JCMS 2009 Volume 47. Number 2. pp. 357–384

The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union*

ROBERT PAHRE
University of Illinois
BURCU UÇARAY-MANGITLI
University of Illinois

Abstract

Among the many objections to Turkish membership of the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy-making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream that it will have little influence in day-to-day policy-making under the assent, co-decision, consultation and co-operation procedures (or the common procedure in the Constitutional Treaty). Its influence may be more evident in areas such as the CFSP or JHA, where unanimity remains the normal procedure. Still, Turkey's veto power here is no different from that of other, much smaller countries. Furthermore, veto power can only block changes and cannot be used to pull the EU in undesirable new directions. Even this veto power can be avoided if the EU-27 establish whatever policies they desire prior to Turkish membership, forcing Turkey to accept a *fait accompli*. Despite these limitations to its power, Turkey may have some influence in purely intergovernmental settings such as negotiations over new treaties that might occur some decades hence.

* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the European Union Studies Association in Austin in March 2005, the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago in April 2005, the University Association of Contemporary European Scholars in Zagreb in September 2005 and 'Turkey and Europe', Symposium of the Program on South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We are grateful to all participants' comments and questions in these forums. This research has been supported in part with funds from the University of Illinois' European Union Center, provided under US Department of Education Grants #P015A030180 and P015A060171.

Introduction

The question of admitting Turkey has become an important political issue throughout the European Union (EU). Opposition to Turkish membership was an important motive for the French to vote against the Draft Treaty for a Constitution in May 2005, and it has also been an important electoral issue in Germany, Austria and other countries. Despite this visibility, many voters would be surprised to learn that Turkey has been interested in joining the European Economic Community (EEC, now EU) since 1959. The EU has since grown from six to 27 members and even three former Soviet Socialist Republics joined the European Union before Turkey could commence formal negotiations.

Of course, Turkish membership raises many issues not found in post-communist Estonia. Harry Flam (2003, pp. 7–8) argues that the most important reasons for the EU's unwillingness to admit Turkey have been its budgetary implications, the cultural question of whether Turkey is part of Europe and the political implications stemming from Turkey's size and likely voting weight. Many others have also raised concerns about Turkish voting power in an enlarged Union (Aleskerov *et al.*, 2002; Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005). They note that Turkey will soon have a larger population than Germany (see 'Charlemagne', 2005; Müftüler-Baç and McLaren, 2003; Quaisser and Reppegather, 2004). Matthias Wissman, a leading CDU member of the Bundestag (Der Standard, 2004), fears that 'Turkey would soon be the largest country in the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU',[1] a concern shared by former Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (2004) among many others.

We will argue that these concerns are unwarranted. Turkey is most feared on those dimensions where it is most different, but its influence is smallest where it is the most different, *precisely because* of this difference. Whenever Turkey has preferences outside the European mainstream, it will have little influence. Preferences, and not simply voting weight, determine influence.

In making this argument, we set aside many economic and social issues in the interests of the narrowly political. For example, Cyprus presents a policy issue that will need to be resolved for Turkish accession (for review, see Forysinski, 2005; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005). The economic consequences of Turkish membership also present significant challenges (see, for example, Quaisser and Reppegather, 2004; Sajdik and Schwarzinger, 2008, ch. 11). Islam does raise some cultural issues for Turkish accession –

[1] 'Die Türkei wäre bald das größte Land der Union und würde die Architektur der Eu völlig verändern.'

though cultural integration has already begun and Turkey participates in the Eurovision song contest and in international sports as part of Europe.

Whatever one thinks of these economic or cultural issues, political decision-making processes will be responsible for delineating their future developments. The bodies of the European Union can encourage, influence or reduce the significance of these other interactions. For this reason, it is important to examine Turkey's likely influence in the political processes of the European Union independent of its economic or cultural effects.

I. History and the Fears of Turkish Influence

Turkey has self-consciously sought to converge on European practices for a long time. Starting with the 1839 Tanzimat Declaration, elites equated modernization with westernization (for a detailed account, see Özbudun, 1984; Shaw and Shaw, 1977; for its economic underpinnings İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987; Kasaba, 1988; and for Turkish elite views today, McLaren, 2000). Following World War I, these goals became a pillar of Kemalism: 'development along the lines of the "contemporary civilization" of the West' (Sezer, 1981, p. 3).

Successive governments have sought membership of the EU and other European institutions (Kabaalioğlu, 1999, p. 20) such as the OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952). Important political figures such as Adnan Menderes (prime minister, 1950–60) and İsmet İnönü (prime minister, 1961–65) concluded that Turkey should participate not just because of the EEC's economic opportunities but also because of its political potential. The process of joining many European institutions has led to some convergence in preferences over time. Public opinion polls generally support this convergence – 55.3 per cent of Turks believe that harmonization with the EU will improve standards for democracy and human rights and 53.7 per cent further believe that economic and social conditions will improve with EU membership (BBC Monitoring Europe, 2007b).

Consistent with this historical goal, Turkey applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. This led to an Association Agreement in 1963, with an eye toward an eventual customs union. An Additional Protocol in 1970 called for Turkey to reduce its duties on Community industrial products gradually over 22 years, with the free movement of labour to be accomplished over 12 years. The customs union was finally completed in 2001, making trade in industrial goods free from tariffs and quotas. Turkey has also followed EU economic policy towards many third parties, granting preferential tariffs to countries in central and eastern Europe,

the Middle East and North Africa and the signatories of the Lomé Convention. Though it did not yield accession, this Protocol does mean that many controversial economic issues have already been addressed to a substantial degree.

The lack of further progress in the 1970s and 1980s was partly a result of political events in Turkey. Beginning in the 1950s, Turkey entered a period of boom-and-bust economic cycles, accompanied by political crises that led to disruptions in the democratic system in 1960, 1971 and 1980. After the 1980 military intervention, the parliament and all political parties were dissolved. This prompted the European Community to freeze its relations with Turkey until the resumption of democracy in 1983. This episode serves as a reminder that, although Europe serves as an essential point of reference, and an aspiration for most Turks, backlashes against European values can also occur.

In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership. Since this application came after the recent accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), the addition of another Mediterranean country seemed plausible for both Turkey and the EU. The Mediterranean enlargement also made democracy and the respect of human rights an implicit condition for membership, and these would become explicit conditions in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria (see Müftüler-Baç, 2003).

Despite promising moves, the EU put possible negotiations with Turkey on the back burner after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 2000 Nice summit did not even provide hypothetically for the number of future Turkish votes or members of the European Parliament (MEPs), suggesting that the EU-15 did not foresee membership (Flam, 2003, p. 2).

The seemingly slow pace of negotiations, continued stalemate over Cyprus and the recent election of leaders who oppose Turkish accession, such as Nicholas Sarkozy in France, raise the likelihood of another Turkish backlash against Europe. Signs of this backlash may be occurring, as a recent study shows that Turkish public support for EU membership has fallen from 76.4 per cent in 2002, to 64.8 per cent in 2004 and to 57.4 per cent in 2006 (BBC Monitoring Europe, 2007a). Thus, the long-term trend of convergence with western Europe is not without some backsliding as events occur.

Considering these contradictory forces in Turkish society and politics, it is challenging to make long-term predictions about the change in Turkish preferences. The accession process will likely help Turkish reformists in some issue areas and Turkish policy preferences will approach the EU mainstream in these areas. Yet this convergence in Turkish preferences will be balanced with rising Turkish nationalism and conservative reactions against the EU's role as a 'norm-setter'. For example, Turkey's abolition of the death penalty,

in response to EU demands, was particularly unpopular after the arrest of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (KPP) leader Abdullah Öcalan. At this point in Turkey's history, the overall impact of the accession negotiations and early years of membership on Turkey's preferences will be moderate.

Turkey's likely effect on the EU has also changed over the years since its first Association Treaty. Turkey is no longer applying to be one of seven, but one of 30. This inevitably dilutes its influence no matter how large its formal weight. At the same time, this larger Union changes the political opportunities for Turkey. Instead of being markedly less developed economically than the rest of the Union, it can now join a coalition of newer 'cohesion' members. Wolfgang Quaisser and Andrea Reppegather (2004, p. 80) note that, with Turkey included, the cohesion countries that receive EU structural aid will comprise 36 per cent of the population, 41 per cent of the votes in Parliament and 43 per cent of the votes in the Council of Ministers, while contributing only 9 per cent of the EU's GDP. Turkey will be a natural leader of this group.

This political logic strikes fear in some existing members. They point out that a large, rich country such as Germany will no longer be able to stop budget-busting policies that favour poorer countries in agriculture and structural policy. Henry Flam (2003, p. 25) concurs, maintaining that 'a coalition of poor, new Member States can easily block decision-making in the EU-28'.

Such calculations are not unfounded, but they are incomplete. For example, QMV not only reduces Germany's ability to block policies that favour poor countries, but it also reduces the ability of Turkey and other countries to block budget policies that existing members favour. Understanding the role of Turkey requires this kind of symmetrical analysis, as well as consideration of the status quo. In what follows we will develop an analysis of Turkey's likely role in EU policy-making that will consider not just voting weights in the Council but the full panoply of EU decision-making procedures. We will also give explicit attention to the location of the status quo, since the importance of veto powers depends in significant part on what remains in place when a new proposal is vetoed. We show that many fears concerning Turkey's future influence are overstated.

II. Concerns about Turkey's Preferences in Europe

Turkey's membership in the EU has sparked media concern on at least two dimensions (see for example, *Economist*, 2004). First, many claim that Turkey will increase the 'Muslim influence' in the EU, especially if a large, fundamentalist Islamic revival party one day governs it. Even a pro-Turkey

Danish editorial acknowledged that an Islamic revival party might some day pop up 'like a jack-in-the-box' ('som trolden af æsken') (Politiken, 2004). As it stands, Muslim influence in Europe is currently small, consisting of a few Muslim members of parliament in Germany and the Netherlands (and still none in France).

Against these fears, some expect positive effects. Turkish membership may have a 'moderating' influence on Muslims currently living in the EU who might otherwise turn to radical opposition movements. Integration in Vienna, where Islam has been officially recognized since 1912, supports this notion (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2004). The current government of Turkey argues that greater integration between Islam and Europe will turn the issue of cultural difference into an advantage. For example, the government recently sent 700 moderate imams to Europe as part of a policy to encourage moderate forms of Islam (Salhani, 2004). The Justice and Development Party (AKP) also sees the EU as useful for its own identity politics, hoping that entry into the Union will eliminate the headscarf issue in Turkey. Such moves highlight Turkey's role as a 'bridge' between Europe and its neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East.

A second concern about preferences is secular, an expectation that Turkey would tend to join the peripheral coalition of the UK, Scandinavia and most central and eastern European countries (CEECs). These countries tend to be less strongly integrationist than the original six and this cleavage overlaps with other policy areas such as the role of markets or the EU's relationship with the US. Turkey's votes here could make a real difference. For example, Turkey's peripheral position in conjunction with declining public support for European integration could pose an obstacle for future treaty reform once Turkey becomes a member.

Because this division already exists in Europe, however, Turkey would not change the terms of the Union. Instead, it would simply contribute to the victory of one side or another in an existing debate. As in many of the issues that we discuss, Turkey would tend to reinforce existing trends more than it might change the direction of the EU.

III. The Dimensionality of EU Politics and Turkey's Likely Preferences

Our analysis of Turkey's weight in the political institutions of the EU depends both on voting rules and on preferences. Though Turkey will *formally* have as much influence as Germany, these votes may not affect policy, and may not give Turkey as much power as Germany has. We will focus on what Turkey

can use its power *for* and whether it can make the EU do things that it would not otherwise do.[2]

Several different theories might help us evaluate Turkey's influence in the future European Union. Scholars using power indices to measure influence would capture the large role of Turkey's voting weight and assign it a large power index number (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005; Hösli, 1993, 1995, 1996; Lane and Maeland, 1996; Thomson and Hösli, 2003). Unfortunately, these approaches do not normally consider preferences but instead treat each ordering of preferences as equally likely (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996). With this inattention to preferences comes a failure to include the status quo against which policies are voted.

The simplest way to incorporate both preferences and the status quo is an 'intergovernmentalist' theory of Council decision-making (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998). This approach's central claim is that policy outcomes reflect 'lowest-common-denominator' (LCD) bargaining, so the outcome will be whatever the most reluctant negotiator will accept. This implies that Turkey can serve as a brake on decisions when it is the LCD, but that it cannot pull the EU in new directions because other members will prevent this.

Despite some useful insights, intergovernmentalism remains limited in several respects. Intergovernmentalist theory rests primarily on the study of a few 'grand bargains' in major intergovernmental conferences (Anderson, 1995; Sverdrup, 1998). Between these grand bargains, Council decision-making typically uses qualified majority voting (QMV), so the LCD can be outvoted. Even decisions that apparently enjoy a consensus in the Council have been taken in the shadow of a possible QMV decision. Empirically, the theory lacks support where one would most expect it. In the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), for example, policy outcomes often lie closer to the median voter than to any LCD (Smith, 2004).

Our approach examines the EU as a political system (Hix, 1999), emphasizing its formal institutions and how politicians can pursue their interests within that system. We give special weight to the growing literature using spatial theories of politics to understand the EU (Crombez, 1996, 1997; Hug and König, 2002; Pahre, 1997, 2001; Tsebelis, 1994; Schneider and Cedermann, 1993, and to some extent Schneider *et al.*, 1995; less formally, Hix, 1999; Kreppel, 2002). Spatial theory explicitly includes voting rules such as QMV and allows domestic political constraints to affect outcomes in ways beyond what intergovernmentalism allows (i.e. Crombez,

[2] We are obviously following Robert Dahl's (1957) definition of power as the ability to get someone else to do something that they would not otherwise do. Turkey is not powerful if its votes are cast to keep the EU doing what it already does.

1996, 1997; Hug and König, 2002; Pahre, 1997, 2001; Tsebelis, 1994; Schneider and Cedermann, 1993). It leaves open some questions, such as where preferences or policy agendas come from, but 'constructivist' conceptions of these processes can help flesh the theory out when needed (see Smith, 2004; Sverdrup, 1998).

The major divisions in EU politics fall on the left–right dimension, the pro- or anti-integration axis, or represent particular national interests. Some scholars have found additional dimensions for secondary policy issues, such as a north–south cleavage over agricultural and regional policy, or domestic divisions over alternative politics against traditional values (for recent contributions to this large literature, see Aspinwall, 2002; Hix, 1999, 2002; Marks *et al.*, 2002; Marks *et al.*, 2004; Noury, 2002; Pennings, 2002).

Simplifying, we can say that national interests often dominate policy-making in the Council of Ministers, while the complexities are more evident in the European Parliament. In the Council, these national interests are often organized around the question of greater or lesser integration. Even if ministers have preferences shaped by their position on the left–right dimension, it often plays better politically to defend national interests instead. We will therefore analyse Turkey's preferences in the Council as if it were a unitary actor pursuing a more or less coherent national interest. In a later section, we will analyse the European Parliament largely along the left–right dimension.

Like other large countries such as the UK and France, Turkey's national interest will probably not lie in rapid integration. Unlike small countries that recognize a lack of control over the outside world, large countries tend to place a greater value on the sovereignty costs of deeper integration.

Second, and related in part to its size, nationalism remains very strong in Turkey, as in France, Poland and the UK. Though lacking the imperial elements of, say, British or French nationalism, deep patriotism and a state-centred nationalism have remained an essential part of the Turkish polity since the 1930s (Ergil, 2005; Heper, 1985, p. 144). Though it has not presented itself as an obstacle to membership, this nationalism is likely to make Turkey prefer slower integration after membership. This nationalism may also pose challenges for EU referenda once Turkey becomes a member, especially on large issues such as constitutional reforms.

Third, Turkey has limited capabilities to implement decisions toward rapid integration. If, like other countries, it prefers to commit only to those policies that it expects to be able to implement (Martin, 2000; Mertha and Pahre, 2005), this weakness in administrative capabilities will also lead Turkey to demand a slower pace of integration, lest it be legally committed to policies that it lacks the capacity to implement fully.

Fourth, Turkey's position on the European periphery also means that it will have the kind of extra-European interests that also characterize the UK and Scandinavia. Its regional interests in the Middle East, for example, differ considerably from the EU mainstream. Because of its own Kurdish minority, Turkey has advocated a strongly centralized constitution for Iraq, in contrast to the more federal principles that most Europeans support. Turkey also has significant interests in central Asia not shared with other EU Member States.

Finally, it is worth noting that the EU does not currently have a religious policy dimension. There are few EU issues that would be affected by the fact that most Turks are Muslims. On some of the most visible issues involving civil rights, such as women's headscarves, Turkey's secularist tradition turns out to be very similar to that of France and different from the traditions in more integrationist countries such as the UK or the Netherlands.

Though there is no Muslim/Christian policy dimension, one might argue that the EU does have a 'Christian Socialist' dimension behind its concern for social solidarity and subsidiarity, and certainly Christian Socialism has played an important historical role in the European Union. Interestingly, the Christian Socialist caucus in the European Parliament (European People's Party (EPP)) has recently admitted the AKP as an observer. The decision was reportedly an easy one, as EPP caucus spokesman Robert Fitzhenry claims that 'a vast majority of group's members agreed that the AK Party is very similar to most of the Christian democratic parties in Europe' (cited in Kubosova, 2005). This position represents a remarkable reversal since the EPP's 1997 declaration that 'The European Union is a civilisation project and within this civilisation project, Turkey has no place' (cited in Müftüler-Baç and McClaren, 2003, p. 23). Christian Socialist views also remain more diverse than the EPP would like to admit, as Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy both lead EPP-member parties but oppose Turkish membership. EPP diversity is also evident in the concerns of many British Tories about whether their party even belongs in that party group.

In summary, Turkey will likely want slower integration, less social policy, less environmentalism and more agricultural and regional policy. Indeed, it has already sought exemptions in some of these areas, including agriculture, environment, taxation, competition policy and transportation ('Turkey to ask EU for exemptions . . .', Anatolia News Agency, 2005). Agricultural policy will pose particular challenges, in part because of the serious regional differences in Turkish agricultural development (Demir, 2005; Quaisser and Reppegather, 2004). Its overall position on the left–right dimension is somewhat harder to predict in light of the collapse of the Republican Party and the current dominance of the AKP.

As we will show, having a position closer to the status quo than the EU core on all issues other than the North–South dimension implies that Turkey may serve as a partial brake on integration. However, it will not play a role in leading the EU into new and possibly undesirable directions.

IV. Turkey and the Council

We begin our institutional analysis with the European Council, which remains the most important decision-making organ for many purposes (Thomson and Hösli, 2003). It has the right of initiative in a few issue areas such as enlargement. With a sufficient supermajority, it can always amend Commission proposals, and its approval (usually by QMV) is necessary for almost all forms of legislation.

We will analyse Council decision-making under both unanimity and QMV rules. Unanimity is the oldest decision rule and it remains important in treaty negotiations. In these settings, the veto held by a country with outlier preferences can shape the result in important ways. Even so, this veto power can only block initiatives and not take new actions. Worries that Turkish membership will lead to major new spending programmes redistributing income south-eastwards are therefore unreasonable.

In addition, the EU-27 can take actions today in issue areas where they anticipate a future Turkish veto. For example, the EU norm against capital punishment would have been impossible to create with Turkey as a member, given unanimity requirements in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Recognizing this, the EU-15 established the norm before beginning Turkish membership negotiations, thereby avoiding any Turkish veto in the future. As we will discuss below, we expect more such changes in advance of Turkish membership, reducing its future influence once it joins the Union.

Now let us consider Turkey's influence under a stylized form of QMV. The QMV procedure requires a majority of about five-sevenths of the weighted votes, which we will model with only seven states. Treating Turkey as one of those seven exaggerates its influence (29 votes out of about 375, or 7.7 per cent, which is a little more than half of one-seventh). We will examine politics on a single policy dimension, reflecting the stronger germaneness constraint of EU policy-making.

Figure 1 shows this model, with the ideal points of seven EU Member States shown on a single dimension. Before Turkey joins the EU, policy will lie in the 'core', which is the range of policy from 3's ideal point to 5's ideal point. Any policy to the left of 3's ideal point would attract a QMV majority (3 through 7) to move it to the right, while any policy to the right of 5's ideal

Figure 1: Effects of Turkey on the Council Core



point would attract a similar majority to move it to the left. Between 3 and 5, three or more players would block any move in either direction.

We will now add Turkey to this abstract model, analysing all possible preferences, whether likely or not. We consider five possible locations for Turkey's ideal point (labelled T1–T5), exhausting the logical possibilities of types of effects in this model. Because the line representing policy space is symmetric, particular illustrations of Turkey's location should *not* be interpreted as implying that Turkey is on either the 'left' or 'right.' In any case, Turkey's preferences will likely be different from one issue to the next.

As we have stressed throughout this article, Turkey's influence is shaped by two factors: its ideal point, and the weighting that its votes receive. Adding an eighth player means that a 5/7 majority requires six votes of eight. This case is illustrated in the bottom diagram, treating Turkey as a 'normal' country. Alternatively, we might suppose that Turkey's large weighted vote means that a majority of five (of eight) countries can pass any proposal if that five includes Turkey, while six countries are necessary if Turkey opposes the proposal. This situation is shown in Figure 1 as 'powerful Turkey'. This procedure greatly overstates Turkey's real votes but the distinction between the two scenarios is useful, and much easier to see when exaggerated.

This procedure works tolerably well for all foreseeable decision-making processes. If it takes effect, the revised EU Constitution will use a 'double majority' vote requiring a majority of 55 per cent of Member States

representing 65 per cent of the Union population, with a blocking coalition also required to consist of at least four states. If Turkey were to join the EU today, it would have 70 million of the EU's population of 550 million (including Bulgaria and Romania), or about one-eighth of the total. This would have an effect similar to the 'powerful Turkey' scenario discussed in the text, although reducing Turkey's blocking power a little because of the four-state minimum requirement for any measure to pass.

Adding Turkey defines a new core – the set of policies that, once adopted, cannot be changed. These cores are shown as C1–C5 for each of the five possible locations of Turkey's preferences. The pre-Turkey situation also defined a core. When those cores are identical, adding Turkey has no effect, for whatever policy was in effect before Turkey will remain after Turkey. If the post-Turkey core is a superset of the pre-Turkey core, Turkey will again have no effect, since every policy previously in effect would continue to be in the core and would therefore not be subject to change (by definition).

When Turkey is a 'normal' state, it can expand the core slightly when it has extreme preferences. We see this in the cores C1, C2 and C5 (C5, we should note, is the mirror image of C2 but is included to illustrate effects in both directions). When Turkey's preferences lie only slightly outside the existing core, as is true of T2 and T5, it expands the win-set slightly to include its own ideal point. In contrast, when Turkey has extreme preference on a policy dimension, it will always be outvoted. However, outvoting Turkey requires that the policy coalition add some *other* state to the winning QMV coalition. This other country's preferences may help shape the win-set. As we see in Figure 1, state 2 will help define the win-set in these cases.

When Turkey is 'powerful' in the sense defined above, it will have greater influence. It can move policy in a favourable direction in the same way as a 'normal' Turkey. In these cases, Turkey can expand the core in the direction that it favours; equivalently, it can keep the core from reaching too far away from its preferences.

The more interesting effect happens on the opposite end of the policy dimension. Turkey's weighted votes do not help much in pulling policy toward its ideal point but are very useful when putting together a blocking coalition against policy changes unfavourable to Turkey. A coalition of five states that includes Turkey can ignore the most distant *three* Member States, labelled 5–7 in our figure. This pulls in the right-hand bound of the core, either to 4's ideal point or to Turkey's own ideal point. This effect is visible in C2, for example.

Even in these cases, Turkey's influence is limited to *new* policy initiatives. Any well-established policy will already be located in the pre-Turkey core, that is, between the ideal points of states 3 and 5. Analysing this requires a

Figure 2: Effects of 'Powerful' Turkey on the Council Win-Set



new concept, the 'win-set'. The win-set is the set of policies that the Council prefers to a particular status quo. This differs from the core, which does not consider the status quo at all.

Any policy that is chosen before Turkey joins will still be an equilibrium outcome and therefore not subject to change. The CAP is probably a good example, and it would be very difficult to change whether or not Turkey joins the EU. We need only conduct a win-set analysis, then, when the pre-Turkey core is not a subset of the post-Turkey core. To see the maximum extent of its possible influence, we consider only the case of a 'powerful' Turkey. Figure 2 assumes that the pre-Turkey policy is in that set of the core that does not lie in the post-Turkey core (T5, which is the mirror image of T1, is not shown). Below the pre-Turkey core, we show this set of 'changeable' policies that are no longer in the post-Turkey core. That set provides the possible locations of the status quo.

To see the maximum change, suppose that the player farthest away can propose a new policy – this means T1 or state 1 for policy changes to the left, state 7 for policy changes to the right. Any proposal needs to attract five votes if the coalition includes a 'powerful' Turkey (as in all the cases here). For policy moves to the left, this means that the fifth actor from the left must be no worse off under the new policy; as policy moves to the right, the fifth actor from the right must be no worse off under the new policy. The minimum change is infinitesimal. Because the set of changeable policies is an open set

defined by the boundary of the 'unchangeable' core, a closed set, policy could change by epsilon, bringing it into that core. The win-set consists of all points between that minimum and maximum (see Figure 2).

In all such cases, the new policy will remain within the old core, as all the win-sets are subsets of that core. The constraints imposed by the need to satisfy existing members limit policy change considerably. Turkey's power helps determine the new outcome, but so does existing members' choice of the status quo. Indeed, the existing members can forestall any change by choosing the pre-Turkey status quo accordingly.

We would expect, then, that the *potential* for Turkish membership of the EU will shape policy choices today. This will be particularly likely in areas that are subject to unanimity today but may be subject to QMV in the future, such as some JHA issues. The finding that Turkey's future influence might help existing members select particular solutions to problems in advance of Turkey's membership is a much more narrow form of influence than seen in most of the fearful accounts discussed above.

Finally, we will consider two factors that might confound this voting weight analysis. First, some scholars emphasize the importance of Council unanimity norms, which could make vote-counting exercises irrelevant (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Rodden, 2002). Unfortunately, we are not aware of any studies that control for the status quo and the nature of QMV majorities while simultaneously examining the role of voting weights, which is what spatial theory would have us do (see Pahre, 2005, for the general critique). Some results are suggestive, however. Harry Flam (2003, p. 26), for example, finds that per capita GNP, Cohesion Fund status and voting weight explain variation in per capita contributions among the EU-15. However, voting weight has the smallest substantive effect and is of marginal statistical importance. This is consistent with the theory here, which would predict that controlling for the status quo and the QMV coalitions would increase the measurable effect of voting weight.

The use of unanimity is likely to decrease in response to Turkish membership. Carubba and Volden (2001) suggest that the EU will make greater use of smaller supermajorities as the number of members increases. This implies a greater use of QMV where unanimity now applies. Despite rejection of the first constitutional treaty, the double majorities in its 'common procedure' may prove to be desirable in future treaties, whether these include the reform treaty or not. Such procedural innovations would increase Turkey's ability to influence new policies but reduce its ability to block changes to the status quo.

Second, Stefanie Bailer (2004) has argued that differences in national bargaining 'skill' also affect outcomes in the Council. For example,

participants view UK representatives as very skilful negotiators because of the high levels of information gathered through the excellent network of British EU civil servants. Turkey will not join the UK among the ranks of the 'highly skilled'. Turkey's former Secretary-General for European Union Affairs, Ambassador Murat Sungar, said that he lacked sufficient numbers of expert officers in the core committee that will conduct full membership negotiations with the EU (Kurt, 2005). This lack of skilled personnel remained a problem for Sungar and was one cause of his resignation in August 2005 (Boland *et al.*, 2005). Turkey will doubtless fare poorly on the 'skill' dimension until it has been an EU member for some years and its professional diplomatic staff have had an opportunity to develop appropriate expertise and networks.

The question of 'skill' will pose challenges for Turkey's first Council Presidency. The theoretical literature on the institution of the presidency is still thin, but it seems that the holders of this office do have some ability to affect policy outcomes in their favour (Huelshoff, 2002; Kollman, 2003; Tallberg, 2004). Experience in EU policy-making and thorough preparation for the presidency both play an important role in determining just how much influence the chair can have. Skill in brokering deals also helps shape the scope for a country to achieve its own goals as part of the package. In its first presidency a lack of infrastructure and experience will likely make Turkey somewhat less effective than others.

In short, it is hard to see how Turkey could have systematic and major effects on EU policy. It can at best pull new policies in a favourable direction, and can make the EU's existing policies unsustainable by weakening some blocking coalitions. In both cases, existing members are hardly powerless. By establishing a status quo strategically, existing members can reduce Turkey's likely influence even further. This is exactly how members have dealt with previous major expansions and we expect the same behaviour before Turkey becomes a member.

V. Turkey and the Commission

After the Council, the Commission is probably the EU's second most influential body. Like the Council, it has a voice on every issue. Each Commissioner has important agenda-setting powers in his or her policy domain. A Commissioner can also influence important policy decisions across issues by voting in the Commission, though traditions of deference and consensus dilute this influence.

In this setting, Turkey's first Commissioner will certainly be an influential figure in Europe. As a large country, Turkey will expect that its Commissioner

be given an important portfolio. Countries usually choose their commissioner candidates carefully so that they will be qualified for an important post. Austria has chosen particularly well for a small country, winning first Agriculture and then External Relations in successive Commissions (1999–04, 2004–09), thanks to the European-wide reputations of their nominees (Franz Fischler and Benita Ferrero-Waldner). Poland has also played this game well, obtaining the important post of Regional Policy for Danuta Hübner, an academic turned politician.

When countries fail to select wisely, the Commission President now feels sufficiently strong to relegate a weak candidate to a secondary post. The recent precedent was Jacques Chirac's choice of Jacques Barrot in 2004, despite his legal problems and involvement in scandal. Commission President Barroso assigned Barrot to Transportation and not to an influential economic post as France had sought.

Knowing this, Turkey should choose a safe pair of hands. Given the uncertainties surrounding Turkey's first commissioner, a Commission President will likely not appoint the Turkish Commissioner to a post such as External Relations where significant discretion is essential to the job. Nor will the President want to offend Turkey with a minor post such as Information Society. The President would also avoid a post where Turkey's preferences are significantly different from the European mainstream, such as regional policy or culture.

Given this, a significant economic post would be a likely destination for Turkey's first commissioner. Turkey would therefore be wise to nominate a commissioner with significant international economic expertise with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) or similar body. This background would imply that this commissioner would have preferences that lie within the mainstream economic policy approaches found in the industrialized democracies. If this decision were made today, the set of likely candidates would include past or present foreign ministers such as Ali Babacan or Abdullah Gül, or Central Bank Governor Süreyya Serdengeçti. Another popular name would be Kemal Derviş, the former Minister of State, a former IMF official and now head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

Turkey might also follow the lead of several accession countries and choose a diplomat closely associated with the accession negotiations, such as Murat Sungar or Ali Babacan. This strategy seems to be more popular with the smallest countries in the EU such as Latvia (Andris Piebalgs), Lithuania (Dalia Grybauskaite), Malta (Joe Borg), Slovakia (Ján Figel') and Slovenia (Janez Potočnik). None of these ended up with a major portfolio, however, making this strategy less attractive for a large country.

An economic commissioner is also likely because these posts are both important and constrained. Any new regulations would have to go through both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. This limits the discretion available to Turkey's first commissioner, though he or she would still retain the important agenda-setting powers of the Commission. Finally, the constraints under which Turkey will choose a commissioner practically guarantee someone with mainstream views. If Turkey selects poorly, its candidate will presumably suffer Barrot's fate.

VI. Turkey and the European Parliament

The final major political body of the EU for us to consider is the Parliament. We will set aside the European Court of Justice (ECJ), despite its importance, because the secrecy around its votes makes it extremely difficult to forecast the role of a Turkish justice.

The first question is the number of seats that Turkey will receive. In the past, the EU has assigned voting weights to countries in a rank-order fashion, and not proportional to population. Small countries are overrepresented and the norm is for large countries to be treated similarly to one another. Though Germany obtained more seats in the EP after reunification, the other large states have identical numbers of seats despite varying populations.

It is likely that Turkey would receive the same number of EP seats as either France, Italy, the UK or Germany, depending on its population on the date of membership. As a 'worst-case scenario' for Turkey's alleged power, we will analyse Turkey's future influence under the assumption that it will have the same number of seats as Germany.

Despite this formal equality, Turkey will remain much less influential than Germany, the most influential country in the European Parliament today. Germany's influence does not simply reflect the size of its delegation but also how the political systems of Germany and the EU interact.

Politics in the EP is dominated by the party groups (Hix, 1999; Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). The most important of these are the PES and the EPP, which represent mainstream social democracy and Christian democracy (conservatism), respectively. Because many EP decisions require an absolute majority of all MEPs, mobilizing these two party groups is often necessary and sufficient to pass any measure.

Within these party groups, national delegations provide a key organizing principle. Positions are normally worked out in each national delegation, after which each party group develops a common position. In addition, European

party groups have no way of keeping national delegations in line, though national delegations can keep their members in line in various ways.

Herein lies the German advantage. Germany's two largest parties are the SPD (PES) and the CDU/CSU (EPP). Their size in Germany guarantees that at least one of them will always be in government, and thus represented in the Council. Their size in the EP means that they are typically the largest national delegation in each of the two largest party groups. Thus, Germany has two domestically dominant parties that occupy political positions at the heart of the two largest party groups in the EP.

Turkey is not likely to enjoy such an advantage. On the centre-left, the high degree of fractionalization will make it unlikely for Turkey to have much influence within the PES. On the centre-right, the increasing rivalry between AKP and other parties will likely divide AKP's votes in the next elections. These divisions will make Turkey's EP delegation look more like France's or Italy's than Germany's or the UK's. This will reduce its influence considerably.

To see the importance of this particular combination of features, consider the other large countries. Berlusconi's Forza Italia formerly sat in the Union for Europe group though it has since joined the EPP. The UE is a mid-sized political group toward the right end of the political spectrum, consisting of a heterogeneous collection of parties, including Poland's Prawo i Sprawiedłiwość (Law and Justice), Ireland's Fianna Fáil and French Gaullists. This group's support is not necessary for passing most legislation in the EP. Its modest size makes policy leadership more difficult and its heterogeneity makes it hard to unite around any measure. Being in such a group made Forza Italia marginal despite its significance in Italian politics. This structural weakness was the most important reason for Forza Italia to join the EPP instead.

Though they may come together in domestic presidential races, parties of the French left and right are also divided. Left parties are found in both the PES and GUE, right parties in EPP and UEN. These divisions make the French delegation in each group relatively small for a large-country delegation. They do not help shape the caucus agenda to the same degree as the German parties.

Britain's two largest parties now share the same potential advantages of the German parties in that Labour sits in the PES and the Conservatives sit in the EPP (they historically sat in the European Democratic group and some figures have suggested leaving the EPP because it is too pro-EU). During most of the time since UK membership, however, both parties have had outlier preferences within these party groups, largely as a result of their internal divisions over Europe. Consolidation of the Blair wing of the Labour Party has made it much more a part of the PES mainstream, increasing its influence accordingly. However, the Tories have moved in the opposite direction and become more

strongly eurosceptic. This has had the effect of marginalizing them in the EPP on many issues, since the EPP and ELDR represent the political traditions that have historically been the most supportive of the EU.

In light of this analysis, the key question is, then, where will Turkey's MEPs sit in the European Parliament? On the Right, the AKP was recently given observer status in the EPP, despite the EPP's traditional foundation in Christian Democracy. Prime Minister Erdoğan has sought to join the EPP partly because its conservative agenda seems suitable for the AKP programme. Like the EPP, the AKP has also been strongly pro-European – uniquely so, for a religious party in Turkey. Erdoğan also sees strategic advantages in this move, hoping to neutralize EPP opposition to Turkey's membership.

The opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) is a member of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES) and the Socialist International. Although the left has traditionally been sceptical about EU membership because of the Kemalist principle of sovereignty, they have come to accept membership of an intergovernmental EU. This support depends on its long-term relationship with the PES and the hope that integration with Europe will strengthen secularism in Turkey (Hale and Avcı, 2001; see also Turkish Daily News, 2002).

We can expect interesting changes to accompany Turkey's accession process. There is some tendency for parties from an 'unconventional' party system to assimilate to the more standard EU system as they work within party caucuses and develop joint programmes with them. For example, Slovakia used to be characterized by a party system consisting of conventional left–right parties and unconventional, 'alternative' parties. Around the turn of the century, one of these alternative parties, Smer, found itself as the only significant party proposing any traditional 'leftist' policies. After it joined the PES, however, it began to assimilate to PES policies and now approaches the model of a conventional social-democratic party, having abandoned some previous policies of an authoritarian bent (Učeň, 2004, pp. 63–6). The same assimilation has happened to other parties in central and eastern Europe and we can expect an analogous evolution for at least some parties in Turkey.

The relative strength of these parties will also reflect the electoral system that Turkey uses to choose MEPs. The EU rules for electing MEPs require that each country use a proportional system of some kind even if they use first-past-the-post (FPTP) in national elections, as does the UK. Most countries use a system of proportional representation (PR), but Ireland and Malta use transferable vote systems that work like FPTP in some ways, and like PR in other respects.

Turkey uses a closed party list PR system with a 10 per cent electoral threshold (EPIC Project). Turkey will probably choose a similar system for EP elections. In that case, Kurdish parties and other minority groups might win seats in the Parliament. On the other hand, since the left has never received more than 40 per cent of the votes in Turkish history, leftist opposition parties such as the CHP would most probably win seats only from their traditional strongholds such as Izmir. Fragmentation of the Turkish delegation is likely.

While Turkish parties will tend to receive votes in line with their national-level support, it is important not to view EP elections isolated from national elections. Voters may view EP elections as 'second-order' elections in which many of them punish the incumbents, or vote eurosceptic, rather than voting their normal party loyalty (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In this case, opposition parties would benefit from the electorate's psyche. In the Turkish context, we would expect opposition parties on the right to gain more than the leftist parties because of the above-mentioned political structure. Although AKP is claiming a centre-right position, it is a hybrid of several right-wing factions including more traditional Islamist ones. Hence, another centre-right party like DP (Democratic Party) or a nationalist party like MHP (National Action Party) might more easily attract the reactionary votes in the EP elections. In sum, we would expect centre-right parties including AKP to have more votes than CHP and the CHP to win seats from its traditional strongholds in the PR system. This fragmentation on an otherwise-dominant right may end up resembling the pattern in France, whose EP delegation is relatively weak.

Our analysis so far suggests that Turkey's influence will be particularly small in the European Parliament. This implies that Turkish MEPs will not play a major amendment role, nor will they be key players in the budget procedure.

We should also consider more informal forms of influence in the EP, such as lobbying of MEPs by industry, labour and other groups. Because the EP is a parliament with low party discipline, similar in many respects to the US Congress, lobbying has played a rapidly increasing role as EP powers have increased since Maastricht.

We are not aware of any studies that look at how *national* differences affect lobbying. The literature does emphasize that both national and European associations play key roles (Bouwen, 2004). Several recent studies, following developments in the theory of lobbies in the US Congress, emphasize the powers of groups that can provide important information to the EU, including peak associations of labour and capital (Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Crombez, 2002).

Turkey has several peak associations in which labour and business interests are organized. Among these associations, TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) and TÜGİAD (Türkiye Genç İşadamları Derneği, Young Businessmen's Association of Turkey) have been more active in lobbying for the accession of Turkey. TÜSİAD's lobbying group has visited major European capitals before the decision about Turkish membership in 2004. They mostly made contacts with ministers, heads of state and peer organizations (e.g. French Entrepreneur's Movement (MEDEF)). TÜGİAD, on the other hand, followed a slightly different path by joining the subcommittee meetings of YES (Confederation of Young European Businessmen's Associations) and following events relating to the European Union and YES in Brussels. MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), a Muslim and faith-based association, does not actively lobby in Europe because of its members' scepticism about the possibility of membership. It represents small and medium-sized firms in Anatolia, which tend to fear competition from European firms.

Major labour unions in Turkey such as TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İsçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), HAK-İŞ (Hak İsçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions), KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions) and DİSK (Devrimci İsçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) are members of the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC). The ETUC unanimously adopted a resolution calling for Turkey's accession to the EU in October 2004 (see http://www.eutuc.org). This organizational unity on EU matters stands in contrast to their differences at the national level, which include ideology, religion and public versus private sector membership bases. TÜRK-İŞ, the largest federation, is also the most sceptical of EU membership, while the religiously oriented HAK-İŞ and leftist DİSK both see the EU as a way to improve social justice in Turkey.

Given the lack of scholarship on national variation in lobbying success, it is hard to know what these facts imply. Certainly Turkey has an infrastructure of peak associations that can play a role in the usual forms of interest representation in Brussels. The relative fragmentation of these associations will tend to make them weaker than those from countries that retain a unified peak association structure. Beyond that, it is hard to tell.

In summary, it is hard to see how Turkey might 'punch above its weight' in the European Parliament. The reverse seems more likely, with Turkey's MEPs and interest groups being somewhat less influential than their numbers would imply.

VII. Dealing with Turkey's Accession: Prior Changes in Policy and Decision-Making

Whatever Turkey's likely influence over policy in the future EU, current members can reduce it by taking some decisions *before* Turkish entry. The EU has a long tradition of changing its rules before enlargement. For example, the EU-6 laid out the Common Fisheries Policy one day before beginning accession negotiations with four countries with significant fishing fleets (Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK). As a result, the CFP became part of the *acquis communautaire* that the new members would have to accept (Franchino and Rahming, 2003).

The Nice treaty similarly changed policy before the eastern enlargement. Despite its ostensible goal of streamlining decision-making in a Union of 25, it did not introduce majority voting in taxation, social policy, immigration or structural spending, where existing members would want to have vetoes against changes reflecting the interests of the countries of central and eastern Europe (Heinemann, 2002).

Changes in decision-making procedures provide another example. Though the Czech Republic is more populous than Belgium, it received fewer seats in the EP (20 against 22), and the same pattern characterizes the pair of Hungary and Portugal. Nice also introduced rules for enhanced co-operation by eight or more members, which keeps new members from blocking deeper co-operation that the EU-15 want (Heinemann, 2002). These provisions will have similar effects on Turkey.

The accession negotiations can also lock in policies on certain issues. For example, several areas in which Turkish jurisprudence differs from general EU practice have already been made part of the entry package. These include abolition of the death penalty, minority rights for Kurds and a *de facto* prohibition on the introduction of laws on adultery. The EU-27 will doubtless add other requirements as they wish. As we showed above, this is an effective way to minimize Turkey's post-accession influence.

We would expect more such changes in advance of Turkish accession. The CAP and regional policy seem particularly likely targets of policy change, since Turkey's preferences in these areas differ most from the large, rich countries that have dominated the Union. Institutional changes that retain an advantage for existing members also seem likely.

As Munchau (2004) has argued, the real question is not whether Turkey will join the EU but what kind of Europe Turkey will join. The EU's current members have every interest in making that Europe serve their own interests, even at the expense of Turkey's. In the cases discussed in this section, however, the prospect of Turkish membership changes the EU *away* from

Turkish preferences as existing members prevent Turkey from changing structures later on. Rather than fearing Turkish membership, a heresthetically[3] sophisticated opponent of Turkey might favour negotiations as a way to move the EU away from positions that Turkey would support as a member. Without seeing conspiracies behind every political position, we should recognize the incentives for certain members of the EU to drag out accession negotiations in order to change the Union in their own favour.

Conclusion

We have argued that Turkey's room for influencing the EU is surprisingly narrow, despite the many worries to the contrary. The EU's many veto players make it difficult to change policy (Hix, 1999; Kreppel, 2002; Tsebelis, 2002, ch. 11). Normal legislation requires approval of the Commission, Council and Parliament, a tricameral structure that gives disproportionate weight to the status quo. Moreover, the existing members can make last-minute changes to that status quo before Turkey joins.

Like any other country, Turkey's accession may present trade-offs between widening and deepening the European Union (see Pahre, 1995). Former Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (2004, p. 3) put such concerns in strong terms in a speech at the University of Leiden, choosing the provocative analogy of the Habsburg empire's attempts to build a multinational state in south-eastern Europe after beating the Ottoman Turks back from the gates of Vienna in 1683:

> The Turks were continually driven back and the central European empire grew steadily larger [. . .]. The territory of the Danube monarchy now lies spread across 15 different countries. The empire expanded but the capacity to absorb the new peoples declined. At a certain moment the Danube monarchy reached the limit of the number of peoples that it could hold together.[4]

Habsburg history, according to Bolkestein, illustrates a 'consolidation problem' (*consolidatieprobleem*) analogous to Brussels' problems now, torn between unity and diversity, centralism and decentralization, absolutism [*sic*] and democratization. He reminds us that the Habsburgs ended up giving Europe World War I.

It is easy to talk about abstract problems of 'consolidation', but a closer review of decision-making institutions, Turkey's preferences and the status

[3] For an explication of this term, see Riker (1986).

[4] 'De Turken werden steeds verder teruggedrongen en het Midden-Europese keizerrijk werd steeds groter . . . Het territorium van de Donaumonarchie ligt nu verspreid over bijna vijftien verschillende staten. Het keizerrijk breidde zich uit maar de capaciteit om de nieuwe volken te absorberen nam af. Op een zeker moment stuitte de Donaumonarchie op de grens van het aantal volken die zij bijeen kon houden.'

quo suggests that the pessimists reach too far. Like any other Member State, Turkey will retain some scope for influence. However, its influence will likely be surprisingly small, despite the size of its population.

Correspondence:
Robert Pahre
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois
361 Lincoln Hall
702 South Wright St
Urbana, IL61801, USA
Tel +001 (217) 333 2851
Fax +001 (217) 244 5712
email pahre@uiuc.edu

References

Aleskerov, F., Avcı, G., Iakouba, V. and Umut Türem, Z. (2002) 'European Union Enlargement: Power Distribution Implications of the New Institutional Arrangements'. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 41, pp. 379–94.

Anatolia News Agency (2005) 'Turkey to ask EU for Exemptions in Transport, Agriculture, Taxation', 12 July.

Anderson, J.J. (1995) 'The State of the (European) Union: From the Single Market to Maastricht, from Singular Events to General Theories'. *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp 441–65.

Aspinwall, M. (2002) 'Preferring Europe: Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 81–111.

Bailer, S. (2004) 'Bargaining Success in the European Union: The Impact of Exogenous and Endogenous Power Resources'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 99–123.

Baldwin, R. and Widgrén, M. (2005) 'The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting'. Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 62, February.

BBC Monitoring Europe (2007a) 'Poll Shows 60 per cent of Turks Support EU Accession', 8 January.

BBC Monitoring Europe (2007b) 'Turkish Poll Shows Support for EU, Separatism Regarded as Main Threat', 10 January.

Boland, V., Kuser, M. and Minder, R. (2005) 'Tensions over Accession Grow as Turks Suspect Brussels of Double Standards: Ankara's Diplomat in Charge of Negotiations Quits as Problems over the Recognition of Cyprus Come to the Forefront'. *Financial Times*, 7 August.

Broscheid, A. and Coen, D. (2003) 'Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission. An Informational Model of Forum Politics'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 165–89.

Carubba, C.J. and Volden, C. (2001) 'Explaining Institutional Change in the European Union. What Determines the Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers?' *European Union Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 5–30.

Charlemagne (2005) 'When to Talk Turkey'. *Economist*, 17 September, p. 54.

Crombez, C. (1996) 'Legislative Procedures in the European Community'. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 199–228.

Crombez, C. (1997) 'The Co-decision Procedure in the European Union'. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 97–119.

Crombez, C. (2002) 'Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 7–32.

Dahl, R. (1957) 'The Concept of "Power" '. *Behavioural Science*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 201–15.

Demir, G. (2005) 'Turkish Agriculture on the Way to the EU'. *Turkish Daily News*, 14 February.

Der Standard (2004) 'CDU/CSU setzen auf Schüssel'. 9 December. Available at:«http://derstandard.at/?url=/?id=1884941».

Economist (2004) 'The Unwelcome Guests'. 11 December, pp. 48–9.

Ergil, D. (2005) 'Rising Nationalism'. *Turkish Daily News*, 28 February.

Flam, H. (2003) 'Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession'. Stockholm University Institute for International Economic Studies, Seminar Paper No. 718. Available at: «http://www.iies.su.se/publications/seminarpapers/718.pdf».

Forysinski, W. (2005) 'Is Cyprus a Condition for Turkey's Accession to the European Union?' Paper presented at the 35th UACES Annual Conference and 10th Research Conference, University of Zagreb, 5–7 September.

Franchino, F. and Rahming, A.J. (2003) 'Biased Ministers, Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies: An Application to the EU Fisheries Policy'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 11–36.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004) 'Der österreichische Weg'. 14 December.

Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1996) 'An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism'. *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 269–99.

Hale, W. and Avcı, G. (2001) 'Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership'. In Rubin, B. and Kirisci, K. (eds) *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Heinemann, F. (2002) 'The Political Economy of EU Enlargement and the Treaty of Nice'. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 19, pp. 17–31.

Heper, M. (1985) *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate: The Eothen Press).

Hix, S. (1999) *The Political System of the European Union* (New York: St Martin's Press).

Hix, S. (2002).'Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament'. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 688–98.

Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997) *Political Parties in the European Union* (New York: St Martin's Press).

Hösli, M.O. (1993) 'Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers'. *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 629–43.

Hösli, M.O. (1995) 'The Balance Between Small and Large: Effects of a Double-Majority System on Voting Power in the European Union'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 351–70.

Hösli, M.O. (1996) 'Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union'. *JCMS*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 255–73.

Huelshoff, M.G. (2002) 'The European Council and EU Summitry: A Comparative Analysis of the Austrian and German Presidencies'. In Bischof, G., Pelinka, A. and Gehler, M. (eds) *Austria in the European Union* (Contemporary Austrian Studies Vol. 10) (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers).

Hug, S. and König, T. (2002) 'In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference'. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 447–76.

İslamoğlu-İnan, H. (1987) (ed.) *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Kabaalioğlu, H. (1999) 'The Relations between Turkey and EU: A Turkish Perspective'. In Bagci, H., Janes, J. and Kuhnhardt, L. (eds) *Parameters of Partnership: The US – Turkey – Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

Kasaba, R. (1988) *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press).

Kollman, K. (2003) 'The Rotating Presidency of the European Council as a Search for Good Policies'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 51–74.

Kreppel, A. (2002) *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Kubosova, L. (2005) 'Turkish AKP Gets Observer Status in EU's Largest Political Family'. *EUObserver.com*, 31 January. Available at: «http://euobserver.com/?aid=18285&rk=1».

Kurt, S. (2005) 'Müzakereler için yeterli memurumuz yok'. *Zaman Daily News*, 14 March. Available at: «http://www.zaman.com.tr».

Lane, J.-E. and Maeland, R. (1996) 'Constitutional Power in the EU'. Network on Enlargement and new Membership of the European Union Working Paper, No. 96–2, Twente, the Netherlands.

Marks, G., Wilson, C.J. and Ray, L. (2002) 'National Political Parties and European Integration'. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 585–94.

Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M. and Edwards, E. (2004) 'Mapping Party Support for European Integration in a United Europe: All in the Family?' Manuscript, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Martin, L.L. (2000) *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Co-operation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

McLaren, L. (2000) 'Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue'. *JCMS*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 117–29.

Mertha, A. and Pahre, R. (2005) 'Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rights'. *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 695–729.

Moravcsik, Andrew. (1991) 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community'. *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 19–56.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Müftüler-Baç, M. (2003) 'The New Face of Turkey: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of November 2002 Elections'. *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 421–38.

Müftüler-Baç, M. and McLaren. L. (2003) 'Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey'. *European Integration*, Vol. 25, pp. 17–30.

Müftüler-Baç, M. and Güney, A. (2005) 'The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961–2003'. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 275–87.

Munchau, W. (2004) 'Turkey Could Join a Very Different Europe'. *The Financial Times*, 20 December, p. 19.

Noury, A.G. (2002) 'Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 33–58.

Özbudun, E. (1984) 'Antecedents of Kemalist Secularism: Some Thoughts on the Young Turk Period'. In Evin, A. (ed.) *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich).

Pahre, R. (1995) 'Wider and Deeper: The Links between Expansion and Enlargement in the European Communities'. In Schneider, G., Weitsman, P.A. and Bernauer, T. (eds) *Towards a New Europe: Stops and Starts in Regional Integration* (Boulder, CO: Praeger).

Pahre, R. (1997) 'Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games: Parliamentary Oversight in Denmark and Elsewhere'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 147–74.

Pahre, R. (2001) 'Divided Government and International Co-operation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway, and the European Union'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 131–62.

Pahre, R. (2005) 'Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 113–46.

Pennings, P. (2002) 'The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space. The European Elections of 1999'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 59–80.

Politiken (2004) 'Et større Europa: Tyrkisk mod og europæisk nøl'. *Politiken.dk*, 17 December. Available at: «http://politiken.dk/VisArtikel.sasp?PageID=349890».

Quaisser, W. and Reppegather, A. (2004) 'EU-Beitrittsreife der Türkei und Konsequenzen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft'. Working Paper No. 252, Osteuropa Institut–München, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Abteilung.

Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) 'Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results'. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3–44.

Riker, W.H. (1986) *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Rodden, J. (2002) 'Strength in Numbers? Representation and Redistribution in the European Union'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 151–75.

Sajdik, M. and Schwarzinger, M. (2008) *European Union Enlargement: Background, Developments, Facts* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers).

Salhani, C. (2004) 'Analysis: How Turkey Will Change Europe'. *United Press International*, 21 December.

Schneider, G. and Cedermann, L.-E. (1993) 'The Change in Tide in Political Co-operation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration'. *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 633–62.

Schneider, G., Weitsman, P.A. and Bernauer, T. (1995) *Towards a New Europe: Stops and Starts in Regional Integration* (Boulder, CO: Praeger/Greenwood).

Sezer, D.B. (1981) 'Turkey's Security Policies'. *Adelphi Papers* 164 London: IISS.

Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K. (1977) *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II. Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Smith, M.E. (2004) 'Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Co-operation'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 95–136.

Sverdrup, U. (1998) 'Precedents and Present Events in the European Union – an Institutional Perspective on Treaty Reform'. ARENA Working Paper WP 98/21. Available at «http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/publications/wp98_21.htm».

Tallberg, J. (2004) 'The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations'. *JCMS*, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 999–1022.

Thomson, R. and Hösli, M.O. (2003) 'Who has Power in the European Union? A Comparison of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in EU Decision-Making'. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April.

Tsebelis, G. (1994) 'The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter'. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, pp. 128–42.

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Turkish Daily News (2002) 'Baykal asks PES's support'. 16 November.

Učeň, P. (2004) 'Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics'. In Gyárfášová, O. and Mesežnikov, G. (eds) *Party Government in Slovakia: Experience and Perspectives* (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs).