
tva

March 12, 2024

1 TVA

This is the voting input

	voter_0	voter_1	${\tt voter_2}$	voter_3	${\tt voter_4}$	voter_5
preference_0	C	В	C	C	В	A
preference_1	A	D	D	D	Α	D
preference_2	D	C	A	В	D	В
preference_3	В	A	В	A	C	C





1.1 Strategic Voting

	voter_0	voter_1	voter_2	voter_3	${\tt voter_4}$	voter_5
preference_0	C	В	C	C	В	Α
preference_1	Α	D	D	D	A	D
preference_2	D	C	A	В	D	В
preference_3	В	A	В	A	C	C

Winner: C {'A': 1, 'B': 2, 'C': 3, 'D': 0}

Note that **voter 5** is the only voter that can engage in strategic voting. Voter 5 prefers B over the winner C. Hence, they can increase their Happiness Level by placing B as their first preference, resulting in a tie between C and B in the voting outcome (for plurality, voting for two, Borda). Since ties are resolved in alphabetical order, B wins over C.

The table below displays the two voting strategies available to voter 5.

voter strategic_voting new_result strategic_H previous_H
$$\setminus$$
 0 5 [B, A, D, C] B 0.410487 0.0

```
1
       5
              [B, D, A, C]
                                    В
                                          0.410487
                                                            0.0
   strategic_overall_H previous_overall_H
0
               2.820973
1
               2.820973
                                   3.410487
The table displays the best strategic voting for each voter
   voter strategic_voting new_result strategic_H previous_H \
0
              [B, A, D, C]
                                          0.410487
                                                            0.0
       5
                                    В
   strategic_overall_H previous_overall_H
               2.820973
0
                                   3.410487
Strategic Voting Risk
0.13682886358890622
1.2 Coalition Voting
             voter_0 voter_1 voter_2 voter_3 voter_4
preference_0
                    Α
                            В
                                                     В
                                    Α
                                             Α
                            С
                                    С
                                             С
                                                     С
preference_1
                    В
                                             В
preference_2
                    С
                            Α
                                    В
                                                     Α
                            D
                                    D
                                             D
                                                     D
preference_3
                    D
New voting configuration:
[['A' 'D' 'A' 'A' 'C']
 ['B' 'C' 'C' 'C' 'D']
 ['C' 'B' 'B' 'B' 'B']
 ['D' 'A' 'D' 'D' 'A']]
Effective Coalition: [1, 4], Strategic Changes: {1: ('D', 'C', 'B', 'A'), 4:
('C', 'D', 'B', 'A')}, Original Winner: A, New Winner: C
Changes in Happiness Levels for Coalition Members:
Voter 1: Happiness Change = 0.179
Voter 4: Happiness Change = 0.179
New voting configuration:
[['A' 'B' 'A' 'A' 'B']
 ['B' 'D' 'C' 'C' 'D']
 ['C' 'C' 'B' 'B' 'C']
```

Effective Coalition: [1, 4], Strategic Changes: {1: ('B', 'D', 'C', 'A'), 4:

('B', 'D', 'C', 'A')}, Original Winner: A, New Winner: B

Changes in Happiness Levels for Coalition Members:

['D' 'A' 'D' 'D' 'A']]

Voter 1: Happiness Change = 0.590

Voter 4: Happiness Change = 0.590

Summary of Successful Coalitions and their Strategic Votes BORDA:

Successful Coalition Members: Voter_1, Voter_4

Strategic Changes (Borda Rankings): Voter_1 changes to D > C > B > A; Voter_4

changes to C > D > B > A

Original Winner: A, New Winner: C

Changes in Happiness Levels for Coalition Members: Voter_1: 0.179; Voter_4:

0.179

Successful Coalition Members: Voter_1, Voter_4

Strategic Changes (Borda Rankings): Voter_1 changes to B > D > C > A; Voter_4

changes to B > D > C > A

Original Winner: A, New Winner: B

Changes in Happiness Levels for Coalition Members: Voter_1: 0.590; Voter_4:

0.590