



General Assembly

Sixty-second session

First Committee

10th meeting

Wednesday, 17 October 2007, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chairperson: Mr. Badji (Senegal)

The meeting was called to order at 3:15 p.m.

Agenda items 88 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): This afternoon the Committee will have a thematic debate on nuclear weapons with panellists who will join us shortly. But first, the Committee will hear three or four statements by delegations who have requested the floor, and then, once the panellists arrive, we will again take up the thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Bin Momen (Bangladesh): Our meeting today on the issue of nuclear weapons takes place against the backdrop of multiple setbacks in recent years. The disappointing outcome of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the failure to reach a common agreement at the 2005 World Summit and the continued impasse at the Conference on Disarmament have forestalled progress on the nuclear disarmament issue.

Despite years of relentless efforts by the international community, nuclear weapons still pose the greatest threat to humanity. The NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We must ensure full universality of the NPT, CTBT and other international instruments without a single exception.

The 1968 NPT, signed by almost all countries of the world, provides a guarantee that while non-nuclear nations would forgo building nuclear weapons, nuclear nations would gradually relinquish their own nuclear weapons. Ironically, the lack of political will of only a few continues to cast a shadow over the prospect of making the world free from nuclear weapons.

Bangladesh strongly believes that the three main pillars of the NPT — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — should receive non-discriminatory attention. In that context, we wish to underscore that article IV of the NPT guarantees the inalienable rights of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Those guarantees must apply without discrimination, and the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology must be upheld. As a confidence-building measure, the nuclear-weapon States must also provide binding guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of using them.

The CTBT will soon mark the eleventh anniversary of its adoption. Although it has achieved near-universal adherence with 176 signatories, regrettably to date we do not have sufficient ratifications for its entry into force. We urge the remaining 11 Annex 2 States, whose ratification is essential for its entry into force, to do so as soon as possible.

Bangladesh strongly believes in regional approaches to nuclear disarmament. Confidence-

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

07-54751 (E)



building measures through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute significantly to that goal. We welcome the creation of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone by five Central Asian States. We appreciate all other existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and call for the establishment of similar zones in South Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world. We also believe that the recent trend towards bilateral agreements on the civilian use of nuclear energy should not in any way hinder the cause of regional nuclear disarmament. We also call for universal access to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, as these have so far had a deterrent effect on nuclear proliferation.

It is our expectation that the Conference on Disarmament will soon begin negotiations towards an agreement on the complete elimination of fissile materials used for the production of nuclear weapons.

In spite of the disappointing outcomes of the recent past, we are nonetheless heartened to see some glimmers of hope. We are confident that, given the necessary will, it will be possible to build on the outcome of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, held in Vienna earlier this year. We need, however, to reinvigorate our efforts in earnest to ensure the Treaty's continuing relevance and strength.

In the face of these realities, it is with a deep sense of pride that Bangladesh can point out our own impeccable disarmament and non-proliferation credentials. We have consciously and unconditionally decided to remain non-nuclear. Bangladesh is the first Annex 2 nation in South Asia to have signed and ratified the CTBT. We are party to almost all disarmament-related treaties, including the NPT. We have also concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including the Additional Protocols. Those are tangible testimonies to our unwavering commitment towards the twin goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.

We will never falter in our commitment towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me, at the outset, to reiterate my delegation's support for convening a conference on nuclear dangers, as agreed at the Millennium Summit in 2000. The international community must renew its commitment to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons after a long period of paralysis in the

disarmament machinery, frequent use of double standards and growing distrust with regard to these issues.

In recent months, we have certainly witnessed some encouraging signs, after a long period of stagnation or even regression on disarmament matters. The result of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is a good example of those signs, as is the incipient but promising progress made at the Conference on Disarmament.

Furthermore, we are encouraged to hear, with increasing frequency and increasing vigor, authoritative voices of those among the nuclear Powers who recognize the need to eliminate those weapons and who oppose doctrines that advocate their use and, even worse, their development. Those dangerous doctrines clearly encourage or serve as an excuse for those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons, and therefore they must be immediately abandoned.

Furthermore, we recognize the spread of the appeal to reshape international action for disarmament. As one of the nuclear Powers stated only a few days ago:

“We must recognize that disarmament is in crisis, its legal bases are threatened. Some treaties are not functioning adequately. Others are eroded or in decline, and the mechanisms for negotiations are practically disjointed.”

That is a quotation from one of the nuclear Powers that my delegation agrees with.

Unfortunately, we have also noted certain disquieting facts, such as a weakening of the NPT that could be a result of the cooperation agreement between one State party to the Treaty and another that is outside that regime. If we wish to invigorate the Treaty, particularly at the Review Conference to be held in 2010, all States parties must seek its universalization and promote the full respect of both the Treaty and the commitments entered into at the Review Conferences, in particular those of 1995 and 2000. Only by respecting the letter and spirit of the Treaty will it be strengthened. We must, above all, recognize the need to intensify our efforts and revitalize the basic commitment that led to the establishment of the NPT.

Mexico is convinced that in order to make progress, we must above all overcome the differences between those who consider disarmament a priority

and those who consider non-proliferation a priority. In fact, that is what has led to virtual paralysis in the disarmament agenda. The equilibrium between non-proliferation and disarmament is fragile. It is a question of two sides of the same coin, and therefore we must, once and for all, accept that they are inseparable. Those who wish to give priority to one over the other of those fundamental objectives of the NPT undermine their own credibility and diminish the legitimacy of their efforts. We must leave behind that debate and make progress on both fronts.

The nuclear Powers have the obligation to work towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and must be held accountable for that by the international community. We require transparency and timely, precise and verifiable information to evaluate, on a regular basis, the existing nuclear stockpiles and thereby verify compliance with the commitments undertaken. Following a limited and selective information policy will preserve the uncertainty in the international community, if not skepticism concerning compliance with article VI of the NPT.

The establishment of transparency mechanisms will clearly contribute to achieving a genuine alliance against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would contribute in particular to reducing international tension that arises from the need to respect the right to develop nuclear energy for civilian use while strengthening efforts to avoid the possible diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes.

I cannot fail to mention in this context the importance of encouraging cooperation between existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and of advancing the creation of new zones. Unfortunately, the necessary support to consolidate existing regimes or to establish new ones has been lacking. The case of Tlatelolco shows that those regimes have demonstrated their usefulness over time. The Office for Disarmament Affairs can and should play an important role in that respect.

Any time that change occurs, new areas for improvement are opened. In that context, we wish to point out that the arrival of the new Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, and his High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Sergio Duarte, assures the Mexican delegation that the nuclear disarmament agenda will have the priority it merits. The current impasse must be eliminated. Transparency and parallel

work on disarmament and on non-proliferation, access to technologies for energy production for peaceful purposes and universal adhesion of the NPT are important steps towards genuine nuclear disarmament.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I give the floor to the representative of Portugal, who will speak on behalf of the European Union.

Mr. Pereira Gomes (Portugal): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the countries that align themselves with this statement. In order to save time, I will shorten my oral statement; the full text is being distributed.

As we stated in the general debate (see A/C.1/62/PV.2), progress is needed in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation in accordance with relevant international instruments and by negotiating new ones, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty. A stand-off should be avoided between those who give priority to disarmament and those who give priority to non-proliferation.

The EU believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are crucial for global peace and security. The NPT is the cornerstone of this regime, based on mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT provides the essential multilateral norm and the basis of all our endeavours to address security challenges in the nuclear field. The EU underlines its continued support for the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and shall bear in mind the current situation.

Today the Non-Proliferation Treaty is more important than ever. Its authority and integrity must be preserved and strengthened. We reiterate our support for an effective and universal non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and international safeguards. We fully recognize the inalienable right of all States parties to develop, research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. But the international community must unequivocally exclude any possibility of the improper use of civilian nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes.

The inconclusive outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference should be an additional encouragement for all of us to invest in a successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, where it is crucial that we succeed in strengthening the NPT in all its aspects.

As a matter of fact, today there is room for some hope, considering the satisfactory conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, made possible by a positive and constructive spirit that clearly showed the commitment to the NPT regime on the part of the overwhelming majority of States parties, despite the unjustifiable objections raised by Iran that led to a loss of time. The EU and its member States actively contributed to the deliberations of the session by submitting detailed views and proposals on all three areas of review. We trust that those and further contributions by the EU will play their part in a successful and substantive conclusion to the current review cycle. The EU is engaged in it on the basis of its common position adopted prior to the 2005 Review Conference, by which we stand.

As we celebrate its first half-century, the European Union reaffirms its full support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in pursuing the objectives of peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear safety. Furthermore, we recognize its indispensable global role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and countering new threats of nuclear terrorism all over the world, in particular through its Nuclear Security Fund, which the European Union continues to support.

We would also like to welcome the recent report by the Director General of the IAEA entitled, "Possible New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel". The European Union believes that it is time to take the first concrete steps towards a new approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. A balanced multilateral mechanism would significantly contribute to reducing concerns about proliferation as well as about the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU therefore welcomes the proposals made so far, especially those supported or brought forward by its own member States. The EU is of the opinion that different proposals are welcome and might bring solutions for different requirements for security of supply as defined by States parties to the NPT.

We must be united in a common endeavour to make the non-proliferation regime more effective. The EU places particular emphasis on a policy of reinforcing compliance with the multilateral non-proliferation regime. We are committed to strong national and internationally coordinated export controls to complement our obligations under the NPT.

We recognize that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) play a crucial role in requiring United Nations Member States to adopt effective measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery or manufacture from falling into the hands of non-State actors worldwide. Resolution 1540 (2004) also requires rigorous controls over the production, use, storage or transport of such materials. We commend the work of the 1540 Committee and encourage its efforts to build awareness and capacity in, and direct assistance to, those regions where full implementation of the resolution is most urgent.

We urge all States to fully implement the resolution. The EU is ready to continue to provide assistance, in particular in building legal and administrative infrastructure, sharing our experience in implementation and in training relevant national authorities.

The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) reflects the international community's profound concerns over Iran's nuclear programme. We deplore Iran's continued failure to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and of the IAEA Board of Governors. We are greatly concerned by Iran's past lack of cooperation with the IAEA and by its defiance of the international community by continuing uranium enrichment-related activities. Such a step directly contradicts the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors, made mandatory by the Security Council resolutions. We appreciate the IAEA secretariat's continuous efforts to resolve the long-standing issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme.

The European Union welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all questions concerning Iran's past nuclear activities. The EU notes that Iran's full and timely implementation of the IAEA workplan would constitute a significant step forward. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's

nuclear programme requires that the IAEA be able to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, through the implementation of the Additional Protocol and required transparency measures.

We urge Iran to cooperate fully in implementing the workplan in a complete and swift manner and with a constructive spirit to assist the IAEA in its efforts by providing all access required by its safeguards agreement and by implementing the Additional Protocol. We also urge Iran to open the way for negotiations by complying with the requirements as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007).

The EU supports the statement on Iran issued on 28 September 2007 in New York by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with the support of the High Representative of the European Union, which, *inter alia*, welcomed the agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve all questions concerning Iran's past nuclear activities. Moreover, we note that the Ministers agreed, in view of the fact that Iran has not fulfilled the requirements of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), including the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, to finalize a text for a third sanctions resolution under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations with the intention of bringing it to a vote in the Security Council, unless the November reports of Dr. Solana and Dr. ElBaradei show a positive outcome to their efforts.

The EU remains committed to seeking a negotiated solution that would address the international community's concerns and allow Iran to develop a domestic nuclear industry for peaceful purposes. A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

We urge Iran to consider the generous and far-reaching proposal made to them in June 2006, which would reaffirm Iran's rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry and bring Iran far-reaching political and economic benefits.

The EU will ensure the effective implementation of the measures contained in the Security Council resolutions. We call upon all countries to implement the measures in full and without delay. The EU is united in its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities and to see all aspects of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved.

We welcome the news that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and admitted IAEA inspectors. We also welcome the agreement reached during the last round of the Six-Party Talks and we look forward to its early implementation. These are positive moves by the Democratic People's Republic, and they constitute important steps towards the implementation of the agreement reached by the participants in the Six-Party Talks on 13 February 2007.

The EU hopes that the inter-Korean summit held from 2 to 4 October 2007 will serve to reinforce the growing atmosphere of confidence and trust in the Korean peninsula, which would also contribute to efforts, within the framework the Six-Party Talks, to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

However, the European Union remains concerned about the situation on the Korean peninsula and by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea self-declared possession and testing of nuclear weapons. We urge the Democratic People's Republic to comply with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to implement its commitments, as contained in the joint statement of September 2005. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic programmes in a complete, irreversible and verifiable manner, to observe the obligations under the NPT, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to refrain from any further tests of a nuclear device and to re-establish the moratorium on long-range missile testing. The EU remains committed to the objective of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The European Union supports the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT and welcomed the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the cold war, in particular by two EU member States. We stress the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear

weapons in accordance with article VI of the NPT, in particular by those countries that possess the largest arsenals. In that context, we recognize the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control as a contribution to the maintenance and enforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. We are pursuing efforts to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in disarmament. The EU also calls on all States concerned to take the appropriate practical measures in order to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), which reduced United States and Russian strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to 6,000 accountable warheads, is due to expire in 2009. We note that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, or Moscow Treaty, which limits each side to no more than 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, will expire on 31 December 2012. While welcoming the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons that START I and the Moscow Treaty have brought about, the European Union stresses the need for more progress in structurally reducing those nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-up processes. In that regard, the EU was very encouraged by the announcement in July that the United States and the Russian Federation are discussing the development of a post-START arrangement.

The CTBT is as essential to nuclear disarmament as it is to non-proliferation. Last year's tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT reminded us all of the need to redouble our efforts to complete the outstanding ratifications required for the Treaty to enter into force. The EU believes that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear-weapon-test explosions and all other nuclear explosions and a credible verification regime are vital. The occurrence of nuclear tests after the opening of the CTBT for signature underlines the need for an early entry into force of the Treaty as soon as possible.

The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, without precondition, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation. It constitutes a priority that is ripe for negotiation. We have been encouraged by the substantive debates conducted in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue during the session last year, the progress made this year through the appointment of a coordinator on item 2 of the agenda and the constructive deliberations on a fissile material cut-off treaty that took place during the first part of this year's session.

Pending the entry into force of a fissile material cut-off treaty, the EU calls on all States to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the action of those four nuclear-weapon States that have decreed such moratoria.

The EU recognizes the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances, provided for by the Protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear-weapon States, noted by Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and reaffirmed at the sixth NPT Review Conference to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT on the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Positive and negative assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime and can serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. We are committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. We hope that outstanding issues concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones can be resolved through full consultations in accordance with Disarmament Commission guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved.

The European Union remains committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council and by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU calls upon the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan) (*spoke in Russian*): It is my honour to speak today on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

First of all, allow me to associate myself with the congratulations addressed to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish to assure you and the members of the Bureau of the full support of the delegations of our countries in your efforts to carry out the work of this Committee productively and effectively.

It must be recognized that, unfortunately, over the past 61 years — a time during which the United Nations has been actively considering nuclear energy issues and has undertaken many efforts in the area of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons — humankind's anxiety has not diminished. Throughout those years, the nuclear arms race has continued. According to some statistics, there are now more than 20,000 units of this type of weapon on Earth.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) causes a concern that only increases in today's world, where terrorists try to gain access to WMD. The lack of a broad-based consensus on reforming the collective security system has led to a crisis of lack of international stewardship in this area. The legitimate tools available to the world community to halt the proliferation of WMD have grown weak. We are convinced that effective nuclear control can be achieved only through a system of strictly enforced agreements and treaties and the implementation of major political initiatives.

Moral, economic and other considerations aside, we need to reinforce the legal barriers to proliferation. Therefore, our countries deem it necessary, first and foremost, to adapt the entire system of multilateral agreements to the new realities, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It must be recognized that the Treaty has become an asymmetric agreement, providing sanctions only for the non-nuclear States. Yet, if the nuclear States call for the development of nuclear weapons to be banned, they themselves must set an example by reducing and renouncing their nuclear arsenals.

The countries of our region advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Central Asian

States believe that everything that is being done today to highlight the threat of nuclear weapons, including the initiatives and measures to stave off that threat, deserves the greatest attention and support from the world community.

In that context, we support international efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related technologies. We advocate the further strengthening of the disarmament process and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, together with the speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the revitalization of the negotiating process on the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

On 8 September 2006, in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, the treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia was signed. In many respects, this is a unique instrument, as there now appears, for the first time since the Second World War, a huge region free from nuclear weapons on the map of the northern hemisphere. This joint initiative of the Central Asian countries was announced 14 years ago here in the United Nations at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly by the President of Uzbekistan. It is in keeping with the desires of the majority of the countries of the world. It was highly commended by the world community and received broad endorsement in the United Nations General Assembly. The signing of the treaty has shown that, on the basis of previous international experience and legal instruments, States can together ensure security, stability and peace in a region and create the necessary conditions for the development and prospering of their people.

Recent events in the area of nuclear non-proliferation have shown that the idea of creating a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone was and remains timely and relevant. It is a real contribution by the States of the region to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the global process of disarmament and non-proliferation and the establishment of a regional security mechanism.

Moreover, it is clear that the signing of this Treaty on a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone constitutes something of a breakthrough in the world community's multilateral negotiating process on non-proliferation issues, which had come to a standstill.

I am pleased to announce that the Parliaments of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have already ratified the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the ratification of the treaty is being finalized successfully.

In this context the Central Asian States again call upon the nuclear States to reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances for the non-nuclear countries.

We are in no doubt that all the conditions are present for the successful work of the Committee. The delegations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan express their willingness to cooperate with you, Sir, with the members of the Bureau and with all the other delegations in the achievement of that goal.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): We will now suspend the thematic debate on nuclear weapons and begin the panel discussion. I invite the panellists to return to the podium.

It gives me pleasure to welcome this afternoon these eminent panellists: His Excellency Mr. Sudjandnan Parnohadiningrat, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States of America, Mr. Jeffrey Eberhardt of the United States Department of State and Ms. Patricia Lewis, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. I welcome all the panellists and without delay I give the floor to Mr. Sudjandnan Parnohadiningrat, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States of America.

Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia): Allow me first of all to express my gratitude to Ambassador Sergio Duarte, High Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, for inviting me to participate in this thematic debate. It is a great pleasure for me to be back here again after so many years. I have sat in this room, together with our colleagues, in the past; on some occasions I have sat at this very table. I am very glad to be in this forum once again.

Let me start by saying that we are now entering an entirely new phase of the nuclear dilemma, which demands entirely new ways of thinking about nuclear weapons and security. It is time for all of us to wake up to today's reality that not only does the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute a grave threat to international peace and security, but that the continued existence of those weapons also poses a similar threat.

As long as nuclear weapons remain, in my view there is a risk that they will one day be used, be it by design or by accident. With an estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads in the custody of a number of States, the issue merits worldwide concern. The question of how to reduce the threat and the number of existing nuclear weapons must be addressed with no less vigour than the question of the threat from additional weapons, whether they be in the hands of the existing nuclear-weapon States, proliferating States or terrorists.

The goal of nuclear disarmament has long eluded the international community, and the expectations of progress towards that goal have not been fulfilled. In the context of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), for instance, there is a widely shared perception that the nuclear-weapon States have attempted to avoid implementing their legal obligations and commitments under article VI of the NPT. Agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences are seen by many adherents to the NPT as having been abandoned.

Despite the end of the cold war, the past decade has more setbacks than successes. For instance, in September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, where I had the privilege of chairing Main Committee I, the objective of nuclear disarmament was repudiated, contended and rendered irrelevant. Even worse, one nuclear-weapon State clearly stated that nuclear disarmament no longer exists.

Now, let me speak about nuclear disarmament and the NPT once again. Thirty years after the NPT came into force and 15 years after the cold war ended, the non-nuclear-weapon States generally share the view that the nuclear-weapon States are disregarding their obligations and commitments and are instead extending their arsenals indefinitely or even developing new types of nuclear weapons. That is what I can sense from the last Review Conference, where, once again, I had the privilege of being one of the committee chairpersons.

The NPT enjoins non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been effectively contained as nearly all non-nuclear-weapon States have fulfilled their commitments by renouncing the nuclear option. Hence, adhering to both ends of the central bargain under the NPT — non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament — is critical to the survival of the NPT itself. It would be unfair and untenable to demand that the non-nuclear-weapon States comply with their obligations while the nuclear-weapon States have failed to live up to their obligations and commitments. That is not my feeling alone, but is shared by many non-nuclear-weapon States, as, once again, I sensed at the last Review Conference of the NPT.

Just as the nuclear non-proliferation objectives are backed by stringent enforcement and verification measures, the Treaty's disarmament commitments should be similarly backed. The failure to deal with that issue through the creation of extra-NPT mechanisms runs the risk of the NPT regime becoming irrelevant and ultimately leading to its collapse.

Since the last NPT review cycle, debates have focused more on the non-proliferation pillars of the NPT, from Libya to Iraq, from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Iran, from A.Q. Khan to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and from the Proliferation Security Initiative to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Those are issues that mostly relate to non-proliferation concerns, but none of those steps is adequate to eliminating the nuclear danger. As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, the threat posed by such weapons will remain.

Some States have made it clear that most article VI problems today lie with the threat of emerging nuclear arsenals in some present or former NPT non-nuclear-weapon States. Even worse, some have obviously stated that the effort to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons is simply a utopian dream. It is clear to many, if not all, however, that nuclear disarmament is possible and achievable. If nuclear disarmament is viewed merely as a utopian dream, article VI — which was diligently crafted and thoroughly negotiated in the past — does not have any meaning at all.

It is the concern of a majority of States parties to the NPT that nuclear-weapon States are still obliged to meet those obligations and commitments that they agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. If nuclear-weapon States are of the view that those undertakings are only historical commitments, I am afraid that other professed commitments — for example, Decision 3 of the 1995 NPT Review Conference on the indefinite extension of the NPT — may also become irrelevant. I also had the privilege of being part of that process in 1995, and at that time I thought that the implementation of Decision 3, in

accordance with the decision of the Review Conference, would be vigorous. Yet, some 10 years after the 1995 Review Conference, I noticed that something else was going on.

Therefore, we remain deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. We are also concerned about the continued deployment of thousands of such weapons. In general, we see that progress towards nuclear disarmament has slowed down and is distant from its ultimate objectives. The following are some facts that I have collected in support of such an argument.

First, nuclear weapons are being retained in their thousands, many on alert status, along with the attendant risk of accidental or unauthorized use, which undeniably constitutes a frightening possibility.

Secondly, the unilateral declaration of national security interests based on relegitimation of nuclear weapons in the security strategies or doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States will create another nuclear arms race and promote nuclear deterrence.

Thirdly, there have been systematic attempts to delink non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which the 2000 Review Conference Final Document held to be mutually reinforcing, with an exclusive focus on the former — non-proliferation — thereby exacerbating discrimination and unsustainable double standards.

Fourthly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was open for signature and ratification in 1996, has not yet entered into force. The longer it is delayed, the more likely it is that testing will resume, which would be a major setback to the efforts to constrain the qualitative improvement of weapons and the development of new types of weapons.

Fifthly, the resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty has yet to get off the ground, although it constitutes the next vital step on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Its conclusion has been frustrated by the imposition of untenable preconditions relating to verification.

Sixthly, the 2002 Moscow Treaty contains no commitment either to destroy or to render unusable weapons that are no longer operationally deployed. Unfortunately, reductions in deployment and operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

As I sensed at the most recent NPT Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States have been sending mixed signals in recent years about their nuclear disarmament commitments. Unlike at the 2000 Review Conference, it seemed that there was no coordination among nuclear-weapon States. We also saw that they were not able to issue a joint statement.

We are all aware that the preamble of the NPT clearly sets out two conditions for the realization of nuclear disarmament: easing international tension and strengthening the trust of States parties. Indeed, during the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the two conditions set out by the NPT preamble existed.

Following the end of the cold war, when there was no longer ideological competition and nuclear deterrence was not relevant, we were very optimistic because international tension had been reduced, particularly between the two rival blocs. There was a conducive atmosphere that created confidence and trust among the nuclear-weapon States — an atmosphere in which they managed to issue a joint statement and finally, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, agreed to the 13 practical steps.

But what have we seen since 2000? If my reading of various sources is correct, some nuclear-weapon States, instead of eliminating their nuclear arsenals, are modernizing, promoting and developing new types of nuclear weapons. Just one illustration is the ongoing development by the United States of Reliable Replacement Warheads through the Complex 2030 programme. I would like to stress that that is understandable from the perspective of only one country, but I am wondering if it is in the true spirit of the international community's interest in having a world free of nuclear weapons.

It is true that thousands of nuclear weapons have been retired and dismantled in the United States and in the Russian Federation, through bilateral strategic agreements such as the START I and START II treaties. But START I, if I am not mistaken, will expire in 2009, and START II has not been ratified. The reductions under the Moscow Treaty are not irreversible, verifiable and transparent. Perhaps it is time that the IAEA be called upon to verify nuclear arms control agreements such as the Moscow Treaty.

Therefore, we urge nuclear-weapon States — in particular the United States and the Russian Federation — to exercise leadership and commit to further negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons as those two States did

during the negotiations to establish the NPT in the 1960s. Such negotiations could lead to the replacement of START I and to an incremental approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

We may not reach consensus on an action plan for nuclear disarmament at the next NPT Review Conference, but we should not retreat from our past commitments. We must at least reaffirm our common nuclear disarmament goals, consider how to achieve them and agree to resume making progress on further specific measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. For that ideal course, the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference presents a good opportunity.

So what should be done now? Nuclear weapons must never again be used by States or by anyone, including terrorists. To that end, they must be outlawed. The international community's efforts to get rid of such weapons before someone somewhere is tempted to use them can be complemented by efforts to outlaw them.

In our view, nuclear disarmament is possible and achievable through careful, sensible and practical measures. But if we are to achieve disarmament, a leadership role and intensive coordinated work by nuclear-weapon States are required. Concertedly, the international community can turn the efforts to achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint endeavour.

In 1996, the International Court of Justice, in its landmark advisory opinion, agreed unanimously that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It is now time to move beyond the present stalemate and revive the discussions and negotiations on the kinds of measures or concrete steps that can be undertaken. For our part, we, together with other non-nuclear-weapon States, have submitted a number of proposals towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

In many disarmament forums, non-nuclear-weapon States have reiterated their call for full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking made by nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. That undertaking should be demonstrated without delay, through an accelerated process of negotiations and the

full implementation of the commitments made at the Review Conference.

In addition, the Article VI Forum, in which approximately 30 countries participated and which was sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative, identified priority issues for achieving nuclear disarmament, including, among others, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), immediate negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the de-alerting of United States and Russian Federation nuclear forces, the strengthening of systems for ensuring verified and irreversible reductions under the Moscow Treaty, the strengthening and expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the declaration of a non-first-use policy and the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

Underlying the crisis related to nuclear disarmament has been the paralysis in the multilateral disarmament machinery that was consciously built for nearly three decades. That paralysis has been reflected in the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, the spirit of divisiveness in the First Committee and the criticism of the Disarmament Commission.

For the past few years, the debate in the field of disarmament has focused on process rather than substance, and many so-called decisions simply reflect the lowest common denominator of widely differing opinions. For example, the Conference on Disarmament has remained deadlocked for 10 years regarding its programme of work. The current cycle of the Disarmament Commission has not made substantive progress on its two agenda items. And, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the States parties failed because issues relating to the agenda and the programme of work took up most of the time allocated to the substantive session.

In my view, multilateralism should become the basis for the dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. With so much of our disarmament machinery deadlocked to the point of paralysis, an increasing number of States — particularly members of the Non-Aligned Movement — are reconsidering the idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD) or a world summit on disarmament, as recommended by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.

The only consensus document that we have is the Final Document adopted at SSOD I in 1978, which, inter

alia, clearly stated that nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction remain the highest priority and the principal task of our time. And if we all see that that document has become outdated, perhaps further efforts, including an additional round of negotiations, will be carried out. Through a fourth special session devoted to disarmament, we could not only address the whole disarmament agenda but also deal comprehensively with real reform of the disarmament machinery, thus avoiding a piecemeal approach.

In conclusion, I should like to offer the following observations. The continued existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to all of humanity, and their use would have catastrophic consequences for human beings. This much I have heard on so many occasions from so many countries and NPT States parties. Hence, there is a compelling need to take appropriate steps towards attaining the priority objective of totally eliminating such weapons. Yet, the objective of permanently abolishing them requires political will on the part of all, in particular the nuclear-weapon States.

The NPT constitutes an essential legal instrument for nuclear disarmament, and its article VI remains valid. It is an integral part of the NPT bargain and should not be treated as a peripheral issue by a number of States parties. The consensus political agreements of 1995 and 2000 must be implemented in an incremental, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

While the world is watching the process of United Nations reform, we must continue to explore possibilities for advancing the dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of the United Nations so that the groundwork will be ready when the real action begins. In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the First Committee, particularly, has a central role and primary responsibility in promoting and pursuing all disarmament measures, including nuclear disarmament.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): The Ambassador of Indonesia provided a very broad and detailed analysis of the situation in the area of nuclear disarmament. His statement was a veritable wake-up call for us to achieve progress and concrete results in that field.

I now give the floor to Mr. Jeffrey Eberhardt.

Mr. Eberhardt (United States of America): I am pleased to be taking part in this panel today. Events such as these provide an excellent opportunity to

engage in a dialogue on important security issues and, I hope, provide greater clarity with regard to United States policies and perhaps even dispel some of the enduring myths surrounding those policies. The United States is pleased to have the chance to participate, and we thank the organizers of this event for their willingness to provide this important forum.

Earlier this week, Mr. Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator of the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); Mr. Will Tobey, a Deputy Administrator at NNSA; and Mr. Andy Semmel, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Non-proliferation at the Department of State, gave a detailed briefing on the United States record of accomplishment with regard to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We were very pleased to have such high-level representation from NNSA in presenting that briefing, for they really are the United States experts on nuclear weapons.

NNSA is the agency within the United States Government responsible for developing, building, maintaining and dismantling our nuclear weapons. It manages our nuclear weapons industrial infrastructure and oversees the United States national laboratories, such as the famous Los Alamos facility which designed the first atomic weapon. Today, NNSA supervises the process of dismantling the large numbers of nuclear weapons that we are retiring from service, oversees the conversion of former nuclear weapons materials to alternative uses, and operates cooperative programmes for the securing and disposition of former nuclear weapons material from our former cold war adversary. The briefing on Monday was the most recent example of ongoing United States efforts at diplomatic dialogue on disarmament.

I would not wish to duplicate that briefing, but for the benefit of those unable to attend that event, I will note some of its highlights relating to our efforts to reduce both the size of our nuclear weapons stockpile and — more important — the modern role of nuclear weapons in United States deterrent strategy. That done, I will focus the bulk of my remarks on the larger issue of how the international community can create the conditions that would allow for the achievement of our shared goal — a world without nuclear weapons.

The stockpile reductions achieved by the United States, including both weapons and the fissile material to

produce those weapons, have been dramatic. When we reach our Moscow Treaty numbers, the United States will have reduced its operationally deployed nuclear weapons by 80 per cent from our cold war high. That will be the lowest number of weapons in the stockpile since the Eisenhower Administration — in other words, since before many of those in this room were born — and since well before the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty came into force. Commensurate with those reductions, the United States continues to make dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons delivery systems, including the elimination in 2005 of the last of our most modern intercontinental ballistic missile, the Peacekeeper, and the upcoming retirement of all our nuclear-tipped advanced cruise missiles.

As the NNSA experts emphasized just days ago, contrary to an oft-heard criticism, the United States is not simply putting warheads on a shelf. We are, in fact, dismantling large numbers of warheads, and dismantling them at a faster rate. The Department of Energy has accelerated its warhead dismantlement programme by nearly 150 per cent and looks to maintain and, hopefully, further increase that higher rate of dismantlement. As for the fissile material to produce weapons, the United States ended its production of highly enriched uranium for weapons in 1964 and the production of plutonium for weapons in 1988, shutting down the last of our reactors for producing plutonium in 1989. Even more significantly, the United States has removed 374 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 59 metric tons of plutonium from its defence stocks. Most of that material will be converted to produce fuel for civilian reactors.

Those facts only begin to tell the story of United States accomplishments and do not recount the billions of dollars that the United States has spent to assist Russia in securing and eliminating its fissile material stocks. All of that has been made possible by President Bush's commitment to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. In keeping with the President's direction, the United States nuclear posture review reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons, outlining a strategy that places greater reliance on conventional weapons and defences. Pursuant to the nuclear posture review, we seek to rely less and less on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence.

Having reviewed briefly the “disarmament math”, let me now turn to the larger issue of how disarmament progress can be sustained — that is to say, how we can achieve the global security environment envisaged by the NPT that will allow for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

There seems to be great interest these days in the thorny questions that arise when one attempts to think seriously about that. One of the best-known manifestations of the new interest came from outside Government circles with a January 2007 op-ed piece in the *Wall Street Journal* by former United States Secretary of State George Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former Senator Sam Nunn. From the other side of the former cold war, former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev also has spoken out.

Current United States Government officials also have spoken publicly on those subjects. Our comments have tended to focus less upon building laundry lists of traditional arms control steps than upon the more subtle and serious challenges of creating the strategic conditions in which it would become both possible and desirable for nuclear weapons possessors to abandon their arsenals. The new United States emphasis, in other words, is not so much upon what would have to be done to control and eliminate nuclear weapons as upon the circumstances under which such comparatively mechanical or technical tasks would become realistic — that is, upon the practical challenges of making nuclear disarmament the most stabilizing, deliberate policy choice.

As one example, our Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Christina Rocca, has called upon her colleagues to think realistically about how to create an environment in which it is no longer necessary for anyone to rely upon nuclear weapons for security, and offered some thoughts on what that might mean. The United States also released a detailed series of papers on disarmament issues in advance of the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting that not only lay out for public view the United States record and position on disarmament, but also begin to sketch a vision for how the international community might achieve and sustain a world free of nuclear weapons.

Those pronouncements focus on the need to make greater progress in the vital task mentioned in the NPT preamble — that of easing tensions and strengthening trust in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their elimination. Clearly, it is important to reduce those competitive dynamics between nations that may make the development and the retention of nuclear weapons seem a prudent course in reaching the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

The United States continues to stress that other factors are also important: ensuring solid adherence to non-proliferation obligations; the suppression of trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the elimination of other forms of WMD against the use of which nuclear weapons might provide a useful deterrent; the development of ways to meet strategic deterrent needs by non-nuclear means; the role of ballistic missile and other defences in containing the dangers of breakout from a disarmament regime; and the importance of creating a system capable not merely of detecting, but also of deterring and, if necessary, responding to such breakout. By focusing less on the more frequently debated “how-to-do-it” questions of controlling fissile material, verifying reductions or physically eliminating weapon systems, and more on the “why-to-do-it” questions of how to create the underlying conditions that would make disarmament a reasonable policy choice, I believe that those United States initiatives make important contributions to the disarmament debate.

Indeed, there seems to be growing interest in more realistic and practical studies of how to achieve disarmament. For example, in one of her last official acts as British Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett delivered an address in June that cited the *Wall Street Journal* op-ed piece, welcomed recent United States disarmament initiatives and called for new vision and action aimed not only at reducing warhead numbers, but also at limiting the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. Beckett stressed the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures in strategic relations and called for more progress in what she described as the hard diplomatic work on the underlying political conditions, resolving the ongoing sources of tension in the world in order to help build a new impetus for global nuclear disarmament.

Foreign Secretary Beckett also called attention to work getting under way in the think-tank community,

in part funded by the British Government, with the aim of helping to determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and addressing what she described as perhaps the greatest challenge of all: determining the path we can take to complete nuclear disarmament that avoids creating new instabilities potentially damaging to global security.

Such work is clearly to be welcomed to the extent that it attempts sincerely to grapple with the many questions that disarmament raises. The fact that people now seem to be trying to address such challenges is greatly encouraging. Indeed, I suspect that even those who think that nuclear disarmament is impossible can find common cause in at least one important respect with those who seek to achieve disarmament. Specifically, both groups should encourage serious attention to the practical policy challenges that necessarily would arise in creating and sustaining a world free from nuclear weapons. I imagine that disarmament skeptics would expect that a serious study of those questions would highlight the difficulty of answering them, and, if such skeptics are correct in their assessment of disarmament's impossibility or undesirability, such serious attention presumably would help undercut disarmament enthusiasm by disarming the disarmers, as it were. Conversely, for disarmament's ardent advocates, studying those questions is vital, because answering them in a pragmatic and realistic manner is the only way to ever achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Both the "pro" and the "anti" camps perhaps can agree on the importance of giving realistic and practical attention to the requirements for disarmament. It is only the unserious supporters of disarmament — the sophists who care about it as an instrument of political coup-counting against the nuclear-weapons States, rather than as a means of accomplishing anything constructive — who should dislike asking and struggling with those issues.

In closing, allow me to say again how pleased I am to be here today. Whatever else one might say about United States nuclear policies, in our willingness to engage in dialogue on these issues and provide a wealth of information on our nuclear forces and infrastructure, the United States is second to none. I look forward to your questions.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Eberhardt for his statement. I now give the floor to

Ms. Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Ms. Lewis (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Duarte, for the invitation to speak here today. It is a great honour and opportunity.

As we have just heard from the previous two speakers, in papers recently delivered in Japan and placed on the United States State Department website, the United States Special Representative for Nuclear Non-proliferation asks the fundamental question: if we wish to get rid of nuclear weapons, how do we do so in a way that is consistent with the values that lead us to be interested in disarmament in the first place?

Dr. Ford asks this question because, as he quite rightly says, consequences matter. Clearly a follower of the great Irish and British philosopher, Elizabeth Anscombe, who established the ethical philosophy of consequentialism, he challenges the pro-disarmament lobby — in other words, all of us here in this room — to weigh the foreseeable consequences of nuclear disarmament against those of other, alternative futures, in particular to defend the chief ability and desirability of nuclear disarmament when it is measured against a range of potential futures that do not involve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

I do not want to go into a long discussion on the well-known problem of consequentialism, such as unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences, intended and unintended consequences and actual versus expected consequences, let alone the so-called black-swan events, which are so improbable and yet so devastating that they lay waste any attempts to cope with the unforeseen consequences of our actions. I do encourage you to read Nassim Nicholas Taleb's book, "The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable". It is well worth the read.

However, I think it is very useful to look at the stability of the international system in the context of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, to look at disarmament drivers and at proliferation drivers and to come up with some ideas of how to maximize the probability of a stable disarmament process and of a world situation in which nuclear disarmament increases security and in which unintended and unforeseen consequences can be dealt with.

So how do we approach that? First of all, I think we must understand what we are doing today. We characterize our security in many regions as security with nuclear weapons. In terms of the consequences of what we have today, a concept of security based on being able to blow civilization to bits is not a concept that has its roots in a long-term stable security strategy.

We know from the study of human and other primate behaviour that the haves versus the have-nots is a primary source of conflicts and that a security framework based on long-term inequality is not sustainable. We can infer that unfairness is a major societal stress.

The Dutch primatologist Franz De Waal recently came to talk to us at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) about trust and cooperation in primate society. He told us about an experiment that they did, and he showed it to us on videotape. I encourage you to take a look at the blog site “Disarmament Insight” for his exposé of this. They put two monkeys in cages next to each other. The monkeys could see each other through the bars. They taught each of them a trick, a very simple trick, and as a reward for doing the trick properly, each monkey got a piece of cucumber. The monkeys liked cucumbers, so they were very happy; they did the trick and they got a cucumber. They continued doing this for a few days, and the monkeys would take the cucumbers and eat them. The monkeys were happy and the experimenters were happy.

Then, one day, they did the same trick, but the experimenters gave one monkey a grape and the other monkey a cucumber. The first monkey took the grape. He liked grapes. They were different from cucumbers; they had a higher sugar content, higher energy value and thus higher value. The other monkey took the cucumber and ate it and looked at the first monkey eating his grape and thought — well, he did not think anything, they do not think, obviously, they just look. Then they did the same trick again. But that time, the second monkey refused the cucumber and dropped it. The first monkey saw that he had dropped the cucumber and grabbed it. Now he had the grape and the cucumber. They did the experiment again, and the monkey picked up the cucumber and threw it back at the experimenter. He would not accept the cucumber because the other monkey had the grape.

I think we all understand that story very well. It turns out that in all societies that have hierarchy, the issue of fairness is a major driver in societal cohesion.

We are seeing many experiments now that demonstrate that. In an unfair situation within a hierarchy, there is an acceptance within the hierarchy of unfairness, but where there is inequality or a flattened hierarchy, unfairness is not acceptable.

I think what we are seeing now is that unsustainability in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime. That has been interpreted as allowing some States to have nuclear weapons — I will not refer to them as grapes, but perhaps some might — and not others. Others are not allowed the nuclear weapons.

What we have in the international security system is what we call a “dynamic equilibrium”. That is not a fixed state of equilibrium, but it is constantly shifting to keep the equilibrium in some kind of balance. A security system that is based on a few countries’ maintaining the balance of power through the perceived terror of nuclear deterrence is a temporary state of affairs. The downside of it as well is that it is one that assigns high value to nuclear weapons, thus making them objects of desire for those who aspire to power. We may indeed have unwittingly turned nuclear weapons into a domination fetish.

Our discussion today is very much to be welcomed. We do need to ask the question as to how we create the conditions for nuclear disarmament, and we need to ask it urgently, as we are perhaps at a tipping point — the one feared in the 1960s of sliding into a world of many more nuclear weapons possessors. It is also urgent because we are also poised on the verge of a world in which there will be a dramatic expansion in the production and use of civil nuclear energy. That will pose new problems in terms of safety and security, and new systems will have to be put in place to manage the burgeoning use of fissile materials and to reduce proliferation risks.

It is clear that the path that the world is now on is dangerous, but that is always true. If we do not head down the path of nuclear disarmament, then we may well be heading towards a world of nuclear proliferation — not immediately, not tomorrow, but over the next 10 years or so. I think that there has never been a clearer indication of the link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

What we could do is look at a range of possible futures. Some of them would have an end point of nuclear weapons abolition, and some would have an end point short of that. Other futures would have a larger number of nuclear weapons possessors — perhaps a much larger

number — and probably the future would not include the status quo, but we should not rule that out either. For each of those futures, we could come up with a range of likely security analyses based on what we understand today. We would, most likely, be wrong on most counts because the world changes as we change what we do, and we certainly could not factor in the highly improbable high-impact events that could happen.

It seems to me that the best course of action is to determine to head towards nuclear disarmament, as agreed in the NPT itself, in 1995 and again in 2000, but in taking each step we need to ascertain the security impacts of our actions and then decide on the next step. The United States and the Russian Federation could continue to reduce their numbers and do so more dramatically; because of the large numbers, they would be unlikely to affect the security equation radically in so doing, but it would demonstrate the good faith that is required today. I think it is really important as well to see the nuclear weapons numbers of both countries fall in both the long range, or what one might call strategic, and in the shorter range, or what one might call tactical weapons.

I think at this point, if we are looking at the future of an end point of very low numbers, and eventually zero, it is really important to establish the base line of nuclear weapons. Right now, a margin of error in the numbers is not so vital in the case of the five nuclear-weapon States. However, as numbers decrease, uncertainties become more significant, and at zero — if we were ever to get to zero — a hidden cache of weapons would be extraordinarily destabilizing.

We therefore need to set in place confidence-building mechanisms now to be sure of the numbers of nuclear weapons that we have, how many are gotten rid of, and then what is left. We need good, verifiable information in which we all can place a high degree of trust; that information should supplement information from other sources as an independent track of information that cannot be obtained in other ways.

As part of the effort as well, we need to establish some confidence-building measures and some transparency measures. There is a whole range of possibilities. There are unilateral approaches, unilateral statements, bilateral approaches and plurilateral approaches. I would propose one of the recommendations from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission that I served on until last year, which is a moratorium on fissile material production as a confidence-building measure on

the part of those that are currently producing it for nuclear weapons, which would be first of all, certainly, the five nuclear-weapon States, and then those States outside the NPT.

I would also propose that, as a good confidence-building measure, we look very much to creative ways in which we could bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. I think that would really help to set the stage for further discussion of nuclear disarmament. Part and parcel of the process of building trust in the process of disarmament is that type of measure, which helps create the conditions in which we might be able to bring about nuclear disarmament.

We also must tackle some of the really difficult thorny issues of root causes of insecurity, particularly in terms of regional insecurity — in the Middle East, North-East Asia and so on. We must try very hard to remove the conditions for war so that we cannot be looking towards nuclear weapons to keep a balance of terror, if you like, between countries, and thereby create the conditions for disarmament.

Another really difficult issue to address and that really needs addressing are those countries that are under the so-called nuclear umbrellas. We need, again, to address regional security there to remove the perceived need for nuclear weapons so that we do not unwittingly encourage proliferation. I wonder if we really should be asking how much nuclear disarmament today would encourage regional proliferation and increase regional insecurity. Those non-nuclear-weapon States under the so-called nuclear umbrellas really need to be reconsidering their security strategies to prepare and to help create the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Going down to very, very low levels of nuclear weapons is one of the most difficult parts of that transition, and we need to look at it very carefully. As I said, numbers of nuclear weapons get more and more significant as they go down, and one or two extra nuclear weapons can make a big difference to how we build confidence and create those conditions.

The issues of breakout of any agreements and of how to prevent, how to prepare for and how to respond need to be addressed very seriously. We need to look as well at the sustainability of the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is no good getting there and then having it unsustainable and creating more insecurity that way. We need to prepare for that world and we need to do it with

both political and technical agreements. I very much recommend the approach of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission to outlaw nuclear weapons in the way that we have outlawed biological and chemical weapons. We are still in the process of getting rid of biological and chemical weapons, but they are nonetheless outlawed in international law. I think such an approach would allow us to abolish and to sustain the abolition.

There have been some interesting thoughts on how to deal with breakout. One was the idea of the United Nations having its own nuclear force under the control of the Security Council. That is a serious idea put forward some decades ago; I think it is absolutely crazy, but I wanted to put it forward just in the interests of transparency and fairness.

Another idea is, at the very low levels, having missile defences. That is an idea put forward by Jonathan Schell in his book *The Abolition*. As we know, before you get to that end point, missile defences can be destabilizing; they are certainly expensive and can be unreliable, but at zero it is possible that, in a world free of nuclear weapons, they could be a stabilizing factor. That would depend on how they are set up and how multilateral they are in their disposition.

The other issue is the idea of hedging. I think that, at the moment in the international system in the case of nuclear weapons, people are hedging. The nuclear-weapon States are clearly hedging, and the non-nuclear-weapon States in regions of high instability are thinking about hedging. One of the things that will happen as we go along is that hedging will increase. How we manage that without creating instability is going to be a very difficult process. Certainly, the nuclear-weapon States and those that possess nuclear weapons will maintain for quite a while a scientific research capability. That will happen, so we have to work out how to manage that. Over time, that is not very sustainable because the tacit knowledge — the engineering knowledge of how to actually do those things — is lost.

Another idea is an interim measure, in going down to very low levels before getting to zero, to establish a bank of nuclear weapons. The bank could be a place under international control where possessors of nuclear weapons could deposit their weapons under international control but could withdraw them at times of crisis. There are lots of problems and issues associated with that, and I would be glad to discuss it. They must be seen, however,

as temporary measures on the way to a world without nuclear weapons.

If that is the direction in which we must travel, then it is crucial to achieve support for such interim measures and to think them through very carefully. This is where I come back to the proposal from the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom that was mentioned, that of establishing a disarmament laboratory. That is exactly where we could test out some of those various ideas and options. I think it is something we very much welcome.

We could indeed be on the cusp of a more secure world, free from the terror of nuclear weapons and — who knows — free from major violent conflicts. If we can imagine it, we can achieve it.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Lewis for her lively statement. She has formulated many questions and has thought alongside us. She has given us some answers, which I hope are shared by many delegations here, who will certainly get a chance to respond to the many questions that she has asked.

I now suspend the formal meeting in order to proceed to an informal meeting for questions and answers.

The meeting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): During this portion of the meeting we will be hearing three or four speakers, depending on how much time we have. We are slowly approaching 6 p.m., which is the stopping point for our work today.

Mr. Tarui (Japan): First of all, I very much appreciate the very fruitful and pertinent discussions. There were many valuable suggestions and questions that we should take into very serious consideration in the future whenever we think about nuclear weapon programmes. That being said, in this thematic debate on nuclear weapons, I would like to further present our views on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Japan strongly believes that nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime, is a necessary condition for achieving international peace and security. In other words, as the then-Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Ms. Margaret Beckett, pointed out in her major speech made on 25 June, nuclear disarmament is the grand

bargain of the NPT between the nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots. The nuclear-weapon States must therefore completely implement their obligations under article VI and make further nuclear disarmament efforts with renewed determination in order to build confidence among States and encourage the non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their non-proliferation obligations, thus creating a peaceful international security environment.

Based on those beliefs, Japan will submit to the First Committee a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. Last year, 167 countries — an overwhelming majority, including some nuclear-weapon States — again adopted this resolution. That demonstrates that there exists broad support in the international community for our approach, which advocates the achievement of a peaceful and safe world free from nuclear weapons through further practical steps and effective measures taken by all States. Japan believes it is critically important that this resolution be adopted through majority support in order to intensify the momentum towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that was created by the successful commencement of the 2010 NPT review process at the first session of the Preparatory Committee this year.

At this stage, I would like to provide a few examples of the practical and effective measures put forward in Japan’s resolution. First, Japan welcomes the steady progress made by the nuclear-weapon States, especially the United States and the Russian Federation, in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, as long as an estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is patently clear that further concrete efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals are required.

Japan strongly encourages the United States and the Russian Federation to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for in the Treaty in an irreversible and verifiable manner. From this perspective, Japan is paying close attention to the talks between the United States and Russia concerning arrangements after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expires in 2009, and we welcome the positive positions shown by both countries in the joint statement released on 3 July 2007.

Furthermore, it is vital that those efforts to reduce nuclear weapons progress with transparency. For instance, we commend the recent announcement by the United States on the increase in the rate of nuclear weapons dismantlement. We welcome the presentations based on actual figures in the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee by some nuclear-weapon States on the nuclear disarmament measures that they have taken. Furthermore, Japan strongly encourages all the nuclear-weapon States to give due attention to greater transparency in nuclear disarmament. As a transitional measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to avoid accidental nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States should further lower the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a very high priority as a practical measure for nuclear disarmament. The fact that currently 177 countries have signed and 140 have ratified the CTBT is an indication that it is fulfilling its role as the widely accepted international norm banning nuclear testing. In order for the CTBT — which was adopted 11 years ago — to enter into force, we again strongly urge the countries that have not yet signed and/or ratified this important nuclear disarmament treaty, especially the ten Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay. In addition, pending its entry into force, it is important for the nuclear-weapon States and States that are not party to the NPT to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), which will serve as the quantitative cap to nuclear weapons, is an important nuclear disarmament measure and one that the international community should be tackling now. We would like to point out that given the focused discussions in the first session of this year’s Conference on Disarmament, there is nothing preventing the commencement of FMCT negotiations without preconditions. This year, the Conference on Disarmament successfully formulated a package centred around document CD/2007/L.1 and a draft presidential statement and decision, CD/2007/CRP.5 and CD/2007/CRP.6, that would provide an appropriate mandate for each of the four core agenda items and, based on that package, came extremely close to achieving a consensus. This package is currently the most realistic proposal before the Conference on

Disarmament, reflecting the best possible compromise. We would like to emphasize the tremendous importance of forging a consensus next year on a programme of work based on the package proposal, and of commencing FMCT negotiations.

It is also within the purview of the First Committee to consider the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation, which is the other critical pillar for the realization of a peaceful and secure world, free from nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that nuclear non-proliferation is also crucial for the development of a favourable climate for the advancement of nuclear disarmament.

With regard to the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October last year, we strongly urge that country to comply promptly with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). In that connection, Japan emphasizes the significance of the adoption of second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of September 2005, in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the Statement and the 13 February agreement. As a part of those actions, the Democratic People's Republic also agreed to disable its three facilities at Yongbyon and to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programmes, in accordance with the 13 February agreement, by 31 December.

However, the adoption of the second-phase actions is only a step towards full implementation of the Joint Statement of the September 2005 Six-Party Talks. Japan believes that further work at the Six-Party Talks is needed in order to realize the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. Japan will continue to work together with other partners at the Six-Party Talks towards full implementation of the Joint Statement as a whole.

As for Iran, Japan considers the workplan agreed in August between Iran and the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be a forward-looking step aimed at resolving the nuclear issues. Japan hopes that Iran will cooperate sincerely with the IAEA according to that workplan in order to resolve outstanding issues. Furthermore, Iran must make additional efforts to restore the confidence of the international community by fully complying with all

relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council without further delay.

Lastly, since disarmament and non-proliferation are issues intimately linked to national security, Japan recognizes that sustained efforts over a number of generations are necessary for their achievement. It is therefore important to pass on to future generations our knowledge, our experiences and our aspirations concerning those issues. From that perspective, Japan places great importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education and is making active efforts at various levels. We intend to continue implementing new initiatives in support of the education of the next generation, who will be the bearers of our future.

On Monday, 15 October, a documentary film entitled "White Light/Black Rain", directed by Mr. Steven Okazaki, was shown by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and Home Box Office (HBO) in this Conference Room. I believe that the many people who watched that documentary directly felt the devastation caused by the atomic bombs and the agony of the *Hibakusha*, the victims of those bombs. Japan will continue to work tirelessly to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in the conviction that the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should never be repeated.

Mr. Chang Dong-hee (Republic of Korea): I am very honoured to speak after a useful brainstorming session. I am sure that those discussions will provide us with good food for thought.

Since the openly recognized failures of the seventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 2005 World Summit, there has been growing criticism that multilateral disarmament is in disarray. However, we have recently witnessed some positive developments in the disarmament and non-proliferation community.

Following the adoption of the Decision on a Compliance Mechanism and the Plan of Action at the Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), held in November 2006, the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) succeeded in adopting a Final Declaration. It also agreed on the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit and on an intersessional work programme. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010

NPT Review Conference, held last May, is also believed to have constituted an auspicious commencement for the new NPT review cycle.

Furthermore, although consensus has yet to be reached on a programme of work, the Conference on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, is deemed to have built quite considerably on last year's achievements by allowing for constructive, structured and substantive discussions. That can be attributed to the successful and effective performance of the six Presidents and the seven Coordinators. We believe that those positive developments will provide new impetus and a boost of energy to reinvigorate our common efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Nuclear disarmament is of vital importance if we are to secure an effective NPT regime. It is a commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States as a quid pro quo for renunciation of the pursuit of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. Although significant progress has been made thus far in reducing nuclear arsenals, the five nuclear-weapon States still possess more than 26,000 nuclear warheads.

It is true that there remains a significant perception gap between the nuclear haves and have-nots regarding the accomplishments of nuclear-weapon States in terms of nuclear reduction. The best way to close that gap and to restore trust and confidence between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States is for the nuclear-weapon States to faithfully implement their article VI obligations, as indicated in the outcome documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. In addition, it is important to alleviate the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. Providing adequate security assurances to those non-nuclear-weapon States that are in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT would serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) celebrated its eleventh anniversary last month. However, its entry into force remains a distant goal, despite repeated calls upon all States that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so without delay. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated in a message on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary, this should "not be a time for celebration, but for rededication to the noble work that lies ahead in achieving the Treaty's entry into force". We must bear in mind that a

prolonged logjam may lead some States into the temptation of testing, thereby jeopardizing the test-ban norms, which are an important foundation of the NPT.

We cannot overemphasize the importance of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as the next logical step. It would serve not only as a guarantor of nuclear non-proliferation, but also as a precursor to nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament, however, has long been paralysed, unable to initiate substantive discussions on an FMCT.

In that connection, we welcome the presidential draft decision (CD/2007/L.1) submitted this year in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that it will provide us with a good starting basis for negotiations in 2008. In the meantime, considering the pressing need to curb the production of fissile material, we urge all States possessing nuclear weapons to voluntarily declare and abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes pending the enactment of the FMCT. This would certainly be conducive to further enhancing transparency and confidence-building among States.

Despite the setbacks and challenges, the NPT still remains the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, and it is in urgent need of further strengthening and reinforcement. In addition to continuing to work to ensure universal adherence to the NPT, we should also strive to secure the universal application of the non-proliferation commitments under the Treaty with enhanced global safeguards and verification standards. This would enhance global confidence in the NPT system by bolstering its monitoring and verification mechanisms.

It is my great pleasure to inform you of the recent breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue. The Six-Party Talks has been the main vehicle for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. This process has made significant progress since its launch in 2003. In the Joint Statement of September 2005, the six nations agreed on a blueprint for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Initial Actions Agreement of February 2007 took that consensus forward another step, laying out the specific actions to implement the Joint Statement.

Additional progress was achieved during the recent round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing last month. An agreement was adopted on the second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement that specifies the disablement of the core North Korean

nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and a complete and correct declaration of all nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the end of this year. Furthermore, the successful completion of disablement and a declaration within the stipulated time frame could allow us to enter the dismantlement phase starting next year.

The Korean Government will continue to cooperate closely with related parties for the smooth implementation of the agreement and the future advancement of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, we will make every effort for the Six-Party Talks process to move beyond the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and to develop into a multilateral dialogue mechanism in North-East Asia.

Again, we have before us the opportunity to reverse the disappointment and ongoing deadlock in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. With the second session of the NPT Preparatory Committee scheduled for next year, the First Committee should redouble its efforts this year to provide tangible and productive outcomes.

Let me conclude my statement by quoting the late United States President J. F. Kennedy:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries, large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world".

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. Streuli (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): This year, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered a new cycle with the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, held in May 2007 in Vienna. Unfortunately, this first session repeated the impasse experienced in the 2005 Review Conference. Likewise, the substantive debate that we witnessed deepened the rift between the divergent interests of the State parties. On the one hand, non-nuclear-weapon States stressed the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, and on the other hand, nuclear-weapon States focused on proliferation. Finally, the concern of States with overriding energy concerns who fear that their access to nuclear technology will be restricted is a disquieting trend, but we must do everything to ensure the success of the NPT review process that will be continued in Geneva in May 2008.

Since its inception, the NPT has been marked by compromise. As this philosophy of compromise reaches its limit, some commitments have not been met and some developments show that the current trend is to no longer recognize the achievements. Switzerland, however, remains of the view that the NPT is the only multilateral instrument able to respond to issues of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Accordingly, we attach primary importance to the implementation as soon as possible of what the previous review conferences achieved.

Since 2005, the non-proliferation regime has undergone various developments that we would like to briefly review.

First, with regard to nuclear disarmament, we must note that even if there have been some reductions, the nuclear-weapon States are conducting programmes to develop or replace their nuclear arsenals. Some of them do not seem to recognize any longer what was achieved at previous review conferences. In that vein, we note with concern that last year, for the first time, certain nuclear-weapon States did not support in this very General Assembly the resolution calling for the negotiation of a binding multilateral instrument offering non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has still not entered into force. Switzerland hopes that the Article XIV Conference that was held in September 2007 in Vienna has encouraged States whose ratification is crucial for the entry into force of the CTBT to ratify it. Switzerland also hopes that broad support will be forthcoming at this session of the General Assembly for the draft resolution of New Zealand on the CTBT.

Secondly, I turn to nuclear non-proliferation. Regional questions, on the other hand, have seen some encouraging developments. A workplan has been established between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran to deal with pending issues. Although that process will not be able to resolve Iran's entire nuclear dossier, it is — according to Mr. ElBaradei's own words — an investment in peace. It creates new momentum that we must support. Switzerland also believes that the full capacity of diplomacy has not been used here. Consequently, we encourage the parties concerned to sit down as soon as possible at the negotiating table.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has, since the beginning of the year 2007, seen promising development. Switzerland welcomes the constructive attitude demonstrated by the parties involved and hopes that the process for the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will soon be successful. Switzerland also welcomes the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. My country participated in the third meeting of that forum, held in Astana in June 2007.

Switzerland believes that priority in the area of nuclear disarmament should be given to a gradual, realistic approach with attainable objectives. In that context, my country notes that although the discussions at the Conference on Disarmament were particularly substantial this year, they still did not lead to the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Switzerland will spare no effort to maintain the momentum we witnessed this year at the Conference

on Disarmament towards providing a negotiating mandate, without preconditions, for a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Switzerland, in cooperation with Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria and Sweden, has elaborated a draft resolution entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. We feel that the draft, foreshadowed in the 2000 Thirteen Steps, is consonant with a pragmatic and realistic approach.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): There are six speakers remaining on my list. We will hear them at tomorrow afternoon’s meeting. I would ask delegations to be ready to introduce their draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament because that meeting will also be devoted to the introduction of draft resolutions on the item under discussion.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.