

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

MAPLE TOKEN

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PeckShield April 4, 2021

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1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related source code of the **Maple Token** smart contract, we outline in the report our systematic method to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistency between smart contract code and the documentation, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of the smart contract exhibits no ERC20 compliance issues or security concerns. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Maple Token

Maple is a decentralized corporate credit market that aims to provide capital to institutional borrowers through globally accessible fixed-income yield opportunities. In particular, liquidity pools are utilized to aggregate funding from liquidity providers and are loaned out to earn interest. The pools are professionally managed by pool delegates to provide as a sustainable yield source. And Borrowers request capital from the Maple protocol and pay associated interest fee. The Maple token is the protocol token of the Maple protocol. This audit covers the ERC20-compliance of the Maple token.

The basic information of Maple Token is as follows:

ltem	Description
lssuer	Maple Labs
Website	https://maple.finance/
Туре	Ethereum ERC20 Token Contract
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Audit Completion Date	April 4, 2021

Table 1.1: Basic Information of	of Maple Token
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In the following, we show the Git repository and the commit hash value used in this audit:

• https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-token.git (10d561f)

And this is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been checked in:

• https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-token.git (6903752)

1.2 About PeckShield


PeckShield Inc. [6] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystem by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).


1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [5]:

- <u>Likelihood</u> represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk;

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.





We perform the audit according to the following procedures:

- <u>Basic Coding Bugs</u>: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- <u>ERC20 Compliance Checks</u>: We then manually check whether the implementation logic of the audited smart contract(s) follows the standard ERC20 specification and other best practices.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

Category	Check Item
	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
Basic Coding Bugs	Revert DoS
Dasic Coulling Dugs	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead of Transfer
-	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
	Approve / TransferFrom Race Condition
ERC20 Compliance Checks	Compliance Checks (Section 3)
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe

regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.



2 Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the Maple Token. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place ERC20-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	2
Informational	1
Total	3

Moreover, we explicitly evaluate whether the given contracts follow the standard ERC20 specification and other known best practices, and validate its compatibility with other similar ERC20 tokens and current DeFi protocols. The detailed ERC20 compliance checks are reported in Section 3. After that, we examine a few identified issues of varying severities that need to be brought up and paid more attention to. (The findings are categorized in the above table.) Additional information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions are in Section 4.

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, a minor ERC20 compliance issue was found and our detailed checklist can be found in Section 3. Also, there is no critical or high severity issue, although the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 2 low-severity vulnerabilities, and 1 informational recommendation.

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	Low	Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant	Business Logic	Fixed
		fundsToken		
PVE-002	Informational	Inconsistency Between Document and Imple-	Coding Practices	Fixed
		mentation		
PVE-003	Low	Consistency Between withdrawFunds() And	Coding Practices	Fixed
		withdrawFundsOnBehalf()		

Table 2.1: Key Maple Token Audit Findings

Besides recommending specific countermeasures to mitigate these issues, we also emphasize that it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms need to kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed in mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for our detailed compliance checks and Section 4 for elaboration of reported issues.

3 ERC20 Compliance Checks

The ERC20 specification defines a list of API functions (and relevant events) that each token contract is expected to implement (and emit). The failure to meet these requirements means the token contract cannot be considered to be ERC20-compliant. Naturally, as the first step of our audit, we examine the list of API functions defined by the ERC20 specification and validate whether there exist any inconsistency or incompatibility in the implementation or the inherent business logic of the audited contract(s).

ltem	Description	Status
nama()	Is declared as a public view function	1
name()	Returns a string, for example "Tether USD"	1
symbol()	Is declared as a public view function	1
symbol()	Returns the symbol by which the token contract should be known, for	1
	example "USDT". It is usually 3 or 4 characters in length	
decimals()	Is declared as a public view function	1
uecimais()	Returns decimals, which refers to how divisible a token can be, from 0	1
	(not at all divisible) to 18 (pretty much continuous) and even higher if	
	required	
totalSupply()	Is declared as a public view function	1
totalSupply()	Returns the number of total supplied tokens, including the total minted	1
	tokens (minus the total burned tokens) ever since the deployment	
balanceOf()	Is declared as a public view function	1
balanceOI()	Anyone can query any address' balance, as all data on the blockchain is	1
	public	
allowance()	Is declared as a public view function	1
anowance()	Returns the amount which the spender is still allowed to withdraw from	1
	the owner	

Table 3.1: Basic View-Only Functions Defined in The ERC20 Specification

Our analysis shows that there is no ERC20 inconsistency or incompatibility issue found in the audited Maple Token. In the surrounding two tables, we outline the respective list of basic view -only functions (Table 3.1) and key state-changing functions (Table 3.2) according to the widely-

ltem	Description	Status
	Is declared as a public function	1
·	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token transfer status	1
t	Reverts if the caller does not have enough tokens to spend	1
transfer()	Allows zero amount transfers	1
	Emits Transfer() event when tokens are transferred successfully (include 0	1
	amount transfers)	
	Reverts while transferring to zero address	1
	Is declared as a public function	1
	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token transfer status	✓
	Reverts if the spender does not have enough token allowances to spend	1
	Updates the spender's token allowances when tokens are transferred suc-	1
transferFrom()	cessfully	
	Reverts if the from address does not have enough tokens to spend	1
	Allows zero amount transfers	1
	Emits Transfer() event when tokens are transferred successfully (include 0	1
	amount transfers)	
	Reverts while transferring from zero address	1
	Reverts while transferring to zero address	1
	Is declared as a public function	1
approval	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token approval status	1
approve()	Emits Approval() event when tokens are approved successfully	1
	Reverts while approving to zero address	1
Transfor() quant	Is emitted when tokens are transferred, including zero value transfers	1
Transfer() event	Is emitted with the from address set to $address(0x0)$ when new tokens	1
	are generated	
Approval() event	Is emitted on any successful call to approve()	1

Table 3.2: Key State-Changing Functions Defined in The ERC20 Specification

adopted ERC20 specification. In addition, we perform a further examination on certain features that are permitted by the ERC20 specification or even further extended in follow-up refinements and enhancements (e.g., ERC777/ERC2222), but not required for implementation. These features are generally helpful, but may also impact or bring certain incompatibility with current DeFi protocols. Therefore, we consider it is important to highlight them as well. This list is shown in Table 3.3.

Feature	Description	Opt-in
Deflationary	Part of the tokens are burned or transferred as fee while on trans-	
	fer()/transferFrom() calls	
Rebasing	The balanceOf() function returns a re-based balance instead of the actual	—
	stored amount of tokens owned by the specific address	
Pausable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to pause the token	—
	transfers and other operations	
Blacklistable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to blacklist a	
	specific address such that token transfers and other operations related to	
	that address are prohibited	
Mintable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to mint tokens to	—
	a specific address	
Burnable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to burn tokens of	—
	a specific address	

Table 3.3: Additional Opt-in Features Examined in Our Audit	Table 3.3:	Additional Opt-in	Features	Examined	in (Dur A	۱udit
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4 Detailed Results

4.1 Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant fundsToken

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low

- Target: ERC2222
- Category: Business Logic [4]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [2]

Description

Though there is a standardized ERC-20 specification, many token contracts may not strictly follow the specification or have additional functionalities beyond the specification. In the following, we examine the transfer() routine and related idiosyncrasies from current widely-used token contracts.

In particular, we use the popular token, i.e., ZRX, as our example. We show the related code snippet below. On its entry of transfer(), there is a check, i.e., if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]). If the check fails, it returns false. However, the transaction still proceeds successfully without being reverted. This is not compliant with the ERC20 standard and may cause issues if not handled properly. Specifically, the ERC20 standard specifies the following: "Transfers _ value amount of tokens to address _ to, and MUST fire the Transfer event. The function SHOULD throw if the message caller's account balance does not have enough tokens to spend."

```
64
        function transfer(address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
65
            //Default assumes totalSupply can't be over max (2^256 - 1).
66
            if (balances[msg.sender] >= value && balances[ to] + value >= balances[ to]) {
67
                balances [msg.sender] -=
                                          value;
68
                balances[_to] += _value;
69
                Transfer (msg. sender , _to , _value);
70
                return true;
71
            } else { return false; }
72
        }
73
74
        function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
```

```
75
            if (balances[ from] >= value && allowed[ from][msg.sender] >= value &&
                balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {
76
                balances [ to] += value;
77
                balances [ from ] -= value;
78
                allowed [ from ] [msg.sender ] -= value;
79
                Transfer(from, to, value);
80
                return true;
81
            } else { return false; }
82
```

Listing 4.1: ZRX.sol

Because of that, a normal call to transfer() is suggested to use the safe version, i.e., safeTransfer (), In essence, it is a wrapper around ERC20 operations that may either throw on failure or return false without reverts. Moreover, the safe version also supports tokens that return no value (and instead revert or throw on failure). Note that non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful. To use this library you can add a using SafeERC20 for IERC20. Similarly, there is a safe version of transferFrom() as well, i.e., safeTransferFrom().

In the following, we show the withdrawFunds() routine in the ERC2222 contract. If the USDT token is supported as tokenAddress, the unsafe version of fundsToken.transfer(msg.sender, withdrawableFunds) (line 181) may revert as there is no return value in the USDT token contract's transfer() implementation (but the IERC20 interface expects a return value)!

```
174
175
          * @dev Withdraws all available funds for a token holder
176
          */
177
         function withdrawFunds() public virtual override {
178
             uint256 withdrawableFunds = prepareWithdraw();
179
180
             if (withdrawableFunds > uint256(0)) {
181
                 require (fundsToken.transfer (msg.sender, withdrawableFunds), "FDT:
                     TRANSFER_FAILED");
182
                 updateFundsTokenBalance();
183
184
             }
185
```

Listing 4.2: ERC2222::withdrawFunds()

Recommendation Accommodate the above-mentioned idiosyncrasy with safe-version implementation of ERC20-related transfer(), transferFrom(), and approve().

Status The issue has been addressed by the following commit: 6903752.

4.2 Inconsistency Between Document and Implementation

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: N/A
- Impact: N/A

- Target: ERC2222Category: Coding Practices [3]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1041 [1]

Description

The Maple token is the native governance token of the Maple protocol and it is designed to be a FundsDistributionToken (FDT) token that inherits the ERC20 token standard and further implements the ERC2222 token standard.

During the analysis of the token contract, we notice a specific misleading comment located at line 213 of ERC2222::updateFundsReceived(). In particular, the preceding function summary indicates that "the contract computes the delta of the previous and the new funds token balance". However, the implemented logic (line 208) indicates it is the delta of the new and the previous funds token balance.

```
198
        /**
199
         * @dev Updates the current funds token balance
200
         * and returns the difference of new and previous funds token balances
201
         * @return A int256 representing the difference of the new and previous funds token
             balance
202
         */
203
        function _updateFundsTokenBalance() internal virtual returns (int256) {
204
             uint256 prevFundsTokenBalance = fundsTokenBalance;
205
206
             fundsTokenBalance = fundsToken.balanceOf(address(this));
207
208
             return int256(fundsTokenBalance).sub(int256( prevFundsTokenBalance));
209
        }
210
211
        /**
212
          st @dev Register a payment of funds in tokens. May be called directly after a
             deposit is made.
213
         * @dev Calls _updateFundsTokenBalance(), whereby the contract computes the delta of
              the previous and the new
214
          st funds token balance and increments the total received funds (cumulative) by delta
              by calling _registerFunds()
215
         */
216
        function updateFundsReceived() public virtual {
217
             int256 newFunds = updateFundsTokenBalance();
218
219
             if (newFunds > 0) {
220
                 distributeFunds(newFunds.toUint256Safe());
221
```

Listing 4.3: ERC2222::updateFundsReceived()

Recommendation Ensure the consistency between documents (including embedded comments) and implementation.

Status The issue has been addressed by the following commit: 6903752.

4.3 Consistency Between withdrawFunds() And withdrawFundsOnBehalf()

- ID: PVE-003
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low

- Target: ERC2222
- Category: Coding Practices [3]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1041 [1]

Description


As mentioned in Section 4.2, the Maple token follows the ERC2222 token standard that allows the token holders to be able to claim proportionate amounts of interest that have been paid over time. Specifically, there are two related routines, i.e., withdrawFunds() and withdrawFundsOnBehalf(), that can be used by token holders to withdraw all available funds, either directly by the token holders themselves or indirectly on behalf of token holders.

Our analysis with these two routines shows certain unnecessary inconsistency. In particular, For gas optimization purposes, the withdrawFunds() routine has implemented an enhancement that avoids making the asset-transferring call if the transferred amount is 0. However, the same enhancement has not been taken in the withdrawFundsOnBehalf() routine.

To elaborate, we show below the code snippet of ERC2222::withdrawFundsOnBehalf(). This routine allows for withdrawing all available funds on behalf of a token holder. However, it also makes the transfer request (line 193) even when the given withdrawableFunds is 0.

```
174 /**
175 /**
176 * @dev Withdraws all available funds for a token holder
176 */
177 function withdrawFunds() public virtual override {
178 uint256 withdrawableFunds = _prepareWithdraw();
179
180 if (withdrawableFunds > uint256(0)) {
181 require(fundsToken.transfer(msg.sender, withdrawableFunds), "FDT:
TRANSFER_FAILED");
```

```
182
183
                 _updateFundsTokenBalance();
184
             }
185
        }
186
187
         /**
188
          * @dev Withdraws all available funds for a token holder, on behalf of token holder
189
         */
         function withdrawFundsOnBehalf(address user) public virtual {
190
191
             uint256 withdrawableFunds = _prepareWithdrawOnBehalf(user);
192
193
             require(fundsToken.transfer(user, withdrawableFunds), "FDT:TRANSFER_FAILED");
194
195
             _updateFundsTokenBalance();
196
        }
```



Recommendation Avoid the token transfer() call when the transferred amount is 0 in both withdrawFunds() and withdrawFundsOnBehalf() routines.

Status The issue has been addressed by the following commit: 6903752.



5 Conclusion

In this security audit, we have examined the Maple Token design and implementation. During our audit, we first checked all respects related to the compatibility of the ERC20 specification and other known ERC20 pitfalls/vulnerabilities. We then proceeded to examine other areas such as coding practices and business logics. Overall, although no critical or high level vulnerabilities were discovered, we identified two low severity issues and an informational suggestion that were promptly confirmed and fixed by the team. In the meantime, as disclaimed in Section 1.4, we appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions about our findings, procedures, audit scope, etc.



References

- MITRE. CWE-1041: Use of Redundant Code. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1041. html.
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- [5] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_ Methodology.
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