Robert O. Keohane, Marc A. Levy (1996) Institutions for environmental aid: Pitfalls and promise, Global Environmental Accords: Strategies for Sustainability series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press

ISBN:

0-262-11213-2_cloth; 0-262-61120-1_pbk

Abstract:

Nine papers empirically examine institutions that transfer aid for the purpose of strengthening environmental policies in recipient countries, identifying obstacles to effectiveness. David Fairman and Michael Ross review the experience with conditionality in the arena of economic development assistance, drawing lessons for international environmental practice. Fairman discusses the Global Environmental Facility. Elizabeth R. DeSombre and Joanne Kauffman analyze the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund. Cord Jakobeit considers debt-for-nature swaps. Ross examines conditionality and logging reform in the tropics. Thomas Bernauer studies the international environmental financial transfer arrangements designed to reduce chloride pollution in the Rhine River. Barbara Connolly and Martin List address the reactions of governments, the nuclear industry, the European Community, and nongovernmental organizations to the opportunity to scrap or retrofit dangerous Soviet-built nuclear power plants operating in Eastern Europe. Connolly, Tamar Gutner, and Hildegard Bedarff discuss organizational inertia and environmental assistance to Eastern Europe since 1989. Keohane is at Harvard University. Levy is at Princeton University. Index.