# West Germans Against The West

Anti-Americanism in Media and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1968

Christoph Hendrik Müller

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List of Abbreviations

General Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)
AG	Aktiengesellschaft (joint-stock company)
ARD	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (public German TV and radio stations)
BHE	Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (1950s refugee party)
BRD	Bundesrepublik Deutschland (see FRG)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian-Democratic Party)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Bavarian sister party of the CDU)
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront (Nazi labour organisation)
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik (see GDR)
DKP	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist Party, founded in 1968)
DP	Deutsche Partei (German Party)
DVP	Deutsche Volkspartei (Weimar German national-liberal party)
FAZ	*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberal party)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GI	enlisted soldier of the US Army, abbreviation of "government issue"
GVP	Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (Pan-German People's Party)
HICOG	High Commission of Germany
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany, banned by the Constitutional Court in 1956)
NL	Nachlass (private papers)
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (1960s neo-Fascist party)
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi Party)
OMGUS	Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)

POW	Prisoner of War
RIAS	Radio im Amerikanischen Sektor (US radio station in West Berlin)
SA	Sturmabteilung
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party)
SRP	Sozialistische Reichspartei (1950s neo-Fascist party)
SS	Schutzstaffel
TV	Television
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
ZDF	Zweites Deutsche Fernsehen (public German TV station)

Archives

ACDP	Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik in der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU party archive, St. Augustin)
ACSP	Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (CSU party archive, Munich)
ADL	Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in Gummersbach (Liberal parties archive, Gummersbach)
AdsD	Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (SPD party archive, Bonn)
BArch	Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives, Koblenz)
BayHStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Munich)
CFA	Commonwealth Fund Archives (at the RAC)
HIA	Hoover Institution Archives, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, California)
HStAS	Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
IfZ	Institut für Zeitgeschichte München – Archiv –
NRW HStA	Nordrhein-Westfälisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Düsseldorf
NHStA	Niedersächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Hannover
RAC	Rockefeller Archive Center (North Tarrytown, New York)
RFA	Rockefeller Foundation Archives (at the RAC)
StAB	Staatsarchiv Bremen
StAHH	Staatsarchiv Hansestadt Hamburg

1
Introduction

1.1 General introduction

> Everyone who lives in the Americas today, whether descended
> from the Aboriginal population or from voluntary or involun-
> tary settlers, has been shaped by the 500 years that have passed
> since Columbus sailed. But so has everyone in the Old World,
> though in ways of which we are rarely conscious.[1]

Ever since the American Revolution, the Marxist historian Eric
Hobsbawm told an audience in Seville at the quincentenary celebra-
tions of Christopher Columbus's voyage to the New World, the United
States (USA) had been a 'model of political innovation'.[2] Furthermore,
the long-term effects of Columbus's discovery were to be felt in popular
culture, leisure, consumption and nutrition, since that discovery, in the
long run, had brought not only chewing gum and Coca-Cola to Europe,
but also potatoes, maize, peanuts, sunflowers, tobacco, chocolate and
cocaine.[3]

Never, however, had the impact of the USA on Europe been greater
than after the Second World War. With the dramatic increase in Cold War
tension during the second half of the 1940s, the USA became the guar-
antor of West European military security, while the eastern half of the
continent was controlled by the Soviet Union. Initially, West Germany,[4]
as an occupied country, felt the impact most directly and was proba-
bly most closely related to the USA.[5] Even before the foundation of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the summer of 1949, cataclysmic
Cold War events were being played out on German soil, most impor-
tantly the introduction of the Deutschmark as the new currency by the

USA in June 1948 and the subsequent Berlin Blockade as a Soviet reaction to the attempt to introduce the currency in the three Western sectors of Berlin that made up West Berlin. The High Commission of Germany (HICOG), consisting of High Commissioners from France, the United Kingdom and the USA, remained in control of West Germany from the foundation of the FRG to the suspension of the occupation statute in 1955, one of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's most vital foreign policy successes.

The immediate post-war years and the first two decades of the FRG were thus seen by many of its contemporaries as a period of intensified Americanisation. The political system of Western Germany was heavily influenced by American political thinking, the main monetary institution, the *Bundesbank*, and its predecessor, the *Bank deutscher Länder*, bore a certain resemblance to the US Federal Reserve, and Adenauer's foreign policy was directed at the reintegration of Western Germany into the Western nations led by the USA.[6] West Germany became a major base for American ground troops during the Cold War. Economically, West Germany moved towards a more liberal system, dominated by the necessity to internationalise trade and commerce. Monopolies were more strongly regulated, as American-style antitrust and anti-cartel laws were introduced. Also, Marshall Aid contributed to the recovery of the West German economy. Culturally, American popular music and Hollywood films, mostly banned at least in the later years of Nazi Germany, gained commercial success and, in the case of jazz, support in the public radio stations. The FRG and West Berlin hosted American radio stations such as RIAS Berlin, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Furthermore, the US government attempted to influence the cultural-intellectual sphere of Western Germany directly through the institution of *Amerika-Häuser*,[7] which were established in order to represent American culture and societal thinking as well as to constitute a forum for discussion. The American-controlled newspaper *Die Neue Zeit* was for many Germans the first point of contact with the 'American way of life', before the paper went into decline in 1949.[8] From October 1948 onwards, *Der Monat*, founded and mostly financed by the US military, was to become the West German voice of American-style 'consensus liberalism'.[9] All this was part of a larger Allied effort to re-educate Germans in order to re-establish liberal democracy and make Germans realise the enormity of Nazi German crimes against humanity.[10] In an 'Americanisation from below',[11] archetypal American products like Disney comic strips, Coca-Cola,[12] Chesterfield cigarettes, chewing gum and jeans (so-called *Nietenhosen*) once again gained prominence in West German everyday

life. The political scientist Arnulf Baring in 1988 summarised the history of the FRG by using the architectural metaphor of the FRG resting on an American foundation.[13]

All these developments, perceived as a broad societal process of 'Americanisation', triggered considerable criticism and certain defence mechanisms. Some historians even claim that '[w]hen the American impact was too direct and too carefully thought out, it usually misfired'.[14] Thus even pro-American voices felt it necessary from time to time to warn against the perceived threat of total 'Americanisation'. In January 1953, the legendary post-war mayor of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen, raised the issue during the opening ceremony of an exhibition entitled 'Trade Relations between Bremen and the USA – A Bridge between the Continents':

> One thing has to be crystal clear to all Americans and all Germans. We Germans cannot ask America to orientate herself to us. Yet at the same time, America should not attempt to Americanise Germany. My hope and my aim is to be able to help ensure that the best ideas of both nations finally meet and amalgamate without either of these [nations] giving up or losing their idiosyncrasies.[15]

During the same year, a young student of political science (and future professor at the Free University of Berlin), Harry Pruss, expressed his worries (in somewhat shaky English) about growing anti-Americanism in Europe after his return from a year in the USA:

> In Europe there has been a growing antiamerican [*sic*] flavoured scepticism during the last two years. It was partly originated by communist influences partly it was induced by moral preachments and threats from Americans. Obviously 'the' Americans were regarded as to be a little too enthusiastic about their own achievements, and too little aware of the dangerous implications Americas [*sic*] real power is giving to the expressions of her national sentiments. When some demagogues appeared on the scene all Europe acclaimed that America is going fascist. ... Thus the conviction of a national crisis in America was given expression by prominent European writers.[16]

Although Pruss 'saw a lot of signs but could not find the "Crisis" ',[17] and although he said he had experienced the most decisive year of his life in the USA, he probably caught the mood of many Germans,

if not many Europeans. With the rise to prominence of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the subsequent witch-hunt against communists, liberals and free-thinkers generally referred to as McCarthyism, a demagogue had indeed arrived on the scene. There is no denying that *some* aspects of 1950s America were genuinely shocking to European liberals. In 1953, for example, some 30,000 books with allegedly communist content were removed from the libraries of the German *Amerika-Häuser*.[18] Nevertheless, that does not explain the general outburst of anti-American resentment Pruss had observed. In 1953, Germany had its own fair share of anti-communist demagogues. Also, it was noted with some surprise in the USA that hardly anything was reported in Europe about the vocal and freely voiced opposition to McCarthyism in the USA, thus presuming a uniformity of US opinion.[19] The vital element of Pruss's observations is the fact that the USA, in 1953, was seen as a little too self-confident, a little too power-hungry. Many in West Germany felt their own culture and political persuasions to be under threat by a seemingly all too powerful USA.

Of course, anti-American sentiment was by no means an exclusively German phenomenon. Particularly in France,[20] but also in Britain[21] and other European states,[22] Americans were seen at times as ignorant, superficial, flashy and self-righteous.[23] No other European state's fate after 1945, however, was as closely linked to the USA as (West) Germany's. Nor was anti-Americanism of this type a new phenomenon after 1945. This image of the USA originated in the Wilhelmine era, was only slightly modified during the Weimar years and then strongly reinforced by the National Socialist wartime propaganda.[24] One of the (often contradictory) German 'America myths' of the nineteenth century was that of the 'country without a history and culture'.[25] During the Weimar Republic, the established socio-economic elites had often used similar anti-American resentments and stereotypes in order to defend their cultural hegemony and subsequently their status. Anti-Americanism had especially been utilised to counteract feminist demands and the feared rise of an 'egalitarian' and commercialised mass culture.[26] In that respect, anti-Americanism fulfilled similar functions to anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic. At least during the inter-war years, '[a]nti-Americanism could thus be defined as the anti-Semitism of the European intellectual'.[27] In later Nazi propaganda, 'the Jews were the most visible and reprehensible agents of modernity and capitalism'.[28] The USA represented correspondingly unwelcome social forces.[29]

After the end of the Second World War, anti-Americanism in various guises resurfaced in the West German public (and published) discourse,

but also, if anecdotal evidence is to be believed, at many a dinner table discussion and in arguments about the right choice of radio programmes. Unlike in France or Britain, where anti-American discourse at the time was mostly confined to the cultural elites,[30] West German anti-Americanism could be found in all social strata. It is claimed that the sometimes 'shrill attacks on the United States were a means of reasserting a European identity in the face of America's overwhelming economic, military, and cultural presence'.[31] Furthermore, the memory of envy evoked by the apparent affluence of American soldiers during the hunger years after the war may have fostered anti-American resentments.[32] Thirdly, the anti-American propaganda of Joseph Goebbels during the final years of the war[33] contributed to anti-American sentiment long afterwards: the alleged plan of Henry Morgenthau to convert '[i]ndustrialised Germany ... into a huge potato field'[34] was etched into the collective consciousness of both Western and Eastern Germany well into the 1950s.[35] The Allied carpet-bombing of most German cities and the subsequent death and destruction had played a part in strengthening these resentments.[36]

It has been argued, however, that the defence mechanism of anti-Americanism was less a defence against the real danger of the total Americanisation of the politico-cultural sphere of Western Germany, and more a defence against the general modernisation and globalisation of Western Germany.[37] Although Western Germany after 1945 certainly had to deal with the most direct and powerful experience of US influence, and thus was most likely to mistake 'America' for modernisation as such, the use of anti-Americanism as a weapon against modernisation attempts within Germany goes back to the Weimar Republic, if not to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[38] The Jewish-German philosopher Hannah Arendt, by then a US citizen, argued in 1954 that it had always depended more on the political attitudes of a European whether he (or she) saw the USA as a dream or a nightmare, rather than on concrete experience of the USA itself. The dream of a better life without hunger and oppression had, at least until the late nineteenth century, simultaneously been a nightmare for those in Europe fearing modernisation.[39] Throughout the twentieth century, as Philipp Gassert has stated, German images of America ('*Amerikabilder*') were and are still being used to define Germany's position within modernity.[40] In the words of Dan Diner, 'the stance towards America is an indicator for the westernization of Germany',[41] an analysis echoed by Christian Schwaabe.[42] In this context, 'anti-Americanism is part of a larger search for German – and "federal republican" – identity', as Andrei Markovits

has claimed.[43] Reinhold Wagnleitner, who has analysed the cultural impact of 'Americanisation' on post-war Austria, called the USA 'the original edition of modernity' ('*Originalausgabe der Modernität*'), whereas Europe was only a synchronised version.[44] Those in Germany hoping for modernisation (however defined) of its society and political system thus searched for what they saw as positive features in the USA, whereas the anti-modern forces in Germany emphasised the allegedly negative features of the USA and the impact they had on Western Germany, thus using the USA as their Freudian 'Other'.

The term 'Americanisation' and the corresponding European fear of it go back a long way, at least to the early years of the twentieth century.[45] In Germany, the conservative journalist Adolf Halfeld used it in his 1927 monograph *Amerika und der Amerikanismus* to warn against perceived 'American' influences in Europe.[46] Even earlier, in the 1850s, German immigrants in the USA had lamented the 'Americanisation' of the German community, i.e. their progressive integration into the way of life of their new homeland and the corresponding loss of identification with Germany.[47] 1950s contemporaries constantly used the term and its negative connotations. The conservative journalist Klaus Mehnert, for example, was shocked by the high degree of Japanese 'Americanisation' after being subjected to 'that really terrible din of jazz music' ('*das wirklich entsetzliche Geplaerr der Jazzmusik*') in the dining room of his hotel during his travels in the Far East in 1954 and 1955.[48] 'Americanisation' is hardly seen as something positive. When seen not as a theoretical historical concept, but used by contemporaries to describe what they thought was happening to them, it is a synonym for the feeling that their old lives were disintegrating.[49] The US Provost Marshal General's office must have realised even before the end of the war that 'Americanisation' carried mainly negative connotations for most Germans, for when the USA began its re-education programme for German POWs held in the USA, the office declared that the programme was not an attempt to 'Americanise' the POWs, but simply to enable them to understand the American way of life.[50]

However, according to Rob Kroes, the word 'Americanization' is unduly alarmist: 'It reduces the complex processes of cultural influence, of borrowing, imitation, and reception, to a stark binary form of a zero-sum game',[51] that is to say, it wrongly implies that any degree of Americanisation will lead to a corresponding degree of de-Europeanisation. Kroes nevertheless credits a certain analytical validity to the Americanisation concept by looking at the processes used to contextualise the perceived Americanisation as a threat to European

culture. In his view, the Americanisation discourse says more about its participants than about the perceived process itself:

> To the extent that the word *Americanization* can serve any useful analytical purpose at all, it should be taken as a shorthand reference to what is essentially a black box in the simple diagram of cultural transmission and reception. If in this process there are obvious senders and receivers as well as modes and means of transmission, the black box is a semiotic dark room where messages undergo a process of translation, where they are decoded and reencrypted, decontextualized and recontextualized, and made to fit the receivers' frames of reference.[52]

Some analytically minded early visitors to the USA agreed, in much simpler words, that many would come to America with preconceptions that were hard to eradicate even after an extended stay:

> Perhaps few Europeans come to America without certain ready made views. ... Europeans tend to have a large number of touchstone subjects with which they approach America: material wealth, radio and television, motion pictures, young people ('how is it, are they all gangsters?'), the churches, high schools, clothes, the colour bar, the health and hygiene obsession, public opinion with respect to the various European nations, the American philosophy of life and so on. The ready made beliefs change only slowly.[53]

Anselm Doering-Manteuffel has also argued that the term 'Americanisation' is misleading for the period after 1945, since it attempts to analyse the success of American cultural patterns in another national-cultural context.[54] His preferred term was 'Westernisation', the emergence of a common value system on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.[55] 'Westernisation' is based on the 'Ideas of 1789', and on overcoming antagonistic ideas on political and societal organisation.[56] It does not view cultural and political developments as a one-way street from the USA to Europe, but attempts to analyse the cultural transfers in both directions, i.e. the cross-fertilisation between the 'New World' and Europe that led to the common value system on which 'the West' was based after 1945. Westernisation, Doering-Manteuffel argued, was a much longer process that exceeded the direct influence of American policies in Western Germany during the occupation and its immediate aftermath.[57] Recent historiography has even challenged the idea of American hegemony in the Western sphere during the 1950s

and emphasised successful European influence exerted on American policies.[58] For example, there is ample evidence that the strong anti-communism at the Free University of Berlin during the 1950s was a case of student radicalisation from below, rather than the Free University having been a grand US design as a weapon in the Cold War.[59] Whereas nobody would deny the American impact on post-war Western Europe, only European co-operation could ensure the success of 'Western' values: 'Although the emergent West German democracy was essentially home-grown, it only developed under American aegis.'[60] A strong German impact on the shape of the future FRG was evident even during the OMGUS years, between the end of the war and the foundation of the FRG: some of the Western Allies' plans in relation to education, the civil service and the social insurance system failed because of German non-co-operation.[61] This is not to say that the USA's military supremacy can be ignored. However, the successful *ideological* battle in West Germany can only be explained by German willingness to adopt these values, and not by the alleged hegemony of everything 'American'. To quote the cultural historian Rudy Koshar, '[s]tudies emphasizing how Europe was "Americanised" often miss the interactive and negotiated elements of this process'.[62]

However, the term 'Westernisation' has been criticised since its inception, as it seemed to have become 'a new "master narrative" ',[63] whereas it was nothing more than a revised *Sonderweg* theory,[64] in which the old German particularisms that had constituted the *Sonderweg* had finally been overcome in favour of 'Western' normality. Volker Berghahn criticised the Westernisation concept in order to defend the explanatory tool of Americanisation by arguing that, at least in the case of Western Germany, the USA *did* exert 'hegemonic pressure' on Germany that was greater than ever before.[65]

The American political scientist James Ceaser has used the terms 'metaphysical America' and 'symbolic America' and argued for a distinction between them and what he perceived as the 'real America'.[66] The latter is 'the country where we live, work, struggle, and pray, and where we have forged a system of government that has helped to shape the destiny of the modern world'.[67] Ceaser attributed the 'honour' of creating that 'symbolic America' to the German existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, by whom 'America was transformed from a country to a major literary and philosophic category that intellectuals have since been unable to ignore'.[68]

'Symbolic America' has recently, and somewhat misleadingly for the purpose of this study, been analysed within the framework of

'Occidentalism'[69] by the writer Ian Buruma and the philosopher Avishai Margalit. Obviously referring to Edward Said's famous intellectual catchphrase 'Orientalism',[70] which is used for the often distorted Western conception of the Orient, 'Occidentalism' in reverse is used to describe the distorted images of 'America' and 'the West'. The term is slightly misleading in the 1950s West German context, since it was often those conservative Germans claiming to defend the *Abendland* (Occident) who most ferociously attacked 'America'. They positioned the Occident between East and West, and thus saw it not as synonymous with the West, but in an antithetical relationship.[71] Nevertheless, 'Occidentalism' offers an analytical framework that allows us to realise that anti-Americanism/Occidentalism often says more about the anti-American/Occidentalist than about his or her subject, 'America' and 'the West'.[72] West German anti-Americanism contained many of the typical anti-Western features of Buruma's and Margalit's 'Occidentalism' concept:

> Four features of Occidentalism can be seen in most versions of it; we can call them the City, the Bourgeios, Reason, and Feminism. Each contains a set of attributes, such as arrogance, feebleness, greed, depravity, and decadence, which are invoked as typically Western, or even American, characteristics.[73]

The more radical anti-Americans in Western Germany rejected precisely those features. The protagonists were not primarily concerned with an accurate description of the USA in the 1950s, but wanted to prevent 'their' Germany from following the 'American' route towards modernity. The city, western capitalism, Enlightenment reason and a less traditional role for women in society all stood for rationality over the soul, for modernity over tradition, for 'the West' over Germanness. Said said about the Western perception of the Orient that 'the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience'.[74] Similarly, 'symbolic America' helped to define Western Germany and its identity.

Ceaser's symbolic and metaphysical 'America' – European and other imaginations of what 'America' has come to mean in literature, philosophy and political discourse – is the one this study is mainly concerned with. The USA itself was obviously far too diverse and heterogeneous an entity to have *one* truthful image.[75] What is important here is thus the cliché, or the various cliché versions, of the USA prevalent in 1950s

Western Germany. A consequence will be to refer to the concept and discourse of 'Americanisation', and sometimes of 'America', in inverted commas, since these concepts are more semiotic in nature than they are a socio-political reality (although the socio-political reality will at times frame the discourse and will thus also be interpreted). The largely semiotic nature of the concepts facilitates the notion that contemporary reports about 'America' were full of contradictory messages in which, for example, 'America' was simultaneously identified as a workers' paradise and a capitalists' heaven. These identifications were therefore less a description of the USA and more a projection of Germany's hopes and fears.

However, one has to be careful not to brand *any* critique of the USA or 'America' as anti-American. Even though some of the critiques of the USA might today seem quaint, if not irrational, they nevertheless reflect a contemporary political discourse that was genuinely concerned with the socio-political or economic topic in question. I shall thus use the political scientist Gesine Schwan's definition: she has argued that anti-Americanism (and anti-communism) is a fundamental rejection of the normative implications of what the critic considered to be the core of 'Americanism' (or communism).[76] A critique of US foreign policy at the time of the Korean War, for instance, might just be that: an arguably justified critique. It only becomes anti-American if the critic uses the Korean War as an illustration of what he or she considered to be fundamentally wrong with 'America' and 'Americanisation' as such. Schwan distinguishes between '*Amerikakritik*', the mere critique of certain features of America, and the more fundamental anti-Americanism concerned with the perceived essence of the USA.[77] Günter Moltmann defined 1970s left-wing anti-Americanism in simpler terms: 'the focus is rather on prejudices, nationalistic clichés, indiscriminate generalities and extreme condemnations'.[78] The same could be said for the period reviewed here: only when a critique of the USA goes beyond the factual discussion of socio-political and cultural circumstances in the USA, focusing instead on clichés, generalities and condemnation, I consider them anti-American. Under such circumstances, 'America' is used as a smokescreen onto which the critic's view of modern Germany is projected. A factual discussion of US racism in the 1950s and early 1960s or of alleged or real US atrocities is thus not instantly anti-American. When, however, the discussion of those topics is presented in comparison to Nazi Germany, in order to make the more recent German history appear that little bit less evil and more 'normal', the discussion becomes relevant for this study.

Many examples of anti-American and anti-Western sentiment presented here stem from right-wing extremists and anti-liberal thinkers. Their inclusion was straightforward, since the connection between their presentation of 'America' and their opposition to the modernisation or 'Westernisation' of Western Germany are quite obvious. However, a broader spectrum of voices is also presented here which, at times, succumbed to anti-American sentiment as defined above. Some prominent liberal and Social Democratic politicians, journalists and academics have thus been included, often alongside right-wing extremists. By no means, however, is this an attempt to place the former in the same political-ideological camp as the latter. What is intended instead, in line with the thematic rather than chronological structure of this study, is to show how far – initially extremist – interpretations of 'America' could reach at times during the post-war years and the 'long 1950s'. Most of the liberals and Social Democrats included were deeply impressed by the USA and came back from their often extended travels[79] with overwhelmingly positive impressions. What was interesting to me was the fact that, despite this, they still fell into some of the traps of right-wing or traditional anti-Americanism, thus – possibly subconsciously – regurgitating certain clichés and preconceived ideas about 'America'. It thus seemed fitting to include these otherwise moderate or even positive voices in order to show the full scale of America clichés without attempting to brand these voices anti-American *per se*. There was no single German tradition of interpreting 'America' during the post-war years and the 'long 1950s' (or at any other time), but there were certain themes of anti-American thinking and certain America clichés that were not exclusive to the right-wing discourse of the day, but reached well into the liberal and left-wing sphere. This monograph is thus also a study of the various cultures of communication in the period. Especially, the interface between public opinion, written and electronic media, and 'highbrow' academic and intellectual discourse were explored to find that almost all themes of anti-Americanism appear in very similar form (and often even in an almost identical phraseology) in these highly different cultures of communication. It can thus be concluded that these different cultures strongly interfaced with each other. The personal diaries of high-ranking journalists also prove that it is not only a case of the media successfully reaching audiences, but also a case of public opinion exerting a strong influence on individual journalists' thinking.

Doering-Manteuffel has argued that recent scholarship and historiography have established a sound and solid knowledge of the political

and societal developments in the FRG. Therefore, he reckons, historians can now turn their attention to the changing patterns of social and political orientations. He thus calls for historical research into the influence and impact of ideas and ideologies on West German society after 1945.[80] In line with his call for research into the changing patterns of social, political and ideological orientations, this book outlines and categorises a number of anti-American lines of argument and their changes throughout the first two decades of the FRG. These lines of argument correspond, as is shown below, with certain types of 'self-Americanisation of the Germans'.[81] The supposedly American influence on the FRG is as much the active search of certain groups within Western Germany for it to become a more 'American', more 'Western' state and society, as it is the direct influence of Allied control over Germany after the unconditional surrender. What contemporary critics called 'Americanisation', thus insinuating US cultural superimposition against the will of the Germans, was often more self-inflicted than superimposed.

Kaspar Maase has identified five variations of this self-Americanisation: technocratic Americanism, republican Americanism, egalitarian Americanism, hedonistic Americanism and distinctive Americanism.[82] These dimensions of self-Americanisation correspond closely with those categories of anti-American sentiment identified in this study. Nevertheless, Maase's broad categories, however analytically valid they are, need not only to be defined, but also extended. It will thus be argued that anti-Americanism in post-war Western Germany was more about the real or perceived modernisation of West German society, culture and the economy than about the allegedly devastating American influence on Western Germany. As stated above, many of the ideas about the 'symbolic America' and the real Germany presented in this study are the ideas of a 'counter-culture' on the fringes of right-wing extremism. It is not the attempt to present the more extreme ideologies that were underpinned by anti-Americanism as widely held in Germany in the 1950s, or even as mainstream and commonplace. However, many radical protagonists exploited some widely held views about the USA in order to reject the validity of pluralistic and liberal socio-political developments in the FRG. Furthermore, they did not only employ certain preconceptions of the USA, but simultaneously reinforced them, if the examples taken from oral history research are to be accepted. Whereas these sentiments were often most clearly voiced by the extremist fringe, they were also held by more moderate figures. Combining both extremist and moderate proponents of a certain strand of anti-Americanism in the same chapter is by no means an attempt to tarnish the moderates and place them in

an extremist corner. It will show instead how far into the centre some perceivedly extremist ideas about 'America' reached and how widely accepted even some very crude attacks on the USA were in the 'long 1950s'.

For our preliminary understanding of the subject, one thing is important to notice: in order to explore the image and representation of 'America' and the USA in West Germany, a description of the governmental and party political attitudes towards the USA is not sufficient. Although these are explored, cultural-historical sources need to be included.[83] The 1950s experienced a decline of party political involvement and a retreat into work and family life.[84] In November 1950, over 80 per cent of the West German adult population said they were unwilling to take a position of responsibilty in the political life of their country even if asked to do so; And 62 per cent of the pollsters' respondents preferred to 'leave politics to others', and no improvement was in sight: seven out of ten youths said the same.[85] An American education expert visiting Germany in 1956 observed among German youth a 'reluctance to join any organisation, membership in which might turn out to be a liability'.[86] Not only was party-political involvement comparatively low, but so was general interest in parliamentary politics.[87] Between June 1952 and August 1962, only 27–31 per cent of the respondents to an Allensbach survey said they were interested in politics. In June 1973, 49 per cent replied 'yes' to the same questions.[88]

Other forms of public engagement were also comparatively low during the 1950s. Most types of clubs and societies (*Vereine*) had fewer active members than in the 1920s. The famous German *Vereinskultur* was thus temporarily in decline.[89] Sports clubs were smaller than in the late 1920s and 1930s, and the further inclusion of women into organised sports had not yet begun.[90] Even youth organisations and clubs were not very popular – only 30 per cent of all young people were members of a sports club.[91] People had significantly less contact with their more distant relatives and acquaintances than in the 1970s and 1980s,[92] and even the local pub or *Eckkneipe* was less frequented than the later mythologisation of the 1950s has led us to believe: just one in six males regularly met at a weekly *Stammtisch* in his local pub.[93] Families spent a lot of their leisure time together at home, reading popular literature, magazines and newspapers, listening to the radio and – increasingly in the later 1950s – watching TV. If they went out, the cinema was a favourite destination.[94] In order to understand the socio-political and cultural attitudes of the day, these rather less highbrow sources have to be explored alongside political and intellectual sources.

All this, however, does not mean that the 1950s was a totally apolitical decade, although it was (and remains) 'often wrongly regarded an unpolitical and stagnant decade', as Gerhard A. Ritter summarised.[95] The (understandable) reluctance to join a party-political organisation after the excess of mandatory organisation during the Nazi era is counterbalanced by a willingness of a substantial minority to voice spontaneously political opinions in the form of protest marches and demonstrations. It has been claimed that the wave of protests in 1968 and 1969, generally thought to be the largest in the history of the FRG to that date, was not nearly as strong as that of the mid-1950s (or later of the early 1980s). Generally, the various protest movements of the 1950s, including the anti-rearmament movement ('*ohne mich*') and the subsequent activities against nuclear armament ('*Kampf dem Atomtod*'), compared well with the students' movement of the late 1960s in terms of participation, the number of campaigns and structural organisation.[96] Also, at least at the elite level, the 1950s was a forerunner of today's 'informed society', with very thorough and wide-ranging debates about state and society.[97]

Another 1950s historiographical myth will have to be challenged from the outset: just as much as 1950s Western Germany was not as community-oriented as the mythologisation of the decade would have us believe, neither was there a general 'silence' concerning events prior to 1945.[98] Even some very recent sections of historiography still reiterate that 'silence' hypothesis.[99] This study intends to show that the legacy and memory of the Nazi dictatorship and the Second World War were not simply suppressed until the 1960s students' movement came along to tackle the guilt of its parents' and grandparents' generation. The 'silence' hypothesis – or better, accusation – itself is older than the Federal Republic. As early as 1947, the liberal weekly *Die Zeit* warned against the suppression of memory regarding Germany's recent past.[100] Throughout the Adenauer era, this warning was regularly repeated.[101] 1950s Western Germany might have treated the issues arising from the Nazi dictatorship in an often awkward, inappropriate or even downright negationist fashion, but neither the public and published discourse nor day-to-day conversations among 'ordinary Germans' could ignore the topics. An American visitor reported after a visit to Hamburg in 1956:

> At first I was surprised at the extent to which the Nazi regime, the war, and post-war destitution dominate present-day life. Most conversations among Germans seem to drift back to these events.

The lives of all adults were profoundly affected by the war. The single women and widows, the marriage advertisements in the newspapers, and the many fatherless children are an ever-present legacy of the war. The reconstruction of the country is slowed up by the loss of a large part of an entire generation.

The destruction caused by wartime bombing still is very much in evidence in most cities, much more so than in England or Holland. The war also dominates the economic life because the entire economy is supported by the need for physical reconstruction. Yet this reconstruction is not accompanied by a sense of optimism, but by a deep-seated suspicion of the boom. For most people, the collapse of 1945 destroyed faith in a secure future.[102]

The following chapters, which explore the various facets of West German anti-Americanism during the post-war years and the 'long 1950s', are not arranged chronologically, since that might not be helpful to the analysis of the anti-American discourse of the day. Rather, they are organised in accordance with the theme or type of anti-Americanism. In this way, it can be shown that certain types of argument recurred throughout the period, but were also to be found in different media products and in diverse sociological and ideological settings.

Chapter 2 looks at the way German nationalism after 1945 was reawakened and re-established by using alleged American shortcomings in both the past and the present. Tales of brutality in American POW camps after the Second World War were as important as the nuclear bomb attack on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The infamous Morgenthau Plan to divide Germany into many pieces and turn it into a mainly agricultural economy was used against the USA and as a clandestine outlet of latent anti-Semitism. Finally, German racism and anti-Semitism during Nazi Germany was put into relation with the US treatment of racial minorities (Native Americans and Afro-Americans) in its own country. By bringing up the alleged or real shortcomings of the USA, German crimes were thus seen as less unique. This chapter is therefore mainly about how West Germany attempted to come to terms with its Nazi past ('*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*') at the expense of the USA.

Chapter 3 is different. It describes how anti-American clichés and arguments were employed to reject liberal democracy and modern capitalism. This chapter is thus one of ideological analysis, although it also contains more descriptive passages on anti-democratic associations and party-political institutions. Two of the theoretical protagonists of anti-Western thought are the political and social philosophers Carl Schmitt

and Arnold Gehlen. Many of the systematic rejections of 'America' were based on the attempt to place Germany ideologically between the East and West, between the USA and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and 'Bolshevism'. The reason for that is not only rational and ideological; it was also seen as an opportunity to find a place for a unified Germany between the two Cold War power blocs.

Chapter 4 shows how contradictory the messages about 'America' were in the 1950s. Whereas the 'America' of chapter 3 is one of cold-blooded capitalism, hyper-rationality and Wall Street, there was an alternative narrative, concerned with an 'America' based on hedonism and gender equality. It was formulated by those who rejected not economic-industrial modernity, but moral modernity. 'America' in this context is one of 'hot' music, openly displayed sexuality, cultural superficiality and career women unconcerned with family values.

' "Americanisation" Revisited' summarises these very conflicting and confusing messages about 'America' that Western Germany generated and received in the 1950s and early 1960s. It will try to come up with conclusions that explain how and – more importantly – why West Germany was so concerned with the USA, while at the same time refusing to look closely at the reality of that state. It is the aim of this monograph, while analysing all the different types of anti-Americanism, to prove how closely interlinked the different cultures of communication (traditional media, electronic media, public opinion and elite discourse) were at the time, and how, similarly, many of the themes of anti-Americanism were dealt with within these different cultures of communication.

This book is mostly concerned with the post-war years and the 'long 1950s'. Traditionally, the 'long 1950s' referred to the chancellorship of Adenauer: 1949–63. Economic and cultural historians, however, have recently expanded the period: The doyen of West German economic history, Werner Abelshauser, has argued that the 'long 1950s' spanned the period from the currency reform of 1948 to the economic crisis in 1966.[103] The cultural and environmental historian Arne Andersen agreed and argued that, in the public memory, the 1950s ended with the recession of 1966–7 and the ensuing student and youth protests.[104] The 'new era' of anti-American discourse following the 'long 1950s' is dominated by student protest and the events surrounding '1968'. The Vietnam War and other issues dominating the late 1960s are dealt with in an epilogue on '1968' and 'America' that outlines the changes in the German discourse on 'America' that did occur and that point towards future directions for research in the area. First, though, one of the most relevant bodies of sources will be described in more

details: the letters, reports and other dispatches from those Germans lucky enough to be invited to the USA during the 'long 1950s'.

1.2   Early visits to the USA

> A hundred years ago, the education-hungry [*bildungshungrig*] German went to Italy, today, he is invited to the USA in order to participate in a 'program'. Amongst all professions sending representatives to the New World, teachers have the biggest share.[105]

Siglinde Kreuzer, a school teacher, took part in a teacher-trainee programme that brought young German teachers to the USA from September 1953 to March 1954. In her résumé of those months, she summarised the aim of the programme: to be educated in what seemed most relevant in the early 1950s – democracy. Whereas a century earlier fine arts and culture, i.e. Italy, were at the forefront of learning, in post-Nazi Germany it was civility and peaceful coexistence. She also got the grammar right: whereas the education-hungry German in the nineteenth century actively went, the poverty-stricken post-war German of the 1950s is passive, i.e. invited. Post-war American planning for Western Germany wished to educate the educators, and hence those who were presented with an expensive ticket to the USA included many school teachers, but also university students and academics. The historian Harold Zink wrote as early as 1957 that the chief educational emphasis of the US authorities in Germany after 1949 was on sending teachers to the USA as well as on facilitating international educational exchange.[106] But more broadly, all types of decision-makers and opinion-formers were invited to experience at firsthand Western-style democracy and the 'American way of life' – politicians, high-ranking civil servants, journalists and people involved in commerce and manufacturing.[107] The first Germans to benefit from that exchange programme went to the USA as early as autumn 1948.[108] According to other sources, seven Germans even went on an official exchange programme in 1947, with 50 students invited privately to the USA in that very same year.[109] From 1947 to 1955, over 11,700 Germans visited the USA as part of one of the various exchange schemes.[110] Between 1950 and the middle of that decade, by far the largest number of foreign students in the USA came from the FRG.[111] The HICOG authorities were quite forthright when explaining the motive behind this American generosity: 'It is the belief that the Germans can best learn democracy by rubbing shoulders with it.'[112] The

exchange programme has thus been described as a 'cultural Marshall Plan'.[113]

Only when it came to semi-official and official visits, did both sides seem to have been very careful about who was invited. For example, the controversial Hans Globke, Adenauer's chief-of-staff in 1949 and permanent secretary (*Staatssekretär*) after Adenauer's election victory in 1953, accompanied the Chancellor on many state visits, even to Moscow. He never went to the USA. Globke's appointment and retention were, according to Jeffrey Herf, the most important signal of Adenauer's 'policy of democratization via integration [of people officially involved in Nazi Germany]':[114] Globke had written a pro-Nazi commentary of the 1935 Nuremberg race laws. US diplomats and protocol officials seem to have advised against Globke accompanying Adenauer to the USA. He thus never went there, in spite of his good contacts with the US Senate and Jewish circles in the US, as his friend, the German émigré and journalist Klaus Dohrn recalls.[115]

In particular during the early days of the FRG, politicians' visits to the USA were carefully observed by the West German press. When the Social Democrat Hamburg mayor Max Brauer, a political refugee in the USA from 1936 to 1945, became the first German statesman to visit the USA after the Second World War (from 10 November 1949 to 13 January 1950), the Christian Democrat Adenauer was worried about the massive publicity he received. According to Erich Lüth, Brauer's press officer at the time, Adenauer contacted the editor-in-chief of the German Press Association *dpa*, Fritz Sänger, through an intermediary in order to try to sound out whether it was possible to dampen the public echo of Brauer's journey just a little. After all, the intermediary is said to have argued on behalf of Adenauer, Brauer was only the head of a *Land* government.[116] A few years later, during the campaign for the 1953 *Bundestag* election, Adenauer quite consciously used the opportunity of a visit to the USA in spring 1953 to show the German public his standing with the most powerful Western force.[117]

The massive costs that the exchange programmes generated for the various bodies in the USA did not go unnoticed, either in the USA or in West Germany. In a report in April 1955, the German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* sarcastically asked whether the money the USA spent on bringing influential Germans to America was wasted.[118] The article stated that by that date, 25 per cent of the *Bundestag* members and 17 per cent of the *Bundesrat* members had been brought to the USA 'in order to experience democracy the way the USA wants it to be understood'.[119] Leading American politicians, the report went on, no longer saw the

value of these travel expenses, since a good number of Social Democrats had been brought over, yet the SPD was, according to these politicians' viewpoint, nevertheless still willing to trust the Soviet Union more than the US. According to the article, the chairman of the finance subcommittee of the Congress ('*Unterausschuß des Bewilligungsausschusses*'), John J. Rooney, asked the US High Commissioner in Germany, James B. Conant, whether he would not think the travel expenses of '5,000 to 6,000 Dollars per German'[120] were wasted. With Conant disagreeing, Rooney came back at him: 'I cannot believe how we can consider it a success to spend so much money on a man to bring him into this country if he subsequently deserts us when it comes to the most important question for us: our security.'[121]

This *Spiegel* report highlighted US attempts to influence the West German public. The impression one is left with after reading the article was that at least some leading members of the Congress, like Rooney, considered the financial and ideological investments in Germany worthless if they did not translate directly into strategic and geopolitical support for the USA. Readers were left with the impression that the USA was attempting to buy off West German parliamentarians by inviting them to extensive and expensive trips in the USA. Some contemporary Germany critics even branded the exchange programmes financed by such foundations as Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie as 'transatlantic interventions' in Germany.[122]

Generally, however, exchange programmes were received gratefully by those who benefited from them. On behalf of many recipients, Chancellor Adenauer – who had seen two of his sons invited by that date – thanked the USA for their generosity in a speech in San Francisco in April 1953:

> One of the many constructive measures of the last few years has been the very generous exchange programme between Germany and the United States that your government has executed. Within this programme, thousands of my fellow Germans who currently play a leading role in public life, or who possibly will play such a role in the future, had the opportunity to visit this country and to get to know your way of life and your form of democracy. Amongst those visitors, there will probably be nobody who did not gain from that experience. Two of my sons participated in this exchange programme, and I personally consider myself an exchange student on this journey, who comes to your country with open eyes and open ears.[123]

Of course, Germans had been involved with the USA before 1945. Some had family members who had emigrated well before the Nazis came to power. Others had Jewish and/or left-wing friends who emigrated after Hitler had come to power. Especially among the Social Democrats and trade unionists, but also in academia, there were many who had returned to Germany after 1945 from their forced migration in order to help build a new and democratic Germany. Furthermore, the USA had been economically involved in Germany during the Weimar Republic. William Wrigley had opened a chewing gum factory in Frankfurt am Main in 1925.[124] Adenauer himself had been in contact with the USA since his days as mayor of Cologne in the 1920s, when he was involved in setting up the Ford Motors subsidiary *Ford-Werke* in Cologne-Niehl. On 2 October 1930, Henry Ford had laid the foundation stone for that factory. Although Adenauer did not get firsthand experience of the USA before he became the FRG's first Chancellor, he and his wife had family contacts and friends in the USA, including a number of emigrants.[125]

However, the people with contacts in the USA established long before 1945 did not prove to be that relevant to the assessment of West German anti-Americanism in the 'long 1950s'. Their judgement of the USA was professional, which does not, however, mean uncritical. Nevertheless, they were either too sophisticated or too clever to rely on anti-American clichés when writing or speaking publicly about the USA. Also, a detailed knowledge of the USA must have made it blatantly obvious how simplistic and unsophisticated most America clichés actually were.[126] Thirdly, certain American peculiarities were less amazing when they had been experienced for a long time, and some seasoned travellers to the USA or long-time émigrés probably no longer even noticed the things that first-time travellers to the USA found most impressive.[127] Politicians who had previous knowledge of or had contacts with the USA, like Adenauer and Brauer, were more concerned with the way Germany was represented in the USA. Many Germans, for example, were offended by the way the *New York Times'* correspondent in Germany, Drew Middleton, represented the new Germany. Brauer's press officer Erich Lüth had co-financed his journey with Brauer by writing articles about their travels for various Hamburg newspapers. In at least two of these articles, Lüth took issue with Middleton's claims that Nazism had taken hold again in many areas of Germany, especially in Bavaria.[128]

It was those 'newcomers' to the USA, like Siglinde Kreuzer, who were more likely to be in awe of what they saw, but also unable to differentiate clearly between what they saw and what they had taken with them from Germany in terms of prejudice. Their writing is thus a very important

source for the decoding of the many different debates about what the USA supposedly represented, by itself and as a force of modernisation in Western Germany. One can safely assume that their reports and tales from the 'New World' were vital in shaping general West German ideas about 'America', since – according to Hermann-Josef Rupieper – even conservative estimates assume that every visitor spoke to about 150 people about his or her trip after the return, thus reaching a total of three million Germans that way.[129]

One of the interesting findings of this study is that certain anti-American clichés and prejudices were prevalent in the observations of various visitors, be they academics or non-academics, left-wing or right-wing politicians, trade unionists or businessmen. They cut across political divisions. The level of education seems to have been less a defining factor, whereas previous experience of the USA seems to have been more important in the shaping of attitudes. One might thus argue that the American concept of bringing Germans over to re-educate them did finally bear fruit with more and more Germans familiarising themselves with the 'real' USA.

2
Vergangenheitsbewältigung at the Expense of the United States

When the US Army made headway in Germany in spring 1945, intelligence officers were rather puzzled by the fact that few ordinary Germans actually felt responsible for the National Socialist dictatorship and the war it had unleashed. Many of them showed 'not the slightest trace of guilt' and hoped that the US Army came as a 'liberator', not an 'occupier'.[1] In August 1945, army intelligence reported its own surprise at the fact that many Germans felt more hostile towards the Americans than towards the French and British. This was explained by the inaccurate assumption that the USA entered the war voluntarily, and thus must have had an agenda of its own, namely, exporting its way of life.[2] When the military government subsequently failed to provide Germany with enough food, many Germans reacted with arrogance and disobedience towards the occupational force after autumn 1945.[3] The Protestant clergyman Martin Niemöller noted during his lectures in the immediate post-war era that many Germans tended to blame the Allies for material hardship, not the war instigated in the name of Germany.[4] Humanitarian aid from the Allies was taken for granted,[5] and recipients of CARE support parcels even began to complain. One woman wrote to the distribution service that the chocolate she received did not match 'the quality of the previous parcel'.[6] Another complaint concluded that 'one cannot avoid the impression that you are of the opinion that, because the Germans have lost the war, they have to be content without protest with everything [you offer]'.[7] Johannes Semler's 'chicken feed' speech of January 1948 has become almost legendary:

> [They] sent us maize and the chicken feed, and we had to pay dearly for it – no presents are made. We had to pay for it in dollars from German labour and German exports, and we are still supposed to say

thank you for it. It's about time that German politicians forgo saying thank you for these nutritional subsidies.[8]

In the city state of Bremen in January 1947, Senator Hermann Wolters strongly criticised the military government for not providing enough fuel for heating and denied any German responsibility for that. The incident gained additional publicity because Wolters made his announcement in the Bremen parliament after the censor of the military government had banned it from being broadcast by Radio Bremen, for whom it had been recorded.[9]

The historian Karl-Ludwig Sommer explains this rather cack-handed behaviour so soon after the war as the result of a strong 'self-defence complex' that forced Germans to blot out the recent past.[10] When it became obvious in the early 1950s that the FRG was to be integrated into the Western defence system,[11] Sommer argues, not only was the memory of the Second World War suppressed, but also of the days of occupation, hunger and devastation, the *Trümmerzeit*.[12] Dagmar Barnouw criticises the strong US emphasis on 'collective guilt' in the re-education effort after 1945 which led to a West German counter-thesis of collective innocence, putting the blame for the crimes committed before 1945 solely on Hitler and a few of his senior henchmen.[13] Harold James summarised that, paradoxically, '[t]he highly stable West German parliamentary system emerged out of a deep hostility to Allied impositions'.[14]

Possibly *the* overarching issue in German nation-building after the foundation of the FRG and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 was the question of how to deal with Germany's recent savage past of world war and the Holocaust. The GDR took the rather simplistic route of interpreting Nazi Germany as the latest stage of capitalism in decay, while also blaming 'Hitler and his gang' for the Nazi crimes, thus letting most other Germans off the hook.[15] The FRG had to search for a more sophisticated explanation of what had happened and why. That is not to say that West Germans did not themselves engage in sometimes very simplistic defence mechanisms: the often crude anti-communism of the era was not only a by-product of the Cold War, but also a way to deal with German guilt by comparing Nazi crimes to Stalin's crimes.[16] Anti-communism often functioned as an 'integration ideology'[17] that enabled former Nazis to accept the FRG. Also, by overemphasising the admittedly appalling fate of those millions of people expelled from the former German East, an attempt was made in conservative and reactionary circles to construct a genuinely German victim perspective in relation to the Second World War.[18] But apart from these crude and simplistic defence

mechanisms, West Germany had genuinely to engage in *Vergangenheits-bewältigung* (coming to terms with Germany's Nazi past) and the more concrete *Vergangenheitspolitik* (the politics of coming to terms), a term coined by the German historian Norbert Frei.[19] Frei rightly criticises the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* for its fogginess and lack of clarity,[20] and instead analyses the actual political steps taken in post-war Western Germany to deal with the Nazi past, often by rehabilitating former Nazis for example in the civil service.[21] There is, however, a justification for using the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* especially for its 'fogginess': many Germans 'came to terms' with their past not through introspection and critical historical analysis, but by lashing out against those trying to teach Germany new and democratic ways, i.e. the Western Allies.

Even the legacy of the First World War was a highly contentious issue during the first two decades of Federal Republican history. The question of German war guilt, which had exercised many Germans so much in the inter-war period, became once again a highly politicised topic even beyond the historians' *Zunft* in the 1950s.[22] It is thus no surprise that the far more recent memories of occupation after the Second World War played a dominant role in West German attempts at *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. A very peculiar form of that 'coming to terms' can be seen in the counterattack of setting German crimes in relation to the real or imagined shortcomings of 'America'. The observation of alleged or real American crimes against humanity does become politically relevant. Although not every anti-American critique fits into the revanchist category, there is an element of whitewashing the Nazi past in the German critique of the victorious nations after the Second World War. The contemporary nationalist (and anti-liberal) historian Caspar Schrenck-Notzing claimed in 1965 that there was a taboo relating to historical research into the history of the occupation[23] and that historians were even subjected to a 'control over opinions' ('*Mei-nungskontrolle*').[24] Nevertheless, he continued to analyse critically the American impact on post-war Germany. Even if the Nazi Party had never existed, he argued, the American occupation of Germany would not have been any different, as the comparison with Japan allegedly indicated.[25] The American re-education attempts were ridiculed by the title of his monograph, *Charakterwäsche* ('cleansing of the character').[26] Schrenck-Notzing's assessment is all the more puzzling if one considers the fact that as early as 1951,

> the focus of the US effort was no longer on the punishing of war crim-inals and re-educating the German public but rather on preventing

the war criminals problem from causing further criticism in both the United States and Germany of the American occupation.[27]

Especially in relation to the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the de-Nazification programme imposed on Germany by the US government, alleged US double standards were consistently emphasised to the German public by critics of US policy. The rather conservative anthropological sociologist Arnold Gehlen, for example, highlighted Margret Boveri's analysis of US attitudes to the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, namely that the US government stopped vilifying Franco the very moment they reached geostrategic agreements with him in 1954 and subsequently began to vilify his international opponents.[28] Also, the media, academia and politicians, often from the right-wing fringes, stressed the shortcomings of the American political system and the darker phases of American history. These reports and interpretations were not necessarily wrong. Quite the opposite: one is surprised how thoroughly the racial laws in the USA or the situation of the Native American tribes were observed and criticised and how accurately racist stereotypes were analysed.[29] Also, the radical Right in post-war Western Germany by no means depended on attacks on 'America' to justify its existence. When the German publicist Dolf Sternberger gave a speech in Dallas in December 1951 on the dangers of the radical Right in the FRG, an American suggested that these organisations might be a reaction against US de-Nazification policy and the mistakes of the occupation authorities in Germany, and thus an American responsibility. Sternberger answered that he thought that these organisations would most likely have also sprung up if the occupation authorities had not attempted to de-Nazify Germany.[30] I tend to agree. Attacks on 'America' made neo-nationalist rhetoric much easier after 1945, but they were not a precondition. Furthermore, by no means do I attempt to label all critical remarks and reports 'anti-American'. Their analysis is nevertheless necessary, since those issues were prominent in the debate. Certain patterns of argument were established that were subsequently used for fundamental attacks on what was seen as the American system.

As the following paragraphs demonstrate, these fundamental attacks were not just an elite discourse, but seem to have had some grounding within the general population of Western Germany. When Hannah Arendt briefly returned to Germany from the USA in 1950, the year before she became a US citizen, in order to get her own impressions of post-war Germany, she was to be disillusioned. In her report for the American Jewish Committee, she identified within all social strata a total

lack of compassion for Jewish victims of the Nazi dictatorship,[31] indifference towards the destruction and terror caused by German soldiers,[32] and even a striking level of indifference towards the destruction of German cities.[33] Most noteworthy, however, was her insistence that even with the fear of Soviet aggression, most Germans she spoke to did not show any pro-American leanings, but adopted instead an absurd stance of neutrality.[34]

There is also a clear indication of popular distrust of the USA and some grassroots support for National Socialism even after the war when looking at US opinion polls in Germany during the HICOG years of West German semi-independence (1949–55). Already during the occupation years (1945–49), the number of Germans in the American zone who rejected National Socialism outright had declined. On average, only a third of the respondents rejected it outright. An increasing percentage, averaging about 50 per cent, thought that National Socialism was a good idea badly executed.[35] From the foundation of the FRG in 1949 onwards, American pollsters conducted surveys in the whole of Western Germany. After the electoral success of the neo-Fascist SRP in Lower Saxony in 1951, the inhabitants of that *Land* (federal state) were interviewed about their attitudes towards the recent German past. Not surprisingly, 86 per cent of SRP supporters in Lower Saxony saw more good than evil in the Nazi ideas. Rather surprisingly, however, 47 per cent of those not supporting the SRP agreed.[36] When the pollsters analysed the responses to this question, which was regularly included in the polls in the whole of West Germany, it turned out that it was the better educated, the young and the Protestants who on average saw more good than evil in National Socialism.[37] Throughout 1952, the reports detected a rise in support for National Socialism among supporters of the Liberal Party FDP[38] and among the young.[39] It can thus be concluded that it was not just ageing former Nazis and the uneducated who were longing for a return to the past.

Subsequently, German attitudes towards Nazi Germany did filter down into West Germans' attitudes towards the former occupiers. In March 1950, 55 per cent in the area occupied by the USA before the foundation of the FRG, and a massive 77 per cent in West Berlin, thought that the US authorities themselves had not followed democratic principles when governing their part of Western Germany.[40] In late 1949, 17 per cent had blamed foreign countries exclusively for the outbreak of the Second World War, and another 17 per cent thought the fault lay on both sides. Although these numbers decreased over the next six or seven years, in May 1955 a staggering 14 per cent still believed in exclusive

Allied responsibility and 15 per cent in an equal share of the blame. In April 1956, these numbers had decreased to 12 per cent and 11 per cent respectively.[41] Furthermore, even in 1953, a very substantial minority of West Germans were not entirely persuaded by the new political system. Almost a third of the respondents (31 per cent) thought that 'the good aspects of democracy were exaggerated by the American informational operation in Germany', and as many reckoned that the Americans did not speak freely enough about their own country's problems and about the shortcomings in the US version of democracy.[42]

An opinion poll conducted by the Allensbach institute in November 1950 is a further example of many West Germans accusing America of 'technocratic'[43] self-interest, both economically and strategically: asked for the two most important reasons the USA had to introduce the Marshall Plan, 58 per cent reckoned that the US intended to prevent Western Europe from becoming communist; 32 per cent thought the USA was securing allies in a possible war with Russia; and 29 per cent claimed that America was using the financial aid programme to dump its surplus commodities. A mere 19 per cent thought in 1950 that it was America's real intention to help people who were starving or otherwise in need.[44]

In contrast to these anti-American accusations, similar allegations were not raised against German politicians favouring Germany's integration into the Western world. In spite of Kurt Schumacher's infamous parliamentary outcry against Adenauer on 24 November 1949, describing him as 'the Chancellor of the Allies' ('*Der Bundeskanzler der Alliierten*'),[45] only a small minority of Germans accused Adenauer during the 1950s of selling out German interests to the Americans. In August 1953, just 10 per cent thought that Adenauer was safeguarding other interests than Germany's. Of these 10 per cent, 3 per cent thought he was safeguarding the interests of the Catholic Church, 2 per cent were worried about him protecting the interests of capitalists, and only 1 per cent accused Adenauer of putting the interests of foreign countries before those of Germany.[46] In July of the same year, only two of the 17 per cent who stated that Adenauer had said something over the previous three months which they did not like criticised his supposed dependence on the Western powers and neglect of German interests.[47] This particular complaint against Adenauer gained prominence only once more during the 1950s, in 1956, during the heated debate on German rearmament,[48] and did not feature at all by 1959.[49]

The following sections indicate both how the public resentment against 'America' and some basic principles of liberal democracy were

exploited by the radical, anti-democratic right of German politics, and how even pro-democratic and *pro-American* political observers at times fell into the trap of voicing anti-American resentments and clichés, perhaps without always realising the significance of what they were saying. The American occupation of Germany (2.1) will not be judged as an historical reality, but in the way it was represented in later years, mainly after the foundation of the FRG and thus after West Germany gained an at least internally sovereign status. The Morgenthau Plan (2.2), although partially present in the American and British directive for occupied Germany, JCS 1067 of September 1944, will be seen as what it came to mean in Germany: a myth with often anti-Semitic overtones. The discourse on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (2.2) will only be taken into account when seen in relation to Germany. Finally, the prominence of the alleged or real mistreatment of the USA's minorities (2.3) in West German public and private discourse will be seen in relation to West Germany's attempt to rescue the possibility of German nationalism after Auschwitz and the Second World War.

2.1   The American occupation of Germany

In the immediate post-war era, the effects of anti-American Nazi propaganda can easily be detected in public and private statements about Allied soldiers and troops. In May 1946, a young Bremen woman wrote rather sarcastically in her diary:

> Culture is actually brought over to us for the very first time by our 'liberators', who spend all day and all of the night thinking about how to belittle us. … By the way, what I also wanted to mention: The Yanks [*die Ammies*] have turned our bomb shelter, the Lettow-Vorbeck-School, into a concentration camp [*KZ*] for Nazis …[50]

Her statement contains two anti-American allegations: not only are the Americans in general ridiculed for their alleged lack of culture and sophistication, but also, the American occupation is accused of running concentration camps and of attempting to bring the German nation to its knees. Whereas this private diary entry can be explained by the youth of the diary writer (she was seventeen or eighteen at the time), later and far more public sources levelled very similar criticisms against the US occupational forces. Some of these accusations were so excessive that they cannot simply be explained by some harsh decisions taken by the US occupation authorities, like the abolition of all pension payments to

former German soldiers. With hindsight, it has been said that the US and British directive for occupied Germany, JCS 1067, promulgated on 22 September 1944,

> was, in effect, an official but diluted version of the Morgenthau Plan and it remained the cornerstone of American Military Occupation until replaced by a new directive in July 1947. … An opportunity to facilitate and accelerate the economic recovery of Europe as a whole had been lost for the time being.[51]

Others saw at least 'relics of the Morgenthau Plan' in the text of the directive.[52] JCS 1067 outlawed the manufacture of oil and rubber and merchant ships in occupied Germany, banned all aircraft production and specifically forbade the Occupation authorities from taking any steps towards the rehabilitation of the German economy, except in the agricultural sector.[53] Nevertheless, strategic mistakes in US occupational policy cannot justify the amount of criticism and hatred that some quarters in German society felt for the Americans in post-war Germany.

It has to be said first, however, that, on the whole, the Germans were relieved when the American troops marched into Germany. The occupation in its early stages meant an end to the war that had raged for far too long. Although people felt for the German soldiers, their hope for peace was directed towards the Americans.[54] Many US Army officers were surprised at the willingness to co-operate with the occupational forces, and even the friendliness that many Germans showed towards the GIs.[55] There seems to be some evidence that even during the war, especially young Germans were not hostile but helpful towards US fighter pilots who were forced to parachute into German territory.[56] The presence of American soldiers, especially black soldiers, was thus an indicator for a West German's political attitude more in the late 1940s and in the 1950s than in the immediate post-war era. It can therefore be assumed that a different agenda entered the political framework more linked to the inner-German discourse on Germany and her future than to the post-war occupational reality. A Bremen activist in the 1968 student unrest retrospectively said about his childhood in the 1950s:

> I [secretly] listened to American '*Neger*' music under my duvet with a home-made crystal set [*Detektorradio*], since even the sight of coloured American GIs evoked fright and hostility in my mother and my grandparents. But for us, they were the ones who brought a new era [*eine neue Zeit*].[57]

The sight of American occupation soldiers thus split the West German population into those who rejected US involvement in Germany, i.e. the democratisation and de-Nazification of the country, and those for whom the US presence signified a new and more positive era after the devastation brought about by the war and the Third Reich. For the latter, the 'American soldiers and their families literally carried the markers of that better and easier life on their bodies'.[58] GIs often were a symbol of the 'American way of life' which many Germans, especially younger ones, longed for.[59]

In the immediate post-war era, however, some in the first group alleged that the Americans sent a disproportionately high number of black GIs to Germany in order to undermine German national pride.[60] These claims, overheard by US military intelligence, echoed similar accusations made against the French after the First World War in relation to the deployment of North African soldiers to the Rhineland.[61] After the Second World War, the question of racial purity was still a major issue: clergymen in rural Lower Saxony accused the Allies of having instigated the expulsion of Germans from Germany's former Eastern territories in order to eradicate the ethnic purity of the German tribes by mixing them up.[62] These accusations culminated in the idea that many Jews who left Germany for the USA after 1933 came back with the occupation forces in order to take revenge for Nazi persecution.[63] From the safe distance of his Canadian exile, the early Nazi activist and subsequent opponent of Hitler, Otto Strasser,[64] accused the Western Allies of having abused German prisoners of war (POWs) for years as slave labourers.[65] As late as July 1949, the leading North Rhine-Westphalian FDP politician Friedrich Middelhauve accused the US occupation authorities of still running 'labour camps' in their zone of occupation.[66] Later still, in the run-up to the general election in 1953, the right-wing umbrella organisation *Nationale Sammlung*[67] recommended that its speakers and activists compare the POW camps to Nazi German concentration camps:

> The situation in the West German Federal Republic: The Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic suffer from the same tragedy in their inceptions. Both were produced by a military defeat. For both, the victor states have ordered the constitution [*Staatsform*] (end of the monarchy – Morgenthau Plan). In both, the responsible 'statesmen' have heaped guilt upon themselves. Instead of national self-confidence – national self-abuse. … The internment camps the same as concentration camps.[68]

But even mainstream publications in the FRG regularly likened the conditions in Allied POW camps to those in Nazi concentration and extermination camps. This must have been a matter of mass interest, since most Germans would have known a POW, either a family member or in their wider social circle. Historians reckon that between eleven million and twelve million German men had at one stage been POWs.[69] The significance of that comparison is somewhat distorted, however, since many West Germans in the early post-war period were confused about the concentration camp system, not necessarily distinguishing between concentration camps on German soil and extermination camps in Eastern Europe.[70]

Some journalists of the Protestant weekly *Christ und Welt*, founded in 1948, regularly equated the internment camps for former NSDAP members with concentration camps.[71] Michael Schornstheimer has shown that two of the most popular weekly German magazines, *Quick* and *Stern*, consistently alleged a contradiction between American commitment to democracy and humanitarian values on the one hand, and the reality of the US occupation on the other.[72] By analysing serialised eye-witness reports and letters to the editors in both magazines throughout the 1950s, Schornstheimer concluded that almost any report about Allied POW camps contained at least one episode that showed how cruelly the Allies treated German POWs. The American POW camp near Bad Kreuznach was dubbed the 'Death Camp' in a *Quick* report as late as 1959.[73] Not only was it claimed that American soldiers treated the German POWs unnecessarily harshly, the report even alleged systematic torture in order to exact confessions of war crimes. In another story, the stigmatisation of POWs by the letters 'PW' on their clothing was compared to the stigmatisation Jews had to suffer by being forced to wear a visible yellow Star of David. The tragic situation of Soviet POWs and displaced persons in Germany during the war was largely ignored in these articles.[74] Also ignored or played down is that fact that most inmates of American POW camps were released relatively quickly, certainly in comparison with Soviet camps, were many thousand German inmates were released as late as 1955.

Schornstheimer's analysis showed that even in the late 1950s, the Allied liberation of Europe was not necessarily seen as that: liberation from Fascism. Rather than stressing the fact that it was mainly the US war effort which had enabled Western Germany and many other Western European nations to return to a democratic order, the Americans were accused of crimes against humanity, and thus implicitly of double standards. A nation that systematically tortured POWs, it was implied,

could not simultaneously be interested in reintroducing a humane order into Germany. An element of self-interest, whether military-strategic or economic, was written into the US war effort by such critics. The conservative journalist and political commentator Armin Mohler, a Swiss who was nevertheless widely read in Germany and after 1954 was Paris correspondent for the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit*, accused the Americans of attempting to find the very last German war criminal, while the war criminals on the other side (i.e. Allied war criminals) could visit the FRG freely on business or tourist trips.[75] The Liberal Party (FDP) in North Rhine-Westphalia went even further in their 1952 party manifesto, the 'German Manifesto' (*Deutsches Programm*), where they 'demand[ed] redress [*Wiedergutmachung*] of the injustice created by National Socialism, victor's despotism [*Siegerwillkür*] and de-Nazification',[76] thus equating the post-war occupation with the crimes of National Socialism. These outbursts were nevertheless not directed towards a readership in the USA, but used in the inner-German discourse. The aim of such utterances was a very peculiar kind of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. German war crimes were set in relation to American war crimes in order to rescue the German commitment to nationalism.

Also high on the agenda both for the radical Right and the Adenauer government (and indeed the US government under Eisenhower once the USA wanted to get West Germans into uniform for the Cold War) was the introduction of an amnesty for 'ordinary' soldiers who served in the world war. Ordinary Germans, and especially the *Wehrmacht*, were thus defended against accusations of *unusual* brutality. Even some German intellectuals adopted equally simplistic methods to whitewash the German Nazi past by blaming the occupation forces. As early as 1946, Hermann Hesse wrote in a letter to Thomas Mann: 'The criminals and black marketeers, the sadists and the gangsters in Germany are no longer Nazis and no longer speak German; they are Americans.'[77] Ridiculing the American attempt to de-Nazify and re-educate Germans after the war remained in vogue in the 1950s. Ernst von Salomon's (1902–72) often quite satirical fictionalised autobiography *Der Fragebogen* (*The Questionnaire*), first published in March 1951, was printed in eight editions and 206,000 copies within 17 months.[78] The book not only ridiculed the re-education efforts, but also described the American occupational soldiers as brutal, corrupt and stupid. Von Salomon had already gained impeccable anti-democratic credentials during the Weimar Republic. As a member of the free corps *Organisation Consul*, he was imprisoned for five years for his role in the murder of the Jewish-German foreign minister Walter Rathenau in June 1922,[79] albeit as a 19-year-old.[80] On his

release in 1927, he became a 'national revolutionary' and sympathised with 'national bolshevism' as propagated by the Strasser wing of National Socialism.[81] During the Nazi years, he remained side-lined and avoided contact with the Nazis after the murder of SA leader Ernst Röhm in 1934. After 1945, von Salomon propagated a peculiar combination of national neutralism[82] and self-defined Prussian values.

Von Salomon's accusations against the US forces have to be outlined and analysed carefully, not because of his involvement in the anti-democratic Right during the Weimar Republic, but because of the publicity he got after 1949. His fictional account of a prisoner under four governments, *Das Schicksal des A. D.*, was published as late as 1960.[83] Before its publication as a book, it was serialised in the influential weekly *Die Zeit* in December 1959. The protagonist A. D. is portrayed as a Kafkaesque victim of 'justice', a relatively innocent and naive character who manages to get imprisoned under four utterly different regimes: the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany and the US occupation. Von Salomon portrays the miscarriages of justice under the American occupation as just as inhumane as they were under the previous regimes.[84]

These descriptions, however, cannot match the damning criticism of the American occupation von Salomon levels in his autobiographical *Fragebogen*. When the US troops march into the Bavarian village of Siegsdorf, where von Salomon and his then common-law wife Ille Gotthelft[85] had spent the final months of the war, he immediately reports unconfirmed rumours in the village about violence against German soldiers[86] and civilians,[87] theft,[88] rape[89] and the mistreatment of POWs.[90] His own *Wehrpass* (the military document that could prove he was not a member of the SS), is taken away and ripped up by an American soldier for a laugh.[91] The fact that he is then without the document is one of the reasons why he and Gotthelft are arrested early one morning a couple of days after the US soldiers arrived in the village. All these allegations, most of them unconfirmed rumours that von Salomon heard in the village, are nothing compared to what was to follow in his own report about the period after his arrest.

When von Salomon and Gotthelft are arrested by the US military police, they seem, according to von Salomon's report, to embark on a journey to hell. The accusations against the American occupational forces, allegedly either experienced or witnessed by him, range from violent interrogations,[92] outrageously brutal treatment of prisoners and internees,[93] the systematic rape of women arriving in the internment camps[94] (although later half-heartedly denied by Gotthelft,[95] who

happened to be 'Jewish' in the racist Nazi interpretation of the word, and kept this secret under Nazi rule with the help of von Salomon),[96] double standards and anti-Semitism,[97] to leniency towards the SS at the expense of other internees,[98] violence against and the severe beatings of women,[99] lack of food and medication[100] and the extradition of Red Army deserters to the Soviet authorities.[101] In order to illustrate the systematic, sadistic and cynical ill-treatment of internees, von Salomon describes how 'the one-legged hopped around since the Americans had taken their artificial limbs and burnt them'.[102]

Another 'man of the past' with a desire to tell stories of American brutality was Hjalmar Schacht, the acting minister of national economy from 1934 to 1937 and president of the *Reichsbank* 1924–30 and again 1933–9. Like von Salomon, he was not at all a spent force after 1945, since he remained active as a published author well into the 1950s and was even translated into English.[103] Schacht propagandistically exploited his imprisonment under Nazi rule in order to discredit the American occupation. His autobiography is full of comparisons between those two allegedly inhumane governments. Whereas the account of his imprisonment by the US occupation forces on his way to the Nuremberg Trials is full of gruesome details, the account of his imprisonment under the Nazis hardly mentions any brutality. He only hints at the mistreatment of Nazi prisoners and concentration camp inmates.[104] After being sent to Dachau by the Nazi authorities, he even concluded that '[t]he treatment and the food were very good'.[105] On his release, he was understandably looking forward to his return home:

> Our final release from the Gestapo in the Puster Valley enabled us once again to breathe freely. Up to the last moment there was always the chance of a shot in the neck. Now, however, we were that much further on towards our return to civilian life. At least, so we imagined.[106]

His hope was in vain, since Schacht was soon imprisoned by the US Army and taken to Italy. After he was moved to Naples,

> [o]ur personal treatment was brusque, not to say churlish. We were conscious of an atmosphere which obviously owed its origin to German emigrant circles. We had defied Hitler at the risk of our lives. Now, without further ado, we were lumped together with the guilty ones of the Hitler régime.[107]

Following an odyssey through many Nazi prisons, concentration camps, POW camps and Allied prisons, he reported of an American camp in Oberursel that '[t]he conditions were the most revolting I had ever experienced in any of my prisons'.[108] With clear overtones of the 'Jewish war' Nazi wartime propaganda, he continuously blamed these allegedly appalling conditions on the perceived enemies of Germany, be it 'German emigrant circles' or American Jews:

> While in Kransberg [in the Taunus region of Germany] I had been questioned on several occasions by British and American officers, among them an American Jew who went out of his way to be as beastly as possible.[109]

While the term 'torture' does not appear in his description of the prisons and camps he had been imprisoned in by the Nazis, the Allies were – if only indirectly – accused of torture:

> Later, the inmates of Kransberg Camp in the Taunus were for the most part scientists and armament technicians, and it was contemptible to see how the victors took advantage of the prisoners' position to pick their brains for information on military and industrial matters. It was a scientific plundering of the helpless, an intellectual torture-chamber.[110]

These reports of mistreatment and exploitation of the weak might or might not be true; that is not important here. What is vital is the way Schacht explained the Allies' conduct. After being freed from Nazi imprisonment, he 'was now to go through it all again in an American prison':[111] no washing bag, luggage disappeared, money stolen, no contact with his family and '[a]t night we had to sleep with the electric light on and there was always a guard in the room'.[112] In both prison systems, he wrote (after reporting on his transfer from Ravensbrück concentration camp to Moabit Prison in Berlin), prisoners were transferred from here to there without explanation:

> during the whole four years I experienced this system at the hands of the Nazis, the Americans and the denazification tribunals: prisoners were moved here and there without any warning and consigned to one place or another like so many parcels.[113]

For Schacht, there was only one explanation:

> I am not complaining about all this; but I am forced to the conclusion
> that directly it is let loose[,] the beast in man is the same everywhere
> and at all times. No one should presume to set himself up above his
> fellows.[114]

This explanation for his suffering is another attempt to rescue the possi-
bility of a continued national discourse in Germany after Auschwitz. If
'the beast in man is the same everywhere and at all the times', then why
should Germany be more culpable than any other nation? If the Nazi
dictatorship was only one of many other expressions of evil in world
history, then Germany should not be excluded from the world com-
munity for too long. After all, '[t]he French Revolution, in relation to
its own period, was no less murderous and horrible than the Gestapo
system'.[115]

   The Bavarian industrialist Otto Seeling (1891–1955)[116] serves as a third
example of a man utilising his (alleged) treatment by the US occupation
forces to defend German nationalism after the Third Reich. In 1949,
he explained his initial rejection of the Christian-conservative 'Moral
Rearmament' movement of Caux with his mistrust of all ideologies
('*Weltverbesserungspläne*'):

> I referred to the fact that Christ's teaching of 'love thy neighbour' has
> been preached for two millennia. Nevertheless, that did not prevent
> the Second World War, nor the cruelty of the concentration camps,
> nor the hatred with which the German people have been persecuted
> after the collapse [*Zusammenbruch*].[117]

At Caux, Seeling himself was surprised by the friendliness of other
nationals towards the Germans:

> One gets the impression that the representatives of those nations that
> would have cause to be angry with us, and with whom we should be
> angry for plenty of things done to us after the collapse, are especially
> caring towards us Germans.[118]

Once again, a public German figure managed to equate the Holocaust
with German post-war suffering. The concentration camps are men-
tioned in the same breath as the hatred against Germans after the collapse
of Nazi Germany, and the suffering of nations attacked by Germany

during the world war is equated (and thus played down) with 'things done to us after the collapse'. In the private journal of his travels in the USA in 1951, he outlined some of his sufferings:

> We are welcomed by the American Secretary of War [*Kriegsminister*]. 'Distinguished guests', we are called. I have to think back to the time six years ago when I was still an American prisoner. I have to think about that fact that I had to follow my murdered son's bier under police escort. I have to think that I was a beaten and imprisoned man.[119]

Seeling was rather unwilling to break with the German past, as demonstrated elsewhere in that journal. On meeting a 28-year-old Austrian, the son of an industrialist, at a convention in Detroit, he commented: 'He was an officer in the German *Wehrmacht*, and feels and thinks so decently German [*so anständig deutsch*] that one simply has to like him for that.'[120] It is thus not surprising that Seeling utilises accusations of alleged American war crimes, like the maltreatment of POWs, in order to make the enormity of the Holocaust appear less exceptional in comparison. However true his personal memory might be, he nevertheless enriches the public discourse – for example, at the Rotary Club in Nuremberg – with further clichés about the comparability of the German and the US war conduct. The extract from his diary about the Austrian *Wehrmacht* officer is all the more poignant since he actually seems to believe what he is saying, rather than just using the rhetoric of German nationalism.

It is now impossible to verify the claims of Seeling, Schacht and von Salomon about their individual experience at the hands of the American occupiers. They are extremely relevant, though, because they seem to be exemplary of a barrage of similar tales. In 1955, a journalist sarcastically remarked:

> [W]ho of us does not have a former *Kreisleiter* [local Nazi Party official] or SS man living in the flat above? All that has indeed become so non-transparent. The *Kreisleiter* might call himself 'refugee from the East' ['*Ostflüchtling*'] today, and the SS man ranks under the label 'politically persecuted', since the Americans locked him away into a camp after their invasion.[121]

In order to make Germany's infinitely more horrific extermination camps in Eastern Europe appear to be just one crime among others

in world history, the German Right repeatedly emphasised real or invented horrors in the US prison camps immediately after the invasion of Germany and the unconditional surrender. Of course, the US de-Nazification efforts were among the most unpopular measures taken by the Western allies. The authorities in the American zone had initially been the strictest in terms of de-Nazification, and very few people were regarded as innocent.[122] The authorities thus wanted to deal with 'minor cases' first in order get them out of the way. This plan backfired, as Hagen Schulze has pointed out: as the Cold War intensified, the interest in pursuing German war crimes diminished and it was thus often those with the most incriminating past that got off 'scot free'.[123] Furthermore, the at times blasé attitude of some Americans towards the war, and thus German suffering, may have added to these feelings. Ernest Hemingway's first post-war letter (dated 18 December 1946) to his German publisher Ernst Rowohlt[124] suffices as an example:

> My dear Ernst:
>
> I was delighted to receive your letter … . You certainly had a hell of a war and I am delighted that you were not one of the numerous Krauts that were killed in Schnee Eifel or Hurtgen Forest [*sic*]. Do not think this is the language of the oppressive victor as you certainly killed many more of our boys at both of these places than we killed of you [hand-written addition:] (glad we never killed each other). …
>
> Your old counter-comrade,
> Ernest Hemingway[125]

That, however, does not explain the widespread popularity that especially von Salomon's anti-American accusations had well into the 1960s. They might not have been a majority perception even in the 1950s, but they were fostered in the German press. Neither *Quick* nor *Stern* is to be regarded as reactionary or even right-wing. They nevertheless constantly engaged in anti-occupation propaganda, as shown above. Even the liberal *Zeit* did not refrain from publishing some these tales, as von Salomon's novel *Das Schicksal des A. D.* indicates.

Even far more fair-minded voices did, however, not shy away from such comparisons. Germany's Federal President Theodor Heuss addressed the ceremony at the opening of the memorial in the former concentration camp Bergen-Belsen on 30 November 1952. Quite clearly, he did not attempt to deny or trivialise the crimes committed under Nazi

rule and in Germany's name. He nevertheless did bring Allied brutality into the equation:

> I hear the objection: And the others? Don't you know about the internment camps of 1945/6 and their brutality, their injustice? Don't you know about the imprisoned victims [and] the suffering under a formalistically cruel system of justice, that Germans are still subject to date? … I do know about that, and I have never hesitated to talk about it. But talking about the injustice and brutality of others in order to refer to it, that is what the morally undemanding do who one can find in any people, among the Americans as much as among the Germans or the French or others. No people is better than the others, you will find good and bad [*solche und solche*] everywhere. America is not 'God's own country', and the harmless Emanuel Geibel has caused so much subaltern stupidity with his proverb [claiming] that the world should heal with Germanness [*dass am deutschen Wesen noch einmal die Welt genesen werde*].[126]

Heuss claims to deny the moral validity of such comparisons by calling them morally undemanding ('*moralisch anspruchslos*'). He nevertheless utilises them in this speech without questioning the accuracy of the claims laid against the US forces. Elsewhere, he attacked the concept of German collective guilt by comparing that concept to Nazi ideology. He argued that the concept in question was like the Nazi view of the Jews, by which the simple fact that somebody was Jewish implied 'the guilt phenomenon'.[127]

Historiography has come to the conclusion that there was no widespread and systematic mistreatment of German POWs at the hands of the Americans. Wolfgang Benz, among others, totally dismisses claims of a 'missing million' German POWs who allegedly were systematically mistreated by the Americans and subsequently died.[128] Arthur L. Smith also dismisses the 'missing million' in the West as a myth, while admitting that the treatment of German POWs at the hands of the US Army in the camps along the Rhine amounted to a 'war crime'.[129] Between 8,000 and 40,000 POWs died in the camps,[130] which were uniquely bad in comparison with all other POW camps in the Western zones, according to Smith.[131] The POWs experienced hunger, bad accommodation and very inadequate medical care,[132] and also random cases of theft and cruelty,[133] but Smith did not find any evidence of *systematic* torture or other cruelty. Similarly, there is scant evidence of *systematic* abuse of the civil population under American occupation. John Gimbel, in his

1961 study of the US occupation of the small Hessian university town of Marburg, came across some allegations of theft, beatings and sexual violence committed by GIs, but these incidents seem to have been a thing of the very early phase of occupation, and did not seem to be systematic in nature.[134] Also, Marburg's American university officer reported the incidents immediately to his superiors in order to prevent further ones that could lead to a German backlash against the American re-education programme.[135] Although individual reports about suffering at the hands of American soldiers can neither be verified nor refuted today, it is important to report on the statistics we have about American maltreatment, injustice and sexual violence to the conduct of other occupational forces. Of course, statistics concerned with rape and other forms of violence against civilians sometimes fail to account for the true extent of personal suffering. Nevertheless, they have to be taken into account for an accurate evaluation.

Even before the US Army had conquered Germany, there was some fear of sexual violence. According to anecdotal evidence, women wondered whether they would be raped by the Americans.[136] Oral history research in the Ruhr Valley has also found reports of attempted rapes of young women by GIs,[137] but they were mostly dismissed as 'traumatised mythology', the result of racist ideology (about black soldiers) and the fear of revenge for German war crimes.[138] Historical research has equipped us with the statistics of sexual violence cases involving GIs and German women. They do merit closer examination. During 1945, the US Army and the US military government in Germany received 1,500 accusations of rape levied by German women against US soldiers; 600 of these were considered worthy a military trial and 300 soldiers were found guilty.[139] By 1 July 1945, 169 soldiers had been convicted, 29 were executed for rape and further 15 for murder in conjunction with rape. The other convicts were sentenced to an average of 14 years' forced labour. This compares to only one execution out of 139 soldiers initially sentenced to death for desertion. Furthermore, it stands comparison with a total of 900 rape convictions in Germany in 1938, and 500 rape convictions in Bavaria alone in 1950.[140] Although many unreported cases have to be taken into account when referring to sexual violence, the extent of sexual crimes committed by Americans in occupied Germany by no means compared to the numbers from the French and especially the Soviet occupied zones.[141] Also, the statistics indicate that the military government dealt very strictly and swiftly with the perpetrators of sexual violence amongst its military staff.

The most enduring 1950s hangover from the occupation days before the foundation of the Federal Republic[142] was the question of German war criminals (or 'POWs', as the German Right preferred to call them) in Allied prisons on West German soil *after* that foundation in 1949,[143] especially in the light of the debate about West German rearmament that was finally concluded with the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* in 1956. Whereas the allegations levied by Schacht, von Salomon and Seeling referred to incidents in the immediate post-war era, the term 'POWs' here refers to war criminals still in prison after 1949. The Liberal Party (FDP) in North Rhine-Westphalia even included their plight in their official 1952 'German Manifesto'. In that manifesto, the FDP North Rhine-Westphalia declared that they would not accept 'the judgements of the Allies, which intend to discredit our people and especially our military tradition [*Soldatentum*]'.[144]

In the American zone, the most notable and notorious Allied prison was Landsberg Prison in Bavaria. The most serious unrest was caused by the threat of execution of some of the prisoners, and the subsequent execution of seven of these war criminals on 7 June 1951. Many Germans shared the 'as much neurotic as popular aversion'[145] against an alleged *Siegerpolitik* (the policy of the victor[s] or victors' politics, a term that will regularly crop up in the following sections) pursued by the Allies, especially the Americans. Even a number of Social Democrats were involved in that rhetoric.[146] The issue of 'POWs' was the subject of many private and public utterances. Although some people merely asked for clemency, others managed to link their plea for the prisoners with serious attacks on the USA as an occupation force, or on the USA as such. In February 1951, the Protestant minister Augustin Flossdorf sent a telegram to the president of the *Bundestag* (German Parliament), Hermann Ehlers:

> With dismay [*Entsetzen*] I hear that the execution of the seven red-jackets [*Rotjacken*][147] has been ordered, although it is generally known that the judgment was reached through blackmail and forgery, without publication of the judges' opinion, and generally without access to means of legal redress. … These judgments are similar in method to the judgments of drumhead court martials [*Standgerichte*] in Nazi Germany [*im Nazireich*], or even worse. Last week, a certain person of public standing wrote to me: in the East, there are the robbers, and in West one finds the hangmen.[148]

Ehlers replied very politely ('*Sehr geehrter Herr Pfarrer*', '*Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung*') and assured the clergyman that the federal government

should present arguments for the judgment to be overturned, but did not criticise, or even address, Flossdorf's rather outrageous comparison with Nazi Germany.[149] On the day of the hanging of the 'seven red-jackets', 7 June 1951, a former German soldier wrote to President Theodor Heuss: 'The gallows of Landsberg are to me the most concrete superlative [the worst example] of "crimes against humanity" '.[150]

The *Gesellschaft für neue Staatspolitik e.V.* (Society for New Politics) issued an undated pamphlet, probably in the following year demanding 'justice for German soldiers'.[151] It accused the USA of 'one-sided victors' politics' ('*einseitige Siegerpolitik*') and 'tribunal justice' ('*Tribunaljustiz*') against 876 German citizens imprisoned by the Western Allies, 341 of them in Landsberg. The pamphlet even referred to 'the leading American expert on the law of nations, Kunz', who allegedly wrote in *The American Journal of International Law* that 'the laws of war were consistently and massively broken by all participants (*Kriegsführenden*) in the Second World War'. Consequently, the pamphlet called for the release of these 'so-called war criminals'.

In December 1952, the neo-Fascist *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (Socialist Reich Party) reported in its journal *Deutsche Blätter* on the memoirs of the 'American diplomat and financier Stanton Griffis'.[152] Griffis, it is claimed, had admitted in his memoirs that he had threatened Swedish industrialists during the Second World War with 'accidental' bombardment if they did not stop delivering militarily essential goods to the Germans.

> Mr. Griffis is lucky that he is called Griffis and is an American. If he was a German, he would probably have been hanged in Nuremberg or Landsberg, and he could not write his memoirs At the least he would be imprisoned in Landsberg or Werl for threatening crimes against humanity and for alleged war crimes.[153]

In bitter and sarcastic words, the USA was accused of double standards. The message is clear: whereas Germans were still imprisoned for 'alleged war crimes', the Americans could show off the very same crimes (or threats of such) in their voluntarily published memoirs.

The prisons of Landsberg and Werl remained a potent symbol for alleged miscarriages of justice. As late as 1958, at a meeting of the 'Comradeship of the Interned' (*Kameradschaft der Internierten, KdI*), a speaker accused the Allies of 'torture in Nuremberg, in Landsberg, in Werl and at many other places'.[154] The accusation was always the same: the Allies were not even-handed and used two different yardsticks. Whereas

German soldiers were unfairly imprisoned for their wartime conduct, Allied soldiers were praised for doing very similar things.

Yet many of the statements came from right-wing groups, soldiers' associations and lobby groups, or from individuals who might know a 'POW' personally. Far more crushing is the judgement of the American occupation of Germany by of one of the leading intellectuals of post-war Germany, the influential sociologist Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984).

Schelsky had been a member of the SA as a student, and was tutored, among others, by Arnold Gehlen during the Third Reich. In 1943, aged 31, he was offered a professorship at the *Reich* University of Strasbourg, a Nazi institution, which he never took up for war-related reasons. In 1953, he became professor of sociology in Hamburg after four years as director of the *Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft* in the same city. In 1960, he went to the University of Münster, and in 1970, he co-founded the 'reform university' of Bielefeld, where he was also a director of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF). Three years later, he returned to Münster, where he retired in 1978.[155]

Schelsky argued in 1953 that the Allies had superimposed changes on a totally passive German population and German society during the days of the occupation,[156] and had thus to be held co-responsible for the increasing depoliticisation of the West German population in the 1950s. Although the Nazis had the lion's share of responsibility for that trend, he argued, the Allies had helped to strengthen it:

> On top of that [the experience of National Socialism and war], the experiences of the post-war period: the contradiction between the announcements and standards of the victors [on the one side] and the praxis of the treatment of Germany and the occupation policy [on the other], the collective accusation and punishment through de-Nazification, the failure to organise support and security through the state, the increased corruption inside and outside public administration as a consequence of the societal upheaval [*gesamtgesellschaftlicher Umsturz*], and so on.[157]

As an explanation for many Germans' retreat into the private life of the family, he also blamed the Allies as much as the Nazi dictatorship for having caused that retreat:

> The basis and organisation of new public life, dictated and created by the occupation powers, were no less unable to fulfil their task against the typical social dangers …than the old system of the German

public sphere. The situation and the experiences before and after the ceasefire [i.e. the unconditional surrender] in the same way forced the flight into tight social support. The intimate relationship and bond was the only thing reliable, [and] became the only thing desired and protected.[158]

Even Helmut Schelsky accused the Americans, or the Allies as such, of having double standards and being inefficient and unfair in their reorganisation of Western Germany. The accusation of unfairness and one-sidedness seems to have been the principal accusation levied against the US occupation. Closely linked to the accusation of unfairness against the defeated German army was the Morgenthau Plan and the nuclear attack on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2.2   US war crimes? Atomic bombs and the Morgenthau Plan

Whereas the prominence of the criticism of the US occupational conduct is almost understandable, since the occupation with all its positive and negative connotations was very visible in large parts of post-war Western Germany, the prominence of two other wartime issues linked to the US is striking: these were the infamous Morgenthau Plan and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bombs had no real bearing on post-war Germany, and the Morgenthau Plan to de-industrialise and pastoralise Germany, however seriously it may have been taken for a short while during the war, was never implemented. To be more precise, it was nowhere near implementation at any time after Germany's unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. The historian Lothar Kettenacker calls the Morgenthau Plan a 'stillbirth' that was never seriously intended to be implemented by the British or by the Americans.[159] Alan Kramer states that the Morgenthau episode 'has come to occupy a place in some of the [academic] literature quite out of proportion to its true significance'.[160] Nationalist historiography still explored the Plan as late as 1965: Schrenck-Notzing dedicated two entire chapters in his study of the occupation period, *Charakterwäsche*, to the supposedly detrimental impact of the Plan on US occupation policy.[161] In my own schooldays in a rather left-wing school[162] in the city of Bremen in the late 1980s, the Morgenthau Plan was given far more space in the history of post-war Germany than it deserved. Even Konrad Adenauer was supposed to have used the Morgenthau Plan as a rhetorical weapon

when annoyed with the US government. Following the US-Soviet nego-tiations about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1966 and early 1967, the former Chancellor was supposed to have called the Treaty 'a new and multiplied Morgenthau Plan' ('*neuer Morgenthau-Plan im Quadrat*').[163]

Although President Roosevelt had initially signalled some support for the plan drawn up by his Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau Jr., he withdrew his approval in early October 1944 under the com-bined pressure of his advisers, who included John McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War and later US High Commissioner in Germany.[164] On 20 October 1944, Roosevelt wrote that he 'dislike[d] making plans for a country which we do not yet occupy'.[165] According to John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, 'the State Department had won its battle with Secretary Morgenthau over his scheme for a Carthaginian peace settlement with Germany'.[166]

It thus seems more appropriate to use the term 'Morgenthau myth' when evaluating the further propagandistic use of the plan in right-wing German discourse. An attack on the Morgenthau Plan was obviously as much embedded in anti-American rhetoric against 'Morgenthau the US official', as it was an outlet for anti-Semitism directed against 'Morgenthau the Jew'. Certain things could easily be left unsaid or vague, because the name Morgenthau all but gave away his religious family background, thus allowing for a coded form of anti-Semitism. Also, the name of Morgenthau had been used in Nazi German propaganda long before the Morgenthau Plan to denounce President Roosevelt as a leader under 'Jewish godfathers'. The *Völkische Beobachter* used a picture of Morgenthau as early as 14 March 1941 to identify him as one of the alleged 'Jewish godfathers' of the President.[167] Goebbels had later made Morgenthau a household word when stating: 'Hatred and revenge of a truly biblical nature can be seen in the plans cooked up by the American Jew, Morgenthau.'[168]

When looking at how both the Morgenthau Plan and Hiroshima were interpreted by the critics of the USA, the attempt to whitewash Germany's recent past becomes blatant. The fact that it was mostly right-wing radicals who used the Plan and the bombs as examples of US wrongdoing on which a counterblast against 'America' might be based does not detract from the curious prominence that it soon gained well outside the extremist circles in which the argument had originated.

One of the most prominent associations of right-wingers and neo-Fascists in Western Germany, the *Nationale Sammlung* (National

Coalition Movement), even included the fight against the 'Morgenthau policy' in its election manifesto for the *Bundestag* election 1953:

> The *Nationale Sammlung* places its candidates under an obligation to pursue the following social and political aims: 1. To overcome the ill-fated past. The *Nationale Sammlung* is a party of inner-German equality. Therefore we object to the political two-class-system created by the Morgenthau policy [*Morgenthaupolitik*]. We demand – Abolish the direct and indirect injustice of de-Nazification – Abolish the punishment of political persuasion. … Abolish the domestic and international propaganda of collective guilt against the German people. Abolish all special court judgements taken by the victors …[169]

The 'Morgenthau policy' is thus a synonym for all alleged injustice created by the US occupation forces: de-Nazification, the persecution of political opinions, propaganda against the German people. At a party conference a few months before the manifesto was issued, the party's leader and member of the Bavarian Parliament, August Haußleiter,[170] had called the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'the Supreme Commander of the *Morgenthaupolitik*'.[171] In the audience 800 people applauded this statement frantically. At a party meeting in Holzminden in February of that year, Haußleiter had, according to an intelligence report, declared that

> In the days of 1945, the Last Judgement came to us (misery, imprisonment, expulsion, etc.) Morgenthau played judge over our people. In this context, the speaker [Haußleiter] reminded the audience of the … phosphorus attacks on Dresden. Then he talked about show trials based on Russian examples. One would have to stop, the speaker continued, slandering every nonconformist [*Andersdenkenden*] as a criminal. The victors had gone to war for the exact reason to give us the freedom of political persuasion. But the first thing they did was to punish nonconformists.[172]

Haußleiter's hatred of the Allies and Adenauer's allegedly cowardly government went so far that he threatened them with a new 20 July 1944, i.e. an uprising against the allegedly dictatorial authorities along the lines of the plot to kill Hitler on that day in 1944. The *Oberpfälzer Anzeiger* daily on 27 February 1952 quoted him as saying:

> The 20th of July is important. At some stage, a 20th of July could be staged against Adenauer, and then we want to execute it in a better

way than it was done in 1944. … Not the *Obersalzberg* is to be erased, but the *Petersberg*.[173]

Haußleiter thus not only threatened Adenauer with death, but also equated the Allied High Command on the Petersberg mountain near Bonn with Hitler's Alpine retreat on the Obersalzberg mountain.

For some years, the name Morgenthau was used in right-wing circles as a synonym for anything supposedly anti-German and pro-American. Even the self-acclaimed Christian party in government, the CDU, was directly linked to Morgenthau by Haußleiter in November 1956:

> He [Haußleiter] called the CDU 'American exile riff-raff' [*amerikanisches Emigrantengesindel*] and the members of government 'Morgenthau-Boys'. … The CDU pursues a policy for Big Capital, and Mr Pferdmenges and Mr Abs [of the *Deutsche Bank*] are children of Wall Street. … It is a scandal how German youth is brought up. No young man learns anything from his past and his history anymore, but his whole life is Americanised.[174]

Although still living in exile in Canada during the 1953 election campaign, the highly influential early National Socialist Otto Strasser also had a few things to say about Morgenthau. In a 1952 article entitled 'Deutschland ein zehnfaches Korea', which was distributed in the *Bundestag*, Strasser refuted the 'Zionist' US Congressman Jacob K. Javits' demand for German military support for the US war effort in Korea. Javits had allegedly predicted that Germany would become a second Korea. In the article, Strasser denounced the statement of the 'fanatically anti-German Congressman' from New York as an 'outcome of the Morgenthau mentality' ('*Ausfluß der Morgenthau-Mentalität*') and as 'the continuation of the *Morgenthau-Politik* by other means'.[175] A year earlier, he had bemoaned the fact that 'the *Morgenthau-Politik* has by no means been overcome, even if its fathers and godfathers do not use the term 'Hun' for the Germans anymore, but for the Russians and the Chinese'.[176] The connotations carried by the term *Morgenthaupolitik* were, however, even wider. Without mentioning his name, Richard Hondorf indirectly accused Morgenthau and other American Jews of being responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War (writing in the extremist right-wing journal *Nation Europa* in 1952):

> Finally, the world war, the whole misery from which the world is suffering, and the responsibility for which the Chancellor of the German

Federal Republic [i.e. Adenauer] is trying, amidst warm parliamentary approval, to palm off on the German people, is totally the responsibility of the driving forces behind Roosevelt, whose names I do not want to list here in order not to be accused of anti-Semitism.[177]

The world war was thus not the outcome of Nazi German aggression and ideology, but linked to nothing but an (obviously fictional) 'Jewish World Conspiracy'. This piece of journalism is particularly important since the *Nation Europa* was not just a pamphlet handed out at semi-clandestine right-wing gatherings in the backroom of a German public house. Liberal contemporaries organised in the Club of Republican Journalists evaluated the importance of the journal in 1959:

> The journal *Nation Europa* stands out amongst all the 'national' publications [*eine auffällige Erscheinung im 'nationalen' Blätterwald*]. … There are counterparts to *Nation Europa* in England (Oswald Mosley's *European*) and in France under the title *Défense de l'Occident*, edited by Maurice Bardèche. The three journals are closely linked, and [articles by] correspondents of one of the journals are often published in the other two as well.[178]

Politicians more mainstream than the ones quoted above were also involved in the anti-Morgenthau rhetoric. A leading member of the FDP was prominent among them. The North Rhine-Westphalian co-founder of the party, Friedrich Middelhauve (1896–1966), was a member of the *Bundestag* from 1949 to 1957. In North Rhine-Westphalia, he was a member of the federal state parliament from 1946 to 1958. From 1954 to 1956, he was Deputy Minister President of that federal state, and also minister for the economy and transport. For many years, he was deputy leader of his party for the whole of Western Germany. He was prominent within the North Rhine-Westphalian FDP at a time when moderate Christian Democrats were worried about forming a coalition with the FDP because of the party's right-wing extremist tendencies, particularly in Lower Saxony, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia.[179]

In a speech given to the alumni of a student fraternity (*Alte Burschenschafler*) in Aachen in February 1953, Middelhauve attacked the 'Morgenthau psychosis' he saw still at work in certain quarters of the occupation authorities.[180] Although he praised the USA for 'having genuinely attempted to learn from the mistakes of the past in the last few years',[181] he still spent some time listing these mistakes. These included,

of course, the 'Versailles Diktat' after the First World War, but, more importantly, after the Second World War

> the fundamental error [of judgement] that the totalitarianism of the Soviets was not as dangerous and threatening as National Socialism, that Hitler was a criminal and should be ousted, but not *the good old Joe, Väterchen Stalin*. Stages along this path: Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, Roosevelt's path of error. Symptomatic of this: Morgenthau psychosis, Morgenthau Plan!! De-Nazification![182]

For the rest of his speech, Middelhauve told the Allies (and his audience) how they could continue to learn from their mistakes: they should end the de-Nazification programme, stop the defamation of 'our soldiers and officers', instigate a general amnesty for all war crimes, release those still imprisoned for alleged war crimes and remove the de-Nazification papers of all civil servants from their files in order to 'finally and totally stop the *Naziriecherei*' (snooping around for former Nazis). Finally, he told the British occupation authorities, responsible for North Rhine-Westphalia, to realise that 'we Germans are not a colonial state with which one can do whatever one likes'.[183] Although Middelhauve had repeatedly made his demands known to the Allies,[184] and had (as mentioned in the previous section) even accused the USA of still running 'labour camps' in the American zone of occupation in July 1949,[185] it is revealing that the accusation of a 'Morgenthau psychosis' had infiltrated his vocabulary by 1953, whereas it does not seem to have been a phrase he would use in 1949. The longer the period since the actual Morgenthau Plan, it seems, the bigger the myth would become.

The following examples of anti-Morgenthau rhetoric indicate how widely the right-wing propaganda could reach in the 1950s. Although outspoken anti-Semitism in post-war Germany was mainly an ideology (if such a crude set of thoughts can be called 'ideology') of the extreme Right, the idea of some sort of Jewish-American revenge was widespread and can be found in the most unexpected quarters. Some representatives of the gay subculture in 1950s Germany, mostly driven underground by the criminalisation of male homosexuality and, as a lobby group, far removed from the radical Right, saw the Morgenthau Plan as an actual crime against humanity, on the same level of depravity as the crimes of the Gestapo. The banned and confiscated gay rights journal *der neue ring* in 1958 reported on the abysmal French soldiers' conduct of interrogation in the Algerian war. Under the heading 'Sartre forced into silence. Can Semites still be tortured today?', a certain Adriaen van

der Aa reported on official French attempts to silence Jean-Paul Sartre and his reports about the severe torture of Arabs in French POW camps in Algeria. Van der Aa outlined some of the reported French methods of torture in order to conclude:

> These things [torture] have always disgusted and been condemned by civilised mankind, regardless of who the perpetrators were (be it the participants in the Spanish Civil War, the Gestapo, certain executors of the Morgenthau Plan, or degenerate troops in Korea).[186]

Finally, a highly regarded liberal politician fell for the 'Morgenthau myth' as late as 1954–55. The FDP's Reinhold Maier (1889–1971), first post-war Prime Minister of Württemberg-Baden before the formation of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg in 1952, and Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg in 1952–3, visited the USA in 1954 and 1955. In a report or speech entitled *Dauerfreundschaft mit Amerika*[187] ('Permanent Friendship with America'), he divided the post-war presence of the USA as an occupation power into two five-year periods. Whereas he was full of praise for the second period of partnership, and more generally full of praise for the degree of democratisation he had seen all over the USA,[188] he also had harsh words about the American occupation of Germany between 1945 and the end of 1949, i.e. his first few years as Prime Minister of Württemberg-Baden:

> It was no small thing to have been there [in Württemberg-Baden] and involved as a German after 1945, because of the Americans and because of the Germans. Permanent pressure from above, and permanent attacks of understandable indignation and premature impatience from below. He who was there could observe from very close the Morgenthau-inspired plan to punish and reform [the Germans][*morgenthau-benetzter Züchtigungs- und Besserungsplan*], that had been started.[189]

Maier went on to praise those Americans who subsequently 'drew the Plan's fangs one after the other',[190] until 'necessity [had] defeated the American prejudice and theories'.[191] However, he did not shy away from underlining the Morgenthau Plan's allegedly detrimental effect on post-war Germany. The German Nazi past, however, passed unmentioned in his report.

The US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had even less connection to the West German experience of US occupation. One can safely assume

that the Right in Germany had no real interest in defending the human rights of those Japanese who suffered heavily under and after the bombing. This is not to brand any criticism of the bombings as anti-American *per se*. The nuclear attacks caused indescribable suffering, and historians debate to this day whether they were a military necessity. Nevertheless, the German Right used the bombings to argue that other nations, and especially the USA, were just as inhumane as the Germans had been in the Second World War.

One might assume that the British bombing of Dresden and other German cities had more prominence than the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, since that bombing did, after all, cause tremendous suffering in Germany. Dresden certainly held a very important place in the commemorative culture of the communist GDR. According to the cultural historian Bill Niven, 'Dresden became a symbol of arbitrary Allied violence for many Germans, and a card which could be played in the mutual accusation game when the Allies began to uncover the extent of German war crimes'.[192] Surprisingly, however, that is only the case in very few examples I have uncovered. Dresden is mentioned from time to time, but Hiroshima and Nagasaki are far more prominent in the extremist discourse of the day. The working hypothesis thus has to be that reference to these occurrences had more to do with an attempt to uncover alleged American double standards in relation to war crimes than with real concern about the horrors of nuclear war. British bombing raids over Germany were used less for propaganda purposes because the British were perceived as comparatively weak, whereas the Americans were seen as the main Western force in Germany.

In 1950, the right-wing publicist Bruno Brehm warned against the dangers of total annihilation of all life on earth and the radioactive poisoning of the earth's atmosphere through the development of the hydrogen bomb by quoting Albert Einstein. Brehm continued to argue that, initially, both Hitler's plans for the extinction of all European Jews and the 1918 plans of the Czech politician Beneš to drive out all ethnic Germans from Czech territory were just hypothetical ideas (*Gedankenspiele*), the latter one ruled out by the British government. Both Hitler and Beneš, Brehm argued, came back to their initial plans as soon as they had an opportunity to execute them. But those events were merely yesterday's child's play (*Spielereien von gestern*) compared to the threats in relation to the hydrogen bomb.[193] Although Hiroshima is not mentioned in Brehm's quotation, he set the tone for more to come. The comparison between Nazi Germany's crimes against humanity and the destructive power of the

nuclear (and hydrogen) bomb became a recurrent topic in right-wing discourse.

In 1957, the Munich section of the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* sent an open letter to the United Nations and the London Conference on Demilitarisation demanding that the former US President Harry Truman be put on trial:

> [We] demand a trial against the former President of the USA, Harry Truman, for his war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed through his command to bomb two Japanese cities with nuclear bombs. Hundreds of thousands of civilians – women, children, and the elderly – were killed or permanently harmed. In the interest of mankind, this has to be pursued. If Germans are still in prison for their alleged war crimes, or if Germans are still – twelve years after the war – being persecuted, not to mention those Germans handed over to the hangman, then it is only just to also pursue the crimes of the opposition. The mass murder of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a statute-barred crime! The same law – and thus the same gallows – for all war criminals![194]

In October 1957, a right-wing pressure group supporting former Nazis, the *Bundesverband der ehemaligen Internierten und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigten* (BIE), was banned by the German courts for its anti-democratic activities. The judges quoted from the BIE publication *Der Ring*:

> Who was responsible for Auschwitz? It is absolutely clear, without a shadow of a doubt, that the German public was as uninvolved in these dark happenings as the British people at the beginning of the bombing of cities [*Bombenkrieg*] and the American people in the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although these happened – unlike Auschwitz – under the public gaze, they were also the result of wartime decisions taken by a few and without the opportunity to influence them from outside.[195]

The BIE not only accuses the British of having started the *blitz*. The article also argues that the British and US bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in a way worse than Auschwitz, since they happened 'under the public gaze', whereas the German system of extermination was concealed from the public. It seems blatantly clear from these statements that the West German national and extreme Right used the atomic

bombs to absolve Germans of their guilt and to argue for the release of all war criminals on the German side.

The *Verein zur Förderung der historischen Wahrheit* ('association for the promotion of historical truth') distributed a flyer in Hamburg in 1965 entitled '1945 – twenty wasted years? 1965' calling for more German confidence and the German unification. They underlined their demands by attacking the American (and British) war record:

> 1945 was a year of inhumanity in an allegedly cultured [*kultiviert*], yet in reality only civilised [*zivilisiert*] world! In Dresden, about 300,000 defenceless, mostly fugitive women, men, and children (!) were dismembered or buried by high-explosive bombs or burned alive by phosphorus during the bombing terror of the Western powers! … On 6 August of this 'year of madness', a nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima which destroyed the whole city in one go, murdered 200,000 human beings, and condemned thousands of others to a tortured existence as cripples. And on 9 August, this mass murder was repeated in the city of Nagasaki. This second nuclear crime had 150,000 victims. All that in the name of an alleged crusade for 'freedom and humanity'!
>
> Germans also became guilty in this age of mass crime. Especially the shameful mass murders in the secret extermination camps in the occupied Eastern territories may not be glossed over or played down. But it is an undeniable fact that all participants in the war committed crimes, and therefore the hypocritical onesidedness, with which only atrocities committed by Germans are persecuted, will finally have to stop.[196]

This quote is particularly interesting since it accuses the Western powers, in addition to war crimes, of being merely *zivilisiert*, not *kultiviert*. Other chapters[197] deal with the importance of the Occident in relation to anti-Western thinking. One of the key themes of the Occidental discourse, however, is hidden in the quote above: culture (*Kultur*) versus civilisation (*Zivilisation*). *Kultur* was the Occident, based on history, tradition, experience and deeply felt Christian values. *Zivilisation*, however, was merely an intellectual construct that was born out of the allegedly misguided ideas of 1776 and 1789 (the American and French Revolutions). This dichotomy is not new to post-1945 German discourse; it had in fact dominated the 'America debate' in Germany at least since the Wilhelmine Empire. It is interesting in this context, however, that *Zivilisation* was, once again, accused of being so shallow and without

roots that it cannot even guarantee the very essence of its own definition – the humane values of the revolutionary period in Europe and North America.

These right-wing groupings and individuals, however marginal they may seem in hindsight, were far from irrelevant, since they were considered a real threat to the constitution. Haußleiter, the leader of the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* and co-leader of the *Nationale Sammlung*, was, after all, a member of the Bavarian state parliament. Hundreds, sometimes close to 1,000, people went to hear his speeches. The *Nation Europa* was, as I have indicated, influential not only in the German Right, but was also well connected with the European extreme Right, including England's infamous Oswald Mosley. And finally, the number of intelligence reports gathered by the *Verfassungsschutz* and held by the Ministry of the Interior, some of which I have used in this chapter, indicate how seriously these groups were taken, at least by their contemporaries.

Both the examples of the rhetoric surrounding the Morgenthau myth and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicate how the right-wing discourse, probably multiplied in many a pub or dinnertable conversation, could trickle down (or rather up) to more general debates within post-war West German society. Mainstream politicians like the FDP's Maier and Middelhauve and even gay rights campaigners were not immune to the constant reminders of alleged US war crimes. When it came to the many problems the USA faced in the 1950s, most prominently the civil rights issue in relation to Afro-Americans and the treatment of the USA's indigenous peoples, it becomes even more obvious how many mainstream figures in post-war west German public life became – often subconsciously – involved in the 'blame game'.

2.3   *Indianer* and *Neger* and other dark chapters in US history or politics

For many a German, *Indianer* ('Red Indians' or Native Americans) carried a lot of sentimental baggage. Through the adventure novels of Karl May, most German boys and some German girls had travelled to the Wild West in their imagination with the Apache chieftain Winnetou, the epitome of Rousseau's Noble Savage, and his German 'blood brother' Old Shatterhand, May's *alter ego*. In 1929, the philosopher Ernst Bloch probably spoke for many (male) members of the age cohorts this study is mainly concerned with when he called Karl May 'the boys' Shakespeare'

('*Shakespeare der Jungens*').[198] In the 1950s, May was for many young Germans the closest connection they had with the USA.[199] Not surprisingly, those Germans who had the chance to see the USA before TV reports made American images all too familiar in German living rooms quite often fell back on the romantic images from their childhood. The industrialist Otto Seeling could almost see 'Red Indians on the warpath' while travelling on a train in the USA:

> For hours and hours the train has been travelling through a landscape in which I can well imagine *Indianer* on the warpath. A wide river with many rocks and islands, mountain forest [*waldige Höhen*] on both sides. Again and again, one sees old wooden houses where trappers might once have stayed and which are now derelict. Furthermore, wide plains with wild grasses. What German farmers could create here! [*Was könnten hier deutsche Bauern schaffen!*][200]

Considering the sentimental and romantic baggage most German travellers brought with them, it is not surprising that many were shocked by the reality of Native American life on the reservations. One exchange student remembered this during his extended travels through the USA 1955 and 1956:

> Our trip through the States has allowed us a fairly systematic study of the Indian reservations in the South West. Only very few other experiences on this trip have impressed us so deeply. We met the culture of the indigenous Americans, who lived on that soil since [*sic*] 2 or 3 thousand years. We discovered remainders of their religion, which had taught them to subordinate to nature, to live as part of it. The original way of life of the Indians had become a fiction in their reservations. Irrestibly [*sic*] their order deteriorated under the impact of civilisation and commercialism of the white man.[201]

Adolf Ehlers, the Bremen State Senator for the Interior, expressed similar sentiments in a letter to his wife:

> Our driver said during two extended tours in this area [the Grand Canyon] that all Red Indians are good, but these here, the Hopi *Indianer* are the best. It is now too late for this realisation: They are no more the *Indianer* of our romantic adolescent dreams. They look sad and melancholic, and we became sad and melancholic, too.[202]

Two days later, he wrote from Philadelphia about his Grand Canyon experience:

> According to one's childhood imagination, one expects to find an *Indianer* with flamboyant head-dress behind every ledge. But one does not meet them by the rocks, but in or outside the hotel foyer. The hotel has large annexes where Red Indian baskets, pottery and textiles are on offer. At very high prices. I do not want to research what a low price the *Indianer* gets for his products. This is the low side of this incredible experience Grand Canyon, the devastating situation of a group of people that we as boys have loved so dearly in our childhood.[203]

Ehlers was by no means anti-American. He was one of a number of leading SPD politicians who went to the USA and came back deeply impressed by the American way of life, its friendliness and the stability of American democracy. He is therefore a fascinating example of an early visitor to that country. His letters and reports are generally an appraisal of America. However, the negative impressions he formed during his extended journey from March to May 1955 show how deeply rooted the contemporary discourse on 'America' must have been in West German society, since even Ehlers, a very intellectual politician, could not free himself from these preconceived sentiments. Besides his probably accurate descriptions of *Indianer* living conditions, the only other negative or dubious impressions he took home were linked either to sexuality or to the treatment and the living conditions of racial, ethnic and religious minorities. This is not to say that these impressions are *a priori* false. They are, however, deeply rooted in one of the German – and European[204] – traditions of interpreting 'America'. Andrei Markovits pays particular attention to the nineteenth-century German construction of a Native American 'Noble Savage', as embodied by May's Chieftain Winnetou, as a scathing critique of 'Yankeeism' and US-style capitalism. The 'Noble Savage', helped by a good number of German-born trappers, fights the erosion of his livelihood through the forces of a destructive Anglo-Saxon modernity.[205] After Auschwitz, the temptation to berate the USA for its treatment of the Native Americans or other minority groups was even greater.[206] Another example taken from Ehlers' letters to his wife illuminates that point:

> Of course, every owner can use economic means of repression against the weaker. Law and the constitution are thereby rendered an empty formality. That happens in very many places over here. Even the very good-natured and politically harmless and slightly naive people of

Bremerton [or Brementon, he uses both spellings for a small town he visited] have a lot of racial resentments and even an element of anti-Semitism. One does not like to have a Jew in one's club.[207]

Even some of the most liberal-minded visitors to the USA, Ehlers among them, felt it necessary to raise the matter of anti-Semitism in the USA. This is not saying that anti-Semitism did not exist in 1950s North America. I would not criticise Ehlers for making these – probably accurate – observations. Bringing up the issue of anti-Semitism in the USA, however, is a possibly subconscious attempt to cast the very recent German past in a better light in comparison. Even a Social Democrat like Ehlers must have felt the urge to rescue some of Germany's honour by contrasting the image of 'America the liberator from Fascism' with that of 'America the oppressor of ethnic minorities at home'.

The situation of Black Americans, or *Neger* (Negroes), as Germans (and Americans and Britons) would have said in those days, was another issue that recurred again and again in the early reports on the USA. Moreover, the institutionalised racial segregation practised in the USA could also be observed at home in Germany: the historian Maria Höhn has shown, using the example of the small village Baumholder in Rhineland-Palatinate, that there was virtually total segregation of black and white soldiers in the US Army throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, despite official attempts to integrate the two groups. The US Army had informally segregated the bars in Baumholder, with white sergeants threatening publicans with a 'white' boycott if blacks were served; the village even saw segregated brothels.[208] It was thus appropriate for Germans to notice and comment on US racism. Indeed, black GIs stationed in Germany later commented on the discrepancy between racial segregation in the USA and the US attempts to re-educate West Germans in an anti-racist way.[209] Nevertheless, as Höhn has argued, there was good deal of *Schadenfreude* in Germany at manifestations of US racism, since it proved to the Germans that they, at least, had overcome their Third Reich racism, whereas the supposedly morally superior USA were still steeped in it.[210] It is thus no surprise that many Germans visiting the USA throughout the 1950s felt the need to comment on US racism and the often abysmal social situation for people from ethnic minorities. After visiting a community centre in New York City, Adolf Ehlers reported to his wife:

Brilliant the Negroes: proud and confident, good-looking. Shocking: The Puerto Ricans. Adolescents aged fourteen to sixteen dancing. The

rhythm of the drums, a sadness in their faces that depresses us. As you would expect: everything, yes, everything exclusively reduced to sexuality. Even for the USA, I think, it is a problem to integrate these people.[211]

In San Francisco, he observed black women dancing in a night club:

We saw how much of the original, of the descent, is still there. In a club, Negro women staged dances of such an erotic wildness that we were in consternation. One totally lacks scales for judgement, unless we take our own measurements that are not suitable since they often become priggish. One searches for an explanation, but there is none, since we do not know enough about anthropology. For me, this was thus an expedition into total darkness.[212]

It is clear that Ehlers was deeply troubled by his encounter with the 'Other'. Blackness, sexuality and depravity were indistinguishably linked and thus turned into an anti-American cliché. It is, once again, important to stress that I do not consider him anti-American *per se.* Nor do I think he was a racist. But he was a child of his time in his judgement of 'Black America': he simultaneously linked a critique of the social conditions of racial minorities in the USA with sexual depravity among the minorities, as seen in the case of the Puerto Ricans he saw dancing in New York. Subsequently, he felt threatened by black female sexuality in San Francisco. The Blacks in New York, however, were – in a sense – 'white' enough to be accepted: they were 'proud and confident; good-looking'.

Even among Germans who were inclined to view the USA as a liberator from Fascism rather than a victorious and vicious occupation force, there was a tendency to stress the USA's problems with racial minorities and to link the US culture and subculture to sexuality. This is significant since the most serious accusations against Nazi Germany were most certainly based on its racial and anti-Semitic policies culminating in the Holocaust. Thus accusing the USA of racism and subsequent depravity itself helped, even if only subconsciously, to lift some of the blame from the German people. Obviously, much of the critique of US racism was valid. Some commentators kept their observations to themselves in order not to offend their hosts. Willy Brandt, later German Chancellor, who was seen as a member of the 'American faction' within the Berlin SPD in the early 1950s,[213] only retrospectively recalled that during his first visit to the USA in 1954, the highest representative of Black America he got a chance to meet was the president of the sleeping-car attendants'

union.[214] Others, however, were more forthcoming in their criticism. The radio and TV journalist Peter von Zahn wrote extensively about his posting in the USA. In one of the books, he included a chapter about 'crackpotism' in southern California, i.e. all sorts of New Age movements unknown to most Germans in 1955. There, he sarcastically recalled an ad placed by a fortune-teller which ended with the announcement 'Separate rooms for Coloureds and Mexicans'.[215] In the same book, he dedicated a whole chapter to racial segregation and the shock he experienced when he first encountered its manifestations in the form of segregated waiting rooms in railway stations.[216]

The reports of more conservative, if not racist, German visitors to the USA are even more interesting than the reports of liberals and Social Democrats. Although somewhat appalled by Black America, they simultaneously manage to condemn the USA for the alleged or real mistreatment of this ethnic minority. The industrialist Seeling, whose anti-Semitic orientation can hardly be denied,[217] showed many signs of a racist attitude as well:

We briefly touched Haarlem [*sic*] – the Negro city. How strange to see a quarter the size of a big city in the middle of New York where only Negroes live and where one can see mostly Negroes in the streets. … Negroes everywhere, part of them strangely dressed-up [*komisch aufgedonnerte*] Negresses. It gives me the creeps [*Es kommt mir unheimlich vor*].[218]

In a bus stop café near Detroit, he observed:

Half of those waiting there were Negroes and Negresses. Including real exhibits [*Darunter Ausstellungsstücke*]: What does a Jungle Queen look like in American clothing …[219]

Despite his total lack of understanding of black culture, Seeling still managed to attack white Americans for their hypocrisy after visiting the Ford Motors factory in Detroit:

Whites, Negroes, Asians, all mixed. All white women work with gloves on. The Negresses obviously not. The big worry in Detroit is the steep increase in numbers of Negroes. There are more then half a million here. They have doubled in the last ten years. On paper [*formell*] they are seen as having equal rights. But nobody wants them in the White quarters. If a Negro buys a house in a better area, the value of the other

houses falls to a third or a fourth, since all the Whites are moving out. The Negroes have their own bank, which finances such house purchases systematically.[220]

The language Seeling employed to describe the social situation in Detroit is reminiscent of the way the Nazis had talked about Jews: 'They have doubled in the last ten years' – it sounds more like a plague of rats than an observation on human beings. He also insinuates that 'Negro banks' systematically finance purchases in previously all-white neighbourhoods to drive the prices down and turn them into all-black neighbourhoods. However, in spite of his racism, he still emphasised 'American' hypocrisy, i.e. the fact that blacks have equal rights only formally, but not in reality (and even that was not true of the USA in the 1950s), and the fact that white Americans do not want to live in the same neighbourhood as their black fellow citizens.

The most eloquent (and probably the most intelligent) critique of 'American' hypocrisy was once again written by Ernst von Salomon.[221] He was not only concerned with the present, but dug deep to find hypocrisy embedded in US history. By his own account, he had already started to whitewash the German Nazi past while the past was still very present. In 1951, he recalled a conversation he had with foreign journalists in Berlin after the murder of SA leader Ernst Röhm in 1934. Although himself disgusted by the violent death of his old comrade, von Salomon slowly gets even more disgusted by the harsh evaluation of the German political situation by the foreign journalists. Eventually he says to himself in anger:

Should I tell this Englishman something about the bloody history of his kings, about Ireland, and about the concentration camps of the Boer War; Should I remind this Frenchman of Robespierre, of the execution of the Duke of Enghien, and of Napoleon's order: 'André Hofer is to be tried by a war tribunal, condemned to death, and shot'; Should I point out to this American the extinction of the Red Indians, the treatment of the Negroes, and the rule of gangsters in Chikago [*sic*]?[222]

Elsewhere, he reiterates his belief that the American call for democracy in Germany was hypocritical and two-faced. Here is a brief account of how he judged the early, supposedly democratic, US history:

Prussia was governed by a king called Frederick II who was regarded as the most enlightened monarch in Europe and who – I hesitate to

use the term 'as commonly known' – was the first monarch on the Old Continent to establish friendly relations with the Great Washington's freedom-loving and independent republic. During the following decades, the United States forced the original natives of America, the [Red] Indians, further and further back into the west of the continent in unusually cruel fights, and thus bit by bit increased the number of states from 13 in the year of the Declaration of Independence to 26 in 1823, the year of the Monroe doctrine. [At the same time] Prussia was, like the other states of Europe, overrun by a man named Napoleon, who had managed to become Emperor of France. [Prussia] then, like the other states of Europe, raised to fight a war, generally referred to as a 'War of Liberation', against Napoleon until the tyrant was forced out of office. In this war, the United States of America – I hesitate to use the term 'as commonly known' – fought on Napoleon's side.[223]

In order to underpin his general criticism of the USA and its influence on Germany, he used the example of the treatment of blacks in contemporary America and the expulsion of Native Americans from their territory in American history. One should not forget that the primary aim of von Salomon's autobiography is indicated by its title. His main intention was to undermine the moral validity of the questionnaire (*Der Fragebogen*) used by the US occupational government in their attempt to de-Nazify Germany. In this brilliant piece of sarcasm, he totally undermines the representation of the USA as the 'Land of the Free'. The message is brought home loud and clear: even in its foundational history, the USA had been no better than any other country. Its foreign politics were pure *Realpolitik* without any consideration of the international struggle for freedom, and internally the USA made territorial gains at the expense of its indigenous people, the *Indianer*.

It has been aim of chapter 2 to demonstrate that the public climate in the post-war years and the 'long 1950s' was by no means solidly admiring of the USA. Criticism of the Americans could be used by those whose real target was the establishment of 'Western' democracy in the FRG. Both alleged or real shortcomings of the US political system, like the racial question or the treatment of minorities, and objectionable actions of the USA in the past, were used to warn contemporary West Germans not to go down what was perceived as the 'American path'. The next chapter looks at how liberal democracy and supposedly 'American-style' capitalism became targets themselves.

3
Rejection of the Republic – Democracy and Capitalism

On the ideological front, the input of some supposedly 'American' ideas in Western Germany was all too obvious, but also very hard to grasp. What indeed was the 'American' world-view? And how much of that world-view was merely a re-import of indigenous European ideas? What was it, on the ideological front, that the US occupational government brought to Germany? Democracy is an obvious answer. Nevertheless, democracy is as much a highly contested concept as modernisation itself. As this chapter shows, some contemporaries criticised the USA for super-imposing parliamentary democracy on Western Germany, although it did not, according to the critics, suit the German tradition. Others alleged that even the Americans themselves had not been able to introduce a proper parliamentary democracy in their own country, a country the German critics saw as being governed by big business and 'Wall Street' rather than the people.

According to Kaspar Maase, 'republican Americanism' as a form of 'self-Americanisation' identified with the rules and principles that were seen as functional in the US political system. This type of 'self-Americanisation' goes back to the bourgeois German revolutionaries of the nineteenth century. It gained prominence again after the Second World War in those circles that identified with the American re-orientation programme.[1] The non-democratic Right had to reject the republican ideas epitomised by 'America' in order to reject parliamentary democracy. At least during the 1950s, it was mainly the Right that constantly made a connection between 'America' and democracy. If the Left intended to attack the political system of the FRG, they hardly ever brought America into the equation.

Another integral part of what was seen as 'the American system' came under attack: American-style capitalism. The middle section of this

chapter will thus analyse links between anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism. Property rights were so deeply enshrined in the American-style republic that it is in fact difficult to disentangle them from capitalism when assessing modern America. West Germany saw fundamental critiques of the new 'American' world economic order from both the radical Left and the radical Right. Yet once again, the radical Left rarely attacked 'America' as such when aiming at the capitalist system. Their critique of capitalism had such a long tradition that America was not really needed as a mirror image for Germany. After all, Karl Marx himself had found sufficient material in the Old World to underpin his critique of capitalism and liberalism. The radical Right, however, did engage in a thoroughly anti-American discourse in order to defend their economic-political ideas and reject the new and more international trade system that came into existence in Western Germany after the Second World War. One important symbol of 'America' was the supermarket, an institution relatively new to West Germany after 1945. The supermarket thus became one of *the* images of the USA, and thus all that was supposedly wrong with 'America'.

The final section deals with contemporary attempts to find a 'German' way between East and West, i.e. between the USA and the Soviet Union. Since anti-communism was embedded in the West German public conscience in the 'long 1950s', and had been a major theme in Germany ever since the Soviet Union came into existence in late 1917, it is far more rewarding to analyse the image of 'America' created by those searching for an independent Third Way between the two power blocs. Whereas the Soviet Union had little reputation to lose in that debate, the real aim of the often very unflattering comparisons between 'East' and 'West' was the USA and the Western value system associated with 'America'.

3.1 The Rejection of American-style democracy

The first two decades of post-war Western Germany experienced many very public and well-aimed attacks against liberal democracy and those proposing the idea in post-war Western Europe. The attacks were not confined to pamphlets published by radical fringe organisations. Some came directly from the centre of the post-war West German elites. One prominent neo-conservative example was Heinrich Hauser, an anti-Nazi émigré to the USA who, after returning to Germany, became

editor-in-chief of the illustrated weekly *Stern*.[2] He claimed as early as 1945 that

> Germans will loathe and never adopt the American brand of democracy, [and that] the Americans will make a horrible mess of the occupation job as soon as it becomes more than a military affair.[3]

In 1947, he introduced an article with the words: '[t]he German ideas and plans outlined herein are certain to be labelled "escapist" and "reactionary." No doubt they are – from the point of view of modern man. But who is modern man to judge?'[4] Hauser is thus a prime example of a political thinker who both rejected American-style democracy and linked his anti-Americanism with an anti-modern stance that was unashamed of being called reactionary. This is particularly interesting since at least the first quote was never published in German, but was written and published in the USA where he lived during the Nazi era. With Hauser having been an outspoken enemy of Hitler, these quotes cannot be dismissed as the post-war utterances of a defeated and confused nation that had for 13 years been fed with anti-liberal propaganda. Hauser's anti-Americanism was consciously anti-democratic and anti-modern in an unbroken Weimar tradition.

Similarly, the expressionist poet Gottfried Benn in 1950 justified his initial involvement with Nazi Germany. Without mentioning 'America' or the West, he reasoned, 'I believed in a real renewal of the German people, which would indicate an exit from rationalism, functionalism, and civilisatory paralysis, [and] which would serve [the interests of] Europe …'.[5] Benn thus thought that the National Socialist so-called revolution would rid Germany of the Western Enlightenment influence of rationalism and of Western concepts of functionalism and civilisation. These three concepts had supposedly dominated the Weimar Republic, and Benn was willing to believe in a revolution that would reinstate real Germanness. Even in 1950, he argued that many an historical success of the Occident was based on violence, not democracy.[6] Since 'America' was seen as the epitome of rationalism and functionalism during the Weimar Republic, Benn's attitudes constitute a further attack on 'America'. He distanced himself from the Nazis soon enough, but that did not alter his perception of the West and Western values.

The sentiment against American-style democracy, or what was perceived as that, was carried into the post-war discourse on 'America'. A prototypical version of that sentiment can be found in Leo Lawrence Matthias's *Discovery of America anno 1953*.[7] According to his own

account, Matthias (1893–1970) had been a friend of the influential post-war German publisher Ernst Rowohlt, who published Matthias's books after the Second World War, since 1912.[8] He held a doctorate in law and was a volunteer in the First World War. After the war, he was on the side of the Socialist revolutionaries.[9] Disillusioned with the results, he went to Soviet Russia to report on the new system, but was not convinced by what he saw there.[10] From 1923 to 1925, he lived in Mexico and became friends with, among others, the photographers Edward Weston and Tina Modotti.[11] In 1933, he returned to Mexico after a few months in Amsterdam and held a chair in sociology in Mexico City. Since this did not work out financially, he moved to Vienna, where he stayed until the *Anschluss* seemed inevitable (unfortunately, he was not too forthcoming with dates in his autobiography).[12] During the first years of the Second World War, he held chairs in Sociology and Political Science in various Latin American universities. At some stage after the entry of the USA into the war, he moved to the USA where he stayed for over a decade. During that time, he was in charge of the Bureau of Latin-American Affairs in New York, advising the State Department, and then became Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology and Political Science at Burlington, Vermont. Afraid of McCarthyism, he left the USA in the early 1950s and settled in Switzerland.[13]

Matthias became, according to Dan Diner, the doyen of FRG anti-Americanism 'whose American reconnaissance [the playwright Rolf] Hochhuth obviously valued highly' in the 1970s discourse on 'America'.[14] America, Matthias argued, lacked true nobility,[15] and thus 'authority in the traditional sense'.[16] Matthias described US public policy as run by industrial and economic lobbies[17] and rackets undermining fair trade.[18] The racketeer, Matthias went on, enjoyed perfect freedom, since his crimes were not prosecuted. He was therefore in a similar position to Russian governors, and the end result was a lack of freedom for society as a whole.[19] Even US prisons were run by rackets formed by the most powerful and violent inmates.[20] US history had shown that all power in the USA was in the hands of the businessman, whereas the rest of society was 'imprisoned by freedom' ('*in Freiheit gefangen*').[21] Matthias concluded by saying that there 'is an America myth as there has been a Russia myth. … Everything could be lost if one fell for it [the America myth].'[22]

Others, however, bemoaned the alleged fact that democracy in the USA had taken over too many aspects of life. The FAZ journalist Edgar Kull explained the alleged mediocrity of high schools there by reference to American 'democratic exuberance'.[23] Putting slow learners and high

achievers in the same class, he argued, was too democratic. Neither of them would benefit from getting mediocre content (*'Hausmannskost'*), since one would still be unable to follow the class and the other would be bored. Although equality might be good in politics, it was not appropriate in school, Kull concluded.[24]

The next sections, however, are not concerned with prominent individuals and their objections to American-style democracy, but conduct two case studies: I closely examine the ideology of a well-connected pressure group contesting the idea of liberal and parliamentary democracy, and then the teachings of a highly influential and at least partially respected, but nevertheless reactionary, academic, Carl Schmitt, and his followers and fellow academic right-wingers in the FRG.

3.1.1　*'Die Erste Legion'*

Even the federal government of the FRG seems to have contained a number of right-wing anti-democratic radicals. A rather obscure political organisation, *Die Erste Legion* ('The First Legion'), gained some prominence in the very early 1950s. In January 1951, the weekly news journal *Der Spiegel* reported that the secretive organisation had been in operation clandestinely for roughly two years and had about 10,000 members, 90 per cent of whom preferred to remain anonymous. The *Legion* functioned as a lodge (*'Orden'*), it was reported.[25] In February 1951, *Die Zeit* reported that

> some prominent members of Bonn's governing coalition are members of the 'Legion' or close to it: Erich Mende of the FDP, Hans von Meerkatz [*sic*[26]] of the DP. Dr [Kurt Georg] Kiesinger (CDU), who was the first to spill the beans and announce the aims [of the 'Legion'], has left the 'Legion', at least officially. But the former Federal Government's chief spokesman [*Bundespressechef*] Dr [Heinrich] Böx, Judge [*Amtsrichtsrat*] [Prof. Erich] Schmalz, one of the aides to the Federal Chancellor, and [Adolf] Dedekind, personal aide to [*Bundesrat*] Minister [Heinrich] Hellwege, are even members of its leadership.[27]

The daily *Die Welt* published an article the following day by the chairman of the *Legion*, Erich Schmalz, who named Dedekind, Boex [*sic*] and himself as the leadership of the 'First Legion'.[28] Later that month, the daily newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* quoted the New York weekly German language publication *Aufbau/Reconstruction*:

> The Members of Parliament [*Bundestagsabgeordneten*] Kiesinger, Mende, and von Meerkatz [*sic*] are the leaders of this 'First Legion' … .

Kiesinger is one of Adenauer's closest aides and has repeatedly played a role in parliamentary debates when support for Adenauer was needed. In a programmatic declaration [*Programmerklärung*], Kiesinger sharply objects to the 'Ideas of 1789' and to parliamentarism, particularly to the majority principle [*Mehrheitsprinzip*]. … This group [the *Legion*] is to be taken seriously and originated in the political-militant wing of Catholicism. It already has well over 10,000 members and does not want to be a new party, but a 'movement'. The well-known banker [Robert] Pferdemenges also belongs to it.[29]

The future German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger was often connected with the *Legion* in the contemporary press. *Der Spiegel* had named Kiesinger and Mende as 'advisory' ('*beratend*') members of the 15-member leadership, and von Merkatz as an 'active' member of that council, as early as January 1951.[30] Kiesinger later distanced himself from the organisation.[31] He was nevertheless still named as a leading supporter ('*Förderer*') of the *Legion* in the daily *Bonner Rundschau*, together with Mende and von Merkatz, as late as June 1951.[32] This was particularly interesting, since that front-page article referred to a *Legion* press conference held by Schmalz in Bonn on 11 June.[33] This suggests that even the self-confessed leader of the *Legion*, Schmalz, counted Kiesinger, Mende and von Merkatz among the most prominent supporters of the *Legion*. Also, two intelligence reports found in the Bremen State Archives and written in mid-February and late October 1951 counted those three Members of Parliament first among the advisory council ('*Beirat*')[34] and then among the roughly 30 members of the extended executive ('*Führungskreis*')[35] of the *Legion* 'in spite of repeated denials'.[36]

As further leading members of the *Legion*, the Bonn newspaper report mentioned the consultant for the CDU *Bundestag* parliamentary party, Helmut Teewag, and the parliamentary party chairman of the CDU, Karlfranz Schmidt-Wittmack (although slightly misspelled).

The organisation was particularly strong in the industrial areas of North Rhine-Westphalia.[37] Its head office was in Cologne.[38] Some elements of the two leading German parties seem to have reacted against the anti-democratic worldview of the *Legion* (see below): after the CDU of the Rhineland decided in May 1950 that membership of the *Legion* and full-time activism for the CDU Rhineland were incompatible,[39] the SPD decided in January 1951 that no Social Democrat should be allowed to be a member of the *Legion*.[40] This conflicts with some claims in the academic literature that the *Legion* was part-financed by the Adenauer administration (see below). It took the CDU at the national level until

September 1951 to consider that fact that the *Legion* might be a threat to democracy.[41] The *Legion* reacted quickly: at a leadership meeting in the Hotel Belvedere in Brühl on 30 September, it decided to 'support the governing coalition in Bonn with all its power'.[42] The *Legion* would also attempt to improve its relationship with the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU. Its aim was to get the CDU to rethink its decision to distance itself from the *Legion*.[43] At that stage, the organisation had about 800 members left. Representatives of the Association of German Industry (*Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*) and the Employers' Federation (*Arbeitgeberverbände*) were also present at the Brühl meeting.[44]

Modern historiography, to my knowledge, does not refer to the *Legion* and its connections to the Adenauer administration in detail.[45] The last extensive historiographical reference I have discovered was contained in Kurt Tauber's 1967 study of post-war German nationalism, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*.[46] Tauber claimed that the *Legion* received government subsidies[47] and numbered the *Legion* among 'other militant anti-Communist vigilante groups whose leaders and members, as well as objectives and methods, suggest that their commitment to the constitutional order may be purely tactical, and to liberal democracy, nonexistent'.[48] Tauber reiterated a newspaper report[49] about the (former) General Secretary of the CDU British Zone committee, Erich Schmalz, who was 'also [the] organizer of that curious semi-secret, government-sponsored "elite order" and anti-Communist vigilante group, the First Legion (*Erste Legion*)'.[50] According to Tauber, Schmalz also attended clandestine meetings with other right-wingers, many of them linked to the neo-Fascist Naumann Circle, in the autumn of 1951.[51] In addition to Kiesinger, Mende and von Merkatz, Tauber also mentioned the CDU politician Gerhard Schröder among those who 'were consistently linked with the *Legion* despite repeated denials'.[52]

I have found scant evidence for Tauber's claim that the *Legion* received direct state subsidies. *Der Spiegel* claimed – rather casually – that the *Legion* was supported ('*protegiert*') by Chancellor Adenauer, and that its financial basis was 'mainly secured from the same funds from which the moneys for the governing parties flow'.[53] One of the few other contemporary claims was made by a rival reactionary grouping, the *Bruderschaft* ('Brotherhood'). In 1951, the *Freiheits-Briefe*, edited by Bruno Fricke and closely linked to Otto Strasser, who at that stage was still living in exile in Canada, wrote in March 1951 of the *Erste Legion*: 'This subsidiary [*Ableger*] of the CDU has in an extensive leaflet campaign – where might the money have come from? – called for a fight against the *Bruderschaft*'.[54] Tauber claims, however, that the *Bruderschaft* had been 'involved in the

several attempts of the Right wing of the Adenauer party to absorb radical Rightist elements in such organizations as the … First Legion (*Erste Legion*)'.[55]

Thus the attack on the *Legion* seems to have been more a case of sour grapes than a serious claim. Nevertheless, some evidence points to at least some sort of approval of the *Legion* in government circles: on 6 January 1951, a member of the *Legion*[56] had sent a copy of an open letter regarding its disapproval of the *Bruderschaft* to Adenauer. Adenauer's personal referent Dr Wilde replied on 16 January 1951:

> The Federal Chancellor wishes to thank you for sending him your open letter to the *Bruderschaft* which he has acknowledged with interest. Yours sincerely [*In vorzüglicher Hochachtung*], Dr Wilde[57]

The friendly or at least courteous tone of his reply might indicate that Adenauer saw the *Legion* as a way to bring the radical Right into the constitutional framework of post-war Western Germany. Adenauer's office certainly made inquiries about the grouping: the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, West Germany's federal interior intelligence agency, confirmed in a letter to the Office of the Federal Chancellor in May 1951 that so far, nothing had been found to prove that the *Legion* was anti-constitutional or a threat to the state.[58] In April, one of the *Legion*'s leaders, Adolf Dedekind, the aide to Minister Heinrich Hellwege, expressed his regret about the negative attitudes of the Social Democrats towards his organisation. This posed the risk of the *Legion* becoming a 'club of the coalition parties', he feared.[59]

No conclusion seems possible yet on the exact linkage between Adenauer and *Legion*. However, at least in the case of the former chief spokesman of the Adenauer administration Heinrich Böx, his prominent position in the *Legion* did not hamper his future diplomatic career: He became Consul of the Federal Republic in New Orleans in November 1951,[60] at which stage he had left his position within the *Legion* leadership due to his absence.[61] Subsequently, he was the FRG's ambassador to Norway and Poland.[62] Major newspapers commemorated his eightieth and his eighty-fifth birthdays in 1985 and 1990, respectively.[63] Some sort of involvement of leading, and supposedly parliamentary-democratic, politicians from the right-wing fringes of at least the CDU, the FDP and the DP in the *Legion* thus seems established. A closer look at the *Legion*'s programmatic outlook and ideological standing, especially on the issues of Western democracy and 'America', is thus more than justified in the context of this study.

In December 1950, *Die Erste Legion* had published its political and societal aims and persuasions in a pamphlet that the *Verfassungsschutz* decided to keep in its files:

> *Die Erste Legion* is an organised militant community, willing to fight for the spiritual, social and political renewal on the basis of the natural order founded in God. *Legion* is elite. *Legion* is the opposite of mass. … The masses are there because the old elites have failed. In order to turn the masses back into human beings, we need new elites.[64]

The anti-democratic implications of this statement are blatant. The new rule of the masses, i.e. the democratic political system of the still almost embryonic FRG, is rejected in favour of an allegedly God-given elitist structure of society. The ideas of the *Legion* were allegedly 'the fundament of a natural order based in God' ('*das Fundament der natürlichen, in Gott gegründeten Ordnung*').[65] This anti-modern societal order might even be achieved by military means: 'There is no contradiction [*Widerstreit*] between Law and Power [*Recht und Macht*], if Power is based on Law, and if it is in the right hands.'[66] In January 1951, the conservative daily *Die Welt* reported on the worldview of the *Legion*:

> The mechanistic democracy, as it has developed since the French Revolution, with its danger of the atomic splintering of the people [*atomare Aufsplitterung des Volkes*] and the simultaneous danger of compromising even absolute values through majority decisions, is not the last and only possibility of democracy in the thinking of these men. In their imagination, they see the image of a strong state, whose authority appears visibly, yet whose power is simultaneously kept in check through the generous delegation of its task and through large units of self-administration.[67]

In March of that year, the daily *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* reported that the *Legion* was strongly opposed to implanting foreign political systems into Germany. According to this report, they rejected both liberal democracy and economic socialisation.[68]

This information on the political ideology of the *Erste Legion* was probably taken from a programmatic pamphlet the chairman, Schmalz, published in March 1951 under the title *Legion und Staat*. It is important to quote a lengthy section from this brochure, since it epitomises anti-Western political thought in 1950s West Germany, including more than a pinch of anti-Americanism.

The state has to pursue the unity of the people. Therefore it can never accept the theft of historically established German soil in the East and West of our Fatherland. The German state and the German people became the *Mittelvolk* of Europe under certain historical circumstances. This *Mittelvolk* is permanently threatened from all directions, unlike the hitherto impregnable Anglo-Saxon nations. It is therefore impossible simply to implant political systems into Germany that are tried and tested with the English and the Americans. ... The nineteenth century was dominated by two systems of thought that proved to be illusions: Liberalism and Marxism. Liberalism is based on the idea of the innate good of human nature and the resulting demand for absolute freedom. For Liberal thought, Man at his birth is like a blank sheet of paper. It [Liberalism] ignores that Man at his birth already carries the legacy of many generations, good and bad. It considers Man an unhistorical being, takes him out of history, tribe, and people, his profession and his time. The Man of Liberalism is unreal. All of Liberalism's attempts to achieve world-wide happiness [*Weltbeglückungspläne des Liberalismus*] failed. Liberalism remained just the *Weltanschauung* of a certain bourgeois stratum [of society]. The Capitalist economic system is built upon it. ... In contrast to all 'reactionary' ideologies, since they are basically of the past, [i.e.] Liberalism, Socialism, and Bolshevism, the *Erste Legion* pledges to the strong state that is able to achieve the common good against group interests. ... Liberal Democracy belongs to the past. Its basic assumption of the individual, bound only by very few laws like the penal law code but otherwise totally free, has been falsified by the social reality. ... Democracy of Liberal distinction must therefore be replaced by a Democracy that accepts the general and fundamental moral law and the history of [this] people, the obligations of the citizen towards the totality of the people, the social obligation of all property, and the deep rooting of our national Self in occidental culture. ... Today's political parties have lost their lively connection to the people, the only legitimisation of their claim to represent the people. They [the parties] have disintegrated into interest groups, since they lack any ideas really linked to the present. ... There is a threat that the fate of German Democracy in the year 1933 might be repeated.[69]

These sections are obviously an attack on the existing West German political system, supposedly forced on them by the British and US military government. The *Legion* bemoaned the loss of German territory in

the East. In addition, it even laid a revanchist claim to lost territories in the *West*, which makes it extraordinarily reactionary in its interpretation of post-war history. One prominent *Legion* member, Dedekind, claimed that this pamphlet was 'the work of one individual', Erich Schmalz, and as such just a basis for discussion.[70] Since the tone of future *Legion* publications, however, did not significantly alter, and since Schmalz was always quoted as the leader of the *Legion*, Dedekind's assertion does not seem to carry too much weight.

Yet the *Legion* even got involved in the day-to-day struggle for 'national reawakening' through attacks on the occupation powers. In late 1950 or early 1951, the grouping released another pamphlet:

> Germany – torn into two parts, threatened in its security and freedom from the East, internally undermined by Communism and the corrosive spirit of Marxism and Nihilism, led by a formal parliamentarism that does not have the trust of the people, interrupted in its social structure by class war, interspersed by interest groups and their egoistic representatives, its bureaucracy corroded by corruption – calls for men who will offer themselves selflessly to the duty of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Therefore, the men of the First Legion have come together in order to give the people a new sense of security by a determined fight against all sedition [*Wühlarbeit*], to renew the spiritual and moral standing according to eternally valid laws … and to strengthen the state within the borders of the law drawn by God.[71]

The anti-communist implications of this pamphlet are clear, but so are the attacks on parliamentary democracy and American-style capitalism and neo-corporatism. 'Formal parliamentarism' and 'interest groups' were equally responsible for the supposedly sorry state of the divided Germany as communism and Marxism were. The accusation of 'nihilism' has traditionally been made by the conservative and reactionary German Right against both Marxism and the West.[72] The fact that this pamphlet was brought to the attention of Adenauer's infamous right-hand man Hans Globke must be seen as another indication that the Adenauer administration at least knowingly tolerated an anti-democratic and politically elitist movement within its own ranks.

In August 1951, the *Legion* publication *Der Deutsche* carried a scathing article on the decison of the US *Landeskommissar* for Bavaria, Shuster and the Bavarian Council of Ministers to keep Hitler's tea-house on his Alpine retreat, the *Obersalzberg*, closed to the public. Shuster and the Council of

Ministers want to avoid creating a place of pilgrimage for Hitler in the Bavarian Alps. *Der Deutsche* commented:

> Stories of a Tea-House … The Bavarian ministry would deserve the gratitude of all good democrats of they installed a special taskforce [*Sonderkommission*] for the dismantling [*Demontage*] of the *Obersalzberg*. We would instantly like to make a few practical suggestions for the task-force: One should blow the *Obersalzberg* up with a nuclear bomb from America or from Russia! … Is there a threat of a new *Kyffhäuser* legend, this time at the *Obersalzberg*?[73]

This piece contained elements of the peculiar form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* outlined in chapter 2: the dismantling of industry, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and an attack on supposedly Americanised 'good democrats'. The crimes of Hitler and Nazi Germany are intrinsically linked to the alleged crimes of the Allies after the war, and German nationalism is thus normalised through comparison.

The outlook of the *Legion* on democracy is deeply indebted to the German political theorist Carl Schmitt, who had been opposed to parliamentary democracy during both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. In another issue of the *Legion* publication *Der Deutsche* attempted to resurrect Schmittian thinking after the war:

> Machiavelli's first clause is based on differentiating friend from foe. The importance of this differentiation was again explained in our day by Carl Schmitt; an achievement that on its own should be sufficient to protect him against the attacks from a section of the so-called Christian journalism [*Publizistik*], attacks that are a regrettable symptom of the leading role of [certain] 'characters' in our intellectual life. The differentiation between friend and foe has the same meaning for politics as the one between good and bad in morality and the one between true or false in science. … The Friend/Foe Theory is not at all an evil invention. The fool says in his heart: there is no God. So says our Christian Bible. The fool says in his heart: there is no foe. So says our political primer [*politische Fibel*]. The number of fools is infinite; it ranges from famous teachers of the law of nations, who assume [the existence of] general friendship and simply overlook the existence of foes, to the modern ideologues, who want to rescue Europe with the help of the right of participation for trade unions [*Mitbestimmungsrecht der Gewerkschaften*] instead of tanks. The best and most just social order does not protect us from our foe; it only makes us all the more desirable as potential booty.[74]

It is necessary to outline Schmitt's interpretation of democracy and liberalism in order to analyse fully the tradition of anti-liberal thought which forms the foundation for the *Erste Legion*'s worldview presented above. Schmitt's influence on the FRG's political Right is particularly important, since, although academically a pariah after his support for Hitler in 1933, he continued to publish and exert an influence after 1945. I shall thus first summarise Schmitt's fundamental legal and political belief, as formulated predominantly in the Weimar period, before linking him and his post-1945 utterances to the contemporary anti-democratic discourse. It is necessary to outline Schmitt's ideology before 1945, since he not only laid the parameters of his belief system during the Weimar era, but also the foundations for his fame that enabled him to influence West German thought after 1945 in spite of his exclusion from the post-war academic system.

3.1.2   Anti-liberal thought: Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Republic

Carl Schmitt, like many of his contemporary Weimar Republican left- and right-wing political thinkers, attempted to come to terms with what he saw as the devastating influence of the Enlightenment on Occidental society. In his intellectual concept, the legacy of the Enlightenment is a legacy of individualisation. Post-Enlightenment socio-political organisation was based on the supremacy of the economic over the political, and thus on the supremacy of the private good over the common good. The organisational legacy was a governmental system of parliamentary democracy. These legacies, according to Schmitt, were already predominant in Wilhelmine Germany. *Ergo* the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* under Bismarck was a consequence of the supremacy of the private good, Bismarck's attempt to gain control and parliamentary support in a Prussian-dominated Protestant parliament, over the common good, religious freedom. Schmitt was a predominantly Catholic thinker. The *Kulturkampf* was formative in his intellectual concept, since it alienated his religion from the state. Wilhelmine Germany had universal male suffrage, and although the *Reichstag*'s influence was rather limited, Schmitt related the Wilhelmine system to mass democracy and liberal parliamentarism. His profound anti-liberalism is therefore based on his religious peer group's first encounter with a, however limited, form of liberal mass democracy.

According to Schmitt, any political system will find itself in states of emergency. Whether by revolution, natural catastrophe or war, emergency legislation will be required, if only to subordinate the individual to the army or civil defence. In this exceptional situation, according to

Schmitt, authorities might have to suspend valid law. They also have to realise who is their friend and who is their foe, according to Schmitt's famous friend/foe dichotomy so evocatively summarised by the *Erste Legion* in section 3.1.1. The ability to do so is the true sign of power and sovereignty: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.[75] … If the individual states no longer have the power to declare the exception … then they no longer enjoy the status of states.'[76] In spite of the occurrence of the exception in any state, he argued, the Enlightenment was not willing to accept the need for the exception in legal terms, since it seemed to be based on the legacy of pre-Enlightened decision-making processes behind closed doors. Enlightenment rationalism believed that the will of the people, achieved through open debate, would always be synonymous with the common good. Thus the legal exception was an obsolete concept: 'The rationalism of the Enlightenment rejected the exception in every form.'[77]

Schmitt attempted to link this legal-philosophical development to the predominant theological developments of the Enlightenment period. In his view, the constitutional state is to the absolutist state what deism is to the theistic tradition. Deism is the idea of God as the first mover, the mechanical God that has created the world and given it a constitution or set of rules, but has since retreated from direct involvement. Theism is the theological tradition prior to the deistic one, portraying a personalised God directly involved in Old Testament fashion, punishing and rewarding directly and sometimes arbitrarily. Schmitt interpreted deism as 'a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world. … The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.'[78] In this Schmittian analogy, absolutism recognises the necessity of the exception just as the theistic God recognises the necessity of direct intervention in the form of miracles and punishments. Both concepts are based on the assumption that human beings have an innate possibility to be evil.

Enlightened liberalism and deism, on the other hand, present different assumptions: since both the Enlightenment God and the Enlightenment state have created the world, or respectively the state, in a just and good fashion, the given infrastructure should ensure that human beings can identify with the common good. Therefore miracles and the exception in legal terms would be directed against the infrastructure and thus ensure the opposite of its intention: injustice and the violation of inalienable constitutional rights.

On this first level of criticism, Schmitt attacked the factual misconceptions of Enlightened liberalism. Schmitt, seeing himself as a Hobbesian,

argues that the Enlightened liberal search for truth cannot replace the need for authority. Quoting from the *Leviathan*, he states 'autoritas, non veritas facit legem'.[79] Force is therefore, in the Schmittian universe, stronger than truth, and the Enlightened liberal is wrong, since 'every rational interpretation falsifies the immediacy of life'.[80]

The second level of Schmittian criticism was concerned with contradictions within the liberal concept itself, and, more importantly for Schmitt, liberalism's claim to be synonymous with democracy. He argued that even Enlightened liberalism is based on dictatorial methods, since the Enlightenment sees the need for political education. Political education is a means to create Enlightened citizens, who themselves are a prerequisite for liberal democracy. Without political education, liberal democracy could not come into existence, because the search for the common good needs involvement and open debate. The general will of a political entity can only be created on the basis of general involvement, which requires general understanding of the problem in question and of the procedures of liberal democracies. But this necessity for political education poses an intermediate threat to democracy. 'The consequence … is a dictatorship that suspends democracy in the name of true democracy that is still to be created.'[81]

In that respect, Schmitt proposed, liberal democracy does not differ from other ideologies like Marxism that claim to use dictatorial measures like propaganda and indoctrination to create true justice and democracy. Schmitt had thus created the ground for later criticism of liberal democracy by the German New Left of the 1960s and 1970s. The German political philosopher Jürgen Habermas comes close to Schmitt when he argues that the Enlightenment destroyed itself by transforming its ideology of openness into a new orthodoxy which in itself became a means of structural exclusion.[82] Yet unlike the German New Left, Schmitt analysed these dictatorial measurements as a contradiction within the liberal democratic system, but not as a contradiction to democracy. Theoretically, this does not destroy democracy, but it is important to pay attention to it because it shows that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy.[83]

His definition of democracy is obviously broader than the liberal democratic definition. For Schmitt, democracy has no self-explanatory values, whereas the liberal democrat combines certain allegedly innate values with democracy. Schmitt states that 'A democracy can be militarist or pacifist, absolutist or liberal, centralised or decentralised, progressive or reactionary, and again different at different times without ceasing to be a democracy'.[84] Democracy is based on the 'recognition of the identity'[85]

of government and subjects, of state and law. In a Rousseauian move, Schmitt claims that this identity defines a democracy, since in a democracy the minority will is identical with the majority will, if the identity mentioned above is recognised. In that case, democracy does not have to be progressive or liberal by definition, but simply has to express the will of the people.

> In social democracy, it [democracy] joined with socialism. The success of Napoleon III and the result of Swiss referenda demonstrate that it could actually be conservative and reactionary. … If all political tendencies could make use of democracy, then this proved that it had no political content and was only an organisational form.[86]

Since the attempt now is to establish that Schmitt most certainly considered himself a democrat, yet has suspicions about liberalism, his interpretation of democracy and liberalism has to be outlined. So far, Schmitt had merely argued that liberalism is just another ideology claiming to be democratic, yet using dictatorial means to achieve true democracy, or rather what liberals conceive as true democracy. This analysis is not anti-liberal as such, but simply relativist. Liberalism is one concept of democracy that, like other concepts, has certain faults.

In his detailed analysis of modern mass parliamentarism, though, Schmitt actually does become anti-liberal. Although this might be more a result of Schmitt's involvement in Weimar Germany's politics than the result of theoretical analysis, these anti-liberal resentments have to be mentioned, because Schmitt subsequently assumed congruence between liberal democratic ideology and the Enlightenment. Schmitt's main problem with liberal parliamentarism was its relation to mass democracy. In that combination, he argues, the problem of invisibility occurs, since mass parliamentarism requires complex organisational structures, and for ideological reasons, the elected parliamentarian is not directly responsible to his (or her) electorate or constituency. Liberal democracy is opposed to imperative mandates, because the parliamentarians' conscience is the highest instance in the decision-making process. This results in a lack of direct control that consequently leads to the alienation of the electorate.

Secondly, the problem of invisibility occurs in legislative-executive relationships. The government always depends on parliament to sanction government decisions. Therefore, a complex network of relating committees and other bodies has to be introduced. In spite of the principle of openness in terms of decision-making, decisions are made behind

closed doors, and interest groups can impose their influence in this re-created twilight of hidden policy.

> As things are, it is of course practically impossible not to work with committees, and increasingly smaller committees; in this way the parliamentary plenum gradually drifts away from its purpose (that is, from its public), and as a result it necessarily becomes a mere façade.[87]

Invisibility, according to Schmitt, is thus an innate problem of liberal parliamentarism combined with mass democracy. This, however, does corrupt the fundamental justification for the liberal governmental system. Openness in order to define the truth is based on the parliamentary plenum. Once the plenum is a 'mere façade', the liberal parliamentary system has made itself obsolete:

> If in the actual circumstances of parliamentary business, openness and discussion have become an empty and trivial formality, the parliament as it developed in the nineteenth century has also lost its precious foundation and its meaning.[88]

Modern mass democracy is thus in effect not much better than absolutism, the governmental system that was supposed to be opposed by the liberal system for its principle of behind-closed-doors decision-making and its lack of openness. Schmitt, who was not only a political theorist, but also the constitutional adviser to the Brüning/Hindenburg government of the last years of the Weimar Republic, consistently argued for presidential emergency legislation in order to overrule *Reichstag* decisions, or lack of decisions, on governmental proposals. In order to substantiate his theoretical arguments for this style of government, he created a system in which he established congruence between the Enlightenment and liberal parliamentarism.

Using the case of the USA, Schmitt in 1932 outlined in detail his critique of liberal democracy. He argued that especially the USA had placed the thrust for power and hegemony over true internationalism.[89] Schmitt was not upset about this, since he was a believer in power and force over ideology, but he seemed glad and almost smug about this opportunity to describe the methods of American 'modern imperialism'. The first method of modern imperialism was to persuade the world of an outdated nineteenth-century antithetical relationship between politics and the economic sphere.[90] In doing so, the USA succeeded in arguing that economic protectionism was not political, and thus not imperialist in

the initial meaning of the word. The second method was to turn the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, originally a doctrine to prevent US interference in Europe and European interference in both Americas, into its opposite: 'the word-wide influence, including all of mankind, of the United States upon other powers'.[91] By not joining the League of Nations after the First World War, Schmitt argued, the USA stayed officially outside Europe. However, by allowing countries like Cuba and Panama to join, the USA managed to influence the League of Nations indirectly: it had official contracts to intervene in the decision-making process of many American countries like Cuba and Panama in exchange for military protection.[92] The Monroe Doctrine had thus enabled the USA to intervene in Europe quite strongly through its satellites, while Europe still had no say in American affairs.

Schmitt admitted he was quite impressed by the sheer power and domination that allowed the USA to conduct its world-wide influence:

> I want to warn against the opinion that this is an inferior type of cunning and Machiavellianism. Such an elasticity, such an ability to operate with a broad and open terminology [i.e. the reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine] in order to force the peoples of the earth to accept [the terminology] is a phenomenon of world-historical status.[93]

Nevertheless, Schmitt was worried – not about the implications that the American conduct might have on the ideology of liberal democracy, however, but on Germany lacking the power to respond to that challenge:

> We Germans are admittedly captured in a sad political impotence, not only in the world, but also in Europe. As a German talking about American imperialism, I can only get the impression that I am talking like a beggar in rags about the wealth and treasures of a stranger. … This type of imperialism – I do not talk specifically about American [imperialism] – is even more dangerous than military or economic oppression for a country like Germany that is on the defence. A country is only defeated when it succumbs to a foreign vocabulary and a foreign understanding of law, especially international law. … We do not want to succumb to any type of imperialism, neither the American type … nor an even more dangerous, since closer, type. We do not want to surrender, either legally or morally or intellectually.[94]

3.1.3   Anti-liberal thought: Carl Schmitt and his followers in the FRG

By 1945, Schmitt was in a rather awkward position, personally and intellectually. Personally, his reputation was tainted by his initial support for Hitler and the Nazi *Machtergreifung*.[95] Intellectually, he had to reconsider his position. According to Jan-Werner Müller,

> Schmitt had declared the death of the Leviathan, i.e. the end of modern European statehood at the hands of organized interest groups, and resigned himself to the failure of its replacement through a *Reich* as the new form of political unity.[96]

Whereas Schmitt would from now on still maintain his analysis of the modern welfare state, 'bristling as it was with resentment against Jews, returned émigrés and other harbingers of the secular modernity he thought lay behind the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and his own personal fate',[97] he could no longer offer the solution of the *Reich*. Nor could he still properly defend his idea of a dictatorship defending democracy after the excesses of the Nazi dictatorship.

Schmitt's biographer Paul Noack summarised that Schmitt was mainly known to insiders ('*Er war und blieb ein 'Geheimtip*') after 1945, chiefly because he remained unrepentant in relation to his (early) involvement with National Socialism.[98] Following his initial arrest by Soviet troops and his rather surprising release after just a few hours in captivity, and subsequent stints of imprisonments by the Americans,[99] Schmitt eventually withdrew from Berlin to Plettenberg in the rural and remote Sauerland region, and experienced economic hardship in the post-war years. He even had to sell the larger part of his extensive library in order to make ends meet.[100] The Swiss conservative Armin Mohler was one of the first people to visit him in 1948.[101] Nevertheless, for most of the 1950s, Schmittian thought was debated almost entirely 'in a rather secretive network of "circles" and private "academies"'.[102] These defined themselves against the perceived intellectual climate of liberal democracy. During the 1960s, they became more open about their intellectual project.[103] The philosopher Hermann Lübbe recalled that Schmitt appeared for the first time in the *Collegium Philosophicum* at the University of Münster, organised by Joachim Ritter, in 1958.[104]

In spite of Schmitt's almost clandestine existence in Plettenberg, however, important publications soon gave him the chance to voice his opinions. The influential journal *Christ und Welt* gave him space as early as 1949 (see below), although Schmitt initially preferred to be published anonymously.[105] In 1950, the national daily *Frankfurter*

Allgemeine Zeitung gave him some column inches, as did the journal *Merkur* in 1952, and two years later even the liberal Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit*.[106] Dirk Moses even goes as far as claiming, in a summary of recent research into Schmitt's influence after 1945, that Schmitt 'ran a de facto chair of legal philosophy from his home insofar as he conducted an extensive correspondence, received important figures, and appeared at special symposia'.[107]

Schmitt's solution to his intellectual dilemma, i.e. the need to reconcile the death of the *Reich* and the end of the possibility of a benevolent dictatorship after Hitler, was to sidestep into the world of classical philosophy. In 1949, Schmitt argued for a genuine and comprehensive amnesty in order to conclude the de-Nazification process.[108] He used the example of Odysseus returning home after years of wandering and exile in order to explain the significance of an amnesty: 'An amnesty in its true and grand meaning is about ending a civil war.'[109] Odysseus was bent on revenge against those who had profited from his absence, Schmitt explains, and thus showed no mercy. Zeus had to intervene and bind both sides of the conflict by oath to end the bloodshed. That, Schmitt claimed, was the very first amnesty, although the word had not been used. In a civil war, 'the victor uses legality like loot. He takes revenge in the name of the law.' Without mentioning the Allies, Schmitt argues that de-Nazification is about that, taking revenge. He, however, considers the Second World War as a civil war and thus demands, in accordance with the demands of many Germans, an amnesty to conclude the war once and for all.

Even Schmitt felt he had to conceal his anti-liberal beliefs in the postwar era. Not only his academic followers, but also he himself had to be secretive about his real ideas. Only very subtly would he attack the Allies:

> The continuation of the old answers [to the questions posed by history] becomes ahistorical. It is thus only too inevitable that the victor of the epoch gone by should be most likely to miss the new call of history. How should the victor understand that his victory as well can only be true once? And who would be allowed to lecture him about that?[110]

Schmitt thus insinuates that the victory of liberal democracy in 1945 was singular. He reiterates the belief that it is power, not ideology, which defines history. Liberal democracy is thus not an eternal truth, but rather a fluid power structure to be replaced once it is historically outdated (an assessment underlined by the fact that Schmitt did not define 'East' and 'West' by ideology, but by geography and geopolitics, in which 'East' was

defined by its land masses and 'West' by the oceans).[111] Nevertheless, Schmitt claimed in 1955, religious and civil wars lead to the legal, moral and ideological condemnation of the enemy, and thus to an absolutism of the victor's legal framework, resulting in the criminalisation of the opponent who is not seen as a human being, but merely a pest.[112] Since we already know that Schmitt considered the Second World War as a civil war, this is an obvious indictment of the Allies' attempts to punish war criminals and to de-Nazify Germany. Schmitt accuses them of being guided by ideology rather than the recognition of their own limits.

In his 1952 interpretation of the burgeoning Cold War, Schmitt indirectly outlined why he was so opposed to ideologies. Although the USA certainly tried to present itself as an *ideological* power, basing its actions on values like democracy and justice, Schmitt saw things differently: 'Over the course of thirty years, during one human generation, the richest country on earth, holding the most powerful war potential on earth, has switched from pluralism to unity [*Einheit*].'[113] This unity, however, was the 'unity of the world' ('*die Einheit der Welt*'), thus the alleged desire for US world domination to replace the duopolous conflict with the Soviet Union, held by the 'governing strata' ('*die herrschenden Schichten*') of the USA.[114] A unity of the world, however,

> would mean that the survivor of today's world duopoly would be the only ruler of the world tomorrow. The victor would realise the unity of the world, [but] obviously according to *his* viewpoint and his ideas. *His* elites would exemplify the new type of man. They would plan and organise according to *their* political, economic, and moral ideas and aims.[115]

These ideas, Schmitt claimed, were based on a simplistic philosophy of history, the simple continuation of the nineteenth-century belief in progress.[116] Besides the anti-American cliché of 'American' intellectual simplicity, Schmitt here reiterates his disbelief in all ideologies. Although the (alleged) American will for world domination is based on ideology, Schmitt outlined, the outcome would just be a further example of power politics, in which the loser of the conflict (as Germany had before) would be subjected to the will of the victors without any choice. Democracy, international co-operation and justice are thus a veil to disguise the face of power and the will for domination.

Schmitt's dislike of ideologies was later directed against the 'tyranny of values' which the FRG had allegedly succumbed to.[117] He worried that this 'tyranny' could easily nominate any value, be it the *Sozialstaat*

(a state based on social values), the *Rechtsstaat* (a state based on the rule of law) or the classless society, as the highest value and thus force other values into submission, if not into extinction.[118]

> The science of value [*Wertlehre*] will make it difficult to prevent the fact that the execution of the higher value will not only bring with it the removal of the lower value and the destruction of the un-value [*Unwert*], but [will] also sanctify that [the removal or destruction of other values].[119]

The Basic Law (the FRG's constitution) had already entered that dangerous territory, Schmitt claimed by referring to the constitutional expert Ernst Forsthoff, by enshrining social rights. In place of liberal fundamental rights, he argued, 'value judgements of a "social" nature' had entered the Basic Law, thus transforming the constitution from a clear and calculable set of meanings into a 'flowing development of meaning' ('*fließende Geltungsfortbildung*').[120] Thus, he argued elsewhere – and certainly in reference to his pariah status in Western Germany, where he never again was awarded a professorship after his involvement with the Nazi government – it was possible to prevent certain books from being published in the name of 'values'. In a clever rhetorical move, Schmitt even likened the censorship of right-wing thought in the FRG with the Nazi policy of 'euthanasia', which had been seen as a positive 'value' by well-meaning people in the Weimar Republic before it was enacted under the Nazis:

> Then, in 1920, it was possible to demand the destruction of unworthy [*lebensunwert*] life with humane and well-meaning intentions. How much more harmless and less dangerous can it seem today to suppress the publication of un-publication-worthy writings and the expression of un-expression-worthy opinions, [and] to already stop at the print shop the printing of un-print-worthy books and essays …[121]

Schmitt thus claims that ideology is nothing but power in disguise; whoever has the power to define values and, more importantly, to rank their importance, controls that society as much as dictators could by the pure execution of their power. Ideology and values are thus as dictatorial as 'real' dictatorships are, but they claim at the same time to be morally superior. Whereas in political systems without such an emphasis on values, however, the opposition still had a chance if it was strong enough, modern liberal democracies had eliminated opposition, and thus the friend/foe structure of politics, through semantics. Schmitt's

anti-ideological stance becomes even clearer when he praises the analytical value of fables: 'Political situations and the behaviour of man can be decoded by transferring them on to the animal, since this is a way to rid them of their ideological veil.'[122] Schmitt had therefore not changed his fundamental beliefs even ten years after the war. Ideologies, including liberal democracy, were in his opinion mere tools to conceal power structures. One can see why both Social Darwinist right-wingers and the New Left eventually rediscovered Carl Schmitt as a political analyst.

Throughout the 1950s, the radical Right of the Federal Republic drew heavily on Schmittian thought. The journal *Nation Europa*[123] constantly questioned the value of liberal democracy along Schmittian lines. In a leading article for the journal in 1951, Heinrich Zillich argued that liberal democracy was an empty concept, to be filled with meaning by whoever was in power:

> Who does remember what democracy and parliamentarism are? By themselves … they mean nothing. They only gain value through the spirit that fills them. They have to help justifying terror, mass murders, expulsions [*Menschenverjagung*], uncountable violations of the law – they even help disguising those from the people who benefited from [military] defeat. Injustice could rank unstoppably [*geil wuchern*] because [our] organically grown law and eternal values were violated. We live in a hell of hypocrisy.[124]

A year later in the same journal, Richard Hondorf was even more overt in his condemnation of democracy, using the classic Schmittian defence of the necessity of dictatorship in certain circumstances.

> Often, one confuses despotism with dictatorship, [the latter] originating in the Roman understanding of the state, the lawfully transmitted leadership of a state in order to rid it of an emergency. … The Prussian and the Austrian history know many examples of highly developed judicial security under enlightened monarchs. And the deprivations of rights for the opposition under Fascist and National Socialist dictatorship are surpassed in many respects by the deprivation of rights for National Socialists in the victorious democracy after 1945.[125]

By trying to give dictatorship a more positive face by comparing it with ancient Rome, Hondorf achieves a scathing attack on the FRG. While admitting that the opposition under Hitler had been deprived of their rights (what an understatement), he makes the present out to be rather worse.

Ernst von Salomon[126] was once again the most prominent figure to prove in the early 1950s how deeply indebted the anti-liberal right-wing fringe of the FRG was to Schmitt. His *Fragebogen* contained a number of reflections on democracy. Most poignantly, von Salomon accepted the Schmittian verdict that democracy and liberalism are not necessarily inseparable. In his interpretation of the *Third Reich*, he attributed democratic validity even to Hitler:

> I have used the term 'Democracy' rarely and without pleasure. I do not know what it is, and I have never met anybody who could explain it to me conclusively. I fear, however, that Hitler's claim that his ideological concept was a concept of democracy would be very difficult to refute.[127]

Von Salomon was, according to his own account, by no means a supporter of the Nazi regime. Hitler's anti-Semitism disgusted him, especially since his wife or partner herself was 'Jewish' by descent in the eyes of the Nazis, and he considered many Nazis too primitive. In retrospect, he even considered Hitler's involvement in the 1923 attempted *coup d'état* as the main obstacle to success:

> The first grand and earnest attempt of the national movement to change the German situation through the state failed due to the existence of this man Hitler. It did not fail because of any resistance from the official powers of the Weimar system, not at all, under no circumstances, not one indication for that. It failed because General von Seeckt, a representative of true statesmanship, preferred the *Reich* to be in the weakly hands of a surrogate state [*Scheinstaat*], the *ersatz* state of parliamentary parties and bureaucracy, rather than handing it [the *Reich*] over to the dark powers that came from within a people in turmoil and reached for government.[128]

Although initially distinguishing between that *Scheinstaat* of liberal democracy and the Nazi movement, von Salomon regarded the Nazi movement, and especially the phenomenon of Hitler, as the final expression of the age of rationality, i.e. the Enlightenment.

> I did not understand him [Hitler], neither his character nor his teaching. I did not simply consider them wrong, I did not understand what he wanted. What I understood about his speeches, his methods, and

his thoughts, I could only grasp by comparison with other methods and thoughts … . They were – although extremely coarsened – the methods and thoughts of liberal democracy, [a theory that] was equally as alien to me. I was able to grasp the phenomenon of this man and his movement only in relation to the history of thought. Then he was the last trough of the age of *ratio* that began with a bold reach for the stars, the emancipation of Man from God, and ended as 'one of the most rudimentary, primitive, and infantile intellectual periods of mankind', 'accompanied by the quiet laughter of the Orient that – like a thin and mocking hidden voice – went along with our progress', as Egon Friedell wrote. To me, Bolshevism seemed indeed to be the legitimate heir, unless we would manage to come back to a constructive understanding of the state after the shameless and violent destruction of all organic powers through the ideological meaninglessness of bourgeois-liberal and social democratic conjuring tricks. And then an even later deconstructive period [than Bolshevism] would be developed called the National Socialist movement.[129]

Here, von Salomon goes even further than Schmitt, who, after all, did consider himself a democrat, although not of bourgeois liberal denomination. Von Salomon denounces democracy as such as a weak outcome of Enlightenment thought. For him democracy is equated with misery, for example when he described life in Allied internment camps as 'the type of forced democracy of equal misery',[130] In a further reflection on his life, it becomes clear what he would like to see in democracy's place – a strong and powerful German nation, untainted by Hitler's rule, a nation so powerful that even when led astray by the Nazis, the whole world had to fight it in order to defeat it:

My real tragedy was that I never found the real collective. I searched for it in the nation, in the very nation that is now doomed to destruction [*welche jetzt ihrem Ende entgegendämmert*], and what a nation! – one that was so strong that, in spite of her falsified claim and her falsified concept, the whole world had to go against her in order to break her force.[131]

In von Salomon's opinion, the Enlightenment with its emphasis on constitutionality and reason had replaced the pre-modern definition of power and state as an organic structure within the framework of Natural Law theory. From here it is only a very short step to the pre-eminent anti-democratic thinker and theorist of the FRG, Arnold Gehlen.

Gehlen, an anthropological sociologist, regarded progress and industry as fundamental to his concept of man, since he considered human beings to be incomplete animals unable to survive in a state of nature due to a lack of fur and claws and other natural means of survival and self-defence. He was as anti-liberal as Schmitt and von Salomon, but his anthropological analysis of human beings, which was central to his concept of societal organisation, brought him closer to Social Darwinism than Schmitt ever was. Although Schmitt acknowledged the existence of force and violence, he attempted to create control mechanisms. Gehlen simply embraced a 'survival of the fittest' ideology as a viable and value-neutral option of societal organisation.

He was born in Leipzig in 1904. After studying philosophy in Cologne and Leipzig, he became professor of philosophy in Leipzig in 1934. In 1938, he was invited to Königsberg, and in 1940 to Vienna. At both universities, he was also head of the respective Institutes of Psychology for a few terms. In 1947, after being severely wounded when serving as an officer during the war, he became professor of sociology and psychology at the newly founded University of Administration (*Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften*) in Speyer. From 1962 until his retirement in 1969, he was professor of sociology at the Technical University in Aachen. Gehlen died in Hamburg in 1976.[132]

Gehlen's 1967 treatise *Moral und Hypermoral* argues that Enlightenment and liberalism established an orthodox ethos of humanism that is contrary to nature and could prove destructive to human society. Gehlen proposes in its place 'an ethical pluralism, i.e. [recognition of the fact] that there are several functionally and genetically independent and ultimate social-regulative instances in human beings'.[133] Later, he argued that the humanist idea of human beings as essentially good and caring is false. This might be part of human nature, but not its essence. Gehlen, an expert on the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, attempted to combine his theory of the incompleteness of human beings with the Hobbesian idea of innate insecurity and fear. Self-preservation is essential, and the use of force and violence on behalf of the state is justified to defend society and state. Robespierre's interpretation of terror as an outcome of virtue is thus seen as a 'little illuminating flash' in the midst of allegedly self-destructive Enlightenment humanism.[134] These virtues of self-defence had been forgotten in the twentieth century due to Enlightenment philosophy: 'Our century fulfilled the Enlightenment dream: Morality, namely that of humanist ethical prosperity, celebrating a tremendous victory; and virtue [is] in fundamental decline.'[135] Enlightenment thought, Gehlen argued, ignored the innate and thus natural

possibility of evil within human beings. Since in Enlightened humanism the common good is rationally deducible, and since all human beings are rational, anything contrary to the common good is a relict from previous, un-Enlightened and anti-rational forms of social organisation. This belief, which Gehlen attributed to both Enlightenment and humanism, led to a lack of social responsibility. In Gehlen's view, social responsibility has to include the at times drastic and even violent exercise of power to protect human beings from their nature. As a predominantly Hobbesian thinker, he shared Hobbes' fear of anarchy, because he considered human nature weak and timid. According to Hobbes, without autocratic rule there cannot be peace in human society, there can only be 'continuall feare, and the danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short'.[136]

The Enlightenment, Gehlen stated, generalised the previously private virtue of morality to replace the public virtue of responsibility. The private ideal of harmony is thus given undue status within the public sphere, whereas a willingness to take responsibility and make controversial, unpopular decisions would be far more required: 'Since humanity sees nothing grander than itself, it must permanently embrace itself.'[137] According to Gehlen, the Enlightenment, after abandoning responsibility, left modern society without any binding elements. It led modernity to believe that societal organisation without confrontation or the threat or execution of violence was a possibility. The organisational form of *Gemeinschaft*, based on tradition, racial purity and authority, lost its fundamental justification, since Enlightenment rationality could not accept those three elements as rational binding elements for society. Yet since the Enlightenment could not replace tradition and authority with functioning rational concepts to organise human coexistence, the outcome of the victory of the Enlightenment ideal was not the common good, but egotism or lack of orientation. The ideology of individualism, according to Gehlen a destructive, not a liberating concept, negates the self-defensive strength of *Gemeinschaft.* Unlike Adam Smith, Gehlen did not believe that self-interested individuals will, through peaceful negotiation, achieve the common good. He was closer to the Hobbesian concept of human nature, arguing for the need to restrain individual interests. If individualism, with its innate lack of responsibility, were not restrained, Gehlen predicted apocalyptic consequences, since modernity produced nothing but emptiness and a lack of real values: 'After ridding itself from all binding elements, the individual destroys itself through laziness, suicide, vice, or psychology.'[138] One can only presume that here Gehlen was referring to psychoanalysis (rather than psychology) as

the highest form of self-indulgence and the attempt to explain failure as society's rather than the individual's fault. This in itself has to be seen as an anti-American (and anti-Semitic) cliché since even at the time of writing, in 1967, psychoanalysis had become the epitome of New York Jewish self-indulgence, later to be simultaneously celebrated and ridiculed in the movies of Woody Allen and the novels of Philip Roth and Erica Jong. Two years before the publication of Gehlen's treatise, the nationalist historian Caspar Schrenck-Notzing had called the post-war era the 'psychological era' in which psychology had become the 'exemplary academic discipline'.[139] 'Psychoanalysis was invented [*konzipiert*] in Vienna, clinically tested in Zurich; in the United States, it established itself in the hearts and minds of millions.'[140] Ten years before *Moral und Hypermoral*, Gehlen had already linked the Enlightenment with the precondition for psychoanalysis, i.e. the 'excessive ability to talk to other people':

> Her [the Enlightenment's] heyday comes to an end, the epoch she instigated seems over, but she has left deep and unconscious traces within ourselves. The modern soul's excessive ability to talk to other people [*die exzessive Mitteilungsfähigkeit*] is a product of Enlightenment culture, impossible in the sixteenth century.[141]

Enlightenment, psychoanalysis and modernity are thus inextricably linked in the thinking of Gehlen. They are perceived as mis-developments, and the epitome of those perceived mis-developments is to be found in modernity as defined by the USA.

Although the godfather of German anti-Enlightenment thought, Carl Schmitt, was effectively sidelined in the intellectual life of the FRG, many of his followers were active and vocal. The *Erste Legion* had excellent contacts with mainstream political parties, if not the Adenauer administration, von Salomon was widely read and discussed,[142] and Gehlen held important positions within post-war academia. Many extracts of Schmittian anti-liberal thought were widely discussed in the newspapers and magazines of post-war Germany. Although the FRG did not deviate from the path of democratisation, it had a strong and vocal undercurrent of anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary thought.

3.2 The reaction against the alleged economic Americanisation

The industrial and economic 'Americanisation' of West Germany in the 1950s deserves special attention. Even before the foundation of the

FRG, liberal politicians like the future Economics Minister (and later Chancellor) Ludwig Erhard had worked towards the establishment of a modern economic system, later known as 'social market economy' or 'Rheinish capitalism'. Social market economy tried to combine a high level of economic freedom and flexibility with a sound social security net. The gradual strengthening of that social safety net throughout the 1950s was partially in contrast to the more liberal and less protective system of American capitalism, and thus at times allowed West Germans to distinguish themselves from the USA. However, the USA still had a very significant impact on the creation of the social market economy.

Although the indirect cultural influence of American production methods on Germany goes back to the Paris World Exhibition in 1900,[143] it was only after 1945 that the USA had a direct and formative influence in Western Germany.[144] This very visible involvement generated a form of anti-Americanism with very distinctive features. A generational gap between the anti-Americanism of the older and the 'Americanisation' of the younger generation became obvious within the West German industrial elites of the 1950s. This was of considerable significance when looking at the US post-war economic strategy for West Germany. According to Volker Berghahn, this strategy 'was not just designed to reconstruct West Germany materially but also intended to restructure the organisation of West German capitalism after the experience of Nazism'.[145] Immediately after Germany's unconditional surrender, the USA became involved in repairing the strained relationship between employers and workers. American trade union representatives came to Germany to create a labour movement based on co-operation and the rejection of communism.[146] Furthermore, the USA worked towards the resurrection of – and German participation in – a more open and liberal world trading system. US policy was thus directed against the German, if not the European, cartel tradition,[147] since the lesson learned from the conflict with Nazi Germany was that cartels threaten world peace and national security.[148] More importantly still was the American desire to break up vertically concentrated industries, i.e. the concentration of virtual monopolies within certain sectors of industry. Whereas it was left to the Germans themselves to finalise Allied anti-cartel decrees in an anti-cartel law, the *Kartellgesetz* of 1957 which Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard called the Federal Republic's 'Economic Basic Law',[149] the Allies wasted no time in breaking up certain monopolies, thus deconcentrating German industry.

Whereas the older generations of entrepreneurs (especially the coal and steel barons) continued to cherish the traditional organisational

form and industrial ideology of the pre-1945 period, the younger generation found it easier to adapt to American economic and political beliefs.[150] Yet even younger academics (although not necessarily economists) questioned the wisdom of imposing the US economic approach upon Germany:

> [T]hough the American economic system appears very well suited to America where it has produced a great deal of happiness it is by no means established that this system would work elsewhere but no one I spoke to outside a small group of liberal intellectuals seemed able to see this.[151]

Two themes of anti-American discourse used to counteract what were perceived as flawed economic developments in contemporary Germany were to the fore. The first theme is relatively straightforward and deals with opposition to the internationalisation of trade and the introduction of deconcentration measures and stricter anti-cartel laws. My main focus, however, is not on the actual developments on that front, since that has been widely documented in the historical literature describing the West German economy in the 'long 1950s'. I shall instead focus on attempts to attack liberalisation trends by exploiting the bogey of 'America', i.e. on the way in which 'America' and its system was blamed for these developments, whereas it was blatantly obvious that these policies were as much of contemporary German origin as they were an outflow of US economic thinking and its impact on Western Germany.

Then, I shall outline the way many German travellers to the USA presented the allegedly new 'American' concepts of self-service shopping in the supermarket. Again, the focus is not as much on the historical development of shopping habits in Germany, and more on how the significance of the supermarket was used to express discontent with the way modern West Germany was developing. Since the nineteenth century, many Germans had seen America as the home of 'shoddy "American style" consumer goods designed for the broad masses'.[152] For many Germans in the 1950s, the supermarket became a potent symbol for that sort of crass materialism and consumerism that stood in sharp contrast to the self-image of German quality products. Once statements about self-service shopping in the USA have been outlined and analysed, I shall concentrate on how the supermarket slowly became a trope for everything that was supposedly wrong as such within West Germany in the age of Westernisation/Americanisation.

3.2.1   The internationalisation of trade and its enemies

The mostly older coal and steel elites of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Saarland fought strongly against the American impact on heavy industry in the early 1950s.[153] Even the doyen of the German social market economy, Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, complained well into the first few years of the decade about Allied plans to break up the coal and steel industry and the chemical corporation IG Farben.[154] Such enterprises had been among the most heavily cartelised and concentrated before 1945, and their managers found it most difficult to come to terms with American economic policy demands.[155] Consequently these older generations of managers and entrepreneurs met the attempted 'Americanisation', although in many respects more a modernisation of an outdated form of capitalism, with strong anti-American resentments. Even the American term 'manager' was frowned on as unsuitable for the West German situation.[156]

The anti-Americanism of the older generations did not entirely fail in its political objective – the utilisation of anti-modern resentments in order to achieve domestic economic goals. As Paul Erker pointed out, the alleged 'Americanisation of West German industry' in terms of its decartelisation did not happen in the major industrial branches. It totally bypassed the electrical industry (Bosch and Siemens), and mainly the banks too, which reverted to their former organisational structures after half-hearted attempts to modernise the industry. Furthermore, the skilled trades and handicrafts (*Handwerk*) were not reorganised in order to ensure the freedom of trade,[157] despite heavy pressure to do so by the post-war US authorities in Western Germany.[158] Erker thus rejects the Americanisation model as 'too diffuse' to describe the realities of post-war West German economics.[159]

The economic historian Werner Abelshauser pointed out that soon after the Korean War, the German economy was once again slowly becoming organised along corporatist lines,[160] guided by a 'process of interest reconciliation that resembles not a free market but a kind of political cartel'[161] consisting of the umbrella organisations of business and trade unions in close co-operation with the state authorities.[162] I shall now show how an often rhetorical anti-Americanism helped to facilitate the reintroduction and cementing of certain anti-liberal modes of organisation within Western Germany. Secondly, I wish to show how economic arguments were utilised in order to discredit US credibility and thus allow for a rejuvenation of German nationalism.

The Bavarian industrialist Otto Seeling managed to combine the fight against decartelisation with an attempt to prevent the introduction of

the 40-hour week. He criticised alleged American hypocrisy in relation to anti-trust policies in order to utilise this line of argument in the domestic German debate about trade union demands for shorter hours. In a talk about his trip to the USA in late 1951, he told the Munich Chamber of Commerce and Industry in April 1953 that the use of American anti-trust practices would cause a lot of harm in Germany.[163] He strongly rejected these imposed laws (*'aufoktroyierte Gesetzgebung'*) and claimed they were even designed to undermine the German economy.[164] The USA itself, he said, did not adhere to that principle:

> Everybody in America swears he has nothing to do with cartels and price-fixing; everybody swears that it is the biggest economic sin. But one can find out: America has only one price of steel, from New York to California. And if you compare the prices of different car producers using the key of 'weight and cubic capacity', you will find the same [price per] unit. Another big coincidence! It may be that these things are determined by price leadership that allow smaller competitors to follow the prices of larger competition. That is probably the case. Quite how far the hypocrisy of anti-trust attitudes is taken in America can be deduced [from the fact] that the president of Chrysler is never allowed to sit at the same table as Henry Ford. They are not allowed to eat together …[165]

Seeling subsequently argued that America and Germany were not on the same footing. Germany needed all its resources to rebuild its wealth which had been destroyed in the war:

> That will not be possible in Germany with a 40-hour week. If America introduces the 40-hour week, then it is due to the fact that the power of human labour [over there] plays a much smaller role in relation to machine power than it does with us.[166]

Yet whereas some business leaders mainly used anti-American sentiments in order to try to prevent the decartelisation of their industry or to reject trade union demands, others used economic (or pseudo-economic) arguments for a totally different goal. Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's Minister of National Economy (1934–7) and Weimar and Nazi German President of the *Reichsbank* (1924–30 and 1933–9), managed to link an economic critique of the Western allies with a more fundamental attempt to rejuvenate German nationalism. Although politically a spent force after 1945, if not after 1944 as a result of his involvement in the plot to assassinate

Hitler and his subsequent imprisonment,[167] he continued to publish on economic and personal matters, and his major works were even translated into English. He thus continued to have an impact on public opinion after the foundation of the FRG. Schacht did not grapple with concepts of liberal democracy in order to reject them – as Schmitt and von Salomon did – but argued along traditional lines of national self-interest. He himself had paved the way for a partial command economy by undermining economic liberalism in his own policies from 1934 to 1937 and had thus put perceived national self-interest above economic principles. After 1945, he accused the USA of doing the very same thing.

In a circular letter of October 1949, the disgraced economist managed to combine neo-liberalism with neo-nationalism in a damning attack on the German media's 'lack of dignity and the obsequious behaviour' towards the rest of the world.[168] Whereas he asked for a neo-liberal policy of low taxation and minimal state interference within Germany,[169] he also bemoaned the international lack of respect for the 'little man', using the example of a recent devaluation of the pound sterling:

> Worse, much worse, the moral consequences [of the devaluation] seem to be. Once again, the little man [*der kleine Mann*] has to find out that the value of his savings are dependent on the good or bad policies of his government, that an economic-politically failing government can destroy the success of his labour, and that he will have to carry the consequences of governmental failures. The little man cannot flee into equities, as most businessmen would do. But even the latter have suffered, since they trusted the repeated assurances of the British government that no devaluation would happen. … It seems as if the rulers of the world [*die Herrscher der Welt*] have lost all understanding of what is right and proper.[170]

Although these complaints might have been commonplace beyond Germany, the opening lines of Schacht's circular indicate that he is not concerned about 'the little man' world-wide, but more about the lack of German influence in international decision-making:

> The devaluation of the pound has made us conscious once again what a *quantité négligeable* we are in the world. Whereas over twenty countries followed that measure immediately after the announcement of the devaluation, we were kept in suspense for a week and a half. And finally, we were expected to sell the coal we deliver to France at an unchanged rate. The Berliner tends to say in a case of such impotence: '*Mit uns können sie es ja machen*' ['They can do that with us'].[171]

Even though this might sound like an attack on Britain, the real culprit is located in the USA. British politicians are seen as short-sighted and possibly stupid; the real Machiavelli behind the decision to devalue is the USA:

> The only large market that could possibly absorb more English goods is [the internal market of] the Unites States of America. There have been quite a few reports about the opportunities that America has allegedly offered the British in this respect. Does anybody believe in all seriousness that American industry would tolerate competition dumping prices in its own market?[172]

Schacht does not offer any explanation for why the USA should have had an interest in devaluing the pound against the dollar, however. He claims to write in his capacity as a financial expert, but uses his analysis mainly to drive home the message of German impotence. He does not name the Americans as the 'rulers of the world', but all his insinuations drive that message home. The pseudo-financial analysis of the devaluation is thus turned into a discourse on German nationalism and Germany's standing in the world.

In his book *Gold for Europe* (*Mehr Geld, mehr Kapital, mehr Arbeit*),[173] written in late 1949 and published in Britain in 1950, Schacht even subtly likened the Allies to Hitler:

> On 20 June 1948, the Occupation Powers decreed that paper money then in circulation must be devalued to a new level. It was decreed arbitrarily that henceforth ten Reichsmarks would be one Deutschemark. People could draw on part of their thus reduced deposits immediately, and part would be made available to them later. But only a few months elapsed before this other part was once more arbitrarily, and in spite of their promise, curtailed by the Occupation Powers. Does anybody believe that such measures are the proper means for creating confidence in currencies which the state can arbitrarily alter according to its politics, to a change of party, or to considerations of utility? It goes without saying that the inflation brought about by Hitler through the unlimited printing of banknotes belongs to the same category.[174]

A few pages later, Schacht steadfastly announced that a '[C]urrency is one of the strongest pillar of a national economy'.[175] It is therefore, 'impossible for any country to put its currency … at the disposal of another

country whose financial and economic policy it does not control'.[176] In the final remarks of his book, Schacht's nationalist message was unequivocal:

> When a very intelligent British colonel asked me in an internment camp, in the summer of 1945, what success I had expected from the belated attempt upon Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, I replied, 'We should have preserved a German Government.' What I wanted to express was the fact that German responsibility would have survived and been available for the task of leading the German people out of the disaster into which it had been plunged. Today this responsibility lies with the Occupation Powers. They took it over of their own free will, and now they are feeling its weight.[177]

Schacht, however, had not only the restoration of German national pride in mind when writing this attack on the 'Occupation Powers' and their 'so-called currency reform in the summer of 1948'.[178] His second aim was the reinstatement of the old elites. Exactly by whom, one might want to ask, was the German people 'plunged into disaster'? If anybody, Schacht himself was instrumental in providing the monetary policy that helped pave the way for war. As Nicholls and others have argued, it was exactly because the old German elites were seen as too dangerous for the European reconstruction that was to follow the Second World War that the Allies had agreed to insist on the unconditional surrender of Germany.[179]

Politically more active right-wingers got involved in the (pseudo-) economic debate as well. Once again, the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* led by the Bavarian Member of State Parliament August Haußleiter was especially vocal. Their journal *Die Deutsche Gemeinschaft*, edited by Haußleiter, published an article entitled 'The mini-Metternichs from Bonn' in January 1954:

> The National Socialist revolution [was] the last European revolution, and Metternich's descendants are still the victors. … Look at the German universities. Amongst 3,000 students exactly thirty CDU [Christian Democratic] scholarship holders, shouting as if they were the only ones, speaking their integration hotchpotch [*Integrations-Kauderwelsch*], thinking American and praying Roman. … For you [the mini-Meternichs], the German peasant is good enough to fill your churches. At the same time, you conduct your export business on his back. Do you even know about the poor soil in our Jura mountain

villages? Do you think it is possible to liberalise our mountain peas-
ants' [*Gebirgsbauern*] stony fields? … [The mini-Metternichs] already
feel that their famous election victory was based on deception. A tired
people did not vote for Dr Adenauer, but for economic growth [*Kon-
junktur*], not for Rome nor Washington nor integration, but for a full
feeding trough.[180]

The Adenauer administration and their student supporters within the
CDU were accused of ignoring the interests of the German peasants in
order to 'think American', i.e. to please the USA. Economic liberalisation,
European integration and international trade, it was argued, benefited
only those chosen few involved in business, whereas the masses were
condemned to a bleak future. Adenauer's second election victory in 1953
was only possible because of deception and empty promises of 'full feed-
ing troughs'. Interestingly, the radical Right at this stage had adopted
the restoration rhetoric that until then, and also later in historiography,
has been a feature of the Left, initially the Catholic Left.[181]

In the previous year, before the general election, the right-wing
umbrella organisation *Nationale Sammlung*, of which Haußleiter's
Deutsche Gemeinschaft was an integral part, had been even more vocal
in their economy-based anti-Americanism. In the suggestions for the
election campaign, it was argued:

About the social situation: the hegemony of the Americans since
1945 has led to their capitalist system becoming the ruling system
by coercion. Their proponent is economics minister Erhard with his
social market economy, where the decorative adjective 'social' is pure
mockery. The American-capitalist economic model and its executor
Erhard have destroyed the *Mittelstand* almost totally. Heavy indus-
try and large banks are supported in every way possible. They have
thanked the governing parties with an election campaign trust worth
32 million [deutschmarks]. … Here, we should warn against the veil
with which Erhard has covered the real situation of the economy. It
can be compared with the illusory boom of the 1920s: foreign debts,
high interest rates, dependency on American big capital [*Großkapital*],
inclusion [*Hineinziehung*] into every crisis at Wall Street.[182]

Aristocracy of birth, the text continued, had been replaced in Germany
by the 'aristocracy of speculators and managers' (*Adel der Spekulanten und
Manager*). Where the former, in spite of all their flaws, at least had self-
discipline and felt obliged to support the state, the latter consisted of

'ice-cold egotists' only interested in their profits.[183] Although Erhard and his Christian Democrats were the ones this rhetoric was obviously aimed at, this was done with a hefty dose of anti-Americanism and – once again – not so subtle anti-Semitism. An 'aristocracy of speculators' is too close to the Nazi German anti-Semitic propaganda not to be recognised, without the author having to be too direct. The mention of Wall Street, as argued elsewhere,[184] could in this context only be connected in the minds of readers and listeners to old clichés of an allegedly Jewish-dominated Wall Street.

The argument about the right economic model for post-war Germany was heavily interwoven with anti-American prejudices and accusations. Erhard is described in that context as just an executor of American capitalist interests, and economic liberalism is not seen to serve the interest of the German people. While Erhard and others were genuinely interested in creating a new (and very Federal Republican) economic model, 'America' was too easy a target in order not to be used and abused by the opponents of a more liberal and open West German economy.

3.2.2   Shopping in America: distaste for the consumer society (or Fordism on shelves)

West Germany in the early 1950s saw fundamental changes in terms of consumption and shopping – the rise of the self-service shop[185] – as did most of Western Europe.[186] The first post-war self-service outlet in Germany was opened in Hamburg in August 1949 by a working-class co-op initiative called *Produktion*,[187] while a previous incarnation had opened its doors in Osnabrück in 1938 (albeit with limited success).[188] In May 1952, there were 98 self-service shops in Western Germany,[189] about half of them co-ops.[190] The shops that had been converted to self-service increased their revenue by 93 per cent as a result.[191] When, in 1953, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) staged a US-inspired trade exhibition in many German cities to popularise the idea of self-service shopping,[192] a good number of successful self-service shops were already in operation in Western Germany. In 1964, self-service shops for the first time generated more revenue in Western Germany than traditional ones.[193] Although the early 1950s in West Germany were still relatively 'lean years',[194] even working-class households had increased their consumption of processed, tinned, readymade and frozen food significantly throughout the 1950s.[195]

In March 1951, the illustrated magazine *Frankfurter Illustrierte* reported that, by then, more than 30 supermarkets had already opened in

Germany.[196] The magazine went on to ask whether Germany was being Americanised:

> Is Germany getting used to the American way of life? [*Bürgert sich Amerikanisches in Deutschland ein?*] A little trolley with a wire basket – and then the overjoyed housewife walks through her 'paradise'. Slowly, she walks from shelf to shelf, takes her time to look at the exhibited foodstuff, and chooses without any haste. The little trolley is soon filled up, and at the exit of the self-service shop, at the till, piece by piece it is summed up. There she might be shocked, because her enjoyment in looking, choosing, and shopping has seduced her to make some provisions [*etwas vorzusorgen*]. We already have over thirty such shops in the Federal Republic. The proprietors save plenty of time and personnel and see with joy that their revenue is up by a third.[197]

Bearing in mind that commercially successful self-service shopping was as old as the Federal Republic, and that by 1952 almost all bigger cities must have had one of those shops, it is all the more surprising that supermarkets were seemingly one of the most amazing features for a German visiting the USA for the very first time. Many visitors, including journalists and politicians, commented on them on their return to Germany. Supermarket and self-service shopping had at that stage become the norm in the USA: by 1954, between 60 and 70 per cent of all retail purchases were made in self-service outlets.[198] It has to be said, however, that such outlets in Germany came nowhere near their American counterparts in terms of size.

In a language as colourful as the products he described, the radio and TV journalist Peter von Zahn told the German public about self-service shops (or 'silent shops') in his travel report, *Fremde Freunde. Bericht aus der Neuen Welt*, published in 1953:

> We should not forget the two shops with self-service. Without hesitation, my children called them silent shops [*stumme Läden*]. They consider shopping there as boring as I do. One takes a metal trolley and pushes it past rows of shelves containing a never-ending number of multi-coloured tins. The first impression is one of confusing colourfulness. … The whole of America is tinned [*auf Dosen gezogen*]. The liquid sun-fruits of California, the yellow wheat flakes of the Midwest, and the pre-cooked ham from the pigs that once ran around in the American corn belt. Peeled potatoes from distant Idaho, olives from

Florida, beef goulash from Chicago's slaughter-houses, and chicken cooked in rice that grew by the Gulf of Mexico.[199]

Both in Germany and among German visitors to the USA, there was some suspicion that the need for eye-catching packaging in self-service shops would increase the price of goods[200] and lead to over-consumption. Carla Reisner, wife of the trade journalist Hermann Reisner, commented on 'female issues' in a separate chapter of Reisner's trade guide to the USA, published in 1952. She was quite impressed by the '*Super-Markets*', but also critically mentioned that the number of products on display inspired the housewife to buy more than she had intended:

> While shopping in the supermarkets, one is thunderstruck again and again by the range of goods, by the fancy presentation, packaging, and so on. All that often leads to one finding oneself at the exit with a 10-dollar-bag when initially all one wanted to buy was parsley. I quite often observed the American woman doing her shopping for the whole week (usually Friday evenings) and even keeping the bread at home in the deep freezer.[201]

The Hamburg Liberal Party politician Willy Max Rademacher was also simultaneously impressed by the 'food fair stores' in the USA and worried about the impact the number of products might have on consumerism. He described the supermarkets as something uniquely American in an article published in the daily newspaper *Hamburger Anzeiger*:

> A foreigner who forgoes the visit to, or – even better – shopping in such a store, has missed a typical institution of American life. Here once again, a triumph of organisation. One arms oneself with a two-storey trolley [*zweistöckiges Fahrgestell*] made from wire mesh and moves cheerfully from stall to stall in order to choose for oneself. … Packaging and presentation are so appealing and clear that the urge to spend [*Kauflust*] is psychologically enhanced even further.[202]

Elsewhere, however, Rademacher severely criticised this attitude of buying too much, regardless of need. Most blocked drains, he claimed, were caused by food being flushed down the toilet. This seemed obscene to somebody from a country that had experienced extreme hunger and poverty after the Second World War:

> This wealthy country still has the philosophy [*Grundsatz*] that the destruction of the worn-out and the secondhand is the secret to

increased production and consumption. A German mechanic and gas-fitter … told me that his main business was to empty clogged-up drains of [waste] food. Nevertheless, I saw a few beggars in New York.[203]

The last few quotations indicate that supermarkets and their range of goods did not only evoke amazement and awe among German visitors to the USA, but also some unease. The fear of waste after over-shopping was the most common and relatively mild criticism. Others noticed the standardisation of American life and thus picked up an old theme of *Amerikakritik* that had been voiced regularly in the Weimar German debate on 'America'. Similarly, some of the Nazi propaganda against the USA had resorted to this theme of standardisation and rationalisa-tion. During the first half of the twentieth century, conservative opinion about 'America' was divided: whereas some 'reactionary modernists'[204] in the 1920s praised the 'production ideology' of Fordism and regarded the rationalisation allegedly epitomised by 'America' as positive, others, while agreeing, feared that the 'American way' of modernisation was not possible without simultaneously forgoing traditional values in favour of mass culture and Western democracy.[205] During the Second World War, the American branch of the Frankfurt School, a group of left-wing intel-lectuals in exile because of their neo-Marxist beliefs and, in some cases, their Jewish background, had begun to discuss these themes. Some of them, most notably Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, were almost as critical of rationalisation, mass consumption and 'Fordism' as their conservative counterparts, although for different reasons. The themes of both 'standardisation' and 'money as the new God' were thus already embedded in the German discourse on 'America'. Both themes also, once again in the 'long 1950s', said very little about the real America, and a lot about what those voicing the criticism wished and feared for West-ern Germany. The criticism of 'America' is thus, once again, a debate on Western Germany rather than a fair depiction of the USA in the 1950s.

Surprisingly, the otherwise very moderate and progessive mayor of Bremen, the SPD politician Wilhelm Kaisen, used pretty strong words ('*Gleichschaltung*') after visiting the USA in 1950 to describe the stan-dardisation of commodities and goods there:

Standardisation. German observers repeatedly notice that American life is monotonous, because one is dogged wherever one goes by standardised commodities [*Standardwaren*]. This *Gleichschaltung* of consumption gives the lives of all the united nations over there the same layout. Everybody is subjected to the same standard – technology [*Technik*] sees to that.[206]

It is important to note that Kaisen dismissed many of the other problems German visitors to the USA usually noticed, whereas he seems to take the standardisation problem really seriously.[207]

In a slightly different context, the press officer of the German Diplomatic Mission in Washington, Walter Gong, told industrialists in Düsseldorf in November 1952 about the USA:

> This continent has the press it needs: newspapers with a circulation of millions … huge factories of public information and public opinion-building which often profoundly shock European journalists. …
>
> The American, whose life is predominantly standardised (this is true at least for city dwellers) sees [newspaper] advertisements as a means of information … . The design of newspaper and magazine advertisements focuses on the image, which generally seems more and more to displace the word. A long text, still common in German advertisements, is seen as disruptive. [He emphasises, though, that there is hardly any business influence on the political line of a paper: independence and incorruptibility.]
>
> Public Relation: hundreds of bigger and smaller firms offer their services everywhere in the country with elegant eloquence – to politicians, industrialists, department stores, sports clubs, charities, foreign governments, etc. … Many PR firms have turnovers of millions.[208]

Although talking about the media and public relations industry, and not about supermarkets, Gong also spread the *Amerikakritik* that life in the USA, at least in the cities, was standardised and thus slightly boring. Earlier in the same year, the publicist Dolf Sternberger had written about his visit to the USA. In a rather humorous and sympathetic article about 'bathroom customs in America', he described how even official dinners had an official toilet break in order to prevent people from interrupting the post-dinner speakers. One sentence stands out, though: when describing how 'the puritans' were quite unabashed when it came to the call of nature, he observed that '[t]hey [Americans] had rationalised it [the call of nature]'.[209] Even when it came to the (sensible) institution of the toilet break, the accusation of hyper-rationalisation was never too distant. This criticism was pre-empted by the editor-in-chief of the influential West Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel*, Erik Reger, during a visit to the USA in 1950, when he carefully criticised 'the standardisation and mechanisation of all expressions of life, from the factory to the entertainment venues, the permanent attempt "to make it work" …'.[210]

Just as boring and shallow, some German visitors to the USA observed, was the drive for commercial and financial success over supposedly higher values like education and morality. In February 1952, the *Bremer Nachrichten* reported on a 'fireside chat' ('*Kaminabend*') on the USA, organised by the German-American Carl Schurz Society, Bremen. The newspaper highlighted the theme of money:

> As she [Dr Rut Thurn] explained, the word 'money' is capitalised [in the USA], and many youths often decide to go for a simpler job in spite of their High School or even university education, because the earning potential is much better.[211]

The alleged importance of money was an observation many Germans made, albeit sometimes indirectly. The travelling trade journalist Hermann Reisner, editor of the *Übersee-Post*, claimed as 'Europe's biggest trade magazine',[212] reported the following in 1952:

> During my stay in Los Angeles, I also overheard an advertisement acquisitor [*Anzeigenvertreter*] visiting his publisher in the morning and telling him he would resaddle [change jobs: *umsatteln*] immediately. He would buy beehives and rent them out to orchards while they are in blossom. He would like to do that immediately, and maybe he would even earn a little more. The moral of this story: The Americans are extremely volatile in their vocation (compared to us). … The same is true for changing accommodation. One does not put down roots as much in one's accommodation, does not mind living here today, there tomorrow, leaving all the inventory behind and selling it in order to live amist unfamiliar or new furniture tomorrow.[213]

The Americans, Reisner reports, drift from here to there for the chance to 'earn a little more'. They do not put down roots and have no sentimental attachment to their homes or fixtures and fittings. Reading that passage, one ends up with an image of *the* American as hyper-rational, oriented towards money and commercial interests, and living in standardised accommodation.

As outlined above, the supermarket to many 1950s visitors to the USA seemed to be the most potent symbol of rationalisation, standardisation and commercialism. This was despite the fact that the idea had been imported into Germany as early as 1938, and that initially it had been adopted by the co-op movement in order to raise living standards for those least well-off. The regular description of the supermarket as

an archetypically American institution is closely linked to the fear of a 'total Americanisation' of Germany. This fear might have been politically irrelevant and naïve in most cases. How potentially powerful an argument against the modernisation and Westernisation of Germany it could become will be best documented by the following snippet: in the mid-1960s, the extremist *Deutsche Freiheits Partei* (German Freedom Party) in Duisburg described the whole of Western Germany as a huge supermarket:

> But nevertheless we do not have to be ashamed of ourselves. Because you and I fought under historically unique circumstances. In 1918, Germany was robbed of her territory and was starved. In 1945, Germany was torn apart, and the Western part was turned into a supermarket. They stripped the German people of their belief in Germany and replaced it with a belief in profit, hot sausages, and the only true 'free world' [*alleinseligmachende 'freie Welt'*]. The largest 'partner' USA intended to turn the Federal Republic into its overseas branch. Its managers of German citizenship could not get to Washington fast enough. … And the German people, branded by war and privation, slaved away and ate in that supermarket. Now it has had enough to eat and does not even notice that it will soon have to go to the till.[214]

The supermarket thus became more than a synonym for 'Americanisation'. It became a symbol for the (alleged) loss of German independence, and therefore as potent a symbol of the alleged political 'Americanisation' as it was a symbol of the economic 'Americanisation' of Western Germany.

3.3   'Neither Moscow nor Wall Street' – Germany between East and West

Whereas many types of anti-Americanism mentioned so far have roots going back to Wilhelmine Germany or even further, this section will deal with a far more perfidious type intrinsically linked to the rise of Soviet communism. Anti-Soviet propaganda had successfully been employed in Germany since the final days of the First World War. Invoking fears linked to 'the East' was thus no difficult task in Western Germany after the Second World War.[215] However, unfavourable comparisons between the Soviet Union and the USA only became widespread towards the end of the Weimar Republic. The Weimar German conservative thinker Oswald Spengler had been amongst the first to draw a comparison between both

forms of modernity.[216] Martin Heidegger engaged in similar discourse as early as 1935 (see below).

By rejecting both East and West after the Second World War in favour of a Germany controlled by neither the Soviet Union nor the USA, the latter was implicitly linked and likened to the Soviet Union. Many accusations against the USA thus did not have to be made explicitly, since the equation that the USA was as bad as the Soviet Union was sufficiently evocative and closely linked to West Germany's emotional and sometimes irrational fear of socialism. Presenting Germanness as a 'third way'[217] between socialism and capitalism, thus adopting a stance of 'national neutralism' ('*Nationalneutralismus*'),[218] was often nothing more than the positive expression of the rejection of both the Soviet Union and the USA. In 1950, during her first visit to Germany after the end of the Nazi dictatorship,[219] Hannah Arendt was shocked that, when talking to Germans, they did not adopt a pro-American stance even in light of the fear of Soviet aggression, but adopted an absurd stance of neutrality between the two powers.[220]

The *leitmotiv* of the 'national neutralist' argument tended to have a European dimension: the Christian Occident ('*das christliche Abendland*') was positioned between the Orient (i.e. the Soviet Union, often referred to as 'Russia') and the New World in the West. Christian Occidental values were described as being under threat from Western superficiality and soulless materialism[221] on the one side and Oriental brutality and anti-rationality on the other. Both clichés have a longer history.[222] They nevertheless constituted something genuinely new and 'Federal Republican', since they were reinvented and updated to suit the requirements of 'Occidental' German conservatism after 1945.[223] In the nineteenth century, 'Occidental' thought had been based on a rejection of the revolutionary ideas of 1789, and in the eighteenth century, the 'Occident' was a Europe free of Turkish influence.[224] After 1945, however, 'Occidental' thought had to readjust and take the new geostrategic world order into account. In 1965, the nationalist historian Caspar Schrenck-Notzing bemoaned the fact that 'Washington and Lenin are far more prominent protagonists in the history of today's Germany than Bismarck and Frederick the Great'.[225] Germany's total defeat in 1945 had for many West Germans discredited Germany's attempts to search for an independent power, to be replaced by a foreign policy ideology of internationalism and inter-dependence.[226] And even if that search had been called for by a majority, the realities of the Cold War and the continuing influence of the Allies over German policies would have stood in the way. In order to rescue at least the idea of German power, right-wing

circles tried to create a political-cultural climate that was 'neither East nor West'.

Martin Heidegger gave a series of lectures in 1935, published in 1953 under the title *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*). Since the publication of the *Introduction* coincided with the time-frame of this book, it is relevant to introduce some of his thinking as part of the contemporary discourse, although the actual lectures pre-dated the FRG by over a decade. Heidegger introduced the theme as follows:

> This Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in a great pincer, squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other. From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same, with the same dreary technological frenzy and the same unrestricted organization of the average man. … We have said, Europe lies in a pincer between Russia and America, which are metaphysically the same, namely in regard to their world character and their relation to spirit.[227]

Heidegger was mainly concerned with the over-technocratisation of modern America and the Soviet Union, in which technology and technocracy had replaced depth and meditation.[228] This theme, although already developed in the 1930s by Heidegger and Spengler, became all the more popular after the Second World War, where 'America' more than any was seen as anti-spiritual, materialistic (in the non-Feuerbachian meaning of the word), power-hungry and technocratic. Germany, on the other hand, was presented as the last defender of Occidental depth and a supposedly organic societal organisation.

In its crudest and possibly most prominent form, containing a lot of anti-Semitic overtones, the 'Germany between East and West' argument was utilised after 1949 by the Nazi renegade Otto Strasser (1897–1974). By 1955, Strasser was still in enforced exile in Canada, where he lived near Bridgetown, Nova Scotia. His utterances were, however, still taken seriously in extremist right-wing circles, as the prominence of his articles and speeches in the files of the various German internal intelligence agencies indicate. Although Alexander Gallus rightly states that Strasser was politically isolated in Western Germany after returning to in March 1955,[229] I do not agree with Gallus's claim that Strasser was only a marginal figure within the extreme Right. Besides regular articles about him in the mainstream press, some of them quoted here, the intelligence files on other extremist organisations do contain many cross-references, and the

mere existence of the intelligence files used for this section indicate that he was seen as a threat at least by his contemporaries.

Before and after his return to Germany in March 1955, Strasser's battle-cry was 'Neither Moscow nor Wall Street'.[230] The reference to Wall Street was not just anti-American, but contained anti-Semitic allusions about the alleged connection between the New York world of high finance and world-wide Jewry. It was also a prime example of an anti-Western and anti-liberal sentiment which was supposedly softened by the pseudo-impartiality achieved through the inclusion of anti-communism. Since anti-communist attitudes in the West German public could almost been taken for granted in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the anti-Americanism of Strasser's battle-cry deserves closer attention.

In August 1950, Strasser argued in a typed circular on the Korean War that 'South Korea was to about the same extent a satellite of Washington as North Korea was a satellite of Moscow (analogue to the situation in West Germany and East Germany)',[231] before arguing for an independent Germany. In 1951, Strasser as good as praised the SPD leader Kurt Schumacher for his nationalist stance and his critical distance vis-à-vis the Western Allies:

> In any case, that is more logical, realistic and nationalist than Adenauer's policy, which is just as unconditional in its support [*bedingungslose Gefolgschaftsrolle*] for the Western Allies as the support of the Grotewohl government in Pankow [the East German government] for Moscow.[232]

Strasser thereby managed to equate explicitly East German attitudes towards Moscow with the Adenauer government's relationship with the West. Since the West German public's hostility towards the East German 'Pankow government'[233] was well established at that stage, the real target of Strasser's polemic had to be the Adenauer government and the Western Allies.

Yet even before Strasser's attacks on Wall Street became a regular feature in his articles, his followers had been expressing a similar sentiment. As early as February 1951, the 'African Headquarters of the Strasser Movement' called for his renaturalisation in a 'resolution' that subsequently demanded military independence from both Moscow and Washington:

> We call on every German compatriot [*Landsleute*]: Not one man as cannon fodder, not a drop of blood for Moscow or Washington! Remember Churchill's swearword: The Huns [*Hunnen*] … remember

the theft of our granaries, the Eastern Provinces! Remember the slave camps in Siberia, the prisoners in Western European prisons and those officers and soldiers who were condemned to long prison sentences within Germany herself! Remember the dismantling of our industry, often enough done for competition reasons …![234]

Strasser had left the NSDAP in the summer of 1930 and had fled Nazi Germany in May 1933. His odyssey through Europe finally brought him to Canada. After Hitler's fall, Strasser tried to regain his German citizenship and be renaturalised. The FRG, however, insisted on the validity of Hitler's expatriation order signed in October 1934. Some of his followers asked rhetorically: 'How dangerous must this man and his ideas be that he is the only German not to be allowed into his fatherland, and that his following is persecuted and ostracised under Hitler and Adenauer!'[235] On 19 November 1954, the Supreme Administrative Court (*Bundesverwaltungsgericht*) decided against the Federal Minister of the Interior and ordered Strasser's renaturalisation.[236] Strasser returned to Germany in March 1955 and lived in Munich until his death in 1974. After some rather unsuccessful attempts to get engaged in party-political activity, he gave up active politics after the *Bundestag* election in 1961. He did, however, continue to publish articles in cyclostyled fringe newsletters. He also travelled and gave speeches in Canada and USA in the 1960s and 1970s after initial visa rejections.[237] However, his influence on far Right circles in Germany had probably been at its peak in the years before and the months after his return.

While still in exile, Strasser proposed his own political system for post-war Germany, 'Solidarism' ('*Solidarismus*'), which was a sort of dialectical synthesis between 'East' and 'West', i.e. Marxism-Leninism and parliamentary liberalism/capitalism.[238] In a 1952 article for the Berlin *Tagesspiegel*, he outlined his idea of Solidarism as 'the solidarical and equal participation of all classes in the whole people's economy [*Volkswirtschaft*], that means participation in property, management, and profit for all Germans that participate in the production process'.[239] He went on:

Instead of that [centralism], we demand a large degree of autonomy for the German *Landschaften und Stämme* that makes every dictatorship and every totalitarian state structurally impossible. Against the massively increased bureaucracy in all cultured states [*Kulturstaaten*] whose cancerous growth [*krebsartiges Wuchern*] endangers the whole people's organism [*Volksorganismus*], we demand the

self-administration of the German professions and estates [*Berufe und Stände*]. With that, we attempt to replace the calcified centralist form of party democracy with the modern, decentralised form of the democracy of estates [*Ständedemokratie*], so that finally the German workers and the German peasantry get their fair share of the representation they deserve.[240]

More on Solidarism can be found in the Canadian leaflet 'The Story of Otto Strasser', published by the 'Friends of Otto Strasser'. Strasser wrote on 25 March 1952:

To differentiate this programme clearly from both, National Socialism and Marxist-Socialism, I call it SOLIDARISM, thus bringing it into close contact with the basic catholic teaching on modern economy.—

Solidarism is economically a **co-ownership** of the private-capitalist, the employees (not the unions) and the nation, represented by the state, each with one third of the shares. This one-third ownership of the state provides at the same time for all taxes, which otherwise are abolished.

This principle of **self-administration** is also prominent in the political sphere; the Parliament is based on professions, not on parties, each German of course having the right of free and secret balloting in his own profession; the different professions are represented in parliament according to their numbers, thus assuring a real cross-section of all the people in the country.

The idea of self-administration is strengthened by political decentralisation.— State rights versus Centralism is the watchword to avoid any dictatorship and the cancer-like growth of modern bureaucracy.

Finally, in the field of foreign policy, the principle of self-administration goes hand in hand with the principle of **self determination** of all peoples, small or big. This principle alone makes the real co-operation between peoples possible, just as the principle of co-ownership makes the co-operation between the classes possible, leading to a **Confederation of Europe**, more or less along the lines of the British Commonwealth and ending with a 'European Switzerland'.

The three white and Christian federations: Pan American Union, British Commonwealth and Confederation of Europe, working closely together guarantee the external security and the internal well-being of the West.[241] [Text written in English; Strasser's emphases and Strasser's grammatical peculiarities]

Besides the blatant exclusiveness and racism of the last paragraph ('white and Christian federations'), Strasser really was looking for a system beyond both liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism. His economic model, however, was an attempt to incorporate the workers and the state into the capitalist mode of production. The abolition of taxation in favour of state participation in the capitalist profit system was also a breakaway from previous economic models. This, of course, was nothing new: the idea of a corporate state was a common feature in Fascist ideology; Mussolini had proposed similar structures for Italy. A parliament consisting of the estates had been an important political construct even before the Fascist ideology had taken hold of Europe – it had been discussed since Bismarck's days.

It is interesting, however, that Strasser was still propagating the idea of a breakaway from parliamentary democracy in favour of a parliament of professional and estate representation *after* 1945 and long after his break with Hitler. Although Strasser rejected the philosophical materialism of socialism and Marxism, he nevertheless wanted to limit parliamentary activity to the socio-economic sphere. Seemingly harmless, in fact Strasser's true dislike of the West can be found in that suggestion. In another article he wrote for a German-language newspaper in Nebraska in October 1951, he argued that the Marshall Plan was bound to fail, since it was based on the 'Marxist' assumption that economic well-being overrides the spiritual values of a society. Strasser believed that the nation, not class, and not even religion, was the driving-force of mankind. People were willing to work and to vote for their economic well-being, he continued, but they would not fight or die for it. 'They fight and die today – like centuries and millennia before – only for freedom! – For personal freedom – for national freedom – for religious freedom!'[242] This is German Idealism in its crudest form. Social circumstances are not the human driving-force for Strasser, but the *idea* that both overrides and pre-exists the social structure of a society. Since the social and material sphere is only a subsection in the essence of mankind, Strasser is more than willing to have the economy administered in parliament. He thus reduces parliament to a body organising the co-ownership of the means of production as outlined in his Solidarist economic-political model. In Strasser's system, the really important issues concerning mankind, freedom, religion, and, above all, the nation, are sacrosanct and thus not negotiable in parliament.

However, after his return to Germany, Strasser soon became disillusioned with the reality of post-war Western Germany. On a visit to Canada in 1957, he complained of West German social and political

realities in an interview published in most Canadian newspapers. He stated that West Germany was 'alarmingly Americanised' ('*erschreckend amerikanisiert*') and that the German people only thought of their economic well-being ('*Wohlstand*') and thus did not have time for political matters.[243] At that stage, Strasser had dropped the mask of the impartial observer of the faults of both 'East' and 'West'. His whole disgust at modern life was reserved for the allegedly detrimental effects of 'Americanisation' on his beloved German people.

It was not only Strasser, however, who harboured such anti-American and anti-Semitic resentments, spiced with a dash of anti-communism. In 1953, a former member of the NSDAP told a gathering of former *Waffen-SS* members in Hildesheim that the policy of the Western Allies was 'dictated only by the Wall Street, i.e. the plutocrats'.[244] The prominent right-winger Karl Heinz Priester, leader of *Der Deutsche Block*, which was affiliated to the *Nationale Sammlung*, used similar terminology. He published an article in the journal *Die europäische Nationale*, entitled 'Germany – East-West Colony or Equal Rights in a Free Europe. A Polemic against Nihilism, Obsequiousness, and any Dictatorship' (undated, probably 1952), in which he wrote:

> For centuries, Germany has fulfilled its task to act as a bulwark to protect Europe from the flood from the East [*die Überflutung vom Osten her*], yet at the same time act as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The Treaties of Yalta and Potsdam, for which the 'great European' Churchill was an active godfather … opened the way for Bolshevism to enter the heart of Europe, Germany. The same Treaties and the disastrous policies of Wall Street have forced the [two] parts of Germany and Europe, depending on their geography, into East-West politics [*Ost-West-Politik*].[245]

According to Priester, the Schuman Plan and the activities in the Ruhr Valley were just the latest expression of the enslavement of Germany. He continued:

> The European shall not be the slave of either West or East, of either High Finance [*Hochfinanz*] or Bolshevism. We do not want to be bought by Wall Street, nor do we want to be subjugated by the Kremlin. We are not willing to do socage work [a feudal tax] under the yoke of the usurper, but we also do not want to suffer under the knout of Bolshevism. We are deeply anchored in Europe, our culture is higher, our traditions and customs binding on us [*unsere Überlieferung*

verpflichtet], our vitality [*Lebenskraft*] is tougher than that of other powers on earth.[246]

Priester's fellow *Nationale Sammlung* leader, August Haußleiter (also the head of the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*), told a meeting in Göttingen:

> We can see two paths ahead of us. Pankow on the one side and Bonn on the other side. In Pankow, Piek [*sic*] speaks a Russian German, and it is quite possible that Dr Adenauer speaks an American German. We worry that they cannot understand each other. In Germany, the German language must be spoken.[247]

The idea that materialism and nihilism dominated the intellectual climate in both the USA and the Soviet Union was predominant in the 'Occidental' West German intellectual debate (see below). Some of these themes also made it into the demagogic right-wing discourse of the decade. As early as October 1950, an association known as 'The Third Front' ('*Die Dritte Front*') argued for Germany to lead an association of neutral states between the two emerging superpowers.[248] Its leader Wolf Schenke, a former Asia correspondent for the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter*, was a leading 'national neutralist' and saw Germany as oppressed by both the USA and the Soviet Union.[249] The 'Third Front' praised Occidental values and contrasted them with the superpowers' alleged materialism:

> Here again, the choice between what the Soviet Union and what the United States represent is not appropriate for us, if we recognise the deep inner relationship of the materialist-mechanical understanding of life that is dominant on both sides. … Every sign indicates that the USA is on her way to go through a period of totalitarian madness [*totalitärer Wahn*] which we fortunately have [left] behind us. The ideas predominant in the Soviet Union and in the USA seem reactionary to us, hopelessly outdated and overtaken by time. … The values we have to remember and which we have to give importance to again are *European* [emphasis in original], grown in Greece and Rome, melted into Christianity and Teutonicism [*Germanentum*], brought to fruition in Italy, France and Germany. Americanism is no more stranger [to these values] than Russian Bolshevism is.[250]

Having established these supposedly European values, the pamphlet then called for a politically independent Europe under (West) German

leadership, following the example of other neutral states like India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and Middle Eastern countries.

The emphasis on allegedly European ideas as a counterpoint to both US and Soviet materialism and nihilism was often repeated by right-wing organisations in the 1950s and early 1960s. The *Bund Nationaler Europäer* (Association of National Europeans) or BNE, founded in autumn 1964, published a good number of flyers praising the idea of European unity between then and 1965. However, these were not the ideals of the founding fathers of the European Union (EU). The BNE used the European idea to spread their anti-communist and anti-American rhetoric. Like Strasser, they used the rhetoric of class struggle. In their founding principles, they demanded the 'abolition of all class barriers'.[251] In connection with that, they demanded 'the overcoming of Eastern Bolshevism and Western nihilism. Our revolutionary movement constitutes the fundament of a new European consciousness.'[252] In a further pamphlet, they despaired that

> the peoples of Western Europe have become increasingly dependent on the United States of North [*sic*] America. A small but unusually powerful group of intellectuals without roots successfully works for the destruction of the spiritual and cultural foundations of the Occident.[253]

Who they meant becomes clearer further on:

> The politicians of yesterday: the collective guilt hypocrites [*Kollektivschuldheuchler*] in Germany, the eternal blatherers in Strasbourg, the status quo capitalists in the USA, and the slave owners in the East cannot direct our way towards the future![254]

Whereas, so far in this chapter, the combination of anti-Western and anti-communist resentments has been expressed by renowned right-wingers and anti-Semites, the expression of those anti-Western sentiments was all the more worrying when they were voiced at the sociopolitical centre of Western Germany. To take one example, the teacher Siglinde Kreuzer went to the USA from September 1953 to March 1954 on a teacher trainee programme.[255] In an article for the intellectual journal *Die Sammlung*, she summarised:

> The American is an immigrant [*Eingewanderter*], he or his ancestors have left their homeland [*Heimatland*] for personal reasons. Consciously or unconsciously, one had to break with the European

tradition. He who looks back too much, will become weak and unproductive [*untüchtig*]. The new country gives the immigrant a lot, freedom, well-being, security, but it also requests, besides hard labour, a spiritual sacrifice, a willingness to assimilate. … Does the American have not something of a modern nomad about him …?[256]

In this analysis of spiritual 'America', the lack of tradition and history is seen as a requirement for modern America, since that immigrant society could not function otherwise. *Zivilisation* has to be placed above *Kultur* in such a society, the author seems to be saying. Certain Weimar German modes of thinking on modernity and 'America' are thus taken as a fact, whereby arguing that certain attitudes and states of mind might be beneficial, if not necessary, for the 'New World', but could not be implemented in Europe or, more specifically, Germany.

Although the culture/civilisation dichotomy was slowly receding into the background of the German public debate during the 1950s,[257] it survived in some rather vocal pockets of conservative thinking.[258] Ironically, Occidental conservatism is not too remote in that respect from the radical neo-Marxist thinking of the New Frankfurt School and its main protagonist, Adorno. In *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (*Dialectics of Enlightenment*),[259] Adorno and Horkheimer had argued that over-rationalisation had corrupted the Enlightenment legacy and that the 'culture industry' in the USA had massively supported the corrosive effect that this had on modern society. The sociologist Heinz Bude even argued recently that the *Kulturkritik* school of thought, one of the strands influencing '1968' in Germany, borrowed heavily from the conservative critique of democracy and modernity as agents of mediocrity.[260] The difference between the two ideologies, however, was the normativity implicit in occidental conservatism. Whereas neo-Marxism was, at least at that early stage, mainly about positivism and the description of a perceived misdevelopment, conservatism tried to rescue the idea of an Occidental Christian Europe that had organically grown over 'two millennia', as the journalist Hans Zehrer never tired of mentioning (see below). That type of conservatism thus attributed all malformations to either 'the East' or 'the West' in order to come to the normative conclusion that Occidental Christianity was the only way forward.

Another figure from the political centre rather than from the Right was the well-known economist and social scientist Alexander Rüstow (1885–1963). In 1954, he stated in a lecture in Heidelberg:

Out of the two antagonistic/hostile spheres [*feindliche Lager*] into which human kind is split today, the East has too little freedom,

and the West has too little authority. Authority and freedom are not at all antagonistic/hostile and conflicting poles. Quite the opposite: true authority and true freedom are possible only in conjunction. Authority without freedom is tyranny, freedom without authority is anarchy.[261]

Rüstow is obviously well above any suspicion of being an enemy of democracy or an anti-Semite. His arguments are far more refined than those crudely revanchist statements uttered by Strasser and his henchmen. A supporter of Erhard's social market economy, Rüstow had always been on the left wing of social market thought. His emphasis had been on equality of opportunities, and he had often criticised fundamentalist *lassez-faire* economics. However, he presented himself as a staunch anti-liberal in this lecture. His interpretation of 'the West' is one of a societal organisation predestined to dissolve into anarchy, because of the alleged lack of authority. A few years later, he stated that in his opinion, freedom (*'Freiheit'*) was a negative and initially empty term, and that it was not freedom but humanity (*'Menschlichkeit'*) that defined the West.[262] He also declared that he rejected 'Anglo-Saxon parliamentarism' as a model for the rest of the world:

> It is a fact of constitutional policy that Anglo-Saxon parliamentarism has not functioned anywhere outside of its countries of origin, not even in France, not even in Italy, and in Germany in very recent times only because of a very special constellation that cannot be generalised.[263]

Especially because Rüstow was above any suspicion of being part of the same mind-set as Strasser and his supporters, he is an important witness to the fact that a centre-Left economic theory did not necessarily require a centre-Left political persuasion. Rüstow's ideas about authority in conjunction with the question of German positioning in the post-war world were a further example of sections of the German public searching for a third and independent way between the two superpowers.[264]

Yet Rüstow was not the only establishment figure (or institution) who succumbed to this type of anti-Western sentiment. Mainstream newspapers like *Die Welt* or the *Sonntagsblatt* were arguably as centre (or centre-Right) as possible in post-war Germany. One of their main journalists, Zehrer, will be the subject for the remainder of this section. He had been banned from journalism and writing in Nazi Germany. Immediately after the war, he became the first editor-in-chief of the newly founded daily *Die Welt*, but soon had to resign, in part because of his

nationalist conservatism. From 1948 to 1953, he was editor-in-chief of the weekly *Sonntagsblatt*. In 1953, after *Die Welt* had been fully handed over to German hands, the publisher Axel Springer reinstated him as editor-in-chief. Von Zehrer held that position until his death in 1966.[265] Springer had known Zehrer since the early 1940s, and Zehrer became his 'personal friend, journalistic advisor, and political mentor'.[266] According to the political scientist Kurt Sontheimer, Zehrer had found his way into liberal democracy, albeit as a conservative, when faced with the humiliating collapse of the Third Reich.[267]

Zehrer, however, was not as impeccably pro-democratic as his journalistic career in post-war Germany (and especially his non-career in Nazi Germany) might suggest. He had volunteered to fight in the First World War in 1917 and had participated in the *Kapp-Putsch* in 1920.[268] During the later Weimar years, he was a leading member of the conservative revolutionary *Tat* Circle,[269] and had consistently argued for an authoritarian state.[270] Liberalism, for Zehrer, was 'the universal swearword'.[271] He was an associate of Carl Schmitt, and stayed in contact with that discredited thinker after 1945.[272] In the early 1950s, during his editorship of the *Sonntagsblatt*, he was closely associated with the Nationalist Opposition movement consisting of former Nazis, including the infamous FDP maverick Werner Naumann and his circle,[273] and many other organisations on the right-wing fringe. In September 1951, Zehrer was expected to attend a Nationalist Opposition meeting at Altenberg, but could not attend.[274]

Zehrer shared the fear of the extreme Right that Germany, and possibly the whole of Europe, could be crushed between East and West:

> It does not look good for us Europeans. When the century began, we had the world at our feet and we ruled the world. Today, in the middle of the century, the world has risen against us, and the lords from the Don and the Mississippi meet in Berlin and Vienna. We have become the satellites of two world powers, and the threat of a third world war hangs like a dark cloud over the no man's land of a continent that only seems to have the choice between merging with the floods of Atlantis [*Fluten von Atlantis*] or the steppes of Eurasia. ... Hemmed in between America and Russia and challenged from both, we Europeans are once again playing the great game of life and death that so far we have always won. ... It is part of our fate not to know whether we will still be here at the end of this century, and, above all, how and in which shape we will exist. However, two millennia are still alive and effective within ourselves.[275]

For Zehrer, both America and 'Russia' (i.e. the Soviet Union) were 'powers which lacked the Middle Ages'.[276] Both nations 'lack the spiritual substructure' ('*Ihnen fehlt der geistige Unterbau*'[277]). What he really meant, however, was that both nations lacked their own Middle Ages and had to turn to the Occident for spiritual meaning, since '[t]he Occident is the only force that owns a Middle Age with the heavy historical freight of two millennia and the depth of Christian belief'.[278] The new world powers were thus the mere 'offspring and stepbrothers of Europe' ('*Ableger und Stiefbrüder*').[279] As such, all their faults were a reflection and a mirror image of what had gone wrong in the Occident since the Enlightenment:

> The European inoculated the bacteria culture of his thinking into the virgin soil of America and Russia, and gets it back as technocracy and the Communist Manifesto, and if he has the strength for it, he can recognise himself in that mirror that West and East have handed to him.[280]

Elsewhere, he elaborated on this:

> Both powers, America and Russia, are the creations of Humanism and Liberalism, of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. … They are powers of Modernity [*Neuzeit*]. This world was also ours until yesterday, because we created it. But with us, it grew from the great spiritual substructure of the Middle Ages. Those two powers lack that substructure. They are powers without the Middle Ages. That is their external strength, and that is their internal weakness. … This flagship 'Europe' has the Middle Ages on board; she carries a heavy historical freight, she has draught [*Tiefgang*]. The two new world powers follow in her wake with lighter freight. Therefore, they are faster and can accept the waste-products of our intellect as absolute and essential and real: the machine, the motor, the *regnum hominis*, and all that.[281]

According to Zehrer, machine and motor, conquering the world and governing nature, were 'waste-products' for Europeans, not ends in themselves – whereas those waste-products were absolute and essential for America and Russia. America, once again, was branded as culturally superficial and inferior. *Zivilisation* was all important in the USA, Zeher implies, whereas *Kultur* and depth were nowhere to be found. America, in Zehrer's eyes, was 'the perfection of practical specialisation'.[282] What is interesting here is that Zehrer himself had been part of the technology

debate in Weimar Germany. The 'reactionary modernists' of the inter-war years in Germany, as Jeffrey Herf has called them,[283] had played a vital role in aligning technology with *Kultur*. Whereas Romantic Germany had previously seen technology as fundamentally opposed to *Kultur*, i.e. as an essential ingredient of *Zivilisation*, Weimar German conservatism integrated positive notions of 'German' technology into the national discourse.[284] Zehrer's insistence that America and Russia saw technology as an end in itself is thus in line with the original Weimar debate: Germany needs progress and thus engages in technological research, but technology is not the be all and end all.

The themes Zehrer exploited were based on themes extensively explored in the Weimar German debate on 'America'. In 1927, for example, the conservative journalist Adolf Halfeld had expressed his reservation about 'America' and 'Americanisation'. He had also tried to defend the traditions of Old Europe against technical-industrial modernity and criticised the alleged lack of tradition in the supposedly artificial and over-rational society of the USA.[285] This attitude, reawakened by people like Zehrer after 1949, had repercussions even among those with firsthand experience of the modern USA.

A conclusion to be drawn from Zeher's writing is that Germany had to reject the malformations of both 'the East' and 'the West' in favour of Occidental conservatism. He made that explicit when praising the virtues of Old Europe versus the faults of Marxism and American-style modernity:

> It is no longer about power, it is about spirit [*Geist*]. It is not about dominance, it is about responsibility. The current state of the world is solely our fault. We from the Occident [*wir Abendländler*] have brought about the catastrophe. … Does Russia, does America have anything to offer to us spiritually? They have to remind us of our guilt; that is all. They have nothing to offer us that we do not already have in a better and deeper version.[286]

If more proof was needed that Zehrer, like many conservatives at the time, feared the corrosive influence of 'America' more than Marxism, the following two quotations will illuminate that. He readily dismissed the Cold War as an anachronism as early as 1950: 'This fight between America and Russia … is not a fight for world domination, but a world historical interlude behind which, already today, other forces are looming'.[287] He did not dismiss the Cold War as such, however. Two years later, he made it clear that, for him, that conflict had a foregone

conclusion and a sure winner: the USA. In an article about the early stages of US space exploration, he attested that the USA was after more than world domination and wanted something even greater: the 'absolute domination of the Universe'.[288] Relating this to Zehrer's earlier thoughts about responsibility – or the USA's alleged lack of it – this must have been a threatening concept to him.

Zehrer's image of America is deeply embedded in Weimar German conservative thinking. It would not merit that much attention were it not for Zehrer's position as an opinion former, as one of the most prominent and influential journalists of his time. Zehrer has to be described as an extremist at the heart of the West German establishment.

This chapter has shown that anti-democratic, anti-capitalist and thus anti-Western thought was to be found not only in the extremist margins of West Germany's society, but at times at the very centre. There was a broad spectrum of anti-American criticism, and it was aired in mainstream newspapers as well as in extremist publications. 'America' was once again used as a screen onto which all fears conservatives and reactionaries had for the future of Germany could be projected.

4
Hedonism and Equality

Whereas the previous chapter, especially sections 3.2 and 3.3, presented 'America' as a country of cold-blooded capitalism, dominated by a pure profit orientation and 'Wall Street' greed, this chapter investigates an almost diametrically opposed *Amerikabild*: the USA as a country of mass hedonism and equality. According to contemporary opinion polls, the USA was seen in West Germany as the country where workers had the best living conditions in the world: in October 1952, 47 per cent thought that America offered the best conditions, whereas only 10 per cent opted for Germany and a mere 1 per cent for the Soviet Union.[1] Although not overtly concerned with class equality, the issue does enter the equation when looking at mass consumerism, particularly in relation to a new style of quintessentially American music: rock and roll (section 4.4). Realistically, there never seems to have been a danger of a *social* revolution instigated by rock and roll, but conservative circles in 1950s Western Germany feared exactly that. More importantly, the equality issue comes into focus when addressing the issue of gender and sex (section 4.5). 'Egalitarian Americanism', as defined by Kaspar Maase, identifies the USA as a supposedly less hierarchical society. The promise of equality, or at least the equality of opportunity, is as tempting a concept of 'self-Americanisation' as is the prospect of breaking down social and socio-cultural barriers and hierarchies.[2] Many contemporary observers on the Left, including the Catholic Left, expected the 'Americanisation' of Western Germany in terms of equality of opportunity, at least between the end of the war and the foundation of the FRG.[3] No wonder that those in West Germany opposed to social change – and especially opposed to sex equality – took issue with 'America' once again in order to hit out at the proponents of change within Germany. Whereas 'real America' might not have been the most egalitarian place in the 1950s, and whereas

the 'real American woman' more closely resembled the protagonists of a Doris Day film than a 1950s version of Hillary Clinton, conservative elements of the contemporary West German discourse tried to evoke an image of the USA as defined by mass consumerism and domineering, college-educated and sexually liberated career women.

The following sections will analyse a number of focal points for the allegedly egalitarian and hedonistic influence of 'America' on Germany. Both American and German women played a particular role in the formation of an anti-Americanism, one that was based on both envy and fear. Sexual relations between German women and American soldiers (section 4.1) were widely reported and received condemnation and even mob punishment. Women involved with GIs were accused of prostituting themselves for cigarettes, chocolate and nylon stockings. Cigarettes and sex in the post-war era and beyond thus symbolised superficiality, immorality and self-interest – Maase's typology of 'hedonistic self-Americanisation'.[4] The conservative German Friedrich Sieburg wrote in 1954: 'The victors wanted to bring us the thinking of Abraham Lincoln, but we were content with Chesterfields.'[5]

Cinema (section 4.2) and television (section 4.3) were seen as further detrimental and corrosive influences on Germany and German culture. Although the tendency to interpret 'American' culture in such ways receded somewhat during the 'long 1950s', albeit not without backlashes,[6] cinema and especially TV were still seen as negative influences on German culture. For many German conservatives, cinema stood for sex, crime and violence, and its influence on the German youth was feared. Although as much a European as an American invention, with a long tradition in both Germany and the USA, cinema became *the* symbol for the supposedly corruptive influence of 'America' over Germany. Television, on the other hand, stood for cultural superficiality and thus harked back to a discourse that had earlier dominated the Weimar Republic and even the Wilhelmine era. However, the (admittedly) often poor quality of American TV programmes put new and strong arguments into the hands of those who saw 'America' as a country of cultural simplicity and superficiality.

Jazz and rock and roll are interesting examples that show how cultural connotations of 'America' slowly began to shift and be modified during the 1950s (section 4.4). Whereas rock and roll was often seen as falling within the same parameters within which jazz had been interpreted during Weimar and Nazi Germany, as a further symbol of cultural superficiality, but also as a form of culture dominated by an 'inferior race' ('*Negermusik*'), jazz – with the advent of bebop in the 1950s – was

slowly reinterpreted during the 1950s and 1960s. Where it used to be a signifier for 'America', it slowly became a signifier of 'European' culture in opposition to mainstream American culture.

In the sphere of sexuality (section 4.5.1), many conservative Germans feared the devaluation of love and marriage through the alleged rationalisation of sexual relations in the USA. Contemporary Germans even saw a shift 'from Dixieland to Kinseyland' in the USA. Simultaneously, a relaxing of sexual morals in Germany was feared and blamed on American influence. In the aftermath of the American-instigated currency reform of 1948, the appearance of a naked female breast on one of the new banknotes was seen as evidence of the corruption of traditional morality: the new DM5 banknote carried the allegorical depiction of freedom as a bare-breasted woman.[7] Especially the reinterpretation of female sexuality in the Kinsey Reports led to the issue of the equality of the sexes (section 4.5.2). Here, conservatives in Germany feared what they saw as the 'monstrous' power of women in the USA. Educated women, confidently demanding an independent career, might not have been the norm in the USA during the 1950s, but many German observers certainly presented that as the norm in order to warn against allegedly similar trends in Western Germany. This rather distorted image of the gender structure in the USA will be interpreted as a means to rectify what conservative Germans saw as one of the anomalies left over from the war – the mass engagement of women outside the home as a consequence of an initial shortage of male labour in the immediate post-war era.

4.1   The post-war legacy: *Ami-Mädels* and *Veronicas*

In the immediate post-war period, the socio-cultural stereotype of the *Ami-Mädel* – or *Soldaten-Liebchen*, (*Fräulein*) *Veronika*,[8] *Amiflittchen*; in the case of post-war Austria: *Chocolate-Girl* or *Ami-Hure*[9] – became firmly established as a focal point for future resentments against 'American' hedonism. It was often – consciously or subconsciously – contrasted with the ultimately more 'German' image of the *Trümmerfrau*.[10] This is a retrospective, possibly slightly sarcastic, summary of the situation in the US zone of post-war Berlin by the cultural historian Ralph Willett:

> In the smoky, fetid basement bars of Berlin, diluted swing provided the background for jitterbugging, drinking and sexual negotiations as an army of *Fräuleins* endeavoured to find partners who would provide food and shelter for a night, a month or longer.[11]

The US policy of non-fraternisation with the people in occupied Germany did not last long – it was dismantled in October 1945.[12] On the sexual level, that might have had to do with the fact that American soldiers were not allowed to frequent brothels, unlike their French and German counterparts, who could visit medically screened prostitutes.[13] Since many Germans, both men and women, were surprisingly friendly to their conquerors, many GIs took the risk of disobeying their superiors. At least anecdotal evidence points to mass professional and casual prostitution near US army garrisons in the immediate aftermath of the war.[14]

Whereas the German public's reaction to American-German sexual relationships were often rather harsh, the inter-German *Onkelehe*[15] (i.e. the mostly extramarital relationship between a war widow and her new partner) did not carry the same stigma as the *Ami-Mädel* (although both forms of extramarital cohabitation seem to have contributed to a surprisingly high rate of children born outside marriage: in 1950, 9.5 per cent of all newborns in the FRG did not have married parents).[16] The difference between these two forms of extramarital cohabitation was not only a matter of race or nation. The *Onkelehe* carried connotations of necessity and wartime death. *Ami-Mädel* sexuality, on the other hand, carried connotations of jazz and swing, tobacco and alcohol (as seen above), the attributes of hedonism in its almost purest form. Furthermore, the latter type of sexuality also carried the stigma of unpatriotic action. Sleeping with the enemy, as it was, obviously almost ridiculed German soldiers' sacrifices during the war, seen by many as a betrayal of the suffering of German men.[17] (Even the horrific mass rapes of April 1945 in Berlin, committed by Red Army soldiers, were sometimes retrospectively interpreted as a lack of German women's honour and a stab in the back of the suffering German men at the front or in the POW camps.[18]) Although poverty and necessity did enter the discourse on the *Ami-Mädel*, at least the male discourse was more concerned with the sexual and national morality of the issue.

Actual or assumed relationships between GIs and German women were soon met with strong criticism from within the German population. In May 1946, a young woman from Bremen observed in her diary:

> I think everybody has forgotten that we were once an independent people, and not a herd of swine [*Schweinehunde*]. For chocolate or chewing gum, the girls throw themselves at the Negroes or, in the best case, at the other Yanks [*Ammies*].[19]

Quite often it was the parish priest who condemned these relationships. As early as June 1945, the Protestant parish office in the Württemberg town of Künzelsau reported to its superior office:

> Unfortunately, we quite regularly have to reprimand street urchins for their shameful begging for chocolate, and the girls and young women for their at times outrageous attempt to get pally [*sich anbiedern*] with enemy soldiers. Especially those evacuated from the Rhineland seem to have lost their sense of decency and German women's dignity in relation to our enemy. Repeated serious and very clear warnings and admonitions from the pulpit were not successful, especially since those who should be paying heed are usually not in the church.[20]

Some compatriots of the *Ami-Flittchen* were so outraged that they threatened them and sometimes even punished them by shaving their heads.[21] Young German soldiers returning from the front as well as former Hitler Youth members illegally published and distributed crude squibs ridiculing German women who went out with 'their Black cavaliers' heavily made-up and smoking Chesterfields.[22] The relationship between German women and black GIs was particularly frowned on.[23] In the immediate aftermath of the war, the authorities were more likely to approve a – theoretically illegal – abortion if the German woman reported that she had been raped by a 'Negro'.[24]

In Günter Grass's 1963 novel *Hundejahre*, these resentments are dealt with retrospectively. The novel's protagonist Walter Matern visited his former Danzig SA leader Sawatzki after the war. Sawatzki had left Danzig and moved to West Germany, where he cohabited with a woman. All three got very drunk, and Sawatzki begins to recite a whole alphabet of apologetic and anti-democratic stereotypes. The letter 'Y' stands for 'Yankee': 'No Yank has touched her, and definitely no Tommy either', he proudly proclaims about his partner, Inge.[25] The three of them conclude that drunken night with a threesome, as if to counteract Sawatzki's pseudo-moralistic outburst.

Frankfurt am Main under American occupation was seen as a hotbed of immorality. Hans Werner Richter recalled a conversation he overheard on a train in the immediate post-war years:

> An old man says, 'Have you seen that in Hamburg – all the Tommies with German girls. That is too much, that is far too much.' A younger man responds, 'Oh, you haven't been to Frankfurt yet.' An older, tired-looking woman joins in, 'What are you talking about? Hunger

hurts. And, when all's said and done, there are still some respectable girls.'[26]

Frankfurt was considered as a potential alternative to Bonn as the provisional capital of the FRG in autumn 1949, yet the lobby group pressing for Bonn as the capital argued against the Hessian city on the grounds of its alleged Americanisation, especially in relation to the high number of *Ami-Mädels* or *Veronicas* in the city. Frankfurt, the Bonn lobbyists went on, was considered by the Americans as an entertainment centre, which explained its low cultural standard compared to other large German cities.[27] Adenauer echoed such resentments against Frankfurt in an unpublished interview in 1961, claiming that he pressed for Bonn over Frankfurt since the latter was 'totally Americanised'.[28]

The image of the *Soldaten-Liebchen* was soon integrated into international popular culture. In Billy Wilder's film *A Foreign Affair* (Paramount, 1948), Marlene Dietrich gets involved with a member of the American Military Police in Berlin, played by John Lund.[29] The title of the film is obviously a 'double entendre linking personal with international relationships'.[30] Whereas it was not always the American soldier who is accused of bartering cigarettes, food or shelter for sex (Marlene Dietrich, for instance, is the seductress in Wilder's movie, wielding her corrupting influence on the American serviceman[31] – but Wilder was, after all, American, although of Austrian descent), the negative connotations of German – American sexual relations were made obvious by most German observers. A woman growing up in the Hessian city of Hanau near Frankfurt, where many GIs were stationed, recalled that she had to keep her GI boyfriend Bill secret as late as 1958: 'If anyone had seen me with him, I would have been an *Amiliebchen*.'[32]

The belief that sexual *laissez faire* was linked to post-war American influences in Germany is not historically accurate. It was not necessarily the American influence after the Second World War that brought promiscuity to Germany. Klaus-Dietmar Henke argues that many girls and women had already become morally more permissive before 1945. He attributes that development to the corrosive influence of National Socialism on the old elites and their moral authority.[33] Dagmar Herzog states that Nazi Germany saw pretty open discussions of sexuality which even continued into the early 1950s:[34] 'The concept of the repressed fascist was a creation of the 1960s.'[35] In 1949, 71 per cent of the German women questioned by the renowned Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy approved of pre-marital sex.[36] It could even be argued that the image of German women had been changed during the 'Golden Twenties' in

Berlin, although this change was admittedly linked to jazz clubs and bars, which could thus be blamed on 'America' in return.

However, the impression taken from the immediate post-war era was one of the USA as a highly sexualised and highly exploitative nation. Sexual relations were separated from love and marriage, they became merely a commodity. The post-war linkage of cigarettes, chocolate, jazz bars and sexuality was to remain in many Germans' minds as the image of 'America'. The tone was set for the evolving debate during the 1950s on 'American' hedonism and the rationalisation of sexuality.

4.2   Hollywood and *Heimatfilme*

Cinema, unlike many other issues dealt with in this chapter, was certainly not seen as an invention of the 1950s (although the decade was in some ways the decade of cinema, since more viewers than ever before or after frequented the cinemas). The Kinsey Report on female sexuality as well as rock and roll were certainly contemporary 1950s American innovations; television, although older, came into prominence only during that decade. Cinema, however, had been a symbol of modernity and thus 'America' long before. The expressionist yet conservative German poet Gottfried Benn had exclaimed during the Weimar years: 'Tempo, jazz, cinema, *Übersee* …. Personally, I am opposed to Americanism.'[37]

Cinema and film had already gained a certain artistic respectability during the First World War, after the governments in Berlin, Paris, Washington and London had discovered their role and usefulness in war propaganda and appeals to endure the hardships caused by the war. Cinema was thus slowly transformed from a mere fairground attraction without a political or social message into an entertainment venue for the masses and even a playground for the cultural *avantgarde*. By the end of that war, cinema as a cultural sub-section was sophisticated enough to attract Weimar Germany's thespian elite. By the mid-1920s, it was an industry big enough to require full-time critical observers like Siegfried Kracauer,[38] attract occasional comments by intellectual heavyweights like Walter Benjamin, and contributions from writers like Bertolt Brecht.[39] In that decade, the German film industry was Hollywood's only serious competitor on the world entertainment market. During Nazi Germany, cinema had become one of Goebbels' most important propaganda weapons. At least before the war, cinemas in Nazi Germany even screened some Hollywood movies.[40] It was only in the final years of the Nazi dictatorship that Germany was culturally cut off from the output of American film studios.

Since cultural conservatives like Benn had already established the connection between cinema, modernity and 'America' during the Weimar Republic, the anti-Americans of the 1950s thus only had to rehash old cultural stereotypes. In 1950, the conservative journalist Zehrer claimed that the detective novel had become 'similar to jazz, film, broadcasting and football, the representative expression of our time'.[41] Elsewhere, he talked of the 'proletarian cult' of 'film, jazz, football, and the boxing match' as the new world culture.[42]

Considering this deep-rooted belief and the long tradition of this sentiment, it is therefore no surprise that 'America', the cinema and a corrupting influence on the German people were even in the 1950s and 1960s still linked in the public perception. 'Civilisation' often was an alternative for 'America', since many 1950s advocates of the Christian *Abendland* (Occident) were still stuck in the Weimar dichotomy between *Zivilisation* and *Kultur*. The latter stood for Christian occidental (and often enough 'German') values, whereas *Zivilisation* was seen as the dangerous, corrupting force of materialism and superficiality imported from America and France. *Zivilisation* cared more about the supposedly inorganic values of the Enlightenment than about the organically grown values of German *Kultur*.[43] In the eyes of Ernst von Salomon, the cinema was the ultimate artistic expression of *Zivilisation*:

> Although from my earliest youth I eagerly attended [the cinema] … I always shared the slight contempt with which my literary colleagues later in life considered my involvement in film, [shared it] with all those who were inclined to regard film as a sometimes amusing, but basically corrupting *Afterkunst* [crap art], as a not undangerous instrument of the will to civilisation [*Zivilisationswillen*].[44]

Others feared that American cinema was an expression of the American national character with its tendency towards standardisation and the commodification of art.[45] The right-wing extremist August Haußleiter summarised this attitude in April 1955 when writing about the American 'Marilyn Monroe civilisation'.[46] The anthropological sociologist Arnold Gehlen came to the following conclusions in 1957:

> The cultural mass media, cinema and broadcasting, have followed a primitivisation criticised by many, but hardly avoidable for financial reasons. The [media] industry must make revenue and reach many, [since] the invested capital is at times enormous and cannot take risks. An artistically remarkable, sensitive and intelligent film could occasionally be a success, but the experiment is too risky …[47]

Gehlen's former student Helmut Schelsky in the same year referred to cinema as a leisure 'supplied for consumption' ('*Verbraucherangebot*'),[48] although he defended the cinema against accusations of being a corrupter of youth.[49] Not all commentators and direct observers of 'American' culture during the 1950s thus feared cinema as a corrupter and saw an immediate threat to the Occident and German culture. Some saw cinema simply as a light-hearted form of entertainment that, while lacking sophistication, was no threat. One exchange student even attributed an early, slightly cynical form of enjoying 'bad taste' to American cinema audiences:

> American pictures are of poor artistic quality. But everybody, also educated people, seems to go and see them. They go and are cynical about them. … [The movies] are often meant to be enjoyed in the spirit of humour which you exercise when you sneer at kissing scenes and western romances, when you get excited by all the valour displayed by a frontier hero and yet despise the cliché. Movies are not meant to be taken seriously or as a work of art.[50]

Nevertheless, both cinema and 'America' were still frequently described in the 1950s as having the power to corrupt morality and destroy quality culture. The files of the West German governmental censorship agency *Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Schriften*, or its forerunner at the Conference of the German States' Education and Cultural Ministers (*Ständiger Ausschuss der deutschen Kultusminister*), are consequently full of complaints against certain films, comic strips[51] and even whole literary genres like pulp fiction, and against the allegedly devastating influence of such publications on German youth. A certain Anton Rupert Sittl from Munich wrote to the first agency in November 1957 under the heading 'cultural decline':

> New York schools have been allocated a policeman each because of the steep increase in juvenile crime. For years now, New York theatres, films and night clubs [*Nachtlokale*[52]] have been far more liberal. This trend has now contaminated our illustrated magazines. There are [in Germany] minor theatres now which have little in common with art. So-called nylon underwear performances [*Neylon-Wäscheschauen*, *sic*] and stripe thise [*sic*] cannot be topped anymore. Avaricious and unscrupulous landlords [*Schnapswirte*] contaminate our people. Public prostitution [*Schaudirnengezücht*] has won. These women are

humiliated into modern wage-earning slaves. Every woman is a sister of the Mother of Christ. It is our obligation to save these souls.[53]

The American influence, it seems, had corrupted Germany and driven German women into prostitution. Cinema, according to this letter, has played its part in the corruption.

4.2.1 Cinema, sexuality and crime

Although cinema as an art form had gained a certain respectability long before the Second World War, both public opinion and protagonists of 'high art' in West Germany quite regularly linked cinema and film with the alleged increase in crime and the loosening of morals in 1950s Western Germany. For many morally conservative Germans, the connection between cinema and loose morals, sex and criminality seemed only too obvious. Repeatedly throughout the 1950s, demands were made to protect the German youth from westerns and gangster films and pulp fiction.[54] It made no difference that Germany itself had had a long tradition of indigenous pulp fiction and an adventure novel tradition, going back to the Wild West novels of Karl May in the Wilhelmine era.[55] One might assume, however, that by the mid-1960s, people would have accepted cinema and cartoon strips as a successful cultural transfer, or even re-transfer, from the USA which had roots as much in American as in European culture. That is not necessarily true. In 1965, H. Reinmuth from Treysa in Hesse wrote to Chancellor Erhard on behalf of 'six youths':

> Today's high youth crime rate is based on the following origins: various youth magazines, or better: the multitude of trashy literature [*Schundheftchen*], including Tarzan, Tom Prox, Billy Jenckins and so on, which only show what is base to [our] youth and corrupt them. … In addition, various movies, especially couboy [*sic*] and gangster movies, are inclined to mess [our] youth up [*den Kopf verdrehen*]. These films should be banned, and in case of contravention, strictest measures should be employed. Accepting these suggestions would certainly reduce the percentage of youth participation in crime significantly. …
>
> Yours obediently [*Ihr gehorsamer*],
> H. Reinmuth[56]

In 1959, Ria Becker from Düren had blamed the *Halbstarken* riots[57] on 'second-rate and dirty movies' in a letter to the German Minister for the Interior:

> Is it not possible to block the entry into Germany of the American flood of inferior and dirty movies? Totally agreeing with political and economic co-operation with the United States, one should nevertheless honour Occidental [*abendländisch*] culture and should not try to uproot it by imposing the most primitive things from a country that is culturally highly inferior to ours. If one kept a closer eye on these things, such chaotic scenes [*Entgleisungen*] as the ones in the Berlin *Sportpalast* or in Duisburg, involving the American Kings of Jazz [*die amerikanischen Jazz-Könige*], could not have happened, and they were a real embarrassment in front of all foreign nations.[58]

Another woman argued in the same year that American directors and journalists profited from 'crime, blood, and tears' and asked the minister to prevent the making of a second film about the Frankfurt prostitute Rosemarie Nitribitt, found murdered in her apartment in 1957:

> This is to ask [you] to protect the decent part of [our] population not only from anti-social elements [in general], but especially from anti-social profiteers (private, film, the press and so on). Please prevent the looming Americanisation over here in respect to business being conducted with crime, blood, and tears.[59]

Ten years later, the extremist Hamburg organisation *Gesamtdeutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft* was worried about the socio-genetic future of Germany because of the amoral threat cinema supposedly posed:

> German youth is drawn into a sexual free-for-all [*enthemmter Sex-Rummel*] by films and books. The relaxation and destruction of the moral order … has led to a situation where in 1962 there were 10,000 mothers aged between 13 and 18 years, whereas in 1964, there were 15,000 [mothers] aged 13 or 14 years alone. … The feeding of [our] youth with whodunits instead of great and honourable examples and role models and with films full of dirt, the drugs trade and prostitution has led to a situation where … judges reckon that 40 per cent of our minors are to be considered at risk of committing a crime [*kriminaloid*].[60]

The organisation added that an estimated 1,000 'Stripe-tease [*sic*] bars', atonal music and the 'uninhibited homosexuality of both genders' added to the problem.[61]

Whereas the previous examples came from arguably extremist individuals and organisations, possibly without any other outlet for their anger, even highly educated 'multipliers' like the nationalist historian Caspar Schrenck-Notzing or the journalist Hans Zehrer used similar modes of explanation for Germany's perceived problems. Schrenck-Notzing claimed that crime in America was being justified by the frontier experience of the American pioneers, and that the myth was kept alive by the 'dream factories of Hollywood'.[62] Zehrer, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Sonntagsblatt* and the daily *Die Welt*, saw cinema as responsible in part for crime in Germany. After a number of home-made bombs had exploded in various German cities in 1952, he explained these acts, committed by juvenile loners who felt alienated and short-changed by life, as follows:

> The romance of the cinema with its gangster and wild west movies did the rest. It cost a human life in Bremen and one in Eystrup. … [Zehrer continues to write about another crime, committed by] A human being full of cinema romance [*Kinoromantik*], who considered himself an outcast from society and who had even written a book, *Herz ohne Heimat* [literally: Heart without Home].[63]

In another article about 'how to become a perfect criminal', Zehrer argued that the cinema did not enrich life and make it fuller, but quite the opposite: 'it makes [life] emptier and poorer'.[64] He outlined a number of rather gruesome cases of juvenile crime and cruelty, each time concluding that the perpetrators said in court they admired American cinema: one of them said he killed his girlfriend 'the way he had seen it in an American movie'. Another juvenile criminal told the court: 'It has always been the ideal of my life to become a gangster, like the ones I have seen in American movies.'[65] Zehrer reckoned that German youth did not read any more and had thus lost its imagination.[66] In yet another article[67] he blamed 'wild west movies, gangster movies and whore movies [*Dirnenfilme*]'[68] for juvenile delinquency. A 19-year-old criminal described in the article 'still lived on the prairie and in the street valleys [*Straßenschluchten*] of Chicago, and he was fascinated first by the Colts and then by the hard blows against the head, and he automatically [*wie von selber*] drifted from adventure into crime'.[69] Looking at Zehrer's journalism, it becomes obvious that the early Federal Republic was showered by articles

blaming 'American movies' for violence, depravity and prostitution. The conservative journalist Klaus Mehnert (1906–84) reported from the USA in 1954 and 1955 that many cinema and TV films were 'Atrocious. Nothing but murder and manslaughter [*Nur Mord und Totschlag*]. Similarly another trailer: Frankenstein – Monster. Disgusting stuff.'[70] Mehnert, like Zehrer, had been associated with the conservative revolutionary *Tat* Circle during the later Weimar years.[71] After Hitler had become Reich Chancellor in 1933, he declared that his life 'now had a meaning again'.[72] Later, he worked for the Third Reich's foreign propaganda in eastern Asia.[73] In the early 1950s, both Zehrer and Mehnert were closely associated with the informal and extremely right-wing Nationalist Opposition movement.[74]

With the foundation of the FRG in 1949, both the Protestant and the Catholic hierarchy began to reclaim some of the moral influence they had lacked under Hitler, as Heide Fehrenbach has argued. One of the main battlegrounds in the fight over West German morality was the cinema,[75] especially because cinema attendance in 1950s West Germany was at its peak. In 1946, the Fulda Bishops' Conference established a central office for film matters. From the following year onwards, two Catholic film journals began to be published, *Filmüberschau* and *Filmdienst der Jugend*. The Protestant Church first issued a film journal, *Evangelischer Film-Beobachter*, in 1948, in order to establish an outlet to assert its moral authority over films screened in Germany.[76] Some clergymen seem to have taken the (local) law into their own hands in order to resist the assumed negative influence of the cinema on the morale of the parish. In 1954, the then deputy chairman of the German Liberal Party, FDP, Erich Mende, sharply criticised this unofficial censorship ('*Nebenzensur*')[77] in a speech in the German parliament (*Bundestag*). He named six 'of about 50 examples'[78] where clergymen had either exercised their non-statutory censorship rights by pressing the local authorities to ban a film, staging a blockade outside the cinema or ringing church bells during the screening. In one case in Konz near Trier, Mende reported, the police prohibited the screening of a film after the church had used its influence, even though a Catholic cinema circular, *Katholischer Filmdienst*, had expressed no objections to it (*Der Seelenbräu*).[79] Mende went on to quote a Catholic priest who had spoken of 'the devil's trilogy: Marxism, liberalism and sexualism'.[80] The latter two, as this monograph argues, were intrinsically linked to 'America' in the imagination of many contemporary Germans.

Highly educated journalists and the clergy as much as semi-anonymous letter-writers thus took part in a campaign against allegedly

corrupting films. It did not matter that some of the films in question were of German origin, since cinema since the Weimar Republic had almost automatically carried the connotation of 'Americanisation'. 'America' was thus directly or indirectly described as the corrupter of German youth. Whereas the previous section was mainly concerned with the *content* of the films, there are also examples in which cinema as such, i.e. the actual *building*, became a synonym for an allegedly degenerate 'America'. Probably unwittingly, Germany's 1999 Nobel laureate Günter Grass regularly described the cinema not as a place of culture, but as one of sexuality. In his 1961 story *Katz und Maus*, he presented the cinema as the ideal place for juvenile sexuality in Danzig during the world war.[81] In his subsequent novel *Hundejahre*, he quite explicitly described the seemingly normal, commonplace and casual juvenile sexual activities in the cinema.[82] Whereas that might just have come down to a question of opportunity (or lack of such), however, the cinema as an ultimately amoral *American* place is to be found in contemporary descriptions of open-air cinemas in the USA. In 1955, the TV journalist Peter von Zahn described scenes from such an outlet:

If still half of all American women begin their honeymoon untouched, this only means that they marry rather young, and not that they are innocent: Anyone who has ever been to an American open-air cinema knows what I mean: on a mild summer night, there are hundreds of cars in front of a screen the size of a house, and mostly young couples are sitting in the cars, fifteen-, sixteen-, and seventeen-year-olds who in the face of a 10-metre high romance [on the screen] have only one occupation, which is called 'petting' or 'necking' in the New World – the exchange of caresses. These caresses may only go so far. By no means, however, do they leave the girls in any doubt about the nature-given constitution of man.[83]

The German industrialist Otto Seeling also commented on the 'advantages' of open-air cinemas in the USA, namely that married couples could take their children with them and let them sleep on the back seat. He added, however, that

[l]overs use the open-air cinema for other purposes. It is totally dark, and it is frowned upon to shine a torch into the car. My blessing to married couples and lovers. I will not use [visits to] this institution for any purpose.[84]

4.2.2　*Heimatfilm* as the counter-image to 'America'

Whereas some observers rejected cinema outright for the reasons given above, others favoured a 'Germanised' version of the artform. The German/Austrian film genre of *Heimatfilm* was hugely successful in West Germany for most of the 1950s. One epic, *Grün ist die Heide* (1951), had had an audience of about 19 million at the West German box office by 1959. Another, *Der Förster vom Silberwald* (1954), had been watched by a cinema audience of 22 million by 1958.[85] The genre was, often consciously, used to present a counter-image to an 'Americanised' modernity, not unlike its musical equivalent, the *Schlager*.[86] Family structures represented in the *Heimatfilm* were, if not obviously pre-modern and aristocratic, at least socially conservative. *Urban* social and economic problems were mostly excluded, although the genre did deal with certain contemporary problems, like the integration of millions of refugees from the former German East, but mostly within a *rural* setting.[87] One has to be careful, however, not to equate the *Heimatfilm* genre with German cinema as such during the 1950s. First, Hollywood and non-German European productions were commercially very successful and hugely popular in 1950s West Germany. Secondly, however, one should not assume that the German film of that period was totally dominated by the *Heimatfilm*. Only about one fifth of all films made in West Germany between 1950 and 1962 belonged to the genre, although the percentage was much higher in the first half of the 1950s.[88] Some German films of the 1950s even dealt quite consciously with the question of German guilt and the Shoah. Reducing German cinema to the *Heimatfilm* genre 'amounts to an oversimplification of cultural assets in Germany's formative postwar period. … The new German cinema began in 1946 and not in the late 1960s.'[89] Nevertheless, *Heimatfilme* were popular, and they did contain a conscious normative social message. Especially as a counter-image to 'America', they do merit a closer examination in this context.

'America', however, is not the obvious theme, or even the hidden theme, of the genre. More important than the creation of a German rural counter-image to 'American' modernity was the accommodation of Eastern expellees into a new *Heimat* in Western Germany,[90] thus accommodating modernity as well as tradition. Yet, as Margit Szöllösi-Janze has shown, the normative family concept was particularly well portrayed in the *Heimatfilm*.[91] Using the example of *Waldwinter* (1956), she argues that the genre, rather than just presenting a reactionary and ahistorical ideology, does take contemporary social problems into account. The rural community portrayed in *Waldwinter,* including a number of Silesian

expellees, consists mainly of the younger and the older generation. Vague allusions to the war and the Nazi past are made in order to explain the lack of a middle generation. The fact that the film does acknowledge socio-political reality makes it a more effective way of presenting conservative family and societal structures as right and good. Martin, one of the protagonists, is 'cured' of his lack of *Heimat* sentiment. He gives up his life in Paris, in many respects as potent a symbol of modernisation as 'America', when he realises that he is needed in his rural German community. His wife-to-be, the blonde and blue-eyed epitome of Germanness, Marianne, directly addresses the dilemma of post-war family structure and offers the normative solution: she is heavily involved in sorting out the problems of her community while without male protection, but she resumes her traditionally passive role as a woman when Martin is reformed and willing to marry her in order to work for the good of the village.[92] In this case Paris, but more often the USA, especially the American metropolis, represents a mere stepping-stone in many *Heimatfilme* before the protagonists return to their true *Heimat* in rural Germany.[93]

The episode from *Waldwinter* is significant for two reasons: not only does it present the normative post-war view of socially desirable family structures in its purest form, it also signifies that this structure is widely accepted in 1956. In this respect, the *Heimatfilm* is a means to communicate contemporary normative ideologies, but it also reflects an already established norm.[94] Since the normative message is carried very clearly in *Waldwinter*, and since audiences for *Heimatfilme* in general dropped sharply from 1956 onwards,[95] it has been argued that the normative message of the nuclear family had become accepted by 1956,[96] whereby the *Heimatfilm* had fulfilled its integrative function. The booming economy had reintegrated the male breadwinner into society,[97] and during the previous year Adenauer had successfully negotiated the release of almost 10,000 POWs in Moscow.[98] Prior to that, concerted efforts had been made by the socially more conservative elements in media, politics and the arts to re-establish the nuclear family as the predominant family model. Divorce had been increasing between 1948 and 1953, and the level of new marriages had decreased.[99] The newly established Ministry for Family Affairs (*Familienministerium*) under the Christian Democrat Franz-Josef Wuermeling had set out in 1953 to rectify the war-induced social changes and upheavals in Western Germany.[100]

Obviously, the reason for the decline of the *Heimatfilm* genre is not monocausal and simply to be found in the alleged outdatedness of the genre after 1956. Commercial reasons were at least as important as the

impression of 'job completed'. The movie industry in Germany was not mainly guided by moral crusades, but predominantly by financial success and profit margins. General cinema attendance in West Germany had peaked in 1956 at 817.5 million tickets.[101] The emergence of television played its part, not only in Germany, in weakening the movie industry and pushing it into temporary decline. However, TV sets were owned by a relatively small minority of the German population. In August 1956, there were only about 500,000 TV sets in West Germany, up from about 100,000 in February 1955.[102] These numbers increased to one million in October 1957, and then to three million by the end of the decade.[103] Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, only a third of West German households owned a TV.[104] It can thus safely be argued that it was not only the purchase of TV sets that dented the popularity of the *Heimatfilm*. It is important to note that the genre was not merely comforting and escapist, but also consciously created an anti-modern counter-image to the often sexualised representations of modernity: 'Paris' and 'America'. The genre 'emerged and peaked at a specific historical moment: a period of political and economic uncertainty, emotional and social upheaval'.[105] It catered for the needs of its time with a peculiar combination of reaction, romanticism and, at times, careful economic modernisation. When West German society had established itself in a combination of socio-moralistic conservatism with economic modernisation, the production of new *Heimatfilme* soon declined.

In 1962, a group of young and soon to be influential German filmmakers declared 'daddy's cinema' dead ('*Papas Kino ist tot*') in their *Oberhausen Manifesto*, thus castigating the *Heimatfilm* tradition for its alleged triviality and its personal and artistic continuities from Nazi Germany.[106] *Heimatfilme* did not, however, totally vanish into obscurity. German TV channels still screen the occasional 1950s *Heimatfilm*. During the 1950s and 1960s, conservative and reactionary film clubs often showed *Heimatfilme* in order to establish a cultural counterweight against Hollywood. In spring 1967, the Hamburg *Freundeskreis Filmkunst*, a film club directly linked, according to the Hamburg intelligence service, to the neo-Fascist party NPD, celebrated its fifth birthday. In a leaflet issued on that occasion, they boasted that they had regularly shown German films, sometimes even Nazi propaganda films, because they had to counteract the 'American' (and possibly Jewish) cultural influence:

> World-wide forces have been working for decades to corrode and distort the peoples, their cultures, and their traditions, in order to be able to defeat them more easily also physically.[107]

These 'world-wide forces', one has to assume in recollection of Nazi propaganda, were 'America' and the *weltweites Judentum*, (international organisation of Jews). In order to counteract that corrosive process, the *Freundeskreis* said, the club had shown a number of alleged German masterpieces, including *Deutsche Heimat im Osten*. 'Against this background, the demise of today's movie industry becomes really obvious.'[108] In March 1968, the club produced another leaflet that was to be distributed outside cinemas and theatres ('Dear Friend of the Art of Cinema, Dear Visitor to the Theatre!'[109]). In this leaflet, soliciting new club members, the authors became downright sarcastic:

> It has to be said finally that we had been extraordinarily underdeveloped. We Europeans, especially we Germans, had totally lost contact with the great world culture. Our education was so narrow-minded [*schmalbrüstig*] that we did not even know how to use the terms Callgirl [*sic*], Striptease, or Playboy. All that had to be taught to us with loving patience. And that was good. … Today, we know more. We have got in contact with real world-class standards. Even the extensiveness of our cinema programmes indicates a free development and human dignity to a high degree. The Holy Trinity of body, spirit and soul has reached classical dimensions in the majority of the movies of today. That is why every movie appeals to the *whole* human being. One goes home delighted and edified. What we saw lasts for years in our memories as a real experience of art – it persists in our child and grandchild.[110]

Not only was the Allied re-education programme ridiculed once again, but the traditional prejudices against the low standard of American culture were also wheeled out. In addition to that, the alleged oversexualisation of 'America' came into the equation. The whole effect of post-war re-education, it is alleged, was that Germans now confidently use terms like 'Callgirl, Striptease, and Playboy'. 'America', one has to deduce from this statement, has brought the Germans nothing but degeneration. German films, on the other hand, were the last chance to create a counter-image to all those corrupting influences coming from the other side of the Atlantic.

4.3 Television, bad taste and cultural superficiality

Cultural superficiality has been one of the main accusations against the USA in the nineteenth and even more prominently in the twentieth

centuries. In part, this had to do with a sense of inferiority Europe experienced as a result of the overarching symbolic and real power that the USA seemed to exert over the 'Old Continent'. Hollywood had become the epitome of American 'cultural imperialism' after the Second World War at the latest, and it seemed appropriate to many Germans that 'America' as a 'young nation' should excel in a young and highly commodified artform, the cinema. The communist playwright Bertolt Brecht, himself involved in filmmaking during the Weimar Republic, had accused Hollywood of superficiality during his years in exile in California: 'The intellectual isolation here is monstrous. In comparison with Hollywood, Svendburg [in Denmark, where Brecht spent most of his exile years] is a world center.'[111]

The US 'culture industry' was seen as the destroyer of 'real' (i.e. 'European') cultural depth. It seems indicative of this attitude towards 'America', which was so deeply integrated into the German interpretation of 'America', that it was possible after 1945 in female German discourse, according to the gender historian Atina Grossmann, to construct a 'good', 'cultured' and thus 'European' Russian officer, one who loved Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy and deplored the excesses of sexual violence committed by his comrades, as a counter-image to the brutal 'Asiatic' rapist. By contrast, such a 'cultivated' status was rarely attributed to American occupiers.[112] The political scientist James Ceaser saw an element of racism, or at least a reminiscence of the racialist discourse that had evolved around 'America' in the nineteenth century, in the attribution of cultural superficiality to 'America':

> Ideas influenced by racialism thus persist at the vanguard of progressive thought, which depicts the United States as the land of diminished intelligence, low taste and cultural homogenization.[113]

Although Ceaser presumably was targeting the European Left of the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. the New Frankfurt School and its French counterparts), his accusation might hold true for some of the claims levied against 'America' by West German 'Occidental' conservatism of the 1950s.

It has to be said, however, that the activities of the *Amerika-Häuser* in many West German cities and towns did modify some of the harsher judgements, many of them a hangover from Nazi propaganda. The USA managed to present culturally inclined Germans with a far more positive impression of the USA's cultural achievements.[114] The advent of television in Germany, however, strongly reinforced many cultural

stereotypes: whereas cinema was at least consumed in a traditional way, in a theatre, TV was consumed at home, and, unlike a novel, often casually, along with rather mundane activities like ironing. TV thus became the most evocative European symbol of American cultural superficiality. There are numerous reports by America travellers mentioning the advent of TV as something at least slightly worrying. Many commented on how deeply TV had already penetrated American society in the early to mid-1950s. In Germany, TV was still a relative novelty at that stage, although the victorious 1954 Football World Cup campaign was a threshold in terms of TV ownership in Germany. Not everybody was outright in their critical of TV, however. In 1952, during his visit to the USA, the Hamburg FDP politician Willy Max Rademacher[115] described 'the inevitable television'[116] as a glorious invention and a disease at the same time in an article for the *Hamburger Anzeiger* newspaper:

> Television is a glorious invention and a disease at the same time. At least seven programmes are available to choose from. The propaganda [i.e. advertisements] is accepted stoically, because in exchange for these often rather arbitrary interruptions of the programme one has the advantage of receiving television and also radio free of charge. After all, the simultaneous claims in one evening that Camel, Chesterfield, and Morris cigarettes, or Blatz, Budweiser, and Schlitz beer, are the *non plus ultra*, do cancel each other out.[117]

Many, however, saw television as a new low in terms of American cultural superficiality. The conservative journalist Klaus Mehnert was disturbed by TV quiz shows in 1954–5:

> A real plague are the quizz [*sic*] and give-away programmes – for some reason incredibly popular, for my understanding highly idiotic. ('What is the name of the American university that has the same name as a famous church in Paris and that is called in its English translation Our Lady?' – 'Notre Dame.' – 'Bravo, well guessed! You will get a free air ticket to Hawaii.' And so on …)[118]

A young student and architect-to-be went to some length in his scholarship report about his stay in the USA in 1955 and early 1956 to show how much of a devastating influence TV had already become:

> One of the strangest elements in American life seemed to us TV. The poor quality of the average programs and the optical strain of simply

looking at Television horrified us, we classified TV rather a national disease then [*sic*] a means of entertainment or communication. And yet, it had conquered almost all social groups, regardless of profession, intelligence or age. I will never forget how a famous architect and Dean of a university, whom we visited, left his two 3 and 5year old [*sic*] children in front of the T.V. set and went out with us for supper. The children remained alone at home. When we came back hours later the two had fallen asleep in front of the running set, which showed the average shooting scene of a western. TV had become drug and baby-sitter at once in this case: a certainly imaginative but irresponsible use of TV.

During many visits of farmers in the West and Southwest we noticed, that TV was seen and heard everywhere. The families sat everywhere under the audiovisual shower of superficial entertainment or advertising, and we felt, that this mania would systematically ruin, what was left of family contacts.[119]

Besides the fact that children were left watching TV unsupervised, and thus exposed to scenes of violence unsuitable for their age, German visitors bemoaned the loss of social life and stimulating conversation after television was introduced in the USA. As early as 1952, the wife of a travelling journalist had observed that 'Television destroys all sociability [*Geselligkeit*]. Instead of engaging in conversation, everybody gathers round the set [*Apparat*] in the semi-dark, in silence and staring [straight ahead]'.[120] This counter-image to German/European *Geselligkeit*, that art of good and thus intelligent conversation, could not be stronger: in Germany, engaged conversation with a group of friends, in the USA everybody in a darkened room, staring at the TV and not interacting.

Her husband had already noted some semi-sophisticated reaction to commercials and advertisements during the first part of his trip, although he was probably staying in a hotel and was so would have been more concerned with radio: 'During my stay in New York I observed that nobody listens to the radio anymore, since <u>even an American</u> [Reisner's underlining] cannot put up with the commercials in the long run.'[121] 'Even an American'. The lesson to be drawn from this: imagine how quickly the rather more sophisticated Europeans would reject commercial radio and TV! Another German commentator attributed some sort of consumer sophistication to American children and remarked that '[t]heir response to television or to comic books is that of a sophisticated audience. For one thing, active play has often disappeared in favour of playing the consumer of shows and presentations in print.'[122]

The issue of TV and superficiality is closely linked to that of *Bequemlichkeit* (convenience or an attitude of laziness). Whereas TV as a cultural medium and a childminder was described as laziness with regards to intellectual activities and the rearing of children, a search for *Bequemlichkeit* was also seen in other activities. The CDU politician Otto Lenz[123] stated at a press conference after a trip to the USA in spring 1953:

> Very many Americans will now come to London on the occasion of the coronation [of Elizabeth II], and also to the Continent. They will really enjoy visiting Germany and Switzerland and other European countries, but I was told by Americans who know Germany and other European countries again and again that here in Europe they do not find the same comfort, the same convenience on their travels that they are used to in America.[124]

Some observers even seemed to suggest that all social interaction in the USA was based on *Bequemlichkeit*:

> Everything in this country has to be practical and convenient, there is no time for waiting, no time for contemplation; understanding for organic growth is lost forever. Of course, this phenomenon is not restricted to America, it is a sign of our times. But American schools do nothing to counteract it.[125]

Many Germans visiting the USA during the 1950s were worried about the long-term effect TV, cultural superficiality and the search for convenience would have on the Americans. If even children are turned into mere entertainment consumers and forgo 'active play' in favour of consumerism in front of the TV, then the future might be bleak. In February 1958, a German Rotarian in Neumünster voiced his worries about the future in a talk entitled 'The Tower of Babel'. He did not specifically name the USA, since by that stage, popular culture had arguably been 'Americanised' all over the Western world. 'It obviously does not need a special emphasis that it is to be feared that film, radio, television, and picture newspapers [*Bildzeitungen*[126]] will also impoverish and cripple the language.'[127] Others feared that more leisuretime would not necessarily lead to a better life, but to more consumerism and apathy. The SPD politician Fritz Erler (1913–67), a regular visitor to the USA and John F. Kennedy's personal contact in the SPD,[128] voiced such concerns in 1956:

> The increasing amount of leisure time creates similar problems for America as it does for us. Even today [in the USA], the weekend

lasts from Friday lunch-time to Monday morning. One of those days belongs to the family. But over there as well, as one can readily observe, the mass consumption [*Massenkonsum*] is directed towards sporting events, TV programmes, films, and such things. Technology threatens to eat up the human being.[129]

Although Erler did include Germany in his analysis, he still used many phrases (*Massenkonsum*, technology, film) that the reading German public would have instantly connected with 'America'. This is thus one more example of a German warning his fellow citizens not to go down the 'American' path. It is particularly interesting and ironic that a Social Democrat would warn against the effects of too much leisure time on society.

Even official Germany did not shy away from rather opinionated reports about superficiality. In 1956, the German embassy in Washington reported to the German Foreign Office on the Republican Party conference in San Francisco held between 20 and 24 August 1956. For almost two of the 3½ pages, the report heavily criticised the conference for being totally geared towards unity and TV presentability:

> The Republican Party conference was the triumph of the party organisation committee [*Parteiorganisation*] in its attempt to give millions of spectators at the conference hall and on TV [*am Fernsehfunk*] an image of unconditional unity … . Every phase of the conference was so carefully thought through and calculated to make the best impression that the neutral observer got the feeling of watching a puppet theatre in which the strings of each puppet are pulled by puppeteers who remained unseen, but whose names were well known and whose careful preparation was always obvious. The party leadership had been able to impress its understanding so thoroughly on the delegates that this party conference only had the task of documenting the indivisibility and unity [*Einheit und Geschlossenheit*] of the party and to re-elect the previous party leaders by acclamation, that no speaker dared to step out of line …[130]

This is a rather early critique of the '*Amerikanisierter Wahlkampf*' (Americanised election campaign), an accusation still prevalent in German politics today; it recently surfaced, for example, in relation to Gerhard Schröder's election campaign in 1998. The conference was further described as 'circus with a political interlude' ('*Zirkus mit politischem Zwischenspiel*').[131] The report also noted that the election programme

prepared by the leadership was 'accepted unanimously and without discussion'.[132] This is an attempt by official Germany to raise a question implicit in the report: Aren't we Germans more democratic than those who supposedly teach us democracy? Where could true democracy be experienced, when even the political parties and democratic institutions in the USA themselves are all about advertisement, propaganda and presentability? Although this was obviously a confidential report, one not written for mass circulation, it is nevertheless interesting how 'America' was presented to the German Foreign Office.

The SPD politician and intellectual Carlo Schmid[133] (1896–1979) voiced similar sentiments. After travelling in the USA in 1954, Schmid wrote in the following year that the US political parties oriented their policies

> according to the special interests and local traditions of the population in various areas … and serve them [the policies] to the people in an appealing package. … The head offices of all political parties all have the appearance of the public relations departments of larger Chambers of Commerce or of the advertisement departments of large insurance corporations.[134]

A few years later, however, the accusations levelled against America, whether overtly or covertly, had been replaced by secret or open admiration. Before the 1961 election, Willy Brandt, then the SPD candidate for the chancellorship, sent a team of election advisers to the USA to find out as much as possible about the Kennedy/Nixon election of 1960.[135]

The anti-American accusation of superficiality and materialism (in the non-Marxist sense) cannot only be seen in relation to television. As stated above, TV simply became the quintessential symbol of that perceived American lack. Lack of taste and intellectual simplicity, however, were detected by early visitors to the USA in other areas as well.

Particularly remarkable, considering the German preference for a furniture style often ridiculed as *Gelsenkirchener Barock*,[136] was the report of a travelling journalist in 1952 on the 'American' sense of interior and garden design:

> When a European sees his first antique shop, he cannot believe his eyes. Outside the shop there is a type of garden full of dwarfs, figurines, roe deer, most importantly: pink flamingos, and a large number of other types of hideousness which our ancestors have banished to the scrap trade a long time ago.[137]

A similarly damning critique of 'American' interior design was made a year earlier by the Bavarian industrialist Otto Seeling after his visit to the Niagara Falls:

> Before our return to Buffalo, we bought picture postcards. It is indescribable how much tastelessness one could find in this souvenir shop. The equivalent shops or stalls in our tourist destinations [*Ausflugsorte*] are arts and crafts shops in comparison.[138]

Even the cultural elites of the USA do not escape Seeling's acerbic pen. After his visit to the Ford Museum in Detroit, he exhibits his self-perceived cultural superiority:

> Besides technical stuff the house also contains all the art that Ford had collected. The whole thing is suffocatingly packed with stuff [*Das Ganze ist von einer erdrückenden Fülle.*] One can see that money was no an object – but it has no system. What is our German Museum [in Munich] in comparison![139]

An exchange student who had been to Yale and Berkeley between 1953 and 1955 gave his verdict on clothing and style in the USA:

> All in all there is more fantasy and more humour, more non-chalance [*sic*], less drabness. It is less imperative to wear expensive clothes, men wear more cottons, e.g. jeans, khaki or denim trousers. Perhaps one could relate this to a certain male ideal, short, very short hair, casual appearance, a reminiscence of the pioneer days, virility. Then again there are many fancy clothes, pink and black, black leather jackets with white lapels for certain youngsters. In short, more freedom of expression, also more lapses of taste.[140]

Finally, Willy Max Rademacher gave his verdict on the New York suburb Coney Island on the Atlantic coast:

> Unfortunately, Coney Island, this mixture of Travemünde Bay and fairground, is rather typical for most seaside resorts, even though Coney Island remains unsurpassed.[141]

All these impressions are not particularly harmful, but more often humorous, and do include comparisons with Germany that do not necessarily flatter the latter. They are not even particularly anti-American.

However, they are interesting when seen in relation to the subject of this chapter. Nobody is denying (either today or in the 1950s) that the Americans, like other cultures, have and have had their fair share of bad taste. What is striking, however, is how regularly this was pointed out by German visitors in the 1950s. The reason for this cannot only be the novelty factor. It also points to two rather more serious interpretations: first, these visitors must have come with certain preconceptions. If one looks for bad taste, one will undoubtedly find it. The fact that the USA and 'America' already had the reputation of tastelessness and cultural superficiality starting in the nineteenth century explains why the theme occurs so often in these reports from the 1950s. Secondly, however, one needs to interpret them within the context of German nationalism and national insecurity. As argued repeatedly in this book, many West Germans tried to re-establish a German national discourse at the expense of 'America'. Whereas some of the comparisons with Germany were simply light-hearted and good-natured, others were more menacing. Although still sounding humorous, the former POW Seeling also insinuated the injustice done to him by the Americans:

> I have forgiven the Americans a few things since I saw what they are doing in their own country [*wie sie es in ihrem Lande treiben*]. The water is chlorinated over here as well. That's why they drink so much whisky and cocktails. Disgusting [*schauerlich*], I am yearning for a proper glass of *Kirschwasser*. That's a real spirit [*Das ist doch ein reeller Schnaps*]![142]

Seeling must have felt bitter about a few things 'the Americans' allegedly did to him and his own country, Germany, since he can forgive them now, after having seen 'what they are doing in their own country'. He does not go into any more detail, but maybe that was unnecessary, since he could assume that his readers would know what he meant (i.e. the alleged injustices committed by the US Army during the occupation of Germany). Understanding alleged American primitiveness allowed Seeling to conclude his report in a somewhat reconciliatory fashion:

> We are not only separated from the Americans by an ocean, but mostly also by our history and culture. America is an unimaginably rich country by nature. We are poor by nature and through the errors of our politics. Therefore, the American way cannot be our way. There are wide areas where we can learn from the Americans. The merits achieved in America are astonishing. But the European is also sometimes amazed by the primitiveness he encounters over there.

Nevertheless I agree with the sentence: [in English] 'Europe needs more American attitude than tools'.[143]

Even though Seeling was obviously impressed by what he had experienced, his praise was not wholehearted. European, and thus German, intellectual and cultural superiority had to be emphasised in order to defend 'the Old Continent' against American dominance.

Another visitor to the USA from a conservative background, the CDU politician Otto Lenz, even emphasised this point at the press conference after an official visit to the USA:

One cannot blame the Americans for simplifying European matters a little bit. For not having the proper understanding [*das Gefühl*] for all these historical difficulties with which Europe is burdened because of her history. Over there, one thinks in a bigger context – over there, one thinks – I would say: more primitively – and one soon wants to see a 'fact' [he used the English term] of the endeavours, the endeavours that America has undertaken in the last years for Europe.[144]

Reinhold Maier (1889–1971), an FDP politician, first post-war prime minister of Württemberg-Baden before the formation of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg in 1952, and Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg 1952–3, visited the USA in 1954 and 1955.[145] Generally highly impressed by the Americans and their commitment to democracy, his observations were similar to Lenz's. In an article for the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* Maier wrote:

The American does not think in a complicated way. We, on the other hand, have been forced to think in a very complicated way [*um zehn Ecken herum*] for years. The American thinks simply, maybe alarmingly simply [*vielleicht bedenklich einfach*].[146]

Whereas earlier examples of alleged superficiality and bad taste were taken from the cultural sphere (in the broadest possible sense, including fashion and tourism), the last few examples were of a different nature: they highlighted the alleged *intellectual* superficiality of 'the Americans', although in a sometimes humorous, light-hearted and conciliatory fashion. This was commonplace in the German published discourse of the time. In his 1955 novel *Am grünen Strand der Spree*, Hans Scholz (who was to become cultural editor of the Berlin quality *Der Tagesspiegel* in 1963) gave voice to a fictional Berlin bar pianist. Talking about his days as a

musician in an American POW camp in the Champagne region, whose task it was to entertain the GIs, he joked about his inability to talk fluent English but concluded: 'Nevertheless, I could never shed the impression that the *Amis* [Americans] themselves were not too good with the English language either.'[147] If the USA could be attacked fundamentally in terms of intellectual ability, the following question automatically arises: how could this not only culturally, but also *intellectually* inferior country claim the right to control matters in West Germany? After that, it is relatively easy to call for full independence from US influence.

4.4   Jazz, rock and roll and *Halbstarke*

> Helmets off helmets off: We've lost. … Take your rusty helmets off: we've lost. … Now jazz is our song. Excited, hectic jazz is our music. And the hot mad frantic song, through which the drums race, catlike, scratching. … Our upidee [*Juppheidi*[148]] and our music are a dance over the abyss that yawns at us. And that music is jazz. For our hearts and our heads have the same hot-cold rhythm: excited, crazy and hectic, unrestrained.
>
> And our girls have the same hot beat in their hands and their hips. And their laughter is hoarse and brittle and hard as a clarinet. And their hair, it crackles like phosphorus. It burns. And their heart has a syncopated beat, savage and sad. Our girls are like that: like jazz. And the nights are like that, the girl-jangling nights, like jazz: hot and hectic. Excited.
>
> Who will write us new laws of harmony for us? We have no further use for well-tempered clavichords. We ourselves are too much dissonance. …
>
> Do you still hear Hölderlin? Do you recognise him, drunk with blood, in fancy dress and arm in arm with Baldur von Schirach? Do you hear the infantryman's song? Do you hear the jazz and the Luther hymns?[149]

The German expressionist writer Wolfgang Borchert wrote this 'Manifesto' in the name of a generation of German men who had sacrificed their youth and innocence to the horrors of war, and who had gone from the classroom straight into battle ('Between Langemark and Stalingrad lay only one mathematics lesson').[150] Hamburg-born Borchert (born 1921) died from a malaria-like fever in Basle in November 1947 after two stints on the Eastern front, sustaining a severe war wound, two war-time imprisonments for plain-speaking in letters, and a death

sentence that was commuted due to his young age. In his posthumously published 'Manifesto', he speaks of the necessary abandonment of all things German, including the poets, Bach (the well-tempered clavichords), grammar, philosophy and sexual morals, in order to be able to love Germany again.

> This we admit: our moral philosophy has nothing more to do with beds, breasts, parsons and petticoats. … Our philosophy is the truth. And the truth is new and hard as death. … Fool your girl at night, but in the morning, in the morning tell her the truth: Say you are going, and forever. Be as kind as death. Nitchevo. Kaputt. For ever. Parti, perdu and nevermore.
>
>   For we are no-men. But we do not say No in despair. Our No is a protest. And there is no peace for us in kisses, for us Nihilists. For into the nothingness, we must again build a Yes.[151]

For Borchert, the music of that nothingness is jazz. Jazz is the antithesis of everything German – Martin Luther, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, the Nazi dictatorship (Hölderlin, drunk on blood, arm in arm with Baldur von Schirach), bourgeois morality and military uniform. Jazz is the soundtrack for the discovery of a new and different Germany, one in which it becomes possible to build a Yes again into the nothingness the war had left behind.

For Borchert, the connotations of jazz were positive, since jazz encouraged severe soul-searching into what Germanness is and what it ought to be after the war. Yet for those Germans wishing to recreate Germanness on the basis of tradition and attempting to salvage the possibility of nationalist discourse, jazz carried mainly negative connotations, albeit for the very same reasons that Borchert praised it. Jazz had been seen as the ultimate expression of cultural 'Americanisation' throughout the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. Culturally conservative observers saw jazz, as much as Borchert did, as the antithesis of all things German, although they loathed it for its alleged levelling affect and supposed cultural inferiority.

Looking at the perception of jazz during 1950s Western Germany, however, one can also see how fragile the connotations of 'Americanisation' and anti-Americanism were. Whereas jazz and swing were regularly dubbed 'Nigger music' during the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship, and whereas swing as an offshoot of jazz was often characterised as both 'Negroid' and Jewish music,[152] thus being used as a vehicle for anti-American and anti-Semitic propaganda, jazz music itself

during the 1950s – with the advent of less 'commercial' forms like cool jazz and bebop – became a form of elite differentiation from the perceived 'Americanisation' of German society.[153] Simultaneously, more consumption- and market-oriented 'Cold War liberals' began to supersede religiously inspired conservatives in West Germany. This led to the gradual acceptance of a 'clean' form of American music, purged of its racial connotations, and culminating in the opening of a state-sponsored 'Jazz Saloon' for youths in West Berlin in April 1960.[154] This redefinition of jazz's connotations, however, was obviously not sudden and total. For a long time, the dichotomous conflicting notion of jazz as 'the American', versus jazz as elitist and anti-American, coexisted and overlapped. Where the 1950s avant-garde Left utilised their love of jazz in the latter sense (see below), conservative anti-Americans still tried to write it off as an alleged form of cultural 'Americanisation'. In part, this might have been due to a conceptual confusion: from the 1920s to the 1950s, a time when 'jazz had many outspoken enemies in Germany … Europeans usually referred to all American popular music as jazz'.[155] It was only in the latter half of the 1950s that a wider public began to distinguish between 'authentic' jazz and lighter, 'commercial' popular music.[156] As far as possible, I shall attempt to clarify this conceptual misunderstanding in the following section in order to establish whether the references refer to 'real' jazz or generally to popular music. I shall also analyse the shift from jazz to rock and roll as the principal signifier of 'Americanisation' during the 1950s.

An example of the 'Weimar interpretation' of jazz as an expression of America, cultural superficiality, even nihilism, is presented in Hans Zehrer's[157] newspaper article 'Jazz – the black man's answer: rhythm as the last principle of order', published in October 1952.

> Around the turn of the century, a number of strange phenomena surfaced. They surfaced from the underground of the suburbs, the fairgrounds [*Rummelplätze*], the dock areas and the brothels. Not only that: they surfaced from the underground of the soul and from the physiological one below the belt, from the unconscious of the individual and from the darkness of the collective soul. … They [the phenomena] have captured the whole world within 50 years and govern her now.[158]

While that is quite obscure, Zehrer soon got to the point: 'Today Louis Armstrong, who emerged from the brothels of New Orleans, carries the honorary title "King of Jazz".'[159] Zehrer was afraid of the 'proletarian

cult' of this culture, and for him, Armstrong's jazz trumpet heralded its dominance. Jazz, he said, 'shows the face of the street: lowbrow, grey, everyday, true, and real, and without mendacity. … It is the music of everyday, the song of the street.'[160] When closing one's eyes while listening to jazz, Zehrer said, one could see the following images in front of the inner eye:

> In the background, the artificial heart of our civilisation beats, the pistons stomp, the cogwheels rattle and the conveyer belts drag. It is the song of our everyday: the hooting of the cars, the whistle of the trains, the ringing of alarm bells, and the sound of the steam whistles and sirens. It is the hard, cold, violent, and relentless rhythm of our world which fills us every day and circles within our blood. The man on the percussion beats the small drums and the kettledrum, the one on the piano hacks, the one on the double-bass plucks the strings – that is the rhythm.[161]

The images of the Industrial Revolution evoked by Zehrer do not signify Manchester-style capitalism, they signify 'America' and jazz. It is important to notice that he always wrote about black jazz musicians, and even entitled the article 'the black man's answer'. The jazz concert he described featured Louis Armstrong in a 'fair pavilion made from cold ferroconcrete' ['*eine Messehalle aus kaltem Eisenbeton*'], and this phrase recurs throughout the article like a *leitmotiv*. This symbol of supposedly American architecture reinforces an uncanny notion of 'Americanised' modernity.

What Zehrer really thought about the 'Americanised' modernity became clear when he defined his aversion to it in more abstract terms: 'This is a time that is nothing like it was for us only yesterday: history, causality, discursive thinking, progress, development, linearity [*Linie*]'. For Zehrer, 'America' signified modernity without progress, modernity stuck in an underworld of cultural superficiality and the automation of life. As shown in a previous chapter,[162] Zehrer always compared America (and the Soviet Union) with the European and Christian Occident. America is not separated from Europe, but it has become the embodiment of the European Enlightenment gone haywire. 'Europe' is history, causality, discourse and real progress, i.e. the progress of the spirit, whereas America is all that the Occident should not become. This interpretation of 'America' is not just a supposedly harmless humouring of the alleged cultural superficiality of American popular culture, it goes much further.

In its most radical form, i.e. in Carl Schmitt,[163] it pits the Christian Occident against liberal democracy.

Zehrer's interpretation of jazz as the antithesis to Germanness was important and common in the early years of the FRG. In November 1952, for example, disgust was expressed in a Protestant parish newsletter in Nuremberg at the fact that a jitterbug dance tournament on the Sunday before Prisoner of War Remembrance Week had been sold out, whereas a concert given in the opera house as part of Remembrance Week had not been fully attended despite the fact that entry had been free of charge.[164] That understanding of jazz was, however, distinctively Weimar conservative in its world-view. During the following years, the connotations of jazz slowly changed. This is not to say that all Germans went along with that change. Even an outside observer, i.e. an American education specialist visiting Hamburg in 1956, got the impression that many Germans parents blamed jazz (rather than rock and roll) for the perceived increasing 'Americanisation' of their offspring:

> Many social customs [in Germany in 1956] seemed 'old-worldish' to me. Families still seem to be very close and children are very polite. But the Germans themselves feel that their way of life is becoming 'Americanised' rapidly, especially among the young people. The great desire for material possessions, such as electrical appliances, cars and motor bikes, is quoted in this connection. It is probably true that German life, while still very much part of the old world tradition, is rapidly acquiring American characteristics. … Many parents complain that their children are corrupted through movies and jazz, in which a tremendous interest exists among the young.[165]

Although this observer does even mention the ultimate status symbol of the *Halbstarken*,[166] the motorbike, and although in the same report he does briefly refer to the problem of *Halbstarke* and juvenile delinquency itself, he still focuses on jazz rather than rock and roll when analysing the perceived 'Americanisation' of Western Germany. One has to wonder, however, whether that might have been his own misinterpretation rather than public opinion in 1956.

In many areas of the public debate, different interpretations of the connotations associated with jazz gained prominence during the 1950s. The slow redefinition process of the connotations of jazz might be best described in Günter Grass's 1959 novel *Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum)*[167]: In the immediate post-war era, the dwarfish protagonist and first-person narrator Oskar embroiders an afternoon in an 'Americanised'

dance hall in Düsseldorf (*Tanzcafe 'Löwenburg'*) with all the insignia of
the American presence in Germany:

> When the cold drink [*Kaltgetränk mit Schuss*] was served, I bought ten
> *Amis* [American cigarettes] from the waiter and took – after lighting
> the lady's cigarette – my amber cigarette-holder in order to smoke a
> Camel half-way down. … The five-man band played 'Don't fence me
> in'. … A lot of chewing gum was moved.[168]

The dance floor is surrounded by racketeers and 'easy women'. Oskar
dances a shuffle ('*Schieber*') with his woman, a nurse. Soon he is taken
for an American because of his expensive suit: 'Didn't I tell you, it's a
Jimmy! Look at the Jimmy. Hello, Jimmy! Come on, Jimmy! Let's go,
Jimmy! [Last two exclamations in English]'[169] Although 'Don't fence me
in' was certainly no jazz song, but a 1940s pop song about the American
Wild West, it became *the* favourite song for the first two years after the war
for the listeners of Radio Munich's show 'Midnight in Munich', which
was, according to the cultural historian Hermann Glaser, 'one of the
hottest jazz broadcasts in Europe' at the time. One third of a total of
about 60,000 song requests to the show were for 'Don't fence me in'.[170]
It is therefore certainly no coincidence that Grass chose it to summarise
the café's ambience. Café life and its music in the immediate post-war
era are connected in Grass's imagination with racketeering, prostitution
and American cigarettes – all the insignia of 'America' and the occupa-
tion. This, however, did change dramatically later in the novel. After
the currency reform of June 1948, jazz is seen more as an expression of
counter-culture than of 'Americanisation'. Oskar's friend Klepp changes
his political affiliations from monarchism to communism, and Oskar
and Klepp start up a *Jazzband*. Looking back in 1959, Oskar recalls:

> Once a week I had to endure his [Klepp's] visit, had to listen to his opti-
> mistic jazz tirades, to his musical-Communist Manifesto, because he
> who had been a faithful Royalist while confined to bed became a pay-
> ing member of the KPD [Communist Party of Germany] once I took
> his bed and his bag-pipe Elizabeth [*Dudelsack-Elisabeth*] away from
> him. He still pursues this as an illegal hobby [the KPD was banned in
> West Germany in 1956] by drinking beer, eating blood sausage and
> explaining the beneficial commonalties between a jazz band that is
> employed full-time and a Soviet *kolkhoz* [collective farm] to harmless
> little men standing at the bar reading bottle labels. … Jazz fan was his
> second … confession.[171]

German 1950s youth culture (and counter-culture) experienced a 'war of symbols' ('*Krieg der Zeichen*'):[172] the *Exis* (self-styled 'existentialists'),[173] mainly from the educational and social elites,[174] tried to distinguish themselves from the 'Americanised' working-class culture of the *Halbstarken* (juvenile delinquents; literally: 'half-strong').[175] If anecdotal evidence is to be believed, it even came to fist-fights in some places between those two subcultures.[176] The *Exis* rejected the *Halbstarken* culture of rock and roll, leather jackets and motorbikes by turning to bebop and cool jazz, performed in the favourite *Exis* hangout, the '*Jazz-Keller*'[177] (basement jazz bar): 'Whereas Dixieland and rock and roll carried, in the eyes of the *Exis*, the stigma of the "American", cool jazz signified a "French" and culturally anti-American attitude.'[178] Maase quotes a grammar school boy who 'decided to go for modern jazz quite early on, as I had an aversion to America'.[179] Jean Améry stated in 1960 that jazz was not music for the masses, but music for an elite that tried to distinguish itself 'not without snobbery'.[180] The cultural dichotomy of 1950s youth culture could be summarised as 'rock'n'roll for the working-class youth, jazz for the educated'.[181]

Rock and roll[182] in its early days was seen as an attack on the perceived cultural and social hegemonies in Germany. Before the advent of rock and roll, the German-language *Schlager* tradition was the lowbrow alternative to jazz and classical music. The term had originated in Vienna in the 1860s,[183] and described German-language songs with an overwhelmingly moral-conservative message. The *Schlager* has been described as the musical equivalent of the *Heimatfilm*.[184] Rock and roll, on the other hand, bore the marks of rebellion against sexual norms, societal authority and social stratification, epitomised by Bill Haley, Marlon Brando, James Dean and the early Elvis Presley: 'What to the older generations may have seemed to be the mindless conformity of American culture became the stuff of cultural revolt for the younger generation.'[185] This revolt, however, was not necessarily left-wing in orientation: some members of the German New Right in the 1960s retrospectively praised their French counterparts for adopting the style of the *blousons noir* and for recognising the potential for *right-wing* revolt amongst French rock and roll fans.[186] It also appeared at a time when the socio-economic conditions and educational opportunities for young people had massively improved in comparison to the situation in 1949 or 1950.[187] Although general unemployment was still high in 1955, there was almost full employment for the under-25s.[188] Furthermore, even when things had looked much worse, in the days of high youth unemployment in 1950, contemporaries barely noticed a politically revolutionary mood among

the young.[189] It is therefore necessary to analyse further why in the second half of the 1950s, when the favourable economic situation seemed even less propitious for a social revolution, that *Halbstarken* and rock and roll were seen as such a threat.

Between 1956 and 1958 in West Germany, about 5 per cent of male juveniles (aged 15–20) were *halbstark*.[190] The term, however, had entered public discourse much earlier: according to the historian Reinhold Wagnleitner, the term *Halbstarke* had already been used colloquially in Northern Germany at the end of the nineteenth century.[191] Thomas Grotum writes that it was used for sections of working-class youths in some German regions at that time. Even earlier, in the 1870s, it was a technical term in the prison service for criminal and delinquent persons under the age of 25.[192] Winfried Speitkamp also traces the term back to the Wilhelmine Empire, where it was used for various youth subcultures in some large cities.[193]

In June 1951, Hans Zehrer published an article in the *Sonntagsblatt* about '*Die Halbstarken von Texas*', in which he described 'their customs and rituals' ('*ihre Sitten und Gebräuche*').[194] They had copied their casual clothing and demeanour, Zehrer claimed, from the actors James Stewart and Robert Taylor. A few months earlier, in March, Zehrer had concluded an article about the relationship between juvenile crime and the cinema[195] with an observation about the 'so-called *Halbstarken*':

> One only has to look at the high number of so-called *Halbstarke* – when they leave the cinema, excited but with cold eyes, [they] light a cigarette purposely casually, talk curtly and secretively, throw the long hair back boldly, and amble out into the street with a heavy and rolling gait. They all live in the 'world of the quick grab' [*Welt des schnellen Griffes*]: for the Colt, into the till [*in die Ladenkasse*], and for the girl; in adventure, in crime, and in vice. … [T]his world of the *Halbstarke* […] slowly begins to become representative for the whole and shows the actual living [*eigentlich-lebendige*] face of the culture we live in.[196]

In addition to the highly sexualised presentation of rock and roll (and thus 'America'), which will be dealt with in a later section,[197] rock and roll concerts and films unleashed a public display of aggression in the shape of the *Halbstarken-Krawalle* (teenage riots) from late 1955 onwards in West Berlin and other German cities.[198] Cinemas and concert halls were demolished and shopwindows smashed, and this triggered a media campaign linking the riots to the alleged shortcomings of American

culture.[199] Between 1956 and 1958, 96 riots were reported in 28 cities, including some in the GDR.[200] The West Berlin police alone counted 36 riots and arrested 309 males between April and September 1956.[201] In the north German city of Bremen, about 500 adolescents formed a spontaneous protest march to the city centre, blocking streets and tram lines, after watching a rock and roll movie in November 1956.[202] In October 1958, Bill Haley and the Comets performed in a Hamburg concert hall (*Ernst-Merck-Halle*). Some young men got into a fight with students recruited as bouncers to ensure no riots would take place. The scuffle escalated and the police had to be called to clear the concert hall.[203] In its next edition, the influential weekly *Die Zeit* branded rock and roll an epidemic and likened its fans to 'a pack of predatory animals looking for prey'.[204]

The *Halbstarken* movement consisted to a large extent of young male apprentices[205] and workers.[206] Juveniles from middle- and upper-class backgrounds kept their distance, so these consisted mainly of unskilled male workers, apprentices and unemployed from working-class families.[207] Only 17 of 445 people arrested for rioting in Berlin between April and October 1956 were female.[208] The harsh reaction in the German press to rock and roll was an expression of fear and not just a smug presentation of cultural superiority. The *Halbstarken* were probably the earliest visible movement of discontent in the young FRG. This was all the more surprising, since the lyrics were often hardly rebellious.[209] Part of the German media reacted with anxiety and reiterated cultural stereotypes ('*Urwaldmusik*') similar to the ones used against jazz and swing in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.[210] It is not so much the outrage against that type of music that was interesting, since many Americans were similarly outraged. It was rather the connection immediately drawn between the *Halbstarken*, *Urwaldmusik* and the supposed superiority of European culture over American culture. Old clichés were conjured up to discredit a new social phenomenon. The at times hysterical reaction to rock and roll as a sign of the 'Americanisation' of Germany have been interpreted as a reaction to a supposed lack of respect for the existing socio-cultural hierarchy, including a lack of respect for private property and social order. Rather than questioning capitalism and the social order, however, many young people were simply reacting to what they perceived as stuffy and outdated. Dress codes and gestures certainly challenged sexual norms, and in that respect rock and roll was a rebellion, in both Germany and the USA. In Germany, it can certainly be said that it was also a radical rebellion, because youth policies during that period were most seriously concerned with adolescent sexuality, or rather preventing it.[211]

But the *Halbstarken* rebels did not advocate socialism. They were look-ing for a society with more relaxed social norms, and rock and roll and other 'American' expressions of youth culture were used to express that desire.[212] The *Halbstarken* did find 'the newest American music a tool for provoking the rage of respected society',[213] as the cultural historian Diethelm Prowe argued, but they were not 'convincing as carriers of any kind of a democratic working-class culture'.[214] Even some contempo-raries remarked that the *Halbstarken* phenomenon as a serious long-term threat to public order was being blown out of proportion by the popular press.[215] Once society had become more open in the early 1960s, rock and roll began to lose its appeal as a means to provoke.

Slowly throughout the later 1950s, attitudes relaxed and a new type of anti-American resentment surfaced in relation to rock and roll. Shrewd music management, it was claimed, turned the rebellious *Halbstarken* into consumerist and apolitical *teenagers*.[216] This time, the criticism often came from the Left. The cultural historian Jost Hermand, for instance, has claimed that especially adolescents from the lower social classes per-ceived rock and roll, for a while, as both rebellious and a liberation from inflexible cultural norms,[217] but he concluded that the culture indus-try channelled this potential resentment into escapist entertainment.[218] Hans-Jürgen von Wensierski has argued that the 'commercialisation of juvenile protest' had begun as early as 1955, i.e. *before* the worst riots of 1956 and 1957.[219] These riots, he claimed, had merely been a sponta-neous alliance of authentic juvenile protest and the economic interests of the emerging mass consumption industry.[220]

Some contemporaries agreed. Journalists soon condemned the alleged commodification of juvenile anger and excitement by the music indus-try. In 1957, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* journalist Andreas Razumowsky detected first signs of a commercialised and 'Americanised' teenage culture which seemed to promise fun, community and 'the safe promiscuity of the Brave New World',[221] thus likening 'America' with Aldous Huxley's seminal anti-utopian 1932 novel.[222] Razumowski concluded his article with a call to take a 'mental note' of 'the gigan-tic business that is made with the psychological problems of insecure juveniles' ('*seelische Not haltloser Halbwüchsiger*').[223]

In 1960, the Radio Bremen jazz journalist Siegfried Schmidt-Joos wrote:

> Then it was realised how much these hot rhythms aroused especially young people. There were the first scandals about smashed chairs and concert halls. The managers saw their chance. If rock music in its hard

version could be so stimulating, then a played down version should generate sales in huge numbers.[224]

As a result, he argued, the popular music of the day lost out in quality, since the simplified and watered-down version of rock and roll was enough to generate sales: 'a hoarse voice, a tenor saxophone, an electric guitar, and a simple teenage scream fully sufficed'.[225]

In an inversion of the conservative fears of rock and roll, the Left saw its hell-raising potential as a plus, and was disappointed when the likes of Peter Kraus, Conny Froebes and Ted Herold[226] produced an acceptable and marketable (German) version of it. Even Elvis Presley fell out of favour with the Left after his tour of Germany as an American GI in 1958. Whereas the famous photo of Elvis leaving the ship in Bremerhaven in military uniform instantly turned him into German mothers' ideal son-in-law, the Left saw this (although quite often in retrospect) as the funeral of rock and roll.[227]

The acceptance of American culture declined slightly during the 1950s in Western Germany. In 1950, 18 per cent of Germans in the former American zone thought they could learn from America in terms of culture; in 1956, only 16 per cent agreed.[228] Axel Schildt has argued that the spectacular success of American cultural products among young Germans might have stimulated anti-American resentments in the older generation.[229] Although the fears initially linked to rock and roll and the resulting *Halbstarken* riots proved to be unfounded after its domestication, rock and roll still seemed to confirm American cultural superficiality. When fears of a social revolt subsided, the fear of a culturally superficial German youth as a result of the popularity of American popular music continued.

Peter Duignan and Lewis Gann remind us, albeit rather defensively, that 'the US continued to develop its own "high culture" in a variety of ways',[230] namely through amateur dramatics, church choirs, symphony orchestras[231] and, most importantly, scholarship, yet public perception of American culture did not take that into account. As shown above, as soon as something as quintessentially American as jazz became popular among intellectuals, it also seemed to lose its significance as something 'American' in the West German discourse. When jazz became the choice of the intellectuals, it was simultaneously 'Europeanised' in public perception. In order to rescue German (and European) self-definition of cultural superiority, it seems, 'America' needed to be seen as inferior. Rock and roll fulfilled that function, after jazz had been 'Europeanised'. For a positive redefinition of Germanness after 1945, 'America' needed to

be used as the embodiment of superficiality. German nationalism defined itself, once again, not with America, but against it.

4.5   'The most spoiled women in the world'

It was not only the allegedly revolutionary potential of rock and roll that provoked its denunciation in Germany (and in the USA). The explicit sexuality of the musical genre was also used in Western Germany as a counter-image to what was perceived as German. Elvis 'the Pelvis' Presley shocked the protagonists of established morality through provocative sexual gestures and body movements, i.e. his infamous hip gyrations.[232] This sexualisation of the public sphere was reflected in Germany in a further contemporary nickname for the *Halbstarken*, now all but forgotten: *Mädchenkönners* (literally: 'those who can do [it with] girls'). The *Halbstarken* were portrayed by their contemporaries as sexually active before marriage, and according to oral history evidence, they often *were* sexually active, unlike most of their middle-class teenage counterparts.[233]

Whereas Presley's sexualised movements were equally shocking to certain strata of US society (in 1956, he was allowed to perform there, but only on condition that he didn't move),[234] the import of Presley's music into Germany further enhanced the perception that a less stringent moral code was moving from the USA across the Atlantic Ocean and into Germany. In December 1956, the usually rather liberal weekly *Der Spiegel* ran a title story about Presley and ecstatic female Presley fans throwing underwear on the stage, headlined 'From Dixieland to Kinseyland'.[235] The magazine expressed surprise at the rapture that Presley, this 'sextraordinary personality', evoked in middle-class teenagers who 'allowed themselves to be transported from Dixieland to Kinseyland'.[236] The Kinsey Reports, the first comprehensive studies of first male then female sexual behaviour in the US,[237] were considered a further step away from sexuality based on intra-marriage relationships, towards a hedonistic and 'mobile'[238] sexuality.

Reception of the Reports in Germany, to be outlined later in this chapter (section 4.5.1), fed into stereotypes about *the* American woman already prevalent in Western Germany. The American woman and her alleged misbehaviour was widely commented on in the FRG. Her independence was seen as a threat to the supposedly God-given patriarchal family structure, and 'America' was thus rejected on the grounds of the supposedly revolutionary position women occupied in modern society. Gender equality was nothing German conservatives of the day desired (section 4.5.2).

With reference to the supposedly 'Americanised' gender structures of the post-war period in West Germany, it has been argued that social conservatives utilised moralistic sentiments in order to re-establish the patriarchal gender structure in Germany, one that based women's lives on the proverbial 'three Ks': *Kinder*, *Küche*, *Kirche*.[239] The war had forced many women into the lower-paid end of the labour market and thus into the role of breadwinner for their father- and husband-less families. At the end the war, millions of men were either dead or in Allied POW camps, especially in the Soviet Union, where they remained sometimes for years. In Bavaria in 1946, for example, the male/female ratio was 162 women to every 100 men in the 20–35 years age group.[240] In the whole of Western Germany in 1950, there was a similar lack of balance, with only 77 men aged 25–45 to 100 women of the same age group.[241] Women thus had to remain in their newly acquired roles as breadwinners and take responsibility as *Trümmerfrauen* ('rubble women') in clearing up the devastation that Allied air raids and land attacks had imposed on German cities.[242] *Trümmerfrauen* employment hardly features in official statistics. They often worked unofficially, since their employment in 'male' hard labour constituted a legal grey area.[243]

This sometimes led to conflict when husbands and fathers returned from the war or the POW camps and attempted to reassert themselves as family decision-makers and disciplinarians without accepting the new socio-cultural circumstances.[244] Many children who were conceived during their father's brief leave from the front had never met their fathers and now had to accept 'that uncle'[245] as a figure of authority and importance.[246] Although the Allies had reintroduced traditional family law, cleansed of the worst Nazi excesses, by 1946 and thus reintroduced legal male authority over wives and children,[247] the years of absence had left a mark on family structures. Many returning soldiers found it difficult to accept the newfound independence of their wives.[248] Many men, returning from the war as 'losers', also reverted to aggression and – at times sexual – violence.[249] In consequence, the divorce rate in Germany rose rapidly. Between 1939 and 1948, the year many POWs returned home, the number of divorces in the area then occupied by the Allies more than doubled.[250] As Dagmar Herzog has remarked, the reconstruction of 'domesticated heterosexuality', an important component of the transition from National Socialism to liberal democracy, was by no means self-evident in 1945.[251]

As early as 1948, women in the workforce had become perceived as a problem: after the currency reform, many firms laid off employees, since the new currency initially made labour less affordable. At the same time,

people previously engaged in the grey economy had to look for legitimate work. Unemployment soared, especially among women. Nevertheless, the former heroines of the 'rubble years' often had their application for benefits rejected on the grounds that their household duties made them unavailable for paid unemployment.[252]

The 'problem' of female independence needed to be addressed. Reviving the traditional family as a normative concept was seen as one means to counteract supposedly disturbing changes to society. Not only the revival of a more traditional role of femininity had to be addressed, but also the 'reconstruction of masculine citizenship' in the face of war-time defeat and the degrading experience of POW imprisonment especially in the East.[253] 'By the early years of the Adenauer era, continuing signs of female independence were condemned in the press and discouraged through social policy', Heide Fehrenbach wrote.[254] Many women in traditionally male occupations lost their jobs.[255] In addition, there was serious discrimination against married female civil servants at least until 1953.[256] Single women were also often informally discriminated against in favour of young married couples.[257] It has even been claimed that as late as the 1970s, mainstream historiography largely ignored women's survival work after 1945, at least outside the heroic legend of the 'rubble women'.[258] Only after 1959, when the economic circumstances demanded more labour, female employment began to be required again, at least in the form of part-time work.[259] Part-time work was from then on often described as a 'positive compromise' between household duties and female employment.[260]

It has been argued (in relation to 1950s recipe books in the USA) that the reiteration of socially conservative moral standards is not necessarily an indication of social reality, but more an indication of what the proponents of such standards desired – the 'relentless repetition of gender norms [was] an articulation of general fears and uncertainties about those norms'.[261] In Germany, the easiest solution, it seemed, was simply to try to reverse the social trends outlined above. That, however, had to be popularised first. Women's magazines certainly had a major impact in presenting more traditional family norms in the post-war era.[262] But simply stating the norm was not enough – the assumed consequences of *not* returning to that norm had to be highlighted. The following section will show how a totally distorted image of women in the USA was used to evoke a rejection of 'America' and certain Western values, i.e. the supposed independence of American women and their seemingly egalitarian position within society. To some extent, the participants in this discourse could refer to a similar debate in Weimar Germany,

where women, and especially American women, had come to 'symbolize all the contradictions and ambiguities, as well as the opportunities, of modernity'.[263] Nevertheless, new elements were added in the 1950s to accommodate the vastly different context of the experience of mass female employment in the latter half of the Second World War and in the immediate post-war era. Anti-Americanism was utilised in the 1950s in order to re-establish the normative family concept (and thus 'domesticated heterosexuality')[264] by describing the 'American women' (and 'Americanised' German women) as a dystopia of gender relations.

4.5.1 'From Dixieland to Kinseyland'

In 1955, two years after the publication of the second Kinsey Report, on female sexuality, the German radio and TV journalist Peter von Zahn published a second book about his experiences in the New World, *An den Grenzen der Neuen Welt.* Under the heading 'No Limits to Frankness' (*Keine Grenzen der Offenherzigkeit*), he reported he had seen a lot of rather embarrassed American women in the streets and hotel foyers of the USA:[265]

> Recently it seems that a lot of American ladies look into male eyes with slight embarrassment. Not because they were enchanted by the new Kinsey Report. No. But because almost 6,000 of the long-haired gender talked shop [*aus der Schule geplaudert*]. [They talked] with a frankness, as if it was the most natural thing in the world to tell a total stranger, a university lecturer, how often and with what result they exchanged caresses of an intimate nature with a man before marriage. … There is no transliteration and no euphemism: it describes in every detail, sometimes in a terminology which is too medical, and definitely with exact percentages, what previous generations would only dare to whisper … . Yet people with an over-heated imagination should keep their hands off [the Report]. They will be disappointed: The relationship between the Kinsey Reports and erotically arousing literature is like the relationship between the German rail timetable and an [erotic] adventure in the sleeping-car.[266]

Von Zahn conveys two messages at the same time. He both portrays American women as shameless and indiscreet while also perpetrating European cultural stereotypes. Sexuality in the USA, it appears, is based on percentages and medical research. The image of Europe, however, seems to be encapsulated in an erotic adventure on the Orient Express. Possibly in reaction to the first Kinsey Report (1948), the editor-in-chief

of the respected West Berlin daily *Der Tagesspiegel*, Erik Reger, had used a similar analogy after visiting the USA in 1950:

> Will even love become a mass product, a standardised commodity in America? A letter to the editor published in a magazine says about today's type of girl [*der heutige Girl-Typ*]: [in English] 'They provoke desire, but they prevent achievement.' Is that true? A question mark remains. 'Sex Appeal' plays too big a public role [in the USA] to influence the intimate [sphere]. … There are books with the most daring sexual topics, but they are so 'scientific', so [repeats the word in German] that they differ from eroticism, from gallant literature like the pictures in a botany book from the nature of a flowering twig.[267]

There are a number of reports like von Zahn's on the participation of US citizens in sex questionnaires. The Bremen economist Alfred Jacobs and his wife Margret, for example, both civil servants for the state of Bremen with an academic background, reported on their research trip to the USA in 1960. While there they interviewed a doctor of Viennese origin, Christofer Tietze of the National Committee of Maternal Health, about his participation in the research for the US National Health Survey:

> [According to our conversation], Americans, and especially American women, very willingly and frankly reveal information about very private and intimate things in these representative surveys (they used to be interviews, but since 1960 are self-evaluations). This seems to be an expression of the rather extraordinary mentality of the Americans. For example: 2,712 white women aged 18 to 40 years were questioned about very intimate things (e.g. contraception) in a Michigan University survey about the 'growth of American families'. Ten per cent did not reply at all. Only ten women [of those who did reply] refused to answer these specific questions.[268]

The last report about the willingness of Americans to express intimate details of their private lives was not particularly judgemental, but rather expressed surprise or even secret admiration, yet there were also harsh criticisms of Kinsey and 'America' as such. The prominent German sociologist Helmut Schelsky was among those critics. During the 1950s, Schelsky repeatedly expressed his distaste for the allegedly new branch of social science epitomised by the Kinsey Reports. He contrasted Kinsey's

social norms with the Roman Catholic tradition, and thus came to unfavourable conclusions about Kinsey:

> The peoples of Roman Catholic tradition, far more sophisticated [*lebensklüger*] in their sexual norms and institutions, have kept the borders of the unnormable and fundamentally private much clearer; thus the facts of the Kinsey Reports are neither shocking to them, nor are they particularly interested in the reverse moralistic sermons [*umgekehrte Moralpredigten*] of [the reports].[269]

The Kinsey Reports, in Schelsky's view, contained elements epitomising the prevailing Protestantism, if not Puritanism, of the USA:

> The specifically American of the Kinsey Reports should not be over-looked: the modern metaphysical fundament of this country – the combination of Puritan moral perfectionism and the equally typical perfectionism of conformity.[270]

Schelsky accused Kinsey of eroding moral values by scientific means. By describing certain sexual activities and types of intermarital behaviour as commonplace, Schelsky argued, sexual science thus turned them into normality:

> [Kinsey's] thesis that these varieties … of sexual activity are 'natural' means more: Because they are part of human beings' nature, it is illegitimate to restrict and denounce them through social and cultural norms and taboos, i.e. the biologically natural variety of sexual behaviour has to be *morally accepted*. A new normativity is derived from biological facts. … One can call this naturally variable sexual behaviour 'democratic pluralism of sexuality' and ask for 'tolerance' towards it … . Kinsey's arguments and reformist intentions turn biology and statistics into normative academic disciplines.[271]

Schelsky's real intention in attacking Kinsey so viciously and sarcastically was a defence of the normative societal model of the nuclear family. In a sense, he is still dealing with a particularly German problem, i.e. the erosion of the traditionally normative family model through the enforced war-time absence of husbands and fathers. When writing about the effects of Kinsey's alleged new normative standards, this becomes all too clear:

> The pseudo-leadership of science within the intimate and personal area has enhanced the insecurity and discontinuity of behaviour.

On this basis, the shattering and pernicious influence of the Kinsey Reports cannot be overstated: soldiers in Korea and thousands of women with marital difficulties … alike will interpret these in the light of Kinsey's statistics and will finally know 'what should or ought to be different in their marriages'.[272]

Substitute the Second World War for 'Korea', and the specifically German dimension to Schelsky's diatribes is obvious. Schelsky as a moral conservative wanted traditional solutions to the modern problem of mass (or 'total') war. In 1953, he had summarised what he saw as the status quo in West Germany: 'A decline or a transfer of male-parental [*väterliche*] authority in favour of a transfer of importance within the family towards the housewife and mother in the constitution of the German family can … be presumed as a fact.'[273] Although one should assume, Schelsky continued, that this transfer of power would have been rectified by the end of the war and the return of the male breadwinner, this did not happen.[274] Consequently, the father of the family had lost his institutional position of power in the family, even within the blue-collar working class (*Industriearbeiterschaft*).[275] Whereas these sections might be seen as merely descriptive, albeit an overstatement of the real situation of housewives in 1953, Schelsky's normative intentions become obvious when he describes 'the most noble practical task of family sociology':

It seems to me the most noble practical task of family sociology to prove the family and its existence as a value and an aim, as the social-moral central idea [*Leitidee*] of social policy and, even further, of the economic system and the definition of citizenship as such.[276]

The Kinsey Reports, Schelsky feared, would undermine the validity of the traditional family model by declaring the complex nature of human (sexual) intercourse to be normal, thus creating new normative standards not in line with more traditional family norms.

Some visitors to the USA were quite surprised to observe relatively open expressions of sexuality in the USA unheard of in Germany at that stage, including plenty of '*Handgreiflichkeiten*' (canoodling) in the study hall of Pittsburgh's Carnegie University.[277] In Schelsky's eyes, that was typical of the unlimited search for risk-free pleasure ('*risikolose Genußsucht*') allegedly so widespread and common in America.[278] He regarded 'petting' as a compromise between the fundamental desire for and dependency on sexual pleasure, the habitual refusal to take risks and the consideration of moral values that are nevertheless seen as merely

superficial.[279] Moreover, 'Kinsey's orgasm statistics' ('*Orgasmus-Statistik Kinseys*')[280] created new social conventions, in which sexual success in terms of sexual fulfilment forced new social pressures on individuals who wanted to be seen as successful:[281] 'The elimination of prudishness turns into a compulsion for sexual promiscuity, unless one wants to be suspected by society as abnormal.'[282] Schelsky was worried that traditional institutions and conventions that used to regulate human sexual desire ('*menschliche Triebwelt*') would be replaced by

> [p]sychotherapy and psychological welfare, conscious sex education and organised marital guidance, *birth-control* and *child-guidance clinics*, group pedagogy and *human relations*, the whole apparatus of modern soul technique [*moderne Seelentechnik*] or *'social engineering'* …[283]

It is obvious that Schelsky was uncomfortable not only with the Kinsey Reports, but with many other 'modern' approaches to dealing with society's alleged ills. But it was not only sexual research that upset him, but also psychotherapy, sex education, birth control, marriage guidance, and the like. Here he is partially at odds with many post-war Germans, for whom sexual discussions were important.[284] If anything, the first seven or eight post-war years saw a 'hyperventilated fascination' with an alleged sexual crisis.[285] With the publication of the Kinsey Reports, some German commentators even scoffed at the prudishness and backwardness of American attitudes towards sexuality.[286] It has also to be stressed that the academic discipline of *Sexualforschung* did not originate in post-war America, but had flourished in inter-war Germany.[287] The sex researcher and gay rights campaigner Magnus Hirschfeld had founded the Berlin medical research Institute for Sexual Science in 1919. He had started his campaign for the decriminalisation of homosexuality as early as 1897.[288] The Weimar German Sex Reform movement, consisting of almost 150,000 doctors, social workers, and lay persons, had argued for the legalisation of abortion, the promotion of contraception and sex education, and promoted a woman's right to sexual satisfaction.[289] And it was, after all, the Austrian Sigmund Freud who had instigated the public and academic discourse on sexuality long before the Weimar Sex Reform movement. It was Hitler's access to power in 1933 which forced Hirschfeld and his colleagues to emigrate, thus exporting *Sexualforschung* to the USA. Even the young FRG had seen a 'questionnaire about the intimate sphere' ('*Die Umfrage in der Intimsphäre*') in 1949, published in 1953 (and revealing widespread pre-marital sex).[290] What was portrayed after 1945 as 'American', i.e. the allegedly new 'hedonistic' understanding of

sexuality and the alleged lack of commitment to traditional morality, was thus just as much an inner-German discourse, stretching back to the Weimar Republic, in relation to which socio-cultural anti-Americanism was utilised in order to criticise genuinely German socio-cultural developments. Even after 1945, birth control and sexual enlightenment were still burdened with the stigma of being 'Jewified' and degenerate,[291] and thus perceived as 'American'. Schelsky had been a member of an informal think-tank of morally conservative academics long before publishing his treatise. As early as 1952, he met regularly with the reactionary Hamburg University academic Hans Harmsen and the education expert Curt Bondy. According to a Rockefeller Foundation report about Harmsen, 'He, Schelsky, and Bondy meet to exchange ideas on their broad common interest, the emergence of modern social problems'.[292] Harmsen had been 'the only prominent Weimar sex reformer to collaborate actively with the National Socialists and their sterilization programs, [who had] moved relatively seamlessly into the leadership of the post-war family planning organization, *Pro Familia*.'[293] (The Weimar Sex Reform activist Anne-Marie Durant-Wever, however, who maintained a distance from involvement with the Nazis and later confronted the German Nazi past directly and uncompromisingly, was pushed to the sidelines as vice president of *Pro Familia*.[294]) Incidentally, Harmsen was even supported by US foundations committed to the re-education of the German people. Soon after the foundation of the FRG, he was awarded a $2,575 travel grant to Britain and the USA by the Rockefeller Foundation.[295] That did not change his mindset, however: As late as 1979, Harmsen did not attempt to conceal his anti-Semitic ideology by bitterly complaining in an interview with the cultural historian Atina Grossmann that, in the 1920s, he was not promoted at the Berlin University Hygiene Institute because he was neither a socialist nor a Jew.[296] Bondy, on the other hand, had spent the Nazi years in exile in the USA, where he taught at the College of William and Mary.[297]

The Kinsey Reports, however, sparked a wider debate about the allegedly loose sexual morals of 'the Americans'. Some observers agreed with Schelsky's interpretations, although possibly not with his moral rigidity. A German exchange student in the USA reported on 'the system of "dating" ':

I was brought up to think that a man should have a girlfriend, a somewhat more personal girlfriend, but not that such a girlfriend should be a 'date' only, so that he could go out with different girls in the same period of time or different ones each time. I can see the system is very

practical – mutual needs are satisfied – but there is little genuine feeling in it. … [in summary: The system has humour and practicality] … But there is something cynical about it. The omnipresence of psychology in America is symptom and source of this rationalism. What is startling is the frankness with which popular opinion has adopted dating as the most intelligent solution of early relationships between the sexes. Dating appears like a 'logical' conclusion once the situation is realistically approached. This applies to birth control too.[298]

The author's uneasiness here is obvious. Although he acknowledges the practicalities of the system of 'dating', he is also disturbed by them. According to this author, sexuality and love are reduced to practicalities and logic, thus moving away from the ideal of eternal love.

A large section of the West German discourse on 'American' sexuality focused on *the* American woman and will be dealt with in the next section. West German contemporary discourse saw attempts to brand the whole American population as sex-crazed and degenerate. This discourse had different aims and methods and thus has to be separated from the misogynism which focused on 'loose women'. Leo Matthias's *Entdeckung Amerikas Anno 1953* is a prime example of the attempt to term all of America degenerate. He claimed that '[t]here is no other country [but the USA] where sexual desire has found such a crude and brutal expression'.[299] A New York striptease bar, where – as Matthias has observed – American men sometimes spent three or four hours watching women undress, made a Paris brothel scene look like an ancient Greek vase.[300] Von Zahn went as far as jokingly condoning rape when being confronted with a sixteen-year old divorcee in Lexington, Kentucky in 1955:

Nobody seems to mind [her age]. According to popular legends stemming from the days of the pioneers, a fifteen-year old virgin is the cause of extreme surprise in Kentucky or Tennessee and is explained by her ability to run faster than the neighbour's son.[301]

At least in terms of the public debate, the 'sexual revolution' in Western Germany had begun long before the mid-1960s.[302] Nazism had done its part to create a society more secularised than Britain and the USA at the time.[303] As we have seen, the early 1950s had even already experienced a backlash, if not a 'sexual counter-revolution'. Schelsky and others were part of a discourse that certainly changed from the early to mid-1950s onwards, when the emphasis switched to issues such as the sanctity of marriage.[304] Sexuality was very much out in the open

long before the further liberalisation that came about in the 1960s. Not only literature (arguably always riskier when it comes to sexuality), but also academia and the popular press were involved in direct discussions of the issue. This backlash, however, was less directed at the USA, and was more an attempt to rectify the perceived social upheavals that followed Germany's unconditional surrender in 1945 and the poverty and deprivation that followed. However, attempts were made to blame changing morals in Western Germany on foreign influence rather than on developments within Germany. In order to counteract German feminist demands, social conservatives created a *femme fatale* image of *the* American women.

4.5.2   '*Frauenstaat Amerika*'

Besides the discourse on sexuality and the alleged loss of (female) innocence in both Germany and the USA, another sex-related topic came to the fore in the public discussion in 1950s Western Germany. American women were not merely presented as driven by sexual desire, but they were also described as selfish, hedonistic and too powerful. At a time of similar or even stronger uncertainty, during the crisis-ridden years of the Weimar Republic, some of these issues had already come to the fore. As in the 1950s, *the* American woman had been attacked for her alleged shortcomings during the Weimar years, while the real target were 'modern' German women who had gained the right to vote, were increasingly involved in the workplace, had easier access to contraceptives and tended to remain unmarried for longer in a period of changing sexual norms.[305] It was thus easy to rehash some of these Weimar sentiments in the 1950s, while adding some new ones. The popular press played a vital role in popularising clichés of *the* American woman. The West Berlin newspaper *B.Z.* commented about Marlon Brando in January 1954 that his popularity with American women was not astonishing since the American woman 'is the most spoiled woman in the world … who so often and with such pleasure stresses that she reigns over her man, [and who] does not hide anymore that her heart and her senses react most strongly to the brutal gorilla sex appeal'.[306] For many German observers, an even bigger problem than the alleged loose morals of 'the American woman' was her perceived dominance over her husband, sometimes enhanced by the household technical progress that liberated women from a lot of work in the domestic sphere. Even younger Germans were bemused by certain elements of domestic American culture seeming to confirm that stereotype of female dominance. In 1955, a German journalist was surprised to see the father of an American family doing the washing-up.[307]

A young German architectural student on a scholarship to the USA from January 1955 to April 1956 was so impressed by the image of an art history professor washing the dishes that he described this as 'typical' in his scholarship report (written in English), submitted five years after his stay:

> The family … was certainly as typical [*sic*] American as possible. Man and wife taught at the university. The 15-year-old son had just bought his first used car for 100 dollars from his babysitting income. His mother explained [to] us enthusiastically her electric blanket. Her husband, the professor of art history, was doing the dishes.[308]

The wife of a travelling business journalist observed that housework was relatively light for many women anyway:

> Since over there men are often not able to earn money as quickly as their women spend it, women often also have to work in a job, in an office, as a sales person, produce ice-cream, and so on. Domestic work is easily done. The wonderfully constructed household gadgets help a lot.[309]

In August 1956, the *Badische Neue Nachrichten* newspaper even characterised the whole of the USA as a country run by women ('*Frauenstaat Amerika*').[310] Leo Matthias, in his influential 1953 report quoted above, stated that '[t]he power of the American woman is the most monstrous form of women's power history has known'.[311] He claimed that the American woman had exchanged 'her birthright', femininity, for equality rights ('*das Linsengericht einer Anzahl von Rechten*'[312]) that were fundamentally inferior to her birthright. College education for women, especially in women's colleges like Wellesley College, had alienated women from their nature and thus destroyed their ability to live happily with men.[313] In consequence, '[t]he femininity of women has disappeared in America'.[314] Instead of charm and femininity, contemporary observers seem to insinuate, American women preferred to use their legal rights to achieve their goals. Otto Seeling reported on the tendency of American girls to drag the man they want to the justice of peace for a shotgun wedding ('*Schnellheirat*') whenever it suited them: 'American girls tend to insist on their certificate like Shylock.'[315]

The journalist Hans Zehrer even feared that the whole Western world was living in 'the epoch of the woman'.[316] He described the alleged female dominance in the West as 'Amazons in a world of steel and concrete', an obvious allusion to 'American' modernist architecture. One of

his main proofs for the female dominance thesis was the fact that 'two-thirds of American wealth is in the hands of widows'.[317] About three years earlier, he had been expressing his fears about the allegedly disproportionate financial sex balance by claiming that two-thirds of the massive American wealth was in the hands of women.[318] One of the consequences of the lack of 'real men' in the face of all-powerful women, he argued, was that male 'homosexuality was as rampant as a plague'.[319]

Although these portrayals of alleged female dominance in the USA are often grossly exaggerated, even the German Diplomatic Mission in the USA considered the political and social influence of women there to be unique. In April 1951, a *Frauenreferat* (women's department) was established as a special department at the German Diplomatic Mission in Washington to 'reflect the impressive position of American women and their great influence upon public life'.[320] No other Diplomatic Mission (the forerunner of the West German embassies) had such a department, it was unprecedented in German diplomatic history.[321] This is significant since even 'official Germany' seems to have considered the role of women in American public life more noteworthy than that of women in other Western countries.

Coming back to the initial argument about the attempt to revive traditional gender roles in post-war Germany by attacking the alleged unnaturalness of American female dominance: some historians have argued that many German women themselves saw their employment in the 1950s as temporary.[322] This argument could be supported by the fact that, until 1969, the female vote for the socially conservative CDU in general elections was about 10 per centage points higher than the male CDU vote.[323] This had been a pattern in the Weimar Republic too, when women voted for conservative parties like the Catholic Centre Party in greater numbers than men.[324] Nevertheless, that does not show that the mechanism of public opinion and even propaganda were not utilised to achieve that commonly shared state of mind. The examples shown above have documented that there was, to say the least, a misrepresentation of femininity in the USA of the 1950s. It has also become clear that a lot of attention was devoted to that topic. The socially conservative elements in Germany distorted sex relations in the USA to make a point about the present and the future of women and family life in Germany. Yet again, West German anti-Americanism based on alleged American hedonism was not primarily concerned with the USA. German reviewers argued, for instance, that single mothers who sent their children to the cinema in order to be able to spend time with their lovers at home were responsible for juvenile delinquency.[325] The critique of 'America' was

thus a moral crusade against socio-cultural developments within Germany. The USA, of course, did have an impact on the sex structure in Western Germany. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, for example, has outlined the material and idealistic support given to West German women's organisations in the run-up to the creation of the *Grundgesetz* (West German constitution) by the HICOG Women's Affairs Section. Without this support, he argued, legal equality between men and women might not have become as important an issue, eventually leading to the enshrinement of equality before law in the constitution,[326] a privilege exceeding what American women enjoyed at the time. Nevertheless, the disproportionate and vicious attacks on 'the American woman' in Western Germany's public and published discourse cannot simply be explained by this direct impact. Germany was, once more, engaging anti-American clichés in order to fight an inner-German battle.

5
'Americanisation' Revisited

For a long time, historians have considered post-1945 Western Germany as an example of massive 'Americanisation'. Almost total hegemony over Western Europe in general, and the FRG in particular, was ascribed to the USA. Whereas the contemporary fear of total Americanisation was restricted to the nationalist Right in the 'long 1950s', this interpretation gained ground in more mainstream and moderate left-wing circles from the mid-1960s onwards. 'Coca-Colonisation', a provocative exaggeration of the term 'Cultural Imperialism', became a catchphrase for the anti-American discourse in West European left-wing circles in the 1970s. Initially coined by the French newspaper *Le Monde* as early as 1949,[1] the term is now used in scholarly literature to describe the alleged or real influence of American culture in Europe after 1945.[2] Within the neo-Marxist framework of cultural imperialism theory, the rest of the world is seen as victimised by the irresistible striving of the USA for cultural, industrial and economic world domination. Radio, TV, Hollywood, the music and the advertising industries, and technological improvement all generate an unquenchable thirst for more consumption of mostly American-produced consumer goods, with the USA willingly exploiting that thirst.

There are, however, alternative explanatory models for the success of typically 'American' products and modes of behaviour. Westernisation, modernisation and 'self-Americanisation'[3] theories all prescribe a more active role to the West German population, one in which West Germany is not a helpless victim of American imperialism, but a conscious actor looking for a different, more Western or more modern interpretation of Germanness after the political and moral collapse of 1945. 'America' might have been the role model in that search, and the USA certainly used its power over the defeated Germany to indicate the direction, but

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the integration of the FRG into the West – politically, culturally, ideo-logically, economically and militarily – could not have been achieved without willing and voluntary co-operation. This, however, was met with massive opposition, especially – but not exclusively – from the Far Right within West Germany. As shown, various types of anti-American and anti-Western sentiment were utilised in order to discredit West German attempts to modernise or 'Westernise' the FRG.

Within those circles willing to 'self-Americanise', certain distinctively 'American' commodities or patterns of behaviour became a signifier for that attitude. Kaspar Maase takes blue jeans as an the exam-ple: before they gained the connotations of rock and roll and the working class in the mid-1950s, denim trousers were worn by upper-class Germans who had travelled the USA. They were a sign of a cosmopolitan, easy-going lifestyle in a supposedly backward-looking and petty-bourgeois post-war Germany.[4] In the 'war of symbols',[5] it became important to define the values attributed to quintessentially 'American' commodities and attitudes in order to define the German way into modernity.

In Edgar Reitz's epic and monumental TV series *Heimat* (1984) about the Simon family between 1919 and 1982 in the fictional Hunsrück vil-lage of Schabbach, one of the protagonist disappears in the late 1920s, leaving wife and children behind. 'Following the American victory [in 1945], Paul visits Schabbach, wearing a big Texan hat …. But he is not a generous soul; he represents America as an antithesis to *Heimat*: a consumerist and soulless society.'[6] In Alon Confino's description of this scene the distinctive symbolic self-Americanisation of Simon – the Texan hat – signifies as much his 'otherness' in the rural Hunsrück region as it signifies his 'Americanised' character: consumerist and soulless. Amer-icans, represented as 'shallow, rootless, money-grabbing materialists',[7] provide the counter-image to *Heimat*. The hat, at least in a 1980s por-trayal of the 1940s and 1950s, symbolised everything 'American'. Texan hats frequently played a similar role in 1950s political caricature: when-ever a politician was to be portrayed as particularly Americanised, the Texan hat functioned to symbolise his alleged state of mind. Chancellor Adenauer was depicted by the caricaturist's pen in that way on a regular basis.[8]

Other head-gear regularly used as a symbol of 'Americanisation' included that of the Native Americans and the mortar board used at the conferment of honorary doctoral degrees by US universities. Once again, these symbols were sometimes used to criticise or ridicule Adenauer's alleged Americanisation. Before the SPD politician Erich Ollenhauer

(1910–63) went to the USA in early 1951, the daily *Fränkischer Volksfreund* attacked Adenauer:

> On Sunday, Erich Ollenhauer will fly to the USA. Not, like our Federal Chancellor, to collect doctor's caps and simultaneously to hold talks culminating in [the sentence] 'We will, without reservations [*auf Gedeih und Verderb*], implement the military policies in Germany that you have imposed upon us'. Neither does Ollenhauer want to smoke peace-pipes with a Red Indian chieftain in order to return to Germany with the head-dress [*Kriegsschmuck*] of a chieftain.[9]

Ollenhauer himself joked to a journalist that he would not want to compete with Adenauer on the number of doctoral mortar boards and Red Indian head-dresses ('*Indianerschmuck*') brought back from the USA.[10] During his trip, the *Bremer Nachrichten* published a caricature showing Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles with a peace-pipe and a Native American head-dress. Their head-dress and the stake in the background are embellished with dollar signs. Ollenhauer, wearing cowboy boots and a cowboy hat, offers them a chest with 'SPD' inscribed on it, full of glass beads and toys. He tells the two American politicians: 'My goods and prices, great chieftain, are without peer.'[11]

Further visible American, or rather Anglo-Saxon, trophies were framed certificates of honorary doctorates on the office walls of German politicians. Many American universities considered it a duty to confer honorary doctorates on prominent visitors, or even to insist that foreign statesmen should visit their university in order to receive an honorary degree. The first President of the FRG, Theodor Heuss, ridiculed this in a letter to his friend Professor Fritz Ernst in Heidelberg (not a place where academic traditions were cast aside lightly in the 1950s), and likened the honorary doctorates to the scalps of enemies that a Native American on the warpath allegedly wore on his belt:

> It was nice of you to remind me of the University of Wisconsin, but I am frightened of these American university journeys and their ridiculous honorary doctorates. I say to all Americans that I am not a Sioux Red Indian who wears doctoral certificates on his belt instead of scalps. … It is my first time in [the USA], and I want to learn this or that about history, meet some people again, learn something, but I do not want to give academic talks permanently. That is indeed not only exhausting, but also a little banal.[12]

Blue jeans were highly prominent features of distinctive self-Americanisation, as mentioned above. More conservative people feared the end of the Occident due to the triumphal march of the cowboy's attire into Europe. Von Zahn was obviously more cosmopolitan and liberal than some of these cultural pessimists. Even he, however, observed the success of these quintessentially American trousers with slight distaste:

> The costume of Texas has clearly made an impact outside its own borders, not unlike the [distinctively Bavarian] leather pants ('*Seppelhosen*') that can be seen more and more frequently north of the River Main. How many kids in the New and the Old World do not wear Blue Jeans – those bulgingly tight long trousers made from canvas – and those pointed boots with high heels whose shape made its way on strange detours from sixteenth century Spain via Mexico and Texas to Bielefeld, back in the Old World.[13]

Yet even certain everyday behaviours aroused suspicion in post-war Germany. If leather jackets and blue jeans worn by *halbstarke* rock and rollers generated anti-American feelings, so did more subtle gestures and postures. Walking around with one's hands in one's pockets or chewing gum even today is sometimes seen as a subtly rebellious, 'American' statement. Furthermore, the former President of Germany, Karl Carstens, generally not suspected of being a secret admirer of revolutionary theories, recalled a habit he acquired while working in the library of the Yale Law School where he spent the academic year 1948/9: 'There I got used to putting my feet on the desk whilst working. A very convenient posture, which was frowned on for a long time in Germany.'[14]

The most potent symbol of 'America', however, was probably the skyscrapers ('*Wolkenkratzer*') of many US cities. Many German observers showed open amazement and admiration for the skylines of Manhattan, Detroit and other US cities. At the same time, however, most felt that there was something wrong. In order to express their unease, a comparison to the Tower of Babel was often made. The Babel theme seemed particularly fitting, since the big cities also had a level of multiculturalism unknown to Western Germany in the 1950s. In September 1955, a journalist from the *Deutsches Volksblatt* observed:

> Detroit a true Babel. One buys one's vegetables at a Chaldaian from Tal Qif in Iraq, one's coffee at a Maltese, gets the washing done by a Chinese or Philippine, goes to a Calabrian barber and gets one's letters written by a Polish secretary. At the bank, Miss Abdalla from Syria works at the counter, and one talks to the bank manager in

German. The book shop owner is black as the night [*schwarz wie die Nacht*], while the cleaning women, driving to work in a brand-new car, is from Hungary. After an evening's celebration, the band plays an Israeli Hora, then an Armenian and then an American square dance. It is easier to learn Greek dancing in Detroit than in Athens. … Whole Negro cities with tens of thousands of inhabitants are developing within Detroit. Wherever coloured citizens appear, the whites move out, and often it only takes a couple of months before a whole street has changed its 'colour'.[15]

Besides the fact that alleged American double standards with regards to the 'Negro problem' are emphasised,[16] the journalist concentrates on the multicultural side of the Babel theme, as the headline of the article indicates: 'Detroit – kaleidoscope of the peoples'. The otherwise very pro-American Hamburg FDP politician Willy Max Rademacher also emphasised that theme when humorously talking about New York as a 'Babel of the peoples' ('*Völkerbabel New York*').[17] Rather less flattering is the comparison made by the conservative journalist Klaus Mehnert: 'In some respects surely great, but a swarming anthill full of noise and incredible dirt.'[18]

A full-blown attack on modernity as such, however, was delivered by the ultra- conservative Bavarian industrialist Otto Seeling. When Manhattan is seen for the first time from the harbour, he noted in his diary:

Like some majestic man-made mountain range [*Felsengebirge von Menschenhand gebaut*] the towering skyscrapers. One thinks of the building of the Tower of Babel. Although it is a success, one feels a certain uneasiness, because it seems like a challenge to God or nature to impose such an unreasonable demand on the weight-bearing capacity of the Earth and to stretch too foolhardily into the sky. The Americans have invented the atomic bomb – inventions sometimes turn on their inventors![19]

Back in New York City a few days later, he wrote about the rocky ground which made it possible for all those skyscrapers to be built:

Somehow, God's hand and divine Providence always have to give the basis for human megalomania! The only question is: How long will God stay silent. Here more than anywhere I am under the impression of Ortega Y Gasset's claim that every degeneration of a culture is

indicated by the overdimensionality [*Überdimensionierung*] of buildings and that colossal buildings are the herald of demise [*Vorboten des Unterganges*].[20]

As Seeling has shown in other comments quoted throughout this book, he was deeply uncomfortable with the USA and modernity as such, and it seemed could hardly wait until God's wrath struck the USA for its alleged sins. Clearly, he saw the USA as a modern Roman Empire, or any other empire that had collapsed. The symbol he used was the Tower of Babel, and he too expected divine intervention to halt what he perceived as a menace to mankind – modernity.

The interpretations of the various distinctive symbols of 'America' show that neither popular Americanism nor anti-Americanism in 1950s West Germany was based on a intimate knowledge of and an intensified debate about the USA. 'America' had vague connotations of a society in which, to express it negatively, everything was commodified and where technical-civilisatory progress and growing wealth were traded against cultural superficiality.[21] From a positive viewpoint, US society appeared to be the New World, in which traditional class barriers and hierarchies were dismantled and people mixed in a more egalitarian and less prejudiced way.[22]

Not all types of anti-American or anti-Western sentiment presented here had the same target and conveyed the same message. Indeed, some sentiments are contradictory when pitched against one another. This book has put them together since they have a feature in common: they all misrepresent the 'real America' and do not even strive for accuracy. Instead they use 'America' as a smokescreen on which a dystopian version of (West) Germany's future is projected.

In order to rescue the possibility of German nationalism after Auschwitz, the Americans, and in particular the US forces in Germany, were accused of self-interest and double standards. Their alleged or real misconduct against German soldiers in POW camps was used to relativise German war crimes by comparison. American politicians were exposed as self-interested and seeking control over Germany. US racial policy was highlighted, often in direct relation to Nazi German crimes against humanity. This was an obvious and conscious attempt to whitewash the German Nazi past by pointing to the alleged self-interest or moral ineptitude of another nation in order to preserve some form of German nationalism. By overemphasising alleged American double standards in relation to German war crimes, the right-wing fringe used 'America' to reject a more Western and less nationalist version of Germany.

Yet more extreme voices rejected liberal parliamentary democracy as such, or at least as an option for Germany. Many opponents of liberal democracy had been prominent critics of the Republic during the Weimar years. What is surprising, however, is the space that mainstream publications gave to anti-liberal thinkers like Carl Schmitt and Arnold Gehlen after 1949. A prominent member of the Weimar German Conservative Revolutionary *Tat* circle, the journalist Hans Zehrer, even edited two important West German newspapers, *Die Welt* and the *Sonntagsblatt.* During the early 1950s, a clandestine anti-democratic lodge, *Die Erste Legion*, numbered among its members some prominent politicians of the Adenauer administration. The various protagonists of the anti-liberal and anti-Western discourse presented in this book pitted the Occident with its alleged tradition and cultural depth against a New World that supposedly lacked history, culture and sophistication and could thus not be relied on to provide a meaningful blueprint for the future of Germany.

Semantic anti-Americanism, like the rejection of 'American' words such as 'manager', was used by some members of the post-war German business elites to resist attempts from within Germany to introduce stricter anti-cartel laws. At the same time, anti-American clichés and – again – an emphasis on alleged US shortcomings were utilised to reject the internationalisation of trade and US demands for a more open economy.

Cultural anti-Americanism was often employed to discourage both the lower social strata and working women from assuming a different and more ambitious place within the public sphere and workplace. The USA was portrayed as sex-crazed and hedonistic in order to argue for the restoration of traditional roles within post-war Germany. By referring to an 'America discourse' prevalent in the Weimar Republic, describing 'America' as superficial and naive, another attempt was made to rescue German nationalism by presenting Germany – and sometimes Europe – as traditional, cultured and sophisticated.

The various brands of anti-American rhetoric were thus used merely within a German – or at the most European – context and were not a meaningful attack on the USA. Not all Germans engaged in anti-American discourse. Conservative and liberal historiography has predominantly argued that the 'long 1950s' in Western Germany were a period of often uncritical Americanisation. Others have rather timidly objected that there was no unambiguous pro-American stance in the West German consciousness after 1945.[23] This book has gone further: the early years of the FRG experienced a substantial, vocal and well-funded minority that used anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in order to reject the project of modernisation.

Epilogue: '1968' and 'America'

Much of this book has been concerned with right-wing anti-Americanism, although this study has shown that some of the initially right-wing and often Weimar Conservative discourse reached well into the political centre, sometimes taking in Social Democrats, Social-Liberals and liberal-leaning Christian Democrats. Previous chapters were mainly concerned with the 'long 1950s', and the thorough archival research conducted for this study has not unearthed much evidence for genuinely left-wing anti-Americanism in that period. General historiography agrees that '[t]he German left [in the FRG] did not enter the debate over the rapid spread of American popular culture until the 1960s'.[1] Nor was the Left prominent in many other genres of anti-American discourse analysed here. Some overlaps between Schmittian thought and neo-Marxist – especially Frankfurt School – rejections of liberal democracy were obvious, but these were not primarily an attempt to deploy 'America' as a smokescreen on which the alleged deficiencies in modern West Germany were projected.

With the advent of *left-wing* public discontent in the mid- and late 1960s, generally referred to in shorthand as '1968', the USA became more of a focal point for the Left.[2] However, generally, the left-wing movement of the mid- to late 1960s was often very critical of American actions, but it was not, at least not in the material I have used as a sample survey,[3] anti-American *per se*. Most of the left-wing publications were highly critical of US military action in Vietnam, of the CIA involvement with right-wing paramilitary groups and of the US support for right-wing and military dictatorships world-wide, e.g. in Greece. Left-wingers critically analysed capitalism, imperialism and 'late capitalism', but they did not necessarily use 'America' as a mirror for what they perceived as modernity. Some products and ideals perceived as 'American' were even welcomed

and incorporated into the ideology of '1968',[4] and it was not uncommon for anti-Vietnam War pamphlets to emphasise and praise American democratic values and achievements.[5] When the USA was criticised, it is mainly for specifics and 'the system' that allegedly originated there. In the same breath, however, Western Germany and Western Europe received a similarly thorough and critical analysis. At times, the focus shifted from a critique of the war towards a rhetorical battle with the West German authorities about heavy-handed police tactics, likening the West German police to the Gestapo.[6] This is not to say that the author of this study agrees with the criticism of the USA and capitalism prevalent in '1968'. However, one has to be very careful not to label every criticism of 'America' and the USA anti-American. The working definition of the scope of the interest of this study was one of America clichés created or recycled in order to place (West) Germany in the opposite corner. The left-wing critique of 'America' had, however, different targets and a different methodology. Left-wing anti-Americanism, which no doubt existed, belonged to a different era of US-German relationship, in the later 1970s and early 1980s. Ironically, it was often the radical Right during the early stages of the Vietnam War that combined perceived left-wing slogans like 'Hands off Vietnam'[7] with anti-American sentiment and radical German nationalism.[8] On the other hand, the left-wing anti-Vietnam campaign did, at times, echo older *right-wing* rhetoric, for example when Günter Grass outlined in his 1968 May Day speech that at the evening family meal, parents were confronted by awkward questions from their children: 'Tell me, when the Americans deploy napalm as a weapon, that is a war crime, isn't it?'[9] At least in the 1960s, however, this was the exception rather than the norm.

The general lack of genuine anti-Americanism in '1968' can be explained by a number of factors. First, there was the lack of coherence within the movement, as Jan-Werner Müller has pointed out: ' "68" was to a large degree constituted by spontaneous action, a self-declared permanent revolution which left little time for strategic thinking and was sustained by effervescent media such as the poster and the flyer.'[10] Furthermore, '1968' as a student and youth movement was in itself an international, even world-wide phenomenon with student protests registered in 56 countries, including Eastern Europe and the developing world.[11] In a transatlantic transfer,[12] many of the slogans, and often the form of protest, came from the USA itself, as did the at times violent rejection of the war in Vietnam. In the USA, the Vietnam War campaign was far more heavily influenced by the counter-culture, whereas in West Germany it became increasingly the domain of the

far Left, although pacifism had been involved in the early stages of the campaign.[13] Initially, in the autumn of 1965, the campaign was fundamentally informed by pacifist and humanitarian considerations and represented Social Democratic, trade unionist and revolutionary Marxist shades of persuasion.[14] This explains the lack of a coherent anti-American discourse with the anti-Vietnam campaign in Germany, since Social Democrats and trade unions in West Germany had a broadly pro-American tradition at least since 1949, if not going back to the Weimar Republic, while the hardcore Left was predominantly concerned with an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist agenda so thoroughly enshrined in the movement that it did not need the 'smokescreen America' for its argument. The political scientist Claus Leggewie has argued that the explosive rage of the day against the USA came less from some fundamental anti-Americanism than from the disappointment over a fallen idol by a generation that had grown up under the influence of cultural Westernisation and had admired men such as John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.[15]

Recent historiography has emphasised the generational dimension to the 1968 movement.[16] Genuinely reformist attitudes are now often attributed to the previous generation, i.e. the 'sceptical generation' or the 'forty-fivers', as Dirk Moses has called them.[17] This generation was born around 1930, old enough to have experienced the Nazi regime at first hand, but still young enough to be able to re-orient itself politically after 1945. The 'forty-fivers' had been involved in the last, desperate attempts by the Nazis to prevent the unconditional surrender (*Flakhelfer-Generation*). After Germany's surrender, they generally became pro-American and pro-European, and thus were strong proponents of 'Cold War liberalism'[18] with its heavy emphasis on consumption, international trade and economic growth. 'Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the forty-fivers did generate a political answer to National Socialism: the Federal Republic as a project of consolidation and reform.'[19] The 'forty-fivers' were vital in West Germany for the reform movements of the late 1950s,[20] whereas the next generation, i.e. '1968', born in the 1940s, were mere 'fellow travellers' (Ulrich Herbert) of the 'forty-fivers' in their desire to reform the FRG.[21]

Philipp Gassert has argued that, within the New Left in West Germany, criticism of the USA was, in the final analysis, also an expression of cultural Westernisation.[22] Jan-Werner Müller concurs: 'As opponents of the United States and the Western powers, [1968] took a large step in the direction of a Westernization – or even Americanization – of the Federal Republic.'[23] Gassert still defined the protest movement's

'criticism of America through America' (that is through 'American' forms of protest) as anti-American, since it encompassed a 'fundamental critique of the liberal capitalist system'.[24] That is, however, a matter of definition. There is no doubt that the radical neo-Marxist Left in the FRG – before *and* after 1968 – rejected the liberal capitalist system outright. Archival evidence points in a different direction with regards to the attitudes of '1968' towards 'America': whereas the 'American' (and thus to a large degree the West German) political and economic system was mostly rejected by '1968', the movement did not resort to an often invented 'America' to counteract perceived mis-developments in West Germany. The 'forty-fivers' had achieved a level of Westernisation in West Germany that enabled '1968' to criticise the USA at eye level. Future research into German anti-Americanism during West Germany's 'red decade' (1967–77)[25] will have the bear this in mind.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Eric Hobsbawm, 'The Old World and the New: 500 Years of Columbus' [1992], in idem (ed.) *Uncommon People. Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz*, 2nd paperback edn. (London, 1999), p. 396.
2. Ibid., p. 398.
3. Ibid., pp. 403ff.
4. The term 'Western Germany' (or 'West Germany') refers – until 1949 – to the three Western zone of occupation after the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, i.e. the American, British and French zones of occupation, and to the Federal Republic of Germany after her foundation in the summer of 1949.
5. Alexander Stephan, 'A Special German Case of Cultural Americanization', in idem (ed.) *The Americanization of Europe. Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York and Oxford, 2006), p. 69f; Bernd Greiner, ' "Test the West". Über die "Amerikanisierung" der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner (eds.) *Westbindung. Amerika in der Bundesrepublik* (Hamburg, 1999), p. 18f.
6. Wolfram Hanrieder even argues that the integration into the West became '*Staatsraison*' (a fundamental principle enshrined in the state) in the FRG under Adenauer: Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994*, 2nd edn. (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zürich, 1995), p. 263.
7. For more on the 'America Houses', see Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, 'Die amerikanische Kulturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1968', in Detlef Junker (ed.) *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945–1990. Ein Handbuch*, vol. I, *1945–1968*, 2nd edn. (Munich and Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 616–618.
8. Wolfgang Benz, *Die Gründung der Bundesrepublik. Von der Bizone zum souveränen Staat*, 5th edn. (Munich, 1999), p. 91f.
9. Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich, 1998), especially pp. 149ff.
10. The effort to 'make them see' the extent of these crimes was initially met with a very negative response from many Germans: Dagmar Barnouw, *Germany 1945. Views of War and Violence* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996), chapters 1 and 4.
11. Christian Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus. Wandlungen eines Feindbildes* (Munich, 2003), p. 134.
12. Although Western Germany was about to add its own globally and instantly recognisable icon of consumerism to the Coke bottle and Mickey Mouse in the 1950s: the Volkswagen Beetle; see Erhard Schütz, 'Der Volkswagen', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. I, 4th edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 353.

13. Arnulf Baring, *Unser neuer Größenwahn. Deutschland zwischen Ost und West* [1988], 3rd edn. (Stuttgart, 1989), p. 11; Baring indeed strongly warned against the breakdown of the German-American relationship through a West German turn towards the East and towards neutrality.

14. Harold James, *A German Identity 1770–1990* (London, 1989), p. 188.

15. StAB 3-V.12. Nr. 9: Opening speech by the Bremen *Senatspräsident* and mayor Wilhelm Kaisen, 12 January 1953, Amerika-Haus Bremen, for an exhibition entitled 'Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Bremen und U.S.A. – eine Brücke zwischen den Kontinenten'.

16. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 171, Folder 1379: report by Harry Pruss, Harkness Fellow 1952–1953, in English.

17. Ibid.

18. Gienow-Hecht, 'Die amerikanische Kulturpolitik', p. 617; Angela Möller, *Die Gründung der Amerika-Häuser 1945–1949. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte amerikanischer Kultur- und Informationspolitik in Deutschland* (MA thesis, Munich, 1984), p. 143f; Maritta Hein-Kremer argues that a shift in attention from 're-education' to 'anti-communism' had begun in the US Information Centres in West Germany as early as 1947: Maritta Hein-Kremer, *Die amerikanische Kulturoffensive. Gründung und Entwicklung der amerikanischen Information Centers in Westdeutschland und West-Berlin 1945–1955* (Cologne, Vienna and Weimar, 1996), p. 547.

19. Hannah Arendt, 'Europa und Amerika' [1954], in idem, *Zur Zeit. Politische Essays*, 2nd edn. (Hamburg, 1999), p. 89. A US citizen since 1951, Arendt made this observation in the third part of a lecture series she gave at Princeton University, published in the journal *Commonweal* under the title 'The Threat of Conformism', 24 September 1954. The lectures were based on impressions from her journey to Europe in 1952.

20. See Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy. The History of French Anti-Americanism* (Chicago, 2005).

21. See, for example, Graham Greene's 1955 Indo-China novel *The Quiet American*.

22. For a survey of European attitudes towards the USA during the twentieth century, see Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire. America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2005).

23. Or even hypocritical, especially in relation to racism, as section 2.3 shows.

24. Karl-Ludwig Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft. CARE, CRALOG und die Entwicklung der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehung nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Bremen, 1999), p. 369.

25. Alexander Schmidt, *Reisen in die Moderne. Der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürgertums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1997), p. 81; see also section 3.3.

26. Adelheid von Saldern, 'Überfremdungsängste. Gegen die Amerikanisierung der deutschen Kultur in den zwanziger Jahren', in Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern (eds.) *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996), pp. 221–40.

27. Marcus Cunliffe, 'The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism', in Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem (eds.) *Anti-Americanism in Europe* (Amsterdam, 1986), p. 20. An even stronger connection bewteen anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism is made by Andrei S. Markovits, *Amerika, dich haßt sich's besser.*

Antiamerikanismus und Antisemitismus in Europa (Hamburg, 2004). Markovits maintains that the phenomena have to be considered 'twin brothers', and that European anti-Americanism without anti-Semitism was unimaginable (pp. 173ff). For an English version loosely based on the above German-language polemic, see idem, *Uncouth Nation. Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton, NJ, 2007), pp. 150ff.

28. Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism. Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965–1990* (New York and Oxford, 1992), p. 380.

29. Ibid.

30. Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (London, 2005), p. 353.

31. Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997), p. 156.

32. Ibid., p. 40ff; Hermann Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. I, *Zwischen Kapitulation und Währungsreform 1945–1948* (Munich and Vienna, 1985), p. 166.

33. Before the war and throughout the 1930s, Germany was keen on contacts with the USA at certain levels: the administration fostered the exchange of tourists, students, academics and businessmen, German cinemas screened Hollywood films and German bands still played swing music. For more, see Michaela Hönicke, 'Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (1933–1945)', in Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland (eds.) *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt, 1997), p. 70; Hans Dieter Schäfer has made similar observations, although his interpretative framework of Nazi rule as one of conscious modernisation is simplistic, to say the least: Hans Dieter Schäfer, 'Amerikanismus im Dritten Reich', in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.) *Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung* (Darmstadt, 1991), especialy pp. 203–7.

34. Quoted in Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans. An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton, NJ 1996), p. 111. Diner's latest publication on anti-Americanism, *Feindbild Amerika. Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Berlin, 2002), is basically a rehash of the above title (origally published in German in 1993) with an added chapter on the German reaction to 9/11.

35. Ibid., pp. 111ff; the Morgenthau Plan did exist, but was never implemented and was dropped shortly after news of it was published. For a more detailed discussion of the Morgenthau Plan and its psychological impact upon postwar Western Germany, see section 2.2.

36. See Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940–1945* (Berlin, 2002) and the debate surrounding Friedrich's study in Lothar Kettenacker (ed.) *Ein Volk von Opfern? Die neue Debatte um den Bombenkrieg 1940–45* (Berlin, 2003).

37. Kaspar Maase, '"Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft". Nationalisierende Deutung von Globalisierungsprozessen?', in Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (eds.) *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1997), pp. 219–241; idem, 'Amerikanisierung von unten. Demonstrative Vulgarität und kulturelle Hegemonie in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre', in Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern (eds.) *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996), pp. 291–313.

More recently, Jan Behrends, Árpád von Klimó and Patrice Poutrus (eds.) *Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa* (Bonn, 2005), pp. 10ff (introduction). For the historiographical debate on whether Western Germany experienced a period of modernisation or restoration during the 'long 1950s', see Christoph Hendrik Müller, 'Anti-Americanism and Anti-Western Sentiment in the Federal Republic of Germany during the "Long 1950s" (1949–1966)' (DPhil thesis, Oxford, 2003), pp. 43–65.

38. Michael Wala, 'Amerikanisierung und Überfremdungsängste: Amerikanische Technologie und Kultur in der Weimarer Republik', in Ursula Lehmkuhl and Michael Wala (eds.) *Technologie und Kultur. Europas Blick auf Amerika vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, Vienna and Weimar, 2000), pp. 121ff.

39. Arendt, 'Europa und Amerika', p. 72f. Arendt voiced this interpretation in the first part of a lecture series she gave at Princeton University, published in the journal *Commonweal* under the title 'Dream and Nightmare', 10 September 1954. She did, however, also state that in 1954 those seen as reactionaries in Europe had become pro-American, whereas European liberals had begun to voice anti-American resentments (p. 80) – a theory *not* confirmed in this study, at least not for the case of Western Germany in the 'long 1950s'.

40. Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich. Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933–1945* (Stuttgart, 1997), p. 370.

41. Diner, *America*, p. 108.

42. Schwaabe, *Antiamerikanismus*, pp. 103ff: Schwaabe interprets the end of the Second World War as a true 'Hour Zero' in at least one way. The total collapse of Nazi Germany had taken old German ideas of military heroism to its grave. After 1945, (West) Germans began to define themselves not through the 'heroic rejection of the Western trader society' ('*heroische Verweigerung gegen das westliche "Händlertum"'*, pp. 15ff), but more and more as a Western nation founded on pacifism and '*Nie wieder Krieg'* (no more war). After 1945, Schwaabe claims, Germans often rejected 'America' because in the eyes of the Germans it was beginning to resemble their own militaristic past (pp. 13 and 103ff). This might be true for '1968' and beyond, but Schwaabe's claims can certainly not be corroborated in full for the 'long 1950s'.

43. Andrei S. Markovits, 'Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West German Identity', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.) *The Federal Republic at Forty* (London and New York, 1989), p. 37.

44. Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg. Die Kulturmission der USA in Österreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1991), p. 2.

45. For example, the British journalist William T. Stead published *The Americanization of the World. The Trend of the Twentieth Century* in 1901. See Philipp Gassert, 'Was meint Amerikanisierung? Über den Begriff des Jahrhunderts', *Merkur*, vol. 45, no. 617/618 (September 2000), p. 788.

46. See Egbert Klautke, 'Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel', in Wolfgang Eßbach (ed.) *Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder* (Berlin, 2000), p. 173f.

47. James W. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America. The Symbol of America in Modern Thought* (New Haven, CT and London, 1997), p. 163.

48. HStAS Q1/30, Bü 322: transription of Mehnert's original travel journal, p. 18. Inicidentally, '*Jazzgeplärr*' was a term used by Nazi propagandists during the Weimar Republic (von Saldern, 'Überfremdungsängste', p. 219).

49. Michael Geyer, 'America in Germany. Power and the Pursuit of Americanization', in Elliott Shore and Frank Trommler (eds.) *The German-American Encounter. Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800–2000* (New York and Oxford, 2001), p. 129.

50. Arthur L. Smith, *The War for the German Mind. Re-educating Hitler's Soldiers* (Oxford and Providence, RI, 1996), p. 79.

51. Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall. Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Chicago and Urbana, IL, 1996), p. xi.

52. Ibid.

53. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 87, Folder 713: report by Klaus Hartmann, Harkness Fellow in Yale (and, for a time, in Berkeley), 1953–55, written in English, submitted August 1955, p. 3. Hartmann went on to become lecturer and then Associate Professor (Philosophy) in Bonn, 1962–72, and finally Professor in Tübingen.

54. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1999), p. 15.

55. Ibid. p. 13.

56. Ibid., p. 15.

57. Idem, 'Im Westen angekommen? Die Westernisierung der Bundesrepublik seit 1945', *Vorgänge*, vol. 2 (2001), p. 5.

58. See, for instance, Klaus Larres, 'Eisenhower, Dulles und Adenauer: Bündnis des Vertrauens oder Allianz des Misstrauens? (1953–1961)', in Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland (eds.) *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt, 1997), esp. pp. 120–7.

59. James F. Tent, 'The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961', in Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Hermann-Josef Rupieper (eds.) *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (Cambridge and Washington, 1993), pp. 246ff and 254.

60. Geyer, 'America in Germany', p. 121.

61. Helga Grebing, 'Demokratie ohne Demokraten? Politisches Denken, Einstellungen und Mentalitäten in der Nachkriegszeit', in Everhard Holtmann (ed.) *Wie neu war der Neubeginn? Zum Deutschen Kontinuitätsproblem nach 1945* (Erlangen, 1989), p. 8f.

62. Rudy Koshar, ' "Germany has been a melting pot": American and German Intercultures, 1945–1955', in Elliott Shore and Frank Trommler (eds.) *The German-American Encounter. Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800–2000* (New York and Oxford, 2001), p. 159.

63. Philipp Gassert, 'Die Bundesrepublik, Europa und der Westen. Zu Verwestlichung, Demokratisierung und einigen komparatistischen Defiziten der zeithistorischen Forschung', in Jörg Baberowski, Eckart Conze, Philipp Gassert and Martin Sabrow (eds.) *Geschichte ist immer Gegenwart. Vier Thesen zur Zeitgeschichte* (Munich and Stuttgart, 2001), p. 69.

64. Ibid., p. 68.

65. Volker Rolf Berghahn, 'Conceptualizing the American Impact on Germany: West German Society and the Problem of Americanization', *GHI*

Conference Papers on the Web, no. 1 (1999), www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/
westernpapers/berghahn.pdf, p. 4.

66. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America*, p. 1.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 187; for more details on Heidegger's attitudes towards America, see
   section 3.3.
69. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, 'Occidentalism', *The New York Review
   of Books*, 17 January 2002, electronic edition, http://www.nybooks.com/
   articles/15100; subsequently published in an extended book version: idem,
   Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies (New York, 2004). The con-
   cept of Occidentalism had previously been used within anthropology: James
   G. Carrier (ed.), *Occidentalism. Images of the West* (Oxford, 1995).
70. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient* [1978], 4th
   edn. (London, 1995)
71. See especially section 3.3.
72. For a modern example, see Stefan Weidner, *Mohammedanische Versuchungen*,
   paperback edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), pp. 209–18.
73. Buruma and Margalit, 'Occidentalism', part 1.
74. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 1f.
75. Wolfgang Wagner, 'The Europeans Image of America', in Karl Kaiser and
   Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.) *America and Western Europa. Problems and Prospects*
   (Lexington, MA and Toronto, 1978), p. 19.
76. Gesine Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland.
   Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden, 1999), p. 19.
77. Ibid., p. 61.
78. Günter Moltmann, 'Anti-Americanism in Germany: Historical Perspective',
   Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 21, no. 2 (August 1975), p. 13.
79. See section 1.2.1.
80. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, p. 7.
81. Maase, '"Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft"', p. 224; see also Winfried
   Fluck, 'California Blue: Americanization as Self-Americanization', in Alexan-
   der Stephan (ed.) *Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The German
   Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York and Oxford, 2005),
   pp. 221–37. For the case of Austria, Wagnleitner even talks about a 'classic
   case of self-colonisation', since there was a congruence of anti-communist
   values between the Austrians and the US occupation forces (Wagnleit-
   ner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg*, p. 3). For a further discussion of
   Wagnleitner's monograph, see chapter 5.
82. Maase, '"Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft"', p. 225.
83. The need for a plurality of sources has long been recognised in rela-
   tion to research into any aspect of contemporary history ('*gegenwarts-
   naher Geschichte*'). See, for example, Paul Erker, 'Zeitgeschichte als
   Sozialgeschichte. Forschungsstand und Forschungsdefizite', *Geschichte und
   Gesellschaft*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1993), especially p. 210f.
84. Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten. Freizeit, Massenmedien und 'Zeitgeist' in der
   Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), pp. 109–51, 441–50; also
   Grebing, 'Demokratie ohne Demokraten?', p. 15; Dominik Geppert, *Die
   Ära Adenauer* (Darmstadt, 2002), pp. 84ff; Kaspar Maase even saw escapism
   and a *permanent* retreat from the public into the private sphere as the most

important socio-cultural legacy of National Socialism. (Kaspar Maase, *Grenzenloses Vergnügen. Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850–1970* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), p. 233).

85. Anna J. Merritt and Richard L Merritt (eds.), *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany. The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955* (Chicago, London and Urbana, IL, 1980), p. 94: Report No. 50, 30 November 1950.

86. StAHH 361-2 VI 530: typed report by Werner Warmbrunn, 'Impressions of Germany, 1956', August 1956, p. 4.

87. Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen. Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 94f.

88. Christoph Kleßmann, *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation. Deutsche Geschichte 1955–1970* (Göttingen, 1988), p. 60.

89. Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, p. 138.

90. Ibid., p. 445.

91. Heinz-Hermann Krüger (ed.), *'Die Elvis-Tolle, die hatte ich mir unauffällig wachsen lassen'. Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1985), p. 8.

92. Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, p. 113

93. Ibid., pp. 136 and 445.

94. Cinema attendance peaked in 1956 with 817 millions tickets sold in West Germany, according to ibid., p. 445.

95. Gerhard Albert Ritter, *The New Social History in the Federal Republic of Germany* (London, 1991), p. 17.

96. Heinz Bude, 'Achtundsechzig', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. II, 2nd edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 129; also Michael Geyer, 'Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), pp. 376–408, and Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany. A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York, 2003), pp. 32–45.

97. Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich, 1999), introduction.

98. For a further debate of the 'silence' hypothesis, see Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories. The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, CA, London and Los Angeles, 2001), and Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1997).

99. See, for example, Bill [William John] Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past. United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich* (London and New York, 2002), p. 4: 'Only once in the pre-1990 period, in West Germany with the showing of the American TV series *Holocaust* in 1979, had the wider German public been so shaken by the theme of German atrocities.'

100. Manfred Kittel, *Die Legende von der 'Zweiten Schuld'. Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der Ära Adenauer* (Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p. 14.

101. Ibid., pp. 14ff.

102. StAHH 361-2 VI 530: typed report by Werner Warmbrunn, 'Impressions of Germany, 1956', August 1956, p. 1.

103. Werner Abelshauser, *Die langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1966* (Düsseldorf, 1987), pp. 15ff, 69ff.

104. Arne Andersen, *Der Traum vom guten Leben. Alltags- und Konsumgeschichte vom Wirtschaftswunder bis heute*, special edn. (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1999), p. 7.
105. Siglinde Kreuzer, 'Public Education in America. Gedanken nach einer Studienreise', *Die Sammlung*, vol. 10, no. 2 (February 1955), p. 95.
106. Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* [1957], 2nd edn. (Westport, CT, 1974), p. 207.
107. For a good overview of the exchange activities, see also Karl-Heinz Füssl, 'Zwischen Eliteförderung und Erziehungsreform: Deutsch-amerikanische Austauschprogramme', in Detlef Junker (ed.) *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945–1990. Ein Handbuch*, vol. I, *1945–1968*, 2nd edn. (Munich and Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 623–33; for more details, see idem, *Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. Bildung – Wissenschaft – Politik* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2004), chapter 6, esp. pp. 185ff, and chapter 7.
108. Ibid., p. 216.
109. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegs-demokratie. Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945–1952* (Opladen, 1993), p. 393.
110. Ibid., p. 295.
111. Füssl, *Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch*, p. 237.
112. HICOG Information Bulletin, Special Issue, January 1950, quoted in Rupieper, *Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, p. 397f.
113. Rupieper, *Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, p. 390.
114. Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 289.
115. Klaus Dohrn, 'Globkes Verhältnis zu den Vereinigten Staaten', in Klaus Gotto (ed.) *Der Staatssekretär Adenauers. Persönlichkeit und politisches Wirken Hans Globkes* (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 175.
116. StAHH 622-1 Familie Lüth 5: letter by Lüth to the Hamburg State Archive (StAHH) in January 1968. Lüth claimed in that letter that Sänger had told him about that incident 'strictly in confidence' ('*im Vertrauen*').
117. Marie-Luise Recker, 'Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1969', in Gerhard Albert Ritter (ed.) *Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen im 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Bundesrepublik* (Düsseldorf, 1997), p. 301.
118. Der Spiegel, vol. 9, no. 18 (27 April 1955), pp. 15–16: 'Amerika-Reisen: Ist das Geld verschwendet?'
119. Ibid., p. 15; Rupieper corroborates that number, stating that about 25 per cent of the members of the first *Bundestag* (1949–1953) had visited the USA: Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, p. 403.
120. Der Spiegel, vol. 9, no. 18 (27 April 1955): 'Amerika-Reisen: Ist das Geld verschwendet?', p. 16
121. Ibid.
122. Caspar Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche. Die amerikanische Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen*, 3rd edn. (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 14 and 297.
123. HIA Adenauer, Konrad, Miscellaneous papers, 1953–1957: Adenauer speech at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, 11 April 1953, p. 11f.
124. Alon Confino and Rudy Koshar, 'Régimes of Consumer Culture: New Narratives in Twentieth-Century German History', *German History*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2001), p. 135.

125. Hans Peter Mensing, 'Amerika-Eindrücke Konrad Adenauers und Adenauer-Bilder in den USA', in Klaus Schwabe (ed.) *Adenauer und die USA. Rhöndorfer Gespräche Band 14* (Bonn, 1994), pp. 241–63.
126. See, for example, Wagner, 'The Europeans' Image of America', p. 27f.
127. For a good example of assimilation, see Burghard Ciesla, ' "Tassos Rund-briefe" aus dem "Land der Autos": Auto-mobile Kulturerfahrungen einer deutschen Ingenieurfamilie in der Neuen und Alten Welt', in Ursula Lehmkuhl and Michael Wala (eds.) *Technologie und Kultur. Europas Blick auf Amerika vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, Vienna and Weimar, 2000), esp. pp. 178–81.
128. See StAHH 622-1 Familie Lüth 5: press cutting from *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 'Besorgnisse und Trugschlüsse der USA', 27 December 1949; press cutting from *Hamburger Echo*, 'Middleton erfindet Neonazismus', 14 January 1950; typoscript of that same article with different title 'Starker Widerspruch gegen Drew Midleton'; for a later example of Middleton's writing on the (alleged) German threat and his influence upon public opinion in the USA, see HIA Bateman, Kenneth A., Papers, 1945–1985, Box No. 12: typescript 'Selected readings on THE IMPACT OF THE NEW GERMANY', Residential Seminar on World Politics, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 1954.
129. Rupieper, *Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, p. 415f.

Chapter 2

1. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 215.
2. Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955*, 4th edn. (Bonn, 1986), p. 372f; obviously, Hitler had declared war on the USA, but some Germans must have thought that the USA had entered the war willingly because Nazi Germany never attacked US territory.
3. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 221: again according to US military intelligence observations.
4. Raimund Lammersdorf, 'Verantwortung und Schuld. Deutsche und amerikanische Antworten auf die Schuldfrage, 1945–1947', in Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner (eds.) *Westbindung. Amerika in der Bundesrepublik* (Hamburg, 1999), p. 236.
5. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 227.
6. Ibid., p. 229.
7. Ibid.
8. IfZ F 84/1: photocopy of the speech and reactions, p. 10; Semler gave this speech at meeting of CSU leaders (*Landesausschuß*) in Erlangen on 4 January 1949. According to Anthony J. Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility. The Social Market Economy, 1918–1963* (Oxford, 1994), p. 187, even the Bavarian Prime Minister was present. Semler was duly dismissed as Director of Economics of the Bizonal Area on 24 January. He defended himself in February 1949 by claiming that bread had been distributed that was inedible and was thus rejected 'by humans and animals' (IfZ F 84/1, p. 34). He claimed that the term '*Hühnerfutter*' had generally been used for this bread in northern Germany. It was not his invention, he said, and he had not known that the

term 'chicken food' [*sic*] had a secondary meaning in the English language (ibid.).

9. Hartmut Müller (ed.), *Occupation – Enclave – State. Wiederbegründung des Landes Bremen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Politik und Alltag* (Bremen, 1997), p. 133f.
10. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 365.
11. A debate closely related to the Korean War (1950–3) that ultimately led to the creation of the *Bundeswehr* in 1956.
12. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 372.
13. Barnouw, *Germany 1945*, especially chapter 1 and 4.
14. James, *German Identity*, p. 177.
15. See Herf, *Divided Memory*, for a detailed discussion of the East German case.
16. See, for example, Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit der deutschen Vergangenheit nach 1945* (Stuttgart, 1999), p. 141f.
17. Dietrich Thränhardt, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*], 2nd edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), p. 111.
18. Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, 'Auslandsdeutsche', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. I, 4th edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 384f.
19. Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1996).
20. Ibid., p. 12f.
21. See also section 1.3.1.
22. The Fischer Debate on who was responsible for the outbreak of the war is the most obvious example. The related issue of German military atrocities against civilians in Belgium in the first few months of the war was also still contentious in the late 1950s and early 1960s: see John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914. A History of Denial* (London and New Haven, 2001), especially p. 411–16.
23. Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche*, pp. 9ff.
24. Ibid., pp. 10 and 296f.
25. Ibid., p. 11.
26. Ibid., especially pp. 106–49 and 179–83.
27. Frank M. Buscher, *The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1945–1955* (New York, Westport, CT and London, 1989), p. 3; other historians and political scientists agree that the de-Nazification attempts were among the least successful US policies during the occupation. See Manfred Knapp, 'Zum Stand der Forschung über die deutsch-amerikanischen Nachkriegsbeziehungen', in idem (ed.) *Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 50 and related footnotes.
28. Arnold Gehlen, *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter. Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der industriellen Gesellschaft* [1957], 2nd edn. (Hamburg, 1959), p. 42f.
29. For example, ibid., pp. 47ff.
30. Dolf Sternberger, 'Was die Amerikaner von Deutschland denken', *Die Gegenwart*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1 January 1952), p. 12.
31. Hannah Arendt, *Besuch in Deutschland* [translation of her report for the American Jewish Committee, 'The Aftermath of Nazi Rule. Report from

Germany', 1950] (Berlin and Nördlingen, 1993), p. 25; West German currents of ideological neutrality will be extensively discussed in section 3.3.

32. Ibid., p. 24.
33. Ibid., p. 28f.
34. Ibid., p. 27.
35. Merritt and Merritt, *Semisovereign Germany*, p. 7; for more details about public opinion during the occupation years see idem (eds.) *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949* (Chicago, London and Urbana, IL, 1970).
36. Idem, *Semisovereign Germany*, p. 123f: Report No. 87, 29 June 1951.
37. Ibid., p. 150f: Report No. 118, 10 January 1952.
38. The FDP strongly refuted that claim by questioning the methodology of that poll. In a circular for party members (*Rednerschnellbrief* or *RSB*), the party argued that the sample of 1,200 people questioned was too small, since a representative poll would require at least 2,500 people questioned. Also, it argued, the poll question ('If you take everything into account, was there more good or more bad in the ideas of National Socialism?') was a 'negligent simplification' of a complex problem that pitted the positive sides of the living conditions under National Socialist rule against the hardship of the post-war years. (ADL D2-10: RSB 19/53, 13 February 1953).
39. Merritt and Merritt, *Semisovereign Germany*, pp. 197ff: Report No. 167, 12 January 1955. Also, 44 per cent of those questioned declared their support for a 'single, strong national party'.
40. Ibid., p. 61: Report No. 11, 30 March 1950.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Ibid., pp. 37 and 205: Report No. 171, 11 February 1953.
43. Maase, ' "Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft" ', p. 225: Maase defined the anti-American cliché of 'technocratic Americanism' as an approach concerned with everything that enhances power and efficiency. 'America' symbolises ways and means to succeed in the economic or political sphere. Advertisements and political propaganda are used as means to this end. 'Americanism' is thus equated, to a certain extent, with shrewdness, materialism and self-interest.
44. Erich Peter Neumann and Elisabeth Noelle (eds.), *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947–1955* (Allensbach, 1956), p. 334. The poll referred to 'Russia' rather than to the Soviet Union.
45. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer. Gründerjahre der Republik 1949–1957*, vol. II of Karl Dietrich Bracher, Theodor Eschenburg, Joachim C. Fest and Eberhard Jäckel (eds.), *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 6 vols. (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 65; Adenauer, however, had provoked Schumacher with serious accusations against the SPD: see Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Chancellor of the Allies? The Significance of the United States in Adenauer's Foreign Policy', in David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt (eds.) *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions. Germany and America since 1776* (Cambridge and Washington, 1997), p. 316. Nevertheless, Schumacher regularly and publicly attacked both the Western Allies and the FRG. In August 1951, he told the public radio station *Bayerischer Rundfunk*: 'In the last few weeks, the Allies have shown inconsiderate victors' politics [*rücksichtslose Siegerpolitik*] in quite a number of questions. … The whole German people

can now see which unrealistic arrogance and lack of consideration the Allies have shown in the question of the costs of the occupation.' Schumacher went on to accuse Adenauer's administration of 'submissiveness' which did not even achieve any leniency towards Western Germany from the Allies (AdsD Nachlaß Fritz Erler, Sig. 7B: radio transcript, *Bayerischer Rundfunk*, 29 August 1951). Most poignant an indication of Schumacher's dislike of the occupation powers was his accusation against the Catholic Church during the 1949 general election campaign, which cost him many votes among Catholic workers – he called the Church 'the fifth occupation force' ('*die fünfte Besatzungsmacht*'): Recker, 'Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe', p. 297.

46. Erich Peter Neumann and Elisabeth Noelle, *Statistics on Adenauer. Portrait of a Statesman* (Allensbach and Bonn, 1962), p. 24.
47. Ibid., p. 46f.
48. Ibid., p. 50f.
49. Ibid., p. 48.
50. StAB 7,500-25 Bd. 2: Diary of Ingemarie von Hallen, née Wieting (born 1928), 19 May 1946; Müller and Rohdenburg wrongly attributed the diary to von Hallen's mother Adele Wieting, born 1893: Hartmut Müller and Günther Rohdenburg (eds.), *Kriegsende in Bremen. Erinnerungen, Berichte, Dokumente* (Bremen, 1995), pp. 88ff.
51. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony James Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace. The Political Settlement after the Second World War* (London, 1972), p. 186f.
52. Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'USA und westdeutscher Wiederaufstieg (1945–1952)', in Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland (eds.) *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt, 1997), p. 95; for a detailed discussion of the Morgenthau Plan, see section 2.2.
53. Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, p. 186f
54. See for example the diary of the Würzburg clergyman Fritz Bauer in March 1945: 'Our love belongs to our soldiers; they belong to us. Our hope is directed towards the Americans', quoted in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Irina Renz (eds.) *Besiegt und befreit. Stimmen vom Kriegsende 1945* (Gerlingen, 1995), p. 48.
55. See Klaus-Dietmar Henke: *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands* (Munich, 1995), esp. pp. 169–77.
56. Schäfer, 'Amerikanismus im Dritten Reich', p. 208.
57. Jörg Streese, 'Das Schweigen, die Sprache, der Aufbruch. Stationen einer Jugend vor dem Hintergrund der Bremer Straßenbahn-Unruhen 1968', in Olaf Dinné, Jochen Grünwaldt and Peter Kuckuk (eds.) *Anno Dunnemals: 68 in Bremen* (Bremen, 1998), p. 48.
58. Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins. The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill, NC and London, 2002), p. 226.
59. Ibid., p. 226f.
60. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 366. Black GIs in Germany were, like their fellow Caucasian GIs, better off than most Germans living near US Army bases and thus caused resentment as a constant and very visible reminder of German defeat and inferiority. Even in areas outside the initial American occupation zone, where GIs only began to be stationed with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the population reacted angrily

to their presence: Maria Höhn, '*Heimat* in Turmoil. African-American GIs in 1950s West Germany', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 146.

61. Heide Fehrenbach, 'Of German Mothers and "Negermischlingskinder". Race, Sex, and the Postwar Nation', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 166f; idem, *Race after Hitler. Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2005), p. 53f.

62. Frank Bösch, *Das konservative Milieu. Vereinskultur und lokale Sammlungspolitik in ost- und westdeutschen Regionen (1900–1969)* (Göttingen, 2002), p. 189.

63. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 366.

64. See also section 3.3.

65. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 57: Otto Strasser, 'Deutschland und der Atlantik Pakt', Cincinnatier Freie Presse, 27 February 1949. Strasser alleged that the Allies attempted to draft Germans into British, French and US Foreign Legions, and had used German POWs as slave labourers.

66. NRW HStA RWN 172/401: speech entitled 'Grundgesetz und Entnazifizierung', 19 July 1949, p. 3.

67. The *Nationale Sammlung* was an alliance of the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* (German Community), led by August Haußleiter, Munich, Member of the Bavarian Parliament, *Der Deutsche Block* (The German Bloc), led by Karl Meissner, Munich, and the *Deutsche Soziale Bewegung* (German Social Movement), run by Karl Heinz Priester, Wiesbaden. All three leaders of the association gained, or had already gained, prominence as rather vocal neo-Fascist protagonists in Western Germany (BArch B 106/63080).

68. BArch B 106/63080: 'Richtlinien für Redner und Mitarbeiter der Nationalen Sammlung für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1953', 13 August 1953. A copy was obtained by the intelligence service and forwarded to the Interior Ministry.

69. Annette Kaminsky (ed.), *Heimkehr 1948* (Munich, 1998), introduction, p. 8.

70. See, for example, Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau. The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 11f and 73ff.

71. Matthias Weiß, 'Journalisten: Worte als Taten', in Norbert Frei (ed.) *Karrieren im Zwielicht. Hitlers Eliten nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2001), p. 262.

72. Michael Schornstheimer, *Bombenstimmung und Katzenjammer. Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Quick und Stern in den 50er Jahren* (Cologne, 1989). Schornstheimer's study is often oversimplified and one-sided. Whereas the magazines' reports are taken at face value, he dismisses the regular condemnation of the Nazi regime in other features of both magazines as schematic, only paying lip service (p. 20) to anti-Nazi views. I do, however, agree with certain judgements that Schornstheimer makes of 1950s Germany. For a more extensive study of all types of Second World War remembrance literature in Germany after 1945, see Rolf Düsterberg, *Soldat und Kriegserlebnis. Deutsche militärische Erinnerungsliteratur (1945–1961) zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Motive, Begriffe, Wertungen* (Tübingen, 2000).

73. Schornstheimer, *Bombenstimmung und Katzenjammer*, p. 308.

74. Ibid., p. 301.
75. Hermann Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. II, *Zwischen Grundgesetz und großer Koalition. 1949–1967* (Munich and Vienna, 1986), p. 188.
76. NRW HStA RWN 172/90: section 2 of the manifesto (file contains various prints of the manifesto).
77. Quoted in Diner, *America*, p. 119.
78. Ernst von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen*, [1951] 9th edn. (Hamburg, 1953).
79. Klaus Theweleit, *Männerphantasien*, vol. I, *Frauen, Fluten, Körper, Geschichte* [1977], 2nd edn., 2 vols. (Reinbek, 1980), p. 18.
80. Jost Hermand, *Ernst von Salomon. Wandlungen eines Nationalrevolutionärs* (Leipzig and Stuttgart, 2002), p. 6.
81. Ibid., pp. 7ff.
82. See also also section 3.3.
83. Ernst von Salomon, *Das Schicksal des A.D.* (Hamburg, 1960).
84. Ibid., pp. 241ff.
85. See also Hermand, *Ernst von Salomon*, p. 16f.
86. von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen*, p. 614.
87. Ibid., p. 622f.
88. Ibid., pp. 622–5.
89. Ibid., p. 622f.
90. Ibid., p. 631.
91. Ibid., p. 53f.
92. Ibid., pp. 641–9, 655.
93. Ibid., pp. 658–726, 782–7.
94. Ibid., p. 663f.
95. Ibid., p. 736.
96. Ibid., passim, and Hermand, *Ernst von Salomon*, p. 15.
97. von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen*, pp. 695, 735.
98. Ibid., p. 705.
99. Ibid., p. 717.
100. Ibid., pp. 721, 724.
101. Ibid., p. 775f.
102. Ibid., p. 720.
103. See, for example, Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, *My First Seventy-Six Years. The Autobiography of Hjalmar Schacht* (London, 1955), or idem, *Gold for Europe* (London, 1950).
104. Schacht, *My First Seventy-Six Years*, pp. 424–40.
105. Ibid., p. 440.
106. Ibid., p. 442.
107. Ibid., p. 443.
108. Ibid., p. 450.
109. Ibid., p. 449.
110. Ibid., p. 444.
111. Ibid., p. 443.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. p. 428.
114. Ibid., p. 443.
115. Ibid., p. 444.

116. Otto Seeling lost all economic positions in 1941; became a member of the bizonal *Wirtschaftsrat* 1947–8; 1952 president of the *Landesverband der Bayerischen Industrie* and chairman of the supervisory board of the *Süddeutsche Bank*, Senator of the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft*.

117. ACSP 1.2. N Se 5.1.3.: typescript of Seeling's talk about Caux at the Rotary Club Nuremberg, 1 November 1949, p. 1.

118. Ibid., p. 3.

119. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 26: private travel journal, typescript, 1 December 1951.

120. Ibid., p. 18, 25 November 1951.

121. Karl August Horst, quoted in Assmann and Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit*, p. 225.

122. Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, vol. II, *Deutsche Geschichte vom 'Dritten Reich' bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, 4th edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 119.

123. Hagen Schulze, *Germany: A New History* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1998), p. 290.

124. Incidentally, also the publisher of *Der Fragebogen* and Leo Lawrence Matthias's highly anti-American writings that are dealt with in other chapters.

125. Facsimile reprint in Thomas Piltz (ed.) *Zweihundert Jahre deutsch-amerikanischer Beziehungen. Two Hundred Years of German-American Relations. 1776–1976* (Munich, 1975), p. 139.

126. HIA Heuss, Theodor, Miscellaneous papers, 1949–52: typescript of his speech in Bergen-Belsen, 30 November 1952, p. 4.

127. Ibid.: typescript of Heuss's speech in Wiesbaden at the Society for Christian-Jewish Co-operation, 7 December 1949, p. 2.

128. Wolfgang Benz, 'Schwierigkeiten der Heimkehr. Eine Einführung', in Annette Kaminsky (ed.) *Heimkehr 1948* (Munich, 1998), pp. 18 and 345.

129. Arthur L. Smith, *Die 'vermißte Million'. Zum Schicksal deutscher Kriegsgefangener nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (München, 1992), p. 86.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., p. 35f.

132. Ibid., p. 36.

133. Ibid., p. 37.

134. John Gimbel, *A German Community under American Occupation. Marburg, 1945–1952* (Stanford, CA, 1961), p. 69f.

135. James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine. Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago and London, 1982), pp. 74ff

136. See, for example, the diary of Margarete Heilers (wife of the Jewish writer Will Pless who was murdered in Dachau), Ansbach, 1 April 1945: 'The farmer's wife suddenly gets in contact with me and asks whether the Americans were going to rape us' (quoted in Hirschfeld and Renz, *Besiegt und befreit*, p. 56).

137. Lutz Niethammer, 'Privat-Wirtschaft. Erinnerungsfragmente einer anderen Umerziehung', in idem (ed.) *'Hinterher merkt man, daß es richtig war, daß es schiefgegangen ist' Nachkriegserfahrung im Ruhrgebiet* (Berlin and Bonn, 1983), pp. 20ff.

138. Ibid., especially p. 33.

139. Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, p. 200f.
140. Ibid., p. 201.
141. Ibid., p. 200; also Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe*, p. 216.
142. Obviously, the occupation period did not officially end until the Western Treaties came into operation in May 1955: see Anthony J. Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic. West German Democracy 1945–1990*, paperback edn. (London and New York, 1997), p. 135f.
143. Many thousand POWs were of course still imprisoned in camps in the Soviet Union until Adenauer's 1955 trip to Moscow. The USA was in complete support of obtaining their release. What matters here is the question of genuine war criminals held by the Western Allies.
144. NRW HStA RWN 172/90: section 2 of the manifesto (file contains various prints of the manifesto).
145. Norbert Frei, 'Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 – eine Bilanz', in idem (ed.) *Karrieren im Zwielicht. Hitlers Eliten nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2001), p. 321.
146. Ibid.
147. German war criminals in the US prison at Landsberg in Bavaria awaiting execution wore a distinctive red uniform (Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, p. 214). On 31 January 1951, 21 of the remaining 28 'red-jackets' there had their sentenced commuted to a term of imprisonment by the US administration in Germany. Seven remained on death row (ibid., p. 219). On 7 June 1951, these seven men were hanged in the presence of Vice-Chancellor Franz Blücher (FDP) and Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer (CSU). The US Supreme Court had signed the execution orders the day before (ibid., p. 231).
148. ACDP I-369 12/1: telegram to Ehlers, February 1951.
149. ACDP I-369 12/1: letter Ehlers to Flossdorf, 19 February 1951.
150. Quoted in Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, p. 195.
151. ACDP I-369 12/1: according to the order of the file, the flyer must have been sent to Ehlers late 1952 or early 1953.
152. BArch B 104/422: *Deutsche Blätter*, 15 December 1952, p. 6, 'Die Memoiren der Mr. Griffis. USA drohten Schweden mit Bomben'.
153. Ibid.
154. BArch B 106/15577: meeting of the *Landesverband Hessen*, 10 December 1958, in Schwarzenborn, a former prison camp for National Socialists.
155. Franz-Werner Kersting, 'Helmut Schelskys 'Skeptische Generation' von 1957. Zur Publikations- und Wirkungsgeschichte eines Standardwerkes', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 50, no. 3 (2002), pp. 465ff.
156. Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen in der deutschen Familie der Gegenwart* (Dortmund, 1953), p. 83.
157. Ibid., p. 124.
158. Ibid., p. 158.
159. Lothar Kettenacker, 'Der Morgenthau-Plan: Geschichte einer Totgeburt', in Gerhard Albert Ritter and Peter Wende (eds.) *Rivalität und Partnerschaft. Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Anthony J. Nicholls* (London, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, 1999), p. 265.
160. Alan Kramer, *The West German Economy, 1945–1955* (New York and Oxford, 1991), p. 43.

161. Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche*, pp. 78–105.
162. Gymnasium an der Hamburger Straße, Bremen, Germany.
163. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 64: press cutting, introduction to *Politische Studien*, March/April 1967, vol. 172.
164. Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, p. 184.
165. Ibid., p. 185.
166. Ibid., p. 267.
167. Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, p. 309.
168. Cited in Diner, *America*, p. 111.
169. BArch B 106/63080: *Verfassungsschutz* (domestic German secret service) copy of the election manifesto.
170. According to Renate Höpfinger (ed.), *Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (ACSP). Verzeichnis der Bestände* (Munich, 1998), p. 13, Haußleiter led a rather colourful political life. Before 1933, he was a member of the national-liberal DVP. During Nazi Germany, he worked as a journalist for the *Fränkischer Kurier* newspaper. After the Second World War, he co-founded the CSU in Kulmbach and was a CSU Member of the Bavarian Parliament from 1946 onwards. Although he was expelled for a while from parliament for militarism (1947–8), he was subsequently elected deputy chairman of the CSU for 1948 and 1949. In 1949, he resigned from the party and founded the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*. In his later life, he co-founded the Green Party (1979) and was one of three party spokespersons until 1980. He became head of their weekly newspaper *Die Grünen* and Member of the Bavarian Parliament for the party in 1986 and 1987. He died in July 1989. For biographical information on Haußleiter, see also Alexander Gallus, *Die Neutralisten. Verfechter eines vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ost und West 1945–1990* (Düsseldorf, 2001), pp. 222–9.
171. BArch B 106/63080: press cutting *Die Neue Zeitung*, 17 November 1952.
172. AdsD Nachlaß Erich Ollenhauer, Mappe 459: intelligence report, *Verfassungsschutz*, 1 February 1953.
173. BArch B 106/63080: press cutting, *Oberpfälzer Anzeiger*, 27 February 1952, p. 5, 'Haußleiter und ein neuer 20. Juli'.
174. BArch B 106/63080: Report of a CDU member about Haußleiter speaking at a meeting of the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* in Goslar, 22 November 1956.
175. BArch B 106/15566: photocopy of that article added to a letter from the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* to the Ministry for the Interior, 1 April 1953; an undated copy of the article can also be found in IfZ ED 118, Mappe 60.
176. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe, March 1951, p. 3.
177. BArch B 106/15596: excerpt from *Nation Europa*, vol. 3, 1952; quoted in a report by Adolf Volbracht, *Neofaschistische Tendenzen in der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur und Presse (Zitate)*, financed by the German and the International Sections of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (for more on the German section of the CCF, see Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*).
178. BArch B 106/15577: press information of the *Club republikanischer Publizisten im Grünwalder Kreis*, May 1959. Although Mosley was generally regarded a spent force in Britain in 1959, the transnational co-operation of right-wing extremists would have added to the reasons for German contemporaries to take the journal seriously.

179. Frank Bösch, *Die Adenauer-CDU. Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945–1969* (Munich and Stuttgart, 2001), p. 143.
180. NRW HStA RWN 172/551: notes for his speech, p. 5.
181. Ibid., p. 4.
182. Ibid., p. 4f.
183. Ibid., p. 24.
184. See, for example, speeches and articles in NRW HStA RWN 172/401 and NRW HStA RWN 172/419.
185. NRW HStA RWN 172/401: speech entitled 'Grundgesetz und Entnazifizierung', 19 July 1949, p. 3.
186. BArch B 106/785: *der neue ring*, April 1958, p. 6.
187. HStAS Q1/8, Bü 278: undated typoscript 'Dauerfreundschaft mit Amerika'. The text makes it obvious that it was written after his visit in 1954/5.
188. Ibid., p. 4.
189. Ibid., p. 1f.
190. Ibid., p. 2.
191. Ibid.
192. Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past*, p. 96.
193. BArch B 106/15596: Bruno Brehm, *Am Rande des Abgrunds – Von Lenin bis Truman*, published 1950, p. 537; quoted in a report by Adolf Volbracht, *Neofaschistische Tendenzen in der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur und Presse (Zitate)*, financed by the German and the International Sections of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (for more on the German section of the CCF, see Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*).
194. BArch B 106/63080: *Deutsche Gemeinschaft, Kreisgemeinschaft München*, 9 July 1957.
195. BArch B 106/15577.
196. StAHH 136-3 18: flyer '1945 – Zwanzig Jahre vertan? 1965'.
197. See sections 3.3, 4.2 and 4.4.
198. Werner M. Doyé, 'Helden sterben nie – Wie Pierre Brice Old Shatterhand wurde', in Constanze Carcenac-Lecomte, Katja Czarnowski, Sybille Frank, Stefanie Frey and Torsten Lüdtke (eds.) *Steinbruch. Deutsche Erinnerungsorte* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), p. 120.
199. Michael Koetzle, 'Kleines Glück mit Büttenrand – Kindheit in den Fünfzigern', in Michael Koetzle, Klaus-Jürgen Sembach and Klaus Schölzel (eds.) *Die Fünfziger Jahre. Heimat – Glaube – Glanz. Der Stil eines Jahrzehnts* (Munich, 1998), p. 15.
200. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 5: private travel journal, typescript, 12 November 1951.
201. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 88, Folder 721: fellowship report of Peter Haupt, written in English, submitted 1961, p. 24. Haupt was born in 1923, received a Harkness Fellowship the USA, went there from January 1955 to April 1956, and went on to become an architect and a professor of architecture at the *Technische Universität Berlin* from 1966 to 1989.
202. StAB 7,144-25; letter to his wife from Washington, 9 May 1955.
203. StAB 7,144-25; letter to his wife from Philadelphia, 11 May 1955.
204. See, for example, Britta Mischek, *Die Konstruktion nationaler Identitäten in der englischen politisch-satirischen Druckgrafik zur Amerikanischen Revolution 1763–1783* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), p. 279–356; esp. pp. 335ff.

205. Markovits, *Amerika, dich haßt sich's besser*, pp. 77–82.
206. Ibid., p. 81f.
207. StAB 7, 144-25; letter to his wife, Bremerton, 25 April 1955.
208. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, pp. 95–103.
209. Fehrenbach, *Race after Hitler*, p. 17.
210. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, p. 101.
211. StAB 7,144-25, letter to his wife from Washington, 2 April 1955.
212. StAB 7,144-25, letter to his wife from 'San Franzisko' [*sic*], 28 April 1955.
213. Andrea Stuppe, 'Aspekte des Amerikabildes Willy Brandts, 1933–1963: Eine Studie unter Berücksichtigung des Materials im Willy-Brandt-Archiv' (MA thesis, Cologne, 1997), p. 29.
214. Ibid., p. 46 (footnotes).
215. Peter von Zahn, *An den Grenzen der Neuen Welt* (Hamburg, 1955), p. 120.
216. Ibid., pp. 209–16.
217. On his flight from Amsterdam to New York via Shannon in 1951, he took a fancy to the woman sitting next to him who – to his disappointment – left the plane in Ireland. He describes her as 'slightly Semitic-looking, but more refined' ('*leicht semitischer Einschlag, aber sehr verfeinert*'), ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 1.
218. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 29: private travel journal, typescript, 26 November 1951.
219. Ibid., p. 15.
220. Ibid., p. 20.
221. See also section 2.1.
222. von Salomon, *Fragebogen*, p. 433.
223. Ibid., p. 55f.

Chapter 3

1. Maase, ' "Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft" ', p. 225.
2. Ermarth, '*The German Talks Back:* Heinrich Hauser and German Attitudes toward Americanization after World War II', in idem (ed.) *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945–1955* (Oxford and Providence, RI, 1993), pp. 101–31.
3. Quoted in ibid., p. 114.
4. Quoted in ibid., p. 101.
5. Gottfried Benn, *Doppelleben. Zwei Selbstdarstellungen* (Wiesbaden, 1950), p. 88.
6. Ibid., p. 94f.
7. Leo Lawrence Matthias, *Die Entdeckung Amerikas Anno 1953 oder Das geordnete Chaos* (Hamburg, 1953).
8. See idem, *Die Kehrseite der USA* (Reinbek, 1964), introduction.
9. Idem, *Es hing an einem Faden. Meine Jahre in Lateinamerika und in Europa* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1970), p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. Ibid., p. 18.
12. Ibid. pp. 34ff.
13. Ibid., pp. 373ff.

14. Diner, *America*, p. 123.
15. Matthias, *Entdeckung Amerikas*, p. 134.
16. Ibid., p. 133.
17. Ibid., p. 49f.
18. Ibid., pp. 51ff.
19. Ibid., p. 53, 'Russia' being the Soviet Union.
20. Ibid., pp. 177ff.
21. Ibid., p. 279.
22. Ibid., p. 322.
23. BayHStA PrASlg Stk 1958/2a: press cutting, FAZ, 29 May 1958, p. 7: 'Die gleiche Bildungs-Chance'.
24. Ibid.
25. *Der Spiegel*, vol. 5, no. 4 (24 January 1951), p. 5: 'Legion. Unter der Oberfläche'.
26. His name is Hans-Joachim von Merkatz.
27. BArch B 136/4375: press cutting *Die Zeit*, 1 February 1951.
28. BArch B 136/4375: press cutting *Die Welt*, 2 February 1951.
29. BArch B 136/4375: press cutting, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 23 February 1951.
30. *Der Spiegel*, vol. 5, no. 4 (24 January 1951), p. 5: 'Legion. Unter der Oberfläche'.
31. See BArch B 136/4375: press cutting, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 May 1951 – both Kiesinger and Mende denied their alleged *Legion* membership.
32. Bonner Rundschau, 'Erste Legion fordert ein "Volksheer"', front page, 12 June 1951.
33. ACDP PDok Böx, Heinrich/allgemein: Interpress Archiv Nr. 153, 13 June 1967. This press cutting confirms date and place. The *Legion* was characterised therein as an 'association of politicians who sought the renewal of democracy' ('*die Erneuerung der Demokratie*').
34. StAB 4,22/2-40: unidentified report, probably intelligence, 16 February 1951.
35. StAB 4,22/2-40: unidentified report, probably intelligence, 31 October 1951.
36. Ibid.
37. StAB 4,22/2-40: report by Dr [Joachim] von Hoffmann, *Freie Hansestadt Bremen*, *Vertretung beim Bund* (federal representation of the Federal State of Bremen in Bonn) about an informal conversation between von Hoffmann and Adolf Dedekind.
38. ACDP Abteilung Pressedokumentation, Schmalz: press cutting, NRZ, 30 August 1956.
39. BArch B 136/4375: Landesvorstandsbeschluß CDU Rheinland, Cologne, 5 December 1950.
40. BArch B 136/4375: according to the news agency *Platow Dienst*, 27 January 1951.
41. Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika. German Nationalism Since 1945*, 2 vols. (Middletown, CT, 1967), vol. II, p. 1135.
42. StAB 4,22/2-40: unidentified report, probably intelligence, 31 October 1951.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. There is a very brief reference in a footnote of Volker Ilgen and Dirk Schindelbeck, *'Haste was, biste was!'. Werbung für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*

(Darmstadt, 1999), p. 212f, which refers to '*Die Bruderschaft Erste Legion*'. This is rather misleading, since the *Bruderschaft* and the *Erste Legion* were two separate right-wing organisations hostile to one another. Ilgen and Schindelbeck claim with reference to *Der Spiegel* (24 January 1951, p. 5) that '*Die Bruderschaft Erste Legion*' was some sort of secret organisation and a militant elite against Bolshevism with roughly 10,000 members in 1951. More importantly, the footnote claims that the organisation was formed as an Adenauer initiative. The actual article (*Der Spiegel*, vol. 5, no. 4 (24 January 1951), p. 5: 'Legion. Unter der Oberfläche') quoted above refers to the *Legion* as 'a brotherhood supported by Chancellor Adenauer' ('*diese von Bundeskanzler Adenauer protegierte Bruderschaft*'), but also makes it quite clear that the *Legion* wanted to have nothing to do with *Die Bruderschaft* and actually warned against this rival lodge.

46. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. II, p. 1135.
47. Ibid., vol. I, p. 356.
48. Ibid.
49. BArch B 136/4375: press cutting, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 May 1951.
50. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. I, p. 278.
51. Ibid., vol. I, p. 287; for more on the Naumann Circle, see Aaron Donaghy, 'The Naumann Affair of 1953. A Case Study of British Intervention in Semi-sovereign West Germany' (MA thesis, Dublin, 2005) and Volker Rolf Berghahn, *Modern Germany. Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1987), p. 214.
52. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. II, p. 1134.
53. *Der Spiegel*, vol. 5, no. 4 (24 January 1951), p. 5: 'Legion. Unter der Oberfläche': '*Finanzielle Grundlage der Ersten Legion sind im wesentlichen die Fonds, aus denen auch die Gelder für die Regierungsparteien fließen*'.
54. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe, March 1951, p. 7.
55. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. I, p. 122.
56. Signature impossible to decipher.
57. BArch B 136/4375, 16 January 1951.
58. BArch B 136/4375: letter from *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* to the *Bundeskanzleramt*, 17 May 1951, replying to an inquiry from the *Bundeskanzleramt*, 10 May 1951.
59. StAB 4,22/2-40: report by Dr [Joachim] von Hoffmann, *Freie Hansestadt Bremen*, *Vertretung beim Bund* (federal representation of the Federal State of Bremen in Bonn) about an informal conversation between von Hoffmann and Adolf Dedekind.
60. ACDP PDok Böx, Heinrich/allgemein: Interpress Archiv Nr. 153, 13 June 1967.
61. StAB 4,22/2-40: unidentified report, probably intelligence, 31 October 1951.
62. ACDP PDok Böx, Heinrich/allgemein: press cutting, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 June 1990.
63. ACDP PDok Böx, Heinrich/allgemein: press cuttings, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 June 1985; *General-Anzeiger Bonn*, 28 June 1985; *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, 28 June 1985; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 June 1990.
64. BArch B 136/4375: *Legion* pamphlet, December 1950.
65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.
67. BArch B 136/4375: press cutting, *Die Welt*, 20 January 1951.
68. StAB 4,22/2-40: press cutting, *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 30 March 1951.
69. StAB 4,22/2-40: Schriftenreihe der Ersten Legion Nr 1, 'Legion und Staat' by Professor Erich Schmalz, March 1951, pp. 7–11.
70. StAB 4,22/2-40: report by Dr [Joachim] von Hoffmann, *Freie Hansestadt Bremen*, *Vertretung beim Bund* (federal representation of the Federal State of Bremen in Bonn) about an informal conversation between von Hoffmann and Adolf Dedekind.
71. BArch B 136/4375: undated pamphlet, probably between 5 December 1950 and 6 January 1951, according to the order of the file. The pamphlet was marked for the attention of Adenauer's State Secretary Hans Globke.
72. See section 3.3.
73. BArch B 136/4375: Der Deutsche. Politischer Brief der Ersten Legion, vol. I, No. 2, August 1951, p. 2, 'Geschichten um ein Teehaus'.
74. BArch B 136/4375: Der Deutsche. Politischer Brief der Ersten Legion, vol. I, No. 1, July 1951, p. 4, 'Deutschland und das Problem der Neutralität'.
75. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* [1922] (Cambridge, MA and London, 1985), p. 5.
76. Ibid., p. 11.
77. Ibid., p. 37.
78. Ibid., p. 36.
79. Ibid., p. 33.
80. Ibid., p. 71.
81. Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* [1923] (Cambridge, MA and London, 1985), p. 28.
82. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* [1961] (Cambridge, 1989).
83. Schmitt, *Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, p. 28.
84. Ibid., p. 25.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 24.
87. Ibid., p. 49.
88. Ibid., p. 50.
89. NRW HStA RW 265 – 20938: public lecture 'USA und die völkerrechtlichen Formen des modernen Imperialismus', September 1932.
90. Ibid., p. 34.
91. Ibid., p. 36.
92. Ibid., pp. 41ff.
93. Ibid., p. 45.
94. Ibid.
95. Dirk van Laak, *Gespräche in der Sicherheit des Schweigens. Carl Schmitt in der politischen Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrepublik*, 2nd edn. (Berlin, 2002), p. 26f.
96. Jan-Werner Müller, *Another Country. German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity* (London and New Haven, 2000), p. 210.
97. A. Dirk Moses, 'The "Weimar Syndrome" in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Carl Schmitt Reception by the Forty-Fiver Generation of Intellectuals', in Stephan Loos and Holger Zaborowski (eds.) *Leben, Tod*

und Entscheidung. Studien zur Geistesgeschichte der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 2003), p. 187.

98. Paul Noack, *Carl Schmitt. Eine Biographie* (Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p. 249; see also Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind. Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (London and New Haven, CT, 2003), p. 51ff. As late as 1970, Schmitt was rather brusque when asked about his involvement with the Nazi movement. In a newspaper interview, '… Schmitt speaks of a fall from grace [*Sündenfall*]. He had committed it, full stop [*und nun Punkt*]' (NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 196: press cutting from *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, 28 June 1970, p. 8, 'Geschmäht und auch bewundert. Jens Litten über ein Gespräch mit Professor Carl Schmitt', by Jens Litten).

99. van Laak, *Gespräche*, pp. 31ff.

100. Noack, *Carl Schmitt*, p. 253.

101. Ibid., p. 265.

102. Müller, *Another Country*, p. 211.

103. Ibid.

104. Hermann Lübbe, 'Carl Schmitt liberal rezipiert' [1986], in idem (ed.) *Die Aufdringlichkeit der Geschichte. Herausforderungen der Moderne vom Historismus bis zum Nationalsozialismus* (Cologne, Graz and Vienna, 1989), p. 310; see also van Laak, *Gespräche*, pp. 192–200.

105. Noack, *Carl Schmitt*, p. 277f.

106. Ibid., p. 275; his writing for *Die Zeit*, however, led to a serious disagreement in July 1954 between editor-in-chief Richard Tüngel, who favoured the publication of Schmitt's article, and the then political editor Marion Gräfin Dönhoff. Dönhoff subsequently left the weekly for almost a year and moved to London in order to work for the *Observer*. Schmitt seemed well informed about this disagreement and commented in June 1955, after Tüngel was forced to resign over the incident, that 'countesses become hyenas' in relation to claims that Gräfin [Countess] Dönhoff had agitated against Schmitt and had distributed compromising material about him (Noack, *Carl Schmitt*, p. 280f).

107. Moses, 'The "Weimar Syndrome" in the Federal Republic of Germany', p. 193.

108. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 429: press cutting from *Christ und Welt*, 10 November 1949, 'Amnestie – Urform des Rechts', by Carl Schmitt.

109. Ibid.

110. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 456: galley of Schmitt's article 'Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu Ernst Jüngers Schrift "Der Gordische Knoten"', 1955, p. 166.

111. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 403: copy of Schmitt's article 'Der neue Nomos der Erde', *Gemeinschaft und Politik*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1955), p. 9.

112. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 456: galley of Schmitt's article 'Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu Ernst Jüngers Schrift "Der Gordische Knoten"', 1955, p. 150.

113. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 338: galley of Schmitt's article 'Die Einheit der Welt', *Merkur*, January 1952, p. 3.

114. Ibid., p. 2.

115. Ibid., p. 4; Schmitt's italics.
116. Ibid., p. 8.
117. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 338: copy of Schmitt's article 'Der Gegensatz von Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft als Beispiel einer zweigliedrigen Unterscheidung. Betrachtungen zur Struktur und zum Schicksal solcher Antithesen', *Estudios Juridico-Sociales*, Santiago de Compostela, 1960, p. 176; Schmitt attributes the term '*Tyrannei der Werte*' to Nicolai Hartmann.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., p. 174.
121. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 456: privately printed article 'Die Tyrannei der Werte. Überlegungen eines Juristen zur Wert-Philosophie', Stuttgart, 1960, written 1959, p. 15.
122. NRW HStA RW 265 – Karton Nr. 456: galley of Schmitt's article 'Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu Ernst Jüngers Schrift "Der Gordische Knoten"', 1955, p. 149.
123. See section 2.2 for more information on that journal.
124. BArch B 106/15596: *Nation Europa*, lead article, no. 1, 1951; quoted in a report by Adolf Volbracht, *Neofaschistische Tendenzen in der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur und Presse (Zitate)*, financed by the German and the International Sections of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (for more on the German section of the CCF, see Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*).
125. BArch B 106/15596: extract from Hondorf's article in *Nation Europa*, March 1952; also quoted in Adolf Volbracht's report.
126. See also section 2.1.
127. von Salomon, *Fragebogen*, p. 406f.
128. Ibid., p. 405.
129. Ibid., p. 413f.
130. Ibid., p. 692: 'die Art erzwungener Demokratie des gleichen Elends'.
131. Ibid., p. 483.
132. Biographical data from Arnold Gehlen, *Moral und Hypermoral* [1967], 5th edn. (Wiesbaden, 1986), p. 194 and idem, *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter*, p. 123.
133. Gehlen, *Moral und Hypermoral*, p. 10.
134. Ibid., p. 63.
135. Ibid., p. 62.
136. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [1651], Penguin Classics edition ed. C. B. Macpherson (London, 1985), p. 186.
137. Gehlen, *Moral und Hypermoral*, p. 141.
138. Ibid., p. 162.
139. Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche*, p. 106.
140. Ibid., p. 107.
141. Gehlen, *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter*, p. 75f.
142. See also section 2.1.
143. Volker Rolf Berghahn, 'Fordism and West German Industrial Culture, 1945–1989', in Elliott Shore and Frank Trommler (eds.) *The German-American Encounter. Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800–2000* (New York and Oxford, 2001), p. 147.

144. Ibid., pp. 151ff.
145. Idem, *The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa and New York, 1986), p. 328.
146. S. Jonathan Wiesen, 'Coming to Terms with the Worker: West German Industry, Labour Relations and the Idea of America, 1949–60', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 36, no. 4 (2001), p. 563.
147. Berghahn, *Americanisation*, p. 113.
148. Ibid., p. 118.
149. Berghahn, 'Fordism and West German Industrial Culture', p. 153f
150. Idem, 'West German Reconstruction', pp. 65–81; idem, 'Fordism and West German Industrial Culture', p. 155.
151. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 177, Folder 1421: report by the young mathematician Ernst Robert Reifenberg about his year as a visiting student in Berkeley and Stanford, CA, written in English, submitted October 1953, p. 6. The punctuation, or lack of it, in the text is as in the original. Reifenberg was born in Berlin, but went to Cambridge (Trinity College) for his academic career. He died in 1964 in a climbing accident in the Dolomites.
152. Wiesen, 'Coming to Terms with the Worker', p. 567.
153. Berghahn, *Americanisation*, pp. 150ff.
154. Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility*, p. 325.
155. Volker Rolf Berghahn, 'West German Reconstruction and American Industrial Culture, 1945–1960', in Reiner Pommerin (ed.), *The American Impact on Postwar Germany* (Oxford and Providence, RI, 1995), p. 72.
156. idem, *Americanisation*, p. 250f.
157. Paul Erker, ' "Amerikanisierung" der westdeutschen Wirtschaft? Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung', in Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (eds.) *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1997), p. 141; also Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West. The Americanisation of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, 1992), p. 415.
158. Zink, *The United States in Germany*, pp. 330ff.
159. Paul Erker, ' "Amerikanisierung" der westdeutschen Wirtschaft?', p. 145.
160. Werner Abelshauser, 'The First Post-Liberal Nation: Stages in the Development of Modern Corporatism in Germany', *European History Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1984), p. 304–11 and 313.
161. Ibid., p. 286.
162. Ibid., p. 305.
163. ACSP 1.2. N Se 5.1.5.: 'Eindrücke eines Industriellen von einer Reise in die USA', 22 April 1952.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. See section 2.1 of this thesis for an analysis of Schacht's account of his imprisonment by the Nazis and subsequently by the US occupation forces, as described in Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, *My First Seventy-Six Years. The Autobiography of Hjalmar Schacht* (London, 1955).
168. HIA Schacht, Hjalmar Horace Greeley, Miscellaneous papers, 1932–1970: *Finanzbrief* circular, 8 October 1949, p. 6. Initially, I found this document, somewhat surprisingly, in HIA Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) Presse- und

Informationsstelle der Landesregierung, Printed issuances, 1949–50. After informing the Hoover Institution Archives about that, it was decided on 4 April 2001 to transfer the circular.

169. Ibid., p. 5f.
170. Ibid., p. 3f.
171. Ibid., p. 1.
172. Ibid., p. 1f.
173. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, *Gold for Europe* (London, 1950).
174. Ibid., p. 11f.
175. Ibid., p. 21.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid., p. 125.
178. Ibid., p. 50.
179. Nicholls, *Bonn Republic*, pp. 1–10.
180. BArch B 106/63080: copy of the journal *Die Deutsche Gemeinschaft*, January 1954, p. 1f, 'Die Miniatur-Metterniche von Bonn. Warum das Regime des 6. Septembers scheitern muß'.
181. See Müller, *Anti-Americanism and Anti-Western Sentiment*, pp. 43–65.
182. BArch B 106/63080: 'Richtlinien für Redner und Mitarbeiter der Nationalen Sammlung für den Bundestagswahlkampf 1953', 13 August 1953. A copy was obtained by the intelligence service and forwarded to the Interior Ministry.
183. Ibid.
184. See section 3.3.
185. See Jennifer A. Loehlin, *From Rugs to Riches: Housework, Consumption and Modernity in Germany* (New York and Oxford, 1999), p. 91ff.
186. See de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, pp. 376–415, for a survey of the growth of supermarkets in Europe, especially Italy.
187. Michael Wildt, *Vom kleinen Wohlstand. Eine Konsumgeschichte der fünfziger Jahre*, revised paperback edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), p. 153.
188. Andersen, *Traum vom guten Leben*, p. 58; Wildt, *Vom kleinen Wohlstand*, p. 149f.
189. Andersen, *Traum vom guten Leben*, p. 56.
190. Ibid., p. 57.
191. Ibid., p. 56.
192. Wildt, *Vom kleinen Wohlstand*, p. 150.
193. Andersen, *Traum vom guten Leben*, p. 58.
194. Michael Wildt, 'Continuities and Discontinuities of Consumer Mentality in West Germany in the 1950's', in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (eds.) *Life after Death. Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s* (Cambridge and Washington, 2003), pp. 220–2.
195. Idem, 'Plurality of Taste: Food and Consumption in West Germany during the 1950's', *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 39 (Spring 1995), p. 28ff.
196. *Frankfurter Illustrierte*, 23 March 1951, p. 2, quoted in Ilgen and Schindelbeck, *'Haste was, biste was!'*, p. 11.
197. Ibid.
198. Erica Carter, *How German is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1997), pp. 58 and 78.

199. Peter von Zahn, *Fremde Freunde. Bericht aus der Neuen Welt* (Hamburg, 1953), p. 23.
200. Loehlin, *From Rugs to Riches*, p. 92f.
201. Carla Reisner, 'Strictly Feminine! oder Frau Carla plaudert von Frau zu Frau', in Hermann E. Reisner, *Reisner in Amerika. Ein Reisebericht der Übersee-Post über den Süden und Westen der USA sowie vier west-kanadische Provinzen mit Export-Anregungen für die Praxis* (Nuremberg, 1952), p. 320.
202. ADL D2-11: Anlage zu Rednerschnellbrief RSB 25/53, 10 April 1953, 'Amerikanischer Bilderbogen. Eindrücke einer USA-Reise', p. 9f (also as a typescript in StAHH 622-1 Familie Rademacher 3). Report about Rademacher's three-week travels through the USA in 1952, written for his friends and acquaintances, Christmas 1952. This section of his report was also published in the *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 7 October 1952 (press cutting in StAHH 135-1 VI 074-1 Band I).
203. ADL D2-11: Anlage zu Rednerschnellbrief RSB 25/53, 10 April 1953, 'Amerikanischer Bilderbogen. Eindrücke einer USA-Reise', p. 9 (also as a typescript in StAHH 622-1 Familie Rademacher 3).
204. A term coined by Jeffrey Herf: see idem, *Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* [1984], 6th paperback edn. (Cambridge, 1998).
205. Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, p. 370.
206. StAB 3-S.1.a. Nr. 410 (added to the file under *zu S.1.a. Nr. 410*): typed notes about Kaisen's journey to the USA together with Karl Carstens, 19 April to 3 June 1950.
207. Twelve years later, however, Kaisen seems to have mellowed. He told the Bremen *Bürgerschaft* (parliament) about the rather casual and unsentimental way of buying and selling houses: 'Buying a house over there is like buying furniture for us. Such a house is seen as furnishings [*Mobiliar*] and not, as with us, as real estate [*Immobilie*]. That saves additional costs' (StAB 7,97/2-15: transcript of his talk on 7 November 1962 about his journey to the USA, 19 September-15 October 1962).
208. StAB 3-A.3.N.3. Nr. 509: Walter Gong, 'Gedanken über die amerikanische Presse', *Arbeitskreis der deutschen Industrie*, November 1952, Düsseldorf.
209. Dolf Sternberger, 'Badezimmer-Sitten in Amerika', *Die Gegenwart*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1 February 1952), p. 81f.
210. Der Tagesspiegel, 26 October 1950, Beiblatt, p. 1: 'Mit vierzehn Nationen in Amerika. Versuch eines Berichts. Von Erik Reger. I'.
211. StAB 7,1053-1: press cutting.
212. Hermann E. Reisner, *Reisner in Amerika. Ein Reisebericht der Übersee-Post über den Süden und Westen der USA sowie vier west-kanadische Provinzen mit Export-Anregungen für die Praxis* (Nuremberg, 1952), p. 118.
213. Ibid., p. 193.
214. StAHH 136-3 20: circular by the Deutsche Freiheits Partei, Duisburg, undated, probably mid-1960s.
215. See, for instance, Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD. Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945–1956* (Oxford, 1997) and Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus*.
216. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America*, p. 179f.
217. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, p. 9.

218. Gallus, *Die Neutralisten*, introduction.
219. See also introduction to chapter 2.
220. Arendt, *Besuch in Deutschland*, p. 27.
221. The symbol of this 'soulless materialism' was Detroit, the epitome of conveyer-belt production. (Axel Schildt, *Konservativismus in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen im 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 1998), p. 233).
222. For the traditional set of attitudes towards 'the East', see Klaus Theweleit's monumental two-volume doctoral thesis *Männerphantasien* (*Male Phantasies*) (see bibliography).
223. To be fair, however, the Federal Republic did also produce alternative interpretations. One example might suffice: the economist Hans Ilau, closely linked to the academics behind the social market economy, interpreted 'East' and 'West' as diametrically opposed. He stated that the organically grown order of the West ('*gewachsene Ordnung des Westens*') was much harder to understand than the man-made order of the East ('*gemachte Ordnung des Ostens*'), just as an organism was harder to understand than a mechanism. (Hans Ilau, 'Der Sinn des Eigentums', in Franz Böhm, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Hans Ilau, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow and Günter Schmölders (eds.) *Hat der Westen eine Idee? Vorträge auf der siebten Tagung der Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft am 8. Mai 1957 in Bad Godesberg*, 2nd edn. (Ludwigsburg, 1959), p. 30).
224. Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika*, pp. 24ff.
225. Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche*, p. 12.
226. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 116f.
227. Quoted in Ceaser, *Reconstructing America*, p. 188f.
228. Ibid., pp. 187ff.
229. Gallus, *Die Neutralisten*, pp. 229ff.
230. '*Weder Wallstreet noch Moskau*' (NHStA VVP3 Nr. 82: Rundbrief (circular) Nr. XX von Dr. Otto Strasser, 20 August 1950, p. 2, typescript; also IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe, ed. Bruno Fricke, February 1951, p. 1); 'Neither Moskow, nor Wallstreet [*sic*]!' (IfZ ED 118, Mappe 58: press cutting, Deutsch-Amerikanische Bürger-Zeitung, Chicago, 1 June 1950, headline of an interview with Strasser); Germany and Europe should be '*werder moskau- noch wallstreethörig*' (IfZ ED 118, Mappe 61: press cutting, Otto Strasser, 'Wo also steht er?', Tagesspiegel, 12 July 1953, p. 2); '*Weder Moskau, noch Wall- street – sondern Deutschland und Europa!*', ('Neither Moscow nor Wall Street – but Germany and Europe!', in BArch B 106/15566: undated commercial leaflet for the weekly *Wochenzeitung 'Deutsche Freiheit' – Herausgeber Dr. Otto Strasser*, edited by Strasser)
231. NHStA VVP3 Nr. 82: Rundbrief (circular) Nr. XX von Dr. Otto Strasser, 20 August 1950, p. 1, typescript.
232. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe, March 1951, p. 2.
233. Official Western Germany referred to the GDR government as 'Pankow', a suburb of (East) Berlin, since East Berlin was not acceptable as a capital, and since Berlin was not regarded as part of either the GDR nor the FRG.
234. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe, February 1951, p. 5f.
235. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: Freiheits-Briefe (editor: Bruno Fricke), March 1951, p. 7.

236. See BArch B 106/15566 and BArch B 106/15567 for the legal case against Strasser's renaturalisation.

237. Werner Röder and Herbert Arthur Strauss (eds.), *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933*, vol. I (3 vols., Munich, 1980), pp. 740–2.

238. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 61: for the term '*Solidarismus*', see his *Tagesspiegel* article quoted below, and the letter from Stasser to Welt am Sonntag newspaper, 6 May 1953.

239. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 61: press cutting, Otto Strasser, 'Wo also steht er?', Tagesspiegel, 12 July 1953, p. 2.

240. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 61: press cutting, Otto Strasser, 'Wo also steht er?', Tagesspiegel, 12 July 1953, p. 2.

241. IfZ ED 118, Mappe 60: leaflet 'The Story of Otto Strasser', published by the 'Friends of Otto Strasser' in Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, 25 March 1952.

242. IfZ ED 118, Bd. 45: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt der Volkszeitung, Nebraska, Dr. Otto Strasser, 'Marshall-Plan-Gelder allein genügen nicht. Es mangelt der Geist'.

243. BArch B 106/15567: Embassy report to the AA, Ottawa, 25 September 1957, about Strasser's visit to Canada.

244. AdsD Nachlaß Erich Ollenhauer, Mappe 459: intelligence report (*Verfassungsschutz*), meeting of the *Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit ehemaliger Waffen-SS-Angehöriger*, Hildesheim, 9 January 1953 – speech by Jan Blankemeyer, former *Gauinspekteur*, from Oldenburg.

245. BArch B 106/15596: Karl Heinz Priester, 'Deutschland – Ost-West-Kolonie – oder gleichberechtigt in einem freien Europa. Eine Streitschrift wider Nihilismus, Unterwürfigkeit und jegliche Diktatur', *Die europäische Nationale* (n.d., probably 1952), p. 6, quoted in a report by Adolf Volbracht, *Neofaschistische Tendenzen in der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsliteratur und Presse (Zitate)*, financed by the German and the International Sections of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (for more on the German section of the CCF, see Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive?*).

246. Ibid., p. 28.

247. AdsD Nachlaß Erich Ollenhauer, Mappe 459: intelligence report (*Verfassungsschutz*) about a meeting of the association *Unabhängige Göttinger*, Göttingen, 12 January 1953.

248. NHStA VVP3 Nr. 82: pamphlet ''Aufruf zur Bildung der "Dritten Front"', Hamburg, 31 October 1950.

249. Gallus, *Die Neutralisten*, pp. 195–203.

250. NHStA VVP3 Nr. 82: pamphlet 'Aufruf zur Bildung der "Dritten Front"', Hamburg, 31 October 1950, p. 1.

251. StAHH 136-3 73: flyer, archival page number 342105.

252. Ibid.

253. StAHH 136-3 73: flyer, archival page number 342106.

254. Ibid.

255. See section 1.2.1.

256. Kreuzer, 'Public Education in America', p. 97.

257. Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation. Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945–1960* (Göttingen, 1999), p. 351.

258. See also sections 2.2, 4.2 and 4.4.
259. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* [1944], paperback edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).
260. Bude, 'Achtundsechzig', p. 127.
261. BArch N 1169/300: special publication of the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* daily, 25 May 1954, p. 8. 'Autorität und Freiheit', *Heidelberger Institut für Psychagogik*, 12 May 1954.
262. Alexander Rüstow, 'Weltpolitische Folgerungen', in Franz Böhm, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Hans Ilau, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow and Günter Schmölders (eds.) *Hat der Westen eine Idee? Vorträge auf der siebten Tagung der Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft am 8. Mai 1957 in Bad Godesberg*, 2nd edn. (Ludwigsburg, 1959), p. 87.
263. Ibid., p. 89.
264. See also Michael Ermarth, 'Counter-Americanism and Critical Currents in West German Reconstruction 1945–1960: The German Lesson Confronts the American Way of Life', in Alexander Stephan (ed.), *Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York and Oxford, 2005), pp. 40ff.
265. BArch N 1311, Findbuch zum Bestand, Zehrer's private papers in Koblenz.
266. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, p. 121; Markus Payk, 'Ideologische Distanz, sachliche Nähe. Die USA und die Positionswechsel konservativer Publizisten aus dem "Tat"-Kreis in der Bundesrepublik bis zur Mitte der 1960er Jahre', in Jan Behrends, Árpád von Klimó and Patrice Poutrus (eds.) *Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa* (Bonn, 2005), pp. 229ff.
267. Kurt Sontheimer, *Die Adenauer-Ära. Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik*, 2nd edn. (Munich, 1996), p. 143.
268. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, p. 145.
269. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. I, p. 287.
270. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?*, p. 121.
271. quoted in ibid.: '*das universale Schimpfwort*'.
272. Ibid., p. 145.
273. On the Naumann affair of January 1953 see, for instance, Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, p. 214, and Donaghy, 'The Naumann Affair of 1953'.
274. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, p. 287.
275. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 31 December 1950, 'Mächte ohne Mittelalter'.
276. Ibid. In order to emphasise that analysis, Zehrer's newspaper article is ornated by a picture of the Chrysler Building or '*Das Kreysler-Gebäude in New York*', i.e. one of the symbols of modernity. The theory of a lack of tradition in the USA and the Soviet Union became almost a mantra for Zehrer, and nearly two years later he repeated that 'both are powers without a Middle Ages' in an article about the Swiss journalist Robert Jungk's book *Die Zukunft hat schon begonnen* concerning the USA's space exploration. (BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, hand-written date, probably 12 October 1952, 'Wie wird die Welt von morgen aussehen?').
277. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 31 December 1950, 'Mächte ohne Mittelalter'.

278. Ibid.
279. Ibid.
280. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt or Die Welt, 6 October 1952 (date hand-written, quite unclear), 'Jazz – die Antwort des schwarzen Mannes. Der Rhythmus als das letzte Prinzip der Ordnung'.
281. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 31 December 1950, 'Mächte ohne Mittelalter'.
282. Ibid.
283. Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*.
284. Ibid., p. 224.
285. see Klautke, 'Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus', p. 173–181, esp. p. 180.
286. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 31 December 1950, 'Mächte ohne Mittelalter'.
287. Ibid.
288. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, hand-written date, probably 12 October 1952, 'Wie wird die Welt von morgen aussehen?' (about the Swiss journalist Robert Jungk's book *Die Zukunft hat schon begonnen*).

Chapter 4

1. Neumann and Noelle (eds.), *Jahrbuch*, p. 288; Once again, the poll referred to 'Russia'
2. Maase, ' "Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft" ', p. 225.
3. Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft. Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2000), pp. 208ff.
4. Maase, ' "Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft" ', p. 225.
5. Quoted in Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, p. 421.
6. Frank Trommler, 'Neuer Start und alte Vorurteile: Die Kulturbeziehungen im Zeichen des Kalten Krieges 1945–1968', in Detlef Junker (ed.) *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945–1990. Ein Handbuch*, vol. I, *1945–1968*, 2nd edn. (Munich and Stuttgart, 2001), p. 569.
7. Harold James, 'Die D-Mark', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. II, 2nd edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 443.
8. The American nickname for German female fraternisers was *Veronika Dankeschön*, containing the initials VD: Elizabeth D. Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley, CA, London and Los Angeles, 1999), p. 100f; idem, 'The Hour of the Woman. Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 38; Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, p. 128f; Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (London and New Haven, CT, 2003), chapter 3.
9. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg*, p. 328.
10. Heineman, 'The Hour of the Woman', p. 37f.
11. Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London and New York, 1989), p. 93.
12. Goedde, *GIs and Germans*, p. 43.

13. Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, p. 193.

14. Merith Niehuss, *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft. Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland 1945–1960* (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 307ff.

15. So called because children supposedly referred to their mother's new partner as 'uncle'.

16. Angelika Vogel, 'Familie', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.) *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. III, *Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), p. 40.

17. Ibid., p. 41.

18. Regina Mühlhauser, 'Vergewaltigungen in Deutschland 1945. Nationaler Opferdiskurs und individuelles Erinnern betroffener Frauen', in Klaus Naumann (ed.) *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2001), p. 390.

19. StAB 7,500-25 Bd. 2: Diary of Ingemarie von Hallen, born 1928, 19 May 1946; see also section 2.1.

20. Quoted in Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, p. 195f.

21. Ibid., pp. 198ff.

22. Ibid., p. 199.

23. See, for example, Höhn, '*Heimat* in Turmoil', especially pp. 146–53.

24. Atina Grossmann, 'A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers', in Robert G. Moeller (ed.) *West Germany under Construction. Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1997), p. 47; However, the vast majority of abortions approved in post-war Germany were a consequence of a reported rape by a Red Army soldier (ibid., pp. 34 and 45).

25. Grass, Günter: *Hundejahre* [1963], 16th edn. (Berlin and Neuwied, 1963), p. 452: 'Y wie 'Yankee' – Da is mech kain Ami drann jewesen ond kain Tommy sowieso' (East Prussian dialect).

26. Quoted in Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte*, vol. I, p. 48.

27. Reiner Pommerin, *Von Bonn nach Berlin. Die Alliierten, die Deutschen und die Hauptstadtfrage nach 1945* (Cologne and Vienna, 1989), p. 185.

28. Interview with Leslie Hargrove of *The Times*, 25 January 1961, cited in Ermarth, '*The German Talks Back*', p. 102.

29. For details, see Willett, *The Americanization of Germany*, pp. 28–39, and Emily S. Rosenberg, ' "Foreign Affairs" after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 18 (1994), pp. 59–70.

30. Rosenberg, ' "Foreign Affairs" after World War II', p. 60.

31. Ibid., p. 63.

32. Ingrid Schmidt-Harzbach, 'Rock'n'Roll in Hanau', in Angela Delille and Andrea Grohn (eds.) *PerlonZeit. Wie die Frauen ihr Wirtschaftswunder erlebten* (Berlin, 1985), p. 40.

33. Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, p. 198.

34. Dagmar Herzog, 'Desperately Seeking Normality: Sex and Marriage in the Wake of the War', in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (eds.) *Life after Death. Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s* (Cambridge and Washington, 2003), p. 164ff.

35. Ibid., p. 171; for more details, see idem, *Sex after Fascism. Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2005), chapter 1. For a critical analysis of Herzog's hypothesis, see Adelheid von Saldern, 'Innovative Trends in Women's and Gender Studies of the National Socialist Era', *German History*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2009), pp. 95–100.

36. Herzog, 'Desperately Seeking Normality', p. 173.
37. Quoted in Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik*, p. 186.
38. Kracauer was the author of the first serious study of the relationship between Weimar cinema and the rise of Hitler: Siegfried Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler. A Psychological Study of the German Film* (London, 1947).
39. See Christoph Hendrik Müller, 'Weimar Cinema: Escapist "Dream Factory" or a Fair Depiction of Weimar Germany's Socio-Political Reality?', *Retrospect. Journal of the IHSA* (1997), pp. 26–34.
40. Hönicke, 'Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland', p. 70.
41. BArch N 1311/36: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 23 April 1950, 'Das Geheimnis von Scotch Abbey. Der Kriminalroman – die Apologie des kleinbürgerlichen Humanismus'. It has to be said, however, that Zehrer considered 'petty-bourgeois humanism' to be the mood of the day, not moral corruption. Nevertheless: he does link cinema with modernity.
42. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt or Die Welt, 6 October 1952 (date hand-written, illegible), 'Jazz – die Antwort des schwarzen Mannes. Der Rhythmus als das letzte Prinzip der Ordnung'.
43. On the culture/civilisation dichotomy, see also sections 2.2, 3.3 and 4.4.
44. von Salomon, *Fragebogen*, p. 344f.
45. Karl-Heinz Götte, 'Film und Nationalcharakter in den USA', in Walter Hagemann (ed.) *Filmstudien I* (Münster, 1952), pp. 41–50.
46. Quoted in Gallus, *Die Neutralisten*, p. 225f.
47. Gehlen, *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter*, p. 34.
48. Helmut Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation. Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* [1957], 4th edn. (Düsseldorf and Cologne, 1960), p. 354.
49. Ibid., pp. 362ff.
50. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 87, Folder 713: report by Klaus Hartmann, written in English, submitted August 1955, p. 7f.
51. Official Germany, however, does not seem to have had a problem with cartoons: On 18 July 1956, President Theodor Heuss bestowed upon Walter E. Disney the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Verdienstorden der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) 'to acknowledge the outstanding contribution you have made to the strengthening of cultural ties between our two countries' (IfZ ED 135/71). On 2 November 1956, the German ambassador to the USA, Heinz Krekeler, presented the order in the German embassy in Washington.
52. The German term *Nachtlokale* carries far more dubious connotations than the English term night club. Usually, striptease bars are referred to as *Nachtlokale*.
53. BArch B 106/776.
54. See, for example, AdsD Nachlaß Erich Ollenhauer, Mappe 458: intelligence (*Verfassungsschutz*) report about the *Bundeskongreß des Demokratischen Kulturbundes*, 30 April 1953.
55. See section 2.3; also Uta G. Poiger, 'A New, "Western" Hero? Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 413.
56. BArch B 106/776: letter to the Federal Chancellor, dated 7 May 1965.
57. See section 4.4.

58. BArch B 106/776: letter to Minister Gerhardt Schröder, received 6 April 1959.

59. BArch B 106/895: letter of Gertrud Steigleder-Loose from Brügge, West-phalia, to the Minister for the Interior, Georg [*sic*] Schröder, dated 30 January 1959.

60. StAHH 136-3 70: flyer, archival page 343160.

61. Ibid., archival page 343160f.

62. Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche*, p. 20.

63. BArch N 1311/37: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 6 April 1952, 'Das dritte Sprengstoffpaket'

64. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, probably Sonntagsblatt, 5 October 1952: 'Wie wird man ein perfekter Verbrecher'.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, probably Sonntagsblatt, 4 March 1951, 'Ein junger Mann von 19 Jahren. In der Wirklichkeit der Cowboys, Gangster und Dirnen'.

68. The '*Dirnenfilme*' he named and shamed, however, include Josef von Sternberg's Weimar German masterpiece *Der Blaue Engel* (*The Blue Angel*), starring Marlene Dietrich, Emil Jannings and Hans Albers, and the infa-mous post-war German movie *Die Sünderin*, notorious for a very brief scene of nudity.

69. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, probably Sonntagsblatt, 4 March 1951, 'Ein junger Mann von 19 Jahren. In der Wirklichkeit der Cowboys, Gangster und Dirnen'.

70. HStAS Q1/30, Bü 314: original typed diary of Mehnert's travels around the world, 1954/55, p. 138; HStAS Q1/30, Bü 322: transcription of the same diary, p. 111.

71. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. I, p. 287.

72. Weiß, 'Journalisten', p. 262.

73. Ibid.

74. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, vol. I, p. 287; for more details on Zehrer's involvement, see section 3.3.

75. Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany. Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill and London, 1995), pp. 118ff.

76. Ibid., p. 124

77. ADL D2-14: Anlage zum RSB [Rednerschellbrief] 50/54, 8 April 1954; transcript of Mende's *Bundestag* speech on 2 April, pp. 2 and 3.

78. Ibid., p. 3.

79. ibid, p. 2f.

80. Ibid., p. 4.

81. The male narrator of the story tells the reader: 'A week later, my [female] cousins went back to Berlin. We did not get to do anything special with them, except for the usual smooching in the cinema' (Grass, *Katz und Maus* [1961], special edn. (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1975), p. 36).

82. The novel's narrator takes a girl to the cinema, neither of them is older than sixteen. 'Finally, I put my arm around Jenny's shoulder. It did not stay there for long, since heavy artillery attacked Leningrad for at least thirty seconds [in the newsreel]. Jenny did not want to see an English bomber plane being shot down by our fighter plane and put her forehead against my overcoat.

I allowed my arm to wander. … *Befreite Hände* [literally: liberated hands] was not a detective story …. The hands belonged to a sculptor who had a crush on her sculptor professor …. As often as she him on the screen, I simultaneously Jenny in the cinema. … Jenny's skin was cool and dry. Since she kept her thighs closed, I was of the opinion that she loosen them. She did that immediately, but kept her eyes on the screen. Her hole was tighter than Tulla's [the narrator's cousin], I should have known that. When I used a second finger, she turned her head away from the film and said: 'Please don't, Harry. You hurt me.' I stopped immediately' (Grass, *Hundejahre*, pp. 340ff). Later in the novel, the narrator goes to the cinema with his cousin, and he immediately attempts to touch her. (ibid., p. 376).

83. von Zahn, *Grenzen*, p. 182f.
84. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 6: private travel journal, typescript, 14 November 1951.
85. Kleßmann, *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation*, p. 46.
86. Rainer Moritz, 'Der Schlager', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. III, 2nd edn. (Munich, 2002), p. 209f.
87. See, for instance, Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany*.
88. Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, 'Film', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.) *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. IV, *Kultur* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), p. 476.
89. Frank Stern, 'Film in the 1950s. Passing Images of Guilt and Responsibility', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 267.
90. Moeller, *War Stories*, p. 128; see also Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing German*.
91. Margit Szöllösi-Janze, ' "Aussuchen und abschießen" – der Heimatfilm der fünfziger Jahre als historische Quelle', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, vol. 44 (1993), pp. 308–21.
92. Ibid., p. 320.
93. Johannes von Moltke, 'Trapped in America: The Americanization of the *Trapp-Familie*, or "Papas Kino" Revisited', *German Studies Review*, vol. 19, no. 3 (October 1996), p. 456; a noticeable exception are the two *Trapp-Familie* movies, later to be remade in Hollywood as *The Sound of Music*. In an 'unusually productive resolution' to conflicts of national, cultural and even sexual interest (p. 473), the family finds a new, albeit Germanised, *Heimat* in rural America.
94. Szöllösi-Janze, 'Aussuchen und abschießen', p. 310.
95. Ibid., p. 313.
96. See also Herzog, 'Desperately Seeking Normality', and idem, *Sex after Fascism*, chapter 3.
97. See also section 4.5, especially 4.5.2.
98. Anthony Nicholls states that as many as 30,000 military and civilian prisoners were released after Adenauer's visit to Moscow: Nicholls, *Bonn Republic*, p. 139f.
99. Christine Bartram and Heinz-Hermann Krüger, 'Vom Backfisch zum Teenager – Mädchensozialisation in den 50er Jahren', in Heinz-Hermann Krüger (ed.) *'Die Elvis-Tolle, die hatte ich mir unauffällig wachsen lassen'. Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1985), p. 89.

100. Ibid.
101. Kahlenberg, 'Film', p. 475.
102. Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, p. 268.
103. Ibid., p. 262.
104. Ibid.
105. Heide Fehrenbach, 'Cinema, Spectatorship, and the Problem of Postwar German Identity', in Reiner Pommerin (ed.) *The American Impact on Postwar Germany* (Oxford and Providence, RI, 1995), p. 185.
106. von Moltke, 'Trapped in America', p. 455.
107. StAHH 136-3 76: p. 342718.
108. Ibid.
109. StAHH 135-6 76: p. 342741.
110. Ibid.
111. Quoted in Frank Trommler, 'Brain Drain or Academic Exile? German Scholars in American Universities', in Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich (ed.) *Germany and America. Essays in Honor of Gerald R. Kleinfeld* (New York and Oxford, 2001), p. 14.
112. Grossmann, 'A Question of Silence', p. 48.
113. Ceaser, *Reconstructing America*, p. 88.
114. Möller, *Die Gründung der Amerika-Häuser*, pp. 152ff.
115. Willy Max Rademacher, 1897–1971, member of the DDP, then after the war member of the FDP; FDP chairman (*Vorsitzender*) in Hamburg 1946–58 and 1966–9; Member of the Hamburg Parliament 1946–9; Member of the *Bundestag* 1949–65.
116. ADL D2-11: Anlage zu Rednerschnellbrief RSB 25/53, 10 April 1953, 'Amerikanischer Bilderbogen. Eindrücke einer USA-Reise', p. 11 (also as a typescript in StAHH 622-1 Familie Rademacher 3): Report about Rademacher's three-week travels through the USA in 1952, written for his friends and acquaintances, Christmas 1952.
117. Ibid., p. 10; this section of his report was also published in the *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 7 October 1952 (press cutting in StAHH 135-1 VI 074-1 Band I).
118. HStAS Q1/30, Bü 314: original typed diary of Mehnert's travels around the world, 1954/55, p. 138; HStAS Q1/30, Bü 322: transcription of the same diary, p. 110.
119. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 88, Folder 721: fellowship report of Peter Haupt, written in English, submitted 1961, p. 23f (Haupt's punctuation).
120. Carla Reisner, 'Strictly Feminine!', p. 320.
121. Reisner, *Reisner in Amerika*, p. 19.
122. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 87, Folder 713: report by Klaus Hartmann, written in English, handed in August 1955, p. 8.
123. Otto Lenz, 1903–1957: Centre Party before 1933; 1928–1938 Prussian Ministry of Justice; 1944 imprisoned in relation to the assassination attempt on Hitler; after the war, co-founder of the Berlin CDU, 1951–1953 Secretary of State at the *Bundeskanzleramt*, 1953–1957 Member of the *Bundestag*.
124. ACDP I-172 009: transcript of the press conference, Spring 1953.
125. Kreuzer, 'Public Education in America', p. 97; Kreuzer participated in a teacher trainee programme in the USA, September 1953 to March 1954: see also section 1.2.1.

126. Probably a reference to the *Bild-Zeitung* tabloid newspaper published by the conservative media mogul Axel Springer.

127. BArch B 111, Paket 39, Zg. I 28/1959: talk given by Rotarian Herr von Raab-Straube at the Rotary Club Neumünster, 27 February 1958, entitled 'Der Turm von Babel' (The Tower of Babel).

128. He was a member of parliament from 1949 until his death in 1967. From 1964 to his death, he was chairman of the SPD parliamentary party in the *Bundestag*. From 1939 to the collapse of the Nazi regime, he had been imprisoned in various institutions and concentration camps.

129. AdsD Nachlaß Fritz Erler, Sig. 12B: article from *Der mündige Christ*, Summer 1956, 'Was bietet uns Amerika'.

130. ACDP I-070 031/1: Embassy report to the German Foreign Office, 29 August 1956, about the Republican Party Conference in San Francisco, 20 to 24 August 1956. Copy of the report in Hans Globke's private papers, p. 1f.

131. Ibid., p. 2.

132. Ibid.

133. He was not only a member of parliament (1949–72) and minister for the *Bundesrat* (1966–9), but also a professor of political sciences in Frankfurt (1953–1964) and a translator of French poetry into German.

134. AdsD Nachlaß Carlo Schmid, Mappe 101: manuscript for the journal *Der Wähler*, 1955.

135. Recker, 'Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe', p. 303.

136. On *Gelsenkirchener Barock*, see, for example, Paul Betts, 'The *Nierentisch* Nemesis: Organic Design as West German Pop Culture', *German History*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2001), p. 185–217.

137. Reisner, *Reisner in Amerika*, p. 27.

138. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 14: private travel journal, typescript, 23 November 1951; However, Anthony Nicholls has assured me as an eye witness that the souvenir shops at the Niagara Falls *were* outrageously tacky and vulgar at that time.

139. Ibid., p. 19.

140. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 87, Folder 713: report by Klaus Hartmann, written in English, handed in August 1955, p. 13.

141. ADL D2-11: Anlage zu Rednerschnellbrief RSB 25/53, 10 April 1953, 'Amerikanischer Bilderbogen. Eindrücke einer USA-Reise', p. 7 (also as a typescript in StAHH 622-1 Familie Rademacher 3).

142. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 30: private travel journal, typescript, 3 December 1951.

143. Ibid., p. 34.

144. ACDP I-172 009: transcript of the press conference after Lenz' visit to the USA, Spring 1953.

145. For his interpretation of the Morgenthau Plan, see section 2.2.

146. HStAS Q1/8, Bü 278: special edition (*Sonderdruck*), *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 14 May 1955, 'Das Deutschlandbild in USA. Von Dr. Reinhold Maier'.

147. Hans Scholz, *Am grünen Strand der Spree. So gut wie ein Roman* [1955], paperback edn. (Reinbek, 1966), p. 247.

148. German exclamation of joy, often used in hiking songs; for the original German version, see 'Das ist unser Manifest', in Wolfgang Borchert, *Das Gesamtwerk* (Leck, 1984), p. 308–15, at 309.

149. Wolfgang Borchert, 'This is Our Manifesto' [between 1945 and 1947], in idem: *The Man Outside. The Prose Works of Wolfgang Borchert. Translated from German by David Porter* (London, 1966), pp. 245ff.

150. Ibid., p. 249.

151. Ibid., p. 249f.

152. von Saldern, 'Überfremdungsänste', pp. 217ff.

153. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', pp. 300ff.

154. Uta G. Poiger, 'American Music, Cold War Liberalism, and German Identities', in Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. Poiger (eds.) *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations. American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York and Oxford, 2000), pp. 134ff.

155. Idem, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA, London and Los Angeles, 2000), p. 137.

156. Ibid., p. 138.

157. At that time, Zehrer was editor-in-chief of the *Sonntagsblatt*. For further biographical data, see section 3.3.

158. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, *Sonntagsblatt* or *Die Welt*, 6 October 1952 (date hand-written, illegible), 'Jazz – die Antwort des schwarzen Mannes. Der Rhythmus als das letzte Prinzip der Ordnung'.

159. Ibid.

160. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, *Sonntagsblatt* or *Die Welt*, 6 October 1952 (date hand-written, quite unclear), 'Jazz – die Antwort des schwarzen Mannes. Der Rhythmus als das letzte Prinzip der Ordnung'.

161. Ibid.

162. See section 3.3.

163. See sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.

164. Neil Gregor, ' "Is he still alive, or long since dead?": Loss, Absence and Remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945–1956', *German History*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2003), p. 194.

165. StAHH 361-2 VI 530: typed report by Werner Warmbrunn, 'Impressions of Germany, 1956', August 1956, p. 2f.

166. See below.

167. Günter Grass, *Die Blechtrommel* [1959], special edn. (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1984).

168. Ibid., p. 543ff.

169. Ibid.

170. Hermann Glaser, *Deutsche Kultur 1945–2000*, paperback edn. (Berlin, 1999), p. 43.

171. Grass, *Die Blechtrommel*, p. 613.

172. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 300.

173. Their French 'existentialist' and American 'beatnik' predecessors had already 'existed' in the 1940s. For further details on the foreign roots of this counterculture, see Heinz-Hermann Krüger, ' "Exis, habe ich keine gesehen" – Auf der Suche nach einer jugendlichen Gegenkultur in den 50er Jahren', in idem (ed.) *'Die Elvis-Tolle, die hatte ich mir unauffällig wachsen lassen'. Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1985), pp. 131–6.

174. Ibid., p. 149.

175. In France, they were called *blousons noir* or 'black jackets'. The closest British subcultural equivalent might be the Teddy Boys.

176. Krüger, ' "Exis, habe ich keine gesehen" ', p. 144.

177. Ibid., p. 139.

178. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 301.

179. Ibid.

180. Quoted in ibid., p. 302.

181. Idem, *BRAVO Amerika. Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg, 1992), p. 177.

182. The term 'rock and roll' was apparently invented in 1951 by the American DJ and producer Alan Freed, one of the early godfathers of the genre: Hanna Brunhöber, 'Unterhaltungsmusik', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.) *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. IV, *Kultur* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 179, 181 and 194.

183. Moritz, 'Der Schlager', p. 202.

184. Ibid., p. 209f; for a discussion of the *Heimatfilm*, see section 4.2.2.

185. Kroes, *If You've Seen One*, p. ix.

186. StAHH 136-3 102: archival page number 351465.

187. Ulrich Chaussy, 'Jugend', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.) *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. III, *Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), p. 213.

188. Ibid., p. 210.

189. Ibid., p. 209.

190. Susanne Zahn, ' "Außer Rand und Band". Die Halbstarken', in Doris Foitzig (ed.) *Vom Trümmerkind zum Teenager. Kindheit und Jugend in der Nachkriegszeit* (Bremen, 1992), p. 114.

191. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg*, p. 347.

192. Thomas Grotum, *Die Halbstarken. Zur Geschichte einer Jugendkultur der 50er Jahre* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1994), p. 21f.

193. Winfried Speitkamp, *Jugend in der Neuzeit. Deutschland vom 16. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1998), p. 258.

194. BArch N 1311/36: press cutting, Sonntagsblatt, 17 June 1951, 'Die Halbstarken von Texas – ihre Sitten und Gebräuche'.

195. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, probably Sonntagsblatt, 4 March 1951, 'Ein junger Mann von 19 Jahren. In der Wirklichkeit der Cowboys, Gangster und Dirnen', see also section 4.2.1.

196. Ibid.

197. See section 4.5.1.

198. Uta G. Poiger, 'Rock'n'Roll, Female Sexuality, and the Cold War Battle over German Identities', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 68 (1996), p. 587, 598.

199. Idem, 'Rebels with a Cause? American Popular Culture, the 1956 Youth Riots, and the New Conception of Masculinity in East and West Germany', in Reiner Pommerin (ed.) *The American Impact on Postwar Germany* (Oxford and Providence, RI, 1995), pp. 93–124.

200. Detlev J. K. Peukert, 'Die "Halbstarken". Protestverhalten von Arbeiterjugendlichen zwischen Wilhelminischem Kaiserreich und Ära Adenauer', *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1984), p. 543; Winfried Speitkamp

also estimates about 100 bigger *Halbstarke* riots in the larger West German cities in that period: Speitkamp, *Jugend in der Neuzeit*, p. 257.

201. Poiger, 'Rebels with a Cause?', p. 97f.
202. Gabriele Dietz, 'Sozius-Miezen. Halbstarke Mädchen', in Angela Delille and Andrea Grohn (eds. *PerlonZeit. Wie die Frauen ihr Wirtschaftswunder erlebten* (Berlin, 1985), p. 32ff.
203. Kaspar Maase, ' "Halbstarke" and Hegemony: Meanings of American Mass Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany During the 1950s', in Doeko F. J. Bosscher, Rob Kroes and Robert W. Rydell (eds.) *Cultural Transmisions and Receptions. American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam, 1993), p. 153.
204. Quoted in Maase, ' "Halbstarke" and Hegemony', p. 154f (*Die Zeit*, 31 October 1958); the *Halbstarken* myth grew so strong that as late as 1963, the daily *Westfälische Nachrichten* reported that juvenile rock and roll fans stitched buttons to their skin to show how tough they were: ' "Rocker" fallen über "Jazzer" her. Rowdys terrorisieren eine Stadt. Bandenmitglieder nähen *sic*h zum Beweis ihrer Männlichkeit Knöpfe an die Haut', *Westfälische Nachrichten*, 21 September 1963
205. Anecdotal evidence in Hans-Jürgen von Wensierski, ' "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke" – Jugendsubkultur in den 50er Jahren', in Heinz-Hermann Krüger (ed.) *Die Elvis-Tolle, die hatte ich mir unauffällig wachsen lassen'. Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1985), p. 103.
206. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 304; von Wensierski, ' "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke" ', pp. 119ff.
207. Zahn, 'Außer Rand und Band', p. 115.
208. Dietz, 'Sozius-Miezen', p. 32.
209. Kleßmann, *Zwei Staaten, ein Nation*, p. 50.
210. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 305.
211. Julia Ubbelohde, 'Der Umgang mit jugendlichen Normverstößen', in Ulrich Herbert (ed.) *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 406ff.
212. Andersen, *Traum vom guten Leben*, pp. 213–21.
213. Diethelm Prowe, 'The ' "Miracle" of the Political-Cultural Shift. Democratization between Americanisation and Conservative Reintegration', in Hanna Schissler (ed.) *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Oxford and Princeton, NJ, 2001), p. 453.
214. Ibid.
215. Detlev Siegfried, 'Vom Teenager zur Pop-Revolution. Politisierungstendenzen in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur 1959 bis 1968', in Karl Christian Lammers, Axel Schildt and Detlev Siegfried (eds.) *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg, 2000), p. 582f.
216. See ibid., pp. 586–90.
217. Jost Hermand, *Kultur im Wiederaufbau. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Munich, 1986), p. 358.
218. Ibid., p. 359.
219. von Wensierski, ' "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke" ', p. 124.
220. Ibid., p. 127.
221. quoted in von Wensierski, ' "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke" ', p. 108: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 January 1957.

222. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World. A Novel* [1932], 2nd edn. (London, 1950); idem, *Brave New World Revisited* (New York, 1958).
223. Quoted in von Wensierski, ' "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke" ', p. 108: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 January 1957.
224. Siegfried Schmidt-Joos, *Geschäfte mit Schlagern* (Bremen, 1960), p. 150.
225. Ibid., p. 32f.
226. See ibid., pp. 151ff
227. Greil Marcus, *Lipstick Traces. A Secret History of the Twentieth Century*, paperback edn. (Cambridge, MA, 1990), p. 245. In his *Secret History*, Marcus chooses a photo of Elvis in uniform (although an image from a film rather than Presley in his army uniform) to bemoan the demise of Presley's art.
228. Axel Schildt, 'Die USA als "Kulturnation". Zur Bedeutung der Amerikahäuser in den 1950er Jahren', in Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern (eds.) *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996), p. 268.
229. Ibid., p. 269.
230. Peter Duignan and Lewis H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West. The Americanisation of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, 1992), p. 416.
231. On the reception American musical 'high culture' in West Germany, see Toby Thacker, ' "Playing Beethoven like an Indian": American Music and Reorientation in Germany, 1945–1955', in Dominik Geppert (ed.) *The Postwar Challenge. Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–58* (London and Oxford, 2003), pp. 365–86.
232. Maase, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 307.
233. Ute Ackermann and Peter Kuhnert, 'Jenseits von Lust und Liebe? Jugendsexualität in den 50er Jahren', in Heinz-Hermann Krüger (ed.) *'Die Elvis-Tolle, die hatte ich mir unauffällig wachsen lassen'. Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1985), especially pp. 67–72.
234. Marcus, *Lipstick Traces*, p. 148.
235. *Der Spiegel*, vol. 10, no. 50 (12 December 1956), pp. 56–62: 'Von Dixieland nach Kinseyland. Rock'n'Roll-Singer Elvis Presley'.
236. Ibid., p. 58.
237. Alfred Charles Kinsey, Wardell Baxter Pomeroy and Clyde Eugene Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (London and Philadelphia, 1948); Alfred Charles Kinsey (ed.), *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (London and Philadelphia, 1953).
238. Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte*, vol. II, p. 99.
239. Proverbial more in the English-speaking world than in Germany, it seems, where the 'three Ks' only gained prominence as a figure of speech in the 1970s and 1980s, although they had already been used sarcastically by members of the feminist movement of Wilhelmine Germany: Sylvia Palatschek, 'Kinder – Küche – Kirche', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.) *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. II, 2nd edn. (Munich, 2002), pp. 419ff.
240. Merith Niehuss, 'Kontinuität und Wandel der Familie in den 50er Jahren', in Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (eds.) *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre*, 2nd edn. (Bonn, 1998), p. 317.
241. Geppert, *Ära Adenauer*, p. 80.

242. For a more detailed account, see Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles and Oxford, 1993), chapter 1.
243. Niehuss, *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft*, p. 80.
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307. 'Detroit – Kaleidoskop der Völker', *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 24 September 1955, p. 9; newspaper cutting from HStAS Q1/35, Bü 444.
308. RAC CFA Series 20.2, Box 88, Folder 721: fellowship report of Peter Haupt, written in English, submitted 1961, p. 22.
309. Carla Reisner, 'Strictly Feminine!', p. 320.
310. Quoted in Poiger, 'Rock'n'Roll, Female Sexuality', p. 589.
311. Matthias, *Entdeckung Amerikas*, p. 249.
312. Ibid., p. 238.
313. Ibid., pp. 240ff.
314. Ibid., p. 231.
315. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1. p. 6: private travel journal, typescript, 14 November 1951. For biographical data, see p. 88 of this thesis (footnotes). The reference to Shylock is not the only anti-Semitic comment in Seeling's journal. On his flight from Amsterdam to New York via Shannon, he took a fancy to the woman sitting next to him, who left the plane in Ireland. He describes her as 'slightly Semitic-looking, but more refined' ('*leicht semitischer Einschlag, aber sehr verfeinert*'), ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 1; see also section 2.3).
316. BArch N 1311/40: press cutting, probably Die Welt, 14 November 1953, 'Wir leben in der Epoche der Frau'.
317. Ibid.
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319. Ibid.
320. BArch N 1266/134: Written version of a presentation by *Frauenreferentin* Hanna Kiep to Walter Hallstein, then State Secretary to the *Bundeskanzleramt*, during his journey to the USA, 15 March 1952.
321. Ibid.
322. Ritter, *Über Deutschland*, p. 106.
323. Ibid., p. 103; see also the table in Eva Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany. Life, Work and Politics* (Munich, New York and Oxford, 1989), p. 201.
324. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, p. 81.
325. Poiger, 'Rebels with a Cause?', p. 102.
326. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, 'Bringing Democracy to the Frauleins. Frauen als Zielgruppe der amerikanischen Demokratisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1952', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 17, no. 1 (1991), p. 63.

Chapter 5

1. Jeff R. Schutts, 'Born again in the Gospel of Refreshment? Coca-Colonization and the Re-making of Postwar German Identity', in David Crew (ed.) *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (New York and Oxford, 2003), p. 124.

2. Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation and the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC and London, 1994), translation of idem, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg*. It is slightly disturbing that Wagnleitner used the term 'Coca-Colonisation of Europe' (Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg*, p. 351) without the slightest trace of irony as late as 1994. His monograph is a manifestation of left-wing anti-Americanism, although from a period not relevant for the time-frame of this book. He sincerely calls the 'cultural and media imperialism' of the USA the 'so far most successful continuation of earlier forms of colonialism and imperialism' (ibid., p. 2). The US media industry is 'an apologist of the military-industrial complex' (ibid.), and its influence on Europe was so obvious in the post-war era that one might be inclined to 'think of a new form of the Monroe Doctrine: *die Marilyn-Monroe-Doktrin*' (ibid., p. 327f).

3. Maase, ' "Amerikanisierung der Gesellschaft" ', p. 225f.

4. Ibid.

5. Idem, 'Amerikanisierung von unten', p. 300.

6. Alon Confino, 'Edgar Reitz's *Heimat* and German Nationhood: Film, Memory, and Understandings of the Past', *German History*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1998), p. 187.

7. Ibid., p. 188.

8. See, for example, the back page of Ermarth (ed.), *America and the Shaping of German Society*.

9. AdsD Nachlaß Fritz Erler, Sig. 7B: press cutting, 'Ollenhauers Aufgabe in den USA' by Wilhelm Riepekohl, *Fränkischer Volksfreund*, 9 February 1951.

10. AdsD Nachlaß Fritz Erler, Sig. 7B: press cutting,*Schweinfurter Tageblatt*, 11 February 1951; also mentioned in *Hamburger Echo*, *Fränkische Tagespost*, *Westfälische Rundschau*, and *Freie Presse* of the same day.

11. AdsD Nachlaß Fritz Erler, Sig. 7B: press cutting, *Bremer Nachrichten*, 15 February 1951

12. BArch N 1221/634: letter dated 20 February 1958.

13. von Zahn, *Grenzen*, p. 104; it has to be explained to the non-German reader that the mentioning of the Westphalian town of Bielefeld usually evokes images of extreme provincialism and petty-bourgeois lifestyle in Germany (unless referring to Bielefeld University's History and Social Sciences Schools, of course).

14. Karl Carstens, *Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen* (Boppard am Rhein, 1993), p. 121.

15. 'Detroit – Kaleidoskop der Völker', *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 24 September 1955, p. 9; newspaper cutting from HStAS Q1/35, Bü 444.

16. See also section 2.3.

17. ADL D2-11: Anlage zu Rednerschnellbrief RSB 25/53, 10 April 1953, 'Amerikanischer Bilderbogen. Eindrücke einer USA-Reise', p. 8 (also as a typescript in StAHH 622-1 Familie Rademacher 3). Report about Rademacher's three-week travels through the USA in 1952, written for his friends and acquaintances, Christmas 1952.

18. HStAS Q1/30, Bü 314: original typed diary of Mehnert's travels around the world, 1954/55, p. 138; HStAS Q1/30, Bü 322: transcription of the same diary, p. 111.

19. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1., p. 3: private travel journal, typescript, 10 November 1951.

20. ACSP 1.2. N Se 4.1.1.: private travel journal, typescript., p. 8, 17 November 1951.

21. Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, p. 398.

22. Ibid.

23. Gesine Schwan, 'Antiamerikanismus und demokratisches Bewusstsein in der Bundesrepublik von 1945 bis heute', *vorgänge*, vol. 2 (2001), p. 25.

Epilogue

1. Stephan: 'A Special German Case of Cultural Americanization', p. 83; also Philipp Gassert, 'Antiamerikaner? Die deutsche Neue Linke und die USA', in Jan Behrends, Árpád von Klimó and Patrice Poutrus (eds.) *Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa* (Bonn, 2005), p. 254; Götz Aly, *Unser Kampf. 1968 – ein irritierter Blick zurück* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), pp. 144–51.

2. Ibid.

3. HIA German subject collection, especially boxes 82–88 and 92 (student publications, fringe party publications, university political groupings); StAHH 136-3 (similar sources, collected by the Hamburg *Verfassungsschutz*).

4. Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen*, p. 103.

5. An association close to the banned Communist Party KPD (at least according to the Hamburg *Verfassungsschutz*) reprinted a newspaper article by Peter Weiss (2 August 1966) in which he praised 'democratic, progressive America', although he did concede that that 'America' was a minority (StAHH 136-3 427: archival page number 423515). Another pacifist organisation in an open letter to the Hamburg *Senat* (28 January 1966) praised the US involvement in Germany after 1945 and the human rights history of the USA before voicing its disagreement with the Vietnam War (StAHH 136-3 1172: archival page number 419236).

6. Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, pp. 69ff.

7. See, for example, StAHH 136-3 20: Kleine Schriftenreihe der Aktion Wiedervereinigung, 'Kriegsgefahr vertieft deutsche Spaltung' (a publication associated with the NPD).

8. See also StAHH 136-3 70: archival page number 342312f; StAHH 136-3 20: journal 'Neue Politik', no. 8, 19 February 1966, 'The Germans to the front!' (another publication associated with the NPD); StAHH 136-3 20: the publication quoted above, Kleine Schriftenreihe der Aktion Wiedervereinigung, 'Kriegsgefahr vertieft deutsche Spaltung' contained a little poem by a certain Günther Heydt: '… Ami's [*sic*] Kampf in Vietnam / geht doch einen Dreck uns an. / Stützung des Systems von Ky / zwingt den Vietkong nicht ins Knie. / Dort die Ami's [*sic*] unterstützen / Kann dem Deutschen gar nichts nützen. / der doch nur den Frieden will / ihn zu sichern ist sein Ziel.'

9. Quoted in Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, p. 147.

10. Jan-Werner Müller, '1968 as Event, Milieu, and Ideology', in idem (ed.) *German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic* (Basingstoke and New York, 2003), p. 120.
11. Detlef Siegfried, 'Understanding 1968: Youth Rebellion, Generational Change and Postindustrial Society', in Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (eds.) *Between Marx and Coca-Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960–1980* (New York and Oxford, 2006), p. 61.
12. Wolfgang Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur* (Hamburg, 2000), pp. 54ff.
13. Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, p. 69.
14. Ibid., p. 70.
15. Claus Leggewie, ' "1968": A Transatlantic Event and its Consequences', in Detlef Junker (ed.) *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook*, vol. II, *1968–1990* (2 vols., Cambridge and Washington, 2004), p. 424f.
16. Most poignantly (and controversially) by historian and renegade '1968' veteran Götz Aly (Aly, *Unser Kampf*).
17. A. Dirk Moses, 'The Forty-Fivers. A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy', *German Politics and Society*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 94–124; idem, 'The "Weimar Syndrome" in the Federal Republic of Germany', p. 192f.
18. Poiger, 'American Music, Cold War Liberalism, and German Identities', pp. 134ff.
19. Moses, 'The Forty-Fivers', p. 117.
20. Ulrich Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozess. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte – eine Skizze', in idem (ed.) *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002), p. 44.
21. Ibid., p. 45; see also Aly, *Unser Kampf*, pp. 185–210.
22. Philipp Gassert, 'Neither East nor West: Anti-Americanism in West Germany, 1945–1968', in Detlef Junker (ed.) *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook*, vol. I, *1945–1968*, 2 vols. (Cambridge and Washington, 2004), p. 633.
23. Müller, '1968 as Event, Milieu, and Ideology', p. 137.
24. Gassert, 'Neither East nor West', p. 634.
25. Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967–1977* [2001], 4th paperback edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 2007).

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Note

The *umlauts* Ä, Ö and Ü are treated as 'ae', 'oe', and 'ue' in the alphabetical order.

1 Unpublished sources

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PDok Böx, Heinrich/allgemein (Abteilung Pressedokumentation, Böx, Heinrich/allgemein)

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ADL: Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in Gummersbach

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BayHStA: Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv

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CFA Series 20.2, Box 177, Folder 1421 (Commonwealth Fund Archives; Harkness Fellowships: Fellowship Files; Reifenberg, Ernst Robert, 1952-Germany, Mathematics, 1952–64)

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StAB: Staatsarchiv Bremen

3-A.3.N.3. Nr. 509 (Senatsregistratur; Auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Militärwesen; Auswärtige Angelegenheiten; Nordamerika; Unterlagen über Amerika)

3-S.1.a. Nr. 410 (Senatsregistratur; Senat und Inneres; Senat im allgemeinen; Reisen von Senatsmitgliedern, insbesondere von Bürgermeister Wilhelm Kaisen; Amerika-Reise des Präsidenten des Senats Bürgermeister Kaisen)

3-V.12. Nr. 9 (Senatsregistratur; Auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Militärwesen; Beiträge zur Völkerverständigung; Das amerikanische Informations-Center in Bremen – Amerika Häuser)

4,22/2-40 (Schriftgut von Behörden, Gerichten, öffentlich-rechtlichen Anstalten und Körperschaften; Auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Militärwesen; Bremische Vertretung beim Bund; Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsangelegenheiten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 'Erste Legion')

7,97/2-15 (Nichtamtliches Schriftgut; Nachlässe und Familienarchive; Kaisen, Wilhelm; Briefe von der Reise in die USA 1962)

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7,500-KT-25 Bd. 2 (Nichtamtliches Schriftgut; Kleine Erwerbungen; Tagebücher; Kriegstagebücher; Kriegserlebnisbuch Ingemarie von Hallen, geborene Wieting)

7,1053-1 (Nichtamtliches Schriftgut; Schriftgut von Parteien, Verbänden und Vereinen; Carl Schurz Gesellschaft; 1948–50)

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StAHH: Staatsarchiv Hansestadt Hamburg

135-1 VI 074-1 Band I (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Informationsangelegenheiten; Staatliche Pressestelle VI; Auswärtige Beziehungen, Ausland, internationale Angelegenheiten; Amerika; Nordamerika; Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika; Band I 1950–2)

136-3 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz)

136-3 18 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Neue Rechte (Organisationen und Initiativen); Verein zur Förderung der historischen Wahrheit bzw. Komitee zur Wiederherstellung der historischen Wahrheit)

136-3 20 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD); Aktionsgemeinschaft unabhängiger Deutscher)

136-3 70 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Neue Rechte (Organisationen und Initiativen); Gesamtdeutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft und die Zeitschrift 'Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit. Organ des Weltbund der Völkischen')

136-3 73 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Neue Rechte (Organisationen und Initiativen); Bund Nationaler Europäer und Deutschland-Rat)

136-3 76 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Neue Rechte (Organisationen und Initiativen); Freundeskreis Filmkunst e.V., Hamburg (NPD-nahestehend))

136-3 102 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für

Verfassungsschutz; Rechtes Parteienspektrum und rechte politische Aktivitäten; Neue Rechte (Organisationen und Initiativen; Republikanischer Studentenbund (RDS))

136-3 427 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Linkes Parteien- und Organisationsspektrum und Kontakte zu Staaten des sozialistischen Lagers; Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD); Tarnorganisationen und Wiederzulassungsbestrebungen; Junge Aktion gegen Atomtod und Störtebeker-Club)

136-3 1172 (Regierung, Volksvertretung, allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Allgemeine und innere Staatsverwaltung; Innere Verwaltung; Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Studenten- und Schülerbewegung; Außerparlamentarische Opposition (APO); APO-Szene und Folgeerscheinungen; Anti-Imperialismus-Gruppen; Vietnam / Laos / Kambodscha; Aktivitäten verschiedener Organisationen zur Beendigung des Vietnam-Krieges)

361-2 VI 530 (Fachverwaltung; Schul- und Kultuswesen; Schul- und Hochschulverwaltung; Oberschulbehörde VI; Besuch US-amerikanischer Erziehungsfachleute in Hamburger Schulen und Austauschprogramm mit US-amerikanischen Lehrern, 1952–62)

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