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1 Introduction

Roger Bartlett and Karen Schönwälder

The relationship between German speakers and German states, on the one hand, and their non-German counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe, on the other, has been a fundamental feature of European history. It has been, and remains, a complex and multifaceted phenomenon which defies easy definition. In the 1960s the German writer Hermann Schreiber published a book on the subject which was entitled *Land in the East: Promise and Doom of the Germans*.[1] The English translation appeared as *Teuton and Slav*.[2] Both publishers, in their search for an arresting title, seized upon particular evocative aspects of the topic. If the German version carried haunting echoes of the *Drang nach Osten*, the search for *Lebensraum* and the lost war, the English editors looked to ethnic markers of a particular stamp to pinpoint the subject. Both of these perspectives offered a very partial summation of the relationship; and, at a time when Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was seeking new channels of dialogue across the East–West divide, the English subtitle, 'The Struggle for Central Europe', emphasized the conflictual elements in what has been in different times and places a field of friendship and co-operation as well as enmity and strife.

The present volume of essays is devoted to this challenge of definition and the historical realities which have underlain it. The title chosen here uses simple words to encompass the complexities of the subject. Geographical terms stand metonymically for the peoples involved, mainly because such terms find easier acceptance in a situation where no single set of defining criteria matches the historically recorded phenomena on the ground. The 'German lands' are to be understood as the historically changing core territories of Germanic settlement,

culture and language. 'Eastern Europe' is a still more imprecise term. While its eastern boundary is conventionally accepted as the Ural mountains, its western limits have fluctuated widely according to time, political conjuncture and national or ideological point of view, not least in the twentieth century. In this volume it may be taken to mean simply those more easterly lands which lie beyond the German 'core territories'; in this usage 'Eastern Europe' may overlap with areas otherwise designated *Ostmitteleuropa*, *Südosteuropa*, or even Central Europe. Our title is not intended to counterpose to each other two discrete units, but rather indicates the broad east–west division and interaction of the peoples inhabiting the area which stretches from the Urals to the Rhine.

Few parts of these territories were ethnically homogeneous. The predominant political structures which grew up within and beyond the German lands — the Holy Roman, the Habsburg and the Russian Empires, the Kingdom of Prussia and the German Empire — were all multiethnic or multicultural. In the interrelations of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe over the centuries, moreover, impulses of culture, religion, political and economic interest, whether uniting or dividing, have often cut across linguistic or ethnic differences. And 'Germany' only acquired political statehood with the creation in 1871 of the *Kaiserreich*, which purported to be a German nation-state; yet in 1900 about five million of its fifty-six million inhabitants did not speak German as their first language, while the German-speakers of the Habsburg Empire and elsewhere were excluded. The eastern part of our region was still more heterogeneous, inhabited as it was by Baltic, Latin, Magyar, Romany, Slav and, of course, Germanic as well as other elements, all of whom influenced each other in many ways and whose self-images and loyalties varied widely over time, under the influence of shifting political, economic, religious and cultural pressures.

In the lands of settlement to the east, German identity can pose still greater problems for the outside observer and the historian than it does within the German lands themselves. In the medieval usage of these areas a German might be one who came from a core German territory, spoke a Germanic language, or to whom German law applied; but none of these criteria was necessarily decisive or historically unambiguous. Medieval Cracow is a clear example of 'a Polish site reshaped by both German immigration

and borrowed German municipal law',[3] but it cannot be assumed that its population was predominantly German in origin, culture or language. Martyn Rady, in his contribution to this volume, emphasizes the 'fluidity of identity' in the medieval period which complicates meaningful ethnic or national distinction. Such problems persisted, and have remained actual into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An attempt to count Germans in St Petersburg in 1860, bedevilled by mutual assimilation of Baltic and Reich Germans, Russians, Latvians, Estonians and others, fell back in frustration on language and religion as the only useful identifying criteria; yet even these could not encompass the complexity of lived identities.[4] Anthony Smith, in his general anatomy of ethnicity and nationhood, highlights the inadequacies of language and religion as fundamental markers of ethnic or national ascription.[5] Recent 're-immigration' from the east into the Federal Republic of Germany, based on rights of ancestry, raises even broader questions of national and ethnic identity.

From the point of view of the receiving or host communities, German identity might be equally problematic. Karin Friedrich demonstrates here how inapplicable later concepts of national affiliation are to local interests and identities in the pre-modern Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In eighteenth-century Russia, as Lindsey Hughes and John Klier indicate, a 'German' could be any non-Orthodox Western foreigner.

This fluidity of identity and multiplicity of interaction is crucial to an understanding of our region's history. While the concept of a *Drang nach Osten* has now been entirely discarded, the immense importance of Germans and German culture in the development of Central and Eastern Europe is not a matter of dispute. In detail and in interpretation, however, few historical themes have been so contentious as the relations of 'Teutons' and 'Slavs', and students of the region must still struggle with the heritage of nationalism and of prejudice and misconception. Historical controversy has attached to this theme from the outset, since the beginnings of modern historiography coincided here with the decisive establishment of Great Power hegemony and the political subordination of weaker peoples. From the early nineteenth century, historians of the several peoples involved have sought to define a continuous national past which would serve to legitimate exclusive national identities and national

political claims. In Germany, political and territorial revisionism played a significant part in the establishment of university research into East European affairs; consequently, this research had from the outset a pronounced political dimension. After the First World War, energies were concentrated on demonstrating the German character of lands lost in the Versailles settlement. In inter-war Poland, on the other hand, the *Drang nach Osten* was also a popular concept, but for opposite reasons, serving as the symbol of a threat which all Poles had to resist.[6]

The linking of *Ostforschung*, German research on Central and Eastern Europe, with expansionist political aims reached a peak after 1933. In a programmatic article of 1937, Hermann Aubin, a leading figure in the field, demanded that what had been previously described as *Ostsiedlung* (Eastern settlement) or *Ostkolonisation* (Eastern colonization) should now be seen as the German *Ostbewegung* (movement to the East). Crucial to his argument was the idea that the phenomenon of *Ostbewegung* constituted an entity: the trinity of territory, time and material content required, he said, a unitary approach (*eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung*). His idea of an eastward movement lasting essentially unchanged over centuries of European history not only necessitated the distorting conflation of a large number of very varied phenomena; it also accommodated fashionable concepts such as 'living space' (*Lebensraum*) or 'national/popular soil' (*Volksboden*). It invited the inference, moreover, that there existed an organic German 'movement', almost like a biological force within the body of the people (*Volkskörper*), constantly seeking to (re)occupy specific lands to the east once settled by Germanic tribes. Aubin drew overtly political conclusions: 'awareness of the bleeding frontiers' truncated in 1918, he thought, had brought new understanding of German history, and in 1937 the 'unitary view' of the German *Ostbewegung* could help to define current political tasks.[7]

This is not the place to examine this historiography in detail.[8] Suffice it to say that after the war the tradition was not entirely broken. While *Ostforschung* had no place in East Germany, there was much continuity in West German research. Klaus Zernack has recently emphasized the extent to which the 'new beginning of *Ostforschung*' in the 1950s, proclaimed once more by Hermann Aubin, refused to re-evaluate its past and its assumptions, and continued the isolationist approach of ignoring

other Central and Eastern European historiographies.[9] The latter, now written under politicized Marxist control, were used in their turn to legitimize the new political status quo and new national borders. Serious international dialogue and co-operation was restricted right up until 1989. From the beginning of the new German *Ostpolitik* and détente with the socialist East in the 1960s, however, changes began to take place: multinational conferences, joint commissions on history textbooks, other collaborative projects and growing attention to international research laid foundations for the new developments which have shown themselves in all the countries concerned in the 1990s. As Jan Piskorski wrote in 1991, particular views of German settlement in Eastern Europe are no longer an automatic corollary of historians' nationality.[10]

The majority of those writing in the present collection do not belong to any nation involved in the long struggles over territories and historically founded political claims. While they may therefore be less closely caught up in the argument, they must also ensure that they are fully aware of the ramifications and implications of different positions. The approach adopted here is a limited one: to illuminate as clearly as possible a number of important themes and discrete case-studies. These essays do not offer, and do not seek to offer, a comprehensive view of relations between the Germanies and Eastern Europe. Not only would such an attempt exceed the scope of the present publication, but it would in all probability be misleading. Rather than one history, there are many histories of these relations. The settlement of the *Donauschwaben* has as much to do with the life and movements of Serbs, Vlachs and Bulgarians as it has with the processes whereby peasants migrated eastward from the southern principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. The pre-Partition life of the 'German' burgher in Danzig forms part of the social matrix of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth rather than of a German history. Rather than to synthesize or simplify, to seek some single thread unifying all these relationships, we are concerned to demonstrate their multifarious and contingent nature.

This approach also makes a virtue of the restrictions imposed by constraints of space, in presenting a relatively small number of closely focused essays. It is impossible in this volume to address the multitude of problems, periods and regions involved

in our subject. The Habsburg lands and Viennese Germandom have received less attention than the North and Berlin. The role of economic networks such as the Hanseatic League; the crucial part of German universities and their alumni in the development of Eastern European culture; the theoretical and sociological dimensions of migration and diaspora — such themes as these await treatment elsewhere.

At the same time, a number of common concerns unite the contributors. Martyn Rady, Lindsey Hughes, Roger Bartlett and Bruce Mitchell, and Karen Schönwälder all address in different ways the question of how people came to live in mixed regions, and the degree to which host communities were the prime movers in these migrations. Schönwälder's chapter also serves to demonstrate and remind us that the traffic between east and west has been by no means only in one direction, especially in the last century and a half. Easterners came to German lands in many guises: as workers on landed estates or in mines, as students and teachers at German universities, as refugees. They came too as military victors. The resurrection of the Prussian state in the early nineteenth century was made possible by Russia's destruction of French hegemony. It is an obvious irony that it was the destruction of the next, German invaders of Russia, in the mid-twentieth century, that then enabled 'Eastern Europe' to push its frontiers so far westwards, over lands long claimed as German, and establish Russian/Soviet domination across former Habsburg domains and in the heartland of Germany itself. Since 1989, however, the political tide has been reversed again, while at the same time the human flow from east to west has greatly increased.

A second general theme is the way in which mixed communities coexisted, collaborated and conflicted, a question addressed primarily by Karin Friedrich, Hans Lemberg, Keith Sword and Norman Davies. Immigrants experienced, of course, very different environments. Peasants settled in cohesive village communities faced different pressures from members of mixed urban communities or individual specialists adapting to a dominant host culture. Although such relations have often borne tension and conflict, they have been equally marked by positive interaction, harmonious symbiosis and mutual benefit: the theme of Norman Davies's concluding meditation. Hans Lemberg's case-study exemplifies some modern modulations of such

relations. The inter-war Czechoslovak Republic is certainly not familiar as a symbol of peaceful ethnic coexistence. But as Lemberg — and before him Karin Friedrich's chapter — demonstrates, there are no easy generalizations. In the first place, there was no single simple 'German' view of the Czechs, but at least three, symbolized here by the capitals Vienna, Prague and Berlin. And even in the 1930s, and after 1938, significant elements among the Sudeten Germans continued to see themselves as citizens of the Czech state, and remained faithful, some into exile, to 'their' Czech state authorities.

These divisions in German consciousness and attitudes towards the Czech state and Slovakia have found renewed expression in the post-1989 period. Current relations between Germany and the Czech Republic are clouded by the demands of expellee organizations in Germany, a vocal minority who want German support for Czech entry to the European Union and compensation for Czech victims of the Nazi regime to be made dependent upon a Czech apology for the post-war expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and a repeal of the Beneš decrees.[11] In the Czech Republic these demands have revived memories of the German occupation and fears of Great Power chauvinism. Yet history has equally been used as a reminder that the bitter hostilities of the Nazi period and its aftermath are not the historical norm. Former German President Richard von Weizsäcker recently took Prague University as an example of the long intertwining of Czech and German history, of a (now destroyed) symbiosis between the two cultures.[12] Václav Havel, speaking at about the same time in Dresden, similarly revived the memory of the long-standing and active neighbourly links between Bohemia and Saxony.[13]

A third theme addressed here is the question of cultural influence, intercommunal communication, and national perceptions (Barry Nisbet, Johannes Paulmann, John Klier). The influence in Central and Eastern Europe of Herder, discussed by Barry Nisbet, has been profound, and his ideas have retained a lasting resonance. In Communist Hungary reference to them could be used, for instance, to raise the otherwise taboo subject of ethnic Hungarian minorities.[14] Herder the 'German' thinker exemplifies the cosmopolitan nature of the eighteenth-century European 'republic of scholars', and could be more properly called a Central European: born in East Prussia (Polish territory

today), he received important intellectual impulses from his years in Riga before turning westwards, ultimately to a career in the supranational Lutheran Church as an ecclesiastical functionary in Weimar.[15] If Herder has sometimes been interpreted as the proponent of ideas justifying dangerous nationalistic chauvinism, Nisbet here emphasizes the centrality of linguistic and cultural community in his concept of the nation, in opposition to the political nation of citizens propagated by the French revolutionary tradition. The 250th anniversary of Herder's birth, in 1994, was marked by declarations of his innocence of the charge of fathering German *völkisch* nationalism. Instead he was claimed by some for a tradition of multiculturalism and by others as a witness to the reconfirmation of national pride at a time of increasing supranational integration.[16]

Cultural symbiosis in Europe has also been represented, in a very different way, by the Jewish population, until the destruction of its communities during the Second World War. While there is a vast literature on the prehistories of the mentalities and doctrines which made that destruction possible, John Klier adopts a less commonly explored angle, examining the impact of reformist German Jewry and German models of integration on Russian Jewish and official thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The later emergence of anti-Semitism in Germany served equally to legitimate persecution in Russia.

Johannes Paulmann's paper likewise offers a less conventional approach, in this case to diplomatic relations, examining the potential of royal family ties as channels of political and national communication. As means of exerting political influence, the 'personal' letters of the Russian and Prussian (later German) ruling families were as unsuccessful as other royal attempts at private diplomacy, such as the French *secret du roi*. Paulmann's account throws into relief the confusion and mistrust they could create and the inability of nineteenth-century princes to understand the real mechanisms of power. The bankruptcy of royal personal diplomacy and the anachronism of the view which claimed foreign policy as the prince's personal prerogative was finally demonstrated in the approaches to war in 1914.

The unfinished business of Germany's wars in the later twentieth century forms the subject of Keith Sword's and Theo Schulte's essays. Sword's paper details the complexities of the post-war demographic settlement in the Polish–German

borderlands, and the interrelationships between identity and political and economic conjunctures. Schulte addresses current problems involved in acknowledging the realities of the past: controversy over the historical role of the *Wehrmacht* touches deep sensitivities and continues to confuse national perceptions of the war period. Schulte points out that, in recent years, the vision of Germans as victims has tended to grow at the expense of the perception of Germans as culprits: a development illustrated equally by the contentious issue of expulsions from Czechoslovakia already mentioned. That this is by no means a dominant view, however, is suggested by the remarks of Richard von Weizsäcker, also quoted above; in the controversy over the *Wehrmacht*, Schulte warns against over-simplification on either side, and against the drawing of final conclusions before sufficient proper research has been carried out. It remains for Norman Davies, in his concluding review of German–Polish relations, to resituate these vital questions in a longer and more optimistic historical perspective.

In conclusion, we wish to extend our thanks to the participants of the seminar series held at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, in 1994–5, at which some of these papers were first presented; to John Andrew and Radojka Miljević for their sterling editorial work on the text; and to Macmillan Press for accepting the book into the SSEES–Macmillan series.

Roger Bartlett
Karen Schönwälder

NOTES

1. Hermann Schreiber, *Land im Osten: Verheißung und Verhängnis der Deutschen*, Düsseldorf, 1961.
2. Hermann Schreiber, *Teuton and Slav: The Struggle for Central Europe*, London, 1965.
3. Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350*, Harmondsworth, 1994, p. 179.

4. Margarete Busch, *Deutsche in St. Petersburg 1865–1914: Identität und Integration*, Essen, 1995, p. 20.
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6. Jan M. Piskorski, 'Die Ostsiedlung des Mittelalters in der Entwicklung des östlichen Mitteleuropa: Zum Stand der Forschung aus polnischer Sicht' (hereafter 'Die Ostsiedlung'), *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands*, 40, 1991, pp. 27–84 (27–8). See also W. Wippermann, *Der 'deutsche Drang nach Osten': Ideologie und Wirklichkeit eines politischen Schlagwortes*, Darmstadt, 1981.
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8. See further Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of 'Ostforschung' in the Third Reich*, Cambridge, 1988; and Karen Schönwälder, *Historiker und Politik: Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1992.
9. Klaus Zernack, 'Der historische Begriff "Ostdeutschland" und die deutsche Landesgeschichte', *Nordost-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Regionalgeschichte*, new series, 1, 1992, 1, pp. 157–73 (170).
10. Piskorski, 'Die Ostsiedlung', p. 30.
11. See speeches by Finance Minister T. Waigel and Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber to Sudeten German organizations, and response, May 1994 and May 1996: the *Independent*, 23 May 1994; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 May 1996. The Czech–German declaration to which these controversies were linked was finally agreed in late 1996.
12. Speech reported in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3 January 1996.
13. Ibid., 9 November 1995.
14. György Dalos, 'Prophet im fremden Land', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 August 1994.
15. N. Hope, 'Johann Gottfried Herder: The Lutheran Clergyman' in K.G. Robbins (ed.), *Essays Presented to W. R. Ward*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 109–34.
16. See, for example, Herfried Münkler, 'Ein politischer Denker — neu zu entdecken', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 6 September 1994; and Ivo Frenzel, 'Zerrissen zwischen Pflicht und Neigung', *Die Welt*, 20 August 1994.

2 The German Settlement in Central and Eastern Europe during the High Middle Ages

Martyn Rady

Starting around 1100, German settlers began moving eastwards across the River Elbe. The volume of their migration is uncertain and may have accounted for only several thousand people in any one year.[1] The newcomers were moving, however, into thinly populated lands and their rate of reproduction and of assimilation of the native Slavs and Balts was evidently high. Within two centuries, much of the territory between the Elbe and Oder had changed from Slav-speaking to German-speaking. Along the Baltic coast, wide swathes of Pomerania and Prussia had been similarly transformed. Farther east, Courland and Livonia were by 1300 dominated by a thin stratum of German-speakers with heavier concentrations in the towns. Scattered across other parts of Eastern Europe were islands of the German language, most notably in Bohemia, Moravia and Transylvania.

The German settlement was preceded in some areas by military conquest and the ejection of the indigenous population. Elsewhere, however, it was the native princes who invited in settlers and even expelled part of the indigenous population to make way for the newcomers. In the majority of cases, however, the Germans cultivated hitherto empty land, establishing themselves in the wilderness or founding villages side by side with existing older communities. The second phenomenon frequently had the consequence of creating 'double-villages': a Deutschschluppa and Wendischschluppa in Upper Lusatia, or a Pod Teutonicorum and Pod Hungaricorum in Transylvania.[2]

German peasants were attractive to local rulers who in their letters of invitation frequently explained the benefits they would bring to the local economy: *pro utilitate*, *reformacione* and *melioracione*. The Slavonic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were not ignorant of agriculture, as is sometimes maintained. The Germans, however, plainly understood the principles of cereal exploitation and they probably also introduced to the regions of settlement the 'heavy' plough or *Pflug* and the system of annual three-field rotation.[3] German villages were, moreover, planned, and designed to maximize production. They were additionally vested with special rights, the so-called 'German law', which permitted a measure of self-government and freed the villagers from burdens and dues customarily owed by the indigenous population. German law and agricultural methods were rapidly embraced by native populations so that within a short time the legal and economic distinction between German and Slav was eroded. The 'German law' village is not necessarily, therefore, a village of Germans.

The German settlement affected not only the rural economy but prompted an intensification of urban growth. Although often founded on the top of earlier settlements, German towns were larger and were locked into a network of trading relations with merchant communities farther west. The Hanseatic ports of northern Germany and the great mercantile centres of Augsburg and Nuremberg provided both the capital for business investment and the cargoes of cloth which were traded for grain, furs, wax and metals. Along with the towns came the spires of cathedrals and abbeys, and, as the tithe-yield from the countryside increased, the foundation of new parish churches. The German settlement of Transylvania was followed by the construction of several hundred new churches, many of which were strongly fortified.[4] The march of the knights through Prussia and Livonia was in its turn accompanied by the building of blockhouse convents. More usually though, settlement went hand in hand with the spread of Cistercian and Premonstratensian monasteries and canonries. The German settlement transformed the landscape of Central and Eastern Europe in respect, therefore, not only of the morphology of its villages and towns but also of the 'sacralization' of its space.

In much of the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, and along the Baltic shore east of the Vistula, the German settlement

was preceded by the violence of conquest. Contemporary accounts describe the amputations and indignities done, and glory that the victors spared neither the aged nor the women. Even where the settlement proceeded peaceably, chroniclers relate the mistrust between the newcomers and the Slavonic population. In 1285 the Archbishop of Gniezno complained of the 'invasion of German knights and colonists' which had deprived the Polish nation of 'the praiseworthy laws and customs of its homeland'.[5] The histories of individual towns are often punctuated by accounts of pogroms and of the looting of German shops. For the most part, however, relations between Germans and Slavs were harmonious and it is only a nationalist and selective misreading of the past which has convinced historians otherwise. The frequency of human contact and intermarriage in the newly-settled lands of Central and Eastern Europe also made for a fluidity of identity which must qualify all attempts to establish who was and who was not an 'ethnic German'. The son returning from Bohemia in the dialogue *Meier Helmbrecht* (c. 1260), who greeted his German parents with the words 'Dobra ytra', may be an extreme example, but within families language and identity plainly did change from generation to generation.[6] There are plentiful instances of the children of Germans bearing Slavonic names, and even of one sibling bearing a German name while another carried a Slavonic one.[7] Over time, the immigrants might forget their origins, even to the extent of imagining themselves, as in Transylvania, to be the descendants of the Goths or of the ancient Dacians.[8]

Places, like families, could pass from one linguistic group to the other. Village names often demonstrate an extraordinary mutability, reflecting the changing linguistic affiliation of the majority population. The village of Cunradesdorf near Meissen, founded in the late twelfth century by a certain Conrad von Spannseil, had within a few years become Conradiz, and by the sixteenth century was variously referred to as Korschitz or Kurschicz. Likewise in northern Lusatia in the sixteenth century, Bärwalde became Bjerwald, and Weissenberg became Wospork.[9] Whole regions, as for instance between the Saale and Elbe rivers, could in time revert back from predominantly German-speaking to Slav-speaking. In Posen and Cracow, a more complex process took the language of urban administration from German through Latin to Polish.[10] In some places, languages were melded. The

sixteenth-century Bishop Kromer of Warmia wrote of how 'a great many Slavs live to this day in the villages and coastal parts of Lüneburg and in Brandenburg. They speak the language of Poles, only mixed with the German tongue'. The German dialect spoken in parts of Lower Silesia was sufficiently influenced by Polish as to be designated 'pulsch'.[11]

* * *

Although the impact of the German settlement on the lands of Central and Eastern Europe was immense, interpretations of it have been varied. For most of the nineteenth century and for a good part of the twentieth, the settlement was portrayed by German historians as an elemental process born of an ancient impulse and as expressing, in Treitschke's words, 'the northward and eastward rush of the German spirit and the formidable activities of our people as conqueror, teacher and discipliner of its neighbours'.[12] It is of course still possible to find post-war German historians using the loaded vocabulary of the nationalist period: *Drang nach Osten* ('urge towards the East'); 'cultural gradient'; *deutscher Volksboden* ('German national soil') and so on. For the most part, however, the new generation has adopted a more circumspect language. This is not just in reaction to the extravagances of the Nazi period. The small number actually involved in the settlement, which year by year was probably no greater than normal mobility in the Middle Ages, has suggested the inappropriateness of such terms as *Zug nach Osten* ('drive to the East') and *Ostbewegung* ('eastern movement'). It has additionally become clear that the eastern settlement was by no means a German monopoly. Flemings played an important role particularly in the cultivation of marshland, and the principal unit of rural measurement in the east was the so-called 'Flemish hide'. Walloons and Italians were equally active. Ironically, the first *Theutonicus* of Transylvania known to us by name is a certain Johannes Latinus, who numbered among his properties a *villa Latinorum*.[13] Such discoveries as these urge a terminology stripped of overtly ethnic connotations and explain the current fashion for more neutral expressions such as *Ostsiedlung* ('eastern settlement'), *Landesausbau* ('development of the land'), and *Kolonisation zu deutschem Recht* ('colonization under German law').[14]

Although the eastern settlement remains a discrete subject of scholarly enquiry in modern Germany with its own research institutes and journals, its historians have not been able to isolate themselves entirely from larger historiographic trends. Since the war, German historians have increasingly analysed the history of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as subjects in their own right rather than as objects of policy.[15] This approach has consolidated a variety of *Landesforschung* ('regional research') and *Siedlungsformenforschung* ('research on types of settlement') which has sought to examine the preconditions of settlement and the impact of migration upon the local landscape. Although often minute in scope and factological in their style, studies of *Landesforschung* are informed by an exacting scholarly tradition which stretches back into the nineteenth century, and by a concern for comparative approaches.[16] Curiously, however, the interest of German historians has seldom extended beyond comparing one region of German settlement with another. Despite the pioneering approaches of several Anglo-Saxon historians, German research has for the most part failed, therefore, to benefit from the growing interest in comparative frontier studies.[17]

The *Landesforschung* of the German settlement lacks the broad schematic framework of the nationalist approach and, on account of the limitations of its comparative methodology, threatens all too easily to dissolve into detailed studies of toponymy and topography. Many post-war German historians have sought to compensate for these deficiences by incorporating the *Ostsiedlung* into the much larger theme of 'Europeanization'. On the one hand, therefore, the eastern settlement is rendered as the counterpart of the Spanish *reconquista*, of the Norman conquest of England and southern Italy, and of the crusades and Latin empire. On the other, and rather more controversially, it is made into the mediating instrument by which the culture and society of Central and Eastern Europe were elevated and absorbed into Western Europe. The German *Ostsiedlung* is thus made synonymous in the context of the regions of settlement with an *Europäisierungsprozess* ('process of Europeanization') and even with a *Verwestlichung* ('westernization'),[18] and the 'decades-long migratory movement' is accordingly transformed into an act carried out 'on behalf of the nascent west'.[19] As has been cruelly

remarked, German historians may have abandoned their nationalist rhetoric only to the extent of redefining the eastern settlement as the instrument and cultural expression of a surgent *Abendland* ('Occident').[20]

Interpretation of the *Ostsiedlung* as Europeanization fails on a number of counts, not least its inherent tendency towards cultural determinism. More particularly, this type of approach does not acknowledge the complexity of cultural processes and embodies a reductionism which overvalues a single aspect of relations between Western and Eastern Europe. The entry of Central and Eastern Europe into Latin Christendom was accomplished gradually and its starting point stretches back at least to the end of the first millennium. The integration of west and east can scarcely be located in a single phenomenon, however signal its effect. In addition (and as we will later argue), it was precisely because a large part of Central and Eastern Europe had already absorbed many of the essential qualities of western culture, mediated primarily through the institutions of the church, that its settlement by immigrant Germans was rendered possible in the first place. This is not to deny the transforming effect of the German settlement in Central and Eastern Europe; it is rather to place this transformation within the framework of a deeper and more complex pattern of cultural and institutional integration.

* * *

Karl Hampe, in his *Der Zug nach dem Osten* (Leipzig, 1920), put the origins of the German settlement at the end of the eighth century when Charlemagne undertook his first expedition against the Slavs living east of the River Elbe. Such an approach presupposes, however, the existence of defined bodies of Slavs and Germans which the sources themselves will not allow. Einhard himself, Charlemagne's biographer, explained that the Slavs to the east of the Frankish lands, although 'almost identical in their language', still 'differ greatly in habits and customs' from one another.[21] Over the course of the next two centuries, with the foundation of the Moravian, Polish and Abodrite dukedoms, these differences would become more pronounced. A vast gulf in terms of material culture and administrative organization separated these mature Slavonic principalities from

the neighbouring Wilzi, Hevellians and Dalemintzi. As František Graus has observed,

> As regards civilization as a whole, the region inhabited by the Slavs falls into different areas, and just as there is no one system of Slav law, so there is no uniform Slav civilization either. Even fairy-tales — a typical repository of folk culture — differ markedly from region to region.[22]

The Germans themselves were no less divided. A product of earlier Frankish colonization which bears in several respects a close resemblance to the later settlement east of the Elbe, the German and East Frankish kingdom passed under a variety of names: *Francia orientalis*, *Francorum regnum orientale*, *Alemannia*. In similar fashion, the people themselves might variously be called *Franci orientales*, *Franci Theutonici*, *Alemanni* and *Germani*.[23] More usually, however, they were not referred to as a single national group at all but were enumerated according to their ancient tribal names: Bavarians, Saxons, Swabians, Franconians and Thuringians.[24] The proliferation of names and peoples reflects the fragmentation of power within the German and East Frankish kingdom which would remain a feature of its political organization throughout the medieval period. Thus, although the later eastern settlement might on occasions be directed by a strong central authority, it would remain for the most part an affair of local princes, bishops and marcher lords. The territories they won as a consequence of their involvement strengthened centrifugal tendencies within the German kingdom and served to tilt the balance of power relationships within the Old Reich towards the east.

Nor, with due respect to Hampe, did the frontier between the German kingdom and the Slavonic world represent a barrier, the crossing of which was of much contemporary significance. The Saxon and Sorb *limes* established by Charlemagne were intersected by roads, and beyond the gateways lay shadowy marcher territories. Often, however, the frontier was not demarcated but comprised instead thick swathes of forest. Routes through the forest might be marked with lopped trees, but even so, as the monk Herbord experienced at the time of the Pomeranian mission (1124),

> We kept to these marks, but it took us all of six days to get through the wood [...] and it was very hard going, on account of various snakes and huge wild beasts, and troublesome cranes that were nesting in the branches of trees and tormented us with their croaking and flapping, and patches of bog which hindered our waggons and carts.[25]

In 1130, Conrad II was obliged to abandon his campaign against Hungary, because the approaches to the kingdom were 'so fortified with rivers and forests'.[26] Just as commonly, however, the frontier was marked by wide stretches of empty land, the *indagines*, *hagen* or *preseka*, across which were built diverse fortifications, *munitiones* and *obstacula*. Frontier guardsmen, often the remnants of tribal auxiliaries, patrolled the no man's land: Polish Stróże, Bohemian Chods, and Hungarian Széklers, Kék-Kends and Pechenegs.[27]

Commercial activity continued, nevertheless, across these solitudes while frequent allusions to intermarriage and recruitment into warbands suggest that the early medieval frontier was as much a corridor as it was an obstacle. Political alliances also intersected its long reaches. Charlemagne's expedition across the Elbe in 789 against the Wilzi was undertaken in alliance with the pagan Sorbs and Abodrites.[28] In the later ninth century, the Moravians intervened on several occasions in Frankish affairs, supporting one rival faction against the other. The Carolingians vengefully repaid this interference, summoning the Hungarians against the Moravians. Crossing the frontier was additionally a method of flight. In 840 Louis the German, having been defeated by his father, 'bought his way through the land of the Slavs', and two centuries later, a Saxon knight escaping a charge of murder took refuge in the Polish court.[29] One can only speculate, however, as to the circumstances which brought an eighth-century Avar prince to a Frankish burial ground near Linz.[30]

The frontier itself was not static. During the Carolingian period, the dukes of Bavaria pushed along the line of the riverways and old Roman roads into Carantania. Their advance was followed by the replacement of Slavonic princes by Frankish counts, and by subsequent competition among the Bavarian sees for the souls and tithes of the native population.[31] By the early ninth century, the Frankish advance had penetrated to the upper reaches of the Drava.[32] Charlemagne's destruction of the Avar

khanate at the end of the eighth century opened Pannonia to Frankish rule. There is some evidence of Bavarian settlement in the former Avar territories and of the construction of a line of defences east of the Tisza River, presumably against the Bulgarians.[33] Nevertheless, such movements as these were exceptions. The north-south flow of the rivers and other hindrances, both natural and man-made, rendered campaigning difficult. Although Schünemann's estimate that a force of just several thousand Frankish knights required a baggage-train sixty miles long seems exaggerated, the logistical problems involved in fielding an army were immense.[34] In 820, a Frankish army was obliged to abandon Pannonia on account of 'the length of the route' and the 'unhealthy land and water' which made it fall victim to dysentery.[35] As Lambert von Hersfeld was later to advise Henry IV, without thorough preparation before an eastward campaign, 'disease and famine will in a short time consume many of your men and almost all your horses'.[36] We may count, therefore, the huge number of battles and skirmishes fought across the frontier between 789 and 1157 — at least 175 excluding minor confrontations.[37] We should not, however, marvel that for much of this period the borderland between the Frankish *regnum* and its eastern neighbours barely moved, but continued instead as a smudged line along the course of the Elbe, Saale and Enns.

Frankish expansion eastwards reached its highpoint with the occupation of Pannonia. The destruction of the Avar khanate was followed shortly afterwards by the conversion of Moravia and the implantation of missions from the archbishopric of Salzburg. At some point, the ruler of Moravia made himself a vassal of the Frankish king, showing dutiful gratititude when his 'fiefs' were converted into allods. In 845, fourteen Bohemian dukes were received by Louis the German and baptised.[38] These were, however, ephemeral gains. Pannonia and the Moravian dukedom were lost at the end of the ninth century to the Hungarians, and the eastern marches in modern-day Austria and Slovenia seem also to have been abandoned at around the same time. In the north, the evangelizing activity of the see of Hamburg, which claimed jurisdiction along the southern Baltic coast, was interrupted by the Viking sack of the city in 845. Its evangelical vigour seems thereafter to have departed as rapidly as did the proselytizing of the once fervent Bavarian sees. In most of the

Frankish realm, missionary prelates were gradually superseded by aristocratic ones and the interests of the marcher counts assumed a correspondingly defensive and self-serving character. Although expeditions to enforce tribute-payments from the tribes living east of the Elbe remained common enough, no scheme of conquest or conversion, let alone of settlement, was undertaken.

The elevation of the Saxon Henry (I) the Fowler to the throne in 918 shifted the balance of power in the German and East Frankish kingdom to the north-east. The Liudolfinger dukes of Saxony had previously been active across the Elbe, seeking to reduce the Slavonic tribes living there to tributary status. A new urgency was given by the close political connections which developed during the early tenth century between several of the trans-Elbian tribes and the Hungarians. During the reigns of Henry I and of his son and successor, Otto I, there was unprecedented German military activity east of the Elbe which was followed by the construction of forts and burgwards, most notably at Brandenburg, Mecklenburg and Havelberg. The building of forts was at its most intense between the Saale and Elbe, in the lands of the Sorbs and Dalemintzi. The region rapidly fell under the strong influence of Saxon and Thuringian counts who intermarried with the leading Slavonic families.[39] The territories east of the Elbe-Saale line were collected into two marches, the Thuringian march and the Saxon march. The first of these was later reorganized into the smaller Meissen, Lusatia and North Marches. The second remained intact under the Billung family whose scions extended their authority into the region north of the Elbe largely unchecked. There is some evidence from later chroniclers that the Billungs may have introduced settlers into their march. Helmold of Bosau, writing around 1170, noted in Schleswig and Wagria the traces of ancient furrows among the woods and the remains of embankments, and recalled that Henry the Fowler had 'fixed the boundary of the kingdom in Schleswig [...] and ordered a colony of Saxons to settle there'.[40]

The Saxon rulers were plainly intent on transforming power relations with the Slavonic tribes from one of loose overlordship based on the payment of tribute to one of more direct rule. As a Slav embassy to Otto I's court complained in 955, they 'would pay tribute as usual, but would keep the government of the

region in their own hands; they would accept peace on those terms but would otherwise fight for their liberty'.[41] Lordship went hand in hand with the duty of conversion and more particularly with the establishment of a network of new bishoprics east of the Elbe. Oldenburg, on the site of the Wagrian stronghold of Starigrad, was probably the first. It was followed by Havelberg (946), Brandenburg (948), Merseburg (967), Meissen (968) and Zeitz (968, subsequently transferred to Naumburg). In 968, the archbishopric of Magdeburg was set up with jurisdiction over all these foundations save Oldenburg, and 'as metropolitan of all the people of the Slavs beyond the Elbe and Saale, recently converted or yet to be converted to God'. As first archbishop of Magdeburg, Otto installed Adalbert who had previously undertaken a mission to Kiev. He chose as bishop of Merseburg Boso of the missionary abbey of St Emmeram in Regensburg.[42]

The achievement of the Saxon rulers did not endure. The new bishops rapidly came into conflict with the marcher lords whose interest was more the collection of tribute from the pagan Slavs than their conversion and the swelling of church tithes. Within a short period missionary prelates were replaced once again by the scions of aristocratic families and the evangelical impulse faltered. The jurisdiction of Magdeburg as metropolitan see of all the trans-Elbian Slavs was weakened firstly by the creation of an independent Polish archdiocese based on Gniezno, and then by the ambitions of the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen which established its own sees at Ratzeburg and Mecklenburg. Rebellion did the rest. In 983 and 1018, massive uprisings of subject Slavonic tribes destroyed the sees of Brandenburg, Havelberg, Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and in 1066 Ratzeburg was overcome. For most of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, these bishoprics either lay vacant or struggled on as distant outposts. Although the region between the Saale and the Elbe remained continuously in the possession of its margraves, control of most of the territory east of the Elbe was lost as a consequence of these rebellions. Power was held instead by local Slav princes, some of whom embraced Christianity but none of whom acknowledged either the German ruler or his vassals as overlord. The principal achievements of the century were the foundation of the bishopric of Bamberg which completed the conversion of the Slav population living in the region of the

Upper Main, and the slow penetration of the Babenberg rulers of the Ostmark, and of the Bavarian Eppensteiner family, into what would become Lower Austria and Carinthia.

* * *

The sudden expansion of German power eastwards after the vicissitudes and neglect of the eleventh century has been variously explained as a consequence of demographic pressures or as the product of crusading ideology.[43] The new and vigorous eastward policy pursued by the German princes owed much, however, to the new dynasties which took power on the frontier during the course of the early twelfth century. In 1106, the last of the Billung dukes of the Saxon march expired. Most of the Billung properties were subsequently acquired by Lothar of Supplinburg (the future Emperor Lothar III), through whom they devolved by marriage to the Welf line of Bavarian dukes and thus ultimately to Henry the Lion of Saxony. Some further Billung estates were granted to the Ascanian family of Ballenstedt, while the Billung claims to Holstein were ceded to the counts of Schauenburg. In the 1120s and 1130s, the power of the Ascanians was extended to the North Mark, while the Wettin family received Meissen and Lusatia. Most of these grants were in name only, since the territories enumerated were still occupied by Slavonic princes. Over the succeeding decades, however, the newly enfeoffed families made good their claims. The Wagrians of Holstein were defeated in the late 1130s by Adolf of Schauenburg. Their lands were rapidly settled and a new city was founded at Lübeck. Following hard upon the 1147 'Wendish' crusade came a succession of campaigns, led by Henry the Lion and the kings of Denmark, which destroyed the power of the Abodrite rulers.

Conquest was followed by the institutions of evangelization. In 1154, Henry the Lion refounded the see of Ratzeburg, appointing to it Evermod of the Premonstratensian canonry of Magdeburg. In 1160, the Saxon ruler translated the bishopric of Mecklenburg to Schwerin and of Oldenburg to Lübeck, installing missionary prelates in both sees. Farther south, the Ascanian Albert the Bear recaptured Havelberg (in 1136) and Brandenburg (in 1157) and reconstituted their bishoprics. Thereafter, the Ascanians continued their drive towards the Oder,

while their Wettin neighbours in Meissen made good their own claims to Upper Lusatia, acquiring also advocacy of the see of Naumburg-Zeitz. The changed balance of forces east of the Elbe prompted in its turn the submission of the remaining Slavonic princes. In 1181, Bogisław I of Pomerania chose to accept German overlordship, converting his principality into a fief of the empire. In exchange for their lands, the Piast princes of Silesia likewise submitted to imperial dominion. In their turn, the pagan rulers of the Middle Oder made haste both to convert and to marry their offspring into the victorious line of Ascanian princes.

The rapid extension of large dynastic properties in the region of conquest cannot, however, be ascribed entirely to the relentless determination of Henry the Lion or Albert the Bear. The Slavonic principalities had been weakened both by their own internecine conflicts and by recent irruptions of Danes, Poles and Bohemians. Members of their ruling houses had frequently embraced Christianity even at the cost of savage civil war in which a Gottschalk or a Henry sought German aid against a Cruto or a Nyklot. (The names by which the rivals are recalled betray the link between conversion and acculturation). The princes of Pomerania had accepted baptism prior to Otto of Bamberg's missions in the 1120s, for only by so doing could they hope to ward off the westward expansion of Christian Poland. Silesia was also ruled by Christian dukes from at least the eleventh century, although the conversion of its countryside was slow. Both Silesia and Pomerania had thus entered the orbit of Latin Christendom well before their political submission; it only remained to be decided whether they would be incorporated in the German Empire or in the remains of the Piast kingdom of Poland. As Thomas Kantzow, author of the sixteenth-century Pomeranian Chronicle, was later to explain while reviewing the wars fought out in the twelfth century, his country's inclusion within Germany had at least the merit of 'putting an end to all the changes of this land'.[44]

As the powers of the Slavonic princes faltered, the might of their German neighbours grew. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the loose collection of lands and rights which constituted the older form of German lordship was gradually superseded by the territorial principality.[45] The new German duchies were distinguished by the contiguity of estates, by the

concentration of jurisdictional rights, by the transition from consanguinity to dynasty within the ruling family, and by the conversion within their boundaries of allods into fiefs. The lordships which were carved out east of the Elbe in the twelfth century were precisely of this type. They were integrated complexes of territory and jurisdiction which concentrated authority at the apex of a feudal hierarchy and were spatially organized around castles and private churches. They were, moreover, both designed for expansion and indeed dependent upon it, for by the twelfth century relations of landownership provided almost the sole basis for relations of power. Furthermore, enfeoffment rather than immediate administration through *ministeriales* permitted the retention of indigenous rulers, which eased their submission. Henry the Lion's final victory over the Abodrites was followed by the return of Mecklenburg as a Saxon fief to the Slavonic chieftain Pribislav, the founder of a dynasty which would reign in Mecklenburg until 1918. In Brandenburg, likewise, those Slavonic families which accepted baptism were enfeoffed with land and incorporated as vassals within the newly-imposed feudal hierarchy.[46]

The conquests east of the Elbe and the territorial lordships carved out in their wake required an underpinning of material resources. Military victory was therefore rapidly followed by the economic reorganization of the captured territory. In many places the conquerors simply established themselves on top of the vanquished population, extracting the customary dues and services. The rhetorical advice of the Saxon knights to those who pleaded to waste the territory of the Abodrites is illustrative of their intentions: 'Is not the land we are devastating our land, and the people we are fighting our people?'[47] Slav villages thus remained within the area of conquest and were transformed into sources of revenue for the conquerors and of tithe-income for the priests. They may often be distinguished by their hybrid or purely Slavonic nomenclature — Rosinezdorf, Lucinsdorf, Ztarekostol, and so on — or by their morphology which customarily followed either the *Rundling* style of houses gathered in a circle, or a pattern of farms scattered *sparsim et particulatim* across the landscape.[48] On occasions, however, change of ownership prompted a change of toponym so that the Slav character of the settlement is almost entirely hidden in the

sources. German knights might even undertake the foundation of new settlements by moving in Slavs. Thus we know of a village founded in the mid-twelfth century near Naumburg by a German nobleman called Gerhard, but the village's name, Nibodiz, is entirely Slavonic. Likewise, a village dug out of uncultivated woodland by Bishop Walram of Naumburg bears the Slavonic name of Nuslize. This phenomenon is sufficiently attested for one German historian to distinguish two phases of settlement: a *Frühkolonisation* ('early colonization') by Slavs and a later *Hochkolonisation* ('mature phase of colonization') by immigrant Germans.[49]

Analogous developments took place within the areas conquered by the Teutonic and Livonian knights in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Throughout Courland and Livonia and in parts of Prussia, what was left of the native population was kept in place and there was only a thin layer of German settlement. Even in respect of Prussia, however, where the surviving records are the most comprehensive, the precise proportions between the national groups are hard to establish with any certainty. In the lands of the commandery of Christburg, for instance, which was settled by Germans in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, estimates vary between 670 to 1420 German families and 700 to 900 Prussian ones. Despite this imprecision, the figures do suggest that a large part of the existing population survived.[50] Contrary to the story of the 'extermination', Prussian nobles were often also kept in place as fiefholders, and we may presume that they retained their villages, the so-called *Hackenzinsdorfer* of the Prussian peasantry. Prussians were also involved in the opening up of new lands for cultivation, in the course of which they obtained rights identical to German settlers.[51] In Livonia, there was no large-scale migration except into the towns. The villages of Baltic and Finnish peasants largely survived as the *Lehen* (fiefs) of an élite of German knights or as the property of ecclesiastical institutions.[52]

Large parts of conquered territory comprised, however, deserted or sparsely-populated land. To these places, the conquerors invited in settlers from communities in western Europe. In a famous passage, Helmold of Bosau relates the rural reconstruction of Holstein by Count Adolf of Schauenburg in the 1140s:

> As the land was without inhabitants, he sent messengers into all parts, namely to Flanders and Holland, to Utrecht, Westphalia and Frisia, proclaiming that whosoever were in straits for lack of fields should come with their families and receive a very good land — a spacious land, rich in crops, abounding in fish and flesh and exceeding good pasturage.[53]

A remarkable proclamation, allegedly published in 1108 by the bishops and rulers of Saxony, declares,

> The heathens are the worst men, but their land is the best of all with meat, honey, flour, when it is cultivated! Here you Saxons, Franks, Lotharingians, Flemings, most famous conquerors of the world, you can save your souls, and if you want to, you will acquire the best land to live in.[54]

The arrival of German and Flemish peasants was often sufficient to force the decline or dispersal of the native population. Helmold tells how, at the time of Count Adolf's reconstruction of Holstein, 'the Slavs who lived in the villages round about withdrew and Saxons came and dwelt there, and the Slavs little by little failed in the land'. On the Ascanian estates, a similar pattern of depopulation prompted Albert the Bear to send 'to Utrecht and to places lying on the Rhine, to those, moreover, who live by the ocean and suffer the violence of the sea — to wit, Hollanders, Zealanders, Flemings — and he brought large numbers of them and had them live in the strongholds and villages of the Slavs'. In a few places, the Slavs were forcibly ejected from their homes to make way for the newcomers. We learn again from Helmold that in the 1160s Count Henry of Ratzeburg divided the land of the Slavonic Polabians among the 'multititude of people' he had summoned from Westphalia.[55] A few years later, the margrave of Brandenburg was requested by the prior of Hamersleben to replace Slav peasants on the monastery's estates with Germans who would be less 'negligent'.[56]

It was not just the conquerors who undertook rural reconstruction. From the twelfth century onwards, the Slavonic princes of Pomerania and Silesia and the rulers of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary promoted the settlement of their lands by German peasants. This development cannot be seen as simply one of keeping pace. The lands of Central and Eastern Europe

were experiencing precisely the same enlargement of the territorial principle and principality as the German duchies farther west. The states of the region were acquiring a new territorial organization and administration, which was in the process of supplanting the earlier tribally-derived system of government based on retinues, 'feedings' and the distribution of plunder. Chieftains were becoming barons, servitors making themselves into nobles. Relations within the emerging class of nobility and between its members and the ruler were increasingly based less on personal bonds than on property rights and the obligations which flowed from them. Full exploitation of the resources which derived from land required in its turn efficient methods of rural management and cultivation. Moreover, as conditions became more stable within the region and new forms of military defence were found, the retention by the prince of large tracts of empty border land was seen as increasingly wasteful. The transformation of the forests and wastelands along the frontier thus became one of the first tasks to be performed by German settlers.

The rulers of Central and Eastern Europe frequently employed church institutions to found the earliest German settlements. Monasteries, convents and chapters were allocated land, often in deserted frontier regions, on condition that they cleared and cultivated the new properties. Most brought in German peasants to undertake the task.[57] The use of monasteries as centres for rural clearance was evidently commonplace by the late twelfth century. The 1175 ducal privilege to the Cistercians of Leubus in Silesia specifically recorded that the foundation was intended 'not for peasants or workers, but for the celebration of the divine by educated men and for those who contemplate the heavens'. Even so, the Cistercians of Leubus settled their granges not with lay brothers but with German peasants.[58] The border region between Silesia and Moravia saw a particularly dense settlement of German villages, planted in the main by religious houses. In 1233, the Polish duke Władysław Odonicz ceded a massive 6000 peasant hides or *Hufen* on the border with Pomerania to the Cistercians of Leubus and Heinrichau and to the Templars.[59] Likewise at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Andrew II of Hungary gave the Transylvanian Burzenland to the Teutonic Order with the intention that it make a *nova plantatio* and establish cities and markets — the region

had previously been a defensive wilderness occupied in the main by Pecheneg border guards.[60] Andrew's successor, King Béla IV, subsequently awarded the border banate of Severin (Szörény) to the Hospitallers. In this case, however, the Hospital was forbidden to engage in settlement since this might have the consequence of depopulating other parts of the kingdom.[61]

Failure to perform the required settlement could bring reprisals. In 1289, a Benedictine monastery which had previously been awarded lands on the border between Silesia and Bohemia on condition that it clear and settle them, but had failed to do so, had its properties repossessed by the duke of Wrocław. The duke undertook the clearance himself and three years later gave the property over to a Cistercian house.[62] The Teutonic Knights in Transylvania were for their part sufficiently ambitious in their plans for the Burzenland to excite the wrath of King Andrew, who ejected them from their properties in 1224. At the invitation of Duke Conrad of Mazovia, the knights moved six years later to Chełmno (Kulm) and to the Polish border with the Prussians. Relations between church institutions and secular rulers were commonly soured over the issue of tithes. New settlements were often granted exemptions from all payments including tithes for the first few years of their foundation. Many immigrant Germans were also accustomed to paying a lump sum, the *decima constituta*, rather than a proportion of produce. Disputes over tithe-payments provided fertile ground for litigation not only between villages and churches but also between local parishes whose priests vied for the right to tithe in newly cleared and cultivated land.[63]

Rulers themselves were often directly involved in organizing the settlement of their lands. In thirteenth-century Pomerania, the dukes Barnim I and Wartislaw III called in German knights whom they enfeoffed on royal lands. The knights then recruited peasants and settled them on the new properties. The rulers of Great Poland were equally active, sponsoring the formation of a dense network of new villages in the south of the country along the edge of the Carpathians, and then in the fourteenth century reaching eastwards up to the Wisłok River.[64] In Hungary, the dismissal of the Teutonic Order from Transylvania in 1224 was followed by Andrew II's massive reorganization of the southern marches. German peasants were moved into the territory evacuated by the Order and given an additional wide swathe of

territory from which the original inhabitants were removed. The function of the Germans was at first military and they were obliged to furnish 500 soldiers for the defence of the kingdom, but the extensive economic rights ceded them led to the rapid growth of their communities and to the foundation of a tight web of commercial centres.[65] Along the Prussian border, the Teutonic Order customarily made massive grants of recently conquered land to its knights, sometimes up to eighty hides per horseman. These blocks of land were parcelled out to villages which then assumed the obligations of military service. Exploitation of the Prussian 'wilderness' often assumed the character of land-speculation with knights cooperating together as collective contractors.[66] In the sixteenth century, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania proposed a massive cultivation of the forest zone and also of parts of White Russia, which was underwritten by Italian capital. A huge area was surveyed and distributed into hides, but owing to the excessive burdens imposed on the peasantry it attracted little new settlement.[67]

The interest of rulers extended to the foundation of towns which might operate as centres of exchange, defence and revenue-collection. The twelfth-century occupation of Wagria was thus followed by the building of the city of Lübeck, and around the same time the kings of Hungary granted the earliest urban charter to a community of Walloon merchants in Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg).[68] Over the next century, there was an unprecedented wave of urban foundations in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1234, Barnim I of Pomerania in his charter for Prenzlau affirmed his commitment to organize cities in the same manner as had been undertaken elsewhere, reckoning by this measure to swell his own profits.[69] *Pro utilitatibus et comodis*, a common enough phrase, alternated in the charters of the period with *pro necessitate seu conservacione terre nostre*. Cities were also defensive strongholds and their strategic function did not sit uneasily with their commercial significance. Not only did wealth need protection but also the cities commonly occupied locations at the crossing points of rivers, in valleys or at the entrance to defiles. Ottokar II of Bohemia's 'burning zeal to adorn the kingdom with cities' saw the construction, therefore, of a network of trading emporia reaching from Ungarisch Hradisch (Uherské Hradiště) to Wiener Neustadt which could act also as a defensive shield to ward off Hungarian incursions.[70] The charter

of the city of Płock, given by Casimir III in 1352, explained in detail the size and quality of the defensive walls which were to be built around the new foundation.[71]

If the settlement of Germans was essentially a planned operation, so too was the physical construction of their cities and villages. A feature of the new cities planted in Central and Eastern Europe was their attempt to follow the gridplan of Roman *castra*. Since, however, they were frequently planted on the top of older settlements, the lines of the streets and walls were often forced to assume an irregular pattern. The ramparts of Buda thus jutted forth to accommodate an older royal *Kammerhof*; those of Beszterce (Bistriţa) in Transylvania extended outwards to enclose two convents.[72] The centre of a city would commonly comprise a large market square, around which were built the homes of the *Meliorat* or *Ringbürger*. The square itself might subsequently be occupied by a cathedral, after which the market would have to move to a less central location (as happened for instance in Wrocław). The planting of a town might be followed by the construction of a contiguous settlement intended to accommodate the overflow of population. More usually, however, suburbs would sprawl out, often running over and enclosing older villages and markets, and creating a complexity of superior and precedent rights. Dominating the city was frequently the fortress of the *Vogt* or *advocatus*, a royal or ducal nominee. The *Vogt* customarily exercised 'high justice' in criminal matters and claimed additional administrative prerogatives which might date back to a time before the city's legal foundation. The presumptuous activities of the *Vogt* often brought him into confrontation with the city government and sometimes into actual physical conflict with the citizens. The planned character of the cities was thus seldom matched by any grand jurisdictional design capable of reconciling the medley of overlapping rights and privileges introduced by the pattern of urban settlement. In the countryside, by contrast, the majority of villages were founded *in cruda radice*, 'out of wild root', as the frequency of the suffixes -hagen, -rodung and -walde amply demonstrates. Carved out of the marsh or woodland wilderness, they display an extraordinary regularity and uniformity in the arrangement of farmsteads and plots. The paraphernalia of German *Siedlungsformenforschung* and the language of village morphology — *Waldhufendorf*; *Marschhufendorf*; *Angerdorf*

and so on — are products of the nineteenth century, and many villages assumed intermediate forms which defy easy classification. The sources do, however, employ two key terms which may be used as a basis for discussion: the 'Flemish' and the 'Frankish' hide (*Hufe*, *mansio*). The distinction between the two varieties of hide was not one of size, as hides within each category might vary enormously in the quantity of land they enclosed. Rather, the type of hide determined the shape of the settlement as a whole and reflected the particular problems and opportunities faced by the settlers at the time of the village's foundation.[73]

In forest, swampy or upland regions where land was plentiful, the most common form of hide was the 'Frankish', which is typified by the modern name of *Waldhufe*. Farmhouses were built at intervals beside a long streetway, behind which stretched long parallel plots of land set at right angles to the road. The villages were often so long that they ran into each other. The plots themselves might reach back several miles in length and were evidently cleared in stages over a number of years. In upland terrain, the overall shape of the plots frequently twisted to avoid natural obstacles, with each assuming an attenuated and sinuous form. The uniform character of the plots might also be disturbed by commonly-owned cattleways along which herds were moved from the farmsteads to those parts of the hides which were put down to pasture. Originally, each household possessed a plot apiece which was divided from its neighbour by a strip of turf about a foot wide, but over time plots might be partitioned or combined. Deserted plots are common enough in the fifteenth century.

The 'Flemish-hide' village assumed a quite different form. Farmhouses were concentrated around a central green or *Anger*, which might also contain a church, school and shops. The village was usually surrounded by several fields. The villagers owned strips within the fields, commonly two or three, and additional fields were cultivated and divided up according to the prosperity and ambition of the community. The 'Flemish hide' was most suitable in regions which had been already settled. Since hides did not have to adjoin homes, fields could be positioned in such a way as to occupy the irregularly placed stretches of uncultivated land lying between older settlements. Thus, 'Flemish-hide' villages were usually found in lowland areas

where there was a history of previous settlement. Often, however, 'Frankish-hide' villages had to add on 'Flemish-hide' fields, particularly when their own slender plots had run back so far as to make any further extension irksome.

The origins of the terms 'Flemish' and 'Frankish' are obscure and probably misleading. Villages opened in marshlands, where we might expect Flemings to have been more active, customarily follow a Frankish form. The so-called *Marschhufendorf* was, after all, no more than a *Waldhufendorf* with the kinks caused by progress across an upland terrain removed. Moreover, Slavonic villages often themselves adopted 'Flemish' and 'Frankish' forms. We know, therefore, of villages in Upper Lusatia with such names as Wendischbaselitz, Wendischrottmannsdorf and Wendischcarsdorf, which were organized according to the 'Frankish' hide even though their toponymy suggests an originally Sorbian population.[74] The assarting of woodland near Tarnów by Polish peasants in the early fourteenth century seems likewise to have been undertaken according to the principles of the 'Frankish hide'. The sixteenth-century Lithuanian clearance was, for its part, probably based on 'Flemish' principles, although the number of hides per family as well as the size of the hides themselves clearly differed from normal practice.[75]

The link between ruler, monastery or knight and the village settlement itself was the *locator*. The *locator* contracted with the owner of the land to enlist peasants and to settle them on specified lands. In return for this labour, the contractor usually received a part of the land of the village, often a double-holding, and the hereditary office of village-headman or *Schultheiss* which brought with it certain customary revenues. Nevertheless, medieval contracts of location are numerous (about 400 survive from thirteenth-century Silesia alone) and they list a diversity of obligations, contractual forms and rewards. In some areas, dynasties of professional *locatores* were active, who having cleared one countryside moved on to another. The Stange family, which by the close of the thirteenth century had amassed 665 *Hufen* in the lands of the bishopric of Pomesania, had previously been involved in large-scale undertakings in Moravia,[76] and Conrad von Löwendorf, who undertook a massive clearance in Bohemia amounting to 800 *Hufen* in all, was appointed by Ottokar II on the basis of his reputation as 'a

suitable and expert man in such matters'.[77] More commonly, however, *locatores* were involved in just one venture. After a flurry of activity and organization, they settled down to enjoy the proceeds of their labour and to pass on their status to the next generation. Memory of their achievement was recorded for posterity in the names of the villages they founded: a *villa Echelini* (Heczelsdorf), *villa Humberti* (Hammersdorf) or *villa Epponis* (Neppendorf) — there are a hundred such toponyms in Transylvania alone.[78]

Contractors sometimes joined together in consortia to undertake large-scale settlement and clearance. Among the earliest such ventures was the draining of fenland belonging to the diocese of Hamburg-Bremen. Several groups of *locatores* undertook the work of reclamation, which began in 1106, parcelling up and selling on the recovered land to Hollanders. Consortia of this type were particularly active in the establishment of towns. The St Gall quarter of Prague was thus built during the early thirteenth century by a consortium of entrepreneurs headed by a royal minter called Eberhard.[79] The founding of Buda in Hungary during the middle years of the thirteenth century appears to have involved several consortia which were likewise led by moneyers. Their descendants battled for power in the new city for much of the later thirteenth century, subverting the principle that the headman of the town should be elected by the citizens.[80] For his part, the previously mentioned Conrad von Löwendorf headed up a consortium of *locatores* in Bohemia which founded a small town and a network of supporting villages in the countryside. Conrad was rewarded by the king with the hereditary office of *Vogt*, shops in the new town, several mills and a tenth of all cleared land. His colleagues were given hereditary judicial offices in the outlying villages.[81]

The actual mechanism by which these early entrepreneurs managed to recruit peasants to engage in the work of clearance and settlement remains, however, uncertain. Some tantalising evidence survives in the form of the appeals made by Adolf of Schauenburg and Albert the Bear, as recorded by Helmold of Bosau (see p. 26 above). Just as famously, Wiprecht of Groitzsch applied in the early twelfth century to his mother in Franconia to find settlers for the new lands being opened up in the diocese of Merseburg, and he 'brought back many Franconian peasants and instructed them to cultivate the region, when they had cleared the

forest, and to possess it by hereditary right'. Evidently, though, Wiprecht employed intermediary *locatores* to complete the task of settlement. Their names, both German and Slavonic, were inscribed on the landscape: an Ottendorf and Everhardisdorf, a Scazlausdorf and Drogisdorf.[82]

Just as there were families of *locatores*, so it would seem that there were dynasties of settlers. Once they had cleared one region, they sold up and moved on to cultivate another wilderness. The Saxons of Transylvania thus partly comprised families which had previously been active opening up new land in Silesia. Having acquired in the mean time an expertise in mining technology, some families may have gone on to settle in the mineworkings of modern-day Bulgaria and Kosovo.[83] Other immigrants plainly retained connections with their homeland, at least until they were confident that their latest undertaking would be successful. Helmold records how when the Slavs attacked a Frisian outpost in Wagria, only a hundred of the 400 settlers were to be found, 'because the others had returned to their fatherland for the purpose of setting in order the belongings they had left there'.[84] Merchants in the newly-founded towns of Central and Eastern Europe showed, as one might expect, an even greater readiness both to return home once their fortunes were made or to press yet further eastwards in their search for commercial opportunities. Their business connections were consolidated by a network of interlocking marriages and commercial agreements which could leave, as with the Hanseatic merchant Hildebrand Veckinchusen, a brother in Reval, a first wife in Dortmund, a second in Riga, and a final resting place in Lübeck.[85]

The *locator*, having enlisted a band of venturesome peasants, would commonly organize a clearance. During this period, which might last for six months to a year, the settlers would work together and would enjoy exemption from all taxes and tithes. Thereafter, the land would be measured and the hides divided. Accurate parcellization was plainly an art which spawned its own profession of skilled *mensuratores*. The *Geometria Culmensis*, compiled around 1400 on behalf of the Teutonic Order, reveals a notable grasp of trigonometry, of Pythagoras' theorem, and even of the value of pi. As one historian has remarked, the *Schnur* or measuring line was the veritable symbol of the German settlement, as perhaps the terms *šňůra* in Czech and *sznura* in Polish may be held to demonstrate.[86] The measuring arts might,

however, be abused. Helmold tells of how the Count of Schauenburg gave to the bishop of Oldenburg-Lübeck a grant of 300 *Hufen* in Holstein. Plainly, though, the Count later thought better of the deal:

> The bishop [...] went to view the property and, after holding an inquisition with the settlers, discovered that it comprised hardly a hundred hides. The Count for this purpose had had the land measured by a short and to us unknown line; besides he measured with the line swamps and woodland, and he made the number of fields very great.

The case was taken to Henry the Lion who judged 'that measurement was to be made according to the custom of the land and that swamps and the denser woods were not to be measured'.[87] Upon division of the assarted land, individual hides were usually apportioned by the drawing of lots among the settlers. The *laneus* or *mansus* might thus also be rendered in the surviving Latin sources as a *sors* or as the chance of fate. In the distribution of the hides, the *locator* and the priest frequently took a double or additional portion.

In order to be attractive to newcomers and entrepreneurs from the west, the settlement required more than just an accurate measuring-line. The immigrants had to be convinced that the conditions of settlement were sufficient to ensure the success of their venture. In the first place, this required guarantees that the dues owed by the newcomers would not be so heavy in the early years as to wipe out their meagre profits and room for reinvestment. Contracts of location thus frequently specify a minimum period of exemption from customary dues. Moreover, the settlers needed assurance that the fruits of their industry could be passed on to the next generation and so were desirous of complete rights in inheritance law. The principle had thus to be accepted that property did not upon death revert either to the crown or to the local lord but would instead be passed on intact to heirs. Since the burdens imposed on the native peasantry were frequently excessive, the newcomers additionally required freedom from all onerous services and the right to administer themselves without interference from royal or district officials. They were anxious to be judged, moreover, by their own legal norms even in the case of appeals to superior courts. These rights, which together comprised the so-called 'German law',

were so closely bound up with the conditions of settlement that their enumeration is commonplace in charters of location and in the charters of newly founded villages.

Similar considerations affected the conditions of urban settlement. The privileges of newly founded cities commonly relieved the citizens from the performance of *opera servilia* while ceding them the right to self-government and to their own laws. Some cities in Central and Eastern Europe went on to develop their own written customs, one of the most comprehensive of which was the Buda *Stadtrecht* composed in several stages during the early fifteenth century.[88] More commonly, however, the new cities borrowed codes of urban customary law which had proved successful elsewhere: Lübeck or Hamburg law in the Baltic region; Magdeburg and Nuremberg law in Brandenburg and Poland; and Buda law in Hungary. When confronted by tricky legal matters, the magistrates in a new foundation might refer back to the 'mother-town' for advice, and litigants were sometimes entitled to appeal actions to the magistracy of the 'mother-town'. Since, however, such procedures might have the consequence of taking cases outside the jurisdiction of the kingdom or principality, rulers sought to prevent townsfolk appealing outside the territory. For the German-law cities in the lands of the Bohemian crown, Jihlava was specified as author of 'the highest law in this kingly regiment' and all appeals were directed towards its *Schöffen*. An analogous role was maintained by the royal castle in Cracow which, according to Casimir III's privilege of 1356, dealt the *supremum ius Theutonicum Magdeburgense* in Poland. In fifteenth-century Hungary, the court of the royal Tavernicus took over as highest forum for appeals emanating out of the kingdom's principal seven cities, although the law it followed was most probably the law of Buda.[89]

The contemporary association between German law and effective economic exploitation proved sufficient for a large number of purely Slavonic villages to be transformed by their lords into villages of German law. This development was plainly under way in Silesia by the second half of the thirteenth century. Grant of German law was sometimes accompanied by a change in the village's actual name, but this would appear to be more common when accompanied by the reorganization of peasant plots to bring them into line with 'Frankish' or 'Flemish'

forms.[90] Some of the provisions of German law were extended to migrant Vlach shepherds from Transylvania who were employed in the Carpathian uplands of southern Poland, for the so-called *ius Valachorum* operating in these parts turns out upon closer inspection to be derivative of German law. Its conferral was probably intended to distinguish free shepherds from the region's peasantry which still laboured under the more onerous terms of Polish law.[91]

* * *

The nature of the early Slavonic and Hungarian states in Central and East Europe has been much debated. Otto of Freising's famous account of the kingdom of Hungary in the mid-twelfth century, where he alleged, 'the will of the prince alone is held by all as sufficient', has been cited to support a 'despotic' interpretation of the region's early history.[92] Almost certainly, however, the emerging kingdoms of Central and Eastern Europe were multi-cellular from a legal point of view. They permitted a variety of customary procedures to operate which were only loosely subject to royal supervision. The subsequent codification of the liberties and rights of, for instance, the Pechenegs, Cumans and Széklers in Hungary could hardly have been undertaken without such a history of legal and jurisdictional difference. Nevertheless, these rights were seldom acknowledged in written form before the thirteenth century. They were passed on orally and, as a group of Pechenegs were to complain to the Hungarian Palatine in 1224, rights of an unwritten kind were vulnerable to contradiction and diminution.[93] References in early charters to the fragility of human memory suggest the regularity with which autarkic systems of customary law were misinterpreted by royal and other officials.[94]

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the structure of legal relationships within Central and Eastern Europe was transformed. The act of conversion to Catholic Christianity brought in its train a great influx of clergy. The special legal status attaching to the clergy was formally recognized in the texts of the region's earliest laws, as also the right of members of the clergy to be impleaded only before church courts.[95] Moreover, the native rulers, having embraced Catholic Christianity, made massive donations of land to religious institutions. These grants

were typically accompanied by the cession of jurisdictional rights which lifted the legal administration of the donated territory out of the hands of royal or ducal officials. Whereas previously, however, jurisdictional rights of this kind had never been formally recorded in writing, the new grants of immunity were ceded by charter.[96] In the majority of cases, it was the recipients themselves who framed the document, employing a terminology with which they themselves were familiar. In some instances, they simply copied out charters of French, Italian or German provenance. The incorporation of Central and Eastern Europe within Latin Christendom had thus the double consequence of both redefining existing legal relationships through the admission of a completely new vocabulary, and of fixing these relationships in the form of the sealed privilege.[97] In Hungary, this development was hastened by King Koloman's acquisition of the Italian cities of the Dalmatian coast at the close of the eleventh century. Their incorporation into the realm was followed by royal confirmation of their extensive powers of self-government and recognition of the right of the citizens to be judged by their own quite separate laws.[98]

The advent of a new legal vocabulary and of written instruments carried implications which extended beyond the relationship of the ruler to the Church. The privilege had the character of a private treaty which enumerated rights and obligations in the form of a contract. It was thus suitable for use in lay society as a means of specifying the personal bonds which had previously guided transactions between the ruler and members of his retinue. During the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the privilege was increasingly employed in Central and Eastern Europe to establish the terms under which lands, revenues and rights were held by the leading men of the principality. In the majority of cases, these instruments imitated in their form and content the charters previously granted to ecclesiastical bodies. Unwritten customary laws and procedures were, likewise, codified for the first time and published in the form of charters: as for instance was the case in thirteenth-century Hungary with respect to the rights of the Pechenegs of Árpás and of the borderguards of Örimagyarósd.[99] Society thus became linked by a network of private legal relationships, at the heart of which lay the concept of the chartered immunity. This development facilitated the restructuring of medieval society in

Central and Eastern Europe and permitted the emergence of a new landowning class of nobility bound together by ties of a quasi-feudal nature. In the process, it destroyed what was left of the primitive form of 'public' or 'patrimonial' power originally possessed by the ruler and replaced this with an interlocking system of private rights, duties and exemptions.

During the course of the High Middle Ages, the peculiarities of the Central and East European societies steadily diminished. Not only did they adopt many of the 'common denominators' of western feudal life,[100] but also rights and relationships acquired a new fixity in law which made their erosion far harder than in the previous period of legal illiteracy. These preconditions were vital for the success of the German settlement. The peasants and *locatores* who ventured eastwards required firm guarantees of their rights and exemptions. Their undertakings had to be supported, not just by vague and easily reduced promises that they would be able to live under German law, but by the formal expression of this right through instruments which were recognized as permanent and inviolable. In the lands of Central and Eastern Europe, these circumstances were substantially in place by the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. A mature concept of rights and of privileged immune status was developing which provided the constitutional framework for settlement. The charter with its hanging or impressed seal, which was as much the symbol of the eastern settlement as the measuring line, was already by the time of that settlement an understood and recognized feature of legal relationships in the regions to which the Germans came.

It is no accident that the geography of the German settlement should have followed the geography of Latin Christendom, and that a substantial immigration should have taken place only in those territories which were either conquered by German lords or whose own rulers had previously embraced Catholic Christianity. In the neighbouring lands of Orthodox Christianity, where the concept of the jurisdictional immunity (at least in its secular form) was barely understood and the codification of local custom almost unknown, the legal preconditions for settlement were lacking. In this region, the German migration was thus confined to a handful of opportunistic merchants and to a few colonies of miners. German communities, such as those in

Wallachia, which moved over time from Catholic to Orthodox overlordship, almost invariably perished.

The impact of the German settlement upon the lands of Central and Eastern Europe was enormous. Language, demography, the geometry of the landscape, and degrees of economic exploitation and urbanization were all substantially affected by the influx of German peasants and townsmen into the region. This transformation was not responsible, however, for the 'westernization' of the region nor for its inclusion within the sphere of Latin Christendom. Rather, it was rendered possible in the first place because this large continental space had already become part of a greater European culture and because its institutions had already been altered and rearranged so as to fit western legal norms. In this critical regard, the Germans were no more *Kulturträger* ('bearers of culture') than they were agents of Europeanization. They were instead participants in a much larger and longer process of acculturation, the beginnings of which stretch back into the first millennium and to the terms of the region's conversion to Catholic Christianity.

NOTES

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13. *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, ed. Franz Zimmermann and Carl Werner, I, Hermannstadt (Sibiu), 1892, pp. 7, 54. This Johannes was clearly an Italian as the names of both his son and grandson, Corrado and Gianino respectively, suggest: see ibid., pp. 54, 82.
14. On the terminology of the German settlement, see in particular Walter Schlesinger, 'Zur Problematik der Erforschung der deutschen Ostsiedlung', and Jan Piskorski, 'Die deutsche Ostsiedlung des Mittelalters', pp. 82–3.
15. Hans Lemberg, 'Lage und Perspektiven der Zeitgeschichtsforschung über Ostmitteleuropa in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *ZfO*, 35, 1986, pp. 191–218 (206).
16. Klaus Zernack, 'Der historische Begriff "Ostdeutschland" und die deutsche Landesgeschichte', *Nordost-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Regionalgeschichte*, Neue Folge, 1, 1992, pp. 157–73 (166–7); Herbert Ludat, *An Elbe und Oder um das Jahr 1000: Skizzen zur Politik des Ottonenreiches und der slavischen Mächte in Mitteleuropa*, Cologne and Vienna, 1971, pp. 67–8.
17. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*; James Westfall Thompson, *Feudal Germany*, Chicago, IL, 1928. On comparative approaches to the medieval frontier, see in particular Robert I. Burns, 'The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages' in Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (eds), *Medieval Frontier Societies*, Oxford, 1992, pp. 307–30.
18. Ludat, *An Elbe und Oder*, p. 4.
19. Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards*, p. 316.
20. Ibid., pp. 300–21; Timothy Reuter, *Germany in the Early Middle Ages 800–1145*, London and New York, 1991, pp. 12–13. Just to make things worse, this approach may be shown to have its origins in historical literature of the 'anti-Bolshevik front' variety published in Germany during the Second World War.
21. *Einhard and Notker the Stammerer: Two Lives of Charlemagne*, trans. Lewis Thorpe, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 69.
22. František Graus, 'Slavs and Germans' in Geoffrey Barraclough (ed.), *Eastern and Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, London, 1970, pp. 15–42 (35).
23. Horst Fuhrmann, *Germany in the High Middle Ages c. 1050–1200*, Cambridge, 1986, p. 19. The terms *Germania* and *Germanus populus* were, however, recognized as a consequence of their mediation through classical texts.

24. Reuter, *Germany in the Early Middle Ages*, p. 91.
25. Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier 1100–1525*, London and Basingstoke, 1980, p. 17, citing Herbord, *Vita Ottonis* (*Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, ed. A. Bielowski, II, p. 78).
26. *Imperial Lives and Letters of the Eleventh Century*, trans. Theodor E. Mommsen and Karl F. Morrison, New York and London, 1962, p. 85 (Wipo, *Gesta Chuonradi II*, ch. 26).
27. Hansgerd Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter im mittelalterlichen Ungarn*, Wiesbaden, 1972, pp. 5-11.
28. *Carolingian Chronicles*, trans. Bernhard Walter Scholz, Ann Arbor, MI, 1972, p. 68 (*Annales Regni Francorum*, anno 789).
29. *Carolingian Chronicles*, p. 140 (*Nithardi historiarum libri IV*, I, 8); Bronislaw Geremek, 'Poland and the Cultural Geography of Medieval Europe' in Fedorowicz (ed.), *A Republic of Nobles*, pp. 10–27 (21).
30. Walter Pohl, *Die Awaren: Ein Steppenvolk im Mittelalter, 587–822 n. Chr.*, Munich, 1988, p. 311. Although Pohl does not mention this, the Avar may be presumed to have held high rank on account of the large number of arrows found in his grave.
31. A.P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 14–26; more generally, Aloysius L. Kuhar, *The Conversion of the Slovenes and the German-Slav Ethnic Boundary in the Eastern Alps*, Studia Slovenica, New York and Washington, DC, 1967.
32. August Dimitz, *Geschichte Krains von der ältesten Zeit*, I, Laibach, 1874, p. 126.
33. Charles R. Bowlus, *Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Struggle for the Middle Danube 788–907*, Philadelphia, PA, 1994, p. 13.
34. Konrad Schünemann, 'Ostpolitik und Kriegsführung im deutschen Mittelalter', *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, 17, 1937, pp. 31–56 (32).
35. *Carolingian Chronicles*, p. 107 (*Annales Regni Francorum*, anno 820); for further examples, see Schünemann, 'Ostpolitik und Kriegsführung', p. 51.
36. Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter*, p. 14, citing *Lamperti monachi Hersfeldi opera*, *MGH SS*, 1894, p. 198.
37. Schünemann, 'Ostpolitik und Kriegsführung', p. 33.
38. Reuter, *Germany in the Early Middle Ages*, p. 82; *The Annals of Fulda*, trans. T. Reuter, Manchester and New York, 1992, p. 24.

39. Herbert Ludat, *Slaven und Deutsche im Mittelalter: Ausgewählte Aufsätze zu Fragen ihrer politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Beziehungen*, Cologne and Vienna, 1982, pp. 5, 11.
40. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold, Priest of Bosau*, trans. F.J. Tschan, New York, 1935, p. 65, see also pp. 72, 235.
41. Reuter, *Germany in the Early Middle Ages*, p. 162.
42. Boyd H. Hill Jr, *Medieval Monarchy in Action: The German Empire from Henry I to Henry IV*, London and New York, 1972, pp. 40–1, 162.
43. On crusading ideology and its contribution to the eastward expansion of German power, see in particular Friedrich Lotter, 'The Crusading Idea and the Conquest of the Region East of the Elbe' in Bartlett and McKay (eds), *Medieval Frontier Societies*, pp. 267–306.
44. Oskar Kossmann, 'Die deutschrechtliche Neugestaltung Pommerns', p. 76 (citing Thomas Kantzow, *Pomerania*, ed. Georg Gaebel, I, 1908, p. 178).
45. See generally in this context Benjamin Arnold, *Princes and Territories in Medieval Germany*, Cambridge, 1991, and my own comments on the same in 'The Nobility and East-Central Europe during the Medieval and Early Modern Periods', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 74, 1996, pp. 687–99 (693–4).
46. F.L. Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia*, Oxford, 1954, pp. 18–20; Karl Jordan, *Henry the Lion: A Biography*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 81–2.
47. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold*, p. 180.
48. Schulze, 'Der Anteil der Slaven', pp. 323–4, 332; Walter Kuhn, 'Flämische und fränkische Hufe als Leitformen der mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung' in Kuhn, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung*, Cologne and Vienna, 1973, p. 28 (article first published in *Hamburger Mittel- und Ostdeutsche Forschungen*, 2, 1960, pp. 146–92).
49. Schulze, 'Der Anteil der Slaven', pp. 325–6.
50. Higounet, *Les Allemands en Europe centrale*, p. 245; Marian Biskup, 'Das Problem der ethnischen Zugehörigkeit im mittelalterlichen Landesausbau in Preussen', *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands*, 40, 1991, pp. 3–25 (9–10).
51. Higounet, *Les Allemands en Europe centrale*, p. 251.
52. Walter Hubatsch, 'Die deutsche Siedlung in Livland im Mittelalter' in *Deutsche Ostsiedlung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, ed. Kommission zum Studien der deutschen Kultur im Osten an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Cologne and

Vienna, 1971, pp. 122–4; E. Mugurevics, 'Interactions between Indigenous and Western Cultures in Livonia in the 13th to 16th Centuries' in David Austin and Leslie Alcock (eds), *From the Baltic to the Black Sea: Studies in Medieval Archaeology*, London, 1990, pp. 168–78; *Liv-, Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch*, I (1093–1300), Reval, 1853, pp. 6, 30, 145, 214, 439–40, 445, 650; *Chronicle of Henry of Livonia*, trans. J.A. Brundage, Madison, WI, 1961, p. 227.

53. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold*, p. 168.
54. Lotter, 'The Crusading Idea', p. 277.
55. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold*, pp. 225, 235, 239.
56. Carsten, *Origins of Prussia*, p. 33.
57. Walter Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren der mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung' in Schlesinger, *Die deutsche Ostsiedlung des Mittelalters*, pp. 225–61 (229–30).
58. Ibid., p. 229; Heinrich Appelt, 'Die mittelalterliche deutsche Siedlung in Schlesien' in *Deutsche Ostsiedlung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, pp. 1–19 (5–6) ('non pro agricolis vel structoribus, sed pro litteratis divinorum celebratoribus celestiumque contemplatoribus').
59. Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren', p. 231.
60. Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter*, p. 107; *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, I, pp. 11–12, 30.
61. Ibid., pp. 75–6.
62. Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren', p. 231.
63. Appelt, 'Die mittelalterliche deutsche Siedlung in Schlesien', pp. 6–7; more generally on this subject, see Piotr Gorecki, *Parishes, Tithes and Society in Earlier Medieval Poland*, Philadelphia, PA, 1993.
64. Higounet, *Les Allemands en Europe centrale*, pp. 153, 215–18; for further examples from Silesia and Lusatia, see Gorecki, *Parishes, Tithes and Society*, pp. 109–10, and Gertraud Eva Schrage, *Slaven und Deutsche in der Niederlausitz. Untersuchungen zur Siedlungsgeschichte im Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1990, p. 86.
65. *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, I, pp. 34–5; Béla Köpeczi (ed.), *Erdély története*, I, Budapest, 1986, pp. 332–40.
66. Carsten, *Origins of Prussia*, p. 57.
67. Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren', pp. 236–8.

68. Erik Fügedi, 'Der Stadtplan von Stuhlweissenburg und die Anfänge des Bürgertums in Ungarn', *Acta Historica* (Budapest), 15, 1969, pp. 103–36.
69. Klaus Conrad, 'Urkundliche Grundlagen einer Siedlungsgeschichte Pommerns bis 1250', *ZfO*, 31, 1982, pp. 337–60 (357).
70. Jörg K. Hoensch, *Premysl Ottakar II von Böhmen: Der goldene König*, Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1989, pp. 103–4.
71. Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren', p. 247.
72. András Kubinyi, *Die Anfänge Ofens*, Berlin, 1972, pp. 57–8; György Györffy, *Az árpádkori Magyarország történeti földrajza*, I, Budapest, 1987, p. 559.
73. For this and much of what follows, see Kuhn, 'Flämische und fränkische Hufe' (see note 48 above), pp. 1–51, and Walter Kuhn, 'Bauernhofgrössen in der mittelalterlichen Nordostsiedlung' in Kuhn, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen*, pp. 53–111 (article first published in *Hamburger Mittel- und Ostdeutsche Forschungen*, 4, 1962, pp. 210–67).
74. Schulze, 'Der Anteil der Slaven', p. 329.
75. Kuhn, 'Bauernhofgrössen in der mittelalterlichen Nordostsiedlung', pp. 91, 94.
76. Carsten, *Origins of Prussia*, p. 53.
77. Hoensch, *Premysl Ottakar II von Böhmen*, p. 103; Konrad Schünemann, 'Zur Geschichte des deutschen Landesausbaus im Mittelalter', *Südostdeutsche Forschungen*, I, 1936, pp. 30-46 (34).
78. Schünemann, 'Zur Geschichte des deutschen Landesausbaus', p. 34.
79. Ibid., p. 35.
80. Martyn Rady, *Medieval Buda: A Study of Municipal Government and Jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Hungary*, Boulder, CO and New York, 1985, pp. 23–38.
81. Schünemann, 'Zur Geschichte des deutschen Landesausbaus', p. 36.
82. Ibid.; Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, p. 136.
83. Ernst Wagner, 'Az erdélyi szászok településtörténete az újabb kutatások tükrében', *Új Erdélyi Múzeum*, I, 1990, 1–2, pp. 22–32 (24–5); Miklós Takács, 'Sächsische Bergleute im mittelalterlichen Serbien und die "sächsische Kirche" von Novo Brdo', *Südost-Forschungen*, 50, 1991, pp. 31–60 (35–6); Nikolaj Markov, 'Le "problème saxon" dans l'histoire bulgare pendant le Moyen Age: Une nouvelle hypotèse', *Südost-Forschungen*, 51, 1992, pp. 21–8 (22); on a possible German settlement near the present Macedonian border and its recent sad fate, see Ger Duijzings, 'Egzodus iz Letnice

— Hrvatske izbjeglice s Kosova u Zapadnoj Slavoniji', *Narodna umjetnost*, 32, 1995, 2, pp. 129–52, esp. p. 135 (I am grateful to the author for sending me a copy and English translation of this article).

84. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold*, p. 178.
85. Philippe Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, London and Basingstoke, 1970, pp. 173–4.
86. Kuhn, 'Flämische und fränkische Hufe als Leitformen der mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung', pp. 3–5.
87. *Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold*, p. 222.
88. *Das ofner Stadtrecht*, ed. Karl Mollay, Budapest, 1959; a much older but still valuable edition was published by Andreas Michnay and Karl Lichner, *Buda városnak törvénykönyve*, Pressburg, 1845.
89. Rady, *Medieval Buda*, pp. 141–59; Kuhn, 'Westslavische Landesherren als Organisatoren', pp. 244–5.
90. Conrad, 'Urkundliche Grundlagen einer Siedlungsgeschichte Pommerns', pp. 346, 350.
91. Kuhn, 'Flämische und fränkische Hufe als Leitformen der mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung', p. 30.
92. *The Deeds of Frederick the Great by Otto of Freising and his Continuator, Rahewin*, trans. C.C. Mierow, New York, 1966, pp. 66–7 (*Gesta Friderici I imperatoris*, I, ch. 32).
93. Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter*, p. 230.
94. 'Labilis est hominum memoria, sed vivit littera': *Codex diplomaticus et epistolaris Moraviae*, V, Brünn, 1850, p. 13; thus also, *Liv-, Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch*, I, p. 178.
95. See thus György Györffy (ed.), *Diplomata Hungariae antiquissima*, I (1000–1131), Budapest, 1992 (hereafter *Diplomata*), p. 387; György Bónis, 'Die Entwicklung der geistlichen Gerichtsbarkeit in Ungarn vor 1526', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, 80 (Kanonistische Abteilung, 49), 1963, pp 174–235 (182–7).
96. Such clauses were commonplace in Hungary by at least the twelfth century, see Györffy, *Diplomata*, pp. 40, 53, 60–1, 307.
97. Conrad, 'Urkundliche Grundlagen einer Siedlungsgeschichte Pommerns', pp. 339–41.
98. Györffy, *Diplomata*, pp. 340, 357, 407.
99. Göckenjan, *Hilfsvölker und Grenzwächter*, pp. 230–2.
100. Jenő Szűcs, 'Theoretical Elements in Master Simon of Kéza's *Gesta Hungarorum*, 1282–1285', *Études Historiques Hongroises*, 1975, pp. 239–81 (246–7).

3 *Cives Patriae*: 'German' Burghers in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

Karin Friedrich

Modern theories of nation-building and nationalism have usually looked to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the starting point for the formation of the nation, without taking into account expressions of pre-modern national identity and nationhood. Hans Kohn's distinction between a democratic — hence a 'good Western' — nation-building process modelled on the French Revolution, on the one hand, and a 'negative Eastern', romantic and xenophobic cultural nationalism, on the other hand, is typical for this approach.[1] Research on the myths of origin of early modern nations, such as the Batavian myth of sixteenth-century Dutch historians and the Swedo-Gothic myths in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus in the seventeenth century, however, has demonstrated that a sense of national belonging and political identity existed long before 1789. The extent to which theories of modern nation-building limited the definition of a nation has rightly been criticized by John Elliott:

> The apparent uncertainty of modern historians when faced with the question of nationalism in early modern Europe stands in marked contrast to the increasingly confident use in the sixteenth century of the words *patria* and *patrie*.[2]

In particular, early modern states with several national communities within frequently changing political boundaries, such as the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, have posed problems for theorists of the modern nation state. Since the union of crowns (1385) and of the parliaments (1569), Poland–

Lithuania embraced several provinces, from the Polish core lands of Wielkopolska and Małopolska, to Mazovia, Royal Prussia and the Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands, and bore the character of a multinational, multicultural state. One of the many groups that found a home under the political umbrella of the Polish–Lithuanian republic were settlers from the Holy Roman Empire, who migrated eastward in several waves from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The main centres of the rural and urban settlement of these foreigners — most of them German-speakers — were Wielkopolska and Prussia. The latter was ruled by the Teutonic Order until 1454, when the estates (including the Prussian towns) openly rebelled against their Teutonic masters and subjected themselves to the Polish crown.

The nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has always considered conglomerations such as the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth to be unstable and 'unnatural'. Thus, with hindsight, historians have often interpreted the partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia and Austria (1772–95) as the natural result of the country's lack of national, political and religious cohesion. This approach ignores the fact, however, that for over 300 years the Polish–Lithuanian state was an example for the successful cohabitation of several groups of linguistic, ethnic and religious origin, who carved out for themselves a common political identity under the aegis of 'Sarmatian' nationhood, until the hegemonial ambition and military superiority of its neighbours put an end to this experiment.

In the nineteenth century, the emergence of a German nation state under Prussian leadership was linked to a policy of preventing the reconstitution of a Polish state by all possible means. It was then that the negative stereotype of the frivolous and licentious Polish nobleman was reinforced and contrasted with the image of the thrifty, morally superior Protestant German city-dweller. This stereotyping grew more hostile and vicious as relations continued to deteriorate after the foundation of the new Polish state in 1918, the atrocities of the Second World War, and the Communist era in post-1945 Poland.

It is not difficult to provide evidence for the difficulties plaguing the German–Polish relationship. In rural Mazovia, the proverb 'German, Swabian, the devil's brother' was usually used against burghers from the Holy Roman Empire and of Protestant origin,[3] although most national and religious stereotypes

1. *Courland and Semigalia,* Polish fief (1561–1775)
2. *Ducal Prussia*, Polish fief (1525–1657)
3. *Lembork and Bytów,* Polish fief (1637–57)
4. *Livonia*, Polish fief (1561–1621 [60])
5. *Spisz* — 13 towns, mortgaged to Poland (1660–1772)
6. *Duchy of Siewierz*, possession of Bishops of Cracow (1443–1790)
7. *Smolensk, Seversk, Czernihów,* ceded to Poland (1619–67)

Poland–Lithuania at its greatest extent (1634–5)

originated in the Baroque literary genre of *descriptio gentium* and were used by Polish writers interchangeably for Germans, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Jews and other national groups.[4] As stereotypes more often reflect the political concerns of those who use them, rather than historical reality, they are symptomatic but unreliable instruments for measuring national and social conflicts. Although proverbs and stereotypes have usually been associated with popular culture, negative images of the alien German burgher and merchant were most likely propagated by the Polish noble and intellectual élites.[5]

There has been little reliable analysis of the national identity of burghers from Germany in Poland in the late medieval and early modern period, since historians have been content with a simple division between 'Germans' and 'Poles'. The criteria used to define 'Germanness' or 'Polishness' have usually been taken straight from the context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: names, language, religion, the Herderian notion of 'cultural' nationality and concepts of race — applied to the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries these are tools as anachronistic as the political programmes accompanying them. The most distorting method used to define German or Polish nationality is the counting of German or Polish names in the burgher-lists of the towns.[6] Relying on the conjecture that German burgher families in Polish cities had gradually adopted Polish names, Oskar Kossmann insisted that these burghers still belonged to the German nation. Pushing the exercise of name-analysis to absurd extremes, he tried to discover Germans behind Polish names on the basis that 'the German burghers who had immigrated to Poland in the Middle Ages were by now [in the sixteenth century] completely polonized'.[7] Consequently, he tried to discover 'Herr Sauer' behind 'Pan Kwaśniewski' (*kwaśny* means *sauer*), and 'Herr Leidner' behind 'Pan Cierpiński', because *cierpieć* means to suffer (*leiden*).[8] According to Kossmann's assumption that nationality was defined by blood, a German remained a German even if he was no longer aware of it.

Similar problems exist for the linguistic argument. There is no doubt that German was the predominant language of the burgher élites in several cities of Royal (Polish) Prussia. In several cases, burghers, particularly in Danzig and Elbing, associated their language with the origin of their forefathers from German lands.[9] After citing selected examples out of context, Kurt

Forstreuter, the late director of the Prussian State Archives in Berlin, concluded that 'for the estates of Royal Prussia, being Prussian was the equivalent of being German'.[10] Many burghers, however, spoke, wrote and read both German and Polish, and there were many Prussian burghers with Polish as their mother tongue.[11] The widespread practice of burghers sending their children to Polish-speaking parts of Royal Prussia, or to Poland, so that they could learn Polish, indicates that the attitude towards language differed greatly from Herder's view that it was the essential expression of a nation's 'spirit'.

Another popular methodological tool used to assess nationality is religious stereotyping. Assuming that all Lutherans in Wielkopolska were Germans, Oskar Kossmann generously concluded that 20 per cent of the population in the Great Polish countryside in the eighteenth century were Germans, while on the Polish side, Jerzy Topolski's figure of a mere 6 per cent is based on the number of families with German names — a method significantly favouring a Polish majority.[12] Jolanta Dworzaczkowa even considers 'German' to be a synonymous expression for 'Protestant', and specifically for Lutheran.[13] The 1767 confederation of the Polish, Lithuanian and Prussian dissidents, which appealed to Russia for support against the programme of political centralization under Poland's last elected king, Stanisław August Poniatowski, however, did so less on religious or national than on political grounds. In particular, the city of Danzig used the confederation as a show of force to revive some of the city's privileges of self-government, which had been undermined by the eagerness of the Polish crown to impose a more uniform political structure on all members of the Commonwealth.[14]

The picture of German–Polish antagonism, therefore, needs to be exposed to fresh scrutiny. The issue at stake is not whether German burghers spoke German, adhered to Lutheranism and used German family names, but whether they considered the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as an alien and inhospitable culture from which they separated themselves consciously as 'Germans'. What has regularly been omitted in traditional approaches is the question of what people considered themselves to be: Poles, Germans or something else. More important still, little notice has been taken of regional differences within Poland–Lithuania and of the impact of the constitutional

structures of the Commonwealth on the attitudes of the various nationalities it accommodated. In what follows, therefore, to avoid imposing anachronistic nineteenth- and twentieth-century national ascriptions which have no relevance to the political and historical content of early modern nationhood, the use of terms such as 'German', 'Polish', 'Prussian' and so on will reflect contemporary local usage and the self-image of those concerned (unless otherwise specified).

In an early modern context, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth proved for centuries a successful political system. Its main pillars were the free election of the monarch, a common diet, a decentralized system of local dietines and the right to form confederations. These institutions were supported by the successful creation of a cohesive political identity based on the mixed form of government, a strong element of republicanism[15] and a mythical vision of the past — a key element of an early modern sense of nation. The Polish nobility considered their political nation as descendants of the ancient Eastern warrior-tribe, the Sarmatians, who were also the ancestors of other Slavs, among whom the Poles were the leading nation.[16] It included non-Slavs, such as the Prussian and Lithuanian nobility, as it was open to anyone who adopted its political values. This political and national — not ethnic — identity proved a strong political cement for the state. It also had a social aspect: at least in the Polish and Lithuanian palatinates, the *civis*, the Sarmatian citizen, was by definition a nobleman.[17]

These are the underlying features that need to be taken into account in any discussion of the identity of burghers in Poland–Lithuania, who, by the official Sarmatian definition, were excluded from this identity of the *cives Patriae*, the citizens of the republic. Contemporary Western observers usually commented on the deplorable situation of commoners in the Commonwealth.[18] In the Holy Roman Empire, Samuel Pufendorf and Hermann Conring were the two writers most responsible for creating a negative German view of the haughty Polish nobles' apparent disdain for urban prosperity.[19] Although several Polish writers self-critically condemned the harsh treatment of peasants in Poland, few had a favourable opinion of burghers, in particular of merchants.[20] It seems odd, therefore, that the most urbanized province of the Commonwealth, Royal Prussia, was also one of its most faithful, as it repeatedly defended Poland

against Swedes and Muscovites in times of war and crisis. The main reason for the continuous loyalty shown to the Polish crown and Commonwealth was the fact that the burghers of Danzig, Thorn and Elbing (*urbes maiores*) traditionally held a seat in the senate chamber of the provincial Royal Prussian Diet together with the palatines and castellans of Royal Prussia. In no other province of the Polish–Lithuanian state did cities have such an active political voice and such status; in Royal Prussia even smaller cities (*urbes minores*) had access to the chamber of deputies until 1662, when they lost this right under pressure from the Prussian and Polish nobility. The following examples — taken from late medieval and Renaissance Cracow, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Royal Prussia, and pre-partition Warsaw — show a great regional variety in the status and identity of burgher communities in Poland–Lithuania and, full of apparent paradoxes, reveal the deficiencies of modern nation-building theories.

Cracow, until the end of the sixteenth century the royal capital of Poland, had been endowed in the later Middle Ages with Magdeburg law, as were most Polish cities, and possessed wide-ranging rights of self-administration. The acceptance of German law did not, as traditional German historiography tended to argue, automatically indicate the presence of German burghers; rather, Polish rulers had recognized early on that this law enhanced urban development and prosperity. In the course of the fifteenth century, however, the city's privileges were reduced, most notably by the privilege of Nieszawa of 1454, which secured considerable influence over the city for noble office-holders. Taxes were to be collected by the local palatine, and appointments to the city council were to be sanctioned by him. It was not until the early sixteenth century that Cracow recovered from this blow, when Sigismund I granted the city representation in the chamber of noble deputies.[21] Representatives from the burgher élites of Cracow, Wilno, Lublin, Warsaw and Poznań were admitted to the Sejm as part of the 'noble estate', not as cities represented by burghers in their own right.

In late medieval Cracow, the patriciate was dominated by well-to-do merchant families, many of German and Italian origin. Some of the most prominent families of Cracow rose into the *szlachta*, while during the early sixteenth century a new wave of immigrants arrived in the city. Trade and intellectual links during

the period of Humanism and the Reformation attracted families from all over the Holy Roman Empire to Cracow. Some families came from Hungary, like the Thurzos, who were originally of Austrian descent,[22] while new burghers such as the Betmans, Schillings, Hersteins, Decjus and Boners were immigrants from Alsace.[23]

During the first three decades of the sixteenth century, a considerable part of the town council consisted of first- and second-generation Germans (that is, settlers from the Holy Roman Empire and their children). Between 1516 and 1527, seven out of twelve council members had German roots, including the only councillor from a craft background, the goldsmith Johann Zimmermann; the others were bankers, wholesale merchants or mine-owners. Germans had an important stake in some guilds, such as the leather-workers, brass-founders, coopers, cutlers, painters and special goldsmiths, the 'ryngmacherzy' (ringmakers).

By the 1530s, petitions reached the king from these guilds asking to change the language of their guild regulations from German into Polish. Although this says much about the advance of the Polish language, it provides no information on nationality issues: some guilds with a majority of Polish members kept statutes in the German language into the seventeenth century, while guilds dominated by recent migrants from the Holy Roman Empire adopted Polish constitutions. In 1532, the king demanded — mainly for practical reasons — that office-holders in the city should be bilingual. But Cracow society was far from being split along clear national lines: in the debate which followed, several prominent burghers from Germany took the side of the Polish-speakers, while the Fogelweder family, although closely linked by marriage to Polish families, advocated the interest of the German-speakers.

Loyalties are tested by behaviour in times of war. When, in 1587, after the double election of Sigismund Vasa and Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg to the Polish throne, Habsburg troops besieged Cracow, a group of prominent burghers of German origin took up their weapons and actively supported the defence of the city and the Zamoyski–Vasa party against 'the German enemies'. For this Kaspar Gutteter, Jan Waxman, Paul Perun and Valentin Rymer were ennobled. The highest private contribution

to the costs of defending the city came from the German burgher community: Jan Spigler and K. Gutteter each payed 200 złp.[24]

Such examples reveal the difficulties in creating a consistent profile of the 'typical German burgher'. This does not mean that Cracow burghers and Polish nobles were not aware of the tensions that existed between Poles and Germans. In the Polish Sejm, some senators protested against what they perceived as a domination of the city by foreigners. The bishop of Cracow, Piotr Tomicki, wrote to the Alsatian-born historian and royal secretary Jodocus Decjus:

> I spoke to the palatine of Ruthenia [who was to become the new palatine of Cracow] about the nomination of new city councillors — he received the proposed list badly, saying that the capital should not be run by foreign Germans.[25]

Decjus, who had been a member of the city council of Cracow before advancing to the royal court and entering the nobility, was an intriguing figure among the Cracow foreigners. He dedicated to King Sigismund I a history of Europe which tried to prove that both Poles and Germans were descended from the mythical Vandal king Tuisco, the ruler over an empire from the Don to the Rhine.[26] Polish–German conflicts, he pointed out, were battles between equal brother nations, of an honourable nature, not aiming at a one-sided political or linguistic domination of one nation over the other. The reference to historical mythology suggests that burghers of German descent tried to establish counter-myths to Sarmatism to claim their share in Polish–Sarmatian society. Historical myth could serve as a political instrument of conflict-resolution, and not just as a means of emphasizing hostility and differences.

By the sixteenth century, there was no longer a coherent German community in Cracow. Many burghers of foreign origin had consciously accepted Polish identity, and, like converts, were eager to assert their new creed. In the 1520s, the Swiss humanist Rudolf Agricola reported to Vienna that:

> it is sad to look at Cracow these days. There is hardly any German who is better treated than a Jew. One should no longer trust this city and its Polonized Germans, who do not look at us foreigners with any liking, which comes from the fate of war. If the Germans win, they

> will be happy for them, but if the Poles should be victorious, they will celebrate with them just as well.[27]

Agricola was alluding to the last war against the Teutonic Knights, in which Poland–Lithuania was engaged at the time. The words of the Swiss humanist clearly mirror the crisis of identity of Germans in Cracow at a time when anti-German feeling in the city ran high. The adoption of Polish customs, names and the Polish language seemed, for many, to be the most attractive alternative, since a career as a councillor could eventually lead to ennoblement and its consequent political and economic advantages.

While there is little debate between Polish and German historians about the assimilation of the Cracow Germans to their Polish environment, the national identity of the Germans in the towns of Royal Prussia, which was part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth for over 300 years, has been the focus of emotional nationalist debates. This province has long been regarded by traditional German historiography as the stronghold of 'German culture and nationality' in Poland–Lithuania, 'saved' from Polish oppression and neglect by Frederick the Great through the first partition of Poland in 1772. After 1945, many historians who had oiled Hitler's propaganda machine by stressing Germany's historical rights to these 'German lands' continued to occupy eminent academic posts in West Germany.[28] Calling Royal Prussia anachronistically 'West Prussia', the name given to the province after the partitions, Walter Hubatsch affirmed that, as a result of the Union of Lublin in 1569,

> West Prussia lost its autonomy [...] the German element in the country was, however, not decisively influenced by this act. The Warmian peasantry maintained its Germanness as much as the lowlands of Danzig, Marienburg and Elbing, and in the cities of Royal Prussia, the German population remained untouched, so that by the partitions Germany won back not Polish- but German-inhabited areas.[29]

In the past, such statements provoked vociferous reactions from Polish historians, who in turn tried to show that Polish Prussia was closely connected to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth by the cultural identity of an overwhelmingly Polish-speaking Catholic population.[30] The result was that many of the accounts

of national groups have ended in passionate battles about statistics, tailored by historians according to their political and national agendas. It is only in more recent years that historians in Poland and Germany have started a thorough and long-overdue revision of older approaches.[31]

The urban communities in the late medieval state of the Teutonic Knights, formed by migrants from the Holy Roman Empire who mixed with local Prussian inhabitants, had little in common with the Cracow Germans. The strong sense of community and of political and national identity that developed among Prussian burghers and nobles in the fifteenth century had its origin in their rebellion against the Teutonic Knights in 1454.[32] During the resulting Thirteen Years' War, the Order fought unsuccessfully against the allied Prussian, Polish and Lithuanian forces. After the Polish–Prussian victory over the Knights, in 1466, and the union with Poland, Royal Prussia's privileges were extended and enhanced. The Prussian estates continued to defend their special status under the Polish crown, which granted them self-government in the Prussian Diet, exemption from Polish taxes and military contribution, a separate governor, separate courts and many other privileges.

When, in 1570, the Prussian Diet denied Marcin Kromer the bishopric of Warmia, he complained that 'nothing else, I suppose, do the Prussians hold against me than the fact that I am not a native of their country; I come, in fact, from Mazovia and Poland, and have my descent from Germany'.[33] The fact that Kromer's ancestors were from Germany did not qualify him for office in Royal Prussia, the same province where burghers of German origin were merchants and artisans, ruled as burgomasters or royal burgraves and owned landed properties. One of the cornerstones of Royal Prussian identity was the *ius indigenatus*, which barred any noble or burgher not of Prussian birth from political office, full citizenship and landownership in the province.

A major difference from the burghers in other parts of the Commonwealth was the fact that the three largest cities of Royal Prussia, Danzig, Elbing and Thorn, had been equal — if not more powerful — partners of the nobility during the wars of liberation from the Teutonic yoke. Unlike the representatives of Cracow, the Prussian burghers participated in their own right in their provincial diet, as members of the urban estate, not as

members of the nobility. The decentralized system of political decision-making gave Prussian burghers great advantage over their peers in Polish or Lithuanian towns. The other important contrast to the Germans in the Polish cities was that the Prussian burghers themselves had fought the Teutonic Knights. Nobody could point at them as a hostile, German element, as some Poles did with the Cracow Germans. On the contrary, the decision of the Prussian estates to side with Poland against the Knights, whom they unanimously considered 'foreign tyrants from Germany', was an ideal catalyst for the formation of Prussian national identity.[34] In 1549, the Royal Prussian delegate, von Knobelsdorff, defined this identity in the aftermath of the anti-Teutonic revolt:

> As nobody would dare to call a Lithuanian a Pole, and a Mazovian a Lithuanian, or a Mazovian a Prussian [...] so the Holy Roman Empire has many nations: Belgians, Germans, Italians, Spaniards; therefore, Belgians cannot be Italians, or Italians Spaniards; he who is born in Silesia or Lithuania cannot be a native Prussian.[35]

The Prussians, whether nobles or burghers, never called themselves Germans; moreover, they considered their Prussian nation equal to the Poles and Lithuanians, who formed with them the three dominant nations of the Commonwealth. Through their identity as Prussians, they avoided the dilemmas suffered by German burghers in Cracow. While the Cracovian Germans had to remain foreigners or assimilate, the Prussian burghers took part in the diet of their province, where they could influence the political life of Royal Prussia and, indirectly, the king and the Commonwealth. Despite the incorporation of the noble estates into the Polish Diet at Lublin in 1569 (the three cities refused to join), the Prussian Diet survived as a more or less effective institution of provincial self-government until the partitions.

The relationship between the Prussian cities, the king and the noble-dominated political culture of the Commonwealth was not without tensions, but it cannot be characterized as a struggle between Poles and Germans. Royal Prussian burghers aspired to be equal citizens and have a political voice, while the Polish, and increasingly also the Prussian, nobility tried to deny them political participation. Unlike many burghers in Cracow, the Prussian burghers did not hope to enter the *szlachta* at the first

possible moment. They tried to live up to their civic ideal of politically active urban representatives, for the good of their cities. The ideal form of government which fostered their prosperity, they claimed, was the Polish system of the mixed government, with its monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. The decentralization of the noble republic perfectly suited the interests of the Prussian cities.

The contrast between the Polish cities and the three major Royal Prussian cities was frequently commented on in contemporary political literature. Sebastian Petrycy characterized the political weakness of Polish burghers in this allegory:

> To his surprise the donkey was invited to the wedding, and he looked forward to the fine food, but when he arrived, he was ordered to the kitchen to carry food and water. This way, some of our cities go to the Sejm, but they sit far away, ready to listen to what they are ordered to do.[36]

The reason why, in the words of the Prussian historian Christoph Hartknoch, 'the cities in Royal Prussia are beyond doubt in a much better condition than they have been under the Teutonic Order, and better now than the Polish cities',[37] was not that the burghers were Germans and more industrious (as reflected in the nineteenth-century proverb of 'polnische Wirtschaft'); rather, Royal Prussian cities owned special rights and liberties, granted and protected by the Polish crown. In 1651, the noble Prussian Senator, Ignacy Bąkowski, acknowledged and defended the political weight of the Prussian cities: 'We cannot permit in any way that our Prussian cities should become equal to their Polish counterparts'.[38]

One of the main reasons for the prosperity of the Prussian cities was their right to possess and administer extensive landed property. The burghers were conscious of the fact that their German-law traditions had been preserved by Polish royal guarantees. In contrast, in Polish cities, self-governing municipal authorities had in most cases been replaced by royal officials such as the palatine or *starosta* and their courts.

Despite the occasional problem in relations with the noble-dominated Commonwealth, Prussian burghers frequently perceived any association with Germany in hostile terms. The Danzigers regularly complained that the Emperor considered

Prussia part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and demanded contribution and military service from the Prussian estates, including the cities, which they, of course, refused.[39] Numerous historical treatises tried to prove that neither Poland nor Prussia had ever been subject to the Emperor. As late as 1591, the Thorn burgomaster Heinrich Stroband appeared alarmed about the need to fortify the city better, as the Teutonic Knights, with the help of the Emperor, 'have recently thought of means by which they could bring us under the yoke of their black cross again'. Fortifying the city also meant 'to increase the good and glory of the whole crown and of the republic' and would give the Prussian burghers a good name in the Polish Diet.[40] The goal of all this was that 'we maintain this city *in antiqua unione Regni Poloniae* under the protection of our king and hereditary lord'.[41]

Thus the contention that the predominance of the German language reflected the German character of the Royal Prussian cities is utterly unconfirmed. When, in 1527, the Prussian Diet decided that for practical reasons the debating language was to be Polish (although the protocols were written in Latin), the cities resisted with the demand that noble deputies should be selected on the grounds of their ability to speak German. The palatine of Chełmno countered that, since the citizens of Royal Prussia were subjects of the Polish king and had to deal with the Polish Sejm, they had to know the language of their lord and country.[42] The demand of the cities to hold diets in German had nothing to do with disloyalty. Władysław IV himself sometimes addressed representatives of the cities in German — a gesture of royal favour acknowledging the burghers' ancient privilege to preserve their language. For many burghers the German language was intimately connected with the province's special rights and ancient customs, such as the *ius indigenatus* or exemption from the garrisoning of Polish troops on Prussian soil. Giving up the German language meant nothing less than making concessions to political centralization, which Prussian burghers feared more than anything else. Foremost among those who most dearly clung to these 'ancient' freedoms of self-government were not necessarily nobles and burghers of German origin, but often the newcomers who had only recently received the Prussian *ius indigenatus*, as the noble deputy Mikołaj Sieniecki observed in his sixteenth-century memoirs.[43]

It was during the Polish–Swedish wars that the Prussian burghers demonstrated their strongest loyalty to the Commonwealth. During the Deluge of the 1650s, Danzig was a particularly staunch defender of the Polish crown. Satirical broadsheets from Danzig mocked the city of Thorn, which, after withstanding the Swedes in the 1620s, capitulated in 1655. Mainly responsible for the fall of Thorn were several nobles who hoped, by escaping to safety within the city-walls, to save their moveable property, and who advised immediate surrender. Their hopes were dashed when the Swedes began their occupation with the confiscation of noble goods. As a result, however, Danzig accused her 'little sister' Thorn of 'an open-door policy'.[44] Danzigers insisted that, as the strongest pillar of the republic, they alone deserved to have their coat of arms adorned with the Polish crown, for whose liberty Danzig had always fought at the cost of many burghers' lives. Danzig's contributions to the Second Northern War against the Swedes (1655–60) amounted to several times the royal budget, and the city still suffered in the next century from the debts it had incurred, mainly because the king and the republic never repaid the money they had borrowed.

Danzig's behaviour has caused great embarrassment to German nationalists. Werner Hahlweg wrote in 1976 that 'Danzig was a weak buffer-state between the great powers of Sweden and Russia'. Poland was only mentioned once:

> Danzig had an independent statehood which was historically recognized even by Poland, as an autonomous city-republic, [but] which by the beginning of the eighteenth century lost its power and became a small state [*Kleinstaat*] without particular political or military force.[45]

This characterization defies all evidence from the Danzig archives. Even in the eighteenth century, Danzig historians and politicians repeatedly confirmed their allegiance to the Polish crown, being 'a part in the body of the republic'. Despite many opportunities to abandon the Commonwealth, Danzig's decision in favour of remaining part of the Polish crown was taken very consciously. Not only the city's anti-Swedish attitude, but also its hostility to the Elector of Brandenburg proved that its policies were not guided by any national German or Protestant agenda. When King John Casimir concluded an anti-Swedish alliance with Brandenburg Prussia, the three major Royal Prussian cities

warned him against accepting help from such a neighbour, while the majority of the Polish and Prussian nobility supported the decision. This suspicion proved justified when the Elector betrayed the alliance in 1656 and contributed to the Polish defeat in the battle of Warsaw, for which he received Warmia from the Swedes. Together with the Polish nobility, the Prussian burghers subsequently protested energetically against the pawning of Elbing in 1658 to the Great Elector, whose son, Frederick III, occupied the city in 1698.

Nevertheless, since the incorporation of the Prussian noble deputies into the Polish Sejm at the 1569 Union of Lublin, when the memory of the struggle against the Teutonic Knights had become fainter, tensions between the Polish and the Prussian estates had undoubtedly increased. Some Polish noblemen suspected not only Prussian burghers but the whole province of pro-German loyalties. Some Polish noblemen fostered an image of the Prussians as 'alien Germans'. The deputy Jan Piotrowski, who lived during the rule of Stefan Batory, complained that the office and royal leasehold (*starostwo*) of Puck was about to be given to the Royal Prussian Wejher family:

> Prussian vacancies should not be distributed unless it is to Poles. They say that Wejher will receive Puck; this is most peculiar, to give these Germans such a power, and I do not know what for![46]

The onslaught on Prussian privileges by the kings and the Sejm was the main cause for this disharmony. Although the ritual of formal confirmation of the Prussian cities' ancient liberties continued to be performed, the burghers were more and more often denied participation in the republic's precious state of freedom.

In response, allegiances among the Prussian burghers were no longer so clearly defined. Gottfried Lengnich, professor of history and syndic in Danzig, regretted that the Prussians in the fifteenth century had not followed the example of the Dutch, who had seceded from Spanish tyranny. Instead of submitting to the Polish crown, the Prussians should have founded their own state and avoided the oppression now suffered from Polish domination. But even as the confederal character of the Commonwealth, which had provided a unifying umbrella for the multinational republic, was falling apart, neither Lengnich nor his

colleagues among the Danzig magistrates ever considered the possibility of switching their allegiance to another state or to a German dynasty. The burgomaster of Thorn, Christian Klosmann, expressed his dislike for the 'despotismo Berolinensi' of the Hohenzollern rulers in particularly strong words:

> May God protect our fatherland from this neighbour. I would rather live under the Poles on six acres of lands than under the Brandenburg Prussians on eighteen, because I detest their tyranny.[47]

After 1697, the decline of burgher liberty was no longer blamed merely on the political exclusivity of the nobility, but the Polish king was increasingly seen as one of the causes of evil. Yet the ruler whom the Prussian burghers opposed so vigorously was a German: Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony, who was suspected of importing dangerous absolutist doctrines from his country and was accused of not knowing Sarmatian ways and liberties. For the first time in Danzig's history, in 1717, the city was forced to pay direct regular contribution to the Polish crown army. While the nobles were forgiven by Augustus for deserting him for the Swedish puppet king Stanisław Leszczyński during the Great Northern War, the cities had to buy back their king's grace. One of the greatest breaches of mutual trust was the so-called tumult of Thorn in 1724, when a showdown between Jesuit pupils and an angry Lutheran crowd led to the devastation of the local Jesuit college. The punishment, sanctioned by the king, was the public execution of five Protestant council members and a burgomaster, and an end to the exclusively Lutheran-governed city council.

An ever increasing number of political treatises surfaced in Royal Prussia emphasizing the centralizing, tyrannical policies of the Teutonic Knights. The political message was not lost on contemporary observers: the act of rebellion, which had once freed the Prussians from an oppressive power, could be repeated. The main purpose of submitting to the Polish crown, the Thorn professor Johannes Schultz wrote in 1712, had been the safeguarding of ancient Prussian liberties, among which self-government in the Prussian Diet, self-taxation and the *ius indigenatus* were the most important. Only if these liberties were restored to their former glory would the Prussians no longer be 'slaves of the Polish republic'.[48] Royal Prussian anger was

mainly directed at the garrisoning of Saxon troops in the province, which triggered a wave of anti-foreign, anti-German resentment, shared by the burghers.[49]

The government practice of *absolutum dominium*, so popular in the eighteenth century among German princes, was rejected with horror by the burghers of Polish Prussia, as it was by many nobles in the rest of the *Rzeczpospolita*. They had been particularly incensed by the fact that Augustus had not only accepted Frederick III and I's self-coronation as king in Prussia, in 1701 — he had actually congratulated him for this act, regarded by the Polish Prussian estates as a direct threat to their province. They remembered well that during the Swedish Deluge, Brandenburg had plotted with the Swedes to partition Poland–Lithuania. The coronation emphasized Hohenzollern pretensions to the whole of Prussia. Proud of running their own affairs in cities and dietines, the Prussians could not imagine subjecting themselves to Brandenburg Prussia, where the powers of the estates, including the cities, had been reduced by military force and a strict tax regime.

Hatred of the Hohenzollern received a new impetus towards the end of the existence of Poland–Lithuania, when the long-feared designs of partition materialized. As the Prussian king became one of Poland's greatest enemies, German-speaking burghers were met with increasing resentment in the Commonwealth. In this situation Samuel Luther Geret, the resident envoy of the city of Thorn in Warsaw, reacted immediately to counter such attitudes when a Hamburg newspaper erroneously reported in May 1772 that Thorn was conducting negotiations with Frederick the Great, with the intention of joining the Hohenzollern monarchy. Geret sent a letter to Stanisław August Poniatowski, affirming his and the city's unbroken loyalty to the Polish crown.[50]

In Danzig, the first partition in August 1772 cut off the city from its suburbs. In the words of Johanna Schopenhauer, mother of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, this caused public wailing and broken hearts everywhere:

> The Prussian came overnight [...] like a vampire into our doomed fatherland. Desperation changed into wild anger and ever-growing hatred against everything Prussian, turning into the decision to defend

> the last ray of this sun of freedom which was left to us, to fight for it with our lives and property.[51]

At the same time, German burghers in Warsaw were similarly resolved to defend the republic against the onslaught of Russian troops on the Polish capital. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, a wave of immigrants from Saxony had accompanied the courts of Augustus II and Augustus III, the two Saxon Electors on the Polish throne, and had settled in the city. In 1794, Warsaw Germans enthusiastically supported the uprising led by Tadeusz Kościuszko against the occupying Russian forces. An immigrant from Nuremberg, the printer and bookseller Michael Gröll, published a German-language newspaper, the *Warsaw News For Poland's Free Citizens*.[52] The paper reflected the reform spirit of the Constitution of 3 May 1791, which admitted burghers to the Sejm and granted them rights previously reserved for the nobility. The extent to which Warsaw burghers were identified with Germans by the Polish nobility is mirrored in the protests of nobles against 'this urban class, dominated by Germans'.[53] Their German origin, however, did not stop these burghers from adopting the political goals of the reformed republic. Michael Gröll's paper, appealing to 'the citizens and soldiers of Poland',[54] concluded in the last desperate days before the Russian conquest of the Warsaw suburb of Praga:

> Is it possible that we could give up our fatherland, and our happy, liberal laws, that we turn ourselves and our children into Germans and Russians? Shall our fatherland thus become the prey of uncontrolled barbarians?[55]

Finally, considering the strong support among German burghers for the cause of the Polish constitution, there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that the first scientific journal in the Polish language was published by a burgher from Leipzig, Lorenz Mitzler, and that the Polish weekly with the title *Patryota Polski* was edited by the Thorn burgher T. Bauch.[56]

Early modern national identity was not a duller and more muddled precursor of modern nationalism, but a powerful factor regulating the political relationships among the citizens and estates of the multinational Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. German burghers who migrated over several centuries — mainly

for trade and crafts — to other Polish royal towns were under pressure to choose between a German ('alien') and a Polish identity and, in a majority of cases, assimilated to their Polish environment. The traditions of Royal Prussia, however, provided its burghers with a strong political and national Prussian identity and distinguished them as Prussians from their German counterparts in the Polish and Lithuanian provinces. Nevertheless, what the burgher élites in all parts of the Commonwealth had in common was the civic consciousness of being citizens of a common fatherland, the Polish–Lithuanian republic. The attempt of the nobility to deny burghers a political consciousness equal, but not identical, to the noble nation of the Commonwealth had failed long before the Constitution of 1791 recognized the burghers as a political estate.

NOTES

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1. Hans Kohn, *Prelude to Nation States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815*, Princeton, NJ, 1967, *passim*.
2. John Elliott, 'Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe' in Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (eds), *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, London and Boston, MA, 1978, p. 121.
3. Kazimierz Maliszewski, 'Uwagi o wyznaniowych aspektach zbiorowego wizerunku Niemców w Polsce XVI–XVII wieku', *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis*, Historia CXIV, No. 1554, Wrocław, 1993, pp. 79–80.
4. Gerard Labuda, 'Geneza przysłowia "Jak świat światem, nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem"', *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza*, Historia, 8, 1968, p. 19.
5. Kazimierz Maliszewski, 'Kształtowanie się stereotypu Niemca i obrazu krajów niemieckich w potocznej świadomości sarmackiej od XVI do połowy XVIII wieku' in Kazimierz Wajda (ed.), *Polacy i Niemcy: Z badań nad kształtowaniem heterostereotypów etnicznych. Zbiór studiów*, Toruń, 1991, p. 13.
6. Burghers are defined for present purposes as those either born in a city to parents with burghers' rights, or those having acquired

burghers' rights on the basis of owning property and making their living in a city — their names, as a result, being recorded in burgher-lists.

7. Oskar Kossmann, *Die Deutschen in Polen seit der Reformation*, Marburg, 1978 (hereafter *Die Deutschen*), p. 20.
8. Ibid., p. 158.
9. Stanisław Achremczyk, *Życie polityczne Prus Królewskich i Warmii w latach 1660–1703*, Olsztyn, 1991, (hereafter *Życie polityczne*), pp. 263–4.
10. Kurt Forstreuter, 'Die Westpreußischen Ständetage von 1497–1506: Bemerkungen zu einer polnischen Veröffentlichung', *Beiträge zur Geschichte Westpreußens*, 4, 1973, p. 15.
11. 'In Toruń (after 1724) three Protestant pastors preached in Polish, which means that among the Protestants in this city were some who spoke only Polish, and in the suburbs they even formed a majority': Marceli Kosman, 'Zarys dziejów rodzimego obcego nurtu w Polskim protestanyzmie (do roku 1939)', *Studio Historica Slavo-Germanica*, 76, 1977, p. 74.
12. Kossmann, *Die Deutschen*, p. 194.
13. J. Dworzaczkowa, 'Reformacja a problemy narodowościowe w przed-rozbiorowej Wielkopolsce', *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, 23, 1978, p. 94.
14. Jerzy Dygdała, 'Udział Gotfryda Lengnicha w Toruńskiej Konfederacji Dysydenckiej w 1767 roku', *Zapiski Historyczne*, 42, 1977, pp. 10–30.
15. Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko*, Notre Dame, 1989, pp. 1–27.
16. Stanisław Cynarski, 'Sarmatyzm — ideologia i styl życia' in Janusz Tazbir (ed.), *Polska XVII wieku: Państwo, Społeczeństwo, Kultura*, Warsaw, 1974, pp. 269–72.
17. See A.S. Kamiński, 'The *Szlachta* of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Their Government' in I. Banac and P. Bushkovitch (eds), *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, New Haven, CT, 1983, pp. 17–45; Robert I. Frost, 'The Nobility of Poland–Lithuania, 1569–1795' in H.M. Scott (ed.), *The Nobilities of Early Modern Europe. Vol. 2: Eastern Europe*, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 183–222.
18. Teresa Chynczewska-Henel, *Rzeczpospolita XVII wieku w oczach cudzoziemców*, Wrocław, Warsaw and Cracow, 1993, pp. 140–1 and *passim*.
19. S. Pufendorf, *Einleitung zu der Historie der vornembsten Staaten so itziger Zeit in Europa sich befinden*, Frankfurt am Main, 1682,

p. 685, and H. Conring, *Cyriacus Thrasymachus*, Stettin, 1656, p. 17.

20. Maciej Sarbiewski wrote, in 1630, 'swojej wolności / i dostojności / dać nie gotowi / plebeiuszowi' ([the Polish nobleman] is not willing to give freedom or honour to the commoner).
21. Leon Rymar, 'Udział Krakowa w Sejmach i Sejmikach Rzeczypospolitej', *Rocznik Krakowski*, 7, 1905, pp. 187–258.
22. E. Reinhardt, 'Johann Thurzo von Bethlemfalva, Bürger und Konsul von Krakau in Goslar, 1428–1496', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Goslar*, 5, 1928, pp. 29–66.
23. Janina Bieniarzówna, *Mieszczaństwo Krakowskie XVII wieku*, Cracow, 1969, pp. 39–41, 44–5.
24. J. Bieniarzówna and J.M. Malecki, *Dzieje Krakowa: Kraków w wiekach XVI–XVIII*, 3 vols, Cracow, 1984, II, p. 158.
25. Ibid., p. 78.
26. Tadeusz Ulewicz, *Sarmacja*, Cracow, 1950, pp. 71–3.
27. Bieniarzówna and Malecki, *Dzieje Krakowa*, p. 75.
28. See Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich*, Cambridge, 1988, and Jörg Hackmann, 'Der Kampf um die Weichsel: Die deutsche Ostforschung in Danzig von 1918–1945', *Zapiski Historyczne*, 58, 1993, p. 57.
29. In Erich Keyser, *Geschicht der Stadt Danzig*, Göttingen, 1951, Preface.
30. See, for example, S. Aszkenazy, *Gdańsk a Polska*, Warsaw, 1937, or A. Vetulani, *Lenno Pruskie: Od traktatu Krakowskiego do śmierci księcia Albrechta, 1525–1568*, Cracow, 1930.
31. See Michael Müller, 'Zweite Reformation und Städtische Autonomie im Königlichen Preußen: Danzig, Elbing und Thorn in der Epoche der Konfessionalisierung, 1557–1660', Habilitation, Freie Universität Berlin, 1993; Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, *Zwischen polnischer Ständegesellschaft und preußischem Obrigkeitsstaat: Vom königlichen Preußen zu Westpreußen 1756–1806*, Munich, 1995; and Jörg Hackmann, 'Der Kampf um die Weichsel'. Much of post-1960 Polish historiography abandoned its polemical tendencies in favour of more balanced source-based research.
32. Janusz Małłek, 'Die Entstehung und Entwicklung eines Sonderbewußtseins in Preußen während des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts' in his *Preußen und Polen: Politik, Stände, Kirche und Kultur vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 74.
33. W. Kętrzyński, 'Martin Cromers Rede über das Preußische Indigenat', *Altpreußische Monatsschrift*, 17, 1880, pp. 349–50.

34. For a more detailed analysis of this identity, see Karin Friedrich, 'The Other Prussia: A Study of National, Political and Historical Identity of Burghers in Early Modern Royal Prussia', PhD thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1995.
35. Franz Hipler, 'Die Ermländische Bischofswahl vom Jahre 1549', *Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins*, 11, 1897, pp. 78–9.
36. Jan Ptaśnik, *Miasta i Mieszczaństwo w Polsce*, Cracow, 1934, pp. 230–1.
37. *Altes und Neues Preußen*, 'Von der Republic des Landes', Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig, 1684, p. 641.
38. Achremczyk, *Życie polityczne*, p. 70.
39. Ernst Hoffmann, 'Danzigs Verhältnis zum Deutschen Reich in den Jahren 1466 bis 1526', *Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins*, 53, 1911, pp. 3–49, *passim*.
40. Heinrich Stroband, 'Von der Befestigung der Stadt Thorun, 1591', Archiwum Państwowe w Toruniu (APT), Kat. II, II.12, p. 12.
41. Ibid., pp. 14–14 verso.
42. Achremczyk, *Życie polityczne*, pp. 262–3.
43. Stanisław Kot, 'Świadomość narodowa w Polsce w XVI–XVII wieku', *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 70, 1938, p. 23.
44. 'Wiersze XVII Wieku', Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Cracow, MS 1883, pp. 115–17.
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47. Jerzy Dygdała, *Polityka Torunia wobec władz Rzeczypospolity w latach 1764–1772*, Toruń, 1977, p. 177.
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52. Władysław Smoleński, *Mieszczaństwo Warszawskie w końcu XVIII wieku*, Warsaw, 1917, pp. 5-6.
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54. *Warschauer Zeitung für Polens freye Bürger*, vol. III, Warsaw, 30 October 1794.
55. Ibid.
56. Heinz Lemke, *Die Brüder Załuski und ihre Beziehungen zu Gelehrten in Deutschland und Danzig*, Berlin, 1958, p. 144.

4 German Specialists in Petrine Russia: Architects, Painters and Thespians

Lindsey Hughes

Relations between Russia and Germany in the reign of Tsar Peter the Great (1682–1725) offer a rich field of study. Russia's diplomatic relations with north German states — notably Prussia, Hanover, Holstein, Mecklenburg and Saxony — expanded significantly as a result of the hostilities and alliances of the Great Northern War. The tsar himself first passed through northern Germany in 1697 on the outward leg of his Grand Embassy, prompting Sophia Electress of Hanover to express the opinion that the tsar had a 'lively wit', but, despite all the qualities nature had bestowed upon him, could do with being 'somewhat less coarse'.[1] In the aftermath of the battle of Poltava (1709), which greatly improved Russia's international credentials, Peter was often in Germany — in Carlsbad and Dresden in 1711, Stettin in 1712–13 (when he visited the grave of Martin Luther in Wittenberg), again in 1716–17, on his way to and from Paris. An anecdote recounts how, in Berlin, Peter, who had a habit of disconcerting his hosts, slipped out of the back entrance of his lodgings rather than climb into the lavish carriages sent by King Frederick and arrived at the royal palace with a couple of attendants on foot.[2] Rumours circulated that Peter *was* a German, for example, the story that his mother, Tsarina Natalia, gave birth to an unwanted daughter, who was replaced by a boy baby from the 'German' or Foreign Quarter of Moscow. Peter was sometimes identified as the son of the Swiss soldier Franz Lefort or of a nameless German barber, from whom he apparently inherited his passion for shaving beards and carrying out surgical operations.[3]

Whereas in the reigns of his immediate predecessors there were severe restrictions on Russians crossing the border, Peter actively encouraged selected subjects to go abroad on state business. Members of the royal family visited Germany, for example the tsar's eldest son, Alexei Petrovich, married in 1711 to Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel, and his niece Ekaterina, married off in 1716 to Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg.[4] Less distinguished subjects also found themselves dispatched abroad by royal command. On 25 January 1716, Peter ordered the Senate: 'Send to Königsberg thirty or forty persons chosen from among the young clerks to study the German language for the convenience of the Collegiate Boards. And send a supervisor with them to stop them going on a spree.'[5]

Even during Peter's reign, however, comparatively few Russians ventured abroad unless on official business. Traffic from west to east was much livelier. The number and variety of Westerners, and especially Germans, coming to the new Empire in the east of Europe grew steadily throughout the eighteenth century. A huge amount of work on such German visitors and immigrants, and on Russian–German *Wechselwirkungen* in the period, has been done by scholars of both German states over the last forty years. Nevertheless, there is still some truth in the words of a leading specialist in the topic, published in the 1960s: 'The history of Germans in Russia, their cultural life and mutual relations with the Russian people has yet to be written. It is not easy to gain an overview of this broad, infinitely complex field.'[6] Germans in Russia included such distinguished visitors as the husband of Peter's niece Anna, Frederick William, Duke of Courland, who died of alcoholic poisoning a few days after his wedding in 1711, and the Duke of Holstein, who married Peter's daughter Anna in 1725 after being kept waiting for several years. The earliest surviving descriptions of St Petersburg were made by Germans, notably an 'Exact account of the newly-built Fortress and Town of St Petersburg...', based on observations of the city in 1710–11 and published anonymously in Leipzig in 1713.[7] A number of German diplomats left accounts of their time in Russia, the most detailed being that of Friedrich Christian Weber, minister to the court of George I at Hanover, which also contains a description of St Petersburg.[8] Holsteiners F.W. von Bergholz and H.F. von Bassewitz are a mine of information on the last

years of Peter's reign and the period immediately after his death.[9]

* * *

Despite such tempting sidetracks, the focus of this chapter will be on another area of contact and influence: foreign technical specialists who were hired to work in Russia as employees of the tsar. 'Immigration by invitation' into Russia was not a new phenomenon. In the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries the situation in the east of the Slavic lands bore some resemblance to the situation further west in the eleventh to twelfth centuries,[10] when the need for manpower prompted Central and East European rulers to issue invitations to both 'élite' Germans and peasant settlers. In Russia, from the fifteenth century onwards, rulers were interested only in the former category. The trickle of individual specialists — mercenaries, doctors, engineers, craftsmen — invited to Russia during the reigns of Ivan III and Ivan IV turned into a flood in the 1630–70s, when the creation of a 'new model army' under Tsars Mikhail and Alexei required foreigners to command and train new infantry units, supplemented by hired engineers and various experts on armaments, explosives and fortification. In 1652, the 'New German Quarter' (*Novo-nemetskaia sloboda*) was set up on the outskirts of Moscow to accommodate the growing numbers of personnel and merchants arriving from the mainly Protestant West, not only Germans but also Dutchmen, Englishmen, Scots, Swedes and Danes. In the seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries the noun *nemets*, the modern Russian term for 'German' (adjective *nemetskii*, derived from *nemoi* 'dumb') was applied more or less indiscriminately to West Europeans. The term frequently carried negative connotations. When Archpriest Avvakum, leader of the Old Believer schismatics, exclaimed: 'Poor Russia, what do you want with German ways and customs?', he was denouncing non-Orthodox European foreigners in general rather than Germans in particular.[11] The term continued to be used as an expression of disapproval by opponents of reform well into the 1720s. A monk was knouted, had his tongue cut out and was sent to hard labour in Azov for complaining that the tsar 'loves Germans, shares their faith and dresses his soldiers in German coats'.[12]

Peter fought such prejudices, not for personal reasons, still less for politically correct ones, but out of necessity. In order to implement military and administrative reforms, he desperately needed foreign 'know-how'. Jacob Stählin, himself a member of the post-Petrine generation of German scholars working in Russia, supplies a telling anecdote:

> It would be wrong to say that Peter the Great had a blind love of foreigners and foreign customs and their way of life; but it is evident from all circumstances that he loved foreigners and treated them graciously only for the benefit of his state [...]. Once he said in the presence of a number of Russian gentlemen: 'I know that the marked preference that I give to foreigners is not pleasing to all my subjects. But I have various subjects: some are intelligent and reasonable and observe that I treat foreigners well and try to get them to stay here in order that they [my subjects] can learn from them and adopt their sciences and arts, for the good of the state and for the evident benefit of my subjects. I also have foolhardy and wicked subjects who do not appreciate or acknowledge my good intentions and wish to remain in the old mire of their ignorance. In their stupidity they despise anything good which is new to them and would willingly hinder it if only they could. They do not reflect on what it was like in our country before I travelled in foreign lands and invited foreigners to Russia and how little I would have achieved without their aid in all my undertakings against our formidable enemies.'[13]

A cornerstone of this policy was Peter's manifesto of 16 April 1702. All foreign officers, merchants and craftsmen were to be given assistance, treated with 'benevolence' and allowed 'unrestricted passage' in and out of Russia (this in contrast to stringent immigration controls imposed as recently as the early 1690s). Foreigners were to be allowed to *leave* the service in the manner 'usually adhered to by the other sovereigns of Europe'. Free exercise of faith (but not proselytism) was to be tolerated since 'deriving our power from the All-Highest, we do not pretend to compel any human conscience but readily allow each Christian to work for his own salvation at his own risk'. For their part, foreign specialists were required to provide references and to be prepared to be examined on their knowledge. If they proved incompetent they were to be dismissed at once.[14] Many Germans, mostly although not exclusively from the northern and Baltic territories, came to Russia before and after this decree to

serve in the most diverse capacities: as officers, scientists, educators, administrators, craftsmen, tailors, hatters and shoemakers (producing high-quality goods for the newly Westernized Russian nobility), musicians, gardeners and shepherds, to name but a few.[15]

* * *

A notable area of German influence was architecture. Changes in the built environment provided some of the most visible signs of Peter's reforms, most notably in St Petersburg, which was planned and constructed according to regular, rational, innovative principles, using masonry rather than traditional wooden construction and giving priority to new types of building such as dockyards, wharves and the admiralty. The model for St Petersburg was Amsterdam rather than Moscow. In these circumstances foreign expertise was vital. In the words of a recent study: 'The construction of St Petersburg as it stood in about 1725 and the architectural revolution which it embodied were essentially and undeniably the work of European masters hired by Peter I.'[16] The term 'revolution' may be questioned — there were pre-Petrine precedents for architectural Westernization[17] — but the contribution of foreigners to Peter's new capital (founded in 1703) is incontrovertible. It is a striking fact that no Russian-born architect served in the St Petersburg Chancellery of Building until 1724. And a substantial proportion of the foreign architects hired by Peter were Germans.

One of the first German builders and decorators to serve Peter was Konrad Osner the Elder (1669–1739/47) from Nürnberg, who came to Russia in 1703 via Berlin. His projects included carving, sculpture and plasterwork. He worked on the Peter-Paul fortress and on cascades and grottos at Peterhof. The most famous was Andreas Schlüter (1665–1714).[18] After working in France, Holland, Italy and Poland, he went to Berlin to build a royal palace and arsenal (1698) for Frederick I, but after a spell as director of the Berlin Academy of Fine Arts, he was 'disgraced' as a result of allegations of technical faults in some of his buildings. Despite this, Peter saw and admired some of Schlüter's work in Berlin and Potsdam in 1712 and hired him as his *Oberbaudirektor* with a salary of 5,000 roubles, many times the average Russian master mason's pay. Schlüter was only in

Russia for a year; in 1714 he fell ill and died. The main visible traces of his work are to be found on the exterior of Domenico Trezzini's Summer Palace, bas-relief plaques of allegorical subjects celebrating Russian naval victories against the Swedes (1713–14 was the 'year of the Russian fleet') and illustrating other maritime themes such as 'Cupid with seahorse', 'Cupid fighting with a sea monster' and 'Cupid and sea elephant', based upon drawings by the early seventeenth-century Italian Andrea Maglioli. Schlüter also worked on designs for pavilions in the palace gardens. Many later buildings are thought to have been modelled on his projects.[19]

The most prolific of St Petersburg's German architects was Johann Friedrich Braunstein, in Russia from 1714–28, who was hired on the recommendation of Schlüter. His major projects were carried out on Peter's estate at Peterhof on the Gulf of Finland, St Petersburg's 'Versailles', started in 1714 on the basis of some of the tsar's rough sketches. When it came to planning the Grand Palace, with its terraces of fountains, Braunstein was ousted by the Frenchman Jean Baptiste Le Blond, but Le Blond died in 1719, leaving Braunstein to take over again. He was the designer of Peter's favourite retreat, the small Mon Plaisir Palace (the end pavilion bears the German name *Lusthaus*), the Marly (1721–3) and Hermitage (1721–4) pavillions, as well as the Upper and Lower parks and grotto. Braunstein is said to have beaten his Russian pupils, depriving them of firewood in winter and setting them to work on household tasks. Many such stories circulated about foreign masters, who were frequently resented by their Russian charges. Suspicion of the 'nemtsy' was not so easily overcome.[20]

A third architect hired at the same time as Schlüter was Gottfried Johann Schädel (1680–1752) from Hamburg. He worked mainly for Peter's favourite, Alexander Menshikov, supervising work on the prince's palaces in the centre of St Petersburg (1713–27) and at Oranienbaum (1713–25) on the Gulf. A fourth was Georg Johann Mattarnovy (died 1719), who arrived in St Petersburg on Schlüter's recommendation in February 1714. He described himself as 'a master of the construction of grottoes and fountains'. Mattarnovy's first known Russian project was a grotto and gallery for the Summer Palace. He also designed the second Winter Palace (1716–21) and first stone cathedral of St Isaac (1717–27), both predecessors

to more famous surviving buildings on the same sites. His only extant building is the *Kunstkamera* (Chamber of Curiosities, 1718–34, completed by N. Härbel). This was later home to the Academy of Sciences and today houses the Museum of Ethnography. Mattarnovy's son Christian (also known as Ivan Ivanovich, born 1705) also worked in St Petersburg, teaching drawing in the Cadet Corps.[21]

Given the cosmopolitan careers of Peter's German architects and their collaboration in Russia with architects and craftsmen of other nationalities, as well as the local specifications imposed upon them, it would be fruitless to try to define a recognizably German style in the work of these builders. Rather, they contributed to the heterogeneous Western aspect of the new capital, described a few years later by a visiting Italian as 'a kind of bastard architecture, one which partakes of the Italian, the French and the Dutch'.[22]

The *Kunstkamera* (Chamber of Curiosities), St Petersburg. Georg Johann Mattarnovy, 1718–34. Completed by N. Härbel. (Photograph supplied by the author.)

* * *

The powerful image of a new city rising from the marshes does make it tempting — despite my earlier caveat — to speak of a 'revolution' in Russian architecture. In painting, home-grown achievements were much less visible and more modest. The background to developments in the figurative arts during Peter's reign is the almost complete absence of secular élite art in the reigns of his predecessors. The first Russian portraits made from life, nearly all royal, date from the 1650s. (Few Russian aristocrats can claim ancestral portraits painted before the eighteenth century.) In the second half of the seventeenth century, against a background of modest Western influences at court, a small contingent of foreign artists, including at least one German, Peter Engels from Hamburg, worked in the royal workshops, but their impact was limited.[23] Court art remained under the auspices of the icon painting workshops of the Royal Armoury, and hence subject to a degree of Church control, until well into Peter's reign. Peter was less interested in painting than in architecture, and among the figurative arts he favoured engraving and printing, which provided relatively quick results for the reproduction of portraits and images of battle scenes and victory parades, for public and foreign consumption. Plans for an Academy of Arts were realized only in the 1750s. Still, Peter was the first Russian ruler to have Western artists on his household payroll. The first and longest-serving court painter was a German, Johann Gottfried Danhauer (Tannhauer, Donouer, 1680–1733/37), who worked in St Petersburg for twenty-six years. He was of south German extraction, Bavarian or Schwabian, and had worked under Sebastiano Bombelli in Venice, earning something of a reputation as a copyist of Rubens.[24] Peter first met him in Holland in 1697, but he was hired only in 1710. In his contract Danhauer specified: 'I am skilled in the making of both large-scale portraits in oils and smaller ones, in miniature'. He could also turn his hand to making clocks, musical instruments and sculpture. He was expected, like all foreign artists under contract, to 'teach painting to Russian pupils' and probably later acted as tutor to Ivan Nikitin, the first Russian portraitist in the Western manner. In 1712 (after being forced in 1711 to accompany the royal party on the Pruth campaign against the Turks, where he lost all his property) he became *gofmaler* (from *Hofmaler* — court painter — one of many German loanwords in Russian), painting portraits

of members of the royal family and their circle, including Menshikov, his wife and daughters, F.M. Apraksin and Peter Tolstoy. Danhauer's best-known works are a profile portrait of Peter, made in the 1710s, and the tsar's death-bed portrait. He also played a prominent role in the artistic preparations for Peter's funeral.[25] After Peter's death he requested leave to go home, but in 1728 he returned ill to Russia and died there.

The archive of Peter's private office, the Kabinet, contains interesting information on Danhauer. We learn, for example, that for the first half of 1715 he was paid 320 roubles. (The Russian artist Ivan Nikitin in 1721 received 200 roubles for a whole year.)[26] This was still much less than architects: the salary of the Italian architect Michetti was listed on the same household payroll as 5,000 roubles. Danhauer complained that he did not receive his pay at all for 1719 and 1720. (In 1721 he received 641 roubles.) A Stählin anecdote records that Danhauer 'painted portraits completely in the Italian taste in the most lively colours and with excellent placing of light and shade'.[27] This favourable assessment may be contrasted with more recent opinions 'that his activity as a teacher [may have] compensated for his deficiencies as a painter' and that his portraits were 'pedestrian and uninspired'.[28] Such views need to be set against the fact that the attributions of many paintings from the Petrine period are still disputed, a situation which may be resolved now that Russian art historians are no longer obliged to reach 'patriotic' conclusions by attributing the best works wherever possible to native artists. It may well be that the number of foreign painters working in Russia in Peter's reign has been underestimated, as well as credit being denied for more accomplished work. One of the most prolific turns out to have been the hitherto almost unknown Johann Heinrich Wedekind (1674–1736) from Reval (Tallinn), who started work for the Russian court after the capture of Reval in 1710 and continued working for Peter's successors, although he was known less as an original portraitist than as a copyist, 'who filled almost all the walls in St Petersburg homes with his copies of portraits of the imperial family and distinguished persons'. Portraits of the Menshikov family originally attributed to Danhauer may have been his.[29]

* * *

The pre-history of Petrine theatre shows a similar pattern to that of architecture and painting, in so far as it was, by and large, out of step with cultural developments in Western Europe. There were no theatres in Muscovy, public or private, until the second half of the seventeenth century, although the Orthodox church staged some very theatrical public ceremonies and there were elements of theatre in folk culture. The first official theatrical performance in Russia took place in October 1672, for the private entertainment of Tsar Alexei and his close circle. It was staged by the German pastor Johannes Gregory and youths from his congregation. For later performances musicians were hired from Germany, from Courland, Danzig and Saxony, who claimed competence on the organ, trumpet, cornet, dulcimer, trombone, viol and viol de gamba, as well as vocal music and 'other instruments'.[30] The repertoire included *The Comedy of Bacchus*, featuring drunkards, maidens and performing bears, alongside plays based on biblical subjects. The theatre lapsed with the tsar's death in 1676. In the 1690s theatre was revived in the Latin 'school dramas' staged by the Moscow Academy, but, like the tsar's theatre, they were not intended for the general public.

Peter was not an enthusiastic theatre-goer (perhaps because he found it hard to sit still for any length of time), but he was persuaded by what he saw in Western Europe — in England, in 1698, Peter had a brief affair with an actress called Letitia Cross — to attempt to create a public playhouse.[31] Theatre was part of the Western cultural scene, therefore Russia must have it, too. In 1701, negotations were initiated in Danzig with an itinerant German theatrical troupe led by Johann-Christian Kunst.[32] Despite hearing horror stories of conditions in Russia, they eventually signed a contract for 4,200 roubles per year and Kunst (Director von Ihro Zarischen Majestät Hof-Komödianten), his wife and seven players arrived in Moscow in June 1702. A government decree was issued to build a playhouse (*komedial'noi dom*) in the Kremlin with large shuttered windows ('since no light is needed for plays'), the work to be completed in time for the arrival of the tsar from the Baltic campaign in December 1702.

This work and the company of players were placed under the direction of the Foreign Chancellery and its head, F.A. Golovin. Chancellery officials were unhappy with the task:

> We are not accustomed to such matters and don't know how to deal with them. We beg that this theatrical business [*komediinoe delo*] be transferred from us to the Armoury because in that chancellery there are craftsmen who are used to dealing with such things and the work will be speeded up.[33]

Golovin urged his underlings to get on with the project if they did not wish to incur the sovereign's wrath, to which they replied that the site was too small for the specifications and building materials were very expensive. Kunst was badgering them for money for costumes, but they suspected he was using it for personal expenses. They doubted whether he was a 'competent master'. Apparently the translators (scripts were to be rendered from German into Latin into Russian!) were saying that the plays were 'of little merit': 'If the premises are built in such a famous place and at great expense and the performance turns out to be poor, we fear your wrath, my lord.'[34]

The theatre seems to have started regular performances in September 1703. The actors were Germans and the first plays were all performed in German, but Kunst had to take on ten Russian pupils and from 1705 plays (all translations) were staged in Russian. Women's parts in the German plays were performed by Miss von Willich and Mrs Paggenkampf, but the first Russian actors were all male. The leading actor Fedor Buslaev was supposed to receive forty roubles per annum, other players from twenty to thirty roubles, but, judging by a petition of 1704, wages were rarely paid on time.[35] Kunst received the huge salary of 3,500 roubles, but did not live long to enjoy it. He died in 1703 and was replaced by another German, Otto (Artemy) Fürst, who demanded 4,000 roubles. Fürst, a goldsmith by profession, was not a success. In the winter of 1704 only three productions were mounted. Russian apprentice actors complained that Fürst was hardly ever in the theatre and that they were not taught their parts and actions properly, partly because he was unable to take rehearsals in Russian. Audiences, although they were treated to plenty of scenery, machinery and costumes, were deterred by the fact that in addition to paying the seat price (ten, six, five or three kopecks), they also had to pay a gate toll for entering and leaving the Kremlin.[36] The repertoire of the Moscow playhouse during its short existence seems to have consisted mainly of lowbrow material, chosen for comic or sensationalist effect,

adapted from German and Dutch texts, themselves often based on old histories, chronicles, courtly tales and bowdlerized versions of other plays, for example Molière's *Le Médecin malgré lui*. German offerings included *Prince Pickled Herring* or *Jodelet*, adaptations of Andreas Gryphius and Daniel Casper. It has been suggested that these German comedies failed because they were 'quite alien to Russian life at that time and had no points of contact with [local] customs and concepts'.[37] By 1706, the theatre had fallen into disrepair, a sad end to 'the most unmitigated disaster in the history of Russian theatre'.[38]

* * *

A few conclusions may be drawn from this brief introduction to three areas of German cultural influence in early modern Russia. Some apply to foreign specialists in general, regardless of their nationality or profession: they received much bigger salaries than their Russian counterparts (where any existed) and they were obliged to train Russians. It was assumed, and written into contracts, that foreigners would take pupils. Their success as teachers, however, was hampered by the fact that their grasp of Russian was almost invariably inadequate or non-existent and they usually had little in common with their pupils, who tended to be drawn from the ranks of clerks, artisans and even peasants. These German case histories also point to other barriers to assimilation. With regard to painting and architecture, continuing Russian 'backwardness' is reflected in the comparatively slow growth of Russian national schools trained in Western technique and theory. The Russian Academy of Arts planned by Peter did not come into existence until 1757. In the case of the theatre, Russian reluctance (on the part of both actors and audiences) and the lack of a native repertoire delayed the development of a national theatre for several decades. It is also significant that Peter did not pursue this scheme with the same energy that he devoted to projects which coincided more closely with his own personal interests.

Was Peter too dependent upon foreigners in general and Germans in particular? Until recently, both in Russia and the West, the view has been that Peter managed to strike a more or less happy balance in his dealings with foreigners, but that after his death, when Russia was ruled by a series of weaker sovereigns,

Germans were able to take over the state and impose a 'reign of terror' which brought Russia to the verge of ruin. The reign of Peter's niece Empress Anna Ioannovna (1730–40) is associated with the notorious 'bironovshchina', a period of foreign rule masterminded by the empress's advisor Ernst Johan Biron (Bühren). In a famous image formulated by the pre-revolutionary historian V.O. Kliuchevskii, 'Germans poured into Russia like rubbish from a torn sack'.[39] Recent studies argue that both the numbers and relative influence of Germans in Russian government in the first decades of the eighteenth century have been greatly exaggerated. In particular, revisionist Russian historians point out the anachronism of equating the 'Germans' active in Peter's reign and later, who were drawn from a number of regions and united only by language and common European culture, with German nationalists of the twentieth century.[40] Even so, Russian nationalist historians continue to be troubled by the fact that so much of the élite art and architecture of eighteenth-century Russia was produced by foreigners. There are to date no monographs devoted specificially to Petrine foreign painters (although architects have been slightly better served)[41] and general surveys of the period tend to contain only the sketchiest information about German artists. Peter attracted criticism both from the nineteenth-century Slavophiles, who condemned him for spurning native genius and placing too heavy a reliance on alien models, and from Soviet historians, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the German origin of artists was particularly problematic. The remark on Danhauer in the standard Soviet *History of Russian Art* sets the tone: he was, it seems, 'incapable of conveying all the complexity of Peter's image [in his portraits], something which was achieved only by Ivan Nikitin'.[42] It could, of course, be argued (although I have not found examples in Soviet writings) that early eighteenth-century Germany was a poor choice as a source of new ideas and excellence in art, architecture or theatre. The Thirty Years' War had a prolonged detrimental effect on the arts in the north, as did the lack of patronage from Protestant churches and princes. The Catholic Church and rulers in the south promoted the arts more actively, but even so, few major artists from Germany in the period enjoyed an international reputation, either in their own time or today. But to suggest that Peter failed to select the best on offer also poses problems. A possible way out of the dilemma

posed to national pride was to emphasize the fact that certain foreigners chose to work in Russia rather than elsewhere, thus distancing themselves from their origins and turning them into 'one's own foreigners' (*svoi nemtsy*). It was argued that such specialists assimilated Russian tastes, adapted their designs to Russian conditions and in some cases became 'Russified' and better artists than they had been in their native environment, so that the recipients rather than the bearers of new cultural trends took the credit for their achievements. The main point, of course, is that the eighteenth century was a period of considerable artistic mobility and interchange in which Western artists, regardless of their country of origin, looked to ideal models drawn from earlier times and civilizations. In a modern state national art could advance only in an international context, as Peter observed as he travelled around Europe. In his own day Peter's ideological supporters had few qualms about foreign borrowing. Feofan Prokopovich, one of the tsar's leading propogandists, argued thus:

> Firearms were in use among other nations before us; but if they had not reached us to this day, what would have become of Russia and where would she be now? The same is true of printing, architecture and the other liberal arts. Wise is the man and the nation which is not ashamed to adopt what is good from strangers and foreigners; foolish and ridiculous is he who will not leave off his bad ways and accept what is good from others.[43]

In the case of art and architecture, Peter's decision to expand St Petersburg from its original fortress site and defensive role into a capital city made foreign assistance vital. The great majority of available Russian builders and painters were trained in carpentry and icon-painting respectively, adequately skilled for work in architectural brigades and painting workshops under foreign supervision, but insufficiently acquainted with modern design, technique and theory to initiate their own projects. Foreigners arguably dominated Imperial architecture for the rest of the century, but Germans were never as prominent as they were in Peter's reign. In the following decades the main German contribution was to scholarship and science, notably through the Academy of Sciences: thirteen of the first sixteen academicians were Germans.

This paper began with an anecdote about the German or Germans who may have facilitated Peter's entry into the world. It ends with a poignant footnote about the German who failed to prevent him from leaving it prematurely. The last item in the unpublished volumes of the *Letters and Papers of Peter the Great* is a letter begging the King of Prussia to send at once his personal physician, von Stahle, to attend the tsar, who was suffering from 'a chill and some discomfort'.[44] Three days later Peter was dead. The invaluable Stählin has an anecdote: apparently it was Blumentrost, Peter's German doctor, who sent for two eminent foreign physicians, von Stahle in Berlin and Boerhaave in Leiden. The latter exclaimed that Peter could have been cured with medicine costing five copecks if treatment had been started in time.[45]

NOTES

1. Letter of 1/11 August 1697, in E. Bodemann (ed.), *Briefe der Kurfürstin Sophie von Hannover an die Raugräfinnen und Raugrafen zu Pfalz*, Leipzig, 1888, quoted in G. Vernadsky (ed.), *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, 3 vols, New Haven, CT, 1972, II, pp. 313–14.
2. J. Stählin, *Podlinnye anekdoty o Petre Velikom*, Leningrad, 1990, pp. 107–8 (Russian translation of *Originalanekdoten von Peter dem Grossen*, Leipzig, 1785).
3. M. Semevskii, *Slovo i delo, 1700–1725: Ocherki i rasskazy iz russkoi istorii XVIII veka*, St Petersburg, 1884, p. 66.
4. M. Semevskii, *Tsaritsa Praskov'ia 1664–1724*, Moscow, 1884 (reprint, 1989), p. 69. This source describes the duke as a 'coarse, uneducated, wilful and highly eccentric owner of a scrap of German soil'.
5. A. Voskresenskii, *Zakonodatel'nye akty Petra I: redaktsii i proekty zakonov, zametki, doklady, donosheniia, chelobit'ia i inostrannye istochniki. Tom I: Akty vysshykh gosudarstvennykh ustanovleniiakh*, Leningrad, 1945, p. 215.
6. E. Amburger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutsch-russischen kulturellen Beziehungen*, Giessen, 1961, p. 9. See also Amburger, *Die Anwerbung ausländischer Fachkräfte für die Wirtschaft Russlands vom 15ten bis ins 19te Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden, 1968,

and L. Kopelew (ed.), *Russen und Russland aus deutscher Sicht: 18. Jahrhundert: Aufklärung*, Munich, 1987.

7. *Exacte Relation von der von Sr. Czaarschen Majestät Petro Alexiowitz, an dem grossen Newa Strohm und der Ost-See neu erbauten Festung und Stadt St. Petersburg, wie auch von dem Castel Cron Schloss, und derselben umliegenden Gegend, Ferner Relation von den uhralten rußischen Gebrauch der Wasser Weyh und Heiligung, Nebst einigen besonderern Anmerkungen aussgezeichnet von N.G.*, Leipzig, 1713. References are to a new Russian translation: 'Tochnoe izvestie o kreposti i gorode Sankt-Peterburg, o kreposti Kronshlot, i ikh okrestnostiakh' in Iu.N. Bespiatykh (ed. and trans.), *Peterburg Petra I v inostrannykh opisaniiakh*, Leningrad, 1991, pp. 47–80. Heinrich von Huyssen (1666–1739), tutor to Tsarevich Alexis, has been suggested as the possible author. On him, see P. Petschauer, 'In Search of Competent Aides: Heinrich von Huyssen and Peter the Great', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 24, 1978, pp. 481-502.
8. In Russia 1714–17, recalled September 1719. See *Das veränderte Russland*, part I, Frankfurt, 1721–2. Translated into English as *The Present State of Russia*, 2 vols, London, 1722–3, reprint, 1968. Parts II and III of *Das veränderte Russland* appeared in Hanover in 1739 and 1740. See also 'A Description of the City of St Petersburg, with Several Observations Relating to it' in *The Present State of Russia*, I, pp. 297–352. Russian translation with commentary in Bespiatykh, *Peterburg Petra I*, pp. 102–38.
9. H.-F. de Bassewitz, 'Éclaircissemens, sur plusieurs faits, relatifs au règne de Pierre le Grand, extraits en l'an 1761 à la requisition d'un savant des papiers du feu Comte Henningue Fréderic de Bassewitz, conseiller privé de L.M. Impériales romaine et russienne, chevalier de St. André', *Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie*, 9, 1775, pp. 283–380; F.W. von Bergholz, 'Tagebuch, welches er in Russland von 1721 bis 1725 als holsteinischer Kammerjunker geführt hat', *Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographe*, 19–21, 1785–88. Translated as *Dnevnik kammer-iunkera Berkhgol'tsa, vedennye im v Rossii v tsarstvovanie Petra Velikogo s 1721–1725 g.*, Moscow, 1857–1860, third edn, Moscow, 1902–3.
10. See Bartlett and Schönwälder's Introduction to this volume.
11. 'Okh, okh, bednaia Rus', chego-to tebe zakhotelos' nemetskikh postupov i obychaev': 'Kniga besed' in *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma im samim napisannoe i drugie ego sochineniia*, Moscow, 1960, p. 136. Avvakum was burnt at the stake in 1682.
12. G.V. Esipov, *Raskol'nich'i dela XVIII stoletiia*, 2 vols, St Petersburg, 1861, II, pp. 169–70.

13. J. Stählin, *Podlinnye anekdoty*, pp. 47–9. Related by P.I. Iaguzhinskii.
14. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii: Sobranie pervoe*, St Petersburg, 45 vols, 1830, IV, no. 1910, pp. 192–5.
15. In 1711, Peter discussed with Leibniz (director of the Royal Society of Sciences in Prussia) plans for an Academy. Leibniz was given a contract for Russian service (1 November 1712) but did not go. He told Peter that Russia urgently needed foreign teachers, schools and libraries: see J.L. Black, *Citizens for the Fatherland: Education, Educators and Pedagogical Ideals in 18th-century Russia*, Boulder, CO and New York, 1979, p. 33; P. Petschauer, 'The Philosopher and the Reformer: Tsar Peter I, G.W. Leibnitz and the College System', *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 13, 1979, pp. 473–87; and A.J. Rieber, 'Politics and Technology in Eighteenth-Century Russia', *Science in Context*, 8, 1995, pp. 341–68. In 1701, the tailor G. Satreber and saddlers G. von Kremar and K. Rat arrived from Hamburg, having heard that 'there was a great need for their craft' in Moscow; milliners included G. Strauss and A. Rengat from Brandenburg: see V.A. Kovrigina, 'Remeslenniki Moskovskoi Nemetskoi Slobody v kontse XVII-pervoi chetverti XVIII veka', *Russkii gorod*, 9, 1990, pp. 182–201. Alexander Menshikov's private musicians were mostly German and included Elizabeth Blesendorf, a singer hired in Berlin in 1711/13: see I.V. Saverkina and Iu.N. Semenov, 'Orkestr i khor A.D. Menshikova', *Pamiatniki kul'tury*, 1989 (1990), pp. 161, 166. Shepherds were summoned from Silesia to Kazan´ to teach Russians how to shear sheep and prepare wool to lessen dependence on English cloth for the army. The project was not successful because of the coarseness of the local fleece: see Weber, *The Present State of Russia*, I, p. 181.
16. J. Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture*, Chicago, IL, 1988, p. 155.
17. See L. Hughes, 'The West Comes to Russian Architecture' in Paul Dukes (ed.), *Russia and Europe*, London, 1991, pp. 24–35.
18. H. Hallström, *Der Baumeister Andreas Schlüter und seine Nachfolge in St. Petersburg*, Stockholm, 1964; R. Kroll, *Andreas Schlüter und der Sommerpalast Peters I*, Berlin, 1976.
19. D.A. Kiuchariants, *Khudozhestvennye pamiatniki g. Lomonosova*, Leningrad, 1985, pp. 14–15.
20. L.N. Semenova, 'Inostrannye mastera v Peterburge v pervoi treti XVIII v.', *Nauka i kul´tura Rossii XVIII v.: Sbornik statei*, Leningrad, 1984 (hereafter *Nauka i kul´tura*), p. 213.
21. On Mattarnovy senior, see the entry by L. Hughes in the Macmillan *Dictionary of Art*, ed. Jane Turner, London, 1996.

22. *Lettres du comte Algarotti sur la Russie*, London and Paris, 1769, p. 64. Francesco Algarotti, who visited St Petersburg in 1739, is best known for his reference to 'this great window recently opened in the north through which Russia looks on Europe'.
23. Engels painted scenery for the short-lived court theatre. On cultural developments in the later seventeenth century, see L. Hughes, 'The 17th-Century "Renaissance" in Russia', *History Today*, February 1980, pp. 41–5, and Hughes, 'The Moscow Armoury and Innovations in 17th-Century Muscovite Art', *Canadian–American Slavic Studies*, 13, 1979, pp. 204–23.
24. N.P. Sharandak, *Russkaia portretnaia zhivopis' petrovskogo vremeni*, Leningrad, 1987, p. 35; I.E. Grabar' (ed.), *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, 13 vols, Moscow, 1960, V, pp. 303-06.
25. V.Iu. Matveev, 'Raznykh khudozhestv mastera' in *Nauka i kul'tura*, pp. 146–57.
26. *200-letie Kabineta ego imp. velichestva 1704–1904*, St Petersburg, 1911, pp. 222, 223, 259.
27. Stählin, *Podlinnye anekdoty*, p. 67.
28. A. Bird, *A History of Russian Painting*, London, 1987, p. 343; G.H. Hamilton, *The Art and Architecture of Russia*, London, 1983, p. 343.
29. I.M. Zharkova, 'Zhivopisets petrovskogo vremeni Iogann Genrikh Vedekind', *Soobshcheniia Gosudarstvennoi Tret'iakovskoi Galerei: Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo. Iskusstvo XVIII–pervoi poloviny XIX veka*, Moscow, 1995, pp. 64–78, also quoting *Zapiski Iakoba Shtelina ob iziashchnykh iskusstvakh v Rossii*, 2 vols, Moscow, 1991, I, p. 53.
30. C.R. Jensen, 'Music for the Tsar: A Preliminary Study of the Music of the Muscovite Court Theatre', *The Musical Quarterly*, 79, 1995, 2, p. 377.
31. L.N. Maikov, *Rasskazy Nartova o Petre Velikom*, St Petersburg, 1891, p. 9.
32. Information from P.O. Morozov, 'Russkii teatr pri Petre Velikom', *Ezhegodnik imperatorskikh teatrov, 1893-1894*, St Petersburg, 1894, book 1, pp. 52–80; P. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom*, 2 vols, St Petersburg, 1862, II, pp. 422ff.
33. The following from documents in *Sbornik vypisok iz arkhivnykh bumag o Petre Velikom*, 2 vols, Moscow, 1872 (hereafter *Sbornik*), II, p. 312, memos from clerks of the Foreign Office and Golovin.
34. Ibid., p. 314.
35. Ibid., p. 318.
36. Ibid., p. 317. In 1704, a Swede, a servant of Fürst, who was smoking a pipe and dropping ash on the ground, when asked by a

clerk of the Foreign Office to go outside to smoke, objected with foul language, and reached for his sword. A complaint to Fürst had no effect and the Swede hit the clerk over the head. A punishment of beating with sticks was imposed, 'to deter others from behaving improperly and impolitely in the theatre': ibid.

37. Morozov, 'Russkii teatr pri Petre Velikom', p. 65.
38. S. Karlinsky, *Russian Drama from its Beginnings to the Age of Pushkin*, Berkeley, CA, 1985, p. 47.
39. V.O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 5 vols, Moscow, 1989, IV, p. 272.
40. See, for example, E.V. Anisimov, 'Rossiia pri imperatritse Anne Ivanovne (problema "bironovshchina")' in M. di Salvo and L. Hughes (eds), *A Window on Russia: Proceedings of the V International Conference of the Study Group on 18th-Century Russia, Gargnano, 1994*, Rome, 1996, pp. 51–6.
41. See, for example, Iu. Ovsiannikov, *Dominiko Trezini*, Leningrad, 1987.
42. Grabar′ (ed.), *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, VI, p. 304.
43. Feofan Prokopovich, *The Justice of the Monarch's Will* (1722) in A. Lentin (ed. and trans.), *Peter the Great: His Law on the Imperial Succession. An Official Commentary*, Oxford, 1996, p. 279.
44. Leningradskoe Otdelenie instituta istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR, fond 270 (Komissiia po izdaniiu Pisem i bumag Petra I, 1872–1921), delo 109, l. 24 (25 January 1725); written in the first person but signed by chancellor Fedor Golovkin and accompanied by a German translation.
45. Stählin, *Podlinnye anekdoty*, pp. 174–5.

5 State-Sponsored Immigration into Eastern Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Roger Bartlett and Bruce Mitchell

The large-scale medieval population movements from German lands into territories further to the east which have been discussed in previous chapters were caused by circumstances which obtained in lands both of origin and of destination. The needs of Eastern European rulers and opportunities for trade, for settlement, for farming or other employment all came together to propel people eastward in search of a life more promising than that they led at home. Excess population with unemployed skills could find space (land to live on) and opportunity (applications for their skills) to the east; and rulers or owners of land often established co-ordinated systems of immigration and settlement in order to take advantage of this. In the eighteenth century patterns of eastward migration were determined by similar considerations, but were distinguished by the greater involvement and organization undertaken by state governments, especially in the second half of the century. Particularly in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, the major powers of the day, and above all the absolutist states of Central and Eastern Europe, elaborated measures to foster immigration into their territories and to settle foreigners there *en masse* on empty lands. This essay will deal with the three most important practitioners of such policies, Prussia, Russia and Austria–Hungary.

In the migrations of this period Germans were not alone, although they have often been portrayed as the essential settler material in the East. The German scholar Walter Kuhn, writing in 1956, brought a necessary corrective to the discussion when he pointed out that eighteenth-century *Ostwanderung* (eastward

migration) was actually a multinational phenomenon. Planned peasant colonization of East European lands, he noted,

> was carried through as a sort of communal activity of the European peoples [*eine Art Gemeinschaftswerk der europäischen Völker*]. In southern Hungary the groups involved included Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs and Romanians, in smaller numbers also French, Italians, Spaniards, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Albanians; in Russia there were Great Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Swedes and French.

Nevertheless, Kuhn continued,

> at the head of this great work there stood, in Hungary as in Russia, the Germans, both among the planners of the chancelleries in Vienna and Budapest and in the Chancellery of Guardianship of Foreigners in Russia, and in terms of the numbers and economic achievements of the settlers themselves.[1]

This quotation from Kuhn is interesting for a number of reasons. First, its observation that settlers were not solely German makes a fundamental point which by implication calls into question the value of the ethnic identifier; secondly, it indicates correctly that Germans nevertheless predominated numerically in these processes. Thirdly, however, Kuhn appears to fall back into what is a traditional ethnically based view in emphasizing Germans' leading role in these processes both at the upper and the grass-roots levels, as if Germans have some special and unique affinity or talent for *Ostwanderung*. This view, implicit or overt, expressed at its extremes in proud admiration of German cultural superiority and *Kulturträgertum* in the East or in hostile attacks on the sinister *Drang nach Osten*, has been a commonplace of writing on these migrations, both by Germans, by descendants of the settlers themselves, and by East European nationalists, until very recently.[2] Over the past decade, however, in tandem with the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and in Germany itself, both German and East European scholarship has developed very different and more empirical ways of seeing — though these are still not without their problems.[3] All three of Kuhn's points will be examined further in this chapter.

The eighteenth-century recruiting operations of Prussia, Russia and Austria were remarkable for their systematic nature.

These were government-run programmes of the same order as, for instance, ship-building or military procurement. They originated fundamentally in the economic needs of the country and the policies and methods preferred by contemporary governments in meeting those needs. The Hohenzollern rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, trying to develop the poor resources of their marches in the east of Europe, constantly ran out of people. The Thirty Years' War (1618–48) and the following Swedish–Polish War (1656–7) seriously depleted the population in Hohenzollern territories.[4] These losses were compounded by bubonic plague in 1709–10; and the wars of the eighteenth century were equally devastating. Successive Prussian governments were therefore acutely aware of population levels, and welcomed immigrants of all kinds. They benefited especially from the conflicts and religious (not ethnic) cleansing of the Counter-Reformation. As is well known, Prussia's Potsdam Edict (1685) was a response to Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and was aimed principally at French Huguenots.[5] The Counter-Reformation 'cleansed', however, not only French, but also Dutch, Flemish, Italians, Austrians, Hungarians, Silesians and Czechs, as well as Germans; and these people went both to Prussia and all over Protestant Europe and the New World. (Some Huguenots found their way to Russia.) And the Potsdam Edict, which became the foundation of Prussian eighteenth-century colonist recruitment programmes and a landmark for other states as well, was neither unique nor the first of its kind, having been preceded by similar declarations from Britain and Denmark.[6]

The main provisions of the Edict guaranteed full rights of citizenship and of religious freedom for immigrants and offered them state assistance and grants of land and money with which to establish themselves. A rough figure for the results of the Edict in Prussia suggests 20,000 refugee arrivals by 1700;[7] and other immigrants took advantage of it too. The Swiss authorities even negotiated an agreement with the Prussians to export their surplus population voluntarily to Prussia: Switzerland was overcrowded at this time.[8] The early historian of Prussian colonization, Beheim-Schwarzbach, summed up the longer-term dynamic of the settlement process:

> The Great Elector (1640–88) gave the impulse to large-scale state colonizations, the first King in Prussia, Frederick III and I (1688–

> 1713) tolerated and protected them; the practical and economical father of the great monarch [that is, Frederick William I, 1713–1740] saw in the colonies a major lever for bringing land and industry into bloom; but it was Frederick II who for the first time created a whole branch of administration, to which from beginning to end he devoted especial predilection and special energies. Colonizations formed the centre-piece of his internal policies aimed at the cultivation of the land; he was the first to bring method into the process of these economic questions, and the colonizations became actually his hobby-horse.[9]

On coming to the throne in 1740, Frederick II set up a special office to encourage immigration, the Fifth Department of the Prussian *Generaldirectorium*, which was to develop manufacturing and also 'to draw into the country as many foreigners of all conditions, characters and types, as it is at all possible to do'.[10] Frederick saw population simply as a form of capital. He fixed a set value on the unit of a colonist family: it must not cost the state more than 400 Thalers to bring in and settle. His government regulated closely who came in: for the year 1747, for example, only wool- and leather-workers were wanted in Prussia's provinces. Colonists also had to pay a special monthly tax which represented from 6 to 11 per cent interest on the capital outlay upon them: an attempt directly to claw back the state's very significant expenses in this field. Over the forty-six years of his reign, Frederick II's government issued eighty-eight major edicts (not to mention minor ones) either regulating or encouraging new immigration and settlement.[11] One estimate of total immigration to Prussia in the period 1640–1786 is half a million, and with these incomers' descendants, one million: about one sixth to one fifth of the total population.[12]

In the Austrian lands it was primarily the results of the successful Turkish wars at the end of the seventeenth century which prompted the Imperial and Hungarian authorities to take similar action and enlarge upon the old traditions of attracting settlers from without. The successes of the Holy League and Imperial arms which resulted in the treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718) brought large areas of territory previously held by the Ottomans under Austrian control. As early as 1689, a first Habsburg patent on population announced a Hungarian settlement programme (*Ungarisches Einrichtungswerck*). The Hungarian Diet created special settlement commissions, and in 1723 came a special law on 'the Resettlement of

the Kingdom' which has been seen as 'the fundamental law of Danube–Swabian colonization'.[13]

During the century from the 1680s to the 1780s, three main regional groupings of settlement can be distinguished in the Austro-Hungarian lands. First, the Military Frontier running from the north of Siebenbürgen to the Adriatic was further developed. This rather successful attempt at a military cordon of peasant militia to guard the south-eastern marches against hostile (Ottoman) intrusion, manned essentially by Serbs and Croats, had parallels elsewhere (Russia), and lasted into the late nineteenth century.[14] Extensive flight and immigration of Serbs, a minority of them Catholic, together with some Bulgarians, took place into what became the new Habsburg territories during the war years. In 1690, a large body of Orthodox Serbian families under their Patriarch Arsenius moved northward from Albania and South Serbia, initially into the Temesvár Banat and the Bačka (southern Hungary), in response to a charter issued by Leopold II.[15] In 1735, however, Serb unhappiness over service conditions and lack of promised autonomy provoked a rebellion. Its failure led to the dissolution of the obsolete northern Tisa–Maros part of the military frontier, and abolition of settler privileges; as a result many Serbs migrated eastwards to Russia and were resettled in new colonies in the Ukraine, designed to contain the Crimean Tartars.[16]

The second major group of settlers were post-war immigrants into the Banat and Bačka, who arrived mainly in the first decades of the eighteenth century. In 1716, the strategic and economic value of the Banat highlands, included in the area's latest configuration as the Temesvár Banat,[17] prompted Vienna to declare the region a Crown domain (*Kron- und Kammerdomäne*), directly subordinate to Vienna. It retained this status until 1779, when it passed under Hungarian county administration (to which the Bačka had been subject since 1690).[18] Thirdly, when peace was renewed in the mid-eighteenth century, settlement resumed not only in the Banat and Bačka but in Siebenbürgen, bringing in likewise many non-German (Southern Slav and Vlach/Romanian) as well as German immigrants. The high point of Habsburg settlement and active population policies falls in the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, in the years 1763–87. The eighteenth century saw three main waves of immigration (the so-called *Schwabenzüge*), especially from southern Germany, in

1722–6, 1763–8/73, and 1782–7, which brought in respectively some 10–15,000, 45,000 and 23,000 settlers. Available statistics and estimates of the total of such incomers vary: in the century from the 1680s to the 1780s they amounted to between 100,000 and 200,000.[19]

The policies of the Habsburg authorities reflected both religious, political and economic considerations. The newly reconquered territories of Transylvania and eastern Hungary were largely Protestant (Calvinist), and already in 1696 the Viennese *Hofkriegsrat* therefore decided that no 'unbelievers' (that is, non-Catholics) should be accepted for immigration to the area; similarly, bitter experience of Hungarian insubordination suggested 'tempering the rebellious Hungarian blood with the German'.[20] Crown domain status, with its subordination to Vienna, avoided reincorporation into the Hungarian kingdom, and allowed the Banat to be exploited systematically on mercantilist and populationist principles.[21] The colonization policy of the new military and civilian governor, Count C.F. Mercy, placed initial emphasis on mining and communications: the Habsburgs suffered acute shortage of precious metals, lacking their principal rivals' colonial mineral and commercial resources, and conditions were in any case as yet unfavourable to agriculture. Mercy introduced skilled Tyrolean, Styrian and Bohemian labour;[22] other German specialists were recruited for canal and river engineering and drainage works, and for fortress repairs, and German settlements were established along the principal ways of communication. Between 1718 and 1734, before the wars of the Polish and Austrian successions and the next (disastrous) Austro-Turkish confrontation (1738–44), Mercy's active and enlightened governorship gradually transformed the province. Colonists, wooed with substantial tax concessions, were recruited and assisted on their journey by state agencies, the *staatliche Kolonistenanwerbungs- und Speditionsbüro* in Worms and Regensburg: a system expanded and developed under Joseph II. Settlers introduced from all over the Habsburg and Imperial domains (Styria, Tyrol, Bohemia, Saxony and, in lesser numbers, from Italy, including some expatriate Spaniards)[23] provided the expertise and some of the labour for a great programme of public works: roads, bridges, dikes and canals were constructed and mining developed in the eastern mountains. The Italians were intended (but failed) to

introduce sericulture. The first Schwabenzug of 1722–6 consisted almost exclusively of Catholic Habsburg subjects; and Serbs and Jews were explicitly barred from settlement in Temesvár. Only under Joseph II was non-Catholic immigration both permitted and encouraged. In the middle decades of the century the Banat and Siebenbürgen further east were also used as a place of exile for political, social and religious 'undesirables', which might theoretically serve both social and penal purposes and the policy of population growth, but in practice was unsuccessful and deleterious.[24] After the Seven Years' War, settlement of the Banat and Bačka was taken up more systematically, on the basis of a patent of 1763. Colonization spilled over into Slavonia and Syrmia, and after 1775 into the Bukowina (northern Moldavia), acquired from the Turks; it was further encouraged by Joseph II's Patent of Settlement of 1782 which called forth the third Schwabenzug.[25] German farmers were settled, usually on the best land: here the German reputation for efficiency gave them an advantage. Especially after the abolition of serfdom (1785) there was considerable colonist movement within and between regions of settlement; and some went further east altogether, to Russia.[26]

In the nineteenth century, state support for immigration to the Habsburg lands ebbed away, and immigration became episodic. Bohemians settled in the Banat highlands in 1828, 2000 Württembergers settled in Siebenbürgen shortly before the 1848 revolution; and some migration followed the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878.[27] The German-speaking colonists of the Banat and Bačka established themselves, meanwhile, as a separate entity alongside the existing Serb, Romanian and Hungarian population; early on they had become known collectively as *Schwaben*, despite disparate geographical origins — a small minority hailed from Swabia — and the lack of common characteristics and interests between the highland mining communities and the farmers of the plains and heathland. In time this collective identity became strong enough to absorb the few remaining Spanish and Italians as well, and in the twentieth century the term *Donauschwabe* became current, embracing all such colonists along the Danube.

The third major East European player in this game, Imperial Russia, started somewhat later than her competitors. State-directed 'inner colonization' was an established Russian practice

in which foreigners had occasionally figured on earlier occasions.[28] The use of settled defence lines similar to Austria's Military Frontier had a long Muscovite and Russian history. In the early eighteenth century, Peter the Great gave sanctuary and land to small numbers of Southern Slavs who had joined his disastrous 1711 campaign against the Ottomans. But only from the 1750s did policy on mass immigration become more systematic, reaching its apogee under Catherine II and Alexander I in the period 1760–1820.[29] The Serbian colonies created in 1752–4 by migrants from the Habsburg Military Frontier were the spearhead of new settlement in the south, a policy interrupted by the Seven Years' War and only taken up again in 1762–4. Then major new programmes both created a new plan of settlement for 'New Russia' (the lands north of the Crimea) and, under the aegis of the new Chancellery of Guardianship of Foreigners, brought some 25,000, mainly German, immigrants to settle on the Volga in the period 1763–72. After Catherine's first victory over the Ottomans and the resulting Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774), which extended Russian borders southwards, the settlement and development of the region was given top priority under the direction of the new favourite, Prince G. Potemkin; and henceforward all new foreign settlement was directed to the Black Sea littoral. The main preoccupations were defence and agriculture, but the government was also much concerned with developing the towns and commerce of the region. The principal groups involved were Bulgarians[30] and Greeks, Germans (including originally Dutch Mennonites coming from Prussian territories) and a considerable number of Armenian subjects of the Crimean Khan. But numerous other nationalities were represented in smaller numbers: riff-raff from the coastal towns of Italy, stray Montenegrins, Turkish refugees, a Swedish colony — Potemkin even wanted to obtain British convict deportees for his new territories, though he allegedly balked (apparently on ideological grounds) at accepting American Loyalists who were seeking a new home after the American Revolution.[31] In Catherine's reign (1762–96) probably 100,000 colonists of all nationalities, a majority of them from German lands, were settled in the south and east of European Russia; large numbers continued to arrive during the upheavals of the Napoleonic wars and the years immediately after, and although land was becoming increasingly scarce in the



German immigration into the Russian Empire
in the 18th and 19th centuries

target region, the Russian government continued to accept them, albeit on ever more stringent conditions. The general policy of accepting foreign settlers was suspended in 1819, and all state activity petered out around 1830. Thereafter the colonists' special administration remained in place and their separate juridical status intact until the 'Great Reforms' of the 1860s; but such episodes of mass immigration as occurred were either a matter of private enterprise, as in Volhynia in the 1860s or the Russian Baltic provinces in the 1900s, or were managed exceptionally by the government for reasons of state, as in the 1830s and 1860s, when large movements of Bulgarian refugees were accommodated for political reasons in the context of the continuing Russo-Turkish confrontation.

Thus, from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, large-scale bureaucratically-organized government programmes of the major East European states moved tens and hundreds of thousands of people, a majority of them German, eastwards, to form settled communities, principally rural and agricultural, on unused land. In the longer historical perspective it is useful to ask why such state activity should peak at this particular time; and equally to return to Kuhn's observations cited at the beginning of this essay and consider why Germans were numerically predominant.

Why at this time? Some reasons have already been suggested. All these countries found themselves in this period with more land than they had people to settle on it, and urgent needs of both security and economic development which only population increase could satisfy. In Prussia, the urgent requirements of internal development and military strength meant that potentially all social categories were desired, 'foreign bodies' of all descriptions. In southern Hungary and southern and eastern Russia, military success brought large but exposed territorial acquisitions which made settlement and absorption particularly urgent. And it was characteristic of the absolutist states of the time to conceive of such problems in terms of state initiative and regulation, rather than leaving matters to private activity and the workings of demand and supply.

Private enterprise did play a significant part in all these programmes, since it became rapidly apparent that diplomats and state officials were no match on the ground for private recruiters: the traditions of the medieval *locatores* combined with those of

the military recruiting sergeant and press-gang to produce a modern breed of independent recruiting agent which proliferated across Europe, broadcasting promises true and false, ignoring legal niceties, and creating excitement and social effervescence wherever they went. Some of them enjoyed remarkable success, at least for a time, and led vividly picaresque and adventurous lives.[32] But they were all under the control of central government offices, and in the Russian case, when the private colonies established by these 'summoners' (*vyzyvateli*) proved troublesome, the latter were removed from their management.

Yet the availability of empty lands, and the activism of the early modern absolutist state, are not sufficient explanation, particularly in the Russian case. Here available land was more extensive, and population density lower, than anywhere else. Nevertheless, Peter I's well-known Manifesto of 1702 summoning foreign immigrants, mentioned by Lindsey Hughes in her chapter, was addressed first to soldiers, then to merchants and artisans; Peter undertook no group settlement of foreigners worth mentioning; and despite the first steps of the 1750s, it was only Catherine II who on her accession at once set a mass immigration in train. The missing link here (apart from the need for peace, achieved in 1763) is political and economic theory. The ideas of mercantilism and their outgrowth of cameral 'sciences', from the late seventeenth century onwards, had always emphasized the importance of population as a tool for the maximization of state wealth and strength, and consequently international power: the 1719 Habsburg 'Einrichtungs-Befehl' for the Banat had ordered first and foremost that everything should be done 'whereby the land may be more populated and brought into use [*bebaut*]'.[33] Maria Theresa's recognition in 1766 of 'the increase of the people as one of the most priceless objects [of policy]'[34] was echoed by Frederick II's declaration in his second *Political Testament* of 1768: 'The first principle [of statecraft] which presents itself, the most general of all and the most true, is that the real strength of a State consists in the number of its subjects.'[35]

Traditional mercantilist economic doctrine, however, emphasized above all not the activities of the peasant masses, but the more urban, mercantile and industrial economic pursuits, as generators of national wealth: Count Mercy's development of mining in the Banat was highly symptomatic of this established

point of view.[36] Only in the mid-eighteenth century did there appear a new emphasis on agriculture as the main productive sector of the economy,[37] a view which late cameralist writers shared with the Physiocrats, theoretical newcomers who were less impressed by the populationist argument. One of the most succinct expressions of the older cameralist view in its new mid-century formulation is to be found in the elder Mirabeau's fabulously popular *L'Ami des Hommes, ou Traité de la Population*, which went through twenty editions in France between 1756 and 1760:

> The true principle of all wealth is therefore the multiplication of the human species, called population: which is the subject of this Treatise. The first among the labours for which Man must be employed is the multiplication of the products of the earth, the art called *agriculture*, whose indispensable connection with population will be demonstrated in the following chapters.[38]

For a while in the mid-eighteenth century, 'populationism' was one of the most influential dogmas of statecraft throughout Europe. Catherine II, like Frederick II, was a fanatical populationist,[39] while Joseph II's similar interest in the problem may have been more informed by Physiocratic thinking;[40] the same ideas were equally current at the other end of the Continent, in France and Britain. Only towards the century's end was the primary emphasis on population growth superseded by Physiocratic, free-trade and Malthusian theories. Populationist doctrines emphasizing agriculture reinforced the self-evident need to settle lands which while under-populated were both unproductive and a security risk. In other words, human bodies, whether native or, if necessary, foreign, were seen as the critical factor in the state's security and prosperity, and the primary foundation of wealth was now sought in agriculture, which emphasized large-scale peasant settlement rather than the recruitment of urban elements and technical specialists or craftsmen, who had featured largely before. Programmes to attract and settle foreigners *en masse* were accordingly ubiquitous in Europe at this time — not just in the three Eastern European monarchies discussed, but in Poland,[41] Denmark, Ireland, Spain[42] — and in the New World possessions of the colonial powers. The German diaspora of the late seventeenth to

nineteenth centuries was consequently world-wide, and not confined to Eastern Europe.[43]

And why Germans? Kuhn's assertion that it was Germans in the state chancelleries who planned these operations is self-evidently true for the governments of Berlin and Vienna, which were not surprisingly predominantly staffed in all departments by Germans: but, despite the centuries-old experience of German colonization in the south-east, there is little evidence that such German administrators particularly sought ethnic German colonists or had any inveterate ethnic preferences. For Russia the claim is simply wrong: the highest posts in the Imperial Russian Chancellery of Guardianship were held by Russians, and Germans were employed below them, together with other Russians, because of specific technical skills, general administrative ability or linguistic convenience. The old argument that Catherine II, a German princess, especially favoured her countrymen for the new colonies, is quite without foundation — one of her earliest comments was an expression of pleasure at the prospect of immigration from Persia.[44] At the level of government planning the German ethnicity of rulers and government officials was adventitious and irrelevant: it had negligible or no bearing upon governments' policy and its implementation.

Governments' choices of sources from which to draw immigrants were affected by numerous factors, which both conditioned and reflected rational policy decisions. In principle Catherine would take virtually any 'body' for her new colonies, and her proclamations were translated into Greek, Serbian and Romanian as well as Western languages.[45] But like all governments of the day, she preferred those most compatible in terms of religion, politics and culture. She was delighted to welcome Persian Armenians, and Greek, Bulgarian and other Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Muslims, unsurprisingly in the Ottoman–Russian war zone, were less desirable (in fact the new legislation allowed their enserfment, as an attraction to other immigrants). The Habsburgs likewise accepted Vlachs and Serbs. All these ethnic groups, however, were restricted by the nature of relations between the Ottomans and the Austrian and Russian governments; many such colonists arrived as refugees or as a result of military operations. And while they possessed known and valuable talents — the

Armenians, for instance, as international merchants, the Greeks as sailors — they did not offer other skills which these governments required, such as mining expertise. Questions of cost, adaptability and integration were also prominent, and in these respects the conditions of the southern borderlands were clearly different from those of metropolitan areas, or of the lands which Frederick II sought to colonize.

When international relations closed off immigration from further south and east, Central and Western Europe remained the only source of recruits. Here conditions varied widely. National stereotypes played a limited role. Views of Germans as especially suitable immigrant material appear occasionally in contemporary sources: their stolid loyalty might sometimes be contrasted with Hungarian rebelliousness, as above, or with French frivolity,[46] and they enjoyed in some quarters a reputation for skill in farming,[47] which was not always substantiated. But in general such opinions had a limited effect upon policy. And the — often justified — claims of later historians, that together with German immigration culture had been brought to uncultured areas, sometimes ascribe to German *Tüchtigkeit* successes which frequently had other or additional causes. In the case of the Temesvár Banat, for example, Habsburg propaganda exaggerated the ruination of the area under the preceding Ottoman domination,[48] and Mercy's systematically planned and executed economic development conflicted with the pastoral life of much of the existing population, who were understandably slow to engage actively in radical transformation of their own culture. The undoubted success of the German colonists in Russia, who became much more prosperous than their Russian, Ukrainian and other peasant neighbours, sparked a long-running debate in the nineteenth century which focused on the handsome land allocations, tenure systems and privileges granted to the original settlers — among whom the most successful of all were in fact not Germans as such, but Mennonites of Dutch extraction, expert farmers recruited from Prussia.[49] Detractors, it is true, have tended to exaggerate the benefits accruing from these factors. In general the migrants who colonized the new territories of Prussia, Russia and Austria–Hungary also suffered the hardships and the fate common to pioneer settlers everywhere. The first generation usually showed a high mortality rate and did little more than reproduce itself; prosperity only became apparent in subsequent

years. As Frederick II put it, 'the first generation of colonists is of little value':[50] his profit lay in their successors.

The predominance of Germans in these eastern colonizations arose in large part from the particular circumstances of the Holy Roman Empire and the central and southern German lands.[51] These territories were well populated, in some times and places overpopulated: in the eyes of one contemporary commentator, despite the historical recurrence of war, famine and plague, 'Germany, I dare to assert, is nevertheless the most populous land in Europe, maybe, even, in the whole world'.[52] Yet these lands were relatively close to the target settlement areas which in comparison were empty; this imbalance of itself predisposed population movement to rectify it. The areas of European emigration underwent great economic difficulties and insecurity in the period under consideration, both because of the devastating wars which were repeatedly fought over them, and the exactions of their many small but independent princes.[53] The popular masses of other nations were either too well-off to move in large numbers, as was the case for example in Holland, or had other more obvious destinations for migration, such as the French and British colonies of the New World. (Britain and France were also well able to prevent large-scale emigration: many would-be recruiting agents, for instance, ended in the Bastille.) It is striking that the name 'Europe's America' was applied both to the Banat and to Russia; state-directed settlement in the eastern borderlands of the Old, European, World coincided with state-controlled migration to the New. Proportionately as many Britons and Irish (for example) as Germans emigrated in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; they simply went to different places. In the larger perspective of eighteenth-century European migration, German settlers, while predominant in eastern and south-eastern Europe, play a smaller role in a global drama involving in some degree almost all European peoples.

Before the Napoleonic wars, the rulers of the German states were able to exert some control over the movements of their subjects. Legal powers varied from one principality to the next, as did the physical capacity to restrain would-be emigrants, and equally the government's ability to make life sufficiently attractive to its subjects to keep them voluntarily at home. The governments of German states sought to balance their own

perceived interests against the advantages of good relations with the recruiting powers, who in their turn sought, at least ostensibly (though by no means always in practice), to ensure correct behaviour on the part of their representatives. (Like Prussian army recruiters, the many private recruiting agents employed were less scrupulous.) While German state administrators sometimes did not object to the loss of poor subjects, it was to the advantage of the recruiting powers to obtain respectable citizens who were unencumbered by obligations at home and who could bring capital with them: this subsequently became a cardinal regulation of the Russian and Prussian systems. The corresponding Habsburg screening mechanisms may have represented a desire to maintain good relations with the minor German states of the Empire: in 1768, after countermeasures and protests from individual principalities against the unexpectedly successful Russian recruitment, Joseph II as Holy Roman Emperor issued a general ban on emigration from all Imperial territories.[54] It is worth noting that the greater part of German eastward emigration came not from the smallest kingdoms and petty principalities of the central German space, whose power to resist emigration by their populations was minimal, but from the medium-sized territories such as Bavaria (a cockpit for the rivalries of the Thirty Years' War), Baden, Württemberg and the Rhine Palatinate, where the effects of war were severe and where the security of life was repeatedly threatened by French encroachment, from the predations of Louis XIV to the revolutionary expansion of the later eighteenth century. Thus it was the principalities especially of southern Germany which supplied the bulk of the migrants. The great social upheavals of the period also fostered social restlessness, extravagant expectations and eschatological hopes and fears.[55] The political fragmentation and *Kleinstaaterei* of the German lands rendered them vulnerable to external pressures and facilitated the outflow of their population into the emptier lands to the east.

In sum, the major immigration programmes of Prussia, Russia and Austria–Hungary were a response, on the one hand, to the practical, concrete needs of their territories, and, on the other hand, reflected the structure and philosophy of their governments and the prevailing dogmas, economic, political and religious, of the day. As security problems lessened, as the target areas became fuller (and eventually in some cases overpopulated)

and the conventional wisdom moved on to other ideas, so state-organized immigration was phased out. The populations recruited by these programmes, as Kuhn observed, included a great variety of different ethnic elements. And if Germans headed the multinational eighteenth-century trek into the eastern European borderlands, it was not because they were bearers of superior talents or a special cultural and political mission, but because they were numerous, because they were summoned by foreign (and their own) governments to empty land and indefinite promise in the east, while at home life was uncomfortable, and because they were not prevented from leaving. The variety and specificity of the reasons for German eastward migration are increasingly recognized in the most recent scholarly work on the areas of settlement; and studies of Russia and of the Habsburg lands as multinational empires and societies of which the German migrants were one part promise a fuller and more balanced understanding of their history.[56]

NOTES

1. W. Kuhn, 'Wesenszüge und Verlauf der deutschen Ostsiedlung' in *Der Deutsche Osten: Referate des ersten Ostseminars der Hochschule für politische Wissenschaften, München*, Munich, 1956, pp. 5–18.
2. Kuhn's own earlier work in the Nazi period was redolent of *Blut und Boden*: in an article of 1943, for example, he had noted the contemporary 'resettlement of our outposts in the East and the progressive construction of a new populational foundation for the German people in the East [*den Aufbau eines neuen ostdeutschen Volksbodens*]': Kuhn, 'Die Erforschung der neuzeitlichen Ostsiedlung' in H. Aubin, O. Brunner, W. Kohte and J. von Papritz (eds), *Deutsche Ostforschung*, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1943, II, pp. 155–235 (235). Less objectionable variations on the approach can be found throughout the writing since the Second World War. It informs much ex-colonist and *Landmannsschaft* historiography, in Germany and in America — for example J.A. Baumann, *Geschichte der Banater Berglanddeutschen Volksgruppe: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Temeser Banats*, Österreichische Landsmannschaft, Eckart-Schriften, 109, Vienna, 1989 (hereafter *Geschichte der*

Banater); F. Koch, *The Volga Germans: In Russia and America, from 1763 to the Present*, Pennsylvania, PA, 1977 (American ex-colonist interest is carried in the *Journal of the American Historical Society of Germans from Russia* and the journal *Heritage Review*). It also shapes such significant and otherwise valuable works as I. Fleischhauer's *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich*, Stuttgart, 1986, or the extensive exhibition catalogue sponsored by the Land government of Baden-Württemberg, *Die Donauschwaben: Deutsche Siedlung in Südosteuropa. Ausstellungskatalog*, Sigmaringen, 1987, 2nd edition, 1989. These latter works have nothing in common with Kuhn's 1940s chauvinism, and in Fleischhauer's case her wide-ranging research added considerably to scholarly knowledge of the German communities in Russia. In their exclusive focus on the Germans as an ethnic group, however, these writings fail to reflect accurately either the latter's history on the ground or the relations of the central authorities to their immigrant subjects.

3. See, for example, D. Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert: Die deutschen Kolonisten und die Balkansiedler in Neurußland und Bessarabien 1751–1914*, Munich, 1993; M. Fata, 'Einwanderung und Siedlung der Deutschen (1686–1790)' in Günter Schödl (ed.), *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Land an der Donau*, Berlin, 1995 (hereafter *Land an der Donau*), pp. 89–181 (90). Schödl's thoughtful 'Schlußbetrachtung' in the same volume is concerned principally with the implications of twentieth-century events. While those events, however, fully justify the rethinking underlying such works as this Siedler series or — to give another example — the 'Tausend Jahre Nachbarschaft' series sponsored by the Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat (Bonn), the bilateral approach which these series still embody (Germans counterposed to all other ethnic groups) continues to favour a particular agenda and perspective with political as much as historical overtones. For recent East European writing on Russia and South-East Europe see notes 13 and 27 below.
4. The extent of population loss attributable to the Thirty Years' War has been much debated. See the careful summary in Geoffrey Parker *et al.*, *The Thirty Years' War*, London, 1984, pp. 208–15.
5. See the anniversary survey of Meta Kohnke, 'Das Edikt von Potsdam: Zu seiner Entstehung, Verbreitung und Überlieferung', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus*, 9, 1985, pp. 241–75; the anniversary produced other work, notably in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1986. See also F. David, 'Les Colonies des réfugiés protestants français en Brandebourg-Prusse (1685–1809):

institutions, géographie et évolution de leur peuplement', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*, 140, 1994, pp. 111–42.

6. On Prussian 'inner colonization' in general, see M. Beheim-Schwarzbach, *Hohenzollernsche Colonisationen*, Leipzig, 1874; G. Schmoller, 'Die preussischen Kolonisationen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts' in *'Zur inneren Kolonisation in Deutschland': Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, 32, 1866; and H. Berger, *Friedrich der Große als Colonisator*, Gießen, 1896. More recent scholarship has been less interested in the Hohenzollerns' *Siedlungswerk* as such than in social relations and agrarian development. See also W. Abel *et al.*, 'Von der Frühzeit bis zum Ende des 18. Jh.': vol. 1 of H. Aubin und W. Zorn (eds), *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozial-Geschichte*, Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 510–11, 517–18; and, among case studies, B. von Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff, *Ein Provinz in Frieden erobert: Brenkenhoff als Leiter des friederizianischen Retablissements in Pommern*, Studien zur Geschichte Preußens, 37, Cologne and Berlin, 1984; and O. Wank, 'Zur ländlichen Besiedlung Ostpreußens im 18. Jahrhundert am Beispiel der Hauptämter Barten und Ortelsburg', *Preußenland*, 27, 1987, pp. 1–17.
7. Beheim-Schwarzbach, *Hohenzollernsche Colonisationen*, pp. 48–53.
8. Ibid., pp. 132–46.
9. Ibid., pp. 261–2.
10. Ibid., p. 272.
11. Ibid., p. 633, Table lxiv.
12. Schmoller, 'Die preussischen Kolonisationen', p. 41.
13. G. Schödl, 'Die Deutschen in Ungarn' in K.J. Bade (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland, Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Munich, 2nd edition, 1992, pp. 70–85 (75). Among the extensive German-language writing on the Habsburg colonizations, see especially A. Peterson *et al.* (eds), *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslanddeutschtums*, Breslau, 1933 (to be used with caution, but includes good historical summaries on Banat and Bačka); K. Schünemann, *Die Bevölkerungspolitik Oesterreichs unter Maria Theresa*, Berlin, 1936; E. Wagner (ed.), *Quellen zur Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen, 1191–1975*, Vienna, 2nd edn, 1981; A. Schaser, *Josephinische Reformen und sozialer Wandel in Siebenbürgen*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 29, Stuttgart, 1989; O. Feldtänzer, *Josef II und die Donauschwäbische Ansiedlung: Dokumentation der Kolonisation im Batscherland 1784–1787*, Munich, 1990; *Die Donauschwaben* (see

note 2 above), which, despite its tunnel vision, gives a concise but balanced overview; and the recent works of M. Fata (see notes 3 and 50). Among Eastern European studies, besides Fata's work, see A. Fintă, *Colonisâule Habsburgul in Banat (1717–1739)*, Timişoara, 1971; S. Ćurčić and S. Kićošev, *Development of the Population in Baranya* (People's Museum, Beli Manastir-Museum of Vojvodina), Novi Sad, 1992; S. Kićošev, *The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina: The Problems of Ethnic Identity*, Novi Sad, 1995; K. Kocsis and E. Kocsis-Hodosi, *Magyarok a határainkon túl a Kárpát-mendencében*, Budapest, 1991; and Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi, *Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin: A Study in Ethnic Geography*, Toronto and Buffalo, NY, 1995.

14. Alan Ferguson, 'Russian Landmilitia and Austrian Militärgrenze', *Südostdeutsche Forschungen*, 13, 1954, pp. 137–58; G.E. Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia 1522–1747*, Urbana, IL, 1960; Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740–1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution*, Chicago, IL, 1996.
15. 'Diplom' of 21 August 1690, reconfirmed in 1706. F. Lotz, 'Die ersten deutschen Kolonisten der Batschka (Futak 1702, Neusatz 1709)', *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter*, 3, 1966, pp. 169–79 (170).
16. N.D. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'The Settlement of the Southern Ukraine (1750–1775)', *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US*, IV, 4 (14)–V, 1 (15), Summer–Fall, 1955, Part One; N. Popov (ed.), 'Izvestie o pokhozhdenii Simeona Stepanova syna Pishchevicha', *Chteniia imperatorskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri moskovskom universitete*, 1881, 4, pp. 1–320; ibid., 1882, 2, pp. 321–479; and ibid., 1883, 2, pp. 480–561; Harvey L. Dyck, 'New Serbia and the Origins of the Eastern Question: A Habsburg Perspective', *Russian Review*, 40, 1981, pp. 1–19.
17. The administrative boundaries of the Banat were redrawn many times.
18. H. Diplich, 'Die staatsrechtliche Stellung des Banats im 18ten Jahrhundert', *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter*, 16, 1967, 2.
19. On statistics see Schünemann, *Die Bevölkerungspolitik*, p. 378; *Die Donauschwaben*, pp. 138–42.
20. *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 38
21. See in general S. Jordan, *Die kaiserliche Wirtschaftspolitik im Banat im 18ten Jahrhundert*, Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, 17, Munich, 1967, and Schödl (ed.), *Land an der Donau*, pp. 146–80.

22. See Baumann, *Geschichte der Banater.*
23. F. Milleker, *Versuch einer Ansiedlung von Spaniern im Banat*, Banater Bücherei, 59, Wrschatz, 1937.
24. Schünemann, *Die Bevölkerungspolitik*, pp. 78–94; Fata, 'Einwanderung und Siedlung', pp. 173–80.
25. *Die Donauschwaben*, pp. 16–17
26. K. Stumpp, *Weiterwanderung deutscher Kolonisten aus Ungarn (Batschka) und dem Banat nach Südrußland in den Jahren 1804–1816*, Südostdeutsches Archiv, 19/20, Munich, 1976/77.
27. *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 17.
28. B. Nol´de, *La Formation de l'Empire Russe: Études, Notes, Documents*, 2 vols, Paris, 1952–3. On the Russian settlements in general, see R.P. Bartlett, *Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia 1762–1804*, Cambridge, 1979; Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert*; D. Brandes *et al.* (eds), *Bibliographie zur Geschichte und Kultur der Rublanddeutschen. Vol. 1: Von der Einwanderung bis 1917*, Schriften des Bundesinstituts für ostdeutschen Kultur und Geschichte, 4, Munich, 1994; the same Bundesinstitut's journal *Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur der Rußlanddeutschen* carries useful current bibliographies of international work in the field.
29. See Bartlett, *Human Capital*, and Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert, passim.*
30. Besides works already cited, see S.V. Bernstein, 'Osnovnye etapy pereseleniia Bolgar v Rossiiu v XVIII–XIX vv.', *Sovetskoe Slavianovedenie*, 1980, 1, pp. 42–59.
31. E.I. Druzhinina, *Severnoe Prichernomor´e 1775–1800*, Moscow, 1959, *passim*; Bartlett, *Human Capital*, esp. p. 127; Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert*, pp. 22–47.
32. For example, the Baron Caneau de Beauregard, who had a seat in Holland, successfully ingratiated himself in Russia with members of the St Petersburg government and high society, and directed a 'company' which set up many of the 'private' colonies on the Volga, giving them Swiss names. When the private Volga colonies were taken over by the Crown in 1768, Beauregard and his crowd of underlings offered themselves to the Austrian colonization programme; Beauregard finally returned in poverty to Holland. Details in K. Stählin, *Aus den Papieren Jacob von Stählins: Ein biographischer Beitrag zur deutsch-russischen Kulturgeschichte des 18ten Jahrhunderts*, Königsberg and Berlin, 1926, pp. 332–5; Schünemann, *Die Bevölkerungspolitik*, pp. 299–303; Bartlett, *Human Capital*, esp. pp. 63–4.

33. Quoted in *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 16.
34. Handbillet of the Empress Maria Theresa, 22 July 1766, quoted in *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 16.
35. *Politische Korrespondenz Friedrich's des Großen. Ergänzungsband: Die Politischen Testamente Friedrich's des Großen*, ed. G. Volz, Berlin, 1920, pp. 126–7.
36. Mining operations in the Banat were curtailed after the loss of the North Serbian provinces in 1739 left the area once again on the front line of Austrian–Turkish confrontation.
37. M. Raeff, 'The "Well-Regulated" Police State and the Problem of Modernisation in Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', *American Historical Review*, 80, 1975, pp. 1221–43; Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800*, New Haven, CT and London, 1983.
38. V. Riquetti, *Marquis de Mirabeau, L'Ami des Hommes, ou Traité de la Population*, new corrected edition, 5 vols, Avignon, 1757, III, p. 239.
39. See H. Storch, *Historisch-statistisches Gemählde des Russischen Reichs am Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 8 vols, Riga and Leipzig, 1797–1802, I, pp. 462ff.; M.M. Shpilevskii, 'Politika narodonaseleniia v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II', *Zapiski Imp. Novorosiiskogo Universiteta*, VI, Odessa, 1871, pp. 1–178.
40. D. Beales, *Joseph II: I: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa 1741–1780*, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 171 and *passim*.
41. Proclaimed in the constitution of 1791.
42. P.J. Hauben, 'The First Decade of an Agrarian Experiment in Bourbon Spain: The "New Towns" of Sierra Morena and Andalusia, 1766–75', *Agricultural History*, 39, 1965, pp. 34–40; R. Hayes, 'The German Colony in County Limerick', *North Munster Antiquarian Journal*, I, 1937, 2 (October), pp. 45–53; D. Häberle, *Auswanderungen und Koloniegründungen der Pfälzer im 18ten Jahrhundert*, Kaiserslautern, 1909, *passim*; G.G. Pisarevskii, *Iz istorii inostrannoi kolonizatsii v Rossii v XVIII v.*, Moscow, 1909 (hereafter *Iz istorii*), pp. 20–7. The Polish constitution of 1791, which guaranteed existing landowner rights and thereby perpetuated serfdom, nevertheless actively promised full freedom to all foreigners settling in the country, in the interest of increasing the population: see E. Donnert, *Kurland im Ideenbereich der Französischen Revolution: Politische Bewegungen und gesellschaftliche Erneuerungsversuche 1789–1795*, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pp. 150–51.

43. See also Andreas Brink, *Die deutsche Auswanderungswelle in die britischen Kolonien Nordamerikas um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Studien zur modernen Geschichte, 45, Stuttgart, 1993.
44. *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva*, 148 vols, St Petersburg 1867–1918, LI, p. 214.
45. Bartlett, *Human Capital*, p. 59.
46. The Württemberger Heinrich Groß, Russian Minister at The Hague in the 1760s, viewed French would-be colonists with particular distaste: see Pisarevskii, *Iz istorii*, p. 58.
47. See, for example, views cited in Bartlett, *Human Capital*, p. 34.
48. Laurian Şomeşan, *Die Theibebene: eine natürliche Grenze zwischen Rumänen und Magyaren. Geographische und geopolitische Studie*, Sibiu and Hermannstadt, 1939, p. 71; Ioan Haţegan, 'Nachwort' in Johann N. Preyer, *Monographie der königlichen Freistadt Temesvar*, Timişoara, 1995 (bi-lingual German–Romanian edition), p. 296.
49. See R. Bartlett, 'Colonists, *Gastarbeiter*, and the Problems of Agriculture in Post-Emancipation Russia', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 60, 1982, 3, pp. 547–71; D. Neutatz, *Die 'Deutsche Frage' im Schwarzmeergebiet und in Wolhynien [...] (1856–1914)*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europas, 37, Stuttgart, 1993; and J. Urry, *None but Saints: The Transformation of Mennonite Life in Russia 1789–1889*, Hyperion Press, s.l., 1989.
50. Beheim-Schwarzbach, *Hohenzollernsche Colonisationen*, p. 277. A widely current saying about colonists declared: 'Dem ersten der Tod; dem zweiten die Not; dem dritten das Brot' (The first finds death, the second, want, the third, bread).
51. For an excellent recent overview for the Habsburg lands in Fata, 'Die Ungarnwanderer und ihre Motive' in Schödl (ed.), *Land an der Donau, pp. 187–96*. See also Fata, 'Auswanderung aus Württemberg nach Südosteuropa zwischen dem 17. und 19. Jahrhundert' in *Materialien*, ed. Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde, Tübingen, I, 1993, pp. 24–40 (quoted in Schödl, *Land an der Donau*, p. 685), and 'Die Auswanderung aus Württemberg ins Banat im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert' in *Kulturraum mittlere und untere Donau: Traditionen und Perspektiven des Zusammenlebens*, ed. Museum für Geschichte des Kreises Karasch-Sewerin, Reschitza *et al.*, Reşiţa, 1995.
52. *Briefe über die Auswanderung der Unterthanen, besonders nach Rußland*, Gotha, 1770, p. 90.
53. Compare ibid., pp. 17–30; Brink, *Die deutsche Auswanderungswelle*, pp. 134–52 and further literature cited there.

54. Beheim-Schwarzbach, *Hohenzollern Kolonisationen*, p. 276; Pisarevskii, *Iz istorii*, p. 178.
55. See, for example, Schödl, 'Die Deutschen in Ungarn' in Bade (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland* (see note 13 above), p. 77; D. Brandes, 'Deutsche in Rußland und der Sowjetunion' in ibid., pp. 103–4.
56. Besides recent work already cited, see, for example, the writings on the Russian Empire of Andreas Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Verfall*, Munich, 1992, and his chapter in D. Dahlmann and R. Tuchtenhagen (eds), *Zwischen Reform und Revolution: Die Deutschen an der Wolga 1860–1917*, Essen, 1994.

6 Herder's Conception of Nationhood and its Influence in Eastern Europe

H. Barry Nisbet

Over the last two hundred years, the influence of German thinkers on Eastern Europe has been constant and profound. This is especially true in the political sphere, in which, since the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideas of Hegel and Marx in particular have had incalculable consequences. One German theorist whose impact on the political thought of Eastern Europe made itself felt from a much earlier date was Johann Gottfried Herder; and it may well be that, in the long run, his ideas will be seen to have had more far-reaching and longer-lasting consequences than those of the fathers of socialism. For Herder's reflections on nationhood have played, and continue to play, a fundamental part in modern nationalism and in the self-understanding of numerous national groups, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

The truth of this observation is not diminished by the fact that Herder is often no longer recognized as the originator of ideas concerning nationhood which we now regard as commonplace. This does mean, however, that in assessing his influence it is of little help simply to compile a list of the many writers, theorists and politicians who have explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to him: such a catalogue would convey only a fragmentary and indeed arbitrary impression of his impact and reception. This chapter will attempt instead to identify primarily those aspects of Herder's thinking which his Eastern European readers, and those whom they in turn influenced, found most significant. Once this intellectual context has been established, the final section will describe the main routes by which the ideas

in question were disseminated, citing representative examples from several of the countries most receptive to them.

The nation, for Herder, was the fundamental unit in world history. Nations in his view are analogous to natural organisms; in this they closely resemble the family.[1] The healthy nation is a 'natural system' (*SW*, XIV, p. 226), and its culture and institutions are all of a piece, informed by a distinctive spirit or ethos which is that nation's inherent principle of growth and development.[2] As such, the national community is prior to, and independent of, the state (cf. *SW*, XIII, p. 382), and the state — except in its earliest, patriarchal form — is accordingly an artificial construction. The terms which Herder applies to the national community are *Nation* (with its organic, biological associations) and *Volk*. The latter term, which in Herder's day was associated more with the common people than with the educated, is the wider of the two, and Herder uses it increasingly often in his mature and later works; indeed, it was he, more than anyone else, who freed this term from its formerly lowly status, enabling it to acquire an almost sacral aura in the heyday of German nationalism.[3] The inclusion of the common people in Herder's definition of the nation is of the greatest importance, for the national spirit, in his view, pervades — or ought to pervade — every section of the organic community, and not just its political and cultural leadership.[4] It was precisely because, in the Germany of Herder's day, courtly and aristocratic society had become largely subservient to a foreign culture, namely that of France, that the young Herder believed it essential for the nation's health that German cultural traditions should be revitalized and cherished by all sections of the population.

The national spirit informs the totality of national life, or what Herder describes as 'the whole living tableau of its way of life, customs, needs, and the peculiarities of the country and region' which gives each nation its distinct character (*SW*, V, p. 502). This cannot be apprehended by purely intellectual or rational means, but only by an act of imaginative understanding or empathy (*Einfühlung*) of an essentially aesthetic nature.[5] The most characteristic embodiment of the national spirit is the national language, in which the consciousness of the nation becomes articulate.[6] For this reason, the preservation and cultivation of the German language is one of the central themes

of Herder's work.[7] But it is in its poetry that a nation's character is most fully and adequately expressed. As Herder puts it:

> Just as entire nations are distinguished by a single language, so also do they have certain favourite directions of the imagination, certain movements and objects of thought — in short, a *genius* which, despite all individual differences, finds expression in the most popular works of their heart and spirit. (*SW*, XVIII, p. 58)

The national character will, of course, be evident in all forms of literature which employ the national language. But its most authentic expression is in the lyric or song, for according to Herder — like his early mentor Hamann — the song is the original form of literature, and the earliest phases of all languages have a pronouncedly lyrical quality, in which the most fundamental characteristics of the nation receive simple and immediate expression. The songs of early or unsophisticated nations, in particular, reflect all aspects of these nations' culture (see *SW*, V, p. 164); or in Herder's words:

> Their songs are the archive of the people, the treasury of their knowledge, religion and theogony, and the cosmogonies of their fathers' deeds and of events in their history, an expression of their heart and an image of their domestic life in joy and sorrow, in the marriage-bed and in the grave. (*SW*, IX, p. 532; cf. XXV, pp. 82, 88)

Thus the collecting of folk-songs, for Herder, has more than just an aesthetic significance. Such songs are anthropological and historical documents in which the nation records, as it were, its own natural history (*SW*, IX, p. 533). When a nation's identity or cultural integrity is threatened, it is therefore vitally important that its folk-songs and oldest literary traditions should be recorded and its cultural heritage preserved.

One might expect that, since Herder regards the healthy nation as an organic whole analogous to the family, he would look on ethnic or racial homogeneity as a desirable or even necessary property of the authentic national community. He is, of course, aware that certain nations have a high degree of ethnic unity — for example, the ancient Hebrew nation, which he describes as 'a genetic individual' (*SW*, XVII, p. 285) and which, especially in his earlier years, he sees as a model of the truly organic community[8] — and he is consistent enough to admit that, by his

own criteria, the most natural (that is, family-like) state is the nation-state whose citizens are all genetically related (*SW*, XIII, p. 384). Nevertheless, he is equally aware that most nations of Europe contain complex racial mixtures. He does not, however, believe that this detracts from their national coherence and identity: on the contrary, he considers that the influx of an external group — as in the Norman conquest of England — can have an invigorating and beneficial effect (*SW*, XIV, pp. 380f.). Thus Herder defines nationality primarily in cultural rather than in racial or ethnic terms.

All nations and national cultures, for Herder, are in principle equal, and have an equal right to develop and express their own traditions. In the same way, he maintains that all racial groups are equally worthy of respect (*SW*, XVIII, p. 248). It follows from this that there are no absolute standards by which the culture and values of any particular nation can be assessed. As he says himself:

> No human being, country, nation or national history, no state is identical with any other, so that truth, beauty, and goodness are not identical among them either. If this is ignored and another nation is blindly taken as a model, all is confounded. (*SW*, IV, p. 472)

Each nation must therefore be judged primarily on its own terms, according to its own character and potential; in Herder's words, 'the genius of man's natural history lives in and with each nation as if each were the only one on earth'.[9]

These, then, are the basic principles underlying Herder's so-called 'cultural relativism',[10] his belief in the individuality and uniqueness of every nation. Something must now be said about his views on the relations between individual nations, and on the place of the individual nation in world history.

In the first of his two works on the philosophy of history, *Another Philosophy of History* (1774), Herder is concerned, on the one hand, with individual nations and cultures, and in particular with defending their unique contribution to history. On the other hand, while he rejects the fashionable theory of history as constant progress, he is also concerned to detect some kind of development or continuity throughout the historical process, and to define the relationship between successive national cultures. To complicate matters further, his own cultural

relativism is by no means value-free, for it is based on the premise that each nation should strive to develop its cultural potential independently of other national cultures. It follows from this that the more successful a given nation is in this endeavour, the more original its culture will be, and the more highly Herder will value it; conversely, the more imitative or derivative a culture is, the less he respects it. Consequently, his portrayal in *Another Philosophy of History* of the earliest cultures, in particular of ancient Israel, Phoenicia and Greece, is almost entirely favourable, because he considers that they developed in relative independence of one another. The culture of medieval Europe, as the product of new and developing nations, again receives high praise — not least, of course, because the optimists of progress, against whom *Another Philosophy of History* is chiefly directed, liked to dismiss the Middle Ages as backward and unenlightened. For similar reasons, Herder's comments on the post-medieval centuries are increasingly negative and sarcastic, because he wishes to refute such writers as Voltaire and Hume, for whom the emergence of modern civilization from barbarism begins essentially with the Renaissance (see, for example, *SW*, V, p. 524 and 530). The middle section of this work similarly culminates in an extended denunciation of contemporary culture (*SW*, V, pp. 534–54), with frequent gibes at the French (*SW*, V, pp. 541, 546, 552–3 and *passim*). As in many of Herder's early writings,[11] then, his historical impartiality is qualified, in this case, by his polemical attempts to liberate the culture of his own country from French domination; and much of what he says about cultural history is unduly influenced by his negative assessment of supposedly imitative as distinct from original cultures. The latter distinction leads almost inevitably — as it tends to do in the later sections of *Another Philosophy of History* — to a picture of history as a process of cultural decline. But Herder's reflections on world history are more complex than this. Much of his dissatisfaction with the optimists of progress arises not because he cannot himself detect any progress in history, but because existing theories of progress are crude and simplistic. To overcome this deficiency, he resorts to a whole series of mutually reinforcing metaphors in order to convey the complexity and incommensurability of history, with its many unknowns and variables, more adequately than would be possible if he were to

employ a logically coherent theory based on a limited number of rational concepts.[12]

Since nations, for Herder, are analogous to organisms, he readily applies to them the familiar metaphor of the growth cycle, declaring that each has its period of growth, efflorescence and decline.[13] But in *Another Philosophy of History*, when he discusses the continuity between successive national cultures, he also applies the metaphor of the growth cycle to world history as a whole, tracing the development of ancient culture from its infancy in Biblical Judaea to its so-called manhood in Rome, followed by its decline in the later Roman Empire (*SW*, V, pp. 483, 487, 494, 499). After the fall of Rome, a new cycle begins in Europe with the rise of the Germanic nations (*SW*, V, p. 515). But Herder does not pursue the image of the growth cycle any further.

When he abandons this metaphor in *Another Philosophy of History*, he replaces it with another metaphor which is better able to convey the increasing complexity of European culture in the modern (that is, post-Renaissance) era, namely the metaphor of history as a tree.[14] More than the metaphor of the growth cycle, that of the tree has the advantage of suggesting development towards greater complexity and refinement, but without committing Herder to the doctrine of progress in the simplistic form which he rejects; for the higher branches and twigs become ever more brittle, remote from their roots, and liable to wither under stress (*SW*, V, p. 575). Thus, he is able to sustain this metaphor into the polemical sections of *Another Philosophy of History*, exploiting the associations of weakness, dependence, and fragility which the youngest and uppermost portions of the tree possess.

Other metaphors which he uses in his two historical works to denote cultural development throughout history have similar in-built qualifications intended to dissociate them from the theory of history as continuous progress. The advance of human culture is like an erratic or winding path, a meandering river (*SW*, XIV, p. 234), or a twisting chain (*SW*, V, p. 586; XIV, p. 229; XXX, p. 398). Herder is particularly fond of the chain metaphor, because the individual links, each complete in itself, aptly represent the individual nations in history. All such metaphors suggest a forward movement with interruptions or lateral deviations: the latter enable Herder to distance himself from the theory of linear

progress, while the forward movement dissociates him from historical scepticism. In the earlier of his two philosophies of history, Herder himself is more interested in national particularity than in any doctrine of progress.[15] But in his second major work on history, *Ideas on the Philosophy of History* (1784–91), he inclines in the opposite direction: while he remains as interested as ever in the unique contribution to history of each national culture (his famous chapter on the Slavs is only one of numerous similar instances), he is now more interested than before in the progressive aspects of international cultural development such as the growth of scientific knowledge.[16] But beyond that, he now begins to echo, with fewer qualifications than in his earlier works, the Enlightenment's belief that some kind of ethical progress can be detected in history. The supposed 'laws' of history which he now propounds, by analogy with the laws of mechanics, admittedly incorporate that same lateral movement or deviation (in the form of oscillations between extremes when the equilibrium of a given national or international order is disturbed) which characterized the earlier metaphors for cultural development already mentioned. But Herder now proclaims that, in the course of history, such disturbances and oscillations will gradually become less violent, and that the equilibrium of human societies will become ever more firmly established (*SW*, XIV, pp. 233–7). This is simply the Enlightenment's doctrine of progress in a new guise, namely that of metaphorical 'laws' whose quasi-scientific form is designed to create the impression that human progress is a natural necessity. The goal to which this progress supposedly leads — what Herder calls a universal condition of 'humanity' (*Humanität*) — is not, however, obviously compatible with that cultural pluralism or relativism which he continues to defend, and it is interesting that in his later years he speaks more favourably of inter-cultural borrowing than he had tended to do in the 1770s (see, for example, *SW*, XVII, p. 212).

These views carried with them important political implications. It follows from Herder's belief in the equal rights of all nations that European culture has no claim to universal validity. He therefore regularly condemns colonialism, with its destruction of indigenous cultures (see, for example, *SW*, V, p. 550 and XVIII, pp. 221–4). He is likewise strongly opposed to the slave trade (*SW*, XIII, p. 233), and his so-called 'Negro Idylls' are an eloquent plea for the emancipation of African slaves (*SW*, XVIII,

pp. 224–34). It is also in keeping with his cultural pluralism that he disapproves of the activities of Christian missionaries, despite his own position as a senior minister of the Lutheran Church (*SW*, IV, p. 472). What troubles him most about all forms of imperialism, of course, is their harmful effects on distinctive cultures, which may then be prevented from realizing their full potential or destroyed altogether: cultural variety, for Herder, is an end in itself.

Herder's views on the principles of international politics are thus perfectly clear: they follow naturally from his belief in cultural autonomy. His views on internal politics and government are more elusive, however, both because nowhere does he expound them systematically and because he hesitated to express them freely, given that he was an employee of minor German autocrats for most of his adult life. But his political theories need not be discussed in detail here, for they have been thoroughly analysed by others;[17] only their relationship to Herder's theory of nationhood and of the organic community calls for further examination in the present context.

Since, in his view, most forms of state — including hereditary monarchy — are not in any sense natural or organic (*SW*, XIII, pp. 377–8), Herder tends to regard the modern state as such with distrust, to minimize its role (*SW*, XIII, p. 383), and to say very little about what precise constitutional arrangements he favours. But it is plain enough that he regards Greek democracy as a natural form of government and as the source of a flourishing culture which went into decline as soon as it fell victim to Macedonian and Roman despotism (*SW*, V, pp. 619–23 and IX, pp. 324–8). And free and peaceful competition between states — as among the ancient Greek republics and in Renaissance Italy — is the best way to ensure that each develops its cultural potential to the full.[18] In short, Herder's democratic and republican principles flow directly from his belief in national individuality and cultural self-determination.

In political contexts, organic metaphors of the kind Herder employs can be confusing, because they can be interpreted in contradictory ways. On the one hand, an organic process can be described as natural as distinct from voluntary or deliberate, which implies that it is causally determined rather than the result of free human choice. Yet, on the other hand, it can also be described as natural as distinct from artificial, which implies that

it is self-determining and free from external constraint.[19] Herder's organic metaphors are nearly always of the latter kind: their sense is libertarian rather than deterministic, and the supposedly natural processes to which they refer are regularly contrasted with artificial or (as Herder usually puts it) 'mechanical' processes (see, for example, *SW*, V, pp. 620–1). The modern state — he has absolutist states such as Prussia in mind — is like a machine, in that it is controlled centrally by a single person (*SW*, V, p. 534); and the ways of thinking which it encourages are so imbued with abstractions and generalizations that individual and local needs are overlooked and cultural differences are obliterated (*SW*, V, pp. 536–9). The modern state, in other words, is no longer generated by, or even in touch with, the national culture in the way that ancient states usually were. For the same reason, Herder applies mechanical metaphors to multinational states in general: the multinational state, he declares, is 'a fragile machine [...] without inner life or mutual sympathy between its parts' (*SW*, XIII, p. 385). In other words, only the single-nation state can be truly organic; and since size is plainly a factor here, it is difficult to imagine how any modern states, other than the smallest of these, could ever be entirely healthy, in Herder's estimation.

If it is difficult, not to say impossible, for the larger modern states to be fully organic embodiments of the nation, it is equally difficult to imagine how international relations in the modern world could ever be anything other than 'mechanical' in Herder's sense. He does not attempt, as Kant did, to overcome this difficulty by drawing up plans for an international organization to eliminate conflict.[20] Indeed, the mechanical metaphors of equilibrium, centres of gravity, relaxation oscillations, and so on, used in the so-called 'laws' of historical progress set out in his *Ideas on the Philosophy of History*, suggest that he was resigned to the prospect that inter-state relations must always incorporate a mechanical, adversarial element, as his remarks in that same work on the 'necessary antagonism' in world history confirm (*SW*, XIV, p. 234). This constant tension between the primacy of the individual nation and the need to promote a workable international order is fundamental to his reflections, in his later years, on what he calls *Humanität*.

The concept of *Humanität*, a term which covers both the universal potential of all human beings and the particular forms in which this is partially realized,[21] was a central but also ambiguous part of Herder's legacy to the nineteenth century. In the *Ideas*, Herder resolves the tension between particular and universal human aspirations, between national allegiance and international brotherhood, by describing both as expressions of *Humanität*. But obvious difficulties arise when the same term is used to denote both the empirical manifestations of human nature in the various national cultures of past and present and an ideal potential or teleological goal to be realized ever more completely with the passage of time. For the latter, normative, sense of the term implicitly devalues its former, empirical, significance as merely local, partial and relative; and besides, it implies that those cultures which realize the ideal more completely are superior to those which do so less completely, and that later societies — or at least future societies — are likely to be ethically superior to earlier ones. In other words, Herder's use of the term *Humanität* masks an underlying conflict between his cultural pluralism and those universalistic principles which he shares with most thinkers of the Enlightenment. But when one asks what those future, more humane societies which the older Herder envisages will look like, the vision he offers is hardly an inspiring one. Already in 1774 he predicts 'a less sensuous, more uniform human race' in the future, but he at once proceeds to lament the loss of individual vitality and identity which this greater uniformity already seems to entail (*SW*, V, pp. 575–80); and in the *Ideas* he notes a similar development, declaring that 'everything in Europe is tending towards a gradual extinction of national character' (*SW*, XIV, p. 288): a prospect which does not fill him with the kind of cosmopolitan enthusiasm which one encounters in some of his contemporaries, such as Lessing and Kant.[22] This evident sense of loss makes the optimism with which he insists that mankind is drawing ever closer to the ideal of *Humanität* seem less convincing — especially since he defines this ideal in terms of such colourless abstractions as 'human dignity' (*SW*, XIV, p. 213) or 'reason and equity in all classes and activities of human beings' (*SW*, XIV, p. 230). The moral fervour which inspires such passages may be no less intense than the aesthetic fervour which animates his portraits of the different nations and cultures of the past. But it is the latter, not the former,

which carry more conviction today and which also appealed more to his nineteenth-century readers. This poses the question of Herder's legacy to modern nationalism, and the extent to which he can himself be described as a nationalist.

Herder's liberal individualism and habitual distrust of the state mean that only a wilful misreading can interpret his works as those of a chauvinist, let alone of a forerunner of Nazism.[23] And if he is in any sense a nationalist, he is also an internationalist, for he repeatedly defends the equal rights of all nations and — especially in his later works — emphasizes the cultural enrichment which they derive from one another.[24]

In past discussions of his relationship to nationalism, the distinction has often been made between 'cultural' and 'political' nationalism.[25] Herder himself has usually been classed as a cultural nationalist, inasmuch as his interest in nationhood was primarily cultural, being counterbalanced by what one writer describes as 'political apathy'.[26] If the main aim of cultural nationalism is to regenerate the national community, especially by fostering its cultural traditions,[27] it is certainly legitimate to describe Herder as a cultural nationalist, so long as it is remembered that such nationalism can at any time become a potent political force. As John Hutchinson says, 'Cultural nationalism is a political movement'; and cultural nationalism and political nationalism may well alternate and give rise to each other within a given community.[28]

Another distinction which is often made in this context is that between 'territorial' and 'ethnic' nations or nationalisms, the former being associated chiefly with Western Europe, the latter with Eastern Europe and with various parts of Asia.[29] If either of them can claim Herder as patron, it is surely rather the ethnic variety of nationalism than nationalism focused on a particular territory and an existing or future national state. In his earlier years, in particular, Herder's sympathies lay very much with those communities in which nation and state did not coincide: Germany as he knew it was a community of this kind, and one of the main aims of his first major work, the *Fragments on Recent German Literature*, was to liberate it from the dominance of foreign (especially French) cultural influences.

Herder's thoughts on nationhood, then, were focused mainly on those national cultures and ethnic communities which did not possess an autonomous state, or whose cultural or political

autonomy was threatened from outside.[30] He did not regard himself primarily as a political theorist, let alone as a political activist. He saw himself rather as a cultural educator, who sought to persuade his own nation, as well as other nations, to foster and develop its cultural traditions before these were abolished or forgotten. He also appealed to other countries to conserve and chronicle their cultural heritage as a contribution to what he describes as the 'natural history' of the world's nations, or what might now be called their cultural anthropology. The preface to Part II of the collection of folk-songs which he compiled in 1774 contains an appeal of this kind, addressed specifically to the Baltic peoples (*SW*, XXV, p. 83).

His influence on East European nations, especially those without a national state of their own, was certainly considerable. The most familiar example of this influence is his chapter on the Slavs in the fourth volume of the *Ideas*, of which more will be said shortly. Although he was chiefly concerned with cultural matters, his ideas had considerable political potential as a stimulus to national consciousness, and his belief in the organic nation-state as the most 'natural' political unit may well have encouraged those who actively sought political autonomy for their peoples.

Herder's interest in Eastern Europe, and the Slav countries in particular, first arose between 1764 and 1769, during his stay in Riga. In those years, he became interested in folk poetry, including that of Latvia and East Prussia, and developed an admiration for Russia, encouraged by Catherine the Great's reforming plans and apparent sympathy with the progressive ideals of the Enlightenment. Riga, in Russian hands since the early eighteenth century, enjoyed considerable freedom under its Russian governor, and the interests of its large German-speaking community were generally respected. Herder intended, when he left Riga for France, in 1769, to return there eventually, and perhaps to become involved in Catherine's programme of reforms in Russia.[31]

Once he had settled in Germany, he continued to interest himself in Slavonic and East European culture. There are folk-songs from Eastern Europe — especially Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — in the collections he published in 1778–9 (*SW*, XXV, pp. 143–6, 183–4, 196–200, 399–403, 409–12 and *passim*); and in his *Ideas on the Philosophy of History*, he includes

observations on most of the ethnic and cultural groups of Eastern Europe, with reflections on their place in world history (see, especially, *SW*, XIV, pp. 267–89). Much of his own influence in Eastern Europe derives from these two preoccupations — his work on folk-songs and his ethnological comments (especially on the Slavs) in the *Ideas*.

Herder's influence in Eastern Europe reached its height in the first half of the nineteenth century. But its beginnings are to be found even earlier, during his own lifetime (he died in 1803). Already in the last decades of the eighteenth century the leading German universities, including Jena (the local university of the Duchy of Weimar, where Herder resided), had attained an international reputation, and growing numbers of students from Eastern Europe, especially Bohemia and Russia (the latter connected by dynastic links with Weimar), studied at them. Some of the Slovakian students at Jena in the 1790s came to hear Herder preach (he was the senior Lutheran clergyman in Weimar), and Nikolai Karamzin, in his *Letters of a Russian Traveller*, records a meeting with him in 1789.[32] Through such encounters, and through lectures on history and literature at Jena and other universities, Herder's ideas became known to educated Slavs long before his published writings were translated into the Slavonic languages, and the original German versions were widely read in such circles.

Given the fact that Herder's own ethnic and cultural nationalism had arisen from his desire to defend the German cultural legacy against the dominance of French culture in eighteenth-century Germany, it is understandable that its subsequent appeal outside Germany was chiefly to those countries and communities whose national and cultural identity was felt to be threatened by foreign domination. Consequently, although his ideas aroused considerable interest in Russia from a relatively early date, the main object of this interest was not so much his cultural nationalism as his liberal views on politics (as in the case of Alexander Radishchev)[33] or his philosophical pantheism (as in that of Gavriil Derzhavin).[34] It is in countries less powerful and less independent than Russia that his main cultural impact is to be found, especially in Poland, Bohemia and Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, among the Sorbs of Lusatia, and in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. In all of these communities or countries, the pattern of his reception is remarkably uniform, and

to enumerate the many parallel instances which research has uncovered would be tedious.[35] It will be more profitable to attempt a general outline of the manner in which Herder's influence took effect in the many individual cases.

Again and again in the early nineteenth century, in different countries, Herder's ideas are to be discerned informing the efforts of scholars, journalists, and artists to stimulate interest in the literatures and languages of their various national communities. This applies, for example, to Kasimierz Brodżinski's appeal in 1819 for a Polish literary revival and a collection of Polish folk-songs.[36] The same influence can be detected in the revival of Czech and Slovak literary culture during this period: the work on Slavonic philology and literature by Juraj Palkovic and Jan Kollár, both of whom had studied at Jena and themselves wrote in German, is plainly indebted to Herder, as are the writings of Pavel Josef Safárik and Josef Dobrovský on related topics.[37] Similar developments took place in Slovenia in the first decades of the century, as in Jernej Kopitar's Slovenian grammar of 1808 and Vuk Karadžić's collection of Serbian folk-songs and Serbian dictionary of 1818.[38] In Croatia, Herder's ideas were assimilated somewhat later (mainly in the 1830s and 1840s, via Czech writers such as Kollár) and contributed to the Illyrian cultural revival of those years; the time-lag is largely due to the Austrian censorship which, in those parts of the Habsburg Empire which had little direct contact with Germany, was able to obstruct the reception of subversive ideas from the Protestant north.[39]

Finally, among the non-Slavonic countries, Hungary proved particularly receptive to Herder's teachings. For in his later works, he had explicitly criticized Joseph II's policy of Germanization as a threat to the non-German cultures of the Austrian Empire (*SW*, XVII, pp. 58–61), and already in the *Ideas*, he had warned that, if present trends continued, the Hungarian language might become extinct within a few centuries (*SW*, XIV, p. 269). This warning was often quoted in Hungary, and Herder's works were studied and translated by such founders of modern Hungarian literature as Ferenc Kazinczy and János Erdélyi, the latter of whom published a three-volume collection of Hungarian folk-songs and legends in 1846–8.[40] In Romania, Herder's thought was again discovered relatively late, and its strongest effects were experienced by the generation of 1848 and

their immediate successors such as V. Alecsandri, who published his collection of Romanian folk-songs in 1852.[41]

During the Romantic era there was, of course, a widespread interest in historical philology, folk poetry, and national literature throughout Europe, and it is not justifiable to conclude that Herder's influence is at work wherever such interests, or related symptoms of cultural nationalism, can be detected. Indeed, many of the writers named here — and the list could be greatly extended — were equally familiar with the work of other German scholars such as the Schlegel brothers, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Jakob Grimm, all of whom encouraged the study of European vernaculars and literatures. The fact remains, however, that those East European writers mentioned invoke Herder's name regularly, and translate or quote from his works.

Why, one may ask, did Herder in particular attract so much attention? One of the main reasons for this interest is to be found in that passage from his works which is most frequently quoted, and which was translated at a relatively early date into nearly all of the languages referred to, namely the famous chapter on the Slavs in the final volume of the *Ideas*, which appeared in 1791 (*SW*, XIV, pp. 277–80). In this remarkable chapter — which is only three pages long — Herder gives a highly sympathetic account of the Slavs and their contribution to European history. He depicts them as a hard-working, peace-loving people composed of agriculturalists and artisans who settled over a vast area of Europe, not through military conquest but by moving into lands vacated by others. Their lot has generally been an unhappy one, he says, as the victims of oppression and exploitation by other more warlike peoples, especially the Germanic nations. He proceeds (no doubt with his early hopes for Russia still in mind) to foretell a great future for the Slavs and their culture, and concludes by calling for 'a history of this nation as a whole'.

It is not difficult to understand why this document had such a wide appeal to the Slavonic peoples. The kind of sentimental primitivism in the tradition of Rousseau which informs Herder's portrait of the Slavs still had a wide appeal in the Romantic era — especially among the Slavs themselves, whom he contrasts favourably with their oppressors, the 'bellicose hereditary princes' of Germany (*SW*, XIV, p. 279). The fact that this contrast was drawn by a leading German thinker gave it added

credibility; and, equally important, it could be cited with greater authority, and less risk of censorship, than if it had been voiced by Slav liberationists themselves. The fact that Herder presented the Slavs as a single nation of great antiquity also appealed to pan-Slavist sentiments, especially among the smaller, more vulnerable groups within the Habsburg Empire. The latent political appeal of this chapter was consequently varied and considerable. In particular, Herder's prediction of a great Slav resurgence was calculated to reinforce those chiliastic hopes and expectations which readily take root in oppressed nations, especially when expressed in the ringing rhetorical tones which Herder employed:

> ye deeply bowed, once so industrious and happy peoples, you will at last awake refreshed from your long indolent sleep, freed from your chains of slavery, and will use your fair lands from the Adriatic to the Carpathian Mountains, from the Don to the Moldau, as your own property, and celebrate on them your ancient festivals of peaceful industry and commerce. (*SW*, XIV, p. 280)

This chapter was the first piece of Herder's work which many people encountered in Eastern Europe, for it was regularly translated and often published as a separate item in journalistic contexts.[42] It naturally encouraged many to explore other of his works, such as his essay of 1773 on Ossian and European folk-songs, with its praise of ancient poetry and the language of the common people. (Ossian, of course, was popular from the start in Eastern Europe, since Macpherson's supposed ancient epic deals with a Celtic nation whose identity is portrayed as threatened, and which is celebrated in an elegiac mode.)[43] Herder himself coined the word *Volkslied*, on which the English word 'folk-song' is modelled,[44] and did more than anyone — as noted earlier — to raise the German word *Volk* from its previous lowly status. His glorification of the *Volk* carried populist and libertarian overtones which were bound to find positive echoes among opponents of monarchic and aristocratic rule throughout Eastern Europe.

Much work remains to be done on this whole subject. For one thing, we need to know more about the sources on which Herder drew in his assessment of the Slavs: his library contained many works on this topic, and he names no fewer than sixteen authori-

ties in his famous chapter in the *Ideas*.[45] No comprehensive study exists of his reception in Eastern Europe — partly because few, if any, people are able to read all the many languages in which the primary evidence for this reception is to be found. Nevertheless, the main lines of his influence are clear enough to show that it was indeed far-reaching, and that even those who may have arrived independently at conclusions similar to his own concerning nationhood and national culture often found it expedient, for political reasons, to cite him as their champion and authority.

NOTES

1. See, for example, *Herders Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols, Berlin, 1877–1913 (hereafter *SW*; most subsequent references to this edition are given in brackets within the text), XIII, p. 384; also Robert Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, New York, 1935, p. 95.
2. See F.M. Barnard, *Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy. Rousseau and Herder*, Oxford, 1988, pp. 162–9; also H.B. Nisbet, 'Goethes und Herders Geschichtsdenken', *Goethe-Jahrbuch*, 110, 1993, pp. 98–9.
3. See Reinhart Koselleck, 'Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse' in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 7 vols, Stuttgart, 1972–92, VII, p. 316.
4. On the various terms which Herder employs to denote this national spirit see Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, p. 85.
5. See, for example, *SW*, V, pp. 502–3 and Hans Dietrich Irmscher, 'Grundzüge der Hermeneutik Herders' in J. G. Maltusch (ed.), *Bückeburger Gespräche über J. G. Herder 1971*, Bückeburg, 1973, pp. 17–57.
6. On the significance of national languages see, for example, *SW*, I, pp. 1–7 and 400–6 and ibid., II, p. 18. Some commentators, such as Holm Sundhaußen, *Der Einfluß der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie*, Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, 27, Munich, 1973, pp. 27ff., tend to overstress the (albeit vitally

important) role of language to the exclusion of other factors in Herder's theory of the nation, virtually identifying nationality with language. This error is corrected by Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge, 1981, p. 45; see also John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, London, 1978, p. 21.

7. For his early works, see the references in note 6 above; for later examples, see *SW*, XVI, pp. 604–8 and ibid., XVII, pp. 58–9, 286–9, 309–10 and *passim*.
8. See Barnard, *Self-Direction*, p. 259.
9. *SW*, XVIII, p. 249; compare ibid., XIV, p. 227. See also Eugen Lemberg, *Nationalismus*, 2 vols, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964, I, p. 172, and Otto Dann, 'Herder und die Deutsche Bewegung' in Gerhard Sauder (ed.), *Johann Gottfried Herder 1744-1803*, Studien zum achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 9, Hamburg, 1987, pp. 308–40 (esp. pp. 322–3).
10. See Barnard, *Self-Direction*, p. 229.
11. See, for example, his essay of 1773 on Shakespeare (*SW*, V, pp. 213–15) and the prefaces to his collections of folk-songs (for example, *SW*, XXV, pp. 9–10).
12. The creative role of metaphors in historical scholarship has been increasingly recognized in recent years. On Herder, see especially Heinz Meyer's excellent article (which deals mainly with *Another Philosophy of History*), 'Überlegungen zu Herders Metaphern für die Geschichte' (hereafter 'Überlegungen'), *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 25, 1982, pp. 88–114, and Walter Moser, 'Herders System of Metaphors in the *Ideas*' in Wulf Köpke and Samson B. Knoll (eds), *Johann Gottfried Herder: Innovator through the Ages*, Bonn, 1982, pp. 102–24.
13. See, for example, *SW*, V, pp. 504, 588; IX, p. 375; XXX, p. 398. On Herder's use of cyclic models, see H.B. Nisbet, *Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 69–71. On the use of cyclic models in general and their application to world history since antiquity, see Jochen Schlobach, *Zyklentheorie und Epochenmetaphorik: Studien zur bildlichen Sprache der Geschichtsreflexion in Frankreich von der Renaissance bis zur Frühaufklärung*, Humanistische Bibliothek, Series I: Abhandlungen, 7, Munich, 1980, esp. pp. 341–3.
14. Herder plainly regarded the tree metaphor as fundamental to *Another Philosophy of History*, for it occurs at the very beginning of his earliest known sketch of the work: see Hans Dietrich Irmscher, 'Johann Gottfried Herder: "Entwurf zur Philosophie der Geschichte"' in Heimo Reinitzer (ed.), *Textkritik und Interpretation. Festschrift*

für Karl Konrad Polheim zum 60. Geburtstag, Berne and Frankfurt am Main, 1987, p. 339.

15. See Meyer, 'Überlegungen', pp. 106–11.
16. See, for example, *SW*, XIII, pp. 367–74, and, especially, ibid., XIV, pp. 204–52. This interest is, however, to some extent foreshadowed in earlier years: compare *SW*, IV, p. 478 and ibid., IX, pp. 311–77; also H.B. Nisbet, 'Herder und die Geschichte der Wissenschaften' in Martin Bollacher (ed.), *Johann Gottfried Herder: Geschichte und Kultur*, Würzburg, 1994, pp. 97–115.
17. See especially Barnard, *Self-Direction*, and id., *Herder's Social and Political Thought. From Enlightenment to Nationalism*, Oxford, 1965; also Horst Dreitzel, 'Herders politische Konzepte' in Sauder (ed.), *Johann Gottfried Herder 1744-1803* (see note 9 above), pp. 267–98.
18. *SW*, IX, pp. 327, 348, 354; see also ibid., XIV, p. 492 and Dreitzel, 'Herders politische Konzepte', p. 294.
19. On the ambiguity of organic metaphors in political contexts see Barnard, *Self-Direction*, pp. 162–9.
20. See Kant's essay 'Perpetual Peace' (*Zum ewigen Frieden*) in Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 20 vols, 1900–, VIII, pp. 341–86.
21. On the various senses of *Humanität*, see *SW*, XIII, pp. 154–5 and ibid., XVII, p. 138 (as universal human potential); ibid., XIII, p 350 (as the present condition of human beings in specific historical contexts); ibid., XIII, p. 161 and ibid., XIV, pp. 210–17, 230 (as an imperfectly realized ethical ideal). See also Hans Erich Bödeker, 'Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus', *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, III, pp. 1091–2, and Hans Dietrich Irmscher's editorial comments on Herder's *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität* in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Werke*, ed. Martin Bollacher *et al.*, Frankfurt am Main, 1985–, VII, pp. 817–37.
22. See, for example, the dialogues *Ernst und Falk* in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Werke*, ed. Herbert G. Göpfert, 8 vols, Munich, 1970–9, VIII, pp. 451–88, and Kant's remarks on national and cosmopolitan values in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, XV, pp. 590–1.
23. Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, p. 263, already makes this point; on Herder as an alleged precursor of Nazism see Bernhard Becker, *Herder-Rezeption in Deutschland: Eine ideologiekritische Untersuchung*, Saarbrücker Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft, 14, St Ingbert, 1987, pp. 133–8.
24. See, for example, *SW*, XIV, pp. 289, 381, 559; ibid., XVII, pp. 212 and *passim*; see also Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought*, pp. 86–7.

25. See, for example, Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, p. 239; Hans Kohn, *Nationalism. Its Meaning and History*, revised edition, Princeton, NJ, 1965, p. 31; Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 12–13; Dann, 'Herder und die Deutsche Bewegung', p. 308.
26. See Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism*, p. 240.
27. See Hutchinson, *the Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, p. 9.
28. Ibid., pp. 35 and 42.
29. See, for example, Lemberg, *Nationalismus*, I, p. 174; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 138, 140.
30. See Lemberg, *Nationalismus*, I, p. 174.
31. See his letters of late October 1769 to Johann Friedrich Hartknoch and of 4 November 1769 to the customs officer Begrow in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Briefe: Gesamtausgabe 1763–1803*, ed. Karl-Heinz Hahn, Wilhelm Dobbek and Günter Arnold, 9 vols, Weimar, 1977–88, I, pp. 167–8, 172–3.
32. G. Ziegengeist, H. Graßhoff and Ulf Lehmann (eds), *J.G. Herder: Zur Rezeption in Ost- und Südosteuropa*, Berlin, 1978, pp. 93, 109.
33. Erhard Hexelschneider, 'Volk und Volkslied bei Herder und Radischtchew' in W. Dietze *et al.* (eds), *Herder-Kolloquium 1978*, Weimar, 1980, pp. 339–44.
34. Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, pp. 108, 111–12.
35. Only a selection of the secondary literature on this influence can be cited here. The most useful general work is Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, which contains chapters on most Eastern European countries; see also Sundhaußen, *Der Einfluß*; Konrad Bittner, *Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und die Slawen*, Reichenberg, 1929; Peter Drews (ed.), *Herder und die Slawen: Materialien bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Slavistische Beiträge, 267, Munich, 1990; Erhard Hexelschneider, 'Volk und Volkslied'; K.A. Howells, 'Herder, Karadzič, and Cultural Nationalism', *Trivium*, 15, 1980, pp. 55–62; János Rathmann, 'Herder and the Hungarian Enlightenment', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 263, 1989, pp. 497–500; and Dieter Schullerus, 'Die Herder-Rezeption in Rumänien' in W. Dietze *et al.* (eds), *Herder-Kolloquium 1978*, pp. 327–33. Comprehensive references can be found in Gottfried Günther *et al.* (eds), *Herder-Bibliographie*, Berlin and Weimar, 1978, pp. 567–8 and 572–8, and Doris Kuhles (ed.), *Herder-Bibliographie 1977–1992*, Stuttgart and Weimar, 1994, pp. 298–300, 302–8.
36. See Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, p. 90.
37. Ibid., pp. 94–5, 101.

38. Ibid., p. 120; Howells, 'Herder, Karadzič, and Cultural Nationalism', p. 61.
39. See Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, pp. 119, 125–31.
40. See ibid., pp. 146–57, and Rathmann, 'Herder and the Hungarian Enlightenment', *passim*.
41. See Schullerus, 'Die Herder-Rezeption in Rumänien', pp. 327–31.
42 See, for example, Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, pp. 98–104, 106, 119–20, 122, 127–8.
43. Ibid., p. 154.
44. See Irmscher's remarks on this in Hans Dietrich Irmscher (ed.), *Herder, Goethe, Frisi, Möser: Von deutscher Art und Kunst*, Stuttgart, 1968, p. 175.
45. See *SW*, XIV, p. 280; also Ziegengeist, Graßhoff and Lehmann (eds), *Herder*, pp. 11–12.

7 *Westjuden*: Germany and German Jews through East European Eyes[1]

John D. Klier

An enormous literature has been devoted to the so-called *Ostjuden*, the traditionalist East European Jews who increasingly moved into the heartland of the German Reich in the period after 1871.[2] A highly visible target for German antisemites, their presence also produced feelings of extreme ambivalence among 'native', acculturated German Jews. To the latter, the *Ostjuden*, easily identified by their garb, Yiddish speech, religious organization and practice, and 'immigrant' trades, called into question their own status and position as an integral part of German society. The *Ostjuden* existed to be pitied, assisted, scorned and very occasionally romanticized. The simplest way for German Jews to explain away the embarrassment caused by their co-religionists was to point to the backward social and economic conditions and obscurantism of the Russian Empire (or, alternatively, Old Poland), whose environment had produced the degenerative state of the *Ostjuden*.

Virtually no attention has been paid to the other side of this equation, the attitudes and assumptions in Eastern Europe about German Jews and the society which had produced them. Yet German Jewry had a powerful influence on East European Jewry which is worth exploring. Moreover, the German Jewish experience often served as an object lesson for Russians, official and unofficial, in shaping assumptions about their own Jewish Question. This is even more the case because the rise of the antisemitic movement in the German Empire in the 1870s and 1880s forced a re-thinking, by Russian Jews and Gentiles alike,

about the prospects of Jewish life in the midst of Christian host communities.

This chapter will explore the attitudes of Jews and non-Jews in the Russian Empire toward German Jewry in the period from the entry of Jews under Russian rule, as a result of the first partition of Poland in 1772, to 1890, the year of the resignation of Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor of Germany. The focus of the study is on the Jews of the German Reich rather than the Jews in the German lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. The emphasis is upon materials which appeared in the Russian-language press and stimulated public debate. The copious treatment of German Jewry in the Yiddish and Hebrew press is another matter, and will be noted only in passing.[3]

The term *Ostjuden* designated a specific cultural type rather than just any Jew from Eastern Europe. Jews from the East who circumvented their origins, such as Solomon Maimon, found a ready welcome from their acculturated German brethren.[4] We must be aware from the very beginning of the differentiation that existed within the Jewish community in Eastern Europe between the stereotypical *Ostjuden*, on the one hand, and 'progressives', 'renegades', '*apikhores*' (Epicureans, that is, heretics) and '*maskilim*' (partisans of the Jewish Enlightenment movement), on the other. In a curious conjunction, traditionalist *Ostjuden* fully shared the suspicions of the Russian peasantry (and many non-peasants as well) that the 'Germans' were too clever by half, too sly for their own good, and certainly not to be trusted.[5] 'German' (*nemets*) was the popular expression for *any* foreigner. It was a generic term which traditionalists routinely applied to any Jew who violated norms of religious practice, custom or physical appearance. Yiddish literature is replete with portraits of such 'Germans', attired in the tell-tale frock coat rather than the traditional caftan. For *Ostjuden*, as for many Russians, Germany was a source of scandal and temptation, not a model for emulation.

For Jewish 'Germans' in the East, Germany commanded admiration and respect. It was the source of the *Haskalah*, the Jewish version of the European-wide Enlightenment movement associated with the Berlin sage Moses Mendelssohn. The movement for religious reform within Judaism was also largely a German phenomenon, and elicited general admiration from the *maskilim* even when imitation was not a realistic possibility.

Finally, Germany presented a model of the future which Russian Jewish ideologues hoped to attain: civic emancipation and cultural integration. The canonization of Germany as a beacon of salvation ensured that the rise of political antisemitism there had, understandably, a profoundly disorientating impact on her East European Jewish acolytes.

Since the impact of reform-minded *maskilim* on their own communities was minimal, the *Haskalah* assumption that progressive rulers (Emperor Joseph II being the prime example) were well-disposed toward the Jews encouraged them to approach Russian officials with their proposals. In 1800, a *maskil* from the Belorussian town of Kreslavka (Kreslaw), Dr Il'ia Frank, dispatched such a project to a member of the Russian Senate, the poet Gavriil Derzhavin, who had been sent by Emperor Paul to explore the role of Jews in the regional economy of Belorussia. One of the most effective ways of elevating the backward moral state of Russia's Jewish subjects, Frank announced to Derzhavin, was to encourage them to study 'pure' biblical (as opposed to talmudic) Hebrew and other European languages. In this, he invoked the example of Mendelssohn:

> By just such means did Mendelssohn enlighten himself, and afterward he had recourse to such means in order to enlighten his German fellow believers, and the most fortunate success crowned his endeavours. He called for the study of the Jewish [that is, Hebrew] and German languages, published a highly exact translation of the Old Testament [in German], and the more this translation was read, the more highly did German Jews rise in their moral development.[6]

Derzhavin was sufficiently impressed to incorporate aspects of Frank's recommendations into the massive reform proposal which he prepared for the imperial government. The revival of biblical Hebrew and the provision of a German translation of the Old Testament, he observed, produced educated Jews in Germany who were the equal of the most enlightened men in Europe. So impressed was Derzhavin with the progress made by German Jews, that he proposed importing some of their leading scholars in order to staff the state-run 'Sanderin', a bureaucracy which he proposed to create in order to administer the life of Russian Jewry. In addition, Derzhavin chose German as one of the three languages in which he proposed that the work of Jewish schools

be conducted in the future (the other two being Russian and Polish). The same triad was to be obligatory for all commercial transactions among Jews.[7]

In 1802, pursuing the same initiative which had led to Derzhavin's assignment to study Belorussian Jewry, the reform-minded Tsar Alexander I appointed a committee to draft a law code to regulate Jewish life in the empire. It provoked lobbying efforts from both traditionalist Jews, who sought to block any change in their existing status, and from *maskilim*, who sought change on the European model. The first Russian Jewish publicist, Ieguda Leib ben Noakh (Nevakhovich), published a Russian-language pamphlet designed to influence the committee in the Jews' favour, *The Lament of the Daughter of Judea*. As evidence for his claims about the perfectibility of the Jews under the influence of equal treatment, Nevakhovich invoked two of the staples of Enlightenment Judaeophilia, Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem* and G.E. Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*, both published in Germany.[8] Novakhovich, incidentally, was the product of a circle of progressive Jews from Shklov, in Belorussia. David Fishman has explored the environment of this provincial town which produced a surprising explosion of cultural and intellectual activity. There is no question that many of the adepts of this circle looked to Germany for inspiration.[9]

Studies of the internal discussions within the reform committee appointed in 1802 clearly demonstrate the influence of *Haskalah* ideology, especially of the emphasis on the civilizing impact of European vernaculars upon the Jews. German language — hardly a commonly used East European vernacular outside the Baltic region — was inevitably included as a desirable language for Jewish use. The Statute for the Jews published in 1804 was, on the whole, sympathetic to the Jews, in the sense that it left in place at least some of the prerogatives of Jewish autonomous administration which Russia had inherited from Poland along with Poland's Jews. Throughout, however, it stressed linguistic reform. Jews were permitted and invited to send their children to any state educational institution in the empire. At the same time, Jews were allowed to keep their own traditional educational system — the so-called *kheder* — but with the proviso that either Russian, Polish or German be introduced as the language of instruction. A requirement was imposed that Jews must keep their commercial documentation in one of the

three languages. Finally, a term of eight years was set after which all communal elders and rabbis were expected to demonstrate an ability to read or write in one of the languages.[10]

The reign of Nicholas I has frequently been depicted as one of outright persecution of the Jews, highlighted by the imposition of military recruitment as a means of forcibly converting Jews to Christianity. A similar objective was attributed to a state Jewish school system sponsored by the Nicholaevan regime.[11] Contemporary scholarship challenges these assumptions, demonstrating that Nicholas's treatment of Jews was not anomalous, and even questioning the consistency of conversionary activity.[12] Michael Stanislawski quotes a revealing statement by Count S.S. Uvarov, the Minister of Education who implemented Nicholas's school reforms: 'Believe me', he told his German collaborator Dr Max Lilienthal, 'if we had such Jews as I met in the different capitals of Germany, we would treat them with the utmost distinction, but our Jews are entirely different.'[13] Uvarov's comment suggests that it would be better to characterize the reign of Nicholas I as a quixotic attempt to transform *Ostjuden* into *Westjuden*, rather than as a period of unremitting persecution. Best of all, the German experience offered a mechanism for such a process of transformation in the form of a progressive Jewish school system.

There is no doubt that Nicholas's bureaucrats were well informed about what was happening to the Jews in Germany and in the Habsburg Monarchy, where a similar school system was implemented in Austrian Galicia shortly after the first partition. Official publications, usually based on German sources, glowed with praise for the work of Mendelssohn and his followers, and for the resultant transformation and emancipation of German Jewry.[14] In 1840, Nicholas appointed a 'Committee for the Transformation of the Jews', headed by one of his most talented administrators, Count P.D. Kiselev. The statement of working assumptions which Kiselev prepared for the activities of his committee was replete with examples drawn from states such as Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Prussia and France, as well as with invidious comparisons between Russian and Western Jews. Kiselev was especially impressed with the work of the German Reform movement. It had stripped away the moral dross of talmudic interpretations of the Scriptures, and joined the dogmas of the Old Testament with 'a purely moral philosophy'.[15]

The key to the spread of these high moral doctrines, thought Kiselev, was the creation of a progressive Jewish school system. He singled out for praise the German Jewish communities of Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Dessau, Breslau and Berlin, which had created institutions which could easily stand comparison with Christian schools. Small wonder, then, that Kiselev recommended the creation of a analogous progressive school system for the Jews of the Russian Empire in order to effect their moral and religious transformation.[16] Nor was it surprising that the energetic Minister of Education, Uvarov, whose view of German Jewry has been quoted above, should hasten to comply. Following the suggestion of Kiselev, Uvarov sought to recruit Jewish collaborators who had been educated in Germany and Austria.[17]

Uvarov's closest co-worker in the establishment of the state Jewish school system was Max Lilienthal, a German Jew who had taken a degree from the University of Munich and who was hired in 1838 to head the small, Germanized Jewish community of Riga. In 1841, he was called to St Petersburg to oversee the implementation of the new state Jewish school system.[18] In this capacity he toured the Pale of Settlement to promote the new schools and published a manifesto in their defence.[19] The curriculum of the new schools reflected their Germanic inspiration. Indeed, German language was one of the subjects taught, while a number of textbooks were translated from German. A few teachers were hired from Germany before Nicholas halted the employment of all foreigners in reaction to the outbreak of the revolutions of 1848.[20]

The first generation of native Russian *maskilim* remained reverent devotees of the early giants of the *Haskalah*. The first prominent Russian *maskil*, Isaac Ber Levinsohn, imbibed the first principles of the movement while resident in Brody, in Austrian-ruled Galicia. In later years he conducted all his correspondence with the Russian government in German. In his famous manifesto of the Russian *Haskalah*, *Te'udah be-yisra'el* (*Testimony in Israel*), he argued at length for the Jews to acquire non-Jewish vernaculars, and he gave equal weight to German and Russian.[21] As the activities of a few lonely pioneers like Levinsohn broadened into a wider movement, and began to engage Russian language and culture, there remained a small 'German party' dedicated to German as the most appropriate language for

enlightenment. These partisans included Kh.S. Slonimskii, who was later to serve as the Overseer of the state-sponsored Zhitomir Rabbinical Seminary.[22] When the most significant Hebrew-language newspaper in the Russian Empire, *Hameliz* (The Mediator), first appeared in Odessa in 1860, a section was published in German, in Hebrew characters. Even the title appeared in German translation, in German script.[23]

There were occasional spats between Russian 'Berliners' and real Germans. Lilienthal made a very bad impression when he toured the Pale of Settlement in 1841. Self-important and arrogant, he snubbed native enlighteners and preferred to socialize with communal big-wigs. The Vilna *maskil* Mordekhai Aaron Ginzburg declared in disgust that

> this is not the man whom we need: he knows less Torah than young students, and even his philosophical knowledge is not great. One can't deny that these doctors speak German fluently, for it is their mother-tongue, as well as French and often English as well, and they know Latin and logic, history and geography, etc. — but these are matters which gymnasium students know as well; what has this knowledge to do with the name 'Doctor of Philosophy'?[24]

None the less, when political circumstances again permitted foreign personnel to seek employment in Russia, the most progressive Jewish communities sought to hire exemplars of the new type of 'German' rabbi, with their advanced university degrees.[25] In Odessa, progressives — or more precisely, the city's Galician élite — secured the election of Dr Shimon Areyeh Schwabacher as the official 'state rabbi' in 1860. Schwabacher, a native of Oberdorf, Württemberg, held a doctorate from the University of Tübingen.[26] In 1863, the progressives in St Petersburg chose as their communal rabbi Dr Avraam Neiman, a graduate of Würzburg and Hesse Universities, who had served as rabbi in Riga and occupied a variety of official advisory positions in the Russian state bureaucracy before his appointment.[27] Neither man had an adequate command of Russian; both preached in the synagogue in German until their dying day (Neiman died in 1875, Schwabacher in 1888).

Yet, over time, the German language began to lose its prestige and influence. In large part, this was a consequence of the rise of a new, self-confident group of Russian Jews. The 'Young

Maskilim', trained in the new schools and rabbinic seminaries of the state Jewish school system, were increasingly acculturated into the Russian milieu. This was even more the case of a group characterized elsewhere by the present writer as the 'Russian Jewish Intelligentsia', a group more attuned to the wider, non-Jewish world, and able to move confidently in Russian society.[28] Their agenda may be described as the 'Russianization' of the Jews of the empire (that is, the acquisition by Jews of the Russian vernacular, as well as the abandonment of the more obvious symbols of Jewish particularism). Thus, while the flagship newspaper of the Russian Jewish Intelligentsia, the Odessa-based *Rassvet*, editorially welcomed the appointment of the progressive Schwabacher in 1860, it also gave full space to critics who lamented the appointment of a German-speaking rather than a Russian-speaking religious leader. A subsequent editorial specifically attacked 'Germanizers' within the Odessa Jewish community who sought 'to displace our beautiful and rich Russian tongue'.[29] State rabbis were subject to triennial re-election, and the standard complaint directed against Schwabacher on these occasions was his stubborn refusal to learn Russian.[30] This debate even resounded outside of the Jewish community itself. The extraordinarily influential journalist M.N. Katkov used his newspaper *Moskovskie vedomosti* to lament the spread of German among the Jews of the Russian Empire. It was time, he demanded, for Russian to 'enter its rights' as the language of the empire.[31]

German had yet another area of linguistic influence. The *Haskalah* tradition was to scorn Yiddish as a corrupt and impure 'jargon', far removed from 'pure' languages such as Hebrew or German. None the less, *maskilim* were constrained to write in the language as the only practical way of taking their message to a wider audience. They wrote their Yiddish with a bad conscience and some of them, as Dan Miron has pointed out, made efforts to re-identify with 'pure German'. They did this through the importation of Germanisms in spelling and gender assignments, even when this made neither phonetic nor grammatical sense.[32]

As Steven Zipperstein points out, the controversies surrounding Schwabacher during his lengthy service as state rabbi in Odessa did not centre on his status as a progressive. 'The employment of a "modern" rabbi of one sort or another was by now taken for granted in Odessa', he asserts.[33] Nor were Odessa

and St Petersburg typical of the empire as a whole. Jewish life in Odessa, around whose city limits, according to traditionalists, the fires of Gehenna burned, was dominated by emigrants from German-speaking lands in the Austrian Empire, while the Jewish community of the imperial capital was a motley of rich merchants and retired soldiers, none of whom had an organic connection or rootedness there. In few other Jewish centres were there progressives in sufficient numbers or with sufficient wealth or influence to attract a 'German' communal leader. This did not stop progressive Jewish publicists from gazing with admiration at the changes which were taking place among German Jews.

At this point it is appropriate to differentiate between the *Haskalah* of the Berliners and the battle for religious reform which was waged in Germany throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. The *Haskalah*, in all its diverse manifestations, was concerned with the acculturation and economic normalization of the Jews. In essence, it was a response to the changing, more tolerant, attitudes of European society toward the Jews. It sought to make the Jews 'worthy' of emancipation, ready and able to hold their heads high in the midst of an enlightened Christian society. It assumed the good intentions and benevolence of states and rulers. Religious reform as such was not the chief concern or priority of the *maskilim*. In Germany in particular, the failure of the state to respond in rapid fashion to Jewish initiatives provoked disenchantment. David Friedlander, the Berlin communal leader who considered himself Moses Mendelssohn's disciple and successor, demonstrated how far the 'enlightened' were willing to go in order to accommodate Christian society and to secure political rights. In 1799, in an effort to secure full civil rights, he approached Pastor W.A. Teller, provost and head of the Berlin consistory of the Lutheran Church, with a proposal for the mass conversion of Berlin Jewry. It was well known that all but one of Moses Mendelssohn's own children eventually converted to Christianity.[34]

The movement for religious reform was a response to the threat to the integrity and survival of Judaism posed by the intellectual compromises offered by *maskilim* like Friedlander, and the growing phenomenon of non-observance detected among the Jewish masses in Germany. The reformers sought to adapt Judaism to the realities of the modern world. Every

proponent of reform had not only to identify what changes needed to be made, but also the basis on which any group or individual could justify such change in the light of Jewish tradition. The debate over 'Reform' thus took many forms, identified with such religious leaders and philosophies as Abraham Geiger, Samuel Holdheim, Samson Raphael Hirsch (Neo-Orthodoxy) and Zecharias Frankel (the Positive Historical School). Laymen also played a key role in creating reform congregations, such as the *Reformfreunde* in Frankfurt (1842) and the Association for the Reform of Judaism in Berlin (1845). Reformers gathered together to delineate the essential principles of Judaism in a series of rabbinical assemblies in Brunswick (1844), Frankfurt am Main (1845) and Breslau (1846).[35]

Such initiatives were impossible in the Russian Empire, where even the moderate doctrines of *Haskalah* were seen as dangerous heresy by the mass of traditionalist Jews. Such debates as there were concerning religious reform were restricted to mere trivialities, and never raised the question of ultimate authority in Judaism. All efforts of the Russian government to create a 'progressive' central agency or governing board for the Jews of the empire proved to be dismal failures. The state rabbis produced by the state Jewish school system, and forced upon Jewish communities, lacked any prestige and exercised absolutely no influence. None the less, the controversies and debates taking place in Germany were well known to acculturated Russian Jews. When the vagaries of the censorship permitted it, important works of German Jewish scholarship were translated into Russian. When the Jewish Question became a public issue in the Russian press, at the onset of the Era of Great Reforms under Alexander II in the late 1850s, Jewish life in Germany received copious attention from both Christians and Jews.

Indeed, for those sympathetic to the possibilities of the reform of Russian Jews — and to a consequent improvement in their legal position —the German example was a vital piece of evidence. In its inaugural issue of 1859, the provincial *Kievskii telegraf* began an extended series on the Jews.[36] While the author noted the debasement of the Jews' national character and traditions effected by centuries of persecution, he presented an overwhelmingly positive image of Jewry in the contemporary age. His description of the *Haskalah* and the evolution of the Reform Movement in Germany was designed to demonstrate that

the Jews could and would become good subjects, if only Russian society would abandon its long-held prejudices against them. Another Christian correspondent, A. Georgievskii, went further still. In a survey of Jewish history, and with special attention to the events of his own day, he praised Judaism for its inherent vitality and creativity, which allowed it to evolve and adopt itself to the modern world. This process was immediately evident in the development of the German Reform Movement. It was a striking example of how a religion could satisfy the spiritual requirements of its followers while not clashing with the realities of the modern world. Indeed, he praised modern Judaism for its role as a 'champion of freedom of thought, even in the religious sphere where it is usually given little scope'.[37]

This enthusiasm for the Reform Movement was perhaps understandable among Gentiles, who witnessed the liquidation of rites and customs which made the Jews a people apart. Those Russian Jews like I.S. Galbershtadt, who appeared in the Russian Jewish press to protest against the wholesale abandonment of Jewish ritual, still looked to Germany for guidance. Even as he rejected the moral 'Don Quixotes who pray with uncovered heads', he pointed to the 'positive-historical approach' of the moderate reformer Zecharias Frankel.[38] A Jewish correspondent writing from Berlin in the prestigious *Russkii invalid* urged that a new generation of progressive rabbis should be trained in the Russian rabbinic institutes in Vilna and Zhitomir, whose curriculum should be modified to mirror that of the new progressive rabbinic seminary in Breslau.[39] Jewish publicists were not constrained from making invidious comparisons between Germany and Russia as a whole. The editors of the Russian Jewish newspaper *Sion* offered a vigorous defence of the perceived failings of Russian Jews which had been raised by one critic, who complained that Russian Jews, unlike their German counterparts, had not produced a great thinker like Moses Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn had been able to accomplish much, the editors noted, because he was dealing with a [German] society which produced men like Kant, Lessing and Herder. Russian society, not yet itself capable of producing men of such calibre, could not expect a similar level of enlightenment from the Jews.[40]

The spirit of benevolence towards the Jews which characterized the early Reform Era did not long endure, once the

Jewish Question became entangled in the complex politics of the Russian borderlands and the difficulties which beset Russia in the turbulent period after the emancipation of the serfs. Even as the mood darkened at home, Jewish publicists could continue to point to Germany as a land which recognized that equality for Jews was closely tied to the well-being of society as a whole.[41] German Jews had problems, but these were often the problems of success. As Germany moved towards national unity, for example, German Jews had to decide how to reorganize their communal institutions to correspond to the new national configuration.[42] The unification of Germany brought about the removal of the last lingering legal restrictions upon the Jews. Jewish publicists tended to view this as the inevitable march of progress, marked by the fall of one reactionary bastion after another, such as restrictions on Jews serving as schoolteachers or judges.[43]

The danger of making Germany the epitome of Jewish emancipation and acculturation was revealed, however, by the rise of the modern antisemitic movement in Germany. If this state was such an exemplar of Jewish–Gentile coexistence, why had a reaction against the Jews broken out in German society? Nor could Jews and their defenders ignore this unpleasant phenomenon, because Judaeophobe publicists rushed to bring it to the attention of their readers — and to draw the inevitable conclusions. This was even more the case because Russian conservatives began to integrate German antisemitic ideology into their own world view.[44]

The various 'classics' of German antisemitic thought, by Richard Wagner, Eugen Dühring, Wilhelm Marr, Heinrich von Treitschke and others, quickly appeared in Russian translation. The activities of Pastor Adolf Stoecker's Christian Socialists were closely followed, and there was extensive reporting of the meetings of the Antisemitic Congresses and the Antisemites' Petition submitted to Chancellor Bismarck. A typical example of the Russian Judaeophobe press, *Novorossiiskii telegraf*, itself long pilloried for its crude hostility to the Jews, greeted the Antisemites' Petition with malevolent irony: 'And so, besides those well-known Russian barbarians who persecute the Jews, yet another nation, Prussia, heretofore considered an enlightened state, has appeared in Europe to rise up against the predominance of the Jews'.[45] In the period after the massive Russian pogroms of 1881–2, when minor antisemitic riots occurred in several

German towns, they were seized on with relief by the conservative press in Russia. Here was proof, editorialists proclaimed, that the cause of anti-Jewish violence was not to be sought in the 'barbarism' of the Russian people, but in the faults (chiefly economic exploitation) of the Jews themselves.[46]

How did Jewish publicists respond to a campaign which threatened to undermine their long-accepted argument in favour of equal rights for the Jews of the empire and which called into question their own assumptions about the inevitable march of human progress? What had gone wrong with the privileged status of the *Westjuden*?

The rise of political antisemitism in Germany (as in Austria–Hungary) was marked by a number of events and controversies. The year 1879 was the *annus mirabilis* for German antisemitism. Wilhelm Marr's antisemitic pamphlet *The Victory of Judaism over Germandom*[47] became a best-seller. The Berlin movement of the court preacher Adolf Stoecker, originally designed as a movement for social justice intended to wean the working class away from socialism, took a decisive antisemitic turn. The well-known historian and liberal politician Heinrich von Treitschke published a hostile warning to the Jews in *Preussische Jahrbücher*. Throughout 1881, antisemites noisily propagated an 'Antisemites' Petition' which, among other demands, called for an end to immigration of *Ostjuden*. In April 1882, it was submitted to Chancellor Bismarck with over 225,000 signatures. The First International Anti-Jewish Congress, which attracted many leading antisemites from Central Europe, was convened in Dresden in 1882. In the following year, a second Congress was held in Chemnitz.[48]

The antisemitic movement in Germany never enjoyed tangible success under Bismarck, who handled this potentially disruptive challenge with his usual skill. The government refused, on a technicality, to accept the Antisemites' Petition. Stoecker's Christian Socialist Party, firmly rejected by the Berlin working class, was humiliated at the polls. The international movement, represented by the Antisemitic Congresses, quickly split into hostile factions. All these events received extensive coverage in the Russian press. They could not be ignored by Russian Jewish publicists, especially against the background of the crisis engendered by the outbreak of pogroms in Russia in 1881,

which Judaeophobes cited as proof that the Jews were a problem in every society in which they lived.

The simplest response of Jewish commentators to events in Germany was to dismiss them as anomalous, or as some sort of atavism. Thus, the movement was dismissed as an effort to mask medieval prejudices in a modern guise,[49] or as 'medieval murk',[50] which in any case was being brought under control or was being rejected by enlightened European opinion. Here efforts were made to differentiate between the higher, self-conscious strata of society and the ignorant masses.[51] Alternatively, reports sought to show that the movement was not a mass movement, and that the Berlin working class had proven resistant to the blandishments of antisemitic agitation.[52] Much opprobrium was heaped upon the character of the antisemitic leaders, such as Marr.[53] The Antisemitic Congresses were said to demonstrate 'comic stupidity', 'blind fanaticism and confusion' and 'a stupid farce of intransigent hostility to the Jews'.[54] Especially after the outbreak of the pogroms in Russia, publicists sought to link antisemitic agitation to criminal violence. Writers expressed surprise that antisemitic meetings were permitted by the authorities, and predicted that official patience with the antisemites was wearing thin.[55] The participation of representatives from Russia in the Dresden Congress allowed editorialists to link German antisemitism with the Russian pogroms. The Congress rostrum was denounced as 'the aereopagus of the leaders of the barefoot brigade' [that is, the Russian *pogromshchiki*].[56]

There were limits on the ability of critics to dismiss German antisemites as fanatics and *pogromshchiki*, especially when respected voices like that of the Berlin professor Heinrich von Treitschke joined the antisemitic chorus. Even while faulting his scholarship and proclaiming that his efforts revealed that the cultural development of Germany was not as high as had been imagined, writers had to engage with his arguments. Using a professor to catch a professor, a report in *Rassvet* summarized an attack on Treitschke that had been penned by the doyen of German Jewish scholarship, the historian Heinrich Graetz. Graetz was annoyed by Treitschke's aspersions against the patriotism of German Jews, as well as the fact that he had used pages from Graetz's own *History of the Jews* to buttress his case.[57] As a side issue, Treitschke had complained of the flood of Polish Jews into

Germany, where their children would be the future rulers in the stock exchange and the press. Unlike the Jews from Iberia, who had a glorious past, the Polish Jews were scarred by their long residence in the tyrannical Polish state. Treitschke's attack blended his prejudice against the Jews with his equally strong prejudices against Poland.

Ironically, these were prejudices which were fully shared by Graetz. His magisterial history remains notorious for its dismissal of the brilliant cultural achievements of the Jews in Eastern Europe. For Graetz, the most important creation of the *Ostjuden* was the movement of Hasidism, which he thoroughly despised as 'a crabbed dogmatism that defied all logic'. What German antisemite would have disagreed with Graetz's description of the cunning and dishonest *Ostjuden*: 'Against members of their own race cunning could not be well employed, because they were sharp-witted; but the non-Jewish world with which they came in contact experienced to its disadvantage the superiority of the talmudical spirit of Polish Jews.'[58] Treitschke's attack produced the delicious irony of forcing Graetz to defend the *Ostjuden*. He did this with a notable lack of enthusiasm. Unable to find anything positive to say in favour of the *Ostjuden*, he mitigated the contrast between the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim by pointing out that Poland could not reasonably be described as a tyranny.[59] The further irony was that correspondents in the Russian Jewish press did a better job of defending German Jewry than did German Jews themselves, who shied away from the debate. The former were lavish in their praise of the demonstrable ability of the Jews to assimilate into German society and to make noteworthy contributions to German culture.

If the Jews had already carried out Treitschke's exhortation to become good Germans, then where had antisemitism come from? Russian Jewish commentators found the roots of the movement in the events of the German past and the political exigencies of the German present. A commentator for *Rassvet* pointed to the role of the vicissitudes of German history. The emancipation of the Jews had been brought into Germany on the bayonets of the victorious troops of Napoleonic France. The struggle against French hegemony, and the Romantic Movement which followed it, all worked against the Jews. Their emancipation was seen as a French import, and consequently rejected in the period of reaction after 1815. German Romanticism idealized the German

Middle Ages, a time of specific hostility to the Jews. Germany was living through another period of reaction, exemplified by the fall of Minister of Religious Affairs Adalbert Falk and the end of the 'Kulturkampf' against the influence of the Catholic Church. It was this atmosphere which called up the ghosts of the past — the 1818 'Hep! Hep!' Riots against the Jews, for example — and made antisemitism respectable.[60] But like all periods of reaction, this too would pass.

A perceptive commentator on Marr's vision of Germany dominated by Jews placed events in the context of the unification of Germany, which confronted Germans with new challenges and new opportunities, to which Jews brought their own particular talents. Jews were thus prominently represented in the wild wave of stock-market speculation called the *Gründerzeit*. When the inevitable crash came, it was easy to blame everything on the Jews.[61] This background helped to explain, for a number of commentators, why the antisemitic movement was concentrated in the middle classes and generally spurned by the working class. During the period of opportunity and expansion, Jews emerged as competitors to the established professional classes, and attracted their envy.[62] Likewise, it was this element of the population, not the workers, who suffered the consequences of stock speculation.

The economic analysis had to concede that the Jews played some objective role in the rise of antisemitism, if only in their guise as agents of social and economic change. A purely political analysis, on the other hand, could virtually dispense with the real activities of actual Jews altogether. An editorial in *Rassvet* claimed to have penetrated the myths of the antisemites: the attacks on the Jews were 'the dust thrown into the eyes of the hungry by the satiated'. The chief culprits were 'Protestant Jesuits and Brandenburg Junkers', who sought to deflect censure of their own exploitation of the peasantry by attributing it to the Jews. Not surprisingly, the peasant was not fooled.[63] A 'Letter from Berlin' confirmed this analysis. The movement was virtually restricted to Berlin, since it lacked a broad popular basis. The whole campaign was nothing more than 'electoral agitation of the Prussian Berlin reactionaries against German progressives' who were overwhelmingly supported by the Jews.[64] An editorial published in *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* four years later confirmed this analysis. Antisemitism, it claimed, stood exposed

as a 'great political lie', used by political speculators who pandered to human weaknesses. Rather than trying to explain economic theories or the problems of the budget to the masses, antisemitic agitators tried to set them against the Jews.[65] This tactic was effective only where old prejudices were still fresh, and presumably would be dispelled by the march of civilization and enlightenment.

Indeed, the editorialist did not have long to wait. In 1888 *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* welcomed the 'final and decisive' blow against antisemitism. The new German emperor, Frederick III, had issued a letter in which he emphasized that all his subjects, whatever their religion, were equally dear to him. These words of the emperor testified that 'the period of the rule of folly has come to an end, that the temporarily resurrected corpse of religious and national intolerance has decomposed, that European antisemitism has finally lost the moral and intellectual support which it received from Berlin'.[66] The editorialist used this happy moment to remind the reader that, wherever the Jews were freed from restrictive laws, they brought intellectual and moral strength to society. Once again, Germany and her Jews could serve as an object lesson for Russians.

This idyllic moment was only illusory. The example of Germany, frequently evoked in the deliberations of the Imperial Russian High Commission for the Review of the Existing Laws on the Jews of the Empire, which met between 1883 and 1888, failed to convince Russian bureaucrats to continue the course of piecemeal emancipation which had characterized the reign of Alexander II. In Germany itself, the liberal Frederick III was already mortally ill when he ascended the throne, and was dead within a hundred days of the inauguration of his reign. His son and successor, William II, took the German Empire in quite different directions. The visible antisemitic movement did indeed go into decline, but as Peter Pulzer has observed, this decline 'was matched by its increasing pervasion of social life, semi-political bodies, and ideological and economic pressure groups'.[67] And while Russian Jewish publicists continued to evoke the movement of Jews into German society as a great success story, the arrival in Germany of more and more of the despised *Ostjuden* fuelled the underground reservoirs of West European antisemitism.

German Jewry was an essential ingredient of the world view of East European Jews, whether in the guise of 'Berliners' and 'heretics' in traditionalist eyes, or as a paradigm and symbol of hope for *maskilim* and proponents of acculturation. Nor were these images entirely fanciful, for German Jewry represented what those in the East hoped or feared all Jews would become. The emergence of the antisemitic movement in Germany posed a dilemma for those who espoused the German path of Jewish development. It forced them to reassess, if never to abandon, the hopes which they had placed in Germany as the *Kulturträger* of Jewish emancipation. Even when these hopes seemed dashed, Germany continued its leadership role through its position as a major centre for the rise of political Zionism — itself a *Westjuden* solution for an *Ostjuden* dilemma.

NOTES

1. This chapter serves as a companion piece to my discussion of the interconnection of Russian and German attitudes toward the Jews in 'German Antisemitism and Russian Judeophobia in the 1880s: Brothers and Strangers', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 37, 1989, pp. 524–40. All dates are Old Style unless indicated.
2. See, most recently, Steven E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923*, Madison, WI, 1982, and Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany*, New York, 1987. See also Trude Maurer, *Ostjuden in Deutschland, 1918–1933*, Hamburg, 1986. Aschheim notes that the term itself is anachronistic before the early twentieth century.
3. For this topic, see Alexander Orbach, *New Voices of Russian Jewry: A Study of the Russian-Jewish Press of Odessa in the Era of the Great Reforms, 1860–1871*, Leiden, 1980.
4. Solomon Maimon, *An Autobiography*, ed. and trans. Moses Hadas, New York, 1967.
5. This discussion ignores the much broader question of the attitude of the educated Russian public towards Germans and German culture, especially in its guise as cultural competitor to French culture. Germans enjoyed pride of place in popular prejudices toward foreigners. For a mere sampling of this diverse theme see Ronald

Hingley, *The Russian Mind*, London, 1977, and James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretative History of Russian Culture*, New York, 1970, pp. 97–102f.

6. Quoted in Iu.I. Gessen, *Evrei v Rossii*, St Petersburg, 1906, p. 447.
7. G.R. Derzhavin, *Sochineniia*, 9 vols, St Petersburg, 1864–83, VII, pp. 295, 301, 304.
8. Nevakhovich, *The Lament of the Daughter of Judea*, St Petersburg, 1803, pp. 18–31.
9. David E. Fishman, *Russia's First Modern Jews: The Jews of Shklov*, New York, 1995, pp. 30–7.
10. John D. Klier, *Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the Jewish Question in Russia, 1772–1825*, DeKalb, IL, 1986, pp. 116–43. It might be noted that the Committee paid close attention to the examples of the treatment of the Jews in other Central European countries, especially Prussia and the Austrian Empire.
11. The classic statement of this position is by S.M. Dubnow, but it has become firmly entrenched in the secondary literature: see S.M. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland: From the Earliest Times until the Present Day*, trans. I. Friedlaender, 3 vols, Philadelphia, PA, 1916–20, II, pp. 13–87.
12. Michael Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–1855*, Philadelphia, PA, 1983, pp. 15f. See John D. Klier, 'State Policy and the Conversion of the Jews in Imperial Russia', forthcoming.
13. Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I*, p. 45. Compare the account of a similar conversation between Nicholas I and Moses Montefiore in *Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*, ed. L. Loewe, 2 vols, London, 1890, I, p. 334.
14. For a typical example, see 'Evreiskie religioznye sekty v Rossii', *Zhurnal Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del*, November 1846, pp. 269–71. An earlier article in the same journal applauded the work of the nascent Reform Movement in Germany to bring traditional Jewish rites, such as circumscision, more into line with European norms: ibid., October 1844, pp. 94–5.
15. Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv Ukrainy, Kiev, fond 442, opis' 1, delo 4026 (1841–4), ll. 29–35.
16. Ibid., l. 38 obverse.
17. See Julius Hessen (Iu.I. Gessen), 'Die russische Regierung und die westeuropäischen Juden', *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 57, 1913, 5/6 (May–June), pp. 257–71, and ibid., 7/8 (July–August), pp. 482–500.

18. Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I*, pp. 58–9. Lilienthal's credentials were impeccable: he was recommended for the Riga post by Ludwig Philippson, the editor of the Leipzig-based *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* and one of the leaders of progressive Judaism in Germany.
19. Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I*, p. 76.
20. Ibid., p. 104.
21. Israel Zinberg, *A History of Jewish Literature. Vol. XI: The Haskalah Movement in Russia*, ed. and trans. Bernard Martin, Cincinnati, OH and New York, 1978, pp. 21–34.
22. P. Merek, 'Iz istorii evreiskoi intelligentsii', *Evreiskii vestnik*, 1928, pp. 124–42.
23. Orbach, *New Voices of Russian Jewry*, p. 72.
24. Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I*, p. 94.
25. Continuing its own romance with German Jewry, the Russian government specifically authorized Jewish communities, with the permission of the Ministry of Education, to recruit rabbis from Germany: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii: Sobranie vtoroe*, 55 vols, St Petersburg, 1830–84, XXXII, no. 31,831, 13 May 1857.
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29. *Rassvet*, 21 April 1861.
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31. *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 28 February 1865.
32. Dan Miron, *A Traveller Disguised: A Study of the Rise of Modern Yiddish Fiction in the Nineteenth Century*, New York, 1973, pp. 65–6.
33. Ibid., p. 95.
34. Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749–1824*, Detroit, MI, 1967, pp. 70–4, 85–114.
35. For a good overview, see Michael A. Meyer, *Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York and Oxford, 1988.
36. *Kievskii Telegraf*, 1 and 4 July, 19, 26 and 29 August 1859.
37. *Rassvet*, 19 May 1861.
38. *Rassvet*, 22–9 July 1860.
39. *Russkii invalid*, 12 November 1861.
40. *Sion*, 29 February 1862.

41. *Den': Organ russkikh evreev*, 24 July 1870.
42. Ibid., 27 June 1870.
43. Ibid., 28 August 1870.
44. This phenomenon is explored further in Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question*, pp. 407–16.
45. *Novorossiiskii Telegraf*, 1655, 17 August 1880.
46. See *Kievlianin*, 25 September 1882, and *Novoe vremia*, 17 April 1882.
47. Wilhelm Marr, *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum vom nicht-confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet*, Bern, 1879.
48. For a useful survey of these events, and their background, see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Antisemitism, 1700–1933*, Cambridge, MA, 1980, and Peter G.J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, New York, 1964, revised edn, London, 1988. There were parallel events in Austria–Hungary, such as legal proceedings surrounding Professor August Rohling's antisemitic tract *Der Talmudjude*, the Tiszaeszlár ritual murder trial in 1882, the noisy activities of several antisemitic politicians such as Győző Istoczy, and the successful rise of the Christian Socialists of Karl Lueger in Vienna.
49. *Rassvet*, 20 November 1880.
50. Ibid., 6 December 1879.
51. *Russkii Evrei*, 4 August 1882.
52. *Rassvet*, 15 January 1881.
53. Ibid., 26 September 1879.
54. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda*, 4 and 25 September 1882.
55. *Russkii Evrei*, 15 September 1882.
56. Ibid., 9 September 1882.
57. For the full Treitschke–Graetz controversy, see Jehuda Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew, 1893–1914*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1975, pp. 16–23. This work as a whole examines the German-Jewish response to the rise of the antisemitic movement.
58. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers*, p. 15.
59. *Rassvet*, 22 December 1879.
60. Ibid., 6 December 1879.
61. Ibid., 13 September 1879.
62. *Evreiskaia biblioteka*, 13, 1880, p. 67.
63. *Rassvet*, 27 November 1880.
64. Ibid., 29 January 1881.
65. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda*, 7 July 1885.
66. Ibid., 6 March 1888.
67. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Antisemitism*, p. 219.

8 'Dearest Nicky...': Monarchical Relations between Prussia, the German Empire and Russia during the Nineteenth Century

Johannes Paulmann

Relations between monarchs are often described in terms of personal relationships. We know who liked whom, and who did not get on with each other. If one thinks of the rather phlegmatic Prussian King Frederick William III and the enthusiastic Tsar Alexander I, it may not seem unjustified to attribute some of the changeable and difficult relations between Prussia and Russia during the Napoleonic wars to their different characters.[1] Nor are we surprised, knowing the character of Kaiser William II, to read that Alexander III judged him to be 'an exhibitionist and a nuisance'. After meeting him during a visit to St Petersburg in 1888, the Tsar declared that the Kaiser was 'a little urchin, badly brought up, full of malice'.[2] The relationship between the shy Nicholas II and the exhibitionist William II was certainly no better. Yet this kind of character history is only of limited value for understanding monarchical relations. One has to take a wider view to assess their significance by analysing how personal, dynastic and foreign relations were interlinked and how they interacted. Taking a closer look at monarchical relations between Prussia, and later the German Empire, and Russia, we may ask how those relations worked in practice: what form they actually took and by what means they were cultivated.

* * *

Dynastic relations between Germany and Russia had their origins in the eighteenth century. It was the children of Peter the Great who began to marry into the ruling houses of the German minor states. In 1725, Anna, Peter's daughter, married Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, and this was the origin of the official family name after Anna's son became Tsar Peter III of Russia in 1762; until after 1918 the *Almanach de Gotha* used the title Romanow-Holstein-Gottorp,[3] thus acknowledging the Romanovs' transformation from a Russian into an international dynasty.

There were several factors affecting international dynastic relations in Europe.[4] At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia rose to become one of the major powers in the European state system. Such a status influenced dynastic relations and shaped the choice of possible marriage partners. Marriage to princesses and princes from minor German territories could further Peter's local geopolitical ambitions, but, above all, it was less likely to disturb the international equilibrium than the marriage tie with France which Peter had originally aimed at, since its political consequences were deemed to be insignificant compared to establishing links with one of the other major powers. Another restriction on the marriage market, and a factor in international relations, was religion. In terms of dynastic relations with Russia, a marriage into the Romanov family was 'neutral' in respect of the religious balance between the European countries, as none of the other important powers lost or gained a potential ally to whose religious affiliation it could appeal for political purposes. The possibilities of marriage in the Russian case were thus not so much determined by the denomination of the prospective candidate before marriage, but by her willingness to convert to the Orthodox faith, an essential prerequisite. This was relatively easier for Protestants, of which Germany had an attractive number of suitable partners on offer. An additional factor in dynastic relations was a territorial one. The ruling families from time to time acquired new territories, lost parts of their property or swapped one for the other. In this property market, dynastic links were a valuable potential asset. This, again, set certain limits on dynastic relations, as the potential inheritance of territory through family connections might be

seen to increase the power of one country over the other. Viewed from a territorial perspective, the Russian links in the eighteenth century were almost exclusively German. While retaining this particular strength in the following century, the German connection was supplemented by marriages to families from England, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark.

Apart from the obvious function of providing a marriage partner of suitable status to produce heirs, these dynastic links could also prove useful for direct political purposes. As heads of states, kings and emperors had political relations with each other. It is with these relations in their dynastic context that this chapter is mainly concerned. It demonstrates that there were other factors working on international and dynastic relations in addition to power, religion and territory. In the nineteenth century there was nationalism, as is usually appreciated. Another factor, however, is generally not given much consideration in this context: namely communication. What follows draws particular attention to the role played by communication in the monarchical relations between Prussia, the German Empire and Russia.

There were several ways of fostering relations between monarchs. Kings and emperors could meet in person. These royal meetings took place very often during the nineteenth century and ranged from private family gatherings to official state visits. Regular exchange also took place in the form of diplomacy. This was mainly an indirect means of relating to one another. On at least two occasions in the nineteenth century, in 1815 and 1873, German–Russian diplomatic relations led to treaties which had a peculiarly monarchical tinge. The idea of a monarchical league was anti-national and anti-revolutionary, and it had international as well as domestic aims. Despite its obvious failure, it was a clear ideological statement by Prussian and Russian monarchs, and this ideological community characterized the image of their relationship for a considerable time.[5]

Besides these diplomatic forms there was a less public form of exchange. The kings and emperors also communicated directly by letter, and like most educated people in the nineteenth century, many monarchs were prolific correspondents. As historical sources their letters are deemed to be more reliable than formal diplomatic documents, and nearer to what people actually thought at the time.[6] They may also appear to be more private than diplomatic dispatches, more personal than anything

that travelled through the hands and mouths of diplomats. When a king wrote to a fellow sovereign it was indeed something special, and one might, therefore, interpret this as a form of monarchical interaction indicating their sovereign power to make foreign policy in a direct, unchecked and personal way: the great men regulating the affairs of state and exercising their supreme will. This is, of course, an exaggerated view and would not get us beyond a history of personal relationships. This chapter will show just how intimate some of those letters really were; what effect they could have; and what rules and norms they followed. In this way it will demonstrate the connection between personal, dynastic and foreign relations. Three different examples from Prussia, the German Empire and Russia will be examined: (1) the correspondence from Prince William of Prussia to the Tsarina, Alexandra Fedorovna, to demonstrate the importance of women and of those not on the throne; (2) the letters from King Frederick William IV to Tsar Nicholas I, to show their significance in times of crisis; and (3) the well-known correspondence Kaiser William II had with the last Tsar, Nicholas II, before the First World War, in order to highlight a peculiar continuity in German–Russian relations.

* * *

While there had been indirect dynastic links between the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs since the eighteenth century,[7] it was only in 1817 that a daughter of King Frederick William III, Princess Charlotte, married into the inner Romanov family circle, becoming the wife of Grand Duke Nicholas, brother of, and later successor to, Tsar Alexander I. The marriage was clearly welcomed by the two sovereigns of Russia and Prussia. Reporting on the ceremony, which was performed in 1817 in St Petersburg, Alexander I wrote to Frederick William III:

> It was during that memorable struggle, when our peoples — united with each other by the force of destiny — went with us along the path of adversity and glory, and it was, so to speak, in the middle of the battlefield that this union so dear to us was decided. This gives the final touch to the indissoluble alliance between Prussia and Russia by merging our two families into one.[8]

Alexander himself thus interpreted the marriage as having a political significance. Couched in terms of a union of families, he placed it firmly in the international and ideological context of the recent wars fought against France. He meant it to strengthen the link between the two peoples and he established an obligation for future relations between Prussia and Russia. There was no potential for territorial acquisition in this dynastic link. The limits imposed on marriages by the status of both countries as Great Powers could, on the one hand, be disregarded precisely because Prussia's status as such could well be disputed at that time. On the other hand, the general context had changed. The Holy Alliance had established (at least as an argument) a fraternity of sovereigns who, empowered by God alone, were, so to speak, the guardian angels of peace. Competition over territory between the leading families had been replaced, according to this view, by an international alliance of 'fathers of families' respecting each other's legitimate rule.[9]

What, then, was the significance of the dynastic link? Was it merely a symbolic knot between the two countries, a rhetorical device to be used if need be? This partially describes its function, but it was not just a camouflage for the realities of power politics. The practical significance, I contend, lay rather in the opening up of new channels of communication. One of these was between Prince William of Prussia and his sister Charlotte. William was the son of King Frederick William III and younger brother of the Crown Prince, from whom he later took over, first as acting head, then as Prince Regent, and in 1861 as his successor to the Prussian throne. Charlotte became Grand Duchess Alexandra Fedorovna in 1817, Tsarina on the accession of Nicholas I in 1825, and Empress Dowager from the death of Nicholas in 1855 until her own demise in 1861. For most of the time, therefore, their correspondence was not one between reigning monarchs but between mere members of the royal family, both of whom, however, were very close to the respective sovereigns.

William and Charlotte — she used her German name when signing letters to Berlin — wrote to each other regularly from the time of her marriage until her death. They corresponded almost every week, although occasionally tensions between the two countries made writing difficult, even between these two close family members. In 1838, for example, it took William about three months to complete a letter to Charlotte.[10] Tensions were

also revealed from the Russian side, from 1846 onwards, for example, when Nicholas I, because of a disagreement over Prussian domestic policy, forbade Charlotte to set foot on Prussian soil to meet her brothers.[11] Still, despite these political differences the correspondence never ceased completely. On the contrary, some of its significance arose out of the differences in policy. The conditions under which the letters were written and delivered meant that they could criss-cross each other. Theirs was not a businesslike pattern of 'message-and-response' or diplomatic exchange. Apart from being a dialogue it also served as a one-way channel of communication. One of the functions was to pass on news — news of various private, social and public matters, though always, of course, with the chance of giving one's opinions about them; it served as a simple means of conveying knowledge about events in Prussia to the Russian court and vice versa.

The correspondence between William and Charlotte may first be seen as an intimate exchange between brother and sister. They wrote the letters themselves, and used their German mother tongue. It was in principle up to the recipient (and sender) to decide who should see or learn about them. Unauthorized breaking of seals was what their writers were concerned about when they sent the letters by special envoys. The impression that the letters were a mainly private matter between the correspondents is confirmed by the fact that they did not deal predominantly with politics. The partners wrote about what they had done in the past week, who they saw, about social events at court, what they had heard from others and elsewhere, and they conveyed family news. Indeed, William even wrote about matters very dear to his heart, for example about the difficulties he encountered with his wife Augusta, a Princess of Sachsen-Weimar and granddaughter of Tsar Paul I. She most certainly had her own will and decisive political opinons. William detected the reasons for Augusta's opinions in her liberal education, with leanings towards France.[12] When his sister Charlotte, however, ascribed critical comments by William on Russian tariff policy in 1840 to Augusta's influence, he answered her:

> By the way, if you believe that Augusta's dislike of Russia has anything to do with the opinion I expressed, then I think you should know my character well enough not to imagine that she has such

> influence on me! As you say yourself: My trust in and friendship with the Emperor are built on such solid ground that neither can be so easily shaken. And Augusta will be able to do so least of all, since I can testify that however disinclined she may be towards the Russian character in general, she normally tends to have a great love for the Emperor! Unfortunately our attitudes towards Russia and France are so diametrically opposed that we hardly ever mention these two countries, to avoid constant quarrelling.[13]

It can already be seen from this quotation that politics were actually interwoven with 'other matters', and that public affairs entered the correspondence between William and Charlotte. It should nevertheless be stressed that one of the functions of the correspondence was to keep up and develop family ties. They wrote to one another on their respective birthdays and wedding anniversaries, reminded each other of their common past on the anniversary of their mother's and father's death, or showed their appreciation of the partner by reference to special days for him or her. All this did not only serve the purpose of keeping their relationship alive, but also had the general effect of keeping the channels of communication between the dynasties open. By establishing and preserving the bonds between the two groups, the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs, the correspondence between these members of the royal families gave their dynastic link a practical significance beyond their personal relationship.

Indeed, it was meant to do so. Clear evidence of this can be found in the letters themselves, so that the assumption of reading 'private' letters must be modified to a certain extent. Phrases like the following occur again and again over the years in William's letters: 'These are details for Nicky', 'as I am in complete agreement with the Emperor on this', 'to you and the Emperor', 'if my last letter would only be taken to heart [that is, by the Emperor]', 'the question you and the Emperor asked'.[14] Many comments were directly aimed at the Tsar, but it was also generally assumed that Charlotte's husband would read the letters or learn about their contents. In 1847, William wrote, for example: 'Of course, I must ask you to keep this letter secret for the time being, except from the Emperor'.[15] This passage indicates that what William wrote could normally even go beyond the Tsar. It was common practice, as we know from other sources, to show letters to other people, read them out aloud in front of

third persons, pass on passages in correspondence with other partners. In short, though these were private letters and though they could be treated as intimate, their writers knew that they had a wider readership, explicitly demanded privacy when they wanted it, and quite often deliberately calculated or asked for third persons to read their thoughts.

In this communicative setting it was no wonder that William several times attempted to correct rumours about himself or the Prussian kings which went round the European courts and had reached St Petersburg. He also explained events in Prussian policy. Indeed, one important function the correspondence fulfilled was that of mediation. William repeatedly explained the actions of his father or brother, interpreted their words and tried to clear misapprehensions in Russia about Prussian attitudes. In 1828, when King Frederick William III voiced his dislike of the Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire, his son wrote to St Petersburg:

> the thought that all this could reach Nicholas's ears by any other route, without any soothing comments, made me decide to tell you this, and to leave to you whether you mention it to Nicholas [...]. It is all too likely that such things will be picked up by other pens, because Papa speaks about them loudly at dinner and afterwards. — The reason I can reassure you, however, and what makes me certain that Papa will, after all, take your side, is as follows: In his heart of hearts Papa believes Nicholas is fully and completely justified [...].[16]

The Prussian Prince could mediate by means of his correspondence with the Tsar's wife as long as he held a pro-Russian point of view. In addition to the examples already mentioned, his strong interventionist attitude in 1830 against France, Belgium and Poland must have been appreciated in St Petersburg. In this case, without consciously trying to mediate, he in effect showed the Russian government that there were vigorous legitimists in Prussia in contrast to the soft approach which the King and his minister took.[17] William himself knew that in Prussia he was held to be a 'blind follower' of Russia because he cultivated such close ties with St Petersburg.[18]

This basic accord reached its zenith in 1848. After the failed revolution, William shifted away politically from the Russian autocrats. He now accepted the necessity of a constitution,

though with a strong monarchical prerogative, and representative bodies. This put William at odds with the Tsarina and her husband. They let him know this, and he repeatedly justified his views. Relations in this respect did not improve but worsened when William became Prince Regent for his sick brother. His government was termed — full of liberal hopes — a 'New Era'. Yet the Tsarina wrote to him critically in November 1858: 'The whole country, Prussia, even Europe, as though struck by lightning, everything in uproar, red names coming up again [...] Your position is very bad.'[19] And in June the following year she responded to one of his letters by saying: 'The contents hurts me, because your policies and ours are diverging ever further. Never speak of politics to me again.'[20]

If anything could be more marked than the disagreement about domestic policy between the Prince of Prussia and the Tsarina after 1848, then it was their diverging views on the foreign relations between the two countries. The disharmony culminated during the Crimean War (1853–6) and, for the first time, almost interrupted the communication. The cause for disagreement lay in the Prussian refusal to join Russia against the Western allies. Prince William was, in fact, strongly in favour of joining Russia's enemies in order to force her back into line, as he regarded her as having broken international law and endangering the European equilibrium.[21] William was also highly critical of the policy his brother, the King, pursued. Sitting on the fence, in his view, endangered Prussia's status as a Great Power, because she might well be left in the lurch after the war when the others got together and made peace. A Great Power, according to William, must be consulted in all major questions, otherwise it was not one.[22]

William believed that despite these disagreements on domestic and foreign policy, relations between the families could be carried on as normal. So he thought he could go on stating his views in a relatively open fashion. This was, however, in part an illusion. As he held opposite views from his Russian relatives his letters no longer had a directly mediating function. At most, they had such an effect indirectly because his justifications at least explained Prussian actions. Communication was not actually severed. At worst, however, his letters added to the irritation, especially in regard to Prussian policy during the Crimean War when William's view, in combination with that of his brother's

official policy, left the impression of a split in the ruling élite of Prussia. Earlier in the century, William's deviating opinions did not have the same effect. The main reason for this change was that in the 1850s, as heir apparent to his brother, he played a far more powerful role in Prussian politics. This in turn affected his correspondence. Different norms applied, and Prince William had to be careful not to engage in secondary or even subversive communication with the Russian court. The near-break in the correspondence, his inability to travel to St Petersburg, as he had done quite often earlier, and the diminishing political content of the letters — all this was due not just to diverging opinions but also to the changed position he held in the communicative setting. To make this clearer, this chapter will next look at another Prusso-Russian correspondence, the letters from his brother King Frederick William IV to Tsar Nicholas I during the Crimean War.

* * *

The Prussian King and the Tsar were related by marriage. Nicholas, through his marriage to Charlotte, was Frederick William's brother-in-law. They had known each other since the Napoleonic wars and had met repeatedly in Prussia and Russia before and after they ascended to their respective thrones. Their intimacy was indicated by the way Frederick William IV addressed Nicholas. Instead of the formal 'Monsieur mon Frère' or 'Sire' still used by their immediate predecessors, the Prussian King wrote 'Chérissime et bien aimé Nix!' ending his letters with 'Votre fidélissime & tendrement attaché frère & ami Fritz'.[23] Nevertheless, they were quite clearly not as intimate as William and Charlotte, as may be gathered from the fact that they used a more formal language, French. Although this was determined by the need to have a language both understood, it gave these letters a more official character. It also meant, by the way, that they could be more easily read by others.

Family connections generally influenced the pattern of correspondence between reigning monarchs. As mentioned above, it was common to write on the occasion of all those special events in the life-cycle like marriage, birth of children, accession to the throne, deaths in the family. The anniversaries of these events provided an annual opportunity to send a letter if a king

wished to do so. There were other types of events that allowed this as well: thanks might be sent for hospitality after a personal meeting, or a message to commemorate a battle important for both persons or countries. These were accidental political events rather than those determined by family and rites of passage. Both types of occasions were the norm for letters from sovereign to sovereign: kings and emperors usually wrote to each other on what one might call commemorative occasions. It was regarded as a common civility, and it served, of course, to preserve the bonds between families. Besides, it was also a form of exchange which could express a certain community between all reigning monarchs in Europe. These commemorative letters, at the same time, opened and kept open channels of communication. Monarchs did not, generally speaking, write to fellow sovereigns 'out of the blue'. The more distant they felt, dynastically and politically, the more this rule applied. The reverse was valid as well: the more closely they were connected the more easily they could write to one another, not because they could disregard the norms and rules just described, but exactly because they had more events to commemorate together.[24] The relatively close dynastic links between Prussia and Russia served a purpose in this respect.

It should, therefore, not be surprising if many letters between sovereigns appear to be empty, full of formulas and — in a political sense — seemingly meaningless phrases. Their point was, besides the commemoration, to keep on communicating. The general norm provided opportunities to do so. Yet these letters could also serve as an excuse to write about other, politically relevant matters. And they furnished a background of intimacy for correspondence with an obvious political intent — the diplomatic correspondence via *Handschreiben* (personal letter).

Set against these norms and rules, we realize that the letters the Prussian King wrote to the Tsar during the Crimean War were exceptional. We can see this already from the number of letters he wrote. There were usually gaps of some months between the commemorative letters, yet we know of at least twelve letters which Frederick William IV wrote to Nicholas I between September 1853 and August 1854, that is, on average at least one a month. Compared to the famous letters from William II to Nicholas II, which will be treated below, this was an intensive kind

of 'bombardment'. The Kaiser on average only wrote four times per year to the last Tsar.

The letters of the Prussian King in 1853–4 contain almost nothing of the commemorative kind, as they all fall into the category of diplomatic *Handschreiben*. There are, however, traces of the usual personal matters. In August 1854, for example, in a letter mainly concerned with the Russian withdrawal from and the Austrian occupation of the Danube Principalities, Frederick William described how he hurt his leg on a stone bench in the Charlottenburg Park. This prevented him from praying at his father's grave.[25] Knowing Frederick William IV, this reference to his father, the father-in-law of Nicholas I — who in 1840 had hurried to Berlin to be present at his death-bed — was almost certainly not accidental. It was probably a deliberate emotional appeal to the Tsar. Frederick William IV's letters were full of such appeals. They abounded in exclamations and contained many protestations, such as 'Je Vous aime *plus que jamais*. Je Vous sers, je Vous servirai en ami. Et en ami, je Vous dirai la vérité — toute la vérité.'[26] The Prussian King had a very vivid style. His letters always left the impression of being written on the spot, they seemed to convey his true, inner thoughts. Yet this spontaneity was the product of deliberate and careful writing.[27] He often wrote them himself, had their contents checked either in the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by his close counsellors, and, if they were in French, also had them corrected. Leopold von Gerlach, an influential member of the conservative court camarilla and aide-de-camp to the King, commented on one occasion to Graf Münster, the military attaché at St Petersburg: 'The courier is now bringing a letter from the hand of the King, that gave us a lot of trouble and work.'[28] Sometimes the King also received a draft from the Ministry, which, as far as this was possible at all, already had to be written in his own peculiar style.[29]

The letters were often sent by special envoy or handed over by military attachés. In Prussian–Russian relations the latter had a particular position in so far as they were not responsible to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or subordinate to the ambassador but were in direct communication with the King (via the aide-de-camp Gerlach) and attached in person to the Tsar.[30] This form of conveyance added to the seemingly personal touch of the letters. Taking all this together — the familiar address, the

commemorative allusions, the personal style and the special mode of delivery — these *Handschreiben* expressed the King's belief that great affairs were best dealt with by direct communication from sovereign to sovereign.[31] They were manifestations of his belief that monarchs were divinely gifted.

If that was the King's intention and belief he had certainly misjudged reality. It has already been mentioned that the King's letters were known to the Prussian Foreign Secretary. The ambassador in St Petersburg and the special envoys received copies. They were part of the Prussian diplomatic correspondence. We must regard them, therefore, as official letters rather than private ones, despite all the formal trappings of intimacy. Yet they turned out to be a most counter-productive means of communication in the context of European policy. Frederick William was the only monarch who wrote so many letters during the Crimean crisis. Since he specifically composed them according to each recipient, taken as a whole, they created a rather contradictory impression, obviously playing off one fellow sovereign and his government against the other. (Incidentally, the Prussian policy in general left that impression anyway, even without the monarch's correspondence.) But even the letters to one addressee alone created considerable confusion. We have a description of their reception at the court in St Petersburg from where the Prussian military attaché wrote to his confidant, Leopold von Gerlach, in July 1854:

> Here you have another example of the disastrous royal correspondence. The King writes his florid style with a thousand subordinate clauses, parentheses, witticisms, protestations, using expressions that no one understands. The Emperor is irritated, the Empress ditto; the former cannot understand a treatise written in German, the latter neither one in German or any other language. Exercising great self-control, the Emperor has just given the answer (to Manteuffel). Thereupon another letter arrives, imploring him to regard Austria as a friend. You will understand that this is beyond their comprehension and makes them impatient. Then there is the whole crowd of sons and daughters-in-law, everyone understands half of what is going on, is half-listening, but shouts out aloud. Then you walk in and give explanations, and then everyone is likely to be annoyed when they see that they have got it wrong. But this complaining in all directions cannot be undone. That is the curse of these royal letters.[32]

This passage referred to a letter the King had written to the Tsarina, his sister Charlotte, in addition to the ones he wrote to the Tsar. We can now see how wise his brother William had been when he almost completely omitted politics from his private letters to the Tsarina during the Crimean crisis. The description also shows that the letters became known to a larger audience in St Petersburg. And the Tsar, of course, also showed them to his advisers, not only to his family. Strangely enough, Frederick William IV appears not to have taken this into proper consideration. He must have thought that they were safe in the hands of the Russian autocrat because, as we know from a letter written during that period to Queen Victoria, he did not expect the ministers, even in a parliamentary monarchy, to be shown his letters.[33]

In addition to this serious misjudgement of the communicative setting, a misfortune happened which, knowing the general practice of the time, the Prussian monarch should have taken into account or at least have considered possible.[34] What happened was that copies of several of the letters Frederick William IV wrote to the Russian tsars ended up in Paris and London! Corruption and espionage played a role, although we do not quite know how these letters in particular fell into the wrong hands. It was probably connected to the 'Potsdam theft of dispatches' uncovered in autumn 1855. The Foreign Secretary Manteuffel had hired a former Prussian lieutenant, Techen, to spy on his rivals from the conservative camarilla around the King's aide-de-camp, Leopold von Gerlach. Techen even got his hands on diary entries from Gerlach and on the correspondence he had with the military attaché, Münster, in St Petersburg. To make things worse, Techen was not paid well enough and offered his services to others, among them the French ambassador in Berlin. After that, inter-allied co-operation worked well and they were communicated to London. We have a rather embarrassed report by Bernstorff, the Prussian ambassador in London, on the very conversation in which he realized that the British Foreign Secretary was familiar with the King's letters to Alexander II. Bernstorff himself first had to write back to Berlin to check the accuracy of Clarendon's information:

> As far as I am concerned, therefore, there is no doubt that a large and important part of Your Majesty's government's correspondence with

> the Russian court is known, in its entirety, to the English Cabinet, and that in particular, it is aware of the contents of a number of letters which Your Majesty personally has directed to Emperor Alexander. [...] For when I spoke to Clarendon about how the King's government had supported the Austrian suggestions in St Petersburg, and of the letter which Your Majesty wrote to the Emperor of Russia on that occasion, he asked me, smiling ironically, why the Cabinets of the Western Powers had not been informed of the instructions sent to St Petersburg in order to show them that Prussia approved of their suggestions, and therefore supported them? This could not have been done, he went on, because they were not couched in terms which would have allowed them to be communicated in this way. He then quoted a number of expressions and phrases which, he said, were used in Your Majesty's letter to the Emperor, and which seem to have touched him in a particularly unpleasant way. These were of two sorts: first, the expressions of tenderness towards a relation and expressions of friendship for Your Majesty's noble nephew. And secondly, he objected to those phrases in which Your Majesty tried to appeal to the Emperor's emotions most strongly [...], namely, those passages in which you mentioned the subversive passion which would be unleashed if this dreadful war were to go on, and the dangers which they would pose for the stability of all legitimate thrones in Europe.[35]

The consequences of this episode were also spelt out by the ambassador to his King: 'and so it is impossible to avoid the charge of being two-faced'. Even if we discount this case of espionage, probable corruption and inter-allied co-operation, it seems incredible that the Prussian King was so blind to the situation. Considering how many people officially read the letters, and bearing in mind how information was spread in this world of the aristocratic, courtly and diplomatic élite in Europe, the revelation that the Prussian King's policy was two-faced was bound to occur. Did Frederick William IV's belief in the divine gifts bestowed on legitimate sovereigns play a trick on him here?

Winfried Baumgart has shown that the foreign-policy-makers in Prussia, though they might have been familiar with the King's letters to other sovereigns, certainly were often, and deliberately, left in the dark about the King's motives.[36] Baumgart's judgement, that it was Frederick William IV who determined Prussia's neutrality in the war in general and who applied the particulars of policy himself, or at least controlled them personally, is correct. But we must emphasize that, while this may have been the intention, it led to 'moderated anarchy' in Berlin,

and to isolation if not ridicule in Europe, because the King, in fact, was not able to control the effect of the intricate means he had employed.[37] One important reason for this was that the King did not take sufficient account of the communicative setting. As personal letters were an essential part of his actions, this, ironically, proved fatal. The very means that was theoretically designed to further trust and friendship had exactly the opposite effect, namely created distrust. By the end of the Crimean War, the wily King, through the abuse of monarchical relations, especially with Russia, had outwitted himself. He had almost succeeded in being left out of the peace negotiations. Prussia's status as a Great Power was thus severely endangered by its own sovereign. This should finally have put the lid on personal letter-writing of a political nature by Prussian monarchs to their Russian fellow sovereigns. Yet the Prussian–Russian correspondence did not end in 1861 with the death of Frederick William IV.

* * *

The correspondence between the last Kaiser and the last Tsar created astonishment when it was first published at the end of the First World War. After the abdication of Nicholas, the revolutionary government found William II's letters among the papers in the imperial palace. Some were bought by the *New York Herald*, which printed them in its European edition in the original English in September and October 1917.[38] In 1918 they appeared in book form. More letters were later distributed by the Bolsheviks and by the early 1920s editions of letters from 1894 until 1914 were available in English, German and French.[39] The sensation was such that even the *Vorwärts*, the Berlin paper of the Social Democrats who were certainly not inclined to be lenient towards the Kaiser, asserted that they must be forgeries. Their style just seemed wholly inappropriate for diplomatic letters. They were not forgeries, and had the general public known about the Prussian–Russian correspondence earlier on in the century they would not have been so surprised — neither by the existence of the correspondence, nor by its contents, nor by the style of the letters. In principle these conformed to the pattern established earlier.

The familiarity in address should not have surprised readers in the 1920s: 'Dearest Nicky [...] your most devoted and affectionate friend and cousin Willy' only differed in the choice of language, English, from the manner in which Frederick William had addressed the Tsar's great-grandfather. William II and Nicholas II were, after all, related through the marriage of 1817 between Charlotte and Nicholas I. That the letters were full of trivialities, as one of their editors remarked,[40] was not due to William's character but to the conventions of letter-writing between sovereigns. Of the seventy-three letters known to have been written between 1894 and 1914, almost two thirds were of the commemorative kind or took an appropriate event as a starting point. Most of the other letters contained a reference of this sort. It was only during 1904–5 that William II wrote to the Tsar purely on political matters, not waiting for an anniversary to provide the opportunity. Even during that time, though, the commemorative letters were duly sent on the appropiate dates.

The 'Willy–Nicky' correspondence was also not as secret as the *Herald*'s special correspondent Herman Bernstein claimed when the first letters were published in 1917.[41] Contrary to his statement that the Foreign Secretaries had no knowledge of them, they were, like those of Kaiser William's ancestor on the Prussian throne, known to the German Foreign Office, where some of them were drafted and others corrected.[42] When the Kaiser, for example, consulted his Chancellor on a particular letter in 1904 and Bülow asked for a second revision, William answered in a characteristic way:

> Finally, I cannot omit pointing out that there has to be a limit to this permanent editing of my private correspondence with the Tsar. My letters are acquiring more and more the character of notes or memoranda, which they do not otherwise have. It could make the Tsar even more distrustful if it ever occurred to him that my *private* letters were written in the Reichskanzlei! And I might well come to take the view that it is no longer necessary to show you my 'private letters'![43]

Here we find again that peculiar belief that somehow exchanges between sovereigns were not part of the communicative setting in which they took place. The divine gift, William must have thought, was also bestowed on his writings when he assumed that Nicholas had no idea about the

involvement of German officials. There are several appeals to the Tsar's secrecy, and the Kaiser renewed the practice of having an aide-de-camp directly attached to the Tsar's person, and vice versa. These two personal military attachés served as postmen between the two. The special monarchical relations became apparent when the French President Fallières asked the Tsar for the same privilege. William wrote to Nicholas: 'The idea of a swaggering "aide-de-camp" from our Colleague "the woodcutter Fallières" following about in your suite caused me unlimited amusement.'[44] About two years earlier, when William tried to put together the defensive alliance with Russia which was intended to include France, he had let the Tsar know his opinion of their prospective ally. Nicholas wanted to inform the French statesmen before Germany and Russia concluded their treaty but William wrote:

> it is impossible to take France into our confidence *before* we two have come to a definite arrangement. Loubet and Delcassé are no doubt experienced statesmen. But they not being Princes or Emperors I am unable to place them — in a question of *confidence* like this one — on the same footing as you my equal, my cousin and friend.[45]

No misfortune in the form of espionage took place this time but the international world proved as small and communicative as before. For a start, William made a serious blunder when he thought that Nicholas kept his letters secret from his own Foreign Secretary. It should have made him suspicious that the Tsar only answered after longish intervals, even, or especially, to letters of political importance.[46] William's letters with which he hoped to enlighten the young Tsar on the international situation were often merely acknowledged but not fully answered.[47] Indeed, the reports of the Austrian ambassador in St Petersburg show that the 'private' letters were handed to the Russian Foreign Secretary and that their existence, if not necessarily their contents, was known by diplomats from third countries. Nicholas's answers, above all, were apparently drafted, at least in parts, by the Russian Foreign Office, as were William's letters by the German *Auswärtiges Amt*. Prince Liechtenstein, for example, reported in 1896 to Vienna about a conversation he had with the German ambassador Prince Radolin:

> It is [...] known that the German Kaiser and Tsar Nicholas II correspond directly with one another and that Kaiser Wilhelm sees it as his duty to give His Majesty, his cousin, whom he considers to be ill-informed in many things, a true picture of European politics, especially of the threat to the monarchical idea emanating from France. Lobanow has recently told Radolin that the German Kaiser's letters are shown to him, and the German ambassador has the impression that the Russian Tsar's answers to his supreme master reflect not only Lobanow's ideas, but also his expressions.[48]

Not only did Russian officials and foreign diplomats learn about these letters, but the dynastic links between Prussia, the German Empire and Russia were by no means as special as the Kaiser assumed. The Tsar's mother, the Dowager Empress Mariia Fedorovna, had been, before her marriage, a Princess of Denmark. Her sister Alexandra had married the future King Edward VII of England. Harmless as the dynastic link might appear at first sight, it was not so when we learn the proper name of the dynasty they both came from, the house of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg. This was the same family that in 1864–6 lost Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. Indeed it was their father, Christian IX, who had suffered this loss of territory for his dynasty. There was no love lost between them and the Kaiser, and channels of communication between Russia, Denmark and Britain ensured that they knew about their mutual enmity.

Surprisingly enough, William II — like his predecessor Frederick William IV — misjudged the communicative setting. In 1905, shortly after the meeting at Bjoerkoe, where, on his own with Nicholas, he attempted to forge a secret alliance with Russia, he wrote to the Tsar:

> The 'Arch intriguer —and mischiefmaker' in Europe as you rightly call the King of England has been hard at work in the last months. At Cowes he said to one of my friends —a German gentleman I sent to observe the 'Entente Cordiale' — 'I cant [*sic*] find out what has been going on at Bjoerkoe! Benckendorff knows nothing — *for he always tells me everything* — Copenhagen knows nothing and even the *Emperors* [*sic*] *mother — who always lets me know everything* — has heard nothing from her son this time; even Lambsdorff — who is *such a nice man and lets me know all I want to hear* — knows nothing or at least wont [*sic*] tell! It is very disagreeable!' This shows you how very wide is the net of secret information he has cast over Europe and over you.[49]

William's own courtiers knew better. Graf Zetlitz-Trützschler remarked in his notes at the height of the political exchange between the German and the Russian Emperors in 1904: 'I am fairly sceptical about the correspondence between the two monarchs. At the moment there is no prospect of favourable political effects of any magnitude. Indeed, confidential remarks, should they reach further than Petersburg, for example London, could have quite unfavourable repercussions.'[50] The Kaiser's general attitude towards England, and his attempts to play off one fellow sovereign against the other, made their way around Europe.

We should not be misled into thinking that the bad and not-so-bad characters in this dynastic game were the decisive forces. The high point of special monarchical relations between Prussia, the German Empire and Russia, in terms of diplomacy during the age of imperialism, the meeting at Bjoerkoe, turned out to be a non-event. The Russian ministers would not follow their sovereign's lead — and the treaty remained a draft.[51] Only nine years later the 'most devoted and affectionate friends and cousins' were at war with one another. Kings and emperors no longer controlled international relations. Dynasties had long lost out against nationalism and racism. Shortly before the First World War, even their last function, that of providing channels of communication to convey knowledge and possibly to mediate, had lost most of its significance. In 1914, the Austrian ambassador reported from Berlin on a conversation which he had had with William II, who expressed his distorted views on German–Russian relations in the following manner:

> Unfortunately it was a fact [the Kaiser said] that relations between Berlin and St Petersburg left much to be desired. Still, it was regrettable that the German press was also playing with fire and that mention should be made of a possible military encounter between Germany and Russia. In St Petersburg and Paris journalistic outbursts of this sort were being commented on out of self-interest, and the eventuality of a war between Germany and Russia was presented as likely in the near future. He had no need to assure me [the Kaiser went on] that all this was pure nonsense. Russia could not think of war for a considerable time, though this did not prevent it from being most unfriendly to Germany at every opportunity. The 'towering' friendship between Germany and Russia was a lie even in Bismarck's time, despite the former Chancellor's assertions to the contrary, and

> throughout his own twenty-five years on the throne his interest had been only to maintain the outward appearance of friendly relations between the two empires. At the same time the antagonism between Slavs and Germans was continuing. The main thing was therefore to maintain if not intimate, then at least correct relations between the two countries. [...] He, the Kaiser, was conducting a lively correspondence with Tsar Nicholas, although political questions were only touched on superficially.[52]

Communication continued, channels were still open, but no one really listened any longer. Misuse and misjudgement had led to mistrust — and this is always fatal to efficient communication. In the July crisis of 1914, the special monarchical relations between Germany and Russia could not and would not prevent the outbreak of war.[53] Dynastic links between the two countries had, in the past century, fulfilled various functions from conveying court and political news to mediating between their rulers. In their political essence they had proved, certainly since the Crimean War and specifically in the hands of Frederick William IV and William II,[54] a disturbing element in international relations. This was due to their very nature, the 'private' character they had acquired during the nineteenth century. Dynasties no longer ruled over territories but were part of a national polity which they could not control in the same manner as earlier. A monarch's function in international communication was no longer a leading one. The setting had become increasingly complex. Relatively unchecked action in the form of letter-writing was still possible, though only under certain constitutional conditions which Prussia, the German Empire and Russia still fulfilled. This is what made the monarchical relations between the two possible, so special and, ultimately, ineffective and harmful at the same time.

NOTES

Thanks to Jane Rafferty for bringing my English up to scratch, and to her and Angela Davies for their help in translating the German quotations. Translations from the French are my own.

1. See the introduction in *Briefwechsel König Friedrich Wilhelm's III. und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser Alexander I.*, ed. Paul Bailleu, Leipzig, 1900 (hereafter *Briefwechsel*), p. xii, and Brendan Simms, 'The Road to Jena: Prussian High Politics 1804–6', *German History*, 12, 1994, pp. 374–94. Footnotes have been kept to a minimum. On relations between Prussia, the German Empire and Russia in general, see Mechthild Keller (ed.), *Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht. 19. Jahrhundert: Von der Jahrhundertwende bis zur Reichsgründung (1800-1871)*, Munich, 1992; Ludmila Thomas and Dietmar Wulff (eds), *Deutsch–russische Beziehungen: Ihre welthistorischen Dimensionen vom 18. Jahrhundert bis 1917*, Berlin, 1992; Winfried Baumgart *et al.*, *Preußen-Deutschland und Rußland vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1991; and Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin and Werner Conze (eds), *Deutschland und Rußland im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus*, Wiesbaden, 1977. For German foreign policy from 1871, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik: Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914*, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, and Klaus Hildebrand, *Das vergangene Reich: Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945*, Stuttgart, 1995; for Russian foreign policy in general, see William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*, New York, 1992; and for the period before the First World War with special emphasis on the making of foreign policy, see David MacLaren McDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900–1914*, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
2. Quotations from Lamar Cecil, 'William II and his Russian Colleagues' in Carole Fink *et al.* (eds), *German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890–1945*, Norman, OK, 1985, p. 106.
3. *Almanach de Gotha*, Gotha, 1937, p. 109. For the last Tsarina's desire to have this changed, see Dominic Lieven, *Nicholas II: Emperor of All the Russias*, London, 1993, p. 58.
4. See the recent criticism of the 'balance of power' concept by Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, Oxford, 1994, pp. 5–11.
5. See, for example, the attitudes held by the future Kaiser William II in 1884: John C.G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II.: Die Jugend des Kaisers 1859–1888*, Munich, 1993, p. 443, and Ludolf Herbst, *Die erste Internationale als Problem der deutschen Politik in der Reichsgründungszeit: Ein Beitrag zur Strukturanalyse der Politik 'monarchischer Solidarität'*, Göttingen, 1975.
6. See Roger Chartier (ed.), *La Correspondance: Les Usages de la lettre au XIXe siècle*, Paris, 1991, pp. 451–2, and Reinhard Nickisch, *Brief*, Stuttgart, 1991, pp. 13–19.

7. *Briefwechsel*, p. x.
8. Ibid., letter 262, 1/13 July 1817.
9. The term 'fathers of families' stems from the treaty of 14/26 September 1815: see *Key Treaties for the Great Powers, 1814–1914*, ed. Michael Hurst, 2 vols, Newton Abbot, 1972, I, pp. 96–7.
10. See, for example, *Prinz Wilhelm von Preußen an Charlotte: Briefe 1817–1860*, ed. Karl-Heinz Börner, Berlin, 1993 (hereafter *W–C*), letters 158, 19 February 1837, and 169, August–November 1838.
11. *W–C*, letter 299, 15 October 1850.
12. Ibid., letter 161, 8 June 1837.
13. Ibid., letter 174, 31 March 1840.
14. In the order quoted in *W–C*, letters 61, 132, 163, 205 and 260.
15. Ibid., letter 239, 26 January 1847.
16. Ibid., letter 82, 13 July 1828.
17. See ibid., letters 101–10.
18. Ibid., letter 94, 30 December 1829.
19. Charlotte to William, in *W–C*, p. 411, letter of 17 November 1858.
20. Ibid., p. 418, letter of 10 June 1859.
21. See the introduction in *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs. Serie II: Preußische Akten*, ed. Winfried Baumgart, 2 vols, Munich, 1990–1 (hereafter *AGKK2*), I, pp. 42–3.
22. See William to Frederick William IV, 12 March 1854, in Peter Rassow, *Der Konflikt König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. mit dem Prinzen von Preußen im Jahre 1854: Eine preußische Staatskrise*, Akademie der Wissenschaften, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 9, Mainz, 1960 (1961), pp. 704–5. This source edition should now always be read in conjunction with Baumgart's comments in *AGKK2*, I, pp. 42–4, as its interpretation is heavily coloured by moral judgments and prejudice against the 'unruly' Prince.
23. *AGKK2*, I, document 332, 11 June 1854.
24. These remarks are based on my reading of numerous letters between various monarchs in the nineteenth century.
25. *AGKK2*, I, document 398, 5 August 1854.
26. Frederick William IV to Nicholas I in *AGKK2*, I, document 398, 5 August 1854.
27. See introduction to *AGKK2*, I, pp. 32–3, and Winfried Baumgart, 'Zur Außenpolitik Friedrich Wilhelms IV. 1840–1858' in Otto Büsch (ed.), *Friedrich Wilhelm IV. in seiner Zeit*, Berlin, 1987, pp. 132–56 (147–8).
28. Gerlach to Münster in *AGKK2*, I, document 401, 8 August 1854.
29. See *AGKK2*, I, document 87, 8 December 1853.

30. Gerhard Ritter, *Die deutschen Militär-Attachés und das Auswärtige Amt: Aus den verbrannten Akten des Großen Generalstabs*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Heidelberg, 1959, pp. 8, 11–12, 29–30, 47–8. The reference here is to the *Militärbevollmächtigte* ('military plenipotentiary'), a channel of communication peculiar to Prussian–Russian relations, not to be confused with the normal military attachés who were appointed by all powers.
31. See Baumgart's interpretation in *AGKK2*, I, p. 33.
32. Münster to Gerlach in *AGKK2*, I, p. 786, July 1854.
33. Frederick William IV to Victoria in *AGKK2*, II, document 295, 10 May 1855.
34. The King in fact encouraged the rivalry between his own counsellors, which led to underworld practices amongst them, while the King had close contact with the Police Chief. For this and the story that follows, see the Introduction, by Baumgart, in *AGKK2*, II, pp. 40–1.
35. Bernstorff to Frederick William IV in *AGKK2*, II, document 429, 29 February 1856.
36. Baumgart in *AGKK2*, I, pp. 44–8, and Baumgart, 'Zur Außenpolitik' (see note 27 above), pp. 138–55.
37. For an analysis of the 'anarchy' at the heart of the Prussian government in general, see David E. Barclay, *Frederick William IV and the Prussian Monarchy 1840–1861*, Oxford 1995, especially chapter 10.
38. The editions are preserved in Bonn, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (hereafter PA/AA), R 3573: *New York Herald, European Edition*, Paris, 3, 4 and 28 September and 25, 26 and 28 October 1917.
39. *The Willy–Nicky Correspondence: Being the Secret and Intimate Telegrams Exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar*, ed. Herman Bernstein, New York, 1918 (only contains letters of 1904–7); *Briefe Wilhelms II. an den Zaren 1894–1914*, ed. Walter Goetz, Berlin, 1920 (hereafter *Briefe*; also contains the original English versions); *Correspondence entre Guillaume II. et Nicolaus II., 1894–1914*, ed. Marc Semenoff, Paris, 1924.
40. Goetz in *Briefe*, pp. 13–14, 26.
41. *New York Herald, European Edition*, Paris, 3 September 1917.
42. PA/AA, R 3573: Memorandum, Berlin, 4 February 1920. In 1884–5, however, William, when still only a Prussian Prince, had cultivated a secret correspondence with Alexander III: see Röhl, *Wilhelm II.*, pp. 440–5, 452–3, 457–60.
43. PA/AA, R 3573: William II to Bülow, 4 January 1904.

44. *Briefe*, letter 54, 29 January 1906.
45. *Ibid.*, letter 42, 21 December 1904.
46. See the report by William's Lord Chamberlain, Robert Graf Zedlitz-Trützschler, *Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof: Aufzeichnungen*, Stuttgart, 7th edn, 1924, p. 102, 7 December 1904.
47. Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereafter HHStA), P.A.III 147: Szögyény to Goluchowski, Berlin, 18 January 1896.
48. HHStA, P.A.X 107: Liechtenstein to Goluchowski, St Petersburg, 20/8 April 1896.
49. *Briefe*, letter 49, 22 August 1905.
50. Zedlitz-Trützschler, *Zwölf Jahre*, pp. 104–5, 10 December 1904.
51. Barbara Vogel, *Deutsche Rußlandpolitik: Das Scheitern der deutschen Weltpolitik unter Bülow 1900–1906*, Düsseldorf, 1973, pp. 46–8, 204–16, 221–8, 232–3. While William had proceeded in close co-operation with Bülow, Nicholas had acted on his own, but was made to retract by his ministers, Lamzdorf and Witte; on the 'crisis of autocracy' in Russia and especially the attempt to integrate foreign policy into the reform of government between 1905 and 1911, see McDonald, *United Government* (see note 1 above), pp. 78–81 (for Bjoerkoe).
52. HHStA, P.A.III 171: Szögyény to Berchtold, Berlin, 12 March 1914.
53. On Nicholas's position and his waning trust in William II, see Lieven, *Nicholas II* (see note 3 above), pp. 195, 199–202; on William's role in 1914 see Fritz Fischer, 'Kaiser Wilhelm II. und die Gestaltung der deutschen Politik vor 1914' in John C.G. Röhl (ed.), *Der Ort Kaiser Wilhelms II. in der deutschen Geschichte*, Munich, 1991, pp. 259–84.
54. The parallel between Frederick William IV and William II is striking. The 'anarchy' which existed in the 1850s was neither sufficiently moderated nor abolished during the German Empire; for the latter period, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im deutschen Kaiserreich*, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, especially pp. 11–39 ('Das deutsche Kaiserreich als System umgangener Entscheidungen'), 39–65, and 287–315. Emperor William I was an exception, not least because his communications with his Russian colleagues took place in close co-operation with his Chancellor Bismarck. This did not prevent tensions between the Emperors, as was clearly demonstrated by the famous 'Ohrfeigenbrief' Alexander II wrote to William I in 1879; for this episode see Mommsen, *Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik* (see note 1 above), pp. 42–3.

9 The Germans and Czech Statehood in the Twentieth Century

Hans Lemberg

The title of this chapter, 'The Germans and Czech Statehood in the Twentieth Century',[1] is asymmetrical. There are 'the Germans', an ethnic or national group named without further qualification and without regard to their statehood, and on the other hand there is 'the Czech state', a term which de-emphasizes ethnicity or national ascription. This asymmetry is a challenge and raises important issues. How, in fact, did Germans perceive the Bohemian/Czech/Czechoslovak etc. *state*, and what attitude did Germans of various provenance take towards its statehood? The question has been asked only rarely.[2] To trace some aspects of this topic, which has had many variants during the twentieth century, this chapter will examine three periods: the years before 1918, the time of the first Czechoslovak Republic, and the period after Munich.

First, the period before 1918. A modern Czechoslovak state came into existence only on 28 October of that year. However, the history of Czechoslovakia's most important predecessor, the Kingdom of Bohemia, goes back to the Middle Ages. Together with the margravate of Moravia and some Silesian duchies, the Kingdom encompassed the whole of the Bohemian Lands (or Czech Lands, *české země*), the so-called Lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas. These Lands, having fallen under the domination of the House of Habsburg as early as 1526, remained part of the Habsburg domains right up to the first decades of the twentieth century. During that period they lost much territory in the north, but the heartland remained intact largely within its historical borders — Bohemia, Moravia and the remnants of Silesia.[3]

During the nineteenth century, the Bohemian lands were scarcely affected by any of the changes in the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of 1867, that great event, assigned the Bohemian Lands as a whole to the western part of the Monarchy, to Cisleithania. In spite of this remarkable continuity from the Middle Ages to 1918, however, the *image* of this state or remnant of a state changed radically as the age of nationalism developed, beginning with the events of the stormy year of 1848.

The nobility of the Bohemian Lands had fought against the centralizing tendencies of the Vienna Government since the times of Joseph II, and in the course of this struggle they took up the weapon of patriotic particularism. Discovering the Bohemian Lands as their real fatherland, they began to seek the restoration of 'Bohemian State Rights' (*české státní právo*), the Bohemian right to independent statehood.[4] During the second half of the nineteenth century, the bourgeois Czech national movement appropriated this slogan and adapted it to its own use. This appropriation was encouraged by semantic indistinctness: in Czech, as in nineteenth-century German, *böhmisch* and *tschechisch* had the same meaning (in Czech, even today *český* signifies both the territory of Bohemia and the Czech language). So *české státní právo* came to mean not only the rights of the historical Bohemian Lands, but also the rights of the Czech-speaking ethnic community.[5] Consequently, when, in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, some Czech political parties described themselves as 'state-right-minded' (*státoprávní*), they suggested by this title not only the partial or full restoration of the historical autonomy of the Lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas within the Habsburg Monarchy, as supported by the traditionalist nobility; they also implied that the statehood (*státnost*) was to be ethnic Czech, an outcome which was to be achieved and sustained by the 'Czech' national movement.

By the beginning of the present century, this movement had matured and already possessed nearly all the attributes of a modern nation state: only the state itself was missing.[6] Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that until the Great War, even amongst Czech 'state-right-minded' politicians, only very few aimed for a sovereign Czech state free of the bonds of the

Habsburg empire, or a restored kingdom of Bohemia or anything similar.

This state-right motif has recently regained topicality because only now, after the break-up of the Czechoslovak state, have the dreams of the Czech 'state-righters' (*státoprávníci*) apparently been fulfilled: in 1993 a real Czech state came into existence. What was gained in 1918, however, was not a *český stát* but in fact, as a result of the political constellation at the end of the First World War, something greater, namely a Czechoslovak state. Consequently the *státoprávníci*, who were aiming for a proper Czech state, had to change their way of thinking immediately, and some Czech political parties and institutions had to be renamed Czechoslovak. The case of one political party, founded only months previously, in January 1918, is very symptomatic. Originally called Czech State-Right Democracy (*Česká státoprávní demokracie*), it was now renamed Czechoslovak National Democracy (*Československá národní demokracie*): the idea of state rights was now very evidently fulfilled, even outdated. There were even more bizarre changes of name: a book on the Czech national character, for instance, was republished after 1918 under the title 'The Czechoslovak National Character'.[7]

However, to return to the initial question: what did the Germans think of Bohemian or Czech state rights before the coming into existence of Czechoslovakia? And who were 'the Germans' in this context? We may distinguish three groups of Germans. The first comprised the Germans of the Habsburg Monarchy. This group, composed largely of representatives of official Austria or the 'political class', was in general distrustful of the young national movements of the mostly Slav *ethnies*[8] or *Volksstämme* — the term used in the Austrian fundamental laws to describe those nationalities which enjoyed equality of rights with Germans in the Habsburg empire. They usually saw these Slav national movements as manifestations of Russian-dominated Panslavism, a phantom and a bogey which was the perfect counterpart of that other bogey, the German *Drang nach Osten*.[9] The more often the Czech or other national movements played the card of their own statehood, in the sense of asserting Czech state rights, the more nervous official circles in Vienna became. But in the eyes of Vienna there was an issue even more

dangerous and more menacing to public order in Austria: the frequent and vehement quarrels about language.

The second group of Germans were those in the Bohemian Lands. These Germans are, on the one hand, to be generally identified with the Austrian Germans of the first group. On the other hand, however, they were much more sensitive to the discussions of Czech state rights, because they were themselves fearful of becoming a minority in a Bohemian–Moravian–Silesian sub-state of Cisleithania, and had already experienced some of the pleasures of minority status in the workings of Bohemian self-government.[10] It was, therefore, no wonder that the Pan-German (*alldeutsch*) movement gained momentum above all in the Bohemian Lands.

The third group of Germans concerned were the Germans of the Bismarck Reich of 1871. This third group took a level-headed view of the political and national currents on the other side of the border with the Habsburg Monarchy. Of course, misgivings were felt in the German Reich too about 'subversive Slav activities' (*slavische Umtriebe*) or the Panslav menace, and these were reflected from time to time in pejorative remarks by prominent Reich Germans about the Czechs: for instance the derogatory verses of Heinrich Hebbel against the Czech and Polish 'servant peoples' (*Bedientenvölker*) who allegedly threatened the state edifice of Austria, or the notorious comment by the historian Theodor Mommsen that the 'skulls of the Czechs' could not be influenced by rational arguments, but only by blows.[11] However, such animosities were directed generally against the Czech national movement; they were not primarily concerned with the 'Czechification' of Bohemian statehood.

The three groups of Germans just discussed may conveniently be labelled by the names of their respective capital cities — Vienna, Prague and Berlin. In the years of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918–38), the next period to be considered here, the political and cultural landscape outlined above was crucial in determining the images of the new republic which they created. Only during the First World War did it become clear that one consequence of an allied victory would be the foundation of a Czechoslovak Republic. The heterogeneity of the pro-Allied Czech exile press during the war demonstrates the fluidity of the situation before this point. One periodical was called *Independent Bohemia*, another, which appeared in France, *La*

Nation Tchèque, while a third journal took the title *Československá Samostatnost* (Czechoslovak Independence).[12]

It would, of course, be of great interest to observe how the Czechs, or these so-called Czechoslovaks, saw their new state, and how they perceived the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, so crucial for this state's existence. But it would require separate treatment, and the present enquiry restricts itself to the German perspective. How, then, did the Germans perceive the Czechoslovak Republic?

Let us begin this time with the last of the three groups of Germans, the Reich Germans. Even before 1918, the Germans in the Reich, or (to use the symbolic label) Berlin, perceived the Bohemian Lands as a matter of concern for Austria–Hungary alone, and this attitude continued to dominate Reich German thinking after the foundation of the new Republic. This by now customary political distance made it possible for the German Reich to be the first state to recognize the new Czechoslovak Republic,[13] and until the mid-1930s relations between Berlin and Prague remained correct, if not friendly[14] — in marked contrast to German–Polish relations in this period, which were rather strained. The frequent complaints of the Sudeten Germans about the minority policies of the Czechoslovak authorities aroused little sympathy on the part of the Berlin Government, which declared such matters to be the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. Only the increasingly active line of Nazi foreign policy brought a sharper note into relations between Berlin and Prague, tensions rising to the deadly crisis of 1938.

Relations between Czechoslovakia and the reduced Austrian Republic were comparable with the positive relationship between Berlin and Prague. After the Allied decision of 1919 that Sudeten German territories should not form part of German Austria, Austrian–Czechoslovak relations were clear and positive until the end of the First Austrian Republic in March 1938.

A central issue for the present chapter is the attitude to the new Czech Republic of those Germans who, *via facti* and by the terms of the 1919 peace treaty of Saint Germain, found themselves living there: those Germans who called themselves German Bohemians, German Moravians, Prague Germans, and so on, and who only later, for the sake of practicality, were defined by the newly coined general name of Sudeten Germans. In the eyes of these people the situation at the end of 1918 or the beginning of

1919 appeared as follows. The new Czechoslovak Republic had come into existence as a result of the principle of national self-determination proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson. At the time this principle was on its way to becoming a sort of higher fundamental law for restructuring the system of states in Europe, replacing the outdated notion of historical legitimacy. Self-determination was understood in Eastern and Central Europe as self-determination for 'nations' (*Nationen*) or 'peoples' (*národy*), and these were perceived as ethnic groups or ethnies, not (as in the Western European and American world) as etatistic units. Under these circumstances, it was logical and consistent for Sudeten Germans to demand that all Czechs — or, if they insisted, Czechoslovaks — be assigned to one state, and all Germans to another.[15] The great majority of Sudeten Germans saw their fatherland in this historic moment in a 'German Austria' (*Deutsch–Österreich*), which sooner or later, in however long a perspective, must necessarily merge with a common state of all Germans — a solution which had been sought but not achieved in the 1860s. From this point of view, the emphatic determination of the new Czechoslovak Republic to incorporate the whole territory of the historical Bohemian Lands, including the regions of German settlement, was seen as sheer imperialism. In the first months and years of Czechoslovakia, politicians of all Sudeten German parties found themselves in fundamental opposition to this state, which seemed to them to have legitimacy only in the territory inhabited by the Czech and Slovak populations.

This attitude nevertheless soon began to change, especially among such German political and social groups as industrial workers, farmers, capitalists and politicians. Daily life had to go on, and there was evidently no realistic alternative to the presently existing Czechoslovak state. Consequently, the general elections of 1925 produced a two-thirds majority of German votes for the so-called 'activist' German parties, which were prepared to co-operate actively with the majority populations in Czechoslovakia and *ipso facto* to acknowledge their own affiliation to this state.

One significant body of historical and public opinion in Germany places the blame for the failure of 'activism' in the late 1930s principally on the allegedly wilful policies of the Czechoslovak government, and at the same time sees the phenomenal rise of the Henlein movement as in some way

inevitable. In order to test the accuracy of this picture, it will be useful to bring our particular concern to bear and ask how the Sudeten Germans perceived the Czechoslovak Republic during the 1920s and 1930s. Of course, there were certain groups which stuck to their negativist[16] attitude throughout the twenty years of the First Republic. Such people rejected this state fundamentally, either because they subscribed to the Greater German (*großdeutsch*) ideology and could not imagine as their own any state other than a state of all Germans, or because they were Communists and objected to the Czechoslovak Republic as a capitalist state which suppressed its national minorities.

The real problem, however, lay in the camp of the German 'activists' in Czechoslovakia, who were willing and eager to adjust to the political realities of the day and, if possible, to benefit from them. Their aim was to improve the economic and social situation of Czechoslovakia's German citizens by joining in the life of the republic. This positive attitude was facilitated by the significant political and cultural continuity with pre-war Austria. The legal and social system had changed little since 1918, and the modernization of living conditions had affected both Czech and German citizens equally. When, after 1918, a new self-awareness nevertheless arose among the Sudeten Germans, the reason was the almost complete reversal of the relative positions of Czechs and Germans as compared to the situation before 1918. The minority situation of the Czechs in Austria–Hungary before the First World War was nearly identical with that of the Germans in Czechoslovakia after the war. This meant that in both cases life was quite agreeable for the minorities, but that there were also certain areas of discomfort, mostly psychological and sometimes bitterly painful for the persons concerned. These were the well-known 'pin pricks', be it the order of Czech and German names on street signs, or — felt much more acutely — the necessity for state servants of German nationality to learn the Czech language and to be examined in it, the dismissal of thousands of them, the agrarian reforms which severely affected a large number of German landowners, and so on.[17]

Another rather obvious circumstance seems to be of great importance here: for the Sudeten Germans it was impossible to look at Czechoslovakia from without, in an objective way. For them Czechoslovakia was, willy-nilly, their own state, not merely,

as the title of this chapter has it, a *Czech* state. This powerful sentiment of belonging together, this fellow-feeling of Germans and Czechs in spite of all the hardships and the differences in day-to-day political strife, derived its strength from the common cultural tradition which the two sides had shared through the centuries. Elizabeth Wiskeman's book on Czechs and Germans describes a significant scene from the nervous months of the Sudeten crisis. A nationalist Sudeten German who had travelled to the beloved land of Hitler's Germany returns to hated Czechoslovakia and, crossing the border, at once has a strong feeling of coming home from a foreign country.[18]

Given this rather ambiguous situation, it is even more interesting to ask how Czechoslovakia perceived herself, or how her leaders fashioned the so-called 'Czech state idea' (*Idea Československého státu* was the title of a pompous two-volume publication of 1937).[19] Here it may appear that insufficient effort was made to enable citizens belonging to national minorities to identify themselves fully with this state. This was true even for the Slovaks, who according to official doctrine were part of the state-forming nation. What did the reverence for the Protestant and Hussite Idea proclaimed in Prague mean to the mostly Catholic Slovaks? And did not the attempt to 'de-austrify' (*entösterreichern, odrakouštit*) the new republic throw out the baby with the bath-water by neglecting, or even dismissing, the traditional links of the Bohemian Lands with German or Austrian culture and deliberately reorientating Czechoslovakia to the cultural and political world of Western Europe and the USA?[20]

However, daily bread comes first, before cultural matters. Herein lay the main reasons for accusations against 'this state', as it was called, of supposed hostility towards its German *Volksgruppe* (ethnic group or 'minority' — a word which the Germans did not like). We are dealing here with a phenomenon which was by no means restricted to inter-war Czechoslovakia: wherever an economic crisis strikes a considerable group of the population, this group tends immediately to blame this on the government and on alleged policies of oppression. It is not easy to assess the extent to which the very difficult situation in Czechoslovakia after the Depression really conformed to this pattern. But certainly the critical increase of national tensions, evidently determined at root by the economic situation, also

resulted from the coincidence of two essentially political circumstances. First, the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler had introduced full employment through rearmament in a manner which exerted a powerful attraction and held great public-relations appeal for the Reich's co-nationals beyond the borders in Czechoslovakia, where the misery of unemployment was widespread. On the other hand, at this critical point in the mid-1930s the suprapartisan Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (later Sudetendeutsche Partei), led by Konrad Henlein, began to attract great support in the German constituency; while at the same time the government, from 1935 under the new Presidency of Edvard Beneš, missed the opportunity for concessions in the minority question — even in matters where they would have cost little, especially when compared to the enormous concessions extorted in 1938, even before Munich, by the Sudeten Germans supported by Hitler.[21] The decisive influence on the course of events was, without doubt, the imperialist policy of Hitler's Third Reich, which threatened the very existence of Czechoslovakia from without, using the Sudeten Germans as the vehicle for its policy.

It was the Sudeten crisis of 1938, prepared by the *Anschluß* of Austria to the now Greater Germany, which precipitated catastrophe in the relationship between the Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia. The Sudetendeutsche Partei, which, meanwhile, had become by far the strongest German political force in Czechoslovakia, was now more and more open in its proclamation of irredentist aims, in slogans like 'Lieber Führer mach uns frei / von der Tschechoslowakei' (Dear Führer, free us from Czechoslovakia) or 'Heim ins Reich' (Back home to the Reich). Now the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans, even the majority of the former 'activists', turned their back on the so-called *Tschechei*, which to many Sudeten Germans was now (and only now) nothing more than the mere state of the Czechs and the Slovaks, to which Germans did not wish to belong. Nevertheless, this picture was not without exceptions: most Sudeten German conscripts obeyed the call-up in the days of pre-Munich crisis, and there was a small but important minority among the Sudeten Germans in the republic which remained faithful after the Munich Treaty as well, and even in persecution, exile and concentration camps. Generally speaking, however, after the Sudeten Crisis, and still more after the Munich *Diktat*, only a few small groups among the Germans of

Czechoslovakia continued to accept the Republic as their own. Of these, the most important were the Social Democrats, if we leave aside the Communists, who, meanwhile, as a consequence of the new Popular Front line of the Comintern, had made a U-turn from negativism to support of the Republic.

An essential part of the story which must also be recalled is the tragic wartime epilogue to this 'conflictful community' (*konfliktní společenství*), as Jan Křen aptly termed the relationship between Czechs and Germans in this one country,[22] an epilogue which was acted out on the London stage between two groups of exiles. One of them represented the Czechoslovak state with its government-in-exile, under President Beneš; the other was the nucleus of the faithful remnants of Sudeten German 'activism', led by the Social Democrat party leader Wenzel Jaksch, who fought for the right of Sudeten German exiles to enlist in the British and the Czechoslovak-exile armed forces fighting Hitler's Germany, and who strove desperately to build new foundations for a post-war Czech–German democratic community. The tragedy can be followed in the slow but steady change of Beneš's policy from a near-friendly attitude, still evident in 1940–1 when Jaksch was offered a seat in the Czechoslovak state council-in-exile, to total denial of contacts even with the anti-Hitler democratic exponents of the idea of 'good' Germans in Czechoslovakia. In direct parallel, there emerged the idea of the unconditional and comprehensive transfer of the Sudeten German population to Germany, once Czechoslovakia had been liberated.[23] The files of the British Foreign Office contain expressions of disgust at this change of attitude on Beneš's part.

The third period to be considered is that ushered in by the division between Czechs and Germans. The progressive destruction of Czechoslovakia (the Munich treaty of Autumn 1938, the separation of Slovakia and the formation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939) finally shattered completely the community of Germans and Czechs in the Czech lands, breaking links which had united them in their common activities for centuries. The Protectorate was organized on the pattern of colonial territories in Africa; the dubious role of the Reichsgau Sudetenland still awaits thorough analysis — perhaps the title of Grünwald's book *Opfer und Täter* may be significant, meaning that the Sudeten Germans were victims and perpetrators alike.[24] The notorious facts of the occupation

regime and of Nazi plans for the post-war period, developed and elaborated during the war, led to the situation in 1945 whereby the Sudeten Germans were confronted with the now derisive proclamation of their own former slogan, 'Heim ins Reich'. More than 95 per cent of the Germans (approximately 3.2 million) had to leave the restored Czechoslovak Republic; the relatively small number remaining were severely restricted in their civil rights and remained without guaranteed minority status until 1990.

Thus, as far as the question of 'the Germans and the Czech state' is concerned, during the half-century from the late 1940s there existed a completely new situation. The answer to the question now seemed logical and simple: after 1946 it was either/or, A or B. Germans could now look at the Czechoslovak Republic only from without. A further simplification of the issues involved arose from the fact that there now existed a newly established, newly consolidated and fully autonomous Austrian nationality, different from its pre-war counterpart. The term 'Germans' could now no longer include Austrians. (How Austrians have perceived the Czech state in the post-war period is a separate topic, and beyond the scope of the present chapter.)

A closer look, however, will show that things are not as simple as they may seem. The end of the life shared by Czechs and Germans in one state did indeed make the relationship of any Bonn or Berlin Government with the ČSSR or even the ČSFR much easier than that of the Weimar Republic with the ČSR. But on the other hand, the new situation also produced mechanisms of psychological repression. In Czechoslovakia, as also in the German Democratic Republic, the recent events of expulsion and population transfer were made taboo, and with them also the history of centuries of Czech and German coexistence in one country. Furthermore, from the 1950s to the late 1980s, 'the Germans' did not exist as a single group: two semi-national units were developing in the new German states of the GDR and the Federal Republic. And the former Sudeten Germans living in both these states kept or developed their own specific attitude towards Czechoslovakia, which influenced, to some limited extent, the political line of the Federal Government of West Germany.

This becomes evident if one tries to identify the social groups among present-day Germans who take any interest in the former

Czechoslovakia or the new Czech Republic.[25] For the background to this question, one has to recall the tradition mentioned above, going back to the Bismarckian German Reich in the nineteenth century, of lack of interest in the Bohemian Lands. It is still so to-day: for the German public in general, events in Poland are far more interesting than those in Czechoslovakia or Czechia. The Czech state has attracted the attention of the German public only in cyclical phases, after 1945, for example, in the years 1948, 1968 or 1977, and of course also in 1989 and for a time thereafter. Between these dates there have been periods in which things Czech have fallen back into oblivion, and general German interest in Czechoslovakia has been restricted to certain population groups only, among which by far the largest consists of people of Sudeten German origin — even if the small clusters of specialized journalists, economic experts in so-called 'Eastern trade', academics specializing in Bohemian and Czech studies, diplomats and others have been the most important sources for a continuous perception of the eastern neighbour-state, at least in the former Federal Republic of Germany.

The new Czech Republic of 1993 is, for the first time since the Reformation, a real Czech state — and in a way this is the state the Czech 'state rightists' of the last decades of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth centuries might have dreamt of. In one respect it is even more than that: this new Czech Republic has no significant national minorities, not even a German one comparable in any meaningful way with that of 1918 or 1937. As far as one can see, this circumstance is acknowledged in Czechia but is not being taken as cause for celebration. Other problems are more pressing today.

In conclusion, let us return once more to the question of present-day German attitudes towards this new Czech state. We may summarize initially by saying that the former situation has changed completely: of the traditional three categories of Germans only one has survived. The coexistence of Czechs and Germans in one state in the numerical proportion of 2:1 has ended irrevocably. However, the problem of the 'lost' Germans causes pain in the Czech Republic which can be compared to the pains sometimes felt after amputation, in the phenomenon of the so-called phantom limb. In Germany, some (though not all) Sudeten German organizations demand material compensation

from the Czech Republic, if not the right to return to their former homeland; and these demands are often put forward in vociferous and radical tones. These demands are noted less in Germany than in the Czech Republic, where they are received with great irritation and sensitivity, a sensitivity encouraged by certain political groups who hope to catch fish in these still muddy waters.

However, it may not be an illusion or an exaggeration to make a prognosis here which perhaps at first sounds absurd: that the presence of Sudeten Germans and their descendants in Germany and Austria will, in the long run, have positive consequences for future German–Czech relations. This influence may be comparable to that of the Huguenots in Germany, whose ancestors likewise left their French homeland under duress, some centuries ago, and who today are nevertheless important factors in the good relations between Germany and France. If one looks more closely at the present picture of the many positive contacts between Germany and the Czech Republic, signs of this leavening function are clearly discernible, both during recent decades and in the present — even if, in the babble of publicity (to change the metaphor), such tones are for the most part less audible than more radical voices.

Examination of government policy in the enlarged Germany of today, and also assessment of all predictable alternative outcomes after future elections (which will be what really counts), suggest that German attitudes to the Czech Republic can be summarized by the title of the first treaty signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, after the collapse of the Communist regime: 'Good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation'. Even if everyday relations, with their numerous problems, including international ones, have replaced the euphoria of the new beginning in which the treaty was born, this formula still seems valid today.

NOTES

1. The contents of this chapter have been published with some variations in a Czech version as 'Němci a český stát ve 20. století' in Frank Boldt (ed.), *Velké dějiny — malý národ. O dnešní české státnosti a o současném odkazu velkých dějin zemí české koruny a Československé republiky*, Prague, 1995, pp. 22–33.
2. Among the rare exceptions to this rule are Eugen Lemberg, 'Volksbegriff und Staatsideologie der Tschechen', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, 8, 1959, pp. 161–7, and, more recently, Hans Lemberg, 'Deutsche und Tschechen in der gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung' in Hans Süssmuth and Fritz Pleitgen (eds), *Deutschlandbilder in Polen und Rußland, in der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn*, Schriften der Paul-Kleinewefers-Stiftung, 1, Baden-Baden, 1993, pp. 207–21.
3. For a detailed survey of the history of Bohemia, see Jörg K. Hoensch, *Geschichte Böhmens: Von der slavischen Landnahme bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1987.
4. See Milan Myška, 'Der Adel der böhmischen Länder: Seine wirtschaftliche Basis und ihre Entwicklung' in Armgard von Reden-Dohna and Ralph Melville (eds), *Der Adel an der Schwelle des bürgerlichen Zeitalters 1780–1860*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte, Mainz, Abteilung Universalgeschichte, Beiheft 10, Stuttgart, 1988, pp. 169–90.
5. On the problem of Bohemian state rights, see Ernst Birke and Kurt Oberdorffer (eds), *Das böhmische Staatsrecht in den deutsch-tschechischen Auseinandersetzungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Marburg an der Lahn, 1960.
6. Jiří Kořalka, 'Aufstieg der tschechischen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft' in Kořalka, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa. Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen Ländern*, Schriftenreihe des österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Instituts, 18, Vienna and Munich, 1991, pp. 76–125.
7. Hans Lemberg, 'Unvollendete Versuche nationaler Identitätsbildungen im 20. Jahrhundert im östlichen Europa: Die "Tschechoslowaken", die "Jugoslawen", das "Sowjetvolk"' in Helmut Berding (ed.), *Nationales Bewußtsein und kollektive Identität: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, pp. 581–607, especially p. 588.

8. For the use of this term see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, 1986, Part I. (Smith, however, uses the same form for singular and plural.)
9. Wolfgang Wippermann, *Der 'deutsche Drang nach Osten': Ideologie und Wirklichkeit eines politischen Schlagwortes*, Darmstadt, 1981.
10. See Jiří Kořalka, 'Mehrheiten und Minderheiten in den politischen Vertretungskörpern der böhmischen Länder' in Kořalka, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa*, pp. 126–74.
11. Quotations in Hans Lemberg, 'Deutsche und Tschechen — die nationalen und die staatlichen Beziehungen' in O. Anweiler, E. Reißner and K.-H. Ruffmann (eds), *Osteuropa und die Deutschen: Vorträge zum 75. Jubiläum der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde*, Osteuropaforschung, 25, Berlin, 1990, pp. 192–222, especially p. 197.
12. Cf. Ernst Birke, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Gründung der Tschechoslowakei 1914–1919' in Karl Bosl (ed.), *Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder*, 4 vols, Stuttgart, 1967–70, III, pp. 239–447, with opulent bibliography; also Frank Hadler (ed.), *Weg von Österreich! Das Weltkriegsexil von Masaryk und Beneš im Spiegel ihrer Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1914 bis 1918. Eine Quellensammlung*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, new series, 34, Berlin, 1995.
13. This was done in a premature way by the German Consul General in Prague. Cf. Manfred Alexander, 'Die reichsdeutsche Politik gegenüber der ČSR zwischen 1918 und 1938' in Peter Glotz *et al.* (eds), *München 1938: Das Ende des alten Europa*, Essen, 1990, pp. 63–73.
14. See the voluminous document edition, *Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag: Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik*, 6 vols to date, Munich, 1983–, I, 1983, ed. Manfred Alexander; IV, 1991, ed. Heidrun and Stephan Dolezel.
15. For the fluid situation in 1919, see Hans Lemberg and Peter Heumos (eds), *Das Jahr 1919 in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ostmitteleuropa*, Bad Wiesseer Tagungen des Collegium Carolinum, 17, Munich, 1993.
16. Here, the contrary of 'activist'.
17. See Rudolf Jaworski, *Vorposten oder Minderheit? Der sudetendeutsche Volkstumskampf in den Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und der ČSR*, Stuttgart, 1977.

18. Elizabeth Wiskeman, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia*, London, 1938, 2nd edn, 1967.
19. J. Malypetr *et al.* (eds), *Die Tschechoslowakische Republik: Ihre Staatsidee in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Prague, 1937.
20. This was deplored by pro-government contemporaries: see Minister Spina's words, quoted in Hans Lemberg, 'Die Tschechoslowakei im Epochenjahr 1933', *Bohemia Zeitschrift*, 25, 1984, pp. 313–32 (330). Czech translation: 'Československo v přelomovém roce 1933', *Český časopis historický*, 88, 1990, pp. 881–97.
21. Cf. Ferdinand Seibt, *Deutschland und die Tschechen: Geschichte einer Nachbarschaft in der Mitte Europas*, Munich, 3rd edn, 1993.
22. Jan Křen, *Konfliktní společenství: Češi a Němci 1780–1918*, Prague, 1990 (German translation in press).
23. Cf. Hans Lemberg, 'Die Entwicklung der Pläne für die Aussiedlung der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei' in Detlef Brandes and Václav Kural (eds), *Der Weg in die Katastrophe: Deutsch-tschechoslowakische Beziehungen 1938–1945*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa, 3, Essen, 1994, pp. 77–92.
24. Leopold Grünwald, *Sudetendeutsche — Opfer und Täter. Verletzungen des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes und ihre Folgen 1918–1982*, Munich, 1983.
25. This has been attempted in Hans Lemberg, 'Deutsche und Tschechen in der gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung' (see note 2 above).

10 Invited but Unwanted? Migrants from the East in Germany, 1890–1990

Karen Schönwälder

Over the centuries, thousands of Germans have migrated from the territories between the rivers Rhine and Elbe to regions further east. This migration has been a focus not only of historiographical but also of political controversy. Migration, however, was not a one-way movement. If, historically, the flow was overwhelmingly from west to east, in the modern period the picture has become more complex, and migration from Central and Eastern Europe to the German lands has formed a central feature of German history in the past century. Many inhabitants of present-day Germany are descendants of such migrants from the east or have themselves migrated from east to west. Their ancestors may, in the late nineteenth century, have left their villages in the border regions of Prussia and the tsarist empire to work in the industrial and mining centres further west. Decades later, others had to leave their homes in East Prussia or Silesia as a consequence of the Second World War. More recently, millions of East and Central Europeans have sought a better life in Germany, where some of them were welcomed as 'fellow Germans' while others were at least temporarily accepted as new 'guest workers'. This chapter will, first, outline the major features of the migratory movements in the last one hundred years, concentrating on labour migration. It will then turn to a discussion of how those migrants from the east were received in the German states: invited but unwanted?

At the time of the *Kaiserreich*, the empire founded in 1871, migrants from the east formed one part of a huge migratory movement. The predominant feature of these movements was,

until about 1890, emigration. Between 1820 and 1925, approximately 5.8 million people left the German lands to go to America. Not until the end of the century did German industry became strong enough to provide employment for all the population of the empire. But in the 1890s, Germany became a country of immigration (as immigration now exceeded emigration) and of major internal migratory movements. 'Mass emigration was succeeded by migration inside the empire from the open country to the city, from agriculture to industry, from the east to the west. There was also some immigration of foreign labourers.'[1] It is estimated that about two million people took part in the internal migration from east to west. About 20 per cent of them were ethnic Poles. These Prussian Poles (and Masurians) became the so-called Ruhr Poles or the Poles of Berlin. They were Prussian German citizens, not foreign nationals, who mainly came from the regions Prussia had acquired in the Polish partitions. Emigration and migration to the west created a huge shortage of labour in East Elbian agriculture. The *Leutenot* was satisfied by the employment of migrant labourers from still further east. By 1914, the number of foreign workers in Germany had increased to about 1.2 million. In 1907, about 60 per cent of the foreign employees held Russian or Austro-Hungarian citizenship; in Prussia about 70 per cent of the foreign agrarian labourers were foreign Poles. Increasingly, foreign workers were employed in industry. Apart from eastern migrants, Italians accounted for a large share of the migrant population.[2]

Foreign workers were desperately needed in German agriculture and industry; many of them were actively recruited. Nevertheless, their employment was fiercely attacked. One of the opponents of the recruitment of Poles, in particular, was the sociologist Max Weber. As a contributor, in the early 1890s, to a study of the socio-economic changes in East Elbian agriculture, he had analysed how the shift to intensive cultivation and to the cultivation of root crops was accompanied by a seasonalization of agricultural employment. As the owners of the large East Elbian estates now wanted to work as much of the estate as possible themselves, they became increasingly reluctant to rent out any land. As root crops required intensive labour, but only in limited periods of the year, the landowners increasingly tried to rid themselves of those peasants who had formed part of the

estate and had been granted an allotment. More and more such resident labour was replaced with seasonal labourers who received money wages, and many of whom were Poles from the tsarist or the Austro-Hungarian empires. For the local population, exclusively seasonal employment meant insecurity and impoverishment, to which they reacted by a flight into industrial work. Weber was fiercely critical of the pauperization of the German peasants and of what he saw as the resulting 'Slavic flood which could mean a cultural regression of several generations'. In the view of the young social scientist, the existing distribution of landed property and the economic interests of the large landowners constituted a threat to German culture and the German people; migration across the eastern border and the employment of foreign workers should be banned; the German peasant should be enabled and motivated to stay.[3] To some extent, this was a typical statement in a conflict which characterized the time of the empire: the conflict between the economic interest in cheap and flexible labourers from the east, and the political nationalism which saw the Poles, in particular, as a threat which had to be contained and prevented from spreading further inside German borders. In 1885, following the logic of political nationalism, Prussia closed its eastern borders, a measure accompanied by an expulsion of all those ethnic Poles who were regarded as foreign citizens. 'We want to get rid of the foreign Poles', Bismarck told the Prussian parliament in 1886, 'because we have enough of our own. The number of the Poles in the Eastern provinces of Prussia must be diminished, and that of the Germans increased. The former object is being attained by the expulsion of foreigners; the latter may be attained by introducing German settlers.'[4] Even at the time, the wave of expulsions caused embarrassment, probably because of the huge numbers involved: about 30,000 expellees who had often lived in the country for many years and now had to leave within days.[5] Among the motives for this measure were fears of a strengthened Catholicism and of support for Polish national and thus separatist demands, as well as a growing nationalist hostility towards minorities. Jack Wertheimer has argued that anti-Jewish attitudes and the increasing influence of antisemitic agitation played a part in the expulsions. Indeed, Jewish migration already then attracted particular attention and hostility. In fact, only a few tens of thousands of Jews from the

tsarist empire and Austria–Hungary immigrated into Germany, while many more were merely passengers in transit for America.[6]

In 1890, the landowners succeeded in having the ban on recruitment from the east lifted. A compromise between political interests and economic demands was found in the strictly seasonalized migration of Polish workers: they were admitted only between April and the end of the year. Initially, 'foreign' Poles were admitted only to the four eastern provinces; from 1891 they could also work in the middle and western provinces but here only in agriculture, not in industry. Thus a hierarchy was introduced in which Poles were treated differently from, for example, Italians, but later also from Ruthenian migrants, who, after 1905, were no longer forced to leave Germany in the winter. Tight controls were introduced for all migrant labourers, and the system of permits and controls developed from the early twentieth century formed the basis of later arrangements. The obligation to leave Germany for three months every winter was meant to ensure that no settlement would take place. Additionally, the migrant labourers were not allowed to bring their families. Short-term permits ensured the use of migrants as a buffer in times of boom and crisis respectively.

In the Weimar Republic, selective discrimination against Polish migrants was abolished. The existence of a Polish state as a negotiating partner and the influence of the labour movement in Germany ensured improvements such as equal wages for German and foreign citizens, and migrants were (at least officially) included in the accident and sickness insurances.[7] However, Weimar governments were fairly radical in their attempts to reduce and control migrant labour. Immediately after the war, the great majority of the then about two million foreigners, who had actually kept the war economy going, were sent home.[8] Due to unemployment and preferential treatment of German citizens, the number of foreign workers was now significantly reduced. But estate owners in Pomerania, for instance, continued to insist that Polish seasonal labourers were indispensable, as only they were prepared 'to undertake the back-breaking task of digging potatoes and harvesting sugar beets' and to accept life in cramped barracks. As Shelley Baranowski writes in her study on Pomerania, the 'substandard, overcrowded, and often filthy quarters of the Polish contingent, in which women and children predominated, produced high rates of illegitimacy, infant

mortality, and infanticide'.[9] In 1927, Germany and Poland signed a treaty on agrarian labourers. It was one German interest in this context to be able to repatriate Polish nationals who had become settled in Germany. The Polish government initially opposed this but later accepted German demands and, as a result, altogether some 50,000 Poles who had put down permanent roots were compelled to revert to a migratory seasonal labour scheme.[10] Such systems kept labour cheap, as payment was granted only for ten months. As settlement was prevented, a flexible labour force was created which was adjustable to crises (annual quotas were fixed) and had an advantageous structure (mainly young, single, often female). These labourers were unlikely to be organized and did not cause huge welfare or educational expenses. Regulation and control, in Weimar times, followed German labour market demands and became part of a now existing labour market policy: residence permits were issued only if employment was secured, and strict controls were exercised by the employment agency, which required employers to apply for permission to employ foreigners and migrant labourers to carry registration cards. All these restrictions applied to manual workers only, not to white-collar employees and businessmen.

A number of authors have stressed the continuities from the development of a highly regulated system of labour import around the turn of the century to the 'guest worker' recruitment of the Federal Republic of Germany. They have pointed to the facts that the German labour market dictated the numbers admitted and that the interests of the German state determined (and still determine) the right of residence. There was, and is, a high degree of state intervention, and it has been a continuously pursued aim of German governments to attract migrant labourers but to prevent immigration.[11] Nevertheless, as Ulrich Herbert has emphasized, the years of the Second World War, with the racial hierarchy applied to foreign and forced workers (in particular those from the east) and their often horrendous treatment, should be seen as a distinct phase.[12]

This chapter does not attempt to give a comprehensive account of the movements of migrant labour into German states, and its regulation. After 1945, of course, labour migration from the east did not continue along traditional lines. The migrants from the east of this period were former citizens of the Third

Reich and ethnic Germans who wanted or who had to leave Polish and Soviet (and other East European) territories. In the last weeks of the war, millions of Germans had fled west with the retreating German troops. Many others were expelled after the end of the fighting. According to official German estimates, in 1950 about twelve million of the West and East German population were expellees.[13] In the territory of the Soviet zone of occupation, the population increased from 15.2 million (before the war) to 17.6 million in 1946 — in spite of the wartime losses. Nearly one quarter (22.3 per cent) of the population were newcomers.[14] Later, smaller groups of migrants came as refugees: in 1956 from Hungary, for example. From the 1960s onwards, the East German state recruited Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian labour. And finally, since the second half of the 1980s, (West) Germany has witnessed a significant short- and long-term immigration of East Europeans. Thus, in 1986, about 11,000 Poles applied for asylum in Germany, and in 1989 the figure was already about 29,000. By this time official statistics recorded 220,000 Poles in West Germany. In 1990, 35,000 Romanians arrived as refugees, but the German government made great efforts swiftly to repatriate these, generally rejected, asylum-seekers. In a parallel move, Germany concluded agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which established three categories of migrant labourers. These are, first, the *Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer* [contract workers/employees], who come to Germany with their employers — at least this is the official version. Numbers, in 1992 and 1994, ranged between 65,000 and 100,000, and the largest contingent of contract labourers came from Poland. Secondly, there are 'guest workers', a small group of people who come to improve their skills; and, finally, seasonal labourers admitted for up to three months. The numbers of the latter are not restricted, but they can only be employed if no German or EU-applicant can be found. In 1994, about 150,000 seasonal workers were employed, mainly in agriculture, of whom about 80 per cent were Poles.[15] The employment of contract workers, on building sites in particular, has been heavily attacked as cheap competition. Illegal employment exists on a significant scale. Recently debated measures, such as the obligation to pay wages according to German wage agreements, aim at reducing conflicts and abuse. To a certain extent, the current migrant labour schemes could be

seen as repeating earlier patterns characterized by an uneven economic development and the importing of a flexible labour force under strictly controlled conditions, which ensure that this labour force is adjustable to German economic demands and that migration does not become immigration.

* * *

Migrant labour has been an essential component of the German economy in the past one hundred years; migrants were invited (or, during the wars, forced) to take up jobs, although their movements were tightly controlled. To what extent were they 'unwanted'? To return to the *Kaiserreich* and the question of support for the nationalist rejection of immigrants from the east: how popular were the Bismarckian expulsions, the nationalistic discrimination against Poles, and organizations such as the Pan-German League? Obviously this is very difficult to assess. Here, by way of illustration, is an autobiographical text. A fourteen-year-old boy from Hinterpommern describes how, in 1881, he was recruited to work for a sugar factory in Schleswig-Holstein. Together with forty-five men, women, boys and girls he travelled via Schneidemühl, Berlin and Hamburg. On their arrival in Berlin, other travellers greeted them as 'another gang of Polacken', or as 'the stupid Polacken' — a derogatory term for Poles. The boy did not even speak Polish, he regarded the 'real Polacken' as inferior to himself, but for the Berlin population all those simply dressed, rural people who spoke strange dialects and came from the eastern provinces of Pomerania, West Prussia or Silesia were 'Polacken' — and, in a similar way, the boy regarded himself as a *Sachsengänger* although he was not at all 'going to Saxony'.[16] Popular perceptions of 'us' and 'them' do not necessarily follow official definitions. Decades later, after 1945, Germans who had had to leave their now Polish or Russian home countries would encounter rejection in Schleswig-Holstein or Niedersachsen as Poles or 'Polacken'. Indeed, recent research has to some extent questioned the commonly told success-story of Germany's smooth integration of the refugees and expellees after 1945, and has taken a closer look at the considerable conflicts which erupted between natives and newcomers. Research so far seems to suggest that tensions were greater in rural regions. For the Ruhr area Alexander von Plato has argued

that, as everybody there had experienced the destruction of their living environment, as many had been uprooted and the population of the big cities had partly been evacuated, the difference between 'homeless foreigners' (*heimatlose Fremde*) and natives whose home country had become unfamiliar (*fremd gewordene Heimat*) was not that significant.[17] The rural regions, on the other hand, were far less affected by the war but had to accommodate the majority of the refugees. Peasants complained that the refugees did not get up at five in the morning to help with the cows, and often they did not like their lifestyles or dialects. Refugees might encounter rather cynical labels, such as 'homeless' or '*herumzigeunernd*' (rootless like gypsies). Those from West Prussia or the Poznań region (the *Warthegau* of wartime Germany) occasionally found themselves being attacked as '*Polacken*' who practised a disorderly '*polnische Wirtschaft*' (lived in a Polish muddle) and did not speak proper German. There were even petitions to the military administration to free one rural region in southern Schleswig from a 'flood' threatening the 'nordic character of the people'.[18] How representative were such examples? Do they denote a widespread hostility between western Germans and Poles or those regarded as Poles? Elsewhere in this book, Norman Davies presents a picture of peaceful cohabitation and emphasizes how misleading it can be to take the more spectacular expressions of nationalism or even racism for the norm. Furthermore, it is important to note regional differences. Too often the tensions in the Posen/Poznań province before 1919 provide the focus. Writing about the industrial and mining centre of the Ruhr, the American historian Richard C. Murphy has described the integration of immigrant miners as a model 'creation of a plural society', 'a success story of American dimensions'. It is likely that in a stream of migrants and among many newcomers, speakers of the Polish language were not all that different. The approximately half a million Poles and Masurians who had migrated to the Ruhr area before 1914 often coexisted harmoniously with ethnic Germans.[19] Discriminatory measures against ethnic minorities, such as restrictions on the use of the Polish language, were introduced by the state, from above. They could be placed in a continuum of Prussian assimilationary policies as well as in a context of popular nationalism. The popularly elected *Reichstag* in 1886 opposed the mass expulsions of foreign Poles as justified neither

in form nor extent. The Centre Party leader Windthorst emphasized the principle of equality before the law. As a consequence of the *Kulturkampf* against the influence of the Catholic Church, his Catholic party opposed discriminatory legislation, as did Poles, Danes, Alsatians, left Liberals and Social Democrats, while the National Liberals, the Conservatives and smaller groups on the right voted in favour.[20] One should not take every Germanization measure and every restriction on migration as truly representing the climate among the German population. From the 1890s onwards, however, significant changes occurred: public pressures on the government increased and the Polish policy became a public issue.[21] Agents and expression of this change were pressure groups such as the Pan-German League or the Society for the Eastern Marches. The first priority of the Pan-German League, which was founded in 1891/4, was the 'preservation of the German people (*Volkstum*) in Europe and overseas and its support wherever threatened'. It seemed to be a widespread feeling at the time that the German *Volkstum* was indeed threatened, a feeling reinforced by events in the Habsburg monarchy. The 'Polish question' attracted significant attention and, as Mildred Wertheimer has pointed out, hardly a single issue of the *Alldeutsche Blätter* appeared which did not contain an article on this topic.[22] Max Weber, quoted above, was a member of the Pan-German League and also of the National Liberal Party. Polish agrarian labour was for him the 'existential question for the Germans'. 'We can cope with our Polish *Volksgenossen*', he argued in 1893, 'we hope to raise the domestic Polish proletariat to the German cultural level, but this becomes impossible if the continued incursion of swarms of eastern nomads regularly destroys and contradicts this civilizational effort.' From a 'civilizational' point of view, the importation of Poles was, for Weber, more dangerous than a recruitment of Chinese, because the 'half-Germanized Slavs of our east' (probably referring to the Kashubians and Masurians) would assimilate with the Poles.[23] Germandom and civilization are identical, he explained to a conference of the League in 1894. This is the typical attitude of a German nationalist but also of a National Liberal modernizer who identified Polish influence with backwardness and who, as with the *Kulturkampf*, aimed at assimilation within the nation state. The 'modernizer' attacked the landowners and their outdated political and social power

position as well as the exploitation of migrant labourers. In 1899, Weber left the League because it had failed to tackle the question of the Polish agrarian labourers in a determined way and instead had engaged in attacks on Danes and Czechs, whom Weber regarded as rather trivial in terms of national policy.[24]

The nationalistic pressure groups did not find equal support in different sections of German society but appealed especially to middle-class Germans. Their supporters were public officials, teachers or professionals, and the League, for example, was particularly strong where the socialist challenge was immediate.[25] Labour migration seems to have symbolized the advancing 'Slavonic threat' as well as the threat of a growing and increasingly socialist working class. The Germanization of the Poles and the alleged 'Slavonic threat', previously largely a regional conflict and an issue of government policy, were now made a national issue and carried to the west, where the Pan-Germans demanded measures to restrict the Polish influence. In Kassel, the leader of the League's chapter protested against alleged cultural pollution when the Bohemian String Quartet was invited to perform the music of Dvořák, Tchaikovsky and Josef Suk.[26] In western regions, Polish speakers were subjected to police surveillance and the use of their language was restricted. Workers were less likely than middle-class Germans to support nationalist organizations. The Social Democrats and the trade unions demanded international freedom of movement and looked to a socialist transformation of society to solve the conflicts now emerging. In the early twentieth century, however, xenophobic and nationalist trends gained in influence.[27] Altogether, a description of the Ruhr as the model plural society, as suggested by Richard Murphy and quoted above, is an unrealistic application to Germany of an idealized version of the American melting-pot idea — and indeed, Murphy has not found many supporters.

After the shift of the 1890s towards a new, increasingly aggressive and more influential nationalism, another major shift occurred during, and due to, the First World War. The wartime mobilization of society made nationalism a truly popular cause. As John Breuilly has suggested, it was only now that the internal formation of the nation succeeded.[28] Defeat in the war, combined with the failure to accept this fact and to place the blame on those truly responsible for the war, heightened the perception of

Germans as being under threat and as victims. For the present topic this became important in two ways. First, the territorial losses Germany had to face provided one prism which allowed many Germans to see their nation as the victim of the war. On the basis of the solidarity of the self-declared victims as well as the experience of wartime community, which was raised to the status of myth, the Pan-German cause, understood as identification with a greater ethnically defined German *Volk*, became truly popular in the Weimar period. Previously, the ethnic Germans abroad had not really been an important theme. Jürgen C. Heß, in his study of the democratic liberal party of this time, the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei*, has shown how nationalism acquired a quasi-religious character as the force which was supposed to give strength in these times of misery and threat.[29] Now the solidarity of a *Volk* living within and outside the borders of the state acquired central importance. Secondly, the Polish minority and Polish migrants became identified with the territorial conflict and were often seen as representatives of an enemy in the east. The constitution of the Weimar Republic granted its national minorities equal treatment and certain rights. The imperial policy of discrimination and enforced Germanization was not continued. Nevertheless, the territorial conflict had repercussions for the Polish-speakers in Germany, who were identified with the new Polish state und thus with the loss of major territories. About two thirds of the Ruhr Poles left Germany after 1918 (one third opted for the new Polish citizenship, another third went to France or Belgium). This cannot solely be explained as a flight from a hostile environment: France was attractive as it offered employment. But their departure indicates at least that their integration was only limited. Assimilation unquestionably advanced in the following years, but it should not be misunderstood as a sign of a harmonious 'melting pot'. Instead, it was to a great extent a reaction to pressures which the individuals, if they did not escape by leaving Germany, found hard to resist.

As regards the attitudes of the ethnic German population towards 'migrants from the east', the propaganda of the Nazi regime and the experience of a foreign labour system with rigid racial hierarchies and a superior position for the German worker most probably stabilized hostile attitudes towards (in particular) Poles, Russians and Czechs. After 1945, the influence of such

attitudes was not really put to a test, as contact was limited. We know very little, for example, about the reception of Polish and other commuters and 'guest workers' in East Germany. Examples have been mentioned above of negative attitudes towards German refugees and expellees from the east. But of course there was also the solidarity of all Germans as victims of the war, as experiencing a common fate. There were strong political pressures and encouragement to integrate the German incomers from the east. There was no legal discrimination, rather significant material help. In the 1950s more jobs became available. Rather than being one part of a suspect alien immigration, the ethnic Germans, later called *Aussiedler*, represent the welcome migrants from the east. The West German open-door attitude towards the '*Aussiedler*' is a feature of German policy which many non-Germans find hard to comprehend. It is actually a practice which was introduced as late as 1953. West Germany's Basic Law of 1949 contains a famous article, Article 116, which is often quoted as proof for the survival of a dubious concept of the *Volk* as distinct from a Western concept of citizenship. Article 116 explains that a

> German within the meaning of the Basic Law is anybody who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin [*Volkszugehörigkeit*] or as their spouse or descendant.

German citizenship is not citizenship of the Federal Republic of Germany but citizenship of the Reich which, according to one predominating legal opinion, continued to exist at least until the unification treaties were signed. Thus, under certain circumstances, ethnic Germans in Poland are regarded as possessing German citizenship.[30] Secondly, apart from the citizens of the *Reich*, another group of German ethnic origin is included, but only in so far as its members were living at the time on territory which, in 1937, was German *Reich*. This excluded, for example, ethnic Germans from Romania. One could argue that, in the Basic Law of 1949, West Germany behaved principally as the successor to and representative of the *Reich*, and wanted to keep its doors open to all those who had belonged to it. Yet a *völkisch* (ethnic) element is certainly present. It was

significantly strengthened in 1953, when a *Bundesvertriebenengesetz* (Federal Law on Expellees) came into force. Now the definition of an *Aussiedler* was extended to include anybody of ethnic German origin (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) whose own or whose parents' place of residence in May 1945 had been in the Soviet Union, Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and — added in 1957 — China. '*Aussiedler* are German citizens and members of the German *Volk* who left the regions of desettlement after the end of the general expulsions (1950) under the continued expulsionary pressures directed against the German population.'[31] This law opened the door for an immigration of 2.85 million 'ethnic Germans' between 1950 and 1992. In the years before 1953, it was far from clear that every ethnic German should be welcome in West Germany. In 1951–2, for example, the West German mining industry, suffering from a severe shortage of labour, devoted considerable energy to recruiting Transylvanian Saxons (ethnic Germans from Romania) in Austria. For the Ruhr industry they promised to be a reliable and steady workforce, as they seemed to embody older German attitudes the West Germans now lacked. Potential Italian recruits were believed to be 'unproductive workers, inclined to sully their hostels and politically as well as productively unreliable'. It was feared that 'admitting foreigners would undermine the attempts to improve the industry's status', which was seen as already bad due to the presence of so many Poles.[32] As they had not been citizens of the Reich in its 1937 borders, however, West Germany was not obliged to accept the Transylvanian Saxons. Indeed, the Foreign Office as well as the Ministry of the Interior and even the Federal Ministry for Expellees opposed these recruitment plans. The major reasons were probably high unemployment, in particular among refugees and expellees, and fears that the Federal Republic would lose international support for the integration of its roughly eight million refugees and expellees if it started to invite even more immigrants.

The open-door policy towards ethnic Germans marked by the 1953 law was a result of the Cold War. Economic growth and an increasing shortage of labour turned the East European immigrants into an attractive potential. Thus, in 1956, refugees from Hungary were pursued by recruitment agents from several countries, among them agents from the Ruhr mining industry,

and about 10,000 came to West Germany. From the mid-1950s to the later 1980s, West Germany's attitude to the reception of *Aussiedler*, as well as East Europeans who sought asylum, was extremely liberal. They were desired immigrants, as distinct from Turkish labour migrants or Asian and African refugees.

Since the end of the 1980s, however, attitudes towards immigrants from the east have changed. The door to Germany is still open to 'ethnic Germans', and they are still granted German citizenship, but, according to new rules of 1990 and 1993, criteria are now more strictly applied and eligibility is checked in the country where the would-be *Aussiedler* lives.[33] It is no longer politically useful to demonstrate, by a generous reception of East European migrants and refugees, how unbearable life in a socialist system is. Given their huge numbers (nearly 400,000 in 1990; 218,000 in 1995), the ethnic Germans are no longer a welcome addition to the labour force. Opinions on the issue of the *Aussiedler* are divided. A number of academics and politicians of the Green Party and the SPD have suggested abolishing the special status granted to 'ethnic Germans' from Eastern Europe and treating them as ordinary immigrants, perhaps with a special quota. From the other end of the political spectrum, the federal government has been attacked for introducing a restrictive admission procedure in places far away from Germany and thus removed from public scrutiny. Bavarian government officials have been quoted as complaining that 'Germans from the east are dammed up' while 'for asylum seekers the door to Germany is still wide open'. The Catholic bishop responsible for *Aussiedler* issues criticized restrictive and rejectionist attitudes and demanded that, instead, the door should remain open and a long-term willingness to accept the ethnic Germans be secured.[34] Such a friendly welcome to those officially German is not extended by the population at large. A 1989 survey found that only 31 per cent of the population regarded the *Aussiedler* as 'true Germans'.[35] Obviously, many Germans do not believe in the officially proclaimed community of the German people. Many perceive the *Aussiedler*, who get much state support, as a threat and as competitors for jobs and housing. In a survey conducted in 1990, the participants were offered a scale of +5 to -5 to indicate the degree of their sympathy — or otherwise — for particular nationalities. Most popular were the French, the Austrians and the North Americans,

while the Sinti and Roma (-1.5), the Turks (0.2 in West Germany, -0.8 in the East) as well as the Poles (-0.2 West, -0.4 East) found themselves at the bottom of the scale. In a similar survey in 1989, *Aussiedler* got a -0.1 rating. Among extreme-right voters, the appeal to the solidarity of the German *Volk* is particularly ineffective and hostility towards competing newcomers predominates, with the *Aussiedler* getting a -1.0 rating on the sympathy scale.[36]

Many Germans are in favour of a policy of mutual understanding and integration with Germany's eastern neighbours. However, attitudes towards immigration from the east among the German population are not universally positive. Attacks on Polish buses in 1991 were widely publicized. Some authors have linked Polish labour migration with the loss of territories in 1945. In a lecture at a seminar of the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer-Foundation, Professor Erwin Faul described immigration from the east as a process which could amount to a partial conquest, thus continuing a process begun with the expulsions of the late 1940s.[37] Migration and the expulsions are shown as two facets of one Polish advance. The appeal to defend German territory (even 'living space'!) against this alleged threat is perceptible, although not made explicit in this inflammatory text.

It is likely that, apart from hostilities born of fear for jobs and competition for housing, older hostilities and prejudices have survived and may resurface in a situation of large immigration movements and the enormous transformations and crises which Germany faces today. Migration from the east will, in different forms, continue to be a feature of German life past and present. The newcomers from the east will encounter kindness, often indifference and occasionally hostility — as does any other migrant. For some Germans, the Christian and white Polish or Czech migrants will be the more welcome colleagues and neighbours compared to those from Turkey. Others may recall memories of anti-Polish prejudices or hold Poles they encounter responsible for the loss of Silesia. Thus, migrants from the east may sometimes be unwelcome. However, this response cannot be generalized and it should not be allowed to obscure parallel features of tolerance and friendship.

NOTES

1. Friedrich Burgdörfer, 'Migration across the Frontiers of Germany' in W.F. Willcox (ed.), *International Migrations. Vol. II: Interpretations*, New York, 1931, pp. 313–89 (319); for a general outline see K.J. Bade, 'German Emigration to the United States and Continental Immigration to Germany in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', *Central European History*, 13, 1980, pp. 348–77. Bade prefers to call Germany not an immigration country but a labour-importing country, as it did not allow permanent immigration.
2. For the figures and an outline of the history of foreign labour see U. Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labour in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1990. I have used the German original: *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter*, Bonn, 1986 (hereafter *Geschichte*).
3. M. Weber, 'Entwickelungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter' in Weber, *Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Schriften und Reden 1892–1899* [= *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*, ed. W.J. Mommsen in co-operation with R. Aldenhoff, vol. 4/1], Tübingen, 1993 (hereafter *Gesamtausgabe*), pp. 425–62 (458). For a translated text see M. Weber, 'Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers', *Economy and Society*, 8, 1979, pp. 177–205.
4. Quoted in the *Annual Register*, 1886, pp. 343–6 (345).
5. See, for example, H. Neubach, *Die Ausweisungen von Polen und Juden aus Preussen 1885/86: Ein Beitrag zu Bismarcks Polenpolitik und zur Geschichte des deutsch-polnischen Verhältnisses*, Wiesbaden, 1967, p. 242.
6. About one third of the expellees were Jews. Of the approximately 2 million migrants in transit, roughly 80,000 stayed in Germany: see I. Blank, '"...nirgends eine Heimat, aber Gräber auf jedem Friedhof": Ostjuden in Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik' in K.J. Bade (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland, Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Munich, 2nd edn, 1992, pp. 324–32; J. Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany*, New York, 1987.
7. Referring to Pomerania, Shelley Baranowski writes, however, that 'Education for their children, unemployment insurance, and public health services were rarely extended to them': see Baranowski, *The*

Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protestantism, and Nazism in Weimar Prussia, Oxford, 1995, p. 63 (hereafter *Sanctity*).

8. According to U. Herbert's estimate, which includes prisoners of war: Herbert, *Geschichte*, p. 114.
9. Baranowski, *Sanctity*, p. 63.
10. See G.S. Rabinowitch, 'The Seasonal Emigration of Polish Agricultural Workers to Germany', in two parts: *International Labour Review*, 25, 1932, pp. 213–35 and 332–67 (230); on p. 365 a figure of from eighty to a hundred thousand is quoted.
11. H. Esser and H. Korte, 'Federal Republic of Germany' in T. Hammar (ed.), *European Immigration Policy*, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 165–205; K. Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat: Genese und Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin, 1985. To a certain extent, West Germany in the 1950s returned to regulation schemes of the pre-war years. A decree on alien employees of January 1933 and the 1938 Aliens Control Decree were revived and ensured continuity with respect to the right to residence and access to the labour market.
12. Herbert, *Geschichte*, pp. 173–8.
13. For an overview see W. Benz (ed.), *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ergebnisse, Folgen*, Frankfurt am Main, revised edn, 1995.
14. W. Meinicke, 'Probleme der Integration der Vertriebenen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone', *Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde*, 35, 1992, pp. 1–31.
15. V. Ronge, 'Ost–West-Wanderung nach Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 43, 1993, 7, pp. 16–28; H. Seidel, 'Arbeitserlaubnisrecht', *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik*, 15, 1995, pp. 109–14 (110–11, 112–13); U.R. Mayer, 'Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer aus Osteuropa', *Betriebs-Berater*, 48, 1993, pp. 1428–31. There are no figures for commuters; the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 11 January 1995 gave an estimate of 30,000 for Bavaria.
16. See the document in G. Ritter and J. Kocka (eds), *Deutsche Sozialgeschichte: Dokumente und Skizzen*, 2nd edn, 2 vols, Munich, 1977, II, pp. 205–9.
17. D. von der Brelie-Lewien and R. Schulze, 'Flucht und Vertreibung — Aufnahme und Seßhaftwerdung: Neue Fragen und Ansätze für einen alten Themenbereich der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte', *Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde*, 30, 1987, pp. 94–119 (101).
18. See the examples in ibid., and in F. Dettmer, 'Kontakte zwischen Flüchtlingen und Einheimischen nach Ende des zweiten

Weltkrieges', *Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde*, 26, 1983, pp. 311–24. '*Polnische Wirtschaft*' literally means Polish economy, but is actually a derogatory term indicating chaos and filth.

19. R.C. Murphy, *Guestworkers in the German Reich: A Polish Community in Wilhelmian Germany*, Boulder, CO, 1983, pp. 189, 201.
20. See the contemporary report quoted in note 4 above.
21. This is emphasized by, for example, H.K. Rosenthal, 'The Prussian View of the Pole: The Significance of the Year 1894', *Polish Review*, 17, 1972, pp. 13–20; G. Eley, 'German Politics and Polish Nationality: The Dialectic of Nation Forming in the East of Prussia' in G. Eley, *From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past*, London, 1986, pp. 200–28.
22. M.S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890–1914*, New York, 1924, p. 163.
23. M. Weber, 'Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung' in Weber, *Gesamtausgabe*, pp. 165–98 (183) (lecture to the general meeting of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, March 1893).
24. M. Weber, 'Zur Polenfrage' in Weber, *Gesamtausgabe*, pp. 717–19; his letter of resignation from the Pan-German League is quoted in the introduction to the *Gesamtausgabe*, pp. 61–2.
25. R. Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914*, Boston, MA, 1984.
26. Ibid., p. 122.
27. M. Forberg, 'Foreign Labour, the State and Trade Unions' in E. Rosenhaft and W.R. Lee (eds), *The State and Social Change in Germany, 1880–1980*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 99–130; with more emphasis on German xenophobia, see also J.J. Kulczycki, *The Foreign Worker and the German Labor Movement: Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of the Ruhr, 1871–1914*, Oxford and Providence, RI, 1995.
28. J. Breuilly, 'The National Idea in Modern German History' in J. Breuilly (ed.), *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern State*, London, 1992, pp. 1–28.
29. J.C. Heß, *'Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein': Demokratischer Nationalismus in der Weimarer Republik am Beispiel der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei*, Stuttgart, 1978, p. 48. See also K. Schönwälder, 'The Constitutional Protection of Minorities in Germany: Weimar Revisited', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 74, 1996, pp. 38–65.

30. See, for example, D. Blumenwitz, *Minderheiten- und Volksgruppenrecht: Aktuelle Entwicklung*, Bonn, 1992, p. 98. Thus, these persons are regarded as possessing dual citizenship.
31. 'Aussiedler sind deutsche Staatsangehörige und Volkszugehörige, die nach Abschluß der allgemeinen Vertreibungsmaßnahmen [1950] die Aussiedlungsgebiete unter dem fortdauernden gegen die deutsche Bevölkerung gerichteten Vertreibungsdruck verlassen haben.'
32. M. Roseman, *New Miners in the Ruhr: Rebuilding the Workforce in the Ruhr Mines, 1945–1958*, PhD dissertation, University of Warwick, 1987, p. 350.
33. See S. Delfs, 'Heimatvertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler. Rechtliche und politische Aspekte der Aufnahme von Deutschstämmigen aus Osteuropa in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 43, 1993, 48, pp. 3–11. On the procedures before 1990, see E. Liesner, *Aussiedler: Die Voraussetzungen für die Anerkennung als Vertriebener. Arbeitshandbuch für Behörden, Gerichte und Verbände*, Herford and Bonn, 1988. With the *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz* of 1993, children no longer inherit the status of *Aussiedler*, and applicants have to prove their persecution as well as their active commitment to Germandom.
34. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 December 1991.
35. Of those surveyed, 29 per cent said they were not true Germans while 40 per cent were not sure: see *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984–1992*, ed. E. Noelle-Neumann and R. Köcher, Munich, 1993, p. 520.
36. *Das Profil der Deutschen: Spiegel Spezial*, Hamburg, 1991, p. 19; *Der Spiegel*, 17 April 1989, p. 151.
37. E. Faul, 'Das vereinigte Deutschland — europäisch integrierte Nation oder diffuse "multikulturelle Gesellschaft"?' *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 39, 1992, pp. 394–420.

11 Soldiers and War Criminals: The Ongoing Debate about the *Wehrmacht* in the Second World War

Theo J. Schulte

In March 1995, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research opened an exhibition to the general public entitled *War of Extermination: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941–1944*. An accompanying edited collection of some thirty articles by international historians soon followed. The exhibition, which received extensive press attention both at home and abroad, embarked on a tour of the Federal Republic and Austria that was scheduled to finish in Marburg in October 1997.[1] The didactic purpose of the entire venture was readily apparent. In a now unified Germany, some fifty years after the end of the Second World War, there was a pressing need to lay to rest a powerful apologist myth. Disturbingly large numbers of the 'ordinary men' who formed 'Hitler's army' had not distanced themselves from the most sinister and perverse racial aspects of the war in the east. On the contrary, as with their comrades in the police battalions, they had been 'willing executioners' in a war directed against civilians in the 'killing fields' behind the front lines.[2] Evidence had, in fact, been available for decades which deeply implicated the German army, as an institution, in the systematic murder and abuse of captured Red Army soldiers and the terrorizing of the civilian population of the occupied Soviet Union.[3] The latest research, drawing in part on new sources from hitherto closed archives in the former Eastern bloc, more ominously pointed to involvement at rank-and-file level in the implementation of the

Holocaust, with the emphasis thus shifted from the concentration camps to the military rear areas. The war fought by the soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* in Eastern Europe could be regarded in no way other than as an integral component of National Socialism's racial extermination policies. Atrocities had been committed by the army from the very commencement of the war and were an essential component of the initial successful advance, not a forced response to the later stalemate and retreat.[4] Fundamental questions were raised regarding the behaviour of ordinary German soldiers — in a far from ordinary war. The experience and memory of the battlefield could no longer be separated from the implementation of the Final Solution. Here was yet another call for the re-evaluation of the relationship between Germans and their National Socialist past that had echoes of the historians' debate during the 1980s about the uniqueness of the Holocaust and German national identity.[5]

The essential problem was that the notion of the German army as one of the key instruments of Hitler's racial terror had been suppressed in the Federal Republic. Since the time of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a myth has been created that the *Wehrmacht* had maintained its honour and operated according to conventional rules of warfare, except in response to the Red Army's barbarism. The maintenance of this falsehood was an enduring victory for the *Wehrmacht* to rank alongside those it had enjoyed on the military battlefield. The needs of state-building reinforced the myth, and it was encouraged during the Cold War when anti-Communism legitimized the need for West German rearmament within NATO. The *Bundeswehr*, despite the emphasis on its new democratic character, was also an army which, through various historical continuities, embodied the tradition of proven combat experience against Russia.

The distorted view of the *Wehrmacht* survives primarily because it involves the emotional experiences of many generations of Germans. Eighteen million of them, born as early as 1880 and as late as the end of the 1920s, served in the *Wehrmacht*. At least three million men participated in the attack on the Soviet Union and as many as five million were involved at one time or another in this theatre of war. Mass conscription as a forced response to military, economic and demographic crisis in the period after 1942 cut across all age- and social groups such that Hitler's vast Eastern Army became a mirror image of Third Reich society. For many veterans, the campaign in the east represented a 'rite of passage'. It was an

article of faith to differentiate between the vast majority of essentially decent German soldiers who had distanced themselves from Nazism and a tiny minority who were involved in a separate war of racially motivated extermination. Such denial was reinforced by a sentimentalization of the army's 'heroic' role in defending the Reich against the advance of the Red Army, and by a related myth which portrayed the estimated one million German soldiers who had died as prisoners of war in Soviet captitivity after 1945 as totally innocent victims of the conflict. To even suggest that the ordinary soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* could be seen to be directly involved in that most heinous of war crimes, the extermination of the Jews, would have been to acknowledge that an entire generation had been Nazified. Instead, those who returned from the front underwent a form of 'collective amnesia' and became the new democratic Germany's workers and bureaucrats, professors and politicians, judges and lawyers, writers and poets, and soldiers. Long after the end of the war, the highest echelons of society in the Federal Republic — irrespective of political affinities — continued to reinforce this idea of a fundamental distancing between the German army and the Nazi state, particularly if such prominent persons were themselves part of the war generation. Most recently, despite a proven willingness to confront the Nazi past in many of its aspects, former President Weizsäcker and former Chancellor Schmidt, both of whom saw active service in the eastern theatre, have argued strongly against collective responsibility on the part of the rank and file of the *Wehrmacht*.[6] Even some of the historians who, from the 1970s, had undertaken the seminal research on the institutional Nazification of the *Wehrmacht* came to be regarded as equally prone to this collective amnesia. Their writing was criticized for semantic niceties which obscured the extent to which the rank and file were involved in genocide. This was not so much a lack of comprehension of the perverse character of the war but rather, as the work of the following generation of historians was to argue, an inability to transcend personal experiences.[7] Having established itself in the formative years of the Republic, the myth has not only sustained itself, but is also widely accepted as received wisdom in a number of Western countries.[8] Before the distractions of reunification in 1989–90, and despite agreement amongst most scholars that the war was one of enslavement and annihilation, attempts to create a broader awareness of the *Wehrmacht's* true role amongst the general public had been of limited success.[9] In any

case, the wider historians' debate had reached a form of impasse well before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and even the bitter exchanges over calls for empathy with the German army's alleged defence of the Reich and Western civilization after 1944 had faded away. The same could have been said, until recently, of the related controversial assertion that the initial German onslaught on the Soviet Union in 1941 was really a 'preventative war'.[10]

Without unification, the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union might have created further opportunities to shape public perceptions. As it was, while Germany's neighbours expressed anxieties that had a clear and often highly prejudiced tendency to extrapolate from the Nazi past, the majority of Germans seemed almost exclusively concerned with the immediate present. A number of edited collections did flow from the many conferences held to commemorate the start of 'Operation Barbarossa'. But whilst they attempted to reinforce arguments about *Wehrmacht* complicity in a war of extermination, such publications, as with an exhibition in Berlin, appeared to have made no real breakthrough in altering long-held received views.[11] Furthermore, while vitriolic denial and even threats of legal action by veterans' organizations, which were features of the response to critical writings in the 1980s, might well have slipped out of the frame, conference speakers still met with residual animosity from old soldiers, who denied the primacy of the damning evidence in military files over the exoneration offered by an appeal to personal memories.

And yet the *Wehrmacht's* true role in the war in the east was not a topic that could be consigned to history. Internal debates on post-unity national identity, as a variant of coming to terms with the past, started to emerge, and the new international context was also important. After 1990, there again existed a single German nation-state of considerable economic influence that was, even without nuclear weapons, anything but a military dwarf. The effective strength of the *Bundeswehr* may have been reduced to 370,000 and the armed forces controlled by NATO's integrated command structure, but at a time when the old military systems were disintegrating in Eastern Europe, this German army in the centre of the continent had considerable potential weight. The marked reluctance of the majority of young men to perform military service may have supported the view that 'Germans are no longer obsessed with power but oblivious to it', but the future always holds surprises.[12]

In December 1992, the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic asserted that 'history determines the range of operations for German troops'. If it was clearly problematic in the extreme to deploy the *Bundeswehr* in any of the many areas of Europe that suffered under Nazi military occupation, this was a matter of more than constitutional niceties or conventional strategic considerations. What was really under discussion was the unresolved issue as to the criminality of the *Wehrmacht*.

Nor had the half-decade from the 'peaceful revolution' of 1989 to the fiftieth anniversary commemorations in 1995 to mark the end of the war in Europe moved Germany beyond the Hitler era. The date 8 May 1995 was something of a watershed in the debate on the *Wehrmacht's* role in the war because of a painful recognition that the remnants of the war generation would themselves soon pass into the past. Many, including the organizers of the Hamburg exhibition, clearly felt that this might be the last opportunity for an act of atonement that would address some uncomfortable and unresolved historical legacies. The impetus to do so was prompted by a trend in the anniversary literature which suggested that the Germans should also be seen as victims of the war, rather than simply as the perpetrators of terror and suffering. Such a viewpoint was hardly novel, but it was revived by the arguments as to whether 1945 should be regarded as a liberation or a defeat. Set against the atrocities committed by the Third Reich were 'crimes' against the Germans themselves: the mass terror bombings of German cities, the mass rapes of women in the eastern provinces of the Reich by the advancing Red Army, the mass expulsions of ethnic Germans from their ancestral homes in the east and, of course, the mass deaths of German army prisoners of war in Soviet hands.[13] There was a particularly disturbing tendency in some of the anniversary literature to write of an 'invasion' from the east in 1944–5. This again reinterpreted the German army's role as essentially defensive, and, in the process, denied the fact that behind this shield the mass murders in the concentration camps had actually been intensified.

Renewed attempts to encourage debate on the true role of the German army throughout the war seemed essential. During the spring of 1995, the German weekly paper *Die Zeit* produced a collection of articles taken from past editions of the paper entitled *Obedience to Murder?* The magazine focused very much on the historical evidence which implicated the German army in the trail of blood that Nazism had left across Europe, and the question of

continuity between the *Wehrmacht* and the *Bundeswehr*. There was also discussion of army deserters in Nazi Germany, which reached the depressing conclusion that to have served loyally in Hitler's army (irrespective of any murderous connotations) was much more likely to have earned post-war respectability (and a war pension) than to have acted the part of 'traitor'. A round-table discussion of interested parties indicated a marked lack of agreement on the central issue of the extent to which the German army as a whole could be implicated in criminal activities. A selection of readers' letters took up this dispute. Here, again, were the familiar responses. Apology, denial and refutation (usually based on anecdotes and personal reminiscences of the war), interspersed with often moving statements of contrition.[14] It remains uncertain whether admissions of direct involvement from former *Wehrmacht* soldiers or the letters from a younger generation — including serving *Bundeswehr* officers — accepting the grimmest evidence of the historical research, offer some way forward for the new Germany that would allow it to overcome the past without marginalizing the Hitler period. A popular-opinion survey conducted in April 1995 certainly pointed to a marked generation gap: overall, 52 per cent of Germans believed that the *Wehrmacht* had committed war crimes (39 per cent did not) but amongst those over sixty-five years of age, some 63 per cent could not accept this verdict (26 per cent did).[15]

At the time when the main body of this chapter was written (June 1996), the debate was being both widened and deepened. Discussion was taking place in the Federal Republic on plans to abolish conscription and create, instead, a professional army. This issue is linked with emotional writings on the essential character of all armies, irrespective of their democratic credentials, a controversy embodied in the phrase borrowed from Tucholsky that 'soldiers are murderers'. It is a short step to yet further discussion on continuities between the *Wehrmacht* and the *Bundeswehr*, and the controversy is fuelled, in turn, by the press attention given to the sheer volume of historical material that continues to appear on the criminal activities of the German army, conscripts and professionals alike.[16]

Indeed, to add a postscript (April 1997), the most recent reactions to the 'Verbrechen der Wehrmacht' exhibition have played no small part in keeping the debate alive. The tour arrived in Munich in February 1997 to a highly charged and hostile response from the Bavarian Right; both from elements within the mainstream

Christian Social Union and from the extreme neo-Nazi movement. Such was the gravity of the situation and the unfavourable international publicity that the furore even prompted a debate in the German parliament. In the mean time, the exhibition organizers themselves received over fifty invitations from both inside and outside Germany; sufficient to keep the tour on the road well into the next millennium. To add to all this, all manner of sub-debates have emerged, ranging from suggestions that the German army was actively planning a world war from 1925 onwards, to work which points — almost paradoxically — to a General Staff corrupted by Hitler through lavish financial inducements while also inclined to condone the continued presence of Jews within the officer corps.[17]

Overall, the tone of the proceedings has also been much influenced by the so-called Goldhagen controversy. In the narrowest historical sense, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* offers a parallel study which emphasizes virulent antisemitic influences on the men of the German police battalions who carried out many of the massacres in the east, but it is — as with the debate on the ordinary soldiers of the German army — much more bound up with how, fifty years on, the war years are perceived.[18]

* * *

To hold out against the tone of this flood tide of new research, where the words *Wehrmacht* and criminal appear almost interchangeable, yet at the same time avoid a reputation as a quasi-apologist, may seem a foolhardy task. This caveat noted, and while deeply entrenched denial clearly explains the impetus to provide yet further unequivocal proof of *Wehrmacht* complicity in war crimes, this chapter holds the view that such an approach runs the risk of merely assembling material which is over-narrowly concerned with corroboration of the highly questionable assertion that every German soldier was in some measure a war criminal. Total condemnation of the *Wehrmacht* is no more an aid to understanding this dark chapter in German history than is total exoneration.[19] Rather, it should be stressed that many questions remain open, particularly with regard to the issue of personal motivation. In this regard, evidence of 'non-conformism' warrants much more attention than it has currently received. Provided a sense of the true balance is maintained, research should be concerned as much with 'exceptions to the rule' as with the 'norm'. Overall, a more nuanced

view is called for that takes account of the many and varied generational influences on the men of the *Wehrmacht* and the contingent circumstances under which the war in the east was fought.

As a basic premise, the *Wehrmacht* should not be regarded as an homogeneous entity. Significant generational differences and contrasts in areas of deployment existed. For example, although rear-area postings in the occupied Soviet Union may have taken on the characteristics of front-line active service (which the younger recruits performed), more attention needs to be given to the way in which the experiences of the First World War in the east shaped attitudes amongst the older group of soldiers assigned to the *Wehrmacht*'s hinterland.[20] Many of the officers who commanded rear areas after 1941, and elements of the troops under their command, were over-aged men who had served on the Eastern Front in the First World War. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 did not mark the end of the war for these soldiers. Most of the *Ostheer* had to remain to secure the area and could not be moved west. It found itself involved in a bloody and cruel local war, not a mere mopping-up exercise. Promised resources did not materialize and the German forces had to bring in fuel and food, as the local peasants hid most of their own produce. The forced requisition policies which the occupying army introduced produced a backlash; some 20,000 German soldiers died during seizure actions. In response to this, as military reports noted, there was a marked breakdown of discipline, characterized by the murder of farmers for their livestock and even the desecration of churches — patterns of behaviour that would be repeated a generation later. Apart from the odd unit 'contaminated by Bolshevism', most of the men of the Imperial German Army carried home a marked degree of contempt for the Russians after 1918.[21]

In the Weimar Period, a paradoxical mixture of memories of the 'triumph' over tsarist Russia and a virulent anti-Communism combined with strong emotions of national humiliation at Versailles. To this toxic cocktail were added new 'management of violence' approaches to warfare, first developed during 1914–18, which demanded the total destruction of the enemy's society as a precondition for the post-victory development of one's own.[22]

On 3 February 1933 (four days after he had been made Chancellor), Hitler spoke to the commanders of the armed forces about his plans for conquest of new living space in Russia and the

ruthless Germanization of occupied territory. This scheme was presented as his most important foreign policy aim. There was no opposition to the project despite its clearly implied racial dimensions. An ideological affinity already existed between elements in the upper echelons of the military and the party hierarchy. The process was extended by military expansion, with the creation of a large and highly Nazified officer class. On the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union, the corps stood at some 250,000-strong, from a level in 1938 of a mere 20,000, and had been indoctrinated through a training programme which linked Bolshevism and Jewry. Amongst the junior officers, in particular, racist ideas had became commonplace.[23] Again, paradoxical thinking was in the ascendant, with the Soviet Union seen both as a Judaeo-Bolshevik Asiatic monster and yet one with feet of clay. The dominance of arrogance over anxiety was clearly articulated in February of 1941 during the planning stages of the attack on the Soviet Union, when the military spoke of an eight-week war.[24]

Belief in the necessity for such an attack was shared by significant numbers of the non-military conservative élite. Foreign Office mandarins, industrialists, senior churchmen, members of the medical profession and eminent historians produced justifications for the war. It was to be a crusade that would avenge not just the defeat of 1918 — when Communists and Jews were portrayed as having betrayed the nation — but all of German history to 1789. And crusades, of course, are not fought at home. Only through the destruction of the Soviet Union could the Nazi utopia be created. The war against Poland acted as a laboratory for the forthcoming conflict further to the east, with the German army abandoning any residual reservations it might have had about a racial war. Deep-seated anti-Polish sentiments on the part of the traditional German officer corps helped reinforce this shift.[25] Although some form of 'normal war' followed in the intervening western campaign, patterns of behaviour had been established. The attack on the Soviet Union was clearly planned and implemented as a racial war of extermination. Evidence of Soviet brutality, including that from the first contacts between the Nazi Security Service and the Soviet NKVD in occupied Poland, merely served to reinforce existing attitudes, not shape them.

The various explanations that historians have advanced for German army involvement in a war of extermination are, problems of semantics excepted, all in agreement in placing the *Wehrmacht* at

the heart of Nazi brutality. This applies whether one writes of antisemitic tendencies in the eastern army (Krausnick), slow corruption into extermination (Messerschmidt), the failure to differentiate between the military and ideological (Förster), the dominance of anti-Bolshevism (Streit/Pätzold) or the false notion of a Jewish–Partisan link as matter of convenience (Hillgruber).[26] Special military directives, the so-called 'criminal orders', were drawn up to legitimize the war of extermination. These included not only the Commissar Order, which permitted the summary execution of captured political officers of the Red Army, but also a range of other decrees, such as the *Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaß* and the Barbarossa decree: martial laws that abrogated any of the rights which civilians might have expected to be allowed under military occupation. The 'necessity of war' was a pretext for the most draconian measures, particularly hostage-taking and collective reprisals.[27] As a result, in thousands of ruined towns and villages scarcely a single Soviet family remained untouched by death, hunger and destruction. Army Group Centre (Belorussia) was not untypical. Every fourth person (some 2.2 million of the local inhabitants) perished, 209 towns and 9,200 villages were destroyed, the Jews in seventy ghettoes were murdered, and most of the vast numbers of Red Army prisoners of war held captive in sixty camps perished as a result of cold, hunger, summary execution and rampant disease, in what has been termed 'the other Holocaust'. The impact on the economy of the area was such that capacity had still not returned to pre-war levels by the late 1980s.[28]

In this context of racially determined destruction, the murder of the Jewish inhabitants of the occupied East was integral to the war effort. A complex matrix existed between the German army, the SS/SD and economic agencies, in which the former played an active and calculated part in the genocide. The *Wehrmacht*'s role went far beyond logistical support for the SS and SD. Incidents such as the infamous mass murder of 33,771 Jews at Babi Yar near Kiev in September of 1941, by Nazi special forces and elements of the army, were not isolated exceptions but are known to have taken place across the entire occupied territories. Even the reputation of the Sixth Army which perished at Stalingrad has been tarnished.[29]

Again, the focus needs to be placed clearly on the part played by the ordinary German troops. How far the racist thinking of Nazism reached into the schools, the Hitler Youth and the barracks of the conscript rank-and-file soldiery during the 1930s remains a much

less well researched area. Powerful arguments have been advanced that among those who would later form the army which invaded the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 there was an 'everyday racism' that pervaded all classes and social groups. The Nazification of significant elements of the working class is particularly controversial, since here was a key element of society traditionally seen as resistant to the appeal of Fascism.[30] Recent research does provide extensive evidence of deeply ingrained racist attitudes on the part of ordinary soldiers during the war. Such sentiments are particularly pronounced in both the tone and content of letters home from the front (*Feldpostbriefe*). Photographs taken by ordinary soldiers, and amateur cine-film, also contain sordid images which reinforce the view that the war had become a form of 'execution tourism'.[31] For the demythologizers this is the proof that the relentless Nazi propaganda machine had produced conscripts for Hitler's army who fully shared his views on inferior peoples and that it was these ideas, not the exigencies of war, that motivated atrocities. All the same, despite the extensive literature now available which cites many examples of rank-and-file participation in genocide, quantified research is still far from complete. It remains debatable as to how far such ideologically based thinking extended throughout the troops of the *Wehrmacht*. Moreover, although the various studies clearly show ordinary troops engaged in acts characterized by murder-lust, sadism, emotional cruelty and even sexual perversion, an ideological basis for such behaviour is not always evident.[32] In particular, whilst the weight of grim evidence on the wholesale murder of Jews by ordinary soldiers is inescapable, the degree to which they both initiated and participated in such massacres simply because of antisemitism alone remains unclear. Analysis of *Feldpostbriefe* and individual diaries may suggest otherwise, a thesis reinforced by one particular comparative study on the differing behaviour of the Italian and the German armed forces in the Balkans, which argues that the officers of the *Wehrmacht*, unlike their Italian counterparts, rarely saw the Jews in anything other than categorical terms. But it is less certain that the rank and file shared such fixed views.[33]

Studies of the terroristic activities of the German army on this broader geographical front, in Greece as well as in Italy, where racially motivated actions against the non-Jewish civilian population are not usually considered to have been the norm, point to the difficulties of determining motivation.[34] The same can even

be said of recent work which explores the role of police battalions and various civilian agencies in related acts of barbarism in occupied Europe.[35] Peer-group pressure and dogged conformity within the group, a general all-encompassing xenophobia unrelated to any specific racial or national category (hence the inclination to murder not just Jews but all and sundry, including Italians and Greeks), deference to authority, careerism, draconian discipline, and the motivating role of junior and non-commissioned officers are just some of the possible variables in the equation. Such an assessment may well take us into areas of psychology, sociology and anthropology, where many historians are reluctant, for various reasons, to venture. But, as with Holocaust studies in general, the very irrational nature of the beast may necessitate such a combined approach.[36] The harsh 'demodernized' conditions under which the war was fought in the Soviet Union should also not be excluded from the analysis, since these lent this quasi-colonial conflict a peculiar savagery and moral brutalization. Racism and xenophobia were stimulated by the almost primeval backdrop to the conflict. And as even the most fervent advocates of the ideological indoctrination approach agree, despite the views of a select few romantics in the military hierarchy, for many ordinary troops exhausted by the war, the backward and primitive nature of much of the occupied territory only served to reinforce long-held stereotypes of Russia.[37] The deliberate abandonment of conventional rules of warfare in these 'lawless territories', and their replacement by racially based guidelines, was also used to obscure principles of accepted morality in order to convince the troops that brutality was not only permissible but a formal requirement. The quasi-legal directives which denied traditional norms of conduct in war had just such a purpose. German commanders were often at pains to stage executions in an organized and disciplined fashion. However weak and flimsy this legal fiction was, its significance for the removal of inhibitions on the part of the ordinary soldiers should not be underestimated. Certainly, this view can be placed within the context of the phenomenon identified by 'structuralist' historians of the Third Reich, whereby the Nazi regime's capacity to create a permanent state of emergency allowed normal law-abiding individuals to be led astray.[38]

Non-conformism, in particular, warrants more attention among scholars, not least because it seems to have been over-marginalized lest its acknowledgement be construed as giving succour to

apologists. Provided a sense of balance is maintained, and full recognition given to the many acts of barbarism and cruelty perpetrated by the men of the German army, historians should be concerned as much with 'exceptions to the rule' as with the 'norm'. This is not intended to encourage the revival of a body of literature which ignores all but supposedly unambiguous acts of resistance, such as the anti-Hitler Bomb Plot of 1944. On the contrary, the latest research which clearly links the men of the 20 July 1944 to Hitler's war of extermination in the east can be drawn upon to demonstrate the many inconsistencies that make it so difficult to justify a Manichean view of the relationship between individuals and Nazism.[39] Contradictions and paradoxes emerge throughout official *Wehrmacht* reports on the conduct of the war. Alongside references to German troops who expressed misgivings that collective reprisal measures were both unsound and unnecessarily brutal are calls for restraint in order to curb over-zealous units which engaged in the wholesale murder of men, women and children. Detailed criticism of the shameful and dishonourable behaviour of German troops is to be found alongside directives urging increased violence in pursuit of elusive military goals that were often clearly determined by Nazi racial thinking. Despite the highly bureaucratic tendency of the Nazi state to catalogue in a detailed and often unashamed fashion its violent activities (which, ironically, provided the material for subsequent historical research and legal prosecutions), a good deal of evidence which allows us insights into cruelties is actually drawn from reports of the select few officers who took exception to such policies.[40] The majority of officers may well have been more consistent in their ideological loyalties, but although this does not necessarily imply a rift between officers and men, it does suggest differences in their approach to the war. As one writer has emphasized, between the extreme positions which suggest a quasi-religious commitment on the part of the common soldier to the Nazi *Weltanschauung* and the image of him stolidly resisting the flood of propaganda, lies a terrain of attitudes waiting to be explored.[41] Many of the harrowing accounts of massacres still leave unresolved questions as to why a very select few refused to participate in murder. We obviously need to know much more about those who refused to obey. The frequent references to an initial reluctance of many to participate in murder (that soon gave way to the habituation of a majority into a regular programme of killing) also poses many questions that have not been

satisfactorily answered.[42] In any such analysis, one should also set against the damning evidence of popular racism contained in *Feldpostbriefe*, material taken from similar sources which points to a marked lack of ideological enthusiasm, a sense of impotence rather than dominance and even, occasionally, hostility to Nazism.[43] Official ideology was often filtered and sometimes diluted by the inertia of army life and the boredom of occupation duty. Reports on troop morale present a picture in which many soldiers shunned propaganda, preferring instead to retreat into the escapist world of popular light entertainment films and theatre. To advance this view of 'normality' is not to present a monolithic and unrealistic conception of ideology, nor is it to deny the dangers of historicizing the Third Reich. National Socialism clearly sought to influence and distort popular beliefs on notions such as patriotism, conceptions of law and justice and military honour in the most subtle fashion. But the actual extent to which the regime succeeded in instilling its value system among the rank and file remains a vast and complex subject in which there are no obvious or simple explanations. If the vast literature on resistence, opposition and dissent inside the Third Reich is applied to the German army rank and file, what emerges is not a clear dichotomy between fanatics fighting a religious war, or ideology-free and perhaps bored and apathetic soldiers, but a continuum.[44]

Strategies for survival, which included desertion, self-mutilation, feigned displays of incompetence and various attempts to sit out the war (including those 'slipper soldiers' who had abandoned not only military uniform and conventions of rank but the war itself) offer valuable alternative insights into indoctrination and motivation.[45] Desertion, in particular, suggests a complex pattern of attitudes to the war ranging from moral rejection of Nazism to 'simple' self-preservation.[46] Such research needs to be better integrated with the 'fashionable' literature which sometimes seems preoccupied with participation in atrocities.

Problematic as it may be to establish causal connections, more work needs to be done on everyday life in the 1930s; particularly with regard to the way in which the conformity enforced in public encouraged withdrawal into privacy, with a resulting escape from reality and increased passivity. At the same time, since the German army contained a broad cross-section of male German society, with individuals ranging in age from teenagers to octogenarians, the debate needs to go beyond the already complex issue of the extent

to which the Third Reich alone shaped behaviour. Due regard needs to be given to long-term trends in popular attitudes by way of longitudinal studies covering the period from the start of the age of 'classic modernity' in the 1890s, particularly the links between the modern and the irrational.[47] To downplay everything except antisemitic influences would be to ignore a half-century of informed research.

Finally, recognition should be given to intrinsic problems in any attempt to re-create the mental world of the Third Reich. This is not to excuse the many acts of barbarism or even moral indifference on the part of the soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* in occupied Eastern Europe. None the less, some fifty years after the end of the war, despite the necessary impulse which drives historical research and the temptation to draw easy parallels with the cruelties of our own time, many of the men who served in the German forces regarded it as a different time and place, and the political vocabulary and values of the present are often inadequate in attempting to explain the situation in which they found themselves and the way in which they behaved.[48]

NOTES

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originals. A complete list, mainly of German sources and including numerous newspaper references, is available directly from the author, who can be reached on email: T.J.Schulte@anglia.ac.uk.

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3. T.J. Schulte, *The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia*, Oxford, 1989 (hereafter *German Army*), pp. 1–27.
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6. See J. Thies, 'Germany and Eastern Europe between Past and Future' in A. Baring (ed.), *Germany's New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives* (hereafter *Germany's New Position*), Oxford, 1994, pp. 65–78 (75).
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12 From Ethnic Cleansing to Ethnic Resurgence: The German Minority in Poland, 1945–95

Keith Sword

The re-emergence of a German minority in Poland as a cultural and political force is one of the more remarkable aspects of social and political transformation since the ending of Communist rule in 1989. The expulsion of ethnic Germans from the states of Central Europe in the late 1940s was widely regarded as a final resolution of the 'problem' of the German minorities in the region. Yet in Poland the expulsions of the late 1940s were followed by decades during which tens of thousands more people of German descent or affiliation migrated westwards — most going to the Federal Republic. By the 1980s the 'problem' seemed once more to have been finally resolved. There were no longer any Germans in Poland — or so government spokesmen claimed. Consequently, the emergence of a sizeable German minority in the late 1980s and early 1990s caught many Poles by surprise.

The situation of the German minority in Poland in the half century following the Second World War cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to a number of background factors. First are purely ethnic-national rivalries. Memories of the Germans as a 'fifth column' in the 1930s and of the activities of the German occupation regime during the Second World War remained strong in Poland during the post-war period. Second are ideological considerations. For as long as Germany was divided, the Federal Republic, with its remarkable post-war economic recovery, represented a direct challenge to the values

and policies of the Communist leadership and exercised a magnetic attraction to citizens of eastern bloc states.

Linked to this were security concerns. The majority of ethnic Germans in post-war Poland lived in the western frontier regions which had been acquired in 1945 at the expense of Germany (the so-called 'recovered territories'). Communist policy was to keep alive fears of German revanchism in order to convince Poles that their security interests lay in closer ties with Moscow. It followed therefore that the periodic evidence of German ethnic revival in the region was construed by many Poles as part of a long-running German campaign to prise the western territories out of Poland's grasp.

The German minority became increasingly a factor in Warsaw–Bonn diplomatic relations in the post-war decades. Indeed a significant element in the post-war history of the German minority in Poland has been the existence of what Milton Gordon has termed 'outside power' in relation to ethnic minorities: the existence of a neighbouring state, in this case the stronger West German state, as 'protector' or 'guardian' — real or imagined — of the minority within.[1] The existence of this 'outside power' should not be underestimated, since during the 1980s and following German reunification it clearly influenced ethnic mobilization within Poland.

In the years before the Second World War, ethnic Poles represented only some two-thirds of the population of the Second Republic. Ethnic and national minorities within the Polish borders included Ukrainians (estimated to be 15–16 per cent), Jews (8–10 per cent), Belorussians (4–6 per cent) and Germans (2–3 per cent). These minority populations were unevenly distributed, with the Slavic minorities concentrated in the eastern regions, beyond the Rivers Bug and San, while Germans and Jews were more widely dispersed. The size of these minority communities has been a subject of some debate. It is argued that the size of the German minority was understated in both the 1921 and 1931 censuses, essentially for political reasons. Historian Jerzy Tomaszewski estimates the true number of Germans in Poland to have been 780,000, as compared with the 741,000 shown in the 1931 census.[2] Although the German minority was widely dispersed, many were found in central and western districts of the pre-war Republic — particularly in the Poznań, Łódź, Pomeranian and Silesian regions.

The Second World War brought in its wake considerable changes in the ethnic structure of the Polish population. The racial policies of the Nazi occupation regime resulted in the almost complete extermination of the Jewish minority, estimated at between 2.7 and 3 million before the war. The frontier changes in 1945 led to the loss of some 50 per cent of Poland's pre-war territory to the Soviet Union, and, as a result, the pre-war Slavic minorities (5–7 million people) were largely incorporated into the neighbouring Soviet republics. Poland was compensated in the west at the expense of Germany and the territory acquired in this way comprised a third of Poland's post-war area. By this westward shift, Poland also acquired a larger German population — an unwelcome addition of which the Polish authorities quickly sought to rid themselves.

Ethnic Cleansing and Persecution

Historian Krystyna Kersten has asserted that the Polish Communist authorities laboured under two policy assumptions which were never set down explicitly in print. The first was a belief, born of recent experience, that Poland's security interests would not be served by retaining ethnic or national minorities within state frontiers. The Polish Government intended all minorities to leave Poland, whether voluntarily, by pressure or naked force. Those who remained would face assimilation. The second assumption was that, in order to rebuild Poland's population (which had fallen from 35 million to 24 million in the period 1939–46), Poles living abroad should be encouraged to return to the homeland.[3]

In the drive for ethnic homogeneity, the Polish authorities entered into population exchange agreements with their eastern neighbours. With regard to the German population, however, policy developed without reference to German wishes or needs. The most radical measure was the expulsion of ethnic Germans in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam Great Power Agreement of 2 August 1945. Between 1945 and 1949, some 3.2 million Germans moved westward, some to take up residence in the Soviet occupation zone (later the German Democratic Republic) while others moved further west into the regions which became the Federal Republic of Germany.[4] The transfer of ethnic Germans was frequently carried out in appalling conditions and resembles what in more recent times has come to

be termed 'ethnic cleansing'. All those who admitted to German nationality were liable to the transfer provisions. On the basis of a Polish government decree of 13 September 1946, they lost all civic rights and their property was subject to confiscation.

Those people who had been Polish citizens at the outset of war, but had later, under Nazi occupation, been registered on the *Volksliste* (as being of German descent), were subject to certain administrative measures by the Polish authorities, depending on the category to which they had been allocated. Those regarded as the most committed Germans — Category I *Volksdeutsche* — were expelled from Poland or found themselves in forced labour camps. Those in Category II could be rehabilitated on the basis of a court procedure, while Categories III and IV were obliged merely to make a declaration of loyalty to the Polish people and state.[5]

The Polish authorities adopted special measures with regard to former German citizens who were indigenous or 'autochthonous' inhabitants of particular localities such as the Silesians, Kashubians, Warmians and Masurians — Slavic peoples who had undergone a considerable degree of Germanization after long periods under German (Prussian) rule.[6] They were subjected to a verification procedure in order to determine their degree of identification with Polish culture and the Polish state. Most were deeply attached to their homes and farms and were willing to 'return' to Poland in order to be left with their land.[7] It is estimated that altogether there were 1,104,000 of these 'autochthons' in the newly acquired regions of the west and north.

Sociologist Andrzej Sakson, however, describes the policies of post-war Communist regimes towards these people as 'mistaken and discriminatory'.[8] One of the main instruments in the process of polonizing the German/'autochthonous' population of the recovered territories was an organization called the Polish Western Union (*Polski Związek Zachodni*, the PZZ). Among the three main tasks of the PZZ was *antyniemieckość*, combatting manifestations of German identity and culture:

> Our programme with regard to the Germans can be expressed clearly: complete and absolute elimination [...]. Elimination of the German element does not end with the expulsion process. We must aim for a goal which is several times more difficult and more complicated: the

> removal of the centuries-old traces of German presence in these territories. This means something more than removing German shop signs or memorials, it means uprooting German weeds from all areas of life — removing traces of German feeling from people's minds.[9]

The alacrity with which the Polish Communist authorities pursued this radical policy proved in many respects counter-productive. The hostility demonstrated towards any evidence of German culture rubbed off on the 'autochthons' — the groups which Poland wished to 'reclaim'. Silesians, for example, had a unique identity and culture, which was reflected in their language, the Silesian dialect — a form of Polish with multiple borrowings from German. As they were increasingly ostracized by the Polish community and state authorities, their ties of sentiment to Polish culture and society weakened and they felt increasingly drawn towards the culture of their German former neighbours. This underlines the complexities of ethnic identification, its potential for shift, and the drawbacks of using a blanket term such as 'Germans'. The use of the terms 'ethnic Germans' and 'German minority' is, however, a convenient form of shorthand used in the Polish literature and the convention has been maintained here.

A further factor in the equation was the impact of the new settlers from the east — referred to as the *ludność napływowa* (literally, immigrant or newcomer population) in the Polish academic literature. These had transferred from the areas of eastern Poland incorporated into the Soviet Union and had moved west in their hundreds of thousands to occupy territory vacated by the departing Germans. The newcomers from the eastern borderlands prided themselves on their patriotism. Having experienced the unsettling effects of displacement themselves, and arriving in territory which had only shortly before belonged to another state, they were insecure, keen to assert their mark in their new surroundings and were intolerant of what they saw as vestiges of German presence. The complexity of this situation needs to be stressed since, in discussing relations between the 'German minority' and the 'Polish community', we are generally talking about a Polish group which, while enjoying the support of the Polish state apparatus, was viewed by many locals as a new and intrusive element.

As a result of war losses, border changes and population transfers, Poland had, by 1950, been transformed into one of the most homogeneous states in Europe in ethnic terms. The minorities in Poland represented a mere 2 per cent of the population. The Polish authorities considered that the 'German problem' had been resolved by flight and the programme of forcible transfers. It is generally acknowledged, however, that significant numbers of Germans remained. At the beginning of 1950, there were still 100,000 people in the western and northern regions (former East Prussia) who were regarded by the Polish authorities as Germans, and a further 80,000 *Volksdeutsche* who had not been 'rehabilitated'. They were found especially in Lower Silesia, where their labour was exploited in the mining industry.[10] Some were kept in labour camps such as the one at Lambinowice, near Opole. Others were employed in industry or in the new state farms (PGRs) created by the Communist authorities in the 'recovered territories'. In the late 1940s, these ethnic Germans became an invisible minority, unacknowledged by the Warsaw authorities. They were subject to severe restriction of their freedoms and rights. Indeed, the ethnic Germans became 'non-persons' to such a degree that, until 1951, they had no official identity documents. Jan (Johann) Kroll recalled that in Stalinist times, many ethnic Germans like himself were persecuted twice over: by the Poles because they were Germans and by the Communists for ideological reasons — because as former farmers, they were 'kulaks':

> From the earliest post-war years they attempted to polonize us by force. In school our children had to inform their teachers if parents spoke German at home. They were ridiculed and beaten because they spoke Polish badly. They were taught to feel contempt and hatred for any Germans, as if all Germans were Nazis and war criminals. Our names were polonized compulsorily and if anyone had a typically German name, such as Helmut or Hildegarde, then the official would write a completely different one in his documents.[11]

The signing of the Zgorzelec (Görlitz) Agreement with the GDR on 6 July 1950 required, within the context of 'fraternal relations' between the two socialist states, that the continued residence in Poland of people considered by the Polish authorities as German should be put on a regular footing. For

the first time in the post-war period, the Polish authorities officially acknowledged the existence of a German minority in Poland. It should be stressed that this recognition was made subject to strict limitations. First, the Polish authorities acknowledged as members of the German minority only those individuals whose German identity it accepted. There was no chance of those people who had been positively verified (as Poles) or rehabilitated by the authorities opting for German identity. Secondly, a territorial limitation was placed on the activities of the German minority. Community and associational activities were permitted only in the Koszalin, Szczecin and Wrocław voivodships. In these three districts, German-language schools were opened, and other German cultural activities were permitted. (Immediately after the war, and until 1949, it had been forbidden to teach German children in their own language.)[12]

Migration to Germany

Continued pressure exerted by the Polish Communist authorities towards polonization of the 'German minority' brought superficial success. Linguistic and cultural awareness were gradually extinguished in the rising generations. But the main effect of such policies was to drive German ethnic feeling underground. In addition, the confrontation with Poles reduced the social distance between 'autochthons' and Germans. The former came to regard Germans increasingly as 'people of the same culture' — which is, after all, how many Silesians were treated by the Poles.

Ultimately, ethnic Germans were able to vote — with their feet. In the post-war decades, from the 1950s to the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens moved westward and took up residence in Germany. Some of the Polish migrants travelled as tourists and stayed as political refugees from Communism, while others were received as *Aussiedler* (ethnic Germans displaced from another state for political, ethnic or religious reasons). The latter were helped by Article 116 of the Federal Republic's 1949 Basic Law (Constitution), which stated that 'a German [...] is anybody who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as their spouse or

descendant'. This was a controversial provision since it could be used to extend recognition of citizenship to those outside current German frontiers, for example in Poland. It played a major role in facilitating large-scale, post-war migration from Poland to Germany.[13]

A continuing irony in Polish–German relations during the Communist period was the Polish Government's frequent refusal to acknowledge the existence of a significant German minority while periodically agreeing to 'release' large numbers of this non-existent group as a concession to Bonn.[14] In the post-war decades we can detect four main waves of emigration. From the mid-1950s, an emigration to Germany of people from the 'recovered territories' was allowed out of humanitarian concern for 'family reunion'. The first transfer took place on the strength of an agreement between the German and Polish Red Cross organizations. In the years 1955–9, some 248,626 people left Poland for West Germany and West Berlin. A further 40,000 travelled to the GDR.[15] A large number of these were Silesians, Masurians, Warmians and other 'autochthons' who had been alienated from Poland by the crude propaganda and petty bureaucracy of the Communist authorities as well as the hostility of neighbours. Sadly, among those deciding to leave for Germany there were people who, in the past, had fought to defend a Polish presence in the region. For example, among the people who left the Polish People's Republic for Germany after 1956, there were 230 people who had been active in the Polish cause during the Silesian Uprisings of the early 1920s.[16]

The Warsaw Agreement of 1970, finalized after talks between the Polish authorities and German Chancellor Willy Brandt, contained no mention of the 'German minority', although Brandt had referred to German graves in Poland. ('The Polish side was against regulating the problem of the German minority in the Agreement. It maintained its stance of providing information regarding a few thousand people of indisputably German nationality.')[17] Further agreement between the Red Cross organizations of the two countries, however, led to a renewed exodus. As a result of these two agreements, some 424,000 people are estimated to have emigrated to Germany by 1974.[18]

The third large wave took place in the late 1970s and during the Solidarity upheaval. In August 1975, Helmut Schmidt

discussed the problem of the Germans in Poland with Edward Gierek, during conversations in Helsinki over the 'Third Basket' of the CSCE provisions. The result of these talks was agreement on the exodus of 250,000 Germans from Poland, an important step in the process of normalizing Polish–German relations. This outflow continued into the early 1980s and merged with another, less official migration of mass proportions.

In the aftermath of martial law (December 1981), and especially from the mid-1980s onwards, a fourth major exodus can be detected. Factors affecting the decision by tens of thousands of people to pull up roots and leave Poland included the repressive policies of the Jaruzelski regime and the deteriorating economic situation. In the period 1980–9, the Federal Republic admitted as many as 632,800 *Aussiedler* from Poland.[19] The outflow thereafter began to ease: 133,872 in 1990; 40,129 in 1991 and 17,742 in 1992.[20] The movement of such large numbers of people aroused cynicism in Poland. There were claims that many were in fact economic opportunists, attracted by the benefits of the West German 'economic miracle'. Certainly the number leaving was far higher than any reasonable estimate of the German minority in 1980, and undoubtedly reflects the fact that large numbers of 'autochthons' as well as ethnic Poles were continuing to stake a claim to German identity.

Re-emergence of the German Minority

The rise of the Solidarity trade union in 1980–1 and its challenge to Party hegemony offered the prospect of greater social and political rights to Polish citizens. Minority groups within Poland, however, initially viewed Solidarity with a certain ambivalence. While they stood to gain greater freedom, they were suspicious of the strongly nationalist and Roman Catholic values associated with the Solidarity programme, fearing a return to the more exclusive, intolerant nationalism of the inter-war period.

Nevertheless, from the mid-1980s the German minority began to grow in confidence. After 1982 there was a loosening of the official restrictions on minorities. This was due, in part, to domestic factors (the increasing influence of political opposition), but also to external factors such as Gorbachev's process of liberalization in the USSR. During this period, too, ethnic Germans became aware that the West German government

was pressing the Polish authorities to recognize the existence of a German minority and extend to it rights of cultural expression and organization. The German government placed a proposal before the European Parliament on 17 January 1984, calling for

> an immediate stop to violations of human rights (discrimination against the German language) and a guarantee that Germans living in Poland have the right to travel to the state of their choice and remain in that state as the Helsinki Final Act specifically provides.[21]

In western Poland, growing numbers of people began to emphasize their German identity, there was strong development of German social and political activity, and the first informal organizations began to appear. In the early 1980s, several local groups of the *Deutsche Freundschaftskreise* (DFK) had come into existence in Silesia, although active members were watched closely by Polish security operatives. But by the mid-1980s a number of other German organizations had emerged. Most significant in terms of membership was the Socio-Cultural Association of the German Minority (*Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Minderheit*, hereafter SKG) in Opole. In the early days it proved impossible to register such organizations legally with the Polish authorities.

Interestingly, one of the factors which inspired the creation of such groups was the awareness that ethnic Poles in the Soviet republics were beginning to organize themselves and develop their ethnic culture. There was a strong feeling that if such rights were being extended to the Poles in the east, then ethnic Germans in Poland should not be denied those same rights. A further factor was the propaganda campaign in the Opole region of Silesia, organized by the Federal German Union of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen*, BdV). One of the aims behind such high profile activities, and an aim taken up by the SKG, was to limit the number of departures and maintain a German presence in the region.[22]

At this time, too, ethnic Germans began to seek wider contact with West German diplomats and politicians. The first meeting between representatives of the German minority and a visiting politician from Bonn took place in January 1988, when Hans-Dietrich Genscher was handed a petition.[23] The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the real prospect of German reunification raised

the possiblity that bilateral relations would be put on a new footing. In particular, the 1970 treaty by which the Federal Republic had agreed to Poland's western frontier (and hence reconciled itself to the loss of pre-war territory) would need to be reexamined. Some members of the German minority were optimistic at this stage that a border revision was imminent. This may have played a part both in the burgeoning of German ethnic feeling and in the rising tension with the Polish population that can be detected between 1989 and 1990.

Polish official pronouncements at this time continued to deny the existence of a German minority. On 7 May 1985, General Jaruzelski, the architect of martial law in Poland, stated in the course of a speech delivered in Wrocław (Breslau):

> We have done more than was required of us in discharging our international obligations regarding the repatriation and reunification of families separated by the war. The problem of a German national minority in Poland has thereby ceased to exist once and for all. This chapter is closed for ever.[24]

Indeed, statements emanating from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church were also critical of claims to German ethnic identity, and suggestions that mass might be celebrated in the German language received a negative reaction. In the course of a sermon delivered at Częstochowa on 15 August 1984, the Polish primate Cardinal Glemp stated:

> [If] after forty years [that is, in the second generation] someone claims to be a foreign national without knowing his 'native' tongue or the culture and customs of his supposed motherland, then what is involved is an artificial process driven by motives of a rather base order — quite simply by money and hopes of an easier life. [...] We cannot, with clear conscience, organize services in a foreign language for people who do not know that language, but who only want to learn it in the course of worship.[25]

In Polish academic and journalistic writing as late as 1987–8, West German references to a German minority in Poland were referred to as a 'theory' and elsewhere as 'fiction' or 'myth'.

It is difficult to say exactly at what point the reversal in attitudes and perceptions occurred in Poland. But certainly by 1989, the year in which the Berlin Wall fell and Communist rule

in Poland was finally toppled, there was a decisive change in Polish state policy on the question of the German minority. Previous, Communist, governments had maintained a policy of instilling in the Polish people as desirable the concept of ethnic and national homogeneity — and most moves in domestic policy *vis-à-vis* the German minority had been tactical in dealings with Bonn. By 1989, there was a growing awareness in Poland that, as with the parable of the loaves and fishes, the German minority had undergone a 'miraculous multiplication'. It was not reasonable to continue denying its existence.

The Solidarity government which came to power after the 1989 elections concluded that it was unreasonable to expect loyalty and commitment to the Polish state from people who were continually being monitored by the security services. A new policy was adopted, based upon enabling all minorities to develop their own cultural identity and to play a full part in the life of the Polish state and society. Two initiatives regarding ethnic minorities were taken. One was to create a parliamentary Commission for Ethnic and National Minorities. The other was to transfer the Bureau for National Minorities from the Interior Ministry (MSW), where it had been associated with threats to national security and secret police surveillance, to the Ministry of Culture. Furthermore, politicians began to venture the idea that national minorities might play a greater political role by gaining seats in the Sejm (Polish parliament). In May 1989, Lech Wałęsa, in a letter to voters, mentioned the Germans among these minorities.[26]

In contacts with Polish representatives, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasized that approval of German economic aid for Poland would be made dependent on a positive handling of the issue of the German minority. Kohl's actions were motivated by a desire not only to help this *Volksgruppe*, but also to stem the large influx of ethnic Germans from the east which, when added to a massive inflow of non-German asylum-seekers, was by the late 1980s reaching extraordinary proportions. Kohl arrived in Warsaw for talks with Polish premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki in November 1989.[27] Among the seventy-eight points in the Joint Declaration issued by the two leaders on 14 November 1989 was agreement on reciprocal measures providing wider access, for those who required it, to the language and culture of the other. In particular, the Poles agreed that

German language classes would be made available for those children who requested it, and that periodicals could again be published in the German language.[28]

Ethnic tensions which had lain hidden for four decades came to the surface after 1989. Some of these problems were associated with the political and economic transition of the early 1990s. Silesians, in particular, occupied some of the lowest positions in the social structure, being mainly skilled workers, agricultural workers and technicians, farmers and artisans. They had lower levels of education, and did not participate in the wielding of power (traditionally they had remained remote from local and national politics). It was precisely these occupational groups which found the transition to market economy after 1990 most painful. As sociologist Danuta Berlinska has emphasized, the registration of Silesians with German organizations and with the German consulate was, for many, a form of insurance taken out in case the Polish economy collapsed completely.[29]

In 1990, the Germans began to exert their influence in politics at local level, and their representatives took seats on local councils. The largest of the German associations, the SKG in Opole, eventually registered with the Polish authorities on 14 February 1990. By engaging in political mobilization, the SKG leaders had little interest in wider state issues, but they sought to strengthen the links which bound members of the minority and to raise their self-confidence. During the 1990 local elections the Society had 130,000 members in 170 local groups. It put forward candidates in thirty-eight of the sixty-one wards in the Opole region and ultimately won 380 of the 1440 seats (some 26.4 per cent). As a result the Society was represented on thirty-five of the local councils and had an overall majority in twenty-six.[30] A similar degree of political mobilization could be observed in Silesia during the autumn 1991 General Election. Under an extreme form of proportional representation the German minority gained seven Deputies to the Sejm and one Senator to represent their interests.

The political mobilization of the German minority (particularly in Silesia where they constitute a majority in some areas and a sizeable minority in others) led to tension in relations with the Polish community. A degree of social polarization took place, which was evidenced by demonstrations, the appearance of graffiti and angry letters of complaint to the local press. Polish

opinion was inflamed by the erection of war memorials to German war dead, by the appearance of street signs in German and by the political concessions made to the German minority. Fear was expressed that the German minority could re-emerge as a fifth column, paving the way for German state expansion. The situation was aggravated by the deteriorating economic situation in Poland and by other factors, especially the activities in Poland of *Bund der Vertriebenen* representatives and neo-Nazi groups. Chancellor Kohl's ambiguous statements about the western frontier did little to calm the situation, and neither did some inaccurate and inflammatory reporting in the Polish press.

The new political situation of the two states meant that Polish–German bilateral relations had to be placed on a new footing. The first result was a Treaty of 14 November 1990, confirming the existing Polish–German frontier, which came as a disappointment to those ethnic Germans who had been anticipating a border revision, but did much to calm Polish fears. This was followed on 17 June 1991 by a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation, which regulated the situation of respective minorities on the basis of reciprocity. This Treaty was something of a landmark and provided the model for subsequent bilateral treaties signed by Poland with other neighbouring states. Both sides denounced hatred between peoples (Article 2) and acknowledged the role of minorities and similar groups in forming a natural bridge between the Polish and German peoples. The Treaty further stressed (Article 20) the rights of Poles in Germany and Germans in Poland to freely 'express, maintain and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any attempt at forcible assimilation'.[31]

Several other developments worked to the advantage of the German minority. Freedom to revert to the use of German Christian and family names which had been polonized after 1945 was granted, although the Polish authorities remained reluctant to agree to the German minority's demands that place names in some areas of Silesia should be in two languages. There were fears that this might provoke hostility among the Polish population. Support was given to the development of cultural activities — the formation of clubs and organizations, cultural festivals, publications — and provision for a German-language programme to be broadcast daily on local radio. The authorities

also approved the development of schooling in German, with support from the Polish Ministry of Education.[32] By 1994 there were forty-five primary schools and one nursery school in which pupils could be taught in German. These schools were attended by 5,178 pupils.

The period 1990–1 seems to have marked a high point in ethnic and political mobilization on the part of the German minority. Nevertheless, when a survey was carried out among the 'German minority' of Silesia in May 1990, the most numerous group were those who identified themselves with the region: 63 per cent described themselves as Silesian; 15 per cent described themselves as Poles, or indicated that they inclined towards Polishness (most of these were born after 1945); 12 per cent stated unequivocally that they were German (most of these were born before the Second World War); 10 per cent inclined towards a German identity.[33]

Subsequently, political support for German election candidates declined. In the 1993 parliamentary election, for example, there was an overall fall in the number of votes cast for candidates of the German minority:[34]

	1991	1993
in the Opole region	74,251	60,770
in the Silesian region	129,202	108,010
in Poland as a whole	137,167	110,454

One reason for this decline in support, suggested by sociologist Zbigniew Kurcz, is that, having voted for a representative of the German minority in 1991, these people experienced no noticeable improvement in their situation — something they had been promised by community leaders in the period when German ethnic associations were developing and seeking to attract new members. Many 'ethnic Germans', certainly in Silesia, were workers who had been made redundant from state enterprises as the economy was being restructured. They were dissatisfied with their lot and had played the 'ethnic card' in the hope of improving their situation. (By the 1993 election many of this group would have switched their support to the former Communists, now participating in the political process as social democrats [SLD].) Kurcz also draws attention to the crystallizing of sectional interests *within* the minority community. In addition

to the working-class population, there was a middle-class element which had grown prosperous thanks to earlier periods of work in West Germany. The more entrepreneurial elements among this group could use the new freedoms to set up their own businesses. They had little to gain from supporting ethnic German candidates.[35]

There are other possible reasons for the decline in support for ethnic German candidates, including a sense of 'abandonment' by Germany over the 1990 Treaty which finally established the Polish–German frontier. Certainly there was a realization that, within post-unification Germany, the problems of ethnic Germans in Poland had been relegated to a secondary consideration. Furthermore, the strong inflows of *Aussiedler* to the Federal Republic during the 1980s had led to questioning of the true 'Germanness' of some newcomers. Finally, the lifting of visa requirements for *all* Polish citizens wishing to visit Germany meant that members of the German community organizations were no longer 'privileged' in this respect, as they had been in the past.

There may also have been a sense of manipulation by German interests — particularly by the *Bund der Vertriebenen*. The sixteen demands put forward by the German minority's electoral activists in 1991 carried some terms and phraseology startlingly similar to those employed by the BdV. It is true that the sixteen demands included the right to dual citizenship, a measure widely supported by ethnic Germans. This would have entitled 'ethnic Germans' to settlement in Germany if economic conditions in Poland had become unduly harsh. On the other hand, the BdV treated dual citizenship as a step towards its long-term vision of creating a territory with autonomous (German–Polish) administration and thereby gradually undermining Polish sovereignty in the region. In fact, the concept of dual citizenship is not one which is accepted by the Polish authorities; it is not recognized in Polish law.[36]

Evidence seems to indicate that radical German ethnic feeling began to wane in 1993 and has continued to decline since. The German language courses made available for Silesians did not encounter the expected demand, many saying that if they travelled to Germany then they would learn there. Similarly, fewer parents than expected requested that their children be taught in German at primary school. In addition, the

participation of German minority representatives in government at local and parliamentary level had the effect of diluting the radical fervour of 1989–90. Such activity, particularly on local councils, led to greater tolerance, less anti-Polish feeling and a sense that both groups should learn to work together for the good of the community as a whole. Economic pressures also eased. Identification with German values ebbed as the perceived balance of advantage between the German and Polish economies has begun to move in Poland's favour. Despite the continuing gulf in prosperity, Poland in the mid-1990s was enjoying the highest growth rates in Europe and attracting large foreign investments. Those living in the border regions may well have concluded that it would not be as advantageous in the long run to move west.[37]

In conclusion, while it is unwise to predict in any ethnic-nationalist context that antagonisms have eased and will not flame up into full-scale hostilities, there are reasons for believing that this is the case in the Polish–German border regions. The ending of Communist rule and its oppressive treatment of minority groups, the bilateral agreements between governments over frontiers and the treatment of minorities, the incorporation of the German minority into Polish political life at local and national level — indeed, Poland's adoption of West European standards in its treatment of minorities — all these have made it easier for ethnic Germans to feel that there is a place for them in the new Poland.

Postscript: Statistics

The German minority in Poland today is chiefly concentrated in Upper Silesia (the Opole, Katowice and Częstochowa districts), with smaller numbers being found in Lower Silesia (Wrocław district), Western Pomerania (Slupsk, Koszalin and Szczecin districts) and Eastern Pomerania, Masuria and Warmia (Gdańsk, Torun and Olsztyn districts) Some estimates from German sources give their numbers as being over one million, although these are not given much credence by Polish experts. Since there have been no ethnic questions in post-war censuses, no official statistics of minorities exist. For this reason the official statistical year-book (*Rocznik Statistyczny*) does not include figures for the ethnic minorities. While the year-book does have figures of religious affiliation, these are not useful with regard to the

German minority since many 'Germans' are Roman Catholics, and there are members of the Protestant denominations who are ethnic Poles. The 1995 year-book also lists ethnic minority organizations, including forty-three which have been created by the German minority.[38]

The following statistics were drawn up by the Ministry of Culture in June 1993. Because they are only estimates, they contain a lower figure (a) and a higher figure (b):[39]

Ethnic Groups in Poland	(a)	(b)
Germans	400,000	500,000
Ukrainians	250,000	350,000
Belorussians	200,000	300,000
Lithuanians	20,000	25,000
Slovaks	20,000	25,000
Other minorities	15,000	20,000

Estimates of the numbers of ethnic Germans are based on membership of German organizations and political registration. Polish sociologists claim that only a small minority of this group are in fact of ethnic German origin. They estimate that this number is probably less than ten thousand. The rest are members of the 'autochthonous' groups, particularly Silesians.[40]

NOTES

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3. K. Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948*, Berkeley, CA and Oxford, 1991.
4. S. Banasiak, *Przesiedlenie Niemców z Polski w latach 1945–1950*, Łódź, 1968, p. 223; K. Skubiszewski, *Wysiedlenie Niemców po II wojnie światowej*, Warsaw, 1968. In English, see A. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans*, London, 1979; S. Banasiak, 'The Settlement of the

Polish Western Territories, 1945–47', *Polish Western Affairs*, 6, 1965, pp. 121–49; K. Kersten, 'The Transfer of the German Population from Poland, 1945–47', *Akta Polonia Historicae*, 10, 1964, pp. 27–47. The expulsion process has been something of a 'blank spot' in Polish historiography during the post-war period. Although Banasiak and Skubiszewski produced books on the subject in the late 1960s, there was little public discussion during the Communist period. Indeed, Banasiak's book was produced in a tiny print run of only sixty copies. More recently (the second half of 1995), there has been a lively public discussion about the expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War in the columns of two Polish weeklies, *Rzeczpospolita* and the Catholic *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Concurrently, the publication of a letter on this subject from the former Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* provoked a series of letters from German readers, many of them very emotional. See J. Kranz, 'Rany, prawdy i blizny', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 3 March 1996.

5. A. Sakson, 'Mniejszość niemiecka na tle innych mniejszości narodowych we współczesnej Polsce', *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1991, 2 (259), pp. 1–23.
6. The term 'autochthon' is one used by Polish academics and administrators. The attempt to distinguish between them and 'true Germans' is a complex and perhaps rather fruitless issue, given both the degree of intermarriage in such localities and shifting loyalties across time. For the historical background, see N. Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols, New York, 1984, II, pp. 112–38. For a literary expression of the complexities of ethnic identity in the Polish–German borderlands, see G. Grass, *The Tin Drum*, London, 1989.
7. For more on the verification process, see J. Misztal, *Werifikacja narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych*, Warsaw, 1990. The verification process does not seem to have been very efficient. The claim is made in one study that many of those positively verified as Poles during the 1940s were in fact Germans: see Z. Kurcz and W. Podkański, 'Emigracja z Polski po 1980 roku' in W. Misiak (ed.), *Nowa emigracja i wyjazdy zarobkowe za granicę*, Wrocław, 1991, p. 44.
8. A. Sakson, 'Mniejszość niemiecka', p. 18.
9. H. Schampera, 'Ignorowani Ślązacy', *Res Publica*, 1990, 6, p. 9. For more on the activities of the PZZ, see M. Musielak, *Polski Związek Zachodni 1944–1950*, Warsaw, 1986.
10. See J. Walczak, 'Niemiecka sila robocza w polskim przemyśle węglowym po II wojnie światowej' in W. Jastrzębski (ed.), *Ludność*

niemiecka na ziemiach polskich w latach 1939-1945 i jej powojenne losy, Bydgoszcz, 1995, pp. 73–91.

11. W. Kalicki, 'Jestem Ślązakiem i Niemcem' (conversation with Jan Kroll), *Res Publica*, 1990, 6, p.16.
12. G. Janusz, 'Działalność oświatowo-kulturalna mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce w latach pięćdziesątych', *Sprawy Narodościowe*, 4, 1995, 1 (6), pp. 171–85.
13. J. Kosiarski, 'The German Minority in Poland and Relations with the Federal Republic', *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 1, 1992, 1–2 (Summer–Autumn), pp. 47–68 (49).
14. On migration to Germany, see A. Ochocki, *Emigracja ludności z Polski do Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1952–197*, Warsaw, 1972, and J. Korbel, *Emigracja z Polski do RFN: Wybrane problemy*, Opole, 1986.
15. J. Rogall, 'Polen', *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, 1991, 222, pp. 27–36.
16. A. Albert, *Najnowsza Historia Polski 1918-1980*, Warsaw, 1991, p. 778.
17. Quoted in R. Breyer, 'Polityka RFN wobec mniejszości w III Rzeczypospolitej' in A. Sakson (ed), *Polska-Niemcy: Mniejszość niemiecka w Wielkopolsce*, Poznań, 1994, p. 164.
18. A. Gwiazda, 'Poland's Policy Towards Its National Minorities', *Nationalities Papers*, 22, 1994, 2, pp. 435–44 (436).
19. Rogall, 'Polen', p. 32 (table).
20. V. Ronge, 'Ost–West-Wanderung nach Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 43, 1993, pp. 16–28. Other statistics from German official sources indicate that 1,372,182 *Aussiedler* from the Polish regions travelled to West Germany in the period 1950–90. Quoted in Rogall, 'Polen', p. 32.
21. Quoted in Kosiarski, 'The German Minority', p. 51.
22. W. Kalicki, 'Jestem Ślązakiem i Niemcem', pp. 18–19.
23. R. Breyer, 'Polityka RFN', p. 168.
24. Quoted in Gwiazda, 'Poland's Policy', p. 436.
25. Quoted in Kosiarski, 'The German Minority', p. 52.
26. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 28 May 1989 (quoted in Breyer, 'The German Minority', p. 166)
27. As a sign of the new, more relaxed attitude of the Polish authorities towards the minorities, both leaders attended a mass celebrated in Polish and German by Bishop Nossol of Opole. By this point there had been a reversal in the policy of the Polish Catholic hierarchy. The German language had been introduced into the liturgy in areas where it was needed, although the lack of bilingual priests continued to pose a problem.

28. Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, subsequently revealed that in the period 1990–3, Germany had assigned DM 100 million to support the activities of the German minority in Poland. Reported in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 November 1993 and quoted in S. Łodziński, 'Polityka państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości narodowych w latach 1989–1993', *Przegląd Polonijny*, 1995, 1, p. 134.
29. D. Berlinska, 'Procesy demokratyczne w Polce a mniejszość niemiecka na Śląsku Opolskim', *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1991, 2, p. 30.
30. Ibid.
31. The Treaty was signed by the respective Foreign Ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Significantly, Skubiszewski was a professor of international law who had in the 1960s written an influential monograph on the expulsion of Germans from Poland (see note 4 above).
32. P. Madajczyk, 'Polityka III Rzeczypospolitej wobec mniejszości niemieckiej' in A. Sakson (ed.), *'Polska-Niemcy'*, pp. 157–70.
33. Ibid.
34. Z. Kurcz, 'Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce' in Z. Kurcz and W. Misiak (eds), *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce a Polacy w Niemczech*, Wrocław, 1994, p. 31.
35. Ibid.
36. While Polish Law (15 February 1962) does not recognize dual citizenship, nevertheless some 40,000–60,000 members of the 'German minority' in Poland possess both Polish and German passports. This is partially the result of a Convention signed in 1975 between the Polish People's Republic and the GDR to allow for the offspring of mixed marriages. This legislation was annulled following German reunification. Another reason is that those who settle in Germany as of right (that is, the *Aussiedler* whose right to German citizenship has been accepted by the German authorities) are not required to renounce their Polish citizenship. By contrast, other Poles who wish to take up German citizenship are obliged to submit documents proving that they have renounced their Polish citizenship: S. Łodziński, 'Polityka państwa polskiego', p. 148.
37. D. Berlińska, 'Nasi Niemcy', *Polityka*, 14 (1834), 3 March 1993.
38. *Rocznik Statystyczny 1995*, Warsaw, 1995. The list of ethnic minority organizations in, Table 35 (104), p. 71, is based on bodies which have fifty members or more. The largest, the Socio-Cultural Society of Germans in the Opole region of Silesia, boasts 180,068 members. Its sister organization in the Katowice region has 73,500 members. Three other associations have more than ten thousand members and a further seven more than one thousand members. The

remaining groups are mostly small and locally based, with a membership in the hundreds.

39. A. Gwiazda, 'Poland's Policy', p. 442.
40. Z. Kurcz, 'Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce', p. 20.

13 One Thousand Years of Polish–German Camaraderie

Norman Davies

Augustus II (ruled 1697–1733) is one of those fascinating figures from Poland's past whom serious students of its history often neglect. Polish historians tend to see his reign as the beginning of their country's misfortunes, and so to pass it by in embarrassment. German historians are drawn to monarchs whose political achievements were more impressive. Yet Augustus was a notable actor on the contemporary European stage: a great aristocrat, Duke of Saxony, Meissen and Lusatia, Elector of the Holy Roman Empire and an outstanding soldier, with a distinguished reputation as an Imperial commander in the campaigns of the Holy League. His greatest prowess, however, lay elsewhere. Augustus has the remarkable distinction of featuring in the *Guinness Book of Records* as the man who reputedly fathered the largest number of children in history: some 300. It is a nice coincidence that he is known in German as 'Friedrich-August der Starke', Augustus the Strong. As the present writer told the story elsewhere,

> August the Strong's amours formed one of the wonders of the age, attesting no less to his catholic and cosmopolitan taste than to his phenomenal stamina. After a series of youthful adventures in Madrid and Venice, where he had variously disguised himself as a matador and a monk, he returned to Dresden in 1693 to the charms of his bride, Eberdine, Princess of Bayreuth, to the labours of the Electoral Office, and to the cultivation of a bevy of concubines — official, confidential, and top secret. Maurice de Saxe was the Elector's son by his one-time Swedish favourite — Aurora, Countess of Königsmark. He received his name, it was said, in memory of the famous victory that was

> gained over his mother at the royal hunting-lodge at Mauritzburg. His half-brother, Count Rotowski, was the son of Fatima, a Turkish girl captured at Buda in 1684. His half-sister, Countess Orzelska, Princess of Holstein, was the child of Henriette Duval, daughter of a Warsaw wine-merchant. In Poland, the new King left no stone unturned. When the Countess d'Esterle, who had journeyed with him to Cracow to witness his coronation, was surprised in flagrante with Prince Wisniowiecki, she lost her place to Princess Lubomirska, wife of the royal Chamberlain and niece of a cardinal. The latter, having changed her name to Mme Teschen, soon yielded to the businesslike Mme Hoym, who negotiated a legal contract and a salary of 100,000 RM per annum. This professionalism was copied by most of her successors, not least by Mme Cosel, who insisted on the erection of a suitable palace for herself in Dresden, and by Maria, Countess of Denhoff, daughter of the Polish Crown Marshal, whose interests were astutely managed by a mother-in-law intent on recovering her family's insolvent fortunes. The most extraordinary story of all concerned the abandoned mistress of the British ambassador to Saxony, who, having turned for comfort to the Elector-King, scored the only known non-event in fifty years of gallantry.
>
> Yet unlike his spermatozoa, most of the political ventures of Augustus the Strong failed to reach their target.[1]

The hilarious world of that licentious monarch, who reigned simultaneously in Dresden and in Warsaw, provides an apt introduction to the theme of this chapter. It suggests that the history of Polish–German relations is not quite so uniformly sombre as many modern historians would have us believe. Certainly, Poland and Germany have lived through a very long period when mutual hatred and contempt have been all too common. Frederick the Great of Prussia, who appeared on the European scene shortly after August the Strong had left it, undoubtedly changed the tone for the worse. As a comment on the nefarious role which he played in the dismemberment of the old Polish Commonwealth, he quoted the Latin tag of *Vita mea, mors tua*. In other words, he cynically calculated that Poland must die so that Prussia could flourish. From that time onwards, growing hostility marked the attitudes of the nascent German and Polish nations. In the hands of Prussian leaders, German identity was nurtured with a sense of superiority over Germany's eastern neighbours. In the Nazi era, it reached the nadir of all international relationships when occupied Poland was turned into the *Lebensraum* laboratory and the home of the Holocaust. Over

several generations from the days of Bismarck, Germans were led to believe the official stereotype of the Pole as a lazy, incompetent and incorrigibly rebellious savage. Official Prussian and German historians joined their Russian colleagues in the thesis that the destruction of Polish statehood had rendered great service to humanity, for Poland was the habitat of Anarch and of the *polnische Wirtschaft* — a common German expression for 'a right old shambles'.

For their part, the Poles were increasingly taught both to fear Germany and to despise it. By the most influential modern nationalist leaders, such as Roman Dmowski, they were told that Germany was a still more dangerous enemy for them than Russia. Not least in the People's Republic after 1945, they read in their history books about an unending national struggle in which their forebears fought for survival against medieval colonists, the Teutonic Knights, the armies of Frederick the Great, the school inspectors of Wilhelmine Germany and the Nazi SS.

Such is the dialectic of German and Polish nationalism that each side developed a mirror image of the other's prejudices. Both sides cultivated the myth of the 'thousand-year War of Teuton and Slav'. Both sides gave central prominence to Germany's centuries-old *Drang nach Osten*. The Germans were taught to think that their 'Drive to the East' was one of the great civilizing missions of European History; Poles were encouraged to think of it as one of the most sustained campaigns of unrelieved evil and oppression that could be imagined.

The purpose in presenting a less conventional selection of elements within the history of German–Polish relations is to emphasize once more just how much the monotone stereotypes impoverish and imprison the larger story. Five themes may illustrate the case.

The first is that of the prehistoric Lusatian Culture. In the early nineteenth century, archaeological pioneers digging in the district of Bautzen or Budisyn, west of the River Oder, discovered a series of sites all belonging to the same unmistakable prehistoric culture. Their finds were soon linked to further sites over a wide area ranging from Pomerania in the north to Upper Silesia in the south and to Masuria and to Mazovia on the Vistula in the east. This 'Lusatian Culture' flourished for at least a millennium, *c.* 1400–400 BC, spanning the transition from the late Bronze to the early Iron Age.

One thing which archaeology could not definitively prove, however, was the ethnic associations of these prehistoric Lusatian people. In Imperial Germany, it was taken for granted that the Lusatians had been Germanic, thereby consolidating the assumption that the eastern lands of the modern German Empire were founded on native German soil. The assumption automatically turned the Slavs of Prussia into a tribe of alien parvenus. Such conclusions were quite unacceptable to the Polish archaeologists who began their researches at a slightly later date. In the twentieth century, a Polish 'Aboriginal' or 'Autochtonous' School took immense pains to show that the Lusatians were proto-Slavs and that the expanse of the European Plain between the Oder and the Vistula formed the prehistoric Polish heartland. Their findings, which automatically demoted the prehistoric Germanic tribes recorded in the region to the status of transients and intruders, were formally upheld after 1945 by the Communist censorship of the Polish People's Republic.[2]

Caught between conflicting Prussian and Polish versions, the cultural authorities of the German Democratic Republic encouraged the equally dubious view that 'Lusatian culture' should be attributed to the ancient Illyrians.

Of course, neutral observers might wonder why such a large tract of Europe had to be exclusively awarded to the forebears of only one of the modern claimants. Surely, there had been room enough on the Great European Plain for tribes of all hues to cohabit in harmony. After all, apart from Germanics and Proto-Slavs, a suitable place has to be found for the ancient Celts. If present-day political backing for the Celtic claims is weak, evidence for a Celtic presence in the prehistoric German–Polish borderlands is extremely strong.[3]

The second theme is the Hanseatic Tradition. The Hansa was one of the major international institutions of medieval Northern Europe. First recorded in 1161 at Visby on the Baltic island of Gotland, it started as an association of individual merchants, but soon grew into a far-flung league of commercial cities spanning many countries. Its most westerly member was Dinant in Brittany, its most easterly — Novgorod. Lübeck became the site of its annual assemblies, which, despite a long period of decline, did not come to an end until after the Thirty Years' War. The League's objectives were to enforce the freedom of the seas, to suppress piracy, to reduce tolls and tariffs, to oppose the

restrictive practices of princes, and generally to promote the liberties and prosperity of its members. Since several major cities within the Kingdom of Poland belonged to the League — notably Wrocław, Cracow, Gdańsk (Danzig), Elbląg (Elbing) and Toruń (Thorn) — it exercised an important influence on the development of Polish–German relations over several centuries.

Not surprisingly, German historiography has traditionally stressed the German character of the Hansa. For similar reasons, Polish historiography either minimized or totally ignored the Hansa's role in Poland. It is, however, a serious anachronism to view the League's activities through modern national perspectives of any ilk. What is more, the ethos of the Hansa cities long survived the active period of the League's history. In Royal (West) Prussia, for example, as Karin Friedrich's paper makes plain, the German burghers of Danzig, Elbing and Thorn stayed intensely loyal to the Polish Commonwealth right to its destruction during the Partitions at the end of the eighteenth century. They did so for the same reasons which had inspired them to escape from the Teutonic State in 1466 and to seek protection of their municipal liberties from the Polish king. Like their most famous son, Nicholas Copernicus, who was born in Toruń only seven years after the city's incorporation into Poland, they took their pride in their 'Polishness' not from any sense of modern ethnic identity but from their view of Poland as the land of freedom where their Hanseatic virtues were valued. By the same token, they were intensely fearful and contemptuous of the militaristic and coercive spirit of 'Prussianism' which was fostered by Hohenzollern rule in the neighbouring Duchy of Prussia and, from 1657, in the united state of Brandenburg–Prussia. It was entirely predictable, as proved to be the case, that when the Hohenzollerns eventually annexed the great city of Danzig, the German burghers promptly rebelled in the best Polish (and Hanseatic) fashion. Two hundred years on, when the German Federal Republic is animated by an ethos much closer to that of the Hansa than of Prussia, it may not be too fanciful to think that the Hanseatic tradition still has a part to play, not least in relations with the European Union's most immediate eastern neighbour.

The third theme, of migration, assimilation, and co-habitation, takes up the argument of several previous papers in this volume. Just as medieval Poland saw a great influx of German merchants

and colonists, so the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen huge tides of Polish migration into Germany. The result in both countries is a complicated ethnic mix and varying degrees of assimilation which modern nationalists (and racists) have been loathe to explore. Indeed, thanks to the pervasive nationalism of Imperial Germany, the institutionalized racism of the Third Reich, and the strongly anti-German and nationalistic bias of the post-war Communist regime in so-called People's Poland, this is a subject which has been suppressed for generations. Yet it is vital to any proper understanding of Polish–German relations.

It is a simple fact, not only that there is still a substantial German minority in present-day Poland, but also that large numbers of Polish families can claim German descent. The high incidence of German names gives a clue, but does little to uncover the real rates of intermarriage and assimilation over the centuries when women adopted not only their husbands' family names but also their culture and identity. The same can be said on the other side. Not only is there a substantial Polish minority in Germany, topped up by repeated waves of immigration since 1945, there is a large number of German families who knowingly or unknowingly are descended in whole or part from Polish stock. Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher, often thought of as the most Germanic of Germans, is a good case in point.

This is a complex and sensitive subject which demands many nuances and refinements. For one thing, it is necessary to stress that ethnic purity is a myth. Both the Germans and Poles have been forged from the most variegated ethnic elements. Secondly, one has to take account of an important Jewish element within Poland's (and Germany's) population. For six centuries, from the time of the Black Death, Poland provided the principal refuge for Europe's persecuted Jews — at least 10 per cent of the total population. Since many of those Jewish refugees originated in medieval Germany, the majority of Polish Jews continued to speak Germanic Yiddish right to the end of the community's existence during the Holocaust. When the time came for those Polish Jews to migrate westwards again, particularly to imperial Germany and to Vienna, they assimilated very rapidly into modern German culture and society. At the same time, like many neophytes, they rapidly turned their backs on the world which they had left, frequently adopting hostile attitudes both to the

traditional religion of the *Ostjuden* and to their memories of Poland.[4]

A very particular history also needs to be told about those border provinces where substantial communities of Poles and Germans lived alongside each other for centuries. Pomerania, Wielkopolska, Kujawy, Silesia and Galicia all have a long pluralistic past which has been almost completely forgotten amidst the nationalist whirlwinds of the twentieth century. A favourite 'trick question' for Polish lecture audiences is 'Who is the most famous son of the city of Poznań?'. No-one ever remembers Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg in this context. Similarly, it is fascinating to read in the first chapter of General Guderian's war memoirs that he took time off during the opening offensive of the invasion of Poland in September 1939 to visit the ancestral home of his family at Gross-Klonia.[5] In the same way, millions of men conscripted into the armies of the Reich continued to think of themselves as Poles despite their German uniforms. The collected war correspondence of Joseph Iwicki, who wrote daily letters in Polish to his mother from his billet on the Western Front in 1914–18, is an eloquent testimony to the lot of such men. Iwicki, who came from a Polish village in Pomerania, had been sent to fight the British in Belgium, whilst hoping none the less that the war in which he was involuntarily engaged would somehow result in an independent Poland.[6]

His thoughts closely reflect those of the young poet, Edward Słoński, whose lines recorded the hopeless predicament of Polish soldiers in the Austrian army on the Eastern Front ordered to fire at Polish soldiers fighting in the Russian army:

> We are kept apart, my brother,
> By a fate that we can't deny.
> From our two opposing dug-outs
> We're staring death in the eye.
>
> ...
>
> So when you catch me in your sights,
> I beg you play to play your part,
> And sink your Muscovite bullet
> Deep in my Polish heart.

> For I see the vision clearly,
> Caring not that we both will be dead;
> Since THAT WHICH HAS NOT PERISHED
> Shall rise from the blood that we shed.[7]

That was in 1914. And 'that which had not perished', from the words of the national anthem, was Poland.

The ethnic kaleidoscope of the Polish–German borders was considerably more varied than modern descriptions permit. It can be amply illustrated, for example, from the history of Silesia. Since the bloody confrontations of the three Silesian Risings in 1919–21, and the forcible mass expulsion of Germans after 1945, Silesian history has often been reduced to a simplified dialectic of German versus Pole. Post-war Poles have been fed on tales of endless German oppression in Silesia — as if all Germans had been Nazis; and the Silesian *Vertriebene* or 'expellees' have lived for fifty years on tales of endless Polish barbarity — as if all Poles had belonged to the Communist security service. In reality, Silesia's past was not two-sided, but many-sided. Neither Poles nor Germans displayed any high degree of uniformity. There was a world of difference between the old-established German Catholic communities of rural Silesia, with their Baroque monasteries and peasant villages dating from Austrian and Bohemian times, and the pushy Prussian Protestants and bureaucrats who built and organized Silesia's burgeoning industrial cities. Similarly, the proletarian Polish Catholic parishes of the Upper Silesian mining region, who sent Wojciech Korfanty as deputy to the Reichstag before 1914, had no more in common with the Polish Protestant towns of neighbouring Austrian Silesia, like Cieszyn, than with the great estates of such German 'smoke-stack barons' as the Hohenlohes or the von Donnersmarcks, who ruled their lives from on high. There were many Silesian families who were perfectly bilingual, who spoke their own peculiar dialect at home, and who had no desire to be forced into one exclusive German or Polish compartment. Many Silesians, like their most eloquent spokesmen, wanted nothing more than to savour their own inimitable *Heimat*:

> There's no 'why' about the rose, it blooms because it blooms,
> Paying no heed to itself, not caring whether it is seen.[8]

Oh valleys broad, and heights! Oh fair green forest.
You are the pensive refuge of all my joys and sorrows![9]

When old Silesia came to an end in 1945, the scourge arrived in the form of the victorious Red Army and the vengeful Communist security forces which followed in its wake. Prior to their expulsion, many German Silesians were beaten, raped, pillaged, tortured, imprisoned and killed in quantity. At Lamsdorf (Łambinowice) an ex-Nazi camp was re-opened for the incarceration of German civilians. And Lamsdorf was not the only example. Even the former SS concentration camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau was kept in business in 1945–6 for the internment of German prisoners. Germans tended to blame 'Poles'. They had no reason to know or to care that in reality the Poles were being scourged no less viciously than they were themselves, and by the same Communist agencies. Indeed the notorious Security Office of those early post-war days (the UB) was run by the Soviet authorities, and was not under Polish control.[10] Strangely enough, though they perceived the tragedy differently and suffered in different ways, both the Poles and the Germans of Silesia were sharing a common fate for the last time. What better epitaph than one pronounced three centuries earlier at the end of the Thirty Years' War: 'We are now wholly — nay more than wholly, devastated!'[11]

Notwithstanding the deepening animosities of the late nineteenth century, and the atrocities of the mid-twentieth, it is worth recording that none of the adverse events put an end to the strands of sympathy which still existed for Poland in Germany and for Germany in Poland. These form the fourth theme, of polonophilia and pro-Germanism.

German polonophilia is undoubtedly the thinner strand, perhaps because in their era of power and prosperity Germans paid little attention to their eastern neighbours. It is still in a relatively disadvantaged position for the simple reason that, whilst many Poles speak German, very few Germans bother to learn Polish. Even so the record is not entirely blank. Poles would be heartened to read the *Polenlieder* of the 1830s, when German opinion strongly supported the November Rising against Russia, just as they were in the 1980s, when West Germany organized the largest campaign of food aid to Poland's near-starving citizens.

Polish pro-Germanism has taken many forms. In the political sphere, it has always traditionally been followed by those Polish leaders who, trapped by Poland's unenviable dilemma between two powerful empires, none the less judged Russia to represent the greater threat. Such during the First World War was the position of Józef Piłsudski, whose Legions fought for the Central Powers in 1914–17 and who took part in the German-sponsored government of the restored Kingdom of Poland, but only to the point when he was pressed to sign an unconditional oath of loyalty to the Kaiser. After his refusal, he found himself a political prisoner in Magdeburg Castle. Generally speaking, Poles from the east were most impressed by the Russian danger and were most prepared to consider co-operation with Germany. Poles from the western provinces, in contrast, who knew the German menace at first hand, were least reluctant to work with the Russians.

In the economic sphere, where Poland traditionally acted as the bridge between the dynamic German economy and the vast Russian market, Poles were torn between admiration for the quality of German achievements and fear of domination by German interests. In the cultural sphere, German influences were steadily growing stronger from the Enlightenment onwards. As Polish universities declined or, in the nineteenth century, were suppressed, increasing numbers of Polish students were sent to Germany to be educated. German philosophy, German science, German art and German music were all well known, widely disseminated and carefully imitated in Poland. Numerous Polish intellectuals, from August Cieszkowski, the philosopher, to Alexander Bruckner, the historian, preferred to write and publish in German. Not until the twentieth century did engagement with German culture acquire the negative, unpatriotic overtones of more recent times. One of the curious questions still to be answered is whether Polish nationalism of the *Blut und Boden* variety was not itself the product of Poles who invented an anti-German ideology from too much familiarity with German ways of thinking.

Polish individualism, and the instinctive mistrust of authority which crystallized in the long stretch of statelessness, were rooted in conditions which few Germans experienced. Even so, they could appeal to German radicals and dissidents, who were themselves uneasy at the ingrained conformism of their

compatriots. For a poet like Günter Grass, Poland possessed all the quiet, dotty charm of Don Quixote:

> I have always said that Poles are gifted,
> Perhaps too gifted. But gifted for what?
> They are masterly kissers of hand and cheek,
> And what is more, past masters of Melancholy and Cavalry.
> Don Quixote himself, you know, was a highly gifted Pole,
> Who took his stand on a hillock near Kutno
> With the rays of the sunset carefully at his back.
> Lowering his talented white-red-pennanted lance,
> He rode straight at the ungifted beasts
> Which had to depend on motorized horse-power,
> Charging the flank of the Field Grey ranks...
> Whether it was done in masterly fashion or otherwise,
> And whether they were sheep, or windmills, or Panzers
> Which kissed Pan Kiehot's hands, I cannot tell,
> At all events he was embarrassed, and blushed in masterly fashion,
> So I cannot say exactly — but Poles *are* gifted.[12]

The story of Polish cavalrymen charging German tanks in 1939 is a myth which many Poles are willing enough to share. But in the words of Günter Grass there is sympathy and affection as well as irony.

And so finally to the fifth theme, the Catholic Connection. Thanks to Poland's proximity to Protestant Prussia, and her subjection to German/Eastern policies strongly inspired by the Prussian legacy, the picture of Polish–German relations has often been dangerously over-simplified in the religious sphere as well. 'Catholic Poland' was seen to have faced 'Protestant Germany' much in the way that it faced 'Orthodox Russia'. In reality, though predominantly Catholic in modern times, Poland sheltered a rich variety of religious communities right up to 1939. And Germany, though predominantly Protestant in the north and east, is predominantly Catholic in the south and west. In the National Socialist era, when the German state was in the hands of pagan Nazis, the inclusion of Austria significantly raised the Catholic percentage in the Reich's population. Catholic Poles have never been bereft of Catholic allies in Germany; their popular identification of Germany with Prussia and Protestantism is a false one.

How effective the Catholic connection has been in practical politics is another matter. Prior to the Reformation, the Polish Church naturally turned to the German bishops to help them in their difficulties with the Teutonic Knights. Pawel Włodkowic (Vladimirius), Rector of the Jagiellonian University, formulated an elaborate treatise on the un-Christian 'crusading' activities of the Knights of Prussia, and presented it to the Council of Constance. Unfortunately the Empire could no more curb the Knights than the Church Council could. So cutting the Teutonic state down to size was left to the valour of Polish–Lithuanian arms. (Modern Polish audiences would be surprised to find that the Virgin Mary was the patroness of the Order, as she was of Poland.)

After the Reformation, when the rise of Hohenzollern Prussia posed a strategic threat to Poland, the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburgs was Poland's natural ally. Though the Polish *szlachta* disliked the Habsburgs' absolutist instincts, especially after the suppression of Bohemia, and no Habsburg candidate ever won a Polish royal election, the Polish–Imperial frontier was one of the quietest in Europe. In the Empire's greatest hour of need, in 1683, when Vienna was besieged by the Ottomans, it was John Sobieski and his winged hussars who rode to the rescue. Poland's union with Saxony (1697–1763) was inspired by the common fear of Prussia.

Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* gains a prominent place in Polish history books as an instrument of Prussia's policy of Germanization (which it was). But, as Poles forget, it was primarily used to attack the Catholic Church within all parts of Germany. After all, it led not just to the imprisonment of the Polish Archbishop of Breslau, but also to that of the Archbishop of Cologne.

In the First World War, German policies towards Poland were undoubtedly pursued with an eye to the empire's advantage. On the other hand, with the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland in 1916 and the creation of an autonomous Polish government and administration, they also revealed a degree of enlightened self-interest. It was German concessions in 1916–18 that paved the way for a viable, independent Republic in 1918. Archbishop Kakowski, as Chairman of the German-sponsored Regency Council in Warsaw, was the very first Pole to hold a position of authority in Warsaw for almost fifty years. Of course, as the

German empire soon collapsed, the relative generosity of its dispositions was quickly forgotten in the euphoria of independence.

German policies to Poland in 1939–45 bore little relation to those pursued in 1914–18. Since the Nazis planned to reduce the Poles to a nation of illiterate helots, their plans for the racial reconstruction of the *Lebensraum* involved the genocide not only of the Jews but also of the Polish intelligentsia, including the Catholic clergy. In the territories of the New Reich, for example, in Łódź, in the Warthegau, and in Silesia, the SS immediately carried out a wholesale purge of Polish priests. Some three thousand of them were sent to Dachau alone. (According to the US chaplain who interviewed the handful of survivors on the day of Dachau's liberation in 1945, they begged not for bread but for breviaries.)

All in all, some 2–3 million Polish Catholics were killed within the Greater Reich by the Nazis, to the deafening silence of the Vatican. This tragedy may be seen as just another example of Nazi inhumanity. It may also be seen as one of the worst episodes of the shared humiliation of Catholics in Germany.

It certainly sets the context for the remarkable initiative taken by Poland's Catholic hierarchy in 1966. For twenty years, the post-war Communist regime had covered up its own crimes by relentlessly harping on the crimes of the Fascists, and of the Fascists alone. The celebration of Poland's Millennium had caused a split between the interpretation of the Church, which stressed Poland's membership of the universal Christian community, and the propaganda of the Communist state which was banging the drum about the thousand-year war of Teuton and Slav. Then, without warning, the Polish bishops issued a public address to their brother bishops in Germany. It extended forgiveness for Germany's sins against Poland, and asked forgiveness for Poland's sins against Germany. Its aim was unerring. No other step did more to dissolve the hatreds of the Cold War. Nothing could have better set the two divided nations on the path of reconciliation. Within four years, Chancellor Willy Brandt was on his knees in Warsaw. Within a dozen years, solidly backed — as it was reported — by the votes of German cardinals, the Archbishop of Cracow found himself on St Peter's throne in Rome.

* * *

Over the centuries Polish–German relations can be classified as good, bad and indifferent. There are patches of black and white, and every conceivable shade of grey. To talk of a 'thousand-year reign' of *bonhomie* or *camaraderie* is certainly eccentric. But it is no more inaccurate than the tale about a thousand-year reign of unmitigated antagonism. Indeed, only one of ten recorded centuries can be said to have been dominated by entrenched mutual conflict. The decades from 1870 to 1970 were suffused with xenophobic nationalism, and encompassed some of the most atrocious acts of inhumanity in European history. But they can hardly be judged typical.

Historians, like politicians, must sometimes resort to affirmative action. After generations of fear and suspicion, it can do no harm to point to the silver lining among the clouds, and to raise one's glass to the old Polish toast: KOCHAJMY SIĘ! (Let us love one another). It is a toast which Augustus the Strong, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, must have drunk many times with relish.

NOTES

1. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1981, I, 493–94. See also K.L. von Pollnitz, *La Saxe Galante or the Amorous Adventures of Augustus of Saxony...*, London, 1750.
2. See Konrad Jażdżewski, *Ancient Peoples and Places: Poland*, London, 1965.
3. See J. Rosen-Przeworska, 'Les Survivances celtiques dans les traditions populaires polonaises', *Ethnologia Polona*, 7, 1981, pp. 47–58; also Rosen-Przeworska, *Les Sculptures de Ślęza et le problème celtique en Pologne*, Paris, 1962.
4. See J. Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914*, Oxford, 1987; S. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923*, Madison, WI, 1982.

5. Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, London, 1952, p. 38.
6. Józef Iwicki, *Listy polaka, żołnierza armii niemieckiej z okopów I wojny światowej*, ed. A. Juzwenko, Wrocław, 1978.
7. Rozdzielił nas, mój bracie,
   Zły los i trzyma straż —
   W dwóch wrogich sobie szańcach
   Patrzymy śmierci w twarz.

   [...]

   A gdy mnie z dala ujrzysz
   Od razu bierz na cel
   I do polskiego serca
   Moskiewską kulą strzel.

   Bo wciąż na jawie widzę
   I co noc mi się śni
   Że TA, CO NIE ZGINĘŁA
   Wyrośnie z nasej krwi.

   (E. Słoński, 'Ta co nie zginęła' in P. Hertz (ed.), *Zbiór poetów polskich XIX wieku*, 7 vols, Warsaw, 1960–75, IV, pp. 855–6.)
8. Die Ros' ist ohn' Warum, sie blühet weil sie blühet,
   Sie acht't nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet.

   (J. Schlieffer [Angelus Silesius, 1624–77], 'Ohne Warum' in *Penguin Book of German Verse*, London, 1959, p. 173.)
9. O Täler weit, o Höhen
   O schöner, grüner Wald,
   Du meiner Lust und Wehen
   Andächt'ger Aufenthalt!

   (Joseph, Freiherr von Eichendorff [1757–1857], 'Abschied' in ibid., p. 311.)
10. See John Sack, *An Eye for an Eye: Jewish Revenge on Germans in Poland in 1945*, New York, 1993.
11. 'Wir sind doch nunmehr ganz, ja mehr denn ganz verheeret!'
    (Andreas Gryphius (1616–54), 'Tränen des Vaterlandes' in *Penguin Book of German Verse*, p. 131.)
12. *Pan Kiehot*
    Ich sag es immer, Polen sind begabt.
    Sind zu begabt, wozu begabt,
    begabt mit Händen, küssen mit dem Mund,
    begabt auch darin: Schwermut, Kavallerie;
    kam Don Quichotte, ein hochbegabter Pole,
    der stand bei Kutno auf dem Hügel,
    hielt hinter sich das Abendrot

und senkte die weißrotbegabte Lanze
und ritt den unbegabten Tieren,
die auf Motore angewiesen,
direkt ins Feldgrau, in die Flanke…

Da brach begabt, da küßten unbegabt
— ich weiß nicht, war'n es Schafe Mühlen Panzer —
die küßten Pan Kiehot die Hände,
der schämte sich, errötete begabt;
mir fällt kein Wort ein — Polen sind begabt.

(Günter Grass, *Gesammelte Gedichte*, Neuwied and Berlin, 1971, p. 117, and *Gedichte und Kurzprosa*, Studienausgabe, 11, Göttingen, 1994. Reproduced by kind permission of Gerhard Steidl Verlag. Translated by Norman Davies.)

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