

Laboratory session 3

Message authentication and integrity protection

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
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Laboratory session 3 — Contents

Review of message authentication and integrity protection

Your tasks in this laboratory session


General model of the authentication problem



Forging attack

F wants to build x' so that $\hat{u} = u'$ and $\hat{b} = 0$ (i.e., u' is accepted)


General model of the integrity protection problem



Illegitimate modification (alteration) attack

F can block x and wants to replace it with x' such that $\hat{u} \neq u$ and $\hat{b} = 0$

Authentication + integrity protection system




Authentication tags

A typical solution for signing is to **append a tag** to the message

$$x = (u, t) \quad , \quad t = T(k, u)$$

The tag **depends on both** the key and the message

The corresponding verification splits the received signal into message and tag, **computes the correct tag** on the received message and **checks it against the received tag**



Implement the authentication scheme

Consider the following symmetric scheme for message authentication and integrity protection:

- ▶ the message u is a sequence of M bits
- ▶ the key k is a sequence of K bits
- ▶ the authentication tag t is the binary representation of the integer product $s = s_u s_k$, where s_u and s_k are the sum of the digits in the decimal (base 10) representation of u and k , respectively.

The tag is transmitted along with the message u , and the receiver, which knows k , computes the tag from the received message and checks whether it is identical to the received tag. If so, the message is accepted as authentic.

Task 1

Using a programming language of your choice, implement the above scheme, and the corresponding verification so that the complexity of each is polynomial in both M and K .

Design and implement a substitution attack

Your aim is to evaluate the weakness of the naïve symmetric scheme for message authentication and integrity protection, implemented in Task 1.

Task 2

Using a programming language of your choice

- ▶ design and implement a substitution attack to the above scheme that, without knowing the key k , and **after blocking and observing a legitimate message/tag pair $x = (u, t)$ sent by A**, replaces it with a different pair $\tilde{x} = (\tilde{u}, \tilde{t})$ so that \tilde{u} is accepted by B as authentic;
- ▶ evaluate the computational complexity for this attack.

What is the success probability of your attack strategy?

Design and implement a forging attack

Task 3

Using a programming language of your choice

- ▶ design and implement a forging attack that, without knowing the key k , aims at creating a message/tag pair $\tilde{x} = (\tilde{u}, \tilde{t})$, such that \tilde{u} is accepted by B as authentic;
- ▶ evaluate its computational complexity;
- ▶ evaluate its success probability.

What you need to turn in

Each team must turn in, through the Moodle assignment submission procedure:

1. the source code for your implementation (either as a single file, many separate files, or a compressed folder)
2. a short report (to be submitted as a separate file from the source code file / compressed folder) in a graphics format (PDF, DJVU or PostScript are ok; Word, T_EX or L^AT_EX source are not), including:
 - 2.1 a brief description of your implementations for Tasks 1-3, explaining your choices;
 - 2.2 a plot of the average required computation time vs M and K , for the authentication/verification scheme;
 - 2.3 two plots of the average required computation time vs M and K , both for the successful substitution and forging attacks;
 - 2.4 a plot of the success probability vs M and K , for the forging attack.