

Mirfa Secure Transaction App

A secure transaction processing application built as a submission for the Mirfa Engineering Challenge. This project demonstrates **Envelope Encryption** using AES-256-GCM, structured within a scalable TurboRepo monorepo.

Live Demo

- **Frontend (Vercel):** <https://mirfa-secure-app-web-ivory.vercel.app/>
- **Backend (Railway):** <https://api-production-5ffc.up.railway.app/>

Architecture & Design

Envelope Encryption Strategy

To ensure maximum security, this application uses **Envelope Encryption**. We never store the data encryption keys (DEKs) in plain text.

1. **Key Generation:** For every transaction, a unique 32-byte **DEK** is generated.
2. **Payload Encryption:** The user's JSON payload is encrypted using this DEK (AES-256-GCM).
3. **Key Encryption:** The DEK itself is then encrypted using a system-wide **Master Key (KEK)**.
4. **Storage:** The database stores:
 - The encrypted payload.
 - The encrypted DEK.
 - The unique Nonces (IVs) and Auth Tags for both.

Tech Stack

| Component | Technology | Reasoning |
|-----------|----------------|--|
| Monorepo | TurboRepo | Efficient build caching and shared package management. |
| Frontend | Next.js 14 | React server components and optimized rendering. |
| Backend | Fastify | High-performance, low-overhead Node.js framework. |
| Database | PostgreSQL | Robust relational data storage. |
| ORM | Prisma | Type-safe database access and schema management. |
| Crypto | Node.js Crypto | Native, standard library for AES-256-GCM operations. |

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|-------------------|------------------|--|
| Deployment | Vercel & Railway | Scalable serverless (FE) and containerized (BE) hosting. |
|-------------------|------------------|--|

\Database Configuration (Neon / Postgres)

The project uses **Prisma ORM** connected to a PostgreSQL database (specifically optimized for **Neon Serverless Postgres**).

1. Connection Setup The `datasource` block in `packages/db/prisma/schema.prisma` is configured for PostgreSQL. The connection string is retrieved from the `DATABASE_URL` environment variable.

2. Prisma Client Singleton To handle serverless connection limits (common with Vercel and Neon) and Next.js hot-reloading, the Prisma Client is instantiated as a global singleton. This prevents "Too many connections" errors by reusing the existing connection instance.

```
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';

const globalForPrisma = global as unknown as { prisma: PrismaClient };

export const prisma =
  globalForPrisma.prisma ||
  new PrismaClient({
    log: ['query', 'error', 'warn'],
  });

if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production') globalForPrisma.prisma = prisma;
```

3. Data Models The schema defines robust models such as `User` for identity management and `SecureRecord` for storing encrypted transactions, linked via relation fields.

📁 Project Structure

```
.
├── apps
│   ├── api           # Fastify Backend Service
│   └── web            # Next.js Frontend Application
├── packages
│   ├── crypto         # Shared encryption logic (AES-GCM helpers)
│   ├── db              # Shared Prisma schema and client
│   ├── ui              # Shared React UI components
│   ├── config          # Shared TS/ESLint configs
└── turbo.json        # Build pipeline configuration
```

🛠 Getting Started

Prerequisites

- Node.js 20+

- pnpm (npm install -g pnpm)
- PostgreSQL database (Local or Cloud)

1. Clone the repository

```
git clone <your-repo-url>
cd mirfa-secure-app
```

2. Install Dependencies

```
pnpm install
```

3. Environment Setup

Create a `.env` file in the root (or in specific apps) based on `.env.example`.

Required Variables:

```
# Database Connection
DATABASE_URL="postgresql://user:password@localhost:5432/mirfa_db"

# Security (Must be 32 bytes / 64 hex characters)
# Generate via: openssl rand -hex 32
MASTER_KEY="your_64_char_hex_master_key_here"

# API Port
PORT=3001

# Frontend API Connection
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL="http://localhost:3001"
```

4. Database Migration and build generation

Generate the Prisma Client and push the schema to your database.

```
pnpm build
pnpm db:push
```

5. Run Locally

Start both the Frontend and Backend in development mode.

```
pnpm dev
```

- **Web:** `http://localhost:3000`
- **API:** `http://localhost:3001`

6. Run Backend with Docker (Local)

You can containerize and run the backend API using the `Dockerfile` located in the root directory.

Build the image:

```
docker build -t mirfa-api .
```

Run the container backend : Ensure you have a `.env` file in your root directory with the necessary variables (DATABASE_URL, MASTER_KEY, etc.).

```
docker run -p 3001:3001 --env-file .env mirfa-api
```

Note: The API will be accessible at `http://localhost:3001`.

API Reference

1. Encrypt Payload

POST `/tx/encrypt` Accepts a party ID and a JSON payload, encrypts them, and returns the record ID.

```
// Request
{
  "partyId": "party_123",
  "payload": { "amount": 500, "currency": "USD" }
}
```

2. Retrieve Encrypted Record

GET `/tx/:id` Returns the raw stored data (encrypted ciphertext, wrapped DEK, nonces) without decrypting.

3. Decrypt Payload

POST `/tx/:id/decrypt` Server-side decryption. Unwraps the DEK using the Master Key, then decrypts the payload.

Running Tests

The cryptography package includes unit tests to verify encryption integrity and tamper resistance.

```
pnpm test
```

Cryptography Engine (Deep Dive)

The core security logic resides in `packages/crypto` and implements **AES-256-GCM** (Galois/Counter Mode) to ensure both confidentiality and integrity.

Envelope Encryption Flow (`encrypt.ts`)

We utilize a two-tier key architecture to secure data:

1. **Session Setup:** A unique, random 32-byte **Data Encryption Key (DEK)** is generated for every *single transaction*.
2. **Layer 1 (Payload):** The actual JSON payload is encrypted using this DEK.
 - *Output:* `payload_ct` (Ciphertext), `payload_nonce` (12-byte IV), `payload_tag` (Auth Tag).
3. **Layer 2 (Key):** The DEK is then encrypted using the system **Master Key (KEK)**.
 - *Output:* `dek_wrapped` (Encrypted Key), `dek_wrap_nonce` (12-byte IV), `dek_wrap_tag` (Auth Tag).
4. **Result:** The database stores only the encrypted artifacts. The raw DEK is discarded immediately from memory.

Decryption & Verification (`decrypt.ts`)

Decryption is a strict reverse process that validates integrity at every step:

1. **Validation:** Checks if the Master Key is valid hex (64 chars) and Nonces are standard size (12 bytes).
2. **Unwrap DEK:** The system attempts to decrypt `dek_wrapped` using the Master Key. If the `dek_wrap_tag` does not match, the operation fails immediately (tamper detection).
3. **Decrypt Payload:** Using the unwrapped DEK, the system attempts to decrypt the payload. Again, the `payload_tag` is verified.

Error Codes Standard (`errors.ts`)

The system throws standardized error codes to prevent information leakage while aiding debugging:

| Error Code | Meaning | Cause |
|----------------|-----------------------------|---|
| ER-4001 | <code>INTEGRITY_FAIL</code> | Auth tag mismatch. Data or Key was tampered with. |

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| ER-4002 | INVALID_NONCE | IV is not 12 bytes (24 hex chars). |
| ER-4003 | INVALID_KEY | Master Key is not 32 bytes (64 hex chars). |
| ER-4004 | CIPHERTEXT_CORRUPT | Hex string contains invalid characters. |
| ER-5000 | UNKNOWN | Unexpected system failure. |

💡 Security Testing Suite

The project includes a robust test suite using **Vitest** (`index.test.ts`) that goes beyond "happy paths" to verify the system behaves correctly under attack.

Run Tests

```
pnpm test
```

Test Scenarios Covered

The suite validates 7 specific security scenarios:

1. **Lifecycle Success:** Verifies that data encrypted with a Master Key can be decrypted with the same key.
2. **Payload Tampering:** Modifying a single character in `payload_ct` triggers ER-4001 .
3. **Tag Manipulation:** Changing the `payload_tag` (Authentication Tag) triggers ER-4001 .
4. **Key Envelope Attack:** Tampering with the encrypted DEK (`dek_wrapped`) prevents the key from being unwrapped.
5. **Nonce Replay/Swap:** Swapping the payload nonce with the key nonce triggers an integrity failure.
6. **Invalid Nonce Length:** Providing a non-12-byte nonce throws ER-4002 .
7. **Wrong Master Key:** Attempting to decrypt a record with a different valid Master Key fails authentication.

⚙️ Backend Architecture (Fastify API)

The API (`apps/api`) is built with **Fastify** for high performance and low overhead. It follows a modular "Plugin & Factory" pattern to keep concerns separated.

📁 Backend Structure

```
apps/api/src
  ├── config.ts          # Env validation (Fails fast if MASTER_KEY is invalid)
  └── index.ts           # Entry point (Starts server)
```

```

    └── server.ts          # App Factory (Registers plugins & routes)
    └── decorators
        └── authenticate.ts # JWT Verification Decorator
    └── plugins
        └── cors.ts         # CORS configuration
        └── jwt.ts           # JWT Strategy setup
    └── routes
        └── auth.routes.ts   # Login / Signup (Bcrypt + Prisma)
        └── health.routes.ts # Health check endpoint
        └── tx.routes.ts     # Core Transaction Logic (Protected)

```

1. Boot Sequence & Validation (config.ts)

The server employs a "**Fail Fast**" strategy. On startup, `config.ts` validates critical environment variables.

- **Critical Check:** If `MASTER_KEY` is missing or not exactly 64 hex characters (32 bytes), the process exits immediately (`process.exit(1)`). This prevents the server from running in an insecure state.

2. Authentication Strategy

Security is implemented using `fastify-jwt` and `bryptjs`.

- **User Management:** Passwords are hashed with **bcrypt** (salt rounds: 10) before storage in Prisma.
- **Session:** On login, a **JWT** is issued containing the user's ID.
- **Decorator:** We created a custom `authenticate` decorator (`decorators/authenticate.ts`). This allows us to protect routes easily:

```
// Example protection in tx.routes.ts
app.post('/tx/encrypt', { onRequest: [app.authenticate] }, handler);
```

3. Transaction Logic (tx.routes.ts)

This controller acts as the bridge between the **User**, the **Database**, and the **Crypto Engine**.

- **Isolation:** Transactions are linked to the specific User ID extracted from the JWT (`req.user.id`). Users can only fetch their own records.
- **Integration:**
 1. Receives `partyId` and `payload`.
 2. Calls the shared `@repo/crypto` library to perform the Envelope Encryption.
 3. Uses `@repo/db` (Prisma) to store the result (`SecureRecord`) containing the encrypted payload and the wrapped DEK.



Frontend Architecture (UX & Components)

The frontend (`apps/web`) is built with **Next.js 14** using the App Router, styled with Tailwind CSS, and enhanced with Framer Motion for smooth transitions.

📁 Component Breakdown

```
apps/web/src/app
├── components
│   ├── AuthScreen.tsx      # Login/Signup handling with JWT storage
│   ├── Dashboard.tsx       # Main secure vault view
│   ├── RecordItem.tsx      # Individual transaction row with decrypt action
│   └── CopyButton.tsx      # Utility for copying JSON/IDs
└── page.tsx                # Root controller managing Auth state
    └── types.ts             # Frontend Types (RecordType)
```

1. Authentication Flow (`AuthScreen.tsx`)

- **JWT Handling:** On successful login, the JWT is stored in `localStorage` ('`mirfa_token`').
- **Session Persistence:** `page.tsx` checks for this token on mount to restore the user session.
- **Logout:** Clearing the token instantly redirects the user back to the Auth Screen.

2. Secure Dashboard (`Dashboard.tsx`)

- **Data Fetching:** Fetches encrypted records from `/tx` using the Bearer token.
- **Encryption Action:** Users can input a `Party ID` and `JSON Payload`. The app sends this to `/tx/encrypt` and immediately updates the UI with the new encrypted record.

3. Decryption UX (`RecordItem.tsx`)

- **On-Demand Decryption:** Records are shown in their encrypted state by default (locked icon).
- **User Action:** Clicking "Decrypt" sends a request to `/tx/:id/decrypt`.
- **Verification:** If the integrity check passes on the backend, the plaintext JSON is revealed with a smooth animation.
- **Security:** Decrypted data is never stored in `localStorage`; it exists only in React state.