

Python - Session Management 1

Running the app on Docker

```
$ sudo docker pull blabla1337/owasp-skf-lab:session-management-1
```

```
$ sudo docker run -ti -p 127.0.0.1:5000:5000 blabla1337/owasp-skf-lab:session-management-1
```



Now that the app is running let's go hacking!

Reconnaissance


One of the core components of any web-based application is the mechanism by which it controls and maintains the state for a user interacting with it. To avoid continuous authentication for each page of a website or service, web applications implement various mechanisms to store and validate credentials for a pre-determined timespan. These mechanisms are known as Session Management.

An attacker who is able to predict and forge a weak cookie can easily hijack the sessions of legitimate users.


Cookies are used to implement session management and are described in detail in RFC 2965. See [WSTG-SESS-01](#) for more information.

The goal of this lab is to get access to admin panel, without knowing his/her credentials. So let's start.

At the first look, there is default credentials and site leads us to perform new login:



Before performing new login, let's check if there is any cookie(s):



No cookies for now. so we just continue to login as user john :

OWASP ZAP - OWASP ZAP 2.11.1

Standard Mode

Quick Start Request & Response

Text

POST http://172.24.39.42:5000/login HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.24.39.42:5000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 27
Origin: http://172.24.39.42:5000
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://172.24.39.42:5000/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
username=john&password=1234

Text

HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND
Server: Werkzeug/2.2.2 Python/3.7.2
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2022 07:44:03 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 199
Location: /panel
Set-Cookie: sessionId=am9obg==; Path=/



History

ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
84	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/	200	OK	20 ms	10,047 bytes	Medium		Form, Password, Scrip...
85	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/hints.js	200	OK	6 ms	940 bytes	Low		
86	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/lumino.glyphs.js	200	OK	7 ms	65,479 bytes	Low		
90	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/bootstrap.min.js	200	OK	13 ms	31,824 bytes	Medium		Comment
89	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/css/Normalize.css	200	OK	7 ms	8,225 bytes	Low		Comment
88	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/jquery-3.6.0.min.js	200	OK	9 ms	89,501 bytes	Low		Form, Script, Comment
93	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/css/daterangepicker3.css	200	OK	12 ms	34,564 bytes	Low		Comment
91	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:40:44 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/css/styles.css	200	OK	7 ms	23,035 bytes	Low		Password, Comment
94	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:44:03 AM	POST	http://172.24.39.42:5000/login	302	FOUND	18 ms	199 bytes	Low		SetCookie
95	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:44:03 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/panel	200	OK	8 ms	9,824 bytes	Medium		Form, Script, Comment
96	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:44:03 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/lumino.glyphs.js	304	NOT MODIFIED	11 ms	0 bytes			
97	Proxy	9/16/22, 3:44:03 AM	GET	http://172.24.39.42:5000/static/js/hints.js	304	NOT MODIFIED	6 ms	0 bytes			

Alerts 0 5 4 2 Primary Proxy: localhost:8080

Current Scans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

An interesting cookie found! after submitting login request, server respond us with 302 redirect and new cookie named `sessionId` and a base64-looking value for it. To make sure, decoding value `am9obg==` as base64, gives us very interesting string: `john` ! It keeps track of submitting username. Let's check next response, which server redirects us to:



We logged in to user panel with a cookie named `sessionid` that keeps username as base64 encoded string.

In order to WSTG-SESS-01:

A common mistake is to include specific data in the Token instead of issuing a generic value

Exploitation

Let's see server reaction to manipulating cookie. To do so, we can totally remove cookie or change it's value to something random. For example I base64 `blahblah` and put the result(`YmxhaGJsYWg=`) in `sessionid` cookie:

We successfully logged in as user `admin` without knowing his password. Mission complete!

Additional sources



WSTG - v4.2 | OWASP Foundation