

1 Multi-Currency Wallet Simulator (SRS v1)

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# Summary Review Report

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## 1. Review Overview

4 Formal document review of the Software Requirements Specification (SRS) v1 for the *Multi-Currency*  
5 *Wallet Simulator* web-application.

6 Objectives:

- 7 • Identify ambiguities, inconsistencies, and missing requirements that could hinder implemen-  
8 tation and test design.
- 9 • Assess the **testability** of both functional and non-functional requirements, including error  
10 handling, usability, and performance aspects.
- 11 • Provide input for revising SRS v1 into a clearer, more testable SRS v2.

12 Scope of review:

- 13 • Entire SRS v1 document:  
14     ○ 3 pages with line numbering.

15 Meeting Information:

- 16 • Date: 21st November 2025  
17 • Time / Duration: 1-hour 15min  
18 • Consolidation and report writing: ≈ 15min

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## 2. Participants and Roles

Name	Role	Responsibility
Marcus	Manager	Decided to review the SRS, defined scope and objectives
Marcus	Author	Write SRS v1, responsible for rework/producing SRS v2
Marcus	Moderator	Planned and guided the review process, accepted/adjusted identified defects

Victor	Scribe	Performed systematic review, identified defects and testability issues
Isabella, ChatGPT, (Marcus), Claude	Reviewers	Performed systematic review, identified defects and testability issues

## 1 3. Defined Severity Levels

2 Defects were classified using four severity levels:

- 3     ▪ **Critical**: Defect that can cause seriously wrong behaviour, unsafe assumptions, or block meaningful test design.
- 4     ▪ **Major**: Defect with significant impact on clarity or completeness; different teams might reasonably implement different behaviours based on the current wording.
- 5     ▪ **Minor**: Defect that slightly harms clarity, precision, or consistency, but is unlikely to cause major behavioural divergence.
- 6     ▪ **Cosmetic**: Stylistic, formatting, or spelling issues that do not affect behaviour or test design.

## 10 4. Defect Categories

11 Each defect is tagged with one or more categories:

- 12     ▪ **A** - Ambiguity / Clarity
- 13     ▪ **M** - Missing / Incomplete Requirement
- 14     ▪ **C** - Consistency / Contradiction
- 15     ▪ **T** - Testability / Measurability
- 16     ▪ **S** - Scope / Assumptions
- 17     ▪ **F** - Formatting / Structure

18 These categories help analyse where requirements quality is weakest (e.g. many issues in testability vs. many in scope/assumptions).

## 1 5. Defect Summary by Severity

Severity	Count	IDs
Critical	0	
Major	7	D-01, D-04, D-05, D-07, D-12, D-17, D-19
Minor	15	D-02, D-03, D-06, D-08–D-11, D-13–D-16, D-18, D-20–D-22
Cosmetic	0	

2 Total defects identified: 22

3 No Critical defects were found; the main issues are Major (clarity and testability) and Minor (refine-  
4 ments and scope).

## 5 6. Overall Reflections and Recommendations

6 Strengths of SRS v1:

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- Clear domain and scope: a limited, simulation-only multi-currency wallet system with three currencies.
  - Functional behaviour is generally well-structured.
  - Error handling is conceptually sound: invalid input and external API failure do not modify balances.
  - Non-functional aspects explicitly mention usability, performance, and testability, which is very relevant for a testing-focused course.

14 Main weaknesses identified:

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1. Ambiguous or incomplete core concepts
    - User / wallet ownership model (single vs multi-user).
    - Wallet status state machine and whether “closed” is a final state.
    - Detailed behaviour of exchanges (rounding, same-currency transfers).

1      **2. Non-functional requirements not measurable enough**

- 2            ○ Usability phrased as “understandable without prior training” without performance  
3            or preference measures.
- 4            ○ Performance described as “reasonable response time” without concrete thresholds.
- 5            ○ Stress testing mentioned without defined load or acceptance criteria.

6      **3. Scattered or implied definitions**

- 7            ○ “Invalid input” not fully tied to all validation rules.
- 8            ○ “Sensitive payment information” not concretely defined.
- 9            ○ Architecture constraints duplicated and mixed with testability.

10     **Recommended next steps:**

11     **1. Address all Major defects first**

- 12            ○ This will significantly improve clarity and testability of both functional and non-func-  
13            tional requirements.

14     **2. Refine Minor defects where effort is reasonable**

- 15            ○ Especially those that clarify scope and test conditions (same-currency exchanges,  
16            browser support, persistence, stress tests).

17     **7. Detailed Defect List**

18     Locations follow the format [page, line] as in the SRS (e.g. p. 1, l. 27).

19     The Title gives a short label for each defect; Recommendation is a concise suggestion for rework.

20     See next pages.

ID	Severity	Category	Location	Title	Comment / Description	Recommendation
D-01	Major	S, A	p. 1, l. 5–7; 14–18	User / wallet ownership model	“The user” is used without defining whether the system is <i>single-user</i> or <i>multi-user</i> or how wallets are owned.	Explicitly define whether the simulator is single-user or multi-user and how wallets are owned/isolated.
D-04	Major	M, T	p. 1, l. 28; p. 2, l. 1–4	Deposit validation rules	Validation rules are described for <i>withdrawals/exchanges</i> , but not clearly for <i>deposits</i> and initial deposits (e.g. 0 or negative amounts).	Make explicit how the system handles non-positive deposit and initial-deposit requests (reject + error).
D-05	Major	T, M	p. 2, l. 11–15	Exchange rounding strategy	Rounding is said to be “clear and deterministic” but the exact rule, precision, and rounding step are not specified.	Specify the exact rounding rule, precision (e.g. 2 decimals), and when rounding is applied in the calculation.
D-07	Major	M, A	p. 2, l. 16–20	Wallet status state machine	Allowed status transitions are given only as examples, and it is not explicit that “closed” is a final state.	Define the allowed status transitions and state clearly that “closed” is a terminal state with no further changes.

D-12	<b>Major</b>	T, A	p. 3, l. 2–4	Error re-response definition	The phrase “clear error response” is used without specifying HTTP status codes or response body structure.	Define HTTP status code range and a minimal JSON structure for invalid input errors (e.g. errorCode + message).
D-17	<b>Major</b>	T, A	p. 3, l. 12–14	Usability goal measurability	“Understandable without prior training” is a qualitative goal with no measurable success criteria for usability tests.	Replace “understandable without prior training” with measurable usability criteria (task success rate, time, errors).
D-19	<b>Major</b>	T, A	p. 3, l. 15–17	Performance target vagueness	“Reasonable response time” and “typical operations” are vague; no concrete response time targets are given.	Define concrete response-time targets for key operations in the intended local/demo environment.
D-02	<b>Minor</b>	M, F	p. 1, l. 12–13	Architecture: overview vs constraint	The architecture (frontend, API, DB, FX API) is described, but it is unclear if this is a strict constraint or just an overview.	Clarify that this architecture is a design constraint (or move it to a dedicated constraints subsection and reference it).
D-03	<b>Minor</b>	M, S	p. 1, l. 4–7; 11–21	Persistence and data lifetime	The use of a relational database is mentioned, but there is no explicit statement about persistence across restarts or retention.	State whether wallets and transactions persist across application restarts and whether there is any retention policy.

D-06	<b>Minor</b>	A, S	p. 2, l. 3–7; 11–12	Same-currency exchange behaviour	Exchanges “optionally in a different currency” are defined, but behaviour for same-currency transfers (e.g. DKK→DKK) is not specified.	Specify behaviour for same-currency transfers (e.g. effective rate 1.0, no external API call) to avoid ambiguity.
D-08	<b>Minor</b>	S, A	p. 2, l. 16–20	Who changes wallet status	The SRS does not state whether status changes are done by end users, admins, or automatically, or through which interface.	Define whether status changes are initiated by end-users, admins, or system logic, and through which interface.
D-09	<b>Minor</b>	A, T	p. 2, l. 21–22	Stored amounts for exchanges	For exchange transactions, it is unclear whether both source and target amounts (with currencies) are stored or only one amount.	Require that exchange transactions store both the debited and credited amounts with their currencies, in addition to balances.
D-10	<b>Minor</b>	M, T	p. 2, l. 25–27	Transaction history ordering/scope	The history view is mentioned but the sort order and which transactions (source, target, failed) are included are not defined.	Define sort order (e.g. newest first) and whether the history includes both source and target roles and failed transactions.
D-11	<b>Minor</b>	A, T	p. 1, l. 28	“Validated” initial deposit wording	“Validated” initial deposit is referenced without explicitly stating which validation rules apply.	Tie “validated” explicitly to the deposit validation rules (and any extra constraints, if they exist).

D-13	<b>Minor</b>	M, C	p. 3, l. 2–4	Definition of “invalid input”	Examples of invalid input are given (“such as...”) but it is not clearly linked to all validation rules in Section 3.	Link “invalid input” to all violations of the validation rules in Section 3 and clarify that the list given is non-exhaustive.
D-14	<b>Minor</b>	T, A	p. 3, l. 5–8	Cached exchange rate behaviour	The system may reuse “recently obtained” rates, but “recently” and cache behaviour are not defined beyond “no invented rates”.	Clarify that caching is optional, but any cached rate must come from a real prior API response (no invented values).
D-15	<b>Minor</b>	A, T	p. 3, l. 5–7	“Data that cannot be processed”	The phrase “data that cannot be processed” is broad and does not give examples of what is considered unprocessable.	Give examples of unprocessable data (e.g. invalid JSON, missing fields, unsupported currencies, non-positive or non-numeric rates).
D-16	<b>Minor</b>	S, T	p. 3, l. 9–10	Scope of “sensitive payment information”	“Sensitive payment information” is not defined, and it is unclear whether DB, logs, and client-side storage are all included.	Define which real-world payment data must never be accepted or stored and extend this to DB, logs, and client storage.
D-18	<b>Minor</b>	S, T	p. 3, l. 12–13	“Modern desktop browser” scope	“Modern desktop browser” is vague; supported browsers/OS versions for testing are not specified.	Specify at least a minimal supported browser/OS set (e.g. Chrome + Edge on Windows, Chrome on macOS).

D-20	Minor	T, M	p. 3, l. 17–18	“Testable with automated tools” vagueness	Saying it “shall be testable with automated tools” adds little without stating which properties enable automation.	Specify properties that support automation, such as stable API endpoints and a way to create/reset test data.
D-21	Minor	C, F	p. 3, l. 19–22	Duplicated architecture constraint	The architecture constraint appears both in the overview and non-functional sections, creating duplication and consistency risk.	Avoid duplication by keeping architecture in one section and referencing it from the non-functional/testability part.
D-22	Minor	T, M	p. 3, l. 17–18; 21–22	Undefined stress test conditions	“Stress performance tests” are mentioned without specifying load levels or acceptance criteria.	Define a simple stress scenario (e.g. requests/sec or concurrent users) and acceptance criteria (no crashes, no data corruption).