

DeFort: Automatic Detection and Analysis of Price Manipulation Attacks in DeFi Applications

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ABSTRACT

Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications facilitate tamper-proof transactions among multiple anonymous users, since attackers can access the smart contract bytecode directly, vulnerabilities in the transaction mechanism, contract code, or third-party components can be easily exploited to manipulate token prices, leading to financial losses. Since price manipulation often relies on specific states and complex trading sequences, existing detection tools have limitations in addressing this problem. In addition, to swiftly identify the root cause of an attack and implement targeted defense and remediation measures, auditors typically prioritize understanding the methodology behind the attack, emphasizing ‘how’ it occurred rather than simply confirming its existence. To address these problems, this paper presents a novel automatic price manipulation detection and analysis framework, named DeFort, which contains a price manipulation behavior model to guide on-chain detection, multiple price monitoring strategies to detect pools with abnormal token prices, and various profit calculation mechanisms to confirm attacks. Based on behavioral models, DeFort can automatically locate transactions and functions that cause abnormal price fluctuations and identify attackers and victims. Experimental results

demonstrate that DeFort can outperform state-of-the-art price manipulation detection methods. Furthermore, after monitoring 441 real-world projects for two months, DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Security and privacy** → *Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation.*

KEYWORDS

blockchain, decentralized finance (DeFi), price manipulation attack, smart contract

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1 INTRODUCTION

With the advancement of blockchain and smart contract technologies, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications have found widespread use in web3 ecosystems. Typically, DeFi applications are implemented by smart contracts and deployed on blockchains. Due to the support for tamperproof and anonymous transactions, DeFi applications enable users to participate in multiple finance activities (e.g., token deposits, withdrawals, and exchanges) without relying on untrusted third parties. Recently, DeFi applications managed a total value of \$51 billion in digital assets and facilitated daily transactions totaling \$6 billion in assets [25].

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However, since the bytecode of smart contracts can be accessed directly on the blockchain, potential vulnerabilities in DeFi applications can be easily exploited to manipulate the price of the token, resulting in financial losses for users or fund pools. Typically, price manipulation attacks are mainly caused by unprotected trading mechanisms, vulnerable contract implementations, and untrusted third-party components. Specifically, for the trading mechanisms, due to the lack of protection of corresponding parameters and behaviors, attackers can take advantage of legitimate operations present in the mechanism for arbitrage. For example, for sandwich attacks (a category of manipulation attack), attackers utilize excessive slippage set by users to conduct front-running transactions and arbitrage. For contract implementations, a lack of expertise in smart contract development may result in the creation of vulnerable contracts. For example, coding errors can lead to incorrect price-calculation methods. Moreover, in many DeFi applications, the price of tokens is based on third-party Oracles. Attacking untrusted third-party Oracles can manipulate the price of tokens in related DeFi applications [50]. Things become even worse with the abuse of lending tools like Flashloans. Attackers can effortlessly borrow a significant quantity of tokens, manipulating token prices for profit.

To detect price manipulation attacks in DeFi applications, existing methods can be classified into two categories, i.e., code-based methods [22] and behavior-based methods [78]. Code-based methods use static analysis or symbolic execution technologies to detect vulnerabilities in smart contract source code or bytecode rather than directly detect price manipulation attacks. Typically, the effectiveness of code-based methods is based on the design of their detection rules. Due to the lack of knowledge of business logic for specific DeFi applications, most code-based methods have to use some general detection rules to detect price manipulation caused by some classic smart contract bugs, such as integer overflow and reentrancy. Therefore, existing code-based methods cannot deal with price manipulation attacks caused by specific function bugs. Moreover, due to the lack of implementation of third-party components, code-based methods cannot still address dangerous price oracles. In addition, due to the lack of dynamic execution of contracts, code-based methods often generate a large number of false positives. Behavior-based methods analyze transactions rather than source code to identify attack behaviors. Typically, behavior-based detection methods trace transactions related to target accounts and use multiple specific patterns or rules to identify dangerous trading behaviors. However, since patterns or rules in existing behavior-based methods are simple and limited, they cannot perform well in complex real-world price manipulation attacks, which usually involve multiple attack accounts and complex operations.

Although existing detection methods can identify some classic price manipulation attacks, they still suffer from three challenges. ❶ **Scalability.** Existing methods often rely on specific detection rules, which are difficult to adapt to the business logic of different DeFi applications. ❷ **On-chain Monitoring.** The absence of on-chain attack detection support in many existing methods prevents the early detection of price manipulation attacks before their transactions are packaged. Consequently, defenders are unable to employ blocking techniques to prevent attacks. ❸ **Automatic Analysis.**

Typically, auditors concentrate not only on whether a price manipulation attack occurred but also on ‘how’ the attack took place, which is crucial for implementing preventive measures and mitigating the spread of attacks. Unfortunately, current detection methods lack the ability to automatically analyze attack behaviors, making it challenging for auditors to quickly identify the root cause of the attack. Therefore, *how to effectively detect and analyze complex real-world price manipulation attacks in real-time is an important challenge in the security of DeFi applications.*

To address the above challenges, we can intuitively address them by abstracting and modeling the behaviors of price manipulation attacks, thereby obtaining a comprehensive model for price manipulation detection. By incorporating various abnormal price detection and profit detection strategies into the model, the detector can be easily adapted to different business logic without altering the overall detection process. Moreover, based on the model, the detector can trace the whole attack process and analyze related operations, transactions, and accounts.

Inspired by the motivation above, we present a novel detection and analysis framework named DeFort for price manipulation attacks in DeFi applications. DeFort traces on-chain transactions for target DeFi applications and maintains a general behavior model to guide price manipulation attacks. Specifically, DeFort integrates multiple price calculation strategies to monitor the price of different tokens and identify abnormal price fluctuations. Based on abnormal price detection, DeFort tracks fund flow among related accounts and pools to detect profits and confirm price manipulation attacks. By analyzing the state transitions in the model and fund flows among accounts and pools, DeFort can obtain the whole process of attacks, locate dangerous transactions and functions, and identify attackers and victims. There are four main contributions of this paper as follows:

- We present a novel framework named DeFort for the automatic on-chain price manipulation attack detection and analysis of DeFi applications.
- We present a general behavior model for price manipulation attacks to guide detection and analysis.
- We integrate multiple abnormal price detection and profit detection strategies based on our behavior models to enhance the detection capability of DeFort.
- We evaluated DeFort in an on-chain environment to monitor 441 real-world projects for two months. DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After we introduce relevant background information in Section 2, we describe our price manipulation modeling and illustrate the detailed design of DeFort in Section 3. We then evaluate it in Section 4. Following that, in Section 5, we discuss its applications and limitations. Finally, we outline related work in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.

2 BACKGROUND

In this section, we present necessary background for detecting and analyzing price manipulation attacks to facilitate a clear comprehension of our proposed approach.




Figure 1: The process of price manipulation attack.

2.1 Smart Contract and Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

Smart contract [82] is a self-executing program with the terms of the agreement between the buyer and the seller being directly written into lines of code. These contracts run on blockchain [27] networks and automatically execute, control, or document legally relevant events and actions according to the coded terms, without requiring an intermediary or a central authority to enforce them [3].

DeFi is a blockchain-based form of finance which operates without dependence on central financial intermediaries like brokerages, exchanges, or banks for the provision of financial services [76]. Instead, it utilizes smart contracts deployed on blockchain. Transactions in the blockchain represent signed messages during the execution of contracts [23]. Due to DeFi's rapid expansion and provision of services like lending, insurance, and trading, DeFi has encountered significant challenges, notably in security and privacy [61], necessitating continual research and innovation.

Some DeFi applications offer a tool called flash loan [58], which transforms the ways of obtaining loans in the blockchain environment. Unlike traditional loans, flash loans enable users to borrow any amount of assets without requiring collateral, on the condition that the borrowed assets are returned within the same transaction [73]. This distinctive feature allows for a multitude of applications, such as arbitrage, collateral swapping, and self-liquidation. However, it also introduces or exacerbates a number of potential risks and attacks, like the notorious price manipulation attacks which could result in substantial financial losses [75].

2.2 Price Manipulation Attacks

Price manipulation is a well-trodden ruse in conventional financial markets. In the cryptocurrency space, price manipulation attack means that attackers gain excessive profit by using different deceptive strategies to artificially inflate or deflate the price of cryptocurrencies [21, 41]. There are many ways to cause price manipulation attacks such as flash loan, oracle, pump and dump, front running, etc. The flash loan method [58] causes the token price to rise or fall sharply, and then attackers trade back assets to make a profit. This is due to the use of instantaneous prices, which is a problem with the contract code. The oracle approach [74] refers to manipulating oracles, which are third-party components, to feed abnormal prices, and attackers use the abnormal price to conduct transactions to make profits. Pump and dump [79] refers to a group of manipulators who buy cryptocurrencies in large quantities to drive up the currency price in order to scam more investors into following suit

to further increase the price, and then manipulators suddenly sell the currency for a profit, causing the price to fall rapidly. While front running [65] is when attackers execute the same or related transactions for profit before knowing what others are about to execute or the price movement. Both of these utilize transaction mechanisms. As shown in Fig. 1, all the above methods directly or indirectly change prices and then take advantage of abnormal prices to make profits.

3 METHODOLOGY

In this section, we first present a general behavior model for the detection of price manipulation. Based on the behavior model, we propose our detection and analysis framework.

3.1 Modeling for Price Manipulation

Although the root causes of different price manipulation attacks in DeFi applications vary, all of these attacks have two common behavioral characteristics. The first characteristic is to cause abnormal fluctuations in token prices. For example, although the “pump and dump” and “flash loan” attacks utilize different mechanisms to manipulate the price, both of them lead to large fluctuations in the price of tokens. The second characteristic is to take advantage of abnormal prices to make profits. Although the attacker uses multiple accounts to collaboratively achieve the attack process, a successful attack must mean that some accounts profit after the abnormal price fluctuations. Therefore, by detecting abnormal prices of target tokens and profits of related accounts, the detector can detect different types of price manipulation attacks without using specific rules to match their unique attack process.




Figure 2: Behavior Model for Price Manipulation Detection.

To detect various price manipulation attacks, we model the detection of price manipulation attacks into an automaton based on the above two characteristics. Figure 2 presents the model for the detection of price manipulation, which consists of five states, i.e., *Start*, *Normal*, *Abnormal*, *Price Read*, and *Profit*. The *Start* state denotes the start of detection. The *Normal* state denotes that the prices of all the tokens associated with target DeFi applications are within the normal fluctuation range. The *Abnormal* state denotes that there exists a token from tokens associated with target DeFi applications whose price is out of the normal fluctuation range. The *Price Read* state denotes that the victim reads the price of abnormal tokens. Typically, when an attacker makes a profit, the DeFi application will read the price of the abnormal token and transfer the corresponding token to the attacker's account. Therefore, when the token price is in an abnormal range, the transactions that include price reading

operations often involve profit making. The *Profit* state denotes that at least one account makes a profit from DeFi applications. Note that the scope of detection includes all the addresses of target DeFi applications and accounts that have interacted with the target DeFi applications. We define three mechanisms, i.e., price calculation mechanism (*PCM*), bound calculation mechanism (*BCM*), and profit detection mechanism (*PDM*) to guide the state transitions, where the price calculation mechanism is used to calculate the price of tokens, the bound calculation mechanism is used to calculate whether the current price of the target token within a normal fluctuation range, and the profit detection mechanism is used to detect whether an account makes a profit.

3.1.1 Modeling for Normal state. Assume that D is the set of target DeFi applications and X is the set of pools or pairs associated with the target DeFi applications. $X_a \subseteq X$ represents the set of pools or pairs whose associated tokens exhibit abnormal prices. $X_n \subseteq X$ represents the set of pools or pairs whose associated tokens exhibit normal prices. T denotes the set of associated tokens. We use the function $PCM(P, Tk_1, Tk_2, t)$ to calculate the exchange rate of Tk_1 relative to Tk_2 in time t in the pool or pair P and use the function $HCM(P, Tk_1, Tk_2, t')$ to calculate the historical exchange rate of Tk_1 relative to Tk_2 from the historical time t' to the current time in the pool or pair P . When the model is in the normal state, all the associated tokens in DeFi applications must have normal prices. We define the function *BCM* to determine whether the current token price is in the normal price range. Specifically, *BCM* is defined as the following formula:

$$\forall x \in X, \frac{1}{B(\alpha, T_h, t)} \leq \frac{PCM(x, Tk_1, Tk_2, t)}{HCM(x, Tk_1, Tk_2, t)} \leq B(\alpha, T_h, t), \quad (1)$$

where t denotes the current time, t' denotes the historical time, T_h denotes the list of historical price information. The element of T_h is a 2-tuple (p, t) , where p indicates the historical price value and t denotes the sampling time of historical price p . $B(\cdot)$ denotes an abnormal price bound calculation strategy, which calculates the change between the current price and historical price and is controlled by a hyperparameter α and historical price information T_h .

3.1.2 Modeling for Abnormal state. In contrast, when the model is in the abnormal state, existing an associated token in DeFi applications has a normal price, which can be defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \exists x \in X, \frac{1}{B(\alpha, T_h(Tk_1, Tk_2), t)} &\geq \frac{PCM(x, Tk_1, Tk_2, t)}{HCM(x, T_h(Tk_1, Tk_2), t)} \text{ or} \\ \exists x \in X, B(\alpha, T_h, t) &\leq \frac{PCM(x, Tk_1, Tk_2, t)}{HCM(x, T_h(Tk_1, Tk_2), t)}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

When an abnormal price is detected, the model transitions to the *Abnormal* state. When the price returns to normal and no account makes a profit, the model transitions back to *Normal* state.

3.1.3 Modeling for Price Read state. Since the price reading operation will be triggered when the attacker needs to use the abnormal token price for exchange operations, the detector can monitor price reading operations to detect potential attackers. Note that *Price Read* state is transient. In this state, the model adds the related address to read the price to the abnormal related address set S_a and then transitions back to the *Abnormal* state.

3.1.4 Modeling for Profit state. Assume that S_a is the set of addresses that have had transactions with the target DeFi applications. The profit of an address for a specific token is determined by the difference between its deposited and withdrawn tokens from the target pool or pair. We define the functions $In(x, addr, Tk)$ and $Out(x, addr, Tk)$ to calculate the total number of tokens Tk deposited and withdrawn by the address $addr$ into/from the pool or pair x , respectively. The profit of $addr$ for Tk form x is defined as follows:

$$Profit(x, addr, Tk) = Out(x, addr, Tk) - In(x, addr, Tk). \quad (3)$$

Since an attacker can control multiple addresses to collaboratively perform price manipulation attacks, profit detection often needs to analyze a set of addresses related to the abnormal price token. Since the attack may be associated with multiple tokens, we can perform a general equivalent token (e.g., USDT) to standardize the value of different tokens. By calculating the value of the tokens that each account ultimately gained or lost, we can confirm whether a price manipulation attack has occurred. We use the function *PDM* for profit detection, which is defined as follows:

$$\exists A \subseteq S_a, \sum_{a \in A} \sum_{i=1}^{|T|} PCM(x, Tk_i, Tk, t) \times (Profit(x, a, Tk_i)) > 0. \quad (4)$$

Note that when the model is in *Abnormal* state and the *PDM* returns true, the model transitions to *Profit* state. When the model reaches *Profit* state, it means a price manipulation attack has been detected.

3.2 Overview of DeFort

Figure 3 presents the framework of our DeFort approach based on the prize manipulation detection model. As shown in Figure 3, DeFort consists of three key components, i.e., on-chain monitor, model-driven detector, and model-driven analyzer, respectively. The on-chain monitor acquires real-time transactions and token information related to target DeFi applications or accounts from the corresponding blockchains. The model-driven detector utilizes the obtained transactions and token information with a behavior model to identify price manipulation attacks. Specifically, the detector employs a price calculation mechanism to assess target tokens and a bound calculation mechanism to determine whether the current token price falls within a normal range. If a token exhibits an abnormal price, the detector employs a profit calculation mechanism to verify whether existing accounts capitalize on the abnormal price to generate profits. The detector triggers a price manipulation attack alert when it detects profits. Note that to adapt to different DeFi applications, the model-driven detector integrates multiple price and bound calculation strategies. The model-driven analyzer analyzes the fund flow of relevant accounts and pools, attack and victim accounts, and related function calls based on the process of behavior model state transitions, related transactions, and abnormal token price changes.

3.3 On-chain Monitoring.

In the scenario of on-chain monitoring, there are two ways to obtain real-time transactions. One is to use RPC provided by a third party, such as Alchemy [2], Infura [36] and QuickNode [59]; the second is to build a self-built node. Currently we use the first one




Figure 3: Framework of DeFort.

to implement on-chain monitoring scenarios. To avoid excessive API requests, we set different monitoring frequencies based on the transaction volumes and activity of different DeFi applications, and the confirmation times of blocks on different chains. We manually collect and store the information corresponding to DeFi applications, including the tokens held, the creator of the contract, etc.

3.4 Model-based Detection.

The key for model-based detection is to calculate the token price, identify the abnormal price, and detect the profit. Since the implementations of different DeFi applications vary, to achieve detection for various price manipulation attacks, the model-based detector integrates multiple price, bound, and profit calculation strategies.

3.4.1 Price calculation mechanism. Most DeFi applications are implemented based on specific DeFi protocols [26], such as Uniswap V2 [70], Uniswap V3 [71], and Curve [24], which include token price calculation methods. We integrate the price calculation methods in the mainstream DeFi protocols into our price calculation mechanism. Since different DeFi protocols have their unique functions and variable names, DeFort scans the bytecode of target DeFi applications and matches the bytecode with protocol templates to identify the protocol used. In this way, DeFort can automatically select the specific price calculation strategy for DeFi applications.

Typically, price calculation functions in DeFi applications often contain common words [14], like “*getLatestPrice(·)*”, “*updatePrice(·)*”, and “*getUnderlyingPrice(·)*”. Based on the above observations, for DeFi applications that do not use mainstream protocols, we constructed a signature library to store the function signatures of possible price calculation functions and use the library to match the bytecode. In this way, DeFort can automatically obtain price calculation functions and get the token price by executing these functions. Furthermore, DeFort supports the deployment of custom price calculation functions and allows auditors to specify a price calculation strategy for detection. Note that since auditors can access the bytecode and even the source code of DeFi applications, they can easily obtain their token price calculation functions.

3.4.2 Bound calculation mechanism. To determine whether the current token price is within a normal price range, DeFort utilizes the historical token price as a metric. Specifically, DeFort records historical token prices in a list T_h while tracking transactions and calculates a normal token price based on historical price information

as follows:

$$HCM(x, T_h, t) = \frac{\sum_{(p, t') \in T_h} \frac{1}{\sqrt{t-t'+\beta}} p}{\sum_{(p, t') \in T_h} \frac{1}{\sqrt{t-t'+\beta}}}, \quad (5)$$

where $\beta > 0$ is a hyperparameter used to control the impact of time on the weight of historical prices. The higher the value of β , the lower the impact of the time factor on the weight. Here, the more recent the historical price is given a higher weight. Note that using multiple historical prices, rather than a single price from the previous time, is done to detect price manipulation by gradually increasing the price.

Based on the calculated normal price, we calculate the variance of historical prices and use the variance to calculate the bound of the normal price fluctuation, which can be defined as follows:

$$B(\alpha, T_h, t) = 1 + \alpha \frac{\sqrt{\sum_{p, t' \in T_h} \frac{(p - HCM(T_h, t))^2}{\sqrt{t-t'+\beta}}}}{\sum_{p, t' \in T_h} \frac{1}{\sqrt{t-t'+\beta}} HCM(T_h, t)}, \quad (6)$$

where α is a hyperparameter and a higher α determines a large fluctuation range. According to the calculated normal price together with the bound of the normal price fluctuation, DeFort can determine whether the current price is within a normal price range.

3.4.3 Profit calculation mechanism. For DeFi applications with abnormal token prices, by scanning related transactions, we obtain the addresses that interact with the application. Since the price manipulation attack may be associated with multiple DeFi applications, we track the transactions related to obtained addresses and analyze the fund flow of these addresses. To unify the prices of different tokens for profit calculation, DeFort calculates token prices using the generally equivalent token (e.g., USDT). Specifically, DeFort uses third-party price calculation platforms [18, 19] to obtain the exchange rate between the detected tokens and USDT. Since the attacker may use multiple accounts to collaboratively perform attacks, DeFort first scans transactions that cause abnormal prices and obtains a set of accounts related to such transactions. DeFort then calculates the profit of the accounts obtained. Since the accounts used to make profits may be different from the accounts used to perform price manipulation, DeFort also calculates the profit of all the accounts that interact with DeFi applications after the model transitions to the *Abnormal* state. By combining profitable accounts and accounts involved in price manipulation, DeFort detects whether there exists a group of accounts that can ultimately make a profit.

3.5 Model-based Analysis.

To assist auditors in quickly finding the root cause, DeFort supports automated analysis of price manipulation attacks. Specifically, DeFort analyzes attacks from three perspectives, i.e., fund flow, address, and function calls.

3.5.1 Address analysis. To ensure efficiency, DeFort only obtains addresses related to the target DeFi application when the model is in *Normal* state. When the model transitions to *Abnormal* state, DeFi obtains all the addresses that interact with the abnormal DeFi application or its related addresses. Note that DeFort obtains both account addresses and contract addresses, which may be related to DeFi applications. By calculating the profits of these addresses, DeFort identifies the attackers and victims, where addresses that are not related to transactions that cause an abnormal token price and loss funds are identified to victims. On the contrary, addresses obtained that cause abnormal token prices or make profits are identified as attackers. Note that victims are typically associated with DeFi applications, which often are fund pools or pairs. Benign accounts may be involved in transactions during the attack. To avoid false positives, DeFort filters addresses that do not make profits or cause an abnormal token price. Considering that normal price fluctuations can result in small profits, DeFort also filters addresses with minimal profits.

3.5.2 Fund flow analysis. For each target DeFi application, DeFort monitors all the related transactions and extracts all the token transfer or swap operations. By analyzing the parameters of these operations, DeFort can obtain the number, source address, and destination address of the transferred token. Based on the information extracted, DeFort can construct a fund flow among DeFi applications and its related accounts. In addition, when the model transitions to *Abnormal* state, DeFort tracks the transactions of related accounts. For potential attackers, DeFort will analyze their historical transactions and trace their fund sources. This is because attackers may use other DeFi applications or flash loans to perform attacks and transfer profits to other accounts. Obtaining more transactions can better analyze the attack process.

3.5.3 Function call analysis. To analyze the reasons for price manipulation, DeFort extracted the sequence of function calls in the transaction. First, DeFort obtains the transactions that caused abnormal token prices and then extracts functions that could lead to price anomalies, such as *swap*, *transfer*, and *balanceOf*. Then, DeFort extracts all the functions related to token transfers in the transactions when the model in *Abnormal* state. In this way, DeFort can derive two sets of candidate functions: one that may result in abnormal token prices and the other that may yield profits. Based on address analysis and fund flow analysis, DeFort filters functions associated with benign accounts. Note that, since there exist nested calling relationships between functions, DeFort retains the function call sequence of the candidate function, which aids auditors in locating the function.

4 EVALUATION

In this section, we comprehensively evaluate DeFort with real-world DeFi environments and data to answer the following research questions (RQs):

- **RQ1:** How accurate is DeFort in detecting price manipulation attacks within DeFi applications?
- **RQ2:** How effective is DeFort in the analysis of price manipulation attacks in DeFi applications?
- **RQ3:** Is DeFort capable of detecting real-world price manipulation attacks during on-chain deployment?

4.1 Datasets

We conducted our experiments utilizing two datasets gathered from real-world DeFi environments. These datasets collectively contain data on 489 DeFi applications across four major Ethereum-compatible blockchain networks [80]. The first dataset, referred to as *D1*, consists of 54 DeFi applications that have previously experienced price manipulation attacks. The second dataset, named *D2*, comprises 435 DeFi applications deemed highly unlikely to possess vulnerabilities.

In constructing *D1*, we initially incorporated all 23 vulnerable DeFi applications identified by DeFiTaint [41]. Subsequently, we collated all attack incidents reported in DeFiHackLabs [67] from April 1, 2022, to March 1, 2023. DeFiHackLabs, renowned for its comprehensive coverage of blockchain attack events and boasting 4.3k stars, serves as a well-acknowledged repository in this field. From this source, we identified 128 incidents, each annotated with descriptive labels. Then, focusing on “price manipulation”, we extracted 19 incidents specifically tagged with this attribute. Recognizing that some price manipulation incidents might be categorized under alternative labels like “flashloan”, we performed a manual analysis of the remaining incidents without the “price manipulation” tag to ensure no relevant cases were overlooked. This process yielded 35 incidents associated with price manipulation vulnerabilities, with 4 already present in *D1*. After removing duplicates, these were added to *D1*, which finally contained 54 incidents. This dataset primarily serves to evaluate the true positive detection rate of DeFort.

The dataset *D2* was constructed using high-quality DeFi applications sourced from DeFiLlama [25], often likened to the “Google Play” of the DeFi ecosystem. These applications have undergone rigorous audits and are deemed free of price manipulation vulnerabilities. As of early 2023, the total value locked (TVL) in these applications amounted to approximately 27.4 billion dollars. The rationale for selecting these applications is based on the premise that a higher TVL in a DeFi protocol correlates with increased developer attention and a lower likelihood of suffering from price manipulation attacks. We tracked the activities of these 435 DeFi applications, capturing the transaction data from every block over a one-month period (from October 9, 2023, to November 9, 2023, UTC) through various block explorers and analytic platforms [13, 29, 30, 57]. This effort resulted in a comprehensive collection of 428,523 transactions. *D2* is mainly employed to assess the false positive rate of DeFort’s detection capabilities.

4.2 Implementation

We implemented DeFort with approximately 4,500 lines of code (LOC). DeFort currently supports compatibility with five blockchain chains—Ethereum [28], Binance [10], Fantom[31], Polygon [56], and Base [4]. For acquiring relevant state information from specific

blocks, we employ blockchain node APIs facilitated by QuickNode [59], an external RPC service provider. All experimental evaluations of DeFort were conducted on a system running Ubuntu 20.04, powered by an Intel® Xeon® W-2235 CPU (3.80GHz, with 6 cores and 12 threads) and equipped with 32GB of memory.

4.3 RQ1: Efficacy of Attack Detection

To address RQ1, we conducted an evaluation of DeFort using the datasets *D1* and *D2*. Table 1 presents the details of *D1* alongside the detection outcomes of DeFort in comparison to other leading approaches, namely DeFiRanger [78], FlashSyn [16], and DeFiTainter [41]. DeFort attained a recall rate of 96.3%, outperforming all comparable state-of-the-art approaches. However, it missed detecting two price manipulation attacks related to the “BeltFinance” and “Discover” DeFi applications. A subsequent in-depth analysis of the execution processes revealed the reasons for these false negatives. BeltFinance, a stableswap AMM protocol employing multi-strategy yield optimization with four assets and six strategies, presented a challenge. The core issue in the BeltFinance attack was its unique and intricate mechanism for calculating the *MultiStrategyToken* price by aggregating strategies, which DeFort could not accurately interpret from transaction execution traces. This limitation can potentially be addressed by incorporating domain-specific knowledge manually or enhancing the price identification method, perhaps through leveraging the semantic comprehension abilities of large language models. In the case of Discover, the attackers exploited flash loans to manipulate prices, a tactic discernible through the contract function *getprice()* in ETHpledge. However, the transaction trace lacked detailed function call information, including the return value of *getprice()*. Trace-based DeFort, in its current form, lacks access to such deeper call information and therefore could not detect the attack. This limitation is not inherent to DeFort’s methodology and could be resolved by broadening the tool’s reach to access relevant information.

As detailed in Table 1, we benchmark DeFort against three pertinent approaches—DeFiRanger, FlashSyn, and DeFiTainter—using the *D1* dataset. DeFiRanger and FlashSyn, which are not open-source, detected four and eight price manipulation attacks, respectively, according to their published experimental results. All these attacks were also identified by DeFort. On the other hand, DeFiTainter, an open-source tool and the current state-of-the-art solution in this field, identified 27 out of 54 attacks. In contrast, DeFort successfully detected 52 out of the 54 attacks, thus achieving a 92.6% higher detection rate than DeFiTainter, as highlighted in Table 1.

To assess the false positive rate, we subjected DeFort to an analysis using the *D2* dataset. Given that the DeFi applications in *D2* are generally considered non-vulnerable and, consequently, unlikely targets for attacks, their transactional activities are presumed to be normal. In our commitment to a more thorough evaluation, we corroborated the status of these DeFi applications against security companies’ databases and attack reports [6, 20, 35, 47], confirming their non-involvement in any attacks during the period from October 9, 2023, to November 9, 2023, UTC. Subsequently, DeFort was tested on the validated *D2* dataset, comprising 428,523 transactions across 435 DeFi applications. The outcomes reveal that DeFort

achieved a zero false positive rate on *D2*, underscoring its potential for extensive application in large-scale, on-chain monitoring scenarios.

Answers to RQ1: DeFort exhibits remarkable effectiveness in identifying price manipulation attacks, achieving a recall rate of 96.3% and a zero false positive rate, respectively. Notably, DeFort successfully detects attacks on dataset *D1* that remain undetected by other tools, surpassing the performance of the current state-of-the-art tool by 92.6%.

4.4 RQ2: Efficacy of Attack Analysis

In RQ2, we evaluate DeFort’s efficacy in analyzing price manipulation attacks within the incidents identified by DeFort in RQ1.

DeFort’s analysis primarily utilizes transaction execution traces, focusing on surface-level code aspects such as function calls and variables. As a result, the functions pinpointed by DeFort often correlate with the vulnerability’s cause rather than representing its root cause. Therefore, we term the function identified by DeFort as the “associated function”. Furthermore, security analysts require not just the identification of this associated function but also a comprehensive description of the overall attack behavior. This holistic view aids in swiftly understanding the complete attack process. DeFort addresses this need by providing a detailed description of the attack behavior, encompassing the attacker, victim, profiteer, key function call sequence, and fund flow. This upper-level extraction and summarization of semantic information from attack transaction behaviors enable security researchers to conduct an in-depth analysis of the vulnerabilities underlying an attack event. Moreover, such explanatory information is crucial for strategizing defenses against certain types of price manipulation attacks, as discussed in Section 5.1.

We employed the associated function and behavior descriptions as metrics to evaluate DeFort’s analytical capabilities. An analysis was deemed effective if both the associated function and the behavior descriptions were accurate. To validate DeFort’s analysis, we compared its results with attack event analysis reports from third-party security firms [5, 9, 12, 49, 54]. This comparison involved a manual review to ensure the thoroughness of our assessment. DeFort’s analysis was verified as accurate for 50 out of the 52 attacks. The analyses for the APC and ATK attacks were not confirmed due to the unavailability of the relevant vulnerability code as open source. For instance, the analysis of the ATK application is based on assumptions derived from available evidence and logical inferences, such as the significant rewards received by the user and the prior price manipulation, suggesting that the contract likely issues payouts based on ATK’s current value [11].

We delve deeper into DeFort’s analysis of the BGLD attacks to further clarify its findings. As depicted in Fig. 4, DeFort’s analysis on these attacks was verified as accurate through manual verification. The root cause is that \$BGLD charges an extra fee on transferring [8]. In part ❶, Attacker1 first borrowed 125 \$WBNB from DPPAdvanced through flash loan. Then Attacker1 called function *swap()* and exchanged 125 \$WBNB to 1,967,931 \$BGLD_1 in 0x7526_PancakePair. Next Attacker1 transferred 1,527,058 \$BGLD_1 to 0x7526_PancakePair and called 0x7526_PancakePair’s function

Table 1: Information about price manipulation attacks on vulnerable DeFi applications and the corresponding detection results of different tools. The time indicates the attack time measured in UTC. The loss amount is in USD. DR refers to DeFiRanger [78], FS refers to FlashSyn [16], DT refers to DeFiTainter [41], DF refers to DeFort.

#	App	Time	Loss	Chain	DR	FS	DT	DF	#	App	Time	Loss	Chain	DR	FS	DT	DF
1	bZx	2020/02/18	350K	ETH		✓		✓	28	EGDFinance	2022/08/07	36K	BSC			✓	✓
2	Eminence	2020/09/29	7M	ETH		✓	✓	✓	29	ANCH	2022/08/09	107K	BSC			✓	✓
3	Harvest	2020/10/26	21.5M	ETH	✓	✓	✓	✓	30	XSTABLE	2022/08/09	56k	ETH				✓
4	CheeseBank	2020/11/06	3.3M	ETH	✓	✓	✓	✓	31	Cupid	2022/08/31	78k	BSC			✓	✓
5	ValueDeFi	2020/11/14	6M	ETH	✓		✓	✓	32	Zoompro	2022/09/05	61K	BSC				✓
6	WarpFinance	2020/12/17	7.8M	ETH	✓	✓	✓	✓	33	BXH	2022/09/28	40K	BSC			✓	✓
7	PancakeBunny	2021/05/19	45M	BSC			✓	✓	34	ATK	2022/10/12	61K	BSC				✓
8	AutoShark	2021/05/24	750K	BSC			✓	✓	35	INUKO	2022/10/14	50K	BSC				✓
9	BeltFinance	2021/05/29	6.23M	BSC			✓		36	PLTD	2022/10/17	24K	BSC				✓
10	ApeRocket	2021/07/14	1.26M	BSC		✓	✓	✓	37	BDEX	2022/10/30	3K	BSC			✓	✓
11	PancakeBunny	2021/07/16	2.4M	POL			✓	✓	38	BBOX	2022/11/16	12K	BSC				✓
12	Sanshulnu	2021/07/20	111K	ETH			✓	✓	39	MBC	2022/11/29	5.9K	BSC			✓	✓
13	DotFinance	2021/08/25	430K	BSC			✓	✓	40	APC	2022/12/01	6K	BSC				✓
14	PancakeHunny	2021/10/20	1.93M	BSC				✓	41	AES	2022/12/07	60K	BSC				✓
15	CreamFinance	2021/10/27	130M	ETH			✓	✓	42	BGLD	2022/12/12	18K	BSC			✓	✓
16	OneRing	2022/03/21	1.45M	FTM		✓		✓	43	Nmbplatform	2022/12/14	76K	BSC			✓	✓
17	GYMNetwork	2022/04/09	312K	BSC				✓	44	DFS	2022/12/30	2K	BSC				✓
18	ElephantMoney	2022/04/12	11.2M	BSC				✓	45	GDS	2023/01/03	180K	BSC			✓	✓
19	RikkeiFinance	2022/04/15	1.1M	BSC				✓	46	RoeFinance	2023/01/11	80K	ETH				✓
20	WienerDOGE	2022/04/25	30K	BSC		✓	✓	✓	47	Upswing	2023/01/17	36K	ETH			✓	✓
21	Fortress	2022/05/08	3M	BSC				✓	48	UPSToken	2023/01/18	45K	ETH			✓	✓
22	Hackerdao	2022/05/24	65K	BSC				✓	49	BonqDAO	2023/02/01	88M	POL			✓	✓
23	NOVO	2022/05/29	65K	BSC				✓	50	FDP	2023/02/06	4K	BSC				✓
24	Discover	2022/06/06	11K	BSC					51	Sheep	2023/02/10	3K	BSC				✓
25	Equalizer	2022/06/07	72K	POL			✓	✓	52	Starlink	2023/02/16	12K	BSC				✓
26	InverseFinance	2022/06/16	1M	ETH				✓	53	SwapX	2023/02/27	1M	BSC				✓
27	SpaceGodzilla	2022/07/13	25K	BSC				✓	54	LaunchZone	2023/02/27	320K	BSC				✓

skim(), making Attacker1 get back 1,527,058 \$BGLD_1. Note that in the previous operation, 0x7526_PancakePair transferred 30,541 \$BGLD_1 to the zero address, which means that 30,541 \$BGLD_1 were burned. Then Attacker1 called function *sync()*. At this time, the liquidity in pool 0x7526_PancakePair was extremely imbalanced, causing Attacker1 to swap out 133 \$WBNB using only 1 \$BGLD_1. The attacker then repaid the flash loan to DPPAdvanced and transferred the profit of 8 \$WBNB to Attacker2. Immediately afterwards, in part ②, Attacker1 called function *migrate()* of ERC1967Proxy and leveraged the same logic to launch an attack on 0x4293_PancakePair. The other detailed information of this attack is shown in Fig. 4. Finally, in part ③, Attacker1 gained a total of 18,476 \$BUSD. In this case, DeFort identify function *skim()* in 0x7526_PancakePair as the associated function. This is reasonable because the attacker called function *skim()* that burned some tokens, unbalancing the liquidity, which in turn the attacker profited from.

Answers to RQ2: DeFort proves to be effective in analyzing price manipulation attacks, with its analysis verified as accurate for 50 out of the 52 attacks. This level of effectiveness significantly aids security analysts in swiftly unraveling and understanding the attack process.

4.5 RQ3: Efficacy in Detecting and Analyzing Real-world Attacks during On-Chain Deployment

To estimate RQ3, we further deployed DeFort to five real chains for real-time monitoring, targeting 441 high-value DeFi applications from DefiLlama. DeFort successfully identified and analyzed five price manipulation attacks on five different DeFi applications and promptly issued relevant alerts on Twitter (X). The information about these attacks is shown in Table 2.

For the attack on Carson, hackers utilized flash loans to continuously invoke the function *swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()* in a closed-source contract (0x2bdf...341a). This process involved swapping from token \$BSC-USD to token \$Carson and swapping back repeatedly to burn token \$Carson for profits. In terms of the incident related to MagnateFi, project owners manipulated the price through function *setDirectPrice()* and subsequently absconded with funds. This type of fraud is also known as "rug pull". The other three attacks have similar behaviors. As for the attack on FFIST, attackers called the function *transfer()* and triggered the internal function *_airdrop()* to set token number of predictable address to one, which caused a liquidity imbalance in the pool. Then attackers made a lot of profits by taking advantage of the price anomaly at this moment. This kind of attack has also




Figure 4: Core steps of the attack on BGLD. For operations bounded the box, they are sub-operations under a particular function. Red lines indicate fund flows. The process is from top to bottom. The function marked in blue is the associated function.

been used in the AI-Doge, QX and Utopia programs [7]. Regarding the attack that occurred on Uwerx, the vulnerability primarily originates from the susceptible function `_transfer()` and its implications when interacting with the specified variable `uniswapPoolAddress`. Although the tokenomics were initially structured to support the project by burning tokens and reallocating funds for marketing purposes, the vulnerability was utilized to cause imbalances and manipulate market prices [52]. Following this, we take the attack on LeetSwap as an example to show DeFort’s detection and analysis of the attack in detail.

DeFort deduced that function `sync()` as the associated function and the key function call sequence is `swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()`, `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens()`, `sync()` and `swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()`. Other behavior descriptions provided by DeFort, which are correct after manual proofreading, are shown in Fig. 5. Firstly, attacker1 deposited 0.001 \$WETH to attacker2. Then, attacker2 initiated a normal micro-swap operation in a contract called LeetSwapV2Pair, which is the victim, exchanging token \$WETH for




Figure 5: Core steps of the attack on LeetSwap. For operations bounded the box, they are sub-operations under a particular function. Red lines indicate fund flows. The process is from top to bottom. The function marked in blue is the associated function.

token \$axlUSDC. This step resulted in a tiny lift of \$axlUSDC price. Subsequently, attacker2 invoked a call to vulnerable function `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens` shown in Listing 1 to transfer almost all \$axlUSDC tokens from LeetSwapV2Pair to LeetSwapV2Fees, leading an extremely imbalance in LeetSwapV2Pair. Following that, attacker2 triggered function `sync()` to synchronize. At this moment, the price of token \$axlUSDC became very high. Finally, attacker2 executed a reverse swap to acquire a greater amount of \$WETH and transferred money to the profiteer.

```

1 function _transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens(address
  token, uint256 amount) public returns (uint256) {
2   if (amount == 0) {
3     return 0;
4   }
5   uint256 balanceBefore =
      IERC20(token).balanceOf(fees);
6   _safeTransfer(token, fees, amount);
7   uint256 balanceAfter = IERC20(token).balanceOf(fees);
8   return balanceAfter - balanceBefore;
9 }

```

Listing 1: Vulnerable `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens()` in LeetSwapV2Pair contract.

After analyzing the source code, we found that the root cause behind the attack is that the function `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens()` was mistakenly assigned a 'public' visibility specifier, as shown in the first line of Listing 1. Therefore, anyone could invoke a call to this function to transfer tokens from LeetSwapV2Pair to LeetSwapV2Fees. DeFort determined function `sync()` as the associated function, following function `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens()`. Since function `sync()` exists to set the reserves of the contract to the current balances [72], we can assume that function `sync()` demonstrates the impact of calling function `_transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens()`, which in turn allows subsequent function `swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` to utilize that impact. Therefore, function `sync()` is indeed related to the vulnerability in this attack and can be regarded as the associated function. In conclusion, the effective information provided by DeFort can help security researchers to further investigate vulnerabilities behind attacks.

Answers to RQ3: DeFort demonstrates its capability to detect real-world price manipulation attacks in an on-chain deployment. Furthermore, it offers crucial insights for attack analysis, thereby assisting security analysts in rapidly deciphering the underlying vulnerabilities of such attacks.

5 DISCUSSION

5.1 Application to Attack Blocking

The accurate detection and effective analysis provided by DeFort can help block certain types of price manipulation attacks, such as those related to Automated Market Maker based Decentralized Exchanges (AMM-DEXs). AMM-DEXs allow digital assets to be traded in a permissionless and automated way by using liquidity pools rather than a traditional market of buyers and sellers. LeetSwapV2Pair on LeetSwap incidents shown in Fig. 5 is AMM-DEX. DeFort detected an attack on the LeetSwap program and

regarded LeetSwapV2Pair as the victim. With the above information, if we have the authority granted by the project, we are able to withdraw some or all of the tokens from LeetSwapV2Pair in a timely manner before the transaction is confirmed, making it impossible for the attacker to complete the attack. Since most on-chain attack transactions are confirmed within tens of seconds to minutes, rapid and accurate automated detection and analysis are critical for attack blocking. Excluding APIs request time, DeFort's running time on dataset *D1* is 0.01-0.2 seconds, which takes up very little time before attack blocking is implemented.

5.2 Limitation in Design and Implementation

DeFort's analysis is based on transaction execution, not deep into the source code level, and the analysis granularity is coarse. In the future, by accessing the source code analysis technology, we can further locate the functions and variables that are not reflected in the transaction execution path to obtain more detailed analysis information. For specific DeFi applications, DeFort relies on prior knowledge in the database to recognize variables representing prices. To mitigate this problem, we can access a large language model to help understand the semantics of recognizing relevant price variables. In addition, DeFort supports detecting and analyzing transaction behaviors on five chains, and we will extend DeFort to support DeFi applications on other chains in the future.

6 RELATED WORK

6.1 Detection of Price Manipulation Attacks

To ensure the security of funds and privacy in DeFi applications, various tools have been developed to detect vulnerabilities hidden in contract programs. Static analysis tools like Slither [32], VeriSmart [63], Zeus [39], and Securify [69] analyze programs at source code and bytecode level. Symbolic execution tools such as Mythril [22], Oyente [46], Manticore [51], VerX [55] and DeFectChecker [15] use symbolic values instead of specific values during the execution. Besides, dynamic fuzzing tools [17, 33, 37, 45, 62, 68] automated generate input data and monitor the abnormal results of target programs at runtime [60]. Recently, GPTScan [66] combines LLM [40] to detect logic vulnerabilities in contracts.

Different from above work, we concentrate on the detection of price manipulation attacks in DeFi applications. Existing tools with the ability to detect attacks or vulnerabilities related to price manipulation include DeFiRanger [78], FlashSyn [16], DeFiTainter [41] and GPTScan [66]. DeFiRanger constructs cash flow trees(CFT) from trasaciton sequences, lifts the semantic of CFT to high-level DeFi actions and subsequently employs specific patterns to identify price manipulation attacks. However, DeFiRanger is greatly limited by its templates. FlashSyn applies numerical approximation strategies to synthesize adversarial contracts that potentially exploit DeFi applications with price manipulation attacks. Nonetheless, there is a gap between synthesized contracts and the ones that launch attacks on the real chain. DeFiTainter builds call graph based on contract state and transactions, then conducts inter-contract taint analysis to analyze all execution paths and disclose price manipulation attacks. Despite that, DeFiTainter requires manual analysis and labeling of taint sources and taint sinks, which is not trivial work. GPTScan utilizes GPT [53] to match candidate vulnerable

Table 2: Price manipulation attacks detected by DeFort. The attack time is in UTC. The loss amount is in USD.

#	Application	Attack Time	Loss	Chain	Block	Attack Transaction Hash
1	FFIST	2023/07/20	230K	BSC	30113118	0x199c4b88cab6b4b495b9d91af98e746811dd8f82f43117c48205e6332db9f0e0
2	Carson	2023/07/26	143K	BSC	30306325	0x37d921a6bb0ecdd8f1ec918d795f9c354727a3ff6b0dba98a512fceb9662a3ac
3	LeetSwap	2023/08/01	620K	BASE	2031747	0xbb837d417b76dd237b4418e1695a50941a69259a1c4dee561ea57d982b9f10ec
4	Uwerx	2023/08/02	324K	ETH	17826203	0x3b19e152943f31fe0830b67315ddc89be9a066dc89174256e17bc8c2d35b5af8
5	MagnateFi	2023/08/25	6.4M	BASE	3073444	0x39555e75d76b294248a434fdfe9640e0cfe3f22bd7fceb675fd4ef4b5e02f719

functions and recognize key variables and statements which are associated with price manipulation vulnerabilities.

6.2 Analysis of Attacks

To the best of our knowledge, DeFort is the first tool that can automatically analyze attacks in DeFi application scenarios. A similar technique is fault localization, which can be divided into three categories: program spectrum [1, 38, 77, 81], mutation analysis [34, 44], and learning to rank [42, 43, 48, 64]. Program spectrum method [1, 38, 77, 81]. Due to the characteristics of blockchain and smart contracts, the above methods cannot be directly used in DeFi applications. Joran et al. [34] and Li et al. [44] design specific mutation operators based on mutation-based fault localization methods to extend traditional mutation analysis to DeFi applications fault localization tasks. However, mutation-based techniques require hours to locate potential faults in single DeFi application. Besides, the above methods lack the capacity to provide a comprehensive analysis of attack happened in DeFi applications.

7 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed DeFort, a novel, automatic price manipulation attack detection and analysis approach. With a price manipulation behavior model, Defort can detect price manipulation attacks on blockchains and conduct a comprehensive analysis, including pinpointing the associated function and generating attack behavior descriptions. Our evaluation using collected datasets and real-world deployments demonstrates that DeFort achieves high precision both in detection and analysis, outperforming state-of-the-art approaches in almost all metrics.

8 DATA AVAILABILITY

DeFort has been integrated as a part of MetaScout¹, an industry-leading, real-time contract security monitoring platform. To facilitate future research, we have made the dataset publicly available on our GitHub website at <https://github.com/maoyixie/DeFort>.

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