


ENLIGHTENED WAR

GERMAN THEORIES AND CULTURES OF WARFARE
FROM FREDERICK THE GREAT TO CLAUSEWITZ



Edited by Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson



Enlightened War

Studies in German Literature, Linguistics, and Culture

Enlightened War

German Theories and Cultures of Warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz

Edited by
Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson



CAMDEN HOUSE

Rochester, New York

Copyright © 2011 by the Editors and Contributors

All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation, no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded, or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

First published 2011
by Camden House

Camden House is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Inc.
668 Mt. Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA
www.camden-house.com
and of Boydell & Brewer Limited
PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK
www.boydellandbrewer.com

ISBN-13: 978-1-57113-495-0

ISBN-10: 1-57113-495-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Enlightened war: German theories and cultures of warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz / edited by Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson.

p. cm. — (Studies in German literature, linguistics, and culture)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-1-57113-495-0 (alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 1-57113-495-6 (alk. paper)

1. War and society—Germany—History—18th century. 2. War and society—Germany—History—19th century. 3. Germany—Intellectual life—18th century. 4. Germany—Intellectual life—19th century. 5. War (Philosophy)—History—18th century. 6. War (Philosophy)—History—19th century. 7. War and literature—Germany. 8. War in literature. 9. Enlightenment—Germany. I. Krimmer, Elisabeth, 1967– II. Simpson, Patricia Anne, 1958–

DD204.E65 2011

303.6'609430903—dc22

2010046131

This publication is printed on acid-free paper.
Printed in the United States of America.

*This book is dedicated to
Cecily, Colton, Henry, Jackson, Mark, and Theo*

Contents

List of Illustrations	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Introduction: Enlightened Warfare in Eighteenth-Century Germany	1
<i>Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson</i>	

Part I: War and Enlightenment

1: The Point of Recognition: Enemy, Neighbor, and Next of Kin in the Era of Frederick the Great	21
<i>Sara Eigen Figal</i>	
2: Writing War and the Aesthetics of Political Literature in the 1790s: Daniel Jenisch's (Un)timely Seven Years' War	41
<i>Johannes Birgfeld</i>	

Part II: Cultures of War in Classicism and Romanticism

3: Agamemnon on the Battlefield of Leipzig: Wilhelm von Humboldt on Ancient Warriors, Modern Heroes, and <i>Bildung</i> through War	75
<i>Felix Saure</i>	
4: War, Anecdotes, and the Backsides of Reason: Kleist with Kant	103
<i>Galili Shahar</i>	
5: "Schon wieder Krieg! Der Kluge hörts nicht gern": Goethe, Warfare, and <i>Faust II</i>	126
<i>Elisabeth Krimmer</i>	
6: Recoding the Ethics of War in Grimms' Fairy Tales	151
<i>Patricia Anne Simpson</i>	

Part III: War and Gender

- 7: On Gender Wars and Amazons: Therese Huber on Terror and Revolution 175
Inge Stephan
- 8: Angelica Kauffmann's War Heroes: (Not) Painting War in a Culture of Sensibility 192
Waltraud Maierhofer
- 9: Citizen-Soldiers: General Conscription in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 219
Ute Frevert

Part IV: War and Theory

- 10: Just War and Perpetual Peace: Kant on the Legitimate Use of Political Violence 241
David Colclasure
- 11: Military Intelligence: On Carl von Clausewitz's Hermeneutics of Disturbance and Probability 258
Arndt Niebisch
- 12: Host Nations: Carl von Clausewitz and the New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* 279
Wolf Kittler
- Bibliography 307
- Notes on the Contributors 335
- Index 339

Illustrations

1. <i>Hector Sends Paris into Battle</i>	199
2. <i>Vortigern and Rowena</i>	201
3. <i>Eleonora Sucking Poison from the Wound of Her Husband, King Edward I</i>	203
4. <i>Aeneas Mourning for Pallas</i>	204
5. <i>Achilles Mourns for Patroclus</i>	206
6. <i>Arminius and Thusnelda</i>	208
7. <i>Inibaca Discovering Herself to Trenmor</i>	211
8. <i>Athena Putting on Armor</i>	212

Acknowledgments

THE DEBTS OF GRATITUDE that we have accumulated in editing this volume are significant. We would like to thank the interlibrary loan staffs at Montana State University and the University of California, Davis. Both the University of California at Davis and the Scholarship and Research fund at Montana State University granted generous research stipends that provided much-needed time and resources.

Many thanks also go to friends and colleagues who have contributed to the writing of this book. In particular, we would like to thank both readers; their insightful and constructive comments greatly improved the volume. Special thanks go to our research assistants, Kathryn Kincade and Verena Hutter; their hard work, cheerful reliability, and sharp eye for errors and omissions made a speedy completion of this volume possible. Finally, we would like to thank James Walker, our editor at Camden House, who was instrumental in bringing this project to fruition and always a pleasure to work with. Most of all, we would like to thank our families for their unwavering support and patience.

E. K. and P. A. S.
November 2010

Introduction: Enlightened Warfare in Eighteenth-Century Germany

Elisabeth Krimmer and Patricia Anne Simpson

IN 1942, ERICH WENIGER, a renowned professor of pedagogy, published a book entitled *Goethe und die Generäle* (Goethe and the Generals). Weniger was concerned with a perceived rift between what he called the cultures of Potsdam and Weimar, that is, the ethos of German militarism and the culture of Weimar Classicism. The personification of this antithesis was the most prominent exponent of Weimar Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whom Weniger accused of a decidedly anti-military attitude and temperament, citing

Goethes oft und deutlich geäußerte Abneigung gegen Preussen, seine niemals verhehlte Bewunderung für Napoleon, das befremdende Schweigen der Tag- und Jahreshefte über die doch recht nahe liegenden Ereignisse des Oktobers 1806, die Flucht nach Teplitz 1813, die kühle Zurückhaltung gegenüber dem Freiheitswillen der jüngeren Generation, das Fernhalten des Sohnes vom Dienst in der Front.¹

[Goethe's often and explicitly stated aversion to Prussia, his never-concealed admiration for Napoleon, the alienating silence in his day-and yearbooks about the events of October 1806 that occurred very near him, his escape to Teplitz in 1813, his cool aloofness towards the passion for freedom of the younger generation, keeping his son from serving on the front.]

To Weniger, Goethe's presumed distance from a culture of war was a source of deep pain: "für uns [liegt] das Schmerzliche darin [. . .], dass Weimar sich in geschichtlich bedeutsamer Stunde gegen Potsdam gewendet haben könnte" (6; for us the pain consists in the fact that Weimar could have turned against Potsdam in a historically significant hour). Consequently, Weniger's 210-page treatise was designed to close the rift by providing evidence of Goethe's intense interest in all affairs military, his familiarity with scholarship on war, and his acquaintance and continued conversations with numerous generals and military thinkers.

The affinity of Weniger's investigation with National Socialist thought makes his work a highly problematic source, and yet his attempt to read

Weimar literature not with distance to, but in the context of the contemporary culture of war points to significant oversights in much scholarship on the long eighteenth century. As we contend in the following pages, Enlightenment discourse not only was developed during but responded to and was profoundly shaped by a period of prolonged European warfare ranging from the Seven Years' War (1756–63) and the Polish Revolution to the almost continuous wars from 1792 to 1815 known as the Revolutionary (1792) and Napoleonic Wars (1803–15). In spite of this temporal proximity and a resultant ideological affinity, many critics of the period have neglected the nexus of war and Enlightenment discourse. This volume seeks to correct this by exploring the intricate interrelations between the literature and culture of the period and contemporary theories and practices of war.

The Practice of War

In the early modern period, wars were fought by foreign mercenaries or the forcibly enlisted native poor and led by privately funded entrepreneurs such as Ernst zu Mansfeld, Christian von Braunschweig, Bernhard von Weimar, and, most famously, Albrecht von Wallenstein, head of the armies of the Hapsburg monarchy during the Thirty Years' War. Since these armies were not funded by the state, they were regarded as a precious resource, and commanders on both sides had a vital interest in keeping the casualty rate low.² As a result, early modern wars were fought “with limited means for limited objectives.”³

Because these war entrepreneurs invested their fortune in their armies, they sought to avoid costly battles and had their soldiers rob and plunder for sustenance.⁴ Thus both sides posed an equal threat to the population in any arena of war. Eyewitness accounts of the period emphasize over and over again that when it came to pillage and extortion, hauling off livestock and burning villages, there was no difference between friend and foe. In her history of the draft, Ute Frevert points out that during this period most of the population suffered the consequences of war but did not identify with its goals or policies. Rather, average citizens saw wars “as mere dynastic struggles and military skirmishes.”⁵ Seventeenth-century mercenaries switched sides, and prisoners were routinely, though compulsorily, recruited by the winning army and integrated into the force. This was no longer the case once soldiers were defined by their nationality. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, warfare became a national enterprise, and the practice of “cabinet war” became a war of the people.⁶

A change in military technologies accounted in part for this shift in the nature of war. Technical innovations made warfare more expensive, and private entrepreneurs were priced out of the market. Since only states were

now able to shoulder the massive cost of furnishing the artillery and supplying large numbers of soldiers, war changed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. While the condottieri of previous centuries benefitted from long, drawn-out conflicts of low intensity and from the highly remunerative taking of hostages, eighteenth-century armies strove to concentrate their force and achieve decisive victories in large battles.

In Prussia, the militarization of the state is commonly traced back to the reign of Frederick William (1713–40). He himself never led his army to war, but he left a superbly trained standing army to his son and successor Frederick II (1740–86), also known as Frederick the Great. Under his leadership, Prussia amassed an army proportionally larger than that of any other European power and rose to European prominence due to its outstanding military successes.⁷ Frederick the Great invaded Austrian-owned Silesia in 1740, thus jump-starting the Austrian War of Succession, which lasted until 1748, and during the Seven Years' War (1756–63), he fought a coalition composed of almost every other European state, including France, Russia, Sweden, Austria, and most of the German states of the Holy Roman Empire. To this day, the history of German militarism acknowledges its origins in Frederick's Prussian legacy.

The nexus of Prussian militarism and state formation is but one example of the intricate connection between the transformation of European warfare and evolving concepts of the nation, national identity, and citizenship. As state-sponsored conflict replaced the "private warfare" of feudal orders, national attributes became central to the call for mobilization, especially in the German states. In the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the model of the citizen soldier replaced that of the mercenary. In Prussia, conscription was made official policy in 1808 but was not enforced until 1813. Since conscription made soldiers easily available and replaceable, the sizes of all European armies increased dramatically, and so did the willingness to tolerate enormous casualty rates.

Contemporaries and later generations alike have tended to romanticize the citizen soldier and attribute the success of the Revolutionary Army to the nationalistic fervor and moral fortitude of motivated soldiers; however, recent research indicates that the military successes of the French army were due to numerical superiority and their high tolerance of mass slaughter rather than to superior combat motivation. Moreover, researchers have shown that the figure of the enthusiastic patriot eager to volunteer for military service for the fatherland is at least in part a myth. In France, conscription was a highly unpopular measure. Paddy Griffith points out that "the majority of conscripts habitually desert within their first few days of service — assuming they turned up to be conscripted at all."⁸

While France and England were at war from 1792 to 1815, Prussia's stance during this period was a peculiar one. On 20 April 1792, France had declared war on Prussia and Austria. Following a failed attempt to

invade France, Prussia withdrew from the war in 1795 (Peace of Basel) and pursued a policy of neutrality that angered many ardent young patriots, including the prominent theorist of war Carl von Clausewitz. Prussia's early withdrawal led to the paradox that German intellectuals and writers witnessed the European war that raged all around them from a safe distance. It is during this period that Immanuel Kant's influential essay "On Eternal Peace" (1795) instigated a lively debate. More than any other text, it spoke to the fundamental paradox of enlightened warfare. Kant believed in the pacifying effects of trade and foresaw an ever-growing rationalization of the political order. This confidence in reason, progress, self-determination, and the future obsolescence of war goes a long way to explain why war as a cultural concept and historical reality is perceived to be diametrically opposed to the ideals of the Enlightenment and its legacy. And yet, as the articles in this volume seek to show, there is a demonstrable and intimate, though often overlooked relation between Enlightenment culture and contemporary practices and theories of war.

While warfare constitutes a central parameter for the analysis of twentieth-century literature, eighteenth-century texts ranging from the Enlightenment to Classicism and Romanticism are often read in isolation from the military turmoil of the period. With regard to Germany, it is not only the perceived rift between Weimar and Potsdam that accounts for this oversight; rather, the devastation wrought by the First and Second World Wars eclipsed all previous conflicts and effectively suspended interest in historical wars. Consequently, there remains a rich field of material to consider within the framework of martial aspirations and practices in the long eighteenth century. Especially the Napoleonic wars remain of great interest today since recent studies consider them to be the first examples of total war. As Fremont-Barnes and others have pointed out, the "Revolutionary Wars mark the beginning of modern war" (8).

The First Total War

When Ricarda Huch wrote her work on the Thirty Years' War shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, she initially entitled it *Der große Krieg in Deutschland* (The Great War in Germany, 1914). Up to 1914 and beyond, the Thirty Years' War, which was fought largely on German lands, was seen as the worst war in German history. By 1648, the German population had been reduced by one third.⁹ In light of this, one might well be tempted to call the Thirty Years' War the first total war, and yet it is eighteenth-century warfare that is perceived as a precursor of twentieth-century total war in recent scholarship.¹⁰

There are several reasons why late eighteenth-century, rather than seventeenth-century warfare, is singled out as the first total war. First, although it remains incontestable that the Thirty Years' War reduced the population drastically and devastated entire regions, recent scholarship has raised questions with respect to the nature of this destruction. Mortimer, for example, points out that the most gruesome accounts are often second-hand reports and goes so far as to speak of the "myth of the all-destructive fury of the Thirty Years War" (164). Others support Mortimer's relativization and point out that the nature and impact of suffering in that war differed from twentieth-century warfare in important ways. For the most part, the casualties of the Thirty Years' War were deaths caused by famine and epidemics, in particular typhus and the plague.¹¹ However, to some extent this also holds true for eighteenth-century warfare as well, so neither the extent nor the nature of the destruction caused by these wars accounts for the fact that it is eighteenth-century and not seventeenth-century warfare that is regarded as a template for total war. In order to account for this, we need to turn our attention to two defining features of the concept of total war: both the total mobilization of the population and the ideology and rhetoric of extermination are "inventions" of the eighteenth century.

There is a growing consensus that the Napoleonic Wars represented the first historical manifestation of total warfare, an effort of enormous magnitude that required the mobilization of all civilian and military resources.¹² The French *levée en masse* of 23 August 1793 explicitly integrated all citizens into the war effort: "all young men would go off to fight; the married men would do transport or munitions work; the women would make tents or uniforms and would serve in hospitals; the children would comb lint" (Griffith, 80). Since the French army lived off the land, imposed heavy taxes, requisitioned, and routinely pillaged and plundered, the civilian populations of all countries occupied by France suffered greatly. Their homes were looted, their livestock and crops taken from them, and they themselves were subjected to humiliating and at times brutal treatment. The German army behaved no differently. In his autobiography *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben* (Life and Destiny as Described by Himself), Friedrich Christian Laukhard, a failed German academic turned soldier, described the treatment of property and people during the campaign in France in 1792:

Das Furagieren ging so recht nach Feindesart: man schnitt ab, riss aus und zertrat alles Getreide weit und breit und machte eine Gegend, worauf acht bis zehn Dörfer ihre Nahrung auf ein ganzes Jahr ziehen sollten, in weniger als einer Stunde zur Wüstenei [. . .] was sie da Anständiges vorfanden, nahmen sie mit [. . .] Was nicht dazu diente, wurde zerschlagen und sonst verdorben [. . .] es gibt wüste Teufel unter diesen Leuten, welche einem Frauenzimmer allen Drang antun können.¹³

[Requisitioning was conducted in the manner of enemies; one cut off, tore out, and trampled all wheat far and near, and turned an area that should have provided the food for eight to ten villages for an entire year into a desert [. . .] any decent item they found, they took away [. . .] What did not serve this purpose was destroyed or ruined in some other way [. . .] there are savage devils among these people, who can do a woman all kinds of harm.]

If the suffering of civilians was great, the lot of the common soldier was equally abysmal. Hygiene was rudimentary, lice abounded, and medical skills were severely limited. The injuries caused by muskets and bayonets were horrific, and there were no anesthetics besides alcohol. Even so, most casualties were due not to injuries inflicted on the battlefield, but to disease caused by inclement weather and deficient nutrition. Laukhard again offers a description of his experience. The rain on the campaign was so horrid that they

im Kote herumlagen wie die Schweine [. . .] das Wasser von allen Seiten in die Zelter eindrang und uns alle durchnässte [. . .] Aber nichts nahm unsere Leute ärger mit als der Durchfall [. . .] die Abtritte, wenn sie gleich täglich frisch gemacht wurden, sahen jeden Morgen so mörderisch aus, dass es jedem übel und elend werden musste, der nur hinblickte: alles war voll Blut und Eiter [. . .] Starb einer unterwegs, so warf man ihn von dem Wagen auf die Seite und liess ihn unbegraben liegen. (178–8, 200)

[lay about in excrement like pigs [. . .] water rushed into the tents from all sides and soaked us all [. . .] but nothing harmed our people more than diarrhea [. . .] the toilets, even though they were being taken care of every day, looked so lethal every morning that everybody who so much as looked at them got sick, everything was full of blood and pus [. . .] if anybody died en route, they threw him from the wagon and left him there unburied.]

Undoubtedly the mass mobilization of soldiers and the devastating impact of the Revolutionary Wars on civilians and soldiers alike were similar to twentieth-century warfare. More importantly, in addition to these structural similarities, there were also significant ideological parallels. According to David Bell, the Revolutionary Wars represented the first manifestation of a war of extermination. He claims that it was precisely the dream of perpetual peace that gave birth to the nightmare of total war: “they transformed peace from a moral imperative into a historical one. And so they opened the door to the idea that in the name of future peace, any and all means might be justified — including even exterminatory war” (77). From 1800 onwards, the notions of war as barbarity and war as salvation were conjoined as eighteenth-century thinkers began to perceive in war a “terrible sublimity. They began to see in it the ultimate

test of a society and of an individual self. They began to imagine it as an elemental, cleansing, even redemptive experience" (6). No longer the exclusive pursuit of aristocrats and other professionals, war became a character-building experience from which every male citizen stood to benefit.

A thorough analysis of eighteenth-century texts shows that First World War authors such as Ernst Jünger were not the first to use war as a springboard for fantasies of transcendence or to find in war a source of moral and social catharsis. Rather, the conceptualization of war as a transcendental, transformative experience was already fully developed in the eighteenth century.¹⁴ Side by side with the debate on eternal peace existed another eighteenth-century tradition that considered war a moral institution and lavished praise on its ennobling features. Tellingly even Kant himself, who illuminated a template for eternal peace, saw fit to link the experience of war with the notion of the sublime:

Selbst der Krieg, wenn er mit Ordnung und Heiligachtung der bürgerlichen Rechte geführt wird, hat etwas Erhabenes an sich und macht zugleich die Denkungsart des Volks, welches ihn auf diese Art führt, nur um desto erhabener, je mehreren Gefahren es ausgesetzt war und sich mutig darunter hat behaupten können: dahingegen ein langer Frieden den bloßen Handelsgeist, mit ihm aber den niedrigen Eigennutz, Feigheit und Weichlichkeit herrschend zu machen und die Denkungsart des Volkes zu erniedrigen pflegt.¹⁵

[Even war, if it is conducted in an orderly fashion and with respect for the sanctity of citizens' rights, has something sublime about it and at the same time makes the mind of a people, which carries it on in this way, all the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which it is exposed and which it is able to meet with courage: in contrast, a long-lasting peace tends to bestow dominance on a mere commercial spirit and with it the basest egotism, cowardice, and effeminacy and to degrade the mind of the people.]

Similarly, in his response to Kant's essay, published in 1796, Ludwig Heinrich Jacob (1759–1827), a professor of philosophy in Halle, wondered if peace makes a nation weak whereas "der Krieg die gute Folge hat, daß der Geist erhoben wird, daß er rüstige Affekte erzeugt und allenthalben Gelegenheit schafft, daß sich die schönsten Tugenden zeigen können" (war has the good result that the mind is elevated, that it gives rise to robust affects and creates opportunities everywhere so that the most beautiful virtues can show themselves).¹⁶ In an essay published in 1792, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) was mindful of the same problematic when he called war "eine der heilsamsten Erscheinungen zur Bildung des Menschengeschlechts" (one of the most beneficial phenomena for the education of mankind).¹⁷

Somewhat later in the nineteenth century, the same notion of peace as foul was to reappear in Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel's *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 1821):

Der Krieg, als der Zustand, in welchem mit der Eitelkeit der zeitlichen Güter und Dinge, die sonst eine erbauliche Redensart zu sein pflegt, Ernst gemacht wird, ist hiermit das Moment, worin die Idealität des Besonderen ihr Recht erhält und Wirklichkeit wird; — er hat die höhere Bedeutung, daß durch ihn, wie ich es anderwärts ausgedrückt habe, die sittliche Gesundheit der Völker in ihrer Indifferenz gegen das Festwerden der endlichen Bestimmtheiten erhalten wird, wie die Bewegung der Winde die See vor der Fäulnis bewahrt, in welche sie eine dauernde Ruhe, wie die Völker ein dauernder oder gar ein ewiger Friede, versetzen würde.¹⁸

[War, as the condition in which one takes seriously the vanity of all temporal possessions and things, which in other circumstances is an edifying phrase, is accordingly the moment when the ideality of the particular attains its right and becomes actuality — it has the higher significance that, through it, as I have written elsewhere, the moral health of the nations is preserved in its indifference toward the solidification of finite determinacies, just as the movement of the winds preserves the sea from foulness, which a constant calm would produce, just as a permanent or even eternal peace would do for the nations.]

While peace is represented as foul and stagnant, war is seen as enlivening and purifying. In Friedrich Hölderlin's *Hyperion*, another example, war is a bath that cleanses its participants: "Ich betrachte diese Schlacht, wie ein Bad, den Staub mir abzuwaschen" (I regard this battle as a bath to wash the dust off of me).¹⁹ Clearly, alongside the debate on eternal peace there was a strong tradition that valorized war and praised its ennobling qualities. Even the ideal of *Bildung* or "education" was constructed in partial alignment with the experience of war so that the bourgeois self was centrally defined through its relation to battles both historical and spiritual. Analyses of texts by Kant, Schiller, Humboldt, Goethe, and Kleist demonstrate the conceptual alliance of warfare and *Bildung* and the relation between the sublime and its inverse, terror.

While the warrior enlarges his human potential through the experience of danger and transcendence, the enemy is dehumanized and demonized. Literature of the period is filled with references to Napoleon as the devil or Anti-Christ, for example, in texts by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Ernst Moritz Arndt, and even with examples of what Bell calls a rhetoric of extermination (102).²⁰ It is not accidental that the period around 1800 also witnessed the birth of the guerilla or partisan fighter, who bore some resemblance to the present-day terrorist. German intellectuals who sought

ways to defeat the French were greatly interested in the Spanish resistance movement against Napoleonic occupation after 1808. Historians of warfare have pointed out that the anti-Napoleonic guerilla war — *guerilla* is Spanish for “little war” — was fought with abject cruelty and vehemence. Neither wounded nor prisoners, neither women nor children were spared. In their willingness to blur the boundaries between armies and civilians and to employ extreme violence, the guerilla wars around 1800 provided a model for resistance fighters and terrorist movements of later centuries.

Departing from the reality and representation of warfare around 1800, this volume seeks to shed light on the current discussion of the legitimacy of violence by juxtaposing theories of war and discourses of revolution, resistance, and insurgency. In so doing, the essays here comment on the negotiation between Enlightenment ideals of universality that dominate the discourse about just wars and the inscription of national identity and military conflict into that ethical register.

An important aspect of this discussion concerns the relation between warfare and human rights discourses. According to Michel Foucault, the eighteenth century experienced a shift from a society conceived of as fractious and permeated by war-like relations to a State endowed with military institutions. This change implied a transition from a discourse of warring parties to a universal discourse. Departing from this premise, *Enlightened War* is interested in the interrelation between changing practices and discourses of war and the renegotiation of discourses of universality, in particular those that engage human rights, among which are municipal rights, international rights, and the right to hospitality.

The Culture of War

The essays in this volume trace changes in the practice and conceptualization of warfare from the early Enlightenment to German Classicism and Romanticism, but they differ considerably in interest and method. Some discuss theories of warfare; others analyze the representation of warfare in literature or art of the period; some focus on questions of gender; others highlight issues of nationality. In spite of this variety, however, all of these articles proceed from the assumption that warfare and Enlightenment culture are interdependent to an extent hitherto underestimated in scholarship. Specific wars shape national cultures and civil identities, impact social and cognitive categories, and transform gender roles. Conversely, literary and philosophical discourses transform the theory and practice of war. Eighteenth-century discourses and practices of war informed Enlightenment thought, which in turn exerted a legible influence on the practice of war. Precisely because of this dialectic, we need to consult a variety of disciplines, including history, art history, philosophy, military theory, gender

studies, and literature, in order to comprehend the interrelation of culture and war in all its dimensions.

In positing war as the focal point of our investigation, from which we gain insights into society and culture at large, we follow a model suggested by Michel Foucault in his lecture series *Society Must be Defended* from 1975–76, edited posthumously by Mauro Bertani and Alessandra Fontano.²¹ Here Foucault inverts Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum that power and therefore politics are war continued by other means. He maintains that power relations are "anchored in a certain relationship of force that was established in and through war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified [. . .] politics, in other words, sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war" (15). In light of the foundational importance of war, Foucault asks: "Can the phenomenon of war be regarded as primary with respect to other relations?" (47). He describes a historical development from the Middle Ages to the modern era in which the state gradually acquired a monopoly on warfare. As a consequence, social relations within the state were pacified while "the institutions of war tended to exist, so to speak, only on the frontiers, on the outer limits of the great State units" (48). Thus, war in the form of martial practices disappeared from the social body, but remains the motor behind all social institutions, behind the law and even behind discourses of truth.

While Foucault's analysis appears to posit war as the point of origin, this volume conceives of the relation between war and society as a complex, multidirectional feedback loop. And yet Foucault's suggestion that war is the nucleus of society and its institutions would seem to be pertinent with respect to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Prussia. There it was indeed the war that instigated not only the implementation of military reforms but also the reformation of civil society, including the abolition of rural serfdom and the introduction of a certain measure of religious tolerance. The transformation of the Prussian administrative and legal system by Karl Freiherr vom Stein and Karl August Fürst von Hardenberg, the overhaul of education by Wilhelm von Humboldt, and the military reforms under the leadership of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Neidhardt von Gneisenau were conceived of as integral parts of a common effort to modernize the Prussian state in response to the defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806.

In addition to these concrete political connections, the intimate link between the military and literary spheres is also evident in myriad points of contact between the most eminent writers and their contemporaries in the army. Carl von Clausewitz, for example, was a member of the *Christlich Deutsche Tischgesellschaft* (Christian German Dinner Society), which was also frequented by Heinrich von Kleist, Clemens Brentano, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Clausewitz was acquainted with Wilhelm von Humboldt

and Achim and Bettina von Arnim, and was known as an avid reader of Fichte, Goethe, and Schiller. Such personal contacts fostered the exchange of ideas and encouraged the polyhistoricism of the period. Thus, if Weniger belabored Goethe's familiarity with tactical manuals and theoretical treatises on war, he did not revolutionize our understanding of the Weimar luminary, but was merely drawing attention to the normalcy of interconnections among different disciplines around 1800. After all, Frederick the Great not only led campaigns but also wrote philosophical essays. The writer Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz wrote dramas, but also an essay entitled "Über die Soldatenehe" (On Soldier Marriages), in which he made detailed suggestions for military reforms. Finally, Goethe not only participated in the campaign in France in 1792, but wrote a memoir about his experiences.

If the interrelation between war and culture is intimate and insoluble, the nexus of warfare and gender is even more so: "Gendered identity is at the center, not the margin, of the culture of war" and "responds to the discourse on war and nation."²² Several articles in this volume demonstrate that contemporary gender discourses informed and were transformed by the emerging concept of the soldier citizen, the evolution of heroic masculinity, and the increasingly sutured border between gendered identity and citizenship. National identities, gender roles, and erotic desire were intertwined, and all were inflected by practices and cultures of war. This volume traces the connections between the contemporary discourses of war and gender through a variety of contexts and themes, including the proliferation of literary texts that feature women warriors, the impact of war in the visual arts, and the homoeroticism facilitated by the motif of brothers-in-arms. It will become evident that the construction of gender necessarily interacts with and may even undermine the representation of war.

Enlightened War

All twelve essays in this volume investigate the multiple and complex interactions between warfare and Enlightenment thought, the paradox that Enlightenment thinkers conceptualized war not only as a lamentable failure of cognition, but also as a formative experience on the national and individual levels. In the interests of chronological order and thematic coherence, the book is divided into four parts: parts 1 and 2 discuss the literary movements of Enlightenment, Classicism, and Romanticism, while parts 3 and 4 address important thematic clusters; all of them discuss the specificity of historical wars, the cultural valuations of warfare, including evolving concepts of heroism, and the interrelation between gender, nation, and military conflict. Inhibited by the horrific legacy of German

warfare in the twentieth century, cultural criticism has largely averted its gaze from the specifically German historical experience of war in the Enlightenment period. The essays in this volume fully explore the cultural, philosophical, and practical territories of the eighteenth-century battlefield.

Part 1 focuses on the Seven Years' War and the Polish Revolution, highlighting the interplay of politics, aesthetics, and war. Reading works by Frederick the Great along with juridical texts and encyclopedia entries, Sara Eigen Figal's essay posits that the contemporary language of war and enmity was intimately intertwined with the vocabulary of neighbor and brother. Her reading of Frederick's ethics of war with reference to Johann Valentin Embser and Voltaire encourages us to rethink the contribution of Enlightenment thought by focusing on channeled warfare. Her analysis centers on a notion of war that predates the demonization of the enemy; rather, in consonance with the scrupulously documented linguistic usage of the time, neighbors, next of kin, and even brothers comprised the image of the enemy. Further, foes were defined according to standards of sociability. Figal's essay highlights the expectation of reciprocity between groups. Conflict ensued as a consequence of breaching an implicit contract; at stake was the recognition of the enemy as brother or neighbor, and the military strategy was informed by that cognition. It was ultimately the potential identity of the neighbor and enemy that limited war and specified military strategy. Figal's reading provides a critical perspective on the construction of a template not for perpetual peace, but for perpetual war.

Daniel Jenisch's *Borussias*, an epic in twelve cantos published in 1794, was the longest and most elaborate literary treatment of the Seven Years' War in eighteenth-century German literature. Although long overlooked by scholars, the epic was not only highly popular in its own time — there were eight preprints in the most prestigious journals of the time — but, as Johannes Birgfeld's reading demonstrates, it is also an important contribution to the tradition of war writing. Birgfeld highlights the contradictions between political imperatives, military facts, and genre conventions in Jenisch's epic. The portraits of death and suffering on the battlefield and Jenisch's extension of humanity to the enemy constitute powerful antiwar messages. However, the *Borussias* was also designed as a political intervention in contemporary Prussian politics; hence, Jenisch's commitment to Prussian greatness and to Frederick as the embodiment of national prowess counteracts the text's pacifist potential.

Part 2 elaborates on the relation of war, German Classicism, and Romanticism, highlighting the nexus between warfare, the ideal of *Bildung*, and notions of the sublime, and also deliberating on the question of the interactivity between the individual and society as mediated by the events of war. In his essay, Felix Saure shows that Wilhelm von Humboldt's

theory of individual self-formation was indebted to his notions of modern and ancient warfare, foregrounding the interconnections between Humboldt's theory of war, his concept of individual rights vis-à-vis the state or nation, and the idea of *Bildung*. Filtered through the lens of his intellectual Hellenism, Humboldt's critique of contemporary military practices, including the existence of standing armies, inhumane treatment of soldiers, and the mechanistic service of mercenaries, underscored his larger complaint about the deficits of modernity. Humboldt, both as a man of letters and as a career diplomat, rendered the needs of the state or nation secondary to the imperative of achieving a harmonious individuality. Saure situates Humboldt's thought alongside that of contemporary military theorists and writers, often by way of contrast, noting that Humboldt challenged the executive right to declare war because it diminishes the right of the individual and society; war was recuperated as part of the process of *Bildung*, and the positive portrayal of pain and suffering became tolerable only in this framework. This image contrasts sharply with the nationalist discourse of self-sacrificing heroism. Instead, as Saure concludes, the theory of war as a "bloody game of chess" had to give way to the organic education of the individual.

Focusing on Kleist's war anecdotes, published in the *Berliner Abendblätter*, Galili Shahar unveils inverted correspondences between Kleist's theory of violence and Kant's philosophy of reason. Kleist's soldier is the *doppelgänger* of Kant's officer. He is not a duty-bound self but a self-destructive war machine that reasserts the materiality of the body and its pleasures, wounds, and perforations. Kleist's texts do not support the idea that laws subdue violence, but rather expose the violence at the heart of the law.

Elisabeth Krimmer's essay analyzes the nexus of politics, aesthetics, and warfare in Goethe's *Faust II* and contextualizes Goethe's thoughts on war by comparing them to Fichte's and to Clausewitz's theories on warfare. Her reading shows that Goethe posited an affinity between genius in art and genius in war. He explored the link between warfare and the sublime but, unlike some of his contemporaries, he did not consider the practice of war itself, its battles and martial exploits, to be ennobling. Rather, the revaluation of war in *Faust II* rests on Goethe's analysis of its origin: war is rooted not only in man's lowest impulses, but also in his highest aspirations; wars are the result of self-indulgence, greed, and lust for power, but they are also propelled by the same energy and hunger for activity that lie at the heart of human relationships and drive the creation of art. Nevertheless, even if warfare as presented in *Faust II* evinces an affinity with man's creative capabilities and his desire for transcendence, Goethe never failed to introduce critical notes, not only ironizing the capacity of politics to tame martial impulses, but also advocating the ability of art to temper the destructive force of war.

The essay by Patricia Anne Simpson that concludes part 2 of the book examines the literature of German Romanticism and the Wars of Liberation and highlights the interrelation between bourgeois identity formation, concepts of nation, and the experience of war. Specifically, Simpson traces the influence of military discourse and contemporary warfare in three of the Grimms' fairy tales. With reference to military journals, she contends that the soldier tales, though firmly situated in the realm of imaginative literature, recoded the ethics of war through a populist identification with the plight of the ordinary soldier in the early nineteenth century. Moreover, she locates the discussion of soldiers' responses to harsh discipline, forced service, and severe impoverishment within a larger discussion of the relationship between representations of the warrior in narrative and the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. The implacable inscriptions of trauma on character are attested to in the post-conflict plots of the three Grimms' tales in which the soldiers reenter bourgeois society through reaffirmed fraternity, interventions from older female characters, and finally through marriage; however, the most crucial element of their reintegration is the possibly fictional ability to uphold the ethics of peace.

Part 3 focuses on the interrelation between war and gender. Inge Stephan's article on Therese Huber's *Die Familie Seldorf* explores how domestic struggles and gender wars impact national politics and warfare and, conversely, how war destroys the family unit and disrupts traditional gender roles. In Huber's novel, the ideals of the Enlightenment are both the prime motivation for and the first victim of the war. Stephan concludes her article with a discussion of the figure of the Amazon around 1800, which highlights the connections between contemporary demands for women's rights and the women warriors in reality and fiction.

Waltraud Maierhofer's article on Angelica Kauffmann's war heroes demonstrates convincingly that Kauffmann brought the culture of sensibility into dialogue with Neoclassical paintings and enlisted both in order to radically transform gender roles. Drawing her themes from Homer's and Virgil's war epics and other literary sources, Kauffmann's paintings do not depict battle scenes, but focus instead on the emotional suffering wrought by war — pregnant moments of departure, loss, and lament. Her art feminizes masculinity and expands the semantics of war to extend female experiences to warriors. Men are heroes of feeling and women are endowed with the attributes of war and strength. Both sexes share in the task of mourning the dead, and to both, war remains a deeply tragic experience.

In her contribution to the volume, Ute Frevert traces the history of the draft from 1800 to the present. She shows that the newly formed concept of the citizen soldier initiated a discourse on political rights and on the valence of war. In the early part of the nineteenth century, gender discourses were enlisted in support of military service because a martial

education was framed as a national project of masculinization. In spite of these efforts, the citizen soldier remained a hotly contested concept, and the national rhetoric of honor, valor, and patriotism did not meet with enthusiastic approval. Resistance to the draft was quite common, and numerous contemporaries expressed aversion to the forced obedience of military service. Toward the end of the century, a growing acceptance of the military became the dominant paradigm.

Part 4 centers on warfare in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century theory and philosophy. David Colclasure's essay on Kant offers a close reading of the philosopher's position on political violence, engaging with the Habermasian thesis that Kant's concept of peace was purely negative — that is, that Kant allowed for wars of self-defense but rejected proactive measures on behalf of peace, such as wars of intervention motivated by human-rights abuse. Reading against Kant with Kant, Colclasure points to a possible conflict between his emphasis on the state as the primary guarantor of individual autonomy on the one hand, and his endorsement of state sovereignty and rejection of revolutionary violence on the other. Inherent in this dialectic is the idea that a state that can no longer fulfill its primary function as guarantor of human rights relinquishes its *raison d'être* and possibly its sovereignty. While the violent overthrow of a tyrannical regime was out of the question for Kant, the idea that one state might intervene on behalf of the population of another contradicts the letter but not the spirit of his argument.

In his article, Arndt Niebisch shows that the concept of friction, so central to Clausewitz's understanding of war, also informed how the foremost theorist of war conceptualized military intelligence and the processing of information on the battlefield. Niebisch shows that Clausewitz's theories possess striking similarities to modern chaos and complexity theory, but he also demonstrates that they were rooted in mathematical theories of his own time. Clausewitz's attempt to develop a theory of war through a focus on chance, noise, and error may have differed from the models devised by contemporary military theorists such as Jomini, but they owed much to Enlightenment models of mathematical probability.

Finally, drawing on Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* and the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), the concluding essay, by Wolf Kittler, discusses the persistence of Clausewitz's thought in contemporary writing about "nonconventional" means of waging wars. As Kittler notes, the presumption of familiarity with the Prussian officer's works saturates U.S. military strategy and interpretation to a surprising degree. He references Harry Summers's invocation of Clausewitz to authorize his own interpretation of why the United States lost the war in Vietnam in his book *On Strategy*, and he foregrounds the knowledge of Clausewitz demonstrated by General David Petraeus, with a focus on the latter's dissertation. Kittler's critical approach to the longevity

of Clausewitz's views on war exposes the roots of military strategies involving the relationship between civilian policy-makers and the military, the role of the "people" in conventional and guerilla warfare since the Napoleonic era, and counterinsurgencies and nation-building practices. His essay provides a new and perspicuous examination of continuity in strategizing warfare since the late eighteenth century that contributes a new element to contemporary military hermeneutics.

In *The First Total War*, David A. Bell argues boldly for logical connections among Enlightenment thought, the revolutionary period, and the intense generalization of total war during the Napoleonic era. "Ever since," he writes, "the same developments have shaped the way Western societies have seen and engaged in military conflict" (9). Noting the correspondences between a discourse of perpetual peace and the prosecution of total wars, Bell draws a pattern between the late eighteenth-century attitudes toward bellicosity and the martial postures of today in the West. The object of study in his book, as in ours, is the culture of war — the historical, literary, and social discourses generated by the inherent and uncomfortable contradiction between the intellectual aspirations of Enlightenment values of universal human rights, equality, and reason, and the brutality of armed conflict. The culture of war emanating from France generated symmetrical discourses throughout Europe, discussions that contemplated the identity of the soldier, the place of standing armies vis-à-vis civil society, and the capacity of violence on the battlefield to approximate the sublime. Further, the culture of war, to an extent still under-theorized today, dominates and exerts a formative influence on gender identity and aesthetic practices.

While Bell is primarily concerned with Napoleonic France, our focus here is on the culture of war in German-speaking Europe. Though developing national sentiment can be overrepresented in explanations about historical warfare and mobilization, it is undeniable that concepts of nation organize and structure subjective identities. In the German context, the military supremacy of Frederick the Great, the presumptive superiority of the Prussian army, the humiliating defeats associated with counterrevolution, the crucial battles of Jena and Auerstedt, and the rhetorical force pledged to military reform leading up to the Wars of Liberation were all constitutive moments in the culture of war. They articulated the tensions between Enlightenment theory and historical practice. The essays in this volume inhabit the space shaped by that contradiction.

Notes

¹ Erich Weniger, *Goethe und die Generäle* (Leipzig: Insel, 1942), 6. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are our own.

² Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2007), 25.

³ Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Napoleonic Wars* (London: Cassell, 2004), 25.

⁴ See Geoff Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618–48* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 10.

⁵ Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, trans. Andrew Boreham with Daniel Brückenhaus (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 22.

⁶ Herfried Münkler, *Über den Krieg: Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion* (Weilerswist: Velbrueck, 2002), 116.

⁷ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The French Revolutionary Wars* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 12.

⁸ Paddy Griffith, *The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789–1802* (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 30 and 202.

⁹ Most scholars cite this number, but there is some disagreement. Dyer, for example, claims that the population was reduced from twenty-one million before the war to only thirteen million in 1648; see Gwynne Dyer, *War: The Lethal Custom* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), 217. There is consensus that the “fighting varied in intensity and scope” in different regions; Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 781.

¹⁰ While eighteenth-century warfare was linked to the notion of total war, seventeenth-century warfare was similar to the wars of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries, in particular with respect to the nexus of religion and warfare. On the role of religion in the Thirty Years’ War, see Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 128–77.

¹¹ See Georg Schmidt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Munich: Beck, 2006), 90. See also Gerhard Schormann, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 119. Wilson concludes that, since most deaths were due to disease, it is “very likely that many of the people who died in the Empire between 1618 and 1648 would have had their lives cut short even without the war” (793).

¹² David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 7; see also Rothenberg, 19.

¹³ Friedrich Christian Laukhard, *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben* (1796; repr., Leipzig: Koehler, 1989), 116–17.

¹⁴ See Elisabeth Krimmer, *The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010), 19–26.

¹⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 263.

¹⁶ Ludwig Heinrich Jacob, “Über Theorie und Praxis in Kants Schrift ‘Zum ewigen Frieden,’” in *Ewiger Friede? Dokumente einer deutschen Diskussion um 1800*, ed. Anita and Walter Dietze (Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 1989), 209–10.

¹⁷ Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen," in *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel (Darmstadt: WBG, 1960), 98.

¹⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, vol. 7 of *Werke*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), 492–93.

¹⁹ Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Friedrich Beissner, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1965), 3:127.

²⁰ See Kleist's "Germania:" "Horchet! — Durch die Nacht, ihr Brüder, / Welch ein Donnerruf hernieder? / Stehst du auf, Germania? / Ist der Tag der Rache da? / Deutsche, mutger Völkerreigen, / Meine Söhne, die, geküßt, / In den Schoß mir kletternd steigen, / Die mein Mutterarm umschließt, / Meines Busens Schutz und Schirmer, / Unbesiegt Marsenblut, / Enkel der Kohortenstürmer, / Römerüberwinderbrut! / Alle Plätze, Trift' und Stätten, / Färbt mit ihren Knochen weiß; / Welchen Rab und Fuchs verschmähten, / Gebet ihn den Fischen preis; / Dämmt den Rhein mit ihren Leichen; [. . .] Eine Lustjagd, wie wenn Schützen / Auf die Spur dem Wolfe sitzen! / Schlagt ihn tot! Das Weltgericht / Fragt euch nach den Gründen nicht!" Heinrich von Kleist, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, ed. Helmut Sembdner, 2 vols. (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1993), 2:26–27.

²¹ Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997).

²² Patricia Anne Simpson, *The Erotics of War in German Romanticism* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2006), 19.

Part I: War and Enlightenment

1: The Point of Recognition: Enemy, Neighbor, and Next of Kin in the Era of Frederick the Great

Sara Eigen Figal

THE TERM *MILITÄRISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG* (military enlightenment) as it is used today refers to reconnaissance, to the active gathering of information about an enemy's intentions, capabilities, and position. It involves issues of recognition, of seeing, of interpreting, of understanding, and all with the intent of modeling one's own response appropriately to engage or otherwise defeat a recognized enemy.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, *militärische Aufklärung* was an idea interwoven with philosophical discourse. Then as now, it involved dynamics of cognition and recognition; then, as now, it was concerned with the identification of both self and enemy. However, the ambitions of this recognition in the eighteenth century reached beyond positional mapping and strategic response, and involved finely tuned intellectual and psychological insights into cultural difference, human rivalry, and the limits of rational control.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, perceptions of Enlightenment values and representations of military culture separated themselves so thoroughly that now it seems implausible to many that they should be studied together. This essay reconstructs a legacy that includes not only celebrated plans for perpetual peace, but also equally "enlightened" theories of perpetual war. Such writings on war were concurrent with peace projects, drawing upon similar tropes and staging an equal claim to enlightenment. While Immanuel Kant's treatise on perpetual peace tends to dominate discussions of enlightenment and warfare, Frederick the Great's essays on the subject are seldom discussed in this context. Unlike Kant, Frederick dismissively responded to contemporary philosophers who devoted considerable energy and attention to theorizing peace within the discourse of a limited, rational concept of war. These debates about warfare, the enemy, and the justifications for peace projects and hostility benefit from a careful examination of the rhetoric of warfare and hence a better understanding of military enlightenment and philosophical discourse.

Perpetual War

In his *Examen de l'essai sur les préjugés* (Examination of the Essay on Prejudices, 1770), Frederick II of Prussia scathingly dismissed the optimistic pacifism characteristic of the French *philosophes* whom he otherwise admired. Attacking in particular the thought of Baron d'Holbach (1723–89), Frederick wrote:

Si vous voulez établir une paix perpétuelle, transportez-vous dans un monde idéal où le tien et le mien soient inconnus, où les princes, leurs ministres et leurs sujets soient tous sans passions, et où la raison soit généralement suivie; ou bien associez-vois aux project de défunt l'abbé de Saint-Pierre.

[If you want to establish a perpetual peace, you have to transport yourself to an ideal world where “yours” and “mine” are unknown, where princes, their ministers, and their subjects are all without passions, and where reason reigns over all; or you can commit yourself to the project of the deceased Abbé Saint Pierre.]¹

Frederick's contempt for fantasies of perpetual peace is not surprising; however, the specifics of his criticism of pacifist discourse warrant attention. In the passage cited above, he identifies several interrelated points of conceptual failure with reference to human nature and its passions. A necessary premise for the realization of perpetual peace is, he suggests, the flawed notion that human passions can be eliminated; further, this “ideal world” requires that reason be isolated and granted governance over all human affairs.

The regulation or repression of passions — primarily those resulting in violent action — that one finds as a central requirement of rational peace projects was roundly critiqued by eighteenth-century texts that accepted war as an inevitable component of civilization. Frederick's own voluminous writings, as well as the work of the modest scholar, classical philologist, and Gymnasium teacher in Kaiserslautern Johann Valentin Embser (1749–83), offer disparate points of entry into discussions of bellicosity, but both writers anchored their arguments and the language used to construct them deliberately within Enlightenment discourse. Both used an appeal to reason and the deployment of rational argument to acknowledge the passions of both individuals and nations, and ultimately to channel emotional energies that are themselves not governed by reason and thus cannot simply be reasoned away.

Enlightenment calls for perpetual peace tended to insist upon a rational overcoming of political hostility based upon an equally rational preference for peace.² Frederick, who accepted the inevitability of war, was not caught up in this theoretical construction of logical necessity, but

focused instead upon the human need to channel affective energy (love, hatred, altruism, rivalry) and to preserve the always contested boundaries of identity. The preservation of identity boundaries, whether individual or collective, requires not only recognition of similarity with brothers and neighbors, but also an active and aggressive defense against the encroachment of brothers and neighbors. It is in the balance of respect and aggression, of reciprocity and rivalry, of empathy and hostility that this more bellicose tradition is able to present a concept of limited war. Quite simply, if one accepts perpetual war, one may focus one's analytical energies upon limiting its destructive power. In the following, I examine several texts that present a public discourse of channeled — and relatively chastened — hostility, resulting in two provocative governing principles: first, that one may hate one's brother, but one may not kill him; and second, that one may kill one's enemy, but one may not hate him.

In a book entitled *Die Abgötterei unsers philosophischen Jahrhunderts. Erster Abgott: Ewiger Friede* (The Idolatry of our Philosophical Century. First Idol: Perpetual Peace, 1779), Embser criticized the moral and federative cosmopolitanism of the late eighteenth century in general, and proposals for “perpetual peace” in particular, as an example of the era's “idolatry.” In so doing, he offered a defense of war as not merely inevitable, but productive. Conflict between nations, he insisted, functions like conflict between individuals in that it reinforces the borders of identity. Further, conflict between community groups renews moral commitments to the common good. Shrugging off as naively well-meaning the failed gestures toward the wisdom of peace offered to humanity by philosophy, reason, and history (citing Saint Pierre, Rousseau, Morus, and Gaillard), Embser argued that human beings are by nature designed to form and operate in small communal groups with particular identities, which will necessarily result in inter-group conflicts.

Drawing upon common imagery of the nation as an extrapolation of biologically driven emotional ties that first bind the nuclear family, then the larger extended family, then the clan, and finally the nation, Embser reasoned that, just as people are bound by familial relations, their nature also comprises anti-social impulses (“ungesellige Triebe”). Families and nations, he argued, are strong only as long as their unity is defined against all external forces. “Gesellschaft setzet Trennung voraus”: that is, society presupposes division, and it is precisely the ability to recognize relations of both reciprocity and exclusion that makes the social realm functional and allows reason and ethics to flourish. He observed: “die Menschen sind durch ihre Natur blos zu kleinen Gesellschaften bestimmt” (human beings are by their nature designed for small communities).³ The borders of these small communities are like the borders of the self as Embser understood it, and these boundaries must be defended, and often, for selfhood to thrive. Distinctions among identities are crucial for the robust

thriving of communities, and Embser exhibited only contempt for such “idiotic illusions” as the “so-called love of humanity” or cosmopolitanism (44).

The Enlightenment’s celebration of *fraternité* naturalized the bonds of citizens by calling them “brothers.” This brotherhood, if we follow Pierre Saint-Amand’s reading of the French *philosophes*, was constructed and disseminated as a rationalized reciprocity. The *philosophes*, he argued, “aspired to be the saviors of mankind, but to do so they had to sever human beings from their own evil” (3). They theorized a pacifistic reciprocity that restricted violence among human beings to a lesser stage of development along a teleological path of perfectibility. Universal brotherhood was envisioned as both the instrumental concept and the goal for human societies progressing from a violent and barbaric past toward a future perpetual peace. Reason, repulsed by the consequences of hostility, would be the guarantor against excesses of passion. The French Revolution (and subsequent military actions throughout the following centuries) gave the lie to this delusional repression of hostility, leaving the proponents of rationalized ethical standards bewildered and disillusioned in the face of violence. By focusing exclusively upon reasoned harmony (the “moral world” identified by Koselleck), theorists of peace offered no means for checking the expression of hostility, and their program took on its own absolutist character (Koselleck, 119, 127–82). At moments of passionate disruption, when ethical norms that could accommodate and channel emotion were most needed to mitigate disaster, only horrified repudiations of a “return to barbarism” were forthcoming from the guardians of reason.

In Embser’s analysis — which, as Wilhelm Janssen notes, was thoroughly bound up within Enlightenment philosophy (49) — the hallmark of enlightenment is the recognition that virtue lies in activity devoted to the common good.⁴ But for Embser, the common good is not and cannot be the product of perpetual peace. For both individuals and nations, virtuous activity (*Tätigkeit*) is both proactive and reactive: while its goals are altruistic, it is stimulated by conflict or misfortune. We can hear the passion of the *Sturm und Drang* and the aesthetic terminology of the Enlightenment combining in Embser’s acceptance of hostility as that which gives rise to “noble, sublime, and beautiful virtues.” It is the function of conflict, he insisted, to catalyze the human species along a course of progress and avoid an otherwise inevitable deterioration of human culture to the level of plants and animals (201). War, for Embser, is not bestial; it is instead a way of staving off animality. It is an activity by which human communities recognize and preserve their identity and their commitment to their own common good. The significant focus of his analysis is not upon violence as a problem of war, but rather upon conflict as a challenge to and reinforcement of particular identity, which is always defined and exercised by the

recognition and preservation of difference. Only when boundaries of difference are established — only when the neighbor is defined as both an ally and an enemy — can rational claims upon the individual to self-sacrifice and altruism be effective.

For Embser it is precisely the painstaking balance between amity and enmity, between reciprocity and rivalry, that provides a means of containing the potential excesses of both. As Saint-Amand so aptly writes, morality has its origin not in moments of perceived reciprocity and likeness, but rather “from a point of fearful recognition” (14). The brother with whom one builds is always potentially the enemy who destroys. At the same time — and more significantly for an effective ethics — the enemy is always also the brother, the neighbor, the next of kin. The ethical discourse of war and peace during the reign of Frederick the Great further asserted the identity of ally and enemy.

Recognizing the Enemy

How does one speak of (write of, think of) an enemy? Turning to texts that do not suppress hostile passions and their societal expressions, we find evidence of an opponent who may be regarded not as satanic but as brotherly, who may be seen not as an animal or a bacterium deserving of eradication, but rather as a neighbor.

Historians recognize the shift from eighteenth-century “cabinet wars” to the ideological “first total war” of the Napoleonic era and trace the social and political conditions that accompanied this shift in waging war.⁵ I would like to side with Armstrong Starkey in suggesting that the eighteenth-century conflicts were not so benign as the term “cabinet-wars” would imply.⁶ It is true that these military conflicts were relatively more disciplined, less destructive, and more amenable to diplomatic reconciliation than those in following centuries. Nevertheless, the actual horrors of eighteenth-century warfare should not be elided in order to magnify the unique properties of the more ideological wars to come. The Prussian engagement in the Seven Years’ War inflicted vast suffering upon civilian populations and decimated the army. It was also not as free from “ideological” sentiment as some accounts would suggest: Frederick II’s military engagements proved to be a unifying channel for theoretically unstable but nonetheless fervent proto-nationalist energies. An analysis of this war reveals a surging interest in mobilizing popular sentiment through identification with an amalgam of references that included king, country, “nation,” religious confession, and moral position. Protestant propaganda framed the Seven Years’ War as a defensive conflict and battle for freedom led by an enlightened king, and it produced images of an enemy that highlighted charges of immoral behavior, war crimes, and threats to “national”

and religious survival.⁷ Klaus Bohnen, with only slight exaggeration, has described the patriotic swell of that period as the moment in which a “Nationalsinn,” a sense of nation, was born.⁸

Within texts circulated as propaganda — those belonging to the “Krieg mit der Feder” (war with the pen), as Hans-Martin Blitz describes the phenomenon — it was certainly possible to characterize the enemy as a monster (147ff.). And even though this was not (yet) a dominant mode of discourse, the specific strategies of the linguistic usage associated with propaganda were frequently at odds with the presumed underpinnings of rationality or ethical aspirations. Thus, the rhetorically constituted enemy assumed greater importance in this theory of bellicosity.

The configurations of this enmity are present in contemporary definitional language. In eighteenth-century German texts, the primary term for a military enemy is *der Feind*, which brings with it a rich set of associations. If we turn to popular contemporary sources for insights into linguistic usage — Luther’s Bible translations and catechisms and Zedler’s *Universallexicon* — the image of the enemy at one extreme is infused with the satanic. *Der Feind* is how Luther describes the incarnation of evil: the serpent has *Feindschaft* (enmity, hostility) with woman; Satan both is identified as the essential *Feind* of humankind and carries *Feind* as an alternative proper name. At the same time, God is the *Feind* of all evildoers. When characterizing God, *Feind* is always modified: God is only an enemy *of*, and more specifically he is the enemy of those who repudiate him. He is the enemy of his enemy; his wrath, one might say, is analogous to a justifiable defensive war.

Zedler’s *Universallexicon*, which was compiled between 1731 and 1754, is widely regarded as the most comprehensive and encyclopedic index of usage in the eighteenth century.⁹ The lexicon elaborates upon the plural, *Feinde*: “Feinde, sind Theils leibliche, die einen plagen, ängstigen, verfolgen, und alles Herzeleid anthun” (Enemies are those living beings who plague, terrify, and persecute a person, and cause all kinds of heartache).¹⁰ On the other hand, continues the dictionary, there are spiritual enemies such as the Devil; “the world with all its treachery and evil”; “our own sinful flesh and blood”; and generally “all sorts of evil and discord” against which one must fight. Regarding the singular, *Feind*, Zedler is explicit that enmity — the condition of *Feindschaft* among people — is a direct result of “*Eitelkeit*” or vanity, itself the condition of man’s fallen state. The opposite of enmity involves a kind of pre-lapsarian — and therefore politically inconsequential — altruistic unity among all beings. As the *Lexicon* iterates: “It thus appears to be impossible that a man should be able to live without enemies” (9: col. 450).

In addition to the Christian reading of *Feind*, Zedler includes a lengthy entry on the term as used at a personal, social level:

Durch einen Feind versteht man eine solche Person, welche dem andern die Pflichten der Geselligkeit versaget, und ihm also in dem Gebrauch derer Mittel, dadurch er seine wahre Glückseligkeit zu erlangen suchet, zuwider ist. (9: col. 445)

[One understands by enemy a person who fails to perform the obligations of sociability toward another, and thereby thwarts him in the use of those means by which he seeks his true contentment.]

Central here is the idea that the American Declaration of Independence would later enshrine as the right to the “pursuit of happiness.” The “Pflichten der Geselligkeit” or the obligations of sociability appear to be the condition of accord. “Geselligkeit,” we read, “ist eine Pflicht mit andern Menschen eine friedliche und dienstfertige Gesellschaft zu unterhalten, damit alle durch alle ihre Glückseligkeit erlangen mögen” (10: col. 1260; Sociability is an obligation to maintain a peaceful and supportive community with other people, so that all are able through one another to achieve happiness).

Zedler’s definition of *Geselligkeit* develops over an entire column, surprisingly without recourse to the biblical citations that otherwise liberally enliven the dictionary’s entries, and reasons that we are all required to support others’ *Glückseligkeit* as much as our own. This is nothing less than an obligation of love: the essay expands to define *Liebe* as “eine innigliche vernünftige Zuneigung gegen eine Person, ihre Glückseligkeit zu befördern” (an internal, reasonable inclination toward another, to further his happiness). Since we all owe each other as well as ourselves these “schuldige Pflichten,” the entry concludes, “Derowegen sind, Vermöge der Geselligkeit alle Menschen einander zu lieben schuldig, als sich selbst” (10: col. 1260; Therefore all people, according to the principles of sociability, owe love to one another as much as to themselves).

This eudemonistic understanding of the function of sociability has at its core the “schuldige Pflicht” — the owed duty, or obligation. The degree to which this obligation reflects either a rationalization of the state and its components (whether individual or group) as instruments of mutual benefit, or a reliance upon a metaphysical basis of social good requires its own analysis. This is the secular invocation to love all people that has as its religious complement the directive to love and honor your neighbor. But how is this to be done?

The entry on *Feind* is quite forthright in its admission that no human life exists without hostility. Rather than bemoaning or denying that enmity is an inevitable element of social congress, the essay instead stresses the priority of ensuring that each belligerent party pursues his or her rights (*Rechte*) through “orderly means” or “appropriate media” (“ordentliche Mittel”). Justice hinges on these *Mittel*: “Die Mittel nun darzu machen die Gerechtigkeit gegen unsere Feinde aus” (These means constitute justice

toward our enemies). They may include probity and plain dealing (*Redlichkeit*), and they may also include violence or even “vernünftige Rache” (reasonable revenge); in either case, we are obligated by the very “Pflichten der Geselligkeit” that are under assault to move from injury to accord through the legislated medium of retribution. It is this movement through ritualized violence that forms or constitutes justice (*Gerechtigkeit ausmachen*).

The German word for war, *Krieg*, is introduced in Zedler with a deceptively simple parallel to the nature of enmity:

Krieg ist in richtigen Verstande derjenige Zustand, da zwey einander nicht unterworfenene Theile derer Völker wegen Unterlassung derer gegenseitigen Pflichten einander etwas widriges zufügen, damit der, so seinen Pflichten zuwider handelt, zu gehöriger Beobachtung dererselben möge gebracht werden. (15: col. 1890)

[War is properly understood as that particular condition whereby two groups of people who are not subjugated to one another begin to inflict something adverse upon each other because of failure to uphold mutual duties, so that the party who has acted contrary to his duties can be brought to proper acknowledgment of them.]

Here too we encounter enmity as the failure to uphold mutual obligation. The complexities of declaring war, the right to wage war, and the various kinds of war are then discussed in the entry, but of primary interest here is the emphasis on the failure of obligation — the all-too-human failure of obligation — that incites belligerency. Further, both obligations and war can exist only between free and equal parties: peoples (*Völker*) or states with legitimate rulers.

Frederick the Great began his *Réflexions sur la tactique* (Study of War, 1758) with the following reference to the classical Roman authority on militarism: “Vegetius stated that war must be a study and peace an exercise, and he is right.”¹¹ For Frederick, the study of war was necessarily constant; peace was a process, an artifice that required effort and practice and had limited duration. Inevitably the edifice of peace would break down, leaving the study of war to yield its profit (or loss) in the field; and then the exercise of peace could begin again. It was with an appreciation for the cycles of war and peace that Frederick speculated upon tactical advances for a possible future war with Austria. Tacitly acknowledging that this defied hopes for a lasting peace, he wrote: “Prussians are under the necessity of thinking about war because they have a restless and turbulent neighbor” (49). He also noted that other peoples’ cycles of war and peace affect one’s own readiness to respond to all conditions, and thus constant study during peacetime is necessary: “It is particularly dangerous for a prince to allow the people to languish in a state of inactivity and to grow soft and effeminate at a time when the fatigues of war harden and discipline their neighbors” (71).

For Frederick, the enemy was a disciplined (if restless) neighbor, whose successes in the field of war were cause for serious analysis and emulation, and who thereby elicited deep respect. When writing for officer-readers in his *Study of War*, he referred to Austria as a “Colossus” threatening to decimate him, an enemy neighbor of classic and worthy proportions, who was the subject of his writing “because they among all of our enemies have made the most advances in the art of war” (155). While Frederick remained contemptuous toward theories of lasting peace, he readily acknowledged a sober respect for the contiguous enemy.

The reality of future conflict was inevitable, for Frederick believed that war was a necessary (and legitimate, honorable) device for maintaining the overall European balance of power. His 1748 essay *Principes généraux de la guerre* (General Principles of War) contains the following admission: “I write only for my officers. I speak only about that which is relevant to the Prussian service, and I focus upon no other enemy than our neighbors — the two words unfortunately have become synonyms” (28:4). This text, unpublished for four years, was translated into German in 1753 as the Seven Years’ War loomed large, and it was circulated among Frederick’s officers to prepare them for confrontation with their neighbor.

The *Nachbar*

What was this enemy neighbor, in German the *Nachbar*? Could Prussia’s enemy really be a neighbor? The term *Nachbar*, etymologically considered, is a *naher Bauer*, a nearby farmer or landowner, the man who owns the contiguous parcel of land. Returning to Zedler, we find that *Nachbar* was not only the person living next door, but also that person’s “Aecker, Wiesen, Holzungen, Weinberge und andere Grund-stücken” (23: col. 53; acres, fields, forests, vineyards, and other plots of land, also entire estates together). Further, this neighbor was identified as an ever-potential *Feind*. The person-and-land, as one entity, represented so much probable conflict that two columns are devoted to strategies of peacemaking:

Dahero sollte ein Haus-Vater dem Neid und der Feindschafft seiner Nachbarn zu entgegen, und ihren geneigten Willen zu gewinnen, zu erst und vor allen Dingen sorgfältig verhüten, daß weder von ihm selbst, noch von seinen Bedienten und Haußgenossen der Nachbarschafft sich über ihn zu beschweren und ihm gehäßig zu seyn, die geringste Ursach nicht gegeben werde. (23: col. 54)

[Thus the head of household, in order to avoid arousing the envy and enmity of his neighbors, and to win their benevolent will, should first and foremost carefully prevent that either he himself, his servants or

household companions give the least cause for the neighbors to complain about him or to treat him ill.]

The regulatory behavior expected as a citizen in the neighborhood (*Nachbarschaft*) applied in a larger political context as well. The self-as-neighbor, this head of household, was the *Hausvater*, the patriarch of extended family and property, responsible for the moral and physical well-being of his domain in much the same way as the *Landesvater* was responsible for the larger family known as a state. And similarly, of course, the *Landesvater* struggled with difficult neighbors.

The *Universallexicon* also noted that a common curse in both Jewish and Christian traditions is to wish upon one's enemy a bad neighbor. A cited Jewish adage notes, "Daß Gott den, welchem er feind sey, an einen bösen Nachbar gerathen lasse" (23: col. 54); that is, God punishes his enemies with a bad neighbor. This neighbor is one whose land abuts yours, one with whom border disputes arise from greed and are fueled by gossip. Both reason (the Golden Mean) and religion inveigh upon us to love this neighbor, and both acknowledge that this love requires effort; it is less a natural state than an exercise, rather like peace as Frederick understood it. Neighbors, however, are potentially better enemies to have than brothers, who are equally difficult to love. Common sayings attest to this: as one of several entries found under *Nachbar* in Grimms' *Deutsches Wörterbuch* pronounces sagely, "it is highly advisable to have one's brothers and sisters as friends, but not as neighbors."¹² In fact, what resounds in the familiar language of the King James translation of the Bible as "love thy neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) is a more distanced translation of a command that Luther understood better as "Du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben wie dich selbst." Relying upon Greek and Latin versions of the Bible, the translators working for James may simply have moved from the Greek "plesion," meaning "close by" or "neighbor," to the English word. The number of instances of the term "neighbor" in the King James Version does seem to accord with the Greek. However, the Greek term "plesion" was already an interpretive translation used throughout Leviticus for a variety of Hebrew words for nation, kin, people, friend, and companion. Luther, who had the Hebrew Bible at hand, seems despite limited mastery of the language to have better captured the ambivalences in the commandments to extend love and restrain hostility. Lending the German tongue to God, Luther tells us, "You should love your *Nächsten*, your next-of-kin, the one next to you, as you love yourself."

The Grimms' *Deutsches Wörterbuch* offers the following order of definitions for *Nächste*: "1. der in nächster nähe sich befindet" (one found in closest proximity); "2. der nächstfolgende im verwandtschaftsgrade" (the closest in order of relatedness); "3. im biblischen sinne der

mitmensch, nebenmensch, dann überhaupt der andere” (13: col. 135; in the biblical sense the fellow human, then generally the other). Luther uses this one word for several different Hebrew terms. In the book of Leviticus, chapter 19, verses 16 and 18, he offers “der Nächste” for the Hebrew *ʾer*, or *rea*, meaning friend or companion; in verse 17 of the same chapter the Hebrew thus translated is *ʾel*, or *ʾam*, meaning kin, people, or nation. In each of the commandments, the order either to love or not to hurt your next (-of-kin) is grammatically located in a phrase following a related commandment that explicitly addresses the treatment of kin: either “thy people” or “thy brother” (King James Version). The “friend” that then follows is the potential medium bridging particular and universal brotherhood. Looking to Zedler, *Nächster* signifies on the one hand (and within the realm of law) one’s closest kin; on the other hand, *Nächster* is any person, “er sey Freund oder Feind, unser Glaubens-Genosse oder nicht, unser Anverwandter oder nicht, wie zu sehen aus den Worten Christi” (23: col. 368; be he friend or enemy, our companion in faith or not, our relative or not, as is found in the Word of Christ). Critically, this *Nächster*, “er sey nun wer er wolle, muß von uns geliebet werden” (be he whomever he will, must be loved by us). And it is clearly no easier to love a brother than an enemy. This difficult extension from particular to universal obligation is noted further as the entry refers to Leviticus, but states that love is due to all included in the widest understanding of the *Nächster*, namely all people, of all religions, including declared enemies and persecutors.

Now the *Feind*, the enemy, is identified through divine command with the nearest person, the brother. It is in the entry for *Du* (you) that Zedler provides the following insight into brotherhood. Commenting on the biblical commandment *not* to hate one’s brother, the entry reads:

Hiermit hat Gott ohne Zweifel vorbeugen wollen der natürlichen Unart, die bey Menschen nach dem Fall mehr zum Neid und Haß, als Liebe und Gunst geneigt ist [. . .] Derjenige nun, welcher uns nicht zum Haß, sondern zur Liebe fürgestellt wird, ist der Bruder oder Nächste, da zwar diß Wort im Alt. Testament oft und meistens bedeutet die vom Jüdischen Volck und Geschlecht, weil sie alle von einem Stamm=Vater, Jacob, herkommen, und also unter sich Brüder, das ist, Bluts=Freunde und Anverwandte gewesen. (7: col. 1521)

[Here God undoubtedly wished to mitigate the natural flaw which, since the Fall, inclines men more to envy and hate than to love and good will [. . .] The one who is placed for us not to hate, but to love, is the brother or the next of kin; this word in the Old Testament often and usually designates those of the Jewish people and line, because they all came from one father, Jacob, and therefore were brothers together, that is, blood-kin and relatives.]

Here we have a plethora of apparent synonyms: *Bruder*, *Bluts-Freund*, *Nächster*, *Anverwandte*. These words are coterminous, signifying the kin whom we are ordered to love, an order only necessary because of the irrepressible rivalry that inspires acts of hate.

The hatred behind the order to love is a primal scene of conflict, the war between brothers for favor. It is the story of Cain and Abel, which figures consistently in explanations for human bellicosity. It is precisely Cain's murder of Abel and the extended fratricide among what Voltaire identified as "our brothers the Huns, the Franks, the Visigoths" that persuaded that premier *philosophe* to break from his well-rehearsed insistence upon the reasonableness of peace in his poem, "La Tactique" (1773).¹³ As Azar Gat notes, "Voltaire never tired of denouncing war, blaming it on the cynical ambition of rulers and the folly of peoples" (51). However, in response to an essay on military tactics by Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743–90), an essay that swept the salons as much as it influenced military thought, Voltaire's poem acknowledged the theory of war as a "new achievement of the Age of Reason" (Gat, 52). The poem places the argument for war in the mouth of Guibert: "Il n'est pas fort humain, mais il est nécessaire. / L'homme est né bien méchant: Caïn tua son frère" (It is far from humane, but it is necessary. Man is born bad: Cain killed his brother). The Voltaire-like voice that speaks from the poem acknowledges ruefully that, despite his past protestations, war is a necessary art, howsoever one might long for the "impracticable peace" of more wistfully optimistic thinkers — and he names here the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

Might we read Voltaire's poem as a small allegory of what Ernst Cassirer perceived to be the frustrating paradox of the Enlightenment, namely that while struggling for progress, thinkers constantly returned to the problem of origins? Certainly here we have such a struggle bounded by the primal myth of fratricide, the origin of murderous rivalry among brothers on the one hand, and the utopian fantasy for the future, the perpetual peace of Saint-Pierre on the other. And the poem uses the fatal origin to critique and discredit the fantasy's realizable potential. The pacifist *philosophe* of Voltaire's text is forced by the myth of the past and its powerful metaphors that extend to the present to admit the folly of his own present theories — those that launched the poem — and to relinquish the laurel crown to the art of war.

"Impracticable peace" aside, within the realm of practicable sociability, the brother is always — possibly — an enemy. The enemy at the gate threatening Frederick (and other European potentates like him) is the owner of the neighboring garden with disputed borders. But, as the story of Cain and Abel suggests, he is closer than the term "neighbor" quite admits. This enemy is less a *Nachbar* than he is *der Nächste*, the one nearby who is also next-of-kin. He (or she) is really a brother.

At the level of social ceremony, a universal brotherhood of European monarchs comes as no surprise: all rulers were brothers (or sisters) within a rigidly codified rhetorical system of address. This applied, of course, to religious as well as to worldly princes. Again Zedler, under *Frater*:

Es gibt aber nicht allein natürliche Brüder, die von einer Mutter geboren sind; Sondern es pflegen auch Personen von gemeinen Stande, Würde und Condition sich unter einander mit diesen Namen zu belegen, die Cardinäle, Patriarchen, Ertz= und Bischöffe werden vom Pabste *Fratres*, die geringere aber *Filii* geheissen. Wie denn auch Kayser, Könige und Potentaten einander in sollemnen Zuschriften, Friedens=Handlungen und andern Negotiationen mit dem Bruders=Titel zu begrüßen gewohnt sind. (9: 1765)

[There exist not only natural brothers who are born of one mother; rather, it is the custom of persons of similar rank, dignity, and condition to use this name among themselves. Cardinals, Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops are called “brother” by the Pope, whereas lesser clergy are called “son.” Similarly, Emperors, Kings, and Potentates are accustomed to greet each other with the brother-title in official appeals, peace negotiations, and other dealings.]

Monarchs across Europe shared the “brother-title” when corresponding with each other peaceably in order to perform a textual promise of loyalty, as well as to declare mutual sovereign status and the right to offer or request aid in the protection of common interests. The right to use “brother” in ceremonies and correspondence was in fact so carefully maintained a convention that the young jurist Johann Jacob Moser (1701–85) published an essay in 1737 entitled *Von dem Bruder-Titel unter großen Herrn, besonders denen gecrönten Häuptern* (On the Brother-Title among Important Personages, Particularly Crowned Heads). Not insignificantly, this title was reserved for European rulers; as Moser noted,

Endlich so gilt diese hohe Brüderschaft auch nur unter denen Europäischen Potenzen Christlicher Religion, und zwar ohne Ansehung der Religion, sie seyen Evangelisch, oder Ev. Reformirt, oder Catholisch, oder Griechisch; allein kein Potentat von allen diesen hat jemals mit dem Türkischen Kayser Brüderschaft gemacht.¹⁴

[Finally, this elevated brotherhood exists only among the Christian European Potentates, without regard to denomination, be they Protestant, Reformed, or Catholic, or Greek; however, no Potentate from among all these has ever acknowledged brotherhood with the Turkish Emperor.]

As no one doubted the power of the Ottoman Sultan either to contract peace or to wage war, the failure to extend the appellation “brother” indicated an additional signification of kinship marking a family that ended at

the neighbor-borders of Christian Europe, with its intermarried ruling houses.

Luther employed the term *Nächster* not only in his translation of the Bible, but in his profoundly influential catechism as well. He wrote two catechisms to be precise: the *Large Catechism* was designed for priests and heads of households, and as such it instructed its paternal readers in how to use the *Small Catechism* with children and the uneducated. It was the duty of every *Hausvater*, insisted Luther, to examine his children and servants weekly and to ascertain what they know of it. This *Small Catechism* is written in simple language and compelling rhythms, quoting each of the Ten Commandments and asking simply, “Was ist das?” (What does this mean?).¹⁵ In response to the eighth commandment, against bearing false witness “wider deinen Nächsten” (against your neighbor/next of kin), the catechist explains, “We should fear and love God, that we may not deceitfully belie, betray, slander, or defame our neighbor (*Nächsten*), but defend him, speak well of him, and put the best construction on everything” (155). Similarly, in elaborating upon the ninth commandment, against coveting one’s neighbor’s house (“deines Nächsten Haus”), the catechist recites: “We should fear and love God, that we may not craftily seek to get our neighbor’s inheritance or house, and obtain it by a show of right, but help and be of service to him in keeping it” (157). The use of *Nächster* throughout the Catechism may be understood doctrinally to include all fellow human beings; however, the role of *Nächster* in this child-like diction invites a vacillation between the encompassing notion and the narrower, more emotionally resonant definition of one’s own family — the circle in which the recitation is intended to take place.

Frederick’s Catechism

Clearly influenced by Luther’s (and Calvin’s) catechism, Frederick II wrote his own catechism in 1770. His, written in French and entitled *Catéchisme de morale à l’usage de la jeune noblesse* (Moral Catechism for the Use of Young Nobles), was translated immediately into German as the *Moralischer Dialog zum Gebrauch des jungen Adels*.¹⁶ This text was written to rehearse not church-bound orthodoxy, but rather what Frederick called “bürgerliche Religion”: a deeply felt moral orientation toward the social collective.¹⁷ More specifically, this text was produced for the young cadet corps attending Frederick’s military academy in Berlin, a school designed to transform the offspring of the Junker caste into officers.¹⁸

The rhetorical model that Frederick utilized — the catechism — was carefully chosen. In his essay on *Self-Love as a Moral Principle*, also written in 1770 and read in its German translation before members of the Prussian Academy, Frederick advocated the production of catechisms as

an effective method to instill a reverence for *Tugend* — a virtue characterized by self-sacrifice — in children beginning in their earliest youth.¹⁹ In yet an earlier piece of writing, the *Instruction pour la direction de l'académie des nobles à Berlin* (Instructions for the Direction of the Academy for Nobles in Berlin, 1765), Frederick outlined morals as the primary subject to be conveyed by the appointed Professor of Philosophy. Specifically, *vertu* (or *Tugend*, as it was translated into German) was to be understood as the pinnacle of selflessness, a selflessness that placed the common good above personal well-being and the *patrie* or *Vaterland* above one's own life. Students were to understand above all else that without such self-sacrificing virtue, society itself would crumble (*Oeuvres*, 9:92–93).

In his own catechism for cadets, Frederick exhibited considerable skill in preparing his young pupils for inevitable entry into war, employing a language of paternalism and brotherhood that has both religious and secular moral overtones. If war on the European continent witnessed brother-kings engaging in battle with their brother-enemies, it is here in Frederick's catechism — the medium that used repetition of words both to touch the spirit and to shape conscious reason — that the language of family and brotherhood developed as the basis from which a cadet would declare himself willing to die in battle. While a willingness to die — and thus the possibility of dying — is articulated, it is cast in language of noble sacrifice. The necessity of killing, however, is left implicit.

Frederick's dialogue moves the cadet skillfully through stages of professed loyalty, beginning with an unwavering “natural” duty to parents and siblings and a family line. It is the cadet, rather than the questioner, who in answer-form identifies a love and faithfulness among brothers and a profound gratitude toward parents as the effortless expression of nature, as the natural emotional language of the kinship bond. While the questioner begins and ends with queries that specifically address the absolute loyalty to the greater good of the social collective (first of the general *Gesellschaft* and finally the State), the bulk of the work consists in exchanges that script a translation of particular familial loyalties into political metaphors. The first question asks for a definition of “*Tugend*” (virtue), to which the proper answer is: “Eine glückliche Neigung der Seele, die uns antreibt, zu unsrem eignen Vortheil die Pflichten der Gesellschaft zu erfüllen” (*Moralischer Dialog* 381; A fortunate inclination of the soul that spurs us on to fulfill the obligations of society to the best of our abilities). While the ostensible focus is the duties one acknowledges to the collective, a vital part of the sentence identifies these duties as the natural response of the spirit. They are the result of a drive emanating from the core of the spirit; thus they are “natural” and universal (and thus unchallengeable) rather than the arbitrary or mutable product of education. Such, at any rate, is the indoctrination of the cadets. We may recall that Zedler, too, heralded

the “Pflichten der Geselligkeit” as the highest of obligations, identifying those who fail in such duties as enemies, “Feinde.”

What duties did Frederick rehearse for his catechists? Among them is the obligation of alliance with the brother: “Natur und Blut erinnern uns an die Treue und Zuneigung, die wir unsern Geschwistern schuldig sind, da sie mit uns einerlei Ursprung haben, und da die unauflöslichen Bande der Menschheit uns mit ihnen verbinden” (*Moralischer Dialog* 381; Nature and blood remind us of the loyalty and love that we owe to our siblings, because they share with us a common origin, and because the indissoluble bonds of humanity bind us with them). Nature and blood may perhaps be understood as nature both metaphysical and physical: it is a compound nature that dictates obligation by testifying to — though unable to guarantee — love owed. Additionally required of the cadet in his identity “als Bürger” is the recognition of all human beings “als Geschöpfe von Einer Gattung, als Gefährten, als Brüder, welche die Natur uns gegeben hat” (382; as creatures of one kind, as comrades, as brothers, whom nature has given us).

The price of failing to recognize the brother in the other is severe: it amounts to no less than one’s own membership within the humane world. As Frederick wrote in his essay on “Self-Love”: “Der Hartherzige hört auf, ein Mensch zu sein, weil er die Vorrechte seiner Gattung nicht ehrt und in seinesgleichen seine Brüder verkennt” (*Œuvres*, 9:48; The hard of heart ceases to be a human being, for he no longer honors the rights of his kind, and denies the brother in his fellow man). An individual’s refusal to know — *kennen* — the brother in a fellow human being does not alienate the slighted other, but instead marks a change in the individual from *Mensch* to non-*Mensch*. This is as close as Frederick got to potentially associating a particular kind of enemy (one who is hard) with the non-human, with one who is (self-) excluded from the brotherly contract of amity-enmity that is otherwise developed in his writings.

This contract’s tension — the tension of brotherly peace and brotherly war that is not only practically but also conceptually both mutually hostile and mutually dependent — is well sustained by Frederick’s use of familial metaphors to catechize *Tugend*. As the catechism reiterates: “we should love the fatherland in upstanding fashion, because it is our common mother” (382). This is a similar personifying gesture that occurs in the naming of a neighbor’s land as the neighbor (so that the land itself could be friend or enemy). Here, the father-mother-land is itself *der Nächste*, our next of kin. Given the moral specification of father and mother, it should be an easy task for the cadet-catechist to declare that, were the father-mother-land to require it, he would be prepared to sacrifice property and life in its defense.

These metaphorically driven ideas are complicated by a set of questions and answers that establish parameters for dealing with the realities of

familial travail, involving the all-too-common issue of battles over inheritance that alienate and trigger war between siblings. We find ourselves again approaching the trope of Cain and Abel, but here it is in Frederick's interest — not only morally but also politically — to rehearse with the catechist-cadet all of the reasons that he should not and would not pursue personal family rivalries. Regardless of what a problematic sibling might initiate, the text dictates the proper response: “unsre Familie sollte nicht durch Zwietracht zerrüttet werden” (383; no strife would tear apart our family).

The questioner pushes the point: what would the cadet do if his own brothers started a fight, spread a rumor, plotted his downfall or death? Would he have the inner strength and direction to continue to do his duty? The answer allows the respondent to admit to initial outrage in such situations, but this is followed by the clear decision to behave honorably, to be the injured party rather than the injurious. In the words recited by the cadet:

Dann werde ich mit ihnen reden und ihnen sagen: ich ehrte zwar das Blut meiner Eltern in ihnen, und es wäre mir unmöglich, wie gegen erklärte Feinde, gegen sie zu handeln; indeß würde ich Vorsicht anwenden, um zu verhindern, daß sie mir nicht schaden könnten. (384)

[Then I would talk to them and would say to them that, indeed, I honor the blood of my father and my mother within them, so it would be impossible for me to treat them as declared enemies, but that I would take measures to prevent them from causing me harm.]

Because brothers are rivals, hostility is probable. Nevertheless, brother-rivals must make peace because they are of one blood; they must discipline the rival-side of the relationship. Just what measures provide that discipline is unspecified. Important here is that the catechism identifies the virtuous stance and provides an affective foundation, namely regard for the shared blood of father and mother. The selfish demands of ego — indignation and self-preservation — are both expected and justifiable, but they are submitted to the governing morality of the “consideration of the blood of my father and mother within them.” Grounding an individual's moral obligations with the blood-bond nexus into which he is born is a useful and appealing idea, one that Friedrich used not systematically but iconographically, for rhetorical value rather than for logical, philosophical consistency.

Conclusion

I began with the question, What conditions of political amity and enmity produce rhetoric of an enemy who is not satanic but brotherly? And how

might this influence our understanding of a culture's relationship to war? In order to answer such questions, we may be advised to rethink our received wisdom of what is to be cherished in the legacy of the Enlightenment. What if it is not the call to governance by reason alone, or calls for perpetual peace, or the insistence that civilization must bring about universal tolerance? What if some of the era's best insights involve the inevitable hostility that is always a part of brotherhood? Here I venture to speculate that the paradox sustained by these texts at this time — this paradox of brother-enemy-neighbor — marks an insight of both philosophical and political consequence. The tolerance of belligerence within overarching ideals of shared human identity may be a valuable part of a culture that, while prepared to engage in war, is able to do so without giving vent to excessive eruptions of hatred and without condoning the annihilation of a monster other.

Notes

¹ Frederick II, *Principes généraux de la guerre*, in *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, ed. Johann D. E. Preuss, 31 vols. (Berlin: Decker, 1846–56), 9:165. The works of Frederick II have been digitized by the University of Trier in a project that includes not only the French original texts but also several significant German translations and all of these may be accessed at the following site: <http://friedrich.uni-trier.de/>. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

² See also Pierre Saint-Amand, *Laws of Hostility: Politics, Violence, and the Enlightenment*, trans. Jennifer C. Gage (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996), and Reinhard Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).

³ Johann Valentin Embser, *Die Abgötterei unsers philosophischen Jahrhunderts. Erster Abgott: Ewiger Friede* (Mannheim: Schwan & Götz, 1779), 47. See also Wilhelm Janssen, "Johann Valentin Embser und der vorrevolutionäre Bellizismus in Deutschland," in *Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution: Studien zum bellizistischen Diskurs des ausgehenden 18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Johannes Kunisch and Herfried Münkler (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1999), 43–56.

⁴ Here Janssen is primarily interested in analyzing Embser's fascination with individualism.

⁵ See David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007); Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001); Patrick Speelman, *Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).

⁶ Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of the Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 5–7.

⁷ For a discussion of the ambiguous meaning of “nation” during the Seven Years’ War in German political and literary texts and the variety of images deployed by printed propaganda from all sides of the conflict, see numerous essays in the collection, *“Krieg ist mein Lied”: Der Siebenjährige Krieg in den zeitgenössischen Medien*, ed. Wolfgang Adam and Holger Dainat (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007); see also Hans-Martin Blitz, *Aus Liebe zum Vaterland: Die deutsche Nation im 18. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000); and on the British and French use of “nationalist” propaganda during the Seven Years’ War, see Bell 80. On Protestant representations of the Prussian war as defensive and justifiable, see also Georg Schmidt, “Teutsche Kriege: Nationale Deutungsmuster und integrative Wertvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Reich,” in *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 53–54.

⁸ See Klaus Bohnen, “Von den Anfängen des ‘Nationalsinns’: Zur literarischen Patriotismus-Debatte im Umfeld des Siebenjährigen Kriegs,” in *Dichter und ihre Nation*, ed. Helmut Scheuer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 122. On the gradual changes in the meaning of “nation” over the course of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, see Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2008), 39–73. On the irony of making Frederick II an icon of German nationalism, and the ways in which “muddlings” of Prussian and German interests “were eventually to shape the movement forward towards a German nation-state,” see Russell Frank Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004), 17; see also Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806* (London: Routledge, 1998), 274.

⁹ See <http://www.zedler-lexikon.de/>.

¹⁰ Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universalexikon aller Wissenschaften und Künste* (Halle und Leipzig, 1731–54), 9: col. 450.

¹¹ “Végèce dit que la guerre doit être une étude et la paix un exercice, et il a raison,” Frederick II, *Réflexions sur la tactique et sur quelques parties de la guerre, ou Réflexions sur quelques changements dans la façon de faire la guerre*, in *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, 28:153.

¹² Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854–1960), 13: col. 22–27.

¹³ Voltaire, *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Louis Moland (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1877), 10:187–93.

¹⁴ Johann Jakob Moser, *Von dem Bruder-Titul unter großen Herrn, besonders denen gecrönten Häuptern* (Frankfurt an der Oder, 1737), 423.

¹⁵ Martin Luther, *Der kleine Katechismus. Nach der Ausgabe v. j. 1536*, ed. Otto Albrecht (Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1905).

¹⁶ Frederick II, *Dialogue de Morale à l’usage de la jeune noblesse*, vol. 9 of *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*. The German translation (ordered by Frederick) was distributed as the *Moralischer Dialog zum Gebrauch des jungen Adels*. I cite from the

version printed in *Friedrichs des Zweiten Königs von Preussen bei seinen Lebzeiten gedruckte Werke. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt* (Berlin, 1790), 381–400.

¹⁷ In his *Miroir des princes, ou instruction du Roi pour le jeune duc Charles-Eugène de Wurtemberg* (1744), Frederick wrote the following admonition: “You are the head of the civil religion of the land, which consists of integrity and all moral virtues. It is your duty to help realize these and especially humanity, which is the cardinal virtue of all thinking beings. Leave spiritual religion to the supreme being. We are all blind in this matter, erring in various ways” (*Œuvres* 9:6)

¹⁸ I have written extensively about Frederick’s catechism, its form, and its significance for thinking about Enlightenment theories of enmity; see Sara Eigen Figal, “When Brothers Are Enemies: Frederick the Great’s Catechism for War,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009): 21–36.

¹⁹ Frederick II, *Essai sur l’amour-propre envisagé comme principe de morale*, in *Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, 9:97–98. The essay was translated into German in the same year as *Versuch über die Selbstliebe, als Grundsatz der Moral betrachtet*.

2: Writing War and the Aesthetics of Political Literature in the 1790s: Daniel Jenisch's (Un)timely Seven Years' War Epic *Borussias*

Johannes Birgfeld

IN 1794 DANIEL JENISCH, a proponent of the late Enlightenment who is largely unknown today, published what must be called one of the most unique books of eighteenth-century German literature. A versatile writer, Jenisch was well acquainted with many respected authors but by and large had remained at the margins of the literary republic. In a time of political crisis, with a literary market dominated by topical, short-lived news in broadsheets, pamphlets, and newspapers, Jenisch offered readers a two-volume epic in twelve cantos entitled *Borussias*. The text is not only the longest and most elaborate literary treatment of the Seven Years' War (1756–63) in eighteenth-century German literature, but proves on closer examination to be highly complex and innovative. Among other features, it combines detailed battle scenes with long lamentations for the victims of war; it contrasts a king's soliloquy on suicide with a dying soldier's heavenly revelations about the true nature of the universe; and it juxtaposes reports of plots against Frederick with a eulogy of his political achievements. Past interpretations of the text have found it inconclusive. In contrast, this chapter maintains that the epic constructs a coherent argument: to Jenisch, the Seven Years' War served as a Trojan Horse that allowed him to participate in the 1790s debate on Europe's political future despite censorship and the anti-Enlightenment campaign initiated by the Prussian government under Johann Christoph von Wöllner. But since Jenisch is largely unknown today, a brief introduction to the man and his work will preface my interpretation of *Borussias*.

Daniel Jenisch: Prolific, Well-Connected, Battle-Hungry, and Sidelined

Daniel Jenisch's current marginality does justice neither to his talents nor to his status among writers and intellectuals around 1800, particularly in

Berlin. He was born in 1762 in Heiligenbeil at the Vistula Lagoon/*Frisches Haff* to the southwest of Königsberg.¹ In spite of a humble background, he entered Königsberg University as a student of theology and philosophy in 1780, and he must have seemed bright and promising: soon Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann took a liking to him and acted as his patrons. After earning a master's degree, Jenisch moved to Berlin in 1786, spent some months as a private tutor in Brunswick, and returned to Berlin in 1788 to be ordained and take the post of third minister at the *Marienkirche*. Here, too, Jenisch made friends quickly, among them Karl Philipp Moritz and the editors of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Friedrich Gedike and Johann Erich Biester. Further acquaintances included the late Enlightenment theologians Franz Volkmar Reinhard and Wilhelm Abraham Teller, and the Prussian court chaplain Friedrich Samuel Gottfried Sack.

When Jenisch married the daughter of *Oberkonsistorialrat* (councilor of the consistory) Johann Samuel Diterich in 1794, his ties to the *Berliner Spätaufklärung* (Berlin Late-Enlightenment) strengthened again: Diterich, like Teller, Gedike, and Biester, was a member of the (partly) secret *Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft*.² Founded in 1783, the group united twenty-four unwavering advocates of the Enlightenment from Berlin's political, cultural, and intellectual elites in regular meetings for rigorous debates of fundamental philosophical questions rather than of current politics — until it dissolved under political pressure in 1798.³ Like many other Berlin-based representatives of the Enlightenment, Diterich was a target of Wöllner's anti-Enlightenment policies in a controversy that Paul Schwartz has referred to as “der erste Kulturkampf in Preußen um Kirche und Schule (1788–1798)” (the first cultural struggle in Prussia over church and school).⁴

Although he was well connected — or possibly because he socialized with so many *personae non gratae* after 1788 — Jenisch moved up hardly any rungs on the Church's career ladder. He became fifth deacon at the Nicolai Church in Berlin in 1792 and fourth deacon only in 1799. He was poorly paid, and his most prestigious appointments came in 1793 when, after Moritz's death, he succeeded him as professor of antiquities at the Berlin Academy of Arts, as professor of commercial style at the Berlin Academy of Architecture, and as professor of German literature at the Französisches Gymnasium.

Jenisch's relocation to Berlin marked the beginning of a truly remarkable publishing career. Until his mysterious disappearance in 1804, when he presumably killed himself, he wrote over thirty books and published a total of approximately 15,000 printed pages in less than twenty years. His texts covered a wide variety of subject matter and genres ranging from translations of Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* (1786), Aristotle's *Ethics* (1791), and James Harris's *Philological Inquiries* (1789), to philosophical studies such as *Ueber Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Herrn Professor*

Kant in der Metaphysik, Moral und Aesthetik (On the Basis and Merits of Prof. Kant's Discoveries in Metaphysics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, 1796), and editions such as *Moses Mendelssohns kleine philosophische Schriften. Mit einer Skizze seines Lebens und Charakters* (Moses Mendelssohn's Minor Works, Including a Sketch of His Life and Personality, 1789). Jenisch also wrote reviews of literary and philosophical works, sermons, and essays on literary history and theory, such as *Ueber den sittlichen Anstand im Lustspiel* (On Ethical Propriety in Comedy, 1791) and *Theorie der Lebens-Beschreibung* (Theory of Biography, 1802), one of the earliest theories of biographical writing. He published in renowned journals, including Moritz's *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde*, drafted linguistic studies such as his *Philosophisch-kritische Vergleichung und Würdigung von vierzehn ältern und neuern Sprachen Europens* (Philosophical-Critical Comparison and Evaluation of Fourteen Older and Younger European Languages, 1796), and, last but not least, composed poetic works. *Borussias in zwölf Gesängen* (1794) represents the most ambitious among his major literary texts.⁵

Various contemporaries characterized Jenisch as impulsive, arrogant, and vain. He engaged in numerous battles with intellectual opponents, including the Romantics. Worst of all, Goethe's misinterpretation of Jenisch's *Über Prose und Beredsamkeit der Deutschen* (On the Prose and Eloquence of the Germans, 1795) as an attack on him gave rise to his famous *Literarischer Sansculottismus* (Literary Sansculottism).⁶ The rift between Jenisch and Goethe and Schiller also motivated a harsh distich in the *Xenien* (1796):

Borussias

Sieben Jahre nur währte der Krieg, von welchem du singest?
Sieben Jahrhunderte, Freund, währt mir dein Heldengedicht.⁷

[Only seven years the war raged, about which you sing?
Seven centuries, my friend, your epic poem lasts to me.]

Borussias and Its Critics

Warned so elegantly and prominently of the extraordinary boredom inflicted by Jenisch's epic, very few literary critics have taken an interest in *Borussias*, and they have mostly sided with Goethe and Schiller. Some take issue with Jenisch's style, which is modeled after Klopstock's *Messias* and seems out of date in a time in which Classicism blossomed and the early Romantics appeared on the stage.⁸ Anselm Maler detects epigonal marginality and calls the project inappropriate and delayed.⁹ Similarly, Iwan d'Aprile brands *Borussias* as unreadable.¹⁰ D'Aprile, Wolfgang Biesterfeld, and Dieter Martin all lament Jenisch's supposedly ambivalent attitude toward Fredrick II (Biesterfeld, 178; d'Aprile, 130–31)¹¹. Some object to

embarrassing bursts of vanity, while others complain that the individual cantos do not form a coherent whole.¹² Indeed, a lack of coherence (and enthusiasm) was already diagnosed in 1796 by an anonymous reviewer of the *Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. Unlike his recent successors, however, this reviewer credited Jenisch with “several well-conceived and outstanding passages.”¹³

At closer inspection, however, it seems that the unified front against *Borussias* rests largely on misreadings. For example, critics insist on calling *Borussias* an epic about Frederick II, a *Friedrich-Epos* (Biesterfeld, 172; Sauder, “Nachwort,” 107) although Jenisch’s preface seeks to pre-empt this:¹⁴

Man hat das Werk *Borussias* genannt, und nicht *Fredericias*, weil Friedrich zwar die Hauptperson, aber nicht der Hauptgegenstand des Gedichts ist; und weil Friedrich selbst durch Grundsätze, Schrift, und sein ganzes Leben, das erhabene Geständniss abgelegt hat, dass er sich für sein Volk, nicht aber sein Volk für ihn geschaffen glaubte.¹⁵

[This poem has been named *Borussias*, and not *Fredericias*. For although Frederick is its protagonist, he is not its main subject. And because Frederick’s principles, writings, and entire life are a sublime demonstration that he believed he was made to serve his people, not his people to serve him.]

From this, d’Aprile concludes that Jenisch intended to write about the people, the *Volk* (134), not about an individual (the king).¹⁶ Furthermore, he argues that *Borussias* sought to reinvent Frederick as a promoter of republicanism, offering a republican reinterpretation of the panegyric poetry on Frederick published after the Seven Years’ War (130). The above citation, however, does not support this: it documents Jenisch’s appreciation of Frederick’s supposed and much publicized rapport with his people, but it does not imply that Jenisch mistook the enlightened despot for a republican — and neither does the rest of the text.¹⁷ In fact Jenisch’s intentions were quite different; consider the list of contents as included in the preface:

Die Verwüstungen des Krieges — eine Schlacht — eine Wahlstatt — eroberte Städte — erstürmte Vestungen — das Grosse und Schauervolle der neuern Kriegskunst — die gegenwärtige moralische und politische Lage des menschlichen Geschlechts — Berathschlagungen über das Wohl der Völker — Gemälde leidender oder guter Menschheit, blühender oder zerstörter häuslicher Glückseligkeit — aufgeheitert durch Episoden der romantischen Gattung — und durch Einen großen, allgemein-bewunderten Charakter zu Einem Ganzen verbunden. (I:VI)

[The devastations of war — a battle — a battlefield — conquered towns — assaulted fortresses — the magnitude and terror of the new

art of war — the present moral and political state of mankind — consultations on the welfare of nations — portraits of suffering or good humanity, of flourishing or thwarted domestic happiness — exhilarated by romantic episodes — and joined together by one grand, commonly admired personality.]

Clearly, to Jenisch *Borussias* was not primarily about Frederick, but aimed to represent a *totality* of life's experiences *connected* by the late Prussian king. Moreover, the post-Frederician and post-revolutionary present are integrated into this totality. In other words, Jenisch did not simply analyze the past, but commented on the current state of affairs as well:

Die Grundsätze über Staatsverhältnisse, über Rechte und Pflichten der Herrscher und der Völker, in welchen die Borussias geschrieben ist, und, nach dem Charakter des Helden des Stücks, und der Epoche, in welcher das Drama spielt, geschrieben seyn musste, sind die Grundsätze aller guten und gerechten Fürsten, aller guten und gerechten Völker. Denn unter dem Scepter Friedrich Wilhelms II. und unter den Augen seines Thronerben, dem Friedrichs Vorbild so heilig ist, kann und muss ein Schriftsteller keine andere Grundsätze vortragen. (1:xiv–xv)

[The principles of government, of the rights and responsibilities of sovereigns and peoples, on which *Borussias* is based and had to be based in accordance with the character of its hero and the era in which the drama is set, are the guiding principles of all good and just monarchs, all good and just peoples. During the government of Frederick Wilhelm II and under the eyes of the heir to the throne, to whom Frederick is a sacred role model, no poet could or should promote different principles.]

Contemporary Prussian readers must have gleaned from this that *Borussias* was intended as a “Fürstenspiegel” (mirror of princes; Biesterfeld, 178). Certainly the phrase “no poet could or should promote different principles” can be read as an attempt to camouflage pro-revolutionary sentiments, which Jenisch had expressed in the early 1790s (Sauder, “Nachwort,” 107), but it is not indicative of an explicit republican program (d’Aprile, 134). There is no evidence that Jenisch counted the introduction of a new political system in Prussia among the most pressing issues of the day.

And yet, in its own way, *Borussias* is politically subversive. After all, Jenisch identified the principles of good government *in general* with those that guided the absolutist monarch Frederick and his age *specifically*. He also pointed out that the prince, the future Frederick Wilhelm III, held these values sacred — and thus implied that the current government of Frederick Wilhelm II and Wöllner did not pay them much heed. Apparently Jenisch was not primarily concerned with systemic change, but sought to

prevent the ruling monarch from turning back the clock any further, from destroying *all* the achievements of Frederick's reign.

Although Jenisch did not make his point directly, but merely alluded to it, he was as open as he could be in the witch-hunt atmosphere of contemporary Berlin. For instance, explicitly in order "to avoid potential misunderstanding," he referred his readers to an excerpt from *Borussia's* ninth canto and some concluding remarks published jointly in the third part of *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* in 1794.¹⁸ Both are quite remarkable. The first draws a picture of mankind's future beginning in 1759: Frederick's narrow survival of the war is presented as a victory and his subsequent years as king are glorified as a new *Pax Augustea*, an age of justice and prosperity.¹⁹ Significantly, however, only a few lines are dedicated to Frederick Wilhelm II, and they deliver a seemingly kind warning against sycophants that barely conceals the underlying criticism of the sovereign and his reliance on Wöllner:

Dem gewaltigen Friedrich
 Folget der freundliche Friederich Wilhelm! Du kennst ihn, den Edlen.
 [. . .]
 Dass kein Schmeichler dem Throne sich nah! kein Heuchler ihn täusche!
 (2:199)

[The mighty Frederick
 Is succeeded by the friendly Frederick Wilhelm! You know him, the
 noble. [. . .]
 May no sycophant approach the throne! May no Pharisee beguile him!]

Similarly, by praising the heir apparent, the future Frederick Wilhelm III, the following lines also deliver indirect criticism of Frederick Wilhelm II:

Er, der Erbe des Throns, der gleichbenamete Friedrich,
 Tritt in die Bahn des bewunderten Helden mit Schritten des Riesen,
 Und vollbringt mit der Kraft des Himmelerhabenen Oheims
 Alle Wünsche des gros- und edel-fühlenden Vaters. (2:200)

[He, heir to the throne, also called Frederick,
 Follows the path of the admired hero with giant footsteps,
 And with the strength of his heavenly-sublime uncle,
 He fulfills all of his great- and noble-feeling father's wishes.]

The rest of the canto, as printed in the *Merkur*, condemns the recent developments in France and envisions a golden future of eternal peace based on the rule of law and the wise reign of a world monarch.²⁰

In order to prevent any misinterpretation of the epic, however, Jenisch's concluding remarks state explicitly that there are times when one must veil the truth, and that the current political situation was such a

moment (“Menschengeschlecht,” 233). In the early 1790s, political and religious censorship reached unknown heights in Prussia (Schwartz, 109–17).²¹ Certainly Jenisch’s instructions to read *Borussias* allegorically were motivated by these constraints. He encouraged his audience to seek meaning *between* the lines and connect the dots between his description of the Seven Years’ War and the Prussia of 1794; moreover, the appendix to the second volume, entitled “Anmerkungen von dem verstorbenen Professor Mori[t]z” (Annotations of the deceased Professor Moritz), characterizes *Borussias* as a “serious epopee of *our* times” (2:367, my emphasis). It not only offers an interpretation of the book, but points out that *Borussias* is a “vollständiges und rührendes Gemählde des politischen und häuslichen Zustandes, der Sitten und ganzen Denkungsart der kultivirten Menschheit unserer Tage (complete and stirring tableau of the political and domestic situation, of the manners and the mentality of cultivated mankind in *our* day [my emphasis]).

Undoubtedly, in Jenisch’s and Moritz’s view *Borussias* was not designed *primarily* to praise the character of the former Prussian king, but to portray the political and social state of affairs in Prussia during Frederick’s rule and thereafter. The work does not depict a single hero or event, but rather an entire country, Borussia/Prussia. Quite possibly Jenisch even conceived of Prussia as a paradigmatic model of the modern state.²² *Borussias* does not promote a “personality cult,” but mixes praise of the man with plaudits for his work and achievements. Frederick thus appears as a role model for current and future kings and his politics are presented as exemplary. Significantly, in the table of contents (1:1–18) Frederick is one of many subjects, and in three of the twelve cantos of the *Borussias* he is but a marginal figure.

In light of these findings, a new interpretation of Jenisch’s *Borussias* is in order, even more so since *initially* it was not condemned by contemporaries. We know of at least eight preprints of excerpts between 1790 and 1794 in some of the most prestigious journals of the time: four in Wieland’s *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* and two each in Schiller’s *Neue Thalia* and the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (see Martin, 349–50). Harsh criticism and personal attacks on Jenisch by Goethe, Herder, Schiller, and August Wilhelm Schlegel did not begin until 1794, when the first book edition was published (d’Aprile, 129–30). The initial positive reception and Karl Philipp Moritz’s early praise show that the project was not untimely, unreadable, or ridiculous per se.²³

Narrative Structure

Although some critics lament the lack of a cohesive narrative structure, *Borussias* is both carefully composed and complex. The twelve cantos easily

and coherently divide into four sections of three cantos each, all set during the Seven Years' War, from 1756 to 1763.

The first three cantos recount events from the first two years of the war. In the first canto, a scene of idyllic peace is disturbed by daemons and furies from hell. Motivated by pride, revenge, and hatred, Austria, Russia, Saxony, France, and Sweden unite in an alliance against Prussia, intent on destroying it for good.²⁴ Frederick responds with a pre-emptive strike against Saxony, and the first canto concentrates on his triumph over the Saxons in 1756 and on part of his campaign in Bohemia, including his celebrated victory in the battle of Prague in May 1757.

The subsequent increase of difficulties on the battlefields provides the main subject of cantos 2 and 3: the Austrians' decision to retreat into Prague, rather than abandon it, impedes Prussian progress, and when Frederick bombards the city, Maria Theresia summons her war cabinet. The text then contrasts the opinions of one dove and two falcons. The empress's decision to intensify the military effort results in the battle of Kolín in June 1757.²⁵ Kolín rightly forms the center of the third canto; the battle was not only a turning point in the war that quashed all hope of a quick victory, but also Frederick's first defeat in the field since 1741 and thus a crack in the myth of invincibility.²⁶

Kolín, however, also marked the onset of years of exhausting battles on many fronts and a steadily intensifying Prussian crisis. Cantos 4 to 6, the second part of *Borussias*, focus on Prussia's fight for survival: the fourth recounts bloody victories against French, Austrian, and Swedish troops; the fifth again depicts military encounters, including the battle of Zorndorf; and the sixth portrays two failed plots against Frederick, both orchestrated from within Prussia.²⁷

With the third part of *Borussias*, cantos 7 to 9, Jenisch returns to the battlefields, soon reaching the epic's first climax in its portrayal of Prussia's and Frederick's darkest hours after the Prussian defeats at Hochkirch on 14 October 1758 and at Kunersdorf on 12 August 1759. Both put Frederick under such pressure that he considered suicide.²⁸ At this point Frederick is stripped of all military might and glory, and his posture changes from that of a military leader to that of a troubled human worthy of the reader's compassion.²⁹

Of course Frederick never killed himself, and Jenisch the theologian would not have wanted to endorse suicide publicly. Instead, the description of Frederick's somber mood gives way to two cantos of optimistic religious thoughts attributed to the revered poet Ewald von Kleist, who died at Kunersdorf.³⁰ In Jenisch's account, the mortally wounded Kleist overhears Frederick's soliloquy on suicide and grows so anxious for Prussia's future that he perishes immediately. The next two cantos portray Kleist's after-life.³¹ The poet ascends to a celestial world, where he is transfigured into an angel and introduced to the eternal truths of the universe.

The juxtaposition of Frederick's crisis and Kleist's transfiguration is a deft strategy:³² it enabled Jenisch to turn cantos 8 and 9 into a prolonged celebration of the variety, vastness, and greatness of God's creation, and it also allowed him to unfold a grand cosmology that alludes to numerous contemporary concepts and motifs ranging from Klopstock's *Frühlingsfeier* to popular fantasies about a journey to the moon.³³ Moreover, Jenisch unfolded his interpretation of a core piece of Protestant theology: God's judgment and mercy. According to Jenisch, a sinner's punishment should not consist in physical torture, but in the pain of self-knowledge; penitence is not eternal, but aims to reform the sinner, who ultimately takes his place in the celestial empire:

Denn nicht feurige Schlünde, nicht schwefelkochende Tiefen,
 Brennende Wüsten nicht, und nicht pest-hauchende Sümpfe
 Bilden die Hölle sträflicher Seelen. [. . .]
 Hellerkannte, lebhaftgefühlte, und doch nicht befolgte
 Wahrheit, die sich nun selbst dem geschärften Auge des Geistes
 Unwiderstehlich aufdringt, und das immer sich schliessende Auge
 Immer von neuem aufreißt, das verübte Böse zu schauen [. . .]
 Das ist Hölle der Will- und Vernunftempfänglichen Wesen;
 Selbsterkenntnis — der flammende Pfuhl, der cocytische Abgrund.
 (2:93–94)

[For not blazing craters, not sulphurous depths,
 Not burning deserts and not foul-breathing swamps
 Are hell for culpable souls. [. . .]
 Clearly perceived, vividly sensed, yet still not obeyed
 Truth, now irresistibly forcing itself on the sharpened
 Eye of our mind, tearing open the ever-closing eye again and again
 To behold evil perpetrated [. . .]
 That is hell for a being susceptible to will and reason;
 Self-knowledge — the flaming mudhole, the cocytian abyss.]

Finally, at the end of canto 9, Kleist inquires about Frederick's fate. As he wonders whether Frederick will succumb to despair, his guiding angel promptly recites Prussia's victories and Europe's history until 1794 and draws a utopian vision of a future in harmony, wealth, and universal peace.

Contemporary readers may well have wondered why a vision of such splendid prospects would be followed by three more cantos. To be sure, *Borussias*'s plot is not meant to inspire suspense; after all, the outcome of the war was well known in 1794. *Borussias* was never about *what* happened during the Seven Years' War, but about Jenisch's *arrangement and interpretation* of the events.

While the first three sections of *Borussias* depict Frederick's failing hopes of swift victory, his battle for survival, and his moment of despera-

tion, the last section is dedicated to Prussia's victory. Triumph, however, comes only with the help of Russia. A letter by the future Tsar Peter III opens the tenth canto. As his predecessor, Elisabeth, succumbs to an illness, Peter employs Frederick's former tutor Charles Egide Duhan (1685–1746) as councilor. The remainder of the tenth canto gives a gruesome account of the Prussian bombardment of Dresden, an event that many contemporaries perceived as an unacceptable atrocity.³⁴ The eleventh canto documents Duhan's teachings to Peter III, which are essentially a eulogy of Frederick II and his politics: Frederick's decisions to grant religious tolerance, commission the *Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten* (General State Laws for the Prussian States), introduce fair taxation, drain swamp lands, and encourage immigration correspond with the ideal future outlined in canto 9.³⁵ Thus, canto 11 is the historical counterpart to Jenisch's utopian vision of canto 9. It also incorporates a short epic on Frederick (2:284–304), introduced with the following lines:

Eine der jüngeren Pieriden, die, feurigen Geistes,
Jeden blumigen Tand der Dichter verschmäh't, und erhabne
Themen sich wählt, womit sie die Herzen der Menschen zur Tugend
Und zu Thaten entflammt, (der Dichtkunst würdige Ziele.)
Hat den Einzigen Mann des Jahrhunderts also besungen. (2:283–84)

[One of the younger Pierides, of fiery spirit,
Scorning all of the poets' flowery babble, and choosing
Sublime topics for herself, inspiring human hearts to virtue
And great deeds (ambitions worthy of poetry),
Sang thus about the unique man of the century.]

Four brief cantos follow, embedded in the eleventh canto, praising every facet of Frederick's rule. For the most part, these four cantos are identical with Jenisch's journal publication *Friedrich, der große Mann seines Jahrhunderts* (Frederick, the Great Man of His Century) of 1789. Although this self-citation has been criticized as unacceptably vain (Martin, 239; Biesterfeld, 179), it also signals the steadfastness of Jenisch's convictions and of his resistance to the post-Frederician government. Finally, the epic within the epic further emphasizes the central theme of *Borussias*: the praiseworthiness of Frederick's rule.³⁶

While the heavenly vision of canto 9 outlines the goal, canto 11 casts Frederick as the man to implement it. The twelfth canto, finally, cuts things short. Elisabeth dies, Peter III offers peace, and the victory at Torgau heralds Frederick's and Prussia's survival. A summary of the last years of the war, the devastation it caused, and the beginning of a new era of peace conclude the epic.

Writing in Times of Political Turmoil: Wöllner, the French Revolution, and Turning Political Tides in Europe

Clearly, any interpretation of *Borussias* needs to be mindful of the epic's political and cultural context. Three events are of particular importance. First, when Jenisch moved to Berlin in 1788, Johann Christoph von Wöllner rose to the powerful post of Secretary of Budget and Justice and Supervisor of the Spiritual Department Regarding All Matters Concerning the Lutheran Church, School, and Diocese. In the same year he issued the infamous *Edict, die Religions-Verfassung in den Preußischen Staaten betreffend* (Edict Concerning the State of Religious Affairs in the Prussian States), which was followed by more decrees, including the equally infamous edict on censorship of 1788, all of which were intended to humiliate and silence the Prussian proponents of the Enlightenment. As a Lutheran priest in Berlin, Jenisch was Wöllner's subordinate in this first *Kulturkampf*, but in spite of this precarious position, he proved to be a staunch defender of the Enlightenment.

Second, Jenisch's position was complicated by the French Revolution. He welcomed the initial changes in France in 1789, most notably in his *Ode auf die gegenwärtigen Unruhen in Frankreich* (Ode to the Current Unrest in France, 1789), but turned his back on the regime in early 1793.³⁷

Third, Jenisch wrote *Borussias* over the course of several years. The earliest incarnation of the epic was the four-canto poem "Friedrich, der große Mann seines Jahrhunderts," mentioned above and published in two parts in 1789 and 1790 in the *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung*. Several months later, Jenisch drafted the longer epic, which was already entitled *Borussias*, though with only eight cantos it was significantly shorter.³⁸ This variation in length and a comparison between the preprints and the book version show that Jenisch changed both the wording and his concept over time. In a number of cases, the alterations can be traced to political changes in Europe.

For instance, in the first draft of *Borussias* published in 1790 in *Der neue Teutsche Merkur*, Jenisch advertised the core element of canto 11: the education of Frederick as told by his teacher Duhan.³⁹ But while the book version features Peter III of Russia as the addressee of Duhan's tale, the early draft pairs him with King Stanislaus Leszczyński. Born in 1677, Leszczyński had twice been the elected King of Poland (1704–9, 1733–36) and was eventually ousted by the Saxon kings and compensated with the Duchy of Lorraine. In his new realm, he emerged as one of the most remarkable monarchs of the eighteenth century. He modernized Lunéville and Nancy, invited Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Buffon to his court,

founded a Royal Library and a Royal Society for Arts and Sciences, and introduced public schools, public hospitals, and public support for the poor. A contemporary reader might have appreciated the correspondence between Leszczyński's program of modernization and Frederick's achievements; although fictional, the scene would have framed Frederick as *the* prototype of the enlightened ruler. It also would have afforded Jenisch an opportunity to comment on the precarious situation in Poland since the 1760s, culminating first in the "enlightened" modernization of Poland during the early 1790s,⁴⁰ then in the Second and Third Partition of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Against this backdrop, Jenisch's replacement of Leszczyński with Peter III in the Duhan scene clearly reflects current shifts in the European balance of power. What was possible in 1790 — to take sides with the Polish reform movement — apparently was too risky in 1794 after Poland's downfall and the Second Partition.⁴¹

***Borussias*: Poetry or Historiography of the Seven Years' War?**

Although it might look like it *prima facie*, *Borussias* is not, strictly speaking, a war poem. It offers neither a comprehensive nor an accurate account of the Seven Years' War. Only eight of the twelve cantos feature war scenes at all.

Eighteenth-century poetry about the Seven Years' War, such as Michael Denis's *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa* (Poetic Images of the Majority of Bellicose Events in Europe, 1760–61) and Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim's *Preußische Kriegslieder in den Feldzügen 1756 und 1757 von einem Grenadier* (A Grenadier's Prussian Battle Songs from the Campaigns of 1756 and 1757, 1758), generally favors one of the warring parties.⁴² Both Denis and Gleim championed the party to which they owed their allegiance celebrating its victories and ignoring or reinterpreting its defeats.⁴³ Jenisch operated differently: his accounts of battles are selective too, paying little attention to Hastenbeck, Groß-Jägersdorf, Krefeld, Bergen, Minden, Korsbach, Landeshut, Liegnitz, Vellinghausen, Lutternberg, or Burkersdorf; however, he did not simply focus on Prussian *victories*, but chose Prussian *battles* (won or lost) over battles fought by Prussia's allies. *Borussias* is not about the Seven Years' War in general, but about Prussia's performance in the war and about its impact on Prussia specifically.

In addition, Jenisch also altered the chronology of events, as his preface points out:

Die Schlacht bey Torgau allein musste, dem Drama des Gedichts gemäs[s], in das Ende des Winters verlegt werden, da sie eigentlich gegen den Anfang desselben geschlagen ward. Allein das Gemähde von der damaligen Witterung, die diese Schlacht so besonders schau-

ervoll macht [. . .] passt eben so wohl auf den Anfang, als auf das Ende des Winters. (1:xiv)

[The battle of Torgau had to be moved to the end of winter for the sake of the epic's dramatic structure, while in fact it had been fought at the beginning of winter. A sketch, however, of the weather conditions that made this battle particularly gruesome [. . .] suits the beginning and end of winter in the same way.]

In fact, the battle of Torgau is not only moved from early to late winter, but from 1760 to circa 1762, now occurring *after* Elisabeth of Russia's death instead of before it. Similarly, Charles Egide Duhan died in 1746, fourteen years before his supposed history lesson with Peter III. Furthermore, the opening of canto 12 suggests that the end of Duhan's teachings, set in 1759, and the death of Elisabeth, which took place years later in 1762, occurred in close proximity. Jenisch's audience would have noticed these alterations and — since they are so dramatic — have realized that they were not errors, but a clear indication that *Borussias* was not aspiring to deliver an accurate history of the Seven Years' War.

Archenholz, Antiwar Sentiments, and *Portraits of Suffering or Good Mankind*

But if Jenisch was not interested in a full account of the war, why did he portray so many battles? In order to answer this, one must consider three factors. First, Jenisch's representation of military action is in no way original. The battle of Leuten, for example, opens with the following lines:

Und nun donnert's zur Schlacht.
Schrecklich beginnet der Kampf. Wie tiefgewurzelte Bäume
Stehen Theresiens Reihn: gleich dir, orkanische Windsbraut,
Stürzen die Preussen daher: es stäuben die Blätter der Bäume,
Mancher Zweig entrasselt dem Stamm: in grösseren Wirbeln
Kreisen die Blätter, entrasseln die abgesplitterten Zweige. (1:206)

[Now thunder opens the battle.
Dreadfully the fighting begins. Like deeply rooted trees,
Theresia's troops are lined up: like you, bride of the hurricane,
The Prussians attack: trees' foliage whirls like dust,
Many a branch falls rattling from the trunk: leaves gyrate
In large spirals, splintering boughs rattle down.]

Clearly, Jenisch was not concerned with the events on the battleground: two enemy lines hundreds of meters long moving slowly towards one another while firing shots.⁴⁴ Instead, he dramatized the event, dressing it

up with images, metaphors, allegories, and comparisons. In doing so, Jenisch adopted a practice common throughout the century: in order to enhance the literary value of their subject matter, war poets frequently compared military action to natural forces or addressed kings and commanders as Hannibal or Hercules:⁴⁵

Wie, wenn die Wind im Abend stürmen,
Und plötzlich schwarze Wolken thürmen,
Das heitre Blau wird schnell zur Nacht,
So plötzlich schwärzen sich die Felder,
Sie brechen vor aus Busch und Wälder,
Wie Flocken, die der Nord gebracht [. . .]⁴⁶

[As if wind turns into storm at evenfall,
And suddenly black clouds are mounting,
Merry blue turns quickly into night,
So suddenly the fields turn black,
They sally forth from bush and wood,
Like flakes brought by northern winds (. . .)]

So wild als ungestüme Meere
Ergiessen sich erzürnte Heere
Weit über das erschrockne Feld [. . .]⁴⁷

[As furious as the tumultuous sea
Enraged armies flood
Across the frightened (battle) ground (. . .)]

Der Feldherr sprach: Rückt an! brecht ein! sie brachen,
Wie Sommer-Donnerwetter ein [. . .]⁴⁸

[The commander said: Advance! Sally forth!
Like summer lightning they erupted.]

They also used extended allegories often taken from the animal kingdom:

Der Löw erhebt sich königlich,
Schaut langsam um sich her,
Ergrimmt, zerreißt sie, lagert sich,
im Schatten, wie vorher.⁴⁹

[The lion rises regally,
Slowly he looks around,
Enraged, lacerates them, reclines,
In the shadow, like before.]

In spite of these embellishments, Jenisch, like many war writers of the age, sought to portray the core of the historic event faithfully. For example,

since Leuthen was known for the successful deployment of the oblique battle formation (Duffy, 213–21), Jenisch described this maneuver in poetic terms:

Also täuschet den mächtigen Feind mit verstellter Bewegung
 Hannibal-Friedrich: er droht, er zuckt zur Linken; und schläget
 Auf der Rechten der Schlacht: es schiessen, es schlagen, es bluten
 Beyde Heer' in dem Schaarengewühl. Die werdende Schlacht glüht
 Immer feuriger an. Doch nun ersinnt er ein neues.
 Da, wo die Achse des Kampfs sich am heissesten drehet, wo Mavors
 Lanz' am blutigsten trieft, da stellet der Held die Reihen
 Seiner Brennen in dichtgedrängte, gewaltige Haufen;
 Schulter an Schulter, und Fuss an Fuss, und Waffen an Waffen
 Stehen die Helden, und dürsten nach Blut: ein lebendiger Knäuel,
 Künstlich zusammengerollt, mit schlauer Verwirrung geordnet [. . .]
 Nur ein Wink, und der Knäul fliegt auf und Tod und Verderben
 Sprühet, zur Rechten, zur Linken [. . .]
 [. . .] plötzlich entfaltet den Knäuel
 Friedrich: es laufen die Reihn der Krieger, wie flammende Kugeln,
 Von geometrischer Hand, zum festen Ziele geworfen,
 Hierher, dorthin, jede auf abgemessenem Pfade,
 Nach gemessenem Ziel. (1:207–9)

[Thus Frederick-Hannibal deceives the mighty enemy
 With a hidden move: he threatens, indicates the left; and attacks
 On the right flank of the battle: both armies
 Shoot, hit, bleed in the thick of the troops. The emerging battle glows
 with
 Ever greater fire. But now he contrives something new.
 Where the axis of the battle turns the hottest, where Mavor's
 Lance drips with the most blood, there the hero deploys the lines
 Of his Prussians in densely packed, mighty crowds;
 Shoulder to shoulder, and foot to foot, and weapon to weapon
 The heroes stand, lusting for blood: a lively cluster,
 Coiled up artificially, arranged with clever confusion [. . .]
 Just one nod, and the ball flies open and death and perdition
 Rain down on the right, the left [. . .]
 Suddenly Frederick unwinds the ball:
 And the lines of warriors run, like flaming bullets,
 Thrown to their firm target by geometrical hands,
 Hither and thither, each on measured trail,
 Towards a measured destination.]

A diligent reader will notice that this description is not accurate. Frederick decided to use the new oblique attack order before the battle had started. Also — and this too is typical of Jenisch's technique — the description of Leuthen is copied from Archenholz's *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*:

[Friedrich] wählte die schiefe Schlachtordnung [. . .] eine Stellung, die zu den Meisterwerken der Kriegskunst gehört [. . .]. Friedrich machte verstellte Bewegungen gegen den rechten Flügel des Feindes, während daß seine Absicht auf den linken gerichtet war. Er befahl [. . .] eine Linie in viele Haufen zu teilen, diese Haufen dicht auf einander zu schieben, und so die gedrängte Menschenmasse sich bewegen zu lassen. [. . .] Dieser so gestellte Soldaten-Körper nimmt verhältnisweise nur einen sehr geringen Raum ein, und zeigt in der Ferne wegen der vermischten Uniformen und Fahnen einen höchst unordentlichen auf einander gehäuften Menschenklumpen. Allein es bedarf nur einen Wink des Heerführers, so entwickelt sich dieser lebendige Knaul in der größten Ordnung, und mit einer solchen Schnelligkeit, die einem reißenden Strom ähnlich ist. (131–32)

[Frederick chose the oblique order of battle [. . .] an emplacement that counts among the masterpieces of the art of war [. . .] Frederick carried out deceptive movements toward the enemy's right wing, while his intentions were directed toward the left. He commanded [. . .] one line to split up into groups, to position these groups close to one another, and so to let the densely packed mass of men move [. . .] A body of soldiers thus positioned takes up only a relatively small amount of space and due to the mix of uniforms and banners appears from a distance as a highly disorganized and piled-up clump of men. But it takes just one nod from the commander and the lively cluster unfolds with the greatest order and with a speed comparable to a raging torrent.]

In fact, many citations from Archenholz are almost verbatim. For instance, Archenholz's "Es war leichter, sie zu töten, als in die Flucht zu schlagen" (158; It was easier to kill them than to put them to flight) becomes Jenisch's "Leichter zu tödten, als in die Flucht zu scheuchen!" (1:244; More easily killed than scared into fleeing). Even when Jenisch did not quote directly, he followed Archenholz's narrative.⁵⁰ Jenisch did not conceal his reliance on Archenholz; there is even a direct reference to his source in the preprints.⁵¹ And since Archenholz was quite popular and respected, both can be read as strong signals by Jenisch to his readers suggesting the sincerity of his project and increasing his credibility.

Particularly in one significant way, however, *Borussias* is not a versified Archenholz. In Jenisch's text, battle descriptions are not only relatively brief, but accompanied and even superseded by long and detailed descriptions of the deaths of individual soldiers, some quick, some slow and painful, some during and some after the battle. Jenisch called these portraits of death and suffering "Gemählde leidender oder guter Menschheit, blühender oder zerstörter häuslicher Glückseligkeit" (1:vi; portraits of suffering or virtuous mankind, flourishing or ruined domestic happiness). This feature is without doubt one of the most innovative of this text, and it actually turns *Borussias* into an antiwar epic.⁵²

Sieben Tage blicket vom Dampf der Leichen die Sonne
 Dunkler über der Flur, und traurig schauet der Vollmond
 Durch den verpesteten Schleier der Wolken. Der zitternde Wandrer
 Flihet mit eilendem Fuss hin über die Felder des Todes. [. . .]
 Singe, Muse! der Tausenden Einige, welche das Rachswehr
 Mavors heute zur Erde gestreckt und dem Staube gegeben [. . .].
 (1:248)

[For seven days the vapor of dead bodies makes the sun shine
 Darker over the meadow, and the full moon gazes sadly
 Through the befouled veil of clouds. The trembling wanderer
 Flees on hasty foot over the fields of death (. . .).
 Sing, muse! of some of the thousands, who were felled today
 And turned to dust by Mavor's vengeful sword (. . .)]

Und wie wird nun dein zärtliches Weib sich raufen das Haar, und
 Hände ringen, o Fritz! dem hier der würgende Säbel
 Ach! das süsse Leben entreisst, und die stattlichen Glieder
 Mördersch zerstückelt [. . .]. (1:150)

[And how will your tender wife now tear her hair and
 Wring her hands, oh Fritz! From whom the strangling sabre
 Wrests sweet life and murderously dismembers
 Mighty limbs (. . .)]

Du auch, Beer! mit der tapfern Faust, du Mars der Cohorte,
 Liegst in der Mitte von zehn erschlagenen Russen [. . .]
 Schrecklich! der letzte der Wütheriche, welchem du Wunden gebohret,
 Lastet mit bürdendem Körper die tot-aufröchelnde Brust dir,
 Und zernagt dir mit knirschendem Zahn das Fleisch an dem Herzen*.
 (* Thatsache.)
 Kommet, ihr Fürsten! und seht's, und hasset den Krieg, der die
 Menschen
 Also schaurig erbosst, die nie sich sahen und kränkten. (1:256–57)

[You too, Beer! With the courageous fist, you, Mars of the cohort,
 Lying amidst ten slain Russians [. . .]
 Horrific! The last of the tartars in whom you drilled wounds,
 Burdens your bosom breathing death with his heavy body
 And gnaws away the flesh around your heart with grinding teeth.*
 (*a fact.)
 Come, you princes! and behold, and hate war, which angers men,
 Who have never seen or offended each other horrifically.]

Like many eighteenth-century authors including Cronegk, Karsch, Belach, and Denis, Jenisch acknowledged and even praised Frederick's military talents. But he also drew attention to the atrocities of war inflicted by

Frederick and his opponents, including the forced integration of the Saxons into the Prussian army, Frederick's bombardment of Dresden, and Russian war crimes (e.g., 1:222–39). Like many before him, Jenisch depicted war as a loathsome and fundamentally unchristian activity. This is already evident in his poem “D. M. Josephi Secundi. Imperatoris Romani S.,” from 1790, where he criticized Joseph II of Austria for attempting to force war on peaceful Bavarians and Belgians in the late 1780s.⁵³ He continued this critique in *Borussias*, for example, in contemplating the death toll of a battle: “Tapfre Männer und edele Jüngling! erzählt's in der Hölle: / Wie die Menschen einander sich morden! Wie ihre Beherrscher / Sie zu dem wechselseitigen Brudermorde bedingen” (1:130; Brave men and noble youth! tell it in hell: / How humans are murdering each other! How their rulers / Entail them to mutual fratricide). The same critique also informs Frederick II's self-critical deliberations,⁵⁴ the plans for eternal peace outlined in *Borussias*, and the third volume of Jenisch's *Geist und Charakter des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Spirit and Character of the Eighteenth Century):

Aber dem menschlichen Geschlecht würd' es offenbar ersprießlicher seyn, aller Kriegskunst zu entbehren, als diese grausame, Menschen-Leben und Menschen-Glück zerstörendste aller Künste zu vervollkommen, oder welches einerley ist, sie immer mörderischer, immer zerstörender zu machen. (3:243)

[It would, however, be obviously more advantageous to the human race to dispense with all the art of war instead of perfecting this most cruel of all arts, most destructive of human life and human happiness, or, which amounts to the same, to make it even more murderous, more destructive.]

A Trojan Horse: Reshaping the Aesthetics of Political and War Literature in the 1790s

In many ways, Daniel Jenisch's *Borussias* is not what it appears to be at first glance. In the eyes of many of Jenisch's contemporaries, it was not an untimely, ridiculous, or failed project. Nor did it attempt to provide an accurate literary historiography of recent European or German military developments. Rather, it focuses on the Prussian battles, deliberately changes the chronology of events,⁵⁵ and even introduces fictional encounters to the narrative, such as the Duhan-episode. Furthermore, the descriptions of military actions are stylistically unoriginal and do not seek to impress the reader with a sensational rendering of the current art of war. Instead, they are often taken from Archenholz's *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, a technique that Jenisch acknowledges openly.

Clearly, *Borussias* does not focus on the representation and praise of military achievements, but it still has original features and made innovative contributions to the art of writing war. The most important of these consists in the detailed description of the dead and wounded, who are even addressed by their (fictive) names. The deliberate attempt to turn the reader's attention away from the military events toward their disastrous impact on countless soldiers was virtually unique in eighteenth-century German war literature, and in combination with the unfolding of a road-map towards eternal peace (9:207–14), this is a clear sign that *Borussias* is indeed an antiwar epic.

Jenisch's descriptions of the horrors of war never employ euphemisms; rather, they testify to his strong antiwar sentiments.⁵⁶

Armer Regler, das ist der Lohn des rühmlichen Muthes
 Womit du dir, von Friederich selbst in der Ferne bemerkt,
 Eine silberne Schärp' erkämpfst? Dir mähet ein Säbel
 Ab von dem Körper den rechten der tapfern Arme: den andern
 Quetschet das zermalmende Rad der donnerführenden Wagen
 Hah! da liegst du und stöhnst! Doch stirb nur! stirb nur; die Menschen
 Quälen und morden und tödten einander: im Grabe nur ruhn sie!
 [. . .] Dort steht er, der gute
 Sommer, am Baume gelehnt, und hält (entsetzlich!) mit eigner
 Hand sein dampfendes Eingeweide. Des schrecklichen Mörsers
 Zackigt-schmetterndes Eisen zerriss ihm den Leib in der Mitte. (2:30–31)

[Poor Regler, this is the reward for laudable courage
 Which, noticed from a distance by Frederick himself, earned you
 A silver sash? A saber mows
 The right of your stalwart arms from your body, the other
 Crushed by the crunching wheel of thunder-carrying wagons.
 Ha! There you lie and moan. Just die! Die; man
 Tortures and murders and kills man: only in the grave they rest
 [. . .] There he is, good Sommer,
 Leaning against a tree, holding (how horrific!) with his own hands
 His steaming intestines. Horrible mortar's
 Jagged shattering iron ripped his body open in the middle.]

Jenisch lists and describes numerous atrocities, and he does not attempt to omit or whitewash those committed by Prussians. Like many of his contemporaries, he denigrates the French and Russians, calling the former wild barbarians (1:173) and the latter a “barbarische Schaar der Mörder und Räuber des theuren Vaterlandes” (1:239; barbaric band of murderers and robbers of the dear fatherland). In recent years such rhetoric has been interpreted as a precursor of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German chauvinism, but an analysis of *Borussias* shows that such claims need to be

modified.⁵⁷ Unlike many other eighteenth-century war writers, Jenisch not only vilified the Prussian enemies, but also explicitly re-humanized the Russian soldiers. The end of the fifth canto, for example, contains a unique, breathtaking moment. After a lament for the Prussian victims of the battle of Zorndorf, Jenisch turns his attention toward the enemy:

Aber sage mir, Göttin! o sage, waren denn alle
Krieger Moscoviens höll-entflohn Dämonen? o nenne,
Nenne mir einige Kinder der Unschuld, welche das Rachschwert
Des nichts schonenden Brennischen Mars auf den Feldern um Zorndorf
Tödtete, dass sie nicht kehrten in ihre friedliche Heimath. (1:257)

[But tell me, goddess! O tell me: Were all the
Muscovite soldiers demons escaped from hell? O tell me,
Tell me about some children of innocence, whom the vengeful sword
Of the pitiless Prussian Mars killed in the battle fields of Zorndorf,
Murdered so that they did not return to their peaceful homeland.]

Jenisch then extends his dirge, so far reserved only for the German-speaking victims of war, to the Russian soldiers who died at Zorndorf. Six times he praises enemies, sings of their virtues and of how they will be missed by their loved ones:

Ach! wie klaget er dich, der alte Vater des Stammes,
Wenn er der Freuden gedenkt, die ihm der Enkel gewährte:
Wann du ihm, schnell, wie der Wind, die vergessne Pfeif' aus der Hütte
Holtest, und, selbstbedächtig, die glühende Kohle mitbrachtest. (1:263–64)

[Alas! how the old father of the clan mourns you
When he remembers the joy his grandson bestowed on him:
When you, fast as the wind, fetched him the pipe forgotten
In the cottage and even, of your own accord, brought along the glowing coal.]

Jenisch's decision to individualize the horror of war has been misunderstood as sentimentalization. For example, Martin believes that Jenisch's sentimental miniatures were designed to evoke emotions and empathy for his characters.⁵⁸ This is certainly true, but it also allies Jenisch with the poets of *Rührdramatik* such as Iffland and Kotzebue and thereby situates him unjustifiably close to the realm of the trivial. It is certainly not trivial to call for compassion for the victims of war; indeed it is bold and unusual to demand compassion for the enemy. Furthermore, Jenisch's sentimental portraits represent an effort to adapt the genre of epic to his times:

[S]ollte [. . .] nicht der siebenjährige Krieg ein sehr würdiger Stoff zur
Epopée seyn? Gewiß war Homer's Eroberung von Troja ein weit

geringerer Stoff. Denn wenn er gleich, durch die Natur der damaligen Art Krieg zu führen, einen jeden Helden mehr in Handlung darstellen konnte, als der Dichter, der eine Kriegsgeschichte der neuern Zeit darzustellen hat: so kommt diesem von der andern Seite das Große und Schauerliche der neuern Kriegskunst zu statten — ein Stoff, dessen Homer, wenigstens um zwey Drittheile entbehrte. Und überdem, welche Geschichte ist reichhaltiger auch an einzelnen Beyspielender Tapferkeit, als der siebenjährige Krieg. (“Heldengedicht,” 277)

[Should the Seven Years’ War not be a worthy subject for an epic? Homer’s conquest of Troy was undoubtedly a far lesser subject. For even if, because of the nature of conducting war in his times, he could portray every hero more in action than a poet who has to represent a war story of recent days, the latter still benefits from the greatness and horror of the current art of war — Homer was lacking at least two thirds of such material. And finally, what story is richer in individual examples of bravery than the Seven Years’ War.]

In his *Geist und Charakter des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Jenisch returns to this point:

Friedrichs Taktik verwandelte die Menschen fast nur in Maschinen, und beschränkte überall zu sehr die freye Selbstthätigkeit einzelner Individuen und ganzer Corps im Heer, durch deren glückliche, nur auf den Augenblick berechnete Operazion, sehr oft doch ein wichtiger Streich geführt, nicht selten eine Schlacht gewonnen werden kann. (242)

[Frederick’s tactics practically turned people into machines and generally limited the free independence of individuals and of entire army corps too much, whose fortunate operations, often designed only for the moment, very often dealt an important blow to the enemy, and, not too rarely, even won a battle.]

In other words, for Jenisch, writing a heroic epic at the end of the eighteenth century meant adjusting the genre to the changing nature of war and heroism. Eighteenth-century warfare generally prohibited spontaneous and decisive action even by commanders, and common soldiers rarely influenced the outcome of a battle. Consequently, a late eighteenth-century war epic had to feature only a few heroes, and their heroism, if there was any at all, was not defined by military achievement, but consisted mainly in the “ultimate sacrifice.” Thus, Jenisch constructed his *Borussias* as a double memorial: to Frederick, the King, on and off the battlefield, but also to the unknown soldier. He erected countless fictional gravestones not by praising nonexistent feats of arms, which were all but impossible anyway, but by dwelling on the individuals’ virtues and merits in civilian life and on the grief felt by their friends and families.

Although *Borussias* seems to bear some of the hallmarks of sentimental and trivial literature around 1800, particularly in its family portraits (2:372), it was nonetheless an attempt to redefine the heroic epic in light of contemporary warfare and politics. Jenisch may have employed aesthetic devices that border on the sentimental, but *Borussias* itself is not trivial. It is not only a fascinating example of war literature, but also an inspired and innovative contribution to the aesthetics of writing about war and of political literature in general.

The best way to understand this is probably to accept — even if only for the sake of the argument — what Jenisch and Moritz suggested: that *Borussias* is generally not just a war poem, but a portrait of Prussia/Borussia under Frederick; that it is designed as a commentary on and corrective of contemporary Prussia ruled by conservative forces eager to turn back the clock in all spheres of society not only there, but also in France or in Poland. In this respect, Jenisch was quite bold in focusing on the *one* achievement that Frederick Wilhelm II could not ignore or belittle, Frederick's military success. But at the same time, Jenisch based his narrative on an altered concept of heroism. He emphasized the costs of military action over its benefits at a time when Europe was again engaged in warfare, this time against France, and he presented military victory not as the zenith of Frederick's reign, but as the foundation of more important successes in other fields. The last six cantos then outline, debate, and praise these non-military accomplishments.

Clearly, *Borussias* offers a portrait of and commentary on the political and social status quo of Jenisch's times. His epic of the Seven Years' War can be interpreted as a veiled critique of contemporary politics and society, a critique that he could not have published directly during Wöllner's regime. Cantos 8 and 9, for example, contain an extended theological speculation in which the concept of a spiritual punishment of sins and the vision of God's guaranteed mercifulness towards all sinners would have provoked sanctions if Jenisch had published them in the form of a treatise. After all, Wöllner went to great pains to limit the influence of Enlightenment philosophy, opposing all forms of religious speculation and fighting deism and naturalism amongst Prussian theologians. Deftly circumnavigating censorship, Jenisch created a public forum for his dissenting views by presenting them as the vision of a dying soldier in a poetic treatment of the Seven Years' War. Similarly, it was not accidental that Jenisch's heavenly vision lavishes praise on Hume, Kant, Mendelssohn, Milton, and Klopstock, Boerhaave and Haller (2:135–39).

Although the sixth canto has often been overlooked, it too alludes to several contemporary grievances. One of the two plots against Frederick recounted here is instigated by fanatic Catholic priests and executed by a former Jesuit, serving to add fuel to the fire of anti-Catholic and anti-Jesuit sentiment so widespread in the Enlightenment. Canto 6 also alludes to the

campaigns against secret societies in the late 1780s and 1790s, most famously the Illuminati, but also the *Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft*.⁵⁹ By portraying a Jesuit plot against Frederick, Jenisch insinuated that kings, especially Prussian ones, would do well to fear conspiracies of conservative circles, specifically the Rosicrucian Order and the power-hungry Wöllner, more than those concocted by the left.

The second plot against Frederick in *Borussias* was the brainchild of Friedrich von der Trenck, who was famous for spending years in Prussian prisons for alleged high treason and for his many attempted escapes from jail. He was released in 1763, wrote a successful autobiography, and played a prominent though dubious role after 1789: Frederick Wilhelm II awarded him money for a book promoting Prussian interests, but Trenck identified with the Hungarian struggle for freedom and moved to Hamburg and Paris.⁶⁰ He defended the revolution vociferously, welcomed the September massacres of 1792, and ended his life on the guillotine on 25 July 1794.

To Jenisch and other representatives of the late Enlightenment Trenck must have seemed like a personification of the archenemy — a traitor to Frederick and Prussia, violent and out of control, a revolutionary who discredited the revolutionary cause — so it is no surprise that Jenisch's epic recounts Trenck's betrayal of Frederick, using the episode to decry Trenck as a revolutionary and to distance himself and the Enlightenment movement in Berlin from such a radical. When Trenck tries to instigate a rebellion in Magdeburg castle, Jenisch has him speak to murderers and robbers; the character of his co-conspirators alone proves that his revolutionary rhetoric is not only ill-directed but a lie, and his revolutionary posture a fake:

Wer? — wer hat euch der all-genossenen Güter des Himmels
Tückisch beraubet? von Luft und Licht euch tückisch gesondert? [. . .]
Wer? — wer ist es, der euch dies Leben des Todes bereitet?
Menschen! — Menschen, wie ihr! Wem giebt die gebährende Mutter
Mehr als Knochen und Haut? [. . .]
Friedrichs erhabener Thron ist nicht entfernter vom Grabe,
Als die unterirdische Höhle des Ewig-gefangnen!
Aber zwischen der Wieg' und dem Sarge [. . .]
Da gebieten die Könige! — da verläumdnen die Schmeichler! [. . .]
Und die Tugend verdarbt! Da triumphieret das Laster!
Staub beherrscht den Staub! und Würmer zertreten einander.
Was sind Könige? Menschen, die andern Menschen gebieten,
Kleiner zu seyn, wie sie selbst — sie selbst — unwürd'ger, als alle; [. . .]
Was ist Recht? das mit aufgehobnem Arme gesprochne
Wort des Stärkern, womit er die stumme Feigheit erschrecket. (1:297–99)

[Who? — Who deprived you maliciously of the commonly enjoyed goods
Of heaven? Who separated you maliciously from air and light?

Who? — Who causes you to live this life of death?
 Men! — Men like you! To whom does the birthing mother give
 More than bones and skin? [. . .]
 Fredrick's sublime throne is no farther removed from the grave
 Than the underground hell of the eternally-imprisoned!
 But from cradle to casket [. . .]
 It is kings who rule! — There sycophants slander! [. . .]
 And virtue starves! There vice is triumphant!
 Dust governs dust! and worms crunch worms.
 What are kings? Men commanding other men,
 To be smaller than they themselves — they themselves — more unworthy
 than all; [. . .]
 What is law? The word of the stronger
 Delivered with raised arm, frightening mute cowardice.]

According to Sauder, Jenisch used *Borussias* to declare his “friderizianische Gesinnung” and his opposition to Wöllner in a public forum (“Nachwort,” 108). A careful reading of the text leaves no doubt as to its strong political intentions. Jenisch may even have hoped that Friedrich Wilhelm II would find his text instructive, in the manner of a mirror for princes (Biesterfeld, 178). On the other hand, *Borussias* is neither a “monumentale Blut-, Schweiß- und Tränen-Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges” (d’Aprile 129; monumental blood-, sweat-, and tears-history of the Seven Years’ War) nor a text with a straightforward message. In order to do it justice, one has to read it in its proper context: the political turmoil of the 1790s, the *Kulturkampf* in Prussia, Jenisch’s affiliation with the late Enlightenment, his work as a Lutheran priest, and finally his position in the aesthetic debates of the 1790s in Berlin. In light of these circumstances, the epic form, although not favored by the average reader of the time, offered many advantages: the sheer size of such a project, its artistic language, and its apparent datedness might have occasioned a lighter touch on the part of the censors. It also presented an intriguing literary challenge to a writer intent on proving his craft.

Jenisch’s affirmation of the epic form could also be seen as a contribution to the classicist reorientation in Berlin in architecture, literature, and the arts around 1800. This is all the more convincing if we consider that Karl Philip Moritz, who endorsed *Borussias*, was a key representative of Berlin Classicism, and that Jenisch himself expressed his classicist ambitions in his preface and in *Ueber Prose und Beredsamkeit der Deutschen*.⁶¹ Finally, the late eighteenth century witnessed an ever-growing competition of nations but also of different political concepts, represented by individuals like Struensee, Frederick, Joseph II, Friedrich Wilhelm II, Robespierre, Danton, Marat and others. With history suddenly seeming very open, Jenisch may have believed that the epic form was not ill-suited to influence an increasingly personalized political debate about history’s future direc-

tion. Jenisch might have felt, that the effort invested in such a voluminous and ambitious work, the traditionally high esteem bestowed on the genre of epic and its association with issues of the utmost national importance made it potentially a supremely effective tool, capable of attracting attention and admiration for both the book and the political model represented by Frederick's Prussia. In conclusion, *Borussias* is not only a fascinating document of Jenisch's political and aesthetic ambitions, but a complex and original text in its own right.

Notes

¹ We know next to nothing about Jenisch's early years, and accounts of his life in general offer few details; see Gerhard Sauder, "Daniel Jenisch," in *Literatur Lexikon: Autoren und Werke deutscher Sprache*, ed. Walther Killy (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1990), 6:95. See also Gerhard Sauder, "Nachwort," in *Jenisch, Daniel, Ausgewählte Texte*, ed. Gerhard Sauder (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1996), 103–15; and Herman Patsch, "Daniel Jenisch," in vol. 24 of *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm and Traugott Bautz, columns 895–906 (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2005); quoted from http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/j/jenisch_d.shtml.

² Other members included Johann Jakob Engel, Friedrich Nicolai, Johann Karl Wilhelm Möhsen, Ernst Ferdinand Klein, Carl Gottlieb Svarez, Moses Mendelssohn as an honorary member, and Johann Joachim Spalding. For a complete list, see Ernst Haberkern, *Limitierte Aufklärung: Die protestantische Spätaufklärung in Preußen am Beispiel der Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft* (Marburg: Tectum, 2005), 193–206.

³ Friedrich Nicolai described the society's goals in 1799: "The members' only goal was reasonable conversation about interesting and particularly scientific issues so as to mutually enlighten the mind through amicable exchange of ideas and thus develop a clearer understanding of different terms and to submit them to an independent examination [. . .] Love of truth was the spirit of this society"; Friedrich Nicolai, *Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung, über meine Kenntniß der kritischen Philosophie und meine Schriften dieselbe betreffend, und über die Herren Kant, J. B. Erhard, und Fichte* (Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1799), 65–66. In spite of such assertions, one must assume that the society also functioned as an exchange forum for news from all levels of government, thus making otherwise arcane political affairs of the late 1780s and the 1790s more transparent at least within this small elite circle. All English translations from the German are mine.

⁴ For Sack's, Teller's, Spalding's, and Jenisch's superior attempt to offer resistance to Wöllner, see Christoph Weiß, "'Krieg gegen die Aufklärer:' Carl Friedrich Bahrdts Kritik der Wöllnerschen Regressionspolitik," in *Carl Friedrich Bahrdt (1740-1792)*, ed. Gerhard Sauder and Christoph Weiß, 319–51 (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1992), 327. For Woellner's attack on Diterich, see Paul Schwartz, *Der erste*

Kulturkampf in Preußen um Kirche und Schule (1788–1798) (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 153–59.

⁵ For the most detailed account of Jenisch's writing see Patsch, who shows that Jenisch only rarely composed fictional works in a strict sense, such as his three volumes of *Romantisch-scherzhafte Erzählungen* (Romantic-Comic Stories, 1792). Instead, most of his literary works were inspired by historical events and attempted to recount or comment on them. In doing so, Jenisch regularly reverted to the literary genres most commonly used for this purpose: poetic epitaphs, satires such as *Die Duncias des Jahrhunderts; oder der Kampf des Lichtes und der Finsterniß. Ein heroisch-komisches Gedicht in zwölf Gesängen* (This Century's Dunciad; or Light's Battle against Darkness. A Heroic-Comic Poem in Twelve Cantos, 1793), an ode praising the new Prussian Code of Law, and an extensive comment on the turn of the century in his *Lapidarschrift* in verse entitled *Obelisk an die Gränzscheide des achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Obelisk at the Border Crossing between the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Century, 1801).

⁶ Goethe, aware only of the article's first part, felt unjustly attacked. Jenisch's intentions were quite different, which becomes clear once both parts of the article are taken into consideration (see Sauder, "Nachwort," 109–10).

⁷ Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, *Distichen. Xenien*, in *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*, ed. Reiner Wild (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1988), 4.1:808. This was not the only distich directed at Jenisch. The following one reads "Guter Rat // Accipe facundi Culicem, studiose, Maronis, / Ne, nugis positus, arma virumque canas," mocking Jenisch's use of the opening words of Virgil's *Aeneis*, "Arma virumque cano," as the motto of the *Borussias* (1156). A third distich against Jenisch, "Agamemnon // Nicht der gewaltige Dis, mich tötet' Ägisthos und brachte / In Hexameter mich, daß ich erstickte und starb" (732; Agamemnon // Not the powerful Dis, but Aegisthus killed me and turned me into / Hexameter, that I asphyxiated and died), was excluded from the *Xenien* publication in 1796. While Rainer Wild's commentary coherently identifies Dis with Frederick II, Aegisthus with Jenisch (killing, like Aegisthus, the war hero, though with words instead of weapons), and the "deadly" hexameters with those of the *Borussias* (1162), this distich discredits Jenisch's earlier *Agamemnon* translation.

⁸ See Wolfgang Biesterfeld, "Friedrich der Große als epischer Held: Daniel Jenischs "Borussias" (1794)," in *Fridericianische Miniaturen 1*, ed. Jürgen Ziechmann (Bremen: Edition Ziechmann, 1988), 175.

⁹ Anselm Maler, "Versepos," in *Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur*, vol. 3.2: *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution*, ed. Rolf Grimminger (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1984), 376–77 and 390.

¹⁰ See Iwan d'Aprile, "Daniel Jenischs *Borussias* im Kontext der zeitgenössischen literarischen Debatten," in *Geist und Macht: Friedrich der Große im Kontext der europäischen Kulturgeschichte*, ed. Brunhilde Wehinger (Berlin: Akademie, 2005), 129.

¹¹ Dieter Martin, *Das deutsche Versepos im 18. Jahrhundert. Studien und kommentierte Gattungsbibliographie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993).

¹² Martin speaks of the “Peinlichkeit” of an “umfängliche[s] Selbstzitats” (239) while Sauder is irritated by a “peinliche[s] Selbstlob” (“Nachwort,” 108). Biesterfeld complains that Jenisch’s epic consists of inhomogeneous elements (176). Martin finds the epic “überfrachtet” and suffering from a number of “poorly motivated conjunctions and parentheses” (239).

¹³ Anonymous, “Borussias in zwölf Gesängen,” *Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* 26.2 (1796): 336; Anonymous also lamented that it lacks “inner coherency” (137).

¹⁴ See also Anonymous: “The epic’s hero, Frederick II, assaulted by six powerful sovereigns” (334); and Martin treats it as one of six eighteenth-century heroic poems about Frederick II (204). Three were written during Frederick’s lifetime — Christian Gottlob Stöckel’s “Das Befreyte Schlesien” (6 cantos, printed 1745–48), Friederike Sophie Abel’s 1752 epic in 5 cantos “Das eroberte Schlesien,” and the unfinished, anonymous “Friedrich der Sieger” (1 canto printed in 1758) — and three after his death. Although among the latter only Jenisch’s was completed, Martin’s unearthing of Karl Kretschmann’s incomplete “Friedrich der Große” (1796–99) and Schiller’s abandoned idea of a “Fridericiade” (1788–91) reminds the modern reader that neither Jenisch’s choice of subject nor of literary form (epic) were per se untimely. For details of all six projects see Martin, 203–46.

¹⁵ Daniel Jenisch, *Borussias in zwölf Gesängen*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Himburg, 1794), 1:xv.

¹⁶ D’Aprile reads the Borussias as an attempt to interpret the Frederick-material from a republican point of view (131).

¹⁷ It would be misleading to call Jenisch an active promoter of republicanism working towards the abolition of the monarchy. He was quite aware of the risks and misguided developments associated with many a monarch’s rule, but, after witnessing the French Revolution, he regarded the monarchic system as the better option: “If we contrast the unspeakable ills arising from weak or debauched monarch-characters to the welfare of peoples to the well-known ailments of the most famous of Europe’s new republics, the venality of high ranking public servants, the saleability of elections and offices, the ever-brewing fury of parties, the franticness of the common man’s will, so easily passing from freedom to anarchy: will there be any advantages to be listed on the republic’s side?”; see Daniel Jenisch, *Geist und Charakter des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, politisch, moralisch, ästhetisch und wissenschaftlich betrachtet*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Königl. Preuß. Akad. Kunst- und Buchhandlung, 1800/1800/1801), 1:76.

¹⁸ “Uebrigens verweist man [= Jenisch], wegen jeder möglichen Misdeutung, auf die Schluss-anmerkung zu dem Fragment der Borussias »das veredelte Menschengeschlecht« in dem Wielandischen Merkur” (1:xv; “By the way, to avoid potential misunderstanding, one [Jenisch] points to the concluding remarks of the fragment ‘ennobled humankind’ from the Borussias in Wieland’s Merkur”).

¹⁹ “Und Europa beseligt ein allerquickender Friede. / Allgefürchtet, allgerecht, das Wunder der Völker, / Herrschet dann Friedrich; er sitzt im Rath der Fürsten, ein Richter; / Er versöhnt sie, bedroht den Stolzen, beschützt den Schwachen; / In gefürchteter Hand hält er die Waagschal Europens. / Aber sein eigenes Volk nennt ihn den Besten der Väter / Und der Nahme der Preußen, verklärt von dem göttlichen Friedrich, / Ueberstrahlet weithin die Völker der staunenden Erde” (Europe is blessed with an invigorating peace. / Feared everywhere, always just, the marvel of all peoples, / Frederick governs: sitting in the Sovereigns’ counsel, a judge; / He reconciles them, threatens the proud, guards the weak; / In his dreaded hand he holds Europe’s scale. / But his own people call him the best of all fathers / And all Prussians’ name, transfigured by the divine Frederick, / Outshines the peoples of the astonished earth); see Daniel Jenisch, “Das veredelte Menschengeschlecht. Fragment aus dem IX. Gesang der Borussias. Ein profetisches Gesicht des verklärten Kleist,” in *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 5.1 (1794): 219.

²⁰ “All is governed by a king, but the king himself is a subject / Of eternal law. The common good legislates. / No obsolete customs and no fanatic priests, / Nobody’s violence and nobody’s malice forces mankind / to be wretched” (“Menschengeschlecht,” 230).

²¹ See Schwartz, *Der erste Kulturkampf*, 109–17, and Heinrich Hubert Houben, *Hier Zensor — wer dort? Der gefesselte Biederrmeier* (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1990), 153–75.

²² Maler calls the *Borussias* a “Preußen-Epopöe” (377) or “Preußenepos” (390), although he does not define or legitimize the terms in detail.

²³ Jenisch pointed this out when he published his *Litterarische Spiessruthen. Oder die hochadligen und berühmigten Xenien* (Literary Switches, or: The Most Noble and Infamous Xenien) in 1797 (Weimar: Rein), an annotated edition of Goethe and Schiller’s *Xenien* in which his comments identified many of their targets. In response to No. 268, which had ridiculed the *Borussias*, Jenisch remarked: “[Borussias:] By Jenisch. Cf. some pieces in Schiller’s *Thalia*, in particular the Hamletian Frederick” (99). After all, Schiller had accepted two voluminous excerpts from *Borussias* for his *Neue Thalia* in 1793.

²⁴ See, for example, “Not with an even-tempered eye Theresia watched Frederick / Rule over Silesia (once her inheritance), for pride and vengeance were raging in her soul” (1:13) and “Thus Europe’s sublime sovereigns agreed upon the doom of the One / Of the Prussian” (1:16).

²⁵ In depicting the Austrian queen deliberating arguments in favor and against war, Jenisch could consult for inspiration Franz Christoph von Scheyb’s two-volume *Theresiade. Ein Ehren-Gedicht* of 1746 (Vienna: Johann Jacob Jahn), which presents similar debates.

²⁶ See Christopher Duffy, *Friedrich der Große. Ein Soldatenleben* (Augsburg: Weltbild, 1994), 188.

²⁷ One of the plotters was a Jesuit hoping to poison the king, the other Prussia’s most famous prisoner, Friedrich von der Trenck, who tried to instigate a rebellion of allied prisoners of war in Magdeburg castle.

²⁸ See Frederick's note to Finckenstein from the night of the battle, documenting despair (reprinted in Duffy, 270–72). In the second, extended version of Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz's *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland von 1756 bis 1763*, published in 1793, Jenisch and his contemporaries could read about the scene: "It was said that Frederick openly wished for his death in this desperate a situation"; Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, "Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland von 1756 bis 1763," in *Aufklärung und Kriegserfahrung*, ed. Johannes Kunisch (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1996), 237.

²⁹ "Deeply lost in horrific sorrow he sighed: / »Human life! What art thou? Human life« a heavy gale / Crossing the heath! An ocean full of raging waves" (2:45); see also 2:53–56.

³⁰ Ewald von Kleist, a good friend of Gleim, Lessing, and Uz, received severe injuries at Kunersdorf. As was common in the eighteenth century, he was not taken care of by a physician, but was left without any help where he had fallen and been robbed of his clothes. He was picked up on the third day (!) and carried to Frankfurt an der Oder, where he finally received medical treatment but died of his wounds; see Ingrid Patitz, *Ewald von Kleists letzte Tage und sein Grabdenkmal in Frankfurt an der Oder* (Frankfurt an der Oder: Kleist-Museum, 1994).

³¹ Although this sequence has been interpreted as a Katabasis (Biesterfeld, 178), it is not. Kleist does not descend into the underworld, like Dante in the *Divine Comedy*, to return to earth after an extended guided tour. Rather, his death is final.

³² Jenisch was not the first to perceive this coincidence. In Archenholz's *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges* the description of the king's despair is immediately followed by a passage recounting Kleist's death (237–40); however, the fact that the dying Kleist unintentionally eavesdrops on Frederick was Jenisch's invention.

³³ Jenisch's "For unlimited is God! unlimited products of his almightiness! / Like the crystals of ice on the window pane, like a drop upon the bucket, / Myriad worlds are clinging to the Maker's throne" (2:76) clearly alludes to Friedrich Klopstock's *Frühlingsfeier*: "Not into the ocean of all worlds / Do I want to plunge myself [. . .] // Only round the drop in the bucket, / Round the earth alone will I float and pray"; see Klopstock, *Oden* (Hamburg: J. J. C. Bode, 1771), 32. And Jenisch fantasizes enthusiastically about the universe and its inhabitants: "Einige reisen, wie sterbliche Menschen auf Erden in ferne / Theile der all-ernährenden Fläch', in die näheren Monden / Ihres Planeten: ander' in alle kreisenden Welten / Ihres Sonnensystems; noch andre von Milchstrass zu Milchstrass" (2:81; Some travel, like mortal humans on earth to far away / Parts of the ever-sustaining plane, into the nearer moons / Of their planet; others in all-rotating worlds / Of their solar system; others still from milky way to milky way).

³⁴ Numerous descriptions of the Dresdners' suffering during the bombardment are included in 2:223–43: "Underneath the beams of her own house the mother perishes, / The breast-fed infant closely pressed to her bosom / Atop the small boy, strongly nestling up against her hand, / Her back protectively bent — the

future mason will find, when he disturbs the horror while rebuilding / Mother and children, decomposed, a Laocoön group" (2:227). There is also criticism of Frederick, e.g., "You are angry, Muse, at the hero, for ravaging more than hardship / Forces him to" (2:244).

³⁵ See 2:269–70, including "Frederick coins the dictum of the wise men / Carves it in unweathered tables, / So that it may be eternal light and law to the obedient peoples, / So that none of the future princes with a fox's perfidies / Misinterprets you, holy law of the mankind consecrated to God / Or crushes you blasphemously with lion's claws" (2:270).

³⁶ The epic within the epic, even if it repeats points already made, is never *necessarily* just an "unnecessary appendix" (Martin, 239). Before dismissing such a noticeable maneuver and lamenting a supposed lack of talent, one should at least consider a possible reasoning behind it.

³⁷ See Daniel Jenisch, "Hymnus auf das Fest der Freyheit, von der französischen Nazion den 14. Julius 1790 in Paris gefeiert," *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 2.1 (1791): 403–10, and "Die französische Revoluzion, was sie war, und was sie geworden ist. Eine Threnodie," *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 3.3 (1793): 260–75.

³⁸ See Daniel Jenisch, "Probe eines Heldengedichts, Borussias, oder der siebenjährige Krieg in acht Gesängen," *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 1.2 (1790): 276–98 and 329–48.

³⁹ For another rearrangement of the original structure see Martin's discussion of the siege of the Saxon army at Pirna (233).

⁴⁰ On May 3, 1791, after three years of intense debate, the "Four Years' Sjem" produced what is considered Europe's first modern codified constitution.

⁴¹ Jenisch took great interest in the Polish struggle, as is evident from the epilogue to canto 12, his account of the historic developments that accompanied the writing of *Borussias*. In a bitter tone Jenisch recollects Russia's and Prussia's crushing of the Polish reform movement: "»Freedom!« it sounds in the west, »Freedom!«; and »Servitude!« / »Servitude!« sounds the scourge of despots through the air in the East" (2:362); "The French Revolution began: Poland wanted to become free: Russia forbade it" (2:362, footnote).

⁴² Michael Denis, *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa, seit dem Jahr 1760*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Joseph Kurtzböck, 1761).

⁴³ See Johannes Birgfeld, "Kriegspoesie für Zeitungsleser, oder Der Siebenjährige Krieg aus österreichischer Sicht: Michael Denis' *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa seit dem Jahre 1756 im Kontext des zeitgenössischen literarischen Kriegsdiskurses*," in "*Krieg ist mein Lied*": *Der Siebenjährige Krieg in den zeitgenössischen Medien*, ed. Wolfgang Adam and Holger Dainat (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 215–39.

⁴⁴ This was the core of the so-called "Lineartaktik," which was regarded as the centerpiece of warfare throughout the eighteenth century; see Georg Orthenburg, *Waffe und Waffengebrauch im Zeitalter der Kabinettskriege (1650–1792)* (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986), 153–60, and Siegfried Fiedler, *Kriegswesen und*

Kriegführung im Zeitalter der Kabinettskriege (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986).

⁴⁵ See Christoph Heinrich Amthor, "Die triumphirende Reinholds-Burg [. . .]," in *Auserlesene und theils noch nie gedruckte Gedichte [. . .] zusammen getragen und nebst seinen eigenen an das Licht gestellt von Menantes. Erstes Stück*, ed. Christian Friedrich Hunold (Halle: Neue Buchhandlung, 1718), 44; see also Denis 2.

⁴⁶ Samuel Gotthold Lange, "Der Sieg bey Friedberg, Gesungen im Jun. 1745," in *S. G. L. Horatizische Oden und eine Auswahl aus des Quintus Horatius Flaccus Oden fünf Bücher*, ed. Frank Jolles (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1971), 31.

⁴⁷ Johann Friedrich von Cronegk, *Der Krieg. Ode* (place & publisher unknown, 1757), 3.

⁴⁸ Christian Leberecht Heyne, *Anton Wall's Kriegslieder* (Leipzig, 1779), 35.

⁴⁹ Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg, *Kriegeslieder eines Königl. Dänis. Grenadiers bey Eröffnung des Feldzuges 1762* (Place & publisher unknown, 1762), 16.

⁵⁰ For another verbatim quote, compare Jenisch 1:127 "magischer Zirkel" with Archenholz 70; for Jenisch's general tendency to follow Archenholz regarding the military course of events, compare Jenisch 1:79–81 with Archenholz 64–66 or 1:182–84 with Archenholz 110–12.

⁵¹ See "Cf. Mr. v. Archenholz' History of the Seven Years War," in Jenisch, "Friedrich, der große Mann seines Jahrhunderts. Ein lyrisches Gedicht in vier Gesängen vom Herrn Prediger Jenisch. 1st & 2nd canto," *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung* 2 (1789): 246–64, here 254; or compare the lengthy quote on page 49 with Archenholz 129.

⁵² Only Belach's *Nachtgedanken* has similar, but much briefer literary memorials to individuals who died on the battlefield and might therefore be regarded a forerunner of Jenisch; see Andreas Belach, *Nachtgedanken bey einer gefährlichen Reise in Kriegszeiten* (Breslau: Johann Ernst Meyer, 1761), 24.

⁵³ See Jenisch, "D. M. Josephi Secundi. S.," *Deutsche Monatsschrift* 1.3 (1790): 89–93; see also "His ambitious gaze sweeps far astray; / Detects at Germany's border / Belgians, inhabiting a neglected realm, / Living on what they wrench from nature; / Ponders, finds / With the innocent people / Reason for dispute, for war," Daniel Jenisch, *Ausgewählte Texte*, ed. with an afterword by Gerhard Sauer (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1996), 91.

⁵⁴ "The unworthy rule over millions: / Now floating with the breeze of the ever changing prince's mood / Now with the proud longings of a whoring woman, / Now with a favored servant's mean pursuit of glory / Or with a fanatic priest's sacred bloodthirstiness [. . .] / See the flourishing men, ploughers, sons, fathers / Bleeding to death on cruel Mavors' killing fields" (1:157–58).

⁵⁵ See 1:133, where Jenisch once again draws the reader's attention to his deliberately incorrect historic chronology: "Actually the prince [whose death the narrative has just placed among the events of the battle of Kolín] died during the Siege of Prague."

⁵⁶ Jenisch does concede that war might sometimes be justified: “What is victory, and battles resulting from victory, / But fratricide of the human race? Unless the bloody war’s / Goal was noble” (2:296). There can be no doubt, however, as to his general detestation of war as an inhuman and unchristian activity: “All their [the soldiers’] limbs were trembling: after all they were human! / Humans created by you, nature, not for reciprocal murder” (2:322).

⁵⁷ See Hans Peter Herrmann, Hans-Martin Blitz, and Susanna Moßmann, eds., *Machtphantasie Deutschland. Nationalismus, Männlichkeit und Fremdenhaß im Vaterlandsdiskurs deutscher Schriftsteller des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996).

⁵⁸ Dieter Martin, “Klopstocks *Messias* und die Verinnerlichung der deutschen Epik im 18. Jahrhundert,” in *Klopstock an der Grenze der Epochen*, ed. Kevin Hilliard and Katrin Kohl (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995), 113–14.

⁵⁹ See Haberkern, 3; and also Schwartz.

⁶⁰ See Walter Grab, *Friedrich von der Trenck. Hochstapler und Freiheitsmartyrer und andere Studien zur Revolutions- und Literaturgeschichte* (Kronberg im Taunus: Scriptor, 1977).

⁶¹ For an introduction to new research perspectives opened up by the still rather recent concept of *Berliner Klassik*, see Iwan d’Aprile, Martin Disselkamp and Claudia Sedlarz, eds., *Tableau de Berlin. Beiträge zur »Berliner Klassik« (1786–1815)* (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005). For specific information on Jenisch and Berliner Klassik, see Iwan d’Aprile and Conrad Wiedemann, eds., *Daniel Jenisch. Kant-Exeget, Popularphilosoph und Literat in Berlin* (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2010). While Jenisch clearly participated in the strong classicistic orientation that formed one key characteristic of the complex cultural developments specific to Berlin around 1800, it will be necessary to define his place within the broader phenomenon in much greater detail once the *Berliner Klassik* has been researched more extensively. See also the *Berliner Klassik* research project’s webpage at www.berliner-klassik.de/.

Part II: Cultures of War in Classicism and Romanticism

3: Agamemnon on the Battlefield of Leipzig: Wilhelm von Humboldt on Ancient Warriors, Modern Heroes, and *Bildung* through War

Felix Saure

Goethe sitzt in Weimar und dichtet die Iphigenie, draußen tobt die Schlacht von Jena und Auerstädt, sie irritiert ihn, doch er schreibt weiter, Abwegiges, aber Bleibendes, das Parzenlied.

[Goethe sits in Weimar, writing the Iphigenia, the battle of Jena and Auerstedt rages outside; it irritates him but he keeps writing, absurd, but lasting, the song of the Fates.]

— Gottfried Benn, “Drei alte Männer”

Homeric Warriors and Modern Combat Surgery

IN GOTTFRIED BENN’S PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE “Drei alte Männer” (Three Old Men), Goethe is seen as a distanced, Olympian writer who declines to immerse himself in the morally suspect quagmire of current politics.¹ This is not the place to discuss the validity of this poetic statement from the late 1940s — new interpretations paint a different picture of the stance of the “Weimarer Dichterkönig” (poet prince of Weimar) toward and of his involvement in the wars of his time — but Benn certainly formulated a longstanding and influential preconception about German idealism.² German artists and thinkers, so the argument goes, fled from the political landscape of the French Revolution to the Arcadian lands of Greece to consort with tragic gods and supreme artists rather than radical politicians and modern militaries.

Goethe’s close friend, Wilhelm von Humboldt — living in a private museum of ancient art which Berglar calls “a dream of classical Greece reborn on the sandy grounds of the Mark Brandenburg”³ — was one of many German thinkers from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries who spent most of his intellectual existence in ancient Greece. His ardent fascination with Hellas was well-known; throughout his life the aristocrat from Berlin engaged the ancients in a variety of ways: as a linguist, a philosopher

of history, a historian of politics and arts, a theorist of education, and last but not least as a cultural critic. Even today, the name Wilhelm von Humboldt is nearly synonymous with the German intellectual passion for Hellas that sometimes may have become a *Tyranny of Greece over Germany*, as Eliza M. Butler entitled her monograph on German Philhellenism.⁴ Educated by preeminent scholars at his family's castle at Tegel and later at the then leading university of Göttingen, Humboldt had acquired an encyclopedic knowledge of ancient history and culture.⁵ An expert in the Greek language, he even advised Goethe in questions of ancient meter.⁶

Humboldt was not only a man of letters but, as a career diplomat and Prussian minister, deeply involved in international diplomacy.⁷ He was equally at home in his personal library in Berlin, the conference rooms in Vienna, the Prussian court, and even the battlefield of Leipzig, and, as I will show, his experiences on the battleground were at least as formative as those he gained on the diplomatic stage. Seeing how wars were fought after the French Revolution and witnessing how new political ideas and modern technology had shaped the sphere of the military strongly influenced his thoughts about relations between the nation, the army, and the individual soldier. On the battlefield of Leipzig, Humboldt experienced a situation that offered him a strong contrast to his concepts of war, which were based on a specific notion of ancient history, an anthropology determined by German Idealism, and contemporary liberal thinking.

As the sun rose on 20 October 1813, about one hundred thousand soldiers lay dead or wounded on the muddy fields near the Saxon city of Leipzig.⁸ Involving more than half a million troops, the *Völkerschlacht* (battle of nations) there would remain the single largest military confrontation until the First World War. We know from his letters that the well-educated Prussian diplomat witnessed death, dying, looting, and the general chaos of post-battle horror firsthand. Although Joseph Görres later characterized him as "cold and clear as the December sun," a letter to his wife Caroline from 20 October 1813 shows that Humboldt was in fact deeply moved by what he observed:⁹

Es war dies das erste Schlachtfeld, das ich sah, und ich habe nun erst einen Begriff davon. Es liegen noch eine große Menge von Toten darauf, die meisten halb oder ganz nackt ausgezogen, oft mehrere übereinander. Die meisten lagen mit ausgestreckten Armen auf dem Gesicht, wo man erst das Homerische "die Erde mit den Zähnen nehmen" recht versteht und einsieht.¹⁰

[It was the first battlefield I saw and it is only now that I have an idea of it. Many dead men still lie there, most of them partially or completely naked, often lying on top of each other. Most lie face down with their arms stretched out, so that one fully understands Homer's "to bite the dust."]

As the reference shows, Humboldt established a link between his own experience of war and the most iconic notion of war in the European tradition — the *Iliad*. In Homer's epic, Agamemnon, the Greek king and leader of the military expedition to Troy, uses the expression "bite the dust" when, in exchange for sacrificing a bull to Zeus, he pleads with the father of the gods not to end the day before many of Hector's — his enemy's — comrades "mit Geknirsch in die Erde gebissen!" (bitten the dust with gnashing teeth).¹¹ At this point, the literary image of war in ancient Greek literature became an annotation to a specific event in modern Germany. Humboldt evaluated his experience through the eye of a philologist, and his literary knowledge of military violence and suffering strongly affected his perception of the battlefield.

After his experience on the battleground, Humboldt immediately turned to the study of the Hellenic world. Later on the same day he met with Gottfried Hermann, a professor of ancient Greek philology, to discuss a translation of Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* on which he had been working for many years.¹² Humboldt's Homeric remarks about the battlefield, however, were not triggered by his professional projects at the time.¹³ He also did not seek to aestheticize his experience through a classical reference. Instead, the letter cited above emphasizes physical suffering and post-combat body politics. Visiting the battleground in the company of the Austrian diplomat Ludwig von Lebzeltern, Humboldt noticed how a soldier who lay buried under several corpses and appeared to be dead himself moved his hand ever so slightly. Without mentioning either his rank or his nationality, Humboldt described the efforts to save him in great detail: the severe head-wound, the soldier's reaction when spoken to, his painful attempt to stand up with the help of others summoned by Humboldt and his colleague, and finally the fact that he remained silent and quite probably died after being brought to a nearby village for care.¹⁴

Humboldt's letter to Caroline continues with a description of the makeshift hospital set up in St. Thomas's Church:

Den Nachmittag ging ich in der Stadt bei den Verwundeten und Gefangenen herum. In der Thomaskirche liegen an 700 gefangene und verwundete Franzosen, von denen heute abend seit dem 16. und 18. noch keiner verbunden war. Von dem lugubren Anblick der halbdunkeln Kirche mit dem dumpfen Gewinsel und Gestöhn hat man keinen Begriff. (150)

[In the afternoon I walked through the city, among the wounded and the prisoners. About 700 captured and wounded French lay in St. Thomas's Church, as of this evening none of them bandaged since the 16th and 18th. One cannot imagine the sad sight of the penumbrous cathedral filled with a dull whining and moaning.]¹⁵

In Humboldt's epistle, the men "biting the dust" in Homer's telling of the Trojan War and the soldiers who struggled to stay alive on the muddy grounds of the Leipzig battlefield or in the gloomy atmosphere of a central European church merge, because both underwent experiences of extreme physical suffering.

The focus on individual soldiers rather than on the army as a collective entity and the references to the cultural matrix of ancient battle are paradigmatic for Humboldt's thinking about warfare. Even though the concept of the nation informed his writings on politics and history, Humboldt did not primarily conceive of war as a force that purifies the collective body through death and suffering: even in times of conflict, the community does not supersede the individual. In this respect I disagree with David Bell's reading of Humboldt in his seminal study on the transformation of warfare around 1800.¹⁶ Bell, referring only to Humboldt's political essay *The Limits of State Action* (1792),¹⁷ considers him the protagonist of the "new enthusiasts of war," a group including Johann Gottfried Herder, Immanuel Kant, and the rather obscure pedagogue and publisher Johann Valentin Embser (81–82). According to Bell, Humboldt glorified war and claimed that war furthers the progress and growth of a nation, and also focused on the impact of warfare on the collective. In contrast, I argue that Humboldt's ideas about the national significance of war were secondary to his critique of it, which derived from his ideal of individual development.

Humboldt's concept of war was intimately linked with his notion of *Bildung* and with the ideal of the harmonious individuality embodied in the works and deeds of ancient Hellenic poets, politicians, artists — and warriors. For him, as for his English contemporary William Wordsworth, "war is liberating because it is an extraordinary occasion for self-development."¹⁸ In *The Limits of State Action* as well as in other texts about ancient history and anthropology, Humboldt himself clearly distinguished between the effect of war on the individual and the collective. He did indeed note some positive results of war upon the nations involved, but at the same time he sharply criticized modern wars for impeding the development of individual virtues. Being one of the strongest proponents of early liberalism, he clearly put the emphasis on the individual and developed his critical remarks about contemporary warfare and the negative effects of a strong state waging these wars. In the following, I will further explore the connection between Humboldt's notion of modern and ancient warfare, his concepts of *Bildung* and the nation, and the reality of historic and modern wars.¹⁹

The *Bildung* of the Individual and the Nation

Even though it mainly consists of unpublished manuscripts, introductions to books never finished, and letters outlining plans for extensive studies,

Humboldt's work covers a wide range of subjects.²⁰ Amid this diversity, the concept of *Bildung* is the lynchpin connecting his studies of ancient history, his detailed bureaucratic plans for reforming the Prussian educational system, his unpublished poems, his linguistic ideas, and his drafts for a German constitution. Like the aesthetic, philosophical-historical, and socio-political ideas of Schiller, Herder, Hegel, and other thinkers of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany, Humboldt's notion of *Bildung* was the result of a critical analysis of Enlightenment philosophy. As John Wyon Burrow's discussion of his *Limits of State Action* shows, Humboldt perceived Enlightenment thought to be "in a number of contexts unacceptably inhibited, uniform and dominated by concepts too mechanistic and limited in scope to accommodate the full richness of the concrete world and the full range of human potentialities" (xxiv–xxv). For Humboldt, both modernity's focus on rationality and the complex and anonymous structure of the modern state run counter to man's true nature.

In an unfinished text from his early years, Humboldt lamented that the current state of the arts and sciences was characterized by isolated knowledge and fragmented findings:

Der Mathematiker, der Naturforscher, der Künstler, ja oft selbst der Philosoph beginnen nicht nur jetzt gewöhnlich ihr Geschäft, ohne seine eigentliche Natur zu kennen und es in seiner Vollständigkeit zu übersehen, sondern auch nur wenige erheben sich selbst späterhin zu diesem höheren Standpunkt und dieser allgemeineren Uebersicht.²¹

[In our days the mathematician, the natural scientist, the artist, and even the philosopher usually start their business without knowing its true nature and understanding it in its full context. Only a few will later reach a higher vantage point and an overview of their subjects.]

Three decades later Humboldt criticized Friedrich Schlegel's studies of ancient Sanskrit on the same grounds. His respect for the groundbreaking accomplishments of Schlegel's philological studies shows,²² but he sharply criticized the author's "schneidende Systemsucht" (obsession with trenchant systematization; Freese, 423).

In the mid-1790s Humboldt progressed from criticism to constructive proposal with his *Plan einer vergleichenden Anthropologie* (Plan for a Comparative Anthropology). Employing a holistic approach, the new discipline of comparative anthropology would integrate both the results of a variety of empirical methods — for example historical and geographical analysis — and subjective insights derived from poetry and biographical writing.²³ According to him, the systematic application of the principles of enlightened philosophy negatively affects the modern state. That is, the state is an anonymous machine composed of numerous isolated cogs, and although these cogs execute their respective tasks effectively and mechani-

cally, the soulless nature of the state apparatus distracts and alienates men.²⁴ The only way to escape modernity's fatal fragmentation is to develop a well-rounded and harmonious individuality through *Bildung*, which promotes both diversity and unity in the individual and eventually in the entire social body. In *The Limits of State Action*, his classical essay on political liberalism, Humboldt offered the following definition of *Bildung*:

Der wahre Zweck des Menschen — nicht der, welchen die wechselnde Neigung, sondern welchen die ewig unveränderliche Vernunft ihm vorschreibt — ist die höchste und proportionirlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganzen. (64)

[The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed not by changeable desires but by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, is the highest and most proportionate development of his powers into a complete and consistent whole.] (10)

This frequently cited sentence summarizes Humboldt's anthropological theory. It is the yardstick with which he measured past and present social and cultural developments. Here, an individual intent on perfecting himself must engage in the constant pursuit of a unity that transcends the antagonisms inherent in differing interests and skills and results in a harmonious whole. This concept of *Bildung* formed the foundation of Humboldt's thoughts and informed both his cultural critique and his attempts to overcome the deficits of modernity.

All of Humboldt's intellectual endeavors and political theories were centered on this anthropological notion of human development. In *The Limits of State Action* he imagined the state as a subsidiary political framework that does not restrict, but enhances individual potential. For him the question posed by contemporary theorists — “whether the State should provide for the security only, or for the whole physical and moral well-being of the nation” (9) — was based on a fallacy, because a focus on the well-being of the collective would automatically impede individual freedom and development. Thus, the “Staat” (state) — unlike the “nation,” which is a community with common cultural, historical, and linguistic roots²⁵ — was viewed as a function of the individual's needs only and possessed no inherent value. The state's role was limited to providing security and a basic legal and organizational framework for social interactions.²⁶

In spite of his dire warnings about any proactive interference in the name of an abstract collective good, Humboldt did not wish to promote the isolated existence of solitary individuals. Maximum freedom from state intervention was only one element of his anthropology and political philosophy. He was aware that *Bildung* can only be completed through exposure to a “variety of situations,” and such variety can only be achieved in interaction with others.²⁷ Since the “community is the condition and the

preserve of individuality” (Rosenblum, 258), “society” is an indispensable prerequisite of *Bildung*, but unlike the abstract entity of the state, society is a self-organized body of multiple personal relations. Only by balancing freedom with the greatest possible number of social connections and interactions can man as an individual overcome his status as a mere subject of a state and emerge as an integral element of society without giving up his distinctive individuality. Eventually — as in Schiller’s idea of the aesthetic education of man — humanity as a species will develop into a harmonious whole.

Consequently, according to Humboldt the ideal state facilitates exposure to a variety of situations, but this does not mean it has to organize the process of *Bildung* actively. Rather, the development of individuals and society as a whole occurs without deliberate interference, since such interference might promote growth but would more likely prove restrictive and harmful.

Totality of Life, Suffering, and Death: Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jr., and Theodor Körner

Since Humboldt’s notion of *Bildung* presupposes variety, it also includes the experience of hardship, suffering, and even death. Indeed, in Humboldt’s thinking death and suffering are not just tolerated but essential elements of an anthropological and political model intimately related to his perception of ancient Greece. The Hellenic world functions as an ideal because here pain and suffering form an integral part of a harmonious existence. Humboldt even referred to the inclusion of pain, in the form of melancholy, as “gerade das Idealische in ihrer Natur (*Schriften zur Altertumskunde*, 94; exactly the idealistic element of their [the Greeks’] nature).²⁸

Far from describing an idea of merely historical interest, Humboldt defined a constant of human existence, subsuming even his personal experience of pain under this anthropological notion. When his nine-year-old son died during his stay in Rome in the summer of 1803, Humboldt reflected on this loss in numerous letters to friends and colleagues.²⁹ In a letter to Caroline written the following spring, he stated that the true purpose of life is not happiness, but to “exhaust all of human life” and to eventually fulfill one’s destiny (Freese, 402). Here, the consistent and self-reflexive application of the concept of *Bildung* represents a tool with which personal loss can be overcome. A decade later Humboldt reaffirmed this idea, claiming that life “attracted” him because it is a “rich drama in which even pain is a sublime, delightful feeling” (Freese, 561). Finally, one of the didactic letters to Charlotte Diede, written in 1832, joins a detailed account of the advanced state of his Parkinson’s disease with an affirmation of *Bildung*: “Die Entwicklung aller Keime aber, die in der individuellen Anlage eines Menschenlebens liegen, halte ich für den wahren Zweck des

irdischen Daseins, nicht gerade das Glück" (I consider the true aim of our life here on earth to be not happiness, but the cultivation to the full of the talents with which we have been endowed).³⁰

Humboldt's reflections on the importance of pain and suffering not only pertained to his personal experience but also implied a political philosophy. This is evident in a reference to the death of Theodor Körner, a dramatist and poet and son of Christian Gottfried Körner, an important critic and theorist of art, whose home was an intellectual and artistic center in Dresden around 1800. Theodor Körner's rather traditional plays had already garnered success in Vienna, and he was appointed poet to the Viennese court and stood at the threshold of a promising career when he decided to join the Prussian insurrection against the Napoleonic occupation in 1813 as a member of the "Lützowsche Freikorps."³¹ Indeed Humboldt himself, a close friend of Körner's father, recommended the successful playwright as an eager fighter for Prussia in a letter to Prussian quartermaster and military reformer August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (Vienna, 14 March 1813; Freese, 554–55).³²

The "Royal Prussian Free Corps" under the command of Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm von Lützow consisted of unpaid volunteers and was the only unit to accept members from all over Germany, most of whom had an academic background. The corps included such illustrious figures as the early sports enthusiast and propagandist of Germanic values "Turnvater" Jahn, the poet Joseph von Eichendorff, and the founder of the Kindergarten-system, Friedrich Fröbel. As a regular unit of the Prussian Army, the Freikorps was in charge of the so-called "Kleiner Krieg" (small war) as envisioned by the military reformers Gneisenau and Gerhardt von Scharnhorst and propagated by Carl von Clausewitz.³³ Unlike regular and well-ordered armies trained for major battles, the Freikorps — which had great freedom in its organization — aimed to disrupt the communication and logistics of the Napoleonic troops (Portmann-Tinguely, 332–33).³⁴

Interestingly, in his letter to Gneisenau Humboldt underscored his recommendation with a reference to Hellas, noting that the modern army was prejudiced against poets and might even reject an application by the patriotic Spartan poet-warrior Tyrtaeus (14 March 1813; Freese, 555).³⁵ Here he situated the early nineteenth-century playwright Körner in a cultural context with a seventh-century BC poet who, although his biography remains largely unknown, is seen as paradigmatic for an artist whose work is dedicated to the good of the community at war.

As a member of the Lützowsche Freikorps, Körner wrote poems and songs about the fight against Napoleon with the intention of instilling hatred against the enemy and strengthening a German identity defined by a common culture, language, and history (Portmann-Tinguely, 312–15). For example, his "Jägerlied" (Rifleman's Song) includes images reminiscent of Kleist's nationalistic "Ode Germanias an Ihre Kinder" (Germania's Ode

to Her Children), his drama *Hermannsschlacht* (Hermann's Battle; see W. Kittler, 218–55), and Fichte's *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Addresses to the German Nation),³⁶ and was intended to evoke a unified Germany: "Aus Westen, Norden, Süd und Ost [. . .] Vom Oderflusse, Weser, Main, / Vom Elbstrom und vom Vater Rhein / Und aus dem Donautal. / Doch Brüder sind wir allzusamm"; [. . .] Uns knüpft der Sprache heilig Band, / Uns knüpft ein Gott, ein Vaterland, / Ein treues deutsches Blut" (Vv. 6, 8–11, 13–15; From West and North, from South and East [. . .] / From river Oder, Weser, Main / From Elbe and from father Rhine / And from the Danube stream. / We're brothers all together here [. . .] / Bound by our language holy band, / Bound by one God, one Fatherland, / A truly German race).³⁷

In the late summer of 1813, Körner died in a minor encounter with French troops in the Mecklenburg region (Johnston, 154–55). The precise circumstances of his death remain unknown, and his involvement in an obscure military action may not merit attention; however, his enormous posthumous influence and extensive reception history indicate that there was more at stake than Körner's personal bravery. Soon after his death he became, in Otto W. Johnston's words, "the Myth Personified" (143). Like his contemporary Lord Byron, who celebrated the Greek fight for freedom in his song and died while organizing a rebellion in the Balkan country, Körner was seen as a youthful artist who realized the ideas expressed in his poems by sacrificing his life for the anti-Napoleonic cause and for his vision of a unified Germany.³⁸

As a result, Körner's works and the ideas for which he stood were popular in Germany throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and under diametrically opposed ideological circumstances.³⁹ But while Theodor Körner's contemporaries celebrated his sacrifice on the altar of the German nation, Humboldt — who belonged to the generation of Theodor's father — related Körner's death to his concept of individual development:

I have heard people criticize and deplore Körner's death. A man with creative gifts should not have to risk himself, they say. One couldn't speak more shabbily of creativity [. . .]. The true talent and the true spirit that every poet, every genuinely great author needs, stem from his character and are nourished by it. (6 December 1813)⁴⁰

According to Humboldt, Körner's death did not deserve censure; rather, he saw staking one's life in war as the highest expression of human existence. Körner's talent resided not exclusively in his literary work, but in the entirety of his life. He was a "homo ludens," who took life to and ultimately beyond its limits: "For the essence of man's value is that he can risk himself and, when necessary, play freely with his own life" (Cowan, 165). It is noteworthy that Humboldt formulated his ideas about the

meaning of death in battle not as a distanced theorist, but as a father, whose son Theodor had volunteered for the Prussian Guard in March 1813.⁴¹

Just as Humboldt defended the freedom of the individual against state intervention in his essay on *The Limits of State Action*, he sought to shield Körner's death against exploitation in the service of a nationalistic agenda. In order to emphasize the anthropological significance of his statement, he cited the example of Aeschylus, the Greek playwright who fought in the battle of Marathon against the Persian invaders. According to Humboldt, it would be inconceivable for the Greeks to prevent Aeschylus from participation in battle in order to protect him from harm just so he could "finish a couple trimeters more" (Cowan, 165).⁴² Consequently, the Germans should not use Körner's artistic talent as an excuse to disparage his courage and general character. Extraordinary poetic ability did not constitute a reason for exemption from the battlefield.

Humboldt drew on the cultural matrix of ancient Greek history and literature when he articulated his experience of the Leipzig battleground and when he sought to understand the death of the young Körner. The structural analogy of Körner's and Aeschylus's situations is obvious: both were warriors and poets; both fought in a major conflict as non-professional soldiers and citizens of their communities. In addition, both were engaged in a war against an invader perceived as a threat to the traditional order: the German princes and most of their subjects feared the Napoleonic invasion with its radical military and political repercussions, while the Greeks dreaded the Persian superpower. Last but not least, both Körner and Aeschylus represented war against a barbaric enemy as an experience that defines individual and collective identity.

Aeschylus's role in the victorious battles of Marathon and Salamis presented an opportunity to situate Körner in a tradition of poets who defend their communities in times of vital threat, a role that Humboldt emphasized in his letter of recommendation to Gneisenau.⁴³ But on the occasion of the poet's death, Humboldt's interpretation was aligned with his liberal ideology and explicitly challenged the contemporary nationalistic discourse. He defended Körner's death against monopolization in the name of a collective and instead presented it as a meaningful path toward self-formation of character. Körner's violent death was the tragic outcome of a seamless process of *Bildung* and thus homologous with Humboldt's historically grounded apotheosis of individual freedom.

Chess Games and Noble Beauty

Humboldt's focus on the individual within the cultural matrix of German Graecomania is also evident in his general remarks about ancient and mod-

ern wars. His concept of war, which comprised cultural criticism, socio-political utopianism, and historical analysis, was designed to support his idea of *Bildung*: the contrast between the harmonious existence of man in ancient times and the disorientation and even destructiveness of modern life played itself out in different conceptualizations of war.

Humboldt condemned violent confrontations that alienate individuals from their anthropological, moral-ethical, historical, and personal purpose. The second chapter of *The Limits of State Action* expands on individual freedom and the encounter with the world in all its variety as preconditions of the idealized process of *Bildung* and cites, among other examples, the experience of war: “as the conflicts of warfare are more honourable than the fights of the arena, [. . .] the struggles of exasperated citizens [are] more glorious than the hired efforts of mercenaries” (*Limits*, 13–14). A glance at the original shows that John Wyon Burrow’s translation omits an important aspect of Humboldt’s text. The wording “*getriebene Miethsoldaten*” (*Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 67 [my emphasis]; mercenaries forced into service) refers to a force *imposed upon* the “mercenaries.” The helpless situation of these soldiers forced to fight by an external power prompted Humboldt’s critique — not the character of the soldier of fortune but the systematic abrogation of individual freedom, which included the freedom to participate in or abstain from battle. His target is not the devastation wrought by an absolutist army in action, but the predicament of the individual in the rationally organized military of the enlightened eighteenth century.

Humboldt’s reference to “*getriebene Miethsoldaten*” alludes to an important contemporary debate about the military politics of several German princes.⁴⁴ The literature of the period critically reflected the practice of lending troops, especially to the King of England, most famously in Friedrich Schiller’s *Kabale und Liebe* (Intrigue and Love) of 1784.⁴⁵ In 1775 Friedrich Leopold zu Stolberg, just before he set out for Switzerland with the young Goethe, had published his critical “Lied eines Deutschen in fremden Kriegsdiensten” (Song of a German in Foreign Military Service), a literary hymn to liberty and love of the fatherland in the Klopstockian tradition.⁴⁶ Christian Daniel Schubart’s journal *Deutsche Chronik* (German Chronicle) reported on soldiers who were “exported” to America and South Africa, and he also wrote the popular “Kaplied” (Cape Song), about soldiers who had been sold to the Dutch East India Company.⁴⁷ Ulrich Bräker’s literary autobiography *Der arme Mann im Tockenburg* (The Poor Man in Tockenburg) appeared in 1789, the year of the French Revolution and includes a detailed account of the deprived Swiss author’s forced service in the Prussian army and his eventual escape.⁴⁸ Having been recruited by the Hessians, the well-educated Johann Gottfried Seume documented his experiences as a mercenary fighting in the British Army in his fragmentary *Mein Leben* (My Life), one of the most popular

autobiographies of his time.⁴⁹ The Alsatian pedagogue and author Gottlieb Conrad Pfeffel, who himself ran an “École militaire” or “Académie militaire” and is well known for his didactic fables,⁵⁰ published a poem on the occasion of the American fight for independence which also denounced the German sovereigns’ practice of sending their troops overseas (“Lied eines Neger-Sklaven im Anfang des nordamerikanischen Krieges” / Song of a Negro Slave at the Beginning of the North-American War). And in 1797 Herder wrote the long poem *Der deutsche Nationalruhm* (German National Honor), in which he criticized the Germans who — “*slavishly obedient*” (emphasis in original) — serve in foreign armies in North America and South Africa.⁵¹

Friedrich Christian Laukhard’s *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben* (Life and Destinies as Described by Himself) contains a report of a journey through the Hessen-Kassel area in 1776 in which he mentions “half naked children [. . .] begging and complaining their fathers were sent to America.”⁵² Laukhard’s autobiography was popular at the end of the eighteenth century, in part because of the author’s vivid description of the lives of the lower classes.⁵³ It also offers a trenchant critique of the modern army’s machinery and the mercenary system as seen through the eyes of the soldiers of revolutionary France (293–300).

Laukhard’s multivolume work also includes an account of his life as a common Prussian soldier — he had joined the military out of financial and social despair — during the campaign of 1792.⁵⁴ He contrasts the disciplined Prussian and other German troops with the less orderly but enthusiastic French units who, he reports, were fervently devoted to their cause, and possessed “iron patience,” while the German mercenaries complained readily when stressed or strained (Laukhard, 294, 297). The French troops — who referred to themselves as “volunteers” rather than “soldiers” — actively discussed current politics and showed great patriotism (298). At the same time the common French soldier, unlike his German counterpart, was not at the mercy of his officer nor exposed to humiliating or cruel punishments like running the gauntlet; delinquent common soldiers and officers were treated alike, and soldiers were trained “without cursing, swearing, beating and thrashing” (298–99).⁵⁵

Even though Laukhard compared the French army with the German military, nationality was of little concern to him. His detailed and passionate account highlights a new type of military identity embodied by the French revolutionary troops: a soldier, liberated from the systematic drill, line-fighting, and rational deployment of professional soldiers typical of the army of the Enlightenment, motivated by patriotism rather than careerism, an independent agent rather than executor of higher orders. The post-enlightened soldier was a member of an army, itself an integral part of the nation. He was an armed citizen, not a subject of the absolutist state or an employee of a military contractor.

The new soldier was self-confident, patriotic, and enthusiastic about the mission of his army and the nation he served. He was, in the words of Carl von Clausewitz, not “just a machine,”⁵⁶ but a soldier fit for the new “war of the people”: “Der Krieg war urplötzlich wieder eine Sache des Volkes geworden” (The war had suddenly become an issue of the people again).⁵⁷

Laukhard’s description of German soldiers and his vision of a new warrior, both based on personal experience, resemble Humboldt’s critique of the modern “machine-like” soldier (*Limits*, 43). But while Laukhard’s new, “post-machine-like” soldier was derived from and tailored to the ideology of the French Revolution, which Laukhard embraced wholeheartedly, Humboldt saw the events in France in a far more critical light. He was especially doubtful whether such radical changes were sustainable in the long term.⁵⁸ Interestingly, both writers compared the French soldiers with Greek warriors, Laukhard likening the revolutionary soldier to the “noble defenders of Greece” who were driven by “love of their fatherland” (296), and Humboldt seeing Hellas as the home of self-determined and community-conscious warriors but believing the new French Republic to be artificial and machine-like — hence “modern” in the most negative sense (*Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 34–37, 40). In light of his primarily negative perception of the French Revolution, Humboldt’s ideal soldier could not be the French *sans-culotte*; his critique of the military, however, resembles Laukhard’s.

In his *Geschichte des Verfalls und Unterganges der griechischen Freistaaten* (History of the Decline and Fall of the Greek City States), Humboldt leveled his criticism at the alienating and mechanical nature of an impersonal system of command and control. The essay describes eighteenth-century wars as a “bloody game of chess” played by enlightened sovereigns and different from any violent confrontation in ancient times:

Es war damals noch nicht daran zu denken, dass der Krieg, wie im 18. Jahrhundert [. . .] gewissermassen bloss wie ein blutiges Schachspiel geführt worden wäre; die Gefahr triff jeden Einzelnen [. . .] jeder Einzelne [musste] sich ihr entgegenstellen. (*Schriften zur Altertumskunde und Ästhetik*, 81; cf. *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 100–101)

[In those times it was unthinkable to wage war — as was done in the eighteenth century — as if it were a mere bloody game of chess; [in those times] the violence affected each individual [. . .] and each individual had to confront it. (*Limits*, 43–44)]

Humboldt employed the traditional allegory of chess as the “game of kings” — common in pictorial and literary representations of the eighteenth century⁵⁹ — to underline the importance of individual freedom even in times of war. To Humboldt, eighteenth-century soldiers were isolated

pieces in a political game played by aristocrats, while the soldiers of antiquity were independent and self-determined in their approach to war; war in classical Greece was not a “mere game,” but instead affected each individual directly, and the Greek politico-legal system did not filter or reinforce, or organize the use of violence. When we read these remarks against the background of Humboldt’s ideas about the relationship between the “Staat” and the individual, it becomes obvious that Humboldt denied the modern state the right to declare and wage war in an absolutist way — however “enlightened.” In his view the state should not act as an autonomous entity because its abstract demands would stand in opposition to individual rights.

Humboldt elaborated on the differences between ancient and modern warfare in the fifth chapter of *The Limits of State Action*, entitled “Über die Sorgfalt des Staats für die Sicherheit gegen auswärtige Feinde” (On the Solicitude of the State for Security against Foreign Enemies). Here he focused on how antiquity and modernity conceived of the relation between the individual and the collective body and concluded that the “highest beauty” of the “noble character of the warrior” could only exist in antiquity (*Limits*, 43–44). In contrast, the modern organization of armies and of warfare in general automatically widened the gap between the individual soldier and the military unit; the modern soldier sacrificed his freedom and became “machine-like” (43). He did not live freely but was kept alive as a human resource for the future martial needs of his superiors, that is, the state or an officer. The soldier’s existence was defined not by his — potentially heroic — actions on the battlefield, but by his integration in an impersonal system of human, technological, and bureaucratic vectors.

The limitations and one-sidedness of such a system were reflected in the ethical profile of the modern professional soldier: his “warlike spirit” was not tempered by the “highest peaceful virtues” nor his “military discipline” balanced by the “highest feeling of freedom.” Thus, his “machine-like existence” was constantly in danger of degenerating into “wild and lawless ferocity” on the one hand and “slavery” on the other (43–44). In his critique, Humboldt warned that this new kind of soldier was not a “reluctant killer” tamed by habits inculcated by civil society — a concept Harpham elaborates on in a recent article about Western troops today.⁶⁰ Rather, he was an unthinking destroyer unaware of his status as a small cog in the large machinery of a state and its administration.

Standing armies, the organizational setting for the modern soldier, further increased the sense of fragmentation and alienation. Since the modern army was both an all-embracing totality and an anonymous collective to be used like a piece in a game of chess, it did not allow for a process of *Bildung*: “Moreover, these [standing armies] and other modern methods of warfare in general are very far from ideal for promoting human culture” (*Limits*, 43). As appendices of the modern bureaucratic “Staat,” standing

armies were not the expression of a temporary “spirit of war,” but a *perpetuum mobile*, like the administration they served. They develop a life of their own and “carry war [. . .] into the very bosom of peace” (*Limits*, 44).

Humboldt did not object to the violent nature of war itself, but sought to avert the danger of *constant* militarization of part or even the whole of modern society. Militarization implies one-sidedness and could not be reconciled with his anthropologically founded educational (*bildungstheoretische*) project. He saw war as “salutary and necessary”⁶¹ when it enabled the individual to experience “situations in which contrasting extremes are most closely and variously intermingled.” Thus war had the “most interesting and improving” effects (*Limits*, 43) *only* if it was a *temporary* condition of society *as a whole*. Its violent spirit should inspire every member of society as long as it remained limited to periods of actual conflict.

Humboldt’s critique of the modern army was analogous to his notion of the organic national structure of ancient Greece.⁶² He believed that wars promote state formation but are neither the only nor the most important means to advance national spirit. His ideal nation is not built on war; instead he explicitly condemned aggressive foreign policy. An inevitable war has to be fought, and no state should “forcibly interfere to prevent it,” but states should never “seek pretexts for war” (*Limits*, 44–45).⁶³

Since Humboldt favored an organic approach, his ideal nation would prepare for war in a rather old-fashioned way, refraining from “all positive institutions calculated to prepare for war” and instead fostering individual preparedness. Training for war — insofar as it is necessary at all — would focus on the individual citizens’ potential and willingness to defend their nation; thus, military training would include “not only the skill, daring, and subordination of the soldier, but animate those under its discipline with the spirit of true warriors” (*Limits*, 45). Again, Humboldt’s vision of the ideal soldier does not highlight the power of the army organized around the eighteenth-century notion of effective use of troops and material, but rather the freedom and *Bildung* of each citizen.

Humboldt did not solve the conflict between “subordination” and “freedom” or between “discipline” and “noble-mindedness” (*Limits*, 45). The list of diverging qualities he attributed to his ideal soldier is reminiscent of the Prussian debate about military reform following the victories of the French revolutionary armies. Wolf Kittler has shown how “absolute subordination” and “absolute spontaneity” became the cornerstones of a discourse involving officers, politicians, and poets alike (283, 362). However, while many ideas for military reform were developed after the defeat at Jena and Auerstedt or at least after 1800, Humboldt’s remarks *On the Solicitude of the State for Security against Foreign Enemies* had already been published separately in 1792 in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*.⁶⁴

It is noteworthy that Humboldt's critique of mercenaries and of standing armies as the institutional extension of the professional soldier resembles the late Kant's thoughts on modern conflicts in his essay "Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf" (Project for a Perpetual Peace), first published in 1795.⁶⁵ The third "preliminary article" of *Perpetual Peace* — the structure of Kant's text mimics a contemporary peace treaty, which adds an ironic dimension to his work⁶⁶ — states that "standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time be totally abolished [because] they incessantly menace other states [. . .]" (4–5). In the second "article" Kant also condemned the practice of lending troops to another state if there is no common enemy: "it is forbidden to every state to let troops to another state, against an enemy not common to both" (4). In his treatise Kant urged the same argument as Humboldt: a soldier in a standing army is abused "as an instrument or machine" because his sole purpose is to kill or be killed; however, this is "incompatible with the right which nature has given to every one over his own person" (5).⁶⁷

Humboldt was an early and critical reader of Kant's essay. In two letters to Friedrich Schiller (30 October and 11 December 1795), he called *Perpetual Peace* "not very important" (*Briefwechsel*, 205 and 257) and opined that the essay's "brilliant" language was the only accomplishment worth mentioning. The text "made no great impression," because most of the preliminary ideas had already been developed by "Abbé St. Pierre" — Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre's *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, published in Utrecht in 1713 and popularized by Rousseau in his *Extrait du Projet de paix perpétuelle de M. Abbé de Saint-Pierre*, which appeared in 1761.

Unlike Kant, Humboldt situated his assessment of the current state of the military in a broad political and historical context. Both thinkers agreed that service in a professional army is conducive to alienation, but only Humboldt presented an alternative: "the highest beauty [of the] noble character of the [ancient] warrior" (*Limits*, 43–44). Again, his thoughts on war and warriors were intricately intertwined with his anthropology, his cultural criticism of the alienating effects of modern life, and above all his historical utopia of a life in harmony in ancient Greece.

A War on Two Fronts: Humboldt's Ideas between Remnants of Eighteenth-Century State Ideology and Emerging Romantic Nationalism

As a theorist, Humboldt fought a war on two fronts. On the one hand he opposed conservative thinkers who considered any militia or people's army potentially revolutionary and thus a threat to the state. One of those think-

ers was Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, who belonged neither to the generation of the status-conscious absolutist elite of the Friderician army nor to that of the professionally trained career officers of the reform period following the disastrous Prussian defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806.⁶⁸ He worked tirelessly at court and in the field to improve the military system during the fight against Napoleon.⁶⁹ Looking back on his own efforts, however, Marwitz, who emerged as the most prominent spokesman for aristocratic resistance to military reform, vehemently rejected any national or people's armies.

During the Napoleonic Wars, citizen militias were a hotly contested issue in Prussia and Germany. While some felt that arming a substantial portion of the civilian population presented a strategic advantage, others considered it an incalculable political risk.⁷⁰ Clausewitz, for instance, one of the foremost theorists of modern warfare and a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, supported a people's army for strategic reasons (Strachan, 50–51). Unlike Clausewitz, Marwitz — who served as commander of a “Landwehrbrigade,” a local militia unit, during the anti-Napoleonic uprising — criticized the idea of a nation in arms in his memoirs, written in the 1830s:

Es ist überhaupt nur ein Blendwerk, von den Ideologen aufgestellt, daß nur die Nationalität und die Vaterlandsliebe (bei dem großen Haufen!) gute Kriegsheere erzeuge, gegen welche die sogenannten Söldner von Hause aus zurückständen [. . .]. Alle diese [Söldnerheere] besiegten die gegenüberstehenden Nationalheere.⁷¹

[In general, it is only make-belief, set up by ideologists, that only nationality and love of one's country (of such a crowd!) make good armies to which by nature the so-called mercenaries take second place (. . .). All these (mercenary armies) defeated the opposing national armies.]

Marwitz believed that “such a crowd” was incapable of patriotic feeling, that only “sublime souls” could love the fatherland, that the crowd could be loyal only to the local lord — for example, to a leader of a *Landwehrbrigade* such as Marwitz himself. Without this traditional bond, “we will see soldiers' rebellions and revolutions.” Hence, according to Marwitz, the insurrection against Napoleonic rule in 1813 was motivated by an ardent desire for revenge, not by any positive feelings toward the nation or the country.⁷²

The individual as the subject of *Bildung* and the crucial actor in war is absent from Marwitz's paradigm of violent conflicts, and he denied the importance of the nation as the decisive collective entity in times of war, thus differing from his Romantic contemporaries, who accorded the “nation,” not “such a crowd,” a primary, sacrosanct role in war. Marwitz's reflections were indebted to the enlightened model of the soldier; he

abstracted from the individual as well as from metaphysical entities such as the historically-ethnically founded nation, and thought in terms of rationally governed states and their chess-like “fighting elements.” As we have seen, Humboldt was opposed to the late-absolutist focus on the sovereign and the enlightened state that characterizes Marwitz’s thinking, but he also refused to attribute intrinsic value to the nation and did not share in the aggressive furor that inspired many of his contemporaries. While many authors incited the Germans to fight a merciless nationalistic guerrilla war for the people,⁷³ Humboldt insisted on the individual as the absolute criterion against which any action of the state or nation should be judged.

While some Romantic authors called for immediate action, others were content to theorize the new world order and its wars. The first group comprised such diverse writers as Theodor Körner, Ernst Moritz Arndt, and Heinrich von Kleist, who, in their poems and essays, tried to spur hatred against Napoleon and the French and promoted a concept of society as an emotional community, not a rational order. The second group was most prominently represented by Adam Müller.⁷⁴ In a letter to Goethe in the spring of 1810, Humboldt called Müller, who held lectures about the Prussian state in the French-occupied capital, “a real opposition party,” but also “a smart head who deprives himself of what would naturally come to him if he were reasonable.”⁷⁵ In a letter to Christian Gottfried Körner dated 15 July 1811, when both Humboldt and Müller were in Vienna as Prussian diplomats,⁷⁶ Humboldt accused Müller of intellectual simplicity (“Leichtigkeit”) and of being incapable of “thorough analysis of the [intellectual] subjects per se” (Freese, 540). Finally, Humboldt wrote to Friedrich August Wolf that Müller’s “direction [of thinking] is so modern that our ways won’t easily meet” (3 July 1812).⁷⁷

Humboldt’s criticism notwithstanding, Müller was one of the intellectual leaders of the Romantic movement, which sought to transcend the divide between politics and art, the individual and the collective, and religion and the state. Romantic thinking envisioned a truly revolutionary new order which would not only overcome the deficits of the old world of enlightened absolutism, but also offer an alternative to the current project of the American and French revolutions. Like the Romantic project, Müller’s works cover aesthetics as well as politics and social theory.⁷⁸ As a theorist of society, he developed a concept of war that focused on the collective.

In 1809 Müller published his *Elemente der Staatskunst* (Elements of the Art of Statecraft), which was based on lectures given to a circle of politicians and diplomats in Dresden in the years 1808 and 1809. His all-embracing theory of politics, nation, and society focused on two crucial points: first, the non-mechanical nature of the state, a premise so central to his thinking that he addressed it in the very first paragraph of his multivolume work: “Aber wer nennt den Staat eine Maschine, und seine Glieder totes Räderwerk!” (Müller, 7; But who calls the state a machinery

and its parts a dead mechanical work!; see also 90); and second, a “totality” seeking to integrate each individual into the “enlarged family” of the state and largely deny individual rights (Müller, 59–70; 21–34; 112; see also Portmann-Tinguely, 16–9; 22–23; 386). To Müller, “*der Mensch ist nicht zu denken außerhalb des Staates*” (23, emphasis in original; the existence of the individual man is inconceivable outside the state).

Müller regarded war as an inevitable event in the history of any nation, not only “natural” (11) but also necessary, because neither war nor peace offers the full range of human experience. Indeed, war undergirds the very existence of society since a real “civil society” can only be forged during the extraordinary challenge of war and external threat (9, 52–53). Müller sharply criticized conventional notions of war, the strict bifurcation of social life into a civil and a military sector (24–25) and the organizational and mental preparation for war. He condemned the professional army in the enlightened tradition since “*der Krieg ist und bleibt bloßes Gewerbe einer einzelnen Zunft, und wird nicht zur Nationalangelegenheit*” (11; war is and remains the mere business of a single guild and does not become a national issue).⁷⁹ In its positive form war, as Müller defined it, is a violent confrontation between two “Nationalkräfte” (national powers) which affects every single member of the respective communities. Since everyone is involved, the “idea of the nation” becomes clear and obvious to all citizens. A peace after such a war is a “peace par excellence” and not a “dead peace,” the result of depersonalized negotiations between sovereigns (52–53). The “spirit of peace and weapons” belong together and form a dynamic necessary to all nations. In contrast, a war that is initiated by a sovereign and not willed by the whole of society can only be destructive and usually spirals out of control (151; also 108, 296, and 360).

Müller’s critique of modern wars as they were fought by professional eighteenth-century armies bears a striking resemblance to Humboldt’s ideas. However, despite the similarities in wording and phrases, Humboldt’s and Müller’s concepts of society were fundamentally different. While Müller replaced the abstract state of the Enlightenment with a new idea of national communities, Humboldt focused on the individual. His concept of self-formation derived from his notion of the Hellenic ideal of individuality. Here, individuality comprises a totality consisting of myriad and various experiences. Thus, in ancient Greece, war was a formative constituent of individual development. The security policies and military actions of the competing city-states enabled and fostered the individualized experience of war, which was a state of collective violence that affected every citizen directly. The “highest beauty” of the “nobler characteristics of the warrior” was a result of his dual existence as a soldier and a civilian (Humboldt, *Limits*, 43). Fighting was not relegated to a separate segment of society and its professional cadre of military functionaries who devoted their careers and lives to warfare; it offered the citizen soldier the

opportunity to add another, albeit extreme, experience to his individual process of *Bildung*. In Humboldt's view, wars did not originate in the demonization of the enemy, nor were they total wars for the sake of a teleological, religious, or ethnic absolute such as found its poetic expression in Romantic poems and its ideological legitimization in the idea of the "organically structured nation" as an extension of the family. Based on his vision of the Hellenic warrior and ancient warfare, Humboldt's concept of warfare offered an anthropologically and philosophically founded alternative to the cold effectiveness of an enlightened military without embracing the emerging Romantic celebration of the excessively belligerent nation.

Notes

¹ Gottfried Benn, "Drei alte Männer. Zwei Gespräche [1948]," in *Szenen/Dialoge/Das Unaufhörliche/Gespräche und Interviews/Nachträge/Medizinische Schriften*, ed. Holger Hof, vol. 7.1 of *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Gerhard Schuster and Holger Hof (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003), 125. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

² See Gerhart Hoffmeister, "The French Revolution and Prose Fiction: Allegorization of History and its Defeat by Romance," in *Romantic Prose Fiction*, ed. Gerald Gillespie, Manfred Engel, and Bernard Dieterle (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2008), 5.

³ Peter Berglar, *Wilhelm von Humboldt*, 7th ed. (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996), 133.

⁴ Eliza M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence Exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1935); an abridged German translation is available under the title *Deutsche im Banne Griechenlands* (Berlin: Der Neue Geist, 1948).

⁵ See Paul R. Sweet, *Wilhelm von Humboldt: A Biography*, 2 vols. (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1978), 3–81; Berglar, 20–22; Heinz Steinberg, *Wilhelm von Humboldt* (Berlin: Stapp, 2001), 8–10; Tilman Borsche, *Wilhelm von Humboldt* (Munich: Beck, 1990), 21; Herbert Scuria, *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Werden und Wirken* (Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1976), 22–26; and Daniel Kehlmann, *Die Vermessung der Welt* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2005), 19–26.

⁶ Tilman Borsche, "Wilhelm von Humboldt," in *Personen, Sachen, Begriffe A–K*, ed. Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Regine Otto, vol. 4.1 of *Goethe-Handbuch*, ed. Bernd Witte et al. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998), 504.

⁷ See Gordon A. Craig, "Wilhelm von Humboldt als Diplomat," in *Die Politik der Unpolitischen: Deutsche Schriftsteller und die Macht 1770–1871*, trans. Karl Heinz Siber (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1996), 111–35.

⁸ See Eckart Kleßmann, ed., *Die Befreiungskriege in Augenzeugenberichten* (Munich: dtv, 1973), 160–95; Christopher Clark, *Preußen: Aufstieg und Niedergang*

1600–1947, trans. Richard Barth, Norbert Juraschitz, and Thomas Pfeiffer (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2007), 423–29.

⁹ Humboldt also wrote a sonnet focusing on his “inner storms”; see sonnet no. 8 and commentary in Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Kleine Schriften, Autobiographisches, Dichtungen, Briefe, Kommentare und Anmerkungen zu Band 1–5, Anhang*, vol. 5 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*, ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 2nd, rev. and enlarged ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 170. This corresponds to no. 1088 of 23 December 1834 in Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Gedichte*, ed. Albert Leitzmann, vol. 9 of *Abt. I: Werke von Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. *Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: B. Behr’s Verlag [Friedrich Feddersen], 1912), 428–29. See also the editor’s introduction in Marianne Cowan, ed., *Humanist without Portfolio: An Anthology of the Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 1963), 16.

¹⁰ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Federn und Schwerter in den Freiheitskriegen: Briefe von 1812–1815*, Vol. 4 of *Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen*, ed. Anna von Sydow, 7 vols. (Berlin: Mittler, 1910), 149.

¹¹ Homer, *Ilias, Odyssee*, trans. Johann Heinrich Voss (Essen: Emil Vollmer, 1996), 2: vs. 410–18.

¹² See Horst Rüdiger, “Wilhelm von Humboldt als Übersetzer,” *Imprimatur* 7 (1936/37): 79–96, and Hellmut Flashar, “Wilhelm von Humboldt und die griechische Literatur,” in *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Vortragszyklus zum 150. Todestag*, ed. Bernfried Schlerath (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), 86. Flashar calls the connection between Humboldt’s visit to the battleground and his discussion with Hermann “uncanny” (gespenstisch), but he does not elaborate on it. Humboldt’s introduction to his translation of *Agamemnon*, which contains important statements about his theory of translation and his philosophy of language, as well as a paradigmatic remark about the French reception of antique texts, is partially reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, 137–45. Humboldt’s contemporaries found the translation, which tries to capture the rhythm of the original, rather difficult to read (see commentary, *Kleine Schriften*, 649). Today it is of only historical and philological interest.

¹³ See *Federn und Schwerter*, letter 76, 150. In Leipzig he referred to the time he spent translating the *Agamemnon* as a period when both he and his wife were living a “more idealistic” life less touched by reality (*Federn und Schwerter*, letter 78, 22 October 1813, 152–53).

¹⁴ See *Federn und Schwerter*, letter 76, 20 October 1813: “Wie wir an einem Ort waren, wo mehrere Tote lagen, bemerkte ich, daß ein scheinbar Toter noch eine Hand rührte. Wir ritten heran, er hatte eine starke Kopfwunde, aber zuckte noch. Wir ließen Leute herankommen, und obgleich er gar kein Zeichen gegeben hatte, daß er unsere Bemühungen für ihn hörte oder achtete, so fühlte er nicht so bald, daß man ihn anfaßte und ihm half, als er alle Kraft zusammennahm und sich mit aufhalf. Wir brachten ihn ins Dorf, er sprach aber gar nicht und ist vermutlich doch gestorben” (149–50).

¹⁵ Leipzig was not the first time Humboldt was confronted with the dismal practices of eighteenth-century medicine. He had become chief of the state medical system

early in 1810, and in a letter to his wife he mentioned a conference at the Berlin public hospital Charité about the extermination of scabies. This nasty illness, he wrote, had spread during the war. Humboldt had witnessed how a lack of linen had worsened the situation in the Charité; see his letter to Caroline, Berlin, 27 February 1810, in Rudolf Freese, ed., *Wilhelm von Humboldt, Sein Leben und Wirken, dargestellt in Briefen, Tagebüchern und Dokumenten seiner Zeit*, 2nd, completely revised and altered ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986), 510. Two decades earlier Humboldt had taken detailed notes of the drastic sanitary and medical conditions in the hospital Hôtel-Dieu de Paris in the diary of his journey to the revolutionary capital in the summer of 1789 (*Kleine Schriften*, 41–44).

¹⁶ David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare As We Know It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003).

¹⁷ Substantial parts of "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen" appeared in 1792 in different journals (*Neue Thalia* and *Berlinische Monatsschrift*), but the complete text was published no earlier than 1851; see *Kleine Schriften*, 299–301. Further citations of this text are taken from Wilhelm von Humboldt, *The Limits of State Action*, ed. and trans. John Wyon Burrow (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993). The German text is taken from *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, vol. 1 of *Werke*.

¹⁸ See Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Romantic Militarism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43, no. 2 (1982): 251 and 256–58.

¹⁹ On Humboldt and war see Christina Sauter-Bergerhausen, "Vom 'Blutigen Krieger' zum 'friedlichen Pflüger': Staat, Nation und Krieg in Wilhelm von Humboldts 'Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen'," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 12 (2002): 211–62; and Clemens Menze, "Der Krieg unter der Idee der Bildung: Zu Wilhelm von Humboldts Kriegsverständnis," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 75 (1999): 325–37.

²⁰ Humboldt himself characterized his way of working as a focus on "tun" (doing) not "Taten" (deeds) and on "Lernen" (learning), not "Hervorbringen" (producing); see Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Briefe*, ed. Wilhelm Rößle (Munich: Hanser: 1952), 422.

²¹ Humboldt, "Theorie der Bildung des Menschen," in *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, vol. 1. of *Werke in fünf Bänden*, ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), 234. The title of the fragmentary essay, which was probably written in 1794 or 1795, is from the first editor, Albert Leitzmann.

²² See Humboldt, "Einleitung zum Kawi-Werk (Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts)," in *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, vol. 3. of *Werke in fünf Bänden*, ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 8th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996), 515n1.

²³ "Geschichtsschreiber, Biographen, Reisebeschreiber, Dichter, Schriftsteller aller Art, selbst den speculativen Philosophen nicht ausgenommen, enthalten Data zu

dieser Wissenschaft" (*Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 337); see also Hans-Josef Wagner, *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Anthropologie und Theorie der Menschenkenntnis* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 98–100.

²⁴ Cf. "Men are neglected for objects, and creative powers for results. A political community, organized and governed according to this system, resembles an agglomerated mass of living but lifeless instruments of action and enjoyment, rather than a multitude of active and enjoying energies" (Humboldt, *Limits*, 31).

²⁵ Angelika Rüter, "'Individuum,' 'Nation,' 'Staat' — Zum Status der Begriffe im Werk Wilhelm von Humboldts," in *Multum — non multa?: Studien zur "Einheit der Reflexion" im Werk Wilhelm von Humboldts*, ed. Peter Schmitter (Münster: Nodus, 1991), 77.

²⁶ Unsurprisingly, libertarian thinkers today are attracted by this notion of freedom and make *The Limits of State Action* (and not the *Attempt to Define the Legal Limits of Government*, as Humboldt's text is called in a 1965 translation by Marianne Cowan) one of their historical and theoretical flagships (see Liberty Fund, "Online Library of Liberty").

²⁷ "Freedom is the first and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development [i.e., *Bildung*] presupposes; but there is besides another essential — intimately connected with freedom, it is true — a variety of situations" (*Limits*, 10).

²⁸ See also the fragmentary "Latium und Hellas oder Betrachtungen über das classische Alterthum," in *Schriften zur Altertumskunde und Aesthetik: Die Vasken*, vol. 2 of *Werke*, 44–45.

²⁹ See Karl Grube, *Wilhelm von Humboldts Bildungsphilosophie: Versuch einer Interpretation* (Halle an der Saale: Akademischer Verlag, 1935), 56, and Siegfried A. Kaehler, *Wilhelm von Humboldt und der Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte deutscher Lebensgestaltung um 1800* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1927), 52–53.

³⁰ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Briefe an eine Freundin*, ed. Joachim Lindner (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1986), 287. Humboldt had met Charlotte Diede, the daughter of a pastor, rather briefly at the spa of Bad Pyrmont in 1788. Thirty years later, Charlotte wrote him asking for advice and help in financial matters, and they corresponded until his death. In 1847 Diede published a selected and revised collection of the letters, which would soon become popular as didactic reading for young women in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and enjoyed multiple editions. A first English translation, under the title *Letters of Wilhelm von Humboldt to a Female Friend*, was published as early as 1849 (trans. Catharine M. A. Couper, 2 vols. London: John Chapman).

³¹ For an analysis of the concept of war in Körner's works, see Albert Portmann-Tinguely, *Romantik und Krieg: Eine Untersuchung zum Bild des Krieges bei deutschen Romantikern und "Freiheitssängern": Adam Müller, Joseph Görres, Friedrich Schlegel, Achim von Arnim, Max von Schenkendorf und Theodor Körner* (Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitäts-Verlag, 1989), 298–355; for the decisions leading to Körner's enlistment, see 325–33.

³² See also Steinberg, *Wilhelm von Humboldt*, 92.

³³ See Wolf Kittler, *Die Geburt des Partisanen aus dem Geist der Poesie: Heinrich von Kleist und die Strategie der Befreiungskriege* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1987), 218–55.

³⁴ See also Klaus Latzel, *Vom Sterben im Krieg: Wandlungen in der Einstellung zum Soldatentod vom Siebenjährigen Krieg bis zum II. Weltkrieg* (Warendorf: Fahlbusch, 1988), 39; and Clark, *Preußen*, 400–447.

³⁵ “Sie wissen aber selbst, verehrungswürdigster Herr Obrist, welch übles Vorurteil die Dichtkunst oft bei unseren Armeen erweckt, von denen man vielleicht sogar den Tyrtaeus in eigener Person wegweise.” Tyrtaeus was a Spartan poet who created war-songs appealing to his fellow citizens to fight for their city; see Johannes Irmscher with Renate John, eds., *Lexikon der Antike*, 10th rev. and expanded ed. (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1990), 607.

³⁶ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, intro. Reinhard Lauth, 5th revised ed. after the first ed. of 1808 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978), 200 and 207.

³⁷ Translated in Otto W. Johnston, *The Myth of a Nation: Literature and Politics in Prussia under Napoleon* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1989), 147–50.

³⁸ A comparison of two paintings documents the structural analogy of the public perception of Byron and Körner: “Die Lützower an der Leiche Theodor Körners, anonymous copper engraving after Otto Donner von Richter, after 1813,” in Akademie der Künste Berlin, ed., *Berlin zwischen 1789 und 1848: Facetten einer Epoche*, cat. no. 6.156, 364, 382; and Reinhold Baumstark, “Joseph-Denis Odevaere: Tod des Lord Byron,” in Reinhold Baumstark, ed., *Das neue Hellas: Griechen und Bayern zur Zeit Ludwigs I.* (Munich: Hirmer, 1999), cat. no. 49, 235–37. Both paintings show the respective poet laid in state and surrounded by iconic objects of war. Körner lies in a half-timbered house crowded with desperate but revengeful comrades, the floor covered with oak leaves. Byron is laid out on a daybed in antique style (with antique Greek architecture in the background) wearing a laurel wreath; the titles of his major works are engraved on the bottom of the kline; the Greek word for freedom is visible on the base of a column near his head; a lyre has fallen from his hand; and his sword hangs from the bed as well.

³⁹ See René Schilling’s introductory article, “Körner Superstar: Freiheitskämpfer, Kriegsheld, arische Lichtgestalt und Vorbild des DDR-Soldaten — die Geschichte einer deutschen Leitfigur,” *Die Zeit*, 16 November 2000; see also Johnston, 143–58; and Clark, 440. In the mid-nineteenth century, Croatia used Körner’s works to foster the cause of the Illyrian revival movement; see Marijan Bobinac, “Theodor Körner im kroatischen Theater,” in *Porträts und Konstellationen 1: Deutschsprachig-kroatische Literaturbeziehungen*, ed. Marijan Bobinac, *Zagreber Germanistische Beiträge* 11 (2002): 59–96.

⁴⁰ Translated in Cowan, 165.

⁴¹ Humboldt equipped the sixteen-year-old, who was then a student at Heidelberg, with a recommendation letter to the general chief of staff of the Silesian Army, Gerhard von Scharnhorst (Freese, 552–53). See also Scurla, 403–4; and Humboldt, *Federn und Schwerter*, letter 74, 143.

⁴² Cf. “Auch Körners Tod habe ich tadeln hören. Ein Mensch von Talent sollte sich nicht aussetzen. Man kann auf keine unwürdigere Art vom Talent, vorzüglich von einem Dichter, reden. Das wahre Talent und der wahre Geist, den der Dichter und jeder wahrhaft große Schriftsteller braucht, stammen aus dem Charakter und werden durch ihn genährt. [. . .] Aeschylus würde es sehr sonderbar gefunden haben, wenn man ihn hätte hindern wollen, bei Marathon zu kämpfen, um einige Trimeter mehr zu machen. Das ist gerade das Edle am Menschen, daß er mit sich selbst wagt und, wie es darauf ankommt, mit seinem Dasein ein freies Spiel treibt” (Freese, 575–76).

⁴³ Later, the German “Philhellenen” would use a phrase from Aeschylus’s *Persians* to call for the liberation of modern Greece; see Friedgar Löbker, *Antike Topoi in der deutschen Philhellenenliteratur: Untersuchungen zur Antikerezeption in der Zeit des griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1821–1829)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 214–15.

⁴⁴ Recent studies show that Hessian regiments fighting the American rebels were typical of the contemporary practice of renting troops among European powers; see Karl-Hermann Wegner, *Kurbessens Beitrag für das heutige Hessen* (Wiesbaden: Hessische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1999), 91–96, and Frank-Lothar Kroll, *Geschichte Hessens* (Munich: Beck, 2006), 36. Wegner emphasizes the propagandistic dimension, e.g., Mirabeau’s flyer of 1776 titled “Avis aux Hessois” (93–94). See also Charles W. Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1987).

⁴⁵ Friedrich Schiller, “Kabale und Liebe,” in *Gedichte, Dramen I*, ed. Albert Meier, vol. 1 of *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Peter-André Alt, Albert Meier, Wolfgang Riedel, 755–858 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), 780–81. In the second scene of the second act the valet tells the prince’s lover the story of seven thousand young men — among them some of the valet’s sons — forced to join the prince’s military and already on their way to America.

⁴⁶ Alfred, Kelletat, ed., *Der Göttinger Hain* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1967), 191–93.

⁴⁷ Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, *Deutsche Chronik: Eine Auswahl aus den Jahren 1774–1777 und 1787–1791*, ed. Evelyn Radczun (Leipzig: Reclam, 1988), 153–54, 176–78, 180–82, 191–93, 207–8, 242–43. Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, “Kaplied,” in *Deutsche Gedichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Klaus Bohnen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), 343–45.

⁴⁸ Ulrich Bräker, *Der arme Mann im Tockenburg* (Zurich: Diogenes, 1993), 126–91.

⁴⁹ Johann Gottfried Seume, *Mein Leben. Nebst der Fortsetzung von G. J. Göschen und C. A. H. Clodius*, ed. Jörg Drews (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990), 53–91.

⁵⁰ Humboldt knew Pfeffel’s fables and considered him a “famous man;” see his letters to Henriette Herz on 24 October 1789 (Freese, 66) and to Schiller on 18 August 1795 (*Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Schiller und Wilhelm von Humboldt*, ed. Siegfried Seidel, 2 vols. [Berlin: Aufbau, 1962], 1:95).

⁵¹ Johann Gottfried Herder, *Der deutsche Nationalruhm. Eine Epistel* (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1812). Initially, Herder wanted to include *Der deutsche*

Nationalrühm in the 1797 volume of his *Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität* (Letters for the Advancement of Humanity), but he decided to withhold the text — which was already printed — at short notice because he feared negative repercussions. *Der deutsche Nationalrühm* was first published in 1812.

⁵² Friedrich Christian Laukhart, *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben*, ed. Karl Wolfgang Becker (Leipzig: Koehler und Amelang, 1989), 40. For a popular modern literary adaptation of the situation of the soldiers from the Hessen-Kassel region in the American War of Independence, see Sandra Parette, *Der Winter, der ein Sommer war* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1972).

⁵³ See Karl Wolfgang Becker, “Nachwort,” 429.

⁵⁴ See Elisabeth Krimmer, “A Portrait of War, a Grammar of Peace: Goethe, Laukhart, and the Campaign of 1792,” *German Life and Letters* 61.1 (2008): 46–60.

⁵⁵ For the history of “Gassenlaufen,” “Prügel,” and other cruel punishments in the eighteenth-century Prussian army see Joachim Dyck, ed., *Minna von Barnhelm oder: Die Kosten des Glücks, Komödie von Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Über Wirte als Spitzel, preußische Disziplin, Lessing im Kriege, frisches Geld und das begeisterte Publikum* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1981), 45–52.

⁵⁶ See Carl von Clausewitz to Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 1809, quoted in Hew Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege*, trans. Karin Schuler (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008), 70.

⁵⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1998), 667; see also Strachan, 31 and 39; and Irene Etzersdorfer, *Krieg: Eine Einführung in die Theorie bewaffneter Konflikte* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 212, 217.

⁵⁸ See Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Ideen über Staatsverfassung, durch die neue französische Constitution veranlasst,” in *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 40; see also Humboldt, “Über Einrichtung landständischer Verfassungen in den preußischen Staaten,” in *Schriften zur Politik und zum Bildungswesen*, vol. 4 of *Werke*, 442–43 and 438–39. For a discussion of Humboldt’s position towards the French Revolution, see Clemens Menze, “Humboldt und die Französische Revolution,” *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts* (1987): 158–93; and Menze, “Wilhelm von Humboldts Theorie aller Reformen,” *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 62.1 (1986): 52–79; Udo von der Burg, “‘Als Nation null’ — zeitgenössische Gedanken Wilhelm von Humboldts zur Französischen Revolution in Briefen und Tagebuchnotizen der 90er Jahre,” in *Erziehungsdenken im Bannkreis der Französischen Revolution*, ed. Kurt-Ingo Flessau and Friedhelm Jacobs (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1998), 149–69; Christina M. Sauter, *Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Aufklärung* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989), 324–25; and Bernd Glazinski, *Antike und Moderne: Die Antike als Bildungsgegenstand bei Wilhelm von Humboldt* (Aachen: Shaker, 1992), 278.

⁵⁹ See “Cüstine am Rheinstrome,” in *Politische Annalen* 1 (Jan/Feb/March 1793): 413, ed. Christoph Girtanner; see also the “Allegorie auf den Beginn des Siebenjährigen Krieges” (1756), Kupferstichblatt der Zeit [copper-engraving showing an allegorical picture of the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War], in Jörgen

Bracker, ed., *Frieden für das Welttheater. Goethe — ein Mitwirkender, Beobachter und Vermittler zwischen Welt und Theater, Politik und Geschichte. Max Wegner zum 80. Geburtstag. Zur Sonderausstellung des Museums für Hamburgische Geschichte vom 26. November 1982 bis zum 27. März 1983* (Hamburg: Hamburger Museumsverein, 1982), 8. For a modern example of chess terminology, see also Ewald Frie, *Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, 1777–1837: Biographie eines Preußen* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001): “Truppen wurden [im achtzehnten Jahrhundert] wie Schachfiguren auf möglichst ebenen Flächen verschoben, um den Gegner taktisch matt zu setzen” (57).

⁶⁰ Geoffrey Galt Harpham, “The Depths of the Heights: Reading Conrad with America’s Soldiers,” *Profession* (2008): 81.

⁶¹ My translation of “heilsam und nothwendig” (*Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 100); the Burrow translation reads “either beneficial or necessary” (*Limits*, 43; my emphasis).

⁶² Felix Saure, “. . . Meine Grille von der Ähnlichkeit der Griechen und der Deutschen.” Nationalkulturelle Implikationen in Wilhelm von Humboldts Antikekonzept,” in *“Die Ideale der Alten”: Antikerezeption um 1800*, ed. Veit Rosenberger (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008), 116–18.

⁶³ “Auch müsste ich sehr unglücklich in Auseinandersetzung [i.e., Erklärung] meiner Ideen gewesen sein, wenn man glauben könnte, der Staat sollte, meiner Meinung nach, von Zeit zu Zeit Krieg erregen. [. . .] Es wird Krieg von selbst entstehen; und entsteht er nicht, nun so ist man wenigstens gewiss, dass der Friede weder durch Gewalt erzwungen, noch durch künstliche Lähmung hervorgebracht ist; und dann wird der Friede der Nationen freilich ein eben so wohlthätigeres Geschenk sein, wie der friedliche Pflüger ein holderes Bild ist, als der blutige Krieger” (*Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 101–2).

⁶⁴ *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 20.2 (1792): 346–54.

⁶⁵ Emanuel [*sic*] Kant, *Project for a Perpetual Peace*, first English trans. (London: S. Couchman for Vernor and Hood, 1796).

⁶⁶ Rudolf Malter, “Nachwort,” in Immanuel Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, ed. Rudolf Malter (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1995), 73.

⁶⁷ “III. [. . .] Add to [these problems], that to be paid for killing, or to be killed, is to serve as an instrument or machine in the hands of another (the state) which is incompatible with the right which nature has given to every one over his own person” (5).

⁶⁸ The most important documents of the reform period are collected in Georg Eckert, ed., *Von Valmy bis Leipzig: Quellen und Dokumente zur Geschichte der preußischen Heeresreform* (Hannover: Norddeutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955). For an introduction to the military reforms in Prussia beginning in 1806, see Clark, 376–81 and 406, and Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Preußen: Geschichte eines Staates* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997). See Kittler for the history of ideas and the cultural significance of the reforms.

⁶⁹ See Ewald Frie, *Marwitz*; and Frie, “Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz: Militär, Gesellschaft und der Krieg,” in *Macht- oder Kulturstaat?: Preußen ohne*

Legende, ed. Bernd Heidenreich and Frank-Lothar Kroll (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Spitz, 2002), 55–66. For Marwitz's political importance, see Clark, 384; for his position in the context of the military reforms see Schoeps, 114–15.

⁷⁰ Theodor Fontane (1819–98), the late nineteenth-century novelist, journalist, and historian and Germany's most important realist, who devoted many works to the history of Prussia, dealt with this discussion in his first novel, *Vor dem Sturm: Roman aus dem Winter 1812 auf 13* (1878). See also Clark, 400–437.

⁷¹ Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, *Nachrichten aus meinem Leben: 1777–1808*, ed. Günter de Bruyn (Berlin: Der Morgen, 1989), 281.

⁷² “Die Vaterlandsliebe ist überhaupt ein Gefühl, dessen nur edlere Seelen fähig sind. Was man bei dem großen Haufen so nennt, wenn er nach langer Unterdrückung gegen seine Peiniger aufgerufen wird (wie wir 1813), ist ganz einfach die Rache und die Begierde, ferneren Verlust und Not abzuwenden. Die Masse der Eingebornen wird nur bei der Fahne erhalten durch den gewohnten Gehorsam gegen den Landesherrn. Wo dieser entweicht, sehen wir Soldatenaufstände und Revolutionen” (281–82).

⁷³ For the radicalization and totalization of war through the French Revolution in France and Germany, see Portmann-Tinguely 370–7; compare also the more theoretical perspective of Etzersdorfer 56–59.

⁷⁴ See Adam Müller, *Elemente der Staatskunst: Sechsenddreißig Vorlesungen*, new ed. of the 1936 Meersburg reprint of the original Berlin ed. of 1808–1809 (Berlin: Haude und Spener, 1968).

⁷⁵ “Adam Müller bildet hier eine förmliche Oppositionspartei [. . .]. Er ist auch ein guter Kopf, der sich selbst um das bringt, was ihm notwendig zufallen müßte, wenn er vernünftig wäre” (10 February 1810; Freese 509).

⁷⁶ For Müller's intrigues in Vienna, see Sweet 2, 117–18.

⁷⁷ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Briefe an Friedrich August Wolf*, ed. Philip Mattson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), 308.

⁷⁸ For an introduction to Adam Müller's ideas, see Peter Paul Müller-Schmid, “Adam Müller (1779–1829),” in *Politische Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts: Konservatismus — Liberalismus — Sozialismus*, ed. Bernd Heidenreich, 2nd, completely revised edition (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2002), 109–38; Gerhard Göhler and Ansgar Klein, “Politische Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in *Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1991), 321–22 and 325–43; and Klaus Hermsdorf, *Literarisches Leben in Berlin: Aufklärer und Romantiker* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987), 321–29. For an analysis of Müller's ideas about war, which cannot be separated from his philosophy of state and society, see Portmann-Tinguely, 8–58.

⁷⁹ See also Müller 25 about the uselessness of “standing armies and weapons supplies” in the case of war.

4: War, Anecdotes, and the Backsides of Reason: Kleist with Kant

Galili Shahar

Prologue

THIS READING OF HEINRICH VON KLEIST is a reading of “backsides.” It recognizes the subversive, “inverted” forms of his literature and acknowledges contradictions and holes in his writing. It goes to the margins of German Classicism, to the no man’s land of the Napoleonic Wars, and to the peripheries of Kant’s philosophy. These are the sites in which Kleist stood as an officer, an author, and a critic; in these contexts, his writing appeared and vanished. His novels and plays are responses to the literary court of Weimar¹ and are read as subversive interpretations of Goethe’s work. From an “epistemological” point of view, his literature can be seen as a long remark on his *Kant-Krise* and as a prolonged struggle with the definitions of Enlightenment;² his “misinterpretation” of Kant, however, opens perspectives on disasters in the realm of reason.³ In the political context, his work can be located as an appendix to Prussian militarism and the war with France.⁴ Herein lies the meaning of reading Kleist from the “back”: it is a reading that explores the subversive movement that governs his writing and studies the counter-movements, the movements of resistance and escape that characterize his war literature. In his writings Kleist declared war — war against Enlightenment and Classicism, but also war against war itself. His soldiers resist the conventional warfare of his age and often move on different, irregular, “inverted” paths of violence.

This article primarily examines Kleist’s war anecdotes, his short “reports” on German soldiers and officers published in the *Berliner Abendblätter* (Berlin Evening Newspaper). It attempts to demonstrate the existence of an inverted correspondence between Kleist’s theory of violence, his views on the human body and the mechanism of desire, and Immanuel Kant’s critique of reason. My main argument is that Kleist’s protagonists, his “war-machines,” should be understood as exposures, naked reflections of “practical reason,” and as supplements to Kant’s theory of the sublime. The body of Kleist’s soldiers, a body of aggression and

laughter, emerges as a double of the transcendental subject — the hidden, forgotten body of the “categorical imperative.” Kleist’s war anecdotes read in this framework as textures of (counter-)Enlightenment. This implies, however, that Kleist’s *Kant-Krise* should not be viewed merely as an event of crisis that brought the author to the negation of the values of the Enlightenment, but rather as the origin of a complementary discourse on the conditions of reason. In this view, Kleist’s prose of war sets the tone for a different, inverted conception of Enlightenment that includes its denied bodies. Kleist reveals the backside of Kant’s project and introduces its paradoxes and ambivalent messages.

The War of/on Reason

Kleist’s protagonists are born and destroyed on the fringes of a symbolic order that carried the names of Goethe, Kant, and Napoleon. This is the imagined space “Germany/1800,” which is illuminated in his writings as fields of wars and catastrophes. In his works Kleist creates distorted images of his era — misrepresentations of the *Zeitgeist*. He tells about the radical conditions of violence and desire. He looks at the ambiguous nature of *Bildung*, education/culture, and exposes the terrible faces of war. The form and style, however, in which Kleist tells about the denied bodies of the Enlightenment suit his subjects. His strategies of narration and dramaturgical techniques resemble his topics — exaggerated, torn, and distorted. Thus, his work often withdraws from definitions of *schöne Literatur* or, as in the case of the war anecdotes and the political manifestos, it abandons the field of literature and creates hybrids of prose, reports, and propaganda. These texts become parodies of literary writing.

Most of Kleist’s war anecdotes were published anonymously in the *Berliner Abendblätter* in 1810–11. The fact that the anecdotes appeared in a newspaper is not insignificant. As a short report, a fragment from everyday life, the anecdote is a form of writing that suits the newspaper. Many of Kleist’s anecdotes were based on facts and “true stories” that had already been published in German newspapers, journals, and official reports. The anecdote is a “touch of the real.”⁵ It opens a path of escape out of the canon and the formal historical narrative into minor, forgotten layers of reality (Gallagher and Greenblatt, 24–72). The anecdote, in this New-Historicist view, ruptures the official, homogeneous story, cites foreign voices, and recalls extraordinary figures and unexpected events. It creates “history from below” (53).

The anecdote fashions an adventurous context of cognition. It abandons the pretension of universal knowledge and offers only broken pieces of *Weltanschauung*. It reads like a rumor about being. Ostensibly the anecdote has a wholeness of its own; it appears as a “hole and a whole.”⁶

The anecdote is written as a fragment that enjoys closure and fullness. However, it does not argue for totality and does not offer monumental descriptions. Its truths are rather local and lie open like wounds. The anecdote is a riddle; it lacks closure and is written as “Fabel ohne Moral,” a fable without a moral. Kleist’s anecdotes often tell about the common and the ordinary, and yet have the character of miracles and wonders. Like many of his novellas, his anecdotes challenge the conventions of reading and the logic of perception, and ultimately undermine the possibilities of knowledge.⁷

Kleist’s war anecdotes deal with ironic bodies of violence. They bring “news” about generals, officers, or ordinary soldiers who abandon the order of war. His protagonists live within the bounds of the law, in which obedience, discipline, and rules prevail; however, they often cross these borders, enter the peripheries of military order, and immerse themselves in wonders and crimes. This is the experience of the drunk in the anecdote “Der Brantweinsäufer und die Berliner Glocken” (*SW*, 3:360; *The Brandy Guzzler and the Berlin Bells*), a soldier who has succumbed to the temptation of wine, responding to an inner voice of desire that finds an echo in the bells of the Berlin Cathedral, city hall, and the spire at Spittelmarkt (hospital market) until he finally falls asleep on the peripheries of Prussian discipline. Kleist’s anecdote was based on a journal report about a drunken man of Jewish origin. In his new version, Kleist dressed the drinker in Prussian uniform and addressed him as a soldier from “Lignowsky’s regiment,” referring ironically to Prince Eduard von Lichnowski and addressing his anecdote as an ironic remark on the Prussian army and its bodies of discipline. He tells in the beginning of the anecdote that the “unendliche Schläge” (endless beatings) that the soldier has undergone for being drunk have not solved his bad manners; rather, he proves himself to be “incurable,” and military discipline and punishment are revealed here as ineffective and worthless.

One of the earliest pieces of evidence for Kleist’s critical view of military discipline is found in his famous letter to his teacher Christian Ernst Martini in March 1799, in which the young Prussian officer expressed his views on the military order:

Die größten Wunder militairischer [*sic*] Disciplin, die der Gegenstand des Erstaunens aller Kenner waren, wurden der Gegenstand meiner herzlichsten Verachtung; die Offiziere hielt ich für so viele Exerciermeister, die Soldaten für so viele Slaven, und wenn das ganze Regiment seine Künste machte, schien es mir als ein lebendiges Monument der Tyrannei. (*SW*, 4:27)

[The greatest wonders of military discipline, while objects of awe to all the experts, became objects of my own most heartfelt contempt; the officers I regarded as so many drillmasters, the soldiers as so many

slaves, and then when the whole regiment was performing its tricks, it seemed to me a living monument to tyranny.]⁸

Kleist's criticism of military discipline and punishment was later bound up with the discourse on reforms in the Prussian army, which was spearheaded by the officers Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Wilhelm von Gneisenau after defeat in the war against Napoleon. The reform sought to restructure the Prussian army and to redefine its warfare and battle tactics. The model of reform was national and also to some degree liberal: it demanded opening the officer ranks to the middle class and advocated reorganizing the army in a national frame that would be based on the patriotic emotions of the people. It also sought to eliminate physical punishment such as the famous "Prügelstrafe" (beating punishment), which was abolished in 1807.

Kleist was engaged in this discourse. He even met Gneisenau a few times in 1811 and gave him articles he had written that probably discussed military issues and that Kleist considered his contribution to the military enterprise of Prussia (see *SW*, 4:505–6). Indeed, Kleist's involvement in the discourse of war and military violence was not without significance (see W. Kittler, 220–30).⁹

However, Kleist's interest in violence was radical and anarchistic. He considered violence a natural condition and a spontaneous dimension of social life and human behavior that challenges reason, order, and law. His story *Erdbeben in Chili* (Earthquake in Chile, 1807) hints at this insight, in which, behind and beyond civil law and social contract, a principle of destruction erupts and natural, bare forms of violence prevail. Kleist was not a pacifist or a peaceful thinker; rather, he acknowledged the self-evident and yet paradoxical forms of war. He did not deny the necessity of violence, but violence is also reintroduced in his work as a model of resistance. He exposed the anarchistic dimension of violence and its power of negation: violence is not only a medium of political repression, but also a medium of resistance, emancipation, and struggle for justice. Its consequences, however, are still destructive and its implications are apocalyptic.

This is the heritage of Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas, who, in the novella named for him (1811), conducts a war for justice that undermines the state and its institutions. His war is primarily a revolt; his methods are not those of conventional, regular warfare, and he uses such tactics as night war, sudden attacks from the depths of the forest, ambush, and camouflage. His war, we are told, is of a new kind — "unheard of and without example" (*SW*, 2:72). Kohlhaas fights an irregular war that challenges the state order; his enterprise, his vision of justice, is bound up with the destruction of the sovereign, the Elector of Saxony. This dimension of anarchistic, spontaneous violence and irregular war is also hinted at in the attack led

by the prince in Kleist's play *Der Prince von Homburg*, written in 1809–11, where the prince, a dreamy Prussian knight, a sleepwalker and a cavalry commander in the army of the elector of Brandenburg, unexpectedly calls on the cavalry to attack the Swedish army, contradicting the dictated instructions of the field marshal to wait for the signal for attack. Homburg denies the given order and calls for a war that is ordered from the "heart" (SW, 2:582). It is the heart — an emotion, a desire, a spontaneous and inner movement — that, in his view, should govern the German troops in battle, so he demands suspension of the written order (and thus suspension of the state's law) in favor of an irregular, singular, emotional act of violence.¹⁰

To use Benjamin's critical categories of violence, Kleist's protagonists reject the functions of the "rechtserhaltende Gewalt," the law-preserving violence in the state (the army, the police, the court), and ostensibly stress the elements of the "rechtsetzende Gewalt," foundational violence.¹¹ Kleist's works feature natural, spontaneous, creative forms of war that do not serve the prevailing political order, but rather challenge its existence. His protagonists, if one again recalls the war that Michael Kohlhaas declares against Saxony, live under the sanction of "Göttliche Gewalt," divine violence (Benjamin, 59–64).¹² In one of his first mandates, his war declarations, Kohlhaas introduces himself as a man subject to no law of the empire or the world, but only to God's (SW, 2:68). In a later mandate, published shortly before his attack on Wittenberg, he describes himself as the "viceroi of Michael, the Archangel," who comes with fire and sword to punish the world. He calls on the people to join him "in setting up a better order of things," a provisional world government (SW, 2:73). Kohlhaas's war is that of the Final Day. His mandates constitute an apocalyptic interpretation of world politics and thus document the moment in which "foundational violence" is enfolded in a vision of "divine violence," a vision of destruction in the name of absolute justice.

According to Benjamin, divine violence reveals itself in an apocalyptic state of emergency — in moments in which the profane order is suspended and the state is destroyed. He differentiates it from "mythical" forms of power as neither of nor for the state; rather, it demands the destruction of the law. In its "biblical" form, divine violence is revealed as a category of justice that is intricately intertwined with God's "anger" and acts of annihilation (Benjamin, 60–61). The implications of this sacred, "divine" discourse are thus both destructive and deconstructive — a discourse that embodies radical, apocalyptic thoughts on law and evil that turn also into a gesture of writing, into a "name," a personal signature of literature.¹³ Kleist's warriors should be understood in this context: they act beyond the frames of the state and civil law in a search for absolute justice. Violence, in Kleist's world, implies a desire for resistance, a drive for creation, a search for justice.

But violence finally turns here into gestures of writing. Kleist's major realm of resistance was the realm of literature. His views on violence and war were not only political but also poetical. The logic of violence in his world was not only "foundational" or "divine," but often grotesque. Evidence for this poetics of violence is found in his anecdotes, such as "Tages-Ereignis" (Event of the Day), which tells of the crime of an "Ulan" (cavalry soldier) named Hahn who is called upon by the officer Pape to submit to arrest because of a minor offence (*SW*, 3:363). Hahn, standing near the window in his room, rejects the command and answers Pape with an insult. When the officer enters to arrest him "with violence," Hahn shoots him to death. Soldiers rush to the scene, but Hahn asks them to remain at a distance and fires an additional bullet into Pape's head. Finally, some of his comrades manage to bring him under control and take him to prison. The king orders that the death sentence of the military tribunal be executed.

This anecdote deals with the dialectic of violence and its socio-political aspects. The soldier responds to the command "from above" with a violent gesture of resistance, shooting the officer who embodies military discipline and represents hierarchy and order. Toward his comrades, the members of his own class, the soldier refrains from using violence and thus follows the logic of social solidarity (see Moser, 180). Hahn's violence, however, is essentially destructive and anarchistic. His murder of the officer does not bring about a new order, nor does it fulfill a vision of justice. From a political point of view the shots are "meaningless": they simply open several minor holes in the representative body of the Prussian army before order is restored. However, the "meaninglessness" of Hahn's action hints again at the real meaning of violence in Kleist's world: violence itself has no goal, no end, and no fulfillment; it is a pure gesture of resistance, a principle of negation, an experience of revolt.

And the gestures of violence in Kleist's work, I argue, should be viewed also as poetic remarks, as gestures of resistance in the field of German literature. The scene in which Hahn abuses Pape and declares his resistance to the command that requires his arrest (*SW*, 3:930) can be read as an ironic citation of the famous scene in Goethe's play *Götz von Berlichingen* (1772) where Götz, a nobleman and knight who serves his sovereign, the Kaiser Maximilian, faithfully, becomes the object of a political plot by the bishop of Bamberg. He is banned by the Emperor and ordered to surrender by a messenger of the army who declares him "Beleidiger der Majestät," a person who is guilty of lèse majesté. Götz, standing near the window of his house, answers with abuse:

Mich ergeben! Auf Gnad und Ungnad! Mit wem redet ihr! Bin ich ein Räuber! Sag deinem Hauptmann: Vor Ihro Kaiserliche Majestät hab ich, wie immer, schuldigen Respekt. Er aber, sag's ihm, er kann mich . . .¹⁴

[I should surrender! Unconditionally! Who are you talking to? Am I some brigand? Tell your Captain: To his Imperial Majesty, as ever, I offer all due respect. But as for him, tell him, he can . . .]¹⁵

Goethe's knight has respect for the emperor; for the army commander, however, he feels contempt. The missing words of his abuse ("er kann mich . . .") are revealed in the first version of the play and read "er kann mich im Arsch lecken" (Götz [1994] 525; he can kiss my arse). By reenacting Goethe's scene, Kleist's soldier extends the political horizon of the anal abuse, endowing it with a radical interpretation — the killing of the officer.

The discourse of violence in Kleist's anecdote is that of a repressed body living under the sanctions of the army and its discipline. His soldier refuses to obey orders and rejects the categories of public reason. This leads us to consider the inverted correspondence between Kleist's discourse of violence and Kant's theory of Enlightenment and reason. In his essay "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" (Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment? 1784), Kant discussed the meaning of Enlightenment and the functions of reason and introduced the "öffentlicher Gebrauch," the public use of reason, which in his view constituted the political meaning of Enlightenment thought.¹⁶ The public use of reason implies an open, rational, and critical discussion in which issues of common interest are negotiated in the public realm. This view opposes the "Privatgebrauch," the private use of reason, in which the subject's critical reflection may lead to individual acts of disobedience. One of Kant's examples deals with the case of an army officer:

So würde es sehr verderblich sein, wenn ein Offizier, dem von seinen Oberen etwas anbefohlen wird, im Dienste über die Zweckmäßigkeit oder Nützlichkeit dieses Befehls laut vernünfteln wollte; er muß gehorchen. Es kann ihm aber billigermaßen nicht verwehrt werden, als Gelehrter über die Fehler im Kriegsdienste Anmerkungen zu machen und diese seinem Publicum zur Beurteilung vorzulegen.¹⁷

[Thus it would be ruinous if an officer, receiving an order from superiors, wanted while on duty to engage openly in subtle reasoning about its appropriateness or utility; he must obey. But he cannot fairly be prevented, as a scholar, from making remarks about errors in the military service and from putting these before his public for appraisal. (*Practical Philosophy*, 18–19)]

The discourse of Enlightenment is defined by and restricted to the public functions of rationality and criticism. Reason is thus aligned with the discipline of obedience: "räsonnirt, so viel ihr wollt, und worüber ihr wollt; nur gehorcht" (Kant, *Werke*, 6:170; argue as much as you will about what you will, only obey). Reason, in Kant's view, should manifest itself in pub-

lic and in a scholarly context, but never as a source of individual, private resistance.¹⁸ The code of Enlightenment is that of courage — *sapere aude!* (6:162); however, the courage to know and the sovereignty of the subject are restricted to and defined in the public realm. Reason demands self-control.

In this context I would like to consider Kleist's anecdote as a response to Kant's concepts of Enlightenment and public reason. The anecdote was the literary genre of counter-Enlightenment. Its category of action is not based on the public use of reason, but rather on spontaneous forms of violence. The anecdote rejects the imperative of obedience and performs gestures of individual resistance. Kleist's soldier is not discursive. He does not use arguments for his case. His language is that of an offended subject. He indeed stands "near the window," on the threshold of the public space. His deed, however, wounds the *Öffentlichkeit* and deconstructs the order of society.

Kleist's soldier is the double of Kant's officer. He embodies the other (dark, demonic) side of the "autonomous subject" and manifests its repressed desires. However, the opposition between these figures should also be understood in terms of correspondence or analogy. Both Kleist's soldier and Kant's officer embody a principle of justice, a metaethical category, and a challenge to the discourse of subjectivity. Both demand the suspension of the subject's interests and action beyond the self. Both public use of reason and spontaneous violence are situated "beyond the pleasure principle," where the logic of self-fulfillment, self-contentedness, satisfaction, and happiness is suspended.¹⁹ I will return to this argument below.

Kleist's soldiers are figures of resistance. Some of them have left the order of war, wandering and fighting as partisans in the forests of their homeland (W. Kittler). Indeed, one may follow Carl Schmitt's suggestion to read Kleist essentially as the poet of the German national resistance and to praise *Hermannsschlacht* (The Battle of Hermann, 1808) as "die größte Partisanendichtung aller Zeiten" (the best partisan poetry of all times).²⁰ Schmitt counts Kleist among the German intellectuals who created, under the influence of the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon, the "theory of the partisan" (49–52). The partisan war, according to Schmitt, is the practical application of a political theory based on the figure of irregular violence (48–49): the partisan embodies irregularity, movement, political engagement, and territorial commitment; his warfare marks a radical dimension in political life — the hidden, dark, and dangerous aspect of sovereignty.

However, reading Kleist's anecdotes as prologues to a theory of partisan warfare reveals the ambiguities and ironies inherent in his concept of political violence. Alongside political engagement and love of the fatherland, his soldiers also embody play and paradox. The wars conducted by his protagonists, as in the case of Michael Kohlhaas, are not merely patri-

otic.²¹ They lack, as in Penthesilea's case, the clear distinction between friend and enemy, and they collapse in a hysteric discourse of desire and violence.²² In a few anecdotes the question of war is introduced as a joke — a chapter in a philosophy of fools. In these cases, Kleist's soldier emerges not as a partisan but as a *war-machine*, a microorganism of violence that moves against the political order on "paths of escape" and irony.²³ The war-machine, Deleuze argues, should be differentiated from the state organization of political violence. The war-machine has no transcendental plan, no territorial commitment, no discipline or order; rather, it embodies diagrams of an imminent departure — plans of a deterritorial movement. The war-machine destabilizes discourses of power, meaning, and representation; it deconstructs contexts, territories, and monopolies and thus stands against the modern concept of the state. The structure of the war-machine is that of desire; its course of violence is not repressive, its implications are not ideological (Deleuze, 22).

Kleist's figures join the gallery of soldiers in Lenz's *Die Soldaten* and Büchner's *Woyzeck* to embody the "untragic" warrior of German literature. Like Brecht's "human war machine," the protagonist of *Mann ist Mann* (Man Equals Man, 1926), who leaves his identity behind and marches like a fool to the front, Kleist's soldier also hints at the paradoxes of war and the dialectics of the human condition. This war machine does not affirm law and order, but rather challenges the idea of sovereignty. Its movement is self-destructive, and it often embodies only a minor, local view on the Napoleonic wars.

Kleist's war machine reveals itself in the "Anekdote aus dem letzten Preussischen Kriege" (Anecdote from the Last Prussian War), where a Prussian cavalryman from the battalion of Prince von Hohenlohe has survived the defeat in Jena and is now riding to escape from the French army. His story is related by a village innkeeper, whose establishment the horseman enters, covered with dust and asking for a glass of brandy. The shots of the French soldiers can be heard in the village. The cavalryman, however, asks for another glass and rejects the warning advice of his host, who urges him to run away. The French soldiers approach the village gate, but the Prussian cavalryman pulls a pipe out of his boot, asks for a match, and says, "Na! nun sollen doch die Franzosen die Schwerenot kriegen!" (SW, 3:357; Let those Frenchies throw a fit, *Abyss*, 264). In the end he mounts his horse, draws his sword, spits and curses, digs his spurs into the horse's sides, charges toward the enemy, pushes three Frenchmen from their saddles, and rides away with their horses.

The case of the Prussian cavalryman should, according to his host, be told as an example of military excellence, for "wenn alle Soldaten, die an diesem Tage mitgefochten, so tapfer gewesen wären, wie dieser, die Franzosen hätten geschlagen werden müssen" (SW, 3:356; if all the soldiers who fought on that day had been as brave as he, the French

would certainly have been beaten, *Abyss*, 264). However, this “example” is ambiguous. The cavalryman had already abandoned the Prussian war business in favor of private combat against the French. He no longer obeys the principles of war, but rather the principles of pleasure. The defeat in Jena, the wish for retaliation, and the question of Prussia’s future are secondary in this story. The horseman relinquishes the burden of the great war and devotes himself to minor “needs,” for this is the path of the anecdote: it tells about escape routes from the order of war and about refugees who wander on the wrong track. Something of this empty, celebratory journey of the Prussian cavalryman is imprinted in the language of the anecdote, in its rapid, panting sentences. The rhythm of the horseman’s ride is heard in every line of this “demonic” story. The war machine turns here into a writing machine; the horseman’s gestures, his movement of escape, his logic of resistance are transformed into processes of literarization and text-producing. The body becomes a script.

The war anecdotes should be read also as prologues or introductions to the concepts of violence that also govern Kleist’s novellas and plays. Yet these “introductions” are written as parodies, as short jokes on the essence of war. This is also the case of the soldier in the anecdote “Unwahrscheinliche Wahrhaftigkeiten,” the first of the “Improbable Truths” that are told by an old and cheerful German officer. The first report concerns a soldier who was wounded during the Rhine battle of 1792. A bullet penetrated his chest and moved through his body between skin and flesh until finally reaching the end of his backbone, where it retraced its route and left his body without causing any serious harm (*SW*, 3:376–77). The wounded body of the German soldier is the medium of a miracle — it represents the wonder of inversion. Kleist’s soldier embodies the paradox of a motion that is written as an inverted cycle, as a motion of return from the backside, from behind. The soldier’s body is “elastic.” It can tolerate logical contradictions and thus carry means of resistance beyond the discourse of pure or practical reason. The soldier survives his injury and continues to fight as a perfect organism of violence, as a war machine. Yet his story should be seen as a satire of military loyalty and patriotism. Kleist’s soldier is not a hero. The anecdote about his wound cannot serve as a positive, reconstructive myth of war, but rather appears to be a joke, an absurd, impossible truth on the battle against France. The soldiers in Kleist’s war fantasies emerge as parodies, inverted images of the Prussian body, and their stories are told by military fools. They embody the inverted perspective of their own military origins and carry messages with double meanings about their homeland.

The anecdote about the Rhine battle is a minor report on a war incident that tears the narrative apart. It is written against the stream, omitting monumental stories of kings and kingdoms in favor of short reports on the

backsides of common soldiers. It deals with neither the history of triumph nor the chronicles of defeat. Its interest is not of national relevance. Rather, the anecdote focuses on the wounded body, on the injuries of a human being. It opens a perspective of “history from below” or, more correctly, history from behind, revealing the human condition from its inverted side. What, however, is the significance of a story that is written from *behind*? And what is the nature of a truth that opens at the rear, at the “backbone”? These questions bring us to the “Anekdote aus dem letzten Kriege.”

Anal Politics, the Sublime

Kleist’s soldiers embody an inverted perspective on the human condition, as becomes evident in the “Anekdote aus dem letzten Krieg” (*SW*, 3:361; Anecdote from the Recent War). This short story, based on a tale published in the *Beobachter an der Spree* (The Spree Observer), is about a German drummer from the infantry regiment of Puttkammer who continues his private war against Napoleon after the defeat of his battalion at Jena. Following the destruction of his army the drummer travels on country roads and shoots every Frenchman in sight. After his capture and subsequent death sentence, on being led to his execution by the French soldiers, the drummer gives voice to one last wish: “er zog sich die Hosen ab, und sprach; sie mögten ihn in den . . . schießen, damit das F. . . kein L. . . bekäme” (*SW*, 3:361; he pulled down his trousers and asked, could they please shoot him in the . . . , so as not to tear a h. . . in his s. . . , *Abyss*, 268). The words missing from these lines are to be completed by the reader: the drummer asks that his executioners “ihn in den *Hintern* schießen, damit das *Fell* kein *Loch* bekäme” (to shoot in the *arse*, so as not to tear a *hole* in his *skin*). The words *Fell* (skin) and *Loch* (hole) are not spelled out in this anecdote, but rather appear as broken signs [F. . . , L. . .]. The reason for the incompleteness of the signs is, however, not only a “moral” one; it is the fate of the body itself that is illustrated here. The opening of the word, its broken form, its void, the fragmentation of the sign, signifies the wounded body.

The Prussian drummer, like his fellow the cavalryman, is a survivor of the battle of Jena. He too is a parody of the military body that turns to private, aimless battles and rides on paths of escape. Some readers find evidence in this anecdote of Kleist’s patriotism and his faithful devotion to his Prussian homeland. His drummer refuses to surrender and continues his war against France after the defeat of his battalion, and even after his arrest and the pronouncement of his sentence, he continues his gestures of resistance. His last request, to be shot from behind, is meant to offend and humiliate the French officers; at the same time he keeps his heart whole

and faithful to his homeland (Moser, 171–78). This interpretation does justice to one aspect of Kleist's writing, but it elides its more radical meaning. For the military insight of the drummer is basically *anal*. The exposure of his backside is a gesture of resistance that goes beyond national commitments. It was not accidental that the Prussian officer Eduard von Lichnowsky expressed his discomfort with this anecdote. He did not find in it an honorable description of a war hero, but rather a humiliating portrait of a German soldier bringing shame upon the Prussian army. His last wish undermines codes of civil behavior and conventions of public representation. The drummer has no dignity or honor; his private philosophy and views of justice are not based on the noble feelings of war heroes, but rather on repressed desires — on the wishes of the naked body.

Kleist's drummer creates an inverted perspective on the symbolic order. It is a view that is opened from the hidden, forgotten side of sexual disciplines, from the periphery of erotic discourse. In his essay "Charakter und Analerotik" (Character and Anal Eroticism), Sigmund Freud indicates the affinity between miserliness and the anal discourse of sexuality.²⁴ Anxiety about spending, excretion, and emission is described as a symptom of the anal complex. In the discourse of sexuality the anus is defined as a zone of scum and shame. Bodily excretions are defined as a source of filth and dirt; the anal body is thus excluded from the realm of pleasure (28). Cleanness, purity, thriftiness, and love of order are understood in this context as symbolic functions of forbidden anal eroticism. Manners, moral behavior, and the foundation of ethics are read here as reactions that hint at the origin of the complex. A similar logic is to be related to discourses of representation: ideals of beauty and aesthetic purity can be read as symbolic substitutes that cover the holes, the anal cut of the sexual body. In the cultural context, anal eroticism is viewed as a perversion, a demonic projection, the work of the devil, a sin. But like everything that is forbidden and repressed in the discourse of sexuality, anal eroticism becomes a desire — a wish that is hidden "beyond the pleasure principle." Its logic of reappearance is that of resistance, criticism, and mockery. As an example of the return of anal eroticism as a gesture of resistance, Freud recalls the scene from Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* noted above, in which the protagonist turns to the army commander's messenger and declares, "er kann mich . . ." (he can . . ., Freud 28).

Kleist's drummer performs the anal gesture in his peripheral war against Napoleon; however, like the soldier Hahn, who stands near the window and condemns the agent of the law, the drummer is an actor of revolt who embodies an ironic remark on Goethe's early play. Goethe's *Götz* is a nobleman, a loyal figure, who refuses to join the farmers' revolt and maintains visions of peace and political harmony within the state. He continues to espouse an affirmative principle of violence that preserves political order. Kleist's drummer, on the other hand, reproduces the anal gesture in a dif-

ferent context offending the concepts of military discipline, loyalty, and honor and undermining the norms and conditions of representation. His Shakespearean joke, as Kleist refers to it, reads very differently from Goethe's interpretation of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* in his novel *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, 1795–96), in which he seeks the core of *Bildung* and the principle of public representation. It is precisely the aristocratic norm of self-representation that Kleist's drummer undermines with his last wish. It is not reason but desire, not the freedom of education and self-control, but rather the ecstasy of self-destruction that constitutes the "value" of the drummer's Shakespearean enterprise.²⁵

The "Anekdote aus dem letzten Krieg" demonstrates the cynical reasoning of Kleist's political thought and reveals his subversive method as an author of minor forms. The writer, like his drummer, performs his "Shakespearean" role in no man's land, at the periphery of his homeland, as if it were an epilogue to literary and political defeat. The drummer, who turns his execution into a work of art, is a refugee from the battle of Jena ("Kleist with Napoleon"), but also an emigrant from Weimar, the court of German literature ("Kleist with Goethe"). Kleist's war anecdotes alongside his novellas and dramas should also be read as responses to Goethe's literary heritage: his protagonists are captured, to use Goethe's own dictum on Kleist's drama *Amphitryon*, in a "Verwirrung der Gefühle," "confusion of emotions."²⁶ His warriors are organisms of mixed, contradictory, and radical emotions that not only challenge the political order but also undermine the literary genres, the concepts of drama, and the conventions of theatrical representation. In this context one reads Kleist's play *Penthesilea* also as an answer to Goethe's own Greek drama, as if it were the double of *Iphigenie auf Tauris*. In contrast to Goethe's protagonist, who evokes moral categories and visions of eternal peace in the Kantian sense, Penthesilea speaks as a naked body of desires.²⁷ The Amazon thus had to remain outside, far from the stage of Weimar.²⁸

A third reading of Kleist's anecdote returns to "Kleist with Kant." Ostensibly, Kleist's protagonists are made from the same material that awakened Kant's nightmares — bodies of weak reflection, organisms of desires and violence, soldiers without honor and respect, fools who contradict the imperatives of practical reason. In Kleist's discourse of war, one does not experience "etwas Erhabenes," the something sublime that Kant attributed to a war conducted with order and respect for civil rights (Kant, 4:133). In his famous remark on war from the chapter on the "Analytik des Erhabenen" (Analysis of the Sublime) in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of the Power of Judgment), Kant discussed the function of war in the process of civilization:

[Der Krieg] macht zugleich die Denkungsart des Volks, welches ihn auf diese Art führt, nur um desto erhabener, je mehreren Gefahren es

ausgesetzt war und sich muthig darunter hat behaupten können: da hingegen ein langer Frieden den bloßen Handelsgeist, mit ihm aber den niedrigen Eigennutz, Feigheit und Weichlichkeit herrschend zu machen und die Denkart des Volks zu erniedrigen pflegt. (Kant, 4:133)

[(The war) at the same time makes the mentality of the people who conduct it in this way all the more sublime, the more dangers it has been exposed to and before which it has been able to assert its courage; whereas a long peace causes the spirit of mere commerce to predominate along with base selfishness, cowardice, and weakness, and usually debases the mentality of the populace.”]²⁹

Kant’s remark on war and peace appears at the periphery of his enterprise, in the margins of his third critique of reason, and thus the significance of this paragraph should not be exaggerated. He was not a philosopher of war. His reflections on “Gewalt” (violence) and “Macht” (power) in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft* pertain to the discourse on aesthetic judgment and the subject’s relationship to the objects of nature.³⁰ His praise for the warrior who embodies the “Unbezwinglichkeit [des] Gemüthes” (the invincibility of mind) is contextualized in a discourse on the virtues of gentleness and compassion (Kant, 4:132), and his remark on war is basically a remark on peace. And yet this marginal remark reveals perhaps the psycho-cultural condition of the Enlightenment in Kant’s view — the need for “Mut,” courage that defines the subject of the Enlightenment. The subject in Kant’s 1784 essay on the question of Enlightenment is required, as discussed above, to “dare” self-reflection. This enlightened being, embodying courage, strength, and freedom of thought, also has “something sublime.” The subject of the Enlightenment is to a certain extent “a soldier,” a subject of violence. The experience of the sublime is an experience with objects of violence which, however, can and should be integrated into a peaceful, gentle order — the order of reason, the discourse of Enlightenment. In the encounter with the sublime the Enlightenment reaches its margins, the senses feel their limits, and reason approaches the territories of its desired, missing object, “das Ding,” the thing.³¹ This potential, the possibility of experiencing the sublime, grows in times of war; however, the experience of the sublime does not demand the destruction of civil society, but rather depends on the merits of peace, civil rights, and compassion. Kant thus viewed the function of war and its role in the process of civilization as if they were sources for the reaffirmation of reason. His soldier is a model of how reason grows and reaffirms its sovereignty “durch Gefahr,” though danger.

Kleist’s views on violence and war are different. When he wrote about the affinity of war and reason, he wrote about paradoxes. This is the essence of his essay “Von der Überlegung. Ein Paradox” (*SW*, 3:554–55; On Thinking Things Over: A Paradox). Self-reflection, Kleist argues, should be

suspended during the deed. “Der Kampf” (the struggle) demands an action that is free of thought, reflection, and planning. It is precisely reason a priori, the application of reason as a precondition of cognition and deed, which is rejected from the field of war. The “German way” in war, according to Kleist, is that of spontaneous violence; war is based on impromptu gestures of aggression, on the reflexes of and the effects on the body. A similar “paradoxical” form of struggle governs the world of Penthesilea, who declares her war of desire against the Greek hero and breaks the rules of civilized warfare (Krimmer, 77). In Kleist’s world, war is not guided by an ideal of order, but rather rejects rational definitions of planning and control. His protagonists are irrational, unordered soldiers. His war-protagonists hint, however, not only at the identity of the partisan, the “irregulärer Kämpfer,” the irregular fighter who condemns the order of war (Schmitt, 21), but also at the paradoxical, grotesque mechanisms of violence.

The gaps between Kleist and Kant are vast. However, a reading of Kleist *with* Kant is more than an explication of contradictions. One should recognize the possibility of correspondence, an affinity of inverted figures between the discourse of the anal body and the theory of the sublime, between the war of desires and the imperatives of practical reason. One can consider the possibility of Kleist’s war anecdotes as critical supplements that bring to light the body that is embedded, hidden in the folds of Kant’s discourse of reason. This path of reading follows Lacan’s model, his reading of “Kant with Sade.”³² Lacan reads Sade’s *Philosophy in the Bedroom* as if it were a completion of Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*, a novel that reveals the radical message of Kant’s philosophy. Sade’s writing leads us to recognize how Kant’s project of reason demands the sacrifice of pleasure and contradicts the idea of progress. Sade’s premise that “I have the right to enjoy your body,” Lacan argues, suits the form and tendency of Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant’s ethical law and Sade’s scheme of desire argue for general validity; both demand the suspension of the subject’s interests, its feelings, wishes, and sense of pleasure. “Law and repressed desire,” Lacan writes, “are one and the same thing” (660). Repressed desire and the law of ethics are both “beyond the pleasure principle.” Sade’s desire and Kant’s law thus require “the same thing”: suspension of the self, the overcoming or the sacrifice of subjectivity. Both define the constellation of the other, the law of the missing object, the desire for “das Ding an sich,” the thing in itself (Lacan, 659).

This way of reading leads to the recognition that Kleist’s anal poetics and Kant’s concept of law share similar terrain. Kant’s moral law and Kleist’s body of anal eroticism reveal themselves as desires, as wishes that are not to be wished, requests that challenge the prevailing norms of the social subject which oppose the idea of life and happiness and contradict the sovereignty of the self.³³ The differences between Kleist and Kant cannot be annulled. Kant recognizes the other as a divine essence and the

horizon of ethics, while Kleist's other is the repressed body, a medium of forbidden desire. Kant prefers the reasonable, the rational, and the universal, and rejects the physical, animal aspect of humanity. Kleist reveals the spontaneous movement of violence and praises the paradoxes of human life and its singularity. This, for example, is the "lesson" of his essay "Über das Marionettentheater" (On Puppet Theater), which incorporates anecdotes and reveals paradoxes of knowledge. Its arguments often collapse into labyrinths of thought, repetitions, and riddles. The speakers talk about the distortions and catastrophes that self-reflection inflicts on the body. The human body that reflects itself, as in the case of the boy who recognizes the beauty of his own portrait, descends into false gestures and becomes immersed in melancholy. The longing for wild spontaneity and freedom brings the protagonist back to the world of animals. One of the anecdotes in the essay tells about a bear that cannot be defeated in a duel. The wild animal is another ironic portrait of the war machine, an organism of weak reflection and an agent of divine violence. An odd correspondence between the divine and the mechanical is mentioned in the final stage of Kleist's essay, as if God's thought is inversely reflected in the animal and the puppet that cannot think. This is how reason, in its divine form, meets the body. Again it is a case of an inverted correspondence between the sublime and the repressed, an anal view of the order of things in Kleist's writing:

Das Paradies ist verriegelt und der Cherub hinter uns; wir müssen die Reise um die Welt machen, und sehen, ob es vielleicht von hinten irgendwo wieder offen ist. (SW, 3:559)

[But Paradise is locked and barred and the Cherub is behind us. We shall have to go all the way around the world and see whether it might be open somewhere at the back again.]³⁴

This is the paradox of a return to a state of innocence. The *way back* into the realm of pleasure is inverted — it is the *back way* to paradise; the entrance lies "behind." Kleist's "Anekdote aus dem letzten Krieg" can be read as another example of the anal insight that is introduced by his speaker in "Über das Marionettentheater" as the "final chapter in world history" (SW, 3:563).

A reading of "Kleist with Kant" thus recognizes sameness hidden in difference: it is the stitch of reason with desire, reflection with physicality, the sublime with the repulsive. Kant's "the thing in itself" is Kleist's "body."

Kant's Joke, the Return of the Body

The story of the drummer from the "Anekdote aus dem letzten Krieg" should be read as "ungeheuersten Witz," a terrible joke, which according

to Kleist has a “Shakespearsche Eigenschaft,” a Shakespearean quality; for, he writes, “the drummer remains faithful to his sphere as a drummer” (*SW*, 3:361; *Abyss*, 268). The drummer does not wish to suffer a new hole in his body, but rather to keep his skin clean and perfect like the skin of his drum. By pointing to the anal cut, the natural hole of his body, however, he creates a field of ironic implications. The anus turns into a membrane, a perfect and natural medium of resistance. The remarks on the drummer’s joke with which Kleist opens and ends the anecdote are important, because they hint that his war anecdote is essentially a work of irony. A joke, if one follows Friedrich Schlegel’s definition, is a structure of knowledge that contains a paradox; it is written as a game of contradictions that are ultimately enfolded in the fragment, in the form of the anecdote itself. The essence of a joke, Schlegel writes, lies in its “Abgerissenheit,” being torn; it is often a “Bruchstück,” a fragment, or a manifestation of “fragmentarische Genialität,” fragmentary genius.³⁵ Like the fragment, the joke is a minor synthesis of cognition, a local and temporary form of knowledge which breaks the logic of conversation by interrupting the narrative in which it is hosted (Schlegel, 2:160). The joke, Schlegel wrote, thus stands in proximity to irony, and for Schlegel irony, as Paul de Man argues, implies a philosophical gesture, a movement of “Philosophy Buffo,” an act of interruption in the processes of signifying and identification.³⁶ Irony is a way of exposing illusions of order, system, and narration. The anal gesture, the drummer’s joke, should be understood in a similar way. His wish to be shot from behind in order to avoid a new hole in his body is a moment of estrangement in the history of the Prussian war; it is a cut, an interruption that refutes the order of war and rewrites the legacy of the partisan as a parody.

Kleist’s remark that the drummer’s joke has a Shakespearean quality can be read in different ways. On the one hand there is Shakespeare’s legacy of the fool, the ironic figure of modern theater who appears close to the king, a grotesque double of the sovereign. Kleist’s drummer is made from similar material in that he inverts the law and constitutes a parody on discipline and discourses of sovereignty. And this fool cannot escape his calling. The drummer, who remains in his domain, identifies with the perfect skin of his drum and thus demands not to suffer any new, unnatural hole in his body. On the other hand is Schlegel’s remark that Shakespeare embodied the essence of literature as a “joke” (124–33), for it is the structure of knowledge in Shakespeare’s drama, based as it is on contradictions and paradoxes of violence and desires. Kleist’s anecdote is written in a similar way, as a nightmare of reason.

This brings us back to the discussion of Kleist with Kant. In paragraph fifty-four of his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, which is written as a note to the chapter on the arts, Kant discusses laughter. In this context he tells a few jokes, the first about an Indian and a bottle of beer:

Ein Indianer, der an der Tafel eines Engländers in Surate eine Bouteille mit Ale öffnen und alles dies Bier, in Schaum verwandelt, herausdringen sah, mit vielen Ausrufungen seine große Verwunderungen anzeigte und auf die Frage des Engländers: was ist denn hier sich so sehr zu verwundern? Antwortete: ich wundere mich auch nicht darüber, daß es herausgeht, sondern wie ihrs habt herein kriegen können. (Kant, 4:222)

[An Indian, at the table of an Englishman in Surat, seeing a bottle of ale being opened and all the beer, transformed into foam, spilling out, displayed his great amazement with exclamations, and in reply to the Englishman's question "What is so amazing here?" answered, "I'm not amazed that it's coming out, but by how you got it all in. (*Critique*, 209)]

We laugh at this joke, Kant writes, not because of its wisdom, for it possesses none, but rather because of our expectations that have suddenly vanished into thin air. This, in his view, is the essence of laughter: "Das Lachen ist ein Affect aus der plötzlichen Verwandlung einer gespannten Erwartung in nichts" (Kant, 4:222; Laughter is an affect resulting from the sudden transformation of a heightened expectation into nothing, *Critique*, 209). Jokes and laughter are based on emptying, moving suddenly from tension to relief, from fullness to void. The joke about the Indian and the emptying of a beer bottle embodies, in this view, the essence of humor — the process of emptying, the transformation into nothing. This is the mechanism of Kant's philosophical joke, which also has sexual implications. It is based on emptying, release, and relief. The syntax of the joke is that of body language; the laughter, Kant writes, is based on a special internal bodily movement that starts with "eine wechselseitige Anspannung und Loslassung der elastischen Theile unserer Eingeweide" (Kant, 4:224; a reciprocal tensing and relaxing of the elastic parts of our viscera, *Critique*, 210). This movement ends with rapid, successive pauses of breathing. According to Kant, the essence of the joke is physical, its nature is "animalisch," animal (4:224; 211).

This joke, Kant argues, is meaningless and empty; it lacks reason and relies on physical effects, but it does refer to colonial experience in India. The joke appears as a "colony" in Kant's *Critique*, as a remote, uncivilized territory in his theory of reason. It is not accidental that the discussion of jokes and laughter appears in Kant's *Kritik der Urteilkraft* after the chapter dealing with the sublime. Since "the transcendental subject itself does not laugh," laughter begins and ends beyond the homeland of reason.³⁷ Kant's fool, the body of laughter, emerges as a "supplement," a marginal note in the discourse of the sublime. It is written on the backside of his project of the Enlightenment. Kleist's anecdotes, however, belong precisely to this territory, to the colony of laughter that is enfolded in Kant's

philosophy. Like the jokes, the anecdotes are written as short, rapid movements that end in a void, with holes.

Epilogue

Kleist's joke, his drummer's last wish, is an ironic remark written on the back of Goethe's literature, Kant's philosophy, and the Prussian discourse of war. The protagonists of his anecdotes, the drummer and the soldier, embody the possibilities of a political prose on the boundaries of German history and literature. Their performances of violence open inverted, critical perspectives on the question of war. They expose the dialectic of war in the age of Enlightenment and reveal a rare, inverted perspective on the denied bodies of Kant's project of reason. Kleist's war anecdotes should thus be read as introductions to his literature, prologues to his novellas and dramas, and perhaps also as their *epilogues* — their last wishes.

Notes

¹ See Ernst Kayka, *Kleist und die Romantik* (Berlin: Duncker, 1906); Wilhelm Emrich, "Kleist und die moderne Literatur," in *Heinrich von Kleist*, ed. Walter Müller-Seidel (Berlin: Schmidt, 1962), 9–25; Katharina Mommsen, *Kleists Kampf mit Goethe* (Heidelberg: Stiehm, 1974).

² See Ernst Cassirer, *Heinrich von Kleist und die Kantische Philosophie* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1919); Ludwig Muth, *Kleist und Kant: Versuch einer neuen Interpretation* (Cologne: Kölner Universität Verlag, 1954); Tim Mehigan, "Kleist, Kant und die Aufklärung," in *Heinrich von Kleist und die Aufklärung*, ed. Tim Mehigan (New York: Camden House, 2000), 3–21; and James Phillips, *The Equivocation of Reason: Kleist Reading Kant* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007).

³ Kleist read Kant's writings between 1800 and 1801 and documented his impressions of Kant's philosophy in some of his letters; see, for example, his famous letter to Wilhelmine von Zenge from March 1801 in Heinrich von Kleist, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, 4 vol. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1997), 205 (all further references to this edition appear in the text as *SW* with volume and page number). According to Kleist's reading, Kant's critique of reason undermines the objectivity of human cognition and scientific knowledge. Kleist's reading of Kant, which was governed by a radical subjectivism, thus denied the universal implications of Kant's philosophical project. Kleist's "misreading" proved itself, however, as a productive way of revealing the "hidden" aspects — the "bodies" of Kant's critique.

⁴ See Dirk Grathoff, "Heinrich von Kleist und Napoleon Bonaparte, der Furor Teutonicus und die ferne Revolution," in *Heinrich von Kleist. Kriegsfall—Rechtsfall — Sündenfall*, ed. Gerhard Neumann (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach,

1994), 31–59; see also Wolf Kittler, *Die Geburt des Partisanen aus dem Geist der Poesie: Heinrich von Kleist und die Strategie der Befreiungskriege* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1987).

⁵ Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2001), 49.

⁶ This phrase is based on Joel Finemann's definition of the anecdote, quoted in Gerhard Neumann, "Anekdote und Novelle: Zum Problem der Mimesis im Werk Heinrich von Kleists," in *Heinrich von Kleist und die Aufklärung*, ed. Tim Mehigan (New York: Camden House, 2000), 150.

⁷ See Friedrich A. Kittler, "Ein Erbbeben in Chili und Preußen," in *Positionen der Literaturwissenschaft*, ed. David E. Wellbery (Munich: Beck, 1999), 27; Christian Moser, *Verfehlte Gefühle: Wissen-Begehren-Darstellen bei Kleist und Rousseau* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), 172–78; and Stefanie Marx, *Beispiele des Beispiellosten: Heinrich von Kleists Erzählungen ohne Moral* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1994), 161–67.

⁸ Heinrich von Kleist, *An Abyss Deep Enough*, trans. Philip B. Miller (New York: Dutton, 1979), 22.

⁹ See also Erika Fischer Lichte, *Heinrich von Kleist: Prinz Friedrich von Homburg* (Frankfurt am Main: Moritz Diesterweg, 1985), 13–16.

¹⁰ The discourse of the heart in Kleist's play is complex and also bound up with notions of love, fear, and mercy. The heart challenges the universality of the law; however, the moments of the heart are exceptional in that they do not challenge the law itself but rather its totality, its universal, global claim. Emotional action thus requires a temporal, local suspension of the law in order to enforce a decision and thereby reinforce the principle of sovereignty. The emotion that prevails in a moment of exception does not destroy sovereignty but rather, by suspending the law, brings it to the highest stage of military and political progress. The law, in other words, is based on the possibilities of its suspension, and this is the paradox of the sovereign in Kleist's play. The law and the heart, reason and spontaneous emotions are not separate, but rather condensed into the same textures of action/acting. The protagonists and the bystanders in Kleist's drama participate in an endless negotiation in which political views are enfolded in erotic plots, courtly play, rumors, and self-ironies. *Der Prinz von Homburg* is not only a drama on the possibilities of action, but also a drama of acting, *ein Schauspiel* of sovereignty.

¹¹ Walter Benjamin, *Zur Kritik der Gewalt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965), 38–47. See also Lawrence Ryan, "Zur Kritik der Gewalt bei Heinrich von Kleist," *Kleist Jahrbuch* 1981/82: 349–57.

¹² See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer: Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben*, trans. Hubert Thüring (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 74–78.

¹³ See Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law," in *Acts of Religion*, trans. Mary Quaintance (New York: Routledge, 2002), 230–98.

¹⁴ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Götz von Berlichingen*, in *Werke*, vol. 4 (Munich: Beck, 1994), 139.

¹⁵ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Goetz von Berlichingen with the Iron Hand*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 7: *Early Verse Drama and Prose Plays*, trans. Cyrus Hamlin (New York: Suhrkamp, 1988), 52. In the English translation of Goethe's play the words that were deleted from the play's second version are retained: "he can kiss my arse!"

¹⁶ Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 11–22.

¹⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Werke* (Cologne: Könnemann, 1995), 6:165.

¹⁸ By individual private resistance I mean an act of disobedience and subversion that is based on reason but does not yet lay claim to universality or general validity. On the question of Kant's view of political disobedience, see David L. Colclasure's article in this volume.

¹⁹ I am referring here to Freud's essay "Jenseits des Lustprinzips" (Beyond the Pleasure Principle), in which Freud redefines the mechanisms of the psyche and reveals the structure of the "Wiederholungszwang," the compulsion to repeat, a primal mechanism of defense based on the internalization of a traumatic experience that demands the suspension or sacrifice of pleasure; see Sigmund Freud, "Jenseits des Lustprinzips," in *Studienausgabe*, vol. 3, *Psychologie des Unbewußten*, 214–17 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000).

²⁰ Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2006), 15.

²¹ Schmitt rejects the idea of "play" (Spiel) as a form of ambiguous discourse that opposes the concept of war; see his discussion on Lenin's concept of partisan war (56). His political theory of the partisan demands seriousness, determination, and the ability to distinguish between friend and enemy. The political, to recall Schmitt's famous definition of sovereignty, is based on the possibility of deciding; however, Schmitt mentions the case of Michael Kohlhaas, who "was not a partisan," but rather a "robber and a murderer." Kohlhaas, he stresses, did not dedicate his war to a revolutionary cause or to the struggle against a foreign occupier, but rather fought for the sake of his "own private justice" (92).

²² On Penthesilea's hysteric discourse, see Helga Gallas, *Kleist: Gesetz, Begehren, Sexualität: Zwischen symbolischer und imaginärer Identifizierung* (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld, 2005), 202–6; Gerburg Treusch-Dieter, *Von der sexuellen Rebellion zur Gen- und Reproduktionstechnologie* (Tübingen: Claudia Gehrle, 1990), 73–85; and W. Kittler 205–9. For further reading on Kleist's *Penthesilea* in the context of war theory and gender discourse, see Elisabeth Krimmer, "The Gender of Terror: War as (Im)Moral Institution in Kleist's *Hermannsschlacht* and *Penthesilea*," *The German Quarterly* 81.1 (2008): 76–80 and Patricia Anne Simpson, *The Erotics of War in German Romanticism* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2006), 128–63.

²³ See Gilles Deleuze, *Lust und Begehren*, trans. Hennig Schmidgen (Berlin: Merve, 1996), 36–39, and also Mathieu Carrière, *Für eine Literatur des Krieges* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990), 74–104.

²⁴ Sigmund Freud, "Charakter und Analerotik," in *Studienausgabe*, vol. 7: *Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000), 25–30.

²⁵ The affinities between Kleist's prose and Goethe's *Bildungsroman* are significant and demand further discussion. See, for example, the comparative reading suggested by Anthony Stephens, who argues that there are similarities between Goethe's critique of causality, his ironic techniques of narration, and the "Shakespearean" insights of his hero, Wilhelm Meister, on Hamlet's fate, and Kleist's worlds of incidents. However, Stephens claims that Goethe endows his protagonist with father figures who save him on the path of dialogue and self-creation. In contrast, Kleist's protagonists wander fatherless, lacking the horizon of *Bildung*, the imagination of the self, the identification with the other, the dialogue with the world; see Anthony Stephens, *Kleist — Sprache und Gewalt* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1999), 441–52.

²⁶ Helmut Sembdner, ed., *Heinrich von Kleists Lebensspuren: Dokumente und Berichte der Zeitgenossen* (Munich: dtv Klassik, 1996), 182.

²⁷ The correspondence between Goethe's *Iphigenia* and Kleist's *Penthesilea* is striking. Both figures appear on the sidelines of the Trojan War; both live under the sanctions of Diana; both experience the terror of gender differences and embody longing and absence; both challenge the law. Iphigenia, however, speaks her poetry with rhymes of reason and peace and escapes the mythical circles of violence. Her body and desires are transformed and vanish in categories of moral discourse and consciousness of duty.

²⁸ Kleist sent Goethe the fragment of his play that was published in the first edition of the journal *Phöbus* in January 1808, and Goethe replied, "[Penthesilea] ist aus einem so wunderbaren Geschlecht und bewegt sich in einer so fremden Region" (*SW*, 4:410). He criticized Kleist for his unrealistic expectations of the theater and for illusions that prevented him from creating in the here and now. Goethe was later quoted as saying that *Penthesilea* evoked bad feelings in him. He rejected the breastless Amazon as a "disgusting figure" (Sembdner, *Heinrich von Kleists Lebensspuren*, 259) and thus decided to remove this figure from the corpus of the Weimar theater. See also Gallas, 209–16.

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2000), 146.

³⁰ On Kant, his theory of the sublime, and his reflections on war in the context of German literature, compare Simpson 38–41. Simpson notices that in his discussion on the sublime of war, Kant suspends his concept of pleasure; war, in his view, lacks any erotic dimension. The re-eroticization of war, Simpson shows, was rather the project of Romanticism.

³¹ For further reading on Kant's theory of the sublime as a supplement to his philosophy of reason, see Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1932), 294–327 endnote 2; Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Die Analytik des Erhabenen. Kant-Lektionen* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994); and Jürgen Nieraad, "Apotheosen des Untergang: das Erhabene," *Compar(a)ison* 2 (1996): 19–35. See also John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*

(Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1992), 17–44; and Alenka Zupanèiè, “Die Logik des Erhabenen,” in *Wo Es war* (4), ed. Slavoj Žižek (Vienna: Turia & Kant, 1994). Zupanèiè writes on the meaning of the sublime as the experience of the possibility to approach the surrounding of the “Ding,” the thing, the object, i.e., to stand on the threshold of death. The sublime, to follow this reading, is the essence of the tragic viewpoint on being.

³² Jacques Lacan, “Kant with Sade,” in *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 645–68.

³³ See James Phillips’s reading of Kant and Kleist as authors of the “law before Oedipus.” Here Kant reappears as a philosopher of “a priori desire” that is not empirical or particular, but rather embodies the “negation of positivity,” a condition for the moral act. “Kantian Law” should not be identified with duties, rules, or “laws” in their psychological, social, or political meanings; it is rather a category of negation that nevertheless creates the condition for the possibility of a spontaneous movement towards things (38–48). Kant’s Law, in this reading, is not a condition for a discipline, but rather a category of freedom. Phillips, however, rejects the anal reading of “Kantian altruism and Kleistian catalepsy” by criticizing the positivist, biological implications of the anal level in Freud’s thesis and its symbolic characterization as a substitute for the desire of the phallus in Lacan’s interpretation. Phillips argues that “the ethical act, in its indifference to the law of exchange, predates the anal stage” (48–49). His reading of Kant is not without difficulties and yet is very evocative. My own reading, however, seeks to maintain the symbolic implication of anality as a condition for a physical interpretation of the moral law.

³⁴ Heinrich von Kleist, *Selected Writings*, trans. David Constantine (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2004), 413–14.

³⁵ Friedrich Schlegel, *Schriften: Kritische Ausgabe*, 35 vols (Munich: Schöningh, 1958), 12:403 and 2:149.

³⁶ Paul de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996), 163–84.

³⁷ Klaus Heinrich, “Theorie des Lachens,” in *Lachen — Gelächter — Lächeln. Reflexionen in drei Spiegeln*, ed. Dieter Kamper and Christoph Wulf (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1986), 17–38.

5: “Schon wieder Krieg! Der Kluge hörts nicht gern”: Goethe, Warfare, and *Faust II*

Elisabeth Krimmer

IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED that Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) was no friend of war and violence. From the description of the stellar constellation during his birth in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (Poetry and Truth, 1811–33), where Mars looks on indifferently — “Saturn und Mars verhielten sich gleichgültig” (Saturn and Mars remained indifferent)¹ — to his unwillingness to accompany Duke Carl August of Weimar on the campaign in France, Goethe sought to remain at a distance from war. Numerous references in his works and letters as well as statements recorded by his secretary, Johann Peter Eckermann (1792–1854), affirm this aversion. For example, in a letter to Johann Friedrich Rochlitz (1769–1842) from 22 April 1822, Goethe called war “diese Erbkrankheit der Welt” (this hereditary disease of the world).² In a conversation with Eckermann on 27 April 1825, he proclaimed his hatred of all forms of violence: “jedes Gewaltsame, Sprunghafte, ist mir in der Seele zuwider, denn es ist nicht naturgemäß” (SW, 19:519; I loathe everything violent, sudden, because it is not natural). During the Wars of Liberation, Goethe belonged to a minority of writers who did not share the national fervor; consequently, he did not support the war effort through literary production: “Bei mir aber, der ich keine kriegerische Natur bin und keinen kriegerischen Sinn habe, würden Kriegslieder eine Maske gewesen sein, die mir sehr schlecht zu Gesicht gestanden hätte” (SW, 19:660; But in my case, since I am not a natural warrior and do not have a martial outlook, war songs would have been a mask that would not have suited me at all).

Judging from these statements, one would not assume that Goethe, who detested war so much, was at the same time extremely interested in the theory and practice of war. And yet he counted many generals among his acquaintances³ and, as Steinmetz has shown, read and reviewed numerous soldiers’ memoirs as well as books on tactics, strategy, and the history of war, including Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Guibert’s (1743–90) *Versuch über die Tactik* (*Essai générale de tactique*, 1770) and Johann Gottfried Hoyer’s (1767–1848) *Geschichte der Kriegskunst seit der ersten Anwendung*

des Schiesspulvers (History of the Art of War since the First Use of Gunpowder, 1797–1800). More importantly, war is a recurring and important theme throughout Goethe's works. *Campagne in Frankreich* (Campaign in France, 1822) recounts the author's experiences during the allied campaign against revolutionary France in 1792. Elsewhere I suggest that *Campagne* rejects the notion of war as a creative and ennobling force as endorsed by so many of Goethe's contemporaries.⁴ If the text fails to portray the horror of war, as many have argued, it is because it does not seek to convey a portrait of war but aims to offer a grammar of peace. *Campagne* does not focus on the dead and wounded; rather, it suggests that war does its most pervasive damage not on the battlefield but in the civic arena. Goethe shows that war erodes the web of rules and habits that govern the peaceful working of society and thus destroys the building blocks of any form of social order.

While *Campagne* is based on personal experience, *Faust II* presents a philosophical reflection on war in allegorical form.⁵ The "Grundbuch des Deutschtums" (foundational book of German culture), as Schöne calls it, is concerned with the institution of war in its various historical guises.⁶ Surprisingly though, *Faust II* offers a somewhat more positive evaluation of warfare than *Campagne* in that it is interested in exploring the link between warfare and the sublime, between violent conquest and man's creative impulses. As I will show, in *Faust II* Goethe did indeed posit an affinity between genius in art and genius in war; however, there is an important nuance that differentiates Goethe's conceptualization of war and the sublime from that of many of his contemporaries. Unlike Schiller, Humboldt, Kant, and others, Goethe viewed the link between violence and creation with considerable irony.

While *Faust I* is primarily interested in interpersonal violence exemplified by the raucous aggression in Auerbach's cellar and the duel between Faust and Gretchen's brother, *Faust II* explores the practice of warfare in great depth. Throughout, war appears as the bane of human existence but also as an enduring, inevitable, and ineradicable social institution. It is not only the infamous fourth act, the last to be completed by Goethe and, according to Emrich, "das große Schmerzenskind" (the big source of grief) of Faust scholarship, that deals with the topic of war.⁷ Rather, war is a recurrent theme in *Faust II*. It is featured in Faust's journey to Classical Greece, which might be described as a form of battlefield tourism, and in the pygmy episode, in which the discovery of treasure leads to enslavement and violence. War is also an important theme in act 3, both in Faust's campaign against Menelaus, reminiscent of the fourth crusade, and in Euphorion's plea for freedom and war, designed to evoke the Greek War of Independence. In all these scenes Goethe explores the link between warfare and the sublime, but, unlike some of his contemporaries, he does not consider the practice of war itself, its battles and martial exploits, to be

ennobling. Rather, the revaluation of war in *Faust II* rests on Goethe's analysis of the origin of war, for he finds it rooted not only in man's lowest impulses, but also in his highest aspirations. Wars result from self-indulgence, greed, and lust for power, but they are also propelled by the same energy and hunger for activity that lie at the heart of human relationships and drive the creation of art.⁸ It is precisely this surprising identity of the drives that underlie war, love, and art that accounts for the inevitability of war.

In the following, I first show that in *Faust II* war is consistently associated with a lack of self-governance and failure of volition. In particular, it is linked with self-indulgence, greed, and hunger for power. Because these failures are portrayed as inherent in the human condition, the violence they spawn is inevitable, and the eradication of war impossible. In *Faust II*, the best hope to contain war and violence consists in the implementation of an effective, centralized leadership. However, if Goethe portrays war as inevitable, it is not only because of the ineluctability of human moral failure, but also because the impulse for war and violence is imbricated with man's loftiest aspirations. Thus, the second section of this article traces the subtle affinities between martial, amorous, and spiritual conquest. But again, even though Goethe frequently alluded to a link between genius and violence and between art and war, he never failed to undermine this link through subtle criticism and irony.

Finally, the third section here seeks to contextualize Goethe's thoughts on war by comparing them to Fichte's and Clausewitz's theories on warfare. As we shall see Fichte, like Goethe, associated warfare with greed and moral turpitude as well as with freedom. Unlike Goethe, however, who detected moral ambivalence in all wars, Fichte posited a clear differentiation between praiseworthy national wars of freedom and detestable wars undertaken for commercial reasons. Moreover, while Fichte believed in a war to end all wars, Goethe, like Clausewitz, saw in warfare an ineradicable social institution. Unlike Goethe, however, Clausewitz maintained the hope that wars could be guided by political reason. In sum, Goethe's literary work contributes to a contemporary philosophy of warfare in part by ironizing the capacity of politics to tame martial impulses and advocating art's ability to temper the destructive force of war. His *Faust II* is a captivating contemplation on the consequences of various dimensions of human aggression.

War and Human Nature

When Faust and his entourage are first transported to the classical Walpurgis Night, they land on the battlefield of Pharsalus in 48 BC, where Caesar's army defeated the troops of the Roman Senate led by Pompey, a

victory that is often identified with the end of the Roman Republic. When Faust then travels with Chiron, the horseman takes him to the location of the battle of Pydna of 168 BC, in which the Roman Republic, led by the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, defeated the Macedonian king Perseus, Alexander's successor — an event that marked the ascendancy of Rome over Greece.

In his essays on *Faust*, Barker Fairley claims that Goethe's "persons are not quite personified and the ideas not quite abstracted."⁹ One might make a similar claim with respect to the numerous historical references in *Faust II*, which oscillate between concrete application and universal validity.¹⁰ If Goethe's specific historical references are expressive of universal laws, it is because they acquire surplus value as they are refracted through the prism of similar events.¹¹ Thus, the battles of Pydna and Pharsalus, which herald the growing and declining power of the republic, are to be understood in the context of France in 1789 and 1830, but they also speak to the cyclical nature of warfare and forms of government in general. The fact that on Faust's journey Pharsalus, the end of the republic, precedes Pydna, the rise of the republic, calls any notion of progress into question. Wars and empires come and go without lasting achievements. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Mephistopheles characterizes warfare as an enduring social institution. To him the ostensible goal of any particular war is but an excuse designed to provide an outlet for mankind's destructive urges:

O weh! Hinweg! Und laßt mir jene Streite
 Von Tyranny und Sklaverey bey Seite.
 Mich langweilt's, denn kaum ist es abgethan,
 So fangen sie von vorne wieder an. (*SW*, 6956–59)

[Horrors! No more! And spare me your account
 Of all those fights of slaves with despotism!
 They bore me, for no sooner are they over
 Than the combatants start again.]¹²

Later on in the play, the Sphinxes liken alternating times of war and peace to the change of night and day. Wars occur with the regularity of natural disasters and are governed by the same inevitability:

So regeln wir die Mond- und Sonnentage.
 Sitzen vor den Pyramiden,
 Zu der Völker Hochgericht;
 Ueberschwemmung, Krieg und Frieden —
 Und verziehen kein Gesicht. (*SW*, 7244–48)

[(We) govern the lunar and the solar day.
 Placed before the Pyramids,

As the nations' highest court,
 We see flood, and war, and peace,
 Never changing our expressions.]

Faust II not only presents warfare as inevitable, it also offers an explanation for its enduring actuality. In his in-depth study of the relation between modernity and allegory in *Faust II*, Schlaffer defines allegory as a figure of depersonalization. He claims that "individuelle Kraft und Sittlichkeit bezeichnen exakt jene Potenzen, deren unvermeidlichen Untergang in der Moderne *Faust II* darstellt" (8; individual strength and morality designate precisely those powers whose inevitable decline in modernity is portrayed in *Faust II*). I believe that the representation of war in *Faust II* is marked by the same lack of individual volition that Schlaffer identifies as a hallmark of at least the first three acts of the work. *Faust II* is interested in human drives and instincts as well as in social institutions, but relegates concepts of subjectivity and individuality to the sidelines.¹³ Consequently, in Goethe's drama the motivations that instigate and promote war are embedded in man's drives and deeply enmeshed in the social network, but bear little relation to the realm of will and morality.

The character flaws that *Faust II* identifies in relation to war are an excessive craving for pleasure, greed for material possession, and lust for power. The prime proponent of crass self-indulgence and dereliction of duty is the Emperor himself.¹⁴ *Faust II* has confused many readers because its rejection of popular rule is paired with disillusioned criticism of the monarchy.¹⁵ Indeed, it is hard to accept that Faust enables the Emperor's military victory over his challenger even though the text provides ample evidence that the Emperor is utterly unfit to rule.¹⁶ To be sure, the text's manifold criticism of the Emperor is confirmed by extraneous sources. In a conversation with Eckermann, for example, Goethe comments: "Ich habe in dem Kaiser [. . .] einen Fürsten darzustellen gesucht, der alle möglichen Eigenschaften hat, sein Land zu verlieren, welches ihm denn auch später wirklich gelingt" (*SW*, 19:584; In the Emperor I have sought to portray a prince who possesses every possible character trait to lose his land, which he then truly manages later on).¹⁷ Incapable of controlling his craving for pleasure and entertainment, the Emperor is oblivious to the demands of government and criminally remiss in his obligations to his subjects:

Doch sagt warum in diesen Tagen,
 Wo wir der Sorgen uns entschlagen,
 Schönbärte mummenschänzlich tragen,
 Und heitres nur genießen wollten,
 Warum wir uns rathschlagend quälen sollten? (*SW*, 4766–69)

[But tell me why at such a time,
 When we would like to banish cares,

Put on the masks of carnival,
 And only cultivate what's pleasant,
 We should torment ourselves by holding council?]

The result of the Emperor's self-indulgence is a catastrophic eruption of violence all over his realm:

Wie tobts in diesen wilden Tagen!
 Ein jeder schlägt und wird erschlagen. (SW, 4812–13)

[What tumult marks these violent times!
 Men kill, and then are killed in turn.]

Undoubtedly, the Emperor's incompetence and lackadaisical attitude lead to rampant violence. Surprisingly though, the text does not argue that war could be avoided under a different form of government. Rather, Goethe appears to suggest that both personal failure and the violence that results from it are ineradicable elements of the human condition. There will always be violence, and the only way to keep it in check is to institute a centralized military power. In *Faust II* an army controlled by a sovereign is indeed, as Foucault suggests in *Discipline and Punish*, "a principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in civil society."¹⁸ Paradoxically, although the incompetence of the ruling sovereign may have led to war in the first place, the fact of war nonetheless confirms the necessity and legitimacy of the monarchy. Goethe elaborated on this connection in a comment on the French military intervention on behalf of Spain's Ferdinand VII in 1824. In a conversation with Eckermann he declared that France's military triumph in Spain was apt to demonstrate the superiority of monarchies over parliamentary rule:

Der beendigte Feldzug der Franzosen in Spanien unter dem Herzog von Angouleme hatte für Goethe großes Interesse. Ich muß die Bourbons wegen dieses Schrittes durchaus loben, sagte er, denn erst hierdurch gewinnen sie ihren Thron, indem sie die Armee gewinnen. Und das ist erreicht. Der Soldat kehret mit Treue für seinen König zurück, denn er hat aus seinen vielen Siegen, so wie aus den Niederlagen der vielköpfig befehligten Spanier die Überzeugung gewonnen, was für ein Unterschied es sei, einem Einzelnen gehorchen oder Vielen. (SW, 19:82)

[The completed campaign of the French in Spain under the Duke of Angouleme held great interest for Goethe. I truly must praise the Bourbons for this step, he said, because they win their throne only by winning over the army. And that is done. The soldier returns with loyalty for his king because his many victories, along with the defeats of the Spaniards, who followed multiple commanders, have con-

vinced him that it makes a difference whether one obeys one or many.]

Political power, if it is not concentrated in a strong leader and supported by a loyal army, remains ineffectual. In warfare, the leadership of one proves superior to the rule of many. Unified command makes victory possible, and the soldier who experiences the strength of such leadership will be all the more committed to his king. It follows that a monarch must be a talented soldier if he is to rule effectively. Unsurprisingly, the sovereign whom Goethe credits with military genius and the resultant political accomplishments is Napoleon:

Mit dem Säbel in der Faust an der Spitze einer Armee, mag man befehlen und Gesetze geben, und man kann sicher sein, daß man gehorcht werde; aber ohne dieses ist es ein mißliches Ding. Napoleon, ohne Soldat zu sein, hätte nie zur höchsten Gewalt emporsteigen können [. . .] es liegt in der Natur der Dinge und ist nicht anders möglich. (SW, 19:300)

[With the saber in one's fist at the head of an army, one may command and pass laws, and one can be sure that one will be obeyed; but without this it is a pitiful thing. Napoleon, if he had not been a soldier, could never have risen to the highest power [. . .] it is the nature of things and it cannot be any other way.]

Goethe's advocacy of the soldier-king stems from the belief that the absence of a centralized military power would result in a war of all against all, the Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Tellingly, in *Faust II* the usurper who challenges the Emperor's rule bases the legitimacy of his claim on the latter's inability to enforce non-violence:

Die Tüchtigen sie standen auf mit Kraft
Und sagten: Herr ist der uns Ruhe schafft. (SW, 10278–79)¹⁹

[Men of ability rebelled, and said:
Let him be ruler who'll establish order.]

By the same logic, however, the fact that the Emperor wins the war proves *ergo ipso* that he is fit to rule. Widespread violence speaks to the absence of leadership; centralized and therefore contained violence testifies to effective leadership. And yet *Faust II* would not be *Faust II* if this lesson were imparted without an ironic twist. After all, the text attributes the Emperor's victory not to his own military prowess but to Mephisto's questionable magic tricks.²⁰ When all is said and done, even the Emperor's military victory cannot dispel the growing doubts regarding his effectiveness as a ruler.

In *Faust II* depravity likes company, and any given vice tends to be accompanied by a host of others; thus, the Emperor not only prefers dal-

liance to duty, he is also motivated by a strong desire for power. As Erichtho tells us, “Denn jeder, der sein innres Selbst/ Nicht zu regieren weiß, regierte gar zu gern/ Des Nachbars Willen, eignem stolzen Sinn gemäß” (*SW*, 7015–17; Those not competent to rule / their own unruly selves, with eager arrogance / seek to impose their will upon their neighbors’ will). This nexus of war, self-indulgence, greed, and hunger for power characterizes not only the Emperor but is played out in different scenarios. In particular, it is the dominant theme in the pygmy episode in the Classical Walpurgis Night. Here Seismos’s initial violent eruption, which brings forth a mountain, also jumpstarts a cycle of greed, slavery, and violence that culminates in war.²¹ As the mountain is propelled upwards, it reveals hidden treasures of gold and thus instigates a struggle for possession and wealth. The pygmies enslave the ants that gather gold on the mountain and, although it is a time of peace, immediately set their slaves to work in preparation for war. As the ants and their fellow slaves the dactyls fabricate arms, the pygmy generalissimo sees fit to steal the feathers of nearby herons as embellishment for the newly forged helmets. This theft rouses the ire of the cranes of Ibycus and causes them to call for war on the pygmies. Finally, all warring parties are destroyed by a falling rock.

Many scholars have read the pygmy episode as a representation of the French Revolution and the ensuing wars. Schöne, for example, likens the episode to “die vulkanistische Erhebung der französischen Republik und der rächende Koalitionskrieg der europäischen Monarchien” (552; the volcanic upheaval of the French Republic and the avenging wars of coalition of the European monarchies). Similarly, Schlaffer and Emrich identify the pygmies with the bourgeoisie and the herons, whose feathers are stolen, with the aristocrats, while ants and dactyls represent the working class (Schlaffer, 88; Emrich, 343). In this reading, the cranes are the counter-revolutionary forces²² and the meteor that destroys both parties is Napoleon (Hamm, 192). Clearly, the pygmy episode is of great political significance, but it also recapitulates the nexus of greed, lack of self-control, and warfare that embroiled the Emperor’s realm in violence — “Mißgestaltete Begierde / Raubt des Reihers edle Zierde” (7666–67; Avarice in monstrous guise / takes the herons’ crowning glory). The main difference between the pygmy war and the war in the fourth act lies in the fact that the pygmy episode presents the intersection of possession, power, and warfare in allegorical form, while the fourth act, which pits the Emperor against a challenger to the throne, develops it as a quasi-historical interlude.²³ The purposeful use of allegory in connection with contemporary events suggests that Goethe did not conceive of his play as a response to current debates but rather as a socio-political investigation of the human condition as such. His account of war strives for greater validity precisely because it is not limited to a specific historical period.

While most scholars read the pygmy episode as an allegory of the French Revolution, Atkins sees the pygmies as colonizers and likens their activity to Faust's dam project in the fifth act (174). In both cases, colonization is associated with warfare. Faust's plan of colonization depends on a land grant from the Emperor, which he hopes to receive in exchange for his and Mephisto's participation in the war effort.²⁴ In order to defeat the troops of the challenger, Mephisto summons die "drey Gewaltigen," the three Mighty Men. The first, Raufebold (Bully), embodies the quick violence of youth; as such, he echoes an important theme of *Faust I*, namely the link between youth's rash exuberance and its propensity toward violence.²⁵ Whereas to Raufebold violence is itself the goal, Habebald (Grabber), who is presented as middle-aged, uses it as a means to acquire wealth. Finally, Haltefest (Holdfast), who is of advanced age, derives pleasure not from acquisition, but from accumulation and the power it bestows. As violence, greed, and hunger for power, Dante's "violenza, avidita, avarizia" (Gaier 127), Raufebald, Habebald and Haltefest embody the triple forces that lie at the bottom of every war in *Faust II*. Lohmeyer sees in them human drives ("Arten menschlicher Triebgewalt").²⁶ Similarly, Gaier interprets the three as "Instinkte der Massen" (48; instincts of the masses) and relates them to the Hobbesian Leviathan, a king whose torso and arms are composed of miniature subjects. Based on the image of the Leviathan, one might claim that the Three Mighty Men embody societal forces harnessed from individual drives; however, regardless of whether we see them as drives or societal forces, they recapitulate the nexus of violence, greed, and power that is so central a theme in *Faust II*.

What the Three Mighty Ones present in allegorical form appears as an individual project in act 5. The link between violence, greed, and lust for power that characterizes every representation of warfare in *Faust II* reasserts itself one last time during Faust's dam-building project. Although he is now in possession of vast holdings, he craves ownership of the strip of land inhabited by the old couple Philemon und Baucis. The couple's modest shack troubles Faust's sense of omnipotence, and he orders Mephisto to "relocate" them. Mephisto interprets Faust's instructions with his customary license, and the couple and their visitor all end up dead. Minutes before Faust's final salvation, the cycle of greed and violence causes the destruction of its most innocent victims yet.

Moreover, in act 5 what had appeared as individual greed throughout most of the play is now linked to its societal complement, commerce; the fifth act firmly establishes a connection that Goethe already hinted at in the first. In the "Mummenschanz" parade of the first act, the ancient Goddess of Victory, Victoria, is not introduced as an allegory of military triumph, but has become the spirit of commerce (see 5451–56). In act 5 Mephisto makes the link between war and commerce explicit: "Krieg, Handel und Piraterie, Dreyeinig sind sie, nicht zu trennen" (11187–88; war, trade, and

piracy together are / a trinity not to be severed). It may be that Faust's military actions on the Emperor's behalf serve to suppress violence and anarchy in the empire, but even if they accomplish a valuable goal, they are undertaken for utterly selfish and menial purposes — selfish impulses, moreover, that have been validated and institutionalized in the form of commerce.

War and Human Creation

Throughout, *Faust II* links warfare and violence to human motivations that are assigned a negative moral value, such as greed and desire for domination; but *Faust II* also portrays a bond between warfare and man's highest aspirations, in particular the desire for love, the capacity for freedom, and the appreciation of beauty and art. This link is prefigured in *Faust I*, where sexuality, desire, and violence are inextricably linked. The death by poison of Gretchen's mother, Faust's murder of Gretchen's brother, Valentin, and Gretchen's infanticide all spring from Faust and Gretchen's illicit relationship. In *Faust II*, the nexus of warfare and love is actualized through the relationship between Faust and Helen. As Jane K. Brown explains, while "Gretchen is natural in the best sense of eighteenth-century Rousseauism[,] Helen, by contrast, is in a sense actually seen stepping from the mirror." Thus, the transition from Gretchen to Helen necessarily reconfigures the relation between love, art, and war.²⁷

In *Faust II*, where romantic relationships are described as "kleine[n] Kriege mit den schönsten Frau'n" (9187; minor skirmishes with the lovely ladies), military and amorous conquests are intimately connected. Interestingly, this is shown to have both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand violence is presented as an analogue of lust. For example, there are parallels between Faust's lust for Gretchen and his murder of Valentin in *Faust I* and Paris's (and his brother Deiphobus's) desire for Helen and the Trojan War in *Faust II*; the common denominator that links lust and violence is the inability to control one's impulses. Seen in this light, sexual incontinence springs from a lack of self-governance that also leads to impulsive violence. But the same excess energy that leads to martial and romantic conquest is also related to man's loftier impulses, to the capacity for love, and even to a desire for transcendence. This is particularly evident in the relationship between Faust and Helen.

Barely back from the Trojan War — which was caused by her beauty — and now joined with Faust, Helen provokes another war. When her husband, Menelaus, and his army march on Faust's castle, Faust, in this case unaided by Mephistopheles, decides to defend his trophy wife through force. Scholars have interpreted Faust's war against Menelaus as a reference to the Fourth Crusade, in which the Peloponnesus came under European

control. Clearly the war against Menelaus is a colonial fantasy in which Faust divvies up the conquered Greek land among his Nordic allies:

Germane du! Corinthus Buchten
 Vertheidige mit Wall und Schutz
 Achaia dann mit hundert Schluchten,
 Empfehl ich Gote deinem Trutz.
 Nach Elis ziehn der Franken Heere,
 Messene sey der Sachsen Loos,
 Normanne reinige die Meere
 Und Argolis erschaff er groß. (9466–77)

[With walls and ramparts, German Prince,
 You must defend the bays of Corinth;
 You, Goth, are ordered to attack
 Achaia with its hundred passes.
 Our Frankish troops shall move on Elis,
 The Saxons are assigned Messene,
 And Normans, when they've cleared the sea,
 Shall bring Argolis glory.]

While Faust's colonial enterprise speaks to his hunger for power, it is also expressive of a spiritual desire. Since Helen is not only a female character whose beauty incites men to fight, but also, as Grair points out, the embodiment of "Hellenic culture [. . .] the symbol and the legacy of classical art and beauty,"²⁸ the military encounter in this act also symbolizes a form of spiritual conquest or, as Williams explains, the "westliche Aneignung und Absorbierung des klassischen Kulturerbes" (97; Western appropriation and absorption of the Classical cultural heritage). After all, Faust's military campaign in defense of Helen opens the path to Arcadia so that the war of the third act "entsteht also aus einem Bedürfnis, das aus der Idyllik erwächst" (Emrich 405; arises from a desire that originates in the idyll). Thus, Faust's war against Menelaus is both a military action motivated by a desire for power and possession — Benn speaks of "S. S. Lyrik im Inneren Burghof" (S. S. lyric in the inner courtyard, qtd. in Schöne 614) — and a spiritual endeavor motivated by a supreme desire for the ideal of beauty.

Even though this representation of warfare would seem to strike a positive tone, Goethe introduces a subtle critique. After all, Faust is able to gain control of Menelaus's territory because Menelaus has been waging war in remote lands. In doing so, he has not only caused great misery in the lands affected by his campaigns — Phorkyas, for example, is a slave whom Menelaus captured in Crete — but left his own country exposed and thus proven a bad guardian of his household. There is nothing in the text to support the conclusion that Helen will do any better with Faust as protector. Tellingly, the offspring of the union of the general Faust and his beauty Helen is poetry, but a poetry that is completely committed to war.

While Helen links warfare with the ideal of supreme beauty, Euphorion, who, according to ancient tradition, is the son of Helen and Achilles, of love and war, enacts the nexus of violence, art, and transcendence. As is widely known, the character of Euphorion is based on Lord Byron, whom Goethe once called the greatest talent of the century (*SW*, 19:231). Byron was famous not only for his poetry but also for his sexual escapades and adventurous exploits, including his participation and death in the Greek war for independence from the Turks. Thus the historical figure of Byron and Goethe's allegorical creation Euphorion, who is first seen chasing women, both embody the close association of the big and the small war, "den kleinen Krieg mit Frau'n." However, while Byron had no trouble locating eager lovers, Euphorion cannot find enjoyment where sexual pleasure is offered willingly. His interest in a woman must be played out as a form of violent conquest. In other words, to Euphorion sexual fulfillment requires rape:

Schlepp' ich her die derbe Kleine
 Zu erzwungenem Genusse,
 Mir zur Wonne, mir zur Lust
 Drück' ich widerspenstige Brust,
 Küß ich widerwärtigen Mund,
 Thue Kraft und Willen kund. (9794–99)

[Here I bring this stalwart girl
 And shall enjoy what I have won;
 For my pleasure and delight
 I embrace her struggling breast,
 Kiss the mouth that shrinks from me,
 Demonstrate my stronger will.]

Euphorion's attempt to forcefully impose his will on the object of his desire corresponds to his eagerness to prove his strength in military combat:

Träumt ihr den Friedenstag?
 Träume wer träumen mag.
 Krieg ist das Lösungswort.
 Sieg! Und so klingt es fort. (9835–38)

[Do you dream that there's peace?
 Dream on, if you must!
 War! Is the countersign,
 Win! The echoing shout.]

Neither Euphorion's sexual violence nor his military ambition remains uncontested.²⁹ While "das Mädchen" berates his advances — "Laß mich

los! In dieser Hülle / Ist auch Geistes Muth und Kraft" (9800–9801; Let me go! I too possess / strength of mind and force of soul) — the chorus criticizes his martial enthusiasm:

Wer im Frieden
Wünscht sich Krieg zurück
Der ist geschieden
Vom Hoffnungsglück. (9839–42)

[He who in peace-time
Wants war again,
Has bidden farewell
To hope and its joys.]

But even though the text offers criticism, it does not utterly reject Euphorion's youthful exuberance. We have ample evidence that Euphorion, who is also a textual reincarnation of the "Knabe Lenker," who appears in the first act, embodies the spirit of poetry. In a conversation with Eckermann, Goethe claimed, "es ist in ihm die Poesie personifiziert, die an keine Zeit, an keinen Ort und an keine Person gebunden ist" (*SW*, 19:343; he embodies a poetry that is not bound to any time, any place, or any person). Critics, taking his cue, speak of Euphorion as the allegory of Romantic poetry.³⁰ His desire to live an active life, to demonstrate his strength and exert his will, are intricately connected with his striving for a higher plane of existence. To Eckermann, Goethe explicates this nexus with reference to Lord Byron:

Byrons Kühnheit, Keckheit und Grandiosität, ist das nicht alles bildend? — Wir müssen uns hüten, es stets im entschieden Reinen und Sittlichen suchen zu wollen. — Alles Große bildet, sobald wir es gewahr werden." (*SW*, 19:277)

[Byron's audacity, cockiness, and grandiosity, is not all that educational? — We must take care not always to look for it in strict purity and morality — All greatness educates as soon as we become aware of it.]

Clearly, Goethe showed great appreciation for Euphorion's boundless drive for activity even if he considered its specific application and goals misguided.

Euphorion's violent end is a testimony to the ambiguity that results from the rupture between energetic force and ethics. Against the urgent entreaties of his parents, Euphorion attempts to fly. At first, his head emanates a radiant glow and the figure is trailed by light; immediately thereafter, however, a beautiful youth crashes to the ground. Interestingly, the text does not identify this "schönen Jüngling" as Euphorion. Rather, it states that onlookers believe they perceive a known figure — "man glaubt

in dem Todten eine bekannte Gestalt zu erblicken" (9902; the dead body suggests a well-known figure). Critics have read the wording "bekannte Gestalt" as a reference to Lord Byron,³¹ but the entire sentence might also be read as a reference to the uncertainty of Euphorion's destiny. For this "schöner Jüngling" then sheds his body and ascends to the heavens, whereupon we hear Euphorion's voice crying for his mother "aus der Tiefe," (9904; from the depths). It remains unclear whether he has been elevated to a higher realm, condemned to a life in the underworld, or both. However, even though his fate is uncertain, the link between man's striving for transcendence, his ability to create art, and his lust for war is firmly established.³²

It would appear, then, that if Goethe was less than sanguine about the possibility of eradicating war, it was because he conceived of the impulse that leads to war as inseparable from man's loftier aspirations. And Euphorion is by no means the only character who embodies this connection. Tellingly, Seismos, the force of violent eruption, is also associated with the mountains and thus with the realm of the sublime and with beauty:

Man wird mir's endlich zugestehn;
Und hätt' ich nicht geschüttelt und gerüttelt,
Wie wäre diese Welt so schön?
Wie ständen eure Berge droben
In prächtig-reinem Aetherblau,
Hätt' ich sie nicht hervorgeschoben,
Zu malerisch-entzückter Schau! (7551–57)

[As people will someday acknowledge;
And if it were not for my shakes and jolts
How would this world be such a thing of beauty?
How could your mountains stand majestic
In azure skies' translucent splendor
Had I not shoved them there for you
To see with picturesque delight?]

As though to further emphasize the link between violence and art, Seismos informs us that, in addition to bringing forth manifold natural beauties, he also created Mount Parnassus, the home of Apollo and the Muses. But again, Goethe introduces a subtle critical note by throwing some doubt on Seismos's accomplishments. Soon after his boasting, Oreas informs us that Seismos's creations are not of lasting value, but mere illusions:

Dergleichen Märchen seh' ich oft entstehn
Und plötzlich wider untergehn. (7819–20)

[I often see such fantasies created,
Then see them vanish suddenly again.]

Moreover, Seismos's mountain was not only born through force but, as the site of the war between the pygmies and the cranes, remains an arena of violence and war.

In *Faust II*, both Seismos's eruptive power and Euphorion's poetical and martial energy are presented as innate character traits. Seen in this light, war and art appear as different formations of the same psychic urges. In Goethe's conversations with Eckermann, on the other hand, the relation between war and personality is inverted. Here, Goethe's remarks as rendered by Eckermann suggest that personality is the effect of war and, consequently, war the cradle of genius:

Denn wenn auch die kriegesischen Jahre kein eigentlich poetisches Interesse aufkommen ließen und also für den Augenblick den Musen zuwider waren, so haben sich doch in dieser Zeit eine Menge freier Geister gebildet, die nun im Frieden zur Besinnung kommen und als bedeutende Talente hervortreten. (*SW*, 19:178)

[For even though the years of war did not encourage the rise of true poetic interest and so were adverse to the muses for the moment, a multitude of free spirits experienced this time as formative, which now in peace come to their senses and emerge as great talents.]³³

Although the above suggests a shifting position — war as the father of genius versus genius and war as offspring of excessive mental energy — the nexus of the capacities for violence and art certainly recurs with great regularity throughout Goethe's later works. In his letters and essays he was fond of lists that juxtapose artistic, scientific, and military achievements, such as the following:

Ob Einer sich in der Wissenschaft genial erweist, wie Oken und Humboldt, oder im Krieg und der Staatsverwaltung, wie Friedrich, Peter der Große und Napoleon, oder ob Einer ein Lied macht wie Béranger, es ist Alles gleich und kommt bloß darauf an, ob der Gedanke, das Aperçu, die Tat lebendig sei und fortzuleben vermöge. (*SW*, 19:617)

[Whether one proves a genius in science such as Oken and Humboldt, or in war and governance such as Frederick, Peter the Great, and Napoleon, or whether one makes a song such as Béranger, it is all the same, and the only thing that matters is whether the thought, the aperçu, the deed is alive and capable of permanence.]

Whereas here the nexus of art and war is recorded as a simple statement of fact, Goethe's poetry makes the same point in a rather playful and ironic manner, for example when he compares a monument erected to celebrate his art with one that memorializes Blücher's military triumphs:

Ihr könnt mir immer ungeschcut
 Wie Blüchern Denkmal setzen;
 Von Franzen hat er euch befreit,
 Ich von Philister Netzen. (SW, 18.1:66–67)

[You may always without being shy
 Erect a monument to me just like to Blücher;
 He liberated you from the French
 I from Philistine nets.]

But again, although it would appear that Goethe became increasingly convinced of a link between violence and genius, between art and war, he never embraced it enthusiastically, but rather expressed disapproval through subtle criticism or biting irony. His poem “Etymologie spricht Mephistopheles,” for example, gives voice to the author’s strong discomfort with the intimate connection between war and art in no uncertain terms. Here Mephisto states sardonically: “Ars Ares wird der Kriegsgott genannt, Ars heißt die Kunst und arsch ist auch bekannt” (SW, 18.1:57; We call the god of war Ars Ares, ars is art and ass is also well known). Mephisto’s etymology shows that Goethe remained highly critical of a close affiliation between war and art; however, there is another relation between war and art that he championed without hesitation.

Throughout, *Faust II* refers to the ability of art to ameliorate the effects of war, a dynamic that is prefigured in Goethe’s *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Although much critical attention has been given to the puppet play that Goethe received from his grandmother, it is generally overlooked that this toy was used to divert the children’s attention away from the ongoing Seven Years’ War. In *Faust II* the calming effect of art is best embodied in the character of Helen. Her supreme beauty causes wars, but it also possesses the power to end them:

Herrscht doch über Gut und Blut
 Dieser Schönheit Uebermuth.
 Schon das ganze Heer ist zahm
 Alle Schwerter stumpf und lahm. (9348–51)³⁴

[Since our lives and wealth now are
 Subject to her beauty’s power,
 The whole army has been tamed,
 Swords are blunted, strong arms lamed.]

Ever realistic, Goethe did not believe that poetry could end all war, but he did hope that it might dampen its horror:

Offenbar ist das Bestreben der besten Dichter und ästhetischen
 Schriftsteller aller Nationen schon seit geraumer Zeit auf das allge-

mein Menschliche gerichtet [. . .] so ist zwar nicht zu hoffen daß ein allgemeiner Friede dadurch sich einleite, aber doch daß der unvermeidliche Streit nach und nach läßlicher werde, der Krieg weniger grausam, der Sieg weniger übermütig. (*SW*, 18.2:86)

[Obviously the efforts of the best poets and aesthetic writers of all nations have been directed toward the essentially human for some time now . . . we cannot hope that this will lead to general peace, but that the inevitable conflict will lessen gradually, that war will be less cruel, and victory less exuberant.]³⁵

Genius may evince an intimate connection to war and violence, but poetry is a unifying force designed to harmonize and to create connections.

Goethe, Fichte, Clausewitz

Due to the thirty-year period of its composition and its posthumous publication, *Faust II* is often read in splendid isolation from other intellectual products of the time, but Goethe's thinking on war bears similarities to that of some of his most illustrious contemporaries. Although he recognized the close ties between war, human weakness, and moral failure, he, like many others including Schiller, Humboldt, and Kant, located war in proximity to man's transcendental striving. Similarly, his deliberations on the link between man's violent and creative energies were not idiosyncratic endeavors but representative of a strain of thinking evident in texts by authors as different as Novalis and Clausewitz. Finally, Goethe's stance on the inevitability of war can be situated in a larger debate on the possibility of "Eternal Peace" or, as Fichte would have it, the notion of a final war to end all wars. In the following I will address some conceptual links between Goethe's thinking on war and that of Clausewitz and Fichte. As I will show, there are significant similarities; however, Goethe's tendency to imbue any positive valuation of war with a profound sense of irony clearly differentiates his stance from that of both Fichte and Clausewitz. Furthermore, Goethe remained at a distance from the rhetoric of the national that underlies Fichte's endorsement of wars for freedom.

The works of the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte combine abhorrence of the moral turpitude of war with a celebration of war as a means to man's ultimate freedom. In his essay "Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die französische Revolution" (Contribution to the Correction of Public Judgments about the French Revolution, 1793), Fichte distanced himself from contemporary claims that war is an ennobling, character-building force. Rather, he suggested that war functions as a source of moral edification for a select few, but the majority will emerge corrupted and depraved. War, according to Fichte, is an opportu-

nity for theft and oppression or, as Goethe would say, an arena of greed and hunger for power:

Der Krieg, sagt man, cultiviert, und es ist wahr, er erhebt unsere Seelen zu heroischen Empfindungen und Thaten, zur Verachtung der Gefahr und des Todes, zur Geringschätzung von Gütern, die täglich dem Raube ausgesetzt sind, zum innigen Mitgefühl mit allem, was Menschenantlitz trägt, weil gemeinschaftliche Gefahr oder Leiden sie enger an uns drängen; aber haltet dies ja nicht für eine Lobrede auf eure blutgierige Kriegssucht, für eine demütige Bitte der seufzenden Menschheit an euch, doch ja nicht abzulassen, sie in blutigen Kriegen aneinander aufzureiben. Nur solche Seelen erhebt der Krieg zum Heroismus, welche schon Kraft in sich haben; den Unedlen begeistert er zum Raube und zur Unterdrückung der wehrlosen Schwäche; er erzeugt Helden und feige Diebe, und welches wohl in grösserer Menge.³⁶

[War, they say, cultivates, and it is true, it elevates our souls to heroic sensations and deeds, to contempt for danger and death, to low regard for goods, which are daily exposed to theft, to deep compassion with everyone with human features because common danger and suffering bind us more closely together; but do not consider this a eulogy to your bloodthirsty addiction to war, a humble plea of sighing mankind not to desist to wipe them out in bloody wars. War elevates only those souls who already possess strength; it inspires an ignoble person to theft and to the oppression of defenseless weakness; it creates heroes and cowardly thieves, and which will be more numerous, I wonder.]

Similarly, in his discussion of the relation between state and military in the same essay, Fichte is clear in his condemnation of the personality traits and behavior encouraged in a soldier:

Durch eben das, was ihren Stand hart macht, die strenge Mannszucht, und die mit Blut geschriebenen Gesetze desselben an ihn angefesselt, finden sie in ihrer Erniedrigung ihre Ehre, und in der Ungestraftheit bei Vergehungen gegen den Bürger und Landmann ihre Entschädigung für die übrigen Lasten desselben. Der roheste Halbbarbar glaubt mit der Montur die sichere Ueberlegenheit über den scheuen, von allen Seiten geschreckten Landmann anzuziehen, welcher nur zu glücklich ist, wenn er seine Neckereien, Beschimpfungen und Beleidigungen ertragen kann, ohne noch dazu von ihm vor seinen würdigen Befehlshaber geschleppt und zerschlagen zu werden. (6:151)

[Precisely that which makes their class hard, the strict manly discipline and the laws written in blood, ties them to it; they find their honor in their humiliation and their compensation for the other burdens of their class in the impunity regarding trespasses against the citizen and

peasant. Through his uniform, the rudest half-barbarian believes to acquire superiority over the shy peasant, who is threatened from all sides and all too happy if he can tolerate his jests, bluster, and insults without being dragged to his worthy commander and beaten up on top of it.]

Based on these anti-military tirades, one would expect to find in Fichte an ardent advocate of peace and yet, in 1813, during the Napoleonic occupation of Germany, when national feelings ran high, Fichte interrupted his lectures at the university and joined the citizen militia. In spite of a partial paralysis of one arm and one leg due to a neurological disorder, he felt called upon to do his part in defense of the fatherland. Inspired by a strong sense of national pride formulated in his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1807), Fichte did not seek out war grudgingly and against his better instincts, but rather celebrated it as a path to freedom:

Freiheit ist das höchste Gut. Alles Andere nur das Mittel dazu, gut als solches Mittel, übel, falls es dieselbe hemmt. Das zeitliche Leben hat darum selbst nur Werth, inwiefern es frei ist: durchaus keinen, sondern es ist ein Uebel und eine Qual, wenn es nicht frei seyn kann. Sein einziger Zweck ist darum, die Freiheit fürs erste zu brauchen, wo nicht, zu erhalten, wo nicht, zu erkämpfen; geht es in diesem Kampfe zu Grunde, so geht es mit Recht zu Grunde, und nach Wunsch; denn das zeitliche Leben — ein Kampf um Freiheit. (4:410–11)

[Freedom is the highest good. Everything else is only a means to freedom, good as such a means, bad if it inhibits it. Temporal life is valuable only insofar as it is free — no value at all but rather it is an evil and agony if it cannot be free. Its only purpose is first to use freedom; if not that, to maintain it; if not that, to fight for it; if it perishes in this fight, it perishes rightly and according to our wishes; for temporal life — a fight for freedom.]

Fichte's panegyric to freedom is taken from his lecture "Über den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges" (On the Concept of True War) transmitted in *Die Staatslehre*, which contains the sum of his thinking about the war against Napoleon. Here Fichte differentiates between two kinds of war: those that are conducted by a warrior class on behalf of bourgeois merchants, and those fought for freedom by a united nation. The bourgeois variant of warfare ultimately serves to guarantee the peaceful conduct of trade and thus is a limited and lesser form of war. Wars fought for the freedom of the "Volk," however, do not allow for negotiation but demand either victory or death. Only the latter qualify as true wars, and the Wars of Liberation fought against Napoleonic France, which Fichte called the empire of the devil (4:418), must be counted among them. As the term "empire of the devil" indicates, Fichte's war for freedom is a crucial element within a larger eschatological framework; it is a war that will end all wars: "Also,

diesen einen Krieg fürchtet ihr so sehr für uns, der, wenn alle Völker unter einem Haupte vereinigt würden, einen ewigen Frieden gebären würde” (4:95; Thus, you fear this one war so much on our account, which, if all nations were united under one empire, would give rise to eternal peace).

If we consider both Fichte’s early and his later contribution on war, the similarities to and differences from Goethe’s thought become apparent. First, like Goethe, Fichte saw a link between war, greed, hunger for domination, and commerce. Second, like Goethe, Fichte placed war in proximity to freedom and ultimately to transcendence. Unlike Goethe, however, Fichte endowed different types of wars with different degrees of moral valence. Wars fought for freedom by citizen soldiers are untainted by greed and thus fundamentally superior to those fought by a professional class for mercenary motivations. To Goethe, in contrast, every war is accompanied by moral degeneracy; even wars fought for lofty political goals are burdened with a host of unwelcome side effects and cannot produce stable societies or lasting values. Although Goethe was not blind to the link between military and spiritual conquests, he never abandoned his conviction that all wars are despicable by nature: “Krieg, Hungersnot und Pestilenz, welche Dinge schon an sich widerwärtiger Art sind” (SW, 19:240; War, famine, and the plague, all of which are revolting in and of themselves).

Fichte was only one of many German intellectuals committed to liberating the fatherland from the French and to propagating the superiority of the citizen soldier. The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz was equally dedicated to the fight against Napoleon and even enlisted with the Russians in 1812 when the Prussian king failed to rise to the challenge. And yet, although Clausewitz’s practical politics resembled that of other supporters of the Wars of Liberation, his theoretical convictions bore similarities to Goethe’s thoughts. Unlike Fichte, Clausewitz did not celebrate war’s transcendental potential, but rather sought to control its destructive energy.

At first glance, Goethe’s and Clausewitz’s concepts of war would appear to be diametrically opposed. In Clausewitz’s thinking, war follows a political mandate; it is in his famous words “eine blosse Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln” (44; a mere continuation of politics by other means).³⁷ In Goethe’s *Faust II*, in contrast, war’s political rationale is but the veneer that gilds man’s destructive impulses. And yet, although Clausewitz insisted that wars be seen as political instruments, he also conceded that war, insofar as it consists of acts of violence, is always also beholden to the realm of human passions and emotions (28–29). War must be thought of as an unholy trinity, “zusammengesetzt aus der ursprünglichen Gewaltsamkeit seines Elementes, dem Hass und der Feindschaft, die wie ein blinder Naturtrieb anzusehen sind, aus dem Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeiten und des Zufalls, die ihn zu einer freien

Seelentätigkeit machen, und aus der untergeordneten Natur eines politischen Werkzeuges, wodurch er dem politischen Verstande anheimfällt” (46; composed of the original violence of its element, hatred and enmity, which are to be considered a blind natural drive, the play of probability and accident, which turn it into a free activity of the soul, and the subordinate nature of a political instrument, which puts it in the domain of mere reason). Indeed, Clausewitz’s insistence that war be submitted to the dictate of a higher reason at times appears born from the fear that war’s original violence (“ursprüngliche Gewaltsamkeit”) might take over and erase its stated political objective. Like Goethe, Clausewitz was deeply skeptical “of the capacity of mankind to raise itself to new moral heights and remain there for long.”³⁸ He, again like Goethe, was convinced that violence and war are ineradicable and that we must strive as best we can to contain their primal force.

Interestingly, like Goethe, Clausewitz also linked the realm of art with that of war. This is particularly evident when he applies the term “genius” to the ideal military leader: “Es gehört also von unten herauf zu den ausgezeichneten Leistungen im Kriege ein eigentümlicher Genius” (79; From the bottom up, a peculiar genius adheres to excellent performance in war). His notion of genius was heavily influenced by the use of the term in Enlightenment aesthetic theory (see Paret, 375). The military genius (“kriegerisches Genius,” 61) is characterized by “ein harmonischer Verein der Kräfte” (62; a harmonious unity of forces). He combines superior intelligence with intuition: “Was hier von höheren Geisteskräften gefordert wird, ist Einheit und Urteil, zu einem wunderbaren Geistesblick gesteigert, der in seinem Fluge tausend halbdunkle Vorstellungen berührt und beseitigt, welche ein gewöhnlicher Verstand erst mühsam ans Licht ziehen und an denen er sich erschöpfen würde” (79–80; What is called for here from higher intellectual faculties is unity and judgment elevated to miraculous insight of the spirit, which in its flight touches on and eliminates thousands of semi-dark ideas, which a normal mind would have to drag to the light with great effort and in which it would exhaust itself). Clausewitz, like Goethe, believed that outstanding achievements in any arena of human activity are essentially isomorphic: “Jede eigentümliche Tätigkeit bedarf, wenn sie mit einer gewissen Virtuosität getrieben werden soll, eigentümlicher Anlagen des Verstandes und Gemüts” (61; Every particular activity, if it is to be executed with a certain virtuosity, is in need of particular talents of mind and soul).

In her path-breaking study *The Body in Pain*, Elaine Scarry claims that Clausewitz, unlike many of his fellow theorists of war, made no attempt to disguise the deeply destructive nature of war or to hide from view the facts of wounding and killing.³⁹ It is the combined appreciation for the genius of war and the devastation wrought by it that unites the thinking of Goethe and Clausewitz. The latter’s insistence, however, that

wars can be guided by political reason finds no equivalent in Goethe's *Faust II*.

Conclusion

Goethe's *Faust II* presents warfare in its numerous historical guises and formations. Goethe's soldiers are mercenaries ("Miethsoldaten," 4819), citizen soldiers, and patriotic freedom fighters à la Byron. But even though *Faust II* offers the whole spectrum of historical warfare, its condemnation of warfare is independent of the respective political contexts. To Goethe, war is variously linked to man's lowest impulses, to greed, lack of self-control, and lust for power. But it also evinces an affinity with man's creative capabilities and his desire for transcendence. Like Fichte, who posited close ties between warfare and freedom, defined as striving toward a transcendental realm beyond earthly goods, Goethe acknowledged a link between warfare and the sublime. Unlike Fichte, however, Goethe did so cautiously and never failed to introduce critical notes and ironic comments. Finally Goethe, like Clausewitz, found genius in both art and war, but unlike Clausewitz, who looked to politics to tame war, Goethe placed his hopes in the ability of art to reconcile differences and, failing that, to temper their destructive force.

Notes

¹ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*, ed. Karl Richter, 21 vols. in 33 (Munich: btb, 2006), 16:13. All further references appear in the text as *SW* with volume and page number. Citations from *Faust* are taken from volume 18.1 and given with verse number. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.

² Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Briefe der Jahre 1821–1832*, vol. 4 of *Goethes Briefe und Briefe an Goethe*, Hamburger Ausgabe, ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow (Munich: Dtv, 1988), 35.

³ See Erich Weniger, *Goethe und die Generäle* (Leipzig: Insel, 1942).

⁴ See Elisabeth Krimmer, "A Portrait of War, a Grammar of Peace: Goethe, Laukhard, and the Campaign of 1792," *German Life and Letters* 61.1 (2008): 46–60.

⁵ Goethe began work on *Faust II* in 1801 when he started writing the Helen act. He finished it in 1831. The bulk of the work was accomplished between 1825 and 31.

⁶ Albrecht Schöne, *Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust: Kommentare* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2003), 2:37.

⁷ See Wilhelm Emrich, *Die Symbolik von Faust II: Sinn und Vorformen* (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1943), 434.

⁸ Emrich makes a similar point when he claims that in *Faust II* the “Heroisch-Kriegerische und Idyllisch-Paradiesische sind beides Manifestationen des Göttlichen im Menschen” (407).

⁹ Barker Fairley, *Goethe's Faust: Six Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 8.

¹⁰ See Viktor Lange, “*Faust: Der Tragödie zweiter Teil*,” in *Goethes Dramen: Neue Interpretationen*, ed. Walter Hinderer (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980), 287.

¹¹ *Faust* scholarship has long been divided between the direction introduced by Emrich, who focused on the “immanente, produktive Symbolik, die ihre ‘Geheimnisse’ in stumm wechselnden Spiegelungen unaufhörlich in sich selbst verbirgt” (23) and the approach favored by Schlaffer, who sees in *Faust* a response to and commentary on specific historical developments; see Heinz Schlaffer, *Faust Zweiter Teil: Die Allegorie des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1981). See also Gaier, who claims that “*Faust* in der Tat als eine Anzahl von Abhandlungen über all diese Themen der Moderne zu lesen ist”; Ulrich Gaier, *Fausts Modernität: Essays* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), 11. My interpretation steers a middle course that acknowledges Goethe’s numerous references to contemporary events but also looks beyond them toward his attempt to devise a universal theory.

¹² All English translations of *Faust II* are taken from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I & II*, ed. and trans. Stuart Atkins, vol. 2 of *Collected Works* (Boston: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1984). The verse numbers are identical to the verse numbers given for the German quotes.

¹³ Schöne refers to a “Gewichtsverlagerung auf transpersonale Weltverhältnisse und Vorgänge” (388). According to Keller, the “Formen des individuellen Bewußtseins werden durch die verbildlichten Grundformeln des Daseins ersetzt”; Werner Keller, *Aufsätze zu Goethes Faust II* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), xiii. See also Schlaffer, who claims that allegory “vernachlässigt Details privater Lebensräume und tendiert auf Gesamtdeutungen von kosmischer Totalität” (37).

¹⁴ Mommsen reads the Emperor as a veiled critique of Carl August’s reign, including his investment in military ventures. Seen in this light, *Faust II* completes what *Campaigne* started; see Katharina Mommsen, “Faust II als politisches Vermächtnis des Staatsmannes Goethe,” *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989), 1–36.

¹⁵ Goethe repeatedly situated himself in the middle ground and found fault with both opposed groups: “Es ist der Welt nicht gegeben, sich zu bescheiden; den Großen nicht, daß kein Mißbrauch der Gewalt Statt finde, und der Masse nicht, daß sie in Erwartung allmählicher Verbesserungen mit einem mäßigen Zustande sich begnüge” (*SW*, 19:83).

¹⁶ Atkins speaks of “his personal irresponsibility, his vanity or self-centeredness, and his unreceptiveness to wise counsel”; see Stuart Atkins, *Goethe's Faust: A Literary Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958), 111. See also Hans Vaaget, “Goethe’s Faust Today: A Post-Wall Reading,” in *Interpreting Goethe's Faust*

Today, ed. Jane K. Brown, Meredith Lee, and Thomas P. Saine (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1994), 42–58.

¹⁷ Initially, Goethe had Emperor Maximilian (1459–1519) in mind. He later decided to omit historical references; see Heinz Hamm, *Goethes Faust: Werkgeschichte und Textanalyse* (Berlin: Volk und Wissen, 1981), 165.

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 168.

¹⁹ See also Goethe's letter to Zelter of 28 June 1831: "Dabei bleibt denn aber doch immer das Löbliche an der Anarchie, daß, wenn sie einmal einen entschiedenen Zweck im Auge hat, so sieht sie sich nach einem Diktator um und merkt nun daß es geht" (*SW*, 20.2:1495).

²⁰ While most scholars read Mephisto's tricks as magical fireworks, Wittkowski recognizes an allegorization of historical events: "Die alliierten Heere der Campagne in Frankreich 1792 (1822) scheiterten auch an dem 'Wasserteufel' Regen und in seinem Gefolge an einer cholera-ähnlichen Epidemie — ein Triumph der Elemente, wie Mephisto ihn jetzt ankündigt"; Wolfgang Wittkowski, "Goethe, Schopenhauer und Fausts Schlußvision," *Goethe Yearbook* 5 (1990): 240.

²¹ See also act 2: "Doch bringen wir das Gold zutag / damit man stehlen und kuppeln mag, / nicht Eisen fehle dem stolzen Mann, / der allgemeinen Mord ersann" (*SW*, 5856–59).

²² See John R. Williams, "Die Deutung geschichtlicher Epochen im zweiten Teil des *Faust*," *Goethe Jahrbuch* 110 (1993): 96.

²³ Steinmetz posits that Goethe's description of this battle may have been influenced by memories of the battle of Leuthen. He also posits similarities between the Gegenkaiser and Napoleon; see Ralf-Henning Steinmetz, "Goethe, Guibert und Carl von Österreich: Krieg und Kriegswissenschaft im vierten Akt von *Faust II*," *Goethe Jahrbuch* 111 (1994), 151–70.

²⁴ Goethe's initial plan had Faust acquire land through a war of conquest in medieval Greece waged against monks. Valet claims that Goethe was motivated to substitute a civil war because of his strong feelings about the July Revolution in France (46).

²⁵ See also Goethe's comments to Eckermann about why he did not fight during the Wars of Liberation: "Wie hätte ich die Waffen ergreifen können ohne Haß! Und wie hätte ich hassen können ohne Jugend" (*SW*, 19:658).

²⁶ Dorothea Lohmeyer, *Faust und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung* (Munich: dtv, 1977), 24. Lohmeyer observes, "als gesellschaftlicher ist der Mensch von seinen beghehrenden Leidenschaftskräften her verstanden" (72).

²⁷ See Jane K. Brown, "History and Historicity in Act II of *Faust, Part II*," *Goethe Yearbook* 2 (1984): 73.

²⁸ Charles A. Grair, "Seducing Helena: The Court Fantasy of *Faust II*, Act III," *Goethe Yearbook* 10 (2001): 99.

²⁹ Niekerk even assumes that Euphorion's death is the punishment for the rape; see Carl H. Niekerk, "Sexual Imagery in Goethe's *Faust II*," *Seminar* 33.1 (1997): 19.

³⁰ Jochen Schmidt, *Goethes Faust Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen — Werk — Wirkung* (Munich: Beck, 2001), 214.

³¹ Peter Anthony Bloom and Hans Rudolf Vaget, “Sardanapal — The French Connection: Unraveling *Faust II*, 10176,” *Goethe Yearbook* 8 (1996): 259.

³² Similarly, the “Knabe Lenker,” whom Goethe identified with Euphorion, is not only an allegory of poetry but is characterized by a martial spirit: “Wie oft ich auch für dich gefochten, / Mir ist es jederzeit geglückt! / Wenn Lorbeer deine Stirne schmückt, / Hab ich ihn nicht mit Sinn und Hand geflochten?” (5618–21).

³³ This suggestion also evinces an interesting parallel to the portrait of Goethe’s childhood in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Here, the event that Goethe singled out as formative is the Seven Years’ War.

³⁴ See also “Schönheit bändigt allen Zorn” (9245).

³⁵ See also “Ich aber bete den an, der eine solche Produktionskraft in die Welt gelegt hat, daß, wenn nur der millionste Teil davon ins Leben tritt, die Welt von Geschöpfen wimmelt, so daß Krieg, Pest, Wasser und Brand ihr nichts anzuhaben vermögen. Das ist mein Gott” (*SW*, 19:416).

³⁶ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 6 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971), 6:90–91.

³⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk* (Munich: Ullstein, 2002), 44.

³⁸ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories and His Times* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985), 351.

³⁹ Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), 65.

6: Recoding the Ethics of War in Grimms' Fairy Tales

Patricia Anne Simpson

The state of peace among men living in close proximity is not the natural state (status naturalis); instead, the natural state is one of war, which does not just consist in open hostilities, but also in the constant and enduring threat of them.

— Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795)¹

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO FIND WAR, its consequences and ethos, at home in the Grimms' fairy tales. In this chapter I contend that the ethical framework of three of the Grimms' tales with soldiers as protagonists reflects a contemporary culture of war. This reading of war stories inscribed within the larger discourse of populist fairy tales and military theory argues that a close connection exists between the soldier tales and the historical context, particularly with regard to gendered bourgeois identity.² The daunting success of the post-revolutionary French army until the Russian campaign, the Wars of Liberation, and, finally, Waterloo prompted a sustained interrogation of military masculinity and the identity of the citizen-soldier in German-speaking Europe.³ In 1815, the publication year of the Grimms' "children's and household" tales, the issue of reintegrating discharged soldiers into civil society and the domestic sphere became urgent. In the immediate postwar context, the transition from a culture of war to a context of family and commerce was effected through reconfiguring military masculinity to incorporate alternative models of male identity.⁴

Elsewhere I note the apparent strangeness of war as a topic of the fairy tale in "Bearskin": "There is something jarring about the appearance of a warrior as protagonist in a tale that begins 'once upon a time.'"⁵ In the following, I argue that there is a compelling connection among the fairy tales, the culture of war, and the struggle to reimagine masculine identity in a postwar context. The soldier tales published in the Grimms' collection offer insights into the erotics of war and allow a deeper understanding of the negotiation between the reality of historical warfare and the fantasies of soldiers in popular literature. Moreover, the fairy tales portray post-conflict soldiers who endure the plight of poverty, institutionalized abuse,

and dislocation during times of peace. In two tales, the protagonists are drawn with features that closely resemble symptoms of what we now recognize as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For all their ostensible simplicity, the stories engage a historical discourse that advocates a subversive ethical code: it forgives desertion, disobedience, and trafficking with the devil. This populist ethics, mediated by supportive feminine influence that aims at reintegrating discharged soldiers into bourgeois life, builds a bridge between militarized masculinity and civilian society. The erotics of war are recoded as an ethics of postwar masculinity.

The culture of war and the existence of standing armies focused literary discourse on the problems of proximity between soldiers and civil society, and evidence supporting this claim appears in the project of the Grimms' fairy tales. In three separate stories, war hovers in the background of this imaginative prose, creating an almost mythical frame for the historical portraits of soldiers. The fairy tales allow an intersection between a realistic portrayal of impoverished soldiers and elements of myth. Further, the fairy tales cast new light on the representation of war in German literature of the time. They specifically thematize the encounter between the army and civil society. To a much greater extent, they resist the regionalism, nationalism, and celebratory militarism we find in some contemporary theater and patriotic poetry. I focus on three tales: "Der Teufel und seine Grossmutter" (The Devil and His Grandmother, 125), "Des Teufels rußiger Bruder" (The Devil's Sooty Brother, 100), and "Der Bärenhäuter" (Bearskin, 101).⁶ These short tales, while exemplifying imaginative popular literature, nonetheless depict realistic problems of the military and soldiers. Moreover, they reflect contemporary debates about military reform as well as perennial problems such as the difficult return of the citizen-soldier to a post-conflict bourgeois setting. None of the stories glorifies the battlefield, none bears witness to the energizing rhetoric of mobilization, nor does any one tale extol the virtue of dying for the fatherland.⁷ The fairy tales, in contrast to other genres' emphasis on the transformative experience of battle, directly address immediate historical issues: the poverty of soldiers, the abuses of military hierarchy, and the difficult reintegration of the soldier into civil society.

Cultures of War

Historians differ on the relationship between the military and civil society in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While there is little consensus about the effects of the French Revolution on the way war was waged, there is some agreement about the impact it had on the culture of war and the discourse about the place of the army in civil society. In his study of war in Europe, Michael Howard describes the political situation

in the late eighteenth century as “a system of states whose frontiers were clearly delineated and whose rulers were absolute sovereigns within their own realms. [. . .] Their wars were conducted with equally well-defined protocol by professional and armed forces recruited from all over Europe and officered by an almost equally international cousinage.”⁸ Howard describes the clarity involved in relations among heads of state, their professional officers, and soldiers. He outlines a military hierarchy that replicated social structures. Citizens were not yet warriors: there was no reference to the sovereigns’ respective subjects beyond the military class. The French Revolution, however, effected change in the composition of fighting forces. Howard writes:

Once the state ceased to be regarded as the “property” of dynastic princes, however hard-working and devoted to the interests of their peoples those princes might be, and became instead the instrument of powerful forces dedicated to such abstract concepts as Liberty, or Nationality, or Revolution, which enabled large numbers of the population to see in that state the embodiment of some absolute Good for which no price was too high, no sacrifice too great to pay; then the “temperate and indecisive contests” of the rococo age appeared as absurd anachronisms. (75–76)

Here Howard emphasizes the shift in the complexion of the warrior, whose citizenship was now significant. The rise of patriotic investment in the nation mobilized a civic population beyond the paid officers and soldiers.

In her work on the history of conscription, Ute Frevert locates the origin of the citizen-soldier in France: “As early as 1789, addressing the Paris National Assembly, the military theorist and politician Edmond Dubois-Crancé advocated that every citizen ought to be a soldier and every soldier a citizen” (Frevert, *Nation*, 9). In France, conscription was in effect by 1798, which, according to Frevert, provided “the basis for Napoleon to recruit the army that spread war across the entire face of Europe, from Spain to Moscow” (9). The revised concept of warfare fed into a revision of the warrior to a citizen-soldier, and legends of French soldiers inspired by the spirit of sacrifice for a higher, national good abound. The Napoleonic Wars inspired Prussian reformers, who took action after the decisive defeat of allied forces at the Battle of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806. Although these reforms circulated in journals and manuals in German-speaking Europe, the ideal was not realized before the decisive battles in 1813–15.

Frevert’s analysis of gendered identities in the culture of war foregrounds the relationship between male sacrifice and female gratitude that is reinforced through a reading of the soldier tales from the Grimms’ collection. In her discussion of responses to conscription in the German-

speaking states, she notes the gender dynamic in transition between war and peace. With reference to the men who enlisted in 1813, she writes:

Their motives varied: some were moved by the prospects of adventure, others wished to flee their fathers' regimes or hoped to gain social and professional advantages. Even gender politics played a role. The war afforded young men an opportunity to present themselves as protectors of hearth and home. Women thanked them for this with special appreciation and various forms of support, which ranged from fundraisers to first aid. Successful warriors were welcomed back with a lavish homecoming festival.⁹

Frevert emphasizes the degree to which military ethos had the potential (for those who returned) to saturate a peacetime domicile. Militarized masculinity, then, persisted in the private sphere. David A. Bell offers a different view of rising militarism in contemporary France, noting that it relied "on a sharp, clear divide between 'military' and 'civilian' society, for it involves the imposition of the values and customs of the former on the latter."¹⁰ As I argue below, the fairy tales enact a fictional scenario that more closely aligns with Frevert's portrayal of a homologous relationship between military culture and civil society.

A crucial element of the reformist discourse involves the militarization of civil society and the character of the soldier, scrutinized in both peace and warfare. In his *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of Judgment), Kant made brief reference to the constitution of the soldier, and he emphasized the ability of the individual subject to enjoy the virtues of peace: the soldier must possess "all the virtues of peace" but also experience the "Unbezwunglichkeit seines Gemüts durch Gefahr" (uncontrollability of his nature or disposition through danger; or, his mind is unsubdued by danger).¹¹ This character sketch, the peaceful citizen whose virtue serves as a prerequisite for facing danger, contrasts sharply with that of the paid professional soldier or the reluctant conscript. In this brief characterization, Kant further identified one of the most critical and lingering effects of martial violence. In his groundbreaking studies of chronic PTSD in Vietnam veterans and Homeric epic, Jonathan Shay unfolds a means of understanding "the specific nature of catastrophic war experiences that not only cause lifelong disabling psychiatric symptoms but can *ruin* good character."¹² War by nature shreds the ethical fabric of each soldier for the sake of a putative greater victory. Shay's work documents the moral devastation of the good citizen transformed into someone locked and loaded for battle; if he survives, he ultimately returns to a social order that no longer accommodates those who have defended it in the theater of war. Shay's work recognizes common symptoms in warriors from epic descriptions and from his own experience and interviews with Vietnam veterans. He does acknowledge historical and cultural differ-

ences, but his observations about the transhistorical effects of battle ring true.

Narrative can represent and recreate historical portraits of warfare, military experience, and the return to “social attachments of the domestic world at peace” (Shay, 2006). The three fairy tales dealing with postconflict soldiers create an aesthetic space and a trial temporality that allows veterans a safety net for their return to civil society, and they register on the populist moral compass of the genre. The first story, “The Devil and His Grandmother,” indeed participates in the moralizing conventions of the folk tale, but at the same time depicts the harshness of military life that drives three soldiers to desert their posts. The tale implicitly indicts the brutalizing, impoverished conditions in the military, creating an exculpatory framework in which the soldiers, despite their inaugural crime of desertion, manage to redeem themselves through good behavior, and eventually they prosper. They remain together, with one soldier taking the lead and helping the others dodge the devil’s wiles. Similarly, in the second story, “The Devil’s Sooty Brother,” the protagonist, Hans, serves the devil in hell, where he enacts a foot soldier’s revenge fantasy against the military hierarchy that oppressed and abused him. The devil himself establishes bonds of trust with the soldier — even though he has disobeyed a direct order — and defends him against the forces of corruption and evil in the civilian world. Here, too, the folk tale justifies a critique of military power structures and accounts for a soldier’s disobedience. The final story, “Bearskin,” shares elements of both of the other tales, but explicitly thematizes the reentry of the shaggy soldier into the family constellation that constitutes the basis of civil society. Bearskin, who carries his weapon and bravery into the postwar world, instantiates a new mode of masculinity that is consistent with the image of the citizen-soldier.

“The Devil and His Grandmother”

The Grimms’ source for this story, according to Jack Zipes, is Dorothea Viehmann, the wife of a tailor from Zwehrn, who also told them the second tale, “The Devil’s Sooty Brother” (1815).¹³ The fairy tales, with their bent toward the fantastic, have prompted a rich tradition of psychoanalytic reading emanating from the theory of a single source for all tales or, conversely, of the universality of the material in fairy tales, hence their expressions in so many narrative traditions.¹⁴ It is admittedly difficult to assert a homologous relationship between the historical context of war and the fantastic logic of the fairy tale; here, however, the moral imperative in the tales dominates. Marina Warner, in her study on female figures in fairy tales *From the Beast to the Blonde*, writes: “Fairy tale is essentially a moralizing form, often in deep disguise and often going against the grain of common-

place ethics” (Warner, 25). The ethical code of the genre advances the cause of the powerless, attending to the plight of the youngest child, the clever underdog, and the virtuous maiden. The economy of transgression and retribution in the tales is rigorous. The few soldiers who appear in this context share one thing: victory off the battle field. They exit the fairy-tale realm with wealth and their wits. In the tales I examine, there is an escalation of reward as well, for the final soldier under consideration, Bearskin, gets the girl.

“The Devil and His Grandmother” is set on a field of war, but not a battlefield: “Es war ein großer Krieg, und der König hatte viel Soldaten, gab ihnen aber wenig Sold, so daß sie nicht davon leben konnten” (Grimm, 2:184; There once was a great war, and the king, who had many soldiers, paid his men so poorly that they could not live on their wages, 2:82). Three soldiers join forces, but to desert, a crime punishable by hanging. The three deserters expect the army to move on, so they hide in a wheatfield the army is forbidden to enter. This opening scene presents two of the most pressing problems that faced the German armies since the French Revolution: impoverished soldiers and the question of whether the profession of soldier in a standing army is economically preferable to that of a menial laborer. The historical debate, to which I turn below, provides the framework for interpreting the soldiers’ desertion in this story.

From 1788 to 1805, Major-General Gerhard von Scharnhorst edited the *Neues militärisches Journal* (New Military Journal), to which he himself was a frequent contributor. Scharnhorst was highly invested in the project of military reform even before the loss in 1806, and the journal can be seen as part of his vision.¹⁵ In the 1790s the journal participated in a debate about the need for a standing army.¹⁶ The changes to the military — or to the perception of the military — wrought by the French Revolution led to a fundamental reassessment of the armed forces. Kant took a strong position opposing standing armies: “For they constantly threaten other nations with war by giving the appearance that they are prepared for it, which goads nations into competing with one another in the number of men under arms, and this practice knows no bounds” (*To Perpetual Peace*, 3). Kant’s remarks, published in 1795, designate one point in a sustained philosophical and journalistic discussion.¹⁷ Scharnhorst referred to an argument made by another theorist in volume 65 of the *Schlözersche Staatsanzeige* to the effect that standing armies are attacked for the following reasons: (1) they cost so much, (2) they are detrimental to agriculture, (3) they do damage to the population, and (4) they corrupt morality and spread laziness (Scharnhorst, 234). In his response, Scharnhorst refuted each of the criticisms separately, claiming instead that standing armies are imperative, for they constitute a professional and trained force (236). He used the journal as a medium for his contributions to this debate.

Scharnhorst's skepticism about the possibility of a philosophically inflected notion of an eternal peace derived from knowledge of human emotions. At the end of part one he wrote: "Der ewige Frieden ist eine Chimäre. So lange die Menschen Leidenschaften haben, werden sie dieselben zeigen; und aus Ehrgeiz, Rachgier [. . .] miteinander in Krieg verwickelt werden" (244; Eternal peace is a chimera. As long as human beings are possessed of passions, they will show this to be true: and for reasons of ambition, revenge, they will wage war against each other). He concludes: "Das Einzige, was den Krieg vermindern wird, mag die Aussicht eines schlechten Erfolgs, und also eine stehende formidabele Armee seyn, die den Krieganfangenden Fürsten entgegen kömmt" (244; The only thing that could lessen the chance of war may be the aspect of a bad outcome, and thus it could be a formidable standing army that forces the belligerent prince to make concessions). It is unsurprising that a high-ranking officer would defend the existence of standing armies. His reference to eternal peace, however, indicates his investment in the larger philosophical discourse in the idiom of the Enlightenment about the possibilities of a Europe without war. Unlike the theory of balance espoused by Frederick II (see Figal in this volume), Scharnhorst theorized the fundamental relationship between bellicosity and human passions, believing that in contrast to a concept of internal regulation of human emotions, the standing army serves in the capacity of sentinel over the passions that lead to waging war.

In addressing the second point, Scharnhorst asserted the opposite: that standing armies in fact bring money into circulation among the poorer classes, even making luxuries available; he concluded that "the surplus of the richer flows into the pockets of the poorer through the class of soldiers ("Soldaten-Stand," 245). He then turns to the issue of alternative work for those in service, such as day workers who toil in the fields, but dismisses this work as seasonal. This defense segues into his third point: that agriculture and industry are in fact helped, not hindered by standing armies (249). He emphasized that soldiers serve only several months a year, implying that they could help with the harvest. The soldiers in "The Devil and His Grandmother" find themselves in the midst of a war; though they hide in a wheat field, they do so with no thought of future harvests, only of escape from their intolerable military life. Scharnhorst's protestations notwithstanding, the deserters complain of pay so insufficient that they would rather face death than continue to serve against their will.

The deserters in the story are beyond concern about soldiers exerting a corrupting influence on the general populace; on the contrary, they find not condemnation but aid. It is perhaps significant that they remain unattached and erotic interests are not a high priority. In his response to the criticism of soldiers' bad influence, Scharnhorst indeed addressed the issue of soldier marriages with dispatch: "Daß diese Heirathen eben nicht glück-

lich sind, gehört nicht zur Sache; Kinder werden erzeugt, und da jetzt zu ihrer Erziehung das Regiment mit beyträgt: so sind auch von dieser Seite die Schwierigkeiten in etwas weggeräumt” (251; That these marriages are unhappy is not the point; children are produced, and the Regiment assists in their upbringing: thus even in this regard some difficulties are dealt with).¹⁸ This dismissal of objections to soldiers’ presence among the civilian population led Scharnhorst to further observations about the moral depravity of soldiers. He makes the point that immoral people can be found in all walks of life, but also insists: “Der Wildeste, der Faulste und Unhöflichste wird in jeder Familie gemeinlich zum Soldatenstande bestimmt” (252; The wildest, laziest, and least polite one in every family is destined for life as a soldier). The saving grace, according to him, is that such men learn obedience in the army. In conclusion, Scharnhorst refuted the accusations against soldiers in a standing army by relativizing their status vis-à-vis the civilian population. His final paragraph compares the soldier’s lot favorably to that of the day worker, the compatriot in unproductive (for reasons of soil quality, weather conditions, etc.) agricultural regions, and unfavorably to the circumstance of the author from the *Staatsanzeigen*, referred to above. Scharnhorst puts class difference in perspective; however, in the fairy tales’ spectrum of ethical reference, impoverished soldiers stand a fighting chance.

Against the canvas of military thought, the three deserters from the fairy tale hide in the field; the army, however, does not decamp as expected. The tale invokes a range of contemporary questions pertinent to military reform, among them the soldiers’ impecunious state, the lack of food, and the interpretation of their character. In an 1801 volume of the *New Military Journal*, Graf von Decken takes up the general question of treachery against the state.¹⁹ He begins: “Von allen Verbrechen, deren sich, der Mensch zu Schulden kommen lassen kann, ist gewiß keines größer und entehrender und zugleich in seinen Folgen von größerem Umfange, als das Verbrechen der Verrätherei” (56; Of all the crimes a person could commit to bring himself guilt, certainly none is greater or more dishonorable and simultaneously more far-reaching in its consequences than the crime of treachery). He supplements his ostensible topic, the behavior of the people during the French Revolution, with historical and literary examples and divides treachery into two separate categories: the active and passive, the latter being more pernicious. In a list of infractions, he enumerates sins of commission and omission, among them the refusal to pay the fatherland its due and to assume others will bear responsibility for defense (62–63). He begins with a hypothesis about the costs of prosecuting a war (*Hülfsmittel*), and insists that providing the minimum of support is insufficient. Von Decken argues that more is owed to the king and fatherland at a time of crisis than grudging service. After excoriating spies and drunk soldiers who inadvertently reveal the position of troops, von Decken levels accusations

against those who withhold full support for war. This condemnation of ignoble behavior applies not only to soldiers but civilians as well.

The behavior of the soldiers and their cohorts alike comes into question in the story. The devil, appearing in convenient dragon form, descends from the sky and makes a deal with the three soldiers, two of whom are melancholy while the third remains upbeat and assumes a leadership position. The soldiers have no choice under the circumstances but to negotiate with the dragon, who removes them from the field of wheat and potential death, gives them a whip (a crack of which causes money to dance from the sky), and allows them seven years of prosperity in return for their souls. He adds: if they solve a riddle at the end of the indenture, they go free and prosper. The dragon, a careful reader of the Faust myth and a bookkeeper at heart, forces a signature from each of them.²⁰ In the compressed diegetic style of the tales, years pass and they thrive. A crucial sentence marks the midpoint of the tale: "Wo sie waren, lebten sie in Freuden und Herrlichkeit, fuhren mit Pferden und Wagen, aßen und tranken, taten aber nichts Böses" (2:185; They drove around with horses and a carriage, ate and drank, but did no evil, 2:83). The signifiers of success, the horses, food, and drink, point to possible excess, but the true index of their deserving nature is their good behavior. They obey a moral imperative in spite of their mortgaged souls. Their secure status in the world does not corrupt their basic ethical profiles.

As their time expires, the two melancholy deserters begin to despair, but the third assures them he will guess the riddle. An "old woman" offers help, and the plucky soldier follows her instructions into the forest, to a suspicious rock hut in which lives the devil's grandmother. The grandmother figure hides the soldier and, in his hidden presence, questions her grandson about the nature of the riddle, revealing the solution to the three questions: What will be their roast? What will be their silver spoon? And what will be their wineglass? For reasons that are not immediately obvious, the grandmother is betraying the devil at the same time that she serves him dinner and engages him in conversation. He answers his own impossible riddle, and the eavesdropping soldier, thus armed with information, returns to his companions and leads them to victory. Each answers in turn with a dead monkey, a whale bone, and an old horse's hoof (2:84–85). Thus the soldiers prevail — and they keep the whip that cracks money to insure their lifelong prosperity.

In the codex of the fairy tales, the soldiers' good behavior is rewarded; cheating the devil out of his ill-gotten souls is acceptable — indeed sanctioned by the old woman and the devil's own grandmother (the story does not conflate the two, but holds open the possibility of their identity), who intervene. The figure of a grandmotherly woman betraying her reprehensible relative has precedent in German tradition, is "a well-known stock character in German folk tales," as Maierhofer notes,²¹ and there could be

a connection to Maria Carolina (1742–1814), Queen of Naples and Napoleon’s adversary. The historical allusion is less important than the admirable complicity of the devil’s grandmother in the story. The crime of desertion recedes and the soldiers, in spite of their initial martial transgression, emerge healthy and wealthy. Furthermore, they emerge as a cohesive group that has committed a crime and recovered together, attributable in part to the uplifting pluck of the deserter who takes care of his cohort. Shay cites cohesion in the military as one possible way to help prevent “psychological and moral injury.”²² He writes: “The *human brain codes social recognition, support, and attachment as physical safety*. Cohesion both increases the ability to overcome fear (we call that courage) and reduces fear” (*Odysseus*, 210). In the ethical realm of the soldier tales, the cohesive bond — even though it is forged by desertion — redeems the three figures in their flight from military misery and aids their recovery through the motivational courage of the brother in arms who survives by his wits and cares for his comrades on the way.

“The Devil’s Sooty Brother”

In the second tale under consideration (by the same informant), the narrative centers on a discharged soldier with “nichts zu leben” (2:83 nothing to live on, 1:400). He, too, encounters the devil in the forest and enters a pact to serve him for seven years, during which time the discharged soldier may not groom himself. The devil, in the guise of a little man, leads him to hell and gives him chores: “er müßte das Feuer schüren unter den Kesseln, wo die Höllenbraten drinsäßen, das Haus reinhalten, den Kehrdreck hinter die Türe tragen und überall auf Ordnung sehen” (2:83; he was to tend the fires under the kettles in which the damned souls were sitting, sweep the house clean and carry the dirt out the door, and keep everything in order, 1:400). There is one stipulation: never to lift the lids on the kettles. Eventually the soldier gives in to temptation and, in a moment reminiscent of Pandora’s Box, lifts the lids and, under them, finds his sergeant, lieutenant, and general, respectively. To each he says: “Treff ich dich hier? Du hast mich gehabt, jetzt hab ich dich” (2:84; Fancy meeting you here! You used to step on me, but now I’ve got you under my foot, 1:401). He stokes the fires, keeping his former commanding officers’ kettles at a good boil. The devil returns but refrains from punishing him for peeking: “Dein Glück ist, daß du noch Holz zugelegt hast, sonst war dein Leben verloren [. . .]” (2:84; You’re just lucky you added more wood to the fire, otherwise you would have forfeited your life, 1:401). The devil sends him back to the world with an order to tell people he meets: “ich bin des Teufels rußiger Bruder und mein König” (2:84; I’m the devil’s sooty brother and my king as well, 1:401).

The declaration foreshadows the end of the tale. Hans, the soldier, takes a sack of dust with him at the devil's behest, and it turns to gold. He then goes to an inn, where the innkeeper is repulsed by the sight of him and steals the gold. Hans returns to hell to complain of his fate, and the devil morphs into a benevolent barber, who grooms his sooty brother, gives him more gold, and allows him to threaten the innkeeper in his name. A rich man, Hans sets off for home, but stops in a kingdom where he wears linen overalls and enchants the King with music he learned from the devil. The king promises Hans his first daughter, but she refuses to traffick with a commoner. The youngest marries the discharged soldier and servant of the devil, and he thus becomes not only the sooty brother but the king as well.

This amounts to a revenge fantasy in which the devil is awarded a higher moral ranking than any officers in the army. The period of post-military indenture also exonerates the soldier for his role in the war. Maria Tatar, in her work *The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy Tales*, notes the motif of "Getting Even."²³ In this story's moral compass, the officers' place in the military hierarchy situates them below the devil in the ethical order of things: he assumes the familial role of brother in sharp distinction from the contemporary epithet brother-in-arms (*Waffenbruder*). The soldier's vengeance is ultimately rewarded because he indeed performs his duty. The seeming contraction within the story — the reward for taking revenge and doing the devil's bidding the way one is supposed to do one's military duty — can only be explained by the narrative's allegiance to the discharged soldier who has nothing to live on after leaving the service. The plight of this soldier would become a prominent theme in the literature of the early to mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, the character of the old woman as warrior's aid would appear as a recurring figure in the literary fairy tales and novellas of Heinrich von Kleist, Clemens Brentano, Achim von Arnim, and later Bettina Brentano-von Arnim. Impoverished veterans populate these stories as well, in sharp contrast to the portrayals of neo-classicized heroes of an earlier era. In this story, however, the need for reform in the army of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries seems to be acute.

In order to demonstrate the possible resonance between historical context and the fairy tale, I refer next to an article in the 1805 issue of the *Neues militärisches Journal* in which an anonymous author treated some aspects of the military hierarchy in need of revision. In "Einige Bemerkungen über die Dienstverhältnisse im Militair" (A Few Observations about the Contractual Relationships in the Military), the author offers an alternative to the harsh regimen of discipline and punishment — "You used to step on me [. . .]." The author's general topic is the art of giving commands and obeying them, with some ancillary attention to the way officers treat each other.²⁴ Aware of class discrepancies in military service, the author of

this piece cites infirmity, poverty, and proximate violence as the causes of subservience in the majority of the population (2). He criticizes those who bellow orders constantly, and replaces this model of command with love: “Wie viel sicherer ist die Liebe, welche ungesehen und ungestraft und selbst da noch ihrer Pflicht treu bleibt, wo die Bande derselben schon aufgehört haben oder zerrissen sind, und welche gemeiniglich freywillig mehr thut, als man beföhlen oder erzwingen kann” (6; How much more certain is love, which unseen and unpunished remains true to duty, even where its bonds have already ceased to exist or are torn apart, and which willingly does more than one can order or force). Love should be the prime ingredient in military communication, the guarantee of obedience, and the author recognizes the all-encompassing capacity to love as an intrinsically human quality: “Der Mensch hat schon einen natürlichen Hang, andere und besonders seine Gebiether zu lieben, wenn er nur nicht von ihnen abgeschreckt und zurückgestoßen wird [. . .]” (6; A human being has a natural inclination to love others and especially his master, if only he is not frightened and pushed away by him). While naturalizing the love of one’s master, he cautions against false intimacy, flattery, and excess, in favor of “paternal care” (9–10; *väterliche Sorgsamkeit*) for the men’s well-being and attention to their ethical education: “dies sind die sichersten Mittel von unsern Untergebenen geliebt zu werden” (10; these are the most secure ways of being loved by our subordinates). The officers burning in the kettles of hell would have done well to heed this call for a more paternal approach to command.

In this story, as in “The Devil and His Grandmother,” a bond between a former soldier and a new leader is forged by the spirit of duty, even though the sooty brother initially allows his curiosity about the contents of the kettles to override his orders. His disobedience is not punished, but rewarded with a new brotherhood, albeit with the devil: this fraternity exemplifies the ideal military bond among soldiers, but also invokes the debate about leadership models based on trust. The soldier is saved from the devil’s wrath by showing the officers no mercy; instead, he adds fuel to the flames. This story contributes to the contemporary discussion about the nature of bonds among common soldiers and their superior officers; the devil begins in a position of superiority over the soldier, but he ultimately exemplifies better leadership qualities and models a fraternal bond beyond the ken of the hell-bound officers.

Almost as a grace note, the story ends with a fortuitous marriage and a fulfillment of the commoner-become-king fantasy. Hans, though rich, wanders in a workman’s overalls and plays hellishly good music before a king. The king promises the “commoner” a bride. The older daughter rejects the apparent commoner and defies her father’s will. The youngest, in a familiar pattern, married the man, motivated by love for her father (1:402). Only the last paragraph of this tale indicates a transfer of the bond between the

devil and Hans to one mediated by marriage. At this point in the story, however, the protagonist's former soldier identity has been displaced by his appearance as a wandering musician in linen overalls. It cannot be said that this tale explicitly thematizes the veteran's hope that positive female influence — what Shay refers to as “the love of a good woman” (*Odysseus*, 73) — will redeem the former soldier and help reintegrate him into civil society and the domestic sphere, but again we have the timeless trajectory of a soldier's progress from battle to a wounded peace and eventual domesticity.

“Berserk”

In the final story, which is based on a seventeenth-century tale by J. J. Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, the soldier at its heart also makes a pact with the devil; he also discharges his part of the bargain honorably, but here the reintegration of a military man into civil society through marriage constitutes an essential element of the narrative. The young man is a volunteer; he enlists, performs his duties bravely, and distinguishes himself as a valiant soldier who is “immer der vorderste, wenn es blaue Bohnen regnete” (2:86; always in the thick of things when the bullets were whistling about, 2:1). The act of volunteering is crucial to distinguish this soldier from the others. Only this tale describes his bravery in extremes of battle — evocative of what Shay describes as a “berserk” state of battlefield abandon (*Achilles*, 77). He writes: “*Berserk* comes from the Norse word for the frenzied warriors who went into battle naked, or at least without armor, in a godlike or god-possessed — but also beastlike — fury” (*Achilles*, 77). Bearskin must become the animal he slaughters in order to redeem his humanity in a postconflict world. In peacetime, the ex-soldier is at a loss. He returns home; his parents are dead and his brothers reject him: “Der Soldat hatte nichts übrig als sein Gewehr, das nahm er auf die Schulter und wollte in die Welt gehen” (2:87; The soldier had nothing left except his gun, which he swung over his shoulder and set off into the world, 2:1).

Trained only to shoot, the young man faces starvation, his military skills redundant in the absence of war. While some returning soldiers would anticipate the celebratory welcoming, Bearskin forfeits any “homecoming” or transition to civil society because he must remain “in combat mode” (*Odysseus*, 20). He encounters the devil (in this incarnation wearing a green jacket), who promises money and property if he has courage: “Ein Soldat und Furcht, wie paßt das zusammen?” (2:87; A soldier and fear don't mix, 2:1). The devil's test is a charging bear, which the young man shoots with gusto and some soldierly trash-talking: “Oho!,” rief der Soldat, ‘dich will ich an der Nase kitzeln, daß dir die Lust zum Brummen vergehen soll’” (2:87; ‘Oho!’ exclaimed the soldier. ‘When I get done tickling your

nose, you won't want to growl anymore, 2:1). Ruth B. Bottigheimer reads this incident (mistakenly identified as occurring in "The Devil's Sooty Brother") in the following way: "[The soldier's] subsequent enrichment is based not on having shot the bear, but on his presence of mind in confronting this fearsome spectacle (daß dir's an Mut nicht fehlt), reward for characteristics not for accomplishment. Thus, in Grimms' Tales, it is not what people do, but what they are that justifies their good fortune."²⁵ Bottigheimer's claim holds in general, but not in this instance. Courage is stipulated as a constitutive aspect of the soldier's identity. It signifies the ability to act in a certain way and cannot, I think, be limited to a quality of mind. Bearskin shoots and taunts at the same time. In the three tales discussed here, each soldier/protagonist is rewarded precisely for how he acts, i.e., for adhering to a particular ethical code that does not necessarily align with a prevailing military model of behavior.

The second part of the test varies the conditions familiar from "The Devil's Sooty Brother." Bearskin may trim neither his nails nor his hair and must refrain from grooming himself for seven years. The post-soldier man must resemble the beast he had to be during battle, and the identification of man with beast is clearly articulated: Bearskin is so named because as part of the devil's bargain, he must wear the fur of the slaughtered bear as a cloak (the devil also gives him the green jacket, the pockets of are an endless source of coins). Bearskin thus becomes a monster, an unkempt human being — though one with ducats in his devil-lined pocket — who nonetheless retains the stalwartness of the soldier, his human voice, and his compassion. As Bearskin transforms, he remains within the perimeters of ethically sanctioned behavior: "Wer ihn sah, lief fort, weil er aber allerorten den Armen Geld gab, damit sie für ihn beteten, daß er in den sieben Jahren nicht stürbe, und weil er alles gut bezahlte, so erhielt er doch immer noch Herberge" (2:88; Everyone who crossed his path ran away in fright. Nevertheless, wherever he went, he gave money to the poor to pray that he survive the seven years, and he paid so well for everything, he was always able to obtain lodgings, 2:2). Bearskin is forbidden to say the Lord's Prayer, but he pays for intercession; in other words, he may not pray, but he may ask others to pray on his behalf, demonstrating his desire for redemption in spite of his pact with the devil.

Lutz Röhrich observes that folktales often portray "a very ancient relationship to animals."²⁶ Some stories emphasize the symbiotic relationship between the animal and human world; in the fairy tales, by contrast, animal helpers abound but do not cohabit the human world as family members. Röhrich observes that these motifs of human-animal collaboration are "rare relics in Europe" (76) and touches briefly on the folktale "The Bear's Son," in which a woman is abducted by a bear and eventually bears him a son. "Bearskin" represents a variant of this type of tale, but with the intervention of war, a berserk state, and its impact on the soldier's

reentry into the bourgeois sphere in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For the outcome of this tale relies on the presumed erotic appeal of a soldier, even one transformed into a beast. Frevert quotes Friedrich Ludwig Jahn from 1810: "Whoever appears in uniform, bearing arms, will soon find himself loved; the soldier conquers her heart with greater ease" (*A Nation in Barracks*, 31); but she contests this image of the man in uniform and the inevitability of his appeal. Common soldiers received little respect, and she attributes possible attraction to officers to their noble origins. The more sexually optimistic comments from Jahn are echoed in the patriotic lyrics of the time, as well as in the motivating pamphlets by national advocates like E. M. Arndt. Though historians question the truth of Jahn's assertion, the fairy tale "Bearskin," as I demonstrate below, underwrites the general erotic economy he promises. This exchange is at least in part a product of the historical context of the tales' publication during the Wars of Liberation, an economy that purportedly rewards military service with sexual favors.²⁷

During his fourth year into the bargain for his survival, Bearskin gains access to an inn where he overhears a man in the midst of a desperate lament because he is on the brink of financial disaster. Money being no object, Bearskin helps him and the old man promises him a bride, certain that one of his three lovely daughters will comply. The youngest reliably chooses the monster that has saved her father from penury, and after wandering for three more years Bearskin returns to the devil, who reluctantly cleans him up, and the rehumanized man returns to claim his bride, whose father "Hielt ihn für einen vornehmen Feldobrist" (2:91; thought he was a distinguished army colonel, 2:4). The narrative details of this fairy tale endorse the popularized notion that war produces warriors who set the standard for masculine identity; they are to be accepted in peace as well.

The ethical framework established in this story holds female characters to a higher moral standard. If we recall the beginning, Bearskin's brothers reject the returning soldier as economically useless. Though the narration condemns them for their hard-heartedness, the brothers do not reappear in the text and their denial goes unpunished. The tale instead reserves retribution for the older sisters of Bearskin's bride. Both reject the man in his hideous bear form, but the second sister — a character curiously missing from "The Devil's Sooty Brother" — articulates a preference for a shaved bear wearing a hussar's uniform: "Wie kann ich einen Mann nehmen, der keine menschliche Gestalt mehr hat? Da gefiel mir der rasierte Bär noch besser, der einmal hier zu sehen war und sich für einen Menschen ausgab, der hatte doch einen Husarenpelz an und weiße Handschuhe. Wenn er nur häßlich wäre, so könnte ich mich an ihn gewöhnen" (2:89–90; How can I marry a man who no longer resembles a human being? I'd rather have the shaved bear that passed through here on show and was taught to act like a man. At least it was wearing a hussar's uniform and

white gloves. If it were just a question of ugliness, I could get used to him, 2:3). The daughter's reference to the type of soldier's uniform is quite specific. The hussars (Hungarian *huszár*), light cavalry generally employed throughout Europe's armies, were known for their fighting skills and cavalier treatment of the civilian population, which only added to their reputation for recklessness. There was also an inspiring Prussian patriot, Freiherr Ferdinand von Schill, who responded to the Emperor Francis I's call to arms in 1809 (technically Prussia sided with France at the time, so Schill had to operate off the political grid): he fought with a band of hussars and was later the topic of popular patriotic ballads.²⁸ Of course, hussars had been around for centuries, and there is nothing helpful in the fairy tale to indicate the historical time except the gun Bearskin carries with him. In the Prussian army most infantrymen carried a relatively reliable rifle by 1782.²⁹ While the devil's sooty brother is discharged with nothing, Bearskin at least has his weapon, the possession of which grounds him in the time period and provides some context for the ensuing ethical recoding.

The moral message of the narrative condemns the daughters' rejection of the man-beast, though their discourse reflects moral demands that the post-conflict soldier transform himself back into human form in order to be acceptable. The sideshow bear, shaved and cross-dressed as a hussar, provides the symmetrical opposite of Bearskin, the soldier cross-dressed as a beast. It is worth noting that the fairy tales do not participate in the gender-bending so common to the literature of this period. We find no amazons, no female recruits, no women warriors. Elisabeth Krimmer writes: "It seems that gender identities are easily accepted as natural entities in times of peace. But the turmoil of a war destabilizes many presumed certainties, and unmask[s] the cultural constructedness of gender itself."³⁰ Though her remarks pertain specifically to the work of Bettina Brentano-von Arnim, they ring true for the context of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century German literature in general. The fairy tales, with their at best veiled historical and temporal context, revert to conventional gendered models. In "Bearskin," the moral barometer points to stable gender categories that are destabilized only by what has become a bendable border between the human and animal world. For the two older sisters, Bearskin is still too much of a bestial warrior. His beastly existence both dehumanizes him and pathologizes the spectacle of the bear trained to perform for human eyes. The figure of the dancing bear is referred to again when the sisters tease the waiting bride: "Und die zweite fuhr fort: 'Aber die Hochzeit wird lustig sein, Bären, die tanzen gut'" (2:90; And the second added, "The wedding will certainly be a merry one, since bears dance so well," 2:4).

The sisters, who not only reject the young man and dishonor their father, but taunt their virtuous younger sister, die at their own hands: "Die eine ersäufte sich im Brunnen, die andere erhenkte sich vom Baum" (2:92;

One drowned herself in a well, the other hanged herself from a tree, 2:5). And the devil visits the bridegroom and gloats about the two souls he got in place of one. With the sisters safely dead, even the devil gets his due. The outcome is predictable: female characters, especially witches, stepmothers, evil stepsisters, and even sisters participate in a narrative economy of violation and harsh punishment. In this story, however, specifically bourgeois attitudes toward the military are in the foreground. The idea of clothing as an extension of the human body and its essential identity includes the uniform, which in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries contributes to a regulation of female desire. The devoted and sincere youngest daughter constitutes the exception. Her choice is rewarded, in this case for her steadfast behavior in the face of looming social and erotic disaster: the engagement to a beast. Further, she disarticulates the relationship between the hideous exterior and the compassionate character within. The two older sisters' refusal, based on sexual disgust, leads them to pay for their lack of desire, rather, for withholding desire, with death.

Soldiers to Civilians

Fairy tales by nature resist readings aimed at historical argument; however, the presence of war in the three stories analyzed here exerts a certain historical influence over their reception. In each story the soldiers are rewarded for being soldierly, albeit to different degrees. Moreover, certain homologies emerge between the contemporary military discourse and the constitution of the fairy tales. In "The Devil and His Grandmother," the cheerful soldier undertakes an uncertain journey in order to learn the answers to the dragon's riddle. He distributes his knowledge among his companions, who did not accompany him on his adventure, and together they defy the devil. Even though they are deserters, they find favor in the ethical context of the story. Their dissatisfaction with their pay goes unremarked; it is accepted as a reasonable motivation for their actions, despite the arguments made in the military journal about the dire crime of betrayal. In "The Devil's Sooty Brother," the discharged soldier has nothing to lose and also enters into an arrangement with the devil. He directly disobeys an order (to peek under the lids), yet the devil refrains from punishing him because he has obeyed orders and stoked the fires. He, too, is rewarded with wealth and eventually a bride and a kingdom. Moreover, the devil grooms him, sealing a kind of fraternal bond with the soldier in an alliance utterly absent from the soldier's relationship to his superior officers, who bubble away in the cauldrons. The acute need for reform in the military is underscored by the essay on relationships among officers and their men in which the author advocates a more paternal notion of command.

Finally, “Bearskin” has similar moral qualities in that the courage that defines the soldier’s existence governs his behavior. The experiences of war, embodied in each of the heroes, inform their civilian incarnations as well. The soldier’s survival of his Faustian pact with the devil entitles him to a perceived promotion! The older daughters’ rejection is roundly condemned, while the good bourgeois daughter prevails; her desire for the soldier as a beast represents the ultimate victory for military morality in a bourgeois world. Warner’s assertion that the tale is a “moralizing form” is complicated by the soldier tales and the wedge they drive between the representation of bellicosity as a national imperative and local, military masculinities as necessarily parsed by the divisions of class, rank, and experience. These soldier tales, informed by the contemporary culture of war, point to a disjuncture between the dominant discourse of a military ethos in reform and the popular ethics that embrace deserters, impoverished warriors, and newly civilized armed men.

Notes

¹ Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, trans. with introduction by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 7.

² The generic label “folk tale” is perhaps preferable to “fairy tale” in referring to the soldier stories, but I defer to the conventional use of the latter term.

³ See Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, trans. Andrew Boreham with Daniel Brückenhäus (Oxford: Berg, 2004); and Waltraud Maierhofer, Gertrud M. Rösch, and Caroline Bland, eds., *Women against Napoleon: Historical and Fictional Responses to His Rise and Legacy* (New York: Campus, 2007).

⁴ My argument departs from groundbreaking work on the discourse of gender and military culture by Frevert and Maierhofer et al., and by Karen Hagemann; see Hagemann, “‘Heran, heran, zu Sieg oder Tod!’ Entwürfe patriotisch-wehrhafter Männlichkeit in der Zeit der Befreiungskriege,” in *Männergeschichte — Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne*, ed. Thomas Kühne (New York: Campus Verlag, 1996), 51–68.

⁵ Patricia Anne Simpson, *The Erotics of War in German Romanticism* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2006), 15.

⁶ I quote from Jack Zipes’s edition of the English translation: Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, *The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*, ed. and trans. Jack Zipes, 2 vols. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988). The original German is quoted from the Reclam edition, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, ed. Heinz Rölleke, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980).

⁷ These representations of war appear in other genres. Following the defeat of Prussia and allied forces in 1806, the circulation of pamphlets with patriotic songs grew in popularity. Frevert cites the example of the *Mildheimisches Liederbuch*,

which in 1799 had nine songs for the military; the revised edition in 1815 had forty-one (Frevert, 30). In more formal genres, we see a similar surge in the thematization of war: for example Schiller's *Wallenstein* trilogy among other plays, Kleist's ultimate tragedy of love and war, *Penthesilea*, and his critical allegory of Germanic bloodthirstiness, *Hermannsschlacht* (*Hermann's Battle*).

⁸ Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1976), 75.

⁹ See Ute Frevert, "Citizen-Soldiers: General Conscription in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in this volume.

¹⁰ David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's War and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 12.

¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 187. I refer to the J. H. Bernard translation, noting my modifications; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951; repr. 1974), 102. In parenthetical page references in the text, the German reference will precede the translation.

¹² Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Scribner, 1994), xiii.

¹³ Zipes, "Once There Were Two Brothers Named Grimm," in Grimm and Grimm, *The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*, 1:xviii. Zipes also mentions that a former soldier, Krause, told the Grimms stories in exchange for old clothes (xviii–xix). There is a rich scholarly literature on the origin of the Grimms' project and their editorial practices. Fink references the pact with the devil (154), though he concentrates his reading on the tales Krause told; see Louis Gonthier Fink, "The Fairy Tales of the Grimms' Sergeant of Dragoons J. F. Krause as Reflecting the Needs and Wishes of the Common People," in *The Brothers Grimm and the Folktale*, ed. James M. McGlathery, with Larry W. Danielson, Ruth E. Lorbe, and Selma K. Richardson (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988), 146–63. My concern here is with the soldiers' tales from other sources, but there are common points. Rölleke explores the impetus for the project to collect and publish the tales, Heinz Rölleke, *Die Märchen der Brüder Grimm: Eine Einführung* (Munich and Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1985), 27–33. For a brief account of the Grimms' female sources, see Marina Warner, *From the Beast to the Blond: On Fairy Tales and Their Tellers* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), 19–20.

¹⁴ Vladimir Propp, "Morphology of the Folktale," in *American Folklore Society Bibliographical and Special Series*, vol. 9, *Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics*, pub. 10, trans. Lawrence Scott, introductions by Svatava Pirkóva Jakobsen, Alan Dundes, pref. Louis A. Wagner, 2nd edition (Austin: U of Texas P, 1968), 9 and 23. Bruno Bettelheim's work on the tales is well-known, but Sigmund Freud's essay, "The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales," is often overlooked; see Sigmund Freud, "The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales," in *Character and Culture*, trans. James Strachey, intro. Philip Rieff (New York: Scribner, 1963), 59–66. It emphasizes the cultural capital certain tales represent in their ability to exert influence over the European unconscious dream activity. For a cogent presentation of the history of

scholarly thought on the tales, see also James M. McGlathery, *Grimms' Fairy Tales: A History of Criticism on a Popular Classic* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993), esp. 6–9.

¹⁵ The journal published a wide array of articles and reviews on military themes, from detailed analyses of historical battles to tabular accounts of contemporary armies and their degrees of readiness. Reviews attended to handbooks for officers, treatises on mathematics for strategists, and tactics for the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Later contributions focused on the role of luck in Napoleon's military triumphs. At least one lengthy essay suggests the possibility of implementing Enlightenment thought in the military. This journal provides a present-day reader with great insight into military culture of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. See Gerhard von Scharnhorst, ed., *Neues militärisches Journal*, 13 vols. (Hannover, 1788–1805).

¹⁶ Gerhard von Scharnhorst, "Ueber die Vor- und Nachtheile der stehenden Armeen," *Neues militärisches Journal* 6 (1792): 234–54. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.

¹⁷ Jeremy Bentham's "Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace" appeared in 1789, though the topic persists throughout the philosophical debate of the eighteenth century. See Marie-Louise von Plessen, ed., *Idee Europa: Entwürfe zum "Ewigen Frieden": Ordnungen und Utopien für die Gestaltung Europas von der pax romana zur Europäischen Union* (Berlin: Henschel/Deutsches Historisches Museum, 2003), a catalog that accompanies the exhibit of the same name. References to Bentham appear on 36 and 159, to Rousseau on 146.

¹⁸ A crucial document, though not published in his lifetime, is J. M. R. Lenz's essay on soldier marriages. His play *Die Soldaten* (The Soldiers), designated a comedy, reveals the baleful influence of the military on bourgeois daughters. The essay, addressed to monarchs, covers a range of issues relating to the military, the identity of the citizen and soldier, and the hardships of life for the latter. In essence, Lenz sees soldier marriages as a possible reform: "Ihr Monarchen! ach seyd ihr so fremd mit der menschlichen Natur geworden, es nicht in seiner ganzen Stärke zu fühlen, was für ein neues Leben, was für wunderthätige Kräfte in eure Soldaten strömen müssen, wenn sie für Weiber und Kinder fechten?" ("You monarchs! Oh, has human nature become so foreign to you that you cannot sense in its complete strength what new life, what miraculous power would flow into your soldiers if they were fighting for wife and child?). Lenz endorses marriage and family as a way of motivating soldiers and simultaneously integrating them into life within the perimeters of bourgeois society. See Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz, *Die Soldaten. Text, Materialien, Kommentar*, ed. Edward McInnes (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1977), 146.

¹⁹ J. F. Graf von Decken, "Verrätherei," *Neues militärisches Journal* 10 (1801): 56–84.

²⁰ It is worth noting that in Goethe's *Faust I*, Mephistopheles insists on the signature, though Faust protests (*Faust I*, lines 1716 ff.).

²¹ Waltraud Maierhofer, "Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples: The 'Devil's Grandmother' Fights Napoleon," In *Women Against Napoleon*, ed. Waltraud

Maierhofer, Gertrud M. Rösch, and Caroline Bland (New York: Campus, 2007), here 57.

²² Jonathan Shay, *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming*, foreword by Senators John McCain and Max Cleland (New York: Scribner, 2002), 208.

²³ Maria Tatar, *The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy Tales*, expanded 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003), 179–92.

²⁴ Anonymous, "Einige Bemerkungen über die Dienstverhältnisse im Militair," *Neues militärisches Journal* 13 (1805): 1–53.

²⁵ Ruth B. Bottigheimer, *Grimms Bad Girls and Bold Boys: The Moral and Social Vision of the Tales* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1987), 27.

²⁶ Lutz Röhrich, *Folktales and Reality*, trans. Peter Tokofsky (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979), 75.

²⁷ I base these comments on work by Karen Hagemann, who notes the ways war songs and poetry in particular reinforce the oppositional model of gender identity. She also quotes one anonymous poem (1813) which praises "unsere jungen Schönen," as the possible reward for military victories. Hagemann concludes: "Lieder wie dieses umspielten zugleich die Vorstellung von der erotischen Anziehungskraft eines Mannes, der seine Männlichkeit als 'Kriegsheld' unter Beweis gestellt hatte" (59), but she does not develop the articulation of the erotic with the ethical any further.

²⁸ On Freiherr Ferdinand von Schill, see www.zum.de (last accessed 29 July 2005).

²⁹ See www.preussenweb.de/waffen.htm (last accessed 29 July 2005).

³⁰ Elisabeth Krimmer, *In the Company of Men: Cross-Dressed Women Around 1800* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 2004), 203.

Part III: War and Gender

7: On Gender Wars and Amazons: Therese Huber on Terror and Revolution

Inge Stephan

Enlightened War

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WAS NOT only the Age of Enlightenment, it was also an epoch marked by extreme violence and numerous wars. Above all, the violent upheaval in the wake of the French Revolution, especially after the execution of the king, raised doubts among contemporaries about whether the Enlightenment and its advocacy of freedom, equality, and human rights were capable of promoting the moral and social refinement of humankind, or rather heralded a new barbarism. The debate over the proper relation between enlightenment and revolution thus formed an integral part of a comprehensive political and philosophical discourse about the proper relation between theory and praxis.¹ The question of violence in particular proved divisive. Does a nation have the right to rebel against a tyrannical government? Which types of violence are acceptable? Under what circumstances is war justifiable? How should one draw the line between defensive warfare and wars of conquest? Who emerges victorious, and who is a victim of war? Is it even possible to avoid war or is war an inescapable fact of human life? Certainly the eighteenth century was not the first to ask these questions, but the violent course of the French Revolution and the ensuing revolutionary wars endowed them with renewed urgency and poignancy.

A survey of literary works and public debates around 1800 shows that questions relating to violence and revolution were discussed with great frequency after 1789. The theme of warfare was all but ubiquitous in classic literary genres such as drama, novel, and poetry, as well as in new media, such as newspapers and magazines. It informed philosophical-aesthetic debates and provided an important motif in the now canonical works of the *Kunstepoche* and in largely forgotten trivial literature and popular fiction alike.²

In the following, I will focus on a novel in which the theme of war is more vivid and present than in any other text of its time. Therese Huber's

book *Die Familie Seldorf* (1795–96), “a tale from the French Revolution” (Heuser, 372) has much to teach us about the paradox of “enlightened war.”³ Huber’s novel differs from other works on the topic because it highlights gender relations and thus approaches the discourse about the war, its possible justification, and its catastrophic consequences from a perspective that was largely excluded from the debates of male philosophers and literati.⁴ However, even though the novel, which was Huber’s first publication, offers a female perspective, it did not appear under her name but rather her husband’s, Ludwig Ferdinand Huber. He was introduced as author in the first of the two volumes and as editor in the second. The confusion caused by this attribution was further exacerbated by the publisher’s comment that editor and author were not identical. Therese Huber only avowed her authorship after becoming a widow and a successful author in 1811.

There are several reasons that Huber unveiled the secret of her authorship so late. Her marriage to Georg Forster, the famous world traveler and controversial revolutionary in the short-lived Mainz Republic of 1792–93, her spectacular separation from Forster, and the affair with Huber, whom she married after Forster’s death, all provided fodder for a public scandal, which she did not want to instigate further with her novel.⁵ The fact that she continued to feel beholden to Forster’s political principles after the separation and retrospectively understood herself as a “Jakobinerin, Demokratin und Revolutionär” (Jacobin, democrat, and revolutionary) was yet another delicate subject which accounts for her reluctance.⁶

Moreover, Huber’s vulnerability in the public eye was attributable to more than her tumultuous personal life. Since any participation in the public sphere violated the rigid gender roles of her time, she was careful to avoid the hostility that met women authors.⁷ Her own father, Christian Gottlob Heyne, a well-known Professor in Göttingen who was by no means a reactionary, criticized his daughter’s authorial ambitions as “einen lächerlichen, unweiblichen Drang” (M. Heuser 348; a ludicrous, unfeminine drive). The contemporary audience must have found it even more objectionable that Huber was not content to publish literary works but also meddled in the sphere of current politics, which was reserved for men exclusively. The following passage from one of her letters shows just how acutely she was aware of this: “ich wußte stets, das Weib solle schweigen, wenn Männer sprächen und nie außer dem innigsten Zirkel von Politik sprechen” (M. Heuser, 349; I always knew that women should remain silent when men speak and should never speak about politics except with their most intimate circle). In light of Huber’s simultaneous breaching of several taboos, it is hardly surprising that she initially attempted to hide her authorship.

In addition to these author- and time-specific reasons, there is a third factor that pertains specifically to the topic of Huber’s novel. *Die Familie*

Seldorf treats the trauma of revolution/violence/war with such determination and urgency that it could easily have been misinterpreted as a roman à clef about Huber's marriage to Forster and the failed Mainz Revolution. We must assume that her experiences in Mainz and her intimate relation to one of the leaders of the revolutionary upheaval there shaped the novel, but *Die Familie Seldorf* is far more than an autobiographically tinged reflection on revolution and counterrevolution.⁸ In the novel Huber sketches a horror vision of a society disjointed through war. The text paints a portrait of a political order in which the Enlightenment ideals of freedom, equality, and human rights have become a mockery. In the following, I will analyze the nexus of gender and warfare in Huber's novel. As I will show, in *Die Familie Seldorf* the war causes a disruption of gender relations as much as gender relations cause war.

Images of Terror

Huber's novel offers a vivid portrait of the time between 1785 and 1793. Although the text maintains its focus on the fate of one family, the story of this family evolves against the backdrop of a colossal historical canvas with numerous characters and storylines. Again and again it shows how the war destroys private relationships and how death, destruction, and madness triumph in the end. Violence in the private and political spheres is a leitmotif throughout the text. The novel is filled with depictions of duels, raids, rebellions, conspiracies, intrigues, iconoclasm, defilement, executions, civil war, battles, street fights, and the struggle for freedom, which all serve to blur and undermine the boundary between war and revolution, and between justice and tyranny.

In order to evoke the terrible destruction wrought by war even before the onset of the French Revolution, the novel introduces a character who fought in the American Revolutionary War. Sara is the central character, and her father, an officer who lives in France but was born in Germany, fought in the Seven Years' War. Seldorf considers the American Revolutionary War "ein wichtiges, ernstes Schauspiel" (1:19; an important, serious drama). "Für die Sache der Menschheit zu fechten" (1:18; In order to fight for mankind), he leaves his wife and two small children, Theodor and Sara, behind in Paris. Five years later, he returns as a "Krüppel" (1:20; cripple) to broken family ties. His wife, who was unfaithful to him, expects a child from her lover. Strangely, she does not exhibit any awareness of guilt, but rather rebels when her husband reproaches her:

Ihr verschloßnes Gesicht ward bei meinen Worten noch finstrier, sie zeigte mir einen Dolch, den sie gegen ihre Brust hielt: Du kannst mir

das Leben nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt aufzwingen, über den hinaus bist du mein Mörder! (1:253–54)

[Her secretive face became even darker with my words, and she showed me a dagger, which she held against her breast: You can only force life upon me to a certain point, after that you are my assassin!]

When her husband forbids her to see her lover and isolates her from society, she withdraws into silence. Husband and wife live alongside one another like “zwei verdammte Geister” (1:255; two condemned spirits). On her deathbed at the birth of her child Antoinette, the wife still does not show remorse. Instead, she accuses her husband of tyranny:

Eigennuz und Herrschsucht waren die Quelle deiner Wohlthaten; ich sollte dein Geschöpf seyn, und das Glück, das ich nicht aus deinen Händen nahm, wurde mir zum Verbrechen; deine Sklavin hat dich betrogen, und ihre unendliche Verdammniß bewies dir, daß sie den Werth ihres Herrn kannte. (1:256)

[Self-interest and tyranny were the sources of your good deeds; I was supposed to be your subservient creature, and happiness that I did not take from your hands, was considered a crime against you; your slave betrayed you, and her infinite damnation proved to you that she knew her master's worth.]

Her accusations are just as incomprehensible to her husband as her previous “fürchterliches Verstummen” (1:255; frightful silence). In retrospect Seldorf admits that he had never understood his wife (1:257).

Seldorf's incomprehension of his wife's needs not only parallels the political predicament of the time but also determines the novel's plot. The fate of Sara's mother anticipates a theme that will repeat itself almost compulsively throughout the novel: because male characters are caught up in and fascinated by the turmoil of war, they neglect their wives and end up destroying their families. Thus they cause suffering not only for themselves, but also for their children and their children's children. Men's obsession with war is the root cause of a sequence of misfortunes that spans generations and ultimately leads to the extinction of entire families. And Seldorf is not the only husband who cares more about war and revolution than about his wife and children. Sara's mother, for example, had been married before, and instead of attending to his wife and unborn child, her first husband had engaged in a duel. Similarly, the French Revolution is of greater importance to Theodor than his sister Sara, and L*** is more worried about his position in the revolutionary conflict than about the well-being of Sara and their child. Women and children are the primary victims of war and revolution both literally and figuratively: Sara's mother, demoralized by her husband's reproaches, dies in childbirth; their daughter Antoinette wastes away and perishes in tender infancy; Theodor

and Sara's childhood is overshadowed by the death of their mother and, variously, by their father's absence and by his cruelty when he is present. The fact that Sara strays from the virtuous path and that Theodor is involved in the counterrevolutionary faction is presented as a direct result of the lack of motherly and fatherly care. Finally, Sara's daughter is shot by her own father, L***, in the line of duty, and Sara herself, the only surviving member of the Seldorf family at the end of the novel, is deeply traumatized by her experiences and likely to remain incapable of giving or reciprocating love.

Since Huber's novel is set in France, the American Revolutionary War is remote in both time and place, whereas the French Revolution impacts the characters in immediate and drastic ways. Readers witness combat operations in the provinces and in the capital. When Sara follows her lover, Count L***, from Saumur to Paris, she finds herself caught between the Royalists and the Republicans, between aggravated mobs and machinating clerics, who manipulate the people's wrath for their own purposes. Yet it is not easy to evaluate the goals and motivations of the various combatting parties since readers identify with Sara who, detached from her original familial and social relations, is caught up in the maelstrom of political upheaval. However, even if we as readers share Sara's disorientation in the general chaos, the narrative gently draws our attention back to the consequences of violence and war. Huber portrays apocalyptic landscapes in order to show that in addition to its human casualties, the war also wreaks havoc on "Mother Earth" herself. All the while, the novel makes it difficult for readers to attribute guilt and responsibility to any one party:

Kaum bezeichneten ihr noch Hügel und Felsen den wohl bekannten Weg, denn alles was Menschenhand zerstören kann, lag zertrümmert am Boden. Verbrannt strekten die Bäume des Walds ihre Zweige empor, oder lagen in Asche zerfallen über dem Weg, oder bedekten mit ihren zerschlagenen Aesten halb verscharrte Leichname. Rauchende Brandstätten sagten ihnen, wo ehemals Dörfer gestanden hatten, und stiessen sie irgendwo noch auf eine bewohnte Hütte, so scheuchte der Anblick von Menschen die elenden Bewohner heraus. Die Felder lagen zerstampft von den wilden Roßen, zersaust das Getraide von den Wagenrädern, die Weinberge von Kugeln aufgewühlt. (2:240)

[Knolls and cliffs barely showed her the well-known path, since everything that mankind can destroy lay demolished on the ground. Scorched, the forest's trees extended their branches upwards, or were spread as ashes across the path, or covered half-buried corpses with their broken boughs. Smoldering embers told them where villages once stood, and if they happened to stumble across an inhabited cottage, then the sight of people scared the miserable inhabitants away. The fields were trampled down by wild steeds; wheat was crushed by wagon wheels; the vineyards were whipped by bullets.]

And yet, in spite of its emphasis on destruction and suffering, the narrative never questions the justification of the revolution. Significantly, there are no positively characterized Royalist partisans, and all of the priests are depicted as corrupt. With the exception of a few anomalies, these figures are in the grip of malice, bitterness, infatuation, or weakness. Thus, their political orientations are mere expressions of personal interests or needs rather than the result of careful reflection and choice. This observation is confirmed by Sara's fate. When she realizes the depth of Count L***'s roguery and loses her child, she becomes a fervent supporter of the revolution, joins a group of women who fight for the revolution in Paris, and finally even takes part in the war disguised as a man in the Republican Army. In doing so, she is trapped in a structure of violence that destroys her as a moral person and turns her into a "warnendes Denkmal" (2:343; cautionary monument) for a falsely lived life, even though she does not incur any personal guilt.

Gender and War

The other female figures in the novel are no better equipped than Sara to realize their modest wishes for happiness and security. Almost all of the women experience failure: they die in childbirth or from early emaciation and exhaustion; they are killed by revolutionary violence or die on the battlefield as victims of events they do not control; or else they become insane or depressed. In some situations, women ultimately emerge as perpetrators although they are victims. The narrative traces the possible courses of action available to women at that time by portraying the destinies of several women characters. The brief account of the wife of Count L*** exemplifies this. She does not emerge as the cruel and heartless rival that Sara has imagined, but is herself presented as a poor, pitiable victim:

Sie war eben achtzehn Jahre da sie starb: still und unschädlich hatte ihre schöne Jugend geblüht; man hatte sie keinen Gebrauch ihrer angeborenen Güte gelehrt, die Menschen um sie her wußten diese Funken der Gottheit nicht zu schätzen — so konnte sie, um wohlzutun, nichts als lieben, um zu geniessen, nichts als lachen und scherzen. Ihre Liebe ward von den kalten abgestorbenen Seelen, mit denen ihr Stand sie verband, zurückgewiesen, von ihrem Gemahl nie angenommen; und Scherz und Lachen wandelte sich früh in Elend, Noth und Angst. Ihr Leben glich einer kleinen Lampe, die in einem menschenleeren Raume brennt und erlöscht; sie leuchtete Niemand, und ihr Erlöschen wird von Niemand bemerkt. (2:315)

[She had just turned eighteen when she died: her beautiful youth blossomed quietly and innocuously; no one taught her the use of her innate goodness, — the people around her did not know how to

appreciate these divine sparks — thus in order to do good she did not know anything other than love, and in order to take pleasure, nothing other than laughter and jesting. Her love was rejected by the cold dead souls with whom her class united her and it was never accepted by her spouse; her jokes and laughter quickly turned to suffering, destitution, and fear. Her life was comparable to a small lantern that burns and goes out in an empty room; she did not illuminate anyone, and no one notices her extinction.]

Other women characters lose their lives just as prematurely and unnoticed as L***'s wife. This has to do with the status that the novel assigns to its female figures. They are daughters, sisters, lovers, wives, or mothers and are therefore always shown in relation to men. They do not live for themselves, but lead their lives secondhand through their male spouses and relatives. As Seldorf's daughter and Theodor's sister, Sara, for example, leads a clearly defined and relatively sheltered life. As Count L***'s mistress, she is subject to the whims of her lover and, finally, as mother of an infant, her actions are narrowly circumscribed by the needs of her child. Thus, out of consideration for her child, Sara must refrain from participating in the raging battles that take place on her very doorstep. During a scuffle, a servant prevails upon Sara, who is determined to help, to stay out of the fight by reminding her of her motherly duties:

Gnädige Frau, dort wird Blut vergossen, dort können Sie nicht helfen. — In dem nämlichen Augenblick tönte zufällig ein schallendes Geschrei die Straße herauf. Deßwegen muß ich hin! rief Sara, indem sie mit einer letzten Anstrengung ihrer Kräfte die Thüre aufriß. Thomas fiel von der gewaltsamen Bewegung die sie machte, nieder; aber indem sie über ihn weg eilen wollte, rief er noch einmal flehend: Und Ihr Kind, gnädige Frau? — Sara stand betroffen still und kehrte mit gerungenen Händen in das Zimmer zurück. Sie setzte sich wieder neben die Wiege und hob ihre trocknen, von Angst und Wachen geschwellenen Augen zum Himmel auf, den sie um Fassung und Muth anzuflehen schien. (2:97–98)

[Madame, blood is being spilled there, you cannot help — Coincidentally, at that very moment a loud scream could be heard up and down the street. That is why I must go there! Sara yelled as she flung the door open with her last bit of strength. Thomas fell down because of the violent movement she made, but as she wanted to hurry away, he shouted imploringly once more: And your child, Madame? — Sara stood quietly affected and turned back into the room with wrung hands. She sat down next to the cradle and raised her dry eyes, which were swollen from fear and wakefulness, towards the heavens, which she appeared to beg for composure and courage.]

After her child's death, Sara is independent for the first time. She no longer has to be considerate of anyone and can make her own decisions. Acting on her own needs and desires for the first time, she takes a remarkable step: she joins the Republicans and fights on their side. In doing so, she turns her previous life around 180 degrees, a political reorientation that she herself interprets as both her death and rebirth. Next to her child's corpse, she swears revenge:

Die Kleine hauchte ihren letzten Athem aus; Sara wartete eine Weile, stand betäubt, hielt ihr Herz mit beiden Händen fest und rief schaudervoll: nun er! Und dann — dann! — Wild klopfte sie in die Hände, und schlug ihre blizenden Augen aufwärts. (2:146)

[The little one exhaled her last breath; Sara waited a while, stood benumbed, firmly held her heart with both hands and cried shuddering: Now, he! And then — then! — She wildly pounded her fists and turned her gleaming eyes upwards.]

Shortly thereafter she joins the Republicans, who do not welcome women in their ranks and are rather startled by Sara's willingness to engage in combat:

Rache und Recht kennt und braucht auch das Weib, antwortete sie kalt; Rache und Recht geben mir allein noch Denkkraft — ich bleibe bei euch! — Eine hohe überfliegende Röthe vertilgte die angeborne Zartheit von ihren Zügen; kühn blickte ihr Auge; von ihrer Stirne fielen die dunkeln Loken zurück, indem sie ihr Haupt erhob, und den Arm drohend streckte, als faßte er einen Dolch. Die Männer standen betroffen. Thirion runzelte finsterner die Stirn: ein neues Opfer der Verräther! rief er aus. Was willst du aber unter uns? setzte er hinzu, indem er sich wieder zu ihr wandte; du bist Mutter. — Sara schauderte: Ich *war* Mutter! (2:147–8)

[A woman also knows and needs revenge and justice, she answered coldly; revenge and justice alone still give me the strength to think — I will stay with you! — A high-flying redness extinguished the natural tenderness from her features; her eyes gazed boldly; her dark curls fell back from her forehead as she raised her head and stretched her arm out menacingly as if she held a dagger. The men were taken aback. Thirion disapprovingly furrowed his brow: A new victim of the traitors! He shouted. What do you want among us? He added as he turned to her again; you are a mother. — Sara shuddered: I *was* a mother!]

Sara participates in conspiratorial meetings and in preparations for the September massacres. Here the female narrator, who throughout the first part appeared to be a rather conservative and casual observer, emerges as a political commentator:

In diesen höllischen Zusammenkünften wurde ein Theil der Gräuel verabredet, welche die ersten Tage des Septembers 1792, auf ewig zu den schwärzesten machen, die jemals die Jahrbücher der Freiheit geschändet haben. Sara ward bald in den Schreckensgeheimnissen eingeweiht, insoweit wenigstens Rache und blinder Fanatismus dabei mitwirkten; denn die noch verhaßteren, geheimen Triebfedern der Politik, der Herrschsucht, des Eigennuzes entgingen ihrem leidenschaftlichen Blick. (2:161–62)

[Some of the atrocities that forever transformed the first days of September 1792 into the darkest that ever disgraced the annals of freedom were arranged during these hellish gatherings. Soon Sara was inducted into the secrets of terror, at least insofar as revenge and blind fanaticism played a part; for the even more despicable secret driving forces of politics, tyranny, and self-interest escaped her passionate gaze.]

The narrative emphatically attempts to distinguish Sara from the other women on whose side she fights. One can hardly imagine a larger contrast than the one between Sara and these “furies” (2:163) and “entarteten Geschöpfen” (2:162; degenerate creatures):

So zeichnete ihr eingeborner Werth sie auch unter den Abarten ihres Geschlechts aus, mit denen ihr feindseliges Schicksal sie in diese unwürdige Gemeinschaft gebracht hatte; aber die nothwendige Rache der beleidigten Weiblichkeit blieb darum bei ihr nicht aus. (2:175)

[Thus, her innate worth distinguished her even amongst the deviants of her gender, in whose unworthy community her hostile destiny had forced her; but the necessary revenge of offended femininity was not lacking in her.]

This “necessary revenge” leads Sara right into the center of the “Reich des Schreckens” (2:173; realm of terror). She becomes a Medea figure, who, “groß und furchtbar” (2:173; large and terrible), fascinates and simultaneously repulses her environment.⁹

Disguised as a member of the National Guard, Sara even partakes in the King’s execution. Here too, the narrative seeks to engage readers by contrasting Sara’s subjective view, distorted by hatred and revenge, with a perspective that presents the King as a pitiable “Schlachtopfer der Politik” (political victim):

Das Thodesurteil über den König war gesprochen: kalte, menschenfeindliche Neugierde trieb sie an, sich als Nationalgarde verkleidet zu dem Dienst im Tempel zu drängen, um seine letzten Stunden zu beobachten. Die heldenmüthige Fassung, die einfache Güte, welche das ferne Europa an diesem Schlachtopfer der Politik bewundert hat,

schrumpften in ihrem bitteren Haß zur elenden Alltäglichkeit zusammen. (2:177)

[The death sentence was pronounced upon the King: cold, misanthropic curiosity goaded her on, disguised as a National Guardist, to rush to duty in the temple in order to observe his last hours. The heroic composure, the simple goodness that distant Europe had admired in this political victim shriveled in her bitter hatred to a miserable mundaneness.]

Sara's lack of empathy during the King's execution has narrative repercussions. Returning from the scaffold, she witnesses an argument between two neighbor children who react very differently to the King's death. While the boy waves the national flag and sings a war song (2:178), the little girl feels for the King's children, who are left behind as orphans (2:180). Upon being asked: "wenn nun unser Vater auch so fortgerissen und gerichtet würde?" (what if our father had been torn away and executed like that?), the boy replies: "Oh nie, nie! Er ist ein Patriot — er kann im Kriege fallen; aber dann weinen wir nicht, dann starb er für die Freiheit." (2:181; Oh never, never! He is a patriot — he can fall in war, but then we will not cry, since he died for freedom). In this scene, as in the entire novel, war and gender are tightly interwoven: The boy's patriotic view is contrasted with the little girl's humanistic view. The boy identifies with the victors and the girl with the victims, while the narrative endorses the girl's perspective.

The female perspective,¹⁰ which shapes the novel's narrative stance as well as its plot, is simultaneously limited and clear-sighted. It is limited in its political analysis, yet it is clear-sighted in its explication of the hidden motivations that drive political decisions and in its awareness of the so-called dark side of the male struggle for freedom. This clear-sightedness, however, does not prevent the female narrator from adopting masculine standards or endorsing traditional concepts of femininity. As I will show, the novel's treatment of the Amazon theme is a case in point.¹¹

Disguised as a man, Sara fights in the Republican Army. In this, she is joined by her friend Babet, whose acquaintance she made during a long illness. However, while Babet is motivated by love for her husband, Sara is driven solely by revenge. The female narrator appreciates the actions of the "muthige zärtliche" (2:206; courageous, affectionate) Babet, but accuses Sara of an "unnatürliche[r] Entschluß" (2:250; unnatural decision). Because of her courage and her combat readiness, Sara soon climbs the military hierarchy and is made into a "Captain" by her comrades:

Ihre Kameraden nannten sie anfangs den finstern Jungfernknecht, weil ihr schweigender Ernst bei ihrer unter Mannskleidern sehr jugendlich und zart scheinenden Gestalt, ihren Spott erregte. Aber

nach dem ersten Gefecht sagten sie ihren Offizieren, dieser Knabe müsse schon im Mutterleibe gefochten haben; er sehe den Kugeln nach als spielte er Federball. Und nun hieß Sara bald der tapfere Verrier; die schwärmenden Jünglinge bei der Armee verhiessen ihm Unsterblichkeit in den Jahrbüchern der Republik, und wenn er fiel, eine Stelle im Pantheon, und sie ward nach einem der blutigsten Tage auf dem Schlachtfeld selbst, von ihren Kameraden zum Rang ihres Kapitäns erhoben. (2:249)

[At first her comrades called her the somber maiden servant, because the silent earnestness of her figure, which appeared very youthful and dainty in men's clothes, aroused their scorn. But after the first skirmish they told their officers that this boy must have been fighting in his mother's womb; he looked upon bullets as if he were playing badminton. And Sara was soon called the brave Verrier; the enthusiastic youths in the army promised him immortality in the annals of the Republic and, if he fell, a position in the Pantheon, and, after one of the bloodiest days on the battlefield, she was promoted by her comrades to the rank of their captain.]

The narrative, however, does not view the heroine's military successes as positively as Sara's comrades. Sara not only transgresses against gender roles, her actions are motivated not by lofty political goals but by her personal agenda. For Sara, the war is a means to avenge herself on her unfaithful lover, L***:

Oft drang sie, Verderben verbreitend, ungestümmer vorwärts, weil sie dort sein weisses Roß sich bäumen zu sehen meinte; aber immer war es, als entzöge ihn eine Wolke ihrem Blick, sobald sie sich ihm näherte; und dann mischte sich ein Tropfen Wildheit in ihr kaltes Blut, und nicht mehr wie ein Todesengel, der mit höheren Befehlen gerüstet, die Sterblichen vernichtet, sondern mit der schrecklichen Feindseligkeit, die Menschenleben gegen eignes Elend aufwiegt, tödtete sie L*** in jedem bewaffneten Gegner. (2:251)

[She often pushed hastily forwards, spreading demise, because she thought she saw his white horse rearing there. It was always as if a cloud obscured her view of him as soon as she approached. And then a drop of ferociousness mixed in with her cold blood and, no longer like an angel of death, who annihilates mortals because of higher orders, but rather with the horrible hostility that weighs human lives against one's own suffering, she killed L*** in every armed opponent.]

As an "angel of death," Sara has become a perversion of woman's traditional maternal function as giver of life. A victim no longer, she now joins the ranks of the perpetrators. The indirect incorporation of the victim motif demonstrates that the narrative views Sara's military career with

extreme reserve. But Babet, whose cross-dressing is motivated by her role as faithful wife and lover, fares no better than Sara: she dies in the thick of combat together with her husband. Unlike Babet, Sara survives, but she is detached from her emotions and increasingly fights like a soulless death machine. She transforms from an Amazon back into a sister-figure only after she coincidentally meets her brother Theodor, whom she has long since believed to be dead. When she beholds Theodor, she faints, and her comrades, who hasten to help her, recognize that their captain is a woman. As the narrative notes, Sara resumes her previous feminine role effortlessly as if “mit der Entdeckung ihres Geschlechts dessen ganze Schwäche zurückgekehrt (wäre)” (2:290; all of her feminine weaknesses returned upon the discovery of her gender). She shoulders a new responsibility when she discovers the orphaned Hypolit, the son of the despised L*** and his lawful wife. As Hypolit’s adoptive mother, Sara does penance for her past life — the Amazon becomes a self-sacrificing mother. Therewith, the female narrator allows her protagonist to return voluntarily to a feminine role which, however, is restricted to motherly and sisterly elements. Sara feels nothing more than sisterly affection for her friend Roger, who is one of the few survivors of the massacre and in old faithfulness vies for her love at the end of the novel. Clearly, Sara’s capacity for love is permanently destroyed by her previous experience: a lover or wife no longer, she can only find the strength to go on as a mother and sister.

Throughout, the representation of the figure of the Amazon is marked by ambivalence. On the one hand the fighting woman is portrayed as an abomination of “feminine nature”; on the other hand the text remains critical of men’s endeavors to exclude women from the political sphere and reduce them to sweet playmates for leisurely moments. L***’s “Widerwillen gegen allen politischen Geist an Weibern” (2:70; disgust at all political spirit in women) is revealed as selfish resentment. L*** prefers an ignorant mistress because such ignorance implies that his lover will not only remain dependent on him but also fail to see through his political and moral double-crossings.

Just as L*** opposes political education for women, Sara’s father fulminated about Amazons in the beginning of the novel when he gave Theodor the following piece of advice:

Die Natur setzte die Vollkommenheit beider Geschlechter in der größten gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit, indem sie ihr die größte Verschiedenheit gab. Der feste, treue, eiserne Mann kann nur der sanftesten Weiblichkeit huldigen; Schwächlinge lieben Amazonen. Damit aber das Weib diesen Zauber ihres Geschlechts besitze, muß ihr Herz kindlich bleiben, wie gebildet auch ihr Verstand sey; und unsre Achtung allein kann das Zutrauen hervorbringen, welches diese Kindlichkeit hält. Fühlt das Weib nicht diesen Lohn seiner Liebenswürdigkeit, so sucht es sich von uns unabhängig zu machen,

und dann wird es verächtlich. Die Natur, die uns stärker machte als sie, verträgt diese Unabhängigkeit nicht; alsdann erniedrigen wir sie dafür, gewaltsam oder listig, zu unseren Sklavinnen, und pflanzen auch alle Laster des Sklavensinnes in ihre entartete Brust. Aus Händen, die wir nicht achten, können wir den Lohn nicht mehr empfangen, der nächst unserm Selbstgefühl der reinste Antrieb zur Tugend ist, und alle einfachen Bande des geselligen Lebens lösen sich auf. (1:26–27)

[Nature put the perfection of both genders in the greatest of mutual dependencies by endowing it with the greatest variety. A firm, loyal, and iron man can render homage only to the softest femininity; weaklings love Amazons. In order for a woman to possess this magic of her gender, her heart must remain childlike, however cultured her intellect may be; and only our esteem can bring forth the trust that maintains this childlike quality. If a woman does not feel this reward for her loveliness, then she will try to be independent from us, and then she will be despicable. Nature, which made us stronger than them, does not tolerate this independence. Therefore we debase them because of it, violently or with cunning, into being our slaves and also plant all the vices of a slave mentality in their degenerate breasts. We cannot receive reward from hands that we do not respect — a reward which, next to our self-esteem, is the purest impetus to virtue, and hence all simple ties of social life disintegrate.]

Seldorf's words are reminiscent of Humboldt's philosophical maxims about gender.¹² In the novel they function as a prophetic anticipation of Sara's later destiny, but the female narrator reduces the validity of Seldorf's opinions when she writes that the father taught his children very "abgezogene Begriffe" (1:27; abstract conceptions) of gender, which do not correspond to reality and therefore must be misleading. Moreover, given his history as a failed husband and absent father, Seldorf is by no means an authority upon which readers of either gender may rely.

Amazons in Fiction and Reality

I would like to conclude my article by expanding my discussion of the Amazon motif from a focus on its particular role in Huber's novel to an analysis of its striking presence in the context of the French Revolution and of literature around 1800 in general. Here, reality and fiction entered a dialectic rich in tensions.¹³ The French Revolution was not only a movement intent on the realization of bourgeois ideals of emancipation, but also a historical phase in which demands for female equality were formulated with a vehemence and a poignancy hitherto unknown. In 1791, Olympe de Gouges drafted a "Declaration of the Rights of Women," a

provocative complement to the “Declaration of the Rights of Man,” which purported to address all of mankind but in actuality promoted the rights of the male gender only. In Article I, Olympe de Gouges stated programmatically: “Woman is born free and lives equal to man in her rights.”¹⁴ Such audacious claims were apt to inspire fear, especially when forwarded with the kind of radical implacability that characterized de Gouges’ style. She even went so far as to publicly challenge Robespierre to a duel. In doing so, as in her demand for “sisterhood” in general — that is, for extending human rights to women as well as men — she ventured far beyond the realm of what was then possible. As her contemporaries responded to her ambitious agenda, de Gouges became the victim of a maliciously gleeful campaign of character assassination targeted at a woman who had “forgotten what behooves her gender.”¹⁵ She was guillotined in 1793 and erased from the collective memory in the following decades.

This was part of a larger process of repression that affected not only de Gouges but an entire group of women who fought for their rights in the context of the bourgeois revolution. Opposed by their contemporaries, these women were denounced as warrior women, emancipated women, abominable strumpets, or simply as ugly and presumptive — in short, as Amazons.¹⁶ And the denunciation was highly successful: Who among us today knows about the struggle of women during the French Revolution? Who recognizes the names Claire Lacombe and Théroigne de Méricourt? Who has heard of the legions of Amazons or of the Society of Revolutionary Republicans, a club whose membership was restricted to women? Who has read the demands of the prostitutes of the Palais Royal, who called for the equality of men and women? Who knows the petitions of the women of the Third Estate or the countless feminist brochures of the revolution?¹⁷

It is striking that the spirited women of the revolutionary era laid claim to the antique model of the Amazon with great self-confidence whereas their male contemporaries perceived the female fight as a threat to the realization of their own goals. The male response was as simple as it was ingenious. While real women were treated as a threat and, as the example of Olympe de Gouges shows, killed without further ado, fictional characters who possessed the same qualities were presented as virtuous. Thus, an historical threat was neutralized by reworking it on an ideological level.¹⁸ For example, in the festivals of the French Revolution the figure of the mother is joined by the equally central figure of the Amazon, the latter an embodiment of revolutionary virtue. The Amazon was often at the center of festivities during the numerous parades of the revolutionary era. However, to conclude that women assumed a position of equality with men in this elevated, symbolic function is a fallacy, as was soon to become evident. The figure of the Amazon celebrated femininity as an embodiment of abstract Republican virtue while simultaneously reducing women to (lifeless) statues. As Amazons, goddesses of liberty, equality, and reason,

they stabilized the collective identity of men. Women's relation to the Amazon figure was necessarily ambivalent, not only because it was frequently joined with the figure of the mother and thus reenacted a split that had always served to victimize women, but also because the Amazon figure had no corresponding manifestation in social reality; moreover, any attempts to establish social and political equality through women's clubs and Amazon legions were persecuted and repressed.

We gain insights into the tremendous anxiety stirred by the so-called Amazons of the revolutionary era when we analyze the sophisticated attempts to turn living Amazons into statues of goddesses and heroines, easily disposable, innocuous accessories in parades and on market squares, but also when we parse the numerous attempts to redefine gender relations and establish new gender roles. Such attempts were not limited to France, but took place in Germany as well — there with the distinct intention of preventing the spread of the revolution to the home country and thus avoiding scenarios in which “werden Weiber zu Hyänen / Und treiben mit Entsetzen Scherz” (women turn into hyenas and jest with horror), as Schiller, mindful of the revolution in the neighboring country, warned in his “Lied von der Glocke.”¹⁹

The figure of the Amazon was to reappear in numerous texts published after 1789. Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and Kleist's *Penthesilea* are but the most prominent examples. Therese Huber's Sara Seldorf sprang from the same complex of ideas that also gave birth to these female protagonists. However, unlike Johanna of Orleans and Penthesilea, she did not belong to some distant historic or mythic past, but was firmly situated in Huber's contemporary Germany. Her first name evokes Lessing's *Miss Sara Sampson*, but her warrior nature clearly sets her apart from Lessing's heroine. The virtuous femininity that Lessing imagined in his bourgeois tragedy could no longer function as a female role model in the changed context of war and revolution, even if Schiller and other authors undertook a determined effort to reintegrate their Amazon heroines into the discourse of female virtue. Therese Huber also attempted to defuse the Amazon figure by portraying Sara as a victim of external circumstances. However, as an Amazon of the pen — that is, a woman writer — she herself transgressed against precisely those normative ideals of femininity to which she submitted her heroine.

— *Translated by Kathryn Kincade*

Notes

¹ See Inge Stephan, “Die Debatte über die Beziehungen zwischen Literatur, Aufklärung und Revolution am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland,” in *Revolution und Demokratie in Geschichte und Literatur: Festschrift für Walter Grab*,

ed. Julius H. Schoeps and Immanuel Geiss (Duisburg: Walther Braun, 1979), 41–59.

² *Kunstepoche* is typically viewed as the literature between 1789 and around 1830, when art and creative artists enjoyed special prestige. See Inge Stephan, “Kunstepoche,” in *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 7th ed. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008), 182–230.

³ All citations in the text are taken from the reprint of Huber’s novel edited by Magdalena Heuser, who is also the commendable editor of Therese Huber’s letters. See Therese Huber, *Die Familie Seldorf*, vol. 1 of *Romane und Erzählungen*, ed. Magdalene Heuser; vol. 7 of *Frühe Frauenliteratur in Deutschland*, ed. Anita Runge (Hildesheim: Olms, 1989), and *Briefe, Bd. 1: 1774–1803*, ed. Magdalena Heuser with Corinna Bergmann-Törner, Diane Coleman-Brandt, Jutta Harmeyer, and Petra Wulbusch (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1999). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

⁴ In a letter to Caroline Carus (24 September 1802), Therese Huber encouraged her friend to become active as a writer and tell the history of the English Revolution, “in a female way from a completely feminine perspective” (*Briefe* 1, 374–75). In this context, Huber remembered her own novel about the French Revolution: “Dieser Familie Seldorf geschieht nicht die gebührende Ehre, es ist eine Fülle von Unglück, eine Haltung in der Gradation des Unglücks, die gewiß Schönheiten hat — außerdem so richtig im Costüm — der Styl hat Fehler — ich bin höchst lächerlich daß ich mich selbst recensire und lobe — aber Sara Seldorf ist meine Jugendfreundinn und wird Maklatur!!!” (Due honor is not paid to the Seldorf family, it is an abundance of misfortune, an attitude on the gradation of misfortune, which certainly has beauty — moreover, in full costume — the style has blemishes — I am entirely pathetic in reviewing and praising myself — but Sara Seldorf is my childhood friend and is becoming wastepaper!!!). The edition of Huber’s letters is designed to comprise 9 volumes; volumes 1, 2, 4, and 5 have already been completed and published (see www.briefaufgabe-huber.uni-osnabrück.de).

⁵ See Klaus Harprecht, *Georg Forster oder Die Liebe zur Welt. Eine Biographie* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1987). See also the movie *Treffen in Travers* (1988), by Michael Gwisdek, and Magdalene Heuser, Julia Klöppel, and Daniel Benedict, “Georg Forster und das Treffen in Travers: Literarischer und filmischer Zugriff auf einen Stoff aus der Zeit der Französischen Revolution,” *Das 18. Jahrhundert* 27.1 (2003): 110–21.

⁶ See Magdalene Heuser, Afterword to *Romane und Erzählungen*, by Therese Huber, 2 vols., ed. Magdalene Heuser (Hildesheim: Olms, 1989), 347–89.

⁷ For more on the difficulties of female authorship see Barbara Hahn, *Unter falschem Namen: Von der schwierigen Autorschaft von Frauen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991).

⁸ See Elisabeth Krimmer, who also provides an overview of older research on the topic, in “Female War Stories: Violence and Trauma in Works by Therese Huber and Caroline de la Motte-Fouque,” *Internationales Jahrbuch der Bettina-von-Arnim-Gesellschaft* 17 (2005): 123–35.

⁹ This Medea-perception alludes to the resoluteness with which Medea carries out her revenge. Although Sara is not a child murderess — this deed is “displaced” onto another figure — the novel’s insistent thematization of motherliness shows that Huber remains completely in the tradition of the Medea figure that Friedrich Maximilian Klinger put forth in his twin dramas *Medea in Korinth*/*Medea auf dem Kaukasus* (1786/90). See Inge Stephan, *Medea: Multimediale Karriere einer mythologischen Figur* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2006).

¹⁰ See endnote 4.

¹¹ See Elisabeth Krimmer, *In the Company of Men: Cross-Dressed Women around 1800* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 2004), as well as Heinz-Peter Preusser and Udo Franke-Penski, eds., *Amazonen — Kriegerische Frauen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2008).

¹² See Inge Stephan, “Gender als Kategorie in der Literaturwissenschaft,” *Zeitschrift für Germanistik* 1 (1999): 23–35.

¹³ See Maya Gerig, *Jenseits von Tugend und Empfindsamkeit: Gesellschaftspolitik im Frauenroman um 1800* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008). Gerig, however, focuses on infanticide and abortion, domestic violence, divorce, separation, and being single, whereas the immediate political context is introduced indirectly via her discussion of Theodor Gottlieb Hippel’s *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber* (1792).

¹⁴ Olympe de Gouges, *Schriften*, ed. Monika Dillier, Vera Mostowlansky, and Regula Wyss, trans. Vera Mostowlansky (Basel: Roter Stern, 1980), 48.

¹⁵ *Moniteur*, 18 November 1793 (qtd. on the cover of the de Gouges edition).

¹⁶ See Gouges, “Stimmen der Nachwelt,” in *Schriften*, 177–78.

¹⁷ See Viktoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff, ed., *Sklavin oder Bürgerin? Französische Revolution und Neue Weiblichkeit 1760–1830* (Frankfurt am Main: Jonas, 1989); Inge Baxmann, *Die Feste der Französischen Revolution: Inszenierung der Gesellschaft als Natur* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1989); and Katharina Rennhak and Virginia Richter, eds., *Revolution und Emanzipation: Geschlechterordnungen in Europa um 1800* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004).

¹⁸ See Silke Wenk, *Versteinerte Weiblichkeit: Allegorien in der Skulptur der Moderne* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1996), and Ivan Nagel, *Johann Heinrich Dannecker: Ariadne auf dem Panther: Zur Lage der Frau um 1800* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993).

¹⁹ Friedrich Schiller, *Gedichte*. Vol. 1 of *Sämtliche Werke in zehn Bänden*, ed. Hans-Günther Thalheim (Berlin: Insel, 2005), 488.

8: Angelica Kauffmann's War Heroes: (Not) Painting War in a Culture of Sensibility

Waltraud Maierhofer

THROUGHOUT THE TWENTIETH CENTURY female artists have represented wars both at home and abroad.¹ Käthe Kollwitz's print "Nie wieder Krieg" (1924, Never Again War) ranks among the most widely reproduced antiwar pieces. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to a number of important women artists in the Age of Enlightenment including the Italian and French painters Rosalba Carriera and Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun and the English sculptor Anne Seymour Damer, but engagement with war seems to be rare. In a letter from 6 June 1793 to Johann Heinrich Meyer (1755–1829), Angelica Kauffmann, one of the most prominent painters of her time and an active member of the international Roman artist community, casually defined the relation between art and war. In an ironic mode, she mentioned to Meyer, the Swiss art historian and painter in Weimar, that a mutual friend "theilt nun seine Zeit zwischen Mars und den Musen, die sich sonst nicht wohl zusammen schicken" (is now dividing his time between Mars and the Muses, two realms that do not normally mesh well).² The friend in question is none other than Johann Wolfgang Goethe, with whom the painter had become friends during his sojourn in Rome. The reference to Mars pertains to Goethe's participation in the military campaign in France and his presence at the siege of Mainz (14 April to 23 July 1793) as a companion and loyal subject of Duke Carl August of Weimar.

Mars and the Muses are indeed commonly perceived as mutually exclusive, since times of war are not conducive to a flourishing of the arts. The apodictic phrase cited above neatly summarizes Kauffmann's few extant comments about war and politics from the 1790s until her death in 1807.³ In the following, I analyze how Kauffmann addressed the subject of war in her works, focusing particularly on how she proposed to resolve the dichotomy set out in her letter. Angelica Kauffmann's skillful deployment of the style and culture of sensibility made her one of very few recognized and successful women artists prior to the twentieth century — so much that she became its celebrity and icon.⁴ Sensibility, which held femi-

ninity and the androgynous in high esteem, and the world of war would appear to exclude each other. But Kauffmann did not avoid the theme of war in her historical paintings, even though it was considered “masculine” in accordance with the contemporary gender dichotomy. Kauffmann was able to portray warfare because war was also a preeminent theme in the most popular sources used by her and other neoclassical painters: the epic poems of Homer and Virgil.

The eighteenth century encompassed both the Age of Enlightenment and early Romanticism. When Immanuel Kant so famously answered the question “What is Enlightenment?” in his 1784 essay as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,”⁵ a legal term, maturity, or legal adulthood, was at its center. Kant largely excluded women from his definition of “Enlightenment,” which emphasized the ability to think, speak, and act autonomously. In scholarship and teaching, the literary and artistic movement of sensibility was once considered a countermovement to reason. This position has since been reevaluated, and a more complementary understanding of the relationship between feeling and reason has contributed to an expanded theory of knowledge during the Age of Enlightenment.

Sensibility originated in philosophical and scientific writings such as John Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) and soon swept Europe. The movement encouraged all readers to think and feel for themselves. Sensibility’s heroes learn to listen to their own heart. They — men *and* women — are highly perceptive and richly emotional; they weep, faint, and feel weak. Moreover, their sensibility is portrayed as a virtue and a positive model for the audience. While Enlightenment discourse involved a predominantly masculine advocacy of reason, followers of Jean-Jacques Rousseau were proponents of imagination and “feminine” sensibility. Among eighteenth-century “experts” on war, even Friedrich Schiller made concessions to the taste of sensibility. He chose allegories not of war but of peace, including Mars with attributes of Peace. This choice is corroborated by the title images for the original almanac publication of his *Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs* (History of the Thirty-Years War; 1790–92) in the *Historischer Kalender für Damen* (Historical Calendar for Ladies). The publisher hoped this work would attract both female and male readers.⁶ In the culture of sensibility, even Mars could represent peace. In a print attributed to Angelica Kauffmann, the god of warfare even acts as peacemaker; it is titled “Mars Makes Peace Between Two Provinces.”⁷ Any understanding of “enlightened warfare” must take sensibility’s representation of war into careful consideration. In the gendered tension between these two discourses, Kauffmann’s works provide a crucial perspective on the relation between war and gender.

Kauffmann enlisted the culture of sensibility in order to transform gender roles radically. She represented war and its far-reaching effects not

by painting battle scenes but through her depiction of interior “battles,” scenes of emotional struggle and loss. Expanding the semantic possibilities of historical painting, she represented war-related experiences of women as heroic and revised the contemporary understanding of the male (war) hero as well. As a result, she feminized masculinity and connected women and war. The age of sensibility also saw a revolution in reading, not only in numbers of readers, especially female readers, and in the genres read, but in the way of reading. Reading novels was intensive, absorbing, and appealing to the readers’ own sensibility, provoking emotions, tears, written outpourings, and in the end a moral response. Translations of the classical epics made them accessible to middle-class and female readers. A number of baroque and eighteenth-century operas dramatized the stories. The *Iliad* was reportedly one of Kauffmann’s favorite pieces of literature.⁸

The highly regarded genre of history painting relied on textual sources ranging from the Bible and Greek and Roman literature to contemporary poetry. I base my central argument on the contemporary conviction that a sensible and aesthetically pleasurable reading of a painting required profound knowledge of the text. The eighteenth-century *ut pictura poesis* debate (“As is painting, so is poetry”) stressed the contrast between the verbal and visual arts: whereas language suited the expression of successive action, images better represented a single moment. A detailed comparison of text and visual interpretation will serve to demonstrate Kauffmann’s profound knowledge of the texts. More significantly, however, this comparison discloses the ways her interpretation often combined and condensed a series of moments, speech elements, or emotions of a textual narrative into a complex visual narrative that needs to be read in a particular order. This text-based approach toward several of her paintings on subjects derived from war epics reveals the deep conflict between love and war, which is experienced with equal intensity by men as well as by women. Kauffmann’s examples range from Classical epics and standard British historiography to eighteenth-century “national” epics, from the *Iliad* and *Aeneid* to the (fake) Scottish *Fingal* and the German *Hermann’s Battle*.

Homer’s Sentimental Revival in Eighteenth-Century England

In his English translation of Homer’s *Iliad*, Alexander Pope (1688–1744) gave the epic an air of sensibility. It was published in six volumes from 1715 to 1720. Toward the end of the century, the neoclassical draughtsman John Flaxman (1755–1826) illustrated the famous edition in the style of antique vase drawings (1795). The *Iliad*, which selectively depicts the ten-year-long Trojan War and is replete with bloody battle descriptions and

heroic death scenes, was an extremely popular and highly respected source of motifs in the canonical painting tradition.⁹ In his lectures on aesthetics (*Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, 1835–38), Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel would claim that the “heroic individual” was no longer possible in the “prosaic” or modern age, but belonged to the Greek epics.¹⁰

Eighteenth-century painters sought examples of heroism in classical literature and mythology, as did Kauffmann with much-admired results. She built on the “sentimental *Iliad*” as seen through the eyes of Gavin Hamilton (1723–98), the Scottish neoclassical history painter.¹¹ Hamilton’s preference for highly emotional scenes of departure and mourning, anticipation of and reaction to death in war, over depictions of battling armies, violent fights, and interfering gods was well known. His juxtaposition of emphatically mourning women and a dead warrior in several works is striking. Popularized in prints by the Italian engraver Domenico Cunego (1724–1803), these works were executed between 1760 and the 1780s. They — and Kauffmann’s first works with motifs from the *Iliad* in 1768 — heralded an important shift in the visual reception of the war epic.

The culture of sensibility had already developed a predilection for emotionally charged scenes of departure and lament. Of course, the impact of departure and death is heightened in times of war. Art historian Ellen Spickernagel has shown that Hamilton’s gendered reactions to the death of the hero presented a new model for gender roles in bourgeois culture, which required men to become soldiers willing to die for the state and women to accept and cope with the consequences.¹² The change to the traditional gender dichotomy consisted in the fact that now women were proclaimed heroic in their suffering of loss, and that sublime female mourning was considered a worthy subject of painting. Martin Myrone claims that the work of Hamilton in the early 1760s revolved around the reformation of the hero, a concept that also describes Kauffmann’s work.¹³

Kauffmann depicted several scenes from the *Iliad* that also inspired Hamilton’s work, some later than Hamilton, some earlier. She closely but selectively followed the literary sources and transposed the affective quality of dialogue to body language and to the composition of the figures in relation to each other. Yet Kauffmann did not completely share Hamilton’s view of sublime mourning as a feminine role. She did not restrict the endurance of loss to women, revising his “message” regarding the “masculine” values of war and its acceptance; rather, her representations of mourning and heroism are more complex with regard to gender. She includes women warriors or male mourners in her work.

To substantiate these claims, it is important to consult extensively the pertinent literary passages that Kauffmann chose to depict. Using several of her paintings on themes from the *Iliad* and other works on war as examples, this article will show that in Kauffmann’s work — as in Hamilton’s

— war is portrayed only indirectly, but — and here Kauffmann deviated from Hamilton — its impact does not divide the sexes, but unites them; both sexes share in the task of mourning the dead. Gender roles are shifting, and even the “heroes” and the Greek goddess of war demonstrate ambivalence about war and fighting.

The Human Side of War Heroes, or Love and War

Kauffmann created her most important works on the theme of war before the French Revolution. In contrast to the Polish engraver Daniel Chodowiecki (1726–1801), who depicted the wars of Frederick II and the Thirty Years’ War and was quite “willing to render the clichés of heroic battle,”¹⁴ or a century later Lady Elisabeth Butler (1846–1933), who became the leading British painter of military motives, Kauffmann never painted battle scenes or even armies. While battle scenes were a highly regarded motif of Baroque art, neoclassical painters focused instead on the death of war heroes. One groundbreaking work exemplifies this trend: the *Death of General James Wolfe* (1770), by Kauffmann’s contemporary and friend the American Quaker Benjamin West (1738–1820). Yet the absence of explicit battles from Kauffmann’s paintings does not imply that she avoided other important war-related motifs. The popular historical or mythological heroes Ulysses and Aeneas, as well as the Teutonic Arminius and the Briton Vortigern, appear again and again in her body of work.

Kauffmann was a founding member of the Royal Academy of Art in London and her four contributions to the first exhibit in 1768 were *Venus Shows Aeneas and Achates the Way to Carthage*, *Hector’s Departure from Andromache*, *Penelope Takes Ulysses’ Bow*, and *Ulysses Discovers Achilles among the Attendants of Deidamia* (all 1768, oil on canvas, Saltram Park, Devon). At first glance these paintings have nothing to do with war, but an eighteenth-century art connoisseur would have recognized that the depiction of a beautiful woman with quiver and sandal-leather straps is in fact Venus disguised as a huntress, as described in the beginning of Virgil’s *Aeneid*.¹⁵ In that same scene, Aeneas is identified by two spears with broad iron tips.¹⁶ In the second painting Hector can be recognized by the exceedingly long spear with a tip made of glistening bronze, and by a mighty crested helmet.¹⁷ In the third work, there is no doubt that the bow that the elegantly clad woman holds with a festive air belongs to Ulysses. These names draw us directly to the Trojan War and subsequent wars that prefaced the founding of the Roman Empire. They invoke the literary epics that vividly present battles, dying heroes, and brutal killings, as well as the consequences of war: abandoned families, decimated cities, funeral processions, and burials. Kauffmann singled out the human aspects of war, whose meaning transcends isolated historical events. She

chose precise moments capable of readily transcending the specific instance and transferring their meaning to many life stories: difficult decisions, departures, fears, expectations and hopes, suffering and sorrow. All of these motifs invite the sensitive viewer to respond emotionally to the painting, grow in his or her capacity for feeling, and thus become more virtuous.

Wendy Roworth has demonstrated that these paintings from the first Academy exhibit illustrate the conflict between love and war as experienced by men as well as women, an argument that this essay extends to include additional works.¹⁸ Kauffmann represents the conflict between personal life and war in a quiet, elegiac manner, avoiding pathos. In contrast to women's "soft grace" and feminine attributes, men's attributes — that is, weapons — are not in active use but rather indicate the "masculine public virtues of patriotism and courage" (Roworth, 48). Many of the heroes who fought for Troy never saw their wives and children again. Achilles and Hector killed many and then suffered gruesome deaths themselves. Ulysses joined the war effort with reluctance. Upon his long-deferred return, he found his home much altered; his son had grown, and even his exemplary wife, Penelope, was hesitant to believe his claim to be her husband.

Two paintings from Kauffmann's first extended trip to Italy, *Coriolanus Entreated by his Mother, Vettunia, and his Wife, Volumnia* and *Ulysses Brings Chryseis to Her Father* (both 1765, oil on canvas, Wrotham Park Collection) thematize the intersection of family and war by depicting episodes from Roman history and the *Iliad*.¹⁹ The general and legendary hero Caius Marcius Coriolanus (c. 489 BCE) had been banned from Rome and sought refuge with a nearby enemy people, the Volscians, whose army he then led against Rome. According to Plutarch's version of the Coriolanus story, wild confusion prevailed in Rome, and nobody dared to confront this enemy until Coriolanus' wife Volumnia, along with their two sons and his mother Vettunia, decided to plead with him to stop the attack.²⁰ Coriolanus did as they asked. Upon his return to the Volscians, he was supposedly executed as a traitor (4:201–11).

Roworth points out that this text was a popular classical "example of patriotism," motherly love, and the importance of family (33). Kauffmann chose to represent the moment when Coriolanus, dressed in armor and accompanied by two soldiers, is confronted with and stopped by an "army" of five women in attitudes of pleading and weeping. The men appear to have just stepped in from the left side of the image; the women form a stationary, solid group on the right, with Vettunia's raised hands at the very center of the composition, indicating nearly the shape of a heart. Overwhelmed with feelings, his left hand raised to his heart, Coriolanus listens as his mother speaks to him earnestly about motherly love and saving the fatherland, about honor and trust, and pleads for release from

hardship and misery. In Plutarch, Coriolanus ponders the importance of family ties:

Is it right to yield everything to wrath and resentment, but wrong to gratify a mother in such a prayer as this? Or is the remembrance of his wrongs becoming to a great man, while the remembrance, with reverence and honour, of the benefits which children have received from their parents is not the duty of a great and good man? (4:209)

The two women then throw themselves at his feet in a last effort to persuade him. Thus, family ties overpower plans for war. In Plutarch, Valeria and Volumnia are inspiring examples of women's bravery, dedication to the fatherland, and, not least of all, rhetoric persuasive enough to end war and bring peace.

The second painting, *Chryseis Reunited with Her Father, Chryse*, further emphasizes Kauffmann's engagement with the motif of family and war. At first glance it is a very similar composition with reversals in the details: a meeting between a man (this one older and in the pleading role, coming from the right, accompanied by a group of three concerned-looking men behind him) and a woman (young and in a more passive attitude, shadowed by two women). At the opening of Homer's *Iliad* (1.43) Agamemnon, the leader of the Greek army, steals Chryseis as his slave when they conquer Troy's allied island Chryse, makes her his concubine, and refuses to return her despite generous offers of ransom. Chryseis is the beautiful daughter of Chryses, a priest of Apollo. He pleads with Apollo for help, and Apollo looses the plague on the Greeks, which prompts the Greek princes to persuade Agamemnon to give the prisoner back, and Ulysses brings Chryseis to her father. Chryses then offers prayers and makes sacrifices, and the plague is removed. Her return prompts another main theme of the *Iliad*, as Agamemnon insists on receiving as compensation the young woman Briseis, who has been given as a prize of war to Achilles, thus severely angering Achilles.

In Homer's text only Ulysses and Chryses speak, while Chryseis remains silent. In Pope's translation the reunion scene reads as follows: "At this, the Sire embrac'd the Maid again, / So sadly lost, so lately sought in vain" (*Iliad*, 2.582–83). Kauffmann translates Chryseis' silence in the text into a receptive appearance, standing still, with downcast eyes and head and gestures fixed on herself, her left arm protecting her chest while Chryse has reached out to embrace her and steps closer. Her right arm is holding her coat; she is balanced in place, not returning her father's embrace and reach. Father and daughter are standing in the center of the painting; Ulysses is barely recognizable holding back another man in the background from the reunion. This composition is familiar from *Coriolanus and the Women*, the companion piece by Kauffmann, in which the confron-



Fig. 1. Hector Sends Paris into Battle (1770). Print by George Sigmund and Johann Gottlieb Facius after Angelica Kauffmann's painting of 1768 (Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz).

tation of soldier and mother is central. In both paintings, war tears the families asunder and is a force opposed to their own interests.

From Hector to Arminius and Vortigern: Heroic Gender Roles in Flux

Kauffmann repeatedly depicted the dialogue scene from the *Iliad* that expressly rebukes the retreat from war into private life, the realm of women (6.320–24). A further example of this focus is *Hector Sends Paris into Battle* (1770, oil on canvas, State Hermitage, St. Petersburg; different version c. 1770, oil on canvas, Bündner Kunstmuseum, Chur, see fig. 1). Looking for Paris, Hector finds him sitting with Helen and her maids. Fervently, he reminds Paris of what is at stake and the prize his fellow Trojans are paying. In Pope's translation, the core of his ardent rebuke reads:

For thee great Ilion's guardian heroes fall,
Till heaps of dead alone defend her wall,
For thee the Soldier bleeds, the Matron mourns,
And wasteful War in all its Fury burns.

Ungrateful Man! deserves not this thy Care,
 Our Troops to hearten, and our Toils to share?
 Rise, or behold the conqu'ring Flames ascend,
 And all the Phrygian Glories at an end. (6.404–17)

In the St. Petersburg version, Hector looks down on a mortified Paris and, with his left hand, points in an energetic, far-reaching gesture beyond the youth. Paris's gestures embody his imminent reply. He concedes that Hector, the "generous chief," is right, but defends himself, that he needed to mourn "Ilion's fate" in secret, claiming that after his retreat he feels war's agony even more deeply and is now ready for glory's "charms" (4.420–24). Revealing that Helen also calls him to arms, he concludes with his readiness to join the battle once more:

Conquest today my happier sword may bless,
 'Tis man's to fight, but heaven's to give success.
 But while I arm, contain thy ardent mind;
 Or go, and Paris shall not lag behind. (6.426–29)

In Kauffmann's interpretation, Paris does not seem to be so ready for war. In both versions Helen looks down at Paris and appears to reply to him. Her hands point to the working maids and (almost) touch Paris, as if she wanted to hold him back. In the *Iliad* Helen asks Hector to rest a little, but he answers as if "on fire" and only asks her to urge Paris on instead while he takes leave of his wife and child in a premonition of death:

This Time forbids to rest:
 The Trojan Bands, by hostile Fury prest,
 Demand their Hector, and his Arm require;
 The Combate urges, and my Soul's on fire.
 [...]
 This Day (perhaps the last that sees me here)
 Demands a parting Word, a tender Tear:
 This Day, some God who hates our Trojan Land
 May vanquish Hector by a Grecian Hand. (6.450–61)

Kauffmann's depiction of Hector follows the text very closely. His melancholic gaze expresses worry for his family, concern dampens his readiness for battle. His hand seems to point not only to the battle raging beyond the wall, but to his own fears that he must face along with the dreaded results of the war as told in the *Iliad*. Since Kauffmann executed this motif several times in slightly different compositions and expressions, it must have been important to her. In all of them, young Paris, with his soft features, sensuous lips, curly hair, and rich, gently draped clothing is the epitome of an androgynous male, an image that was widespread in eighteenth-century art



Fig. 2. Angelica Kauffmann, *Vortigern and Rowena*. Print by Thomas Ryder after A. Kauffmann's painting of 1769/70 (private collection).

and prominently theorized by the pioneering Hellenist Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768).²¹ Critics often cited *Hector Accuses Paris of Effeminacy*, a variation on the title, as an example of Kauffmann's inability to represent heroic masculinity.²² It is telling that the most frequently quoted source of this criticism is not an artist or scholarly art critic, but the diplomat and politician Helfrich Peter Sturz (1736–79), who may have been primarily concerned with maintaining differences between gender roles and between aristocratic and “bourgeois” art and taste.

Kauffmann did not restrict herself to representations of Greek and Roman wars. From among the sagas of the Germanic conquest of England she chose a love story that, in contrast to the *Iliad*, was meant to end a war, namely *Vortigern and Rowena* (or *Vortigern, King of Britain, Enamoured with Rowena at the Banquet of Hengist, the Saxon General*, 1769/70, oil on canvas, Saltram Park, Devon; drawing, chalk, white heightened, 1769/70, Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz, see fig. 2). In this work, Kauffmann makes another point about gender roles and war. In the year 450, the Saxon leader Hengist (–488?) entangled the lecherous chieftain Vortigern in a love story with the Saxon princess Rowena in order to break Vortigern's anti-Saxon resistance. *The History of England* (1743) by French historian Rapin de Thoyras (1661–1725) was a standard work that Kauffmann may have read. De Thoyras describes how Hengist used

his niece Rowena to protect his settlement in Britannia and how she perfectly played the role expected of her:

Hengist receives him with all the Respect due a great King, his Friend and Benefactor. A splendid and exquisite Entertainment is prepared for him, but nothing pleases the Royal Guest so much as the young Rowena, the greatest Beauty of her time. Hengist her Uncle [. . .] ordered her to place herself just before the King [. . .] Hengist perceiving with Joy the sudden Effect of Rowena's Charms on the King, [. . .] makes a Sign to his Niece, who immediately going to the Side-Board, fills a Gold Cup with Wine, and presents it on her Knees to the King, saying in her Language [. . .] Lord King, your Health. Whereupon, Rowena just putting the Cup to her Lips, presents it to the King, who taking it, rises up immediately and gives her a Salute.²³

For her composition, Kauffmann chose to capture this precise moment — before Rowena respectfully retreats, but when Vortigern already yearns for her. The source emphasizes the “fatal” significance of this episode for British history, and contemplates the dire consequences of seemingly unremarkable events (de Thoyras, 32). In this work as well as in the following example, she enlisted the semantics of sensibility in interpreting the role of women as a tool in politics. Rowena is able to help conquer a country and its leader by marriage instead of warfare, and she is more than a passive tool. Similarly, Queen Eleonora accompanies her husband on a crusade and with presence of mind and immediate action saves his life, motivated by her affection.

Like *Hector Sends Paris into Battle*, *Vortigern and Rowena* portrays an interruption of war and the intimate, emotional side of leaders. While the culture of sensibility favored the representation of female beauty for its own sake as a popular motif, here “feminine” charm is instrumentalized as a political tool. The source expressly states that Vortigern “imagines, he may reconcile Love and Policy” (de Thoyras, 32); as dowry, Vortigern gives Hengist the province of Kent and thus annoys the Britons. In a formal sense, too, Kauffmann represents gender balance in her composition. The reception is not a gathering of men with Rowena as the only female guest. An additional lady is sitting at the table, other elegant women present food in baskets, and another one bends over a vessel.

Kauffmann depicted yet another episode from the history of English warfare, *Eleonora Sucking Poison from the Wound of Her Husband, King Edward I* (1776, oil on canvas, private collection; see fig. 3).²⁴ This episode emphasizes the potential heroism of unassuming females during war. At the siege of Acre during the crusade of 1270 to 1273, Edward I, king of England from 1272 to 1307, was attacked with a poison knife. The painting depicts Eleonora, who accompanied Edward on the crusade, sucking the snake poison from his wound. In so doing, she saves his life and decidedly influences the course of the war. To the left soldiers are taking care of other wounded



Fig. 3. Eleonora Sucking Poison from the Wound of Her Husband, King Edward I. Print by William Wynne Ryland after A. Kauffmann's painting of 1776 (Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz).

men. It is not only Eleonora who practices the “feminine” role of helper; Kauffmann transfers the gendered attributes of healing to warriors as well.

The Death of the Hero: Mourning in the Culture of Sensibility

In 1784 Joseph II, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1765–90, born 1741), commissioned two paintings, indicating a preference for events from German history.²⁵ Once again Kauffmann did not depict battles, but scenes occurring shortly after a decisive battle in literary sources: one with the victorious hero in the center and, as the companion piece, a scene of mourning immediately following the death of a young man killed in battle. Both counter the dichotomization of male warrior and female mourner and offer a melancholic war hero and male mourners instead, gender roles in flux. Despite the wishes of the high patron, the latter stems from a classical epic, *Aeneas Mourning for Pallas*, also known as *Pallas, Evander's Son, Killed by Turnus* (1786, original destroyed in 1945 in Berlin; 1785 modello oil on canvas, Innsbruck, Tiroler Landesmuseum Ferdinandeum; see



Fig. 4. Aeneas Mourning for Pallas. Engraving by Franz Valentin Durmer after A. Kauffmann's painting of 1786 (Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz).

fig. 4). Pallas, son of Evander, was killed by Turnus, king of the Rutuli. The painting shows Pallas on his deathbed. There are also several women *and* men, including two guards with spears and soldiers with helmets, surrounding the dead, half-covered man in the center. Some wring their hands, cover their eyes, and tear their hair. They all mourn, gesturing wildly, for the young man who died on his first day of battle, as described in book 10 of Virgil's *Aeneid*. This visual interpretation aligns with the description in the next book of the *Aeneid*:

Servants gathered now, a large number of Trojans,
women of Troy, accustomed to grief, letting their hair down!
Indeed when Aeneas himself moved through the doorway
mourners beat their breasts and lifted a raucous
cry to the stars. The building groaned with their sorrow. (11.34–38)

At the foot of Pallas sits an old white-haired and white-bearded man engulfed in his grief, Pallas's teacher Achates. Aeneas, bare-headed (a servant to the lower left takes his helmet away, a shield lies on the floor), wearing armor under his blood-red coat, bends over Pallas from behind, supporting his head with one hand and with the other covering him with a shroud — a gift from Dido as we know from the text.

The painter closely followed her textual source of information. Her selection of this particular moment also engages the work of her contemporary Gavin Hamilton, who naturalized the relationship between mourning and women. Kauffmann, by contrast, chose to paint the passage in the text where Aeneas is crying and calling out aloud, recalling a promise he had given to the father of Pallas, imagining the father's hope and devastation, an extensive passage she condensed into his facial expression and body language:

Pitiful boy. Fortune came to me smiling;
 why did she envy your life, stop you from seeing
 our kingdom, from riding home to your father in triumph?
 [. . .]
 Joyless father, to see a son's heartrending death-march,
 not the return he hoped for, none of the triumph
 or great promise I made. (Virgil, 11.42–46, 49–55)

Kauffmann's representation of this important moment, Aeneas grieving for Pallas, in some ways resembles Hamilton's depiction of *Andromache Mourning the Death of Hector* (1762; engraved by Cunego 1764). Both Aeneas and Andromache bend over the dead hero in grief, surrounded by several mourners, most of them women. Hamilton emphasized the contrast of dead hero and suffering women of different ages; he claimed mourning as a "natural" expression of heroism for women (Spickernagel, 310). In Kauffmann's work, however, both dead hero and mourner are male and close to each other in more than one respect. Aeneas is frozen in an attitude of grief, not yet showing signs of future aggressive action. According to the text, he soon ceases to lament and begins to reflect on the "masculine" virtue of honor to indicate that the young man did not die in vain:

Still, these wounds are not shameful.
 Evander, you'll see no son run off like a coward
 for mere safety. You'll crave no vile death as a father. (11.55–57)

Unlike the text, Kauffmann does not develop the theme of military glory, but rather focuses on the "feminine" role of the grieving Aeneas.

Similarly, she portrayed Achilles, that bravest and most fearsome of war heroes, in a pose of mourning designed to elicit sympathy. Homer celebrated Achilles as "a god-like Hero [. . .] The bravest far that ever bore the Name" (*Iliad*, 18.73–74). While in England Kauffmann had already conceived of *Achilles Mourns for Patroclus* as an emotional and intimate scene, preserved in the engraving by William Wynne Ryland (1777; fig. 5). In this case, too, she transformed a small part of the text, namely Achilles' reaction to the sad news of Patroclus's death, the "Sad



Fig. 5. Achilles Mourns for Patroclus. Print by William Wynne Ryland, 1777 (Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz).

Tydings” (*Iliad*, 18.21). Again the extended translation by Pope, rich as it is in images, is closer to the painting’s “reading” than a modern translation:

A sudden Horror shot thro’ all the Chief,
 And wrapt his Senses in the cloud of Grief;
 Cast on the Ground, with furious Hands he ‘spread
 The scorching Ashes o’er his graceful Head;
 His purple Garments, and his golden Hairs,
 Those he deforms with Dust, and these he tears:
 On the hard Soil his groaning Breast he threw,
 And roll’d and grovel’d, as to Earth he grew. (18.25–32)

In this moment, Achilles is not the brave warrior, but rather a suffering human being who has lost his dearest companion. He is just as absorbed by grief as are the mourning women in the scene (according to the text, virgins taken captive by Patroclus and Achilles), who cry, beat their breasts, and faint (18.33–36).

A comparison to the work of yet another male contemporary highlights the sentimental focus and inward energy of Kauffmann’s painting.

Jacques-Louis David (1748–1825), who would become the “official” painter of the French Revolution and Napoleon, depicted the same subject as great uproar in the midst of battle, *Les Funérailles de Patrocle* (The Funeral Ceremony for Patroclus, 1778–79, National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin). He followed other passages in the *Iliad* that explicitly call for revenge. Similarly, another stunning depiction of mourning by Kauffmann, *Andromache and Hecuba Weeping over the Ashes of Hector* (1772), which also follows a description in the *Iliad* very closely, lends itself to a comparison with a famous pre-revolutionary work by David also from the *Iliad*: *La Douleur d’Andromaque* (Andromache Mourning Hector, 1783; Musée du Louvre, Paris). Both are very selective in the number of figures, depicting only Hector, Andromache, and the child, plus — in Kauffmann only — Hecuba. Like Hamilton, David contrasts the dead hero and the mourning woman in their vastly differing roles. In Kauffmann’s composition Hector’s wife, mother, and young son all share in one emotion, grief over his death, while Hector, bodiless and sexless, is present only in the urn, no longer the mightiest warrior in the Trojan army and an embodiment of war, but a silent reminder of the butchery of war. This representation suggests that Kauffmann found more significance in the history of human suffering that transcends both biological sex and gender roles than in the “great history” of battles. Both Kauffmann and David drew inspiration from the same work of literature, but the selection and resulting cultural or political messages are markedly different.

For the second painting commissioned by Joseph II, Kauffmann chose a motif from Klopstock’s prose drama *Hermanns Schlacht* (Hermann’s Battle, 1769), which was the first noteworthy dramatic work about Arminius (17/18 BCE–21 CE) and part of a trilogy including *Hermann und die Fürsten* (Hermann and the Princes, 1784) and *Hermanns Tod* (Hermann’s Death, 1787). Called Hermann in German, Arminius was the Cherusci chieftain who defeated a Roman army in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest and was “discovered” and celebrated in the eighteenth century as a “German” national hero. *Hermanns Schlacht* glorifies the heroic sense of freedom and the moral greatness of the Germanic people. In his foreword, Klopstock dedicated the play to Emperor Joseph II. Kauffmann’s painting is commonly referred to as *Hermann und Thusnelda* (Arminius and Thusnelda, original destroyed; 1786, model, oil on canvas, Tiroler Landesmuseum Ferdinandeum, Innsbruck; see fig. 6; drawing, 1786, Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz). Kauffmann locates her depiction in the Teutoburg Forest near the battlefield. Arminius/Hermann has just returned from the decisive battle, where he and his army killed Varus and 20,000 legionaries. In her husband’s account of Kauffmann’s works, *Memoria delle pitture* (Memorandum of Paintings), we find the following short description of this painting:



Fig. 6. Arminius and Thusnelda. Engraving by Franz Valentin Durmer after A. Kauffmann's painting of 1786 (Vorarlberger Landesmuseum Bregenz).

La disfatta di Quintillio Varro, cioè Erminio vittorioso che fa ritorno alle sue selve ove viene rincontrato dalla sua moglie ed altre donzelle qualli esultano di gioja le spargono da fiori d'inzanzi all'Eroe vittorioso che viene suguito da suoi soldati che portano le spoglie di Varro e le insegne delle aquile Romane. La sposa di Erminio semiprostrata avanti ad Esso e presenta una ghirlanda. L'Eroe sta animatto e comanda che siano riunite le spoglie di Varro — Il vecchio Bardo vicino ad un rustico altare apre le braccia per ringraziare le Dei della vittoria ottenuta e nella selva si vedono in distanza li soldati Romani progionieri.²⁶

[The defeat of Quintilius Varus and Arminius returning triumphantly to his woods where he is met by his wife and fair maidens who dancing with joy throw flowers to the victorious hero who is followed by his soldiers who are carrying Varus' booty and the ensigns of the Roman Eagles.] Arminius' wife kneels before him and presents him with a garland. The hero is animated with his triumph and gives orders for all Varus' booty to be put together. The old Bard standing next to a rustic altar raises his arms to thank the Gods for the Victory obtained and in the distance of the wood one sees the Roman prisoners.]²⁷

Strictly speaking, the painting shows not the “defeat of Quintilius Varus,” but the second part of the description, “Arminius triumphantly returning”:

Thusnelda decorates Arminius's spear with a laurel wreath; young girls dance in his presence as he returns; a bard sings a victory song to the gods. Here, too, the battle is omitted, relegated to the blurry presence of the captured Roman soldiers in the background of the painting.

As usual, Kauffmann depicted in one image a series of events that transpired over the course of time in the literary description, but — and this is significant — she left out details of the battle and its gruesome aftermath. The first “event” focuses on Thusnelda, who, having greeted Arminius, points out the shield of Varus. Kauffmann transposes her question into a gesture by Arminius. It initiates reports of the battle and exchanges with his subordinates:

THUSNELDA: (Sie setzt sich bei Hermann.) Was ist das für ein glänzender Schild dort, Hermann?

HERMANN: Das ist Varus' Schild.

THUSNELDA: Bring' ihn mir, Hauptmann! So groß, und hat doch nicht gerettet! (Sie legt ihn vor Hermann nieder.)

HERMANN: Brenno, die Götter haben es gut gemacht. Diese Schlacht war heiß, und sie dauerte.²⁸

[THUSNELDA: (She sits down next to Hermann) Hermann, what is that shield there that shines so?

HERMANN: That is Varus's shield.

THUSNELDA: Bring it to me, Captain! It's so large, and yet it couldn't save Varus. (She lays it down in front of Hermann.)

HERMANN: Brenno, the gods fashioned it well. This battle was hot, and it lasted a long time.]

Only later do Thusnelda and the other women sing the “victory song” (“Siegeslied,” Klopstock, 95) that culminates in these lines: “Empfang von Thusnelda den Kranz des heiligen Laubes, / Befreier deines Vaterlands!” (98; Receive from Thusnelda the Wreath of holy laurel, / Liberator of your fatherland!). Kauffmann does not represent any part of the dialogue in between, in which Hermann hears reports of the battle, gives orders to have the losers killed or enslaved, interrogates captured Romans, and, in rare cases, refrains from condemning them to death (see Klopstock, 89–95). Nor does she depict Hermann as a weary warrior marked by battle, but rather as a beautiful, even androgynous, young man, as though he were Apollo instructing the Muses in a pose featured in many other works.²⁹ Yet the painting also hints at the suffering that war brings: Arminius's outstretched hand points toward something that is not mentioned until later in Klopstock's text. He responds defensively to the “Siegeslied” (victory song), pointing out that the princes had fought just as bravely, that his father was even wounded. He dispatches one of the druids to bring medicine to him (Klopstock, 99). Arminius will soon learn

that his father has died, and in that very moment remember the earlier joy of victory captured in the painting:

Ach, Siegmar! Mein Vater Siegmar! Und tot lagst du schon damals hier, als ich mit allen Freuden des Sieges heraufkam? tot hier, als über Flavius das Todeslos nicht geworfen ward? Aber deines haben die Götter, um Wodan her versammelt, geworfen! [. . .] Wie starb mein Vater? Schweig! ich will es nicht hören. Ich halte seinen Anblick nicht mehr aus. Deckt ihn zu! (Klopstock, 103)

[Oh, Siegmar! Siegmar, my father! And were you already lying dead as I came here full of joy over the victory? Dead, here, while it was not Flavius's destiny to die? But your destiny was settled by the gods gathered here in the presence of Wotan! [. . .] How did my father meet his death? Don't answer! I do not want to know. I cannot look at him any longer. Cover him up!]

Death thus overshadows the joy of victory and tarnishes not only the women's happiness but also the victor's triumphant return from battle. During Kauffmann's time in England (1766–81), the central scenes of her historical paintings included a striking number of mythological or historical women *and* men who in departure anticipated loss (Andromache, Hector), waited for the return of husbands or sons (Penelope), or mourned the dead (Andromache and her son, Aeneas, and even Arminius).

Warrior Women and a Farewell to Arms

Kauffmann goes even further in transferring gender roles with regard to aggression and fighting. She depicted one Amazon warrior, Inibaca, from James Macpherson's *Poems of Ossian*. A literary sensation when it first appeared in 1761 (as *Fingal: An Ancient Epic Poem*), this work inspired Kauffmann to paint a scene where the text attributes "traits that are distinctly un-masculine" to the male character Trenmor, warrior and king of Moven.³⁰ In book 6 of *Fingal*, "mighty" Trenmor, "king of swords," is challenged by a youth in armor but refuses to wield his sword against a much younger man with "feeble" arms.³¹ The "fair-haired youth" then declares himself master of the bow and demands a dart contest without "that heavy mail of steel," that is, without armor. In preparation, he removes his "mail" first — and reveals his true sex: "He [Trenmor] saw the heaving of her breast. It was the sister of the king [Lonval]" (Macpherson, 351). Kauffmann's *Inibaca Discovering Herself to Trenmor*, also known as *The Power of Love* (1773, private collection; see fig. 7) depicts this moment of recognition and the effect on the warrior as described in the poem:³² "The spear dropt [*sic*] from the hand of Trenmor: he bent his red cheek to the ground. She was to him a beam of light that



Fig. 7. Inibaca Discovering Herself to Trenmor. Print by Thomas Burke after A. Kauffmann's painting, 1773 (private collection).

meets the sons of the cave, when they revisit the fields of the sun, and bend their aching eyes" (351). The cross-dressed Inibaca, still wearing a helmet, has cast off her armor (it rests in the background) and reveals almost bare, strikingly bright breasts and arms. Despite his armor, Kauffmann's Trenmor is another androgynous male. As Kozlowski points out, "anatomically, the bodies of Trenmor and Inibaca are virtually identical" (131). The warrior is clearly blushing. Shocked by the prospect of a female naked breast, he throws up his arms in surrender, trying to shield his eyes from its brightness. According to Myrone (159) and Kozlowski (131), critics found Trenmor weak and unmasculine.³³ Beyond her skills with spear and bow, her female body turns out to be Inibaca's true strength. In *Fingal*, Trenmor's story is ostensibly told at a feast for the army, as "the song of peace"; a custom always observed at the end of a war" (348). The painting implies the story's happy ending: Inibaca, who is in love with him, asks Trenmor for his help in escaping an unwanted suitor. Trenmor grants her



*Fig. 8. Angelica Kauffmann, Athena Putting on Armor. Detail
(c. 1765–68, private collection) oil on canvas.*

wish, the suitor does not reappear, and the king of Lochlin gives Inibaca to Trenmor. The warrior becomes a lover.

Kauffmann did not exclusively assign the role of lovers to women or the role of fighters to men. The concept of values in the culture of sensibility permitted the ascription of “feminine” roles to men, and Kauffmann also experimented with females in the “masculine” role of warrior. One of her early works portrays that powerful mythological figure Pallas Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, of household arts and crafts. With or against Mars, Athena was a goddess of war and repeatedly intervened in battles. The armed Pallas Athena, guardian of Athens and daughter of the powerful Jove, was a skilled military logician, known and feared for the heavy, strong, and significant lance she wielded to break long lines of heroes.³⁴ Kauffmann’s *Pallas Athene in Waffen* (Athena Putting on Armor, c. 1765–68, oil on canvas, private collection; fig. 8) portrays a gentle, elegantly clothed woman about to untie her dress.³⁵ She is already wearing a plumed helmet and looks wistfully at the breastplate that the maid presents like a baby swaddled in luxurious cloths. A winged Cupid at her side holds a shield and points to her. Her sword lies ready in front of her. She is pensive, as if contemplating the fighting implied by her armor. She appears

ambivalent, if not reluctant, about her role in battle, a woman destined for love, not war.

In the last example, the painter also drew on literature for inspiration, selecting a situation that allowed expansive emotional interpretation of the theme of gender roles and war. The following reading of Pallas Athena allows us to advance a more complicated transferability of gendered traits. Kauffmann may have relied on a passage in the *Iliad* that describes in detail Athena disrobing and donning her armor. Its details are recognizable in the composition: a delicate dress, decorated with flowers and other “Art,” fit for the Goddess of crafts, is about to fall to the floor; Her barely covered white breasts will soon be covered with “Jove’s Cuirass,” and his “horrid Shield” will hang over her shoulders (5.905, 909, 911). Its decoration tells the story of war:

Here all the Terrors of grim War appear,
Here rages Force, here tremble Flight and Fear,
Here storm’d Contention, and here Fury frown’d;
And the dire Orb Portentous Gorgon crown’d. (5.914–17)

The decoration on her helmet also refers to war, even if the painting cannot show the “hundred Armies on a hundred Plains” (5.921) that the text calls for. Athena herself, however, lacks “mighty Limbs” and “broad shoulders” (5.908, 911). According to this text, she puts on her armor because she is eager to join the battle, and she “burns to meet the War” (5.884). With her “Fury” burning, she defeats “Proud Tyrants,” overthrows “whole Hosts” and vast armies (5.924–25). We would not recognize this battle fever from Kauffmann’s representation of the young and beautiful, voluptuous, sensuous woman with soft features, painted in luxurious attire that exposes parts of her shining white breasts. The attributes and insignia of Athena’s power and standing — helmet, shield, breastplate, and sword — do not inspire “Flight and Fear” as described in the passage, but contradict her demeanor. Were it not for these attributes, she might well represent Venus with a waist-high, winged Cupid at her side, a popular constellation that Kauffmann used in several allegorical portraits. The slender breastplate accentuates the form of the breasts, her female sex; it could hardly be the aegis Homer describes as “Jove’s Cuirass,” with its frightening Gorgon’s head. The textual context of Kauffmann’s image implies death and destruction despite the absence of any dead warrior. Athena is contemplating the “sad Triumph for the mournful Field,” the anticipated death of many in battle. This Athena is not a fierce warrior with “mighty Limbs” and an “ample Breast” but an emotion-filled mourner, a role and attitude typical of the culture of sensibility. Kauffmann demonstrably innovated within this artistic tradition through her nuanced representation of gender and war.

Athena appears repeatedly in the *Iliad* as a goddess clad in armor, and in the *Odyssey* she protects Ulysses during his aimless wanderings. In Kauffmann's later works the Greek Athena became the Roman Minerva — congruent with eighteenth-century culture that worshipped her as the “goddess” of Enlightenment. The eighteenth century laid claim to Minerva as the goddess of intelligence, wisdom, and courage, and left the representation of war to Mars. In Kauffmann's late work, Minerva appears only as an attribute of a virtuous life dedicated to art, as in *A Lady with a Statue of Minerva* (c. 1775, The Tate Gallery, London); in the *Self-Portrait with a Bust of Minerva* (1781/85, Bündner Kunstmuseum, Chur); and in the portrait *Anna Amalia von Saxe-Weimar* (1789, whereabouts of original unknown, copy in Weimar, Klassik Stiftung Weimar). Minerva is represented not with a female body, but as a helmed bust watching over the painter and her patrons in several portraits. Kauffmann's early painting *Pallas Athena in Armor* may be read programmatically as Athena's farewell to arms.

A Farewell to Sentimental Heros

In early works Kauffmann experimented with the subject of Amazon warriors, and she did not disregard the decisive role Athena plays in the ancient stories. In many important works she depicted men prolonging departures or mourning longer than they do in the literary antecedents of these scenes. She did not need to represent warrior heroes on the battlefield. Rather, she enlisted the culture of sensibility and its affinity for tears in order to paint the most ambitious war-related scenes from history and literature, subjects otherwise judged to be “unfeminine” by critics and public alike. She even painted the powerful Achilles as a passive, pensive mourner and Aeneas bereaved by the death of young Pallas; even in her depiction of the triumphant Arminius returning from victory, she includes the hero's grief over the loss of his father.

Contemporary critics of Kauffmann's works, perhaps inspired by the spectacular success of a woman painter, argued that she was unable to portray masculinity and tragic “heroes” convincingly, especially the war heroes of classical mythology (cf. Roworth, 85). In all her paintings on war, Kauffmann transformed war heroes into heroes of feeling — an apparent contradiction in terms, but one that expressed exactly the core values and preferences of sentimental Classicism, its high esteem of sentiment and introspection. Often she chose to paint compositions after the death of the hero, scenes of mourning and lament. While choosing these motifs did not necessarily win the battle against thematic restrictions leveled against women artists, she did manage to create a niche in which she found exceptional success. The thematization of departure and mourning satisfied the contemporary public taste for sensibility, the personal taste of her patrons,

many of whom were women, and, to a certain extent, the taste of art critics.

Kauffmann shared these motifs with contemporary male painters, above all Gavin Hamilton and Jacques-Louis David, who favored a pathos-laden, even — especially David — aggressive, militant manner. Perhaps Kauffmann's early choice of "heroic" motifs, which brought her recognition as a painter of history, together with her refusal to be a court painter, contributed to the considerable protection she enjoyed in Rome during the Napoleonic Wars. However, sensibility's re-evaluation of heroic values did not last. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, with their revolts and wars, their emphasis on "manly valor" and other "masculine" values, ruptured the appreciation for emotion as an expression of humanity, the high esteem for traditionally feminine roles, and the androgynous found in the culture of sensibility.³⁶ Antonio Canova (1757–1822) sculpted a statue called *Napoleon as Mars* (1803–6, marble, Apsley House, London). Kauffmann admired this work of art and described it in a letter to a patron, Captain Robert Dalrymple, dated 19 April 1805, as a "beautiful statue, colossal with the spear in one hand and the globe with the figure of victory in the other. No encumbrance of drapery[,] nothing but the clamys as the antients [*sic*] used to represent their hero's [*sic*]" (Kauffmann, 269). She kept silent about the idea of Napoleon as personification of war.

By this time the reverence for martial values had largely replaced the culture of sensibility. Kauffmann spoke in an apolitical manner, and her celebrity protected her from total silence. She painted an allegory of *Peace with Plenty as Child* (1797, Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, Bregenz), and religious motifs dominate her late works. Allegory served the artist well. She had earlier supported and befriended enlightened and pro-revolutionary politicians such as Dominico Cirillo (1739–99), who was executed in the turmoil of the short Neapolitan republic. When Kauffmann died in 1807 in Rome, she was honored with a splendid funeral under the direction of Canova, and a biography followed, but her works were no longer held in high regard. During the nineteenth-century search for a national history and national heroes, her feminine heroes sank into obscurity, degraded to sentimental decorations.

Notes

A shorter version of this essay, "War and Peace: Angelica Kauffmann's Strategies for Painting War and Enduring the Napoleonic Wars," was presented in a session titled "Women and War" at the German Studies Association Conference in Seattle, Washington, in October 1996. The author also published a longer article in German on a related topic, entitled "Krieg und Frieden in Gemälden und Briefen Angelika Kauffmanns," *Jahrbuch des Vorarlberger Landesmuseumsvereins* (Bregenz, Austria) (1997): 87–107.

¹ See for example the major 2009 exhibition “Witness: Women War Artists,” at the Imperial War Museum North (Manchester, UK).

² Angelica Kauffmann, — *Mir träumte vor ein paar Nächten ich hätte Briefe von Ihnen empfangen*, — in *Gesammelte Briefe in den Originalsprachen*, ed. Waltraud Maierhofer (Lengwil: Libelle, 2001), 190. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the German are mine.

³ Kauffmann’s extant letters do not reveal any explicit strategies for continuing to work as an artist during times of war; see Waltraud Maierhofer, “Krieg und Frieden in Gemälden und Briefen Angelika Kauffmanns,” in *Jahrbuch des Vorarlberger Landesmuseumsvereins* (Bregenz, Austria, 1997), 87–107. They do, however, justify or sustain the picture of Kauffmann — one she herself helped to establish and spread — as a woman who was destined to be an exceptional artist and as such deserved special privileges. In all their brevity and reticence, her remarks are a plea for art in spite of war and destruction.

⁴ See Angelica Goodden, *Miss Angel: The Art and World of Angelica Kauffman, Eighteenth Century Icon* (London: Random House, 2006).

⁵ Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1996), 11.

⁶ See my analysis of the title images in Waltraud Maierhofer, *Hexen — Huren — Heldenweiber: Bilder des Weiblichen in Erzähltexten über den Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Literatur — Kultur — Geschlecht.)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), 101–12.

⁷ Trade 2009. I have not yet been able to see an original of the print.

⁸ The diplomat Peter Sturz, for example, testifies to this effect in his account of his sojourn in London in 1768, where Kauffmann was already a celebrity shortly after her arrival there; see Peter Helfrich Sturz, “Briefe, im Jahre 1768 auf einer Reise im Gefolge des Königs von Dänemark geschrieben,” in *Schriften* (Leipzig, 1779/82; repr. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1971), 32.

⁹ This has been examined and richly illustrated in the exhibition catalogue on “triumph and death of the hero”; see Ekkehard Mai and Anke Repp-Eckert, eds., *Triumph und Tod des Helden: Europäische Historienmalerei von Rubens bis Manet* (Milan and Cologne: Electa & Museen der Stadt Köln, 1987). The eighteenth century seems strikingly underrepresented in the important 2008 exhibition “Homer — The Myth of Troy in Literature and Art”; see Latacz, Joachim, Thierry Greub, et al., eds., *Homer — Der Mythos von Troja in Dichtung und Kunst* (Basel: Hirmer, 2008).

¹⁰ See chapter 2 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, vol. 1, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).

¹¹ See Lindsay Errington, “Gavin Hamilton’s Sentimental *Iliad*,” *The Burlington Magazine* 120 (1978): 11–13.

¹² See Ellen Spickernagel, “Groß in der Trauer: Die weibliche Klage um tote Helden in Historienbildern des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in *Sklavin oder Bürgerin? Französische Revolution und Neue Weiblichkeit 1760–1830*, ed. Victoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff (Marburg: Jonas, 1989), 308–24.

¹³ Martin Myrone, *Bodybuilding: Reforming Masculinities in British Art 1750–1810* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2005), 13. Further references appear in the text as Myrone and page number.

¹⁴ Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2008), 92.

¹⁵ “Tyrian girls customarily carry a quiver / and lace their calves high with violet bootstraps”; Virgil, *The Aeneid*, trans. Edward McCrorie (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1995), 1.336–37.

¹⁶ “Aeneas himself set out, joined by only Achates. / Each hand gripped a spear with its broad spearpoint of iron” (Virgil 1.312–13).

¹⁷ See Alexander Pope’s translation, *The Iliad of Homer*, ed. Maynard Mack, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1967; rpt. 1993): “A Spear the Hero bore of wondrous Strength, / Of full ten Cubits was the lance’s Length, / The steely Point with golden Ringlets join’d, / Before him brandish’d, at each Motion shin’d” (6.394–97). Astyanax is “scar’d at the dazzling Helm, and nodding Crest” (6.597).

¹⁸ See Wendy W. Roworth, ed., “History Paintings for Saltram,” in *Angelica Kauffmann: A Continental Artist in Georgian England* (London: Reaktion, 1992), 42–57.

¹⁹ See the illustrations in Roworth 33–35 (figs. 11 and 16).

²⁰ Plutarch, *Plutarch’s Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (1920; repr., London: William Heinemann, 1959), 4:187.

²¹ For a more extensive reading of this painting, see Roworth, 35; for an extensive discussion of Winckelmann’s aesthetic of androgyny, see Catriona MacLeod, *Embodying Ambiguity: Androgyny and Aesthetics from Winckelmann to Keller* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 1998).

²² See illustration 52 in Tobias G. Natter, ed., *Angelica Kauffman: A Woman of Immense Talent* (Ostfildern: Hatje-Cantz, 2007). Roworth no. 43 illustrates yet another version from 1770 with a slightly different composition: Paris sitting between Hector and Helen, turned away from Helen more than in the other 1770 version. In the Chur version the three protagonists form a triangle, with Paris sitting in front of Hector and looking up at him, but turning and gesturing to Helen. Hector’s outstretched arm points to his left, directing Paris’s gaze beyond himself.

²³ Paul Rapin de Thoyras, *The History of England*, trans. from French by Nicolas Tindal, Vol. 1 (London: John and Paul Knapton, 1743), 31–32.

²⁴ See illustrations in Roworth, no. 43, and Oscar Sandner, ed., *Hommage an Angelika Kauffmann*, Exhibition catalogue, no. 37 (Milano: Nuova Mazzotta, 1992).

²⁵ See Joseph II’s letter to Hrczan, 2 February 1784, quoted in Angelica Kauffmann, “*Mir träumte vor ein paar Nächten ich hätte Briefe von Ihnen empfangen*,” in *Gesammelte Briefe in den Originalsprachen*, ed. Waltraud Maierhofer (Lengwil: Libelle, 2001), 379.

²⁶ Carlo Knight, ed., *La "Memoria delle piture" di Angelica Kauffman* (Rome and London: Edizioni De Luca and Royal Academy, 1998), 37–38, no. 122.

²⁷ Translation by Victoria Manners and Georg Charles Williamson, *Angelica Kauffmann: Her Life and Her Works* (London: John Lane, 1924; repr. New York: Hacker Art Books, 1976), 151. A similar description is given in her memoirs, for which her brother-in-law Giuseppe Carlo Zucchi probably perused this list of paintings; see Giuseppe Carlo Zucchi, *Memorie istoriche di Maria Angelica Kauffmann Zucchi riguardanti l'arte della pittura da lei professata scritte da G.C.Z.*, ed. Helmut Swozilek (Bregenz: Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, 1999), 47 and 133.

²⁸ Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, "Hermanns Schlacht: Ein Bardiet für die Schaubühne," in *Klopstocks Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1888), 88.

²⁹ His build and posture share a remarkable resemblance with Kauffmann's drawing of the *Apollo of Belvedere* in her sketchbook (1760–65, Victoria and Albert Museum, London; see illustration no. 37 in Natter), only reversed: it is the right arm that is outstretched. That she tended to repeat herself was another common criticism against Kauffmann and the quality of her work.

³⁰ Lisa Kozlowski, "Terrible Women and Tender Men: A Study of Gender in Macpherson's *Ossian*," in *From Gaelic to Romantic: Ossianic Translations*, ed. Fiona J. Stafford and Howard Gaskill (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), 133.

³¹ James Macpherson, *The Poems of Ossian: To which are Prefixed a Preliminary Discourse and Dissertation on the era and Poems of Ossian*, ed. Hugh Blair (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, 1851), 350–51.

³² See Roworth illustration no. 30. Some earlier publications spell "Imbaca" (also the digital image project TRIARC of The University of Dublin, Trinity College, online at <http://hdl.handle.net/2262/19867>).

³³ See Martin Myrone, *Bodybuilding: Reforming Masculinities in British Art 1750–1810*, Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2005).

³⁴ Just before this passage, Athena is addressed as "Jove's great daughter and the queen of heaven" (*Iliad*, 5.879).

³⁵ See illustration no. 51 in Natter. The text states: "This is an exception among Kauffman's female figures, because her heroines are generally suffering, virtuous, and patiently passive." It is interesting to note that this work is one of relatively few by Kauffmann that seems to appeal to today's tastes — indicated by its availability as an art poster (*Pallas Athene in Waffen*, www.intofineart.com).

³⁶ Historian Karen Hagemann has published widely on the discourse of masculinity since the eighteenth century and the gendered fields of politics, the military, and war. For this context, her article on "manly valor" is especially relevant as it undertakes to rewrite the history of the Anti-Napoleonic wars, considering major changes in the construction of gender that took place at the same time. See Karen Hagemann, "Of 'Manly Valor' and 'German Honor': Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon," *Central European History* 30 (1997): 187–220.

9: Citizen-Soldiers: General Conscription in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Ute Frevert

ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPT OF the *soldat-citoyen* (citizen-soldier) originated in France, it has survived longer on the right bank of the Rhine than in its homeland. During the 1990s the French government distanced itself from the image of the *soldat-citoyen*, while Germany still adhered to a practice of general conscription, justifying the continuation of this policy not only with military arguments, but also with the rhetoric of politics and civil society: the “citizen in uniform” is still considered to be the pillar of democracy and civic spirit, even if he is currently under fierce attack.

This rhetoric draws on a long tradition, no different in France than it is in Germany or other countries in continental Europe. Since the late eighteenth century, European nations have adopted a model of conscription that assigns the duty of mandatory military service during peacetime to every male citizen. The draft’s greater longevity in Germany can be attributed in some measure to the fact that compulsory military service there was not a “child of democracy” (Theodor Heuss) but rather the creation of an authoritarian regime. In Germany, the integration of the draft into a democratic system did not occur until the period following the Second World War — and this applies only to West Germany. It is precisely the brevity of this success story that prevents the abolition of the draft, although there is a growing consensus that it has outlived its military, political, and social purposes.

In the following text I will outline the development of the draft’s fundamental features in Germany and locate it within the specific historical context. I am particularly interested in two aspects: the relationship between military service, citizenship, and civic spirit, and the significance of military service in the formation and stabilization of gender identities.

The Citizen as Soldier: A Revolutionary Concept

Although the idea that every male citizen is responsible for the defense of the fatherland may be traced back to antiquity, the concept of the citizen-soldier assumed new, more radical traits during the revolutionary period in France. For one thing, the term *citoyen* (citizen) was freed from some of its social restrictions and could potentially include all men, in contrast to the conditions of citizenship in Greece or Rome. Secondly, the figure of the *soldat-citoyen* was no longer limited to wartime. In order to defend the fatherland in the event of an emergency, citizens had to undergo thorough military training. Patriotic enthusiasm alone was not enough to keep the new mass armies fit for active service, and the more complicated the systems of weaponry, the more important proper training became for those who would use the new weapons. As a result, military service became deeply institutionalized and was legally established as a civic obligation even during peacetime.

These regulations by no means found favor at all times and in all places. Even in France, where revolutionary ardor eased some of the friction and where the Napoleonic campaigns garnered great approval, *conscription* still presented difficulties. Though *conscription* complied with the ideals of *égalité* and *fraternité* as they were anchored in the national constitution, the principle of *liberté* would be grossly violated if all young men were forced to perform military and wartime service. The concept of *remplacement* provided a loophole: any man who did not wish to perform his military service could recruit and compensate a substitute to take his place. Thus individual freedom remained unharmed, though it came at the expense of equality.¹

The development of the draft in Germany was similar in some respects and different in others. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, all German states instituted compulsory general conscription for men. The military successes of the French army in the wake of the Revolution and particularly under Napoleon's leadership exacerbated the urgent need for modernization in German military institutions. The states of the *Rheinbund* (Rhine Confederation) under Napoleon's protectorate adopted the French regulations more or less verbatim, and retained them until the late 1860s. But even these states relaxed the rigor of the draft through the sanctioning of substitutions. Prussia, which was, along with the Habsburg monarchy, the largest, most powerful, and populous state in the *Deutscher Bund* (German Confederation), however, opted for a different rendition of the draft. Prussia eliminated the possibility of substitution and in doing so behaved in an even more "Jacobin" manner than did revolutionary France.

Before this change in policy occurred, though, the reformers encountered serious opposition and objections. Initially, the ideas of military

reformers, such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, were ignored by the king, the secretary of the interior, the treasury secretary, or the secretary of trade. Conservative commissioned officers resented the thought that their profession would henceforth be open to commoners as much as they loathed the ensuing obligation to treat these new soldiers recruited from all social classes with respect. Similarly, the figure of the citizen-soldier unsettled the king because it would eliminate the traditional separation between the military and civil society. The military had previously existed as a self-contained class and was an exclusive instrument of the absolute monarch, who disposed over it as he saw fit. The new national rhetoric, which was connected with general compulsory service, called the status quo into question and endangered the king's monopoly on power. It is no wonder then that Friedrich Wilhelm III viewed the work of his military reformers with skepticism. Even though the military catastrophe of 1806, when the Napoleonic conscript forces brought the Prussian army to its knees, revealed the need for change, the new system was only meant to be administered in small doses, leaving the architecture of the Prussian state fundamentally unchanged.²

The military reformers, however, were not revolutionaries; they had studied the success of the French armies very carefully and were prepared to take this lesson into consideration for the design of Prussia's "rebirth." This went well beyond technical and tactical aspects. Above all, Scharnhorst and his colleagues strove to create a new spirit for the army. The military could no longer view itself as a separate class that treated civilians with arrogance and haughtiness. Rather, the army needed to reform its internal relations to such an extent that civilians would be willing to place their trust in it. Simply transforming every citizen into a soldier would not suffice if Germany were to succeed in creating a great and successful "national army" like the one in France: even the concept of the soldier itself needed to change and incorporate civil elements.

This transition began with the new war articles that were enacted in 1808. A response to the pressures from military reformers, these new provisions prohibited humiliating punishment and also stipulated the opening of the officer rank to every suitable soldier and sergeant. In principle, this measure rid the officer corps of their aristocratic privileges (though it would take a long time until this was actually put into practice). All of this occurred explicitly on the grounds of the imminent implementation of the draft, which would henceforth include higher classes.

The general legal regulation of the draft in Prussia began in 1814. It took the national revolt against the French occupation in 1813 to dispel external and internal opposition. After Napoleon's defeat, the obligation to limit the Prussian army to forty-two thousand soldiers no longer applied. At the same time, the military success eased the king's concerns, even if it did not entirely silence them. Friedrich Wilhelm III still found it

problematic to turn everyone into a soldier; the revolutionary origins of these concepts were not yet forgotten.

In Prussia there were also voices that considered civil emancipation, national liberation, and compulsory general conscription to be synonymous. In order to convince men to sacrifice their lives and health for king and fatherland, the government would have to “practically form an alliance with the nation.” This could take place in the form of a constitution that would enfranchise the citizens and limit the king’s powers. Scharnhorst’s colleague Neithardt von Gneisenau believed a “freer form” of the state was needed in order “to increase the devotion to the regents.” Only the “bürgerliche Freiheit der Nation” (civil liberty of the nation) would ultimately inspire the active patriotism that could guarantee the long-term survival of the monarchy.³

In this discourse, military and political participation represented the two sides of the same coin: only citizens who had a vested interest in state affairs could be convinced to defend the state with their own body. Again they turned to France where, as they believed, this link had been created by the Revolution and had yielded rich fruit for the military. However, one could also achieve the goal through reforms from the top down, and a “freie Verfassung” (free constitution) would not necessarily require a bloody struggle; rather it could come directly “from the throne” (Vaupel, 549–52).

Pressured by his reform appointees and officers, the Prussian king repeatedly promised a constitution. The social order of the Prussian state underwent a fundamental change when laws issued at the beginning of the nineteenth century led to the liberation of farmers, the freedom of trade, municipal autonomy, and the emancipation of the Jewish population. Military reforms and the implementation of the draft completed the task of modernization and dramatically restructured the army, the monarch’s pampered and closely guarded favorite child. Even with these changes, reform remained incomplete since it did not include a political emancipation of the citizens. Rights to political participation were not guaranteed until 1848, and the concept of the civilian soldier remained in a state of limbo. A citizen was allowed — or rather obligated — to become a soldier and assume the duty of defending the fatherland; however, he did not acquire political rights.

What beckoned instead was honor. The reformers did not consider military service a compulsory chore, but rather a duty of honor. In a stricter and more direct sense, honor meant serving and protecting the king. By wearing the uniform one could partake firsthand in the honor that the monarch embodied as the territorial lord and supreme commander. The soldiers, however, defended not merely the monarch, but also the fatherland. The latter was a creation of the monarchy only to a certain extent, even if the absolute ruler passed it off as such. It is no coincidence

that the term “nation” has joined that of “fatherland” since the late eighteenth century and has even occasionally sought to replace the latter. While the term “fatherland” alludes to both the natural and the royal father, the nation is constituted of the citizens themselves who, as soldiers, were thus obligated to defend their own honor.

This second interpretation, which resonated in the Prussian reform debates without ever becoming the dominant perspective, was further accentuated during the period of early liberalism. As early as 1816, Carl von Rotteck characterized the defense of the fatherland as “allgemeine gesellschaftliche Pflicht” (general social obligation) that every free citizen would naturally take upon himself.⁴ At the Hambach Festival, a gathering of liberal forces in 1832, speakers advocated the “allgemeine Bürgerbewaffnung” (general armament of citizens) as a condition and result of a free constitution. In addition, Carl Welcker, a representative from Baden, repeatedly and eloquently proposed a “Bürgerheer” (citizens’ army) during the 1830s, in which all young men should enlist.⁵ Their military service would be regarded as a requirement, as well as the culmination of constitutional citizenship (see Frevert, 115); military service put citizens in the position of defending their honor, rights, and liberties, and protecting these against despotic infringements.

Although it is not apparent at first glance, this is precisely the point where political and cultural arguments overlapped. The focus of these arguments was undoubtedly a conceptualization of political citizenship, where the rights to civil freedom and political participation were linked to the individual’s willingness to serve in the army. Such a notion of citizenship had been all but omnipresent since 1789. Naturally, its emancipatory thrust appealed to many contemporaries. Southern German liberals and democrats as well deemed it necessary to actively defend the recently won “constitutional freedom” against both internal and external enemies, even if this meant doing so at gunpoint. In contrast, the standing army, whose men were recruited from the lower social classes, now seemed unreliable since it could easily turn against the wealthy and incite “mob rule.” In order to avoid a potential revolt, the middle class would have to be fit to bear arms and acquire military skills. If they remained “non-combative” and “cowardly,” they would run the risk of being crushed between the forces of restoration and revolution.

Furthermore, the military curriculum appeared able to thwart another development that caused widespread anxiety. In their debates, the Prussian reformers had repeatedly referred to the fact that men — especially middle-class men — were being “degenerated” to a “verweichlichtes Geschlecht” (weakened sex). According to Ernst Moritz Arndt, who was born in 1769, a failed upbringing imbued his generation with “läppische und weibische Vergnügungen, Faulheit und Feigheit” (foolish and feminine pleasures, laziness and cowardice).⁶ Modernity’s “feinere und zahmere Sitte” (finer

and gentler customs), added Welcker, opened the floodgates for general “Verweichlichung, Kleinlichkeit, Schwächlichkeit und Feigheit” (Welcker, 589–607; effeminacy, pettiness, weakness, and cowardice). According to Welcker, oftentimes men could hardly be distinguished from women since they no longer possessed any gender-specific knowledge and skills (see Frevert, 25–26). In order to stop this perceived feminization and to restore the “höchsten Reiz der Männlichkeit” (Arndt, 31; highest charm of masculinity) to men, reputable pedagogues and politicians began recommending military training and a “martial education” in the early nineteenth century. Although they had markedly different opinions about the duration and location of the aforementioned training, southern German liberals and democrats were as convinced of its necessity as Prussian conservatives (Frevert, 113–22, 22–30).

Citizens between Resistance and Acceptance

In the following, I will investigate how citizens responded to this military curriculum and to the new obligation to defend the fatherland and fulfill military service. I will ask whether they embraced the revolutionary rhetoric of emancipation and masculinity or rejected it, referencing traditional customs and relations. As I will show, the whole picture is far more complex than these two options imply. First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between wartime and peacetime service. Many men did not object to participating in a brief military campaign. Several thousand university students, schoolboys, prospective clerks, and young merchants gladly enlisted for the war against Napoleon in 1813. Their motives varied: some were moved by the prospect of adventure, others wished to flee their fathers’ regimes or hoped to gain social and professional advantages. Even gender politics played a role. The war afforded young men an opportunity to present themselves as protectors of hearth and home. Women thanked them for this with special appreciation and various forms of support, which ranged from fundraisers to first aid. Successful warriors were welcomed back with a lavish homecoming festival. Those who had stayed at home celebrated the returning warriors as the “Befreier des Vaterlands” (liberators of the fatherland); the “patriotische(r) weibliche(r) Teil der Bevölkerung” (patriotic female part of the population) in particular, idolized them in every conceivable manner.⁷

Military service provided men with the opportunity to display behavior that was less suited to or even unwelcome in civilian life, and which also more clearly distinguished them from the opposite sex — especially behavior characterized by courage, valor, brawniness, and physical toughness, as well as the use of violence. The possession of lethal weapons distinguished not only soldiers from civilians but also men from women. The use of arms

was reserved exclusively for men, even in the armies of early modernity, which were unimaginable without soldiers' wives and daughters. Women were not considered capable of handling arms, and warfare fit the bill of a masculine profession par excellence.

Nothing changed during the 1813–15 Wars of Liberation, even though a few women managed to participate in the armed fight against the French troops. These warrior maidens came predominantly from military families and had to disguise themselves as men in order to take part in combat. Thus the fundamental division between armed men and unarmed women remained intact during the first modern mass wars. Social mobilization did include women, though it was in a different way and served a different function. Women formed clubs, they looked after military hospitals and first-aid gear, collected money, and knitted stockings for the men on the front. Men, especially young men, in contrast, set out to defend the fatherland with arms and rid it of Napoleon's troops.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, one clarification is necessary: most men participated because they were forced to do so. Just like the French *levée en masse* in 1793, the Prussian equivalent in 1813 was not a voluntary action, but rather a strictly enforced system. All males over the age of seventeen were obligated to participate either as recruits in the recently deployed militia or as soldiers in the conventional line army. This was equally valid for social groups that previously had no military obligations, including the residents of cities and commercial zones, members of certain professions, and property owners. In the eighteenth century, all these groups had benefited from the numerous exemptions, thus restricting the obligation of the nation's defense to small clusters of the rural lower class; in any case, enlisted foreigners comprised the bulk of the troops.

In 1813, the stroke of a pen lifted all of these exemptions — which caused great indignation and protest among those who were affected. Many fathers presented physicians' certificates documenting their sons' physical inability for military service. Then, in order to dispel any doubt about their patriotism, these fathers offered money. Numerous bourgeois citizens declared their willingness to replace their "weakling" sons with young "destitute, but big and strong" men, whom they promised to furnish with uniform and weaponry as well as financial support. These substitute soldiers came predominantly from artisan and agricultural milieus; they enlisted voluntarily, an action that offered them a variety of advantages. They could form their own military units or were quickly promoted to the rank of sergeant or even to officer status. After the war, positions in civil service awaited them.

The majority of men, however, attempted to escape the unpopular and dangerous duty. Desertion was commonplace. The national propaganda that circulated in pamphlets and newspapers called for a passionate

“Volkskrieg” (people’s war) and sought to instill patriotism. But it had no serious impact. Such propaganda only reached an urban and literate audience, and even there it did not meet with undivided approval.

Still there were others who were infected by the propaganda or had personal motives for enlisting in the army. The forty-year-old Ludwig von Vincke, for example, a high-ranking Prussian clerk, wanted to participate in the second campaign against Napoleon in 1815 because he was bored with his job. His thirty-six-year-old colleague Barthold Niebuhr also enlisted voluntarily, as did the much younger Friedrich and Gustav Harkort, who were the sons of a businessman. Niebuhr viewed this as a male initiatory experience. For young men around the age of twenty, military service was, as he wrote in 1808, “eine herrliche Probe; denn er stählt den Charakter, macht männlich und echtmenschlich” (a magnificent test; it steels the character, making you manly and truly human).⁸ Five years later, he jumped at the chance to enlist although he was no longer twenty and was professionally quite established by that time.

Niebuhr’s enthusiasm for “manly” wartime service ultimately did not change the fact that he was utterly dismissive about military duty, or what he denounced as “dumme[r] Friedensdienst” (Dietrich, 1:498; stupid peacetime service). When he discovered the Prussian plans for long-term, obligatory military service, he commented with the following words: “Adieu culture, adieu finances” (Dietrich, 1:477). Vincke could not see anything to be gained from conscription either and viewed it as the “Grab aller Kultur, der Wissenschaften und Gewerbe, der bürgerlichen Freiheit und aller menschlichen Glückseligkeit” (qtd. in Vaupel, 598; the grave of all culture, all science and commerce, civic freedom and every human joy). And even the young Friedrich Harkort returned from the glorious campaign to Paris with the feeling that he was out of place in his decommissioned regiment. Every day, he wrote his betrothed, “wird meine Abneigung gegen den Soldatenstand größer, denn der Friedenssoldat ist in meinen Augen eine unbedeutende Figur” (qtd. in Soeding, 2:529; my loathing for military life becomes greater; for in my eyes the peacetime soldier is really an inconsequential figure).

This attitude was widespread among the middle classes. Even the small group of men who accepted responsibility for the defense of the nation found military service during peacetime both excessive and objectionable. Even after the legalization of conscription in 1814, they sought to evade it as best they could — by collective complaints or individual excuses, even by attempting to bribe the recruiting officers. These men envied France and the southern German states whose lawmakers had permitted *remplacement*. There were voices within the Prussian administration that lobbied for the possibility of substitution in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Ultimately, however, the coalition of reformers who insisted on the “universality of the obligation” successfully achieved their objec-

tives. If the individual purchase of substitutions were permitted, so their argument went, military service would be reduced to a “Lohndienst” (wage service);⁹ it would appear to be a “burden and one far from honorable.” In order to upgrade the service to an “honorable obligation,” it had to be imposed on wealthy and educated men as well (Frevert, 18–20).

Despite massive counter-attacks from influential circles, this “tough” attitude could not be shaken. Any willingness to compromise extended only to how the *Ehrenpflicht* (honorable obligation) would actually be implemented. The law on wartime service of 1814 permitted young wealthy and educated men to serve only one year instead of the customary three (which was later reduced to two). However, this applied only if they enlisted voluntarily. Additionally, they were required to furnish their own provisions, which entailed great costs. As compensation for the latter, they could select their regiment, reside in private quarters and be promoted to *Landwehr* (enlisted army reserves) and reserve officer positions. A particular emblem on their uniforms distinguished them as a special group: as one-year volunteers who rose above the mass of the rank and file. Social differences therefore continued to play a role in the Prussian army. In principle, equality was enforced since no physically fit young man could escape the draft. Where, how, and for how long he had to do this service, however, depended on his economic status and educational background.

With this concession to the property owners and the highly educated, the military reformers of the early nineteenth century intended to subdue middle-class opposition and reach out to bourgeois men, who had traditionally been far removed from the military. The reformers’ calculations, however, were slow to bear fruit. In the first decades after the introduction of the draft, many bourgeois sons preferred to avoid the unloved obligation completely. Instead of voluntarily enlisting, they hoped they would be skipped during recruitment. Their fathers often helped with their connections, but even the military itself struggled with the one-year volunteers. Many of the officers and sergeants greatly preferred to work with normal recruits, who required no special consideration and could be treated more roughly.

It was difficult to overcome such mutually reinforcing biases. The Prussian state took a carrot-and-stick approach by offering both privileges and sanctions; however, original plans to arrest men who avoided the draft and to deprive them of their civil rights were not enforceable. Yet the king ordered local authorities to return civil rights to the plaintiff only after the latter had provided evidence of his appearance before the recruiting commission. The ordinance that required all government workers to have previously fulfilled their military duties moved in a similar direction. Those regulations promoted military service as a precondition of participation in communal and civic life and pressured bourgeois men to conform.

This pressure was less urgent in families whose male members had already voluntarily enlisted under the flag between 1813 and 1815 and had returned as freshly promoted *Landwehr* officers. In these circles, military service was generally held in high esteem. Many citizens, though by far not all, were pleased with their new military rank and as *Landwehr* officers enjoyed training new recruits, conducting military drills, and organizing veterans' associations. Even if they often complained about the arrogance of the (primarily aristocratic) line officers, and occasionally confronted this attitude with courage, they preserved a certain loyalty to the army and raised their sons accordingly. That did not change in the 1860s when the *Landwehr* was demobilized as an independent formation and replaced by a reserve army that was closely bound to the regular army. These measures fomented great political turmoil; however, they did not greatly impact the ambivalent relationship between the middle classes and the military.

In contrast, the experience of the so-called wars of unification had a much greater impact. Prussia's successful campaigns against Denmark in 1864 and against the Habsburg monarchy and its southern German Confederates in 1866, and above all the German war against France in 1870–71 all boosted enthusiasm for the military among the middle classes. Increasing numbers of middle-class youths fancied a military career — if not as a regular officer, then as a reserve officer, for which they trained during their one-year voluntary service. Yet far from all of the conscripts actually fulfilled their duty, since most were discharged as physically unfit. Whereas during the first half of the nineteenth century one would have welcomed, not resented, such a dismissal, in Imperial Germany such exclusions were frequently accepted with disappointment, a clear sign of the growing popularity of military service and the occupational options it entailed.

The Army between Exclusion and Inclusion: Jews, Women, and Social Democrats

In 1903, Victor Klemperer was completely devastated when the infantry regiment physician sent him back home due to inadequate chest measurements, in spite of Klemperer's voluntary enlistment. Like many young men of his generation, Klemperer was attracted to the military from an early age and had devotedly played with tin soldiers, but he also wanted to settle a score for his family. His two older brothers had been turned down after their medical examination; he himself had, to his great delight, passed the first physical inspection and was happy to be "nicht körperlich minderwertig" (not physically inferior). All the greater was his disappointment when it did not work out later.¹⁰

Klemperer came from a family of rabbis but he, like his brothers, had been baptized. If he had made it to the reserve officer position, he would have erased the blemish of his Jewish birth, of which the Imperial German society constantly reminded him. Additionally, his entrance into the military would have invalidated the prevalent stereotype of Jewish physical weakness and cowardliness. For Jewish men who found themselves confronted by growing anti-Semitism, military service held special meaning and played a key role in their political and gender identity. As early as the 1840s, Jews staged massive protests against the Prussian government's plans to absolve all Jewish men from compulsory military service. They continued to fight individually and collectively against exclusion and prejudices in Imperial Germany, which had legally guaranteed their civil emancipation, yet discriminated massively in the civil service sector.¹¹

There was widespread suspicion that Jews consciously shirked their military duties, thus proving their national untrustworthiness. These doubts provoked the infamous "Jewish Census" in the army in the middle of the war in 1916, despite the fact that two decades earlier several Jewish organizations provided statistics that invalidated these suspicions. Yet neither statistics nor logic could change the social and political preconditions that fostered these prejudices. Those who wished to segregate Jews from the nation-state as so-called inner enemies refused to be persuaded. Instead, they exploited the rhetorical nexus between military duty and citizenship in order to solidify their image of the enemy. Anyone who did not serve in the military thereby revealed his lack of regard for the fatherland and thus excluded himself from the national community.¹²

The connection between military and civic status could, however, be defined differently, and this also first occurred with reference to Jewish men. As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, high-ranking Prussian state officials suggested that military duty could be used for the purpose of the Jews' "civil improvement" and even possibly for their conversion (see Frevert, 65). This line of thought called upon the notion of the army as "allgemeine Bildungsschule der Nation" (general education of the nation),¹³ which was firmly established in Prussian legislation in 1814 (Frevert, 73). Although at that time education was conceived as preparation "für den Krieg" (for the war), the educational objectives gradually expanded in the following decades. The army increasingly distinguished itself as a social and political academy during the long period of peace from 1815 until 1914, interrupted only by brief campaigns in the 1860s as well as occasional domestic and colonial deployments. The military wanted to impart not only technical military skills, but also, in the words of the first minister of war, the "Tugenden des Staatsbürgers" (virtues of the citizen).¹⁴ Among these were unwavering loyalty to the king and civil obedience, as well as orderliness, cleanliness, punctuality, thrift, and self-discipline (Frevert, 73).

This curriculum was not restricted to the regular instructional hours during which officers trained their troops; rather, it permeated the entire “domestic service.” It included inspecting uniforms and equipment, physical cleanliness and deportment, and the exact execution of commands and orders. During their service, soldiers learned more than how to fire a weapon, how to handle a bayonet, or how to march in formation. They also learned to bathe daily, to change their undergarments regularly and to make use of medical services. Additionally, they had to clean and mend their uniforms, shine their boots, clean their lockers, and sweep the barracks. Even their extracurricular behavior was strictly regulated and was subjected to military surveillance.

Millions of young men went through this school. Although many conscripts did not actually serve and a large percentage — between 85 and 72 percent in the nineteenth century — was discharged as unfit, the army was a relatively inclusive organization. In the years before the First World War, 270,000 recruits moved into the barracks annually, where they remained for one to three years according to their rank and branch of service. During this time, their superiors disciplined and drilled them until they conformed to the ideal image of the soldier and citizen. Indeed, the military’s complex duty to educate, which was carried out unwillingly prior to 1848, enjoyed growing popularity in Imperial Germany. Many conservative officers who were loyal to the monarchy took this duty as an opportunity to improve and to heal a society “infected” by liberalism, democracy, and even socialism. The soldier they discharged back into society was loyal to the king, an efficient worker, and obedient to his superiors in the factories or at the estate. He also obeyed the laws of state and church. He established an orderly family and raised his children in the same spirit. And, of course, he did not vote for the social democrats.

Along with Jews, the social democrats appeared as an enemy par excellence: an enemy who trampled the principles valued by the officers. The stronger the Social Democratic Party (SPD) became after the 1890s, the more the army intensified its efforts to influence recruits against it. The impact of such indoctrination was nevertheless limited; it could not prevent the rise of the SPD as the party with the most members and strongest constituencies. Military service did not necessarily transform young men into opponents of the Socialists: many could apparently reconcile party membership with a loyalist attitude. In 1891 an observer from Saxony reported that old and young Social Democrats liked to reminisce about their service, told amusing stories about maneuvers, paraded their soldier photographs around and were proud of their regiments.¹⁵

Many men, especially those from the lower social classes, experienced their years in the military as a totally acceptable part of their lives. Even if they initially had the impression, as did the miner Franz Louis Fischer in 1875, that they would never get accustomed to a military lifestyle and

groaned under the drill, these problems soon diminished. With hindsight, Fischer described his second year of service as “the best of my life.”¹⁶ One knew the drill, had learned to get along with the sergeants, and could rattle the new recruits just as one had been rattled in the first year — and had an otherwise worry-free existence. For the time in the military was not only a preparation for future life as a citizen, as the authorities had wished, but also, in some cases, the exact opposite. Military service cultivated dependence since soldiers were not allowed to make independent decisions. As long as soldiers obeyed the rules they did not have to worry about a thing: they received regular pay as well as room and board and clothing. Accordingly, many recruits perceived military service as a moratorium on their growing-up, as the conclusion of their youth, a time of camaraderie among young men, of maneuver romanticism, and of sexual initiation during joint brothel visits.

However, military experience comprised far more than such adventures. In particular it also included less pleasant aspects: strict discipline, subjugation to draconian exercises, an abrasive tone, which could intensify into brutality. Abuse was a daily occurrence and frequently targeted those who were clumsy or who otherwise piqued the anger of their superiors. The physical demands were extensive, and many recruits proved to be no match. The military sold this as masculinity training and many soldiers later recited this credo. The journeyman Michael Schwab, for example, wrote that the military had turned him into a “Staatsbürger und ganze[r] Mann” (citizen and real man);¹⁷ the author Ludwig Goldstein asserted that military service was “für mich weichen, ja weichlichen Kerl besonders nützlich und notwendig” (useful and necessary for me, a mellow, yes, soft fellow).¹⁸ The philosophy professor Friedrich Paulsen, who served from 1871 to 1872, called the army the “Schule der Männlichkeit” (school of masculinity) and was proud all of his life to have completed the military curriculum (see Frevert, 170–82).

Yet the military was by no means the only “school” in which masculinity was learned and taught. The professional world, but also family upbringing, confronted young men (and women) with very specific images of their respective roles and responsibilities. Also, the ever-diversifying youth culture including sports clubs provided models for gender-specific behavior and orientation. Still there is some evidence that military service became increasingly important in the formation of masculine “gender character.” This is partly due to the military’s growing attractiveness — it enjoyed a very high social reputation in Imperial Germany. Additionally, the recruiting principle which combined gender-based exclusion and social inclusion enhanced the meaning of gender as a clear social category. The exclusion of women was a general principle enforced without exception. Women were not even tolerated as wives or daughters in the modern military. In the armies of the eighteenth century, the figure of the married

soldier was a matter of course; by contrast the soldiers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had to be unmarried, as the state strictly refused to assume financial responsibility for soldiers' families. Women as combatants, still a possibility in the Napoleonic Wars of Liberation, were no longer fathomable one century later. If memorials were dedicated to these women warriors, they were not meant as a call to follow in their footsteps, but rather to remind men to prove themselves worthy of their masculine duty and to prevent women from having to fight in their place.

References to women's inability to carry arms were ubiquitous in political discourse; they conditioned women's collective exclusion from politics and also clearly revealed to men the complex and exceedingly flattering consequences of their military service. Women, so they said, could not claim any political rights, because they did not serve in the military and did not defend the fatherland. Men, on the other hand, were entitled to these rights because they were subject to military service *qua* gender, even if the majority did not actively serve. Up until 1918, women's organizations protested futilely against this exclusionary argument, which profiled the military service as a masculine duty and a cornerstone of gender identity.

Finally, for those men who did perform this duty, it was in many respects a gender-specific school. Military service not only taught them to function without women and even to carry out typical women's work — cleaning, washing, and sewing; they also learned to accept men from various regions, confessions, and social backgrounds and to feel at home in this new nationally defined “family” (Frevert, 182–200). Millions of soldiers extended this camaraderie beyond the end of their service by joining veterans' associations. In doing so, they announced their claims to national belonging and social integration, but also their desire to maintain the brotherhood-in-arms that was formed in the military.¹⁹

The veterans' associations played a significant role in staging this community with highly symbolic acts. The members of the associations formed honor guards at each other's weddings; after a member's death they accompanied the casket to the cemetery, presented arms, and gave one last “honorary gun salute.” Military comrades were even present at intimate family events. Their unit's uniform identified them as members of a community and distinguished them from everyone who did not wear this uniform and therefore did not belong. Greater still was the weapons' symbolic character: weapons positioned their bearers in a direct relation to the state which monopolized the use of force and, as politician and historian Heinrich von Treitschke formulated, differentiated itself from all other communities “im Recht der Waffen” (through the right of weapons).²⁰ This direct relationship was never accessible to women; they were not allowed to bear arms, rather they needed masculine protection (Frevert, 210).

Trends during the Twentieth Century

The distinguishing function of the military ended in 1919. The Treaty of Versailles forbade general conscription in Germany, reduced the army to one hundred thousand men, and converted it into a professional army resembling the British model. The military as a school of the nation and of masculinity was obsolete — at least for the generation born between 1900 and the First World War. However, the “old comrades” of the veterans’ associations continued to enjoy, though unarmed, their masculine camaraderie. In this they were joined by new, politically segregated veterans’ associations, formed in the aftermath of the Great War. Although originally designated only for men with experience on the front, they soon began recruiting new, younger members. Athletic defense drills, marches, and flag parades attracted many young men who demonstrated a “Bekenntnis zur Kraft und zur Männlichkeit” (commitment to strength and masculinity) in the paramilitary organizations. However, one should not overestimate such trends toward militarization. The vast majority of male youths who joined clubs in the Weimar Republic organized themselves in sports and soccer clubs, not in the *Stahlhelm* (a paramilitary veterans’ association named after the steel helmets worn in the First World War) or the SA (*Sturmabteilung*). The masculine ideal was no longer represented by the soldier, but rather by the athlete.²¹

But the National Socialists would soon change this. As Hitler announced in his political manifesto *Mein Kampf* in 1925, a man should be raised as a soldier from early infancy, in school just as in youth organizations and in the *Arbeitsdienst* (Labor Service). In 1935, Hitler reintroduced general conscription and sent the first generation back into the barracks. Von Blomberg, Secretary of Defense (*Reichswehrminister*) pointed out “daß das deutsche Volk in der Wehrpflicht stets die durch nichts zu ersetzende *Schule der Nation* gesehen hat, die Schule der Disziplin, der Kameradschaft und der praktischen Volksgemeinschaft” (that the German people always saw in general conscription the irreplaceable *school of the nation*, the school of discipline, of camaraderie, and of the practical national community). To attend this school was again viewed as *Ehrendienst* (privileged service) which “every German man” should fulfill — and for the first time under the same conditions. The privileging of the well-educated and property-owning one-year volunteers was no longer allowed in the *Wehrmacht*. All soldiers served for the same amount of time and, in principle, with equal opportunities for advancement.²²

Because the *Wehrmacht* no longer permitted class privileges, it attempted to embody the national socialist ideal of a “national community” (*Volksgemeinschaft*). At the same time the *Wehrmacht* introduced a new distinction: race. Only men of “Aryan heritage” could become soldiers; Jews were excluded from military combat and service. Despite pro-

tests from Jewish organizations, this exclusion also functioned retroactively; consequently, all veterans' associations dissociated themselves from their Jewish members. Even before the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 decreed the exclusion of Jews from the right to hold German citizenship, the *Wehrgesetz* (Army Law) predated this act in an area that had been an important icon of civil integration and participation for Jewish men since the early nineteenth century.²³

As the racial boundaries of the military "national community" (*Volkgemeinschaft*) were radically redrawn, the war allowed for increased permeability of gender categories. The high command of the *Wehrmacht* affirmed in 1942 that "sich der 'weibliche Soldat' nicht mit unserer nationalsozialistischen Auffassung vom Frauentum verträgt" (the "female soldier" does not conform to our national socialist conception of womanhood).²⁴ But women were at least employed as assistants of the *Wehrmacht* during their obligatory stint in the Labor Service since 1941, and they were also deployed in hospitals and in the office and telephone services. They even served with the antiaircraft units, but up until the end they could only be called upon to volunteer "zur Bedienung von Feuerwaffen im Kampf gegen den Feind" (for the handling of firearms in the battle against the enemy).²⁵

This principle remained unshaken after 1945. As both German states, founded four years after the collapse of the "Third Reich," established national armed forces in the 1950s, they assumed as a matter of course that the personnel would consist primarily of men. However, enlisting in the Federal Defense Force (*Bundeswehr*) or the National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*) remained open to women on a voluntary basis. Here women found a wide occupational field as telephone operators and secretaries. In the 1970s they could even become officers, though only with the musical and medical corps. Women were still not allowed to perform armed service, even if they explicitly expressed the desire to do so.²⁶

An intervention of the European Court of Justice first lifted this ban in 2000. The ban itself mirrored a nineteenth-century mentality that conceptualized women as the unarmed and men as the armed gender. Even the regulations of general conscription, introduced in the Federal Republic in 1956 and in the German Democratic Republic in 1962, conformed to this tradition. Neither the East nor West German government departed from the principle of imposing such a duty only on men. Military service remained a male domain and remains one until the present day — despite progress in other areas.

However, there have been significant changes in the social and political context in which military duty is performed. The image of soldiers became much more tarnished after 1945 than it had been after World War I. This was due only in part to violent war experiences; even more crucial were the socio-cultural changes that began in the 1950s.

Increasing prosperity provided the material basis that allowed large portions of the population to develop new values. The growing popularity of the *Zivildienst* (civilian service) in the Federal Republic was a clear sign of this development. Since the right to conscientious objection was written into the Basic Law in 1949 and the parliament prescribed “alternate civilian service” (*Ersatzdienst*) for such cases in 1956, civilian service has grown more attractive since the late 1960s. Today, civilian servants and soldiers are roughly equal in numbers. Although they were initially denigrated as shirkers and cowards, the so-called “*Zivis*” have since earned a good reputation. The service they perform for society in hospitals, nursing homes, and through their work with disabled people is generally respected and regarded as at least equally valuable. *Zivis* are in no way viewed as less masculine because they perform “feminine” tasks instead of “masculine” armed service. This, too, indicates that the military has not reclaimed its former position as the hegemonic “school of masculinity.”

As the “school of the nation” and of civic spirit, the military has also run its course. Even when the concept of the “citizen in uniform” was created in the 1950s — with direct reference to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau — the priority of the citizen over the wearer of the uniform was to be protected at all costs. In this sense, military service was regarded as a civic duty, though in no way as a prominent method of educating male citizens to achieve political maturity and identification with the nation. The right to fulfill one’s civic duty in civilian institutions further underscores the political “disempowerment” of the military service. One’s willingness to defend the nation in the military is no longer regarded as the dominant or even the exclusive arena of civic spirit.

The obligation of all young men to serve the state, whether in the military or civilian service, is still upheld in Germany. Whether this duty is still relevant in our modern context and whether it should be implemented on gendered grounds remains an open question; — a question that should be the focus of a political discussion that goes beyond the scope of this historical outline.

— Translated by Kathryn Kincade

Notes

¹ See Maurice Vaisse, ed., *Aux armes, citoyens! Conscription et armée de métier des Grecs à nos jours* (Paris: Colin, 1998), 97–130; and Peter Paret, *Understanding War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992), 53–74.

² See Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945* (London: Oxford UP, 1964); see also Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany*,

Military Conscription and Civil Society, trans. Andrew Boreham with Daniel Brückenhaus (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 10–14.

³ Quoted in Rudolf Vaupel, ed., *Die Reorganisation des preussischen Staates unter Stein und Hardenberg* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1938), 2.1:552. Translations are from my *A Nation in Barracks* and modified by Kathryn Kincade.

⁴ Karl von Rotteck, *Stehende Heere und Nationalmiliz* (Freiburg: Herdersche Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1816), 136.

⁵ Carl Welcker, “Anhang zum Artikel Heerwesen (Landwehresystem),” in *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. Carl von Rotteck and Carl Welcker (Altona: Johann Friedrich Hammerich, 1839), 7:589–607.

⁶ Ernst Moritz Arndt, *Grundlinien einer deutschen Kriegsordnung* (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1813), 23.

⁷ Ellen Soeding, *Die Harkorts* (Münster, 1957), 2:498; Louis Berger, *Der alte Harkort* (Leipzig: Baedeker, 1895), 119; see also Karen Hagemann, “Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens” (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002).

⁸ Gerhard Dietrich and William Norvin, eds., *Die Briefe des Barthold Georg Niebuhr* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1926), 2:376–85.

⁹ Johann August Sack to Hardenberg, 1 January 1811, *Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin Dahlem*, Rep. 74, O.O. nr. 4, vol. 1.

¹⁰ Victor Klemperer, *Curriculum Vitae. Jugend um 1900* (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), 1:348.

¹¹ See Horst Fischer, *Judentum, Staat und Heer in Preußen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen: C. B. Mohr, 1968).

¹² See Werner T. Angress, “Prussia’s Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer Controversy before World War I,” *Year Book Leo Baeck Institute* 17 (1972): 19–42; see also Werner T. Angress, “Das deutsche Militär und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg,” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 19 (1976): 77–146.

¹³ Ludger Graf von Westphalen, ed., *Die Tagebücher des Oberpräsidenten Ludwig Freiherrn Vincke 1813–1818* (Münster 1980), 562.

¹⁴ Boyen to Vincke, January 4, 1815, quoted in Westphalen, 562.

¹⁵ See Paul Göhre, *Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter und Handwerksbursche* (Leipzig, 1891), 108; and Gerhard A. Ritter and Klaus Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 bis 1914* (Bonn: Dietz, 1992), 741.

¹⁶ Franz Louis Fischer, *Arbeiterschicksale* (Berlin: Buchverlag der Hilfe, 1906), 113 and 121.

¹⁷ Michael Schwab, *Erinnerungen* (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munich, Dept. IV, Manuscript 3432).

¹⁸ Ludwig Goldstein, *Heimatgebunden: Aus dem Leben eines alten Königsbergers* (Königsberg: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, XX, ms. 7, 1936), 2:64–65.

¹⁹ See Thomas Rohkrämer, *Der Militarismus der “kleinen Leute”: Die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).

²⁰ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politik: Vorlesungen*, ed. Max Cornicelius (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1899/1900), 1:39.

²¹ See Dirk Schumann, "Einheitssehnsucht und Gewaltakzeptanz: Politische Grundpositionen des deutschen Bürgertums nach 1918," in *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung: Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 83–105; Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen, "Vom Jungstahlhelm zur SA: Die junge Nachkriegsgeneration in den paramilitärischen Verbänden der Weimarer Republik," in *Politische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Wolfgang Krabbe (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1993), 146–83; Benjamin Ziemann, "Republikanische Kriegserinnerung in einer polarisierten Öffentlichkeit: Das Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold als Veteranenverband der sozialistischen Arbeiterschaft," *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998): 357–98; and Christa Berg, August Buck, Christoph Führ, and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte* (Munich: Beck, 1989), 5:100–101.

²² Werner von Blomburg, *Völkischer Beobachter*, 20 March 1935, 1–2.

²³ See Ulrich Dunker, *Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten 1919–1938* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977), 189; and Klaus-Jürgen Müller, *Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1987), 57–58.

²⁴ Ursula von Gersdorff, *Frauen im Kriegsdienst 1914–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969), 62.

²⁵ Gersdorff, 62–63.

²⁶ See Swantje Kraake, *Frauen zur Bundeswehr — Analyse und Verlauf einer Diskussion* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992).

Part IV: War and Theory

10: Just War and Perpetual Peace: Kant on the Legitimate Use of Political Violence

David Colclasure

Assent to War and Perpetual Peace

IMMANUEL KANT'S SEMINAL POLITICAL TEXT on war and peace, "Toward Perpetual Peace," provides a backdrop for a general discussion about the justifiability of political violence. What at first glance seems to be a categorical rejection of warfare in fact opens the possibility of justifiable wars that go beyond mere self-defense. Kant's defense of human dignity and its protection, I contend, provides the impetus for this line of argument. What follows is an elaboration and explication of this claim, and an argument for a connection between Kant's thinking on the issue of political violence and its relevance for wars in our own time.

Kant's insistence on the illegitimacy of political revolution is well-known. Deference to existing political authority knows no exception in Kant's thinking; for him, the violent overthrow of an authoritarian, even a despotic regime undermines the juridical condition of a state *as such*, unleashing lawlessness, and must therefore be rejected in favor of a process of slow and gradual reform toward a just, republican state. His dictum "There shall be no war" makes his point abundantly clear both in the context of European wars in the eighteenth century and in the idealist teleology of the development of a non-violent cosmopolitan order in the future. This is not to say that Kant rules out war as a means to achieving justice and order on an international scale, however. War in self-defense, in particular, is certainly permissible in Kant's view. But it is interesting that the allegiance to existing authority that he defends in the case of revolutionary movements changes when it comes to the legitimization of warfare in general. War is the central juncture at which the usual Kantian argument concerning the necessity of absolute obedience to legal authority is challenged. In Kant's argument, the sovereign is constrained by the will of the people and is permitted to wage war only with their assent as a "co-legislating member of the state."¹ War waged without the assent of the citizenry is unjust *ad bellum* for Kant, and while the citizenry cannot rightly overthrow an unjust leader, it can rightly refuse to participate in any given war.

In this essay I argue that this state of affairs lends greater credibility to Kant's cosmopolitan project of perpetual peace than is traditionally acknowledged in the literature on Kant. Taken as a whole, his writing on war and peace provides a formula for a league of nations and the legitimate use of force. If modified with an eye to its representation of external sovereignty in order to account for present-day crises such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, it serves as a provisional model for global peace. Here I first examine Kant's preliminary articles of perpetual peace with special regard for the difference between prohibitive and permissive laws, a discussion aided by a reading of Elisabeth Ellis's major contribution to Kant scholarship on the topic. I then discuss the central preliminary article for my thesis, the fifth article of "Toward Perpetual Peace," on national sovereignty. Further explication of this article is key to my argument as it *prima facie* rejects any violence that would undermine existing political authority. I aim to show that elsewhere Kant arguably makes a case for such a challenge to state sovereignty if human dignity is compromised, though he does so indirectly.

Traditional state sovereignty, which Kant defends, turns out to be the major stumbling block for any reading of his work that would see humanitarian intervention by force as justified under any circumstances. Taking Jürgen Habermas's reading of Kant on cosmopolitanism as a point of departure, I read Kant against himself, arguing that the permissibility, even obligation, to intervene in matters of other states under certain circumstances (for humanitarian reasons), can be established within a Kantian framework. Just war may, then, extend beyond mere self-defense.

Kant himself anticipates the concept of a global public sphere through the teleological argument that political institutions will, over time, come more into line with the concept of a public sphere such as that propounded in his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" for instance. The public sphere, as the locus for discourse by rational actors on matters of generalizable concern, becomes in a global context a check on developments among and between nations and regions in their shared institutions. In Kant's view, as political institutions become more perfect, an international league of nations is given vital support by global publicity. I argue that within a cosmopolitan order, the assent of the world citizenry to intervene forcibly in humanitarian catastrophes is the positive correlative of the "negative" Kantian conception of perpetual peace.

The negative Kantian conception of peace forbids war, while a permissible and justifiable challenge to state sovereignty, a "positive" and proactive conception of peace, is left unattended in his writing. The popular assent to go to war is essential to Kant's model of how a sovereign may legitimately wage war. This premise can be grounded in cosmopolitan right if it serves the defense of universal human rights. As such, popular assent to political violence in a global public sphere through a popular

reverence for human dignity can ultimately serve the end of perpetual peace in the present.

Prohibitive vs. Permissive Laws and the Articles of Perpetual Peace

Itself written in the form of a peace treaty, Kant's "Toward Perpetual Peace" is divided into two main sections, the first of which contains six preliminary articles, and the second of which contains three definitive articles, along with two supplements (the second of which is a "secret article") and two sizeable appendices. The section comprised by the preliminary articles compares contemporary international relations with ideals for perpetual peace, while the section comprised by the definitive articles goes on to present the institutional framework that would be conducive to the attainment of such ideals. These two sections make up the main body of the text. I will focus first on these preliminary articles and then on the second definitive article (on the right of nations) in order to investigate, specifically, how the problem of state sovereignty in Kant's account can be addressed in a way that yields a model for practicable peace. A legitimate challenge to state sovereignty in Kant, *prima facie* an absolute prohibition, can, in reading Kant against Kant, justify the use of violence in response to gross violations of human dignity. The legitimate use of force in a cosmopolitan order is at least as relevant today as it was during Kant's time. This unorthodox interpretation of Kant is in fact necessary if the conditions conducive to the development and defense of human dignity are to become sufficient. In the context of our own time, genocide and ethnic cleansing are grounds for a Kantian argument for the active and eventual violent response to the pursuit of human dignity requisite for a well-functioning global public sphere and international order.

Borrowing from Stoic thought, Kant based his notion of *ius cosmopoliticum* on the principle of hospitality. Stoic thought conceived identity as a collection of concentric circles, the innermost being self, then immediate family, extended family, and so on, out to humanity as such. In this reading, the individual's relation to humanity writ large is the basis for the cultivation of hospitality to otherwise foreign others. Parallel to the Stoic conception of hospitality, Kant meant the right of individuals to be welcomed anywhere in the world to try and enter into (commercial) relations with others. This right in turn is predicated on the assumption that humanity shares ownership of the surface of the globe. The purpose of cosmopolitan right is to protect humanity from war for all time, and the pursuit of a cosmopolitan order based on the principle of hospitality is the highest ethical-political imperative in Kant's system of thought. The pur-

suit of the principle of hospitality is the flipside of the permissibility of potential violence in the name of human dignity. Where hospitality is not a regulative ideal of the global political order, the protection of human dignity may be trampled. Kant's own principles appear to come into conflict with one another: the absolute prohibition of political violence and the strong defense of human rights. I argue in the following that the former prohibition is unintelligible if the latter imperative is to be realized.

In Kant's thinking on warfare there is an important distinction to be made between laws that are to be followed with immediacy and those whose realization may, for the time being, be suspended for pragmatic reasons, such that one's ultimate goal is a prohibition of all circumstances that may be conducive to warfare. In the preliminary articles in "Toward Perpetual Peace," Kant identifies six prohibitive laws with regard to warfare, and characterizes half of them as being of the permissive kind (*leges latae*), and the other half as being strictly valid (*leges strictae*). While violations of the latter represent contradictions of the rule of law itself and must therefore be rejected out of hand, exceptions to the former are provisionally acceptable to the extent that the sovereign is permitted to postpone their execution "as long as one does not lose sight of the end that allows this postponement."² Such laws may not be "implemented too hastily, thus counteracting the very purpose of the legal rule" ("Perpetual Peace," 71). Kant explicates the distinction between purely prohibitive and (merely) permissive laws with a reference to the restoration of freedom in a state that has been conquered and/or whose sovereignty is otherwise under threat.³ Kant's point is that for some prohibitive laws, including some of his preliminary articles (see below), a degree of subjective latitude in their application is allowed. Presumably, if reinstating freedom to a state subjugated forcibly by an occupying power would result in great harm (by reigniting war, for instance), then the sovereign of the occupying land is permitted (and perhaps even obligated) to postpone such reinstatement until such a time as it could succeed without harm. This argument, which concerns the immediacy of prohibitive laws against war, is relevant to my overall argument to the extent that an exception to the principle of peace is a regulative ideal, one that provides a guide to but only an eventual prospect of lasting peace, much as the possible use of political violence may be the expedient to the ultimate cause of the active defense of such a lasting peace.

Given this important distinction between (merely) permissive and purely prohibitive laws, one finds Kant's preliminary articles of perpetual peace divided between the two categories. In looking at the articles individually, I will turn first to the prohibitive laws of the permissive variety in order to demonstrate how those laws capable of suspension until a state of affairs prevails in which they may justly be enforced can apply in

the present day in cases where conflicts involve gross violations of human rights. The point behind the permissiveness of certain prohibitive laws in this context is that there are cases where violence in response to violations of human rights may ultimately serve the principle of perpetual peace.

An example of how such permissive laws are constituted is seen in preliminary article 2, where Kant posits that no independently existing state ought to be treated as a patrimony: "No independently existing state (irrespective of whether it is large or small) shall be able to be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift" (68). To annex a state through royal marriage, for instance, is "to treat it as a graft onto another state, [. . .] to annul its existence as a moral person and to treat this moral person as a mere thing. Doing so hence contradicts the idea of the original contract, an idea without which no right over a people is conceivable." The extent to which the state is ultimately to be considered a moral person relates directly to the troublesome question of the external sovereignty of states in a cosmopolitan world order, a discussion to which I will return later in my argument.

Elisabeth Ellis, a contemporary Kant scholar, provides a highly original interpretation of his political thought that is based on an account of his theory of "provisional" right and offers an innovative approach to engaging a discourse on contemporary political issues through a Kantian lens. For Kant, as Ellis points out, "provisionally, [. . .] in an international context made up of many different types of states, the 'inheritance, exchange, purchase or [gift]' of a state might in the short run actually prevent war."⁴ While treatment of a state as so much property to be disposed of freely contradicts the idea of the original contract, doing so in the short term does not necessarily contravene the ultimate ideal of peace among republican states, hence making such treatment provisionally permissible ("Perpetual Peace," 71–72). Again, this forbearance of certain prohibitive laws mirrors the regulative nature of Kant's overall point concerning the absolute imperative against political violence and the ultimate realization of perpetual peace: the use of political violence may, in my own argument, be required for the larger goal of the realization and defense of human dignity, a defense which may be achievable only in the long run and attained only with a provisional acceptance of active, violent confrontation of those states that subjugate, oppress, or aim to exterminate a population.

Kant's argument for a project of eventual perpetual peace continues with other articles that are temporarily admissible and further buttress my own argument that readiness to engage in warfare with the requisite military forces and resources ultimately requires political violence in the service of human dignity. As mentioned above, this is a matter of acceptance of otherwise unacceptable practices (violent acts), which may be allowable for

now, in order to achieve a state of affairs where such violence can be categorically rejected.

Preliminary articles 3 and 4, also of the permissive variety, are only seemingly difficult to reconcile with Kant's overarching project of perpetual peace. Preliminary article 3 states that "standing armies shall (gradually) be abolished entirely" (69), whereas preliminary article 4 stipulates that "the state shall not contract debts in connection with its foreign affairs" (69), that is, to finance wars. Kant criticizes standing armies and financing war through debt because both further and promote war and preparations for it. For Kant, the mere existence of standing armies ignites wars: "For they continually threaten other states with war by their willingness to appear equipped for it at all times. They prompt other states to outclass each other in the number of those armed for battle, a number that knows no limits. And since the costs associated with maintaining peace will in this way become more oppressive than a brief war, these armies themselves become the cause of offensive wars, carried out in order to diminish this burden." As for article 4, Kant is similarly critical of the theoretically unlimited resources which the system of credit opens up for military adventures: "This credit system can be used as a war chest that surpasses in size the wealth of all other states combined" (69). Ellis points out that it is not obvious how to reconcile the articles on standing armies and war debts with the project of perpetual peace and she rightly makes reference here to Kant's enduring insistence that progress be gradual rather than revolutionary ("Perpetual Peace," 82–83):

These are laws of permissibility [that permit the delay in carrying out a change of constitution until a more fitting opportunity arises]. They allow for leaving in place a condition of public right that is tainted with injustice until everything has either itself developed to the point at which it is ripe for a complete change or been brought closer to ripeness by peaceful means. For any kind of *juridical* constitution, even if it is only to a small degree in conformity with right, is better than no constitution at all. The latter fate, anarchy, is precisely what a *hasty* reform would lead to. — Political wisdom will thus make it a duty to pursue reforms in accordance with the ideal of public right under existing circumstances, but will not use revolutions brought about by nature as excuses in order to engage in an even greater oppression, but rather take it to be an appeal of nature to bring about a lawful constitution based on principles of freedom, the only enduring kind of constitution, by means of thorough reforms. (97)

In sum, one has only to appeal to Kant's own insistence on the impermissibility of political revolution in favor of gradual change in order to explain how one can regard preliminary articles 2, 3, and 4 as provisionally permissible, as described above. To the extent that hasty implementation of these articles would prove detrimental to the end in sight,

perpetual peace, their postponement is in fact called for. Presumably this means, for Kant, that if the immediate abolition of standing armies would undermine international security, for example, then there is good cause for pushing the prohibition out to some point in the future at which it could be executed in an orderly fashion. Thus, these articles are in agreement with my argument: that the maintenance of the means of violent confrontation may be required in the short run in order to eventually attain a state in which such means become unnecessary, or at least not nearly as extensive as they had been. The ultimate elimination of the means becomes possible once they have secured justice through a thoroughgoing deference to human dignity.

These prohibitions stand in stark contrast, however, to those articles which outline strictly prohibitive laws of perpetual peace, namely numbers 1, 5, and 6. Preliminary article 1 is important to the extent that it defines the terms under which an immediate, principled pursuit of human dignity bears the mark of lasting peace as it stipulates: “no peace settlement which secretly reserves issues for a future war shall be considered valid” (67). A peace treaty that reserves issues for a future war is, for Kant, no peace treaty at all: it represents a mere ceasefire or provisional cessation of hostilities. Such a use of the concept of peace would contradict itself, as it allows for existing causes for future conflicts, and would hence not be conducive to the conditions of permanent peace. This permanent peace represents the end to all hostilities, and the peace treaties that make such reservations for a potential future war must therefore, in Kant’s view, be rejected out of hand. This article undergirds my overall argument to the extent that a lasting reverence of human dignity requires a binding international charter which represents an *enforceable*, potentially violent defense of gross violations of the regulative ideal of a general and lasting prohibition of practices that lend themselves to such gross violations.

Whereas article 1 clearly rejects treaties that ineffectively contain the ambitions of rogue states in general, article 6 relates not to the ideal form of an absolute prohibition of warfare, but rather to the permissible means of parties already in combat with one another. Preliminary article 6 stipulates that no dishonorable stratagems are to be permitted in war: “No state shall allow itself such hostilities in wartime as would make mutual trust in a future period of peace impossible. Such acts would include the employment of *assassins* [. . .], *poisoners* [. . .], *breach of surrender*, *incitement of treason* [. . .] within the enemy state, etc” (70). As with fraudulent peace treaties in article 1, such practices are strictly impermissible because they represent a contradiction in themselves, a violation of the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative: “For there must remain, even in the middle of war, some degree of trust in the enemy’s manner of thinking, since otherwise no peace could possibly be reached, and hostilities would degenerate into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*).

For war is only the regrettable expedient in the state of nature (where there exists no court that could adjudicate the matter with legal authority) to assert one's rights by means of violence" (70). To the extent that the end of securing military victory is pursued by the use of such means, any peace that may result between the warring parties would necessarily be fraught with mistrust, and the peace itself meaningless: "these malicious practices would be carried over into peacetime and thus destroy its purpose altogether" (71). Always act such that you can will that the maxim of your action can become a universal law — so goes the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative — and here it applies to the use of assassins, poisoners, etc., all of which are in direct contradiction to the attainment of a peaceable state of affairs after war: treachery cannot breed mutual trust, only more treachery.

The existence of deceptive terms of peace in treaties (article 1), and of dishonorable practices *in* war in article 6 both, in fact, contain the direct violation of Kant's supreme law of morality, the categorical imperative, which holds at its core the prohibition of treating oneself as an exception: the violator of the first article represents an agreement with another that one cannot in principle rationally subscribe to. Hence they both represent maxims of action that are non-universalizable, the contradiction in terms to which no rational agent can rationally assent to should the maxims of both parties' actions be stated openly. Such is the nature of the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative.

National Sovereignty and Interventionism

Preliminary article 5 is the most interesting for my argument as it focuses on the question of state sovereignty: "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state" (70). Ellis rightly points out that Kant must also be implicitly arguing with the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative here: "The maxim under which the ruler of one state allows himself to interfere in the government or constitution of a foreign state would, if universalized, undermine the very notion of sovereign states in the first place and, with that notion, the ability of the ruler to govern" (Ellis, 85). Kant's apparent defense of the traditional notion of external state sovereignty is the important issue for my argument because it relates Kant's thought to the present. In the contemporary context, human rights violations are widespread, and ethnic cleansing and genocide occur with an alarming degree of regularity. Given this state of affairs, the notion of absolute state sovereignty is clearly a relict of another era if one is committed to the elimination of these evils. Especially pressing is the need to reconcile the principle of individual autonomy, a function of the *sovereign state* for Kant, on the one hand and

the promise of a peaceable cosmopolitan order, a free federation of *sovereign states* for Kant, on the other hand without reliance on the traditional notion of *state sovereignty*. This is the challenge that recent literature on Kant's cosmopolitan ideal has been confronted with and on which I focus here.

To address this issue, it is important to consider Kant's treatment of federalism. The second definitive article of "Toward Perpetual Peace," which turns the reader's attention again to the question of state sovereignty, stipulates: "international right shall be based on the federalism of free states" (78). Kant draws a parallel between the state of nature among individuals and the state of nature among nations, pointing out that the former exit from the condition of lawlessness to form a state under the rule of law. Likewise, nations must exit from the condition of lawlessness amongst themselves, which allows for war, and enter not into a state of nations, which would, as a world government, violate the external sovereignty of existing nations, but rather into a federalism of free states that promotes the end of perpetual peace:

Yet what applies under natural law to human beings in the lawless condition, namely that they "ought to emerge from this condition," cannot also apply to states under international right (since, as states, they already have an internal legal constitution and have thus outgrown the coercion by which others subject them to a broader legal constitution according to others' conception of right). Nonetheless, from the throne of the highest moral legislative authority, reason looks down on and condemns war as a means of pursuing one's rights, and makes peace an immediate duty. (80)

With particular reference to the loose and provisional nature of the association of free states envisioned in his cosmopolitan order, he goes on to write:

But since [nations] do not, according to their conception of international right, want the positive idea of a *world republic* at all (thus rejecting *in hypothesi* what is right *in thesi*), only the *negative* surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding federation that prevents war can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the law, though there is the constant threat of its breaking loose again. (81)

It is important at this juncture to recognize that elsewhere Kant relates the evaluation of whether a state is republican or despotic with regard to its external sovereignty to the question whether the people's will is represented in the decision to go to war. As mentioned at the outset, in the *Doctrine of Right*, the sovereign's obtaining the assent of the citizenry is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of any just war. Ellis makes this point when she writes that "the provisional right of nations refers to the

concept of state sovereignty, which though it can be understood broadly as a people's right to determine the actions of their state independent of foreign interference, is perhaps best measured by and most widely understood to mean independence in the decision to go to war" (93). Whereas the violent overthrow even of a tyrannical regime is out of the question for Kant, the refusal to assent to the state's use of violence in its relations to other states is legitimate.

More interesting, however, is the other side of this coin: assent to the use of violence against other states, interventionism in particular, may also be considered legitimate to the extent that the concern for the sovereignty of the other state has been (legitimately) defused. Such a deconstruction of state sovereignty may be precisely what is necessary if one is to both uphold the kind of cosmopolitan order of nations that Kant envisions and also call for potential forcible intervention in cases of human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

Reading *with Kant against Kant* on the issue of cosmopolitanism and intervention can yield an account of the cosmopolitan order that defuses the concerns that contemporary commentators have with Kant's traditionalist conception of external state sovereignty. To wit, Jürgen Habermas takes issue with Kant's reliance on a conventional account of state sovereignty in his cosmopolitan ideal: "Because Kant believed that the barriers of national sovereignty were insurmountable, he conceived of the cosmopolitan community as a federation of states, not of world citizens."⁵ What matters to Kant, I argue, is not so much the external sovereignty of the state as such, but rather the *function* that the sovereign state has traditionally served, that is, its role as guarantor of the rights of the citizen, the securing of the autonomy of the individual.

To the extent that this function is served by other means, the *vehicle* of state sovereignty may become in some sense superfluous. Habermas nearly says as much when he writes that "every individual has the right to freedom under universal laws [. . .]. If Kant holds that this guarantee of freedom [. . .] is precisely the essential purpose of perpetual peace [. . .] then he ought not allow the autonomy of citizens to be mediated through the sovereignty of their states" (128). To the extent that freedom under universal laws is to be guaranteed, and here Habermas is referring to cosmopolitan right in particular, one is to be regarded as both citizen of the world and citizen of a particular state at the same time. But one must ask what legal and institutional framework is in place to guarantee individual rights above and beyond the apparatus of the state before one should be willing to surrender the idea of state sovereignty altogether. In the contemporary context, the authority of the United Nations to prosecute crimes against humanity and to compel its member states to uphold human rights is an example of how law can override state sovereignty for the sake of universal rights, but it is hardly the case that the UN acts as the guaran-

tor for the civil rights of all citizens of individual states. The sovereign state, in other words, is still indispensable, it seems.

It is the *nature* of its sovereignty, then, that remains in question. In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant lays out the condition that the ruler of the republic must first obtain assent from the population for participation in war. I contend that this condition is also permissive, indeed obligatory for intervention in the affairs of other states. This is the crux of any argument that seeks to challenge any reading of Kant that posits that martial means are permitted only in cases of self-defense and only in the name of traditional state sovereignty. In “Toward Perpetual Peace” Kant does not accept the violation of state sovereignty in any case. I argue that, in a cosmopolitan order, there are in fact compelling cases where it may be necessary to violate state sovereignty for the sake of restoring and protecting human rights and human dignity. The sovereignty of a state guilty of human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, or genocide is no longer inviolable precisely because it fails in its function *as a state* to guarantee the rights of its citizens. There is — and this is a key part of my argument — no legitimate and defensible claim to sovereignty in such a case, and a proportionate military intervention from the outside may represent a just exercise of force based on the duty to aid. I elaborate below. At this point, it is necessary to return to the original question. Here, the idealist teleology of the development of a non-violent cosmopolitan order in the future is at stake; violent means to obtain a lasting peace are rejected categorically and cannot serve as a basis for a pragmatic decision to go to war for the sake of human dignity.

Much of this will certainly seem to run counter to Kant’s writing on war and peace. In more than one place he is indeed categorical in his rejection of political violence, such as in the *Doctrine of Right*: “Now moral-practical reason in us pronounces its irresistible veto: *There shall be no war*” (148). Elsewhere he writes that the cosmopolitan order abolishes all war:

The idea of a constitution that is consistent with the natural rights of human beings, the idea, namely, that those who obey the law should also, united, be legislators thereof, underlies all forms of state. And the polity, which, conceived in accordance with this idea and through concepts of pure reason, is a platonic *ideal* (*respublica noumenon*), and is no mere figment of the imagination, but rather the eternal norm for all civil constitutions and disposes with all war.⁶

After all is said about Kant’s writing on war and peace, there seems to be no justification for warfare other than mere self-defense. Yet there is the nagging question some passages in Kant’s political texts raise with regard to the discussion of human rights and state sovereignty that suggest that a closer examination is necessary. This question is evident when looking to Kant’s statements that war is to be prohibited for the sake of state sover-

eignty and yet the defense of human rights is also of paramount importance. It is a question that has not received sufficient attention in Kant scholarship to date.

Linked to the above question, Kant urges his audience to consider the implications of the following claim in a passage from the conclusion of the second definitive article of "Perpetual Peace." Here Kant himself brings human rights into the context of the prohibition of warfare:

The growing prevalence of a [. . .] community among the peoples of the earth has now reached a point at which the violation of right at any *one* place on the earth is felt in *all* places. For this reason the idea of cosmopolitan right is no fantastic or exaggerated conception of right. Rather it is a necessary supplement to the unwritten code of constitutional and international right, for public human right in general, and hence for perpetual peace. Only under this condition can one flatter oneself to be continually progressing toward perpetual peace. (84–85)

Aside from its exceptional anticipation of the nature of interconnectedness of politics in future times, the normative thrust of this passage is that a cosmopolitan public sphere is a fitting response to the fact that a wrong suffered in one corner of the world is felt in all corners (Habermas, 124). This assertion may in fact be part of an argument for a kind of interventionism in Kant's account of the legitimacy of political violence *on behalf of universal human rights*.

In this context, it is also useful to return to the preliminary articles, number 5 in particular. Kant makes one exception to the rule of non-interference by forcible means in the constitution and government of another state: "It would be an altogether different matter if a state, through internal conflict, were divided into two parts, each of which regarded itself as a separate state that laid claim to the whole. In this case, an external state could not be charged with interference in the constitution of the other by lending assistance to one of these parts, for in this case there is anarchy" ("Perpetual Peace," 70). Interestingly, what makes political revolution impermissible for Kant, namely the lawlessness that ensues through the violent overthrow of the government (however brief), corresponds to the anarchy resulting from the type of civil war in which two factions claim sovereignty over the respective other. The lack of a political order, even of an imperfect order, or for that matter, even of a deeply flawed political order, troubles Kant deeply.

If Kant's thinking is interpreted to allow interventionism, then, there must be some reasonable demonstration that the widespread abuse of human rights causes or represents an anarchic state of affairs. This ultimately involves the seemingly difficult task of redefining what counts as war in Kant's view, since only lawlessness in the territory where a single

state once existed (or self-defense) legitimizes political violence (not to mention the assent required of the citizenry of the intervening state). This is no mere semantic exercise with the term *war*. Habermas persuasively argues that Kant's model of perpetual peace is, from today's perspective, as limited as the model of war that it was based on, referring to "the panorama of limited war as it had been institutionalized in the system of the balance of power as a legitimate means to solve conflicts by international law ever since the Peace of Westphalia" (115). Clearly, the notion of world wars did not enter into Kant's thinking, but rather the thought of wars between ministers and states and "technically limited wars that still permit[ted] the distinction between fighting troops and the civilian population, and not yet of guerilla warfare and the terror of bombardment. He is thinking of wars with politically defined aims, and not yet of anything like ideologically motivated wars of destruction and expulsion" (Habermas, 115). The experience of wars in the nineteenth and, especially, in the twentieth centuries has clearly broadened the field to include, in Habermas's terminology "unlimited war" both with regard to the technical possibilities available to the warring parties and with regard to the question of assent to war given by the citizenry. On the latter point, Kant argues that the citizenry, if involved in the decision whether to go to war, will be highly unlikely to vote in favor, as it, not the government, ultimately bears the costs. Today, however, after two hundred years of nationalism-fueled conflicts, this argument appears deeply flawed.

Had Kant lived to see contemporary civil wars and massive human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, such acts would most certainly have fallen under preliminary article 6, which names practices that are strictly forbidden as dishonorable stratagems because they are contradictions in themselves; that is, they violate the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative. The war of extermination that Kant perceives to be the result of such practices (see discussion above) is in point of fact not merely a *consequence* of many wars of the twentieth century, but rather their very *modus operandi*. But, as I mentioned above, to Kant such practices are impermissible since any peace agreement reached at the conclusion of such hostilities would be fraught with mistrust and could not further the goal of perpetual peace.

If what counts as war for Kant is extended to include the "unlimited wars" of the present era, which are often accompanied by ethnic cleansing and genocide, the next step in the argument to establish a duty of interventionism is the demonstration that such massive human rights violations — and not merely the limited case of the specific type of civil war that he names in preliminary article 5 — ultimately also represent the state of lawlessness that he cites as a justification for forcible intervention in the affairs of other states. The key to this argument lies in the conclusion to definitive article 2 of "Perpetual Peace" cited above, in which Kant asserts that a

wrong committed in one corner of the world reverberates everywhere in the world. To reiterate: “[Cosmopolitan right] is a necessary supplement to the unwritten code of constitutional and international right, for public human right in general, and hence for perpetual peace” (85). To the extent that “human right” is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of perpetual peace, its protection is paramount for Kant.

Massive Human Rights Violations and the Global Public Sphere

Above I referred to the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative when establishing the strict prohibitions of preliminary articles 5 and 6. In this case, another formulation of the categorical imperative is useful in establishing the state of lawlessness that prevails in the cases of human rights violations mentioned above: always treat the humanity in yourself and others as an end in itself and never as a mere means. This formulation of Kant’s supreme moral law establishes human dignity as a first principle. It requires no leap of imagination to see that acts such as genocide and ethnic cleansing count as gross violations of this formulation of Kant’s moral law. To the extent that a government engages in such activity, it has returned to the barbarism of the state of nature, which is, per Kant, the state of lawlessness as such. According to his own account in preliminary article 5, intervention would be permitted and should favor those whose dignity has been violated at its very core.

The specific form of such an intervention on behalf of human rights depends upon the nature of the situation, with forcible intervention to be considered a matter of last resort. But clearly Kant’s preference by default for gradual change under despotic regimes loses all validity when confronted with emergency situations such as these. Kant’s own exception to the rule of non-interference, however, in the case of competing factions that lay claim to sovereignty over the whole state provides the basis for considering intervention in these cases legally and morally valid to begin with. The difference here is that one of the “factions” is an existentially threatened population, on behalf of which the human community intervenes.

As mentioned at the outset, the sovereign must obtain the assent of the citizenry to go to war, and it remains to be seen whether this condition is met in these human rights cases as well. The citizenry whose assent is being obtained in such cases is, arguably, *world* citizenry. This is so because, while one is to be regarded as both citizen of the world (cosmopolitan law) and citizen of a particular state (civil law) at the same time, the threatened population has no guarantor of its rights as an autonomous individual through a sovereign state. It is often enough precisely the state that robs

the threatened population of its dignity to begin with. Without the guarantee of rights by means of a sovereign state, one has only world citizenship to rely on. In the cosmopolitan order, an intervention on behalf of human rights would be the proper purview of Kant's federalism of free states. What Habermas calls Kant's anticipation of a "global public sphere" (Habermas, 124), in which a global public, through world summits for instance, can exert political pressure on state governments by "litigating" on behalf of those threatened.

It is *permissible* for a state or states to act proportionately to the extent to which the global community mandates an intervention to stem the violation of human rights. But it is not clear whether there is an *obligation* to act, much less *which state or states* would be required to act if there is such an obligation to aid. In other words, to say that military intervention in cases of gross human rights violations is not merely permissible, but also morally obligatory in Kant's view is to take the argument one step further. Kant does call peace an "immediate duty" in the pursuit of international right: "Nonetheless, from the throne of the highest moral legislative authority, reason looks down on and condemns war as a means of pursuing one's rights, and makes peace an immediate duty" (80). This citation is taken from a context in which Kant describes the loose, pacific federation of nation-states that ultimately, through an increasing number of associations with other states, achieves an end of all wars, forever.

To call forcible interventions, even on behalf of human rights, the vehicle of the immediate duty of peace would run counter to the letter of Kant's writings on war and peace, but one can make an argument that such a notion does not contravene its spirit. What remains unclear, and abundantly so, is whether this duty to intervene on behalf of human rights represents a perfect or an imperfect duty, and upon whom this duty is incumbent. Habermas rightly identifies a related, key weakness in Kant's project of perpetual peace, the solution of which is not immediately obvious:

Kant was satisfied with a purely negative conception of peace. This is unsatisfactory not only because all limits on the conduct of war have now been surpassed but also because of the new global circumstances that link the emergence of wars to specifically societal causes. [. . .] The complexity of the causes of war requires a conception that understands peace as a *process* accomplished by nonviolent means. However, its aim is not merely to prevent violence per se but also to satisfy the real necessary conditions for a common life without tensions among groups and peoples. (Habermas, 133)

Habermas argues here that peace for Kant means merely the absence of war, whereas the influence of "soft power" on potential problem states would preempt the kind of conflicts that would give rise to grounds for war to begin with. Much is to be said for such a proactive approach, yet there are cases in

which soft power is not enough to stem the tide of avoidable human-inflicted human suffering. These situations may, unfortunately, call for military intervention, an option that Habermas does not recognize in this context.

Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism and the Duty of Peace

Arguing *with* Kant *against* Kant yields an insightful answer to the above problem that Habermas observes. At the outset I put forth the assertion that, in Kant's account, the decision on whether to wage war unconditionally depends on the assent of the citizenry. To the extent that the citizenry can rightly refuse to participate in any given war, its autonomy, at least in this regard, is secured, according to my argument. In the context of the cosmopolitan order, the assent of the world citizenry — manifest in the outlets of the global public sphere, for instance — to intervene on behalf of existentially threatened populations, is the positive correlative of the “negative” Kantian conception of perpetual peace.

To the extent that the loose federation of free states remains such, the global public sphere can, as Kant himself anticipated, serve as the vehicle of cosmopolitan right, which is “no fantastic or exaggerated conception of right. Rather it is a necessary supplement to the unwritten code of constitutional and international right, for public human right in general, and hence for perpetual peace” (84–85). Kant argues here that cosmopolitan right is a necessary condition of human right and, by extension, of perpetual peace, while asserting elsewhere, as cited above, that reason makes peace an immediate duty (80). If, then, the duty of peace is satisfied by the pursuit of human right, then the forcible intervention for the sake of the human rights of an existentially threatened population may, by logical extension, satisfy the duty of peace. Here it becomes clear that interventionism, while not a *necessary* condition of perpetual peace, can nonetheless constitute a *sufficient* condition thereof. To the extent that no other remedy is in sight, one can thus reasonably argue for interventionism. My reading of Kant's political texts shows that his cosmopolitan project of perpetual peace is more than a “pious wish.” Such an interpretation is all the more credible since I provide a pragmatic account of the difference between today's wars and warfare in Kant's time. It is all the more remarkable that Kant, who could not have imagined modern practices of war, speaks to them in ways that remain unsurpassed by contemporary theory.

Notes

¹ Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right,” in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*,

ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David Colclasure (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2006), 141.

² Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David Colclasure (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), 71.

³ "For all laws imply a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permission implies a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions. A *law of permissibility* would therefore imply an obligation to carry out an action to which one cannot be obligated. And this, if the object of the law has the same meaning in both respects, would be a contradiction. — But here the prohibition that is presupposed in the law of permission concerns only the future manner of acquiring a right (e.g., through inheritance), whereas the exemption from this prohibition, i.e., the permission, concerns the current status of possession. In accordance with the law of permissibility of natural right, the current state of possession can, in the transition from the state of nature into the state of civil society, continue to be preserved as an, although not lawful, nonetheless *honest possession* (*possessio putativa*). This obtains for such a putative possession as soon as it has been recognized as such in the state of nature, even though a similar manner of acquisition in the subsequent state of civil society (after the transition) is prohibited. This authorization of continued possession would not exist if such a putative acquisition had occurred in the state of civil society. For in the state of civil society such possession would constitute an injury and have to end immediately after the discovery of its unlawfulness" ("Perpetual Peace," 72 footnote).

⁴ Elisabeth Ellis, *Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2005), 81. Further references appear in the text as Ellis and page number.

⁵ Jürgen Habermas, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 128.

⁶ Immanuel Kant, "Contest of the Faculties, Part 2," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David Colclasure (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2006), 160.

11: Military Intelligence: On Carl von Clausewitz's Hermeneutics of Disturbance and Probability

Arndt Niebisch

FOLLOWING NAPOLEON'S TRIUMPHANT military campaigns across Europe and ultimate defeat at Waterloo, the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz committed his thoughts and experience of war to paper. As director of the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule*, a war college in Berlin, he had sufficient repose and time to compile his voluminous work *On War*.¹ Due to his early and sudden death — he died of cholera in 1831 — the book remained unfinished. For the most part it comprises an essayistic and even aphoristic collection of fragments, a compendium of the lessons learned in the campaigns against the French armies. The 500-page volume offers the commander on the battlefield little simple, straightforward advice, and is effectively unusable as a manual in combat. Clausewitz's work nonetheless has become one of the undisputed classics of military tactics and strategy. *On War* still provides the basic outline for the current US Marines' *Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1. Warfighting*.²

Clausewitz's text can be situated in a greater cultural shift that became legible in the decline of the Enlightenment and the rise of Romanticism. Whereas Enlightenment thought favored the controlling force of reason, early nineteenth-century theory raised doubts about the omnipotence of rationality and focused instead on the dynamic, complex, and unpredictable character of the world. In a similar vein, Clausewitz developed a theory of warfare that emphasized the limits of strategic thought and acknowledged the irreducible presence of errors and complexity in war caused by unpredictable events such as malfunctioning equipment, sudden weather changes, or the interruption of communication. In fact, Clausewitz's considerable influence on military theory results from a break with Enlightenment ideas about war. These derived from an image of the French and Prussian armies as well-oiled communication machines in which reliable information and orders circulated through the battlefield.³ As I argue in the following, Clausewitz's insight into the disruptions of communication constitutes a radical departure from this premise. For Clausewitz, military communication is not undisturbed information, but

rather occurs under the conditions of war with the constant impact of the disturbances of battle. The “fog of war” accompanies every action on the battlefield; it suspends absolute certainty and transforms even the most deliberate strategic plan into a gamble. Any notion of predictability collapses under this constant threat and the contingency of actual combat.

To describe this situation on the battlefield in particular and war in general, Clausewitz introduces the concept of “friction”: “Es ist alles im Kriege sehr einfach, aber das Einfachste ist schwierig. Diese Schwierigkeiten häufen sich und bringen eine Friktion hervor, die sich niemand richtig vorstellt, der den Krieg nicht gesehen hat” (261; Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war, 119). Friction becomes the central concept for Clausewitz’s thinking about war. He sees it as not simply resistance, but a form of complexity that envelops every military engagement in a veil of uncertainty and randomness: “Diese entsetzliche Friktion, die sich nicht wie in der Mechanik auf wenig Punkte konzentrieren läßt, ist deswegen überall im Kontakt mit dem Zufall und bringt dann Erscheinungen hervor, die sich gar nicht berechnen lassen, eben weil sie zum großen Teil dem Zufall angehören” (262; This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance, 120).

It is important to realize that this term is not synonymous with “friction” in physics, but instead describes actions and interactions in a natural, but also social, psychological, and political medium. Clausewitz further understands friction as the environmental precondition of all interactions in combat: “Das Handeln im Kriege ist eine Bewegung im erschwerenden Mittel. Sowenig man imstande ist, im Wasser die natürlichste und einfachste Bewegung, das bloße Gehen, mit Leichtigkeit und Präzision zu tun, sowenig kann man im Kriege mit gewöhnlichen Kräften auch nur die Linie des Mittelmäßigen halten” (263; Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results, 120). Significantly, Clausewitz describes friction — the “resistant element” is nothing else — as a “Mittel,” that is, a medium that can disturb but also connect all interactions in war. Friction is not simply an isolatable “element,” as the English translation suggests. For Clausewitz, it does not make sense to think about war without friction, because war happens within the medium of friction itself. Friction is thus of central importance for any form of communication and processing of intelligence on the battlefield; it forced Clausewitz to develop a hermeneutics founded not on meaning and understanding, but on distortion, errors, and probability.

Clausewitz provides not only a new approach to warfare, but more importantly, he elaborates a notion of complexity that contributes to an understanding of modern societies. In order to elucidate the innovative aspects of his approach, I contextualize his theory of warfare within contemporary thought that still had philosophical roots in the Enlightenment. The writings of the strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini are of special interest here. Further, I reflect on current scholarship that recognizes Clausewitz as a theorist who anticipated nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory. Although these approaches risk refracting Clausewitz's theories through a postmodern lens, they disclose the ways in which notions of complexity are central to his understanding of warfare.

This discussion will provide the theoretical framework for a close reading of chapter 6, "Intelligence in War," in book 1 of *On War*. Here, I argue, Clausewitz develops a unique form of hermeneutics that corresponds not with modern mathematical systems, but with the probability theory of his own time. In fact, he develops his own "game theory" in order to help the commander evaluate the situation and strategies on the battlefield. I discuss this development in a comparative close reading of the card game whist in Edgar Allan Poe's famous detective story "The Murders in the Rue Morgue." My interpretation demonstrates that the importance of Clausewitz's concepts exceeds the study of warfare. Instead, they point towards the demand for new tools to organize and survey modern civilizations.

As I emphasize in the conclusion, these tools were developed in the probability theory of Clausewitz's time and contributed to the statistical classification of modern societies. Clausewitz's thinking recognized that the nation states that emerged in the Enlightenment period created a new socio-political situation that was marked by an increasing complexity in all areas of life that eluded traditional mechanical rationality; yet they demanded a calculus of probabilities that also incorporated or accounted for the errors and abnormalities in all aspects of science and life. Clausewitz was acutely aware of these transformations and enumerated the effects of these changes on the battlefield.

Turning Away from Enlightenment Strategy: Clausewitz and Jomini

In general, Clausewitz's work is read in opposition to the writings of the contemporary Swiss strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini who, as a great admirer and student of Napoleon and Frederick the Great, dominated military thought in the early nineteenth century. Military historians like to describe Jomini and Clausewitz as two extremes of one spectrum: while

Jomini understood warfare as a calculable and isolatable event, Clausewitz suspended any possibility of producing a simple, mechanistic, and predictive theory of warfare.⁴ This polarization, however, is facile. In his magnum opus *The Art of War*, Jomini openly confesses that he means to identify principles that guide the business of war.⁵ He further understands war in analogy to the strategy-based game of chess and even acknowledges being the first to write a book “which proclaimed the existence of general principles, and made the application of them through strategy to all the combinations of war.”⁶ In his *Summary of the Art of War*, he actually discusses *On War* and criticizes in particular Clausewitz’s rejection of the possibility of a definitive theory of war (9–10). Jomini, however, relativizes his own position. He contests the assumption that there are only a few of these principles for warfare and asserts that the application of these principles is worthless without a military genius to execute them (14–16). His argument does not simply respond to Clausewitz’s writings; rather, *The Art of War* departs from the idea that “war in its *ensemble* is not a science, but an art” (321). Like Clausewitz, he acknowledges the importance of “soft factors” in warfare such as the morale of the troops, the spirit of the leader, etc., as decisive elements that make it difficult to establish fixed principles (*Summary*, 15–16), but despite this tacit acknowledgement of friction, he concludes that a theory of war must develop general principles.

Neither Jomini nor Clausewitz questions the possibility of a theory of war, but both do ponder ways to design such a theory. For Jomini, war is not merely a mechanical business, and for Clausewitz there are certain constant rules that describe any militaristic activity. Clausewitz is known for clear-cut definitions such as “Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen” (191–92; War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, 75), and Jomini constantly asserts that all principles must still adjust to the shifting realities of battle (*Summary*, 15). However, the way both theorists formulate their problems differs decisively. Jomini seeks to devise a relatively stable theory that could satisfy scientific standards of necessity and validity as derived from the Enlightenment, even as he acknowledges the limits of such an endeavor. Clausewitz, on the other hand, tries to design a framework that is intrinsically connected to unpredictability, risk, and gambling, but that nonetheless attempts to describe certain recurring factors that underlie the business of war.

There is, moreover, a decisive difference in Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s respective treatments of the question of agency. For Jomini, individuals are rational decision makers, able to manipulate and control reality. This cognitive agency connects Jomini intrinsically to Enlightenment thought. His theory requires a rational subject that coordinates and influences the world. Certainly he acknowledges the limits of this subject’s ability to

manipulate the world, but battle is without doubt a process that can be ascribed to the determined actions of struggling rationalities.⁷ In contrast, Clausewitz's perspective departs not from a potentially controlling subject, but from the complex environment within which these subjects and rationalities operate. To Clausewitz, "Der Krieg ist nie ein isolierter Akt" (196; War is never an isolated act, 78), and his emphasis on the ubiquity of friction further underlines this point. Ultimately, the uncontrollable contingencies are more powerful than any willfully implemented plan. To spell it out in a philosophical comparison, while Jomini is much closer to Kant's Copernican Revolution in epistemology, with its focus on the transcendental subject, Clausewitz's thinking resembles a Hegelian position that tries to understand processes based on the development of a ubiquitous spirit.

The contrast between these two philosophers of war is critical. Jomini endorses the theoretical belief of Enlightenment culture that all events and phenomena are ultimately subject to scientific and exact description, whereas Clausewitz breaks with this hope. His book *On War* can be understood as an attempt to theorize the untheorizable. Clausewitz was not trying to construct a necessary and eternally valid theory of warfare; rather, he was interested in pointing out moments that resisted such attempts. Instead of simplifying warfare, he embraced the complexity of the combat situation. Analytical Enlightenment reduction gave way to a rather Romantic understanding of complexity that focused on abnormalities and errors, and not on the seamless working of rationality.

In one respect, however, Clausewitz remained ensconced in the Enlightenment. He recognized the importance of citizenship for the emergence of national armies. The French army drew its strength not primarily from new technologies or the strategic genius of Napoleon, but from the mass conscriptions that affected all male French citizens who could carry a weapon (Smith, 28). Fascinated by the power of the French armies, Clausewitz realized that the changing conditions of warfare were intrinsically connected to the formation of the modern state that gave every citizen the same rights and duties. In fact, he favored a similar conscription system in Prussia and was instrumental in the creation of a militia that also brought greater parts of the general population under arms (28–31). The Prussian monarchy, however, was very suspicious of these attempts, because it feared a revolution or other socio-political consequences that would transfer the military hegemony to larger parts of the population (31). And yet, modern warfare demanded the resources of armed citizenship. The egalitarian status of every citizen was not only an ethical imperative that threatened old power structures, but also necessary from a military perspective. Only the bourgeois duty to defend the nation, which applied to all citizens, could create an army equal to those of other modern nation-states. Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is the extension of politics by other means is a consequence of this fusion of citizenship and military demand.⁸

The increasing complexity of the modernizing world led to this double-edged relationship to the Enlightenment: the rejection of reason as the all-encompassing theory-building power on the one hand, and the acknowledgment of egalitarian citizenship as a necessary resource for the military on the other. By “friction” Clausewitz did not simply mean problems caused by steam, smoke, terrain, or weather, but also a variety of social, psychological, and political factors. The Prussian general understood well that war was influenced by every detail, ranging from the mood, fear, or courage of the individual soldier to nation-wide support for a war. War and its friction constitute an environment in which everything has exponential and unpredictable effects — not unlike the wings of a butterfly in Asia that could cause a dramatic storm in North America according to the popular example from contemporary chaos theory. Current studies of Clausewitz allude to this notion, acknowledging that he abandoned the reason-based epistemological and scientific perspective of Enlightenment culture and emphasizing links between his thinking and non-linearity and chaos theory.⁹ Although this position tends to project postmodern thought onto Clausewitz’s early nineteenth-century theories, it unveils deeper layers of his text that demonstrate an advanced understanding of communication focused on the role of errors and disturbances.

Recognizing Complexity I (Postmodern)

In his book *Clausewitz and Chaos*, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that Clausewitz’s concept of friction can be understood along the lines of contemporary mathematical models that have emerged in nonlinear dynamics, chaos and complexity theory, and fuzzy logic. These approaches share an emphasis on the unpredictability and indeterminacy of relationships among the parts of even very simple systems (Cimbala, 6–7). As Clausewitz said in his own definition of “friction”: “Die Friktion, oder was hier so genannt ist, ist es also, welche das scheinbar Leichte schwer macht“ (264; Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult, 121).

Like Cimbala, the historian Alan Beyerchen links Clausewitz’s thinking to nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory. In his “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” he argues that war was for Clausewitz a nonlinear event: a phenomenon, in which the input in a system can generate disproportional effects — “immeasurably small differences in input can produce entirely different outcomes for the system, yielding various behavior routes to a degree of complexity that exhibits characteristics of randomness.”¹⁰ As Beyerchen emphasizes, on the one hand warfare continually changes depending on the subjective, political, social, material, and other elements that determine its context, and on the

other hand warfare itself has an impact on the social, political, etc. framework that determines its conduct. This interactive complexity of warfare makes it a nonlinear event, whose outcome is practically unpredictable: "Clausewitz's conception is that the conduct of any war affects its character, and its altered character feeds back into the political ends that guide its conduct" (Beyerchen, 69). In Clausewitz's work, the interconnectedness of war with all aspects of a society under arms constitutes the decisive factor for the unpredictability implied in every war (Beyerchen, 67–69). To Beyerchen, the emphasis on chance that runs through the entire text indicates that Clausewitz designed a dynamic theory in which an analysis of the initial condition of a system cannot reliably produce accurate predictions about its future states. This approach has nothing in common with a Cartesian form of reasoning that bases the explanation of complex systems on an understanding of their smallest and isolated parts. Rather, Clausewitz's analysis of the dynamic structure of war tried to understand the complexity that underlies combat.

This penchant for nonlinearity, as Beyerchen argues, accompanies most of Clausewitz's thinking from the general concept of friction, in which the unpredictability of conditions slows down every interaction (Beyerchen, 75–77), to the famous trinity of war which defines warfare as a complex intermingling of irrational, random, and rational elements (Beyerchen, 69).¹¹ It also includes Clausewitz's interpretation of the difficult communicative situation on the battlefield (Beyerchen, 76–77). As Beyerchen notes, however, Clausewitz did not anticipate modern chaos theory, but rather created a theory design, atypical for his time, that incorporated complexity and the limitations of military theory. Beyerchen emphasizes that his re-reading of Clausewitz along the lines of nonlinear theory gives "new access to the realistic core of Clausewitz's insights" (61).

Beyerchen's postmodern analysis of Clausewitz's thinking demonstrates convincingly that knowledge and certainty do not constitute the basis for Clausewitz's theory. The decisive factor in his theory of warfare lies in a new understanding of noise, chance, and distortion as unavoidable but also productive elements in combat. Clausewitz's analysis of the role of military intelligence is the lynchpin in this complex interaction of chance, distortions, and decision-making that is so crucial for *On War*. Moreover, these theorems do not focus on the normal functioning of a system, but view abnormalities and unpredictable behaviors as integral parts of the system. Throughout *On War*, Clausewitz is much more concerned with errors occurring on the battlefield than with tactical successes. To focus on errors also means to emphasize the complexity of a process. In precisely this move we see the overlap between early nineteenth-century thought and postmodern communication theory. As I will show, chance, distortion, and complexity were supremely important in Clausewitz's analysis of the communicative situation on the battlefield.

Recognizing Complexity II (Clausewitz's Communication Theory)

In his article "Clausewitz and Intelligence," David Kahn argues that: "Carl von Clausewitz disdained intelligence."¹² This statement is problematic. Clausewitz may have doubted the reliability of intelligence on the battlefield, but he did not intend to exclude intelligence from the tools of the commander. The omnipresent "friction" surrounding all military activity manipulated every piece of information that reached the commander, including intelligence and surveillance. This, however, did not render intelligence worthless, but rather demanded a new hermeneutics capable of dealing with the information entropy of the battlefield. In fact, the problems that intelligence poses can be understood as a model for the complexity of combat in general.

Clausewitz devoted chapter 6 of book 1 of *On War* to a detailed discussion of handling intelligence on the battlefield. For him, intelligence constituted a central but also highly problematic element in warfare. It encompasses all knowledge about the enemy and determines all further strategies; thus, the gathering of intelligence is imperative. Clausewitz further acknowledged the obvious and trivial bit of wisdom that one should trust only those messages whose validity can be ascertained: "Denn daß man nur sicheren Nachrichten trauen solle, daß man das Mißtrauen nie von sich lassen müsse, steht wohl in allen Büchern, ist aber ein elender Büchertrost" (258; The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, 117). But he then proceeds to reject this simple insight as unusable book knowledge that should not be applied on the battlefield. The reason for this is simple: on the battlefield no message is certain. As Clausewitz boldly stated: "Ein großer Teil der Nachrichten, die man im Kriege bekommt, ist widersprechend, ein noch größerer ist falsch und bei weitem der größte einer ziemlichen Ungewißheit unterworfen" (258; Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain, 117). However, he did not advocate a rejection of intelligence, but rather offered a sophisticated and complex description of the communicative situation on the battlefield that leads to a unique hermeneutics the commander can employ.

Clausewitz, although — or possibly because — he himself was an author, distrusted theoretical knowledge and emphasized the limitations of theoretical planning. According to him, there is already great uncertainty "bei den ersten Entwürfen, die auf dem Zimmer und noch außer der eigentlichen Kriegssphäre gemacht werden" (258; when plans are drafted in an office, far from the sphere of action, 117). He further stressed that this uncertainty is amplified in the "Getümmel des Krieges" (258; the thick of fighting, 117), when every incoming piece of intelligence is

quickly superseded by new messages. This description of the value of intelligence is astonishing. In Clausewitz's time, the sources of intelligence were limited to reports by spies, the interception of enemy messengers, and mere visual contact. There was no air surveillance, nor wired or wireless communication circuits the enemy could tap into. In his text on the role of intelligence in Clausewitz, Kahn points out that this limitation was a central reason for Clausewitz's mistrust of intelligence (119). Clausewitz, however, did not describe the communicative situation as a deficiency, but instead understood it as a rush and overflow of information — a situation in which constantly new incoming messages disturb the commander.¹³ Thus, military intelligence is problematic not because of its lack, but its surplus. The challenge is to find the correct message in a stream of faulty information.

Clausewitz further analyzed this orgiastic communicative situation on the battlefield and arrived at an astonishing result:

Ein Glück noch, wenn sie, einander widersprechend, ein gewisses Gleichgewicht erzeugen und die Kritik selbst herausfordern. Viel schlimmer für den Nichtgeprüften, wenn ihm der Zufall diesen Dienst nicht erweist, sondern eine Nachricht die andere unterstützt, bestätigt, vergrößert, das Bild mit immer neuen Farben ausmalt, bis die Notwendigkeit uns in fliegender Eile den Entschluß abgedrängt hat, der bald als Torheit erkannt wird, so wie alle jene Nachrichten, als Lügen, Übertreibungen, Irrtümer usw. (258–59)

[At such times one is lucky if [the messages'] contradictions cancel each other out, and leave a kind of balance to be critically assessed. It is much worse for the novice if chance does not help him in that way, and on the contrary one report tallies with another, confirms it, magnifies it, lends it color, till he has to make a quick decision — which is soon recognized to be mistaken, just as the reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on.] (117)

Clausewitz suggested that in a situation characterized by an overflow of input, not all input can be correct. Thus, a situation in which the information appears faulty or contradictory is preferable to one in which everything seems clear and smooth. War is not clear and smooth, and faulty information becomes a means of correcting errors. When the observer cannot identify an error, he has no way of judging the validity of incoming intelligence. The truth of a communicative situation is not implied in one message, but has to be extracted from the entropy of all available information.¹⁴

In sum, Clausewitz developed a hermeneutics founded not on the recognition of truthful messages, but on identifying incorrect information. This is the only information that can be trusted, because in a complex and continuously shifting situation, intelligence cannot be 100 percent accurate. What appears to be truth may be faulty, and wrong information can

be used as a corrective. Information creates noise and noise becomes the actual information. As Beyerchen points out, friction on the battlefield corresponds to the information-theoretical notion of “noise”:

The second meaning of “friction” is the information theory sense of what we have come to call “noise” in the system. Entropy and information have some interesting formal similarities, because both can be thought of as measuring the possibilities for the behavior of systems. According to information theory, the more possibilities a system embodies, the more “information” it contains. Constraints on those possibilities are needed to extract signals from noise. Clausewitz understands that plans and commands are signals that inevitably get garbled amid noise in the process of communicating them down and through the ranks even in peacetime, much less under the effects of physical exertion and danger in combat. His well-known discussion of the difficulty in obtaining accurate intelligence presents the problem from the inverse perspective, as noise permeates the generation and transmission of information rising upward through the ranks. (76–77)

As Beyerchen notes, Clausewitz’s understanding of communication characterized the transmission and cryptographic technologies of the Second World War. The main theorist of such a “Mathematical Theory of Communication” is the engineer and mathematician Claude E. Shannon.¹⁵ In Shannon’s model, an information source selects one or several elements from a set of possible messages — defined as words of the English language, pictures, or any kind of physical impulses. In a second step, a transmitter encodes the message, thereby transforming the message into a signal, which is then transmitted through a channel to the receiver. In a final step, the receiver, who functions as an inverted transmitter, decodes the signal back into the message for the destination (Shannon, 99).

The operation of selection is crucial to Shannon’s theory because it defines his concept of information. As he postulates, if the set of messages generated by the information source is relatively small, then the probability of selecting the same message again is relatively high, making redundancy quite common. On the other hand, if the number of messages generated by the information source is relatively large, then the probability of selecting the same message again is relatively low, making redundancy uncommon. If the probability of redundancy is high, then there is also a higher probability that the information transmitted will be relatively unsurprising, meaning that the amount of information is small. If the probability of redundancy is low, the information transmitted has a greater chance of being surprising, that is, of conveying a large amount of information. Thus, according to Shannon’s model, information is an index of the uncertainty in a communication system (Shannon, 98–106). This “uncertainty” within a communication system can also be described as its “complexity.”

Noise is an unavoidable part of any communication system. Like “friction” for Clausewitz, it affects all actually working communication systems by contaminating the transmitted signal (Shannon, 111). As errors and extraneous materials invade the signal, the process of decoding grows more difficult — indeed, less likely. The receiver can no longer simply register all incoming input, assuming that all input is part of the signal to be decoded, in order to reveal the message. One must secure the transmitted signal from noise by developing clear protocols for distinguishing “signal input” from “noise input.” Reception from a noisy channel is thus a matter of differentiating between relevant and irrelevant input.

Clausewitz’s commander can be compared to the receiver of Shannon’s communication theory. As the commander obtains all incoming information, he must make a decision that distinguishes relevant input from disturbing or even damaging noise. It should be noted that this communication theory emerged from Shannon’s work in cryptography, where he designed a secrecy system that disguises important information as noise in the channel (Shannon, 113). This strategy corresponds to Clausewitz’s insight that valid information is not apparent but contained in the noise of the information transmission. In the terminology of Michel Serres, another theorist of noise, noise hangs onto communication like a parasite, but precisely this irritating parasite then becomes a source of information.¹⁶ Moreover, the mathematician Warren Weaver, in his comment on Shannon’s communication theory, observes that according to this theoretical set-up, a high degree of information is not beneficial, but implies great complexity, which in turn undermines secure data transmission (Shannon, 109). Clausewitz’s description of the battlefield demonstrates that he was already aware of this fact. Communication in combat is not disturbed through lack, but more importantly through overflow of incoming intelligence.

The escalating conditions of chaos in a communication channel correspond to Clausewitz’s general understanding of the battlefield. The combat situation is marked by an irreducible complexity. Therefore, military theory cannot be founded on deductive, simplifying methods that generate universally adaptable models for the commander. Military reasoning must grasp this complexity and dissect the information overflow quickly and efficiently. These decisions cannot be based on one specific scenario, but must be made instead on a quasi-statistical negotiation of all possible scenarios.

War, Games, and Chance: Poe and Clausewitz

Clausewitz confronted the nineteenth century with a new, non-mechanistic way of thinking about war, an approach that broke with a strategic

understanding governed by fixed rules, and established a strategy that acknowledged the constantly shifting reality of battle. In his model, war became a game. This figurative language does not imply that it became less serious; more precisely, war became a card game in which the dissemination of cards represented the probabilities that the commander had to deal with in combat:

Wir sehen also, wie von Hause aus das Absolute, das sogenannte Mathematische, in den Berechnungen der Kriegskunst nirgends einen festen Grund findet, und daß gleich von vornherein ein Spiel von Möglichkeiten, Wahrscheinlichkeiten, Glück und Unglück hineinkommt, welches in allen großen und kleinen Fäden seines Gewebes fortläuft und von allen Zweigen des menschlichen Tuns den Krieg dem Kartenspiel am nächsten stellt. (208)

[In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities war most closely resembles a game of cards.] (186)

The card game, not chess, more closely approximates the reality of war. In chess, every player knows all the preconditions and resources of the opponent, because they are exactly the same as his or her own. Only the opening move might bring an advantage. In the card game, by contrast, every player starts out with a different set of cards. The gambler does not know the hands of the other players and must guess their strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, only the development of the game itself reveals the truth of a hypothesis. In effect, the commander becomes a gambler.

One of the most famous nineteenth-century treatises on playing cards is the introduction of Edgar A. Poe's crime story "Murders in the Rue Morgue."¹⁷ Published nine years after *On War*, the text elaborates a replica of the activities and skills of Clausewitz's commander, albeit on the whist table.

In his introduction Poe debates what kind of game requires the most and best-trained analytical skills. In his reflections he quickly rejects chess and checkers as "frivolous" games that concentrate exclusively on the ability to play checkers or chess well but hardly provide intellectual incentives that go beyond the realm of playing the particular game: "The best chess-player in Christendom may be little more than the best player of chess; but proficiency in whist implies capacity for success in all these more important undertakings where mind struggles with mind" (380). According to Poe, whist offers more to the intellect than strategic board games. Whist is a simple card game played by four players in two fixed teams in which each team tries to get the greatest number of tricks. The game is extremely

simple, but Poe acknowledges that it is insufficient to know the rules and strategies well to be successful at it:

But it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is evinced. He makes, in silence, a host of observations and inferences. So, perhaps, do his companions; and the difference in the extent of the information obtained, lies not so much in the validity of the inference as in the quality of the observation. The necessary knowledge is that of what to observe. (380)

To excel in this game requires a keen ability to observe every detail, especially those that at first appear to be external to the game. Everything counts: the gestures, facial expressions, etc. add up to a complex calculus: “Our player confines himself not at all; nor, because the game is the object, does he reject deductions from things external to the game” (380). More decisive, however, is the player’s knowledge of what to do and how to evaluate information. The difference between strategic board games and card games is not simply that whist and poker rely more on probabilities than chess and checkers and therefore imply chance, but — and this is what makes card games different from dice games — they also expose the players to a flood of information.

As stated above, playing cards entails more than an understanding of the game; it also requires the ability to read the players and to detect all kinds of information. The successful player must understand the correct meaning of certain signs and be able to select the relevant ones. In Clausewitz’s terminology, the successful player gathers information through attentive observation, thus exposing himself to great “friction.” The act of observation itself becomes contaminated with friction as Clausewitz stated: “Diese Schwierigkeit *richtig zu sehen*, welche eine der allergrößten Friktionen im Kriege ausmacht” (259; This difficulty of *accurate recognition* constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, 117). This skill, however, involves not only cognitive reasoning as it predominates in chess, but a form of intuition constructed by experience and time. The skills that Poe ascribes to the good whist player correspond to what Clausewitz called “*coup d’oeil*,” namely the ability to analyze a situation quickly and to distinguish between helpful and faulty information (*Vom Kriege*, 234; *On War*, 102).

On the battlefield a surplus of information is not an advantage, but instead generates a complex situation, that is, noise: “Aber es ist viel gewöhnlicher, daß die Berichtigung unserer Vorstellungen und die Kenntnis eingetretener Zufälle nicht hinreicht, unseren Vorsatz ganz umzustößen, sondern ihn nur wankend zu machen. Die Kenntnis der Umstände hat sich in uns vermehrt, aber die Ungewißheit ist dadurch nicht verringert, sondern gesteigert” (234; Usually, of course, new information and reevaluation are not enough to make us give up our intentions:

they only call them in question. We now know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain, 102). In this situation, as Clausewitz pointed out, calm nerves, experience, and the laws of probability are a commander's only resources, and although Clausewitz said, "Wir sehen also, wie von Hause aus das Absolute, das sogenannte Mathematische, in den Berechnungen der Kriegskunst nirgends einen festen Grund findet" (208; absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations, 86), he also acknowledged that "viele dem Feldherrn vorliegende Entscheidungen eine Aufgabe mathematischer Kalküls bilden würden, der Kräfte eines *Newton* und *Euler* nicht unwürdig" (251; many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler, 112). Clausewitz, however, did not demand a form of reasoning that generates complexity from single axioms, but a type of thinking that is able to process the given complexity of the perceived situation.

Probability, War, and Society: Clausewitz and Statistics

Clausewitz did reject the idea of basing military strategy on merely mathematical reasoning, one example of which would be the geometrical calculations of the army lines that were so central to Jomini.¹⁸ However, the constant reliance on probability and the image of the card game connect Clausewitz's thinking to mathematical models of probability that had been applied since the seventeenth century by mathematicians such as Christiaan Huygens and Blaise Pascal for analyzing the probability of winning games based on chance. In fact, the early theory of probability, as Lorraine Daston points out in her book *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment*, emerged from an analysis of chance in gambling.¹⁹

The history of probability began in 1654, when the mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat corresponded about problems related to gambling and betting, and pondered issues such as how to distribute the winnings among players when a game was interrupted before the end.

In 1657, Christiaan Huygens, inspired by this correspondence, published the first brief treatise on probability, *De ratiociniis in aleae ludo*, which discussed Pascal and Fermat's problem in detail. Jacques Bernoulli's *Ars conjectandi*, published posthumously in 1713, was the first longer work on probability, and it opened the way for the development of modern statistics. In this book Bernoulli introduced the idea that an analyst who disposes over a great set of data can derive mean values to help in evaluating the certainty of an individual observation, an idea that was further developed by Abraham de Moivre, who introduced the concept of normal distribution in 1738 in

the second edition of his *Doctrine of Chances*. Finally, the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace, a contemporary of Clausewitz, extended the study of probability to include scientific and epistemological applications.²⁰

As outlined in Laplace's "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities," the need to study probabilities does not arise from the observation of uncertainties in the world, but from the insight that human knowledge cannot conceive of all data that cause phenomena.²¹ Therefore one has to extrapolate probable outcomes from limited data sets. According to Laplace, only a higher intelligence, also known as "Laplace's demon," would be able to comprehend all factors of causality.²² Regarding my reading of Clausewitz, Laplace claims that uncertainty arises from problems related to the collection and interpretation of data. Human beings cannot achieve absolute certainty because they cannot gather unlimited data, and the data they do gather is still subject to the constant impact of noise and distortions caused by the limits of instruments for measurement, human sensibility, and other unpredictable factors. The general epistemological problems of early nineteenth-century sciences thus correspond to the communicative difficulties in combat. In both discourses decisions cannot be based on absolute certainty, but have to be approached according to the laws of probability.

In her article "Chance and Uncertainty in *On War*," Herbig criticizes the presumed correspondence between mathematical concepts and Clausewitz's notions of probability:

Which "laws of probability" does Clausewitz have in mind in this passage? One may infer that he does not mean what in his day was called the Doctrine of Chances, now usually called the mathematical or statistical theory of probability. This theory seeks to calculate the relative frequency with which a particular event, within a given class of events, will occur, but this calculation requires large numbers of events to be valid. Clausewitz' emphasis in *On War* is at the opposite pole, on the distinctive and the unique events, and he rejects as too facile the search for mathematical certainty in war. He applies a commonsensical notion. (107)

I would argue against drawing such a sharp distinction between the two. As Rüdiger Campe points out in "Die Sorge der Prinzessin," (The Worries of the Princess) the invention of probability arose from concerns about the singularity of events.²³ In a discussion of the fourth volume of the famous *Logic of Port Royal*, an early standard logic manual, Campe acknowledges that probability is related to the question of whether or not one should be worried about the occurrence of a particular event (67–69). Campe observes that the theory of probability does not neglect the single event, but situates it in a delicate tension between its actual and potential occurrence (70), that is, attempts to deal with its potential occurrence or non-

occurrence. As Campe emphasizes, the rise of statistical thought is connected to an understanding of the event as an important concept for both modern science and narrativity.²⁴ Similarly, the fact that Clausewitz's commander must make decisions for one particular situation does not exclude the possibility that these decisions can be based on quasi-statistical data sets. The correct decision for the present moment is based on the knowledge accumulated throughout the commander's campaigns. This understanding of acquired knowledge as a data-set can also be found in Laplace, who argues that the rules and laws of probability are themselves not abstractions, but merely mathematical models resembling the common sense: "It is seen in this essay that the theory of probabilities is at bottom only common sense reduced to calculus" (196).

With its attempt to collect data for potential error correction, probability theory tries to limit the sources of uncertainty. Similarly, the vast experience of the commander provides guidelines for the battlefield. As Daston points out: "Order was to be found in the mass and over the long run, in large numbers, no longer in the individual case" (183). Or as Clausewitz attested, "Sind die beiden Gegner nicht mehr bloße Begriffe, sondern individuelle Staaten und Regierungen, ist der Krieg nicht mehr ein idealer, sondern ein sich eigentümlich gestaltender Verlauf der Handlung, so wird das wirklich Vorhandene die Daten abgeben für das Unbekannte, zu Erwartende, was gefunden werden soll" (199–200; Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead, 80). He emphasized that "[jeder der beiden Teile wird] nach Wahrscheinlichkeitsgesetzen auf das Handeln des anderen schließen und danach das seinige bestimmen" (199–200; each side, using the *laws of probability*, forms an estimate of its opponent's likely course and acts accordingly, 80). For Clausewitz, the empirical data that grounds statistical thinking enables the ensuing decision-making process to approach the reality of the battlefield, unlike the merely theoretical reasoning that dominated military thinking throughout the Enlightenment period.

Conclusion

Clausewitz is probably best known for his statement that war is the extension of politics by other means. For him war in a modern society is always a significant political matter because every citizen is involved in the war effort, either on the battlefield or on the home front, contributing to food production or the domestic economy in order to provide the fighting forces with the resources to win the war.

As Peter Paret points out in the opening line of *Clausewitz and the State*: “Clausewitz regarded the growth of the modern state as the most significant process in history” (2). Only a nation-state was able to provide the resources to organize a continually growing population, to support the citizens with food, labor, and shelter, and to build a strong army. For Clausewitz, mercenary armies were no longer efficient enough to fight against the powers that could be mobilized by a *Grande Nation*.²⁵ The complexity of warfare increased in proportion to the growth of the nation-state, and, as Stefan Kaufmann has demonstrated, this symmetry had crucial consequences for the communicative structures on the battlefield. As Kaufmann argues, the enormous size of the armies prevented any commander from visually surveying the army as one closed body. Control was limited and individual soldiers and officers became more independent, simply because the communicative network of warfare could no longer coordinate them. Nations, according to Kaufmann, now faced the task of disciplining their subjects and uniting them into a collective entity, forging them into one army. He acknowledges that the introduction of the *tirailleur*, that is, a soldier with relatively great liberties within the army formation, is symptomatic of this development (28–68).

This structural shift increased the force of the armies, but the price for the augmentation of power was a deterioration of the communicative structures. New tools of communication and evaluation were needed in order to organize and survey such a society.²⁶ Thus, it is no surprise that the rise of the nation-state coincided with the introduction of the statistical evaluation of society.²⁷ The nation was recognized as a complex system governed only in part by rationality and characterized by a great friction that could only be described according to the rules of probability. Uncertainty and an overload of information determine life in such a society. Not only the commander but also the politician required an intelligence that could interpret large amounts of empirical data to coordinate and understand national processes. In modern societies, communication is always communication in the presence of noise.

Within this historical context, Clausewitz’s *On War* offers a modern theory of warfare that analyzes the new challenges of communication on the battlefield. But it also provides a description of war as an escalating scene of complexity reflecting the social structures that emerged from Enlightenment culture and were amplified by the increased productivity of early industrialization.

Enlightenment culture heightened the complexity of modern societies through a scientific and technological revolution that improved the length and quality of life. From the late eighteenth century on, monarchies have increasingly developed into modern nation-states in which citizenship is an important part of the political order and a necessity for recruiting a forceful army. Clausewitz was among the first to recognize that such socially

and politically changing societies needed different descriptive tools. Reason was an important tool for the advancement of science, but it proved incapable of grasping the errors and abnormalities that contaminate reality. Turning his attention toward these complexities was Clausewitz's great achievement.

Notes

¹ All English translations are taken from Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1976). The original German quotations are from Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Bonn: Dümmlers, 1973). Page numbers for both are included parenthetically in the text.

² In the current combat manual *FMFM1 Warfighting* of the US Marine corps, the author and general A. M. Gray celebrates Clausewitz's *On War* as the ultimate guide to study strategy and tactics, and he acknowledges that "all Marine officers should consider this book essential reading"; see A. M. Gray, *Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1. Warfighting* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1986), 79.

³ See Stefan Kaufmann's comprehensive study of the communicative situation on the battlefield, *Kommunikationstechnik und Kriegsführung 1815–1945: Stufen telemedialer Rüstung* (Munich: Fink, 1996), 26–68. He starts with the Napoleonic wars and maintains that they were already marked by an increased complexity that undermined communication based on mere audiovisual presence. This complexity led to an increased reliance on communication technologies in modern warfare. Kaufmann also offers a detailed discussion of early nineteenth-century warfare.

⁴ See for example Michael Howard's excellent introduction to Clausewitz's thought, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford UP, 2002). Howard emphasizes that Clausewitz was against a geometrical construction of the army formation as it was employed by theorists such as Heinrich von Bülow and Jomini (24). Paret recognizes as the decisive difference between Jomini and Clausewitz Jomini's failure to see the importance of politics for the business of war; see Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 205. Hugh Smith points out that Jomini's reliance on principles and his attempt to write a "learnable" theory of war made his texts much more appealing to a larger audience than Clausewitz's somewhat complex and enigmatic writings; see Hugh Smith, *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2005), 57–59.

⁵ Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977).

⁶ Antoine Henri Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War or a New Analytical Compend of the Principal Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy*, trans. by O. F. Winship and E. E. McLean (New York: Putnam & Co, 1854), 12.

For the chess analogy see page 5. Jomini wrote this text as a didactic condensation of his larger work as the tutor for the son of the Russian Tsar in 1837.

⁷ This focus on a specific agent becomes apparent in a passage where Jomini claims, “even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, [a general] will always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them” (*Art of War*, 344).

⁸ The French Revolution and the newly cast French Nation delivered a mass army that led through the Jacobinian mass conscriptions to the first total mobilization of an entire society to war; see Geoffrey Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914* (London: Routledge, 2000), 2. Smith understands the French national unification as the condition for the growth of the French Army from an operational army that counted about five thousand soldiers before 1789 up to the Russian campaign in which six hundred thousand men participated (26). Kaufmann emphasizes that the immense growth of the French army led to administrative and communicative problems that in fact needed a national spirit for binding such an enormous army back into one disciplined corpus that could be controlled on the battlefield (40–47).

⁹ See here especially Stephen Cimbala’s *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), and the work of the historian Alan Beyerchen (see below).

¹⁰ Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security* 17.3 (1992–93): 65.

¹¹ Clausewitz described the changing nature of war as “chameleonic” and continued by asserting that “der Krieg ist also nicht nur ein wahres Chamäleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Falle seine Natur etwas ändert, sondern er ist auch seinen Gesamterscheinungen nach, in Beziehung auf die in ihm herrschenden Tendenzen eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit, zusammengesetzt aus der ursprünglichen Gewaltsamkeit seines Elementes, dem Haß und der Feindschaft, die wie ein *blinder Naturtrieb* anzusehen sind, aus dem Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeiten und des Zufalls, die ihn zu einer *freien Seelentätigkeit* machen, und aus der untergeordneten Natur eines politischen Werkzeuges, wodurch er *dem bloßen Verstande* anheimfällt” (212–13; as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity — composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone (89).

¹² David Kahn, “Clausewitz and Intelligence,” in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 117.

¹³ The urgency and overflow of information is only partly reproduced in the English translation “with reports streaming in” (117). The German formulation, “eine Nachricht die andere drängt” (258), expresses explicitly that one message is literally “driven” by the next.

¹⁴ Katherine Herbig points out that the communicative situation on the battlefield is infiltrated by chance and uncertainty and a successful communication appears to

be highly improbable. However, she ignores that Clausewitz recognized a positive aspect in communicative errors since they activate the critical judgment of the commander; see Katherine L. Herbig, "Chance and Uncertainty in *On War*," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 106. Herbig correctly recognizes that chance also had a positive connotation for Clausewitz because it is able to trigger creativity and courage, but she fails to apply this notion to the analysis of uncertain intelligence on the battlefield.

¹⁵ Claude E. Shannon, "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems," in *Claude E. Shannon, Collected Papers*, ed. N. J. A. Sloane and Aaron D. Wymer (New York: IEEE Press, 1993), 84–143.

¹⁶ Michel Serres, *The Parasite*, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982). It is central for Serres that every interruption also has a genuine productive quality that produces a change in the system: "Theorem: noise gives rise to a new system, an order that is more complex than the simple chain. This parasite interrupts at first glance, consolidates when you look again. The city rat gets used to it, is vaccinated, becomes immune. The town makes noise, but the noise makes the town" (14).

¹⁷ Edgar Allan Poe, "Murders in The Rue Morgue," in *Poe's Tales of Mystery and Imagination*, ed. Pádraic Colum (London: Aldine Press, 1959), 378–410.

¹⁸ See the extensive discussion of army formations in article 31 of *The Art of War*. Note that here Jomini was much more careful with the evaluation of these formations than he is given credit for, for example, when he stated that "these different orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them" and further admitted that "under these circumstances [the chaotic situations on the battlefield], all orders of battle which must be laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable" (195).

¹⁹ Lorraine Daston, *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988), 13.

²⁰ For a detailed discussion of the history of probability Daston, Ian Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference* (London: Cambridge UP, 1975), and Theodore Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820–1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1986). These three present the fundamental studies of the history of probability from the early modern period to the twentieth century. A more recent study by Rüdiger Campe contextualizes the development of probability theory within the emergence of modern literary forms such as the novel; see Rüdiger Campe, *Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeit. Literatur und Berechnung zwischen Pascal und Kleist* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002).

²¹ Pierre-Simone Laplace, *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, ed. Frederick W. Truscott and Frederick L. Emory (New York: Dover Publications, 1951).

²² "Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of beings who compose it — an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis — it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe

and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eye" (4). Laplace introduces this hypothetical intelligence as a model for securing the ontological possibility of a deterministic universe. For him, chance and uncertainty are no predicates of the world, but epistemological restrictions of the observing (human) subject.

²³ Rüdiger Campe, "Die Sorge der Prinzessin und die Zukunft des Ereignisses," in *Wissen. Erzählen. Narrative der Humanwissenschaften*, ed. Arne Höcker, Jeannie Moser, and Philippe Weber (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006), 65–82.

²⁴ As Campe argues: "Das Rechnen der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretiker und Statistiker und das moderne Erzählen, in dem, mit Hayden White zu sprechen, die Form allemal Bedeutung ist, haben zumindest *ein* Element gemeinsam: das Ereignis oder Vorkommnis (*événement, event*). Ereignisse sind die Elemente von Geschichten *und* in der Wissenschaft der statistischen Berechnungen" (66).

²⁵ Paret points out correctly that Clausewitz's attitude towards the French nation was necessarily ambiguous, and he further acknowledges that "Clausewitz's sarcastic comments on the self-proclaimed saviors of humanity in Paris went hand in hand with admiration for the energies they generated" (20).

²⁶ This is reflected in the fact that Napoleon was only able to mobilize his troops with the help of an optical telegraph network that he installed in large parts of Europe (see Kaufmann, 48–54).

²⁷ Theodore M. Porter analyzes the interplay between statistical thought and the emergence of social and life sciences that was also of great influence for the governmental organization of modern society throughout the nineteenth century.

12: Host Nations: Carl von Clausewitz and the New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*

Wolf Kittler

I.

WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED the “Clausewitz Renaissance”¹ in U.S. American and British military studies is the result of Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s new translation of Clausewitz’s book *On War* which appeared at a critical date in 1976, just one year after the last U.S. soldier had been evacuated from Saigon.² Bernard Brodie, the eminent theorist of nuclear deterrence, had not only contributed a short introductory note on “The Continuing Relevance of *On War*” (50–64) but also a long commentary entitled “A Guide to the Reading of *On War*” (773–853), which was placed at the end of the book. Six years later, in 1982, the U.S. Army infantry colonel Harry G. Summers quoted Brodie’s conclusion: “Clausewitz is probably as pertinent to our times as most of the literature specifically written about nuclear war,” and called his book *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, with obvious nods to both the content and the title of the Prussian officer’s work *On War*.³

Summers had served as a squad leader in the Korean War, as a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam War, and on the negotiation team for the United States at the end of that same war before becoming an instructor and distinguished fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His critical analysis of everything the United States got wrong politically and militarily in Vietnam can be summed up in a few short quotes:

As Professor Raymond Aron recently pointed out, it is essential to distinguish the First Indo-China war between France and the Viet Minh from the Second Indo-China war between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. (Summers, 84)⁴

Our new “strategy” of counterinsurgency blinded us to the fact that the guerrilla war was tactical and not strategic. (88)

Instead of focusing our attention on the external enemy, North Vietnam — the source of the war — we turned our attention to the symptom — the guerrilla war in the South — and limited our attacks to the North to air and sea attacks only. [. . .] we took the *political* task (nation-building/counterinsurgency) as our primary mission and relegated the *military* task (defeating the aggression) to a secondary consideration. (102)

Our so-called strategic offensive in the South was never more than a *tactical* offensive, since we were unable to carry the war to the enemy's main force — the Vietnamese Army — and instead expended our energies against a secondary force — North Vietnam's guerrilla screen. (116)

Among the many reasons that led to this confusion between tactics and strategy, Summers lists a sequence of changes in military doctrine which, in the period between the Second World War and the Vietnam War, shifted from one extreme to the other, namely from victory defined by the enemy's "unconditional surrender" — the "national aim" in the Second World War — to the concept of "limited wars," which characterized the role of regular forces in the age of nuclear deterrence (for instance in the Korean War), to a final and fatal shift in the 1962 *Field Service Regulations*, which "dropped the concept of 'wars of limited objectives' [. . .] and introduced the concept of limited means" (64–69). According to Summers, this decline of military doctrine was possible because "the military had allowed strategy to be dominated by civilian analysts — political scientists in academia and systems analysts in the defense bureaucracy" (43). One of the main culprits, however, was President John F. Kennedy, who, after "his meeting in Vienna with Khrushchev in 1961, [. . .] emphasized the need for U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities" for the following reasons:

We no longer have a nuclear monopoly. Their missiles, they believe, will hold off our missiles, and their troops can match our troops should we intervene in these so-called wars of liberation.⁵ Thus, the local conflict they support can turn in their favor through guerrillas or insurgents or subversion. (Quoted in Summers, 72)

As a consequence, "counterinsurgency became not so much the Army's doctrine as the Army's dogma, and (as nuclear weapons had done earlier) stultified military strategic thinking for the next decade" (Summers, 72–73). Instead of fighting and, in the end, winning a regular war, as it had done (and, according to Summers, successfully so) in Korea, the military was "called upon to perform political, economic, and social tasks beyond its capability" (79) — in other words, "nation building," and that is, for Summers, "clearly an inappropriate military task" (116). Thus, while certainly aware that "Clausewitz himself had devoted a chapter of *On War* to the 'People in Arms'" (74), Summers invoked the same Clausewitz in

order to corroborate his claim that the Vietnam War was lost because the United States mistook the Viet Cong insurgency and South Vietnam's lack of national unity, rather than the regular North Vietnam Army, for this war's center of gravity.

If this sounds strange at a time when the very terms "counterinsurgency" and "nation building" are all over the public realm, and only three years after both the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps issued a substantial field manual entitled *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5),⁶ it should not be forgotten that the reading of Clausewitz's book *On War*, which Summers had undertaken in his *Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, did in fact have a substantial impact on both the "Weinberger doctrine" of 1984, and the "Powell doctrine," which, although only formulated in 1992,⁷ already dominated the strategy of the first Gulf war, which was fought as a regular conflict with national and international support, superior force, a plausible exit strategy, and a clear, attainable objective: to reinstitute Kuwait, which had been occupied and annexed by Iraq, as a sovereign country — in short: a winnable war. Only in the second Gulf war, which has not yet come to an end, did the unclean spirit of counterinsurgency, which Summers and Powell had tried to cast out, return with a vengeance.

II.

In book 8, chapter 6B, of *On War* Clausewitz wrote:

If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities. (735)

This is a literal translation of the "original," or "Urtext," which was published posthumously by Clausewitz's wife Marie, née von Brühl. But in the second German edition of the book, which appeared in 1853 and which served as the basis of all later publications until Werner Hahlweg restored the original version in 1952,⁸ Count Friedrich von Brühl, the editor and brother-in-law of the author, changed the wording in the last part of the sentence so that its meaning was completely reversed. In this version the phrase concluded thus:

To make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions.⁹

As Beatrice Heuser writes, "the change made by Count von Brühl reflects the militaristic culture which increasingly characterized Prussia and other German states."¹⁰ But the question of who ought to be in charge when a

nation goes to war, the political leadership or the commander-in-chief, which is raised in the two different formulations, did not go away, of course, when the Prussian State was abolished by the Allied Control Council in 1947. As Harry Summers wrote in his *Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, one can go astray just as easily toward the opposite extreme. After having quoted the original version of Clausewitz's text, Summers concludes:

It is instructive to note that North Vietnam followed Clausewitz's instructions almost to the letter. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the military commander and chief throughout most of the war, was a member of the ruling Politburo, a Deputy Premier of the North Vietnamese Government, the Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the People's Army in Vietnam. (141)

The implication of this statement is that the United States had never established such a close collaboration between the civilian policy-makers and the military, that their political leadership had never consulted their military experts, and, therefore, interfered much too much with the purely military side of the war. Five years later, a young West Point graduate was wondering exactly what role the military had played in the decisions that determined each of the various political and military conflicts in which the United States had been involved since the Vietnam War. The answer to this question was given in a dissertation entitled *The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era*, and accepted by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University in 1987.¹¹ The author was David Howell Petraeus, under whose direction the new U.S. Army manual *Counterinsurgency* was issued in December 2006, who served as Commanding General of the U.S. Multi-National Force Iraq from 2007 to 2008, who was the tenth Commander of the U.S. General Command, and who became the top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan after President Obama ousted General Stanley McChrystal on June 23, 2010.

Petraeus mentions Clausewitz only once. In the conclusion of his book, almost casually, neither bothering to check the exact wording of the quote, nor the bibliographic reference, as if familiarity with *On War* could be taken for granted within the U.S. military officer corps, Petraeus writes:

Though most military officers quote flawlessly Clausewitz' dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," many do not appear to accept fully the implications of his logic. (303)¹²

Clausewitz looms large in the background of Petraeus's dissertation because its point of departure is Summers's book *On Strategy*. The two authors are in agreement about the following facts: (1) that the Korean War "was the first 'limited war' fought by the United States in modern times" (Petraeus, 35; cf. Summers, 59); (2) that "Kennedy and [General

Maxwell] Taylor's enthusiasm for fighting counterinsurgency wars had been successfully communicated, if not force-fed, to the ranks" (Petraeus, 76; cf. Summers, 73); (3) that this enthusiasm resulted in "a geometric expansion" of "the Army's counterinsurgency elements, the Special Forces," the "Green Berets" (Petraeus, 98); (4) that "even in Vietnam, military leaders recall, U.S. forces never lost a battle" (Petraeus, 109);¹³ and (5) that "what actually defeated South Vietnam was a massive invasion by [regular] North Vietnam forces" (Petraeus, 311; Summers, 76).

Petraeus also finds that, in the first decade after the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had widely accepted Summers's conclusions. First of all, there were doubts "in the minds of many in the military [. . .] about the ability of U.S. forces to conduct successful large-scale counterinsurgencies" (108), which resulted in a widely shared conviction "that, in general, involvement in a counterinsurgency should be avoided" (308), as well as in "drastic reductions in the amount of classroom hours spent on small wars issues in military courses" (285). Instead of fighting such "nasty 'little' wars" with uncertain outcomes (109), "the United States should either bite the bullet or duck, but not nibble" (34). Since "America is only good at fighting crusades" (302), "U.S. units should not be committed [. . .] unless public support is assured, military objectives are clear and reasonably attainable, and commanders are provided sufficient forces and the freedom necessary to accomplish their missions" (257).

Thus, the military's lessons in Vietnam produced what Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in a congressional hearing in February 1985, had criticized as an "emerging belief that the United States must only fight popular, winnable wars" (quoted in Petraeus, 313). As already mentioned above, this belief became U.S. military doctrine under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and, later, General Colin Powell. As a consequence of this "'all or nothing' approach to the use of force" (Petraeus, 312) in the post-Vietnam era, "the military have rarely been as aggressive as the president's civilian advisers" (135). "America's military leaders," rather than being, as popular "perceptions" have it, "cigar-stomping, table-pounding warmongers" (134), turned into "Pentagon doves" vis-à-vis "State Department hawks" (193). And the "new realization of the limits of public support for protracted military operations" (127) led to "an increase in the traditional military distrust of civilian political leaders" (115).

In other words, one decade after Vietnam, when Petraeus's dissertation was written, many officers in the U.S. military did "not appear to accept fully the implications [of] Clausewitz' dictum that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means,'" because, disgruntled with both the public and the civilian policy-makers, they had withdrawn from politics and concentrated their instruction, doctrine, and plans instead on what they perceived as the purely military side of their mission: regular warfare.

Petraeus could not disagree more. If Summers concluded that because “U.S. forces never lost a battle” in Vietnam, this war should have been fought and, above all, could have been won with regular forces rather than by means of counterinsurgency operations, Petraeus comes to the following, much more subtle conclusion:

Although this phrase is heard frequently, I have never heard anyone define the terms “battle” and “lost.” Beyond that, it is arguable whether either side ever won the battle for the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese citizenry, although some progress had certainly been made by the South Vietnamese government and the United States by the early 1970s. In any case, that battle was never decisive; the North Vietnamese seized control of the South in 1975 with conventional forces, not insurgents. (109n11)

Thus, “war and peace” cannot be conceived of as “mutually exclusive conditions” anymore (Petraeus, 311–12), as might be the case in conventional conflicts; there is rather a wide range of political ends and solutions to military actions “throughout the spectrum of conflict” (307).¹⁴ With this, President Kennedy’s obsession with “spreading the gospel” of counterinsurgency” (Petraeus, 95) is redeemed, and “the difficult tasks of developing the doctrine, equipment, and forces for nasty ‘little’ wars,” or, to use the latest terminology, “low-intensity” and “asymmetric” conflicts are poised to make “a comeback in the military school system” (Petraeus, 285).

The reason for this complete reversal of the “lessons” that Summers and his followers had drawn from the American experience in Vietnam is not military doctrine, but the political reality of the 1980s. As Petraeus, the graduate student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, sees it, the U.S. military needs to recognize

that involvement in small wars is not only likely, it is upon us. It would seem wise, therefore, to come to grips with what appears to be an emerging fact for the U.S. military, that American involvement in low-intensity conflict is unavoidable given the more assertive U.S. foreign policy of recent years¹⁵ and the developments in many Third World countries, particularly those in our own hemisphere. It would be timely to seek ways to assist allies in counterinsurgency operations, ways consistent with the constraints of the American political culture and system, as well as with the institutional agendas of the military services. One conclusion may be that in some cases [. . .] it would be better to use American soldiers in small numbers than “in strength” to assist a foreign government’s counter insurgents. [. . .] while always remembering that it is the host country’s war to win or lose. (309–10)

Among the examples Petraeus gives to illustrate the challenges the U.S. military might face in the near future is the following observation which,

in light of the difficulties U.S. and NATO forces are encountering at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan as we speak, appears perspicuous and far-sighted: “the Soviet inability to achieve a decisive result in Afghanistan has reminded some military observers of the problems of counterguerilla [*sic*] warfare in rugged terrain where the enemy enjoys sanctuaries” (275). But, as Petraeus noted while writing his dissertation in 1987: “*Indeed, the United States is already involved in counterinsurgencies* — albeit not with U.S. combat troops. [. . .] U.S. military elements are also providing assistance to a number of countries fighting insurgencies, among them: Chad, Columbia, Ecuador, Honduras, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Sudan, and Thailand” (307). But that is not all. Petraeus even allows for the possibility that the U.S. military might have to go beyond “the lessons of Vietnam” because these are, as he writes, “of less relevance to terrorist operations than to other forms of low-intensity conflict” (279).

Thus, Petraeus’s insistence on counterinsurgency goes hand in hand with his claim that those in the U.S. military who “advise against involvement in counterinsurgencies unless specific, perhaps unlikely circumstances obtain — i.e., domestic public support, the promise of a quick campaign, and freedom to employ whatever force is necessary to achieve rapid victory” (305), do not understand the logic of “Clausewitz’ dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means.’” Although it is unlikely because *The Theory of the Partisan* had not yet been translated into English at the time, it is as if Petraeus had studied Carl Schmitt, who declares at the beginning of this book, that Clausewitz’s “formula of *war as the continuation of politics* already contains a theory of the partisan in a nutshell, the logics of which have been brought to an end by Lenin and Mao-Tse-tung.”¹⁶

It is easy to see why General David Petraeus’s season came right after three of the “military objectives” by which Clausewitz defined the “defeat of the enemy” in a regular campaign (719–25) had been achieved in the second Gulf War: the Iraqi army had been crushed, the territory of the whole country including its capital, Baghdad, had been occupied, and the dictator Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. And yet the war was not over because large numbers of the population continued to engage the U.S. troops by means of guerrilla tactics and terrorist actions in a low intensity conflict that is still far from being finished today. As commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, Petraeus had ample opportunity “to employ classic counterinsurgency principles to build security and stability, including conducting targeted kinetic operations and using force judiciously, jump-starting the economy, building local security forces, staging elections for the city council within weeks of their arrival, overseeing a program of public works, reinvigorating the political process, and launching 4,500 reconstruction projects.”¹⁷

III.

In his introductory essay on “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency,” Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, who was a member of the writing team that produced the field manual, remarks:

The manual concludes with an annotated bibliography listing both classical counterinsurgency texts and more modern works directly applicable to the Global War on Terror. The inclusion of a bibliography of non-military texts — to this author’s knowledge, the first ever printed in an Army doctrinal manual — is key evidence of the Army’s acceptance of the need to “Learn and Adapt” to succeed in modern counterinsurgency operations.¹⁸

Welcome to academia, welcome to the school of military theorists that Clausewitz’s teacher Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a member of the War Academy of Berlin, founder of the Berlin Military Society, and head of the Prussian Army’s Reform Commission after 1807, had created at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Scharnhorst had insisted early on that the theoretical and practical guidelines for the conduct of any future war must adhere to two principles, which the “Foreword” to *Counterinsurgency* reiterates almost literally: “Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it must be informed by contemporary experiences” (U.S. Army FM 3–24).

The historical period covered in the field manual starts with “the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century” (U.S. Army FM 3–24, 1–21), though mentioned only once, and goes all the way to the counterinsurgency operations “our Soldiers and Marines” are currently conducting “in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Foreword). The earliest historical example discussed at some length is the Napoleonic Wars, in which Clausewitz himself had fought and which, for him, constituted the turn from the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century, which in today’s terminology would have to be classified as limited wars, to what he called “war in its absolute state,” the state it had adopted “under Bonaparte” (Clausewitz, 702). About the difference between these two types of war Clausewitz wrote:

The generals opposing Frederic the Great [in the eighteenth century] were acting on instructions — which implied that caution was one of their distinguishing characteristics. But now [at the beginning of the nineteenth century] the opponent of the Austrians and Prussians was — to put it bluntly — the God of War himself. (706)

Within the context of counterinsurgency operations, it is all the more important to note that Napoleon, the creator of modern mobile warfare, after having conquered almost all of Europe, found his nemesis in what

Clausewitz called “a genuine new source of power,” namely a war that “as in Spain [. . .] is primarily waged by the people” (447). The reference is to the insurrection of the Spanish peasants who, under the direction of local monks and priests, fought a small or — to use the Spanish word that was coined at the time — guerilla war against the regular French troops in the Pyrenees between 1808 and 1814. The horrors of this fight between soldiers and civilians have been recorded in Francisco Goya’s cycle of etchings under the title of *Los desastres de la guerra*.

In Prussia, which, after having been defeated by Napoleon in the battle of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, had just signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 — a treaty which required a drastic reduction both in the terrain of the Prussian state and the size of its army — the insurrection of the Spanish peasants provided a glimpse of hope for such patriots as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and their disciple Clausewitz, as well as the former Prussian officer and poet Heinrich von Kleist. It showed that Napoleon’s superiority could be defeated even in the absence of a big and well-trained army.

But the first guerrilla war in human history was certainly not the only low-intensity conflict the Prussian army reformers studied behind the backs of their King Frederic Wilhelm III and his more moderate political advisors, who — determined to fulfill the conditions stipulated in the Treaty of Tilsit — suppressed any attempt to organize a war or an uprising against Napoleon that would have violated the officially sanctioned alliance with France. Gneisenau himself had fought in the American War of Independence. The reformers all had read the writings of Heinrich von Bülow who, after having fought in the War of Independence as well, described the “guerrilla” tactics of the Iroquois, who attacked regular troops in small groups and disappeared immediately thereafter, blending in with the terrain.¹⁹ And he predicted that “Tartars” from the East might one day overtake all of Europe by using the tactics and strategy of the same kind of unconventional warfare.²⁰

There is also no doubt that the Prussian officers around Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had studied the Haitian Revolution, which started after Napoleon tried to restore slavery, which had been abolished by the French Convention in 1794, after only eight years, in 1802. The brutal and remarkably successful uprising was widely discussed in such German military periodicals as *Minerva* and *Die Neue Bellona*, a journal in which Clausewitz himself published. Heinrich von Kleist placed one of his last and most complex novellas, “The Engagement in Santo Domingo,” within the context of this insurgency, and, as Susan Buck-Morss has recently shown, even Hegel referred to this battle between black Slaves and their European Masters in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.²¹ Then there was the counterrevolution in the Vendée between 1793 and 1796, which Clausewitz mentioned explicitly in *On War* (333), the insurrection in Tyrol under the leadership of Andreas Hofer in 1809/1810, and finally,

the Russian peasants who harassed and killed Napoleon's troops on their retreat from the Russian campaign after the torching of Moscow. Thus, Napoleon, the God of War himself, found his match in that "genuine new source of power" which is the people's war. Clausewitz summed it up succinctly:

The Spanish War spontaneously became the concern of the people. In 1806 the Austrian government made an unprecedented effort with reserves and militia; it came within sight of success and far surpassed everything Austria had earlier considered possible. In 1812 Russia took Spain and Austria as models: here immense spaces permitted her measures — belated though they were — to take effect, and even increased their effectiveness. The result was brilliant. (716)

Another remarkable, although rather short-lived event within that same time period was the success the Prussian officers and reformers finally had in talking their reluctant King into issuing an edict, the Prussian *Landwehredikt* (Call for the Formation of a National Militia), which Carl Schmitt has called "*Magna Charta* des Partisanentums" (Schmitt 48; a kind of *Magna Carta* of guerrilla war), on 21 April 1813.²² This edict not only called upon the people to join a popular militia and to arm themselves with whatever weapons were at hand, be it axes, hammers, or scythes, to fight against Napoleon's troops, but also stated explicitly that whatever crimes might be committed by "unbridled rabble" in the turmoil that was bound to happen in such a general uprising must be accepted because, in that national emergency, it was much more important "to prevent the enemy from moving his troops freely on the battlefield." In other words, the King himself, in his very role as the embodiment of the law, signed a document which in effect abolished the rule of law for an acherontic moment of absolute war. Since Napoleon was defeated by regular troops in the battle of nations at Leipzig, the moment of this officially sanctioned popular uprising never came. And Friedrich Wilhelm III does not seem to have had any qualms about the question of whether it was logically possible for him to place his subjects, once again, under the rule of a law that he himself had invalidated only a few months before and that, therefore, could no longer serve as a basis of his legislative powers when he rescinded the "Landsturmedikt" in the summer of 1813.²³

In one of the most famous passages of *On War* Clausewitz wrote:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a wonder-worthy²⁴ trinity — composed of primordial violence, hatred, enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander; the third the government. (101)

Scholars have been pondering the question whether Clausewitz was more of an Enlightenment thinker or rather a Romantic for a long time, and it would, of course, be interesting to know whether he had read the writings of Kant and Hegel and if so, how intensively.²⁵ But whatever the answer to this question may be, I am not sure that it is even necessary to place Clausewitz in one or the other camp, the Enlightenment or Romanticism. For it should be noted that he did, in fact, correspond with a philosopher who straddled these two philosophical schools, namely Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who, early in his career, was called the “new Kant” and had nonetheless, or perhaps exactly for this reason, a decisive influence on such Romantic thinkers and poets as Novalis and the brothers Schlegel, to name only a few.²⁶ As Clausewitz’s letter to Fichte proves, the trivial distinction between reason and emotion is much too coarse a parameter to tell the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement apart.²⁷

What Clausewitz shared with his contemporaries, to whichever literary or philosophical school they may have adhered, was the experience of “a genuine new source of power,” the people. They all had seen this new power emerge in two forms: in spontaneous uprisings such as the storm on the Bastille, or the guerrilla war in the Pyrenees, and in the form of the *levée en masse*, the creation of the administrator, engineer, and mathematician Lazare Carnot, the instrument of Napoleon’s genius.²⁸ Thus, the government’s reason, *la raison d’État*, could either come into conflict with the people’s hatred and enmity, or it could co-opt those same emotions for the sake of its own political rationales. And as to the role of chance, the commander’s challenge, I am not so sure how much Clausewitz knew about the new probability calculus, which Pierre-Simon Laplace had developed during his lifetime.²⁹ It could well be that what Clausewitz had to say about the hazards of war was not so much influenced by mathematical theories, but rather by the card game L’Hombre, a pastime of soldiers that is mentioned several times in *On War*.

Two forms of mass organization, the spontaneous rebellion of the people in small groups and the highly structured regular army — not composed of paid mercenaries anymore, but of conscripted citizens — emerged during Clausewitz’s time. Napoleon’s army brought the European balance of power almost to the breaking point. Local insurrections were one, if certainly not the only reason for his downfall. After the balance of power had been restored at the Congress of Vienna, the figure of the guerrilla fighter seemed to have left the scene, but we have seen it come back with a vengeance throughout the twentieth century.

It is true, as the field manual *Counterinsurgency* states, that “Clausewitz thought that wars by an armed populace could only serve as strategic

defense" (U.S. Army FM 3-24, 1-20),³⁰ but he was even more specific. For him insurgents fight, like the Spaniards in their insurrection against the occupation of their country by Napoleonic troops, "in defense of their native soil" (419). In his book on the legal status of the partisan, which was published in 1963 — that is, only one year after the French defeat in the Algerian War of Independence — Carl Schmitt follows Clausewitz in emphasizing this connection to the native soil. It is "the telluric character of the partisan" which distinguishes this figure from the pirate or the corsair, who fall under maritime law (Schmitt, 27). For Schmitt the partisan is "one of the last guardians of the earth" (74), someone who, in his (for there are no female guerrillas in Schmitt's theory) relation to the native soil, is one of many sons of the earth who defend their respective claims to the maternal heritage by setting and guarding boundaries and borders.³¹ That is to say, the ideal partisan still operates within the *ius publicum Europaeum*, in which the *ius ad bellum* is a monopoly of the state.

What Schmitt calls the *ius publicum Europaeum* was itself defined by spatial borderlines. The first of these was the *raya*, by means of which Pope Alexander VI divided the globe into two spheres, one for the Spanish and the other one for the Portuguese to explore and colonize. Later on, the European states traced so-called "friendship lines" across the North American continent, which separated a space of lawlessness and conquest beyond the line from a space of European law on this side of the line. In wars waged within the confines of the *ius publicum Europaeum* each opponent, rather than criminalizing the enemy, respects the other one as *iustus hostis*, and violence is hedged or shielded by a *ius in bello*, that is, international law.

If the fatal escalation of violence and counter-violence, which Clausewitz described in the first chapter of *On War*, is potentially given in any kind of war, it is particularly prominent in low intensity conflicts and terrorist activities. States and their regular troops treat the guerrillas as *bors la loi*, and the irregular fighters strike back in kind. As Napoleon said: "il faut opérer en partisan partout où il y a des partisans" ("wherever there are partisans, you have to operate as partisan"; quoted in Schmitt, 20). As a consequence and as we have experienced very recently, there is not much of *ius in bello* left. The only reason Schmitt still places the partisan within the framework of European law is that figure's relation to the native soil, the guerrilla's "telluric character," which, despite all the brutality of irregular warfare, still lends a shadow of legitimacy to guerrilla warfare.

There are, however, three historical events that in the course of the twentieth century have torn the partisan away from this legitimizing grounding in the maternal soil: (1) the motorization and information techniques of modernity, which provide the guerrilla with a new mobility; (2) aerial warfare, which has opened up a new space of combat; and (3)

the impact of world-revolutionary ideologies. The most extreme example of the latter is Lenin's Bolshevik revolution in 1917, whereas Mao's Chinese Civil War, while clearly inspired by the idea of a world revolution, was still very much counting on the peasants' connection with their native land. In view of such disturbing developments Schmitt concludes his *Theory of the Partisan* by raising "the question of the real enemy and a new *nomos* of the earth" (96). The Greek term *nomos*, which is usually translated as law, is what Schmitt, in reference to Jost Trier's famous essay "Zaun und Mannring" (Fence and Man-Ring), calls a "fence-word."³² The law, in other words, is local and regional, necessarily confined by boundaries; hence, the global claims of the world revolution toll, for Schmitt at least, the end of justice and of politics.

IV.

Where Schmitt bases his analysis on "the partisan's telluric character," the field manual *Counterinsurgency* speaks of culture. Since this word signifies etymologically the cultivation of the soil, its meaning comes surprisingly close to Schmitt's term:

During Napoleon's occupation of Spain in 1808, it seems little thought was given to the potential challenges of subduing the Spanish populace. Conditioned by the decisive victories at Austerlitz and Jena, Napoleon believed the conquest of Spain would be little more than a "military promenade." Napoleon's campaign included a rapid conventional military victory but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable environment for the populace. The French failed to analyze the Spanish people, their history, culture, motivations, and potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. The Spanish people were accustomed to hardship, suspicious of foreigners and constantly involved in skirmishes with security forces. Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted occupation struggle that lasted nearly six years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the Empire's total armed strength, almost four times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally designated. The Spanish resistance drained the resources of the French Empire. It was the beginning of the end for Napoleon. At the theater level, a complete understanding of the problem and a campaign design that allowed the counterinsurgency force to learn and adapt was lacking. (U.S. Army FM 3-24, 4-1)

Section 4 of the field manual, which contains this analysis of the "early Spanish uprising against Napoleon" (1-3), is placed under a motto from Clausewitz's book *On War* which Harry Summers had already invoked at the head of his chapter on "Tactics, Grand Tactics, and Strategy":

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish [. . .] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (Clausewitz, 100; Summers, 83; U.S. Army FM 3-24, 4-1)

Napoleon created a modern army that was mobile and flexible because for the first time in military history it was broken up into divisions, each of which was composed of all three arms of the service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and which — under the command of one of Napoleon's young officers — could operate more or less independently, like a small army in a nutshell. This is the reason one of the two battles mentioned in the quote from the field manual was, in fact, not a single, but a twin battle fought by one part of the army under Napoleon himself at Jena and, at the same time, by another part under Bernadotte and Davout, on the battlefield of Auerstedt. It is no coincidence that Napoleon was also the first to have revealed the Achilles heel of such large and well-organized military formations: guerrilla warfare.

Although deconstruction has taught us not to determine historical origins anymore, and although the term “small war” was already common in the eighteenth century, I think it is safe to join both Carl Schmitt and the field manual *Counterinsurgency* in assuming guerrilla warfare in the modern sense to be concomitant with Napoleon's creation of the modern army. Precisely because these armies are so well organized, they are vulnerable to popular insurgencies, which are supported and fought by untrained civilians and in which, as Clausewitz had already noted in a stunning calculation, one single soldier has the potential to outweigh a whole army of well-trained and armed soldiers. Since Howard and Paret are obviously unable to face the extreme case Clausewitz envisioned in this passage, I have changed the translation; he wrote:

It would be sheer pedantry to claim the term “army” for every single partisan who resides independently in a remote province of the country. Still, we must admit that no one thinks it odd to talk of the “army” of the Vendée during the French Revolutionary Wars, although it was often not much stronger.³³

The field manual does not go to that extreme, but the exact numbers it gives still confirm Clausewitz's assessment of a large numerical disproportion between guerrilla fighters and regular soldiers: “During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win” (U.S. Army FM 3-24, 1-67).

Just like Schmitt, the field manual notes a historical shift in the twentieth century, but it introduces much finer distinctions than Schmitt by subdividing this period into different phases. First, there was an epoch of

insurgencies that started with the September Revolution of 1917 and ended with Khrushchev's call for "wars of national liberation," which triggered President Kennedy's interest in counterinsurgency warfare: "The Bolshevik takeover of Russia demonstrated a conspiratorial approach to overthrowing a government; it spawned a communist revolution that supported further 'wars of national liberation'" (1-18). Then there was yet another change after the Second World War:

Most 19th century insurgencies were local movements to sustain the status quo. By the mid-20th century they had become national and transnational revolutionary movements. Clausewitz thought that wars by an armed populace could only serve as a strategic defense; however, theorists after World War II realized that insurgency could be a decisive form of warfare. This area spawned the Maoist, Che Guevara-type focoist, and urban approaches to insurgency. (1-20)

And, finally, there were "many new insurgencies" that appeared "after the Soviet Union's collapse [. . .] These new insurgencies typically emerged from civil wars or the collapse of states no longer propped up by Cold War rivalries" (1-21). It is a telling symptom that Lenin, who, after having studied Clausewitz in his Swiss exile, adapted the Prussian general's theory *On War* to the objectives of the Marxist world revolution, and who has, therefore, been considered an important theorist of insurgency warfare by Schmitt and many others (Schmitt, 94; Strachan, 30-31), is mentioned only three times in the field manual *Counterinsurgency*. The reason for this change of perspective from Lenin "the professional revolutionary," as Schmitt liked to call him full of spite (54), to new forms of insurgency is explained carefully in the field manual:

Recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary ideals. [. . .] People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity. When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government's ability to defend itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support for an insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist. (1-21)

Michel Foucault has suggested inverting Clausewitz's famous aphorism "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means" (Clausewitz, 731) into "politics is the continuation of war by other means."³⁴ This is precisely what the field manual *Counterinsurgency* recommends, even if perhaps not so much as a method of critical analysis, but rather as a practical objective. As the manual's foreword states,

“Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors [instructed to] be ready both to fight and to build” (1–105); they must be prepared to swing back and forth between the two poles of Clausewitz’s dictum, from politics to war and vice versa.

There are two reasons why it is worth noting within this context that the new field manual was written by and is meant for both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps: one, the Marines were originally not a military formation, but rather, “essentially police at sea,” and two, after “the primary Marine mission changed to that of going ashore to protect American lives and property in various Latin American nations,” the Marines had ample opportunity to learn and adapt to counterinsurgency warfare in such countries as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua³⁵. They were among the first to develop a Manuel on *Small Wars Operations*, written in 1935 and published in 1940 (Bickel 218), which was based on the “bottom-up” experiences of their ranks in the field (245).³⁶ Quite a few of the central ideas contained in the new field manual were already conceived by Marines at the beginning of the twentieth century.

If guerrilla fighters are defined as irregular combatants who can turn themselves into civilians anytime, then the counterinsurgency-trained U.S. soldiers and marines are being instructed to mimic guerrillas, but only up to a certain limit, namely to the point where they are not allowed to blend in with the population by exchanging their uniforms for civilian clothes, a limit which only Special Forces are allowed to transgress. Thus, while the field manual *Counterinsurgency* tries hard to abide by the international rules set in the Geneva Conventions (see “Appendix D: Legal Considerations”), it is not immune to the uncanny propensity of guerrilla warfare, that tends to drag clearly defined opponents — and in practical terms that means soldiers who are symbolically distinguished by their uniforms, or at least their insignia — into the abyss of a mirror relation. As Capt. Merritt A. Edson, who developed the famous “Coco patrols” in Nicaragua, wrote already in 1928: “The idea would be an outfit as near like the bandits as possible — using the same side trails they use — becoming bush men like them — and living like them” (quoted in Bickel, 172). Quoting a line from the poem “Palermo” in Theodor Däubler’s cycle *Hymn to Italy*, Carl Schmitt sums it up succinctly: “The enemy is our own question as gestalt” (87).³⁷

Yet, as we know from Lacan, mirror relations can trigger, or more precisely oscillate quickly between both mad love and mortal hate. Now, it is of course the military’s mission to teach even those people who are not what Dave Grossman called “natural born killers” how to kill. But what about love? How far is that supposed to go? That the two tendencies are not meant to be acted out on the exact same level of intensity can be gleaned from the striking difference between the semantics of the verbs used in the two parts of the following sentence: “For example, auxiliaries

might be co-opted by economic or political reforms, while fanatic combatants will most likely have to be killed or captured” (U.S. Army FM 3-24, 1-68). Table 5-3 warns explicitly: “Avoid mirror-imaging (trying to make host-nation forces look like the U.S. military). That solution fits few cultures or situations.” And appendix A distinguishes carefully between emotion and calculated self-interest:

Once the unit settles into the AO [the Area of Operation], its next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two separate components. “Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN [Counterinsurgency] success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents. (A-26)

Co-option can consist in “civil measures,” which, according to Keith Bickel,

can be viewed essentially as “bribing” the people not to support the insurgents. This tactic as traditionally used by the United States comes in the form of the promise of better quality of life; hence the emphasis on medical, educational, governmental, and economic measures designed to win the support of the people and psychologically isolate them from the insurgents. (100n37)

The field manual puts it much more delicately: “COIN [counterinsurgency] [. . .] involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines” (1-4). We know that the success of the so-called Awakening Councils in Iraq was, at least partially, due to the following simple rule, which the field manual phrases quite abstractly: “Under certain conditions, the U.S. Government will make payments to HN [host nation] civilians” (D-35). But we have recently also learned that such money-based alliances can easily disintegrate as soon as the flow of dollars dries up, not to speak of the possibility that the bribes fall into the insurgents’ hands.

In order to enable U.S. soldiers and marines for more subtle forms of co-option, the field manual makes a moving and desperate attempt to turn potentially parochial U.S. citizens into tolerant cosmopolitans by urging them not only to study “major world cultures” (7-16) in general, but to gain “background information on the populations, cultures, languages, history, and governments of states in an AO [area of operation]” in particular. In order to help the military get rid of, or at least conceal “embed-

ded American beliefs [that may be] preventing the unit from understanding the HN [host nation] population or its multinational partners” (8–25), the manual even goes so far as to state: “Academic sources, such as journal articles and university professors, can also be of great benefit” (3.11). If I understand correctly, this sentence does not refer to our colleagues in the sciences who are funded by the Department of Defense, but to scholars in the Humanities, but please do not celebrate too soon: those who are studying European cultures will certainly not gain, and may perhaps even lose positions as a result of this new “cultural awareness” among “small-unit leaders” (7–16) in the military.

The majority of those who wrote the few pages on the subject of “Culture” in the field manual must have been recruited in the Department of Anthropology. No one else would have defined “culture” and “cultural forms” in terms of “ideas, norms, rituals, codes of behavior” (3–336), “symbols, ceremonies, and narratives” (3–49), and no one else could have smuggled a comment on Claude Levi-Strauss’s book *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* (The Elementary Structures of Kinship) into the introductory paragraph of the chapter: “Cultural rules are flexible in practice. For example, the kinship system of a certain Amazonian Indian tribe requires that individuals marry a cousin. However, the definition of cousin is often changed to make people eligible for marriage” (3–38).³⁸ Subsections of the chapter are entitled: “Identity,” “Beliefs,” “Values,” “Attitudes and Perceptions,” “Belief Systems,” and “Cultural Forms.”

The arguments and examples are a medley of commonplace topics from today’s American politics and academia. I cannot refrain from quoting at least one instance: “Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true. Beliefs can be core, intermediate, or peripheral” (3–40). Examples for the first of these three categories consist of what the manual elsewhere calls “embedded American beliefs,” which the authors of the text claim to be shared by a majority of the population, but which are also clearly meant to remind U.S. soldiers and marines of the ideals for which they are supposed to fight and die, including “belief in the existence of God, the value of democratic government, the importance of individual and collective honor, and the role of the family.” Examples for the last category, peripheral beliefs, are carefully chosen to represent both a religious and a secular group in order to avoid bias: “a belief about birth control may derive from an individual’s beliefs about the Roman Catholic Church. Beliefs about the theory of sexual repression may come from a person’s opinion of Sigmund Freud” (3–41). I can see my colleagues gleefully choosing these examples, but I have to admit that I find the two sentences rather clumsily written, and I leave it to the reader to decide whether examples such as these will be sophisticated enough to prepare the U.S. military for a “battle of ideas” (2–5) with “Islamic extremists” (Foreword).

Other forms of co-option consist in what we, literary scholars, are trying to teach our students, such as the importance of narrative, which the manual defines as follows: “The central mechanism, expressed in story form, through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed” (Glossary-6). As a consequence, counterinsurgents must be enabled to become both good listeners and good storytellers themselves: “The most important cultural form for counterinsurgents to understand is the narrative” (3–50). “Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements” (1–76). Fighting back with exactly the same weapon counterinsurgency must “discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative” (5–2). The term “propaganda” is consistently used with the modifier “insurgent” in the field manual, whereas U.S. military countermeasures are listed as “information” and “psychological operations.”³⁹ Such operations must carefully balance top-down and bottom-up relations between the higher and the lower ranks:

Higher headquarters usually establishes the COIN narrative. However, only leaders, Soldiers, and Marines at the lowest levels know the details needed to tailor it to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, a nationalist narrative can be used to marginalize foreign fighters. (A-42)

It is within the context of this explicit reference to the current Iraq War that the manual implicitly quotes Clausewitz’s famous dictum about war: “This is art, not science” (A-42; cf. Clausewitz, 707).

Thus, the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency “cultural training” (6–14) spans a wide range of fields from “Social Network Analysis” (appendix B), to ethics, which prescribes “appropriate treatment of women and children” (3–35) down to the more basic imperative, “Eat their food” (Table 6–5).

V.

Carl Schmitt’s *Theory of the Partisan* was conceived as a sequel to his earlier book *Der Begriff des Politischen* (The Concept of the Political), a concept that, for Schmitt is determined by the difference between friend and foe:⁴⁰

Foe is not the competitor or the opponent in general. Foe is not the private opponent whom one hates under feelings of antipathy. Foe only is, at least eventually, that is, according to the real possibility of fighting, a collectivity of men opposed to another such collectivity. Foe is only the *public* foe because everything that is related to such a

collectivity of men, and particularly so to a whole people, therefore, turns *public*. Foe is *hostis*, not *inimicus* in the wider sense; πολέμιος, not ἐχθρός.⁴¹

The distinction between the two concepts in Latin and Greek allows Schmitt to stay within the tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who, in *quaestio* 40 of his *Summa Theologiae*, distinguished between two types of enemies, personal enemies — for whom Luke 6:27 prescribes, “Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you” (cf. Matt. 5:44) — and public, or, at the time of Aquinas, religious enemies, against whom Christians have a right to fight a just war. For Schmitt, the modern state secularizes this distinction, but its borders correspond to the opposition between heathens and Christians. As Rousseau said:

La guerre n’est donc point une relation d’homme à homme, mais une relation d’État à État, dans laquelle les particuliers ne sont ennemis qu’accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni même comme citoyens, mais comme soldats; non point comme membres de la patrie, mais comme ses défenseurs.⁴²

[Thus, war is not at all a relation from man to man, but from State to State, in which the particular individuals are enemies only accidentally, not at all as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not at all as members of the fatherland, but as its defenders.]

For Schmitt, the partisan wages a just war because, as long as he defends his native soil, he stays within the boundaries of his state, whereas the world revolutionary represents the last stage of a long history of “depoliticization.” In this case, there is no *iustus hostis* any more, but only the good guys, us, and the bad guys, criminals, who are, by definition, *hors la loi*. Schmitt fights for the so-called Westphalian system, which was created in 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years’ War and which stipulated a new order of Europe according to the maxim *cuius regio eius religio* (whose realm, his religion). In this system it can sometimes be difficult to know who the enemy is, which was the problem faced, for instance, by General Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, the commander of the Prussian contingent in Napoleon’s Grande Armée on its Russian campaign. By signing the Convention of Tauroggen, in December 1812, Yorck concluded an armistice with the Russian General von Diebitsch because he had decided that Prussia’s “real enemy” was the French, and not the Russian state. Clausewitz, who had already made up his mind on the real enemy’s identity in the summer of the same year (“Political Declaration,” 285–303), was in Diebitsch’s entourage. Yorck knew all too well that his arbitrary transgression from the narrow boundaries of military service to the decision-making processes of foreign policy was nothing short of treason, which is why, in his letter to the king, he wrote

that he would be just as ready to die on the battlefield as with his back to a wall in front of a firing squad. When the Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm, heard of Yorck's unauthorized decision, he sure enough threatened to court-martial the disobedient general. But as the tide turned against Napoleon, Yorck was finally absolved when the Treaty of Kalisz placed Prussia on the side of Austria and Russia. He returned to Berlin in triumph.

Schmitt's reflections on the difference between *hostis* and *inimicus* throw a strange light upon one of the key terms of the field manual *Counterinsurgency*, the term "host nation."⁴³ It would be an interesting task to research who was the first to coin this seminal expression, which may very well contain one of the most important and wide-ranging objectives of U.S. foreign policy in our time. The earliest example I could find is a *White Paper* by Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer from 1980, which is quoted in Summers's book *On Strategy* (190 and 195). In his dissertation, David Petraeus uses the term already as if it went without saying and, above all, within a symptomatic context:

One conclusion may be that in some cases, contrary to prescriptions derived from the lessons of Vietnam, it would be better to use American soldiers in small numbers than "in strength" to assist a foreign government's counter insurgents. [...] while always remembering that it is the host country's war to win or lose. (Petraeus, 310)

The field manual states: "There are never enough linguists" (A-12),⁴⁴ and Table 5-1 contains the following warning about the treacherous nature of language:

Consider word choices carefully. Words are important — they have specific meanings and describe policy. For example, are counterinsurgents liberators or occupiers? Occupiers generate a "resistance," whereas liberators may be welcomed for a time. (Table 5-1)

One wonders whether this insight was ever applied to the manual's key term "host nation," which oscillates etymologically between two diametrically opposite meanings, namely between "host," in the sense of someone who welcomes and "hosts" a guest (and it should be noted here that the word "guest" is derived from the same root as host), and "hostile" in the sense of inimical. Be it intentional or not, the term "host nation" captures the ambiguous nature of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in foreign countries in an uncannily precise way. Whoever fights insurgents is not just once, but constantly faced with Yorck's question: Who is the real enemy? In such a fight, the distinction between friend and foe is never obvious or clear and can even shift on a sliding scale over time. In the words of the field manual: "As an insurgency ends, a defection is better than a surren-

der, a surrender better than a capture, and a capture better than a kill” (A-52).

I do not have the political and legal expertise to discuss all the implications of the term “host nation” within the limited space of this essay, but I dare make a few concluding remarks based on the following three quotes: “Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable worldwide” (U.S. Army FM 3-24, preface vii); “This publication’s purpose is to help prepare Army and Marine Corps leaders to conduct COIN operations anywhere in the world” (Introduction ix); and “Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors” (Foreword). The field manual *Counterinsurgency* never mentions the possibility that its principles might have to be applied on U.S. American soil. Insurgents are always on the other side, only to be found in foreign nations, and they are particularly prone to emerge in those nations that are threatened in their very essence: “new insurgencies typically emerged from civil wars or the collapse of states no longer propped up by Cold War rivalries. Power vacuums breed insurgencies” (1–21). However, there are also “outside actors [which] are often transnational organizations motivated by ideologies based on extremist religious or ethnic beliefs” (1–7) such as, for instance, “hard-core transnational terrorists” (1–79).

Just as for both Clausewitz and Schmitt, the crux of counterinsurgency doctrine is and remains the nation-state. Nation building tries either to restore or to export the Westphalian system: “Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist” (1–21). But in order to do that, U.S. troops have to operate “worldwide,” just like transnational terrorists, their fiercest opponents. And since “insurgencies often rely heavily on freedom of movement across porous borders” (1–99), which is the case right now at the borders between Iraq, Syria, and Iran, as well as between Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. counterinsurgents cannot always respect those boundaries in turn. Thus, national borders, which according to Leonard Cohen’s song are the partisan’s “prison,” must be at one and the same time violated and protected.

The times when the most advanced technical media were classified and for military use only are over. Today, insurgents and counterinsurgents share the same channels, and they both buy their equipment “off-the-shelf” (8–20). There is always a mirror relation at work. If the field manual states, “Insurgencies are often localized; however, most have national or international aspects to them” (3–175), then this is true for counterinsurgents as well. International law must be respected, but the regional nature of national laws has its advantages, too. If you want to deny the protection of supposedly universal human rights to your enemies, you can imprison

them in Guantanamo Bay, where the Marine Corps “undertook some of its earliest amphibious warfare exercises” in 1922 (Bickel, 57).

It remains to be seen whether the Westphalian system can survive such assaults from all sides, from terrorists and insurgents on the one hand, and from those who are fighting a war on terror on the other. Once this battle has been decided — provided it will ever come to an end — we will know what we mean when we talk of “globalization.”

Notes

¹ See Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz’s *On War*: Problems of Text and Translation,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 73.

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1976).

³ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 56; the original citation is on page 57 of Brodie’s introduction to *On War*.

⁴ The reference is to Raymond Aron, “On Dubious Battles,” *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College* 10.4 (Dec. 1980): 2–9.

⁵ “Wars of National Liberation” had been “announced by Khrushchev in January 1961, on the eve of President Kennedy’s inauguration” (Summers, 72).

⁶ U.S. Army Headquarters. *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>, December 2006. Foreword signed by David Petraeus, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Commander, and James F. Amos, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant. There is also a printed version on the market, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, IL: Chicago UP, 2007), but I prefer the pdf file because it is searchable.

⁷ See Hew Strachan, “Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 34.

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege. Vollständige Ausgabe im Urtext mit historisch-kritischer Würdigung*, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: F. Dümmler, 1952).

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, transl. O. J. Matthijs Jolles, quoted after Clausewitz, *On War*, 735n1. To this the editors and translators, Howard and Paret, add the following comment: “Of the several hundred alterations of the text that were introduced in the second edition of *On War*, and became generally accepted, this is probably the most significant change.”

¹⁰ Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Pimlico, 2002), 76.

¹¹ David Howell Petraeus, *The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era* (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1987).

¹² The relevant passage in Clausewitz is: “It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics — the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by laws of its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means” (731).

¹³ The formulation is an obvious allusion to the motto of Summers’s book: “‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said the American colonel [that is, Summers himself]. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be so,’ he replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant’” (Summers, 1).

¹⁴ It is a telling symptom of the changes that have occurred since the 1980s that in May 2009, Senator James Inhofe used the formula “the full spectrum of threats both in the near and the far term” in a congressional hearing in order to protest against Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s plans to enhance the counterinsurgency potential of the U.S. military at the expense of highly sophisticated weapons systems designed for conventional conflicts (quoted in Thomas Shanker, “Shopping for Unconventional War, Gates Visits Congress,” *New York Times*, 11 May 2009, A8). With the appointment of Lt. General Stanley A. McChrystal, a Green Beret and former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, as top American commander in Afghanistan the trend continued (see Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War. Worsening Conditions: Commando Operations Expert Is Chosen for ‘New Approach,’” *New York Times*, Tuesday, 12 May 2009, A1 and A10). But if that is a victory for the advocates of counterinsurgency warfare in the U.S. military, they still have to fight their opponents who opt for purely technical solutions à la Donald Rumsfeld; see the op-ed piece by David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency specialist and former advisor of General Petraeus, and Andrew McDonald Exum about the detrimental effects of Drone strikes across the Afghan border on the Pakistani population (David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” *New York Times*, 12 May 2009, Sunday Opinion 13).

¹⁵ Needless to say, these were the Reagan years.

¹⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), 15. Since both Carl Schmitt, “Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political” (*Telos* 127 [2004]: 11–78) and the translation by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos P Publishing, 2007) are unreliable, I prefer to give my own translations.

¹⁷ *Wikipedia*, s.v. “David Petraeus: Involvement in the Iraq War,” accessed May 2009, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Petraeus.

¹⁸ John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,” <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519foreword.html>, 6.

¹⁹ Heinrich von Bülow, *Geist des neueren Kriegssystems, hergeleitet aus dem Grundsatz einer Basis der Operationen* (Hamburg: 1799); Heinrich von Bülow, *Über Napoleon, Kaiser der Franzosen* (Berlin: 1804); Heinrich von Bülow, *Neue*

Taktik wie sie seyn sollte (Leipzig, 1805); Heinrich von Bülow, *Militärische und vermischte Schriften*, ed. Eduard Bülow and Wilhelm Rüstow (Leipzig: 1799).

²⁰ Clausewitz almost never quoted his sources (perhaps he did not find that necessary in an unfinished manuscript), but when he mentioned the “semibarbarous Tartars” (708), he certainly had von Bülow in mind, whose writings he had studied carefully.

²¹ See Heinrich von Kleist, “The Engagement in Santo Domingo,” in *Die Marquise von O. and Other Stories*, trans. Martin Greenberg (New York: Criterion Books, 1960), 193–228. See also Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History* (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 2009), and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), 104–38.

²² In *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten* (Berlin 1813), edict dated April 21.

²³ Martin van Creveld’s claim that Clausewitz is obsolete today because he supposedly knew little or nothing about low intensity conflicts is based on a very superficial reading: “The present volume has [. . .] a message — namely, that contemporary ‘strategic’ thought [. . .] is fatally flawed; and, in addition, is rooted in a ‘Clausewitzian’ world picture that is either obsolete or wrong. We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trade blocks, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups”; Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), xi. See also Christopher Bassford’s comments: “Creveld’s anti-Clausewitzian interpretation derives from the very much *pro*-Clausewitzian work of Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.” (80); Christopher Bassford, “Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz’s Thought,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 74–90.

²⁴ Howard and Paret translate the original “wunderlich” as “paradoxical.” Yet since the sense of the German word is very close to the English “to wonder,” I think the etymological relation between the two words should be stressed in the translation: The trinity makes you wonder.

²⁵ This question is widely discussed in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*. See Strachan 40–41. José Fernández Vega emphasizes the role of Johann G. C. Ch. Kiesewetter, who “not only disseminated Kantian theories but also collaborated with Kant in Berlin in the corrections for his last book, the *Critique of Judgment*,” and who was Clausewitz’s teacher at the War Academy in Berlin, José Fernández Vega, “War as ‘Art’: Aesthetics and Politics in Clausewitz,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 122–37 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 124; see also 131. On Hegel see Antulio J. II. Echevarria, “Clausewitz and the War on Terror” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 196–218 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), particularly 206–7.

²⁶ See Carl von Clausewitz, “Letter to Fichte (1809),” in *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992), 279–84.

²⁷ For a typical example of a rather naïve application of this distinction see Ulrike Kleemeier, “Moral Forces in War,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 10.

²⁸ Carnot’s writings have been published in two volumes under the title: Lazare Carnot, *Révolution et mathématique* (L’Herne: Collection Classiques de la Stratégie, Paris, vol. 1: 1984, vol. 2: 1985). For Carnot the theorist of fortifications, see *De la défense des places fortes* (2nd ed. 1811), vol. 2, pp. 23–84. For Carnot the administrator of the *levée en masse*, see, for but two examples, his letter to the representative Duquesnoy, dated 23 frimaire an II (December 13, 1793), and listed under the title “Tirailleurs en grand nombre,” vol. 2, p. 185; and his letter to the general Michaud, dated 10th germinal an II (March 30, 1794), and listed under the title “Défense stratégique, initiative tactique,” vol. 2, pp. 190–92. For Carnot the mathematician, see *Réflexions sur la métaphysique du calcul infinitésimal* (1787, 2nd ed. 1813), vol. 2, pp. 439–66. And for Carnot the physicist who paved the way for his son Nicholas Léonard Sadi Carnot’s seminal work *The Motive Power of Fire*, see *Principes fondamentaux de l’équilibre et du mouvement* (1803), vol. 2, pp. 476–91.

²⁹ I am not convinced by the attempt to turn Clausewitz into a precursor of complexity theory; see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz and the Non-Linear Nature of War: Systems of Organized Complexity,” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 45–56.

³⁰ Cf. “A *people in arms*, or home guard, may be listed as specific means of defense” (Clausewitz, 447).

³¹ An analysis of Jacques Derrida’s reading of Carl Schmitt would exceed the scope of this essay, but I should at least mention his suggestion that the loss of the clear distinction between friend and foe, which Schmitt conceives as a de-politicization of modernity, could be due to the rising influence of women in politics. Derrida even goes as far as to ask: “et si la femme était le partisan absolu?” (and what if woman were the absolute partisan?); see Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), 181–83.

³² Jost Trier, “Zaun und Mannring,” *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 66 (1942; repr. 1971): 60.

³³ Changing the singular “für jeden Partheigänger” (for every single partisan) into a plural Howard and Paret write: “for every *band of partisans*” (Clausewitz, 333; my emphasis).

³⁴ Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997), 14–19.

³⁵ Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 51.

³⁶ Cf. U.S. Army FM, Introduction, x. 3–5, 3–123, and 3–164, where the importance of “bottom-up” learning in counterinsurgency doctrine is emphasized repeatedly.

³⁷ Theodor Däubler, *Hymne an Italien* (Leipzig: Insel, 1924), 65–66.

³⁸ Claude Levi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949).

³⁹ The term “counterpropaganda” is only used once (U.S. Army FM, E-13).

⁴⁰ See George Schwab, “Enemy or Foe: A Conflict of Modern Politics,” *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987): 187–201.

⁴¹ Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Munich: Duncker & Humblodt, 1932), 16; my translation.

⁴² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Du contrat social,” bk. 1, chap. 4, “De l’esclavage,” in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 3, *Du contrat social. Écrits politiques*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964), 357; my translation.

⁴³ Less than a year before the new field manual was issued in December 2006, *Army Regulation 570-9: Host Nation Support* appeared on March 29 of the same year.

⁴⁴ It is obvious that the term linguist, within this context, is almost synonymous with translator.

Bibliography

- Adam, Wolfgang, and Holger Dainat, eds. *“Krieg ist mein Lied”: Der Siebenjährige Krieg in den zeitgenössischen Medien*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007.
- Addington, Larry H. *The Pattern of War since the Eighteenth Century*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo sacer. Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben*. Translated by Hubert Thüring. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002.
- Akademie der Künste Berlin, ed. *Berlin zwischen 1789 und 1848: Facetten einer Epoche*. Catalogue of an Exhibition at the Akademie der Künste, 30 August to 1 November 1981. Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1981.
- Amthor, Christoph Heinrich. “Die triumphirende Reinholds-Burg [. . .].” In *Auserlesene und theils noch nie gedruckte Gedichte [. . .] zusammen getragen und nebst seinen eigenen an das Licht gestellt von Menantes. Erstes Stück*, edited by Christian Friedrich Hunold, 18–41. Halle: Neue Buchhandlung, 1718.
- Angress, Werner T. “Das deutsche Militär und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg.” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 19 (1976): 77–146.
- . “Prussia’s Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer Controversy before World War I.” *Year Book Leo Baeck Institute* 17 (1972): 19–42.
- Anonymous. “Borussias in zwölf Gesängen.” *Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* 26, no. 2 (1796): 334–40.
- Anonymous. “Cüstine am Rheinstrome.” *Politische Annalen* 1 (Jan/Feb/March 1793): 412–35; edited by Christoph Girtanner.
- Anonymous. “Einige Bemerkungen über die Dienstverhältnisse im Militair.” *Neues militärisches Journal* 13 (1805): 1–53.
- Archenholz, Johann Wilhelm von. “Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland von 1756 bis 1763.” In *Aufklärung und Kriegserfahrung*, edited by Johannes Kunisch, 5–513. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1996.
- Arndt, Ernst Moritz. *Grundlinien einer teutschen Kriegsordnung*. Leipzig: Fleischer, 1813.
- Aron, Raymond. “On Dubious Battles.” *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College* 10, no. 4 (December 1980): 2–9.

- Atkins, Stuart. *Goethe's Faust: A Literary Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958.
- Barker-Benfield, G. J. *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1992.
- Bassford, Christopher. "Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz's Thought." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 74–90. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Baumstark, Reinhold. "Joseph-Denis Odevaere: 'Tod des Lord Byron,' 1826, Bruges, Groeningemuseum." In *Das neue Hellas: Griechen und Bayern zur Zeit Ludwigs I*, Catalogue of an exhibition of the Bayerisches Nationalmuseum Munich, 9 November 1999 to 13 February 2000, cat. no. 40, 235–37. Munich: Bayerisches Nationalmuseum, 1999.
- Baxmann, Inge. *Die Feste der Französischen Revolution: Inszenierung der Gesellschaft als Natur*. Weinheim: Beltz, 1989.
- Becker, Karl Wolfgang. "Nachwort." In *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben*, by Friedrich Christian Laukhard, edited by Karl Wolfgang Becker, 429–39. Leipzig: Kochler & Amelang, 1989.
- Belach, Andreas. *Nachtgedanken bey einer gefährlichen Reise in Kriegszeiten*. Breslau: Johann Ernst Meyer, 1761.
- Bell, David A. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.
- Benjamin, Walter. *Zur Kritik der Gewalt*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965.
- Benn, Gottfried. "Drei alte Männer. Zwei Gespräche" [1948]. In *Szenen/Dialoge/Das Unaufhörliche/Gespräche und Interviews/Nachträge/Medizinische Schriften*, edited by Holger Hof, vol. 7.1 of *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Gerhard Schuster and Holger Hof, 100–129. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003.
- Berg, Christa, August Buck, Christoph Führ, and Dieter Langewiesche, eds. *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, vol. 5. Munich: Beck, 1989.
- Berger, Louis. *Der alte Harkort*. Leipzig: Baedeker, 1895.
- Berglar, Peter. *Wilhelm von Humboldt*. 7th ed. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996.
- Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz and the Non-Linear Nature of War: Systems of Organized Complexity." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 45–56. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- . "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War." *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992–93): 59–90.
- Bickel, Keith B. *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940*. Boulder, CO: Westview P, 2001.

- Biesterfeld, Wolfgang. "Friedrich der Große als epischer Held: Daniel Jenischs 'Borussias' (1794)." In *Fridericianische Miniaturen 1*, edited by Jürgen Ziechmann, 171–80 and 235. Bremen: Edition Ziechmann, 1988.
- Birgfeld, Johannes. "Kriegspoesie für Zeitungsleser, oder Der Siebenjährige Krieg aus österreichischer Sicht: Michael Denis' *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa seit dem Jahre 1756 im Kontext des zeitgenössischen literarischen Kriegsdiskurses*." In "*Krieg ist mein Lied*": *Der Siebenjährige Krieg in den zeitgenössischen Medien*, edited by Wolfgang Adam and Holger Dainat, 215–39. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007.
- Blitz, Hans-Martin. *Aus Liebe zum Vaterland. Die deutsche Nation im 18. Jahrhundert*. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000.
- Bloom, Peter Anthony, and Hans Rudolf Vaegt. "Sardanapal — The French Connection: Unraveling *Faust II*, 10176." *Goethe Yearbook* 8 (1996): 252–70.
- Bobinac, Marijan. "Theodor Körner im kroatischen Theater." In *Porträts und Konstellationen 1: Deutschsprachig-kroatische Literaturbeziehungen*, edited by Marijan Bobinac. *Zagreber Germanistische Beiträge* 11 (2002): 59–96. <http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/MBobinac2.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2009).
- Bohnen, Klaus. "Von den Anfängen des 'Nationalsinns': Zur literarischen Patriotismus-Debatte im Umfeld des Siebenjährigen Kriegs." In *Dichter und ihre Nation*, edited by Helmut Scheuer, 121–37. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.
- Borsche, Tilman. *Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Munich: Beck, 1990.
- . "Wilhelm von Humboldt." In *Personen, Sachen, Begriffe A–K*, edited by Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Regine Otto, vol. 4.1 of *Goethe-Handbuch*, edited by Bernd Witte et al., 503–6. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998.
- Bottigheimer, Ruth B. *Grimms Bad Girls and Bold Boys: The Moral and Social Vision of the Tales*. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1987.
- Braker, Jürgen, ed. *Frieden für das Welttheater. Goethe — ein Mitwirkender, Beobachter und Vermittler zwischen Welt und Theater, Politik und Geschichte. Max Wegner zum 80. Geburtstag. Zur Sonderausstellung des Museums für Hamburgische Geschichte vom 26. November 1982 bis zum 27. März 1983*. Hamburg: Hamburger Museumsverein, 1982.
- Bräker, Ulrich. *Der arme Mann im Tockenburg*. Zurich: Diogenes, 1993.
- Brown, Jane K. "History and Historicity in Act II of *Faust, Part II*." *Goethe Yearbook* 2 (1984): 69–90.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History*. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 2009.
- Bülow, Heinrich von. *Geist des neueren Kriegssystems, hergeleitet aus dem Grundsätze einer Basis der Operationen*. Hamburg, 1799.

- . *Militärische und vermischte Schriften*. Edited by Eduard Bülow and Wilhelm Rüstow. Leipzig, 1853.
- . *Neue Taktik wie sie seyn sollte*. Leipzig, 1805.
- . *Über Napoleon, Kaiser der Franzosen*. Berlin, 1804.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth, and Thom Shanker. "Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War. Worsening Conditions: Commando Operations Expert Is Chosen for 'New Approach.'" *New York Times*, 12 May 2009, A1 and A10.
- Burg, Udo von der. "Als Nation null — zeitgenössische Gedanken Wilhelm von Humboldts zur Französischen Revolution in Briefen und Tagebuchnotizen der 90er Jahre." In *Erziehungsdenken im Bannkreis der Französischen Revolution*, edited by Kurt-Ingo Flessau and Friedhelm Jacobs, 149–69. Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1998.
- Burkhardt, Johannes. *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992.
- Burrow, John Wyon. Introduction to *The Limits of State Action*, by Wilhelm von Humboldt, edited by John Wyon Burrow, xvii–lviii. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993.
- Butler, Eliza M. *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence Exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1935 (abridged German translation under the title *Deutsche im Banne Griechenlands*. Berlin: Der Neue Geist, 1948).
- Campe, Rüdiger. "Die Sorge der Prinzessin und die Zukunft des Ereignisses." In *Wissen. Erzählen. Narrative der Humanwissenschaften*, edited by Arne Höcker, Jeannie Moser, and Philippe Weber, 65–82. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006.
- . *Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeit. Literatur und Berechnung zwischen Pascal und Kleist*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002.
- Carnot, Lazare. *Révolution et mathématique*. 2 vols. Paris: L'Herne, 1984–85.
- Carrière, Mathieu. *Für eine Literatur des Krieges*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990.
- Cassirer, Ernst. *Heinrich von Kleist und die Kantische Philosophie*. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1919.
- . *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1932.
- . *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Translated by Fritz C. A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1968.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

- Clark, Christopher. *Preußen: Aufstieg und Niedergang 1600–1947*. Translated by Richard Barth, Norbert Juraschitz, and Thomas Pfeiffer. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2007.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. "Letter to Fichte (1809). In *Historical and Political Writings*, edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, 279–84. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992.
- . *On War*. Translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles. New York: The Modern Library, 1943.
- . *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1976.
- . *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York, London, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf (Everyman's Library), 1993.
- . *Vom Kriege*. Bonn: Dümmlers, 1973.
- . *Vom Kriege*. Berlin: Ullstein, 1998.
- . *Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk*. Munich: Ullstein, 2002.
- . *Vom Kriege. Vollständige Ausgabe im Urtext mit historisch-kritischer Würdigung*. Edited by Werner Hahlweg. Bonn: F. Dümmler, 1952.
- Cowan, Marianne, ed. *Humanist without Portfolio: An Anthology of the Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Translated by Marianne Cowan. Detroit: MI: Wayne State UP, 1963.
- Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945*. London: Oxford UP, 1964.
- . "Wilhelm von Humboldt als Diplomat." In *Die Politik der Unpolitischen: Deutsche Schriftsteller und die Macht 1770–1871*, translated by Karl Heinz Siber, 111–35. Munich: dtv, 1996.
- Crevel, Martin van. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Cronegk, Johann Friedrich von. *Der Krieg. Ode*. [Place & publisher unknown], 1757.
- D'Aprile, Iwan. "Daniel Jenischs *Borussias* im Kontext der zeitgenössischen literarischen Debatten." In *Geist und Macht: Friedrich der Große im Kontext der europäischen Kulturgeschichte*, edited by Brunhilde Wehinger, 129–41. Berlin: Akademie, 2005.
- D'Aprile, Iwan, Martin Disselkamp, and Claudia Sedlarz, eds. *Tableau de Berlin. Beiträge zur »Berliner Klassik« (1786–1815)*. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005.
- D'Aprile, Iwan, and Conrad Wiedemann, eds. *Daniel Jenisch. Kant-Exeget, Popularphilosoph und Literat in Berlin*. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2010.
- Daston, Lorraine. *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988.

- Däubler, Theodor. *Hymne an Italien*. Leipzig: Insel, 1924.
- De Man, Paul. *Aesthetic Ideology*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996.
- De Thoyras, Paul Rapin. *The History of England*. Translated from French by Nicolas Tindal. Vol. 1. London: John and Paul Knapton, 1743.
- Decken, J. F. Graf von. "Verrätherei." *Neues militairisches Journal* 10 (1801): 56–84.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Lust und Begehren*. Translated by Hennig Schmidgen. Berlin: Merve, 1996.
- Denis, Michael. *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa, seit dem Jahr 1760*. 2 vols. Vienna: Joseph Kurtzböck, 1761.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Force of Law." In *Acts of Religion*, translated by Mary Quaintance, 230–98. New York and London: Routledge, 2002.
- . *Politics of Friendship*. Translated by George Collins. London: Verso, 1997.
- Dietrich, Gerhard and William Norvin, eds. *Die Briefe des Barthold Georg Niebuhr*. Vol. 2. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1926.
- Duffy, Christopher. *Friedrich der Große: Ein Soldatenleben*. Augsburg: Weltbild, 1994.
- Dunker, Ulrich. *Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten 1919–1938*. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977.
- Dyck, Joachim, ed. *Minna von Barnhelm oder: Die Kosten des Glücks, Komödie von Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Über Wirte als Spitzel, preußische Disziplin, Lessing im Kriege, frisches Geld und das begeisterte Publikum*. Berlin: Wagenbach, 1981.
- Dyer, Gwynne. *War: The Lethal Custom*. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004.
- Echevarria, Antulio J. II. "Clausewitz and the War on Terror." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 196–218. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Eckert, Georg, ed. *Von Valmy bis Leipzig: Quellen und Dokumente zur Geschichte der preußischen Heeresreform*. Hannover: Norddeutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955.
- Ellis, Elisabeth. *Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World*. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2005.
- Embsen, Johann Valentin. *Die Abgötterei unsers philosophischen Jahrhunderts. Erster Abgott: Ewiger Friede*. Mannheim: Schwan & Götz, 1779.
- Emrich, Wilhelm. "Kleist und die moderne Literatur." In *Heinrich von Kleist*, edited by Walter Müller-Seidel, 9–25. Berlin: Schmidt, 1962.
- . *Die Symbolik von Faust II: Sinn und Vorformen*. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1943.
- Errington, Lindsay. "Gavin Hamilton's Sentimental Iliad." *The Burlington Magazine* 120 (1978): 11–13.

- Etzersdorfer, Irene. *Krieg: Eine Einführung in die Theorie bewaffneter Konflikte*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2007.
- Fairley, Barker. *Goethe's Faust: Six Essays*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1953.
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Fichtes Werke*. Edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte. 6 Vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971.
- . *Reden an die deutsche Nation*. Introduction by Reinhard Lauth. 5th, revised ed. after the first ed. of 1808. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978.
- Fiedler, Siegfried. *Kriegswesen und Kriegführung im Zeitalter der Kabinettskriege*. Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986.
- Figal, Sara Eigen. "When Brothers Are Enemies: Frederick the Great's Catechism for War." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009): 21–36.
- Fink, Louis Gonthier. "The Fairy Tales of the Grimms' Sergeant of Dragoons J. F. Krause as Reflecting the Needs and Wishes of the Common People." In *The Brothers Grimm and the Folktale*, edited by James M. McGlathery, with Larry W. Danielson, Ruth E. Lorbe, and Selma K. Richardson, 146–63. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988.
- Fischer, Franz Louis. *Arbeiterschicksale*. Berlin: Buchverlag der Hilfe, 1906.
- Fischer, Horst. *Judentum, Staat und Heer in Preußen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert*. Tübingen: C. B. Mohr, 1968.
- Fischer-Lichte, Erika. *Heinrich von Kleist: Prinz Friedrich von Homburg*. Frankfurt am Main: Moritz Diesterweg, 1985.
- Flashar, Hellmut. "Wilhelm von Humboldt und die griechische Literatur." In *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Vortragszyklus zum 150. Todestag*, edited by Bernfried Schlerath, 82–100. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1977.
- . *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76*. Edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 1997.
- Frederick II. *Friedrichs des Zweiten Königs von Preussen bei seinen Lebzeiten gedruckte Werke. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt*. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voss und Sohn, 1790.
- . *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*. Ed. Johann D. E. Preuss. 31 vols. Berlin: Decker, 1846–56.
- . *Versuch über die Selbstliebe, als Grundsatz der Moral betrachtet. In der ordentlichen Versammlung der Königl. Preuß. Akademie der Wissenschaften Donnerstags den 11. Jänner 1770 abgelesen; Aus dem Französischen übersetzt*. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1770.
- Freese, Rudolf, ed. *Wilhelm von Humboldt, Sein Leben und Wirken, dargestellt in Briefen, Tagebüchern und Dokumenten seiner Zeit*. 2nd, completely revised and altered ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986.

- Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. *The French Revolutionary Wars*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.
- Freud, Sigmund. "Charakter und Analerotik." In *Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion*, vol. 7 of *Studienausgabe*, 23–30. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000.
- . "Jenseits des Lustprinzips." In *Psychologie des Unbewußten*, vol. 3 of *Studienausgabe*, 214–72. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000.
- . "The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy-Tales." In *Character and Culture*, translated by James Strachey, introduction by Philip Rieff, 59–66. New York: Scribner, 1963.
- Frevert, Ute. *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*. Translated by Andrew Boreham with Daniel Brückenhaus. Oxford: Berg, 2004.
- . *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland*. Munich: Beck, 2001.
- Frie, Ewald. *Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, 1777–1837: Biographie eines Preußen*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001.
- . "Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz: Militär, Gesellschaft und der Krieg." In *Macht- oder Kulturstaat?: Preußen ohne Legende*, edited by Bernd Heidenreich and Frank-Lothar Kroll, 55–66. Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Spitz, 2002.
- Gaier, Ulrich. *Fausts Modernität: Essays*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000.
- Gallagher, Catherine, and Stephen Greenblatt. *Practicing New Historicism*. Chicago, IL: Chicago UP, 2001.
- Gallas, Helga. *Kleist: Gesetz, Begehren, Sexualität: Zwischen symbolischer und imaginärer Identifizierung*. Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld, 2005.
- Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
- Gerig, Maya. *Jenseits von Tugend und Empfindsamkeit: Gesellschaftspolitik im Frauenroman um 1800*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2008.
- Gersdorff, Ursula von. *Frauen im Kriegsdienst 1914–1945*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969.
- Gerstenberg, Heinrich Wilhelm von. *Kriegeslieder eines Königl. Dänis. Grenadiers bey Eröffnung des Feldzuges 1762*. [Place & publisher unknown], 1762.
- Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*. Berlin, 1813.
- Glazinski, Bernd. *Antike und Moderne: Die Antike als Bildungsgegenstand bei Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Aachen: Shaker, 1992.
- Glover, Michael. *The Napoleonic Wars: An Illustrated History 1792–1815*. New York: Hippocrene, 1978.

- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *Briefe der Jahre 1821–1832*, vol. 4 of *Goethes Briefe und Briefe an Goethe*, Hamburger Ausgabe, edited by Karl Robert Mandelkow. Munich: dtv, 1988.
- . *Faust I & II*. Edited and translated by Stuart Atkins, vol. 2 of *Collected Works*. Boston: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1984.
- . *Goetz von Berlichingen with the Iron Hand*. In *Early Verse Drama and Prose Plays*, vol. 7 of *Collected Works*, translated by Cyrus Hamlin. New York: Suhrkamp, 1988.
- . *Götz von Berlichingen*. In *Werke*, vol. 4, 73–175. Munich: Beck, 1994.
- . *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*. Edited by Karl Richter. 21 vols. Munich: btb, 2006.
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, and Friedrich Schiller. *Distichen. Xenien*. In *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*. Vol 4.1. Edited by Reiner Wild, 754–830. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1988.
- Göhre, Paul. *Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter und Handwerksbursche*. Leipzig, 1891.
- Goldstein, Ludwig. *Heimatgebunden: Aus dem Leben eines alten Königsbergers*. Königsberg: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, XX, ms. 7, 1936.
- Goodden, Angelica. *Miss Angel: The Art and World of Angelica Kauffmann, Eighteenth-Century Icon*. London: Random House, 2006.
- Gouges, Olympe de. *Schriften*. Edited by Monika Dillier, Vera Mostowlansky, and Regula Wyss, trans. Vera Mostowlansky. Basel: Roter Stern, 1980.
- Grab, Walter. *Friedrich von der Trenck. Hochstapler und Freiheitsmartyrer und andere Studien zur Revolutions- und Literaturgeschichte*. Kronberg im Taunus: Scriptor, 1977.
- Grair, Charles A. “Seducing Helena: The Court Fantasy of *Faust II*, Act III.” *Goethe Yearbook* 10 (2001): 99–114.
- Grathoff, Dirk. “Heinrich von Kleist und Napoleon Bonaparte, der Furor Teutonicus und die ferne Revolution.” In *Heinrich von Kleist. Kriegsfall — Rechtsfall — Sündenfall*, edited by Gerhard Neumann, 31–59. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1994.
- Gray, A. M. *Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1. Warfighting*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1986.
- Griffith, Paddy. *The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789–1802*. London: Greenhill Books, 1998.
- Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm. *The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*. Edited and translated by Jack Zipes, 2 vols. New York: Bantam Books, 1988.
- . *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. 13. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854–1960.

- . *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*. Edited Heinz Rölleke, 3 vols. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980.
- Grube, Karl. *Wilhelm von Humboldts Bildungsphilosophie: Versuch einer Interpretation*. Halle an der Saale: Akademischer Verlag, 1935.
- Gwisdek, Michael, dir. *Treffen in Travers*. 1988.
- Haberkern, Ernst. *Limitierte Aufklärung. Die protestantische Spätaufklärung in Preußen am Beispiel der Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft*. Marburg: Tectum, 2005.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight." In *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 113–54. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1997.
- Hacking, Ian. *The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference*. London: Cambridge UP, 1975.
- Hagemann, Karen. "'Heran, heran, zu Sieg oder Tod!' Entwürfe patriotisch-wehrhafter Männlichkeit in der Zeit der Befreiungskriege." In *Männergeschichte — Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne*, edited by Thomas Kühne, 51–68. New York: Campus, 1996.
- . *Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002.
- . "Of 'Manly Valor' and 'German Honor': Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon." *Central European History* 30 (1997): 187–220.
- Hahn, Barbara. *Unter falschem Namen: Von der schwierigen Autorschaft von Frauen*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.
- Hamm, Heinz. *Goethes Faust: Werkgeschichte und Textanalyse*. Berlin: Volk und Wissen, 1981.
- Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. "The Depths of the Heights: Reading Conrad with America's Soldiers." *Profession* (2008): 74–82.
- Harppecht, Klaus. *Georg Forster oder Die Liebe zur Welt. Eine Biographie*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1987.
- Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, vol. 1. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
- . *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*. Vol. 7 of *Werke*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976.
- . *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977.

- Heinrich, Klaus. "Theorie des Lachens." In *Lachen — Gelächter — Lächeln: Reflexionen in drei Spiegeln*, edited by Dieter Kamper and Christoph Wulf, 17–38. Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1986.
- Herbig, Katherine L. "Chance and Uncertainty in *On War*." In *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, edited by Michael I. Handel, 95–116. London: Frank Cass, 1986.
- Herder, Johann Gottfried. *Der deutsche Nationalruhm. Eine Epistel*. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1812.
- Hermsdorf, Klaus. *Literarisches Leben in Berlin: Aufklärer und Romantiker*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987.
- Herrmann, Hans Peter, Hans-Martin Blitz, and Susanna Moßmann, eds. *Machtphantasie Deutschland. Nationalismus, Männlichkeit und Fremdenhaß im Vaterlandsdiskurs deutscher Schriftsteller des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996.
- Heuser, Beatrice. *Reading Clausewitz*. London: Pimlico, 2002.
- Heuser, Magdalene. "Nachwort." In *Romane und Erzählungen*, by Therese Huber. 2 vols., edited by Magdalene Heuser, 347–89. Hildesheim: Olms, 1989.
- Heuser, Magdalene, Julia Klöppel, and Daniel Benedict. "Georg Forster und das Treffen in Travers: Literarischer und filmischer Zugriff auf einen Stoff aus der Zeit der Französischen Revolution." *Das 18. Jahrhundert* 27, no. 11 (2003): 110–21.
- Heyne, Christan Leberecht. *Anton Wall's Kriegslieder*. Leipzig, 1779.
- Hoffmeister, Gerhart. "The French Revolution and Prose Fiction: Allegorization of History and Its Defeat by Romance." In *Romantic Prose Fiction*, edited by Gerald Gillespie, Manfred Engel, and Bernard Dieterle, 1–21. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2008.
- Hölderlin, Friedrich. *Sämtliche Werke*. Edited by Friedrich Beissner, 8 vols. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1965.
- Homer. *The Iliad of Homer*. Translated by Alexander Pope, edited by Maynard Mack. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1967. Reprinted, 1993.
- . *The Iliad of Homer*. Translated by Alexander Pope, with notes by the Rev. Theodore Alois Buckley, MA, FSA, and Flaxman's Designs. 1899. www.gutenberg.org.
- . *Ilias, Odyssee*. Translated by Johann Heinrich Voss. 2 vols. Essen: Emil Vollmer, 1996.
- Honig, Jan Willem. "Clausewitz's *On War*: Problems of Text and Translation." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. 57–73. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Houben, Heinrich Hubert. *Hier Zensor — wer dort? Der gefesselte Biedermeier*. Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1990.

- Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford UP, 2002.
- . *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1976.
- Huber, Therese. *Briefe, Bd. 1: 1774–1803*. Edited by Magdalena Heuser with Corinna Bergmann-Törner, Diane Coleman-Brandt, Jutta Harmeyer, and Petra Wulbusch. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1999.
- . *Briefe, Bd. 2: 1804–Juni 1807*. Edited by Magdalena Heuser, Petra Wulbusch, Andrea Kiszio, Jessica Kewitz, Diane Coleman-Brandt. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2003.
- . *Briefe, Bd. 4: 1810–Juni 1811*. Edited by Petra Wulbusch. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1999.
- . *Briefe, Bd. 5: 1812–Juni 1815*. Edited by Petra Wulbusch, Magdalena Heuser, and Andrea Kiszio. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2005.
- . *Die Familie Seldorf*. Vol. 1 of *Romane und Erzählungen*, edited by Magdalene Heuser; vol. 7 of *Frühe Frauenliteratur in Deutschland*, edited by Anita Runge. Hildesheim: Olms, 1989.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von. *Aeschylus Agamemnon metrisch übersetzt*. Leipzig: Fleischer, 1816.
- . *Briefe*. Ed. Wilhelm Rössle. Munich: Hanser, 1952.
- . *Briefe an eine Freundin*. Edited by Joachim Lindner. Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1986; English: *Letters of Wilhelm von Humboldt to a Female Friend*. Edited by Charlotte Diede, translated by Catharine M. A. Couper, 2 vols. London: John Chapman, 1849.
- . *Briefe an Friedrich August Wolf*. Edited by Philip Mattson. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990.
- . *Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Schiller und Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Edited by Siegfried Seidel. 2 vols. Berlin: Aufbau, 1962.
- . *Federn und Schwerter in den Freiheitskriegen: Briefe von 1812–1815*. Vol. 4 of *Wilhelm und Caroline von Humboldt in ihren Briefen*, edited by Anna von Sydow, 7 vols. Berlin: Mittler, 1910.
- . *Gedichte*. Edited by Albert Leitzmann; vol. 9 of Abt. 1: *Werke of Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: B. Behr's Verlag (Friedrich Feddersen), 1912.
- . "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen." In *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, edited by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 56–233. Darmstadt: WBG, 1960.
- . *Kleine Schriften, Autobiographisches, Dichtungen, Briefe, Kommentare und Anmerkungen zu Band 1–5, Anhang*. Vol. 5 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Edited by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel. 2nd, rev. and enlarged ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002.
- . *The Limits of State Action*. Edited and translated by John Wyon Burrow. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993.

- . *Schriften zur Altertumskunde und Ästhetik. Die Vasken*. Vol. 2 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Edited by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 4th ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986.
- . *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*. Vol. 1 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Edited by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 3rd ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980.
- . *Schriften zur Politik und zum Bildungswesen*. Vol. 4 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel. 5th ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996.
- . *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*. Vol. 3 of *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Edited by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel. 8th ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996.
- Ingrao, Charles W. *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1987.
- Irmscher, Johannes, with Renate Johné, eds. *Lexikon der Antike*. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1990.
- Jacob, Ludwig Heinrich. “Über Theorie und Praxis in Kants Schrift ‘Zum ewigen Frieden.’” In *Ewiger Friede? Dokumente einer deutschen Diskussion um 1800*, edited by Anita and Walter Dietze, 208–13. Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 1989.
- Jansen, Christian, ed. *Der Bürger als Soldat. Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert*. Essen: Klartext, 2004.
- Janssen, Wilhelm. “Johann Valentin Embser und der vorrevolutionäre Bellizismus in Deutschland.” In *Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution: Studien zum bellizistischen Diskurs des ausgehenden 18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts*, edited by Johannes Kunisch and Herfried Münkler, 43–56. Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1999.
- Jenisch, Daniel. *Ausgewählte Texte*. Edited and with an afterword by Gerhard Sauer. St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1996.
- . *Borussias in zwölf Gesängen*. Vol. 1: I.–VI. *Gesang*. Vol. 2: VII.–XII. *Gesang*. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Himburg, 1794.
- . “D. M. Josephi Secundi. Imperatoris romani. S.” *Deutsche Monatsschrift* 1, no. 3 (1790): 65–96.
- . “Die französische Revoluzion, was sie war, und was sie geworden ist. Eine Threnodie.” *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 3, no. 3 (1793): 260–75.
- . “Friedrich, der große Mann seines Jahrhunderts. Ein lyrisches Gedicht in vier Gesängen vom Herrn Prediger Jenisch. 1st & 2nd canto.” *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung* 2 (1789): 246–64.
- . “Friedrich, der große Mann seines Jahrhunderts. Ein lyrisches Gedicht in vier Gesängen vom Herrn Prediger Jenisch. 3rd & 4th canto.” *Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung* 3 (1790): 43–64.

- . *Geist und Charakter des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, politisch, moralisch, ästhetisch und wissenschaftlich betrachtet*. 3 vols. Berlin: Königl. Preuß. Akad. Kunst- und Buchhandlung, 1800/1800/1801.
- . “Hymnus auf das Fest der Freyheit, von der französischen Nation den 14. Julius 1790 in Paris gefeiert.” *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 2, no. 1 (1791): 403–10.
- . *Litterarische Spiessruthen. Oder die hochadligen und berüchtigten Xenien*. Weimar: Rein, 1797.
- . “Probe eines Heldengedichts, Borussias, oder der siebenjährige Krieg in acht Gesängen.” *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 1, no. 2 (1790): 276–98 and 329–48.
- . “Das veredelte Menschengeschlecht: Fragment aus dem IX. Gesang der Borußias. Ein profetisches Gesicht des verklärten Kleist.” *Der neue Teutsche Merkur* 5., no. 1 (1794): 217–34.
- Johnston, Otto W. *The Myth of a Nation: Literature and Politics in Prussia under Napoleon*. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1989.
- Jomini, Antoine Henri. *The Art of War*. Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977.
- . *Summary of the Art of War or a New Analytical Compend of the Principal Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy*. Translated by O. F. Winship and E. E. Mc Lean. New York: Putnam & Co, 1854.
- Kachler, Siegfried A. *Wilhelm von Humboldt und der Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte deutscher Lebensgestaltung um 1800*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1927.
- Kahn, David. “Clausewitz and Intelligence.” In *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, edited by Michael I. Handel, 117–26. London: Frank Cass, 1986.
- Kant, Immanuel. “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” In *Practical Philosophy*, translated by Mary J. Gregor, 11–22. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1996.
- . “Contest of the Faculties, Part 2.” In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld; translated by David Colclasure, 150–63. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2006.
- . *Critique of Judgement*. Translated by J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner, 1951; rpt 1974.
- . *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2000.
- . *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*. Edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968; Reprint, 1974.

- . “Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right.” In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld; translated by David Colclasure, 110–49. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2006.
- . *Project for a Perpetual Peace*. First English translation. London: S. Couchman for Vernor and Hood, 1796.
- . *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. Translated by Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2003.
- . “Toward Perpetual Peace.” In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld; translated by David Colclasure, 67–109. New Haven: Yale UP, 2006.
- . *Werke*. Ed. Rolf Tomann. 6 vols. Cologne: Könnemann, 1995.
- . “Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf.” In *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*, vol. 6 of *Werke*, 6 vols., edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, 195–251. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.
- Kauffmann, Angelica. “*Mir träumte vor ein paar Nächten ich hätte Briefe von Ihnen empfangen.*” In *Gesammelte Briefe in den Originalsprachen*, edited by Waltraud Maierhofer. Lengwil: Libelle, 2001.
- Kaufmann, Stefan. *Kommunikationstechnik und Kriegführung 1815–1945: Stufen telemedialer Rüstung*. Munich: Fink, 1996.
- Kayka, Ernst. *Kleist und die Romantik*. Berlin: Duncker, 1906.
- Kehlmann, Daniel. *Die Vermessung der Welt*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2005.
- Keller, Werner. *Aufsätze zu Goethes Faust II*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991.
- Kelletat, Alfred, ed. *Der Göttinger Hain*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1967.
- Kilcullen, David, and Andrew McDonald Exum. “Death from Above, Outrage Down Below.” *The New York Times*, 12 May 2009, Sunday Opinion 13.
- Kittler, Friedrich A. “Ein Erdbeben in Chili und Preußen.” In *Positionen der Literaturwissenschaft*, edited by David E. Wellbery, 24–38. Munich: Beck, 1993.
- Kittler, Wolf. *Die Geburt des Partisanen aus dem Geist der Poesie: Heinrich von Kleist und die Strategie der Befreiungskriege*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1987.
- Kleemeier, Ulrike. “Moral Forces in War.” In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 107–21. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Kleist, Heinrich von. *An Abyss Deep Enough*. Translated by Philip B. Miller. New York: Dutton, 1979.

- . "The Engagement in Santo Domingo." In *Die Marquise von O. and Other Stories*. Translated by Martin Greenberg. 193–228. New York: Criterion Books, 1960.
- . *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. 4 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1997.
- . *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. Edited by Helmut Sembdner. 2 vols. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1993.
- . *Selected Writings*. Translated by David Constantine. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2004.
- Klemperer, Victor. *Curriculum Vitae. Jugend um 1900*. Vol. 1. Berlin: Siedler, 1989.
- Kleßmann, Eckart, ed. *Die Befreiungskriege in Augenzeugenberichten*. Munich: dtv, 1973.
- Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb. "Hermanns Schlacht. Ein Bardiet für die Schaubühne." Vol. 4 of *Klopstocks Gesammelte Werke*. Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1888.
- . *Oden*. Hamburg: J. J. C. Bode, 1771.
- Knight, Carlo, ed. *La "Memoria delle piture" di Angelica Kauffman*. Rome and London: Edizioni De Luca and Royal Academy, 1998.
- Koehler, Benedikt. "Gescheiterte Utopie: Adam Müller und die politische Romantik in Berlin." In *Berlin zwischen 1789 und 1848: Facetten einer Epoche*. Ed. Akademie der Künste Berlin, Catalogue of an Exhibition at the Akademie der Künste, 30 August to 1 November 1981, 26–36. Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1981.
- Köhler, Gerhard, and Ansgar Klein. "Politische Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts." In *Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, edited by Hans-Joachim Lieber, 259–656. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1991.
- Koselleck, Reinhard. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of the Modern World*. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1988.
- Kozłowski, Lisa. "Terrible Women and Tender Men: A Study of Gender in Macpherson's *Ossian*." In *From Gaelic to Romantic: Ossianic Translations*, edited by Fiona J. Stafford and Howard Gaskill, 119–36. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998.
- Kraake, Swantje. *Frauen zur Bundeswehr — Analyse und Verlauf einer Diskussion*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992.
- Krimmer, Elisabeth. "Female War Stories: Violence and Trauma in Works by Therese Huber and Caroline de la Motte-Fouque." *Internationales Jahrbuch der Bettina-von-Arnim-Gesellschaft* 17 (2005): 123–35.
- . "The Gender of Terror: War as (Im)Moral Institution in Kleist's *Hermannsschlacht* and *Penthesilea*." *The German Quarterly* 81, no. 1 (2008): 66–85.

- . *In the Company of Men: Cross-Dressed Women around 1800*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 2004.
- . "A Portrait of War, a Grammar of Peace: Goethe, Laukhard, and the Campaign of 1792." *German Life and Letters* 61, no. 1 (2008): 46–60.
- . *The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010.
- Kroll, Frank-Lothar. *Geschichte Hessens*. Munich: Beck, 2006.
- Lacan, Jacques. "Kant with Sade." In *Écrits*, translated by Bruce Fink, 645–68. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.
- Lange, Samuel Gotthold. "Der Sieg bey Friedberg, Gesungen im Jun. 1745." In *Horatizische Oden und eine Auswahl aus des Quintus Horatius Flaccus Oden fünf Bücher*, edited by Frank Jolles, 29–38. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1971.
- Lange, Viktor. "Faust: Der Tragödie zweiter Teil." In *Goethes Dramen: Neue Interpretationen*, edited by Walter Hinderer, 281–312. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980.
- Laplace, Pierre-Simone. *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*. Translated by Frederick W. Truscott and Frederick L. Emory. New York: Dover Publications, 1951.
- Latacz, Joachim, Theiry Greub, et al., eds. *Homer — Der Mythos von Troja in Dichtung und Kunst*. Basel: Hirmer, 2008.
- Latzel, Klaus. *Vom Sterben im Krieg: Wandlungen in der Einstellung zum Soldatentod vom Siebenjährigen Krieg bis zum II. Weltkrieg*. Warendorf: Fahlbusch, 1988.
- Laukhard, Friedrich Christian. *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben*. Edited by Karl Wolfgang Becker. Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1989.
- Lenz, Jakob Michael Reinhold. *Die Soldaten. Text, Materialien, Kommentar*. Edited by Edward McInnes. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1977.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude. *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949.
- Liberty Fund. Online Library of Liberty. http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fperson=3789&Itemid=28 (accessed 27 February 2010).
- Lichte, Erika Fischer. *Heinrich von Kleist: Prinz Friedrich von Homburg*. Frankfurt am Main: Moritz Diesterweg, 1985.
- Löbker, Friedgar. *Antike Topoi in der deutschen Philhellenenliteratur: Untersuchungen zur Antikerezeption in der Zeit des griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1821–1829)*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000.
- Lohmeyer, Dorothea. *Faust und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung*. Munich: dtv, 1977.
- Luther, Martin. *Der kleine Katechismus. Nach der Ausgabe v. j. 1536*. Edited by Otto Albrecht. Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1905.

- . *The Small Catechism. Triglot Concordia: The Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church: German-Latin-English*. St. Louis, MI: Concordia Publishing House, 1921. <http://bookofconcord.org/smallcatechism.php> and in German at <http://bookofconcord.org/german-sc.php>.
- Liotard, Jean-Francois. *Die Analytik des Erhabenen: Kant-Lektionen*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994.
- MacLeod, Catriona. *Embodying Ambiguity: Androgyny and Aesthetics from Winckelmann to Keller*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 1998.
- Macpherson, James. *The Poems of Ossian: To which are Prefixed a Preliminary Discourse and Dissertation on the era and Poems of Ossian*. Edited by Hugh Blair. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, 1851.
- Mai, Ekkehard, and Anke Repp-Eckert, eds. *Triumph und Tod des Helden: Europäische Historienmalerei von Rubens bis Manet*. Exhibition catalogue. Milan and Cologne: Electa & Museen der Stadt Köln, 1987.
- Maierhofer, Waltraud. "The Death of the Immortal Hero: The Original Illustrations of Schiller's *History of the Thirty Years' War*." In *Word and Image in the Eighteenth Century: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*, edited by Renata Schellenberg and Christina Ionescu, 268–91. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars P, 2008.
- . *Hexen — Huren — Heldenweiber: Bilder des Weiblichen in Erzähltexten über den Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Literatur — Kultur — Geschlecht)*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2005.
- . "Krieg und Frieden in Gemälden und Briefen Angelika Kauffmanns." *Jahrbuch des Vorarlberger Landesmuseumsvereins* (Bregenz, Austria) (1997): 87–107.
- . "Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples: The 'Devil's Grandmother' Fights Napoleon." In *Women Against Napoleon*, edited by Waltraud Maierhofer, Gertrud M. Rösch, and Caroline Bland, 57–78. New York: Campus, 2007.
- Maierhofer, Waltraud, Gertrud M. Rösch, and Caroline Bland, eds. *Women against Napoleon: Historical and Fictional Responses to His Rise and Legacy*. New York: Campus, 2007.
- Maler, Anselm. "Versepos." In *Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur*, vol. 3.2: *Deutsche Aufklärung bis zur Französischen Revolution*, edited by Rolf Grimminger, 365–422. Munich: Carl Hanser, 1984.
- Malter, Rudolf. "Nachwort." In *Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, edited by Rudolf Malter, 69–85. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1995.
- Manners, Victoria, and Georg Charles Williamson. *Angelica Kauffmann: Her Life and Her Works*. London: John Lane, 1924; rpt New York: Hacker Art Books, 1976.
- Martin, Dieter. *Das deutsche Versepos im 18. Jahrhundert: Studien und kommentierte Gattungsbibliographie*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993.

- . “Klopstocks *Messias* und die Verinnerlichung der deutschen Epik im 18. Jahrhundert.” In *Klopstock an der Grenze der Epochen*, edited by Kevin Hilliard and Katrin Kohl, 97–116. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995.
- Marwitz, Friedrich August Ludwig von der. *Nachrichten aus meinem Leben: 1777–1808*. Edited by Günter de Bruyn. Berlin: Der Morgen, 1989.
- Marx, Stefanie. *Beispiele des Beispiellosten: Heinrich von Kleists Erzählungen ohne Moral*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1994.
- McGlathery, James M. *Grimms’ Fairy Tales: A History of Criticism on a Popular Classic*. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993.
- Mehigan, Tim. “Kleist, Kant und die Aufklärung.” In *Heinrich von Kleist und die Aufklärung*, edited by Tim Mehigan, 3–21. New York: Camden House, 2000.
- Menze, Clemens. “Humboldt und die Französische Revolution.” *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts* (1987): 158–93.
- . “Der Krieg unter der Idee der Bildung: Zu Wilhelm von Humboldts Kriegsverständnis.” *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 75 (1999): 325–37.
- . “Wilhelm von Humboldts Theorie aller Reformen.” *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 62, no. 1 (1986): 52–79.
- Mommsen, Katharina. “Faust II als politisches Vermächtnis des Staatsmannes Goethe.” *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts*, 1–36. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989.
- . *Kleists Kampf mit Goethe*. Heidelberg: Stiehm, 1974.
- Mortimer, Geoff. *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618–48*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
- Moser, Christian. *Verfehlte Gefühle: Wissen-Begehren-Darstellen bei Kleist und Rousseau*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1993.
- Moser, Johann Jakob. *Von dem Bruder-Titul unter großen Herrn, besonders denen gecrönten Häuptern*. Frankfurt an der Oder, 1737.
- Müller, Adam. *Elemente der Staatskunst: Sechsenddreißig Vorlesungen*. New edition of the 1936 Meersburg reprint of the original Berlin edition of 1808–1809. Berlin: Haude und Spener, 1968.
- Müller, Klaus-Jürgen. *Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1987.
- Müller-Schmid, Peter Paul. “Adam Müller (1779–1826).” In *Politische Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts: Konservatismus — Liberalismus — Sozialismus*, edited by Bernd Heidenreich, 2nd, completely revised edition, 109–38. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2002.
- Münkler, Herfried. *Die neuen Kriege*. Berlin: Rowohlt, 2002.
- . *Über den Krieg: Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion*. Weilerswist: Velbrueck, 2002.

- Muth, Ludwig. *Kleist und Kant: Versuch einer neuen Interpretation*. Cologne: Kölner Universität Verlag, 1954.
- Myrone, Martin. *Bodybuilding: Reforming Masculinities in British Art 1750–1810*. Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2005.
- Nagel, Ivan. *Johann Heinrich Dannecker: Ariadne auf dem Panther: Zur Lage der Frau um 1800*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993.
- Nagl, John A. "The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency." <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519foreword.html>.
- Natter, Tobias G., ed. *Angelica Kauffman: A Woman of Immense Talent*. Ostfildern: Hatje-Cantz, 2007.
- Neumann, Gerhard. "Anekdote und Novelle: Zum Problem der Mimesis im Werk Heinrich von Kleists." In *Heinrich von Kleist und die Aufklärung*, edited by Tim Mehigan, 129–57. New York: Camden House, 2000.
- Nicolai, Friedrich. *Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung, über meine Kenntniß der kritischen Philosophie und meine Schriften dieselbe betreffend, und über die Herren Kant, J. B. Erhard, und Fichte*. Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1799.
- Niekerk, Carl H. "Sexual Imagery in Goethe's *Faust II*." *Seminar* 33, no. 1 (1997): 1–21.
- Nieraad, Jürgen. "Apotheosen des Untergang: das Erhabene." *Compar(a)ison* 2 (1996): 19–35.
- Olenhusen, Irmtraud Götz von. "Vom Jungstahlhelm zur SA: Die junge Nachkriegsgeneration in den paramilitärischen Verbänden der Weimarer Republik." In *Politische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik*, edited by Wolfgang Krabbe, 146–83. Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1993.
- Orthenburg, Georg. *Waffe und Waffengebrauch im Zeitalter der Kabinettskriege (1650–1792)*. Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1986.
- Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State*. New York: Oxford UP, 1976.
- . *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories and His Times*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985.
- . *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2007.
- . *Understanding War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992.
- Paretti, Sandra. *Der Winter, der ein Sommer war*. Munich: Bertelsmann, 1972.
- Patitz, Ingrid. *Ewald von Kleists letzte Tage und sein Grabdenkmal in Frankfurt an der Oder*. Frankfurt an der Oder: Kleist-Museum, 1994.
- Patsch, Hermann. "Daniel Jenisch." In vol. 24 of *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz and Traugott Bautz,

- columns 195–906. Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2005. Qtd. from http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/j/jenisch_d.shtml.
- Peitsch, Helmut. “Die Revolution im Familienroman: Aktuelles politisches Thema und konventionelle Romanstruktur in Therese Hubers *Die Familie Seldorf*.” *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 28 (1984): 248–69.
- Petraeus, David Howell. *The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era*. PhD diss., Princeton University, 1987.
- Pfeffel, Gottlieb Conrad. “Lied eines Neger-Sklaven im Anfang des nordamerikanischen Krieges.” In *Deutsche Gedichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, edited by Klaus Bohnen, 33–35. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000.
- Phillips, James. *The Equivocation of Reason: Kleist Reading Kant*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007.
- Plessen, Marie-Louise von, ed. *Idee Europa: Entwürfe zum “Ewigen Frieden”: Ordnungen und Utopien für die Gestaltung Europas von der pax romana zur Europäischen Union*. Berlin: Henschel/Deutsches Historisches Museum, 2003.
- Plutarch. *Plutarch's Lives*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Vol. 4. 1920. Reprint, London: William Heinemann, 1959.
- Poe, Edgar Allan. “Murders in The Rue Morgue.” In *Poe's Tales of Mystery and Imagination*, edited by Pádraic Colum, 378–410. London: Aldine Press, 1959.
- Porter, Theodore. *The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820–1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1986.
- Portmann-Tinguely, Albert. *Romantik und Krieg: Eine Untersuchung zum Bild des Krieges bei deutschen Romantikern und “Freiheitssängern”: Adam Müller, Joseph Görres, Friedrich Schlegel, Achim von Arnim, Max von Schenkendorf und Theodor Körner*. Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitäts-Verlag, 1989.
- Preusser, Heinz-Peter, and Udo Franke-Penski, eds. *Amazonen — Kriegerische Frauen*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2008.
- Propp, Vladimir. *Morphology of the Folktale*. Vol. 9 of The American Folklore Society Bibliographical and Special Series; Pub. 10 of The Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics. Translated by Lawrence Scott; introduction by Svatava Pirkóva Jakobsen and Alan Dundes; preface by Louis A. Wagner, 2nd edition. Austin: U of Texas P, 1968.
- Rennhak, Katharina, and Virginia Richter, eds. *Revolution und Emanzipation: Geschlechterordnungen in Europa um 1800*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2004.
- Ritter, Gerhard A., and Klaus Tenfelde. *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 bis 1914*. Bonn: Dietz, 1992.
- Rohkrämer, Thomas. *Der Militarismus der “kleinen Leute”: Die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1914*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990.

- Röhrich, Lutz. *Folktales and Reality*. Translated by Peter Tokofsky. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979.
- Rölleke, Heinz. *Die Märchen der Brüder Grimm: Eine Einführung*. Munich: Artemis, 1985.
- Rosenblum, Nancy L. "Romantic Militarism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43, no. 2 (1982): 249–68.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Napoleonic Wars*. London: Cassell, 2004.
- Rotteck, Karl von. *Stehende Heere und Nationalmiliz*. Freiburg: Herdersche Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1816.
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques. "Du contrat social." Bk. 1, ch. 4: "De l'esclavage." In *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 3: *Du contrat social. Écrits politiques*, edited by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond. 347–470. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964.
- Roworth, Wendy W., ed. *Angelica Kauffmann: A Continental Artist in Georgian England*. London: Reaktion, 1992.
- Rüdiger, Horst. "Wilhelm von Humboldt als Übersetzer." *Imprimatur* 7 (1936/37): 79–96.
- Rüter, Angelika. "'Individuum', 'Nation', 'Staat' — Zum Status der Begriffe im Werk Wilhelm von Humboldts." In *Multum — non multa?: Studien zur "Einheit der Reflexion" im Werk Wilhelm von Humboldts*, edited by Peter Schmitter, 67–84. Münster: Nodus, 1991.
- Ryan, Lawrence. "Zur Kritik der Gewalt bei Heinrich von Kleist." *Kleist Jahrbuch* 1981/82: 349–57.
- Sack, Johann August. 1 January 1811. *Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin Dahlem*. Rep. 74, O.O. nr. 4, vol. 1.
- Saine, Thomas P. *Black Bread — White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution*. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1988.
- Saint-Amand, Pierre. *Laws of Hostility: Politics, Violence, and the Enlightenment*. Translated by Jennifer C. Gage. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996.
- Sandner, Oscar, ed. *Hommage an Angelika Kauffmann*. Exhibition catalogue. Milano: Nuova Mazzotta, 1992.
- Sauder, Gerhard. "Daniel Jenisch." In *Literatur Lexikon: Autoren und Werke deutscher Sprache*, edited by Walther Killy, vol. 6, 95. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1990.
- . "Nachwort." In *Jenisch, Daniel. Ausgewählte Texte*, edited by Gerhard Sauder, 103–15. St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1996.
- Saure, Felix. "'... Meine Grille von der Ähnlichkeit der Griechen und der Deutschen': Nationalkulturelle Implikationen in Wilhelm von Humboldts Antikekonzept." In *"Die Ideale der Alten": Antikerezeption um 1800*, edited by Veit Rosenberger, 113–29. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008.

- Sauter, Christina M. *Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Aufklärung*. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989.
- Sauter-Bergerhausen, Christina. "Vom 'Blutigen Krieger' zum 'friedlichen Pflüger': Staat, Nation und Krieg in Wilhelm von Humboldts 'Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen,'" *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 12 (2002): 211–62.
- Scarry, Elaine. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987.
- Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, ed. *Neues militärisches Journal*. 13 vols. Hannover, 1788–1805.
- . "Ueber die Vor- und Nachtheile der stehenden Armeen." *Neues militärisches Journal* 6 (1792): 234–54.
- Scheyb, Franz Christoph von. *Theresiade. Ein Ehren-Gedicht*. 2 vols. Vienna: Johann Jacob Jahn, 1746.
- Schiller, Friedrich. *Gedichte*. Vol. 1 of *Sämtliche Werke in zehn Bänden*, edited by Hans-Günther Thalheim. Berlin: Insel, 2005.
- . *Gedichte, Dramen 1*. Edited by Albert Meier. Vol. 1 of *Sämtliche Werke*, 5 vols., edited by Peter-André Alt, Albert Meier, and Wolfgang Riedel. Munich: dtv, 2004.
- Schilling, René. "Körner Superstar: Freiheitskämpfer, Kriegsheld, arische Lichtgestalt und Vorbild des DDR-Soldaten — die Geschichte einer deutschen Leitfigur." *Die Zeit*, 16 November 2000. <http://www.zeit.de/zeit-laeufte/koerner> (accessed 27 February 2010).
- Schlaffer, Heinz. *Faust Zweiter Teil: Die Allegorie des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1981.
- Schlegel, Friedrich. *Schriften: Kritische Ausgabe*. 35 vols. Munich: Schöningh, 1958.
- Schmidt, Georg. *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*. Munich: Beck, 2006.
- . "Teutsche Kriege: Nationale Deutungsmuster und integrative Wertvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Reich." In *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, edited by Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt, 33–61. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000.
- Schmidt, Jochen. *Goethes Faust Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen — Werk — Wirkung*. Munich: Beck, 2001.
- Schmidt-Linsenhoff, Viktoria, ed. *Sklavin oder Bürgerin? Französische Revolution und Neue Weiblichkeit 1760–1830*. Frankfurt am Main: Jonas, 1989.
- Schmitt, Carl. *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1932.

- . *Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963.
- . "Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political." *Telos* 127 (2004): 11–78.
- . *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. Translated by G. L. Ulmen. New York: Telos P Publishing, 2007.
- Schoeps, Hans-Joachim. *Preußen: Geschichte eines Staates*. Berlin: Ullstein, 1997.
- Schöne, Albrecht. *Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust: Kommentare*. Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2003.
- Schormann, Gerhard. *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.
- Schubart, Christian Friedrich Daniel. *Deutsche Chronik: Eine Auswahl aus den Jahren 1774–1777 und 1787–1791*. Edited by Evelyn Radczun. Leipzig: Reclam, 1988.
- . "Kaplied." In *Deutsche Gedichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Edited Klaus Bohnen, 343–45. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000.
- Schumann, Dirk. "Einheitssehnsucht und Gewaltakzeptanz. Politische Grundpositionen des deutschen Bürgertums nach 1918." In *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung: Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, edited by Hans Mommsen, 83–105. Cologne: Böhlau, 2000.
- Schwab, George. "Enemy or Foe: A Conflict of Modern Politics." *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987): 187–201.
- Schwab, Michael. *Erinnerungen*. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munich, Dept. IV, Manuscript 3432.
- Schwartz, Paul. *Der erste Kulturkampf in Preußen um Kirche und Schule (1788–1798)*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1925.
- Scuria, Herbert. *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Werden und Wirken*. Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1976.
- Sembdner, Helmut, ed. *Heinrich von Kleists Lebensspuren: Dokumente und Berichte der Zeitgenossen*. Munich: dtv Klassik, 1996.
- Serres, Michel. *The Parasite*. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982.
- Seume, Johann Gottfried. *Mein Leben. Nebst der Fortsetzung von G. J. Göschen und C. A. H. Clodius*. Edited by Jörg Drews. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990.
- Shanker, Thomas. "Shopping for Unconventional War, Gates Visits Congress." *The New York Times*, 11 May 2009, A8.
- Shannon, Claude E. "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems." In *Claude E. Shannon, Collected Papers*, edited by N. J. A. Sloane and Aaron D. Wymer, 84–143. New York: IEEE P, 1993.

- . *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1949.
- Shay, Jonathan. *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. New York: Scribner, 1994.
- . *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming*. Foreword by Senators John McCain and Max Cleland. New York: Scribner, 2002.
- Simpson, Patricia Anne. *The Erotics of War in German Romanticism*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2006.
- Smith, Helmut Walser. *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2008.
- Smith, Hugh. *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas*. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2005.
- Smith, Steven B. "Hegel's Views on War, the State, and International Relations." *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1983): 624–32.
- Soeding, Ellen. *Die Harkorts*. Vol. 2. Münster, 1957.
- Speelman, Patrick. *Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.
- Spickernagel, Ellen. "Groß in der Trauer: Die weibliche Klage um tote Helden in Historienbildern des 18. Jahrhunderts." In *Sklavin oder Bürgerin? Französische Revolution und Neue Weiblichkeit 1760–1830*, edited by Victoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff, 308–24. Marburg: Jonas, 1989.
- Starkey, Armstrong. *War in the Age of the Enlightenment, 1700–1789*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- Steinberg, Heinz. *Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Berlin: Stapp, 2001.
- Steinmetz, Ralf-Henning. "Goethe, Guibert und Carl von Österreich: Krieg und Kriegswissenschaft im vierten Akt von *Faust II*." *Goethe Jahrbuch* 111 (1994): 151–70.
- Stephan, Inge. "Die Debatte über die Beziehungen zwischen Literatur, Aufklärung und Revolution am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland." In *Revolution und Demokratie in Geschichte und Literatur: Festschrift für Walter Grab*, edited by Julius H. Schoeps and Immanuel Geiss, 41–59. Duisburg: Walther Braun, 1979.
- . "Gender als Kategorie in der Literaturwissenschaft." *Zeitschrift für Germanistik* 1 (1999): 23–35.
- . "Kunstepoche." In *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 182–230. 7th ed. Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008.
- . *Medea: Multimediale Karriere einer mythologischen Figur*. Cologne: Böhlau. 2006.

- . "Revolution und Konterrevolution: Therese Hubers Roman *Die Familie Seldorf* (1795/96)." In *Der deutsche Roman der Spätaufklärung: Fiktion und Wirklichkeit*, edited by Harro Zimmermann, 171–94. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1990.
- Stephens, Anthony. *Kleist — Sprache und Gewalt*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1999.
- Strachan, Hew. *Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege*. Translated by Karin Schuler. Munich: dtv, 2008.
- . "Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 14–44. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Sturz, Peter Helfrich. "Briefe, im Jahre 1768 auf einer Reise im Gefolge des Königs von Dänemark geschrieben." In *Schriften*. Leipzig, 1779/82; rpt. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1971.
- Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.
- Sweet, Paul R. *Wilhelm von Humboldt: A Biography*. 2 vols. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1978.
- Tatar, Maria. *The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy Tales*. Expanded 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003.
- Treitschke, Heinrich von. *Politik: Vorlesungen*. Edited by Max Cornicelius. 2 vols. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1899, 1900.
- Treusch-Dieter, Gerburg. *Von der sexuellen Rebellion zur Gen- und Reproduktionstechnologie*. Tübingen: Claudia Gehrle, 1990.
- Trier, Jost. "Zaun und Mannring." *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 66 (1942; rpt 1971): 232–65.
- U.S. Army Headquarters. *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>, December 2006. Foreword signed by David Petraeus, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Commander, and James F. Amos, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant.
- The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2007.
- Vaget, Hans. "Goethe's Faust Today: A Post-Wall Reading." In *Interpreting Goethe's Faust Today*, edited by Jane K. Brown, Meredith Lee, and Thomas P. Saine, 42–58. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1994.
- Vaisse, Maurice, ed. *Aux armes, citoyens! Conscription et armée de métier des Grecs à nos jours*. Paris: Colin, 1998.
- Vaupel, Rudolf, ed. *Die Reorganisation des preussischen Staates unter Stein und Hardenberg*, Vol. 2.1. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1938.

- Vega, José Fernández. "War as 'Art': Aesthetics and Politics in Clausewitz." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 122–37. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Virgil. *The Aeneid*. Translated by Edward McCrorie. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1995.
- Voltaire. "La Tactique." In *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*. Edited by Louis Moland. Vol. 10. Paris: Garnier Freres, 1877.
- Wagner, Hans-Josef. *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Anthropologie und Theorie der Menschenkenntnis*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002.
- Warner, Marina. *From the Beast to the Blond: On Fairy Tales and Their Tellers*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994.
- Wawro, Geoffrey. *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Wegner, Karl-Hermann. *Kurbessens Beitrag für das heutige Hessen*. Wiesbaden: Hessische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1999.
- Weigley, Russell Frank. *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004.
- Weiß, Christoph. "Krieg gegen die Aufklärer: Carl Friedrich Bahrds Kritik der Wöllnerschen Repressionspolitik." In *Carl Friedrich Bahrds (1740–1792)*, edited by Gerhard Sauder and Christoph Weiß, 318–51. St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1992.
- Welcker, Carl. "Anhang zum Artikel Heerwesen (Landwehrsystem)." In *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. Carl von Rotteck and Carl Welcker, 7:589–607. Altona: Johann Friedrich Hammerich, 1839.
- Weniger, Erich. *Goethe und die Generäle*. Leipzig: Insel, 1942.
- Wenk, Silke. *Versteinerte Weiblichkeit: Allegorien in der Skulptur der Moderne*. Cologne: Böhlau, 1996.
- Westphalen, Ludger Graf von, ed. *Die Tagebücher des Oberpräsidenten Ludwig Freiherrn Vincke 1813–1818*. Münster, 1980.
- Williams, John R. "Die Deutung geschichtlicher Epochen im zweiten Teil des *Faust*." *Goethe Jahrbuch* 110 (1993): 89–103.
- Wilson, Peter H. *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- . *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009.
- Wittkowski, Wolfgang. "Goethe, Schopenhauer und Fausts Schlußvision." *Goethe Yearbook* 5 (1990): 232–68.
- Zammito, John. *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1992.

- Zedler, Johann Heinrich. *Grosses vollständiges Universallexikon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*. Halle und Leipzig, 1731–54. <http://www.zedler-lexikon.de>.
- Ziemann, Benjamin. “Republikanische Kriegserinnerung in einer polarisierten Öffentlichkeit: Das Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold als Veteranenverband der sozialistischen Arbeiterschaft.” *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998): 357–98.
- Zimmermann, Rolf Christian. “Goethes *Faust* und die Wiederbringung aller Dinge: Kritische Bemerkungen zu einem unkritisch aufgenommenen Interpretationsversuch.” *Goethe Jahrbuch* 111 (1994): 171–85.
- . “Goethes Humanität und Fausts Apotheose: Zur Problematik der religiösen Dimension von Goethes *Faust*.” *Goethe Jahrbuch* 115 (1998): 125–46.
- Zipes, Jack. “Once There Were Two Brothers Named Grimm.” In Grimm and Grimm, *The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*, 1:xi–xxviii.
- Zucchi, Giuseppe Carlo. *Memorie istoriche di Maria Angelica Kauffmann Zucchi riguardanti l'arte della pittura da lei professata scritte da G. C. Z.* Edited by Helmut Swozilek. Bregenz: Vorarlberger Landesmuseum, 1999.
- Zupanè, Alenka. “Die Logik des Erhabenen.” In *Kant und das Unbewusste*, edited by Mladen Dolar, vol. 4 of *Wo Es war*, edited by Slavoj Žižek. Vienna: Turia & Kant, 1994.

Contributors

JOHANNES BIRGFELD, PhD, teaches Modern German Literature at Saarland University in Saarbrücken. His recent publications include *Das Unterhaltungsstück um 1800* (2007, coedited with Claude D. Conter); *Christian Kracht* (2009; coedited with Claude D. Conter); *Krieg und Aufklärung* (2010); and *August von Kotzebue Werklexikon* (2011; coedited with Alexander Koenig and Julia Bohnengel). His main research areas are eighteenth- and twentieth-century German literature, contemporary German literature, and the history of German drama and theater.

DAVID COLCLASURE is an independent scholar and has most recently published a book on the philosophy of literature entitled *Habermas and Literary Rationality* (2010). His new translation of nine political texts by Immanuel Kant is entitled *Immanuel Kant: Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings* (2006). His research interests focus on German philosophy from the eighteenth century to the present, and he has also published articles on Austrian and German literature and literary theory. His recent teaching in the field of German studies has included contemporary politics and policy in Germany.

SARA FIGAL, most recently assistant professor of German at Vanderbilt University, has written extensively on eighteenth-century ideas of community, focusing particularly on conflicts of inclusion and exclusion, war, and peace. She identified and elucidated theories of community, kinship, and race in her monograph *Heredity, Race, and the Birth of the Modern* (2008) and in her coedited volume *The German Invention of Race* (2006; paperback 2007). Her contribution to the current volume reflects an ongoing engagement with questions of perpetual war and Enlightenment ideas of peace, also developed in her article "When Brothers Are Enemies: Frederick the Great's Catechism for War," which appeared in *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009). Figal has also written on film, the history of medicine, and the figure of the Circassian woman in Western literature and scientific writing.

UTE FREVERT is director at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and scientific member of the Max Planck Society. She was a

professor of German history at Yale University from 2003 to 2007 and taught history at the universities of Konstanz and Bielefeld and at the Free University in Berlin. Some of her best-known work has examined the history of women and gender relations in modern Germany, social and medical policy in nineteenth-century Germany, and the impact of military conscription on German society from 1814 to the present day. Her classic study of the duel was praised for superbly connecting cultural and social history. Her most recent work analyzes the political, social, and cultural representations of trust and honor. Her book on European identifications looks at nineteenth- and twentieth-century transnationalism as an experience of mutual encounters and influences, of exclusion and inclusion, of trust and distrust. She is an honorary professor at the Free University in Berlin and member of several scientific boards, and she was awarded the prestigious Leibniz Prize in 1998.

WOLF KITTLER is professor of Germanic, Slavic, and Semitic studies and comparative literature at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has taught at the universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Konstanz, and Munich, and at Cornell University. His publications include books on Kafka and Kleist, as well as multiple publications on Western literature, philosophy, and technology from antiquity to the present. His research focuses on cultural history, literature, art, philosophy, history of science, technology, warfare, and law.

ELISABETH KRIMMER is professor of German at the University of California, Davis. She is the author of *In the Company of Men: Cross-Dressed Women around 1800* (2004) and *The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present* (2010), and coauthor (with Susanne Kord) of *Hollywood Divas, Indie Queens and TV Heroines: Contemporary Screen Images of Women* (2004). She has published numerous articles on German literature and was awarded the essay prize of the Goethe Society of North America in 2006 and the Max Kade prize for best article in the *German Quarterly* in 2010. Her most recent project explores concepts of masculinity in recent Hollywood film.

WALTRAUD MAIERHOFER is professor of German at the University of Iowa. She is the author of *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre und der Roman des Nebeneinander* (1990) and has published widely on narrative prose, focusing on the Age of Goethe. Her interdisciplinary interests resulted in a "Rowohlt Bildmonographie" on the painter Angelika Kauffmann (1997) and editions of Kauffmann's letters (1999 and 2001). Her work on historical fiction on the Thirty Years' War (*Hexen — Huren — Heldenweiber*, 2005) was supported by the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation. Her recent book publications include *Florenz* (2007), an edition of a travel

guide to Florence with anecdotes by Adele Schopenhauer, as well as an edition of the libretto to the opera *Circe*, by Pasquale Anfossi, in the translation by Goethe and Vulpius. She coedited a collection of articles entitled *Women Against Napoleon* (2007) and collaborated with Astrid Klocke on a college textbook for introductory courses on German literature from 1750 to the present, *Deutsche Literatur im Kontext* (2009).

ARNDT NIEBISCH is assistant professor of German and European studies at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. He received his PhD from the Department of German and Romance Languages and Literatures at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, with a dissertation on the noise aesthetics of Italian Futurism and German Dadaism. He is currently working on an edition of the scientific and technical writings of the Dadaist Raoul Hausmann. His research interests focus on the intersection of literature, science, and technology.

FELIX SAURE received his PhD from Philipps-Universität Marburg in 2005 with a dissertation on the German architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel (book forthcoming). He worked at the Institut für Neuere deutsche Literatur at Philipps-Universität Marburg from 2000 to 2009 and is presently Studienrat in Hamburg. His teaching and research interests include eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature and culture, culture and national identity, politics and contemporary German drama, Wilhelm von Humboldt, the literature of the GDR, and cultural representation of migration. He is currently working on articles about Weimar classicist Carl August Böttiger and on GDR novels about the Napoleonic Wars. Saure's recent publications include articles on the nexus of sports, Greek antiquity, and national identity from Winckelmann to Turnvater Jahn, and on Karl Friedrich Schinkel.

GALILI SHAHAR is professor of comparative literature at the Tel Aviv University. His research interests focus on German and Jewish literature and thought. His publications include *Verkleidungen der Aufklärung: Narrenspiele und Weltanschauung in der Goethezeit* (2006), *theatrum judaicum: Denkspiele im deutsch-jüdischen Diskurs der Moderne* (2007) and articles on Kafka.

PATRICIA ANNE SIMPSON is associate professor of German studies at Montana State University, Bozeman, where she is also German section coordinator. She is the author of *The Erotics of War in German Romanticism* (2006), coeditor of *The Enlightened Eye: Goethe and Visual Culture* (2007), and coeditor of the *Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture* (2009–11). Simpson has also published numerous articles and book chapters on contemporary literature, music,

and film. She is currently completing a book manuscript entitled *Cultures of Violence in the New German Street*. Simpson served as executive secretary for the Goethe Society of North America and as a member of the Executive Board of the German Studies Association. In addition, she is the principal investigator and project director for a U.S. Department of Education Title VI grant in undergraduate international studies and foreign languages. She is also the librettist for a new opera based on the Orpheus myth; *Schau nicht zurück, Orfeo!* premiered in Nuremberg in July 2010.

INGE STEPHAN is professor of German literature and gender studies at Humboldt University, Berlin, emerita since 2009. Her recent publications include *Inszenierte Weiblichkeit: Codierung der Geschlechter in der Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts* (2004); *Medea: Multimediale Karriere einer mythologischen Figur* (2006); and she has coedited numerous volumes, including *Männlichkeit als Maskerade: Kulturelle Inszenierungen vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (2003), *Meisterwerke: Deutschsprachige Autorinnen im 20. Jahrhundert* (2005), *Gender Studien: Eine Einführung* (2006), *NachBilder des Holocaust* (2007); *NachBilder der RAF* (2008); *NachBilder der Wende* (2008), *Gender@Wissen: Eine Handbuch der Gender-Theorien* (2009), *Carmen. Ein Mythos in Literatur und Kunst* (2010), and *Freud und die Antike* (2010).

Index

- Abel, Friedericke Sophie, 67n14
 Aeschylus, 42, 84, 99n43
 Aeschylus, works by: *Agamemnon*, 42, 66n6, 77, 75–101, 198
 Agamben, Giorgio, 122n12
 Alexander the Great, the (Alexander III of Macedonia), 129
 Amazons, 175–91
 Anthor, Christoph Heinrich, 71n45
 Angress, Werner T., 236n12
 Aprile, Iwan d', 43, 66n10, 72n61
 Aquinas, Thomas, 298
 Archenholz, Johann Wilhelm von, 54, 55–56, 58, 69n32, 71nn50–51
 Archenholz, Johann Wilhelm von, works by: *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, 55, 58, 69n32
 Aristotle, 42
 Aristotle, works by: *Ethics*, 42
 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 8, 92, 165, 223
 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, works by: *Grundlinien einer deutschen Kriegsordnung*, 236n6
 Arnim, Achim von, 11, 97n31, 161
 Aron, Raymond, 279, 301n4
 Atkins, Stuart, 134, 148n12, 148n16

 Baumstark, Reinhold, 98n38
 Baxmann, Inge, 191n17
 Belach, Andreas, 57, 71n52
 Bell, David, 6, 16, 17n12, 38n5 78, 96, 154, 169n10
 Bell, David, works by: *The First Total War*, 16
 Benjamin, Walter, 107, 122n11
 Benn, Gottfried, 75; on Goethe, 75, 136
 Benn, Gottfried, works by: “Drei alte Männer,” 75
 Bentham, Jeremy, 170n17
 Berglar, Peter, 75, 94n3
 Bernoulli, Daniel, 271
 Bertani, Mauro, 10, 18n21, 304n34
 Bettelheim, Bruno, 169n14
 Beyerchen, Alan, 263–65, 267, 276n10, 304n29
 Bible, 34; Hebrew Bible, 30; King James Translation, 30, 31, 34; Luther Bible, 26
 Bickel, Keith, 294–95, 301, 304n35
 Biester, Johann Erich, 42
 Biesterfeld, Wolfgang, 43, 66n8
Bildung, 8, 12, 13, 65n3, 75, 78–100, 104, 115
Bildungsroman, 124n25
 Birgfeld, Johannes, 12, 41–72
 Blitz, Hans-Martin, 26, 39n7, 72n57
 Blomberg, Werner von, 233
 Bloom, Peter Anthony, 150n31
 Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von, 140, 141
 Bohnen, Klaus, 26, 39n8, 99n47
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 1, 8–9, 16, 17n12, 38n5, 82, 91–92, 96n16, 98n37, 104, 106, 110, 113–15, 121n4, 132–33, 140, 144–45, 149n23, 153, 160, 168n3, 169n10, 170n21, 207, 215, 218n35, 221, 224–26, 258, 260, 262, 278n26, 287–92, 299, 302n19; Napoleonic Wars, 2–5, 17n12, 91, 103, 111, 153, 215, 218n36, 232, 275n3, 286
 Borsche, Tilman, 94n6
 Bottigheimer, Ruth B., 164, 171n25
 Bracker, Jörgen, 100–101n59
 Bräker, Ulrich, 85, 99n48
 Braunschweig, Christian von, 2
 Brentano, Clemens, 10, 161

- Brentano-von Arnim, Bettina, 11, 166
 Brodie, Bernard, 279, 301n3
 Brown, Jane K., 135, 149n27
 Brühl, Friedrich von, 281
 Büchner, Georg, works by: *Woyzeck*, 111
 Buck-Morss, Susan, 287, 303n21
 Buffon (Georges-Louis Leclerc), 51
 Bülow, Heinrich von, 275n4, 287, 302–3n19
 Burg, Udo von der, 100n58
 Burkhardt, Johannes, 17n10
 Burrow, John Wyon, 79, 96, 101
 Butler, Eliza M., 76
 Butler, Eliza M., works by: *Tyranny of Greece over Germany*, 76, 94n4
 Butler, Lady Elisabeth, 196
 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 83, 98n38, 137–39, 147
- Caesar, Gaius Julius, 128
 Calvin, Johannes, 34
 Campe, Rüdiger, 272–73, 277n20
 Canova, Antonio, 215n28
 Carnot, Lazare, 304
 Carriera, Rosalba, 192
 Carrière, Mathieu, 123n23
 Cassirer, Ernst, 32, 121n2, 124n31
 Cimbala, Stephen J., 263, 276n9
 Clark, Christopher, 94n8
 Classicism, 4, 9, 11–12, 43, 73–240, 103, 214; Berlin Classicism, 64; war against Classicism, 103; Weimar Classicism, 1
 Clausewitz, Carl von, 4, 10, 13, 15–16, 17n2, 82, 150n38; communication theory, 265–68, 276–77n14; correspondence with Fichte, 303n26; and counterinsurgency, 279–307; and Enlightenment, 260–63, 289; friction, 15, 220, 259, 261, 262–68, 276n11; Goethe, Fichte, and, 128, 142–47; and mathematical probability, 258–78; and warfare, 91, 100n57
 Clausewitz, Carl von, works by: *Historical and Political Writings*, 303n26; *Vom Kriege (On War)*, 15, 100n57, 150n37, 270, 275, 301n2
 Clausewitz, Marie von (née Brühl), 281
 Chodowiecki, Daniel, 196
 Colclasure, David, 15, 123, 241–57
 Complexity Theory, 15, 258–60, 262–65
 Coriolanus, Caius Marcianus, 197–98
 Cowan, Marianne, 83, 84, 95n9, 97n26, 98n40
 Craig, Gordon A., 94n7, 235n2
 Creveld, Martin van, 303n23
 Cronegk, Johann Friedrich, 57, 71n47
 Cross-dressing, 185–87
 Cunego, Domenico, 195
- Dalrymple, Robert, 215
 Danton, Georges Jacques, 64
 Daston, Lorraine, 271, 273, 277
 Däubler, Theodor, 305n37
 David, Jacques-Louis, 207, 215
 de Man, Paul, 119, 125n36
 Decken, Johann Friedrich von, 158, 170n19
 Deleuze, Gilles, 111, 123n23
 Denis, Michael, 52, 64, 70n42
 Denis, Michael, works by: *Poetische Bilder der meisten kriegerischen Vorgänge in Europa*, 52
 Derrida, Jacques, 122n13, 304n31
 Diebitsch, Hans Karl Friedrich Anton von, 298
 Dietrich, Gerhard, 226
 Disselkamp, Martin, 72n61
 Diterich, Johann Samuel, 42, 65n4
 Duffy, Christopher, 55, 68n26, 69n28
 Duhan, Charles Egide, 50–53, 58
 Dunker, Ulrich, 237n23
 Dyck, Joachim, 100n55
 Dyer, Gwynne, 17n9
- Edson, Merritt, 294
 Edward I of England, 202–3
 Eichendorff, Joseph von, 82
 Elisabeth of Russia (Elizaveta Petrovna), 51, 53
 Ellis, Elisabeth, 242, 245, 257n4

- Embsen, Johann Valentin, 12, 22–25, 38n3, 78
- Embsen, Johann Valentin, works by:
Die Abgötterei unseres philosophischen Jahrhunderts. Erster Abgott: Ewiger Friede, 38n3
- Emrich, Wilhelm, 127, 133, 136, 148n7
- Engel, Johann Jakob, 65n2
- Enlightenment, 4, 9–16, 17–73, 170n15, 175, 177, 192–93, 214, 258–60, 273–74, 277n19; anti-enlightenment, 41, 42; *Bildung* and, 79; Clausewitz and, 260–63, 289; counter enlightenment, 104, 110; discourse of, 2, 22, 193; Kant and, 109–10, 116, 123n16, 193, 216n5, 242; late enlightenment, 41–42, 63–64; military enlightenment, 21, 38; paradox of, 11, 32
- Errington, Lindsay, 216n11
- Etzersdorfer, Irene, 100n57, 102n73
- Exum, Andrew McDonald, 302n14
- Fairley, Barker, 129, 148n9
- Ferdinand VII of Spain, 131
- Fermat, Pierre, 271
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 8, 98n36, 100n56, 128, 142, 150n36, 289; correspondence with Clausewitz, 303n26; ideas on war, 142–48
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, works by:
Reden an die Deutsche Nation, 83, 98n36, 144
- Figal, Sara Eigen, 12, 21–40, 157
- Fischer, Franz Louis, 230–31
- Fischer-Lichte, Erika, 122n9
- Flashar, Hellmut, 95n12
- Flaxman, John, 194
- Fontane, Theodor, 102
- Fontana, Alessandra, 10, 18n21, 304n34
- Forster, Georg, 176
- Foucault, Michel, 9, 10, 18n21, 131, 149n18, 293, 304n34
- Frederick the Great (Frederick II of Prussia), 3, 11–12, 16, 21–40, 50, 260
- Frederick the Great (Frederick II of Prussia), works by: *Catéchisme de morale à l'usage de la jeune noblesse* (*Moral Catechism for the use of Young Nobles*), 34, 36; *Examen de l'essai sur les préjugés* (*Examination of the Essay on Prejudices*), 22; *Instruction our la direction de l'académie des nobles à Berlin* (*Instructions for the Direction of the Academy for Nobles in Berlin*), 35; *Principes généraux de la guerre* (*General Principles of War*), 29, 38n1; *Reflexions sur la tactique* (*Study of War*), 28–29, 39n11; *Self-Love as a Moral Principle*, 34, 36, 40n19
- Freese, Rudolf, 79, 81, 92, 95–96n15, 98n41, 99n42, 99n49, 102n75
- Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, 4, 17n7
- Freud, Sigmund, 114, 124n24, 125n33, 169n14, 296
- Freud, Sigmund, works by: “Charakter und Analerotik (“Character and Anal Eroticism”), 114; “Jenseits des Lustprinzips” (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle”), 123n19
- Frevert, Ute, 2, 14, 17n5, 153–54, 168n3, 169n9, 219–37
- Frie, Ewald, 101n69
- Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia, 221, 288
- Fröbel, Friedrich, 82
- Gaier, Ulrich, 134, 148n11
- Gaillard, Gabriel-Henri, 23
- Gallagher, Catherine, 104, 122n5
- Gallas, Helga, 123n22, 124n28
- Gates, Robert, 302n13
- Gedike, Friedrich, 42
- Gerig, Maya, 191n13
- Gersdorff, Ursula von, 237n24
- Gleim, Johann Wilhelm Ludwig, 52, 69n30
- Gneisenau, August Neidhard von, 10, 84, 106, 222, 235, 287; correspondence with Wilhelm von Humboldt, 82

- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 1, 11, 43, 66n6, 75, 85, 94, 100n54, 121, 126–51, 147; and *Bildungsroman*, 124n25; conversation with Eckermann, 126, 130–31, 138, 140; correspondence with Humboldt, 76, 92; correspondence with Kleist, 124nn27–28; correspondence with Johann Friedrich Rochlitz, 126; correspondence with Zelter, 149n19; on Fichte and Clausewitz, 142–47; interpretation of Hamlet, 115; on Jenisch, 43, 47; and Kleist, 103, 115; on Lord Byron, 137–39; and militarism, 1; and war, 126, 128; on warfare and the sublime, 127, 147
- Goethe, Johann, Wolfgang von, works by: *Campagne in Frankreich*, 127; *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, 141; *Distichen. Xenien*, 43, 66n7, 68n23; *Faust I*, 127; *Faust II*, 13, 126–51; *Götz von Berlichingen*, 108–9, 114, 122n14, 123n15; *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, 115; *Letters*, 140, 147n2; *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, 115
- Göhre, Paul, 236n15
- Goldstein, Ludwig, 231, 236n18
- Goodden, Angelica, 216n4
- Görres, Joseph, 76, 97
- Gouges, Olympe de, 187–88, 191n14
- Goya, Francisco, 287
- Grab, Walter, 72n60, 189n1
- Grair, Charles A., 136
- Grathoff, Dirk, 121
- Greenblatt, Stephen, 104, 122n5
- Griffith, Paddy, 3, 17n8
- Grimm, Wilhelm, and Jakob Grimm, 12, 14, 151–70
- Grimm, Wilhelm, and Jakob Grimm, works by: “Der Bärenhäuter” (“Bearskin”), 152, 155, 156, 163–66, 168n6; *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 30, 39n12; *Kinder und Hausmärchen* (*The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*), 12, 168n6; “Der Teufel und seine Großmutter” (“The Devil and his Grandmother”), 152, 155–57, 162, 167; “Des Teufels rußiger Bruder” (“The Devil’s Sooty Brother”), 152, 155, 160–63
- Grimmelshausen, Johann (Hans) Jakob Christoffel, 163
- Grube, Karl, 97n29
- Guibert, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de, 32, 126, 149n22
- Haberkern, Ernst, 65n2, 72n59
- Habermas, Jürgen, 15, 242, 250, 252, 253–56, 257n5
- Hagemann, Karen, 168n4, 171n27
- Hahn, Barbara, 190n7
- Hamann, Johann Georg, 42
- Hambach Festival, 223
- Hamilton, Gavin, 195, 205, 215, 216n11
- Hamm, Heinz, 133, 149n17
- Hanibal (also: Hannibal), 54–55
- Hardenberg, Karl August Fürst von, 10, 236n3; correspondence with Johann August Sack, 236n9
- Harprecht, Klaus, 190n5
- Harris, James, 42
- Harris, James, works by: *Philological Inquiries*, 42
- Harkort, Friedrich, and Gustav Harkort, 226, 236n7
- Harpham, Geoffrey Galt, 88, 101n60
- Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, 8, 18, 79, 195; possible influence on Clausewitz, 289, 303n25
- Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, works by: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, 8, 18n18; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 287, 303n21; *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (*Lectures on Aesthetics*), 195, 216n10
- Heinrich, Klaus, 125
- Hengist, 201–2
- Herbig, Katherine, 272, 276
- Hercules, 54
- Herder, Johann Gottfried, 47, 78–79, 86, 99

- Herder, Johann Gottfried, works by:
Der deutsche Nationalruhm, 86
- Herz, Henriette, 99
- Heuser, Beatrice, 281, 301n10
- Heuser, Magdalena, 176, 190n3
- Heuss, Theodor, 219
- Heyne, Christian Gottlob, 176
- Heyne, Christian Leberecht, 71n48
- Hitler, Adolf, 233
- Hofer, Andreas, 288
- Hoffmeister, Gerhart, 94n2
- Holbach, Baron Paul-Henri Thiry d', 22
- Hölderlin, Friedrich, 8, 18n19
- Hölderlin, Friedrich, works by:
Hyperion, 8
- Homer, 14, 60–61, 77, 78, 95n11, 193, 198, 205, 213, 216n9, 217n17
- Homer, works by: *Iliad*, 77, 194, 198; *Odyssey*, 95n11
- Honig, Jan Willem, 301n1
- Houben, Heinrich Hubert, 68n21
- Howard, Michael, 152–53, 169n8
- Hoyer, Johann Gottfried, 126
- Huber, Therese, 14, 175–90; correspondence with Caroline Carus, 190n4
- Huber, Therese, works by: *Die Familie Seldorf*, 14
- Huch, Ricarda, 4
- Huch, Ricarda, works by: *Der große Krieg in Deutschland*, 4
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 7, 8, 10, 12, 18n17, 78–94, 127, 142, 187; anthropological theory, 80, 81, 85; and *Bildung*, 13, 78–94; chess as war, 87–89; concept of Nation, 78–84, 87, 92–94; correspondence with Charlotte Diede, 81, 97n30; correspondence with August Neidhard zu Gneisenau, 82; correspondence with Goethe, 76, 92; correspondence with Henriette Herz, 99n50; correspondence with Caroline von Humboldt, 76, 77, 81, 95–96n15; correspondence with Christian Gottfried Körner, 92; correspondence with Schiller, 90, 99n49; correspondence with Friedrich August Wolf, 92, 102n77; death, 81–84; fascination with Greece, 75–78, 81, 82–84, 87
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von, works by: *Briefwechsel*, 90, 99n50; *Geschichte des Verfalls und Untergangs der griechischen Freistaaten*, 87; *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit zu bestimmen* (*The Limits of State Action*), 18, 78–80, 85, 88, 89, 92, 96n17, 97n26; *On the Solicitude of the State for Security against Foreign Enemies*, 89; *Schriften zur Altertumskunde*, 81; *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte*, 85
- Hume, David, 62
- Hussein, Saddam, 285
- Huygens, Christiaan, 271
- Iffland, August Wilhelm, 60
- Ingrao, Charles W., 99n44
- Inhofe, James, 302n14
- Jacob, Ludwig Heinrich, 7, 17n16
- Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig (“Turnvater”), 82, 165
- Janssen, Wilhelm, 24, 38n3
- Jenisch, Daniel, 12, 41–72; rift between Jenisch and Goethe and Schiller, 43
- Jenisch, Daniel, works by: *Borussias in zwölf Gesängen*, 41–72; *Geist und Charakter des 18. Jahrhunderts*, 58, 61, 67; *Moses Mendelsohns kleine philosophische Schriften. Mit einer Skizze seines Lebens und Charakters*, 43; *Ode auf die gegenwärtigen Unruhen in Frankreich*, 51; *Philosophisch-kritische Vergleichung und Würdigung von vierzehn ältern und neuern Sprachen Europens*, 43; *Theorie der Lebensbeschreibung*, 43; *Über Prose und Beredsamkeit der Deutschen*, 43, 64; *Ueber den sittlichen Anstand im Lustspiel*, 43; *Ueber Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen*

- des Herrn Professor Kant in der Metaphysik, Moral und Aesthetik*, 42–43
- Johnston, Otto W., 83, 98n37
- Jomini, Antoine-Henri, 15, 260–62, 271, 275nn4–6
- Jomini, Antoine-Henri, works by: *Summary of the Art of War*, 261, 275n6
- Joseph II of Austria, 58, 64, 203, 207; correspondence with Hrczan, 217n25
- Jünger, Ernst, 7
- Kahn, David, 265–66, 276n12
- Kant, Immanuel, 4, 216n5; and de Sade, 117; and Enlightenment, 109–10, 116, 123n16, 193, 216n5, 242; Kleist's reading of, 103–21; prohibitive and permissive laws, 243–48
- Kant, Immanuel, works by: "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," 123n16, 216n5, 242; *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 115, 124n29; *Critique of Reason*, 117; *Metaphysics of Morals*, *Doctrine of Right*, 249–51, 256; *Zum ewigen Frieden (On Perpetual Peace)*, 4, 17n16, 21, 90, 101n66, 151, 156, 168n1, 241–57
- Karsch, Anna Louisa, 57
- Kauffmann, Angelica, 14, 192–202; correspondence with Johann Heinrich Meyer, 192
- Kaufmann, Stefan, 274, 275n3
- Kayka, Ernst, 121n1
- Keller, Werner, 148
- Kelletat, Alfred, 99n46
- Kennedy, John F., 280, 282, 284, 293, 301
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 280, 293, 301n5
- Kilkullen, David, 302n14
- Kittler, Wolf, 15, 83, 89, 98n33, 101, 106, 110, 122n4, 123n22, 279–304
- Kleemeier, Ulrike, 304n27
- Klein, Ernst Ferdinand, 65n2
- Kleist, Ewald von, 48–49, 68n19, 69n30
- Kleist, Heinrich von, 8, 10, 13, 18n20, 92, 98n33, 121nn1–4, 122nn6–10, 124nn25–28, 125n33, 161, 169n7, 277n20, 287; correspondence with Christian Ernst Martini, 105; interpretations of Goethe's work, 103; *Kant-Krise*, 103–4; as negative mirror image of Kant, 103–21; theory of violence, 103–14; violence in Kleist's works, 107–9, 116
- Kleist, Heinrich von, works by: *An Abyss Deep Enough*, 111–13, 119, 122n8; *Amphitryon*, 115; "Anekdote aus dem letzten Preussischen Kriege," 111, 115, 118; "Der Branntweinsäuer und die Berliner Glocken," 105; *Das Erdbeben in Chili*, 106; *Hermannsschlacht*, 83, 169n7; *Michael Kohlhaas*, 106, 107, 110, 123n21; "Ode Germanias and Ihre Kinder," 18n20, 82; *Penthesilea*, 115, 169n7, 189; *Der Prinz von Homburg*, 122n10; "Tages-Ereignis," 108; *Über das Marionettentheater*, 118; *Die Verlobung in St. Domingo (The Engagement in Santo Domingo)*, 287, 202n21; "Von der Überlegung: Ein Paradox," 116
- Klemperer, Viktor, 228, 229, 236n10
- Kleßmann, Eckart, 94n8
- Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, 43, 49, 62, 85, 218n28
- Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, works by: *Frühlingsfeier*, 49, 69n33; *Hermanns Schlacht*, 207–10; *Messias*, 43, 72n58
- Kollwitz, Käthe, 192
- Körner, Theodor, 81–84, 92, 97n31, 98n38, 99n42
- Körner, Theodor, works by: *Jägerlied*, 82
- Koselleck, Reinhart, 24, 38
- Kotzebue, August, 60
- Kozłowski, Lisa, 211, 218n30

- Kraake, Swantje, 237n26
Kretschmann, Karl, 67
Krimmer, Elisabeth, 17n14, 100n54, 117, 123n22, 126–50, 147n4, 166, 171n30, 190n8
Kroll, Frank-Lothar, 99n44, 102n69
Kunstepoche, 175, 190n2
- Lacan, Jacques, 117, 125n32, 294
Lacombe, Claire, 188
Landwehr, 227, 228, 236n5
Lange, Samuel Gotthold, 71n46
Lange, Viktor, 148n10
Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 272–73, 277n21, 289
Latzel, Klaus, 98n34
Laukhard, Friedrich Christian, 5–6, 17n13, 86–87, 100n52, 147n4
Laukhard, Friedrich Christian, works by: *Leben und Schicksale von ihm selbst beschrieben*, 5, 86–87
Lebzeltern, Ludwig von, 77
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 123, 285, 291, 293
Lenz, Jakob Michael Reinhold, 11, 170n18
Lenz, Jakob Michael Reinhold, works by: *Die Soldaten*, 111, 170n18; *Über die Soldatenehe*, 11
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 69, 100n55, 189
Leszczyński, Stanislaus (King of Poland), 51, 52
Levi-Strauss, Claude, 296, 305n38
Lichnowski, Eduard von, 105
Löbker, Friedgar, 99n43
Locke, John, 193
Locke, John, works by: *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 193
Lohmeyer, Dorothea, 134, 149n26
Luther, Martin, 26, 30–31, 34
Luther, Martin, works by: *Der kleine Katechismus*, 39n15
Lyotard, Jean-François, 124n31
- MacLeod, Catriona, 217
Macpherson, James, 210
Macpherson, James, works by: *Fingal*, 194, 210–11
Maierhofer, Waltraud, 14, 168n4, 170n21, 192–218
Mainz Republic, 176
Maler, Anselm, 43, 66n9
Malter, Rudolf, 101n66
Man, Paul de. *See* de Man, Paul
Mansfeld, Ernst zu, 2
Marat, Jean-Paul, 64
Maria Carolina of Austria, 160, 170
Maria Theresia of Austria, 48
Martin, Dieter, 43
Marwitz, Friedrich August Ludwig, 91–92, 101n59, 102n69
McChrystal, Stanley, 282, 302n14
Medea, 183, 191n9
Mehigan, Tim, 121n2, 122n6
Mendelssohn, Moses, 43, 62, 65n2
Menze, Clemens, 96n19, 100n58
Méricourt, Théroigne de, 188
Meyer, Edward C., 299
Meyer, Johann Heinrich, 192
Militarism, 28, 96n18, 103, 152, 154, 236n19; German militarism, 1–3
Milton, John, 62
Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de, 99n44
Möhsen, Johann Karl Wilhelm, 65n2
Moivre, Abraham de, 271
Moivre, Abraham de, works by: *Doctrine of Chances*, 272
Mommson, Katharina, 121n1
Montesquieu (Charles-Louise de Secondat), 51
Moritz, Karl Philipp, 42, 47
Mortimer, Geoff, 5, 17n4
Morus, Thomas, 23
Moser, Johann Jakob, 33, 39n14
Müller, Adam, 92–93, 97n31, 102nn74–76
Müller, Adam, works by: *Elemente der Staatskunst*, 92
Münkler, Herfried, 17n6, 38n3
Muth, Ludwig, 121n2
Myrone, Martin, 195, 217n13, 218n33

- Nagl, John A., 286, 302n18
 Neumann, Gerhard, 121n4, 122n6
 Nicolai, Friedrich, 65n2
 Nicolai, Friedrich, works by: *Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung, über meine Kenntniß der kritischen Philosophie und meine Schriften dieselbe betreffend, und über die Herren Kant, J. B. Erhard, und Fichte*, 65n3
 Niebisch, Arndt, 15, 258–78
 Niebuhr, Barthold, 226
 Niekerk, Carl H., 149n29
 Novalis (Georg Phillip Freiherr von Hardenberg), 142, 289

 Olenhusen, Irmtraud Götz von, 237n21

 Paret, Peter, 17n2, 150n38, 235n1, 274–75, 279, 301n2, 303n24
 Paretti, Sandra, 100n27
 Pascal, Blaise, 271, 277n20
 Paullus, Lucius Aemilius, 129
 Paulsen, Friedrich, 231
 Perseus (of Macedon), 129
 Peter III (Pyotr Fyodorovitch), 50–53
 Petraeus, David Howell, 15, 282, 285, 299, 301n6, 302n14, 302n17
 Pfeffer, Gottlieb Conrad, 86, 99n50
 Phillips, James, 121n2, 125n33
 Plessen, Marie-Louise von, 170n17
 Plutarch, 197–98, 217n20
 Poe, Edgar Allan, 260, 277n17
 Poe, Edgar Allan, works by: “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” 260, 269, 277n17
 Pope, Alexander, 194, 198, 199, 206, 217n17
 Porter, Theodore M., 277n20, 278n27
 Portmann-Tinguely, Albert, 82, 93, 97n31, 102n73, 102n78
 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 152, 154
 Propp, Vladimir, 169n14

 Reagan, Ronald, 302n15
 Reinhard, Franz Volkmar, 42

 Revolution: French Revolution, 17n8, 24, 51, 67n17, 70n41, 75–76, 85–87, 89, 92, 94n2, 100n58, 102n73, 133, 134, 142, 152–53, 156, 158, 175–78, 187, 188, 190nn4–5, 196, 207, 276n8, 292; Polish Revolution, 2, 12
 Robespierre, Maximilien François Marie Isidore de, 64, 188
 Rochlitz, Johann Friedrich, 126
 Röhrich, Lutz, 164, 171n26
 Rölleke, Heinz, 168n6, 169n13
 Romanticism, 4, 9, 11, 12, 73–173, 193, 231, 258, 289; German Romanticism, 14, 18n22, 123n22, 168n5
 Rosenblum, Nancy L., 81, 92n18
 Rothenberg, Gunther E., 17n3
 Rotteck, Carl von, 223, 236nn4–5
 Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, 23, 90, 122n7, 170n17, 193, 298, 305n42
 Roworth, Wendy, 197, 217n18
 Rüdiger, Horst, 95n12
 Rüter, Angelika, 97n25
 Ryan, Lawrence, 122n11
 Ryland, William Wynne, 203, 205, 206

 Sack, Friedrich Samuel Gottfried, 42, 65n4
 Saint Pierre, Abbé de (Charles Irénée Castel), 22, 23, 32, 90
 Saint-Amand, Pierre, 24, 25, 38n2
 Sauder, Gerhard, 44, 45, 64, 65nn1–4, 67n12
 Saure, Felix, 12–13, 75–102
 Sauter, Christina M., 100n58
 Sauter-Bergerhausen, Christina, 96n19
 Scarry, Elaine, 146
 Scarry, Elaine, works by: *The Body in Pain*, 150n39
 Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, 10, 82, 91n41, 106, 156, 221, 286
 Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, works by: “Ueber die Vor- und Nachtheile der stehenden Armeen,” 170n15
 Schill, Ferdinand von, 166, 171n28

- Schiller, Friedrich von, 8, 11, 43, 47, 67n14, 79, 127, 169n7, 189, 191n19, 193; aesthetic education of man, 81; correspondence with Humboldt, 90, 99n50; on war, 142
- Schiller, Friedrich von, works by: *Distichen. Xenien*, 66n7, 68n23; *Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, 193; *Historischer Calender für Damen*, 193; *Jungfrau von Orleans*, 189; *Kabale und Liebe*, 85; "Lied von der Glocke," 189, 191n19; *Neue Thalia*, 47, 68n23; *Wallenstein*, 169n7
- Schilling, René, 98n39
- Schlaffer, Heinz, 130, 133, 148n11, 148n13
- Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 47, 289
- Schlegel, Friedrich, 79, 97n31, 119, 125n35, 289
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 10
- Schlesinger, James, 283
- Schmidt, Georg, 17n11, 39n7
- Schmidt, Jochen, 150n30
- Schmidt-Linsenhoff, Viktoria, 191n17, 216n12
- Schmitt, Carl, 110, 117, 285, 290–94, 297, 298, 299, 300
- Schmitt, Carl, works by: *Der Begriff des Politischen*, 297, 305n41; *Theorie des Partisanen* (*Theory of the Partisan*), 123n20, 302n16
- Schoeps, Hans-Joachim, 101n68
- Schöne, Albrecht, 127, 133, 136, 147n6
- Schormann, Gerhard, 17n11
- Schubart, Christian Daniel, 85, 99n47
- Schumann, Dirk, 237n21
- Schwab, George, 231, 236n17
- Schwartz, Paul, 42, 65n4
- Scuria, Herbert, 94n5
- Sedlarz, Claudia, 72n61
- Sembdner, Helmut, 18n20, 124n26, 124n28
- Serres, Michel, 268, 277n16
- Seume, Johann Gottfried, 85, 99n49
- Seymour Damer, Anne, 192
- Shahar, Galili, 13, 102–24
- Shakespeare, William, 115, 119, 124n25
- Shannon, Claude E., 267–68, 277n15
- Shay, Jonathan, 154–55, 160, 163, 169n12
- Simpson, Patricia Anne, 1–18, 123n22, 124n30, 151–70
- Smith, Helmut Walser, 39n8, 217n14
- Smith, Hugh, 262, 275n4
- Society of Revolutionary Republicans, 188
- Soeding, Ellen, 226, 236n7
- Spalding, Johann Joachim, 65n2
- Spickernagel, Ellen, 195, 205, 216n12
- Starkey, Armstrong, 25, 38n6
- Stein, Karl Freiherr vom, 10
- Steinberg, Heinz, 94n5, 98n32
- Steinmetz, Ralf-Henning, 126, 149n23
- Stephan, Inge, 14, 175–91
- Stephens, Anthony, 124n25
- Stöckel, Christian Gottlob, 67n14
- Stolberg, Friedrich Leopold zu, 85
- Strachan, Hew, 91, 100nn56–57, 293, 301n1, 301n7, 303n23, 303n25
- Sturm und Drang*, 24
- Sturz, Peter Helfrich, 201, 216n8
- Sublime, the, 7–8, 16, 24, 81, 91, 103, 113–18, 120, 124n30, 127, 139, 147, 195
- Summers, Harry, 15, 291, 301n3
- Summers, Harry, works by: *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, 282
- Svarez, Carl Gottlieb, 65n2
- Sweet, Paul R., 94n5
- Tatar, Maria, 161, 171n23
- Teller, Wilhelm Abraham, 42, 65n4
- Thoyras, Rapin de, 201–2, 217n23
- Treitschke, Heinrich von, 232, 236n20
- Trenck, Friedrich von der, 63, 69n27, 72n60
- Treusch-Dieter, Gerburg, 123n22
- Trier, Jost, 291, 304n32
- Tse-Tung, Mao, 285
- Uz, Johann, 69n30

- Vaget, Hans, 148n16, 149n24, 150n31
- Vaisse, Maurice, 235n1
- Vaupel, Rudolf, 222, 226, 236n3
- Vega, José Fernández, 303n25
- Viehmann, Dorothea, 155
- Vigée-Lebrun, Elisabeth, 192
- Vincke, Ludwig von, 226, 236n13
- Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro), 14, 193, 205
- Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro), works by: *Aeneid*, 66n7, 196, 204, 217n15
- Voltaire (François Marie Arouet), 12, 32, 39n13, 51
- Vortigern, 196, 199, 201
- Wallenstein, Albrecht von, 2
- War: American Revolutionary War, 177, 179; Austrian War of Succession, 1, 3; battle of Jena and Auerstädt, 10, 16, 75, 89, 91, 111–13, 115, 153, 287, 291, 292; erotics of war, 151–52; guerrilla wars, 9, 92, 110, 253, 279, 280, 285, 287–90, 292, 294; Napoleonic Wars, 2–5, 17, 91, 103, 111, 153, 215, 218, 232, 275, 286; Revolutionary Wars, 2, 4–6, 17, 175, 292; Seven Years' War, 2–3, 12, 25, 29, 39, 41–73, 100, 141, 150, 177; Thirty Years' War, 2–5, 17, 193; total war, 4–6, 15, 16, 17, 25, 38, 94, 169; Vietnam War, 15, 154, 279, 280–85, 299, 301, 302; World War I, 7, 76, 230
- Warner, Marina, 155–56, 168, 169n13
- Wartenburg, Ludwig York von, 298
- Wawro, Geoffrey, 276n8
- Weaver, Warren, 268
- Wegner, Karl-Hermann, 99n44
- Weigley, Russel Frank, 39n8
- Weimar, Bernhard von, 2
- Weimar, Carl August of, 126, 148n4, 192
- Weimar Republic, 233, 237n21
- Weiß, Christoph, 65n4
- Welcker, Carl, 223, 224, 236n5
- Weniger, Erich, 1
- Weniger, Erich, works by: *Goethe und die Generäle*, 1, 16n1, 147n3
- Wenk, Silke, 191
- West, Benjamin, 196
- Westphalen, Ludger Graf von, 236nn13–14
- Wild, Rainer, 66n8
- Williams, John R., 136, 149n22
- Wilson, Peter, 17n9, 39n17
- Wilson, Woodrow, 282, 284
- Winckelmann, Johann Joachim, 201, 217n21
- Wittkowski, Wolfgang, 149n20
- Wolf, Friedrich August, 92, 102n77
- Wöllner, Johann Christoph von, 41–42, 45–46, 51, 62–64, 65n4
- Wordsworth, William, 78
- Zedler, Johann Heinrich, 26–31, 33, 35, 39nn9–10; on war, 28
- Zipes, Jack, 155, 168n6, 169n13
- Zucchi, Giuseppe, 218n27
- Zupanèie, Alenka, 125n31

Enlightened War investigates the multiple and complex interactions between warfare and Enlightenment thought. Although the Enlightenment is traditionally identified with the ideals of progress, eternal peace, reason, and self-determination, Enlightenment discourse unfolded during a period of prolonged European warfare from the Seven Years' War to the Napoleonic conquest of Europe. The essays in this volume explore the palpable influence of war on eighteenth-century thought and argue for an ideological affinity among war, Enlightenment thought, and its legacy.

The essays are interdisciplinary, engaging with history, art history, philosophy, military theory, gender studies, and literature and with historical events and cultural contexts from the early Enlightenment through German Classicism and Romanticism. The volume enriches our understanding of warfare in the eighteenth century and shows how theories and practices of war impacted concepts of subjectivity, national identity, gender, and art. It also sheds light on the contemporary discussion of the legitimacy of violence by juxtaposing theories of war, concepts of revolution, and human rights discourses.

CONTRIBUTORS: Johannes Birgfeld, David Colclasure, Sara Eigen Figal, Ute Frevert, Wolf Kittler, Elisabeth Krimmer, Waltraud Maierhofer, Arndt Niebisch, Felix Saure, Galili Shahr, Patricia Anne Simpson, Inge Stephan.

ELISABETH KRIMMER is Professor of German at the University of California, Davis, and PATRICIA ANNE SIMPSON is Associate Professor of German Studies at Montana State University.



Cover image: The Battle of Jena and Auerstedt, 1806: "The injured supreme commander of the Prussian Army, Duke Ferdinand von Braunschweig, is led away from the battle." Chromotype after Richard Knötel (1857–1914). From: *Die Königin Luise in 50 Bildern* (Berlin: Paul Kittel, 1896). Used by permission of akg-images.

 CAMDEN HOUSE

668 Mt. Hope Avenue
Rochester, NY 14620-2731, USA

P.O. Box 9, Woodbridge,
Suffolk IP12 3DE, UK

www.camden-house.com
www.boydellandbrewer.com

