

Self-fulfilling Volatility and a New Monetary Policy

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Big Question (Is it possible?)

One monetary tool (i_t) \implies (i) inflation, (ii) output, and (iii) risk-premium

- ① Macroeconomics: Taylor rules \implies (i) inflation and (ii) output
- ② Finance: (iii) risk-premium \propto volatility² (e.g., Merton (1971))
 - Usually overlooked in a textbook macroeconomic model
 - **Reason:** log-linearized \implies no price of risk (\simeq risk-premium)
- ③ We study these components seriously in monetary frameworks
 - Need analytical global solutions

Takeaway (Self-fulfilling volatility)

In macroeconomic models with nominal rigidities, \exists global solution where:

- Taylor rules (targeting inflation and output) \rightarrow \exists rise in volatility and risk-premium

Standard non-linear New-Keynesian model

1. **Show:** proper accounting of a price of risk changes dynamics

Aggregate volatility↑ \iff precautionary saving↑ \iff aggregate demand↓

- **Conventional Taylor rules** \implies \exists new indeterminacy (aggregate volatility)
- **Equilibrium:** \exists rise in aggregate volatility in a self-fulfilling way, which drives business cycles

Non-linear New-Keynesian model with a stock market + portfolio

2. **Build** a parsimonious New-Keynesian framework where: ▶ Explain

Stock volatility↑ \iff risk-premium↑ \iff wealth↓ \iff aggregate demand↓

- Asset price as endogenous shifter in aggregate demand (and vice-versa)
- **VAR analysis:** **financial** vs real volatility ▶ VAR analysis

Isomorphic structure between two frameworks

- Conventional Taylor rules \Rightarrow again, equilibria with self-fulfilling volatility (in stock market volatility): (endogenous) stock market volatility and risk-premium driven business cycle
- Risk-premium targeting in a specific way \Rightarrow determinacy again

Takeaway (**Ultra-divine coincidence**)

One monetary tool (i_t) \Rightarrow (i) inflation, (ii) output, and (iii) risk-premium

- Generalization of the Taylor rule in a risk-centric environment with risk-premium
- Aggregate wealth management of the monetary policy

Remember: no bubble \Rightarrow only fundamental asset pricing

Literature review

A non-linear textbook New-Keynesian model (demand block)

The representative household's problem (given B_0):

$$\max_{\{B_t, C_t, L_t\}_{t \geq 0}} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[\log C_t - \frac{L_t^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\eta}} \right] dt \text{ s.t. } \dot{B}_t = i_t B_t - \bar{p} C_t + w_t L_t + D_t$$

where

- B_t : nominal bond holding
- D_t includes fiscal transfer + profits of the intermediate sector
- Rigid price: $p_t = \bar{p}$ for $\forall t$ (demand-determined)

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where

- B_t : nominal bond holding
 - D_t includes fiscal transfer + profits of the intermediate sector
 - Rigid price: $p_t = \bar{p}$ for $\forall t$ (demand-determined)
- ① A non-linear Euler equation (in contrast to textbook log-linearized one)

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{dC_t}{C_t} \right) = (i_t - \rho) dt + \text{Var}_t \left(\frac{dC_t}{C_t} \right)$$

Endogenous drift

- ② (Aggregate) business cycle volatility $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ precautionary saving $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ recession now (thus the drift \uparrow)

Problem: both **variance** and **drift** are endogenous, is monetary policy i_t (Taylor rule) enough for stabilization?

Firm i : face monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz with $Y_t^i = A_t L_t^i$ and

$$\frac{dA_t}{A_t} = g dt + \underbrace{\sigma dZ_t}_{\text{Fundamental risk}}$$

- dZ_t : aggregate Brownian motion (i.e., only risk source)
- (g, σ) are exogenous

Flexible price economy as benchmark: the ‘natural’ output Y_t^n follows

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dY_t^n}{Y_t^n} &= \left(r^n - \rho + \sigma^2 \right) dt + \sigma dZ_t \\ &= g dt + \sigma dZ_t = \frac{dA_t}{A_t}\end{aligned}$$

where $r^n = \rho + g - \sigma^2$ is the ‘natural’ rate of interest.

A textbook New-Keynesian model with rigid price ($\pi_t = 0, \forall t$)

With

With

$$\hat{Y}_t = \ln \frac{Y_t}{Y_t^n}, \quad (\underbrace{\sigma}_{\text{Exogenous}})^2 dt = \text{Var}_t \left(\frac{dY_t^n}{Y_t^n} \right), \quad \left(\sigma + \underbrace{\sigma_t^s}_{\text{Endogenous}} \right)^2 dt = \text{Var}_t \left(\frac{dY_t}{Y_t} \right)$$

A non-linear IS equation (in contrast to textbook linearized one)

$$d\hat{Y}_t = \left(i_t - \underbrace{\left(r^{\text{blue}} - \frac{1}{2}(\sigma + \sigma_t^s)^2 + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \right)}_{\equiv I_t^T} \right) dt + \sigma_t^s dZ_t \quad (1)$$

- What is r_t^T ? a risk-adjusted natural rate of interest ($\sigma_t^s \uparrow \Rightarrow r_t^T \downarrow$)

$$r_t^T \equiv r^{\textcolor{blue}{n}} - \frac{1}{2}(\sigma + \textcolor{blue}{\sigma_t^s})^2 + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2$$

Big Question: Taylor rule $i_t = r^{\text{blue}} + \phi_y \hat{Y}_t$ for $\phi_y > 0 \Rightarrow$ **full stabilization?**

Up to a first-order (no volatility feedback): **Blanchard and Kahn (1980)**

- $\phi_y > 0$: Taylor principle $\implies \hat{Y}_t = 0$ for $\forall t$ (unique equilibrium)
- **Why?** (recap): without the volatility feedback:

$$d\hat{Y}_t = (i_t - r^{\text{blue}}) dt + \sigma_t^s dZ_t \underset{\substack{= \\ \text{Under} \\ \text{Taylor rule}}}{=} \phi_y \hat{Y}_t dt + \sigma_t^s dZ_t$$

Then,

$$\mathbb{E}_t(d\hat{Y}_t) = \phi_y \hat{Y}_t$$

- If $\hat{Y}_t \neq 0$, then $\mathbb{E}_t(\hat{Y}_\infty)$ blows up $\rightarrow \hat{Y}_t = 0$ for $\forall t$ as unique equilibrium
- Foundation of modern central banking

Big Question: Taylor rule $i_t = r^{\text{ne}} + \phi_y \hat{Y}_t$ for $\phi_y > 0 \Rightarrow$ **full stabilization?**

Now with the non-linear effects in (1):

Proposition (Fundamental Indeterminacy)

For any $\phi_y > 0$:


exists a rational expectations equilibrium that supports a sunspot $\sigma_0^s > 0$ satisfying:

- ① $\mathbb{E}_t(\hat{Y}_s) = \hat{Y}_t$ for $\forall s > t$ (martingale)
- ② $\sigma_t^s \xrightarrow{a.s} \sigma_\infty^s = 0$ and $\hat{Y}_t \xrightarrow{a.s} 0$ (almost sure stabilization)
- ③ $\mathbb{E}_0(\max_{t \geq 0}(\sigma_t^s)^2) = \infty$ (0^+ -possibility divergence)

Aggregate volatility \uparrow possible through the intertemporal coordination of agents

A textbook New-Keynesian model with rigid price ($\pi_t = 0, \forall t$)

Key: construct a path-dependent intertemporal consumption (demand) strategy



- Stabilized as attractor: $\sigma_t^s \xrightarrow{a.s} \sigma_\infty^s = 0$ and $\hat{Y}_t \xrightarrow{a.s} 0$ but $\mathbb{E}_0(\max_{t \geq 0} (\sigma_t^s)^2) = \infty$

1. An endogenous aggregate risk arises and drives the business cycle.
2. Sunspots in $\{\sigma_t^s\}$ act similarly to **animal spirit**?
3. New monetary policy

$$i_t = r^n + \phi_y \hat{Y}_t - \frac{1}{2} ((\sigma + \sigma_t^s)^2 - \sigma^2)$$

Aggregate volatility targeting?
Animal spirit targeting?

- Restores a **determinacy** and **stabilization**, but what does it mean?

Next: open the stock market, and relate these terms to the **risk-premium**

The model with a stock market + portfolio decision

Standard demand-determined environment

$\sigma_t^s \uparrow \implies$ precautionary saving $\uparrow \implies$ consumption (output) \downarrow

We can build a **theoretical framework with explicit stock markets** where

Financial volatility $\uparrow \implies$ risk-premium $\uparrow \implies$ wealth $\downarrow \implies$ output \downarrow

- Wealth-dependent aggregate demand
- Now, sticky price so $\underline{\pi_t \neq 0}$: Phillips curve à la **Calvo (1983)**

▶ Skip the detail

Identical capitalists and hand-to-mouth workers (Two types of agents)

- **Capitalists:** consumption - portfolio decision (between stock and bond)
- **Workers:** supply labors to firms (hand-to-mouth)

1. Technology

$$\frac{dA_t}{A_t} = \underbrace{g}_{\text{Growth}} \cdot dt + \underbrace{\sigma}_{\text{Aggregate shock}} \cdot \underbrace{dZ_t}_{\text{Fundamental risk (Exogenous)}}$$

2. Hand-to-mouth workers: supply labor + solves the following problem

$$\max_{C_t^w, N_t^w} \frac{\left(\frac{C_t^w}{A_t}\right)^{1-\varphi}}{1-\varphi} - \frac{(N_t^w)^{1+\chi_0}}{1+\chi_0} \quad \text{s.t. } p_t C_t^w = w_t N_t^w$$

- Hand-to-mouth assumption can be relaxed, without changing implications

3. Firms: production using labor + pricing à la Calvo (1983)

4. Financial market: zero net-supplied risk-free bond + stock (index) market

Capitalists: standard portfolio and consumption decisions (very simple)

1. Total financial wealth $a_t = p_t A_t Q_t$, where (real) stock price Q_t follows:

$$\frac{dQ_t}{Q_t} = \mu_t^q \cdot dt + \sigma_t^q \cdot dZ_t$$

Financial risk
(Endogenous)

- μ_t^q and σ_t^q are both endogenous (to be determined)

2. Each solves the following optimization (standard)

$$\max_{C_t, \theta_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \log C_t dt \text{ s.t.}$$

$$da_t = (a_t(i_t + \theta_t(i_t^m - i_t)) - p_t C_t)dt + \theta_t a_t(\sigma + \sigma_t^q)dZ_t$$

- Aggregate consumption of capitalists \propto aggregate financial wealth

$$C_t = \rho A_t Q_t$$

- Equilibrium **risk-premium** is determined by the total risk

$$i_t^m - i_t \equiv \text{rp}_t = (\sigma + \sigma_t^q)^2$$

Dividend yield: dividend yield = ρ , as in Caballero and Simsek (2020)

- A positive feedback loop between asset price \longleftrightarrow dividend (output)

Determination of nominal stock return dI_t^m

$$dI_t^m = \underbrace{[\underbrace{\rho}_{\text{Dividend yield}} + \underbrace{\pi_t}_{\text{Inflation}} + g + \mu_t^q + \overbrace{\sigma \sigma_t^q}^{\text{Covariance}}]}_{\text{Capital gain}} dt + \underbrace{(\sigma + \sigma_t^q) dZ_t}_{\text{Risk term}}$$
$$= \underbrace{i_t^m}_{\text{Drift}} = \underbrace{i_t}_{\text{Monetary policy}} + \underbrace{(\sigma + \sigma_t^q)^2}_{\text{Risk-premium}}$$

- Close the model with supply-side (Phillips curve) and $\{i_t\}$ rule

Flexible price economy allocations (benchmark)

- $\sigma_t^{q,n} = 0, Q_t^n, N_{W,t}^n, C_t^n, r^n$ (natural rate), rp^n (natural risk-premium)

Gap economy (log deviation from the flexible price economy)

- With asset price gap $\hat{Q}_t \equiv \ln \frac{Q_t}{Q_t^n} = \hat{C}_t$ and π_t

Proposition (Dynamic IS)

A dynamic gap economy can be described with the following equations:

- $\mathbb{E}_t d\pi_t = (\rho\pi_t - \kappa\hat{Q}_t)dt$ with $\kappa > 0$

- $d\hat{Q}_t = (i_t - \pi_t - r_t^T)dt + \sigma_t^q dZ_t$ where $r_t^T = r^n - \frac{1}{2}(rp_t - rp^n)$
 $\equiv r^n - \frac{1}{2}\hat{r}p_t$

where $rp_t = (\sigma + \sigma_t^q)^2$ and $rp^n = \sigma^2 \implies \hat{r}p_t \equiv rp_t - rp^n$

Now, with asset (stock) price gap \hat{Q}_t :
Real volatility

$$d\hat{Q}_t = \left(i_t - \pi_t - \left(r^{n\!} - \frac{1}{2} \left((\sigma + \sigma_t^q)^2 + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \right) \right) dt + \sigma_t^q dZ_t \right)$$

Real volatility

(2)


Here

Monetary policy: Taylor rule to Bernanke and Gertler (2000) rule

$$i_t = r^{\textcolor{blue}{n}} + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \underbrace{\hat{y}_t}_{= \zeta \hat{Q}_t} \\ = r^{\textcolor{blue}{n}} + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_q \hat{Q}_t, \text{ where } \underbrace{\phi \equiv \phi_q + \frac{\kappa(\phi_\pi - 1)}{\rho}}_{\text{Taylor principle}} > 0$$

Multiple equilibria (risk-premium sunspot)

- **How?:** countercyclical risk-premium with conventional Taylor rules



Is a sunspot $\sigma_0^q \neq 0$ supported by a rational expectations equilibrium?
: with Bernanke and Gertler (2000) rule

Assume $\sigma_0^q > 0$ for some reason (initial disruption)

- The same **martingale equilibrium** ► Mathematical explanation ► Tree diagram

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
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
- ① (Almost surely) stabilized in the long run after sunspot $\sigma_0^q > 0$
Meantime: crisis with financial volatility (risk-premium)↑, asset price↓,
and business cycle↓

- ② $\mathbb{E}_0(\max_t (\sigma_t^q)^2) = \infty$: an $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ possibility of ∞ -severity crisis ($\sigma_t^q \rightarrow \infty$)
 - \exists big crisis that supports $\sigma_0^q > 0$ (e.g., Martin (2012) in asset pricing contexts)


Asset price volatility (σ_t^0) when $\phi = 1.108$ $\phi_{\omega} = 0$ $\sigma = 0.009$
Initial volatility $\sigma_0^0 = 0.9$, Number of sample paths = 200



(a) With $\phi_\pi = 1.5$



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


(b) With $\phi_\pi = 2.5$.

Figure: $\{\sigma_t^q, \hat{Q}_t\}$ dynamics when $\sigma^{q,n} = 0$ and $\sigma_0^q = 0.9$, with reasonable calibration


- As monetary policy responsiveness $\phi \uparrow$
Stabilization speed \uparrow , \exists more severe crisis sample path
 - $\sigma_t^q \uparrow$ by $\sigma \implies 2 - 10\% \downarrow$ in Q_t (depending on monetary responsiveness)

Asset price volatility (σ_t^q) when $\phi = 1.108$ $\phi_{\sigma} = 0$ $\sigma = 0.009$
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(a) With $\phi_\pi = 1.5$

Asset price volatility (σ_t^q) when $\phi = 2.8824$ $\phi_{\sigma} = 1$ $\sigma = 0.009$
 Initial volatility $\sigma_0^q = 0.9$, Number of sample paths = 200



(b) With $\phi_\pi = 2.5$.

Figure: $\{\sigma_t^q, \hat{Q}_t\}$ dynamics when $\sigma^{q,\text{blue}} = 0$ and $\sigma_0^q = 0.9$, with reasonable calibration

- As monetary policy responsiveness $\phi \uparrow$
 Stabilization speed \uparrow , \exists more severe crisis sample path
- $\sigma_t^q \uparrow$ by $\sigma \implies 2 - 10\% \downarrow$ in Q_t (depending on monetary responsiveness)

Opposite case: with initial sunspot $\sigma_0^q < 0$

- Explains **boom** phase

Financial volatility (risk-premium) \downarrow , asset price \uparrow and business cycle \uparrow

New monetary policy \Rightarrow financial + macro stabilities $\hat{Q}_t = \pi_t = \hat{r}p_t = 0$

$$i_t = r^{\textcolor{blue}{n}} + \phi_{\pi} \pi_t + \phi_q \hat{Q}_t - \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \hat{r}p_t}_{\text{Sharp}}, \text{ where } \underbrace{\phi \equiv \phi_q + \frac{\kappa(\phi_{\pi} - 1)}{\rho} > 0}_{\text{Taylor principle}}$$

restores a **determinacy** with:

Takeaway (**Ultra-divine coincidence**)

One monetary tool (i_t) \Rightarrow (i) inflation, (ii) output, and (iii) risk-premium

► Sharpness

Leading to:

$$\underbrace{i_t + rp_t - \frac{1}{2}rp_t}_{=i_t^m} = \underbrace{r^n + rp^n - \frac{1}{2}rp^n}_{=i_t^{m,n}} + \underbrace{\phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_q \hat{Q}_t}_{\text{Business cycle targeting}}$$

Ito term

Ito term

\parallel

\parallel

$$\rho + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t(d \log a_t)}{dt} \quad \rho + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t(d \log a^n)}{dt}$$

- i_t^m , not i_t , follows a Taylor rule?
- A % change of (i.e., return on) aggregate wealth, not just the policy rate, follows Taylor rules
 - Why? Because i_t^m , not i_t truly governs intertemporal substitution

My research: other papers

Main theme: modern macroeconomics meets with modern finance

1. Roles of aggregate volatility and risk-premia (or term premia) fluctuations in monetary policy transmission

- A New Indeterminacy with Fluctuations in Volatility and Risk Premium (with Seung Joo Lee)
- A Higher-Order Forward Guidance (with Seung Joo Lee)
- A Unified Theory of the Term-Structure and Monetary Stabilization (with Seung Joo Lee)

2. General New-Keynesian macroeconomics

- Endogenous Firm Entry and the Supply-Side Effects of Monetary Policy (with Seung Joo Lee and Zhenghua Qi)
- What Do We Learn From Reading Every FOMC Transcript? (with Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Cooper Howes)


3. Banking, Panics, financial frictions

- ① Efficiency, Risk and the Gains from Trade in Interbank Markets (with Matthias Hoelzlein and Jens Orben)
- ② The Spatial Transmission of US Banking Panics (with Seung Joo Lee)

4. Others

- ① Gender Gap, Structural Change and Female Comparative Advantage: A Quantitative Analysis of China (with Cassie Xiang)
- ② ... Several Projects on CBDCs


Thank you very much!
(Appendix)




- 1 → 2 comes from “non-linearity (not linearizing)”
- 2 → 3 comes from “portfolio decision” of each investor and externality
- 3 → 4 comes from the fact wealth drives aggregate demand
- 4 → 1 where business cycle has its own volatility (self-sustaining)

Financial volatility measures

▶ Go back



(a) Financial Uncertainty series



(b) Financial vs. Real Uncertainty

Figure: Common measures of the financial volatility (left) and real vs. financial uncertainty decomposed by [Ludvigson et al. \(2015\)](#) (right)

The correlation between series is remarkably high and they all display positive spikes at the beginning and/or initial months following NBER-dated recessions

- Many of past recessions are, in nature, financial


In a similar manner to Bloom (2009), Ludvigson et al. (2015):

VAR-11 order:


$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \log (\text{Industrial Production}) \\ \log (\text{Employment}) \\ \log (\text{Real Consumption}) \\ \log (\text{CPI}) \\ \log (\text{Wages}) \\ \text{Hours} \\ \text{Real Uncertainty (LMN)} \\ \text{Fed Funds Rate} \\ \log (\text{M2}) \\ \log (\text{S\&P-500 Index}) \\ \text{Financial Uncertainty (LMN)} \end{array} \right] \quad (3)$$

Financial uncertainty (LMN) is also replaced by the stock price volatility (following Bloom (2009)) and Baa 10-years bond premia

Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis




(a) Response: Industrial Production




(b) Industrial Production

Figure: Impulse-response of IP to one std.dev shock in financial uncertainty measures (left) and the historical decomposition of IP to various attributes (right)


- ① IP falls by 2.5% after one standard deviation spike in the [Ludvigson et al. \(2015\)](#)'s financial uncertainty measure
 - Financial uncertainty has been important in driving IP boom-bust patterns
- ② Other graphs: IRF and historical decomposition of S&P 500 [► S&P500](#), and FFR (monetary policy) [► FFR](#), FEVD [► FEVD](#)




(a) Response: S&P500 Index



(b) S&P500 Index



(a) Shock: Financial Uncertainty



(b) Shock: Real Uncertainty

With 3 different financial uncertainty measures: [Ludvigson et al. \(2015\)](#), [Bloom \(2009\)](#), Baa 10-years bond premia (left)

(i) Industrial Production

Horizon	Fin. Uncert. (LMN)	Real Uncert. (LMN)	Stock Vol. (Bloom)	Baa 10-Yr Premia
h=1	0	0.30	0.21	0.12
h=6	1.27	3.37	2.98	1.36
h=12	4.28	4.38	3.16	1.94
h=36	3.24	1.67	1.98	0.64

(ii) S&P-500 Index

Horizon	Fin. Uncert. (LMN)	Real Uncert. (LMN)	Stock Vol. (Bloom)	Baa 10-Yr Premia
h=1	0.11	0.08	0.39	0.06
h=6	3.30	0.25	3.26	0.62
h=12	4.77	0.54	10.03	2.16
h=36	6.50	0.91	12.16	2.40

(iii) Fed Funds Rate

Horizon	Fin. Uncert. (LMN)	Real Uncert. (LMN)	Stock Vol. (Bloom)	Baa 10-Yr Premia
h=1	0.01	0.98	0	0.08
h=6	0.42	0.84	3.11	1.66
h=12	1.47	0.91	4.69	2.30
h=36	2.81	2.05	5.02	3.17

Financial uncertainty shocks explain close to:

- 5% of the fluctuations in both IP and S&P-500 series

Real uncertainty explains:

- Additional 2-4% of movements in industrial activity in the medium run

- Financial wealth (e.g., risk-intolerance) and aggregate demand: Mian and Sufi (2014), Caballero and Farhi (2017), Guerrieri and Lacoviello (2017), Caballero and Simsek (2020a, 2020b), Chodorow-Reich et al. (2021), Caballero et al. (2021)
- Financial disruption (volatility) and macroeconomy: Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2014), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Di Tella and Hall (2020)

Our paper: a monetary framework that incorporates financial wealth, aggregate financial volatility, risk-premium, and business cycle (all endogenous)

- Monetary policy and financial market disruptions: Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Nisticò (2012), Stein (2012), Cúrdia and Woodford (2016), Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020), Galí (2021)

Our paper: a monetary policy's financial targeting (first and second-orders) in the world without bubble + lean against the stock market

- Asset pricing and nominal rigidity: Weber (2015), Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), Campbell et al. (2020)
- Time-varying risk-premium in New-Keynesian model: Laseen et al. (2015)
- Indeterminacy with an idiosyncratic risk: Acharya and Dogra (2020)

Our paper: an analytical expression of time-varying risk-premium in a monetary model + new indeterminacy in aggregate volatility

Go back

- ❶ Capitalists bear $(\sigma_t + \sigma_t^q)$ amount of risks when investing in stock market
 - Risk-premium $rp_t = (\sigma_t + \sigma_t^q)^2$
 - Natural risk-premium (in the flexible price economy) $rp_t^n = (\sigma_t + \underbrace{\sigma_t^{q,n}}_{=0})^2$
- ❷ If a real return on stock investment is different from its natural level (return of stock investment in the flexible price economy), then \hat{Q}_t jumps

Takeaway (Risk-adjusted natural rate)

r_t^T is a real risk-free rate that makes:

stock market's real return (with risk-premium rp_t) = natural economy's (with risk-premium rp_t^n)

$$\left(\underbrace{r_t^T}_{\text{Risk-free rate yielding equal return on stock}} + rp_t \right) - \frac{1}{2} rp_t = \left(\underbrace{r_t^n}_{\text{Natural rate}} + rp_t^n \right) - \frac{1}{2} rp_t^n$$

Ito term Ito term

Is a sunspot $\sigma_0^q \neq \sigma^{q,n}$ supported by a rational expectations equilibrium?
: with Bernanke-Gertler (2000) rule

▶ Go back

Assume $\underline{\sigma_0^q > \sigma^{q,n} = 0}$ for some reason (initial sunspot)


Blanchard and Kahn (1980) does not apply: we construct a rational expectations equilibrium (REE: not diverging on average) supporting an initial sunspot σ_0^q


$$\begin{aligned} d\hat{Q}_t &= \left(i_t - \pi_t - \left(r_t^n - \frac{1}{2}(\text{rp}_t - \text{rp}_t^n) \right) \right) dt + \sigma_t^q dZ_t \\ &= \underbrace{\left((\phi_\pi - 1)\pi_t + \phi_q \hat{Q}_t + \frac{1}{2}(\text{rp}_t - \text{rp}_t^n) \right)}_{=0, \forall t} dt + \sigma_t^q dZ_t \end{aligned}$$

- Called the 'martingale equilibrium': supporting an initial sunspot in financial volatility σ_0^q
- $\{\sigma_t^q\}$ has its own (endogenous) stochastic process, given initial $\sigma_0^q \neq 0$

$$d\sigma_t^q = -\frac{\phi^2(\sigma_t^q)^2}{2(\sigma_t + \sigma_t^q)^3} dt - \phi \frac{\sigma_t^q}{\sigma_t + \sigma_t^q} dZ_t$$

Again, the same structure





➡ Go back Asset price $\{q_t\}$ and the conditional volatility $\{\sigma_t^q\}$ are stochastic

- Rational expectations equilibrium (REE): no divergence on expectation
- As q_t approaches the stabilized path, then $\sigma_t^q \downarrow$, and more likely stays there: convergence ($\sigma_t^q \xrightarrow{a.s} \sigma_\infty^q = \sigma_{\cdot n}^q = 0$)
- But in the worst scenario σ_t^q diverges (with 0^+ -probability)

► Go back

What if central bank uses the following alternative rule, where $\phi_{rp} \neq \frac{1}{2}$?

$$i_t = r_t^{\textcolor{blue}{n}} + \phi_{\pi}\pi_t + \phi_q \hat{Q}_t - \boxed{\phi_{rp}} \hat{r}p_t, \text{ where } \phi \equiv \phi_q + \frac{\kappa(\phi_{\pi} - 1)}{\rho} > 0$$

- Then still \exists martingale equilibrium supporting sunspot $\sigma_0^q \neq 0$
- As $|\phi_{rp} - \frac{1}{2}| \uparrow \implies$ (on average) longer time for σ_t^q to vanish
- Especially, $\phi_{rp} < 0$ (**Real Bills Doctrine**) is a bad idea

► Summary

► Simulation

$\phi_{rp} < 0$ (Real Bills Doctrine)	$0 < \phi_{rp} < \frac{1}{2}$
(i) With $\phi_{rp} \downarrow$, convergence speed \downarrow and less amplified paths	(i) With $\phi_{rp} \uparrow$, convergence speed \uparrow and more amplified paths
(ii) $\sigma_t^q > \sigma_t^{q,n} = 0$ means a crisis $(\hat{Q}_t < 0 \text{ and } \pi_t < 0)$	(ii) $\sigma_t^q > \sigma_t^{q,n} = 0$ means a crisis $(\hat{Q}_t < 0 \text{ and } \pi_t < 0)$
$\phi_{rp} = \frac{1}{2}$	$\phi_{rp} > \frac{1}{2}$
No sunspot (Ultra-divine coincidence)	(i) With $\phi_{rp} \uparrow$, convergence speed \downarrow and less amplified paths (ii) $\sigma_t^q > \sigma_t^{q,n} = 0$ means a boom $(\hat{Q}_t > 0 \text{ and } \pi_t > 0)$
As $\phi \uparrow$, convergence speed \uparrow and \exists more amplified paths	



(a) With $\phi_{rp} = 1$ (b) With $\phi_{rp} = 1.5$.

Figure: $\{\sigma_t^q, \hat{Q}_t\}$ dynamics when $\sigma^{q,n} = 0$ and $\sigma_0^q = 0.9$, with varying $\phi_{rp} > \frac{1}{2}$