MARCIN K. PESKI

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PERSONAL

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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

University of Toronto, Professor (with tenure)	2020-present
University of Toronto, Associate Professor (with tenure)	2014-present
University of Toronto, Associate Professor (without tenure)	2011-2014
University of Texas, Austin, Assistant Professor	2008-2011
Princeton University, Visiting Fellow	2007-2008
University of Chicago, Assistant Professor	2005-2008

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL	June 2005
M.A. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL	2001
M.A. Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland	2000
B.A. Mathematics, Warsaw University, Poland	2000

GRANTS

SSHRC "Bargaining Under Incomplete Information"	2019-present
SSHRC "Smooth stable matching	2012-2018
NSF "Interactive Beliefs, Strategic Uncertainty, etc"	2007-2011

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Theoretical Economics, Associate Editor	2015-present
Dynamic Games and Applications, Associate Editor	2019-2023

PUBLICATIONS

- 1. Random Utility Coordination Games on Networks, 2024, Theoretical Economics, accepted
- 2. Stationary social learning in a changing environment, with Raphaël Levy and Nicolas Vieille, 2024, Econometrica, Vol 92, No. 6 (November, 2024), 1939–1966
- 3. Bargaining with Mechanisms, American Economic Review 2022 (112), pp 2044-82
- 4. *Value-based distance between information structures*, 2022, with Fabien Gensbittel and Jerome Renault, *Theoretical Economics* 2022 (17), p. 1225–1267,
- 5. A tractable model of many-to-many matching, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2022 (14), pp. 1-43,
- 6. *Value of persistent information*, with Juuso Toikka, 2017, *Econometrica*, vol.85, issue 6, p. 1921-1948
- 7. Large roommate problem with non-transferrable random utility, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017 (168, issue C), 432-471

- 8. A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes, with Thomas Wiseman, Theoretical Economics 2015 (10), 131–173
- 9. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Discounting, Theoretical Economics 2014 (9), 651–694
- 10. Spontaneous Discrimination, with Balazs Szentes, American Economic Review; (2013) 103(6), 2412-36
- 11. Anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, Theoretical Economics; (2012) 7, 25–55
- 12. Critical Types, joint with Jeffrey Ely, Review of Economic Studies; (2011) 78 (3): 907-937
- 13. Prior Symmetry, Categorization and Similarity-Based Reasoning, Journal of Economic Theory; (2011) 146, 111–140
- 14. The principal-agent approach to testing experts, joint with Wojciech Olszewski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011) 3(2), 89-113,
- 15. Generalized risk dominance and asymmetric dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory; 2010, 145 (1)
- 16. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side, Theoretical Economics; 2008, 3 (1)
- 17. Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games, Games and Economic Behavior; 2008; 62 (2)
- 18. Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability, joint with Jeffrey Ely, Theoretical Economics; 2006 1 (1)
- 19. Generalization of Result on "Regressions, Short and Long, joint with Francesca Molinari, Econometric Theory; 2006, 22(1)

WORKING PAPERS

- 1. Informed principal with continuation, 2025
- 2. Non-distortionary belief elicitation, with Colin Stewart, R&R Ecma, 2025
- 3. Bargaining with Mechanisms and Two-sided incomplete information, 2025
- 4. Local stability of stationary equilibria, joint with Balazs Szentes, April 2013
- 5. Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity, September 2007
- 6. Small Group Coordination, Job Market Paper, 2004

PH.D. STUDENTS

- 1. Supervisor:
 - a. Krithika Ragupathi,
 - b. Sean Elliott,
 - c. Billur Görgülü (co-supervisor)
 - d. Yiyang Wu, 2018,
 - e. Qianfeng Tang (UT Austin), 2011.
- 2. Committee member: Alim Faraji, Rubi Hudson, Xiaoya Gao, En Hua Hu (2025), Ruizhi Zhu (2023), Mario Palasciano (UofT math 2023), Urmee Khan (UT Austin, 2011)

REFEREE ACTIVITIES

American Economic Journals: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Econometric Theory, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, Theoretical Economics

INVITED PRESENTATIONS

- 2005: U, U Wisconsin, University of Pennsylvania, Rochester, U Toronto
- 2006: Olin BS, Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, University of Western Ontario, Harvard-MIT, U. of Minnesota
- 2007: UCL, U Texas at Austin, Yale, Penn State, Caltech, UCLA, UC Davis, Stanford GSB, LSE.
- 2008: Northwestern, Washington University, Simon Fraser, Cornell
- 2009: OSU, Rice, Boston University
- 2010: U Toronto, U Chicago, UC San Diego, U Pittsburg, U Montreal
- 2011: U Toronto, Harvard-MIT, U Wisconsin, U Texas
- 2012: Shanghai Micro Workshop, Yale (Cowles)
- 2013: Paris Game Theory Seminar, HEC Paris, Workshop on Stochastic Games in Bonn, Northwestern University,
- 2014: Western Ontario, Stony Brook Game Theory Festival,
- 2015: U Michigan, Penn State, Workshop on Stochastic Games in Singapore,
- 2016: Columbia U, Duke,
- 2017: UT Austin, Minnesota, Rochester, Pittsburgh
- 2018: U of Montreal, Queens
- 2019: WashU, UCL