

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI VERONA

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

MASTER'S DEGREE IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

Master Thesis

**UNDERSTANDING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS USING GRAPH ANALYSIS,
INVARIANT ANALYSIS & PROCESS MINING**

Supervisor:

Prof. Massimo MERRO

Co-supervisors:

Prof. Ruggero LANOTTE

Marco LUCCHESI

Candidate:

Marco OLIANI

Matr. VR457249

Academic Year 2022/2023

"Gallina vecchia fa buon brodo"
(Valentino Rossi)

Abstract

Bla bla bla

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Contribution	1
1.2	Outline	1
2	Background	3
2.1	What ICSs are	3
2.2	ICS components	4
2.2.1	SCADA systems	4
2.2.1.1	Scada architecture	5
2.2.2	Field devices	6
2.2.3	PLC	6
2.2.3.1	PLC Architecture	7
2.2.3.2	PLC Programming	8
2.2.3.3	PLC Security	9
2.2.4	RTU	11
2.2.5	HMI	11
2.2.6	Cybersecurity components	12
2.2.7	Communication Networks	12
2.3	ICS Communication Protocols	12
2.3.1	Modbus	13
2.3.1.1	Modbus registers	14
2.3.1.2	Modbus Function Codes	15
2.3.1.3	Modbus Security	15

2.3.2	Ethernet/IP	17
2.3.3	Common Industrial Protocol (CIP)	17
2.3.4	Other Protocols	17
3	Related work	19
4	State of the Art: Presentation of Ceccato et al. Work	21
4.1	Paper's Goal	21
4.2	Process Analysis Steps	21
4.2.1	Scanning of the System and Graph Analysis	21
4.2.2	Businness Process Analysis	21
4.2.3	Invariants Analysis	21
4.3	Application to a Simulated Testbed	21
4.4	Limitations	21
5	Proposal to Improve Ceccato et al. Work	23
5.1	Improving Pre-processing	23
5.2	Improving Graph Analysis	23
5.3	Improving Invariants Analysis	23
5.3.1	Automatic Detection of Actuators and Sensors	23
5.3.2	Invariants Generation	23
5.4	Obtaining Extra Information on the Runtime Evolution of the Physical Process	23
5.5	Improving Businness Process Analysis	23
6	Case study: the iTrust SWaT System	25
7	Application to the iTrust SWaT System	27
7.1	Pre-processing	27
7.2	Graph Analysis	27
7.2.1	Conjectures About the System	27
7.3	Invariants Analysis	27
7.3.1	Actuators Detection	27
7.3.2	Daikon Analysis and Results Comparing	27

7.4	Obtaining extra information on the runtime evolution of the physical system	27
7.5	Businness Process Analysis	27
8	Conclusions	29
8.1	Discussions	29
8.2	Guidelines	29
8.3	Future work	29
	List of Figures	31
	List of Tables	33
	References	35

Introduction

LOREM ipsum dolor bla bla bla. Ma dove metto l'abstract? Prova di interlinea che direi posso anche andare bene, ma bisogna poi vedere il tutto come si incastra alla fine, in modo da ottenere un bel risultato alla vista.

1.1 Contribution

Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's standard dummy text ever since the 1500s, when an unknown printer took a galley of type and scrambled it to make a type specimen book. It has survived not only five centuries, but also the leap into electronic typesetting, remaining essentially unchanged. It was popularised in the 1960s with the release of Letraset sheets containing Lorem Ipsum passages, and more recently with desktop publishing software like Aldus PageMaker including versions of Lorem Ipsum.

1.2 Outline

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2: provides background on the topics covered in this thesis: Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and other devices, industrial communication protocols.

Chapter 3:

Chapter 4:

Chapter 5:

Chapter 6:

Chapter 7:

Chapter 8:

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 What ICSs are

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICSs) are information systems used to control industrial processes such as manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution [1].

ICSs are often found in critical infrastructure facilities such as power plants, oil and gas refineries, and chemical plants.

ICSs are different from traditional IT systems in several key ways. Firstly, ICSs are designed to control physical processes, whereas IT systems are designed to process and store data. This means that ICSs have different requirements for availability, reliability, and performance. Secondly, ICSs are typically deployed in environments that are harsh and have limited resources, such as extreme temperatures and limited power. Thirdly, the protocols and hardware used in ICSs are often proprietary and not widely used outside of the industrial sector.

ICSs are becoming increasingly connected to the internet and other networks, which has led to increased concerns about their security. Industrial systems were not originally designed with security in mind, and many of them have known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. Additionally, the use of legacy systems and equipment can make it difficult to

implement security measures. As a result, ICSs are increasingly seen as a potential target for cyber attacks, which could have serious consequences for the safe and reliable operation of critical infrastructure.

The increasing connectivity of ICSs and the associated security risks have led to a growing interest in the field of ICS security. Researchers and practitioners are working to develop new security technologies, standards, and best practices to protect ICSs from cyber attacks. This includes efforts to improve the security of ICS networks and devices, as well as the development of new monitoring and detection techniques to identify and respond to cyber attacks.

2.2 ICS components

Industrial control systems (ICSs) are composed of several different components that work together to monitor and control industrial processes.

2.2.1 SCADA systems

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (**SCADA**) is a system of software and hardware elements that allows industrial organizations to [2]:

- Control industrial processes locally or at remote locations
- Monitor, gather, and process real-time data
- Directly interact with devices such as sensors, valves, pumps, motors, and more through human-machine interface (HMI) software
- Record events into a log file

The SCADA software processes, distributes, and displays the data, helping operators and other employees analyze the data and make important decisions.

SCADA systems are known for their ability to monitor and control large-scale industrial processes, and for their ability to operate over long

distances. This makes them well-suited for use in remote locations or for controlling processes that are spread out over a wide area. However, the same features that make SCADA systems so useful also make them vulnerable to cyber attacks.

SCADA systems were not originally designed with security in mind, and many of them have known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. Additionally, the use of legacy systems and equipment can make it difficult to implement security measures. As a result, SCADA systems are increasingly seen as a potential target for cyber attacks, which could have serious consequences for the safe and reliable operation of critical infrastructure.

To secure SCADA systems, it is important to implement security measures such as network segmentation, secure communication protocols, and access control. Additionally, it is important to monitor SCADA systems for unusual activity and to implement incident response procedures to quickly detect and respond to any security breaches.

2.2.1.1 Scada architecture




Figure 2.1: SCADA architecture schema

SCADA architecture consists in **five layers** (Figure 2.1):

- Level 0 (**Field Level**): contains **field devices** (2.2.2), or *sensors*.
- Level 1 (**Direct Control**): includes **local or remote controllers** such as **PLCs** (2.2.3) and **RTUs** (2.2.4). Controllers interface directly to the field devices reading data from sensors and sending commands to actuators.
- Level 2 (**Plant Supervisory**): contains computer systems that **collate and store informations** from the previous level and provide a **Human-Machine Interface** (*HMI*, 2.2.5) for operator control.
- Level 3 (**Production Control**): collect and aggregates data from the Plant Supervisory level to generate **reporting** to the Production Scheduling layer.
- Level 4 (**Production Scheduling**): includes business systems (such as ERP systems) used to **manage ongoing processes**.

Production Control level and Production Scheduling level are not directly connected to the process control, but concerned with monitoring production and targets and production scheduling level.

2.2.2 Field devices

Field devices are the **sensors** and **actuators** that are used to collect data from the process and control it. Examples of field devices include temperature sensors, pressure sensors, valves and pumps.

2.2.3 PLC

A *Programmable Logic Controller* (PLC) is a **small and specialized industrial computer** having the capability of controlling complex industrial and manufacturing processes [3].

Compared to relay systems and personal computers, PLCs are optimized for control tasks and industrial environments: they are rugged and

designed to withstand harsh conditions such as dust, vibrations, humidity and temperature: they have more reliability than personal computers, which are more prone to crash, and they are more compact and require less maintenance than a relay system. Furthermore, I/O interfaces are already on the controller, so PLCs are easier to expand with additional I/O modules (if in a rack format) to manage more inputs and outputs, without reconfiguring hardware as in relay systems when a reconfiguration occurs.

PLCs are more *user-friendly*: they are not intended (only) for computer programmers, but designed for engineers with a limited knowledge in programming languages: control program can be entered with a simple and intuitive language based on logic and switching operations instead of a general-purpose programming language (*i.e.* C, C++, ...).

2.2.3.1 PLC Architecture

The basic hardware architecture of a PLC consists of these elements [4]:




Figure 2.2: PLC architecture

- **Processor unit (CPU):** contains the microprocessor. This unit interprets the input signals from I/O modules, executes the control program stored in the Memory Unit and sends the output signals to the

I/O Modules. The processor unit also sends data to the Communication interface, for the communication with additional devices.

- **Power supply unit:** converts AC voltage to low DC voltage.
- **Programming device:** is used to store the required program into the memory unit.
- **Memory Unit:** consists in RAM memory and ROM memory. RAM memory is used for storing data from inputs, ROM memory for storing operating system, firmware and user program to be executed by the CPU.
- **I/O modules:** provide interface between sensors and final control elements (actuators).
- **Communications interface:** used to send and receive data on a network from/to other PLCs.




Figure 2.3: PLC communication schema

2.2.3.2 PLC Programming

Two different programs are executed in a PLC: the **operating system** and the **user program**.

The operating system tasks include executing the user program, managing memory areas and the *process image table* (memory registers where inputs from sensors and outputs for actuators are stored).

The user program needs to be uploaded on the PLC via the programming device and runs on the process image table in *scan cycles*: each scan is made up of three phases [5]:

1. reading inputs from the process images table
2. execution of the control code and computing the physical process evolution
3. writing output to the process image table to have an effect on the physical process. At the end of the cycle, the process image table is refreshed by the CPU

Standard PLCs **programming languages** are basically of two types: **textuals** and **graphicals**. Textual languages include languages such as *Instruction List* (IL) and *Structured Text* (ST), while *Ladder Diagrams* (LD), *Function Block Diagram* (FBD) and *Sequential Function Chart* (SFC) belong to the graphical languages.

Graphical languages are more simple and immediate comparing to the textual ones and are preferred by programmers because of their features and simplicity, in particular the **Ladder Logic programming** (see Figure 2.4 for a comparison).

2.2.3.3 PLC Security

PLCs were originally designed to operate as closed systems, not connected and exposed to the outside world via communication networks: the question of the safety of these systems, therefore, was not a primary aspect. The advent of Internet has brought undoubted advantages, but has introduced problems relating to the safety and protection of PLCs from external attacks and vulnerabilities.

```


PROGRAM PLC1
VAR
    level AT %IW0 : INT;
    Richiesta AT %QX0.2 : BOOL;
    request AT %IW1 : INT;
    pumps AT %QX0.0 : BOOL;
    valve AT %QX0.1 : BOOL;
    low AT %MX0.0 : BOOL;
    high AT %MX0.1 : BOOL;
    open_req AT %MX0.3 : BOOL;
    close_req AT %MX0.4 : BOOL;
    low_1 AT %MW0 : INT := 40;
    high_1 AT %MW1 : INT := 80;
END_VAR
VAR
    LE3_OUT : BOOL;
    GE7_OUT : BOOL;
END_VAR

LE3_OUT := LE(level, low_1);
low := LE3_OUT;
GE7_OUT := GE(level, high_1);
high := GE7_OUT;
open_req := Richiesta;
close_req := NOT(Richiasta);
pumps := NOT(high) AND (low OR pumps);
valve := NOT(close_req) AND (open_req AND NOT(low) OR valve);
END_PROGRAM

CONFIGURATION Config0
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK task0[INTERVAL := T#20ms,PRIORITY := 0];
PROGRAM instance0 WITH task0 : PLC1;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION

```

(a) Example of ST programming



(b) Example of Ladder Logic

Figure 2.4: Comparison between ST language and Ladder Logic

Indeed, a variety of different communication protocols used in ICSs are designed to be efficient in communications, but do not provide any security measure i.e. confidentiality, authentication and data integrity, which makes these protocols vulnerable against many of the IT classic attacks such as *Replay Attack* or *Man in the Middle Attack*.

Countermeasures to enhance security in PLC systems may include [6]:

- protocol modifications implementing **data integrity**, **authentication** and **protection** against *Replay Attacks*
- use of *Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems* (IDP)
- creation of *Demilitarized Zones* (DMZ) on the network

In addition to this, keeping the process network and Internet separated, limiting the use of USB devices among users to reduce the risks of infections, and using strong account management and maintenance policies are best practices to prevent attacks and threats and to avoid potential damages.

2.2.4 RTU

Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) are computers with radio interfacing similar to PLCs: they transmit telemetry data to the control center or to the PLCs and use messages from the master supervisory system to control connected objects [7].

The purpose of RTUs is to operate efficiently in remote and isolated locations by utilizing wireless connections. In contrast, PLCs are designed for local use and rely on high-speed wired connections. This key difference allows RTUs to conserve energy by operating in low-power mode for extended periods using batteries or solar panels. As a result, RTUs consume less energy than PLCs, making them a more sustainable and cost-effective option for remote operations.

Industries that require RTUs often operate in areas without reliable access to the power grid or require monitoring and control substations in remote locations. These include telecommunications, railways, and utilities that manage critical infrastructure such as power grids, pipelines, and water treatment facilities. The advanced technology of RTUs allows these industries to maintain essential services, even in challenging environments or under adverse weather conditions.

2.2.5 HMI

The *Human-Machine Interface* (HMI) is the hardware and software interface that operators use to monitor the processes and interact with the ICS.

An HMI shows the operator and authorized users information about system status and history; it also allows them to configure parameters on the ICS such as set points and, send commands and make control decisions [8].

The HMI can be in the form of a physical panel, with buttons and indicator lights, or PC software.

2.2.6 Cybersecurity components

Cybersecurity components, as seen in section 2.2.3.3 about PLCs security, are used to protect ICSs from cyber threats and vulnerabilities. They can include firewalls, *Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems* (IDP), and *Security Information and Event Management* (SIEM) systems.

2.2.7 Communication Networks

Communication Networks are the networks that are used to connect the different components of the ICS and allow them to communicate with each other. Communication networks can include wired and wireless networks, such as Ethernet/IP, Modbus, and DNP3 (see Section 2.3).

2.3 ICS Communication Protocols

As mentioned in Section 2.1, industrial systems differ from classical IT systems in the purpose for which they are designed: controlling physical processes the former, processing and storing data the latter. For this reason, ICSs require different communication protocols than traditional IT systems for real time communications and data transfer.

A wide variety of industrial protocols exists: this is because originally each vendor developed and used its own proprietary protocol. However, these protocols were often incompatible with each other, resulting in devices from different vendors being unable to communicate with each other.

To solve this problem, standards were defined with a view to allowing these otherwise incompatible device to intercommunicates.

Among all the various protocols, some have risen to prominence as widely accepted standards. These *de facto* protocols are commonly utilized in industrial systems due to their proven reliability and effectiveness. In

the following sections, we will provide a brief overview of some of the most prevalent and widely used protocols in the industry.

2.3.1 Modbus

Modbus is a serial communication protocol developed by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 for use with its PLCs [9] and designed expressly for industrial use: it facilitates interoperability of different devices connected to the same network (sensors, PLCs, HMIs, ...) and it is also often used to connect RTUs to SCADA acquisition systems.

Modbus is the most widely used communication protocol among industrial systems because it has several advantages:

- simplicity of implementation and debugging
- it moves raw bits and words, letting the individual vendor to represent the data as it prefers
- it is, nowadays, an **open** and **royalty-free** protocol: there is no need to sustain licensing costs for implementation and use by industrial device vendors

Modbus is a **request/response** (or *master/slave*) protocol: this makes it independent of the transport layer used.




Figure 2.5: Modbus Request/Response schema

In this kind of architecture, a single device (master) can send requests to other devices (slaves), either individually or in broadcast: these slave devices (usually peripherals such as actuators) will respond to the master by providing data or performing the action requested by the master using the Modbus protocol. Slave devices cannot generate requests to the master [10].

There are several variants of Modbus, of which the most popular and widely used are Modbus RTU (used in serial port connections) and Modbus TCP (which instead uses TCP/IP as the transport layer). Modbus TCP embeds a standard Modbus frame in a TCP frame (see Figure 2.6): both masters and slaves listen and receive data via TCP port 502.




Figure 2.6: Modbus RTU frame and Modbus TCP frame

2.3.1.1 Modbus registers

Modbus provides four object types, which map the data accessed by master and slave to the PLC memory:

- *Coil*: binary type, read/write accessible by both masters and slaves
- *Discrete Input*: binary type, accessible in read-only mode by masters and in read/write mode by slaves

- *Analog Input*: 16 bits in size (word), are accessible in read-only mode by masters and in read/write mode by slaves
- *Holding Register*: 16 bits in size (word), accessible in read/write mode by both masters and slaves. Holding Registers are the most commonly used registers for output and as general memory registers.

2.3.1.2 Modbus Function Codes

Modbus Function Codes are specific codes used by the Modbus master within a request frame (see Figure 2.6) to tell the Modbus slave device which register type to access and which action to perform on it.

Two types of Function Codes exists: for data access and for diagnostic Function Codes list for data access are listed in Table 2.1:

Function Code	Description
FC01	Read Coils
FC02	Read Discrete Input
FC03	Read Holding Registers
FC04	Read Analog Input Registers
FC05	Write/Force Single Coil
FC06	Write/Force Single Holding Register
FC15	Write/Force Multiple Coils
FC16	Write/Force Multiple Holding Registers

Table 2.1: Modbus Function Codes list

2.3.1.3 Modbus Security

Despite its simplicity and widespread use, the Modbus protocol does not have any security features, which exposes it to vulnerabilities and attacks.

Data in Modbus are transmitted unencrypted (*lack of confidentiality*), with no data integrity controls (*lack of integrity*) and authentication checks

(*lack of authentication*), in addition to the *lack of session*. Hence, the protocol is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, such as Denial of Services (DoS), buffer overflows and reconnaissance activities.

The easiest attack to bring to the Modbus protocol, however, is **packet sniffing**: since, as mentioned earlier, network traffic is unencrypted and the data transmitted is in cleartext, it is sufficient to use a packet sniffer to capture the network traffic, read the packets and thus gather informations about the system such as ip addresses, function codes of requests and to modify the operation of the devices.




Figure 2.7: Example of packet sniffing on the Modbus protocol

To make the Modbus protocol more secure, an encapsulated version was developed within the *Transport Security Layer* (TLS) cryptographic protocol, also using mutual authentication. This version of the Modbus protocol is called **Secure Modbus** or **Modbus TLS**. In addition to this, Secure Modbus also includes X.509-type certificates to define permissions and authorisations [11].

2.3.2 Ethernet/IP

Ethernet/IP (where IP stands for *Industrial Protocol*) is an industrial protocol that allows the *Common Industrial Protocol* (CIP) to run on a typical Ethernet network [12].




Figure 2.8: Ethernet/IP stack compared to the OSI stack

Ethernet/IP uses the main Ethernet standards, such as IEEE 802.3 and the TCP/IP suite, and implements the CIP protocol stack at the upper layers of the OSI stack (see Figure 2.8). It is furthermore compatible with the main Internet standard protocols, such as SNMP, HTTP, FTP and DHCP, and other industrial protocols for data access and exchange such as *Open Platform Communication* (OPC).

2.3.3 Common Industrial Protocol (CIP)

2.3.4 Other Protocols

Chapter 3

Related work

Chapter **4**

State of the Art: Presentation of Ceccato et al. Work

4.1 Paper's Goal

4.2 Process Analysis Steps

4.2.1 Scanning of the System and Graph Analysis

4.2.2 Business Process Analysis

4.2.3 Invariants Analysis

4.3 Application to a Simulated Testbed

4.4 Limitations

Chapter **5**

Proposal to Improve Ceccato et al. Work

5.1 Improving Pre-processing

5.2 Improving Graph Analysis

5.3 Improving Invariants Analysis

5.3.1 Automatic Detection of Actuators and Sensors

5.3.2 Invariants Generation

5.4 Obtaining Extra Information on the Runtime Evolution of the Physical Process

5.5 Improving Business Process Analysis

Chapter 6

Case study: the iTrust SWaT System

Chapter 7

Application to the iTrust SWaT System

7.1 Pre-processing

7.2 Graph Analysis

7.2.1 Conjectures About the System

7.3 Invariants Analysis

7.3.1 Actuators Detection

7.3.2 Daikon Analysis and Results Comparing

7.4 Obtaining extra information on the runtime evolution of the physical system

7.5 Business Process Analysis

Chapter 8

Conclusions

8.1 Discussions

8.2 Guidelines

8.3 Future work

List of Figures

2.1	SCADA architecture schema	5
2.2	PLC architecture	7
2.3	PLC communication schema	8
2.4	Comparison between ST language and Ladder Logic	10
2.5	Modbus Request/Response schema	13
2.6	Modbus RTU frame and Modbus TCP frame	14
2.7	Example of packet sniffing on the Modbus protocol	16
2.8	Ethernet/IP stack compared to the OSI stack	17

List of Tables

2.1	Modbus Function Codes list	15
-----	--------------------------------------	----

References

- [1] *ICS defintion*. URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/industrial_control_system (visited on 2023-04-06).
- [2] *What is SCADA?* URL: <https://www.inductiveautomation.com/resources/article/what-is-scada> (visited on 2023-04-05).
- [3] *PLC defintion*. URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/programmable_logic_controller (visited on 2023-04-06).
- [4] William Bolton. *Programmable Logic Controllers, 6th edition*. Newnes, 2015, pp. 7–9.
- [5] M. Ceccato, Y. Driouich, R. Lanotte, M. Lucchese, and M. Merro. “Towards Reverse Engineering of Industrial Physical Processes”. In: CPS4CIP@ESORICSA 2022 (Copenhagen, Denmark, Sept. 30, 2022). 2022.
- [6] H. S. G. Pussewalage, P. S. Ranaweera, and V. Oleshchuk. “PLC security and critical infrastructure protection”. In: 2013 IEEE 8th International Conference on Industrial and Information Systems (Dec. 2013). 2013. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICIIInfS.2013.6731959>.
- [7] *Remote Terminal Unit*. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_terminal_unit (visited on 2023-04-08).
- [8] *HMI defintion*. URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/human_machine_interface (visited on 2023-04-11).

-
- [9] *What is Modbus and how does it work?* URL: <https://www.se.com/us/en/faqs/FA168406/> (visited on 2023-04-13).
 - [10] *Hacking: Modbus - Cyber security OT/ICS*. URL: <https://blog.omarmorando.com/hacking/ot-ics-hacking/hacking-modbus> (visited on 2023-04-15).
 - [11] Modbus.org. "MODBUS/TCP Security". In: pp. 7–8. URL: https://modbus.org/docs/MB-TCP-Security-v21_2018-07-24.pdf (visited on 2023-04-16).
 - [12] ODVA Inc. "EtherNet/IP - CIP on Ethernet Technology". In: URL: https://www.odva.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PUB00138R7_Tech-Series-EtherNetIP.pdf (visited on 2023-04-18).