse Linie zur Zeit nur *promittendo*, der Heilige Stuhl dagegen *explendo*."

²⁹⁰ See statements by spokesmen of the Catholic Sudeten German *Ackermann* Congregation, *VdL*, June 4, 1956, p. 13; note that the West German Federal Supreme Court decided on March 26, 1957, that the 1933 *Reichskonkordat* continued to be in full force and to be binding for the Federal Republic of Germany.

²⁹¹ For a general discussion of the *Kirchenkampf* in Communist Eastern Europe, see Brigitte Kortner, "Atheismus contra Religion," *Politische Studien*, August 1959, pp. 517–529.

Actually, as a matter of principle, the Holy See has always taken its time in adjusting internal administrative boundaries to conform with *de facto* or *de jure* changes in national frontiers. The Vatican usually does not recognize national changes unless in its view, they bear the stamp of legitimacy and permanence. For example, ignoring most of the relatively short-lived changes brought about by the Napoleonic Wars, the Vatican did not make final administrative readjustments until several years after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Similarly, the new situation created in Poland by the Versailles Peace — a legally final and binding settlement — was not recognized by the Holy See until 1925, when final clerical boundary changes were fixed by the Polish Concordat. The ostensibly illegal territorial changes made by the Nazis in Poland after 1939 were ignored *de jure* (but condoned, if not supported, *de facto*). To presume continued Germanophile tendencies on the part of the Vatican was understandable but ignored its necessary concern for the 60 million Catholics living behind the so-called Iron Curtain. Aside from the compulsory migrations, which in a sense the Church had to condemn, and apart from its traditional emphasis on natural or divine rights, which happen to underly the formulation of expellee claims to the homeland territories, the Vatican, if anything, could be pleased that Catholicism had returned to an area where Protestantism had grown strong since the Reformation. Clearly, the Holy See, especially since the Papacy of John XXIII, has taken diplomatic pains to facilitate insofar as possible the position of the Church in Poland, while at the same time, trying avoid a violation of the German concordats.²⁹²

²⁹² For example, apparently to appease the Polish Communist government, the *Annuario Pontificio* of 1958 reflected *de facto* administrative conditions, using Polish place names for the Oder-Neisse areas and explaining their provisional nature in a footnote; see "Politische Akzente im Päpstlichen Jahrbuch — Städte der deutschen Ostgebiete erstmals mit polnischen Namen aufgeführt," *SZ*, January 29, 1958. Similarly, the *Annuario Pontificio* of 1963 listed Polish (instead of Italianized) first names of the bishops administering the disputed areas, see *MID*, January 12, 1963.

2. *Exile Mentality*

It has been said elsewhere that unrelenting appeals to legal rights and divine sanctions are typical of an emigre society working to force political changes that would bring about restoration of a status or way or place of life lost.²⁹³ To the extent that expellee organizations have lived up to their self-styled image of an emigre political movement, parallels with earlier German groups and activities have become more relevant. Many expellee religio-cultural aspirations are strikingly similar to those traditionally associated with the German ethnic groups of East Europe. The exclusiveness of the Homeland Provincial Societies has served to prevent a fusion with other religio-cultural groups in West German society. Propagation of familiar cultural values as a means to remind of German ethnic struggles against non-German influences and anticipation that these values would permeate into West German society, preparing it for reception of expellee political goals, bespoke a messianism without which a serious movement for national rehabilitation and renewal could probably not do. The strange, though noble, combination of humble priests and militant politicians, with both appealing to return to the East in order to redeem the unfree part of the Occident and resurrect the old German-Christian bulwark against the communist tide, bears resemblance to earlier Christian crusades. Thankful to God for their material prosperity and spiritual confidence, West Germans were expected to rally behind a new leadership in the interest of promoting another lofty national European cause. What made the Germans from the East sure that God looked favorably on their aims? What rewards could the crusaders expect? Adventure? Honor? Glory? Acquisitions? Were not both the expellee emigre society and the West German host society inclined to deplore earlier crusades and oppose any new missions?

In a study entitled *German Exile Politics*, Lewis Edinger evaluates German Social Democratic leaders, who, while in exile in Czechoslovakia, France, and England after 1933, undertook no less than to overthrow the Nazi government by remote control.²⁹⁴ Edinger attempts to explain why they failed. Sudeten German Social Democrats, close to or part of the exile political movement Edinger describes,

²⁹³ Edinger, *op. cit.*, especially p. viii.

²⁹⁴ Edinger, *op. cit.*, especially chap. 9.

founded and still are active in expellee organizations. The last President of the National Federation of Homeland Provincial Societies, Wenzel Jaksch, was, for example, a member of the exiled Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sopade*).²⁹⁵ A critical observer of expellee organizations in West Germany cannot help but be struck by the parallels in the two movements.

Exiled German Social Democrats then, just as most of the German expellee politicians now, believed that they would be able to gain the necessary support inside as well as outside Germany for their movement. While the so-called antitotalitarian record of the Social Democrats could not be questioned, that of some expellees could. Nevertheless, the Germans from the East felt that they fully qualified "as the obvious focus" for a popular movement aimed at uniting "Germans of the widest political and social persuasions." Some exiles then, as some expellees now, were "victims of a false historical analogy." The former tried to overthrow a modern dictatorship "by emulating the Bolshevik campaign against the Tsarist regime a quarter of a century earlier." The latter tried to inaugurate a campaign for return to the homeland with the rusty tools of ethnic minority strife and the German-Christian border land spirit of yesterday. The German Social Democrats failed because they were unable to convince Germans at home to take revolutionary action. Expellees have always presumed an active will and potential capability on the part of Germans and East Europeans to throw off the yoke of communist dictatorship and socialism, removal of which was and continues to be a basic precondition for recovery of the East German provinces. This revolutionary spirit is, however, by no means assured in every part of East Europe, and if it were, as it might be in Poland and Czechoslovakia, it is still certain to meet every inch of the way with resistance against a German intruder.

The anti-Nazi exile movement, then, suffered from socalled factionalism, lack of ideology, and "a legacy of personal and doctrinal differences." Its leaders were not revolutionary conspirators or agitators but "sought to cast revolutionary efforts . . . into traditional molds, hoping that reason, logic, and yearning for liberty would induce Germans to turn against Hitler." Most expellee leaders now are of a similar mind. Often designated "professional expellees"

²⁹⁵ Jaksch died December 1966 in an automobile accident.

(rather than professional revolutionaries) they continue using equally old fashioned tools, assuming that these are appropriate and that a consciousness of legal rights and a romantic nostalgia for the lost homeland provinces suffice to achieve their aims. Although their organizations have a common political ideology and doctrine there has always been much factionalism as well as considerable difference in interpretation and emphasis.

In many ways the situation of the expellee elite is much more favorable now than that of their Social Democratic colleagues was then. For unlike the anti-Nazi exiles, the East German expellees never operated in a foreign country but received substantial support by the "host government." Although prohibited initially and driven into camouflage by the occupation authorities, the expellees eventually acquired a large organization which enlisted considerable spiritual and intellectual powers. Did they make the best use of them? Or are they now — as were the Social Democrats then — "disposed to ignore a climate of opinion that did not suit their own inclination?" The opinion outside of Germany, especially in the countries and governments whose peaceful cooperation is indispensable for the realization of their aims, was generally adverse if not devastating. The opinion of their own government and people will be gauged below.

CHAPTER VI

THE WEST GERMAN PUBLIC

In 1961, Hans Krüger, President of the newly organized Federation of the Expellees (*BdV*), declared that the fusion of regional and homeland provincial federations had strengthened the political position of the expellees in the Federal Republic. Owing to "a harmonious relationship" between the expellees and the political parties, he said, West Germany's foreign policy was based on a position that was mutually agreed upon:

All parties have repeatedly recognized the right of self-determination and the right to the homeland. Reunification and restoration of a united German state has likewise been made a basis for policy formulation. We are at one with the important political forces on questions relating to the Oder-Neisse territories. The right of self-determination also governs the claims of our ethnic groups outside the Reich areas, especially the Sudeten Germans.¹

At the same time, Krüger took note of a basic change in the attitude of the West German press toward the expellee organizations, observing that it had gone from initially negative sentiments to what he called open-mindedness and objectivity. Through increased contacts abroad, he pointed out, the expellee organizations had been recognized as a political force; their basic aims – rejected and scoffed in the East – had met with increasing understanding in the West.

¹ Hans Krüger, "Der Bund der Vertriebenen im vorparlamentarischen Raum," *DOD*, Beilage zu No. 21, May 22, 1961.

A. POLICY POSITIONS

1. *Major Political Parties*

Krüger had reason to allude to a common attitude among all the political parties, except the communists, and the government on basic foreign policy positions of the expellees. Because the occupation powers originally prohibited the expellee party, many East German politicians joined West German parties as these were established. The efforts of the parties to integrate the expellees need not be explored here. All of them have, with varying degrees of emphasis and different approaches, advocated integration. Faced with expellee foreign policy claims, they have elaborated positions reflecting many of the ideas implicit in the expellee movement. This was manifest in the platforms of the important political parties even before the establishment of the Bonn Government. "The law must again become the basis for all of public life," said the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in its Constituent Proclamation, issued in Berlin in June 1945. A new Germany was to be created on the basis of concepts of "Justice and Peace."² After its 1949 election victory, the CDU controlled the federal government. At this time – in an effort to retain expellee votes – it created, as a branch of the party, a special West German regional organization called the Oder-Neisse State Association of the CDU-CSU Union of Expellees and Refugees.³ Led by expellees and West Germans, this organization was primarily responsible for formulating expellee and refugee policy for the Christian Democrats.⁴ Its Hamburg Program of 1953 upheld claims to the homelands as "an inalienable right of the entire German people" and reproached the Soviet Union for having frustrated the unification of a free Germany "based on respect of human rights."⁵ Insisting on the right to self-determination of Germans everywhere,

² *20 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union – Eine Dokumentation* (Bonn: CDU, n.d.), pp. 28–31 and 36–39.

³ See by-laws of the *Landesverband Oder-Neisse der CDU/CSU – Union der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge* (UdV) (pamphlet, 1958).

⁴ *Informationsbrief Nr. 13 – CDU/CSU Landesverband Oder-Neisse* (Bonn), August 1961, p. 14, lists Linus Kather, Theodor Oberländer, and Josef Stingel as national chairmen. A Christian Democratic Union in Exile (*Exil CDU*) was also established to cooperate with the Soviet Zone refugee movement.

⁵ CSU (ed.), *Deutschland Sozialer Rechtsstaat im geeinten Europa* (Hamburg: Sator, 1953), pp. 249–260.

the party never recognized the Oder-Neisse line as a legally valid state boundary.⁶ In 1965, a federal election year, the *CDU* reiterated this position, stressing that it sought reconciliation with Germany's eastern neighbors and asserting that lasting peace could only be maintained through general respect for the rights of man. Since, in the view of the party, these rights were abrogated as long as Germany remained divided, until reunification, the Federal Republic, as their champion, would remain the only legitimate representative of all Germans.⁷

Often, efforts have been made to clarify the position of the *CDU-CSU* through direct contacts with expellee leaders. For example, in its Principles of Expellee Policy and so-called Final Resolution, both of which documents grow out of a recent, special expellee congress, the party pledges on-going support for the tenets of its Eastern policy. These include recognition of Germany's continued existence within its 1937 boundaries, rejection of the Oder-Neisse line as a valid German eastern boundary now or in future, and insistence that any final German boundary must await a final peace settlement.⁸

Franz Josef Strauss, Federal Minister of Defense until 1962 and Federal Finance Minister since December 1966, has perhaps been more outspoken than any other *CDU-CSU* leader on the question of how to bring about such a German peace settlement. In a book designed for an English-speaking audience, but nevertheless scheduled for publication at the height of the 1965 West German federal election campaign, Strauss argues that reunification of Germany and European solidarity are one and the same problem. Suggesting that the interests of "the whole of Germany" might best be protected by a European community, he goes on to say:

We do not seek the restoration of a German national state within its old borders but the reunification of... Germans under... a European

⁶ "Grundsatzentschliessung von Karlsruhe (1960) - Selbstbestimmung für Deutschland" and "Kölner Manifest" (1961), in *Die CDU: Geschichte, Idee, Programm, Statut* (Bonn: CDU, 1961), 2nd ed., pp. 46 and 51; *ABC der CDU - Kleines Handbuch der CDU-Politik* (Bonn: CDU, 1964), 4th ed., pp. 161 ff.

⁷ "Düsseldorfer Erklärung," *CDU Bundesparteitag 1965* (Bonn: Presse und Informationsdienste der CDU, 1965), pp. 724 ff.

⁸ "CDU/CSU - Grundsätze der Vertriebenenpolitik," *MID*, January 23, 1965; and *Freiheit und Recht in Deutschland und Europa - Vertriebenenkongress der CDU/CSU in Nürnberg 3. und 4. Mai 1965* (Bonn: Presse und Informationsdienste der CDU, 1965), pp. 316 ff.

Federation The fate of our refugees, their integration into the West, and also the maintenance of their basic rights to their traditional homes (are) . . . much more a European than a German national problem. The final goal must be for all Europeans to live where they choose, a prospect only to be achieved by the abolition of the old national boundaries of Central and Eastern Europe.⁹

This instance of transposing "the German question" into "the European problem" illustrates the gradual shift in emphasis away from the concept of Four-Power Responsibility that has taken place among the Christian Democrats — a trend also observable in the other major parties. Still, in the face of indefatigable traditionalism in Bavaria, where Strauss is chairman of the State Association of the *CDU-CSU*, this trend does not preclude a party policy, which, though assertedly European in orientation, may have a distinctly national profile.¹⁰

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (*SPD*), the West German opposition party until very recently, did not, unlike the *CDU-CSU*, create a special expellee or refugee infra-organization. It, nevertheless, took pains to safeguard expellee interests in its party program. In 1952, at Dortmund, and in 1954, at Berlin, it described restoration of German unity as "the most urgent political claim of the German people." Alluding to the Oder-Neisse line, the *SPD* resolved:

Settlement of German territorial and border questions must await a peace treaty. This settlement must not be prejudiced by prior agreements between governments of individual parts of Germany and the Occupation Powers. Detachment of lands that belonged to Germany in 1937 has not created a new law but a new injustice. The Social Democratic Party of Germany does not recognize this state of affairs either in the East or in the West.¹¹

In its official programs adopted in the period 1959–1961, the *SPD* advocated an active Eastern policy. It called for peaceful co-

⁹ Franz Josef Strauss, *The Grand Design – A European Solution to German Reunification* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 88; also *SZ*, September 6, 1965.

¹⁰ A Swiss reviewer of Strauss' book suspects this "Europeanization" of the German question of "camouflaging a national postulate" See *NZZ*, November 27, 1965, Blatt 5.

¹¹ *Action Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany*, adopted by the Party Conference at Dortmund, September 28, 1952, and revised by the Party Conference at Berlin, July 24, 1954 (Bonn: *SPD*, n.d.), p. 11.

operation with all East European nations, especially Poland, and, again unlike the *CDU-CSU*, even envisaged "fullscale diplomatic and trade relations with all nations irrespective of their government systems." This outlook, it was made clear, was nevertheless not to prejudice inviolable ethnic group rights (*Volksgruppenrecht*) or legitimate expellee claims to homelands, both of which, it was asserted, were understood to accord with principles proclaimed by the United Nations.¹² *SPD* leaders conferred periodically with expellee leaders. Invariably, the results of these contacts were pledges on the part of the *SPD* that were broader in implication than those in the general party platform. A series of such meetings took place in 1960 and 1961 before the fourth West German federal elections. The *SPD* repeated its promise to uphold expellee rights to self-determination and to the homeland, but made it clear that these rights ought not to be implemented in such a way as to inflict undue injustice upon Germany's eastern neighbors.¹³ The *SPD* sought, at this time, to persuade the *Landsmannschaften*, especially the Pomeranians, to see the need for establishing full diplomatic relations with Poland, a move, the party said, that would not necessarily imply recognition of the communist political regime in Poland.¹⁴ Recently, the *SPD* has stepped up its efforts towards this end. Through its special Expellee Commission (*Vertriebenenausschuss*), it has arranged seminars for the expellee elite at which reports about East Europe, German foreign policy, and legal problems are discussed.¹⁵ The other parties, in particular the *CDU-CSU*, have often attacked the *SPD* for being too conciliatory toward Germany's eastern neighbors, charging it with being hypocritical for advocating expellee rights but failing to defend the 1937 German frontiers. Criticism is also leveled at the *SPD* for its apparent willingness to sacrifice German territory in favor of

¹² *Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, Beschluss vom ausserordentlichen Parteitag der *SPD* in Bad Godesberg vom 13.-15. November, 1959 (Bonn: *SPD*, n.d.), p. 24; *Ausserordentlicher Kongress der SPD*, Bonn: 28. April, 1961 (Bonn: *SPD*, n.d.), p. 37.

¹³ "Heimatrecht ohne Gewalt – Aussprache zwischen *SPD* Präsidium und *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*," in *Verheissungsvoller Anfang zu den Gesprächen mit den Landsmannschaften*, ed. by Gert Kögel (mimeographed by the *SPD*, n.d.).

¹⁴ "Das Gespräch mit der *Landsmannschaft Pommern*," in *ibid.*

¹⁵ See, for example, the report on a seminar held at the party's school, *Heimvolkshochschule der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, in Bergneustadt, with top expellees, such as Jaksch, Rehs and Hupka, in *MID*, July 30, 1966.

Poland.¹⁶ True, *SPD* leaders have pledged far greater flexibility in Germany's relations with communist East European governments, including that of the German Democratic Republic, and, perhaps more outspokenly than other politicians, have suggested the need for major compromises, but they have not yielded in any sense on the issue of legal and human rights. The expulsions and annexations remain, in their view, an injustice. As one of the party's deputy national chairmen recently insisted, any renunciation of German rights in advance of a final peace settlement, in line with demands made by the communists in East Europe, "would destroy all hope for a just and durable peace in Europe."¹⁷

The expellee policy of the Liberal Democratic Party (*FDP*), has gradually approached that of the Social Democrats. In its Berlin Program of 1957, it advocated a German foreign policy "based on the right of self-determination, the rights of free mankind, and the right to the homeland," as well as called for a relaxation of tension and promotion of peaceful relations with the peoples of East Europe.¹⁸ In the federal election year 1961 it pledged to safeguard "German legal claims to restitution of the German Reich within the boundaries of 1937."¹⁹ At a special Federal Congress for Expellees in the same year it protested strongly against all forces urging moves "to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as pre-payment toward future (peace) negotiations."²⁰ In 1965, the year of the fifth federal elections, the

¹⁶ In 1965 the *CDU* criticised Fritz Erler, the (recently deceased) *SPD* Federal Faction Chairman, for having advocated a compromise with Poland on the boundary question; see *Oder-Neisse Informationen*, Wahlsondernummer (Bonn: *CDU-CSU*), August 1965, pp. 12 and 29. Also, at its 1968 Nuremberg convention the *SPD* advocated a "preliminary recognition" of the East European *status quo*. This met with the strongest criticism and rejection in expellee and *CDU-CSU* circles; see especially *DOD*, February 16, March 28, and April 8, 1968.

¹⁷ "Wehner: Heimatrecht darf nicht Faustrecht werden," in *MID*, November 5, 1966; also Erich Janke, "Herbert Wehner zur Oder-Neisse Frage," *Archiv, HvP-Artikeldienst*, November 9, 1966.

¹⁸ *Berliner Program der Freien Demokratischen Partei*, beschlossen und verkündet durch den VIII. ordentlichen Parteitag am 26. Januar 1957 in der Reichshauptstadt (*FDP*, 1957), pp. 5 and 15 f.

¹⁹ *XII. Ordentlicher Bundesparteitag der Freien Demokratischen Partei, 23. bis 25. März 1961 in Frankfurt/Main: Eine Dokumentation zur Bundestagswahl 1961* (Bonn: Bundesparteileitung der *FDP*, 1961), p. 126.

²⁰ "Entschließung – Arbeitskreis I, Wiedervereinigungspolitik," in *Bundeskongress für Heimatvertriebene der Freien Demokratischen Partei in Lübeck, 12. und 13. August 1961* (mimeographed by *FDP*).

FDP softened its stand on the question of the 1937 German boundaries. It stressed that West Germany, deprived of any chance "now or in future" of coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the issue of borders, could no longer invoke the legal responsibility of the four Allied Powers to settle the matter of German reunification. Since, on the contrary, there were even indications of an understanding between Western and communist powers that the German question could not be solved in the foreseeable future, it was time, the party said, for Germany "to take matters into its own hands." Diplomatic relations with East European states and talks with officials of the German Democratic Republic on arrangements for interzonal trade and free passage of West Germans and West Berliners to Central Germany and East Berlin were deemed in order.²¹ The *FDP* pledged not to yield on the issue of Germany's legal and natural claims, as embodied in the principles of self-determination and the right to the homeland,²² but the party's national chairman, then Erich Mende, cautioned Germans to realize that eventually territorial questions would have to be negotiated. As he put it, having started the war and lost it, Germans could not assume that others would pay for it.²³

West German politicians have paid particular attention to the Sudeten German problem. As early as 1950, all parties in the *Bundestag*, except the Communists, adopted what has subsequently been referred to as the Protection Declaration (*Obhutserklärung*). In this statement of common policy, the parties and the government pledge to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia. In the same document, the Prague Declaration, in which the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia mutually sanctioned the expulsions and recognized the Oder-Neisse line,²⁴ is declared void and not binding for West Germany.

The Sudeten German Council on which, as said earlier, the major

²¹ *Mit festem Ziel für Deutschland – Die Deutschland-Politik der freien Demokratischen Partei* (Bonn: booklet issued by the *FDP*, 1965).

²² "Das unverbrüchliche Recht auf Heimat," *Bulletin*, September 7, 1965.

²³ "Der Status quo nicht im deutschen Interesse," *Bulletin*, January 8, 1965.

²⁴ *Bundestag*, 75th Session, on July 14, 1960, record as quoted in the Chronological Table, *op. cit.*: Vol. II, p. 33 see also "Zur Sudetendeutschen Frage," Sonderdruck aus der Zeitschrift *Sudetenland*, 1964, Heft 4, pp. 9 f.

West German parties are represented, operates as a two-way sounding board for the opinions of party and *Landsmannschaft* politicians. In 1961, after Council members expressed their agreement with basic proposals for a future solution to the Sudeten question offered by the Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society, all of the parties on the Council separately, in joint communiqués and resolutions, or by other means, endorsed what may be termed the Sudeten German liberal wing position: condemnation of the expulsions, support of the right to self-determination, and insistence on the 1937 German frontiers. The argument runs that the Federal Republic of Germany has no territorial claims against Czechoslovakia but that this does not prejudice the inalienable rights of Sudeten Germans to their homeland.²⁵ The stand of the parties on the Sudeten German question remained essentially unchanged during the 1965 federal election campaigns, with the *CDU-CSU* giving more emphasis to it than the *SPD* or *FDP*.²⁶

2. *Legislative Resolutions*

The declaration protecting Sudeten Germans was only one of several resolutions passed by the *Bundestag* in support of expellee claims. In fact the federal legislature displayed remarkable accord in such matters as German eastern frontiers, the fate of Germans in East Europe, and basic questions of West German eastern policy.

The Görlitz Agreement between Poland and the German Democratic Republic, also sanctioning, as did the Prague Declaration, the Oder-Neisse line, evoked an all-party protest in the *Bundestag*, which disclaimed its legality for West Germany.²⁷ The parties' dismay over

²⁵ "Zur Sudetendeutschen Frage," *Sudetenland*, *op. cit.*; "Für Heimat und Selbstbestimmungsrecht – erfolgreiche Aussprache zwischen SPD und SL," (mimeographed, Sudeten German Landsmannschaft, January 20/21, 1965); "CSU und Landsmannschaft – Aussprache der SL mit dem Bundesminister Dr. Franz Josef Strauss," *Voksbote*, June 6, 1961, p. 3; also "Parteien zur Bundestagswahl 1961," *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, September 8, 1961, and special pre-election issue of the *Sudetendeutsche Rundschau* (Munich), August, 1961.

²⁶ *MID*, January 23, 1965.

²⁷ A protest resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of the House. See *Bundestag*, 68th session on June 13, 1950, records as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 30-33; note protest of the Communist Party (*KPD*), in *ibid.*, and Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Verbindung mit der Deutsch-

the fate of Germans remaining in East Europe is reflected in two unanimous resolutions. In 1951, a large number of ethnic Germans in the Rumanian Banat were forcibly relocated by the Rumanian authorities, and the *Bundestag* unanimously condemned what it termed "the incredibly cruel act" of uprooting an ethnic group that had been in the Banat for centuries.²⁸ Ten years later, a Working Group of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was asked to investigate the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with East European countries. The group, headed by the late Wenzel Jaksch, reported in detail on "the considerable state of human distress that still exists among . . . Germans in these countries" and asked the *Bundestag* to resolve that the government, in shaping its relations with East Europe ought to "devote special attention" to their fate. The resolution was adopted unanimously on June 14, 1961.²⁹

Diplomatic relations with East Europe also concerned the parties. When Bonn established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955, it was made clear that this act did not imply legal recognition by West Germany of the Oder-Neisse line. On special request of all parties, the *Bundestag* unanimously approved this policy.³⁰ In 1961, the aforementioned Working Group in the Foreign Affairs Committee proposed that the *Bundestag* resolve that the government should avail itself of every opportunity for achieving a normalization of relations with East European states, but that it should make sure that this could be accomplished "without abandoning vital German interests." The proposal stressed further that "in establishing possible official contacts with any countries that have deported German groups . . . or have German territory under temporary administration" the government should "assert claims for appropriate reservations under international law." The proposal was unanimously approved.³¹

Polnischen Historiker Kommission (ed.), *Polen, Deutschland und die Oder-Neisse Grenze* (East Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1959) (hereafter referred to as German-Polish Documents), pp. 659-661.

²⁸ First *Bundestag*, 177th session on November 23, 1951.

²⁹ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 3. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 2807, A. Bericht des Abgeordneten Jaksch: Die Schicksale der deutschen Verfolgung in Ost Europa und der Sowjet Union seit 1939.

³⁰ Second *Bundestag*, 101st and 102nd session on September 22 and September 23, 1955, record as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 88-92.

³¹ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 3. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 2740.

In assessing the general pro-expellee attitude of West German parties, their general constitutional mandate should be remembered. The preamble to the West German Federal Constitution – the Basic Law of 1949 – states that

the German people, to have a new order . . . for a *transitory period* . . . has given itself this Basic Law, thereby acting also on behalf of those Germans who were denied participation. The entire German people remain called upon to accomplish the union and freedom of Germany through free self-determination.³²

This mandate purportedly binds the entire German people to look upon the West German government as the only legitimate force authorized to speak for the Germans east of the Elbe river, presumably not only those in the communist part of Germany but also those behind the Oder-Neisse line.

A common approach among the parties in respect of West Germany's policy in East Europe and acceptance of the right to self-determination is traceable at least through 1961. After the erection of the Berlin wall, the Liberal and Social Democrats adopted a more flexible attitude towards West German diplomatic relations with East Europe.³³ None have, as yet however, compromised on the question of so-called legitimate claims and natural rights. Aside from general constitutional assertions, this development is due in no small measure to the influence of expellee leaders. Their influence is obviously reflected in the 1961 resolutions fixing limitations on and pre-conditions for West Germany's future relations with East Europe. The resolutions were prepared under Wenzel Jaksch, a Social Democrat, then president of the Expellee Federation.

3. Government Position

(a) *Legal and Information Policy.* The principal thesis, underlying all West German federal policy on all-German and eastern questions, is the assumption of Germany's continued legal existence within its 1937 borders. Pursuant to the Four Power Declaration and the Potsdam Protocol of 1945 as well as to the Bonn, Paris, and London Agreements of 1952 and 1954, the disposition of former German

³² *Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1949, p. 1, emphasis added.

³³ As of very recently, both the *CDU* and *SPD*, after having formed the Great Coalition in late 1966, have adopted a similarly flexible position.

Eastern territories now under Polish and Soviet administration will be finally agreed upon in a future German peace settlement. Pending such a settlement, the stipulation in the preamble to the West German constitution that the German people unite their country not only has political significance but also encompasses a "legal obligation on the part of all organs of the state to strive with all their strength for the unity of Germany."³⁴ At the same time, however, West Germany assures its Allies that reunification of Germany and any disputes between the Federal Republic and other states will not be settled by force.³⁵ On this basis, the Federal Republic of Germany, though legitimately bound to the principle of free self-determination, considers itself as a state in transition.³⁶ The German Democratic Republic, which was not chosen by the German people as an act of free self-determination, is consequently not regarded as a legitimate state and is not to be recognized as such. Boundary changes, it is held, can only be made through territorial settlements that respect human rights. For example, the Saar Region was returned to West Germany after a plebiscite in 1955.³⁷ These principles must be similarly applied when solving the East German boundary problem. Such acts as the Görlitz Agreement, concluded between the German

³⁴ See Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ed.), *Das Verbot der KPD* (Karlsruhe: Müller, 1956), for the first of nine Principles for the Judgment (*Leitsätze für das Urteil*) outlawing the German Communist Party (KPD) in a trial before the Federal Supreme Constitutional Court in 1956: "Der Präambel des Grundgesetzes kommt vor allem politische, aber auch rechtliche Bedeutung zu. Alle politischen Staatsorgane haben die Rechtspflicht, die Einheit Deutschlands mit allen Kräften anzustreben: sie müssen ihre Massnahmen auf dieses Ziel ausrichten, insbesondere alles unterlassen, was die Wiedervereinigung rechtlich hindert oder faktisch unmöglich macht."

³⁵ See "Declaration by the German Federal Republic," given in London on October 3, 1954, when it was admitted to the Brussels Treaty. Together with the prohibition against manufacturing atomic and certain other weapons accepted by West Germany on the same day, its renunciation of "recourse to force" constitutes a formal and binding part of the London and Paris Treaties. For the text, see U.S. Department of State, *London and Paris Agreements, op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁶ See explanation of "provisional" character in Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1965), p. 172 (hereafter referred to as Adenauer Memoirs).

³⁷ Minor border corrections were also agreed upon between the Federal Republic of Germany and some of its Western neighbors. These concerned small West German border areas temporarily controlled by the Benelux countries and returned to the Federal Republic under bi-lateral agreements in 1958, 1959, and 1960.

Democratic Republic and Poland and recognizing the *de facto* incorporation of the Oder-Neisse areas into Poland, cannot in effect change Germany's *de jure* status, because the communist government of the German Democratic Republic lacks the force of all-German representation.³⁸

Whether the Big Four could legitimately cede German areas is frequently debated. At Potsdam, the Western Allies merely promised to support, at a future peace conference, a Soviet proposal for ultimate transfer of the City of Königsberg and adjacent areas to the USSR. However, in view of the Soviet Union's "continued legal breaches regarding the German question," it is doubtful that the Allies remain bound by this promise. Thus, even if lawfully authorized to dispose of German Reich territory, they did not, in fact, do so, and they remain obligated to Germany to make a final settlement in respect of reunification and establishment of frontiers in the East.³⁹ Pending a final peace settlement, the Federal Republic, as the only part of Germany in which Germans live in freedom, is under obligation to carry on a policy providing for the possibility that other parts of Germany will at sometime defer to the liberal principles of the West German constitution. Thus, the Federal Republic must stand ready for reunification and must protest against the postponement of a final settlement, because a transfer of the East German provinces to the other powers might legitimately take place, against Germany's will, by what is known under international law as prescription. Even opponents of this classical principle, which allows for a change in territorial title through the maintenance of a *de facto* situation over a considerable length of time, agree that protracted silence on the part of the injured state might be construed as a renunciation of entitlement to the disputed area.⁴⁰ Repeated protests

³⁸ Note that the Federal Government identified itself with the aforementioned theses on the right of self-determination formulated at Königstein; see *Bulletin*, November 29, 1961; also August 30, 1968.

³⁹ On this and the following, see opinion of a high-placed official in the Bonn Foreign Office, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg, "Deutschlands Grenzen," *Die politische Meinung*, December 1962, Heft 79, Sonderdruck (English: *Germany's Frontiers - The Evidence of International Law*, reprint).

⁴⁰ No universal agreement exists among international lawyers on either the principle of prescription itself nor on the length of time required for it to take effect, Meyer-Lindenberg concludes.

against the *de facto* situation are therefore required on the part of the Federal Republic to prevent an involuntary change of territorial title from happening. A final solution to the question of Germany's eastern borders may consist of a compromise (*Ausgleich*) between Germany and Poland, safeguarding the interests of both, and thus creating a "basis for a just peace." Yet, until the time for such settlement has come, Germany's legal rights must be defended.

The presumed existence of the 1937 German borders that underlies the West German constitution and post-World War II international agreements is also derived from the continued validity of pre-war treaties such as the 1933 Reich Concordat. This assumption is, moreover, embodied or implied in important federal legislation affecting the expellees and refugees.⁴¹ The German judiciary has had frequent occasion to hold that the Oder-Neisse territories continue to be part of Germany.⁴² The illegality of annexations and the collective right to self-determination are usually cited as valid principles in the framework of the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. The principle of the right to the homeland has been recognized directly or by inference in both federal legislation⁴³ and in at least one of the West German state constitutions.⁴⁴ The same principle is, moreover, deemed to underly important multilateral treaties binding in West Germany and designed to protect civilians. The 1945 Statutes of the International Military Tribunals for Germany considered deportation a war crime. The 1948 Genocide Convention outlaws forcible transfer of children. The 1949 Geneva Convention Protecting Civilians in Time of War and the European Human Rights Convention Fourth Supplementary Protocol, prohibit both deportation of individuals and collective expulsions.⁴⁵

The general legal theses bear striking resemblance to those de-

⁴¹ For example, the Citizenship Act of 1951, the Equalization of Burdens legislation of 1952, and the Federal Expellee Act of 1953.

⁴² An example is a case before the Court of Appeals in Celle concerning nationality of Germans beyond the Oder-Neisse line, see *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1952 (Munich), p. 175.

⁴³ Equalization of Burdens procedures foresee a return to the homeland, and German citizenship provisions state that they do not prejudice a future application of the right to the homeland.

⁴⁴ The Baden-Württemberg Constitution of 1953.

⁴⁵ The right to unmolested domicile is also implied in the recently proposed International Human Rights Covenants; neither these nor the European Supplement are as yet in force.

veloped and promoted by the expellee movement. In their relations with expellee organizations, the federal and state governments are bound by federal statute (1) to keep alive among expellees, refugees, and the entire German people, the cultural heritage of the expulsion areas; (2) to safeguard, keep up to date and put to use to that end archives and libraries; and (3) to further science and research in connection with projects resulting from the expulsions and integration.⁴⁶ Thus, the government has a duty to encourage and support the cultural and academic interests of the expellee movement, and it has not only contributed continuously to the financial support of the various expellee groups but has at times viewed with concern the weakening of these groups owing to internal strife.⁴⁷

The West German Federal Government has consistently made substantial efforts to publicize these basic concepts through the Ministry of All-German Affairs, the Expellee Ministry, the Press and Information Office, and other government agencies and offices.⁴⁸ The flood of information and literature distributed, often free of charge, by the government, is impressive. To broaden knowledge of the complex legal topics of self-determination and homeland rights, the government often buys and redistributes publications by expellee and West German scholars. It has sponsored treatises,⁴⁹ ordered reprints of a study,⁵⁰ permitted or encouraged its officials to publish with or without reference to the government,⁵¹ and even published

⁴⁶ Paragraph 96 in the *Bundesvertriebenengesetz*, reads in part: "Bund und Länder haben . . . das Kulturgut der Vertreibungsgebiete in dem Bewusstsein der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge und des gesamten deutschen Volkes zu erhalten sowie Archive und Bibliotheken zu sichern, zu ergänzen und auszuwerten. Sie haben Wissenschaft und Forschung bei der Erfüllung der Aufgaben, die sich aus der Vertreibung und der Eingliederung der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge ergeben, zu fördern." See *Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1953, I., p. 201.

⁴⁷ Author's correspondence with Federal Expellee Ministry.

⁴⁸ Such as the *Büro Bonner Berichte* in Bonn.

⁴⁹ Such as Gerhart Scheuer, *Der deutsche Staat in rechtlicher Sicht* (Bonn: Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1966).

⁵⁰ Such as the following Special Editions for the All-German Federal Ministry: Fritz Faust, *Das Potsdamer Abkommen und seine völkerrechtliche Bedeutung*, Sonderausgabe für das Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Frankfort: Metzner, 1964), 3rd ed.; and Herbert Kraus (then presiding over the Göttingen Circle), *Der völkerrechtliche Status der deutschen Ostgebiete innerhalb der Reichsgrenzen nach dem Stande vom 31. Dezember 1937* (Göttingen: Schwartz, 1966) 2nd ed.

⁵¹ Such as Meyer-Lindenberg, *op. cit.*; and Franz Thediek, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Heimatrecht* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche

under its own name.⁵² Much of the information so put together reappears in skillfully prepared digests – for example, in Armed Forces information bulletins.⁵³ Also, information on cultural and political background, as well as on the present status of the Oder-Neisse territories, reaches West German civilians and soldiers.⁵⁴ In handbooks and information sheets given to German or foreign visitors, on special commemorative postage stamps, picture postcards, medals, or signposts, and in official road or railroad maps, attention is constantly called to the expellee problem, the three- or four-fold division of Germany, and to the status of the Oder-Neisse territories.⁵⁵

Federal and state governments address both East and West Germans in still other publications and through special projects. This is done to advise expellees of their integration rights,⁵⁶ to discuss

Fragen, 1965). Thediek was a highplaced official in the Bonn All-German Ministry.

⁵² Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ed.), *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker und die Sowjetunion – Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage* (Bonn, 1966).

⁵³ See *Information für die Truppe – Hefte für staatsbürgerliche Bildung und psychologische Rüstung* (a monthly publication for internal distribution to units and training officers, edited by the Führungsstab der Bundeswehr, Unterabteilung Personal und innere Führung); further serials are *Dokumente und Kommentare*, Schriftenreihe innere Führung, and *Wandzeitung Heimat und Staat*, the latter (Munich: Schaeffer) is a map service used by the Bundeswehr.

⁵⁴ For example, "Die deutschen Ostgebiete," *Information für die Truppe*, No. 13, 1958; cf. also "Das Potsdamer Abkommen und die deutschen Ostgebiete," in *ibid.*, No. 12, 1959. West German civilians have access to information and map services of the Federal Central Office of Political Education (*Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, formerly *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst*).

⁵⁵ See *Do you Know Germany?* (Information sheet issued by the Federal Expellee Ministry); *Germany Today – Facts and Figures* (Frankfort: Metzner, 1954); and *Deutschland heute*; all handbooks obtainable through the Federal Press and Information Office. Also *Deutschland jenseits der Oder-Neisse Linie* (Essen: Tellus, n.d.), Sonderausgabe für das Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen; special postage stamps commemorating the expulsions appeared in 1955 and 1965; other stamps show public buildings in towns located in the Oder-Neisse areas.

Further, see picture postcard series intitled *Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein*, issued by the All-German Ministry, and showing locations in the German Democratic Republic and the Oder-Neisse areas; also, special gold coins sold through banks show coats-of-arms of Oder-Neisse provinces. Road signs showing directions and distances to German towns in the Oder-Neisse territories can be found throughout West Germany and West Berlin.

⁵⁶ Special publications are issued from Bonn or from state governments, such as North-Rhine Westphalia.

teacher's guidelines for treatment of the Oder-Neisse territories in public schools,⁵⁷ or simply to develop in the population "an all-German consciousness of its responsibility in respect of the German question."⁵⁸ The state government of Lower Saxony is, in particular, known to have sponsored, with sums at times exceeding one million marks per year, an extensive information and training program consisting of local meetings, week-end seminars, films, exhibits, and publication of special serials designed to enlighten East and West Germans of all classes and age groups. At least two informal groups have sprung up as a result of this activity: The Society for the Promotion of West-East Encounters in Europe (*Gesellschaft zur Förderung der West-Ostbewegung in Europa, e.V.*) and the Circle for Eastern Questions (*Arbeitskreis für Ostfragen*). The latter has been particularly noted for its conduct of the so-called Conversations at Barsinghausen (*Barsinghausener Gespräche*) in Lower Saxony.⁵⁹ This information campaign for "the instruction of the population of Lower Saxony in the origins and effects of Germany's division" encompassed, in 1960, over 2,600 public events attended by more than 200,000 German and foreign visitors. Besides West German government officials and legislators, all existing expellee, refugee, church, youth, and student organizations participated.⁶⁰ On county and local

⁵⁷ Cf. p. 143 above.

⁵⁸ See, for example, *Gesamtdeutsche Bewegung in Schleswig-Holstein in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Kurzfassung eines von Reg. Rat Dr. H. Walsdorff auf einer kultur- und heimatpolitischen Tagung . . . auf dem Scheersberg im Oktober 1961 gehaltenen Vortrags (mimeographed, n.d.); or *Der Niedersächsische Minister für Vertriebene und Kriegsgeschädigte, Die gesamtdeutsche Arbeit in Niedersachsen* (Hanover: mimeographed, 1962).

⁵⁹ For a complete outline of the program, including budget figures, see *ibid.*, pp. 5-11; as an example of program content, see the addresses by Richard Voigt, State Minister of Culture, and by Ministerialdirigent Wronka, high official in the Lower Saxony State Expellee Ministry, on "German Lands in the East" (June 13, 1961), and "All-German Consciousness" (January 29, 1962), respectively (MSS, mimeographed); also *West-östliche Begegnung - Deutschland und seine Nachbarn im Osten - Kulturprobleme, Jugendfragen, Berichte, Kommentare* (monthly, published from Hanover and Berlin); and *Die Barsinghausener Gespräche - Schriften zur deutschen Frage* (Leer, Ostfriesland: Rautenberg) serial, since 1958.

⁶⁰ See "Die Massnahmen zur Festigung des gesamtdeutschen Bewusstseins im Jahre 1961," in *Mitteilungen des Niedersächsischen Ministers für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegssachgeschädigte* Nr. 1/62 (MS, mimeographed, n.d.); also State Government Directive, dated February 15, 1961, to the District Governors (Administrative Presidents) in Lower-Saxony, *Der Niedersächsische Minister für*

levels, a widespread system of so-called West-East German Communal Sponsorships (*West-Ostdeutsche kommunale Patenschaften*) operates to encourage projects initiated by the Homeland Provincial Societies. This system, by which a West German town or county undertakes to sponsor cultural and homeland political activities of expellees from an East German town or county, was established in 1953 by formal agreement between the national *Landsmannschaft* Federation (*VdL*) and the Federal Association of Top Communal Organizations.⁶¹ By 1956, about 200 such sponsorships had been established; in April 1961 their number was about 300.⁶² As a result numerous so-called East German Houses and East German Homeland Rooms have emerged in large cities and smaller communities. Some East German Houses have developed into genuine cultural and political meeting places. East and West Germans alike are invited to attend special East German cultural homeland exhibits, shows, and lectures or otherwise to use available facilities such as libraries, archives, museums, conference rooms, and *Landsmannschaft* offices. Most of these centers are private foundations set up and continuously supported in whole or in part by the appropriate state or communal governments. Aside from the larger centers such as those in Aachen, Berlin (*Haus der ostdeutschen Heimat*), Düsseldorf (*Haus des deutschen Ostens*), Hamburg, Hanover, and Wiesbaden, and the more numerous smaller Homeland Rooms,⁶³ the Special East German

Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegssachgeschädigte, an die Herren Regierungs-präsidenten.

⁶¹ *Richtlinien*, der Bundesvereinigung der Kommunalen Spitzenverbände Köln-Marienburg (Deutscher Städtetag, Deutscher Landkreistag, Deutscher Gemeindetag, Deutscher Städtebund) und des Verbandes der *Landsmannschaften* vom 15. Dezember 1953 für die Übernahme von Patenschaften über ostdeutsche Gemeinden und Landkreise (Hanover: mimeographed, 1961).

⁶² For example, the West German city of Lübeck sponsors the Pomeranian city of Stettin; Gelsenkirchen sponsors the East Prussian city of Allenstein; Cologne sponsors Breslau, etc. The West German city governments grant space and other logistic support for meetings of expellees from the sponsored East Germany city, maintain Address Tracing Centers, arrange East German cultural exhibits or provide other benefits and services. See "Bestehende west-ost-deutsche Patenschaften," *VdL*, July 26, 1954; list in *Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*, 1948-58, *op. cit.*, pp. 83 ff; and *BdV Arbeitsbrief*, April 1961.

⁶³ There are over 40 Homeland Rooms (*Heimatstuben* and *Heimatsammlungen*) in the State of North-Rhine Westphalia alone. See Alfons Perlk (ed.), *Die Ostdeutschen Heimatstuben und Heimatsammlungen in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Troisdorf: Wegweiser, 1964). East German Houses are also projected for Stuttgart and Munich.

Library (*Bücherei des deutschen Ostens*) in Herne, Westphalia,⁶⁴ the East German Gallery in Regensburg,⁶⁵ and the Pomeranian Cultural Foundation (*Stiftung Pommern*), which will be set up in Kiel, are particularly noteworthy. The last of these is of special interest, because it is conceived of as a so-called corporation at public law and, thus, for the first time, gives an expellee organization the status of a government agency, thereby fulfilling a longstanding aspiration on the part of some *Landsmannschaften*.⁶⁶

Speakers from the so-called Guardianship for the Indivisible Germany (*Kuratorium unteilbares Deutschland*) are frequently invited to programs initiated for West and East Germans on federal, state and local levels. The *Kuratorium*, an assertedly private, non-partisan organization was founded in 1954 as a People's Movement for the Reunification of Germany (*Volksbewegung für die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands*).⁶⁷ Promptly labeled a "Center of Provocation" by the Soviet Zone press, the organization has since not only enlisted the services of distinguished West German statesmen, politicians, and scholars, but has also been able to gain financial support from industry and labor unions and from West German community and state government funds. Pledged "to strengthen the will of our people

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-181.

⁶⁵ See the Foundation's Act and By-Laws, *Urkunde über die Errichtung der "Stiftung Ostdeutsche Galerie"* in Regensburg (Regensburg: MS, n.d.), set up by the Federal Government, the eleven states and the city of Regensburg.

⁶⁶ For the state law creating the Foundation, see *Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Schleswig-Holstein*, Nr. 18, December 23, 1961 and Nr. 11, July 7, 1967. The establishment of other such foundations is planned by the Silesian, Brandenburg, and East Prussian *Landsmannschaften*. The Federal Expellee Ministry is supporting the idea of public foundations. For the promotion of homeland cultural activities see "Kulturpolitik wird aktiviert," *DOD*, November 21, 1968, pp. 5 f.; and a Memorandum dated December 6, 1968 received from the Federal Expellee Ministry.

⁶⁷ Herbert Hupka (ed.), *Unteilbares Deutschland: ein Rechenschaftsbericht 1954 bis 1960* (Berlin/Bonn: Kuratorium unteilbares Deutschland, n.d.); see also the organization's serial publication *Unteilbares Deutschland* (Berlin/Bonn). On German Unity Day Celebrations: in 1961, for example, the *Kuratorium* organized 1,700 meetings all over West Germany, enlisted the active support of 30,000 youths, and attracted about 400,000 visitors; see *Bulletin*, No. 108, 1961, p. 1044. On financing see *Richtlinien*, der Bundesvereinigung der Kommunalen Spitzenverbände, *op. cit.*, p. 2; and Der Minister für Arbeit, Soziales und Vertriebene des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *Wahrung des gesamtdeutschen Bewusstseins und Pflege des kulturellen Heimaterbes Ost- und Mitteldeutschlands in Schleswig-Holstein* (mimeographed, 1962), p. 1.

for re-unification," the organization, operating from its headquarters in Bonn and its various state and local offices, has contributed appreciably to the enlightenment of persons in the Federal Republic and abroad on many aspects of the problem of Germany's division and prospects for reunification.⁶⁸

Since, as pointed out earlier, expellee organizations could not undertake to finance these and other expensive activities on their own, it follows that many projects are substantially, if not fully, subsidized by public sources. These subsidies may include direct support of the organizations. For example, Linus Kather estimates that in 1959, the *ZvD* under his leadership, received a federal subsidy amounting to DM 130,000.⁶⁹ During the fiscal year 1959 the German federal budget allocated DM 350,000 for direct support of organizations of expellees, refugees, and "other victims of war damage." In the same year, one million marks was earmarked for support of "cultural interests" of expellees and refugees. Appreciable sums for other specific expellee projects came from government contingency funds.⁷⁰ Also, expellee and refugee newspapers reportedly received varying amounts from the Federal Government Press and Information Office.⁷¹

Figure 16 shows the principal federal expenditures during recent years that have most likely gone towards supporting expellee and

⁶⁸ The *Kuratorium's* Executive Chairman has only recently changed his views on German re-unification urging the Bonn Government to recognize the German Democratic Republic *de facto* and to give up its claim to exclusive representation of all Germans (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*). See *Der Spiegel*, December 11, 1967, pp. 27-29, on Wilhelm W. Schütz.

⁶⁹ For these and other relevant details see Kather *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 87 and 176.

⁷⁰ See *MID*, June 6, 1959. For earlier figures, see *VdL*, November 21, 1955, and *Der Schlesier* (Recklinghausen), No. 50, 1955; also, *Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1958, *op. cit.*, pp. 366 ff., and earlier years.

⁷¹ See, for example, the request for and government promise of such support in *MID*, January 11, 1963, and July 12, 1963, respectively. Note, however, that the *BdV* and officials in the Federal Expellee Ministry as well as the Press and Information Office have not confirmed whether this support is actually taking place. Cf. reports on that latter office's support, through its so-called Reptilia Fund (Federal Account No. 0403-300), of certain West German newspapers, in *SZ*, July 4, 1967, and August 25, 1967. See also Brillinger, *op. cit.*, who conducted the expellee press survey and inventory on the request of and for the Federal Government to determine the economic situation of the newspaper publishers interviewed and to investigate what federal support or other sponsorship should be forthcoming.

FIGURE 16. *Federal Government Support of Expellee and Refugee Activities*
(including All-German Projects)

In DM by Fiscal Years

In Support of Religious, Cultural, and Educational Activities

Activity or Project (Ministry and Account)	Actual Expenditures		1966 Budget Request
	1960 DM	1965 DM	DM
Cultural Organizations (Expellee, 2602-601)	675,000	1,746,000	1,800,000
Research Institutes ¹ (Interior, 0602-625 ff.)	386,000	874,000	963,000
Youth Organizations (DJO)* (Family and Youth, 2902-571)	100,000	130,000	130,000
Church Organizations (Interior, 0602-606)	455,000	760,000	760,000
East-West German Church Encounters*	400,000	450,000	500,000
Seminars for Teachers of Eastern Studies (Interior, 0635-303)	387,000	678,000	700,000
Totals	2,403,000	4,638,000	4,853,000

In Support of Projects Benefiting Expellees, Refugees, and Retained Germans

Information Programs (Expellee, 2602-300)	412,000	402,000	415,000
Tracing Centers (Expellee, 2602-602)	6,874,000	6,503,000	5,904,000
Support of (East and Ethnic) Germans Retained Abroad (Expellee, 2602-303)	4,300,000	4,705,000	3,700,000
Private Travel from Central and East Germany (All-German, 2702-603)	14,738,000	86,958,000	95,000,000
Refugee Organizations (All-German, 2702-601)	301,000	480,000	530,000
Totals	26,625,000	99,048,000	105,549,000

In Support of All-German Projects Including Projects Likely to Benefit Expellee Activities

Activity or Project (Ministry and Account)	Actual Expenditures		1966 Budget Request
	1960 DM	1965 DM	DM
All-German Projects at West German Universities (Scientific Research, 3102-651).		7,761,000	5,000,000
Research and Cultural- Political Purposes (All-German, 2702-600) . . .	35,587,000	81,685,000	45,000,000 ³
Support of Special All- German Assistance Projects (All-German, 2702-606) . . .	36,250,000 ²	41,462,000	44,000,000
All-German Publications (All-German, 2702-608) . . .		2,500,000	2,500,000

* Estimates based on personal interviews.

¹ These include the East European Institute at the Free University of Berlin, the East European and the South-East Institutes in Munich and the Working Association on East European Research in Tübingen.

² Request for Fiscal Year 1962.

³ Actual expenditure Fiscal Year 1966: DM 96,059,000.

Sources: *Bundeshaushaltplan*, Rechnungsjahr 1962, 1967 and 1968 respectively; interviews in 1961, 1967 and 1968 at All-German and Federal Expellee Ministries.

refugee cultural and homeland political interests. In terms of amounts allocated, the emphasis seems to be more on welfare support projects effective outside West Germany – that is, on behalf of Germans remaining under communist rule – than on direct support of the activities of organizations in West Germany. In any case, since substantial additional funds are available from state, county and community sources, direct subsidy of the movement by federal agencies becomes relatively significant. For example, in 1965, the sum of DM 1,746,000, in the form of a direct subsidy from the Federal Expellee Ministry, was more than matched by contributions from the eleven different State budgets totaling close to DM 7,000,000. Note, in addition, that approximately DM 5,500,000 were made available from the Federal Interior and All-German Ministries, bringing total government contributions for cultural purposes to DM 14,000,000.⁷² Interested East Germans in the competent minis-

⁷² Interview at Expellee Ministry in 1967. The figures are similar for fiscal year 1967. For coordination and distribution of state and federal subsidies for

tries complain, however, that annual expenditures of 14 million marks for homeland cultural purposes on behalf of close to 10 million expellees correspond to about DM 1.50 per expellee — an average amount that is, they point out, substantially below that which West German governments at all levels are spending for similar purposes on West Germans.⁷³

In sum, public support from sources ranging from local to federal agencies, whether direct or indirect, has been substantial, consistent, and in many cases prone to increase. Leaving aside federal provisions for support of East Germans beyond the Oder-Neisse line and allocations of the All-German Ministry, in which expellee projects as such are not readily identifiable, a conservative estimate of annual federal support of the expellee movement would be DM 18 million plus another 7 million per year from state funds. It is reasonable to assume, moreover, that the amount spent by the West German federal states is matched by the contributions from community budgets and aggregate annual support thus may be as much as DM 32,000,000 or about \$8,000,000. Compared with other government expenditures, this amount may seem small, but, surely, its efficient utilization has been and doubtless will continue to be of great help in generating East German ideas and ideals in many quarters in West German life.^{73a} That these ideas have, in any case, reached West German youth and have been influential in general campaigns to promote the study of East Germany and East Europe in the public schools is a significant result of the governments' information policy.

East German homeland cultural purposes, pursuant to Article 96 of the Expellee Law, see "Richtlinien für die Durchführung des § 96 BVFG," *Der Wegweiser*, No. 12, December 1963.

⁷³ Aggregate federal, state, and community expenditures for culture and fine arts amounted to DM 1,111,197,000 in 1961 and to DM 1,498,148,000 in 1966. Assuming that about one tenth of these amounts was devoted to cultivating West German homeland provincial arts, customs and usages, the per capita amount for 1966 would be DM 2.50. See, *Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (ed.), *Die Ausgaben der Länder für Kunst und Kulturflege 1961 bis 1966* (Bonn: Sekretariat der Konferenz, Dokumentation No. 19, July 1967).

^{73a} Note for comparison: recent deliberations before the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe revealed that, to date, the political parties represented in the *Bundestag* had received a total of DM 23,540,000 in public funds for their 1969 federal election campaigns, see *NZZ*, July 19, 1968. For public support of parties on the state level note: total expenditures per legislative period in Bavaria are DM 8 million; see *SZ*, March 29, 1968, p. 21.

(b) *Public Schools.* The study of questions relating to Germany's eastern neighbors and in particular of problems regarding the Oder-Neisse line and German reunification, on as broad a basis as possible, has, as said earlier, always been a major political and cultural function of the expellee organizations. The *Landsmannschaften* pressed government officials, school faculties, and parents toward establishing minimum requirements for teaching what came to be called Eastern Studies (*Ostkunde*). Expellee leaders and East German teachers arranged conferences and discussions preceding the formulation of ministerial decrees.⁷⁴ They published their own version of teaching guide lines, prepared bibliographies for parents and teachers, and gave practical advice on how to teach lessons on East Germany, or how to arrange East German Weeks.⁷⁵ After establishment of the Bonn Government, and even before promulgation of the Federal Expellee Act directed responsible ministers to perform this task, West German state governments, largely on the basis of expellee suggestions, put out directives about teaching *Ostkunde* in the public schools.⁷⁶ In 1953, the *Bundestag* requested that the federal government persuade the states to convey in public schools "a thorough knowledge of Eastern and Central Europe" and to expand the teaching of civics and politics so as to include "knowledge of the German Eastern Territories."⁷⁷ The general request reached the states in the form of Recommendations by the Standing Conference of States' Ministers of Culture on the Teaching of Eastern Studies. The gist of the official policy is this: (1) The concern with and desire for German reunification must be kept alive and be continually

⁷⁴ Resolution of a group of delegates from the *Südostdeutsche Kulturwerk*, the *Adalbert-Stifter Verein*, *Landsmannschaften*, teacher training academies, and representatives from State Education Ministries, at Rimsting/Chiemsee, on October 2 and 3, 1953.

⁷⁵ Held annually in many schools. See *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sudetendeutscher Erzieher im Adalbert-Stifter Verein*, *Grundsätze für die Behandlung des deutschen Ostens im Unterricht* (Munich, n.d.); *Göttinger Arbeitskreis* (ed.), *Mein Ostdeutsches Buch — Wegweiser für Schule und Heim* (Göttingen, n.d.); and *Heimatbücherei der Donauschwaben* (ed.), *Schenkt der Jugend Heimatbücher* (Freilassing, Bayern, n.d.).

⁷⁶ Eugen Lemberg, "Der deutsche und der europäische Osten im Geschichtsunterricht," *Aufgabe und Gestaltung des Geschichtsunterrichts* (Frankfort: Diesterweg, n.d.); also "Der deutsche Osten im Unterricht: Gundsätzliches zum Problem," by same author (MS: VdL, n.d.). See also collection of West German States' Recommendations and Directives (*Runderlasse*) of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (on file at the *Göttinger Arbeitskreis*).

⁷⁷ *Bundestag Drucksache*, No. 4098/3196, June 3, 1953.

developed in pupils; to that end a well-rounded knowledge of "Central Germany" (the former Soviet Zone and present Communist German Democratic Republic) and its people is required. (2) Pupils must be familiar with the "German East" (the lost Oder-Neisse territories), its geography, economy, and history, cultural achievements, and important personalities. (3) They must acquire fundamental knowledge of the culture and contemporary political problems of the nations in East Europe. And (4) in order to enable teaching faculties to fulfill these tasks, special lectures, courses, and seminars are to be held at teachers' colleges, and appropriate questions are to be required on teachers' examinations.⁷⁸

Educators in the Federal Republic are convinced that *Deutsche Ostkunde* is indispensable. There was some controversy over whether it should be a separate subject or whether it should be taught in the general disciplines of geography, history, and civics. The general approach eventually won out.⁷⁹

Text books and background material most frequently used in the primary and secondary schools convey the desired image of the German East. In the primary or grade schools (*Volksschulen*), emphasis is on geography. Beginning in the fifth or sixth grade, facts

⁷⁸ See "Empfehlungen zur Ostkunde im Unterricht der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 13. Dezember 1956," in Ernst Lehmann, "Mitteldeutschland und Berlin als Bildungsauftrag deutscher Schulen," *Deutsche Ostkunde - West-Ostdeutsche Blätter für Erziehung und Unterricht* (Troisdorf: quarterly organ of the Federal Working Association for Institution on German Eastern Studies [see p. 143 above]), September 1958; also *Bulletin*, January 10, 1957, pp. 56 f.

⁷⁹ There is variance in the federal states as to its implementation. See *Unterricht in den Volksschuloberstufen*, nach der Bekanntmachung des Bayr. Staatsministers für Unterricht und Kultus vom 12. Juli 1961 (Munich: May 13, 1962), especially pp. 52 f. and 71 f.; also, Arbeits- und Sozialminister, Nordrhein-Westfalen, *Ostdeutschland im Unterricht*, Vortragsheft 10 (Troisdorf: Wegweiserverlag, 1955); Walther Hofstätter, "Der deutsche Osten im Deutschunterricht," *Deutsche Ostkunde*, September 1956; in same issue, Hans Klemenz, "Die 'ostdeutsche Woche' und der Deutschunterricht," pp. 7 ff.; further, Albert Schettler, "Ostkunde - falsch und richtig gesehen," *Deutsche Ostkunde*, April 1959; cf. also circulars of West German school geography teachers, *Mitteilungsblatt des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Westfalen im Verband deutscher Schulgeographen*, especially the "Protokoll der 14. Fachsitzung in Erdkunde vom 10. Juli 1957." As an example of extracurricular activities on the state level, see Directive (*Erlass*) by the Cultural and Expellee Minister of Lower Saxony to carry special Eastern Studies and Central Germany (i.e. the German Democratic Republic) Weeks, to be attended by primary and secondary pupils from the 7th grade up: "Ostkunde-Wochen und Mitteldeutsche Wochen," in *Schulverwaltungsblatt für Niedersachsen* (Hanover), Heft 8, August 15, 1961, p. 187.

are introduced in rather a rudimentary fashion by maps of Germany showing it divided into three parts within the 1937 frontiers. The Oder-Neisse areas are shown as being under Polish and Soviet administration; basic population and economic data are furnished for "the three Germanies." The expulsions are usually not referred to until in the last (8th) grade at which time they are discussed in a contemporary history course. Treatment of the expulsions in text books varies. It may be based on a simple statement to the effect that "all persons of German descent had to leave," or on detailed descriptions of "the unprecedeted catastrophe." Treatment of East European problems is marginal.⁸⁰ Whether this fundamental and descriptive type of coverage is sufficient to create and develop in primary school pupils (1st through 8th grades) a genuine interest or even desire for German reunification depends to a large extent on the teacher's individual interpretation.

The situation is different in the secondary schools (*Mittel- und Höhere Schulen*). Admission to these schools, usually at the age of ten or eleven, is selective on the basis of entrance examinations. Less than one fourth of all German pupils are admitted. Subjects of the German East and Eastern Europe are introduced two times, between the ages of 10 to 11 and 15 to 16, and a third time in high schools preparing for university (*Gymnasien, Lyzeen*), between the ages of 18 and 19.⁸¹ In the latter type schools, the subject is first introduced in a course on Economic and Cultural Geography of Germany. Treatment of the "three Germanies" is usually very complete. The texts seem factual and are amply documented by maps and photographs. In his first year in high school, the student has the opportunity to learn the following facts: (1) The area east of the Oder-Neisse comprises Germany's most valuable agricultural and industrial provinces and has been German for the past 800 years. (2) After World

⁸⁰ For the grade school text used in Bavaria, see Otto Steidle, *Bilder aus deutscher Geschichte, Neuzeit und Gegenwart* (Munich: Lurz, n.d.), pp. 184, 187; further, Dr. W. Boehm, and Dr. E. Deuerlein, *Die Welt im Spiegel der Geschichte, Geschichtsatlas, kl. Ausgabe* (Munich: Bayr. Schulbuchverlag, n.d.), especially topic on page 32, "Deutschland zwischen Krieg und Frieden;" also Franz Heilmannseder und Dr. H. Klenk *Erdkundliches Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch, Teil I, Mitteleuropa* (Munich, Oldenbourg, 1950) 2nd ed., especially pp. 111 f., "Jenseits der Oder-Neisse Linie." History of Germany after 1870 is taught in the 8th grade; see Otto Steidle, *Neuzeit und Gegenwart* (Munich: Lurz, 1957).

⁸¹ Contemporary history of Germany is usually offered twice, in upper grades only.

War I, when the "Poles wanted all of Upper Silesia," they got the "most valuable part" of this area, although, according to a plebiscite, all of it "should have remained in Germany." (3) After World War II, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes, which were expropriated; there was a "great wave of dying," and unbearable sufferings. About 2,000,000 Germans perished in the process. (4) The lost areas, since 1945 under Polish and Soviet administration, are now "depopulated" and much of their arable land "devastated." (5) Since 1945, streams of poor expellees and refugees have poured into West Germany, increased its population density, and added to existing national burdens. All Germans hope that "East and West Germany will be reunited and free."⁸²

Most of these facts are reintroduced in the 8th and 9th grades on a more sophisticated plane and more within the scope of eastern and central European geography: "Since the seizure (in 1921) of German (East) Upper Silesia, Poland has had a heavy industry . . . and has become the third largest coal producer in Europe." For this reason, one text book concludes, "with the expulsion of 11,000,000 Germans we have not only lost . . . valuable agricultural land but the harmony of our . . . economy has been greatly disrupted."⁸³ Of this area, it is said that

the Soviet Union annexed the northern part . . . with Königsberg, which they renamed Kaliningrad . . . Germans who had not fled from the Russian army were expelled from their homes in disregard of all rules of international law and humanity . . . When the Poles finally saw that in expelling the Germans they had removed valuable manpower, they began to retain them, especially the skilled workers.⁸⁴

The German background of the East German provinces is frequently stressed: "Silesia, its history and culture are the creation of its

⁸² See, for example, the text book used in Northwest Germany: Prof. Dr. Emil Hinrichs, *Deutschland und die Länder Europas ringsum* (Frankfort: Diesterweg, 1955), 4th ed., especially pp. 75, and 123 ff.; also, the atlas *Seidlitz I, Deutschland* (Kiel: Hirt, n.d.), pp. 110 ff., 122 f., 124 f.; cf. Ludwig Bauer, *Erdkundliches Unterrichtswerk für höhere Lehranstalten* (Munich-Düsseldorf: Oldenbourg, n.d.).

⁸³ Christian Degn, et al., *Seydlitz, 4. Teil: Deutschland und Europa* (Kiel: Hirt, 1955), pp. 91, pp. 111 f., 161 ff.

⁸⁴ Heinrich Barten (ed.), *Deutschland - die Mitte Europas* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1957), p. 113; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 114 ff., chap. on Poland; also, Wilhelm Franz et al., *Deutschland* (Frankfort; Diesterweg 1954), especially part one "Die Gliederung Deutschlands seit dem Postdamer Abkommen," pp. 159 ff.

German population since the year 1200.”⁸⁵ Polish administration is sometimes criticized: “In Breslau, almost every reminder of the Germans is being eradicated. The Poles are doing all they can to make the capital of Silesia a Polish metropolis.”⁸⁶

In the top grades (from age 18) the topic of the German East is treated in its entire complexity, and, depending upon the intellectual level of the class, may be of junior academic quality. The approach is usually interdepartmental: economic geography, cultural and political history, sociology, and civics. The student is offered all important data and documentation. The general East European background is given: peoples, their accomplishments, their early and present political and economic problems. Historical cause and effect relationships are established. Thus, in discussing events leading to the expulsions, comment and data are introduced on the “eradication of millions of Jews” in consequence of Nazi race legislation and “compulsory wartime organization of foreign labor.”⁸⁷ The expulsions are seen as “the last... waves of a migration, unprecedented in Europe, which began in 1939–40 in consequence of the German-Soviet alliance and resettlement schemes.”⁸⁸ The large economic loss of the disputed Eastern territories is often stressed,⁸⁹ but it is also viewed against the background of West Germany’s current overall economic viability. Sociological and economic changes resulting from the expulsions and the integration of the expellees are often examined, and some of the socio-legal aspects of *Heimatrecht* may be

⁸⁵ Dr. F. H. Knöllner, *Mitteleuropa* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1956), 10th ed., p. 73.

⁸⁶ Degn, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁸⁷ See Dr. Ernst Busch, *Von der französischen Revolution 1789 bis zur Gegenwart* (Frankfort, Diesterweg, 1958), pp. 197 ff., and 239; other history texts are *Grundriss der Geschichte*, für die Oberstufe der höheren Schulen (Stuttgart: Klett, n.d.), Ausg. B, 2 vols.; and *Völker, Staaten und Kulturen*, Ein Kartenwerk zur Geschichte (Berlin: Westermann, n.d.), note especially maps pp. 87 f.; also, Dr. Wilhelm Nettmann, *Kulturgeographie Deutschlands* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1957), pp. 26 ff., 144 ff.

⁸⁸ Prof. Dr. E. Hinrichs, *et al.*, *Erdkunde für Höhere Schulen* (Frankfort, Diesterweg, n.d.), pp. 183 f., und 197 ff.

⁸⁹ Hermann Bartels, *Mitteleuropa*, Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgeographie (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1956), note on pp. 88 f., “Als die Siegermächte 1946 (*sic!*) mit dem Beschluss von Potsdam die Gebiete östlich der Oder und Neisse der polnischen Verwaltung unterstellten, wurde die Ernährungsbasis für das deutsche Volk abermals eingeschränkt... alle (diese Gebiete) waren Länder einer blühenden Agrarwirtschaft, deren Leistungen höher lagen... als in den angrenzenden Landschaften der benachbarten Staaten.”

explored.⁹⁰ Apart from mentioning the right to the homeland, most text books in current use do not elaborate on the political purposes and ambitions of the expellee movement. The ultimate question, the restitution of the lost homeland, may be raised in a general way at times:

The recovery of the lost *Heimat* is not a matter of waiting for a favorable situation to develop in world politics, nor of the unity of expellee . . . groups and organizations standing ready to march. It is rather a matter of intensive intellectual and moral education which is directed into the future (and intended) for the generations to come.⁹¹

The government's concern with education in Eastern Studies persists. Aside from continued interest in the *Landsmannschaften*,⁹² many public and private organizations lend their support to this effort, as even a cursory perusal of the large quantity of teacher's aid materials shows.⁹³

The government's legal principles its public relations approach in the German question, its interest in the teaching of Eastern Studies,

⁹⁰ Günther Frede und Karl Kolling, *Freiheit und Verantwortung, Lese- und Arbeitsbuch zur Gemeinschaftskunde* (Stuttgart: Klett, n.d.), note the section "Die Heimatvertriebenen," accounting for the socio-economic problem, pp. 85 ff.

⁹¹ See *ibid.*, p. 91: "Die Wiedergewinnung der verlorenen Heimat ist nicht eine Sache des Wartens auf eine günstige weltpolitische Situation und des Zusammehaltens vertriebener Volksgruppen in marschfesten Organisationen, sondern sie ist Sache einer intensiven, auf Generationen hinaus berechneten, auf die Zukunft gerichteten, geistigen, sittlichen und erzieherischen Arbeit; eines tiefen inneren Wandels der betroffenen Völker und Volksgruppen."

⁹² See "Deutsche Ostkunde," *DOD*, January 15, 1962, pp. 8 f.; *MID*, April 27, 1963, and November 14, 1964. See also the special atlas, F. Dörr, Ph. Geiger, und W. Karl (ed.), *Ostdeutsche Heimat in Karte, Bild und Wort* (Munich: List, n.d.), sponsored by the *Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft für deutsche Ostkunde im Unterricht*.

⁹³ For material serving as teachers' aid furnished by government agencies, see *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, für die Hand des Lehrers (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für den Heimatdienst (now called *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*), serial, especially issues July-August, 1957, "Die Sudetendeutschen;" and May-June, 1958, "Wappen und Flaggen deutscher Länder." The Guardianship for an Indivisible Germany is, as said above, interested in this facet of enlightenment; see *Unteilbares Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, p. 32, for its recommendations to the Standing Conference of State Cultural Ministers. Note also that one of the so-called independent weekly expellee newspapers, the *Ost-West Kurier* (Frankfort), with a total monthly printed circulation of about 190,000, is being subscribed to by the public schools.

For an illustration of the Polish concern with West German teaching materials see Waclaw Sobanski, *School Textbooks in the German Federal Republic* (Warsaw: ZAP, 1962).

and its close contacts with the expellee elite integrating or lobbying in the Bonn ministries, predetermined the course of West German foreign policy. From the very beginning, a foreign policy against the interests of the expellees, whether conducted openly or coverly, was not practicable. Every move of West German diplomacy that might affect their homeland claims would be subject to immediate scrutiny by East German experts. Any wrong step on the part of the government might provoke ill will among the expellees whose movement presumably was able to influence millions of German voters.

(c) *Foreign Policy.* This attitude of acceptance on the part of the government of the expellee aspirations was prevalent even before the Bonn Republic was formally established. Early in 1949, Konrad Adenauer, as President of the West German Parliamentary Council, publicly criticized the Allies for having tolerated the expulsions at the Potsdam Conference. He spoke of "six million (*sic*) Germans who . . . perished," and deplored crimes during the expulsions that equalled "the misdeeds committed by German Nazis."⁹⁴ He also said that "a German could never recognize the Oder-Neisse line."⁹⁵ In one of the first *Bundestag* sessions, Adenauer, speaking formally for the government, again branded the expulsions as inhuman and cited the Western Allies as supporting him in his protest against the wrongful seizure of the Oder-Neisse areas.⁹⁶ He subsequently discredited the newly established communist German government in Pankow,⁹⁷ and condemned it when it recognized the Oder-Neisse line as its final frontier with Poland.

In 1950, the Western Allies, at their Foreign Ministers Conference in New York, shared "the desire of the German people for the unification of Germany on a basis which respects the fundamental liberties" and, pending reunification, considered "the government of the

⁹⁴ Adenauer Memoirs, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-190. Adenauer made these remarks during his first official postwar trip abroad in his controversial speech before the Interparliamentary Union in Bern on March 23, 1949. See also Paul Weymar, *Konrad Adenauer - Die autorisierte Biographie* (Munich: Kindler, 1955), p. 385-392. The exaggeration of East German population losses, which were actually over 2 million (see Figure 1), may have been due to lack of complete statistics which were not available until nine years later.

⁹⁵ *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung* (Heidelberg), May 19, 1949, as quoted in German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 651; also Weymar, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

⁹⁶ First *Bundestag*, 5th Session on September 20, 1949, as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 9 f.

⁹⁷ First *Bundestag*, 13th session on October 21, 1949, in *ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

Federal Republic as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs."⁹⁸ The Korean war had begun. The desire to rearm West Germany and draw it into the existing Atlantic alliance was evident. Perturbed by the emergence of the nominally independent German Democratic Republic, and concerned about its own security, the Bonn government, too, urged the Allied High Commissioners to permit West German defense forces.⁹⁹ Until 1955, efforts continued on both sides of the Iron Curtain to reunite Germany through all-German elections. These endeavors failed because of the firm commitment by both Germanies to the Eastern and Western alliance systems respectively. Premises and procedural terms of reunification proposed by one side were never accepted by the other. The Big Three at various Ministers Conferences and at the 1955 Geneva Summit Meeting insisted, together with West Germany, *inter alia*, on genuinely free all-German elections prepared and conducted under international supervision as a first step to German union. Apparently fearing loss of its zone of influence in Central Europe, the Soviet Union always rejected this course, proposing in turn, either directly or through the German Democratic Republic, the neutralization of Germany and the formation of an all-German interim government to conduct elections. The area of a united Germany as originally envisaged by the Communist East was that of West Germany, Berlin, and the German Democratic Republic; the Oder-Neisse area was not considered an object of any settlement. The Federal Republic and its Western Allies, however, maintained that Germany's eastern border was to be settled at a final peace conference in which a freely elected all-German government was to participate.¹⁰⁰

That this policy was in harmony with the homeland provincial aims of the expellees needs no emphasizing. Adenauer hardly

⁹⁸ *American Foreign Policy Documents: 1950-1955*, *op. cit.*, p. 1711; Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953-1955* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966), p. 165 (hereafter referred to as Adenauer Memoirs 1953-55).

⁹⁹ Adenauer Memoirs, *op. cit.*, pp. 350 f.

¹⁰⁰ Adenauer Memoirs 1953-55, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 94 f., 213, and 351; for fuller documentation covering the period March 1950 through December 1955 see Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ed.), *Die Bemühungen der Bundesrepublik um Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands durch gesamtdeutsche Wahlen - Dokumente und Akten* (Bonn, 1954-1961), in three parts.

mentions the expellee organizations or ambitions in his autobiography, but their influence upon the Bonn government can be detected in specific incidents affecting foreign policy.

For example, in the fall of 1953, shortly after his first reelection, Chancellor Adenauer is reported to have suggested, during an informal interview, the possibility of a future Polish-German condominium over some of the disputed Oder-Neisse territories. This was after the June 1953 people's rebellion in Communist Germany had been suppressed with the help of Soviet forces. Aware of the Soviet Union's increasing firmness on the German question, the Federal Chancellor may have wanted to test a more flexible policy toward Poland. His remarks elicited strong protests from the expellee elite, and Adenauer subsequently denied having mentioned a possible condominium.¹⁰¹ In the subsequent *Bundestag* debate, the Federal Chancellor, repeating earlier government statements, said that "the German people will never recognize the so-called Oder-Neisse frontier . . . but that the problems connected with (it) must be settled not by force but only by peaceful means." Spokesmen from all parties agreed with "the claim to the German Eastern provinces," and urged "acceptance of the right to the homeland . . . as a basis of international law."¹⁰²

Similarly, Federal Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, during an informal gathering of the Foreign Press Association in London on May 1, 1956, let it be understood that the claim to the Oder-Neisse territories was "problematical" and that its partial renunciation might have to be considered in order to realize the reunification with the 17 million Germans in the Soviet Zone. This statement immediately caused a furor in expellee circles. Within 48 hours, von Brentano modified his statement in a radio interview and in an official Department Note to the effect that no German Federal Government would ever recognize the Oder-Neisse line, nor consider it "an object of barter." The problems, he said, lay not "in the

¹⁰¹ Extract of the interview with Associated Press and subsequent rectifications in German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, pp. 669 f.; for protests in the expellee movement, see *Der Schlesier*, No. 34, 1953; *Das Pommernblatt*, September 15, and October 1, 1953; and *FAZ* September 24 and October 19, 1953.

¹⁰² Second *Bundestag*, 3rd and 4th sessions on October 20 and October 28, 1953, as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 74-76; also Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 111 f.

incontestable claim as such . . . but in its realization."¹⁰³ Although he repeated these explanations during the following weeks at interviews and in a government declaration before the *Bundestag*, the expellees were not reconciled until he reassured them in a personal address at one of their large national reunions.¹⁰⁴

The Foreign Minister's declaration of June 1956 also reaffirmed the federal German policy of not opening diplomatic relations with countries of East Europe.¹⁰⁵ This policy, subsequently referred to as the Hallstein Doctrine,¹⁰⁶ was based on the theory, supported by the Western Allies, that West Germany has the exclusive right to speak for the entire German people. In 1954 and 1955, the West German and the communist East German states were formally granted sovereignty by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union respectively. When West Germany established fullscale diplomatic relations with Western countries and the German Democratic Republic with communist countries, the problem arose of how West Germany could carry on relations with countries that had extended *de jure* recognition to the Pankow Government.

In September 1955 the Russians invited the Federal Chancellor to Moscow for the purpose of opening diplomatic relations. Although this was not formally fixed as a precondition for talks, it is evident that the Germans wanted at least two things in exchange from the Russians: release of German prisoners of war and assurance that diplomatic relations would not prejudice the final German peace settlement. Adenauer got both. Some 30,000 German prisoners of

¹⁰³ For von Brentano's original statement see *Die Welt* (Hamburg), May 3, 1956; also cited in German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 676; expellee and *Landsmannschaft* protests in *Archiv*, May 4, 1953; *HvP*, May 4, 1953; *Das Ostpreussenblatt*, May 12, 1956; *VdL*, May 21, 1956; for reaction among the opposition parties see *SPD Pressedienst*, May 8, 1956, and *FDP Pressedienst*, May 8, 1956; for government rectification, see *Bulletin*, May 4, May 29, and June 29, 1956.

¹⁰⁴ For von Brentano's speech in Bochum at the annual national reunion of the Upper Silesian Homeland Provincial Society on July 1, 1956, see *Unser Oberschlesien*, No. 10, 1956; *Bulletin*, July 4, 1956; also US Embassy, *Internal Press Reports* (Bonn, MS), May 3, May 4, June 7, and July 3, 1956.

¹⁰⁵ Second *Bundestag*, 155th session on June 28, 1956, as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 95-97; and partly in *BdV*, *Der wahre Tatbestand*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁶ Named after Walter Hallstein, until recently President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, formerly Assistant Secretary in the West German Foreign Office.

war and civilians were subsequently allowed to return to Germany, and the Soviet government took official notice of West Germany's stipulation that establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow did not mean that the Federal Republic recognized "the present territorial status of either party," nor did it mean that the Federal Republic abrogated "its authority to represent the German people in international affairs."¹⁰⁷ The credit for the Chancellor's reservation is often claimed by expellee leaders.¹⁰⁸ Though it is not clear to what extent this policy derives directly from expellee influence, the record shows that the Federal Government, in its contacts with the Soviet Union since 1955, has so far remained adamant in maintaining its adopted frame of reference.

After his return from Moscow, Adenauer not only got the aforementioned all-party backing in the *Bundestag* for what he had achieved, but also for what then appeared to be a logical answer to the problem of shaping future relations with smaller East European countries. At a conference of West German ambassadors in December 1955, Foreign Minister von Brentano made it clear that Bonn would take a dim view of any state extending *de jure* recognition to the German Democratic Republic. Already, "an intensification of relations with Pankow was to be deemed an unfriendly act toward the Federal Government." Diplomatic relations, it was explained, had been established with Moscow "only because the Soviet Union . . . belonged to the four former occupation powers . . . responsible for the split of Germany by subdivision into occupation zones." Thus, only the Soviet Union together with the three Western Allies could help reestablish Germany's unity. This could not be achieved by

¹⁰⁷ For a full account of the Federal Chancellor's visit to Moscow, from September 8 to September 13, 1955, see *Adenauer Memoirs 1953-1955*, *op. cit.*, chap. 13; for the Chancellor's letter dated September 14, 1955, containing the reservation (*Vorbehaltsbrief*) and related government declarations see the documentation, edited by the Federal All-German Ministry, *Die Bemühungen der Bundesrepublik*, *op. cit.*, part 2, pp. 237-249; also *Bulletin*, September 15, 1955. The Soviet Government's answer, published subsequently through TASS News Agency, states that in fact two Germany's existed, and that the German borders had been settled by the Potsdam Agreement; see *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, East), September 16, 1955 as cited in Marzian Documents (April 1955 - May 1956), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁰⁸ The reservation is said to have been suggested, if not drafted, for the Bonn Foreign Office by expellee leaders with the advice, especially, of Professor Hans Koch (former *Landsmannschaft* speaker), who was a member of the West German delegation to Moscow; see *VdL*, No. 46, 1955, p. 2.

opening diplomatic relations with Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and other communist states.¹⁰⁹

The Bonn government consistently followed this policy until very recently by not establishing full-scale diplomatic relations with any government recognizing Pankow. Bonn has also invoked this policy several times warning states that indicated a willingness to do so, not to recognize Pankow. The avowed purpose — no recognition of and no diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic — has been fulfilled. In all except the cases of Yugoslavia, Cuba and certain African states, actual *de jure* recognition of Communist Germany has thus far been averted.

Religious observation of the Hallstein Doctrine was always encouraged by the expellee elite. When Bonn negotiated a treaty on economic cooperation with Yugoslavia in 1956, a crisis arose between expellee lobbyists and the government, because of the treaty itself and because of indications that Tito might open diplomatic relations with Pankow. The federal government's course of action during the ensuing months was due in no small measure to interference by the expellee organizations. The economic agreement between Yugoslavia and West Germany provided for compensation to Yugoslavia of 26 million marks for wages withheld from Yugoslav laborers imported into Nazi Germany during the war. In addition, there was a provision for a 99-year loan of 240 million marks.¹¹⁰ Expellee leaders opposed the agreement on the grounds that it did not allow for corresponding compensation for the especially severe damages to ethnic Germans interned in or expelled from Yugoslavia. Expellee leaders also wanted a guarantee that Yugoslavia would not recognize the German Democratic Republic and thus, in effect, the Oder-Neisse line. After the agreement was reached in March 1956, the expellees succeeded in delaying its discussion in the *Bundestag* for nearly seven months.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Wilhelm Grewe, Under Secretary in the Bonn Foreign Office, in an interview after the December 7, 1955 conference; cited in Heinrich von Siegler, *Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlands — Eine dokumentarische Diskussionsgrundlage*, Sonderausgabe für das Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Bonn: Siegler, 1964), 5th ed., p. 50; also "Jede Anerkennung der 'DDR' ein unfreundlicher Akt," *Bulletin*, December 13, 1955, pp. 1993 f.; and *Der Spiegel*, March 15, 1965, pp. 29-33.

¹¹⁰ See comment on the treaty by Hermann Raschhofer, in *VdL*, November 5, 1956.

¹¹¹ See *VdL* Circular, dated June 18, 1956, concerning the draft bill in connection with the German-Yugoslav treaty; also "Zur Vertagung der Ratifizie-

It was, nonetheless, ratified in September. Expellee leaders continued, however, to exert oppositional pressure on the government and in the legislature throughout the time of the Hungarian revolution and the Polish crisis, when a more careful attitude may have been appropriate. Yugoslavia, encouraged by Poland, did what the federal government wished to avoid: in October 1957, it recognized the German Democratic Republic and the Oder-Neisse line. Partly yielding to continued expellee demands, partly abiding by its self-imposed theories, Bonn severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade.¹¹² Similarly, Bonn broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, when, after the Cuban crises of 1962, that republic officially recognized the German Democratic Republic.¹¹³

Subsequent events are to be viewed in the light of a hardening Soviet attitude towards the German question and the increasing reluctance of the Western Allies to be drawn into open conflict with the Soviet Union. Earlier, the Soviet leadership conceived of an eventually united but neutral Germany; now, they wanted a confederacy, with the peaceful co-existence of the two German states within a European security system. Their last major peace proposal in 1959 called for acceptance of two German states as signatories and, pending eventual German unity, maintenance of West Berlin as a "demilitarized free city."¹¹⁴ This peace project aimed at cementing Germany's three-fold division and prohibiting what the Russians termed "any form of vengeful move demanding a revision

tung der Jugoslavienvertrages," *VdL*, July 16, 1956, pp. 1 f. According to a circular issued by the Council of Southeast Germans (*Rat der Südostdeutschen*), dated June 15, 1956, the opposition was particularly strong among the Southeast ethnic Germans.

¹¹² Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, especially comment by the Yugoslav German leader Josef Trischler. Cf. also Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 148-150; further *SZ*, September 12 and August 18, 1957, and *NZZ*, October 27, 1957. Except for a part of the compensation, the treaty, as well as consular relations, remained in effect in spite of expellee protests.

¹¹³ *Der Spiegel*, March 15, 1965, *op. cit.*; also Werner Zoll, "Über den Wert der Hallstein Doktrin," *Aussenpolitik*, Heft 9, 1963, pp. 602-609.

Note that the Bonn government did not depart from this course until, after the establishment of the *CDU-CSU-SPD* coalition when it (re-)established in 1967 and 1968 full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania: See *Bulletin*, August 9, 1967; *The New York Times*, February 1, 1968; and *NZZ*, February 2, 1968.

¹¹⁴ Wilhelm G. Grewe, *A Peace Treaty with Germany? An Analysis* (Bonn: German Council on Foreign Relations, 1959). In German, "Ein Friedensvertrag mit Deutschland?" in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 9-10, 1959, pp. 301-322.

of the borders of Germany or asserting territorial claims against other countries." The Bonn government as well as the expellees opposed this and later schemes.¹¹⁵ The Western Allies also rejected the Soviet proposals. Though they welcomed better relations between Bonn and East Europe, since this course would accord with their own major policy shift from armed deterrence and cold war posturing to some measure of conciliation in Europe, the Western Allies took care to note that the West's official position on the German question had not changed. In fact, the Big Three maintained their position on the exclusive legitimacy of the West German government.¹¹⁶ More recently the frontier issue was not mentioned as part of a German peace, but it was held that the German problem could only be solved by exercise of the principle of free all-German self-determination.¹¹⁷

The climate produced by East-West differences over Germany was hardly conducive to good relations between Bonn and East Europe. Aside from the treaty with Yugoslavia, consular, commercial, and cultural exchange agreements were made with the Soviet Union in 1958 and 1959. Nevertheless, relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, where reconciliation was most called for, made very little, if any, progress. When, after the 1956 uprisings in Budapest and Poznan, Poland's Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, publicized his plan for making Central Europe a nuclear free zone, the question of West German-Polish relations acquired practical significance. There are indications that until 1958 Warsaw would have agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations even if Bonn had not

¹¹⁵ For the text in German of the 1959 Soviet Peace Draft, see Siegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-130. For a government reaction to this so-called "Soviet onslaught," see *Bulletin*, "Sowjetischer Anschlag auf die Bundesrepublik," January 14, 1959; "Das Nein zum Sowjet Vorschlag," January 20, 1959; "Vertriebenenverbände, Emigranten und der sowjetische Vertragsentwurf," February 14, 1959; "Kein Friedensvertrag auf der Basis der Teilung Deutschlands," March 10, 1959, and in same issue, "Unannehbare Vorbedingungen;" further, "Was Moskau aus Deutschland machen will," April 7, 1959; summary of *Landsmannschaft* protests in *VdL*, January 16, 1959.

¹¹⁶ See part of text of Western Allied Notes to the United Nations Secretary General, dated December 3, 1963, in Siegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff. See also the subsequent Three-Power Declaration in Germany (ostensibly in reaction to the Khrushchev-Ulbricht friendship pact of June 1964), as reviewed in *Archiv, HvP Artikeldienst*, July 1, 1964; also *FAZ*, November 25, 1968, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ Cf. "Deutschland-Erklärung der Westmächte," *Bulletin*, May 13, 1965, p. 657.

formally recognized the Oder-Neisse line.¹¹⁸ In West Germany, too, influential personalities in church and government circles urged conciliation and implied eventual sacrifice of the Oder-Neisse provinces.¹¹⁹ Aside from the fact that for military reasons Rapacki's plan was considered unacceptable by both the Federal Republic and its Allies, discussion of it could have prepared the way for normal West German-Polish relations. That this opportunity was missed may have been owing to mistrust and impatience on both sides as well as to Soviet interference – in the form of yet another Berlin crisis in 1958.

The storm of protests aroused among expellees against any moderation towards and possible sacrifice to Poland has no doubt contributed to frustrating West Germany's official moves.¹²⁰ Eager to retain the sympathies of expellee voters, Bonn's official claim to the 1937 German boundaries and its defense of the right to the homeland were repeated before and after the federal elections in 1957.¹²¹ Warsaw reacted abruptly to this and to Bonn's break with Belgrade by denouncing so-called West German revisionism and stressing that the Oder-Neisse line is a permanent and unchangeable "peace" frontier.¹²² Nevertheless, Bonn aimed at expanding existing trade

¹¹⁸ See account of Hansjakob Stehle, foreign correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, "Fäden zu Bonn und Moskau," *FAZ*, March 13, 1963, p. 9; also, his book *Nachbar Polen* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1963) chap. 5; cf. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Le problème des relations diplomatiques entre la Pologne et la République Fédérale d'Allemagne," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne* (Paris), No. 4, October-November-December 1963, pp. 8-21. Wladyslaw Tykocinski, former Chief of the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin and recent defector to the U.S., confirmed that Warsaw was interested in relations with Bonn through 1958; see one of his reports in *SZ*, July 30/31, 1966, page 9.

¹¹⁹ Such as opinions (mentioned earlier) of the high Protestant church official Niemöller after his return from a visit to Poland. See also a plea for moderation by Kurt Sieveking, the Mayor of Hamburg and President of the Federal German Upper House (*Bundesrat*), given in an address in Hamburg on January 21, 1957; part of text in German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 693.

¹²⁰ For reactions against Niemöller, see p. 212 of this study. On the so-called "Sieveking Affair" see *Archiv*, February 7, 1957; *Der Schlesier* No. 7, February 1957, and *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, January 12, 1957.

¹²¹ Second *Bundestag*, 188th session on January 31, 1957, and Third *Bundestag*, 3rd session on October 29, 1957, as cited in Chronological Table, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 116-121; cf. also German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 703; further, see Adenauer's interview with CBS in New York, on September 22, 1957, *ibid.*, pp. 701 f.; and Kather, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 146-148.

¹²² *VdL*, February 15, 1957; German-Polish Documents, *op. cit.*, pp. 702 ff., citing *Tribuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 24, 1957, and Gomulka's speech on November 29, 1957.

relations with Poland and studied the possibility of diplomatic relations. East German leaders in the Expellee Federation reacted by exerting pressure upon the Foreign Minister and the Federal Chancellor not to do so lest people inside and outside West Germany would come to believe that Bonn had renounced claims to its eastern provinces and abandoned the Germans still living there "under Polish administration."¹²³ When, in January 1958, the opposition parties moved that the *Bundestag* request the Federal Government "to initiate discussions with the Polish Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations," the entire problem was passed on to the Commission on Foreign Affairs for deliberation. Eventually, the above-mentioned Working Group — consisting of expellee leaders and conservative West German legislators — took the problem under consideration. Informal explorations at Warsaw, undertaken meanwhile by Bonn through Berthold Beitz, Executive Director of the Krupp enterprises, were frustrated in no small measure by Adenauer's and Vice Chancellor Erhard's untimely pre-election appeals to the sympathies of the *Landsmannschaften*, by their timely publication in the expellee press, and by the unanimous opinion of the *Bundestag* that normalization of relations with East European states should not lead to "abandonment of vital German interests."¹²⁴

From 1957 to 1961, the expellee leadership remained particularly vigilant. During the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959, von Brentano indicated that he favored an exchange of Declarations Renouncing the Use of Force (*Gewaltverzichterklärungen*) with both Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to make progress toward German reunification and convince these countries of West Germany's oft-asserted peaceful intentions. The sequence of events — immediate protests by top expellee leaders in Bonn and Geneva and rejection of Brentano's plan by the Federal Cabinet — was such

¹²³ *BdV*, "Stellungnahme . . . zur Frage der Aufnahme diplomatischer, der Erweiterung wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen zu Polen und der gegenwärtigen kulturellen Verbindungen (sic)," often referred to as *Polenmemorandum* (MS draft, typed, dated January 26, 1958); also Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, notes on proceedings in the Federal Foreign Office and on the All-German Committee of the *BdV*; and the Heidelberg Resolution (*Heidelberger Beschluss*) of the *DJO*, dated October 17, 1959, in *Arbeitsbriefe*, No. 1, 1965, part B.

¹²⁴ On the Beitz mission, see Stehle, *Nachbar Polen*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-334.

that direct interference by expellee leaders with Bonn Eastern policy can be assumed.¹²⁵

Relations between Bonn and Prague were also for a long time unsatisfactory. In consideration of the all-party protection extended to Sudeten Germans in 1950, the Federal Government felt that it could well safeguard the interests of these Germans by repeated appeals to the principles of self-determination and the right to the homeland.

Apparently not satisfied just with Bonn's repeated claim to the continuing validity of the 1937 frontiers and irritated with the Foreign Office's vague statements about the status of the Sudetenland, Sudeten German leaders pressed for a clarification.¹²⁶ It came prior to and during the 1959 Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers. In respect of the Sudetenland and the German-Czechoslovak boundary of 1938, Bonn simply took cognizance of the fact that "the validity of the Munich Agreement under international law is in dispute." Though Bonn maintained that it did not have "any territorial claims against Czechoslovakia," this did not preclude the government's obligation to support Sudeten German claims to the right of self-determination and return to the homeland.¹²⁷ In other words, the Federal Government, while not denying the continued legal effect

¹²⁵ See "Erklärung des BdV," *VdL*, August 7, 1959, p. 1; also, "Barons-Politik," *Der Spiegel*, August 12, 1959, pp. 15 f., report about the activities at that time of Federal Expellee Minister Oberländer and BdV President Krüger; also "Die Frage der Nichtangriffspakte," *Archiv*, August 8, 1959; and "Druck des Rechts," *DOD*, August 10, 1959, pp. 4 f. Other sources state that von Brentano's initiative was rejected by Adenauer and his cabinet as well as the *Bundestag* Committee on Foreign Policy even before a formal written expellee protest had reached them: see "Bonns Ostpolitik und ihre Bremser," *SZ*, July 30, 1959; also "Ostpolitik im Eisschrank," *SZ*, January 16-17, 1960, p. 3; and Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*, especially his record about the roles of Krüger and the late Axel de Vries.

¹²⁶ In April 1959 a Foreign Office spokesman who had alleged that the 1938 Munich Agreements were no longer legally valid, retracted his statement; see *MID*, April 18, 1959, and *SZ*, April 18-19, 1959, p. 7.

¹²⁷ See "Grenzen und Forderungen," *VdL*, June 5, 1959, p. 4. The Foreign Office spokesman gave the following "official statement" by the Federal government: "1. Die Bundesregierung stellt fest, die völkerrechtliche Gültigkeit des Münchner Abkommens ist bestritten. 2. Die Bundesregierung ist der Ansicht, dass sie das Heimatrecht und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der in ihre Obhut gekommenen und aus der Tschechoslowakei vertriebenen drei Millionen Sudetendeutschen vertreten muss. 3. Die Bundesregierung hat keinerlei territoriale Ansprüche an die Tschechoslowakei."

of the 1938 cession, did not and does not claim the recovery for Germany of the Sudetenland.

Under Gerhard Schröder, who became West German Foreign Minister in 1961, and Ludwig Erhard, who succeeded Adenauer as Federal Chancellor in 1963, the Bonn government gradually adopted a more conciliatory attitude in its eastern policy, without, however, compromising the basic foreign policy positions already described. Beginning in 1963, West Germany established official trade missions in Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia.¹²⁸ Moreover, in what may be termed a reinterpretation of the Hallstein Doctrine, Schröder declared that it applied only to those states that already had diplomatic relations with Bonn. Consequently, he considered "establishment of diplomatic relations with the East European states" as not incompatible with Bonn's claim to exclusive representation of all Germans (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*).¹²⁹ Schröder had previously asserted that Bonn could not "pursue a policy of revenge or restoration" regarding East Europe:

Our aim is a just and new European order based on peaceful agreements, in which all nations may live freely together as good neighbors. The nations of the Warsaw Pact also belong to Europe.¹³⁰

Apparently optimistic about the new Bonn-Warsaw trade agreement, Schröder said that Bonn was "prepared to sign corresponding agreements with any other East European state... interested in so doing."¹³¹ Yet, he remained adamant on the question of the German Eastern frontier, contending that "its final determination must be

¹²⁸ The Bonn-Warsaw Trade Accord was signed in March 1963 and renewed once in March 1966. See *Bulletin*, March 8, 1963 p. 390; March 13, 1963, p. 415; and May 13, 1966, p. 500.

¹²⁹ Alfred Rapp (ed.), Gerhard Schröder, *Wir brauchen eine heile Welt – Politik in und für Deutschland* (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1963), pp. 276-278; and *Bulletin*, August 19, 1966, p. 862.

¹³⁰ Gerhard Schröder, "Aspects of German Foreign Policy," *Sudeten Bulletin*, September 1963, pp. 264-276; the quotation is from Schröder's address to the CDU Party Congress in Dortmund on July 4, 1962. See also Rapp (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 229 f.; for the text of another speech on May 28, 1965, in which he repeated this principle see Gerhard Schröder, *Deutsche Politik heute und morgen* (Bonn, 1965) pp. 22 f.

¹³¹ Gerhard Schröder, "Aspects of German Foreign Policy," *op. cit.*, p. 275. After establishment of Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Federal Chancellor and former West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt as Federal Foreign Minister (December 1966), full diplomatic relations were opened with Rumania and a trade accord was negotiated with Czechoslovakia.

decided by a peace treaty that would make sense only if the super-sedure of Germany's division was a part of it."¹³²

Ludwig Erhard, upon his accession to the Chancellorship in 1963, formally declared:

Peace and justice are inseparable. Justice cannot be granted to only one group of people; it is for all peoples. The expulsion of millions of Germans from their centuries-old homesteads in no way changed the legal picture. It was an injustice and no wrong ever makes a right.

We are not here to reopen old wounds. What we are seeking is a path of understanding, based on justice, peaceful negotiation, and mutual respect. The way is not easy . . . it calls for patience and sacrifice . . . We have already traveled it with success in handling the boundary question in the West, where peace and freedom prevail. We are ready to go the same road of reconciliation as far as the East is concerned.¹³³

When his Transportation Minister, the late Seeböhm, demanded, as Sudeten German speaker, the restitution of "the stolen Sudeten homeland,"¹³⁴ Erhard promptly rejected this and reiterated the official policy that West Germany had "no territorial claims whatsoever with regard to Czechoslovakia."¹³⁵ Aroused by this reprimand, Sudeten Germans protested until Chancellor Erhard and the Presidium of the Sudeten German Council, in a Joint Declaration on October 16, 1964, repeated the stand taken by the previous cabinet: Non-assertion of territorial claims against Czechoslovakia does not exclude rights to the homeland or to self-determination for the Sudeten Germans and that the solution of problems resulting from the illegal expulsions are a matter for the entire German people. The Chancellor's statement was preceded by similar declarations of the major parties in the *Bundestag*.¹³⁶ He subsequently rejected communist

¹³² He also defended the right to self-determination for Germans, calling it "a general precept of the law of nations . . . anchored in the United Nations Charter." See *Bulletin*, July 19, 1966, p. 746; and Rapp (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 204 and 252.

¹³³ From Erhard's Government Declaration on October 18, 1963, as repeated in his address to the First Congress of East German Land Representatives at Bonn on March 22, 1964. See *Sudeten Bulletin*, May 1964, p. 144.

¹³⁴ From Seeböhm's speech on May 17, 1964, at the annual Sudeten German Convention in Nuremberg, as cited in James H. Wolfe, "Press comments on Mr. Seeböhm's speech on the Sudeten German Question," *Sudeten Bulletin*, February 1965, pp. 50-52.

¹³⁵ From Erhard's speech before the New York Council on Foreign Relations, June 11, 1964.

¹³⁶ "Zur Sudetendeutschen Frage," *Sudetenland*, *op. cit.*

charges of revanchism and imperialism, as he said, with "a good conscience," and added that West Germany did "not ask for one square meter of foreign soil."¹³⁷

In 1966, the federal government, finally, did what expellee pressures apparently had prevented it from doing in 1959. In its so-called Peace Note of March 26, 1966, Bonn offered to exchange, with the governments of the Soviet Union and that of any East European state, Declarations Renouncing the Use of Force, just as it had done with the Big Three, when acceding to NATO in 1954. In the same note, Bonn stressed, however, that it must formally insist on the 1937 frontiers as a point of departure for a new all-German government which would, "when the time had come," deal with Poland about this frontier "in the same spirit that had led to the compromise (*Ausgleich*) between Germany and its Western neighbors." As for the Sudeten Problem, the Note stated that "the 1938 Munich Agreement was torn to pieces by Hitler and no longer has any territorial significance." It concluded that the German problem had to be solved "in a just manner by granting the entire German people the right freely to decide its political framework and its fate."¹³⁸

In consonance with the no-change policy of the communist East European bloc, the Soviets as well as the Poles and Czechs rejected these peace overtures. They condemned Bonn's insistence on the 1937 frontiers. In their view, West Germany's offer to renounce the use of force was worthless since it did not include the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, they argued, West Germany was the only European state that had raised territorial claims. Demanding German reunification on Bonn's conditions, ostensibly to ensure a lasting peace, therefore meant, in fact, demanding war with the socialist countries of East Europe, because they would never voluntarily agree to a change of territorial status. In unconciliatory language, both Prague and Warsaw insisted that Bonn finally recognize that Poland's present western boundaries were legal and final, that the 1938 Munich Agreement was null and void *ab initio*, and

¹³⁷ From a speech at a convention of Silesians in Hanover on June 13, 1965, cited in BdV (ed.), *Zum Jahr der Menschenrechte 1965 – Ein Almanach* (Bonn: BdV, 1966), pp. 56–59.

¹³⁸ Text of the note in *Bulletin*, March 26, 1966, also April 1, 1966; cf. *NZZ*, March 27, 1966 and April 22, 1966.

that the German Democratic Republic was a legitimate state in its own right.¹³⁹ These demands, of course, continue to incense the expellees, especially the Sudeten Germans.

The problem of how to dispose of the 1938 Munich Agreements has caught the attention of prominent lawyers, government officials, and university professors. They point out that the 1938 cession of the Sudeten area could not possibly be declared *nul et non avenu*. The war-time declaration by the British and French, who were parties to the Munich Treaty, indicating intent of unilateral cancellation had no legal effect. Morally right or wrong, the treaty had been carried out. The 1938 cession, concomitant agreements between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the 1945 expulsions had specific legal effect on property, family and citizenship status of Sudeten Germans. This situation can hardly be voided retroactively without creating individual hardships and dangerous precedents under international law.¹⁴⁰ Invoking the June 1961 *Bundestag* resolution and the 1950 Protection Declaration, the *BdV* warns the Federal Government not to "break its word." Expellee leaders reject the demands for a formal annulment and uphold Sudeten German rights to self-determination and return of the homeland.¹⁴¹ Their fear that Bonn will soften its legal rights positions is currently giving rise to considerable homeland rights propaganda in the press and at mass meetings.¹⁴² Expellee representations such as these have no doubt contributed further to chilling West German relations with the Kremlin and to delaying normal relations with East Europe.

(d) *Quasi-Official Position.* A sample collection of the more informal statements made by government and party leaders at expellee congresses and similar occasions since the establishment of the Bonn Republic highlights the government's predicament. How can it fulfill

¹³⁹ For the text of the answers to the West German Peace Note received by Bonn in April and May 1966, see *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 11, June 10, 1966; also *NZZ*, May 9, 1966 and May 20, 1966.

¹⁴⁰ "Ein völkerrechtswissenschaftliches Gutachten zur Gültigkeit des Abschlusses des Münchener Abkommens," *AWR-Bulletin* (Vienna), No. 1, 1966 as republished in Bundesminister für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ed.), *Aktuelle Materialien zur Deutschland Frage* (serial) No. 38.

¹⁴¹ *Archiv*, June 18, and June 20, 1966; *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, August 12, 1966, p. 1; and *Volksbote*, August 13, 1966, p. 1.

¹⁴² These included another march to Bonn on May 14, 1966, in which nearly 100,000 expellees participated. See *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, May 14 and May 21, 1966.

two mutually exclusive obligations? How can it effect expellee integration into West German society and at the same time assuage the peculiarly East German cultural and political consciousness of the expellees? Inability to explain logically the antithetical nature of these aims has led West German politicians – over and above defending Bonn's formal policies on the German and Eastern questions – to resort to indulgence in generalities. More often than not, these pleased the expellee elite and the expellee population but angered the West and filled the Communist East with deep mistrust.

The *Landsmannschaften* are “the ‘armies of the peace’... using weapons of (East German) toughness and perseverance in the peaceful fight for a reunited Germany.”¹⁴³ The expellees preserve the “spirit which could become the yeast dough (*sic*) for the spirit of the entire German people.” They “foster the determination to regain the homeland now occupied by strangers.”¹⁴⁴ The expellees are bringing “the fresh air of the battle front into the rear echelons.”¹⁴⁵ They stimulate “invigorating impatience . . . and new impulses for our will to reunification.”¹⁴⁶

In seeking to perpetuate individual traditions, the *Landsmannschaften* are not “trustees of the past but custodians . . . of all-German assets.”¹⁴⁷ It is “the gratifying task of the expellee press to

¹⁴³ Jakob Kaiser, Federal All-German Minister, in *Pommernblatt*, June 1, 1953.

¹⁴⁴ Franz Thediek, at the time Deputy Secretary, All-German Ministry, *Archiv, HvP-Artikeldienst*, August 14, 1952.

¹⁴⁵ Peter Paul Nahm, Deputy Secretary, Federal Expellee Ministry: “Die Flüchtlinge bringen Frontluft in die Etappe. Während Mitteldeutschland und andere Teile der Welt unter heroischen Opfern für die Freiheit kämpfen, sollten wir uns nicht . . . entzweien . . . Mögen uns die Geflüchteten lehren, um was es sich zu kämpfen lohnt,” in “Die politischen und sozialen Aufgaben der Flüchtlinge aus der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone im geteilten und wiedervereinigten Deutschland,” *Aussenpolitik*, April 1957, pp. 221-224.

¹⁴⁶ Kaiser: “Die Heimatvertriebenen . . . sind zu einem Element der heilsamen Unruhe geworden. Denn von . . . ihren Landsmannschaften gehen immer neue Impulse für Wiedervereinigungswillen unseres Volkes aus,” from a speech at the National Congress of the West Prussian *Landsmannschaft* in 1956, *VdL*, July 16, 1956, pp. 7 f.

¹⁴⁷ Theodor Heuss, at the time Federal President: “Indem die ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften die ererbten Werte pflegen, sind sie nicht die Treuhänder einer Vergangenheit, sondern die Bewahrer und Verwalter eines gemeindeutschen Besitzes,” in *VdL*, December 14, 1958, p. 4.

keep alive and to pass on to the younger generation the memory and love of the homeland.”¹⁴⁸

In 1957 the President of the *Bundestag* commented:

We need these groups with their ethnic . . . consciousness and traditions, because the overpopulated Federal Republic must envisage . . . the danger (confronting highly industrialized modern mass states) of losing itself in the monotony of a technical civilization . . . We need a clean, deep, and innermost love of our native land.¹⁴⁹

Federal Expellee Minister Oberländer pledged he would not be satisfied “until the last expellee is economically integrated,” but hastened to point out that “preservation of the ethnic structure of the expellees . . . is just as important as the cultural nuances and ethnic peculiarities of Rhinelanders and Bavarians.”¹⁵⁰

Peter Paul Nahm, a high placed official in the Expellee Ministry, asserted that the expellees’ stay in the Federal Republic was temporary. Because of this, he went on, West Germany ought not to promote their assimilation without “providing them with a social structure that will facilitate reunification.” He concluded that “the expellees have been entrusted to us for preservation and protection but not for exploitation and social fusion.”¹⁵¹ Catchwords such as “*economic integration, yes – the right to the homeland is absolute, integration does not nullify it – but social fusion, no!*” were frequently voiced until about 1959.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Adenauer: “Es gehört zu den dankenswerten Aufgaben der Vertriebenenpresse, die Erinnerung an die Heimat wachzuerhalten und die Liebe zur Heimat an die junge Generation weiterzureichen,” in *Unser Danzig*, November 1, 1958.

¹⁴⁹ Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the *Bundestag*, in a speech at a reunion of Carpathian Germans in Karlsruhe on August 4, 1957, in “Treue Bewahrung der nationalen Besonderheit,” *Bulletin*, August 8, 1957.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Baron Wrangel of the North-West German Radio Network, on December 22, 1955.

¹⁵¹ Nahm, in *Aussenpolitik*, *op. cit.* Referring primarily to Soviet Zone refugees, he said in part: “Es wäre unverzeihlich, wenn der provisorische Aufenthalt die Nivellierung und nicht die Profilierung förderte. Wir haben für eine Sozialstruktur der Flüchtlinge zu sorgen, die den Vollzug der Wiedervereinigung erleichtert. Daraus ergibt sich: Die Flüchtlinge sind uns zur Pflege und Bewahrung, nicht aber zum Ausnützen und Einschmelzen anvertraut – sie haben nicht etwa nur dem Augenblicksbedarf der Wirtschaft, sondern in erster Linie der Vorbereitung der Wiedervereinigung zu dienen” (emphasis added).

¹⁵² Nahm, *Die sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Wirkungen der Vertreibung auf die Gemeinden der Bundesrepublik*, *op. cit.*, p. 34; further, Nahm: “das Recht auf Heimat ist absolut. Die Eingliederung löscht es nicht,” from a speech before *VdL* delegates in Kassel on May 2, 1959, *VdL*, No. 17, 1959,

In recent years, statements such as these seem to have subsided, but Christmas, New Year's, Homeland Day, German Unity Day, or week ends preceding federal or state elections continue to provide good occasions at which to direct sentimental appeals to expellees: "The 'thought of the homeland' is spreading among the German people. This is not only welcome but actually indispensable, so that the Federal Government, in its efforts to solve the German question, will be certain to rely on the strong will of the entire German people."¹⁵³ Adenauer referred to the East German expellees as "the most resolute avant-garde of all-German thought." He assured them that their political aspirations would not be disregarded.¹⁵⁴ Federal President Heinrich Lübke promised that "the hour of self-determination"¹⁵⁵ would come, and an Expellee Minister affirmed that Germany would never accept division.¹⁵⁶

The government has nevertheless not done everything that expellee leaders want. It has rejected their repeated demands that their internal political and legal position be strengthened by giving the *Landsmannschaften* such privileges as corporation status and symbolic seats in the Federal Parliament. It has not allowed the establishment in the Federal Armed Forces of special East German regiments. It has not delegated special attachés to its embassies abroad for expellee public relations work, and it has not created special administrative offices for the Oder-Neisse territories in the Ministry for All-German Questions nor in the Foreign Office.

Owing to its belief in the natural and historical rights of the expellees, the Federal Republic has up to now maintained its claim to exclusive representation of the entire German nation. It still upholds the validity in theory of the 1937 Reich frontiers, of the principle of

p. 4; similarly von Brentano in a special message for New Year 1959, *Archiv*, December 18, 1958.

¹⁵³ Ernst Lemmer, All-German Minister in *Archiv*, December 18, 1958; similarly Oberländer, in a message on Homeland Day, earlier, "das Grundrecht auf Heimat ist unverjährbar . . . selbst wenn niemand mehr von uns . . . auf der Erde sein wird, bleibt ihre Rückgabe gesamtdeutsche Forderung unseres Volkes," *Archiv*, September 9, 1954, p. 2.

¹⁵⁴ Adenauer, in New-Year messages to expellees, *Archiv*, December 19, 1958; *VdL*, January 9, 1959.

¹⁵⁵ Lübke: Die Stunde der Selbstbestimmung wird kommen," *Die Welt*, July 9, 1963, p. 1; cf. *Bulletin*, October 25, 1963.

¹⁵⁶ Johann Baptist Grädl, Expellee Minister, *Bulletin*, June 22, 1966, p. 649.

self-determination, and of the right to the homeland.¹⁵⁷ It considers the 1938 Munich cession as no longer valid and seems to strive for a formula, acceptable to Prague, to get the agreement off the books.¹⁵⁸ It envisages a future, all-German, government to talk to Warsaw eventually about the final German-Polish boundary. Unlike the Homeland Provincial Societies, it does not state precisely how much, if any appreciable area, of the Oder-Neisse provinces it wants to repossess.

B. POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT

Up to the November 1966 Bonn government crisis, it seemed, judging by the results of five federal elections, that the majority of West Germans supported the government policies described above. The image of Germany within its 1937 frontiers had become a matter of routine acceptance for them.¹⁵⁹ Everyone has had access to a wealth of material on all aspects of the German problem. How do the people feel about the expellee movement and its aims?

Whether crudely or on a sophisticated level, the government, in its relations with the public, has sought to inform more than to persuade. Unlike some expellee publications, school text books on German-Polish relations "do not awaken passions or hatred."¹⁶⁰ There is no call to aggressive action. The only controversial aspect of governmental education or information programs is their tendency, whether deliberate or not, to elicit strong desires for the reunification of Germany, even if by peaceful means. For the young, the danger lies elsewhere. *Ostkunde* is not tied to contemporary history until

¹⁵⁷ It has, however, not made an official declaration regarding the legal effect of the instruments incorporating the Danzig and the Memel areas into the Reich in 1939.

¹⁵⁸ Sudeten German leaders, protesting Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Czechoslovakia and requesting termination of its operations, did not succeed in persuading the Bonn Government to act.

¹⁵⁹ All West German TV programs show on their daily weather reports the map of Germany as of 1937.

¹⁶⁰ Helmut Wagner, "Das Bild der jüngeren polnischen Geschichte in den Schulbüchern der Bundesrepublik," *Internationales Jahrbuch für Geschichtsunterricht* (Brunswick) annual, Vol. IX, 1963/64, p. 63; also *Über die Darstellung der Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehungen im Geschichtsunterricht*, Sonderdruck aus *Internationales Jahrbuch für Geschichtsunterricht*, 1957/58 (Brunswick: Limbach, 1960).

in the last grades of both the primary and secondary schools. The study of German history may, because of lack of time, or owing to negligence or prejudice on the part of the teacher, not reach the events of the 1930's by the time the pupils leave school. Recent surveys and public discussion reveal that West German pupils in grade and vocational schools — about 80 percent of the student population — are not well informed about Nazi Germany. This of course means that many young Germans fail to acquire a proper perspective of Germany's place in modern history.

1. Reactions Among West Germans

Whether most adults in West Germany succeed in acquiring a correct perspective in respect of the history of their country in the twentieth century is an open question. Initial opposition among many West Germans to the expellees and their movement has, of course, been strong enough to be felt even today. After 1945, those in West Germany who were "bombed out" or otherwise grieved by the war and had to enlist government support for welfare, housing, or reconstruction credits felt discriminated against by the authorities in relation to the expellees.¹⁶¹ There are indications of envy among an appreciable number of West Germans who felt that the expellees were quite well taken care of by the government.¹⁶² When asked, an equally large number did not want to contribute even a small amount for needy East Germans.¹⁶³ Criticism continues of the expellee movement and the activities of its leaders. Lack of realism in their purpose and aims is alleged, and revival of Nazi ideology and employment in their ranks of former active Nazis is charged.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ G. Baumert, *Vorversuche zur Untersuchung des sozialen Klimas*, Material aus den Erhebungen in Darmstadt (Frankfort: Institut für Sozialforschung an der Johann-Wolfgang Goethe Universität, MS., n.d.), esp. pp. 40, 52 ff: a good summary of a study of East-West German relations and social tensions in a small Hessian town.

¹⁶² Institut für Demoskopie, *Jahrbuch*, (Allensbach, 1947-1955), pp. 199 ff.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, especially charts pp. 200 f.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, "Braune Farbe im Flüchtlingsblätterwald: Die alte Garde der NSDAP im Sudetengau steht in den Organisationen der Vertriebenen auf Wacht," *SZ* April 18/19 1959, p. 5; accusations regarding Federal Minister of Expellees, Theodor Oberländer, in "Oberländer — Drittes Reich im Kleinen," in *Spiegel*, December 2, 1959, frontpage and pp. 29-42. Cf. *Landsmannschaft* reaction in H. Hupka, "Nazi-Mentalität?" *DCD*, August 17, 1959, p. 1.

Conversely, a general lack of compassion among West Germans for the tribulations of the East Germans has annoyed the latter group. In spite of active government and professional interest in *Ostkunde* and other patriotic endeavors, the average adult West German plays no role in the activities and interests of the expellee groups, partly because of their exclusiveness. Discussion of matters which expellees particularly take to heart is relatively infrequent in West German communications media.

The generally nationalist slant that grew up in Germany during the interwar period has not been revived in the West German press and is not apparent in radio and television. Depending on the political orientation of a particular communications medium, reaction to the expellee movement and its aims may be sympathetic or indifferent.¹⁶⁵ Judging, however, from many furious reactions in the expellee press, the attitude toward the movement in some of the more sophisticated West German newspapers and on West German television may be considered very critical, if not hostile.¹⁶⁶ Such noted West German political journalists and commentators as Jürgen Neven DuMont, Hansjakob Stehle, Günther Gaus, and Kurt Wessel are frequently attacked by expellee spokesmen for contrasting East German homeland political aspirations with the realities of the situation in the Oder-Neisse provinces.¹⁶⁷ Such open or implied criticism is often greatly resented:

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Karl O. Kurth, "Presse, Film und Rundfunk," in *Lemberg-Edding, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 403-434.

¹⁶⁶ When a journalist of one of the leading West German papers proposed final renunciation of the Oder-Neisse areas and their eventual incorporation into a free "Eastern Federation" with Central Germany and Poland, the *Landsmannschaften* charged him with spreading "poison," being a "separatist," and committing "treason." See "Verräter sind unter uns," *Pommernblatt*, May 3, 1958, and May 10, 1958. Cf. comment on the so-called "Wenger Case" in *Ostpreussen Blatt*, May 3, 1958, p. 1, and May 17, and May 31, 1958.

¹⁶⁷ For examples of West German broadcasts arousing expellee resentment, see Jürgen Neven DuMont, "Sind wir Revanchisten?" on First Television Program, July 2, 1963; Silesian reaction to similar report in *Der Spiegel*, June 19, 1963, pp. 17 f.; also Hansjakob Stehle, "Deutschlands Osten - Polens Westen," on First TV Program, October 2, 1964; reaction in *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, October 10, 1964, pp. 1 f. For more recent incidents, see Erich Janke, "Um die Achtung der Menschenrechte," *Archiv, HvP-Artikeldienst*, August 17, 1966; also *Der Schlesier*, August 25, 1966, p. 1; and *SZ*, April 8, 1968, p. 17.

How long will the federal government allow a small clique of leftist intellectual snobs (*sic*) to ridicule, on television and radio, millions of German expellees?... The barbarity of these monsters (*Unmenschen*) must be stopped.¹⁶⁸

The expellees have demanded guarantees of greater influence in shaping policies for West German radio and television networks.¹⁶⁹ Since these have not been forthcoming, the tension continues.¹⁷⁰

West German neutralist and leftist groups, a new small left-wing party called German Peace Union (*DFU*), and other non-partisan groups promoting German-Polish Friendship or European Union, should be mentioned. They, too, naturally oppose expellee demands and government support for expellee claims, but their size or influence has as yet been relatively small. (This includes a new German Communist Party, *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* or *DKP*, only very recently founded.) Other, more powerful organizations, such as the labor unions – in which expellees have no leading roles – are generally disinterested in the foreign policy goals of the expellees.

To be sure, the man on the street in the Federal Republic, if asked, was and probably still is in favor of reunification. Pending its realization, he has advocated West Germany's continued adherence to the West and has not inclined towards renunciation of the Oder-Neisse area.¹⁷¹ Too involved, perhaps, in his own needs and pursuits, and with too few ties to the East,¹⁷² he has been, clearly, an unlikely fellow-traveler for an emerging revisionist movement.

Whether expellees and West Germans would actually return to the lost East German provinces if it were possible is a question that has been seriously examined by the government, expellee groups, the

¹⁶⁸ "Wie lange noch?" *Unser Oberschlesien*, August 5, 1965, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹ "Vertriebene wollen mitreden," *SZ*, November 17, 1964, p. 11.

¹⁷⁰ For *BdV* criticism of a West German television report on the expellee youth organization, see *MID*, June 24, 1961; the *DJO* charged collusion of West German networks and East European communist agitators, in "Hand in Hand mit östlichen Agitatoren," *Ostjugend Press* (Munich), February 25, 1962, pp. 1 f.; more recently: Jaksch's protest against "wrong and dishonorable television reporting practices," in *MID*, November 21, 1964; and Erwin Rogalla, "Umkehrter Chauvinismus," *Unser Oberschlesien*, July 22, 1965.

¹⁷¹ Elisabeth Noelle, *Auskunft über die Parteien*, Allensbacher Schriften 2 (Allensbach: Institut für Demoskopie, 1955); and Noelle et al., *Antworten – Politik im Kraftfeld der öffentlichen Meinung* (Allensbach, 1954), especially pp. 119 f.; also, DIVO Institut, *Basic Orientation and Political Thinking of West German Youth*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.

¹⁷² Institut für Demoskopie, *Jahrbuch*, *op. cit.*, and *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* 1957, especially section on "Flüchtlinge," pp. 199 ff.

German radio and television networks, and polling institutes. As early as 1950, Elisabeth Pfeil investigated expellee integration in Bavaria and found that among a representative cross section of 4,400, a total of 60 percent wished to return home.¹⁷³ In July 1956, the *EMNID* Institute in Bielefeld polled about 1,500 West Germans, 400 expellees, and 100 Soviet Zone refugees, asking if they would return (or go) to the Oder-Neisse areas if the provinces there, together with the German Democratic Republic, were reunited with Germany. Definitely in favor of returning (or going) were only 65 West Germans, but 247 expellees, and 34 refugees.¹⁷⁴ In 1957, the *Institut für Demoskopie* in Allensbach polled 460 expellees and refugees among some 2,000 West Germans and compared the results with a similar inquiry made by the same institute in 1953. Another poll of 2,000 West Germans conducted in 1959 by the same Institute revealed similar results. It was found that the desire to return home had declined appreciably in four years, and that it was primarily the older people who wished to return. Notwithstanding the Allensbach surveys, the expellee press insisted on the validity of the *EMNID* investigation, asserting that 71 percent of the young people – age 16 to 30 – wanted to return as compared to only 62 percent of those above age 65. Nevertheless, in view of the very small numbers polled, this claim seems unrealistic.¹⁷⁵ A similar inquiry made by the Frankfort *DIVO* polling institute revealed that 72 percent of a larger number of youths questioned declined to give up Germany's claims to the Oder-Neisse areas even if, by renouncing them, they could reunite with the Communist German Democratic Republic.¹⁷⁶

The results of more recent inquiries are conflicting and of limited validity, because the number of persons interviewed has been too

¹⁷³ Elisabeth Pfeil, *Fünf Jahre später – Die Eingliederung der Heimatvertriebenen in Bayern* (Frankfort: Metzner, 1951).

¹⁷⁴ See *EMNID Institut für Meinungsforschung, Die Bereitschaft, in den Osten zu gehen, Sonderauswertung im Auftrage des Göttinger Arbeitskreises* (Bielefeld, July 1956, MS).

¹⁷⁵ For the Allensbach Surveys see *Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee, Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet – Die Ostgebiete und die Flüchtlinge* (Allensbach: mimeographed, 1959). For the others see *EMNID Institut, op. cit.* Note that only 65 were interviewed in the age group 16 to 24, and some 300 in older groups. For the expellee interpretation, see K. V. Müller, "Der Heimkehr-wille der Vertriebenen," *Sudeten Bulletin*, October 1957, pp. 108 f.; also *Die Brücke* (Munich), August 3, 1957.

¹⁷⁶ *Der Volksbote*, March 2, 1957. There were 16 percent in favor.

small in view of the conditional nature of the question. A poll conducted in 1960, again by *EMNID*, indicated that "half of the expellees in the Federal Republic would return to East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia if these belonged to Germany tomorrow." Of a cross section of the total population, only 17 percent were willing to return.¹⁷⁷ A special poll made in 1963 by the *Infratest* Institute in Munich for the First West German Television Program showed that 53 percent of the expellees questioned admitted that loss of their homeland was Germany's own fault. Another 36 percent blamed "the other side." Of the West Germans polled, 56 percent admitted German guilt and 40 percent denied it. Of a small group, 94 percent of the expellees and 95 percent of the West Germans rejected reconquest of the lost areas through use of force. Of the expellees, 76 percent felt at home in the Federal Republic and only 7 percent were ready to resettle in their native province provided it was in a free and democratic Poland.¹⁷⁸

Willingness to return or go East may of course be due to lack of full economic and social integration in West Germany. It may indicate overwhelming homesickness in older expellees, or enterprising or nationalist spirit in young East or West Germans. The extent of desires for reunification with the Soviet Zone (according to official policy, this must precede the final all-German peace and large-scale German migrations beyond the Oder-Neisse line) cannot now be ascertained. Aside from conflicting polls, a number of factors such as the relatively high level of living in West Germany, the seeming immutability of Germany's division, and the continued distrust of Poland and Czechoslovakia tend to contribute to a decline of interest in the entire German Eastern question.

The year 1961 may have marked the turning point in this regard. It was a year in which it could be said that satisfactory integration of most expellees had been achieved. There was almost a complete stop to the inflow of Soviet Zone refugees and a rapid decline of

¹⁷⁷ *Das Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen*, Sonderdruck aus dem Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundesregierung, "Deutsche Politik 1961," pp. 60 f.

¹⁷⁸ Report on inquiry in *SZ*, July 4, 1963, p. 4. In contrast, the Wickert Institut in Tübingen revealed a year later that 69 percent of the East German men interviewed were ready to return East if they were allowed to do so. See *Die Pommersche Zeitung*, September 26, 1964, p. 1. More recently, however, a brief poll of West Germans by the Allensbach institute showed that 53% were willing to give up the Oder-Neisse provinces and 33% were unwilling to do so; see *Der Spiegel*, December 11, 1967, p. 33.

interest in the expellee party, as shown by the loss of voters and its virtual dissolution. The ugly Berlin wall – erected without interference by West Germany's friends – may have convinced West and East Germans alike that a stalemate had now come and that reunification was not in sight, let alone return to the Oder-Neisse areas.

Yet, even now, over two decades after World War II, it is too early to assess definitely the potential strength of German national feelings and aspirations. Two recent events call for consideration: public debate of the German question within the Lutheran Church of Germany and the emergence of right radical groups inside and outside the expellee movement.

A Memorandum (*Denkschrift*) distributed by the Public Relations Office of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Germany, proposing reunification of German claims to the Oder-Neisse areas and reconciliation with the Poles, stirred up more adverse reaction in West Germany than its authors may have anticipated. Aside from energetic protests from expellee leaders, debates about concepts of the right to the homeland and self-determination took place within a wider audience than before. The discussion, which began at the end of 1965, is currently in progress.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ *Die Lage der Vertriebenen und das Verhältnis des deutschen Volkes zu seinen östlichen Nachbarn – Eine evangelische Denkschrift* (Hanover: Verlag des Amtsblatts der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, 1965); see modification of the *Denkschrift* by the Synods in *Ostkirchliche Information*, March 1966. For rejection by the *Landsmannschaften*, see especially BdV – Ausschuss für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *Die völkerrechtlichen Irrtümer der evangelischen Ost-Denkschrift* (Bonn, 1966); rebuttals by expellee pastors and laymen in D. Erich Wehrenfennig, *Memorandum, zur Lage der "Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien"* (in der Zerstreuung) (Kirnbach: Mathesius, 1966); Pfarrer W. Marienfeld, *Heimatverzicht – Ja oder nein? – Eine Stellungnahme zu der Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland* (MS, 1965); Joachim Konrad, *Zur Kirchlichen Heimatrecht-Debatte* (Ulm: Unser Weg, 1963), reissued and distributed 1966. Joachim Freiherr von Braun, *Gerichte ohne Gnade?* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1966). Collection of critical West German reactions in Pfarren Hoppe (ed.), *Das Echo auf die Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland über die Lage der Vertriebenen und das Verhältnis des deutschen Volkes zu seinen östlichen Nachbarn* (Auerbach: MS, n.d.); *Stimmen zur Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland* (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1966); Reinhard Henk (ed.), *Deutschland und die östlichen Nachbarn – Beiträge zu einer evangelischen Denkschrift* (Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1966); Helmuth Fechner, *Vorverzicht, Völkerrecht und Versöhnung – Aspekte der Ostkunde unter Berücksichtigung der Denkschrift der EKiD* (Wolfenbüttel: Grenzland-Verlag, 1966), 2nd ed. also, Gotthold Rhode, "Ein Brief an Bischof Lilje," in *Die Politische Meinung* (Bonn), February 1966, pp. 15–30.

The discussion is now continuing also among the Catholics where it was

2. Right Radical Reaction

While the debate among Protestant leaders may act as a catalyst for existing national fervor, neo-Nazi and right wing reactionary groups are frankly encouraging extremist nationalist illusions. The emergence of such ideas is not surprising. The development of a non-partisan expellee movement, its interpenetration into professional, political, cultural, and religious spheres, and its traditional roots and large following – all in the context of Germany's unfulfilled national desires – easily produced a climate ever more conducive to radical nationalist feelings among a small element of the population.

Extreme rightist groups have sprung up outside the expellee organizations since 1950. About a hundred organizations exist on the extreme right in West Germany – small political parties; youth, student, and veterans groups; publishers and cultural circles. They achieved a high in total formal membership in 1954 and reached a low in 1964. In terms of votes garnered, the leading rightist parties reached their high mark in 1951 and hit a low in 1961.¹⁸⁰ After establishment of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the trend has again turned upward.¹⁸¹ The NPD was formed in

prompted by the Bensberg Circle Memorandum: see *Ein Memorandum deutscher Katholiken zu den Polnisch-Deutschen Fragen*, ed. by Bensberger Kreis (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1968); for rebuttals see *Unser Verhältnis zum polnischen Volk – Erklärung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholischer Vertriebenen-organisationen*, herausgegeben vom Heimatwerk schlesischer Katholiken (Cologne, 1968); as well as "Zum Memorandum des Bensberger Kreises," Arbeitskreis für Natur- und Menschenrechtsfragen, Königstein/Ts., and "Eine Stellungnahme des Ermländerrates zum 'Bensberger Memorandum,'" both in *Mitteilungen für die Heimatvertriebenen Priester aus dem Osten* (Königstein/Taunus) Beilage 1968, pp. 10 through 16; and *DOD*, March 15, 1968, pp. 2 f.

¹⁸⁰ According to election statistics, the most significant of the rightist West German parties, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), reached its high point in the 1951 Lower Saxony State elections when it got nearly 367,000, or 11 percent of the votes. The SRP was outlawed in 1952 by the West German Federal Supreme Court. The successors, lastly the German Reich Party (DRP), declined in importance, winning less than one percent of the votes in the 1961 Federal elections. For a summary history see Richard S. Cromwell, "Rightist Extremism in Post-war West Germany," *Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah), June 1964, pp. 284–293.

¹⁸¹ Aggregate member totals of right radical groupings are: 1954 – 18,000; 1964 – 22,500; 1965 – 28,600. See Bundesminister des Inneren, *Erfahrungen der Beobachtung und Abwehr rechtsradikaler und antisemitischer Tendenzen im Jahre 1965* (Bonn: MS, 1966); same report for 1964 in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Beilage zur Wochenzeitschrift Das Parlament (Hamburg), March 17, 1965.

Hanover late in 1964 and absorbed members of the now defunct German Reich Party (*DRP*) and other extreme rightist organizations. Its relatively large gains of votes and mandates in recent local, county, and state elections, its increase in formal membership, and the background of its members and sympathizers show that it is a political force requiring close observation.¹⁸²

Background investigations reveal that the *NPD* is locally strong in Lower Saxony and Franconia. It has many followers among young men under 30, Protestants in small towns, civil servants, students, and self-employed. One survey estimates the share of expellees and refugees among *NPD* followers at 28 percent as compared to their overall share in the West German population of 23 percent.¹⁸³

With a few exceptions, West German extreme rightist organizations outside the expellee movement have not, until recently, stressed specific irredentist goals. The so-called Association of National Students (*Bund nationaler Studenten*) (*BNS*), which was particularly active in local university chapters between 1956 and 1961, has pledged "to support the ethnic Germans (*das deutsche Volkstum*) in foreign countries in their difficult fight for freedom and justice."¹⁸⁴ In 1958, at Heidelberg, one of its leaders, Helmut Sündermann, former highly placed Nazi official, publicly admired Hitler for having "placed Greater Germany in History." Dissatisfied with the mere talk of the West German political parties about the lost East German provinces, the *BNS* demanded reestablishment of

¹⁸² Federal and State election statistics show that the *NPD* (not to be confused with the Soviet Zone *NDPD* with which the German Communists sought to attract East and West German rightists) got 2 percent of the votes in the 1965 federal elections, or twice as many as in 1961. Within a year, the *NPD* more than doubled its percentage of votes in Hamburg (1.8 percent to 3.9 percent), and more than trebled it in Hesse (2.5 percent to 7.9 percent); in three recent elections in Bavaria (Federal, Communal, and State), the rates were 2.7 percent, 1.6 percent and 7.4 percent respectively. It gained 8 of 96 seats in the Hesse diet, and 15 of 204 seats in the Bavarian diet. During that period, its card-carrying members increased from 14,000 to nearly 20,000. See "Der Parteitag der NPD in Karlsruhe," *NZZ*, June 21, 1966, Blatt 1.

¹⁸³ See report about recent Allensbach and *EMNID* surveys in *Der Spiegel*, April 4, 1966, p. 34, and in Erwin K. Scheuch, *Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland? Eine Untersuchung bei den Anhängern der NPD* (Cologne: MS, n.d.) respectively.

¹⁸⁴ For the *BNS*' summary history, see Volker Berghahn, "Right-Wing Radicalism in West Germany's Younger Generation," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Springfield, Colorado, University of Colorado) 1962, pp. 318-336.

the Reich within old homeland borders, from the Meuse to the Memel rivers, as the supreme national goal.¹⁸⁵ The so-called National Opposition and National Freedom Movement that was begun, but not carried out, by the BNS, has now reemerged as a self-styled movement of national consolidation and revival through the NPD and its concomitant political groups.

The NPD's foreign political goals and the activities of organizations sympathizing with it go further than those of West German rightist students and many of the Homeland Provincial Societies. Article XI of the NPD's "Manifesto" states in part:

Germany is entitled to claim the territories in which the German people have been growing for centuries. We do not contest other peoples' rights to their native living space, but we insist with equal determination on the right to our homeland. Readiness to renounce it destroys our position guaranteed by international law.¹⁸⁶

At its 1966 national party congress, the NPD elaborated on this policy in its so-called Declaration of Principles Concerning the German Eastern Territories (*Grundsatzerklärung zu den deutschen Ostgebieten*) by stressing that it is the task and constitutional obligation of all Germans to guarantee the restitution of Germany within its own "contiguous living space."¹⁸⁷ The 1945 expulsions, "the robbery of the German people's traditional national soil," and the division of Germany are condemned as a cruel, illegal, and thus far unatoned

¹⁸⁵ BNS-Dokumentation, pp. 11 f., 37, as cited in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ "Gundsätze unserer Politik," in NPD, *Das Manifest der NPD*, Wurfsendung (Hanover: NPD, n.d.); see also "Die politischen Grundsätze der NPD," in one of the party's newspapers, *Deutsche Nachrichten* (Hanover), Sonderdruck IV, 1965. The German text of Article XI reads: "Deutschland hat Anspruch auf die Gebiete, in denen das deutsche Volk seit Jahrhunderten gewachsen ist. Wir machen keinem Volk seinen heimatlichen Siedlungsraum streitig, aber wir bestehen mit gleicher Entschiedenheit auf dem Recht auf unser Land. Verzichtbereitschaft zerstört unsere völkerrechtliche Position bei der Vertretung der Lebensrechte des deutschen Volkes." Note that these NPD claims as well as the goals of AKON described below are recurring in the NPD's party program published late 1967. See especially chapter XV of "Das Programm der NPD – Grundlagen nationaldemokratischer Politik," *NPD Kurier* (Hanover), D/67, DN Sonderdruck.

¹⁸⁷ "Es ist . . . die Aufgabe unseres ganzen Volkes für die Wiederherstellung unseres geschlossenen Siedlungsraumes einzustehen." See "Anspruch auf das ganze Deutschland," in *Oder-Neisse: AKON-Informationsdienst* (Darmstadt), No. 10, 1966, pp. 5 f.

act of communist violence. "No federal government and no party have the right to renounce the claim . . . to East Germany."¹⁸⁸

Thus, the new Germany is to include not only its areas within the 1937 frontiers but all of West Prussia, Danzig, and the Sudetenland.¹⁸⁹ According to the *NPD*, the Sudeten area was validly ceded to the Reich in 1938 in fulfillment of the principle of self-determination claimed by Sudeten Germans since 1919. The area is therefore considered as still part of Germany. In spite of the 1945 expulsions, "the Sudeten Germans' right to the homeland . . . has not been extinguished." the *NPD* pledges in particular to "support the Sudeten German Homeland Provincial Society in its battle for rights." From this, it follows, according to the *NPD*, that "non-Germans, individuals or groups, now residing in the Sudetenland, have not obtained and cannot acquire the right of domicile (*sic*)."¹⁹⁰ Party leaders proclaim: "For us there is no Kaliningrad, no Gdansk, no Wroclaw, and no Cheb — for us there is only Königsberg, Danzig, Breslau and Eger."¹⁹¹

Claims to recovery of East German provinces, including all ethnic German areas adjacent in the East (except Austria), are explained in detail through an organization called Action Oder-Neisse (*Aktion Oder-Neisse* or *AKON*). *AKON* was formally established in 1962 in Stuttgart — that is two years before the *NPD* came into being. It claims to be non-partisan and non-denominational. Annoyed by "a decade and a half of inactivity," a small, impatient group allegedly split off from the expellee movement and resorted to what it called self-help and action. Hand bills were printed containing claims to lost East German areas and distributed, in its name, at expellee

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁸⁹ See interview with *NPD* National Chairman Friedrich Thielen, in *Der Spiegel*, April 4, 1966, pp. 42-44.

¹⁹⁰ "Die NPD erklärt, dass das Heimatrecht der Sudetendeutschen in ihren angestammten Siedlungsgebieten durch Zeitablauf nicht erlischt. Das Heimatrecht steht den Sudetendeutschen als Individualrecht und als Gruppenrecht zu. Die NPD ist deshalb der Auffassung, dass kein nicht-deutsches Individuum und keine fremdnationale Gruppe, die derzeit im Heimatgebiet der Sudetendeutschen wohnen, dort ein Heimatrecht erworben hat oder erwerben kann." Point No. 4 in "NPD Erklärung zur Sudetendeutschen Frage," *Pressemitteilung der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft* (Munich), September 9, 1965, p. 2. See also "Die Rechtsnatur des Münchner Abkommens," *Deutsche Wochenzeitschrift* (Hanover), May 13, 1966.

¹⁹¹ "Deutscher Nationalismus — Marke NPD," *NZZ*, November 26, 1966, Blatt 2.

social and church reunions, national congresses, Homeland and German Unity Day celebrations, and on similar occasions.¹⁹²

A cross section of *AKON* hand bills, propaganda leaflets, and so-called press releases are reproduced in Plate VI below. The map of Germany, enlarged to its pre-World War I area plus the 1938 Sudeten Land cession, appears on *AKON*'s stationery and nearly all of its propaganda material. "Freedom for East Germany" is demanded. The „reunification" of these areas, which were "German for 700 years" and are now under foreign administration, is frowned upon as being "unnecessary and silly." German fellow citizens are asked how much longer they will tolerate "the destruction of Germany." Pledged "to organize national resistance against selling out Germany," *AKON* asks voters to reject "renunciative parties and politicians," and emphasizes that giving up title to "the German East means . . . treason against the future of our youth and the entire German people."¹⁹³ Germans must realize that without the Eastern provinces Germany would remain "fully dependent on the world economic situation." *AKON* insists that even "the European Economic Community is not a permanent economic solution" for Germans.

Alleged Polish plans of aggrandizement during the interwar period are alluded to and the reconquest of East Germany is advocated without recourse to war by applying the principle of self-determination. As did the defunct expellee party and the right-wing Sudeten German faction, *AKON* criticizes the *BdV* and the *Landsmannschaften* for demanding only the return of German areas within 1937 frontiers. It claims that this limitation violates the self-determination rights of the Germans from the Memel and Danzig territories as well as those of the Sudeten Germans. Attention is called to the fact that the mere claim of the expellees to the homeland right defeats their own purpose, because unless properly qualified, it extends the same right to Russians, Czechs, and Poles now domiciled in East German areas:

¹⁹² *AKON, So entstand die AKON* (mimeographed, n.d.). One of its founders still holds membership in a Hesse local group of the Silesian Homeland Provincial Society.

¹⁹³ Rüdiger Schütte, "Verzicht auf deutsches Land ist Landesverrat," *Oder-Neisse, AKON Informationsdienst*, November 10, 1966, pp. 15 ff.

Putting into effect the right of self-determination in East Germany requires reestablishment of the legal status violated by the expulsions in every respect: . . . unlimited German sovereignty in these territories, and above all, . . . *renunciation by East Germany's present illegal inhabitants*, and restitution of all property illegally taken away from expellees . . . This does not, of course, mean that expulsion in its horrible form . . . will be resumed . . . in the opposite direction; rather should *East Germany's illegal inhabitants leave Germany in an orderly way with all legal and humanitarian guarantees*. Older people, disabled, and particularly loyal persons are allowed to stay (*sic*).¹⁹⁴

Whether a sufficient number of Germans will resettle in East German provinces once the "foreigners" have left is not doubted:

Whether as much as 70 percent – as was stated recently by a public opinion polling institute – or just 10 percent, whether a few more or less expellees want to return to their homelands, this is entirely immaterial. The German Eastern territories are not only homelands of expellees but also . . . property of all Germans. Hence the entire German people must reclaim their title and preserve it for coming generations. Twenty years of foreign domination have transformed these territories into developing areas. Recolonization (*sic*) will . . . guarantee work and bread and lasting full employment for decades to millions of people.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ AKON, *Presseerklärung zum Nichtverbleib der polnischen, tschechischen u.a. Bevölkerung in den ostdeutschen Gebieten* (handbill, n.d.); the original text reads: "Die Verwirklichung des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes in Ostdeutschland erfordert die Wiederherstellung des durch die Vertreibung verletzten Rechtszustandes in jeder Hinsicht und auf allen Gebieten, – also nicht nur öffentlich-rechtlicher Art – dadurch, dass die deutsche Staatshoheit in diesen Gebieten wieder unbeschränkt ausgeübt werden kann und vor allem zivilrechtlich dadurch, dass die *derzeitigen widerrechtlichen Bewohner Ostdeutschlands* das Gebiet aufgeben und dass alle den Vertriebenen widerrechtlich entzogenen Vermögensgüter an die *Beraubten*, bzw. deren *Rechtsnachfolger* zurückgegeben werden. Dies soll selbstverständlich nicht bedeuten, dass die Vertreibung in ihrer furchtbaren Form wie seinerzeit nunmehr in umgekehrter Richtung wiederholt wird; die *widerrechtlichen Bewohner Ostdeutschlands* sollen vielmehr in ordnungsgemässer Form, unter *Wahrung aller Garantien des Rechts und der Menschlichkeit* Deutschland verlassen, wobei ältere, behinderte und besondersloyale Personen verbleiben dürfen."

¹⁹⁵ AKON – Hamburg, *Wer will denn noch zurück?* (mimeographed circular, n.d.). The original reads: "Die Frage, ob 'gar' 70%, wie es kürzlich ein demoskopisches Institut feststellte, oder 'nur' 10%, ob etwa mehr oder weniger Vertriebene zurückkehren wollen, ist völlig unerheblich. Die deutschen Ostgebiete sind ja nicht nur die Heimatlande der Vertriebenen, sie sind auch gleichzeitig

AKON may have a few thousand active members. Under its national office in Darmstadt, Hesse, it has agencies and so-called local Action Groups in every West German state.¹⁹⁶ It enlists support for its "actions" by various methods. A particularly blunt pamphlet entitled "German - Defend Yourself!" contains a copy of an appeal to volunteers for border protection squads in East Germany originally issued by the Weimar government immediately after World War I. *AKON* explains that this appeal reveals not only "Polish brutality in 1918," but also Germany's determination to reject "Polish intruders." It concludes:

Today, of course, we cannot set up Freecorps. We proclaim, however, the levying of Germans of all age groups, in the most critical moment of our nation, when even *our own government is about to surrender and betray the rights of its citizens from the East - and thus of Germany*. These volunteers, persons attached to Germany, can and shall cooperate everywhere, by words and actions, in newspapers and meetings, but especially in *AKON*. They will help prevent Germany from being devoured by her enemies, above all, Bolshevism, simply because this is required by a momentary deal between America and Russia. *Germans, defend yourselves! Fight against injustice! Save Germany!*¹⁹⁷

The *NPD*, its press organs, such groups as *AKON*, and supporting news organs, have been trying and, to some degree, succeeding, in

Eigentum des ganzen deutschen Volkes. Daraus ergibt sich für das ganze deutsche Volk die Verpflichtung, sein Eigentumsrecht zurückzufordern und für kommende Generationen zu erhalten. Zwanzig Jahre fremde Herrschaft haben aus diesem Gebiet Entwicklungsland gemacht. Die Neukolonisation wird daher auf Jahrzehnte hinaus für Millionen Menschen Arbeit und Brot und eine dauerhafte Vollbeschäftigung garantieren."

¹⁹⁶ "Der organisatorische Aufbau der Aktion Oder-Neisse (AKON)," in *Oder-Neisse: AKON Informationsdienst*, No. 10, 1966, pp. 10 f.; also author's correspondence with *AKON* in 1966.

¹⁹⁷ See G. Hammer, "Deutscher, wehre Dich!!" in *ibid.*, pp. 8 f. The German reads: "Heute können wir selbstverständlich keine Freikorps aufstellen. Wir rufen jedoch auf zur Werbung von Deutschen jeden Alters in der schwersten Stunde unserer Nation, in der selbst die eigene Regierung die Rechte ihrer deutschen Bürger aus dem Osten - und damit Deutschland selbst - preisgibt und zu verraten sich anschickt. Überall können und sollen diese freiwilligen, Deutschland verbundenen Menschen durch Worte und Taten, in Zeitungen und Versammlungen, insbesondere aber in der *AKON* mitarbeiten und verhindern helfen, dass Deutschland seinen Feinden, vor allem jedoch dem Bolschewismus zum Frasse vorgeworfen wird, nur deshalb, weil ein augenblickliches Arrangement zwischen Amerika und Russland dies fordert. *Deutsche, wehrt Euch dagegen! Steht auf gegen das Unrecht! Rettet Deutschland!*"

attracting more expellees. One of the party's deputy chairman designated the *NPD* "the political haven of expellees."¹⁹⁸ The largest newspapers, the *Deutsche Nationalzeitung und Soldatenzeitung* (Munich), an extreme rightist weekly publication, has, as was said, bought Silesian and Sudeten German weeklies and has other expellee issues.¹⁹⁹ Total printed circulation of these weeklies, together with that of the other organs, amounts to about 200,000 per issue or over 800,000 per month. This accounts for over a fourth of the monthly circulation of the entire expellee press.²⁰⁰

Apparently, however, such extremism and hostility was too much even for some of the *Landsmannschaften*. BdV President Jaksch and other expellee leaders declined to work with what they referred to as neo-Fascists and considered "any cooperation with *AKON* as not in the interest of the Federation."²⁰¹ Still other East Germans deny that expellees are responsible for the growth of the *NPD*.²⁰² Relations are broken with former homeland provincial organs taken over by right radical newspaper publishers.²⁰³ This reserve toward the *NPD* and *AKON* policies is probably not shared by some of the Homeland Provincial right-wing factions, especially the Sudeten Germans. In fact, *AKON* has accepted a *Sudetendeutscher Heimatverein* as a corporate member and stands ready to accept other Expellee Homeland Provincial Units.²⁰⁴

West German right radical irredentism protests Germany's protracted emasculation and rejects what it terms German vassalage

¹⁹⁸ *NZZ*, June 21, 1966, Blatt 1.

¹⁹⁹ Two Sudeten German newspapers: *Der Sudetendeutsche - Sudetendeutsche Landesausgabe der Nationalzeitung*, and *Teplitz-Schönauer Anzeiger - Rundschau - Schlesische Lokalausgabe der Nationalzeitung*; and one for former civil servants: *Notweg der 131er - Ausgabe E der Nationalzeitung*.

²⁰⁰ Der Bundesminister des Inneren, *op. cit.*, 1965, pp. 23-25. This report shows a considerable increase in circulation of some of the rightist newspapers, newsletters, and periodicals; cf. Plate III.

²⁰¹ *AKON, So entstand die AKON*, *op. cit.*, and *AKON, Presseerklärung* (handbill) December, 1964.

²⁰² "Die Heimatvertriebenen sind keine Vorkämpfer des Rechtsradikalismus," *Archiv*, May 18, 1964, p. 4; and "Keine Verbindung zwischen Vertriebenen und NPD," *Das Ostpreussen Blatt*, November 26, 1966, p. 3. Cf. *DOD*, September 14 and 21, 1968.

²⁰³ "Schlesische Rundschau in neuen Händen," *MID*, January 5, 1963.

²⁰⁴ Author's correspondence with *AKON* functionaries in 1966. Note also "Der Rechtskurs der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft," *NZZ*, March 17, 1968, p. 3 and "Unter Witikos Banner," *SZ*, July 6-7, 1968, p. 4.

under "alien powers that repress the peoples of Europe and maintain Germany's and Europe's division to serve their own political interests."²⁰⁵ Germans, the movement holds, must stop being "lackeys" (*Handlanger*) of other states, and start "to serve the German fatherland."²⁰⁶ They must realize that their country cannot "be blamed for all of the world's misfortunes." The *NPD* claims that "the lie of Germany's exclusive war guilt" could cost the country "billions in blackmail money."²⁰⁷ What Germany needs is a new national consciousness and "a true historical outlook" (*ein wahres Geschichtsbild*), it says.

Earlier, a neutralist German radicalism was feared by the Allies. Constructive Western policy and economic rehabilitation in West Germany seemed, however, to have suspended extremist reactions. Still, the great majority of West Germans now support the large democratic parties. The ideology of the expellees permeated the large parties and rightist factions, but it has not developed into an object of all-German enthusiasm. In fact, public criticism of and opposition to expellee organizations and to newly emerging right radical groups are frequent. The Bonn government carefully observes the development of these groups.²⁰⁸ Most East German leaders wish to stay aloof from them. Only time will tell whether West German

²⁰⁵ The preamble of the *NPD* Manifesto reads in part: "Die fortschreitende Einschmelzung Westdeutschlands in den atlantischen Machtblock und die völlige Unterwerfung Mitteldeutschlands unter die sowjetische Diktatur drohen die Teilung Deutschlands und Europas zu verewigen. Unser Volk geht in zwei entgegengesetzten Systemen auf. Während viele Westdeutsche gedankenlos die *nationale Not* vergessen, wird den *Mitteldeutschen das Recht zur Selbstbestimmung* verwehrt. *Raumfremde Mächte entmündigen die Völker Europas* und halten gemeinsam die Teilung Deutschlands und Europas um ihrer eigenen politischen Ziele willen aufrecht."

²⁰⁶ "Nationaldemokratischer Erweckungsfeldzug in Bayern," *NZZ*, December 18, 1966, Blatt 1.

²⁰⁷ Article X of the *NPD* Manifesto reads in part: "Deutschland braucht um seiner Zukunft willen ein *wahres Geschichtsbild*. Wir wehren uns gegen die Verherrlichung des Landesverrates und die Behauptung, Deutschland sei an allem Unglück der Welt allein schuld. Sie führen zur moralischen Selbstvernichtung unserer Nation. Wir fordern deshalb: *Schluss mit der Lüge von der deutschen Alleinschuld*, mit der von unserem Volk fortgesetzt Milliardenerträge erpresst werden sollen."

²⁰⁸ See the reports herein cited on Neo-Nazism prepared by the Federal Ministry of Interior.

right radicalism will be able to gain more, and the expellee movement less, support among the people, or whether, because of propitious circumstances outside West Germany, both movements will gradually decline in significance.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Hitler's campaigns in the East, accompanied as they were by unwanted barbarities and atrocities, provoked violent reactions and commensurate suffering for the Germans of the East, innocent and guilty alike. As the Soviet armies advanced, thousands upon thousands of Germans, along the whole front from the Baltic to the Balkans, fled westward in terror. Most of the thousands who remained behind were abruptly torn from their homes and driven west with the willing help of the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and others. For all practical purposes, by the time of the Potsdam Conference, East Europe was rid of its German minorities. In confirmation of this, the Soviet armies stood, menacing, upon the Elbe and the Danube.

West Germany was the place of refuge for the millions of Germans forcibly expelled from the East. In spite of great misfortunes, however, the expelled Germans from the East got little sympathy from the Western Powers, whose memories of the war and feelings of hostility towards Germans were still too fresh. The occupying authorities paid little attention to the expellees other than prohibiting them from organizing political movements. This prohibition was not inconsistent with the general policy of the victors, which, the first few years after the war, consisted in keeping close control over the entire German population and its activities.

The expellees, nonetheless, were not long in setting up organizations to protect their interests. Often, these grew up under the guise of ecclesiastical or cultural undertakings. By 1949, when the Constitution of the Federal Republic gave legitimacy to the political undertakings of the expellees, the true nature of these organizations had already become apparent. Generally, the East German elite that

provided the leadership for the expellee organizations, brought the expellees a large measure of cultural and intellectual respectability and enabled them to extend their influence to government affairs and party politics as well as to the churches and schools. Though the efforts of the expellees to create a powerful and lasting political party failed, their influence on West German politics in general and on West German foreign policy in particular was significant. Certainly, they have been one of the important factors in the decision of the three major West German political parties to make reunification an integral part of their foreign policy programs.

Claims for reunification of West and Communist East Germany — made by the expellee organizations, the major West German political parties, and the Bonn Government alike — included as a minimal demand, provision for a final delimitation of the Oder-Neisse line and, as a maximum demand, provision for reestablishment of Germany, within its 1937 or even 1938 boundaries.

Insistence on return of the provinces east of the Oder-Neisse, which are now parts of Poland and the Soviet Union, has been matched by equally resolute demands for integration into Western Europe. As a result, West German foreign policy has been peculiarly dualistic, marked on the one hand by singular cooperation with the West and on the other by strong opposition towards East Europe. Contrasts and parallels with the policy of the Weimar Republic shows that then, as today, the government aspired to a peaceful revision of Germany's eastern borders, although the desired territorial changes were obviously such that they could hardly be settled by negotiations. Poland, then as now, refused even to discuss German claims. It is true, moreover, that remarks of German politicians on the Eastern question in the 1920's were just as vague and misleading as those made today. The Weimar Republic promoted the political activities of East German minority associations in Poland just as the Federal Republic today supports the political activities of expellee organizations in West Germany. Academic research in Weimar Germany in preparation for revising the Versailles Treaty and the institutions to which it gave rise has been paralleled in the Federal Republic by similar undertakings, which, as part of the expellee movement, are sponsored by the administration.

The contrasts are perhaps more obvious. After 1919, the Reich's territorial losses in the East were made the cause of further extreme nationalism, tensions, and new war. After World War II, in contrast, the West German government opposed encouraging outright anti-Polish or anti-Czech sentiments. Also, unlike Weimar Germany and the Third Reich, the Federal Republic cooperated with the West: at first, grudgingly, under the occupation; then, willingly, under the Marshall Plan. West German cooperation with the Free West in fact flourished notwithstanding the absence of a final peace settlement and in spite of the Potsdam Conference, which has settled nothing for the Germans. The diminution of Germany in 1945 was, after all, worse than that after World War I. Including the Soviet Zone, nearly half of Germany's area was lost. This was illegal and, to many Germans, immoral.¹

Yet, after formally protesting the *de facto* situation, the Federal Republic ratified the Bonn, London, and Paris Agreements, pledging a no-war policy on the issue of frontiers, accepting arms control and restrictions on sovereignty, and trading freedom of action for membership in the Atlantic Bloc. Later, encouraged by its allies and concerned about its own safety, West Germany armed. In this, the Germans, including the expellees, who had been directed by the occupying powers to shun militarism, cooperated once again, though reluctantly at first. In addition, the Federal Republic cooperated by paying war debts and contributing to current occupation costs. Unlike Pankow, Bonn also paid damages to Israelis and other victims of Nazi persecution. Unrelenting, constructive cooperation thus assured West Germany its acceptance in the community of free nations.

While the Bonn Government continued to cooperate with the West in these and other ways, and eventually developed a more conciliatory attitude towards East Europe, the expellee movement, originally encouraged by the general anticommunist mood of the cold-war period, persisted in its original Eastern policy goals. The self-imposed mission of the expellees nevertheless seemed self-defeating. They

¹ German high school students are asked to ponder this statement by a German historian: "As compared with the Potsdam Agreement, the Versailles Treaty was a Peace of Nikolsburg." See Max Seitz, *Die neueste Zeit – Vom Wiener Kongress bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Blutenburg, 1963), 4th ed., p. 144.

aspired to no less than a rollback of Soviet power and influence from Central Europe, a virtual restitution of the *status quo ante*, and thus an annulment of the major political, strategic, and historic consequences of World War II. As a movement of non-violent persuasion rather than revolutionary upheaval, the expellee groups had to rely more on words than actions. That the time for action — that is, for realization of expellee goals — has never come has turned out to be the major, on-going frustration of the expellee cause.

This frustration has at the same time constituted one of the primary reasons for the reactivation of a heretofore relatively insignificant German rightist faction. Dissatisfied with Bonn's apparent inaction, irritated about the softening of the West's alliance system, and concerned over East European communist pressures, extremist followers have been lured by the aspirations of the expellees and have veered towards ever greater claims or ever stronger calls for militancy. Aware of the conflicts inherent in expellee claims to homeland territories, German extremists have proposed no less than a reverse, eastward expulsion of Poles and Czechs from their post-World War II territorial acquisitions. This new German right radical reaction, which combines elements of irredentist thinking, as well as earlier Prussian and Nazi attitudes towards East Europe, with the traditions and homeland policy aims of the expellee organizations, has conjured a specter so sinister that it seems frightening even to expellee leaders.

In sum, what all this means is that the expellee movement bears considerable responsibility for West Germany's failure to face the consequences of a lost war. Specifically, the movement has contributed to the immobilization and inflexibility of the Federal Republic's Eastern policy. It is also true that many West German political and governmental leaders have in turn been guilty of deferring to the anachronistic aims of the expellees. Clinging to historic concepts of human rights, the expellees and their West German friends have agreed that "equity will come to the vigilant and not to those who sleep." They argue that the legal basis for revision of the *de facto* territorial situation is stronger than after Versailles. The very suggestion that Germans might return to East Europe raised everywhere fears of another, no-to-be-tolerated German mission, and such fears pose a well-nigh insurmountable obstacle to reconciliation. Consequently, as long as West German politicians, at all levels,

support or cooperate with the expellee movement, any attempt, however honest, at a reconciliation with East Europe will be mistrusted. Clearly, such efforts have to date only served to create a solid communist front vis-à-vis West Germany and have precluded improving contacts with Germans east of the Elbe river.

The endurance of expellee and rightist nationalism in West Germany is doubtless equally unacceptable to the countries of the free West in spite of a revival of national interests elsewhere. Relations between and attitudes inside the two power blocs dividing and opposing each other in Europe have changed to a point where some states freely indulge again in nationalist experimentation. Many responsible leaders in the West are pleased to note assertions of nationalism in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in East Europe. They try to conciliate the Greeks and the Turks over Cyprus. They are not overly concerned about Austro-Italian strife in the Tyrol. They are apprehensive but not yet despairing about De Gaulle's national European ventures. At the same time, they are invariably appalled at the mere prospect of a German nationalist revival.

A strong, nationalistic, unpredictable Germany is certainly not called for. Both East and West fought the war to defeat it. West Germany's failure to face the consequences of this defeat contributed to sustaining East-West tensions beyond the cold war era. Both the West and East must assume some of the responsibility for this circumstance, for they both have avoided really trying to find a solution to the German question. The East still refuses to admit its share of responsibility for creating the German problem, or the need for solving it, or the fact that a reasonable solution requires the cooperation of the Germans and the West. The Poles, for example, as sensitive observers of the German scene, have been among the first communist states to appreciate growing West German irredentism. Not reassured by Ulbricht's promises of no revision of the status quo, their concern persists. During a brief interlude between 1956 and 1958, Warsaw might have been ready to deal with West Germany even without a formal guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line, and Bonn may have missed its chance at this time. But before and since then the Poles have countered unreasonable expellee claims, made directly or through Bonn spokesmen, with equally insensitive insistence on

historic title to their "Recovered Western Territories." Similarly, inflammatory Sudeten German claims cause the Czechs to create unnecessary difficulties for Bonn. An annulment of the Munich Agreement *ab initio* may be unacceptable to Bonn for legitimate reasons, but an instrument disposing of the problem in internationally acceptable and legally valid form is called for. Both Warsaw and Prague latterly insist on West Germany's unconditional, unilateral acceptance of the *status quo* and full recognition of the Pankow government. In the eyes of many responsible West Germans, not to speak of expellees and rightists, this is adding insult to injury. While Hungary takes the same stand in charging Bonn with stubbornness, Rumania has tested its growing freedom of action by establishing full diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1967. The Soviets, however, not to mention Pankow, prefer to continue their unsophisticated approach to the German question, fearing that a conciliatory policy would weaken their bulwark in the heart of Germany, not to say in the heart of Europe. It might have been hoped that the Poles and the Czechs, who had so much experience with minority problems during the inter-war years and managed to a considerable extent to deal with them, would find a way of approaching the German question, including the problems posed by the self-styled expellee minority, with greater understanding and less distrust, but this has not been the case thus far.

The West on the other hand is inclined to forget that Bonn's post-war cooperation presupposes expectations that must be disappointed in the general climate of an East-West *détente*. Many Germans are irritated by Franco-British conflicts over the Common Market, resent De Gaulle's dismantling of NATO, and fail to understand Allied inaction in Berlin. In spite of progress towards European economic integration, a further loosening of the West's political and military alliance system and a growing reluctance to deal with the problem of Germany's division could cause a dangerous feeling of isolation on the part of West Germany. Tendencies to judge West Germany not so much by its record of postwar cooperation but by Nazi war-time atrocities have perpetuated suspicions of Germany in the West and sustained hostile attitudes towards Germany in the East. Such suspicions and attitudes hardly help the Federal Republic to cope with internal instability. Extreme nationalists and irredentists could win new converts to their cause if West Germans were to become con-

vinced that "no amount of good will and . . . good conduct could, even in the United States, completely disarm the mistrust."²

Surely, complete mistrust of Bonn's current efforts to solve the problem of German division is unwarranted. The expellee movement and the spread of its claims to the right radical faction are more a matter of accidental development than of a predetermined grand design. Similarly, financial and other support of expellee organizations and projects by the government, from the lowest to the highest levels, developed more or less naturally as the movement became inextricably interwoven into the system of existing West German institutions. To conclude that all this represents a centralized national irredentist German conspiracy would ignore the fact that West Germany's democratic federal system provides for the emergence of a multitude of political activities, from the extreme left to the extreme right, in an effort to find national unity in a scheme of pluralist interplay of political forces.

The expellee movement doubtless will have a role in West German politics for some time to come. The East Germans, while integrated into the West German economy, have — by their own choice — remained a distinctly separate political and social grouping. By concentrating on natural, close-at-hand national goals they have captured the interest and enthusiasm of many Germans. Owing, however, to the very favorable economic development, the opposition in responsible quarters, and to the obvious, increasingly firm stalemate over the German question, the expellee movement has failed thus far to make its cause appear to be a vital enough one to be taken up and championed by the entire German people. Consequently the overwhelming majority of West German voters still support the large democratic parties. Such support, if it continues, may cause the new right radicalism to decline in its recently won, if relatively small importance.

Meanwhile, a wiser expellee leadership may emerge, and much good advice offered by scholars close to or inside the movement may find a larger audience. Hans Koch has warned that "the times of riding over the East" were a matter of the past, that a deeper under-

² Alfred Grosser, "Le malaise allemand," *Le Monde* (Paris), February 4, 1966, as cited in Wolfgang Wagner, "Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Weg — Die Zukunft Europas und die deutsche Frage," *Europa Archiv*, September 25, 1966, pp. 645-654.

standing of the new East Europe was needed. Eugen Lemberg has urged his compatriots not to yield to the peculiarly parochial tribal spirit that has often haunted emigre societies. Kurt Rabl saw the "supreme achievement" of his scholarly juridical efforts in the avoidance of future expulsions. And Reinhart Maurach, another jurist, has deemed "the price of Germany's sacrifice not too high if it gives rise to rebirth of a new international law."

More than two decades after the second World War, millions of German families are still divided, and some East Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain are still "people on the road." If these persons can be set to rest, extreme irredentism may very well have had its last outburst in Germany, but until this is assured, statesmen responsible for shaping policies and decisions in respect of the German question ought to be sensitive to the need for tempering rather than aggravating the internal rigors of the West German political scene. De Gaulle's exclamations on the undeniably Polish character of certain German cities in the Oder-Neisse area, made during his recent visit to Poland, is a case in point. Responsible statesmen, it is to be hoped, will realize that the East German minority movement is manifest in a complex, well organized network of political, cultural, academic, and religious groups and centers with substantial outside financial support, that they have a large following, their own press and institutionalized channels for reaching political parties, schools, and churches; and that, because of the nature of their movement and national aspirations, which are being passed on to and accepted by many of the younger East German generation, they may continue to be an influential factor in the West German course of politics.

West German Eastern policy thus faces an extremely difficult task. Seeking reunification and maintaining the desire for eventual all-German self-determination, it must credibly demonstrate in East Europe that West Germany's intentions are peaceful and not counter to vital national interests of communist states. The Bonn government's efforts at genuine reconciliation with the East have been gradually increasing. It is therefore not inconceivable that a constructive Eastern policy will emerge — a policy that would at least go some way towards mitigating the antagonisms that have troubled the course of affairs in East Europe in our time.

POSTSCRIPT

More than a year has passed since the research for this volume was completed and the publisher began to process the manuscript. It therefore seems necessary to add a few words about recent political developments.

The federal elections held in West Germany in September 1969 resulted in the first change of the ruling party since the establishment of the Bonn government. This change came about not by virtue of a clear shift in majorities from the conservative Christian Democrats to the liberal Social Democrats, but through an opportune coalition of the *SPD* with a greatly liberalized though considerably diminished *FDP*. Freed from the restrictions of the earlier Grand Coalition, the new Federal Government, under Chancellor Willy Brandt, has immediately begun to pursue a foreign policy designed to relax East-West tensions and to do away with protracted cold war attitudes. The new course, which seems to have some support of Bonn's allies, is a highly conciliatory and concessionary one. It could even lead to full recognition by Bonn of the *de facto* consequences of World War II. Whether such a policy will help to reduce tensions in Central and Eastern Europe depends primarily on the reaction in the East to the new diplomatic overtures.

In any case, virtual unanimity among the federal legislators of West Germany, as expressed previously in official resolutions on the German question, may be a matter of the past. The West German electorate seems now, and in the foreseeable future probably will remain, divided into a large conservative-legalistic group on the one hand and a growing liberal-pragmatic group on the other. From the outward appearances, the expellee organizations are continuing their activities. But their pressures for the peaceful restoration of a

single German state, exerted in the name of Western-style self-determination, might in time simply evaporate into political history. As a new era of superpowers and intra-bloc loyalty begins, such pressures could possibly be seen as one of the last major manifestations of conservative national idealism in West Germany.

More than fifty years after the signing of the Versailles Treaty and a quarter of a century after the termination of World War II, the lessons of the Second Reich (1871-1919) and the Third Reich (1933-1945) may yet be forged in the national-consciousness. Notwithstanding different concepts of statehood and self-determination, both Germanies – at least in theory – still consider themselves to be located in phases of transition, with each aspiring in different ways after reunification with the other. But the superimposed considerations of the separate power blocs to which they belong make it seem likely that the two Germanies will remain sealed off from one another for some time to come.

The solution of the German question is still not in sight, but it is clear that in no case could justice for all prevail. Reparation of wrongs on one side will almost always mean denial of rights on the other. What is worth remembering is that at a time when European stability to a large extent means world security, unsettled national problems and local injustices seem of secondary importance.

Munich, 1970

Hans W. Schoenberg

TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLE I. *Membership in Homeland Provincial Societies of East German Expellees in West Germany*
(Based on Total Arrivals in 1950)

Name and Address of National Headquarters Office	Total Expellees	Paying Members (Estimates)	Percent of Participation	Votes in Federation Speakers Assembly
<i>Northeast Germans</i>				
Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft				
Hannover-Döhren, Kastanienallee 23	40,000	20,000	50	1
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Litauen				
Hannover, Engelbosteler Damm 75a	30,000	5,000	17	1
Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen				
Hamburg, Parkallee 86	1,300,000	140,000	11	5
Bund der Danziger				
Lübeck, Mühlentücke 1	200,000	50,000	25	2
Landsmannschaft Westpreussen				
Münster, Warendorfer Str. 21	500,000	50,000	10	1
Pommersche Landsmannschaft				
Hamburg 13, Johnsallee 18	900,000	60,000	7	3
Landsmannschaft Berlin-Mark Brandenburg				
Kiel, Mühlenstrasse 81	130,000	25,000	19	1
Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe				
Gevelsberg, Westfalen, Hagenstr. 234	300,000	30,000	10	1
	3,400,000	380,000	11	15

(continued)

Name and Address of National Headquarters Office	Total Expellees	Paying Members (Estimates)	Percent of Participation	Votes in Federation Speakers Assembly
<i>Silesians</i>				
Landsmannschaft Schlesien (Nieder- & Oberschlesien) Bonn, Poppelsdorfer Allee 15	1,500,000	470,000	24	12
Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier Bonn, Kaiserstrasse 173	500,000			4
<i>Studeten Germans</i>				
Studetendeutsche Landsmannschaft München, Arnulfstrasse 7	1,900,000	350,000	18	13
<i>South East Germans</i>				
Karpathendeutsche Landsmannschaft Slowakei Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen	70,000	10,000	14	1
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Ungarn München, Himmelreichstrasse 22	140,000	24,000	17	1
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Jugslawien Stuttgart, Charlottenplatz 17	146,000	35,000	23	1
Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben aus Rumänien München, Sendlingerstrasse 5	30,000	6,000	20	1
Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen München, Sendlingerstrasse 48	26,000	20,000	77	1

(continued)

TABLE I (Continued)

Name and Address of National Headquarters Office	Total Expellees	Paying Members (Estimates)	Percent of Participation	Votes in Federation Speakers Assembly
Landsmannschaft der Buchenlanddeutschen				
München, Artilleriestrasse 20	40,000	10,000	25	
Landsmannschaft der Dobrudscha-deutschen				
Stuttgart W, Johannesstrasse 23	8,000	*		
Landsmannschaft der Bessarabiendeutschen				
Stuttgart, Florianstrasse 17	70,000	25,000	36	2
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland				
Stuttgart, Diemer-Saldenstrasse 48	70,000	*		
Subtotals	600,000	130,000	22	8
Grandtotal	7,900,000	1,330,000	17	52

* Numbers relatively insignificant.

Sources: For organizations and addresses see BdV (ed.), *Material- und Personal-Katalog für ost- und mitteleutsche Kulturräte in der Bundesrepublik und West-Berlin* (Hamburg: Kant, 1961); Albert Deckl (ed.), *Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens* (Bonn: Festland) annual; local telephone directories in the Federal Republic of Germany. For membership and group figures see Wambach Archives, *op. cit.*; own interview material obtained at BdV; and publications of the West German Federal Statistical Office, *op. cit.*

TABLE II. *The Expellee Homeland Provincial Press (1952-1954)*
Number of Newspapers, Periodicals, and Bulletins
Frequency of Issue

Homeland Provincial Society	Total Number	Weekly	2-3 Times per Month	Monthly	Less Frequent
<i>Northeast Germany and Europe</i>					
Baltic Area	3	—	—	3	—
East Prussia	15	1	3	3	8
Danzig	4	—	—	2	2
West Prussia.	3	—	1	2	—
Poland	3	1	1	2	—
Pomerania	22	—	2	9	11
East Brandenburg	8	—	—	5	3
Subtotals	58	1	7	26	24
<i>Silesia</i>	68	1	2	48	17
<i>Sudeten Area</i>	74	2	14	42	16
<i>Southeast Europe</i>	13	2	2	7	2
Total Reich German .	190	4	22	109	55
Total Ethnic German .	23	2	3	14	4
Grand Total.	213	6	25	123	59

Category

Provincial Society Homeland	Interest General	—Religious— Cath. Prot.	Region Homeland	News Local	Bulletin
Baltic Area	2	1	—	—	—
East Prussia	2	1	3	5	2
Danzig	1	2	1	—	—
West Prussia	1	—	—	—	2
Poland	—	—	2	—	1
Pomerania	2	2	2	3	3
East Brandenburg. . . .	1	—	1	4	1
	9	6	9	18	7
<i>Silesia</i>	10	3	8	6	6
<i>Sudeten Area</i>	6	3	—	13	47
<i>Southeast Europe</i>	1	—	6	2	4
Total Reich German .	22	9	14	28	17
Total Ethnic German .	4	3	9	2	5
Grand Total	26	12	23	30	22

Source: Karl O. Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse der Heimatvertriebenen*, *op. cit.*; material obtained at the *VdL*, *BdV* and the Göttingen Circle.

TABLE III. *Selected Important Expellee Newspapers of Homeland Provincial Societies*

Homeland Provincial Society, Name Place and First Year of Publication	Frequency	Reich Germans			
		Circulation per Issue 1953-54	1953-54	1957-58	Computed Monthly Total Printed Circulation 1965-66
East Prussia:					
<i>Das Ostpreussenblatt</i> , Hamburg, 1950	X	96,000	288,000	557,300	472,000
West Prussia: ¹					
<i>Der Westpreusse</i> , Lübeck/Münster, 1951	T	16,000	32,000	38,600	51,000
Pomerania:					
<i>Die Pommersche Zeitung</i> , Hamburg, 1947	Y	34,000	68,000	246,300	260,000
Silesia:					
<i>Der Schlesier</i> , Recklinghausen, 1949	W	37,000	160,300	181,100	100,000*
<i>Schlesische Rundschau</i> , Stuttgart, 1949	T	35,000	105,000	—	—
Upper Silesia:					
<i>Unser Oberschlesien</i> , Bonn, 1951	Z	12,000	12,000	24,000	41,600
Total		230,000	665,300	1,047,300	924,600
Sudeten Germans					
<i>Sudetendeutsche Zeitung</i> , Munich, 1951	W	35,000	151,600	149,000	150,000*
<i>Der Sudetendeutsche</i> , Hamburg, 1947	W	40,000	216,700	—	—
Total		75,000	368,300	149,000	150,000

(continued)

		Ethnic Germans			Computed Monthly		
					1953-54	1957-58	Total Printed Circulation
Name Place and First Year of Publication		Frequency	Circulation per Issue	1953-54	1953-54	1957-58	1965-66
Baltic Area:							
<i>Baltische Briefe</i> , Marburg/Hamburg, 1948	...	M	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	9,500
<i>Danzig:</i>							
<i>Unser Danzig</i> , Lübeck, 1948	...	Z	19,000	19,000	43,000	32,000	
Poland:							
<i>Weg und Ziel</i> , Hanover, 1949	...	M	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,700	
Southeast Europe:							
<i>Der Donauschwabe</i> , Aalen, 1951	...	W ²	10,000	43,300	43,300	52,000	
<i>Newland</i> , Salzburg, Austria, 1948	...	W ²	1,000	4,000	4,000		
Total	...		41,000	77,300	101,300	99,200	
West German Regional							
Federation:							
<i>Wegweiser für Heimatvertriebene</i> , Frankfurt	...	T	180,000	360,000	360,000	100,000 ³	
<i>Heimatwacht</i> , Hanover	...	M		170,000	170,000	159,000	
<i>Mittelungsbatt des Bundes der Vertriebenen</i> , Stuttgart	...	M		70,000	70,000	67,000	
Church:							
<i>Königsteiner Rufe</i> (Catholic)	...	M	85,000	85,000	85,000	60,000	
Total	...		265,000	685,000	500,000 ⁴	386,000	
Grand Total	...		611,000	1,795,900	1,797,600	1,559,800	

(continued)

For Footnotes and Sources: See Page 320.


TABLE III (Continued)

1 As within 1937 German boundaries	X Thrice per month, later weekly
2 Circulation in West Germany only	T Twice per month, later thrice per month
3 Including: <i>Kleiner Wegweiser</i> , M(estimate)	Y Twice per month, later weekly
4 Estimate	W Weekly
	Z Monthly, later twice per month
	M Monthly

Sources: Willy Stamm (ed.), *Leitfaden für Presse und Werbung*, Essen, Annuals, 1951 to 1965; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1952 to 1959, *op. cit.*, Kurth, *Handbuch der Presse der Heimatvertriebenen*, *op. cit.*; Institut für Publizistik der Freien Universität Berlin, *Die deutsche Presse 1956* (Berlin: 1956); und *Zeitung- Zeitschriftenverlag*, *Das Fachorgan für das gesamte deutsche Pressewesen*, especially No. 18, September 1958, p. 765, archives of the Carl Gabler Werbegesellschaft, Munich; interviews at the *BdV* and Federal Expellee Ministry.

PLATE IV (MAP 1)


East German Territories Claimed by the Homeland Provincial Societies



H.W. Schoenberg

PLATE V (Map 2)

Das gewaltsam zerrissene Deutschland innerhalb seiner Grenzen von 1937



Nichts ist endgültig geregelt, was nicht gerecht geregelt ist. Abraham Lincoln

PLATE V (Map 2) [p. 324]

*Central and East German Territories Claimed by the Association of
Central German Homeland Provincial Societies (VLM)*

Translation of Inscription

Left Margin: Nothing is settled finally unless it is settled justly, Abraham Lincoln

Right Margin: Germany, forcibly split, within her 1937 frontiers

Center: *Shall it remain like this?*

No! Never!

Right of Self-Determination for All Peoples!

Reunification in Peace and Freedom

Source: *Vereinigte Landsmannschaften Mitteldeutschlands (VLM)*, Bonn,
distributed through *Deutsche Einheit, e.V.*, Munich.

PLATE VI

Selected Propaganda Material of Action Oder-Neisse (AKON)

No. 1 Vote No For Renunciating Parties! [p. 326]

No. 2 Oder-Neisse Never Frontier! [p. 327]

No. 3 AKON – Fellow Germans! [p. 329]

No. 4 "You Give Him the Pill!" [p. 330]

No. 5 Poles in Germany. [pp. 333-336]

Sources: Material ed. and issued by AKON in Alverdissen (North-Rhine Westphalia), Pfungstadt (Hesse), Darmstadt (Hesse), Bremen and Munich.

Translation of No. 1

Vote No

For Renunciating Parties and Renunciating Politicians!

You are responsible now for the success of reunification of all parts of Germany!

Translation of No. 2

ODER-NEISSE NEVER FRONTIER!

East of the Oder and Neisse rivers there is century-old German territory:
East Prussia – Danzig – West Prussia – Pomerania – East Brandenburg
Silesia and in the South our Sudetenland.

700 years German, 16 years under foreign administration.


Renounce it already now?

No!

ODER-NEISSE RENUNCIATION—UNNECESSARY AND SILLY

Wählt

keine Verzichtspartei, keine Verzichtspolitiker!



Sie tragen jetzt die Verantwortung
für das Gelingen der Wiedervereinigung
ganz Deutschlands!

Verantwortlich: Aktion Oder-Neiße (AKON),
W. Geißler, 4921 Alverdissen.

PLATE VI (No. 2)

Oder-Neisse niemals Grenze!



Ostlich von Oder und Neiße liegt uraltes deutsches Land:

Ostpreußen · Danzig · Westpreußen · Pommern · Ostbrandenburg · Schlesien, und südlich unser Sudetenland



700 Jahre deutsch, 16 Jahre unter fremder Verwaltung.
Jetzt schon darauf verzichten?

Nein!

Oder-Neisse-Verzicht — unnütz und töricht!

Translation of No. 3

AKON

Fellow German!

How long will you tolerate Germany's destruction? Bolshevism plans the world revolution, even today, with so-called co-existence!

Formerly: The German East

Yesterday: Central Germany

Today: Berlin in Danger

Tomorrow: ???

The old generation is accused of insufficient resistance against Hitler.

We take notice of it!

We organize national resistance against Germany's sell-out.

Translation of No. 4

AKON

"You give him the pill, perhaps he'll swallow it more readily."

(The cartoon shows the West German party chiefs or officials, Ludwig Erhard [CDU], Herbert Wehner [SPD] and Erich Mende [FDP] urging the President of the Evangelical Church in Germany [Kurt Scharf] to give the "renunciation" pill to the German.)

PLATE VI (No. 3)


AKON

**Deutscher
Mitbürger!**



Wie lange noch willst Du zusehen, wie Deutschland zerstört wird?

Der Bolschewismus plant die Weltrevolution, auch heute mit der so-nameden Koexistenz!



Vorgestern: Der Deutsche Osten

Gestern: Mitteldeutschland

Heute: Berlin in Gefahr

Morgen: ? ? ?


Der älteren Generation wirft man ungenügenden Widerstand gegen Hitler vor. Wir nehmen es zur Kenntnis!

Wir organisieren den nationalen Widerstand gegen den Ausverkauf Deutschlands.

Verantwortlich: Aktion Oder-Neiße (AKON) e. V.
Spenden erbeten: AKON-Bez. B Konto: 584 Ffm.

Mitarbeit erbeten: Schriftlich an: Erwin Arlt, 8 München 15, Rückertstraße 7
Druck: H. W. Klöppinger, Pfungstadt

PLATE VI (No. 4)



„Gib Du ihm die Pille, da schluckt er sie vielleicht eher!“

Herausgeber: Aktion Oder-Neiße (AKON) e. V. · 61 Darmstadt, Postfach 144

Verantwortlich: Bundesvorsitzender W. Geißler · 4921 Alverdissen, Ostersiek 168

Druck: Schloßbergdruckerei W. Schierlitz

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Translation of No. 5

- (a) POLES IN GERMANY
- (b) East Germany supplied *additionally*: Lower Saxony or Hesse
- (c) East Germany as large as: Denmark, Benelux, and Switzerland *together*
- (d) East Germany: a third of Germany
- (e) A BIT OF HISTORY
- (f) *Germanic*: long before Christ and the invasion of the Slavs (600 years *after* Christ)
- (g) *German*: long before America and Australia were discovered!
(German eastern border according to the right of self-determination)
- (h) 13 MILLIONS OF GERMANS EXPELLED FROM EAST GERMANY
- (i) *Expulsion thus*

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- (a) GENOCIDE – MASS CRIME
- (b) 13 million *expellees* from East Germany: Australia and New Zealand depopulated
- (c) 2.2 million people died during expulsions
- (d) POLAND NOT GUILTY?
- (e) Poland divides Germany by the Vistula Corridor in 1919
- (f) Territories Conquered by Poland in the East and West from 1919 to 1921
- (g) Poland wants Former German Colonies in Africa
- (h) Polish Conquests 1919–1946
 - Small Record of Sims*:
 - Poland annexes West Prussia 1919
 - Poland controls German Danzig 1920
 - Poland separates East Prussia from motherland 1920
 - Poland invades Upper Silesia 1920
 - Poland invades Byelorussia 1920
 - Poland invades the Ukraine 1920
 - Poland occupies part of Czechoslovakia 1939
 - Poland expels deliberately one million Germans 1919–31
 - Poland murders thousands of German civilians 1919–39
- (i) 1939: Newspaper *Nasza Przyszlosc* demands: *Poland as far as the Ural*
- (k) 1932: Polish warship *ordered to fire* at public buildings in Danzig if impeded in port.

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- (a) TERRITORIES DEMANDED BY POLAND FROM 1918 TO 1963:
- (b) Semi-official Polish Postcard from 1935/39
- (c) *Translation*: "Each of you carries in his heart the seed of future rights and the extent of future frontiers. Adam Mickiewicz."
- (d) *Poland as far as Berlin and Dresden*. Czechoslovakia: Polish–Baltic Areas: Polish–Byelorussia: Polish!
- (e) CORRIDORS – POWDER KEGS
- (f) If England had an Irish and the Soviet Union a Chinese corridor...
- (g) *Partly or Totally Demanded*:
 - Zone 1*: (= black) as far as Breslau
 - (by) Party Leader Dmowski 1918
 - President of State Paderewski 1918
 - Polish Deputy of the General Commissioner of Danzig 1932

Zone 2: (= Oder-Neisse line)

(by) Polish Western Borderlands Association 1926-39
 Foreign Office Warsaw 1930/31
 Important Polish Newspaper 1939
 Minister of Social Affairs Koscialkowski 1939
High General Staff Officer Baginski 1927
 Parts of Polish public 1939

Zone 3: (= "State of Elbe Slavs" with Hamburg and "State of Lusatia" with Berlin)

(by) University Professor Stojanowski 1946
 Newspaper of the Free Poles in Chicago 1963
 Reich Capital (to be moved to) Merseburg: Baginski 1927

- (h) GERMAN PROPOSAL OF 1939: ELECTIONS IN THE VISTULA CORRIDOR
- (i) *German election victory* (probable): Polish traffic route to Gdingen
Polish election victory (improbable): German traffic route to Danzig
No matter, which election victory:
 - (1) German port Danzig to Germany
 - (2) Polish port Gdingen to Poland
 - (3) Poland access to the sea

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- (a) *One Minute to Twelve - Radio Warsaw: 1939*
 "This insolent (German) proposal shows clearly how necessary the military orders of the Polish Government have been."
- (b) *One Minute to Twelve: German Consul assassinated in Cracow!*
- (c) *Before the War 3-4,000 Germans in Poland*
1939: 20,000 Germans in Poland
- (d) Civilian Victims among Ethnic Germans in Poland
- (e) *No SPACE IN POLAND?*
 3 Poles return from the Curzon territories (= Byelorussia and Ukraine) taken from the Soviet Union in 1921
 In compensation, 20 Germans leave by force their 700 years old homeland (Oder-Neisse territories)
- (f) **DECISION OF THE VICTORS IN 1945:**
 Determination of Western Polish frontier not before peace treaty with total Germany - East Germany (Oder-Neisse) only under foreign administration
- (g) (scales indicating) value of the Oder-Neisse areas - 18.0. Value of Curzon areas - 3.4
- (h) **RIGHT TO THE HOMELAND BY MEANS OF ARMS???**
Polish Children in East Germany
- (i) **RECUPERATION OF EAST GERMANY only by War???**
21 million square kilometers changed proprietors since 1947 - without war - in the middle of the atomic era
(Map of) Germany (appearing) to the right on the same scale
- (k) **FRIENDSHIP YES: BUT LIKE THIS: Poland for the Poles! Czechoslovakia for the Czechs! Germany for us Germans!**

PLATE VI (No. 5)

• ^oPolen in Deutschland •

④ Ein wenig Geschichte

^④ 13 Millionen Deutsche aus Ostdeutschland vertrieben

^{h)} 13 Millionen Deutsche aus Ostdeutschland vertrieben




PLATE VI (No. 5-continued)

◎ Völkermord — Massenverbrechen

④ 13. Millionen Heimatvertriebene aus Ostdeutschland

Australien + Neuseeland
entvölkert

④ 2 200 000 (2,2 Millionen) Vertriebene

④ Polen unschuldig?

④ Polen spaltet Deutschland durch Weichselkorridor 1919

④ Polens Eroberungen (schwarz) in Ost und West 1919–21

④ Polen wünschten ehemalige deutsche Kolonien in Afrika

④ 1939: Zeitung „Nasza Przyszłość“ verlangt Polen bis zum Ural

④ 1932: Polnisches Kriegsschiff Schießbetecht auf öffentl. Gebäude in Danzig wenn im Hafen behindert

④ Kleine Sündenlist:


Polen annexiert Westpreußen	1919
Polen kontrolliert das deutsche Danzig	1920
Polen trennt Ostpreußen vom Mutterland ab	1920
Polen marschiert in Oberschlesien ein	1920
Polen marschiert in Westpreußen ein	1920
Polen marschiert in die Ukraine ein	1920
Polen besetzt Teile der Tschechoslowakei	1939
Polen verfrisbt fast 1.000.000 Deutsche	1919–31
Polen ermorden Tausende deutscher Zivilisten	

PLATE VI (No. 5-continued)

① Polnische Gebietswünsche 1918–1963



② Korridore — Pulverfässer



③ Teilweise oder total gefordert:

Zone 1 (= schwarz), bis Breslau	1918
Parteichef Drzewski	1918
Staatspräsident Poderewski	1932
Poln. stellv. Generalkommissar für Danzig	1932
Zone 2 (= Oder-Neiße-Linie)	
Poln. „Westmarkenverbund“ 1926–39	
Auswärtiges Amt Warschau 1930/31	
Große polnische Zeitungen 1939	
Sozialminister Koscikowski 1939	
Haber Generalstabsoffizier	
Baginski 1927	
Teile der poln. Öffentlichkeit 1939	
Zone 3 (= „Elbländerstaat“ mit Hinterpommern und „Lausitzstaat“ mit Berlin)	
Universitätsprof. Stojanowski 1946	
Zeitung der freien Polen in Chicago 1963	
Reichshauptstadt nach Merseburg: Baginski. 1927	

④ Deutscher Vorschlag 1939: Wahlen im Weichselkorridor



PLATE VI (No. 5-continued)

① 1 Minute vor 12
Sender Warschau:
„Dieser unverschämte (deutsche) Vorschlag beweist deutlich, wie notwendig die militärischen Anordnungen der polnischen Regierung gewesen sind.“

② 1 Minute vor 12
Deutscher Konsul
in Krakau ermordet!

1939

③ 3-4.000
dem Krieg
Deutsche in
Polen
1939: 20.000
Deutsche in Polen
④ Die Zivil-Opfer der deutschen Volksgruppe in Polen

⑤ Siegerspruch 1945:
Festlegung polnischer Westgrenze erst im Friedensvertrag mit Gesamtdeutschland, - Ostdeutschland (-Oder-Neiße) nur unter fremder Verwaltung.

⑥ Kein Platz in Polen?
3 Polen kehren aus den der Sowjetunion 1921 geraubten Czerni-Gebieten (= Weißrussland und Ukraine) zurück.
20 Deutsche verlossen dafür zwangsläufig ihre 700-jährige Heimat. (Oder-Neiße-Gebiete)

⑦ Heimatrecht durch Waffen ???
Polnische Kinder in Ostdeutschland.

⑧ Wiedergewinnung Ostdeutschlands
nur durch Krieg ???

21
Millionen km²
— ohne Krieg —
Besitzer gewechselt
mittendrin im Atomzeitalter
seit 1947

Rechts Deutschland im gleichen Maßstab

POLEN
den Polen!
TSCHECHEI
den Tschechen!
DEUTSCHLAND
uns Deutschen!

Herausgeber: AKTION ODER-NEIßE (AKONI) e. V. - Zu beziehen bei: Theo Wietzorek, 282 Bremen-Aumund, Blumenhoher Str. 1a - Verantwortlich: Joachim Drischel, Pfungstadt, Frankfurter Str. 7 - Druck: H. W. Kämpfing, Pfungstadt

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As an aid to the reader, an outline of material included in the bibliography of this study follows:

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 - A. Non-German**
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 - 1. West German
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 - 3. Rightist Political Organs

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- The most recent, detailed and documented study on the rise and decline of the expellee party (GB/BHE). The study, completed under the auspices of the Marburg Institute for Scientific Politics, examines *inter alia* the party's role in the expellee economic integration process and appropriately explains its downfall as being caused largely by the success of this integration. As another reason for the BHE's decline Neumann concludes (p. 392) that in the Federal Republic "a 'fifth estate,' a population group burdened with political and social dynamite, could . . . not be conserved" and that therefore, "*the 'Emasculation of the Expellees' as a particular political force was a necessary consequence of the societal development in a highly industrialized and economically dynamic country.*" This is open to question. The expellee movement - undisturbed by the fate of the BHE - is still a going concern. The East Germans' "subculture consciousness" (as appropriately termed by Neumann, p. 12), their exile mentality, and the messianistic concept of their movement's goals are unchanged.
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 Very good on historical background of German-Polish relations in the inter-war and war periods. Summarizes diplomatic prelude to Oder-Neisse line and expulsions. Expellee problems and activities in West Germany as well as official Bonn position on the Oder-Neisse frontier are mentioned briefly in the last chapter (using sources to 1958).
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This study ably retraces some of the background of recent German-Slav relations. Like the more recent book by Broszat (*supra*), it stresses the expansive, nationalist and — under Hitler — aggressive German eastern policy. It summarizes the diplomatic preparations of the Oder-Neisse line and briefly discusses the expulsion and resettlement of East Germans up to 1954. It mentions expellee organizations (including Homeland Provincial Societies), the expellee party and some prominent East German leaders, states some of their homeland provincial aims and indicates presence of their influence on Bonn's foreign policy. The few sources used are dated 1947 through 1954. The latter part of the book deals with development in Western Poland and Czechoslovakia during the early postwar period. The author condemns expellee chauvinism and opposes restitution to Germany of the lost eastern provinces. Miss Wiskemann's book caused considerable protest among expellees and West German Government spokesmen. See for example *SZ*, August 9, 1956; *VdL*, August 13 and 27, September 17 and 24, 1956; *EPS*, August 24, 1956; and *Archiv*, September 13 and 27, October 4, and November 1, 1956.

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COMMITTEE AGAINST MASS EXPULSIONS (ed.), *The Land of the Dead*. New York: author, 1947.

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— *Men without Rights of Men*. New York, author, n.d.

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C. DISSERTATIONS

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This unpublished work is a relatively brief empirical study on minority social integration in a small rural community (St. Märgen) in South West Germany. Though the number of interviews (especially of expellees) is small and the time spent in the village less than a year, most of the facts uncovered and conclusions derived therefrom seem valid and pertinent. The author

appropriately hypothesizes and proves the phenomenon of the expellees' "economic integration without cultural assimilation." Among the most interesting findings are his observations on the strong social cohesiveness of the small ethnic German groups and families found and the high degree of their personal satisfaction derived from life in their insular milieu, re-created along patterns from their old homelands in South Eastern Europe.

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BÖTZER, BRIGITTE, *Das Vertriebenenproblem in der Münchner Tagespresse, 1945-1953.* Munich: University, Zeitungswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 1957.

Fine contribution on treatment of expellee problems in West German dailies under American occupation.

FUKAS, DIETER, *Gibt es im positiven Völkerrecht eine Norm des Inhalts, dass der Mensch in der Heimat nicht aus ihr vertrieben werden darf?* Erlangen: University, 1959.

HABEL, FRITZ PETER, *Historische, politische und soziale Voraussetzungen des Zusammentreffens zwischen Bayern und Sudetendeutschen nach 1945. Ein Beitrag zum Strukturwandel Bayerns.* Munich: University, Diss. Phil., 1966.

In this detailed analysis of encounters between Sudeten Germans and Bavarians since 1848 the author devotes considerable attention to documenting the post World War II influx, resettlement and organizational history of Sudeten expellees in Bavaria. In spite of evidence shown to the contrary the author concludes *inter alia* that the (Sudeten) expellee movement consists merely of "actors and dummies" (*Akteure und Statisten*) – an unjustified generalization, to say the least.

HILF, RUDOLF, *Die Presse der Sudetendeutschen nach 1945 und ihre Stellungnahme zum Schicksal der vertriebenen Volksgruppe.* Munich: University, 1951.

Contains some useful documents; comment not convincing.

ÖBERKESCH, VALENTIN, *Völkerrechtliche Betrachtung zum Problem der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen.* Graz: University, 1952.

SCHMIDT, MANFRED HORST, *The East German Landsmannschaften in the German Federal Republic: Their Organization and Influence.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Ph.D. dissertation, 1959.

On the basis of material gathered primarily in 1956 this rather short unpublished work (139 pp.) summarizes the historical background of East German groups and discusses the organizational development and pattern of the *Landsmannschaften*, neglecting, however, organizational traditions and their reappearance, and activities of other important expellee organizations in West Germany. *Landsmannschaft* objectives at the time, some of their relations with West German political parties, and presence of expellees in Parliament are described (using sources to 1957). Treatment of expellee press and other communications, their background and significance is wanting as is the analysis of such basic East German aims as the rights to self-determination and homeland. A short part (also based on sources to 1957) discusses expellee influence on legislation and administration. The author concludes generally, but inappropriately (on p. 128), "that although the *Landsmannschaften* are supported and encouraged in their work of maintaining the cultural heritage of the folk-groups by the West German Government, their influence has been negligible in the affairs of the political parties, the federal legislature, and the federal ministries." He predicts that, assuming progress of the expellees' eco-

nomic and social integration, "the influence of the *Landsmannschaften* will in all likelihood recede" – an optimistic prediction.

WAMBACH, MANFRED MAX, *Parteienstaat und Verbändestaat*. Bonn: University, Diss. Phil., 1969.

This dissertation is expected to be published in Stuttgart by Ferdinand-Enke-Verlag within the series *Bonner Beiträge zur Soziologie*, ed. by Gottfried Eisermann. Its title will be *Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol*. This important work is based *inter alia* on Wambach's own valuable archives which this author was permitted to use (see pp. XIII and 72 ff. *supra*). The study contains a theoretical and empirical analysis of certain aspects of the Federal Republic's pressure groups, including the expellee organisations.

IV. Newspapers, Periodicals, Serials

A. NON-GERMAN

- A.W.R.-Bulletin*. Vierteljahrsschrift für Flüchtlingsfragen (Vienna).
- Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne* (Paris).
- Foreign Affairs* (New York).
- Integration – Bulletin International* (Vaduz). Ed. by Fürst von Liechtenstein Stiftung.
- Journal of Central European Affairs* (Springfield, Colorado: University).
- Osteuropäische Rundschau*. Nachrichten und Berichte aus den Ländern Hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, bearbeitet nach der Zeitschrift *East Europe* (Munich). Ed. by Free Europe, Inc.
- Polish Western Affairs* (Poznan).
- Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe.
- News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York). Ed. by National Committee for a Free Europe.
- The New York Times*, International Edition.
- Political Science Quarterly* (New York: Columbia University).
- The Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, Indiana).
- U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.).
- Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah).

B. GERMAN

1. West German

- Amtsblatt der Erzdiözese München und Freising* (Munich).
- Aussenpolitik – Zeitschrift für internationale Fragen* (Stuttgart).
- Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland* (Bonn). Ed. by Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Serial.
- Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn).
- Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart).
- Deutsche Ostkunde – West-Ostdeutsche Blätter für Erziehung und Unterricht* (Troisdorf).
- Der Europäische Osten* (Munich).
- Evangelischer Pressedienst* (Bethel-Bielefeld).
- Evangelischer Kirchendienst Ost* (Berlin).

- Europa Archiv* (Bonn).
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Göttinger Tageblatt.
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung.
Informationsbrief – CDU/CSU Landesverband Oder-Neisse (Bonn).
Informationen des evangelischen Presseverbandes (Göttingen).
Informationen für die Truppe (Bonn). Ed. by Bundesministerium für Verteidigung.
Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung (Allensbach). Ed. by Institut für Demoskopie.
Kirchliches Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (Gütersloh).
Kieler Nachrichten.
Münchener Merkur.
Osteuroparecht (Stuttgart). Ed. by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde.
Ostkirchliche Informationen (OKI) (Hanover).
Das Parlament (Hamburg).
Politische Literatur – Berichte über das internationale Schrifttum zur Politik (Frankfort).
Die politische Meinung (Cologne).
Politische Studien (Munich). Ed. by Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften.
Der Spiegel (Hamburg).
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich).
Vierteljahrsschriften für Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart).
Der Wegweiser (Troisdorf). Zeitschrift für das Vertriebenen- und Flüchtlingswesen, herausgegeben vom Arbeits- und Sozialministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Die Welt (Hamburg).
Wirtschaft und Statistik (Mainz and Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). Ed. by Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden.

2. Expellee and Related Organizations

Note: Principal Homeland Provincial newspapers and other important expellee organs are listed on pp. 123 ff. and in Table III, *supra*.

- Arbeitsbrief* (Munich). Expellee youth circular.
Banater Heimatblätter (Munich).
Deutscher Ostdienst (DOD) (Bonn). Ed. by the Expellee Federation (BdV).
Central Europe Journal (Munich). Sudeten German organ in English (formerly, *Sudeten Bulletin*).
Expellee Press Service (EPS) (Göttingen).
Gesamtdeutscher Block/BHE – Nachrichtendienst der Partei (Bonn).
Informationen des Verbandes der Landsmannschaften (VdL Informationen) (Bonn).
Jahrbuch der Albertus Universität zu Königsberg/Pr. Ed. by Göttinger Arbeitskreis (Überlingen and Würzburg).
Jahrbuch der Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe 1957 (Munich).
Der Jugendkreis: Blätter für Gruppenarbeit (Hameln). Expellee youth organ.
Königsteiner Blätter. Organ of East German Catholic Institutions.
Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe (Gevelsberg).
Mitteilungen für den Deutschen aus dem Donauraum (Karlsruhe).

- Mitteilungsblatt des Hilfskomitees der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche und der Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Bessarabien* (Hanover).
- Mitteilungsblatt* (Hanover). Ed. by Hilfskomitee der Jugoslawien-Deutschen.
- Mitteilungsblatt der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft* (Munich).
- Mitteilungs- und Informationsdienst für Vertriebenen-, Flüchtlings- und Kriegs-geschädigtenfragen (MID)* (Bonn).
- Der neue Ackermann* (Munich). Sudeten German Catholic organ.
- Ostdeutscher Literatur-Anzeiger* (Göttingen). Ed. by Göttinger Arbeitskreis.
- Ost Jugend Press*. Ed. by Deutsche Jugend des Ostens (DJO).
- Das Pommern-Blatt* (Hamburg).
- Pommern Brief* (Hamburg).
- Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen (HvP)* (Göttingen).
- Siebenbürgische Zeitung* (Munich).
- Sudeten Bulletin* (Munich). Sudeten German organ in English (re-named *Central Europe Journal, supra*).
- Sudetenland*. Vierteljahresschrift für Kunst, Literatur, Wissenschaft und Volks-tum (Munich).
- Studenten Greif* (Berlin/Hamburg). Mimeographed newsletter issued by expellee student organization; from 1959 (Heidelberg/Göttingen).
- Der Südmährer* (Geislingen).
- Volk auf dem Weg* (Stuttgart). Periodical for ethnic Germans from Russia.

3. Rightist Political Organs

- Deutsche Nachrichten (DN)* (Hanover).
- NPD organ.
- Deutsche National-Zeitung und Soldaten-Zeitung* (Munich).
- Deutsche Wochenzeitschrift (DWZ)* (Hanover).
- NPD newspaper.
- Notweg der 131er – Ausgabe E der Nationalzeitung* (Munich).
- Oder-Neisse: AKON – Informationsdienst* (Darmstadt).
- Schlesische Rundschau – Schlesische Lokalausgabe der Nationalzeitung* (Munich).
- Der Sudetendeutsche – Sudetendeutsche Landesausgabe der Nationalzeitung* (Munich).
- Teplitz-Schönauer Anzeiger – Sudetendeutsche Lokalausgabe der Nationalzeitung* (Munich).

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