Government Coercion of Dissidents

DETERRENCE OR PROVOCATION?

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The dynamic effect of government coercion on dissident activities has been a controversial issue. It is contended that this relationship is significantly altered when different control variables such as regime type, ideological orientation, and economic performance are employed. Time series data based on 24 countries is used to estimate the net effect of government coercion on two types of dissident activities: protest demonstrations and deaths from domestic group violence. It is shown that in democratic nations, government sanctions provoke a higher level of protest demonstrations. However, in nondemocratic countries, at the extreme, severe sanctions can impose an unbearable cost, resulting in an inverse relationship between sanctions and political deaths. The nature of the regime influences not only the dynamics of the relationship between government coercion and dissident activities, but also the qualitative character of opposition response.

Does government coercion result in less or more dissident activity? This question has generated considerable controversy. Lichbach (1987) has provided a good summary of previous arguments and developed a parsimonious model to analyze the shift in tactics of the opposition group based on a rational actor (RA) model. As one reads various arguments on the precise nature of this relationship, it becomes clear that no consensus appears to be developing on this complex issue. It is the contention of this article that this lack of consensus stems from the fact that most arguments (about the dynamic interaction between government coercion and dissident activities) are made in isolation, without specifying precisely, the overall situation or context

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within which the decisions are made. To put it in statistical terms, what should be at issue is not the simple correlation between government coercion and rebellious behavior, but the partial correlation, after pertinent factors that impinge on this dynamic and complex relationship are taken into account. There may, of course, be some differences of opinion about the nature and type of control variables employed to analyze this partial relationship. Indeed, we would like the debate to evolve in this direction, because different control variables could alter the relationship significantly.

Before delving into the relationship between expressions of political dissent and government coercion, let us first define "coercion." It is obvious that coercion can take various forms. As Gurr (1986) correctly points out, "For a general theory of coercion, we need both a general definition of coercion and distinction among its forms or types" (p. 154). The literature on government coercion (Gurr 1986; Zimmerman 1980) implies three different aspects of coercion. First, coercion may be *overt*, that is, the actual use of governmental authority to inflict punishment on the dissident groups. Second, it can also manifest in expectations about future *threats* of sanctions from the regime. Third, coercion can have *covert* or preemptive aspects, such as surveillance and infiltration of the opposition movement by the forces of the authority. Although a total picture of coercive activity within a society includes all three aspects, research efforts dictated by the availability of data have concentrated mainly on overt coercive actions. Covert operations by the authorities to quell and confuse a dissident movement have been well documented (Marx 1982). However, data on such activities are extremely difficult to obtain. Some researchers have tried to measure the total coercive capability of a regime by estimating its "coercive potential" (Bwy 1968; Gurr 1970b; Hibbs 1973; Cooper, 1974). Many of these efforts concentrated on measuring the relative amount of resources devoted to internal security forces and military outlays. Gurr also attempted to factor in the past loyalties of the military force to civilian regimes to measure the total coercive potential. Unfortunately for us, none of these data were available in comparable form during our study period. Therefore, we focus on coercive actions and expectations about future sanctions.

This article attempts to develop a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical explanation of the relationship. In section 1, we review past literature briefly to demonstrate the need to consider important control variables that affect this relationship. Section 2 develops the microfoundations of a simple model that identifies the specific factors that should be taken into account. In section 3, we test some implications of this model by employing a pooled (time series and cross section) model. The final section derives tentative conclusions and suggestions for further work.

1. THE RATIONALE FOR SPECIFYING A CONTEXT

Lichbach (1987) has observed that "ad hoc justifications and findings exist for all possible specifications of the function" (p. 269). Although most justifications are reasonable, they are piecemeal. One can always pick up a few strands of the various arguments and make a particular case. At the outset, a negative relationship between coercion and acts of defiance seems obvious. Because retribution imposes a cost on the perpetrator, rational actors facing higher costs should reduce their participation. This view has been articulated in the economic analysis of Becker (1976) and Tullock (1971), and the sociological analysis of Smelser (1963) and Johnson (1982).

Note that this kind of reasoning seems reasonable but begs the question: What are the overall costs and benefits in a specific situation? What role is played by economic variables? The dynamics of the relationship between coercion and rebellion may be sensitive to the specification of these costs and benefits. Arguments have also been made that the relationship is positive because policies of repression result in further mobilization of dissidents and lower the legitimacy of a repressive government (Eckstein 1965, 1980; Gurr 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend 1972; Gurr and Duval 1973; Hibbs 1973; Kuran 1989). Again whether this actually takes place depends on the type of regime and the socioeconomic conditions of the participants. The results could be radically different depending on whether this action takes place in a democracy or dictatorship.

Other arguments have been made about a quadratic relationship (initially positive and subsequently negative) between acts of government suppression and dissident activities. Gurr (1970a) has pointed out that "the threat and severity of coercive violence used by a regime increases the anger of dissidents, thereby intensifying their opposition, up to some threshold of government violence beyond which anger gives way to fear" (p. 238). Empirical evidence supporting this view is available, among others, in Bwy (1968), Feierabend and Feierabend (1972), Gupta and Venieris (1981), and Venieris and Gupta (1983, 1985). Again, whether frustration and anger result in escalating the cycle of violence would appear to depend on the nature of the repression, the availability of economic opportunities, and the type of government. Particularly, fear is more likely to breed and persist in a dictatorial regime.

Finally, arguments have also been made about a U-shaped quadratic relationship. Lichbach and Gurr (1981) have argued that low levels of repression may initially reduce the mobilized resources of the opposition resulting in less dissident activity. Further repression will result in more frustration and injustice. A hard-core opposition group may be able to

mobilize more resources in the long run and escalate its activity. Obviously, this scenario would be contingent on the specific economic and social conditions and the type of regime in power.

As stated earlier, all these arguments justifying different possible signs for the functional relationship between coercion and rebellious action appear prima facie reasonable. However, which of these arguments will be paramount in a specific situation and how these factors will jointly contribute to the ultimate outcome, depend on critical antecedent factors. These factors include the type of regime faced by the opposition group, changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the participants, factors affecting group identity, and so on. Simple theorizing of this bivariate relationship between coercion and dissidence, without considering the complex world in which the relationship is embedded, can take us only so far. We should move the debate to a different plane by analyzing and testing the potential significance of these antecedent factors that impinge on the relationship. In the following section, we develop the theoretical foundations for incorporating the antecedent factors that we regard as potentially significant. The ultimate touchstone of their relevance and validity is provided subsequently by empirical tests.

2. MODEL SPECIFICATION

In line with recent developments in this field, we build the model from the point of view of a rational participant facing specific constraints. Applying rationality in this connection means simply that most participants are cognizant of the political, social, and economic reality facing them, and they make the best possible decision on the average. This notion is consistent with individual and periodic episodes of irrational action, as long as such acts are limited and do not persist over time. It is also consistent with subjective heuristics and biases they may exhibit in their decision-making process. The basic essence of the subjective decision-making process can be modeled as long as participants connect their decision making to the social reality around them.

We start with an underlying behavioral hypothesis of utility maximization. In our simple formulation, the utility from political and economic activities is maximized by the competing allocation of time. In symbolic terms it can be written as

$$U = U(Ye, Yr)$$

where Ye is the measure of economic income (defined broadly), and Yr measures political income. For the sake of analytical clarity, we assume that Ye is created by time spent on economic activity, and Yr is created by spending time on rebellious antisystemic activities (for a detailed explanation of this hypothesis, see Gupta 1990 and Gupta and Singh 1992).

In order to specify the constraints and potentially important antecedent factors, we adopt a modified version of the model proposed by Lichbach (1987, 269-82). Where

$$Tt = Tr + Te \quad [1]$$

$$Tr = PDr \quad [2]$$

$$Te = PDe \quad [3]$$

Tt is the total time available, Tr is the time spent on rebellious activity, and Te is time spent on economic activity. PDr is the total amount of person-days spent on rebellious activity and PDe is the total amount of person days spent on economic activity. The only departure we make from Lichbach's model is that, in his case, the overall time constraint is allocated between violent and nonviolent activity, whereas ours is between political and economic activity. We argue in favor of the latter version because it establishes a more comprehensive closure of the model and brings into prominence the economic opportunity cost of time. Clearly, the availability of economic opportunities and the higher implied earnings of labor will make dissident activity relatively less attractive. The monetary value of the output that can be obtained from both activities is

$$O = O (Tr, Te). \quad [4]$$

This encompasses all government subsidies, accommodations, benefits that can be obtained for both dissident activities and economic activities within a specific regime. The monetary value of the cost of each activity can be specified as

$$C = RTr + ETe + F. \quad [5]$$

RTr is the variable cost of dissident activity, which includes the amount of government coercion imposed due to escalation of activity. F, the fixed cost, is a function of the general level of repression and organizational costs of the

opposition groups. ETe, the cost of economic activity, is the forsaking of leisure-time to earn existing wages. Again, following Lichbach's formulation, the constrained maximization can be represented by the following Lagrangian function:

$$L = RPDr + EPDe + F + \lambda[Ot - O(PDr, PDe)]. \quad [6]$$

The first-order conditions for minimizing costs (after factoring out P) are[1]

$$R = \lambda Or$$

$$E = \lambda Oe.$$

The above equations state that in order to maximize the total benefits in a specific regime, marginal costs of dissident and economic activity are continuously compared with the marginal benefits attributable to both activities. Ceteris paribus, if the marginal benefits of economic activity are relatively higher in a specific situation, then participants will be less attracted to dissident activity. Conversely, if the reward of economic activities is low, participation in dissident activities may become an attractive option. Note that this model can easily be extended to incorporate Lichbach's basic concept of a relative choice between violent and nonviolent dissident activity by decomposing political activity further into two separate components for violent and nonviolent tactics. However, we feel that initially the choice between economic and political activity is more fundamental because it connects the model to various economic opportunity variables and maintains a parsimonious model. What are the testable implications of this model? Consider the following reduced-form equation:

$$(NBr = F(GC, RT, GI, NBe; \varepsilon). \quad [7]$$

Our model implies that the net benefits of rebellious activity (NBr) are dependent on the amount of government coercion (GC), the regime type (RT), the degree of group identity (GI), and the net benefits of economic activity (NBe); ε is an error term for other factors not captured by this formulation. It seems appropriate to argue that the amount of dissident activity will be determined by the level of net benefits obtainable (NBr). It should be clear from our formulation that the relationship between Nbr and GC, our basic focus, depends critically on what is happening with the other variables: RT, GI, and NBe. As discussed earlier, what is at issue is the partial

1. For derivation see Lichbach (1987, 279-80).

relationship between NBr and GC after controlling for these variables, not the simple bivariate relationship.

We have also stated previously, that the control variables to be employed in order to disentangle the partial relationship between NBr and GC are likely to be controversial. We welcome this controversy. Let us consider the detailed rationale for each control variable. One of the most important factors impinging on the relationship between NBr and GC is the type of regime (RT). Lichbach (1987) states that "the regime thus turns out to be the key factor that influences opposition activity because it alters the costs of an opponent's tactics" (p. 289). Henderson (1991) argues that "the accountability of a democratic government can mean that people have a chance to acquire their goals and will not become so restive as to attract the policy of repression" (p. 133). Gurr (1970a) has argued that the public order critically depends on people having the means to reach their aspirations and this relationship may be a scientific law of social organization. The type of regime has direct implications for the qualitative nature of tactics employed by the dissident groups. Note that in democratic systems, political leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King openly advocated defiant, nonviolent means (Chong 1991). In stark contrast, Mao, Guevara, and other leaders facing dictatorial regimes spend a great deal of time elaborating the tactics of guerrilla attacks. Clearly, the nature of the regime appears to be an important determinant for the type of tactics employed and the resultant interaction between coercion and dissident activity.

Why should group identity (GI) be a control variable? The private interest or the by-product theory of collective political action contends that if benefits resulting from a successful dissident activity are distributed equally to everybody in the group regardless of the level of participation, then the possibility of benefit cannot be considered to be an incentive to participate, resulting in "the paradox of revolution" (Tullock 1971). A similar argument has also been offered by Silver (1974), Ireland (1976) and Roeder (1982). Recently, a number of studies have argued the need for including public goods besides private goods as a motivating force for collective action. Frohlich and his associates (Frohlich, Hunt, and Oppenheimer 1975) explicitly introduced the concept of public goods in collective political action. A number of theoretical studies (Lupsha 1969; Chamberlain 1974; Mason 1984; Gupta and Singh 1992) have argued for the inclusion of group motivation or ideology as an explanation of the logical problems of a freerider posed by Olson (1971) and Sen (1967). Muller and Opp (1986), with the help of a sample survey of actual and potential participants in antisystemic protest activities, have provided empirical evidence for the ideological factor in individual expected utility function. In psychology, scholars such as Erikson

(1968), Tajfel (1970, 1978), and Volkan (1990) have stressed the importance of "group identity" as a determinant of individual action. This variable, alternatively termed group ideology, identity, or cohesiveness, is potentially relevant and admittedly difficult to measure. In the empirical section, we will suggest some proxies for capturing GI.

The rationale for including net economic benefits (NBe) is self-evident. Our theoretical model brings to the forefront the competing opportunity costs of participating in economic and dissident activity. It is not only the present economic options that are relevant for the decision-making calculus, but the perception of future economic benefits. To put it another way, besides real economic growth and employment levels, the underlying trends in economic inequalities and population growth rates are potentially important for assessing perception about future opportunities. Gupta (1990) has provided empirical evidence of the impact of economic variables on collective rebellious behavior.

Having provided the rationale for taking into account the interactive effects of regime type, group identity, and economic performance, the dynamics of political instability and government coercion are investigated in an empirical setting.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

DATA AND SAMPLE SPECIFICS

The problem with empirical estimation of the behavioral equations pertaining to the acts of political violence based on aggregate national data is that, although the impacts of some of the independent variables are measurable across time, the effect of others are discernible only through cross-national studies. For example, economic variables such as per capita gross national product (GNP), which vary significantly over time, can be used for estimating relationships in a time series analysis. However, there are some variables, relating mostly to institutional and distributional change, such as the regime type (which, for all the developed nations, has not changed during the sample period) or measures of distribution of income, which vary primarily across nations and not across time. But for a fuller understanding of the behavioral relationship the inclusion of both are necessary. Therefore, for this study, we have pooled time series with cross-section data. It should be noted that those variables that do not change over time, in fact, serve as cross-section dummy variables.

The empirical investigation is based on the following 24 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, West Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The data for each country consist of annual observations for the period from 1960 to 1980. The choice of countries and the time period are basically governed by the availability of data and the manageability of the study. All variables employed in the investigation are defined in Table 1, along with their mean and standard deviation values. The data sources for each are also indicated.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Because antisystemic activities are diverse, we employ several specifications. Initially, we use a comprehensive index of political instability. Subsequently, a distinction is made between violent and nonviolent activities. Gupta (1990, 198-204) has provided specific details for developing a political instability quotient (PIQ) for various countries over time by employing cluster analysis. In the first step, a hypothetical country profile is constructed, which is regarded as an epitome of a stable nation. The standardized Euclidian distance for each country (based on the number of dissident activities actually taking place at a point of time) is measured from this hypothetical country (with no dissident activity whatsoever). Discriminant analysis is employed to generate weights for aggregating various types of dissident activities. Eight different types of dissident activities are aggregated by the discriminant weighing scheme to arrive at PIQ: (1) number of political demonstrations, (2) number of riots, (3) number of political strikes, (4) number of deaths from political violence, (5) number of assassinations, (6) number of armed attacks, (7) number of political executions, and (8) occurrence of successful/unsuccessful coups d'état. A dummy variable for democracy is also included in the weighted equation. Further details of the procedure as well as the estimated data series for PIQ are available in Gupta (1990). Two tests of construct validity for PIQ are made in Gupta (1990). First, the compatibility of PIQ with other generally accepted rankings such as those by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold (1969) is established. Second, the ability of existing structural theories to explain political instability among nations based on PIQ and the ability of PIQ to duplicate empirical results are evaluated. Both tests indicate that the computed PIQ is a reasonable, comprehensive measure of different types of dissident activities.

A primary assertion of this article is that the nature of the regime and the type of dissident activity permitted within the institutional structure are

TABLE 1
Data Description and Source

Variable Name	*Description*	*Mean*	SD	*Source*
PIQ	Political instability quotient	0.90	0.81	A[a] & E
PD	Protest demonstrations	9.80	31.28	E
LD	Log (deaths from domestic group violence)	1.46	1.69	E
LA	Log (armed attacks)	1.46	1.48	E
GC	Government coercion for the entire sample	11.34	11.34	E
GCD	Government coercion for democracies	20.50	33.01	E
GCN	Government coercion for nondemocracies	6.29	10.56	E
GCD (GURR)	Government coercion for democracies (Gurr)	17.55	30.38	P
GCN (GURR)	Government coercion for nondemocracies (Gurr)	6.13	9.22	P
CSD	Cross-section dummy	12.50	6.93	
TSD	Time series dummy	11.00	6.06	
GNP	Real gross domestic product	3,231.77	2,449.97	B
URBAN	% of population living in urban areas	27.71	16.47	E & C
POPG	Annual rate of population growth	60.87	73.90	B
GINI	Coefficient for income inequality—1970	22.88	11.87	E
ELF	Index for entholinguistic factionalism	0.24	0.20	E
INT	Coefficient for intensity economic, political, and separatist discrimination	3.60	3.93	E
LIT	% of literate population	27.96	21.74	D
EHE	Enrollment in higher education	12,820.78	21,968.38	E & D

A = Banks (1971).
B = Kravis, Summers, and Heston (1984).
C = United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*.
D = UNESCO *Yearbook*.
E = Taylor and Jodice (1983).
P = *POLITY II* (Gurr 1989).
a. Based on calculation by Gupta (1990).

important control variables. In order to explore this issue further, we make a decomposition of the overall political dissidence variable. Previous empirical literature on the nature of political dissidence has demonstrated the existence of two distinct dimensions of dissidence: predominantly violent and predominantly nonviolent (Eckstein 1965; Hibbs 1973; and Rummel 1963). Following Hibbs's (1973) empirical finding, we have chosen the variables that load the highest in factor analysis within its own dimension. Thus we have employed deaths due to group violence (LD) as a proxy for the violent dimension, and protest demonstration (PD) to represent the largely nonviolent dissident activities.

However, as indicated by Gurr (1986) the choice of death from domestic violence (LD) as a proxy for violent political activities may be contaminated

by the fact that most of the deaths occur among the dissidents and are caused by the political regimes during their process of repression. Consequently, the death variable may not fully capture the strategic choice made by the opposition. The alternative specification of the amount of armed attacks by the dissidents (LA) is used to represent the more violent forms of political opposition.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONTROL VARIABLES

Government Coercion

We focus on two aspects of GC. First, overt government coercion is proxied by the actual number of governmental sanctions taken by the authorities, such as censorship, restrictions on political behavior, arrest of opposition politicians, exile or deportation of adversaries, and so on. Second, the expectations regarding future coercion are captured by a partial adjustment model.

Regime Type

The next task is to develop the classification of RT. We classify countries into two regime types: democracies and nondemocracies. Karl Popper (1988), in his characteristic parsimonious style, defines democracy as a system in which a transition of power can take place within the rule of law without bloodshed. In order to develop an operational classification for all countries in our sample, we follow two alternative specifications. First, following Gupta (1990), a nation is classified as democratic if it has a civilian government, the effective head of the state is elected, and if the elected head operates within some measure of checks and balances. The data series is largely based on the work of Banks (1971). Although any definition is likely to be arbitrary to some extent, the proposed classification appears reasonable, and provides binary data for all sample countries across 20 years. Further details of the classifying scheme are available in Gupta (1990). Second, we employ Gurr's classification of democracies on a 10-point scale, available as a part of Inter-University Consortium data series, *POLITY II*.

Group Identity

Following arguments by Gupta (1990), the strength of group identity (GI) is hypothesized to be a direct function of the factors deepening "cleavages"

within the society. As Kelman (1973) points out, with increased level of fragmentation it is easier for groups to see each other as adversaries, which contributes to the overall hostility within a society. Therefore, these factors are proxied by Gini coefficients, measuring economic cleavages, and the index of ethnolinguistic factionalism (ELF) and intensity of economic, political, and separatist tendencies (INT), measuring social and political cleavages. In this group we also include two other factors relating to the educational level of the population. We hypothesize that the strength of group identity is also determined by factors of awareness that comes through education. Empirical studies, such as the Kerner Commission Report (1968), find that the participants in urban riots are somewhat better educated than the nonparticipants. Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between dissident activities and literacy in the society (LIT). However, literacy may not tell us the entire story about the complex relationship between the level of education and participatory behavior in acts of political defiance. We further hypothesize that enrollment in higher education (EHE) will serve as a mollifying force within the society, because these individuals are more likely to develop a stake in the current political system. Again, the Kerner Report found the counter-rioters to be even better educated than the participants and the nonparticipants.

Factors of Economic Benefits

Factors of economic benefit measure the opportunity cost of the participants for devoting their time away from economic activities. Factors affecting the level of economic benefits at the aggregate level are proxied by the GNP, the annual rate of population growth (POPG), and percentage of population living in urban areas (URBAN). The variable population growth is linked with the perception of economic opportunity because high rates of population growth are accompanied by high ratios of youths in the population. Youths form the backbone of any political movement (particularly the left-leaning ones), since they have the least opportunity cost of participation. Since, for the most part, they are yet to enter the economic sector of the nation, their current opportunity cost is less (Gupta 1990). A number of important studies have found the percentage of urbanized population to be positively linked with dissident activities (Hibbs 1973). We hypothesize that this preponderance is caused by (1) the higher opportunity cost of peasant population to leave a farming season and embrace political activism (Popkin 1979) and (2) easier access to dissident movement, or relatively low cost of association (Tilly 1978).

ESTIMATION RESULTS

Overt Coercion

We model the response of opposition groups to actual open coercive acts. The empirical results are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. In each table, various models are presented, with a different set of control variables for each model. Let us consider the results presented in Table 2. In the first instance, government coercion variables are regressed solely by themselves, assuming a simple bivariate relationship. The results indicate insignificant t values and a very low coefficient of determination (0.01), implying a model with hardly any explanatory power (model 1). This is consistent with our contention that a simple bivariate relationship does not make sense. In model 2, a distinction is made between democratic and nondemocratic nations, employing Gupta's definition. The results improve dramatically once we distinguish the regime type. The democratic countries have a U-shaped quadratic relationship, which is statistically significant (only in model 2). Conversely, the nondemocratic countries have an inverted U-shaped relationship, which is statistically significant. The adjusted R^2 increases to 0.26, indicating considerable increase in explanatory power. The F test for the inclusion of the regime type distinction is highly significant at the 1% level (89.64 vs. critical value of 4.79). Following general econometric convention, we rely on F tests to test the joint significance of a group of variables at each model stage; the t values are suspect because of possible multicollinearity. Specific variables are included (in spite of insignificant t values) as long as the F test for their joint significance exceeds the critical value. These results indicate that regime type is a basic determinant of the relationship between government coercion and dissident activities.

Because this is a pooled (time series and cross-section) model, in the third equation, we introduce dummy variables across the cross-section and time series dimensions. The F test for these four control variables is significant at the 1% level (7.37 vs. critical value of 3.48), although the coefficients of the government coercion variables do not change considerably with the inclusion of these variables. This model implies that the results are marginally different, once cross-country and time series differentials are controlled. In model 4, we include proxies for economic performance variables. A set of three variables are included: real output (GNP), URBAN, AND POPG. The F test for the inclusion of these three variables is significant at the 1% level (5.29 vs. critical value of 3.95), implying that economic performance variables

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TABLE 2
Dependent Variable: PIQ

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 (Gurr)*	*Model 7 (Gurr)*
Constant	.8700 (19.6)	.718 (17.6)	.540 (3.45)	.731 (3.20)	.454 (2.0)	.711 (16.65)	.213 (0.55)
GC	.00325 (1.0)						
GC^2	−.0000023 (.11)						
GCD		−.011 (3.5)	−.0048 (1.38)	.0048 (1.2)	.0004 (0.1)	−.0058 (1.91)	.0071 (1.76)
GCD^2		.000078 (4.1)	.00005 (2.6)	.00001 (0.5)	.00002 (1.2)	.000054 (2.75)	−.0000043 (0.19)
GCN		.071 (10.4)	.071 (9.9)	.071 (10.0)	.067 (9.5)	.087 (8.96)	.072 (7.21)
GCN^2		−.0007 (6.0)	−.0006 (5.7)	−.0006 (5.4)	−.00053 (4.8)	−.0012 (5.10)	−.00082 (3.67)
TSD			.042 (2.0)	.053 (2.5)	.047 (2.3)		.029 (1.35)
TSD^2			−.0009 (1.0)	−.001 (1.1)	−.0009 (1.0)		−.00034 (0.36)

CSD			−.0074 (0.39)	−.03 (1.3)	−.025 (1.1)		−.013 (0.55)
CSD^2			−.0004 (0.49)	.0008 (0.9)	.0009 (1.0)		−.00004 (0.04)
GNP				−.00009 (3.3)	−.00008 (3.0)		−.00005 (1.73)
URBAN				−.0003 (0.1)	.001 (.25)		−.00027 (0.06)
POPG				−.008 (0.2)	−.0002 (0.04)		.026 (0.63)
GINI					−.008 (1.5)		−.011 (1.94)
ELF					.786 (4.9)		.590 (3.57)
INT					−.001 (0.1)		−.0062 (0.56)
LIT					.006 (2.0)		.0099 (3.24)
EHE					.000002 (1.6)		.037 (1.01)
R^2	.01	.27	.31	.34	.39	.23	.35
Adjusted R^2	.003	.26	.30	.32	.37	.22	.32
F ratio	1.68	89.64	7.37	5.29	9.97	72.5	8.014

NOTE: t values are in parentheses. For definition of each variable, see Table 1.

TABLE 3
Dependent Variable: Log (Deaths from Domestic Group Violence)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 (Gurr)*	*Model 7 (Gurr)*
Constant	1.038 (12.0)	.866 (9.7)	.897 (2.6)	−.33 (0.7)	−.55 (1.1)	.88 (9.52)	.520 (0.61)
GC	.044 (7.1)						
GC^2	−.00013 (3.1)						
GCD		.034 (5.1)	.040 (5.2)	.043 (4.9)	.043 (4.8)	.040 (6.00)	.049 (5.54)
GCD^2		−.00006 (1.5)	−.00009 (2.0)	−.0001 (2.1)	−.00015 (2.2)	−.000094 (2.24)	−.00013 (2.74)
GCN		.12 (8.0)	.11 (6.7)	.10 (6.3)	.09 (5.8)	.13 (6.26)	.088 (4.05)
GCN^2		−.0011 (5.5)	−.0009 (3.7)	−.001 (3.6)	−.00083 (3.4)	−.0017 (3.46)	−.001 (2.10)
TSD			.148 (3.1)	.163 (3.5)	.154 (3.3)		.159 (3.38)
TSD^2			−.0075 (3.7)	−.008 (4.1)	−.008 (3.8)		−.0078 (3.81)

CSD			−.0538 (1.3)	.095 (1.9)	−.084 (1.62)		−.086 (1.63)
CSD^2			.001 (0.58)	.003 (1.2)	.002 (1.1)		.002 (0.97)
GNP				.00002 (0.3)	.00004 (0.7)		.000046 (0.73)
URBAN				.016 (1.9)	.012 (2.2)		.019 (2.03)
POPG				−.042 (0.5)	−.021 (0.2)		−.013 (0.15)
GINI					.023 (1.9)		−.02 (1.67)
ELF					.004 (0.01)		−.086 (1.63)
INT					−.06 (2.5)		−.064 (2.62)
LIT					.023 (3.5)		.02 (3.35)
EHE					−.000002 (0.7)		−.11 (1.41)
R^2	.15	.20	.24	.27	.29	.18	.28
Adjusted R^2	.14	.20	.23	.25	.27	.17	.26
F ratio	43.33	17.33	5.85	7.58	3.32	11.05	8.46

NOTE: *t* values are in parentheses. For definition of each variable, see Table 1.

TABLE 4
Dependent Variable: Log (Dissident Armed Attacks)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 (Gurr)*	*Model 7 (Gurr)*
Constant	.836 (13.09)	.78 (11.48)	1.35 (5.40)	1.05 (3.34)	1.38 (2.29)	.82 (11.78)	1.58 (2.58)
GC	.067 (14.34)						
GC^2	−.0002 (7.09)						
GCD		.067 (13.08)	.045 (8.18)	.031 (4.90)	.033 (5.12)	.068 (13.63)	.039 (6.24)
GCD^2		−.0002 (6.50)	−.00013 (3.89)	−.00006 (1.73)	−.000066 (1.91)	−.00022 (6.92)	−.000099 (2.87)
GCN		.09 (7.89)	.096 (8.29)	.097 (8.57)	.089 (7.89)	.075 (4.74)	.065 (4.10)
GCN^2		−.00065 (3.42)	−.00068 (3.68)	−.00076 (4.23)	−.0007 (3.95)	−.0005 (1.33)	−.00035 (0.99)
TSD			.019 (0.56)	−.024 (0.07)	−.00037 (0.01)		−.01 (0.31)
TSD^2			−.00056 (0.37)	−.0001 (0.06)	.00002 (0.16)		.0005 (0.36)

CSD			−.21 (6.85)	−.22 (6.02)	−.21 (5.54)		−.21 (5.53)
CSD^2			.0098 (7.95)	.0096 (6.51)	.0092 (6.15)		.0089 (5.85)
GNP				.0002 (4.8)	.00022 (5.12)		.00022 (4.89)
URBAN				−.0081 (1.45)	−.0019 (0.29)		−.0017 (0.26)
POPG				.12 (2.19)	.096 (1.50)		.10 (1.49)
GINI					−.0079 (0.92)		−.0077 (0.88)
ELF					−.024 (0.09)		−.10 (0.39)
INT					−.059 (3.39)		−.065 (3.60)
LIT					.017 (3.62)		.020 (4.11)
EHE					−.08 (1.49)		−.01 (1.53)
R^2	.39	.40	.47	.50	.53	.39	.51
Adjusted R^2	.39	.39	.46	.49	.51	.38	.49
F ratio	161.26	2.98	18.22	9.73	4.77	0.74	6.65

NOTE: *t* values are in parentheses. For definition of each variable, see Table 1.

TABLE 5
Dependent Variable: Protest Demonstrations

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 (Gurr)*	*Model 7 (Gurr)*
Constant	–2.85 (2.3)	–0.96 (0.8)	9.18 (2.0)	–21.43 (3.3)	–31.36 (4.8)	–1.21 (0.95)	–45.64 (4.01)
GC	1.22 (13.5)						
GC^2	–.002 (3.1)						
GCD		1.63 (18.3)	1.84 (18.1)	1.49 (12.8)	1.35 (11.7)	1.48 (16.20)	1.03 (8.74)
GCD^2		–.004 (7.3)	–.005 (8.4)	–.003 (5.4)	–.003 (4.8)	–.0034 (5.81)	–.0017 (2.58)
GCN		.34 (1.7)	.39 (1.8)	.42 (2.0)	.246 (1.2)	.42 (1.46)	.669 (2.27)
GCN^2		–.003 (0.9)	–.003 (1.0)	–.005 (1.5)	–.003 (0.8)	–.0049 (0.71)	–.0063 (0.94)
TSD			–.058 (0.1)	–.29 (0.47)	–.484 (0.8)		–.005 (0.007)
TSD^2			.017 (0.7)	.017 (.63)	–.021 (0.8)		.0028 (0.10)

CSD			1.72 (3.1)	2.78 (4.2)	2.53 (3.8)		2.72 (3.07)
CSD^2			–.083 (3.7)	–0.13 (4.8)	–.116 (4.4)		–.110 (3.83)
GNP				.002 (2.8)	.003 (3.6)		.0023 (2.74)
URBAN				.178 (1.5)	.003 (2.2)		.240 (1.95)
POPG				1.95 (1.7)	2.14 (1.9)		1.86 (1.52)
GINI					–.27 (1.8)		–.40 (2.43)
ELF					18.56 (4.0)		23.85 (4.90)
INT					.365 (1.2)		.58 (1.73)
LIT					.180 (2.1)		.120 (1.37)
EHE					–.00009 (3.8)		1.55 (1.45)
R^2	.48	.59	.60	.63	.66	.543	.62
Adjusted R^2	.48	.58	.60	.62	.65	.540	.61
F ratio	234.0	63.27	5.7	9.7	10.26	16.82	4.90

NOTE: t values are in parentheses. For definition of each variable, see Table 1.

have a significant joint impact on the relationship. The significant, inverse sign of the coefficient for GNP indicates that real economic growth is an effective deterrence for preventing political instability. Finally, five variables for group identity are incorporated in model 5: ELF, INT, LIT, EHE, and Gini coefficient for measuring income inequality (GINI). Although group identity is difficult to measure, we have used surrogate variables measuring the degree of division within society along ethnic, linguistic, and economic lines (ELF, INT, and GINI). Also EHE and LIT imply that the spread of education nationwide would raise consciousness. The F test for the joint significance of these five variables is again significant at the 1% level (9.97 vs. critical value of 3.17).

Subsequently, we estimated models 2 and 5, by using the alternate definition of democracy proposed by Gurr (1989), estimated as models 6 and 7. In order to obtain comparable results and to contrast the differences between regimes, we made a binary classification between democracies and nondemocracies. Because the series ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), we adopted several alternative classifying schemes, resulting in no significant change in the conclusions. The results reported in the tables are based on democracies having values greater than 4 and nondemocracies having less than or equal to 4.[2] The results based on Gurr's definition of democracy are similar to those derived by employing Gupta's (1990) definition.

What inferences can we draw from Table 2? First, our basic contention that government coercion and dissident activity should not be analyzed as a simple bivariate relationship appears to be vindicated. The control variables for regime type, economic performance, and group identity provide additional explanatory power and alter the partial relationship between government coercion and PIQ. The remarkable change in results (between model 1 and 2), once regime type is distinguished, needs special mention. Although the initial relationship between government coercion and PIQ for democracies is U-shaped for model 2, it weakens progressively as the specification is enlarged to include more control variables for economic performance and group identity. This result indicates that, in a democratic regime, the crucial determinants of political instability are economic performance and factors shaping group identity. Government coercion has little explanatory power once these variables are included, implying that the solutions to political instability in these nations are political rather than coercive. This result is

2. There was a small number of cases where the countries were in transition because of coups d'état and other irregular transfers of power. POLITY II provided no information for these years. For empirical convenience, we interpolated the missing data by averaging the values for the preceding and the subsequent years.

robust across both definitions of democracy. In contrast, in nondemocracies, the partial relationship between government coercion and PIQ is highly significant (inverted U-shaped) and remains unaltered even when additional control variables are included. Notice that the magnitude of the effect of government coercion on dissident activities is more pronounced in nondemocracies relative to democracies. This magnitude depends on the *level* of GCD and GCN, since it is a quadratic relationship.

In Figure 1 we have simulated the relationship between GCN and PIQ for model 2 and model 5, by using the partial coefficients of the specific models and a monotonic vector of increasing coercion values. Note the dynamics of this relationship is significantly altered in model 5 when additional control variables are employed. The relationship between GCN and PIQ is initially positive and subsequently negative. Because the mean GCN for nondemocracies is 6.29 ($N = 327$, $SD = 10.56$), most of these nations fall within the range where the relationship between PIQ and GCN is positive. However, we may note that some nondemocracies do have the capability of quelling dissident movement by an extensive use of coercion. The turning point in the relationship occurs at GCN = 60.9 for model 5, whereas the maximum value of GCN in the sample is 97. Models 2 and 5 are simulated with Gurr's definition with essentially similar results (reported as Gurr 2 and 5).

The question arises, Why is the partial relationship between dissident activity and government coercion fundamentally different for democracies and nondemocracies? We have noted earlier that the answer to this question may lie in the inference that the solutions in democracies are generally of a political nature, whereas in nondemocracies the use of brute force can at times be effective.

The decomposition of political instability between violent and nonviolent activity is taken up next. Initially, consider the results based on deaths from domestic group violence as a proxy for the more violent dimension of dissident activity. Table 3 shows the results for the same set of explanatory variables employed in Table 2, when deaths (LD) is the dependent variable. For violent political activity, the partial relationship between government coercion and LD is significant for both democracies and nondemocracies across various model specifications. Note that coercion is relatively more provocative in nondemocracies, because the coefficient for GCN is approximately twice that of GCD. However, Figure 2 shows that for democracies, the simulated partial relationship between GCD and LD is positive and significant within the operational zone of the relationship (mean GCD = 20.5, $SD = 33.01$). Interestingly, the maximum value of GCD is 221 in our sample, which is close to the turning point in the simulated relationship (at GCD =



Figure 1: Political Instability Quotient (PIQ) and Coercion for Nondemocracies

188, for Gurr 5), the point which Gurr (1970a) called the "equilibrium of high violence and high coercion."

In contrast, Figure 3 shows that the simulated relationship between government coercion and deaths for nondemocracies is also initially positive



Figure 2: Percentage Change in Deaths and Coercion for Democracies

and significant; however, the turning point (at GCN = 45, in model 5) is well within the feasibility range, maximum value of GCN is 97 (for the subsample based on Gupta's definition of democracy). This result corroborates our previous finding that government coercion in nondemocratic regimes, when



Figure 3: Percentage Change in Deaths and Coercion for Nondemocracies

employed at the extreme values, can be a deterrent to dissident activities, whereas in democracies, the deterrence segment of the relationship falls outside the sample range.[3]

3. Of course, one may question the long-term ability of even the most brutal regime to govern by sheer force. For example, Rummel (1990) documents the extraordinary coercive capabilities of the Soviet Union.

Now, consider the alternative specification of armed attack events (LA) reported in Table 4. The results of this proxy are essentially similar to the death variable. The relationship between coercion and violent activity is positive for democracies because the threshold point beyond which coercion acts as a deterrence falls well outside the sample range for these regimes (Figure 4). In contrast, for nondemocracies the results generally indicate an inverted-U relationship, with the deterrence threshold falling within the sample range (Figure 5). Again, the coefficient for nondemocratic coercion (GCN) is approximately twice as much as the coefficient for democratic coercion (GCD). One exception to this general result is that when we delineate the regimes based on Gurr's definition of democracy, the shape of the relationship between armed attacks and government coercion for nondemocracies is indeterminate because the quadratic term for GCN is insignificant in models 6 and 7. However, because the GCN coefficient is positive and significant in both models 6 and 7 and the turning point (92.9) lies outside the feasibility range (maximum value = 62, for Gurr's subset of the sample), the relationship may be viewed as positive.

The modeling of nonviolent dissident activity is taken up next. In Table 5, we report the same regressions when the number of protest demonstrations is the dependent variable. In this case, the relationship between coercion and protest demonstrations for nondemocracies is generally insignificant across various model specifications. One exception is the specification based on Gurr's definition of democracy, which is classified as indeterminate. We draw this conclusion because the GCN coefficient is insignificant in model 6 and significant in model 7, whereas the quadratic term is insignificant in both specifications.

In contrast, this relationship for democracies is highly significant and remains so across the different models, including Gurr's specification of democracy. Note that the size of the GCD coefficients is significantly higher than the GCN coefficients, although the precise response of PD will depend on the level of GCN and GCD in each case. For the average profile the relationship is essentially positive: the quadratic terms of GCN and GCD are relatively less important because the mean of coercion variables falls toward the lower end of the spectrum (mean of GCD = 20.5 and GCN = 6.29). This indicates that government coercion is relatively more provocative in democratic regimes.

Figure 6 plots the partial simulated relationship for democracies. The notion that overt coercion is provocative in democracies is validated further by observing that the threshold at which coercion acts as a deterrence is well beyond the feasibility range (turning points for model 5 and Gurr 5 are 225 and 303, respectively, whereas the maximum value is 221). The fact that



Figure 4: Percentage Change in Armed Attacks and Coercion for Democracies

government coercion, in general, does not act as a deterrence in democracies is also borne out by microlevel survey data of political dissidents in West Germany and the United States by Muller and Opp (1986). These results are better explained by considering the nature of the regime and the propaganda



Figure 5: Percentage Change in Armed Attacks and Coercion for Nondemocracies

value of high coercion for increasing recruitment in democracies, rather than relying on a "martyr syndrome" as an explanation, as suggested by Muller



Figure 6: Protest Demonstrations and Coercion in Democracies

and Opp. These results also generally validate the contention of Lichbach (1987) that the nature of the regime is an important consideration for determining the employment of different tactics by dissident groups, such as choosing between violent and nonviolent activities.

The Role of Expectations in Sanctions

As discussed earlier, one component of government coercion is the expected threat of sanctions from the regime. In this context, government sanctions actually imposed at a point of time are an information input for formulating expectations about the likely nature of government sanctions in the future. To put it differently, the opposition group should not only focus on a particular act of coercion and determine a response to it, but rather consider the overall context and time span for formulating a stable strategy based on the long-term view. Such considerations are traditionally modeled within a partial adjustment framework. A partial adjustment model is based on the notion that the opposition group reacts to expected government coercion (rather than actual incidents of sanction), and that the response pattern may involve considerable delay. The lack of a timely and optimal response may not occur for three specific reasons. First, there is widespread psychological evidence to show that behavioral decision making is not always fully optimal and rational (Wallsten 1980). Second, because the response is based on *expected* coercion, a complete determination of what is anticipated may require time to be formulated in a specific scenario. Third, although the behavioral response may finally be clear to an opposition group, the action itself may be delayed by structural constraints such as the right time and place of proposed activity. This partial adjustment process can be formalized by the following equation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991):

$$DA_t = B_0 + B_1 Gc^e_t + \varepsilon_t \qquad [8]$$

where

DA_t is dissident activity at time t proxied by PIQ, LD, LA, and PD in our models
Gc^e_t is expected government coercion at time t
ε_t is a random error term.

To see how the speed of adjustment is incorporated in this model, consider the following equation:

$$Gc^e_t - Gc^e_{t-1} = \gamma (Gc_t - Gc^e_{t-1}). \qquad [9]$$

Equation 9 can be rearranged as:

$$Gc^e_t = \gamma Gc_t + (1 - \gamma) Gc^e_{t-1}. \qquad [10]$$

Equation 10 shows that expected government coercion is a weighted average of actual coercion in the current period and the expected coercion of the previous period. Undoubtedly, expected coercion is an unobservable variable for which proxy candidates are likely to be controversial. Past studies on coercive potential that focused on the amount of resources devoted to internal security and military forces may have captured portions of this implied threat (Gurr 1970b; Bwy 1968). In the formulation expressed in equation 10, the implicit premise is that current and past coercive acts are good information inputs for expected threats in the future. The parameter γ in equation 10 captures the speed with which expectations are reformulated. If adjustment is instantaneous, actual government coercion is equal to expected government coercion at time t, then γ will be equal to 1 in the polar case. In the other extreme case, if there is no adjustment at all, that is, expected government coercion at time t is equal to expected government coercion at $t - 1$, then γ will be equal to 0. In reality, γ will range between 0 and 1. If γ is closer to zero, the adjustment is slow and rapid if it approaches unity. Now, by substituting equation 10 into equation 8 we get:

$$DA_t = B_0 + B_1 \gamma Gc_t + B_1 (1 - \gamma) Gc^e_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t. \quad [11]$$

Lagging equation 8 by one period and multiplying by $(1 - \gamma)$, we obtain:

$$(1 - \gamma) DA_{t-1} = B_0 (1 - \gamma) + B_1 (1 - \gamma) Gc^e_{t-1} + (1 - \gamma) \varepsilon_{t-1}. \quad [12]$$

Subtracting equation 12 from equation 11 and rearranging:

$$DA_t = \gamma B_0 + B_1 \gamma Gc_t + (1 - \gamma) DA_{t-1} + \mu_t \quad [13]$$

where $\mu_t = \varepsilon_t - (1 - \gamma) \varepsilon_{t-1}$.

Equation 13 is the observable version of the partial adjustment process. This model is estimated along with the relevant control variables, and the results are presented in Table 6. From this table, we can see that the value of γ ranges from .53 to .72 (derived by subtracting the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables from 1), with *t* values of the lag dependent variables ranging from 3.6 to 9.9 for different proxies of DA_t. Both these findings indicate that the partial adjustment process is an appropriate modeling procedure for capturing the dynamic response of dissident activity to government coercion. It is interesting to note that the results presented in Table 6 show an almost identical pattern with those based on actual coercion. For this reason, they are not discussed in detail.

TABLE 6

The Response of Dissident Activity to Expected Government Coercion

	PIQ Model 5	*Log Deaths Model 5*	*Armed Attacks Model 5*	*Protest Demonstrations Model 5*	*PIQ Model 7*	*Log Deaths Model 7*	*Armed Attacks Model 7*	*Protest Demonstrations Model 7*
Constant	.0166	.516	1.379	–24.81	.0938	.672	1.528	–22.94
	(0.64)	(0.74)	(2.29)	(2.10)	(0.36)	(0.97)	(2.51)	(1.88)
GCD	.0035	.0354	.0217	.810	.0088	0.039	.0278	.5111
	(0.61)	(5.02)	(3.49)	(2.95)	(1.49)	(5.69)	(4.57)	(2.08)
GCD^2	–.000005	–.000096	–.00005	–.00071	–.000029	–.00011	–.00008	.0005
	(0.16)	(3.18)	(1.73)	(0.61)	(0.91)	(3.70)	(2.59)	(0.52)
GCN	.054	.072	.0646	.134	.0549	.066	.0443	.3158
	(5.14)	(3.84)	(5.61)	(1.17)	(3.47)	(2.45)	(2.48)	(1.94)
GCN^2	–.00039	–.00057	–.00045	–.0011	–.00054	–.0006	–.000195	.0016
	(2.75)	(2.7)	(3.51)	(0.76)	(1.54)	(1.0)	(0.57)	(0.45)
TSD	.0404	.130	.0140	–0.574	.027	0.125	.0033	–.424
	(1.97)	(3.12)	(0.38)	(1.02)	(1.27)	(3.08)	(0.09)	(0.77)
TSD^2	–.00083	–.0058	.0011	0.027	–.00044	–.0057	.0014	.021
	(0.96)	(3.29)	(0.71)	(0.93)	(0.49)	(3.26)	(0.91)	(0.75)
CSD	–.0157	–.041	–.105	2.32	–.0074	–.041	–.104	1.71
	(0.59)	(0.82)	(2.46)	(3.11)	(0.26)	(0.80)	(2.38)	(2.94)
CSD^2	.0063	.001	.00553	–0.096	–.00004	.0008	.005	–.07
	(0.61)	(0.52)	(3.30)	(3.23)	(0.04)	(0.4)	(2.93)	(2.76)
GNP	–.000068	.000008	.000061	.00172	–.000039	.107	.000066	.00139
	(2.70)	(0.16)	(1.52)	(1.60)	(1.43)	(0.23)	(1.57)	(1.15)

(continued)

TABLE 6 Continued

	PIQ Model 5	*Log Deaths Model 5*	*Armed Attacks Model 5*	*Protest Demonstrations Model 5*	*PIQ Model 7*	*Log Deaths Model 7*	*Armed Attacks Model 7*	*Protest Demonstrations Model 7*
URBAN	.000177	.01	.0022	.1547	−.0013	.010	.0013	.128
	(.063)	(1.33)	(0.31)	(1.99)	(0.43)	(1.27)	(0.19)	(1.72)
POPG	−.0026	−.0059	.111	1.51	.0193	−.00087	.114	1.298
	(0.08)	(.069)	(1.69)	(2.51)	(0.57)	(0.01)	(1.78)	(2.24)
GINI	−.0068	.011	−.094	−.247	−.788	.0093	−.0091	−.286
	(1.47)	(1.0)	(1.05)	(1.91)	(1.61)	(0.84)	(1.1)	(2.12)
ELF	0.58	.062	.186	9.998	.0433	0.15	.0289	12.59
	(4.11)	(0.19)	(0.69)	(2.70)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(0.11)	(3.0)
INT	−.00067	−.045	−.061	.1145	−.0046	−.047	−0.657	.198
	(.064)	(2.18)	(3.12)	(0.57)	(0.43)	(2.30)	(3.33)	(1.0)
LIT	.0043	.0113	.0077	.160	.0062	0.012	.00984	.091
	(1.51)	(1.83)	(1.31)	(2.16)	(2.17)	(2.04)	(1.66)	(1.29)
EHE	.0356	−.112	−.150	.9115	.0266	−0.12	−.149	.818
	(1.41)	(1.75)	(2.50)	(1.52)	(1.05)	(1.90)	(2.40)	(1.37)
Lagged dependent variable	.282	.367	.451	.3525	.316	.372	.469	.418
	(4.21)	(7.23)	(9.73)	(3.58)	(4.81)	(7.41)	(9.93)	(4.19)
R^2	.45	.40	.62	.70	.42	.40	.61	.69
Adjusted R^2	.43	.38	.60	.69	.40	.38	.59	.68

NOTE: The results are reported after White's correction for heteroscedasticity. *t* values are in parentheses. For definition of each variable, see Table 1.

TABLE 7
Summary Results of Relations Between Repression and Dissident Activities

	Overall (PIQ)	*Deaths from Domestic Group Violence*	*Armed Attacks*	*Protest Demonstrations*
Democracies (Model 5)	Insignificant	Positive	Positive	Positive
Democracies (Model 7—Gurr)	Insignificant	Positive	Positive	Positive
Nondemocracies (Model 5)	Inverted U	Inverted U	Inverted U	Insignificant
Nondemocracies (Model 7—Gurr)	Inverted U	Inverted U	Indeterminate	Indeterminate

4. CONCLUSION

Our findings regarding the partial relationship between government coercion and different proxies for dissident activities are summarized in Table 7. On the basis of these results, we make the following concluding observations.

First, a discussion of the dynamic relationship between government coercion and political dissidence should be conducted within the context of a fully specified model, which takes into account factors affecting economic performance and group identity. Our F tests for different control variables (models 2 to 7) and simulations of various specifications (Figures 1 to 6), demonstrate that this relationship is significantly altered when different control variables are employed.

Second, regime type is an important determinant of this relationship, because the qualitative nature of government coercion is different between democracies and nondemocracies. We have employed two alternative specifications for delineating democratic regimes. In our sample data, the average amount of sanctions employed by democracies (mean ranging from 17.5 to 20.5) is relatively higher than in nondemocracies (mean ranging from 6.13 to 6.29). The fundamental qualitative difference of these sanctions is underscored when the analysis distinguishes between the two kinds of political systems. In a democratic environment, government sanctions do not reduce political deaths or protest demonstrations within the feasibility zone, rather they act as provocations. This is because democratic nations have to operate within the constitutional bounds that may limit their capacity to impose severe sanctions, without seriously compromising the political legitimacy of

the regime. In these nations, the general level of political instability (PIQ) is lowered by sustained economic prosperity and reduction of group differences. Consequently, the solutions are to be found within the political process, rather than in coercive action.

In contrast, in nondemocracies, severe sanctions can at times be imposed to an extent that they place an unbearable cost on potential participants of dissident activity. The imposition of these excessive costs is possible for nondemocracies by disregarding fundamental human rights of the dissidents. This is reflected in (1) the inverse relationship between government coercion and political deaths/armed attacks within the feasibility zone for nondemocracies, and (2) the insignificant relationship between GCN and PD across various specifications. Consequently, it is not surprising that protest demonstrations are rare in nondemocracies (means are approximately 1.5 for both definitions of democracy, *SD*s around 2.9) and prevalent in democracies (means ranging from 19.7 to 25.1, *SD*s from 44.3 to 49.2).

Third, besides considering the significance of the relationships within the feasibility zones, it is important to distinguish the magnitude of different responses to government coercion for democracies and nondemocracies. For the overall index of political instability (PIQ), the magnitude of response to coercion is relatively higher in nondemocracies. The same result holds when we consider proxies for violent political activity (LD and LA). However, for nonviolent activity (PD), the magnitude of response is not only higher in democratic regimes but also the coefficient of GCD is generally greater than unity, implying a more than proportionate response to the measures of government coercion.

Fourth, when government coercion is modeled as a partial adjustment process to capture expectations about future government coercion, the entire range of results remains almost identical. Because the value of the adjustment parameter (γ) is always greater than .5 and statistically significant, we can conclude that expectations about future coercive acts are updated fairly rapidly by the dissident groups. From a policy point of view, these results carry two implications. First, manifest coercive acts (distinct from what governments may say and not necessarily do) are an important information input for formulating the oppositions' activities. Second, a shift in government tactics is met with a relatively quick reaction by opposition groups.

Two caveats regarding our analysis are in order. First, our estimation is based on aggregate national data, which may mask significant variations at the micro level. Second, our proxies for measuring economic performance and group identity may not have captured the entire complexities of these variables. These preliminary findings do, however, indicate the significance of the qualitative differences within regime types and the critical influence of

economic and group identity variables on the dynamic relationship between government coercion and dissident activities. More studies involving micro-level data, focusing on the qualitative differences of sanctions applied in various regimes need to be carried out.

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