Book One 7

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The main bulk of BOOK I is devoted to explaining the principles of "atomistic philosophy". The author begins by stating and defending the FIRST principle of his atomistic philosophy, that is, nothing comes from nothing.

The first stage of this study will have this rule as its basis: nothing ever springs miraculously out of nothing. The fact is that all mortals are in the grip of fear, because they observe many things happening on earth and in the sky and, being at a complete loss for an explanation of their cause, suppose that a supernatural power is responsible for them. Therefore, as soon as we have seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, we shall have a clearer view of the object of our search, namely the explanation of the source of all created things and of the way in which all things happen independently of the gods.

If things could be created out of nothing, any kind of thing could be produced from any source; nothing would need a seed. In the first place, human beings could spring from the sea, squamous fish from the ground, and birds could be hatched from the sky; cattle and other farm animals and every kind of wild beast would bear young of unpredictable species,

^{18. 131:} The bulk of Book 3 is devoted to demonstration of the corporeal and mortal nature of the mind (animus) and spirit (anima), the rational and irrational parts of the soul.

^{19. 132–133:} The reference is to the filmy "images" discharged from the surfaces of objects. Their existence and nature are demonstrated in Book 4. See pp. xxvii xxviii.

^{20. 139:} Lucr. mentions this difficulty again at 832 and 3.260.

^{21. 140-145:} On the significance of these important lines, see p. xiii.

^{22.} **146–148:** Repeated at 2.59 61, 3.91–93, 6.39 41.

and would make their home in cultivated and barren parts without discrimination. Moreover, the same fruits would not invariably grow on the same trees, but would change: any tree could bear any fruit. Seeing that there would be no elements with the capacity to generate each kind of thing, how could creatures constantly have a fixed mother? But as it is, because all are formed from fixed seeds, each is born and issues out into the shores of light only from a source where the right matter and the right ultimate particles exist. And this explains why all things cannot be produced from all things: any given thing possesses a distinct creative capacity.

A second point: why do we see the rose bursting out in spring, the corn in scorching summer, the vine at autumn's coaxing, if it is not because, only when the fixed seeds of things have streamed together at their appropriate time, is any created thing uncovered, while the attendant seasons assist the prolific earth to deliver the frail objects into the shores 180 of light in safety? But if they were produced from nothing, they would suddenly spring up at unpredictable intervals and at unfavorable times of the year, for there would be no ultimate particles that could be debarred by the unpropitious season from entering into creative union. Moreover, so far as growth is concerned, the lapse of time required for the confluence of seed would be unnecessary, if things could arise out of nothing. Children, too young to talk, in an instant would become young adults, and trees would suddenly bound up out of the ground. But it is evident that none of these things happens, since in every case growth is a 190 gradual process, as one would expect, from a fixed seed and, as things grow, they preserve their specific character; so you may be sure that each thing increases its bulk and derives its sustenance from its own special substance.

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^{23.} **196–198:** Lucr. is fond of this illustration: see 823–829, 907–914, 2.688-699, 1013–1022. Conveniently, the Latin word *elementa* can mean "letters of the alphabet" as well as "elements."

To start with, the first rule

is that nothing can come from nothing, not even by will of the gods.

Mortal men are afraid as they look about them and see the many things that happen on earth and up in the sky, and they cannot tell why or how and therefore think that gods

must bring them about by fiat. But if our axiom holds and nothing can come of nothing, then we are obliged to look further

to learn what we want to know—how each thing was created

and how, without the gods, all things have come to be.

Consider the contrary case—that being could come from non-being

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and	that anyt	hing co	ould a	rise fro	om anytl	hing or	from
	nothing,						

without even a seed. Men could emerge from sea-foam, scaly creatures could come swarming up from the earth, and birds could burst forth from the sky. In meadowlands or deserts

cattle and wild beasts could simply appear at random, and trees could bear any fruit haphazardly, for all would be able to bring forth all, interchangeably. No bodies would produce their own kind: the idea of motherhood and fatherhood would give way. But it is not

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so, and we know how each kind comes from its seed, in a fixed,

unvarying manner, and everything that is born and makes its way

to the light has its material source in whatever came before it. It cannot happen that things can arise and be begotten from anything else: in each is a unique nature and individual power that sets it apart and defines it. Why do we always see roses bloom in the early spring or grain grow in the summer's heat, or grapes on their vines

ripen in season in autumn, except that these life forms know

from the code that was there in their seeds what to do and when

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so that the teeming earth brings forth in safety its fragile beings that grow in the sunlight? Suppose that they just appeared,

popping up out of nowhere at unpredictable moments,	
would they not come out of season at hostile times of the	
year	
without some initial prompting, with neither restraint nor	
order	
of generation that offers nature's many protections?	
And speaking of generation, what would be the need	
of time for maturation? Why would there be any wait	
for infants to grow into youth or seedlings to turn into	
trees?	
But as we know well, one step must follow another	
as seeds	170
sprout to become plants, preserving their own kind,	
and they grow in their proper seasons nourished by what	
is ordained.	

HERE IS THE ORIGINAL LATIN YEXT

Principium cuius hinc nobis exordia sumet, nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus umquam. quippe ita formido mortalis continet omnis, quod multa in terris fieri caeloque tuentur, quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre		150
possunt ac fieri divino numine rentur. quas ob res ubi viderimus nil posse creari de nihilo, tum quod sequimur iam rectius inde		156
perspiciemus, et unde queat res quaeque creari et quo quaeque modo fiant opera sine divom. Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret. e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere caelo; armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum,		155 159
incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent. nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent, sed mutarentur, ferre omnes omnia possent. quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique, qui posset mater rebus consistere certa? at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur,		165
inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit, materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima; atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni, quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas. Praeterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,		170
vites autumno fundi suadente videmus, si non, certa suo quia tempore semina rerum cum confluxerunt, patefit quod cumque creatur, dum tempestates adsunt et vivida tellus tuto res teneras effert in luminis oras?	175	
quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni, quippe ubi nulla forent primordia, quae genitali concilio possent arceri tempore iniquo. Nec porro augendis rebus spatio foret usus		180
seminis ad coitum, si e nilo crescere possent; nam fierent iuvenes subito ex infantibus parvis e terraque exorta repente arbusta salirent. quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando paulatim crescunt, ut par est semine certo,		185
crescentesque genus servant; ut noscere possis quicque sua de materia grandescere alique.		190