Gramsci and the Labor-Managed Firm

BRUNO JOSSA

Department of Economic Theory and Applied Economics, University of Naples "Federico II," 16, via Mezzocannone, 80132, Napoli, Italy
e-mail: bruiossa@unina.it

Received June 16, 2007; accepted February 14, 2008

Abstract

According to Antonio Gramsci, workers' councils were transitional institutions expected to carry on business in a market economy and thereby prepare the ground for the revolution. However, upon seizing power, workers were expected to establish a centrally planned system and, hence, to renounce autonomous firm management. Finding fault with this approach, the author upholds modern labor management theory, in which Vanek's LMF-type firms are looked upon as socialist firms operating in a market economy.

JEL classification: *B14, B5, P13, P2, P50*

Keywords: *labor-managed firms; socialism; Gramsci; Ward and Vanek*

1. Introduction

Gramsci is the best-known Marxist theorist of workers' councils. "The fundamental event in the Russian revolution is the creation of a new type of State: a State of Councils. This is what historical research is called on to address. The rest is contingent" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 374). Although his theory of workers' councils was mainly developed in articles published in the political weekly *Ordine Nuovo* in 1919–1920, many analysts of his work maintain that his advocacy of workers' councils is a basic element of continuity in his thought.[1]

Gramsci's theory of workers' councils might appear to have little in common with the modern theories of employee-managed firms that were developed after the publication of Ward's (1958), Vanek's (1970, 1977), and Meade's (1972) studies, but a comparative analysis of their respective approaches may prove of interest.

As is well known, in orthodox economics the prerequisite for the proper functioning of an economic system is the adoption of one of two possible resource allocation methods:

1. See Gramsci 1923–1926: 21, 1975: 330, 1137–38, 1519; Garin 1958: 47–48, 1964: 132; Romano 1969: 159; Paggi 1970: introduction, 1977: 29–31; Bonomi 1973: 7–9, 157–58; Salvadori 1973: 43–44, 140, 142, 148–49, 175–80, 388–94, 1975: 4–6, 1978b: 42–43; Macciocchi 1974: 84–85; Badaloni 1975: 108; Vacca 1985: 62; Santucci 2001: 157–58. For some contrary opinions see Asor Rosa 1975: 1553; Lepre 1978: 26, note 27.

Author's Note: This is a much modified version of an article published in Italian in *Economia Politica*, 2004, no. 3.

Review of Radical Political Economics, Volume 41, No. 1, Winter 2009, 5-22
DOI: 10.1177/0486613408324421

private profit considerations or the commands of a planning organ. A third option is simply ruled out.[2] The celebrated debate on planning in the 1930s confirmed the feasibility of different combinations of plan and market, but until the (improbable) appearance of a "new man," entirely devoid of selfishness or self-interest, any orthodox economist will claim that private profit motives or the commands of a planning organ are a necessary assumption for the proper conduct of production.[3] Despite evidence that Gramsci (like most Marxists) rejected this view, he never addressed this basic issue in any of his works, and this limitation is probably responsible for the scant success of his theory of workers' councils.[4]

Another aim of this article is to show that Gramsci's rejection of the idea of only two possible allocation methods prevented him from addressing workers' councils as a means of remedying possible shortcomings of centralized planning. On the assumption that centralized planning was the essence of socialism, Gramsci did not ask himself if the weaknesses of the socialist system as implemented in the Soviet Union were to be blamed on centralized planning without worker incentives.[5]

The above highlights one major difference between Gramsci's workers' councils and modern theories of democratic firm governance in a system of producer cooperatives. Theorists of producer cooperatives equate socialism with democracy in the firm and expect employee-managed firms to be introduced by a democratic parliament; to Gramsci, on the contrary, a system of workers' councils was just one step forward on the road toward socialism, not socialism proper. Doubting the willingness of democratic parliaments or even workers' unions to further a transition to socialism, he looked on councils as transitional tools that would pave the way for a new social order, but not necessarily as a means of running firms efficiently.

Neither will it do to describe Gramsci's as a revolutionary approach, and modern democratic firm governance as a reformist theory. The essence of revolution is a change in production modes, and it is possible to argue that a system of labor-managed firms of the type theorized by Vanek, which reverses the capital–labor relation currently prevailing in capitalism, triggers a revolution in the socialist direction (cf. Jossa-Cuomo 1997: 144–46). Bearing in mind that from Marx's perspective the dominance of capitalists over workers was the greatest evil of capitalism, any policies intended to subvert the relative positions of workers and capitalists can be described as revolutionary (Salvadori 1973: 87).

---

2. To a modern economist, it is a sign of immaturity or scant intelligence to criticize the market and bureaucracy at one stroke as the New Left has long been doing (see, inter alia, Lindbeck 1972; Samuelson's introduction to this book, pp. XIII and XIX; Nove 1983); for a different view, see Albert and Hahnel 1990.

3. Quoting Djankov et al. (2003: 595–96),

> The typical resource allocation mechanism of a socialist system is central planning, while that of a capitalistic system is the market. Comparative economics, whose beginnings date at least from the famous debate on market socialism of the 1930s, has long been concerned with estimating the levels of economic efficiency respectively vouchsafed by a plan or the market in given circumstances.

For a detailed analysis of the economic debate of the 1930s, see, inter alia, Hoff 1938; Lavoie 1985; Jossa and Cuomo 1997: chaps. 1–6.

4. The events that led Italian society to head along different directions from those theorized in Gramsci's writings are also described in section 8.

5. On different occasions he described cooperatives as "a tool for class struggle" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 181) or as "a means to achieve ends associated with communism" (Gramsci 1921–1922: 24–25), but he never spoke of employee-managed firms as tools for furthering centralized planning.

In sum, the conclusions I reach in my study are as follows:

(a) modern producer cooperative theory and Gramsci's theorizations on workers' councils have in common the idea that workers' councils are a tool for the attainment of the transition to socialism;
(b) the second concordant underpinning of these theories is that transition must be a long-term peaceful process, and this is an assumption that Gramsci, unlike other well-known Marxists, shared with modern producer cooperative theory;
(c) Gramsci's approach to transition departs from Marx and Engels's because, differently from them, he held that the market would have to be abolished on the very morrow of the takeover of the proletariat.

2. The Economic Theory of Producer Cooperatives

To start with, let us examine the typical organization of a cooperative in current economic theory. A producer cooperative is an enterprise that is run by workers, but whose hierarchical structure is headed by elected managers. Decision-making powers are ultimately vested in all the firm's workers, but this right is not exercised on a day-to-day basis because, by its very nature, the firm is a hierarchical structure expected to respond to a changing environment thanks to prompt decisions made by single individuals. (The managers of an employee-managed firm can be chosen from among nonmembers, but once appointed they may opt for membership). Theoretically unlimited, the members' decision-making powers in economic matters are actually confined to a small number of resolutions (e.g., appointing managers or passing a resolution on major investments or the admission of new members) which, though important, do not interfere with the efficient running of the firm.

Consistently with the aim of this article, let me emphasize that this negligible role in the management of the firm's economic business does not prevent meetings of workers from performing important functions: electing delegates to parliamentary assemblies or defining the overall guidelines for a centralized plan.[6]

Another point worth stressing is that the aim of democratic firm governance is not only to enable workers to make decisions on particularly weighty options, but also, and above all, to apportion the firm's surplus among them and help devise democratic management modes in keeping with an efficient state mechanism depriving capital—and this is the main point—of all power.

Based on Vanek's theory of producer cooperatives, democratic firms are free to carry on business in the market in line with private utility calculations. They work toward maximizing average worker income because the distribution rules in the firm ensure that the income available for distribution to its workers increases in proportion to any rise in

6. To clarify this point, Panzieri argues (1975: 107):

> Citizens exercising their political rights are barely distinguishable from workers seeing to their work in factories; nor can we assume that workers long oppressed, repressed and exhausted by their masters will undergo instant change the moment they leave the factory bound for the polls. Far from acting itself out entirely in the workplace, the political struggle of the workers' movement is fought on every social terrain. But the factory, the domain of the capitalist, is the main battlefield, for it is there that workers are expected to assert their power.

the firm's aggregate revenue. Although these distributive rules may vary according to the cooperative, they are under control of the firm's members.

The market-based operation of producer cooperatives does not, in itself, rule out large-scale state intervention in the economy, but this is just an option, not a distinctive characteristic of a system of democratic firms.

Last, with reference to the reversal of the capital–labor relationship, it is worth emphasizing that, while in a capitalistic system the owners of capital pay workers a fixed income, in a system of democratic firms it is capitalists that receive a fixed income, i.e., interest on capital.

Did Gramsci assume that labor-managed firms were to be run consistently with the principles laid down in modern production cooperative theory and were to operate in a market system for a long time during the transitional period? Before I answer this question let me preliminarily clarify Marx and Engels's views on this point.

3. The Transition to Socialism in Marx and Engels

Marx encouraged the establishment of producer cooperatives at different stages of his theoretical approach. In his opinion, they were both examples of a different production mode which was bound to assert itself and to supplant capitalism, and the typical institutions of a transitional stage at which the capitalistic firm system retains some of the typical defects of a market economy.

Marx and Engels's idea of transition is "dialectical," not "nihilistic," i.e., it postulates the evolution of one form of society into the other (dialectical view) instead of the abrupt replacement of the older order with a new one (nihilistic view). From a nihilistic perspective, none of the faults that Marx and Engels imputed to capitalism (class divisions, with masters exploiting workers, and the anarchical nature of production; see Engels 1882: 285) would survive in the new order since this would instantly arise as a classless society with centralized planning: the system that arose in the Soviet Union after Stalin's rise to power and experienced its final collapse in 1989. Both Marx and Engels held some nihilistic views. Nihilistic passages include Marx and Engels's statement that the proletariat is expected "to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State promptly upon attaining power" (Marx and Engels 1848: 504) and Engels's argument that "with the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer" (Engels 1878: 269–70).[7] In contrast, dialectical passages from the *Manifesto* include the statements that "the distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property" (Marx and Engels 1848: 498) and "Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation" (500).

Marx and Engels prioritized a dialectical approach in which the capitalistic elements negated depend on the end to be pursued, so that one or the other aspect of the older social

7. A "nihilistic" rationale is perceived behind Gramsci's argument that every revolution must necessarily break up and destroy the present social system in its entirety, and that nothing can be anticipated concerning the way the new society will be organized (Gramsci 1919–1920: 155).

order is carried over into the new one (see Lawler 1994). In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844 (294–95), Marx criticizes a coarse and material form of communism that contrasts "universal private property" with "private property" and calls for the immediate destruction of "everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property." This form of communism, which "negates the personality of man in every sphere," is described by Marx as "the logical expression of private property, which is this negation" (295) and as a movement born of envy and greed because "the thought of every piece of private property as such is turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level" (295). In *Principles of Communism*, Engels makes it clear that revolution does not entail the instant nationalization of all means of production or the launch of an all-comprehensive centralized plan. Once in power, he argues, workers will create "a democratic constitution, because democracy would be no use to the proletariat if it were not viewed as a means of carrying through further measures": progressive income taxes, heavy inheritance and legacy taxes, and the gradual expropriation of owners of land, buildings, railways, and vessels in part directly against payment of compensation and in part indirectly, through the competition of state industry (see Engels 1847: 350–51).[8]

In short, for all their revolutionary impetus, Marx and Engels thought of transition as a gradual process (for an analysis of this point, see Jossa 2005). Is this true of Gramsci as well?

4. The Transition to Socialism in Gramsci

Gramsci held that the preparatory process leading up to a revolution would necessarily be a fairly long one. Thinking of history as an unstoppable process aiming to set mankind free by means of repeated adjustments, he simply could not "share the myth of a proletarian revolution as a sudden leap from necessity to freedom to which the greater part of the European communist intelligentsia were holding on in those days" (Paggi 1970: 236). At the same time, he also conceived of revolution as the ultimate victory (Gramsci 1975: 802) entailing the overthrow of the older order with its institutions and the final defeat of the enemy (Gramsci 1975: 800). This is why Gramsci's view of the aftermath of the revolution strikes us as a rigid, not dialectical, sequence of historical phases involving the advent of the reign of freedom as the utter negation of the reign of necessity. In other words, while deferring revolution in time, Gramsci held that the older order would have to be rapidly replaced by the new order as soon as workers took charge.

In Gramsci's approach, workers' councils are a tool for the achievement of hegemony (see below); and this entails of necessity a long-term process during which workers' councils and markets have to coexist. But Gramsci's approach is marred by two shortcomings: first, his silence on the difficulties attending workers' councils in a capitalistic economy; second, lack of indications concerning postrevolutionary firm management modes and the way worker management and centralized planning could or should be combined.

8. Nowhere in Marx's or Engels's works do we find any elements in support of the argument (Marcuse 1969, and others) that transition will necessarily degenerate into repression unless it is compressed into a very short spell of time. On the contrary, the awareness that the market relations established in a capitalistic order cannot be broken up instantly has led most Marxists to think of transition as a comparatively long-term process (see, inter alia, Baran and Sweezy 1966: 336–37; Sweezy 1969, 1976; Bettelheim 1969a: chap. III).

His failure to mention the insights on these issues reached during the debate in the 1930s can be explained if we bear in mind that because of his imprisonment he had no notice of this debate. A different, though probably more convincing, explanation of this silence has been suggested by Anderson, who describes Gramsci as a representative of "Western Marxism," a movement which (compared to classical Marxism) focuses mainly on philosophical and cultural issues, rather than economics or politics. In Anderson's opinion, this holds true although Gramsci, of all "Western Marxists," is probably the one who most penetratingly concerned himself with combinations of theory and practice (Anderson 1976: 25).[9]

On the issue of firm management modes in the new order, Gramsci wrote (1919–1920: 46–47):

> A worker will only begin to think of himself as a producer when, aware of his contribution to the specific manufacturing process in progress in a given workshop (e.g., the automobile floorshop of a Turin factory) and his role as an indispensable agent within the social environment where cars are manufactured, he takes one step further and comes to view Turin and its automotive industry as a production system centred on automobiles and the greater part of the general activities carried on in Turin and its labour market as mainly associated with the automotive industry. His next step is an understanding of the workers assigned to that myriad general activities as part-creators of the automotive industry since it is they that created the necessary and sufficient assumptions for its very existence. From this cell, i.e., from the factory as the unit and agent of growth behind a given product, the worker moves on to an awareness of a range of ever vaster units and, finally, of the nation as a gigantic production apparatus [. . .]. He develops class consciousness and becomes a communist when he realises that private property is not a function of productivity; and he turns into a revolutionary when he comes to conceive of the capitalist, the private owner, as a deadbolt and obstacle to be done away with. From this stage he will proceed to an apprehension of the notion of the "State" as a complex organisational structure which is the tangible expression of society, a huge production apparatus characterised by the same web of relations typical of life in an industrial floorshop, though magnified and enriched thanks to the new functions demanded by its sheer size.

Are these and similar quotations (e.g., Gramsci 1919–1920: 95, 183–84) evidence of Gramsci's advocacy of the centralized planning model? And, if they are, on what grounds did he assume that firms would actually conform to the commands of a planning organ?

Gramsci doubtless believed that "a socialist State cannot do without the continuing active participation of comrades in the life of its institutions" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 381). "Such a democratic workers' society would act as a magnificent educational tool in impressing discipline on the masses and providing political and administrative instruction; it would help men find their place in society as the soldiers of an army which is about to engage in warfare and needs cohesion to avoid being destroyed and reduced to slavery" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 12). In his opinion, however, the revolutionary process would spontaneously generate the discipline needed to set factories going; on seizing power, the proletariat would rapidly discard utopian ideologies founded on myth and

9. In many countries, including Brazil, "Western cultural Marxism" and "political Marxism-Leninism" developed alongside each other for a long time (see Coutinho 1995: 126–28).

permanently develop the typical mindset of a communist nourished by a measure of unswerving enthusiasm (see Gramsci 1919–1920: 30); with the result, he added, that each worker would promptly exercise self-restraint (see Gramsci 1919–1920: 81).[10] Moreover, he held that no incentives would be needed to inhibit free riding among workers, and that workers would operate in a system where firms were not fully autonomous and had no independent accounting systems. Discipline would be ensured without any top-down commands by the state bureaucracy because in a postrevolutionary society "all social relationships will be shaped, not by organised power structures, but by the technical requirements of production and the organisational structure resulting therefrom" (see Gramsci 1919–1920: 183). Workers' councils will "eradicate individualism and personalism in every form" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 48).

In later years, though, he probably changed his mind. In a well-known analysis of "Americanism and Fordism" published in the *Prison Notebooks,* he described Fordism as a "rational" method "whose generalised adoption, though necessary, required a lengthy process of change both in social conditions and customs and in personal modes of conduct"; adding that the "Fordian method" would have to be adopted during the transition period at least temporarily after the conquest of power by the proletariat.[11] On the assumption that such a productive method called for a combination of compulsion and the kind of persuasion that comes from high wages and the resulting higher standards of life, does this mean that Gramsci looked on persuasion and compulsion as indispensable prerequisites of this initial stage of a socialist order? A Gramsci commentator seems to suggest exactly this when he highlights Gramsci's definition of man as "a being with insatiable appetites that can only be kept in check by enforcing strict controls" (Gallino 1970: 106). However, if this is true, such a radical turnaround would have had to be clearly stated, i.e., Gramsci should have expressly disavowed his original idea (dealt with in detail further on) that the reign of necessity was to give way to the reign of freedom instantly after the revolution.

5. Hegemony and Workers' Councils in Gramsci's Approach

The core element in Gramsci's approach to firm governance in the transition period is a system of workers' councils, which prepares the ground for worker rule by providing an alternative to liberalism and fusing economic and political action into a consistent whole (see De Felice 1971: 275–79, 338–45; Nardone 1971: chap. IV). Yet, in order for this to come about, hegemony must be attained first.

Although the concept of hegemony is derived from Lenin (see, inter alia, Vacca 1985: 64–65), it is nevertheless held to be Gramsci's most important contribution to Marxist thought (see Gruppi 1969: 160; Gerratana 1977; Macciocchi 1974: 199). It is a recurring

10. For a different opinion, see Lukàcs (1922): the division of labor carries to extremes "a sort of brutal egotism eager for possessions and honours" and "these tendencies may well survive within the Communist Party, which has never claimed the ability to work miracles by instantly reshaping the innermost mindsets and drives of its members."

11. See Gramsci 1975: 2139–81, but also Wren and Bedeian 2004, for the relations between Lenin and Taylorism. In the early years after the Russian Revolution, even Lenin and Trotsky consistently set out to increase labor productivity by enforcing both incentives (the carrot) and commands (the stick).

theme in the *Prison Notebooks* (Baratta 1999: 25; see also Liguori 1996: 149) and is closely associated with workers' councils as the seedbed of a "spontaneous self-education process" (see Salvadori 1976: 20).[12] Gramsci contrasts the spontaneity of this process with the voluntary character of the parallel process in trade unions and political parties, but he also makes it clear that economic crises or spur-of-the-moment revolts, while creating a fertile ground for the emergence of certain ways of thinking and tackling problems, will not produce any far-reaching effects unless they are kept under control (Gramsci 1975: 1586–89).[13]

On the one hand, hegemony is the ability to build consensus, i.e., to secure the assent of the majority of the working class to the options that lie ahead; on the other, it is the ability to understand the dynamics of events and identify those social forces that are prepared to support political choices capable of rapidly realizing the potential for evolution inherent in the present.[14] Pizzorno describes it as the position of the dominant class engaged in an effort to secure the consensus of other social groups by spreading a unifying ideology, and contrasts it with the inability of the lower classes to frame an aggregating ideology of their own. Despite their wish to dismantle the dominant organic relationship, the latter will only take action in periods of crisis provided they can rely on an organizational base to represent and support their interests. Without the help of such an organization they will hardly be able to build an opposed historic bloc preparing the ground for the advent of a new state. In other words, in Gramsci's view the basic assumption of worker hegemony is an organic crisis, a crisis in political representation which subverts the harmonious relations between social groups, their parties and social bases, and the actors they have traditionally represented (Pizzorno 1970: 119).

As argued by Bobbio, the dialectical relation between base and superstructure is manifest in all Gramsci's writings, but in Gramsci (unlike Marx) "civil society" (i.e., the positive and proactive agents behind historical growth) is part of the superstructure, not of the base (see Bobbio 1969: 85–86; Prestipino 1990: 36–59, 65)[15] and hegemony is the stage when the latter is influenced by the former.[16] In Gramsci's approach there are two major superstructural planes: "civil society" (private entities) and "the body politic or State," which is the expression

12. The close link between Gramsci's approach to hegemony and the issue of workers' councils is confirmed by Gramsci himself (1923–1926: 137 ff. and elsewhere) and by Gruppi (1972: 75) and Macciocchi (1974: 201). For a different view, see Spriano 1967 and Riechers 1970.

13. One element common to all revolutions was highlighted by Lukàcs: following an initial revolutionary thrust, there is no one able to take over the helm of society "and restoration is likely to ensue because the strata of the resulting revolutionary society do not know what is to be done of this masterless power" (Lukàcs 1922). One major advantage of Gramsci's workers' councils is they know what to do with the power they have attained. The basic role played by workers' councils in educating workers to action explains why Gramsci strongly opposed those ideologues, including Croce, who followed the noxious example set by aristocratic Renaissance intellectuals wishing to educate humankind "from their superior position" without entering the arena of history and practical political action (Altlhusser 1965).

14. Behind Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Andersen (2002: 8, note 2) detects myriad different combinations of coercion and consensus-building; and in situations where coercion is deemed to be too hazardous, he even notes recourse to corruption and fraud, i.e., dealings aimed to enervate and paralyze the antagonist or adversary (see Gramsci 1975: vol. III, p. 1638).

15. Gramsci's "civil society" is a complex bulk of ideological-cultural, rather than material, relationships (Bobbio 1969: vol. I, p. 85). For different definitions of "civil society" in Gramsci, see Badaloni 1990: 16–18.

16. Compared to Marx, "institutions and ideology continue to interact, though in a reverse relationship: ideologies are the primary moment in history; institutions become the secondary moment" (Bobbio 1969: vol. I, p. 91).

of the dominant group's hegemonic position in society at large (Gramsci 1975: 1518; see also 1020, 1590–2302).[17]

Gramsci's notion of hegemony is part of a worldview which conceives of the rise of the working class to power as a process shaped in the main by frictions between base and superstructure:[18] a bottom-up social process which in the opinion of Gramsci's critics is connoted by a significant degree of subjectivism.[19]

The hegemony issue is also closely linked to the "historical bloc," which should not be simplistically construed as an alliance of classes necessary to secure power. It is a fairly more complex phenomenon that is founded on the role of intellectuals as consensus-builders and the party as the "modern Prince" (Portelli 1972). The resulting notion is a maze whose constituent concepts are cross-linked and interconnected like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle and that does not require further discussion here.[20]

Despite his theory of hegemony, Gramsci can hardly be termed a theorist of the democratic transition from capitalism to socialism viewed as a system of workers' councils. Spriano (1967: 32) has rightly remarked that Gramsci's political writings of the so-called "legal decade" do not support the assumption that his idea of democracy departed from that of the 3rd International or that he advocated political democracy and representation as means of attaining socialism (see also Macciocchi 1974: 211–17; Bobbio 1988; Cafagna 1988). And it is clear that nowhere in Gramsci do we find an approach to economic democracy comparable to that of today's theorists of producer cooperatives.

Nonetheless, Gramsci's view of hegemony, the idea of a bottom-up revolutionary process, and the role of intellectuals in his theory of workers' councils combine to suggest that he, of all Marxists, was the one that came closest to theorizing the feasibility of a democratic transition. In his opinion, revolution comes about when the working class "succeeds in persuading the majority of the people, i.e., the amorphous middle classes as well as intellectuals and peasants, that their immediate and future interests fall in with those of such majority" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 144). Basically, this is also Engels's stance in the passage quoted below (1891: 1174):

17. The State–civil society dualism in Gramsci provided an excellent tool to criticize Althusser's rejection of "ideological State apparatuses" (see Forgacs 1995: 63).

18. Bobbio's controversial statement that Gramsci considered "civil society" part of the superstructure is likely to originate from Gramsci's description of "civil society" as the arena where the struggle for hegemony acts itself out (see Texier 1990: 28; Prestipino 1990: 38).

19. The frictions Gramsci theorized between the basic and superstructural planes were aimed not only to stress the dialectical nature of Marxist thought, but also to downplay the prevailingly mechanistic/positivistic view of Marxism held by the Italian Socialist Party in those days. Within a positivist interpretation of the base-superstructure relationship, the argument that the superstructure was mechanically created by the base entailed in practice the cancellation of the second term of the relationship; and the resulting one-way relationship between the two terms deprived the superstructure of its autonomy, thereby negating the dialectical nature of the historical process (see Bonomi 1973: 25–31). Althusser (1965) maintained that Marxist theorists had failed to shed full light on the specific functions of superstructures and "other circumstances." In his opinion, Gramsci's notion of hegemony marked a considerable advance in this direction, although it was just the first step on the road toward a theory on the close-meshed relations between economics and politics.

20. The self-standing role of political action entailed in the notion of hegemony deprives the working class of its centrality and ends up by conferring greater weight on the issue of alliances (see Forgacs 1995: 66–67).

> One can conceive that the old society may develop peacefully into the new one in countries where the representatives of the people concentrate all power in their hands, where, if one has the support of the majority of the people, one can do as one sees fit in a constitutional way: in democratic republics such as France and the United States, in monarchies such as Britain.[21]

That this transition should come about by democratic means is what most modern theorists of producer cooperatives and many Marxists old and new strongly recommend.[22] The need to address this point in association with the grand issue of hegemony can be explained as follows: in Gramsci's opinion, only if intellectuals, left-wing parties, and the people at large come to conceive of self-management as a viable system can the revolt against the injustices inherent in capitalism give rise to worker management and pave the way for a democratic transition to socialism. Gramsci stoutly opposed subversion: "a revolutionary minority seizing power through the use of violence would certainly be overthrown by the rebound from the mercenary forces of capitalism" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 307); but he also knew that only those blinded by ideology could expect workers to shape historical processes autonomously or spark off and carry on revolutionary actions on their own initiative.

6. A Critique of Gramsci's Workers' Councils

As mentioned in section 4 above, Gramsci looked to workers' councils as a necessary tool to discipline the masses and create the assumptions for worker rule in periods of severe conflict. From his perspective, the working class was expected to check not only the disorders fuelled by the war and the Russian Revolution in the "red biennium" in Italy, but generally the turmoil that every revolution carries in its track.

Let it be repeated that Gramsci's concern was not with worker management as such, but with workers' councils as the only organizational form that could vouchsafe a transition to socialism, i.e. the handover of power to the proletariat. He vested in workers' councils' major tasks ("taking over the original functions of the capitalist entrepreneur, the true 'hero' of the industrial scenario," and "demolishing any form of State" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 105), and thought of the plan as a resume of the proposals and projects of single firms and even single workers (Gramsci 1919–1920: 184), but he never mentioned the right of workers to appropriate part of the surplus produced by the firms they managed.[23] And this is where Gramsci's approach to workers' councils departs from that of modern theorists of producer cooperatives.[24]

---

21. The argument that "the adoption of Gramsci's theoretical model . . . might have averted the contradictions responsible for the self-destruction of Marxism in the Eastern world" (see Pellicani 1981: 1–2) can be subscribed to although it is owed to a critic of Gramscism.

22. See, inter alia, Togliatti 1958b: 260–61.

23. "The charge of 'productivism' that is sometimes levelled against Gramsci (due to his approach to councils and the ideas on Americanism and Fordism expressed in the *Prison Notebooks*) is absolutely unwarranted" (Gerratana 1977: 108).

24. On the functions of workers' councils in Gramsci, see, also, Grisoni and Maggioni 1973: 99–112.

For my part, the objectionable approach is Gramsci's, not that of modern theorists of producers' cooperatives. Bearing in mind the criticisms levied against the Soviet model of socialism, today it is possible to argue that a feasible socialist model is market socialism with labor-managed firms, which is not what Gramsci had in mind. In the debate of the 1930s, socialist economists got the better of their liberal colleagues by providing evidence that centralized planning could be reconciled with pricing systems based on individual preferences. What they failed to address was the incentive issue (see, inter alia, Roemer and Silvestre 1993: 108), while today theorists of market socialism hold that no economic system will ever function properly without suitable incentives to underpin choices deemed to work in the interests of the economy.

One further point I wish to stress is the belief of modern theorists of democratic firm management that a gradual transition to socialism can be started by a parliament with peaceable methods. Advocates of democratic firm management describe employee-managed firms as "merit" firms for a number of reasons whose detailed analysis lies beyond the scope of this article. Here it will suffice to mention just one major advantage for society as a whole offered by a labor-managed system of firms: the introduction of economic democracy thanks to the "one person, one vote" principle. From this perspective, fiscal or other public benefits in favor of employee-managed firms are not only reasonable, but may even promote this type of firms. Thanks to the enforcement of such benefits by a parliamentary majority, employee-managed firms could gradually, but steadily, increase in number, supplant capitalistic firms altogether, and, hence, bring about a gradual transition to socialism.

To mention just one of many interesting proposals in this field, another option available to a parliamentary majority convinced of the advantages of a labor-managed firm system would be the introduction of democratic firm management by operation of law, i.e., an act of parliament providing for the mandatory conversion of company shares into bonds and the transfer of the relevant management powers to the workers of the firms concerned.

7. Timing the Transition Period

As mentioned above, Marx and Engels looked on the transition to socialism as a long-term process. Gramsci doubtless shared this view, and the revolution he had in mind (i.e., the ultimate victory and advent to power of the working class) was to be the climax of a long-term process devoted to the attainment of hegemony. This poses a need to put the subsequent steps of this transition process in their right time sequence.

While deferring revolution in time on the assumption that it required a very long preparatory process, Gramsci assumed that the "reign of necessity" would give way to the "reign of freedom" instantly after the revolution:

> A proletarian revolution is a long-term historical process during which certain forces (which we subsume under the term proletariat) engaged in production emerge and gain in influence. . . . At a given step of this process, these new production forces exhaust their potential for development . . . what we term the "revolutionary act," i.e., the violent overthrow of the economic and political apparatus and resulting subversion of the status quo, takes place at this particular step. (Gramsci 1919–1920: 123)

Gramsci's timing of events lies open to one strong objection. To the extent it is true that the transition period is protracted in time so that hegemony may be attained before the outbreak of revolution, and if such pre-revolution hegemony is mainly achieved through the action of workers' councils, it is reasonable to assume that during such a lengthy process the government of a capitalistic society would forcefully contest the establishment of workers' councils in factories. A gradual but steady increase in the number of workers' councils amounts (as Gramsci rightly recognized) to a creeping revolution that a nonsocialist government can be assumed to resolutely oppose. The same argument is set forth in Salvadori (1973: 127): if the Party uses workers' councils as a means to secure freedom of action until the process "enters the violent civil war stage" that leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, capitalists would be able to strike back and inhibit the growth of the council movement.

A way out of this deadlock would be to locate this lengthy transition period after the takeover of the working class, but such a conclusion contradicts Gramsci's explicit deferral of revolution in time and his belief that the older order will give way to the new one instantly.

One passage from Gramsci's work seems to come to our aid. Commenting on the worker control bill laid before the Chamber of Deputies by M. P. Giolitti, Gramsci wrote:

> Any laws enforced by a bourgeois power to regulate this subject tell us ultimately this and only this: that the terrain on which class struggle acts itself out in real—not just verbal—terms has changed thoroughly and that the resulting circumstances are such as to oblige the bourgeois class to make concessions in terms of creating new legal institutions. And this is a clear sign of an organic weakness of the dominant class. (Gramsci 1921–1922: 67–68)

The idea behind this statement, i.e., the assumption that the working class may press a parliament into setting up a system of workers' councils, is at last one point where Gramsci's approach overlaps with that of modern theorists of producer cooperatives. If workers' councils can be created by a bourgeois government and their generalized adoption does amount to a real and proper revolution, we can think of the transition to socialism as a process which comes about within a parliamentary democracy. But this is in contrast with the idea that the old order will give way to the new one instantly after the proletariat secures the power.

8. More about Gramsci and Fordism

According to some, the scant fortune of Gramscian workers' councils is to be traced to the spreading of Fordism and Taylorism. Skilled labor forces are a necessary prerequisite for the success of a system of cooperative firms. Gramsci himself believed that a worker-managed economy could only arise if workers contesting the capitalistic yoke gained a right understanding of their potential role in production and trained themselves in the technical, financial, and managerial functions they intended to take over in future. In other words, he looked on the working class "as a 'political agent' striving to achieve its emancipation from capitalism while maturing a conscience as a 'civil producer' and

thereby preparing the ground for its hegemony in society" (Bonazzi 2002: 13). But Fordism and Taylorism prevented a movement in directions anticipated by Gramsci. In early postwar Germany, a movement for workers' participation arose in advanced sectors of the engineering industry on the initiative of multiskilled workers capable of vying with their managers in developing process innovations. At that time there were few assembly-line workers proper and the influence of trade unions on labor was still negligible. But conditions changed thoroughly from 1924 onward, when Fordist production and working modes spread rapidly across the country.

However, at least with regard to Italy, there are those who maintain that the factors that led society to head in directions diverging from those anticipated by Gramsci were both severe frictions in labor relations in large-size Northern factories and, later on, the emergence of an entrepreneurial class in the part of the country named "Third Italy." Moreover, when workers faced with growing workloads resolved to prioritize the fight for better work conditions, the result was the spreading of unskilled labor because of immigration from the South.

Bonazzi suggests a different explanation of the course taken by Italian society. In Italy, he maintains, the advancement of Taylorism (analyzed in depth by Braverman) was hardly perceived "as a deterministic process entailing the debasement of labour in capitalistic societies as a matter of course" (Bonazzi 2002: 12) because the level of conflict that industrial relations had reached by that time seemed to justify the assumption that workers would manage to fend off the evils of Taylorism that were being denounced.

This argument may be of help in identifying the reasons behind the failure of the Gramscian council movement. The radical changes observed in Italy (and elsewhere) in the 1970s might well have led to the rise of workers' councils if different cultural traditions had been in place. Certainly, Gramsci concerned himself with Fordism, and while he never suggested that Fordism was in conflict with his theory of workers' councils, he did reject a deterministic view of Taylorism. In his opinion, the corporatist movement arose in response to Taylorism (see Gramsci 1975: 2156–58, 2175–77) and even "the so-called high wage" was one of its effects (Gramsci 1975: 2166, 2171–75). Gramsci looked on Taylorism as nothing but "the latest step in a long-term process whose inception dated back to the very birth of industrialism" (Gramsci 1975: 2165) and that might with equal probability have resulted in a cooperative movement. Just as Taylorism had generated the corporatist reaction of Fascism, he thought, so it could produce a response in the socialist direction and hence the establishment of a system of workers' councils. From Gramsci's perspective, the ability to exercise power in the factory need not necessarily precede the material establishment of workers' councils, for it is these that are the educational tool that will "radically change the minds of workers" and "prepare them for the exercise of power" (Gramsci 1919–1920: 89–90). Hence the conclusion that both Taylorism and Fordism, far from conflicting with Gramsci's approach, have a place in his theory as factors capable of sparking off a socialist response to the degradation of labor in capitalistic societies.

9. Conclusions

Gramsci's approach to workers' councils would appear to have little in common with Ward's, Vanek's, and Meade's theories of employee-managed firms. In point of fact, a comparison

between two different views of the transition to socialism may be interesting in many respects. From a theoretical (though not strictly interpretative) perspective, each of them may suggest cross-fertilizing insights for use in reappraising and modernizing the other.

The most obvious difference between Ward and Vanek's employee-managed firms and Gramsci's is that the former are assumed to operate within a market economy, while the latter were probably intended to prepare the ground for a planned command economy.

Second, today's producer cooperative theory may appear in contrast with Gramsci's council theory since modern economists assume that socialism can be attained by democratic means. However, in actual fact the Marxian term "revolution" describes a change in production modes, and some quotes from Engels will help make it clear that in an advanced economic system a democratic transition to socialism is possible even from a Marxian perspective. And Gramsci, of all Marxists, was the one that came closest to theorizing a democratic transition to socialism.

Gramsci, we may conclude, never shifted from his firm belief that workers' councils were a necessary assumption for a socialist revolution. From his perspective, the events that marked the climax of the revolutionary surge, i.e., the seizure of factories by workers in Italy and the march of the Red Army on Warsaw, had revealed that the revolutionary groups of the time were as yet unable to provide the leadership needed for the handover in favor of the masses (Gramsci 1923–1926: 165),[25] but he never suggested that workers' councils could be used to run firms efficiently or prevent waste of resources within a planned economy.

To an orthodox Marxist, my argument in this article is likely to sound tainted by a hint of revisionism. "Revisionist" is the label Gramsci attached to any aspects of middle-class ideology that "are often surreptitiously and dangerously superimposed on the teachings of Engels and even Marx" (Gramsci 1923–1926: 476). While I do not deny that this may be true, let me state that today such a criticism has lost much of its former grip. For my part, in the wake of Lukàcs I prefer to urge Marxists to scan Western literature for whatever provides them with fresh insights. And I also share the view of numerous modern practitioners of critical realism who hold that Marxists can learn a great deal from heterodox non-Marxist economists, just as Marx learned a lot from the classical school of political economy (see Nielsen 2002: 735). Gramsci held the opposite view: he maintained that orthodox thought could draw no tangible benefits from non-Marxist currents of thought or from sources other than original doctrine and its basic notions, since every element that went into the making of an all-inclusive worldview was embedded in Marxist philosophy (Gramsci 1975: 1434).[26] "Gramsci looked on Marxism as a broad view of life that could easily adapt to and be reconciled with whatever fecund tendencies should arise within the modern world" (Rosengarten 1995: 119).

As for myself, I hope to have provided sufficient evidence that the modern economic theory of producer cooperatives is fully compatible with a modern Marxist view of transition viewed against the background of Gramsci's thought.

---

25. For a faithful account of the seizure of factories by workers in Turin in September 1920, see Spriano 1971: 113 ff.

26. For a critique of Gramsci's alleged tendency to address issues with an ideological bias, see Buey 1995.

References

Albert, M., and R. Hahnel. 1990. *Quiet revolution in welfare economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Althusser, L. 1965. *Pour Marx* [For Marx]. Paris: F. Maspero.

Anderson, P. 1976. *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: N.L.R. Books, Verso.

———. 2002. Force and consent. *New Left Review* 17 (September-October): 5–30.

Asor Rosa, A. 1975. La cultura [Culture]. In *Storia d'Italia* [A history of Italy], vol. IV, ed. VV.AA. Turin: Einaudi.

Badaloni, N. 1975. *Il Marxismo di Gramsci* [Gramsci's approach to Marxism]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. 1990. Marxismo e teoria politica in Gramsci [Marxism and political theory in Gramsci]. In *Gramsci e il Marxismo contemporaneo* [Gramsci's place in contemporary Marxist thought], ed. B. Moscatello. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Baran, P., and P. Sweezy. 1966. *Monopoly capital*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Baratta, G. 1999. Hall, Said, Balibar, Gramsci tra noi [Hall, Said, Balibar, Gramsci among us]. In *Gramsci da un secolo all'altro* [An end-of-century appraisal of Gramsci], ed. G. Baratta and G. Liguori. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Bettelheim, C. 1969a. *La transition vers l'economie socialiste* [The transition to a socialist economy]. Paris: F. Maspero.

Bobbio, N. 1969. Gramsci e la concezione della società civile [Gramsci and the notion of civil society]. In *Gramsci e la cultura con-temporanea* [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. I, ed. Instituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. 1988. Gramsci e la teoria politica [Gramsci and political theory]. In *Teoria politica e società industriale. Ripensare Gramsci* [Political theory and industrial societies. Rethinking Gramsci], ed. F. Sbarberi. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.

Bonazzi, G. 2002. Perché i sociologi Italiani del lavoro e dell'organizzazione, pur essendo pro-labour, non sono post-Bravermaniani e meno ancora Foucaultiani [Why Italian labor and organizational sociologists are pro-labor but neither post-Bravermanians nor Foucaultians]. *Sociologia del lavoro* II and III (86–87).

Bonomi, G. 1973. *Partito e rivoluzione in Gramsci* [Revolution and the party in Gramsci's thought]. Milan: Feltrinelli.

Buey, F. F. 1995. Gramsci in Spagna [Gramsci in Spain]. In *Gramsci in Europa ed in America* [European versus American approaches to Gramsci's work], ed. E. J. Hobsbawm. Bari: Laterza.

Cafagna, L. 1988. Figlio di quei movimenti. Il giovane Gramsci e la critica della democrazia [Gramsci's early critique of democracy]. In *Teoria politica e società industriale. Ripensare Gramsci* [Political theory and industrial societies. Rethinking Gramsci], ed. F. Sbarberi. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.

Coutihno, C. N. 1995. Gramsci in Brasile [Gramsci in Brazil]. In *Gramsci in Europa e in America* [European versus American approaches to Gramsci's work], ed. E. J. Hobsbawm. Bari: Laterza.

De Felice, F. 1971. *Serrati, Bordiga, Gramsci e il problema della rivoluzione in Italia* [Serrati, Bordiga, Gramsci and the issue of revolution in Italy]. Bari: De Donato.

De Giovanni, B. 1977. Gramsci e l'elaborazione successiva del Partito Comunista [The place of Gramsci in the Communist Party's later theoretical approach]. In *Egemonia, stato, partito in Gramsci* [Hegemony, the state and the party in Gramsci's thought], ed. B. De Giovanni, V. Gerratana, and L. Paggi. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Djankov, S., E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2003. The new comparative economics. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31 (4): 595–619.

Engels, F. 1847. Principles of communism. In *Collected works*, vol. 6, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

———. 1878. Antidühring. In *Collected works*, vol. 25, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

——— 1882. Additions to the text of Antidühring. In *Collected works*, vol. 25, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

———. 1891. A critique of the draft of the social–democratic programme. In *Collected works*, vol. 27, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Forgacs, D. 1995. Gramsci in Gran Bretagna [Approaches to Gramsci in Great Britain]. In *Gramsci in Europa e in America* [European versus American approaches to Gramsci's work], ed. E. J. Hobsbawm. Bari: Laterza.

Gallino, L. 1970. Gramsci e le scienze sociali [Gramsci and social sciences]. In *Gramsci e la cultura contem*poranea [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. I, ed. Istituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Garin, E. [1958]1997. Gramsci nella cultura Italiana [Gramsci's place in Italian culture]. Reprinted in *Con Gramsci* [On Gramsci's side]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. [1964]1997. Per una nuova lettura [Second readings]. Reprinted *Con Gramsci* [On Gramsci's side]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Gerratana, V. 1977. Stato, partito, strumenti ed istituti dell'egemonia nei 'Quaderni del carcere' [The state and the party as institutional tools for attaining hegemony: The 'Prison Notebooks']. In *Egemonia, stato, partito in Gramsci* [Hegemony, the state and the party in Gramsci's thought], ed. B. De Giovanni, V. Gerratana, and L. Paggi. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. 1997. *Gramsci, problemi di metodo* [Methodological issues relevant to the analysis of Gramsci's work]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Gramsci, A. [1919–1920]1954. *L'ordine nuovo* [The new order]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. [1921–1922]1971. *Socialismo e fascismo* [Socialism versus fascism]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. [1923–1926]1971. *La costruzione del Partito Comunista* [The Communist Party in the making]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. 1975. *Quaderni del carcere* [Prison notebooks], ed. V. Gerratana. Turin: Einaudi.

Grisoni, D., and R. Maggioni. 1973. *Guida a Gramsci* [A Gramsci guidebook]. Milan: Rizzoli.

Gruppi, L. 1969. Intervento [A communication]. In *Gramsci e la cultura contemp*oranea [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. I, ed. Istituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. 1972. *Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci* [Gramsci's concept of hegemony]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Hall, S. 1992. Cultural studies and their theoretical legacies. In *Cultural studies*, ed. L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P. Treichler. New York: Routledge.

Hoff, T. J. B. [1938]1981. *Economic calculation in the socialist society* [English translation]. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

Jossa, B. 2005. Marx, Marxism, and the cooperative movement. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 29 (1): 3–18.

Jossa, B., and G. Cuomo. 1997. The economic theory of socialism and the labour-managed firm. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar.

Lavoie, D. 1985. Rivalry and central planning: The socialist calculation debate reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lawler, J. 1994. Marx's theory of socialism: Nihilistic and dialectical. In *Debating Marx,* ed. L. Patsouras. New York: Lewiston.

Lepre, A. 1978. *Gramsci secondo Gramsci* [Gramsci according to Gramsci]. Naples: Liguori.

Liguori, G. 1996. *Gramsci conteso; Storia di un dibattito*, 1923–1996 [The debate over Gramsci in historical retrospect]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Lindbeck, A. 1972. *The political economy of the New Left*. New York: Harper & Row.

Lukàcs, G. 1922. *Geschichte und klassenbewusstsein*. Berlin: Malik.

Macciocchi, M. A. 1974. *Per Gramsci* [For Gramsci]. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Marcuse, H. 1969. Un riesame del concetto di rivoluzione [A review of the notion of revolution]. In *Gramsci e la cultura contemp*oranea [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. I, ed. Istituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Marx, K. 1844. Economic and philosophical manuscripts. In K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected works*, vol. 3, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart

Marx, K., and F. Engels. 1848. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In *Collected works*, vol. 6, K. Marx and F. Engels. London: Lawrence and Wishart

Meade, J. E. 1972. The theory of labour-managed firms and of profit sharing. *Economic Journal* 82 (March) supplement: 402–28.

Nardone, G. 1971. *Il pensiero di Gramsci* [Gramsci's thought]. Bari: De Donato.

Nielsen, P. 2002. Reflections on critical realism in political economy. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 26 (6): 727–38.

Nove, A. 1983. *The economics of feasible socialism*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Paggi, L. 1970. *Antonio Gramsci e il moderno principe* [Antonio Gramsci and the modern prince]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. 1977. Gramsci e l'egemonia dall' 'ordine nuovo' alla 'questione meridionale.' [Gramsci's approach to hegemony]. In *Egemonia, stato, partito in Gramsci* [Hegemony, the state and the party in Gramsci's thought], ed. B. De Giovanni, V. Gerratana, and L. Paggi. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Panzieri, R. 1975. *La ripresa del Marxismo-Leninismo in Italia* [The fortune of Marxism-Leninism in Italy]. Milan: Sapere edizioni.

Pellicani, L. 1981, *Gramsci: An alternative communism?* Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Pizzorno, A. 1970. 'Intervento' su 'Gramsci e la teoria Marxista' [A "communication" on Gramsci and Marxist theory]. In *Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea* [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. II, ed. Istituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Portelli, H. [1972]1973. *Gramsci e il blocco storico* [Gramsci and the historical bloc] [Italian translation]. Bari: Laterza.

Prestipino, G. 1990. Presenza di Gramsci filosofo della politica [The place of Gramsci within political philosophy]. In *Gramsci e il Marxismo contemporaneo* [Gramsci's place in contemporary Marxist thought], ed. B. Moscatello. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Riechers, C. [1970]1975. *Antonio Gramsci e il Marxismo in Italia* [Gramsci's place within the Italian Marxist movement]. Naples: Thelèma.

Roemer, J. E., and J. Silvestre. 1993. Investment policy and market socialism. In *Market socialism: The current debate*, ed. P. Bardhan and J. E. Roemer. New York: Oxford Economic Press.

Romano, S. F. 1969. Intervento alla prima seduta di lavoro [A communication to the first workshop meeting]. In *Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea* [Gramsci's place in contemporary culture], vol. I, ed. Istituto Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Rosengarten, F. 1995. Gramsci negli Stati Uniti [Gramsci in the United States], vol. 2. In *Gramsci in Europa e in America* [European versus American approaches to Gramsci's work], ed. E. J. Hobsbawn. Bari: Laterza.

Salvadori, M. L. 1973. *Gramsci e il problema storico della democrazia* [Gramsci and the historical issue of democracy], 2nd ed. Turin: Einaudi.

———. 1975. Non imbalsamiamo anche Gramsci' [Shall we suffer Gramsci to sink into oblivion?]. Reprinted in *Eurocomunismo e socialismo Sovietico* [Eurocommunism versus Soviet socialism]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. [1976]1978. Gramsci e il PCI: Due concezioni dell'ege-monia [Gramsci's and the Communist Party's approaches to hegemony]. Reprinted in *Eurocomunismo e socialismo sovietico* [Eurocommunism versus Soviet socialism]. Turin: Einaudi.

———. [1978]1978b. Gramsci e l'eurocomunismo [Gramsci and Euro-communism]. In *Eurocomunismo e socialismo sovietico* [Euro-communism versus Soviet socialism], M. L. Salvadori. Turin: Einaudi.

Santucci, A. A. 2001. *Senza comunismo* [A world without communism]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Spriano, P. 1967. *Introduzione a Gramsci* [An introduction to Gramsci]. In *Scritti politici* [Political writings], A. Gramsci. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

———. 1971. "*L'ordine nuovo" e i consigli di fabbrica* [Workers' councils in Gramsci's articles for "L'ordine nuovo"]. Turin: Einaudi.

Sweezy, P. M. 1969. Reply to Bettelheim. *Monthly Review* 20 (March-April): 101–03.

———. 1976. Socialism in poor countries. *Monthly Review* 28 (October): 1–13.

Texier, J. 1990. Il concetto Gramsciano di "società civile" [Gramsci's notion of "civil society"). In *Gramsci e il Marxismo contemporaneo* [Gramsci's place in contemporary Marxist thought], ed. B. Moscatello. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Togliatti, P. 1958. Gramsci e il Leninismo [Gramsci's relationship with Leninism]. In *Scritti su Gramsci* [Writings on Gramsci], ed. G. Liguori. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Vacca, G. 1985. *Il Marxismo e gli intellettuali* [Intellectuals and Marxism]. Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Vanek, J. 1970. The General Theory of the Labor – Managed Market Economies, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

———. 1977. *The labor managed economy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

VV. AA. 1975. *Storia d'Italia* [A history of Italy], vol. IV. Turin: Einaudi.

Ward, B. N. 1958. The Firm in Illyria; Market Syndacalism. *American Economic Review,* 48 (4): 556-89.

Wren, D. A., and A. G. Bedeian. 2004. The Taylorization of Lenin: Rethoric or reality? *International Journal of Social Economics* 31 (3): 287–95.

Bruno Jossa studied economics in Naples. He has taught at the Universities of Messina and Venice and currently is professor of political economy at the University "Federico II" of Naples. He is the author, with Gaetano Cuomo, of The Economic Theory of Socialism and the Labour-Managed Firm *(Elgar, 1997) and joint editor, with Vincenzo Buonocore, of* Organizzazioni Economiche Non Capitalistiche *(Il Mulino, 2003). His current research is on producer cooperatives.*