

MARCELLO DI BELLO

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EDUCATION	Stanford University , Ph.D., Philosophy	2007–2013
	DISSERTATION: <i>Statistics and Probability in Criminal Trials</i>	
	University of Amsterdam , M.Sc., Logic	2005–2007
	M.SC. THESIS: <i>Formalizing Legislation in the Event Calculus</i>	
	Catholic University of Milan , B.A., Philosophy	2001–2004
ACADEMIC POSITIONS	Arizona State University	from 2020
	ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, <i>School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies</i>	
	Lehman College, City University of New York	2014–2020
	ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, <i>Department of Philosophy</i>	
	Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton	2016–2017
	INFOSYS FELLOW, <i>School of Social Science</i>	
	Stanford University	2014
	LECTURER, <i>Department of Philosophy</i>	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Evidence and probability; risk and decision-making; algorithmic fairness; statistics in the law	
GRANTS / AWARDS	ASU Seed Grant	2022–2023
	PSC-CUNY Research Grant	2020–2021
	Faculty Fellowship Publication Program, CUNY	2019–2020
	Summer Seminar in the Philosophy of Statistics, Virginia Tech	2019
	PSC-CUNY Research Grant	2016–2017
	Infosys Fellowship, IAS, Princeton	2016–2017
	Scholar Incentive, Lehman College, CUNY	2016–2017
	PSC-CUNY Research Grant	2015–2016
	Huygens Scholarship, Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation	2006–2007
JOURNAL ARTICLES	“A Probabilistic Analysis of Cross-examination Using Bayesian Networks”	2021
	<i>Philosophical Issues (a supplement to Noûs)</i> , 31(1): 41–65	
	“When Statistical Evidence Is Not Specific Enough”	2021
	<i>Synthese</i> , 199: 12251–12269	
	“Profile Evidence, Fairness and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions” (w/ Collin O’Neil)	2020
	<i>Ethics</i> , 130(2): 147–178	
	“Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?”	2020
	<i>Mind</i> , 129(516): 1269–1285	

JOURNAL ARTICLES (cont'd)	<p>"Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?" 2019 <i>Mind</i>, 128(512): 1045-1084</p> <p>"Can Probability Theory Explain Why Closure Is Both Intuitive and Prone to Counterexamples?" 2018 <i>Philosophical Studies</i>, 175(9): 2145-2168</p> <p>"Epistemic Closure, Assumptions and Topics of Inquiry" 2014 <i>Synthese</i>, 191(16): 3977-4002</p>
SHORT (<i>< 5,000 words</i>)	<p>"Plausibility and Reasonable Doubt in the Simonshaven Case" 2020 <i>Topics in Cognitive Science</i>, 12(4): 1200-1204</p> <p>"Plausibility and Probability in Juridical Proof" 2019 <i>International Journal of Evidence and Proof</i>, 23(1/2)</p>
ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES	<p>"Legal Probabilism" (w/ Rafal Urbaniak) 2021 <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i></p>
EDITED VOLUMES	<p>"Evidence and Decision Making in the Law" 2020 Guest editor with Bart Verheij <i>Artificial Intelligence and Law</i>, 28, special issue</p>
CHAPTERS/ PROCEEDINGS	<p>"Evidential Reasoning" (w/ Bart Verheij) 2018 Bongiovanni, Postema, Rotolo, Sartor, Valentini and Walton (eds) <i>Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation</i>, Springer</p> <p>"Betraying Davidson: The Quest for the Incommensurable" 2009 Carrara and Morato (eds) <i>Language, Knowledge and Metaphysics</i>, College Publications</p> <p>"The LKIF Core Ontology of Basic Legal Concepts" (w/ Hoestra, Breuker and Boer) 2007 Casanovas, Biasiotti, Francesconi and Sagri (eds) <i>Proceedings of the Workshop on Legal Ontologies and Artificial Intelligence Techniques</i></p>
REVIEWS	<p>"Douglas Walton: Argument Evaluation and Evidence" (w/ Bart Verheij) 2018 <i>Argumentation</i>, 32(2)</p>
TRANSLATIONS	<p>"L'individualizzazione come decisione" 2020 <i>Philosophical Readings</i>, 12(2) – Italian translation of Alex Biederdam, Franco Taroni and Silvia Bozza "The Decisionalization of Individualization," <i>Forensic Science International</i>, 266</p>
TALKS (*= <i>peer-reviewed</i>)	<p>*"Unanticipated Possibilities for Legal Probabilism" <i>May 2022</i> Michele Taruffo Evidence Week, University of Girona, Spain</p> <p>*"The Conjunction Paradox" (w/ Rafal Urbaniak) <i>Mar. 2022</i> Information Ethics Workshop, Northeastern University</p> <p>*"Is Algorithmic Fairness Possible?" <i>Nov. 2021</i> Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Baltimore</p> <p>"Resolving Algorithmic Fairness" (w/ Ruobin Gong) <i>Nov. 2020</i> Australian National University</p> <p>*"Is Algorithmic Fairness Possible?" – postponed <i>Nov. 2020</i> Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Baltimore</p>

TALKS (cont'd) (* = peer-reviewed)	"Probability and Conviction" – cancelled Netherland Institute for Advanced Study	Aug. 2020
	"Statistical <i>versus</i> Specific Evidence" University of California, San Diego, Halicioglu Data Science Institute	Mar. 2020
	*"Varieties of Statistical Evidence" – cancelled Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society, New Orleans	Mar. 2020
	"Profile Evidence, Fairness and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions" University of Alabama, Department of Philosophy	Jan. 2020
	"Is Algorithmic Fairness Possible?" Rutgers University	Nov. 2019
	"Comments on Dahlman's 'Statistical Evidence and the Futility of Lawful Conduct'" University of Groningen	Nov. 2019
	"Statistics in the Courtroom: What Is Wrong With Them?" University of Nevada, Las Vegas	Feb. 2019
	"Statistics in the Courtroom: Do They Threaten the Fair Trial?" Polytechnic University of Milan	Jan. 2018
	"Rethinking the Prosecutor's Fallacy" CUNY Graduate Center, Philosophy Colloquium	Nov. 2017
	*"Does More Evidence Lead to Fewer Errors?" High Performance Computing Center, University of Stuttgart	Oct. 2017
	*"A Two-dimensional Theory of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" Truth and the Criminal Trial, University of Nottingham	June 2017
	"Statistics in the Courtroom: Do They Threaten the Fair Trial?" Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton	April 2017
	"Statistics in the Courtroom: Do They Threaten the Fair Trial?" University of Lausanne	Jan. 2017
	*"Can Probability Explain the Successes and Failures of Epistemic Closure?" XII SIFA Conference, University of Siena	Sept. 2016
	*"Fairness and Statistical Evidence" XII SIFA Conference, University of Siena	Sept. 2016
	*"Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?" Legal Theory Research Group, University of Edinburgh	Jan. 2016
	"Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?" International AI & Law Conference, University of San Diego	June 2015
	"Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?" University of Bayreuth	May 2015

TALKS (<i>cont'd</i>) (*= <i>peer-reviewed</i>)	“Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Probability and Certainty in Criminal Trials” Catholic University of Milan		May 2015
	“Statistics, Eyewitnesses, and Fingerprints” International Conference on Law, Governance and Development, Bangalore		May 2012
	“The Wells Effect, Lotteries, and Newspapers” National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore		Aug. 2011
	“DNA evidence: the Illusionary Precision of Numbers” Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore		Aug. 2011
	*“Betraying Davidson: a Quest for the Incommensurable” First SIFA Graduate Conference, University of Padua		Sept. 2007
TEACHING (*= <i>T.A.</i>)	ASU	Algorithmic Fairness	Fall 2021
		Bayesian Networks in Philosophy	Spring 2021
		Philosophy of Law	Fall 2020, 2021; Spring 2021, 2022
		Ethics, Big Data and AI	Fall 2020
	LEHMAN	Asian Philosophies	Spring 2019
		Introduction to Logic	Spring 2019, 2020
		Is the Criminal Justice System Racist?	Spring 2018
		Philosophy of Law	Spring 2015, 2016, 2020
		Legal Reasoning	Fall 2015, 2017, 2019
		Critical Reasoning	Fall 2014, 2017, 2018; Spring 2015, 2016, 2018
		Problems of Philosophy	Fall 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019
	BAYREUTH	Math on Trial	Summer 2015
		Convicting the Innocent	Summer 2016
	STANFORD	Introduction to Logic	Spring 2014
		Probability and the Law	Winter 2013, 2014
		Political Philosophy*	Spring 2010
		Ancient Greek Philosophy*	Winter 2012
		First-order Logic (up to completeness)*	Winter 2009, Spring 2011
	QINGDAO	Introduction to Statistics	Summer 2013
		Introduction to Philosophy	Summer 2013
REFEREING	<i>Economics and Philosophy; Noûs; Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy; Philosophical Review; Episteme; Ethics; Philosopher's Imprint; Mind; Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Journal of Moral Philosophy; Analysis (×2); Philosophy Compass; International Journal of Evidence & Proof; Philosophical Studies (×3); Law, Probability, and Risk; Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophy of Science (×2); Applied Ontology; Erkenntnis; Synthese (×4); Artificial Intelligence and Law (×3); Frontiers in Sociology; Philosophical Perspectives</i>		