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Global Turmoils: Peace & Conflict Management



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WORLD FOCUS takes up every month one international issue and gives an analysis of its various aspects by persons well known for their specialisation in the subject. The issues covered are topical or near topical, but of an abiding interest. The analysis is simple enough to interest even an initiate to world affairs, but without sacrificing depth. The aim is to present an Indocentric view on a particular issue currently facing the world.

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EDITORIAL

Books that are standard for statecraft management: The Arthashastra an Indian Sanskrit book written by Chanakya in Sanskrit, is all about running the country, it is all about statecraft, economic policy and military strategy, written in the 4th century B.C. The book has about 6000 hymns and draws a lot of ideas from the earlier Yagynavalkya sutras composed earlier. Chanakya mixed a lot of political issues in the Arthashastra that he amalgamated in administering the Mauryan Empire. The Art of War was written by Sun Tzu, a Chinese Military strategist. In the 5th century B.C has influence on all walks of life, none to match it on military thinking. Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian Diplomat in the 16th century wrote a book called The prince. It talks of all means to get the results you need in getting what you want in statecraft. The west calls him the father of modern political thought. Much of what he writes about was earlier said by Chanakya in the Arthashastra and in The Art of War by the Chinese Military strategist Sun Tzu.

Anything that impacts the wealth of a nation generates conflict all the time. In a oil and Gas surplus world, with markets of diminishing returns a lot of people with money not knowing where it should be invested, conflict has become a way of life in the Middle-East. For cash surpluses give most nations the liberty to spend without accountability. With sect conflicts in the Middle-East going out of control of the countries in the region, leaders in the area are operating with oil and gas fields and funding their operations, the entire world virtually being converted to a theater of conflict. So today Turmoil is the order of the day. Rich growing nations are exploring new pastures and areas to keep their people interested tend to step in on areas which are not theirs.

Conflicts are of territorial nature, historical nature and legacy nature as the colonial masters left and went out of the regions they once ruled.

Recently an interesting settlement took place to settle an age old conflict between Peru and Ecuador, where the border dispute was settled by giving one square mile of land to the other on perpetual lease, a great way of owning land and settling long pending issues to keep out the ego of all in place. This is a model of conflict resolution that can be followed by nations in adverse possession of land to settle boundary issues of history.

India now has started to reassess the vexed issues of the region. Keeping in view that foreign policy is nothing but national economic policy with a bottom line of maximum returns to the country and India being a huge market, our leadership is coming out to as a conflict solver in the World. We have the largest Muslim population of the world, all sects of Islam live peacefully in India, like nowhere else. Today India has good commercial relations with Saudi-Arabia, Iran and Israel, the three main actors of the Middle East. All trust India immensely because of the commercial importance of their ties with India.

India has successfully resolved its age old dispute with Bangladesh, to the satisfaction of all. It is a Great Diplomatic Victory. Besides, India has the capacity, competence and capability to solve hard issues that faces as challenges in the region.

New Delhi
June 2016

G. Kishore Babu
Editor



Global Turmoils: Peace and Conflict Management

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Tackling Terrorist Turmoil: 9/11 and Its Aftermath

Prof. Kuldeep Singh

Background

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the newly emerged Central Asian countries witnessed the resurgence of Islam based extremist groups especially in the Fergana Valley. Political deprivation, deteriorating economic conditions, corruption, and steep fall in living standards, unemployment and poor governance in countries like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan provided fertile ground for the rise of such elements. The emergence of radical Islam was of great concern for the Central Asian countries as for almost seven decades of Soviet rule such forces never posed this kind of political challenge. The break-up of the Soviet Union resulting in disappearance of socialist ideology created ideological vacuum, which in the absence of any other viable mass ideology had the chances of being filled by religious orientations. With religious expression having remained suppressed in Soviet time, Islam was seen having a powerful appeal in the changed time. Soon Central Asian countries had whole lot of Islamic missionaries from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other parts of the globe. The short-sighted and hard-line policies of regimes in Central Asia, in the absence of effective democratic channels, helped Islamic forces to grow. The rising unemployment in most of these states, especially in Fergana Valley which was the hub of extremism, created conducive conditions for the spread of such an ideology (Country Report, 2002: p.43). The worst affected was Uzbekistan, that has been home to a large number of militant organizations which sought to overthrow the government in power for paving the way for Islamic state.

The waves of political Islam started appearing in Central Asian countries immediately after their emergence as independent political entities. This started from Tajikistan in 1992 with Islamic rebels based in southern provinces seeking Islamic set-up in the country. By 1996 the indigenous Islamic elements got linked up with Afghanistan based Islamic

forces. Initially the assertion of Islamic forces was not taken alarmingly by the outside world because Tajik civil war (1992-96), in addition to Islamic groups, was also waged by secular and nationalist elements. Even the US perception of Tajik civil war was that it was power struggle among regional clans; that it was maneuvered by Russia for justifying its military presence in Central Asia; that the Islamic forces of Afghanistan were not keen in penetrating Central Asia and that Taliban was indigenous outfit not having any regional agenda (Bhadarkumar, 2005). However, with the capturing of power by Taliban in 1996, Russia in concert with Iran worked for bringing political settlement giving Tajik Opposition a role in the Government of the country. The US debunked the settlement and continued to encourage Central Asian countries to cultivate ties with Taliban Government in Kabul till the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The period from 1996 to 2001 which is taken as second wave of political Islam in the region of Central Asia witnessed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) intensifying its activities in Central Asia, largely in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

However, a real twist happened following 9/11 incidents when the US declared war on terrorism unilaterally telling the world that Osama-bin-Laden, the brain behind the attacks was hiding in Afghanistan. Accused of engineering bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 he was now declared to be the main culprit for 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. At this point of time the US was so determined to defeat the forces of terrorism that it did not strictly adhere to the established UN principle of making a case for the war to be waged and therefore, did not deem it necessary to put credible evidence for the justification of the war before the world (Singh, 2005:187). The US preferred to act this way though under the prevailing circumstances getting UN sanction for the war was not a problem. As it chose



to wage war without UN approval the critics attributed the US act of bypassing Security Council to larger American design of not legitimizing the need to approach the Council and thus reserving the right to act unilaterally (Chomsky, 2001). However, the panic created by 9/11 incidents was weighing heavily on the minds of US policy makers as they undertook urgent measures. The US managed to secure unprecedented diplomatic and physical support whereby all the leading countries of the world offered it logistic support for the operations to be launched. NATO stood with the US firmly, invoking Article Five of its Charter for the first time which read "any attack on a member country would be considered an attack on all NATO members" (Surjeet, 2001: 1). This way it virtually became global war on terrorism.

These developments alarmed the US of the dangers involved in cultivating ties with Islamic elements. The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan gave a new model of Islamic fundamentalism to the extremist forces. With the help of Saudi extremist Osama bin Laden, Taliban ruled Afghanistan became a base for exporting Islamic militancy, more so to the neighboring countries. It became the centre for training terrorists and spreading instability in the region (Rashid, 2002: p.7). This way Afghanistan emerged as the crucial factor in the security set-up of the Central Asian states. These states felt threatened after Taliban came to power because Islam based terrorist groups declared that their objective was to create an Islamic state, extending to whole of Central Asia. With reports of terrorist elements belonging to the IMU, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups infiltrating from Afghanistan and elsewhere the security related concerns of these Central Asian countries got heightened to an alarming proportion never seen before (Nichal, 2009: pp.4-5). Afghanistan and neighboring Central Asian countries became the focus of whole of the world.

Following 9/11 the Central Asian states were very quick to respond to the developments unfolding at a very fast pace in the wake of US led war on terrorism because some of them were already the victim of terrorism and others perceived themselves to be the probable target. The US was granted the Kharshi-Khanabad military base in Uzbekistan and Gansi airbase in Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan. Sense of insecurity emanating from developments in

Afghanistan led the Central Asian countries to grant military services to the US. It was only in 2005 that following differences between Uzbekistan and the US, on the issue of the handling of Andijan unrest by Uzbek government when President Karimov was criticized for 'disproportional reaction', the Uzbekistan got Kharshi-Khanabad military base vacated from the US. Turkmenistan accepted US help for the strengthening of border and had negotiations with the later for permitting the use of Turk aerodromes for US military operations in Afghanistan. With Berdymuhammedov coming to power in Turkmenistan in December 2006 such moves were further intensified. In 2004 Kazakhstan signed a treaty with the US for military cooperation which among other things aimed at strengthening Kazakh navy on the Caspian Sea. The US led NATO became active in the region of Central Asia in the period following 9/11. Kazakhstan signed Individual Action Plan in January 2006 for involving Kazakh military specialists for surveillance and border protection.

The Central Asian countries extended helping hand to the US in its war on terrorism because they had common cause of defeating the forces of radical Islam. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan did not take much time in offering air space and landing facilities to the US because he was under attack from Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the outfit linked with the Taliban which declared that its objective was to overthrow Karimov Government and establish Muslim Caliphate. Subsequently when Russia took its own positions on US attacks and Uzbek President realized that in view of kinship ties across the border in Afghanistan the Uzbeks would not support it; he got reluctant to get involved in the war against Afghanistan. However, his resolve to defeat the forces of radical Islam remained as firm as ever. Tajikistan was less willing partner than Uzbekistan but allowed US army to land in the country. Surprisingly, Turkmenistan that maintained closest ties with the Taliban and looked to Afghanistan as a possible pipeline route for its energy resources, also expressed its willingness to allow US the use of its air space for humanitarian purposes. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also followed their Central Asian counterparts in offering the use of air space to the US. The Central Asian countries were helping the US in its war on terrorism because they feared these



forces no less. They were already the victim of violence unleashed by terrorist groups and knew that the failure to defeat them would mean such attacks continuing in future as well. The Central Asian countries had the objective of defeating the forces of terrorism and the US at this point of time was perceived as leader of the war on terrorism.

Meanwhile the Uyghur uprisings in the Xinjiang province of China added a new dimension to the war on terrorism. The Uyghurs are Sunni Muslims with Turkic ethnic background and have strong connections with the Muslims of Central Asia. The Islamic fundamental forces, which remained dormant over a long period of time during Soviet times, got active in the post-Soviet phase. The activation of Islamic forces in the post cold war period emboldened Pakistan even to propose pan Islamic ring from Kashmir to Kasghar, by attracting Uyghurs to radical Islam (Debata, 2009: 321). Uyghurs got religious education in Pakistan and were deeply involved in the Islamic Jihad movements around the region, since the 1980s when they first traveled south to Pakistan to join Afghan Mujahideen. They joined the ranks of first Hizb-i-Islami and later the Taliban. Uyghurs also went to Central Asian countries to join radical groups such as Islamic Renaissance Party in Kazakhstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. With Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan in 1996, the country turned out to be paradise for carrying out their Jihadi activities from there. The arms and ammunition used by them in recent operations against Chinese security forces also came from Afghanistan. Ironically China had earlier supplied large amount of weapons to support the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The links so established by the Uyghurs were used by them for launching their activities against China. Taliban with the help of Al-Qaeda have made inroads in to the frontier regions of Pakistan, leading to Talibanisation of the country. Taliban after having established control over the territory of Swat and adjoining areas announced Islamic Shariat rule over the region. The Uyghurs have close connections with their counterparts in Afghanistan and Pakistan which signals dangerous situation, for the entire South and Central Asia (Ibid. 322). The Talibanisation of Pakistan and intensified Uyghurs uprisings vitiated the security scenario in the region whereby these

forces were emboldened to target other countries. These elements were preparing for long-drawn battle in Central Asia as prevailing economic and political crisis created fertile ground for Islamist surge in the region (Bhadrankumar, 2010). The militants, after having fought for others, now wanted to fight for their own country.

Contemporary Phase

The war on terrorism entered a new phase after the major withdrawal of US led NATO forces from Afghanistan. The preparation for facing new realities started much before the actual exit. The strategic pact signed between India and Afghanistan committing India for 'training, equipping and capacity building' of the Afghan National Security Services was the outcome of realization that as NATO forces leave Afghanistan the Afghan security forces would not be able to face challenge of the Taliban and other extremists, without outside support. The then Afghan President Hamid Karzai said repeatedly that South Asia faced 'dangers from terrorism and extremism', the danger which was accentuated by the fact that this was used as an instrument of state policy. Being aware that his forces could not check Pakistan's adventure, Afghan President wanted pact with India, US and NATO for dealing with increasingly menacing Pakistan. In his assessment pace talks with the Taliban were futile unless Pakistan, that was the real force behind the terrorist outfits, was fully involved in the peace process. Karzai articulated anti-Pakistan and pro-India undertones because of visible change in US outlook towards Pakistan in the period following death of Osama. A stage was reached where the US realized that security establishment in Pakistan was determined to take central position in negotiations with the Taliban and wanted to prevent the US from having long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Washington made it clear that it would not tolerate the use of terrorist groups, aided by Pak intelligence wing ISI, to kill Americans and their allies in Afghanistan. Such a change in US outlook on Pakistan was surely a positive development.

NATO's major withdrawal from Afghanistan in January 2015, handing command and control of security to Afghan forces, has ended on a mode similar to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 because as in the case of Soviets there is also no clear victory for US



led NATO forces. On the contrary the state intuitions have crumbled and powerful ethnic and tribal groups are staring at each other. The UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan released on 7 March 2016 has documented deteriorating security situation and has underlined the uncertain commitment of Taliban to the peace process in the country. The situation was increasingly volatile as the conflict grew in intensity and scope, resulting in high casualties and displacement of Afghan civilians. In the year 2015 the UN recorded 22,634 security related incidents which was 3 per cent increase in comparison to previous year and second highest number since 2001 (UN: 2016). The Taliban was able to extend its territorial reach temporarily capturing 24 district centers in the north, in the west and in the south in addition to the capture of capital of Kunduz. There were reports of substantial increase in casualties of the Afghan defense and security forces in 2015, the first year of local forces confronting anti-government elements with drastically reduced international military assistance. Ever since the announcement of major pullout by December 2014 the endeavor of US led NATO forces has been to ensure that Afghan forces were sufficiently trained to be capable of taking the responsibility of providing security to the civilians and to have the strength to counter any possible return of al-Qaida with an international agenda. However, with Afghan forces having been given the responsibility, the year 2015 has been marked by increased violence. Helmand Province where Afghan forces were seeking control without US or UK involvement, there were reports of 50 per cent higher casualties in comparison to 2014 and ANA gave up conducting counter insurgency patrol while Taliban militia extended their network of roadblocks. The Afghan government had to hire the services of 30,000 men of 'militia forces' known as Afghan Local Police (ALP) who are essentially local guns-for-hire elements, having a poor reputation of fraud, theft, rape, looting, drug-trafficking and torture (Rogers: 2015). This being the state of affairs it was not surprising to have reports of Taliban entering ALP occupied areas and being welcomed by local people. The deterioration of security scenario has extended far beyond the areas of traditional stronghold of Taliban. The situation has been further complicated by the indications of IS having the design of establishing long-term presence in the country.

Though precise details of IS involvement are yet to be known, there have been clashes between IS and Taliban in the country and reports of IS recruiting supporters in opposition to Taliban. Therefore, it should be no surprise if the US and NATO forces review their commitment to the country. Already NATO has stipulated its intention to provide financial support to ANSF through to the end of 2017 with options available for further support until 2020.

Concluding Observations

NATO exit having witnessed an increase in security related incidents, Afghan forces proving to be ill-equipped to do the task and the danger of IS establishing strongholds in Afghanistan becoming more real, one may be inclined to view NATO withdrawal as premature and ill-conceived move. However, NATO forces having stayed for so long were to leave and ultimately task of security was to be given to Afghan forces. Despite strong rationale offered by US and NATO members for invading Afghanistan geo-political realities of the country for long were agitating against the prolonged stay of the outside forces. The Afghan hostility to foreign control did not permit US-led NATO forces to fight to the finish. Bad memories of Soviet intervention followed by post 9/11 attack were bound to produce mass resentment to foreign forces in the country. Therefore, move to train and equip the Afghan forces for the task of security should be viewed a move in the right direction. There was perception in some quarters that the US led NATO armies were not entirely doing a humanitarian task of peace keeping nature for stabilizing the country, rather it was war where soldiers were killing and were being killed. It is credibly known from global experience that sweeping state actions especially by the alien people exacerbate extremism. It is widely held that realization of foreign occupation produces resentment and at times it is opposed by the violent methods that lead to militancy of many kinds. Also beyond security concerns larger political issues can be settled only with the involvement of diverse sections of Afghan society. Surely the situation would continue to engage the minds of the outside world as deteriorated security scenario in Afghanistan and around may have implications for the region and the world as a whole. Therefore the process of rebuilding Afghanistan and helping security forces in training and modernization



should be continued, keeping a close watch on the situation. However, leading role in this regard is to be assigned to the domestic forces if long-term lasting solution is to be found to complex Afghan imbroglio.

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North Korea's 7th Party Congress: Threat Perception remains unchanged

Prof. Rajaram Panda

Introduction

North Korea hosted its seventh Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea on 6 May 2016, the first in nearly 36 years. It came to a close on 9 May. Once the announcement was made about this, speculations were abound engaging analysts to unravel if the event could be related to a generational reassignment of key personnel and announcement of new pro-market policies or a public reinforcement of nuclear weapons strategy. What made the Korea-watchers ponder was because of Pyongyang's some recent conducts such as latest and fourth nuclear test in January 2016 followed by satellite launch, "70-day battle" (a short-term economic campaign to maximize industrial and construction output with limited time and resources), and multiple conventional weapons and ballistic missile tests.

As it transpired soon after, the party Congress was a political tool to cement Kim Jong-un's rule. In the past, the event drew many delegates from around the world but not this time. For example, in 1980 nearly 180 delegates from 118 countries attended the gathering when Kim Il-sung, the country's founder and Kim's grandfather was still in power. This time, only a handful of foreign delegates were invited. Not surprisingly, Kim Jong-un assumed the centre stage with a large domestic audience and with more than 3,000 delegates in audience from all over North Korea in this rare political gathering.

The Congress was more of a symbolic procedure aimed at elevating Kim Jong-un's official status, both in the party and military. From the beginning the Congress looked like a scripted event and it transpired that the Congress was used as a platform to make grandiose statements about the country's nuclear capabilities, faith in the unitary leadership system, internal cohesion and economic development, whatever untrue that may be. The event was also to announce to the world that Kim was firmly

secured in power and thus reaffirm his political legitimacy. The Congress discussed and revised "Rules of the WPK", stipulating that the party's top post is the chairman who would be the supreme leader representing and leading the party. Some changes were also made in the designation of top party leaders. Kim Jong-un was elected to the top post of the WPK and his "revolutionary cause of Juche (self reliance)" was praised. The event was more of a coronation for third-generation dictator Kim Jong-un than a platform for new policy.

The biggest takeaway of the Congress was the State's hardening of nuclear stance. His was a clear message to the next US President when he takes office. Speaking from the main dais, Kim thundered: North Korea would "wage a vigorous struggle to radically put an end to the danger of nuclear war, imposed by the U.S., with powerful nuclear deterrence". It was to convey to the US that North Korea has the capability to threaten US targets with nuclear attack. Pyongyang has claimed in recent times that its nuclear weapon efforts have accelerated. It demonstrated this claim by conducting a fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and also claimed to have made a breakthrough in missile or nuclear technology. South Korean officials firmly believe that Pyongyang is gearing up for another nuclear test anytime soon. No wonder, the Congress agreed to make the country's nuclear status permanent, besides boosting its nuclear arsenal "both in quality and quantity". As regards quality, based on the nature of January detonation, it is speculated that Pyongyang is in the pursuit of developing a more powerful hydrogen-based nuclear bomb. In terms of quantity, Pyongyang is likely to be in possession of around 50 nuclear warheads by the time the next President assumes office in early 2017.

All the stakeholders in the region have high expectation from China, North Korea's economic and



security lifeline, to put pressure and deter the North from pursuing its nuclear program. Though North Korea's relations with China is strained after Kim Jong-un took power and China's relations with South Korea have warmed, there is still scope for being optimistic that China can have some say in North Korea's affairs and influence policies. This optimism is based on the congratulatory message that Chinese President Xi Jinping sent to Kim for the Congress and Chinese foreign ministry spokesman called for "negotiations and dialogue to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue".

There is a different reading to this development, however. The US and South Korea have taken consistent position that the path of dialogue is closed so long as Pyongyang is unwilling to discuss denuclearisation. Pyongyang insists that the US first talk about a deal that would remove the US protection from South Korea, including the roughly 28,500 US troops based in the South. Such a condition is unacceptable to the US. Under the circumstance, sanctions are unlikely to be removed. The truism, however, is that unless the Kim regime feels pain, North Korea's strategic calculus is unlikely to change. So, the deadlock continues. Given the unpredictability, it leaves the North Korean watchers to speculate on what way the North would respond as, when and if the pain becomes unbearable.

Kim Jong-un sought to obtain formal approval at the Congress for his new ideology "Byongjin", replacing "Songun", or "military first", policy of his late father Kim Jong-il, whom he succeeded in 2011 after his death. Byongjin means the policy of simultaneously developing the economy and nuclear weapons, a two-pronged approach at enhancing nuclear might and improving living conditions of the people by expanding the country's electricity resources using nuclear power plants, although North Korea currently does not have nuclear power plants.

It may be recalled that Pyongyang declared itself a nuclear power in 2005 and has carried out four nuclear weapons tests – in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016 – so far and has intention to conduct some more. In March, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved the toughest sanctions on North Korea in two decades over its missile and nuclear

tests. These measures seem to have little effect on Pyongyang. The immediate adversary to the North's tantrums is South Korea as North's nuclear and missile activities pose direct threat to it. Ties between the two siblings of what once was an unified Korean peninsula have remained turbulent since the both fought a war from 1950 to 1953 and reconciliation has only receded over the years. Tensions have escalated as South Korea joins the annual military drills with the US to demonstrate the US commitment to protect its security. As North Korea fears for its security and threat from the US and South Korea, it has opted to maintain nuclear as a deterrence against what it perceives as hostile US policies. The situation is too complicated and an early solution seems unlikely.

The Congress sent mixed signals. It marked the revival of a more public political style in the country, playing on the formalism of party structure and events. Kim's ruling style is close to his grandfather than his father. After assuming power, he indulged in restructuring the balance of power among the country's elite and institutionalised formal channel of authority. But what it has resulted in is a formal and a more conventional structure of power and government.

Under the circumstance, it is unlikely that Kim's mission for missiles would be abandoned. It is no secret that North Korea, after conducting the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, conducted several tests of both the Musudan road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), systems which are critical to a viable nuclear weapons program.

Though in the past Pyongyang repeatedly failed in Musudan testing, it still has the capability of reaching US forces in Japan and perhaps even Guam. Possession of such road-mobile systems gives North Korea an important component of its deterrent strategy. Even if the system is faulty, Pyongyang is determined to improve its technology to make it more lethal. North Korea is aware that it can take advantage of the election year in the US to further its efforts to complete a viable nuclear weapon and delivery system. As the US would remain busy with domestic politics, military action against North Korea would



have low priority and North Korea is keen to use this window for its advantage. South Korea too would be busy with a presidential election in 2017. Such political transition in both the US and South Korea could advantage North Korea as pressure is likely to lessen, thereby giving the North a free hand to pursue its nuclear program without much interference.

No First-use announcement significant

One significant and encouraging announcement that came from the Congress is that North Korea would not use nuclear weapons unless its sovereignty was threatened by other nuclear powers. Kim also expressed his country's commitment to non-proliferation. At the Congress Kim vowed to "faithfully fulfil" his country's non-proliferation obligations and push for global denuclearisation. It is a different matter that North Korea was the first signatory country to withdraw from the global Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and since then engaged in relentless efforts to further its nuclear weapon programs. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons doctrine, as it claims, has always been a complex of self-defence, deterrence and threat. The truism is that the survival of the ruling Kim family is intimately linked to nuclear arms as it serves the twin purpose of legitimising Kim Jong-Un's hereditary rule, while keeping his foreign foes at bay. On numerous occasions, Kim has made it clear that the future of North's nuclear weapons programme is non-negotiable and that it has no intention of unilaterally giving up its nuclear program or bending to international pressure, which it perceives at forcing its regime into decline or collapse.

At the Congress, Kim Jong-un reiterated his often-state policy to simultaneously develop nuclear weapons and boost the country's battered economy by emphasising increased agricultural and manufacturing production and involvement in the global economy. But with severe international sanctions, it is doubtful how the country shall be able to execute its plans, though Kim hailed the January nuclear test and February launch of a satellite into space at the Congress. Following the January nuclear test and the subsequent satellite launch the following month, the UN significantly expanded the existing sanctions imposed on North Korea in March, which entailed banning all exports with the aim to cripple its

operational capabilities. So, these sanctions have severely hamstrung North Korea's economy and would negatively impact Kim's efforts to improve economically or otherwise.

Notwithstanding the lofty claims of improving the lives of the people in North Korea, besides beefing up its nuclear capability, the truism is that the average human being does not live with dignity or enjoy the basic freedom that civilised society offers to its people. There are reports which suggest that human rights violations are rampant. As the world's most repressive and reclusive states, reports by defectors suggest that there are wanton killings, disappearances, executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and systematic forced labour.

Another significant aspect of the Congress was the intolerance towards the media. The regime expelled a BBC journalist for allegedly "insulting the dignity" of the authoritarian country. The regime also kept foreign media away even though they were welcome to cover the Congress. Some scribes who were allowed to cover the visit of some Nobel laureates were detained at the airport and charged for speaking ill of the system and the leadership. Though over 100 foreign journalists were allowed to cover the Congress, they were actually prevented from covering the proceedings. They had to depend on official reports from state, which used to be released hours later or even the next day of the event.

Reaching out to South Korea

Kim also announced that he was willing to normalise relations with states that have been hostile towards Pyongyang and called for more talks with South Korea so that distrust is reduced and political understanding develops. However it remains unclear if this change of heart implied any change in North Korea's often belligerent attitude towards the US and South Korea. This was a marked departure from North Korea's belligerent utterances in March 2016 when it threatened a "pre-emptive" and "indiscriminate" nuclear strike on the US and South Korea in response to the two nations' joint military drills. Pyongyang always has viewed the US-South Korea joint annual military exercise as preparation for invasion of North Korea. There are rumours that North Korea is preparing for the fifth nuclear test. In late April 2016,



South Korean President Park Geun-hye warned that North Korea had completed preparations for the fifth nuclear test. The Institute for Science and International Security also issued a similar warning.

The conditions that Kim put for dialogue with South Korea would be unacceptable to Seoul. South Korea might be open to talks to ease cross-border animosities but reunification under a federal system whereby North's brand of socialism wanted by Pyongyang, a decades-old proposal, would receive no traction with Seoul. Kim's outreach to Seoul also came with the usual warning: "But if the South Korean authorities opt for a war, persisting in the unreasonable 'unification of social systems,' we will turn out in the just war to mercilessly wipe out the anti-reunification forces and achieve the historic cause of national reunification, long-cherished desire of all Koreans". This is the language that North Korea uses and South Korea is used to it, taking it as smoke without fire, and therefore does not take seriously.

South Korea dismissed the offer for talks as "propaganda" that lacks sincerity. The country is still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union and famine in the 1990s. The sanctions following its nuclear weapon program have further crippled its economy. Despite displeasing Beijing by its behaviour, its dependence China remains undiminished as Beijing has other strategic considerations to keep North Korea afloat.

Reaction of China on the Congress

From the Congress, it transpired that Kim Jong-un may have succeeded in elevating his position in the WPK and status before the domestic constituency but surely did little to win over frustrated ally, China. China is displeased with North Korea's actions after Kim took power in 2011 but has little restraining authority. To have another nuclear state in its neighbourhood is not a comfortable situation for Beijing. But Pyongyang has remained undeterred to the counsel of the international community and continued with its intention to be fully nuclear power state.

In a strongly-worded editorial, the state-run *China Daily* indicted: "He appears unaware that his nuclear ambitions are poison for his country's

economy". It went on to say "they will not only exhaust his country's very limited resources, but will further isolate his country from the rest of the world, politically and economically." But despite Beijing's impatience, its leverage to influence Pyongyang seems to have diminished. Beijing fears that if North Korea collapses, it would dangerously destabilise not only the peninsula but also its own border regions and therefore Beijing is unwilling to squeeze the errant Kim too hard. The influx of refugees that would inevitably result in the event of a collapse scenario is too dreadful for Beijing.

The way events are unfolding in North Korea, Chinese leadership seem to be handicapped to have alternative policy options to bring about change in North Korea. For the time being, Kim Jong-un seems destined to remain the unchallenged leader in North Korea, which implies that the frosty ties that have developed between Beijing and Pyongyang are unlikely to undergo any change. Therefore, China is likely to go along with the international community to support stricter sanctions through the UN Security Council to get compliance from Pyongyang, irrespective of the consequences.

However, in order not to aggravate the already vitiated situation, President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Kim on his new title to his name – chairman of the WPK. The idea seems to be to assuage Kim's ego and hurt feeling as Beijing was infuriated by North Korea's nuclear weapons test and missile launches earlier in 2016. However, unlike in 1980, China did not send any delegation to the Congress, apparently because no invitation was sent. From China's perspective, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea run risks of an accident as well as providing an excuse for the US to bolster its military presence on the Korean peninsula, which Beijing perceives as a part of a larger policy of 'containment'. China is already worried about the US plans to deploy a missile defence system in South Korea. It is unfortunate that Kim in his address did not convey any indication seeking rapprochement with Beijing. That would have surely disappointed Beijing.

Beijing seems to be using both carrot and stick on North Korea. Even while sending a



congratulatory message to Kim, President Xi Jinping made it clear that China would "absolutely not permit war or chaos on the peninsula. This situation would not benefit anyone." If one analyses Chinese strategic preferences, this may be interpreted that Beijing would press Pyongyang to moderate its behaviour while promising to reward if the North complies and then ease some of North Korea's most difficult economic strains. That seems to be exactly Pyongyang's strategy - to validate its strategy of increasing pressure to extort rewards for stopping. Using provocations to survive is now a well known strategy and Kim Jong-un is shrewd at that using it.

The only man through whom Beijing expected to have some say in the North Korean affairs was Jang Sung-taek, Kim's powerful uncle who was purged and executed in 2014. Beijing hoped it was through Jang that some market reforms could be introduced in North Korea. Jang's execution was a setback for Beijing. Beijing sees some hope in dealing with Choe Ryong-hae, who attended the military parade in Beijing in September 2015 marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and was elevated to serve on the standing committee of the party's politburo at the Congress. But if Choe aspires to be too powerful, there is no guarantee that he would not have the same fate as Jang.

North Korea's illegal activities

The living conditions of North Korean diplomats posted overseas say the sad story of the economic conditions back home. With scanty funds to run families and the embassies, the diplomats are forced to indulge in illegal activities by invoking diplomatic immunity to sustain their livings. Illegal smuggling of banned items and stocking alcohol beyond allowable limit for sale are some of the illegal activities some North Korean diplomats are indulging with. Besides the Pakistan-North Korea nexus, there are other activities in which some North Korean diplomats are involved in either in India or in other neighbouring countries that are unacceptable under any diplomatic rules. South Asia has emerged as a vulnerable area for such illegal activities. This is worrying.

There is a recent case of diplomatic consignment of liquor in the North Korean embassy in Karachi far in excess of allotted quota that came to the notice of Federal Bureau of Revenue. The consignment that arrived from Sharjah in early May 2016 declared to be containing 445 cartons of liquor but upon examination it was found to be containing 855 cartons and therefore blocked. The suspicion was raised as there was a sudden surge in diplomatic consignments of liquor imports on the eve of the festival season. If diplomats enjoying immunity indulge in such illegal activities, it speaks poorly of the relationship of the country having diplomatic ties with North Korea.

Similarly, in December 2015 a North Korean diplomat was expelled from South Africa for rhino horn trade. Demand for rhinoceros horn – made of keratin, which is also found in hair and nails – has boomed in Vietnam and China, where it is valued for its supposed medicinal properties. The diplomat was arrested in neighbouring Mozambique in May 2015 on charges related to rhino horn smuggling. The diplomat was arrested after 4.5 kg (10 pound) of rhino horn and \$99,300 in cash were found in his car having a South African diplomatic registration. South Africa's rhino poaching epidemic saw a record 1,215 rhino killed in 2014 for their horns, which is used as a traditional medicine in some parts of Asia.

It is believed that because of cash crunch back in North Korea, most embassies that North Korea maintains overseas receive little monetary or no support from Pyongyang, which is why officials posted overseas indulge in such illegal activities to sustain themselves. It is also believed that they are encouraged to do so by the North Korean leadership. If such stories are true, it is a sad reflection of the country and one will only take Kim's promise of economic development with a pinch of salt.

Conclusion

From what transpired at the Congress, it seems that there is no major change in North Korea's outlook towards the world; no major announcement spelling noticeable change in policy either internally or externally. Kim Jong-un appears unchallenged



in his leadership. There seem to be little hope that his attitude on nuclear weapons program shall be different hereafter. The US, on its side, is expected to remain closeted with its Asian allies and continue to monitor the situation on the Korean peninsula. But what kind of new pressure that the US and its allies would opt to put on Pyongyang with the view to bring out some change remains unclear. This is because it appears all possible means of pressure seems to have been exhausted and yet North Korea continues to pursue what it perceives is in its national interests. The international community shall be left with little more option to punish North Korea even if it conducts the fifth nuclear test, as is speculated.

The Northeast Asia region is becoming volatile as every day passes. If Donald Trump becomes President of the US, things might get messier if he really implements his often articulated policy to reduce the US role as the security provider for its two Asian allies – Japan and South Korea, leaving both to fend for their own security, which means revisiting their nuclear options. A heavily nuclearised Northeast Asia would be a dreading scenario that would be unwelcome to the world. Asia's economic future runs risk of seriously and adversely impacted from such a possible scenario, if it actually happens. Such a possibility imposes enormous responsibility to all possible stakeholders to engage and look for common grounds so that peace and stability on which economic prosperity rests is maintained.

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Complexities of Russia-NATO Relations: Growing Conflicts

Prof. R.G. Gidadhulhi

Russia-NATO relations during the last two and half decades have been saga of more conflict and less cooperation. An effort has been made in this paper to highlight and examine major issues and problems that prevailed between Russia and NATO.

The latest event of conflict between Russia and NATO was in April 2016. In fact it was a matter of great concern and significance that NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting was held on the 20th April 2016 after two years which had raised hopes and expectations of improvement in relations. The main agenda of the 20th April meeting of the diplomats was to reduce the risk of deadly military confrontations between NATO and Russia. But an incident involving a U.S. naval destroyer close to Russia's border in the Baltic Sea has not only dashed hope but aggravated the situation. As per reports on the 12th April 2016, two Russian Su-24 warplanes buzzed a U.S. guided-missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea. Subsequently, on the 14th April 2016 the U.S. military reported another close encounter between a Russian warplane and a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane over the Baltic Sea which was the second such incident within a week. The context of these incidents assumes significance since Russian warplanes buzzed the U.S. Navy ship that was conducting joint exercises with the Polish military in the Baltic Sea. Hence on the 14th April 2016 the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was candid in stating that the Russian pilots' actions were "provocative" and "dangerous." In fact he was not only very critical of Russia but even reminded that the U.S. warship was in international waters. Hence he reiterated and cautioned that under existing rules of engagement between Russia and NATO, such actions by the Russian navy planes "could have been

shot down." These incidents had created conflict and controversy on the eve of the proposed meeting.

Denying any violation on its part and not yielding to western pressure, Russian response has been equally strong resulting in the warning by the Russian military that it would respond with "all necessary measures" to any future incidents. In fact it is important to note that Russia's Defense Ministry defended the actions of those Russian pilots, contending that they had respected all safety rules. Hence Russia's pessimistic response was evident from the views expressed on the 27th April 2016 by the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu at a security conference in Moscow that the 20th April 2016 meeting of the NATO-Russia Council "did not inspire optimism". He even tried to put the blame squarely on the West and NATO. In view of these circumstances, sense of conflict has aggravated between Russia and NATO reducing the hopes of cooperation.

Considering the importance of these incidents, it is worthwhile to examine the context of the event. As per some reports by the Western media, Poland and other NATO members in the Baltic contended that they were worried about an increase in the Russian military presence in its Kaliningrad enclave in the Baltic region, where Russia has been positioning longer-range surface-to-air missiles during the last few decades. Hence some East European and Baltic States claim that they are the most affected by this event and hence on the 15th April 2016, the foreign minister of Poland Witold Waszczykowski made a statement at a conference in Bratislava criticizing "Russia's activity is a sort of existential threat because this activity can destroy countries." It is ironical that this was an expression of anti-Russia



feelings poured by the official of East European country which was once a part of not only the Socialist bloc but also of Warsaw Pact led by the former Soviet Union to counter NATO. It is a matter of fact that Russia has been objecting to the US proposal to install anti-missile defense equipments in Poland and Czech Republic to counter Russia. However, on this issue there has been a more moderate statement by the Czech Defense Minister Martin Stropnický who urged strengthening NATO cooperation but added that Russia "should not be isolated." At the same time Stropnický was critical of Russia which has been actively "testing the defensive capabilities of NATO in the Baltic region."

Cold War-Historical Background

Looking back into history, Super Power rivalry that prevailed for decades during the cold-war era based on ideology between the Capitalist World led by the USA and the Communist World led by the former Soviet Union ended and formal contacts and cooperation between Russia and NATO started in 1991, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1989 even prior to the Soviet breakup, Warsaw Pact led by Kremlin was dissolved and there were expectations by Russian leaders that NATO will follow suit since in principle there was no security threat and no ideological conflict that persisted for decades between the two Super Powers. But much against these hopes and expectations, NATO not only survived but expanded adding 12 new countries between 1999 and 2009. This was because in 1994 NATO evolved the concept known as 'Partnership for Peace' under which many Central, East European and Baltic states joined NATO even as Russia was not happy with this development and chose diplomatic policy of only 'Constructive Cooperation' with NATO. In 1996 Russia was critical for NATO's action in the conflict in Yugoslavia which led to its breakup. Notwithstanding this the decade of the nineties witnessed closer ties with Russia joining Partnership for Peace Program with NATO on 22nd June 1994 and both powers signed Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security at the NATO

summit held in Paris on 27th May 1997. A Joint Permanent Council was created, providing a forum for wide ranging consultations which played a positive role in improving relations between the two. This was of major global significance since a roadmap was laid based on 'lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on principles of democracy and cooperative security'. At the same time there was controversy among analysts including some Russians who argued that even as NATO became much weaker in terms of its military capacity it has become much more difficult to manage.

Russia and Neighborhood

It is worthwhile to examine Russia's relations with its neighbors and their impact on Russia-NATO relations. The Caucasian countries assume considerable significance for Russia. While Armenia has been a close ally of Russia, there are ups and downs in relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. For instance, Georgia assumed significance due to Colored Revolution, 5-day war in 2008 and subsequent recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia.

Notwithstanding these issues the present regime has been trying to improve relations with Russia which were strained a few years back. At the same time the Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirkashvili during his latest official visit on 25th April 2016 to Washington met the Vice President Joe Biden, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, and International Monetary Fund officials. He was candid in stating that Georgia would remain on a pro-Western path even as it restored some ties with Moscow since the future of his post-Soviet country rested with the European Union and NATO. In fact he even stated this policy has been based on the "very clear will of [the] Georgian people". Hence Russia has to be prepared and concerned with NATO coming closer to its border in the long run. During the last over two decades in their own interest the USA and West Europe have been keen to establish close ties with Georgia and these countries.



Armenia has been close and consistent in its relations with Russia.

So far as Azerbaijan is concerned in March 2016 a NATO delegation visited Baku and met Azerbaijan's defense minister Hasanov who has been keen to expand cooperation with NATO. On this issue Russia was not very much concerned since relations with Azerbaijan have been consistently close and in fact Azerbaijan has been spending a lot of money on buying weapons from Russia. Hence Russia has been aware that this visit was in line with national and security interest of Azerbaijan. In fact Azerbaijan has adopted a shrewd policy of close ties with Turkey as well with which military cooperation have been expanding during the last over two decades and a joint military industrial complex has been created and joint military exercises are held once every three months. At the same time the leaders of Azerbaijan have not set any goal of being a member of NATO. On the other hand, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine which have set themselves this goal have been facing problems allegedly caused by Russia for these countries and have not been admitted to NATO so far.

Ukraine

Ukraine has assumed great significance in Russia-NATO relations which have already come under cloud during the last about two decades on few issues such as impact of Orange Revolution, differences on pricing for oil and gas and transportation of oil and gas to West Europe by pipelines passing through Ukraine etc. Equally important has been pro-western governments that have come into power which have reduced importance of Russia in Ukraine's policy perspective and its sphere of influence. This has also resulted in reduction of trade and economic ties between Russia and Ukraine.

Moreover, multiple crisis conditions such as allegations by the West of Russia's forcible annexation of Crimea by deploying military forces in March 2014 and on-going conflict in eastern Ukraine by

separatists have been a turning point in Russia-NATO relations. This is evident from the fact that on the 1st of April 2014, there was a statement issued by NATO foreign ministers that announced it had "decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. NATO has strongly condemned Russia's actions and criticized that it was a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. Subsequently, in September 2014, the NATO-Ukraine Commission adopted a Joint Statement that "strongly condemned Russia's illegal and illegitimate self-declared "annexation" of Crimea. Further it was contended that Russia's action has caused deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law.

Not accepting any of these allegations, Russia's policy has been that annexation was legal on the basis of referendum. Moreover, Russia has consistently argued that conflict in eastern Ukraine is a part of civil war. At the same time to strengthen its hold on this region, Russian defense forces have deployed additional forces in Crimea as a part of beefing up its Black Sea Fleet. It has also redeployed nuclear capable Tupolev Tu-22M33. As a result there have been military encounters between Russia and the NATO countries to Cold War levels, with 40 dangerous or sensitive incidents recorded in the eight months of 2014.

Under East-West dilemma facing the country, the Ukrainian president Poroshenko preferred to join NATO as against the status of non-alignment policy pursued by earlier presidents. As per reports of 24th December 2014 the Ukrainian parliament 'Verkhovna Rada' adopted a law which allowed the country to become part of a military bloc. Being concerned about these developments, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov not only opposed such decision but threatened possible adverse consequences in its relations with Ukraine and prevailing cooperation with NATO. While this was a golden opportunity for NATO to come on the border of Russia, it made a diplomatic move stating that Ukraine had to comply



with few conditions such as settling its territorial disputes, conducting a thorough overhaul of its military and entire governance system before having a feasible chance of joining NATO. While complying with these conditions would take few years, Ukraine was offered the status of 'key ally of NATO'. At the same time NATO has also said that any meeting with Russia would have to address the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and separatists in eastern Ukraine, which has killed more than 9,000 people since April 2014. The West accuses Russia of supporting the pro-Russian rebels that has been denied by Moscow. The Western countries and NATO in particular demand Russia to comply with following conditions—implementation of ceasefire deal in Ukraine, known as 'Minsk-2; comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Since Russia under Putin's leadership is most unlikely to comply with any of these conditions, conflict will persist at least in the near future.

East Europe and Baltic

In 2008 partly in the aftermath of Russia-Georgia war of 2008 some East European states including Poland, Czech Republic were keen to have anti-missile NATO defense system on their territory for ensuring their security, while Russia was against NATO eastward expansion as it would threaten its own security. But from the perspective of the leaders of East European states, security situation was not totally normal. Hence in February 2010, Romania announced a deal with the USA for setting up an anti-missile defense system, which Russia interpreted as a threat to its national security. All these developments indicate persisting security related differences between Russia and east European states which were at one time close and part of military block. In this regard in 2009 Barack Obama cancelled the former decision of USA of installing

missile equipments in East Europe possibly hoping to improve ties with Russia whose then president Dmitri Medvedev was also reciprocating with his reset policy towards Washington.

It is interesting to note that even as many East European states are close to West European democratic political system and have close economic ties with the European Union (EU) and NATO, in Serbia there is a strong movement by a political group which is keen to have close relations with Russia. As reported in December 2015 this organization has announced the launch of an anti-NATO and anti-EU campaign and a return to Serbian nationalist ideology and the revival of the Radicals' original program, oriented around closer relations with Belgrade and Moscow. It also advocates the protection of Serbian national identity and language and Cyrillic script in Montenegro. This was highly exceptional among the European countries but welcomed by Russia.

During the last few years, Baltic region and Nordic region have assumed significance in Russia-NATO ties. Estonia which was a part of the former Soviet Union became a member of NATO in 2004 followed by other Baltic States namely Latvia and Lithuania. In April 2015 with growing tension in the Baltic region there was indication that these states could increase ties with NATO which Russia was highly concerned. It is important to note that both Finland, which borders Russia and Sweden are not members of NATO but have increased cooperation with the transatlantic alliance. From the perspective of leadership of Finland security situation in the region drastically changed after the crises in Georgia and Ukraine. With large Russian minorities living in the Baltic States, concerns had grown in the region about the risk of Russian intervention. In fact amid such concerns, Estonia had called for a NATO force to be stationed permanently in this Baltic country. In that context in an article on the 9th April 2015 in Norwegian daily Aftenposten, the Nordic defense ministers expressed their concern claiming that Russian leaders had shown they were ready to use



military means to achieve political goals. Hence under such prevailing circumstances, leaders of some European countries including Poland, Baltic States expressed their concern due to growing differences between nuclear powers of Russia and NATO. In fact even Norway's defense minister Ine Eriksen Soreide opined that Russia had "created uncertainty about its intentions".

Possibly to make positive response to support these leaders, the United States and NATO have proposed to recalibrate and increase their presence in East European countries and Baltic States in 2016. Thus U.S. administration has already announced that it would quadruple defense-related spending in Europe and would increase the number of combat brigades rotating Eastern Europe. In fact the latest incidents in the Baltic Sea involving a Russian plane flying close to US plane in April 2016 have been an added factor.

In this regard it is important to note that in the second week of February 2016 a western analyst Sam Jones in Munich stated that the Organization of Security Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) played positive role monitoring the compliance of NATO states and Russia with the collection of cold war era treaties and mechanisms that governed military bases, deployments and exercises in Europe. He mentioned that in 2015 Moscow unilaterally withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, one of the diplomatic arrangements that the organization had helped to implement, citing NATO provocations. On this issue Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's prime minister was candid in stating that the world had stumbled into a "New Cold War". Strongly supporting this view Dmitry Solovyov opined that while NATO has been accelerating its biggest military build-up in Eastern Europe since the Cold War, the Western alliance wants to talk to Moscow about improved military transparency under the pretext of avoiding misunderstandings, which is highly contradictory.

Geopolitics

From what has been stated above, it is worthwhile to make an overview of geopolitics of conflicts and cooperation in Russia-NATO relations. During the major period of the nineties, Boris Yeltsin's pro-West policy and dissolution of Warsaw Pact created an environment of co-operation in Russia-NATO relations. But hopes and expectation of Russian leaders that NATO would be dissolved remained a pipe-dream and expansionist policy of NATO led to disillusionment though not conflict in bilateral relations. In the first term of presidency from 1999-2003, Vladimir Putin actively pursued policy to develop cordial relationship with NATO and even proposed in 2001 policy for enhancing bilateral ties on 'Equal Footing'. Moreover, as a part of policy of continuity of cooperation, in 2002 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was set up. However, apart from security related aspects, on issues of Soft-Power there were differences in perceptions between Russia and West including NATO powers. This was possibly because as opined by some western analysts, 'Putinism' combined state capitalism and authoritarian nationalism and even Eurasianism. Hence from western perspective this was against western values of democracy, freedom, liberalism etc. Notwithstanding that there was some improvement in bilateral relations under the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev. In 2009-2011 he brought about some rapprochement and cooperation in Russia's relations with the West and NATO. This was also facilitated primarily by the positive reciprocity between the US president Barack Obama and Medvedev when 'Reset' policy prevailed in bilateral relations. This was evident from the fact that, as mentioned earlier, in September 2009 Obama gave up US policy decision of missile defense installation in Poland and Czech Republic that Russia had firmly objected. Further in March 2010 Russia and USA concluded new 'START' treaty subsequent to which Russia cancelled sale of air defense installations to Iran. In response Russia extended total support to the USA in the aftermath of 9/11 attack and 'Global war on Terrorism'. This helped Russia not only to avoid isolation but also



enhanced cooperation with NATO. It is important that NRC meetings were resumed coinciding the 60th anniversary of NATO which were stalled after Russia-Georgia war in 2008. In response Russia reciprocated transit of military hardware of USA to Afghanistan. However, as opined by some analysts, 'Reset policy' had mixed reactions among some European states. For instance Poland, Baltic States were not in favor of this policy since from their perspective Russia remained a potential threat to their independence. On the contrary, West European countries namely Germany and France had been supportive of improved relations between Russia and NATO.

Possibly being disillusioned and discouraged by lack of positive response from the West to Russia's policy initiatives of cooperation including proposal of 'Equal Footing', assertive Vladimir Putin decided to bring about changes in Russia's policies towards the West. This is evident from the major shift in Russia-NATO relations during the last few years. For instance, Vladimir Putin nullified a 2011 order that created an interagency working group inside Kremlin that focused on fostering missile defense collaboration with NATO. He also revoked in April 2012 presidential decree that created a special envoy for missile shield discussion with NATO held by deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin. Moreover, in 2013 Putin deepened air defense cooperation with Belarus and Kazakhstan by sending additional S-300 missile defense systems to develop countermeasures to evolving NATO missile shield. At the same time possibly to strengthen Russia's position, in October 2013 Vladimir Putin rescinded two government orders concerning Russia-NATO relations. Putin's shrewd political diplomacy is evident from the fact that in April 2014 when there was a change in the headship of NATO, Putin despite strained relations with the outgoing NATO head Anders Fogh Rasmussen, welcomed the selection of former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as its new head with whom he had "very good relations". At the same time he expressed his

frank opinion that it was up to the Western powers and NATO to improve ties with Russia.

At the same time most important development has been Putin's decision to strengthen Russia's military capability. On 26th December 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a New Military Doctrine. Prior to that, he had declared that Russia had to undertake military reforms in the security interest of the country. In fact this was the fourth such declaration on national security following the ones that were adopted in 1993, 2000 and 2010. The maincontents of Putin's Military Reforms were –Need for Russia to improve military capacity; Prevent NATO eastward expansion; Build up military forces near Russia's eastward border; Improve Russia's Information and Communication warfare; Fight against global terrorism. Hence the impact of this reform on Russia-NATO relations is important. On this issue Russian military expert Aleksandr Khramchikhin had been candid in replying to correspondent Nadezhda Kevorkova that Russia would not cooperate with anybody and that Russia's military reforms were always launched in connection with some possible events outside the country. At any rate Putin's military reform assumed geo-strategic significance in the context that Russia has been alleging that NATO alliance continued a 'Containment' policy towards Russia

Hence from Putin's perspective this was part of *tit-for-tat* actions that have been undertaken by NATO. Hence Putin approved a revised national military doctrine to enhance its military capabilities in Black Sea region and even Baltic Sea region claiming that it was in response to NATO's military buildup near the Russian borders as the top military threat. For instance, in early February 2015 NATO diplomats expressed concern over Russia's nuclear strategy. In response Russia, cited NATO's *de facto* breach of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In June 2015 during his official visit to Estonia, the US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared that the U.S. would deploy heavy weapons, including tanks, armoured vehicles and



artillery, in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. This policy decision was interpreted by Western commentators as marking the beginning of a reorientation of NATO's strategy. Reacting to this Russian Defense Ministry official condemned this as the most aggressive act by Washington since the Cold War. At the same time it is important to note that even as NATO suspended all military and civilian cooperation with Russia in the aftermath of Crimean crisis in 2014, NATO authorities took positive diplomatic decision of continuing political dialogue with Russia. Equally important has been that both agreed to cooperate in dealing with problems of global significance such as fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, issues relating to disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction.

A Russian military analyst remarked that in the last two years, there has been a total change in this part of the world and security treaties and mutual-trust measures that prevailed earlier have ceased to exist. Hence on 16th June 2015 Russian news agency quoted Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Meshkov who stated "none of the Russia-NATO programs that used to be at work, are functioning at a working level." In fact on several instances Russia-NATO relations are strained during the last few months. For instance, as reported by Russia analysts on 24th November 2015 tensions rose when Turkey shot down a Russian warplane. It was alleged by the West that it had violated Turkish airspace while on a mission in northwestern Syria. But Russian officials denied that the plane had entered Turkish airspace. Similarly, Iran being a close ally of Russia got commitment of shipment of S-300 missile and radar equipments in April 2017 after Putin lifted the suspension of military supplies, which was frozen in 2010. This has raised strong objection by the West including frank exchange of views in the UN Security Council. While the Western powers argue that this will upset regional balance of power, Russia supported Iran's contention that this military power was purely for defensive and deterrent purposes.

The western reaction to Russia's geopolitics is evident from the concern and policy priority of USA for this region. The US president Barack Obama while addressing European leaders on the 25th April 2016 urged them to ensure unity among the states of European Union (EU). He even contended that the Russian President Vladimir Putin was trying to undermine the unity of EU. Possibly this was in the context of prevailing view of Britain leaving the EU after June referendum. The US president was also perhaps concerned about the threat posed by terrorism, and an ongoing refugee crisis that have tested European unity. Equally significant was that he underlined that NATO had to bolster its "front-line allies in Poland, in Romania, and in the Baltic states" while also meeting "the threat of its southern flank". In view of these circumstances he urged members of the EU alliance to increase their defense capacities and contribute their full share to the alliance and not become complacent about its own defense. More importantly, the underlying geopolitical objective of Obama was to put pressure on Russia accusing it for crisis and instability prevailing in Ukraine and forcibly taking over of Crimea in 2014. In fact the USA and some Western countries are hell bent to punish Russia which has been reeling under economic sanctions by the West during the last about two years and declining oil prices, which have badly hit its economy very badly.

In the first week of May 2016 the U.S. Army General Curtis Scaparotti has been appointed as the new supreme commander of NATO who has stated on 4th May 2016 that his appointment has come at a time when the NATO alliance regards Moscow as a threat to stability over its actions in Ukraine and has largely given up on military or civilian cooperation with Russia. He has frankly stated that to strengthen NATO presence in the region he will urge Washington to strengthen defense capability and station a third permanent brigade of U.S. troops in Europe to bolster the two brigades presently deployed in Germany and Italy. As opined by a western correspondent, Scaparotti's most immediate challenge could be to lay down a clear



boundary beyond which NATO units will not tolerate mounting harassment by Russian forces. He was candid in stating "Even with the end of the Cold War, our NATO alliance remains vital as we face a new set of challenges" identifying one of them as "a resurgent Russia, striving to project itself as a world power." In fact Scaparotti has been highly critical of Russian warplanes routinely buzzing NATO warships in the Baltics and the Black Sea during the last over a year. What is alarming is the fact that both NATO and Russia have stepped up military exercises in response to the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, from the Western perspective the latest event of close flybys by Russian war planes have created growing concern for the West and that they could lead to a direct confrontation.

Russia's reaction and response to policy declaration by Scaparotti have been equally assertive. This is evident from the fact that on the 4th May 2016 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia will set up three new military divisions in the west and the south of the country by the end of 2016. This move was a response to what he called "the buildup of NATO forces in proximity to Russia's borders," as well as "intensified exercises of NATO countries." Hence there are possibilities

of more conflicts between Russia and NATO in the near future.

Conclusion.

From what has been stated above, following concluding remarks are made. Initiatives and policy decisions of Russia to dissolve Warsaw Pact, 'Constructive Cooperation', Founding Act on Mutual Relations and Reset-Policy played an important role for promoting cooperation between Russia and NATO. But pursuance of policy of Eastward expansion of NATO on misplaced perceptions of threats from Russia, refusal to accept Putin's proposal of 'Equal Footing' with NATO, problems arising out of Russia's relations with Georgia and Baltic states, impact of 'Colored Revolutions', allegation of annexation of Crimea by Moscow, persisting differences on Crimean issue and accusation for east Ukrainian crisis, economic sanctions to punish and weaken Russia have been responsible for ongoing conflicts between Russia and NATO. While there is urgent need for cooperation between Russia and the West to deal with problems growing terrorism in many parts of the world, drug-trafficking in the contemporary world, there are growing conflicts and complexities in Russia-NATO relations which are of global concern.

Forthcoming issues of World Focus: 2016 with Deadlines for Submission of Articles (Words: 5,000)

July	Ethics in the Contemporary World (10 th June)
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The Role of Military in Peace, Conflict Management and Democratization of Afghanistan

Prof. Prashant Amrutkar

Security, law and order are the primary duties of State. Army is an important and unavoidable characteristic of State, whether it is in past police State or in today's welfare State. Today in some area of the third world there are revolutions against the military government for the formation of democracy. So the management of military, role of military, military and civil society relations is the core of today's academic discourse.

The study of third world society is an important part of the international relations. Challenge of military government before democratic government is rising problem in the third world countries. So the role of military is going adverse for democratization in the third world. But in country like Afghanistan the military is playing a pivotal role for the democratization in the society.

From October 2001, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is conducting security and stability operation across Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Meanwhile democratization process is going on. Afghanistan witnessed the formation of government according to the people's will—the birth of democracy in Afghanistan. Presidential elections occurred and a new constitution was ratified. A law guaranteeing freedom of press was passed. Today, there are more than 83 registered political parties.

Democracies normally include contested elections, a free press, and the separation of powers. Although these characteristics have been identified as vital features of a democracy, emerging democracies also need to address serious social and economic injustices that threaten democratic consolidation. Afghanistan

is a case in point in this regard. As a burgeoning democracy directly influenced by U.S.-led nation-building efforts, Afghanistan presents a unique and challenging case for democratization.

In this paper we are going to find some answers of questions like, Can democracy be imposed by force or through military occupation? Is it possible for the United States to promote democracy in Afghanistan? At the end of the paper we are trying to suggest some suggestions for better democratization process in Afghanistan.

The wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed, but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.

- President John F. Kennedy, University of California at Berkeley Address, March 23, 1962

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has launched military operations against Afghanistan. The name of this operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, implies that at least part of the mission will be devoted to promoting democracy in this country. Proponents of exporting freedom extol the virtues of such policies, pointing to success stories in Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as more recent cases, such as Panama after 1989. Critics assail America's track record of using military force to promote democratization, citing failures in Somalia and Haiti, as well as incomplete efforts such as Bosnia. The question before us is whether Afghanistan will look more like the former group, or begin to resemble the latter group.

The US - led war on terror in Afghanistan
The US and UK officially launched the "war on terror" on October 7, 2001 in Afghanistan. Since the war in Afghanistan commenced, it has been subject



to numerous challenges. A war that achieved one of its primary goals – the fall of the Taliban - just merely a month after its initiation has turned into a nine-year long struggle for military, political and social victory. Although international security concerns were the initial reason for the invasion of Afghanistan, legal and political documents have increasingly defined the need for governance and development as equally important to military success. Not only have security, governance and development been qualified as the three main objectives in Afghanistan, they are also perceived as being interlinked.¹

NATO's main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominantly through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.

Since NATO took command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan's whole territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to around 50,000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 28 NATO members.

ISAF is a key component of the international community's engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability and creating the conditions for reconstruction and development.

Security: In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF's main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.

Supporting the Afghan National Army: In addition, ISAF is helping to bring the Afghan National Army (ANA) up to operating capability in support of the United States which is sponsoring the overall ANA

training and equipping programme through its Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This is the process of building 'Democratic National security Institutions' in post-conflict Afghanistan.

Supporting the Afghan National Police: It is providing support to the Afghan National Police (ANP) within means and capabilities is one of ISAF's key supporting tasks. In this sphere, ISAF works in coordination with and in support of the United States as well as the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) which was launched in June 2007.

The Afghan Compact, a five-year plan between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community, established a framework for security sector reform and included the overall goals for and objectives for the ANP. This agreement established the original goal to develop a 62,000 professional police service committed to the rule of law. This was later modified by the 'Afghan National Development Strategy' (ANDS) and subsequent decisions made by the Government of Afghanistan which set the new goal at 82,000 police officers.

Disarming illegally armed groups (DIAG): ISAF is collecting illegal weapons, ordnance and ammunitions from armed groups and individual persons. Weapons are then catalogued and safely destroyed so they no longer represent a threat to the local population, Afghan National Security Forces or ISAF personnel.

Providing post-operation assistance: An ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF) has been established since 2006 to provide quick humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of significant ISAF military operations.

Governance: ISAF, through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS), is helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. PRTs' principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the



growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.

Counter-narcotics: In May 2003, the Afghan government adopted a 'National Drug Control Strategy' aimed at reducing the production of illicit drugs by 70 per cent by 2007 and at eliminating all productions by 2012. A Counter-Narcotics Directorate is embedded in the Interior Ministry and a fully-fledged counter-narcotics minister is presently one of the central actors of the Afghan Government. ISAF supports counter narcotics efforts by sharing information, conducting an efficient public information campaign, and providing in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces' counter-narcotics operations. ISAF also assists the training of Afghan National Security Forces in counter-narcotics related activities. In recent assessments by the United Nations and NATO's own military commanders, there is also a growing nexus between the narcotics industry and the insurgency in some parts of the country.²

Process of democratization in the Third World
With the end of the Cold War came a period of massive and profound optimism concerning the prospects for democracy in the Third World. As we approach the end of the twentieth century things look less bright. Are we in the early stages of a comprehensive setback for democracy in the Third World? What has been the role of Western countries in the processes of political transition?³ Many Third World countries have experienced the opening stages of a transition process to democracy. A large number of countries are stuck in the initial phases of a democratic transition. The 1997 Freedom House survey of independent countries with more than one million inhabitants identified forty-nine countries as free. When countries with fewer than one million inhabitants were included (bringing the total number of States in the world to 191) the survey classified seventy-nine countries as free, fifty-nine as partly free, and another fifty-three as not free.⁴

The question whether such numbers constitute great democratic progress is a bit like the question whether the glass is half full or half empty. Yes, "the glass is half full": there has been democratic progress in the past two decades. The democratic transitions began in Southern Europe in the 1970s; they came to

include Latin America in the early 1980s and then Eastern Europe, Africa, as well as parts of Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are more countries today than ever before with some measure of democracy. While the number of 'electoral democracies' has increased steadily, the number of more developed 'liberal democracies' has remained almost unchanged. There were 76 'liberal democracies' in 1991 and 79 in 1996. In other words, elections are held in many countries, but the process of democratization is not moving forward.⁵

Countries with developing economies are referred as third world countries and Afghanistan is one such nation. It is an impoverished country, one of the world's poorest and least developed. In 2010, 40% of Afghans live below the poverty line. Two-thirds of the population lives on fewer than 2 US dollars a day. So the process of democratization in Afghanistan is very important for the governance, stability and development like any other third world country.⁶

The Role of Outsiders in the Process of Democratization of Afghanistan

There are two principal views on the role of outsiders in processes of democratization in the Third World. The first is that democracy is basically a domestic affair and thus there is very little that outsiders can do about it, one way or the other. The second view is that most weak Third World countries are the puppets of stronger States in the North; the strong therefore heavily influence, not only the economic and social but also the political structures and processes of the weak.⁷

The major hurdle in the process of democratization in the third world is the military rule. From last few months the revolution has been started against the military rule and for the formation of democratic government in some third world countries. In this manner the military is the basic opponent in the democratization process in the third world. But in Afghanistan there is only case in the world where Military is trying to establish and regularize the process of democratization through force.

The first time in history, Afghanistan witnessed the formation of government according to the people's will—the birth of democracy in



Afghanistan. The parliamentary elections in Afghanistan were the final event of the internationally-sponsored Bonn Accords of December 2001. Hamid Karzai was selected as temporary president from 2001-2004. During the past six years (2005 to 2011) Afghanistan has made significant progress toward democracy while reconstructing the country's political, social, and security institutions. These include adopting an enlightened constitution (January 2004), this is country's sixth written constitution- was approved by consensus rather than through a vote. Holding a successful presidential election (first election on October 2004 and again second election in August 2009), parliamentary elections (September 2005 and second time in 2010). A law guaranteeing freedom of press was passed, the only one of its kind in the region. While creating a national army and a national police force, dismantling major factional militia units, building a national economy from ground zero, expanding and improving a formal education system, and improving the status and future of Afghan women. He claims that Afghanistan has moved forward towards a democratic government. Now there is a government, a parliament, a judiciary, and freedoms. The constitution as a guarantor of democracy that recognizes elections, free speech and free press, women's rights, and political pluralism. Today, there are more than 83 registered political parties. Today, in Afghanistan, girls have the opportunity to go to school and universities and play a significant role in society.⁸ However, there are still many stages the government should pass through before the democratic system is fully operative, before Afghanistan can be called a liberal democratic State.⁹

Starting conditions favored democratic outcomes:

For the successful establishment of democracy there are some prior conditions required.

1. Economic development - Afghanistan never achieved economic development. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries. The 1979 Soviet invasion and ensuing civil war destroyed much of the country's limited infrastructure and disrupted normal patterns of economic activity. Many years of war and political instability left the country dependent on foreign aid.

2. Ethnic homogeneity - Afghanistan is divided into different ethnic groups as well as that of tribes and sub tribes. The constitution lists 14 major ethnic groups. Thirty-two languages, Sunni Hanafi Muslims comprise roughly 85%, and Shias 15% of the population.

3. Free institutions - Democratic theory suggests that ethnic homogeneity is an important factor in the democratization process. Przeworski points: "Democratization is often considered inherently more difficult in multinational State." Robert Dahl says: "Distinctive cultures are often formed around differences in language, religion, race, ethnic identity, region, and sometimes ideology. Members share a common identity and emotional ties; they sharply distinguish 'us' from 'them'.¹⁰ But it is not been happened in Afghanistan.

4. Organized strong bureaucracy and State institutions - Democratization processes is possible only with organized strong bureaucracy and State institutions, effective police force and judiciary. When the war was over, these institutions were ready for mobilization. Afghanistan in the course of its history was one of the world's weakest States, even before the wars that start in 1978. Some people believe that Afghanistan is not a nation, but loose a collection of tribe. Afghanistan never formed a strong and stable central government; the country's traditional tribal leaders enjoy more support than government.¹¹

5. Prior experience with democracy - Democratic theories suggest that the countries that have had the most success in democratizing are the countries that have had some prior experience with democracy. But Afghanistan never ever has an experience democracy.

According to all above parameters the situation of Afghanistan is not positive for smooth democratic functioning.

The Third Wave of Democratization

According to Huntington, the rise of the Third Wave of democratization is derived from five main causative factors:

1. Loss of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes due to increased popular expectation of periodic and competitive election, and/or poor economic performance or military failure.
2. Growth in global economic output helped modernize many less developed economies. Economic



modernization, which includes structural changes like increased rates of urbanization, education, and a rising middle class, unleashes a constellation of social forces with the organizational capacity and education to press for democratic governance.

3. Changes in the Catholic Church brought about by Vatican II emphasized individual rights and opposition to authoritarian rule. This shift in world view was especially important for the Catholic countries of the Mediterranean and Latin America, as well as the Philippines, Poland and Hungary.

4. Regional Contingency Factor (Snowball effect.), also known as demonstration effects, happens when success of democracy in one country causes other countries to democratize.

5. External factors, most notably the efforts to spread democracy by the European Union and the United States.¹²

Only last factor is working positively in Afghanistan that is US efforts (External factors) to democratization of Afghanistan which is not sufficient for the success of this mission.

Is Democratization of Afghanistan in a real sense?

The security situation in Afghanistan could have been stabilized; perhaps democratization would then have had a better chance to take root. More important, though, the American-led democratization effort in Afghanistan appears to have been flawed from the beginning. In Afghanistan the United States set up a centralized presidential system with a weak parliament unable to check the president, who appoints all the provincial governors. Further, the Bush administration did not oversee a process allowing Afghans to freely choose their first post-Taliban president, but selected Hamid Karzai for this position and pushed the Afghans into ratifying this choice.

The democratization of Afghanistan is conditioned by two factors: the internal factor and the external. The internal factor was the socioeconomic conditions and other internal qualifications. The external factor was the United States military intervention, yet the internal factor or favorable socioeconomic conditions do not exist in Afghanistan to help the country in its leap to the direction of democratic transition. Cases of occupation

with similar socioeconomic condition to Afghanistan, suggest pessimism about democratization by force.¹³

Critique of democratization process of Afghanistan

The process of democratization of Afghanistan by US military operation is a partly successful activity. There are so many hurdles, challenges and limitations in this process.

1. **Challenge of Pakistan** - Islamabad has continued to support the Afghan Taliban, which it sees as an ally opposing the rise of Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, then, has facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban, allowing them, among other things, to disrupt voting in southern Afghanistan, both in the 2009 presidential and the 2010 parliamentary elections. But United States has no option than taking support from Pakistan.¹⁴

2. **Socioeconomic conditions** - The sustainability of democracy extends beyond the ability of the US military forces because it is the result of positive socioeconomic conditions within the country and willingness of major international actors that involved in the specific case.¹⁵

3. **Demilitarization** - Democratic reforms need security of the territory. Security cannot be established without demilitarization of different groups. But demilitarization is not an easy job in a heavily armed society such as Afghanistan where thousand of tons of weapons were sent from neighboring countries to be distributed throughout the country in the course of last twenty five years.

4. **A doubtful objective of United States** - The end of the Cold War has strengthened a trend already underway in US policy for some years: to emphasize the support for democratization and human rights. After the end of cold war it is merely a fresh tactic employed by imperialist forces like US whose goals remain unchanged: subordination and control of the Third World.¹⁶

5. **United States itself reasons of Afghanistan problem** - Past U.S. government's actions are in no small part responsible for the current situation in Afghanistan. As the Economist magazine noted soon after September 11, "[U.S.] policies in Afghanistan a decade and more ago helped to create both Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that shelters him." An examination of this history will reveal the extent to which U.S. foreign policy is based



on hypocrisy, realpolitik, and the short-term pursuit of narrow interests.¹⁷

Conclusion

Despite all the difficulties of the past 24 years, where Afghans solved their problem with force and guns, this time - with the help of the international community.

The recent official birth of democracy in Afghanistan has introduced a few questions regarding the democratic government of Afghanistan and the way in which government has handled the democratization process with the help of US military forces.

The push for democracy in Afghanistan, although often problematic, has experienced some degrees of success. Successful elections, one hallmark of democracy, produced a new Afghan president and cabinet. After the meeting of the Loya Jirga, a nation-wide grand council, the new Afghan Constitution was ratified. Following The Bonn Agreement, the drive for a newly elected government, a ratified Constitution, and the establishment of the rule of law has formed the basis for the development of Afghan democracy. These efforts have been the focal point of Afghan rebuilding efforts in the hopes of founding a democratic Afghan State.

Afghanistan has been ruled by warlords since the era of Taliban rule, and to an extent still is. Informal rule combined with the heroin trade and severe gender inequalities have created a frail foundation on which to promote democratic reforms. Although international human rights, judicial and national assembly commissions have presented significant mandates for change, all are with problematic results.

In order for democracy to take hold in Afghanistan, the fruits of warlord economy—opium production, smuggling, and illicit taxation of trade—must be wrested away from regional power brokers and replaced with socially stable economic incentives. Additionally, the centralized government in Kabul must gain the trust and loyalty of the regional tribal commanders. The future of Afghanistan lies in the ability of its people to forge a united political

community that resolves disputes in the manner of a democratic nation.

As a nation struggling to establish a centralized and legitimate democratic government, Afghanistan faces myriad developmental barriers to democratic consolidation. I can highlights the following specific problems: overcoming well-established political and cultural norms; addressing a government infrastructure ill-equipped to accommodate elements of democracy; human rights and gender issues as basic features of democracy; warlordism across the region; and the illicit drug economy.¹⁸

After decades of atmosphere of war, Afghanistan's political reconstruction faces a daunting number of hurdles. Institutions must be developed at the national, regional and local levels, and a means for interface among these institutions, and between them and an array of international actors, must be created. As each institution defines and develops its role, it will rely on and/or conflict with other institutions at different levels. Establishing a healthy political and societal environment, critical to the success of Afghanistan's new institutions will require development of organizational infrastructure and power sharing at all levels. Long-term integration needs to be taken into account along with short-term needs. Instability also allows fluidity, and institutions supported by resources now will become embedded in a new political culture.

With all these and other possibilities, the role of military is very much important in Afghanistan. But not only military can serve as whole and sole without supporting the internal positive atmosphere which is supporting democratization process.

Suggestions:

For the proper democratization in Afghanistan we can suggest some suggestions which may follow for better result.

1. There is a need to engage regional powers particularly Iran, India, China, Russia and Pakistan in stabilization processes in Afghanistan.
2. There is also an urgent need to build on Afghan government capacities with greater decentralization,



institution building and participation of local Afghans in any stabilization programs.

3. The need of socializing members of the new Afghani armed forces to the professional responsibilities related to military service in democratic States.

4. Requires the civilian control on the military and civil-military relations based on democratic values in State building in post-conflict Afghanistan.

5. If the U.S. really wants to develop democracy and stability in Afghanistan, it must abandon its policy of working with the warlords and factional leaders of the Northern Alliance.

The United States should pursue a political, rather than military, solution to the conflict in Afghanistan

that includes a cease-fire and negotiations with the insurgents.

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IRAN VISIT

Excerpts of Remarks by PM Narendra Modi at Chabahar Connectivity event

23 May, 2016

Today, we are all witnessing creation of history. Not just for the people of our three countries, but for the entire region. To build bonds of connectivity is the most basic of human urges. Today, we seek to fulfil it. The agenda for economic engagement is a clear priority for us. We stand together in unity of our purpose. To carve out new routes of peace, and prosperity is our common goal. We want to link with the world. But, better connectivity among ourselves is also our priority. It is indeed a new dawn for the region.

Iran, Afghanistan and India are deeply aware of the richness and reality of our ancient links. Through centuries, art and culture, ideas and knowledge, language and traditions have formed a common bond between us. Even through turmoil of history, our societies never lost touch with each other. Today, we meet to write new chapters in our engagement.

The Agreement on the establishment of a Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor signed just a while ago can alter the course of history of this region. It is a new foundation of convergence between our three nations. The corridor would spur unhindered flow of commerce throughout the region. Inflow of capital and technology could lead to new industrial infrastructure in Chabahar. This would include gas based fertilizer plants, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals and IT. The key arteries of the corridor would pass through the Chabahar port of Iran. Its very location, on the mouth of Gulf of Oman, is of great strategic significance. Afghanistan will get an assured, effective, and a more friendly route to trade with the rest of the world. The arc of economic benefit from this agreement would extend beyond our three nations. Its reach could extend to the depths of the Central Asian countries. When linked with the International North South Transport Corridor, it would touch South Asia at one end and Europe at another. And, studies show that as compared to the traditional sea routes, it could bring down the cost and time of the cargo trade to Europe by about 50%. Over time, we could even look to connect it with the strong sea and land based routes that India has developed with the Indian Ocean Region and South East Asia.

The world of 21st century offers unique opportunities. But, it also poses its own set of challenges. Today, the nature of global engagement requires an attitude more suitable to this century, not the mindset of the century gone by. Today, the watch-words of international treaties must not suspicion; cooperation not dominance; inclusivity not exclusion. This is also the guiding philosophy and driving spirit of the Chabahar Agreement. This will be a corridor of peace and prosperity for our peoples. Motives of economic growth, and empowerment would drive it. It will build our security without making others vulnerable. It would break barriers among our nations and encourage new benchmarks of people-to-people contacts. And, help us to eventually build what we all desire and deserve - a friendly and healthy neighbourhood.

The world around us is changing in fundamental ways. And, the lack of comprehensive connectivity is not the only challenge that limits our national growth. Political turmoil and undercurrents of economic stress continue to spread in West Asia. In the Indo-Pacific, rise a mix of political competition and economic opportunities is putting pressure on the existing Asian order. Global economy is yet to fully come out of uncertainty and weakness. Our present growth and future prosperity is under threat from the spread of radical ideas and physical terror. Amidst this landscape, our three countries are blessed with the most potent resource—our youth. Our three nations are estimated to have more than 60 percent of their population under 30 years of age. They are an asset in our national and regional development. We want them to walk the road to knowledge and skills; industry and enterprise. And, not fall victim to the path of guns and violence. I am confident that economic fruits of the Chabahar Agreement will expand trade, attract investment, build infrastructure, develop industry and create jobs for our youth. The Agreement will strengthen our ability to stand in mutual support against those whose only motto is to maim and kill the innocents. Its success will be a positive vote for peace and stability in the region.

It is my strong belief that trade and transit routes should only be a starting point of our journey to greater connectivity. In my vision, the full spectrum of connectivity agenda between Iran, Afghanistan and India should span:

- from culture to commerce;
 - from traditions to technology;
 - from investments to IT;
 - from services to strategy; and
 - from people to politics.
- In a way, it is a pledge to:
- Realize the imperative of better connectivity;
 - Establish peace and create stability;
 - Build economic prosperity and engineer new trade ties;
 - Curb radicalism and remove shadows of terror; and
 - Break barriers and spread sweetness of familiarity among our people.
- History will look back at this effort with nothing but approval and admiration.

(http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/remarks-by-pm-at-chabahar-connectivity-event/?comment=disabled)

Global Turmoil- The Bubble can Burst Beyond Borders

Prof. Rajesh Dogra

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze policy guidelines to deal with the menace of international terrorism and its impact on humanity. The challenges that such a situation creates for the whole world should be identified. This is sought to be worked upon by highlighting the various challenges that International terrorism has against the whole world community.

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behaviour since the dawn of recorded history. It is deeply rooted in human experience. It is an affront to civilization. It has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people. It is condemned internationally as an illegal use of force and an illegitimate expression of political will. Terrorists misguided by fundamentalists to adopt this path of violence. Their undying hatred and pursuit of paradise has made this earth a hell. Far from being a new phenomenon, terror has been employed a variety of actors for a very long time.

Terror is a natural phenomenon; terrorism is the conscious exploitation of it. Terrorism is coercive, designed to manipulate the will of its victims and its larger audience. In psychological terms, 'terror', can be seen as a strongly felt emotional reaction to certain act of violence, a special type of extreme fear or profound anxiety paralysing a person. It is a state of intense fear induced by the systematic threat of imprisonment, mutilation or death. It is intensified when the victim is helpless in the hands of another human being. Everyone is afraid of being hurt or killed.

The terrorist manipulates persons and governments by making the threat of bodily harm manifest. The terrorist threatens the most fundamental human drive that is the prime will to survive intact. A person strips from the defences of human courage that most important element of anti-fear, the real or

supposed ability to fight back or defend one's person. Because the terrorist's victims are unarmed, non-combatant, and random and they are totally helpless, the victim's fear be experienced by all observers of the victim's plight, who are equally vulnerable and who desire to live their lives unmolested.

International Terrorism

International terrorism is any act of terror-violence containing an international element e.g. the perpetrator may be from one state while the victim belongs to another state or the terrorist may in a jurisdiction foreign to both. It implies that International Terrorism occurs when the interest of more than one state is affected. It is and has always been a part of international life, raising its head in diver's socio-political contexts. Trans-border terrorism has always existed as an instrument of state policy, whether employed to further the interests of the government of the day within a state's polity, or to weaken another state's policy across the border. It has come to occupy the centre-stage of international relations today.

International terrorism is terrorism that spills over onto the world's stage. It is in many ways a reflection of global politics. Targets are selected because of their value as symbols of international interests. The twentieth century saw the rise of modern international terrorism. It is not a new phenomenon; in one form or another it pervades in recorded history yet each time it appears, still very complex, it looms as a new menace. It is a cancer of the modern world, a growing threat to the maintenance of an orderly society and a scourge which undermines development, economic and political stability and democratic institutions.

Cyber Terrorism

Terrorism's younger relative, cyber terrorism, came out in the 20th century, with the mass popularization of computers and especially internet. Cyber terrorism



could be any kind of terrorism activity that is created or assisted with the usage of computer, it could also be any malicious attempt against a computer or a computer network. Probably the most popular example of cyber terrorism is the usage of computer viruses. The computer viruses are so common now a days, most of the time they are taken as something usual, something we just have to live with. It can be defined as the use of information technology by terrorist groups and individuals to further their agenda. This can include use of information technology to organize and execute attacks against networks, computer systems and telecommunications infrastructures, or for exchanging information or making threats electronically. Examples are hacking into computer systems, introducing viruses to vulnerable networks, web site defacing, denial-of-service attacks, or terroristic threats made via electronic communication.

Nuclear Terrorism

The only certain way for terrorist to achieve mass destruction would be to use a nuclear weapon. For a number of reasons, the preferred means of causing the desired level of fear in the target population in the future could be the employment of Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Weapons. These weapons are a means by which widespread radiological contamination is brought about without the actual use of nuclear explosion. Nuclear terrorism is an immediate challenge for the entire world. Nuclear terrorism denotes the use, or threat of the use, of nuclear weapons or radiological weapons in acts of terrorism, including attacks against facilities where radioactive materials are present.

Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism refers to the international release of toxic biological agents to harm and terrorize civilians, in the name of a political or other cause. The U.S. centre for disease control has classified the viruses, bacteria and toxins that could be used in an attack. Biological diseases are those most likely to do the most damage.

Islamic Militant groups and Biological Weapons
Real threat of biological weapons to India comes from those non state actors that are motivated by religion. Because religion acts as a legitimizing force by subordinating individual responsibility to divine will,

groups motivated by religious extremism experience fewer constraints with respect to the use of violence to inflict indiscriminate casualties on their perceived enemies. Numerous Islamic terrorist groups operating within India and in India's neighbourhood belong to this category.

Amongst these groups, Al Qaeda is the main international terrorist organization, in terms of its geographical presence, cadre strength, financial power, technological capabilities and a track record of committing the most lethal acts of terrorist violence. There are confirmed reports that Al-Qaeda has pursued the development of chemical and biological weapons since early 1990s. Al Qaeda's efforts to acquire not only biological weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction has been analyzed and documented by various researchers over the years. In 1998, Osama Bin Laden spoke of acquiring weapons of mass destruction being a "religious duty". During operations in Afghanistan, coalition forces came across at least six sites where suspected Al-Qaeda activities in chemical and biological weapons were in progress.

Biological weapons- a warfare weapon

One of the main reasons why biological weapons can act as weapons of choice for mass destruction for a state and non-state actor is the relative ease with which they can be produced. Technology and equipment which are required to produce a bio weapon is the same as used in various industries like pharmaceutical, healthcare, food processing and agriculture etc. International trade in such dual-use technologies is substantial, difficult to track, and hard to control. It is therefore necessary that prior consideration must be given to peacetime actions to disrupt or prevent the acquisition of dual-use materials by individuals, organizations, or states with known malicious intent so as to prevent them from developing acquiring biological weapons.

Ecoterrorism

Eco terrorism is a recently coined term describing violence in the interest of environment. Extremists sabotage property to inflict economic damage on industries or factories they see as harming animals or the nature environment. These have included fur



companies, logging companies and animal research laboratories.

Narcoterrorism

It has had several meanings since it coining in 1983 by Former President Belaunde Terry of Peru. It once denoted violence used by drug traffickers to influence governments or prevent government efforts to stop the drug trade and terrorist type attacks against nation's anti-narcotics police. In the last several years, narcoterrorism has been used to indicate situation in which terrorism group use drug trafficking to fund their other operations.

Religious terrorism

The actions performed by groups or individuals, the motivation of which is typically rooted in faith-based tenets. Terrorist acts throughout the centuries have been performed on religious grounds with the hope to either spread or enforce a system of belief, viewpoint or opinion. Religious terrorism does not itself necessarily define a specific religious standpoint of view, but instead usually defines an individual or a group view or interpretation of that belief system's teachings. Religious Terrorism consists of acts that terrify, the definition of which is provided by the witnesses - the ones terrified - and not by the party committing the act; accompanied by either a religious motivation, justification, organization, or worldview. Religion is sometimes used in combination with other factors, and sometimes as the primary motivation. Religious Terrorism is intimately connected to current forces of geopolitics.

Anarchy terrorism

From the 1870s until about 1920, anarchist terrorism was a major global phenomenon. Revolutionaries seeking to overthrow established governments launched a wave of bombings and assassinated a series of heads of state; one such victim was President William McKinley, killed in 1901 by a young Hungarian refugee influenced by anarchist sentiments. Some experts see signs of a new interest in anarchist violence arising out of the recent wave of protests against globalization.

Left-wing terrorism

Left-wing type of terrorism is a set of tactics directed at the overthrow of capitalist governments and their

replacement with Marxist-Leninist or socialist regimes. Left-wing terrorists view the governments they oppose as authoritarian, exploitative and corrupt, and emphasize idealism, pacifism and anti-imperialism. Marxist and other communist and socialist thought heavily influence their ideology. Narodnaya Volya, a 19th century terrorist group that killed Czar Alexander II of Russia in 1881, and developed the concept of propaganda by the deed is a major influence.

Right-wing terrorism

Right wing terrorism draws its inspiration from a variety of ideologies and beliefs, including neofascism, neo-Nazism, racism and opposition to foreigners and immigration. Incidents of this type of terrorism have been sporadic with little or no international cooperation. Their actions are generally poorly coordinated and there are few identifiable organizations. Modern right wing terrorism began to appear in Western Europe in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

Global terrorism:

Referring to the vast worldwide communications facility like internet and mass media facilitated by a phenomenon called Globalization, international terrorism now is turning to the global terrorism. Global terrorism not only has the international nature, but also can be defined as a phenomenon that involved whole the Globe atmosphere by its threat and universal actions. Obviously, the best and the only good example for this phenomenon is Al-Qaeda.

Global terrorism is a new phenomenon that emerged with emergence of "Al Qaeda". This type of terrorism by using scientific and technological developments which caused integration of the world in all the economic, social, cultural and political fields; so that it has created the international community and in the words of "McLuhan", it has created global village. It can take advantage of the new conditions and by doing lethal operations affect the whole world at once.

Technology and Terrorism

Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (NBC) have three dreadful characteristics. "The first characteristic of them is serious deadliness. To the extent that any of such weapons can kill tens of thousands of people. The second characteristic is their



portability. Therefore, the use of them against civilians and unprepared military forces are easy. The third characteristic is their availability; meaning that despite widespread precautions, these weapons may be given to potential aggressors. Existence of these three characteristics in NBC weapons has made them the most dangerous problem for countries' long-term security." Moreover, with the development of science and information technology and industry, governments' power of hidden control (latent violence) has increased. This will cause domestic or international enemies of governments have no alternative but to carry out unconventional attacks, including terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Possibility of more groups' access to these weapons is increasing and nature of public and private agents is changing in a way that clearly shows an increase in attacks by weapons of mass destruction.

Motive behind Terrorism

It is said that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. A person may be called a terrorist by one system and a freedom fighter by another at the same time. Yet there are differences between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. A terrorist is a person who indulges in criminal acts regardless of territorial limitations, innocent bystanders and neutral countries for his political and ideological motives. Terrorists whether organized or unrecognized, do not recognize legal order and public support. A freedom fighter on the other hand fights against the regime or government which has made him a victim and which is responsible for his miserable life and suffering.

Impact of terrorism

The impact of terrorism varies considerably from injuries and loss of life, to property damage and disruption in services such as electricity, power supply, public transportation and communications. Terrorism has impact on a country's economy, impact on foreign direct investments, impact on saving and consumptions, impact on investment, impact on stock markets, impact on foreign trade, impact on national income and growth, impact on commercial real estate, impact on children, impact on society and impact on politics. It has affected each and every aspect of human life. Long term consequences involve costly environments clean-up and prolonged public anxiety.

Genesis of Terrorism

Terrorism has been a part of human history since the beginning of time. Though its objectives have always been the same, to use terror in pursuing political or social agendas, but its power has never been as frighteningly high as it is now. Certain characteristics-like freedom of intention, divergence of opinions, varying aspirations, antagonistic thinking, manifestation of conflict behaviours and diversity in mutual interactions- are ingrained in human nature. And human life is also full of endless chain of events, contingencies and incidences. So the stress situations of human beings serve a decisive factor when such feelings burst into violent forms due to prolong tolerance of unfavourable situation, explaining the phenomenon of terrorism. As the later manifests, it infringes on different sets of human rights, social, ideological, intellectual, educational and financial.

The Real Context of Terrorism

When a plane is destroyed by a bomb, it is frequently called terrorism, but when military forces shoot down a civilian aircraft, it can be deemed as an unfortunate mistake. The United States may launch missiles at a suspected terrorist base and claim it is defending national interests yet it may condemn another country for doing the same thing in another part of the world. Dual standards and contradictions lead to confusions anytime the term terrorism is employed.

Religion and Terrorism

Religion plays an important role in framing bent of mind of people. It is a vital force in the twenty first century, both at the individual and community levels, needs to be taken into account in the formulation of a public policy of harmony. The different religious should be regarded as comrades in a joint enterprise in facing the common problems of peaceful coexistence of the peoples, international welfare, justice, racial equality and political independence of all peoples. Religion is a potent force. As an agent for the generation of peace and happiness, it generates goodwill among people, and helps them to lead a life of

Poverty and Terrorism

Poverty is another factor for increasing the rate of terrorism. When the economic condition of poor people deteriorates, this way affects their ability to fulfil both biological needs and the basic psychological needs.



The poor may feel less secure, less good about themselves, less effective, less able to control their lives, and so on. They may lead people to turn to ideologies, visions of better life that help them deal with the psychological impact of their experience. These ideologies may be nationalistic, religious, or something else. In addition to providing hope for a better future, they can give followers an understanding of the world and a sense of personal significance. But they also identify enemies of the ideology and as a result have an important role in mass killing and genocide, as well as a powerful role in terrorism whether it is terrorism of Palestinians, Osama bin Laden and his supporters, Basques or other nationalist movements.

Shrink Zones of Chaos and Terrorist Sanctuary

Just as reducing the root causes of terrorism is a core objective, so government should change the conditions in areas that have offered terrorists safe havens and bases for transnational operations. Afghanistan, Sudan, Northern Iraq and Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon are leading examples. Government should prevent the emergence of new zones of chaos and sanctuary which provide safe shelter to international terrorists.

Public Cooperation

Democracy is the best defence against terrorism. Democracy in the preamble of a constitution is not enough, democracy in thought behaviour and action is more important. Decentralization of power is the hallmark of democracy concentration of power is an individual or institution is an invitation to terrorism. In a country like India where alienation of people has taken place for a long time and a variety of reasons, people's democracy has remained a dream. Besides many other things, consensus politics and public cooperation are the two most important pre-requisites to combat international terrorism and the only system which could provide both is the people's democracy. It has potential to overcome contradictions in any society with maximum comfort.

Psychological Understanding

It is very clear that different terrorist groups have different grievances and different goals. There cannot be common strategy to combat different kinds of terrorism. Each case of terrorism requires a specific,

in-depth and comprehensive response. Indeed, a broad policy outline may be formulated. The thrust of this policy could be that terrorism may be eliminated by removing the fundamental causes of terrorism, by adopting a carrot-and-stick policy, by compelling, inducing, persuading the terrorists to come to the negotiating table, by bringing the misguided over into the mainstream of life, by isolating the extremists, by exposing their sins, by eliminating antagonistic differences, by sensitising the democratic process and by giving psychological comfort to the minds where terrorism is born. "Kill the killers", or "Bullet for Bullet", policy may crush the muscle power of terrorists but the mind and psyche of violence require much more comprehensive treatment. We must win the hearts and minds of terrorists.

Al-Qaeda & ISIS

With emergence of Al-Qaeda, during the last decade terrorism in the new form started gradually and now it has become a global problem especially in European countries, Middle East and the Islam world, and in a way that actually it has become a fixed and permanent part of contemporary life, and it had affected policies of the countries in the level of sub-national, national and transnational; because it has brought various threats such as threat to the global security and welfare of ordinary people, stability of governmental system, health and speed of economic development and expansion and even survival of democracy for our era. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist movement which originally established gradually by some Arab resistant and also by the support of The USA and some Arab countries long time back for the reason of fighting against occupation Afghanistan by Soviet Union.

Early Origins of Terrorism

The scope of political terrorism has expanded rapidly through history. From the time of the Assassins from late 13th century to the 1700s, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare and conflict, but key ingredients for terrorism were lacking. Until the rise of the modern nation state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the sort of central authority and cohesive society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Communications were inadequate and controlled, and the causes that might inspire terrorism (religious schism, insurrection, ethnic strife) typically



led to open warfare. By the time, kingdoms and principalities became nations, they had sufficient means to enforce their authority and suppress activities such as terrorism.

History of terrorism in modern era

During the late 19th century, radical political theories and improvements in weapons technology spurred the formation of small groups of revolutionaries who effectively attacked nation-states. Anarchists espousing belief in the "propaganda of the deed" produced some striking successes, assassinating heads of state from Russia, France, Spain, Italy, and the United States. However, their lack of organization and refusal to cooperate with other social movements in political efforts rendered anarchists ineffective as a political movement. In contrast, Communism's role as an ideological basis for political terrorism was just beginning, and would become much more significant in the 20th century.

In that era, terrorists used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause. Terrorists also took advantage of the black market in Soviet-produced light weaponry, such as AK-47 created in the wake of the Soviet Union's 1989 collapse. Most terrorist groups justified violence with a deep belief in the necessity and justice of their cause. Terrorism in the United States also emerged. Groups such as the Weathermen grew out of the non-violent group Students for a Democratic Society. They turned to violent tactics, from rioting to setting off bombs, to protest the Vietnam War.

The root cause of terrorism

Terrorism is the use of fear and violence to control others and to influence their behavior. This tool has been used throughout human history, by warlords, emperors, gangsters, priests and preachers, racists, financial magnates, kidnappers, abusive spouses and dysfunctional parents, among others. In most cases, it is the threat of violence rather than the act itself that paralyzes the victims. Terrorism is different from the war or guerrilla operations and shouldn't be mistaken in that way.

Citizens against the State

Citizens' violence against states may be organized or spontaneous. Sometimes it is an impulsive expression

of discontent, having neither clear political goals nor organized leadership or plan. In its organized form, citizens' violence falls under the category of insurgency, aimed at overthrowing the government. The main forms of insurgency are distinct strategies of uprising that differ from one another in several important characteristics. Before turning to examine them in greater detail, ever, it is necessary to cope with the definition of terrorism and to distinguish between this mode of violence and other forms of conflict.

Genesis Of Terrorism

Terrorism has been a part of human history since the beginning of time. Though its objectives have always been the same, to use terror in pursuing political or social agendas, but its power has never been as frighteningly high as it is now. Certain characteristics-like freedom of intention, divergence of opinions, varying aspirations, antagonistic thinking, manifestation of conflict behaviours and diversity in mutual interactions- are ingrained in human nature. And human life is also full of endless chain of events, contingencies and incidences. So the stress situations of human beings serve a decisive factor when such feelings burst into violent forms due to prolong tolerance of unfavourable situation, explaining the phenomenon of terrorism. As the later manifests, it infringes on different sets of human rights - social, ideological, intellectual, educational and financial.

Ideology of Al-Qaeda & ISIS

Ideology is a powerful message that motivates and propels ordinary human beings into action. Ideology, a dynamic and an evolving brief system, is created by the interpretation of events by ideologues. Ideology, not poverty or illiteracy, is the key driver of politically motivated violence.

Ideology frames organizational structure, leadership and membership motivation, recruitment and support, and shapes the strategies and tactics adopted by the group. Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting, reinterpreting or misinterpreting religion and politics. Ideology is used to attract and retain recruits as members, supporters and sympathizers. The personal history and worldview of an individual may make him



or her more or less susceptible to a particular terrorist or extremist ideology.

ISIS & Al Qaeda's Global Behaviour

Terrorism in tradition and modern age of terrorism had a defined and fixed concept. However, today, its concept has become quite fluid. In the past, one of the most important characteristics of terrorism was that it acted locally and indigenously. But nowadays, it operates trans-locally trans-regionally. For example, some smuggling networks like the mafia that they rarely commit criminal acts, just create fear and horror among Italian citizens and citizens of other countries such as Iran or Britain were immune from their harm. Even among Mafia gangsters, there was an unwritten law that based on family members (women and children) were immune and did not enter them into their dangerous games and there was an attempt in terrorist wars not to harm them. Algerian militants were forced to stage street war in Paris, but never targeted London or Washington; but today Al Qaeda as a postmodern group, proclaim the entire world its battlefield and has made the world insecure for U.S. and its allies.

Jihad in a religious context

Jihad in Islam has been the most misunderstood doctrine. Not only have the non-Muslims a totally wrong conception of Jihad but even many Muslims too. It has been grossly misinterpreted and deliberately distorted to give the concept a bad name. This trend has existed for centuries but has again been accentuated in Post 9/11 of 2001. The term Jihad is derived from the root denoting effort exhaustion, exertion, strain. Derivatives of this root occur in forty-one *Qur'anic* verses. If we consult Arabic lexicon we will find that the words *Jahada* and *Jaahada* signifies that a person strove, laboured, toiled, exerted himself or his power, or efforts, or endeavours, or ability, employed himself vigorously, diligently, studiously, earnestly or with energy, was diligent or studious, took pains or extraordinary pains. The subject of Jihad and warfare in Islam are always treated as one. There are however two reasons to discuss them separately.

India continues to be a victim of terrorism

India continues to be a victim of terrorism and is adversely impacting our society and economy at large

and common man is in the forefront of these terrorist attacks. Terrorist even attacked Indian Parliament in 2001 and hence 'terrorism has emerged as the biggest challenge to the democracy' of our country. Consequent to 9/11 attacks, America strengthened its security at home and has taken stern action against the perpetrators thereby ensuring no attacks. On the contrary, even after attack on Indian Parliament in 2001, terrorist again attacked Mumbai in 2008 and ironically the terrorist strikes continue unabated in the country

International Terrorism as a Challenge to Indian Diplomacy

International terrorism poses many a challenge to a nation's diplomacy. As all established rules of international law and diplomatic conduct are violated through a resort to international terrorism, the problem of managing the menace while sticking to established norms of international conduct posits a unique challenge to diplomacy anywhere. The resort by some nations to state sponsorship of terrorism has made terrorism a strategic instrument of their foreign policies and this complicates the problem further. In state-sponsorship of terrorism, surrogate terrorist forces having clandestine ties to the supporting state use terroristic force against the target country.

Conclusion

No-doubt terrorism spring out of despair and injustice; it is the weapon of the weak; not the coward; it is indiscriminate and a crime against its innocent victims. It must be addressed with effective and legitimate means by law enforcement and the national justice systems of all countries of the world the control of its manifestations depends on international cooperation, but its prevention requires addressing its causes. Eradication of terrorism is possible only through the eradication of the causes underlying it. Terrorism is not only a political problem but also moral and social one. It is indeed like a disease, and it can be fought more effectively by eradicating its roots than its syndromes.

An era of modern international terrorism that has been witnessed presently holds dangers to national and international peace and order and stability as well as endangering the humankind itself. These dangers resulting from terrorism can wreck the very fabric of



all the societies the societies affected, very soon, and the societies apparently safe now a days, in the near future. Terrorist acts confronted by a state cannot be eliminated by it alone because of their international linkages. It is therefore, clear that all the nations must form a common front to fight terrorism. It is for this reason that one nation's peace and security will be determined by the success of all nations response to any kind of terrorism, much more and sooner so with international terrorism.

The terrorist power grows in arithmetical progression where as the state power in the age of science and technology can grow in geometrical progression. One fact has is very clear that both the power of state and terrorist has increased. Ultimately, problem of terrorism cannot be solved by violent means. Good ends can be achieved only through good means. Violence leads to counter-violence and anti-humanity. States have to bring down terrorism by applying multi-level approach including changing the behaviour of terrorist through non-violent means.

Governments have to bring them in the mainstream of developmental processes. Terrorists are not born but they are the creation of society. Terrorism breeds from a perceived idea of oppression, injustice and inequality. If the causes of hatred are removed, terrorists would also abate.

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Recent Obama visit to Vietnam

Excerpts of Joint Statement: Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Regional and Global Challenges

The United States and Vietnam reaffirmed their shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes, including full respect for diplomatic and legal processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force in accordance with the UN Charter and international laws, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both countries underscored the commitments of parties to the disputes to refrain from actions that aggravate or broaden the disputes and recognize the importance of strictly implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) and working to accelerate negotiation with substantive results toward the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC). In this regard, both countries expressed serious concerns over recent developments in the South China Sea that have caused tensions, eroded trust and threatened peace, security, and stability. Both countries recognized the imperative of upholding the freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea, called for non-militarization and self-restraint in addressing disputes, reaffirmed shared commitments under the Sunnylands Declaration, and committed to working closely with other ASEAN partners in implementing that Declaration.

Deepening a Long-Term Partnership

Both sides agreed to further enhance the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, making it deeper, more substantive, and more effective in order to better serve the interests of the two peoples for peace, stability, and cooperation in the region and the world.

(<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/23/joint-statement-between-united-states-america-and-socialist-republic>)

Managing Security: An Inclusive Approach

Prof. Snehalata Panda

Traditionally, security in international relations implied protection of the state from external threats. During the cold war the two super powers contending for global supremacy were managing security of states in their respective camps. The two principles of national self determination and sovereign equality of states were principal constituents for respecting national security. But ignoring the precepts became more visible in practice as guarantee of security by the superpowers encouraged alliances. International agencies and the United Nations played a key role in aid diplomacy. Flow of funds from the developed to the under developed countries and management of territorial security was guided by alliance politics. Even so minimum security to individuals was guaranteed by states in the socialist camp. Following the end of cold war, integration with global market set the guidelines for domestic policy and international relations for almost all countries including India. Attendant with it was unprecedented surge in threats to individual security emanating from socio, economic, political, military, environmental, and cultural and other factors. These problems were considered as important as that of managing territorial security. Foreign policy was reoriented to encompass the expanded security dimensions including individual, state and international system. This paper attempts to analyse the concept of security in the changed international scenario with a perspective on expanded scope for managing threats guided by well calibrated policy since integration with global market economy and its implications for India.

Understanding Security

Security is defined as "The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger...Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension, a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger" (1) The "condition" includes an "orientation to future risks" which includes life as well as livelihood and the risk of being pushed to a "threshold of deprivation" that deprives freedom and respect. Baldwin defined it as "absence of threat to acquired values"(2)"Security

policies are those actions one takes to reduce or limit the probability of damage to one's acquired values"(3) Baldwin's conceptualization opens up questions about the threats to security, security from what values and by what means. These questions are answered by Haq (4) who viewed security as "not for states but individuals, and threats are from multiple sources emanating from an unequal world order in which some states dominate". His prescription to overcome the challenges is "development, equity, sustainability, a new partnership between north and south, justice not charity". (5)

Neo realist conception of security centres round the state which ensures security by safeguarding the territory from external attack by resorting to military power. Thus every state is in constant vigil to keep its territorial integrity .A state may also use coercive power on its own citizens thereby impinging their freedom and the right to live a respectable life. As "derivative of power", security has been debated in the post cold war international system the outcome of which is an expanded concept including territorial as well as societal security. Classical national security emphasised use of force to manage territorial security. But this approach is no more relevant in the present century due to increasing interdependence among states and possession of weapons of mass destruction. The threats to security are not from states but also non state entities. Therefore, a comprehensive approach encompassing the individual, ecology, economic and social sectors is more appropriate to contend with new challenges.

The "broader framework of security"(6) as explained by Buzan is "the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change ... The bottom-line of security is survival but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence" . (7) Buzan addresses the



application of the concept to new issues that afflict society, individual and fear accruing from terrorism. This expanded concept breaks new ground for changing the traditional concept of security. His analysis is a combination of "neo realism" and "constructivism" that are core aspects of international relations. These are due to ongoing processes of social practice and interactions. He adheres to the neorealist concept of anarchical international system, "the principal defining characteristic is the absence of overarching government" (8). But this realist perspective is too narrow where the approach to security is "pure struggle for power". This is no more relevant in the contemporary world to formulate policy and apply these to deal with the problems. In Buzan's approach individual is as important as the states and international systems for security issues. The five important sectors threatening security are political, military, economic, societal and environmental. (9) These are interlinked but need to be understood separately so that the implications can be internalized to evolve mechanisms to deal with "National Security Problem". The scheme of security depends on the nature of state which is not one and the same across the globe... (10)

The concept of security for individual is different from that of the state. Hence the models applicable to both are not same. But the five sectors of security might "affect the periphery based on the changes in the centre". These five sectors are intertwined and threats from one sector can affect another. According to him military threat can affect all constituents of a state questioning the state's ability to save the people from harm. Political threats impair the state which might accrue from within the state. These two threats are linked to economic threats. Economic threats are not same for all nations. In market economies insecurity is more due to the interplay of competition and profit motive. However, the nature of insecurity can be deciphered although it depends on the scale of development. Military sector is affected by economic sector while over all general security in a state is affected by the economic sector. Societal security is the most intriguing as almost all societies are bedeviled by differences in culture, ethnicity, economic and political disparities and so on. It has cascading effect spawning from cultural and ethnic identities beyond the boundary of a state. Most conflicts being societal in nature it has to be included

in the macro framework of security. Added to these is environmental security accruing from problems like pollution, global warming, increasing ozone layer, water scarcity and so on. This sector needs greater attention because it threatens human existence. Buzan is right when he states that military threats to security is no more valid as other threats are equally potent which need to be considered for analyzing national and international security "both separately and together".

Security is a "relational phenomenon"; therefore, national security cannot be understood without the "international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded" (11) Regional security is in between national and international security. This is to be taken into account for policy interventions to meet challenges of threats to overall security. While analyzing regional security and its implications on security as a whole Buzan conceptualizes "Amity and enmity among states (12) that cannot be attributed to balance of power. It can be affected by ethnicity, history, ideology etc. He refers to "security complex" that is "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another". (13) Regional security and security complexes are important as every state can place its security in relation to a "complex". (14) Stretching security from the international to the individual, including military, political, economic, societal and environmental aspects breaks a new ground for understanding the concept to meet the challenges in the post cold war global system. In his words 'The "national" security problem turns out to be a systemic security problem in which individuals, states and the system all play a part, and in which economic, societal and environmental factors are as important as political and military ones."(15)

Though end of the cold war was the immediate reason for expanding the concept yet the process of economic development preceding it drew attention of policy makers and researchers to the problem of individual well being much before. In 1970, the Club of Rome expressed concern about the problem of people across the globe suffering from poverty, ill health, environmental degradation, insecurity in employment, uncontrolled urbanization, inflation and so on which affect the very life of the



individual. (16) It noted that a number of factors influence individual lives demanding alternative approach to the security agenda to ensure human wellbeing. The North –South Report of the Independent Commission on International Development highlighted the necessity of North South engagement to "overcome dangerous tensions and to produce significant and useful results for nations and regions-but first and foremost for human beings in all parts of the world"(17). A decade later the report of Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues offered a choice to unconventional approach to manage peace and security highlighting the vulnerabilities of people afflicted with "poverty and deprivation"(18) Subsequently the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance issued a call for Common Responsibility in the 1990s and an approach for "wider concept of security". The Commission on Global Governance stated "The concept of Global Security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the security of the planet" (19) Later the UNDP launched the Human Development Index (HDI) in which human security was highlighted.

Human Security

Human security is a derivative of the changed conception of security in state policy and international relations. This approach assumes that threats emanating from economic, societal, military and allied sectors within the state as well as outside of it could be encountered with appropriate policy interventions. Resorting to military power to ensure territorial security is not cost efficient for the reason that it diverts resources for equipping military thereby reducing investment on human resource. Therefore, human security(20) is emphasized that intertwines economic development with territorial security as well as security to the people by providing the basic needs for human existence. This perspective is added to the traditional security concept in the 1990s reinforced with inputs and action by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)(21). Though individual centric policies guiding international relation was envisaged in the last century human security assumed importance after publication of Human Development Report by UNDP. It emphasized expansion of the scope of security to include people affected by structural deficiencies,

policies of government and natural disasters (22) "encompassing military as well as non military threats" (23) The Commission on Human Security (24) defines it as...to protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment". It reconceptualises security by expanding the scope to include protection and empowerment of individual .Highlighting the threats to individuals it promotes a "new integrated, coordinated and people centred approach to advance peace, security and development within and across nations'

UNDP's Human Development Report,1994 focused on human security which is "a concern with human life and dignity"(25) characterized as universality, interdependence, prevention and people centric. It has identified seven types of threats to human security which are economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political. In other words poverty and unemployment threaten economic security .Disease, malnutrition, unhealthy food, lack of health care and culture specific food habits threaten health security. Environmental security is threatened due to ecological degradation, depletion of natural resources mainly water, pollution, natural disaster etc. Violence ,terrorism, crime etc. threaten personal security while ethnic ,religious, regional, linguistic and other identity based tension threaten community security .Added to these are human rights abuses, political oppression ,absence of democracy which keep the people in perpetual tension in a state. It states that traditional security overlooks "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives." Threats to security may be local or global or both. The seven categories of threats are mostly local while global threats are environmental degradation, international migration, global poverty, population growth, international terrorism and so on. Canada in 1999 urged for altering national security policies to be modified to accommodate human security goals.(26)Canadian Department of Foreign And International Trade contended that state security and human security are mutually exclusive and described it as "freedom from fear and freedom from want". It is included in the G7/G8 summit agendas as well as that of G20 which includes India and China ,the two potential economies in Asia. Jorge Nef has proposed a fivefold classification namely ecology/environment, economy, society, polity and culture.(27) Defining "security of



the individual in his/her personal surroundings, community and environment". George McLean elaborates personal security as protection from violence, access to basic essentials of life, protection from crime, terrorism, pandemic diseases, political corruption, forced migration, and absence of human rights".(28) UNDP ,Canadian organizations and academics have agreed that though security of the state is essential for citizens ,territorial security by itself cannot ensure individual security within a state. This view is precipitated by the changed world system in which the threat of nuclear war attenuated .State security does not ensure "stability and peace" Security which implied state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the traditional sense is expanded to include sovereignty of the individual which is the core of human security. King and Murray (29) identified "generalized poverty "as the threats to human security. Poverty has spillover effect in other areas of human wellbeing like health, education and other sectors that define a respectable existence. Without a sound economic base democracy and political freedom become less important. For policy makers it has great significance as human well being is the core of administration as well as international relations. This can be assessed from the shift in India's economic policy in 1990, fostering bilateral cooperation with countries across continents and engagement with regional groups keeping aside past animosity and present competitive environment. The essence of human security is improving the lives of people. The issues involving human well being can be solved through interdependence rather than isolation requiring coordination among governments, international organizations as well as nongovernmental organizations.

India's Perspective

Colonial experience compelled India's foreign policy makers to keep away from alignment with the superpowers .But it had to count on the former Soviet Union for acquisition of military equipment to safeguard territorial security. Socio- economic policies of successive governments enhanced social security .With the end of cold war it had to reset its economic preferences .Integration with global market enhanced relationship with a number of developed and developing countries and regional groups .Security provided to the individual under the socialist pattern of government was no more available as the capitalist

economy prescribed rules under which the individual had to survive in a competitive and challenging environment. Integration with global market created a favourable investment environment in India for domestic as well as foreign investors. Availability of cheap labour encouraged outsourcing back end jobs to India from US and Europe. Indian citizens accessed employment in foreign countries. Economic reforms pushed up growth. But then the debate centred round inequitable distribution of gains emanating from economic development. Rejection of a political party by the voters that ensured growth indicated popular dissatisfaction. Therefore, policies for inclusive development were evolved .Multi sectoral state interventions to ameliorate the condition of people expanded middle class, reduced poverty, enhanced purchasing power, improved life style of people, boosted literacy, health and wellness indicators got better. Though policy interventions did not empower people , investments on human security solved some major problems of the people Still more remains to be done for the simple reason that India's problems are multifarious with addition of new ones every moment. To begin with India has the largest youth population but their skill remains unutilized. Economic insecurity will reverse our demographic dividend to demographic disaster as is evident from the recent unrests even among the well to do population. Economic advantage of about 65% of young people below the age of 35 years is lost due to lack avenues for earning. Employment is not keeping pace with bulge in youth population. Economic insecurity has cascading effect on other aspects of life .Insecurity among the youth will not make government secure now and in future. Unemployed youth will resort to crimes .Social tensions will increase and economic losses will be more due to strikes and demonstrations. Government response to these challenges are welcome but so far it is far less successful in ensuring financial well being of the youth having high aspirations for better living style. Call for make in India has poor response as many more countries have opened their economies creating more favourable work environment compared to India. (30)

Education as a tool of empowerment has indications of increase in the number of literates but qualitative deficiencies have not enabled majority of the qualified people to compete with their counterparts nationally/globally. It has not ensured a feeling of



confidence enabling them to be financially independent. Women's progress in this score is disappointing as they have to battle against innumerable odds in every walk of their lives to enter educational institutions and continue higher studies. Education apart most women are marginalized due to lack of independent economic resources. Besides "gender based inequalities in access to financial, physical, productive, human and social capital "both in micro level and macro level push women to a most disrespectful life with threats emanating from financial, physical and social insecurity. Health indicators have improved with government intervention but are far below some developing countries of Asia and Africa. Lack of health awareness, poor sanitation, inadequate infrastructure, widening differences in health care facilities in urban and rural areas, cost of prevention and treatment continue to be major deficiencies in this sector. Environmental hazards are far more serious with poor air quality, depleting water levels, erratic precipitation, drought and flood being untamed which together affect food security. Increasing population, reduced cultivable land, scant interest of the youth to take up cultivation as an occupation, heavy risk in investment in farming are some of the reasons affecting agriculture. Reported cases of farmer suicides indicate the risk in investment in agriculture in the absence of favourable climatic conditions, guaranteed market and fair price though support price of some agri-products has been increasing and agricultural loans as well as subsidies are available. But farm sector suffers due to interplay of politics and natural hazards. (31) Poor farmers lacking in market awareness and skill to compete are the worst victims of market economy. Since the last one decade challenges to human security are countered with government initiative but abatement of problems is far from satisfactory. Added to these terrorism and extremism are increasing threatening the lives of innocent people and impeding infrastructure development. These problems are not new to the country but their scope has been expanding since inception of economic reforms. Threats to territorial security are no less challenging. Skirmishes in the disputed borders have diverted attention from more serious problems. Investment in military is becoming imperative diverting the meager resources from sectors essential to ensure human security. Despite India's humanitarian aid to the earthquake affected

people of Nepal, Indo- Nepalese relationship nosedived after the Madhesi resistance following the promulgation of constitution in Nepal. Ethnic problems are more potential in determining India's relationship with the South Asian countries. Commercial relationship has been advanced with all these countries but that has not abated terrorist activity let loose by disgruntled elements across the disputed borders. Relationship with Pakistan is frustrating. China's support to Pakistan in international forums, checkmating India's role in the Indo-Pacific and skewed commercial relationship threaten India's territorial as well as economic security. Successfully overcoming the menace requires cooperation, exchange of information across the world irrespective of the nature of bilateral cooperation among sovereign states. But cooperation even among the common victims is lacking in international forums. (32) Territorial security is as much essential for India as human security especially in its relationship with its neighbour Pakistan and China without which its ambition to be a global power and even an influential regional player cannot be realised. Relationship with great powers is essential to enhance our international stature and domestic prosperity along with good relation with Pakistan based on rationality and a futuristic vision. One important factor is that the role of Indian military has been changed to that of a net security provider thereby expanding its role from safeguarding territorial security to livelihood security, environmental security and engaging in successful rescue operations. It has proved its potential due to the resources at its disposal and capabilities. In future it will assume more responsibilities in providing services to people challenged by natural and human created disasters as well as safeguarding territory. But in an interdependent world, it cannot discharge its responsibilities single handed. In view of this India has signed defence cooperation agreements with several countries and engaging in joint military exercises. This approach has equipped it with capabilities to share broader responsibilities along with exposure to improved methods of warfare. But in this endeavour India has encountered challenges from China. Even Pakistan has drawn Russia to its military commerce. U S has its own interests in cooperating with India. So far India has successfully channeled its strategic relationship with powerful economies across the world and in the southeastern neighbourhood stretching to and South Pacific nations.



Common security threats have drawn several countries together but the diplomatic design to tame Chinese assertions in the South China Sea is major test for India. China's relation with India is selective, competitive and ambiguous. Even potential European economies have kept upfront their own interests in cooperating with India. Relation with nations and regional as well as international groups can be fastened or loosened without breaking but to shake up if need be. Nuclear security cannot be achieved without a concerted global approach to tackle terrorism."India has given high priority to the nuclear issue proving its credential as a responsible nuclear power. It is striving hard to fast forward its international engagement. (33) The bilateral engagement with six NSG members controlling the export of nuclear technology is part of this effort. The most important demonstration of India's leadership lies in the linking of the issue of terrorism and nuclear safety. By adopting a global rather than national response to terrorism India has brought to the fore weakness in the current effort to tackle terrorism. Terror organizations across countries are better networked than countries fraught with the menace of terrorism due to the conception that it is a problem of the affected country."The reach and supply chain of terrorism are global, but genuine cooperation between nations is not".(34) which has strengthened the terrorist organizations. Indian Prime minister's appeal to counter transnational terrorism with a combined approach indicated that security is impossible without global cooperation. For economic prosperity India has been mobilizing investment from several sources as it is the open sesame to domestic prosperity in a globalised open economic system apart from pushing its economic agenda in several bilateral and multilateral forums.

"War is continuation of policy by other means "has become redundant in a globalised interdependent world where military power to deter potential enemies and subjugate them is hardly achievable. Military force has been used in Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve political goals .Whether the desired objectives been achieved through the wars is answered in the negative. In India's neighbourhood Pakistan and China have not resorted to war as they did in 1965 and 1962 respectively. Nor could India retaliate as it did in 1971 for creating Bangladesh. One important reason for refraining from exercise of military power in the

subcontinent could be possession of nuclear power by India, China and Pakistan. It has acted as deterrent no doubt. Skirmishes did occur across the border but territorial integrity is respected .The "use of military forces as a coercive instrument of state power has come under challenge".

India's policy to encounter natural disaster has become more or less holistic rather than rehabilitative encompassing pre disaster warning , recovery and reconstruction .World environment mismanagement coupled with growing urbanization without proper planning has its impact on India with disasters like tsunami and earthquakes .Drought, scarcity of water ,erratic precipitation have impacted cultivation ,the basic source of livelihood to more than eighty percent of the population with concomitant effect on price and inflation. Meteorology has advanced to predict cyclone but earth quakes are neither preventable nor predictable causing heavy loss to life and property. The Bureau of Indian Standards has issued a number of codes as earthquakes damage buildings which in turn kill people. But tremor resistant buildings are not many. By and large India has managed territorial and human security issues with success .But the current issues are far more serious .Global economic slump has impacted negatively while policy interventions are not satisfactory. Personal security is threatened due to growing unemployment, job insecurity, competition, forced migration and above all terrorism. Declining poverty ratio in India may be a mark of outstanding performance of successive government setting a benchmark for developing economies but the number of economically backward is still alarming. Besides the poor are not insecure due to income paucity .The multidimensional threats to their lives and self respect spawn from social and structural bases. Empowerment in all sectors is the core, the power within which will enhance the respect of the people and the country.

Concluding Observations

Human security approach complements territorial security, strengthens human development and enhances human rights.(35) State security and human security differ in the sense that the former concentrates on threats directed against the state while the latter draws attention to threats faced by the individual. Thus individual assumes importance in



the security framework. The threats to human security being multiple it requires involvement of several sectors, local, national, international, governmental and non governmental agencies where military forces are redundant .Another objective of human security is growth with equity as reduction in economic development, deficiencies in democratic governance speed up social tension depriving the individual the fruits of success achieved with economic development and good governance. Economic development is not exclusively affected by one nation; in a globalised world economic run down in one country affects another or several countries. Violation of human rights also results in social tension ,for which institutional frame work need to be capable to safe guard against factors that impinge on rights and freedom indispensable to human life. Violence is inbuilt in societies despite progress. Physical and emotional abuse "hinder self realization."

Though indicators of human security vary in the developed and developing economies natural calamities coupled with extremism and terrorism has made lives more insecure, violating human right and personal security across the globe. Approaches so far to counter the menace is more state centric which need to be human centric with due regard to human rights and basic freedoms. Increasing extremism indicates deficiency in policy as well as implementation, emphasis on state centric approach, retaliation rather than prevention. Human security can be ensured in the post cold war global system characterized by peace and interdependence by restructuring it in such a way that individuals will be free from direct as well as indirect threats .However, the areas specified as threats do not encapsulate the whole gamut of insecurities but provide bases for national policy of several countries as well as in their bilateral and international relationship. Threats to human security cannot be countered independently by one nation, therefore cooperative action and multi sectoral approach is needed. These insecurities are context specific that is it varies across different locations even in the same country, across nations and regions. Terrorists and their organizations are proliferating irrespective of the nature of society and polity. Economic reasons are inadequate to explain as it is present in developed as well as developing countries. Authoritarian and democratic political systems, ethnically diverse and homogenous societies

too have experienced terrorist violence. Therefore, delving deep into the root causes of the threats and evolving measures for protection and empowerment are necessary. Strategies are to be developed to protect people "in a systematic, comprehensive and preventive manner from various threats. People are to be enabled to develop capabilities to overcome the threats .Protection of individuals can be possible with government initiative but empowerment needs both government resources and personal factors to develop capabilities. Both are "mutually reinforcing, interdependent," one without the other cannot peter out the threats to human security. Human security approach is not just a moral base for formulating foreign policy, state action and international interventions ,it is the basic imperative to meet the challenges from multiple sectors, internal as well as external.

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South China Sea: Confluence of Conflicting Strategic Interests

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The South China Sea seems to be heading towards a new flash point of conflict between China and the US and her regional allies. The fundamental reasons for the recent tensions are rising and assertive China with her persistent power projection, countermoves of the US under 'Asia Rebalancing' with the help of 'her regional allies' and lack of consensus on a new regional security architecture among regional players, China and the US. The US continues to be the resident power in this region since the World War II. The rise of China has unsettled the prevailing security regime in the Asia-Pacific region. As far as South China Sea is concerned, it is vital for protection of China's strategic and commercial interests. The recent power projections, both by China and the US in the South China Sea, have raised speculations that it may lead to a military confrontation either between China and the US or between China and her neighbours, which have conflicting and overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. The regional and strategic dimensions of South China Sea have intermingled to the extent that the resolution of these disputes has become more difficult and complex task. The conflicting interests and positions of the US and her regional allies viz-viz China, have led to divergence in the approach to resolve underlying issues and tensions. The strategic and economic significance of the South China Sea to all stakeholders lies at the core of the prevailing tensions.

The South China Sea occupies a strategic location in the larger Pacific Ocean. With an area of 3,500,000 square kilometers, the Sea covers an area from Singapore to Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan. It is located to the south of mainland China; to the east to Vietnam, Cambodia and Malay Peninsula; and to the West to Philippines. It contains some 250 Islands, atolls and reefs. The most notable Islands and shoals are Spratly Islands (810 by 900 Kms), Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank,

and Scarborough Shoal. Its strategic and commercial importance South China Sea is noteworthy as one-third of total global shipping passes through this Sea and it holds huge oil and gas resources. According to one estimate the South China Sea has 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (CFR: 2016). It is the major trade and energy supply route between the countries of Asia-Pacific and other parts of the world. The Malacca Strait, which lies at the eastern end of the South China Sea, is a choke point, linking Pacific Ocean with Indian Ocean. In the recent past, this Strait was infested with piracy and smuggling of goods. China always fears that even a temporary blockade of Malacca Strait by a hostile power may create havoc for supply of energy and goods to her. This concern is referred to as China's Malacca Dilemma. China's growing economy is vitally dependent on the international trade and energy supply passing through Malacca Strait and South China Sea. With ever expanding global trade as well as global supply chains, South China Sea has assumed special significance in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. Its strategic and economic significance is no more limited to Pacific Ocean only.

There are two dimensions of the ongoing conflict and flare up in South China Sea: **Regional Dimension and Strategic Dimension**. Its regional dimension arises from the competing claims by China and her five neighbours- Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan over the territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. The maritime territorial dispute arose among these claimants in 1970s, as there were indications of natural gas and oil deposits in Spratly Island, which is the largest Island in the South China Sea. China claims nine-dash line as the maritime boundary, which covers almost all South China Sea as China's territory. This claim is refuted by the five regional states on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).



which is the accepted international law on maritime boundary issues. Since around 2009, China's official endorsement of the nine-dash line and growing physical assertiveness has raised concerns among China's South China Sea neighbours that perceive their sovereignty and marine resources as directly threatened due to China's excessive claims and assertiveness. Even, the non-claimant nations have also felt concerned about the freedom of navigation and regional stability (Graham: 2012).

With a view to manage the tensions in South China Sea, China and ASEAN members signed a code of conduct for states in 2002, known as the *Conduct of Parties in South China Sea* (DOC). Incidentally, this code of conduct was proposed by China herself. The core of the DOC is that none of the concerning parties shall take unilateral action to change the status quo in South China Sea. The assumption was that the status quo with respect to territorial claims shall maintain peace, security and stability in the South China Sea. The DOC held its ground for a decade or so amidst some minor disputes, but now it is more with the violation than adherence. The DOC was a multilateral mechanism to manage disputes in South China Sea. However, China, fearing interference by the US, later, developed cold feet to multilateralism, whereas other claimants continued to adhere to multilateralism in view of their individually weak position viz-viz China. As a result, there is now a fundamental difference in the approach to solve the maritime boundary disputes among different claimants. While China prefers a bilateral approach to solve this dispute, the other parties and America have been pushing forward a multilateral approach under the UN Convention on Law of Sea, 1982.

The second dimension of prevailing tensions in the South China Sea is of strategic and geo-political nature. As told earlier the US has been a resident power in the Asia-pacific region after the end of World War II, with predominant naval presence in the region. The economic and military rise of China in last two decades diversified and broadened her strategic and economic interests, which demanded not only the mainland coastal security, but also the security of vital Sea Lanes of Communication passing through South China Sea, Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean. The safe supply of trade and energy became

crucial to maintain China's growing economy. One of the core objectives of China's naval modernization in recent years is to protect her vital strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. In order to match the strength of her naval forces to her growing economic and strategic needs, China has moved on rapid modernization of her navy in last two decades. Bedford (2000) argues that there are two main reasons for the rapid modernization of People Liberation Army navy (PLAN): necessity and opportunity. Necessity emerged rising overseas economic interests. The opportunity came with the disintegration of Soviet Union as China was freed from land dispute worries and concentrated on her maritime disputes over the status of Taiwan, the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. During 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the US deployed two aircraft carriers against China, which exposed weakness of Chinese naval forces and prompted China for naval modernization. Since the 1990s, the PLAN has strengthened its forces around four core elements: frigates and destroyers; submarines; naval fighters; and anti-ship missiles. It is unsurprising that these are precisely the systems required to fight a sea battle against an aircraft carrier and its battle group. At present, the Chinese Navy is the second largest navy in the world after the US Navy. China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is also designed to serve her strategic and commercial interests by developing port and other infrastructure facilities in the Indo-Pacific Ocean.

Alarmed by China's growing strategic and economic influence, the US moved on to announce her 'Pivot to Asia' (also called 'Asia Rebalancing') strategy in 2011, which among other things calls for the deployment of 60 percent of US naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. It also entails strengthening strategic partnerships with US allies and friends in the region. The domain of Asia-pacific was changed to Indo-Pacific to have a broader dimension of issues and rope in countries like India in this strategic design. The signing of the US-India Strategic Joint Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in the wake of Obama's visit to India in January, 2015 and readmission of Japan in the Joint Indo-US Malabar maritime exercises are elements of US grand strategy. Also, the signing of Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement between the US and 11 Pacific Rim



states in 2015 is the economic counterpart of 'pivot' strategy. China views US 'Pivot' as a design to contain her strategic influence in the region.

In fact, the US position and activities in the South China Sea is the core of the 'Pivot' strategy. The US justifies its frequent power display in South China Sea on the ground of '**freedom of navigation**' against Chinese infiltrations. It also maintains that it has neutral stand on the maritime disputes between China and her neighbours, a position not tenable in view of close strategic relations between the US and other regional states, which are parties to maritime disputes against China as well as the basic objectives of 'Pivot' strategy.

Deadly Cocktail of the two Dimensions: The complexity of South China Sea condition is the result of mixing of its regional and strategic dimensions. It has not only widened the scope of confrontation, but also raised the complexity of peaceful resolution of maritime disputes and controversies. This has enabling historical background also. During the cold war era, US positioned herself in this region with naval bases in Philippines and Thailand, and developed close security relations with regional states to ward off the threat of communism and Soviet Union and strengthen her strategic influence. Its continuous support to nationalist Taiwan, encouraging the formation of ASEAN in 1967, and launching of bloody confrontation in Vietnam in early 1970s attest this design. After the disintegration of Soviet Union and the end of cold war, the objective of maintaining strategic influence remains the same, but the Soviet Union has been replaced by China in US design. The US and the regional states both have symbiotic relationship and both need each other. The US needs them to promote her 'Pivot' strategy and regional states need the US presence to balance an assertive China. Cornered by China's unilateral moves, the regional states, particularly Philippines and Vietnam have adopted strategy of strengthening military ties with United States. The United States seeks to assure the Philippines and Vietnam, perhaps others, that China will be sufficiently intimidated by growing U.S. involvement to make her move toward more reasonable, more accommodating policies, and accept the need to resolve the conflict through serious

multilateral negotiation. However, there is little to indicate that the approach is working (Frasure: 2016).

The Flare Up: The power projections both by China and the US along with irreconcilable position adopted by all parties have raised serious security concerns in South China Sea in last two years. China has recently developed military facilities in some of the Islands located in the South China Sea by building artificial Islands within waters claimed and controlled by Beijing. China has built three air strips on the contested Spratly Islands and militarized Woody Islands by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system. China has also warned its neighbours against drilling for oil and gas in the disputed region (CFR: 2016). America has dubbed the growing China's assertion as a danger to "freedom of navigation", which could hamper \$5.3 trillion trade that passes through the South China Sea, a charge that Beijing denies (Aneja: 2016). As a security guarantor to many smaller states in the region, the US has countered Beijing's power projection in the South China Sea by holding regular maritime drills in the area claimed by China. In May 2016, The US sent a guided missile destroyer within the 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, a manmade Island claimed by both China and Philippines. The extensive land reclamation and dredging by China has transformed the two rocks of this reef into a large artificial island. This drill was third time since October, 2015. The US dubs these drills as Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in South China Sea (CFR: 2016) China's authoritative reaction to the third FONOP in May, 2016 was that the US warship has threatened China's sovereignty and security interests, endangered safety of personnel and facilities on the reef, and jeopardized regional peace and stability. Again, we oppose such move by the US side and will continue to take necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and security (Panda: 2016). China views US actions in South China Sea as a strategy to counter China's rise and influence in the region. It claims that there was a peace and stability in the region for a decade after signing of Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (DOC) between China and ASEAN members in 2002. But after the 'Asia Rebalancing' or 'Pivot to Asia' strategy of US since 2010, China's commercial and security interests are threatened. There have been disputes in South China Sea earlier also, but the US



is using and exaggerating the disputes to justify her rebalancing or coming back to Western Pacific. The underlining motive of the US would be to focus on security issues of the region in order to compensate her diminishing economic influence as China has replaced the US as the largest trading partner of countries in South-East Asia (Shulong: 2014). China's attempt to promote the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), excluding the US, is intended to diminish America's economic influence in the region.

However, the US has a different account of the situation in South China Sea. A Pentagon Report to the US Congress released on 13 May 2016, (Fox News: 2016) accused China of increasing assertive efforts to advance its national sovereignty and territorial claims. The Report claimed that China has reclaimed 3200 acres in South China Sea by developing artificial land structure. The lack of transparency in growing military capabilities of China is causing tensions in the region. This is the most detailed report so far prepared by the US Defence Department about China's military activities in the South China Sea. While the US justifies its presence and power projection on the ground of freedom of navigation, other regional states make overlapping claim with China over much of the South China Sea under the provisions of UN Law of Sea Convention (UNCLOS), 1982. However, China is not willing to concede to either the territorial claims of her neighbours or the US assertion of freedom of navigation. China continues to make counter territorial claims to the most of the South China Sea on the basis of demarcation of nine-dash line (Hayton: 2016). The US and the regional states share a common strategic orientation against China due to the common threat of China's military assertiveness, the promise of the US security guarantee to regional states and the long presence of the US forces in the region as a resident power. In view of these facts, the power projections from both sides is likely to persist as Chinese assertiveness meets US 'pivot' in South China Sea.

Possibilities of Military Confrontation: In view of the growing tensions in the South China Sea, there are four possibilities of military confrontation. First is the use of force by China against the ongoing US

military operations within China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as China harps on her sovereignty rights in this region. The US maintains that the UN Convention on Law of Sea does not mandate to require prior consent of a coastal state to conduct military activities in her EEZ, whereas China contends that such activities in her EEZ without her permission violate her domestic law as well as international law. Besides, there is equal possibility of conflict by incident as the number of Chinese submarines has increased in the region in recent years. It should be recalled that in a similar fashion, a US destroyer collided with Chinese submarine in June, 2009 (Glaser: 2012). The second possibility of conflict in South China Sea involves conflict between China and Philippines, if former uses force to deter Philippines for exploiting natural gas deposits in the disputed areas particularly in the Reed Bank. Philippines has signed contract with many western countries for exploration of natural gas in Reed Bank. The US has a security agreement with Philippines, and thus may get involved in such conflict. The third possibility of violent confrontation is between China and Vietnam over oil exploration by Petro Vietnam or its partners. Earlier, China has harassed Vietnam exploration vessels, operating in Vietnam's EEZ. The US-Vietnam strategic partnership has emboldened Vietnam to continue with oil exploration despite Chinese threats. The fourth possibility of conflict between the US and China emerges if China harms some US firms, operating in the region or it results in the loss of lives of US citizens.

However, if we consider these possibilities in the larger strategic perspective, the possibilities of a major war in South China Sea are remote, though a minor conflict is not ruled out. Yet, tensions are likely to persist in near future. China is not likely to use force against the US interests, in view of the naval supremacy enjoyed by the latter *viz-a-viz* China in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. As and when China surpasses the US in naval supremacy, the possibility of violent conflict will increase. Again, given the growing importance of US-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region generally to the global economy, the US will have a major interest in preventing tensions and disputes turning into military confrontation (Glaser: 2012). Also, the regional and global strategic environment does not favour China to get involved into a major military conflict with the US, which is



likely to be closely interested in any of the conflict taking place in the South China Sea.

Conclusion: Yet, China is not likely to accommodate the US claims of freedom of navigation in her EEZ or the territorial claims of her neighbours in the disputed areas as her influence in the South China Sea continues to be a question of life and death for her. The South China Sea is not only crucial for her sea born security, but also majority of her trade and energy supply passes through this Sea. More vulnerable is the narrow Malacca Strait located in the South China Sea, which links Pacific Ocean with Indian Ocean. China has tried to develop alternative access to India Ocean through Gwader port in Pakistan. China is developing port facilities in Gwader in Pakistan and linking it with the Western regions of mainland China through road and rail links, passing through Pakistan. Given the volatile political conditions in Pakistan, this option may not be viable alternative in the long run. Thus, China has to depend upon Malacca strait and South China Sea for her trade and energy needs. Also, the success of China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project is contingent on the peace and stability in the South China Sea. China fears that the narrow Malacca Strait may be blocked by an adversary to deny her access to sea. Thus she has to live with 'Malacca Dilemma' in the future also.

It is true that the persisting tensions in the South China Sea pose grave challenge for the peace and stability in the region. Yet, these tensions also provide an opportunity to evolve a regional security architecture for South-East Asia. In view of the rising China and the status quoist US, the old security structure is passing through a transitional phase. The multilateralism, which accommodates the valid interests of all stakeholders, is the key to the new regional security architecture. In May 2016, China has unveiled a multilateral security model sans the US. China has invited Asian countries to join Beijing in framing a security governance model with 'Asian Features' to counter the US 'rebalance' to the region (Aneja:2016). This security structure is to be led by China. The reaction of China's neighbours is not known to this proposal, but it seems unrealistic from the outset. In view of the prevailing conditions both China and the US need to realize that the peace and stability

in this region cannot be ensured without the participation of both. A viable regional security model can be evolved only with the participation of China, the US and other regional states. Later, other stakeholders like Japan, South Korea, India and Australia may also be involved. This model will have implications for the entire Indo-Pacific region. This model will take into account not only the valid interests of all stakeholders, but also the relevant international legal provisions to settle territorial dispute. Till such a regional security architecture is evolved with consultation and consensus, the tensions are likely to persist in the South China Sea, which may be replicated in other parts other Indo-Pacific region

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Syrian Quagmire: Conflict Management and Prospects of Peace-building

Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta & Ms. Salma Zafar

The unprecedented devastation, both in terms of men and material, has brought the Syrian crisis into prominence into international politics of world order. The crisis has sucked in the Syrian citizens as rebels and as victims; the nation-states of West Asian region; the dreaded terrorist organizations of the world; ethnic community like Kurds; withal the major powers of the world. Needless to mention that each of the parties involved have their own vested interests, enough to transform Syria into a battle-field at the cost of life of men, modesty of women, and future of children. Involvement of too many actors has made the crisis so complex that peace seems to be a far cry. Nevertheless, peace has been put into process, probably as a fig-leaf. The prevailing complexity makes it increasingly and tremendously challenging not only for keen observers of the crisis but also for academicians, journalists, policy analysts, peace-makers of the world and other stake-holders. Therefore, authors have made an endeavour to decipher the interests of parties involved in the crisis, the prospects of peace in the region and imperatives for the world community to make peace feasible.

Arab uprising that ensued in 2010, allowed democracy a chance at the cost of deeply rooted authoritarian regimes in many of the countries of Arab world, thereby elating activists with enthusiasm and a feeling of success. The domino effect of the uprising also touched Syria in 2011 after Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. However, the uprising acquired a multi-faceted dimensions in Syria, and rather than bringing hope of a positive change within political regime it perpetuated into a crisis. War between the Syrian State army and rebels became protracted and turned out to be dooms-days for the common Syrian population. Further, the involvement of ISIS made the situation more complex and difficult for the people living there. The crisis led to one of the world's largest migration of the people to neighbouring countries as well as to other parts of the world in search of a life

and survival. The situation has come to an extent where now even the countries of refuge have begun debating about the entry of refugees in their respective nation-state and their capacity to host number of refugees. Refugees bring different forms of social, economic and political problems to a country in which they enter, therefore the ever rising number of refugees in European countries and in Jordan, Lebanon and other neighbouring countries has been sending shiver down their spine. The society, economy and polity within these countries may have to face crisis situations and thus they are over-reacting, on most occasion in a violent manner.

Advent of Syrian Uprising: Causes and Motives

After the death of Hafez al-Assad, his son Bashar al-Assad, became the Syrian President in 2000 unopposed with 97% votes. His appointment raised the hope among the Syrian activists of socio-political and economic reform which gave way to "Damascus Spring". In 2001 leading activists who called for democratic reforms were arrested and imprisoned, bringing an end to the Damascus Spring. Moreover, severe drought in Syria in 2007-2010 led to unprecedented increase in poverty, unemployment and social unrest which forced around 1.5 million people to migrate from countryside to cities. Eleven years rule of Assad was marked by lack of freedom, corruption and economic breakdown. The prevailing social, economic and political conditions were serious enough to fuel resentment against the existing government. The harsh crack down on peaceful protestors by Assad's security forces raised the public anger strongly against the Assad rule. This led to an uprising which was supported by many Islamist movements who were also strongly opposed to the Assad rule.¹ Thus, what started as a series of protests by Syrian pro-democracy aspirants soon embroiled into a prolonged Syrian uprising.



Syrian Uprising: It's Transformation Into Civil War

Violence begets violence and a spark neglected burns the house. Therefore, what needs for a state in case of eruption of violence on any counts, is that it must be contained at earliest, as far as possible through negotiations and compromise. Otherwise, a protracted violence possesses the potentials of very soon engulfing the whole nation thereby leading to a civil war or revolution. History is a witness to many such resistance movements culminating into a revolution and subsequent regime change. Sometime, the situation become so vulnerable that country and its people both are found in shambles. History also reveals that on many occasion states have been dismembered owing to such violence. History also provides lessons that an uprising or disturbance in one country may also spill over into other neighbouring countries. Assad and his associates seem to have failed to learn any lessons from history.

Mohammad Bouazizi suicide protest in December 17, 2010 led to Tunisian uprising which later erupted into an Arab Uprising, engulfing Arab states one by one. A Syrian Hasan Ali Akleh inspired by Mohammad Bouazizi's suicide protest, set himself on fire on January 26, 2011 triggering the series of protests which has led to Syrian uprising.² A "Day of Rage", started at the social media led to a march in Hasan Ali Akleh's hometown Al-Hasakh, which was dispersed by the Syrian security forces. Soon after this, demonstration began taking place at the major cities and Darra emerged as the epicentre of the uprising. The conflict took the violent shape after the arrests and torture of some teenagers who painted revolutionary slogan on school wall. April 22, 2011 has been declared as the "Good Friday Massacre" when 112 demonstrators were killed during anti-government protests. The continuous use of force against the dissent brought more people and more players on the streets.

On-going Civil War: Devastation and Cost of Rebuilding

Syria from being the very beautiful state has transformed into a barren land. This is because Syria has emerged as the battle ground of many wars. Different stake holders are facing as well as contributing to war within the war. The state actors

are not only facing the war from non-state actors like international terrorist organisation and Kurdish forces but also from their own disgruntled and politically ambitious elements. Therefore, this multi-level war in Syria has brought it on the brink of crisis and virtual collapse. According to UNHCR report since the beginning of Syrian crisis, around four million people have fled the country and 7.6 million people are internally displaced, out of which 3.5 million are children.³ UNHCR thus describes Syrian Conflict as a conflict that has contributed to the world's largest refugee crisis. Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees describe it as "the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation." UN says the number of people fleeing owing to the conflict in Syria has escalated to an average of 6,000 a day during 2011—a rate not seen since the genocide in Rwanda nearly two decades ago.⁴ An estimated 5,000 people are being killed each month. The lack of restoring peace in the region even after five years of war is forcing the people to flee the war zone. As a result, the people fleeing the war zone is continuously rising. Moreover, according to UN Report by June 2013, 90,000 people had been killed which by August 2015 has increased to 250,000.⁵ Therefore, Syrian crisis has been compared as even worse than the Rwanda genocide. Syrian civil war also witnessed the massacre at different Syrian city like Aleppo, Hama, Al-Qubair, Houla. With such a huge destruction, UN says it will need \$3.2 billion to help the 13.5 million people including six million children.⁶ More recently, according to World Bank President Jim Yong Kim rebuilding the war ravaged Syria may be as much as \$180 billion.⁷ The amount itself highlight the large destruction and the extent of devastation which Syria has undergone owing to the protracted civil war and war by terrorists, and at all levels be it institution, government or people. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad put the estimated economic loss to the country from the five year war at \$200 billion.⁸ With the polarised Syrian politics and external support, it is also the matter of concern as to who would fund to rebuild the country as the major concern expressed by Kim. The extent of devastation also necessitates to understand the complexity involved on account of involvement of different actors, as peace could be built only when the parties in the conflict are interested in.



Syrian Civil War: The Actors

Syrian uprising in its initial phase was an uprising against authoritarian and corrupt government. Arab uprising and its success in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya gave a hope to the Syrian activist of their success to establish a liberal democratic and transparent government. The conflict in Syria assumed the nature of a sectarian conflict with the interference of foreign and regional powers. The entire dynamic of the conflict got transformed and became complex with the passage of time. Shia dominated Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah group lent their support to the minority Alawite sects of Assad government. Sunni which is a majority group opposing the Assad government is being supported by Sunni dominated countries of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar.

Free Syrian Army or the most popularly known as "Rebel Forces" are the group of deserters who are fighting against Assad regime. These groups are receiving financial and military support from foreign regimes particularly US and its allies (France, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar). On the other hand, Russia and its allies (Iran and Hezbollah) are supporting the existing political regime of Assad. The third party in the Syrian conflict are ISIS and Al-Nusra, the former an independent international terrorist organization and latter an organization supported by Al-Qaeda. The conflict has been added further complexity with the entry of pro-Kurdish forces; which for long have been nursing the aspirations of an independent Kurdistan curving out an area for itself from Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Moreover, the crisis also helped in the merger of Iraqi Al-Qaeda and Syrian militants as well as according to BBC report, Pakistani Taliban, who have also established their base.⁹

External Power's Interference and Their Role
It is precisely the interventions of the external powers, all with their own vested interests that has further prolonged the crisis and the conflict. The civil war has been prolonging since five years with no positive signs of abating. Reason being the entry of different stakeholders: regional actors like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey; major powers like US, Russia, Britain and France; Terrorist Organizations like ISIS and Al-Nusra. The entry of these powers has not only complicated the nature of conflict, but has also

contributed towards its sustenance. The external powers are supplying arms and ammunitions to the pro and anti-Assad forces which has accelerated the violence as a result of which country gradually slipped into civil war. The pertinent question that arises is why the external powers are interested in Syria, even though most of them carry the fig leaf of peace and tranquillity. Though every country entering into the civil war as either pro or anti-Assad forces, eye their own profit rather than saving the Syria from turning into ash.

Interests of Regional Players:

The nation-states of the West Asian region are divided into pro and anti-Assad groups and help the members of those groups. It is an oft-quoted saying that one cannot change the geography of a region or the blessings of nature. West Asia is a unique region in that sense, which has witnessed conflicts on account of its geography as well as owing to bounty of nature that has been bestowed upon the region by nature i.e. oil and gas. The region has also witnessed prolonged conflicts on account of its sectarian and ethnic fault-lines. Syria is one such conflict where most of these dimensions in one way or the other has contributed towards first its escalation and then its acceleration. Accordingly, it makes it imperative to comprehend the interests of each of the parties involved in proper perspective.

Interest of Iran- Alawite sect, to which Bashar-Al-Assad belongs to is considered as the subset of the Shiite sect of Islam.¹⁰ Iran which is the largest Shiite country in the world consider it as its responsibility to help the fellow Shiites. So, religious proximity can be considered as one of the factor of Iran's support to Assad, but certainly not the only factor. Iran backs the Alawites because it would help Iran undermine Israel's security and Saudi Arabia's interests.¹¹ Anarchy of civil war would raise the vulnerability of Israel. This is because if Israel is attacked from within Syria Israel would be left with no opposition within Syria to whom it may think of attacking.¹² Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Iran have always been involved in their own cold war and have even competed for power and influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain and now Syria. Beside this, Syria is the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement, Hezbollah.¹³ With



Saudi's pumping money to Sunni fighters in Syria, Iran backs the Alawites; thereby leaving no opportunity to limit the Saudi or Sunni influence in Syria.¹⁴

Interest of Hezbollah- Lebanon's Shia Islamist, Hezbollah has also given its support to the Assad regime along with the Iran and Russia. Their fighters have provided important battlefield support since 2013. The continued resistance to America and Israel has earned them some popularity in the region vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Lebanon's interests are revealed mostly in terms of recognition and its existence rather than any material benefit. Moreover, Lebanon would also be interested in checking the spill over of the conflict to its own country; therefore, Lebanon may have thought of an offensive posture.

Interest of Saudi Arabia- Saudi Arabia, a Sunni dominated country in the region wish to establish the entire Middle East region as unipolar region, with itself as the most dominant pole. However, it continues to face challenges from Iran, which is a Shia dominated country. This has created a situation of cold war in the entire region whose effect is seen in the neighbouring countries like Yemen, Iraq and now Syria. The Shia and Sunni cold war quite often escalates into a hot war; and Syria is the most recent casualty. In order to consolidate its position in the region Saudi Arabia will never accept or dream of a Shia dominated Middle East region. Therefore, Saudi Arabia's major interest lies in maintaining a regional order which is in its own favour.

Interest of Turkey- Turkish government since the very beginning has been the staunch critic of Assad government. They have always been critical of coalition support for the Syrian Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the banned Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which has been deemed as a terrorist group by Turkey, EU and US.¹⁵ Therefore, with the Kurdish forces also involved in war in favour of Assad, Turkey government fears that that its large number of Kurdish population may also grow restive and demand autonomy.¹⁶ Therefore, Turkish worry is the PKK or the Kurdish issue which if allowed to be in above-mentioned alliance may lead to dismemberment of Turkey with the formation of Kurdistan.

Interest of Kurd- Kurd is an Islamic ethnic community which is spread over Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Since long their demand is pending for an independent state of 'Kurdistan'. However, none of the countries in which this population resides are interested to allow dismemberment of their territory. Therefore, every time their attempts to force their demand have been brutally crushed by the country in which they live, mostly by Iraq and Turkey. The total population of Kurds is estimated to be around 35 million. According to the rough estimates of CIA Factbook 14.5 million of them reside in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, 5 to 6 million in Iraq, and less than 2 million in Syria, which adds up to close to 28 million Kurds in Kurdistan or adjacent regions.¹⁷ Turkey thus has largest number of Kurdish population on its territory and that makes it vulnerable and opposed to any alliance of its Kurdish population with other Kurdish groups in adjacent countries. The Arab uprising and now Syrian civil war provided Kurds the opportunity to begin afresh their demand once again and if possible enter into a bargaining mode for supporting one party over the other as they are regarded as good fighters. As a result the Kurdish forces are not only fighting on the side of the state actors but also the non-state actors. The bulk of Kurdish population are Sunni (mostly of the Shafi'i school), but there are significant minorities adhering to Shia Islam (especially Alevis), Yazidism, Yarsanism, Christianity and Judaism. Kurds are often dubbed as 'the largest ethnic community in the world without a State', though it has been debated as the Kurdish group is largely heterogeneous in terms of their cultural, religious, social and ideological divide. Nevertheless, the Kurds are a force to be reckoned with in the Syrian conflict.

Entry of Major Powers: Pretexts and Hidden Agenda

After the entry of regional powers in the civil war, the battle line between the major powers were also drawn and increasingly got sharpened over time. USA started patronising Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey which is often termed as 'Riyadh Alliance' by Assad. Russia allied with its long-time friend Iran, and Lebanon and has overtly stood in favour of Assad regime. The major powers entered into the civil war on the pretext of helping Syrian citizens, who are being largely displaced internally as well as from their homeland. US pretext of entering into war are



manifold: first its accusation of Assad acquiring chemical weapons and also of using it in his personal interests; second that Assad has been too harsh on his own people in the form of rebels; third that the innocent people of Syria are required to be emancipated of their sufferings; fourth to check the advancing forces of ISIS. Russia on the other hand, entered into war in Syria on account of reasons such as: bombing on ISIS as it is threat to international security. However, both US and Russia has clandestine interests: former want to have a puppet government in Damascus through which it can control the oil and gas trade and direction of the pipelines; the latter want to consolidate the political regime of Assad and wipe out the rebels on the pretext of ISIS so that Russia too can control the oil and gas trade and the directions of the pipeline.

Accordingly, in September, 2014 US led coalition started an air strike in Syria to destroy the ISIS without providing any benefit to Assad forces. Subsequently, after one year, Russia entered into the battle ground beginning air campaign against the terrorists. This also marked the beginning of blame game between both the powers. Russia was criticised for beginning air campaign against Assad opponent which killed mainly western backed rebel forces and civilians. Despite of their claim of having the common enemy that is ISIS, the two powers stands opposed to each other though clandestinely they has similar interests. Therefore, their claim to fight for humanity in Syria cannot be digested simply not even with a pinch of salt. Therefore, the real story behind the prolonged conflict in Syria could be understood only by exploring the hidden dynamics of their involvement.

Interest of US- Arab awakening provided an opportunity to topple those regimes which follow an independent foreign policy. However, the loss of pro-western regime in Tunisia and Egypt, threatened the US interest in the region. US had gone weary of its lost prominence in West Asia and was no longer willing to nurse its threat persisting in the region. According, it tried to seize the first opportunity that came its way in the form of Syrian crisis. US made an attempt to remove its threat, which is in the form of Assad's independent foreign policy. The unfolding of Syrian civil war provided an opportunity to the US and raised its hope of installing pro-west regime in Syria and tilt

the regional balance of power against Russia and Iran, and in favour of US and Saudi Arabia.¹⁸

Interest of Russia- Russia along with Iran is supporting the Assad regime with arms and ammunition. Its forceful intervention in Syria can also be understood in the context of NATO expansion. Russia has slammed the NATO forces for deploying Patriot missiles in Turkey (on the request of Ankara) and thus has reinforced their opposition with the deployment in Syria of the state-of-the art Iskander missiles, which cannot be downed by any known anti-missile system.¹⁹ Moreover, Russia wants to protect its key naval facility which it has leased at the Syrian port of Tartous, which serves as Russia's sole Mediterranean base for its Black Sea fleet and has forces at an air base in Latakia, which is President Assad's heartland.²⁰ Moreover, there are also the growing apprehension that Russia may be using Syria as a card to bring about the lifting of Western sanctions following the Ukraine crisis.²¹ Therefore, Russia is interested in preponderance of its power and military presence in the region. Syria has come as an opportunity for Russia as well.

Entry of International Terrorist Groups- Capitalising on the chaos created by the Arab Spring, militant Islam began gaining the ground in Middle East. Soon Iraq and Syria provided a huge fertile ground for ISIS, the most dangerous terrorist organisation of the world. Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi the self-proclaimed Caliphate began acquiring the large swathes of Iraq and Syria where it proclaimed the creation of Islamic State and Caliphate; claiming the loyalty of the entire Muslim world. Along with ISIS, entered another Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra front. ISIS and Al-Nusra have been fighting at times together or at times against each other. ISIS is a splinter group of erstwhile Al-Qaeda, whereas Al-Nusra is a part of Al-Qaeda. Both the terrorist organizations are interested in acquiring seat of political power in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, civil war in Syria came as an opportunity to them as well.

Peace Process in Syria

Several attempts of peace are being organised by UN to establish peace in the country. Most such attempts are failing or are non-conclusive. Such as Kofi Annan's plan in 2011 of creation of a transitional



government was rejected by both the government and rebel forces.²² Similarly, in 2012 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran makes an attempt to Syrian solution.²³ In 2013 Assad came up with peace plan that includes a national reconciliation conference and a new government and constitution with a demand that first regional and western countries stop funding and arming the rebels,²⁴ was also rejected. US-Russia jointly issued a statement that focussed on a "shared understanding" to revitalise a nationwide ceasefire in Syria and intensify the efforts to find a political solution.²⁵ As a result it saw the beginning of Geneva peace process brokered by US and Russia and backed by UN. However, the hostility of rival party towards each other led to the failure of Geneva I and II.

Reason behind the failure of Geneva I and II

The discussion on Syrian peace plan ended with no result. Though, it saw the deliberate effort from the international community at large. However, there are the factors which has contributed in the failure of peace talks which are as follows:

Firstly, the non-compromising attitude of the rival parties. Rebel forces demand no less than the removal of Assad while the Assad forces uses all its might to remain in power.

Secondly, the divergent views of major powers. The vision of the end game of Syrian crisis differ for US and Russia. For Russia establishment of Assad regime in Syria will bring peace to the country, while for US removal of Assad will help in establishing the peace in Syria.

Thirdly, lack of involvement of all the stake holders in peace process. In Syrian crisis, Assad forces/Rebel forces and US/Russia are not the only key participants. There are other stakeholders like various regional powers and non-state actors like terrorists and Kurds. A conclusive peace process will thus remain elusive without the direct involvement of all the key participants.

Fourthly, the continuation of fight on the ground. While the international community are engaged in peace talks there is no relief for the people on the ground, as the rival party continues the armed attack on each other, breaching the sanctity of peace talks. Therefore, in this hostile and competitive environment it is difficult to reach to any conclusion.

A Fresh New Initiative: Geneva-III in 2016

The failure of two meeting in Geneva in 2012 and 2014 has not deterred the harbingers of peace in Syria. Staffan De Mistura, a UN representative and international community has initiated afresh a third attempt to renew Syrian peace process. The background was prepared by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and United Nation Security Council, and the date of third round of peace process was decided. The peace talk formally started on February 1, 2016 only to be suspended after two days that is February 3, 2016. Staffan de Mistura, announced that he was suspending the process until February 25, 2016 because there was "more work to be done", with the uncertainty whether they will in fact resume.²⁶ In order to prevent this talk from failing, John Kerry and his Russian counterpart based the peace process on facilitation of "*proximity talks*" and "*cessation of hostilities*". In spite of deferring the dates, the peace process has not yet taken off in the spirit in which it should have been taken, reason being that the advantage that has accrued to Assad has encouraged him to claim, why should he participate in a peace diplomacy where the participant are determined to force a transitional government and would ask him to relinquish power.

Proximity of talks means where parties to the conflict are not directly facing off each other at negotiation table, they should be facilitated to sit in proximity for talks and negotiations through a mediator rather talking to each other. Kerry himself explains it as "you are not going to have a situation where people are sitting down at the table staring each other or shouting each other, rather you are going to have to build some process here. He laid out the firmly embedded outlines to the talks in which de Mistura, UN Syrian envoy is to shuttle back and forth between delegations and say 'ok, here's how we envision a cease-fire' to one and then return to the other side".²⁷

Cessation of hostilities means keeping the rival party at bay. It "faces the task of pulling apart combatants that have been at each other's throats in years of bitter war."²⁸ It also aims at accelerating the humanitarian aid to Syria. This clause was added to prevent the use of fragility of Syrian state by any other state to their advantage.



It is being believed that both the processes together will help in pushing the international community towards the "transition discussion" which will help in finding political solution to Syrian crisis. Peace them may not be far from Syria and may arrive soon in near future.

Unresolved Issues- Even though De Mistura, has put-up a brave face, the failure of Geneva III is looming large all over the Geneva Peace Process. This highlights the difficulties of finding a political solution to world's largest crisis. However, it needs resolving some of the unresolved issues to give peace a chance which are as follows:

Firstly, political disagreement about Syrian conflict has not changed neither within the region nor outside the region. Still the key participants continue to stand in opposition to each other like gladiators and their interests have not undergone any change.

Secondly, the most important detail that was also overlooked in Vienna talks was the fate of Assad after relinquishing the seat of authority and his role in future Syria.²⁹ He may also be frightened that US may treat Assad the way it treated Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi.

Thirdly, the proxy war being fought by Saudi Arabia and Iran has destabilised the entire West Asian region. As long as the two countries do not arrive to a solution, the peace in the entire region will continue to be a distant dream. Fact remains that the economic nature of uprisings or war has often been transformed into sectarian conflict with the entry of these two regional hawks.

Fourthly, it is next to impossible to bring the rival parties face to face and prevail upon them to negotiate peace. Once again re-election of Assad as Syrian President in April 2016 elections in government held areas; and the support of its allies have helped him in regaining the lost ground in the course of the civil war. Therefore, Assad and his negotiating team are in no hurry to return to Geneva peace talks.³⁰

Fifthly, the impending issue of Kurdistan is also an important factor in the peace process. Their demand of right to self-determination for Kurds is not going to subside given the number of their political outfits and their bargaining power. West also seem to be interested in curving out smaller states in West Asia, as it would be conducive to control and manipulations to serve their interests. Therefore, it is high time that

the international community should think of giving expression to Kurd's demand for peace in the region. This should facilitate at least one of the parties at the conflict to rest at peace; and make way for other parties to negotiate.

Prospects of Peace: Success or Failure

Leaning on the history, wherever the two major powers have involved in direct conflict, it has been difficult to establish peace there. Afghanistan is one such example. More recently Ukraine, Syria and number of Arab countries are witness to this phenomenon. Since the continuation of five year war, different peace processes have been accepted and discussed with no conclusive results. The people of Syria may no longer be interested in the process, but certainly they want peace in real sense of the term. But with the different stake holders serving their own interests fails to adhere to their plight. Rather than finding solution to the crisis on ground, the leaders are involved in arm-chair discussion and solution. The international community has still failed to address the causes which has resulted in the failure of earlier peace process. Even after five years Syrian conflict has not yet reached the level of conflict management. Therefore, in such a hostile and distrustful environment it reduces the chances any success of the on-going peace process.

What must be done?

First, the parties which have projected themselves as sages of peace in the crisis must try to do it outside the Geneva Consensus as this consensus pre-supposes the formation of a transitional political authority ousting Assad. This is well neigh impossible, especially in the present circumstances in which Assad seems to be well entrenched and his army is on the advance. Assad is not Saddam or Gaddafi, who will abandon his seat of authority and will take refuge in a friendly country of his choice and availability. It would also not be easy to get rid of him in manners of Gaddafi, Saddam or Milosevic; at least for now. Therefore, the best way is to bring first the rebels and Assad face to face on the negotiating table somewhere in Norway, more precisely at Oslo or any other neutral table.

Secondly, the two major powers Russia and USA must understand that it is peace that shall beget more of safe as well as clean oil and gas; not the sources



of energy like oil and gas that would beget them peace. Bad politics and the politics of one-upmanship must be abandoned by both the major countries and completely stay away from the 'zone of chaos'. USA must understand that it is the people of Syria who shall be allowed to decide about the fate of their rulers not any outsider. Therefore, USA must stop arming the Syrian rebels. Disarming of rebels must be made a precondition for allowing them to sit for negotiation with their demands. Russia too must not support Assad, and allow him to fight his own battle. Therefore, first a peace requires to be negotiated between USA and Russia for non-intervention in the conflict zone of Syria.

Thirdly, both USA and Russia using the instrumentality of United Nations (UN) try to prevail on regional actors to withdraw their support to either of the warring parties. This shall facilitate towards de-escalation of conflict and would subsequently make way for peace. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon must be made to understand that the war creates a danger zone in their own region, which may spill over to their countries as well thereby causing havoc if allowed to prolong. Therefore, they may collaborate for de-escalation of conflict rather than to support one against the other and contribute towards escalation of conflict. A peaceful West Asia shall be in the interests of both Shia and Sunni and other sub-sects within the region. This shall also facilitate a fair deal and peace dividend of their priciest possession i.e. oil and gas.

Fourthly, establishment of a strong State alone shall be the route to clean the influx of terrorist organizations. Therefore, if Assad and other state governments in the region are strengthened then they shall be competent enough to choke, suffocate and throw out the forces such as ISIS, Al-Nusra, and Taliban. Accordingly, the UN and other major powers of the world must explore the ways and means to strengthen the hands of state, may be with certain conditionality. Major Powers need to learn that they cannot win a war or emancipate a community by weakening the State or political authority; rather helping them and negotiating with them.

Last but not the least, conflict management alone would be a road to conflict resolution. Therefore, all interested parties first negotiate a cease fire.

Capitalism and globalization also necessitates a peaceful ambience for investment and business. Prosperity will create stakeholders for peace. Peace in turn will enhance the liberty of the people. Therefore, people of Syria must be liberated from hunger, poverty, war, miseries, and displacement rather than from Assad. Their liberation from such miseries will surely empower them to get rid of Assad if he is a bad guy for them. Therefore, economic reconstruction package on contributory basis by major Powers at the behest of UN will be more fruitful than a rigid stand of ousting Assad and then attempting peace.

The containment of Syrian conflict is sine quo non for arresting the spiralling of a new conflict in West Asia, and allowing it to degenerate into another 'Israel-Palestine' conflict. Peace must not become an illusion but descend on the people of Syria as a reality.

Footnotes

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India-Pakistan Relation- An Endless Odyssey of Turbulence

Dr. Rupa Sen

India-Pakistan relation-An endless odyssey of turbulence

The India - Pakistan fiasco has remained a flash point of conflicts and conflagration in south Asia, over six decades now. The sluggish and orthodox tune of Indian foreign policy appeared to gather some momentum under the able leadership of Indian Prime minister Narendra Damodar Modi. The chequered history of the past, begun to unwind, accomodating pragmatic ideas and their viability to ensure the plausibility of heralding, new equation and alliance betwixt the two nations.

Incessant fights within the borders and beyond has been an exhaustive endeavour, practically with no returns, for both India and Pakistan. To find respite from the environment of war and conflict and foster peace and stability instead in the zone, is essential, atleast to encourage economic business and commercial investments to survive the tremendous pace of competition in the global market. Added to it, is another challenge of braving the fatal aggressions of mindless terrorism. It is obvious that Indian diplomats engage on a desperate spree to find a way out of the dungeon. Bent upon improving bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, the former expressed their interest on that line. But amid a host of possibilities, challenges loomed to sabotage all positive attempts.

Pakistan is the hub of terrorists in south Asia, today. This country is the chief exporter of terrorism around the world, especially to India; but the Pakistani establishment protests against this diction, only to convince the world, that such facts were doctored by unethical journalism, engaged in negative propagation against them, which is false. The world is oblivious of the covert aggression by India instead, say the Pakistanis. Candidly, Pakistan has no option but to concoct tales to defend its implicit activities, and deflect mounting pressure, exerted by the

international forum to suppress the perpetrators, nurtured in their homeland. They deliberately indulge in being acrimonious, to avoid flak and avert the world attention, from manouvreing its moves and strategies adopted primarily to undermine the stability, peace and security of India; overtly or covertly Pakistan seeks to woo nations, who fund their projects against India. They cherish the ambition of bleeding India by thousand cuts and jeopardise its process of development. They have already fought a series of four wars, ever since independence in 1947 over jammu and Kashmir a province, in north India.

Actually Pakistan has their own sentiment attached to the Kashmir odyssey. They see it as a territorial issue. A piece of geographical land, wrongly demarcated during and after Independence. One reason that kept the issue alive was the social psyche adhering to it. But lack of a concrete foreign policy, towards India to resolve different issues was the primordial reason that kept peace and stability at bay. As a party to the dispute, they are prejudiced to hold a siognificant position, in solving the impasse. It is nearly impossible to fathom, how that could be possible with Pakistan having too many centres of power. It is rightly said that too many cooks spoil the broth. The Army, the ISI, terrorist groups or the drug peddlers all wish to ride their share of predominance. Pakistan even prefers a third party interface to solve the issues with India. But amongst a cache of unresolved issues, the bone of contention is Kashmir. Almost all conflicts and dissensions are premised on single agenda 'Kashmir'. One nation finds no rationale to part with it, the other seething to restore it. What followed was violent conflagration. The turmoil of six decades reconfigured and pushed the belligerants to that point of spectrum where collateral damages escalated unabettedly.

Series of Military adventurism, took a toll on the lives of thousands and displaced many more from



their hometown causing resentment and displeasure that later catapulted to sectarian frays in different parts of India. However the military exercises against India, normally led to debacle for Pakistan. A part of the nation emerged as Bangladesh in 1971. Reports also hold that people residing in POK are currently resentful of Pakistani establishment and wish to be free from their manouevrance. Does this signal of yet another secession? What if Indian diplomats take full advantage of the adverse situation? Does ethnic trouble in Sind and Baluchistan signify ease either? Does Pakistan realise that it's present approach would immensely jeopardise its political destiny?

Armed engagements that embittered the bilateral relations, may be mentioned as follows.
Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: An insurgency backed by Pakistani terrorist, in India administered Kashmir has been a constant cause for increased tensions.

Siachen Conflict in 1984. India launched operation Meghdoot to capture the Siachen glacier. In response Pakistan countered Indian army in 1985, 1987 and 1995 to retrieve the areas lost in the aggrandisement.

Sir Creek: Dispute on the interpretation of maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. After 1947 Sind became part of Pakistan and Kutch belonged to India. The boundaryline drawn, once again dissatisfied our new born neighbour.

The terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 engineered by Pakistan based terrorist organisation Lashkar-e Toiba and Jaish e-Muhammad triggered India-Pakistan stand off and propelled them to war in 2001-2002. The Mumbai attack in 2008 sponsored by ISI in Pakistan nearly pushed the nations on the verge of war which was later diffused by diplomatic moves. In 2011 Indo-Pak border shooting occurred between August and september across the LOC in Kupwara district resulting five Indian and three Pak soldiers killed. In 2013 a similar incident took place in Mendhar sector of Jammu and Kashmir following a gruesome act of beheading an Indian soldier. In 2014-15 skirmishes erupted in Arnia sector of same Jammu and kashmir killing one BSF and other soldiers plus wounded civilians in the area. Then

followed the incident at Gurudaspur in 2015 and Pathankot episode in january, 2016.

Since 2013 intensity of border skirmishes across India and Pakistan escalated. Though the incidents are scattered and casualties minimum, it shows an aggravation since 2012. In 2013 there has been 42 ceasefire violations along the LOC while in 2012 there were just 28 casualties. The increased military firing across the border elicited allegations from either sides even during ongong process for peace and cooperation. It is the weird mindset of the Army that propmts them to flex power against other nations to exhibit their military prowess. They threaten India and other high powered nations of their inclination to nuke, if required to defend itself. Such announcements send shock waves amongst others; who indulge in pacifying Pakistan by extending providences.

When military expeditions of Pakistan failed repeatedly to accomplish their mission of restoring Kashmir from India, they embarked upon the route to exporting terrorists in India to create a hullabaloo and avenge the pain of being decimated. Unable to edge over fear psychosis of losing war and land to India, Pakistan has opted for Plan B that is terrorism. Pakistan now purports terrorists to India, to quell their depression. Each time their plans are frustrated, more egoistic and recalcitrant, they become.

Currently Pakistan runs as many as 17 terror camps, chiefly belonging to Lashkar-e Toiba. These are active in POK backed by ISI in Pakistan. India however claim that the camps are manned not only by Lashkar-e Toiba but also by Hizbul Mujahideen and Jaish-e Muhammad. These camps in Pakistan are factories that breed, train and house hundreds of terrorist ready to be launched in different locations across POK, and further down to Jammu, Punjab province or even beyond. Pakistan's ISI is increasingly targetting on areas beyond Kashmir for terror attacks as they believe that strikes in these regions trigger immediate effect from Indian side.

The recent the attack at Gurudaspur in Punjab on july 2015, was engineered by Lashkar-e Toiba in Pakistan. The 2011 attack in Mumbai that was rocked by three coordinated bomb explosion that targeted



jewelry trading locations killed 26 people and injured around 130 and killed many in bomb explosion outside Delhi High Court. Both were plotted by Harkat-ul-jihadi-al-Islami. The recent attack at air base at Pathankot killing defence personnel manouevred by Masood Azhar group. Yet the foreign minister of Pakistan Shartaz Aziz faked impression of addressing terrorism. He further retreated that he had leads from India, traced the number of perpetrators and handed over to Jaish-e-Muhammad headquarters and placed Maulana Masood Azhar under detention, for his alleged involvement in the Pathankot terror attack.

The slaughter of nearly 142 innocent school children at Peshwar in January, 2015 is a proof of boomerang effect upon Pakistan for supporting miscreants. This time the innocent school children of Pakistan were victimised.

The ghastly act of the faceless terrorists forced the Pakistan Army to intensify its Taliban Zarb-e-Azab operation in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, which led to decline of Taliban operations recently. Jammatul Akhtar, a Pakistani Taliban divulged his link with the attack. The Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had been requesting Pakistan to keep away from launching insurgent attacks on his land for quiet sometime. But when all prayers fell upon deaf ears, he threatened to take the matter to UN, security Council, to tame the recalcitrant nation. Actually, fundamentalist outfits aim at dismantling democracy and introduce caliphate in Pakistan through armed struggle. Religious extremism nurtured by few perverted groups seek to pull back the nation to the vortex of feudalistic politics fed with narrow nationalism adhering to religiosity.

Describing terrorism as a shared challenge in South Asia, the United States requested all countries in the region to work in tandem to dismantle and disrupt terrorist networks and bring to justice the perpetrators of Pathankot terrorist attack. The carnage was condemned by France and Japan as well, while the later, expressed their solidarity with Government and people of India. One can easily fathom, how serious, Pakistan is, to dismantle the terror installations based on its land?

India's defensive foreign policy had made it vulnerable to Pakistani aggressions over the years; yet failed to master counter insurgency moves, and tried to sort out issues, across tables. India preferred to maintain its stance to prevent turmoil that could dislodge it from the path of economic prosperity. New Delhi, wished to stay afloat as a nation of huge tolerance, patience and perseverance.

Pakistan's socio-political milieu remained a captive to fundamentalism, that undermined progress. The education system, dominance of the ISI and Army, weak civil Governments and fundamentalist groups shunned the gates of advancement and progress. Limited industrialisation led to fragile economic condition, producing inadequate job opportunities, made poor more vulnerable and prone to do anything at the cost of money. It is urgent that its internal issues be addressed, consolidate economic development and confirming internal security by the army, before measures for deterring terrorism could be initiated.

Its instability emanates from breeding terrorism. Pakistan often raise their voice to demilitarise Kashmir. They wish for an extension of right of self determination to Kashmir, while nurturing their land as a sanctuary of terrorism themselves. If Pakistan makes such irrational demands it is equally important that they vacate the territory of POK too, held illegally, over the years. Will POK benefit with the ouster of India? What would be the fate of COK (Chinese occupied Kashmir)? Will Pakistan be able to manage all emerging crisis by herself?

The fact that Pakistan continues to use terrorism as a political tool against India, is a proof that Islamabad encourages terror leaders like Azhar and Hafiz Saeed a free run in their land. A few days ago the social media was abuzz with pictures of Lashkar-e-Toiba leaders, addressing a roomful of students in a University in Pakistan. Indian officials at UN preparing a list of terror leaders both from Pakistan and other countries around, to challenge Beijing's political expediency as a result of its close ties with Pakistan.

China is a rising power in the region. They plan to march their army through CoK, POK right



through the Karakoram pass, which is provocative for India. China believes that her access through Karakoram remains in her hand or shall be facilitated by Pakistan. She plans to apply weapons of mass destruction to destroy India if obstructed; and if Pakistan is decimated they would resist the elephant with all their might. With twin foes at the door will India be able to deter their joint force? China too has its own issues with Tibet. What if Indian Army instigates the Tibetan freedom fighters, to generate a turbulence?

Pakistan had always misused the UN, distorted the reality and portrayed a false picture of challenge in the South Asian belt. All conflict with India, ambit around acquiring Jammu and Kashmir, directly or indirectly. Added to it all their policies towards India, is leader centric in lieu of being premised upon the interest of the nation. It is a catch 22 situation for both Pakistan and India. Rightly, did MJ Akbar of India say that peace with Pakistan would remain elusive unless India is strong enough to take challenges on its stride. He is doubtful of peace between the two nations, as long as legal and territorial status quoism on Kashmir is maintained.

India had shown enough patience over the years and is still hopeful for a positive change of overtures. One can easily fathom that amid misunderstandings and mudslingings, Pakistan across our borders is certainly not a victim of terrorism as claimed, but a hostage to its own ideas, policies and plans.

A fracas emanated, sometime ago when the erstwhile chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir Farooq Abdullah asserted much against the position of India, that Pakistan occupied Kashmir, would continue to be part of Pakistan while Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India. Pakistan tried to change this status quo stance, infiltrating, anti-India terror groups, while India opted for a defensive measure; what transpired was a zero sum game.

As already mentioned, the central issue for India is cross border terrorism, for Pakistan it is nothing other than Kashmir. Hence it is urgent that India subscribes to a calibrated approach towards Pakistan to counter terrorism and also engage it to back channel with the aim of reaching army chief

Raheel Sharif who matters more than the civilian sharif.

The Pakistan-Washington relation has also to be taken into consideration. United States had always and is still a huge supplier of war materials to Pakistan. But there has been a considerable reduction in financial aid, recently. The US has given approximately 2.4 billion dollars from 2004-2010; which is now reduced to 743 million dollars. This is certainly a jolt to Pakistan. However, since Washington currently prefers to nail the Islamic state threat, it is obvious that the big nation would avoid pushing Pakistan much on anti-India terror. On the other hand India too should realize, that waging wars across the border eternally, draining a huge expenditure and other casualties, is not feasible. Therefore it is urgent that India strengthens herself both economically and militarily to deter the insurgents in this belt.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Lahore in December 2015 on Nawaj Shariff's birthday was a high handed gesture on the part of India to build normal relationship with Pakistan.

An in-depth study proves that Pakistan is never at ease with India's presence in Afghanistan and had always persuaded the US to pressure India to refrain from maintaining security footprint in Afghanistan. The reason why India refrained from supplying offensive equipment to Kabul, throughout 2015. On his visit to Kabul, Indian premier Modi clarified his intention of rejuvenating Indo-Pakistan peace process to improve bilateral prospects and reiterated that unless terrorism was weeded, peace and prosperity in Afghanistan would also remain elusive. His entourage to Russia, Kabul, Lahore reverberated the vision Manmohan Singh had imagined way back in 2007. Singh expressed his positive inclination of having breakfast in Amritsar, lunch at Lahore and dinner at Kabul while keeping all identities intact.

If problems amongst our immediate neighbours could be buried, to equip and enhance good relations the entire region could find respite from carnage of massacre. Once a peaceful ambience



prevails in the region socio-political and economic prosperity would surely follow.

But soon after Delhi had taken the maiden step to improve bilateral relations, followed the Pathankot incident which implied Pakistan is in no mood to delink terrorism, and her relationship with India is still far fetched. This resulted in indefinite suspension of bilateral dialogues. It was not until 26th April 2016, that a meeting was fixed in New Delhi. Though both sides wished to break the ice and evolve a healthy working relationship, Pakistan as usual dug up the Kashmir issue, played an irritant, that muzzled future prospects of comprehensive dialogues with India. The Pathankot episode that led to breach of trust on the part of Pakistan, could have been amended by drawing a rapprochement between the nations in question. But attitude of an incorrigible foe like Pakistan managed to stall the entire peace process. Once again bilateral relations slipped to coma.

The civilian Govt in Pakistan bears little significance to military, ISI and terrorist groups who actually calls the shots in Pakistan. Sharif is so trifled and ridiculed that he has been put up for sale at ebay in social network. The society is marked with nepotism, corruption, injustice and group interest. The Government is inept to fight the vices, unless concurred by the Army. Recently Army chief Raheel Sharif had sacked nearly six top military personnels on charges of corruption, which is commendable. He commented, 'The ongoing war against terrorism cannot bring enduring peace and stability unless corruption is not uprooted. Therefore accountability is necessary for the solidarity integrity and prosperity of Pakistan' (*Address in a military gathering Kohat, Times of India, 22 April 2016, General Sharif fires six top officers for graft*). The ease of all officers booked, though subject to proof, the initiative taken, calls for appreciation.

Currently, the political parties like Tahreek-e-Insaf and Awami Tehreek unleashing disturbance in the domestic political domain, while the army enjoys the levers of power without delivering any responsibility; the Chief of army in Pakistan surpassing the Prime Minister in popularity regarding their success against Taliban, while the drug barons

and other bigwigs of business connive to block any change intended by the establishment.

Nawaj Sharif's conciliatory policy towards India, is detested by the Army, ISI, terrorist groups, in his country. Under the circumstance, would Sharif be able to withstand the stiff opposition, from different fronts of his homeland?

The most promising effort to normalize Indo-Pakistan ties began at Lahore summit in 1999; wherein process of composite dialogue and nuclear confidence building measures were generated by AB Vajpayee and Nawaj Sharif. This was disapproved by the army and its chief Parvez Musharraf, who rejected the declaration on pretext that issue on kashmir, was excluded in the declaration. Thereafter Parvez Musharaf the then Chief of Army Staff(COAS) hatched 'kargil' to undermine the peace process and deposed the Prime minister. Later in 2008, Sharif returned home after long exile to Kabul, as opposition leader and declares a package of provisions, pro Indian to woo a section of populace who wished to bury the hatchet and move ahead in the international arena.

He soon embarked upon a mission to accord special priority to a peaceful settlement of issues with India on its agenda. He favored visa free travel for Indians and unilateral Siachen Glacier demilitarisation in May that year. His party went to the extent of connecting India with Afghanistan and energy rich Central Asia via Pakistan five years later. He bounced back to power in 2013. This provided him an opportunity to reconstruct the bond with India that eclipsed earlier. Modi and Nawaj Sharif resolved to take challenges on their stride to forge new hopes of resolving dispute over kashmir and manage other issues, like exploring new routes for trade, find prospects of investments, water crisis etc. People on both sides of the border eagerly waiting to see, how the statesman of two nations lead to ensure a lasting effect to the age old dispute. But unfortunately both sides ended up blaming one another, endlessly even in the recent meet at Delhi. The diabolical relationship seems to usher in more disappointments with little chance of friendly overtures in the offing. Unless Pakistan sheds the baggage of attitude and ego clash,



shadow boxing would continue unabated, bearing no fruit.

The positive overtures, and steps undertaken by India-Pakistan to shore up comprehensive bilateral engagements, to accelerate their plans on issues like peace and security, CBMS, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wular Barrage/Tulbul navigation project, counter terrorism, economic cooperation, narcotics control, humanitarian issues, people to people exchange, religious tourism and a host of other projects are definitely a silver lining amid dark cloud of bitterness and betrayal. But unless the nations whip up a serious plan and adhere to it with utmost diligence, all efforts would converge to a sham show.

If Peace and stability is truly the cardinal principle of Sharif's foreign policy, which he categorically mentioned at 2014 Independence speech in India he and his country should work towards it. (*TOI 17/4/16, Sharif's Panama link, could impact Pak's India Policy by Sameer Arshad*) With his pro-woman and minority welfare schemes, Nawaz Sharif has won over influential liberals who control the English press and bears an impact on making and unmaking of Government in Islamabad. Moreover Sharif has directed his ministers and aides to avoid uttering anti Indian statements or kick up a sentiment of animus that could stall, the resumed peace talks with Bharat.

Sharif aims to gear up the peace building measures and is quiet optimistic of its consequences. He is convinced of better ties with India that would benefit the entire region. Analyst hold that it is certainly a positive development that Pakistan and India agreed to resume comprehensive dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues. The question is will Sharif remain saddled to power, causing displeasure of the army, ISI, drug mafias and terror groups, to fulfill his resolutions?

Candidly speaking the socio, economic and political condition in Pakistan, is quiet volatile and needs oxygen to spring back to life. Political leaders like Sharif have begun to realise, that their antagonistic attitude towards India has dwindled the economy and weakened the political milieu. A huge amount of

budget devoted to upgrade defence capabilities faltered the other aspects of development too, ensuring a trailing effect on Pakistan compared to India.

Another reason to extend peaceful relation with India is China factor. The dragon country is a growing power in the region and is on a spree of making huge investments in the neighbourhood. This nation is pressurising Pakistan so that Gilgit and Baltistan in the Indian territory could be used through them to construct dry port, thermal station, highways, and dig tunnels through mountains for their benefit. They wish to run a corridor from Xinjiang to Arabian sea; and the route would be from Gilgit Baltistan and end at Gwadar port. Baluchistan and Sind are two trouble torn areas, ravaged by ethnic conflicts.

China is wary of making foray into commercial ventures in the region unless it is free from challenges and obstructions. Herein lie the importance of forging a working relation with India to facilitate the prospect of China and of course Pakistan itself.

No matter what the magnitude of challenge is, India should gather enough courage and capability to deter the asymmetrical attacks on her. She should not relent until the menace of terror and horror of military adventurism abounds and haunts our nation. The road ahead may be bumpy, yet our spirits should be high. Peace is elusive not impossible and we shall attain it.

Measures to manage conflict

A new chapter should unfold fostering bilateral and regional cooperation between India and Pakistan. It is high time that both realize how prolonged political imbroglios impaired, regional cooperation in South Asia, for more than sixty years.

Amid an ocean of maladies, circumventing the nations, posing serious challenges, yet some mechanism to survive the crisis, overtly or covertly is urgent to manage the ongoing conflict.

Terrorist organizations are rampant both within and across the two nations. Militants often use crude local explosives materials like ammonia



nitrates, hydrogen peroxide and slurry, to improvise explosives anywhere in India. The state apparatus unable to combat the mindless mayhem has inundated the sentiments of people unabatedly, causing alienation between people and Government. This is particularly true about Kashmir, that remained hostage to long years of proxy war; while regional administration stayed unfazed. The hiatus that evolved is far from being bridged. Thus the process of constant engagement is important to woo the influential section of Kashmiri mind. It is unfortunate to find conflicting nations vying to reap political benefit, at the behest of victims reeling in the conundrums of dissent politics.

The Pakistani politicians are normally reluctant to engage in dialogues with India. They embark upon bilateral talks with India, only when they find themselves in adversity. They do so under duress, pressurised by the international community (especially USA). In either cases they moot the issue on Kashmir and seek to draw political mileage from the deliberation that follows. This shadow boxing centering around the valley, must cease. They should try and look beyond Kashmir, mingled in the relationship. If economic opportunities could be provided to the jobless, better education imparted to suit the job market and a fillip to trade and commerce could be ensured in the conflict zones, conditions would surely improve. To settle issues across the borders it is essential that the home turf is peaceful, stable and satisfied. Unless the unrest within seizes to exist, normal thoughts of repairing past faults, across the border, would continue dwindling.

Besides, promotion of tourism, cultural and entertaining programs, using soft powers like employing icons from film or sports world to ease people to people contact ought to be encouraged to dissipate false beliefs, surging in the minds of people caught in the quagmire. Soft power mechanisms, often outmatch Track II diplomacy to mend and generate countering hegemony of civil society as a challenge to hegemony of the state.

Track-II diplomacies spans from confidence building measures, across LOC interaction, Siachen dispute, sharing water of Indus, expansion of trade between India and Pakistan, joint mechanism to

counter terrorism etc, may help in reducing scope of conflagration of conflicts by shrewd diplomacy of high officials; but people to people interaction tains in emotions and psychological feel. Meanwhile public in Pakistan should be stimulated and sensitised, to edge upon the dictates of the army and ISI.

Another path in this direction is to engage with Pakistan through diplomatic channels; using back channel and people to people contact, to ease the impasse between India and Pakistan. The nations had remained a hostage to their own line of thinking; shut the possibilities of *cul de sac* repeatedly. Mani Shankar Iyer once commented, that the only way to resolve dispute was through dialogues. India should continue engaging Pakistan in talks and identify areas where they could work in collaboration. We can ill afford to forget that our relationships is largely jinxed by tragic legacy of partition. And today India is struck with twin problem of fighting enemies both within the country and across. Nevertheless, India ought to continue her policy of containment and engagement relentlessly.

We need to plug our loopholes rapidly. We need to shore up our intelligence and fine tune our response with effectiveness. Our chain of command regarding security questions should be lapped up. Special garrison of trained combat commandoes be prepared to counter any challenge that emerges. India should rise above emotions and strengthen its capability to counter terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. New Delhi has recently stated that unless Pakistan stops supporting and staging terrorism, talks over Kashmir would not happen. Unless Pakistan convinces us of a specific policy, it is difficult for India to reciprocate on any front to give a fillip to bilateral relations.

On the contrary, Pakistan alleges, India for impeding prospects of normalisation of bilateral relations. Pakistan's UN representative alleged that India suspends talks between two countries on flimsy grounds. The said representative, pointed that despite Pakistan's willingness to resume broad based, comprehensive dialogue, India kept shying from extending, expected cooperation. He reiterated that defeating militant groups, propell the economy forward, and build a peaceful neighbourhood, including



promotion of peace and security in Afghanistan and normalisation of relation with India on the basis of resolution of outstanding disputes were their utmost priority. (*TOI 16/4/16, India attitude hurts talks bid: Pakistan*). But serious talks, get stuck in the vortex of conditionalities, allegations and counter allegations, the leaders of both the nations, often adopt the strategy of one step forward two steps backwards, signalling the impression of alighting the right step, but what actually transpires is yet to be seen. The Pathankot episode ushered a change in the routine engagement of Pakistan with India. But all initiatives fizzled out as soon it began to surface. One light of hope flicked, when Pakistan corroborated the link of Jaish e Mohhamad in the incident at Pathankot, atleast initially, instead of mincing words.

Dearth of eligible leadership, unleashed a sort of political vacuum, in Pakistan. Here the army runs the Government and not viceversa. They detest concrete long term economic reforms that hinders the mission of growth peace and prosperity. Gripped by insecurity, that developments would reduce the predominance of military is why army stalls progress under its boot. Unless the civil Government in Pakistan gathers the potentiality to engage talks with India peace would remain elusive. It is necessary for Pakistan to dislodge the Army from its foothold and devote confidence towards an elected Government. The government should crack down upon the perpetrators of terrorism with seriousness, to convince India of its good intension. Militants should not be allowed to sabotage peace process. Pakistan should enforce stringent rules to fix the terrorist. The perpetrators ought to be booked under rigorous rules. Besides the country should subscribe to certain confidence building measures to ascertain the international community of its good intensions. A five layer technological plan has been recently tabled and considered by Government of India to secure Indo-Pakistan border to combat the continuous infiltration of Pakistan to India across 2900km in the western border.

A plan to build Comprehensive vs Integrated Border Management system(CIBMS) for 24 hours seven days, three sixty five days surveillance of border through technology.

As a measure to engage in peace process, India planned to lock the western border. As part of the plan day CCTV cameras thermal image devices, sophisticated night vision devices, battlefield surveillance radar, underground monitoring sensors and lesser barriers would be placed in every nook and corner of the border which will track and trace all movement from the other side. The integrated set up would ensure that if one device failed the other would instantly alert the control room. The entire project would be regulated by control rooms located 5-10km distance so that any intrusion could be recorded and alert the BSF to jump into action.

Ban-ki-Moon, the Secretary General of UNO suggested few measures to arrest growing spate of terrorism amid the two nations in Asia. Since economic and political deprivation breeds dissent and stifles human rights, it is necessary that nations caught in the quagmire of violence and extremism, should make additional effort to ensure **good governance**. Rules and regulations ought to be given priority. Political participation widened and ensured. Quality education and decent jobs provided and women be protected and empowered. The potential of young should be tapped so that they foster peace building process.

Secondly principled leadership and effective institutions may work in tandem to promote peace. The root of all malaise is deprivation. Corruption and injustice aggravates dissent—leading to alienation. The government should listen to grievances of people try to address and build inclusive institutions accountable to people. Thirdly, both should uphold Human rights for all. All humanitarian actors at local, regional, national and global levels may club together to make the mission replete. Storm (*Times of India dt20/1/16, unite against violent extremism by Ban-ki-moon*).

The UN should lap up its levers to control conflict and violence before we conceive a plan to forge a global partnership to settle the dust of a roaring

Conclusion

Currently the strained, Indo-Pakistan relation that signalled reconciliation seems to have sunk in the abyss of oblivion. Even if genuine initiatives were



undertaken by India, all process of amelioration reached a point of no hope, with unyielding ways of Pakistani attitude. Sheer arrogance on both sides failed bilateral talks repeatedly. This signifies that neither India nor Pakistan is inclined to resolve issues adhering to its relation. This also points to the fact that both the nations lack specific policies to resolve the impasse regarding Kashmir. When two nations embark on the path of rigidity and apathy; stuck in the vortex of conditionalities, status quoism is the best bait. With Pakistan being a hostage, to several centres of power; the army, ISI and militants camped in their homeland calling the shots peace and stability between the two countries would remain a far cry. As far as terrorism is concerned, India should club with other nations of the world to clamp down on insurgency activities of Pakistan. She should send stern signals that terrorist attacks upon her would be meted out in the hardest manner.

But before that we must deploy dominant war fighting capabilities to deter asymmetrical adventurism, of Pakistan. India should up its ante in the process and strengthen defence acquisition process. India needs to evolve a well defined doctrine for limited war against a nuclear backdrop that would escalate expenditure of sponsoring terrorism.

India should change her approach as a regional power while dealing with Pakistan. She may encourage increased cultural ties with Pakistan and China; and foster people to people interaction; through student exchange programme, NSS projects in foreign land, exchange of musical concerts, dance, drama and symposiums on literature. She could seek the cooperation of China to counter insurgent attacks. India has already taken up the Masood Azhar issue with China at a higher level.

Washington still supports Islamabad with consortium of armaments billions of dollars as aid till date. The US is aware of movements of ISI, and is in no mood to enrage the Pakistan Government and their allies by pressurising them to clamp down on terrorist focussing India. The attack on Camp Chapman in 2009 was executed by Khalil Abu Mulal-al-Balawi an agent whom CIA tried to use to infiltrate al-Qaida in Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden. But Khalil was turned around by Haqqani group, a terrorist proxy for

Pakistani intelligence Agency. Washington knew ISI had engineered the attack on the CIA post, but preferred to divert its attention to bigger agenda on its anvil.

With Pakistan indicating no sign of moving away from anti India terror policies while rest of the world remain disinterested, India would have to try on external levers of power to force Islamabad change its stance. India needs to link Pakistans terrorism to wider network of global terror to spin the game around.

India needs to deter terrorist attacks strongly, instead of chasing for solutions after being attacked. Counter terror mechanism such as sanctions committees that act on behalf of international community need to build trust, not just engage in acrimony and defamation of one another. Territorial rift being the crux of dissension between India and Pakistan, it is high time that both nations should overcome mere tactical resistance strategies and vouch for real practical and plausible ways to mitigate the conflict. An expert on politics of Pakistan, Satish Lamba rightly said that multiple centres of power in Pakistan shall undermine all possible prospects of evolving a bonhomie with Jinnahs Pak-i-stan.

Unless the attitude and approach changes across the borders, hope for a turbulent free Indo-Pakistan relation or a strong South Asia would remain a far cry.

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Conflicts in Africa: Case Study on Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda

Dr. Vichitra Gupta

Africa despite having rich natural resources and wealth is pushed to poverty, backwardness, debt, lack of education and healthcare facilities. Many regions of Africa have been involved in a series of conflicts, internal and external since decades. Africa is still facing political instability, famines, violence, death toll, human rights violation, political corruption, no respect of rule of law, internal rebellions, external interventions etc. Weak state structures prevailing in Africa lead to 'failed states'. Despite the series of conflicts in African regions and high number of death toll, Africa lacked media attention. In the world media outlets, Africa gets only 10% of the coverage. From 1990 to 2007 the conflict death rate was too high that if such a destruction and death had been in Europe, people might have started calling it World War III and the media from entire world had started covering the issues, world agencies and other nations had stepped in to provide aid, mediate and try to diffuse the situation.

Hawkins said "The death toll from conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is literally one thousand times greater than that in Israel Palestine. Yet it is the latter that is the object of attention and for media coverage.....and where the intricacies and nuances of the conflict, political situation and peace processes are almost obsessively analysed and presented, African conflicts are brushed off and dismissed as being chaotic and worthy of some vague pity or humanitarian concern, but rarely of any in-depth political analysis."¹ In the International affairs, all the nations have direct or indirect influence over each other; hence it is important to present such issues as happening in Africa, broadly and contextually.

Root Causes of ongoing conflicts in Africa

The Legacy of European Colonialism

In 1870, in order to prevent conflict amongst themselves, European nations partitioned the continent of Africa, created artificial boundaries for their

purpose without realising the cultural and ethnic identities over there. Consequently, regions that later on turned into nations were created with different ethnic groups who were neither able to accommodate themselves nor were able to provide for cultural and ethnic diversity. Identity crisis, political cleavages, mutual jealousies, struggle for power dominance resulted into series of conflicts after independence. Colonial powers intended to exploit the natural resources and wealth from Africa. To run the administration they needed to develop infrastructure, build roads, railways, highways, and telecom, telegraph system etc and establish and improve education system so as to recruit the administrators. In the process of establishing administrative system the colonialists unintentionally tend to civilize the indigenous people as was the case in Asian colonies where the local people could get some development base at the time of independence. Such a process of civilization lacked in Africa.

In Africa, colonialists did not want to spend anything over administration so as to gain huge profits only. They used the local power structures, the African traditions to run the administration, the process that could be more acceptable to local inhabitants. Different ethnic groups, entities and factions struggled to gain position of power in European administration. They started legitimizing their claims of power by emphasizing their own ethnic community to be traditionally or ceremonially the centre of power. Hence the conflict for access to power and other benefits began at that time only that was fanned by 'divide & conquer' technique of the colonialists. The system was favourable to the colonialist as they need not spend any money on salaries of the administrators or on developing infrastructure. Moreover the local power structures were able to grab more forced labour to extract natural wealth for the colonialists and a portion of it for themselves.



Ethnicity and Tribal Identities

In the disguise of respecting customary political structures, the colonialists pushed Africa into the restructured moment of its past that hindered the development for decades to come. Colonialists integrated tribalism into new political geography. Tribes became a passion, a matter of pride for the Africans. At the time when every European had his belonging to a nation, every African had to belong himself to a tribe, a cultural unit established by customary law with a common language. This notion of tribalism pushed Africa to more backwardness, taking them away from civilizing process as they used to feel proud of their tribe, associated in power alliance with colonialists. Tribes kept on fighting with each other to gain political favours from the colonialist. They were well contended with their customary land rights and the political power given by the colonialists to them. They used that power to enslave their fellow African people of the other tribes in order to serve the interests of the colonialists. To prove their loyalty to the colonialist, they plundered their own resources to create wealth for the colonizer by being too harsh towards their own local brethrens. These local hierarchies attained the positions, dominance, status and wealth that were impossible for them otherwise. In some areas, corrupt and inefficient local officials were promoted to power. Tribal identities became too strong during colonialism.

During the Second World War, the European powers weakened themselves by fighting amongst them and in that process they were not able to put strong hold on their colonies. The revolutionary leaders in the colonies raised the slogans of independence that filled the indigenous people with the feelings of patriotism and nationalism and they realized the myth of omnipotence of Europeans and strength of their own culture and civilization. In Algeria where French had imposed their own culture and education, Frantz Fanon emphasised to throw off the colonial culture and searching down to the roots of their own culture. In the process of decolonisation the indigenous people united themselves for the cause of independence by searching their own roots of national bonding in order to turn down the colonialists. In that process, people of different ethnic groups came together but soon after independence they started asserting the supremacy of their own community. They relied on

their own ethnic identity, their traditional and ceremonial power centres that led to a series of conflicts. These ethnic identities are not yet over decades after independence. Some African leaders tried to counter tribalism by proclaiming One Party State so that all the parties are intertwined into one single party and Africa could proceed to the path of development. But One Party Rule could not hold the shared community feelings. Tribal rivalries continued to such a level that from 1960 to 2003, 107 African leaders were overthrown, jailed or exiled leading to various conflicts. The mistrust between the clans, uncertainty about each others' intentions lead to serious conflicts. Each clan tries to build up its weaponry to protect oneself from the possible attack of the other clan group. Piling up of axes, machine guns, machetes etc by both the sides put them in a position that even a single spark of fight turns into a big conflict in neighbourhood and may engulf the entire region consequently. The four centuries of enslavement have seized the cultural, ethical and social essence of African continent.

Intervention from neighbouring countries

Neighbouring countries keep on intervening in each others' internal affairs. When one ethnic community gets dominant position in power, the other one flees and takes shelter in the neighbouring country, reorganises itself from there to launch attacks upon the home country. Their home country in retaliation provides support to the rebels of the country who had provided shelter to the rebels of the home country, as had happened in case of Congo and Rwanda. Hutus from Rwanda took shelter in Congo; Rwanda in turn supported Congo rebels in Congo civil wars.

Economic backwardness and Poverty

Tribalism became too deep rooted in African soil that has blocked all the roads to development, modernity and education. Due to poverty people are more interested in plundering and pillage that is possible at the time of war only. Lack of education does not allow them to learn the ideals of democracy and fraternity. Instead of accommodating the dissent, they try to curb and crush any opposition. Despite having rich natural resources, they are not able to explore them due to lack of technological education.



Conflict between Head of State and the Rebels
Other type of conflict emerges between Head of the State and the rebels who could not find prominent place in political power or are unable to get hold over the economic resources of the area. The rich resources that could be utilized for the development of the nation were wasted in funding the conflicts either by rebels or by Head of the State. The rebels wage wars of succession, occupy certain area and use resources of that area to fund conflicts. Out of that fund they create their own fortress by organising their own army. They also pick up the factions of state army who were underpaid. The rebels often funded by foreign powers try to seize the capital city by overthrowing the Head of the State to occupy the Presidential Palace. Rulers being suspicious of the army that the army general may not dispose him, pay less salary to the army so that the army remains dependent upon the Presidential Palace Patronage. Weakening of army and police leads to weak state that in turn is unable to suppress rebellion. Sometimes State military and police instead of curbing these clashes, escalate them by fomenting ethnic clashes. Military gets split into factions during any civil war that leads to serious bloodbath. In the first 20 years after independence from 1960-1980, there were around 72 military coups and 13 Presidential assassinations in Africa.

Weak State Structure

Weak State institution leads to failed states. Absence of rule of law, rebellions, violence including rape, disruption of humanitarian assistance, pillage, targeting harvests, extortion, planned and coordinated attacks, tortures etc. result into poverty, famines, bloodbath and epidemics. In such a failed state, the situation arises when the state army gets replaced by militia army, armed with plundered weaponry of the State army. Liberia, Somalia Sierra Leone, Congo, Brazzaville Democratic Republic of Congo experienced such situation.

Foreign Intervention

Super powers took advantage of the weak state structures prevailing in Africa. As a part of their Cold War strategy, they kept on intervening in the internal affairs of African states, so as to gain control over political and economic system of Africa, gaining access to rich natural resources and pillage of

minerals, diamonds etc. Though the foreign nations have been pillaging the wealth of Africa by taking advantage of such conflicts, they vilify the African states. J. Brian Atwood, former head of the U.S. Foreign Aid Agency, USAID commented that "the failed states that include a number of African countries suffering from conflict threaten our nation. They cost us too much. They create diseases that impact on us. They destabilize other nations. They stymie economic growth and they deny us economic opportunity in the largest new market place, the developing world."²

Case Studies

Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) located in Central Africa, rich in natural resources but deep rooted in political instability, corruption and colonial exploitation suffers from lack of infrastructure and development.

In Democratic Republic of Congo, the basic reason behind the conflicts is the scramble to seek the control over rich resources of the country such as water, minerals, diamonds, cotton, cassiterite, tin, copper, timber etc. Many national and international corporations find their own interests in supporting the conflicts prevailing in Congo (formerly Zaire). Despite the rich resources, local inhabitants of Congo live the life of slavery and the country suffers from economic instability, indebtedness and poverty. Resources are either exploited by multinational corporations or are utilized to fund the conflicts. Due to Congo's rich natural resources, financing the conflict becomes very easy. Rebels control the resources of a certain area and set up financial, administrative and trading bodies over there. The head of the state on the other hand, by controlling the resources of areas under his control finances his side of conflict. Externally, multinational corporations from rich nations try to gain profits from such conflicts. Instead of making an effort to resolve the crisis, they fuel it, just to gain access to the booty.

Congolese problem dates back to the phase of colonialism in 1885 when Belgian King Leopold II imposed the colonial rule. He acquired Congo at Berlin Conference in 1885 and made it his private property to extract wealth from there by brutalizing the local population. They were forced to produce rubber so as to create an international market of rubber tires



from Congo that provided a big fortune to him. Though he never visited Congo even once, he looted the region's natural resources, accrued vast personal wealth by enslaving the local inhabitants. Forced labour was a practice to exploit rubber, ivory, diamond and timber resources. Human rights violations were committed to such a gruesome level of chopping the limbs, taking out one's eye, chopping an ear etc. Due to the suppression and brutalisation of indigenous people, millions of Congolese died of the diseases that wiped out half of the population of Congo. In 1908 due to international pressure, Belgian Parliament took over Congo from King Leopold, named it Congo Free State and exercised its colonial authority over Belgian Congo. The exploitation of wealth and mineral resources continued as usual during the colonial rule of Belgian Parliament but healthcare and basic education was also taken care of. Though the forced labour and slave trade continued but brutalities were minimised. Even after independence with the change of power in different hands of successive political administration and military authorities, the inhabitants of the region are still suffering slave labour and human rights abuses. The inhabitants have hardly benefitted from their rich resources. Either the political administrator of the region or the countries abroad have been benefitting themselves by accruing personal wealth from the rich resources of Congo. The local inhabitants do not enjoy any economic rights. In June 1961, Congo got independence from Belgian Colonial rule. Patrice Lumumba took over the charge as first Prime Minister. Due to rich natural resources, the superpowers had deep interests in the region and also as part of their Cold War strategy, the foreign nations kept on intervening in the affairs of DRC. Lumumba being non-aligned was of no use to the west. Within a few months Lumumba was overthrown, he was removed from office by President Kasavabu on 5th Sept 1960 but Lumumba declared this action unconstitutional. Taking advantage of this leadership crisis Joseph Mobutu, chief of New Congo Army created a mutiny through his loyal soldiers. He arrested Lumumba and neutralized Kasavabu. Mobutu held a referendum in 1965, conferring all the powers to himself. He changed the country's name to Democratic Republic of Congo, rechanged the name to Zaire in 1971. Mobutu being a staunch anti-communist was supported by US and the West. America provided 300 million for weapons and 100

million for military training to Mobutu regime. Mobutu instead of focussing upon his people's development used American Weaponry to suppress his own people and pillage his own nation's wealth. Large proportion of wealth from copper and cobalt company Gecamines did not go to the state treasury but to the pocket of President Mobutu and his allies. Though America started raising attention to human rights protection and democratic reform of the regime as part of its idealist policy, more focus was on US economic and strategic interests since Congo could provide transportation route as it lies in centre of the continent. Mobutu established one party state and periodically held elections in which he used to be the only candidate. Nobody else could dare to file nomination against him. Mobutu, hence, was to be declared elected unopposed.

Though some political stability was achieved, but human rights violations, corruption, mismanagement continued. Kleptocracy was followed during Mobutu's regime where the person in power embezzles the public fund and enjoys autocratic and dictatorial rule. Although Mobutu tried to introduce democratic reforms by declaring the Third Republic in 1990 but all those were just eyewash.

After three decades of Mobutu's brutal regime, he was overthrown by Laurent Kabila in 1997 with Rwandan support. The incident is well-known as First Congo Civil War. Two successive civil wars were raged in Congo. The first one occurred in 1996 that continued for six months, three weeks and one day, bringing an end to Mobutu's regime in January 1997. Soon after Kabila took over the power, he was accused of corruption, mismanagement, dictatorship etc. leading to Second Congo Civil War that was raged on 2nd August 1998. It continued for four years, eleven months, two weeks and two days. In 1998, the conflict took a serious turn when the rebels took control of one-third of the territory. Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad supported Kabila while on the other hand the rebels were supported by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi governments. The conflict in turn involved seven nations. Later on Chad and Sudan also joined the war. Rwanda supported the rebels of Congo as it was suspicious that Rwanda's rebellion ethnic group Hutu Interahamwe, who had slaughtered nearly 8,00,000 people from Tutsi Rwandan's ethnic group,



were being supported by Congo. Tutsi's by reorganising themselves ousted Hutus from power due to which Hutus took shelter in Congo. The Hutus were also launching attacks from Congo to their home country Rwanda. Rwanda in turn supported Congo rebels and justified their action as necessary to secure their borders. The critics on the other hand termed it as an excuse just to seek control over Congolese diamond mines by deploying 20,000 troops. Ugandan government though did not seek any benefit of rich resources of Congo, but the citizens of Uganda were gaining certain benefits from it. The Second Civil War ended in 2003. Laurent Kabilas was replaced by his son Joseph Kabilas as President. Lusaka Peace Conference was convened to make a peace agreement that was signed by DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On 30th July 2006, first multi-party elections were held in DRC in which Joseph Kabilas won and was sworn in as President.

Congo Civil Wars have been termed as the deadliest wars in the modern African history. Around two million people had been displaced from their homes due to wars. In the wars, violence, rape, bloodshed, death toll occurred to a great extent. 2.7-5.4 million deaths of Congolese were reported from 1998-2008. Two thousand Ugandan deaths and four thousand rebel casualties were reported in the Second War only. Despite the official end to the war, violence continued in many regions.³ Around one thousand people died daily in 2004 from malnutrition and diseases. The war rapes created another problem of HIV infection. The infected mothers gave birth to handicapped children.

The political situation seemed to be peaceful but it was not so in actual. Laurent Nkunda, former General in the Armed Forces of DRC in Kivu, a rebel Tutsi, along with the soldiers that were loyal to him, formed the Congress for the Defence of People (CNDP) which initiated conflict against the government that is well known as Kivu Conflict backed again by Rwanda so as to tackle the Hutu group in Congo. Nkunda occupied North of Lake Kivu in 2007 where he established his headquarters. He led rebels that fought with FDLR (Hutu group) and the army of DRC. He was aiming to capture the city of Goma. Congo alleged that he was receiving aid

from Rwanda. Fighting displaced two million people, large food shortage and humanitarian crisis of catastrophic dimension.⁴ In November 2008, Nkunda threatened President Kabilas that he would topple the government if negotiations were not held. On 22nd January 2009, a deal was signed between Kabilas and Kagame that Nkunda would be arrested and in return DRC would uproot FDLR militants (the Hutu rebel group) in Congo. Nkunda was put to house arrest. CNDP in turn signed peace treaty with government by integrating all the soldiers into national army and turning their group into political party. The government released all the imprisoned members in exchange.

In 2012 again, the leader of CNDP, Bosco Ntaganda along with troops M23 (rebel group, March 23 movement) loyal to him mutinied accusing the violation of treaty by government. The rebellions occupied provincial capital of Goma. Rwanda was accused of supporting rebel groups to gain access to rich resources of Congo. In March 2013 the United Nations' Security Council authorised United Nations Force Intervention Brigade, the first offensive United Nations peacekeeping unit, to neutralise armed groups.⁵ On 5th Nov 2013, M23 declared an end to insurgency. United Nations initiated a peace deal that was signed by 11 African nations including Uganda and Rwanda who have been accused of supporting the rebels time to time, though both the nations have been denying the allegations. The deal had two significant parts. First was for Congo to strengthen its government and administration. The second part was a commitment from neighbouring countries to refrain from supporting rebels and intervening in Congo's internal affairs.⁶

In 2015 again major protests broke out demanding Joseph Kabilas to step down. A law was passed by the lower house that until the national census is completed, Kabilas shall remain in power. Conducting the national census takes years to complete, hence Kabilas would skip the planned 2016 elections. Due to mass protests, the Upper House passed the law omitting controversial census clause. After that the opposition called off the protests. Protests and rebellions are suppressed for the time being and a slender or fragile peace is prevailing in Congo at present.



Though the peace is somehow maintained in Congo but people in Congo continue to die at the rate of about 45,000 per month. The numbers of people dead due to prolonged conflict are estimated at 9 lakh to 54 lakh.⁷ Half of the persons died are children under five years of age. More than 4,00,000 women have been raped in Congo every year. The weapon bearers either from army or from belligerents kill civilians, destroy property and create widespread sexual violence.⁸

Conflict in Rwanda

Rwanda was assigned to Germany in 1884 through Berlin Conference. Germany initially administered Rwanda through the monarchy only. King Yuhiv Musinga was happy with the system as the colonialists did not dethrone him. During World War I, Belgian took control of Rwanda and Burundi. After the War, Rwanda was formally handed over to Belgian by the League of Nations' Mandate. In the beginning, Belgians governed Rwanda through monarchy but in 1926 they concentrated the administration in chieftaincy on the lines of Congo. Two major ethnic groups in Rwanda were the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Tutsi community, believed to have migrated from Ethiopia, seemed to be racially superior, elite and more Caucasian than the Hutus. Colonial administration engaged the Tutsi in the administrative works that established the Tutsi supremacy, thereby marginalising the Hutu. In 1935, identity cards were issued labelling the ethnic identity. Wealthy Hutu could become honorary Tutsi. Hence being Tutsi became a matter of pride.

After World War II, Catholic missionaries started educating, modernising and thereby emancipating Hutu. This led to the formation of Hutu educated elite groups as a counterbalance to Tutsi. In 1957, Hutu scholars wrote 'Bahutu Manifesto' that formally labelled both the communities as separate, contending and antithetical races. They identified their problem as "indigenous racial problem" of Rwanda as the social, political, and economic "monopoly which is held by one race, the Tutsi."⁹ Hutu called for transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu. The growing influence of Hutu alerted Tutsi who started demanding independence at their terms. In 1960 Belgian colonists, in order to overturn Tutsi demand

of freedom starting backing the Hutu by replacing most of the Tutsi chiefs with Hutu. They arranged commune elections in which Hutu got the majority. Hutu-dominated Republic was created by deposing the King. Thereafter in 1962, the country got independence and Hutu formed the formal government after the colonialists left. Being scared of Hutu dominance, Tutsi started fleeing from Rwanda taking refuge in neighbouring countries so as to escape Hutu violence. While being refugees in neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi they organized armed groups, Inyeji (cockroaches) that kept on launching unsuccessful attacks on Rwanda. These resulted into more Tutsi killings and exiles, in retaliation from the Hutu. The indiscriminate killings of Tutsi were reduced in 1973 after Habyarimana, who was not a hardliner, resumed the office of President following a coup.

In 1980 group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda under the banner of Rwandan Patriotic Front planned an invasion of Rwanda. France and Zaire supported Rwanda to cordon off the invasion. The leader Rwigyema was killed the third day of attack. Paul Kagame took the command of RPF and retreated from there to Northern Rwanda. From there he reorganised his forces and held a surprise attack on the northern town of Ruhengiri, captured it for one day and then retreated again to the forests. RPF kept on raging guerrilla war, but could get any significant gains. In 1992 RPF started peace negotiation with Rwandan government in Arusha but after 1993 large scale violence against Tutsi, RPF suspended peace talks and launched a major attack acquiring a large portion of land in Northern Rwanda. Peace negotiations were resumed known as Arusha Accords that gave RPF positions in Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG). UN Peace Keeping Force arrived in Rwanda; it was called United Nations' Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). RPF was given a base in the National Parliament building in Kigali. President Habriyamana started removing the hardliners from senior positions but he could not gain success. The Hutus extremists started plotting against President as they were worried that the President may include Tutsi in the government. The youth militia could not tolerate the peace accord and



Tutsi inclusion in the government. This hatred and intolerance culminated in Rwandan civil war well-known as Rwanda Genocide in 1994. On April 6, 1994 the Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane was shot down killing everyone on board. Prime Minister Agathe Vwilingiyimana was next in line but the Crisis committee that was formed immediately after the death of the President refused to recognise her, stating that she does not enjoy peoples' confidence. UNAMIR sent a team of Belgian soldiers to guard PM Agathe so that she could address the nation on radio station but she was not allowed to do so. She and the Belgian soldiers guarding her were killed. The gruesome genocide occurred leading to mass scale killing of Tutsi and even moderate Hutus. Anybody with Tutsi ID card was killed. Any Hutu sympathetic to Tutsi was also killed. Tutsi and Hutu lived as neighbours hence it was easy for Hutu civilians to recognise and kill the Tutsi people. The Head of the crisis committee Thoneste Bagosora who took over after President Habyarimana's death was the main authority to commit the genocide. Gender centred violence such as rape of Tutsi women was also carried out in massive numbers. Sexual mutilation was also done after rape so as to destroy the reproductive capability of the Tutsi women in order to restrict the Tutsi population.

On 7th April, RPF commander Paul Kagame warned the Crisis Committee of a civil war if the killings were not stopped. RPF attacked from northern side on three fronts. Various attempts were made by UNAMIR for ceasefire but Kagame insisted that first of all the killings of Tutsi should be stopped only then he would accept ceasefire. RPF kept on fighting till the month of June, gained significant territory and rescued many Tutsi civilians. RPF defeated Rwandan forces in Kigali on 4th July. By end of July 1994, RPF defeated the Rwandan government forcing the interim government of Hutu to exile in Zaire, thereby ending the genocide. July 4 is commemorated as the National Liberation Day for Rwanda. Under the new Rwandan Constitution, genocide is a criminal offence. Rwanda today is governed by a Constitution with President Paul Kagame of the RPF. It has low corruption as compared to neighbouring countries. Though Human Rights organisations report the restriction of freedom of speech and suppression of

opposition but no brutality has been reported thereafter.

Conflict Management

The conflict management in such a terrible state of affairs as in DRC and Rwanda seems to be a tough task. Still certain methods and ways need to be explored to avoid turmoil. In today's world of technological advancement, political scientists can devise certain methods to control the conflict-like situation in time.

International agencies should deploy peace-keeping forces in the turbulent areas; take action in time on the basis of data collected from the agencies and media deployed over there. Incase of any situation of conflict that may lead to civil war or other kind of Inter-state war, ceasefire should be forced by UN on both parties immediately.

Proper media coverage of African conflicts needs to be there so that the whole world comes to know about the human rights violations and violence prevailing in those areas. Foreign nations should intervene in time to establish peace. International criticism of any such human rights violation would deter the warring group from causing further damage. Regarding Africa, we may find the news of starving children in famines or the news of donor countries providing humanitarian aid to Africa but the deeper analysis of the context of that aid reveals that the actual purpose of aid is usually missing. In the guise of aid, the intervention of that country into the political and economic affairs of African country involved in war and conflict is not reported at all. Third world nations should also play a major role to establish peace in Africa and secure their African brethrens against any human rights' violation.

Peace awareness needs to be created by NGOs and International Agencies. Regular seminars, conferences and intellectual meets should be arranged to raise awareness about the healing processes, art of mediation etc. Interaction of Africans abroad in such conferences would broaden their outlook to rise up from the narrow ethnic cleavages. African Centre for Strategic Studies has taken steps in this regard.



Political Scientists should evaluate any potential situation of conflict through system approach and behavioural approach and sense any such happening in time. Data collection, questionnaires etc can be used as a means to create a database for pre-conflict analysis and sound any warning in case of any possibility of a conflict.

African leaders need to focus on the modernisation, development and prosperity of the continent in order to achieve a peaceful, stable, secure and strong state. The concept of 'failed state' of Africa should be completely done away with.

Conclusion

In Africa, there is a dire need of cultural plurality sensitization so as to integrate all the ethnic groups and accommodate them giving a proper share in power structure. Modern and technological education is urgently required so that Africa is not dependent on foreign nations to explore their resources. They should be able to be their equal partners and shun their dominance. The resources, instead of being wasted on conflicts, may be utilized for development of Africa and the Africans could become the wealthiest persons. Their economic and business interests shall integrate the communities together, shall eat and dine together instead of fighting over trivial issues. Modern education would sensitize their minds to accept multiculturalism and shun particularism. The ideals of democracy, equality and fraternity could take them from the path of backwardness to modernity. They would learn how people from different communities, different ideologies and different mindset can accommodate with each other.

Africa, as such needs to be rediscovered. Scramble of Africa has to go through a second phase, this time with a new equal partnership with foreign nations, with a new theme not of exploitation but of friendship and mutual respect.

Endnotes

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Turbulence in the South China Sea

Dr. Rup Narayan Das

The expansive South China Sea covering an area of more than 3.5 million square kilometres consists of atolls, reefs, and small islands, only one of which has fresh water to support human habitation, has drawn considerable strategic and media attention in recent times. The Spratlys and the Paracels in particular are two of such islands, which China calls Nansha and Xisha islands, have shot into lime light in recent years and has all the potential to trigger a conflict, which can destabilise the region primarily for the geo-strategic reasons. China occupied the Paracels in 1974 from South Vietnam. The reserve of hydro carbon and its strategic location in the vicinity of shipping lanes have added strategic dimension to the region. The Chinese estimates of oil deposit in the South China Sea are as high as 213 billion barrels. The US Energy Information Administration puts it at around 28 billion barrels and gas accumulation of around 25 trillion cu m. While China claims indisputable sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent waters, China's claim is contested by almost all South-East Asian Countries including Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. Taiwan is also a claimant on the South China Sea. The tectonic shift of the geopolitics from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific has also exacerbated the problem. In order to put the South China Sea issue in perspective, it is worthwhile to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS 1982). According to the stipulation of the UNCLOS 1982, each coastal state has the right to have a 12-miles territorial sea, 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. The UNCLOS 1982 further envisaged that; "Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal state to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under UNCLOS on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal states on matters

related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding." The time of the submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was within ten years of the entry into force of the UNCLOS 1982 for coastal state parties. However, the dead line for submission of claims by state parties was subsequently extended to 13 May 2009. China submitted its claim on the last day and urged the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf not to review the submission from Vietnam and a joint submission from Vietnam and Malaysia.

In yet another case recently *Itu Aba*, Philippines has approached the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague disputing Chinese claims over Itu Aba. Itu Aba is a feature in the Spratly Islands spanning about 110 acres in area. When the court accepted jurisdiction over the case, it made it clear that it would not be deciding which country owned the various disputed features of the Spratly Island chain. The court would be deciding whether China's nine-dash line violates international law.¹ The verdict of the case is expected any time soon; may be by the time this article appears in print. It is against this context that China has started an international campaign to support its cause.

The Chinese claims in the South China Sea can be attributed to a number of factors including meeting the energy requirements and rising nationalism in the military. Although China earlier treated South China as its core interest like Taiwan and Tibet, in recent times it has soft-pedalled its stance and refrained from calling South China Sea issue as its core interest. For example the Defence White Paper of 2010 mentions that the United States is reinforcing its military alliances, and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs. It further



mentions that pressures builds up in preserving China's territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests, in an oblique reference to South China Sea falling short of mentioning it by name.

In 2002 China and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, in which they resolved to jointly safeguard regional stability, cooperate in the area and resolve disputes through peaceful talks between claimants. China very adroitly avoided to have multilateral approach to solve the problem while pleading for joint responsibility to maintain regional stability. The South China Sea issue shot into prominence and acquired greater degree of strategic salience at the Seventeenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 where US secretary of State Ms. Hilary Clinton articulated that the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law, a position which was resoundingly supported by the overwhelming majority of the ARF representatives participating in the meeting.

As expected, China reacted very strongly to this overture fraught with strategic implications for it. While the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the idea as 'attack on China', an article in *Global Times*, basically a government mouthpiece captioned it, 'American Shadow over the South China Sea'. The article cautioned the South-East Asian countries that 'regional stability will be difficult to maintain' if they allow themselves to be controlled' by the United States. It further added, 'South-east Asian countries need to understand any attempt to maximize gains by playing a balancing game between China and the US is risky...China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means'. In yet another article, China criticised Ms. Clinton's idea "to internationalise the South China Sea issue" and said that the US wants to "put off its resolutions so as to contain China's rise." The article also said that "Washington has strengthened its military cooperation in the region, stealthily instigated and supported local countries to scramble for the Nancha Islands, and has despatched naval vessels to China's Exclusive Economic Zone to conduct survey."²

What exacerbated the matters further was the report the Obama administration was in an advanced stage of negotiation to share nuclear fuel and technology with Vietnam. To demonstrate that words matched with intent, a US nuclear super carrier, the USS George Washington, stopped at Danang, about 320 km off Vietnam's central coast in the South China Sea. Although the port call was ostensibly billed to mark the commemoration the 15th anniversary of the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US and Vietnam, the timing reflected Washington's heightened interest in maintaining security and stability in the region.³

The move was perceived by China as the latest example of the US's renewed assertiveness in South and South-east Asia, as Washington strengthens ties with nations that have grown increasingly wary of Beijing's regional might. China was flabbergasted at the US insistence on a nuclear deal with Vietnam. A leading Chinese strategic expert on nuclear policy and disarmament in an interview to an Indian news paper said that any move to allow Vietnam to enrich its own uranium would be a 'double standard' on part of the US. "If the US-Vietnam nuclear deal is a copy of the US deal with the United Arab Emirates, there is no fuss. But if it [involves] enrichment of spent fuel, that is the matter we worry about". Zhai Dequan, the deputy secretary general of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said. He further said that the deal would likely to be seen in China in the context of Ms. Clinton's remarks, which suggested a move by the US to internationalise the South China Sea issue as well as expand its footprints in the region.⁴

Besides, reiterating its historical claim on South China Sea from time to time, China has been taking legislative measures and developing infrastructure in the South China Sea to buttress its sovereign rights. In December, 2012 the Hainan Province of China under which jurisdiction South China Sea falls passed a law "Coastal Ship Frontier Defence Law and Order Management Ordinance", which empowers the provincial authority to board, inspect, seize, deport or force ships to alter course out of areas within China's claimed territorial waters. The regulation stipulates that it applies to ships that



enter under the jurisdiction of Hainan 'illegally', especially territorial waters.

It was also reported in the media in April 2016 that China is edging close to building its first floating maritime nuclear power platforms with the prospect of deploying it in the disputed South China Sea. The *Global Times* in a report said the nuclear platforms could significantly boost the efficiency of the country's construction work on islands in the strategic South China Sea. China is also planning to set up an international maritime judicial centre to protect its sovereignty and make it a maritime power. According to China's top judge Zhou Qiang courts across China shall work to implement the national strategy of building the country into a maritime power. He further said that China resolutely safeguard China's national sovereignty, maritime rights and other core interests.

India and US Pivot to Asia and South China Sea
The unveiling of the 'Pivot to Asia' policy of the USA has also given a new twist to the South China Sea dispute. USA is trying to mentor the countries of the region including its allies in Southeast Asia like Philippines and Japan and strategic partners like India to soft balance China through the subterfuge of 'freedom of navigation' in the South China Sea. India and USA not only have elevated their relationship to the status of 'natural strategic' partnership, but security cooperation between the two countries has also acquired unprecedented dimensions. South China Sea issue found mention in the Joint Statement issued by India and USA during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the USA in September, 2014. The Joint Statement reaffirmed the shared interest of the two countries "in preserving regional peace and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region's continued prosperity." India and USA expressed concern about rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. The two sides called on parties to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force in advancing their claims. Further, the two countries urged the concerned parties to pursue resolution of the territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognised principles of

international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Four months after the Joint Statement, the Joint Strategic Vision Statement issued during the visit of President Barak to India in January 2015 also reaffirmed the convergence of stance between the two countries on the issue. The Joint Statement also said India's Act East Policy and US' rebalancing to Asia provide opportunities for India, the US, and other Asia-Pacific countries to work closely to strengthen regional ties.

As a facet of India's 'Act East' policy, India in recent years has also started the practice of sending its warships to South China Sea. Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) is held each year, alternatively in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea. SIMBEX-15 was held in the South China Sea in May 20, 2015 with Singapore Navy.

In the latest round of such naval exercise on 18th May 2016, four ships of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet set out for a two and half month long operational deployment to the South China Sea and North Western Pacific. The small naval force consisted of the 6,200 ton Shivalik-Class guided missile stealth frigates *Satpura* and *Sahyadri* armed, among other things with anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles; the 27,550-ton Deepak-class fleet tanker *Shakti*, one of the largest surface warships in the Indian Navy; and the 1,350-ton Kora class guided missile corvette *Kirch*, armed with sub-and supersonic anti-air and anti-ship missiles. The dispatch of the fleet has the dual purpose of strengthening military diplomatic ties and enhancing inter-operability with other navies. The Indian warships are slated to make port calls at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Subic Bay in the Philippines, Sasebo in Japan, Busan in South Korea, Vladivostok in Russia, and Port Klang in Malaysia. The fleet will also conduct passing exercises (PASSEX) with other navies to practice cooperation and "showing the flag" in a region "of vital strategic importance to India, according to the defence ministry.³

India's Foray into South China Sea

A new twist was given to India's 'Look East policy' in the year during the visit of the then Minister for External Affairs, Mr S.M. Krishna, to Hanoi in September 2011, to participate in the Fourteenth India-Vietnam Joint Commission Meeting, when it was



declared that the two countries were to sign an agreement to explore oil in the South China Sea. The media in China went overboard in their reaction and comments. However, New Delhi and Beijing handled the issue deftly at the governmental level. On 15 September, alluding to the media report, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, said that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea, and that China's stand was based on historical facts and international law. It was further stated that China was opposed to any project in the South China Sea, without directly referring to India.⁷ The same day, while answering a question raised by a correspondent as to the Chinese objection to the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh venture, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India in New Delhi said that ONGC Videsh had been present in Vietnam for quite some time, including in a major oil venture for offshore oil and natural gas exploration, and that they were in the process of further expanding their cooperation and operation in Vietnam.⁸

The issue was, however, played out in the media, both in China and India. The ultra-nationalist *Global Times* observed that 'reasoning may be used first, but if India is persistent in this, China should try every possible means to stop this cooperation from happening'.⁹ An editorial in the same newspaper criticized the proposal of the ONGC Videsh as reflecting India's rising ambition, and a likely Indian move to counter China's behaviour in the Indian Ocean.

In an article *Global Times* quoted Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, as saying that the United Nations Convention did not give any country the right to expand their own exclusive economic zones and continental shelf into other countries territories.¹⁰ Jiang also warned countries outside the region to support the resolution of this dispute through bilateral channels. The article also quoted her saying, 'As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaged in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope foreign countries do not get involved in the South China Sea dispute.'¹¹ The article further quoted Wu Xinbo, Professor at the Centre

for American Studies, saying, 'As a South Asian country, India actively takes part in East Asian issues through the support of the US, which has been advocating for Asian countries to counter China. The US takes every opportunity to counter China, and its joint military manoeuvres with Japan and other regional countries have been more frequent in recent years.'¹² Wu added that this project helps India kill two birds with one stone. It will bring economic benefits to India while also balancing out China politically. The article quoted yet another Chinese scholar, Shen Dingli, Director of the Centre for American Studies of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, who said, 'In recent years, China has also been building up relations with countries like Myanmar that neighbour India, not to mention that Pakistan invited China to provide safety protection, and offered China a naval port on the Indian Ocean. All these moves made India feel nervous.'¹³

Yet another report by *Xinhua News Agency* said that India's oil exploration cooperation with Vietnam in South China Sea was a blunt trampling up on China's sovereignty.¹⁴ In one more article carried in the *Global Times*, it was commented that 'we (Beijing) shouldn't waste the opportunity to leave some tiny scale battles that could deter provocations from going further'.¹⁵

India, however, did not buckle under pressure and in spite of warning from China, concluded the agreement with Vietnam during the visit of the Vietnamese President, Truong Tan Sang, to India on 12 October. The state-owned ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and its Vietnamese counterpart, Petro-Vietnam, inked a three-year agreement for long-term cooperation in the oil and gas sector. The agreement is intended for developing long-term cooperation in effect for three years. Some of key areas in which both the companies are desirous to cooperate are related to: the exchange of information on the petroleum industry; exchange of working visits of authorities and specialists in various fields of the petroleum industry; new investments; expansion and operations of oil and gas exploration; and production, including refining, transportation, and supply in Vietnam, India, and third countries according to the laws and regulations of their countries. The visiting President of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang, said that all



the disputes with China, including claims over South China Sea, would be solved peacefully through negotiations and code of conduct for good relations in the region.¹⁵ The cooperation between ONGC Videsh and Petro-Vietnam goes back to the 1980s, which led to the signing of the production sharing contract between Hydrocarbon India Ltd, renamed later as ONGC Videsh, and Petro-Vietnam in Phu Kan basin in Vietnam through regular bidding process. India's defiance of Beijing's warning and signing of the agreement with Hanoi further outraged Beijing. The official news agency, *Xinhua*, reported that both China and Vietnam will not allow any third hostile forces to destroy their relations'. Both New Delhi and Beijing, however, did not allow the relationship between the two countries to oil and gas industry and shall be in force and drift further. The then Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, in his meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of East Asia Summit meeting in Bali, reiterated that Indian exploration of oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea were purely commercial, and the issue of sovereignty over South China Sea should be resolved according to international law and practice.¹⁶ Beijing also reiterated its stated position that it didn't hope to see outside forces involved in the South China Sea dispute. The two sides, however, in spite of the spat, struck a friendly note and Beijing extended a charm offensive saying that 'there is no power in the world that can prevent the development of bilateral relations between the two countries'.¹⁷ Beijing appeared to suggest that differences with India were driven by third parties and blamed the United States for sowing discord between China and its neighbours and attempting to contain China.

India's nuanced approach to South China Sea issue

India's nuanced approach to South China Sea dispute can be gauged from the observation in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2014-15. It said, "India has important political, economic, commercial and social interests in the Asia Pacific and has a stake in continued peace and stability in the region. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters and the right of passage, in accordance with international law. India's view is that all countries must exercise restraint and resolve bilateral issues diplomatically, according to the

principles of international law and without recourse to the use of or threat of use of force. India is of the view that in the current regional security landscape, there is need to promote a cooperative approach." India is, therefore, actively with the Asia-Pacific Community through a web of bilateral as well as multilateral fora like the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), so as to contribute to peace and stability in the region. Although India treats the issue of ONGC Videsh's foray into the South China Sea primarily as a commercial venture, its strategic and security implications for the region, though remote and distant, cannot be ruled out. India's strategic position with regard to its engagement in the Asia-Pacific can be discerned from a statement made by its former National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, and some time back in the US when he said, "... China has a presence in South Asia. It has been there for a long time... We have a presence in East Asia for a long time...". Emphasizing on peaceful cooperation, he is further reported to have said:

...we have global interest. China has global interest, all of us do... All the major powers...are not only inter dependent on each other, but also are dealing with each other across a whole range of issues. None of which recognizes some artificial constructs like South Asia or East Asia, these are interlocking circles about security or prosperity, whichever way you look at it.¹⁸

This succinctly reflects India's strategic thinking with regard to the Asia-Pacific.

(Views expressed are personal)

Endnotes

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The Kurdish Issue in West Asia: Domestic and Regional Implications

Dr. Lunghuiyang Riamei

Introduction

The Kurds are the largest stateless minority in West Asia. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's support for the principle of national self-determination for the non-Turkish nationalities living under the Ottoman Empire gave impetus to the Kurds. The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 provided the first forum where Kurdish national aspirations were acknowledged by the international community, but this acknowledgement proved to be short lived. Upon the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, an ancient race composed of tribes, tribal confederations and feudal groups with martial traditions were promised for the first time in the long history an independent state in their own mountainous homeland under the Treaty of Sevres, 10 August 1920¹. However, a vigorous nationalist uprising under the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk forced the allies to accept a revised agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, which omitted all references to an autonomous or independent Kurdish State. The Sevres-Lausanne period presented what might be called a tragic incident in the Kurdish struggle and aspirations. Moreover, the Treaty of Sevres, the creation of new boundaries leading to distribution of the Kurds among several countries; Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, further complicated Kurdish plans. As a result the Kurds became as a stateless minority in the region. Hence, Kurdistan was erased from World's map after First World War when the Allied Powers carved up the Middle East and denied the Kurds a nation-state.

Since the end of the First World War when the great powers imposed their ill-suited solutions to the problems of West Asia, the Kurdish people have constantly suffered from various forms of national oppression in each of the newly constituted states. In some cases this oppression was brutal, as in Kemalist Turkey while in others it was cunning, like the suppression in Iran. Iraq, on the other hand has allowed the existence of a Kurdish nationality;

allowed a limited use of Kurdish language and provided for at least a nominal degree of autonomy in Kurdish inhabited areas which also included a policy of Arabisation involving the mass deportation of Kurds and implantations of Arabs on their lands. Kurds are split into myriad political parties. While some seek to create an independent Kurdistan, others campaign for greater Kurdish autonomy within existing national boundaries. In the Wars in Syria and Iraq, Kurdish forces emerge as the forefront to fight against ISIS.

Populations

Between 25 and 35 million Kurds live in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Yavuz and Gunter (2001) approximated the Kurdish population in Turkey as 7 million (making up between 12 to 15 percent of population), 6 million in Iran (11 percent), 3 million Iraq (between 20 to 23 percent) and 800,000 in Syria (7 percent).² There are also large concentrations of Kurds in Germany (over 50,000), Israel (over 100,000) and Lebanon (75,000-100,000). Australia, Canada, England, Finland, France, Greece, Sweden and the United States each have a Kurdish population of over 10,000³. The Kurds are largely Sunni Muslims divided tribally, geographically, politically, linguistically, religiously and ideologically. However, the accuracy of Kurdish population estimates is difficult to determine. They are the third largest ethnic group in the region after Arabs and Persians.

Language diversity

Unlike many other minority groups in West Asia, the Kurds failed to adopt a *lingua franca*. Kurdistan being a land of high mountains with difficult communications system, and the Kurds never having enjoyed the political unity that might have given them a common literature, it is not surprising that local dialects within groups have varied widely. This hindered inter-Kurdish communication. Kurdish belongs to the family of Iranian languages and, like other Iranian languages, has an Indo-European origin.



It is fundamentally different from Semitic Arabic and Altaic Turkish. Kurdish is therefore more akin to Persian than to Arabic. Modern Kurdish divides into major groups supplemented by scores of sub-dialects. *Kurdi*, includes *Gurani* and *Sulaymani* dialects. *Gurani* is spoken mostly by the Kurds in Kermanshah (Bakhtaran) in Iran. *Kurmanji* is spoken by the largest number of Kurds, especially those in Turkey. It is, for all practical purposes, the literary language of the Kurds and as such is considered the most prestigious of all Kurdish vernaculars. *Zaza* dialect predominates in the north and north-west sectors of Kurdistan. It is also used by some Kurds in the Iranian province of Western Azerbaijan and Central Turkey.⁴ The southern dialect, often called Sorani, with about 6 million speakers is in fact a grouping of many dialects. Sorani is considered to be the classical Kurdish language.⁵ This dialect is spoken in southern Kurdistan, including most of Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan.

Rise of Kurdish Nationalism

Kurdish nationalism emerged as an ideology long before the formation of the Kurds as a nation, not in a middle class milieu but in a largely agrarian society with a powerful tribal component. From the 16th century to the mid 19th century, much of Kurdistan was under the rule of independent and autonomous Kurdish principalities that produced a flourishing rural and urban life. Kurdish destinies changed radically when the Ottoman and Persian empires divided Kurdistan into spheres of influence. In order to protect their sovereignty, the principalities supported one or the other power. A prevailing war destroyed the agrarian system, devastated villages and towns, precipitated massacres and led to forcible migrations of Kurds and the settlement in parts of Kurdistan⁶. All of this inhibited further growth of urban areas and settled agrarian production relations, reinforcing tribal ways of life.

The Kurds are a nation in formation at the crossroads of the Arab, Iranian and Turkish worlds. The sources of these divisions are socio-historical and have prevented the emergence of a full-fledged Kurdish identity.⁷ By the early 1920s, the political geography of the Kurdish areas had begun to assume the general shape that it has today with the Kurds divided between the states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and

Turkey. These policies towards the Kurds were extremely repressive. All the rebellion was put down with great ferocity.⁸

The Kurds have never been aggressively nationalistic. Kurdish life remains tribally structured in most areas and is based on local, tightly knit rural communities under a tribal-religious leader known as *sheikh* or *seyid*. Traditionally, local power in northern Iraq had been wielded by the tribal chiefs, or *aghas* and to a lesser degree by the Muslim Sheikhs.⁹ For them, the effective unit of allegiance has remained the tribe. A tribe is a community, or a confederation of communities, that exists for the protection of its members against external aggression and for the maintenance of the old customs and standard of living. This tribal structure has played a dual role: impeding the formation of Kurdish unity by keeping Kurds fragmented, and preserving a heightened Kurdish attitude toward the Turks, Iranians and Arabs. Tribal structure has constituted the core depository of Kurdish identity, has facilitated mobilisation against centralising governments and has also kept a modern concept of nationalism from developing until the mid-twentieth century.¹⁰

Kurds have been used by both regional and international powers and are abandoned after the goals of these political powers are achieved. Neither the world system nor the regional power is genuinely concerned for the Kurds. The Kurds are critical factors when they can be used as the agents of capital accumulation and the instruments in a regional balance of power. The concept of capital is divisive, and the resulting conflict is indicative of the structural crisis of the system of accumulation. As Rosa Luxemburg argues, the West takes into account only one aspect of economic development, the realm of peaceful competition but fails to acknowledge the realm of violence that arises from the capital accumulation process. Violence and destruction are seen as independent of the realm of the accumulation process, hence, incidental to foreign policy and both are structurally linked.¹¹ Accumulation at the global level means conflict and divisiveness. The realisation of Kurdish political and human rights cannot be attained under the arrangement of the existing world system, which chooses capital's rights over human rights. Hence, the Kurds were victims of the



hegemonic powers who worked for their own political gain.

Kurdish Demands and the Government Response

Since colonial times the Kurds has been systematically suppressed by the occupying forces in West Asia. Kurdish aspirations for independence have been strengthened as a consequence of the history of oppression and brutality at the hands of Arabs, Turks and Iranians. Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria have problems with their Kurds and therefore, a common interest in suppressing Kurdish separatist hopes for independence.

Iraq

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government implemented anti-Kurdish policies which was widely condemned by the international community, but was never seriously punished for oppressive measures, including the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, which resulted in thousands of deaths. The 'Al-Anfal Campaign'¹² constituted a systematic genocide of the Kurdish people in Iraq. Large Kurdish town of Halabja was completely destroyed by the Iraqi army. The campaign also included Arabization of Kirkuk, a program to drive Kurds out of the oil-rich city and replace them with Arab settlers from central and southern Iraq. Needless to say, there were blatant violations of Human Rights during Saddam Hussein regime. Saddam Hussein's regime proved even more disastrous for the Kurds in Iraq. After the Gulf crisis, U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 gave birth to a safe haven following international concern for the safety of Kurdish refugees. The U.S. and British government established a "No Fly Zone" over a chunk of northern Iraq; however, it left some of the Kurdish populated areas unprotected. Bloody clashes between Iraqi forces and Kurdish troops continued but then finally the Iraqi government fully withdrew in 1991, allowing Iraqi Kurdistan to function de facto independently. The region was to be ruled by the two principal Kurdish parties—the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) base in Erbil and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaymaniyah. Then again, tensions between the two principle Kurdish Parties led to intra-Kurdish conflict and warfare. Prior to the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003, Turkey denied the U.S. the

bases in Turkey to launch a northern front into Iraq. This Turkish decision unintentionally made the Iraqi Kurds a powerful ally for the U.S. Aided by the Kurds, U.S. Forces were able to open a northern front in Iraq and secure the oil fields in and around Kirkuk. This ensured the Kurds a prominent role in the future of Iraq. The new government for Iraq post-Saddam Hussein proved very comforting for the Kurds. The Iraq Governing Council (IGC) that was appointed in July 2003 had Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, along with three independent Kurdish leaders. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period (TAL),¹³ signed March 8, 2004, laid out a political transition process, as well as citizens' rights, and much of the debate over the TAL concerned the rights and privileges of the Kurds. Further, both the Arabic and Kurdish languages were deemed "the two official languages of Iraq"—an unprecedented gain for the Kurds historically. Further, the constitution also reflected on this change where Islamic principles are to be considered "a source," but not the only or the primary source of law. The autonomous government of Iraqi Kurdistan has implication for the Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran.

Turkey

Turkish nation and state building failed to incorporate a portion of ethnic Kurds, which resulted in a series of brutally suppressed ethnic-religious rebellions during the 1920s and 1930s in Eastern Turkey. By 1993, the total number of security forces involved in the struggle in southeastern Turkey was about 200,000, and the conflict had become the largest war against terror in the West Asia. Thousands of Kurdish populated villages were destroyed and numerous extra judicial executions were carried by both the sides. More than 37,000 people were killed in the violence and hundreds of thousands more were forced to leave their homes. The question relating to the Kurdish identity and self-perception have not disappeared but remained very much part of Turkish politics. The Turkish society has not yet found its homogeneity or stability and split into many sub-groups with conflicting aspirations. The question of minorities has negatively affected Turkish political stability for many years has also inflicted much damage on Turkish international relations.¹⁴ Combined with uncertainties about the futures of Iraqi Kurds and Turkey's democratization



and prospects for joining the European Union, these circumstances impose various influences and constraints on the self-perception of Turkish Kurds.¹⁵ Turkey is more sensitive to European pressure because of human rights issues than its neighbours. There are strong ideological impediments to the recognition of Kurds as ethnic groups with its own culture, but concessions are almost unthinkable. The military and civilian elites (which include assimilated Kurds) are deeply committed to the Kemalist dogma that the people of Turkey are one homogenous nation and they perceive each denial of unity as vital threat to the nation. The failure to accommodate Kurdish ethnicity and culture has been an important fact that has led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and the displacement of people, as well as several hundred human rights violations. This failure has also caused many governments and international political actors to be drawn into the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds. As a result, the Kurdish question became internationalized and came to dominate a significant proportion of Turkey's foreign policy with issues such as Turkey's membership of the European Union and its regional implications. Turkey has a democratic form of government and public debate is a vital and necessary accoutrement to any kind of conflict. The legacy of violence and the hard power politics between the PKK and the government are difficult to overcome. Therefore, a dialogue between the Turkish government, Kurdish parliamentarian and Turkish Kurds should take place. Turkey cannot be both a democracy and military state. Kurds no longer want to be absorbed by the greater whole of Turkish nationalism; they want to live side by side in equality with their Turkish in pluralist and multi-ethnic society.¹⁶ With the Kurds in Syria gaining more autonomy as the Assad regime began to lose its grip on power and the Iraqi Kurds continuing on their road to form independence. Turkey policy toward Kurds needs a dynamic change and accommodate their demands.

Syria

The Kurds in Syria, in contrast to the Kurds of Iraq, Iran and Turkey are little known in the West, but they have similarly strained relations with the state that governs them and face human rights abuses as a minority. The Kurds in Syria have been subjected to discriminatory practices for decades. The exclusive ethno-centric Arab nation-building project also

officially called the Arab Republic of Syria has denied other ethnic and cultural groups equal and lawful existence.¹⁷ Syrian Kurds have had an almost negligible international profile compared to their neighbours as there has been much less violence in their relationship with the Syrian state. This is largely due to their smaller number and scattered geographical distribution, as well as the effectiveness of official coercion and repression.

The rise of nationalism, stemming regionally from Nasserism¹⁸ and locally from the Baath Party's ascendancy in 1963, increased official discrimination against Syrian Kurds. The Baathist government's Kurdish policy was intended to eradicate the Kurdish presence from Syrian Public life.¹⁹ The state-inspired campaign of Arabisation of the Kurds continued in the 1970s under the government of Hafez al-Assad. Under Hafez al-Assad, Arab nationalism became a founding principle of the 1973 constitution. It became an essential component of political culture, where as pan-Arab and socialist ideals gradually lost their significance. This meant that all Kurds were excluded from the state doctrine. Exclusion was reflected in the ban or non-admission of Kurdish political parties as well as in the repression of pro-Kurdish demonstrations and festivals by the security apparatus.²⁰ Syria also emulated Saddam Hussein's policies by moving thousands of Arabs into the Kurdish regions to create buffer between them and the Kurdish communities in neighbouring states.²¹ Repression was one method of handling the Kurdish question under Assad.

The Kurdish language in Syria, the Kurmanji dialect, was criminalised on several levels by decrees in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the Kurdish names for hundreds of villages in both al-Hasakah province and the Afrin region were replaced by Arabic names.²² Syrian Kurds are under pressure to erase their cultural identity, including public celebrations and feast as well as speaking Kurdish - the essential mechanism for Kurds to preserve their culture in public and work place. In July 2011, The Kurdish National Conference met in Qamishli. The conference proceedings led to the formation of Kurdish National Council. The conference demanded both the right to determine the destiny of the Kurdish people in the framework of a unified Syria and changing the



security-based dictatorship and instituting a plural democratic state. The conference gave support to the Kurdish revolutionary youth movement and called for the adoption of decentralized political system to administer the country. The Kurds believe that the time has come to make up for lost time and claim both their ethnic-identity based and national rights. In fact, the Kurdish parties are calling for the establishment of a federal state, modeled after the one established in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, an idea that is strongly opposed by the Syrian opposition. The Kurdish political movement is contemplating the post-Assad era and realizes that the Syrian state will soon be at its weakest ebb, allowing it to impose Kurdish demands more forcefully than any time in the history of the modern Syrian state.²³

Since the outbreak of conflict in 2011, Democratic Administration of Rojava (Western part of Kurdistan in Syria) the de-facto autonomous Kurdish region has been formed in northeast Syria. The People's Protection Units (YPG) is the defence force of the autonomous region. While the Iraqi Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) are receiving military assistance from western countries including France, Germany, UK and United States; the Syrian Kurds have received little help accusing that they remained close to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian Kurds are essentially operating in an isolated canton facing the IS fighters to the South and deeply suspicious and hostile Turkey in the North.²⁴ Syrian Kurdish fighters YPG and Iraqi Kurdish force Peshmerga took control of the long besieged Syrian town of Kobani on January 2015 and Qamishli after months of fighting Islamic State militants.²⁵ Currently the YPG is engaged against the ISIS terrorist across Northern Syria and openly called on Kurds from outside to join the movement. Syrian Kurds have declared a "Federation of Northern Syria" that unites three Kurdish majority areas into one entity, in an announcement swiftly denounced by the Syrian government, opposition and regional powers. The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and several allied groups have voted to create an autonomous federation.²⁶ The newly declared region, known as Rojava, consists of three distinct enclaves, or cantons, under Kurdish control in northern Syria: Jazira, Kobani and Afrin. The Arab springs and its

consequences have given opportunity for the Syrian Kurds, used to be called the 'forgotten Kurds' to start confronting the Bashar al-Assad brutal regime. Isolated from the rest of the world, they received far less media attention than their brethren in Iraq, Turkey or Iran. Syrian Kurds has been fighting ISIS and were vocal participants in the campaign against Bashar al-Assad regime. According to Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) official Idris Nassan, the plan will involve "areas of democratic self-administration" under the federal banner, encompassing all ethnic and religious groups living in the area. The move is likely to anger neighbouring Turkey, which fears that growing Kurdish power in Syria is encouraging separatism ambitions amongst its own Kurdish minority.²⁷ However, Syrian revolution 2011, a historic opportunity to achieve what Kurds had never been able to achieve, and restore the rights which were stripped from them. They have formed autonomous region of Rojava in North eastern part of Syria after recapturing the town of Kobani from ISIS extremist.

Iran

The political system and governmental structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a unique and complex blend of theocratic and democratic government. Iran is the only Shi'ite state in the community of nations of the Muslim world and its legal framework is formulated in accordance with the precepts of religious jurisprudence and Shi'a traditions. The 1979 Revolution effectively changed the regime and established a governmental structure based on Ayatollah Khomeini's 1970 political treatise, *Islamic Government*.

Iran has undoubtedly become one of the international community's most discussed countries in the world. The Islamic Republic's pursuance of nuclear technology has raised concerns, but has also overshadowed the more serious issues. Under the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the rate of executions in Iran has risen to one of the highest in the world. Although the Kurdish people consist of less than 15 percent of the Iranian population, they make up about half of the number of people executed and have been subjected to political persecution in the past 10 years. Many Kurdish political prisoners and civilians are also executed in secret. Since July 2005, over 1500 Kurdish civilians have been killed,



executed, sentenced to jail or charged to pay compensation by the security forces of the Islamic republic. The Kurdish people in Iran have been heavily targeted by the Islamic Republic since its 1979 inception when Ayatollah Khomeini declared a fatwa against the province of Kurdistan. The Revolutionary Guard crushed opposing unrest by sending 110,000 troops complete with heavy artillery, fighter jets and armed helicopters. According to International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, since Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013, Iran has executed more than 200 people, especially Kurdish activist. Iran's grotesque human rights violations, the rise in executions and many were held as political prisoners inside Iran.²⁸

The 15th Article of the Iranian Constitution, states that the government language is Persian (Farsi), and that "the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian".²⁹ Despite the language provisions in the Iranian constitution, the Ahwaz, Baloch, Kurds and southern Azerbaijanis face difficulties in exercising their rights to use their own languages, in private and in public. These minority linguistic rights guaranteed by the constitution are not provided in practice.³⁰ For example, all state-schooling in Kurdish areas is conducted exclusively in Persian. The study of Kurdish language in schools is prohibited. Kurdish websites, newspaper and magazine are closed or charged for their content. The economy of the Kurdish area in Iran has collapsed and the unemployment rate in Kurdistan is estimated to be 47%.³¹ The human rights violation in Iranian Kurdistan is not a result of sporadic or persistent violation of some officers but it is the result of systematic programmed policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Kurds and the people of Iran. Majority of the groups and organisations operating in Iranian Kurdistan maintain a broader agenda and often couch Kurdish demands in the context of general democratic rights for all Iranians. But the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991 changed the position of the Iranian Kurds. The Kurdish policies of Iran's post-Khomeini government are not very clear yet.

Assassination of Kurdish leaders (besides Ghassemlo and his companions, many Kurdish

intellectual were assassinated by the Iranian agents) suggests that Iran believes that Kurdish population may be eased away from nationalist politics and co-opted with limited cultural, but not territorial concessions. It is unlikely to grant the Kurds autonomy.

Regional Implications

In a region focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the question of the Kurds as the largest nation in the world without its own country has occasionally entered the international spotlight. Some Kurds seek autonomy or even independence from the countries in which they live; those states, however have long denied such aspirations fearing that they would challenge their territorial integrity. The result has been constant instability in the region as the Kurds are becoming more politically aware of their cause and are growing more visible to the outside world. Western powers, who have trumpeted their concern for human rights and national rights to self-determination whenever it had suited them, have not reacted with any vigour or consistency to the violations of rights with respect to the Kurds. The Arabs expected the Kurds to assimilate in the grand movement of Arab Nationalism rather than focus on their divisive issues of identity, language and possible secession. To be a Kurd or an Assyrian was not welcomed in an Arab world that was rising from defeat, and colonialism.³² Time after time, the Kurds have certainly accepted support from countries that were opposed to the Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian governments for their own reasons. No Arab country is eager to encourage separatism in other Arab states primarily because many of these states have ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities of their own. They fear that the arbitrary boundaries in Kurdistan and the resultant fear of separatism that is encouraged at one place might spread to other nations as well. At the end of Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait clearly had little concern for Saddam Hussein, but the Kurdish uprising in Iraq alarmed them more. Even major countries like Egypt did not want instability and regional imbalances in the region. The Arab states tried to avoid the Kurdish problem- what they see as prelude to further secession in the existing Arab states. They insisted on the integrity of Arab boundaries; considered the Kurdish issues as internal affairs and emphasized on the maintenance of relationship between the Kurdish minorities and the states. Thus,



the broader Arab world as whole plays little attention and less directly involved toward Kurdish issues. The Kurdish-Israeli relations are a major element of Israel's policy in West Asia, an effective leverage to exert pressure on Iraq (and to a less extent, Syria) in order to detract the attention of the regional governments and to prevent its active intervention into the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1960s Israeli intelligence and military operatives were quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training to Kurdish commando units and, most important in Israel's view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria. Israel felt particularly threatened by Iran, whose position in the region has been strengthened by the war and nuclear programme. The Israeli operatives included members of the Mossad, Israel's clandestine foreign-intelligence service, who worked undercover in Kurdistan as businessmen. On 30 June 2014 Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked the international community to strengthen in the fight against " Islamic extremism" and to back the independence of Iraqi' Kurds.

Conclusion

The Kurdish question continues to be an important factor in West Asian and international politics. Kurdistan has among the largest oil reserves in West Asia. According to various studies, Kurdistan sits on 43.7 billion barrels (bb) of proven oil and 25.5bb of potential reserves. In addition, the majority of the estimated 200 trillion cubic feet of gas in Iraq is reported to be in Kurdistan region.¹³ The Kurds along with the other discontented minorities are the victims of foreign intervention (colonial/neocolonial), economic and political deprivation and political repression. The conflict of ethnic-nationalists, the clash of identities and loyalties, and exclusive visions over strategic issues are all source of conflict between Kurds and the other groups in West Asia. For several decades the Kurdish secessionist and irredentist movement has been in conflict with, Turkish Arab or Persian nationalism. Kurdish independent state could trigger wider conflict in the region and there are serious geopolitical barriers. In the light of the ethnicised political spaces and unchangeable role of ethnicity and identity formation, managing the contemporary Kurdish problem requires readjusting the political threshold in the region. Instead of trying to create a false sense of ethnic homogenisation, the

state elites in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria should emphasize ethnic diversity within decentralised political system that guarantees protection of minority-group rights. Managing the Kurdish problem requires recognising the distinct Kurdish ethnicity as an integral part of the state's nationalism. But globalisation has made the myth of a culturally homogenous state even more unrealistic, and has forced the majority within each state to be more open to pluralism and diversity. The nature of ethnic and national identities is changing in world of democratic states but the challenge of multiculturalism is to stay. Improved communications, nationalist struggle and even government repression have contributed to making the Kurds into more of a nation than they were before. Within a democratic framework, minorities like the Kurds could surely attain their socio-political ideals. Now confronting with the ISIS, geo-politics of Kurdistan will play a major role in the outcome of West Asian politics and stability.

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Sino-India Border Dispute: A Requiem for Enduring Peace and Tranquility

Dr. Mohor Chakraborty

The world has been witness to a saga stretching over more than half a century now of an enduring rivalry between two Asia-Pacific neighbours – India and China – towards the culmination of a mutually-acceptable geopolitical accommodation. An unresolved territorial dispute, with China and India claiming virtually an entire Indian state and a strategically-salient western route into Tibet respectively, had engulfed them into a month-long limited but intense war in 1962, the septic scars of which have passed down generational veins, leading to a psychological osmosis of mutual suspicion and discomfiture. The 1962 war was followed up by a direct military confrontation in 1986-87, numerous instances of border transgression and sharp politico-diplomatic differences, which have transformed the subcontinent into a locus of sustained geopolitical rivalry. The total disputed area between the two countries runs to approximately 1,35,000 sq. km. and in the absence of a well-demarcated border, a Line of Actual Control (LAC) is used by both sides to claim the area up to which each side has effective military control. Given this backdrop, the article will attempt to trace the trajectory of conflict resolution and peace management along the Sino-India border as undertaken by the United Progressive Alliance – II (UPA-II) and the present National Democratic Alliance – II (NDA-II) governments in India, with a brief review and recall of the highlights of the initiatives of the preceding governments in resolving this dispute.

Sino-Indian Efforts at Border Management: Pre-UPA II Era in Perspective

The sinusoidal trajectory of negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing on the discordant border signaled an important reorientation and was guided by a beacon of light almost after twenty-six years of the border war, when the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, undertook his official sojourn to Beijing and created history. In course of this momentous visit

conducted in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and his Chinese counterpart, Deng Xiaoping resolved to "forget the unpleasant past" and carve a concrete pathway for resolving the protracted crisis. It was agreed by the two leaders that a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Boundary Question would be established to evolve a consensus border, bound within a timeframe for reaching a fair and reasonable settlement of the issue through peaceful and mutually acceptable means.¹ In keeping with the ensuing sentiments, the inaugural JWG meeting was held in 1989 in Beijing. Rajiv Gandhi's visit has gone down the annals of history as a diplomatic vanguard, since it formed the pedestal for all future bilateral deliberations on the sensitive border issue. Within a period of three years of this major understanding, the then Chinese Premier, Li Peng, in his reciprocal visit to New Delhi in December 1991, signed the *Memorandum on the Resumption of Border Trade*, which included overland trade and exchange of commodities by the residents along the border between 1 June and 30 September every year (inaugurated on 15 July 1992).² The decade of the 1990s was particularly significant, since high level bilateral exchanges became routine during this period. In September 1993, when the Indian Prime Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao paid his visit to China, the newfound optimism in relations was taken further with the signing of the *Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border*. This Agreement enabled New Delhi and Beijing to observe the LAC without prejudice to their positions and provided space for experts from both sides to jointly supervise and determine the LAC in those segments where there were disputes on sovereignty.³ The saga of enhanced bilateral understanding was kept apace when the *Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Areas* was signed between the two sides during the



then Chinese President, Jiang Zemin's visit to New Delhi in November-December 1996,⁴ paving the way for the conduct and implementation of a number of bilateral CBMs, aimed at preserving peace in border areas.

With the eclipse of the Congress and United Front governments in the chronology of Indian political history and the ushering in of the first phase of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA – I) government in 1998, the then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee sustained the spirit and goodwill of bilateral relations and scripted history when he visited China in June 2003. In course of his meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, the stage was set for appointing Special Representatives (SRs) from each side, supplanting the JWG mechanism, to address the boundary dispute. Since then, nineteen rounds of SR negotiations have taken place, the last being held in April 2016. The *Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation* appointed Special Representatives "to explore from the political perspectives of overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement". In addition to this seminal effort, the two leaders concluded a Border Trade Protocol on expanding border trade through Nathu La and added a third border crossing point to those operational under the 1991 and 1993 Border Trade Agreements.⁵

With the turn of the new millennium, when the United Progressive Alliance (UPA-I) government succeeded NDA-I in 2004, a slew of developments were unleashed in the course of border negotiations between India and China. To begin with, within the scaffold of the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao's official visit to New Delhi in 2005, the *Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question* was signed, aimed at fostering a long-term, constructive and cooperative partnership, based on the Panchsheel principles.⁶ This Agreement, which marked the successful conclusion of the first phase of the agenda of the SRs and formally initiated its second phase (in which the SRs would work out the specifics of adjustment on the basis of the "Agreement" about evolving a framework for boundary settlement), was indeed a major milestone in attempting to settle the boundary question, through

a 'political settlement' of the issue.⁷ Finally, during the same visit, it was agreed that the third and last phases of SR negotiations would involve the actual delineation and demarcation of the boundary on map and groundwork by civil, military and survey officials.

In course of the official visit of the Chinese President, Hu Jintao to India in November 2006, the two countries converged on enhancing trans-border connectivity through the intensification of border trade by strengthening existing routes and exploring additional ones. This was especially cognizable in the backdrop of the resumption of border trade through Nathu La on 6 July 2006 (in accordance with the Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade signed in June 2003)⁸. Unfortunately, despite this initiative, border trade across Nathu La, Lipulekh Pass and Shipki La was affected during 2008 because of temporary restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities in connection with the Beijing Olympics and Para-olympics. It becomes amply evident from the above analysis that notwithstanding temporary hiccups, an edifice was constructed through the genuine initiatives of the preceding administrative tenures, on which, UPA-II could take forward strides in further resolution of the border issue with China.

Contours of Border Dispute and Management under UPA-II: Guns and Roses

The UPA-II tenure commencing in May 2008 was extremely significant in the history of Sino-India relations, pertaining in particular to the resolution of the border issue since the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed during its term in 2013. An analysis of the major initiatives undertaken by this administration would begin with the re-opening of border trade across Nathu La, Lipulekh Pass and Shipki La in 2009, ending temporary restrictions imposed by Chinese authorities in connection with the Beijing Olympics and Paralympics in 2008.⁹ Following shortly on the heels of this successful resumption, the successive Presidential visits marked the Sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations.¹⁰ Within the course of the Indian President, Pratibha Patil's visit to Beijing in May 2010, both the two countries harped on the "shared vision for the Twenty-first century", hinged on the tenets of peace, prosperity and cooperation, that was reiterated in her historic assertion, that there



was "enough space in the world for both countries to fulfill their individual aspirations and prosper."¹¹ Therefore, the Indian President's diplomatic exercise was "extremely positive, fruitful, productive and meaningful, acting as a starting point to further build on the existing relationship."¹² In a sincere gesture of reciprocating the same, the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao paid a counter-visit to India in December 2010. This visit demonstrated the ensuing and welcome thaw in mutual ties, contributing "to long-term peace, stability, prosperity and development in Asia and the world."¹³ Wen Jiabao, in course of the meeting with his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, appreciated the opening of a telephone hotline between the two Prime Ministers, in addition to reiterating his commitment to continue making full use of all meeting mechanisms, including those between SRs on the border issue.¹⁴

Subsequently, a significant contribution of the Fifteenth Round of the Special Representative Talks on the Border Question, held in New Delhi in January 2012, was the signing of an *Agreement for the establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs*.¹⁵ This Agreement was implemented with the Inaugural meeting of the Working Mechanism in Beijing in March 2012 and was followed up with the Second meeting held in November 2012 in the Indian capital. Within its framework, the two delegations exchanged ideas on additional measures for maintaining peace and tranquility as well as charting newer avenues for building greater trust and confidence.¹⁶ Furthermore, the transition in leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012, with the ascendance of Xi Jinping as its General Secretary and his succession of Hu Jintao as the Chinese President in March 2013 augured well for the future of bilateral ties, as the new leadership believed that, "Some new features of the relationship are now emerging. The border issue has been controlled effectively. Technical frictions and some worries about the trade imbalance are emerging But the problems in trade cooperation are fundamentally different from the border dispute.... The smooth development of trade relations will increase mutual trust and is conducive to the successful negotiation of the border issue".¹⁷ Evidently then, Beijing, quite rationally, put the onus

of enhancing political trust on the unhindered development of bilateral trade relations between, thus acknowledging that it is not pragmatic to hold trade and economic ties hostage to political exigencies, particularly when the latter are as protracted as the border issue.

Unfortunately, a hostile incident which momentarily jolted the optimistic visage of bilateral ties was the intrusion of Chinese (People's Liberation Army/PLA) troops into Depsang Valley on the Ladakh border on 15 April 2013. Although the Indian response to this provocation prevented any further escalation of tensions, the incident introduced a sense of 'déjà vu' in a part of the unsettled portion of the LAC, calling for an urgent push for an expeditious resolution of the boundary question. Fortunately, this "adverse incident" in Ladakh could not derail the scheduled visit of the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Salman Khurshid to Beijing scheduled for May 2013, which was significant in the sense of laying the groundwork for the official sojourn of the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang to New Delhi on 20 May 2013 – his first visit after taking over as Premier in March 2013. In course of this momentous visit, the host Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh candidly expressed concerns on the alleged violation of a critical understanding to maintain peace and tranquility on the border. On his part, while asserting that the larger corpus of bilateral relations hinged on a peaceful border, Premier Li felt it was important to further build trust and understanding in order to maintain border peace. Furthermore, the two leaders decided to entrust the SRs with the responsibility of ensuring incidents like Depsang do not reoccur in addition to arming them with the responsibility of expediting work on demarcating and delineating the border. In sum, the visit was "a meaningful step forward" because both countries agreed to improve the various border-related mechanisms and make them more efficient in the wake of the three-week-long stand-off in Ladakh.¹⁸ As a follow up of this decision, the SRs held the Sixteenth round of negotiations on the Boundary Question in June 2013 in keeping with the mandate of injecting greater momentum into the negotiations process.

Finally, perhaps the most significant achievement of the UPA-II government was the



inking of the *Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)* with China in October 2013, during the official visit of Manmohan Singh to Beijing. It comprised of a new set of confidence-building measures for border management, thereby providing an additional mechanism, premised on the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in the India-China Border (1993). Hailed as a "strategic benchmark", the signing of this Agreement was momentous, against the backdrop of the Depsang valley incident. The most significant component of this Agreement was the willingness of the two countries to 'not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas' (Article VI) and their resolve to 'exercise maximum self-restraint, refrain from any provocative actions, not use force or threaten to use force against the other side, treat each other with courtesy and prevent exchange of armed conflict' (Article VIII). Besides, the other provisions of the Agreement envisaged: a graded mechanism, starting with meetings between border personnel in all sectors; periodic meetings between officers of the regional military headquarters, specifically between the Chengdu military region and India's Eastern Command, and Lanzhou military region and the Northern Command; higher-level meetings between the two Ministries of Defence, aside from the working mechanism for consultation and co-ordination on India-China Border Affairs and the India-China Annual Defence Dialogue; the right to seek a clarification; and establish meeting sites for border personnel, as well as telephone and telecommunication links on the LAC.¹⁹ The visiting Prime Minister hailed the BDCA as an addition "to the existing instruments to ensure peace, stability and predictability on the borders" and added, "We agreed that peace and tranquility on our borders must be the foundation for growth in the India-China relationship, even as we move forward the negotiations towards a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement to the India-China boundary question."²⁰ Summarily then, the UPA-II administration took heart from the successful conclusion of the BDCA, providing greater sensitivity to the unresolved boundary question.

Trajectory of the Border Issue under the NDA-II Government: Prospects of "Meeting Each Other Halfway"?

With the ushering in of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) – II government to power, headed by Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in May 2014, Sino-India relations were expected to reach a "higher level", as communicated by the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang in his congratulatory message to his Indian counterpart immediately after the latter took office. While expressing his desire to "work with India to continuously lift their strategic cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity to a higher level", Li Keqiang "looked forward to making joint efforts with the Indian government led by Modi and press ahead with the friendly cooperation between both the countries in various fields", since he acknowledged China's relations with India "as a priority of Chinese diplomacy".²¹ It is in this context of sustaining and successfully seeing through the spirit of mutual cooperation, that the State visit of the Chinese President, Xi Jinping to India on 17-19 September 2014 – within a period of three months of the NDA-II government's assumption of office - may be viewed. The significance of this sojourn was contained in the fact that it took place in the backdrop of the Chumar incident, on 18 September 2014, when PLA soldiers perched on a hillock claiming the area to be part of China, while simultaneously, another 300 soldiers maintained presence close to the LAC.²² Fortunately enough, this incident could not dismantle Xi's first summit meeting with Modi, during which, the two leaders "reiterated their commitment to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution, proceeding from the overall interests of bilateral relations", as they recognized the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the India-China border areas as an important guarantor for the development and continued growth of bilateral relations, pending a final resolution. In this context, they "reaffirmed the utility and significance of the mechanism of Special Representatives for seeking a political settlement of the boundary question and of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs for handling border related matters".²³ Furthermore, in a stern reference to the string of contretemps along the border by the PLA, Prime Minister Modi urged for the "clarification" or demarcation of the LAC and an "early settlement of



the boundary question", acknowledging it as imperative for respecting "each other's sensitivities and concerns, and peace and stability in our relations". In response, while President Jinping assured him of China's determination to work with India through friendly consultation to settle the boundary question at an early date, he held the absence of demarcated boundaries responsible for "some incidents" like Chumar.²⁴ Summarily then, while the Chumar incident ended without any major conflict and did not act as a spanner to the summit-level negotiations, its timing raised serious questions on the sincerity of Xi Jinping's outreach to New Delhi.

In an attempt to etch the contours of a breakthrough on the India-China border dispute ahead of Narendra Modi's historic visit to China in May 2015, the Eighteenth round of SR negotiations – the maiden venture under the NDA-II government - was held between the Indian National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval and the Chinese State Councilor, Yang Jiechi on 23 March 2015 in the Indian capital. Held in a positive and constructive ambience, the two representatives continued the discussions to reach a mutually acceptable Framework for resolution of the Boundary Question, agreeing to "take necessary steps to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas which is a pre-requisite for continued growth of bilateral relations." Besides, they expressed satisfaction at the growing interaction between the border forces of the two countries and agreed to further expand such important confidence building measures.²⁵

The next big-ticket visit was Narendra Modi's three-day maiden sojourn to China on 14-16 May 2015. The Joint Statement released in course of this visit placed premium on "an early settlement of the boundary question" serving "the basic interests of the two countries to be should be pursued as a strategic objective". In the context of the progress of the SR mechanism, the two leaders reaffirmed the commitment "to abide by the three-stage process for the settlement of the boundary question, and continuously push forward negotiation on the framework for a boundary settlement based on the outcomes and common understanding achieved so far, in an effort to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution as early as possible." Besides,

Modi and his Chinese counterpart, Li Keqiang acknowledged the importance of resolving outstanding differences, including the boundary question, in a proactive manner, such that the development and continued growth of bilateral relations could be guaranteed.²⁶ Evidently then, as New Delhi and Beijing sought to clear obstacles to a relationship that was acknowledged as a "game changer" in the international political order, in letter then, the two leaders agreed to start annual visits between their militaries, expand exchanges between the border commanders and start using a military hotline (though the operational level was not clear) to defuse flare-ups on the border. However, though Modi "stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on a few issues including the boundary question that is holding back our relationship" and reiterated "our stand on the Line of Actual Control", Li emphasized the importance of "maintaining the momentum of talks between special representatives on the border issue in seeking a plan for resolution that is fair and reasonable."²⁷ in spirit, the absence of a real breakthrough in negotiations had stolen a bit of sheen from this much-anticipated high-level visit. Although it does not suggest that no headway was made on the boundary issue in course of the Prime Ministerial sojourn, it was established that progress on the same was destined to follow a slow pace. Besides, Modi's suggestion for resuming the process of clarifying the LAC through the exchange of maps and an agreed demarcation "without prejudice to our position on the boundary question"²⁸ proved to be a non-starter. Although the proposal was not formally rejected, Beijing floated a counter-proposal of negotiating a 'Code of Conduct' that would serve as a "building block" rather than allowing LAC vexations to remain a "stumbling block". In China's first public reaction to Modi's proposal, Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Huang Xilian suggested that both sides should try to reach an agreement on a Code of Conduct as attempts to clarify mutual positions on the LAC had "encountered difficulties" in the past. He further elaborated in this context: "Whatever we do in the border area it should be constructive. That means it should be a building block for the process of negotiations, not stumbling block. If we find that clarification of the LAC is building block then we should go ahead. But if we find that it is a stumbling block it could complicate



the situation further. We have to be careful. Our position is that we have to seek some kind of comprehensive measures, not only one measure to control and manage the border to ensure peace and tranquility along the border. We can try and reach an agreement on the Code of Conduct.”²⁹

India’s reluctance to consider a ‘Code of Conduct’ emanated from reservations to agreeing to restrictions on its plans for infrastructure development in the border region, for which two inferences could be drawn: first, that the Chinese proposal was aimed at limiting India’s military and infrastructure modernization, thereby enabling China to preserve its military advantage in Tibet; and secondly, accepting the Chinese proposal could potentially curtail the ability to effectively patrol and intercept PLA movements in territory claimed by India. Therefore, in India’s view, while an elaboration of the ‘Code of Conduct’ was unlikely to adequately address flare-ups along the border, the absence of attempts at LAC clarification in border negotiations would only restrict India’s flexibility. Given this juxtaposition, while on the one hand, India seeks an ‘early’ border resolution, China prefers border peace and control, on the other.³⁰ Under such circumstances, the resultant dichotomy in views of the two countries, unfortunately, would only defer negotiations on the issue.

The Way Ahead

At the most recent SR meeting (19th Round) between the Indian National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, in Beijing on 20-21 April 2016, a significant, though incremental headway was evident as China candidly indicated its willingness to make concessions on the sensitive boundary issue, suggesting that the two countries “meet each other halfway” on their quest to reach a “fair and reasonable” mutually acceptable solution. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Statement, while reposing faith in the “positive attitude of mutual respect and understanding and on the basis of existing results from negotiations”, hoped that both countries would “stay on the track of political settlement, stick to peaceful negotiations to resolve the boundary question, meet each other halfway and continue to promote the process of framework negotiation so as to strive for a fair and reasonable solution that both sides accept.”³¹ This reference to stay on track for a

political settlement is significant as negotiations have reached a mature stage for the political leadership to take a decision on reaching a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, this sentiment echoes Doval’s predecessor, Shiv Shankar Menon, who had categorically stated in 2014 that with all the technical procedures having been completed, it was contingent on the political will of the two countries to take the negotiation process to a successful fruition. Till then, it gravitated on the two neighbours to “properly manage and handle disputes, strengthen consultations on boundary affairs and well safeguard peace and tranquility in boundary regions so as to create favourable conditions for the development of bilateral relations.”³²

However, despite the optimism in approach reflected in the recent SR meeting, through public handshakes and choreographed statements, in essence, differences over the focus of a proposed framework document for resolution of the boundary question on the one hand and priorities (emerging from India’s focus on demarcating the LAC, while China is pushing for a simultaneous Code of Conduct) on the other, continued to divide the countries, thus making it unlikely for mutual concurrence even on the framework document anytime soon. In any case, the twin ceremonial border meets in the Border Personnel Meetings/BPM Hut of Moldo and TWD Garrison in Eastern Ladakh region on 1 May 2016 between the two Armies have been a welcome gesture, though routine, in the wake of the SR meetings.³³

In sum then, built on an edifice of a deep-rooted conflict of interests and perceptions, over the decades, Sino-India relations have suffered and at times, even braved the apparition of the border war as well as its secondary and tertiary manifestations. Indubitably, adept diplomacy and negotiating skills practised by both countries, borne out by nineteen rounds of SR negotiations, for instance, have moderated tensions and prevented major escalations of conflict. However, on several episodes, efforts at rapprochement have been stalled or retarded at the altar of sporadic incursions, as the Depsang and Chumar incidents highlight. Notwithstanding such detours, it is contingent on the enlightened political will of the administrative echelons in both New Delhi



and Beijing to undertake and sustain sincere and pragmatic measures to reach a mutually-acceptable solution, in addition to abiding by the letter and spirit of bilateral agreements in existence.

Footnotes

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Turmoil in Syria: Implications for Peace and Conflict Resolution

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Syrian Turmoil

Syria has been in turmoil since March 2011 with small localised protests grew into a nationwide movement, at that time, the Syrian authorities tried to brutally suppress them. From the beginning, it has been emphasised on peaceful resolution of Syrian turmoil through political dialogue, and all the countries in the world and the region have reached the consensus that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The turmoil in Syria, which has claimed the lives of almost 270,000 people so far and displaced nearly half the country's population of about 23 million, either internally or outside its borders.¹ Syria is known as the heart of the Arab world or "beating heart of the Arabism" and during the five years of turmoil it has been proved to be the command centre of the region's nervous system. The Syrian turmoil has raised collective fears and triggered unexpected alliances across the West Asian region. In last five years, there has been no serious effort to resolve the Syrian crisis. However, Syria is central to the security of the region but conditions for a resolution of the Syrian conflict through a political solution do not exist till now.² Because, there are several countries at the regional as well as international level which are pursuing bloody politics to fulfil their vested interests in the region? The consequence is that the multiple geopolitical actors seem both hesitant and ineffectual to resolve the Syrian conflict. They talk more than they act. But, the Syrian government has opposed to any outside involvement in its internal affairs whereas its opponents constantly call for such outside involvement on their side. For instance, the United States has called publicly for Bashar al-Assad's renunciation as a President of Syria and also called upon the Syrian government to cease its internal military actions against the opposition.³ The United States has sought, unsuccessfully, to get the UN Security Council to adopt supportive resolutions. It has also imposed unilaterally economic sanctions on Syria. It consults regularly with other states about

how to move forward to deal with this crisis in Syria. Nevertheless, the Syrian government has condemned the United States for its pressure on the Syrian President to step down. The opposition forces have publicly expressed their frustration with the United States for not intervening in the way they wish and have proclaimed that they cannot count on serious US action.⁴

On the other, Russia and China have been insisting that what happened in Libya cannot be allowed to happen again in Syria. They believe that Great Britain, France, and the United States have used an ambiguous UN Resolution to use military force to overthrow the Libyan regime which was led by the former President Qaddafi and reinforced their geopolitical interests. Therefore, Russia and China have used their veto power though several times in the Security Council to prevent a political disorder in the whole Arab region. They are trying to get an opportunity to work for a political resolution to the Syria's internal conflicts. The most important point is that the various powers neutralize each other and no one today has much ability to resolve Syria's internal politics. The consequences of this political deadlock for internal developments in Syria remains therefore very much uncertain, and the internal actors are very much on their own.⁵

Outside Actors: Russia, China and the US

The turmoil and geopolitical developments set in motion by the Arab Spring have transformed West Asia into a theatre for new convergences and areas of competition among outside actors like Russia, China and the US. The most powerful actor in West Asia, internal or external, has for decades been the United States. The Syrian civil war is an arena of a power struggle between various global actors and interests as well as a generator of Islamist extremism which is threatening in the region. The rise of the Islamic State has changed the dynamics and created new



convergences and divergences of interests between various actors, reshaping the geopolitics of the region.⁶ At present, Syria is the first conflict where both the United States and Russia are militarily involved since the end of the Cold War. Both the powers have different approaches towards the Assad's regime. If the US was among the first group of nations that imposed sanctions on the Syrian government and called for the removal of President Assad, Russia remained a strong pillar of support for the Syrian regime. During the turmoil, President Obama came under enormous pressure from Washington's allies in West Asia, namely Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to bomb Damascus to take President Bashar al-Assad out of power. They know that only the US can do it as the Russians are directly backing the Syrian President. But the US President has never been convinced that removing President Bashar al-Assad forcibly from power would produce any positive outcome.⁷ As for Russia, Syria is a strategic asset in the West Asian region where it's only naval base as an outpost of its power from where it could influence regional politics. From the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Russia's primary goal is to safeguard its interests and helping the President Assad's regime to stay in power. Russia has actually played a pivotal part in the Syrian conflict so far. Therefore, Moscow's stakes are very high in this arena. But Putin's bet is not on the Syrian President, but on the Ba'athist state which has built in Syria since 1970 when Bashar al-Assad's father Hafiz al-Assad came into power. That is why; Russian President argues that the only solution to the Syrian conflict is "restoring the statehood".⁸ Moreover, he firmly believes that it is up to the Syrian people to decide their country's political future. But the US and its allies say President Assad cannot be part of any long-term political resolution for Syria.

Russia

However, Vladimir Putin's decision to intervene in Syria was undoubtedly one of the most important events in the contemporary global politics. Involvement in a conflict means that Russia is taking a shot at the international level and contesting with the global role of the US altogether. Now in Syria, there is no going back for Moscow and still it is not clear for how long Russia will sustain its military campaign in Syria, however, it will need to act according to its newly

stated geopolitical ambitions. Consequently, because of the fear of losing existing influence in Syria, Moscow will not change its position on the Syrian President and his role in Syria. While Western powers seek to convince Russia that the Syrian President is the cause of the conflict, but Putin believes that President Assad is the only force that may stop jihadists.⁹ Moreover, Moscow knows it all too well that the act of abandoning President Assad will be interpreted in the West as its weakness and a strategic loss in the West Asia region. Even worse, it will mean the inability of Russian military capacity to yield meaningful results, which would cast shadow on the entire geo-political interests behind Putin's foreign policy. It seems that Moscow will find itself in a strong position in Syria in future, but it will also need to maintain its military force in the country and to secure a spot of a key player in the region. In contrast, a pullout from Syria looks more and more unrealistic because it will leave Russia without its main lever against the West in this conflict.¹⁰ Furthermore, Russia's bombing of the city of Aleppo sent a clear message to the world that Putin is now in charge of the endgame in Syria. Moscow's plan is quickly became a reality that the rest of the world will have to accept it. America, Britain and the rest may not be comfortable with Putin's ambitions in the region. He is also ambitious to restore his country's status as a world power and would like to show potential allies in the region and the wider world that Russia stands by its friends. For the first time, since the end of the Cold War, Moscow's military and diplomatic backing is something truly worth having and the prospect of peace in Syria to a great extent is now dependent on Russia.¹¹

China

Now, China has started to actively engage with both the Syrian government and opposition leaders in an apparent effort to mediate the Syrian conflict. The reasons for Beijing's new approach are a mix of geo-strategic interests and the desire to be seen as an influential actor on the stage of global politics. Beijing had never before gone beyond making rhetorical calls for a peaceful resolution, explaining its reluctance to engage out of respect for Syria's sovereignty. It is certain that China will not support a coalition against Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad. China has good relations with his regime, which it has supplied with



weapons in the past. At the same time, China has become military involved along with Russia are equally incredible. Though Syria itself is mostly irrelevant as a trading partner for China, the region's stability is nevertheless one of Beijing's core concerns, not only because Iraq is among its main oil suppliers.¹² Beijing's \$900-billion Silk Road initiative aims to connect Asia, the West Asia, Africa, and Europe through a wide-ranging infrastructure network. But ongoing fighting and terror attacks are putting this mega-project at risk. The Chinese leadership also worries that the terrorist threat from Syria and Iraq could impact their own country. But there is yet another reason for China's unprecedented involvement in Syria. The peace process provides a unique opportunity for China's diplomats to broaden their experience with multilateral global crisis management and conflict resolution. The ability to shape the resolution of the Syrian conflict is central to Chinese President and his vision of an assertive China taking on more international responsibilities, reflecting its status as a global power. In pursuit of this vision, Chinese diplomats are now involved in more international negotiations than ever before.¹³

Regional Actors: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran

The involvement of regional actors like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran has been another feature of persistent crisis in Syria. The *Shi'a-Sunni* divide has once again opened after decline of the Saddam Hussein of Iraq and now Saudi Arabia seems to be interested to turn the clock back. Money and arms are handed over to the opposition groups in Syria by the wealthy nation of the Gulf like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Opposition groups are dominated by many leaders, but no one can tell who is fighting for whom. The Saudi Arabia is more concerned about the Islamic Republic and that is its biggest monster in the present equation.¹⁴

Saudi Arabia

The Syrian conflict at least for Saudi Arabia is not posing a direct security issue, and actually Saudi Arabia supports for the Syrian opposition groups are coming with the aim of scaling down Iran's influence in West Asia region and playing an active role to increase their influence and depict Riyadh as a leader of the Muslim world. To put it in other words, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is taking advantage from the turmoil in Syria to strengthen and improve its

regional position. This came when the Syrian civil war is considered a security issue for Iran. The Islamic Republic asserts that any negotiation and deal on the future of Syria at international level without considering Tehran's role would be in vain. So, Riyadh is watching Syria through the window of its regional rivalry with Tehran and its main intention is to contain the rising power of the *Shi'a Crescent* in the region.¹⁵ Further, Saudi Arabia sees the threats coming from Iran as widening especially after the wave of Islamic awakening in the region. It also sees the closeness of the resistant movements, especially in Syria, to the Islamic Republic as factors that spoil the balance of power in the region and subordinate the Saudi position in the regional politics. Thereby, walking in line with the Western-Arab approach, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is struggling to weaken Iran's clout in Syria. In fact, to limit Iran's power across the West Asian region, Riyadh is backing the Syrian opposition. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is looking forward to make the most out of Syria's political transition. In case of finding a political settlement for Syria, Riyadh would in no way agree with Bashar al-Assad staying in power in the country, as it would never approve of such plans as split of Syria.¹⁶ Now, the Saudi Arabia is publicly demanding that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad "will be removed by force" if a political solution cannot be found, and Turkey is claiming that it may have to establish a "safe zone" in northern Syria "for humanitarian purposes". Saudi Arabia, Turkey and their *Sunni* allies have poured massive amounts of money and arms into the conflict in Syria. For the Saudis, their focus is on trying to convince everyone that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is an extremely dangerous dictator and he must be removed at all costs. But if the Saudis try to take Damascus and remove Bashar al-Assad by force, the Syrians and their allies will certainly fight back. It means that the Saudis will be fighting Hezbollah, the Iranians and the Russians. They had dreamed of turning Syria into a full-blown *Sunni* nation, and if they give up now Syria will end up being dominated by Iran and Hezbollah. It will be a result that is far worse than if they never tried to overthrow President Assad in the first place.¹⁷ The existential threat in the region, Saudi Arabia sees from the development of the rising power of the *Shi'a Crescent* consisting of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Moreover, the US nuclear deal with Iran



which freed up over \$100 billion for Tehran to pursue military deals with Russia has greatly alarmed the Saudi Arabia. Iran's \$1 billion purchase of the S300 air defence system is just for starters and Tehran is expected to sign deals worth a further \$8 billion with Russia this year. Saudi Arabia also fears that a defeat for its proxy forces would greatly strengthen its number one sworn enemy and increase the influence in the region.¹⁸ Syria as a sandwiched in the centre of the West Asia, Saudi Arabia sees threats across three of its borders. To the east is Iran, to the south is Yemen, and to the north is Iraq and Syria, both the states are deeply unstable. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, rather than waiting for events to reach it, wants to rapidly reshape the reality of the Syrian conflict. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has recognized that a West Asia without a stable Syria is a West Asia without stability.¹⁹

Turkey

In the beginning, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's goal was "zero problems" policy with his neighbours. This doctrine was designed to enable Turkey to emerge as a power broker between the West and the West Asia and North Africa (WANA). He hoped to help integrate the new emerging Muslim Brotherhood governments to become respected members of the international community. The fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt was a blow to his vision. Similarly, the inability to engineer regime change in Syria, and to replace the Syrian regime with a Brotherhood government, was another setback. Turkey initially sought to shape the outcome of the unrest in Syria by promoting political, social and economic support that might pave the way to a stable Muslim Brotherhood led government in Damascus.²⁰ That goal proved elusive, as the Damascus regime increasingly resorted to violence against the opposition, then, Turkey formally cut diplomatic relations with Syria. By the spring of 2012, the Turkish government began providing support for the armed struggle in Syria and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the Syrian rebels as the government of Syria. As Turkey's intended outcomes appear increasingly less likely, Erdogan now appears to be playing defence, seeking to prevent the worst possible outcomes. For Turkey, the nightmare scenario is the breakup of Syria and emergence of autonomous Kurdish zones that

threatens Turkey's territorial integrity. In future, Turkey is likely to continue its financial, diplomatic, and military support to the *Sunni* opposition in Syria, however, this course of action did not get Turkey's any strategic goal but rather perpetuate instability in Syria. Turkey's manoeuvres have not changed the outcome in Syria.²¹

Moreover, Turkey and Syria share a long border and the Turkish government looked the other way as foreign jihadists flooded into Turkey; the so called 'Gateway to Jihad', a small border between Turkey and Syria along the Orontes River, shows how this works. Initially, when the foreign jihadists flooded through the area, Turkish soldiers literally ignored them, and therefore, Islamic State publicly acknowledged Turkey's support, and stated that "most of the fighters who joined us in the beginning of the war came via Turkey, and so did our equipment and supplies". To be very clear, Turkey is just one of many countries which enabled the rise of Islamic State and other extremist groups in Syria.²² Furthermore, Turkey continues to support anti-Assad fighters operating under the banner of the Free Syrian Army, which includes groups that Iran and Russia say are terrorist organizations and which the United States is also not too keen about. Developing ties with Riyadh gives Ankara an important partner in the region and helps it not only overcome its regional isolation, but to also reinforce its hands in Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, ties with Ankara provide Riyadh with an important regional and predominantly *Sunni* partner at a time when it is in deep rivalry with Iran. This is particularly important for the Saudi Arabia's side because it feels that it has lost ground against Iran following Tehran's rapprochement with Washington.²³

Iran

Syria and Iran relation has been going on since the Islamic revolution which took place in Iran in 1979. The basement of the Syria-Iran cooperation is the common regional interests and similarity of positions on the key issues in the West Asia region. Iran and Syria became closer in 1980s, as both countries had common hostility to former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and the tough position on the United States and Israel, which helped to maintain the strategic alliance. Iran is a recognized leader in the *Shi'a* world. About 89% of the population is members of



this branch of Islam; *Sunni* Muslims are about 9%, other religions are 2%.²⁴ At the same time, Iran is the supporter and protector of *Shi'a* Muslims in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Turkey, and even in Saudi Arabia, those countries where *Shi'as* are in the minority. On the other, Syria remains one of the few countries with anti-US and anti-Saudi Arabia ideology in the Arab world. Therefore, if Bashar al-Assad's regime loses its power, Iran's position will suffer. As Iran is the main ideological, military, economic and political opponent of the Saudi Arabia, Washington, and Israel in the region.²⁵ Iran's position on Syria is straightforward: It will do its best to keep Bashar al-Assad in power. But Tehran is smart enough to realize the Syrian regime could be overthrown sooner or later. Hence, Iran has stepped up its support of *Alawite* and other minority militias, not only to preserve influence in Syria. Because, the *Alawites* are often referred to as an offshoot of *Shi'a* Islam, but religion's importance as a bond between Iran and Syria should not be overstated. The closer ties between Iran and Syria are based on geopolitics rather than religion. Iran has long viewed Syria as a counterweight to the United States, Israel, and its Arab rivals. Iran's eight year long war (1980-88) with Iraq cemented the Syria-Iran alliance.²⁶ That is why, Iran has committed a large amount of resources to the survival of one of its key regional allies, supporting training, intelligence, and military activities and even contributing to the pro-regime *Shabiha* militias which have become key players in the Syrian conflict. As it has been discussed earlier, this relation is often understood in purely geostrategic terms, with highlighting Iran's interest in maintaining the Assad's regime as a bridge to Hezbollah, its proxy in Lebanon that serves as a counter to Israel. For Iran, Assad's legitimacy is built upon a foundation that emphasizes the rights of the sovereign state and is grounded in both international law and the will of the Syrian people.²⁷ Iran's *Quds* Force has, which operates in foreign countries, sent thousands of troops to Syria, leading battles against rebel groups. Its drones and advanced weaponry were ubiquitous. Tehran has spent billions of dollars since the start of the civil war in order to preserve its interests in Syria. To further bolster him, Tehran trained and oversaw the creation of the National Defence Forces, a domestic militia comprising tens of thousands of regime loyalists. Iran summons *Shi'a* militias from across the region to fight in Syria;

therefore, President Assad is increasingly dependent on Iran militarily and financially.²⁸ Nevertheless, Tehran does not see a viable alternative to the president of Syria that would preserve its interests in Syria. Iran cannot afford to lose Syria, so it is using Bashar al-Assad to tip the balance of power against other regional powers and further strengthening the rising power of the *Shi'a Crescent* in the West Asia region. Any fundamental change in Syria's political structure will directly and significantly threaten Iran's national security. Tehran's role will continue to deepen in Syria. This will further militarize, radicalize and widen the Syrian conflict. Iran will not change its the *status quo* in Syria. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has declared in June 2015 that Tehran would back Bashar al-Assad "until the end of the road".²⁹

Implications for Peace and Conflict Resolution

There seems no easy resolution to end the Syrian conflict and this problem will not stay confined to Syria as well. Therefore, Syria's neighbours as well as global powers are getting worried but they are bound with their geo-political interests. Syria is a multi-sectarian society with shared identities with groups in other countries as well. As a result, the sectarian tensions that are being unleashed in the region are also spilling over from Syria's borders.³⁰ The West Asia itself is polarized on the issue as most regional powers have a direct stake in the outcome of the Syrian conflict. For Iran and Hezbollah, Syria is a key ally in their confrontation with Israel, and President Bashar al-Assad, the only guarantee of a friendly regime in Damascus. On the other side, there is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran's main regional rival, which together with Qatar and Turkey supports the rebels in Syria. But, Syrian opposition is a diverse mix of exiled political groups, grassroots activists, and defected army men waging a guerrilla war against the Syrian government forces. The Syrian National Coalition is the broadest umbrella group for opposition parties but it is mostly based abroad and has no real power base inside the country. Therefore, resolution to the Syrian conflict is hindered by the lack of consensus between major world powers which support opposition sides in the Syrian conflict. Syrian opposition wants to dismantle the regime of President Assad, while his supporters fear this would lead to Syria's collapse, making a compromise to solve this problem seems almost impossible.³¹ Many of the



defectors are *Sunnis* who oppose *Alawite Shi'a* domination and may have calculated that the regime would fall quickly. The opposition is highly disorganized and has been unable to form a credible national interim government for the areas it controls, although some rebel groups have set up the machinery of local government. Increasing fighting within the opposition groups has also increased the rebels' difficulties. The main cleavage is between the more-secular components of the opposition forces, represented in the field by the Free Syrian Army, and the various jihadist groups, some of which are directly linked to *Al-Qaeda*.³² Backing one party against the other rather than attempting to make peaceful resolution would inevitably destroy the efforts and strengthen the extremists on both sides. But the question is that how the world powers understand the meaning of peace and conflict resolution, and what sort of negotiations they propose to resolve this. Actually, conflict resolution means assisting the parties to identify the deep causes of the conflict and to imagine and implement effective ways of dealing with them. Analysis and imagination, not "negotiating from strength," are the keys to a successful peace process.³³ What should be the role of Russia, the US, the Saudis, Iranians, and other outsiders like regional countries? They should agree to stay out of the way while the talks continued and to stand ready to guarantee any agreement reached by the parties. There is no guarantee, of course, that these efforts will succeed. But unless they are tried, no one can rightfully declare the struggle is irresolvable by peaceful means. The first rule of effective peacemaking is to empower the suffering parties to refashion their own system in accordance with their own basic needs.³⁴ Moreover, the 15 member Council unanimously adopted resolution 2268 on 26 February 2016, endorsing the deal announced in the Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian Federation. The resolution demanded that all parties to the agreement live up to its terms, and urged all Member States to use their influence to ensure that parties to the conflict fulfil their commitments and create the conditions for a durable and lasting ceasefire. In any sincere effort to reach a political settlement in which Syrians alone decided their future through a Syrian-led dialogue without foreign interference. The ball again is in the court of other parties that has yet to prove their good intentions and

commitment to facilitate a peaceful settlement, without preconditions or interference in domestic affairs. With that, they have invited Syrians to promote national reconciliation, mobilize efforts to defeat terrorism and build a unified territory.³⁵ But so far, the Syrian regime has proven resistant to mediation and therefore some of the world's most experienced mediators have failed. Why? The explanation, however, is found in a set of strategic and structural barriers. First, few of the involved global powers have had a genuine interest in negotiations. The Syrian regime believed it could crush the opposition, whereas the opposition gained support from external patrons. As both sides anticipate a victory that would make uncompromised. Second, the opposition has remained fragmented across territories, clans, and worldviews. A series of attempts to coordinate has done little to change this fact.³⁶ The consequence is that the opposition has rarely been able to speak with one voice. Study shows that civil wars with this kind of fragmentation often suffer from spoiler problems: the external sponsors each favouring groups of their own taste and has exacerbated these difficulties. Third, sectarian dimensions, while present one battlefield in the greater rivalry between the two principal denominations of Islam like *Shi'a* and *Sunni*. This has fuelled mistrust and difficulties. Scholars have argued that "religious conflicts are more difficult to settle peacefully than other types of conflicts".³⁷ Fourth, mediation has been hampered by international disunity. International negotiations have been marked by the inability of the United States and Russia to join around a common approach. Furthermore, the regional neighbourhood has been equally unsupportive.³⁸ This multiplicity of regional actors makes any consensual political settlement in Syria is very difficult to achieve it. Solutions can no longer be imposed on fragmented societies by dominant regional players. Now, Syria is in the direst condition as the civil war continues to rage with no clear resolution or political settlement in sight.³⁹ Where civil wars are devastating and both sides destroy infrastructure and wage economic warfare, causing destruction and dislocation. Beyond the casualties of war, human capital is destroyed by the lack of health services and sectarian conflict further destroy the country's social fabric and raises the possibility of a wider regional war between *Shi'a* and *Sunni*. The stand of international community on the Syrian conflict is still not clear and the bitter legacy



of Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan has discouraged Western military intervention, but terrorist attacks launched from jihadist strongholds in Syria could provoke military strikes against them. Further, it seems more likely that the Syrian refugees will also add to existing sectarian tensions in neighbouring countries. They will become the recruiting reservoirs for new generations of fighters and Jihadist and therefore it will be continued for decades.⁴⁰

Moreover, the ongoing effort to resolution in Syria by the UN is now under the leadership of Staffan de Mistura, an Italian-Swedish diplomat who previously headed the UN mission in Iraq. De Mistura's strategy has been to shift from seeking a centrally coordinated ceasefire to focus on minor truces mediated between local actors in different places across the country. The goal of such 'freezes' is to promote de-escalation and distribution of humanitarian aid in the affected areas. However, it remains silent on Bashar al-Assad's fate and does not specify any process for reconciliation. If the UN or other actors in the international community would be willing to offer monitors or peacekeeping forces, the odds would certainly improve, but such interventions are improbable as long as sectarian differences remains in Syria. Therefore, the new initiative seems destined to suffer the same fate.⁴¹ However, De Mistura stated that regional powers, as well as Russia and the United States can play a crucial role in achievement of Syrian crisis settlement. "Countries in the region have a crucial role in achievement of intra-Syrian settlement... We are seeing that developments related to the [Russia-US brokered] cessation of hostilities has been strongly facilitated by the beginning of talks between Russia and the US. Whatever they will be discussing in Moscow will be brought to the attention of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), and many of regional powers are parts of it", De Mistura said. Russia and the United States are co-chairs of ISSG consisting of global and regional powers and organizations that brokered intra-Syria talks.⁴² Moreover, the leaders of the western countries who beat the drum for further US military involvement in the Syrian conflict, either they have failed to learn from history or they want to repeat it again. In terms of American interests, there is need to defeat Islamic State and ultimately unseat President Assad of Syria,

while mitigating the humanitarian crisis befalling the country as soon as possible.⁴³ Beyond that, the United States also wants to control Russian leverage and influence on the West Asian stage in a way that enhances its national prestige. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin has declared that his goal in the Syrian conflict was to fight with the Islamic State. His objective is to uphold President Assad's hold on power by attacking on insurgents even if they are relatively moderate and unaffiliated with Islamic State or *Al-Nusra Front*. Further, Russian President wants to protect his own proxies, retain its access to the naval facility along the Mediterranean coast at Tartus and most likely embarrass the United States while demonstrating Russia's West Asian reach.⁴⁴

If this conflict is not contained and resolved soon, it carries the potential to result in direct military clashes, either by accident or by design, between some of the main regional and international actors, with dreadful global ramifications. With end of the Cold War, bipolar stability gone, the 2001 and 2003 US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq respectively saw a clear shift in America's position to one of unilateralism as a means to conflict resolution. But America's bitter Afghan and Iraqi experiences helped President Barack Obama reverse its policy approach to multilateralism, with a clear aim of giving primacy to diplomacy.

Though, Islamic State is repeatedly presented as the biggest threat to regional and global security.⁴⁵ Moreover, two international coalitions are at work in Syria: one is, led by the US, and includes many of America's Western allies and regional friends in opposition to the Assad regime; another is the rival Moscow-Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Hezbollah axis that wants to ensure the survival of the Assad regime against not just Islamic State, but all opposition forces. As a result, the growing situation in Syria can easily lead to military clashes between various outside actors on the ground, as there has already been between Turkey and Russia, Russia and US, Saudi Arabia and Iran and etc. In the event of such a development, the US and its allies will be forced to back Turkey and Saudi Arabia, against Russia, China, Iran, and Hezbollah. The US has already given the status of Turkey as a critical NATO member.⁴⁶



Conclusion

In a word, Syria has become an arena for regional as well as outside actors; more significantly, these actors have the responsibility to find out peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict, but these actors are playing bloody politics for geo-political interests and they have made Syrian conflict very complicated and there are less possibilities to resolve this problem, because mediators have also become the part of the problem and not part of the solution, indeed, they are also fighting a proxy war in Syria, and therefore, all the actors have high stakes in the regional polities of West Asia. One should remember that if the Syrian conflict continued in future, this problem will become more and more complicated, then, regional as well as outside actors will also have to pay heavy price for their dirty politics in Syria. Because, if your neighbour's house is burning and you are also adding fuel to the fire instead of control to the fire and think you will be safe. This is just foolishness and eventually the fire will come into your house and your house will also burn. Therefore, the future of West Asia as well as Syria looks very dark and this is the failure of the international community, UNO, global powers or regional countries of West Asia. The need of the hour is that all the actors have to play a very crucial role to find out peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict and keep aside their geo-political interests then only the Syrian crisis could be resolved.

End Notes

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Water Disputes and Peaceful Settlement in the World

Dr. Sudhir Wadekar

"The outcome of cooperation between an elephant and a fly is not difficult to predict." - Chomsky¹

I. Introduction: The availability of water has got vital place in the policies of the governments. How to use or share the water of international river is the major question. Countries and non-state actors try to find solution by international law. United Nations and World Bank attempted for peaceful settlement of water disputes. The riparian states attempt to solve their water disputes through the agreements. Major water disputes and efforts for peaceful settlement are discussed in this paper.

We are worried about potable Water. Water scarcity increases water insecurity. Life would be impossible without it. Human can live more than a month without food, but only a week without water. Experts have discussed bringing icebergs from the seas of Antarctica to water-starved region. Proposals have been made to ship water not only in tankers, but also in 660-meter-long "Medusa Bags" from Turkey to countries in the Middle East.² Ismail Serageldin, Vice-President of the World Bank, stated in 1995 that, "If the wars of the twentieth century were fought over oil, the wars of this century will be fought over water."³ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned that "Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future."⁴

Water plays an important role in socio-cultural and religious activities around the world. Ninety seven percent of all the water on the earth is salt water- unsuitable for drinking or growing crops. The remaining 3 percent of water is inaccessible which is locked away in the ice caps of Antarctica and Greenland and in deep aquifers. Only 0.3 percent of the total fresh water is useable for human and animal populations of the world. The world's 38 poorest countries are located near areas that lack sufficient

water supplies. Even those countries that possess sufficient supplies suffer regional or zonal shortages.⁵ 'A World Bank Policy Paper'(1992) on 'Water Resource Management' observed that "water is an increasingly scarce resource requiring careful economic and environmental management... As the demand for water for human and industrial use has escalated, so has the competition for water used for irrigated agriculture." In United States of America 36 states face a water shortage. Water scarcity is a problem in Northern India, Northeastern China and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley in California.⁶

Global climatic change will affect water availability. The clearest threat posed by climatic change is the increase in both evaporative losses and water demands caused by higher average temperatures. Even without changes in precipitation, water availability can decrease by 10 percent or more simply owing to average temperature increases of 2 to 3°C.⁷

In a report on the implementation of Agenda 21's recommendations on fresh water, the UN Secretary General observed that: "By the year 2025 a full 35 per cent of the world population will be living under conditions of water scarcity or stress, compared with about 6 per cent in 1990." The term "water scarcity" is defined as "a per capita availability of fresh water resources of 1,000 cubic meters or less," and "water stress" as "a per capita availability of between 1,000 and 17,000 cubic meters."⁸ Falkenmark and Widstrand suggested ranking of water shortage measure in m³ per capita per year: a) less than 1000 is a water-scarce country, b) 1000-1700 is a water-stressed country, c) 1701-3000 is a water-insufficient country, d) 3001-10000 is a water-sufficient country, and e) more than 10000 is a water-abundant country.⁹

According to UN statistics, worldwide demand for fresh water grew from 579 cubic km per



year in 1900 to 4,130 cubic km in 1990. Americans consume over 70 times as much water annually as Ghanaians. By 1990, water availability per capita in 18 countries had fallen below 1,000 cubic meters per year. Because of population growth, by the year 2025, over 30 countries will be unable to provide 1,000 cubic meters per person per year. In 1990 there were twelve countries in which water availability was less than 500 cubic meters per person per year; this number is projected to increase to nineteen by 2025.¹⁰ The threat to freshwater resources posed by climate change was recognized in Agenda 21, the action plan adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992.¹¹

Dinar, A. et. al. explained three factors that affect the ability of a country to cope with water scarcity. First, water quality is an important dimension of water scarcity. The available water in a country that is polluted is consequently no longer part of the usable quantity. Second, the standard of living in a country is a major factor affecting the way humans will consider water scarcity. Higher living standards are usually associated with elevated levels of water consumption (e.g., washing machines, swimming pools). The technological level of a country may allow its citizens to live quite well on relatively small amounts of water (e.g., recycling, seawater desalination). At the country level, governments attempt for inter-basin water transfers (e.g., China, California, Israel) to ease local water scarcity situations.¹²

II. International River: Since 1950 the continents of South America, Africa and Asia expressed their concern about common river basins, and south Asia particularly produced significant types of international river agencies. Since the Second World War, the total number of the world's independent nations has doubled. Especially in the developing continents, formerly internal rivers have now become international bodies of water.¹³

An international river is one that flows along the borders or through the territories of two or more states, or whose drainage basin is situated on the borders of or within two or more nations.¹⁴ The Helsinki Rules defines 'international drainage basin' and 'basin state' in its articles. Article II: "An 'international drainage basin' is a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by

the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."¹⁵ The 1997 Watercourse Convention defined some terms in Article 2, as: 1) "Watercourse" means a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus; 2) "International watercourse" means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States."¹⁶

In the 20th century, the number of nation-states increased due to the end of colonial power in the continents of Africa and Asia. Because of the disintegration process the number of states is increased. Naturally, the number of international rivers increased. A river which was within a country it crossed boundary.¹⁷ According to the United Nations committee for international natural resources and rivers, there are about 214 international rivers in the world, including about 110 rivers whose drainage basins are very large. There are 69 international rivers in the Americas, 48 in Europe, 57 in Africa, and 40 in Asia.¹⁸

According to McCaffrey, "the term "watercourse" means not only the main surface water channel and the water contained therein, but also the other components of a watercourse system, in particular, tributaries and groundwater." The concept of a "watercourse system" is conveyed by the expressions "catchment," "watershed" and "drainage basin" provided that these terms are understood to encompass subsurface as well as surface water.¹⁹ It is considered that because of the river's physical (geographical) unity a river basin should be developed as a single, indivisible whole, irrespective of political division. It can be considered a common property resource. Its exploitation by one beneficiary may diminish the benefits enjoyed by all others. By the economic perspective the basin should be treated as a unit.²⁰

Water disputes increased because of the growing non-navigational uses of water of international rivers. According to McCaffrey, "the increasing importance of non-navigational uses relative to navigation, and the resulting trend in state practice, leaves little doubt that navigation no longer



enjoys its former preferred status.²¹ India's National Water Policy-2002 gave last preference to the navigation uses in water allocation priorities.²²

III. Water Dispute: A question is asked that, who can control water flow. Powerful countries try to control the water flow of the international rivers. Mark Reisner rightly said, "Water flows towards power and money."²³ J. A. Allan (in his book *The Middle East Water Questions: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy*, 2001), illustrates the factors which are important in controlling water flows of three river basins in the Middle East. He focused on state's water sufficiency, economic capacity, hegemonic power and its position in international politics.²⁴ Egypt, Israel and Turkey are dominant they can control water flow of the international river in the particular basin.

According to scholars, conflicts over freshwater sources will soon replace oil as the major cause of inter-national wars (Falkenmark, 1986; Gleick, 1993; Lonergan, 1997; Klare, 2001). Some scholars disagree with such predictions (Wolf, 1998; Swain, 2001; Alam, 2002; Waterbury, 2002). Some argue that unregulated or unilateral use does little to stem problems of pollution and water scarcity and may increase prospects for lower-level armed conflict (Furlong, Gleditsch & Hegre, 2006; Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel, Mitchell & Sowers, 2006; Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre, 2000).²⁵

Zeitoun says that the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict. And that the effects of conflict are no less consequential than the effects of war. He argues that there is evidence to support the view that control over the sources of the Jordan River had some influence in the 1967 war between Israel and Syria, Egypt and Jordan. There is certainly reason to concern over Egyptian threats over the Nile or the effects of Turkey's damming of the Tigris and Euphrates. In the sense that a water war is one fought for control of water, none of these cases prove to be genuine. In his study, Aaron Wolf has found no example of water as a *casus belli*. Even for those states still formally at war with each other, as Israel and Lebanon, there is not likely to be a 'water war' in future. Water may rarely be the sole motive for war it is often a victim and target of it. Water resources and water infrastructure are closely associated with

all types of military conflict. Zeitoun states that power asymmetry is the reason for the absence of water wars. When the imbalance of power is severe, military conflict may be pre-empted according to the rules of realpolitik: the opportunity costs of an attack are too high. Weaker states 'know their place' in their neighbourhood.²⁶

Gleick, in his article, attempted to link between water and conflict. Scarce water becomes a matter of national security. Nations competition for scarce water leads towards disputes over shared fresh water resources. Not all water resources disputes will lead to violent conflict; indeed most lead to negotiations, discussions, and non-violent resolutions. In the Middle East and southern and central Asia, water is becoming an issue of "high politics," and the probability of water-related violence is increasing.²⁷

Lowi argues that in the both the Jordan and Indus basins, the nature and scope of the larger political conflict were the proximate reason for the failure to reach cooperative solution. Lowi argues, the riparian dispute in a protracted conflict setting is not simply about water; it takes on many of the attributes of the inter-state conflict. The parties involved view the riparian dispute and the political conflict as one and the same. The former is perceived as a manifestation, or microcosm of the later. Both conflicts trigger a similar discourse; both arose a similar attitude toward the adversary. Lowi states that states which are antagonists in the "high politics" of war and diplomacy tend not to agree willingly to extensive collaboration in the sphere of "low politics," centered around economic and welfare issues.²⁸

Gleick highlighted some characteristics that make water likely to be a source of strategic rivalry are: (1) the degree of scarcity, (2) the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one region or state, (3) the relative power of the basin states, and (4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources. He, in this concern, gives the example of Middle East.

In this century, hydroelectric dams were bombed during World War II, and the centralized dams on the Yalu River serving North Korea and China were attacked during the Korean War. Similarly, Iran



claimed to have blacked out large portions of Iraq in July 1981 by bombing a hydroelectric station in Kurdistan. Irrigation water-supply systems in North Vietnam were bombed by the United States in the late 1960s. When Syria tried to stop Israel in the 1950s from building its National Water Carrier, an aqueduct to provide water to southern Israel, fighting broke out across the demilitarized zone, and when Syria tried to divert the headwaters of the Jordan in the mid-1960s, Israel used force, including air strikes against the diversion facilities to prevent their construction and operation. These military actions contributed to the tensions that led to the 1967 War. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, most of Kuwait's extensive desalination capacity was destroyed by the retreating Iraqis, and Baghdad's modern water supply and sanitation system, which had intentionally been destroyed during the war.

In early 1993, it was reported that Saddam Hussein was poisoning and draining the water supplies of southern Shiite Muslims in his efforts to quell the opposition to his government. In 1993, the Peruca dam, the second largest dam in the former Yugoslavia, was intentionally destroyed in the civil war. In 1986, when North Korea announced plans to build the Kumgansan hydroelectric dam on a tributary of the Han River upstream of South Korea's capital, Seoul. This raised fears in South Korea that the dam could be used as a tool to disrupt its water supply, or as a military weapon to flood Seoul. South Korea built a series of levees and check dams above Seoul to try to mitigate possible impacts.

Both Syria and Iraq depend heavily on the Euphrates River. In 1974, Iraq threatened to bomb the al-Thawra dam in Syria; it massed troops along the border, alleging that the flow of water to Iraq had been reduced by the dam. In 1990, in Grand Anatolia Project, Turkey built the Ataturk Dam. It interrupted the flow of the Euphrates for a month to partly fill the reservoir. Syria and Iraq both protested that Turkey now had a water weapon that could be used against them. Indeed, in mid-1990, Turkish President Turgut Ozal threatened to restrict water flow to Syria to force it to withdraw support for Kurdish rebels operating in southern Turkey. In Persian Gulf conflict, the discussions were about using Turkish dams on the Euphrates River to deprive Iraq of a significant fraction of its

fresh water supply. But, no such action was ever taken; the threat of the "water weapon" was again made clear.²⁹

The regional resource disputes within what was the Soviet Union must now be considered international due to the changing political status of the former republics. The destruction of the Aral Sea from overuse of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya rivers was once internal Soviet matter, now the problem affects five independent nations. Egypt's Aswan High Dam led to flooding and dislocation of populations in the Sudan. The Farakka Barrage on the Ganges in India affected water conditions and availability in Bangladesh. In 1992, a serious political dispute arose between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the construction and operation of the Gabčíkovo/Nagymaros project on the Danube River.³⁰

Between 1900-2009, seventeen water disputes with military force used occurred including the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960 killing 3000 Soviet and Chinese troops, and in Mauritania and Senegal in 1989 killing 400 people. In 2010 China tried to block an Asian Development Bank loan to India's projected dam in Arunachal Pradesh. Since then both countries have increased their military presence in the region.³¹ According to Soffer, sometimes riparian states are enemies for reasons unconnected with water, and hostile relations prevent them from cooperating in any arena, especially water.³²

With new technology countries are exploiting water resources. There is domestic and industrial use of water. It is required for irrigation and power generation. The population of the world is growing and water is becoming scarce. Where the standard of living is increased, there water demand is also increased. The states are attempting to satisfy the need of water. All this leads towards water dispute.³³

IV. Peaceful Settlement: The Institute of International Law's *the 1961 Salzburg Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Waters*, the International Law Association's *the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers*, the Southern Africa Development Community's *the 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourses*, and UN's *the 1997*



Watercourses Convention tried to frame international laws on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers.³⁴

On May 21, 1997, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the 51st session, adopted the "Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses." This Convention entered into force on August 17, 2014. It is known as 'the 1997 Watercourses Convention.' This Convention is divided into 7 parts and 37 articles.

Article 5 provides equitable and reasonable utilization and participation: 1) Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. 2) "Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.

Article 6 states the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization:

- a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
- b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
- c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
- d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;
- e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
- f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
- g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.

The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.

Article 7 imposes obligation of not to cause significant harm. Article 8 provides obligation to cooperate. Article 9 is about the regular exchange of data and information of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts. *Article 33 is for the settlement of disputes.* "If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested by one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice."³⁵

According to Shlomi Dinar, international water law provides only hints and suggestions as to how states should resolve their water disputes and co-ordinate their differing plans for the uses of a given river.³⁶

Falkenmark poses two questions relating to human behavior. Would an aggravating water scarcity be expected to strengthen or weaken the self-interest of riparian states? Would crisis conditions make governments less or more willing to cooperate?³⁷ According to Conca et al, shared rivers create bargaining opportunities; states manage basins cooperatively for environmental protection, and for peaceful dispute resolution.³⁸ In controversies over the use of a river flowing from India to East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971), India abandoned its earlier position and now advocates more flexible and equitable use. Examples from Austria, Chile, and Ethiopia may also be cited in this regard.³⁹

Lowi raises two questions: what guides the behavior of states in international river basins and what determines the potential for cooperation among adversaries in the utilization of scarce water resources. For comparative evidence, she analyzed three other cases of riparian dispute in the basin of the Euphrates, the Indus, and the Nile that share certain basic similarities with the principal case (Jordan River dispute). She argues that in all four cases, efforts have been made to reach a cooperative, basin-wide arrangement for the utilization of the waters of the river system. She found in none of the cases has the result been the "optimal" pattern of



river basin development- via unitary, basin-wide planning and management.⁴⁰ River basins with only two riparians are more numerous than those with more riparians. Prospects for cooperation are more likely when there are fewer actors.⁴¹

Lending agencies, notably the World Bank, attempted to formulate guidelines for their own funding activities in relation to projects and programmes (irrigation, hydro-electric, flood control, navigation, drainage, sewerage, or involving industrial uses or possible pollution) that bear on such sensitive issues. The Bank believes that cooperation among riparians best ensures efficient utilization of international waterways. It encourages riparian states to enter into agreements or understandings for utilization of the waterway, for which its good offices are available.⁴²

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have identified more than 2,000 agreements on some aspect of transboundary water. Wolf (1999) puts the figure at 3,600 accords, with the earliest dating back more than a millennium, most are bilateral agreements dealing with river navigation. The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database lists more than 500 cooperative instruments involving 122 river or lake basins for the period 1874-2002. FAOLEX, FAO's on-line legal database, lists more than 100 international agreements for the period since 1980, including treaties and less formal accords such as memoranda of understanding, interagency cooperative agreements, and jointly endorsed meeting minutes. Hamner and Wolf (1997) conducted a partial content analysis of 145 basin treaties from 1874-1996; they found that although many of the treaty basins were multilateral, 86% of agreements were bilateral. On monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution, they found that almost two-thirds of the treaties contained provisions on information sharing and 54% contained monitoring provisions. However, 80% contained no enforcement mechanisms, and 54% had no conflict-resolution mechanism.⁴³

Conca et al studied the 62 international river agreements (for the period 1980-2000) involve 36 of the world's 263 international basins, or 14%. In 36 basins, agreements have been signed with one or more states. States involved in the largest number of

agreements are: Germany: 9, France: 7, Brazil: 6 South Africa: 6 Bolivia: 5 United States: 5. Seventy four countries signed at least one agreement. Countries signed agreements by region are: Africa: 16, Asia: 12, Europe: 20, North America: 5, South America: 9.⁴⁴

Tir and Ackerman analyzed water quantity treaties which commonly allocate water among the signatories or specify water-flow goals (e.g. the 1982 India-Bangladesh treaty, the 1994 China-Mongolia treaty, the 1995 Mekong Basin treaty)- and water quality treaties - which typically seek to minimize pollution or salinity (the 1972 Italy-Switzerland treaty, the 1973 US-Mexico treaty, the 1990 Elbe River treaty). They also analyzed all river use treaties (dealing with navigation, fishing, etc.).

Wolfs (2007) database identifies about 500 treaties signed over roughly the last century. Other research addresses cooperation possibilities but chiefly focuses on physical watershed analysis, international law principles, or technical issues. Brochmann and Hensel show that river treaties help reduce the likelihood of future river conflicts, relatively little attention has been paid to the theoretical and systematic empirical investigations of the politics of why countries agree to enter into river-managing treaties in the first place. Tir and Ackerman raised questions, such as to what extent security concerns cripple the possibility for river treaties? What role do economic factors play? Does water scarcity motivate or preclude cooperation? Does an upstream/downstream relationship really make river cooperation impossible?⁴⁵

'Conca et al consider that two-thirds (67%) of the world's 263 international river basins are bilateral (shared by two basin states), there is a surprisingly large proportion of the accords, 49 of 62, or 79%, that took place in multilateral basins. Yet within the 49 multilateral basins experiencing accords, the most common type of agreement, by a ratio of two to one (33 to 16), is bilateral—that is, an agreement that excludes one or more of the states in a multilateral basin. Forty Six of the 62 accords are bilateral agreements.'⁴⁶



The Third World states that have the most to gain from treaties, where the demand for drinking water will grow the most because of high population growth rates. Active involvement by the developed world and international organizations is necessary. Efforts to foster political development should be continued and much work put into changing the perception of riparian countries toward seeing each other as partners and not as competing foes that have to deplete the rivers' resources. Getting the countries to realize that their environmental security situations are interlinked would help foster river cooperation. Some related success has already taken place; recently, through the World Bank's efforts, bitter rivals India and Pakistan have entered a treaty regulating the use of three common rivers.⁴⁷

Gleick discussed treaties as a tool for peaceful resolution of the conflict. In 805, freedom of navigation was granted to a monastery in Europe. A bilateral treaty was signed in 1221 on the Weser River, which today flows through Germany into the North Sea. Such treaties have helped reduce the risks of water conflicts in many areas. The 1959 Nile River Treaty, the 1977 Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges Waters, and some limited bilateral agreements on the Euphrates between Iraq and Syria, and between Iraq and Turkey, are good examples of treaties. India and Nepal agreed by a December 1991 treaty to go forward on hydroelectric, irrigation, and flood control projects.

Gleick suggested that, "to make both regional treaties and broader international agreements over water more flexible, detailed mechanisms for conflict resolution and negotiations must be developed, basic hydrologic data must be acquired and completely shared with all parties, flexible rather than fixed water allocations are needed, and strategies for sharing shortages and apportioning responsibilities for floods need to be developed before shortages become an important factor." He also suggested that in the treaties all the affected parties should be included, a joint management committee to negotiate disputes, and flexibility to adapt to long-term changes in hydrologic conditions.⁴⁸

Factors of Treaty: Tir and Ackerman discussed three factors that deal more directly with the international river over which a treaty may be signed.

1) **Water Availability:** Potential demand for the river's resources (water) may seek a treaty in order to ensure future availability of river water for direct (i.e. drinking) or indirect (i.e. through agriculture) human consumption. Only when access to the resource becomes questionable- because of an increase in the need for the resource or because less of the resource is available, there will be willingness to compromise with other users to ensure future availability of the resource. Rapid growth has caused a rise in the demand for potable water, which puts a greater strain on the country's water resources, including international rivers it has access to. The problem is also compounded by related issues such as increased water pollution and diversion of water for irrigation and industrial use.

The key variable is not population growth itself but water availability per capita. The states that have an insufficient amount of water to meet their populations' demands will be pressured to secure access to freshwater sources, including international rivers. The country in need of additional water depends on the actions of the other riparian state (e.g. dam construction, pollution, and overuse). This is becoming a critical issue in the Middle East, where 232% of renewable freshwater resources are consumed annually (Hensel, Mitchell & Sowers, 2006). Some scholars argue that water is a strategic issue (e.g. Cooley, 1984; Klare, 2001; Lonergan, 2001). The need for additional water is hence likely to motivate armed conflict because it forces states into a zero-sum, competitive mindset where cooperative, positive-sum outcomes are seen as improbable (Elhance, 1999; Gleick, 1993; see also Furlong, Gleditsch & Hegre, 2006).

2) **Geography of the River:** The ability to cut off supply of a vital resource can allow the actor considerable influence over the disadvantaged party (Baldwin, 1979). The upstream state holds all the cards and does not need a treaty. In fact, realists would argue that the treaty would mean a relative loss of power. Mitchell & Keilbach (2001) argue that when the upstream state can pollute or divert the river, the



downstream state has to absorb all the consequences - regulatory treaties would be irrational because they would provide all the benefits to the victim and impose all the costs on the perpetrator. Lowi (1993) cites the example of Turkey's favorable position on the Euphrates as a key obstacle to river cooperation with Syria and Iraq.

3) Number of Rivers: The greater number of rivers common to the states provides multiple treaty-signing opportunities and multiple rivers may make compromise easier. Fischhendler and Feitelson's USA-Mexico case study demonstrates that the two countries were unable to reach an agreement over the use of Rio Grande water for some time. Yet, when Mexico suggested that they bring the Colorado River water into the negotiations.⁴⁹ It seems likely that agreement would not have been reached on Colorado waters but for the fact that Mexican streams contributed water to the Rio Grande that farmers on the American side of the river, in Texas, wanted. Capitalizing on its advantage on the Rio Grande, Mexico insisted on resolving all water problems. It was in essence a trade of Rio Grande water (to the US) for Colorado water (to Mexico). In 1944, a treaty concerning the apportionment of both the Colorado and the Rio Grande was concluded between the two countries.⁵⁰

The doctrine of "equitable apportionment" seeks a fair balance between the rights and needs of the parties, must have technical help to determine and measure this balance. This means machinery for controlling and measuring the flow of water; it means also administrative machinery. The experience of the past—such as that with the Rhine and Danube rivers—shows that administrative bodies are essential; the United States has created such bodies both with Canada and with Mexico.⁵¹

The international river basin administration was required to solve the problems in the river basin. International agencies were formed for the river administration; European authorities for the Rhine Rivers (Federal German Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States- 1815) and the Danube (Ukraine, Austria and

Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary- 1878), the North American commissions for the Canadian-United States (1909) and the Mexican-United States Commission (1944), and the two agencies in Asia for the Indus (India, Pakistan-1960) and Mekong River (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia-1995).⁵²

V. Conclusion: Water is useful in various uses. Today its availability is core issue. World is struggling to cope with water scarcity. Water security has vital place in the governments' agenda. Global climatic change will affect water availability. It is predicted that by the year 2025 a full 35 per cent of the world population will be living under conditions of water scarcity or stress. Formerly internal rivers have now become international water. Since the Second World War, the total number of the world's independent nations has doubled. Decolonization is the reason in the increase of number of international river. Non-navigational uses of waters get importance than navigational uses.

The Helsinki Rule (1966) and UN Watercourses Convention (1997) are the landmarks in the development of international laws of the uses of international rivers' water for non-navigational purposes. The concept changed from an "international river" to that of an "international drainage basin" or "International watercourse." International water laws are not accepted by all the UN member States. It has limitations and provides only hints and suggestions as to how states should resolve their water disputes.

Dominant states control water flow of the international river. Control of water flow was a major reason in the 1967 war between Israel and Arabs. The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict and the effects of conflict are no less consequential than the effects of war. To avoid conflict countries tries to solve water-sharing conflict by signing the treaties. Non-state actors, like World Bank, provide assistance to find a solution on water dispute. It provides good offices to the conflicting countries. The treaty provides administration mechanism of international rivers. The foreign policy consideration plays a role in fostering cooperation among the riparian States. Water-sharing treaties may create tension among sub-national political units and the centre. In the federal system, sub-national political



units have importance in the cooperation process with riparian State. Negotiation is the legitimate way of solving the water dispute than the way of war.

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US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Role for Russia

Dr. Deepak Yadav

Afghanistan has always played a very crucial role in the Asian and world politics and acted as playground for the 'Great Game'. Due to its unique geographical location and presence of abundant natural resources, controlling of Afghanistan has been a long cherished dream for the colonial powers in the past. In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan served as a 'strategic buffer' state between Czarist Russian and the British Empire in the subcontinent. Afghanistan's relations with Moscow became more cordial after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet Union was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1919¹ after the Third Anglo-Afghan war and signed an Afghan-Soviet non-aggression pact in 1921, which also provided for Afghan transit rights through the Soviet Union. Early Soviet assistance included financial aid, aircraft and attendant technical personnel, and telegraph operators.

The Soviets began a major economic assistance program in Afghanistan in the 1950s. Between 1954 and 1978, Afghanistan received more than \$1 billion in Soviet aid, including substantial military assistance. In 1973, the two countries announced a \$200-million assistance agreement on gas and oil development, trade, transport, irrigation, and factory construction. Following the 1979 invasion, the Soviets augmented their large aid commitments to shore up the Afghan economy and rebuild the Afghan military. They provided the Karmal regime an unprecedented \$800 million. The Soviet Union supported the Najibullah regime even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989. Today, unresolved questions concerning Soviet MIA/POWs in Afghanistan remain an issue between Russia and Afghanistan.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had been a major power broker and influential mentor in Afghan politics, ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society. In the 1980s, many Afghans were Russian language proficient.

Since 1947, Afghanistan had been under the influence of the Russian government and received large amounts of aid, economic assistance, military equipment training and military hardware from the Soviet Union.²

The economic assistance and aid had been provided to Afghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after the Russian Revolution and when the regime was facing the Russian Civil War. Provisions were given in the form of small arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to debated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles to support the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In 1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen the Afghan Armed Forces, by providing small arms and aircraft, and establishing training centers in Tashkent (Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviet Union built an extensive amount of infrastructure, notably giving assistance building the Kabul University, Polytechnical institutes, hospitals, civilian infrastructure, power plants, and local schools. During the 1980s, Soviets established the universities in Blakhe, Herat, Takhar, Nangarhar and Faryab provinces. The Russian faculty soon joined the universities, teaching Afghan students in proficient Russian languages.

In 1978, President Daud Khan began to take initiatives for building the massive military after witnessing India's nuclear test, *Smiling Buddha*, to counter Pakistan's armed forces and Iranian military influence in Afghanistan's polities. A final pre-war treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the PDPA to call upon the Soviet Union for military support.³ Following the Herat uprising, President Taraki contacted Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin was unfavorable to the proposal on the ba-



sis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan.⁴ Following Kosygin's rejection Taraki requested aid from Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Soviet head of state, who warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime.⁵

In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on March 20 and met with Brezhnev, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and other Soviet officials. It was rumored that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the scene in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was probably the most important factor in the Soviets' decision to leave. Gorbachev was attempting to change the stagnant years of Brezhnev and reform the Soviet Union's economy and image across the board with Glasnost and Perestroika. Gorbachev was also trying to ease cold war tensions by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 with the U.S. and withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan whose presence had garnered so much international condemnation. Gorbachev regarded confrontation with China and resulting military build ups on that border as one of Brezhnev's

biggest mistakes. Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relations would have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army from Afghanistan (among other things) and in 1989 the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place. At the same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scale down activities and withdraw even though Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there. The Soviets also pulled many of their troops out of Mongolia in 1987 where they were also having a far easier time than in Afghanistan and restrained the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea to the point of an all out withdrawal in 1988. This mass withdrawal of Soviet forces from contested areas shows that the Soviet government's decision to leave Afghanistan was based on a general change over in Soviet foreign policy.⁶

US Involvement in Afghanistan

US engagement with Afghanistan goes long back in the history books. The first recorded contact between Afghanistan and the United States occurred in 1830s when Josiah Harlan, an American adventurer and political activist from the Philadelphia area of Pennsylvania, traveled to the Indian subcontinent with intentions of becoming the King of Afghanistan. It was when the British Indian army invaded Afghanistan, during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838–1842) when Afghan kings Shuja Shah Durrani and Dost Mohammad Khan were fighting for the throne of the Durrani Empire. Harlan became involved in Afghan politics and factional military actions, eventually winning the title Prince of Ghori in exchange for military aid. The British-Indian forces were defeated and forced to make a complete withdrawal a few years later, with around 16,500 of them being reported to be killed and captured in 1842. There is no clear evidence as to what happened because the claim is made by William Brydon, the lone survivor. Harlan is believed to have left Afghanistan around the same period, eventually returning to the United States.

'Afghan-American relations became important during the start of the Cold War, between the United States and Soviet Union. Prince Mohammed Naim, King Zahir Shah's cousin, became the Chargé d'affaires in Washington, D.C. At that time, U.S. President Harry S. Truman commented that the friendship between the two countries would be "preserved and strengthened" by the presence of senior



diplomats in each capital. The first official Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States was Habibullah Khan Tarzi, who served until 1953. The U.S. Kabul Legation was elevated to the U.S. Embassy Kabul on May 6, 1948. Louis Goethe Dreyfus, who previously served as Minister Plenipotentiary, became the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1949 to 1951.¹⁶ The first American expedition to Afghanistan was led by Louis Dupree, Walter Fairservis, and Henry Hart. In 1953, Richard Nixon who was serving as U.S. Vice President at the time made an official diplomatic visit to Kabul. He also took a short tour around the city and met with local Afghans.

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's state visit to Afghanistan on December 9, 1959. In 1958, Daoud Khan became the first Afghan to speak before the United States Congress in Washington, DC. He was serving as Prime Minister of Afghanistan at the time. His presentation focused on a number of issues, but most importantly, underscored the importance of US-Afghan relations. While in the US capital of Washington, Daoud met with President Dwight Eisenhower, signed an important cultural exchange agreement, and reaffirmed personal relations with Vice President Nixon that had begun during the latter's trip to Kabul in 1953. The Prime Minister also traveled around the United States visiting the New York Stock Exchange, the Empire State Building, hydroelectric facilities at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and other sites. King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and U.S. President John F. Kennedy in Washington, D.C., two months before his assassination.

At that time the United States declined Afghanistan's request for defense cooperation but extended an economic assistance program focused on the development of Afghanistan's physical infrastructure—roads, dams, and power plants. Later, US aid shifted from infrastructure projects to technical assistance programs to help develop the skills needed to build a modern economy. Contacts between the United States and Afghanistan increased during the 1950s, especially during the Cuban Revolution between 1953 and 1959. While the Soviet Union was supporting Cuba's Fidel Castro, the United States was focusing on Afghanistan for its strategic purposes. This was mainly to counter the spread of communism and the strength of the Soviet Union into South

Asia, particularly the Persian Gulf. President Eisenhower made a state visit to Afghanistan in December 1959 to meet with its leaders. He landed at Bagram Airfield and then drove from there to Kabul in a motorcade. He met with King Zahir Shah, Prime Minister Daoud and a number of high-ranking government officials. He also took a tour of Kabul. After this important visit, the United States began to feel that Afghanistan was safe from ever becoming a Soviet satellite state. From the 1950s to 1979, U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than \$500 million in loans, grants, and surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry, and improve government administration.

In 1963, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan made a special state visit to the United States where he was met by John F. Kennedy and Eunice Kennedy Shriver. Zahir Shah also took a special tour of the United States, visiting Disney World in California, New York and other places. Habibullah Karzai, uncle of Hamid Karzai who served as representative of Afghanistan at the United Nations, is also believed to have accompanied Zahir Shah in the course of the King's state visit. During this period the Soviets were beginning to feel that the United States was turning Afghanistan into a satellite state. In 1965, Afghanistan and Cuba saw the establishment of communist parties, the Communist Party of Cuba and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Vice President Spiro Agnew, accompanied by Apollo 10 astronauts Thomas Stafford and Eugene Cernan, visited Kabul during an eleven-nation tour of Asia. At a formal dinner hosted by the Royal Family, the American delegation presented the King with a piece of lunar rock, a small Afghan flag carried on the Apollo 11 flight to the moon, and photographs of Afghanistan taken from space. By the 1970s, numerous American teachers, engineers, doctors, scholars, diplomats, and explorers had traversed Afghanistan's rugged landscape where they lived and worked. The Peace Corps was active in Afghanistan between 1962 and 1979. Many other American programs were running in the country such as CARE, American Scouting overseas (Afghanistan Scout Association), USAID, and others.



After the April 1978 Saur Revolution, relations between the two nations deteriorated. In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph "Spike" Dubs was murdered in Kabul after Afghan security forces burst in on his kidnappers. The U.S. then reduced bilateral assistance and terminated a small military training program. All remaining assistance agreements were ended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Following the Soviet invasion, the United States supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. In addition, generous U.S. contributions to the refugee program in Pakistan played a major part in efforts to assist Afghan refugees. U.S. efforts also included helping the population living inside Afghanistan. This cross-border humanitarian assistance program aimed at increasing Afghan self-sufficiency and helping resist Soviet attempts to drive civilians out of the rebel-dominated countryside. During the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S. provided about 3 billion US dollars in military and economic assistance to the Mujahideen groups stationed on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was closed in January 1989 for security reasons.

Twelve Years after US-NATO Joint Operation: “Operation Enduring Freedom”

It is beyond doubt that presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan has broken the backbone of Taliban. Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, believed to be orchestrated by Osama bin Laden who was residing in Afghanistan under asylum at the time, the U.S.-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” was launched. This major military operation was aimed at removing the Taliban government from power and to capture or kill al Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden. Following the overthrow of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the new government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai by maintaining a high level of troops to establish the authority of his government as well as combat Taliban insurgency. Both Afghanistan and the United States resumed diplomatic ties in late 2001.

The U.S. and its allies quickly drove the Taliban from power and captured all major cities and towns in the country. Many Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders escaped to neighboring Pakistan or retreated

to rural or remote mountainous regions. In December 2001, the U.N. Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to oversee security in the country and train the Afghan National Army. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a loya jirga in Kabul in June 2002, became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected the president of the new permanent Afghan government, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.⁷

In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of ISAF, included troops from 43 countries, with NATO members providing the core of the force. Only a portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operate under NATO command; the rest remained under direct American command. Mullah Omar reorganized the Taliban movement and launched the insurgency against the Afghan government and ISAF forces in the spring of 2003. Though vastly outgunned and outnumbered by NATO forces and the Afghan National Army, the Taliban and its allies, most notably the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, have waged asymmetric warfare with guerrilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets, and turncoat killings against coalition forces. The Taliban exploited the weak administration of the Afghan government, among the most corrupt in the world, to reassert influence across rural areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. NATO countries responded in 2006 by increasing troops for operations to “clear and hold” villages and “nation building” projects to “win hearts and minds”.⁸ On 2 May 2011, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. On 2 May 2011, U.S. officials announced that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed in a Special Operation (code-named *Operation Neptune Spear*) to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, conducted by the CIA and U.S. Navy SEALs, in Pakistan. Crowds gathered outside the White House in Washington, DC, chanting “USA, USA” after the news emerged, and President Barack Obama addressed the nation and the world from the East Room of the White House to tell the world of the operation.⁹ On 21 May 2012 the leaders of the NATO-member countries endorsed an exit strategy for removing NATO soldiers from Afghanistan.



With the death of Osama Bin Laden, US has got an golden opportunity to exit Afghanistan and to stop spending billions of Dollars, although it is a premature withdrawal. Eleven years later, there are many Afghans who barely know anything about the Sept. 11. They don't know that the attacks were the reason for the huge United States and NATO presence in Afghanistan. They don't know that they led to the ousting of the Taliban. What they do know is that Afghanistan has been fundamentally transformed since 2001.

It would be a mistake to interpret these accomplishments as a clear Taliban defeat in the south. Yes, the Taliban there is no longer capable of mounting major military operations. But it has learned that targeted assassinations of key political and tribal figures and government officials and persistent insidious intimidation accomplish many of its objectives. Some supposedly-cleared areas, such as Mallajat, an important subdistrict of Kandahar City, have seen a substantial deterioration of security already. The quality of the Afghan national security forces, on which preserving stability hinges to a great extent, also still remains questionable. The Afghan National Police in particular continue to suffer from many vices and deficiencies, not the least of which is an absolute lack of capacity to suppress crime – the scourge of the lives of Afghans that eviscerates their security and provides a perfect mobilization platform for the Taliban. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has made large progress: Not only has it grown in size, but also its quality has improved. The coming two years will show how much capacity to tackle the Taliban and other forms of insecurity it has. But even the ANA represents hardly a clear-cut success. Worrisomely, it appears that it is deeply ethnically-factionalized, not to mention the fact that most of its high-level commanders continue to be northerners and that southern Pashtuns exhibit little interest in signing up for even rank-and-file positions. Thus, there is a real danger that the ANA may fracture along ethnic lines and around particular commanders when the foreigners leave.

The militias mushrooming around Afghanistan with or without the encouragement of ISAF often prove unreliable and incapable of standing up to the Taliban, yet they frequently bring other forms of

insecurity to an area and undermine good governance and peaceable relations within and among Afghan communities. The Afghan Local Police, one of such militia forces, has the most stringent oversight mechanisms compared to the other militias, but even in its case, the oversight exists mainly during the vetting phase of standing it up. Even in the ALP's case, established mechanisms are lacking for rolling it back should some of its units go rogue. Moreover, precisely because the absolutely necessary vetting takes time, the ALP currently numbers in the low thousands, with a growth of about 1,000 ALP fighters per half a year; thus the ALP can hardly be counted upon as a game-changer. However, sacrificing the vetting procedures and rushing to stand up the ALP faster will likely plunge it into the same abuse and unreliability problems that other militia forces have exhibited, only intensifying conflict dynamics in Afghanistan.¹⁰

Return of Russia to Afghanistan

Russia's heavily troubled past in Afghanistan as well as its unique experience there, coupled with a long history of economic and security dominance in the neighbouring region of Central Asia, both define and constrain Russia's interests and policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan, now as much as after 2014. This role should be primarily analyses in the economic and security context. Russia has some role to play in reconstruction and economic cooperation. It also provides limited security assistance to the Afghan government and has a genuine interest in the improved security and functionality of the state in Afghanistan, especially in view of its genuine security and counter-narcotics concerns.

Even after disintegration of USSR, the influence of Russia still dominates in the Central Asian region and Russia treats Central Asia as its backyard and is always concern about growing influence of US and China in the region. Upon Vladimir Putin's return to power in May 2012, Moscow is increasingly adopting a 'Russia first' strategy, and has begun to provide a better definition of its priorities. Moscow will only get involved in those areas that it considers crucial to its security and domestic development. Other sectors will be 'marketized', left to the private sector or to market competition. The fight against drug-trafficking passing through Central Asia from Afghanistan is one of Moscow's security pri-



orities. Another is the control of labour migration from Central Asia. The Kremlin is also concerned about the risks of interaction between its own Islamic networks and those in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

To support its domestic development, Russia is prioritizing the creation of a Eurasian Economic Space and promoting greater regional coordination in key sectors such as hydrocarbons, electricity, and transport and cereals production. This strategy, which is still in the making, is built on the assumption that Russia will partially retract its interest in states that resist its influence, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Instead, it will privilege regional structures with fewer members – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – but a higher degree of cohesion. Examples of this include the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the yet incomplete Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Space.

On the one hand, Russia's economic cooperation with Afghanistan is likely to modestly expand, depending on security conditions after 2014. While Russian companies may lose in subcontracting in the likely case of reduced Western economic/reconstruction aid to Afghanistan after the NATO security presence ends, they might even gain if they are ready – as they often are in other insecure parts of the world – to more actively subcontract to the West for projects in certain parts of Afghanistan with a potentially more volatile context. On the other hand, the lion's share of Russia's economic attention, projects and investments in the broader region will be absorbed by Central Asia, not Afghanistan.

Russia's Concerns about the Implications for Central Asia

Moscow has voiced serious concerns about the potential effects of the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan on stability in Central Asia. The potential spill-over of instability and militancy from Afghanistan is seen by Central Asian governments, including Russia's security allies, as a major cross-border threat. While the Taliban-led insurgency poses no direct threat to Afghanistan's northern neighbours, overall instability in Afghanistan is likely to increase, the already weak central government in Kabul may further weaken, and cross-border trafficking, sporadic violence and further militarization of northern Afghani-

stan may intensify. The scale of the spill-over threat though, should not be over-estimated. Violent rifts between Tajik government forces and some former commanders of the United Tajik Opposition in Rasht or Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in 2010-2012 show that the spill-over of militancy and instability goes in both directions across the Tajik-Afghan border (not only from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, but also the other way round).¹¹

Despite insufficient or speculative evidence on an Afghanistan-related 'spill-over effect' and a lack of solid international expertise on domestic sources of violence in Central Asia, the threat from 'external militants' has been systematically overrated by all Central Asian governments (but also, to an extent, by Russia, Pakistan and China). It is not clear how much of this overrating is accounted for by: (a) conspiracy-obsessed thinking widespread among the region's mostly autocratic rulers; (b) a degree of genuine concern about the cross-border factor as an additional complication in the case of major internal calamity (e.g. during the looming regime succession in Uzbekistan); or (c) manipulation of the 'cross-border' threat for domestic and foreign policy purposes. For Central Asian regimes, apart from blaming domestic unrest on external scapegoats, such purposes include attracting foreign security assistance. Russia emphasizes the external threat from Afghanistan-based 'militants and terrorists' as one of the main justifications for its security presence in Central Asia and the need to reinforce the CSTO role. Despite a tendency to routinely link any violence in northern Afghanistan to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the picture is actually more complicated. Not all violence in northern Afghanistan is accounted for by remnants of militant exiles from Central Asia such as the IMU.

The IMU – the core of which had been formed in the course of the Tajik civil war by exiled Islamists from Uzbekistan – was pushed out of Tajikistan, following an end to the civil war, and suffered a major blow in northern Afghanistan from the Northern Alliance and the US-led military coalition in 2001. Several hundred remaining fighters relocated to Pakistan's 'tribal areas' where they tried to survive by serving as 'hired guns' and linking up with local militants.¹² Since 2007, the Pakistani government,



under increased pressure from the United States on antiterrorism grounds, tried to use 'the Uzbek card' to split the Taliban elements in the FATA and to blame local and cross-border violence primarily on 'foreigners' such as the IMU.¹³ While there was some influx of IMU remnants and splinter militants back to Afghanistan in late 2000s – early 2010s, as a result of tribal infighting in the FATA and of pressure by Pakistani government forces, this influx was not massive enough, given the overall limited numbers of IMU fighters, to solely account for the rise in violent incidents in northern Afghanistan after 2009. Nor is there strong evidence that such militant elements in northern Afghanistan still see Central Asia as their final destination.

The Afghan Drug Trafficking Challenge to Russia

The only direct large-scale threat that Russian society faces from Afghanistan emanates from the deeply-embedded Afghan opium economy, with Central Asia as the main transit corridor to the Russian market. The Russian government has become increasingly aware of the gravity of this threat to Russian society and elevated its importance to a first-order security challenge rather than a secondary aspect to other threats such as terrorism. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, opiate cultivation, production and export levels increased exponentially and far exceeded the levels under the Taliban back in the 1990s. In 2007, cultivation reached an all-time historical peak (it was 25 times larger than in 2001 when it declined by 91 percent as a result of the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation); in 2012, cultivation was still 19 times larger than it had been under the Taliban in 2001.¹⁴

To conclude, the *drug trafficking, terrorism, return of Taliban, political instability* are some major problems that are haunting the world community after US withdraws from Afghanistan in 2014. Countries like India and Central Asian nations will face the daunting task of fighting terrorism alone if the Taliban returns with the overt and covert support of Pakistan. After 2014, both end-consumers of Afghan heroin such as Russia and transit countries will need to rely on whatever governance will be in place in Afghanistan for drug control and counter-narcotics measures at the source. But, as foreign forces leave, the central government in Kabul stands

little chance of establishing even basic control either in the main drug-producing areas in the south or in major manufacturing areas in the north.

So Russia has a very pragmatic and genuine interest in supporting any political solution for Afghanistan that could improve governance capacity, i.e. increase the functionality and legitimacy of the Afghan state. In areas where the drug economy is compounded by an ongoing, protracted armed conflict, there is no solution to the drug problem without a solution to the conflict. As long as the armed confrontation continues, it both impedes central state access to the areas affected by drugs and conflict and complicates the functioning of any de facto governance structures (i.e. run by the insurgency). In addition, in the absence of functional governance, both neither tough, nor soft counter-narcotics and drug control measures, neither 'security' nor 'development' solutions, nor even a combination of the two, will work.

Against this background, Russia has a very genuine interest in supporting any kind of political solution for Afghanistan that could bring relative stabilization (in terms of the end of a major armed conflict) and increase the functionality of the Afghan state. And this hinges upon progress towards a political settlement and power-sharing between all major veto players in post-2014 Afghanistan, including the insurgency. Also a joint and genuine effort from other regional powers like Pakistan, China, India, Iran is the need of the hour to stop Taliban to return to power in Kabul. This heightened responsibility does not mean Russia should be directly involved in Afghan events. Russia should never intervene in infighting in Afghanistan, especially militarily. Its goal should be protecting Russian interests by using diplomatic and other nonviolent means in Afghanistan and in the region. Moscow should also pursue an active and comprehensive policy in Central Asia—the territory where the first Russian line of defence against security threats emanating from Afghanistan lies. Having effective working relations with all significant Afghan elites and with all regional powers is an important condition for the success of Russian policy in Afghanistan.



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Ukraine at Crossroads: One Year after Minsk-II Agreement

Dr. Manabhanjan Meher

Introduction

Signed a year ago on February 11-12, 2015 the Minsk Accords (Minsk-II) which brought together the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia, commonly referred to as the Normandy Quartet. The accords were signed by the Contact Group consisting of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics with the plan to defuse the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The agreement stipulates several humanitarian measures such as an amnesty for all fighters, exchange of prisoners, access to humanitarian aid for the population, restoration of pensions and social benefits cut off by Kiev. It also stressed the need for a free and fair dialogue to organize future local elections and the adoption of a new constitution for Ukraine in 2015 with a special status for Lugansk and Donetsk. The right to linguistic self-determination will be ensured.¹ Even after the passing of one year, the implementation of the agreements has not moved forward a single step. The ceasefire imposed as a result of the Minsk-II agreement has not been fully respected. There are several factors responsible for its failure, of which the dominant one is the attitude of the ruling regime in Kiev.

Text and Context of Minsk-II Agreement

The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany have agreed on a comprehensive ceasefire in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in line with a document outlining measures to enforce the Minsk agreements. The Normandy Four was created in 2014 to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In February 2015, the quartet's leaders brokered the Minsk peace deal, later signed by representatives of Kiev and the militias of eastern Ukraine. The Minsk deal is a peace roadmap for Kiev and the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine. It aims to implement the peace process agreed upon

in the September 2014 talks, also in Minsk. Here is the text of the Declaration² read as follows:

- President of Russia Vladimir Putin, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, President of France Francois Hollande and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel confirm the full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. They are strongly convinced that a peaceful settlement is the sole option. They are fully ready to take any possible measure both separately and jointly in pursuing these goals.
- In this context the leaders approve the Package of Measures on the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted and signed in Minsk on February 12, 2015 by all parties that signed the Minsk Protocol dated September 5, 2014 and the Minsk Memorandum dated September 19, 2014. The leaders will contribute to this process and use their influence over relevant parties in order to assist the fulfillment of this Package of Measures.
- Germany and France will give technical support for the restoration of a segment of the banking system in the regions affected by the conflict through the creation of an international mechanism of assisting the payment of social benefits.
- The leaders are convinced that the strengthening of cooperation between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia will assist the resolution of this crisis. In order to achieve these goals, they support continuing the trilateral negotiations between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia on energy issues in order to make steps in the development of the 'winter gas package'.
- They also support the trilateral negotiations between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia in order to develop a practical solution to the issues that deeply



worry Russia, concerning the implementation of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement.

- The leaders are still committed to the idea of creating a common humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean on the basis of full respect for international law and the OSCE principles.

- The leaders will remain committed to the implementation of the Minsk accords. To achieve this goal they agreed to create a control mechanism in the Normandy format that will organize regular meetings as a rule at the level of senior officials from foreign ministries.

At first glance, the 13-point memorandum agreed upon isn't very different from the first ceasefire negotiated in the Belarus capital (Minsk) September 2014, the collapse of which in early January caused the current carnage. Since February 2015 agreement was signed, the violence in the East has reduced, but both Kiev and the rebels blame each other for violating the truce regularly. It is common knowledge that the political status quo established in the country after the coup d'état of February 21, 2014, does not suit the population of Donbass, while the new Maidan government and its Western patrons are doing their utmost to preserve it and safeguard reintegration of Donbass on its basis.³ To understand what happened in Minsk, it is necessary to discuss the diplomatic background.

A popular uprising began in the Donbass in April 2014, shortly after the February 2014 coup that brought the Maidan movement to power. In its initial stages, the uprising was peaceful and its demands moderate. These were for a political democratisation of the region, which had up to then been tightly controlled from Kiev, which appointed its governors. The new Maidan government refused to negotiate with the leaders of the uprising, branding them instead "terrorists" in the pay of Russia. It launched what it called an "anti terrorist operation" to destroy them. This steadily escalated over the course of the spring and summer, until on 30th June 2014 it, evolved into a full-scale military assault on the Donbass by the Ukrainian army backed by right-wing volunteer militias and the Ukrainian airforce. The Russians government responded this crisis through a diplomatic

initiative to settle the conflict by peaceful means. The idea was that there should be negotiations between the Donbass and the Maidan government in Kiev to settle the conflict through a new constitution that would take into account the Donbass's aspirations.⁴

Nonetheless Poroshenko and his allies have refused to change the Constitution to accommodate the concerns of the Donbas republics. On the other hand they have refused to withdraw heavy weaponry from the line of contact, have maintained increasingly heavy artillery attacks on the civilian populations and areas and cut off routes for essential foodstuffs, medical aid and technical equipment. Rather than enjoying a ceasefire, the peoples of the Donbas are under a state of siege. Poroshenko openly calls for a military solution to the crisis and has increased the draft in the West. The NATO alliance continues to pour in its forces disguised as "advisers" and "mercenaries" and puts additional pressure on Russia.⁵

Ukraine's Hostile Policy towards Minsk-II Agreement

The new Maidan government refused to comply with the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements signed on February 12, 2015 and Resolution 2202 (February 17, 2015) of the United Nations Security Council which calls on the parties to implement the accords aimed at peaceful settlement in Eastern Ukraine.⁶ In the venue of the Minsk-II agreement itself President Poroshenko made it clear that it would not follow the dictates of the agreement. He claimed that ""It was not easy. In fact, different unacceptable conditions, including retreat and surrender, were put forth to us. But we did not bow to any ultimatums and firmly stood by our position that a ceasefire should not have any preliminary conditions."⁷ This is so is shown by Poroshenko's behaviour in Minsk.

The ruling regime of Kiev has made it clear it did not want the implementation of the Minsk peace agreements, which were put in place to resolve the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. "The Ukrainian leadership is deliberately undermining the Minsk-II agreement, brokered by Germany, France and Russia in February 2015", argues Dr. Stephen Cohen, a prominent American historian and professor of

