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Preface

Axel Fair-Schulz and Mario Kessler

This collection of ten essays deals with intellectuals, who fled Nazi Germany and found either refuge in the United States or in American services in Great Britain and post-WWII Germany. The essays focus on individuals who were outside the commonly known Max Horkheimer-Hannah Arendt circles. These people, whose intellectual achievements are beyond discussion, have been dealt with extensively in a great number of scholarly works. Our intention, however, in this collection is to explore the thought, biographies and intellectual heritage of some less well-known but not less important figures.

There is a broad range of discussed scholars whose political views ranged from communism to anti-communism and whose personal identity can be placed between secular Judaism to Atheism. Their experiences ranged from an outstanding career at an Ivy-League university to the return to the German Democratic Republic and a position as an economic adviser for East Berlin's party leadership. No one of these had actual political power, but asserted some degree of influence. Their intellectual legacy can still be seen in today's political culture. The essay collection does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of German-speaking refugee intellectuals in the United States or even in the English-speaking world. For that purpose the reader may refer to standard monographs, such as Anthony Heilbut's *Exiled in Paradise* or the long-awaited English translation of Jean-Michel Palmier's *Weimar in Exile*.

Devan Barker and Anja-Silvia Goeing discusses two authors that shared a similar fate: The classicist Werner Jaeger (1888–1961) emigrated from Germany in 1936, after having given up his work as a professor of Classics at Berlin University. He became professor first in Chicago and from 1939 to 1960 at Harvard. A product of his studies of Greek Antiquity was the issue of the reception of a so-called ideal, a Greek image of human perfection, as

an objective for educational theory. The philosopher and educational theorist Robert Ulich (1890–1977) immigrated to the United States in 1934. He taught History of Education and Philosophy of Education at Harvard University from 1936 to 1960 and was particularly concerned with expanding and critiquing the pragmatic ideas of John Dewey.

Karl Loewenstein (1891–1973) made, as Markus Lang points out, the scholarly transition from public law to political science. He started his career in 1918 with a dissertation at the University of Munich law school. After several years as an attorney, he had, in 1933, to immigrate to the United States where he found a position as professor for Political Science and Jurisprudence at Amherst College in Massachusetts. He was one of the main protagonists advocating the introduction of political science in West German universities after World War II.

John L. Harvey deals with the historian Hans Rothfels (1891–1976) and his itinerary from a neo-conservative victim of the Nazi racial laws to the trans-Atlantic climax of his career. While serving as a Professor for Modern History at Königsberg University from 1926 until 1934, Rothfels was an intellectual magnet for young nationalists by demanding a reassertion of German influence in Eastern Europe based on authoritarian government and a bygone society of orders. His *völkisch* nationalism and Evangelical Lutheranism however offered no shield from the Jewish racial laws of the Nazi Party. Rothfels's emigration in 1939 led to his rebirth as a prominent historian at the University of Chicago. Burnished with this reputation, he returned to Tübingen in the 1950s to propagate the development of *Zeitgeschichte* and the study of Nazism. Thus a former important proponent of anti-Western nationalism emerged in the Federal Republic as a *grandseigneur* of West German historical writing and an intellectual bridge from Bonn to Washington.

Catherine A. Epstein's essay is devoted to the medievalist Helene Wieruszowski (1893–1973), who belonged to the first generation of professional women struggling for academic careers in the conservative German university system. She had received her doctoral degree only ten years after the first woman in Germany had done so. A few months before Hitler came to power, Wieruszowski tried to habilitate herself in Bonn, but her thesis was rejected. In 1940, she came to the United States after several years' wait for a visa. There she held temporary and part-time positions at The Johns Hopkins University and Brooklyn College, before finding late in life a permanent position at The City College of New York. In the United States Wieruszowski moved away from the discussion of grand ideas towards topics such as the institutional context of medieval letter-writing. Despite the Americanization of her work, Wieruszowski's social and scholarly interaction nonetheless took place mostly within the German-speaking refugee milieu.

The political itinerary and work of Franz Borkenau (1900–1957) reflect the political catastrophes of the 20th century. Throughout his whole life, Borkenau, as Mario Kessler points out, was in search for an intellectual "anchor," a guiding principle for the course of history. This principle would lead to a general interpretation of the complexities of the historical process; an attitude that was quite typical for a generation of intellectuals who had lost ground after the breakdown of the old European order at the end of WWI. Many of this generation embraced communism enthusiastically. Most of them became disappointed only a few years later. As a communist political activist and later as an anti-communist writer who was employed by several American military services, Borkenau stands for both tendencies.

Franz Neumann's (1900–1954) political thought and writing during the Weimar period was strictly connected to social democratic politics, as Alfons Söllner explains. That means it was restricted by practical aims and dominated by belief in the effective power of legal politics. After a productive phase at the London School of Economics, he came to the United States. There he achieved an outstanding reputation with the publication of his *Behemoth* in 1942. His thesis was that Nazi rule is a function of continuing struggles among power groups united only by their hatred of the labor movement, and that Nazi Germany consequently lacks a state in the sense of the modern political understanding. As a professor at Columbia University he helped establish the Free University of Berlin. Neumann also took part in enhancing political theory as a component of political science in American universities.

Axel Fair-Schulz probes into the life and career of the enigmatic Jürgen Kuczynski (1904–1997), an economic historian, essayist and immensely erudite scholar with widespread interests who nevertheless remained attached to the communist movement long after many others had become disillusioned. Kuczynski was socialized in a well-connected left-liberal German-Jewish family and studied in Germany as well as the United States. In the United States, Kuczynski did post-graduate work at the Brookings Institution, where he delved into American labor conditions and issues of social justice. He also worked within the American Federation of Labor as an analyst during the 1920s. After the Nazi's rise to power, Kuczynski fled to Great Britain, where he continued his trajectory as a Marxist scholar of international renown as well as a political activist. The United States Bombing Survey under John Kenneth Galbraith became aware of Kuczynski's works on economic conditions in Nazi Germany and hired him as a researcher. In addition, he collaborated with the Office of Strategic Services in selecting a small group of German exiles that were parachuted as spies into Nazi Germany. Fair-Schulz investigates Kuczynski's peculiar role as a faithful but somewhat heterodox

communist scholar, who benefited much from American and British scholarly culture.

Henry M. Pachter (1907–1980) was a German-American twentieth-century scholar of socialism and political history, whose life and thought is sketched by Stephen Eric Bronner. During the mid-1920s, Pachter was a critical member of the German Communist Youth, from which he was, in 1928, expelled. This was in connection with the rising rigidity within the German Communist Party that became increasingly subject to Stalin's political line. In 1933, he was forced to leave Germany for France and Spain. In 1941, he arrived in the United States. After many years of different professional positions, Pachter was employed as a professor of history at Rutgers University. When the Cold War began, he maintained his commitment to social democracy that can be traced back to his years in Weimar Germany. The value of socialism laid for Pachter, as Bronner points out, in the priorities it will set; the manner in which people will be freed from the drudgery of labor; the way in which their capacities for participation, leisure, and creativity will be fostered.

Ossip K. Flechtheim (1909–1998) was, as Mario Kessler examines, a forerunner in establishing research on communism as an academic discipline in post-WWII West Berlin. He was also one of the founder fathers of political science as a serious scholarly field in West Germany. As a long-standing essayist on what was to become futurist research, he coined the term Futurology. Flechtheim, who taught at several American universities between 1940 and 1952, went finally back to Germany, when, in the atmosphere of McCarthyism, he could not stay in American academia. Flechtheim's research was characterized by an inter-disciplinary approach and was devoted to many different issues, such as Fascism and communism, the conflicts between the developed and the underdeveloped world, and problems of party sociology.

Georg G. Iggers, himself a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, delivered in 2005 a lecture on "Refugee Historians from Nazi Germany: Political Attitudes towards Democracy" that was given at the U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. Georg Iggers's important essay addresses three relevant themes: Firstly, given his personal background and experiences, Iggers reflects how he became increasingly aware of his Jewish extraction and identity; secondly, he probes into how some German-Jewish refugee intellectuals became in the United States progressively concerned with their secular-defined Jewishness and its meaning in contemporary society; and thirdly, he explains in detail the contributions of German refugee historians to American historiography. Thus, Iggers's chapter deals with the cultural transfer of ideas, attitudes, and methodologies between Germany, the United States and back.

This project benefits from the combined perspective of American, Canadian, and German scholars. It grew out of scholarly cooperation between

academics from research institutions that are based in two different towns that share the same name: the Center for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam, Germany, as well as from the State University of New York at Potsdam, USA.

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Abbreviations

AFL	American Federation of Labor
AAUP	American Association of University Professors
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union), i.e., Germany's Christian conservative party
DKP	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist Party)
DNVP	Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National Peoples' Party)
GDR	German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany
ICHS	International Committee of Historical Sciences
IfZ	Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History)
KAPD	Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (Communist Workers' Party of Germany)
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
KPO	Kommunistische Partei-Opposition (Communist Party-Opposition)
POUM	Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist Unity)
SAP	Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (Socialist Workers' Party)
SDS	Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student Alliance)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, i.e., Soviet Union
YIVO	Yidishes Forshungs Institut (Jewish Research Institute)

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Werner Jaeger and Robert Ulich

Two Émigré Scholars on Educational Theory

Anja-Silvia Goeing and Devan Barker

Note: This article is based on research conducted for the workshop "Emigration, Biography, and the Change of Theoretical Approaches," hosted by the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (GACVS), Washington D.C., on July 20, 2000. Since then, the following major works on or by Werner Jaeger and Robert Ulich have appeared: Devan Barker, *Glaube und Erfahrung: Das pädagogische Denken von Robert Ulich*, doctoral thesis (University of Würzburg, 2000); Rudolf Borchardt, Werner Jaeger, *Briefe und Dokumente 1929–1933*, ed. by Ernst A. Schmidt, Schriften der Rudolf Borchardt-Gesellschaft 10 (München: Rudolf Borchardt-Society, 2007); Andrea Follak, *Der "Aufblick zur Idee," Eine vergleichende Studie zur Platonischen Pädagogik bei Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Natorp und Werner Jaeger* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); Manfred Meis, Theo Optendrenk (eds.), *Werner Jaeger* (Nettetal: Matussek, 2009); Alfonso Reyes, Werner Jaeger, *Un Amigo en Tierras Lejanas: Correspondencia 1942–1958*, ed. by Sergio Ugalde Quintana (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 2009); Robert Ulich, *Zur Bildungssoziologie des akademischen Nachwuchses in Deutschland: Zusammenhänge zwischen Herkunft, Schulvorbildung und Studium, nachgewiesen an den Mitgliedern der Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes, 1925–1933: unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, Dresden, 1933,* ed. by Dietmar Waterkamp (Münster, New York: Waxmann, 2000); and Robert Ulich, *Crisis and Hope in American Education* (originally published: Boston: Beacon Press, 1951; repr. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction, 2007).

Research on the impact of forced migration on scientific change in the field of educational theory in Germany is still strictly limited to the discipline itself. However, it is sufficiently known, that other disciplines, like philosophy or classical philology, had important effects on educational thought, action and

finally even on institutional construction. Of fundamental importance for the latest developments in research are the works of Heinz-Elmar Tenorth and Klaus-Peter Horn.[1] They restricted their research to investigation into the publications of a sample of journals relevant to the discipline of education. In their opinion, the discourse on education developed mainly within this medium. Their comparative examination of the themes of purely pedagogical journals during the Weimar Republic, National Socialism, and those edited in exile offers only seemingly a scientifically solid and complete overview of the contemporary theoretical impact on education. The relevant publications of the related disciplines remain overlooked. In order to differentiate the discourse on education within the investigation on changes within the discussion on education conducted by exiled scholars, the research of Tenorth and Horn needs to be extended beyond the bounds of the discipline. The role of classical philology during the Weimar Republic seems to be disregarded, and it is with great pleasure that the authors note one book on platonic pedagogy of this period coming out in 2005: Andrea Follak's *"Aufblick zur Idee": Eine vergleichende Studie zur Platonischen Pädagogik be Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Natorp und Werner Jaeger*" can't do more than point her finger to this gap.[2]

Classical philology derives the way it sees itself directly from the thoughts of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). The classicist Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824) was in his sphere of influence. His ideas on cultural education based on an anthropological approach had a determining influence on the construction of the University disciplines Greek and Latin.[3] During the German Empire and the Weimar Republic, the scholars of classical philology at the University of Berlin were recognized by society as not only having a high social status, they were also seen as the crowned heads of education, sciences, and scholarship in spite of the competition from the growing field of the natural sciences and the continual differentiation of disciplines.[4] In this tradition of humanism, which includes on the one hand the traditional humanistic effort of coping with antiquity and on the other hand the theories of Idealism and Nietzsche, Werner Wilhelm Jaeger represented a new, "Third," Humanism in the 1920s in Germany. His main philological interest was in new editions of classical and early Christian Greek texts as well as their interpretation and comparison from a point of view, which included questions of importance for educational thought. Apart from this, his main systematic interest was devoted to the question of what kind of knowledge human beings could possibly gain from reading Greek literature. Here the idea of the Platonic "Polis" has a central position for him. Whether, like the younger Hannah Arendt,[5] he was able to train systematic thinking by comparing his thought with existing political and philosophical systems and to update and differentiate his own system, the following study will show.

We compare the academic biography of an educationalist, Robert Ulrich, who drew his thinking from the humanistic ideals of Idealism and humanities, with that of Werner Jaeger. Using the criteria set up by Mitchell G. Ash and Alfons Söllner, the comparison examines the role that a new environment played in the educational works and thought of two prominent German humanists who left Nazi Germany to continue their work from within two leading American universities.[6] We are especially interested in the individual dialectic process of transforming and integrating old and new thought which each demonstrates.

The two authors considered shared a similar fate: Having planned to leave as early as 1934,[7] Werner Jaeger (1888–1961) emigrated from Germany in 1936, after having given up his position as professor of Classics in Berlin. He became professor first in Chicago and from 1939 to 1960 at Harvard. A by-product of his intensive studies of Greek Antiquity was the issue of the reception of a so-called ideal, a Greek image of human perfection, as an objective for educational theory. As a result of his Classical studies, Jaeger's was a different environment to that of Ulich. The philosopher and educational theorist Robert Ulich (1890–1977), persecuted by the Nazis in Germany, immigrated to the USA in 1934. He taught History of Education and Philosophy at Harvard University from 1936 to 1960. Ulich was particularly concerned with expanding and critiquing the pragmatic ideas of John Dewey. In his book *The Human Career* (1955) he expanded on Dewey's theory, by systematically grafting onto Dewey's ideas a metaphysical level of sense and meaning in human experience.

In Chicago and Harvard Jaeger joined the Classicists' circle. His theory and philosophy of education was therefore developed in different cultural surroundings. The authors knew one another and their theoretical approaches were in some ways similar. Their principle concern, Humanism, (which in both men's variations proved astonishingly resistant to pragmatism), remains worthy of discussion for its ability to frame a fruitful comparison between the German study of education as a *Geisteswissenschaft* and the American social science approach. The comparison offers important insights into this critical period of American educational history by taking a measured look at the historical contexts influencing two leading figures in what eventually became a whole generation of German scholars who helped recast American educational thought.

WERNER WILHELM JAEGER (1888–1961)

Werner Jaeger,[8] professor of Classics in Berlin from 1921,[9] formulated his so-called Third Humanism[10] against the contemporary philosophical current of

Historicism in Germany, which renounced all normative values. He gave his new theory an explicitly educational task. This Humanism was established in Germany in 1924, during the Weimar Republic and persisted until WWII. It took its ethical values from Classical, specifically Greek Antiquity and was therefore oriented from its inception towards a cultural elite, which had access to the Greek Classics. In his book *Paideia*, published in three volumes between 1934 and 1947, Jaeger presented the philological and cultural foundations of the "Third Humanism." He chose this title because it came after Renaissance Humanism and the enthusiasm for Greek culture in the 18th century. The political aspect was of special importance to Jaeger. In his opinion, human beings were naturally political. That is why the state and society are so important in the life of each individual.

A. The "Third Humanism" According to Jaeger

National Socialism from 1933–1945 in Germany destroyed numerous new currents of educational philosophy. Among them was this so–called Third Humanism. It received some attention after its beginnings in 1924 in Germany, but has yet to be treated in the relevant historical literature. Through a study of the Ancient World, Third Humanism tried to offer a new approach to an old question that even today has lost nothing of its explosiveness. The main thinker of this current was Werner Jaeger. His major work, *Paideia*, forms the theoretical basis of his educational philosophy.[11] Unlike Nietzsche and countless others, the main systematic results of a reception of antiquity can be seen here in a perspective which transcends the particular environment of one single community or group of individuals.[12] Jaeger had argued against the current of historicism[13] in the humanities since the lecture he delivered at Basel in 1914.[14] There he spoke of values that were to be found in antiquity and which retained their meaningfulness even in the days of the Weimar Republic. In his *Paideia* he showed that the human value he regarded as being superior consisted in the political nature of man.[15] This "politicalness" however did not mean the free choice of men to create their own state. Jaeger wrote rather about Athenian democracy, which was more or less an oligarchy, the government of a few aristocrats. For Jaeger, Athenian democracy shows the prototype for human behavior in the state: The individual human being is subordinated to the goals of the state. "Politicalness" for Jaeger consists therefore in working within this subordination of individual to state.

According to Jaeger's interpretation of Plato's *Politeia* in his *Paideia*,[16] the central axis of his educational philosophy was formed by the Polis, around which his understanding of a newly arisen reception of Antiquity revolved. Basing his analysis on analogous ideas of the state as a macro-cosmos and

humankind as a micro-cosmos, he pointed to the highest Platonic-Socratic idea of constituting the state: the idea of justice. According to Jaeger,[17] a just state made possible the optimal development of the single human being. The single human being himself represented the state in its totality, in the sense that he drew on one hand the idea of justice from himself and was on the other hand totally immersed in it. This way of thinking led Plato to the formation of a hierarchically organized classification of ranks within the state. Every rank represented a human capacity of the soul. Accordingly, he relegated farmers and workers to the lowest rank, guardians to the second rank and regarded the philosophical rulers as being of the highest rank.[18] These ranks corresponded to the virtues and capacities of the soul named "calm" for the first, "courage" for the second and the ruling "reason" for the third rank. A more detailed analysis and interpretation of the writings of Jaeger in this context will be developed in a later presentation, examining whether or not Jaeger interprets the Platonic *Politeia* as corresponding to the German Idealism of the first half of the 19th century, especially with Hegel's idea of the national state as synonymous with morality.[19]

This Platonic concept of virtues referring one to the other cannot be simply rendered in practice. In particular, the concept of democracy in the 20th century can't be expressed within the system of Plato's manifestation of the Polis. John Dewey was one of the educational philosophers who consistently took a very different, social-scientific approach. As early as 1916 he distinguished his theory from any kind of idealistic thought in his book *Democracy and Education*.[20] After a critical examination of reflections on education made by Plato, during the 18th-century Enlightenment, and as part of the German idealistic tradition of humanities in the 19th century, he stressed the necessity for pluralism on the grounds of his pragmatic thinking around a relationship of the poles "individual" and "community."[21] He thus showed himself to be working against the idealistic concept of unity as the metaphysical objective designed to create morality in institutional and state surroundings. The necessary pluralism of individuals in a community always had its origins, according to Dewey, in the idea of the autonomous subject.[22] Perhaps it was this widely spread tradition of pragmatic thought, especially in the Anglo-Saxon context, which reached its climax in Dewey's thought,[23] which made it almost impossible to transform the philosophy of Jaeger into the American social context. This, however, remains a speculation.

Jaeger's new humanistic approach was criticized at the time for several reasons. For the National Socialists it failed to demonstrate the superiority of German nature, because Jaeger set the Greek spirit above the German. On the other hand, the opponents of National Socialism criticized the fact that his ideas were too close to those of the German Nazis. Bruno Snell formulated

his famous criticism in 1935: "[Jaegers Humanismus sei] geradezu unpolitisch, weil er nicht der Politik dient,—oder weil er sich jeder Politik dienstbar machen kann; das heißt aber, dass er ständig in Gefahr ist, Literatentum zu werden."[24] As he puts it, Jaeger's humanism is particularly non-political; because it serves no particular political theory yet can be exploited by any political theory. That means that it constantly runs the risk of becoming purely academic. No totalitarian regime can be effectively criticized from such a position.

B. Jaeger's Position in the United States

It is interesting in this context to investigate how Jaeger coped with the democratic system of the United States. After his emigration in 1936 he wrote as before about the systematic problems of human beings in the modern world. He wrote articles of this kind from 1937 to 1959. He did not stress his earlier approach emphasizing normative conclusions for eternal human values based on the ancient Greek world. Rather, he spoke about a more generalized value of living responsively in a cultural tradition without specifying any human values.[25]

In 1943 and 1958 Jaeger delivered two public lectures, which stressed the second root of his thinking: the Christian (Catholic) Religion. In 1943 he offered an interpretation of the Aristotelian reception of St. Thomas Aquinas in his "Humanism and Theology" (German: Humanismus und Theologie, published 1960).[26] After his second presentation made in 1958 at Tübingen, Wolfgang Schadewaldt spoke of a biographical change in Jaeger's thought, which was moving towards a more theologian view of things, creating a Christian *Paideia*.[27] In the writing of Werner Wilhelm Jaeger (1888–1961) we can therefore distinguish three distinct positions concerning his approach to humanism, one that sought a humanistic civilization, which, according to our "democratized" understanding, does not describe a value at all; one reminding us of the importance of tradition in general; and the last reminding us of Christian thought according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

The critical review of Jaeger's humanism shows clearly that his humanism, by stressing the "politicalness" of men and not aesthetic or individual values, champions different human values for example than those of Wilhelm von Humboldt, one of the founders of Second Humanism at the end of the 18th century. It shows too, that Jaeger tried to survive with his classics during Hitler's regime without adopting the concept of National Socialism; and it shows thirdly, that, during his time in the American academy, he did not mention his system of Third Humanism in his ruminations on emerging civilization within the context of democracy in the United States.

Nevertheless, Jaeger had an important impact on his American students and colleagues at the University of Chicago and at Harvard. The huge bequest of unpublished papers by the Dean of the Division of the Humanities, Richard Peter McKeon, is kept in the Archives of the University of Chicago in the Regenstein Library, and reveals Jaeger's influence. McKeon lived from 1900 to 1985 and was Dean at the University of Chicago from 1935 to 1947. As professor of Greek and philosophy he taught the whole history of philosophy from antiquity to modern times, as a look into his detailed and accurately kept file-card box for the preparation of lectures shows. It consists of a few thousand narrowly typewritten cards of half-letter size.[28] His many interests included political agitation for peace after WWII within the UNESCO. He helped formulate UNESCO's 1947 Declaration of Human Rights and was a founding member of its International Institute of Philosophy.[29] McKeon held Jaeger in high esteem as a very close colleague. In fact, one of the main interests of both men was the study of Aristotle. This high regard is demonstrated in their correspondence concerning Jaeger's change of employment from Chicago to Harvard in 1939.

While he was at Chicago—from October 1, 1938 in the position of Edward Olson Professor[30]—Jaeger did not give up his systematic philosophical thinking. An announcement of a public lecture and discussion between the three professors McKeon, Keniston and Jaeger on May 18, 1937 at the Goodman Theatre about the meaning of antiquity for contemporary society verifies this.[31] With the change to Harvard, however, Jaeger transferred his professional interests toward a purely historical view of antiquity. He wrote to McKeon[32] that he accepted the offer to go to Harvard precisely because he would be occupied only with the historical interpretation of antiquity, without political responsibilities and with a reduced number of lectures per term. He would receive and manage a very large budget to build up a center for classical research. A letter to McKeon of October 20, 1945 verifies, on the other hand, that Jaeger did not give up his interest in contemporary philosophy: There he recommended a philosopher who had published an article about Nihilism in the same year.[33]

According to the investigations of Alessandra Bertini Malgarini, once Werner Jaeger was at Harvard, he had problems getting a political office within the University because his colleagues did not want to elect him. His statements were thus respected, but not seen as better than those of the other university professors.[34]

Jaeger's influence over his students was overwhelming. Only 30 years after his death did they realize with great surprise that his statements did not have eternal value.[35] His view of the world had a direct influence on their lives and the way they saw themselves. Here Jaeger's thoughts can be seen to

have a strong determining influence on his former students. It can however not be described in philosophical terms, only in terms of faith.

C. The Motivation of the Theoretical Change

There seemed to be an outer and an inner motivation, which induced Jaeger not to extend his Third Humanism, but to stress, within his systematic statements, general metaphysical orientations that are only indirectly related to the themes of classical philology through the Christian reception of Aristotle by St. Thomas Aquinas. Firstly, there are reasons to assume that Jaeger wanted to deal with antiquity mainly and exclusively as a historical subject during his time at Harvard. Secondly, unlike in Germany, Jaeger has no political influence in the USA as a result of posts within or outside the University. Therefore there was no way he could influence current matters even if he had wanted to. This leads to the conclusion that Jaeger concentrated on his subject in the USA and especially at Harvard within the limits of the historic discipline and without actual philosophical or political references.

ROBERT ULICH (1890–1977)

Like Jaeger, Robert Ulich's thought was also rooted in a political perspective. Upon arriving in America, however, his emphasis broadened to questions of humanity outside the realm of formal political relations. His ethics became marked rather by metaphysical considerations, which he appended to the discussion around Dewey's work in hopes of offering educational direction in the absence of the pre-established educational aims rejected by pragmatism. Ulich's humanism became influential in the American context, largely through the success of a book which did not bear his name. But let us first look at the history.

At the beginning of WWI, Ulich was forced to abandon his plans for an academic career in literature and instead took a job teaching Latin under the terms of the *Hilfsdienstgesetz* or wartime civil service act.[36] His experience here and later at a factory job, introduced him to the plight of the working class and the Marxist propaganda circulating among them.[37] Later, while working as the editor of a journal of adult education for the Dresden public library systems, Ulich worked closely with trade unions of printers and typesetters.[38] By 1919, Ulich had joined the Social Democratic Party in Leipzig.

Within the auspices of the party, he and a few like-minded men founded the Circle of Religious Socialists, or *Kreis religiöser Sozialisten*. Among these men were Adolf Löwe and Carl Mennicke. To this circle was also

drawn the theologian, Paul Tillich,[40] who had purposely distanced himself from another group of religious socialists, the *Bund Religiöser Sozialisten*.[41] This group, however, differed from many of the others in that it was very informally organized, meeting in a Berlin restaurant for discussion. The conversations centered on defining a theoretical basis for the political issues faced by the religious socialists, and Paul Tillich soon became the central figure in these discussions. His concept of "Kairos," an impending, cascading change in society, became central to the group's efforts and soon the group itself was known as the "Kairos circle" or the "Tillich circle."[42] The ideas articulated in this socialist forum remained central to Ulich's concept of society and therefore to his understanding of humanistic education as a societal curative. They also provided much of the tension Ulich encountered while seeking to promulgate his ideas in America as an alternative to Dewey's own particular form of social democracy.

When Nazi control became official in Germany, Ulich went to Bernhard Rust, the new Nazi Minister of Education who had just arrived. Without waiting for him to speak, the minister told Ulich that he had "already signed the dismissal of racially and politically undesirable professors." With a clear understanding that his career and maybe his life were riding on his answer, Ulich responded, "Well, I just wanted to make sure that I am among them."[43]

It is in the picture of Ulich standing before the Nazi minister, including himself among the professors to be black-listed, that we have a clear metaphorical picture of the role Ulich saw humanistic values playing in a political setting. Education was to connect to realities beyond those presented by the environment. It was Ulich's conviction that there were standards of truth, goodness and beauty built into human experience, which found their roots in different soil than that offered by a pragmatist's view of the world. Rather than adapting to his new environment or growing and changing through his interaction with it (alternatives which, in Ulich's mind, would have been the reaction indicated by pragmatism) Ulich insists that there are deeper grounds in which our values and actions must be rooted.

Ulich's humanism was therefore a call to human wisdom as over and against mere erudition in societal or political settings. It became Ulich's growing conviction that unless teachers see their pupils as growing participants in the struggle of man for a decent society and help them to understand what constitutes human greatness or human baseness and what causes the rise or fall of civilizations, teachers are not the trustees of the intellectual and moral capital of society but merely part of its bureaucracy.[44]

Upon fleeing the Nazis, Ulich arrived at Harvard as an accomplished scholar with a well-articulated continental position derived rather eclectically from the tradition of Religious Socialism as well as influenced heavily by

Neo-Kantianism, Idealism, Vitalism and Existentialism. It would have been a simple thing for him to champion of one or more of these schools of philosophical thought in opposition to the predominant Instrumentalism touted by Dewey. Harvard would have had its answer to Columbia.

This, however, was not the path Ulich choose. The discussions of societal demise and regeneration central to the religious socialists gave way to Ulich's training in neo-Kantian thought, and he began an exploration of how humane values could be philosophically justified in an educational world which eschewed all things metaphysical. If Kant's attempt was to critique reason to provide room for the arational, the goal of the neo-Kantians was to suggest philosophical approaches for thinking about the arational and the unknowable. Ulich initiated this movement in the United States not by countering the prevailing current of pragmatism, but by insisting that pragmatism was built on the assumption of an orderly yet not completely knowable cosmos. The attempt to solve problems, especially through application of scientific thought as Dewey preached, rested on rationalistic and even idealistic foundations. (Dewey's relationship to Hegelian thought is no secret). Yet this direction of Ulich's philosophy led to reviews describing his work depreciatingly as idealistic, mystical, or even, "urbane and cultured sermonizing."

Ulich, however, viewed himself as accepting the fundamental position of pragmatism; but then wanted to ask how such a position was possible. He therefore sought to expand beyond Dewey's system of thought from within, accepting its founding principles and pushing them further rather than seeking to replace them. In a private letter to a student, Ulich once described his career in the following words:

> It has been my attempt to make people appreciate the truth which is in pragmatism, but at the same time to show them that pragmatism, if thought through to the end, leads to the assumption of the connection of the human mind with a certain order, or Logos, inherent in the universe. Otherwise the results of our experimenting would all be of a merely haphazard nature; they would not enable us to have a system of thought and experience, but only atomistic and isolated impressions. Thus you may say that my main attempt has been to pull us out of a false antinomy between pragmatism on the one hand and dualistic idealism on the other, and to show the reconcilability of the two. This does not mean a bad compromise such as from my point of view Dewey has made in his last writings, but a real synthesis.[45]

For Ulich, overcoming this "false antinomy" meant a re-enthroning of the humanities as the defining endeavor of a liberal education; that education, even science education, was to become or return to being an education which has the human person at the center of all its endeavors and that humanism, whether religious, rationalist, idealistic or naturalist humanism,[46] was to offer

the needed goals and values which of necessity make up the normative side of any educational philosophy.

Ulich's solution was not well received through his own writings. Within a few years of his retirement, his books were rarely read and almost never cited.[47] Ironically, however, Ulich's humanism did receive a wide audience and became remarkably influential for a period of time.

This happened through the success of a single book published by a committee of Harvard scholars entitled, *General Education in a Free Society*. Although the book does not explicitly list which authors penned which chapters, the stamp of Ulich's thought and writing style are abundantly found in all of the chapters which offer theoretical arguments for the Neo-Humanist bent of the pedagogy presented.[48] Indeed whole paragraphs of key theoretical discussion are lifted almost verbatim from certain of Ulich's published works.

The book became so influential that it was known simply as the Harvard Redbook,[49] although Ulich's contribution or the unique historical context that imported these originally German ideas into the American discussion remained largely unknown.

As the theoretical justification behind the recommendations of the Harvard Committee, Ulich's ideas were propelled more widely and with a fuller measure of credibility than had been attained when published under the name of a single author. With little fear of exaggeration, it could be stated that this book did more to disseminate his philosophical ideas than did any of his philosophical works published under his own name.

The focus of the committee was not to rehash old arguments for or against the role of the Humanities in education—doing nothing in effect but stirring cold coffee. Rather they were given the specific assignment of researching the role the Humanities might have in an educational system which was growing exponentially in the post war period. "The primary concern of American education today is not the development of the appreciation of the "good life" in young gentlemen born to the purple. It is the infusion of the liberal and humane tradition into our entire educational system."[50] In a word, they were to discuss explicitly the role of the humanities in the education of a democracy. The book itself became extremely influential in guiding many of the reform movements of the day, especially in small liberal arts colleges. Henry Crimmel described this work, which by then was referred to simply as the "Redbook" as "perhaps the most influential twentieth century statement of the ideal of liberal education."[51]

Ulich's focus on the humanities is fundamentally much more than a simple question of curriculum, however. Rather it is fundamentally a European, indeed a German call to humanism and human praxiology as the basic perspective from which education is to be defined, education as a human science, rather than a social science. It is an attempt to argue that only through

studying the history of man's struggles with fundamental human questions can society be saved from those sciences, religions, philosophies or politics which would pretend the ability to separate themselves from their rootedness in an imperfect human context and claim direct access to, or knowledge of, the good, the true or the beautiful in an absolute sense.

Ulich's humanism is at its root, an attempt to graft German *geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik* onto American pragmatism and to thereby open the door in American education for a real discussion of the pragmatic need for human and humane values in education. Unlike Jaeger, Ulich sees no way to define particular values, which should be taught, but sees the process of searching as indispensable. As with Dewey, it is the process which becomes more important than the product. Education must teach the need for values, without necessarily specifying which, because while we can't agree on the values, we can at least agree on the *need* and thereby keep the conversation alive. "Education," Ulich insisted, "is not only for some vague kind of general 'growth,' but it has among other purposes, one indisputable purpose, moral growth."[52]

CONCLUSION

The confrontation between the ideas of Werner Jaeger and Robert Ulich leads to the recognition that, in spite of their shared past and a certain amount of agreement between them, they went different ways. Jaeger concentrated much more on the historical part of his subject, while Ulich began a dispute about Dewey. Their interests, which once connected them, the concept of culture and the integrated pattern of humanism, separated them in the USA, because different issues of American thought suddenly became important. Neither, however, gave up their interest in things beyond the knowable: Eternal values, metaphysical truth, which represents the organizing element of the human social world. Through his analysis and systematic integration of Dewey's philosophy, Ulich stressed his own personal concept of freedom, which is based on a liberal concept of democracy and leads in the end to the formal acceptance of metaphysical values.

Here Ulich was radically different from Jaeger who always tried to determinate the conceptual content of "eternal values." While Jaeger moved back to an emphasis on cultural heritage in general, and professionally emphasized purely historical themes in his account of classical antiquity, Ulich's analysis of education moved in a different direction, developing a productive discussion of Dewey's philosophy. Jaeger's influence emanated directly from his students, while, in the case of Ulich, it spread through the "Red Book." Epistemologically we need to ask—and here we come back to the introductory

words of this article—whether the academic biographies of the two scholars can be interpreted in a more general way. Are they indications of a narrowing down and a stronger circumscription of the themes treated by important university educators after World War II? Further investigations are necessary to verify this hypothesis, the results of which may help to recuperate ideas about the philosophy of education lost through war and forced migration.

NOTES

1. Heinz-Elmar Tenorth and Klaus-Peter Horn, "The Impact of Emigration on German Pedagogy," Mitchell G. Ash and Alfons Söllner (eds.), *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigré German-speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge and New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 156–71; Klaus-Peter Horn and Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, Remigration in der Erziehungswissenschaft," *Exilforschung: Ein internationales Jahrbuch*, 9 (1991), 171–72. Klaus-Peter Horn, "Erziehungswissenschaft," Claus-Dieter Krohn et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933–1945* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998).

2. Follak, *Der "Aufblick zur Idee,"* 116–150, certainly reviews her thoughts on Jaeger in their cultural context of *Geistesgeschichte* in the German 1910s and 1920s, but does not provide comparisons with contemporary philologists and educationalists of the 1920s and 1930s, nor follow-ups on Jaeger's developments in America.

3. Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, *Antike und Humanismus* (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1925), 11, 25–28; Rüdiger vom Bruch, "Die Gründung der Berliner Universität," Rainer Christoph Schwinges (ed.), *Humboldt International: Der Export des deutschen Universitätsmodells im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 55; Reinhardt Markner and Giuseppe Veltri (eds.), *Friedrich August Wolf: Studien, Dokumente, Bibliographie: Eine Veröffentlichung des Leopold-Zunz-Zentrums zur Erforschung des Europäischen Judentums* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999); Manfred Landfester, *Humanismus und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur politischen und gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung der humanistischen Bildung in Deutschland* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), 37–39.

4. See Jaeger, *Antike und Humanismus*; Bernhard vom Brocke, "Die Entstehung der deutschen Forschungsuniversität, ihre Blüte und Krise um 1900," Schwinges (ed.), *Humboldt International*, 373, 386f.; Landfester, *Humanismus und Gesellschaft*.

5. See Peter Graf Kielmansegg et al. (eds.), *Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political Thought After World War II* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

6. Mitchell G. Ash and Alfons Söllner, "Introduction," Idem (eds.) *Forced Migration and Scientific Change*, 1–19.

7. Harvard University Archives, HUG 4464.5, Letter from Erfurt 1934: "Mit den besten Wünschen für Ihr Wirken in Amerika . . ."

8. For Jaeger's biography and bibliography, see Wolfgang Schadewaldt, *Gedenkrede auf Werner Jaeger, 1888–1961: Mit einem Verzeichnis der Schriften Werner Jaegers* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963).

9. William M. Calder III, "12. March 1921: The Berlin Appointment," Idem (ed.), *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered: Proceedings of the Second Oldfather Conference, Held on the Campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, April 26–28 1990* (Atlanta, GA: Illinois Classical Studies, 1992), 1–24; Christa Kirsten (ed.), *Die Altertumswissenschaften an der Berliner Akademie: Wahlvorschläge zur Aufnahme von Mitgliedern von F. A. Wolf bis zu G. Rodenwaldt 1799–1932* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985), 176.

10. Horst Rüdiger, *Wesen und Wandlung des Humanismus* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1937), 279–97; Donald O. White, "Werner Jaeger's 'Third Humanism' and the Crisis of Conservative Cultural Politics in Weimar Germany," Calder (ed.), *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, 267–88; Johannes Irmscher, "Der dritte Humanismus," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena: Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe*, 21 (1972), 917–36; Idem, "Werner Jaeger zum 100. Geburtstag: Über die griechische Diaspora. Zwei Vorträge," *Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin 1990*, No. 6/G (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1991).

11. Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, *Paideia: Die Formung des Griechischen Menschen*, 3 Vols. (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter) 1934–1947.

12. Compare Follak, *Der Aufblick zur "Idee,"* 143, who summarizes Jaeger's notion of "idea" as "human being as 'idea'," a point of intersection between individual and society, unifying both by presenting a universally valid prototype.

13. G. Scholtz, "Historismus, Historizismus," Joachim Ritter (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. 3 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), cols. 1141–47.

14. Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, "Philologie und Historie: Antrittsvorlesung an der Universität Basel, gehalten am 18. Dezember 1914 in der Aula des Museums zu Basel," *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur*, Vol. XXXVII (1916), 81–92. Reprinted in Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960), 1–16.

15. Werner Wilhem Jaeger, "Die Erziehung des politischen Menschen und die Antike," *Volk im Werden: Zeitschrift für Kulturpolitik*, Vol. 1 (1933), 43–49, 44, 45, 48. He stresses here explicitly the compatibility of his theory with the newly established Nazi regime in Germany.

16. Jaeger, *Paideia*, Vol. 2, 273–74.

17. Ibid., 279–80.

18. Platon, *Werke in 8 Bänden. Griechisch und deutsch*, ed. by Gunther Eigler, Vol. 4: *Politeia* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), 266–71 (414c–415e).

19. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Werke*, Vol. 7: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu edierte Ausgabe*, 2nd. ed. (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 398: "The state is the reality of the idea of morality, is the spirit of morality. The self-consciousness of the individual has by the state its substantial freedom." Ibid., 441: "The basic concept of the political state is the unity as ideal of its single moments." (My translation; A.-S. G.)

20. John Dewey, *The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, Vol. 9: *Democracy and Education* [1916] (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 87–106.

21. Ibid., pp. 96–97: "We cannot better Plato's conviction that an individual is happy and society well organized when each individual engages in those activities for which he has a natural equipment, nor his conviction that it is the primary office of education to discover this equipment to its possessor and train him for its effective use. But progress in knowledge has made us aware of the superficiality of Plato's lumping of individuals and their original powers into a few sharply marked-off classes; it has taught us that original capacities are indefinitely numerous and variable. It is but the other side of this fact to say that in the degree in which society has become democratic, social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of individuals, not stratification by classes."

22. Ibid., 300–15.

23. See Nicholas Hans, *Comparative Education: A Study of Educational Factors and Traditions* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 174–94.

24. Bruno Snell, "Rezension der *Paideia* Werner Jaegers," *Göttingische Gelehrten Anzeigen*, 197 (1935), 353.

25. Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, "The Future of Tradition," Ruth Nanda Anshen, *Our Emergent Civilization* (New York and London: Harper, 1947), 175–83. See also Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, "The Problem of Authority and the Crisis of the Greek Spirit," *Authority and the Individual: Harvard Tercentenary Publications* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937), 240–250.

26. Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, "Humanism and Theology," Idem, *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 196)0, pp. 300–334. See idem, *Humanismus und Theologie* (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1960). This Christian humanistic thought brought him the approval of the Italian Humanist Giuseppe Toffanin. See Giuseppe Toffanin, *Perche l'Umanesimo comincia con Dante* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1970), 61–75.

27. Schadewaldt, Gedenkrede auf Werner Jaeger, 16, 24.

28. University of Chicago, Archive, Regenstein Library: Richard Peter McKeon Papers. Series V. Box 137.

29. Tim Andrew Obermiller, "Will the real Richard McKeon Please Stand Up?," University of Chicago Magazine 12, 1994: http: www2.uchicago.edu/alumni/alumni mag/9412/Feat4.html.

30. University of Chicago, Archive, Regenstein Library: Board of Trustees Minutes. 28, 133. May 12, 1938.

31. Ibid., Minutes. 27, 105. May 13, 1937.

32. Ibid.: Richard Peter McKeon Papers. Series II: Correspondence. Box 43, Folder No. 14: Letter from Werner Jaeger Feb. 18, 1939.

33. Ibid., Letter of Oct 20, 1945. Further research into the Harvard interplay between Jaeger and his students was not possible, due to the restriction policy at Harvard University Archives, as of 80 years for papers that have to do with affiliates to Harvard University. Only one undated and anonymously drafted dissertation

abstract (in: HUG 4464.5), ascribed to Walter Hayes, shows that Jaeger supervised a historical-philological work on Basil's *Adversus Eunomium*.

34. Alessandra Bertini Malgarini, "Werner Jaeger in the United States: One Among Many Others," Calder (ed.), *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, 107–124.

35. William M. Calder III, "Preface," Ibid., VII–IX.

36. See Else Ulich-Beil, *Ich ging meinen Weg: Lebenserinnerungen* (Berlin: Grunewald, 1961), 60; Robert Ulich, "An Autobiography," Robert J. Havighurst (ed.), *Leaders in American Education: The Seventieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 420.

37. Ibid., 421.

38. Ibid, 423.

39. Renate Albrecht and Werner Schüßler, Paul *Tillich: Sein Leben* (Frankfurt-Main: Peter Lang, 1993), 53.

40. Ulich-Beil, *Ich ging meinen Weg*, 97.

41. Albrecht and Schüßler, *Paul Tillich*, 52. On the history of this organization see Michael Rudloff, *Weltanschauungsorganisationen innerhalb der Arbeiterbewegung der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt-Main: Peter Lang, 1991); Selina Pohly, *Die Religiösen Sozialisten in der Weimarer Republik*, Staatsexamensarbeit (University of Potsdam, Historical Institute, 2007).

42. Albrecht and Schüßler, *Paul Tillich*, 54.

43. Ulich, "An Autobiography," 432.

44. Ibid., 423.

45. Harvard University Archive. Papers of Robert Ulich 1940–1960. Letter to James D. Bales, Harding College, January 15, 1946.

46. Robert Ulich, *The Human Career: A Philosophy of Self-Transcendence* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 25.

47. Although the scholarly influence of a thinker is a difficult thing to gauge, a perusal through the Social Sciences Citations Index shows at least the contexts in which an author was being read and cited. During the height of his career, Ulich was cited regularly. The preponderance of these citations, however, is of his historical and comparative works and only to a much lesser degree, of his philosophical publications. By the early eighties, citations of Ulich's works had dwindled to a mere trickle until not a single citation is reported in 1986. Although a few of Ulich's historical reference works are thereafter cited consistently about once or twice a year, between 1991 and 1999 not a single Ulich reference is made in the educational literature tracked by the index.

48. This book presents interesting problems when trying to use it to elucidate Ulich's thought. While much of the writing is clearly Ulich's, and in some cases uses exact wording, phraseology, and examples, which are found elsewhere in Ulich's writing, the style is obviously not Ulich's. It would probably be safe to assume that Ulich contributed heavily to the original text, which was then edited and reworked by a second or third writer. While this would certainly explain the explicit use of Ulich-type wording and the preponderance of Ulich's ideas in a prose, which differs in style, and flow from Ulich's, it is and must remain only an assumption. It is not, however, a

simple guess, but rather an educated assumption based on close comparison with the body of Ulich's other writings.

Harold Taylor, in interpreting and categorizing the ideas presented in the Harvard Report, therefore unknowingly provides what is possibly the most clear and accurate summary of Ulich's ideas in English. He states: "The advocates of this solution work within the European academic tradition and accept the notion that there is a dualism between mind and body and that there are proper subjects for the training of the mind, as in the case of the rationalists, but that there is no specific philosophical system which supports the program they recommend . . . In the statement of aims, this philosophy differs very little from that of the rationalist. Its theory of knowledge separates mind from body, reason from emotion, and thought from experience. It also holds the view that there is objective value, as well as social education, in knowledge of the Western tradition. Where it differs from rationalism is in its refusal to state a general or specific philosophy to which all students should be committed, and according to which a curriculum should be constructed. Because of this refusal, it is very difficult to find a name for the philosophical position on which the program of general education rests. We have agreed to the term *neo-humanist* or, alternately, *eclectic*, to describe the philosophical foundations, on the grounds that the philosophy is one which emphasizes the humanist tradition of Western Culture, the 'rational guidance of all human activity,' and the fact 'that the tradition which has come down to us regarding the nature of man and the good society must inevitably provide our standard of good . . .' The report goes on to say that 'there is a sense in which education in the great books can be looked at as a secular continuation of the spirit of Protestantism.' The Report acknowledges the difficulty involved in either breaking with tradition, as Dewey suggests, or in clinging to it, as Adler recommends, and states that, 'The true task of education is, therefore, to reconcile the sense of experiment and innovation deriving from science that they many exist fruitfully together as in varying degrees they have never ceased to do throughout Western history." Harold Taylor, "The Philosophical Foundations of General Education," *General Education: The Fifty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 30–32.

49. Those who disagreed with the report's conclusions used this designation of the Report as the Harvard Redbook largely in a pejorative sense. See Paul H. Hirst and R. S. Peters (eds.), *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).

50. *General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), xiv–xx.

51. Henry H. Crimmel, *The Liberal Arts College and the Ideal of Liberal Education: A Case for Radical Reform* (New York and London: Lanham, 1993), 153.

52. In his notes, Ulich has written the word "ethical" and then crossed it out and replaced it with "moral."

2

Karl Loewenstein

From Public Law to Political Science

Markus Lang

In 1996, Alfons Söllner published a comprehensive study of German émigré political scientists.[1] In the introductory chapter, he argued that the emigration of these German scholars should be analyzed in terms of a transition "From Public Law to Political Science." This concept can be broken down into two distinct but interrelated theses:

1. Despite the enormous variety within the group, the largest group of émigré political scientists started their careers as students of public law in Weimar Germany. On an individual level, these scholars are to a large degree shaped by the scientific tradition of their host country. And since the overwhelming majority eventually came to stay in the United States, this meant that most of them were shaped both by German public law and by American political science.

2. On the group level, Söllner holds that the transformation he sees on the individual level has led to decisive influences on the foundation and early development of political science in Germany after the Second World War. The émigré scholars have played a strong role—among other factors—in the shaping of a new *Wissenschaft von der Politik*. Both theses have to be taken together to grasp the full meaning of the concept of transition from public law to political science.

In this essay, I want to elaborate on Söllner's thesis using the work of Karl Loewenstein (1891–1973) as a case study. On the surface, Loewenstein did make the transition from public law to political science. He started his career in 1918 with a dissertation at the University of Munich law school. After several years as an attorney, he received his *Habilitation* from the same school and taught there as *Privatdozent* (university lecturer) too. In 1933 he had to immigrate to the United States and found himself with a teaching assignment

for comparative government and international law at Yale University Graduate School. Two years later, he obtained a position as associate professor for political science and jurisprudence at Amherst College in Massachusetts, a position he would hold for the rest of his life. He participated in various panels and study groups of the American Political Science Association, mainly on comparative government.[2] He was even among the main protagonists advocating the introduction of political science in German universities after World War II through the organization of the first conference in Waldleiningen dealing with the introduction of the new discipline.[3]

Under closer scrutiny, however—and this will be the main point of this essay—the concept of transition from public law to political science does not adequately explain the development of Karl Loewenstein's life and political thought. Rather, an assumption of fundamental continuity in identity and a similar continuity in political thought is necessary. These continuities, I will argue, are not coincidental with or parallel to each other. Rather, I want to suggest the picture of two lines intersecting each other at an angle.

It should be noted that this does not contradict Söllner. He was well aware of the vast differences among the German émigré political scientists. However, being concerned more with the big picture than with the individuals he has to emphasize the common features rather than the individual characteristics. This case study will supplement the big picture painted by Söllner and shed some new light on some of his findings.

I will proceed to look at Loewenstein's development from two different perspectives. In a first step, I will examine Loewenstein's professional identity. For this I will draw upon his private papers[4] to look for signs of his motivations, plans, decisions, likes and dislikes. For the time before his emigration, I will have to use his career as an indicator for his identity, as the sources in his papers are very limited for that period. Secondly, I will reconstruct the development of his political thought. In this part, I will draw mainly on a reconstruction of his publications. With both perspectives I will explain the continuities in Loewenstein's identity and political thought and relate them to Söllner's theses.

IDENTITY AND BIOGRAPHY: A SCHOLAR AND LAWYER IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

Karl Loewenstein defined himself above all else as a legal scholar. Jurisprudence is the center around which his work revolved. He tried his very best to stay in touch with university law departments, though he did not fully succeed in his efforts.

Karl Loewenstein was born on November 9, 1891 in Munich into a Jewish upper middle-class family. Between 1910 and 1914 he studied *Rechtswissenschaft* in Munich, Heidelberg, Berlin and Paris.[5] In 1914, having passed his *Staatsexamen*, he started working on the manuscript for his dissertation on the income tax in Great Britain, which he misplaced amidst the turmoil on the eve of the First World War.[6] Instead of focusing most of his energies on a career in civil service or on a law practice, he used the generous spare time he had as a clerk in various positions in local and regional courts and administrations to write a second dissertation.[7] This second dissertation was presented to the Department of Jurisprudence in Munich just after the War.[8]

Becoming a scholar must have been a true and deeply felt ambition of his. After the dissertation, however, Loewenstein turned his back on academia and established a successful law practice in Munich instead. This decision was influenced primarily by the practical consideration that there just was no chance for him to get an adequate position at the University of Munich.[9] This is supported by the fact that, while a lawyer, he continued to write several books and articles about England and the British Commonwealth, which were published by renowned journals and publishers. When finally the opportunity arose for him to make the transition from law practice to university teacher, he did not hesitate to accept. In 1931, having just finished his *Habilitation*, at the age of forty, after ten years of law practice, he assumed the duties of *Privatdozent* (without giving up his law practice), hoping that in due time he would be appointed full professor.

These hopes were shattered, however, along with his law office, which was among the first Jewish businesses in Munich to be raided by Nazi Storm Troopers on April 1, 1933.[10] With help from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars he was able to firmly establish himself in the American university system: first at the Yale University Graduate School in New Haven, Connecticut (1934–1936), then at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts (1936–1961).

A GERMAN SCHOLAR IN THE UNITED STATES

So far, we have seen that Loewenstein's professional life during the Weimar Republic had revolved around jurisprudence. He got his university degree in jurisprudence, went on to practice the law, and taught at the Department of Jurisprudence in Munich. His identification with jurisprudence did not end with the emigration, though, as a transformation "From Public Law to Political Science" should suggest. Rather, he tried his very best to stay as close to the law schools as possible.[11]

However, these attempts were not off to a good start. His first appointment at an American university was outside the organizational structure of the law schools. At Yale University, he was a member of the Graduate School, teaching courses in comparative government and international law. But he successfully established ties to the Yale University Law School through Thurman Arnold. In the academic year 1934–35, he jointly taught a seminar with Arnold on Comparative Judicial Procedures. By itself, the mere fact that Loewenstein's appointment was outside the field of jurisprudence is inconclusive since he had simply accepted the only offer he had received. The circumstances of this job offer are significant, however.

Originally he had intended, among other possibilities, to go to England to try and make a living as a practicing lawyer. He had asked Harold Laski[12] to assist him in working out the details. Laski discouraged Loewenstein and tried to help him find a teaching position at a law school instead. In the end, the job offer from Yale was the result of the lucky combination between Loewenstein's own efforts, Laski's contacts at Yale University, substantial help from the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, and the Yale Graduate School's need for a cheap way of enlarging their teaching staff. Therefore, even though the efforts to obtain a teaching position at a law school was not entirely successful, Loewenstein's efforts to keep working in the field of jurisprudence played a large part in the process of getting him the position at Yale University.

Even more significant are the circumstances accompanying his transfer to Amherst two years later. In the beginning of 1935, Loewenstein was still hopeful that a way might be found to let him stay at Yale, preferably with a transfer to the Law School. But when during the course of the year it became increasingly clear that this was not an option, he began applying to law schools throughout the country—and only to law schools. These efforts were never crowned by success. But the detailed circumstances of Loewenstein's institutional transfer to political science show just how hard he tried to stay close to a law school.

For a brief period, there was some talk about Loewenstein joining Harvard Law School, but nothing much ever came of that.[13] More promising but in the end just as futile was the possibility to find private funding for Loewenstein at Yale, facilitated by Harold Laski.[14] On December 11, 1935, however, it is again Laski who drew Loewenstein's attention to a position in "American History and Politics" that would open soon at Amherst College, Massachusetts.[15] To make that possibility even more promising, Laski told Loewenstein that President King of Amherst "is a great friend of mine,"[16] and promised to support him in his efforts if he decided to seek that job.

Loewenstein was not impressed by this offer. While he did put in his name at Amherst, he simultaneously wrote to Carl J. Friedrich at Harvard

just a couple of days after receiving notice from Laski. He wanted to inquire whether there might be an opening now at Harvard in the process of a possible reorganization of the Government Department.[17] Friedrich's reply was noncommittal.[18] At the same time Loewenstein tried to establish contacts at Northwestern University's and Michigan State University's Law Schools.[19]

Late in January of 1936 Loewenstein met with President King. During that meeting it was agreed that Loewenstein could have the position if he so desired.[20] This did not improve his willingness to come to a decision, though. The meeting went well, he reported in a letter to Felix Frankfurter just a couple of days later. Still, the search had to continue since "I am most anxious to remain at a Law School and not to be pushed on a side-track in a small college."[21]

A second meeting between Loewenstein, this time accompanied by his wife, and King took place at Amherst on February 16. The very next day Loewenstein had the official offer for the position on his desk. But even before he could ask King for a two-week period in order to make up his mind,[22] he started one last all-out effort to find an alternative at a law school. In a letter to Judge Julian Mack he mentioned the offer from Amherst and noted that he would accept the offer only if Yale could not offer an alternative. Just in case this hint was not enough, he added:

> I would certainly prefer a big university to a small though reputed college since my special abilities are more in the direction of graduate students and particularly because a position at Amherst or any similar institution would remove me from the field of law in which I am most interested.[23]

A very similar letter was written to President James R. Angell of Yale,[24] but neither could do anything specific for Loewenstein.[25]

At the very same time a new complication arose. A friend of Loewenstein's at the University of Minnesota Law School had mentioned on February 10, 1936 that a teaching position for Political Theory and International Law might become available shortly. Loewenstein should put in an application as soon as possible, which he did immediately.[26] Just one week later he had to chase the application with a telegram asking—in the light of new developments—for an accelerated processing of his application. The telegram closed with the cryptic: "Please don't mention Amherst."[27] But even this latest possibility did not bring any results, so in the end Loewenstein had to accept the position in Political Science at Amherst. However, this was only after King had agreed to include "Introduction to Jurisprudence" among his teaching duties, a class that had never been taught at Amherst before.[28]

After joining the political science department in Amherst, his opposition to political science seemed to decline, but not so his identification with *Stdaatsrecht*. For writing to Gerhard Leibholz in October 1936, who was still

in Germany at that time, he rationalizes his new position by simply arguing that what the Germans call *Staatsrecht* the Americans call government or political science. It is worthwhile quoting at length from this letter:

> It would be mere coincidence [. . .] if you ended up at a place where our discipline was needed, which they call government or political science around here. . . [It] is obvious that continental scholars have to adapt in order to be useful. There is little or no interest in theory, *Staatsrecht* is taught and learned pragmatically, comparisons with European developments are neglected, and our dogmatic perspective is regarded as irrelevant—which, to be honest, it is since it has led us to disregard so many important aspects in our studies of the Weimar constitution. What is important here is the descriptive method, which studies institutions without judging their merits through the lens of legal theories. In addition, socio-psychological issues are stressed as opposed to philosophical ones, which we have never learned nor done.[29]

Or, to phrase it differently, Loewenstein argues that *Staatsrecht* and political science are basically the same—apart from vast differences in their most basic assumptions. His position allows him, though, to start considering himself a political scientist, retain his identity in *Staatsrecht* to some degree and at the same time to sharply oppose what will be the defining tendency in American political science through the following decades: behaviorism.

Therefore, it is fair to state that—even though he never succeeded in attaining a position as full professor at an American law school—Karl Loewenstein kept his identity rooted institutionally in *Staatsrecht* before and after his emigration. He tried to keep his professional identity steady and to maintain close ties to the legal profession and the law schools. This marks the first line of continuity in his biography. It is now time to move on to the development of Loewenstein's political thought.

THEORY AND TRADITION

Loewenstein's most important scholarly contribution is his book *Political Power and the Governmental Process*.[30] In this book one encounters Loewenstein's political thought at its best and purest. On some 400 pages, Loewenstein systematically summarizes the gist of his political thought. The result is an attempt at a comprehensive theory of politics and the political process. It can undoubtedly be called his *Lebenswerk*—and Loewenstein does say so himself in a letter to Theodor Maunz: "Sure enough, this is the sum of my work, which I had wanted to write for a long time, and I am thankful for being able to finish it."[31]

It deserves the title for another reason, as well: Loewenstein had been preparing the manuscript for most of his academic life. It goes back to a lecture on the institutions of democracy[32] he gave in the fall of 1932 at the University of Munich, shortly after he had been named *Privatdozent*.[33] Since the late 1930s, Loewenstein has repeatedly tried to solicit money from different foundations that would allow him twelve months of undisturbed work to finish a comprehensive study on comparative political institutions. In the proposals he touches on the aspects that will be important in the book, and even mentions having finished parts of the manuscript.[34]

Another factor is even more important concerning *Political Power and the Governmental Process*. The purpose Loewenstein pursues in writing the book is a genuinely German one: All along, he wanted to write a *Verfassungslehre* in the German sense of the word, a continuation in the tradition of Georg Jellinek's *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. In 1953 he writes to Arnold J. Zurcher while applying for a Fulbright grant: "To characterize [the project] briefly, it is very much along the lines of a *Verfassungslehre*, a type of approach, which hardly exists in this country."[35]

Two years later, while applying for funding through the Ford Foundation, he puts it in different words: "What I have in mind is to do what Georg Jellinek did at the beginning of this century, for the mid-Twentieth Century." And adds with an eye on the émigré German scholars that: "only a person with a European training and background and American experiences is capable of writing something integrating the political civilizations of our time and their underlying ideologies in the sense Jellinek could do it half a century ago."[36]

It comes as no surprise, then, that a collection of his essays, published in 1961 in honor of his 70th birthday is called *Beiträge zur Staatssoziologie*, essays in the sociology of the state, a term most closely associated with Georg Jellinek.[37]

The way in which Loewenstein characterizes the purpose is an important clue for the reconstruction of his political thought. With his remarks he claims to continue in a German tradition as there are hardly any examples in the United States for the kind of work he intended to do. And by referring to Georg Jellinek, this tradition can only be the tradition of the *Gesamte Staatswissenschaften*.

The roots of the *Staatswissenschaften* are based in the long tradition of practical training for civil servants. A rational and efficient administration required well-trained personnel who were familiar with every important aspect of public administration.[38] Traditionally, these sciences for administrative training offered very broad and comprehensive courses. During the first half of the 19th century, however, scholars like Robert Mohl[39] or Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann[40] argued that the training was not comprehensive enough to

provide for adequate civil servants. Therefore, a truly interdisciplinary program for research and instruction designed to incorporate all subjects relevant for the administration of the modern *Wohlfahrtsstaat* was necessary. This was to be found in the concept of *Gesamte Staatswissenschaften*, or the comprehensive sciences of the state.

Thus the *Staatswissenschaften* were supposed to acquire a monopoly on the interpretation and analysis of politics. In the second half of the 19th century, however, this monopoly gradually became located almost exclusively within the law departments of the universities. In this process, the law departments developed into veritable gatekeepers for government jobs.[41] Georg Jellinek can be said to be the last representative of the comprehensive approach, but even for him the legal perspective takes precedence over the sociological when it comes to the analysis of the state.

Loewenstein's understanding of *Staatswissenschaft* definitely does not follow the legalistic line prevalent in the *Staatsrecht* of his own time. Rather, he continues with the more comprehensive approach advocated and implemented in mid-19th-century *Staatswissenschaft*. This means, however, that he broke with the dominant development of the scientific study of the state in Germany in order to go back to an older tradition.

The limited scope of this essay does not allow a full-scale discussion of the continuities and discontinuities within Loewenstein's political thought. Loewenstein was a highly prolific writer. Before his emigration, he published four books and three lengthy articles with about 100 pages each, and a number of smaller studies. Between 1933 and the publication of *Political Power*, he published a total of 71 works, among them no fewer than nine books. It is possible, though, to exemplify the gist of Loewenstein's approach before 1933 using only a couple of his publications. While the characterizations that Loewenstein provides himself about *Political Power* suggest that he is proposing a somewhat "German" approach, I will argue that his pre-1933 studies reveal a rather "American" approach. This will set the stage for my argument of continuity in Loewenstein's political thought, which I will then support by relating the observations about his Weimar publications to the theory of political power contained in his post-1933 studies and most notably in *Political Power and the Governmental Process*.

After Loewenstein had lost the manuscript for his first dissertation in August 1914, he set his sights on a rather ambitious goal: a history of the doctrine of popular democracy from beginning to end.[42] Luckily for him, he realized that this project was way too large and too vague before it was too late. It is significant, though, that during World War I he proposed to study what amounted to a history of the "Ideas of 1789," that is about the enemy of German war propaganda at the time.

No manuscript exists for this project, of course, not even an outline. Some clues as to the possible theses contained in the paper had it been completed, however, can be found in a brief paper about plebiscites and national self-determination published in 1917.[43] His immediate concern was with some provisions in the peace treaty of Brest-Litowsk between the German *Reich* and the revolutionary government in Russia. He argued that plebiscites—especially in connection with territorial changes—have not had a good history. It was all too easy for the current government to manipulate public opinion in order to produce the desired outcome. Thus he is quite skeptical about the utility of direct democracy for questions of national self-determination. For a Ph.D. candidate in jurisprudence it is significant, however, that he uses such decidedly un-legalistic concepts as public opinion and manipulation! The brief paper is an early proof for Loewenstein's life-long commitment to the importance of empirical research.

Just one year later, in 1918, Loewenstein presented his dissertation titled *Volk und Parlament nach der Staatsauffassung der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789* to the law faculty of the University of Munich.[44] He had scaled down the original plan and concentrated on French and American political and constitutional thought at the end of the 18th century. The dissertation is basically an in-depth analysis of the discussions in the French constitutional assembly. Loewenstein is concerned with the relationship between popular democracy and representative government as put forward during discussion on the constitution of 1791. He compares the solutions found by the French with those proposed by the almost simultaneous discussions at the American Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Thus he develops a transatlantic perspective, looking to Germany's western neighbors and from there across the Atlantic to the United States.

The dissertation has to be viewed as a political statement. World War I is raging while Loewenstein positively discusses the merits of the ideas of the French Revolution and American liberalism. Both sets of ideas were vehemently opposed by German war propaganda, which considered German authoritarianism and heroism far superior. Moreover, he bases his studies primarily on French and American literature. Looking at the frequency of citations in the dissertation can show this. The two most frequently cited books were of German origin: Egon Zweig and Robert Redslob about the political theory of the French National Assembly of 1789.[45] This might be due to the problems associated with obtaining foreign books during the war. However, not far behind are the French and American studies by Albert Sarraut about direct democracy in France and by Charles E. Merriam about the history of political theory.[46] Further more, a mere frequency count of the *literature* is somewhat misleading, since the dissertation is based above all on the minutes

of the constitutional debates as published in the *Archives Parlementaires*. Circumstances definitely did not encourage such strong reliance and favorable reception of ideas and documents of the "enemy." The dissertation therefore was a conscious decision in favor of a reception of French and American political ideas.

Between 1922 and 1927, Loewenstein published seven books and papers about Great Britain. Thus, he established his reputation as a specialist on constitutional law and politics on the British Isles and in the Commonwealth. Harold J. Laski, for example, regarded Loewenstein as "one of the few Germans who really understand the inwardness of our politics."[47] The transatlantic perspective from the dissertation was reinforced through personal and scholarly contacts. He had a close relationship with Laski throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1922–23 he translated James Bryce's monumental work *Modern Democracies*.[48] The university lecture in 1932–33 on institutions of democracy, which has already been mentioned as the foundation for Loewenstein's Political Power and the Governmental Process, is also important in this context because it drew heavily on Herman Finer's *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*. All three, Laski, Bryce, and Finer, shared a scholarly existence between Great Britain and the United States. All three were equally renowned on the British Isles and in America, accepting teaching positions on both continents. Loewenstein's contacts with them, personally and intellectually, have to be regarded simultaneously as contacts with British and American scholarship.

In writing about England, Loewenstein developed an interest in the discrepancies between constitutional law and politics. He tried to prove the necessity of empirical studies of politics in constitutional democracies to his German audience. His two articles "Zur Soziologie der parlamentarischen Repräsentation in England vor der ersten Reformbill" and "Zur Soziologie der parlamentarischen Repräsentation in England nach der großen Reform: Das Zeitalter der Parlamentssouveränität"[49] will exemplify these efforts. In both articles he claims to study *legal* problems, namely changes and developments of the locus of sovereignty.[50] On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that he is not so much concerned with questions of constitutional law, public law, law of the state, or any other legal examination. Rather, he is interested in the social bases of political power and thus wants to explain the relative gains and losses of power between parliaments, cabinet and Prime Minister, and the Crown.

The earlier article presents a rough sketch of the political development from Magna Charta to the late 18th century. For a student of British history today, Loewenstein's results most likely will not be of great interest. They are still significant in this context as they show his approach very clearly.

The power shifts that would eventually produce the dominance of the Crown, as he argues, are caused by changes in election laws. These changes in turn, however, are analyzed as reflections of the rise and fall of social groups and their material interests. He arrives at an explanation that is strikingly similar to studies by early American pluralists such as Charles A. Beard, or their British counterparts such as James Bryce.[51]

Loewenstein continues along similar lines in the later article. His analysis is limited this time to a couple of decades in the first half of the 19th century, while occupying almost three times the space. Thus he can show his capacity for richly detailed studies. His main interest is devoted to an explanation for the emancipation of Parliament from the Crown, which was the political basis for an age of parliamentary sovereignty. He again relates the electoral reform of 1832 to the previous rise of a bourgeois middle class, but continues even further in his explanation. In addition to the changes in electoral laws due to developments in the social structure, he identifies ideological and sociological factors that were responsible for the changes. The ideology of liberalism that was dominant among the middle class was associated with political apathy, making representatives relatively independent from their electorate. At the same time, the lack of party discipline guaranteed that Members of Parliament also enjoyed a high degree of independence from the executive. With this analysis, Loewenstein cannot only explain the development of Parliamentary sovereignty. He can also emphasize the unstable and transitory nature of this constellation. Further democratization of electoral laws and the simultaneous politicization of society were responsible—in Loewenstein's judgment—for the decline of the independence of Members of Parliament. Thus came the transition from parliamentary to popular sovereignty.

Why is Loewenstein using this perspective? First of all, he claims that it is the only perspective suited for a study of the peculiarities of British public law. Loewenstein considers it to be important to keep in mind "that the 'normative gestalt' of the English constitution has to be put together from the actual operation of the constitutional and political reality."[52] At the same time, the perspective is directly connected to Loewenstein's dissertation. He continues to study the relationship between people and Parliament in the form of ideal and reality of representation. Furthermore, the "staatsrechtssoziologische Betrachtung,"[53] an interdisciplinary perspective between legal scholarship and sociology, points the focus of his studies directly to "the distance or the congruence of legal analysis with political reality."[54]

Finally, there is also a political motivation behind his perspective. His inquiries are intended as critiques of legal positivism's monopoly on the interpretation of state and politics. For example, the bond between the Members of Parliament and their electorate is considered "legal fiction rather than

empirical reality."[55] Even stronger is his rejection of the treatment German *Staatsrecht* tended to give to political parties. Here it is worthwhile quoting at length from his article:

> In a country, where bureaucrats are generally chosen by a constitutional monarch, the Staatsrecht may ignore the political functions of parties, or treat them with the negative value judgment, as the legal dogmatism of the German Staatsrechtswissenschaft or the terminological strictness of the "Reine Rechtslehre" tend to do. However, as soon as government and party system are inextricably interwoven, as is the case in England, to a degree that the mechanisms of government cannot function without them, certain patterns of party behavior have to be recognized as relevant within the structure of constitutional *law*, even though they may not be mentioned in any constitutional laws.[56]

Applying this line of argument to studies of Weimar Democracy, positivist analyses are insufficient at best, completely misleading at worst. This marks another characteristic of Loewenstein's publications prior to 1927: the establishment of a connection from his studies of Great Britain to the realities of Weimar politics via a critique of legal positivism. The Weimar Republic—most of all the Weimar *Staatslehre*—can learn from other democracies how to improve their government at home.

Around 1926, Loewenstein decided to start working on his *Habilitation*.[57] This decision brought with it a change of subject matter and perspective. In several articles between 1927 and 1932, and most of all in his *Habilitationsschrift* in 1931, he started focusing on the mechanisms and methods for amending the Weimar constitution.[58] Sociological arguments make way for more positivist analyses of legal phenomena—or so it seems at first glance. A closer look changes that impression, though.

First of all, it should be noted that tactical considerations play a substantial role in his decision. After all, so far he had shown himself to be a sociologist—even a "political scientist before the fact"—rather than a legal scholar. Now he faced the need to prove that he was able to do mainstream jurisprudence about the German legal system rather than British politics.

He does not change his perspective completely, though, as an explanation with tactical considerations might suggest. This will become evident by looking at the results that his *Habilitation* produces. He summarizes them as follows:

> As a result, parliament acting in its capacity as constitutional convention faces no material limits in passing amendments; they may even decide to declare the whole constitution void, *as long as they conform to the procedures that will be shown to be absolutely necessary in this study*. Therefore, Carl Schmitt's notion of the material limits for constitutional amendments has to be discarded.[59]

According to Loewenstein, it is parliament—*only* parliament and certainly no *Hüter der Verfassung*, to use Schmitt's terminology—who has the right to change the constitution. This right is not abridged by material limits, but it has to be exercised in strict observance of prescribed procedures. Above all, Loewenstein shows that he is not dealing with an academic problem only. In a detailed analysis he shows that it has become common practice to amend the Weimar Constitution without following those prescribed procedures. It turns out, therefore, that what started out with a positivistic appearance should better be described as a strong argument in favor of the rule of law, based on empirical data about a lack of conformity with this principle.

Taken together, it may appear that his publications before 1933 can be divided into three distinct phases that have little in common: a study in the history of democratic theory in his dissertation; empirical analyses of the British political system; and positivist treatises on the amendment process of the Weimar constitution. I would argue, however, that while differences between these three phases are certainly observable, it makes more sense to view his publications with an assumption of fundamental continuity. Throughout all publications, three common elements can be identified, with differences in emphasis only.

He strongly advocates empirical research. This is manifest in his studies on Britain, but it can also be discovered in the detailed reconstruction of historical debates in his dissertation, and even in the analysis of the ways in which legislators in Weimar have not conformed to the constitutional prerequisites in amending the constitution. Empirical research is needed, above all, to identify the discrepancies between constitutional law and political reality.

However, constitutional law does not lose its importance vis-à-vis empirical realities. No matter what people *actually do*, the student of politics has to continue to study what people are *legally and constitutionally allowed to do*. Within this sphere, it is useless or even dangerous to operate with empirical data. The rule of law can only be supported and protected by interpreting and applying the law books literally using the formalistic techniques borrowed from legal positivism. This component is most prominent in Loewenstein's *Habilitation*, of course, but it is also an important element in the development of the legal framework as a background for the empirical studies.

But what if people do not want to support and protect the rule of law? This is where a third component enters the stage. Constitutional democracy as the institutional guarantee for individual liberty is the ethical goal for Loewenstein. It defines what people *should ethically want to do*. As a relativistic value judgment different people could theoretically substitute all kinds of other values. For Loewenstein, however, individual liberty is the highest value, and there seems to be a sense of duty to promote his values.

As values, they cannot simply be declared binding on all people, as some of the conservative legal scholars would like to have it.[60] Neither are they subordinate to scientific research, whether that means that they are deemed either self-evident or irrelevant, as some of the positivists have held.[61] Value judgments are relativistic. But they call either for direct action for their promotion; or they can guide research by serving as a measure to judge the relevance of certain topics and perspectives. The activist element can best be seen in Loewenstein's polemics against Schmitt's theory of material limits on constitutional amendments. The decisions on his research topics—French and American theories of constitutional democracy, the actual operation of British politics, constitutional amendments in Weimar—can be interpreted as informed judgments of relevancy for democracy at home.

His methodological choice of legal formalism and empirical research is consistent with his ethical judgment. Only legal formalism is compatible with the rule of law, which itself is based on formal rules. The empirical analysis of the discrepancies between the positive legal order and the actual process of government should either prevent legal formalism to insist on unreal premises—as in the studies on British government—or to draw attention to the failure of the political process to conform to the legal order—as in the case of the *Habilitation*.

These three components together help capture the full meaning of Loewenstein's studies prior to his forced emigration. They show that French, British, and American political thought had influenced his approach to the study of politics and constitutions. His empirical orientation was much closer to American and English pluralists like Charles A. Beard, Harold J. Laski, or James Bryce. His ethical imperative gives precedence to the "Ideas of 1789" over the "Ideas of 1914."[62] With this combination of components, Loewenstein is conducting political science in Germany at a time when there was no political science at German universities. They also provide the clue for an explanation of the continuities between his early publications and *Political Power*.

The main difference between Loewenstein's Weimar writings and his later works can be found in the observation that *power* develops from an important category of analysis to the single most important element in his political thought. This, of course, can be interpreted as a direct result of Loewenstein's forced emigration. The Nazi government proved decisively the inadequate viability of constitutional limitations vis-à-vis brute force and violence. Further more, the institutional transition from German *Rechtswissenschaft* to American political science helped reinforce his interest in the analysis of power structures.[63]

Given its central importance the concept of power remains rather vague. Therefore it is necessary to put his statements on power in a larger context.

Particularly, it will be helpful to discuss briefly the concept of power developed by Max Weber. While Loewenstein was a member of Weber's *jours fixes* while at Heidelberg in 1912, Loewenstein and Weber developed a close personal and professional friendship[64] that also resulted in a methodological affinity, especially regarding the concept of power.[65]

Weber's political sociology is based on the four interwoven concepts of *power*, *domination*, *political association*, and *politics*.[66] *Power* is defined as the chance to impose one's will within a social relation. *Domination* is also a social relation, which is limited, however, to the form of order and obedience and to certain identifiable persons. With the *association*, the focus is shifted from social relations towards institutions. The *political association* is characterized by an identifiable geographic area and the possibility of actual or potential physical violence, as well as a certain stability and bureaucracy. The *state* is a form of political association, highly institutionalized, and endowed with the monopoly for the legitimate use of violence. *Politics*, finally, or rather politically oriented actions are defined by their attempted influence on the distribution of power. Politics, thus defined, is always embedded within the given normative structure of the state.

Loewenstein's definitions of power and politics are slightly different from Weber's. At the foundation of his thought is the conception of power "as a strictly neutral, functional, and non-evaluative term, denoting nothing but a factual situation or relationship which is ethically neither good nor evil."[67]

Power is a necessary component of politics. Efforts to ban power from politics are doomed to fail since "power is being considered the dynamic infrastructure of sociopolitical institutions."[68]

Loewenstein does not try any further than that to capture the "essence" of power.[69] Instead, he fashions tools for the analysis of the manifestation of power within the political process. With this intention in mind he defines power to be:

> a socio-psychological relationship operating reciprocally between those who hold and exercise power, here called the "power holder," and those to whom it is directed, spoken of here as the "power addressees." [. . .] Political power denotes [. . .] the exercise of effective social control of the power holders over the power addressees. Social control, in the narrower sense of contemporary political science, is the policy-making or policy-deciding function and the ability of the power holders to make the power addressees obey the policy decisions.[70]

This definition can be conceptualized in a first approximation in diagram 1. Like Weber's, Loewenstein's concept of power is located on the analytical level of social relations. It is an asymmetrical relation between power holders within the structure of the state and individual power addressees.[71] At first



Diagram 1: Conceptualization of Loewenstein's Definition of Power

glance, this asymmetrical structure puts Loewenstein's concept of power squarely within the vertical concepts of power.

By introducing the concept of "social control," however, a complex dimension is added. "Social control" is made up of two components: the capability of the power holders to make policy decisions; and the willingness of power addressees to obey these decisions. The second component is a paraphrase of Weber's *domination.*[72] The first component marks a striking departure from Weber's conceptions. Within this sphere, power is no longer power *over*, but power *to do something*. It cannot be captured in terms of order and obedience; rather it constitutes a collective good that creates opportunities for action instead of limiting them.[73]

With these brief remarks, it is possible to sketch Loewenstein's positions and research designs. Having already discarded the study of "cratology," that is the essence of the power relation itself, two perspectives remain.

1. Power over: Implementation of decisions vis-à-vis the power addressees, which would be the logical focus for research here, is definitely not among Loewenstein's interests of analysis. Instead, when dealing with vertical aspects of power, he focuses mainly on the power addressees. The term itself suggests passivity. Therefore, the guiding question is not "what the power addressees do" but "how they fare" within the power relation. This is the perspective that for Loewenstein provides the ethical rationale for liberalism. "[U]ncontrolled power is evil as such."[74] Therefore,

power may never become so pervasive and absolute that it may destroy individual liberty.

2. Power to do: This perspective leads to a study of the power holders themselves. How many are there? Who are they? What is the relationship between them? These are the questions Loewenstein addresses in *Political Power and the Governmental Process*. They are to be studied empirically as well as juristically, in order to relate the actual governmental structures to the constitutionally prescribed structures.

Put this way, the continuity from Loewenstein's Weimar studies to his later works comes into focus. The guiding value is and remains a strong position on individual liberty. In order to secure liberty, the student of politics has to consider the legal framework as well as the actual operation of government. In *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, Loewenstein is finally providing the theoretical framework for his previous studies. In his publications about Great Britain, he had tried to understand the actual operation of the political process in a constitutional democracy; with his *Habilitation* he wanted to show the dangers associated with a situation in which the actual processes did not operate the way they were supposed to. All through his life's work, the combination of these three components—individual liberty, legal analysis, and empirical research—have remained characteristic for him.

This has set the stage for some further observations. Power has been shown to be Loewenstein's central concept, during the Weimar Republic as well as his later studies, guiding his research interests and perspectives. Despite the attempts at definition, it has still remained rather vague, though. Therefore, it will be necessary to take a look at the way Loewenstein applies the concept of power in his studies. This can be done quite nicely with his typology of political regimes.

Loewenstein's typology of political regimes starts with a wholesale rejection of the classical Machiavellian approach. This dichotomy, that today would lump together England and Saudi Arabia as monarchies as well as the United States and Nazi Germany as Republics, cannot be made useful for a categorization of 20th-century political regimes.[75] From Aristotle, however, he salvages the insight that outwardly similar governments can be quite different in their actual operation—the good vs. the corrupted regimes; from Montesquieu, "whose genius shines more brightly with the progress of time,"[76] he utilizes the distinction between regular governments and despotism as government by "lawless, capricious, tyrannical exercise of political power."[77]

More immediately, however, he draws on Jean Bodin and even more so on Immanuel Kant and their distinction between forms of government and forms of state.[78] Form of state refers to the Aristotelian tripartite division of monarchies, aristocracies and democracies; form of government denotes the

way in which government uses its powers and refers to the distinction between republicanism—that is limited and constitutional government based on the consent of the governed—and despotism.[79] Loewenstein radicalizes these arguments, though,[80] saying that typologies of states should be substituted entirely by typologies of governments:

> [I]t appears that to differentiate between "forms of government" and "forms of state" is of no more than historical relevance. True, state and government are not one and the same. But the type to which a state belongs is determined by the manner in which it is governed.[81]

Therefore, form of government, or "the manner in which, in the individual state society, political power is exercised and controlled"[82] becomes the only basis for Loewenstein's typology. At first, he uses form of government to distinguish between *autocracy* and *political democracy*, defined along the lines of Kant's despotism and republicanism.[83] His terminology changes somewhat over time with the realization that a finer differentiation is necessary. For this purpose, he introduces the concept of *political systems*.[84] He claims that all political systems can be identified by their institutional structure and their underlying ideologies[85] regarding the relationship of liberty and authority. He thus creates the ideal-typical dichotomy of political systems between *autocracy* and *constitutionalism/constitutional democracy*. Autocracy is defined as a political system based on an ideology of authority, characterized by a centralized governmental structure where all power is located with one person, group or party; constitutionalism is based on an ideology of individual liberty, characterized by governmental institutions where power is limited and shared among relatively independent actors.[86] Form of government is then utilized to distinguish between several manifestations of political systems of one family, such as parliamentary and presidential democracies among constitutional democracies, or authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorships among autocracies. This typology will now be related to Loewenstein's power concept. In this context, it shall suffice to stay on the more abstract level of political systems.

The way, in which power is exercised in the different political systems, is visualized in diagrams 2 and 3. The distinction between autocracy and constitutionalism can be found throughout Loewenstein's work. The first time he uses it explicitly is in the very first article published in the United States about "Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe."[87] Between emigrating and the end of the Second World War, autocracy then becomes his main focus of interest. Along with other German émigrés[88] he contributes to the analysis and explanation of the Nazi government in Germany.[89] With the end of World War II, Loewenstein's focus shifts from autocracy to constitutional democracy.[90] After the totalitarian enemy had been subdued for

the time being, the task for the student of politics shifted from the defense of liberty to the analysis of structural prerequisites for liberal governance, especially with an eye on the newly liberated Germany.[91] These prerequisites are, as has already been stated, the existence of several independent power holders and an ideology of liberty.

In *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, his main focus is on the dynamic relationships between power holders. Diagram 2 shows clearly that within the frame of Loewenstein's concept of power in autocracies, the dynamic relationship cannot generate much interest. Power holders decide, power addressees obey—and that's it.[92] In constitutional political systems, however, the existence of more than one power holder causes this relatively simple social relation to become much more complex. No single power holder can simply decide so that power addressees would have to obey. Other power holders have to cooperate in order for policy decisions to become effective. Practically all constitutional political systems have developed similar structures with an assembly or parliament, an executive body, and courts.[93] The differences in the relationship between the power holders in constitutional systems are then used by Loewenstein to differentiate and classify different forms of government.[94]

One final modification arises with the universalization of the vote. With this achievement, the electorate managed to rise to a position of fourth power holder. This marks the transition from constitutionalism to constitutional democracy. Diagram 4 shows the power process in constitutional democracy.



Diagram 2: Exercise of Power in Autocracies



Diagram 3: Exercise of Power in Constitutional States

Diagrams 2–4 reveal that Loewenstein's concept of power is changing across different political systems. In autocracies, power is conceptualized entirely as vertical power. The single power holder—in theory—can freely impose his will on the power addressees. In constitutional systems, the focus shifts from the implementation of policy decisions to the relationships of the several power holders and how they control each other's policy decisions. In constitutional democracies, finally, the process of power is complex. The hierarchical relationship between power holders and power addressees is partly broken up with a "feedback loop" of power addressees acting simultaneously as power holders through elections. Power is no longer a linear relationship of policy decision, policy implementation and obedience; it has become a complex system of individual and state-level actions influencing each other.



Diagram 4: Power and Control in Constitutional Democracies

This concludes the circle. In defining and refining his concept of power and adjusting it to different political systems of the past and present, Loewenstein has come back to the topic of his dissertation, capturing the meaning of popular sovereignty within his concept of power. Thus, he finally tries to reconcile liberty with authority and democracy with the rule of law in order to develop a general theory of constitutional democracy. And while he did not formulate this theory until rather late in his life, many of his earlier publications can be seen as preliminary studies. The process of power in constitutional democracies provides a rationale for Loewenstein's ethical position on individual liberty. His examination of the relationship between the power holders is based on the assumption that constitutional provisions (legalistic) can provide structures in which power can control power (empirical). Thus, the three components of his Weimar studies can be observed again in his later theory.

At the very least, no discrepancy between his early studies and his mature theory can be found; an observation that counters all claims of disruption or radical change within Loewenstein's political thought. Yet all the examples given in this paper support the thesis of continuity.

CONCLUSION

The mid-1930s are the point of culmination in Loewenstein's life. This is where the lines of continuity intersect. Therefore, it should be the point from which Loewenstein's identity and political thought should be considered. During this time, while he did not make the transition "From Public Law to Political Science," he created a brittle combination of the two. He managed to become firmly established within the American political science community, yet held that political science was basically identical with *Staatsrecht*. At the same time he continued to write studies that were combining American empiricism with German legalism and a firm conviction for individual liberty.

Going back and forth on the timeline, however, one discovers that this combination did not last "long," in either way. Before 1933, his methodology was more political than the mainstream of *Staatsrecht* in Weimar Germany; after 1945, his studies were more legalistic than the mainstream of political science in the United States. It may be argued, therefore, that his position in the intellectual fields[95] of German *Staatsrecht* and American political science were marginal. The occupancy of marginal positions in changing environments can be interpreted as another line of continuity in Loewenstein's life.

How can these amazing continuities be explained? First of all, the relationship between continuity and change in studies about émigré scientists[96] needs to be reconsidered. *Continuity may be more important than change*. This, however, does not mean that change is not important, let alone that the emigration had no impact at all on Loewenstein. In fact, one could make the point that the continuity in his work was possible *because* he had to emigrate. Just before his emigration, Loewenstein's work may have tended to develop in the direction of public law proper, due to the institutional restraints laid upon him for his *Habilitation*. It may well have been that this trend would have continued and he would have given up the comprehensive approach that distinguishes his work in the early Weimar period. At Yale and Amherst he was free to pursue this approach again. He may have even leaned more towards political science in the early forties.[97] But the behavioral revolution caused him to return to the approach of the *Staatswissenschaften* with its juridical and institutional components. Also, the attempts to obtain an appointment for

an American law school may be viewed as the stubborn reaction of a man deprived of the *Professur* he felt he had been entitled to.[98]

There may be more biographical reasons for the continuity of his political thought. At the time of emigration he was forty-two years old. Other factors being equal, the outcome may have been different for a younger scholar. Also, compared with other émigrés his transition was extraordinarily smooth. Immediately after the emigration he held a position as assistant professor at one of the top universities in the United States. After just two years he was full professor at Amherst college, shortly thereafter with tenure. It may be argued that this ease did not make it necessary for him to adjust his theoretical approach to the new circumstances.

Biography and the circumstances of his emigration have certainly played an important role in the development of Loewenstein's political thought. The most important reasons underlying the continuity, however, are to be found in his thought itself. I have tried to make the point that the political thought of Karl Loewenstein shows such an amazing continuity because his understanding of *Staatswissenschaften* had been "Americanized"[99] before his emigration to the United States. This is also the opinion of Nicholas J. Spykman, Dean of the Yale University Graduate School, who wrote in his job offer to Karl Loewenstein in 1933:

> I am very impressed by your publications, especially by your studies on the development of British constitutional law, and it is because of your sociological approach to the objects of your studies, which is so much in accordance with our own approaches, that I have decided to invite you to join our faculty.[100]

This also sheds a different light on Loewenstein's characterization of American political science in the 1930s cited before. When he writes to Gerhard Leibholz that political science is just another name for *Staatsrecht*, he in fact refers to his already *Americanized Staatswissenschaften*; and by applauding political scientists for the study of those phenomena that German *Staatsrecht* had neglected to address, he also applauds himself, as these were the kinds of questions he himself had been trying to raise. At the same time he does not acknowledge trends already in the making at that time to transform political science in a behavioral revolution, and who happen to contradict his definition of political science. At the same time, he also retained some of his "German-ness" in the United States. This can be seen most clearly in the project descriptions he gave about *Political Power and the Governmental Process*.

Therefore I would suggest a conclusion which is somewhat at odds with Söllner's thesis on the individual level: Loewenstein's identity has remained rooted in *Staatsrecht* and *Staatswissenschaften*; his political thought has

consistently tried to combine German and American elements. On the group level, however, my results strongly support Söllner, with an interesting twist.

Histories of American political science in the 19th century usually refer to the discipline's German roots; meaning of course roots in the *Staatswissenschaften*.[101] Terence Ball even talks about "the tyranny of Germany over American political science and political theory."[102] Early political science in the United States, then, could be seen in terms of an internationalization and democratization of the German *Staatswissenschaften*. In turn, the reception of American political science by Karl Loewenstein could be seen not as Americanization, but as the re-import of an older German tradition, transformed only to a certain degree in the United States. The emigration then reinforced and continued the internationalization already begun in the Weimar Republic.

This line of argument if elaborated on and substantiated could provide an interesting perspective on the development of political science in Germany after World War II . Loewenstein was one of the "founding fathers" of the discipline.[103] He definitely contributed to the transformation of the study of politics in Germany "From Public Law to Political Science," as suggested by Söllner's group thesis. This transformation was achieved by reverting to the older German tradition of *Staatswissenschaften*.[104] The new twist proposed here, however, lies in the analysis of émigrés like Loewenstein simultaneously as agents of *change* "From Public Law to Political Science," as well as agents of continuity. The most important medium for the *continuity* of political studies in Germany from *Staatswissenschaften* to political science may well be found in the émigrés.

NOTES

1. Alfons Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration: Studien zu ihrer Akkulturations- und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996). For a detailed analysis of the main character of this essay, see Markus Lang, *Karl Löwenstein: Translatlantischer Denker der Politik* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007).

2. See Karl Löwenstein, "Report on the Research Panel in Comparative Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 38 (1944), 540–48.

3. Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten (ed.), *Introduction and Development of Political Science in German Universities: Abstract of the Discussion at Schloß Waldleiningen, September 10–11, 1949* (Frankfurt-Main, 1949). For a discussion of the role the conference played, see Arno Mohr, *Politikwissenschaft als Alternative: Stationen einer wissenschaftlichen Disziplin auf dem Wege zu ihrer Selbständigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1988), 64. Söllner, *Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration*, p. 278 refers to Loewenstein as the most important promoter of the conference by virtue of his providing not only the concept, but also the money for the project.

4. The private papers of Karl Loewenstein are located in the Amherst College Archives and Special Collections in Amherst, Massachusetts. They comprise some 70 boxes with personal and professional correspondence, some unpublished manuscripts, various memorabilia, and a 400 page autobiographical typescript. All materials from this collection are cited as KLP.

5. He spent the second semester in Paris, the fourth in Heidelberg, the fifth in Berlin, and the rest in Munich.

6. Loewenstein had been working on the manuscript in Berlin and wanted to finish up the dissertation with studies at the British Museum. For that purpose he set out to travel to London via Cologne on July 30th, 1914 [*sic*]. He did not realize the "foolishness of my actions" (my translation) until it was too late and the manuscript, which had been checked in advance, had crossed the border to the Netherlands while he stayed in Germany. See *Karl Loewenstein*, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, autobiographical manuscript, KLP Box 15a, 65–66.

7. See ibid., 78–79.

8. Karl Loewenstein, *Volk und Parlament nach der Staatsauffassung der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Studien zur Dogmengeschichte der unmittelbaren Volksgesetzgebung* (Munich: Drei-Masken-Verlag, 1922).

9. This is the interpretation Loewenstein offers in his autobiography. See *Loewenstein*, Des Lebens Überfluß, 143–44.

10. Fortunately Loewenstein had left Munich in March 1933 for Switzerland and Italy, considering never to come back to Germany, as he had secretly counseled Thomas Mann only days before. He did return to Munich, though, in early June for a final and unsuccessful attempt to resume his previous life. See Loewenstein, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, 135–36 and 33334.

11. There is certainly a big difference between *Staatsrecht* and public law, as well as between a *Juristische Fakultät* in Germany and a law school in the United States. While I don't want to reduce the importance for such a distinction, in this context it can be neglected, since Loewenstein did not see this difference—maybe he chose not to do so.

12. Loewenstein had met Laski while conducting research on British politics and public law. The exact circumstances of their first meeting cannot be reconstructed with the material in the KLP.

13. See Felix Frankfurter to Edward R. Murrow, June 22, 1935; Karl Loewenstein to Edward R. Murrow, July 14, 1935; Felix Frankfurter to Karl Loewenstein, Sept. 27, 1935, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

14. See Karl Loewenstein to Harold J. Laski, May 6, 1935; Harold J. Laski to Karl Loewenstein, May 20, 1935; Karl Loewenstein to Harold J. Laski, June 5, 1935, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

15. Harold J. Laski to Karl Loewenstein, Dec. 11, 1935, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

16. Harold J. Laski to Karl Loewenstein, Feb. 5, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

17. See Karl Loewenstein to Carl J. Friedrich, Dec. 20, 1935, KLP Box 8, Folder 16. The Government Department at Harvard would not have brought him into Harvard Law School directly, but at least there was a good chance of establishing close ties to the Law School faculty, as he had done also at Yale.

18. See Carl J. Friedrich to Karl Loewenstein, Dec. 26, 1935, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

19. See Karl Loewenstein to Harold J. Laski, Jan. 27, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

20. One has to emphasize that this was a very generous offer given the rather tense academic labor market in the 1930s.

21. Karl Loewenstein to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 27, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

22. See Karl Loewenstein to President King, Feb. 19, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

23. Karl Loewenstein to Hon. Julian Mack, Feb. 18, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

24. See Karl Loewenstein to James R. Angell, Feb. 18, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

25. See Hon. Julian Mack to Karl Loewenstein, Feb. 19, 1936; James R. Angell to Karl Loewenstein, Feb. 19, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

26. See Kirkpatrick to Karl Loewenstein, Feb. 10, 1936 and Loewenstein's reply, Feb. 12, 1936 (KLP, Box 8, Folder 16), in which Loewenstein mentions the possibility of an offer by "one of the best colleges here in the East," so that Minnesota would have to move rather fast.

27. Karl Loewenstein to Kirkpatrick, Feb. 18, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 16.

28. See Karl Loewenstein to Sydnor H. Walker, Rockefeller Foundation, March 5, 1936, Rockefeller Archive Center RG 1.1 Series 200, Box 419, Folder 4978.

29. Karl Loewenstein to Gerhard Leibholz, Oct. 16, 1936, KLP Box 8, Folder 17. My translation, originally: "Es wäre also ein Zufall [. . .] wenn Sie an einen Platz kommen, wo man unser Fach, das hier Government oder Political Science heisst, gerade braucht. [. . . Es] ist nicht zu übersehen, dass die kontinentalen Gelehrten sich vollständig umstellen müssen, um hier von Nutzen zu sein. Man interessiert sich so gut wie gar nicht für Theorie, das Staatsrecht wird rein pragmatisch gelehrt und gelernt, europäische Parallelen sind kaum von Interesse und unsere dogmatische Betrachtungsweise gilt als unwesentlich, was sie ja bei Licht besehen auch ist, wir haben in der Darstellung der Weimarer Verfassung sehr viel übersehen, was wichtig war. Was hier gilt, ist die deskriptive Methode, bei der Institutionen beschrieben, aber nicht rechtstheoretisch beurteilt werden. Dazu kommt, dass sozialpsychologische Interessen im Vordergrund stehen, nicht geisteswissenschaftliche, und das haben wir eben nicht gelernt und niemals betont."

30. See Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). The German edition is titled *Verfassungslehre* and was published in 1959, with two subsequent editions in 1969 and 1975. There are also Spanish and Japanese editions.

31. Karl Loewenstein to Theodor Maunz, Aug. 11, 1959, KLP Box 10, Folder 13. My translation, originally: "Es ist richtig, dies ist eine Art *summa*, zu der es mich seit langer Zeit gedrängt hat, und ich bin dankbar, dass ich sie vollenden konnte, soweit das Wort 'vollenden' bei einem solchen Gegenstand zutreffen kann."

32. See *Institutionen der Demokratie*, lecture script, KLP Box 42 Folder 9.

33. The lecture draws heavily on Hermann Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, 2 Vols. (New York: The Dial Press, 1932). It appears that it was intended to span two semesters as he did not deal with the executive, with federalism, the judiciary and the bureaucracy, even though these topics were mentioned as

"unentbehrliche Grundkategorien" (*Institutionen der Demokratie*, p.13) of a study of democracy. And incidentally the topics covered coincide closely with the chapters of *Political Power and the Governmental Process*.

34. See Statement of Project Comparative Political Institutions, no date, KLP Box 14 Folder 10.

35. Karl Loewenstein to Arnold J. Zurcher, Oct. 14, 1953, KLP Box 37, Folder 6 [italics underlined in the original].

36. Karl Loewenstein to Wolfgang Friedmann dated Oct. 20, 1955, KLP Box 37 Folder 6.

37. Karl Loewenstein, *Beiträge zur Staatssoziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1961).

38. For a comprehensive discussion of the early tradition of civil service training within the legal science see Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland*, Vol. I: 1600–1800 (München: C.H. Beck 1988), and Wilhelm Bleek, "Die Tübinger Schule der gesamten Staatswissenschaft," Idem and Hans J. Lietzmann (eds.), *Schulen in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), 105–29.

39. See ibid., 110–11.

40. See David F. Lindenfeld*, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 109–10.

41. See Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland*, Vol. II: 1800–1914. This rise and decline of this phenomenon is described in the still ground-breaking study by Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).

42. See Loewenstein, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, 145–46.

43. Karl Loewenstein, "Über Volksabstimmungen bei Gebietsveränderungen: Ein Beitrag zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker," *Annalen des Deutschen Reichs*, 50 (1917), 593–642.

44. Karl Loewenstein, *Volk und Parlament*. The dissertation was not published until almost four years later, due to restrictions imposed by the dire economic situation in Germany at the end of World War I. It was written without an academic counselor (*Doktorvater*), which was unusual for the time. Karl Rothenbücher presented it to the department. See Karl Loewenstein, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, 148–49.

45. See Egon Zweig, *Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constituant: Ein Beitrag zum Staatsrecht der Französischen Revolution* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1909), with 240 citations, and Robert Redslob, *Die Staatstheorien der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Ihre Grundlagen in der Staatslehre der Aufklärungszeit un in den englischen und amerikanischen Verfassungsgedanken* (Leipzig: Veit, 1912), with 94 citations.

46. See Albert Sarrault, *Le gouvernement direct en France* (Paris, 1899), 41 citations, and Charles E. Merriam*, A History of American Political Theories* (New York: Macmillan, 1903), 35 citations.

47. Harold J. Laski to Karl Loewenstein, May 7, 1929, KLP Box 57, Folder 13.

48. See James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York: Macmillan, 1921). The project was supposed to be a cooperative effort with Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartoldy.

However, Loewenstein according to his own recollection had to shoulder by far the heaviest part of the burden. See Karl Loewenstein, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, 155–56.

49. Both essays are reprinted in: Karl Loewenstein, *Beiträge zur Staatssoziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1961), 34–64 and 65–171, the page numbers given here refer to these reprints. Cited hereafter as *Beiträge*.

50. See his reference to the explanation "des *staatsrechtlichen Tatbestands* der *Parlamentssouveränität*," ibid., 68.

51. See Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), and Bryce, *Modern Democracies*.

52. Loewenstein, *Beiträge*, 66. My translation, originally: "daß das 'Normenbill' der englischen Verfassung [. . .] vorwiegend aus den Erscheinungen der verfassungspolitischen Praxis zusammengefügt werden muß."

53. Ibid., 68.

54. Ibid. My translation, originally: "den Abstand oder die Übereinstimmung der staatsrechtlichen Betrachtung mit der politischen Wirklichkeit."

55. Ibid., 50 My translation, originally: "juristische Fiktion, keine tatsächliche Erscheinung."

56. Ibid., 67 My translation, originally: "In einem Land etwa, das die Auswahl der verantwortlichen Beamten grundsätzlich einem konstitutionellen Fürsten zuweist, mag das Staatsrecht die Wirksamkeit der *Parteien* also politisch ignorieren oder mit der negativen Wertbetonung beurteilen, welche ihnen die deutsche rechtsdogmatische Staatsrechtswissenschaft oder auch die begriffliche Strenge der 'reinen Rechtslehre' zuzulegen geneigt ist. Wo aber, wie in England, Staatsleitung und Parteiwesen miteinander so untrennbar verflochten sind, daß ohne sie der Regierungsmechanismus überhaupt nicht funktioniert, muß auch bestimmten Verhaltungsweisen der Parteien *verfassungsrechtliche* Relevanz zuerkannt werden, trotzdem sie, ebenso wie etwa das Kabinett, der Legalisierung durch einen Verfassungsrechtssatz entbehren."

57. See Loewenstein, *Des Lebens Überfluß*, 157–58.

58. See Karl Oewenstein, "Die Rechtsgültigkeit der Neuregelung der Bierentschädigung: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Verfassungsgesetz," Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 13 (1927), 234–59, and his Habilitation Thesis *Erscheinungsformen der Verfassungsänderung* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931).

59. Ibid., p. VII My translation, originally: "Das Ergebnis ist, daß dem als Verfassungsgesetzgeber gestaltenden Gesetzgeber *unter Wahrung der in unserer Untersuchung unter Beweis gestellten unumgänglichen Formen* jede inhaltliche Verfassungsänderung, gesteigert bis zur Totalaufhebung der Verfassung, gestattet ist, daß also die Lehre Carl Schmitts von den materiellen Grenzen der Verfassungsänderung abzulehnen ist." Emphasis in original.

60. For a discussion of the ultra-conservative political thought in the Weimar Republic, see Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik [1962] (Munich: dtv, 1994).

61. Hans Kelsen's *Reine Rechtslehre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1934), is a prime example for this approach. Values are supposed to be kept away from scientific treatment of a topic, in this case the body of pure law. In Kelsen's political writings (as opposed to the legal studies), however, democracy and the rule of law figure in a prominent

position; see Hans Kelsen, *Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1929). While Horst Dreier, *Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990) and, more recently, Detlef Lehnert, "Der Beitrag von Hans Kelsen und Hugo Preuß zum modernen Demokratieverständnis," Christoph Gusy (ed.), *Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 21–55, have shown that there is a close connection between Kelsen's legal and political theory, the value-free approach in his legal theory could be seen as a cause for his rather weak defense of democracy—much weaker than Loewenstein's, anyway.

62. This is not to suggest that there were no traditions of democratic values or empirical approaches in Germany; however, they were certainly much less prevalent than in these western countries. At the very least, Loewenstein's close westward contacts have reinforced his empirical and ethical orientations.

63. Traditionally, American political science had been much more open to the concept of power than the German *Rechtswissenschaft*. For recent discussions of the history of political science in the United States see Michael Baer et al. (eds.), *Political Science in America: Oral Histories of a Discipline* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1991); David Easton et al., *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); James Farr and Raymond Seidelman (eds.), *Discipline and History: Political Science in the United States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); David Easton et al. (eds.), *Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Gerhard Göhler, "Vom Sozialismus zum Pluralismus: Politiktheorie und Emigrationserfahrung bei Ernst Fraenkel," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 27 (1986), 25, refers specifically to the "einseitig machtorientierten amerikanischen 'political science'" as cause for the changes in Ernst Fraenkel's political thought.

64. Their friendship lasted until Weber's untimely death in 1922 in Munich. However, Loewenstein continued to be a devoted follower: Loewenstein's essay on the sociology of parliamentary representation in England (1923) was first published in a volume edited by Melchior Palyi dedicated to the memory of Weber; in the 1963 *Erinnerungsgabe* for Weber, Loewenstein published "personal recollections" (see Karl Loewnstein, "Persönliche Erinnerungen an Max Weber," René König and Johannes Winckelmann (eds.), *Max Weber zum Gedächtnis*, Cologne: Westdeutscher Velag, 1963, 48–52) that showed such an amazing deference to his mentor that Stanley Stark "Toward a Psychology of Charisma," *Psychological Reports*, 40 (1977), 668, note a, nominated Loewenstein as a devoted follower of Max Weber as charismatic scientific leader. Maybe even more decisive is Loewenstein's violent criticism of Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1959) and his reading of Weber as preparing the way for the plebiscitary leadership principle used—or abused—by the National Socialists; see Karl Löwenstein, "Max Weber als 'Ahnherr' des plebiszitären Führerstaates," in his *Beiträge*, 311–28, and idem, *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966). Also, until the 1960s, Loewenstein was in possession of the original manuscript of Weber's monumental *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*; see the preface by Johannes Winckelmann in *Max Weber zum Gedächtnis*, XV.

65. Dirk Kaesler, "Max Weber," Iring Fetscher and Herfried Münkler (eds.), *Handbuch der politischen Ideen*, Vol. 5 (Munich: Piper, 1987), 156, ranks Loewenstein among those representatives of Weberian "'Großparadigmata' politischer Ideen" who developed their own approaches drawing heavily on Weber's writings about power and politics. See also Theo Schiller, "Machtprobleme in einigen Ansätze der neueren Demokratietheorie," Michael Th. Greven (ed.), *Macht in der Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), 141–74, esp. 151–52.

66. The following outline of Weber's sociology of domination is based on his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 1–2 and 691–92, as well as his "Politik als Beruf," Idem, *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1988).

67. Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 6.

68. Ibid., 4.

69. Any further attempt at "cratology" (Ibid., 5) is considered an ill-fated attempt from the beginning, since power—along with love and faith—is among the principal mysteries of human life.

70. Ibid., 6f.

71. The limitation to state actors is a serious shortcoming of Loewenstein's power theory, since all other power holders—economic, social, and international—do not fit his framework. This limitation is most dearly felt in Loewenstein's discussion of pluralism; see his *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, 344–45.

72. On another occasion, Loewenstein equates "power" and "domination." See Karl Loewenstein, "Über das Verhältnis von politischen Ideen und politischen Institutionen [1955]," in his *Beiträge*, 247.

73. This aspect of Loewenstein's concept of power is much closer to the one advocated by Hannah Arendt, *Macht und Gewalt* (Munich: R. Piper, 1996), and idem, *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben* (Munich: R. Piper, 1997).

74. Loewenstein, *Beiträge*, 8. To support this position, he draws on Lord Acton's epigram "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely."

75. See ibid., 20–21.

76. Ibid., 23.

77. Ibid., 24.

78. See Karl Loewenstein, *Political Reconstruction* (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 109.

79. See Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf," Idem, *Werke in zehn Bänden*, Vol. 9, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), 204–05.

80. Kant stops short of outright rejecting form of state. He assigns priority to form of government, though. The relevant passages from his "Perpetual Peace" (Ibid., 208) reads: "Es ist aber an der Regierungsart dem Volk ohne alle Vergleichung mehr gelegen, als an der Staatsform (wiewohl auch auf dieser ihre mehrere oder mindere Angemessenheit zu jenem Zwecke sehr viel ankommt)."

81. Loewenstein, *Political Reconstruction*, 109. See also his "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsrealität: Beiträge zur Ontologie der Verfassungen [1952]," Idem, *Beiträge*, 430–80, especially 44445.

82. Loewenstein, *Beiträge*, 29.

83. See Loewenstein, *Political Reconstruction*, 86.

84. Loewenstein's usage of the term Political System has to be kept apart from the terminology of David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953). Loewenstein does not refer to a logical model, but rather to historical ideal types. Therefore, he can use "Political Systems" in the plural to differentiate between different manifestations of political systems, while Easton's "Political System" as a universal model of the political process can only be used in the singular.

85. Loewenstein uses ideology with the same meaning as Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie* [1929] (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1985).

86. See Loewenstein, *Beiträge*, 29–30.

87. Karl Loewenstein, "Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe," *The American Political Science Review*, 29 (1935), 571–93 and 755–84.

88. See, among others, William Ebenstein, *Fascism at Work* (London: Hopkinson, 1934); idem, *The Nazi State* (New York and Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943); Otto Kirchheimer, "Staatsgefüge und Recht des Dritten Reiches [1935]," Idem, *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus: Die Auflösung der demokratischen Rechtsordnung* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), 152–85; Franz Borkenau, *The Totalitarian Enemy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1940); John H. Herz, "The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International Organization," *Political Science Quarterly*, 54 (1939), 536–54; Ernst Fraenkel, *The Dual State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941); Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942; or the somewhat later study by Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft* [1951] (Munich and Zurich: R. Piper, 1986).

89. See Karl Loewenstein, "Autocracy versus Democracy," idem, "Law in the Third Reich," *Yale Law Journal*, 45 (1936), 779–815; idem, "Government and Politics in Germany," James T. Shotwell (ed.), *Governments of Continental Europe* (New York, 1940), 279–569; and most importantly his book *Hitler's Germany: The Nazi Background to War* (New York: Macmillan, 1939) that went through four editions until 1944.

90. Most importantly in his *Political Reconstruction*.

91. Loewenstein's interest in these topics was not only academic. During World War II he had worked for the Committee for Political Defense whose task had been to help South American states prepare against the possibility of fascist attempts to subvert their governments. After the end of the war, he accepted an appointment as legal adviser to OMGUS. In this function he helped reform the German legal system, especially the administration of justice.

92. Accordingly, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* devotes not more than 17 pages to autocracy specifically. See ibid., 53–54. There are, however,

a number of references in passing, when autocracy serves as comparison for constitutionalism.

93. See Loewenstein, *Beiträge*, 431–32.

94. See Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, 77–78.

95. For a definition of this term, see Fritz K. Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890–1920* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

96. A comprehensive survey of the state of emigration studies can be found in Claus Dieter Krohn et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933–1945* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998).

97. The early 1940s mark the only period, in which Loewenstein published any articles in *The American Political Science Review*. See Loewenstein's bibliography in his *Beiträge*.

98. Loewenstein claims that, in 1933, he had been in line for appointment as professor at the University of Munich. See his *Des Lebens Überfluß*, pp.160–62. See also the collection of letters re: Loewenstein's restitution in Munich between 1946 and 1951, KLP Box 10 Folder 15.

99. For a recent discussion of this key term in German history and historiography cf. Philipp Gassert, "Was meint Amerikanisierung? Über den Begriff des Jahrhunderts," *Merkur*, 54 (2000), 9–10.

100. Nicholas J. Spykman to Karl Loewenstein, Sept. 27, 1933 (official transcript), KLP Box 63. My translation of the official transcript for the German authorities; originally: "Ich habe einen sehr starken Eindruck von Ihren Veröffentlichungen erhalten, insbesondere von Ihren Arbeiten über die britische Verfassungsentwicklung, und es ist wegen Ihrer soziologischen Behandlung des Gegenstandes, die so sehr mit der Einstellung unserer Gruppe übereinstimmt, dass ich Sie gebeten habe, unserer Fakultät beizutreten."

101. See Bernard R. Crick, *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), and Wilhelm Bleek, "Die Gründung der Wissenschaft von der Politik in den USA: Ein Kapitel amerikanisch-deutschen Kulturtransfers," Manfred Funke et al. (eds.), *Demokratie und Diktatur: Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1987), 521–33.

102. Cited on the back cover of John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

103. See his involvement in the founding conference at Waldleiningen, described above, 1.

104. This is consistent with recent studies about the history of political science in Germany who tend to argue as well for a fundamental continuity of the political studies in Germany. See Wilhelm Bleek*, Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), *passim* and pp. 246–48. See also the somewhat more dated but still relevant studies by Gerhard Göhler, "Vom Sozialismus zum Pluralismus," and Arno Mohr, *Politikwissenschaft als Alternative*.

3

Hans Rothfels and the Paradoxes of Cosmopolitan Conservatism

John L. Harvey

Disputes about historiography commonly use intellectual biography to trace the history of ideas through academic disciplines. In the process, biographical subjects are often figures who experimented in new methodologies, such as members of the *Annales* circle, or are those with life experiences that exemplify important characteristics of modern political culture. For the past decade, historians have directed particular attention to the political and intellectual legacies of German-speaking *Ostforscher* in the twentieth century, resulting in a series of studies on specialists in history, demography, statistics, and folklore who defined the genealogy of this interdisciplinary field.[1] As scholars acknowledge a close cooperation of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the humanities, with National Socialism, *Ostforschung* has become a critical site for historians to study the intersection of radical racist ideology and experiments in new research methodologies from imperial to Nazi Germany. These questions now further question how specialists on the east reconstructed their research field after the collapse of National Socialism and to their contribution to a persistent socio-cultural conservatism in faculties in the early Federal Republic.

One of the most challenging cases today is that of the historian Hans Rothfels, due to his significant institutional influence, his experience as a neoconservative victim of the Nazi racial laws, and the trans-Atlantic breadth of his career. While serving as professor for modern history at Königsberg from 1926 until 1934, Rothfels became an intellectual magnet for young nationalists by demanding a reassertion of German influence in Eastern Europe based on authoritarian government and a bygone society of orders. His *völkisch* nationalism and Evangelical Lutheranism however offered no shield from the Jewish racial laws of the NSDAP.[2] Surprisingly, emigration in 1939 led to

his rebirth as a prominent historian at the University of Chicago, as Rothfels clothed himself anew as a transatlantic mediator of intellectual exchange. Burnished with this cosmopolitan reputation, he returned to Tübingen in the 1950s to propagate the development of *Zeitgeschichte* and its study of National Socialism. Thus an important voice of anti-Western nationalism emerged in the Federal Republic as a *grandseigneur* of German historical writing and an intellectual bridge from Bonn to Washington.[3] His conflicting expressions of disciplinary reform and intolerant chauvinism, amplified by his international prestige and victim status, has fuelled academic controversy by forcing scholars to address coexisting attitudes within German history that are often treated as mutually opposed.[4]

Two recent books have led this attempt to contextualize Rothfels within the development of the wider historical discipline and national cultural trends of the twentieth century. The Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) has published a dozen papers from a conference conducted in 2003 on *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte*.[5] Produced amid several academic colloquia and writings on Rothfels, the volume seeks to arbitrate the emerging controversial interpretations and to illustrate new research on his career for future debate.[6] Jan Eckel, a student of Ulrich Herbert at Freiburg, has also produced the first intellectual biography of Rothfels' life from the perspective of his career as a historian in interwar Germany and the Federal Republic.[7]

Although debate about Rothfels can include many perspectives, the basic questions about National Socialism and its legacy after 1945 stand out. To what extent did Rothfels help to undermine democratically oriented scholarship and contribute to a form of historical research compatible with the political designs of the Nazis? Did he sponsor experiments in *Zeitgeschichte* in order to shield Germany's historians and society from a moral confrontation with the national legacy of National Socialism and the Holocaust?

Recent interpretations about Rothfels appear sharply divided along a conceptual fault line concerning the relationship of German conservatism to National Socialism and to the continuity of compromised scholars and their ideas from the 1930s to the Cold War decades. Historians have long acknowledged that nationalism exerted a powerful influence on German historians, both by limiting their critical independence and by nurturing authoritarian politics and ethno-cultural social conflict. Before the mid-1990s, historians tended to relativize the nationalist strains of Rothfels' interwar *oeuvre* within a tragic narrative of German society that succumbed to chauvinism unleashed by an "age of extremes."[8] Criticism of his activism with the far right and the association of his students with the NSDAP went largely unrecognized.[9] But recent revisionism, best represented by Ingo Haar at the IfZ conference, has changed this picture. Haar perceives

Rothfels as a dangerous transitional figure in the historical discipline.[10] He maintains that although German historians had long studied Eastern Europe, until the approximate period of Rothfels' arrival at Königsberg, this attention had centered on intellectual, legal, and state history. A liberal-historicist *Staatsgeschichte* defined the German nation within the *Kleinstaat* borders of 1871 and accepted an ecumenical diversity of European powers within a Rankean system of competing states.

Even conservative *Vernunftrepublikaner*, republicans by reason, rejected expansionary *Volksbodenforschung* and supported limited compromise with the Western democracies in order to modify the hated Versailles Diktat.[11] Rothfels, in contrast, brokered a far more hostile "fighting scholarship" among both traditional conservatives and his younger nationalist students. He legitimized a chauvinistic *Volksgefühle* that blended the veneration for a static corporate order of agrarian society with traditions of state authoritarianism, personified by Bismarck, even as he fought democratic historians and the parliamentary associations they defended.[12] From his Prussian vista, Rothfels conceived of Eastern Europe as a conflict zone between advanced and primitive peoples. In the process, he propagated a paradigm shift in the *Geisteswissenschaften* that prioritized biological struggle among incompatible cultures and justified German national expansion far beyond historical borders to "save" kindred minorities from inherent enemy countries.[13] His experimentations in new forms of nationalist historiography intensified the wider pathological nature of research in interwar Germany, which authorities of National Socialism could employ for warfare and genocide.

As Thomas Etzemüller proposed during the Rothfels Conference, this program offered a coherent intellectual rallying point for younger scholars absorbed by the apparent interwar collapse of Germany's "historical mission" in the East and the crisis of nation-state identity throughout the region.[14] They fashioned a durable, interdisciplinary *Denkstil*, or a system of thought, that applied empirical research of purported German ethnicities across nominal state borders in pursuit of a national "community of destiny." Etzemüller's concept of a common intellectual program of *Ostforschung* extends earlier identifications of Rothfels with the etymological politics of "*Ordensstaat*," "*Mitteleuropa*," or "greater German regional history."[15] Yet by framing the political conditioning of Rothfels and his colleagues to an almost existential ideal of national crisis, Etzemüller minimizes the individual agency to create, alter, or resist a specific "Denkstil," and thus pays less attention to complex evidence of associational life.[16] He is also not clear about when this *Denkstil* arose, how it metamorphosed in the interwar years, or the mechanism by which a *mentalité* of identity crisis was altered to accommodate Nazi racial policy. Compacting Rothfels' pedagogical legacy into a singular *Denkstil* further tends to bind his

own specific *Volkstumskämpfe* to his students' later outright participation in the resettlement and genocidal plans of Nazi agencies.

This has opened space for critics to question if individual scholars fashion a generation, whether Rothfels can be held accountable for the actions of students after his removal from Königsberg, and indeed to what degree he was a locus for the most radical strands of *Volksgeschichte* at the borderland universities.[17] One must respect these questions and acknowledge his distaste for rabid Nazi racism. Nevertheless, the scholarship shows how Rothfels helped orchestrate a rising choir of *Volksgeschichte* that muffled moderate historians such as Richard Salomon and Karl Stählin. Whether intended or not, this act advanced conditions for collaboration with more radical eastern and racial policies.[18]

Relative emphases on empirical research and theoretical approaches also characterize the revisionist historiography on Rothfels, compared to works more accommodating to his legacy. For Haar and fellow critics such as Lothar Machtan or Clarence Pate, a main impulse for study has been impressive archival research and the discovery of previously overlooked texts. They embed their interpretations of Rothfels' texts firmly within a scaffolding of new archival research into the associational life of their subject.[19] It does much to clarify the politics behind ambiguous readings and brings coherence to works that may otherwise appear inconsistent.

Thus Haar and Machtan have emphasized how Rothfels' participation in center of the neo-conservative groups such as the *Deutscher Herrenklub* indicate his readiness to subvert the Weimar Republic, even by 1925.[20] Proof is given through his proximity to the *Ring* movement and with politicians of the right wing of the German Nationalist Party, the DNVP, as well as his attacks against any government (saying that "parliamentary government und unity is fictions") that compromised with Western democracies. Yet while claiming that Rothfels, coincident with conservatives in 1932–33, accepted an accommodation with the Nazi party in support for a wider conservative order, Haar in particular refuses to label Rothfels explicitly "fascist" or "Nazi." He prefers instead that his "model of opposition against parliamentary democracy" was based on an "idealized conception of the Bismarckian state."[21] Was Rothfels a radical *Volkshistoriker* of foreign policy and a Hindenburg elitist at home? Haar does not quite reconcile these positions, or whether one view outweighed the other.

New research reveals that Rothfels privately greeted the rise of the NSDAP with approval and in fact voted for Adolf Hitler during the presidential race of 1932.[22] As empirical findings tend to pose Rothfels closer to National Socialism in his ideas and actions, the controversial critique of Karl Heinz Roth takes on new weight. During the early phase of the revisionist archival research, Roth attempted to unify Rothfels' views around a rubric of "fascist

viewpoints" in order to explain his support for early Nazi goals to destroy parliamentary government and re-order Europe.[23] Roth firmly declares that Rothfels followed Prussian factions of fascism, embodied by Franz von Papen, which sought to resurrect a "hierarchical, authoritarian state system" comprising the old military class, lingering Junkers, an authoritarian bureaucracy, and the conservative Protestant clergy, all through a tactical compromise with Nazi leadership.[24]

Although Rothfels was marginalized eventually due to his Jewish ancestry, Roth concludes that he also would have met the same eventual isolation of like-minded fascists in any case, such as his supporter the Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, once the Nazi leadership radicalized the state after 1935 with its "political-terrorist dynamic."[25] Roth accepts that Rothfels viewed Nazi domestic programs with more skepticism after 1933. But he is less impressed by the Königsberg historian's longing for Bismarckian-agrarian corporate state than for his alleged fascist combinations of "absolute state intervention" with "a *völkisch* power system." Central to Roth's argument is a model of fascism as a popular movement of social unity that exploited *völkisch* irredentism for an expansionary foreign policy—a definition however that also can apply to segments of neo-conservative politics that did not equate to National Socialism. His argument truly is as much about the nature of German fascism as about Rothfels himself.

Commentators on the revisionists have suggested a danger of reducing either individual subjects or a specific research field to slogans.[26] Roth and Haar in the end associate Rothfels with fascism or neo-conservative accommodation, without labeling him a "Nazi scholar."[27] Critics nevertheless have focused on this gray area with more generous estimations of Rothfels' politics and intellectual achievement. Heinrich August Winkler and Wolfgang Neugebauer voiced this position most clearly at the IfZ conference, against the backdrop of some wider concerns about inaccurate assertions by the main revisionists.[28]

Neugebauer finds that although Rothfels adopted *völkisch* overtones after 1931, the core of his actual writing remained oriented towards state that rejected outright racist conceptions of Social Darwinism. He presents Rothfels' vague ideas for "re-ordering" Eastern Europe under a Germanocentric federal system as akin to a "typology of spatial zonal model" akin that which governed the Habsburg Empire. Associations of Rothfels with Nazi eastern designs are only "another variant of combative one-sidedness," because his relative privileging of Germanic populations beyond the Oder-Warta canal rejected any subjugation of the region's ethnic diversity.[29]

While admitting Rothfels' anti-Western bent, Neugebauer and other eastern specialists tend to bestow Rothfels with political moderation and intellectual

innovation, and thus cannot be associated with fascism or sponsorship of the Hitler regime.[30] And if Rothfels supported treaty revision and the re-emergence of German power in the East, this attitude engulfed the public spectrum too.[31] Winkler continues this rationale of relative contextualization, concluding that Rothfels' distrust of parliamentary politics was within both mainstream German conservatism and a widespread public rejection of *Reichstag* politics by 1930.[32] Rothfels instead is held to have preferred a bureaucratic-authoritarian *Rechtsstaat* that would not inhibit basic (if limited) legal-constitutional protections for individual citizens, including Jews, the working class, and non-Germanic ethnicities.

How does the biography of Rothfels navigate these differences? Jan Eckel offers an intellectual history that interprets Rothfels' texts through "interpretative operations" that are guided by the predominant political *Habitus,* which define phases of his subject's life.[33] Because Rothfels integrated his political ideology into his practice of contemporary history, analyzing his texts within their disciplinary milieu can reflect his ideas within mainstream German historiography from the imperial era to the mature Federal Republic.

Rothfels' intellectual conservatism mirrored basic socio-political characteristics of middle-class academia: from a war veteran suspicious of a crisis-ridden Republic, to the radicalization of politics and the years of Nazi trauma, to the conservative reconstruction of Adenauer-era Germany, and the final acceptance of modern democracy by the late 1960s.[34] As with Karl Heinz Roth, Eckel sees an ideological continuity across these life phases. But whereas Roth explains the turns of radicalization and moderation largely through Rothfels' conservatism, Eckel finds a protean strategy that identified historiography with the defense of the German nation-state against threats domestic and foreign. He reads the nationalism of Rothfels through a cyclical belief of historical catastrophe and rejuvenation, founded on hazy geopolitical ideals of European stability under an authoritarian *Ständestaat*. This national loyalty could both contest and support the specific government of an era.

Rothfels battled democratic organs, such as the Historical Commission on the State Archives, even while he affirmed government policies of eastern revision and academic propaganda supporting it. He could both oppose National Socialism and accept its program of revitalizing a right-wing society and achieving renewed state power. After the Holocaust, Rothfels could return dutifully to Germany, because this national service was now fused to a NATO alliance, unified by Soviet containment and the potential recovery of central-western Europe. Thus Rothfels could fashion himself as a sentinel of German nationalism and an academic "bridge" to America.[35]

According to Eckel, Rothfels saw in *Volksgeschichte* a potential for national renewal in an interwar homeland besieged by Soviet communism and

Allied encirclement. Resentment against domestic racism and social violence did not inhibit him from appreciating goals of the NSDAP to destroy representative democracy, cement social unity from above, and overcome the Versailles settlement.[36] But if Rothfels first viewed the Hindenburg-Hitler government as a stabilizing coalition that could regenerate the "Ideas of 1914," Eckel hesitates to cast him within a fascist-Nazi order.[37] For Eckel, Rothfels' attitude was a temporary illusion, ended by the April boycott of 1933. Attempts thereafter to reconcile his status with the state bureaucracy reflected a durable national loyalty and a practical survival strategy, rather than a personal affiliation with the principles of the regime. Eckel thus refuses to extrapolate Rothfels' chauvinistic writings to more threatening racial initiatives among his colleagues later in the war. One must still ask, however, that as few scholars who formed the eventual Nazi planning exerts were outspoken Social Darwinists before 1935, can Rothfels' reservations about ethnic cleansing up to his removal so easily exonerate his own personal radicalization?[38] Aside from the ideological limits of Rothfels' nationalism, it is also important to understand that Nazi authorities desired a relative agreement from conservative scholars in order to secure general public support and tactical collaboration on particular issues.

Another concern with Eckel's method is his concentric overlay between Rothfels' inclinations and the amorphous evolution of the German political right. By framing the biography through key aspects of German national chronology, he tends to restrict the attitudes that shaped Rothfels' worldview only to those texts that seem pertinent to the selected factors. His emphasis on nationality debates as a secular interwar argument bring little insight into the role of Protestantism in Rothfels' life, or his relationship with the family's Jewish heritage across his religious conversion, the interwar radicalization of his national prejudice, and his exile.

Such issues must have influenced his view of German history after 1945, given the persecution suffered by close relatives, his change to American citizenship, and especially the impact of the Holocaust. In terms of the development of Rothfels' historiography, Eckel's understandable interest in *Ostforschung* or *Zeitgeschichte* diminishes the institutional importance of his English-oriented history at Berlin during the 1920s, both in terms of its international reception and how it prepared him conceptually for the new potentialities at Königsberg. Thus Eckel ignores his coordination in East Prussia of wider "foreign studies" aside from the East, and there is no indication about how this entire spectrum of research established conditions for his eventual emigration. A hermetic phasing of Rothfels' career, while conceptually powerful in aspects, does not explain how each section created institutional and mental linkages to a successive change of environment or thought.

Can the existing research resolve differences among the varied revisionists and their opponents? Rothfels certainly poses difficulties of interpretation.[39] His private correspondence during the interwar years, particularly his exchanges with Siegfried August Kaehler, suggests strong attitudes about national citizenship and racist thought.[40] But these expressions did not always accord with the content of his major publications. Aside from admissions about his regard for the NSDAP, private letters shed incomplete light on assumptions that drove his *Volkstumskämpfe* in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. His publications, written for the political present, took the form of documentary annotation, free essays, or book reviews that addressed complex ideas with often superficial content.[41] These unsystematic analyses, though united in a goal to overturn the Versailles settlement, are riddled with inconsistent language and murky concepts such as "federalism" and "bridges to the east."[42] Thus there were different faces of Rothfels, depending on one's selection. The Berlin publications (1920–1926) were conservative, traditional studies in the Rankean tradition, as was the thrust of most of his writings about Bismarck.[43] A contrasting, more ominous *völkisch* voice emerges on nationality questions in the Baltic States, the "Donau region," and Prussia-Poland. There plasticity is perhaps most evident among supposedly neutral American historians, who quoted Rothfels in his defense or with criticism in dissertations that devoted to German interests in the East and the *Auslandsdeutschtum*.[44]

The critical context of Rothfels' writings was the congruity between early Nazi foreign policy and his call for non-violent revision of the Versailles settlement, combined with a *völkisch* cultural campaign directed at eastern German communities.[45] Rothfels never expressed sympathy for a domestic terror apparatus, and he did not share the belief of radical historians such as Erich Keyser that the German Volk must expand or die.[46] Although close to neo-conservative circles, it is difficult to label him a catalyst for a paradigmatic "tipping point" from a democratic, state-centered tradition to Nazi-*völkisch* scholarship. Georg Iggers has emphasized that paradigmatic distinctions between "Nazi" and traditional German historiography can at times assume a problematic gap regarding political-militaristic ideals.[47] How many *Vernunftrepublikaner* and socialists longed for a domestic "people's community" and a "common home" for Germans scattered abroad?[48]

As one example, Hermann Oncken and his students supported a German-Austrian *Anschluss* with comparable *völkisch* rhetoric, which pursued domestic political unity and an ill-defined union of *Deutschtum* across former borders of the Wilhelmine Empire.[49] Neugebauer and Eckel show that Rothfels' appointment to Königsberg was due to the support of his predecessor there, the historians and ministry-referent Wolfgang Windelband, as well as

the Prussian education ministry. He was appointed ultimately under the purview of the liberal republican minister Carl Heinrich Becker, whose national-romantic conceptions of historiography were not necessarily incompatible with Rothfels' conflation of patriotism and research.[50]

Rothfels' dubious interwar publications were composed in full cooperation with such national-liberal Weimar figures as Karl Brandi, Robert Holtzmann, and Otto Hoetzsch, whom the Nazis also eventually marginalized.[51] At the 1938 conference of the ICHS in Zurich, his benefactors were hardly an ideological monochrome, including G. Ritter, H. Srbik, K. Brandi, S. A. Kähler, P. Schramm, G. Rein and the Danish historian Aage Friis.[52] There were personal tensions too. Meinecke did not write Rothfels' recommendation letters for his American emigration.[53] But he did not disavow him either, as he personally carried the initial letters from Rothfels to Harvard historians for the Tercentenary of 1936 and he spoke to colleagues there on his behalf.[54] Finally, a significant number of conservative German historians who fell victim to racial laws in the 1930s offered a comparable degree of support for the early Nazi regime: Hans Herzfeld, Felix Jacoby, Arnold Bergstraesser, Richard Laqueur, Arnold Berney, Werner Jaeger and the sociologist Rudolf Heberle to name a few.

But how intense was Rothfels' embrace of *Volksgeschichte*, and what was its international context? The current emphasis rests on the domestic context for his blend of national-liberal and *völkisch* history, based especially on the keynote lecture on Bismarck and eastern nationalities at the *Historikertag* of 1932. Rothfels, however, had framed perhaps his most virulent attack on Polish sovereignty at least one year earlier, in a propaganda book far more radical than the well-known anthology *Deutschland und Polen*, which appeared under the direction of Albert Brackmann only in 1934.[55] In 1931, Rothfels published the opening essay in an outlandish English-German volume, *The Rent in the East*/*Der Riss im Osten*, edited by the Prussian publisher Ernst-Friedrich Werner-Rades.[56]

This collection assembled a phalanx of Prussian public servants, mayors, archivists, curators, and historians—including Walter Recke of Danzig and Friedrich Andreae of Breslau. It aimed at undermining the international legitimacy of the Polish national border before a British-American audience. Woven among the thirty-two essays were dozens of impressive propaganda photographs of Germanic bearers of culture, plus a score of striking black-red maps that laid out the threat of Polish barbarism against the civilized redoubt of Eastern Prussia.[57] In brazen anti-Polish rhetoric, Rothfels argued that the German "heartland" between the Elbe and Memel was the historical "barrier against the eastern barbarians." This colonial achievement, comparable to Canada for the west Europeans, stood in stark contrast to "barbaric methods

of administration and unjustifiable arbitrariness" of the Allies at Versailles. Rothfels quoted from Frederick the Great to assert how the "general circulation of life blood" in the regions was lost to the new Poland, because "the land, which had yielded a (German) Copernicus, must not be left to rot (*versumpfen*) under barbarians." Drawing perhaps on his own biographical experience, Rothfels concluded that defeat in 1918 had only awakened "destructive European greediness." These had sheared the healthy "nerves and arteries" of Prussia, leaving observers of the German east to stare "from all sides on the future disaster of bloody amputation stumps." This kind of language, applied further in its publishing context, suggests doubt on categorizing his Weimar-era historiography as merely statist. Indeed, he felt comfortable enough with strident *Volksgeschichte* to present it before an American audience, which he would join as a fellow professor within a short decade.

Is there a way to distinguish between National Socialism and a vengeful, energetic, yet undirected political conservatism? If support of Hitler equates to the destruction of Weimar representative bodies or the undercurrent of nationalist revanchism that supported the regime before 1938, then the neoconservative designs of Rothfels indeed helped reinforce the party's popular legitimacy. If National Socialism is understood as a more radical program that pursued Lebensraum through warfare, resettlement, and genocide, it is difficult to charge these goals to his interwar writings, even with their *völkisch* strains. However, Rothfels helped nurture a wider penumbra of chauvinistic and racist historiography throughout university seminars that empowered the later direction of individual scholars, research institutions, and bureaucratic "brain trusts" of the SS that supported Nazi extermination policies. The discussion thus underscores how nationalist cultural expansion, expressed through *völkisch* antipathy for eastern nation states and protective claims for *Auslandsdeutsche*, laid intellectual cornerstones for genocide and ethnic cleansing.[58]

These debates generate the second key issue of German *Zeitgeschichte*, Rothfels' influence over this field, and the ability of Germans to come to terms with National Socialism after 1945. Did *Zeitgeschichte* truly modernize and democratize postwar research? The question is posed in the context of a "path of continuity" among German historians from 1933 to 1945. As universities emerged after the war with scholars compromised from the Nazi era, there was little general basis for an open assessment of war crimes as a component of German national history, and thus meager readiness for acknowledging popular responsibility for the recent past.[59] For decades, critics of conservative historiography in West Germany, in recognizing the limited possibilities of disciplinary reform before the 1960s, have praised Rothfels and his collaboration with the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* as a vital advocate

for open-minded research on National Socialism.[60] This positive view has always been challenged too. Rothfels' return to Germany prompted suspicion among Holocaust historians, such as the American Lucy Dawidowicz, who argued that Rothfels sabotaged an honest appraisal of the Shoah through his influence across publications and research organizations in Germany.[61]

More recently, Matthias Beer, Robert G. Moeller, and Astrid Eckert show the role of Rothfels during the 1950s in the policing of state documentation projects that emphasized the victimization of German citizens under Hitler and Stalin, as a gloss over national attention to public culpability with Nazi war policies.[62] And Matthias Beer used the Rothfels conference in 2003 to demonstrate that *Zeitgeschichte* developed energetically throughout the entire twentieth century, driven by eclectic interests among historians and state officials with contemporaneous national crisis. He recognizes the importance of Rothfels' direction of *Zeitgeschichte* after 1945 towards the new experience of the mid-century catastrophe, without surrendering a positive overall regard for earlier political traditions.[63] However, his concentration on the field's genealogy implicitly diminishes assertions of Rothfels as an indispensable father figure of an unpopular subject for post-war German society.

The most prominent recent critics of Rothfels and *Zeitgeschichte* have been Karl Heinz Roth and Nicolas Berg. They argue that Rothfels used the field to mask "reactionary apologetics" behind present-minded scholarship. His status as a respected reemigrant only helped to shield the Federal Republic from an independent confrontation with its Nazi past.[64] Berg especially expands his attack on Rothfels to include the entire *Zeitgeschichte* project, claiming that Rothfels and the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* acted as a brake against a democratization of German historical practice and a critical reckoning with the Holocaust.[65] Though *Zeitgeschichte* appeared on the surface to depart from Nazi-era research, as a co-editor of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and an influential advisor to the Institut, Rothfels used his authority to drain the studies from real Jewish suffering. As a defensive orientation toward the past, Rothfels worked tirelessly to glorify "resistance" to Hitler by conservatives within the army, church, and bureaucracy.[66] Berg thus considers Rothfels especially dangerous to Jewish survivors who wanted a public memory of the Holocaust as a German experience. He led the failure of historians to acknowledge the era's true victims by limiting criminal responsibility to a few handfuls of deceased Nazi leaders.

Reactions to the accusations of Berg have been critical, although the contributions in an Internet Forum and the aforementioned Hürter-Woller anthology have been more mixed.[67] Sympathizing with the general direction of Roth and Berg, Christoph Cornelissen has proposed that "an exception of surviving" guided the experience, concepts, and politics of Rothfels and

Gerhard Ritter in their treatment of the resistance against Hitler.[68] Both were students of Oncken profoundly affected by attacks from Nazi authorities: Rothfels due to racial laws, Ritter due to his relative opposition to the regime. After the war they sought to construct a narrative of the July plot that opposed National Socialist totalitarianism, considered as a wider "crisis of modern mass society," to the eternal universal morals of civic honor.[69] These existential values, personified by the conservative opposition, represented the true German nation. It could be resurrected for a historical heritage free of association with the Holocaust. Cornelissen basically agrees with Eckel that Rothfels considered his book, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, as a defense of national culture. As a political counter-narrative, it preempted critical historiography of Anglo-American historians and democratically minded émigrés who considered National Socialism to be a culmination of German militarism and authoritarian heritage.[70]

Eckel in turn frames Rothfels' return to Tübingen as a defense of German national culture within the wider political evolution of the Federal Republic. On the one hand, Rothfels presented himself as a transatlantic and independent academic who stood above national scholarship of either "a German or an Anglo-Saxon variety."[71] Politically, he accepted the "Westernization" of the Federal Republic and the surrender of great power status, although only in the 1960s did he truly reconcile with representative democracy.[72] Yet as Eckel shows, Rothfels continued to idealize an "endangered Germany" into the 1960s, which explains both his sometimes-strident anti-communism and his disavowal of historiography that emphasized popular German responsibility for National Socialism and the century's two world wars. He thus presented *Zeitgeschichte* as an integral part of the early Cold War, bounded by the communist revolution of 1917 and the rise of Hitler and world war. Forthright attention to the Holocaust was a diversion from a more basic pursuit of national unification, socio-economic recovery, and security against the Soviet bloc. Now state-oriented "Rankean" perspectives returned from his earlier Berlin years, which justified his alleged distance from Nazi racial thought, while offering ethical lessons to inoculate the German population against empty mass consumerism and the radicalism of the far political left or right.[73]

The strongest defender of Rothfels and postwar *Zeitgeschichte* has been Hermann Graml in the aforementioned colloquia. He summarized that Rothfels considered Zeitgeschichte as an "instrument of historical-political enlightenment and the restoration of humanism in Germany."[74] Graml's criticisms of the revisionists have resonated with numerous scholars, from both a relative traditional and liberal background. These faults include a misreading by Roth of scholarship not affiliated with Rothfels and the Institut, insufficient historical context by Berg for the postwar period, a questionable

selectivity of texts that ignores Rothfels' real contributions to Holocaust awareness, and simplistic dismissal of innovative work by pioneers such as Martin Broszat, Hans Buchheim, and "functionalist" historians such as Hans Mommsen.[75] Rothfels' promotion of the German national-conservative resistance to Hitler was natural public need to find a respectable "alternative" Germany on which to build a future.[76] Graml also contends that contemporary criticism, most notably from George W. F. Hallgarten, which accused Rothfels of ideological censorship in the *Vierteljahrshefte*, must not be taken at face value. Former students have also pointed to Rothfels' personal leadership to reorient German scholarship through pluralistic graduate training, both in America and the Federal Republic. Rothfels is honored for supporting the publication of material on the Holocaust and of articles critical of postwar apologetic historiography, especially the exoneration of Hitler's foreign policy by David Leslie Hoggan.[77]

There is some supporting evidence to defend the postwar *Zeitgeschichte*, within its national limitations. He undoubtedly used the *Vierteljahrshefte* and other venues for declarations that modified former ideas of Prussian-German cultural superiority into Cold War conceptions of Germany as a national "outpost" against threatening Soviet expansion.[78] But he also joined other colleagues in seeking foreign historians to contribute to their journals and to assist in domestic research, even if they brandished critical interpretations of German history.[79] Under his direction, the *Vierteljahrshefte* regularly published essays from American (and domestic) critics of German conservatism, and published notices of Western centers for Holocaust research (YIVO, Wiener Library) and reports on Nazi genocide and resettlement policies.[80]

Rothfels maintained a professional distance from the right-wing revisionism of G. A. Rein and his Ranke-Gesellschaft, which competed with his *Vierteljahrshefte*.[81] Although Rothfels' may not have been the purely "*platonische*" editor that he claimed, existing documents as an example cannot prove that Hallgarten was denied publication based on political factors.[82] Even if German reviews preferred to confront the past on their terms, *Zeitgeschichte* becomes less monochrome than Berg allows when we examine the contributions of postwar journals, such as *Die Wandlung, Merkur,* or *Die Welt als Geschichte*, all of which were forums for more critical historical discussion.[83]

Within these important points, however, lies an important caveat. Rothfels greeted critical research on National Socialism or its antecedents on the grounds of formal state agents, such as SS officials. It is not so much that Rothfels sought to silence debate on the Holocaust, as much as he—and his general profession—left non-addressed questions of civil society and racism. Sensitive government documents were exposed for debate, thus making

postwar history legitimate in the eyes of Western counterparts. But while encouraging international respect, these studies immunized the German body politic from uncomfortable concerns about public support for the atrocities of National Socialism.[84]

If Rothfels became a more moderate guardian of German nationalism after the war, the striking language of his writings merits more attention than the recent studies offer. Reflecting a more pronounced public religiosity after his emigration, Rothfels wove tropes of Christian humanity throughout his articles on nationalism, Bismarck, and the German opposition. His admiration for Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in parallel with similar attitudes of Germans aligned with the Confessing Church, provided an ethical platform for prioritizing the persecution of Christian churches or individuals by the NSDAP over that of Jews, Slavs, or other "a-socials."[85] Ideals of Christian individual autonomy, which were widely shared by other German refugee scholars, allowed Rothfels to critique the democratic "Age of Materialism" after his emigration without leaving telltale *völkisch* fingerprints.[86] The eschatological strain of his arguments also reinforced claims that criticism of the "true Germany" either questioned the moral integrity of the Federal Republic—and the Western betrayal of an "ethical and spiritual revolt against evil"—or merely echoed illegitimate communist propaganda.[87] Indeed, Rothfels continued to present these arguments explicitly to American audiences as a means of reinforcing the national duty of the Adenauer government to a unified "Western front."[88] In this manner, victims of National Socialism became objects for the national conscience—not to be forgotten, but mastered as a moral problem by Germans in their capacity as respectable members of the Christian West. This placed severe limits on his capacity for post-war disciplinary reform, particularly in his association with former Nazi *Ostforscher*, who could associate their professional continuity with a similar defense of "Western" goals.

The emphasis on a linkage between Rothfels' post-war conservatism and a unified West highlights the issue of the United States and American historians, where, unfortunately, present scholarship is weakest. In part, this is a difficulty faced by German scholars with foreign sources.[89] But a more basic conceptual inconsistency lies with application of Rothfels' life phases and his role as a transatlantic bridge of historiography. Historians have studied Rothfels' texts within a "schema of thought" that adjusted to the changing contexts of his professional and political milieu. For Roth and Eckel, this *habitus* provides the chronological-conceptual phases from which to chart the pendulum swings of Rothfels' ideological shifts and professional influence. Excepting Peter Walther, treatments of his American career collapse into a reading of principle texts or available archival materials in Germany proper. And none of the works reviewed here bring attention to Rothfels as a teacher

in America, to his personal and institutional affiliations there, or to how ideas of citizenship changed with his new adopted country.

The current scholarship thus displaces Rothfels from the values of his foreign professional environment. It leaves unexamined both his academic success and the critical relationship between German historical practice and its western counterparts. Christoph Cornelissen, for example, emphasizes that Rothfels was an opponent of Anglo-American historiography, without however explaining how he could garner American support for projects such as the VfZ, if English and French speaking scholars were cool to his nationalist viewpoints.

There is indeed little interest in how American specialists in fact argued key European problems addressed by Rothfels.[90] Thus, neither Eckel nor Peter Walther explain why America's most prestigious historians would welcome him in 1940 or 1946, if his scholastic wares represented values that were theoretically antithetical to American democratic ideals or European cultural diversity. Instead, the present studies circumvent the problems, concluding that Rothfels never required the support of his American peers and lived apart from the profession in which he thrived.[91] His flight to Britain is explained as a conspiracy of conservative appeasers (ignoring mainstream liberal supporters such as G. P. Gooch and A. Pollard). American motives for securing and retaining him at Brown University are ignored. His call to a full professorship at Chicago is laid at the sole responsibility of the University Chancellor, without explaining how an entire history department could remain silent on the replacement of its most prestigious chair in European history.[92] The claims are problematic, as archives contain a wealth of evidence for his widespread friendships among his American peers. But his alleged isolation is even more difficult to reconcile with claims that he completed his ideological de-radicalization in America, based on a redemptive environment that broadened his intellectual horizons.[93] How was Rothfels both isolated within a community and yet modified by experience with it?

These paradoxes can only be explained by treating the American milieu on its own analytical terms and by understanding Rothfels' relationship to the "West" throughout the entirety of his career. Rothfels made continued efforts between the wars to engage with Anglo-American historians, as a means of enhancing German national interests through academic exchange. He assisted liberal historians such as Eugene Anderson (a friend of Eckart Kehr); he participated in the English Rhodes exchange program at Königsberg; and he solicited assistance for support from centers such as the Rockefeller Social Science fellowship.[94] On arriving in America, Rothfels was fully engaged in American academic culture. Contacts were well maintained with émigré historians: article solicitations from W. Gurian at Notre Dame; exchanges with F. Epstein and

D. Gerhard about job placements and German affairs; asking Ernst Kantorowicz for assistance to aid Percy Schramm in circumventing his denazification removal at Göttingen; and collaborating with Hajo Holborn in the direction of Rothfels' first American doctoral student, Lysbeth Muncy of Brown.[95] In return, his émigré colleagues used private channels to promote the publication of his works and to shield him from damaging historical criticism.[96]

Throughout his active career, except perhaps Otto Pflanze, the only significant academic challenge to prompt Rothfels into open debate came well after his retirement from Chicago and Tübingen, from the émigré historian Henry Pachter.[97] Otherwise, American-born historians praised his interwar work. William Langer shared his adulation of German state interests and Bismarck's conservative statesmanship.[98] Even in 1939, Eckart Kehr's former friend, Walter Dorn of Ohio State University, considered Rothfels "an academic dinosaur in an age of pygmies," based in part on a mutual historical admiration for Frederick the Great and corporatist theories of Otto Hintze.[99] Postwar historians would continue to defend his reputation against Kehr's posthumous accusations.[100] Rothfels' academic success rested on a coalition of American professors who admired his writings that privileged the achievement of German high culture and sympathized with a "proper" status of German heritage in Eastern Europe.

Rothfels in turn considered the United States at two levels. Before his emigration, he granted unusual respect for American works, even those written from a liberal point of view.[101] When regarding the interwar American state and society, however, he sided with associates such as Carl Schmitt and the historian Gustav A. Rein, who considered liberal democracy as a front for imperial expansion and a long-term threat to Germany's own European interests.[102] Only after his emigration would Rothfels alter his view. Not only did he vigorously defend his American citizenship and professorship at Chicago, he also privately appreciated his family "becoming spoiled Americans" and voiced repeated concerns that the postwar German faculties were "galvanizing old habits and the institutions which I had thought had gone already in the 1920s."[103] Rothfels' use of internationalism as academic manipulation for nationalist interests explains the dynamism of his English publications well into the 1960s, as well as the appearance for over three decades of translated propaganda volumes from Germany.

For this campaign to succeed, the professional legitimacy of Germans in the eyes of foreign counterparts was necessary. After 1945, Rothfels and his German countrymen required some coordination with similar-minded American scholars and publishing firms. Plentiful academic outlets existed in the form of *Measure* (the University of Chicago), the conservative review *The Modern Age*, Waldemar Gurian's *Review of Politics* (Notre Dame), *Confluence* under

Henry Kissinger at Harvard, and the *American Perspective*, a publication of the right-wing Foundation of Foreign Affairs. Although Rothfels had ties to all of these sites, the most central collaborator was the publishing company of Henry Regnery. The publisher of *The German Opposition to Hitler* was a conservative germanophile and ardent anti-communist with independent wealth and impressive connections with the University of Chicago.[104] Conceived originally as a pamphlet by Rothfels, Regnery asked for its expansion into a book as a more permanent counter to negative Western perceptions of German traditions.[105] Their cooperation however was not unlimited. Regnery failed to convince Rothfels to write a short history of modern Germany in English, aimed as a counter to the critical textbooks that began to emerge by 1955. In turn he refused Rothfels' request to publish an anthology of his Bismarck speeches, considering them too arcane for his public market. However, when he learned that Rothfels planned a second German edition of his *German Opposition* in 1961, Regnery agreed to publish a revised English version "as a sort of antidote to the Eichmann trial" and to counteract the popularization of German collective guilt through William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*.[106]

Within this conservative network, Rothfels was an attractive figure because his ideological arguments could be applied against the secular culture of the welfare state without being darkened by the untenable radicalism of the extreme right. Such promotion however could backfire when ideological colors came into full view, as exemplified by David Hoggan. Powerful American historians had supported Hoggan's career from his Harvard graduation in 1948, and Regnery worked for years to publish his revised thesis on the diplomatic origins of the Second World War.[107] As Hoggan expanded his original accusation of Anglo-Polish responsibility for the outbreak of war into a full apologia for Adolf Hitler, supporters turned into worried detractors.[108] Hoggan became a liability, because he refused to defend German nationalism behind a more careful Burkean gloss. Rothfels' value to Americans was to defend the German conservative tradition with academic credibility so that "fanatics should accuse his admirable presentation of the facts as being influenced by bias."[109] Explaining to Rothfels why he had finally abandoned Hoggan, Regnery demanded that a "publication of this book in this country would be extremely unfortunate and can only benefit the most irresponsible of the professional anti-German group."[110] Political housecleaning also necessitated the saving of personal reputations. By 1962, Langer was disingenuously disavowing his ties to Hoggan in public print and private circulars. Thus American conservatives worked with Rothfels to neutralize *Der erzwungene Krieg* in 1961 when its appearance coincided with the American reissue of *The German Opposition*.[111]

Both sides believed that more seductive pens were needed to preserve the legitimacy of conservative historiography.

The strategy of conservative internationalism demonstrated by Rothfels suggests the difficulty with situating his career within clean paradigms, either as a fascist or *Vernunftrepublikaner*. Both perspectives tend to de-emphasize the real continuities between the consensual nationalism within the Weimar coalition, and the Slavic racism that permeated it, with the early phases of National Socialism. Rothfels in his interwar writing and institutional affiliation represented an aggressive, if ill-defined, momentum within Germany to unleash the nation from postwar European structures and to end domestic political division.[112] Recent research has certainly succeeded in defining Rothfels within these currents of the German right. But there has perhaps been less clarity about whether his Königsberg activities enjoyed academic consensus within the university until 1933. More attention is also needed to understand how his project related to the strategic imperatives of the Reich and Prussian bureaucracies, especially in regards to his steady turn to *völkisch* concepts. Merely to conclude that Rothfels strove to defend the threatened nation does not define how the Republic wanted its interests defended. And although German historians have turned some attention to his exile experience, they have not explained why English-speaking scholars welcomed him, or how they reacted to his most dubious publications.

Nor should the question of Rothfels' relative "holding firm" come as a surprise to students of the Federal Republic.[113] As Ulrich Herbert has explained, the postwar generation moved toward democratic modernity along a consensual path of socio-political conservatism, which succeeded by uniting strands of domestic cultural traditions with a newfound international stability and respected acceptance.[114] To be sure, Tübingen was not Königsberg. An important difference in Rothfels after the 1930s was his acceptance of greater intellectual pluralism (with limits) of students and colleagues.[115] This pluralism nurtured, perhaps unintentionally, the democratic generation of the 1960s. But as this essay proposes, Rothfels must also be examined in a more critical international context from both shores of the Atlantic. His career throws shadows not only over matters of purely national history, but the problematic compromises from agents west of the Rhine to West Germany's civic democratization and the continuity of values from the interwar years. A strategic figure in German historiography, Rothfels is also a lens for appreciating how the German experience was embedded within the wider Western struggle with nationalism, cultural essentialism, and a reactionary backlash against mass social democracy within the very heart of the modern historical discipline.

NOTES

1. Rudolf Jaworski and Hans-Christian Petersen, "Biographische Aspekte der 'Ostforschung.' Überlegungen zu Forschungsstand und Methodik," *Bios*, 15 (2002), 47–62. Examples include Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998). Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt-Main: Campus, 2000); Thomas Etzemüller, *Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte: Werner Conze und die Neuorientierung der westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (München: Oldenbourg, 2001); Alexander Pinwinkler, *Wilhelm Winkler (1884–1984): Eine Biographie. Zur Geschichte der Statistik und Demographie in Österreich und Deutschland* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003); Eduard Mühle, *Für Volk und deutschen Osten. Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005). An earlier version of this essay was published under the tile: "Hans Rothfels: Issues and Paradoxes of an International Debate." *Sozial.Geschichte: Zeitschrift für historische Analyse des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts*, 22 (2007), No. 1, 7–39.

2. For an inside account of Rothfels' removal, see the account by Ernst Posner in the long (35 pp.) travel memoir of the historian Eugene Anderson, August 30, 1937, in: Box 1, Eugene N. Anderson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California Los Angeles. Posner declared that Rothfels' early removal was due to his popularity with students, and false promises of research work in Berlin. Anderson recounted "As one Nazi authority said recently, first we have eliminated all Jews, now we are eliminating all those partly Jewish in blood, then we shall eliminate all those who have studied under the Jews."

3. Klemens von Klemperer, "Hans Rothfels, 1891–1976," *Central European History*, 9 (1976), 381; Helmut Hirsch, "Zum Tod des Historikers Hans Rothfels," *Rheinischer Merkur*, July 16, 1976.

4. For positions of this debate, see the Rothfels Forum of 2003 in H Soz und Kult, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/id=281&type=diskussionen.

5. Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller (eds.), *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte* (München: Oldenbourg, 2003) (hereafter cited as *Zeitgeschichte*).

6. Among the colloquia were the coterminous sessions, Der Historiker Hans Rothfels (1891–1976): Ein "Wanderer zwischen den Welten"? Workshop at the Centre Marc Bloch, Deutsch-französisches Forschungszentrum für Sozialwissenschaften, Berlin, June 15, 2003 and later Hans Rothfels in *Tübingen: Ein Gespräch über die Grundlegung der deutschen Zeitgeschichte*, Tübingen, January 30, 2006.

7. Jan Eckel, *Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005).

8. Hans Mommsen, "Hans Rothfels," Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker*, Vol. 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 127–47; Klemens von Klemperer and Douglas Unfug, "Hans Rothfels (1891–1976)," Hartmut Lehmann and James Van Horn Melton (eds.), *Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 120–54; Ernst Schulin, "Weltkriegserfahrung und Historikerreaktion," Wolfgang Küttler et al. (eds.), *Geschichtsdiskurs*, Vol. 4: *Krisenbewusstein, Katastrophenerfah-*

rungen und Innovationen 1880–1945 (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1997), 174–78.

9. For the first designation of Rothfels as a radical-conservative teacher at Königsberg, including the SA-NSDAP membership of Theodor Schieder and Peter Rassow, see Julius Mader, "Zur Karriere profilierter Revanche-Professoren," *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 11 (1966), 187–89. Hans Mommsen summarized the conventional view by asserting that Rothfels' "neo-conservative leanings . . . never suppressed his predominantly historicist approach and his image of the historian as a trustee of historical tradition." See the entry for Rothfels by Mommsen in: Lucian Boia (ed.), *Great Historians of the Modern Age: An International Dictionary* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 308.

10. Ingo Haar, "Anpassung und Versuchung. Hans Rothfels und der Nationalsozialismus," *Zeitgeschichte*, 63–81. For the formation of the Rothfels-Gruppe at Königsberg, Haar, "'Revisionistische' Historiker und Jugendbewegung: Das Königsberger Beispiel, Peter Schöttler" (ed.), *Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1997), 28–165.

11. Haar, "Anpassung," 64–68.

12. Ingo Haar, "'Volksgeschichte' und Königsberger Milieu: Forschungsprogramme zwischen Weimarer Revisionspolitik und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungsplanung," Hartmut Lehmann and Otto von Oexle (eds.), *Nationalsozialismus in den Kulturwissenschaften*, Vol. 1: *Fächer-Milieus-Karrieren* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 169–209; David Feest, "Abgrenzung oder Assimilation: Überlungen zum Wandel der deutschbaltischen Ideologien 1918–1939 anhand der *Baltischen Monatsschrift*," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung*, 45 (1996), 509, 514–16; Idem, "'Schuld am Weltfrieden': Politische Kommentare und Deutungsversuche deutscher Historiker zum Versailler Vertrag 1919–1933," Gerd Krumeich (ed.), *Versailles 1919: Ziele, Wirkung, Wahrnehmung* (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2001), 256.

13. Peter Lambert, "German Historians and Nazi Ideology. The Parameters of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Problem of Historical Legitimation, 1930–1945," *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (1995), 555–82; Willi Oberkrome, *Volksgeschichte: Methodische Innovation und völkische Ideologisierung in der deutschen Geschichtswissenscahft 1918–1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (1993), 96–101; Ingo Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus: Deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft und der 'Volkstumskampf' im Osten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,, 2000), 14, 97–105, 362–65.

14. Thomas Etzemüller, "'Die Rothfelsianer': Zur Homologie von Wissenschaft und Politik," *Zeitgeschichte*, 121–31.

15. Wolfgang Wippermann, *Der Ordensstaat als Ideologie. Das Bild des Deutschen Ordens in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung und Publizistk* (Berlin: Colloquium-Verlag, 1979), 299–301; the apologetic context of Paul Sweet, "Recent German Literature on Mitteleuropa," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 3 (1943), 11–12; Henry Cord Meyer; *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815–1945* (The Hague: Mouton, 1955), 302–03; Oscar J. Hammen, "German Historians and the Advent of the National Socialist State," *Journal of Modern History*, 13 (1941), 163, 171, 183–86.

16. Aside from the important nuanced differences among scholars bound within the Rothfels Denkkollektiv, Etzemüller does not explain why some Königsberg historians (Rothfels, Friedrich Baethgen and Hans Koch) adhered to radicalizing temptations for re-ordering Eastern Europe, while others (Erich Caspar, Lothar Wickert, Martin Winkler) did not.

17. For the case of Conze, see Marco Wauker, "Volksgeschichte als moderne Sozialgeschichte? Werner Conze und die deutsche Ostforschung," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*, 52 (2003), 351–52; for Wittram, see Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Von Johannes Haller zu Reinhard Wittram: Deutschbaltische Historiker und der Nationalsozialismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 45 (1997), 21–46.

18. Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 32–39; Jörg Hackmann, "'Der Kampf um die Weichsel.' Die deutsche Ostforschung in Danzig von 1918–1945," *Zapiski Historczyne*, V58 (1993), 37–57; Gabriele Camphausen, *Die wissenschaftliche historische Russlandforschung im Dritten Reich 1933–1945* (Frankfurt-Main: Peter Lang, 1990), *passim*.

19. On the importance of this approach, see Axel Flügel, "Ambivalente Innovation. Anmerkungen zur Volksgeschichte," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 26 (2000), 655.

20. Lothar Machtan, "Hans Rothfels and the Historiography of Social Policy in Germany," *Storia della Storiografia*, 21 (1992), 3–24; Haar, "Anpassung und Versuchung," 64–68.

21. Ibid., 69–72.

22. See the letters of Rothfels to his confident Siegfried A. Kaehler of December 21, 1930 and of April, 1932, reprinted and cited respectively in: Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.), *Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler. Brief und Aufzeichnungen 1910–1977* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 36, 141–42. See also Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, 167 and 197 for his "illusions" about a personal security against Nazi anti-Semitism before and after 1933.

23. Karl Heinz Roth, "'Richtung halten': Hans Rothfels und die neo-konservative Geschichtsschreibung diesseits und jenseits des Atlantik, in: *Sozial.Geschichte*, Vol. 18 (2003), 53–54; cited hereafter from the reprint in: Mario Kessler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil (1933–1945): Ausgewählte Studien* (Berlin: Metropol-Verlag, 2005), 297–98.

24. Karl Heinz Roth, "Hans Rothfels: Geschichtspolitische Doktrinen im Wandel der Zeiten," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 49 (2001), 1067.

25. Roth, "Richtung halten," 277.

26. Hans Mommsen, "Der faustische Pakt der Ostforschung mit dem NS-Regime," Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1999), 271–72; Konrad H. Jarausch, "Unasked Questions: The Controversy about Nazi Collaboration among German Historians," Jeffrey M. Diefendorf (ed.), *Lessons and Legacies*, Volume VI: *New Currents in Holocaust Research* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004, 193; Wolfgang Mommsen, "'Gestürtze Denkmäler'? Die 'Fälle' Aubin, Conze, Erdmann und Schieder," Jürgen Elvert and Susanne Krauss (eds.), *Historische Debatten und Kontroversen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003), 97–98.

27. For a clear identification of "Nazi history," see the criteria of Hans Schleier, "German Historiography under National Socialism: Dreams of a Powerful Nation-State and German *Volkstum* Come True," Stefan Berger et al. (eds.), *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800* (London: Arnold, 1999), 178–81. Schleier defines Nazi historians according to adherence to a racial-*völkisch* theory of struggle, Reich, and Lebensraum; to lending historical justification for a single Führertum; leading an ideological mobilization of students; and rejected empiricism in lieu of Erleben cemented by an ethnicity of blood. He stresses that hardly any Nazi theorists or university professors adhered to all of these points, but that state authorities also did not expect them to support specific policy goals. The key for Schleier is not to exculpate professors from Nazi collaboration by reducing an understanding of its writings only to racism.

28. Eduard Mühle, "Ostforschung und Nationalsozialismus: Kritische Bemerkungen zur aktuellen Forschungsdiskussion," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*, 50 (2001), 264–65, and the debate between Haar and Winker, regarding research evidence and methodology, in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (cited hereafter as VfZ), 49 (2001), 643–52, and ibid., 50 (2002), 497–505, 635–50.

29. Wolfgang Neugebauer, "Hans Rothfels' Weg zur vergleichenden Geschichte Ostmitteleuropeas, besonders im Übergang von früher Neuzeit zur Moderne," *Berliner Jahrbuch für Osteuropäische Geschichte*, 1 (1996), 343–44, 350–51; Gert von Pistohlkors, "Images and Notions of Baltic German *Ostforschung* Concerning Baltic History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*," Journal of Baltic Studies*, 30 (1999), 310–14.

30. Wolfgang Neugebauer, "Hans Rothfels und Ostmitteleuropa," *Zeitgeschichte*, 44–46.

31. Karen Schönwalder demonstrates the ease with which former members of the DDP-DVP embraced Nazi foreign policies for eastern revisionism, in her *Historiker und Politik: Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt-Main: Campus, 1992), 39–45.

32. Heinrich A. Winkler, "Ein Historiker im Zeitalter der Extreme," *Zeitgeschichte*, 192–94.

33. Jan Eckel, "Geschichte als Gegenwartswissenschaft. Eine Skizze zur intellektuellen Biographie von Hans Rothfels," ibid., 17.

34. Eckel refers to Rothfels as a "central thermometer" of attitudes with the German historical academy in his *Hans Rothfels*, 27.

35. For example Rothfels, "The Life and Career of a German General," *To Remain Ready for Action: On the Occasion of the 70th Birthday of General Dr. Hans Speidel* (Cologne: Markus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1967), 7–20. On the role of the Cold War in the Verwestlichung of German historians see Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verloren Nation. Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 76–87, 239–40.

36. Ibid., 157–58, 181–82.

37. See especially Eckel, "Geschichte als Gegenwartswissenschaft," 26–27.

38. On this evolution from 1933 to the war, vgl. Willi Oberkrome, "Historiker im Dritten Reich," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, Vol. 50 (2000),

86–89; Alan E. Steinweis, "Antisemitic Scholarship in the Third Reich and the Case of Peter-Heinz Seraphim," Idem and D. Rogers (eds.), *The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy* (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2003), 68–80; Hans-Christian Petersen, "Ostforschung und Gebeitsansprüche. Die Legitimation territorialer Expansion im Werk von Peter-Heinz Seraphim," *Osteuropa*, 55 (2005), 125–35.

39. For the problem of "multiple readings" regarding Rothfels' political essays, Klemperer and Unfug, "Hans Rothfels," 143 and 146, and Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, 357.

40. Hans Rothfels, letter to Siegfried A. Kaehler, April 23, 1933, as quoted from: Werner Conze, "Hans Rothfels," *Historische Zeitschrift*, V237 (1983), 332.

41. His Habilitationsschrift *Bismarcks englische Bündnispolitik* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1924), 126; his main work *Bismarck und der Osten* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1934), 71, and his postwar book *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery, 1948), 166, were really extended essays.

42. See the rare piece of Clarence Pate, "The Historical Writing of Hans Rothfels and the Kriegsschuldfrage, 1924–1945," *The Montclair Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 3 (1974), 30–56.

43. Rothfels' developing attitudes towards problems, such as the foreign policy of Wilhelm II, also must be contextualized by interwar periods and by topic. Thus even Pate, as one of his severest critics, concluded that his call for a European Neuordnung aimed only to return Germany to its imperial borders. Clarence W. Pate, *The Historical Writings of Hans Rothfels from 1919 to 1945* (Ph.D. Thesis, SUNY at Buffalo, 1973), 85, 181; Lothar Gall, "Einleitung," Idem, *Das Bismarck-Problem in der Geschichtsschreibung nach 1945* (Köln and Berlin, 1971), 14–16.

44. See Anne P. Young, *Bismarck's Policy toward the Poles 1870–1890* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1951), 5–7 (thesis directed by Rothfels); Herbert D. Andrews, *Bismarck's Foreign Policy and German Historians, 1919–1945* (Ph.D. Thesis, Evanston: Northwestern University, 1964), 103–118; Pate, "The Historical Writing of Hans Rothfels," 171–176, 191–202. For differences within American publications (e.g., Henry C. Meyer, Oscar Hammen, Felix Gilbert, Paul Sweet, Otto Pflanze), see Dieter Hillerbrand, Bismarck in der angelsächsischen Geschichtsschreibung seit 1945," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, V48 (1966), 387–402.

45. Nazi authorities demanded that leaders of propagandists such as Albert Brackmann cloak *kämpfende Wissenschaft* in rhetorical calls for peace and general coexistence, while the regime bought time for rearmament and a consolidation of power at home. See Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward*, 64–66, and Haar, "Die Genesis der *Endlösung* aus dem Geiste der Wissenschaften: Volksgeschichte und Bevölkerungspolitik im Nationalsozialismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 49 (2001), 23.

46. However, see Haar on Rothfels' support for militant *Rechtsbünde* at Königsberg, *Zeitgeschichte*, 70–71.

47. See Georg G. Iggers' reviews of Helmut Heiber, *Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1966), in: *Central European History*, 2 (1969), 183; of Karl Ferdinand Werner, *Das NS-Geschichtsbild und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967), in: *Journal of*

Modern History, 41 (1960), 646; and of Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, in: *Central European History*, 34 (2002), 468. Willi Oberkrome raised this concern in his review of Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, March 31, 2001.

48. There were many examples, see especially the collection edited by the Republikaner Bernard Harms, *Volk und Reich der Deutschen*, Vols. 1–3 (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1929). The first volume alone on history and Ideenwelt presented *völkisch* contributions by Hermann Aubin, K. A. von Müller, Erich Seeberg and Fritz Rörig with essays by Johannes Ziekursch, Theodore Litt, Paul Tillich, Hermann Oncken, and Fritz Hartung.

49. Klaus Schwabe, "Hermann Oncken," Wehler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker*, (Göttingen: `Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 85; Christoph Cornelissen, "Hermann Oncken (1869–1945)," Michael Fröhlich (ed.), *Das Kaiserreich: Portrait einer Epoche in Biographien*, (Darmstadt: Primus-Verlag, 2001), 388–99.

50. Neugebauer, "Hans Rothfels' Weg," 337; Eckel, Hans Rothfels, 37–38. For Becker's tendencies towards "liberaler Kultur-Nationalismus" and intuitive scholarship, see Guido Müller, "Einleitung," Idem (ed.), *Carl-Heinrich Becker, Internationale Wissenschaft und nationale Bildung: Ausgewählte Schriften* (Cologne and Weima: Böhlar, 1997), 22, and Idem, *Weltpolitische Bildung und akademische Reform: Carl Heinrich Beckers Wissenschaft- und Hochschulpolitik 1908–1930* (Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau, 1991), 388–89.

51. On support for German expansion by historians within the Weimar coalition, see Herbert Döring, *Der Weimarer Kreis: Studien zum politischen Bewusstein verfassungstreuer Hochschullehrer in der Weimarer Republik* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain,, 1975), 97–104; Jürgen C. Hess, *"Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein": Demokratischer Nationalismus in der Weimarer Republik am Beispiel der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei* (Stuttgart, 1978), 150–54, 186–89; Andreas Wirsching, "Demokratisches Denken in der Geschichtswissenschaft der Weimarer Republik," Christoph Gusy (ed.), *Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 77–79, 85–88.

52. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Die Ökumene der Historiker: Geschichte der Internationalen Historikerkongresse und des Comité International des Sciences Historiques* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 244.

53. Among German historians, only Reinhard Wittram and Kähler wrote letters to America. Wittram to William Langer, September 16, 1938 and Kähler to Langer, June 26, 1938, William Langer Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University, Box 6, HUG 19.9.

54. Rothfels asked Meinecke to deliver his initial letter to William Langer in order to avoid German censors, which he feared in any international correspondence. Rothfels and Langer letters, August 12 and October 19, 1936. On his concern for German mail censors, see Edith Lenel to Langer, September 14, 1938, all in: Box 6, Langer Papers. Langer referred to support from Rothfels' associates in America, which included Dietrich Gerhard. Rothfels in fact received his most crucial support for emigration from mainstream, even liberal, British, Danish and American professors (Aage Friis, Eugene Anderson, G. P. Gooch, William Langer, Walter Dorn).

55. For the Historikertag of 1932 as a pivotal point, and the development of the Brackmann publication, see Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, 97–105, 135–49; Stefan Guth, "Between Confrontation and Conciliation. German-Polish Historiographical Relations and the International Congresses of Historians in the 1930s," *Storia della Storiografia*, 47 (2005), 116–18, 147–49.

56. Hans Rothfels, "Die Preussisch-Deutsche Geschichte des Ostens," Ernst-Friedrich Werner-Rades (ed.), *Der Riss im Osten/The Rent in the East* (Berlin: Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft, 1930). This publication was not reprinted his main collection of essays, *Ostraum, Preussentum und Reichsgedanke: Historische Abhandlungen, Vorträge und Reden* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1935). Perhaps because of its highly compromised nature, the publication was never listed in biographies from his Festschriften, nor has it been studied yet by historians.

57. On Rothfels' leadership at Königsberg in the eastern Volkskampf from 1929–1932, see Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, 86–90 and Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, 139–43, 153–59.

Examples included maps of America and Britain with overlays of the footprint of the Polish Corridor, expanded for comparison, to show English-speaking citizens what it would be like if New England or Scotland were equally isolated.

58. Vgl. Wolfgang Mommsen, "Vom 'Volksstumskampf' zur nationalsozialistischen Vernichtungspolitik in Osteuropa. Zur Rolle der deutschen Historiker under dem Nationalsozialismus," Schulze and Oxle (eds.), *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus*, 183–214 and contributions in: Michael Fahlbusch and Ingo Haar (eds.), *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1920–1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).

59. Ulrich Herbert, "Der Holocaust in die Geschichtsschreibung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Idem and Olaf Groehler, *Zweierlei Untergang: Vier Beiträge über den Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse-Verlag, 1992), 67–98.

60. Bernd Faulenbach, "Deutsch Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 94 (1981), 35, 38–41; Klempere and Unfug,„Hans Rothfels," 152–14; Winfried Schulze, "Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945," Christian Jansen et al. (eds.), *Von der Aufgabe der Freiheit: Politische Verantwortung und bürgerliche Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 93–97; Hermann Graml und Hans Woller, "Fünfzig Jahre Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1953–2003," *VfZ*, 51 (2003), 51–88.

61. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 61–62. See the more careful study of Wolfgang Benz, "Wissenschaft oder Alibi? Die Etablierung der Zeitgeschichte," Walter H. Pehle and Peter Sillem (eds.), *Wissenschaft im geteilten Deutschland: Restauration oder Neubeginn nach 1945?* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1992), 11–25. Reactions to Dawidowicz's polemical book were uniformly negative among numerous reviews by left-leaning English speaking historians. Henry Friedlander in particular rose to the defense of Rothfels in his review, in: *American Historical Review*, 87 (1982), 1365.

62. Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 55–63, 171–73, 191; Matthias Beer, "Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Das Grossforschungsprojekt 'Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa," *VfZ*, 46 (1998), 348, 365, and *passim*; Astrid M. Eckert, *Kampf um die Akten: Die Westallierten und die Rückgabe von deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), 369–75, 400–02.

63. Matthias Beer, "Hans Rothfels und die Tradition der deutschen Zeitgeschichte: Eine Skizze," *Zeitgeschichte*, 159–65, 186–90.

64. Nicolas Berg, *Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung* (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2003), 63, 193; Karl H. Roth, "Hans Rothfels und die Konstruktionen der Westdeutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung," Statement for the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, September 2004.

65. Berg, *Holocaust*, 143–92. The arguments are not new, but did not find wide publication before the 1990s. See especially the unpublished dissertation of Zdenka J. M. Gredel, *The Problem of Continuity in German History as seen by West German Historians between 1945 and 1953*, PhD. Thesis (SUNY Buffalo, 1969), 75–102, 171–87.

66. Nicolas Berg, "Hidden Memory and Unspoken History: Hans Rothfels and the Postwar Restoration of Contemporary German History," *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute*, 49 (2004), 195–220.

67. Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker. Eine Debatte, Astrid M. Eckert und Vera Ziegeldorf (eds.), in: Historisches Forum 2 (2004), H-Soz-u-Kult, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/zeitschriften/. Although the debate was mixed in its reaction to Berg, the overall tone can be gained from contributing titles including: "Beware the Moral High Ground," "Nicolas Bergs fulminante Historisierung," "The Importance of an International Context," "Revisionist or Denkmalstürzer?"

68. Christoph Cornelissen, "Hans Rothfels, Gerhard Ritter, und die Rezeption des 20. Juli 1944: Konzeptionen für ein "neues Deutschland?," *Zeitgeschichte*, 99. Cornelissen perhaps overemphasizes the book's lukewarm reception in the western democracies. Seven of (at least) nine English-language reviews of the first edition were quite positive. Two others by Waldemar Gurian and Gordon Craig were critical, but not entirely negative.

69. Jan Eckel, "Intellektuelle Transformationen im Spiegel der Widerstandsdeutungen," Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2002), 153–54.

70. Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal* (Hinsdale, IL: 1948). On the need to preempt Allied historiography, see Cornelissen, "Hans Rothfels, Gerhard Ritter," *Zeitgeschichte*, 94–100. This compares closely to Nicolas Berg, "Lesarten des Judenmords, in: Herbert (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland*, 93–96.

71. Hans Rothfels, "Bismarck und das neunzehnte Jahrhundert," Walter Hubatsch (ed.), *Schicksalwege deutscher Vergangenheit* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1950), 234.

72. Eckel tends to emphasize the ambiguous, positive design of Rothfels after 1945 for a moderate conservative cultural reconstruction, removed from Western

accusations of collective guilt. Compare the biting comments of Berg, "Lesarten des Judenmords," 120–22, to that of Eckel, "Intellektuelle Transformationen," 141, 152–58, 175–76.

73. Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, 336–40, 352–53, 361–63, 379–80.

74. Hermann Graml, "Hans Rothfels und die Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte," *Zeitgeschichte*, 153.

75. Johnpeter Horst Grill, in: *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 19 (2005), 523–525; Volker Ulrich, "Forschung ohne Erinnerung," *Die Zeit*, No. 29, July 7, 2003; Hans Mommsen, "Täter und Opfer—ein Streit um die Historiker," *Die Welt*, September 13, 2003; Peter Schöttler, "Kritik ohne Kontext," *Die Tageszeitung*, February 7, 2004.

76. Arnd Bauerkämper declares that because of his émigré status and American experience, "Rothfels was almost unassailable in post-war Germany." See his "Americanisation as Globalisation? Remigrés to West Germany after 1945 and Conception of Democracy: The Cases of Hans Rothfels, Ernst Fraenkel, and Hans Rosenberg," *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute*, 49 (2004), 160.

77. See Irmtrud Wojak, "Nicolas Berg and the West German Historians," *German History*, 22 (2004), 107–08; Gerhard Weinberg, "Comments," *Historisches Forum 2*; Devin Pendas, "The Historiography of Horror: The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial and the German Historical Imagination," *Lessons and Legacies*, VI: *New Currents in Holocaust Research*, (2004), 210–11.

78. Rothfels continued the idea of the eastern German Vorposten, for example, from describing Königsberg in the 1930s to West Berlin in the 1960s. See Rothfels, "Von der brandenburgischen über die preußische zur deutschen Hauptstadt," *Berlin in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1961), 11.

79. Compare the requests and conversations of Rothfels to Gordon Craig, Felix Gilbert, Felix Hirsch, and Eric Kollman, in: *Tagebuch*, Vol. VIII, Gordon A. Craig, 1954, Gordon A. Craig Papers, University Archives, Stanford University; Rothfels to Felix Hirsch, January 22, 1964, Box 1, Felix Hirsch Collection, Special Collections and Archives, State University of New York-Albany; Eric Kollman to William O. Aydelotte, November 27, 1951, Box 52, W. O. Aydelotte Papers, University Archives, University of Iowa; and for Harold Deutsch, Deutsch to Lawrence Steefel, May 16, 1958, Box 1, L. Steefel Papers, Elmer Anderson Library, University Archives, University of Minnesota. See also contributions in the *VfZ* from 1954 to 1964 by Gerhard Weinberg, Hans Gatzke, Klaus Epstein, John Snell, Hans Kohn, Henri Brunschwig, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Donald Lach, Alex Bein, and Andrew Whiteside.

80. As examples, Rothfels, "Augenzeugenberichte zu den Massenvergasungen," *VfZ*, 1 (1953), 177–94; "Aus den Akten des Gauleiter Kube," *VfZ*, 4 (1956), 67–92; "Zur 'Umsiedlung' der Juden im Generalgouvernement," *VfZ*, 7 (1959), 333–36.

81. Michael Salewski, "Die Ranke-Gesellschaft und ein halbes Jahrhundert," Elvert and Krauss (eds.), *Historische Debatten und Kontroversen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 133, 136–37.

82. Hallgarten alleged that Rothfels, T. Eschenburg, and H. Krausnick overturned an earlier invitation for a large article on General Seeckt and rearmament. Rothfels claimed that Hallgarten's manuscript lacked a »vorurteilsfreie Interpretation«, particularly within numerous inflammatory passages. In the resulting epistolary battle,

Hallgarten accused Rothfels of a decades-old plot against him and other socialist-liberal scholars from the Weimar era. Haar and Machtan have shown that Rothfels indeed battled democratic colleagues in the 1920s, and he was pandering to demand from Hallgarten "wo steckt da der McCarthyism?" But Hallgarten too was opportunistic. He had respected his Chicago colleague before the incident, refused to accept content criticism on its own terms during the exchange, and was exchanging research for publication with Rothfels again by 1956. Lacking evidence of political motives from the editors, one must also recognize Hallgarten's famously difficult temperament—he assured Alfred Vagts just six years later that at a recent AHA meeting he "made peace with the poor cripple: I'm not fighting him, but what he stands for." Such a disposition left him in professional isolation among Americans and prevented any university appointments throughout his writing career. For the complete exchange, see letters Rothfels–Hallgarten March 13 and April 18, 1953; and Hallgarten to Alfred Vagts, December 23, 1959, in: Box 33, G. F. W. Hallgarten Papers, Hoover Institute Library, Stanford University.

83. The *Historische Zeitschrift*, as the primary professional organ of Germany, remained closed however to American contributors. See for example the private testimony of the historian Arthur L. Smith to G. F. W. Hallgarten, January 15, 1956, Box 33, Hallgarten Papers.

84. Ernst Schulin, "Zur Entwicklung der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Versuch eines Überblicks," Jürgen Kocka et al. (eds.), *Von der Arbeiterbewegung zum modernen Sozialstaat: Festschrift für Gerhard A. Ritter zum 65. Geburtstag* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1994), 836–37.

85. For the basic identity of Rothfels with Lutheran-Evangelical Christianity, I thank communications with his grandson, the historian Nigel Rothfels. See also the introductory comments by Rothfels to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ich habe dieses Volk geliebt* (Munich: Kaiser, 1961), 5–8. (An English version appeared in 1965.) On the BK, see Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, "The German Churches and the Holocaust," Dan Stone (ed.), *The Historiography of the Holocaust* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 300–301.

86. See his review of Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1941), in: *Journal of Modern History*, 14 (1942), 385–87, and his admiration for Chancellor Hutchins of the University of Chicago, in: *Auszug des Geistes: Bericht über eine Sendereihe* (Bremen: Heyne, 1962), 130–32. Rothfels' Christian views were more common among refugee historians from East-Central Europe (Waldemar Gurian) and the Hapsburg Empire (Hans Kohn, Friedrich Engel-Janosi), as well as Catholic American specialists such as George Shuster, Ross Hoffmann, or Carlton Hayes. On the conservative émigrés, see Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA: Ihr Einfluss auf die amerikanische Europapolitik 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971), 214–18.

87. Günther Paulus, "Wissenschaftliche Zeitgeschichte oder Apologie des deutschen Imperialismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 3 (1955), 3–28; Horst Syrbe, "Revanchismus unter dem Banner der Europaideologie," Ibid., 11 (1963), 679–703.

88. For these points, see Rothfels' introductory essay "The German Resistance: Its Motives and its Historical Significance," in the Foreign Ministry propaganda volume:

Erich Zimmermann and Hand-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.), *Germans Against Hitler: July 20, 1944* (Bonn, 1960), 9–14; see also his "The German Resistance Movement," Walter Stahl (ed.), *The Politics of Postwar Germany* (New York, 1963), 156–69, and "Psychological and Moral Problems of the German Opposition to Hitler," *Confluence*, 3 (1954), 423–33.

89. Given the importance of source research in the Rothfels debate, the problems with American sources require brief attention. Peter Walther's articles combine German material with four archival deposits from the United States, but lack an American cultural-intellectual context. Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, has only used previously cited sources, conducting no research at Chicago or to the Regnery papers at Stanford, which are essential to any biography. There are no insights from Providence records, including his pre-emigration links to the West and wartime cooperation with the US Army VI Corps. The Langer papers at Harvard are curiously underused, regarding the central role of Edith Lenel and Langer's wider support network for conservative German historians. There are no views of Rothfels' American students through testimony or records, nor any use of the substantial American papers of German émigré historians. His explanation of archival sources (p. 219) is either openly false or tendentious. He notes a lack of correspondence from papers that never existed, from scholars with no association with Rothfels, from one who died before his rise at Königsberg, from papers that indeed do have his letters, from papers he curiously mislabels (but easily recognized upon inspection), or from papers that have been open for years, which Eckel claimed as destroyed. With full respect to research limitations and authorial freedom, Eckel's only American sources are from earlier studies by this author and Dr. Walther.

90. Scholars merely show that modern European history was becoming a more prominent professional field in the United States by the 1920s, noting the increase in monographs and the rise of professional journals. This simply reflects the wider steady growth of academic history. It does not speak to interpretations of politics, culture, citizenship, or ethno-racial issues that determined the content of American debate. See Heinz Wolf, *Deutsch-jüdische Emigrationshistoriker in den USA und der Nationalsozialismus* (Bern, 1988), 254–97; Konrad H. Jarausch, "Die Provokation des 'Anderen': Amerikanische Perspektiven auf die deutsche Vergangenheitsbewältigung," Arnd Bauerkämper et al. (eds.), *Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen 1945–1990* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1998), 432–47; Gabriela Ann Eakin-Thimme, "Die emigrierten Historiker als Vermittler sozialgeschichtlicher Ansätze?," *Comparativ*, 12 (2002), 63–85; Christiane Blume, "Transformationen eines Historikers—Hans Rothfels' Weg aus dem Dunstkreis der Volksgeschichte zur leuchtenden Symbolfigur der Nachkriegshistoriografie," Contribution to *H-Soz-u-Kult*, September 28, 2004.

91. On claims of Rothfels' isolation in America, Peter Th. Walther, "Die deutschen Historiker in der Emigration und ihr Einfluss in der Nachkriegszeit," Heinz Duchhardt and Gerhard May (eds.), *Geschichtswissenschaft um 1950* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2002), 40; Eckel, "Geschichte als Gegenwartswissenschaft," 27–28 and Idem, *Hans Rothfels*, 209, 235.

92. Peter Th. Walther, "Hans Rothfels im amerikanischen Exil," *Zeitgeschichte*, 87–89, and Eckel, *Hans Rothfels*, 214–15. Rothfels was recommended to the University of

Chicago through William Langer and Edward M. Earle, who had published his article 'Clausewitz' in the masterwork *The Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 93–113. Earle was answering Rothfels' own plea and accepted a caveated recommendation from the department chair at Brown. The Chicago dean of the Social Science Division advised Earle that any appointment required the positive recommendation of the history department. (His appointment in Sept. 1946 was one of several hires that year, including Paul Sweet, conducted through the faculty.) See the exchange of E. M. Earle and Robert Redfield, February 26 and April 12, 1946, Box 22, E. M. Earle Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University and the Louis Gottschalk to department chair William Hutchinson, 27.05.1946, in: Box 9, William Hutchinson Papers, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. Eckel did not visit Chicago for research, and Walther and Eckel argue that Chancellor Hutchins appointed Rothfels, with recommendations from Langer, after a fierce battle with the history department over the attempt to install Ernst Kantorowicz. This relationship is unlikely. Hutchins was distanced from the university during the summer of 1946 and left no evidence in the University of Chicago papers of involvement in the Rothfels hire, including recommendation letters. Indeed, the successful opposition by the department in the "Kantorowicz affair" proves its power to protect professional rights. Researchers also must recognize record "gaps" regarding Rothfels at Chicago and Providence. Minutes for the history department meetings were not preserved for his appointment, and original recommendation letters from Providence to the department were lost at both sites.

93. Bauerkämper, "Americanisation as Globalisation?," 158–59, Roth, "Richtung halten," in: Kessler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil*, 291; Blume, "Transformationen eines Historikers," 54–57; Walther and Graml, *Zeitgeschichte*, 96, 148.

94. Rothfels was on the advisory committees for the International Student Exchange Service and the Cecil Rhodes Exchange at Königsberg, see his biographical data in Faculty Biographical File, University Archives, John Hay Library, Brown University. He also assisted Eugene Anderson with his dissertation and his second book on Prussian liberalism, and informed him of his desire for emigration assistance from Harvard. See the correspondence, Rothfels to Anderson, July 21, 1930 and August 23, 1937, Box 1, Anderson Papers; Rothfels' proposal and exchange to August W. Fehling, September 21 and 23, 1931, in: Nr. 26., A. W. Fehling Nachlass, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK).

95. On Rothfels-Holborn, see the recollections of Lysbeth Muncy, "The Joys of Scholarship," *Sweet Briar Alumni Magazine*, Vol. 46 (1976), 52–53 and Rothfels' necrology in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 210 (1970), 257–59. See Rothfels, letter to Waldemar Gurian, January 3, 1945, Review of Politics Managing Editor's Correspondence (restricted), University of Notre Dame Archives; Dietrich Gerhard-Hans Rothfels Letters, Series 2, Box 2, Dietrich Gerhard Papers, University Archives, Washington University, St. Louis. For Rothfels' use of his American status to assist Schramm's denazification penalty, see Rothfels to Kantorowicz, April 23 and 28, 1947, Box 7, E. Kantorowicz Papers, Leo Baeck Institute, New York; his letters with Aage Friis, 21.05.-04.06.1947, in: Nr. 186, Nachlass Rothfels, BAK and Nr. 5424/37, Pk. 11 (Korrespondenz), Aage Friis Papers, Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen.

96. See Fritz Epstein's request to Paul Sweet to redact his comments on Rothfels that associated him with Moeller van den Bruck and Giselher Wirsing in a major research article (see fn. 16). Epstein to Sweet, 18.01.1943, Box 11, Fritz Epstein Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University. Paul Scheffer to Shepard Stone, October 4, 1948, Box 1, Shepard Stone Papers, Archives and Special Collections, Dartmouth College; Arnold Bergsträsser to Henry Regnery, August 15, 1955, Box 7, Henry Regnery Papers, Hoover Institute Library, Stanford University. (Hereafter RP) Bergsträsser wanted Regnery to translate Rothfels' contribution to Hermann Aubin's *Der Deutsche Osten und das Abendland* (Munich: Volk und Heimat, 1953).

97. Henry M. Pachter, "The Legend of the 20th of July 1944," *Social Research*, 29 (1962), 109–15, and the long exchange, 481–88. On Pachter see Stephen Eric Bronner's essay in this volume. Compare this to the critical admiration by Klaus Epstein, in a leading conservative journal, just after savaging Shirer's famous bestseller. See Klaus Epstein, "Germans Against Hitler," *The Modern Age*, 7 (1962/63), 82–95, and Epstein, "Shirer's History of Nazi Germany," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 23 (1961), 230–45. Henry Regnery offered Rothfels 200 offprints of the Epstein article and sent hundreds of extracts to European historians throughout the United States.

98. See especially William Langer, "Rothfels' articles and monographs are among the keenest and most penetrating studies of the period. Done with great impartiality and scholarly thoroughness, they leave nothing to be desired" *The Franco-Russian Alliance 1890–1894* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), 436.

99. Walter Dorn to William Langer, February 16, 1939 and May 25, 1934, Box 6, Langer Papers and Dorn's praise of Rothfels' "penetrating and charming study of Frederick." See Walter L. Dorn (ed.), *Competition for Empire 1740–1763* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940), 341 (dedicated to Otto Hintze). Dorn classed Rothfels with Dietrich Gerhard and Hans Rosenberg as the most talented potential refugees.

100. Klaus Epstein, "The Socioeconomic History of the Second German Empire," *Review of Politics*, 29 (1967), 103; Gordon Craig, "Editor's Introduction," Eckart Kehr, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), XXI.

101. See not only his high regard for William Langer's devotion to Bismarck, in: *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 56 (1935), 69–73 and 58 (1937), 1361–66, but also for the liberal interpretation of Freiherr vom Stein by Guy S. Ford, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 131 (1925) 302–05; and of the Risorgimento by Kenneth R. Greenfield, in: *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 28 (1935), 301–02.

102. Rothfels, "Europa und das englische Weltreich," *Das englische Weltreich*, Auslandsstudien, 5 (Königsberg, 1930), 46–67; and especially the contributions of Schmitt and Rein and Rothfels's "Begrüssungsansprache" in: *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, Auslandsstudien, 8 (Königsberg, 1933), 7–10.

103. Rothfels' report to his Chicago colleagues, "Impressions from a 5-month visit to Germany," No. 59, 8, Rothfels Nachlass, and warnings to émigrés, including Helmut Hirsch, letters January 31, 1952 and December 2, 1957, Helmut Hirsch Collection, Leo Baeck Institute; and to Fritz Epstein; see: *Winfried Schulze Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989), 141–42. On his

American nostalgia, see Rothfels to William Aydelotte, August 25, 1951, Box 52, Aydelotte Papers and to Henry Regnery, August 14, 1951, Box 65, RP.

104. Regnery eagerly published Rothfels' manuscript as the initial volume of his inaugural book series on European history and politics. He also was the editor of the short-lived University of Chicago journal, *Measure*, supported by Chancellor Hutchins, which offered Rothfels a second rostrum from which to criticize the Allied policy of unconditional surrender. For their collaboration, see Henry Regnery, *Memoirs of a Dissident Publisher* (New York, 1979), 42–44, 62.

105. The second edition soon sold all 2,000 American volumes and enjoyed a second printing. On the origins of the book, see Regnery and Rothfels letters, August 12, 1947, Box 65, RP.

106. On the new edition as an "Eichmann antidote" and "one of the best possible answers to Shirer," see Regnery to Harry Elmer Barnes, April 4, 1961 and the Rothfels-Regnery exchange, January 25 to December 16, 1955 and May 12, 1960 to March 4, 1961 in: Boxes 6 and 65, RP.

107. Hoggan's book revised his dissertation, *The Breakdown of German-Polish Relations in 1939* (Ph.D. Thesis., Harvard University, 1948), under the direction of Rothfels' American patron, William Langer of Harvard. It claimed Anglo-Polish responsibility for the origin of the Second World War. Until his career self-destructed, he had been a lecturer at the University of California Berkeley until 1954. On Hoggan, see his coverage in: *Der Spiegel*, May 13, 1964, 28–48, and his anti-Semitic works, including *Frankreichs Widerstand gegen den 2. Weltkrieg: Die französische Außenpolitik von 1934–1939* (Tübingen: Verlag der Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung, 1963); *Das blinde Jahrhundert*, Erster Teil: *Amerika: das messianische Unheil* (Tübingen: Grabert, 1979); and (anonymously) *The Myth of the Six Millions* (Los Angeles: Noontide Press, 1969). The latter was an original purveyor of Holocaust denial, see Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "Lies about the Holocaust," *Commentary*, 70 (1980), 33–34.

108. Hoggan's two academic supporters until the mid-1950s were the AHA presidents William Langer and Thomas Wertenbaker, department chair of Princeton University.

109. Paul Scheffer to Regnery, February 19, 1948, in: Box 65, RP.

110. Ibid., Regnery to Rothfels, August 19, 1963.

111. David Hoggan, *Der erzwungene Krieg* (Tübingen: Verlag der Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung, 1961) and Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism Since 1945* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1967), 533–34, 619–20, 1228, and *passim*. The letters about Hoggan to Rothfels, who published a long documentary attack on Hoggan in the *VfZ*, include Sonntag to Rothfels, February 2, 1962 and Easum to Rothfels, February 1, 1963, Nr. 69, Rothfels Nachlass. For Langer, see Gerhard Weinberg's review and the resulting exchange in: *American Historical Review*, 68 (1962), 104–05, 914–18.

112. On the issue of continuity from Weimar through the Nazi regime, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Zur Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert," *Von der Strategie der Gewalt zur Politik der Friedenssichertun:. Beiträge zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977),

18–22; Peter Fritzsche, "Did Weimar Fail?," *The Journal of Modern History*, 68 (1996), 629–56.

113. Rothfels' self-description in his "Vorwort," idem, *Bismarck, Der Osten und das Reich*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1960), 3.

114. Ulrich Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozess: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze," Idem (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland*, 7–49. Also see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (eds.), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: J.H.W-Dietz, 1993); and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "'Westernisierung': Politisch-ideeller Wandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der 60er Jahre," Axel Schildt et al. (eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg: Christians, 2000), 311–41.

115. Hans Mommsen, "Geschichtsschreibung und Humanität. Zum Gedenken an Hans Rothfels," Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (eds.), *Aspekte deutscher Aussenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1976), 26 and, for America, Roth, "Richtung halten," in: Kessler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil*, 298.

4

Woman, Refugee, Historian

The Life and Career of Helene Wieruszowski

Catherine A. Epstein

Helene Wieruszowski, a woman refugee historian from Nazi Germany, once characterized her émigré years as a time in which her life "was subjected to drastic changes, frequent resettlements, and more or less forcible readjustments.[1] Her little ship was tossed about on the waves of political turmoil and revolutions until it landed on the shore of the New World."[2] Wieruszowski's "ship" however, did not only sail stormy seas during the Nazi dictatorship. Both before 1933 and after 1945, Wieruszowski experienced professional obstacles and disappointments, achievements, and rewards.

In many ways, Wieruszowski's life was paradigmatic of the vicissitudinous refugee historian experience, an experience that included Jewish assimilation in German middle-class life, barriers to an academic career in Weimar Germany, trials and tribulations during the emigration years, and, in the United States, new scholarly interests and eventual academic success. However, Wieruszowski was unique in that she experienced this paradigm as a woman. No other woman refugee historian trained in Germany enjoyed a similar degree of academic success in the United States.[3] Wieruszowski's biography thus coupled the typical experiences of male refugee historians with some of the adverse experiences that women refugee historians faced in both Germany and America.

Born in 1893, Wieruszowski belonged to a family of assimilated Jewish academics; she was baptized and brought up as a Protestant. Her father, Alfred Wieruszowski, was Professor of Law at the University of Cologne. Wieruszowski began her university studies in 1913 and earned her doctoral degree in Bonn in 1918 with a dissertation titled: "The Formation of the Gallic and Frankish Episcopate from the Introduction of Christianity up to the Treaty of Verdun."[4] Two professors were particularly influential in her intellectual development: Wilhelm Levison and Friedrich Meinecke. Her

Doktorvater (doctoral adviser) was Levison, an authority on the Merovingian period, well-known for his painstaking edition of early medieval documents. Under Levison, Wieruszowski was thoroughly trained in the paleographical analysis of medieval sources. In the 1920s she attended Meinecke's courses and seminars in Berlin. Here she came to the history of ideas and at Meinecke's suggestion, began a study of the history of Machiavellianism before Machiavelli. However, her research led her to focus on medieval notions of the state as reflected in documents relating to Frederick II and Philip the Fair.[5] This work resulted in a monograph titled *Vom Imperium zum nationalen Königtum,* which Wieruszowski completed in July 1933 and dedicated to Meinecke with "gratitude to my revered teacher."[6]

Wieruszowski belonged to the first generation of professional women struggling for academic careers in the conservative German university system. Indeed, she received her doctoral degree only ten years after the first woman in Germany had done so. In the 1920s, Wieruszowski held temporary positions at research institutes and taught adult education classes. At the same time, she received a degree in library science and became a librarian at the University of Bonn in 1928. Throughout these years, however, Wieruszowski continued to research medieval history in the hope of pursuing a university career. She not only completed her monograph on medieval state theory but also published a number of articles in scholarly journals. In about 1932, Wieruszowski tried to habilitate herself in Bonn, but her *Habilitation* was rejected. It has been suggested that this was "because she was a Jew, and the faculty did not want to habilitate Jews anymore."[7] The matter of Wieruszowski's *Habilitation* soon became moot.

In 1933, when the Nazis came to power, Wieruszowski was thirty-nine. As a civil servant of Jewish origins, she was dismissed from her library position as of January 1934, despite attempts by the director of the Bonn University Library to intervene on her behalf.[8] In October 1933, Wieruszowski wrote Albert Brackmann, the well-known German medievalist, describing her situation and asking for a recommendation. By this time, she knew she had to leave Germany, but she hoped for a non-salaried affiliation with one of the German research institutes abroad. She wrote Brackmann, "But it would be a support and a comfort were I to receive any kind of commission, and thus would not be totally separated from the soil on which I was not only born and educated, but also believe through my own work to have earned the rights of a native *Heimatrecht*."[9] Brackmann responded by supplying an excellent recommendation in which he wrote that Wieruszowski's "academic works were so thorough and exhaustive and I recommended them for publication with total conviction." He concluded this letter of reference with "I can thus recommend her in every respect." In his accompanying letter to Wieruszowski

Brackmann suggested that since "everything is in transition," she should "wait a bit" before making further career decisions.[10]

Wieruszowski did not have the luxury to wait. She moved to southern Europe where she did archival research in Barcelona, Madrid, and Florence between 1934 and 1940. There Wieruszowski immersed herself in the medieval sources, which claimed her future scholarly attention: *dictamina* (collections of rhetorical form letters) and the works of Mino da Colle. During these years, she later wrote, she "was not free to follow a self-elected path but had to grab materials for her research as they came her way, prepare them for publication as the occasion arose, and use the language which was called for."[11]

In 1940, Wieruszowski came to the United States after several years' wait for a visa. Here she initially followed a path typical of less well-known refugee historians, and woman refugee historians in particular; she held temporary and part-time positions at The Johns Hopkins University and Brooklyn College. For whatever reason, Wieruszowski did not return to library work, a career option chosen by some refugees unable to find teaching jobs. However, the inability to secure a full-time, tenured position led her to consider remigration to postwar Germany.

Wieruszowski asked Hannah Arendt, a good friend, to write Karl Jaspers about the possibility of a university position in Germany. In her letter to Jaspers, Arendt described Wieruszowski's plight, "Her situation in America is very insecure. She has never been able to get a permanent post. She teaches at Brooklyn College but always, only on a part-time basis. She's no longer young (about 50, I think) and is therefore very worried." Arendt then characterized Wieruszowski, "She is a nice and decent person, no genius, but has good, solid knowledge of her field. She is, of course, afraid of Germany, primarily of anti-Semitism. And I should add, she is without inner defenses, very easily hurt, not very stable." In trying to explain her lack of professional success in America, Arendt continued, "She is very typically German. She knows a little too much or perhaps shows it too clearly. She is too honest and in a way too provincial to be pushy on her own behalf. She didn't get any elbows when they were handed out, and that's what makes her such a nice person."[12]

Jaspers responded very favorably, "Now for Frau Wieruszowski: how wonderful it would be if she came here! When I mentioned her to my colleague for medieval history, Professor Ernst [. . .], he was immediately enthusiastic. He does not know her personally, but he is familiar with her publications and told me about them." Jaspers went on to explain that Wieruszowski's potential position would be untenured, and that life in post-war Heidelberg was in many ways very difficult. He nonetheless concluded: "If Frau Wieruszowski can keep a retreat to America open, I would not hesitate to recommend that she try it here for a year and have a look around."[13]

Jaspers wrote a similarly positive letter to Wieruszowski that, according to Arendt, was important for Wieruszowski's self-esteem, "Regardless of what decision she makes, a letter like that was as essential to her as bread itself. She will never adapt to this country and will never feel really good here."[14]

Wieruszowski was Guest Lecturer in Heidelberg in the summer semester of 1948. This visit resulted in her only publication on contemporary affairs, "Discussions with German Students," a brief reflection written in German. Wieruszowski described how she was initially suspicious of her German students, and feared their reaction to hearing "the Jew, the émigré, the American in me." Soon recognizing that these students had a real need to discuss both current political issues and the recent Nazi past, Wieruszowski organized a series of Monday evening discussions at her apartment.[15] Here she found personal interaction with German students relatively unproblematic, but their political attitudes so reactionary that she believed "as regards the main things [students' political attitudes] it is clear to see that there is still an important task to be fulfilled."[16] Like so many other refugees, Wieruszowski chose not to return to West Germany. Her own German past, the Holocaust, and the postwar political climate made remigration too problematic. At the same time, she faced unfavorable career prospects in Germany; few refugee historians received calls to German universities after 1945.

In the United States, however, Wieruszowski's career began to flourish. She was appointed Assistant Professor at The City College of New York, beginning in September 1949. Until 1951, the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences did not even admit women. According to the archivist at The City College, Wieruszowski was the "first woman appointed to a full-time professorial line in the Department of History."[17] This level of professional success was only possible for Wieruszowski because of her emigration. In Germany, a professorship for a woman medievalist of Jewish origins in the middle decades of the twentieth century would have been almost unthinkable. Wieruszowski became Associate Professor at The City College in 1957 and retired as Professor Emeritus in 1961.

In the following decade she published *The Era of Charlemagne*[18] and *The Medieval University*,[19] both collections of documents with substantial introductions. She also published a thick volume of reprinted essays, *Politics and Culture in Medieval Spain and Italy*,[20] which received six very positive reviews. Two glowing reviews appeared in the United States. One writer opened his review with "This collection of essays is a staggeringly impressive composite piece of history,"[21] while another noted that "One must admire the versatility as well as the learning of their author. . . . Her conclusions are often challenging and sometimes daring but always clearly argued and carefully substantiated."[22]

Wieruszowski's academic success came at a high price. She never married, a phenomenon not uncommon among women medievalists in the 1920s and 1930s.[23] In letters to friends after 1945, she frequently complained of sickness, psychological downturns, and a variety of academic slights. She appears to have disliked the United States and like many other refugee historians chose to pass her last years in Europe, although not in Germany. She moved to Lugano, Switzerland in 1971.

Wieruszowski's emigration not only affected her personal life and professional career, but also the content of her historical work. Of her two main teachers, Wilhelm Levison and Friedrich Meinecke, the former appears to have exercised a much more enduring influence on her scholarship. Levinson's preoccupation with the edition of archival sources is evident in all of Wieruszowski's work. As she herself wrote in 1976, "[Levinson] clipped my wings and taught me to read and critically analyze sources, which then later posed the historical problems."[24] Not only are Wieruszowski's books and articles based on careful archival research, but also most of them include large appendices of previously unpublished documents. Along with many other refugee historians, Wieruszowski brought the German predilection for close study of archival sources to American students. On the other hand, Meinecke's influence on Wieruszowski appears to have been tempered by emigration although she wrote that "[Meinecke] was a great teacher, and I am much indebted to him" in a letter to Hannah Arendt in 1975.[25]

Wieruszowski, like many other émigré historians, largely abandoned the German practice of the history of ideas for the more contextual method of American intellectual history. In the United States Wieruszowski moved away from the discussion of grand ideas, as in *Vom Imperium zum Königtum*, towards topics such as the diplomatic antecedents of the Sicilian Vespers or the institutional context of medieval letter-writing. Fritz Stern's generalization of refugee historians in America holds true for Wieruszowski: "The refugee scholars became more empirical, less dogmatic, more attuned to the social realities that their former traditions had tended to neglect."[26] Despite the Americanization of her work, Wieruszowski's social and scholarly interaction nonetheless took place mostly within the German-speaking refugee milieu. She dedicated books or articles to the refugee scholars Hannah Arendt, Ludwig Edelstein, Stephan Kuttner, and Theodor Ernst Mommsen, and in various essays acknowledged her intellectual debt to the refugee historians Emmy Heller, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and Richard Salomon.

Wieruszowski believed that her emigration resulted in the "hodgepodge character of historical themes, geographic areas, even epochs" contained in her *Politics and Culture in Medieval Spain and Italy*.[27] In a letter to an editor she noted that she was concerned about the lack of unity in these essays,

but that "The unity is not in the essays themselves but is in my life and in my fate."[28] Although her peripatetic lifestyle during emigration was reflected in the varied subject matter of her essays, Wieruszowski's life experiences were not directly represented in the topics of her scholarly work. While she wrote an article on "Peter of Aragon and the Jews"[29] and emphasized the importance of "academic migration" in her book on medieval universities,[30] Wieruszowski's twentieth-century experiences do not seem to have stimulated study in similar issues in the Middle Ages. Indeed, it seems rather that Wieruszowski retreated to the medieval and Renaissance repositories in the libraries and archives of Europe to escape the problems of the modern world.

Similarly, despite her gender, Wieruszowski was not particularly interested in medieval women. Although there is a long tradition in German historiography of studying medieval family law and religious women,[31] she did not specialize in these areas. In 1925 she published her only treatment of women, an article in which she examined ideal views of Italian women's lives and education during the Renaissance.[32] In her later work, women were rarely mentioned. She did not discuss women in her studies of medieval academic cultures, nor did she focus on the role of women in high politics. The absence of this topic in her work may help explain the limited attention Wieruszowski's life and work have received. Unlike other women historians of Wieruszowski's generation who pioneered the study of women in medieval history, she did not. Feminist historians have thus had little interest in recovering Wieruszowski's biography.[33]

Helene Wieruszowski died in 1978. Like other refugee historians she experienced a long period of career displacement after the Nazis' rise to power in 1933. However, the tenacity with which she pursued her academic goals through a lifetime of challenges finally came to fruition in 1949 when she was hired by The City College at the professorial level. In retirement Wieruszowski was able to collect her scholarly achievements in a well-received volume of essays. Unfortunately, poor health in her last years prevented the completion of her life's work, a textual edition of Mino da Colle's *Epistolae*. Wieruszowski's ship came into harbor, in her own words, after "a life that was rich in human experiences and filled to the brim with hardships and pleasures, promises, and frustrations."[34]

NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank the late Paul Oskar Kristeller (Columbia University), Robert E. Lerner (Northwestern University), Emil J. Polak (Queensborough Community College of The City University of New York), and Kay Schiller (University of Chicago) for their help in locating sources on Helene Wieruszowski's life

and career. For general biographical data and bibliographical information on Wieruszowski, see Catherine Epstein, *A Past Renewed: A Catalog of German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 344–46. For a complete bibliography of Wieruszowski's works see Emil J. Polak (ed.), *A Medievalist's Odyssey: Helene Wieruszowski, Scholar* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2004), 33–38.

2. Helene Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture in Medieval Spain and Italy,* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1971), X. It is referred to subsequently as *Politics and Culture*.

3. The other first-generation women refugee historians were Emmy Heller, Charlotte Sempell, Erika Spivakovsky, and Selma Stern-Täubler. See Epstein, *A Past Renewed*. For a discussion of all women emigrant historians, see Idem, "Fashioning Fortuna's Whim: German-Speaking Women Emigrant Historians in the United States," Sibylle Quack (ed.), *Between Sorrow and Strength: Women Refugees of the Nazi Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 301–23.

4. Helene Wieruszowski, "Die Zusammensetzung des gallischen und Fränkischen Episkopats von der Einführung des Christentums bis zum Vertrag von Verdun," *Bonner Jahrbücher*, 127 (1922), 1–83.

5. Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*, X.

6. Helene Wieruszowski, *Vom Imperium zum nationalen Königtum: Vergleichender Studien über die publizistischen Kämpfe Kaiser Friedrichs II. und König Philipps des Schönen mit der Kurie*, Beiheft 30 der Historischen Zeitschrift (Munich and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1933; reprinted Aalen: Scientia-Verlag, 1965).

7. Letter 55 from Hannah Arendt to Gertrud and Karl Jaspers, dated March 23, 1947, in Lotte Köhler and Hans Saner (eds.), *Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence*, 1926–1969 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 78.

8. Helga Fremerey-Dohna and Renate Schöne (eds.), *Jüdisches Geistesleben in Bonn 1786–1945*: *Eine Biobibliographie* (Bonn: Rührscheid, 1985), 271.

9. Letter from Helene Wieruszowski to Albert Brackmann, October 22, 1933, Rep .92 Brackmann, Mappe Nr.40, S. 162–163, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin. My thanks to Robert E. Lerner for sharing the Brackmann-Wieruszowski correspondence with me.

10. Letter and recommendation from Albert Brackmann to Helene Wieruszowski, October 24 and 25, 1933, Rep. 92 Brackmann, Mappe No. 40, 158–59, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

11. Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*, IX.

12. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers, dated March 23, 1947, *Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence*, 78–79.

13. Letter from Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, April 19, 1947, ibid., 81–83.

14. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers, dated June 30, 1947, ibid., 91.

15. Helene Wieruszowski, "Gespräche mit deutschen Studenten," *Die Wandlung*, 4 (1949), 82–91.

16. Ibid., 91.

17. Letter from Barbara J. Dunlap, Archives and Special Collections at The City College, to the author, September 21, 1993.

18. Stewart C. Easton and Helene Wieruszowski, *The Era of Charlemagne: Frankish State and Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961; reprinted Huntington, NY: Krieger, 1979).

19. Helene Wieruszowski, *The Medieval University: Masters, Students, Learning* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966).

20. The six reviews were published in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 217 (1973), 413–15; *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 80 (1972), 463–65; *Times Literary Supplement* (May, Vol. 5, 1972), 529; *Studi Medievali*, 14 (1973), 561–63; *Renaissance Quarterly*, 27 (1974), 41–43; and *Saeculum*, 49 (1974), 169–71. Also, see note 2.

21. Robert Brentano, Review of Helene Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*. In *Renaissance Quarterly*, 27 (1974), 41–43, esp. 41.

22. Charles T. Davis, Review of Helene Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*. In *Speculum*, 49 (1974), 169.

23. Norman F. Cantor, *Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Great Medievalists of the Twentieth Century* (New York: W. Morrow, 1991), 389.

24. Helene Wieruszowski, "Grussbotschaft von Frau Professor Dr. Helene Wieruszowski, Lugano," Theodor Schieffer et al. (eds.), *In Memoriam Wilhelm Levison, 1876–1947* (Cologne and Bonn: Hanstein, 1977), 54.

25. The original German reads: "Er war ein großer Lehrer und ich verdanke ihm viel." Letter from Helene Wieruszowski to Hannah Arendt, September 26, 1975, Hannah Arendt Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

26. Fritz Stern, "German History in America, 1884–1984," *Central European History*, 19 (1986), 131–63, esp. 155.

27. Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*, X.

28. Letter from Helene Wieruszowski to Miss Hassol, April 26, 1967, Kristeller Collection, Box 55, Folder marked Helene Wieruszowski. Rare Book and Manuscript Library in Butler Library of Columbia University.

29. Helene Wieruszowski, "Peter von Aragon und die Juden," *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, 22 (1936), 239–54. Reprinted in *Politics and Culture*, 119–45.

30. Helene Wieruszowski, *Medieval University*, 82 *et passim*.

31. Martha Howell et al., "A Documented Presence: Medieval Women in German Historiography," Susan Mosher Stuard (ed.), *Women in Medieval History and Historiography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 101–31.

32. "*De claris mulieribus*. Lebens-und Bildungsideale der italienischen Frau im Zeitalter der Renaissance," *Festschrift zum 25- jährigen Bestehen des humanistischen Gymnasiums in Köln* (Cologne, 1925), 15–29.

33. Susan Mosher Stuard, "A New Dimension? North American Scholars Contribute Their Perspective," Idem (ed.), *Women in Medieval History and Historiography*, 81–99. Stuard mentioned Wieruszowski once, when she incorrectly identified Helen [*sic*] Wieruszowski as president of The Medieval Academy of America for a term (88). See also Judith M. Bennett, "Medievalism and Feminism," *Speculum*, 68 (1993), 309–31. Bennett similarly mentioned Wieruszowski only once, when she noted that Stuard misidentified her as a past president of The Medieval Academy. See 312, note 11.

34. Wieruszowski, *Politics and Culture*, XV.

5

Between Communism and Anti-Communism

Franz Borkenau

Mario Kessler

Franz Borkenau (1900–1957), German-Austrian historian and sociologist, was born in Vienna.[1] His father, Rudolf Pollak (1864–1939), was a jurist and member of the Austrian High Supreme Court. In 1926, quite late in his life, he became a university professor of law.[2] Pollak was of Jewish origin but of Catholic faith, his wife Melanie née Fürth was Protestant.[3] In 1932, their son converted from Catholicism to Protestantism.[4]

As an inhabitant of Vienna, the young Borkenau became involved in the emerging youth culture that was strongly influenced by Freud and particularly by Freud's disciple Siegfried Bernfeld.[5] In 1918 Borkenau finished the Schottengymnasium, a prestigious high school in his native town, with excellent marks. At the End of WWI, Borkenau was briefly called to the Austrian army, but was not sent to the front. In November 1918 he began studying law, history, economics, and philosophy in Vienna and Leipzig. His principal teachers were the Marxist Carl Grünberg in Vienna and Alfred Doren and Walter Goetz in Leipzig. In 1924, he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Leipzig.

As a university student Borkenau shifted to the radical left, which led his father to break contact with him for many years.[6] He joined the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and was appointed chairman of the German Communist Student's League. After his graduation he worked from 1925 to 1929 as Jürgen Kuczynski's assistant at the KPD-sponsored *Forschungsstelle für internationale Politik*, a research institute for the study of international politics.[7] This group of experts was connected with Eugen Varga's information office, which operated in the Soviet embassy and delivered secret material from Berlin to the Comintern headquarters in Moscow.[8] In 1929, when the "Abteilung Varga" was transferred to Moscow,

Borkenau preferred to stay in Berlin. As his life-long friend Richard Löwenthal wrote many years later, Borkenau saw no room for intellectual independence in Moscow.[9]

In the same year, 1929, Borkenau was expelled from the KPD on the grounds of so-called right-wing deviation. However, unlike other expelled communists, Borkenau did not join the anti-Stalinist KPD-Opposition led by Heinrich Brandler and August Thalheimer. Instead, he decided to join the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).[10] But in 1931, Borkenau withdrew from any political activity. Beginning in 1929, he worked as a research fellow at the Frankfurt-based Institute of Social Research led by Max Horkheimer.

In 1934, one year after Hitler's seizure of power in Germany, Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss destroyed the labor organizations, and the Austro-fascist regime came to power. Borkenau, a registered citizen of Vienna, belonged to those who tried to organize a socialist underground movement.[11] He was unsuccessful and was immediately forced to leave, after his expulsion from Germany, the country of his birth. Over the next twelve years, he lived mostly in Paris and London. From 1935 to 1936 he held a part-time and low-paid professorship at the University of Panama. However, he was unfit for the tropical climate of that country. Therefore, he returned to Europe. In 1937 he worked as a reporter in the Spanish Civil War. In 1938, after the German occupation of Austria, the Nazi regime revoked his citizenship. Until the end of his life, Borkenau remained stateless. In 1940–1941, he was briefly deported to an internment camp in Australia. In 1946, Borkenau returned to Germany.[12]

During his years in exile, Borkenau gained a reputation as a profound political analyst and writer on contemporary history. His political itinerary and his work reflect the political catastrophes of the 20th century. Throughout his whole life, Borkenau was in search of an intellectual "anchor," a guiding principle for the course of history, which would lead to a general interpretation of the complexities of the historical process. *Weltgeschichte als Heilsgeschehen?* This attitude was quite typical for a generation of intellectuals who had lost ground after the breakdown of the old European order that followed the pre-1914 "Golden Age of Security" (Stefan Zweig).[13] Many of this generation embraced communism enthusiastically. Most of them were disappointed only a few years later.

After his Ph.D. dissertation Borkenau wrote a number of works on the origins of capitalist society as well as on the communist movement of his time. In the late 1930s he turned away from his critical Marxist position to become an anti-communist. He pretended to be a "Cold War Liberal" of Anglo-Saxon kind.[14] However, over time Borkenau's anti-communism became more and more illiberal, as this essay will show.

FROM AUSTRIA AND GERMANY TO EXILE

During his years in Leipzig, Borkenau's main interest was universal history as the basic tradition of Western historiography. He was preoccupied with the presentation of the history of mankind as a coherent unit, one of the problems that preoccupied him for the rest of his life. The first result of his work was his Ph.D. dissertation on a multi-volume world history that was written in England during the mid-17th century: *A Universal History of the World, from the Earliest Account of Time to the Present, Compiled from Original Authors and Illustrated with Maps, Cuts, Notes, chronological and other Tables*. It was a sixty-five volume history (eighty volumes in different editions) initiated in 1736 by George Sale and published in its first edition in London between 1747 and 1768. This gigantic endeavor was one of the first works to attempt to unify the history of Western Europe with the stories of the world's other known cultures.[15]

As a student of Carl Grünberg, Borkenau became interested in left-wing theory and politics. In the post-war years, the attempt to place socialist upheaval on the political agenda as a practical task was the guiding principle behind the thought of a great number of young intellectuals. Their opposition to capitalism had both a practical and a theoretical dimension. They were deeply committed by the failure of working-class revolutions in Germany, Central Europe, and Italy after WW I. A number of them took the initiative to establish a new academic institute, the Institute of Social Research, which was associated with the University of Frankfurt-Main. It was Carl Grünberg who was appointed head of the institute.[16]

When Grünberg went to Frankfurt, Borkenau aspired to follow him. Max Horkheimer, who succeeded Grünberg in 1930, also had an interest in this promising scholar. Thus, Borkenau started to work on a book entitled *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild* (The Transition from Feudal to Bourgeois Interpretation of the World). He wanted to submit it as his *Habilitationsschrift*, his post-doctoral work. But when the book was completed and published in 1934, there was no chance for *Habilitation* in Germany or Austria.[17]

The central thesis of the work investigates the interrelationship between bourgeois-capitalist thought and the rise of manufactory production, which emerged during the 17th century. Borkenau argued against Wilhelm Dilthey who had seen the forming of the system of *Geisteswissenschaften*, the humanities, as a process of transcending the feudal theological traditions. Borkenau, however, emphasized the connection between intellectual currents and the level of material production and that no philosophy could be ahead of the progress of productive forces. Henryk Grossman, Borkenau's colleague

at the Institute of Social Research, wrote an extensive and sharp criticism of the book. According to him, Borkenau had neglected "dynamic factors" of political developments. That meant explicitly, Borkenau had not taken the class struggles into account.[18] Grossman also refuted Borkenau's contention that modern mechanics dated from the mid-17th century and could be explained in terms of the emerging division of labor in manufacturing. In fact, mechanics were developed in the 15th century; three centuries before manufacturing production emerged.[19] Borkenau's book was seen in the Institute of Social Research as neither Marxist nor accurate,[20] while Lucien Febvre, the renowned head of the French *Annales* School, wrote a much more positive review.[21]

Like other Institute members, Borkenau contributed to the debates on fascism with an essay on the sociology of the movement. He saw Italian fascism as a "developing dictatorship" and raised the question as to whether or not fascism would have a chance to succeed in a country like Germany. He argued that Italian fascism had emerged as a consequence of a set of circumstances that did not exist in Germany, such as the historical weakness of the bourgeoisie that prevented it from a large-scale capital accumulation.[22] Thus, fascism was an instrument of modernizing Italy while the German bourgeoisie was the most advanced ruling class in Europe. Borkenau concluded that the German ruling class would not allow itself to be ruled by the National Socialists. He finished his essay by the end of 1932. It was published in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in February 1933. At this time, Hitler was already German chancellor.[23] The Institute of Social Research and its staff went into exile in Geneva and finally to New York, while Borkenau made a brief stay in Vienna, his native town.

In 1934, Borkenau's fellowship at the Institute ended. After Grossmann's cold review of the book, Borkenau's relationship with the institute could be considered broken.[24] Unlike the majority of institute associates, he had been mostly immersed in politics, and most of his further works were strongly influenced by his political orientation.

He had to look for new employment. Together with his wife Lucie Varga, whom he had married in 1933, and with her daughter Berta, Borkenau went to Paris.

Lucie Varga was a historian and ethnologist in her own right. She was born Rosa Stern in 1904 in Baden near Vienna. Her name Varga came from a previous marriage (there was no relationship to Eugen Varga). In 1931, she completed her Ph.D. thesis under the direction of Alfons Dopsch, a renowned expert of medieval history at the University of Vienna.[25]

In Paris, the couple received financial help from Lucie's mother. Through the mediation of Dopsch, Lucie Varga soon established good contacts to

Lucien Febvre and the *Annales* circle. The couple wrote a number of essays for the journal.[26] Among them was an essay penned by Borkenau on the sociology of Austrian political parties.[27] Another noteworthy essay was Lucie Varga's *The Genesis of National Socialism*. Here, Varga treated Nazism as a form of religion, on par with Christianity and Marxism. She described the phenomenal success of Nazism among German people to specific social causes. Varga noted the ferocious anti-capitalism of German (and Austrian) villagers and the particular force with which the Nazi message could penetrate the younger people. She explained the fragility of German bourgeoisie, its lack of self-confidence in spite of its stake in the German economy, the peculiar way in which the industrial revolution had come late, and the survival of strong, romantically anti-capitalist, and therefore anti-democratic, political forces.[28]

Borkenau could not find an academic appointment in Paris. In 1935, he went to London where he met Bronislaw Malinowski, who taught at the London School of Economics. Borkenau's hopes to be employed at LSE did not, however, materialize. Instead, he was appointed to a professorship in Sociology at the University of Panama. The appointment was low-paid ($100 per month), and Borkenau, as it soon became very clear, was unfit to teach under these conditions. Only a year after his arrival in Panama he left the university. He went to Spain to work for British newspapers. In the meantime, his marriage to Lucie Varga came to an end and they divorced in 1936.

In London Borkenau started to write in English. His first English book was an intellectual biography of Vilfredo Pareto, written in the context of fascist success in many European countries. In this book Borkenau endorsed a version of Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites. The triumph of fascism, Borkenau argued, was not the triumph of an abstract movement, but of the new and coherent elite. The new fascist elite, as well as the Stalinist leadership in the Soviet Union, was relatively independent from material interests. Its coherence rested on the *Führerprinzip*, the principle of authoritarian leadership. As Borkenau wrote:

> [f]rom the point of view of the theory of domination and of élites, Bolshevism and Fascism can only be treated as slightly different specimens of the same species of dictatorship . . . Nevertheless, the different starting point is important. Bolshevism wanted to create an entirely new social order and had to trace its outlines. Fascism intended no such things, but simply wanted to change the existing political regime in order to preserve the existing social structure, and its main institution, private property in the means of production.[29]

At this time, Borkenau started to contest the validity of Marxism. "At every important moment of the Russian revolution, Marxism had to be abandoned,"

he wrote. "It was a belief, and not a scientific guide. In reality, Lenin acted by ingenious intuitions, based on close knowledge of facts, as all great political leaders of all times have done. And the main function of Marxism was to hold the elite together."[30] In Borkenau's view the Bolsheviks were not the forerunner of a classless society, but the creators of a new hierarchical and authoritarian order. An instructive study notes that Borkenau by this time "had completed the construction of a conceptual road that would lead him to the discovery of other "totalitarian affinities" between fascism and Bolshevism."[31]

Borkenau explored the new managerial elite that benefited from the revolution and had to organize collective displays of nationalism (and in the case of the Nazis: racism) to stimulate fanatical obedience to the new order:

> [s]entiments uncontrolled by reason have played an enormous role in the ascendancy of Fascism, and in addition, in the later developments of Bolshevism the same sentiments came to the forefront, though in the official Bolshevist theory this trend is neglected or rejected. Bolshevism of course has to take over many elements of the age of enlightenment, and of rationalism as an ideology, in order to fit the Russian population for a modern industrial order. The common trend, however, the acceptance of authority instead of rational consideration, the eulogy of activity in the place of thought, the unconsidered acceptance of a few metaphysical principles taken for granted and the rejection of any "problems" not solved by these official axioms, is conspicuous. In Fascism as well as in Bolshevism, rationalism is banned from the most important spheres of human life and relegated to matters of pure technique.[32]

Borkenau argued that only in theory, but not in political practice, could class struggle lead to the *complete* victory of one class over all the others, ending in a complete unification of society. "Bolshevism pretends to end towards this solution. But Bolshevism proves precisely that even in the case of the physical destruction of whole classes, the social body is never really unified, and finally the state remains as an arbitrator."[33]

According to Borkenau, Marx was right in his analysis of the development of capitalism, but essentially wrong in his belief that contradictions in the society led to a new and successful "synthesis.": "This is the Hegelian element in his doctrine." If the new state exercises control over society, the classes do not necessarily disappear. Instead, a dictatorship turns out: a dictatorship, which is not exercised through a vanguard party of the working class, but through the ruling bureaucratic elite, which becomes independent of all classes and tyrannizes them.[34]

In London, Borkenau did not join a political party or group. However, he was in contact with the leftist group *Neu Beginnen*, mainly with its theoretical head Richard Löwenthal.[35] Felix Gilbert, a refugee historian from Berlin, wrote that Borkenau was at this time, around 1936, a "remarkably unorthodox Marxist."[36]

It was Borkenau's experience with the terrorist measures taken by the Soviet secret police during the Spanish Civil War which led him to shift away from his critical communist viewpoint. He visited Spain twice (in August 1936 and January 1937). At the end of the same year, as a result of his Spanish experience, he published *The Spanish Cockpit*. The book came out, when the Spanish Civil War was still undecided; based on first-hand experience; it is still a valuable source of information. Borkenau visited Barcelona, Valencia, Madrid, and Toledo, as well as the Aragon and Andalusia fronts. As most observers, Borkenau described the war in Spain as part of the international struggle for or against fascism.

The book made Borkenau's name famous throughout the English-speaking world.[37] After that time George Orwell, who had written an enthusiastic review of the book, became a personal friend.[38] Borkenau's obvious sympathy for the republican cause coincided with his disappointment about the misleading revolutionary experiment.[39] He explained how Manfred Stern, alias Emilio Kléber, one of the most capable military leaders of the International Brigades and known to Borkenau since his university years in Vienna, was called back to the Soviet Union where he later became one of Stalin's innumerable victims.[40] Borkenau also remained skeptical of the anarchist experiment in Barcelona. The anarchists were, as he wrote, incapable of leading military action because of their hatred of discipline.[41]

Every revolution would undergo, in its course, a transformation from mass terrorism to police terrorism. It was this model that explained why the anarchists had been left outside the forces that would influence the course of history during the war and revolution.

> The transformation was cut short in France by the fall of Robespierre, not before having made considerable progress. It came to full strength in Russia in the years after the end of the civil war. In Spain, where the properly revolutionary processes have been so quickly superseded by something entirely different, it has made great strides in the few months since the beginning of the civil war.[42]

With regard to brutal actions that he witnessed in the Spanish Civil War, Borkenau wrote that the role of illusion is intimately related to the role of violence.

> It is not only violence, which is the midwife of every society that is heavy with child. And if violence is the father of every great upheaval, its mother is illusion. The belief which is always reborn in every great and decisive . . . struggle is, that this is the last fight, that after this struggle all poverty, all suffering, all oppression will be things of the past. In a religious form, this was the belief in the millennium. In a secular form, it is belief in a society free from domination.[43]

Borkenau emphasized that the Spanish Republic, faced with the task of organizing a new army, had three alternative policies from which to choose.

> In the first place it might have aimed at creating a revolutionary army. This was the policy favoured by Anarchists and revolutionary Socialists. In the second place there was the possibility of creating a totalitarian army, after the model of the present German, Italian, and Russian armies. This was the policy of the Communists. In the third place, there was the possibility of creating a "normal," non-political army. This was the policy of Prieto's moderate Socialists and Azaña's Liberal Republicans.[44]

The last of these three would have freed the military from all political interference, which appealed to those officers and soldiers who remained loyal to the republic.

During his second trip, Borkenau himself was briefly arrested and interrogated by Soviet military advisers, i.e., NKVD officers.[45] This experience, as well as the ambivalent role of the Soviet Union in general, made his attitude towards Soviet communism and communist ideology in general much more critical. The Soviet Union was, in Borkenau's opinion, not a supportive, but a destructive force in the republic's fight against international fascism.

> As it was, and as it had to be, because the failure of the Spanish Left coincided with fascist intervention, republican Spain was at the mercy of the force which brought help . . . For it was [a] force with a revolutionary past, not with a revolutionary present which had come to help the Spaniards. The communists put an end to revolutionary social activity, and enforced their view that this ought not to be a revolution but simply the defence of a legal government.[46]

Alfred Kantorowicz, at this time a staff officer in the International Brigades, characterized *The Spanish Cockpit* much later as an anti-communist standard work.[47] However, Borkenau's experience in the Spanish Civil War was not yet his ultimate break with the left. At this time he wrote that Marx tried to combine two things that cannot be combined: the Jacobin tradition of 1793 and the ideals of a libertarian democrat.[48] In 1938 and 1939 he published two new books from the standpoint of a non-dogmatic socialist and active anti-fascist: *Austria and After* and *The New German Empire*. Both were critical assessments of German expansionist policy.

Borkenau wrote *Austria and After* right after Austrian unification with Germany. As most of the Austrian contemporaries he regarded, he himself wrote

> as belonging to a larger German fatherland, rather than to a narrower community of the Germans in Austria, that I was a partisan of the Anschluss since I had any political convictions whatsoever, that I regarded the artificial severance

> of Austria from Germany, as laid down in the peace treaties, as the chief source of all miseries, both material and spiritual, of my country. Now these dreams of my youth have come true. They mean suicide for hundreds, untold misery for hundreds of thousands, exile for many who have wished this day to come just as much as I did.[49]

The Republic of Austria, the tiny rest of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was characterized by a mixture of cooperation and conflict between the two political camps of Catholicism and Socialism.

"It is doubtful whether the clergy, who had defended the War to the end, would have easily kept the allegiance of the peasants after it, had there not existed the socialist bogy."[50] The upper classes had lost both their rank and fortunes in the new republic while the Socialists acquired a remarkable amount of prestige through their successful municipal policy in the city of Vienna, a place that was the stronghold of Austrian Social Democrats. Their strategy of propagating advanced ideas in theory and compromising in practical policy enabled the Socialist Party leadership to represent itself as the only conceivable advocate of the workers. The dominance of the Socialists reduced the Communist Party to almost complete insignificance. They helped in putting down the communist revolts that filled the immediate months after the end of the war.

From the days of the formation of the Austrian Republic onward, the Socialists cooperated with the Catholic Party in coalition governments. However, the political balance came to an abrupt end on July 15, 1927. On this day, a spontaneous mass demonstration in Vienna ended in clashes with the police. The socialist leaders sent their "Republican Defense Forces" to disperse the masses and serve the building of the Supreme Court. Suddenly military units arrived and, supported by fascist *Heimwehr* troops, fired into the masses leaving nearly ninety people dead.[51] The socialist Party leadership proclaimed a general strike but broke it off when *Heimwehr* units occupied railway stations and other places of strategic significance.

During the following years, political conflict escalated until the Catholic Engelbert Dollfuss became chancellor in 1932. Under Dollfuss, the Austrian government was moving towards centralization of power in the fascist model while the chancellor kept his distance from the Nazi regime in Berlin. Unlike in Germany, the Austrian Nazis never won significant support among the urban middle class. This stratum had declined, together with industry and banking.

> For the absence of this essential support, Austrian Fascism could not make up, as long as it was represented by the Heimwehren. And even later, the Nazis took over the role of the leading Fascist movement, and won a good deal more peas-

> ant support than the Heimwehren had ever had, the half-hearted willingness of the peasants could never make up for the absence of so powerful a middle-class movement as Nazism had been able to launch in Germany.[52]

On February 12, 1934 the Austrian government provoked a civil war by ordering search warrants for the headquarters of the Socialist Party. At that time the Socialist Party structures were already weakened and the uprising of its supporters was quickly defeated. Subsequently the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and all workers' organizations were banned. On May 1, 1934, the cabinet approved a new constitution that established a one-party system. This new order was called the Patriotic Front and remained in force until Austria became part of Nazi Germany. Borkenau explained how the Patriotic Front government frustrated the ambitions of pro-Hitler sympathizers in Austria who wished both political influence and unification with Germany, leading to the murder of Dollfuss on July 25, 1934. His successor, Schusschnigg, maintained the ban on Nazi activities in Germany, but was forced to resign on March 11, 1938. One day later, German troops invaded Austria no resistance. Borkenau was convinced that Germany would not be content with this peaceful conquest.

> Why should not Germany attempt to continue where Napoleon failed? Should it do so then the Anschluss would not lead to the establishment of a better balance of power, but would be the prelude to a struggle for life and death between all great powers such as the world has never witnessed before.[53]

The future historian would perhaps speak of the *Anschluss* as a prelude to still greater misfortunes for the whole world. Borkenau predicted that Nazi Germany would now try to swallow up Czechoslovakia. In the end this would lead to a conflict between Germany and Russia that "can only be conceived as a round of arms."[54]

The New German Empire, Borkenau's next book, was written right after Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia. Borkenau asked how far Germany would go in its ruthless expansion, what its methods were, and what the political and economic structure of the empire that Nazi Germany was setting out to conquer would be.

Borkenau described in detail that Nazi rule can only work with the help of the most rigid control of the entire economic life. "The all-powerful Nazi State, after having destroyed the trade unions and the various organizations for the safeguarding of industrial, agrarian and banking interests could afford to impose its law upon all classes of the population."[55]

Borkenau explained that it was not in the character of the Nazi regime to be generous to its German opponents or to its occupied nations. He investigated

the Nazi plans for the control of foreign natural resources and international shipping routes, in direct rebuttal to the wishful thinking of British Conservatives and American isolationists that Hitler could be "appeased" by ceding him small, "unimportant" pieces of territory.[56] The Nazis could not envisage "the weak and defeated in any other role but that of an outlet for their sadistic instincts. It is here that the Nazi mentality differs most profoundly from that of all the great empire builders."[57]

> *Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*. (Curb the proud, but when you have subjected them, treat them with humanity.) This was the principle on which the Roman Empire was built, on which every empire has to be built. Constant neglect of either part of this rule invites disaster. Empires crash if they are unwilling to fight their enemies. They crash, too, if they cannot transform a military conquest into peaceful administration. It is the second score on which Germany is likely to fail in the execution of her plans.[58]

FROM CRITICAL MARXISM TO COLD WAR ANTI-COMMUNISM

At the same time, Borkenau tried to re-evaluate the current history of the communist movement. *World Communism: A History of the Communist International* became, like Borkenau's book on the Spanish Civil War, a standard work on its subject, as an early reviewer, Arthur Rosenberg, noticed correctly.[59]

This book was based to some extent on Borkenau's personal experience as an active communist. He had, as he wrote, participated in the revolutionary campaign in Germany in 1923 and he "was struck by the self-assured feeling of the young university students of various nationalist organizations [in Leipzig], who did not doubt that they were infinitely stronger than the communists; which was only the truth. And the weaker side never exerts attraction over the stronger one."[60]

Borkenau emphasized that the "one correct approach to an understanding of the Comintern" has to be "an historical account of it. Communism is not one of those stable factors that are to-day what they were decades ago."[61] In the history of the Communist International three periods should be clearly distinguished. "During the first period the Comintern is mainly an instrument to bring about revolution. During the second period it is mainly an instrument in the Russian factional struggles. During the third period it is mainly an instrument of Russian foreign policy."[62]

No Comintern leader could match Stalin's political ability. Some of them, like Bukharin, were of high moral standards. However, Bukharin "was no politician. He had a particularly unhappy tendency to swing from one attitude

to the opposite one and to carry each of his varying attitudes to extremes."[63] For Borkenau, Stalin's triumph was logical, but was mainly the triumph of the party apparatus over the party intelligentsia. He showed in detail how the active membership was gradually deprived of any possibility of exerting in practice its formal right to participate in the laying down of party policy. "This was in the old Bolshevik tradition."[64]

Borkenau reminded his readers of Rosa Luxemburg's legacy that the proletariat must build a new democratic society; otherwise its rule would degenerate to a dictatorship of a clique. "With all her illusions, Rosa Luxemburg was close to the realities of the Western labour movement." She saw the incompatibility of Leninist Bolshevism and the West and was nevertheless ready to make an attempt at cooperation.[65] In one of the most penetrating passages of his book, Borkenau wrote:

> [l]ooking backward upon her role and attitude, one finds it difficult to believe that anything but a break could have been the end of her relations with the Comintern. But in the meantime she would have been the one person able to balance and withstand the influence of the Russians. She alone might have had the authority and strength to carry those she had persuaded to co-operate with the Bolsheviks with her when she broke with them. All the others who later took that step were officers without troops. She might have left as the head of an army; which would have been of incalculable consequence for the unity of the German workers when they attempted to withstand Hitler. But she died, and Leo Jogiches was killed a few weeks after her.[66]

That minority of party members whose political consciousness had been formed in the democratic context of pre-war Western labor movement was unwilling to accept the Stalinist rigidity. The result was a shifting of the membership and a shifting of the social character of communist parties. Since the late 1920s these parties tended to attract *déclassé* elements more and more, "young intellectuals with Bohemian leanings on the one hand, unemployed on the other." These elements, not the industrial working class, were the social basis for political left-wing extremism.[67] Borkenau concluded that, while capitalism is unable to cope with the problems of the twentieth century, a leading role of the proletariat in present-day upheavals has proved to be a utopian element in Marxism.

> In Russia, not the proletariat, but a quasi-religious order of professional revolutionaries of the intelligentsia took the lead, with the help of the peasants, the peasant soldiers, and the workers. In the West, where there was neither such an order nor masses willing to follow it, the idea of a proletarian revolution proved to be a complete illusion.[68]

It was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 that led Borkenau to break completely with the Marxist left. This shift in his opinion is documented in his books *The Totalitarian Enemy* and *Socialism—National or International*.

The Totalitarian Enemy was Borkenau's immediate reaction to the Hitler-Stalin Pact.[69] He opposed what he saw as "the view commonly held that Fascism and Communism were deadly enemies, and that their hostility was the crux of world politics to-day."[70] In contrast to this opinion, Borkenau provided his own fundamental argument of "the essential similarity between the German and the Russian systems." Borkenau stated that it "is no longer heresy to describe the Nazi regime as 'Brown Bolshevism' and Stalin's regime as 'Red Fascism'."[71] He anticipated a coming conflict between "the democratic and the totalitarian types of régime," which could have even led to a military clash.[72] National Socialism was, as Borkenau stated, a Western revolt against itself, which could only exist in form of a permanent crusade against the principles of enlightenment.[73]

> What else is Hitlerism unless it is these two *credos*: first, that is the Germans are God's Chosen People, by nature superior to all other people, predestined to rule the world and to bring salvation to it; and secondly, that Hitler is the chosen prophet of the chosen people? . . . Yet there remains something specific about the Nazi faith, distinguishing it from ordinary nationalism, and this something decidedly has its roots in the Old Testament. It is the connection between the Nazi faith and what every student of German affairs knows as the German inferiority complex . . . German nationalism and the German belief in the special mission of Germany always had about it something peculiarly unbalanced, something almost pathological.[74]

Despite the different origins of Nazism and Bolshevism, both were results against the Western world. However, Bolshevism was also a result of a Western revolt against itself: it was a product of Marxism. Neither National Socialism nor Bolshevism was based on a concrete economic conception. Their triumph was only the result of successful coups d'état, which demonstrated the decomposition of Western civilization. In Germany, as well as in Russia, the totalitarian dictatorship would also finally lead to a decomposition of the whole society: at first Nazism destroyed the labor organizations but would end in destroying capitalism. In Soviet Russia, the same process had started with the liquidation of non-Bolshevik labor parties and would end in the destruction of the whole society.

Thus, Bolshevism "was from the beginning a sort of Fascism *avant la lettre*." Lenin, by rejecting the idea of a democratic, self-governing party, "was earlier than Hitler in launching the idea of a party and a mass movement entirely built upon obedience, not upon self-determination, and accepting as

ultimate justification the word of one man."[75] Borkenau even went so far as to say that "the Nazi concept of a classless leadership is only a copy of Lenin's idea."[76] He did not neglect the large-scale support for Hitler by Germany's industrial and agrarian "elites": "Hitler, on his road to power, presented himself as the saviour of private property."[77] However, the Nazi regime was, as Borkenau explained, a direct outcome of the collapse, not the expansion, of German capitalism.[78]

> In its economic aspects the totalitarian revolution marks in the main the transition from an economic system run by individual property owners . . . to a centralized and planned economy. It will come even in those countries where it has not yet come. It has started to come under the New Deal in the United States.[79]

Marx's analysis of the effects of industrial competition and of the trends toward monopoly was proven right. "In Nazi Germany the smaller units are destroyed through the action of the state."[80] However, the chief totalitarian movement remained the Soviet Union. "Russia is the totalitarian country *par excellence*: Communism the purest and most logical form of totalitarianism."[81] He concluded: "The year 1929, when the first Five-Year Plan was launched, marks the final emergence of totalitarianism in Russia."[82]

Borkenau anticipated a long-term cooperation between Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany and, like other theoreticians of totalitarianism; he was completely surprised when the German army invaded Russia in June 1941.

Socialism—National or International, written in 1942, dealt with the prospects of socialism after Hitler's defeat. In a brochure which he had published just a year earlier Borkenau had emphasized, "economic planning entails a great deal more bureaucratic power and centralization than was necessary and even admissible in a liberal economic system."[83] Now he stated that "planned economy, if once established, should never abolish individual ownership of means of production." Borkenau saw the reconstruction of world economy as incompatible with "a programme of class struggle."[84] He suggested that the British Labour Party should seek an alliance with the liberal democratic forces of the United States. Socialism that had been pictured as a catastrophic change from one social system to another would come in gradually "precisely through the gradual growth of state intervention," as applied through the policy of the Labour Party.[85]

Remarkably enough, Borkenau insisted on his violent rejection of the Soviet Union as a model for socialism in a time when Western-Soviet alliance silenced much of the previous critique on Stalin and Stalinism. "How could I dare to soil the name of socialism by associating it with a dirty piece of trickery such as Soviet Russia," he asked his readers polemically.[86] Internationalism in the Soviet sense should be considered only as a fake, while "Labour

internationalism would be embodied in mutual help." Liberal internationalism, on the other hand, would mainly be embodied in free international trade, thus, "internationalism, then, is not a specifically labor and socialist point of view at all. It is something carried into the labour movement as an inheritance from the liberal tradition." It is precisely that what would make the relationship between liberalism and socialism particularly complex.[87]

BETWEEN ENGLAND AT WAR AND WESTERN GERMANY IN THE COLD WAR

After his brief deportation to Australia in 1940–41—obviously a very unhappy period in his life—Borkenau moved back to London.[88] His lectureship at London University ended in April 1943, when he started his work for the BBC, mainly for its German program. In 1944 he worked for the American Office of War Information and was designated to establish a democratic-based news agency in liberated Germany. In July 1945, after his private relationship with the Austrian sociologist Marie Jahoda had ended,[89] he went to Bad Nauheim near Frankfurt to direct a branch of the *Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur* (DENA, later DANA), which preceded the *Deutsche Presseagentur*, the German News Agency.[90] But his goal was to teach at a major German university.

The University of Marburg accepted his 1934 book on the transition from feudal to bourgeois society as *Habilitationsschrift*. The committee stated explicitly that Borkenau's long exile had not allowed him to pursue his academic career. However, Borkenau's hope to get a chair in modern history was not fulfilled. He learned that his unusual background and life made him ineligible for a full professorship. Instead of him, the university appointed Fritz Wagner. As it turned out later, this was not a bad decision, since Wagner was to become a very productive and renowned expert in modern historiography. In the 1950s and 1960s he wrote a number of books on European historical thought. These works reflected his liberal open-mindedness. But at the time of his appointment, Wagner's list of publication and his teaching experience was not comparable to those of Borkenau. At this moment Wagner did not have much more to offer than his former membership of the *Reichsinstitut zur Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands*, one of the pillars of Nazi research on what was called "The Jewish Question." Although this matter was not made public when Wagner was appointed, it became clear to Borkenau that a former member of the Communist Party did not have as good a background and personal connections—always the decisive factors in an academic career—than a former researcher at the Nazi *Reichsinstitut*.[91]

In May 1947 the university appointed Borkenau as Honorary Professor, but the prestigious title did not give him an adequate academic position, i.e. a full professorship. Borkenau taught extensively on European history from the Renaissance to present times with special emphasis on his old subject: the generations of cultures and the origins of modern Western civilization.[92] He also married again. His wife Hildegard née Tellmann was a student of chemistry and, like her husband, interested in language studies. In 1947 and 1949 sons Felix and Peter were born, but the marriage ended only a few years later.

It was the U. S. military administration that gave Borkenau a fresh start in his professional career. In November 1948 Harold Hurwitz, at this time working for the American Military Government in Frankfurt-am-Main, offered him a position as chief research consultant at the Political Information Research Service Division.[93] Borkenau asked the university for a sabbatical. Six months later the dean allowed him to extend his leave of absence. In March 1949 Borkenau was appointed chief research consultant at the Editorial Projection Branch that was another division of the U. S. military government. His main task was to publish *Ost-Probleme*, a journal that dealt with communist politics in Europe and Asia.[94] He also translated Gaetano Mosca's old classic *Elementi di scienza politica* and, later, Lionel Kochan's *Russia and the Weimar Republic* into German.[95]

Borkenau published a number of essays for *Ost-Probleme* as well as for *Der Monat*, a journal that was sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. He also wrote the postscript to the German edition of *The God that Failed*, the famous collection of ex-communist writers, who explained why they had broken with communism.[96] Of note is his brochure on *The Year 1917: Reality and Legend of the Russian Revolution*. There he attacked Stalinist falsifications about the revolution of 1917. He explained that in the West, the traditions of political representation and of the liberties of the towns never died out and gave rise to democratic mass movements. In Russia, however, a powerful middle-class and bourgeois liberty did not develop. Industrial development, entrepreneurship, and technology were largely the work of foreigners. Workers and peasants thus knew only the two alternatives of sporadic and violent rebellions and of secret complots, resulting in the Bolshevik *coup d'état*.[97]

Borkenau's main contribution to Cold War literature was undoubtedly his large-scale book *European Communism, which* appeared in 1952 in German and a year later in several other languages. "It is entirely for practical purposes that I have written the present book," Borkenau emphasized.[98] He again made it clear that his attitude toward communism was "one of total rejection . . . Yet even the most dispassionate historian has a public in mind, and the public I have primarily in mind this time differs from the potential readers I have thought of in 1937."[99]

This was entirely true, since Borkenau did not address the book to critical Marxists, of whom he had been one in 1937, the time of his Comintern book. Borkenau saw the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as the first stage in a process, which would lead to a conflict between the communist main powers: Russia and China.[100] In order to prevent this, Stalin would try to extend his political influence over the West, mostly by using Western communist parties as his "Fifth Columns." If the West had nothing to oppose Stalin but a passive policy of containment, it "shall be defeated, as every policy of mere defense must be in the long run . . . I am very far from advocating a policy of the 'offensive,' of the type used by the communists themselves during their various phases of left extremism; nothing would be more disastrous than to adopt a 'forward' policy which, under stress, could be not maintained."[101]

Borkenau urged Western governments to support anti-communist uprisings throughout the whole Soviet Bloc. Had the United States invaded East Berlin during the time of the Berlin blockade in 1948, then "there might have been clashes with Russian tanks, of the type of the Japanese-Russian clashes on the Mongolian border in 1938 and 1939; there would certainly not have been war . . . The Soviet regime in the East German zone would have collapsed, and Stalin would have taken it, knowing that he *could* not go to war. Imagine the consequences of a simultaneous collapse of Russian rule in Yugoslavia and East Germany!"[102] Tito's rebellion against Stalin should also be supported while the West should acknowledge that it was not the leader of Yugoslavia, but Stalin who made the break irreversible.[103] In the Soviet Union there would be no move towards any kind of "poly-centrism" but instead, a move back to the one-man leadership.[104] The attempt to demolish Soviet rule in Poland and Hungary in 1956 would move the internal conflicts among Moscow's leadership to a climax.[105]

While Ossip Flechtheim acknowledged some intellectual merits of Borkenau's *European Communism*,[106] William David Jones criticized that it "descended frequently into the bitterest polemics. The anti-Communist passions of the fifties sometimes overwhelmed Borkenau's true gift for unorthodox yet insightful analysis, the very quality that had been the source of some brilliant historical and sociological writings in the thirties."[107] The former Communist functionary remained reckless in his anti-communist zeal to convince the Western public that he "was free from any totalitarian temptation."[108] Borkenau was unable to see that inside Western communism a less dogmatic tendency emerged that would, years later, become a challenge for Moscow.[109] He specialized, as Walter Laqueur noticed, in predictions. Some of them were borne out by subsequent events, such as the Sino-Soviet split, while others were false, such as Borkenau's assumption that Malenkov would have been

the driving force of the anti-Semitic "Doctor's Plot" in 1952.[110] However, Laqueur noticed that even Borkenau's mistakes were "frequently more interesting and suggestive than the less erroneous analyses of other writers."[111]

Borkenau defined his method as a kind of "content-analysis," taking its departure from what was known to the Western public. He interpreted the peculiarities of Soviet history "from above," as a product of internecine party fights. The historian, as he insisted, "must know the history of numberless party controversies in the past as a learned theologian would the countless disputes that marked the course of Christian dogma."[112] Borkenau insisted that it was exactly this method that led him to predict, in early 1953, that Stalin would either be dead or on death's door. He described his assumption in the following way:

> [o]n January 4, 1953, the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party passed a resolution on the "teachings of the Slánský case" that attracted much attention, first of all because it revealed an extreme anti-Semitic tendency reminiscent of Goebbels propaganda; and secondly, because it indicated an impending decision in the struggle within the East German Communist organization between Ulbricht and Dahlem.
>
> Two other important aspects of this notorious resolution passed, however, almost unnoticed. Malenkov was quoted at inordinate length, and so identified with the anti-Semitic campaign that had just reached its first climax in the Prague trials. By quoting him in this fashion, *and* by adding his own help to the anti-Semitic chorus, Ulbricht, the animator of the resolution, proclaimed himself a Malenkov client. But even more important: while Malenkov was cited at length, *Stalin was quoted with a mere half-sentence dating from 1910*. Such a deliberate affront could have been offered only by people sure of the tyrant's approaching downfall, or else out of the reach of his retribution. Otherwise it was sure suicide. It was primarily on the strength of the evidence found in this resolution that I then predicted, in print, Stalin's immediate death—which sure enough, came seven weeks later.[113]

In August 1949 Melvin Lasky, Ruth Fischer (once chair of the German Communist Party), Franz Borkenau, and possibly the CIA expert Michael Josselson met in a Frankfurt hotel room and discussed their idea for a permanent structure dedicated to what was called an organized intellectual resistance to communist propaganda. There the idea of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was born.[114] In June 1950, Borkenau served as a speaker at the Berlin meeting of the congress.[115] In 1951, he testified against a journalist, the husband of the writer Kay Boyle, Baron Joseph von Franckenstein, who was a former U. S. officer. Borkenau accused him of "communist sympathies." Franckenstein immediately lost his State Department job. His wife lost her position as for-

eign correspondent for *The New Yorker*, a post she had held for six years. For several years, she was blacklisted by most of the major magazines.[116] It was not until 1957 that a decision reversed Franckenstein's dismissal, in which Borkenau had been a so-called friendly witness.[117]

Borkenau died suddenly at the age of fifty-six. On May 22, 1957, he was found dead in a hotel in Zurich, one of the places where he spent a restless life. His last book, an edition of Karl Marx's writings on history, was remarkably more moderate in tone than his previous books. In his preface Borkenau noted that Marxism presents itself as a science capable of practical application. But neither Marx himself nor any of his followers were ever willing to admit that Marxism, like any genuine scientific theory based on experiment, is only a provisional hypothesis subject to constant and unlimited revision as new facts emerge. Thus, Marxism should be considered as a form of secular faith rather than as a scientific method. Borkenau compared Marx's theoretical adventures with the mystical flight of Icarus, resulting in disaster. He went as far to say that Marx's thought could be considered a socialist secularization of Jewish eschatology; a thesis that was supported by authors of different philosophical and political convictions, such as Arnold Toynbee or Martin Buber.[118] The Marxist vision of communist paradise would end, as Borkenau stated, as "an atavistic relapse to early forms of religious thought."[119]

We do not know what would have happened had Borkenau lived longer. His last book on Marx, as well as a brochure on the Civil War in Russia shows, despite its critical stance toward Marxism, an obvious sympathy with non-Bolshevik socialists.[120] However, Borkenau remained isolated. At the end of his life he "was disliked both by Catholics and Jews, Communists and anti-Communists, the friends and foes of the Frankfurt School, academic historians and political philosophers."[121] Even his friendship to George Orwell was not resumed after Borkenaus's return from Australia.[122] It was Richard Löwenthal who remained closest to him.[123]

Borkenau's last writings were, at least, more sober and rational than his *European Communism*. It may be disputed whether or not W. D. Jones's notion is correct that Borkenau was still poking among the fragments of what he once had called evolutionary Marxism.[124] The former communist and then anti-communist writer was now convinced that the dream of social justice would have been realized in the new State of Israel "as nowhere else in the world."[125] He remained an ardent critic of Soviet communism, but without his previous canonical rigidity. Had he once depicted Isaac Deutscher's biography of Stalin as a Bolshevik treatise in liberal disguise, Borkenau now might have read with some reflection Deutscher's indirect rejoinder.[126] In a critical review of *The God That Failed* Deutscher made a clear distinction between heretics and renegades of communism. The heretic breaks, in Deutscher's

words, with Stalinism in the name of socialism. The renegade goes on to break with Marxism and socialism itself and "[h]e claims to have made the discovery that the root of the evil goes far deeper than he at first imagined . . . He no longer throws out the dirty water of the Russian revolution to protect the baby; he discovers that the baby is a monster which must be strangled." As in his communist past, the renegade remains a sectarian, Deutscher stated. "He is an inverted Stalinist. He continues to see the world in white and black, but now the colours are differently distributed . . . Once, he accepted the party's claim to infallibility; now he believes himself to be infallible. Having once been caught by the "greatest illusion," he is now obsessed by the greatest disillusion of our time.[127]

At this time Hannah Arendt wrote her widely disputed essay "The Ex-Communists." There she drew a line between former communists and ex-communists. After their break with the party, former communists disappeared into public and private life. Their communist past did not become "the nucleus of their new opinions, viewpoints, *Weltanschauungen*. They neither looked for a substitute for a lost faith nor did they concentrate all their efforts and talents on the fight against communism." The ex-communists, however, "have become prominent on the strength of their past alone. Communism has remained the chief issue in their lives." Arendt emphasized that, "like the communists, the ex-communists see the whole texture of our time in terms of one dichotomy ending in a final battle. There is no plurality of forces in the world, there are only two." The ex-communists, with all their fanaticism, are communists "turned upside down." Consequently, their anticommunism forms a doctrine that the end justifies the means, even "totalitarian means," as Arendt concluded.[128]

Alfred Kantorowicz, himself a former communist, came to a similar conclusion: "This is not to speak in favor of the whole range of sterile, unconditional anticommunism that in its customary extreme form is another variant of totalitarianism that is not the antithesis, but rather a parallel version of the Stalinist variant of communism."[129] In contrast to Deutscher, Arendt, and Kantorowicz, Borkenau's life and work reflects the impasse in which he found himself. This impasse was not merely his own, it was rather part of a blind alley in which an entire generation of writers and activists destructed by the catastrophes of the 20th century, ended a life of bitterness and self-destruction.

NOTES

1. See also Mario Kessler, "Geschichtspolitik und Geschichtsschreibung am Beginn des Kalten Krieges: Das Beispiel Franz Borkenau," *8. Mai 1945: Von den*

Schwierigkeiten beim Umgang mit deutscher Geschichte (Jena: Thüringer Forum, 2005), 81–92, also in: Mario Kessler, *Vom bürgerlichen Zeitalter zur Globalisierung: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin: trafo verlag, 2005), 145–58; Idem "Zwischen Kommunismus und Antikommunismus: Franz Borkenau (1900–1957)," Mario Kessler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil (1933–1945): Ausgewählte Studien* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2005), 169–96; Idem, *Kommunismuskritik im westlichen Nachkriegsdeutschland: Franz Borkenau, Richard Löwenthal und Ossip Flechtheim* (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011).

2. Among Rudolf Pollak's works are *Die Widerklage* (Vienna, 1889; reprinted: Frankfurt-Main: Kelp, 1970); *Das Concursrecht* (Berlin: Heymann, 1889); *Grundriß der kaufmännischen Rechtslehre: Bürgerliches und Handelsrecht* (Vienna: Rikola-Verlag, 1922).

3. The original name of the family was Borkenau-Pollak. See the family's file in: Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv, St. Pölten, Registratur der ehem. k.-k. Statthalterei, Akt/Abt. VII/4333/1917, V-49-h. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Berta Varga (Budapest), Dr. Lisa Abendroth (Frankfurt-Main), and Professor Harold Hurwitz (Berlin) for valuable information about Borkenau's character and background.

4. See Franz Borkenau's file in Staatsarchiv Marburg, Universitätsarchiv, 305a, acc. 1976/19, No. 3607, no pagination (cited hereafter as University Archive Marburg, Borkenau File). Referring to Gerald Brenan, Árpád Szakolczai writes that Borkenau was shocked when he, as a teenager, had learned about his partial Jewish origin. See Árpád Szakolczai, *Reflexive Historical Sociology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 26.

5. See Richard Löwenthal, "In memoriam Franz Borkenau," *Der Monat*, 9 (1957), No. 106, 57. For Bernfeld's remarkable influence on German and Austrian youth movement after 1900 see Walter Laqueur, *Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), *passim*.

6. "Jews and especially Vienna Jews as an element of social radicalism [were regarded] as an element of social radicalism. Such a contention can only provoke a smile upon the faces of those who know the real situation. After the war a considerable part of the Jewish youth in Austria became socialist because the majority of this young generation was socialist as a whole. But the bulk of Vienna Jews have always been conservative in their political views, and even reactionary." Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After* (London: Faber & Faber, 1938), 105–06.

7. Kuczynski, however, did not mention Borkenau in his memoirs. See Jürgen Kuczynski, *Memoiren: Die Erziehung des J. K. zum Kommunisten und Wissenschaftler* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1973). On Kuczynski, see Axel Fair-Schulz's essay in this volume.

8. Borkenau is not mentioned in an extensive study on Varga. See Gerhard Duda, *Jenö Varga und die Geschichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik in Moskau 1921–1970* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).

9. See Richard Löwenthal, "In memoriam Franz Borkenau," 57–60. See also Löwenthal's introduction to Franz Borkenau, *End and Beginning: On the Generations of Cultures and the Origins of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 4.

10. Borkenau mentioned this otherwise unknown fact in an additional letter to his curriculum vitae, written on March 16, 1946, in: University Archive Marburg, Borkenau File.

11. See Anson Rabinbach, *The Crisis of Austrian Socialism, 1927–1934* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 115–16.

12. For Borkenaus's biography see his curriculum vitae in: Universitätsarchiv Leipzig, Phil. Fak. Prom. 9975; John E. Tashean, *Franz Borkenau: A Study of his Social and Political Ideas*, Ph.D. Thesis, Georgetown University (Washington, D.C., 1962); Idem, "Borkenau: The Rediscovery of a Thinker," *Partisan Review*, 51 (1984), 289–300; Valeria E. Russo, "Profilo di Franz Borkenau," *Rivista di filosofia*, 72 (1981), 20, 291–316; Volker Reinecke, *Kultur und Todesantinomie: Die Geschichtsphilosophie Franz Borkenaus*, (Vienna: Passagen-Verlag, 1992); Birgit Lange-Enzmann, *Franz Borkenau als politischer Denker* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996); Janko Prunk, "Der Beitrag von Franz Borkenau zur Erforschung des Totalitarismus 1932–1940," Dietrich Papenfuß and Wolfgang Schieder (eds.), *Deutsche Umbrüche im 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 297–307; Árpád Szakolczai, "Norbert Elias and Franz Borkenau: Intertwined Life-Works," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 17 (2000), 2, 45–69; Bernd Rabehl, "Kommunismus und Terror: Franz Borkenaus Bestimmung des 'mechanistischen Weltbildes' und Schlussfolgerungen für die 'Systemauffassung' im Marxismus-Leninismus," *Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat*, 10 (2001), 1, 57–67; Clemens Vollnhals, "Ein Renegat schreibt Theoriegeschichte: Franz Borkenau (1900–1957)," Mike Schmeitzner (ed.), *Totalitarismuskritik von links: Deutsche Diskurse im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 177–92.

13. Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1981), 15, writes about life in pre-WWI Europe as "das goldene Zeitalter der Sicherheit."

14. For the problem of Cold-War liberalism see Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

15. Franz Borkenau-Pollak, *A Universal history of the world from the earliest accounts of time*, Phil. Diss., Leipzig 1925 (submitted 1924). A copy can be found at the University Library of Leipzig.

16. For the early history of the institute see Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of The Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), on Borkenau see 13, 16–20, and *passim*.

17. Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1934). The book appeared in the monograph series of the Institute of Social Research.

18. Henryk Grossmann, "Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der mechanistischen Philosophie und die Manufaktur," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 4 (1935), 2, 161–231. On the Borkenau-Grossman controversy, see Rick Kuhn, *Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 163–67. However, Borkenau emphasized Georg Lukács's influence on his own

thought, particularly Lukács's understanding of class conflicts. See Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, VII. He also mentioned Abram Deborin's elaboration of a philosophy of science with an emphasis on practice in contrast to mechanical materialism of Stalinist understanding of Marxism. See ibid. On Deborin see David Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), and Oskar Negt (ed.), *Abram Deborin-Nikolai Bucharin: Kontroversen über dialektischen und mechanischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1969).

19. Kuhn, *Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism*, 165.

20. See ibid, and Szakolczai, *Reflexive Historical Sociology*, 26–27.

21. Lucien Febvre, [Review of] "Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, V6 (1934), 3, 369–74, reprinted in: Idem, *Pour une histoire à part entière* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1962), 743–51.

22. Decades later, this argument was elaborated by a number of authors, such as the Marxist Mihaly Vajda and the non-Marxist A.F.K. Orgonski. For an overview of the discussion, see Reinhard Kühnl, *Faschismustheorien: Ein Leitfaden* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1986), 152–67; Wolfgang Wippermann, *Faschismustheorien: Zum Stand der gegenwärtigen Diskussion* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 80–86, and Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism*, *1914–1945* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 456–59.

23. Franz Borkenau, "Zur Soziologie des Faschismus," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 68, No. 5 (February 1933), 513–47. Reprinted in: Ernst Nolte (ed.), *Theorien über den Faschismus*, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972), 156–81.

24. For Borkenau's marginal position in the institute see Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule: Geschichte, theoretische Entwicklung, politische Bedeutung* (Munich: dtv, 1988), 144–45, 182, 288.

25. Lucie Varga, *Das Schlagwort vom 'finsteren Mittelalter'* (Baden, 1932, reprinted Vienna: Scientia, 1978). A detailed biographical outline of Lucie Varga can be found in Peter Schöttler, "Lucie Varga ou la face cachée des *Annales*," *Sextant*, Nos. 13–14 (2000), 227–45.

26. Lucie Varga's essays are recollected in*: Zeitenwende: Mentalitätshistorische Studien 1936–1939*, ed. by Peter Schöttler (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1991). See also Peter Schöttler, "Lucie Varga: A Central European Refugee in the Circle of the French 'Annales,' 1934–1941," *History Workshop Journal*, 27 (1992), Issue 33, 100–20.

27. Georg Haschek [i.e. Borkenau], "Partis, traditions et structures sociales en Autriche," *Annales*, 7 (1935), 1–12.

28. Lucie Varga, "La genèse du national-socialisme: Notes d'analyse sociale," *Annales*, 9 (1937), 529–46. German translation: "Die Entstehung des Nationalsozialismus: Sozialhistorische Anmerkungen," Idem, *Zeitenwende*, 112–38.

29. Franz Borkenau*, Pareto* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1936), 196–97.

30. Ibid., 181–82.

31. William David Jones, *The Lost Debate: German Socialist Intellectuals and Totalitarianism* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 94. See also

idem, "Toward a Theory of Totalitarianism: Franz Borkenau's *Pareto*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 53 (1992), 455–66.

32. Borkenau, *Pareto*, 211.

33. Ibid., 203.

34. Ibid, 203–04. See the positive review of E. E. Evans-Pritchard in: *Sociological Review*, 29 (1937), 426. Modern authors, such as Gottfried Eisermann and Piet Tommissen, have a much more critical view of Borkenau's *Pareto*; see Gottfried Eisermann, *Vilfredo Pareto: Ein Klassiker der Soziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1987); Piet Tommissen, "Vilfredo Pareto," Dirk Kaesler (ed.), *Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens*, Vol. 1: *Von Comte bis Dürkheim* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1976), 201–31.

35. See Borkenau's essays (written under the pen name Ludwig Neureither) "Klassenbewusstsein," *Zeitschrift fuer Sozialismus*, 1 (1934), 139–56, "Staat und Revolution," Ibid., 181–85, and "Noch einmal: Klassenbewusstsein," Ibid. 325–29.

36. Felix Gilbert, *A European Past: Memoirs 1905–1945* (New York: Norton, 1988), 173.

37. However, *The Spanish Cockpit* was not discussed in a more recent evaluation of the subject that appeared in Russia. See S. P. Pozharskaya and A. V. Zhubin, "Grazhdanskaya voyna i frankisty v Ispanii," Ya. S. Drabkin and P. N. Komolova (eds.), *Totalitarizm v Evrope XX-ogo veka* (Moscow: Pamyatniki istoricheskoy mysli, 1996), 150–79.

38. George Orwell, "Review of Franz Borkenau*, The Spanish Cockpit* (London, 1937)," *Time and Tide*, July 31, 1938, reprinted in: *An Age Like This: The Collected Essays of George Orwell*, Vol. 1, ed. by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 276.

39. Henryk Grossman was fundamentally mistaken when he, in a letter to Max Horkheimer of November 6, 1936, denounced Borkenau for taking a "position against the [Republican] regime in Madrid" and saw him as "a pronounced fascist." At this time, Bokenau had not yet published *The Spanish Cockpit*. Letter from Grossman to Horkheimer, as quoted from: Kuhn, *Henryk Grossman and the Recovery of Marxism*, 171.

40. See Valerie Brun-Zechowoj, *Manfred Stern—General Kléber: Die tragische Biographie eines Berufsrevolutionärs, 1896–1954* (Berlin: trafo verlag, 2000). There was no relationship to Borkenau's first wife Lucie Varga née Stern.

41. Franz Borkenau, "Preface" to Jose Martin Blasquez*, I Helped to Build an Army: Civil War Memoirs of a Spanish Staff Officer* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1939), IX.

42. Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Political and Social Conflicts of the Spanish Civil War* (London: Faber & Faber, 1937), 254.

43. Franz Borkenau, "State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War," *Sociological Review*, 29 (1937), 74–75.

44. Borkenau, "Preface," VIII–IX.

45. NKVD: Russian abbreviation for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (also the name for the secret police).

46. Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, 289.

47. Alfred Kantorowicz, *Politik und Literatur im Exil: Deutschsprachige Schriftsteller im Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: dtv, 1983), 184–85.
48. Franz Borkenau, "State and Revolution," *Sociological Review*, 29 (1937), 52.
49. Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After*, 10.
50. Ibid, 214.
51. The Heimwehr was a paramilitary group founded after World War I. It was similar in violent methods, authoritarian organization, and fascist ideology to the German Freikorps (Free Corps).
52. Borkenau, *Austria and After*, 233–34.
53. Ibid., 335.
54. Ibid., 334.
55. Borkenau, The *New German Empire* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1939), 31.
56. In its analysis and conclusions, Borkenau's book was remarkably similar to Albert Schreiner's *Vom totalen Krieg zur totalen Niederlage Hitlers* (Paris: Editions Prométhée, 1939). Schreiner was one of the leading German communists in French and US exile and worked later as a professor of history in Leipzig and East Berlin. See Mario Kessler, *Exilerfahrung in Wissenschaft und Politik: Remigrierte Historiker in der frühen DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001), 164–96.
57. Borkenau, The *New German Empire*, 140.
58. Ibid., 141.
59. Arthur Rosenberg, Review of: Franz Borkenau, World Communism, in: *The Nation*, 149 (1939), 558. See my comparative essay "Arthur Rosenberg und Franz Borkenau: Gegensätzliche Wege," Mario Kessler, *Ein Funken Hoffnung: Verwicklungen—Antisemitismus, Nahost, Stalinismus* (Hamburg: VSA, 2004), 166–75. Borkenau's analysis of the Comintern also influenced non-partisan studies during the Cold War, e.g., Ossip K. Flechtheim's *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1948, reprinted Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1975).
60. Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), 248 (reprint of the 1938 edition, with a new preface by Raymond Aron).
61. Ibid., 7.
62. Ibid., 419.
63. Ibid., 164.
64. Ibid., 359.
65. Ibid., 147–48.
66. Ibid., 148.
67. Ibid., 420.
68. Ibid., p421.
69. For a recent international reception of the book see Jones, *The Lost Debate*, 118–24; Enzo Traverso (ed.), *Le totalitarisme: Le XXième siècle en débat* (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 353–54; and L. N. Vercenov, "Borkenau: Totalitaricheskij vrag," Idem and Yu. I. Igritskij (eds.), Totalitarizm: Chto eto takoe? Issledovanija zarubezhnych politologov, Vol. 2 (Moscow: R.A.N., 1993), 5–12.

70. Franz Borkenau, *The Totalitarian Enemy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1940), 7.
71. Ibid., 13.
72. Ibid., 7.
73. Ibid., 17.
74. Ibid., 130–31.
75. Ibid., 209.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 21.
78. Ibid., 148.
79. Ibid., 243.
80. Ibid., 74–75.
81. Ibid., 229.
82. Ibid., 225.
83. Franz Borkenau, *After Peace, What? A Program for Counter-Revolution* (Norman, Oklahoma: Cooperative Books, 1941), 6.
84. Franz Borkenau, *Socialism—National or International* (London: Routledge & Sons, 1942), 72. Borkenau expressed his thanks for the revision of the manuscript to Mr. Eric Blair, i.e. George Orwell (X).
85. Ibid., 158.
86. Ibid., 2.
87. Ibid., 30–31.
88. Borkenau had elected to be transferred to Australia because he believed in a successful Nazi invasion in Britain. See Tashean, *Franz Borkenau*, 15, based on information of Richard Löwenthal.
89. Professor Harold Hurwitz gave this information to the author. Marie Jahoda did not mention her relationship to Borkenau in an autobiographical sketch. See her interview "Es war nicht umsonst," Hajo Funke (ed.), *Die andere Erinnerung: Gespräche mit jüdischen Wissenschaftlern im Exil* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1989), 336–60.
90. In Bad Nauheim, Borkenau worked together with the literary sociologist Hans Mayer who did not mention him in his memoirs. See Hans Mayer, *Ein Deutscher auf Widerrruf*, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1982).
91. See University Archive Marburg, Borkenau File, and Wolfgang Behringer, "Bauern-Franz und Rasse-Günther: Die politische Geschichte des Agrarhistorikers Günther Franz," Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1999), 122.
92. Some of his lectures can be found in his book *Drei Abhandlungen zur deutschen Geschichte* (Frankfurt-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1947).
93. University Archive Marburg, Borkenau File.
94. See Harry Pross, *Zeitungsreport: Deutsche Presse im 20. Jahrhundert* (Weimar: Böhlau, 2000), 157. In the early 1950s, Pross was managing director of *Der Monat*.
95. Gaetano Mosca, *Die herrschende Klasse: Grundlagen der politischen Wissenschaft* (Bern: Francke, 1947), with an introduction by Benedetto Croce; Lionel Kochan, *Rußland und die Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf: Müller-Albrechts, 1955).

96. See Franz Borkenau, "Nachwort," *Ein Gott, der keiner war: Arthur Koestler, Andre Gide, Ignazio Silone, Louis Fischer, Richard Wright und Stephen Spender schildern ihren Weg zum Kommunismus und ihre Abkehr* (Cologne: Rote Weissbücher, 1952), 252–261; American edition (without Borkenau's postface): Richard Crossman (ed.), *The God That Failed (*New York: Harper, 1950; new edition: Columbia University Press, 2001).

97. Franz Borkenau, *Das Jahr 1917: Wirklichkeit und Legende der russischen Revolution* (Berlin-Dahlem: Verlag Der Monat, 1952).

98. Franz Borkenau, *European Communism* (London: Faber & Faber, 1953), 13.

99. Ibid., 17.

100. Franz Borkenau, "The Chances of a Mao-Stalin Rift: Will China's Communists Take the Tito Road?" *Commentary*, Vol. 15 (1952), 2, 117–23; Idem, "Getting at the Facts Behind the Soviet Façade," ibid., 17 (1954), 4, 393–400. See also John E. Tashean, "The Sino-Soviet Split: Borkenau's Predictive Analysis of 1952," *China Quarterly*, 94 (1983), 342–61.

101. Borkenau, *European Communism*, 553.

102. Ibid.

103. See ibid., 521.

104. Franz Borkenau, "The Threat of Poly-Centrism," *The New Leader*, July 30, 1956, 15.

105. Melvin J. Lasky, "The 'Sovietologists'" *Encounter*, 5 (1957), 68. Lasky was referring to Borkenau's last prediction.

106. Ossip K. Flechtheim, Review of: Franz Borkenau, European Communism, and Jules Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism," in: *The American Political Science Review*, V48 (1954), 223–24; a slightly altered version in: *Phylon*, 16 (1955), 111–12.

107. Jones, *The Lost Debate*, 186.

108. Jost Hermand, *Kultur im Wiederaufbau: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Frankfurt-Main and Berlin: Ullstein, 1989), 86.

109. For an excellent comparative study on Western European communist intellectuals between Stalinism and democracy, see Thomas Kroll, *Kommunistische Intellektuelle in Westeuropa: Frankreich, Österreich, Italien und Großbritannien im Vergleich* (1945–1956) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).

110. See Franz Borkenau, "Was Malenkov behind the Anti-Semitic Plot?" *Commentary*, 15 (May 1953), 438–46.

111. Walter Laqueur, *The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History from 1917 to the Present*, revised ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1987), 180.

112. Borkenau, "Getting at the Facts behind the Soviet Facade," 398.

113. Ibid., 400. For a discussion of the SED Central Committee's "Lessons" from the Slánský Trial see Mario Kessler, *Die SED und die Juden—zwischen Repression und Toleranz: Politische Entwicklungen bis 1967* (Berlin Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 85–99. Excerpts from the resolution of December 20, 1952 are printed ibid., 153–155.

114. See Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York and London: Collier

Macmillan, 1989), 15, 20–21; and Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 71.

115. See Michael Hochgeschwender, "Remigranten im Umfeld der Zeitschrift *Der Monat* und des *Congress for Cultural Freedem* (CCF)," Claus Dieter Krohn and Axel Schildt (eds.), *Zwischen den Stühlen: Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegszeit* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 180–206, especially 202.

116. On Boyle, see Sandra Spanier Whipple, *Kay Boyle: Artist and Activist* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).

117. For the role of "friendly witnesses" under McCarthyism see Ellen W. Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), *passim*.

118. Franz Borkenau, "Praxis und Utopie," *Karl Marx: Auswahl und Einleitung von Franz Borkenau* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1956, 35–36. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. V (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 178–89; and Martin Buber, *Der utopische Sozialismus* (Cologne: Hegner, 1967), 24.

119. Borkenau, "Praxis und Utopie," 37.

120. Franz Borkenau, *Der russische Bürgerkrieg 1918–1921: Von Brest-Litowsk zur NEP* (Berlin: Grunewald-Verlag, 1954).

121. Szakolczai, *Reflexive Historical Sociology*, 25.

122. See ibid., 29.

123. See Richard Löwenthal, "In memoriam Franz Borkenau."

124. Jones, *The Lost Debate*, 185.

125. Franz Borkenau, "Toynbee and the Future of the Jews [1955]," Idem, *End and Beginning*, 467.

126. Franz Borkenau, "Stalin im Schafspelz: Zu einer neuen Biographie von Isaac Deutscher," *Der Monat*, 1 (1948–49), 14, 203–10. He also attacked E. H. Carr's *History of Soviet Russia* as a product of "iciest calculation," being not far from justifying Stalin's regime. Idem, "Der Spötter als Panegyriker," Ibid., 3 (1951), 36, 614.

127. Isaac Deutscher, "The Ex-Communist's Conscience," Idem, *Heretics and Renegades and other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955, 3rd ed. 1969), 15.

128. Hannah Arendt, "The Ex-Communists," *Commonweal*, 57 (1953), 20, 595–96.

129. Alfred Kantorowicz, *Der geistige Widerstand in der DDR* (Troisdorf: Kammweg-Verlag, 1968), 3.

6

Franz L. Neumann's Place in the History of Political Thought

A Sketch

Alfons Söllner

The historiography of political ideas is firmly established today within the political science family; but in allegorical terms it seems more like the stepmother of the discipline rather than its legitimate daughter.[1] What is the current mood of this sub-discipline of political science? What is the state of the art in this uneasy field between political science and intellectual history, waiting at the windy corner that connects two centuries? The 20th century is over, but since it was a period of turning the tables in almost every respect we can hardly bask securely in intellectual self-confidence. Facing the 21st century, we cannot be sure where we are going since we are still occupied with the question of where we are coming from. The present situation is full of paradoxes and perhaps the most serious, not only for historians of political thought, consists in the contradiction that many scholars tend to fall back on well-established traditions or even a fixed canon of classical figures, whereas others who try to grasp the past century and to construct from it a grand design of political thought hardly come up with any instructive ideas.

Of course, the 1990s produced several weighty, well-written books, which actually fulfilled the promise of their titles by boldly attempting to outline the 20th century in terms of political history. I am thinking, for example, of Eric Hobsbawm's long, suggestive sketch of the "short century," or François Furet's sensitive history of communism, which concentrates less on the subject itself than on its fascination.[2] We could also mention older treatises like Ernst Nolte's *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg*, which was the hidden stumbling block behind the German *Historikerstreit* (historians' quarrel), or Karl Dietrich Bracher's history of political thought from 1982.[3] Interestingly, what is typical of all these accounts is that, despite their commitment, they suffer from

a certain ambiguity, which has methodological implications: while politics is, of course, the core of the narrative and claims all the authors' powers of discourse and explanation, the lessons drawn from the historical setting are often deduced from a different kind of reasoning, which is alien—if not contradictory—to the narrative scheme. Does this mean that in the 20th century the old conflict between theory and praxis, between *vita contemplativa* and *vita activa* has developed into a complete and irreconcilable antagonism? Has political power become a simple, compact totality, the literal "power politics," which also dominates the course of political thought? Does this mean that in the 20th century there is simply no place for intellectual luxury, i.e., for a history of political thinking in its own right?

The following remarks aim to demonstrate that even if we finally have to answer these questions in the affirmative, methodological realism about power is neither a sufficient nor an adequate instrument for understanding the new and complex relationship between politics and thinking, between theory and practice, which is so typical of the 20th century. Of course, any intellectual enterprise is more closely entwined with politics than ever before; but on the other hand there are many examples that demonstrate the increasing impact of educational, scientific and other intellectual investment in politics, which always implies new areas of autonomy and self-organization. If we want to understand the course of political thought in the 20th century in more general terms, then rather than starting from simple entities or isolated lines it seems better to sketch a complex interplay, to imagine a kind of magnetic field between the following four factors, which distinctly mark every incarnation of political thought:

1. the system of political power and its formation into national regimes;
2. the transformation of these political regimes into international constellations;
3. the rather vague but sensitive impact of culture on politics, which results in a distinct and often hegemonic political culture;
4. the internal composition of the academic discipline which specializes in the subject of politics and becomes a formative element of political culture.[4]

Simply enumerating these dimensions does not allow us to envisage a sufficiently constructive idea for an intellectual history of the century, and in this short essay I do not intend to expand on a methodological scale and sketch the internal texture and external context of a narrative, which would turn out to be scarcely less complex than the development of politics itself. I will only try to identify some of the features of Franz Neumann's scientific work and to situ-

ate them in a way that gives contour to some major lines in the fictitious history of political thought. This alone has weighty implications. For example, is Neumann really a case in point? Is he a sufficiently representative figure in this story? Are the different contexts he embraces of general significance for the political curve of the century? And finally, is his style of thinking sophisticated enough to allow conclusions for the history of scholarship?

Presupposing affirmative answers to all these questions,[5] I will describe the three major stages of Neumann's political biography and reconstruct them so as to highlight some general features. This implies chronological limits, since the genesis of this "political scholar" (as Neumann described himself in general terms in 1953)[6] coincided with the first and unsuccessful experiment in German democracy; he reached his peak of intellectual productivity and, perhaps, of political influence under the singular conditions of political exile; and he died prematurely in the mid-1950s, leaving behind an intellectual oeuvre as fragmentary as the postwar period at the time. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that it was precisely Neumann's unusual tripartite course—his path from legal practice via confrontation with Nazism to political science—which is of general significance.

Neumann's thought and writing during the Weimar period was strictly connected to reformist politics, which means that it was restricted by practical aims and dominated by belief in the effective power of legal politics. Here I can only briefly mention his early, close cooperation with Hugo Sinzheimer and the Frankfurt *Akademie für Arbeit*, a trade union school, and his professional commitment as a young lawyer in Berlin where, with Ernst Fraenkel, he focused clearly on the theoretical elaboration of labor law and its practical implementation. In the late 1920s and early 1930s Neumann's perspective undoubtedly expanded, and he concentrated on more general fields like industrial democracy (*Wirtschaftsdemokratie*), constitutional law, especially basic rights (*Grundrechte*) and other areas of conflict between politics and law, which soon became verbal political battlefields.[7]

Does this predominance of practice mean that Neumann's thinking during the Weimar period, as documented in about fifty professional articles and books, cannot make any claim to theoretical relevance? In fact, the contrary seems to be true, for at least two reasons: Firstly, we have to recognize that during the Weimar Republic—and this is very typical of a long and vigorous tradition not only in Germany—it was constitutional, or rather, public law (*Staatsrecht*), which marked out the terrain where the major, decisive political disputations were fought out; secondly, even in Neumann's more practically inclined legal texts there is a kind of subtext, which seems theoretically informed and, more importantly, indicates a clear alternative to or third way between the two dominant schools of thought on public law in Germany.

On the one hand there was legal positivism, which still functioned as the "*herrschende Lehre*," the dominating theory, within the discipline of constitutional law during the Weimar period, and on the other hand there were the new existentialist or substantial trends whose rising stars included Carl Schmitt and Rudolf Smend.[8]

We have to admit that Neumann's legal derivations of special organizational liberties and group rights for the unions were not primarily intended to enrich the methodological details of the debate on public law, highly sophisticated though it was throughout the Weimar period. But let us take a brief look at Neumann's doctoral dissertation written at the University of Frankfurt in 1922.[9] This first academic text we can ascribe to him proposes an explicitly theoretical and methodological project, which contains a rich, general argumentation that covers the whole range of contemporary debate in philosophy and the social sciences. Neumann starts from the philosophy of law, as taught by his *Doktorvater* Max Ernst Mayer, but he is eager to get to grips with a more modern discipline, the sociology of law—with the evident aim of casting some light on its philosophical grounding. Criticizing neo-naturalist thinkers like Stammler and neo-positivists like Hans Kelsen, he ends up with a pretentious reformulation of neo-Kantian arguments, aiming at a new position, which he calls "critical relativism."

It is certainly an extrapolation, but it seems worth drawing the line from here to future developments. Although Neumann adhered strictly to the restrictive methodology of neo-Kantianism, he was apparently not at all happy with its purely negative results. He definitely looked forward to a more positive intellectual enterprise, and distinguished two branches: the immanent analysis of political ideas was to be combined with a sociological theory that was in turn based in a typology of political parties. For the present-day observer, this idea is as simple as its philosophical birth is over-complicated, but the historian whose task is to evaluate and compare sees things differently: As early as 1922, Neumann was able to draw positive conclusions from a dubious, ambiguous *geistige Situation der Zeit*.[10] He felt that he was somewhere in the middle, we could say halfway between Max Weber's concept of *Sozialwissenschaft*, i.e., the Nietzschean-influenced methodological skepticism, which was so typical of the fin de siècle and, on the other hand, the normative or even substantial reactions against *Wertirrationalismus* and putative nihilism. These reactions were to become vital for many political thinkers after World War II.

To situate Neumann's Weimar writings more closely within the larger context of 20th-century political thought would be overstretching the intentions of a practical lawyer. It would also not really help in understanding the unique political culture of Weimar political reformism, which basically consisted of

the illusion that legalist strategies might be effective in simultaneously transforming the capitalist economy and stabilizing political democracy. Nevertheless, we have to realize that for its pioneers, socialist politics, as conducted by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and affiliated unions, was nothing less than an intellectual adventure between two deadly extremes: communism and nationalism. The politics of legality was a very risky project, not least because it was based on a relativist philosophy. In this respect it was part and parcel of a modern, pluralistic and democratic mentality. It would be a misunderstanding to identify this immediately—as many later critics did—with neutrality or even the desire to disrupt the Weimar Republic.[11]

A second aspect of this politics of legality should also be mentioned: its intellectual foundation lay in a kind of applied sociology of knowledge close to the teachings of Karl Mannheim and, in relation to the sociology of law, to the ideas of Karl Renner and Eugen Ehrlich. Combining two interests, the historical and the political, into a single perspective, and seeking to situate this within the history of scholarship between the world wars, we could conclude: Neumann's Weimar writings can be read as a practical version of an embryonic yet impressive stage in the development of modern political science. More outspoken representatives of this political science, which had found a first home in the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, included Hermann Heller and Sigmund Neumann.[12] Most of them certainly retained a somewhat "Germanic" bias, especially in comparison with different Anglo-Saxon traditions, but it was a shock for all of them—the relativists even more than the others—when in 1930–31 the Weimar social and legal system was first transformed by authoritarian rule and, not long after, when Hitler seized power, rooted out step by step. Unavoidably, methodological relativism was no longer suitable for the imperative mood of the hour—the political fight against Hitler.

This conclusion is not only a reflection on the Weimar period; it also results from a more general retrospective view. In Neumann's so-called materialistic decade, his first period in exile, he never fell back on orthodox Marxism, although he undoubtedly reacted strongly against the Weimar experience and his rhetoric and argument were distinctly radicalized. This applies especially to the political pamphlets he drafted in England between 1933 and 1936, which were distributed in Nazi Germany by underground agents.[13] For the shaky and sometimes desperate perspectives of a whole generation of academic expatriates, the disillusioned German lawyer's efforts to fight Hitler were perhaps less important than the conditions he had to submit to in order to have any hope of success. We know that in the early 1940s Franz Neumann became an official member of the first American secret service and actually performed undercover work. Recently discovered information in Soviet archives reveals that in 1943–44 he was even prepared to engage in radical

action like making illegal contact with the KGB, the Soviet secret service—a very risky enterprise in wartime for somebody labeled as an "enemy alien."[14]

Reconstructing Neumann's years in exile between 1933 and 1945 thus requires study of extremely divergent and even conflicting social and political contexts. Our starting point is the London School of Economics, where Neumann wrote his second dissertation in the mid-1930s.[15] He then went on to Max Horkheimer's Institute of Social Research at Columbia University, where he drafted his famous *Behemoth* in the late 1930s.[16] His next port of call was the Washington research section of the Office of Strategic Services, where Neumann landed up willy-nilly immediately after publishing his analysis of National Socialism. Between 1933 and 1942 Neumann succeeded in drafting and completing two major books under the conditions of extreme personal, political and international conflict that characterized the incubation period and, even more, the murderous reality of World War II. What is the major line of thought, what is the theoretical link that connects these two major works?

The answers vary according to the different subjects and aspects discussed in Neumann's writings at the time. Two issues are of major interest for us here: the relevance of the legal and public law perspective, which in 1936 still opened the way to investigation of the rule of law, but was apparently declining in importance; and on the other hand, the enormous impact Neumann made with *Behemoth* and with his total interpretation of National Socialist politics and society. He was successful both in terms of political influence (insofar as theoretical elaborations can make an impression on power politics in wartime) and in inventing and establishing a historical research project that placed Nazi Germany right at the center of contemporary history. So Neumann laid the foundation for the tradition of *Zeitgeschichte,* which in Germany is represented by Martin Broszat, Hans Mommsen and others and lives on in all-embracing accounts like Kershaw's recent portrait of Hitler.[17] While the reception of *Behemoth* in West Germany was rather hesitant,[18] in line with the well-known time lag suffered by democratic culture in the Adenauer era, nowadays the book has almost achieved classic status. We might ask what finally brought it this status, which implies that right from the start Neumann's interpretation of Nazi Germany embodied not only a highly effective analytic potential but also symbolic power and emotional persuasiveness.

I strongly believe that this question cannot be answered simply by looking at the surface of the very rich empirical material Neumann gathered to describe Nazi Germany's political and economic system; nor is it enough to explain his evident theoretical assumptions. We have to dig deeper, to look at the structure of the work, at the methodological center, which is not simple, but rather artificial and complex in its conceptualization and composition. If

we view this center as the underlying theoretical framework in Neumann's *Behemoth*, looking at the genesis of this framework might help to unravel the mystery of the book and explain its enduring impact. One key can be found in Neumann's 1936 doctoral dissertation, which he hesitated to publish precisely because he may have felt that it was still just a useless key to a hitherto unknown door. There can be little doubt that this treatise on *The Governance of the Rule of Law* somehow lacked a really consistent subject—and this becomes quite obvious in the lengthy subtitle of the original work: *An investigation into the relationship between the political theories, the legal system and the social background in competitive society*.

Nonetheless, Neumann is here articulating a distinct combination of research methods and theoretical approaches, which allows him to sketch an extremely wide historical horizon touching on the intellectual genesis of modern society, and to suggest an impressive potential for differentiating between—or rather, counter-posing—the aspect of ideological glorification and also that of rational legitimacy. Tracing back to the origins of these methodological approaches, we find in the background not only classical figures of modern social science like Marx and Max Weber, but also their contemporary heirs such as Karl Mannheim and Harold Laski.[19] Neumann uses all these scholars to limit the multidisciplinary set for analyzing the internal structure and historical change of the modern *Rechtsstaat* (legal state) at a level of abstraction that is risky but suggestive. Amazingly, the most interesting writings in terms of Franz Neumann's place in the history of political thought seem to be the extensive and sometimes strenuous chapters, which form the middle section of his book on the rule of law. These chapters attempt nothing less than a complete history of political thought from the Medieval Ages to Hegel.

Neumann's general and indeed abstract thesis held that in bourgeois society there is an insoluble contradiction between individual and state power, between right and might. I cannot deal here with the question of whether this thesis is really adequate to each of the thinkers his interpretation covers. I merely want to point to the extremely wide historical horizon as such, which he opens up. As early as 1936, like his future colleagues at the Institute of Social Research, Neumann was bold enough to see the current crisis not only in limited terms as the "German" crisis, but as a general breakdown, a cataract of traditional political thinking, because even the established Western democracies seemed neither willing nor prepared to stop the fascist—especially National Socialist—aggression. On the other hand, what is important for our historical perspective—and what marks the decisive difference in Neumann's work—is that Neumann expressed a strictly immanent critique of Western political thought. This means that in a certain way he still kept in line with

the relativist basis of the approach, which guided this excursion into the history of ideas. Perhaps we should speak of a historical sociology of legal ideas with particular respect to their highly ambivalent political implementation.[20]

This conscious methodological basis—internal analysis of political ideas combined with the grounding of this analysis in a sociological setting—is highly significant for the formative period of political science in the 20th century, since it seems the only solid counterweight to alternative reformulations of the tradition of political thought. Here, of course, I am thinking of the works of Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt, which became so influential in the 1950s and 1960s precisely because they expressed an external critique of political modernity and, in the last resort, rested on substantial (either Christian or Ancient) premises.[21] Here we also find the appropriate constellation for understanding the singular and perhaps classical status, which Neumann's *Behemoth* began to occupy in the formation of political thought after World War II. Whereas in the early 1940s it was seen as an almost belligerent political document with clear proposals for military government of Germany, in the 1950s and 1960s it became an academic monument that called for the detailed historical reconstruction of National Socialism, and—if only after a remarkable time-lag—for a thoroughgoing interpretation of the Holocaust based on research, as we can read in Raul Hilberg's intellectual biography.[22]

What, then, is the intellectual center of Neumann's total interpretation of National Socialism? What makes *Behemoth* a theoretical cornerstone in the history of political thought—if not for contemporary consciousness, certainly for the process of historical reconstruction, which attempts to identify major trends in the 20th century? Describing the establishment of the Nazi political regime within the Weimar Republic and upon its ruins, Neumann already elaborates the idea that this regime consisted of two basic, conflicting elements. He speaks of the symbiosis of charismatic leadership and bureaucratic rationality, which enforces the synchronization of the public sphere as well as the discrimination against Jews and other "enemies," and finally results in the preparations for war. Neumann presupposes a similar arrangement of powers that simultaneously organize and disorganize when he analyses the Nazi economy as a dualistic structure consisting of monopolistic and state capitalist elements with the disruptive tendency of mutually using (or rather, abusing) political and economic power.

However, the real and ultimately destructive potential of this *complexio oppositorum* emerges in the third and final chapter on the political sociology of the Third Reich. Here, Neumann not only describes the four pillars of the regime, which form the system of "polycracy," as it was later called: party, state bureaucracy, army and industrial leadership as opposed to the

isolated and completely subjugated masses. The analysis continues by focusing on a new type of domination, which is defined both by positive and negative elements: Nazism means eliminating the rule of law and any other cultural mediation of domination and using direct instruments of power such as propaganda, terror and physical extermination. In this strict sense totalitarian transformation of man and society is both the medium and the final goal of totalitarian politics. Neumann is merely being consistent when he summarizes this interpretation from a negative retrospective viewpoint in relation to the historical horizon: he gives Nazi Germany the highly symbolic title of a "non-state," which has abandoned every rationalizing and mediating element and lacks any kind of political theory. Precisely for this reason, *Behemoth* means both the antidote to the Leviathan and the modern incarnation of the biblical myth. [23]

My remarks on the third and final period of Neumann's intellectual vita are as brief as the few years left until his premature death in 1954. The scholarly work he managed to publish at this time consists of several articles and lectures on a wide range of subjects, which demonstrate diverging perspectives and extensions of his ideas.[24] But labeling these merely as a series of unfinished bit and pieces would underestimate the author's abilities and the far-reaching ideas he was pursuing in the late 1940s and early 1950s. We know that Neumann planned to write a theoretical work—Helge Pross referred to "eine reale Theorie der Politik,"[25] whatever that may mean. So it would be better to describe these texts as a highly significant collection of fragments which, as we know not only from Walter Benjamin's philosophy of history, is always a special challenge to the historian's imagination. I have discussed elsewhere whether Neumann's late articles are internally consistent and what the nature of this consistency might have been.[26] Here I will just take some elements, diverse and contradictory though they may be; like splinters of a broken mirror they may throw some light on general tendencies in the post-war era.

In the decade after 1945, culminating in the 1950s and early 1960s, three major trends made an impact within and beyond the field of political science. Differentiating these trends and re-integrating them into a schematic picture is certainly speculation, but it might be instructive for future historians of political thought:

First, the discipline grew enormously, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with an expansion of personnel and an internal differentiation of research and teaching. At the same time we can discern growing adaptability on the scientific side, which corresponded to the growing need of practical politics for scholarly instruction. More or less in direct reaction to global experiences like Nazism, worldwide military actions and the emerging Cold War, political

science was not only in vogue but also experienced a dynamic development, which can be seen as an indicator of a powerful trend—which we might call the politicization of the social sciences. I want to propose another generalization, even if this evokes protest from colleagues in the neighboring discipline: at least as far as political actuality, public presence and pedagogical influence are concerned; political science became not only a special factor but also the strongest factor in the formation and representation of the political culture of postwar democracies.[27]

Second, closely connected to this trend, but nevertheless a distinct factor within the historical setting after 1945 was what we might call the internationalization of political science. The term—like the current globalization debate—touches on Theodor Fontane's *Ein weites Feld*, but evidently, parallel to the international building of regimes, a cultural reconstruction was taking place, and this had to occur on an international scale. On the other hand it is also quite clear that internationalization in the postwar period was restricted, since the world was increasingly divided into two political hemispheres: East and West. This leads us to speak of a dual antagonism, which was extremely politicized at the same time. Of course, this was centered in power politics but it also had an effective cultural magnetism for east and west. Looking at political science as a typical product of the western democracies, West Germany on the one hand and the USA on the other define the most significant field of play for this political-cultural magnetism. Here we see a lively, free-floating cultural exchange, but also a political hierarchy of center and periphery. So we could talk of "cultural hegemony" (following Antonio Gramsci) or, in line with the current debate among historians, of "Americanization" or "Westernization."[28]

The third trend I would like to identify is much less evident within the historical setting of postwar politics itself; it was more a reflection of the internal composition of the discipline and only became visible later, mostly in the United States where the discipline was in its most advanced state. I am speaking of the intrinsic but nonetheless dynamic conflict between two major approaches within political science, the more normative and the more empirical. In the 1950s and early '60s this line of conflict was transformed into a veritable methodological battlefield. The strictly behaviorist and quantitative fraction was attacked by a small but very eloquent fraction of "pure" political philosophers like Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin—and vice versa. The manifest result of this debate may be less important, but it seems of some historical significance that this empirical-normative debate indicated a much broader conflict, which counter-posed Teutonic (and primordially anti-democratic) cultural pessimism to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of empiricism and democratic optimism.[29]

By drawing out a few threads from Neumann's late articles and searching for their context, it seems that they fit less into this historical texture than illustrate—precisely because they are fragmentary—the unresolved conflicts, the tendencies and counter-tendencies typical of the postwar years:

First, with regard to the trend to politicization, Neumann's energetic contribution to the establishment of political science in West Germany and Berlin are a case in point. Quite evidently, he felt he had a clear political and pedagogical mission—he saw the introduction of political science as a scholarly means to achieve the political goal of democratic re-education. On the other hand, he was the most vehement spokesman for building up political science as an autonomous and research-based academic discipline, not least against the hegemonic desires of the law faculties, which were in the process of reconstruction.[30]

Second, in terms of internationalization, Neumann—in close cooperation with other refugees and especially with re-emigrants, including Fraenkel and Bergstraesser, Loewenstein and Sigmund Neumann—was the living incarnation of the postwar cultural exchange, of its scholarly opulence and political bias. Again, it is interesting how sensitive he was in counterbalancing German and American traditions, drawing critical lessons from the disaster of Weimar but also stressing the German background of American political science within 19th-century *Staatswissenschaften*. If we relate Neumann's material elaborations to the hegemonic discourse of "totalitarianism," we can see that he was reluctantly on the way to a truly comparative theory of modern dictatorship, which depended above all on the practice of material research.[31]

Finally we come to the delicate problem of the normative versus the empirical approach, which in the case of political science not only implies the methodological problem of theory but also touches on the complex question of what status the history of political thought should have for political practice. Here, Neumann's position is more ambivalent than anywhere else: he argues quite resolutely against any kind of normative laziness, which also implies Max Weber's postulate of *Wertfreiheit*; on the other hand he is apparently not inclined to political philosophy as a substantial or neo-idealist enterprise promoting "political truth." However, exclamatory phrases like the well-known slogan "Die Wahrheit der politischen Theorie ist die Freiheit [. . .] Eine konformistische politische Theorie ist keine Theorie"[32] can hardly reaffirm political science as a branch of Critical Theory, i.e., place it within the genealogy of the Frankfort School, since such phrases seem to lack methodological refinement.

We might conclude, with a side-glance at Arnold Brecht's masterly history of relativism[33] that Neumann ended up as a skeptic with undeclared bias or as a neo-liberal against his better judgment.

NOTES

1. This paper was presented at the Conference "Franz L. Neumann's Legacy: The Defense of the Democratic Rechtsstaat in Times of Changing Capitalism," which was organized at the Freie Universität Berlin and the American Academy in December 2000 on the occasion of Franz Neumann's 100th birthday. Karen Margolis has edited the text for publication.

2. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1994); François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

3. Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus*, New Edition (München: Herbig, 1997); Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Zeit der Ideologien: Eine Geschichte des politischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: dtv, 1985); Rudolf Augstein et al., *Forever in the shadow of Hitler?: Original documents of the Historikerstreit, the controversy concerning the singularity of the Holocaust* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J. : Humanities Press, 1993).

4. This typological setting is not so much informed by recent methodological approaches to the history of political science, e.g., David Easton et al. (eds.), *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Study* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); and David Easton et al. (eds.), *Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). It rather tries, in a more abstract way, to identify major trends in the evolution of modern society, which in 20th century constitute new conflicting fields of action for the "political scholar."

5. During two decades Neumann's work attracted some scholarly interest on both sides of the ocean but he never became a major figure in the political theory discourse. I only mention Alfons Söllner, *Neumann zur Einführung* (Hanover: SOAK, 1982); Joachim Perels (ed.), *Recht, Demokratie und Kapitalismus: Aktualität und Probleme der Theorie Franz L. Neumanns* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984; Peter Intelmann, *Franz L. Neumann: Chancen und Dilemma des politischen Reformismus* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); William E. Scheuerman, *Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Jürgen Bast, *Totalitärer Pluralismus: Zu Franz L. Neumanns Analysen der politischen und rechtlichen Struktur der NS-Herrschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1999).

6. See Neumann's most significant and at the same time most personal reflection on the emigration after 1933: "The Social Sciences," *The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), 4–26.

7. Typical titles, out of Neumann's numerous publications during the crisis period of Weimar Germany, read: *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der arbeitsgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung* (Berlin: Laub, 1929); "Die soziale Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Weimarer Verfassung," *Die Arbeit*, 7 (1930), 569–82; *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung: Die Stellung der Gewerkschaften im Verfassungssystem* (Berlin: Heymann, 1932).

8. The best description of the pretentious and dynamic evolution within the Weimar public law can be found in Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland*, Vol. III: 1914–1945 (München: C.H. Beck, 1999), esp. in the chapter "Methodenstreit und Staatskrise," 153–202.

9. Franz Neumann, *Rechtsphilosophische Einleitung zu einer Abhandlung über das Verhältnis von Staat und Strafe* (Inaugural-Dissertation at the University of Frankfurt-Main, December 22, 1922).

10. This allusion to the famous 1930 booklet of Karl Jaspers indicates an ambivalent picture: Whereas in his dissertation Neumann apparently is in contact with the philosophy of crisis so typical for the years after World War I he later is rather anxious to keep independent philosophical reflection out of the legal discourse—a paradox indeed in view of the real crisis after 1929.

11. This misunderstanding becomes evident when you realize that an ultra-relativist and even agnostic thinker like Hans Kelsen—long before he finished his *Reine Rechtslehre* (Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke, 1934) had been quite clear in his confession to modern democracy and its values. See his *Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920).

12. Here not only Hermann Heller's Staatslehre, published posthumously in 1934, needs to be mentioned but also the remarkable chapter "Ist Politik als Wissenschaft möglich?" in Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie* (Frankfurt-Main, 1969), 95–176 (first published 1929). Sigmund Neumann's *Die deutschen Parteien: Wesen und Wandel nach dem Krieg* (Berlin: Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1932) today takes the rank of a classic in the field of political parties.

13. See his *Die Gewerkschaften in der Demokratie und in der Diktatur*, which was printed at Graphia Druck- und Verlagsanstalt in Karlsbad in 1935 under the name Leopold Franz. Under the same pseudonym Neumann published several articles in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*.

14. For the OSS years see Barry Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942–1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. chapter II; and my edition *Zur Archäologie der Demokratie in Deutschland*, Vol. I: *Analysen von politischen Emigranten im amerikanischen Gemeindienst 1943–1945* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1986). For Neumann's Soviet connection see Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood. Soviet Espionage in America: The Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999), 249–60.

15. Written under Harold Laski and entitled "The Governance of the Rule of Law." The manuscript was first published in German translation as *Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes: Eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von politischer Theorie und Rechtssystem in der Konkurrenzgesellschaft*, ed. and transl. Alfons Söllner (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1980). The original text was later published as *The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society* (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1986).

16. Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942; second, revised edition, with a new appendix Toronto, New York, and London: Oxford University Press, 1944). New

edition, with a preface by Peter Hayes, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009. German edition: *Behemoth: Struktur und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1944*, ed. Gert Schäfer (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1977). German paperback edition: Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1984.

17. Ian Kershaw, *Hitler*, Vol. I: *1889–1936: Hybris*; Vol. II: *1936–1945: Nemesis* (London and New York: Longman, 1999 and 2000).

18. See Gert Schäfer, "Franz Neumanns 'Behemoth' und die heutige Faschismusdiskussion," Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: Struktur und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1944* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1984), 663–776 (paperback edition). See also Kurt Gossweiler's positive review of the 1977 edition in the East German *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 27 (1979), 1203–04.

19. A richer interpretation, including the historical and theoretical background, is given in my epilogue to the German translation: *Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes*, 357–79.

20. Closer comparing Neumann's interpretations with the methodological setting applied by Max Horkheimer in his paradigmatic historical essays of the 1930s would demonstrate many parallel perspectives, which apparently made possible Neumann's appointment at the Institute of Social Research.

21. The programmatic books, which all were first given as Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago are Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953); Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

22. Raul Hilberg, *Unerbetene Erinnerung: Der Weg eines Holocaust-Forschers* (Frankfurt-Main: S. Fischer, 1994).

23. See *Behemoth*, reprint of the second edition (New York: Octagon Books, 1963), 459. This somewhat enigmatic constellation of argument and mythical remembrance is further enlightened by realizing that Neumann's Behemoth is also an answer to Carl Schmitt's book *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1938). Articulated as an indirect allusion, it was certainly meant as an intellectual declaration of war.

24. They were collected in two books: Franz L. Neumann, *The Democratic and Authoritarian State*, ed. Herbert Marcuse (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press & The Falcon's Wing Press, 1957); and *Wirtschaft, Staat und Demokratie: Aufsätze 1930–1954*, ed. Alfons Söllner (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).

25. See her Introduction to Franz L. Neumann, *Demokratischer und autoritärer Staat* (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1967), 15.

26. See my essay "Politische Dialektik der Aufklärung: Zum Nachkriegswerk von Franz Neumann und Otto Kirchheimer," Alfons Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration: Studien zu ihrer Akkulturation und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), esp. 168–77, and 188–96.

27. For the American experience see the older treatise of Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1967). The tortuous paths of the discipline in Germany are

now reconstructed in the all-embracing monograph of Wilhelm Bleek, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001).

28. See, e.g., Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); also German Historical Institute, Washinton, D.C., conference papers on the web, No. 1: *The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective*, Conference, March 25–27, 1999, conveners: Volker Berghahn, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, and Christof Mauch.

29. See Jürgen W. Falter, *Der "Positivismusstreit" in der amerikanischen Politikwissenschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982); and David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984).

30. See my essay "Die Gründung der westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft—ein Reimport aus der Emigration?," Claus-Dieter Krohn and Patrick von zur Mühlen (eds.), *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945: Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands* (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 1997), 253–74.

31. Most significant is the 1950 lecture "Die Wissenschaft der Politik in der Demokratie," Neumann, *Wirtschaft, Staat und Demokratie*, 373–92, and his unfinished Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship, German translation in: Neumann, *Demokratischer und autoritärer Staat*. The best-documented figure within the re-emigrants' gallery is Ernst Fraenkel. See esp. his *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 4: *Amerikastudien*, ed. Hubertus Buchstein and Rainer Kühn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000).

32. Franz Neumann, "Zum Begriff der politischen Freiheit," Idem, *Demokratischer und autoritärer Staat*, 102.

33. See his *Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), esp. chapters VI and VII.

7

Jürgen Kuczynski

A German-Jewish Marxist Scholar in Exile

Axel Fair-Schulz

Jürgen Kuczynski (1904–1997) spent a total of eleven years in the English-speaking world: three years (between 1926 and 1929) in the USA and eight years (between 1936 and 1944) in Britain. While his stay in America was voluntary, Kuczynski had fled to Britain in order to save his life, which had been endangered by the Nazi regime—for he was both a Communist and of Jewish background. In Great Britain, Kuczynski worked closely with American institutions, such as the Strategic Bombing Survey and the OSS, being a member of the US Army with the rank of Lt. Colonel. He had identified himself foremost as a Marxist scholar and an active Communist, while deeming his Jewish roots as insignificant until the rising Nazi government made them an issue.

In this essay, I argue that Kuczynski's *bildungsbürgerlich* background, being from an established assimilated Jewish family, primarily centered in Berlin since the late-nineteenth century but with cosmopolitan links across Central Europe, Russia, France, the United States, and Great Britain, prepared him to integrate quickly into American and English cultural, political, and scholarly life. This cosmopolitan cultural background also inoculated Kuczynski against becoming a die-hard Stalinist, despite being politically in tune with the Stalinist party line, especially while in British exile. While he was a faithful Stalinist on the surface, Kuczynski almost instinctively refused to become a mere party soldier. His case nuances the current scholarly consensus, most poignantly expressed by Catherine Epstein, who argues that German Communists, during their years exiled from the Nazi regime (including while in Britain), learned how to survive under challenging circumstances and strangely enough had their "inflexible mind-set" of authoritarian party discipline reinforced.[1] Living abroad brought into focus both Kuczynski's

abiding loyalty to the party as a place of home and protection in a hostile world, simultaneous to underscoring his sense of independence, initiative, self-reliance, industriousness, and resourcefulness.

Jürgen Kuczynski was arguably one of the twentieth century's most intriguing, prolific, and influential Marxist scholars, frequently crossing from academic to journalistic and popular realms of expression, fashioning himself into a respected mediator between the Communist hierarchy and society at large, especially during his years in post WWII East Germany. His personal life spans most of the twentieth century, yet the intellectual and cultural traditions and sensibilities that shaped him date back to the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Among his scholarly accomplishments are significant methodological innovations, such as his focus on the history of everyday life at a time when even Marxist historians by and large wrote history as top-to-bottom political history. Yet, Kuczynski's distance from the conventions and pieties of official Marxist-Leninist discourse was at times uneven and he never fully resolved the tension between his commitment to scholarly professionalism on the one hand and his commitment to party discipline on the other.

Born in 1904 to the economist and pacifist Robert René Kuczynski and the painter Bertha Gradenwitz, Jürgen and his five sisters grew up in the genteel Berlin neighborhood of Schlachtensee, where they socialized with the likes of Karl Liebknecht, Albert Einstein, and Käthe Kollwitz in their parental home. After an interlude as a rather mediocre student at the *Gymnasium* in Berlin-Zehlendorf, Jürgen Kuczynski went on to study philosophy, statistics, and economics at the universities of Erlangen, Berlin, and Heidelberg. Among his professors were Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, Eberhard Gothein, Edgar Salin, Emil Julius Gumbel, Lujo Brentano, and Paul Hensel. The latter became his *Doktorvater*. Kuczynski defended his dissertation on *Der ökonomische Wert. Eine wirtschaftstheoretische, soziologische und geschichtsphilosophische Betrachtung* in 1925 and then followed up with a longer stay in Paris and an internship at the Bett, Simon & Co. Bank in Berlin. These educational and early professional experiences exposed Kuczynski to the leading German scholars in his fields of study as well as the inner workings of society. They also served as important ballast to his growing attraction toward Communism, broadening his mind and sensibility beyond the immediate Marxist milieus.

Kuczynski continued on this trajectory, publishing his first book (incidentally on Marx's economic theories and their relevance for Leninism) in 1926, with almost countless others to follow; altogether totaling over one hundred and fifty by his death in 1997. In addition to those volumes, he published in excess of 4,000 journal and newspaper articles and ended up on the editorial board of several publications across Europe and North America.

He broadened his horizons by spending several years in the United States, as a research student at the Brookings School in Washington and as the founding director of the American Federation of Labor Research Center. His father, well-known statistician René Robert Kuczynski, arranged a stay for his son at the Brookings Institute in Washington. Robert René Kuczynski was one of the most established scholars and public intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century. He studied economics and jurisprudence at Freiburg, Strasburg, and Munich.[2] Internships eventually led him to the US, at first to the Census Office and then to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington, DC. There, as well as at Brookings, Robert René Kuczynski built up an American and international network of professional and personal contacts, which included US Supreme Court Judge Louis Brandeis, as well as a future Canadian Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King. Robert René Kuczynski spent about half of each year between 1925 and 1931 at Brookings and was very fond of Washington's many cultural opportunities. What impressed Jürgen Kuczynski greatly about Brookings, in addition to its scholarly sophistication, was the way Brookings' students married and kept in close touch. Out of the twenty-three students in his class, twelve inter-married each other. Many played significant roles in political, industrial, and cultural affairs later on in the US and Canada. Kuczynski, who in 1938 was sent to the US by the KPD to collect money for its "29.8" radio station, was able to call on several of these old connections.[3]

Kuczynski cherished belonging to this elite circle of highly connected and sophisticated figures, for which intellect and power came together so easily. Translating intellectual ideas into actual policy had always been an alluring idea to Kuczynski, and this coalesced in his attraction to Lenin. It was at Brookings that young Kuczynski found the subject matter that would engage him for a substantial portion of his scholarly life: the social conditions of the working class under industrial capitalism. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), sufficiently impressed by Kuczynski's research at Brookings, gave him the opportunity to publish some of his findings. Beginning in March 1927, Kuczynski and Marguerite Steinfeld produced several brochures, beginning with smaller articles in the AFL publication *American Federationist*, dealing with wage and labor statistics. After Kuczynski's time as a research fellow at Brookings (September 1926 to June 1927) the AFL offered him, at the mere age of 22, the founding directorship of its economic-forecasting research department. Kuczynski happily accepted, focusing on a range of issues, including unemployment and wage statistics. This position, however, was an informal one, inasmuch as the AFL Research Department was officially directed by Florence Thorne, who remained at its helm between 1920 until the 1950s. It was not until the 1944 that the AFL decided to organize its Research Department in a more formal fashion.

Kuczynski worked closely with Thorne and both co-directed the department. It is interesting to note that the Research Department later hired Boris Shishkin as an economist in the 1930s, who had an academic background in many ways like Kuczynski's. He too lived in Europe prior to coming to the US, including Russia and Turkey, and he traveled extensively in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Greece. Shishkin earned a PhD. in economics at Columbia University in New York City in the early 1930s and in 1932 came to Brookings as a Research Fellow. His academic interests included a comparative study of unemployment in the Soviet Union and Imperial Russia from 1857 on as well as tracing the institutional aspects of the American banking industry. In so doing, Shishkin engaged a host of similar methodological and theoretical issues that Kuczynski wrestled with as well during that time period, spanning from the business cycle theories of Marx all the way to Joseph A. Schumpeter und John Maynard Keynes.

Shishkin differed from Kuczynski in one key aspect. While being enmeshed in Marxist and post-Marxist socialist ideas he also engaged the writings of Leon Trotsky. Shishkin even translated parts of Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* from Russian into English.[4] This however differentiates him from Kuczynski, whose commitment to the official party line of the Soviet Union made him unwilling and perhaps unable to seriously engage the writings of dissident Communists like Trotsky. Yet Shishkin too had to overcome some deeply ingrained and historically contingent obstacles in approaching Trotsky. Shishkin's Russian background, as the son of a Czarist who had to flee the Bolshevik state in 1919, lent itself to a fair amount of hostility to anything Bolshevik, including Trotsky's Communist critique of the Soviet Union.

Kuczynski was very flattered by the opportunity to work with Thorne at the AFL Research Department and threw himself into his statistical work, but he eventually became frustrated by the anti-socialist orientation of the AFL. Yet during the initial phase of enthusiasm, Kuczynski boldly declared that his statistical analyses would be destined to translate into official AFL policy—promoting increases in working-class wages and standards of living. Kuczynski even went so far as to suggest that his encouragement of the AFL leadership, to devote more resources to "scientific investigations" of the material conditions of the working class, would lead to the "*Verwissenschaftlichung*" ("scientificization") of the American working class movement.[5] The very choice of this term links Kuczynski with the *Wissenschaftskult* of both his *bildungsbürgerlich* and Marxist backgrounds. It was at Brookings as well that Kuczynski met his future wife, the fellow scholar Marguerite Steinfeld, and the two got married on September 18, 1926. He and she consulted almost daily about articles and analyses of their scholarly work at Brookings as well

as at the AFL. In fact, throughout the first decades of their marriage, Jürgen and Marguerite Kuczynski co-published several brochures and entire books.

Kuczynski continued to work for the AFL until September 1928. Disillusioned and disappointed, he accepted a book contract at Brookings September 30. His manuscript dealt with American employment statistics and was ultimately rejected. Embittered and suspicious of a "pro-government" bias at Brookings,[6] Kuczynski withdrew from the entire project on April 30, 1929. He and Marguerite left the US by ship on July 4 and arrived in France two weeks later.

After their return to Europe in 1929, he became even more involved with institutional Communism, joining the party in 1930 in Germany, although his sympathies with Communism and his loyalty to the Soviet Union had developed years earlier. This final step of joining the KPD set Jürgen Kuczynski apart from his father René, who never engaged in any formal party affiliations.

Jürgen Kuczynski liked to cite industrialist-turned-politician and social commentator Walter Rathenau, who lamented that Kuczynski's father René always constituted a one-man party, preferring its left-wing.[7] Robert René Kuczynski was very sympathetic to the Communist cause, without ever actually joining the party. In fact, his loyalty to Communist causes was not as much a matter of internalized ideology as it was informed by a quest for social justice and the naïve willingness to be impressed by Soviet propaganda. Robert René Kuczynski was a high-minded fellow traveler, who based his politico-ideological decisions on overarching impressions rather than doctrinaire outlook. Thus, what he embraced today could be, potentially at least, criticized tomorrow. His daughter Ursula, who became one of the Soviet Union's most important agents between the 1930s and the 1950s (and later on in East Germany made a name for herself as a writer under the pseudonym Ruth Werner), expressed in a letter, dated November 7, 1927, how relieved she was when her father returned from a trip to the Soviet Union with positive impressions. "I cried for joy, for what if father had not agreed with Russia! It would have been awful."[8]

Ursula, already a committed Communist since 1926, conveys a critical difference between herself, as a believing party member who had accepted the correctness of Soviet policies, and her father, who made his decisions case by case. Jürgen Kuczynski followed in his sister's footsteps, embracing the Soviet Union in a semi-religious fashion, but he approached the cause more self-consciously, as an intellectual journey of reading, understanding, and creatively interpreting Marx, while Ursula confessed in a letter of August 1925 to Jürgen that Marx was "boring, difficult, [and] hard to understand."[9] On November 15, 1926, Ursula relates to her brother that she read Josef Stalin's highly formulaic tract *Problems of Leninism*, conveying a mixture of

self-deprecating humor and misgivings; she confesses that it took her, "poor idiot, about three hours to read 20 pages [having] six pieces of paper with questions."[10] While Ursula was too independent to accept Stalin's clichés completely and without question, she was also too deferential to the ultimate rightness of the cause to treat the text in any other way than to reconcile her—in the faith.

In 1933 the KPD was forced underground with Hitler's rise to power, and Kuczynski worked for its apparatus until 1936. He worked for the Information Department of the illegal KPD, spending most of his time sorting through the still openly available international press and on the lookout for data on economic developments, which he then analyzed for the party leadership. In addition, Kuczynski also worked as an informant for and advisor to the Soviet embassy in Berlin, where Ambassadorial Counselor Sergey Alexeyevich Bessonov regularly forwarded Kuczynski's reports and assessments to Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Maximovich Litvinov. Litvinov frequently responded with follow-up questions for Kuczynski. In addition Kuczynski, as explicitly authorized by the party, contacted British and American diplomats and journalists. He used their connections to publish several articles in the "Herald Tribune" as well as the "Manchester Guardian," using either a pseudonym or withholding his name altogether. Kuczynski continued to publish his *Die Finanzpolitische Korrespondenz*, having it printed in Switzerland since the Nazi rise to power. Yet on February 11, 1934 Kuczynski had to tell his readers that the Nazi laws did not permit him as a "non-Aryan" to work as editor-in-chief, and thus the journal would have to be discontinued. Several months later, Kuczynski re-established the journal in Switzerland under a slightly different name: the *Konjunkturstatistische Korrespondenz* (Economic Growth Statistics Correspondence). He also managed to complete a book manuscript on the causes of the French Revolution, trying to synthesize approaches from intellectual, social, economic, and political history. The manuscript was translated into French by his wife Marguerite and published in 1936 in Paris under the title *Les antécédents d'une révolution: Etudes sur le development de la société française de 1715 à 1789*. Thus while assuming the personal risk of fighting the Nazis within Germany, Kuczynski also made the time for journalistic and academic work.[11]

After fighting in the anti-Nazi Communist resistance inside Germany until 1936, Kuczynski followed his family into British exile. He became one of the leading German Communists there and closely interacted with high-ranking comrades in the British party. In addition, Kuczynski was a leading activist in the German Cultural League, interacting with a broad variety of people, ranging from English aristocrats to left-liberal intellectuals. Robert Chadwell Williams even labeled Kuczynski "the most active German Communist in Britain."[12] As

if those activities did not keep him occupied enough, Kuczynski also found the time to write, between 1936 and 1944, ten books, fifteen brochures, and circa one hundred and thirty articles. He became a regular member of the editorial staff of *Labour Monthly*, the theoretical publication of the British Communist Party. One of his non-Marxist scholarly colleagues wrote to him in 1938 that he was "simply amazed and flabbergasted at the speed with which you turn out your extremely interesting and valuable wage studies."[13]

Kuczynski's book, *The Condition of the Workers in Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union 1932–1938*, published in 1939 in London is programmatic for Kuczynski's scholarly and political agenda while in Britain. As it became habitual for him later on as well, he considered this comparative study as a first attempt, naturally burden with many faults, "this little book has, therefore (in addition to the faults which the author may have made in any case), all the marks of a first exploration of new territory. Others must try to do better. Others must enlarge the field of observation. They must add other countries to the survey—the United States for example or a colonial country."[14]

With this work Kuczynski mixed scholarly and ideological criteria. For him the empirically grounded comparison of the labor conditions in Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union have implications for the future, and all three countries were chosen deliberately. In addition to Britain being Kuczynski's temporary home while he wrote the study it also served as a good example of a capitalist democracy that to him could evolve only either in the direction of fascist Germany or the socialist Soviet Union. He identifies both Britain and Germany as "finance capitalist" countries, stating "Great Britain is ruled by finance capitalism as a whole and by democratic methods, Germany is ruled by the most reactionary section of finance capitalism, the heavy industries, the armament industries, and by dictatorial methods."[15] He went on to say:

> We must learn from the development in other countries. And in this connection the comparison of conditions in Great Britain with those in Fascist Germany and the Socialist Soviet Union is of special significance. While it would be absolutely wrong to say that there are abundant traces of Fascism to be found in this country [Great Britain], it would equally wrong to deny that there are any Fascist tendencies and elements at work in this country at all. The example of Germany and the conditions of the working class in that country will show what Fascism means for the working class. On the other hand the working class in this country wants to fight for Socialism as its ultimate goal. The example of the Soviet Union will show what Socialism can do for the working class, what the working class can do with Socialism.[16]

In part one of this book, Kuczynski compares and contrasts Great Britain and Germany from ten vantage points: "Wages, Hours of Work, Productivity

and Intensity of Work, Accidents, The Mobility of Labour, Unemployment, Health Conditions, Social Insurance, The Relative Position of the Workers, The Pleasures of Life, and Lost Freedom."[17] In essence Britain is presented as a country where workers suffer many hardships, but those hardships are much more pronounced in Nazi Germany. A case in point is the development of productivity and intensity of work. Kuczynski argues that work intensity increased both in Britain and Nazi Germany. Yet, it increased much more in Nazi Germany,

> for in spite of the fact that the development of real wages in Fascist Germany was worse than in Great Britain, the intensity of work—that is, the expenditure of working power per worker—was considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain. That is, *while paying him less and less, Fascism took out more and more from the German worker.*

In addition Kuczynski also argued that the increase in intensity of work did not automatically translate into an increase in productivity, as productivity per worker in Great Britain rises by 20 percent between 1932 and 1937, while in Germany, during the same period, it was only by 11 percent.[18]

In the second half of *The Condition of the Workers in Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union,* Kuczynski includes the Soviet example, which he compares and contrasts with Britain and Germany's, especially regarding food, clothing, social insurance, political and social rights and liberties, as well as cultural factors. Kuczynski's main point in this section is that while the Soviet Union lagged behind Britain and Germany, its general trajectory was one of an upward development, and the other countries would be surpassed sooner or later:

> True, the wives of skilled workers in Great Britain are better clothed than the Soviet worker, but while in Great Britain hundreds of thousands, probably millions, of women are not well enough clothed to reach even a subsistence standard of clothing, that is while they suffer in their health because of poor clothing, one cannot find their counterpart in the Soviet Union . . . [I]n the Soviet Union conditions are improving rapidly; in Great Britain they are virtually stable at their present time, while in Germany they are deteriorating.[19]

Kuczynski is particularly mindful of how the Soviet state inherited a legacy of underdevelopment from Imperial Russia, "until the Soviets came to power, it was only a small minority of the whole population who had shoes—to-day the vast majority of the Soviet workers have shoes, but the demand for shoes is increasing so rapidly that up to now, the Soviet industry has not been able to meet it fully."[20] He applied the same logic to housing standards, which were very poor in the Soviet Union even in the 1930s but were definitely

improving rapidly under the Soviet regime, citing conditions in rural areas he asserted that they, "though poor, are on the average, probably better than in Great Britain and Germany."[21] He explains that "[t]he Soviet Union has been heavily burdened with the crimes of Czarism, and in many respects, it is just now reaching the Western capitalist standard. But this does not alter the fact that the Soviet Union is not only rapidly reaching, but soon will pass the Western capitalist standard."[22]

Kuczynski, being embedded in his *bildungsbürgerlich* traditions and sensibilities, also emphasized the cultural and intellectual aspects of life:

> It is the education of free men whose chief purpose in life is to raise their standard of living, both the physical standard and the spiritual. While relatively more people are unable to read and write in the Soviet Union than in Great Britain and Germany, many more people than in Great Britain and Germany are in the process of acquiring higher or technical education.[23]

Kuczynski would not be the intellectual that he was had he not included literary matters. He proudly noted the immense increases in the publication of books in the Soviet Union, pointing out, for example, that between 1917 and 1936 the Soviet Union published more copies of the works of Charles Dickens than were published in Great Britain (there were 1,100.000 copies published in the USSR), and similarly published more works of Victor Hugo than were published in France (with 1,800,000 copies in the USSR). Yet, while the Soviet Union apparently outpublished France and Britain in terms of their national literary icons, the Soviet Union really excelled in making available immense of copies of Russian writers, such as Maxim Gorky (32 million copies), Alexander Pushkin (over 19 million copies), Leo Tolstoy (about 14 million copies), and Anton Chekhov (well in advance of 11 million). Regarding stage plays and movies of high artistic distinction, the USSR made available tickets much more cheaply to the public than in the other mentioned countries—meaning that even those with small incomes could afford cultural events more easily: "[m]en do not live by bread alone. In no country in the whole world and, more specifically, neither in Great Britain nor in Germany is there so much spiritual food put at the disposal of the masses, of people as in the Soviet Union."[24]

This rather rosy picture of developments in the USSR, of course, excludes any awareness or discussion of the crimes of Stalinism, yet it is very indicative of a *bildungsbürgerlich* family's focus. When I interviewed Kuczynski's youngest sister Renate Simpson, she responded that the appeal of the East German state was, to her, how East Germany poured resources into providing inexpensive paperback copies of world literature, including Dickens, Hugo, and all of the Russian and Soviet authors, and in addition theater and musical

performances from high culture were abundantly available even in smaller towns via highly subsidized tickets.[25]

As it became customary for Kuczynski in later years, he cushioned a critique of the party line within a very orthodox terminology. This comes into focus when one considers what Kuczynski thought to be at the essence of a socialist and, down the road, even a communist society, namely economic efficiency. While pointing to the increasing efficiency of the Soviet economy in the 1930s, he also implied that without an ever higher productivity, the material underpinnings of socialism and communism would evaporate: "[w]hether it is a question of social insurance problems, of educational problems, of prevention of diseases or accidents, of sports or Press services, always we find that full use of the liberties and rights which the workers enjoy can be made only if the means at their disposal are large and increasing."[26] While Kuczynski did not ally himself with Nicolai Bukharin or other "right-wing" Bolshevik critics of Stalin, he pointed out that the future of socialism and communism required an ever more productive system. Kuczynski finishes his book with hyperbole, stating that "in the Soviet Union the worker has gained within a few years more freedom than the workers have gained in a century."[27]

Kuczynski had become more systematically involved in espionage, largely through his sister Ursula, later on known as the writer "Ruth Werner." She arrived in Britain in early 1941, after an illustrious career as a Soviet agent in China, Poland, and Switzerland, and eventually settled into London and vicinity. Jürgen made friends with the German exile and atomic physicist Klaus Fuchs and eventually arranged for him to meet with Ursula, who at that time happened to work for the military intelligence service of the Red Army. This led to the transfer of classified nuclear material from the Western allies to the Soviet Union and became what the East German writer Eberhard Panitz declared as "the greatest case of espionage in human history" (when decommissioned in 1945, Kuczynski returned to his parental home at Berlin-Schlachtensee. In 1950 he hurriedly moved to Weissensee, in the Eastern sector of the newly divided city, possibly to avoid arrest). With this feat undiscovered by the Americans until the 1950s, Ursula and Jürgen had also cooperated with the American OSS in 1944, when it found, trained, and deployed German anti-Fascist exiles for espionage within Germany, resulting in agents being parachuted into Nazi-controlled Europe.

Kuczynski had attracted the positive attention of the Americans who, in 1944, recruited him into the Strategic Bombing Survey under John Kenneth Galbraith, as a researcher with the military rank of lieutenant colonel;[28] his salary was to be $6,000. Dollars per year. The official justification according to US Army internal material was that he was to be "used as [a] key member

of US Bombing Research Mission investigation inside Germany of Ministerial and Municipal records relating to war economy, German war production and matters pertaining to political and morale [*sic*] effects of bombing."[29] There Kuczynski, whose expertise on the Nazi economy was widely sought, worked for both the OSS and the Soviets, and as Galbraith informed me, the Americans were fully aware of his dual role, calling him into the room whenever the Soviets were to be unofficially informed of something. The British Secret Service that shadowed all members of the Kuczynski family closely was approached by a US Major McNeill, who inquired about whether the employment of Jürgen Kuczynski for the US Strategic Bombing Survey would pose a security risk. The British agent handling the case, "C.2 (London)," told the American Embassy:

> Having obtained your advice I called on McNeill and told him that Kuczynski was as far as we were aware, a reputable and able statistician, but on the other hand that he was a prominent and active member of the German Communist Party . . . I said that in our view no objection would be raised to use being made of Kuczynski's technical qualifications but that we must recommend that he should be employed in such a way that his political bias could be prevented from coming into play and influencing his conclusions.[30]

Incidentally John Galbraith confirmed to me in an interview that the US Strategic Bombing Survey was well aware of Kuczynski's close ties with Soviet espionage and only let him see material deemed harmless. In addition Galbraith always called Kuczynski into the room whenever he wanted the Soviets to hear certain pieces of information that could not be conveyed through conventional channels.[31] The British Secret Service also reviewed the application of Kuczynski's father Robert René for the Colonial Office and proposed to "give him accommodation in the Colonial Office, and in view of his connections," considered "from a security angle it would be wiser to put up a case against his employment."[32] Ultimately it was decided that Robert René Kuczynski could work for the Colonial Office under conditions that he would "not be a member of the Colonial Office staff, but will receive his salary from the Colonial Development Vote. He will be accommodated in the office and deal only with those files and other records, which have a bearing on the Colonial populations." RRK's task was to assist in preparing for future colonial censuses as part of the Colonial Studies Research under the Colonial Development Schemes.[33]

There was some confusion on the part of the British Intelligence community concerning his political leanings, "this man, who now lives in England though not definitely known to be a member of the Communist Party is a leading member of the Free German League of Culture and of its recent

offshoot, the Free German Movement."[34] Nevertheless despite the strong perception of his sympathies with the Communist Movement, they were aware of his independence from the Communist Party and occasional critiques of party policies. A British Secret Service source reported about Robert René Kuczynski expressing his dismay about Soviet plans for the future of East Germany, in a speech at the Free German Movement meeting:

> Prof. Robert KUCZYNSKI said that the Russian plans for the future of Eastern Germany represented the same kind of barbarism that the Nazis practised. If Germans were to be put under the Poles he could only advise them to stick to the Nazis, for their lot would be far worse with the Poles than with the Nazis. The intentions of Russia and Poland were the greatest cultural outrage of the 20th century. There was not an atom of justice in them.[35]

A similar tendency to rebel against the party line was noticed the British Secret Service regarding Jürgen Kuczynski. To the British authorities, Kuczynski seemed at once a Marxist scholar and an ideologue, combining the narrowing vision of his strong Communist commitments with a sense of realism. "KUCZYNSKI does not usually overestimate possibilities and indulge in wishful thinking like most Communists are prone to do."[36]

British Intelligence observed Jürgen Kuczynski closely, monitoring his changing fortunes within the exiled German Communist Party in the United Kingdom. The same applied to the Metropolitan Police, which kept extensive files on him. A May 1944 report from the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police chronicles in detail Kuczynski's scholarly and political publications, as well as his membership in a variety of organizations, including the National Committee of the Free German League of Culture, the Free German Institute of Science and Learning. Kuczynski's file even noticed that since February 1942, he was elected chairman of the London Central Branch of the Association of Scientific Workers. His assistant and secretary Johannes Siebert, too, was the subject of a Special Branch file. Kuczynski is identified as the "Economic Expert of the German Communist Party," who

> has been known to us as a Communist since June 1931, when he was employed by the Communist Central Organization in Berlin. In 1932, he was one of the supporters of the World Anti-War Congress Movement, which was organized by Willi Münzenberg on behalf of the Third International . . . Kuczynski is believed to have been in touch with the Soviet Embassy in London in 1937 . . .[37]

The London Metropolitan Police also carefully followed Kuczynski's public speaking and lecture schedules, such as on September 30, 1942, when he spoke at the St. Albans branch of the Czechoslovak-British Friendship Club held at the Friends Meeting House on Lattimore Road, St. Albans about

the "Economics of Fascism." On March 13, 1943, Kuczynski elaborated on "Karl Marx" at the Free German League of Culture at 36 Upper Park Road, and on June 2, 1943, Kuczynski "lectured at the Free German Institute on 'Economic and Political Currents in America and their Importance for the United Nations.' The lecture was in German." A little later, on July 22, 1943, he "addressed the Paddington Branch of the Free German League of Culture, 25 Randolf Crescent, W. 9," on "The Study of History as a Weapon for the Fight against Fascism." His sisters, especially Ursula, Renate, Sabine, and Brigitte were observed as well.[38] The Metropolitan Police had speculated on Kuczynski's influence within the German Communist Party, noting that

> [i]n May 1943, it was rumored that Wilhelm KOENEN, the leader of the German Communist Party in Great Britain, had fallen from favor and would be replaced by KUCZYNSKI. This rumor was not confirmed by events, but KUCZYNSKI is said to have joined the inner councils of the German Communist Party about that time.[39]

On September 19, 1944 the source "Hi.No. 698" reported that Kuczynski's scheduled talk at the Kulturbund on "Germans and Poles," to be given on September 15, 1944, was canceled to ill health. But unofficially he had "serious differences at the moment with the KPD Executive . . . who accused him of deviation to the right." The source claims that Kuczynski was "prevented from giving this talk by his party. He has serious differences at the moment with the KPD Executive here, who accuse him of deviation to the right." The reasons were his apparent belief that "trusts and big concerns [as in cooperations] should be retained [in Germany] after Hitler's downfall." In addition, according to a British Secret Service informant, Kuczynski advocated to keep some features of a capitalist economy in Germany after the fall of the Nazi Regime.[40] As the official Communist line advocated the nationalization of all industry, Kuczynski, who—like Marx and Lenin—had always admired capitalism's remarkable innovative and productive potential, perhaps regarded the Soviet model as not the best possible solution for Germany. On October 12, 1944, Source Ri. No. 1016 reported that "[i]n the jargon the Communist Party KUCZYNSKI is again accused of deviation to the right. It is reported that severe measures are to be taken against him, which can only mean his expulsion from the party."[41]

Kuczynski's British observers were bewildered that he published an article in the "Left News," in which he argued his concerns for the preservation of some capitalist structures in post Nazi Germany—at least in the short run. Maybe they speculated that "this is a put-up job, and that the German Communist Party wishes to use KUCZYNSKI for some purpose whereby he must appear not as a member of the Communist Party but as a renegade

and a reactionary," given that the party at first allowed him to publish the manuscript before publicly condemning it.[42]

The Americans wanted to question him regarding his role in Soviet espionage. However, after the end of the Nazi regime, Kuczynski returned to what became the German Democratic Republic; the US Embassy in London remarked that

> we were hoping to locate JK in the American sector [of Berlin], with a view to asking C.I.A. to interview him. Unfortunately is has now transpired that KUCZYNSKI sub-let his house in the American Sector in June, 1950 and moved to Weissensee, Parkstrasse 49 [it should read 94] in the Russian Sector."[43]

The British contained to observe all correspondence of the Kuczynski family.[44] They seriously considered whether he would defect to the West, given his trouble with party orthodoxy in the East also given party leader Ulbricht's "anti-intellectual campaign."[45] Yet, on March 1951 they concluded that[46] it was "thought that KUCZYNSKI remains an ardent Communist . . . and in no circumstance would [he] defect."[47]

In the GDR, Kuczynski spent some years as a medium-ranking functionary and parliamentary deputy. He then turned full-force to academia and produced such monumental works as his forty-volume *History of the Working Class under Industrial Capitalism*, his ten-volume *History of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, as well as his six-volume *History of the Everyday Life of the German People*. He also became the founding director of the world-renown Institute for Economic History in East Berlin and perhaps the GDR's most well known Marxist public intellectual.

Kuczynski's Marxism was deeply intertwined with German cultural history and a specifically German *bildungsbürgerlich* project of modernity. He and other left-leaning culturally grand-bourgeois intellectuals were drawn to Marxism for ethical and aesthetic reasons: to preserve and expand the Enlightenment legacy, which they understood as being threatened by industrial capitalism. Thus their Marxism was, by nature, far more inclusive and open-ended than what evolved as official Marxism-Leninism within the Soviet domain. By and large, they were not particularly drawn to furthering the analytical prowess of Marxism systematically. Instead, their Marxism was more eclectic and associative, anchored in the explicit and implicit *bildungsbürgerlich* positions of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir I. Lenin. Intellectuals like Kuczynski were culturally tied to the mental world of first and second generation Marxism. Yet they also frequently quoted Marx and Lenin to sustain and "decorate" their own positions. Curiously, almost no *bildungsbürgerlich* Marxist engaged alternative schools or strains

within Marxism, such as the Revisionism of Eduard Bernstein or, later, Karl Kautsky, let alone more recent developments such as "Western" Marxism, Euro-Communism or the various Central and Eastern European departures from orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

His family and their response to the Enlightenment, namely a deeply felt commitment to Enlightenment ideals of emancipation, shaped Kuczynski's cultural background predominantly. His family was progressively estranged from mainstream bourgeois culture, which yielded to illiberal, nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces. Instead, Kuczynski's ancestors gravitated, with some rare exceptions, toward a more internationalist and left-liberal tradition. They were overall anti-monarchical and supportive of constitutional democracy.

Seven generations of Kuczynski's family, starting with the noted physician and medical historian Hirschmann Brandeis, were part of an assimilated-Jewish, left-leaning, and bourgeois intelligentsia. This association led several family members into prison or exile, most recently through the Nazi regime, which targeted the Kuczynskis both as Jewish and prominent left-wing activists. The family's predilection for scholarly and artistic work strengthened significant ties to other countries, leading to extensive stays and exchanges abroad—including Imperial Russia, France, the United States, and Great Britain. Both of his grandfathers were wealthy bankers, who acquired their fortunes in the last third of nineteenth-century Prussia, thus propelling the family into the upper class. Jürgen's paternal grandfather, Wilhelm Kuczynski, was a successful owner of a medium-sized, private bank in Berlin with additional interests in real estate. His maternal grandfather Adolf Gradenwitz owned an equally successful medium-sized bank, later diversifying into machine manufacturing, electro and chemical industries, pharmaceutical production, and real estate. All in all, Jürgen Kuczynski's *wirtschaftsbürgerlich* ancestors were active in the century between the 1840s and the 1940s. Ironically, this newfound status did not erode their anti-capitalist sentiments; on the contrary, most family members were independent supporters of the Social Democrats and many joined Communist parties from the 1930s onward.

The specific reasons for this political and ideological evolution of the family are complex. A key element in this development was the overlap, within the Kuczynski and Gradenwitz families, between *Bildungsbürgertum* (bourgeoisie of education and inner refinement) and *Besitzbürgertum* (bourgeoisie of property). More specifically, this meant that while Jürgen Kuczynski's paternal grandfathers generated considerable fortunes, the generation of his parents was also engaged in more intellectual pursuits, such as his father working as a labor statistician for several towns and cities as well as being an independent scholar. This generational shift in occupation went hand in hand with the growing disdain for how the previous generation had made its

money. Kuczynski charmingly reflects this family tradition and mythology, when he wrote proudly in the biography of his father René Robert Kuczynski that of one of his ancestors five generations earlier, Samuel Brandeis, was the first "white sheep" of the family by participating in anti-government activities in Prussia. This much-esteemed "white" sheep is in contrast with the two "black sheep" of the family, namely the two paternal grandfathers, Wilhelm Kuczynski and Adolf Gradenwitz. Jürgen writes about his father René Robert, saying that

> [w]hen [he] grew up as a rebel against his successful banker-father, he did so because he despised capitally acquired wealth; yet he did not fall into a silly asceticism but was endowed with the ability to enjoy life to the fullest, which incidentally also is a family tradition.[48]

These anti-capitalist sentiments were further focused when the family lost some of its wealth in the aftermath of World War I and later in the Great Depression. Historical circumstances led them to Communist ideology and eventually into choosing the Communist German Democratic Republic as their place of residence. There they confronted accommodating their self-image to socialist public life. Yet, despite Marxist leanings, the Kuczynskis had also internalized what seemed to be a *bürgerliche Leistungsethik* (ethic of achievement) Jürgen in particular was renowned for his remarkable scholarly and journalistic output and for pushing his colleagues into the same, as the agricultural historian Hans-Heinrich Müller, the classicist Liselott Huchthausen, and the historical ethnologist Wolfgang Jacobeit have testified. The relentless focus on scholarly productivity and professionalism collided with the inner-party culture however, which put a much greater weight on ideological conformity than professional *Leistung*.

Jürgen Kuczynski's degree of involvement with and loyalty to the party apparatus is brought into focus by an anecdote related by his daughter Madeleine Karrer. Her father wanted to bring son Thomas to bed one night. Thomas, however, sternly refused to follow his instructions, referring instead to the fact that he and the bears were having a party cell meeting and could not possibly end their proceedings based on such mundane concerns such as bedtime. Incidentally, father Jürgen went to continue with his very own party functionary meeting downstairs, which was interrupted for the sake of taking son Thomas to bed.

No matter how much Kuczynski engaged his intellectual faculties on his journey into Communism it became and remained foremost an emotional and semi-religious attachment. In fact, Kuczynski was keenly aware of this and evoked it playfully by frequently relating how his wife Marguerite used to

tease him by saying: "[i]f you were born 200 years earlier, you would have become one of the most faithful sons of the Catholic Church."[49] On some other occasion, Kuczynski related how leaving the party would be utterly unthinkable, comparable to the attempt to leave humanity.

Kuczynski reports how his "Jewish appearance" compelled the party to instruct him to cease fighting in the anti-Nazi underground in Germany and go into British exile. This was not the first time that he was confronted by anti-Semitic sentiment regarding his Jewish background. While studying in Erlangen in 1924, his *Doktorvater* and close family friend Paul Hensel urged Kuczynski not to eat at the student cafeteria, given the possibility of being harassed by nationalist and Nazi students. He noted in his diary how he felt keenly aware of "being Jewish" in "racial" terms. "I am, I think, the only 'stranger' meaning Jew, in town. People turn their heads when they see me walking on the streets."[50]

In later years especially, Kuczynski refused to identify with any form of Jewishness, even the secular kind. He was a faithful Communist and atheist and grew up without any Jewish education or ritualistic training. While his grandparents visited synagogues occasionally on high holidays—while also celebrating Christmas,—his parents had Jürgen and his five sisters baptized as Protestants. They themselves left Judaism officially in 1930. Jürgen even paid Church dues until he left the Protestants for the Communist party. However despite this estrangement from things Jewish, Kuczynski frequently mused over it as late as his university years. He writes in his diary that "[b]eing Jewish: that is what we are. Heart and intellect live more closely together with us than with you."[51] On November 4, 1924, he writes with youthful hyperbole that "I have worked again with Marx's writings. I think I am the first person who truly understands. Well, one just has to be a Jew and have assimilated Hegel, in order to understand Marx."[52]

Without elaborating further Kuczynski implied that in order to fully appreciate Marx's contribution to critical thought, critical distance is required both toward the status quo and powers that be. In other words, it would take an outsider to understand the outsider Marx. In the words of George Mosse and Isaac Deutscher, it would take a secularized non-Jewish Jew to understand the non-Jewish Jew Marx. This focus on being an outsider of sorts, both within and outside of the Communist movement, was cultivated early on by Kuczynski.

Again in his student diary, he exclaims how much he came to despise the entire political and ideological spectrum, from the *völkisch* nationalists even to the liberals and Social Democrats, referring to the former as *goys* and calling the latter to task for their hypocrisy. In contrast, the Communists are praised—if not for the mental prowess of their leaders at least for their

courage and integrity: "[l]ong live the Communist party, who may not have heads but instead bodies of courage and resolve to destroy this miserable and decaying bourgeois society."[53] What is striking here is not merely how deeply Kuczynski had assimilated the factious intellectual and civil-war-like language and martial metaphors, but also how he managed, in the midst of his loyalty to the party, some measure of critical distance. So while the party was to be admired and supported, it was not distinguished by the intellectual brilliance of its leaders. As Kuczynski was not at a loss for self-confidence in the arena of intellect, this realization was most likely instrumental to maintaining his critical distance.

Kuczynski while in British exile continued the precarious journey of abiding party loyalty combined with a more critical sensibility. Some of his more orthodox comrades, such as Wilhelm and Emmy Koenen, noted his allegedly *klassenfeindliche* or class-hostile attitude, and even while supporting the party line (including the notorious Hitler-Stalin pact), Kuczynski was perceived as aloof and too independent.[54] Another example of this comes from the recollections of former GDR politburo member Kurt Hager, who spent many years in British exile as well. There he and Kuczynski became friends. Yet decades later, Hager recounts in his memoirs, how Kuczynski broke with protocol and ignored the party chain of command. Apparently, Kuczynski neglected to discuss the matter of his return to the newly liberated Germany with his immediate party superiors—speaking with party leader Walter Ulbricht instead.[55]

Later on in the GDR his posture became, in a much more pronounced fashion, a kind of loyal deviation from the party line, but—as an anchor—the pressures of underground work and exile had nevertheless forged a high degree of conformity on his part. Years later he stressed how those years had "made better comrades out of us, better fighters for progress, but not really more lovable human beings. . . . They have also crippled us in many ways."[56] Part of being "crippled" perhaps surfaced as his tendency to gloss over his own misgivings, inner conflicts, and fears. Jürgen Kuczynski's children Peter and Madeleine recall their father also as the *Meister der Verdrängung* (a master of inner avoidance), who remained emotionally closed off to some extent. The painter Wolfgang Frankenstein makes a similar point in a letter in the early 1990s. Within this context, it is striking that one of Kuczynski's nicknames in the family was "the grave," underscoring his unwillingness and inability to discuss complex, emotional, and perhaps painful issues. This peculiar name stands in stark contrast to Kuczynski's well-known reputation as an endless reservoir of witty exchange and anecdotes.

He confided in his memoirs that he displayed too much blind faith in the party line. Yet, unlike the development of many other Communist émigrés,

Kuczynski rather nourished than strangled his yearnings for relative independence within Communist discourse. He was, during British exile, still an intellectual functionary, not fully daring to question the party line, but slowly he evolved into a Marxist intellectual, regarding at least some limited degree of doubt as the pre-requisite for any search for truth and knowledge. Kuczynski increasingly came to consider blind trust in the party's wisdom not as a virtue, but as a vice.

In retrospect, Kuczynski came to date his break with Stalinism to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. Yet, I would argue that this started earlier, and even as a Stalinist he was no mere party soldier.

Jürgen Kuczynski's international connections and family background uniquely prepared him to adjust to life as an émigré in Great Britain. He wrote that

> [i]n England I had three large advantages over other immigrants. I was able to live off of financially managing the fortune of a friend who stayed behind in Germany. The social and cultural position of my father, a very well known economist, gave me swift access to important circles in British society. Finally, I already spoke fluent English at the time of my arrival there, due to having lived in the US between 1926 and 1929.[57]

His polished manners, *bildungsbürgerlich* erudition, personal charm, and linguistic talents enabled Kuczynski to integrate himself into British society, being equally at home in upper-class settings, party meetings, and speeches to working-class audiences. Yet, despite his yearnings to find a home in the Communist movement, his fellow-comrades at times looked upon Kuczynski with suspicion. He ultimately remained an outsider to high-powered party politics and thus was well prepared to use his independent mind when ideological orthodoxy was eventually relaxed in the process of de-Stalinization. While never ceasing to be a faithful Communist, Kuczynski's exile experiences in Britain and abroad broadened his horizons and sense of individual initiative and judgment.

NOTES

1. Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 264.

2. His most important teachers were Georg Friedrich Knapp (his daughter Lilly married the future first president of West Germany, Theodor Heuss, and remained on friendly terms with the Kuczynskis, despite their pronounced political disagreements), Paul Hensel (a grandson of the composer Fanny Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and

personal friend of Kuczynski: father and son), as well as Lujo Brentano, one of Imperial Germany's most influential *Kathedersozialisten*.

3. Jürgen Kuczynski, *Memoiren: Die Erziehung des J. K. zum Wissenschaftler und Kommunisten* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1973), 115–16.

4. Boris Basil Shishkin, "The Brookings Institution: Research Training Fellowship Application," [1932], Brookings Archives, Educational Activities: Training Division Student and Research Training Fellow Records 1924–1978, Box 20, Washington, DC, 1–4.

5. Statement by Jürgen Kuczynski in his and his father's newsletter/journal, the *Finanzpolitische Korrespondenz*, 46 (15 December 1927), reprinted in *Memoiren*, 158.

6. Kuczynski was very critical in his manuscript of official US government statistics and thus speculated how this position might have turned his review committee members at Brookings against him. (Kuczynski, *Memoiren*, 181). In fact, some review committee members, such as Cleona Lewis, rejected the manuscript outright, citing the manuscript's lack of analytical coherence as the main reason. ("Memorandum From Cleona Lewis," Washington, DC, 12 March 1929, especially p. 1, document in Jürgen Kuczynski Papers, Berliner Stadtbibliothek [cited hereafter as Kuczynski Papers], unnamed folder). Others, such as Dr. Isadore Lubin (undated, but probably from March 1929) and Carroll D. Wright (March 21, 1929) urged Kuczynski to implement considerable revisions.

7. Jürgen Kuczynski, *René Kuczynski: Ein fortschrittlicher Wissenschaftler in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1957), 5.

8. Ruth Werner, *Sonjas Rapport* (Berlin: Neues Leben, 1977), 27.

9. Ibid., 14.

10. Ibid., 22.

11. For an overview of Kuczynski's life, see Mario Kessler, *Exilerfahrung in Wissenschaft und Politik: Remigrierte Historiker in der frühen DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001), 91–145, esp. 103–4.

12. Robert Chadwell Williams, *Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 25.

13. Kuczynski Papers, unnamed folder: George Marshall, to Jürgen Kuczynski, Berlin, December 5, 1938.

14. Jürgen Kuczynski, *The Condition of the Workers in Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union 1932–1938* (Victor Gollancz Ltd.: London, 1939), 9.

15. Ibid., 9.

16. Ibid., 10.

17. Ibid., 5.

18. Ibid., 33.

19. Ibid., 78.

20. Ibid., 77–78.

21. Ibid., 80.

22. Ibid., 81.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 83.

25. Renate Simpson, Interview with Axel Fair-Schulz, January 7, 2009, London.
26. Kuczynski, *The Condition of the Workers in Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union 1932–1938* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), 89.
27. Ibid., 92.
28. John Kenneth Galbraith recalled Kuczynski, decades later, as a "very hard-working and capable economist." J. K. Galbraith, telephone interview by author, August 1998.
29. Headquarters US Bombing Research Mission APO 413, 12 October 1944, National Archives London, KV2/1876.
30. C.2 (London), London, to Mr. Lynch, American Embassy London, October 14, 1944, National Archives London, KV2/1876.
31. Galbraith, to author.
32. F. 2b/MJE Bagot, Minute Sheet, January 13, 1944, National Archives London, KV2/1876.
33. S. Robinson, to H. W. H. Sams, January 9, 1944, National Archives London, PF 50445, KV2/1876.
34. R. H. Hollis, to Mr. Lynch, August 10, 1944, National Archives London, KV2/1876.
35. A. B. H. Section R 4, Extract for File No. PF.42628, File No. SF, 411/Germany/5, January 24, 1944, National Archives London. F2B 16/2, KV2/1876.
36. Report by AJC, Section B.4, October 5, 1943, National Archives London, KV 2/1875.
37. Metropolitan Police, Special Branch, May 25, 1944, "With further reference to Jurgen Kuczynski, subject to Special Branch file 402/41/684, National Archives in London, KV 2/ 1876, 1–2.
38. Ibid., National Archives in London, KV 2/ 1876, 3.
39. Ibid., 1.
40. Hi.No. 698, "From a conversation with Hans Straschitz," September 19, 1944, National Archives, London, KV 2/ 1876 1.
41. "Dr. Juergen KUCZYNSKI," 12 October 1944, National Archives London, RI. No 1016.
42. Ibid., original emphasis.
43. Director General, to G.T.D. Patterson, British Embassy, Washington, DC., January 19, 1951, National Archives London, KV 2/1879.
44. F.M. Small, to Colonel Allen, British Embassy, Washington, DC, February 9, 1951, Ibid.
45. "SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR MRS WINTERITZ ABOUT THE KUCZZYNSKI FAMILY," Ibid.
46. Report by D.M. Steward, March 15, 1951, Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Kuczynski, *René* Kuczynski, 8.
49. Kuczynski, *Memoiren*, 242.
50. Kuczynski Papers, Jürgen Kuczynski, Tagebuch, Vol. 2, 7 (October 26, 1924).
51. Ibid, 17 (November 23, 1924).
52. Ibid, 11.

53. Ibid., 10–11.
54. Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries*, 150–51.
55. Kurt Hager, *Erinnerungen* (Leipzig: Faber & Faber, 1996), 99–100.
56. Kuczynski, *Memoiren*, 271.
57. Jürgen Kuczynski, "Wirkung im englischen Exil," Harald Hagemann and Claus-Dieter Krohn (ed.), *Zur deutschsprachigen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Emigration nach 1933* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1997), 405.

8

Mentor and Comrade

Henry Pachter

Stephen Eric Bronner

When Henry M. Pachter died in 1980, a luminous intellect was lost.[1] There were few who could boast of his enormous scholarly range, probably fewer still that could make equal claim to his intellectual rigor or his disdain for passing academic fads. The posthumous publication of his beautiful *Weimer Etudes* brought him a measure of renown that he never really experienced in his lifetime.[2] Before then, some knew him only as the author of *Paracelsus: Magic into Science* (1951),[3] others as the contemporary European historian who had written *Modern Germany* (1978),[4] still others as a publicist or a teacher.

In America, he was primarily regarded as an essayist. This pleased him too, for there was no form he loved as much as the essay—the political essay. The essay form allowed him to act as the gadfly and confront the specific thinker, issue, theme, or idea with which he, always a restless intellect, was concerned at the moment. His essays often appeared cantankerous and often they advanced positions opposed to the values of the left in the United States. But each of his essays was intent upon exploding a myth, expanding an outlook, and provoking the reader into confronting what he or she took for granted. The essays collected in *Socialism in History* were originally written as separate pieces; nevertheless, they rest upon an inter-connected set of values and a certain tradition of inquiry. In this sense, they form a coherent worldview that can only benefit the socialist cause to which Henry Pachter dedicated his life.

He was born as Heinz Maximilian Pächter in 1907 to a bourgeois Jewish family in Berlin, and he grew up in a rigid, stuffy, and thoroughly Victorian atmosphere. It was surely in response that, as an adolescent, Pachter joined *Der schwarze Haufen* (The Black Herd) one of the many groups that composed the German youth movement. This movement, commonly known as

the *Wandervogel*, lacked a direct political purpose.[5] There, however, Pachter received his first taste of community, rebellion, and the possibilities of individual expression. The songs, the hikes, and the élan of a counter-cultural lifestyle had a pronounced effect. But the adult world could not be avoided forever, and it ultimately became impossible to ignore the movement's ideological reliance on neo-romanticism, elitism, and irrationalism.

When the youth movement split in 1926, at the urging of his friend Karl August Wittfogel, who would later write the classic *Oriental Despotism*,[6] Pachter joined the youth league of the German Communist Party (KPD). Later, in Freiburg, he took courses with Husserl and met his lifelong friend Hannah Arendt. There he also studied with a conservative professor of history named Georg von Below, who made Pachter's ideological transition to Marxism easier by emphasizing the romantic roots and the speculative character of that theory, which the old Junker despised. It was also von Below who advised Pachter, in the friendliest terms, to shift his scholarly focus from medieval history and concentrate on another area—medieval history was tacitly closed to Jews.

By the end of 1926, Pachter had returned to Berlin where he met Karl Korsch—author of the influential *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923), minister of justice in the short-lived revolutionary government of Thuringia, Reichstag representative for the KPD, and editor of the party journal *Die Internationale*—who would become the major intellectual influence on his life.[7] Along with Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci, whom Pachter discussed in two essays included in *Socialism in History,* Korsch would also emerge as one of the major contributors to the development of what would be called "critical" or "Western" Marxism.

Although Pachter never completed the essay on Korsch that he always wanted to write, it was from him that the student learned firsthand what was common to all three of these thinkers. None of them viewed Marxism as a fixed "system" or an objective "science" based on a causal notion of economic determinism. They instead interpreted Marxism as a method of socio-historical inquiry that can question even its own specific usage from a critical standpoint. Their personal political beliefs aside, from their method, it becomes impossible simply to identify the working class and its aims with any party or movement. For Korsch, and then for Pachter, there could be no evasions and no pseudo-"dialectical" sophistry. Socialism and the extension of democracy were inextricably bound; the goal of Marxism could only rest upon working-class control—and not mere national ownership—of the means of production.

There was no way for Pachter to hide these heretical views from his communist comrades. Trouble had been brewing for some time when he found

himself expelled from the Communist Youth in 1928 over the question of "socialism in one country." In the meantime, however, he witnessed the degeneration of the KPD. This experience informs Pachter's essay on Gramsci; it is the reason for his critical detachment, his emphasis on Gramsci's political role and mistakes, beyond any admiration for this Italian thinker's theoretical contributions. Pachter could never forget the "bolshevization" of the German party under Zinoviev's henchmen Ruth Fischer and Arkadij Maslow, who later would themselves be dismissed and vilified in favor of the dull-witted Ernst Thälmann once Stalin's star had risen in the homeland of the revolution. A dynamic of intra-party repression had allowed the ruthless persecution and expulsion of the KPD's finest members, including Korsch himself. Indeed, the mid-1920s also witnessed the transformation of Marxism into the codified dogma of "Marxism-Leninism"; the rise of the *apparatchik* mentality; the reliance on outright lies that were—sometimes cynically, sometimes naively—accepted as truth; and the concerted efforts of the Stalinists and the Nazis alike to bring the Weimar Republic to its knees.

After his expulsion, Pachter frequented the bohemian cafes in Berlin. There he came into contact with the expressionist avant-garde and the cultural intelligentsia. He also got in touch with such splinter groups as the Communist Worker's Party (KAPD) and the Socialist Worker's Party (SAP), a group for which he always felt great sympathy and through which he first became friendly with Paul Frölich, the pupil and later the biographer of Rosa Luxemburg. This was also a time of great intellectual activity. Under the supervision of two renowned liberal historians, Hermann Oncken and Friedrich Meinecke, Pachter wrote his dissertation, *Das Proletariat des Vormärz* (1932), which dealt with the creation of the German working class before 1848.[8] That knowledge would also be put to good use later in "Marx and the Jews," which is a small masterpiece in the sociology of knowledge.[9] But Pachter did not confine himself to scholarly pursuits; he also began to teach economic history in one of the workers' schools that flourished in the "red" districts of Berlin.

It did not last long. Following Hitler's rise to power, Pachter led a shadowy existence. In concert with his wife, Hedwig, and Richard Löwenthal, whom he had first met in the Communist Youth, Pachter put out what was probably the first resistance journal, a little paper called *Proletarische Aktion*. That did not last long either. By the end of 1933, Pachter had been forced to flee to Paris. There he took odd jobs, taught at the *Université populaire*, agitated for creating a "popular front" of all antifascist forces, and ultimately served as a publicist for the POUM, a mixed group of Trotskyist and socialists that served the loyalist cause during the Spanish Civil War.[10]

The collapse of Spain left a void. By the late 1930s the grand vision, which the Russian Revolution initially projected had become a nightmare, while the

Fascist barbarians had conquered much of Europe and sought to rule the rest. Gérard Sandoz (Gustave Stern), formerly a companion of Pachter's during their Paris exile, inscribed his *La gauche allemande* to his friend in 1970 with the words: "*En souvenir de nos espoirs et désillusions*."[11] Henry Pachter found the inscription "fitting."

Throughout this time, Pachter still considered himself a revolutionary Marxist. That becomes clear from his first substantive work, *Wirtschaft unterm faschistischen Rutenbündel* (1932), which constituted a critique of Mussolini's economic policies under the Bundle of Sticks, the fascist symbol. The pamphlet highlighted the sophistry of the Fascists and their reliance on cartels; it is still valuable, however, insofar as it retains the flavor of those propagandistic writings, which flooded the left in that period. It is a work of transition. The ultra-left sentiments are there along with a somewhat mechanistic quality, reflecting a bit of the KDP style. Yet the brochure closes with the following: "No political miracle can save the proletariat; no god, no dictator, no tribune. Only the workers themselves can achieve their liberation through the social revolution."[12]

Despite the emphasis on proletarian self-organization, however, there is a clear opening to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which served as the bulwark for the Weimar Republic. After all, Pachter's call for a "social revolution" was unmistakable in the context. The concept had received its popular connotation in Karl Kautsky's *The Social Revolution*, which appeared in 1902 and that argued that the attempt to build the socioeconomic power of the working class could not be divorced from a support for democratic political forms. The same year the brochure was printed, Pachter formally joined the SPD. Few illusions remained about its revolutionary potential. The SPD had supported the Kaiser in the First World War, opposed the revolutionary upsurges in Russia and Europe during the years that followed, and become a stalwart of the status quo in the new parliamentary regime. But it retained a working-class base, forced the passing of numerous pieces of very progressive welfare legislation, and emerged as a clear-cut opponent to the Nazis. Besides, the old aura of the past still had an effect.

In *Weimar Etudes,* Pachter described some of his experiences in this socialist party that had grown bureaucratically petrified with its own success. But the flavor of the movement before its "great betrayal" in 1914, its contradictory commitment to orthodox Marxist theory and reformist practice, its belief in democracy, and its relation to contemporary developments are all explored in "The Ambiguous Legacy of Eduard Bernstein" (1981).[13] In a way, it makes sense that this should have been Pachter's last published essay. "The movement is everything, the goal is nothing" was the phrase most associated with

Bernstein, and Pachter liked its anti-metaphysical implications as well as its emphasis on concrete politics. Also, aside from Pachter's own longstanding commitment to pluralism, parliamentarism, and reform, the figure of Eduard Bernstein provided him with an example of intellectual courage, decency, and an honest willingness to exert the critical faculty, even if it meant clashing with the dominant dogma.

In any event, the young ex-communist's political decision to join the SPD demanded a philosophical confrontation with his recent past. Despite the forced and sometimes over-complicated style, the first step was perhaps his finest article of the period, "Communism and Class."[14] This essay appeared in the prestigious *Die Gesellschaft*, a journal edited by Pachter's SPD patron, Rudolf Hilferding, author of the classic *Finanzkapital* and twice minister of finance in the Weimar Republic. The essay was first published in 1932, after Stalin's "left turn" of 1929. This change of line instituted what came to be known as the "social-fascist thesis," which equated the Social Democrats with the Nazis. Insofar as both groups were hostile to the Communists, and so "twin brothers," any support for a KPD alliance with the SPD against Hitler could be seen as a "right-wing deviation"—even though this division of the working class would ultimately help the Nazis gain power.

In Pachter's view, a fundamentally different worldview had provoked the break between these two competing organizations of the working class at a critical historical juncture. As far as the KPD was concerned, its revolutionary ideology had become split from what was essentially an opportunist practice. This situation is seen as deriving from the "substitution" (Trotsky) of the Party—which, by definition, incarnates the "true" revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat—for the actual working class as the agent of revolution. But, following the theoretical lead of his friend and teacher Arthur Rosenberg, Pachter saw that such a substitution does not lead to a revolutionary identification between the party and the interests of this specific class. Quite the opposite: replacing class with party creates a vacuum that can be filled by any mass base.

Through its adherence to "democratic centralism," lacking any check from below, the party can choose any means to pursue that revolutionary goal, which legitimizes it in the first place. It can also change the goal at will. Any tactic can be decreed a "revolutionary" necessity so long as it meets the immediate needs of the organization. Moreover, just as any mass can fill the vacuum at the base from the standpoint of the revolutionary vanguard, any party capable of exercising discipline and instilling commitment to chiliastic goals can assume primacy from the standpoint of the radical masses. This is precisely what allowed the "vanguard party" to be employed by a variety of movements with ideas ranging across the political spectrum.

In this respect, Pachter provides one of the most interesting analyses of the ideological degeneration of the Communist movement as well as the crossover in membership between the Nazis and Communists that was so striking toward the end of the Weimar Republic. Actually, however, Pachter probably overemphasized the implications of this overriding ideological moment for the KPD position on the "United Front" with the SPD. If any tactic can be viewed as a revolutionary necessity, then there is no reason why the Communists should have ideologically excluded a "United Front" policy per se. Such a policy could have been propagandistically justified just as easily as the separatist course—and it would be proclaimed only a few years later in the "Popular Front" period.

What Pachter underplayed in this essay was the ideological subordination of the KPD to the Soviet Union, and so the actual concerns that determined the party line. In fact, Moscow's "left turn" was anything but "left" insofar as it assumed that capitalism had "stabilized" and that all Comintern efforts should be directed toward supporting the industrialization campaign that would construct "socialism in one country." As a consequence, the Soviet Union moved away from Lenin's emphasis on exploiting international class contradictions to intensifying the conflicts between bourgeois states. From this new standpoint, Hitler's success could appear useful to the Soviet Union in disrupting the West, and Stalin's suicidal German policy would at least retain a certain deranged logic. But then, it would also follow that the "revolutionary" line accompanying the "left turn" was pure fluff. The Communist claim that the Nazi state would only last five years at the most—under the slogan "After Hitler, Us!"—would then be nothing more than the ideological veil for a defeatist policy.

Basically neither the orthodox Communists, despite the efforts of Togliatti and Dimitrov, nor the Social Democrats were able to develop a coherent understanding of fascism. In his broad and insightful essay "Fascist Propaganda and the Conquest of Power," which was written for the UNESCO-sponsored volume *The Third Reich*, Pachter attempted to make his contribution. Through his analysis of the Nazi propaganda effort, it becomes clear that the Nazi purpose was neither to persuade nor simply to deceive. Both persuasion and deception occur within a discourse that, at least potentially, allows for an opponent's response. The Nazi vision was much more radical: the very possibility of rational discourse had to be destroyed, arbitrary power had to prove decisive, and the audience had to be directly subjugated to the speaker's will.[15]

Following the work of Franz Neumann and Hannah Arendt, Pachter argues that terror, symbols, and organizational details are all manipulated to prepare the psychological condition in which individuals become atomized into an

amorphous mass to ensure an immediate identification with the "leader." Real communication is subordinated to the creation of a spectacle in which the entire society will participate. Through mass meetings, torchlight parades, and ideological bombardment, "an artfully contrived mass regression into the age of tribal magic" occurs in which the human condition will be portrayed as one of perpetual combat readiness. Nevertheless, the question remains: combat against whom?

According to Pachter, the choice of enemy was as contingent as the conflicting promises that Hitler made to conflicting classes and groups. Although he did not ground Hitler's mass support in a sociological analysis of the precapitalist groupings within German society, the image of the "little man" is useful. It explicitly refers to the title of the bestseller by Hans Fallada entitled *Little Man What Now?* This "little man"—the peasant, the clerk, the small businessman, the petty aristocrat, the disillusioned army veteran, the civil servant—felt his traditions, position, and possibilities being extinguished by the modern industrial classes of society, their political parties, and their institutions no less than by the values they affirmed. Indeed, Pachter beautifully shows how the cultural climate of the time militated against Enlightenment traditions in favor of irrationalist, vitalist, and neo-romantic ideologies.

The Nazis were, according to Pachter, able to harness the resentment, the moral indignation, and the frustration of the "little man" through the call for harmony, through the fanatical insistence on an abstract apocalypse, and through the demand for revenge on the representatives of modernity: the "bosses," the "Communists," the "democrats," liberals, intellectuals, and Jews. In this orgy of resentment, sadism took the place of a revolutionary impulse and became socially ennobled. Callousness, hatred, fanaticism, violence took on positive connotations. Intuition replaced reason as the criterion of truth; empty abstractions such as "destiny" gave primacy to myth as a form of social cohesion and dynamism. Intensity became its own end. Fanaticism rather than any specific goal is seen as defining Fascist propaganda. Such fanaticism, however, must be perpetually fueled. Fascist propaganda will subsequently always portray the world as being on the brink of war—and there is a sense in which the prophecy becomes self-fulfilling. Only in this way is it possible to ensure a perpetual dynamism—a dynamism without purpose or rational justification—which becomes the vitalistic, existential compensation for what Erich Fromm called "the escape from freedom."

But there were those in the 1930s who were not willing to hand over their freedom quite so easily. In France, the newly formed "Popular Front" sought to defend democracy against the fascist tide in the name of a progressive attempt to "reform the structure," while 1936 also saw the great experiment with revolutionary democracy and antifascist resistance in the Spanish Civil

War. In that year, the military, the church, the aristocracy, and other reactionary classes unified behind Franco's leadership in a revolt against the Spanish Republic. Liberals, socialists, Communists, Trotskyites, and anarchists rose to defend it. While Hitler and Mussolini sent massive military aid and personnel to Franco, the Western democracies—despite the underground shipment of some arms and the enthusiasms of volunteer regiments—remained rigidly neutral. The only real defender of the republic appeared to be the Soviet Union, whose "Popular Front" line was transported to Spain.

This reformist strategy, soon enough, came into open conflict with the revolutionary aims of the anarchist movement. That contradiction on the Spanish left would be tragically resolved in 1937 when Communist forces, with socialist support, slaughtered the revolutionary front of anarchists, syndicalists, Trotskyists, and their partisans in the battle of Barcelona. During the intervening year and a half, Pachter wrote *The Spanish Crucible,* which would remain his favorite work. A testament to the anti-Communist revolutionary left and the struggle of the antifascist cause, when it was republished in Spanish in 1966, Pachter wrote a new introduction.[16] The revisions are startling and the criticisms are balanced. Critical of those liberal historians who in retrospect argued for compromise on the left, Pachter maintains, "the Civil War was inevitable precisely because the revolution was inevitable." Nor should the tragedy of Spain be simply seen as a pre-figuration of World War II or a situation in which the international proletariat stood ready to defend the republic.

Casting aside the vestiges of nostalgia, Pachter is unafraid to question whether the war should actually have been prolonged after late 1937 when it was known to have been lost; ruefully he points out how the zealous antifascists of the time "owed it to the militants to sacrifice them to the cause." That cause itself was the splendid mixture of solidarity and individual dignity that has become the transcendent symbol of the Spanish ordeal. To this cause, Pachter would remain committed. His book is indeed still remembered by many on the radical left: at the urging of the famous anarchist, Daniel Guérin, it was last translated into French as *Espagne 1936–1937: La guerre dévore la revolution* (1986).[17]

By 1941 Henry Pachter's second exile had begun in America. Through the influence of Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, the important theorists of law and the state, he became a consultant for the Institute of World Affairs and the Office of War Information. He also become a research associate for the Office of European Economic Research, which was a branch of the Office of Strategic Services, and it was for this organization that he wrote his little book on Nazi rhetoric *Nazi-Deutsch*.[18] Afterwards, Pachter taught at the New School for Social Research, the City College of New York, and Rutgers University.

As the 1950s turned into the 1960s, Pachter became known as one of many cold warriors, an impression that grew through the impact of certain articles he published in *Dissent*, of which he was a co-founder and editor, as well as through his exaggerated criticisms of leading American revisionist historians like William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolko. He, too, participated in the American Committee for Cultural Freedom along with other organizations covertly supported by the CIA. But the truth is that Henry Pachter was not a mandarin, or a McCarthyite demagogue, or a reactionary. He felt a certain intellectual affinity for those like Maurice Merleau-Ponty who tried to distance themselves from both superpowers in the name of what may be called "a-communism." But, for better or worse, Pachter believed that such a stance was an evasion of the concrete political choice that had to be made. Just as certain leftists like Jean-Paul Sartre provided the Soviet Union with a special "privilege" in foreign affairs, whatever their own reservations about its regime, Pachter did the same with the United States. His criterion of judgment was clear: he would always "prefer the most inefficient democracy over the most efficient dictatorship."

When the cold war began, Pachter maintained his commitment to social democracy. At the same time, however, any past traces of solidarity with the Soviet Union from the common front against Hitler had vanished. In this regard, Pachter was no different than many of his friends—such as Franz Borkenau, Richard Löwenthal, and Fritz Sternberg—who suffered what Brecht called "the Stalin trauma."[19] It is nothing more than fashionable nonsense, however, to suggest that these thinkers somehow created the foundations of modern neo-conservatism. All of them contributed to the development of what might be considered a political realist approach to Soviet foreign policy. *Weltmacht Rußland* (1968), a book that focused on Russia's world power politics, fit into this general enterprise. Pachter suggested that Soviet foreign policy is less a set of discrete strategies reflective of shifts in the leadership than a function of aims and ambitions connected with the emergence of Russia as a modern nation-state under Peter the Great. These ambitions would include barriers to possible invasion from the West, warm water ports to the South and hegemony over the Baltic, as well as secure borders against China to the East. Pachter indeed considered the USSR neither inherently expansionist nor inherently peaceful but rather as a super-power intent upon responding to given circumstances as its national interests dictated whether in terms of its "socialist allies" in the East or its "imperialist enemies" in the West.[20]

This view informs his understanding of "socialist imperialism" in particular and imperialism in general. His essay "The Problem of Imperialism" (1970) interprets the phenomenon as neither intrinsic to capitalist development nor even necessarily as economically profitable for the capitalist class

as a whole. Pachter instead highlights its contingent character and views imperialism as fundamentally political in character rather than as a reflex of economic processes. Opposition to the Soviet Union consequently should be in tactical terms, and the tactics should not be confused with the strategic purpose: peace.[21] Even Pachter's *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (1963), which is certainly not the most even-handed study, made a plea for coexistence as the only realistic response to the possibilities of nuclear war. He believed that the question of nuclear arms should be severed from any other foreign policy issues and, just a few months before his death, he even drafted an essay on unilateral disarmament titled "A Suggestion for Surrender."[22]

Internationalism was perhaps the value Pachter held most dear, and it profoundly informs his major work of the postwar era, *The Fall and Rise of Europe* (1975), which he dedicated to Willy Brandt and Jean Monnet.[23] Whatever its inadequacies, in Pachter's view, the United Nations, along with its many international agencies, as well as regional organizations such as the European Economic Community, needs to be strengthened, which naturally does not preclude reform. This position is also what set Pachter at odds with leftists who uncritically supported Third World dictatorships and the movements of "national liberation." He was always, fundamentally, a cosmopolitan with an innately skeptical view of tradition. Nevertheless, he did not simply dismiss the legitimate grievances of oppressed communities and the tragedy of their plight.

The point becomes particularly clear in his essay "Who Are the Palestinians?" (1975).[24] As an editor of *Dissent*, Pachter noted with alarm the increasing Israeli bias of the magazine and many of its contributors, such as Bernard Avishai, Gordon Levin, Irving Howe, and others. It should be remembered that this article appeared long before the barbarous slaughter of Lebanese civilians in 1982, which jolted many on the left into reconsidering their positions on the Mid-East. Still, Pachter did not fall into the common mistake of those who, in criticizing the role of the oppressor, cast a romantic aura over the representatives of the oppressed. He was suspicious not merely of the terrorism, but the authoritarianism of Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and he deplored the way in which neighboring Arab states have used the Palestinians as a political pawn rather than allow inmates of the refugee camps to settle on their territories.

Whatever the importance of realism to his way of thinking, in any event, normative questions always played a decisive role. Pachter never underestimated the role of ideology when dealing with movements or the speculative moment underpinning a genuine critique of the status quo. In keeping with Karl Korsch, he sought to understand socialism in terms of the normative

purposes it originally was meant to achieve. Only by raising the epistemological question of "what is socialism?" could Pachter consider it possible to connect tactics and strategy, or means and ends, in a plausible manner. Thus, he refused to identify socialism with either the economic reformism of mainstream social democrats or the political authoritarianism of the communists.

"Three Economic Models" (1964) is one of Pachter's best-known essays. It seeks to explain the epistemological assumptions that underpin the workings of "pure" capitalism, the welfare state, and socialism. Considering these systems as ideal types, according to Pachter, both laissez-faire capitalism and the welfare state presuppose the existence of private property as well as a mathematically based notion of efficiency that will judge the value of production solely in terms of its profitability. An iron rule therefore applies: new production methods must produce savings in excess of the capital, which they make obsolete. Both forms, moreover, tie ownership of capital to decisions over investment, identify labor as a commodity, and seek to maintain a consistent flow of profits for the capitalist class. Given that capitalism always required a degree of state intervention, whatever its goal of enabling the individual to maximize profits, it is not seen as inimical to a welfare state. Underestimating the struggle between those committed to one form and those committed to state intervention, which was somewhat understandable in the context of the time, Pachter views the differences between pure capitalism and its welfare variant as matters of degree rather than kind.[25]

But the iron rule remains, along with the market and the insecurity caused by private control over investment decisions, no less than the lack of control by the ultimate consumers. The crucial issue for socialism is consequently neither wages nor the simple "expropriation of the expropriators" (Marx) under the guise of ownership of the means of production. Its partisans must focus instead, according to Pachter, upon democratic control over the means of production and how investment might be directed toward projects that might not bring an immediately calculable profit, but will make life easier and better. It is, for him, a question of priorities: socialism as against any form of capitalism must "provide different answers to the same questions." Thus, socialism should not be identified with a new era of unrivaled productivity in terms of those criteria usually associated with the capitalist labor process.

And, if that is the case, the entire notion of what constitutes "progress" under capitalism must be reformulated. At the time of his death in 1980, Pachter was still collecting notes for a philosophical-historical work on a problem that had passionately intrigued him for many years: the concept of time. This work was never completed, but he did finish what would have constituted a chapter, "The Idea of Progress in Marxism" (1974). Pachter shows himself as critical of economic determinism as of sophistic attempts to identify the interests

of communist states with those of a liberating world spirit. Progress is instead understood in normative terms: it projects bringing the alienated forms of bureaucratic action under democratic control with a view to the extension of humanistic, universal, participatory ends.[26] And discussing how this *might* be achieved becomes the aim of "Freedom, Authority, and Participation" (1978). Aside from its many economic suggestions, usually of a speculative sort, there are practical political insights as well. Thus, while socialists are a minority, they can only press for reforms. Only when real inroads or majorities have been achieved can demands be made for fundamental changes, while a substantial majority is necessary for any structural transformation that assumes "the symbolism of revolution."[27]

Although his description of actual possibilities at any particular stage might well prove accurate, Pachter ignores the way in which emphasizing a strategy of instrumental reform might preclude the possibility of thinking about a more radical transformation. He shows little sensitivity for the problems of moving from one position to the next. He also ignores the way in which "capitalist democracy" tends to transform long-term political goals into short-term economic ones. This not only places socialists on the defensive but also, I think, changes socialism itself into little more than a regulative ideal predicated less on workers' control than on mitigating the whip of the market and furthering the fight for time.

There is a way in which Pachter anticipates this in what is my favorite of his essays: the humorous and prophetic "The Right To Be Lazy" (1956). Building on the earlier pamphlet of the same name by Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, Pachter envisages socialism as stepping back from the single-minded emphasis on production and capitalist notions of efficiency that have dominated the mass organizations of the left. He calls for new criteria for a newly planned and democratically controlled economy no less than a shift from industries that may be profitable in the short term to the construction of hospitals, parks, and other projects that would provide benefits for the community as a whole over a longer period of time. Whether the new society is as "productive" as capitalism is, for him, ultimately not the point. The value of socialism, again, lies in the priorities it will set; the manner in which people will be freed from the drudgery of labor; the way in which their capacities for participation, leisure, and creativity will be fostered.[28]

"What is socialism?" Henry Pachter was willing, for better or worse, to provide an answer: it is the process of emancipation whose realization remains always unfinished. He believed that peace could never exist between humanity and its creations. Ironically, in his view, the person who demands the realization of socialism cannot be a socialist. Socialism is not merely the expansion of wealth or democracy: it is rather the ongoing struggle for intel-

ligence and experience. Thus, for Henry Pachter, socialism can be nothing other than "the highest stage of individualism—its fruition for all."

NOTES

1. All articles mentioned are included in the volume—introduced by this essay—*Socialism in History: Political Essays of Henry Pachter* ed. Stephen Eric Bronner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

2. Henry M. Pachter, *Weimar Etudes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

3. Henry M. Pachter, *Magic Into Science: The Story of Paracelsus* (New York: Schuman, 1951).

4. Henry M. Pachter, *Modern Germany: A Social, Cultural, and Political History* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978).

5. For details see Walter Laqueur, *Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement* (New York: Basic Books, 1962).

6. Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

7. On Korsch see, e.g., Patrick Goode, *Karl Korsch: A Study in Western Marxism* (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1979); Michael Buckmiller (ed.), *Zur Aktualität von Karl Korsch* (Frankfurt-Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1981).

8. Heinz Pächter, *Das Proletariat des Vormärz*, Phil. Diss. (Berlin: Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1929).

9. Henry M. Pachter, "Marx and the Jews," Idem, *Socialism in History*, 219–55 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Fall 1979).

10. POUM: Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Worker's Party of Marxist Unity).

11. Gérard Sandoz, *La gauche allemande: De Karl Marx à Willy Brandt* (Paris: Julliard, 1969).

12. Heinz Pächter, *Wirtschaft unterm faschistischen Rutenbündel* (Berlin: Laub, 1932).

13. Henry M. Pachter, "The Ambiguous Legacy of Eduard Bernstein," Idem, *Socialism in History*, 256–83 (originally published in: *Dissen*t, Spring 1981).

14. Henry M. Pächter, "Communism and Class," Ibid., 89–109 (originally published in German as "Kommunismus und Klasse," *Die Gesellschaft*, October 1932).

15. Henry M. Pachter, "Fascist Propaganda and the Conquest of Power," Idem, *Socialism in History*, 110–46; originally published in: Maurice Baumont, J.H.E. Fried, and Edmond Vermeil (eds.), *The Third Reich* (New York: Praeger, 1955).

16. Henri Rabassière [Henry M. Pachter], *España: Crisol político* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Proyección, 1966).

17. Henry Pachter, *Espagne 1936–1937: La guerre dévore la revolution* (Paris, Amis de Spartakus, 1988). The first edition was published 1937 under Pachter's pseudonym Henri Rabassière.

18. Henry M. Pachter, *Nazi Deutsch: A Glossary of Contemporary German Usage* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1944).

19. On Borkenau see Mario Kessler's essay in this volume, on Löwenthal see Oliver Schmidt, *"Meine Heimat ist—die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung." Biographische Studien zu Richard Löwenthal im Übergang vom Exil zur frühen Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt-Main: Peter Lang, 2007) . See also Mario Kessler, *Kommunismuskritik im westlichen Nachkriegsdeutschland: Franz Borkenau, Richard Löwenthal und Ossip Flechtheim* (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011).

20. Henry Pachter, *Weltmacht Rußland: Tradition und Revolution in der Sowjetpolitik* (Hamburg and Oldenburg: Stalling, 1968); Paperback edition: Munich: dtv, 1970.

21. Henry M. Pachter, "The Problem of Imperialism," Idem, *Socialism in History*, 161–99 (originally published in: Dissent, September–October 1970).

22. Henry M. Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

23. Henry M. Pachter, *The Fall and Rise of Europe: A Political, Social, and Cultural History of the 20th Century* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

24. Henry M. Pachter, "Who Are the Palestinians," Idem, *Socialism in History*, 203–15 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Fall 1975).

25. Henry M. Pachter, "Three Economic Models: Capitalism, the Welfare State, and Socialism," Ibid., 16–35 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Spring 1964).

26. Henry M. Pachter, "The Idea of Progress in Marxism," Ibid., 65–85 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Spring 1974).

27. Henry M. Pachter, "Freedom, Authority, and Participation," Ibid., 36–64 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Summer 1978).

28. Henry M. Pachter, "The Right to be Lazy," Ibid., 3–15 (originally published in: *Dissent*, Winter 1956).

9

Between History and Futurology

Ossip K. Flechtheim

Mario Kessler

The political scientist Ossip K. Flechtheim (1909–1998) had lived in different countries and specialized in various fields of research. He taught and wrote in several languages. Flechtheim even changed his first name: After leaving Hitler's Germany he called himself, instead of Kurt, Ossip. But he never abandoned his intellectual ties with Germany, the country to which he finally returned in 1952. Throughout all the itineraries of his long life, Flechtheim "stood by to his inner convictions," as it was stated in an obituary. "His groundbreaking books about party democracy gave him international reputation. His name is also inseparably bound with futurology as a part of the social sciences. He was one of the founders of this humanistic discipline." Another obituary emphasized that Flechtheim's life and work was "devoted to Germany's liberal democracy after World War II."[1] The authors of these statements were Roman Herzog, who was at that time President of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Eberhard Diepgen, Mayor of the City of Berlin. Unlike Flechtheim, both politicians were members of the conservative Christian Democratic Party of Germany (CDU).

Flechtheim himself had belonged to three different parties of the left: before 1933 he had been a member of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). After his return to Berlin he had joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that he had left in 1962. From 1979 until his death Flechtheim was a member of the *Alternative Liste* that was part of the ecological Green Party.[2]

Flechtheim's work, that includes nearly twenty books and a great number of book editions, is devoted to crucial problems of the twentieth and the twenty-first century: to war and peace, democracy and dictatorship, Fascism and anti-Fascism, the north-south conflict, and capitalism and Communism

in its various forms. The following remarks try to show who Ossip K. Flechtheim was and what the relevance of his work is today.

A LIFE BETWEEN NATIONS AND CULTURES

The benchmarks in Ossip Flechtheim's life are the watersheds in Germany's modern history. He was born in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine, on March 5, 1909. It was the place, where Leon Trotsky once had finished high school. Flechtheim's birthday was at the same date, on which 38 years earlier Rosa Luxemburg was born in Poland. In 1910 the family moved to Germany, at first to Münster, Westphalia, his father's birthplace, and then to Düsseldorf.

Ossip Flechtheim's father Hermann (1880–1960) was a grain dealer and owned a small factory. His mother Olga née Farber (1884–1964) was born in Moscow. The parents spoke to their son both in German and in Russian, thus giving him a multicultural background. Ossip's uncle Alfred (1878–1937) was a Berlin art dealer of international reputation, another relative, Julius (1876–1940), was member of the directorate of AEG, Germany's leading electrical company, and Honorary Professor of Law at Berlin University.[3] The Flechtheims represented the synthesis of *Bildung* (humanistic education) and enlightenment that characterized the Jewish educated middle and upper class in Germany.[4] Growing up with a profound knowledge of German and Russian literature, Ossip Flechtheim became, at an early stage, immune to the nationalist climate that dominated Imperial Germany and particularly her institutions of higher learning. "There was no room for patriotism in our family," as Flechtheim emphasized decades later.[5]

As Jewish immigrants from Tsarist Russia, the Flechtheims did not overlook German anti-Semitism that was connected with anti-liberal thinking. But they were convinced that in Germany anti-Semitism would be less more than "one of the vestiges of the Middle Ages, overhauled by progress."[6] The hope for a German-Jewish symbiosis did not lead them to identify with German nationalism. It was this attitude that was also at the root for Ossip Flechtheim's mistrust for and disinterest in political Zionism, although he never kept secret his Jewish origin combining it with a cosmopolitan outlook. "I was and I remained Jew and German, European, *Weltbürger*, and a citizen of a coming better world."[7] But he did not visit the State of Israel.

At the beginning of World War I members of the Flechtheim family had been drafted to the German as well as to the Russian army. Ossip's Russian uncle, who was a P.O.W. in Germany, told him that the German print media were to mislead people in the hinterland. The real situation at the front, as he had seen it, was much different from the propaganda picture. "Thus I was

unable to say," Flechtheim reported later, "one side is right and the other is wrong." The overthrow of the anti-Semitic Tsarist regime in Russia was, however, celebrated by the whole Flechtheim family.[8]

At the high school in Düsseldorf, Flechtheim became a close friend with Hans (later John H.) Herz. This friendship should last throughout their lives. Both families were secular Jews and supported the democratic experiment on German soil, the Weimar Republic. Like the Flechtheims, the Herz family felt very much at home in European high culture: classical music was played nearly every day in their house. Herz's parents managed to invite first-rate artists, such as the pianists George Szell and Edwin Fischer, to give concerts for the family.[9]

In 1927, after finishing high school with distinction, Flechtheim went with Herz to Freiburg, where both became university students of law. Unlike his friend, Flechtheim became a member of the German Communist Party. At the University of Berlin, where he continued to study, Flechtheim worked with the Communist Student's League. There he came in contact with people who later became known as scholars and political writers. Among them were Richard Löwenthal, at this time National Chairman of the Communist Student's League, the future Bismarck biographer Ernst Engelberg, who succeeded Löwenthal in chairmanship, Nathan Steinberger, student of agrarian economy and many years later arrested under Stalin in Soviet Russia, and Hans Mottek, law student and later author of a multi-volume work on German economic history.[10]

In 1931, Flechtheim traveled for the first time to Soviet Russia (it was in 1964 that he was able to visit the country again). Since he spoke Russian fluently, Flechtheim was able to communicate with people. "All in all, my impression was rather positive," as he noted decades later. There was "still much enthusiasm and hope, although the economic situation was very difficult." It seemed to Flechtheim that the Soviet Union was a country obviously moving towards socialism, although Stalin's negative impact on the politics of the KPD and the Communist International could hardly be neglected.[11]

As a communist student, Flechtheim turned successively to those party circles, which doubted the Stalinist notion that a proletarian revolution was underway in Germany. They also opposed the designation of Social Democrats as *Sozialfaschisten* (Social Fascists). However, this new theory of "Social Fascism" found a positive echo among the party rank-and-file. This was because of the enormous amount of suffering and despair that virtually every social stratum was subjected to in the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Germany and the world at large were completely unprepared for an economic downfall of that degree. "The organized working class did not even have the protection of a social Maginot line," to quote Charles Maier.[12] The

political climate in Germany provided a suitable growth for revolutionary illusions, but also for fascist ideas. The republican order became more and more discredited.

A small group of Communists and Social Democrats formed a clandestine organization called *Neu Beginnen* (New Beginning), often called *Die Organisation* or *Org*.[13] The group sought to work inside the Communist and the Social Democratic Party in order to prevent an internecine warfare, which, as *Neu Beginnen* predicted correctly, would help the Nazi Party to come to power. Unlike many Communists and Social Democrats, the *Neu Beginnen* members saw clearly, to quote a modern American author, that Nazism was not a temporary phenomenon, but, instead, "attracted the attention of the large capitalists in Germany, who were concerned about the growth of revolutionary sentiment in the population and no longer confident that the republican form of government could protect capitalism."[14] Richard Löwenthal, who was already expelled from the KPD and had been a short-time member of the anti-Stalinist KPD-Opposition or KPO around Heinrich Brandler and August Thalheimer, was among the founders of *Neu Beginnen*.[15] Flechtheim, still a KPD member, joined this group. There he found comrades, such as Franz Ludwig (later Francis L.) Carsten, who, in the future, was a well-known historian in London, and Robert Baum (later Robert Jungk), who became, like Flechtheim, one of the founders of the discipline of futurology and one of Flechtheim's closest friends.[16]

On January 30, 1933 Hitler became German chancellor. This date saw the destruction of communist as well as social democratic illusions regarding the impact of the Nazis' seizure to power. The enmity between the two worker's parties has made the victory of the Nazis possible. No serious attempt was made to offer open opposition. Even now, as Wolfgang Abendroth wrote, "the mutual distrust between the two working-class parties continued . . . in the resistance, the Communists still regarding even workers and intellectuals in the illegal opposition as opponents if they were from other groups."[17]

It was at this time, right after the beginning of the Nazi rule, that Flechtheim left the KPD to invest all his political energy to *Neu Beginnen*'s underground work. In an illegal manifesto *Neu Beginnen* stated that "the collapse of German Social Democracy dates not from its passivity in the final crisis of 1933, but from the opportunity it missed in [the ill-fated revolution of] 1918. It bitterly paid for the illusion [. . .] that a working class may securely enjoy the fruits of political democracy, while the reality of power remains in the hands of the possessing class."[18]

Within workers' resistance to the Nazis, intellectuals like Flechtheim found psychological stability. The German workers had long remained virtually untouched by anti-Semitism and reacted, as Hermann Graml wrote,

"either with indifference or hostility to the antisemitic activities of the SA thugs, especially as the same thugs were responsible for smashing the worker's own Trade Unions and political organizations."[19] A growing majority of Germany's industrial and agrarian capitalists, however, accepted Hitler's idea of a racial state that would prevent the communist challenge: There are no revolutions except racial revolutions, Hitler declared as early as 1930 in order to win support from the capitalist class. He made clear that "there cannot be a political, economic or social revolution."[20] "The organic linkage of anti-Communism with anti-Semitism ensured in the long run the support of the traditional elites in German society for Hitler's political programme," as Robert Wistrich, not known for pro-communist tendencies, wrote correctly.[21]

Under difficult circumstances, Flechtheim managed to continue his university studies in Paris and Cologne. In 1934 he submitted his dissertation on *Hegels Strafrechtstheorie* (Hegel's Theory of Criminal Law) at the University of Cologne. Carl Schmitt, who had been his supervisor until Hitler came to power, rejected to cooperate with a doctoral candidate of Jewish origin, since the Nazis started to discriminate against Germany's Jewish population.[22] Finally, Flechtheim's dissertation was accepted by the university authorities in 1934 and published in Czechoslovakia two years later.[23]

After the Nazis' seizure to power, Flechtheim had no chance to get a position in public service or even to work as a registered lawyer. He had to dissolve his parent's household and made a very modest living from limited and part-time working as associate in legal profession. In September 1935 Flechtheim was arrested. When interrogated, he was able to play down his clandestine activities for *Neu Beginnen*, thus being released from prison after 22 days. He went to Brussels to meet his comrades, who told him that there was no future for him in Nazi Germany.[24]

From Brussels Flechtheim went to Switzerland. He was fortunate enough to get a fellowship from the *Institut universitaire de haute études internationales* in Geneva. Simultaneously, he attended Geneva University for postgraduate studies where he could improve considerably his knowledge of the French language. The University Institute of Advanced International Studies was sponsored by the League of Nations. Its directors William Rappard and Carl Jacob Burckhardt hired a number of excellent university professors who had been dismissed in Germany, Austria or Italy. Among them were Hans Kelsen, Flechtheim's law teacher from his Cologne days, the economists Wilhelm Röpke, Friedrich August von Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises and the historian Guglielmo Ferrero.

Like Flechtheim, John H. Herz and Ernst Engelberg worked as research fellows in Geneva. "At the institute, we refugees stuck together. We were friends, although Ossip Flechtheim had distanced himself from the Communist Party,

while Ernst Engelberg [. . .] maintained to be a member," as Hans Mayer, not yet the outstanding sociologist of literature, wrote in his autobiography.[25] Flechtheim took active part in political discussions, although he never wanted to put himself in the foreground, as Engelberg remembered.[26] Between the Charybdis of capitalism and the Scylla of communism, Flechtheim, henceforth, was in search for a synthesis of liberal democracy with humanist socialism.[27]

It was Flechtheim's former teacher Hans Kelsen who suggested him to investigate the ideological origins of contemporary Soviet ideology in connection to Soviet legal theory, but also within the framework of international communist politics.[28] Thus Flechtheim submitted a thesis on *Der Bolschewismus und seine revolutionäre Urideologie* (Bolshevism and its Revolutionary Ideological Origins). Parts of this work appeared in several French and American journals.[29] However, it was only decades later that Flechtheim could publish other chapters of his research in German.[30]

In all of these writings Flechtheim refuted the traditional approach that depicted Soviet and international communism as a theory of conspiracy. He saw the reasons for the seductiveness of communist ideology in the fact that it combined characteristics of a powerful mass movement with that of a centralized "World Party" and with the structures of an illegally and effectively operating organization. Flechtheim emphasized that the problem of social nature of Soviet society should be placed in the center of the analysis. He saw Stalinist bureaucracy, the winner of the social upheavals of the 1930s, not as a new capitalist class in Marxist disguise, as many foreign observers did at this time. The new bureaucratic elite "does not acquire the produced surplus value. It rather burdens future development [through its existence]." The bureaucratic stratum, in its large scale a parasitic outcome of the society, could be overcome in the course of social and political development.[31] Flechtheim's analysis was remarkably close to that of Leon Trotsky and August Thalheimer, two communist heretics whose works he quoted occasionally if not uncritically.

The Communist International, once founded to inspire communist revolutions outside the Soviet Union, had changed its function: The Comintern's current main objective was, as Flechtheim stated, to support Soviet politics.[32] The "Jacobin or Bolshevik road to power" could well be taken, as he emphasized,

> in countries with unfinished bourgeois revolutions, such as in Russia or Spain. This development is based on relatively if primitively advanced tendencies within the proletariat and the peasantry. This road takes logically to the establishment of a dictatorship of a centralized party. The party itself is ruled by a small clique, which enables to constitute a new social order. This collectivistic order is based on an economic system, which might become superior to the existing [capitalist] economy. This development will, however,

> hardly result in the formation of a classless society. Instead of it, a technocratic society will emerge.[33]

Much later, Flechtheim described this kind of society as "Neo-Caesarism."[34]

Flechtheim made clear that the political aims and ethical principles of Communism were incompatible with those of Fascism, but he did not exclude political cooperation between the two movements once and for all. If the Soviet Union would find a political agreement with Fascist powers, "the Communist International would be directed to support this line, even if such a situation seems to be unlikely at the moment or in the near future."[35] Only a few months after these lines had been written, Germany and Soviet Russia concluded their treaty of August 23, 1939. At this time, Flechtheim had already left Europe for the United States.

OSTRACIZED AS ANTI-ANTI-COMMUNIST

Since the beginning of 1939 Flechtheim saw clearly that the Swiss authorities would not allow him to stay in their country. While still in Geneva, he established contacts to the Institute of Social Research. Its director Max Horkheimer, anticipating the Nazi takeover in Germany, was wise enough to transfer the institute's estates from Frankfurt to Geneva as early as 1932. Horkheimer offered Flechtheim a fellowship at the institute. This was Flechtheim's chance to go to New York, when the institute was transferred there in 1939.

In February of that year Flechtheim arrived in New York. On July 5, he applied for the *First Papers* to become an American citizen.[36] At the institute he cooperated closely with Franz Neumann. Neumann's *Behemoth*, the groundbreaking book on Nazi Germany, profited from Flechtheim's expertise. Flechtheim, as Neumann wrote, had "spent much time in research on the history of the Weimar republic."[37] This was a subject about which he was to write extensively in the coming years. Next to Neumann, it was Erich Fromm whose psychoanalytical approach to analyze political and social trends influenced Flechtheim mostly. Flechtheim's academic start in the United States was facilitated by grants from the Oberlander Trust and from the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars.[38] These grants enabled Flechtheim also to support his parents who had managed to escape from Germany to Guatemala.[39]

In 1940 Flechtheim succeeded to find his first academic position at a US university. He became instructor at Atlanta University in Georgia. Later he was promoted to Assistant Professorship of Government. He had found Thomas Mann's support, when Flechtheim asked the writer for a letter of recommendation on his behalf.[40]

At Atlanta University Flechtheim started to teach in English. He offered the whole program of the newly established discipline of political science. Flechtheim gave courses in general and American government and politics, history of political theories, constitutional history, introduction into social philosophy, and comparative economic policy. He also taught modern history of Germany, Russia, and Western Europe.[41]

Atlanta University was a completely new experience for Flechtheim. It was a historically black institution. Unlike most of "white" universities, a number of black colleges opened teaching positions for refugee scholars from Europe.[42] It was at Howard University in Washington, D.C., the most renowned "black" institution of higher learning, where John H. Herz started his long academic career in the United States. "The helping hand stretched out by black colleges and black scholars should not be forgotten at a time when, alas, Jewish-black relations have become strained," as Herz wrote half a century later in a letter to the editors of the *New York Sunday Times*.[43]

Almost all students and most of faculty members at Atlanta University were African-American. The ethnic segregation at institutions of higher learning reflected the social reality in the American South. Compared to mainstream "white" universities, the financial situation of these "black" colleges was difficult. The intellectual climate, however, was characterized through competition. For all these black students a graduation with high marks was, as the Marxist historian Howard Zinn wrote, a "life and death matter."[44] To get even a low-paid employment the students had no choice but to finish school with much better grades than their white competitors on the job market, should they not join the masses of unemployed and unpaid African-Americans, who found no exit from poverty and inequality.

Flechtheim, himself a victim of racial and political persecution, was and remained sensitive to racism. He learned a lot from his neighbor, who once had studied in Germany with Max Weber and Werner Sombart and who was fluent in German.[45] This neighbor was no other than the African-American historian and sociologist W. E. B. DuBois. Flechtheim established a good relationship with the renowned scholar, and he put his name on a list of references for his job applications that he sent to more than fifty colleges.[46] The continuing discrimination of the black population led Flechtheim to conclude that the process of becoming a full-fledged Western democracy in the United States was only completed through the implementation of guaranteed equal rights for African-American citizens.[47]

It was during a visit in New York, when Flechtheim met his future wife Lili Faktor. Her friend Gabriele Speier lived together with Flechtheim's friend from Berlin days, Arkadij (later A. R. L.) Gurland.[48]

Lili Faktor was born in 1917 in Berlin. Her father Emil was editor-in-chief of the renowned financial newspaper, *Börsen-Courier*.[49] Her mother, a promising pianist in her youth, had given up her musical career to raise the children Lili and Richard. Lili's parents, both secular Jews, established a *salon*, a circle of writers and artists, who met regularly in their house. Among them were the painter Oskar Kokoschka, the writers Heinrich Mann and Joachim Ringelnatz, the publisher Ernst Rowohlt, the theater directors Erwin Piscator and Leopold Jessner, and the art dealer Alfred Flechtheim, Ossip's uncle.[50]

The Nazi regime destroyed the economic existence of the family. The Faktors had to escape to Prague, where Lili graduated from a Czech high school. The young refugee Communist Herbert Crüger (much later a victim of East German Stalinism), who was her friend at that time, introduced her to Marxism, although Lili, decidedly a leftist, never embraced Communism.[51] The German invasion to Czechoslovakia endangered the lives of the family. With the help of her life-long friend Sibylle Ortmann, Lili managed to come to the United States. In New York she found a job as a secretary in an office. The lives of all the other family members ended tragically: Her parents perished in the Holocaust, while her brother became a victim in the Stalinist "purges" in Soviet Russia, where he had hoped to finish his education in medicine.[52]

In the end of 1942, the Flechtheims married. Through Ossip, "Lili's life got a new meaning," as her friend, the journalist Carola Stern, said in her necrology.[53] As a married man, Ossip also hoped to avoid to be drafted to the army. In Atlanta, Lili worked, again, as secretary, but also enrolled at Atlanta University, where she took extramural courses in English and philosophy. She was one of the very few white students at the university. In September 1946, she gave birth to Marion Ruth, her only child. Much later she admitted that it was her fate to abandon a life of her own. "My life purpose was to accompany my husband's career throughout all stages."[54] But she wrote several short stories.[55] Her study on Oscar Wilde deserves to be mentioned.[56] She also translated a number of John Herz's works into German.[57]

After his employment at Atlanta University had ended, Ossip Flechtheim was lucky enough to find a part-time teaching position at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine. There he taught from 1943 to 1947. He also taught at Bowdoin College. From 1947 to 1951 Flechtheim was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colby College in Waterville, Maine. "He looked absolutely strange, but his teaching was impressive," as his student Harold Hurwitz, who later became his colleague and friend in Berlin, told to the author.[58] Flechtheim missed, as he noted later, "the big city life. My colleagues went hunting and fishing and I did not."[59] A *Großstadtmensch* (big city person) since his student's days, he always felt estranged in a rural environment.[60]

Lili continued and finished her studies in sociology, economics and psychology. She graduated with distinction from Colby College. After that she found employment as social worker. In 1951, this period of life ended when Ossip Flechtheim was denied to get tenure at Colby College. The university administration mistrusted him. During the academic year 1951–52, when Flechtheim taught as visiting professor in Berlin, College President J .S. Bixler and Dean E. C. Marriner had selected another candidate for the vacant position in the political science department. They informed Flechtheim that his contract could be prolonged for only another year.

He reacted angrily. Given this conditions he would "not for a minute" consider to come back to Colby. He referred to his credentials as a writer and teacher. In Germany, Flechtheim wrote, he would certainly have a good chance to get a chair at one its best universities. He would, however, gladly return to Colby, would the college consider a tenure position as a serious offer.[61] Marriner responded that Flechtheim had to decide quickly would he return for a year or to give up his position.[62] But before Flechtheim had answered he received a letter from the College President. J. S. Bixler informed him that his contract at Colby College had ended. It would be the best for Flechtheim to look for an academic position in Germany.[63]

Flechtheim informed Ralph Himstead, General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) about his case. He wrote that all colleagues who had been denied life tenure at Colby College were either liberals or Jews, not only one had been suspected of sympathies for Communism. Flechtheim's own political position was, as he wrote, "definitely left of the center and decidedly anti-totalitarian," as his book about the KPD would testify.[64] The AAUP's response stated only that there was hardly anything the organization could do for Flechtheim.[65] The Colby College's paper refused to report about the case.[66]

Flechtheim had a communist past, and in the age of McCarthyism there was no way to whitewash the red badge.[67] He now looked for a possibility to continue his academic life in Germany. Unlike him, his wife did not want to go back to the land from which the Nazis had started to destroy Europe. After the family's final return, it took her years to feel at home again in the country and the city of her birth.

AN ENGAGED POLITICAL SCIENTIST

Ossip Flechtheim had first returned to post-war Germany in 1945.[68] He had worked as a senior legal advisor in Robert Kempner's office during the Nuremberg Trial, where Kempner was American chief prosecutor.[69]

Flechtheim felt, as he later admitted, very satisfied to interrogate his former university teacher Carl Schmitt who, as a committed Nazi, once had denied accepting Flechtheim's doctoral thesis.[70] During his time in Germany, where Flechtheim worked until 1947, he found opportunity to collect material for a book on the German Communist Party. In 1948, the book came out in Germany. *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (The Communist Party of Germany in the Weimar Republic) set a high scholarly standard. It was also to become a popular work on its subject.[71]

In this book that Flechtheim dedicated to his friend John Herz, he analyzed the growth and destruction of Germany's third largest political force during the years between 1918 and 1933. The KPD comprised, before the Nazis destroyed it, hundreds of thousands of members and millions of voters all over Germany and constituted the largest section of the Communist International outside the Soviet Union. The party was not powerful enough to realize its self-proclaimed aim to establish a 'Soviet Germany,' but obviously, as Flechtheim wrote, strong enough "to shake the newly established bourgeois republic to its foundations."[72]

If any philosophical system, as Amos Funkenstein wrote, "in some measures objectivizes biographical moments," the same can be said about research on issues of contemporary history.[73] Flechtheim would hardly have written this book, had he not been a KPD member during the last years of the Weimar Republic. Flechtheim quoted Arthur Rosenberg, another former Communist, who once had "not written this book [his *History of Bolshevism*] to please any party or group" and who was "not conscious of any desire to make 'revelations' or to 'settle accounts.'"[74] Unlike the fashionable Cold War literature of that time, such as Franz Borkenau's *European Communism* or Ruth Fischer's *Stalin and German Communism*, Flechtheim did not tell a conspiracy story.[75] Instead, he saw the KPD as "*the* party of strategy turns and changes par excellence. Its course was everything but straight and its leadership was replaced time and again because of real or pretended failure. While the party moved from defeat to defeat, segments of its ideology were opportunistically adjusted to the demands of the day, thus clashing with other ideological elements."[76]

Since each defeat of German Communism resulted in the removal of responsible politicians, a deterioration of leadership took place that was rapid and striking. Flechtheim emphasized the lack of political and human qualities of later party leaders, such as Ernst Thälmann, Hermann Remmele, and Heinz Neumann, as contrasted with the stature of the party founders: Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Paul Levi, Ernst Reuter, and Heinrich Brandler.[77] This was not astonishing: Any communist politician who envisaged a more flexible conception vis-à-vis the SPD was open to the charge of "opportunism" and was finally removed from his position.[78]

Most of Flechtheim's central statements, being far from hysterical anti-Communism, have stood the test of time and are acknowledged facts in current serious historiography.[79] He strictly distinguished between Liebknecht's and Luxemburg's ideas of council democracy and the authoritarian dictatorship that was established in Soviet Russia and in the Soviet Zone of Germany after 1945.[80] Even if this dictatorship had succeeded in establishing a planned economy that had been envisaged by the communist movement as one of its goals, such a system, nevertheless, would flout all "rational, libertarian and humanistic ideas of the communist tradition."[81]

Flechtheim analyzed the twisted road of the early KPD between syndicalism and Social Democratic reform policy. Criticizing the KPD, he did not ignore the political failures of the German Social Democratic Party, the SPD, since November 1918. Flechtheim was among the first non-communist writers to challenge the conventional wisdom that there was no alternative but a Bolshevik dictatorship to the cooperation between the SPD leaders and the military leadership. His book inspired international research on the democratic potential of workers' and soldiers' councils during the time of the German Revolution of 1918–1919.[82]

Flechtheim explained the far-reaching consequences of the split between Communists and Social Democrats in 1918. While Communists totally neglected the democratic achievements of the Weimar Republic, Social Democrats underestimated the anti-democratic potential and pro-Fascist tendency of large sections of the German bourgeoisie and the landlords, the *Junkers*. Throughout the years of the Weimar Republic, the SPD leadership distrusted potentially revolutionary, extra-parliamentary mass actions. The early alliance of SPD leaders, namely Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Noske, with the German military elite during the November Revolution of 1918, the brutal killing of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg by Free Corps soldiers, and the exclusion of Communists from the democratic discourse of the Weimar Republic paved the way for the Communist's anti-democratic sentiment.[83] Thus, they were alienated from social democratic workers, and their abstract demands for action found no echo in reality.

Flechtheim argued that early German Communism was entirely adverse to the Leninist party conception and how the most crucial errors committed by the Comintern in Germany stemmed from wrong evaluations of the actual role of the Bolshevik party in October 1917. He rejected Arthur Rosenberg's thesis that there was never a time in German history more auspicious for the success of a socialist revolution than in the summer of 1923.[84] Taking into account the exhaustion of the proletariat and the recovery of the right at that time, Flechtheim contended "that there were really only two alternatives left: either the victory of Fascism or the revival (*Wiedergeburt*) of the Weimar Republic."[85]

The book shows in detail how Stalin in power was able to suborn the leadership of the Communist International and of the KPD after 1923. At a time when all strength was needed to counter the offensive of the reactionary forces, the KPD attacked the Weimar Republic and, most harshly, the "rightists" and "conciliators" in its own ranks, such as Brandler and Thalheimer. The result was a series of ultra-radical campaigns that isolated the KPD from all possible allies.

In the early 1930s the KPD seemed to strengthen. Its membership grew. The KPD became the party of the unemployed, capable of organizing mass demonstrations, but incapable for organizing a successful struggle for power. As soon as workers lost their jobs, they transferred their votes from SPD to KPD, because the communist polemics against the SPD seemed justified. The young jobless workers were attracted by the voluntarism of the KPD that provided them with the vision of a sudden and ultimate change.[86]

However, the Nazi movement grew much more quickly, enjoying support from people who had previously voted for the bourgeois parties. The Nazi's combination of pseudo-socialist and anti-Semitic propaganda had an inherent logic, while the worker's parties' internecine warfare with its ideological confusion disoriented and alienated people. Thus, Nazism gloried in the mobilization of masses. Its common sense was the resentment of the "Little Man" in a society that crushed him (to quote Eric Hobsbawm) "between the rock of big business on one side and the hard place of rising mass labour movements on the other."[87]

The KPD leaders, however, expected the people to rally immediately to them as long as they were sufficiently vigorous in exposing the "betrayal" of the Social Democratic Party, and they withdrew former half-hearted offers of a United Front with the SPD and with the Trade Unions.[88] But with all necessary criticism of communist ideology and strategy, the communist idea of *No God, no Emperor and no Tribune* was and is, as Flechtheim pointed out, "by no means compatible with National Socialism."[89] In an American journal he dignified "the heroism of the innumerable underground fighters against fascism" of which so many had been KPD members before 1933.[90] Flechtheim's assumption that the incompatibility of democratic and authoritarian tendencies within Communism could lead to a split of the movement inspired the next generation of researchers.[91]

Flechtheim intended to submit his manuscript as a dissertation to a German university. However, Peter Rassow, professor of modern history at Cologne University, Flechtheim's old *Alma mater*, criticized what he called "*die fehlende wissenschaftliche Fragestellung*" (the lack of scholarly approach) and suggested Flechtheim to submit his thesis elsewhere.[92] It was Alfred Weber, professor of sociology at the University of Heidelberg, who accepted

Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik as a thesis of scholarly merit. On March 1, 1948 Flechtheim defended his doctoral thesis successfully.

Most of the reviews in American journals were written by German refugee scholars who had witnessed the decay of the KPD and of the other parties of the Weimar Republic. Henry Ehrmann conceded in *The American Political Science Review* that Flechtheim has told the story "eminently successful." Flechtheim's book, as he wrote, "makes an important contribution not only to the history of the C.P. as such, but also to the general history of the Weimar Republic."[93] Reinhard Bendix praised the detailed data on party membership and its social composition, the discussion of labor aristocracy, "and the concluding appraisal of the relation between ideological struggles in the party and the changing internal and international environment of the Republic."[94] Robert Neumann's review in *The Western Political Quarterly* was less enthusiastic. Neumann criticized that Flechtheim did not discuss in detail some of the early events that preceded the history of the KPD, such as the defeat of the left in the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils of December 1918. Here, as in the history of the pre-Fascist Kapp *Putsch*, Arthur Rosenberg's *History of the Weimar Republic* still remained unrivaled.[95] Walter L. Dorn, the prominent American specialist on modern Germany, emphasized that Flechtheim had convincingly shown "that while Great Britain developed only a reformist labor party and Russia a purely revolutionary socialism, Germany which lagged behind Britain in the development of a democracy but was in advance of Russia, produced both tendencies."[96] William Harvey Mehl summarized: "An honest analysis by a thinker possessed of a broad academic background, this history will afford a needed corrective to the recent work by former KPD leader Ruth Fischer on the same subject."[97]

In some reviews of works about communist politics that Flechtheim published since the late 1940s, he confirmed his left-leaning critique of Soviet Communism. He agreed with Martin Ebon's opinion that "Western civilization can answer Communism only by positive and constructive actions. It cannot fight Communism on the battlefields . . . and expect to win lasting victory. The tractor is, in the end, a weapon superior to the tank."[98] In a cautious critique of Franz Borkenau's *European Communism* Flechtheim wrote that, "though all of us will agree that communism constitutes a formidable threat to Western civilization, not everyone will identify it with fascism."[99] He objected Borkenau's thesis of an all-embracing and all-penetrating communist conspiracy. Obviously "in countries such as France and Italy at least, the communist movement is not simply identical with the MVD."[100]

Flechtheim was only one in a group of about fifty German-speaking legal theorists and sociologists, who had escaped to the United States.[101] They became accustomed to the practice of American liberal democracy, but they

also contributed, as it was said about Flechtheim's colleague Ernst Fraenkel, "to a more critical self-understanding of American democratic theory."[102] These refugee scholars were able to develop a specific approach to democratic education and to "the internationalization of political science."[103] A similar tendency could be seen among German refugee historians, of whom about eighty ended up in the United States.[104] This approach was founded in their German roots as well as in their new intellectual and human experience. Flechtheim's main contribution to this discussion was his edition of a large-scale volume entitled *Fundamentals of Political Science*. The large textbook appeared in 1952 in the United States. A German translation came out six years later.[105]

In explicit contrast to traditional German approach, Flechtheim emphasized that political science is not the science of power as such, nor is it confined to the *Wissenschaft vom Staat*, a discipline with a methodological focus on the state.[106] He argued that the state constitutes a transitional type of social organization characteristic only of the world-historical age of civilizations, an institution that replaced the organizations based upon the authority of custom that were typical of the primitive societies, and possibly foreshadowing a social organization based exclusively upon the authority of reason.[107] Besides the power aspect, the state has other aspects. "Political science, therefore, is that specialized social science that studies the nature and purpose of the state in so far as it is a power organization and the nature and purpose of other 'unofficial' power phenomena that are apt to influence the state."[108]

Fechtheim made clear that political science cannot prescribe a course of action for the people, nor can it lay down anyone's life plan. Unlike old-fashioned authoritarian ethics and unlike modern ideological master-plans, it cannot speak in terms of a simple and categorical "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not." Political science should not convey the false impression that it can relieve the individual of the responsibility of choice. This is fallacious for three reasons:

> First, it has as its subject matter the study of choices among various values. It deals with the struggle between contradictory goals. The political scientist, himself a living human being, and hence a holder of values, finds it tempting to introduce his personal preferences into his study and thus to become a partisan. Second, political science cannot yet provide the average person with so much reliable, quantitative, testable, and hence convicting knowledge that he could make his own choice without much effort. . . . Third, political science is a pure and an applied science all in one . . . Though the pure and the applied political scientist is one and the same person, little agreement exists among political scientists on which values political science, as an applied science is to serve.[109]

Flechtheim concluded that political science can be adequately performed only if the political scientist enjoys a considerable amount of independence and professional security in a society that allows freedom for the expression of intellectual doubt and which provides the scholar with a social network where he can pursue his studies.[110] He agreed with Morris Cohen's statement after which "the fear of offending patriotic or other respected sentiment is perhaps one of the strongest hindrances to scholarly history and social science."[111] Although the *Fundamentals* were primarily written for American readers and students, it was the German edition that contributed mostly to democratic education in a country where independent-minded scholarship had not been popular in the past.[112] One reviewer (Franklin L. Burdette) praised the competence and the "literary skills" of the chapters, while another (Henry Ashby Turner) noted shortcomings: Not much was said about the executive, local government, and public administration. "The discussions of pressure groups, the electoral processes, and federalism are also too brief and superficial to be satisfactory."[113]

It was not only Flechtheim's contribution to political science and, most notably, to the history and sociology of political parties that made his name known to generations of scholars and political analysts. He coined the term "futurology" to describe that field of knowledge. Flechtheim was one of the first, if not the first, to urge introduction of future into education. Alvin Toffler, the renowned American scholar in the field, wrote in 1972: "The founding father of modern futurism, if there is one, may well be a mild-mannered German professor who, as early as the mid-1940s, began speaking and writing about the need for what he termed 'futurology.'"[114] Flechtheim laid down an agenda that has been followed in much research and in various activities in the field around the globe.

It was as early as in 1945 that Flechtheim wrote a text entitled *Teaching the Future*. Published in the *Journal for Higher Education* and reprinted in *Forum*, the essay called for the development of courses dealing with the future.[115] This attitude would include the future as an open dimension, thus enlarging the sphere of human action. "A serious investigation into the future—'futurology' as a science—is scarcely a generation old; it is, historically speaking, still in its swaddling clothes," Flechtheim wrote. He referred to Erich Fromm, Arnold Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin, but also to H. G. Wells and to Johan Huizinga's *In the Shadow of Tomorrow*.[116] "What I then called the new futurological approach," as he explained much later, "was the attempt to discuss the evolution of man and his society in the hitherto forbidden future tense. I held that, by marshalling the ever growing resources of science and scholarship, we could do more than employ retrospective analysis and hypothetical predictions; we could try to establish the degree of credibility and probability of forecasts."[117]

He argued that universities ought to teach about the future as a serious subject. "With education only beginning to adjust to the needs of a dynamic age, it is natural that such problems are as here indicated have not yet penetrated into classrooms and textbooks. In spite of many protestations to the contrary, most schools and universities continue to rely on the perpetuation of the status quo, being satisfied to teach what was and what is."[118] Flechtheim was aware of the fact that college administrators feared to waste funds on "wishful thinking instead of being soundly invested in the sober business of teaching established facts. To them we may say that every beginning has been daring and problematic." Did natural sciences not have their origin in bold speculations of ancient Greek philosophy of nature? "And fragmentary though our information [about the future] may appear at this point, it will grow in proportion as it is made the subject of serious study and inspired teaching."[119]

Flechtheim was in search for a logical approach of the future in the same kind as history is a search for the logic of the past. He tried to assess the fate of mankind in the coming centuries as objectively as possible. However, had he not found support of Franz L. Neumann, his former colleague from the Institute of Social Research, when his career was at stake, he would hardly have continued his academic life. As a refugee who had found asylum in the United States, Flechtheim never shared the fashionable anti-Americanism of German intellectuals from the right and from the left. He returned to the country what once had saved his life, teaching as a visiting professor at the University of Kansas City during the academic year 1954–55. But he knew very well why no American universities had offered him a tenure position. He was well aware of the fact that "most schools and universities continue to rely on the perpetuation of the status quo, being satisfied to teach what was and what is."

IN SEARCH FOR A FUTURE: FLECHTHEIM'S FUTUROLOGY

Political science, taught on university level, was an integral part of American re-education policy in West Berlin and West Germany. Thus, as early as 1949 the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, the German College for Political Education, established in the Weimar Republic and later misused as a pillar of *völkisch* Nazi education, was reopened by initiative of Otto Suhr, a leading Social Democratic politician and educator and Franz L. Neumann, now Professor of Comparative Government at Columbia University and special advisor of West Berlin's SPD Mayor Ernst Reuter. Neumann urged to appoint German refugee scholars for both the *Hochschule* and the Department of Political Science at the recently established Free University. That meant

scholars who actually lived in the United States and were in search for permanent academic positions, such as Ernst Fraenkel and Ossip K. Flechtheim.[120] Unlike the Colby College administration, Reuter, Neumann, and Otto Suhr had a firm understanding of academic excellence. Thus, West Berlin won what America lost. This was particularly true in Ossip Flechtheim's case.

In September 1952, after his year as a visiting professor at the Department of Political Sciences at Free University, Flechtheim was permanently appointed at *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*. At that time, the school still lacked full university status. But for Flechtheim, now 43 years old, the years of uncertainty were over. After a while, the family moved to Rohlfsstrasse in West Berlin's upper middle class district Zehlendorf. In a newly build American-style blockhouse, the Flechtheims spent there almost the rest of their lives. Ossip Flechtheim's parents returned from Guatemala to West Germany. Among Lili's and Ossip's new friends were the journalist Carola Stern, one of Flechtheim's first German students, the protestant minister and anti-Nazi Harald Poelchau, and the Polish-born dissident Communist Wanda Bronska-Pampuch, herself a historian of the Comintern.[121]

Nathan Steinberger, released from a Soviet camp in the Far East after Stalin's death, was one of the few East Germans to whom Flechtheim was able to maintain or to re-establish contact. After the suppression of the communist reform movement in Prague in 1968, Flechtheim's home was the first address for some refugees, such as Eduard Goldstücker or Michal Reiman, a relative of the family.[122] Since their first encounter in London, the Flechtheims maintained a lifelong friendship to the writer Erich Fried.[123] Another friend was Heinz Brandt, a trade union activist and dissident Communist. When, in 1961, the East German *Staatssicherheit* (Stasi) kidnapped Brandt, an ardent critic of the Ulbricht regime, in West Berlin, Flechtheim initiated a campaign to release Brandt from his East German prison. Wolfgang Abendroth, Martin Niemöller, Bertrand Russell and many others supported the campaign. It took three years to free Brandt who returned to the West.[124]

In 1959, the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* merged with the Free University and bore henceforth the name Otto Suhr Institute. The faculty members of the *Hochschule* were offered university professorships. The precondition was the *Habilitation*, the thesis that allows German scholars to teach on university level. Flechtheim, who did not have the chance to write such a work during his exile years, was granted *Dr. habil.* without a special thesis. His essays which he had published since his book on the KPD had appeared were considered as full equivalent. On January 1, 1959 Flechtheim was appointed Associate Professor of Political Science at the Free University. Two years later he became Full Professor for the Sociology of Political Parties.[125] In 1968, the Otto Suhr Institute defended Flechtheim against the CDU minister

Gerhard Stoltenberg who attacked him in the German parliament, the *Bundestag*.[126] Until his retirement in 1975, Flechtheim supervised a great number of doctoral students who later became well-known scholars, such as Bernhard Blanke, Theodor Ebert, Christian Fenner, and Fritz Vilmar.[127]

During his first years as a professor in Berlin, Flechtheim's work focused mainly on the sociology of political parties. He initiated a collective research project that resulted, among other works, in a multi-volume documentary collection on party politics in West Germany.[128] He also continued to write on the history and politics of international, namely Soviet Communism. This part of his work is documented in his collections of essays *Eine Welt oder keine?* (1964), *Weltkommunismus im Wandel* (1965), and *Bolschewismus 1917–1967* (1967).

Flechtheim formulated his basic approach in terms described as immanent criticism (*Ideologiekritik*); the policies of Communism have to be criticized according to the standard of its own ideology.[129] He maintained that those who deplore the social costs of revolutions should not neglect the much higher costs of counter-revolutions.[130] Flechtheim was one of the first political scientists who insisted that the divergences within the communist world would lead to more pluralistic forms of rule. The ruling party in Yugoslavia had more in common with Western Communist parties, such as of Italy and France than with the Soviet party, as Flechtheim pointed out as early as 1959.[131] Generally, "the West and the East are becoming more alike," as he wrote, "whether, where and when they will meet, remains an open question."[132] Post-Stalinist Communist parties could by no means see as totalitarian, as Flechtheim repeatedly emphasized.[133] He forecasted that, under certain circumstances, Communist parties could transform themselves into democratic (or quasi-democratic) bodies. Other observers were, however, much more skeptical.[134]

Years later Flechtheim even went as far as to say that those Communist parties who had criticized the Soviet military intervention in Prague could no longer be regarded as hostile to democracy. Even more, those parties should be seen as allies against social oppression in East and West.[135] Those communist forces who would take off the straightjacket of rigid Bolshevism could contribute to what Flechtheim called the "Third Way," or "Third Force" that is to say a prospect of the future that is different from both what exists in the East and in the West. Flechtheim envisaged a new social and economic system that he defined as "Socialist Humanism." Such a social order would finally incorporate specific features from both the Eastern and the Western systems, but would transcend communist and capitalist orders.[136]

Flechtheim defined the "Third Force" as "the *non-conformists* on this [Western] side of the line, and the *revisionists* on the other [Eastern], who

demand a dynamic renovation and development of either social system," a demand that should be supported by progressive religious groups.[137] In his stern criticism of Flechtheim's view, Rudolf Schlesinger wrote that Flechtheim's predictions went hardly beyond a vague ideal of a society without saying how it would work economically.[138]

Over the years, Flechtheim had explained in a number of essays what he attempted to bring to a first synthesis.[139] He was aware of the fact that, as his friend Robert Jungk wrote, the new discipline of futurology was still "in an early stage of development. Much like sociology in its beginnings, it is still awaiting official academic recognition."[140] Therefore, in 1970 Flechtheim summarized his deliberations in a large book. *Futurologie: Der Kampf um die Zukunft* (Futurology: The Struggle for the Future) became his main work. He had hesitated to write a summing-up of his thoughts, as he wrote in the preface. The struggle for tomorrow would allow only provisional conclusions.[141]

In this book, Flechtheim anticipated three tendencies of converging developments for the foreseeable future, i.e., until the end of the 20th century. "The most clearly negative kind of convergence is the collective death of mankind or, at least, the downfall of modern civilization. The second alternative would stabilize bureaucratic-technological regimes. Armament and arms race, even with air-space weapons, were further reinforced. Eventually this would produce a state of affairs, which one might best describe as neo-Caesarism. The third and least likely alternative of development in the 20th and 21st centuries would lead to a solidarity-based world federation. This would include planning of humankind's future in the service of peace, welfare, and creativity."[142]

Flechtheim made a clear distinction to status quo scholars like Herman Kahn or A. J. Wiener.[143] He saw their futurological philosophy as definitely conservative because they would assume that all development in the technical, commercial, and social spheres would take place within the existing Western social and economic order. These writers around the Hudson Institute would expect the future to be like nothing so much as an American future.

In contrast to this position Flechtheim insisted that a continuing power policy as instigated by the two superpowers could result in a barbaric war would there be no nuclear disarmament.[144] After that war the world would relapse into barbarism not unlike the situation in Europe in the aftermath of the destruction of the Roman Empire. Flechtheim referred to Edward McNall Burns who once had stated that

> the culture of the early Middle Ages undoubtedly represented in certain respects a reversion to barbarism. Intellect did not merely stagnate but sank to very low depths of ignorance and credulity. Economic activity declined to primitive lev-

> els of barter and ruralism, while morbid ascetism and contempt for this world superseded more normal social attitudes.[145]

It is not surprising that Flechtheim saw the political philosophy of contemporary Soviet Communism not as an alternative, but as parallel thinking to right-wing conservatism in the West. Both favored technological modernization without human emancipation, thus disparaging democratic as well as socialist principles. He quoted Thomas Mann's word about Communism as a "new church."[146] The collective mentality of the Communist party elite was, as Flechtheim pointed out, similar to conservative decision-makers. The conservatives would prefer to put the clock back to a social order without strong trade unions as protectors of the welfare state. Communist party bureaucrats also opposed independent political organizations of the workers, such as worker's councils. It could not surprise Flechtheim that he was, therefore, severely criticized in the Communist world.[147] Only eleven years after his death Flechtheim was published in Russia.[148]

However, Flechtheim clearly predicted that a "retreat to *laissez-faire* capitalism," particularly in Eastern Europe, "would cause an immense catastrophe." It would be a historical tragedy should Eastern Europe, disappointed by the iron Soviet rule, dismantle all modest achievements of the communist system and prefer a comeback of the capitalist order.[149] Flechtheim's attitude, however, left no room for fatalism. He interpreted historical progress as real if discontinuous. "The curve upward resolves itself into a series of troughs and crests," as V. Gordon Childe once had written.[150] But Flechtheim, like Childe, insisted, "no trough ever declines to the low level of the predicting one, each crest out-tops its last precursor."[151]

Flechtheim saw communist "statism" not as alternative to capitalist exploitation and profit economy. The Leninist version of teaching Marx was, according to Flechtheim, an understanding of the present and the future in much the same way as the geocentric view of the universe, although 1,200 years old in the 16th century continued to be the official dogma of Christianity. A subtle Marxist analysis of society could certainly remarkably forecast trends of the future. Flechtheim referred to Friedrich Engels who, as early as in 1888, had predicted "the coming world war with its consequences.[152] But neither Marx nor Engels had any monopoly of forecasting. Throughout their whole life a mixture of social prognosis and utopian thinking characterized their scientific work. The Marxian idea that thesis and antithesis would result in a revolutionary kind of synthesis—a leap, as it were in nature—was for Flechtheim entirely imaginary and could not be confirmed by science. Flechtheim underscored that in advanced industrial societies that should always be seen as the proper testing ground of Marxism; the proletariat had not become

a class-conscious agent of history and had not transformed a capitalist into a socialist society. On the contrary, there was an increasing *Verbürgerlichung* of the proletariat, a transformation from blue-collar to white-collar work.

Flechtheim concluded that futurology, as he defined it, could be seen as a suspension of doctrinaire Marxism. Like the dissident Communist Karl Korsch, he saw that all attempts to restore "the Marxist doctrine *as a whole and in its original function as a theory of social revolution*" would result only in a reactionary utopia.[153] Since his time in Geneva, Flechtheim was in search for a synthesis of Marx's revolutionary socialism with Max Weber's more sober social analysis, being aware that Marx's and Weber's political aims were incompatible.[154] Now Flechtheim emphasized that a synthesis could bridge the gap between the Marxian utopian consciousness and the modern, scientific investigation of the future through social prognosis and planning. Futurological forecasting, as Flechtheim saw it, would thus produce a balance between utopia and science. It should be more realistic than the important if impressionistic forecasts of the 1920s and 1930s, such as those written by Samyatin, Huxley or Orwell.

Consequently, Flechtheim's concept of futurology was based on the process of social evolution that was emerging in Eastern and in Western Europe. This concept would integrate the growing permissiveness, liberalism and individualism of Western societies with an enlightened interpretation of socialism. It would lead to a Third Road beyond capitalist and communist systems and would mean a new democratic alternative to existing societies. It would also transcend commonly received notions of democracy. Flechtheim insisted that this new type of democracy was born in Czechoslovakia in 1968—in later years he would also refer to the democratic and socialist experiment in Chile under Salvador Allende. Significantly enough, the Czechoslovak reform movement included a team of scholars under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences that even used the term "futurology" in their social prognosis.[155] The Soviet tanks in Prague demonstrated, as Flechtheim pointed out, that there was no *automatic* development towards convergence in the positive sense. Given the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia and the American war in Vietnam, a negative kind of convergence could be the one that mankind would have to reckon with.[156]

This negative, neo-Caesarian convergence would imply a "post-republican and post-democratic, even post-Fascist regime under democratic disguise. A modern Caesarian dictatorship would be based on pseudo-democratic campaigns, such as plebiscites. The dictators, rather charismatic than traditional leaders, would rule a society in which only relicts of rationality and legality would remain."[157] All cultural and environmental problems would be neglected. Flechtheim referred to the sarcastic remark made by the Polish

writer Stanislaw Jerzy Lec: *Panem et circensis* would mean that "the bread gets whiter and the games bloodier."[158]

What kind of resistance this society would cause? Among the "have-nots," the people in underdeveloped countries, resistance could be expressed in terrorist forms not unlike those of the 19th century, but using modern technology. All these oppressed peoples "know very well that ten trucks filled with dynamite and exploding in the tunnels and under the bridges of Manhattan would cause more damage there than in any other place in the world."[159]

Flechtheim reminded his readers for a possible alternative. There is today, as he wrote, a whole range of technological means at our disposal that earlier generations did not possess. These means should make it possible to enjoy a higher standard of living and particularly a higher standard of education. This would require, but also enable a new kind of social participation based on fundamental human rights and democratic procedures. Flechtheim predicted the re-emergence of Rosa Luxemburg's old idea of democratically elected councils in cooperation with parliamentary bodies. These councils could be formed in a process of non-violent mass action for democracy and social justice. In an interview for Radio Free Europe Flechtheim repeated, that "the Third Road which to my mind is the only sane road for the future, presupposes a coming together of the neo-conformists on our [Western] side with the revisionists in the East." He reminded libertarian intellectuals for their particular responsibility in the struggle of ideas to envisage a project of the future "which neither the East nor the West could claim as its own."[160]

INDEPENDENT ACTIVISM IN WEST BERLIN

As a political person Flechtheim was engaged in party politics for many years of his life. In 1952, right after his return to Germany, he had joined the SPD. Together with his friend Wolfgang Abendroth, professor of political science at Marburg University, he belonged to the minority of Social Democrats who firmly opposed the new party program that the SPD was to adopt in 1959.[161] The so-called Godesberg Program (named after the town near Bonn where the party had its headquarters) drastically revised fundamental party positions. The SPD ended its identification as primarily a working-class and Marxist body that sought the public ownership of key industries. The party now accepted private ownership as base for welfare economy and abandoned the idea of planned economy. When Karl Schiller, the leading party expert in economic affairs, coined the new slogan "competition as far as possible—planning so far as necessary," Abendroth sought initiative to form an organized opposition within the party.[162] In 1961 the SPD expelled Abendroth.

A few months later, in 1962 Ossip Flechtheim left the party.[163] Throughout his life, as he emphasized years later, he was never satisfied with the idea of "capitalism with social modifications."[164] His constant critique to authoritarian tendencies in West Germany found even a temporary positive echo in East Germany, where none of his books was ever published.[165]

Flechtheim's break with the SPD was no ultimate retreat from political affiliation. He supported the idea of a platform for the non-dogmatic left, referring occasionally to the idea of a non-party affiliated left-wing journal. Carl von Ossietzky's and Kurt Tucholsky's democratic engagement in *Die Weltbühne*, the well-known leftist journal, during the Weimar Republic was worthy to be remembered. Flechtheim was particularly aware of the danger that an insufficiently de-Nazified justice could, again, sabotage the democratic order as had happened during the first German republic. He remembered Tucholsky not only for his literary merits but particularly for his clear-sighted warnings of reactionary judges and public prosecutors.[166] For a number of years Flechtheim belonged to the editorial board of *Das Argument*, an independent Marxist bi-monthly journal. In 1967 Flechtheim was one of the founders of *Republikanischer Klub*. The idea of its initiators Otto Schily, Klaus Meschkat, and Horst Mahler was to create an umbrella organization for leftist tendencies outside the established social democratic and communist camps.[167]

The years 1967 and 1968 were the time of student revolt in West Germany and especially in West Berlin. Students became politicized because of university's overcrowding and traditional, highly authoritarian structures. They also opposed the introduction of emergency laws in the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany.[168] Simultaneously, debates about the American war in Vietnam and the Nazi past of many parents, teachers and professors increased. The city of West Berlin, where a student participant in a demonstration against the Shah of Iran was killed, became the center of anti-establishment protest. For a time, the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* or Socialist German Student Alliance (SDS) claimed leadership of a revolt, turning out in violent actions against the police and the headquarters of Springer, West Berlin's press tycoon. The SDS assumed, as a contemporary historian writes, "a firm command of official Marxist vocabulary, but also a sense of humor."[169]

Flechtheim needed a good sense of humor when rebellious students and university assistants, who had learned from his books about Communism and Marxism, criticized him as a lukewarm "reformist." Until 1967–68 Flechtheim was considered most of the left among the faculty of Otto Suhr Institute. "A few months later there were many teachers whose political standpoints were much more radical leftist. Suddenly I found myself in a center position and even 'right' of the center."[170] In a discussion with one

of his most brilliant students, the SDS chairman Rudi Dutschke, Flechtheim advised the students to refrain from any kind of physical violence that would only discredit and defeat the student movement.[171] But Flechtheim protested against rightist slanders to connect the student movement with terrorist or subversive activities. West Berlin would no longer remain a democratic alternative to the East, would the students be persecuted just for political, non-violent actions.[172]

In the 1970s Ossip Flechtheim remained politically active. From 1971 to 1974 he published the international journal *Futurum*. After his retirement from the university in 1974 he founded and co-directed (with Rolf Kreibich) the private Institute for Future Research. A good part of the institute's work was devoted to the risks of atom energy plants, though Flechtheim expressed his skepticism less rigorously than Robert Jungk did.[173] For a number of years Flechtheim was Chairman of *Humanistische Union Deutschlands* and vice-president of the International League of Human Rights. In 1980 he joined the *Alternative Liste Berlin*, the city's branch of the emerging West German Green Party. He was awarded the Fritz Bauer Price for Human Rights. In 1989 the Free University awarded him an honorary doctorate. But Flechtheim refused to accept West Germany's *Grosses Bundesverdienstkreuz* (Grand Cross of Merit). In a letter to Walter Scheel, the President of the Federal Republic, Flechtheim explained that he could not accept an honor that had been bestowed to so many former Nazis.[174]

Keeping always solidarity with socialist and liberal dissidents in Eastern Europe, Flechtheim continued to write on the future of Communism.[175] His editions of Liebknecht's and Luxemburg's works deserve to be mentioned.[176] *Von Marx zu Kolakowski: Sozialismus oder Untergang in der Barbarei?*, published in 1978, was Flechtheim's main contribution to the subject since his KPD book. This new work included case studies on Marx and Engels and on modern Marxists, such as Wolfgang Harich, Svetozar Stojanovic, Eugen Löbl and Leszek Kolakowski. The book dealt mainly with the problem as to what extent these thinkers contributed to a democratic variant of Communism.

Flechtheim contested, again, the universal viability of Marxism. "Neither Marx nor his successors were able to define the new quality of productive sources on which an anticipated socialist society could be based."[177] Marx's prediction of a growth of the proletariat in advanced industrial societies had been proven wrong. "It is no coincidence that the workers, misguided by their 'own' ruling classes, destructed themselves in two world wars."[178] On the other hand, the gap between rich and poor countries, the destruction of nature, and the arms race had grown to an extent that neither the Marxists nor their opponents could ever imagine. Flechtheim pointed out that Marx's and Engel's claim to put historical materialism, as a science, in the same category

as natural sciences, collided with their critical perspective rejecting any intent toward objectivity as a form of positivism.

Marx and Engels were increasingly aware of the problem that its dual character as a means of analysis and social utopianism enhanced the political impact of Marxism. Yet for the Marxist scholarly approach, this was a hindrance. However, the founder fathers of Marxism still believed that there would be a "one-way street to socialism." The most sensitive of the second-generation Marxists, particularly Rosa Luxemburg, were conscious of the fact that a defeat of *democratic* socialism would result in a barbaric relapse of modern civilization.[179] Flechtheim's understanding of socialism had, as he explained, much in common with theorists like Löbl and Stojanovic. They would neither, as Kolakowski did, sacrifice their socialist principles to worshipping bourgeois liberalism nor would for them, as for Harich, democracy become a superfluous luxury on the way towards an egalitarian communist order.[180]

During the 1980s Flechtheim elaborated this argument in a number of publications.[181] In his preface to a collection of essays entitled *Marx heute: Pro und contra* Flechtheim underscored that the option for socialism is an ethical option, not based on scientific certainty.[182] But the late 1970s and early 1980s also show us Flechtheim's internal contradictions that may have reflected the contradictions of West German politics. On the one hand, he took part in a book project that tried to demonstrate that the democratic and socialist left had tended to dismiss too slightly the conspiratory character of the DKP, West Germany's pro-East German Communist Party.[183] On the other hand, Flechtheim attacked the expulsion of DKP members from all kinds of public service as a menace to democracy and freedom.[184]

The message of Flechtheim's last monograph *Ist die Zukunft noch zu retten?* (Can the Future still be Safe-Guarded?) was that one should explore more fully the limits and potentialities of non-violent means of reform and revolution. As the destructiveness of weapons, the ecological crisis, hunger and starvation, mass manipulation and cultural crisis were bound to increase; the future of civilization could depend upon the rapid replacement of traditional means of coercion and deceit by more rational and humane procedures. In 1987, two years after a fundamental reform process in the Soviet Union had started, Flechtheim was more optimistic than years ago about the chances for a development towards a democratic socialism. Would the Soviet Union and her allies to be able to achieve a more democratic society; socialist forces in the West would benefit much from that process. It would help them to resist the growing power of multinational big enterprises, particularly mass media groups. To preserve democracy and its political culture, nationalization of press syndicates as well as of arms industry would be a viable alternative to the excesses of private capital-

ism. "Nationalization though carefully practiced should not be excluded from the political agenda." Class contradictions are not vanished, the class struggle is not over, as Flechtheim, more radical than ever since his communist youth, concluded.[185]

Flechtheim felt no Cold War triumphalism when the Berlin Wall came down and East European Communism imploded. He sought immediately contact to an East German renewed left. His last two books that included essays published from the last fifty years, *Vergangenheit im Zeugenstand der Zukunft* and *Ausschau halten nach einer besseren Welt* came out at East Berlin's Dietz Verlag. Flechtheim reminded his new East German readers that it was exactly the suppression of the reform movement in Prague that had blocked the road to a renewal of socialism. But this idea of humanist socialism cannot vanish, even not in a time of triumph of capitalist restoration.[186] Flechtheim was shocked to witness that almost all East German social scientists, despite their political past and scholarly qualification, had been dismissed from academia in the post-unification "purge" of the early 1990s. The arrogance and behavior of many West Germans reminded him for the darkest past in German history.[187] Flechtheim, already ill and frail, demonstrated his solidarity with the East German left, a minority within the minority, to join the curators of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, at that time a small independent institute closely related with the PDS (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*), the reformed Communist party.

In the early 1990s Flechtheim's health deteriorated rapidly. He withdrew from any public activity. Together with his wife Lili, who survived him for six years, he went to an old people's home in Kleinmachnow near Berlin. There he died on March 4, 1998, one day before his 89th birthday.

Reflecting the history and future of socialism, Flechtheim once remembered those socialists who started fighting fascism right after they head been defeated and persecuted. He quoted Joseph Buttinger, in 1934 the leader of the illegal Austrian socialist movement who wrote about his companions that, in the deepest sense, they have not failed.[188]

> Their socialism lives on, like seed beneath the snow. In every country they have brothers, including some of other name, brought-up in other schools. Everywhere, individually or in small groups, they search for a new way. Gradually they will be joined by other men, thrust into thought and action by the course of social disaster. They will not be units of a mighty host in the near future. But even if their spirit cannot prevail in politics for many years, the needs of the time will call them, sooner or later. Going his own way, even the loneliest will some day encounter brothers, at home or abroad. And wherever in the world they meet, however different their tongues, they will know and embrace one another, and wonder what had made them think they were alone.[189]

NOTES

1. Both obituaries are published in *Europäische Ideen*, No. 110 (1998), 9–10. The issue is devoted to Flechtheim and includes obituaries by Theodor Ebert and Fritz Vilmar, two of Flechtheim's former West Berlin students and at the time of his death professors of political science. The same journal dedicated an earlier issue (No. 69, 1989) to Flechtheim on the occasion of his 80th birthday.

2. This essay is based Mario Kessler, *Ossip K. Flechtheim: Politischer Wissenschaftler und Zukunftsdenker (1909–1998)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007); and on the author's essays *Ein Dritter Weg als humane Möglichkeit? Zu Leben und Wirken von Ossip Kurt Flechtheim (1909–1998)* (Berlin: Helle Panke, 2004) and "Ossip Kurt Flechtheim: Ein Dritter Weg als humane Möglichkeit?" Mario Kessler, *Vom bürgerlichen Zeitalter zur Globalisierung: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin: trafo verlag, 2005), 153–69. See also Mario Kessler, *Kommunismuskritik im westlichen Nachkriegsdeutschland: Franz Borkenau, Richard Löwenthal und Ossip Flechtheim* (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011). For information about Flechtheim I am greatly indebted to his daughter Marion Thimm, to the late John H. Herz and Ernst Engelberg, the Professors Harold Hurwitz, Fritz Vilmar, and Frank Deppe, and to Mr. Wolfgang Herzberg for his help during my research. On Flechtheim see also Siegfried Heimann (ed.), *Ossip K. Flechtheim—100 Jahre* (Berlin: Humanistischer Verband Deutschlands, 2009).

3. See Hans Albert Peters and Stephan von Wiese, *Alfred Flechtheim: Sammler, Künstler, Verleger* (Düsseldorf: Kunstmuseum, 1987); Annegret Heymann, *Der Jurist Julius Flechtheim: Leben und Werk* (Cologne: Heymann, 1990).

4. For this synthesis of *Bildung* and enlightenment among German Jews in a time of growing nationalism see Kay Schiller, *Gelehrte Gegenwelten: Über humanistische Leitbilder im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2000), 11–14. However, not a few Jewish intellectuals shared the doctrine of German nationalism before 1914. Two important examples, who later became disillusioned, are Victor Klemperer and Arthur Rosenberg. See Pater Jacobs, *Victor Klemperer: Im Kern ein deutsches Gewächs* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2000), 73–82, and Mario Kessler, *Arthur Rosenberg: Ein Historiker im Zeitalter der Katastrophen, 1889–1943* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), 32–42.

5. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "In unserer Familie war kein Platz für Patriotismus," Hajo Funke (ed.), *Die andere Erinnerung: Gespräche mit jüdischen Wissenschaftlern im Exil* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1989), 422, hereafter quoted as: Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus."

6. Peter G. J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), 288.

7. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Heute noch skeptischer als 1962," Henryk M. Broder and Michel R. Lang (eds.), *Fremd im eigenen Land: Juden in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1979), 132. The essay was reprinted in: Anneliese Mannzmann (ed.), *Judenfeindschaft in Altertum, Mittelalter und Neuzeit* (Königstein: Scriptor, 1981), 109–12.

8. Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 423.

9. See John H. Herz's autobiography *Vom Überleben: Wie ein Weltbild entstand* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984), p. 41, and his obituary "Ossip K. Flechtheim (1909–1998): Wissenschaftler und Aktivist," Kurt Düwell et al., *Vertreibung jüdischer Künstler und Wissenschaftler aus Düsseldorf 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998), 158–64. See also Kurt Düwell, "Ossip K. Flechtheim und John H. Herz—fast parallele Lebensläufe: Zwei Freunde aus Düsseldorf auf der Flucht vor dem Nationalsozialismus," Ibid., 141–56.

10. On Löwenthal see Oliver Schmidt, *"Meine Heimat ist—die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung": Biographische Studien zu Richard Löwenthal im Übergang vom Exil zur frühen Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt-Main: Peter Lang, 2007); on Mottek and Engelberg see Mario Kessler, *Exilerfahrung in Wissenschaft und Politik: Remigrierte Historiker in der frühen DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001), 146–62, 222–57; on Steinberger see his *Berlin, Moskau, Kolyma und zurück: Ein biographisches Gespräch über Stalinismus und Antisemitismus mit Barbara Broggini* (Berlin and Amsterdam: ID-Archiv, 1996).

11. Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 428.

12. Charles Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 192.

13. For the politics of *Neu Beginnen* see Richard Löwenthal, *Die Widerstandsgruppe "Neu Beginnen"* (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1982), and Walter Löwenheim, *Geschichte der Org (Neu Beginnen) 1929–1935*, ed. by Jan Foitzik (Berlin: Hentrich, 1995). See also Jan Foitzik, *Zwischen den Fronten: Zur Politik, Organisation und Funktion linker politischer Kleinorganisationen im Widerstand 1933 bis 1939/40* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1986).

14. Albert S. Lindemann, *A History of European Socialism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 298.

15. For the KPO that comprised KPD dissidents, see Theodor Bergmann, *Gegen den Strom: Die Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei-Opposition*, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: VSA, 2001).

16. On Carsten see his autobiographical sketch "From Berlin to London," *Leo Baeck Institute, Yearbook XLIII* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1998), 339–49, on Jungk see his memoirs: *Trotzdem: Mein Leben für die Zukunft* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1994).

17. Wolfgang Abendroth, *A Short History of the European Working Class* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 95–96.

18. Miles [i.e. Walter Löwenheim], *Socialism's New Beginning: A Manifesto From the Underground Germany* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1934), 5.

19. Hermann Graml, *Antisemitism in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 90.

20. Quoted from Allan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper, 1959), 141.

21. Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred* (London: Methuen, 1991), 70.

22. For Schmitt's distance from his erstwhile Jewish-born students and colleagues see Joseph W. Bendersky's balanced, but revealing study: *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 195–218.

23. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Hegels Strafrechtstheorie* (Brünn: R. M. Rohrer, 1936, reprint: Berlin: Duncker & Humblo, 1975). See Flechtheim's essays "La fonction de la peine dans la théorie du droit de Hegel," *Revue internationale de la Théorie du Droit*, 10 (1936), 2, 189–97, and "History and Theodicity: Critical Remarks on the Theories of History of Hegel and Marx," *Phylon*, 2 (1941), 2, 238–49, and 3 (1941), 1, 46–65. See also his small collection of essays on legal theory: *Von Hegel zu Kelsen: Rechtstheoretische Aufsätze* (Berlin and Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1963).

24. See Flechtheim's Curriculum Vitae, undated (ca. 1940), in his Collected Papers at Deutsche Bibliothek, Deutsches Exilarchiv 1933–45, Frankfurt-Main (cited hereafter as: Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers), and Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 430.

25. Hans Mayer, *Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf*, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 231.

26. *"Er war kein Mann, der auf die Pauke hieb*." Ernst Engelberg to the author, March 19, 1998.

27. I borrowed this term from Irving Louis Horowitz. See his essay: "Between the Charybdis of Capitalism and the Scylla of Communism: The Emigration of German Social Scientists, 1933–1945," *Social Science History*, 11 (1987) 2, 113–38. Flechtheim himself referred to the saga in his review of John H. Herz's *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, when he wrote: "Avoiding both the Scylla of idealist utopianism and the Charybdis of realist nihilism, he [Herz] walks with much grace the tight rope of a 'Realist Liberalism'." *American Sociological Review*, 16 (1951), 5, 733.

28. On Kelsen see Rudolf Aladár Métall, *Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1969).

29. See Joseph Florin [i.e., Flechtheim], "La théorie bolchevique du droit international public," *Revue internationale de la Théorie du Droit*, 12 (1938), 1, 97–115; Joseph Florin [Flechtheim] and John H. Herz, "Bolshevist and National Socialist Doctrines of International Law," *Social Research*, 7 (1940), 1, 1–32.

30. See the chapters "Der Bolschewismus 1937–1939" and "Kommunistische Internationale und Sowjetunion 1937–1939," both published in Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Weltkommunismus im Wandel* (Cologne: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965), 19–79 and 83–158, and "Der 'Rote Oktober': Auftakt zur Weltrevolution?" and "Bolschewistische Aussenpolitik und deutsch-russische Beziehungen," both published in: Idem, *Bolschewismus 1917–1967* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1967), 17–31 and 33–59." See also Flechtheim's essay "Der Weg zum Sozialismus oder: Ethik und Politik [1937]," in his *Vergangenheit im Zeugenstand der Zukunft*, ed. by Egbert Joos (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), 275–88.

31. Flechtheim, *Weltkommunisdmus im Wandel*, 113.

32. Ibid., p. 108.

33. Flechtheim, *Vergangenheit im Zeugenstand der Zukunft*, 281.

34. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Futurologie: Der Kampf um die Zukunft* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1972), 202–03. He obviously borrowed the term

from Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Decline of the West), where a "Caesarian dictatorship" was anticipated.

35. Flechtheim, *Weltkommunismus im Wandel*, 151.

36. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Curriculum Vitae (undated).

37. See Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, enlarged paperback edition (New York: Octagon Books, 1963), XIV (first ed. 1942). New edition, with a preface by Peter Hayes, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009. On Neumann, see Alfons Söllner's essay in this volume.

38. See Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Statement regarding educational background and experience (undated), and New York Public Library, Manuscript and Archives Division: Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, File Ossip K. Flechtheim.

39. See Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Letter from Hermann Flechtheim, Guatemala City, to his son, September 21, 1940.

40. See Lili Flechtheim's hitherto unpublished recollections. Ms. Marion Thimm was kind enough to send me a photocopy of these memoirs.

41. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Statement regarding educational background and experience.

42. See Gabriella Simon Edgecomb, *From Swastika to Jim Crow: Refugee Scholars at Black Colleges* (Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Publishing Company, 1993).

43. John H. Herz, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Sunday Times*, April 3, 1994.

44. Howard Zinn, *You Can't Be Neutral on a Moving Train: A Personal History of Our Times* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 18. Zinn, an activist in the civil rights movement of the 1960s, taught two decades after Flechtheim at Atlanta University.

45. On DuBois, see the masterful biography of David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. DuBois*, 2 Vols. (New York: H. Holt, 1993 and 2000), which, however, does not mention Flechtheim.

46. See Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Statement regarding educational background and experience.

47. See Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Das Dilemma der Demokratie," *Eine Welt oder keine? Beiträge zur Politik, Politologie und Philosophie* (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1964), 111 and 121.

48. On Gurland see Rüdiger Zimmermann, "Arkadij Gurland (1904–1979): Marxistischer Theoretiker und Publizist," Jürgen Schlimper (ed.), *"Natürlich—die Tauchaer Strasse": Beiträge zur Geschichte der "Leipziger Volkszeitung"* (Leipzig: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen, 1997), 290–322.

49. See Klaus Täubert, *Emil Faktor: Ein Mann und (s)eine Zeitung* (Berlin: Hentrich, 1994), 164–66.

50. See Lili Flechtheim, "Emigration und Remigration," Christa Dericum and Philipp Wambolt (eds.), *Heimat und Heimatlosigkeit* (Berlin: Karin Kramer Verlag, 1987), 33.

51. See Herbert Crüger, *Verschwiegene Zeiten: Vom geheimen Apparat der KPD ins Gefängnis der Staatssicherheit* (Berlin: Linksdruck, 1990), 95.

52. See Deutsche Bibliothek, Deutsches Exilarchiv 1933–1945, Frankfurt-Main: Lili Flechtheim Papers, unpublished autobiographical notes. See also Paul Reimann,

"Juden am Scheideweg," *Einheit: Sudeten German Anti-Fascist Fortnightly* [London], 4 (1943), 2, 21–22 (a literary portrait of Emil Faktor alias Dr. Bergner).

53. Carola Stern, *Zum Tode Lili Flechtheims*, Manuscript, May 21, 2004, 4.

54. Ibid., 2.

55. Lili Flechtheim's short stories were published in: *Neue Zeitung*, October 30, 1953; *Telegraf*, February 12, 1956, and July 5, 1956; *Echo aus Mission und Heimat*, July 1965, 17; *Telegraf-Illu*, April 24, 1960. Her unpublished reflections about her family are located in her papers at the German Exile Archives.

56. Lili Flechtheim, "Oscar Wilde: Splendor and Shame," *The Midwest Journal*, 3 (Winter 1950–1951), 39–45.

57. See John H. Herz, *Weltpolitik im Atomzeitalter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961); Idem and Gwendolen M. Carter, *Regierungsformen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962); Idem, *Staatenwelt und Weltpolitik* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1974).

58. Professor Harold Hurwitz to the author, Berlin, October 6, 2004.

59. Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 433.

60. See Flechtheim, "Heute noch skeptischer als 1962,", 133.

61. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Flechtheim to E. C. Marriner, February 3, 1952.

62. Ibid.: Marriner to Flechtheim, February 20, 1952.

63. Ibid.: Bixler to Flechtheim, March 20, 1952.

64. Ibid.: Flechtheim to Himstead, March 31, 1952. See also his letter to Warren C. Middleton, Washington Bureau, AAUP, Ibid., March 31, 1952.

65. Ibid.: Middleton to Flechtheim, July 24, 1952.

66. Ibid.: Sarah E. Packard, editor *Colby Echo*, to Flechtheim, May 24, 1952.

67. For McCarthyism at the university campuses, see the impressive book: Ellen W. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

68. Around this time, Julius Flechtheim's son Ernst Alex, deputy mayor of the Berlin district of Zehlendorf, was arrested by Soviet soldiers and left without a trace. This tragic incident is not mentioned in Ossip Flechtheim's papers.

69. See Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 434.

70. See "Ossip K. Flechtheim über sein Verhör des Carl Schmitt," *1999: Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte* (1987), No. 1, pp. 108–09, and his autobiographical interview in: Ossip K. Flechtheim and Egbert Joos, *Ausschau halten nach einer besseren Welt: Biographie, Interview, Artikel* (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), 17.

71. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1948), hereafter quoted from the 1969 edition: *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. and introduced by Hermann Weber (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1969). The book was also reprinted in 1973, 1976, and 1986. An Italian translation followed in 1970, French and Japanese editions came out in 1972.

72. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 71.

73. Amos Funkenstein, "The Genesis of Rosenzweig's 'Stern der Erlösung':'Urformel' and 'Urzelle'," Walter Grab (ed.), *Gegenseitige Einflüsse deutscher und jüdischer Kultur: Von der Epoche der Aufklärung bis zur Weimarer Republik* (Tel Aviv: Universität Tel Aviv, 1982), 17.

74. Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of Bolshevism: From Marx to the First Five Years' Plan* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), VIII. Flechtheim introduced the new German edition: *Geschichte des Bolschewismus* (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1966).

75. Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International* (London: Methuen, 1938); Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948). Flechtheim finished his KPD book just before Fischer's book was available.

76. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 74. Emphasis is in the original.

77. See ibid.

78. Modern authors confirm Flechtheim's attitude, see, e.g., Ben Fowkes, *Communism in Germany Under the Weimar Republic* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984), 85–86, 91–109, and *passim*.

79. The number of sources, on which *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* was based, was very limited, since no archives were opened in the mid-1940s. For a correction of details in Flechtheim's book see Hermann Weber's introduction to the 1969 edition and Weber's own work: *Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 2 Vols. (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1969). See also Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten's introduction to the 1986 edition of *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: Junius, 1986).

80. See Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 131–32. See also his epilog to the 1969 edition, idem, 350.

81. Ibid., 327.

82. See, e.g., Eric Waldman, *The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958); Eberhard Kolb, *Die Arbeiteräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1962); Peter von Oertzen, *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1963); Gilbert Badia, *Les Spartakistes 1918: L'Allemagne en Révolution* (Paris: Juillard, 1966).

83. See Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*., 135.

84. See Arthur Rosenberg, *Geschichte der deutschen Republik* (Karlsbad: Graphia, 1935), 157.

85. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 188.

86. Flechtheim's examinations of the collective mentality of the KPD membership were confirmed by more recent studies. See, e.g., Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 282, 295, and *passim*.

87. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 119.

88. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, 281.

89. Ibid., 327.

90. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Reflections on German Communism, Past and Present," *The Midwest Journal*, 5 (Winter 1952–1953), 1, 8.

91. Most remarkable were Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Dreispaltung des Marxismus* (Düsseldorf and Vienna: Econ, 1970), and Hermannn Weber, *Demokratischer*

Kommunismus? Zur Theorie, Geschichte und Politik der kommunistischen Bewegung (Hannover: J.H.W. Dietz, 1969).

92. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers: Letter of Professor Rassow to Flechtheim, January 26, 1947.

93. Henry Ehrmann, in: *The American Political Science Review*, 43 (1949), 2, 374–75.

94. Reinhard Bendix, in: *The American Sociological Review*, 14 (1949), 2, 325.

95. Robert G. Neumann, in: *The Western Political Quarterly*, 2 (1949), 2, 298.

96. Walter L. Dorn, in: *The American Historical Review* 55 (1950), 4, 902.

97. William H. Mehl, in: *The Journal of Modern History*, 22 (1950), 2, 172.

98. Ossip K. Flechtheim, Review of Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today*, in: *The American Political Science Review*, 42 (1948), 5, 1014.

99. Ossip K. Flechtheim, in: *The American Political Science Review*, 48 (1954), 1, 224.

100. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *The Anatomy of Communism*, in: *Phylon*, 16 (1955), 1, 111. MVD, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, is here synonymous with the secret service.

101. See Alfons Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996).

102. Hubertus Buchstein, "Political Science and Democratic Culture: Ernst Fraenkel's Studies of American Democracy," *German Politics and Society*, 21 (Fall 2003), 3, 48. See also Gerhard Göhler and Hubertus Buchstein (eds.), *Vom Sozialismus zum Pluralismus: Beiträge zu Werk und Leben Ernst Fraenkels* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000).

103. Wilhelm Bleek, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), 246.

104. See, most recently, Gabriela Ann Eakin-Thimme, *Geschichte im Exil: Deutschsprachige Historiker nach 1933* (Munich: Meidenbauer, 2005), and Mario Kessler (eds.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil (1933–1945): Ausgewählte Studien* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2005).

105. Ossip K. Flechtheim (ed.), *Fundamentals of Political Science* (New York: Ronald Press, 1952). German ed.: *Grundlegung der politischen Wissenschaft* (Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1958). Among the contributors were Robert J. Koblitz, Norman D. Palmer, Lawrence L. Pelletier, Ithiel de Sola Pol, S. Grover Rich, Jr., George Schueller, and Margaret Spahr.

106. See also Flechtheim's pamphlet *Politik als Wissenschaft* (Berlin: Weiss, 1953).

107. See also Flechtheim's review of Albert J. Nock, *Our Enemy, the State* and A. C. Ewing, *The Individual, the State and World Government*, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, 63 (1948), 2, 289–91.

108. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Delimitation of the Field," Idem (ed.), *Fundamentals of Political Science*, 17.

109. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "The Crisis of Our Civilization," Ibid., 561–62.

110. Ibid., 565–66.

111. Morris R. Cohen, "Method, Scientific," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. X (New York: MacMillan, 1930), 395, as quoted in: Ibid., 566.

112. See Hans Karl Rupp, "Ossip K. Flechtheim," Idem and Thomas Nötzel, *Macht, Freiheit, Demokratie: Anfänge der westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft* (Marburg: Schürer, 1991), 47.

113. Franklin L. Burdette, in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 284 (1952), 173; Henry A. Turner, in: *The Western Political Quarterly*, 6 (1953), 1, 195.

114. [Alvin Toffler, Introductory Note to:] Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Futurology: The New Science of Probability?," Alvin Toffler (ed.), *The Futurists* (New York: Random House, 1972), 264.

115. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Teaching the Future," *Journal for Higher Education*, 16 (1945), 460–65, and in: *Forum*, 104 (1945), 307–11.

116. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Teaching the Future," as quoted from the reprint in: Idem, *History and Futurology* (Meisenheim: Hain, 1966), 64–65.

117. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Discussion on Future Research," Robert Jungk and Johan Galtung (eds.), *Mankind 2000* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, and London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 336.

118. Flechtheim, *History and Futurology*, 65.

119. Ibid., 67.

120. See Gert Schäfer, "Franz L. Neumann: Biographische Skizze," Joachim Perels (ed.), *Aktualität und Probleme der Theorie Franz L. Neumanns* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), 213–14.

121. See Carola Stern, *Doppelleben* (Reinbek: Rowohlt Grossdruck, 2002), pp. 189–90. On Wanda Bronska-Pampuch see the essay of her niece Ulla Plener, "Eine brach mit der zähen Hoffnung," Idem (ed.), *Leben mit Hoffnung in Pein: Frauenschicksale unter Stalin* (Frankfurt-Oder: Frankfurter Oder Editionen, 1997), 54–121.

122. His father Paul Reimann (Pavel Reiman in the Czech version) was Lili Flechtheim's cousin.

123. See Theodor Ebert, "Vom Verlöschen und vom Überleben: Rede zum Gedenken an Ossip K. Flechtheim am 13. März 1998," *Europäische Ideen*, No. 110 (1998), 2.

124. See Andreas Herbst, "Wer war Heinz Brandt? Anmerkungen zum Lebensweg eines Sozialisten zwischen Ost und West,"*Neues Deutschland*, November 15, 1994, and Wilfriede Otto, *Erich Mielke: Biographie* (Berlin: Dietz, 2000), 302–08. See also Heinz Brandt's memoirs: *Ein Traum der nicht entführbar ist: Mein Weg zwischen Ost und West* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1977). On Brandt, see now Knud Andresen, *Widerspruch als Lebensprinzip: Der undogmatische Sozialist Heinz Brandt (1909–1986)* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2007).

125. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers, File: Diplome und Zeugnisse.

126. See "Fakultät verteidigt Flechtheim," *Der Tagesspiegel*, May 21, 1968.

127. See their contributions to the Flechtheim festschrift: Christian Fenner and Bernhard Blanke (eds.), *Systemwandel und Demokratisierung* (Frankfurt-Main and Cologne: E.V.A., 1975). Other contributors included Johannes Agnoli, Pavel Apostol, Erich Fromm, Heinz Joachim Heydorn, John H. Herz, Robert Jungk, Jiri Kosta, Peter von Oertzen, and Hermann Weber.

128. Ossip K. Flechtheim (ed.), *Die deutschen Parteien seit 1945: Quellen und Auszüge* (Berlin: Heymann, 1955); Idem (ed.), *Bund und Länder* (Berlin:

Colloquium-Verlag, 1959); Idem (ed.), *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland*, 9 vols. (Berlin: Wendler, 1962–1971); Idem (ed.), *Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1973).

129. Flechtheim, *Weltkommunismus*, 9–11.

130. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Die Revolution: Formen und Wandlungen," [1957] Idem, *Eine Welt oder keine?*, p. 52.

131. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Die Internationale des Kommunimus 1917–1957," [1959] Idem, 220.

132. Flechtheim, *Weltkommunismus*, 218.

133. See also his later essays "Totalitarismus = Faschismus + Kommunismus? Haben Hitlerdeutschland und Sowjetrussland ideologisch etwas miteinander zu tun?" Anneliese Mannzmann (ed.), *Hitlerwelle und historische Fakten* (Königstein: Scriptor, 1979), 60–70, and "Bolschewismus," Wolfgang W. Mickel (ed.), *Handlexikon zur Politikwissenschaft* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1986), 42–43. In a letter to the editors of *Frankfurter Rundschau* of November 9, 1989, Flechtheim rejected explicitly the notion to compare the DDR with Nazi Germany.

134. See, e.g., Harry Hanak's brief review of Flechtheim's *Weltkommunismus im Wandel*, in: *International Affairs*, 42 (1966), 1, 131.

135. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Nachwort," Idem, *Weltkommunismus im Wandel*, 213.

136. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Sozialistischer Humanismus: Eine dritte Position?," [1959] Idem, *Eine Welt oder keine?*, 126–27.

137. Flechtheim, *Bolschewismus*, 140. Emphasis is in the text.

138. See Rudolf Schlesinger's review of Flechtheim's *Bolschewismus*, in: *Soviet Studies*, 20 (1969), 4, 542–46.

139. See Flechtheim's essays and pamphlets: "Zukunftsforschung heute: Wege und Möglichkeiten," *Universitas*, 22 (1967) 6, 589–98; *Futurologie: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen* (Frankfurt-Main and Berlin: Edition Voltaire, 1968); "Futurologie: Eine neue Wissenschaft," Heinz Joachim Heydorn (ed.), *Wache im Niemandsland: Zum 70. Geburtstag von Alfred Kantorowicz* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969); 61–95; *Futurologie als Dritte Kraft: Ein Gespräch mit Adelbert Reif* (Zurich: Arche, 1973); *Futurum* (Munich: Minerva, 1980), and many others.

140. Robert Jungk in his foreword to: Flechtheim, *History and Futurology*, IX.

141. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Futurologie: Der Kampf um die Zukunft* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), 9. Cited hereafter as *Futurologie*. The book was reprinted in 1980, an abridged paperback edition came out in 1972.

142. Flechtheim, *Futurologie*, 37.

143. See, e.g., Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next 33 Years* (New York: McMillan, 1967).

144. See also Flechtheim's essays "Grundlagen der friedlichen Koexistenz," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 16 (1965), 10, 577–85; "Von der Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit der Abrüstung," *Werkhefte*, 21 (1967), 4, 108–15, and many others.

145. Edward M. Burns, *Western Civilizations: Their History and Their Cultures*, 3rd ed., (New York: Norton, 1949), 198.

146. Thomas Mann, *Meine Zeit: Vortrag, gehalten in der Universität Chicago, Mai 1950* (Amsterdam: S. Fischer, 1950), 29, as quoted in: Flechtheim, *Futurologie*,

319. In an earlier review article Flechtheim wrote: "Communism has turned into an *ecclesia* that perverts the most legitimate interests and the most universal ideal into servants of a self-perpetuating and self-righteous machine . . ." Review of A. Rossi, *A Communist Party in Action*, in: *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 2, 320.

147. In a review of *Futurologie* Jürgen Kuczynski depicted Flechtheim as an ideological opponent" and "likewise an ally in the struggle against monopoly capital". His book, however, should be recommended only to oppose his political standpoint. See *Die Weltbühne*, 66 (1971), 6. Similarly wrote Alfred Böhnisch, *Futurologie: Eine kriiische Analyse bürgerlicher Zukunftsforschung* ([East] Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1971), p. 216, A. L. Gajsutis, "Kritika futurologii O. K. Flechtcheima," *Filosofskie nauki*, 16 (1983), 4, 140, and Igor Bestushev-Lada, "Bourgeois 'Futurology' and the Future of Mankind," Toffler (ed.), *The Futurists*, 194–210.

148. See Ossip Flechtheim, "Futurologiya: Bor'ba za budushchee," I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada (ed.), *Vperedi XXI vek: Perspektivy, prognozy, futurologiya* (*Antologiia sovremennoi klassicheskoi prognostiki, 1952–1999*) (Moscow: Academia, 2000), 247–76.

149. Flechtheim, *Futurologie*, 321.

150. Vere Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History* (New York: Pelican, 1946), 275.

151. Flechtheim, *Futurologie*, 320.

152. Ibid., p. 56. See Engels's impressive "'Introduction' to pamphlet by Sigismund Borkheim, *Zur Erinnerung an die deutschen Mordspatrioten 1806–1807*," *Marx-Engels-Werke*, 21 ([East] Berlin: Dietz, 1962), 350–51, where he envisaged "the ravages of the Thirty Years War compressed into three to four years extending over the whole continent" and a final "collapse of the old states and their traditional statecraft, so that dozens of crowns will roll on the pavements of the streets. . . ."

153. Karl Korsch, "Zehn Thesen über Marxismus heute [1950]," Idem, *Politische Texte*, ed. by Erich Gerlach and Jürgen Seifert (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1974), 385. My emphasis.

154. See Flechtheim, *Bolschewismus 1917–1967*, 15.

155. See Flechtheim's "Vorwort" to: Radovan Richta et al. (eds.), *Technischer Fortschritt und industrielle Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt-Main: Makol, 1972), reprinted as: "Der Prager Frühling und die Zukunft des Menschen," in his *Zeitgeschichte und Zukunftspolitik* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1974), 328–49.

156. For Flechtheim's critique of the American war in Vietnam see his essays "Für und Wider des Krieges in Vietnam," *Der Tagesspiegel*, December 31, 1965, and "Amerikanisches Engagement in Vietnam—aus der Sicht Berlins," Ibid., January 8, 1966.

157. Flechtheim, *Futurologie*, 322.

158. Ibid., 324.

159. Ibid., 325–26.

160. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Marxism and the Third Road," G. R. Urban and Michael Glenny (eds.), *Can we Survive Our Future?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), 381.

161. See Flechtheim's articles "Zur Grundsatzdebatte: Langatmig—zu wenig konkret," *Berliner Stimme*, March 28, 1959, and "Über Marx hinaus?," *Vorwärts*, June 26, 1959.

162. Quoted from: Michael Balfour, *West Germany: A Contemporary History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 194.

163. Abendroth had dedicated his book *Das Grundgesetz: Eine Einführung in seine politischen Probleme* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1966) to Flechtheim, who, in turn, dedicated his *Futurologie* to Abendroth, "*dem Freund, Kämpfer und Gelehrten*."

164. Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 436. See his pamphlet *Westdeutschland am Wendepunkt* (Berlin: Voltaire-Verlag 1967), reprinted in: Idem, *Zeitgeschichte und Zukunftspolitik*, 13–50.

165. See "Flechtheim: Demontage der Demokratie," *Neues Deutschland*, September 7, 1964, and the biographical portrait in *Der Morgen* ([East] Berlin), September 11, 1964. Flechtheim's essay "Die Chance Deutschlands liegt in Entspannung und Abrüstung" from *Spandauer Tageblatt*, August 2, 1965, was reprinted in the DDR. See "Prof. Ossip K. Flechtheim über die Voraussetzungen einer realistischen Friedenspolitik," *Dokumentation der Zeit*, April 2, 1966, 354–56. It was Flechtheim's only publication in East Germany. All items are located in the archives of the newspaper *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin.

166. See Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Kurt Tucholsky: der Publizist als politischer Kämpfer," *Tagesanzeiger* [Zurich], November 20, 1965.

167. Schily became later Social Democratic Minister for Internal Affairs of Germany, Meschkat worked for many years as Professor of Political Science at the University of Hanover, while Mahler joined the NPD, Germany's neo-Nazi party, to become particularly active in its anti-Semitic campaigns.

168. For an early critique of the emergency laws see Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Notstandsgesetze würden die Freiheit des Bürgers dauernd bedrohen," *Westdeutsches Tageblatt*, April 6, 1963.

169. Hagen Schulze, *Germany: A New History* (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1998), 320.

170. Flechtheim, "Kein Platz für Patriotismus," 434.

171. See Jürgen Miermeister, *Rudi Dutschke mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1986), 116. See also Flechtheim's interview collection in: Idem, *Ausblick in die Gegenwart* (Munich: List, 1974), 83 and *passim*.

172. See the appeal to West Berlin's mayor and Senate, published in *Die Zeit*, No. 11 (1968). Among the signatories were Wolfgang Abendroth, Theodor Adorno, Günter Grass, Hans Mayer, and Ossip Flechtheim.

173. See Robert Jungk, *The Nuclear State* (London: J. Calder, 1979).

174. Ossip K. Flechtheim Papers, unnamed folder: Letter to Bundespräsident Walter Scheel, June 19, 1979.

175. See, e.g., his essays "Weder Kapitalismus noch (Sowjet-) Kommunismus: Zum Fall Sacharow," *Das da*, No. 4 (April 1976), 22–24, and "Kolakowski und der Kommunismus," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, October 15, 1977.

176. Karl Liebknecht, *Studien über die Bewgungsgesetze der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1974); Idem, *Gedanke und Tat: Schriften, Reden und Briefe zur Theorie und Praxis der Politik* (Frankfurt-Main and Berlin: Ullstein, 1976); Rosa Luxemburg, *Politische Schriften*, 3 Vols. (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1963, reprinted 1975), all edited by Ossip K. Flechtheim.

177. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Von Marx bis Kolakowski: Sozialismus oder Untergang in der Barbarei?* (Frankfurt-Main: E.V.A., 1978), 26.

178. Ibid., 42.

179. Ibid., 26.

180. See ibid, 246–49.

181. Chapters of *Von Marx zu Kolakowski* appeared in slightly enlarged form as pocket books. See Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Rosa Luxemburg zur Einführung* (Hamburg: SOAK, 1985); Idem, *Karl Liebknecht zur Einführung* (Hamburg: SOAK, 1986); Idem and Hans-Martin Lohmann, *Marx zur Einführung*, (Hamburg: Junius, 1985, 4th ed. 2003).

182. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Zur Einführung," Idem (ed.), *Marx heute: Pro und contra* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1983), 38. Among the contributors to this volume were Helmut Gollwitzer, Helmut Hirsch, Richard Löwenthal, Ernest Mandel, and Peter von Oertzen.

183. See Ossip K. Flechtheim, Wolfgang Rudzio, Fritz Vilmar, and Manfred Wilke, *Der Marsch der DKP durch die Institutionen* (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1980), 44–63. Flechtheim wrote the historical part on the KPD before 1945.

184. Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Blick zurück im Zorn: Westdeutschland 1945 bis 1960," Axel Eggebrecht (ed.), *Die zornigen alten Männer: Gedanken über Deutschland seit 1945* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1979), 31–68. See also Gerard Braunthal, *Political Loyalty and Public Service in West Germany: The 1972 Degree Against Radicals and its Consequences* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990).

185. Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Ist die Zukunft noch zu retten?* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1987), as quoted from the paperback edition (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1990), 201–02, and *passim*.

186. Ossip K. Flechtheim, Interviews with *Neues Deutschland*, March 3–4, 1990, and November 23–24, 1991.

187. See Ossip and Lili Flechtheim's correspondence in the hitherto enclosed section of Ossip K. Flechtheim's papers. Ms. Marion Timm was kind enough to provide me this material.

188. Joseph Buttinger, *Am Beispiel Österreichs: Ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Krise der sozialistischen Bewegung* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wissenschaft, 1953), 619, as quoted in: Flechtheim, *Bolschewismus 1917–1967*, 15.

189. Joseph Buttinger, *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria*, translated by E. B. Aston (New York: Praeger, 1953), 550.

10

Refugee Historians from Nazi Germany

Political Attitudes towards Democracy

Georg G. Iggers

When I was first invited to give the Weinmann lecture, it was suggested that I speak about the impact that the experiences under Nazism had on the refugee scholars, particularly the Jewish ones that led them to become involved as I was in the struggle for racial equality and civil rights in the United States. But I had to disappoint my hosts because very few of the Jewish refugee scholars who came to this country followed such a path and my own case was atypical because I was only eleven when I arrived in this country and received almost all of my education here. I suggested that instead I talk about the attitudes towards democracy that these scholars held before their emigration from Germany and the role, if any, the scholars had in forming democratic attitudes in post-1945 Germany and critically re-examining Germany's past. Briefly, we can distinguish between two groups of émigré scholars. One consisted almost entirely of persons of Jewish ancestry who no longer considered themselves to be Jews and who had converted to Protestantism or been born into families that had converted earlier.[1] Some held political ideas hostile to Weimar democracy, in some cases even close to Nazi ideology, but had to leave Germany because of their Jewish ancestry. The second group consisted of committed democrats who had to leave because of their political views. Some in this latter group were not of Jewish ancestry, but the majority had converted to Protestantism or had left the Jewish community. I shall begin with the first group and restrict myself to the historians, the group that I know best.

The idea exists in the United States that Jews in Germany were almost totally assimilated, that they had almost entirely broken with Jewish religion. This idea was not quite true, although it was frequently the case in the upper middle class, and particularly among intellectuals who played an important role in German culture. In fact Jewish life was still vibrant in the Jewish

middle class, as distinct from the upper middle class. There were still Jewish cultural, social, and sports organizations. There was also an active Jewish intellectual life. The *Jüdische Lehrhaus*, an educational institution for Jewish studies created by Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig in Frankfurt in the 1920s was famous.

There existed a number of Jewish publishers such as Jüdischer Verlag, Philo Verlag, and Schocken Verlag. There was already a sizable Zionist movement prior to 1933. As a matter of fact, the Jewish community was split between Zionists (who published a weekly, *Jüdische Rundschau*) and non-Zionists (organized as the Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), each with its own athletic groups, the Zionist *Makkabi*, the non-Zionist *Schild* sports club, and youth groups.

In the years before the Nazi accession to power the non-Zionists still believed that Jews could be good. Germans and be accepted as such, while the Zionists considered this idea an illusion and called for a Jewish national identity and a Jewish homeland. Jewish religiosity in Germany differed from that in Eastern Europe and in North America. The Jewish Enlightenment began in Germany in the late eighteenth century with philosopher Moses Mendelssohn. Early in the nineteenth century the Liberal movement sought to overcome the gap between traditional orthodoxy and modern German culture. It simplified the religious service, loosened the attachment to ritual, and introduced the German language into the liturgy while also keeping Hebrew. Modern Orthodoxy, initiated by Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch in Frankfurt, appeared in the mid-nineteenth century as a counter movement insisting on the strict observance of Jewish laws, but believing that it could be combined with participation in German culture. The basis of the service was the traditional Jewish prayer book, but the sermons were in German, not Yiddish or Judeo-German. The German Liberal movement was in many ways closer to the Conservative movement in the United States than to Reform Judaism. As a child I was shocked by what I learned in the U.S. about Reform Judaism, which appeared to me as dangerously close to Protestantism. I myself grew up in a Jewish family in Hamburg. My father had been raised in an Orthodox home in Frankfurt; my mother in a religiously indifferent family, although her grandfather had been the cantor and shames in the Temple, the important Hamburg Liberal congregation. My parents managed to find a middle way.

Under the impact of the Nazis I became very observant and Zionist although the two did not logically fit together. However, they did in my circle of Jewish friends. We dreamed of going to Palestine, Eretz Yisrael as we called it, and joining a kibbutz, which would break with the stuffy atmosphere of the urban, bourgeois world of our parents. When I came to America, I was shocked by the commercialized culture that differed so much from the kib-

butz that I idealized. Although I considered myself Orthodox, I felt more at home in the Conservative congregation I found in Richmond, Virginia, where we settled, than in American Orthodox ones. In the meantime some American Orthodox congregations have moved closer to Conservatism, while American Reform Judaism has returned to a more traditional outlook and liturgy.

Beginning in the early nineteenth century many German Jews had themselves baptized as Protestants. What did it mean to be baptized? To many it meant very little emotionally. They had been alienated from a Jewish religiosity, which they considered medieval, and wanted to be part of mainstream German society. The poet Heinrich Heine, who converted as a student in 1825, explained his baptism as "the ticket to European culture."[2] Conversion meant a good deal professionally at least in the first two thirds of the nineteenth century before a religious anti-Judaism yielded to racial anti-Semitism. Converted Jews occupied important places in German academic life relatively early. Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802–1861) became the main exponent of an official conservative Protestant theory of the state. Johann August Wilhelm Neander (1789–1850), who changed his name from David Mendel upon conversion, was appointed professor of Protestant theology in Berlin in 1813. It was virtually impossible for non-converted Jews to be appointed to professorial posts. Departments of mathematics and medicine began to do so in the mid-nineteenth century, but for a long time it did not occur in the humanities, least of all in history. Harry Bresslau, who in 1890 became the first non-converted Jew to be appointed to a professorship in history, had earlier been considered for a professorship in Berlin, which he turned down when he was asked to convert. But ultimately he had his children baptized. Hermann Cohen in 1876 became the first non-converted Jew to be appointed to a professorship in philosophy. Cohen, who identified with liberal, ethical Judaism, wrote that modern liberal Judaism "has in fact entered a cultural historical liaison with Protestantism. Just as the latter has cast off the shackles of the Church, so we have cast off those of the Talmud [. . .] and in all spiritual questions think and feel in the Protestant spirit."[3]

Gradually in the Weimar Republic a few of the new more liberal universities, such as Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Cologne, ceased to discriminate when making appointments. But what did it mean to be a Protestant? The German Evangelical Church—the official name of the Protestant Church in Germany after 1817, which emerged during the Reformation and was strongly influenced by the theology of Martin Luther—saw itself within the spirit of modern civilization, freeing itself from older fundamentalism and later in the nineteenth century embracing modern science. Many of its intellectual exponents viewed the German Evangelical Church as a modern cultural form of Protestantism (*Kulturprotestantismus*). Part of this modern Protestantism

was the close identification with the German nation. However, Germany had not had a revolution in the French, English, Dutch, or American sense. Rather the movement for national unification involved the close cooperation of the emerging middle classes with the semi-autocratic Prussian Hohenzollern dynasty. Two aspects of Luther's theology continued to play a central role in the thinking of the new nationalism. The first stressed the centrality and divine character of the state. Luther took over Paul's admonition in the Epistle to the Romans that "the powers that be are ordained by God. Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God."[4]

Obedience to the Church was replaced by obedience to the prince. The Church became an arm of the state. In the age of nationalism, Luther's reliance on Paul was seen to mean that the German nation possessed a divine mission, a belief that legitimized the wars Bismarck had waged to unify Germany under Prussian hegemony and also legitimized Germany's role in World War I. The second component of Luther's theology, which concerns us here, was his anti-Judaism. After having failed in his efforts to convert the Jews, Luther in his broadside *The Jews and Their Lies* (which was later enthusiastically accepted by the Nazis to legitimize their persecution of the Jews) condemned them and called for the destruction of their synagogues and their extirpation. For the German Evangelical Church during the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century past the Nazi period, Judaism was not a religion with which one could communicate; rather Jews were collectively responsible for the death of Jesus. Their only salvation was conversion, although it soon no longer sufficed. As emancipated Jews climbed the social and educational ladder and increasingly played important roles in the modern economy and culture, religious anti-Judaism after the 1870s turned into racial anti-Semitism. The conception of Jews as medieval fossils was replaced by the notion of Jews as heralds of a modernity that economically threatened craftsmen, small shopkeepers, and peasants, and culturally threatened traditional values and ways of life.[5]

Discrimination then turned against not only non-converted Jews but against anyone of Jewish ancestry. Racial anti-Semitism, not the discrimination and persecution of the Jews as such, ultimately split the Protestant Church during the Nazi period. The Nazis attempted to create a German Protestant Church that would exclude all persons of Jewish origin and remove the pastors who had converted or come from converted families. At this point the Confessional Church was founded (in 1933) in opposition to the Nazi imposition of racial doctrine on the Church. But the Confessional Church did not protest against Nazi policies towards the Jews in so far as they did not affect its members. Pastor Martin Niemöller, who was later hailed as a courageous opponent of the Nazis, still preached in 1935 that the Jews deserved the suf-

fering inflicted on them by the Nazis because as long as they did not convert to the true faith they bore responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus.[6]

The affirmation of a society modern in outlook in many ways yet clinging to traditional attitudes of authority (which marked cultural Protestantism) was also important for the formation of the German historical profession in the first half of the nineteenth century.[7] History played a significant role in the creation of a sense of national identity, and became a professional discipline at Protestant German universities in the first half of the nineteenth century. The historians for the most part considered themselves to be liberals in the sense that on the economic and social planes they wanted the removal of older barriers to a free market economy and an end to feudal class divisions. On an intellectual level they wanted a free exchange of ideas and on a political level the participation of the educated middle classes in the governance of the nation. The historians played an important role in the movement leading to the 1848 Revolution that strove for national federation and a constitutional monarchy.

The setbacks in the 1848 Revolution led to a reorientation on the part of a majority of the historians, reflecting the outlook of broad segments of the middle classes. They increasingly believed that German unification could not come from a revolutionary movement from below but only in alliance with the autocratic Prussian Hohenzollern dynasty; not through resolutions but to quote Bismarck, through blood and iron. At the same time, looking at the French example, and therefore afraid of revolution, they repudiated democracy and sought a solution in a compromise between constitutional government favoring the propertied classes and a strong monarchy that could keep revolutionary stirrings in check and establish Germany as a major world power.

In a period of rapid industrialization and concomitant social conflicts, a strong Marxist-inspired Social Democratic working-class party endorsing democratization emerged as the main challenge to the established order. Under the impact of the First World War, the supporters of the German status quo formulated what may be called a "German Ideology"[8] to justify Germany's cause in the war and to pitch the German "Ideas of 1914" against the democratic "Ideas of 1789" of the Western Allies. Part of this ideology included the belief in the superiority of German *Kultur* with its idealistic roots over the supposedly rationalistic and commercialized *Zivilisation* of the West. This outlook also proclaimed the superiority of German culture over that of the Slavic peoples in the East and justified German expansion and domination of Eastern European peoples. The German cause in the war was given religious legitimacy through the Protestant doctrine of the state. In these discussions the historians played a crucial role.[9]

The historical profession as it developed after the 1848 Revolution focused on the state, identified the state with the Prussian Hohenzollern monarchy,

and saw the 1871 unification of Germany (under the leadership of Bismarck with the exclusion of Catholic Austria) as the high point of German history. This outlook constituted a form of orthodoxy that presented Germany's path into the modern world; a path in which the maintenance of a semi-autocratic regime pursuing many of the social and economic aspirations of the middle classes offered an alternative superior to the Western democracies. The collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy and the establishment of the democratic Republic in the fall of 1918 did not mark the end of this orthodoxy. Rather the majority of historians at the German universities rejected the Republic and the democracy it embodied, continued to adhere to the orthodox view of German history, and advocated the restoration of Germany's dominant place in the world, if need be by military means.

Now, where did the historians, whom the Nazis ultimately drove to emigrate, stand?[10] We can distinguish between several groups among academics with Jewish ancestry that correspond closely to a similar division among historians who had no such ancestry and who in Nazi terminology were Aryans. There were those who vehemently opposed the Republic and rejected reconciliation with the Western states that had imposed the Versailles Treaty on Germany. One key myth of this group was that Germany had been unbeaten on the front in 1918, but had been stabbed in the back by elements in Germany, who with their wartime demands for democratic reforms and their opposition to German war aims, had disrupted the national unity with which Germany had gone to war in 1914. Social Democrats, Communists, and frequently also the Jews were considered to be the culprits. Hans Herzfeld in a 1928 book gave scholarly respectability to this accusation, without, however, mentioning the Jews.[11] Herzfeld, who with a Jewish grandparent fitted the Nazi definition of a Jew, did not emigrate and managed to survive the Nazi years in Germany. Two refugee historians, Gerhard Masur and Dietrich Gerhard, as young men in 1919 joined the ultra-nationalistic, proto-fascist *Freikorps* militia. But Gerhard a few years later moved in a more democratic direction.

Among the right wing, nationalistic historians a generational divide, however, occurred in the Weimar Republic. The older generation firmly established in the universities was criticized by younger historians who reacted against the narrowly politically oriented historical view of their elders and wanted a new history that dealt with the many aspects of life of the broad masses of the population. They understood this population not in terms of a civil society, but as an organic community that knew no social divisions but represented an ethnic nation, the German *Volk,* defined in terms of race.[12] Jews had no place in this community, nor did non-Germans. Calling for heroism and sacrifice, the advocates of a *Volk*-oriented history saw the world in terms

of struggle and the war as a fight to the death against other ethnic groups. In the place of the Germany forged by Bismarck, they foresaw a Greater Germany that would include not only Austria but also all the settlements of ethnic Germans along and beyond the borders of Germany, particularly in Eastern Europe. The cultural superiority of racial Germans, they believed, gave them the right and the obligation to dominate the non-German areas of the East. Apart from this movement, with a different constituency, was the circle of elite intellectuals around the poet Stefan George, who expressed his contempt for modern bourgeois civilization, which he identified with the Jews, and called for a new spiritual awakening free of the rationalist outlook that these intellectuals believed marked the contemporary world.

Despite his anti-Semitism, George was surrounded by a group of admirers of Jewish ancestry, including literary scholar Friedrich Gundolf and at the time still young historians Arnold Berney and Ernst Kantorowicz. Berney on the one hand followed the orthodox direction of Prussian history, later writing a hagiographic biography of Frederick the Great, hoping despite his Jewish origins to have a successful academic career, but at the time of the Hitler Putsch in 1923 admiring the Nazis who he believed would fix the ills of German society. Without giving up his admiration for the Nazis, he noted disappointedly in his diary: "Suddenly it occurred to me that (for the Nazis) I am a Jew."[13] He did not immigrate to the United States after 1933, but discovered his Jewish national identity and went to Palestine. Kantorowicz, in the vein of Stefan George, published in 1927 a history of the thirteenth-century Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II in which he consciously avoided a footnote apparatus to challenge the scholarly establishment and created the myth of a great national leader who would some day redeem the German people.[14] A swastika appeared on the cover of the book. Hitler is said to have admired the work and to have read it twice, and despite Kantorowicz' Jewish ancestry the book was republished under the Nazis. Kantorowicz did immigrate to the United States and there revised his attitudes in a democratic direction.

But among the historians who immigrated to the United States, Hans Rothfels had the closest Nazi contacts after 1933. He was unique among the refugee historians in having grown up in a family in which both parents were non-converted Jews. His father for a while was even head of the Jewish community in Kassel. As a university student Rothfels converted and became an ardent nationalist. In 1926 at a relatively young age he became a full professor of history at the University of Königsberg in East Prussia where he taught a number of the most promising young historians who pursued a *Volk*-oriented history.

Two of his most important students, Theodor Schieder and Werner Conze, after 1939 advised the Nazi government on plans to evict Poles to make space

for German settlers and to free Eastern Europe of the presence of Jews. Rothfels moved away from the orthodox position of Germany as the Bismarckian state to an extended Germany in which Eastern Europe would be organized along new ethnic lines and where the Germans, whom he considered culturally superior, would dominate.

Nevertheless, in 1934 Rothfels was removed from his professorial chair because of his Jewish ancestry and assigned to an undefined position in Berlin despite protest in the Nazi Party, not only because of the important role he played in Königsberg furthering German ambitions in the East but also because of his international contacts with influential right-wing persons abroad, particularly those friendly to Nazi Germany. Joachim von Ribbentrop, later the Nazi foreign minister, intervened personally with Hitler on his behalf. Rothfels made two unsuccessful attempts to be recognized as an "Honorary Aryan." Had he succeeded he would have been the only circumcised Nazi historian. Still hoping to make an arrangement in Nazi Germany, he finally left Germany for England in August 1939, shortly before the outbreak of the war and managed in 1946 to receive a professorial appointment at the University of Chicago.[15]

There was also a small minority of historians who were committed democrats, but who had only marginal positions in the profession. They rejected the orthodox view that saw the highpoint of history as Bismarck's semi-autocratic state, and instead sought to broaden the historical perspective away from a narrow focus on politics to a concern with social factors. All of the historians of this democratic orientation, some of them not Jewish, fled Germany after 1933, mostly for the United States. Among an older generation there was Veit Valentin, not Jewish, who rewrote German history from a critical democratic perspective and who in 1917 was stripped of his right to teach at universities.[16] Alfred Vagts, also not Jewish, dealt with the role that economic interest groups asserted on German foreign policy. Arthur Rosenberg, a Marxist who in the early 1920s was an important spokesman for the German Communist Party in the Reichstag but broke with the party when it succumbed to Stalin, wrote a history of the origins of the Weimar Republic in which he pointed out why Bismarck's German empire was bound to fail from the beginning. Rosenberg, of Jewish origin, was baptized a Protestant as a child but left the church as an adult. As an avowed atheist he never joined the Jewish community, but under the impact of anti-Semitism discovered his Jewish identity and even became a left-oriented Zionist.[17] Hedwig Hintze devoted herself to a largely taboo topic, the positive aspects of the French Revolution.[18] Of Jewish ancestry she was a baptized Protestant, and was also the wife of the eminent historian Otto Hintze, who during the Weimar Republic had moved away from his earlier Prussian orientation to a comparative

approach to social history, which led to a sober re-evaluation of the character of the state in modern society. Hedwig Hintze was offered a professorship at the New School for Social Research in New York, but was unable to obtain admission to the United States and died in her Dutch exile in 1942, as she was about to be deported.[19]

A younger group of critical social historians gathered in the seminars of Friedrich Meinecke at the University of Berlin. Almost all of the participants in this group were at least in part of Jewish ancestry, but none, except Ernst Simon who migrated to Palestine, identified themselves as Jewish. Meinecke was firmly devoted to the orthodox Prussian line, but differed from this orthodoxy on two important points: He moved away from a narrow concentration on politics to a concern with the impact of political ideas. And although, because of a sense of patriotism, he was an ardent supporter of the war in 1914, he together with a small group of intellectuals including Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch soon urged a moderate line and after November 1918 supported the Weimar Republic. Although he remained a monarchist at heart, his sense of reality made him accept the Republic. He was also tolerant of other views. In an academic atmosphere in which the majority in the profession passionately opposed democracy and harbored anti-Semitic prejudices of which Meinecke himself was not entirely free, he was willing to work with young scholars whose views differed from his.

His students thus included young people who were on the political level committed democrats, but also methodologically separated not only from the orthodox Prussian fixation on the state, but also from Meinecke's emphasis on political ideas, and moved to a greater attention to the role of social and economic factors on politics. Three names should be mentioned in particular, Hans Rosenberg who despite his Jewish ancestry was a Protestant, and two Gentiles, Eckart Kehr and Hajo Holborn, whose wife, however, was Jewish. Holborn, although an active Social Democrat, was the first and only person in this group to be appointed to a professorship, namely at the newly established *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (German College for Political Education). Kehr, the *enfant terrible,* as the most radical of the group in his critique of German political and historiographical traditions, received a fellowship from the American Rockefeller Foundation despite opposition from members of the German professoriate who wanted to block his career. He unfortunately died in May 1933 shortly after his arrival in the United States.[20]

All of the persons in this group, including Dietrich Gerhard and Gerhard Masur, whom I have already mentioned, felt forced to leave Germany after the Nazi accession to power, for political reasons, because of their Jewish ancestry, or both. Thus a new generation of innovative scholars was expelled, leaving the German historical profession under the exclusive control of the

traditional historians, who, although generally not party members, felt quite comfortable with the Nazis and in many cases cooperated with them. These young scholars made important contributions to the study of modern German history in the United States and to the exploration of how it was possible for the Nazis to come to power. In addition, three scholars of Renaissance studies, Hans Baron (a student of the already mentioned Ernst Troeltsch), Felix Gilbert, and Paul Oskar Kristeller, played important roles in the revitalization of Renaissance studies in the United States.

Starting over in America was difficult professionally for most of these émigrés, although there were some exceptions. Holborn moved relatively rapidly from an assistant professorship at Yale University to an endowed chair. Rothfels after tenuous employment at Brown University went to the University of Chicago; Kantorowicz to Berkeley; Felix Gilbert from Bryn Mawr College to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton; Arthur Rosenberg to Brooklyn College, where he taught until his early death in 1943; Hans Rosenberg also to Brooklyn College and ultimately to Berkeley; Dietrich Gerhard to Washington University in St. Louis; and Gerhard Masur after an initial stint in Venezuela to Sweet Briar College. George W. H. Hallgarten, who had written an important analysis of German imperialism in the context of global capitalism, found no permanent position, which may have been as much a consequence of his very difficult personality as of his political views.[21]

The decisive breakthrough came only in the course of World War II with the creation by the U.S. government of a special office to discuss how to deal with Germany after the war. In 1942 the "Foreign Nationalities Branch" was founded within the newly established Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA, and within it a special section dealt with Central European affairs.[22] Leading American specialists such as William Langer, H. Stuart Hughes, Carl Schorske, Franklin Ford, Eugene Anderson, Walter Dorn, Gordon Craig, and Leonard Krieger met regularly with German émigré scholars including Hajo Holborn, Felix Gilbert, and social theorists Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Kirchheimer among others. Marcuse and Kirchheimer were associated with the neo-Marxist Institute for Social Research, the so-called Frankfurt School headed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who also immigrated to the United States. Neumann had just published *Behemoth*, the first major analysis of the rise of Nazism that took into account the impact of economic interests.[23]

For the participants the key questions were: how was it possible for Nazism to assume power and to carry out its terrorist and genocidal program, and, looking into the future, how to lay the foundations for a democratic Germany. Although none of these scholars maintained that Nazism was the inevitable result of German history, they nevertheless were convinced that Nazism had

roots in Germany's failure to combine national unification under Bismarck with democratization. They thus established the basis for German studies and henceforth there was a close cooperation between American and German émigré scholars. Hajo Holborn at Yale trained a younger generation, mostly American, but also young émigrés, who later occupied the most important chairs of German history in this country.

Several of the refugees who had come as children or adolescents and received the majority of their education in the United States turned to the study of Germany posing the same question of what had gone wrong.[24] Their work focused less on social and economic factors than on the role of attitudes and ideas that had marked German politics and society since the eighteenth century. George Mosse in *The Crisis of German Ideology* and other works traced the role of *völkisch* that is racial, thought from the German political romantics to the Nazis, linking it in his later works to sexual, male-centered attitudes. Fritz Stern in *The Politics of Cultural Despair* analyzed the political and cultural thought of three ideologues that had prepared the way to the Nazi revolution. Peter Gay dealt with a much broader sphere of German culture from Stefan George to psychoanalysis, not restricting himself to the extreme right. My *The German Conception of History* dealt not with the cultural revolutionaries on the far right but with the illiberalism of the mainstream scholarly establishment since the early nineteenth century that, although not directly leading to the Nazis, created an outlook that made it easy for German academics to accept the Nazis. Two Austrians who belong to this generation should be mentioned, Gerda Lerner, who did pioneer work in feminist history from a critical social perspective, and George Kren, who approached the Holocaust from a psychoanalytical angle.

Now let us look at Germany after 1945, more specifically at West Germany.[25] With the innovative historians gone, the conservative school had a clear monopoly. Nazi racist ideology was abandoned, indeed was taboo, yet nevertheless the majority of the historians, even after the defeat of Nazism, saw Bismarck's semi-autocratic solution of the German question, which rejected a Western style democratic order, as the positive outcome of German history. Few accepted responsibility for Nazism. Of the historians who had immigrated to the United States only Hans Rothfels returned permanently, nor were the others particularly welcome. On the other hand, historians who had been deeply involved with the Nazi regime were in most cases very soon reintegrated into the profession. In West Germany, Rothfels played an important role as a political intellectual, as a professor at Tübingen University and as a director of the newly founded Institute for Contemporary History.[26] He offered an interpretation in his book *The German Opposition to Hitler* that was widely accepted at the time. According to him the only true opposition to

Hitler was that of the military men and the aristocrats involved in the assassination plot of July 20, 1944. Nazism, he argued, was a European phenomenon with roots in the French Revolution, and not peculiarly German.[27]

It arose in Germany not because Germany had been too little democratic, but because in the Weimar Republic it had been too democratic, permitting the masses to place the Nazis into power. There was a tendency in the two decades after the end of the war to focus not on the crimes that the Germans had perpetrated but to see the Germans as victims of the bombings and the expulsions. Rothfels, together with the already mentioned Schieder, was an editor of a multi-volume document project (sponsored by the West German government) on the expulsion of the German population from Eastern Europe.[28] These expulsions did constitute crimes against humanity that should have been documented, but the documentation failed to give adequate attention to the German crimes that had preceded them.

Schieder and Conze, who as we know today from recent scholarship were deeply involved as historians in Nazi plans for ethnic cleansing, something that was largely hidden at the time, became the two most important mentors of young history students in the post-1945 era.[29] They avoided the racist language of the Nazi period, but still maintained essential elements of their earlier views of history. As mentioned, they had rejected the narrow political focus of the orthodox historians for a broader social history and had abandoned the concentration on the *Volk* and the longing for the agrarian world of the Middle Ages. Instead they focused on modern industrial society. Conze founded the very influential Working Circle for Modern Social History in which many of the young critical historians did their work. But like many of the older German historians, Conze and Schieder, unlike the majority of their students, saw Nazism as an integral part of modern society with few roots in German history.

Yet by the 1960s, when a new generation of historians educated in the postwar period reached intellectual maturity, the political atmosphere had changed. In 1961 Fritz Fischer, who had been associated with a Nazi historical institute, published a book on Germany's responsibility for the First World War, entitled *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, which burst onto the German stage like a bombshell.[30] Fischer, on the basis of archival evidence, concluded that the German imperial government bore direct responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, thus refuting the common belief in Germany that war came as a result of the breakdown of the system of alliances in which all sides shared equally. He went further and linked the decision to go to war to the insufficiently democratic structure of Germany in an industrial age. He saw the war as an attempt to escape internal conflicts and to block the demands for democratic and social reforms that would have

threatened the status quo. At the same time he documented the government's plans for extensive territorial expansion (under pressure from economic interest groups) that foreshadowed those of the Nazis.

Independently of Fischer, a generation of historians born around 1930 and educated in the postwar era saw the course of history very differently from their mentors Conze and Schieder. They went back to criticisms of German history held by Weimar intellectuals who had been forced to emigrate. Hans Rosenberg gave several seminars in Germany in the immediate postwar period that was attended by young historians who would play an important role in the reshaping of historical consciousness in West Germany. While the orthodox historians had hailed Germany's deviation from the course of democratization in the West, younger historians such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang Mommsen, Gerhard A. Ritter—not the be confused with the older conservative and ultranationalist Gerhard Ritter—and Jürgen Kocka sought to move Germany in the direction of a modern democracy with a social conscience. They moved away from the anti-rationalism and the nationalism of the older school to a critical historical social science, as practiced by the émigré historians and to openness to the world. It is important to note that almost all of the younger historians spent considerable time in the United States and Great Britain and established contacts with social scientists there, as well as with the surviving refugee intellectuals.

Thus the political outlook changed among the historians. Although the German historical profession had been highly regarded throughout the academic world from the nineteenth century until World War I, German historians for the most part had little interest in or regard for historical studies abroad. For the first time West German historians participated actively in international scholarly discussions. A main concern of historical studies in West Germany was the question of how it was possible for the Nazis to establish their reign of terror, and to apply methods of social analysis to explore what went wrong in Germany's development since the nineteenth century.

Important contributions to this analysis came from the work of refugee intellectuals. However, the well-publicized Historians' Controversy of the mid-1980s demonstrated not unsurprisingly that there were dissident voices that sought to minimize German responsibility for the crimes perpetrated under Nazism, but they constituted a minority.[31] It had been predicted that the reunification of Germany in 1990 would lead to a reassertion of nationalist sentiments. This has not been the case. Not only the historians but also the media, particularly television, continue to confront the public with Germany's past.[32] Textbooks in Germany deal extensively and openly with this past so that German school children are made fully aware of the Holocaust, something that had not been the case in the early postwar years. Also consid-

erable attention is being paid to the contribution of Jews to German culture in pre-Nazi Germany and to the rich heritage that was destroyed. Thus in an important way the work of the refugee intellectuals of the Weimar period has not been in vain.

NOTES

1. See George L. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), and George L. Mosse, *Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a "Third Force" in Pre-Nazi Germany* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1970), particularly chapter 4, "The Influence of the Volkish Idea on German Jewry," 77–109.

2. In German, "Der Taufzettel ist das Eintrittsbillet zur europäischen Kultur," see Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Klaus Briegleb, 11 (Munich: Hanser-Verlag, 1976), 622.

3. Georg G. Iggers, "Academic Anti-Semitism in Germany 1870–1933: A Comparative Perspective," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, 27 (1998), 473–90.

4. Letter to the Romans 13:1–2.

5. Shulamit Volkov, *The Rise of Popular Antimodernism in Germany: The Urban Master Artisans, 1873–1896* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

6. On political Lutheranism, anti-Judaism, and the Confessional Church, see John Moses, *The Reluctant Revolutionary: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Collision with Prussian-German History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009); for Niemöller's sermon, Moses cites Eberhard Röhm and Jörg Thierfelder, *Juden – Christen – Deutsche, 1935–1938*, vol. 2, part 1 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1992).

7. See Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, 2nd edition (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).

8. See Bernd Faulenbach, *Ideologie des deutschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Beck, 1980).

9. See Iggers, *German Conception of History*.

10. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "German Historiography in the Weimar Republic and the Émigré Historians," Hartmut Lehmann and James J. Sheehan (eds.), *An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 32–66.

11. Hans Herzfeld, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die Auflösung der nationalen Einheitsfront im Weltkriege* (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1928).

12. Willi Oberkrome, *Volksgeschichte: Methodische Innovation und völkische Ideologisierung in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).

13. Michael Matthiesen, *Verlorene Identität: Der Historiker Arnold Berney und seine Freiburger Kollegen, 1923–1938* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998).

14. See Ernst Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* (Berlin: G. Bondi, 1927); Robert E. Lerner, "Ernst Kantorowicz and Thomas E. Mommsen," Lehmann and Sheehan (eds.), *Interrupted Past*, 188–205.

15. On Rothfels's affinity to the Nazis and the role of his students Werner Conze and Theodor Schieder under the Nazis, see John L. Harvey's contribution to this volume. See also especially Ingo Haar, *Historiker im Nationalsozialismus: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft und der "Volkstumskampf" im Osten* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), esp. "Hans Rothfels und seine Schüler," 70–105; Karl Heinz Roth, "'Richtung halten': Hans Rothfels and Neo-Conservative Historiography on Both Sides of the Atlantic," Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch (eds.), *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1919–1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 236–59; German version in: Mario Kessler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker im Exil (1933-1945): Ausgewählte Studien* (Berlin: Metropol-Verlag, 2005). On Conze and Schieder and ethnic cleansing, see Ingo Haar, "German *Ostforschung* and Anti-Semitism," ibid., 13–15; see also Heinrich August Winkler, "Geschichtswissenschaft oder Geschichtsklitterung? Ingo Haar und Hans Rothfels. Eine Erwiderung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 50 (2002), 635–52. The most recent and most extensive work on Rothfels is Jan Eckel, *Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005).

16. See Veit Valentin, *1848: Chapters of German History* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1940). On Valentin, see Hans Schleier, *Die bürgerliche deutsche Geschichtsschreibung der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), 346–98.

17. Most recently, Mario Kessler, *Arthur Rosenberg: Ein Historiker im Zeitalter der Katastrophen (1889–1943)* (Cologne etc.: Böhlau, 2003).

18. See Schleier, *Bürgerliche deutsche Geschichtsschreibung*, "Hedwig Hintze," 272–301; Steffen Kaudelka, *Rezeption im Zeitalter der Konfrontation: Französische Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichte in Deutschland 1920–1940* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), esp. chapter 3, "Wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt und demokratische Perspektive: Das Werk Hedwig Hintzes in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus," 214–408.

19. Peter Th. Walther, "Werkstattbericht: Hedwig Hintze in den Niederlanden 1939–1942," Marc Schalenberg and Peter Th. Walther (eds.), *"immer im Forschen bleiben": Rüdiger vom Bruch zum 60. Geburtstag,* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), 415–33.

20. See the biographical introduction by Hans-Ulrich Wehler to the collection of Eckart Kehr's essays, *Der Primat der Innenpolitik: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preussisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965); also Schleier, *Bürgerliche deutsche Geschichtsschreibung*, 483–530.

21. See George W. F. Hallgarten, *Vorkriegsimperialismus: Die soziologischen Grundlagen der Aussenpolitik europäischer Grossmächte bis 1914* (Paris: Éditions Météore, 1935). On Hallgarten, see Schleier, *Bürgerliche deutsche Geschichtsschreibung*, 482–530.

22. See Barry M. Katz, "German Historians in the Office of Strategic Services," Lehmann and Sheehan (eds.), *Interrupted Past*, 136–39.

23. Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944* (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, enl. ed. 1944). New edition, with a preface by Peter Hayes, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009.

24. On this generation see Heinz Wolf, *Deutsch-jüdische Emigrationshistoriker in den USA und der Nationalsozialismus* (Bern: P. Lang, 1988); Walter Laqueur, *Generation Exodus: The Fate of Young Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany* (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, published by University Press of New England, 2001).

25. See Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: dtv, 1993); Georg G. Iggers, "Nachwort zur deutschen Auflage von 1997," Idem, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft: Eine Kritik der traditionellen Geschichtsauffassung von Herder bis zur Gegenwart*, 4th ed. (Vienna: Böhlau, 1997), 400–43.

26. See Peter Th. Walther, "Hans Rothfels im amerikanischen Exil," Johannes Hürter and Hans Woller (eds), *Hans Rothfels und die deutsche Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 83–96.

27. Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., 1948).

28. See *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa* (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1953).

29. See Haar and Fahlbusch (eds.), *German Scholars*.

30. Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); published previously in German: *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961).

31. *Historikerstreit: Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistichen Judenvernichtung* (Munich: R. Piper, 1987).

32. See Wulf Kansteiner, *In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006).

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